

Murder and Create:

State Reconstruction in Rwanda since 1994

Will Jones
Balliol College, University of Oxford

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in Politics in the
Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford

January 2014

Word count: 99,077

Summary Contents

Introduction: neither Pyongyang nor Singapore

(research question, literature, theoretical framework, methodology, data)

1. A state of war

(exile, violence, the military, and the origins of the RPF, 1959 to 1994)

2. Make a desert, and call it peace

(political order and counterinsurgency during the 'transition', 1994 to 2003)

3. The life of the party

(formal institutions and the establishment of a hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime, 2003 to 2013)

4. The fiscal bases of the state

(extractive capitalism in the Congo, 'developmental patrimonialism' at home)

5. Blinded like a state

(foreign relations, donor policy, and extraversion)

6. Navigation without seamanship

(ideology and political imaginary of the RPF elite)

Conclusion: succession in the court of King Paul

Appendices

Bibliography

Expanded Contents

Summary Contents	1
Neither Pyongyang nor Singapore: the new Rwandan state	5
Core Arguments.....	6
Methodology.....	8
Data.....	10
The Literature on Rwanda.....	19
Theoretical Framework.....	29
Structure.....	42
Chapter One: a State of War	48
Part One: State Strength.....	48
Part Two: A Refugee History.....	54
Part Three: The Legacy of Conflict.....	64
Part Four: Political Leadership.....	68
Part Five: The Institutions of the Military.....	77
Conclusion.....	82
Chapter Two: make a desert, and call it peace	85
Part One: The Arusha Accords.....	86
Part Two: Politics After Arusha.....	92
1. <i>The Constitutional Position</i>	92
2. <i>Across the Border</i>	97
3. <i>Internal Security</i>	99
Part Three: The Insurgency in the North-West.....	105
1. <i>The Start of the Insurgency</i>	105
2. <i>Initial Failure</i>	108
3. <i>Reform and Success</i>	110
Part Four: Ending the Transition.....	126
1. <i>Policing and Local Defence Forces before 1999</i>	126
2. <i>The local elections and the creation of a rural RPF</i>	130
Conclusion.....	141
Chapter Three: the life of the party	145
Part One: the RPF and the opposition parties.....	145
1. <i>RPF hegemony</i>	145

2. <i>The Cooperative Opposition</i>	148
3. <i>The Uncooperative Opposition</i>	151
Part Two: Structures of the State.....	156
1. <i>The legislature</i>	159
2. <i>Decentralisation</i>	162
Conclusion.....	169
Chapter Four: the fiscal bases of the state	171
Part One: Commercial Militarism during the Transition (1994 to 2003).....	172
Part Two: The System of Taxation	186
Part Three: The Key Firms.....	197
Conclusion.....	205
Chapter Five: Blinded Like a State	208
Part One: does Rwanda need the outside world?	210
1. <i>Competitive Authoritarianism in Rwanda</i>	210
2. <i>Unseen Linkage to Rwanda</i>	214
3. <i>Unused Leverage</i>	220
Part Two: what sustains this autonomy?	226
1. <i>Interests</i>	227
2. <i>Institutional factors</i>	227
3. <i>Externally projected discourses and ideology</i>	233
Conclusion.....	248
Chapter Six: Navigation without Seamanship	250
Part One: Independence, Development, Unity	254
Part Two: The Singapore Delusion and Urban Transformation.....	257
Part Three: High Modernism in the Collines and Rural Transformation	263
Conclusion.....	272
Conclusion: succession in the Court of King Paul	275
Appendix 1: Acronyms used	282
Appendix 2: List of Interviews	287
Appendix 3: the Rwandan Military High Command	288
Appendix 4: the Rwandan Political Leadership during the transition (1994-2003)	290
Appendix 5: Rwandan Military Figures Raised in Uganda	297
Appendix 6: Graphs Used in Chapter Two	300
Appendix 7: Graphs Used in Chapter Six	307

Bibliography:	319
Books and Journal Articles:	319
Newspaper Articles:	332
International Legal Documents:	334
Official Reports:.....	334
Rwandan Government Documents:	336
Conference Papers:	336
Quantitative Data Sources:	336
Academic Theses:.....	337
Miscellaneous:.....	337

Neither Pyongyang nor Singapore: the new Rwandan state

There are scenes in Rwanda today which seem to be taken out of an Ingmar Bergman or a Luis Bunuel film: hundreds of people going for Sunday picnics at slaughter sites to identify their relatives among the half rotten, half desiccated corpses still lying about in large numbers; organised groups digging up the mass graves (new ones are found almost every week) to disinter bodies and rebury their friends and relatives in consecrated ground after a religious ceremony; lunatics and orphaned children wandering about freely in the countryside; giant masses being sung in the still bloodstained churches to pray for the dead; and suicides or lethal abortions happening at a high rate when Tutsi women realise that they are going to give birth to children conceived by rape .

- Gérard Prunier¹

A country in ashes 18 years ago is now safe and clean. It is one of the least corrupt countries in Africa. Per capita income has tripled... AIDS has been cutting life expectancies in Africa and is widespread in Rwanda. Yet life expectancy at birth in Rwanda has increased from 48 to 58 — in the last 10 years. Deaths of children under 5 have dropped by half in five years; malaria deaths have dropped by roughly two-thirds.

- Tina Rosenberg in the New York Times²

Reading about Rwanda one often gets the impression authors such as Prunier and Rosenberg are talking about fundamentally different countries. A synoptic account of the contemporary Rwandan state constructed after the genocide which could resolve these tensions has yet to be written. That is the gap this thesis seeks to fill. Such a case study has implications far beyond the borders of Rwanda; to our

¹ Gérard Prunier, "Rwanda: Update to end March 1995," in *WRITENET*. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6b6c.html> (1995). Unpaginated version.

² Tina Rosenberg, "In Rwanda, Health Care Coverage That Eludes the U.S.," *New York Times* 2012, July 3rd.

theories of the state, our understanding of authoritarian regimes, and the contemporary orthodoxy on 'state reconstruction'.

Core Arguments

The core claim of this thesis is simple: there is an elite which currently holds 'the strategic command posts of the social structure'³, and has used their near hegemonic position to construct a particular social and political order, centred on but not confined to the legal-bureaucratic state. This order 'works' in the sense that it delivers durable political order and a strong state. With regards to the elite, there is a historical story which must be told about how power was grabbed, and how potential counter elites continue to be marginalised, and a sociological story about how the cohesion of this elite withstood repeated challenges, and how and why that cohesion is now falling away. There is a distinctive state apparatus (administrative, institutional, and ideological) whereby Rwandan society is governed, and there is also a particular society moulded for (and by) particular state structures. Finally, there is a relationship to the external world which minimises the influence of outside forces and maximises Rwandan elite leverage vis-à-vis such forces, notably donors. The donor relationship is asymmetrical, and not in the direction usually assumed. Only when all these elements are assembled is it possible to reconcile the disparate images of Rwanda, and understand the workings of the whole.

Recently, there have been growing calls for an approach to the study of Rwanda which moves beyond the manicheanism of 'friends and enemies' to a more even-handed approach which neither uncritically valorises the RPF and Paul Kagame, nor condemns them wholesale.⁴ This thesis sides unequivocally with those authors: the Rwandan state can be both praised and condemned depending on the factors one attends to, but neither approach is terribly helpful in understanding the fundamental questions of politics:

³ C. Wright Mills, *The power elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p4.

⁴ K Berwouts, "Le Rwanda face aux élections: les fissures dans le miroir," (Réseau européen pour l'Afrique Centrale - European network for Central Africa, 2010); S. Straus and L. Waldorf, *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights After Mass Violence* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011); Phil Clark, *The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice Without Lawyers* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

who gets what, when, and how,⁵ and are those arrangements stable? It is neither good enough to point to Rwanda's growth rate as evidence of its 'success' or the repressive behaviour of the regime as proof of its 'instability'. A more temperate analysis of the prospects for the current Rwandan political dispensation requires us to proceed unencumbered by assumptions about how Rwanda 'should' work, or prior judgments formed from its failure to live up to Washington consensus platitudes about what constitutes 'good governance'. I want to argue that:

1. Both the characterisations of Rwanda as a shining paragon of the African Renaissance, and as a vicious dictatorship tottering on the brink of collapse overstate the case. Instead:
2. The Rwandan state functions beyond the dreams of most contemporary African state-builders, and that success is built on factors which are unlikely to change (but may, under specific identifiable circumstances).
3. The Rwandan elite is illiberal, authoritarian, and willing to use extrajudicial techniques of domination and extreme violence in order to retain their hegemony.
4. Despite the wishful thinking of many, [2] and [3] are not unrelated. In its current form, the Rwandan state does not work *in spite* of its authoritarian behaviour, but in large part in consequence.

As such, we are not in the comfortable position of all good things going together. The construction of the state was not possible in its current form and under the specific historical circumstances of post-genocidal Rwanda without the violence, exclusion, and extremely unequal relations between rulers and ruled. Hence my title: Rwanda's last two decades have been a time of mutually reinforcing murder and creation. This is not the same as offering comfort for autocrats – rather, it is a recognition of the unpleasantness of Rwanda's current predicament, and a refusal to engage in utopian wishful thinking.

In bringing these threads together and concluding I want to point to something underplayed in the literature on state formation and in the study of African politics more generally: the history, sociology,

⁵ H.D. Lasswell, *Politics; who gets what, when, how* (New York, NY: Meridian Books, 1936).

and psychology of elites. The return of institutionalism, and the turn to *politique par le bas*, whilst by no means regrettable, has meant that the study of political elites has largely disappeared from much comparative politics (with honourable exceptions⁶). Whilst this is a problem in general, it is particularly fatal in studying anywhere where patrimonial logics pervade the state. Much of contemporary Africa fits this description. The contemporary political elite of Rwanda particularly so: they resemble something not too far from C Wright Mill's account of the American 'Power Elite'.⁷ Attempts to work these insights into the study of contemporary Africa are not new,⁸ but they appear to have been forgotten. So whilst this thesis is structured by chapters divided into various 'faces of the state', behind each of them lies the character of the elite: contemporary Rwanda is not the African Singapore, nor the African Pyongyang. It is the house the RPF built.

Methodology

These claims cannot be evaluated using the tools of nomothetic⁹ large-n cross-national studies conducted using the statistical analysis of quantitative data. That is not to say that such research has nothing to add here, and as and where such a method fits the specific matter at hand, cross-national statistical data will be deployed. In general, however, this work is a case study of multiple interacting historical processes in one country. A huge body of excellent work has emerged in recent years refining this method, vindicating its worth to social science, and detailing precisely how such research is to be designed, conducted, and evaluated.¹⁰ The validity of this method now commands sufficient consensus within the discipline that it

⁶ Such as Cris Shore and Stephen L Nugent, *Elite cultures: Anthropological perspectives* (Oxford: Routledge, 2002); Gerhard Seibert, *Comrades, clients and cousins: colonialism, socialism and democratization in São Tomé and Príncipe* (Leiden: CNWS, 1999); Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga, *Les voies du politique au Congo : essai de sociologie historique* (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1997); Olivier Vallée, *Pouvoirs et politiques en Afrique* (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1999); C. Messiant, "The Mutation of Hegemonic Domination," in *Angola: the weight of history*, ed. P. Chabal and N. Vidal (Manhattan, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008).

⁷ Mills, *The power elite*.

⁸ Segun Osoba, "The Nigerian Political Elite: 1952-1965," in *African Social Studies*, ed. P. Gutkind and P. Waterman (London: Heinemann, 1977).

⁹ I am here using 'nomothetic' in its sociological sense, to refer to disciplines directed at yielding generalised, 'law-like' understanding, rather than 'ideographic' attempts to provide a full description of a particular case.

¹⁰ J. Gerring, *Case study research: principles and practices* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); A.L. George and A. Bennett, *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); H.E. Brady and D. Collier, *Rethinking social inquiry: diverse tools, shared standards* (Lanham, MD: Rowman &

is unnecessary to once again rehearse the arguments in its favour. In Lijphart's formulation,¹¹ this is primarily an *interpretative case study*, it is 'selected for analysis because of an interest in the case rather than an interest in the formulation of general theory... [but] makes explicit use of established theoretical propositions...with the aim of throwing light on the case'.¹² However, it also fulfils other functions. Firstly, it has a simple atheoretical function of increasing the stock of descriptive knowledge about events in Rwanda. Many of the events described in this thesis have not been written about before. Secondly, the facts brought to bear are frequently deployed for theory-confirmation and information. Thirdly, in holding Rwanda up to theories where it appears to be a deviant case, we can uncover relevant additional variables that were not considered previously (for example, chapter six makes the case that an understanding of ideology can productively enhance extant theories of competitive authoritarianism). Finally, Rwanda's case can be hypothesis generating. Through looking at Rwanda we can develop propositions which can then be tested elsewhere (for example, about the role of party-owned enterprises, which is discussed in chapter five).

Secondly, this is not a work of comparative political *science* narrowly understood (i.e. a hypothetical statement regarding a dependent variable on one side and an independent variable on the other, in which purely quantifiable 'data' is deployed with solely law-generating intent). This work is ideographic: it is concerned with recovering and making explicable (*not* understood in the narrow King, Keohane, and Verba sense¹³ of 'explanation') the unique, contingent, and occasionally subjective. It is also concerned with *verstehen* in the classical Weberian sense in that it is interested in the meanings attached to behaviour by participants in social action, which is a vital part of the wider construction of social reality. It also takes as plausible that ideology and identity can be independent causal factors. It *is*, however, positivist, in the minimal and mundane sense that I take it that there are knowable verifiable empirical facts concerning

Littlefield, 2004); J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer, *Comparative historical analysis in the social sciences* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

¹¹ Arend Lijphart, "Comparative politics and the comparative method," *The American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971).

¹² *ibid.*, p692.

¹³ Gary King, Robert O Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

much of what I am describing, and that through the careful analysis of those facts we can get to the truth about various matters.

Finally, I have not limited this presentation to only those things which I believe can be conclusively proven. Much of this thesis is necessarily speculative, given the paucity of data on the matters in question. I have consoled myself here with the argument of John Clark, i.e. that 'it is better to devise a good *argument*, even one that cannot be the final word, than conclude with a false, and sterile 'scientific explanation'.¹⁴

Data

The core data for this thesis consists of extensive interviews with Rwandans, observers of the current Rwandan political scene, and those who bore witness to the RPF's rise to power. This includes politicians (up to and including Paul Kagame himself), civil servants, soldiers, retired 'struggle comrades', journalists, political dissidents, refugees, lawyers, diplomats, civil society activists, officials of foreign governments, and more than a few 'ordinary' Rwandans. The core of the fieldwork was conducted in Rwanda in 2010 and 2011, but also in D.R.Congo (in 2010 and 2011), Uganda (two trips in 2013), South Africa (in 2012 and 2013), France (in 2011), and ongoing interviews in the UK (since 2009). Research sites in Rwanda were largely urban, and included Kigali, Huye (previously Butare), Gisenyi, and Musanze (previously Ruhengeri). Research in Congo took place in Goma and environs; in Uganda, in Kampala, Mbarara, and in Nakivale Refugee Settlement; in South Africa, in Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Cape Town; and in France, Paris. In addition to the interviews enumerated in the appendix, there have also been extensive informal chats, meetings attended (RPF rallies, civil society meetings, academic roundtables, and so on), and conversations on skype, facebook, and other online media.

¹⁴ John F Clark, "Explaining Ugandan intervention in Congo: evidence and interpretations," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, no. 2 (2001), p262.

Alongside my interviews there is a plethora of corroborating sources. Firstly, many of the key participants in the events of the last twenty years have published memoirs.¹⁵ I was also fortunate enough to be granted access to the archive of the Minadef (the Ministry of Defence) building in Kigali, although not for long enough to do more than a very schematic rifle. Thirdly, this thesis makes use of an extensive grey literature: monographs, technical reports from government agencies, NGOs, unpublished theses, conference proceedings, working papers, white papers, and preprints. Finally, I have made extensive use of regional reporting, including the Kigali New Times (the official mouthpiece of the regime), the independent Rwandan press (notably the Rwanda Focus, and Umuvugizi, which since its ban in 2010 has continued a web-only version from Sweden), the dissident blogs of Hutu nationalist and other regime opponents, and the excellent regional reporting of trusted journalists such as Frederick Golooba-Mutebi and Charles Onyango-Obbo through regional outlets such as the *Kampala Monitor*, *the East African* and so on.

Finally, much of this thesis makes use of the existing vast academic scholarship. As and where work exists which ought be part of this presentation in order to fill a step in the argument, and is better than anything I have because I lacked that author's hard-won access, luck penetrating a given circle of individuals, or simply having been around to, for example, ask questions of people in the late 1990s (some of whom are now deceased), I'm not going to reinvent the wheel, but rather credit it, and try not to spend more time on it than strictly necessary. The 'novelty' of the presentation in such cases is the way in which various elements are being brought together to create a unified story about a given aspect of contemporary Rwanda, explain parts of the larger whole (viz. the Rwandan state building project), or be the subject of theoretical attention for the first time.

¹⁵ M. Beatrice Umutesi and Catharine Newbury, *Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004); F.X.N. Muhoozi, *A Deficit of Logic in the Great Lakes of Africa* (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011); G. Gahima, *Transitional Justice in Rwanda: Accountability for Atrocity* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2013); Theogene Rudasingwa, *Rwanda: national unity, reconciliation, democratisation, and justice* (Dar Es Salaam: Thackers Publishers, 1996); G. Mwakikagile, *Civil Wars in Rwanda and Burundi: Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Dar Es Salaam: New Africa Press, 2013); Theogene Rudasingwa, *Healing a Nation: A Testimony: Waging and Winning a Peaceful Revolution to Unite and Heal a Broken Rwanda* (North Charleston, SC: Createspace Independent, 2013); Y.K. Museveni, E. Kanyogonya, and K. Shillington, *Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda* (Kampala: Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1997); J. Sebarenzi and L. Mullane, *God Sleeps in Rwanda: A Journey of Transformation* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2011); Colin M. Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: power, genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., Publishers, 2004).

Elite interviews are beset by a host of methodological problems: informants will often have imperfect memories of past historical events, intentionally or unintentionally; their experiences of particular periods may be fragmentary or unrepresentative; their conscious and unconscious biases may colour their testimony, lead them to selectively reveal facts, or lie; many if not all informants will have ulterior motives and agendas in speaking to a researcher, and it is often impossible for the researcher to be fully aware of the multiple ways in which any particular individual may seek to misrepresent the facts. As Dean and White asked over half a century ago, ‘how do you know if the informant is telling the truth?’¹⁶

Such problems are made particularly severe by the content of this thesis. Any political research is by its nature a minefield of self-aggrandisement, myth-making, and mud-slinging.¹⁷ Many of the questions I asked – about military campaigns, about instances of mass violence, of government corruption, or extrajudicial assassinations – are deeply politically sensitive, and informants had many reasons to misrepresent the facts, withhold information, or actively lie. Some of my interviews were almost entirely useless, as informants were only willing to speak to a script defined *ex ante* by rigid party lines (either that of the RPF, or its critics). Others were deeply unreliable narrators (I must assume, for example, that many of my informants in Nakivale Refugee Settlement did not give me their real names). Still others have required me to change their names for the purposes of this thesis, or would only talk under absolutely unattributable terms. Rwanda is also, as the great political scientist of Rwanda René Lemarchand has pointed out, “a cultural environment in which concealing or distorting the truth are traditionally regarded as both a virtue and an art”.¹⁸

This research is further compromised by two issues of selection bias. The first is simply that some groups or classes of individuals may be systematically more likely to be willing to be interviewed than others,

¹⁶ John Dean and William Whyte, "How Do You Know If The Informant Is Telling the Truth?," *Human Organization* 17, no. 2 (1958).

¹⁷ Darren G. Lilleker, "Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield," *Politics* 23, no. 3 (2003).

¹⁸ René Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1970), p9.

resulting in an unrepresentative sampling of opinion. At its worst, this could lead to subjects of deep ongoing contention being mistakenly presented as matters of broad consensus. Here, it is that foreign observers (notably embassy and NGO staff) and critics of the regime (notably the refugee activists I interviewed in Uganda and Europe) were dramatically more eager to speak to me than RPF insiders. As such, the majority of the material sourced from interviews in this thesis comes from ‘outsiders’ such as embassy and foreign NGO staff, rather than RPF insiders who, if they were willing to be interviewed by me at all, would not be willing to speak about many of the topics this thesis necessarily must touch on. The second problem with interviews in this thesis is that they were acquired, by and large, through ‘snowball sampling’, i.e. initial informants were asked to nominate further individuals known to them through their social networks who could potentially be willing to be interviewed. It is only by this method that I was able to identify and speak with any serving officers of the Rwandan military, officials at ministries, and (understandably) secretive refugee activists in Nakivale. This further compounds problems of selection bias.

There are, however, important reasons to try and overcome these issues. Only using directly and publicly verifiable information about Rwanda for this thesis would fall foul of a much more dangerous form of selection bias, and would have the effect of sanitising much of the current government’s behaviour, as official records have a tendency to. In many sections of this thesis, it is important to include rumours, and claims which are not strictly verifiable, because they are often all we have concerning crucial aspects of Rwandan history. With these issues in mind the author took a term-length option paper at the University of Oxford in Trinity (summer term) of 2009 on ‘Research Methods in Elite Interviewing’ taught by Professor Christopher Hood. Fortunately, a substantive literature has now grown up addressing how researchers can attempt to overcome these issues, notably championed by the editorial staff of the journal *PS: Political Science and Politics*.¹⁹ It has yielded an abundance of work on qualitative interviews in general,²⁰ and interviews concerning war and conflict in particular.²¹

¹⁹ Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, "Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 35, no. 4 (2002); Jeffrey M. Berry, "Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing," *PS: Political Science and*

This literature suggests three ways in which these problems may be overcome. Firstly, worries about selection bias in interviews acquired through snowball sampling can be overcome by using multiple 'entry points' into Rwandan political life. I acquired interviews through at least four routes. Firstly, I spent a small part of the initial period of my fieldwork working for a Rwandan NGO specialising in 'Peace Education'. This was largely in order to enable me to acquire acceptable access to Kinyarwanda, but it also introduced me to Kigali's small community of civil society activists, journalists, and individuals working in the NGO sector. Secondly, I was able to acquire interviews relatively easily with embassy staff, particularly from Western states including the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and the USA. Thirdly, after a long and fruitless period of attempting to get high-level interviews with the military high command, I redirected my efforts to mid-ranking officials in the RPF and bureaucrats at Minadef, who I initially made contact with through my local RPF branch (in Kacyiru), and discovered ways of presenting my research which made government informants dramatically more sympathetic (notably, by asking about the enduring legacy of the 'struggle' against the MRND and its connection to Rwanda's current developmental success, a key theme of this thesis). Through these contacts I was able to meet and speak to retired soldiers, middle-class urbanites, and ambitious RPF young Turks who supplied me with much of the 'official' narrative of contemporary Rwanda. Finally, through contacts at the Refugee Law Project in Kampala I was able to meet Rwandan refugee activists and exiled journalists in Uganda (notably Kampala and Nakivale Refugee Settlement) who then further introduced me to those opposition figures I was able to interview in Western Europe.

Secondly, there is now consensus that there is scope for triangulation and other forms of validity checking even with interviews not acquired through strict probability sampling.²² Firstly, and most obviously, by

Politics 35, no. 4 (2002); Robert L. Peabody et al., "Interviewing Political Elites," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 23, no. 3 (1990).

²⁰ Irving Seidman, *Interviewing as qualitative research: A guide for researchers in education and the social sciences* (New York, NY: Teachers College Press, 2012).

²¹ Daniel Druckman, *Doing research: Methods of inquiry for conflict analysis* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage publications, 2005).

²² Oisín Tansey, "Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 40, no. 4 (2007).

checking claimed details with the accounts of others also in a position to recall the same events. Unfortunately, it was not often possible to do this with reference to many areas of this thesis, particularly the section on the counter-insurgency. However, the allegations of my informants can also be checked against the extensive record built up by academics and journalists of the same events and processes. Even in cases where precise details cannot be confirmed, it is often possible to assess the degree of conformity of any particular interviewee with the general narrative as reported by other reliable sources, to as to establish a baseline of credibility. Within the interview itself much can be done to try and increase the likelihood of getting reliable information: by making anonymity credible, by assessing the internal consistency of an informant's testimony, by putting to the informant the allegations of others, and – most obviously – by asking for substantiation or verifiable evidence. It was in this way I discovered the UNAMIR logging of violent incidents (p100), and the internal US government report on their training programme with the Rwanda Military Information Platoon (RMIP – cf. p107), both used in the section on the counter-insurgency. Finally, over repeated meetings with the same informant over several years should – all things being equal – further reassure them that their anonymity is genuinely being protected, which reduces one clear reason not to reveal all the facts (i.e. the fear of repercussions).

Thirdly, there is scope for interpretation and reflection on likely sources of bias – even in the study of security services, as the work of Philip Davies shows.²³ Although it is true that it is impossible to be absolutely certain about all the likely sources of bias, or other reasons informants may seek to misrepresent the facts, it is by no means impossible to be aware of many of the sources of likely bias, and steer an interview appropriately. Most obviously, embassy staff may have incentives to try and protect the reputation of their embassy, or their government, or merely to try and promote their government's favoured interpretation of events with an unsuspecting researcher. However, it is therefore also possible to identify areas where informants are *less* likely to have biases or other incentives to misrepresent, and direct an interview accordingly, or to identify particular individuals who are less likely to hold said biases

²³ Philip H. J. Davies, "Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services," *Politics* 21, no. 1 (2001).

(for example, many of the embassy staff interviewed for this thesis were junior staff, who proved consistently less cagey about matters than senior diplomatic representatives).

As this research was partially funded by the Economic and Social Research Council of Great Britain (ESRC) a full assessment was conducted to ensure that this research was compatible with their Framework on Research Ethics.²⁴ As part of the option paper on Elite Interviewing, I also assessed this research against the American Political Science Association's Guide on Professional Ethics, Rights, and Freedoms.²⁵ In order to protect the confidentiality of my interviewees, many of whom asked for anonymity, or may have been imprudently open, I have anonymised all interviewees in this thesis, and they are only identifiable by means of a key on a loose document which has been included with this thesis when it was submitted for examination. Where the consent of informants permits, I am happy to share transcripts upon request.

A similar set of problems beset documentary evidence. Such sources are often strategic interventions responding to the political exigencies preceding their publication (as with many of the UN reports I use), massaged to produce a favourable impression (as with many of the documents produced by donors and the Rwandan government). Problems with the official data released by the World Bank, other international organisations, and African governments, particularly any data which could reasonably be interpreted as pursuant to development, have been meticulously documented by recent scholarship.²⁶ Furthermore, as Ian Lustick points out, the vast quantities of documentary evidence generated by modern

²⁴ ESRC, *Framework for Research Ethics* (London: Economic and Social Research Council, 2012).

²⁵ APSA, *A Guide to Professional Ethics in Political Science* (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 2012).

²⁶ Morten Jerven, *Poor numbers: how we are misled by African development statistics and what to do about it* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

bureaucracies makes issues of selection bias inevitable.²⁷ As with interviews, a large methodological literature has grown up designed to overcome these problems.²⁸

In this thesis, many of these problems can be mitigated, for five key reasons. Firstly, and most simply, Lustick's worry about selection bias caused by documentation overload is significantly diminished when we consider Rwanda. There are only eight reports published by the Rwandan Revenue Authority on Rwanda's finances over the last twenty years. Donors reports are similarly sporadic. It is possible in a way that is probably unlikely in the cases Lustick has in mind to be more such that one has a relatively representative overview of the relevant documentation.

Second, this thesis makes substantially less use of documentary evidence generated by states than many accounts of the Rwandan state, which – for precisely that reason – tend to reflect an official history which valorises the achievements of the RPF.²⁹ The most obvious exception to this is my use of the Rwandan Revenue Authority's *Annual Reports* for the section on the revenue bases of the state. Although these reports were co-productions with DfID and external consultants hired through DfID for the process (notably McKinsey), that only makes selective misrepresentation harder, rather than impossible, and it is reasonable to assume all three organisations would broadly congruent incentives to present a rosy picture. Unfortunately, these are the only reports we have available which speak to this question. As such, all that can be done in this instance is to acknowledge that it is eminently plausible these reports exaggerate Rwanda's achievements in revenue collection somewhat, but it is extremely unlikely that they are entirely exaggerated (because of the plethora of evidence documented throughout this thesis that the Rwandan state does have money to spend).

²⁷ Ian S Lustick, "History, historiography, and political science: Multiple historical records and the problem of selection bias," *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 3 (1996).

²⁸ Jane Ritchie et al., *Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers* (London: Sage, 2013); Jennifer Platt, "Evidence and proof in documentary research: Some specific problems of documentary research," *The Sociological Review* 29, no. 1 (1981); Robert Phillips, "The Politics of History: some methodological and ethical dilemmas in elite - based research," *British Educational Research Journal* 24, no. 1 (1998).

²⁹ David Booth and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, "Developmental patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda," *African Affairs* (2012).

Thirdly, as with interviews, a degree of triangulation is possible. Indeed this thesis deploys such a method to argue that the Rwandan central bank's export figures for minerals cannot be correct, by comparing such figures with the reportage of journalists who were there during the period in question, the statements of armed groups in Eastern DRC regarding their activities, the import figures from receiving countries (such as those produced by the Diamond High Council in Antwerp and the *Nationale Bank van België*), and the results of the US Geological Survey. As it really is difficult to imagine a continent-stretching conspiracy of journalists, rebel leaders, European bankers, and American geologists, the balance of probability here strongly suggests official Rwandan documentation on minerals cannot be regarded with any credibility.

Fourthly, much of the documentation I use is internal documentation, i.e. produced by individuals solely with the intent of such information being seen by other (trusted) individuals within that organisation. Such documentary evidence is substantially less likely to be misrepresentative, particularly in functional bureaucracies which have reasonably meritocratic internal rules, and penalise officers relaying incorrect information. The two cases here – that of violent acts logged by the UN during the immediate post-genocidal aftermath, and the documentation I was able to see in MinadeF's internal archives – both meet that bar.

Fifthly, much of the documentation I use has been subject to extensive controversy and picking over by academics already. The key case here is the UN reports concerning the actions of the RDF in Eastern DRC. I comment at length on this case at the beginning of the section which uses them as evidence (chapter four, section one), but the methodological point, which should be raised here, is that the ongoing process of critique, argument, and verification provided by the scholarly and journalistic community can be – if sufficiently thorough – sufficient to establish the credibility of particular sources. The UN reports I use have emerged almost entirely unscathed from a process of vituperative dispute, where many

(particularly the governments of Rwanda and Uganda) tried very hard to discredit them, with their conclusions intact. As such, this provides a further set of cases where it is acceptable to regard documentary sources as credible.

The Literature on Rwanda

Understanding how, when, and why histories of Rwanda have been constructed and deployed as they have is vital to understanding the present. Authors provide descriptions and explanations, but their writings are also interventions. They are themselves *part of* the politics of modern Rwanda, not merely commentary upon it, exactly as histories of Rwanda cannot be merely repositories of past facts. Consequently, this section cannot limit the literature it surveys to writing on post-genocidal Rwanda; we must start much earlier. Furthermore, we cannot confine the scope of this chapter to listing what has been said; it is also relevant for our purposes to consider who is talking, and why.

This is particularly important, because in modern Rwanda, history is contested at a fundamental level; conflicts have claimed over a million lives in Rwanda during the last century, but there is no agreement *whatsoever* on many of the most basic details of how much of the violence happened and its causes. Rwanda is not the scene of one politically dominant and reiterated narrative, rather it has seen successive distinct historical paradigms reflecting the politics of the day, and in competition with each other. Several historians of Rwanda have repeatedly commented on the deeply historicised rhetoric of political discourse and, conversely, the intensely political nature of Rwandan histories.³⁰ My theoretical understanding of the politics of these histories in Rwanda is guided by the work of scholars of Zimbabwe on ‘patriotic history’:

³⁰ Catharine Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda," *Africa Today* 45, no. 1 (1998); Catharine Newbury and David Newbury, "A Catholic Mass in Kigali: Contested Views of the Genocide and Ethnicity in Rwanda," *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* 33, no. 2/3 (1999); Johan Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda: conflict, survival and disinformation in the late twentieth century* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Terence Ranger (2004: 217) has recently wondered whether Zimbabwe has ‘too much history’. Prolific though they are, he did not mean that historians of Zimbabwe were at any risk of over-production. He referred instead to the dangers of a repetitive ‘single, narrow historical narrative’...as promoted by Zanu(PF) and its allies in the media and academe. As others have pointed out, patriotic history is part of a broader process of polarisation, a production of ‘discursive divides’ that reinforced ‘static and essentialised representations of difference...the narrative of patriotic history is teleological, and its purpose is to legitimise and glorify a particular political regime’³¹

Almost all of this could have been written with Rwanda rather than Zimbabwe in mind. If there is a key difference, it is that the historical scene with respect to Rwanda is more crowded, heterogeneous, and fragmented. Doubtless the RPF would love to possess the kind of ideological hegemony described by Ranger and Alexander, but even within Rwanda their hold on the historical consensus is more tenuous. Nonetheless, the purpose of these histories is the same: to set the boundaries of legitimate opinion, valorise some actors, necessitate certain courses of action, and delegitimise others.

Rwanda did not attract much attention from those working in political science faculties for much of the twentieth century, and we must turn instead to the extensive work of historians, anthropologists, and legal scholars. Their work is important because their narratives continue to be relevant to the politics of the present. What I propose to do is go through what has been written in the order these works were produced. This chronological approach draws attention to the context in which these works were produced, who wrote them, what they wrote, and what they were arguing about.

³¹ Jocelyn Alexander, "Zimbabwe Since 1997: Land and the Legacies of War," in *Turning points in African democracy*, ed. Abdul Raufu Mustapha and Lindsay Whitfield (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2009).

The first studies of Rwanda are histories of the pre-colonial era, and are largely concerned with the status of ethnicity and patron-client relationships prior to the colonial period. These writers, sometimes called ‘the White Fathers’, would include Pères Pagès,³² de Lacger,³³ and Maquet,³⁴ and Abbé Alexis Kagame (no relation).³⁵ These works rely overwhelmingly on the official histories of the Rwandan Court, with the consequence that such scholarship presents an strongly ideological portrait of the precolonial era. B. A. Ogot summarises their utopian account as follows:

...the pastoralists are portrayed as civilising conquerors who introduced law and order where anarchy had formerly reigned supreme. The agriculturalists, on the other hand, are portrayed as docile and silent majorities who never initiated any developments nor founded any state³⁶

This is one example among many. Alexis Kagame also finds it difficult to believe that the state of Rwanda could have borrowed any institution from the agriculturalists. Nor is he prepared to accept the idea that any Hutu could have ruled over ‘noble, Hamitic pastoralists.’ Jan Vansina,³⁷ the first truly critical historian of Rwanda, wrote that these authors produced "*une déformation systématique*" of Rwanda's history. Common to them is an account of a static and peaceful golden age in which patron-client relationships formed a mutually satisfactory system of reciprocity. They reflect the ideas and values of the then predominant intellectual currents related to ethnicity studies: the creeds of climatic and genetic determinism.

³² P. Pagès, *Un royaume Hamite au centre de l'Afrique* (Brussels: Georges Van Campenhout, 1933).

³³ L. de Lacger, *Ruanda: Le Ruanda ancien* (Grands Lacs, 1939).

³⁴ J. J. Maquet, "The Kingdom of Rwanda," in *African Worlds: Studies in the Cosmological Ideas and Social Values of African Peoples*, ed. D Forde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954); J. J. Maquet, *The Premiss of Inequality in Rwanda* (London: International African Institute, 1961).

³⁵ A. Kagame, *Inganji Karinga, vol. I* (Kibayi: Éditions Royales, 1943); A. Kagame, *Inganji Karinga, vol. II* (Kibayi: Éditions Royales, 1947); A. Kagame, *Le code des institutions politiques du Ruanda précolonial* (Brussels: IRCB, 1952); A. Kagame, *Les organisations socio-familiales de l'ancien Ruanda* (Brussels: ARSC, 1954); A. Kagame, *Le pluralisme ethnique et culturel dans le Ruanda-Urundi* (Brussels: Éditions du Marais, 1957); A. Kagame, *Un abrégé de l'éthno-histoire du Rwanda précolonial (Vol. II)* (Butare: Éditions Universitaires du Rwanda, 1972); A. Kagame, *Un abrégé de l'éthno-histoire du Rwanda de 1853 à 1972 (Vol. II)* (Butare: Éditions Universitaires du Rwanda, 1975).

³⁶ B. A. Ogot, "The Great Lakes Region," in *General History of Africa Vol. IV: African from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century*, ed. D. T. Niane (Paris: UNESCO, 1984), p498.

³⁷ J. Vansina, *L'évolution du royaume Rwanda, dès origines à 1900* (Brussels: Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer (ARSOM), 1962).

The prevailing interpretation of Rwandese *political* organisation resulted from attempts by social scientists to explain how a stable and cohesive society was possible despite the political domination of a minority ethnic group.³⁸ Maquet and his followers assumed that ethnic and class stratification between Tutsi and Hutu, as prevailing at that time, were unchanging features of "traditional" Rwanda. Many subsequent works accepted the general lines of their view of pre-colonial Rwanda, and a bowdlerised account of this harmonious, pre-European society has become central to the credo of Rwanda's new rulers.

The response to this literature over the following decades was a concerted effort by a new generation of scholars to historicise ethnicity and patron-client relations, and to draw attention to the presence of conflict, contestation and oppression in Rwanda's history. They start from the oral historian, Jan Vansina,³⁹ and continue in studies by Marcel d'Hertefelt,⁴⁰ Catherine Newbury,⁴¹ David Newbury,⁴² Claudine Vidal,⁴³ and René Lemarchand.⁴⁴ Against the earlier literature, they advance three crucial claims: 1. Rwandese society was not, and is not, homogenous across space and time. 2. Ethnicity was not, and is not, part of a primordial tradition, but a product of modernity 3. Rwandese society was not, and is not, free from oppressive social relations. Much of this work involves historicising the impact of the colonial regime upon ethnic identities and social structures, and so these commentators provide us with the best accounts of the colonial period as well. Sadly, these works have had minimal impact on the historical narratives promulgated by either Rwanda's current rulers or counter-elites.

³⁸ Maquet, *The Premiss of Inequality in Rwanda*.

³⁹Vansina, *L'évolution du royaume Rwanda, dès origines à 1900*.

⁴⁰ M. d'Hertefelt, *Les clans du Rwanda ancien: Eléments d'éthnosociologie et d'ethnohistoire* (Tervuren: Musée Royale de l'Afrique Centrale (MRAC), 1971).

⁴¹ Catharine Newbury, "Deux lignages du Kinyaga (Two Kinyaga Lineages)," *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines* (1974); Catharine Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960* (Manhattan, NY: Columbia University Press, 1988).

⁴² David Newbury, *Kings and Clans: Ijwi Island and the Lake Kivu Rift, 1780-1840* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991); David Newbury, "The Clans of Rwanda: an historical hypothesis," *Africa* 50, no. 4 (1980).

⁴³ Claudine Vidal, "Enquête sur le Rwanda traditionnel: conscience historique et traditions orales," *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines* 11, no. 44 (1971); Claudine Vidal, "De la contradiction sauvage," *L'Homme* 14, no. 3 (1974); Claudine Vidal, "Alexis Kagame entre memoire et histoire," *History in Africa* 15(1988); Claudine Vidal, *Sociologie des passions: Rwanda, Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1991).

⁴⁴ René Lemarchand, "Power and stratification in Rwanda: a reconsideration," *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines* 6, no. 24 (1966); Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*; René Lemarchand, "The coup in Rwanda," *Rotberg and Mazrui, Protest and Power in Black Africa* (1970).

The most important writers on the post-colonial period are the Belgian jurist, Filip Reyntjens,⁴⁵ and the French historian, Jean-Pierre Chrétien.⁴⁶ Their works are supplemented by those of political economists Michel Bézy⁴⁷ and Elie Ndayambaje, Stefan Marysse & Tom de Herdt⁴⁸ who describe the increasing (internal and external) economic vulnerability of the country. Along with Catherine Newbury, these authors explore the relationship between economic and political power structures. Jef Maton's work⁴⁹ is the first to locate the sources of violence in material deprivation and economic distress. The issue of refugees, one of the background causes for the October 1990 invasion by the RPF, is described in full detail by Catherine Watson,⁵⁰ Rachel Van Der Meeren,⁵¹ and André Guichaoua.⁵² Gérard Prunier,⁵³ Ogenga Otunnu,⁵⁴ and W. Cyrus Reed⁵⁵ provide further information on the RPF, its history in exile, and its links with the Ugandan government.

Prior to 1994 a radicalised Hutu historiography emerged within Rwanda that conceived itself as opposed to and overturning a prior pro-Tutsi academic consensus. Prominent writers here include Ferdinand

⁴⁵ Filip Reyntjens, *Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda: droit public et évolution politique, 1916-1973*, vol. 117 (Musée royal de l'Afrique centrale, 1985); Filip Reyntjens, "Rencontres burundaises: Inyenzi du Rwanda et rebelles du Kivu in Les rébellions dans l'Est du Zaïre (1964-1967)," *Cahiers du CEDAF*, no. 7-8 (1986); Filip Reyntjens, "Chiefs and Burgomasters in Rwanda: the Unfinished Quest for a Bureaucracy," *Journal of Legal Pluralism* 25/26(1987); Filip Reyntjens, "Les mouvements armés des réfugiés rwandais : rupture ou continuité?," *Civilisations* 40, no. 2 (1992).

⁴⁶ Jean-Pierre Chrétien, "Hutu et Tutsi au Rwanda et au Burundi," *Au coeur de* 1(1985); Jean-Pierre Chrétien, "Les racines de la violence contemporaine en Afrique," *Politique africaine* 42(1991); Jean-Pierre Chrétien, "La crise politique rwandaise," *Genève-Afrique* 30, no. 2 (1992); Jean-Pierre Chrétien, "Pluralisme politique et équilibre ethnique au Rwanda et au Burundi," *Enjeux nationaux et dynamiques régionales dans l'Afrique des Grands Lacs. Lille: CRNS*, no. 363 (1992).

⁴⁷ Fernand Bezy, "Rwanda: Bilan socio-economique d'un regime (1962-1989)," *Louvain: Institut d'etudes des pays en developpement* (1990).

⁴⁸ S Marysse, T De Herdt, and E Ndayambaje, "Appauvrissement de la population rurale et ajustement structurel: causalite au coincidence," *Le cas de Kirarambogo (Rwanda). Antwerp: Centre for Development Studies* (1993).

⁴⁹ J Maton, *Développement économique et social au Rwanda entre 1980 et 1993, le dixième difficile en face de l'apocalypse*, (Ghent : UG/Unité d'enseignement et de recherche au développement, 1994).

⁵⁰ Catherine L Watson, *Exile from Rwanda: Background to an invasion* (Arlington, VA: US Committee for Refugees, 1991).

⁵¹ Rachel Van Der Meeren, "Three decades in exile: Rwandan refugees 1960-1990," *J. Refugee Stud.* 9(1996).

⁵² A. Guichaoua, "Le problème des réfugiés rwandais et des populations banyarwanda dans la région des grands lacs africains," (Geneva: UNHCR, 1992); A. Guichaoua, *Enjeux nationaux et dynamiques régionales dans l'Afrique des grands lacs*, (Lille: Université de Lille, Faculté des Sciences économiques et sociales, 1992); André Guichaoua, *Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda*, (Paris : L'Harmattan, 1995).

⁵³ Gérard Prunier, "L'Ouganda et le Front patriotique rwandais," in *Enjeux nationaux et dynamiques régionales dans l'Afrique des Grands Lacs*, ed. A. Guichaoua (Lille: Université de Lille, Faculté des Sciences économiques et sociales, 1992).

⁵⁴ Ogenga Otunnu, "Rwandese refugees and immigrants in Uganda," in *The path of a genocide: the Rwanda crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, ed. H. Adelman and A. Suhrke (Livingston, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999).

⁵⁵ William Cyrus Reed, "The Rwandan Patriotic Front: Politics and Development in Rwanda," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 23, no. 2 (1995); William Cyrus Reed, "Exile, reform, and the rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, no. 3 (1996).

Nahimana⁵⁶ and Sylvestre Ndekezi.⁵⁷ Ferdinand Nahimana went on to achieve notoriety as co-founder of *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM), and on December 3, 2003, was found guilty by the ICTR of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement, directly and publicly, to commit genocide, complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity. These figures present Rwandan history as a struggle between authentically indigenous Hutu against the ‘double colonialism’ of the Belgians and ‘foreign’ Tutsis. This struggle culminates in the Hutu revolution of 1957 and the expulsion of the monarchy in 1961. They amounted to a thinly concealed justification of the Kayibanda and Habyarimana republics, and were bereft of academic rigour or empirical grounding. Nonetheless, they do have potency to those that endorse them, notably those portions of the Habyarimana government which reformed in the DRC following the genocide, and other dissidents scattered across the diaspora to this day. They continue to be useful in attempting to make sense of the Rwandan present. These works have found new life in the ‘denialism’ of the exiled opposition *Rassemblement Républicain pour la Démocratie au Rwanda* (RDR), who became the *Forces Démocratiques Unifiées* (FDU-Inkingi), related groups, and their Western helpers.⁵⁸

Unsurprisingly, there has been an explosion of literature on Rwanda in the wake of the genocide. It is of uneven quality. It ranges from journalistic accounts to scholarly works, from first person testimonies by survivors to interviews with convicted killers, from travel writing to official in-depth investigations by aid agencies and international commissions.

Much of this literature focuses on the genocide itself. The definitive work here remains the late Alison Des Forges’ landmark *Leave None To Tell the Story*,⁵⁹ which is still the most wide-ranging, thoroughly

⁵⁶ Ferdinand Nahimana, *Le Rwanda: Emergence d'un État* (Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1993); Ferdinand Nahimana, "Les principautés Hutu du Rwanda septentrional," *La civilisation ancienne des peuples des grands lacs* (1981); Ferdinand Nahimana, "Les Bami ou roitelets Hutu du corridor Nyabarongo-Mukungwa avec ses régions limitrophes," *Études Rwandaises* 12(1979).

⁵⁷ Sylvestre Ndekezi, *Les métiers traditionnels du Rwanda* (Kigali: Imprimerie de Kigali, 1986); Sylvestre Ndekezi, *Rituel du mariage coutumier au Rwanda* (Kigali: Imprimerie de Kigali, 1984).

⁵⁸ See the review of this in T Ndahiro, "Genocide Laundering: Historical Revisionism and the Rassemblement Républicain pour la Démocratie au Rwanda," in *After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond*, ed. P. Clark and Z.D. Kaufman (London: Hurst, 2009).

⁵⁹ Alison Des Forges, *Leave none to tell the story": genocide in Rwanda* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch and Fédération internationale des droits de l'homme, 1999).

researched and reliable source on information we have on the events of 1994. This builds on the earlier pioneering work of Braeckman,⁶⁰ Prunier,⁶¹ Chrétien,⁶² and Willame.⁶³ These early, largely francophone texts offer a persuasive account of the character and origins of the Rwandan genocide. Valuable additional information can be found in the sociologist André Guichaoua's massive tome, *Les Crises politiques au Rwanda et au Burundi: 1993-1994*,⁶⁴ which brings in the interpretations of key politicians, journalists and NGO activists, some of whom, such as Seth Sendashonga, James Gasana, and Alphonse Marie Nkubito, have held significant positions at one stage or another of the Rwandan tragedy. These are supplemented by new works by established historians,⁶⁵ political theorists,⁶⁶ social anthropologists,⁶⁷ journalists,⁶⁸ and scholars of the church⁶⁹ and international relations.⁷⁰ This literature is rigorously researched, assiduously balanced and theoretically informed.

These excellent works have not been invulnerable to a process of discursive polarisation that Lemarchand describes as 'the Manichean Temptation': the framing of Rwandan history and politics in ideologically loaded terms with a view to producing an absolutist account of heroes and villains, be it the RPF account of the genocide, or the revisionist agenda of Hutu populism.⁷¹ On the one hand, there is a tendency to

⁶⁰ C Braeckman, *Terreur africaine: Burundi, Rwanda, Zaïre: les racines de la violence* (Paris: Fayard, 1996); Colette Braeckman, *Rwanda: histoire d'un génocide* (Paris: Fayard, 1994).

⁶¹ Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda crisis 1959-1994: history of a genocide* (London: Hurst, 1995).

⁶² Jean Pierre Chrétien, *Le défi de l'éthnisme: Rwanda et Burundi, 1990-1996* (KARTHALA Editions, 1997).

⁶³ Jean-Claude Willame, *Aux sources de l'hécatombe rwandaise* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995).

⁶⁴ Guichaoua, "Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda."

⁶⁵ Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda."; Newbury and Newbury, "A Catholic Mass in Kigali: Contested Views of the Genocide and Ethnicity in Rwanda."

⁶⁶ Peter Uvin, *Aiding violence: the development enterprise in Rwanda* (West Hartford, Conn: Kumarian Press, 1998). Andrew Wallis, *Silent accomplice: the untold story of France's role in the Rwandan genocide* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006). M. Mamdani, *When victims become killers: colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). S. Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

⁶⁷ Danielle De Lame, *Une colline entre mille, ou, Le calme avant la tempête: transformations et blocages du Rwanda rural* (Tervuren: Musée royal de l'Afrique centrale, 1996); Helen M Hintjens, "Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37, no. 2 (1999); N. Eltringham, *Accounting for horror: post-genocide debates in Rwanda* (London: Pluto Press, 2004); Christopher Charles Taylor and Eckhard Breitingner, *Sacrifice as terror: the Rwandan genocide of 1994* (Oxford: Berg, 1999). Jacques Sémelin, *Purifier et détruire. Usages politiques des massacres et génocides* (Paris: Éditions de La Martinière, 2009).

⁶⁸ L. Hilsum, "Reporting Rwanda: The Media and the Aid Agencies," in *Media and the Rwandan Genocide*, ed. A. Thompson (London: Pluto, 1995); L. Melvern, *A people betrayed: the role of the West in Rwanda's genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2000).

⁶⁹ Timothy Longman, *Christianity and genocide in Rwanda*, vol. 112 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁷⁰ H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, *The path of a genocide: the Rwanda crisis from Uganda to Zaïre* (Rutgers, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000).

⁷¹ René Lemarchand, "Rwanda: the State of Research," *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence* (2013).

conceptualise the genocide as a David-and-Goliath struggle between fixed and ethnic labels which are more or less straightforwardly coupled with good (e.g. the oppressed, heroic Tutsi) and bad (the oppressive, murderous Hutu). The disputes between different approaches are fiercely contested, and they concern fundamental matters of fact. The conflicts over recent history in Rwanda are as vicious as contestation over the status of, for example, the nature of Pre-Colonial Rwanda or the Hutu Revolution of 1957. They too structure the politics of the present, exclude or include, and validate or delegitimise specific actors, actions and social structures. Ethnicity itself, if analysed at all, is usually presented as a straightforward colonial imposition with *no* pre-colonial ancestry, and the RPF are courageous, benevolent, race-blind and liberal. In this category we might cite Brauman,⁷² Destexhe,⁷³ and Verschave,⁷⁴ Keane,⁷⁵ Gourevitch,⁷⁶ Hatzfeld,⁷⁷ Dallaire,⁷⁸ and Rusesabagina.⁷⁹ The one-sidedness of these narratives has its roots partly in the sheer horror of the images conveyed by the media – what has been called ‘the CNN effect’⁸⁰ – and because of the skilful management of information by Rwanda’s new leaders, so that it comes into line with the official history as told by the RPF.

This has produced a ‘politically correct’ view of the genocide. This is not to say that the works of these journalists, scholars and witnesses are inaccurate, or that the authors falsified evidence. Rather, in many instances some crucial facts were overlooked, or their significance underrated or misinterpreted. For example, Peter Gourevitch’s bestseller *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families* has had a decisive impact in shaping the global public perception of the genocide, and is rather short on analysis. Its remarkable descriptions of the horror do little to historicise or otherwise explain the violence. In the words of Timothy Longman, ‘Gourevitch demonstrates little understanding of Rwandan

⁷² Rony Brauman, *Devant le mal: Rwanda, un génocide en direct* (Paris: Arléa, 1994).

⁷³ Alain Destexhe, *Rwanda and genocide in the twentieth century* (London: Pluto Press, 1995).

⁷⁴ François-Xavier Verschave, *Complicité de génocide?: la politique de la France au Rwanda* (Brussels: Éditions la Découverte, 1994).

⁷⁵ Fergal Keane, *Season of blood: A Rwandan journey* (London: Penguin, 1996).

⁷⁶ Philip Gourevitch, *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families : stories from Rwanda*, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998).

⁷⁷ Jean Hatzfeld, "Une saison de machettes," (Paris: Le Seuil, 2003); Jean Hatzfeld, *Dans le nu de la vie* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2000); Jean Hatzfeld, *La Stratégie des antilopes, 3e volet de son récit sur le génocide rwandais* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2007).

⁷⁸ R. Dallaire and B. Beardsley, *Shake hands with the devil: the failure of humanity in Rwanda* (New York, NY: Carroll & Graf, 2005).

⁷⁹ Paul Rusesabagina, *An ordinary man: the true story behind hotel Rwanda* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007).

⁸⁰ Piers Robinson, "The CNN effect: can the news media drive foreign policy?," *Review of international studies* 25, no. 2 (1999).

culture and history, treating the genocide as pre-programmed by colonialism and Hutu as inherently violent'.⁸¹ *We wish to Inform You...*, descends at times into little more than a breathless tribute to Paul Kagame. It matters, however, because it became canon for many. As René Lemarchand points out:

...his narrative carries implications that go beyond the realm of travel writing: it is not unreasonable to assume that this highly naïve and uncritical rendering of the genocide has had a powerful hold on the official thinking of US policy-makers towards the new Rwandan state. To this day, the Tutsi-dominated State enjoys the unconditional support of the US Government⁸²

Gourevitch is one case amongst many. For example, Africa Rights' otherwise excellent *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*⁸³ contains no mention whatsoever of the crimes and torture inflicted by RPF soldiers on innocent Hutu citizens.

On the other hand, the revisionists are no less selective in their use of evidence. This category covers a wide range, from the outrageous to the plausible. At one end, some Hutu extremists flatly deny that a genocide occurred, merely a spontaneous outburst of violence in reaction to the threat posed by the RPF. Some of the claims advanced are straightforwardly genocide denial. At a colloquium held in the French Senate on the 4th of April 2002, Antoine Nyeteta, a Tutsi claiming royal origins, stated, that 'although massacres happened, there was no genocide'. Roger Booboh, the former UN Representative to Rwanda concurred that 'to claim that genocide happened is closer to the politics of surrealism than to the truth'.⁸⁴ There are also Pierre Péan's contorted attempts to prove that the genocide was a Tutsi-engineered plot⁸⁵ and Alan Kuperman's slightly more plausible variant: that the RPF was responsible for creating the conditions that led to the genocide, knew that it was a foreseeable consequence of their actions, but

⁸¹ Timothy Longman, "Placing genocide in context: research priorities for the Rwandan genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research* 6, no. 1 (2004), p24.

⁸² Lemarchand, "Rwanda: the State of Research.", p8.

⁸³ Rakiya Omaar, *Rwanda: Death, Despair, Defiance* (London: African Rights, 1994).

⁸⁴ René Lemarchand, "Le génocide de 1972 au Burundi," *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines*, no. 3 (2002), p561.

⁸⁵ Pierre Péan, *Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs: Rwanda 1990/1994* (Paris: Hachette, 2005).

viewed it as permissible ‘collateral damage’. In his own words, ‘The Tutsi rebels expected their challenge to provoke genocidal retaliation but viewed this as an acceptable cost of achieving their goal of attaining power’.⁸⁶ Péan, among others, is also an advocate of the notorious ‘double genocide’ hypothesis, in which it is argued that the genocide of Tutsi was coterminous with a planned extermination of Hutu by the RPF.

At the less hysterical end, there is Charles Onana’s highly selective account,⁸⁷ which states at the outset that ‘numerous works have been written about the Hutu and their responsibilities in the genocide, we do not see the need for another book on the accusations levelled against them’⁸⁸. Paul Kagame attempted to sue Charles Onana for defamation in a French court in 2002; he lost the original trial and the appeal.⁸⁹ Similarly, A.E. Gakusi and Frédérique Mouser’s history of Rwanda from 1950 up to the genocide⁹⁰ glosses over countless human rights violations committed under Habyarimana’s government.

Finally, no survey of the genocide literature would be complete without mention of Abdul Ruzibiza’s testimony.⁹¹ A former captain in Kagame’s army, member of the crack unit known as the Network Commandos, and assigned to the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI), Ruzibiza alleges that he was directly involved in the shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane on the 6th of April 1994. Ruzibiza’s testimony is exceptionally detailed, corroborates the claims of several other RPF defectors, the findings of the French magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière, and is regarded as credible by René Lemarchand and Filip Reyntjens, the two leading political scientists on post-genocidal Rwanda.⁹² The truth of these claims is not material to this thesis; the shooting down of the Presidential plane is the Central African Kennedy Assassination: catnip for conspiracy theorists which is best left well alone. What is important is that

⁸⁶ A. J. Kuperman, "Provoking Genocide: A Revised History of the Rwandan Patriotic Front," *Journal of Genocide Research* 6, no. 1 (2004), p79.

⁸⁷ Charles Onana, *Les secrets du génocide rwandais.: Enquête sur les mystères d'un président* (Paris: Éditions Dubois, 2002).

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p12.

⁸⁹ Ruth Nabakwe, "Kagame Appeals in French Court Against Verdict Favouring Journalist," *The Perspective* 2002, July 30th.

⁹⁰ Albert-Enéas Gakusi and Frédérique Mouzer, *De la révolution rwandaise à la contre-révolution: contraintes structurelles et gouvernance, 1950-2003* (L'Harmattan, 2003).

⁹¹ Abdul Joshua Ruzibiza and Claudine Vidal, *Rwanda, l'histoire secrète* (Paris: Éditions du Panama, 2005).

⁹² See Lemarchand, "Rwanda: the State of Research.", p23.

different kinds of revisionist histories, plausible and implausible, of the genocide and its origins, whilst almost invisible internationally, have sufficient persistence and power within some groups in the Great Lakes region to affect the politics of post-genocidal Rwanda.

Literature focussing solely on post-genocidal Rwandan politics is less abundant, but excellent work is being produced. The key figure here is Filip Reyntjens, co-editor with Stefaan Marysse of the Great Lakes Yearbook, *L'Annuaire des Grands Lacs*, and author of a string of articles unpicking contemporary Rwanda.⁹³ Other key works include Clark and Kaufman's collection of essays surveying the transitional justice project,⁹⁴ work on the regional political economy,⁹⁵ Pottier's anthropology of conflict, survival and misinformation,⁹⁶ and updated recent histories of the Great Lakes region as a whole by Prunier,⁹⁷ and Lemarchand.⁹⁸ This research is a welcome corrective to the thin, polemical accounts of the Manicheans. What it has only addressed elliptically is the question of how the coercive and administrative apparatus of the state was reimposed upon Rwandan society, and with what consequences. It is to that question that this thesis is directed.

Theoretical Framework

⁹³ Filip Reyntjens, "Constitution-making in situations of extreme crisis: the case of Rwanda and Burundi," *Journal of African Law* 40, no. 02 (1996); Filip Reyntjens, *Talking or fighting?: political evolution in Rwanda and Burundi, 1998-1999* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999); *ibid.*; Filip Reyntjens, "Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship," *African Affairs* 103, no. 411 (2004); Reyntjens, *Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda: droit public et évolution politique, 1916-1973*, 117.

⁹⁴ Phil Clark and Zachary Kaufman, *After genocide: transitional justice, post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation in Rwanda and beyond* (Manhattan, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009).

⁹⁵ Ruddy Doom and Jan Gorus, *Politics of identity and economics of conflict in the Great Lakes region* (Brussels: VUB Press, 2000). Stefaan Marysse and Filip Reyntjens, *The political economy of the Great Lakes Region in Africa: the pitfalls of enforced democracy and globalization* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

⁹⁶ Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda: conflict, survival and disinformation in the late twentieth century*.

⁹⁷ Gérard Prunier, *From genocide to continental war: the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa* (London: Hurst, 2009).

⁹⁸ René Lemarchand, *The dynamics of violence in Central Africa* (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).

Structurally, this is a piece of ‘mid-range theory’,⁹⁹ which is to say that it starts from empirical phenomena (as opposed to a fully theorised abstract entity like ‘the social system’), and then tries to abstract from that phenomena to create general statements that are empirically verifiable. As such, there will not be a fully specified ‘grand theory’ – rather, the single case of Rwanda will yield more general, theoretical propositions as permitted by the facts under investigation. As John Gerring explains, the idea that case studies cannot yield such general propositions is unfounded:

...consider how a case study of a single event—say, the French Revolution—works. Intuitively, such a study provides an N of one (France)... Yet, as I have argued preliminarily, this is a gross distortion of what is really going on... France is observed before, during, and after the event to see what changed and what remained the same after this cataclysmic event. These patterns of covariation offer the empirical clues one needs to reach conclusions about causation. They also create multiple cases out of that individual unit If, instead, there is no temporal variation—if, for example, the French Revolution is examined at a single point in time—then the object of investigation will be covariational patterns within that unit, a case study of type II. Within-unit cases consist of all cases that lie at a lower level of analysis relative to the inference under investigation. If the primary unit of analysis is the nation state, then within-unit cases might be constructed from provinces, localities, groups, or individuals. The possibilities for within-unit analysis are, in principle, infinite. Indeed, within-unit N often swamps across-unit N, particularly where individuals comprise the relevant within-unit case. A single national survey will produce a larger sample than any conceivable cross-country analysis. Thus, in many circumstances case studies of type II comprise a larger N than cross-sectional analyses or TSCS analyses. Evidently, if a case study combines both temporal and within-unit variation, as in case studies of type III, then its potential N increases accordingly.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ As advocated by B. Geddes, *Paradigms and sand castles: theory building and research design in comparative politics* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

¹⁰⁰ John Gerring, "What is a case study and what is it good for?," *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 2 (2004), p343-4.

Nonetheless, there are some foundation assumptions which it is important to state here. My foundational theoretical assumptions here are those of an ecumenical historical institutionalism. Which is to say: it takes as its core purpose the study of institutions as they emerge from and are embedded in concrete historical and social processes, and how they then go on to structure human behaviour. Its core conceptual vocabulary is drawn from the social theory of Max Weber and his intellectual descendants: regimes, classes, bureaucracies, order, authority, domination, and so on. For the avoidance of confusion, I am trying to use these terms in most straightforward way understood in plain English, rather than obscure my meaning by proliferating new definitions. By class, I have in mind a situation in which 'there is a shared typical probability of procuring goods, gaining a position in life, and finding inner satisfaction'.¹⁰¹ By power, 'the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the same action.,'¹⁰² with the caveat that I do not think this definition excludes the 'third face' of power pointed to by Stephen Lukes.¹⁰³ Where any term of art is deployed in an unusual or unexpected way, attention will be drawn to that.

The basic conceptualisation of the state starts with Weber: a centralised bureaucratic apparatus for the purpose of organising (claimed) legitimate domination. Much of this thesis is occupied with the classical Weberian questions about the imposition of violent order, revenue raising to fund military mobilisation, and the routinisation of administrative structures into a 'modern' regulatory regime.' Following Michael Mann,¹⁰⁴ I understand this as a combination of 'infrastructural' and 'despotic' power, where the former is 'the state's capacity to penetrate society and implement decisions through the coordinated activity of civil-society actors', and the latter is 'the state's ability to coerce compliance'. The state's ability to do this is a function of its degree of rationalisation, institutionalisation, and 'embeddedness' within society. As such, I

¹⁰¹ Max Weber, *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1978), p130-1.

¹⁰² Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology.*, ed. Karl Emil Maximilian, C Wright Mills, and Hans Heinrich Gerth (London: Kegan Paul, 1947), p181.

¹⁰³ S. Lukes, *Power: a radical view* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

¹⁰⁴ Michael Mann, "The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results," *European Journal of Sociology* 25, no. 02 (1984).

agree with John Nettl¹⁰⁵ that the state's capacity cannot be understood as unidimensional and capable of being placed on a simple 'weak-strong' continuum, but rather manifests in multiple dimensions, and – furthermore – need not be autonomous to be powerful, and it is possible that the state's power is amplified by its embeddedness, as is the case in Rwanda.¹⁰⁶ That fits with an approach sensitive to the 'ironies of state-building',¹⁰⁷ i.e. how state-building processes can be supported by ostensibly non-state actors, such as political parties, firms, and militant groups. What stands above all of this is the discursive business of legitimation, 'the existence of a managed construction of belief about the state...for the binding of subjects into their own subjection'.¹⁰⁸ The subject of this thesis is, in reality, a disparate and often conflictual set of individuals, groups, institutions and social spaces which, collectively, configure power in contemporary Rwanda. What gives an account of their coherence, purpose, independence, common interest and morality is the state as ideological construction, or – more simply – as *myth*. Understanding that 'face of the state'¹⁰⁹ will therefore be an integral part of this study. This does not mean I want to abandon the study of the 'concrete' state entirely, but rather that we should discuss the state both as an 'abstract-formal' object,¹¹⁰ and the politics of contemporary societies as if such an object did, in fact, exist. As such, I am trying to follow Cooper and Stoler's injunction¹¹¹ to integrate positive and interpretative approaches, and to understand the deep interdependence of the material realm of 'hard power' with the ideational.

This fits an approach which synthesises the study of institutions, elites, social structures, and historical forces both material and immaterial within Rwanda: the study of 'big structures, large processes, and huge

¹⁰⁵ J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20, no. 4 (1968).

¹⁰⁶ Unlike some (i.e. Desmond King) I do not believe Weber and Nettl need to be seen in opposition. For my purposes, I think it is sufficient to point out that the Rwandan state does much which it very usefully explained using a Weberian framework, but also some other things which require us to be more attuned to the multi-dimensionality of power.

¹⁰⁷ Desmond King and Robert C Lieberman, "Ironies of State building: a comparative perspective on the American State," *World Politics* 61, no. 03 (2009).

¹⁰⁸ P Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1988), p68.

¹⁰⁹ Yael Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the state : secularism and public life in Turkey* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

¹¹⁰ N.A. Poulantzas, *Classes in contemporary capitalism* (London: Verso, 1978).

¹¹¹ F. Cooper and A.L. Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1997).

comparisons':¹¹² what is commonly called 'the new institutionalism'. This field has produced a vast and eclectic literature even if one confines oneself to the study of the state since it was 'brought back in' in the 1980s,¹¹³ and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to review it. Broadly, we can characterise the bare bones of the approach as one concerned with studying institutions in order to find sequences of social, political, economic behaviour and change across time, which recognises that institutions operate in contexts 'directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past'.¹¹⁴ Hence, by institutionalism I do not mean the somewhat etiolated abstraction of 'rational choice institutionalists',¹¹⁵ but rather historically grounded work which engages with a number of disciplines including anthropology, economics, sociology, international relations and political science. This makes it possible to be broad-minded about motivation: material, structural and institutional factors can consistently sit alongside identity and ideology. It also leaves room for both functionalist explanation (in accounting for continuity and persistence) and non-functionalist (in accounting for choices and institutional emergence).

Within that framework, this thesis will be most closely situated with the works in comparative study of state *formation*.¹¹⁶ There are four key advantages to this approach. Firstly, it is one of the few approaches which enables a focus not on a particular set of institutions, but on those institutions of the state in general: this work encompasses the study of armies, revenue-collecting bodies, parliaments, bureaucracies, and so forth. Such an approach is indispensable to this thesis. Secondly, because processes of state formation are invariably processes of social contestation and conflict, this literature makes central not only the state itself and the elites which commandeer it, but also the societies in which these states are embedded. This makes it possible to integrate the insights from the literature on state-society relations in

¹¹² Charles Tilly, *Big structures, large processes, huge comparisons* (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984).

¹¹³ P.B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol, *Bringing the state back in* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

¹¹⁴ K. Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Rockville, MD: Arc Manor, 2008).

¹¹⁵ Margaret Levi, *Of rule and revenue*, California series on social choice and political economy (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1988); Robert Bates et al., *Analytic narratives* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

¹¹⁶ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, capital, and European states, A.D. 990-1992*, [Rev. ed., Studies in social discontinuity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); T. Ertman, *Birth of the leviathan: building states and regimes in medieval and early modern Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997); B.M. Downing, *The military revolution and political change: origins of democracy and autocracy in early modern Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

the developing world.¹¹⁷ Whilst Rwanda is hardly a 'strong society with a weak state', Rwanda's distinctive social fabric cannot be omitted from a honest account of the contemporary state. Thirdly, this literature is particularly interdisciplinary: its focus on a set of questions rather than a particular methodology enables it to integrate political science,¹¹⁸ anthropology,¹¹⁹ sociology¹²⁰ and comparative history.¹²¹ Finally, this literature is able to address the 'immaterial' components of statehood, such as the state monopoly of knowledge construction,¹²² legitimation,¹²³ or symbolic violence.¹²⁴ The Rwandan state is an armed body of men (and, occasionally, a woman), the bureaucratic administrative apparatus, but also an ideological project¹²⁵ and system of moral regulation.¹²⁶ Almost uniquely in the corpus of historical institutionalism, the literature on state formation takes these dimensions of statehood seriously.

This sets this thesis in contrast to much of the literature on state *reconstruction*. State reconstruction gains prominence in development literature in the nineties. This new interest, in old themes, is driven by the resurgence of a powerful international discourse on nation-building as promoted by a new breed of interventionist IR scholars, flushed with optimism by the end of the cold war,¹²⁷ the movement in donor

¹¹⁷ J.S. Migdal, *Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); A. Kohli, *State-directed development: political power and industrialization in the global periphery* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

¹¹⁸ Jeffrey Herbst, *States and power in Africa: comparative lessons in authority and control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); M.A. Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003).

¹¹⁹ Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, Cambridge Middle East library (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the state : secularism and public life in Turkey*.

¹²⁰ Jennifer Adams, *The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

¹²¹ M.P. Callahan, *Making enemies: war and state building in Burma* (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 2003); V.T. Hui, *War and state formation in ancient China and early modern Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹²² P. Carroll, *Science, culture, and modern state formation* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2006).

¹²³ G. Steinmetz, *State/culture: state-formation after the cultural turn* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

¹²⁴ M.T. Taussig, *The magic of the state* (Oxford: Routledge, 1997).

¹²⁵ Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State."

¹²⁶ P. Corrigan and D. Sayer, *The Great arch: English state formation as cultural revolution* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).

¹²⁷ M. Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1994); F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin, 1992).

discourse towards the inclusion of 'governance conditions',¹²⁸ and a seeming increase in the frequency of state 'failure' and 'collapse' in the nineties, such as the crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Zaire.¹²⁹

Notably, this literature does not engage with earlier work on 'nation-building' in Africa.¹³⁰ Nor is there much in the way of reference to prior work on state building.¹³¹ As such, this literature tends to exhibit a striking paucity of theoretical substance, and is almost devoid of serious critique. 'State fragility',¹³² 'state weakness',¹³³ and 'state failure'¹³⁴ become catch-all phrases which are neither analytic nor descriptive, attempting to generalise indiscriminately across a disparate array of phenomena. Within this literature, the overwhelming focus is on resolving technical questions about how certain technocratic goals are to be achieved: the correct use of aid at particular times,¹³⁵ the starting points and sequencing of bureaucratic institution building,¹³⁶ the appropriate forms of public management,¹³⁷ models of policing,¹³⁸ or the fine-tuning of a liberal trade policy.¹³⁹ With honourable exceptions, drawn notably from an earlier generation of political scientists writing on African politics¹⁴⁰ there is hardly any critical engagement with the

¹²⁸ WB, "From Crisis to Sustainable Growth," (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989); WB, "Governance and Development," (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992); WB, "Evaluation du programme de repatriement et de réinstallation des réfugiés rwandais," (Kigali: World Bank, 1995); WB, "A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction," (Kigali: World Bank, 1997).

¹²⁹ I.W. Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1995).

¹³⁰ i.e. T. Hodgkin, *African Political Parties: An Introductory Guide* (London: Penguin, 1961); R.S. Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-speaking West Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); J.S. Coleman and C.G. Rosberg, *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1966); John Lonsdale, "States and social processes in Africa: a historiographical survey," *African Studies Review* 24, no. 2/3 (1981).

¹³¹ Barrington Moore, *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1967); Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the absolutist state* (London: New Left Books, 1974); Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, *Bringing the state back in*; Corrigan and Sayer, *The Great arch: English state formation as cultural revolution*.

¹³² Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier, "Development effectiveness in fragile states: spillovers and turnarounds," *Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University* (2004).

¹³³ Stuart E Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy M Weinstein, "Rebuilding weak states," *Foreign Aff.* 84(2005).

¹³⁴ M. Jänicke, *State Failure: The Impotence of Politics in Industrial Society* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990).

¹³⁵ Chauvet and Collier, "Development effectiveness in fragile states: spillovers and turnarounds."

¹³⁶ D Deese, "From Executive Crafting to Pluralistic Politics: Politics and Economic Reform as Sequential, Cumulative Processes in Developing States," in *Development and Democracy: New Perspectives on an Old Debate*, ed. S Ramaswamy and J Cason (Hanover, NH: Middlebury College Press, 2003).

¹³⁷ Sarah Lister and Andrew Wilder, "Strengthening subnational administration in Afghanistan: technical reform or state - building?," *Public Administration and Development* 25, no. 1 (2005).

¹³⁸ Otwin Marenin, *Restoring policing systems in conflict torn nations: Process, problems, prospects* (Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2010).

¹³⁹ Eizenstat, Porter, and Weinstein, "Rebuilding weak states."

¹⁴⁰ Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*; Robert I. Rotberg, *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Medford, MA: World Peace Foundation, 2003); C. Young and T.E. Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013).

theoretical framework as a whole. In the absence of any such critique, much of this work bears more than a passing resemblance to the epicycles of Ptolemaic astronomers.

Moreover, this international relations-led literature typically considers state reconstruction as an *externally-driven* process,¹⁴¹ or as a footnote to the analysis of state collapse.¹⁴² It has not been driven by research programmes of academic institutions, but by government-funded research institutions and think-tanks.¹⁴³ Many of them have their origins in policy debates in the US and in the World Bank. It has often tended to start from and implicitly endorse to varying degrees the dominant orthodoxies of neo-liberal institutionalism, articulated through the language of developmentalism.¹⁴⁴ This orthodoxy is 'liberal' in that it prescribes fiscal conservatism and liberal trade and exchange policies, 'institutional' insofar as it confounds this with the 'good governance' agenda of the World Bank,¹⁴⁵ and 'neo-' only insofar as this bundle of policies is discursively presented to the world as a novel and innovative theory as to how state reconstruction is best to be achieved. In particular, state reconstruction has become, and is seen to have become the construction of bureaucratic state capacities which are autonomous from society, and with the establishment of technocratic institutions required for the successful operation of the modern market.¹⁴⁶ This is taken to mean the establishment of order, bureaucratic 'good governance' – including functioning financial institutions – rapid democratisation, effectively regulated – but liberalised – markets, and state institutions insulated from rent seekers and vested interests.

¹⁴¹ Mark T Berger, "From nation-building to state-building: the geopolitics of development, the nation-state system and the changing global order," *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2006).

¹⁴² Jennifer Milliken, *State Failure, Collapse & Reconstruction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).

¹⁴³ Such as the CIA's State Failure Task Force, and the Governance Teams of the World Bank.

¹⁴⁴ This rather sweeping statement should not be taken as a denial of the substantive and important differences between many of these organisations. For example, I include the Brookings Institute in this complex of institutions. Whilst Brookings is historically close to the US Department of State, it has a far longer history, more institutional autonomy, and a less defined remit than more recent policy unit. However, their position vis-à-vis state reconstruction is broadly in line with that of the other organisations cited.

¹⁴⁵ As argued in Monika François and Inder Sud, "Promoting stability and development in fragile and failed states," *Development Policy Review* 24, no. 2 (2006); Niraja Gopal Jayal, "The Governance Agenda: Making Democratic Development Dispensable," *Economic and Political Weekly* (1997); Kanishka Jayasuriya and Kevin Hewison, "The antipolitics of good governance: from global social policy to a global populism?," *Critical Asian Studies* 36, no. 4 (2004).

¹⁴⁶ Gavin Williams, "Studying Development and Explaining Policies," *Oxford Development Studies* 31, no. 1 (2003).

By setting up this literature in this manner, Rwanda gets excluded. The reconstruction of the Rwandan state was not externally directed by the USA or the UN, and so is frequently, and unjustifiably, left out of discussions as to how to conduct state-building efforts after intervention.¹⁴⁷ Although Rwanda has been cited as a collapsed state by policy-makers and journalists, the genocidal war that took place in 1994 was not enabled or produced by the Rwandan state disintegrating. Instead, the genocide was produced by 'highly disciplined agents of the state [who] pursued the task of murdering many of its people with hideous efficiency'.¹⁴⁸ It was only after the *en masse* retreat of the Habyarimana regime into Zaire that the new state apparatus was put into place, and with astonishing speed. Perversely, it is this absence of a prolonged period of anarchy (i.e. the success of the reconstruction) which militates against the inclusion of Rwanda in many comparative analyses.

In rejecting this picture, this thesis builds on the new wave of interest in authoritarian regimes. 'Authoritarianism' is frequently understood as a system of 'personal rule' in which institutions play little or no part in the production of political order.¹⁴⁹ The definition of authoritarianism advanced by Linz in his seminal study¹⁵⁰ was almost as a residual category of those systems neither democratic nor totalitarian, understood largely in terms of what such regimes were not:

Authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism: without elaborate and guiding ideology...without intensive or extensive political mobilisation...and in which a leader exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ F. Fukuyama, *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

¹⁴⁸ Christopher Clapham, "Degrees of statehood," *Review of international studies* 24, no. 2 (1998), p148.

¹⁴⁹ R.H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1982).

¹⁵⁰ Linz in E. Allardt and S. Rokkan, *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology*; Edited by Erik Allardt, Stein Rokkan (Cambridge, UK: The Free Press, 1970).

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p255.

This way of reading the phenomena in question has, largely, stuck. Particularly in the study of non-democratic regimes in Africa, there has been a repeated tendency to understand such polities as extreme variants of the (unpleasant but basically functional) modal type outlined by Linz: structured by the personal whim of the ruler (if at all), endemically corrupt, devoid of ideology, and above all arbitrary, but in predictable ways.¹⁵² This in general unjust to the power and resilience of formal political institutions in many African states, but particularly unsuited to a country like Rwanda where – as I shall argue – the ideological projection of the state by both friends and critics of the regime emphasises the personality of Paul Kagame and elites around him at the expense of taking Rwandan political institutions seriously. This tendency is as damaging to a realistic appraisal of the current politics of Rwanda as the (parallel) inclination on the part of another group of writers¹⁵³ to treat institutions as technocratic instruments devoid of history and politics.

There are several sub-points to this. Firstly, that institutions – understood as the formal legal-rational apparatus of the state instituted by law – matter in Rwanda, and help illuminate its sources of durability and instability, but not in the straightforward way imagined by the technocrats. In so doing I do not wish to argue that informal mechanisms of power, individuals, and networks – patrimonial or otherwise – are irrelevant: in Rwanda, at least, it is obvious that *both* are relevant. The putative dichotomy between power inhering in formal institutions, on the one hand, or informal networks on the other is sterile and unhelpful. Rather, my argument is that the power and durability of the Rwandan regime rests on its capacity to play mixed games – deploying both institutional and personal ‘modes of domination’¹⁵⁴ in different sectors of the state, contexts, or policy areas. What is surprising, perhaps, is that these modes can coexist in a fairly stable equilibrium. It appears, in Rwanda at least, that if one controls both the

¹⁵² H.E. Chehabi and J.J. Linz, *Sultanistic Regimes* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); J.F. Bayart, *L'état en Afrique: la politique du ventre* (Paris: Fayard, 2006); Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa* (London: International African Institute, 1999); W. Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999); P. Chabal and J.P. Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder As Political Instrument* (London: International African Institute, 1999); Jackson and Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*.

¹⁵³ Usually labelled something like ‘the Washington Consensus’ or ‘the Good Governance Paradigm’ – the problem with such names is that it implies this intellectual paradigm was dreamt up at the World Bank in the 1990s. What they are is technocrats of a form that would be instantly recognisable to Comte or Saint-Simon, which is what I shall call them. See G Williams, “The World Bank and the Peasant Problem,” in *Rural Development in Tropical Africa*, ed. J. Heyer, P. Roberts, and G. Williams (London: MacMillan, 1981).

¹⁵⁴ Weber, *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology.*, pp212-302.

formal institutions, and informal networks of power, there is no obvious reason to stop using one in favour of the other unless the use of one erodes the functionality of the other. Given the tiny size of the Rwandan elite, and the extremely close ties between them, it's relatively easy for the elite to build institutions which work and enable them to do things informal networks can't (e.g., large-scale agricultural reform, the building of mass parties and institutions, the regularisation of authority inhering in offices rather than persons, and so on), but ensure that their activities are not 'directed' at those spheres of quasi-licit activity where personal links of authority still predominate (i.e. the Congolese plunder economy or the banking sector).

Secondly, these thoughts can be linked to the research agenda set out by Ian Lustick¹⁵⁵ on the modalities of power and order in deeply-divided societies characterised not by consociational strategies of bargaining, compromise, and the cooperative behaviour of a plurality of contending elites, but rather *control*: a form of political order which relies on 'the emergence and maintenance of a relationship in which the superior power of one segment is mobilised to enforce stability by constraining the political actions and opportunities of another segment or segments'¹⁵⁶. This is an agenda in which there has been some excellent work¹⁵⁷, but one in which Rwanda still looks like an odd exception. Much of this literature relies on a particular political economy fuelled by easy access to high-value primary commodities (the paradigmatic case of which is the petro-state),¹⁵⁸ long established mass parties able to play an integrative role,¹⁵⁹ or the charismatic authority of great redeemers and populist demagogues.¹⁶⁰ Rwanda exhibits none

¹⁵⁵ Ian S Lustick, "Stability in deeply divided societies: consociationalism versus control," *World Politics* 31, no. 3 (1979).

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p328.

¹⁵⁷ Eva Bellin, "The robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in comparative perspective," *Comparative Politics* (2004); J. Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); B. Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival And Its Demise in Mexico* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); S. Levitsky and L. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Oil and politics in the Gulf of Guinea* (London: Hurst, 2007); Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1988); J.J. Linz, *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes* (Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1985).

¹⁵⁸ Soares de Oliveira, *Oil and politics in the Gulf of Guinea*.

¹⁵⁹ A.R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1966); Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-speaking West Africa*; C.J. Gertz, Carolyn Louise Baylies, and M. Szeftel, *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989).

¹⁶⁰ Samuel Decalo, *Psychoses of power: African personal dictatorships* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); Margaret Canovan, *Populism* (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981); Miles Larmer and Alastair Fraser, "Of cabbages

of these characteristics, and so we can't fall back on these accounts for an off-the-peg narrative about RPF political order.

Thirdly, the political institutions of Rwanda are linked to a particular class structure, which further separates Rwanda from the dominant contemporary account of the new authoritarians. What this points to is the survival of a form of political order in Africa which was supposed to be long dead: Rwanda *is* authoritarian, but bears more resemblance to Chris Allen's stylised 'centralised-bureaucratic politics',¹⁶¹ or the 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' regimes of Brazil and Argentina in the mid-1960s identified by Guillermo O'Donnell.¹⁶² Such regimes are authoritarian - the systems exhibit extremely unequal relations between rulers and ruled, political authority is highly centralised, and it is exercised by a very small number of people – but they are also, at least in part, bureaucratic. Further, such systems are held to exhibit features of modernity which also recur in Rwanda:

...the crucial features that are specific to authoritarian systems of high modernisation: the growth of organisational strength of many social sectors, the governmental attempts at control by 'encapsulation' of the career patterns and power-bases of most incumbents of technocratic roles, and the pivotal role played by large (public and private) bureaucracies¹⁶³

Further to this, O'Donnell holds that there is a class character to such regimes, viz. collusion between "...the public bureaucracy and the propertied sectors...against the peasantry and an emerging urban proletariat."¹⁶⁴ O'Donnell's work, insofar as it is still referenced in contemporary political science, is largely understood as descriptively powerful in a particular place, Latin America (usually taken to not be directly parallel to postcolonial Africa) and time, the 1970s (which has passed). I wish to argue that this is an underestimation of its heuristic power, and that it can also speak to the Rwandan experience in

and King Cobra: Populist politics and Zambia's 2006 election," *African Affairs* 106, no. 425 (2007); Jackson and Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*.

¹⁶¹ Chris Allen, "Understanding African Politics," *Review of African Political Economy* 22, no. 65 (1995).

¹⁶² O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective*.

¹⁶³ Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and bureaucratic-authoritarianism: studies in South American politics* (Oakland, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973), p91.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p89.

important ways. This capture of the state by a narrow-but-substantial class alliance (of state bureaucrats, the military, and the propertied sector) also serves to complicate accounts of the role of African middle classes in building democracy. This is not to say that Barrington Moore has no place in the tropics, as some have argued,¹⁶⁵ rather it is to say that the theoretical frames of Moore and O'Donnell are of relevance to contemporary Africa if understood properly, as arguing that democracy can be forestalled or blocked by class alliances which relate to production in the appropriate way, even if some of those individuals are of average incomes and therefore count as 'middle-class' in the parlance of much contemporary political science. In this way, the contemporary Rwandan 'political class' recalls an earlier literature on the class character of authoritarian politics in Africa.¹⁶⁶ Hence this work contrasts with much of the new literature on the emerging set of states which occupy the twilight between democracy and dictatorship (hybrid regimes, electoral autocracies, illiberal democracies, competitive authoritarianism, etc),¹⁶⁷ in which class structure is underplayed as an explanatory factor.

Finally, this thesis will delve into further different bodies of theory at various points as and when it becomes necessary to do so. Theories are just stylised pictures of reality embedding particular claims about (a) relevance, and (b) causality which enable us to reason from known to unknown cases (or, if you prefer, to learn something new) by yielding non-banal predictions which are testable. In order for them to be useful they must be parsimonious, and hence selective about the phenomena they seek to explain, and the facts deployed in their explanations. As such, theories are specific to what they purport to explain, and not necessarily rival to different theories deployed elsewhere. Given that this thesis grapples with several different 'faces of the state', different segments of theory are deployed with reference to different specific questions, rather than attempting to come up with a single grand theory which would – in trying to speak to everything – do too much violence to the facts to speak about anything. As such, some theoretical

¹⁶⁵ Nic van der Walle, "Barrington Moore in the Tropics: the Middle Class and the Prospects for Liberal Democracy in Africa" (paper presented at the African History and Politics Seminars, Oxford, UK, 8th October 2012).

¹⁶⁶ G. Williams, *State and society in Nigeria* (Ibadan: Afrografika Publishers, 1980); R. First, *The barrel of a gun: political power in Africa and the coup d'état* (London: Allen Lane, 1970); Segun Osoba, "The Nigerian Power Elite, 1952-65," in *African Social Studies*, ed. P. Gutkind and P. Waterman (London: Heineman, 1977).

¹⁶⁷ A. Schedler, *Electoral authoritarianism: the dynamics of unfree competition* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006); F. Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (Revised Edition)* (London: W. W. Norton, 2007); Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*; Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*.

exegesis, where it is relevant to only one chapter, has been moved into that specific chapter on the grounds of readability.

Structure

Chapter one details the role of the military as Leninist organisational weapon and soul of the state, and processes of conflict as one of the key engines of Rwandan state formation. Rwanda's case cannot be simply understood through the application of the work of Charles Tilly *tout court*, but it does offer a corrective to the widely held belief that such accounts simply 'don't work' in the modern developing world:¹⁶⁸ the Rwandan case is one where conflict does promote the formation of a strong state, and – if the theory is appropriately refined – offers strong support for the validity of this argument in contemporary Africa. Further, the political elite of Rwanda are, at least in terms of their self-identity, military elites. On the empirical side there is nothing approaching an impartial account of the Rwandan military to date, only hagiographical accounts by insiders,¹⁶⁹ and chapter one will contribute towards filling that gap. More broadly, much of the political science on militaries is dated, and focussed on either coups, or overtly military regimes. There is more to be said about regimes which discursively present themselves as civilian regimes (and create the required set of civilian institutions for this), but whose organisational logic remains that of the military.

As such, this chapter replies to the neo-Tillyian literature on state formation. There has recently been a series of attempts¹⁷⁰ to integrate the work of Charles Tilly on violence and state-making¹⁷¹ into the study

¹⁶⁸ G. Sorensen, "War and state-making - Why doesn't it work in the Third World?," *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 3 (2001); Christopher Clapham, "War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea," in *Failed States Conference* (Florence, 10-14 April 2001).

¹⁶⁹ FK Rusagara, G Mwaura, and G Nyirimanzi, *Resilience of a Nation: A History of the Military in Rwanda* (Kampala: Fountain, 2009).

¹⁷⁰ B. D. Taylor and R. Botea, "Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World1," *International Studies Review* 10, no. 1 (2008); C. G. Thies, "The political economy of state building in sub-Saharan Africa," *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 3 (2007); Sorensen, "War and state-making - Why doesn't it work in the Third World?."; Clapham, "War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea."

of contemporary Africa. Attempts to integrate Tilly's insights into an understanding of contemporary Africa have had results which are patchy at best: contemporary African wars do not appear to promote statehood in general, and other cases offered, such as Angola,¹⁷² Ethiopia,¹⁷³ or Uganda,¹⁷⁴ are ambiguous at best. Rwanda appears an exception to this dim prognosis on the prospects for robust African statehood built on war: it has been successful in rebuilding from almost total destruction in a manner unparalleled elsewhere. Moreover, this success in rebuilding the institutional and executive capacity flies in the face of much received wisdom, particularly within the donor literature, about the appropriate constitution and policy direction of a post-conflict state. Rwanda is a useful corrective to the claims of many that Tilly-inspired accounts of state formation are not applicable to the modern world. Contrasting Rwanda with other experiences of war and state reconstruction helps identify what *can* be taken from historical works on state formation, and under what circumstances. Furthermore, attention to these factors better explains Rwandan 'exceptionalism' within the modern donor-driven literature on state reconstruction, and corrects some of the more ahistorical, Western-centric, and panglossian tendencies of this work.

Chapter two continues the study of the core institutions of violence into the immediate genocidal aftermath and the 'transition period' (1994 to 2003). The focus of this chapter is how the entrenching of a robust monopoly of force and the successful prosecution of counter-insurgency during this period also involved sophisticated strategies of routinisation, formalisation, and legitimation which ultimately amounted to the construction of a new state apparatus able to rely on much more than mere subjugation. The implication further to this, is that the RPF has in effect solved one of the key principal-agent problems bedevilling any post-liberation government: paying off veterans whilst keeping the army cohesive and disciplined. And all done extremely cheaply.

¹⁷¹ Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Tilly, *Coercion, capital, and European states, A.D. 990-1992*.

¹⁷² Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, "'O Governo está aqui': Post-War State-Making in the Angolan Periphery," *Politique africaine*, no. 130 (2013).

¹⁷³ John Markakis, *Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers* (Oxford: James Currey, 2011).

¹⁷⁴ A.M. Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010).

Chapter three concerns Rwanda's civilian political institutions created following the transition to a formal constitutional democratic order, notably those with representative, decision-making, and administrative roles. Again, much of the current literature is poor because it only deals with Rwanda's political institutions in order to moralise (either to praise or condemn) with reference to a pre-determined Western political template. My argument will be that Rwanda is not a fully institutionalised bureaucratic state, but that its institutions are nonetheless relevant, and examining their design does help account for the functionality of the Rwandan state.

Chapter four will move to an analysis of Rwandan capitalism. Most current work on this either uncritically valorises Rwanda's growth rate or rails against illicit Congolese mineral plunder. Neither approach is particularly helpful. My argument here will be that the success of the Rwandan state project is related to its success in acquiring and concentrating capital in exactly the manner predicted by the state formation literature, and that once an analysis of revenue and its control is added to the picture, the 'Rwandan miracle' makes much more sense. There are two distinct periods: the first stage was of 'booty capitalist' extraction and market creation (during Rwanda's 'transition'), where the key challenges for the elite were – on the one hand – retaining the autonomy of the central state from citizens who might otherwise have sought to extract concessions the central state is unwilling to give, and – on the other – attracting a sustained influx of capital. The former relates to the Rwandan state's operations in Congo, the latter to their strategy of market creation. The second phase regularised the system in such ways as to perpetuate RPF hegemony as the Rwandan economy recovers and grows. The Rwandan elite has adroitly assimilated those aspects of faddish international consensus which serve their purposes (such as new public management), and has moved much of the business of everyday governing to the lower reaches of the state, along with the duty to collect those taxes, thus liberating the central state from many of the classical pressures for public goods provision that taxation produces in the accounts of Tilly and Levi. In so doing, this severs the link between the need to raise reliable income from the population and

representative institutions. On the other hand, the RPF have found a way of having functional capitalism along with a ready source of funds with which to perpetuate their dominance.

Chapter five concerns Rwanda's relations with the outside world: the Rwandan state project relies on the capacity of the elite to resist the normal pressures that limit the field of possible political action for many contemporary African elites, a resistance which has been – at least until recently – extraordinarily successful. Accounting for this requires interrogating the relationship of the elite to donors, the media, NGOs, and the academy itself, and there is both a material story about incentives and international institutions, and an ideational story about the manipulation of discourse which needs to be told here. In detailing this distinctive insulation from international pressure despite considerable dependence on donor resources, I want to point to various ways in which Rwanda's elite belie the vulgar dogma that African leaders are nothing but puppets of shadowy international (usually Western) interests. More precisely, I want to argue that the institutional arrangements and sociology of international bodies are structured to permit an elite that knows what it is doing to create extensive policy independence, regardless of the intentions of donors. Further, that the RPF have been particularly adroit at appealing to the international community through its public trumpeting of neo-liberal economic policies and the poverty reduction agenda, as well as superficially participatory procedures such as poverty assessments and the *Gacaca* courts. This section will thereby engage with that subset of contemporary theorising on authoritarian regimes which directly treats on the state's relationship with the outside world: the theory of 'competitive authoritarianism' as laid out by Levitsky and Way.¹⁷⁵ This isn't expanded upon in this section to prevent the introduction becoming too long, and because I only use Levitsky and Way's framework as it pertains to a state's foreign relations, and so only for this chapter. As such, I have moved that part of theoretical exegesis there.

¹⁷⁵ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*.

Chapter six engages with the immaterial, ideational aspect of the state, in line with Abrams' call for the state to be studied as 'ideological project'.¹⁷⁶ There is a distinctive political imaginary in Rwanda composed of a *bricolage* of visions of modernity and authenticity which compose the Rwandan state-idea, projected, purveyed, and occasionally even believed in. This reified ideological construct functions to promote certain actors and courses of action, exclude others, and structure the field of political action. It is, as such, a vital component of the state's power.

In addressing all these areas, this thesis addresses central questions about the political economy of Rwanda, and a substantial gap in scholarship. In contrast to the reams of paper expended on transitional justice, or education policy, or land reform, there is invariably silence on these issues. There are two key reasons for this gap. The first is that the reputation of the RPF for secretiveness, rumour-mongering, and conspiracy is well deserved. Frequently the only informants willing to talk about these issues are dissidents living in exile, with the consequence that much testimony is tainted with resentment and becomes dated very quickly. Secondly, the academic community practices self-censorship. For that set of academics who do not wish to either sell out or lose access to Rwanda, the only way to square that circle is to write about those aspects of Rwanda untroubling to the regime, or areas where they feel that they can be honestly approving (i.e. the work of Clark¹⁷⁷ on transitional justice, or that of Chambers and Golooba-Mutebi¹⁷⁸ on maternal health). It's telling that many writers who do wish to be critical of the Rwandan regime devote their efforts to writing about military adventurism in Eastern Congo,¹⁷⁹ where their access will not be imperilled, and it will never be difficult to find people willing to attribute the most demonic crimes to Rwandans. It is my hope that what is advanced here can chart a middle path, and is sufficient to advance our understanding of how the contemporary Rwandan state came to be, what secures its durability, and determines its political future.

¹⁷⁶ Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State."

¹⁷⁷ Clark, *The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice Without Lawyers*.

¹⁷⁸ Victoria Chambers and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, "Is the bride too beautiful?: Safe motherhood in rural Rwanda," (2012).

¹⁷⁹ E.g. F. Reyntjens, "The privatisation and criminalisation of public space in the geopolitics of the Great Lakes region," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 43, no. 4 (2005).

Chapter One: a State of War

The history of Rwanda *is* the history of the Rwandan Military

Bernadin Muzungu, Historian of Rwanda¹⁸⁰

Dans ce pays-ci, il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres

Voltaire, *Candide*¹⁸¹

The purpose of this chapter is to establish that the story of the reconstruction of the Rwandan state is inseparable from an account of processes of conflict and military institutions which the framework of state formation theory is best placed to provide. My argument will proceed in five parts: I will briefly outline the case for the strength of the Rwandan state, and then examine in turn the role of the RPF's refugee history, conflict, political leadership, and military institutions in accounting for it.

Part One: State Strength

The overwhelming consensus today is that the Rwandan state has been reconstructed to a degree beyond the most optimistic hopes of those that observed the aftermath of the genocide. A plethora of writers have queued up to offer accounts of an orderly, stable and well-administered Rwanda.¹⁸² One typical example of this literature is this passage from Braeckman's *Terreur Africaine*:

¹⁸⁰ Quoted in Rusagara, Mwaura, and Nyirimanzi, *Resilience of a Nation: A History of the Military in Rwanda*. Original text: B. Muzungu, *Histoire du Rwanda précolonial* (Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 2003).

¹⁸¹ Voltaire, *Candide, ou L'optimisme* (Paris: Cramer, Marc-Michel Rey, Jean Nourse, Lambert, and others, 1759).

¹⁸² Braeckman, *Terreur africaine: Burundi, Rwanda, Zaïre: les racines de la violence*; Gourevitch, *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families : stories from Rwanda*; Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda : power, genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front*.

The cities are more animated than ever, the rural areas are again under cultivation, all children are attending school, the churches are overcrowded with people, the road-menders are at work on the roads, and the widows weed out the public gardens¹⁸³

Even Filip Reyntjens, one of the new regimes' most trenchant critics, concurred that:

A mere two years after the extreme human and material destruction of 1994, the state had been rebuilt. Rwanda was again administered from top to bottom; territorial, military and security structures were in place, the judicial system was re-established, tax revenues were collected and spent. The regime was able in a short time to establish total control over state and society. This control was seen in the maintenance of an efficient army, able to operate inside and far beyond the national borders; the establishment of 'reeducation', 'solidarity' and 'regroupment' camps; the villagisation policy (known as 'imidugudu' policy) ... While many other African countries tend towards state collapse, the Rwandan state has re-affirmed itself vigorously.¹⁸⁴

Reyntjens goes on to comment: 'technocratic governance is apparently satisfactory, with competent and even charming elites articulating an intelligent discourse'.¹⁸⁵

These impressions coincide with the opinions of development professionals. The *Joint Governance Assessment* adopted by the government of Rwanda and its bilateral donors on the 8th of October 2008, concludes that 'Rwanda has made impressive progress in governance since the 1994 genocide'.¹⁸⁶ This is typical of the reports that have been produced in recent years.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸³ Braeckman, *Terreur africaine: Burundi, Rwanda, Zaïre: les racines de la violence.*, p269.

¹⁸⁴ Reyntjens, "Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship."

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p210.

¹⁸⁶ Quoted in G Williams et al., "Carrying out a Joint Governance Assessment—Lessons from Rwanda," *The Policy Practice, Brief 5*(2009), p4.

¹⁸⁷ BTC, *La Coopération Technique Belge au Rwanda* (Brussels: Belgian Development Cooperation Agency, 2006); CIDA, *Canada and Rwanda: Together for Rwanda's Development* (Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency, 2005); DfID, *Rwanda: Country Assistance Plan 2003 - 2006* (London: Department for International

Such quantitative data as exists also supports this assessment. The World Governance Indicators¹⁸⁸ produce aggregate indices of various aspects of governance based on thirty one separate data sources. These are extremely rough and ready measures, and the data series only runs from 1996 onwards, but even a quick neighbourhood comparison on the two measures most relevant here ('Political Stability' and 'Government Effectiveness') reveals that Rwanda's recovery after the genocide is extremely impressive (see graphs 1 and 2).¹⁸⁹

The Relative Political Capacity (RPC) approach adopted by Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson¹⁹⁰ also reflects this. This is an index which compares the *actual* (i.e. officially reported) level of tax revenue extraction to a *predicted* level of extraction following the work of Levi.¹⁹¹ RPC was first developed as a measure of the ability of a state to wage war through mobilising its population,¹⁹² and has since been used successfully in numerous contexts.¹⁹³ As graph 3 shows, RPC makes the case for the Rwandan success story far more clearly. Once 'what they have to work with' is taken into account, the Rwandan state's

Development, 2003); IMF, *Rwanda: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2008); USAID, *Rwanda Report* (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2005); WTO, *Rwanda: Trade Policy Review* (Geneva: World Trade Organisation, 2004); SIDA, *Rwanda Looking Ahead: Reconciliation, Reform, and Regional Stability* (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Agency, 2002).

¹⁸⁸ Daniel Kaufmann, Art Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, *Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996 - 2008. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4978* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2009).

¹⁸⁹ These figures should be treated with due caution: changes are sometimes produced by new data sets joining the index, they use surveys of citizen perceptions as often as they measure reality, and conflate outcomes the World Bank deems normatively desirable with political capacities. Kaufmann et al are measuring *governance*, in which is embedded a set of precepts about what state power is for (usually justice, electoral democracy, and capitalist deregulation). Those outcomes embraced by the World Bank need not correlate with the desired outcomes of any government, and hence need not correlate with the capacity of that state to bring about *their* desired outcomes.

¹⁹⁰ Marina Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Kristin Johnson, "Relative Political Capacity: Theory, Model, Data, and Updates," in *Annual Meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention: Bridging Multiple Divides* (Hilton San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA, 2008).

¹⁹¹ Levi, *Of rule and revenue*. This measure takes the revenue generated through taxation as the most reliable proxy for state capacity, but assesses it relative to what the state 'had to work with', in terms of per capita income, the share of agriculture in the economy, and oil production. A state scoring 1 on this indicator is extracting exactly as much as the predicted revenue function would expect a state to extract in similar conditions, and a score higher than 1 indicates better performance than expected, and score lower indicates worse.

¹⁹² A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The war ledger* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

¹⁹³ Marina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler, *Political capacity and economic behavior*, Political economy of global interdependence (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); Y Feng and S Swaminathan, "Political Capacity and Demographic Change: A Study of China with a Comparison to India," *Urban transformation in China* (2004); C. G. Thies, "Of rulers, rebels, and revenue: State capacity, civil war onset, and primary commodities," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 3 (2010).

extractive capacities are even superior to Tanzania (normally thought of as a far more successful state)¹⁹⁴. Lest anyone think that being ‘most effective state in the Great Lakes’ is too easy a win, graph 4 shows the 12 years in Rwanda after the genocide compared to the same period of time in five other cases: Algeria in 1962, El Salvador and Mozambique in 1992, Lebanon in 1990, and Malaysia in 1960. What is interesting here is the sheer scale and pace of the change: from being *easily* the worst performer, Rwanda catches up with states starting from a far superior extractive base. Many observers attribute the functionality of the contemporary Rwandan state to the residue of ‘an ancient state tradition’.¹⁹⁵ There is undoubtedly some merit to this claim, but I want to argue that it cannot be the *sole* explanatory factor. Graph 5 offers *prima facie* evidence that Rwandan state capacity is not a historical given, but subject to considerable variation, even excepting the genocide. Moreover, it shows that the Rwandan state in 2005 is *more* effective at extraction than it ever was in the era of the Second Republic (1973 to 1994). What this suggests is that even if the current Rwandan state is building on a pre-existing tradition of ‘stateness’ with an almost intrusive level of social control, this state is a new construction, and a different beast from what preceded it.¹⁹⁶

What RPC does not take account of is the formidable additional barriers to successful state reconstruction Rwanda faced. These are fourfold:

Firstly, the country appeared ungovernable; approximately 40% of the population were dead or had fled, including around 75% of government employees, leaving a country with almost all infrastructure destroyed, all banks and businesses plundered, all agricultural production lost. There was a deeply traumatised population of survivors and an unspecifiable number of people complicit in the genocide. There were one million internally displaced refugees (13% of the population), 400,000 widows, 500,000 orphans, 130,000 imprisoned on suspicion of committing acts of genocide, and over half a million ‘old-caseload’ refugees returning in a chaotic fashion.

¹⁹⁴ The other unexpected result here is Burundi. This is in large part because Burundi is *so* poor that a government which manages to extract *at all* is doing ‘better than expected’. That is not what is happening in the Rwandan case: RPC rises dramatically *despite* the coterminous rise in GDP per capita over the period in question.

¹⁹⁵ Reyntjens, “Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship.”, p209.

¹⁹⁶ It is not the purpose of this thesis to offer a comparative assessment of the pre- and post-genocidal Rwandan states, but many of the factors which justify the description of the contemporary state as a ‘different beast’ will be canvassed in remainder of this chapter.

Secondly, the RPF faced widespread challenges to their monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within the territory. Sections of their own military had begun to contract themselves out to private parties (they were not paid by the central government until December 1994 – three months after the genocide).¹⁹⁷ They faced sporadic *Interahamwe* attacks, especially in the former French zones occupied under Opération Turquoise, from pockets of surviving militiamen, periodic infiltrations by the armed forces of the former government of Rwanda from Zaïre, and widespread banditry and looting.

Thirdly, assistance of any description from the international community was slow in coming. Although \$1 billion had been pledged in humanitarian aid, it was impossible to find \$4.5 million to pay Rwanda's arrears to the World Bank in order to release \$250 million in available loans. This lasted until November when the European Union unilaterally gave \$88 million without preconditions.¹⁹⁸

Finally, the new RPF régime was formed almost entirely from exiles; men and women who had spent the entirety of their lives outside Rwanda, predominantly in Uganda. This was an organisation with almost no institutionalised structure within Rwanda, few established links with the local population, and no experience administrating a territory.

As such, any analysis of the Rwandan state must proceed from two premises: the reconstruction of the Rwandan state took place under extremely unfavourable conditions; and whilst much of the behaviour of the current regime in Rwanda is reprehensible, the overwhelming consensus is that the state itself *works*. The reconstruction of even the average level of statehood observed in Africa would be impressive. This is extraordinary.

So much for the strength of the state. It has been argued by many, particularly the Dependency School, that the political economy of the world system is such that states 'on the periphery' have no genuine

¹⁹⁷ It is testament to the resilience of the institution of the RPF that this weakening of the military's organisation was not permanent.

¹⁹⁸ Prunier, *From genocide to continental war : the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa.*, p8.

independence or ability to pursue their own policy agendas. Even states with capacity lack genuine power, or a genuinely autonomous administrative structure. I do not believe this to be an accurate description of Rwanda. A crude comparison of aid flows per person in Rwanda and Sub-Saharan Africa (graph 6) reveal that Rwanda is extremely aid dependent on technical measures, and its economy is certainly ‘peripheral’ in the traditional sense. An even more telling measure of how saturated with aid (in a physical sense) Rwanda has become is given by graph 7. Uvin’s description of aid in Habyarimana’s Rwanda as ‘omnipresent in the country both physically and geographically’¹⁹⁹ remains true today.²⁰⁰

However, Rwanda exemplifies aid saturation without aid dependency. As the work of Hayman²⁰¹ has shown, on all policy areas the RPF considered a priority – refugees, Congo policy, transitional justice, and the scope and pace of democratisation – the government has pushed ahead with its own agenda, rarely altering its position dramatically in deference to the wishes of the donor community. As Hayman remarks, ‘despite its aid dependence...the government is able to create and use policy space whilst maintaining an ever increasing supply of funding’.²⁰² This is covered in more depth in chapter five.

A key example of this is Rwanda’s refusal to adopt the prescriptions of the international peace-building community regarding political liberalisation. Rwanda’s performance on measures of economic success and technocratic state capacity stand in stark contrast with Rwanda’s poor performance on measures of political liberalisation or democracy; Polity IV codes Rwanda from 1994 to 2000 as a ‘self-selected executive’ with only ‘intermediate’ constraints on the authority of that executive, and political competition as ‘repressed’.²⁰³ Freedom House has never listed Rwanda as better than ‘partly free’ (and ‘not free’ for the last seven years),²⁰⁴ and *Reporters Sans Frontières* have labelled Paul Kagame one of their ‘Press Predators’. Rwanda appears to fly in the face of the modern consensus that the World Bank’s

¹⁹⁹ Uvin, *Aiding violence : the development enterprise in Rwanda.*, p42.

²⁰⁰ It is true that Rwanda has a dramatically higher population density than the African continent as a whole. Whilst that *explains* graph 7 in part, it remains true that the *consequence* of this is the ubiquity of aid observed by so many commentators in Rwanda.

²⁰¹ Rachel Hayman, "Rwanda: Milking the Cow. Creating Policy Space in Spite of Aid Dependence," in *The politics of aid: African strategies for dealing with donors*, ed. L. Whitfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Rachel Hayman, "From Rome to Accra via Kigali: 'Aid Effectiveness' in Rwanda," *Development Policy Review* 27, no. 5 (2009).

²⁰² Hayman, "Rwanda: Milking the Cow. Creating Policy Space in Spite of Aid Dependence.", p17.

²⁰³ M. G. Marshall and K. Jagers, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009," ed. Center for Systemic Peace and Colorado State University (2009).

²⁰⁴ Raymond D. Gastil, "Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties," (New York, NY: Freedom House, 2009).

understanding of ‘good governance’ (i.e. conflated economic *and* political liberalisation) is a precondition for development. Indeed, Rwanda looks much more similar, on first glance, to what Modernisation theorists used to advocate: a closed political elite which can use its hegemonic position to bring about development *because* of its insulation from political pressures (something ‘good governance’ accounts argue shouldn’t work).

However, those theories were as general as the accounts which followed them: Rwanda works for reasons which are distinctive and not easily reproducible, as the rest of this thesis will argue.

Part Two: A Refugee History

Understanding the current Rwandan political elite requires understanding the conditions under which it emerged within the banyarwanda population of Uganda over the last fifty years. This section will provide a schematic account for the purposes of highlighting relevant historical influences, i.e. key events and formative influences over the period 1959 to 1994.

Rwanda’s current leaders are the descendants of the ‘59ers: the 130,000-odd that fled Rwandan following the ‘Hutu Revolution’ of 1959. The overwhelming majority of these were merely displaced victims of the anti-Tutsi violence which had spread like wildfire from the North-West of the country, but also included a core of revolutionary activists and conservative opponents of the changes sweeping Rwanda (the abolition of the monarchy, the Tutsi-dominated administration, and the hated *uburetwa* taxes). They settled across Ankole and Kigezi in Uganda (and spread out into Bunyoro, Toro, and Buganda), the Kagera region of Tanzania, the Kivus in Zaire, and Mushisha, Kyankuzo Province in Burundi. Political activity at this point took the form of monarchist armed attacks back into Rwanda by the ‘*Inyenzi*’ (‘cockroaches’) guerrillas to kill Hutu local government officials and mobilise the Tutsi that remained within the country. The firm belief was at this point was that the new government in Kigali would be comparatively easy to

push over, and return would be swift. As the chief medical officer of the Orukinga Refugee Camp in Uganda observed in 1962:

‘the refugees have a patriotic but frequently sentimental feeling that they will be going back within two months...the Ministry has certain situations which we think can remedy the situation [i.e. expedite the return of the refugees to Rwanda]. The solution is demolition of the Lake Nakivale holding camp by allowing cattle-owners to drift into the interior, look for jobs, work, and start life as their predecessors have done’²⁰⁵

Fifty one years later, Nakivale remains the largest refugee camp in Uganda, continues to host many banyarwanda (although now from the post-1994 caseload).

The *inyenzi* attacks failed to undermine the Rwandan government, or effect a return of any refugees (although they came within twenty kilometres of Kigali during the ‘Bugesera Invasion’ of 1963’). They were not supported by the republican government of Apolo Milton Obote (indeed, the decision to try and relocate Rwandans further inside Uganda was motivated in part by a desire to end the incursions across the border), and rapidly declined. Their lasting legacy was twofold. Firstly, the effect of their incursions was to doom any serious attempt at creating a moderate multi-ethnic opposition to the MRND within Rwanda. Unable to reach the refugees in the camps, the government of Rwanda responded with harsher repression meted out against the Tutsi population (a further 35,000 refugees reached Uganda by the end of 1963 according to Jacobs),²⁰⁶ and killed that class of moderates still attempting to bridge the divide, including Michel Rwagasana, founding member and Secretary-General of the moderate *Union National Ruandaise* (UNAR), and Chief Bwanakweli of *Rassemblement Démocratique Ruandaise* (RADER). After 1963, the politics of compromise and accommodation was to all purposes dead. Secondly, the

²⁰⁵ Government of Uganda, Ministry of Community Development Document XXIII, quoted in E.D. Mushemeza, *The politics and empowerment of Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda, 1959-2001* (Kampala: Fountain, 2007), p65.

²⁰⁶ B.L. Jacobs, *Administrators in East Africa: Six Case Studies* (Entebbe: The Government Printer, 1965), p49.

failure of the *inyenzi* also decisively killed monarchism, Tutsi conservatism in general, and set the scene for the ideological outlook of the RPF. Interview subjects repeatedly returned to ‘the failure of their fathers’ as a watershed which motivated the conclusive generational rupture which led, ultimately, to their embrace of the revolutionary modernism of the National Resistance Movement (NRM).²⁰⁷ Although the doomed moderate opposition of the 1960s now receive cautious eulogisation (see, for example, the change of tone in the government controlled *New Times*),²⁰⁸ the *inyenzi* are forgotten, and unlamented, and if they have a lasting influence on the current rulers of Rwanda, it is only as a cautionary tale.

Nonetheless, Uganda did go on to become the crucial site of diasporic political activity over the next thirty years (i.e. 1963 to 1994). There are three core reasons for this. The first, and simplest, is simply in virtue of numbers. Due to the frequency of relay migration, return, assimilation; the conceptual muddiness over who is to count as banyarwanda, or a Rwandan national,²⁰⁹ or a refugee; and simple unrecorded births and deaths, any attempt at arriving at precise figures for the numbers of population a pointless exercise. Nonetheless, it is clear from the initial caseload numbers (cited above) and a matter of consensus amongst competent observers of the region that the Rwandan population of Uganda was one of the largest, and on some estimates outnumbered any other such population by an order of magnitude.²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ Interviews RW30, UG1, and UG7.

²⁰⁸ Felly Kimenyi, "The Life and Times of Michel Rwagasana," *The New Times* 2013, February 1st.

²⁰⁹ These terms are notoriously slippery. The first may either be a minimal claim to be part of a linguistic community (i.e. Kinyarwanda-phone), or a national who is a member of an imagined ethnic community (i.e. the *people* of Rwanda), whereas ‘Rwandan’ is usually taken to be a claim to membership of a modern legal-rational state (i.e. Rwanda) over a period where the politics of citizenship are deeply politicised and subject to repeated manipulation. Who fits into these categories is, as usual, contested. For my purposes, I will use the unambiguous ‘kinyarwanda-phones’ to refer to speakers of the language, ‘banyarwanda’ (or ‘munyarwanda’ in singular) to refer to one who self identifies as such, even if they have no connection with the modern Rwandan state, and ‘Rwandan’ to refer to one making a claim to have ongoing business – most obviously a claim to citizenship – with the modern Rwandan state. The Rwandan diaspora, therefore, are those who identify as Rwandan but have a continued ‘homeland orientation’ (usually the desire to return).

²¹⁰ Cf. Aderanti Adepoju, "The dimension of the refugee problem in Africa," *African Affairs* 81, no. 322 (1982); S Aga Khan, "The One Million Refugees in Africa," *Migration News* 20, no. 4 (1981); AGG Gingyera-Pinyewa, *Uganda and the Problem of Refugees* (Kampala: Makerere University Press, 1998); Robert Dodd, "Background Notes on the Possible Reasons for the Current Uganda/Rwanda Refugee Problem," (Oxford: Refugees Studies Programme Documentation Centre, 1982); Barbara Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid: emergency assistance to refugees* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Barbara Harrell-Bond, Eftihia Voutira, and Mark Leopold, "Counting the refugees: gifts, givers, patrons and clients," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 5, no. 3-4 (1992).

The possible exception here is Zaire, where the figures are (unsurprisingly) even worse. However, in order to arrive at the claim that the population is there, one would have to make the historically inaccurate assumption that the banyamulenge are ‘Rwandans’, which would have – at the very least – been unsupported by the banyamulenge

The second reason is that it was far easier for the '59ers to integrate within the social fabric of certain sections of Southern Ugandan society. There are potentially four distinct categories of banyarwanda in Uganda, of whom the '59s represent only one strata. There are also, firstly, communities which established themselves before the colonial era in Kisoro (now also called Bifumbira), Bukanga, Isingiro, Ruhama, Rushenyo, and Sembabule. Secondly, there are the descendants of the refugees from the skirmish between the Belgian government and the Nyabingi movement (alternately known as Biheko) in the early twentieth century, resident in and around Kabale district where they have integrated with the Bakiga.²¹¹ Thirdly, there are the descendants of labour migrants from Rwanda in the 1920s, brought by oppressive Belgian taxation and labour policies and the labour shortages in Ankole and Buganda.²¹² All these other communities of banyarwanda provided substantive opportunities for '59er integration. They were frequently 'an invisible minority' able to pass as indigenous Ugandans without trouble, they faced next-to-no language barrier, were afforded ample opportunities to engage in employment and acquire land, and the Ugandan state (at least in the beginning) was happy to let the '59ers work in the public sector, avail themselves of state-provided sources of welfare, and educate their children in national schools. Further, there were significant linguistic similarities and cultural affinities between the Rwandans, predominantly Tutsi pastoralists and other Ugandan communities who occupied similar positions in similar social strata, such as the Bahima of Ankole and the Bakiga, which made integration dramatically simpler (indeed, for Rwandans in settlements outside of areas with such populations, such as Kyaka II, where some were relocated in 1982, integration and subsequent social advancement was much less successful). This does not mean, importantly, that Rwandans were universally popular. Indeed, in some regions it was quite the opposite. For example, in Ankole, to the extent that they were identified with the Bahima by themselves and others, the majority Bairu population, who were largely sympathetic to the Hutu cause, regarded them with considerable hostility. In almost every area they settled, the '59ers and those communities sympathetic to them were the minority, and these communities still had to lie low in

themselves, who certainly would not have been interested in 'return', or orientated towards a Rwandan 'homeland' in any clear sense, and so even if one wishes to (dishonestly) brand them 'banyarwanda', it is impossible to regard them as part of a Rwandan diaspora with an ongoing political relationship to the homeland.

²¹¹ Jim Freedman, "Ritual and History : the Case of Nyabingi," *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines* (1974); M. Rutanga, *Politics, Religion, and Power in the Great Lakes Region* (Kampala: Fountain, 2011); M. Rutanga, *Nyabingi Movement: People's Anti-colonial Struggles in Kigezi, 1910-1930*, CBR Working Paper Series (Kampala: Centre for Basic Research, 1991).

²¹² P.G. Powesland, "History of Migration in Uganda," in *Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda*, ed. A.I. Richards (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973).

order to acquire land, jobs, social networks, and so on. The point, rather, is that there were some communities with which they were able to build strong relationships, who acted as their bridge out of poverty and isolation.

Thirdly, this also meant that the '59ers had durable political allies in the Ugandan scene. The demographic profile of party affiliation in southern Uganda in the 1960s escapes lazy categorisation as an ethnic census (for example, being Bairu was no predictor of voting behaviour at all, with most Bairu protestants supporting the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), and Catholics supporting the Democratic Party (DP), despite that being the party most Bahima also voted for). Those few Hutu that had come to Uganda tended to divide on the same sectarian lines as the Bairu, but those Tutsi '59ers, the overwhelming majority, ended up aligned solidly behind the DP for a variety of reasons: firstly, the DP was largely seen in Ankole as the party of the Bahima, with whom they strongly identified (for a variety of reasons: ethno-cultural similarity, a shared interest in monarchy, fears of peasant revolt, extensive intermarriage²¹³). Secondly, Apolo Milton Obote was solidly anti-Monarchist, and in the febrile atmosphere engendered by the inyenzi attacks was disposed to categorical condemnations of the Rwandan community and had no objection to stirring up anti-banyarwanda populist sentiment in order to win votes. Thirdly, the lower branches of the government administration in Ankole had been taken over by Bairu protestants in the UPC who were hostile to the interests of the Rwandans. There may be exceptions to this, but the concatenation of forces is such that the Rwandan Tutsis not supporting the DP must have been very few and far between indeed. Banyarwanda support for the DP became so pronounced that by 1969 (UPC) President Obote was apparently planning a survey with the view to excluding all banyarwanda (refugee and citizen) from the political process as non-indigenous, and eventually expelling them from Uganda altogether.

²¹³ And I do mean extensive. The contemporary Rwandan political elite is stuffed with runyankole names such as Busingye, Ibingira, Baingana, Mugisha, and Asimwe; Luganda such as Mukasa and Wasswa, and Runyoro-Rutooro names such as Kuhebwa, Byarugaba, and Kaboyo. The holders of these names are usually entirely integrated and regard themselves as totally and unproblematically Rwandan, to the extent that most foreign observers would realise the name is not originally Kinyarwanda.

This is the kernel of why Uganda became *the* political scene in the diaspora: nowhere else saw the dramatic confluence of clout and influence, on the one hand, with threat on the other. In Uganda the '59ers were thrust into the violent and unstable Ugandan political scene and forced to become involved as players, particularly after the failure of the inyenzi made it clear they were there for the medium term. This combination of factors simply wasn't true of Tanzania, where the government had put in place a long-standing policy of naturalisation, on the one hand, and placed as many of their refugee populations as possible in isolated settlements where they were insulated from local political disputes (like the Mishamo camp described in *Purity and Exile*²¹⁴), nor Burundi, where the refugees never faced harassment from the state. As such, to consider returning to Rwanda was considered a suicidal risk to take without anywhere near adequate justification.

By contrast, in Uganda various factors enabled the '59ers to attain power, but also to live in a situation of deep, near-permanent precarity. There were periodic attempts to resettle the banyarwanda, sometimes violently, between 1959 and 1973, as documented by J.W. Clay,²¹⁵ and a frequent theme of Obote's speeches was that the (undeserving) Rwandan refugees had created (deserving) Ugandan refugees within Rwanda through their bad behaviour. Although there was a brief hiatus in active state repression under Idi Amin, that was hardly a period of great stability in which the state was known to be peaceable and law-abiding, and repression rapidly resumed in 1979. It reached its apogee in 1982, when, in September, Mbarara district council passed a resolution that all refugees living outside settlements should be moved into refugee settlements. Two UPC ministers, Chris Rwakasisi (Security) and Patrick Rubaihayo (Agriculture), openly supported the action to evict all Banyarwanda, refugees or citizens. The next month government officials and UPC youth wingers began a campaign of violent displacement in Mbarara, Bushenyi, Masaka, and Rakai. Clay estimates that only 25-30% were genuine refugees, but regardless, 'Rwandans' were offered a simple choice: return to Rwanda, move into the camps of Orukinga and

²¹⁴ L.H. Malkki, *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

²¹⁵ Jason W. Clay, "The Eviction of Banyarwanda: The Story Behind the Refugee Crisis in Southwest Uganda," (Cambridge, MA: MSc Thesis in Cultural Survival, 1984).

Nakivale, or be killed.²¹⁶ Some 35,000 people were moved into the camps, some 40,000 crossed back into Rwanda, and somewhere between 4,000²¹⁷ and 10,000²¹⁸ were trapped just inside Uganda when President Habyarimana, claiming the country was ‘full’, closed the border. That 4,000 stayed trapped in a stateless limbo until the NRM entered Kampala in 1986.

This repression is the key explanation for why so many young Rwandans joined Museveni’s NRM (including two who were part of the original 34 men with 27 guns – now popularly known as the Kabamba 27 – that started the war in 1980: Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame). When the Ugandan Bush War ended in 1986, many Rwandans in Uganda believed the new political dispensation of the NRM could be the start of a new era of durable uncontested settlement within Uganda. Such hopes were shattered in 1990 with the abrupt removal of Fred Rwigyema from his position as Deputy Minister of Defence. Rwigyema was a personal friend of President Museveni, a comrade from the very beginning of the struggle, easily the most senior Rwandan in government, and located in the all-important security sector. His removal was the final and strongest proof for many Rwandans that no matter how deeply proved their loyalty or military value to the Ugandan state, there would always be circumstances in which it would be politically expedient, if not necessary, to play to anti-banyarwanda sentiment, no matter how closely any leadership had been to the Rwandan community (indeed, *particularly* if there had been any prior closeness to the banyarwanda – the oft-repeated nonsense that Museveni is a secret Tutsi is repeated by paranoid Ugandans to this day). As Prunier put it:

If Rwigyema, after his great services to the country, and in spite of his personal friendship with the President, could not simply be a Ugandan like any other, then the path of integration was in fact a dream. For many of the Tutsi exiles, including Rwigyema, who had always considered himself to be a

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Claimed in Mushemeza, *The politics and empowerment of Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda, 1959-2001.*, p94.

²¹⁸ Claimed in Melvern, *A people betrayed: the role of the West in Rwanda's genocide.*, p27.

Ugandan, things had to be reconsidered. The result of these changes occurring at the top was that many people lower down decided to turn to the RPF and its radical project of conquest²¹⁹

However, by 1990 the Rwandans were in a position to consider another option, namely, what Prunier somewhat uncharitably describes as ‘the RPF and its radical project of conquest’: an organisation with genuine military muscle, and a programme of action with some prospect of success. How Uganda’s Rwandans got from the *inyenzi* to here is also the story of how the children of the ‘59ers embedded themselves within the NRM’s revolutionary project, and in so doing, became the modernising technocrats from military security that we recognise today.

Although the Rwandans were first organised under the ambit of the Rwandan Refugees Welfare Association (RRWA, founded in 1979), which was primarily a social and cultural organisation designed to insure against further injustices meted out on the *banyarwanda* population by government oppression, it rapidly transformed into the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU) a few months later on June 2nd.²²⁰ Although it was founded in Nairobi, its leaders were ‘Ugandans’ educated at Mulago Paramedical School and Makerere University (both in Kampala): Ben Rutsinga, Fideli Rwigamba, Patrick Mazimpaka, along with Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame. From the outset RANU took pains to distance itself from earlier Rwandan groups in Uganda, particularly the *inyenzi*. It articulated a modern palatable discourse of unity, the abolition of ‘ethnic divisions’ (particularly the ID card system), democracy (not much mention of parties though, which were a discredited currency largely associated with ethnic divisionism and sectarianism – a discourse which survives in Rwanda today), and progress through a strategy of peaceful negotiation and lobbying (and no stated military agenda of return by force at the time of its founding).²²¹ It rapidly set up a series of branches elsewhere in the region (Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire) and further afield (Belgium, Canada, and the USA). However, the leadership and focus of

²¹⁹ Gérard Prunier, "The Rwandan Patriotic Front," in *African Guerrillas*, ed. C. Clapham (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), p127.

²²⁰ Interview RW11.

²²¹ *Ibid.*

activity remained firmly within Uganda, and nodes of RANU elsewhere primarily served the purpose of fundraising through diasporic tithing (for example, members in Kenya were expected to contribute 100 shillings per annum). RANU was dramatically more successful at organisation and mobilisation than any prior Rwandan organisation in Uganda (in part because it directly borrowed the organisational blueprint of the NRM, complete with councils, directorates, a strong intelligence wing, and a Leninist vanguard endowed with complete control over the direction of strategy), and for the first time since the 1960s raised seriously the possibility of return to Rwanda, saturated in the NRM's revolutionary language of cadre, struggle, resistance, and patriotic unity.

However, this discourse masked an agenda which was militaristic from the beginning. This is not entirely surprising: Rwandans in the diaspora had no reason whatsoever to believe any other strategy would work, long enough memories to remember what had befallen the earlier generation of accommodationists, and witnessed the success of the anti-Amin forces in 1979. Military force was the obvious, if not the only strategy, but was adroitly combined with a rhetoric designed to sound modern, 'Western', and congenial to potential Cold War patrons. According to Mushemeza,

In 1979, RANU advised its followers to obtain military training in their host states throughout the world. The defeat of Amin was an inspiration to refugees that it was possible to defeat dictatorship. The idea was that banyarwanda refugees would disguise themselves as nationals of the host country or join a rebel ground, as long as it enabled individuals to obtain skills relation to handling weapons of war²²²

This is slightly conspiratorial (there was no need for many of the Uganda-based Rwandans to 'disguise' themselves, even if they could, many certainly also supported opposition to Obote's UPC, were genuinely oppressed, and had considerable sympathy with the agenda of Museveni's NRM). However, what is undeniable is that even in 1979 the leadership contained many seasoned soldiers. Fred Rwigyema had

²²² Mushemeza, *The politics and empowerment of Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda, 1959-2001*, p103.

trained with FRONASA in 1967 before returning to fight in the struggle against Amin, as did many other young Rwandans who deserted Amin's sinking ship for the new movement being stitched together by Museveni, including Peter Bayingana, Chris Bunyenyezi, Paul Kagame²²³, Sam Kaka, and César Kayitali. These soldiers went on to become key players in the NRM, as did thousands of their comrades. Furthermore, in response to the degenerating security situation within Uganda, the political leadership (i.e. Tito Rutaremwa, Ben Rutsinga, and Fideli Rwigamba) relocated to Nairobi until 1986. In so doing, they all but guaranteed that civilian political structures would be fatally divorced from military structures, and made easy (if not inevitable) their later marginalisation.²²⁴

The victory of the NRM in 1986 was a giant boost to RANU, which was reconfigured a year later in December 1987 as the Rwandan Patriotic Front. There are a few reasons for this, not least because RANU read as UNAR backwards, and the leadership were sensitive to accusations that they were the old discredited failures in new clothing, because the leadership wanted to shift from presenting themselves as a (sectional, ethnic, divisive) 'party' to being a (inclusive, unity-orientated, more militaristic) 'front', a rhetorical modification which, again, recalls the NRM's self-identity as a 'movement' deeply hostile to 'party'. But most of all, this reorganisation was about taking advantage of their new status as a parallel structure within the government, in which the military leaders who had participated in the NRM struggle decisively took the reins, with Fred Rwigyema as the new Chairperson.

Within the new Ugandan state, the RPF grew into a movement dominated by military and intelligence elites. Paul Kagame was made deputy at the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), and recruited a number of other Rwandans into key positions within that structure (see appendix 5). The Rwandan

²²³ Who also allegedly received intelligence training in Tanzania. That Kagame was in Tanzania in 1979 is not disputed, but I have received nothing by way of credible testimony regarding this rumour either way. Interviews UG1, UG3, UG12.

²²⁴ The only thing that might have prevented this is if the Nairobi leadership had been able to bring to the table other resources which the movement might have found equally valuable. However, before 1986 (when they relocated back to Rwanda), RANU's diaspora tithing never came close to the resources obtained through collaboration, their lobbying of states came to nought, and – for all the aspirations towards Rwandans joining militaries across the world – the other branches never created conditions anywhere near as fertile as Uganda for the acquisition of military muscle. Interviews UG7, OTH3.

attendees at the Uganda Cadet Officers school reads like the honour roll of Rwandan military elites in the post-genocidal era: James Kabarebe, Patrick Karegyeya, Kayumba Nyamwasa, John Nyavumba, and Wilson Rutayisire. In another recognisably Leninist move, many became Political Commissars within the army, guarding it against counterrevolutionary thought and action, including Alphonse Furuma, Ndore Rurinda, and Wilson Rutayisire. It's worth noting in passing that a different set of RPF officers took the opportunity between 1986 and 1990 to become wealthy businessmen and big men in the (civilian) public sector – John Imana, Efrance Karenzi, Mohammed Majambere, and Abodon Muberuka – none of whom went on to hold serious political office in the post-genocidal dispensation. It was through the NRM and the Ugandan state that the RPF leadership became who they were. It was also the character of the RPF military during this period and the war they fought which then determined the character of the state in post-genocidal Rwanda.

Part Three: The Legacy of Conflict

When the RPF assumed power on July 19th 1994, the post-conflict dispensation was already distinctive. Firstly, the RPF, unlike the diverse grand coalitions stitched together by the international community exemplified by Liberia, Burundi, or Sierra Leone, was a single organisation in which military elites predominated. Its high command – Fred Rwigyema, Paul Kagame, Kayumba Nyamwasa, etc – were largely soldiers with a record of collaboration since the mid-eighties. They are distinctive for three core reasons:

First, the RPF is much more analogous to a regular army than almost any other African rebel movement in recent history. Its soldiers were, for the most part, recruited from the Ugandan Army, in which some had been serving for almost a decade. The elite of this army had received training from Western powers: when Paul Kagame assumed military command of the RPF following the death of Fred Rwigyema, he had just left a training course in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Whilst during the civil war itself it was forced to adopt a guerrilla strategy of hit and run attacks emanating from bases in the Virunga mountains, this was originally a movement which invaded from Uganda using conventional war strategy. Rather than

forming extensive links with the population within Rwanda, most of the combatants had never set foot in the country they were fighting for. As Prunier observes, *'if one were to take Mao Tse Tung's rules of guerrilla warfare as a guideline, one would have to question whether the RPF could be called a guerrilla movement at all'*.²²⁵ Much like the EPLF, this is an extremely well organised, efficient military machine beyond the dreams of most armed movements. In this early period, the RPF demonstrated institutional strength beyond 'charismatic authority'.²²⁶ When Fred Rwigyema, commander of the RPF, was killed on October 2nd (the second day of fighting), the RPF – though halted – did not collapse. It also survived the following month, in which its two interim commanders, Peter Banyingana and Chris Bunyenyezi were also both killed. Paul Kagame did not return to assume command until November. It is difficult to think of a rebel movement from Burundi which would have survived such shocks without, as far as reported, any high-ranking defections. In general, the RPF has far more similarities with the armies which form the subject of Tilly's argument than almost any of their contemporary guerrilla movements.

Second, consider who the rebels *fought*. The Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) did not have any combat experience when the RPF invaded in 1990, but they were reasonably well-trained, organised, equipped, and knew the terrain better than the RPF. Nor had the forces that RPF combatants had engaged before then been soft targets (the Ugandan Army under Amin and Obote, and the Lord's Resistance Army are more serious customers than pushovers like the Mobutu-era FAZ). Jeffrey Herbst has observed that rebel movements which last for any sustained period of time tend to mimic the quality of the state they are fighting.²²⁷ Rebels fighting strong functioning states (the EPLF and Ethiopia, UNITA and Angola, and the RPF and Rwanda) tend to take on many of the aspects of states themselves; systems of 'moral education', bureaucratic organisation, secure and regular revenue flows, 'encadrement', and so on. Those which do not (Sierra Leone's RUF, the NPFL in Liberia, the various armed resistance movements in Haiti during the 1990s) themselves reflect the dysfunction of their antagonists. Why? Two potential mechanisms: firstly, in persuading people to fight against a state which functions, the job of appearing credible requires that you also possess many of the attributes of 'stateness'. This may work as a general

²²⁵ Prunier, "The Rwandan Patriotic Front.", p119.

²²⁶ Weber, *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology*.

²²⁷ Jeffrey Herbst, "Economic incentives, natural resources and conflict in Africa," *Journal of African Economies* 9, no. 3 (2000).

maxim, but certainly can't have had much effect with respect to the RPF, if only because the task of persuasion was directed to a diaspora community widely and repeatedly harassed by their host governments across the Great Lakes, and not permitted to return to MRND-ruled Rwanda. Secondly, and more importantly, facing an enemy over a sustained period of time which actually has the capacity to fight back requires rebels to build up the strength to continue fighting, or be destroyed. This latter part of Herbst's account is pure Tilly. And in the case of the RPF, it is true. The period between 1990 and 1994 was a crucial period in the growth of the effectiveness of almost every part of the RPF directly involved in the prosecution of the war.²²⁸ The logistical and provision structures set up during this period became critical in the aftermath of the genocide, as detailed in the next chapter.

Third, the RPF is an extremely bad fit for the 'greed and grievance' accounts of civil conflict²²⁹ which have an almost hegemonic status in some policy and donor circles. These accounts model civil conflict as a dynamic two-player game in which both actors are profit-maximising agents seeking the rents associated with power, or those profits that can be achieved through predation during the conflict. In all models the players – usually the government and the rebels – are treated as 'black boxes' whose motivations are determined by revealed preference. Collective identity, if mentioned at all, is regarded as a residue of Darwinian survival processes generating durable animosities between groups, and lowering the costs of cooperation within the group. Civil war is then modelled as

...an investment or resource allocation designed to raise the probability of toppling the government or of drawing monopoly profits from the loot or instant taxation of primary commodities. Rebellion is thus clearly akin to rent seeking²³⁰

²²⁸ There is not space in this chapter to detail precisely the transformations, but it is not controversial to claim that this period saw dramatic improvements in the mobilisation of troops, their training, the tapping of funds in the diaspora, links between different arms of the RPF across the RPF, and so on.

²²⁹ E.g. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *Greedy and grievance in civil war*, Policy research working paper (Washington, DC: World Bank, Development Research Group, 2000), or James D Fearon and David D Laitin, "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003).

²³⁰ C. Cramer, "Homo economicus goes to war: Methodological individualism, rational choice and the political economy of war," *World Development* 30, no. 11 (2002).

Whilst the general usefulness of such theories is contested,²³¹ they are particularly unhelpful in understanding the RPF. As the RPF does not raise capital through 'instant' taxation of the population (but rather through extensive 'tithing' of the Rwandan diaspora, much like the EPLF), many of the unhelpful consequences of said behaviour (the criminalisation of the military movement, the tendencies to fragmentation caused by the easy availability of lootable resources, and the destruction of any potential rapport between the population and the armed movement) do not apply here.²³²

It might be thought that this is also a counterexample to Charles Tilly's claim that one of the core connections between war and state-building is that it forces the state (or rebel movement) to build up networks of capital accumulation with the population it rules over in order to prosecute the war (i.e. a tax system). This is unfair to Charles Tilly: the processes identified in *Capital, Coercion, and European States*²³³ are long-term macro-sociological processes which only begin in the event that [a] the parties waging conflict have long enough event horizons for it to make sense to build up 'non-instant' means of raising revenue from the population, and [b] they control territory for a significant enough period of time to become 'stationary bandits'.²³⁴

Where those conditions *do* obtain, we would expect to see long-term revenue raising relationships between rebels and the populations, as indeed we do in the cases of Angola's UNITA and El Salvador's FMLN. Where the conflict is not anticipated to last a long time and rebels do not have these relationships, the kind of instant taxation and looting Collier and Hoeffler identify is more likely to emerge, as indeed is the case with the Sierra Leonean RUF. The RPF are *neither* a long-term rebellion like UNITA or the FMLN, nor do they engage in predation in the manner of the RUF. Part of the explanation for this is simply that the part of the Rwandan countryside they occupied did not afford

²³¹ Laurie Nathan, "'The frightful inadequacy of most of the statistics': a critique of Collier and Hoeffler on causes of civil war," in *Crisis States Research Centre Discussion Papers* (London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, 2005); Cramer, "Homo economicus goes to war: Methodological individualism, rational choice and the political economy of war."

²³² Collier and Hoeffler do factor diasporas into their argument, but only as a variable increasing the likelihood of civil war incidence (their argument being that the presence of a diaspora offsets the lack/depreciation of 'rebellion-specific capital'). What they do not ask, to my knowledge, is what effect the option of fundraising through a diaspora has on the *character* of that conflict.

²³³ Tilly, *Coercion, capital, and European states, A.D. 990-1992*.

²³⁴ Mancur Olson, *Power and prosperity : outgrowing communist and capitalist dictatorships* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

either lootable resources or a population to instantly tax (almost all had fled). This is in many ways a good thing, as it militates against the kind of criminalisation and factionalism exhibited by so many African guerrilla movements. Again, the success of the Rwandan Army *as institution of reconstruction* in the post-genocidal era, can be explained in part by the experience of conflict beforehand. Once the RPF had control of the territory we do indeed see the emergence of the macro-sociological phenomena predicted by a Tilly model. However, the logic is slightly different: the RPF get by in the immediate post-genocidal period on diasporic ‘tithes’ and international aid which enable them to get control of the land in order to tax it and build the coercive capacity of the state.²³⁵

Fourth, and most simply, the RPF *won*. This is of fundamental importance to understanding the politics of post-genocidal Rwanda, as the next section will argue.

Part Four: Political Leadership

The RPF, upon their assumption of power, formally committed themselves to the protocols laid out in the Arusha Accords. However, with the MRND removed, the only other parties to the accord were the internal opposition which had emerged in the 1990s, which were decimated by the violence meted out in the genocide. Although the accord itself emanated from a ‘deadlocked peace’ (i.e. where no one military force is able to decisively defeat the others), in a comparable way to the Chapultepec Peace Accords in El Salvador, the difference is that all parties to that accord survived to the peace, creating the pluralistic political scene which characterises post-war El Salvador. In Rwanda, by contrast, an accord which on paper created a pluralistic government of national unity obscured the reality in which the RPF were the only organisation in the political field with organisation muscle. As such, the governing coalition of the post-genocidal period was never between partners of equal strength. Furthermore, the experience of exile, the experience of the Ugandan liberation struggle of the NRM, and the military socialisation of RPF elites

²³⁵ Interestingly, this is a much faster route to state capacity than any identified in Tilly’s account of early modern states (in which there were no expatriate Europeans to send money home to ‘kick-start’ the process).

gave them a fundamentally different vision of the state from the opposition figures which had emerged within Rwanda.²³⁶

Three things follow from this. Firstly, it should not surprise us that the major fault line of post-genocidal politics within Rwanda has been between RPF former exiles and civilian politicians from the old opposition. Secondly, it should not surprise us that this is a fight which RPF military elites won. Almost all of those civilian politicians who were incorporated into the government of unity after the genocide were either co-opted or forced out of politics altogether by the end of the decade. Thirdly, the defection of civilian elites from the government has not destabilised politics, for the simple reason that they lacked (and continue to lack) the resources to act as effective counter-elites. The defections/expulsions of figures such as Alphonse-Marie Nkubito, Faustin Twagiramungu, Seth Sendashonga, or Joseph Sebarenzi did not fundamentally change the rules of the game either, because there was never serious political organisation outside the RPF party machine (formed out of over a decade of political organising in exile, and a four year civil war), and the party machine itself doesn't really splinter (more on this in the next section). Correlatively, we should not view the activities of contemporary civilian politicians (such as Victoire Ingabire or Bernard Ntaganda) as challenging the current dispensation, because they too lack the organisational muscle to challenge the hegemonic position of the RPF. Because of the nature of past conflict in Rwanda, it is difficult to imagine any challenge to the current position of the regime emerging from *outside* the RPF, or from isolated civilian defectors from the regime (such as Frank Habineza).

What the departure of Sengashonga, Nkubito, et al *did* do is grant the RPF virtually unconstrained control over the formal institutions of the executive. Moreover, the 2003 constitution ensures that Parliament and other potential institutional constraints are weak. One implication of this is that the executive is in a position to preclude future attempts to build oppositional political strength, and do so 'legally' as many

²³⁶ Again, space precludes detailed discussion of the character of the new Rwandan political imaginary until the final chapter of this thesis. Suffice to say, the ideological tendencies of the new Rwandan elite tend to marry a fairly standard high Modernism in the Nyerere mould with a historical reimagining of an idealised pre-colonial period, race-and-ethnicity-blind nationalism, and a participatory localism reminiscent of Museveni's NRM.

competitive authoritarian regimes do.²³⁷ In Burundi, by way of contrast, the weakness and shared character of the consociational executive left the ruling party, CNDD-FDD, with little option but to fight the opposition through extra-judicial means (arson attacks on party offices, employing gangs of thugs to break up rallies, etc) given that they are unwilling to countenance losing. In Rwanda, much of the repertoire of repression is comparatively judicialised (denying parties registration, arrests on charges of ‘genocide ideology’, etc). Granted, both ruling elites deploy both judicial and extra-judicial means of repression, but the difference of degree is significant.

This has one key implication: public space in Rwanda shows little sign of becoming saturated with violence in the manner of Burundi. The more credible fear is that institutions of the state are so thoroughly co-opted as instruments of the rule of one party that they would be unable to mediate any serious political conflict *between* parties, should such conflict emerge.

The key question, therefore, if we are to try and anticipate future trends, is whether such conflicts are likely to emerge. If I am right that serious threats to the current political supremacy of the RPF are unlikely to emerge from *outside* the elite, or from isolated defections,²³⁸ our core concern must be as to whether the famed unity and cohesion of the RPF is sustainable. It is to that I will now turn. The steady stream of expulsions, exiles, and defections from the government since 1994 has led some observers to allege that this elite is highly unstable, but masks a deeper unity to the Rwandan political elite. A small core of individuals with near monopolistic control over core policy decisions has remained pre-eminent from the immediate post-genocidal period until the present day. That is not to say that there is *no* conflict within this elite (there is) or that no individuals have entered or left this ruling circle (they have), but that the basic constitution of the innermost circle of power is unaltered.

This is in stark contrast to the Rwandan government’s discursive presentation of itself as a diverse coalition commanding broad support and a democratic mandate to rule. This is a vital part of the

²³⁷ Cf. Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War.*, or Valerie J Bunce and Sharon L Wolchik, *Defeating authoritarian leaders in postcommunist countries* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

²³⁸ This theme is returned to in chapters two and three.

legitimizing discourse of the modern Rwandan government as politically representative and ‘ethnically legitimate’. From 1994, the RPF-led government appointed members of Rwanda’s two major ethnic groups to high-level government posts. Although former Defence Minister Paul Kagame took over the Presidency in April 2000, Hutus continue to head key ministries. Throughout the RPF’s years in office, the Prime Minister has always been a Hutu, and many Hutus have reached high-ranking positions within the army. The inclusivity extends to those involved with the previous regime; a Hutu minister from the old Habyarimana government, Marcel Gatsinzi, was Defence Minister until 2010. All parties – except Habyarimana’s *Mouvement Républicain National pour le Développement* and the Hutu-extremist *Coalition pour la Défense de la République* – have been officially included in the new government. Members of these parties occupy seats both in parliament and government.

Whilst this describes the government, it does not describe the elite networks which occupy ‘the strategic command posts of power’,²³⁹ i.e. those networks which direct the activity of the party-state. Gérard Prunier characterises this as a dual power structure within Rwanda, ‘There is of course a government...but this government carries out policies, it does not define them’.²⁴⁰ There are countless examples supplied by former members of the government which point to three trends. First, examples of a wide range of policy questions (notably on military policy, resettlement, and the integration of refugees) being decided outside cabinet by a small circle round the Presidency. Secondly, functions of the state being transferred wholesale to networks answerable to the presidency, and administered by officials in the military, most famously in the form of ‘the Congo Desk’ in the Ministry of Defence, which directly administered the extraction of, and revenue from Congolese mineral wealth during the period 1996 to 2003. Thirdly, extra-legal behaviour indicative of a shadow state network of revenue and command within the military. To illustrate this last case, Prunier cites the example of a former Finance Minister who had often questioned the disbursement of large unauthorised sums of money to the military:

²³⁹ Mills, *The power elite*.

²⁴⁰ Gérard Prunier, "The Social, Political, and Economic Situation," in *Issue Paper formerly posted on <http://www.writenet.org> (now available from the author on request)* (1997).

[In 1996] then Minister of Finance, Marc Rugarera, was asked point blank by an RPA colonel to give him USD 500,000 "to take care of urgent matters". When asked to state in greater detail what the money was for he said it was to pay his men. The Minister then asked him for a detailed list of personnel for whom this money was earmarked and what their salaries were. Whereupon the Colonel exploded and told Rugarera that he would "hear about it". Later, Vice President and Minister of Defence Major General Paul Kagame phoned Rugarera and told him to pay the USD 500,000 to the Colonel "for the good of the country". Rugarera did not push the matter any further and arranged for payment of the monies. This illustrates fairly well the relationship between the Army and the civilian government.²⁴¹

Which is to say: policy is driven by a small elite within the government, and the military is their 'organisational weapon' of choice. The military should not be viewed as another autonomous actor in Rwanda's politics; military involvement means the involvement of a top-down hierarchy answerable to the Presidency and overseen by insiders.²⁴² Rwandan politicians are often quite open about this: Dr Richard Sezibera, the current Minister of Health, remarked to an American diplomat in 1996 that 'until the Rwandan people are educated, a key requisite for real democracy is that people vote in their interests, [therefore] the military will need to participate in the political process.'²⁴³

To say that this makes the Rwandan state *only* a facade is polemic, and overstates the case: much of the manner in which the opposition were marginalised in the 2010 elections was for the most part constitutional and judicialised: the suspension of *Umuwigizi* and *Umuseso*, two independent Kinyarwanda dailies, was effected using the statutes of the Media High Council; some potential-counter elites were silenced using genocide ideology laws, and so on. Simply labelling Rwanda's elite a 'mafia' misses the point: there is both a constitutional government *and* an administrative regime, with the Presidency at the apex of both. As such, whilst the regime engages in a set of para-constitutional practices, it is not the

²⁴¹ Ibid., p45.

²⁴² For example, there are several secretaries employed to work at *both* Minadef and the Office of the President. There were indications that this extremely tight relationship between the Presidency and the military was weakening in the spring of 2003. However, the arrests of two generals – Charles Muhire and Karenzi Kareke – and the replacement of Marcel Gatsinzi with James Kaberebe – loyalist *par excellence* – as Minister of Defence appears to have been sufficient to forestall any subsequent fracture.

²⁴³ Quoted in interview O12.

strategy of the elite to undermine the constitution. The state relies on both the self-sustaining practices of genuinely rule-bound (i.e. constitutional) institutions much of the time, but also the armoury of mechanical elite politics: it is suspended between these two modes of rule.

The core questions this poses are, firstly, what is the nature of this elite, and secondly, what is the nature of the military? Presently, the absolute innermost circle of power is occupied by a small section of the former Ugandan diaspora. Since military victory, the political, economic and military networks of the RPF have been closely linked, with this group at the apex. This report by the UK asylum office is a fairly standard statement of this position:

The RPF has a minority of cabinet seats and assembly places, but it continues to dominate the government's policies. Whilst the coalition government appears to be fairly inclusive, with the participation of the MDR, PSD, PL and PCD [all parties assigned government posts in the Arusha Accords], in addition to the RPF, it merely implements policies under the current system. Responsibility for defining policy appears to be concentrated in the hands of a few, and all the key positions in the power structure are occupied by RPA officers or former RPA officers, who came to Rwanda from Uganda, where they were based until 1994.²⁴⁴

Given the centralisation of power in Rwanda, it should not surprise us that this inner network has a disproportionate amount of influence on political decisions which matter. They also shape control of, and access to political and economic resources. So who are they? Any analysis that attempts to explain Rwandan elite cohesion solely in terms of class won't do. The Rwandan core elite does not sustain its position solely through control of economic resources and access to markets; these are obviously important, but must be situated within more complex social networks. Nor will the contested notion of ethnicity be sufficient: the bonds which link the elite do not – strictly speaking – exclude Hutu, and there are plenty of Tutsis outside them. Neither is access to this elite defined by holding of positions of state.

²⁴⁴ UK-IND, "Rwanda Assessment," (London: UK Immigration and Nationality Directorate, 2001).

The 'entry criteria' of the elite must be defined sociologically. In the case of the current elite,²⁴⁵ social networks are constituted through four overlapping and mutually reinforcing parameters:

First, much of this elite grew up in the Ugandan refugee camps of Nakivale and Orukinga, in the Mbarara region. From these two camps came a tightly-knit group of people clustered in Kigali around Paul Kagame: in 2001, the RPA's Chief of Staff, Col. Kayumba Nyamwasa; the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defence, Brig. Gen. Frank Rusagara; Paul Kagame's special advisor and Director-General of the National Security Service, Lt. Col. Dr. Emmanuel Ndahiro; Presidency Minister, Dr. Charles Mazimpaka; Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice, Gerald Gahima (former Minister of Justice and Attorney General); Lt. Col. Wilson Rutaysire, the Director of the Rwandan Information Office until his death in Eastern DRC in 2000; and Protais Musoni, latterly the Prefect of Kigali, and now the Minister of Local Government overseeing the villagisation and 'decentralisation' policies. The crucial intermediaries in the Congolese theatre were also born in these camps; Lt. Col. Fred Ibingira, who was in charge of the armoured division; and Lt. Gen. Charles Kayonga, director of the South-Kivu operations in 1996.

Second, many of these men were educated at the Ntare secondary school, as were Kagame and two of his most prominent advisors; Claude Dusäidi and Cesar Kayizali. They went on to study at Makerere University, as did Rusagara, Kayumba, Dusäidi, Kayizali and Musoni. At Makerere, they were involved in a clandestine association of refugee students, along with James Kabarebe, now Minister of Defence. Former ministers Aloysia Inyumba and Joseph Karemera, as well as the former boss of the DMI, Karenzi Karake, were also members.

Third, family links the elite. Col. Frank Mugambage (formerly third in command at the Military, now High Commissioner to Uganda) is related to Col. Joseph Karemera (Ambassador to South Africa), himself a cousin of Donat Kaberuka (Minister of Finance). Former Secretary-General of the RPF and then Ambassador to Washington, Théogène Rudasingwa is the brother of Gerald Gahima (now both in

²⁴⁵ There is evidence that this is not the only network within the RPF, merely that which is currently ascendant, and that there have been prior power struggles in which other networks have been marginalised or dismantled. The discussion of these groups, unfortunately, will have to wait for another paper.

exile). Their sister, war hero Doreen Kayitesi, is married to Major General Martin Nzaramba, in charge of North Kivu operations as a colonel in 1996. Protais Musoni is Patrick Mazimpaka's brother-in-law. Aloysia Inyumba's husband is Lt. Colonel Dr. Richard Masozera. He is Director of Immigration and Emigration. Emmanuel Ndahiro is Paul Kagame's cousin, as is Fred Ibingira.²⁴⁶ This third aspect should not be overstated: this is a relatively standard level of authoritarian incestuousness and nepotism, and certainly far less than within elites such as in Singapore or Soviet Russia.²⁴⁷

Fourth, participation in armed struggle within the NRA during the 1980s completes the set of ties which connect all people of significance in Rwanda.²⁴⁸ High ranking officers such as Bagire, Muhire and Ngoga (from the camps at Toro, and without any higher education) received their admission into the higher circles of the military after their success in NRA campaigns. Kayumba and Nzaramba worked with Kagame in the Ugandan Military Intelligence Service, and served with him in Acholiland in 1987-88.

As such, it is not merely that Rwandan competitive authoritarianism makes the emergence of counter-elites unlikely. The bases of solidarity within the elite are also far stronger than those linking many contemporary political elites. This is not to say that there is no conflict within the elite, but it is evidence to support the claim that the current Rwandan political dispensation is stable - at least for the moment - and will regulate conflict *within* this elite at almost any cost, rather than allowing it to imperil the stability of the system.

This also, however, highlights precisely where future sources of instability may lie. April 2010 saw the arrest of two extremely high-profile generals, Karenzi Karake and Charles Muhire. These follow from the defections of two other senior military figures in 2007, Kayumba Nyamwasa and Patrick Karegeya, and

²⁴⁶ This list could go on very much longer. Most of these details can be found in multiple sources, but one place to start is <http://www.mdrwi.org/rapports%20et%20doc/autres%20partis%20polit/rpf.htm> (as long as it is taken with an extremely large pinch of salt). I am particularly indebted to Dorsey for drawing my attention to these links. This presentation here owes much to his work in 2000.

²⁴⁷ Gordon Paul Means, "Soft authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 4 (1996); Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism: ordinary life in extraordinary times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

²⁴⁸ Obviously, this is not to say that all people of significance are connected in all four of these ways, merely that these are the four routes whereby the elite is constituted, and that at the very heart, they do indeed tend to fuse.

two prominent political fixers from the ‘struggle generation’ in 2005, Gerald Gahima and Théogène Rudasingwa. Whilst it is not unusual for middle-ranking RPF cadres of varying degrees of seniority to go into exile (which is what you would expect in a centralised state with a military which is now too large for the peacetime role allocated to it), these are central figures within the political establishment, and indicate that the bonds which unify the RPF political project may be weakening. Moreover, these four have not been silent in exile, but jointly released a ‘Rwanda Briefing’ in August 2010,²⁴⁹ wherein they passionately criticise the government on almost every conceivable count.

What is striking about these defections, however, is how little effect they appear to have had. Although it is difficult to say too much about the inner workings of this notoriously secretive elite, these defections appear to have done little to weaken the Presidency or the RPF hegemony within the country as yet (for all that it is difficult to say what it would look like if they had). This is in part because the strength of the executive is such that individuals in the government can gain power and status, but cannot leverage that influence afforded to them by their positions to undermine the goals of the Presidency. Again, Rwanda exhibits institutionalised politics and the politics of elite networks in tandem: whilst it suits the Presidency to utilise elite networks to bypass formal institutions, it does. But it can equally do the reverse.

Furthermore, there hasn’t been much by way of *public* reaction or outcry to the arrests,²⁵⁰ and strictly speaking *none* of the four (Nyamwasa, Karegyeya, Muhire or Kareke) have been accused of coup-plotting (however, the government did say that Nyamwasa was corrupt, and plotting something, and it is difficult to see what he would have been plotting if not some coup-like challenge to the authority of the Presidency). The rhetoric of the RPF themselves increasingly suggests an embattled regime confronted by relentless internal enemies and external criticism. The interesting thing is that they don’t really face that: internally: the media is largely compliant, the opposition toothless, and the critical NGOs expelled. Externally, they’ve joined the Commonwealth, had rapprochement with the French and the Congolese, and international comment on the 2010 elections was muted insofar as it was critical. Even the publication of the UN report accusing the RPF of acts of genocide in the DRC between 1996 and 1998

²⁴⁹ General Kayumba Nyamwasa et al., "Rwanda Briefing," Retrieved July 9(2010).

²⁵⁰ Not that there would be in a country with public space as tightly controlled as Rwanda’s.

appears to have done little to change Rwanda's relations with the external world: for all that Kagame-bashing appears to be in vogue, there have been no sanctions, and only temporary suspensions of aid. So the furious reaction of the Rwandan state seems disproportionate. They don't really have justification, as nobody internationally is anywhere near as critical or as prescriptive in their pronouncements as they would be with similar behaviour in, say, Burundi, nor seriously challenging the regime. This suggests two possibilities. The first is a regime rhetorically constructing threats in order to justify other policies, the second is a regime losing touch with reality. The former works as a general explanation for why, for example, the Rwandan government occasionally overstates the security threats they face, but doesn't make much sense as an explanation for overstating the seriousness of the donor critique. The latter, however, is credible for a very small, closed elite with a great deal of paranoia to begin with.

Part Five: The Institutions of the Military

If the military remains the core institution of the Rwandan state, it is important to assess what kind of institution it is. The army remains the institution which is, firstly, the core institution for the implementation of state policy,²⁵¹ secondly, the key space for the socialisation of the elite, and thirdly, one of the key links between the political elite and the citizenry. It is also extremely unusual: it is a disciplined institution beyond the aspirations of most African militaries; it is a very structured and tightly run organisation. Both the army and the police (with which they are very closely linked) have extremely effective internal policing structures, and the rank and file are genuinely ethnically mixed (in contrast to the Burundian army, which remains in essence a Tutsi army). Whilst it is true that there are more Tutsi in the top ranks,²⁵² it is nonetheless one of the few genuinely multi-ethnic institutions in Rwanda. It is integrated directly into the political structure: following the Ugandan model, there are places in parliament for the military. It can (and frequently does) function as the 'organisational weapon' in the heart of the state.

²⁵¹ In part, but not only, because so much key state policy since 1994 has been military in nature (counterinsurgency, operations in the DRC, etc).

²⁵² See Appendix 3.

This institutional strength has been testified to on repeated occasions.²⁵³ One former US diplomat who had worked extensively with the Rwandan military from 1994 to 2009 remarked ‘The RDF as it professionalizes becomes all the more disciplined, efficient and well-managed. They are amongst the best I have seen’.²⁵⁴ Their effectiveness is demonstrated not only by their prosecution of the civil war against the FAR, but also their performance in counterinsurgency operations in 1996-‘98 and 2002, and the operations in Zaire/DRC.²⁵⁵ The literature is in agreement that effectiveness has improved as the force trained and received training from Western militaries and more of its officers and NCOs went to schools outside Rwanda.

Of particular note is their peacekeeping performance in Darfur. This experience points to the second key aspect of the army: the RDF, like many former guerrilla movements, is highly integrated with society. During deployment, Rwandans were much better than, say, their Nigerian colleagues at identifying when attacks were likely to happen, what had to be protected (i.e. places where water was being collected), and so on.²⁵⁶ This is indicative of a fighting force which can, in an extremely short time, embed itself within a community, such that its members were frequently better informed about the realities on the ground than ostensibly authoritative Sudanese interlocutors. Although, as I have pointed out earlier, the RPF never built substantive links *within* Rwandan territory prior to 1994, the relationship built up with the Rwandan diaspora, particularly in the Ugandan refugee camps, created a military force with thick linkages to the communities in which they were embedded.

The military sustains this integration within contemporary Rwanda. There is a raft of mechanisms for integration within Rwandan society which is both extremely localised and almost quotidian. These include; firstly, the institutionalised presence of the military in civilian development projects throughout

²⁵³ For this point I am indebted to the theses written by students of American military colleges, in particular, Maj. R. Beeland Rehder Jr., "From Guerillas to Peacekeepers: The Evolution of the Rwandan Defence Forces" (Masters Thesis, Marine Corps University, 2008); R Muhirwa, "Rwandese Patriotic Army Logistics Unit (G4): Assessment and Recommendations for Change" (Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2000); Sam Ruhunga, "Military Integration as a Factor for Post-Conflict Stability and Reconciliation: Rwanda, 1994-2005" (Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006).

²⁵⁴ Interview OTH12.

²⁵⁵ Whilst the behaviour of the RDF during this period is extremely controversial (see particularly the leaked UN Mapping Report on Human Rights Abuses in the DRC), that is only to say that the military is used to do things we may not like. It is not to say that *as military*, the RDF are not a phenomenally effective force.

²⁵⁶ Interview RW29.

the country during 'Army Week' (see figure 8 for an indication of the sorts of activities involved); secondly, the role of the military in Ingando ('solidarity') camps for all returnees to Rwanda;²⁵⁷ thirdly, the military-owned Zigama Credit & Savings Society, originally set up by the military as a cooperative to meet the welfare needs of soldiers, and now a microfinance business serving the general population with 14 branches, 60,000 members, more than 50 percent of the assets and liabilities and nearly all the profits in the microfinance sector; and fourthly, through their pattern of peacetime deployment.²⁵⁸ The army can be found not in fixed installations, but usually in tented camps which are much more mobile. In general, there are frequent patrols in the countryside (especially round Ruhengeri and Gisenyi). The officer core is also very dispersed; many of them live in their homes. What follows from this is that Rwanda doesn't really have huge garrisons insulated from wider society (in sharp contrast to the standard post-colonial pattern). This, for obvious reasons, precludes the formation of the distinctive military sociology behind almost every African coup of the post-colonial era.²⁵⁹

What *explains* this integrative capacity is, firstly, a guerrilla army methodology forged in the refugee camps of Uganda and borrowed in part from the NRA, and secondly, a doctrine formed in response to the need to press ex-FAR into the RPA in 1998 to fight in the counter-insurgency in the north-west of the country. When the RPA integrated about 250-300 ex-FAR in the spring of 1998, the tide shifted decisively in favour of RPA. The decision was informed by the logic that 'the best counter insurgent is a former insurgent',²⁶⁰ and that these largely Hutu recruits were from the areas in question. This reasoning appears to have been sound. The links they formed with the local predominantly Hutu population in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures (a previous bastion of Hutu-power extremism from where Habyarimana drew the bulk of his security forces) were critical in defeating the insurgency. Since then, keeping the military

²⁵⁷ Chi Mgbako, "Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda," *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 18(2005).

²⁵⁸ It is likely that Zigama CSS is also one of the routes through which quasi-legal patronage is channelled. In February of 2010 it was reported that ZIGAMA CSS made a payment of Frw16,000,050 in 2005 to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) but the details of the transaction were not availed during the audit and that there is no evidence to show that this payment was approved by the account holder for eligible beneficiaries. See C. Kwizera, "KIST Locks Horns With Zigama," *The New Times* 2010, 27th February.

²⁵⁹ Ruth First, *The barrel of a gun : political power in Africa and the coup d'état* (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970).

²⁶⁰ Interview RW33.

integrated in this manner has been a key part of doctrine.²⁶¹ As such, the pattern of conflict in the Great Lakes has directly influenced the degree of social and political integration of the military. This is also one of the key reasons why using the military as the core institution of state is less dangerous than it could be elsewhere.

Thirdly, the institutional structure of the military is crucial. The only sort of coup which seems possible in the Rwandan context would be one on the model of Pakistan or Turkey where the existing structure of the army is used to take control.²⁶² This is because the way wars were fought has guaranteed that the institution has a social existence independent of the individuals within it (viz: it is a genuine bureaucracy): Rwandan generals don't really have close retinues clustering around them.²⁶³ First, although the army is structured, it is on a very ad-hoc basis: battalions are assembled for specific purposes and then reconstituted as the situation demands (it is almost impossible to construct an order of battle in Rwanda: it changes too often). A comparison with the DRC is telling: the Rwandan military has no divisional commanders which build up courts around them (they simply don't exist). This is one of the reasons why although both the Rwandan and Ugandan armies have been accused of plundering mineral wealth from the DRC, the pattern of extraction is very different: the general claim with respect to the Ugandan forces is about colonels lining their own pockets independently, the Rwandan troops are accused of operating a centralised structure of plunder where profits were channelled through the 'Congo Desk' in Kigali.²⁶⁴ Second, there is no proper junior officer cadre (there are NCOs, but people tend to enter the army at a junior level, are then promoted to NCOs, and then promoted again) – it's not an entry level position, nor do soldiers tend to stay there. As such, there is no NCO *class*, which makes it difficult to imagine a 'revolutionary coup' of the sort seen in Egypt in 1956 or Ghana in 1979). Third, decision-making

²⁶¹ Interview RW33.

²⁶² This is only one small parallel. In many other ways (e.g. their existence as separate sociological worlds insulated from Pakistani or Turkish society, their very entrenched organisational structures, etc) these armies are very different from the RPA.

²⁶³ If any Rwandan General did, it was Kayumba Nyamwasa, and whilst his departure has been met with discontent within the ranks, it is generally accepted that the accusations of corruption had basis in fact, and I think it is unlikely that his departure could dramatically change the way the army functions.

²⁶⁴ Michael Dorsey, "Violence and Power-Building in Post-Genocide Rwanda," in *Politics of Identity and Economies of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region*, ed. R Doom and J Gorus (Brussels: VUB University Press, 2000); C. Dietrich, "The Commercialisation of Military Deployment in Africa," *African Security Review* 9, no. 1 (2000); Reyntjens, "The privatisation and criminalisation of public space in the geopolitics of the Great Lakes region."

structures vertically link higher and lower ranks.²⁶⁵ Maj.-Gen. Frank Rusagara has written about the ‘collegiate’ decision-making structures of operational command.²⁶⁶ This should not just be dismissed as fashionable rhetoric: operational plans at battalion and brigade level really were developed by a committee comprised of the senior commander, and subordinate (either company or battalion) commanders, and principal staff officers. An American Military Advisor who worked with the military in 1998 observed ‘while it sounds a bit odd, it proved highly effective.’²⁶⁷ This is an extremely clever institutional set-up which fosters incorporation, oversight and bureaucratic rationality at multiple levels: as such it is one which gives the military a stability as an institution of state which is unusual.

Finally, the military is not just integrated with society and political structures, but *with itself*, which is a distant dream for many ostensibly ‘integrated’ post-conflict militaries (most obviously Burundi). The moment of transition in 1994 from rebel army to army of state brought the first wave of integration almost immediately after the RPF took power. In Gako Camp in October 1994 there were about 80-100 ex-FAR officers and many more soldiers undergoing re-education training. This integration training occurred at Gako and lasted about five to six months with those completing the re-education program being integrated into the RPA in January/February 1995. Three aspects of this are important: there actually was a DDR programme, not merely a forced integration overnight, it was a substantial undertaking (i.e. six months); and it was designed *not* by international elites operating under the ‘liberal peacebuilding’ consensus of the UN and others like them, but by the army itself. A larger program occurred after the massive repatriation of refugees in November 1996 (all refugees had to undergo reintegration training). Former ex-FAR and some interahamwe (about 1200-1300) underwent a separate program north of Ruhengeri town for several months.²⁶⁸ This group graduated in late spring of 1998. Of this group about 250-300 were integrated into the RPA (these were the former insurgents which proved so crucial in defeating the insurgency in the north-west). When the Second Congo War began in mid-August 1998 the RPA found itself short of forces. Over the next several months the RPA conducted

²⁶⁵ Which means, further, that they are inclusive at levels at which Tutsi *do not* predominate.

²⁶⁶ Rusagara, Mwaura, and Nyirimanzi, *Resilience of a Nation: A History of the Military in Rwanda*.

²⁶⁷ Interview OTH12.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

forced recruitment of ex-FAR fighters as these men were already trained as military personnel.²⁶⁹ Again, these newly conscripted troops underwent several months of re-education/military refresher training before being integrated into RPA battalions and then being deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. What is key here is that it was the pressures of military engagement which forced the military into becoming a genuinely representative institution, and it was the experience of conflict itself (notably in the DRC) which formed these groups into a single cohesive whole. In short, this is the process of *encadrement* which Tilly cites as one of the core connections between war and state formation. In this case, that logic appears to have been vindicated. Again, what this means is that the military is a far more cohesive institution than many within Rwanda, and than is sometimes claimed by critics.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the distinctive history of conflict in the Great Lakes has created a Rwandan elite which is unified, which lacks serious opposition, and commands an effective state structure which it can use to entrench its political pre-eminence, and pursue its vision of the New Rwanda. Rwanda's state is suspended between constitutional government and administrative regime, which in part explains the polarised nature of the literature. Given that the state employs *both* constitutional and not-quite-as-constitutional means on a routine basis, there is plenty of evidence for Rwanda as *either* an African Pyongyang or an African Singapore, as long as one is prepared to be selective. Further, that specific elite can be accounted for, in part, but the distinctive history of conflict in the Great Lakes region. This chapter has argued that this distinctive history vindicates the logic proposed by Tilly and other theorists within this field.

What I have not yet made explicit is that this strategy of political rule is not just effective, but – more than that – it is necessary. This strategy of political rule relied upon an almost total seizure of political space because the RPF elite, unlike many successful rebels-turned-government, have an astonishingly small

²⁶⁹ Interview RW29.

social base within Rwanda. Given the continued relevance of ethnicity in Rwanda (a reality which – given Rwanda’s history – it is difficult to imagine disappearing in the medium term future, however often the official discourse may claim that ‘all are Rwandans now’), it is difficult to see how the elite can expand beyond the very narrow social base afforded them by the returnee Tutsi community. As this chapter has argued, seeing the RPF as even a ‘Tutsi party’ is inaccurate: the party elite remain largely unconnected to the survivor community, or to various sections of the former diaspora. This narrow base made impossible a settlement like that of Mozambique or Cambodia, where the victorious party engaged in initially pluralist deals which reduced their power in the short term, because both FRELIMO²⁷⁰ and the Cambodian People’s Party²⁷¹ knew that their social base was sufficiently broad for them to be able to become hegemonic in the medium term. The RPF can’t do this, insofar as the constitution of their elite makes it impossible for them to broaden their social base without undermining the structure of rule which makes their present dominance possible. It also appears to be unable (or unwilling) to engage in the process of stitching together a constellation of minorities and sectional interests in the manner of the Baathist regime in Syria,²⁷² which uneasily co-opted an extraordinarily diverse coalition of groups (centred around the Alawi religious group of Bashar Al-Assad) in order to resist attempts to gain power by the Sunni mainstream.

If neither of these routes are taken, Rwanda may prove subject to a political law of gravity: states without social bases may be able to last and rule effectively for the medium term, but not indefinitely. However, the sources of instability in Rwanda are not obvious: the institutions of Rwanda *work* for the current dispensation, the strategies of political control currently adopted do not have an obvious shelf-life, and the integrated nature and institutional framework of the Rwandan military partially negates the problems associated with the narrowness of the policy-making elite. Further, the Rwandan military elite could not be undone in the manner of the slow death of the Turkish military elite over the past few years: they do not face a coming confrontation with a unified status group analogous to the ‘Green Capitalist’ elite

²⁷⁰ Margaret Hall and Tom Young, *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since independence* (London: Hurst, 1997).

²⁷¹ Wendy Lambourne, "Postconflict Peacebuilding in Cambodia and Rwanda," in *Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice*, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2001).

²⁷² Judson C Moiles, "Unity, Freedom and Socialism: The Assads, the Ba'ath and the Making of Modern Syria," *Grand Valley Journal of History* 2, no. 1 (2012).

which has formed the core of the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP).²⁷³ Understanding why that is forms the core of the next two chapters.

²⁷³ Michael Rubin, "Green money, Islamist politics in Turkey," *Middle East Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (2005).

Chapter Two: make a desert, and call it peace

Personne ne veut mettre de l'ordre dans cette situation qui a assez duré, il faudra bien que nous le fassions nous-mêmes...²⁷⁴

- Paul Kagame to Colette Braeckman, 7th April 1999.²⁷⁵

Sovereign is he who decides on the exception

- Carl Schmitt²⁷⁶

The structure of this chapter will be to document and unpack the four key political ‘moments’ of Rwanda’s ‘Transition Period’, which ran from the conclusion of the 1994 genocide to the formal inauguration of a ‘normal’ civilian political order in 2003 with the constitutional referendum that created Rwanda’s Third Republic. Those are; firstly, the Arusha Accords of August 1993, which set the notional rules of the political game for the period, and whose drafting reveals much about the style and strategy of the RPF; secondly, the immediate post-genocidal period (1994-’96), in which lawful and extra-judicial modifications of the Arusha settlement at both the elite and non-elite level established the bedrock of RPF hegemony; thirdly, the professionalization and rationalisation of the state which enabled it to finally defeat insurgent challenges to the rule of the new state (1996-’98); and finally, the establishment of routinized RPF structures throughout the country, and their fusion with the state (particularly around the local elections of 1999 and 2001), which gave the ruling elite the confidence that they could relax control sufficiently to institute the formally democratic constitutional order of post-transition Rwanda. I make no pretence in this chapter to be offering a comprehensive or definitive account of all of these aspects of the Rwandan political system. For many of these issues gaps and misinformation make that largely impossible. But overcoming such barriers is not necessary in order to meet the evidential bar needed here.

²⁷⁴ “Nobody wants to bring order to this situation, which has gone on quite long enough, (so) it will be necessary that we do it ourselves” (author’s translation).

²⁷⁵ Colette Braeckman, “Entretien avec Paul Kagame,” *Le Soir* 1999, February 5th.

²⁷⁶ C. Schmitt, *Political theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p5.

Rather, these are paradigmatic cases that illustrate the general logic of the current Rwandan political system.

Part One: The Arusha Accords

Unlike many cases where armed movements fought their way to military victory (e.g. Eritrea after 1991, Ethiopia after 1990, Uganda after 1987, or South Sudan), the RPF took power in Kigali with a relatively clear constitutional settlement. Formally, they (along with the MRND on behalf of the government of Rwanda, hereafter GoR) remained signatories to the Arusha Accords, the collection of five agreements signed between 16th of September 1991 and the 3rd of August 1993. These accords committed the RPF, formally speaking, to a broadly consociational government of national unity (called the Broad Based Transitional Government, the BBTG, which would include the RPF, the MRND, and the five internal opposition parties), which would integrate the RPF into the Rwandan military, permit the repatriate of Rwandan refugees, and initiate a new constitution drafting process to be put to the people within five years of August 1993.

As Clapham points out,²⁷⁷ the Arusha Accords emerged out of an internationally mediated conflict resolution process which ran to a standardised liberal template, and produced a largely standardised liberal model of governance. This model emerged in the shift away from the ‘statism’ of the Cold War era (i.e. the exclusion of rebel groups from a presence in negotiations to end conflict) to one in which both parties (i.e. the state and the rebels) had to be granted standing. The template’s broad outlines were simple: firstly, there would be a cessation of hostilities, followed by an internationally supervised process of negotiation, and then a solution would be negotiated, the key contours of which could be described in advance – a constitution, multi-partyism, a bill of rights including the requisite guarantees for ethnic or regional sub-units, and a big tent government including all the relevant parties which would preside over all this until such time as the first election could be organised. Additional ‘reconciliation policies’ or

²⁷⁷ Christopher Clapham, "Rwanda: the perils of peacemaking," *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 2 (1998).

military integration could be added or subtracted from the template as necessary. Cambodia and Mozambique are cited by Clapham as reasonably successful examples of this, and Angola and Liberia as the dismal failures.

The Arusha Accords fit this broad narrative pretty well: the finished document matches the liberal template in almost all respects. As Scorgie writes, ‘many observers at the time argued that the Arusha Accords were the most successful resolution to an African conflict in history, and had been virtual ‘textbook mediation’²⁷⁸, an opinion shared by Stettenheim²⁷⁹ and the Chief Negotiator at Arusha, Api Mpungwe.²⁸⁰ Its subsequent failure (i.e. to prevent the genocide) is well known, and led to it never being implemented in the form signed by Anastase Gasana²⁸¹ and Pasteur Bizimungu²⁸² in 1993. However, the process whereby it came about already reveals many of what became the key themes of post-genocidal Rwandan politics. The most obvious point is that the RPF emerged from the negotiations as the clear victor, and easily the canniest players in the Rwandan political arena. At least at the beginning of the negotiations (June 1992), the unconditional bilateral ceasefire²⁸³ was definitely to the advantage of the RPF, insofar as it granted them the breathing space to retool, manage the succession from Rwigyema to Paul Kagame, and convert their operations to their later, dramatically more successful guerrilla strategy.²⁸⁴ The protocol of agreement on the Rule of Law the following year committed the GoR to ‘democracy, national unity, pluralism, the respect of fundamental freedoms and rights of the individual’,²⁸⁵ which essentially amounted to the thoroughgoing dismantling of the MRND state. The protocol on power-sharing²⁸⁶ only increased the MRND’s pain by granting *equal* representation to the MRND and the RPF in

²⁷⁸ Lindsay Scorgie, "Rwanda's Arusha Accords: A Missed Opportunity," *Undercurrent* 1, no. 1 (2004), p68.

²⁷⁹ J. Stettenheim, "The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda," in *Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict*, ed. M. C. Greenberg, J. H. Barton, and M. E. McGuiness (New York, NY: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

²⁸⁰ A. R. Mpungwe, "Crisis and Response in Rwanda: Reflections on the Arusha Peace Process," (Johannesburg: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999).

²⁸¹ Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda)

²⁸² Member of the Executive Committee and Commissioner for Information and Documentation (on behalf of the Rwandan Patriotic Front).

²⁸³ Signed in March 1991.

²⁸⁴ Interview OTH3.

²⁸⁵ *Arusha Protocol on the Rule of Law*, August 18th 1992, Republic of Rwanda-Rwandan Patriotic Front. p1.

²⁸⁶ January 1993.

the BBTG. The protocol on repatriation²⁸⁷ unconditionally conceded right of return, something Habyarimana had never before conceded (on the specious grounds that the country was 'full'). Finally, the protocol on military integration²⁸⁸ provided that 40% of the new armed forces would be RPF, and fully 50% of all command positions. Looking through the final treaty, it is extremely hard to find anything which could plausibly be described as having been settled to the advantage of the MRND. As Adelman and Suhrke note, 'the final version of the Arusha Accords read like a victor's deal, rather than a general agreement between relatively equal sides'.²⁸⁹ However, Arusha should not simply be seen as a temporary RPF victory which rapidly became irrelevant due to the genocide - there are four further aspects which illustrate important components of the Rwandan polity.

Firstly, the Arusha negotiations repeatedly demonstrate the coherence, determination, and organisation of the RPF. The military superiority of the RPF was apparent almost immediately after the civil war broke out. After a disastrous first offensive in which almost no territorial gains were made and their leader, Fred Rwigyema, was killed, the RPF rapidly retooled as a guerrilla force able to hold territory and increase their control. The 'well-clad, fed, and equipped' army quickly gained ground on those occasions they broke the truce,²⁹⁰ and had the resources to continue fighting if they needed to, something they made perfectly clear at the time.²⁹¹ On the negotiation side, the RPF was strongly united, highly driven, dedicated to a detailed and agreed set of goals, and strongly skilled in negotiating.²⁹²

Secondly, the negotiations reveal an RPF already skilled at adroitly turning the institutions, language, and routines of liberal governmentality to their advantage. The status granted to the RPF by the highly internationalised process of negotiation far exceeded their hard resources, strictly speaking: it is worth

²⁸⁷ June 1993.

²⁸⁸ August 1993.

²⁸⁹ Adelman and Suhrke, *The path of a genocide: the Rwanda crisis from Uganda to Zaire.*, p149.

²⁹⁰ C. Watson, "War and Waiting," *Africa Report* 37, no. 6 (1992), p54.

²⁹¹ Interview OTH13.

²⁹² Interviews RW33 and OTH3, but also supported by Mpungwe, "Crisis and Response in Rwanda: Reflections on the Arusha Peace Process." and Scorgie, "Rwanda's Arusha Accords: A Missed Opportunity."

remembering that when the negotiations started, the RPF had roughly 4000 men,²⁹³ had advanced a mere 60k into Rwandan territory,²⁹⁴ had next to no presence within the rest of Rwanda, no formal recognition as the official voice of anyone beyond themselves, and only a slight claim to legitimacy and a place at the table in the future of Rwanda (one which the MRND had repeatedly rejected before, and nobody else internationally had called for before the civil war). However, by framing their agenda in terms congenial to the plethora of international observers and mediation assistants²⁹⁵, the RPF were able to garner their support in pressuring the GoR team to capitulate on multiple occasions.²⁹⁶ For example, by framing military integration as a question not determined by the sizes and competence of the relevant forces, but rather as an issue of minority veto (i.e. as an issue of consociational peace-building rather than military power), the RPF were able to secure the agreement of mediators that a fifty-fifty split in command positions was a reasonable demand.²⁹⁷ Given that by this stage the RPF forces had repeatedly demonstrated their greater competence on the field, this amounted to considerably more than a minority veto. Similarly, other post-conflict accords have assigned representation in the grand cabinets/transitional governments on the basis of support within the country, which would have been greatly to the disadvantage of the RPF. The five seats (equal with the MRND) accorded to the RPF are testament to the way in which the RPF successfully extended the logic of the institutional procedure of the negotiations to influence its substantive content.

Thirdly, this dexterous use of liberal norms was combined with a frequently displayed willingness to revert to extra-legal tactics as and when it suited them. Rather than adopt one strategy or the other, the RPF deployed mixed strategies. The RPF made it clear that they had the resources to continue the insurgency when they abandoned the negotiations in February of 1993 and launched an offensive which made it to within 20 kilometres of Kigali in just two days. As can be seen from the final accords, this did

²⁹³ Prunier, *The Rwanda crisis 1959-1994 : history of a genocide.*, p117. By the genocide, it had increased to at least 25,000.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p94.

²⁹⁵ There were delegations from Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire; observers from Belgium, France, Germany, the United States and Senegal; monitors from Canada, the European Union, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; and representation from the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations.

²⁹⁶ Interview OTH3.

²⁹⁷ To be clear: I am agnostic on whether or not it is a reasonable demand (that is irrelevant here). The point is that processes of framing and contextualisation determine what is deemed to be reasonable by the actors in negotiations.

not undermine the RPF's ability to conduct the negotiations to their advantage, in part because the international mediators remained convinced of the sincerity of the RPF's desire to achieve a peaceful negotiated settlement, even as they demonstrated to the GoR that they had the ability and the will to effect their agenda by force. Further, the military campaigns of the RPF at this period appear to be at least in part about strategically bolstering their status at the negotiating table rather than seizing power through an outright military victory or acquiring further hard resources: the military campaigns during this period have been the subject of much controversy,²⁹⁸ but what is not in dispute is that they were conducted such as to generate huge flows of displaced persons into the rest of Rwanda (the north of the country was effectively emptied)²⁹⁹, and to seize the principal export route of the country, effectively strangling the economy, and making an early resolution of the civil war a matter of extreme urgency for the GoR.³⁰⁰ Despite this, they were not rejected as spoilers at any point in the negotiation, nor were there any punitive sanctions for this behaviour. Here, as in so much in contemporary Rwanda, the RPF demonstrate their ability to continue using formal legal channels alongside extra-legal channels, without undermining the effectiveness of either.

Fourthly, the basic logic of what makes substantive-without-being-anti-system opposition in contemporary Rwanda almost impossible was on display in the negotiations from the beginning. At the outset of the negotiations, the GoR actually represented three quite distinct groups: the MRND, the Hutu-power extremists of the *Coalition pour la défense de la République* (CDR), and the 'minnows' (i.e. representatives of the opposition parties formed within Rwanda since the introduction of multi-partyism in 1990). It is in these two latter factions that the central dilemma of Rwandan opposition politics is visible: the near impossibility of finding any political space between co-optation by the RPF on the one hand, and violent extremist Hutu nationalism on the other. In the fifth stage of Arusha, the RPF

²⁹⁸ For three very different accounts, see Kuperman, "Provoking Genocide: A Revised History of the Rwandan Patriotic Front."; Des Forges, *"Leave none to tell the story": genocide in Rwanda*; and Prunier, *The Rwanda crisis 1959-1994: history of a genocide*.

²⁹⁹ Interview UG5.

³⁰⁰ Clapham, "Rwanda: the perils of peacemaking." Clapham is slightly more generous than I am. He writes, 'whether it took this action, as it claimed, in response to riots and killings instigated by the MRND and its allies, or whether this was simply a tactical move to strengthen its bargaining position, the point was made' (p204). I would prefer to say that *even if* the proximate cause was the killings, it was definitely *also* a strategic move to improve its bargaining position.

successfully demanded the exclusion of the CDR from the negotiations, on the grounds that their violent anti-Tutsi ideology meant that they could not be a credible partner in peace. Although Mamdani suggests that the continued inclusion of the CDR could have saved the process,³⁰¹ the overwhelming weight of the evidence is with Clapham in suggesting that by 1993 the CDR were indeed *fundamentally irreconcilable*³⁰² to any kind of settlement, and it is a serious weakness of the liberal peacekeeping paradigm to simply assume in advance that there exists a hypothetical bargain congenial to all parties which negotiation can reach, and that all participants sit within some kind of overlapping consensus wherein all differences are resolvable.³⁰³ More significant is the process whereby smaller parties were successively forced to align themselves with the RPF or with MRND forces. Throughout the negotiations, the minnows were in an impossible position. They were rapidly bullied into taking sides and risked total exclusion if they did not align with one of the larger blocs as soon as possible. It is widely agreed that certain party systems (and analogous structures of negotiation, such as this) force smaller parties to align with one of the two largest ones, but unlike other countries where the tendency towards bipolarity creates political systems which may be narrow but nonetheless create two credible parties with the possibility of alternance between them, the Manichean bipolarity of Rwandan politics forces parties to align themselves either with the RPF, or with those who, because of the political legacy of the genocide, became straightforwardly inadmissible to the arena of legitimate politics after 1994, and are seen as unchangeably and straightforwardly anti-system. Opposition parties in Rwanda, therefore, are either pushed into bed with forces that have been excluded from Rwandan civic space, or forced to defect to the RPF. This is not to agree with the analyses of Rwandan politics which, at their worst, slip into arguing that it has become simply impossible to disagree with the Rwandan government publicly because to do so will get you shot³⁰⁴ – that is simply false. Rather, it is that the logic of bipolarity which characterises political systems in all

³⁰¹ He writes, '*the Arusha agreement was stillborn, mainly because it failed to take account of the extremist CDR.*' Mamdani, *When victims become killers: colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda.*, p211.

³⁰² Clapham, "Rwanda: the perils of peacemaking.", p205.

³⁰³ The character of the CDR is one of the best documented aspects of the genocide, and substantiation of Clapham's claim can easily be found in canonical sources such as Des Forges, *"Leave none to tell the story": genocide in Rwanda.* The only other scholarship following Mamdani on this matter I have found is Marisa Traniello, "Power-Sharing: Lessons from South Africa and Rwanda," *International Public Policy Review* 3, no. 2 (2008)., who only writes by way of substantiating evidence that '*it is better to have the CDR inside the tent than outside, threatening to burn it down*' (39). This is an undefended platitude, and I do not really know how to respond to it.

³⁰⁴ As is sometimes suggested in works such as Andrea Purdeková, "'Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes': surveillance and state reach in Rwanda," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 03 (2011); Susan Thompson, "Resisting Reconciliation: State Power and Everyday Life in Post-Genocide Rwanda" (Dalhousie University, 2009); Reynjtjens, "Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship."; Mgbako, "Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda."

sorts of environments here has the particularly unfortunate consequence of creating a tiny space for 'loyal opposition', and that is as much the 'fault' (insofar as the attribution of blame is of any interest) of anti-system opposition forces in closing that space from one side as it is the fault of the RPF.

Instead of viewing the constitutional settlement reached after the genocide as a total rupture, it makes more sense, therefore, to regard it as a continuation of these trends visible during the accords: the RPF as more skilful operators than any of their competitors, the adroit manipulation of liberal norms and procedures, the ease with which legal and extra-judicial strategies are mixed, and the Manichean drag for putative opposition.

Part Two: Politics After Arusha

1. The Constitutional Position

The constitutional position after the genocide ended was retrospectively clarified by the 'Basic Law' the National Assembly passed in May of 1995. This document, which entered into retroactive force from the 17th July 1994 (the day the RPF date as the formal conclusion of the genocide and victory of the RPF) established in three short sections what documents were to count as constitutional, and what the relationship was between them. Those documents were: the Arusha Accords; the 1991 Constitution (i.e. the half left unamended after Arusha); the RPF Declaration of 17th July 1994; and the Protocol of Agreement signed between the RPF and the seven political parties from within Rwanda not disqualified by participation in the genocide from participation in Rwandan politics thereafter (the MRND and the CDR), signed on the 24th of November inaugurating the National Assembly. The relationship of precedence between these documents as specified in the Basic Law is basically chronological (i.e. the 1991 Constitution, the Accords, the Declaration, and the Protocol as the final document which is to be

followed in the event of any conflict between the preceding texts). However, as Reyntjens³⁰⁵ points out, article one of the Protocol states that '[the signatories] adhere to the 'Declaration of the RPF concerning the putting into place of the institutions' of 17 July 1994', and therefore there is an ambiguity in the post genocidal era as to whether the Protocol or the Declaration 'constitutes the summit of the constitutional hierarchy'.³⁰⁶

Regardless, the important point for the purposes of this chapter is that both take clear precedence over Arusha and the 1991 Constitution. Whilst this allowed the RPF to publicly affirm that they remained committed to the broad-based, consociational agenda laid out by Arusha, so much so that Gérard Prunier described the new cabinet as 'a small miracle of reason in a sea of madness',³⁰⁷ there were in reality four key respects in which the institutional order had been fundamentally restructured. Firstly, despite redistributing the MRND's seats in the National Assembly to all of the parties, the RPF also added six seats reserved for the military.³⁰⁸ This may look like a small number, but – if we can grant that any officers put into these seats by the military high command at that point were overwhelmingly likely to be RPF loyalists – it was those six seats which handed the RPF an absolute majority in the National Assembly during the transitional period (something Arusha was explicitly designed to avoid). Secondly, the RPF assigned to themselves the five positions in the cabinet that had been allocated to the MRND. Of these, two were offered to 'apolitical technocrats'³⁰⁹, but this seeming gesture of non-partisan willingness to rise above party should not be given too much weight: it's clear that those individuals thus elevated by the RPF (i.e. with no party background or independent support base) were in no substantive sense independent of the RPF patronage which made them ministers in the first place, and – perhaps more importantly – the RPF only needed three seats in addition to the five Arusha gave them in order to effect a blocking minority (the cabinet procedures specified by the Accords required two thirds agreement in order to pass anything, and intentionally gave no party enough to block by themselves. Thus, in a cabinet of twenty-one, the RPF's eight amounted to a veto). Thirdly, the RPF declaration specifies that if the

³⁰⁵ Reyntjens, "Constitution-making in situations of extreme crisis: the case of Rwanda and Burundi."

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p237.

³⁰⁷ Prunier, *From genocide to continental war : the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa.*, p7.

³⁰⁸ Interview RW5.

³⁰⁹ Interview RW13.

cabinet is unable to make a decision, “the President of the Republic decides in a sovereign way”. From the powerless figurehead envisaged by Arusha, therefore, the new settlement reinstated an Imperial Presidency. The combination of the RPF’s eight seats in cabinet and an RPF President (Pasteur Bizimungu) amount to making the RPF the one and only veto player in the Rwandan political system – able to block any change or push through any legislation using their party representatives alone. This effectively reduced the Prime-Ministership, held by the opposition MDR’s Faustin Twagiramungu, to insignificance. Fourthly, the RPF declaration includes, for the first time, an entirely new post not mentioned in any of the other constitutional documents: that of the Vice-President. Filip Reyntjens points out (somewhat grumpily) that the content and powers of this role are never defined in any document.³¹⁰ Of course, it didn’t need to be: the post was created solely for its incumbent, Paul Kagame,³¹¹ who was also Minister of Defence, leader of the RPF, and still serving in the RPF’s military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army, which was split off from the RPF and re-christened the Rwandan Defence Force in the aftermath of the genocide (of course, Arusha’s clauses on the integration of militaries fell completely into abeyance in the aftermath of the genocide, as there was no question of officers of the genocidal military being straightforwardly readmitted, even if they hadn’t overwhelmingly fled to the camps of Zaire). The point of the post was merely to fuse, in the person of Paul Kagame, a position in cabinet, the military, the party, and the Presidency. Given Kagame’s control over the party, and given the power accorded to the RPF by the new rules, it was hardly necessary to specify the content of the post. It meant that when disagreements between Bizimungu and Kagame opened up in the late 1990s, with Bizimungu alleging (not implausibly) that he had been shut out of cabinet appointments and other important decisions, it was relatively straightforward for Kagame to bypass him.³¹² As if to drive the point home, when Kagame ascended to the Presidency on the 24th March 2000, the position was simply left unoccupied, until it was formally written out of the constitution of 2003. The net effect of these changes was to preserve the façade of Arusha, whilst simultaneously granting the RPF a hegemonic position in post-genocidal politics. As Reyntjens observed at the time, ‘the new Fundamental Law is a piece of subtle and smart

³¹⁰ Reyntjens, "Constitution-making in situations of extreme crisis: the case of Rwanda and Burundi."

³¹¹ Interview RW5.

³¹² Interview RW13.

constitutional engineering which attempts to hide the monolithic character of the exercise of power'.³¹³ It was largely successful.

That is not, however, the only role that formal institutions are playing at this point. The story offered by some³¹⁴ is that the government of national unity was never anything beyond a façade for the edification of the international community. That account is credible – the RPF's studious 'information management'³¹⁵ had begun much earlier – but it is partial. Most simply, it is worth pointing out that Arusha may have been retained simply for want of time to devise anything else given the speed at which the MRND state collapsed and the RPF entered Kigali.³¹⁶ Much of the RPF's behaviour was reactive, on the fly, and when there was a set-up available 'off the peg' which only needed marginal modification to be fit for purpose (i.e. the RPF Declaration and the Protocol of Agreement), there is no obvious reason to go to the bother of changing it, particularly to the extent that the important work of the state is conducted by, and decisions taken within the military.

However, GNU was also a mechanism for the co-option of a cadre of urban Hutu elites and genocide survivors, mostly the leadership of the other parties (i.e. Faustin Twagiramungu, Joseph Sebarenzi), but also a few like-minded figures within the RPF (i.e. Seth Sendashonga, Pasteur Bizimungu). Broadly, the function of formal institutions was to keep this strata of the reluctantly-compliant but ever-hopeful within the system for as long as possible, and at least until such time as any alternate strategy on their part (i.e. of substantial anti-RPF political organisation) could be foreclosed. The general pattern was that individuals would be given just enough space and reassurance to believe that the GNU was a substantive and real institution which might work, but nothing concrete. For example, after Faustin Twagiramungu took to the airwaves in December 1994 to publicly condemn the deteriorating security situation, Paul Kagame met with him to privately admit he agreed with him, and initiated a pantomimetic discussion in cabinet

³¹³Reyntjens, "Constitution-making in situations of extreme crisis: the case of Rwanda and Burundi.", p238

³¹⁴ Thompson, "Resisting Reconciliation: State Power and Everyday Life in Post-Genocide Rwanda."

³¹⁵ On this, see chapter five.

³¹⁶ Interview RW11.

about what could be done to improve matters.³¹⁷ What ended up being implemented before Christmas were a set of things the RPF leadership almost certainly wanted to do and would have done anyway: arbitrary arrests were curbed (from about sixty to ten per day), some illegal property seizures were prevented, other properties returned, and the military were paid, on the understanding that the return of salaries meant that the looting was to stop.³¹⁸ Nonetheless, these reforms were enough to convince Twagiramungu and several others that GNU and the cabinet were relevant institutions through which they could be substantial political actors. Hutu moderate politicians were also in general optimistic that they could rely on ethnic block-voting in any election, and so it was no great sacrifice to keep one's head down in the interim, participate (but always 'constructively', which means quietly), and diligently avoid any behaviour which could imperil their ability to participate in the elections which would end the transition (an ending some seriously believed was still only 22 months away). Prunier gives a similar account of how Seth Sendashonga was kept on board:

Sendashonga wrote [Kagame] over four hundred memos on the killings and insecurity during his thirteen months in the cabinet, but Kagame was careful never to answer in writing. At first he kept wavering between partial admission, feigned surprise, and blunt denial, and then later he simply stopped answering. The Hutu ministers were so conscious of the potential catastrophe their eventual resignations could cause that they swallowed it all in the name of national unity.³¹⁹

This system eventually collapsed in all but name following the killings at Kibeho (a refugee camp where the army opened fire on a crowd in April 1995, killing somewhere between the official figure of 338, and Gérard Prunier's estimate of 20,000), but by then it had done what it needed to: the political window whereby the other political parties could have organised to reject Arusha Plus had closed – by the end of

³¹⁷ Interview RW11.

³¹⁸ Ibid. Also mentioned in chapter one of Gérard Prunier, *From genocide to continental war: the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa* (London: Hurst, 2009).

³¹⁹ Prunier, *From genocide to continental war : the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa.*, p18.

the year the balance of international recognition solidified the political order based around this re-reading of Arusha, making it the only game in town.

2. Across the Border

Externally, the continued existence of the MRND across the border in Zaire re-arming with the intent of effecting their return to Rwanda made it perfectly obvious to RPF elites that their military victory was not secure.³²⁰ In five giant camps around Goma³²¹ there were around 850,000 people, including some 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers of the genocidal state's army. A further thirty camps to the south near Bukavu held some 650,000 refugees, along with substantial populations in Burundi and Tanzania. In these camps the MRND state reconstituted itself through a dense network of administrators who organised the camp population along rigidly hierarchical lines, monopolised the food supply, and almost all other aid being disbursed, with a view to marching back to Kigali when the opportunity presented itself.³²² Prunier quotes former MRND Secretary-General Mathieu Ndirumapfse declaring quite openly that the army was being 'trained and redeployed and was just waiting a while before launching a full scale invasion'.³²³ Whilst talk of a full invasion was probably bluff, given the scale of the FAR's defeat, their ability to continue to disrupt matters in Rwanda was demonstrated by their repeated incursions into Rwandan territory in order to carry out attacks on civilians (one incursion near Gisenyi in which thirty-six were killed happened as early as October 31st, 1994) – generally Tutsi, but also enough of the Hutu population in the North-West (where they remained popular) to terrorise the population into helping them. This reached its nadir in May 1997, when these infiltration missions and isolated incidents developed into a full-scale military insurgency.

³²⁰ Interview RW25.

³²¹ Katale, Kahindo, Mugunga, Lac Vert, and Sake. There were also a further thirty smaller camps at the height of the crisis.

³²² Interview RW31.

³²³ Prunier, *From genocide to continental war : the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa.*, p26.

The ex-FAR also continued to be able to acquire arms from a diverse arrange of suppliers (money was not a problem: the *génocidaires* had taken literally all of the Rwandan state's financial reserves with them, and were also making the camps turn a significant profit.³²⁴ These were mainly from the usual suspects – the newly impoverished ex-Soviet military industrial complexes, who had been left with a lot of military hardware on their hands and nothing to do with it – but also China, where Mrs. Habyarimana and her brother were able to visit in October 1994 as a guest of President Mobutu and pick up five million USD's worth of materiel and other supplies at extremely competitive prices.³²⁵ Mobutu's increasingly overt support for the ex-FAR – part of an attempt to parlay the crisis into renewing his indispensability to the West, and to put pressure on his political enemies in Eastern Zaire – only increased the anxiety in Kigali.

The way the camps became an international *cause célèbre* is also relevant because it is a key moment in crystallising the RPF's contempt for the international community, particularly as potentially legitimate critics of the ethical conduct of the regime. In a belated guilt-shocked reaction to being caught sleeping as the genocide unfolded, money flowed indiscriminately into the most visible consequence of the genocide: the refugee situation in the Kivus (it was also more internationally 'legible' – a refugee crisis has a well-worn humanitarian playbook in the way the aftermath of a genocide does not). Funding for the refugees massively outstripped the aid finding its way inside the country (Prunier calculates it as roughly \$1.40 per capita per day in the camps versus only \$0.40 in Rwanda itself, or as this was seen in Kigali, \$879 million for the victims of the genocide against \$2.036 billion for the perpetrators). What was seen in international circles as apolitical, technocratic refugee relief was read in Rwanda quite differently – as political support for the *Haut Criminels Rassasiés*³²⁶ of the MRND, especially as even the aid which had been pledged to Rwanda was held up by the requirement that the RPF somehow find \$4.5 million to pay Rwanda's arrears in loans to the World Bank. Which is to say: debts acquired by the previous genocidal regime were being held over the RPF's head as a pre-condition for further aid. This absurd situation persisted until November. As Frederick Golooba-Mutebi pointed out:

³²⁴ See HRW, "Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity," (Washington DC: Human Rights Watch, 1995). and Mark Hubbard, "UN alert urged as arms pour into new Rwanda war," *Observer* 1995, March 26th. for further details).

³²⁵ Prunier, *From genocide to continental war : the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa.*, p27.

³²⁶ 'Well-fed high criminals' – a punning rechristening of the UN's High Commission for Refugees. From Prunier, *From genocide to continental war: the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa.*, p30.

So dire was the situation that the country could not even deploy Ambassadors to their countries of posting, the exception being the Ambassador to France...made possible by financial contributions from individual members of the government³²⁷

As such, the ostensibly neutral procedures of the institutions of global governance and the humanitarian government-NGO complex were correctly seen as having partisan consequences. Although the RPF were unable to manipulate these aspects of liberal governmentality here as they had at Arusha, it further entrenched the conviction that such things were absurdities to be exploited if possible and ignored if not, rather than credible standards and procedures with moral weight within Rwanda.

3. Internal Security

Internally, there was a similarly bleak picture. The departure of the MRND did not equate to anywhere near full control of the country. Perhaps most obviously, the RPF did not have the physical apparatus of governance, which the MRND had taken with them when they left: phones, vehicles, etc: news from outside Kigali had to be relayed by RPF officials using public transportation until at least 1995.³²⁸ Nor did they have anywhere near enough feet on the ground to have a genuinely national network of agents. Much of the territory was characterised by at least five distinct security issues: the aforementioned incursions by the ex-FAR, along with illegal property seizures on the part of 700,000 chaotically returning 'old caseload' refugees, legal repossession by Hutu being violently resisted by Tutsi survivors, unpaid soldiers engaging in 'instant taxation' in order to feed themselves³²⁹ (this largely stopped after the army was finally paid in December 1994), and the sort of quotidian banditry common to zones of weak state

³²⁷ F Golooba-Mutebi, "Collapse, War, and Reconstruction in Rwanda: an Analytical Narrative on State Making," in *Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2* (LSE, 2008), p25.

³²⁸ Interview RW31.

³²⁹ It might be thought that this counts against the claim in chapter 1 that the RPF was an unusually disciplined and well-behaved force. I am not convinced, if only because the fact that salaries were sufficient to end looting and random acts of violence in the aftermath of the genocide speaks to a considerable degree of cohesion and control.

control.³³⁰ Prisons were obscenely overcrowded, and much justice was still being meted out in the form of *gutunga agatoki* ('pointing the finger') ad hoc trials administered by communities or soldiers with nothing even approaching consideration for the rule of law. Although the enemy had been defeated and the genocide officially ended, Rwanda outside a few small zones was not yet governed by the new rulers of Rwanda in any substantive sense. This, along with the re-invocation of the political legacy of genocide as legitimating extraordinary circumstances³³¹ gave more than sufficient impetus for managing much of the everyday life of Rwanda through the military and unofficial channels rather than the formal civilian institutional apparatus of the state.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the political legacy of the chaos of the landgrabs and the vigilante justice process of this period was to create a near-permanent Damoclean sword hanging over the head of every Rwandan: insofar as it is always possible to indict more or less anyone for *something* untoward they had done during this period, a situation of radical contingency (of the sort identified by Arendt³³² and Agamben³³³ with 'the refugee') persists in which one's security and privilege is subject to no guarantee beyond that afforded by power. Indeed, the Prosecutorial Office 'discovering' that someone's wealth was illicitly acquired in the immediate aftermath of the genocide is one of the more common ways for elites to meet their downfall, most recently in the case of Kayumba Nyamwasa. In this way, figures with status and authority in formal political structures exercise power in virtue of those structures, but remain aware that the ruling circle always retains a get-into-jail card it can play whenever it likes: land illicitly grabbed, a victim not assisted, some minor complicity with the ex-FAR, or an RPF officer over-zealously 'exceeding his authority' to engage in revenge-killing war crimes, and so on. The accusation that Kayumba Nyamwasa had had his hand in the till was almost certainly true, but it had also probably been known for over a decade by the ruling circle (of which Nyamwasa was a member), and he would not be

³³⁰ WRITENET, "Rwanda: Update to end March 1995," (1995).

³³¹ It is acceptable to argue that the post-genocidal environment was an 'extraordinary' one. That is not by point – it is the strategic deployment of the tropes of exceptionalism in political discourse to legitimate bypassing various formal legal channels and institutions that is relevant here.

³³² Hannah Arendt, "We refugees," *Menorah Journal* 31, no. 1 (1943).

³³³ G. Agamben, *Homo sacer: sovereign power and bare life* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).

the only one of whom such charges could be made: the selectivity and timing is what reveals the power-play behind an ostensibly apolitical judicial process.³³⁴

Back in the immediate aftermath of the genocide, conventional accounts of what happens at this kind of juncture (i.e. occupying a territory for the first time, and recreating order in a ‘post-conflict setting’, but lacking the resources for direct rule in the short run) would suggest that the newly occupying power must find a way to reinvent indirect rule, viz. locate a group of actual or potential local notables, and co-opt them to serve as interlocutors with the territory and population they are trying to govern.³³⁵ This is sometimes what is embedded in the consociational peacebuilding agenda when it refers to ‘pluralist inclusion’ (buying off counter-elites) and ‘subsidiarity’ (buying off local leaders in the periphery as well as in the capital)³³⁶. However, in the interior of immediately post-genocidal Rwanda that was not an option: the only putative ruling class was the old one from the MRND state (opposition elites and moderate notables had also been massacred in the genocide). Such individuals as did remain were (accurately) held to be deeply hostile to what they viewed as an occupying power, and resources needed for co-option on that scale simply weren’t available in any case. The RPF was simply not willing to countenance empowering such individuals on the kind of egalitarian basis their relative inability to police the countryside themselves would have entailed, despite the formal institutions of Arusha committing them to inclusive cooperative government, and the slightly surreal insistence of various donors that there be ‘broadening of the political base’ before aid could be resumed,³³⁷ a call which did not bear fruit. A structure of local rule including Hutus as strongmen would have to be reinstated eventually, if rural Rwanda was not to be left stateless, but the immediate reinstatement of those local power-holders who had

³³⁴ Interviews RW3, RW18, and RW23.

³³⁵ There is a vast literature here, but a sampling would include Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (Oxford: Routledge, 2009); Robert Bates, *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*; Milliken, *State Failure, Collapse & Reconstruction*.

³³⁶ I am grateful for this point to James Mayall and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States* (London: Hurst, 2011).

³³⁷ Which, as Prunier (2009) points out, was ‘a bit like asking Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer in 1949 to include former Nazis in his government for the sake of national reconciliation’ (p7).

served under the old regime, or any class of unknown and untrusted Hutu were equally seen as unacceptable.³³⁸

Understanding what the RPF did instead gets us to the crux of the relationship between formal political institutions and informal, extra-judicial mechanisms of power in post-genocidal Rwanda. On the one hand, a strategy of control via extra-judicial means only loosely connected to the formal state apparatus to conduct a campaign of political terror in the periphery, and on the other, the retention of the formal mechanisms of Arusha to co-opt and politically neuter the urban moderates of the centre who ruled the other parties (i.e. Faustin Twagiramungu, Joseph Sebarenzi, and so on).

The latter part of this was detailed in the previous section of this chapter. The campaign of political terror is the more controversial aspect of this account. The two key sources here are: a UNHCR Report which has been permanently embargoed since its writing by Robert Gersony in 1995, its existence officially denied, and its author instructed to never speak about it publicly (a promise he has to date kept), and a report by Human Rights Watch³³⁹ which has been the subject of several attacks, largely directed at the robustness of their methodology or the biases of their authors.³⁴⁰ However, whilst aspersions have been cast on the reports themselves, there are sound reasons to believe their content (or, in Gersony's case, its reported content) is credible. Their conclusions have not been falsified despite ample time and effort in that direction, the authors (both Robert Gersony and the HRW researchers) have produced other work which is of excellent quality, and at least shifts the presumption in favour of their claims, and other journalists (notably Howard French)³⁴¹ and academics (notably Gérard Prunier)³⁴² have produced work substantiating their claims. This is not to exclude various questions which the reports themselves are silent on (for example, HRW does not go so far as to claim hard evidence that the central state directed the violence it documents), or valid questions as to the interpretation of results. The author's interviews

³³⁸ Interview RW33.

³³⁹ HRW, "The Rwandan Patriotic Front," (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 1999).

³⁴⁰ See, for example, Phil Clark, "Why the Congo Experts Need More Scrutiny," *Huffington Post* 2013, 2nd January.

³⁴¹ Howard French, "Kagame's Hidden War in the Congo," *The New York Review of Books* 2009, September 24th.

³⁴² Prunier, "Rwanda: Update to end March 1995."; Prunier, "The Social, Political, and Economic Situation."

with Rwandan refugees in Nakivale Settlement in Uganda also included many accounts which substantiated these claims.³⁴³ Finally, whilst several commentators have rightly pointed out that the evidence amassed would not necessarily guarantee conviction in a court of law, it is my belief that it is sufficiently substantiated to meet the bar for inclusion here.³⁴⁴

To summarise, there are alleged to have been two periods of mass violence largely perpetrated by the RPF in the immediate aftermath of the genocide: from April to September 1994, and from January 1995 until roughly midway through the year. Estimates for body counts vary from between 25,000 to 45,000 people, including Tutsi. The first wave of violence is mixed-in with indiscriminate revenge killings, the general insecurity of the period, cross-border interahamwe incursions, and what should be regarded as ‘forward panic’³⁴⁵ – the forms of collective violence which result from the cathartic outpouring of tension and mental euphoria on the part of killers when their opposing forces suddenly break and flee before them, as the FAR did. The Mylai Massacre and the Rape of Nanking are often offered as the classic examples of this phenomenon, and the behaviour of the RPF when the confrontation and fear of the guerrilla struggle and the civil war was replaced by the sudden collapse of the FAR as fighting force fits this pattern pretty well.³⁴⁶ It is in the second period, after a modicum of calm had been restored, the military had been paid, and the RPF regime were moderately more secure, that the contours of the RPF’s strategy of control can be more readily perceived. There are four important aspects of this. Firstly, the victims of this violence mostly belonged to four categories: (a) génocidaires, their friends and associates, (b) the educated, (c) old PARMEHUTU members³⁴⁷, and (d) *ibipinga*³⁴⁸. As Prunier points out, ‘what these

³⁴³ Interviews UG11, UG13, UG15, and UG19. Although there are obvious reasons why Rwandans facing the imminent coming into force of the Cessation Clause of the Refugee Convention extinguishing their refugee status would have every incentive to misrepresent events in a manner as unfavourable to the Rwandan state as possible.

³⁴⁴ Viz. that its exclusion from the material presented here would be more misleading than its heavily caveated inclusion.

³⁴⁵ For a detailed theoretical exposition of this concept, see R. Collins, *Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

³⁴⁶ The explanation as to why this sort of forward panic would result in violence being directed explicitly at the weak is the same as why police brutality in riots is usually directed at the least aggressive rioters: because of the corrosive atmosphere of tension and fear, violence is actually very low between equally matched combatants, and is therefore directed elsewhere, at ‘blameable targets’ (in this case, populations regarded as collectively guilty because of their complicity with the MRND regime).

³⁴⁷ *Parti pour l’émancipation des Hutu*, the original Hutu nationalist party whose rise to power had triggered the exodus of the ‘59ers.

³⁴⁸ Which Prunier translates as ‘opponents, people who did not think and behave “right”’ – the closest parallel I can think of would be the ‘socially harmful elements’ of Stalinist Russia.

people had in common was their constituting an actual or potential elite, capable of giving shape to a politically amorphous peasant mass. Whether the victims had actually intended to act in a political way was completely beside the point. The point was that they had some capacity to do so'.³⁴⁹ Secondly, the identity of the killers is key. Although the killers were all RPF soldiers or *abakada*³⁵⁰, the general consensus is that individual instances of killing were small, decentralised, and tolerated, rather than instigated according to some grand plan. Which is to say, the programme of violence unleashed in Rwanda was knowingly permitted rather than ordered: once the top leadership had made it clear that it would not take serious steps to pursue or punish anyone doing the good work of removing dangerous people, the violence could and did take care of itself without direct state control (particularly given all of the added incentives created by the acute shortages in housing and so on). Important people could die – the prefect Pierre-Claver Rwangbo, the businessman Gervais Birekeraho, and the banker Aloys Karasankwavu – and nobody was ever arrested.³⁵¹ Thirdly, it is important to stress that this violence comes *nowhere near* the 'double-genocide' hypothesis allegedly by revisionist historians, not only because the violence also encompassed many Tutsi, but – more importantly – because there is no evidence here of an attempt to eradicate communities. Rather, these are pogroms designed to remove potential counter-elites, terrorise communities into submission, and thereby make these zones susceptible to hierarchical control. Finally, it is worth pointing out that this mode of violence did not create groups outside the state to which the ruling elite eventually became politically hostage, in the manner of KANU's relationship to *mungiki* gangs,³⁵² or ZANU-PF's to Veteran's Associations.³⁵³ This is because although the ruling elite did not direct these particular episodes of violence, they nonetheless never permitted agents outside the military to engage in large-scale violence of this form, and took steps to make sure the military retained its status as a hierarchical formal institution with an order of rank and a stable culture of discipline. How that was

³⁴⁹Prunier, *From genocide to continental war : the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa.*, p20.

³⁵⁰ The Kinyarwandisation of 'cadre'.

³⁵¹ Interview RW18.

³⁵² As argued in Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, "Facing Mount Kenya or facing Mecca? The Mungiki, ethnic violence and the politics of the Moi succession in Kenya, 1987–2002," *African Affairs* 102, no. 406 (2003).

³⁵³ N.J. Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-war Zimbabwe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

done is a recurrent theme of this thesis, but it is worth noting here in passing that the strategy only ‘works’³⁵⁴ because of its unusual mixing of formal and informal.

Part Three: The Insurgency in the North-West

After the immediate pacificatory violence, an eerie calm set in over most of the country.³⁵⁵ Although the state set up mechanisms for the channelling of certain resources to the country (usually through the military or aid agencies such as WFP), and filled positions emptied with new officers, in practice the central state did not attempt to engage in transformatory activity, or indeed much activity at all in the countryside for the moment. As should be clear, the government had other priorities: normalising their diplomatic relations, dealing with the crisis in the Congo, and ensuring their control at the political centre (i.e. Kigali). The Rwandan government didn’t even get round to removing the posts of *bourgmestres* until 1999. The key exception to this is the insurgency in the North-West, which bloomed in 1997, and the RPF’s response to it. This case is key because, firstly, the early success of the insurgency demonstrates the main inadequacies in the Rwandan state at that point, and, secondly, the reforms and transformations the RPF instituted in order to eventually defeat the insurgency reveal the ability of the Rwandan elite to change (the state structures under their control, but also themselves), and those changes put in place much of what continues to define the Rwandan state today.

1. The Start of the Insurgency

As mentioned before, in 1994 various senior Rwandan government and military leaders lost no time in reorganising in Eastern Congo. Their eventual goal was wholesale return and ‘liberation’ of Rwanda, along with ‘finishing the job’ of the genocide. In the short term, however, all they were able to do was send small units from the refugee camps into what were then the Prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri to

³⁵⁴ I only use ‘works’ here in terms of the policy’s own aims (i.e. durable control), rather than anything more ambitious.

³⁵⁵ Interview RW33.

engage in small acts of pillage, to murder Tutsis and agents of the new state, and intimidating communities into denying support to the new government. These small acts were all logged at the time by UNAMIR,³⁵⁶ but by definitional fiat became acts of disruption disconnected from wider political narratives, and so were regarded as neither a continuation of the genocide, nor as the first shoots of a budding insurgency, despite being both. Initially, moderate Hutus were singled out as examples, but increasingly were replaced with indiscriminate killings in an attempt to force all Hutus to take sides. – ‘a campaign of ambushing vehicles and killing passengers, killing and kidnapping schoolchildren, burning local government offices, freeing prisoners and encouraging abandonment of homes in favour of living among the insurgents themselves’.³⁵⁷

The insurgency was largely confined to the two prefectures in which it began: Gisenyi, and Ruhengeri. There are three core reasons for this: topography, borders, and history. The first point is the simplest, the volcanic forests of the Virunga National Park are perfect for concealment and enable unseen movement over a comparatively large swathe of territory, exactly as the RPF had found five years before.³⁵⁸ Secondly, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri’s proximity to Congo gave them a safe rear to retreat to, and enabled a variety of forms of jurisdictional arbitrage. As Jackson put it, ‘the region of Masisi is, in fact, the insurgents’ equivalent of a piratical free port’.³⁵⁹ The lawlessness of North Kivu (initially Goma and its environs, later the Masisi plain), and the motley array of militants, rebels, and other assorted armed groups made the area invaluable. Over time, the insurgents forged links with former units of the FAZ,³⁶⁰ Uganda’s ADF,³⁶¹ a congeries of anti-Museveni elements operating in the Rwenzori mountains, including NALU,³⁶² which formed links with Eastern Congo when it joined with the ex-FAZ in fighting in Kasindi, and several Burundian Hutu groups: the FNL³⁶³ (the armed wing of PALIPEHUTU³⁶⁴), and the CNDD-

³⁵⁶ Noted in K. O’Halloran, *Rwanda: UNAMIR 1994/95* (Sydney: Big Sky, 2012), appendices.

³⁵⁷ Paul Jackson, "Legacy of Bitterness: Insurgency in North West Rwanda," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 15, no. 1 (2004), p21.

³⁵⁸ Interview OTH3.

³⁵⁹ Jackson, "Legacy of Bitterness: Insurgency in North West Rwanda.", p20.

³⁶⁰ *Forces Armées Zaïroises*, the former Zairian military.

³⁶¹ Allied Democratic Forces.

³⁶² National Army for the Liberation of Uganda.

³⁶³ *Les Forces nationales de libération*.

³⁶⁴ *Parti pour la libération des Hutu*.

FDD.³⁶⁵ There is actually a formal military agreement between the ex-FAR and the FNL allegedly signed at a meeting on the 21st of May 1997 in which they promise to merge into a supranational Hutu supremacist National Forces of Liberation.³⁶⁶ These links operated through Burundi, and there is some evidence that they could source weapons through then, which stopped in early 1998, as Burundian President Major Pierre Buyoya reached an agreement with the opposition-led Parliament of Burundi on a transitional constitution which legitimised Buyoya's presidency, and required several Hutu groups to renounce violence.³⁶⁷ These links fell apart completely with the commencement of a new round of Arusha peace talks for Burundi on 15th June 1998. After that, the insurgents had to rely on their Congolese connections for weapons, which changed permanently when the RPF directly occupied the Masisi plain in August 1998.

Thirdly, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri's history is one which makes fertile ground for insurgency. These are the traditional homelands of Hutu extremism with overwhelmingly Hutu populations: both were independent provinces in the pre-colonial period and were forcibly incorporated into the central state ruled by the Tutsi monarchy in the late 19th century with considerable resistance and violence.³⁶⁸ They revolted again in 1912 (sometimes called the Nyabingi revolt) which led to another round of repression and violence which led to the formation of a Hutu identity quite different from that of Southern Hutus.³⁶⁹ Juvenal Habyarimana's 1973 coup continues to be popularly understood (with much justification) as a transition from Southern Hutu to Northern Hutu rule. Habyarimana was a native of Gisenyi, as was his wife and the rest of the 'Akazu'. During his reign virtually all important government offices were held by individuals from these two prefectures, and after the RPF invasion of 1990 Habyarimana went so far as to move his capital to Gisenyi, along with the headquarters of the MRND, in order to better fight the civil

³⁶⁵ *Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces de défense de la démocratie*, now the Burundian ruling party.

³⁶⁶ Interviews UG2, and UG13.

³⁶⁷ Interview UG10 .

³⁶⁸ For more on this, see Alison Des Forges, *Defeat Is the Only Bad News: Rwanda under Musinga, 1896–1931*, ed. D. Newbury and R.D. Forges (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011); J. Vansina, *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005).

³⁶⁹ This period has only recently been examined by historians, particularly Rutanga, *Nyabingi Movement: People's Anti-colonial Struggles in Kigezi, 1910-1930*; Rutanga, *Politics, Religion, and Power in the Great Lakes Region*.

war. The North of the country was also where the bulk of the military were recruited from. As the former Sous-Préfet of Bugumya noted

‘Almost every family from this region has a relation or friend amongst those that insist they will come back to take power. The people in the north are fighting for an ideology which they learned long ago’ (Eugene Muzuka Kayiranga)³⁷⁰

As such, the North-West was home to a deep mythico-history of poisoned ethnic relations, resistance, and grievance, which amplified the very real loss of status and privileges for the people of the North-West region as a whole after Habyarimana’s fall. This made for exceptionally fertile soil for insurgency.

2. Initial Failure

In late 1994 and early 1995, the forces in the camps in North Kivu were reorganised, and arms were acquired through new networks as described earlier in this chapter. These camps provided shelter, supplies, manpower, and a tax base for the ex-FAR’s incursions into Rwanda. By 1995, the ex-FAR had expanded their operations to include raids against soft non-military targets (i.e. commune offices), as well as sabotage (of power lines, water resources, and so on), political assassinations, murdering genocide survivors and witnesses, and ambushes along remote roads.³⁷¹ The modus operandi of the insurgency was set. In the early stages of the insurgency, the RPA responded with large-scale violence. That was a mistake:

³⁷⁰ Quoted in Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, *Rwanda: the Insurgency in the Northwest* (London: African Rights, 1998).

³⁷¹ Interview OTH3.

When the RPA conducted harsh reprisals against the civilian Hutu population, it had an adverse effect, because it played right into the Hutu extremist message of Tutsi oppression of the Hutu³⁷²

One RPA Army log from January to August 1995³⁷³ tracked direct engagements between the RPA and the ex-FAR in the North-West: 6 in January, 16 in February, 15 in March, 9 in April, 5 in May, 4 in June, 5 in July, and 5 in August. At the outset, the insurgents were popular – many chose to operate in areas where they had direct kin – and were regularly assisted by the local community.³⁷⁴ The largely punitive responses of the RDF only worsened the situation. Their strategy to supplement their numbers – selecting and training insurgents from the roughly 15,000 (largely Tutsi) Banyamasisi refugees from Zaire living in a camp at Mudende outside Gisenyi³⁷⁵ – only reinforced the claims of the insurgents that the new rulers in Kigali were an ethnically homogenous clique intent on creating a Tutsi supremacy.

By mid-1996, the genocidal insurgency was not only continuing unabated, but seemed to be building momentum: the ex-FAR had reorganised into two divisions (one for each Kivu) and plans were underway to launch an offensive to retake Rwanda with a force in excess of 100,000 (the RDF at this point was just over half that).³⁷⁶ It became clear to the RPF military high command that they had to act pre-emptively, which they did in November 1996 when they entered Zaire to clear the camps. The entire course of the war is too byzantine to even begin to cover here,³⁷⁷ what is relevant to this section is that many of the ex-FAR moved north at this point into the Masisi plain and Rutshuru to recruit, eliminate the ‘Banyamasisi Tutsi’, and create a new rear safe haven.

³⁷² Richard Orth, "Rwanda's Hutu Extremist Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective," in *Genocide in Cambodia And Rwanda: New Perspectives*, ed. S.E. Cook (Livingston, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006), p228.

³⁷³ Quoted in Richard Orth, "Rwanda's Hutu Extremist Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 12, no. 1 (2001).

³⁷⁴ Interview OTH3.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Interview UG3.

³⁷⁷ It is now the subject of multiple great books, particularly T. Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality* (London: Zed, 2007); Prunier, *From genocide to continental war : the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa*; J. Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011).

By November 15th, the mass repatriation of Hutu captured by the RDF following the clearing of the camps in Zaire began. The objective of the Rwandan government was to get these people back to their communes as fast as possible, which meant no IDP camps, and no processing facilities.³⁷⁸ As such, the Rwandan authorities consciously decided to use little to no screening in all cases. Within ten days the majority of the returnees were back in their communes. Although all the disruption led to a reduction of attacks in the short term, in the medium term the conditions for the insurgency improved: ex-FAR structures remained intact, the rear base in Masisi was secure, and thousands of ex-FAR were now residing within the North-West. Small groups resumed attacks by January, and by the second week of May fighting was with battalion-sized groups of insurgents (300 to 500 men) directly attacking the RDF for the first time.³⁷⁹ In some areas, convinced Rwanda would soon be ‘liberated’, locals helped fortify villages, and the RPA suffered heavy casualties for the first time.

Within the RPF, there was consensus that their position was deteriorating significantly, but much disagreement about strategy. Some did advocate scorched earth in the North.³⁸⁰ At no point, however, did that become official policy, and the military high command went so far as to remove one corporal who was advocating the ‘elimination’ of villages that supported the insurgents, and force him out of the army.³⁸¹ This was also the point at which (then Major-General) Paul Kagame first visited the region to conduct a large-scale assessment. Colonel Kayumba Nyamwasa, who had been Gendarmerie Chief of Staff, was sent to Ruhengeri to take command personally. From mid-May until the end of June, RPA units fought battalion-size ex-FAR units in conventional battles in the North-West almost daily. This was as bad as it got for the RPA, and prompted a shift in the new elite’s approach to its military, and its new citizens.

3. Reform and Success

³⁷⁸ Interview RW33.

³⁷⁹ Interview OTH3.

³⁸⁰ Interview UG3.

³⁸¹ Interview OTH3.

Kayumba's new tactics amounted to a war of attrition strategy: they would create conditions where the ex-FAR would mobilise in large formations to attack (as they had done before), conduct newly designed counterattacks calculated to force the insurgents to disperse, and try and 'find and fix' the isolated smaller units.³⁸² The pitched battles usually ensued from attacks on commune headquarters, schools, and smaller RDF positions. Highly mobile units in armoured vehicles would then find and fix the ex-FAR, and artillery (and later helicopter gunships flown by hired Eastern Europeans) to destroy them once fixed. This strategy was only possible because of the increased scale of ex-FAR attacks: "While the ex-FAR caused much insecurity in the North-West, its actions allowed the RPA to confront and destroy it."³⁸³ The larger attacks were a mistake because whilst in the short term they hurt the Rwandan government much more, ultimately the RPA had the resources to win the more conventional war. Most immediately, it became harder for the ex-FAR to recruit new members, train them, or equip them with supplies. As older more experienced insurgents were replaced with new, untrained insurgents without proper provisions, discipline in the insurgency also deteriorated steadily.³⁸⁴

In early October, a force of about 1,200 ex-FAR attacked Gisenyi town itself at around 5 in the morning.³⁸⁵ They seized the electrogaz station but did not sabotage it (this was apparently a stunt about media attention rather than causing damage). They were repulsed by the end of the day, and this would be the last time the insurgents would have success, even of this limited variety, against a key town. Around the same time period, the insurgents began attacking communal *cachots* (local prisons), to liberate their comrades, and those imprisoned as suspected *génocidaires*. What is telling is that usually most of the prisoners returned within a week.³⁸⁶ As usual, some³⁸⁷ attribute this to the ancient Rwandan habit for obedience, but it's at least as plausible that the prisoners quickly realised they were better off in prison with food than travelling with the ex-FAR without shelter and food in order to fight a war they no longer believed they could win.

³⁸² Interview OTH12.

³⁸³ "Orth, "Rwanda's Hutu Extremist Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective.", p228.

³⁸⁴ Interview OTH12.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

Tactics were, however, the smallest part of the story, and the least interesting from the perspective of this chapter. The tactical and strategic changes demonstrate that the RDF was, by that point, a 'learning army'³⁸⁸ capable of flexibly altering its operating procedures in response to new evidence, but as has been repeatedly argued in the security studies literature,³⁸⁹ 'all contests in insurgent environments focus upon the first part of the hyphenated term, politico-military'.³⁹⁰ The ability of the Rwandan army to win was in part about the ability of the state to professionalise the army, to maintain discipline within the ranks, prevent looting and reprisals against the civilian population, and ensure resources of patronage (food, salaries, and so on) are reliably available and reach the intended recipients. As such, this is a story about the filling out and professionalization of the state apparatus, and reveals much about what the Rwandan state in the late 1990s looked like. Five aspects of this merit particular attention.

a. Curbing abuses (and making civilians believe it)

It is beyond dispute that many units of the RDF were heavy-handed and committed human rights abuses, some horrendous in scale, throughout the early period of the insurgency. These are documented at length.³⁹¹ This is perhaps to be expected:³⁹² the army continued its transition from a guerrilla to a professional army, which means three things. Firstly, battalion commanders continued to exercise a high degree of autonomy. Secondly, Kagame and other senior RPF leaders were reluctant to chastise 'brothers in the struggle' who had endured hardship and displayed valour during the hard years of 1990-1994. Thirdly, it is in the nature of rebel movements that there will be some commanders who are the sort of people who would not, in the ordinary run of things, have had any place in a professional army. Crucially, the senior leadership identified from an early stage that these were problems undermining their capacity

³⁸⁸ J.A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

³⁸⁹ Larry Cable, "Reinventing the round wheel: Insurgency, counter-insurgency, and peacekeeping post cold war," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 4, no. 2 (1993); J. Record, *Beating Goliath: why insurgencies win* (Lincoln, NE: Potomac, 2007).

³⁹⁰ Larry Cable, "Getting found in the fog: The nature of interventionary peace operations," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 7, no. 1 (1996), p33.

³⁹¹ In Omaar and Waal, *Rwanda: the Insurgency in the Northwest*.

³⁹² Although certainly not excused.

to win the insurgency, and much was done over the course of 1997 to reform the army.³⁹³ There were commanders who were weeded out and replaced with individuals who understood the importance of the political aspect of counter-insurgency (the appointment of Lt.-Col. César Kayizali, who had hitherto been 301st Brigade Commander in the South-West, to Gisenyi in 1997 is a case in point). Around the same time, Minadef created the Auditorat Militaire as a separate department headed by Lt.-Col. Andrew Rwigamba (no political lightweight – he was a former Minadef Director of Cabinet).³⁹⁴ Several high-ranking officers were prosecuted. The government also went to considerable lengths to inform civilians in the North-West of their efforts. In March 1997 the government set up the RMIP (Rwanda Military Information Platoon – built out of the propaganda corps of the struggle period) which received training from a 3-man US team between 15th March to 20th April.³⁹⁵ The RMIP then embarked on a nationwide campaign of posters, leaflet drops, and public meetings in small groups reinforcing the message of national unity, reconciliation, and amnesty for insurgents who had not been involved in the genocide. There is some evidence that it worked: apart from the bigger attacks, the ex-FAR would also launch attacks on places like schools where they would order the students to separate based on ethnicity, and then kill the Tutsis. As 1997 wore on, more and more frequently people refused.³⁹⁶

As such, it is probably not credible to regard the harshness and human rights abuses of the army as an intentional policy of the central state, at least not after very soon into the insurgency: all my interviews indicate that Kagame and other senior commanders understood the need to win over the population, and that involved reining in the abuses of the military, and running information campaigns, something considerable effort was put into from 1997 onwards.

³⁹³ Interview OTH12.

³⁹⁴ Interview RW3.

³⁹⁵ See the DOD's Report on US Military Activity in Rwanda between 1994 and 1997, available at <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/rwanda/summary.html>.

³⁹⁶ According to Orth, "Rwanda's Hutu Extremist Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective."

On the other side, the insurgents themselves were unable to retain the discipline which had won the support of the local population in the insurgency's early stages. Like the RPF, they originally aspired to a puritan, ascetic code of conduct for their footsoldiers, with brutal penalties for infractions:

‘All sexual relations, willing or not, drunkenness and unauthorised looting are punishable by death. Seven infiltrators accused of stealing 13,000 francs from a peasant were executed while I was an infiltrator. They included the soldiers Frédéric Nsenga, Singirankabo, and Wanga. They were killed in front of us, by small hoes and strangulation. The death penalty is also applied to infiltrators who show fear in combat. Only the commander can give the order to withdraw (Jean Marie-Vianney Cyizere, former infiltrator, September to November 1997)³⁹⁷

Most evidence suggests this was very rarely more than an aspiration: insurgents weren't paid or fed, and discipline collapsed predictably quickly. Continual looting became part of the insurgency almost from its inception. There are multiple reports of large groups of civilians accompanying raids with the sole purpose of looting (up to five hundred), and rumours of locals wearing masks looting their own communities.³⁹⁸ Whilst this must have overcome many short-term resource crises, its ultimate effect was to convince the local population that the insurgents were predatory bandits rather than their liberators.

Finally, the internal displacement caused by the latter stages of the insurgency forced hundreds of thousands into camps supervised by the soldiers. Many of those civilians told African Rights³⁹⁹ that living in the camps had made it possible for them to get to know the soldiers better, and had been a vital part of breaking down the deep demonization of the RDF which had been promoted by the insurgents.

³⁹⁷ Quoted in Omaar and Waal, *Rwanda: the Insurgency in the Northwest*.

³⁹⁸ Interview OTH12.

³⁹⁹ Omaar and Waal, *Rwanda: the Insurgency in the Northwest*.

The only serious complaint in the latter stages of the insurgency concerned an incident on the 19th of December in Karambo, where after fighting between a platoon and insurgents the platoon allegedly summoned the population to congregate in the centre of Karambo and summarily executed 140.⁴⁰⁰ The soldiers concerned were almost immediately arrested and officers from the Auditorat Militaire were on the scene carrying out investigations by the end of the week. This helped to defuse tension, and is an instructive example of the crucial role played by the institutions set up by the central state in making the army behave itself, and creating confidence that would continue.

b. Paying salaries

Satisfying the demands of footsoldiers who endured much during the struggle for the promise of much upon victory has proved the undoing of several regimes. Having not paid their soldiers at all between 1990 and 1994 (the RPF were not prepared for a long war), and only once in 1994 (October) and 1995 (January), regular salary payments started only in mid-1996. In early 1998, the army top brass announced that the arrears would not be paid.⁴⁰¹ Throughout this period wages were extremely low. Between 1994 and 1997 this had been a problem of only limited extent: the de facto continuity of guerrilla struggle helped explain the necessity of delaying salary payments somewhat, the ascetism of the RPF in the bush (no girlfriends, no marriage, etc) limited the financial obligations of troops to their kin, and money had comparatively less value in the chaos of the immediate post-genocidal situation.

However, by 1997 paying salaries had become urgent. This was not just about a desire to ‘look statelike’ (as part of a legitimisation strategy done with an eye fixed on the former government across the border in the DRC), or because soldiers were starting to get married in large numbers and hence asking louder for their salaries, but also as part of the counter-insurgency effort: it was vital to demonstrate the ability of the

⁴⁰⁰ Interview OTH12.

⁴⁰¹ Dates from Benjamin Chemouni, "Understanding the ideology and organizational culture of the Rwandan military: the case of salary management in the Rwandan army," in *ECAS: European Conference of African Studies* (ISTE-CEU, Lisbon, 2013).

government to guarantee resources to integrated soldiers it was unsure of the loyalties of, and insurgents it was trying to bring in from the cold.⁴⁰²

The solution of the government was elegant, original, and solved a related issue: the gradual settling down of soldiers within Rwanda and rising number of marriages had given rise to demands from soldiers for access to credit. Commercial banks were regularly refusing soldiers loans (their salaries were low, and it is a somewhat risky profession), and Banque Populaire (the pre-genocidal cooperative of rural banks offering small loans) was nearly bankrupt. The soldiers themselves were tired, and largely took the view that they had been waiting long enough for the promised fruits of victory.⁴⁰³ The solution was for the Rwandan military to create its own bank: Zigama-CSS.⁴⁰⁴ This was originally set up as a co-op in early 1997 in which every soldier automatically had an account. Salaries were paid by the bank into these accounts, the soldiers were required to donate 10% of their salary, and the bank would act as a facility for low-sum, low-interest rate loans for soldiers and veterans. Soldiers also got shares in Zigama-CSS, and (compulsorily) acquired savings.

The advantages from the point of view of military cohesion were several. Firstly, pay goes to a bank account attached to and owned by a specific soldier. It makes the phenomenon of ‘ghost soldiers’, which has proved so difficult for the NRM, much less common. Secondly, other forms of embezzlement are harder simply because there are no longer paymasters. Thirdly, it makes it easier to transfer money to families. Fourthly, it reduces ‘mis-consumption’ (i.e. burning through a month’s salary on one drunken binge) whilst fighting. Fifthly, the existence of the bank helps guarantee the smoothness of regular payments: the bank is a buffer to avoid building up arrears. This was vital for the ex-FAR reintegrated into the military: it grounded trust, created a (literal) community of interest, and a sense of ownership for many soldiers. It also brought transparency to the whole process: the newly reintegrated could know with

⁴⁰² Interview RW33.

⁴⁰³ Interview, RW11.

⁴⁰⁴ *Zigama* is Kinyarwanda for ‘saving’, CSS stands for ‘*Caisse de sécurité sociale*’, although the anglicisation of the state has left only the acronym.

a reasonable degree of certainty that their salary would be paid, and it was not subject to the whim of a capricious or unsympathetic superior officer. It was also very important for communities: the existence and success of Zigama-CSS meant that when these former insurgents were integrated into the army they were turned from being perceived as dissolute youth to breadwinners – virtually overnight. This was vital in changing the mentality of the community.

It was additionally great for the government because in doing this it solved one of the key principal-agent problems bedeviling any post-liberation government: paying off veterans and keeping the army cohesive and disciplined. And this was all done extremely cheaply: Rwandan soldiers have some of the lowest salaries in Africa.⁴⁰⁵ It illustrates that RPF are an innovative, risk-taking, flexible elite with a great problem-solving culture, capable of creating unusual institutional solutions to overcome new problems as they arise.

c. The international dimension

Changes in the geo-politics of the region also proved fortuitous, although they cannot have initially appeared so. On the 22nd July 1998, Congolese President Larent-Désiré Kabila announced he was replacing James Kaberebe as Congolese Chief of Staff, and that all Rwandan military personnel had to leave the country. By the 29th, the last planeload of Rwandans had returned to Kigali. This exclusion of Rwandans from the governance structures of the DRC undermined the security guarantee Rwanda had gone to war for in 1996, and undid much of the gains of the ADFL victory in the First Congo War. As such, the Rwandan leadership rapidly engineered the undoing of the peace. On August 2nd, the 10th Brigade of the Congolese Army in Goma rebelled and Kayumba took the 211st Brigade over the border to engage in joint action with them. This became the Second Congo War, and is also far outwith the scope of this chapter.⁴⁰⁶ Two small aspects of the war are all that need be mentioned here; firstly, that the

⁴⁰⁵ Personal Correspondence, Ben Chemouni, August 2013.

⁴⁰⁶ Dates and places here drawn from Prunier, *From genocide to continental war : the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa*.

first action of the 10th and 211st Brigades was to engage with the ex-FAR in a series of engagements they won crushingly; second, RCD,⁴⁰⁷ the pro-Rwandan rebel group which ended up controlling much of the East during the second war (and whose elites have been recycled into the political structures of the East pretty much ever since) established durable control over the Masisi plain, depriving the insurgents of any hinterland or access to the wider set of sympathetic armed groups. This is a further example of the Rwandan elites adroit manipulation of their transnational connections and networks for the furtherance of internal state objectives.

d. The integration of the ex-FAR

Ideological reprogramming of the ex-FAR brought back into Rwanda by the clearing of the camps in 1996 was a priority from the beginning. When the refugees returned en masse in November of that year, President Bizimungu and the cabinet were present to address the refugees, engage in ‘mobilisation’ and ‘reconciliation’, and attempt to facilitate the rapid and (quasi-)voluntary return of the refugees to the communes⁴⁰⁸. However, it took longer for the government to decide they also wanted to integrate ex-FAR into the new military: it was not until April 1998 that the first group of around 1,200 ex-FAR completed their re-education and were deployed in Ruhengeri. They had undergone a six week training course involving the sorts of citizenship education and patriotic history which later became the Itorero Ry’Igihugu programme.⁴⁰⁹ Reintegrated ex-FAR were given arms for the duration of this programme and were made responsible for their own protection. Upon graduation, 400 were sent immediately to their home communes.⁴¹⁰ This had two immediate and enormous effects: firstly, it was transformative for the way the civilian population felt about the RDF (it went from something that could plausibly be construed as a foreign Tutsi army of occupation to an army which included many of their direct kin); secondly,

⁴⁰⁷ *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*.

⁴⁰⁸ Interview RW33.

⁴⁰⁹ Patriotic education of this form in Rwanda is now given to gacaca prisoners, refugee returnees, school leavers, and youth from the diaspora, amongst other things. Those, such as Susan Thompson, who consider it to be a North-Korean-style programme of indoctrination clearly haven’t sat through enough of its soul-crushing tedium and inanity. For examples, see Thompson, “Resisting Reconciliation: State Power and Everyday Life in Post-Genocide Rwanda.”

⁴¹⁰ Interview OTH13.

many of the new recruits proved invaluable in terms of the information they brought to the army (terrain particulars, the MOs of various ex-FAR cells, and so on).

Just a month later, in May, the ex-FAR attempted to move into Byumba and Kigali Rurale Prefectures. The RPA was able to respond with rapid and aggressive military action, coupled with RMIP mobilisation and deploying integrated ex-FAR who were from the areas the insurgents were trying to move into. By this point, the RPA had both a military strategy which worked, and were able to ensure the civilian population refused to help the insurgents almost without exception – the insurgents were pushed back in days.

e. Public goods provision

In the climate of the insurgency, conditions were sufficiently bad that the public goods the insurgents and the government ‘competed’ at providing were usually limited to two: order and food. With respect to the first, the insurgents did attempt to do more than undermine the order provided by the government, they tried to replace it with a ‘state-like’ system of order of their own.

Alongside soldiers, civilians were recruited into the insurgency to staff a parallel state structure with two basic levels; *partisans*, who were educated, frequently professionals such as teachers or former government officers who were tasked with coordination, propagandising, and fund-raising, and *résistants*, who were the civilian footsoldiers given limited paramilitary training for the purpose of threatening local officials, small scale looting, and playing a support role during attacks.⁴¹¹ In some districts, the ex-FAR named the bourgmestre and councillors, and attempted to levy ‘taxes’ on the local people and businesses. However, there was never really enough money or staff to make these structures more than aspirational:⁴¹² they were, in part, superficial performances of stateness engaged in spasmodically for half-hearted legitimisation,

⁴¹¹ Interview UG13.

⁴¹² Ibid.

but largely for the purpose of looting and coercing compliance. Even at the height of the insurgency, the ex-FAR were not able to substantively provide security to civilians unless they fled with them into the volcanic forests (an extremely unpleasant proposition most did not countenance for any serious amount of time) – the ex-FAR had almost no logistical support when it ventured out of the forests, and only a third had firearms, and as such insurgents were never able to control territory for long periods of time.⁴¹³ The only benefits they were able to offer the local population (beyond refraining to engage in violence or looting, which rarely feels like a benefit) were economic spoils from looting if they participated in attacks on neighbouring communes, which many did. However, this never amounted to anything sufficiently substantive or regular to give locals a stake in the state-like structures of the insurgency.

By contrast, the government was able to do much better for ordinary civilians. Two tactics beyond increasing RDF troop deployment served to help secure order: the reintroduction of the local defence forces (LDFs), and moving the local population into fortified nucleated settlements, either villages or IDP camps. The LDFs were citizen committees organised at the village level to protect their own communities. They were originally set up by Habyarimana to protect against RPF incursions in the early 1990s. The RPF retained many of these immediately after the genocide (supplemented with their own, composed heavily out of returnees) out of necessity, and disbanded them in 1995 as regular police began work again, and because the LDF were implicated in all manner of abuses against normal civilians. At the nadir of the insurgency, the government resurrected the system in the North-West. The RPF recruited young men, usually those who had been informally helping the army already, and gave them two months training. By October 1999 (the only estimate for numbers I have been able to find is HRW, claiming that there were 5,000 LDF members, roughly 150-250 for each commune.⁴¹⁴ Their function was never to resist a major attack (far too small for that), but rather to act as an early warning system for the army, and to make it impossible for small ex-FAR cells to infiltrate a community and intimidate locals into cooperating.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

⁴¹⁴ HRW, "Rwanda: the Search for Security and Human Rights Abuses," (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

Perhaps surprisingly, African Rights found in their interviews⁴¹⁵ that everyone they spoke to was in favour of villagisation from a security perspective, and ordinary peasants felt much safer now that it was nearly impossible for insurgents to target them in isolated homesteads where they were alone and thereby elicit cooperation from them. They encountered some resentment around the expropriation of land and unresolved claims for compensation, but nothing analogous to the well-spring of resentment springing from similar policies elsewhere on the continent, perhaps because here the security rationale deployed disingenuously elsewhere seemed entirely reasonable to Rwandan peasants at the time.⁴¹⁶

IDP camps served a similar function. By mid-1998 there were four giant camps collectively holding hundreds of thousands of people: Rwerere, Nkuli, Nyamutera, and Kinigi.⁴¹⁷ The degree of displacement was enormous: 54,000 out of the 64,000-strong population of Rwerere Commune in Gisenyi were displaced.⁴¹⁸ In Ruhengeri, the communes of Nyamugari, Cyeru, Nyarotovu, Gatone, and Nyamutera – roughly three quarters of the population – were almost completely empty.⁴¹⁹ The majority arrived in the camps from April 1998 onwards. Many had been hiding out in the volcanic forests with the insurgents beforehand, and only abandoned them for the government-run camps when the insurgents ran out of food. The camps served as the front line of the new state in three respects; firstly, they enabled the state to provide security at a point when it simply lacked the resources to project power comprehensively over the territory of the North-West. Secondly, they acted as vehicles for the channelling of goods to the population. There was quite a lot of the service provision in the camps: supply lines (ran by the WFP) to provide food to the camps were functioning from mid-1997.⁴²⁰ African Rights in 1999 found that almost all the camps had sanitation and water sterilisation facilities which, if never quite enough, probably was superior to what was available outside the camps.⁴²¹ In Rwerere camp there was a dispensary, a nutritional centre, several primary schools, and one secondary school. Nyamutera camp was initially far too large to

⁴¹⁵ Omaar and Waal, *Rwanda: the Insurgency in the Northwest*.

⁴¹⁶ See Christy Cannon Lorgen, "Villagisation in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Tanzania," *Social Dynamics* 26, no. 2 (2000).

⁴¹⁷ Interview UG13.

⁴¹⁸ Jackson, "Legacy of Bitterness: Insurgency in North West Rwanda."

⁴¹⁹ Orth, "Rwanda's Hutu Extremist Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective."

⁴²⁰ Usually rice, lentils, and corn. This was the subject of much grumbling, particularly about the indignities of vegetarianism. Interview UG13.

⁴²¹ AR, "Briefing Paper on the North-West Region of Rwanda," (African Rights, 1999).

have adequate sanitation, but this was spotted and divided into three separate camps in early 1998. Part of why the camps became so large is that they were better able to provide security, food, and shelter than much of the surrounding territory, which had been devastated by the insurgency. Thirdly, many former residents of the camps remarked that living there had enabled them to live alongside RPF soldiers for the first time, and that this had been a largely positive experience which broke down the initial barriers to legitimating the rule of the new state.⁴²²

One attack in December 1997 provides perhaps the clearest illustration of this aspect of the insurgency: early in the month, c1,500 militants attacked the IDP camp in Rwerere. The attackers killed several officers of the local government, released around 100 prisoners from the local *cachot*, and returned to the forest with all but 2,500 of the displaced civilians. The response of the state was not to engage in punitive action, but rather to make it known that a general amnesty would be respected, and that they could return to the camps at any time and would be fed. Food was exceptionally scarce in the forests, which could barely be cultivated, and the planting season in the rest of the North-West had been missed due to insecurity, so the insurgents had very little to loot, which meant the government was able to use food distribution in the North-West as a credible means to coerce. Local officials and military leaders would announce dates and locations for food distribution. If the ex-FAR attacked or operated in an announced area, distribution did not occur. If an area remained calm, food distribution went as scheduled. The camp was back to its pre-attack size in a matter of months, and the authority of the state in Rwerere had been decisively strengthened.

f. Local Administration

Ultimately, extending the control of the state over the North-West in a robust and enduring manner required the establishment of functional formal institutions that commanded the assent (if not the affection) of the local population, but could also be relied upon by central government to rule in the

⁴²² Interview OTH13.

manner so desired. The creation of such structures was a priority of the post-transitional period, and is dealt with in some detail in the next chapter. What local administration looked like at this point, however, is one of the biggest holes in our understanding of what the frontline of the Rwandan state looked like during the latter years of the transition. In 1995 Gérard Prunier wrote for WRITENET that fully 95% of people appointed to the reconstructed levels of local government in Rwanda in the spring of that year were foreign-born Tutsi.⁴²³ There's no footnote given, and it doesn't reappear in any later publications on the period in question.⁴²⁴ This is a surprising claim for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is by no means obvious that there would have been enough foreign-born Tutsi willing and able to take up those (extremely risky) posts.⁴²⁵ Secondly, the RPF have always been very sensitive and well-attuned to the risks of obvious failures of representation (particularly in structures as visible as these). Thirdly, this does not fit with what else we know, which is that the RPF felt they were not able to trust or rely on many of the officers at these levels. As Jackson wrote based on his fieldwork in the North-West in the late 1990s:

The post-genocide local government system in Rwanda is unstable for a variety of reasons, not least because of the many local government officials identified with being sympathisers of the infiltrators. Particularly at the lower levels of *nyumbakumis* (responsible for units of ten households) and *responsables* ('cells' or parishes), there have been numerous cases where support has been given to infiltrators. Local government officers have also been useful in providing information to the FAR regarding RPA troop movement and combat strengths, and there are examples of entire communes 'going over' to the FAR and even luring the RPA into ambush⁴²⁶

⁴²³ Prunier, "Rwanda: Update to end March 1995."

⁴²⁴ Including his chapter on precisely the same period, 'Rwanda's Mixed Season of Hope' in Prunier, *From genocide to continental war: the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa*.

⁴²⁵ I was unable to find any numbers for individuals killed during these years, but the general consensus seems to be that if you accepted a position as a representative of the state in the North-West during this period, you were taking your life in your own hands.

⁴²⁶ Jackson, "Legacy of Bitterness: Insurgency in North West Rwanda.", p32.

Fourthly, Prunier's claim is epistemically suspect. It is unlikely that *anyone* would be in a position to know the ethnic identity of every local government officer at that stage, given the general chaos, instability, misinformation, and confusion reigning at that point. Bert Ingalaere, the preeminent scholar of local government in Rwanda, only believes there are detailed and credible data available for the 1980s, 1990 to 1994, and 2006 onwards.⁴²⁷ Harry Verhoeven, another Rwanda expert, went so far as to call it 'an extraordinary claim which surely can't be right'.⁴²⁸ Ingalaere adds:

...local government/governance at the time was rather chaotic. And I am referring to sub-provincial (prefectural) levels, even sub-commune. I think many of the local authorities that occupied positions in the period before or during the genocide were gone because they fled (to Congo), were imprisoned or dead. Instead, new people were appointed. These were either (and I think mostly) Hutu that were considered not to have been involved in the genocide at the time or genocide survivors. In some areas they were returnees. I think the returnees at the time went mostly to levels above commune.⁴²⁹

It would not be surprising at all if the government of Rwanda itself did not have such information at that point: if the claim refers to the lowest levels of the state, we're talking about some 45,000 *nyumbakumis* and *chefs de zone*, and 10,000 *chefs de cellule*.⁴³⁰ It's unlikely anyone was in a position to conduct an ethnic census at that time.

Finally, this does not fit with what we know about the sources of insecurity in the North-West. Almost all writing on the North-West mentions that the security of communes relied in large part upon security in neighbouring communes, and the determination of officials there to ensure insurgents did not infiltrate, which was frequently lacking, due to the sympathies of many *bourgmestres*. The patchy nature of a forceful

⁴²⁷ Personal correspondence, March 2013.

⁴²⁸ Personal correspondence, March 2013.

⁴²⁹ Personal correspondence, March 2013.

⁴³⁰ There were 106 *bourgmestres*, so it is just about possible that Prunier is referring to them alone.

and cohesive civilian administration created a prisoners' dilemma for many local administrators: refusing to help insurgents would make you a target, and agreeing to help would involve destabilising neighbouring areas. If you knew your opposite number in the *colline* immediately next to you was in the same position, you had every incentive to defect first.⁴³¹ This is in part why the government fell back to a strategy which relied overwhelmingly on the military to provide policing, food, shelter, and so on.

As such, my belief is that the most likely scenario is that the local structures of the state were deeply patchy and weak, and contained at least some Hutu who had occupied similar positions in the pre-genocidal dispensation, and plenty of other Hutu drawn from the local population.⁴³² However, there would be extensive regional variation and ad hoc improvisation. In much of the country, however, the civilian administration only existed in theory, and the military did the 'administrating', insofar as any was done. The final piece of evidence supporting this is that after the insurgency was contained, the Rwandan government embarked on an extensive operation to re-staff the lower branches of the state, which they saw as the final obstacle to ending the transition period: the local elections of 1999.⁴³³

⁴³¹ Interview RW12.

⁴³² In some areas, communities defected *en masse* to Congo as the RPF advanced, and in these literally depopulated areas there were obviously no officers of the old state (i.e. *nyumbakumis*, *chefs de zone*, and *chefs de cellule*) to recycle. However, there generally weren't any newly appointed ones either, at least not until 1998 when the 'new caseload' was forcibly returned.

⁴³³ I also contacted Dr Prunier for comment, and to ask for a source for his statistic. In the interests of fairness, I shall reproduce his response in full:

I stand by what I wrote back in 1995. But today I would not know. I suspect it would be a bit different. Nevertheless the presence and availability of so many foreign-born Tutsi twenty years ago is not surprising at all if you keep certain things in mind :

1. The Rwanda-born Tutsi were mostly dead and Kagame did not trust them much anyway
2. The Hutu former elite had fled into exile
3. The run-of-the mill Hutu left behind were poorly qualified
4. The "foreign-born Tutsi" in government mostly came from Uganda where they had managed to obtain a fairly high educational level for a refugee population, particularly in the last four years, since Museveni had taken power in conjunction with a large Rwandese armed contribution. Members of the European and Canadian-educated diaspora also figured disproportionately.

The reason I stopped talking about this (and about Rwanda altogether) is that after the attempt on my life in 1998, I stopped going there anymore. Without good data from the ground, you cannot write. Thanks God I have other fields of interest. But I do not know anybody working on that particular aspect of the societal bases of the present Rwandese regime.

I think it should be reasonably clear that this does not directly engage with the reasons for my scepticism about Dr Prunier's claims, and given his unwillingness to give a source for his claim, it is difficult for me to do much more at this stage than respectfully disagree. It is worth noting, however, that the types of education referred to in (3) and (4)

Part Four: Ending the Transition

1. Policing and Local Defence Forces before 1999

After the immediate security threats had passed, rule could be deepened, regularised, and professionalised through working with, and co-opting, such structures as were already in place, and through the creation of informal social control mechanisms operated by communities themselves. After Kibeho, the Rwandan government reconstructed the most foundational aspects of any state by piecing together shreds of the old one in largely the same form. The administrative structures of Rwanda at the local level remained the highly ordered and supervised systems documented by Lemarchand in the 1960s,⁴³⁴ and Jefremovas in the 1980s:⁴³⁵ tens of thousands of local leaders keeping watch over and managing very small units of the population. Below the lowest elected local government officer, the *responsable*, there were two levels of administration: the *nyumbakumi*, who was in charge of ten to fifteen households, and the *chef de zone*, who was in charge of about two hundred households.⁴³⁶ The *responsable* governed, with a committee of seven and a local militia, around five hundred to a thousand households. People entered these positions through an opaque process of ‘nomination’ rather than an electoral process,⁴³⁷ which enabled the *abakada* to dominate them.

Committees usually included old caseload refugees and RPF *abakada*, thus ensuring the central state had their proconsuls in the hinterland.⁴³⁸ These levels of government have wide responsibilities; mobilisation of the community in law and order matters, organisation of night patrols, law enforcement, functioning of the (Gacaca) justice system, enforcement of the villagisation policy, provision of such welfare services as exist, adjudication of land disputes, issuing of much official documentation, and administration of the

were not necessary for holding these posts, unless Prunier is only referring to *bourgmestres*, which he must be aware of.

⁴³⁴ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*; Lemarchand, "Power and stratification in Rwanda: a reconsideration."; Lemarchand, "The coup in Rwanda."

⁴³⁵ V. Jefremovas, *Brickyards to graveyards: from production to genocide in Rwanda* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002).

⁴³⁶ The two were later merged to become *umukuru* who, as a committee of four, are responsible for fifty households, often rising to as many as two hundred in the towns.

⁴³⁷ Interview RW15.

⁴³⁸ Interview UG15.

LDF. Information (about, for example, criminal and socially unacceptable behaviour) is recorded by local leaders, and passed up the hierarchy of local government to the police, other organs of the central state, and ultimately to the President's Office. These were the crucial institutions of the state prior to the genocide, and – outside cities at least – remained so after.

The system ensures a strong state with extremely high levels of societal penetration:

In this tightly supervised state, nothing is overlooked, whether it is absence from the monthly Saturday civic duty of cleaning the local area or absence from the weekly local *gacaca*...At best the local *nyumbakumi* will be knocking on the door warning that further absences will 'get one into trouble'. At worst, the absence will lead to a jail sentence. Most may be outside the small RPF ruling network...but they appreciate the security and progress that this ordered society brings⁴³⁹

These structures which administer Rwandan society are pervasive, intrusive and hierarchical. They were used by the RPF leadership for one very simple reason; lacking the resources to control the territory themselves, it was necessary to bind a class of administrators to the state's machinery through granting them access to the patronage of central government in exchange for facilitating the extension and penetration of state power. The continuity in the structural form of these structures across the rupture of genocide is explained by the necessity of working with those existing culturally recognised forms of authority, structures and institutions for a new elite without the finance or manpower to do anything else.

We see a similar story with regards to the coercive arms of the state: the military became almost exclusively RPF, and remained so until the reintegration of Hutu forces following the invasion of Zaire in

⁴³⁹ Bruce Baker, "Reconstructing a Policing System Out of the Ashes: Rwanda's Solution," *Politicizing and Society* 17, no. 4 (2007), p347.

1996, but the three former state police structures were maintained. These were the *gendarmerie*, under the ministry of defence, the *police communale* under the ministry of local administration, and the *police judiciaire* under the ministry of justice. RPF personnel were transferred to positions of command in these forces to ensure their continuation, and to bind them into the new state machine, but no more substantive changes were made. However, these police forces had lost many of their officers, and were small and uncoordinated. A UNDP report concluded in 1995 that:

The material resources available to [police] forces have been almost totally destroyed during the civil strife. In terms of both quality and quantity, the human resources available to these agencies do not suffice to meet even basic requirements. At the present times, the Government of Rwanda does not have available to it the financial means necessary to furnish minimal material resources.⁴⁴⁰

Even by 2006, the total number of police officers in Rwanda, which had been merged in 2000 into the centrally run Rwandan National Police⁴⁴¹, was only 5,800, not near enough to police a population of Rwanda's size. That number had not risen because the RPF had decided to supplement those formal policing structures that they did have by maximising the participation of the whole society in security through informal ('popular') models. Confronted with problems in Rwanda, the willingness of the new leadership to deploy this model is in part attributable to their familiarity with Ugandan models, notably the Resistance Councils of the NRA. The first Commissioner General later wrote:

⁴⁴⁰ Cees De Rover, "Development Assistance to the Gendarmerie and Communal Police Force of Rwanda: Background Report to Facilitate the Elaboration of a Final Project Document," (New York, NY: United Nations Development Programme, 1995).

⁴⁴¹ By Law No. 09/2000 of June 16, 2000.

The model chosen was the community-building approach which emphasised social as opposed to legal action thus recognising informal social control mechanisms, in addition to modern policing, as a critical component of restoring and maintaining social order⁴⁴²

What this meant was that just as the formal justice system was to be supplemented by gacaca, the formal police would be assisted by militias of young volunteers under the authority of the *responsable*: the newly resurrected LDFs, which went on to outlive the insurgency. The principle behind the LDF was of voluntary service by young people selected by their *responsable* for their good behaviour to provide local security for one or two days a week. They received two months training, and nothing more. In the insurgency, the LDF had played an important military role alongside the army in dealing with insurgents. They then shifted to their role supplementing the civilian police, but kept most of their arms. Their functions are ostensibly limited to that of low-level community policing: carrying out patrols, gathering information for the police, and being the first response to any insecurity. Their numbers are unclear, but the best estimate placed them at somewhere around 20,000 men in 2006,⁴⁴³ and there has been no dramatic restructuring of the force before or since, so it is plausible that number has remained relatively constant.

As such, the system of order created was one where citizens are far more likely to encounter LDF personnel than the police in most circumstances. This large supplementary force is the only thing that enables the central state to exert effective control of the territory. Their close links to the community are supposed to ensure that the LDF is minimally accountable at a local level, and this is true, albeit undermined by the power of Mayors to select local leaders in urban zones, and the demand that such leaders be 'qualified' – a rather vague stipulations which allows considerable exercise of patronage.⁴⁴⁴ It is also the case that this system is inevitably inconsistent and irregular in its procedures, and has been

⁴⁴² Frank Mugambage, "Community Policing in a Post-Conflict Society: A Case Study of Post-Genocide Rwanda" (University of Nairobi, 2005), p40.

⁴⁴³ Baker, "Reconstructing a Policing System Out of the Ashes: Rwanda's Solution.", p256.

⁴⁴⁴ Interview RW1.

implicated in human rights abuses more than once. However, the system fulfils what is required of it; it makes possible the governance of Rwanda despite the narrow size and social insulation of the ruling elite.

Whether that is the same as saying 'the central state rules' is unclear: the legal status of these lower ranks of local government is murky at best. Technically, they are not part of the state at all, and their activities, such as patrols and courts, are entirely informal.⁴⁴⁵ In practice, they exist in the 'twilight'⁴⁴⁶ between state and non-state; both vital to the functions of the centre, and instruments of central rule, but outside formal state structures. *The chef de zone* and the *nyumbakumi* rely on the central state for their existence, but have a large measure of local discretion. For example, the villagisation (*Imidugudu*) programme the Rwandan government tasked local government with implementing from 1997 onwards was, as we might expect, at least in part about deepening the already pervasive relationships between citizens and the state. But there was considerable variation across prefectures⁴⁴⁷ in how the policy was enacted; how participatory or coercive the process was, and how quickly it proceeded, and how local officials adapted central instructions to local exigencies. There was practical scope for low-ranking government officials to direct the implementation of policies in the first decade of RPF rule. Knowledge of the legal limit of the state's authority is invariably very low in these areas, as are the kinds of resources that might be used to challenge these twilight institutions when they do overstep their bounds. That, along with their decentralised authority, their appointment from above, and the pressure from the central state to deliver rapid social transformation, created a context in which rural committees frequently overstep the bounds of their authority as they jockey with their neighbours to impress the central authority on which they rely for their continued status. The result is a hugely strong state, in a manner often downplayed by the 'twilight' label.

2. The local elections and the creation of a rural RPF

⁴⁴⁵ Interview RW30.

⁴⁴⁶ Christian Lund, "Twilight institutions: public authority and local politics in Africa," *Development and Change* 37, no. 4 (2006).

⁴⁴⁷ For an extended account of variation in local government patterns across contemporary Rwanda, see Clark, *The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice Without Lawyers*.

In February 1998 the RPF held a party congress in the leafy Kigali suburb of Kicukiro (known as ‘the Mulindi Congress’) at which the next stage of the statebuilding project was sketched out.⁴⁴⁸ Paul Kagame replaced Alexis Kanyarengwe as Chairman, Pasteur Bizimungu was re-elected as Vice-Chairman, and Charles Murigande (a former Professor of Mathematics at the *Université Nationale*) was elected secretary general. This amounted to placing the core structures of the party under the direct control of those known to be a. Kagame-loyalists, and b. the top organisational talent of the party.⁴⁴⁹ The headline conclusion of the congress was that this group were explicitly given public direction to move the country out of the transitional period.⁴⁵⁰ In order to do this, two things were needed: firstly, those local officers of state who had been allowed to remain in post despite their suspect loyalties had to be rooted out and replaced in order to definitively destroy the machinery of the genocide; secondly, the RPF had to become a party with mass structures throughout the country which could guarantee victory in the Parliamentary and Presidential polls in 2003. It is important to note that the RPF was not forced into running any of these elections. Rather, the regularisation of the RPF’s authority had been part of the plan from the start. As Charles Murigande said at the time, ‘Elections are one manifestation of democracy, and because we committed ourselves to teach our people what it was, we are doing it.’⁴⁵¹ However, the RPF were equally committed to winning the process by a crushing margin, and willing to bend rules out of all recognition in order to bring that about.

The process was initially carried out in a Blairite combination of big-tent inclusive spectacles alongside closed-door meetings where the real decisions were taken. Bizimungu convened meetings on Saturdays (called ‘Urugwiro’) which work-shopped policy and tried out ideas much like an elite focus-group. These ran weekly from May 1998 to February the following year, and the rolling programme of guests included trusted individuals from across society: some of the cabinet, the Presidents of the important

⁴⁴⁸ Interview RW18.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁰ Interview RW8.

⁴⁵¹ 2nd March 2001, Kigali. Quoted in ICG, ‘“Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections,’ in *Africa Report No. 34* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2001), p4.

Commissions,⁴⁵² big national organisations such as ISHEMA, *pro-femmes* and LIPRODHOR⁴⁵³, *préfets*, religious leaders, and so on.⁴⁵⁴ The opposition MDR alleged they were shut out of these meetings entirely.⁴⁵⁵ What seems likely is that these meetings were about focus-grouping and including those ‘opinion leaders’ seen to be receptive and sympathetic, rather than a more plural crowd, and that these meetings were not a democratic, open-ended process of policy formation, but rather one in which selected individuals were brought onside for the plan which would follow.

At the same time, the RPF moved to build an electoral machine. A group of cadres⁴⁵⁶ that had first been set up in the war to mobilise, recruit and spread the RPF message in liberated zones were revived.⁴⁵⁷ These were the same individuals which had, in the immediate aftermath of the genocide, been responsible for the distribution of limited chains of resources, deciding on the allocation of houses in the chaos of the old caseload refugees returning, and administering order in zones not directly controlled by the military. These were largely young men, and were disproportionately Tutsi and ‘Ugandan-born’, but not entirely.⁴⁵⁸ Their connection to the politico-military structures of the struggle period, however, made them sufficiently trusted to be endowed with the project of building the RPF in the countryside, and their role as minor big men in the genocidal aftermath gave them the necessary knowledge and resources. Between 1994 and 1998 cadres were posted to all levels of the administration as advisors and ‘right-hand men’, and also applied for jobs in UN agencies, foreign embassies, and so on. In July 1998, at another meeting in Kicukiro, the cadres were given the new mission of electoral victory and turning the RPF into a mass party.⁴⁵⁹ RPF cells were to be created in every administrative cell with the goal of selecting candidates for the March 1999 local elections, which the government announced it would hold shortly after the

⁴⁵² Reconciliation and Land are the most obvious candidates, but there were probably others

⁴⁵³ Human Rights organisations of various forms, all of which at that point had a positive relationship with the government, and all of which went on to lose said relationship.

⁴⁵⁴ Interview RW17.

⁴⁵⁵ Interview, RW16.

⁴⁵⁶ Also known by the Kinyarwanda *abakada*.

⁴⁵⁷ Interview RW17.

⁴⁵⁸ Interview RW27. Claims about the composition of the *abakada* come from (but are not limited to): Bert Ingalaere, Gérard Prunier, Rick Orth, Frank Rusagara, refugees in Nakivale Settlement, and ex-RPF officers. It is a matter of considerable consensus, but not one people are in general willing to go on the record about.

⁴⁵⁹ Interview RW8.

Congress. The date suggests the government wanted to run these elections pretty much as soon as the security situation was deemed sufficiently stable.

RPF cadres interpenetrated a set of other organisations which enmeshed them with the structures of the state, the justice system, and even donor organisations. They were involved in setting up the Local Defence Forces (in many cases they *were* the LDFs), the Community Development Committees (CDCs) which were supposed to offer local grassroots direction on development assistance provided by donors. In February 1998, Aloysia Inyumba (Minister for Women) was put in charge of building a national network of RPF women's groups, *Inzego Z'abari n'abategarugori*, using ministry funds, which were parallel structures to the cadres, and in the first quarter of 1999 Catholic youth leaders were recruited with the help of the newly created National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) to mobilise youth to come to *ingando* sessions – these sessions, held in 'solidarity camps' run by the military, became the foundational basis of mass sensitisation, but also political recruitment, and not-too-subtle urging to vote for particular candidates.

Two things were being assessed in these elections. Firstly, the RPF's capacity to transform itself into an integrative 'mass party': 10,000 cells, so over 100,000 members. This, by necessity, also meant making the RPF a genuinely multi-ethnic party at the lower levels, and the incorporation of huge numbers of young Hutu. Perhaps the best evidence for this is the howls of protest that greeted these moves from some of the more critical genocide survivor organisations. As the ICG wrote at the time:

In Kigali, a genocide survivor described the district elections as 'the return of the killers'. According to him, the RPF is preparing a new generation of Hutu political leaders through the establishment of local authorities, in order to bury the hatchet with the Hutu masses ahead of national elections... The entire reconciliation policy is based on the gamble that a new Hutu leadership can and will rise from the ashes of the former parties and of the post-genocide

repression, that new Hutu leaders will adhere to RPF ideology while being ‘trained’ and ‘enlightened’ in Ingando solidarity camps, and that they will serve the RPF faithfully⁴⁶⁰

Secondly, the elections were a controlled way of testing whether or not the populace could be ‘trusted’ with the franchise. Senior RPF figures were totally open about this – the widespread identification of the democratisation process of the early 1990s with the subsequent genocide had given the senior RPF three core convictions; that the Hutu peasantry had been warped by MRND ideology which required extensive reprogramming to remove, that most forms of direct democracy were dangerously open to populism, and that political parties foster the poisonous identity politics and division which opens the door to communal violence.⁴⁶¹ Again, the openness with which these positions were stated publicly is telling:

For the past seven years, we have tried to teach the Rwandan population new values...This country belongs to all of us and positive values are necessary to rebuild it. The issue [in the elections] will be to see whether the population agrees to this...If the population chooses people who believe in these values, we will have succeeded in our mission, even if the candidates belong to other parties. There is no difference between these people and the RPF. But if the people elected are sectarians, it will mean that the future is still uncertain. If few people of the RPF are not elected by many with positive values, I will easily recruit them. (Charles Murigande, 2001)⁴⁶²

As Murigande makes perfectly clear, elections in Rwanda are about identifying potential local leaders and recruiting them into the party, so it’s not accurate to claim elections are merely a farce designed to stuff the local government apparatus with returned Tutsis. Rather, these elections substantially broadened the sociological bases of the state, and incorporated significant new swathes of Rwandan society into direct engagement with the state.

⁴⁶⁰ ICG, "'Consensual Democracy' in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections.", p9.

⁴⁶¹ Interview RW6.

⁴⁶² Quoted in ICG, "'Consensual Democracy' in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections.", p4-5.

The 1999 elections held in March only filled the two lower levels of local government: the *secteurs* and *cellules*. These positions were traditionally not exceptionally powerful in contrast to the commune *bourgmestre* above them, who held almost all the crucial powers. However, the positions elected in 1999 composed 80% of the electoral college for the 2001 district elections which replaced the *bourgmestres*. The first polls were extremely tightly controlled. ‘Campaigning’ barely merited the title: the whole process was limited by executive order to a single meeting in which candidates were asked to state their name, level of education, and age.⁴⁶³ The electorate was strictly forbidden to make any loud comment or speak with each other about the candidates. When the signal was given, they had to line up publicly behind candidates, and that was the end of the election.⁴⁶⁴ Obviously party could not be mentioned. Several witnesses commented that, in the absence of any other information, the candidate with more education won almost every race.⁴⁶⁵ The RPF-nominated *bourgmestres* supervised the entire process, and the government was able to post ten soldiers at each station in Kigali-Rurale, Butare, Gisenyi, Kibungo, and Cyangugu (i.e. areas of insurgency, suspected opposition party strongholds, and border zones). The Rwandan human rights organisation LIPRODHOR wrote a short report on their observation mission⁴⁶⁶ which communicates much of the feel of these elections, conducted for the most part in a still militarised environment only just out of the insurgency: soldiers in some *secteurs* allegedly came round at 8am to wake people up and move them to polling stations.⁴⁶⁷ 50 people in Umutara were arrested for not voting (although not officially criminal, the government had made it perfectly clear people were expected to vote, and clearly some local government officials were at minimum ‘overenthusiastic’).⁴⁶⁸ The *abakada* electoral committees who selected candidates usually had a representative of the central state present, usually someone military. In Karago, one candidate selected to stand tried to refuse, and was jailed.⁴⁶⁹ In areas where the counter-insurgency was such that the government already had a state apparatus they trusted, the process was even

⁴⁶³ Interview RW16.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ Interview RW18.

⁴⁶⁶ LIPRODHOR, "Observation des élections locales, régions du Nord-Ouest du Rwanda." Photocopy, author's personal collection (1999).

⁴⁶⁷ Interview RW18.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ Interview RW5.

less competitive: LIPRODHOR estimated that 70% of the incumbents were re-elected in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri.

The 2001 elections were different. Firstly, in May 2000 the government published the blueprint for decentralisation⁴⁷⁰ in which the government created larger units called districts with tax powers to replace the old communes in order that these units could be large enough and financially independent enough to be delegated various state functions. The idea was that the central state would then be liberated from the quotidian business of service delivery to float above the population, able to disavow responsibility and thereby blame for any failings. Secondly, these elections were conducted by a civilian National Election Commission (NEC), with a secret ballot and a competitive quantity of candidates (votes chose between 8,175 candidates to fill 2,700 posts). This is extremely suggestive that the RPF believed at this point that their slow democratisation plan tested in 1999 had been successful enough for them to relax control a little further. After the district committees had been popularly elected, the five senior executives of each district were chosen by electoral college composed of cell and sector officials who had gained their positions in the 1999 elections, further suggesting that these individuals were seen as largely trustworthy.

The conduct of the 2001 elections was entirely peaceful, and there are few allegations of electoral malpractice, none of which are that substantive.⁴⁷¹ The real complaints were about two aspects which reveal important aspects of the RPF's *modus operandi*: the complexity and indirectness of the process, and the heavy control exercised by the NEC, were both held to be inimical to genuine democracy. The RPF has repeatedly stated that direct elections would defeat the purpose of its policy, which aims to break down the personalisation of authority.⁴⁷² The government explicitly wanted to weaken the link between the population and its leaders at the district level in favour of collective accountability, hence a system in

⁴⁷⁰ Minaloc, "National Decentralisation Policy and Implementation Strategy for National Decentralisation Policy " (Kigali: Republic of Rwanda, 2000). Photocopy, author's personal collection.

⁴⁷¹ As well as the conclusion of the ICG report, this opinion was echoed by NDI staff (Interviews RW5, RW16, and RW17) as well as several journalists speaking off the record (Interviews RW10 and RW18).

⁴⁷² Interview RW8.

which district executives are collectively appointed by the elected representatives in the immediately lower level.

The NEC itself is a more complex manifestation of the RPF's multi-faceted approach to rule. It is formally one of the institutions specified in Arusha, and there had been some ire that it had not existed for the polls of 1999. The idea was that the permanent secretariat was directly appointed by the Council of Ministers, whereas parliament and the *bourgmestres* picked the national commissioners through a consultative, consensus-based process (which made it very easy for *bourgmestres* seeking to transform into district majors to pick their own judges).⁴⁷³ It was helmed by two RPF big hitters: Protais Musoni as the President and Christophe Bazivamo as Executive Secretary. The secretariat was put in place in August 2000, months before the election.⁴⁷⁴ It had selected and trained sub-national commissioners for the provincial and district levels three months before the legal basis for the commission's existence was approved⁴⁷⁵ (four provincial commissioners per province, i.e. twenty in all, and 33,561 district commissioners). The secretariat itself was just Musoni, Bazivamo, and five assistants. So they relied extensively on local notables to find the commissioners: the *bourgmestres* and their teams. The effect of this was that the local administration and the ostensibly independent commission were largely inseparable at the local level. The national commissioners, in contrast, who were supposed to be the representative group which called the shots, were only put in place sixty days before the elections. The MDR, again, was not included: they allege they were not given the opportunity⁴⁷⁶, the RPF claim that they didn't respond to the invitation to participate in a timely manner.⁴⁷⁷ This fits with the public persona of the RPF as punctilious to a fault, but it is worth considering that during precisely this election period the NEC was willing to relax deadlines where it wanted to: only 7,256 individuals had submitted applications to run by the official close of the application period, only for the NEC to revise that number upward to 8,431 the following week.⁴⁷⁸ In any case, the national commissioners in the end only represented the RPF, and the

⁴⁷³ Interview RW5.

⁴⁷⁴ Interview RW17.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid

⁴⁷⁶ Interview RW10.

⁴⁷⁷ Interview RW8.

⁴⁷⁸ Interview RW17.

satellite parties of the PDI, PSD, and PL.⁴⁷⁹ Hence, although the law gave the NEC secretariat a purely technical role, they had the unopposed power to play a much larger role.

Much of this power lay in deciding who would be on the ballot in the first place.⁴⁸⁰ The NEC was entrusted with vetting candidates using some very vague rules (i.e. candidates had to be ‘persons of integrity’) without any power of appeal (the appeal to the courts was interpreted by the NEC as applying to cases of ballot manipulation, but not itself). Collusion between commissioners who were picked by outgoing *bourgmestres* who then wished to become district mayors was common, and it is important to note that by this point the *bourgmestres* were also largely people seen as trustworthy by the central state: most by this stage were appointees by unilateral presidential decree: twenty-six had been replaced in 1999 alone, and a further thirty-three in 2000.⁴⁸¹ Educational criteria excluded a further set of people: for district level, a secondary school diploma was necessary. For executive positions, a candidate needed a university qualification, ten years of work experience, or five years as a *bourgmestre* (after 1994, obviously). This, as should be clear, most dramatically disadvantaged rural notables who were generally seen by the RPF as less reliable. In the end 28% of candidacies were unopposed.⁴⁸² All of this supervision was more intense in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, where meetings often took place in military camps directly supervised by soldiers, who then went on to vote themselves in the areas they were stationed in.

However, it would be wrong to conclude that this process equated to all-encompassing control. As the ICG pointed out:

It would have been impossible...for the NEC to control all sector nominations. The great majority of candidates, who posed no threat for the election of the district executives, were only

⁴⁷⁹ More detail on the political parties is provided later in this thesis.

⁴⁸⁰ This is common in electoral authoritarian regimes. See Schedler, *Electoral authoritarianism: the dynamics of unfree competition*.

⁴⁸¹ ICG, "'Consensual Democracy' in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections.", p22.

⁴⁸² Ibid.

screened by the NEC, which, after all, was seeking to identify future leaders who could later be recruited into the government. While control over candidacies for the 530 most senior executive positions was probably absolute, the electorate was asked to choose more than 2,700 representatives⁴⁸³

Campaigning was similarly heavily controlled.⁴⁸⁴ Commissioners made repeated dark references to ‘the methods of the past’. Parties other than the RPF were still prevented by law from having structures at the local level (technically the RPF was too, but this was ignored), and the electoral law made the elections formally non-party.⁴⁸⁵ Each candidate was thoroughly briefed on what was and was not allowed. They were told they were forbidden to raise ideological or political issues but were instead expected to advocate personal projects for the benefit of the population with an emphasis on such local issues as education or availability and access to water. This formally anti-political election created conditions where in practice the RPF were the only campaigning body: in Gisenyi, the local prefect authorised outgoing *bourgmestres* to deduct a certain amount of money from communal funds to pay for campaigns, and there were plenty of illicit campaigns conducted by the government run in parallel to the licit ones organised by the NEC.⁴⁸⁶ However, much of this will remain unsubstantiated rumour, as the only observation teams, beyond the limited efforts of permanent embassy staff, were the ICG and LIPRODHOR.

As such, it should be little surprise that the RPF got what they wanted from these elections. 86.9% of newly elected councillors had no previous association with any prior administration.⁴⁸⁷ In this respect, the RPF successfully created a new generation of Hutu local leaders, and an apparatus of the local state purged of genocidal influence. However, the new recruits were mainly at the lower levels. Eighty-six of the 106 newly elected district majors were incumbent *bourgmestres*.⁴⁸⁸ Again in Gisenyi, there are allegations

⁴⁸³ ICG, "'Consensual Democracy' in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections."

⁴⁸⁴ Interview RW16.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁷ ICG, "'Consensual Democracy' in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections."

⁴⁸⁸ ICG (2001), p19.

that the military forced candidates to step down in favour of their candidates, forcibly enrolled candidates into the RPF, or recruited potential RPF sympathisers as candidates.⁴⁸⁹ Perhaps unsurprisingly, all the elected majors in Gisenyi ended up being RPF.

The second stage, where the executive committees at the district level were appointed by electoral college, was even more tightly controlled – candidates seamlessly presented themselves for posts on the district executive committees or city councils with minimal competition or dispute.

In the second stage of the elections, the secrecy of the ballot was respected, but in the overwhelming majority of cases the candidates that were expected to go through did, and most with very little competition.⁴⁹⁰

There were plenty of incumbents around: 154 outgoing for the 106 new posts, and they were empowered to pick the NEC commissioners in their areas, such that there was huge scope for log-rolling. To take Kigali as a paradigm case: in Nyarugenge district, outgoing *bourgmestre* Augustin Kampayana became mayor. In Nyamirambo district it was Gervais Dusbemungu, the outgoing *sous-préfet* (in total, three candidates stood for three places, and that was very common).⁴⁹¹ Many of the bourgmestres put out of a job by the reduction in the number of districts found positions in the new number two job, secretary of finance.

The second round *did* have a secret ballot, but a tiny electorate, so the degree of pressure and coordination could be extremely tight – cell and sector representatives made the delegates aware of whom the most influential local notable would back, and mostly people voted for that individual. As well as all

⁴⁸⁹ LIPRODHOR, "Observation des élections locales, régions du Nord-Ouest du Rwanda."

⁴⁹⁰ ICG, "'Consensual Democracy' in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections.", p19.

⁴⁹¹ Interview RW5.

of the pressure and coordination though, it is worth pointing out at this stage that there was not much appetite for opposition, particularly in those areas that had been made to suffer for their prior disloyalty during the insurgency. As the ICG pointed out:

The voters' choice is understandable. Rwandans are tired of conflict. They tend to prefer candidates who are likely to bring dispensaries, roads, and schools to their impoverished localities, and appease the security apparatus, rather than opposition candidates, who risk bringing nothing but trouble⁴⁹²

What the elections show us is a state in a sufficiently dominant position to be able to reconfigure power at the local level in such a way likely to increase the durable authority of the state apparatus, and deliver the central state a degree of confidence that they could rely upon the local state, rather than trying to make it wither. The RPF did find their generation of Hutu 'wise men', many of whom remain in office today. This generation did come forward and contest for a limited mandate in a minimally democratic way, and did receive limited power at the local level as a result. Given the abysmally low expectations many rural Hutu had of the state at the time, this was a pretty astonishing experience for many, and may have helped build at least a begrudging acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the state at the local level. However, the tight control ensured that this was not in any sense a meaningful airing of public dispute, or a serious opportunity to create a potential political counterweight to the regime in Kigali.

Conclusion

The system of political order outlined in this chapter had clear sociological bases, and relied on that class character in order for it to function. The investment of power in the military was about empowering one class – the Anglophone 'Ugandans' of the RPF military High Command – and the campaign of terror it

⁴⁹² ICG, "'Consensual Democracy' in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections.", p20.

unleashed was about removing another – the putative Hutu squirearchy. A further set of individuals – urban liberals such as Sebarenzi and Twagiramungu – were kept on board by the institutions of GNU, but the system reproduced the social power of those in the military, whilst progressively denuding the liberals of theirs. The effectiveness of the institutions whereby control is exercised in Rwanda relies upon the cohesiveness (in class terms) of their staffing, and those institutions also reinforce that same cohesion. This mode of rule doesn't work if the military cannot be relied upon to retain its distinctive modus operandi, and attitude to the rest of the population, and as appendix 3 shows, the military High Command has rigorously retained its 'Ugandan' character over the 19 years since the genocide.

Alongside this discussion of the formal constitutional position, it must be remembered that the victory of the RPF did not mean peacetime, or any suspension of the 'state of exception'.⁴⁹³ As has been repeatedly pointed out,⁴⁹⁴ a deeply precarious environment of violence, uncertainty, and ethnic security dilemmas had surrounded the RPF more or less unrelentingly since its founding. The RPF's founders were the children of the failed Inyenzi guerrillas of the 1960s, victims of massacres conducted by Idi Amin's military during the Uganda-Tanzania war of 1978-1979 *and* the countermassacres which ensued. They joined Museveni's NRA in the wake of further anti-Rwandese pogroms in 1982, and thereafter fought against the Ugandan army in Luwero, before becoming part of the Ugandan army, and directed to Acholiland, where they fought a vicious and bloody campaign to suppress Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement.⁴⁹⁵ As Prunier observes

⁴⁹³ By 'state of exception', I mean a completely abnormal situation where the continued application of the law through the 'normal' administrative and judiciary channels is going to lead to haphazard, unpredictable, if not catastrophic results, whereas effective action to end the emergency may require stepping out the system of rules in order to defend it. See Schmitt, *Political theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty*.

⁴⁹⁴ Mpungwe, "Crisis and Response in Rwanda: Reflections on the Arusha Peace Process."; Prunier, "The Rwandan Patriotic Front."; Mamdani, *When victims become killers: colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda*; Clapham, "Rwanda: the perils of peacemaking."; Watson, "War and Waiting."

⁴⁹⁵ Yoweri Museveni at the time dispatched military judges to investigate atrocities and other war crimes. One of these was Paul Kagame, and it is periodically suggested that favours acquired at this point were instrumental in allowing him to ascend to leadership of the RPF. Even more conspiratorially, some allege that links built up at this point between Kagame and Commanders Peter Banyingana and Chris Bunyenyezi implicate Kagame in the death of Fred Rwigyema. The evidence appears to be that they were spared by Kagame in 1988 and then went on to be implicated in the death of Fred Rwigyema. This remains one of the recurrent (if clearly inadequately substantiated) tropes of the endless rumour mill that is Rwandan politics. Interview, Kigali, April 2010. Also in Prunier, *From genocide to continental war: the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa*.

The whole life history of these men even before they set foot on Rwandese soil had been full of the sound and the fury of civil war, with its attendant atrocities and civilian massacres, committed against them, around them, or by them. For them violence was not exceptional; it was a normal state of affairs.⁴⁹⁶

We should add that their insecurity had a further source: the ‘Ugandan Rwandans’ were neither Rwandan nor Ugandan when it suited the priorities of the states in those countries to deny them any claim to citizenship, which was most of the time. From Habyarimana’s repeated declarations that the country was full, to Museveni’s strategic games to exclude them from positions of authority (in order to pacify other constituents spinning conspiracy theories about a Cushitic axis in Central Africa), the RPF high command are refugees, whose statelessness and continuous existence in precarious ‘states of exception’ make refugees into political actors which behave in distinctively different ways.⁴⁹⁷ In this specific instance, the exigencies of organising as a fifth column within formal state institutions under continuous risk of violent suppression meant the individuals who ended up ruling Rwanda formed a *modus operandi* they have continued using to this day: avoiding running decisions through Cabinet or the National Assembly, investing the military with significant functions of the state that that would normally be expected to be performed by the civilian side of the administration, and retaining the organisational logic and attitudes of a secretive military-within-a-military on a war footing.

However, the political order upon which the post-genocidal period was built was never intended as more than temporary – the RPF elite’s plans for reconstructing Rwanda involved the institutionalisation of a constitutional order able to do more than terrorise the rural population, but rather create real mechanisms of social incorporation and buy-in. Rwanda in late 1994 looked near stateless. What institutions of order did exist were deeply compromised, and could not be relied upon by central state elites. Central state elites themselves were a fragmented group of post-Arusha survivors, left with a set of rules whose

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p13.

⁴⁹⁷ Arendt goes so far as to call refugees ‘the Avant-Garde’ of their people in Arendt, “We refugees.”

consociational lineage had delivered administrative paralysis and political stalemate. By contrast, the Rwanda that ended the transition was recognisably a functional body politic with a centralised system of rule, an uncontested monopoly of force, and an apparatus for the delivery of policy which responded to it. This system was also narrow, violent, illiberal, and undemocratic. However, it is difficult to see at many points what alternate political paths could have been forged, and at several junctures what is clear is that the Rwandan state during the transition did find ways to selectively incorporate citizens who had previously been political anathema, and slowly persuade communities to consent, if not wholeheartedly, to their rule. As such, this is not a period of violent subjugation, but at least also one of legitimisation. Furthermore, it was not, as is sometimes argued, a period in which a clique of individuals established a form of institution-less rule animated only by kinship and struggle-era solidarity, but also one in which real institutions were formed. As so often in Rwanda, the mixed or 'hybrid'⁴⁹⁸ character of politics meant that the real institutions, legal behaviour, and relatively benign incorporation went alongside personalist decision-making, extra-judicial violence, and unambiguous repression. However, the exigencies of the transition period may not have permitted much else. It is in the decade after 2003 that the Rwandan regime had substantially more policy choices to make, and so perhaps where more can be revealed about the essence of contemporary Rwandan political order. It is to that this thesis now turns.

⁴⁹⁸ Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime*.

Chapter Three: the life of the party

Politics should be done in Kigali, and not among the people

- Tito Ruteremara, President of the Constitutional Commission⁴⁹⁹

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the key relevant aspects of Rwandan democratic politics since 2003, with reference to legal activity, civilian political structures, and formal institutions. This will demonstrate the hegemonic position achieved by the RPF since 2003, despite the transition to an ostensibly democratic constitutional order, and highlights the (sometimes unfairly ignored) role formal institutions play in that process. In so doing, it supports the theoretical case for considering the RPF as a durably hegemonic ruling party,⁵⁰⁰ with reference to its capacity to fulfil two functions; (a) *externally*, the capacity of the party to deploy enough carrots and sticks to give putative political opponents a vested interest in the continuity of the regime, even if such citizens have other reasons to dislike the regime, or if the Rwandan elite is unable to deliver on its promises of soaring development, economic prosperity, and social transformation, and (b) *internally*, the ability of the party to resolve the critical principal-agent and moral-hazard problems which enable the core elite to rely on party cadres to effectively distribute rents and patronage. In both cases, formal institutions play a key part in explaining the functioning of durable hegemonic-party order in Rwanda.

Part One: the RPF and the opposition parties

1. RPF hegemony

⁴⁹⁹ Quoted in ICG, "Rwanda at the End of the Transition: a Necessary Political Liberalisation," (International Crisis Group, 2002), p7.

⁵⁰⁰ Of the modal type identified in Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival And Its Demise in Mexico*.

The International Crisis Group, in their November 2002 Report *Rwanda at the End of the Transition: a Necessary Political Liberalisation*⁵⁰¹ compiled a full list of those occupying the various hierarchies of the civilian state, military, business, and other important organs in order to trace the dominance of the RPF. I have reproduced it in full in Appendix 4, but in summary:

- The absolute apex of the state included representatives of the *Parti Social Démocratique*, Vincent Biruta, and *Mouvement Démocratique Républicain*, Bernard Makuza, as the President of the Transitional Assembly and Prime Minister Respectively (along with Paul Kagame as President)
- Twelve of the sixteen ministries had an RPF secretary general, and the remaining four had an RPF minister (by contrast the MDR, the biggest alternate political party, had four posts – one minister and three secretaries)
- Of the twelve provincial leaders, only one, Pierre Karemera in Butare, was not in the RPF
- Only two of the country's new diplomatic envoys were not RPF (of which one was only the head of the New York Mission)
- Only one of the heads of the countries *eight* separate security services was not from the RPF (Jean-Pierre Bizimana of the MDR in Internal Security)
- In the justice sector, the President of the Supreme Court, the Chief Prosecutor, Chief Justice of the Court of Cassation, the Constitutional Court and the Office of Courts and Tribunals were all RPF
- Eight out of the nine State Commissions were helmed by RPF members, as were three out of the four banks, both major universities, and all but three of the twenty-nine parastatal companies.

The ICG did not investigate the character of the military high command during that period, but I have assembled those details for the period of my fieldwork, and those results (cf. Appendix 3) paint a similarly unequivocal picture of near ubiquitous RPF control at the highest level. As with the military high

⁵⁰¹ ICG, "Rwanda at the End of the Transition: a Necessary Political Liberalisation."

command, the summit of political authority is much more representative (both qua party and ethnicity: Bernard Makuza, for example, is a Hutu) than the tiers of the state only immediately below, where the actual business of governing is conducted.

From the beginning the commitment to the spirit of Arusha and the big-tent government made it necessary that cabinet and parliament retained a plural, consociational character. As discussed in the last chapter, the RPF high command was careful to ensure that they held a blocking majority in both arenas, but beyond that was happy to nurture the image of a broad-based coalition government. But this also necessitated that cabinet and parliament were not serious arenas of political contestation or policy formation. Two key trends which emerged during this period to circumvent this problem remain typical of the Rwandan state to this day: firstly, the moving of policy from the direct control of ministries to other organs (the RDF, the Presidency, or a ‘Commission’ answerable directly to the Presidency, as was done for policy on land, decentralisation, contracting to parastatals and private companies, reconciliation policy, DDR, media regulation, and elections),⁵⁰² and secondly – where the normal ministries did have to be used, a system whereby the Office of the Presidency would interact directly with executive secretaries immediately beneath ministers to coordinate activities, release policies, and so on.⁵⁰³

Remembering this is important to the correct interpretation of the many reshuffles: firstly, being made a minister does not equate to being rehabilitated and brought back into the inner circle, and secondly, being moved from a public ministerial post to a secretarial one does not equate to a demotion. In present day Rwanda, these tropes are no longer about marginalising coalition partners, but about neutering rival factions or otherwise untrusted big men within the RPF. This can be seen in the readmission to the cabinet of James Kaberebe in a 2010 reshuffle as Minister of the Defence.⁵⁰⁴ Prior to the reshuffle,

⁵⁰² Interview RW7.

⁵⁰³ Interview RW14.

⁵⁰⁴ All examples of the rivalries and power-games of the highest echelons of the elite are necessarily guesses, and the only sources for them are rumour. Their inclusion here is therefore heavily caveated, but it is my belief that leaving such rumours out would be more damaging to the presentation here, by implying a false coherence and unity within the inner circles.

Kaberebe was widely regarded as political dead-weight, discredited and distrusted because of his behaviour during the Congo Wars. If, however, James Kaberebe's reappointment is understood more as a symbolically important move it makes more sense. It reassured an older generation of foot-soldiers in the Rwandan military following the arrest of Laurent Nkunda and the exile of Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, but does not affect the general running of Minadef, which would still be directed by Paul Kagame via the Secretary at Minadef, the (seen as) totally trustworthy Jack Nziza. One interviewee at Minadef related in 2010 how Jack Nziza was taking a lot of pleasure in forcing James Kaberebe to be body-searched every day when he entered the Minadef building in Kigali.⁵⁰⁵ The key point here is not that the formal office held by anyone in Minadef is irrelevant, rather that the person of the minister can be bypassed *because* the structures beneath him function.

2. The Cooperative Opposition

The weakness of other parties is readily explicable. Most obviously, all political groupings within Rwanda had been utterly devastated by the genocide itself (opposition figures were explicit targets of the Hutu power regime). In the transition period, several factors prevented any groups seriously rebuilding from this extremely low base. Firstly, it was made perfectly clear from the beginning that Paul Kagame and the rest of the RPF elite regarded the old political class as discredited, and 'party' as a dirty word:⁵⁰⁶ it was clear to them that multi-partyism was discredited, and they were not keen on reaching out to or empowering the opposition parties if they could avoid it. As Paul Kagame wrote in 1995:

If you try to organise elections, to authorise parties to grow like mushrooms and allow competition, you will be making an even bigger problem for yourself than the one you already have: dividing people who are already divided. What does the multi-party system mean in our

⁵⁰⁵ I was not able to find another source for this story, but even if it were only a scurrilous rumour, it would speak to the perception within the department that Nziza, rather than Kaberebe, was calling the shots.

⁵⁰⁶ As many of my interviewees reminded me, the RPF is not a party, it is a 'front'. Interviews UG7, UG8, RW8, and RW11.

African societies? That I will use every tactic to distinguish myself from my neighbour with the aim of winning more votes than he wins... You will never have a united country. We will never have democracy: people will pounce on each other. One party would emerge to defend those who perpetrated genocide, the another would arise saying that members of the former should be tried... You would have a great war. We must analyse the problems that are in store for us and those that we are going to solve.⁵⁰⁷

Secondly, and more concretely, the Forum of Political Parties, established in 1994, placed serious limits on the independence and ability to organise on every party in Rwanda other than the RPF. The Forum is a quasi-governmental institution which all political parties are required to join in order to gain the right to campaign, stand for office, or engage in any other political activity. It is often sold as a home-grown remedy much in the vein of Gacaca, and emerges from the provisions of the Arusha Accords. Its notional function is as a platform for the discussion of sensitive issues and the airing of discontent prior to any broader public debate. The ten registered parties currently in the forum are: the RPF, the two middle-sized pre-genocidal opposition survivors,⁵⁰⁸ the six ‘minnows’,⁵⁰⁹ and PS-Imberakuri (the party of Bernard Ntaganda). All but the last are formally in alliance with the RPF, and the minnows are so small that they have always campaigned on a joint ticket with the RPF.

The effect of the Forum is to seriously constrain any opposition party’s room for manoeuvre, but also to offer some limited compensation. It is said that the Forum is the only arena in which the tinier parties are able to exert any influence at all⁵¹⁰ (the structure of the private meetings of the Forum grants only one seat per party, making this the only political institution in Rwanda where the RPF are not directly and formally in possession of a giant majority), and in which sensitive issues like rural-urban bias, inequality,

⁵⁰⁷ Quoted in ICG, "Rwanda at the End of the Transition: a Necessary Political Liberalisation."

⁵⁰⁸ *Parti Liberal* and *Parti Social Démocrate*.

⁵⁰⁹ PSP, PPC, PSR, PDI, PDC, and the UPDR.

⁵¹⁰ Interviews RW18 and RW23.

and Hutu resentment can be spoken about.⁵¹¹ However, I was not able to find a single example of a concession wrought out of the Forum, or a substantive policy outcome which emerged from it. So as compensation, it is pretty small beer given the constraints. The forum's rules mandate a total ban on local political meetings, and on the creation of any local branches, with the obvious consequence that political parties remained elite groups of individuals in Kigali whose political activity consisted almost entirely of trying to obtain positions of power from the regime.⁵¹²

Furthermore, the Forum grants the regime the power to remove politicians for an extremely expansive list of reasons. Originally uncodified by later written into law as the conditions for membership of the Forum, the guidelines on the activities of political parties circulated in May 2001 included the following restrictions:

It is forbidden to have or to display attitudes that undermine credibility such as drunkenness, lies, licentiousness, breach of trust or betrayal, manipulation, expropriation, corruption, double talk; a reputation of divisionism or discrimination must be avoided; it is forbidden to display obsequiousness; it is forbidden to plot against others; it is forbidden to betray one's country; it is forbidden to work in secret.

Nor were these restrictions simply an unused threat existing only on paper. In October 2002, the Forum publicly denounced Jean Népomuscène Nayinzira, the founder and President of the PDC⁵¹³ for womanising, and refusing to recognise his paternity of an illegitimate child.⁵¹⁴ On the 22nd of the same month, the Forum gave the PDC two weeks to officially request the exclusion of Nayinzira from the National Assembly. He was formally expelled from the assembly and the party four days later. Whatever

⁵¹¹ Interview RW23.

⁵¹² Ibid.

⁵¹³ *Parti Démocratique Chrétien*, renamed *Parti Démocratique Centraliste* in order to avoid the anti-divisionism laws, now the Democratic Party in line with the official switch to English, despite retaining the (now meaningless) acronym.

⁵¹⁴ Interview RW23.

else one might think in principle about the imposition of this wide-ranging set of somewhat Victorian restrictions on the behaviour of parliamentarians, in practice regulation of this nature was used to exclude potential political adversaries. The MDR lost their Prime Minister, Pierre-Célestin Rwigyema, in a similar fashion,⁵¹⁵ and the PL lost Joseph Sebarenzi, President of the National Assembly.⁵¹⁶ This was complemented by the wider-ranging laws on divisionist activity, which were also deployed – whether justifiably or not – in such a manner as to weaken opposition parties, as when Pierre Gakwandi, Secretary General of the MDR, was arrested following an interview in *le Partisan* in which he denounced RPF meddling in the internal matters of the MDR.

3. The Uncooperative Opposition

The alternative to staying within the Forum is pretty bleak. There have been, to date, four attempts at serious opposition organisation within Rwanda. The *Mouvement Democratique Republicain*, which was an attempt to forge a new multi-ethnic moderate opposition to contest the 2003 elections under Faustin Twagiramungu, and three parties organised to contest the 2010 Presidential poll: Bernard Ntaganda's *PS-Imberakuri*, a slightly less inflammatory attempt to reanimate the old MDR constituency, and peel off discontents within the RPF, *FDU-Inkingi*, a largely Hutu populist party funded by the diaspora and led by the Netherlands-based accountant Victoire Ingabire Umuhzoza, and the Democratic Green Party (DGP). There are differences in each of their stories, but space only permits a brief study of one. I have chosen the DGP simply because it managed to contain within it all the aspects of opposition politics which need to be mentioned here, and because the paper trail is considerably less murky. In general, however, the regime has not hesitated to utilise bureaucratic obstruction, heavy patronage and resources of state, infiltration by intelligence services, and extra-judicial violence in order to guarantee their almost total marginality.

⁵¹⁵ Interview RW17.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*

The Green Party was formed in Kampala in October 2009. Its composition was an odd mix of two elements; radical activists and journalists from extremely critical publications such as *Umuseso*, including their President, Frank Habineza, who had been an *Umuseso* journalist and President of the Rwandan NGO Forum on Water, Sanitation, and the Environment; and ex-RPF elites, some of whom were reasonably senior (if not central) members of the struggle, such as André Kagwa Rwisereka, the Vice-Chairman, a '59er who had fled aged ten into Zaire, and been a senior organiser in South Kivu in the early 1990s. The stated reasons for the party's founding were a broadly conventional environmentalist agenda, coupled with concerns over dictatorial tendencies, over-centralisation, and the exclusion of moderates and 'non-Ugandans' from decision making.⁵¹⁷

Formation in Uganda is, obviously, no guarantee of legal status within Rwanda. In 2009 the DGP made three attempts to hold their 'Founding Congress'. Part of the law on political parties mandates that any group intending to form a political party must call a founding congress attended by at least 200 people, with at least five from every district of the country. This is obviously extremely difficult, given the ban on local structures for political parties, and any structures at all before registration. 200 signatures must then be taken, verified by a Public Notary, and then submitted to the NEC, along with a panoply of other documentation (a constitution, minutes of meetings, committee structures, addresses, registers of property, etc). On each occasion, the DGP allege that they were unable to hold the meeting. Either because permission was not granted (holding a meeting requires the consent of the local Mayor), they could not get a venue (one activist claimed "Every time we get a room, officials from Minaloc call hotel owners telling them not to host us claiming we are bad people fighting the government"),⁵¹⁸ or, most seriously, that plain-clothes individuals entered and forcibly broke up the meeting, beating anyone who tried to resist and smashing cameras (which, of course, means there is no verifiable evidence).

⁵¹⁷ I believe Jean-Claude Ntezimana, the Organising Secretary, is also ex-RPF, but this has not been possible to verify.

⁵¹⁸ Interview RW37.

In April 2010, three leading members of the still unregistered party resigned citing disagreements with Habineza. In particular, that he was being manipulated by ‘foreign agents’, and that he had falsely accused the Rwandan government of deploying troops in Eastern Congo in order to assist the UK and the US illegally plundering timber. The retort given at the time was that these agents had been inserted into the party by the RPF as fifth columnists in order to undermine it from within. As the 2010 Presidential poll drew closer the temperature rose rapidly. Government ministers openly called the party divisionist, Habineza courted huge controversy by contending that as no party is required to join the Forum by the constitution, the DGP was not required to, and wouldn’t.⁵¹⁹ The nadir was reached on the 14th of June 2010 when Rwisereka was found murdered and partially beheaded near a wetland in Butare. The formal investigation announced he had been the victim of a failed carjacking. Habineza and others unsuccessfully called for a further independent legal investigation, and shortly afterwards went into exile in Sweden, where he remained for the next two years. Obviously, the DGP did not go on to participate in the 2010 elections.

Habineza returned in September 2012 to contest the parliamentary elections the following year. When the DGP tried to hold their congress in Gasabo in early 2013, the major (Willy Ndizeye) refused on the grounds that a parallel request had been filed by Alex Mugisha, another senior DGP member, and he couldn’t grant permission whilst there was clearly an internal war over who controlled the party. It is very unclear what happened then. The DGP’s account was given in a press release⁵²⁰ the following day:

DGPR’s tenth request was submitted on 6th May to the Major of Gasabo District. It was also an official response to the Major’s letter dated 3rd May, where we had clearly stated that the party had no issues to sort out with Mr Mugisha Alexis, since he had voluntarily resigned from the

⁵¹⁹ I am not a lawyer and won’t pretend I know whether or not this is true. It is at least murky, given that there is a mention in Arusha that some sort of forum for political parties will be set up.

⁵²⁰ Frank Habineza, "Press Release: Opposition Party Registration Becoming Impossible in Rwanda," *Democratic Green Party of Rwanda* Kigali, no. Published at <http://www.therwandan.com/blog/opposition-party-registration-is-impossible-in-rwanda-said-green-party-boss/> (2013, 20th May).

party on 2nd July 2010, his resignation letter was also attached. We therefore requested the Mayor to grant us permission to hold our founding congress on the 21st of May.

Surprisingly, Mr Mugisha Alexis also submitted in [sic] a new request the same day and requested to hold the same congress on the 21st May by at a different location

On 14th May 2013, while we were meeting the mayor at his offices, we were treated to a great surprise when Mr Mugisha Alexis majestically entered and then the Mayor requested us to sit down together and solve the confusion we are causing

This was not part of our plan but we respected the Mayor's request and later asked Alexis what he wanted and why he chose to do what he was doing yet he knew that he has resigned from the party. He made it clear that he wants to be brought back into the party and hold a senior position than he held before [sic]. We explained to him that we have lost all trust in him and that it won't be possible and thus advised him to start a new party with a different name. He did not accept our proposal and we are not ready to bring him back in the party.

The rumours at the time were that Mugisha and Ntezimana, the Organising Secretary, were the leaders of a plot to unseat Habineza and replace him with someone more friendly to the RPF regime.⁵²¹ Mugisha himself now denies having resigned, and by late October, everyone involved was publicly complaining it had all been a giant misunderstanding.⁵²² Habineza went so far as to add that RPF politicians had been spreading rumours about these divisions in order to destroy trust within the party. At the time, however, it was also alleged that Mugisha and Ntezimana had made a more formal deal with the RPF (i.e. registration in return for removing Habineza) or were even 'RPF agents' on the payroll of the security services.⁵²³ One dissident blog wrote:

⁵²¹ Robert Mugabe, "Conspiracy to Oust Frank Habineza from Green Party in Pipeline," *Great Lakes Voice* 2013, October 21st.

⁵²² See comments by Habineza, Mugisha, and Ntezimana in Reporter, "There's a Plot to Finish Us, Alleges Rwanda's Green Party Boss," *The East African* 2012, October 2th.

⁵²³ Interview RW24.

Unverified information from our sources claim RPF senior cadres, local government officials, and some security personnel are pushing hard to foil Green Party registration. The mentioned group is believed to be using one Alex Mugisha to sabotage the party registration pausing to lead unexciting faction [sic]⁵²⁴

Allegations of this form have been levelled before: in 2010, whilst PS-Imberakuri founder Bernard Ntaganda was held up in court battling divisionism charges, a new faction led by Christine Mukabunani emerged and registered a rival party – it was admitted almost immediately into the Forum with no issues. On their eleventh attempt, the DGP finally held a Congress in July and was granted registration on August 5th, one week before the elections. The NEC went on to announce this too late to put them on any ballots.

Several points of interest should be noted here. Firstly, the use of legalistic delaying tactics alongside quite vicious extra-judicial repression, and the use of privatised violent agents demonstrates that the regime's approach for constraining groups like the DGP combines formal and informal strategies. Secondly, the internal politics of the DGP seems to be based on a faultline, common to all 'uncooperative' opposition groups, of RPF splinter cells and people emerging from the more radical Hutu-dominated and populist opposition. Such coalitions are likely to be characterised by very low levels of trust, common programmatic direction, or social solidarity. However, neither group can survive without the other: any group composed solely of Hutu populists would be seen as an extra-system party, and run afoul of the divisionism laws in an instant (this is more or less the fate of FDU-Inkingi), and the narrow sociological base of the RPF makes any party composed solely of splitters a non-starter. Thirdly, in the case of the DGP, the government appears to have refused to permit Mugisha's exclusion from the party. This lends considerable support to the 'infiltrators' interpretation. Fourthly, those singled out for particular violence and repression tend to be individuals like Rwisereka: i.e. splitters from the RPF who are regarded as

⁵²⁴ Reporter, "Opposition Party Registration is Impossible Say Green Party Boss," *The Rwandan* [http://www.therwandan.com/blog/opposition-party-registration-is-impossible-in-rwanda-said-green-party-boss/\(2013, May 20th\)](http://www.therwandan.com/blog/opposition-party-registration-is-impossible-in-rwanda-said-green-party-boss/(2013, May 20th)).

traitors. People, broadly, of whom the RPF expect no better seem to have a much better chance of being left alone. Finally, repression seems to be calibrated: it got considerably worse in the run up to the 2010 elections, but the government seems willing to let groups like the DGP exist within constrained parameters, and doesn't repress 'more than it needs to'. Which is a key survival skill for any incumbent authoritarian.

Part Two: Structures of the State

Rwanda has had twelve elections in its post-genocidal history. In no election in Rwanda has there been a serious possibility of the ruling elite being defeated. They have all been run on time, more competently than many African states (on purely technocratic measures), and – in contrast to many other states with tarnished democratic reputations – the voting itself, the counting, and its aftermath have not been characterised by large-scale protest or violence. Whilst commentators disagree on the extent of pre-electoral violence and electoral malpractice, the consensus of observation missions and competent observers is that, firstly, what violence exists is targeted against a small cadre of counter-elites and RPF defectors, rather than the population in general; secondly, that such violence is controlled exclusively by the state security services, and, thirdly, that the general results would not have been seriously altered by the absence of rigging. Instead, electoral dominance in Rwanda has largely been achieved by the selective co-optation of the opposition, the political dismantling (if not actual killing) of non-co-opted opposition elites, and a set of rules which guarantee the organisational and patrimonial preeminence of the RPF.

Two – the local elections of 1999 and 2001 – were conducted before the conclusion of the transition, and were discussed in the last chapter. One – the constitutional referendum of 2003 – officially terminated it. The decision to use a direct poll in that instance indicated a degree of confidence on the part of the RPF about winning the referendum which some found surprising.⁵²⁵ The others are: two more local elections in 2006 and 2011, Presidential elections in 2003 and 2010, elections to the Chamber of

⁵²⁵ Interview RW24.

Deputies in 2003, 2008, and 2013, and elections to the Senate in 2003 and 2011. Rwanda has a near constant electoral cycle, the effect of staggering the only elections to five-year positions (localities and the Chamber of Deputies), seven year Presidential terms, and eight year Senatorial terms. The system is complex: a mixture of direct and indirect elections exists at the national level. Different electoral systems exist at the different levels and even parallel at the same level. Their results are summarised overleaf. The rest of this chapter will consider what two of the most prominent examples of formal institutions – the legislature, and the sub-national units of government – reveal about the general structure of politics in Rwanda.

Elections in Rwanda since the Genocide:

Year	Type	Date	Winner	Vote %	Electoral System
1999	Local	29-30/03	No-party ⁵²⁶	N/A	Mix of elected and appointed
2001	Local ⁵²⁷	06/03	No-party	N/A	Mix of elected and appointed
2003	Constitutional	26/05	'Yes'	89.9	Direct, mass suffrage
	Presidential	25/08	Paul Kagame	95.1	Direct, mass suffrage
	Chamber of Deputies	29-30/09	RPF ⁵²⁸	73.78	Mix of elected and appointed ⁵²⁹
	Senate	02/10	RPF ⁵³⁰	N/A	Mix of elected and appointed ⁵³¹
2006	Local	06/02-04/03	No-party	N/A	Mix of elected and appointed
2008	Chamber of Deputies	15-18/09	RPF	78.76	Mix of elected and appointed
2010	Presidential	09/08	Paul Kagame	93.08	Direct, mass suffrage
2011	Local	04/02-05/03	No-party	N/A	Mix of elected and appointed
	Senate	26-27/09	RPF	N/A	Mix of elected and appointed
2013	Chamber of Deputies	16-18/09	RPF	TBC	Mix of elected and appointed

⁵²⁶ Officially. In practice there are no local authorities which have engaged in any open opposition to the RPF

⁵²⁷ The two-year margin between this and the preceding local elections was necessitated by the decentralisation reforms, which radically altered the structure of local authorities. See the next section in this chapter for details.

⁵²⁸ Inclusive of the five satellite parties: Christian Democratic Party (*Parti démocratique chrétien*), Islamic Democratic Party (*Parti démocratique islamique*), Rwandese Socialist Party (*Parti socialiste rwandais*), Prosperity and Solidarity Party (*Parti de la Solidarité et du Progrès*), Party for Progress and Concord (*Parti du Progrès et de la Concorde*), Democratic Union of the Rwandese People (*Union démocratique du Peuple rwandais*)

⁵²⁹ The Chamber is made up of 80 deputies. Of these, 53 are elected for five-years term by proportional representation and 24 are elected by provincial councils; of the remainder, two are appointed by the National Youth Council, and one by the Federation of the Associations of the Disabled.

⁵³⁰ Although partially no-party, of those with a party affiliation, the RPF and their satellite parties are the clear winner

⁵³¹ The Senate has 26 members elected or appointed for an eight-year term: 12 elected by provincial and sectoral councils, 8 appointed by the President "to ensure the representation of historically marginalized communities", 4 by the Forum of Political Parties and 2 elected by the staff of the universities. Additionally former presidents can request to become a member of the senate. Originally, the elected members of the senate faced a two-round system, where if no candidate received an absolute majority, the two highest ranked proceeded to a run-off. In 2011 this was omitted.

1. The legislature

Although Rwanda is constitutionally committed to a separation of powers granting the legislature the power to check executive power, there are six key institutional characteristics of the system which make that unlikely, irrespective of whether or not the executive were to follow the constitution to the letter.

Firstly, the RPF and the parties allied to it lack fair, transparent, and democratic mechanisms for choosing candidates to represent them. Both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate operate on a system which combines directly and indirectly elected candidates. The problems with the indirectly elected candidacies are dealt with in the preceding chapter. Directly elected candidates operate on a national list system. How individuals end up on lists is unclear, but selection is conducted at the national level for a single constituency. Entry to said lists is non-participatory (in the sense that there is no open competition for such slots), and mired in accusations of corruption and backhanders.⁵³² What is absolutely clear about the process is that it centralises the decisions about who is a candidate, and denudes it of accountability or independence.

Secondly, legislators do not have specific constituencies. The proportional system returns 53 seats from closed lists in one national constituency. The idea that *regional* conflict (classically, between the north and the south, and increasingly between Kigali and everywhere else) has undermined peace and stability in Rwanda is a core belief of the regime, hence the decision that the national parliament would not have a preponderance of regional representation⁵³³ (it does still have some through the indirectly elected seats). Further to this, the proportionality serves the interest of the elite in presenting the political system as pluralist. Were the system was done on FPTP with one-member constituencies, it is almost certain that the RPF would have won 100% of the seats in both elections. This would not be a gain in political

⁵³² RW27.

⁵³³ RW6.

pluralism, but would render the reality of RPF hegemony more readily apparent (i.e. the democratic façade of the state would be considerably damaged).

Thirdly, the system disadvantages small parties considerably. Were the system to not be based on one national list, but rather local constituencies, small parties would be able to concentrate on building regional constituencies, which is cheaper and easier. This would in particular have benefited the PL and PSD, with their traditional support bases in the educated middle classes of the south (which is not really a wedge constituency from which a national vote base can be built), but would also have been easier for small parties in general. Rather, the current system mandates that any given party must exceed 5% of the national vote in order to achieve any representation at all. This practically excludes some parties, and it is likely that the six parties which entered the elections under the RPF aegis were in this category (in theory, the RPF competes in elections as one party in an alliance of seven. In practice, this is barely remembered. The NEC even forgot to mention this on the ballot in 2008, giving only an option to vote for the RPF). Entering into the alliance for the minor six parties entailed giving the final decision as to which candidate was placed where on the ‘alliance’s’ list to the executive committee of the RPF. Whilst minor in effect thus far, it is worth noting that the use of the Hare-Niemeyer method tends to favour slightly smaller parties that do pass the threshold, to the disadvantage of everyone else. The system therefore increases the incentives for cooperating rather than competing with the ruling party.

Fourthly, the national-list centralised approach makes it easier to manipulate the vote on election day. Most famously, *Umuseso* and the EU both reported in 2008⁵³⁴ that it seemed to clear observers at the polling stations during the vote count that neither the PL or the PSD would have passed the 5% threshold. In the end they received 7.5% (four seats) and 13.12% (seven seats) respectively. The suggestion is that the RPF reverse-rigged the results in order to make the polity appear more plural than it

⁵³⁴ EU, "Final Report: Legislative Elections to the Chamber of Deputies , 15 - 18 September 2008," (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2008)., p38.

really is.⁵³⁵ Local results aren't published, so it is very difficult for citizen activists or observers to spot deviations to complain about national totals.

Whether or not fraud took place is only part of the point, the more important point is that it is nigh-impossible to know whether fraud is taking place or not because counts at local booths are not related to results in any straightforward way which is independently verifiable. This also contributes to the febrile atmosphere of rumour by which Rwanda is characterised.

Fifthly, the appointed members entrench incumbent hegemony. Constitutionally speaking, the disabled representative in the Chamber of Deputies is elected by the Federation of the Associations of the Disabled, the two youth representatives by the National Youth Council, and the 24 women's representatives by Electoral College of the provinces. In practice, these posts are often not contested, and the electing organs are happy to follow the direction indicated by the RPF Secretariat or the Presidency. In the Senate, alongside the 12 elected by provincial and sectoral councils, 8 Senators are simply appointed by the President "to ensure the representation of historically marginalized communities", a further 4 by the Forum of Political Parties, and 2 elected by the staff of the universities. This obviously reduces the accountability of both Houses to the general public, and the lack of transparency in these appointments further increases the power of the central elite.

Sixthly, the Forum is empowered to recall parliamentarians (i.e. dismiss them). Thus far, a significant proportion of legislators have always been recalled before the end of their terms. Between the 2003 and 2008 elections, 14 deputies were replaced, approximately 25% of the Chamber of Deputies. This has the obvious effect of removing any trouble makers that do appear, and making sure as few as possible manifest in the first place. The upshot of all of this is that parliament is not realistically a potential counterweight to executive power for the foreseeable future.

⁵³⁵ Interview RW27.

2. Decentralisation

Before 1994, there was no substantial decentralisation in Rwanda, in reality or name. Rwanda was hierarchically divided into *préfectures*, *sous-préfectures*, *communes*, *secteurs*, *cellules*, and – at the lowest level, *nyumbakumi* (groups of ten households). Power and patronage cascaded down. Very little travelled up. Bourgmestres ruled over communes in a manner similar to pre-'59 chiefs, and were appointed directly by the President,⁵³⁶ and this system lay largely unchanged right up to the genocide.⁵³⁷

Following the cessation of large-scale hostilities around the insurgency in the North-West, the RPF government began an ambitious plan intended to totally reconfigure the countryside, which culminated in the National Decentralisation Policy of 2001. This policy abolished the old structures in their entirety, and brought in a streamlined set of anglicised bodies: 9 *préfectures* became 5 provinces, 106 *communes* became 30 districts, and 1,515 *secteurs* became 416 sectors. Almost overnight, a slew of cities and towns took on new names, usually inspired by pre-colonial coinages: Butare became Huye, Ruhengeri became Musanze, and so on. The new system is summarised in the table on page 156.

The broad features of the system may look similar to the old model: the cascade model has been retained, where power and patronage flow down a structure of committees and councils. However, there are key differences which enable this system to function as an efficient and powerful mechanism for distributing privileges and sanctions based on degrees of loyalty, creating a giant patronage grid which gives citizens a vested interest in cooperation with the regime, through dense organisational networks which monopolise key resources, and trap citizens into supporting the regime. This is a key face of the strength of the state,

⁵³⁶ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p183-8.

⁵³⁷ Reyntjens, "Chiefs and Burgomasters in Rwanda: the Unfinished Quest for a Bureaucracy."; Daniel Goetz, Pascal Blacque-Belair, and Jacques Gagnon, "Assessment of Rwandan Local Authorities' Capacity and Formulation of Strategic Framework for Local Government Development," in *USAID Consultancy Report* (Kigali: RTI-USAID, 1994).

and one which explains both the reputation of the regime for vicious, top-down authoritarianism, and also exceptionally effective and transformational policy implementation at the local level.

Most obviously, the system is *dense*. There is an abundance of layers of government, and the presence of citizens' committees at every level ensures the near ubiquity of the state at the local level.

Secondly, the system guarantees the power of the central state whilst co-opting local elites within specific tiers of government. There is a clear hierarchy at every level, whereby only those in appointed positions below the district are paid. The Executive Secretary is the most powerful person at the sector and cell levels, is appointed by Kigali, and frequently comes from outside the sector. That individual is accompanied by a committee or council of elected senior residents who are supposed to act as the voice of the local community, and in return gain some control over the distribution of privileges, such as FARG⁵³⁸ funds. They do not have significant control over policy.

Thirdly, the system created RPF structures at the local level before opposition parties were even permitted to organise in the collines. Executive Secretaries are almost exclusively RPF, and are widely accused of engaged in overtly party political activities (organising rallies, campaigning for candidates, and so on) and using their post to indirectly reinforce the RPF's power (irregularities over registering candidates for elections, manipulating the ballot in various ways, and so on).

⁵³⁸ *Fonds d'aide aux rescapés du génocide* (the Genocide Survivors' Assistance Fund) a national pot the distribution of which is determined by the assessment of local communities as to who qualifies, and with what degree of need. Many sources of welfare are distributed on a similar basis.

Table: Local Government Structures

Level	No.	Size	Officials	Appointment	Salaried	Powers ⁵³⁹
Central State	1	11,000,000	Various	Various		Various
Province ⁵⁴⁰ / <i>Intara</i>	5 ⁵⁴¹	700,000 to 2,600,000	Governors	Appointed by Presidential Decree	Yes	Almost none (scheduled to be abolished)
District ⁵⁴² / <i>Akarere</i>	30 ⁵⁴³	c400,000	Majors District Councils	Elected Elected		Collect property tax, license tax, and rental tax. Entitled to impose additional taxes (i.e. advertisement or market taxes)
Sector ⁵⁴⁴ / <i>Umujyi</i>	416	c25,000	Committee Executive Secretary	Appointed Appointed	Yes Yes	'Technicians' 'Coordination, management, and execution of 'Development Policy' Entitled to administer fines
Cell ⁵⁴⁵ / <i>Utugari</i>	9,165	c1,200	Council Committee Executive Secretary	Elected Elected Appointed	No No Yes	'A Vehicle for Citizen's Voice' 'Mobilisation and Sensitisation'
Village ⁵⁴⁶ / <i>Umukuru</i>	c16,500 ⁵⁴⁷	c 600	Coordinators <i>Nyumbakumi</i> Head ⁵⁴⁸	Elected Elected	No	Local planning, determination of eligibility for some rents (i.e. FARG)

Source: author's fieldnotes. Various interviews with NGO workers, MINALOC officials, ordinary Rwandan citizens

⁵³⁹ Anything in quotation marks under this column is a quotation from the MINALOC website.

⁵⁴⁰ Until 2002, *prefectures* or *perefegitura*.

⁵⁴¹ Since January 1st 2006. Previously, there were 12.

⁵⁴² Until 2002, *communes*.

⁵⁴³ Previously, 106

⁵⁴⁴ Until 2002, *secteurs*.

⁵⁴⁵ Until 2002, *cellules*.

⁵⁴⁶ No pre-reform equivalent, but referred to in some of the French literature as *agglomerations*: these were formed out of the smaller units government by *nyumbakumi* and *chefs de zone*

⁵⁴⁷ MINALOC estimate. Ostensibly the entire rural population.

⁵⁴⁸ Grouping of ten households.

Fourthly, the government has introduced a system of vertical accountability which ties Executive Secretaries to the central state and overcomes the usual principal-agent problems associated with the use of cadres across an entire nation for the distribution of patronage. At the core of this system are *Imibigo*, a homegrown version of performance-related pay. This is a refitting of the traditional public vow (historically called *imibigo*) to honour the community with one's bravery, but also a distinctively modern idea culled from the performance-based financing models of McKinsey, BCG, et al. The idea, at its core, is that local authorities sign contracts in which they promise to deliver certain measurable development outcomes. Originally, District Majors were the only signatories of these vows to execute local government with the valour and ardour of the armies of King Rwabugiri, and their vow was made (appropriately, given its monarchic background) to President Kagame himself. Now imihigos are written, signed, and promised at all levels of government *to* all levels of government (districts vow to sectors to provide them with the resources they need to achieve their targets. The targets themselves, of course, remain set at the Presidential level). Perhaps strangest of all, individual households are now expected to make such promissory vows to their village authorities, in which they commit to raising their personal development levels.

The net effect of this system is that (a) appointed officials are ultimately accountable to the central government and not their communities, and (b) their individual advancement depends credibly and reliably on their ability to deliver on the developmental targets of the central state (i.e. to actually deliver a loyalty-creating set of benefits and punishments to the local population), thus aligning their incentives as local administrators with that of the central state. Although it is widely alleged (and probably true, although difficult to know with any reliability, given the current state of research) that Executive Secretaries are overwhelmingly Tutsi, urbanites, and regime loyalists, what is unfairly not mentioned is that *within* that set of conditions, promotion and demotion operate on a reasonably meritocratic basis.

Fifthly, Executive Secretaries, Councils, and Committees possess huge amounts of power over ordinary Rwandan citizens, both to sanction and to reward. With respect to punishment, the wide range of options

available at the discretion of local power holders is indicated by the following table. This list of potential offences is not only extremely long, many of the rules are vague, or so ridiculously stringent, or so strange that it is unlikely that anyone would have heard of the proscription before (eating beets at a cabaret?), that they are clearly not universally enforced, and so can be selectively enforced for the disloyal or politically awkward. It is also worth pointing out that many of these rules impose quite severe economic costs on peasants simply in order to comply with them (particularly the regulations on having an appropriately hygienic, ‘modern’ home, at least some of which are transparently only about making things *look* better, rather than actually *be* more sanitary), and the fines are simply beyond the capacity of a large swathe of the rural population, where the median salary is around 300RWF a day.

All of which means that the ordinary lives of Rwandans are ‘governed’ far more than caricatures of weak African statehood usually suggest, and – furthermore – that they are proximate to layers of government that they must display loyalty to in order to access several vital resources (not just the welfare funds, but also various economic and land rights, which are also controlled by these councils).

Table: Fines Imposed at the Sector Level

	Proscribed or obligatory activity	Fine
1	Tending livestock on a public place	10,000
2	Cultivating on riverbeds	10,000
3	Refusal to dig anti-erosion canals	10,000
4	Absence of roof-gutter and receptacle near house	10,000
5	Having a second wife	10,000
6	Churches without a chapel building	10,000
7	Religious groups praying at night	10,000
8	Refusal to participate in nocturnal security patrols	10,000
9	Parents refusing to send children to school	10,000
10	Sending a child from school for not paying tuition	10,000
11	Consulting a traditional healer without permission	10,000
12	Cutting trees without permission	10,000
13	Heating wood to fabricate charcoal	10,000
14	Selling wood products without authorisation	10,000
15	Refusal to make/use a 'modern cooking stove'	10,000
16	Selling homemade products without permission	10,000
17	House without compost bin	2,000
18	House without clothesline	2,000
19	House without a closed toilet	2,000
20	House without a table to put utensils on	2,000
21	House without a conservation place for water	2,000
22	Someone without clean clothing or body hygiene	2,000
23	Teaching without clean clothing or body hygiene	10,000
24	Consumption of beets in cabarets or at home with straw	10,000
25	Commercial centre without a toilet	10,000
26	Restaurant without toilets or not clean	10,000
27	School compound not clean	10,000
28	Health centre not clean	10,000
29	Market with no toilets or not clean	

Fines are given in Rwandan francs (RWF).

Source: letter from a District Mayor addressed to the Executive Secretaries at the Sector Level, seen by Bert Ingalaere.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁹ Bert Ingalaere, "The ruler's drum and the people's shout: accountability and representation on Rwanda's Hills," in *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights After Mass Violence*, ed. S. Straus and L. Waldorf (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011).

The problem in the system (from the point of view of a central state seeking to stabilise its rule – there are plenty of problems with it from the point of view of Rwandan peasants, or democrats, or liberals) is that it does not include substantive informational mechanisms whereby grievance can be articulated and communicated to the government. The much-vaunted *umuganda* communal discussions⁵⁵⁰ are in practice directed by local elites, and must follow topics announced in advance by the central government. Even if useful information were to come out of these discussions, there is no mechanism which would actually give local public servants any opportunity (let alone incentive) to report such information back up the ladder.

Similarly, ‘*ubudebe* development schemes’ (compulsory local participatory community development projects in which communities will gather to weed crop fields, construct buildings, clear marshlands, etc) are not linked to any national planning mechanisms or broader government programmes. Nor are the Community Score Cards which are used to assess *imibigo* compliance much use here either: although they capture progress towards the service delivery targets as defined by the contract, they do not possess the capacity to gather more open-ended information outside that narrow frame. Indeed, given the relentless pressures of *imibigo*, local public servants are far more likely to conceal any local discontent that arises rather than publicise it to the regime, severely straining the capacity of the state to reliably know just how much discontent there is in the collines. All of this is true even if one rejects the (eminently plausible) hypothesis that Rwandan peasants would not accurately represent their preferences to government agents because of fear anyway. This must form part of any explanation of why the government so often reacts to dissent in ways that seem extreme (as when Victoire Ingabire was arrested for her speech at the Gisozi Genocide Memorial in 2010 for asking where the bodies of Hutus killed in the genocide were buried): the ‘paranoia’ of the Rwandan state, if indeed it is that, is a logical consequence of its lack of reliable information about the sentiments of the great mass of the population.

⁵⁵⁰ *Umuganda* is a mandatory community service day from 8:00am to 11:00am, on the last Saturday of each month. ‘*Umuganda*’ refers to something like community service. The day is called ‘*umunsi w’umuganda*’, meaning “contribution made by the community” which is designed to be a day of “contribution and building the country by citizens themselves.” By law all able bodied persons above the age of 18 and below 65 are expected to participate in volunteer community work. It is another of Rwanda’s reimagined neo-traditional institutions ostensibly based on pre-colonial practices. There are meetings at the beginning of the day where community elders (*ubunzi*) chair meetings where the tasks for the rest of the day are decided in an ostensibly participatory and democratic fashion.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate that Rwanda *is* an authoritarian political system, but one which does not resemble the caricature of institutionless, personalistic rule that Rwanda is sometimes uncritically tarred with. Later chapters will argue that other elements of the picture are also inaccurate: Rwanda is neither endemically corrupt nor devoid of ideology.

Notably, institutions do matter in Rwanda. They are important parts of hegemonic state power. They came into being at a particular historical juncture, which not only explains their selection by the RPF elite, but also conditions their ongoing function (i.e. the legacy of the insurgency, the co-option of the moderate opposition, the need to retain the sociological cohesion of the top branches of the elite without rendering the lower levels of government incompetent tools of patronage, and so on). Further, these institutions have now existed in largely unaltered form for a decade, which suggests a degree of entrenchment and durability.

On the other hand, it is perfectly clear that informal channels of power operating through struggle era solidarities (or extrajudicial violence) continue to be relevant. Furthermore, the operation of personal logics at some levels of the state do not appear to undermine the forging of functional institutions in other areas. This segmentation of state logics indicates that the assumed dichotomy between formal and informalised state power is overdrawn. The Rwandan regime can and does play mixed games, deploying different modes of domination in different contexts. This segmentation is made possible by the extreme segmentation of different parts of the state, forged through the creation of bureaucratic enclaves of excellence and the decentralisation policy, which hive off segments of the state from the court politics of the centre. Hence it is relatively easy for the elite to build institutions which work and enable them to do things informal networks can't (i.e. large-scale agricultural reform), but ensure that their activities are not

‘directed’ at those spheres of quasi-licit activity where personal links of authority still predominate (i.e. the Congolese plunder economy or the banking sector).

Thirdly, pointing to the institutionalisation of a formally democratic order might be misunderstood: this is a political order which remains built on *control*: a form of political order which relies on ‘the emergence and maintenance of a relationship in which the superior power of one segment is mobilised to enforce stability by constraining the political actions and opportunities of another segment or segments’⁵⁵¹. Rwandan political order is delivered through exclusion, manipulation, and co-option. Thus far, the system seems to have effectively rendered political opposition impossible. It most resembles a form of political order in Africa which was supposed to be long dead: Rwanda *is* authoritarian, but bears more resemblance to Chris Allen’s stylised ‘centralised-bureaucratic politics’,⁵⁵² or the ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ regimes of Brazil and Argentina in the mid-1960s identified by Guillermo O’Donnell.⁵⁵³ Such regimes are authoritarian - the systems exhibit extremely unequal relations between rulers and ruled, political authority is highly centralised, and it is exercised by a very small number of people – but they are also, at least in part, bureaucratic. Historically, such systems have unravelled when they have been unable to continue the centralisation of rents they are built on (i.e. counter-powers with independent bases emerge) or when they are unable to sustain the flow of goods provision (public or patronage) to their supporters. As such, the next part of any account of the durability of authoritarianism in Rwanda has to turn to the fiscal bases of the state.

⁵⁵¹ Lustick, "Stability in deeply divided societies: consociationalism versus control.", p328.

⁵⁵² Allen, "Understanding African Politics."

⁵⁵³ O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective*.

Chapter Four: the fiscal bases of the state

Choose development, be compliant!

Slogan, 9th Annual National Taxpayer Day, June 13th 2010

The previous chapters can be read as addressing the question, key to any system of political order, of how access to rents is limited in such a way as to (a) hold together a ruling coalition in the capital, and tying the periphery to the core through systems of patronage.⁵⁵⁴ This chapter goes back one step before, to investigate how rents are acquired in the first place, and by whom. As Theda Skocpol pointed out thirty years ago ‘a state’s means of raising and deploying financial resources tell us more than could any other single factor about its existing (and its immediately potential) capacities to create or strengthen state organisations’.⁵⁵⁵ As such, in asking about revenue and its control, this chapter asks the classic Lasswellian⁵⁵⁶ questions of politics about the structure of the state apparatus. The structure of this chapter is to examine the relationship between the political elite, processes of capital accumulation, and market building in three areas: the networks of wealth extraction in the Kivus established by the RPA during the First Congo War (i.e. the late transition period within Rwanda); the system of taxation; and the key private-sector firms with which the Rwandan state is so deeply entwined.⁵⁵⁷ My point in all these areas is to illustrate the ways in which markets and the state in Rwanda are mutually dependent; how the construction of political order in post-genocidal Rwanda was co-constitutive with market-building and capital accumulation in the classic Tillyan sense;⁵⁵⁸ and – further – that these processes were directed by the same elites in order to advance the same agendas.

⁵⁵⁴ D.C. North, J.J. Wallis, and B.R. Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

⁵⁵⁵ Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," *Items* 36(1982), p6.

⁵⁵⁶ Lasswell, *Politics; who gets what, when, how*.

⁵⁵⁷ The other relevant source of revenue for the Rwandan state – virtually unconditional aid – will be discussed in the chapter on Rwanda’s foreign relations.

⁵⁵⁸ Tilly, *Coercion, capital, and European states, A.D. 990-1992*.

Part One: Commercial Militarism during the Transition (1994 to 2003)

What is done inside Rwanda is only part of the story concerning the fiscal bases of the Rwandan state apparatus. The other part is what has been polemically dubbed the looting of Eastern Congo. The actions of Rwandan troops in the Eastern DRC – openly between 1996 and 2002 and covertly for some time after that⁵⁵⁹ - demonstrate the capability of the Rwandan elite to use the apparatus of the military for the extraction of huge amounts of surplus. Rather than simply allowing lower-ranking officers to enrich themselves, the plunder of this immense source of wealth by Rwandan troops and RCD-Goma was [a] systematic, [b] unofficially directed from the centre – Kigali – for the purposes of the centre, and [c] operated by an extremely dense network of individuals bounded by deep historical ties which control the hierarchies of military force, business capital, and state power. The Rwandan ‘power elite’⁵⁶⁰ has been able to sustain the direction of such revenue to and its disposal of it from the centre, combined with their control of their other major sources of income: the profits and taxation revenue from a small set of key firms, also described in this chapter, and virtually unconditional overseas development aid, outlined in the next chapter. In this way, the ruling elite emancipated their own network, and the state itself, from internal popular and external (i.e. donor) pressures which might have otherwise constrained their behaviour in a crucial period for the Rwandan state (i.e. the transition).

The main source for this section is a series of detailed UN Reports to the Security Council. The first⁵⁶¹ such was published on the 16th of April of 2001, to an immediate chorus of protest from the governments of Rwanda and Uganda, who accused the panel of having succumbed to French pressure to publish a

⁵⁵⁹ See the Panel’s two reports on the M23 rebellion: UNSC, "Interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo," (2012); UNSC, "Addendum to the interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2012/348) concerning violations of the arms embargo and sanctions regime by the Government of Rwanda " (2012).

⁵⁶⁰ Mills, *The power elite*.

⁵⁶¹ UNSC, "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/357)," (2001).

'biased' report.⁵⁶² The report fails to footnote its sources assiduously, but no evidence of the 'French connection' has ever been presented. The claim of French bias is unpersuasive, given that Panel members were drawn from a variety of countries, including the United States, which is usually held to be extremely pro-Rwandan. This did, however, lead to several renewals of the mandate of the panel of experts, in order for them to incorporate the criticisms of the RPF. This means we are fortunate enough to have a further set of reports⁵⁶³ culminating in the final report⁵⁶⁴ in which almost all the detailed criticism of the Rwandan and Ugandan regimes had been removed, and had been replaced with obfuscating detail of staggering banality. No explanation for the omissions was given. No credible detailed refutation of the claims made in the original report exists. The claims made in the original report have been supported by many serious political scientists of the region,⁵⁶⁵ and they have been reinforced by a related 'Mapping Report' published much later by another Panel on war crimes committed by the RPF between 1994 and 2004 in the Congo.⁵⁶⁶ The Rwandan government does – on the contrary – have very clear interests in suppressing information on any illicit activities it might be conducting in the DRC, and their reports are not generally sufficiently detailed or open in their citing of evidence to allow much double-checking. It would be imprudent to accept any documents produced by the Government of Rwanda themselves at face value. This also taints documentation and reports produced by the IMF and the World Bank, as these institutions largely base their reports on material supplied to them by the Government of Rwanda.

⁵⁶² Alex Duval Smith, "Uganda to Pull Out of Congo Peace Plan," *The Independent* 2001, April 30th.

⁵⁶³ UNSC, "Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/1072)," (2001); UNSC, "Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2002/565)," (2002); UNSC, "Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2002/1146)," (2002).

⁵⁶⁴ UNSC, "Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2003/1027)," (2003).

⁵⁶⁵ This list could be very long indeed, but the key names would be Dorsey, "Violence and Power-Building in Post-Genocide Rwanda."; Stephen Jackson, "«Nos richesses sont pillées!» Économies de guerre et rumeurs de crime au Kivu," *Politique africaine* 84(2001); Stefaan Marysse and Catherine André, "Guerre et pillage économique en République démocratique du Congo," in *L'Afrique des grands lacs Annuaire 2000-2001*, ed. Filip Reyntjens (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001); J Cuvelier and T Raemaekers, "Supporting the war economy in the DRC: European Companies and the Coltan Trade," in *IPIS*, ed. Marc-Olivier Herman and Pieter Vermaerke (Brussels: Broederlijk Delen, 2002); J Cuvelier and T Raemaekers, "European companies and the Coltan Trade: An Update," (Amsterdam: Kertinactie, 2002). M.W. Nest, F. Grignon, and E.F. Kisangani, *The Democratic Republic of Congo: economic dimensions of war and peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006).

⁵⁶⁶ OHCHR, "Report on most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law between 1993 and 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)." (<http://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/africaregion/Pages/rdcProjetmapping.aspx>: United Nations, 2009).

With those constraints acknowledged, there are a few facts beyond dispute. It is possible to say much about the Rwandan state by looking at Congolese data alone. Mineral production and exports from the DRC display a steady decline over the period in question. The state-owned Générale des carrières et des mines (Gécamines) produced 500,000 tonnes of copper and 14,000 tonnes of cobalt annually during the mid-1980s, but by 2003 production fell to an estimated 9,900 tonnes of copper and 2,400 tonnes of cobalt.⁵⁶⁷ Similarly, diamond exports reached an all-time low in 2000 of USD 437 million,⁵⁶⁸ despite no serious fall in price.⁵⁶⁹ However, this decline could be attributed to the mismanagement of the state-owned companies responsible for the trade in minerals, the occupation of the Eastern side of the country, and the decline in infrastructure in general.

The presence of higher levels of export volume than production volume in Rwanda itself would also not, in itself, prove that the Rwandan state is re-exporting minerals from the DRC, or that it is doing so illegally. That would require excluding [a] the presence of a stockpile of the minerals in question in Rwanda, [b] the minerals entering Rwanda from somewhere other than the DRC, or [c] the possibility that the minerals were purchased *legally* in the DRC. All these possibilities will be addressed. Indeed, at least *some* of the resources in question enter Rwanda illicitly from other territories.⁵⁷⁰ For the moment analysis will be confined to the examination of production and export statistics for just three commodities – coltan, gold, and diamonds – in order to substantiate the claim that Rwandan exports cannot be sustained by domestic production alone:

⁵⁶⁷ Interview DRC2

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁰ Notably Angolan diamonds. See later in this chapter.

Table One: Official Rwandan Coltan Production and Export Figures

Item:	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Total domestic production volume (in tons)*	97	224	224	122	83
Total export volume (in tons)**	97	228	199	329.7	603
Total export value (in million USD)**	1.3	2.7	2.5	4.6	11.4

Sources:

* Rwandan Ministry of Finance (see the Economist Intelligence Unit, *EIU Country Profile 2001: Rwanda Burundi*, p35).

** National Bank of Rwanda (correspondence with Bjorn Willum, journalist, published online at <http://www.willum.com/nationalbankofrwanda19jun01.com>).

As can be seen, the combined discrepancy in coltan production for this five-year period alone amounts to 706.7 tons (nearly half the total volume exported in this period). The US Geological Survey⁵⁷¹ suggests that Rwandan mines are unlikely to be able to support the approximately 100 to 200 tonnes of coltan a year the Rwandan Ministry of Finance claims, but rather about 25 tonnes per year on average. Furthermore, they point out that there was no declared stockpiling of minerals in the pre-genocidal period, and if there had been, it would almost certainly have been removed by the fleeing MRND government. As such, it is likely that the production figures have been inflated in order to disguise the re-export of Congolese coltan. It is also revealing, if inconclusive, that purported production is so irregular, and that the increase in the production of coltan appeared to happen as the AFDL, backed by Rwandan troops, was taking power in Kinshasa in late 1996. In addition, there are several reports to suggest that the quantities involved were in reality very much higher than even this: the International Peace Information Service of the University of Antwerp alleged that the RPA benefited from the one-off export

⁵⁷¹ USGS, "Colombium (Niobium) and Tantalum," (United States Geological Survey, 1998).

of between 1,000 and 1,500 tons of coltan from the stocks of Sominki seized in late 1998, which were flown to Rwanda by the RPA between November 1998 and April 1999⁵⁷²

Furthermore, there appears to be an intentional underestimation of the value of the minerals. According to the US Geological survey, 51 tonnes of coltan were exported from Rwanda to the United States in 1997 in exchange for USD984,000, or USD19.3 per kilogram.⁵⁷³ However, the Rwandan Ministry of Finance's official figures from the same year give USD11.8 per kilogram as the value of the minerals. This undervaluing continues the following year, with the US Geological survey valuing the exports at USD22.7 per kilogram, and the Rwandan Government claiming it is worth USD12.6. The amounts in question, roughly USD10, are too large to be absorbed entirely by middlemen costs. The cost of transport to Rwanda, and from there to international markets outside Africa, must be added to the cost price. According to a representative of a buying house interviewed by Stephen Jackson,⁵⁷⁴ it costs USD1.50 per kilogram air transport between Walikale and Bukavu. Since most of the other mining sites are closer to Bukavu and Goma, where the buying houses are situated, than Walikale, air freight charges from those sites should be cheaper. From both Goma and Bukavu, the coltan can be taken by lorry to Kigali, which is very inexpensive compared to air transport to Kinshasa. Finally, there is the transport out of Africa to the US. For instance, Sabena Cargo, which is operated by SwissCargo, flies regularly between Kigali and Brussels, charges USD 2.20 per kilogram freight from Kigali to Brussels for a minimum of 500 kilogram 'non-volume restricted cargo',⁵⁷⁵ the category within which coltan falls. Shipping air cargo to the United States is likely to be slightly more expensive. Regardless, these costs are not sufficient to close the gap. The most obvious reason for the undervaluation of the minerals is that a significant portion of the revenue does not appear in official state budgets (nearly half), but is somewhere else.

The cost of coltan would go on to rocket in the following years: the average world market price for coltan was about USD 102 per kilogram in 1999 and USD 196 per kilogram in 2000, according to Ryan's

⁵⁷² IPIS, "Mineral Exports by RCD-Goma in 2000," in *Central Africa Minerals and Arms Research Bulletin* (Antwerp: International Peace Information Service, Universiteit Antwerpen, 2001).

⁵⁷³ USGS, "Colombium (Niobium) and Tantalum.", p11.

⁵⁷⁴ Jackson, "«Nos richesses sont pillées!» Économies de guerre et rumeurs de crime au Kivu."

⁵⁷⁵ B Willum, "Foreign Aid to Rwanda: Purely Beneficial or Contributing to War?" (Københavns Universitets, 2001), p12.

Notes.⁵⁷⁶ It reached an all-time high when it sold for a couple of weeks in 2001 for USD 606 per kilogram.⁵⁷⁷ This coincides with a particularly intense period of Rwandan activity in Eastern DRC.⁵⁷⁸

A similar story emerges when we compare the Rwandan government's figures concerning gold production with Belgian figures on gold importation from Rwanda from the Belgian *Institut des Comptes Nationaux*, a subsidiary of the Belgian national bank:

Table Two: Rwandan Gold Production and Export Figures

	1997	1998	1999	2000
Total Rwandan Gold Production (kg)*	10	17	10	10
Value of Rwandan Gold Imports to Belgium (USD)**	35,501,655	29,848,320	2,585,261	659,908

Sources:

* 'Rwanda Official Statistics' (No. 227/01/10/MIN) quoted in UNSC (2001; 2001).

** Belgium, National Bank of, Institut des Comptes Nationaux, selected import statistics made available to Bjorn Willum by Tom de Herdt, University of Antwerp (available from Mr Willum on request at bjorn@willum.com).

⁵⁷⁶ Interview DRC2.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁸ See Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality*.

With the market price of gold at roughly USD 12,000 per kilogram in 1997,⁵⁷⁹ domestic production of gold cannot possibly account for the vast revenues from gold which Rwanda earns from its trade with Belgium *alone*. Finally, although Rwanda has no diamond deposits *whatsoever*,⁵⁸⁰ Rwanda has been exporting diamonds in considerable quantities:

Table Three: Rwandan Diamond Export Figures

	1997	1998	1999	2000
Total Rwandan Export Volume (Carats)	13,060.39	166.07	2,500.83	30,491.22
Total Rwandan Export Value (USD)	720,425	16,606	439,347	1,788,036

Source: Diamond High Council, quoted in UNSC (2001).

Again, we observe exactly the same dramatic spike in diamond exports in 2000, as we saw with coltan. Moreover, the export of diamonds does not appear in any official Rwandan statistics covering this period. They do not produce these diamonds, nor do any exports (or imports, for that matter) feature in official documents published by the government of Rwanda at the time. Given the large quantities of diamonds in RCD-Goma controlled zones, multiple reports of the continued exploitation of these deposits, the apparent absence of these minerals passing through Kinshasa, it seems unavoidable that at least some Congolese diamonds were finding their way out of Africa through Kigali. This is supported by an article published in *The Sunday Telegraph* on the 22nd of July 2001, which alleged that the arms dealer Victor Bout owned a diamond-cutting factory in Kigali; a vital facility in rendering the origin of diamonds virtually untraceable.⁵⁸¹

⁵⁷⁹ USGS, "Colombium (Niobium) and Tantalum.", p70.

⁵⁸⁰ USGS, "Alluvial Diamond Mining Project."

⁵⁸¹ Craig Nelson and Philip Sherwell, "Business as usual for Africa's 'merchant of death'," *The Daily Telegraph* 2001, 22 July.

Not all of the diamonds which pass through Kigali are Congolese in origin. Another source of income between 1998 and 2002 appears to have been the re-export of Angolan diamonds in defiance of the UN embargo on their purchase or sale. Some of the Panel's interviewees alleged that the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) were allowed to sell their goods to international diamond houses through Kigali.⁵⁸² These allegations are further substantiated by the fact that the average quality of diamonds exported from Rwanda is higher than that generally found in the DRC.⁵⁸³ This unofficial understanding probably dates from 1998 when, following the failed operation to quickly overthrow Kabila's government, two battalions of RDF soldiers were caught in the jungle in Western DRC in August afraid of being encircled by Kabila's forces.⁵⁸⁴ To avoid defeat, Kagame requested UNITA's permission to withdraw his forces into north Angolan territory controlled by UNITA. From there they regrouped and some soldiers were flown home to Rwanda. Since then and until the Angolan rebels' final defeat in 2002, the RPA and UNITA appeared to co-operate extensively; Amnesty International received testimony from a pilot that a UK-managed aircraft based in the United Arab Emirates delivered arms to both the RPA in Goma as well as UNITA with the knowledge of Rwandan military officials.⁵⁸⁵ There are no reliable data available on the income accrued to the RPA through this arrangement. There are various other extremely valuable mineral deposits in the Kivus (cassiterite, wolfram, etc), and there is no obvious reason to suppose that the Rwandan government would not have re-exported these minerals had they the opportunity to do so (which they did).

The Rwandan government has admitted to having a force of between 4,000 and 8,000 troops in the DRC between 1996 and 2001.⁵⁸⁶ The International Crisis Group estimated in 2000 that Rwanda had 17,000 to 25,000 in the region.⁵⁸⁷ The UN Panel of Experts in 2001 claimed that Rwanda had an absolute minimum of 25,000 troops; this claim was attributed to unnamed 'military experts with a great deal of experience in

⁵⁸² UNSC, "Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2003/1027)."

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴ Interview DRC4.

⁵⁸⁵ AI, "Great Lakes Region: Refugees Denied Protection (AFR02/02/00)," (Amnesty International, 2000).

⁵⁸⁶ EIU, "Country Report: Rwanda," (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2001).

⁵⁸⁷ ICG, "Scramble in the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War," in *Africa Report No. 26* (International Crisis Group, 2000).

the region'.⁵⁸⁸ Similarly conflicting reports exist for the final date of departure. Further to this, there have been allegations that the CNDP were taking regular direct orders from Kigali as late as 2004.⁵⁸⁹ Sources close to Nkunda told researchers from IPIS how, on Monday the 10th of December 2007, three helicopters of the Rwandan Air Force carried out six flights to Kiorirwe delivering reinforcements of men and arms to the CNDP.⁵⁹⁰ An emerging consensus among academics and public agencies⁵⁹¹ holds that these forces, whatever their number or official function, were engaged in substantial and systematic resource extraction in the DRC for several years, and illegally transporting those resources to Rwanda for re-exportation.

However, it would be unjustified to attribute the presence of Rwandan troops in the Kivu region from 1996 onwards to self-seeking, economic motives alone. The actual scale of the threat from the Hutu camps across the border was difficult to assess. Rearmament undoubtedly existed. Training was taking place. Guerrilla infiltration was multiplying in Rwanda, feeding the insurgency in the North-West. Senior officers were convinced that the French in the Central African Republic were training the ex-FAR.⁵⁹² A full-scale attack was held to be inevitable by the end of 1996 at the latest. The thinking regarding the threat across the border was supported by the abuses against Congolese Tutsi. For example, between the 27th of March and the 4th of April 1996, around 2,500 pastoralists, mostly Tutsi, fled North-Kivu for Rwanda. They joined some 40,000 refugees already there.⁵⁹³ None of this should be ignored. Even if the rumours were false, that is no reason to discount their power to motivate. However, the relevance of security considerations to the initial Rwandan incursion does not exclude overlapping economic rationales. Nor does it preclude the need for further explanation of the prolonged presence of Rwandan

⁵⁸⁸ UNSC, "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/357)."

⁵⁸⁹ Interview RW27.

⁵⁹⁰ Steven Spittaels and Filip Hilgert, "Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC," (Antwerp: International Peace Information Service, Universiteit Antwerpen, 2008).

⁵⁹¹ See all the UN reports cited in this section, as well as Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani, *The Democratic Republic of Congo: economic dimensions of war and peace*; Marysse and Reyntjens, *The political economy of the Great Lakes Region in Africa: the pitfalls of enforced democracy and globalization*; Jackson, "«Nos richesses sont pillées!» Économies de guerre et rumeurs de crime au Kivu."; M. Nest, *Coltan* (Oxford: Wiley, 2013); Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, *Conflict and social transformation in Eastern DR Congo* (Ghent: Academia Press, 2004).

⁵⁹² Interview OTH3.

⁵⁹³ Dorsey, "Violence and Power-Building in Post-Genocide Rwanda.", p340.

troops in this region. Again, this must be linked to both strategic and economic reasoning on the part of the RPF.

Successive reports by AFP,⁵⁹⁴ AP,⁵⁹⁵ the Christian Science Monitor,⁵⁹⁶ and Colette Braeckman in *Le Libre Belgique*,⁵⁹⁷ have detailed how the trade operated: the majority of mining was carried out under the protection of RDF/RCD-Goma/CNDP troops, the remainder under their direct command. These minerals were then transported from several RDF controlled airstrips to Kigali. For example, in 1998 a security official at Kigali's Kanombe airport confirmed the illicit traffic from the DRC to Europe via Rwanda to a journalist from the *Christian Science Monitor*:

There are seven to ten flights coming in every day from Congo...Most of the stuff they carry, diamonds, gold and palm oil, doesn't even leave the airport. It gets loaded on planes for Europe and shipped right out⁵⁹⁸

RCD-Goma (supplanted later by the CNDP, then M23 and a plethora of aligned groups) and the RDF extracted a variety of taxes from this trade, and themselves engaged in it. The planes operate in and out of mineral-rich areas, most of which are inaccessible by road, such as Kindu, Pinda, Punia, Walikale, Masisi, but also bigger towns such as Bukavu, Goma and Kisangani.

RCD-Goma has acknowledged that coltan exported to Rwanda amounted to at least 100 tons per month.⁵⁹⁹ In official statistics for 2000 – up to and including 31 October only – obtained by IPIS, RCD-

⁵⁹⁴ AFP, "Découverte d'un gisement de coltan au Rwanda," *Agence France Press* 2001, 21st January; AFP, "Rwanda and Uganda reject report into plundering of DRC," *Agence France Presse* 2001, 4th May.

⁵⁹⁵ AP, "Search for high-tech ore fuels Congo's war," *Associated Press* 2000, 8th April.

⁵⁹⁶ Lara Santoro, "Behind the Congo War: Diamonds," *Christian Science Monitor* 1998, August 16th.

⁵⁹⁷ LLB, "Les Rwandais pillent-ils de Congo?," *Le Libre Belgique* 1999, 25th October; LLB, "Trop de dépenses militaires," *Le Libre Belgique* 1999, 2nd November; LLB, "A qui profite le coltan de l'est congolais?," *Le Libre Belgique* 2000, 23rd December; LLB, "Des sociétés belges impliquées dans le trafic de coltan," *Le Libre Belgique* 2001, 12th April.

⁵⁹⁸ Santoro, "Behind the Congo War: Diamonds."

Goma lists an export of 445 tons of coltan.⁶⁰⁰ However, it is worth noting that the price of coltan first peaked around December 2000 and January 2001, and much coltan could have been exported during the last two months of that year. *Die Tageszeitung* on 22 December,⁶⁰¹ quoted Nestor Kiyimbi, Governor of Maniema Province, is quoted as having said: "Die Ankäufer deklarierten zusammen eine Ankaufsmenge von 40 Tonnen im Monat, aber wir wissen, dass sie bis zu 140 Tonnen im Monat ausführten."⁶⁰² In late November 2000, RCD-Goma estimated that territory under its control was producing between 100 and 200 tons of coltan per month, according to an article in the *Washington Post*.⁶⁰³ On 8 April 2001, the *Associated Press* wrote that the "rebels say they are sending about 100 tons of Congo coltan to Rwanda a month".⁶⁰⁴ In Butembo, traders told *La Corriera della Serra* that they exported 'about 50' tons of coltan per month from Butembo alone,⁶⁰⁵ thus implying a much higher export rate from the entire Rwandan zone.⁶⁰⁶ That the coltan being re-exported from Rwanda originated in Eastern DRC seems beyond dispute. The highest credible estimate is that around 6% of Rwandan GDP came from Congolese plunder at the peak of the conflict, or £110 million USD.⁶⁰⁷

The control of this trade has three key elements. Firstly, a fiscal system based mainly on the mining sector. About six different forms of tax existed, and were applied to most minerals being traded, including coltan, gold and diamonds.⁶⁰⁸ Secondly, the decisions as to which mineral resources to exploit, and the licensing for the buying offices – known as *comptoirs* – necessary for exporting the minerals, were made by the RDF.⁶⁰⁹ The Panel of Experts documented substantial evidence to the effect that this exploitation and taxation was directed centrally from an administrative entity known as the *Congo Desk*, located in an office

⁵⁹⁹ Interview DRC4.

⁶⁰⁰ IPIS, "Mineral Exports by RCD-Goma in 2000."

⁶⁰¹ Dominic Johnson, "Erzfeinde im Coltan-Rausch," *Die Tageszeitung* 2000, 22nd December.

⁶⁰² Author's translation: "The buyers declared forty tonnes in total for the month, but we know that they exported one hundred and forty tonnes this month"

⁶⁰³ Karl Vick, "Vital Ore Funds Congo's War: Combatants Profit From Col-Tan Trade," *The Washington Post* 2001, March 19th.

⁶⁰⁴ Arnaud Zajtman, "Ore fuels West's cellphones, Playstations, and war," *Associated Press* 2001, April 9th.

⁶⁰⁵ Alberizzi Massimo, "La guerra del minerale misterioso Migliaia di morti in Congo per il Coltan, la sabbia nera «più preziosa dell'oro»," *Corriere della Sera* 2001, April 26th.

⁶⁰⁶ Butembo is 190.3 km.² RCD at their height occupied over a third of the DRC.

⁶⁰⁷ Stefaan Marysse, "Regress, War, and Fragile Recovery," in *The Political Economy of the Great Lakes Region in Africa*, ed. Stefaan Marysse and Filip Reyntjens (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). P148.

⁶⁰⁸ AI, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Rwandese-controlled east: devastating human toll (AFR 62/11/01)," (Amnesty International, 2001).

⁶⁰⁹ Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, *Conflict and social transformation in Eastern DR Congo.*, chapter on Goma. Also UNSC (2001).

of the Ministry of Defence named the Department of External Relations. According to the Panel, a comptoir paid on average 5% of the value of their goods to the Congo Desk.⁶¹⁰ According to the *Washington Post*, RCD-Goma charged diamond dealers as much as 10% of the value of what they carry into the territory.⁶¹¹ According to Hugues Leclercq, a trader from the areas in question, the RDF could earn between 20% and 50% of the value of the diamonds traded.⁶¹² Thirdly, RDF officers, members of the RPF or people closely affiliated with either, owned nearly all of the companies involved in this trade. This indicates three things relevant to this thesis. Firstly, the language of 'plunder' often implies a degree of anarchic chaos, but this economic activity was extremely tightly routinized and regulated by formal institutions (i.e. ministries), for all of its illicit character. Secondly, this form of extraction involved partnership across the ostensibly clean public-private divide. Whilst it is probably too much to say that there is no difference between firms like *Grands Lacs Metals* and the state, they certainly serve to advance state agendas. Thirdly, this strategy was possible because of the control of all the facets of this extraction by the 'Ugandan' elite, and the very close ties between them at the apex of state, military, and commercial institutions.

In areas the RDF could not or did not want to control, it kept an eye on what was going on. According to the *UN Exploitation Panel Report*, there were several examples of the RDF tracking the coltan exploitation through informers. When large amounts of coltan had been mined and packed in bags by the Mai-Mai or the *interahamwe*, the RDF mounted attacks and seized control of the mining areas in question for a few days, just enough for small aircraft to fly in and evacuate the coltan. Furthermore, the panel reported strong indications that most of the fighting between the RPA and the Mai-Mai has taken place over coltan-rich areas. In other areas, where the ALIR and the Mai-Mai were too strong, the RDF came to a profitable modus vivendi with their ostensible enemies. Through middlemen, the RDF simply bought the coltan, which - given the geographical circumstances and the collapsed Congolese infrastructure - was virtually impossible for the Mai-Mai or the ALIR to export by themselves. According to the Panel, the

⁶¹⁰ UNSC, "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/357)."

⁶¹¹ Vick, "Vital Ore Funds Congo's War: Combatants Profit From Col-Tan Trade."

⁶¹² Marysse and André, "Guerre et pillage économique en République démocratique du Congo."

Mai-Mai chief, General Padiri, even once informed 'people in Kigali' that he had 60 tons of coltan to sell.⁶¹³ The degree of Rwandan involvement is not confined to the administration of the trade from Kigali, and purchasing the minerals. According to the BBC,⁶¹⁴ the RDF flew in prisoners from Rwanda who were offered a reduced sentence and/or some small pay to labour as coltan miners. It still remains unclear when this practice was initiated, but five mining sites with Rwandan prisoners have been reported. From these mining fields, the RDF exported the excavated coltan directly to Rwanda by plane or Army helicopters. This is a state which was involved in the direct exploitation of minerals on the ground, and utilising resources from across the sectors of the state (in this case, the 'warm bodies' of prisoners) in order to do it.

The then President of RCD-Goma, Adolphe Onusumba, refused to confirm the use of Rwandan prisoners as miners, but he did indirectly acknowledge the RPA's direct coltan exports to Rwanda in an interview with the *Washington Post* in 2001:

There is cooperation, but Rwanda is not charging us the fees like Zimbabwe charges Kabila... It is a brotherhood... If the Rwandans come and they get coltan from Punia or Walikale [in North Kivu], it's up to them.⁶¹⁵

This is a reference to the diamond mines offered by Kabila's government to the President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, in exchange for lending between 11,000 and 12,000 troops to support the badly trained Congolese government army.⁶¹⁶ What distinguishes the two agreements is that the Zimbabwean government did not run the mines themselves. This indicates a tighter and more formalised relationship between RCD-Goma and the Rwandan state.

⁶¹³ Kasper Hoffmann, "Militarised Bodies and Spirits of Resistance-Armed Governmentalities and the Formation of Militarised Subjectivities in South Kivu/DR Congo: The case of the Mai-Mai group of General Padiri" (Masters Thesis, Universitet Roskilde, 2007).

⁶¹⁴ BBC, "Rwanda Denies Using Forced Labour," *British Broadcasting Corporation* 2001, 22nd March.

⁶¹⁵ Vick, "Vital Ore Funds Congo's War: Combatants Profit From Col-Tan Trade."

⁶¹⁶ Interview DRC4.

Once in Rwanda, the Congolese coltan was “generally stored in facilities owned by the Government”.⁶¹⁷ From there, most of it is exported to international markets by the companies *Rwanda Metals* and *Grands Lacs Metals*, both owned by senior members of the RDF, although this was officially denied by the Government of Rwanda at the time. According to the panel:

In mid-January 2001, some very reliable sources met with the senior management of Rwanda Metals in Kigali. During these discussions, the Director told them that Rwanda Metals was a private company with no relation to the army. He further explained that he was expecting key partners that very morning for discussions. As discussions continued, the so-called partners arrived as planned; unfortunately they were in Rwandan army uniforms and were top officers. This incident confirms accounts from various sources indicating that Rwanda Metals is controlled by the RPF.⁶¹⁸

The stockholders of *Grands Lacs Metals* included senior RPF Majors Gatete, Munyuneza and Kazura, according to the UN Exploitation Panel Report. Major Kazura was the Chief of Security of the Rwandan Army in the DRC (now deputy commander of the AU’s forces in Darfur), Major Dan Munyuneza was the head of the Congo Desk. Clients were either contacted directly or through the Congo Desk, and Major Dan Munyuneza personally signed some of the letters sent to potential clients in Europe and the US.⁶¹⁹

What this shows us is a routinized and efficient system of extraction which could operate transnationally and straddle state and market organisations without losing its centralised control. Unlike in other cases of

⁶¹⁷ Ibid.

⁶¹⁸ UNSC, "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/357).", p21.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid. p29.

'roving bandits'⁶²⁰ paying for themselves through plunder, the system appears to have remained a formalised apparatus for the enrichment of the central state, rather than merely low-ranking officers lining their pockets. None of this should detract from the justified criticism of this behaviour on the grounds of its illegality and terrible cost to the people of Eastern Congo. However, in rightly criticising, much of the scholarship has not paused to consider what this shows us about the effectiveness of the new Rwandan state apparatus.

Part Two: The System of Taxation

Similarly, much of the scholarship on plunder reads as if this is the only, or most substantial source of state revenue. A centrepiece of the Rwandan government's reconstruction of the state has been guaranteeing large reliable sources of revenue from central taxation. Accounts which stress only Rwanda's ability to secure aid⁶²¹ or Congolese mineral wealth⁶²² do so correctly, but miss an important part of the story: neither of those sources of income for the state, even at their highest levels, have been able to cover all of the state's bills, or even most of them. The ability of the Rwandan state to sustain itself, expand, and pay for the *grands projets* it has undertaken rely in no small part on conventional, old-fashioned tax. Following the dictum of Milka Casanegra de Jantscher, a former head of the Tax Administration Division of the International Monetary Fund, that "Tax policy is tax administration",⁶²³ much of my argument here will focus on the bureaucratic management of tax. Firstly, the adoption of the particular revenue-raising model the RPF used tells us important things about the political economy and ideological foundations of the Rwandan state. Secondly, their success is an important part of the configuration of power within the state, the securing of durable political order, and the nature of state-society relations.

⁶²⁰ Olson, *Power and prosperity : outgrowing communist and capitalist dictatorships*.

⁶²¹ Hayman, "Rwanda: Milking the Cow. Creating Policy Space in Spite of Aid Dependence."; Hayman, "From Rome to Accra via Kigali: 'Aid Effectiveness' in Rwanda."

⁶²² Jackson, "«Nos richesses sont pillées!» Économies de guerre et rumeurs de crime au Kivu."

⁶²³ Milka Casanegra de Jantscher, "Administering the VAT," in *Value Added Taxation in Developing Countries*, ed. Malcolm Gillis, Carl Shoup, and Gerardo Sicut (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990), p189.

The increases in revenue from taxation are undoubtedly striking. From 1997 to 2003 domestic revenue generation increased from 9.5% to 13% of GDP.⁶²⁴ By 2008 total tax revenue alone had risen to 14.1%, or Rwf 344.2 billion (over double the highest estimate for Congolese mineral income during the high point of the trade, around 2002).⁶²⁵ Tax revenues for the 2009/2010 financial year hit Rwf 385.2 billion, exceeding the 15% of GDP target.⁶²⁶ Tax revenue has exceeded government targets every year despite continued high growth and the setting of ambitious targets. The consensus from a variety of funders and IFIs is that this performance should be regarded as extremely impressive.⁶²⁷ It hardly needs repeating, but the post-genocidal challenges to such achievements were innumerable: the tax base was minuscule, over 90% of Rwandans worked in a rural economy which was devastated and, in any case, largely non-monetised.⁶²⁸ According to Anthony Land, 'few Rwandans believed they should pay taxes...taxation was perceived as a punitive measure, or simply a means by which tax inspectors could supplement their own meagre salaries'.⁶²⁹ The mobilisation of domestic revenue had never been a serious priority of a Habyarimana regime suckled on plentiful international aid,⁶³⁰ and almost all of the skilled and experienced staff had been killed or had fled the country.⁶³¹ There was no policy, no strategy, a hopelessly dated legal and administrative framework, systems and procedures which were antiquated where they existed at all, staff with almost no training (the country had produced virtually no professionals in the fields of accountancy, financial management, and tax administration since independence – in 1995, 79% of core civil servants had not completed secondary education),⁶³² and discipline had collapsed, with rife bribery and staff coming and going as they pleased. As one of Land's interview subjects put it, 'we were in a deep hole'.⁶³³

⁶²⁴ Anthony Land, "Developing Capacity for Tax Administration: the Rwanda Revenue Authority," *ECDPM Discussion Paper* 57D(2004).

⁶²⁵ RRA, "Annual Report," (Kigali: Rwanda Revenue Authority, Republic of Rwanda, 2008).

⁶²⁶ RRA, "Annual Report," (Kigali: Rwanda Revenue Authority, Republic of Rwanda, 2009/2010).

⁶²⁷ See Land, "Developing Capacity for Tax Administration: the Rwanda Revenue Authority.," Eugene Torero, Max Everest-Phillips, and Richard Stern, "The Rwanda Revenue Authority Project," in *International Workshop on Public-Private Dialogue* (Paris 2006).

⁶²⁸ Qaiser Khan, Amolo Ngweni, and Girindre Beeharry, "Rwanda: Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Growth," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994).

⁶²⁹ Land, "Developing Capacity for Tax Administration: the Rwanda Revenue Authority.," p5-6.

⁶³⁰ Uvin, *Aiding violence : the development enterprise in Rwanda*.

⁶³¹ Interview RW30.

⁶³² Ibid.

⁶³³ Land, "Developing Capacity for Tax Administration: the Rwanda Revenue Authority.," p6.

Here, as with so many other areas of the Rwandan state which moved rapidly from nonexistence to full operation within a very short period of time, the operation was not one of state reconstruction but rather the wholesale creation of an entirely new administrative edifice bound by different laws, administrated through different procedures, and staffed - at least from middle management up – almost entirely by returnees. The centrepiece of efforts to raise taxation revenues was the creation of a semi-autonomous public sector agency integrating all central government tax operations: the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA). From its inception the RRA was conceived as an enclave of bureaucratic competence hived off from the Ministry of Finance.⁶³⁴ It is animated at its core by the seductive notion that a core of the ‘best and brightest’, protected from the messy atavistic spoils-politics of the rest of the administration, and schooled in the best technocratic techniques of ‘rational administration’ can deliver transformative change and progress in virtue of their enclave character. As Verhoeven points out

To donor agencies and international financial institutions, long frustrated with the “permanent crisis” of the African state, bureaucratic islands of excellence seem like a *deus ex machina* to partner with... Unsurprisingly, the proposition that part of the administrative apparatus can somehow be insulated from societal pressures to spearhead reform is central to the World Bank’s good governance agenda, which professes to be a-political and to provide answers to the “cancer” of corruption.⁶³⁵

The creation of the RRA is saturated in neo-liberal language concerning the remodelling of the public sector along New Public Management lines, as has been almost all taxation service reform in Africa in the last twenty years.⁶³⁶ Its annual reports are replete with a language of market sensitisation, stakeholder

⁶³⁴ Interview RW30.

⁶³⁵ Harry Verhoeven, "Hydro-Agricultural Savants and the Paradoxes of State-Building: the Dam Implementation Unit's "Mission of Rebuilding Civilisation" in Sudan," *Third World Quarterly* (under review). Unpaginated version.

⁶³⁶ P. D Byrne, "Privatisation in the Area of Tax Administration: An Overview," in *Harvard University Development Discussion Papers 508 (Taxation Research Series 24)* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1995); Luca Barbone et al., "Reforming Tax Systems: the World Bank Record in the 1990s," in *Policy Research Working Paper 2237* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 1999); Robert Jr Taliario, "Designing Performance: the semi-autonomous revenue authority model in African and Latin America," in *Policy Research Working Paper 3423* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2004); M Kidd and W Crandall, "Revenue Authorities: an evaluation of their

effectiveness, 'corporate level risk management systems', ISO certification⁶³⁷, and so on *ad nauseam*, complete with the sort of inanity – 'Policy Champions', National Tax Day, etc – that one would more normally associate with *Dilbert* or *The Office*. Discursively, this combines all the vacuities of management consultancy with World Bank 'DevSpeak' platitudes.⁶³⁸ It underwrites a schema which could have been dreamt up by Margaret Thatcher's Young Turks in the 1980s: breaking up large public sector organisations into smaller units; separating policy and implementing agencies; placing implementing agencies in a contractual relationship with said policy agencies; encouraging competition for contracts within the public sector, and between public sector agencies and commercial and non-profit NGOs; and privatising many functions of government.⁶³⁹

The broader agenda these reforms speak to unite two themes: the old neo-classical dogmas about reducing the size of the state and unleashing the forces of competition and the market on the one hand,⁶⁴⁰ and the Saint-Simonian dream of rational public administration on the other.⁶⁴¹ Within the academy, both doctrines now look decidedly battered: naïve views about the automatic benevolence of the market's invisible hand or apolitical technocrats are no longer taken seriously. To an extent though, that misses the point, insofar as this vision continues to animate minds and drive policy imaginaries. The RRA, along with a regiment of parallel cases elsewhere have been enthusiastically embraced by DfID,⁶⁴² the IMF,⁶⁴³ and a host of other agencies uncritically reading these changes as the arrival of New Public Management in Africa.⁶⁴⁴ Europeans and Americans are not the only residents of the echo-chamber: de Wulf points out that the most important single organisational model for states across Africa appears to have been the

impact on revenue administration reforms," in *IMF Working Paper 6/240* (Washington DC: The International Monetary Fund, 2006).

⁶³⁷ International Organisation for Standardisation.

⁶³⁸ Williams, "Studying Development and Explaining Policies."

⁶³⁹ Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Mick Moore, "Revenue authorities and public authority in sub-Saharan Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 47, no. 01 (2009).

⁶⁴⁰ Perhaps definitively stated in Christopher Hood, "A public management for all seasons?," *Public administration* 69, no. 1 (1991).

⁶⁴¹ For further exposition of this theme, see Ghita Ioescu's introduction to H. Saint-Simon, *The political thought of Saint-Simon*, ed. G. Ionescu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); MP Cowen and RW Shenton, *Doctrines of development* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).

⁶⁴² DfID, "Evaluation of Revenue Projects: Synthesis Report; evaluation report EV," (London: Department for International Development, 2002).

⁶⁴³ Kidd and Crandall, "Revenue Authorities: an evaluation of their impact on revenue administration reforms."

⁶⁴⁴ C von Soest, "The African State and the Capability to Raise Revenue: A Comparative Study of the Tax Administration in Zambia and Botswana" (Universität Leipzig, 2006).

Executive Agencies established in the UK in the late 1980s and 1990s.⁶⁴⁵ Donors have directly funded experiments in tax collection privatisation elsewhere, as where contracts were given to the British company Crown Agents to manage customs collection in Mozambique (1997-2005) and Angola (2001 – 2011),⁶⁴⁶ and African states themselves have started experimenting with tax-farming: tendering to private agents the right to collect fees from market traders in Uganda⁶⁴⁷ and property taxes in Tanzania.⁶⁴⁸ All this is – in part – an engine of rather than a camera capturing the RRA's success. In situating reforms so successfully within the global managerial zeitgeist, the Rwandan government was able to rely on unstinting and generous support from donors, particularly DfID, to reconstruct revenue collection in Rwanda.⁶⁴⁹

What is less obvious is whether or not those two factors – the unleashing of the market and the introduction of rational administration – are the genuine factors explaining the decision to adopt the RRA model (beyond securing donor credit), or its subsequent success. The most widely cited scholarly defence of the autonomous revenue collection agency model⁶⁵⁰ argues that the success of such agencies is a direct consequence of their autonomy from the state. The posited causal mechanism is that autonomy allows revenue agencies to make credible commitments that the power to tax will not be abused for political reasons, which in turn signals to investors and taxpayers that the state can be trusted, which makes them more likely to engage in wealth-generating activities in the licit economy and declare their real income and wealth, which creates growth and – over time – increases government revenues. This explanation could have been culled, more or less, from the pages of a micro-economics textbook, and there is almost no evidence that this is what is actually going on in Rwanda. As Fjeldstad and Moore point out⁶⁵¹, *if* the

⁶⁴⁵ Luc de Wulf, "Human Resources and Organization Issues in Customs," in *Customs Modernization Handbook*, ed. Luc De Wulf and J. B. Sokol (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005).

⁶⁴⁶ P. Duran and J. B. Sokol, "Policy and Operational Lessons Learned from Eight Country Case Studies," in *Customs Modernization Handbook*, ed. Luc De Wulf and J. B. Sokol (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005).

⁶⁴⁷ Vegard Iversen et al., "Private tax collection—remnant of the past or a way forward? Evidence from rural Uganda," *Public Administration and Development* 26, no. 4 (2006).

⁶⁴⁸ Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, L. Katera, and E Nagelwa, "Outsourcing Revenue Collection: Experiences from Local Authorities in Tanzania," in *Brief 10* (Dar Es Salaam: Research on Poverty Alleviation, 2008).

⁶⁴⁹ Rachel Hayman, "Abandoned orphan, wayward child: the United Kingdom and Belgium in Rwanda since 1994," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 4, no. 2 (2010).

⁶⁵⁰ Robert Jr Taliercio, "Administrative Reform as Credible Commitment: The Impact of Autonomy on Revenue Authority Performance in Latin America," *World Development* 32, no. 2 (2004).

⁶⁵¹ Fjeldstad and Moore, "Revenue authorities and public authority in sub-Saharan Africa," p5-6.

Talercio explanation were the correct one, we would expect to see full implementation of those parts of the proposals most likely to contribute to securing genuine isolation from pressures emanating from the rest of the state, viz., that the agency would have:

1. A clear separate legal status with clearly separate powers it could exercise without reference to any other authority.
2. A clear separate material existence, which could include the power to own assets, borrow money, or the possession of an operational budget independent of the normal national budgeting process, ideally constitutionally guaranteed.
3. The control of a Management Board whose members are independent of the government by virtue of (a) being nominated from a diversity of sources, (b) having relatively long, fixed periods of tenure, and (c) remuneration arrangements which cannot be affected by the central government.
4. Ensuring that all staff are answerable to and dismissable by only the CEO, who is turn answerable to and dismissable by only the Management Board.

All of which amounts to sending business the clearest possible signal that politicians would in future play almost no role in the implementation of tax policy. Rwanda has, at best, implemented some of these Chinese walls between the RRA and the rest of the bureaucracy, but – crucially – nowhere near enough to signal to investors that the collection of tax is regarded as something which should or will be shielded from senior RPF influence. For example, it does have an independent budget, formalised in law as 2.6% retention of the revenue it collects, and its own appointment procedures and personnel rules. However, this was only put in place in 2005, so a bit late to account for the Rwandan revenue-raising miracle.

The RRA's organisational structure fits these precepts slightly better: although it is formally answerable to Parliament and its parent ministry, Minecofin, which is tasked with oversight, its quotidian governance is

undertaken by a Commissioner-General who answers to a board including representatives from Minecofin, the National Bank of Rwanda (BNR), and Private Sector Federation (PSF).⁶⁵² However, all extant reports agree that the Private Sector Federation is, at best, too inadequately staffed and funded to effectively engage with MINECOFIN and the RRA. As with much of Rwandan civil society, there is the worry that the PSF is not genuinely representative of all the stakeholders it is supposed to speak for (particularly small businesses and the informal sector)⁶⁵³ and the expectation that the PSF – reasonably or not – simply will not engage in serious criticism of government when push comes to shove.

What that leaves is the Ministry and the BNR. What this amounts to is positions over which the Presidency holds almost complete power. The first post-genocidal Governor of the BNR, Gérard Niyitegeka, fled to Brussels on the 22nd of December 1995, alleging that the army had threatened his security.⁶⁵⁴ Since then there have been three governors, François Mutemberezi (1996-2002), François Kanimba (2002 – 2011), and the incumbent Claver Gatete, all of whom are returnees with reputations as loyalists.⁶⁵⁵ Similarly, Ministers at Minecofin (like all Ministers) serve at the pleasure of the President. What the ostensibly broad-based board amounts to, in reality, is a fairly narrow set of individuals directly answerable to the Presidency. Moreover, Commissioner-Generals themselves have been selected such as to reinforce this logic. The first Commissioner-General was an outsider vis-à-vis Rwanda, but linked to the elite through the normal networks: no less than a former Director of the Uganda Revenue Authority.⁶⁵⁶ This can be read as innocent of ulterior motives: there is no reason to disbelieve the widespread claim that the appointment of an outsider was a deliberate choice to reduce the likelihood of corruption, favouritism, and so on. However, appointing an outsider also guarantees that the Commissioner-General has no independent support base or network within the country, and holds her position solely in virtue of her continued favour with the board. As a former Director of Military Intelligence in the Ugandan Army, nobody could be more aware of the precariousness and dependence of outsiders in these circumstances than Paul Kagame. Finally, if the strategy behind the RRA were to stress

⁶⁵² Interview RW30.

⁶⁵³ Interview RW4.

⁶⁵⁴ Interview RW15.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid.

its separation from political authority, it would be simply baffling that almost everything published about the RRA stresses the deep and personal involvement of the Presidency (in positive terms), for example:

From the outset the RRA has been able to count on the personal support of the President, who has gone on to play a major part in the campaign to change public attitudes towards paying taxes and related challenges such as corruption.⁶⁵⁷

This is usually called something like ‘high-level political commitment to change’.⁶⁵⁸ It is not the same, however, as support from afar for an essentially autonomous agency. Rather, all reports stress deep involvement from the Presidential office at quite a granular level, and this is seen as reinforcing, rather than undermining the RRA’s credibility. Rather than building its reputation on the strength of its isolation from politics, the RRA is presented as an RPF (if not a Paul Kagame) product. Further, there are strategies to bind it in with a political order at every stage: the ‘policy champions’ amount to politicians, community leaders, and private sector representatives which are supposed to ‘spread the word’, identify the non-compliant, and disseminate knowledge about the new procedures⁶⁵⁹ – they are in effect part of the implementation team. The RRA is simply not walled off from the broader political scene in any credible way. All of this amounts to saying that this is unlikely to be the reason why these reforms were adopted, and cannot be the reasons for its success (in raising central state revenues).

A second potential explanation for the success of autonomous revenue agencies usually favoured by taxation professionals worldwide⁶⁶⁰ identifies ‘managerial autonomy’ as the key enabling factor. The idea,

⁶⁵⁷ Torero, Everest-Phillips, and Stern, "The Rwanda Revenue Authority Project.", p1.

⁶⁵⁸ For general occurrences see George A Larbi, *The new public management approach and crisis states* (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1999). And K. McLaughlin, S.P. Osborne, and E. Ferlie, *New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects* (London: Routledge, 2002). Rwanda gets this description in Land, "Developing Capacity for Tax Administration: the Rwanda Revenue Authority."

⁶⁵⁹ Interview RW30.

⁶⁶⁰ Sandra C Hadler, "Best practice in tax administration in Sub-Saharan Africa: A handbook for officials (June)," *International Tax Program, Harvard Law School: Boston* (2000); Arthur Mann, "Are semi-autonomous revenue authorities the answer to tax administration problems in developing countries? A practical guide," *Research paper for*

broadly speaking, is that such agencies are able to dispense with the (allegedly deadening) standard rules of public service concerning recruitment, deployment, promotion, remuneration, and so forth – in favour of more business-like managerial procedures. As Fjeldstad and Moore point out, in general this is a poor explanation in Africa, as most African revenue authorities simply have not introduced the kinds of tight disciplinary procedures, phases of mandatory job reapplication, or high levels of remuneration:

...it is not surprising that those aspects of the New Public Management case for ARAs [autonomous revenue agencies] that would tend to inflict pain on the tax collectors themselves – for instance, reselection on merit and strengthened anti-corruption procedures – have been rather neglected.⁶⁶¹

Here, Rwanda does seem different. As will be discussed in further detail in the final chapter (on ideology), there is much in the New Public Management which chimes with the reigning ideas of the RPF. There have been multiple overhauls of staff since the foundation of the RRA. Firstly in 1997 itself, when it was established, and again in 2001.⁶⁶² On both occasions, everyone had to undergo externally administered competence and integrity examinations. Substantial numbers of staff were booted out on both occasions, reflected in the average age of an RRA employee: of the 650 staff it employed in 2006, 90% were ‘young Turks’ under 45.⁶⁶³ Similarly, its remuneration package is amongst the most generous in the country.⁶⁶⁴ The success of the RRA in putting in place the procedures of ‘managerial autonomy’ reveal something about the Rwandan state: unlike other states in the region which came up against entrenched bureaucratic interests in trying to push through reform, the almost total destruction of the genocidal state and the total victory of the RPF enabled a new agenda to be conceived and pushed through without any serious opposition from within the state infrastructure. This insight is not terribly new – it has deep parallels with

the project: Fiscal Reform in Support of Trade Liberalization (2004); Seth Terpker, "Revenue authorities—a comparison of the experiences of Ghana and East African countries," *International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation* 53, no. 4 (1999).

⁶⁶¹ Fjeldstad and Moore, "Revenue authorities and public authority in sub-Saharan Africa." p9.

⁶⁶² Interview RW30.

⁶⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid.

the work of Thomas Callaghy⁶⁶⁵ demonstrating that the ability of states to implement structural adjustment in the early 1980s was in large part to do with the extent to which their elites and bureaucracies were committed to long-standing networks of patronage and reciprocity. Unexpectedly, this meant that the youngest, least stable regimes were those most able to bring about wide-ranging change. What is different here is the coupling of that with the diasporic character of the returned political elite. It helps to have individuals like Claver Gatete (an economist educated in Vancouver) in constructing entirely new bureaucratic enclaves with the requisite technical and professional skills. As Booth and Golooba-Mutebi observe:

...the civil service [follows] a pattern that differs from the one observed in recent years in most other countries of the region. It was necessary and possible after 1994 to reconstruct the Rwandan civil administration from scratch. Former civil servants were rehired, but ministries received a good deal of fresh staffing, much of it drawn from returnees from the diaspora and, increasingly, recent products of the National University or universities in Uganda and other countries. The resulting civil service is exceptionally youthful and there has been much learning on the job. In this context, recruitment and promotion decisions are able to be based to a large extent on merit and effectiveness. In addition, administrators are motivated and disciplined by an unusually effective form of performance-based contracting linked to the neo-traditional practice called *imibigo*.⁶⁶⁶

The third potential explanation is that these reforms in Rwanda have been adopted because, firstly – far from being about reducing the power of the state – they are, in reality about increasing the power of the state in general (through increasing its revenue base), and secondly, they shift the locus of control from the *institutions* of the ministry to the *networks* centred around the board, and in so doing increasing the

⁶⁶⁵ Thomas M Callaghy, "Lost Between State and Market: the Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria," in *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: the Politics of Adjustment in the Third World*, ed. Joan M Nelson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

⁶⁶⁶ Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, "Developmental patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda." p392.

control of the political centre (in this case, the Presidency) over revenue. Of course, this is not mutually exclusive with the latter explanation, and it is perfectly consistent with the political centre also believing that this would be the best way to raise revenues, but there is evidence which suggests that both motives were at play, and – further – that it is successful because of the unusually tight set of relationships the regime have with the private sector in the economy. In 2006, there were fewer than 3,000 registered companies paying national taxes in Rwanda. There were 280 ‘large companies’ (i.e. covered by the Large Taxpayers’ Directorate⁶⁶⁷) who collectively account for 90% of tax collected.⁶⁶⁸ 90% is also the proportion of tax collected from individuals and firms based in Kigali. Some 80% of all the tax revenue in Rwanda came from 13 companies.⁶⁶⁹ Put differently, Rwanda in 2006, for all of its success in expanding tax revenue dramatically, was still a country where the President could be (and was) on first-name terms with the payers of four fifths of the central state’s (licit) domestic revenue. The tax base remains minuscule. The overwhelming mass of rural Rwandans (some 80% of employment is in ‘small businesses’) are not connected to the central state apparatus of revenue generation. This should not be taken to imply they are not paying tax – the local levies documented by Ansoms,⁶⁷⁰ Ingalaere,⁶⁷¹ and Purdeková⁶⁷² indicate very much otherwise – but rather that a core part of the Tillyan argument concerning the connection between taxation and representative state institutions is missing: the mobilisation of individuals to gain a say over the taxes they are paying (if such a thing ever happened in Rwanda) would not be directed at the central state, but – rather – any such dissent from rural communities is endlessly subdivided into a series of local disputes, and important taxpayers to the central state can talk to the presidency without intervening representative institutions. Indeed, much rural protest in Rwanda takes the discursive form of pleas by locals for the essentially benevolent central state to intervene in order to sort out the corrupt local officials who subverted the central government’s plan. In

⁶⁶⁷ The LTD is a bureaucratic enclave within a bureaucratic enclave, tasked with dealing with only the most lucrative customers.

⁶⁶⁸ Interview RW30.

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁰ An Ansoms, "Striving for growth, bypassing the poor? A critical review of Rwanda's rural sector policies," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 46, no. 01 (2008).

⁶⁷¹ Ingelaere, "The ruler's drum and the people's shout: accountability and representation on Rwanda's Hills."

⁶⁷² Purdeková, "'Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes': surveillance and state reach in Rwanda."

configuring political action this way, the (rare, but increasingly less rare) protests of locals become a way of reinscribing the authority of the central state.⁶⁷³

Part Three: The Key Firms

A further consideration which points to the high degree of integration between an ostensibly free-market capitalism and the advancement of statist agendas by the elite is the manner in which a significant number of these high-paying taxpayers are not merely known to the state, but created by them. In Booth and Golooba-Mutebi's terms, the current Rwandan state is 'developmentally patrimonial':⁶⁷⁴ not a small night-watchman state unleashing the productive forces of capitalism by staying away from them and reaping tax collected by apolitical professionals, but rather a state actively involved since the genocide in the centralised generation and management of economic rents through a key set of 'private sector' firms. In their definition:

a country is said to display developmental patrimonialism when the ruling elite acquires an interest in, and a capability for, managing economic rents in a centralized way with a view to enhancing their own and others' incomes in the long run rather than maximizing them in the short run⁶⁷⁵

It is Booth and Golooba-Mutebi's purpose to use the case of Rwanda to suggest that certain forms of patrimonial rule under certain conditions may be better at fostering long-term gains in GDP than the Washington consensus 'good governance' state in which an impersonal bureaucracy stays away from direct management of the economy. Whilst it is important in general that the Rwandan development model may in fact have good prospects, what is relevant to this chapter is what such an economic policy tells us about the distribution of power within Rwanda, and the nature of the state.

⁶⁷³ As argued in a very different context by Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the state : secularism and public life in Turkey*.

⁶⁷⁴ Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, "Developmental patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda."

⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p381.

Nine percent of all taxes paid (directly) to the Rwandan state in 2009 were paid by one company: Crystal Ventures Limited (previously incarnated as ‘Tri-Star Investments’, hereafter CVL). That is a large number, but not that unusual. What *is* unusual is that this company is fully-owned by the RPF, but retains private sector legal status. It is governed by a board of directors nominated by the RPF leadership (i.e. the National Executive Committee of the party), it is managed by a CEO appointed in the usual way, and profits are returned as dividends to the RPF – the party that is, not individuals within it.⁶⁷⁶ CVL is important, firstly, because of what it tells up about the historical genesis of the contemporary Rwandan state. It is a perfect example of the militaristic and diasporic character of the early post-genocidal Rwandan state: it grew out of the RPF’s production unit maintained from 1990-1994, and was funded initially through the political contributions of the diaspora.⁶⁷⁷ What began as the logistical wing of a rebel army was transformed in the immediately aftermath of the genocide to fill acute gaps in governance and address core shortages in the post-genocidal climate: not just working in construction and private security provision, but also the use of RPF reserves to import goods, pay the salaries of civil servants, and so on. As one of Booth and Golooba-Mutebi’s interview subjects notes, ‘in this phase, the party was sponsoring the government, financial returns were hardly an issue’.⁶⁷⁸

CVL is not the only firm within Rwanda to have been explicitly created out of the military-political complex to advance core aims of the ruling elite: the army itself created an investment arm in 2007 explicitly tasked with advancing the state’s agenda as set out in Vision 2020 by undertaking socio-economic projects designed to create productive (and profitable) enterprises, called the Horizon Group.⁶⁷⁹ Its first venture was the establishment of a construction company established with an initial gift of equipment from the government and engineers seconded from the military.⁶⁸⁰ It went on to undertake a series of projects for the government including the construction of irrigation dykes, coffee-washing

⁶⁷⁶ Interview RW4.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁸ Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, "Developmental patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda." p390.

⁶⁷⁹ Interview RW4.

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid.

stations, cassava-growing, a dairy (*Laiterie Nyabisindu*) and ‘comprehensive urban site development’ (which, as the final chapter makes clear, makes Horizon central to the advancement of a core priority for the regime: the reconfiguration of Kigali). It collaborates extensively with Zigama-CSS, the military’s micro-finance initiative, which now has over GBP 90 million in assets and over 150,000 members.⁶⁸¹ Finally, it is widely credited with saving Rwanda’s pyrethrum processing industry, when it took over Sopyrwa in Musanze.⁶⁸² Although Horizon is run as a private firm with no serving officers on board, it has a CEO on secondment from the army (following a posting with a military bank) who has said publicly that profitability is no more than an equal objective to the social and political goals of Horizon.⁶⁸³ Indeed, its priorities do closely match with the government’s: it moved into housing in the era when stock shortage became an acute political problem (the late 1990s), and the move into pyrethrum, not exactly the most promising investment, is in large part about the importance of the employment Sopyrwa brings to the politically fragile North-West.⁶⁸⁴ The core point here is that the ‘private’ sector as well as the formal apparatus of the legal-rational state is being used to advance core aims of the ruling elite, as in the case of CVL: ‘building’ the Rwandan state also meant the building of a revenue-generating private sector.

The second point of interest here is CVL’s transformation from a wartime provisioning unit acting as a post-genocidal stop-gap into one of the largest and most profitable firms in Rwanda. Today, CVL is enormous: it operates or has operated in metals trading (through the infamous *Rwanda Metals*, fingered by the Panel of Experts as the key firm through which the RPF laundered Congolese metal assets, then sold off to a Botswana firm in 2002),⁶⁸⁵ road construction, housing estates, building materials, fruit processing, mobile telephony, printing, furniture imports, and security services.⁶⁸⁶ In each of these sectors, the CVL subsidiary was initially the largest domestic firm, if not the largest firm, if not the only firm. Today, it has a 50%-or-more stakes in eleven companies operating in Rwanda, and many more minority stakes. By 2009, these were CVL’s shareholdings:

⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

⁶⁸² Interview RW6.

⁶⁸³ Interview RW30.

⁶⁸⁴ Interview RW6.

⁶⁸⁵ Interview DRC2.

⁶⁸⁶ Interview RW6.

CVL shareholdings: Majority only Including minority

Turnover (USD millions)	35	167
Direct tax (USD millions)	0.8	24
Post-tax profits (USD millions)	7	47
Value as a % of Rwanda's GDP	<1	>3

Source: NISR and RRA (2010)

The historical development of this is not dissimilar to what was done to the RRA: the introduction of modern management principles and foreign trained staff (often specifically headhunted for the purpose) with a view to transforming CVL into a 'modern' capitalist enterprise which is expected, at its core, to be about making money in a competitive private sector (even if it ultimately answers to the RPF). Perhaps more remarkably, it has maintained this – thus far – without transforming into a machine for looting the economy or enriching a narrow groups of insiders at the top. The claim that 'Rwanda is the least corrupt country in Africa' has been repeated *ad nauseam*, but here has a particular relevance. There is little evidence that CVL is used by individuals for private enrichment, except in those cases where prominent individuals that have left the inner circles of power are alleged to have done so because they were found with their hand in the till. Of course, it is replied by these same individuals (the defection of Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa is only the most recent and obvious example) that these are trumped-up charges masking what is really going on: liberal and moderate voices being forced out by a ruthless and autocratic Paul Kagame intolerant of any dissent.⁶⁸⁷ This is not impossible, but the latter-day conversion to pluralist social democracy by figures like Nyamwasa strains credibility.⁶⁸⁸ Even if the steady trickle of Rwandan elites into exile is to be understood in terms of power struggles within the elite, it remains reasonable to ask what

⁶⁸⁷ Interview RW10.

⁶⁸⁸ Kayumba Nyamwasa is a military figure of long-standing, Military Chief of Staff during the struggle, and is alleged to have played a key role in some of the more violent suppression tactics deployed by the RPF during the struggle (see F.K. Rusagara, G. Mwaura, and G. Nyirimanzi, *Resilience of a nation: a history of the military in Rwanda* (Kampala: Fountain, 2009).), actions in Congo (see Reyntjens, "The privatisation and criminalisation of public space in the geopolitics of the Great Lakes region."), and during the counter-insurgency in the North-West (see Omaar and Waal, *Rwanda: the Insurgency in the Northwest*.)

that struggle was *about*. In that context, it is extremely plausible that at least some of these cases are about elites who wanted a more ‘relaxed’ distribution of the profits of organisations like CVL went. As Booth and Golooba-Mutebi point out:

Kagame’s rather austere sense of public duty and strait-laced line on corruption are not to everyone’s taste. Some, at least, of the early defections from the RPF government may be best explained in these terms...a plausible suggestion about some of the more prominent early defectors is that they were eager for a more ‘flexible’ approach, permitting greater scope for using public funds to buy the political support of key players, ‘the working methods of the old regime.’⁶⁸⁹

This hard line on corrupt self-enrichment, were it just window dressing, would only manifest in the case of politically sensitive or controversial individuals who had or have generated some friction with the regime, but that’s not so. New appointees to permanent secretary or parastatal management positions in the most innocuous sectors are teased with the question ‘Have you got your pink [i.e. convict’s] uniform ready?’, no matter how unquestionable their fealty to the regime.⁶⁹⁰ Indeed, it is likely that the RPF-CVL link is precisely what grants the inner circle the capacity to be whiter-than-white themselves: the wealth channelled legitimately to the institution of the party as CVL dividends relieves senior politicians of the pressures (felt by many comparable African ruling parties) to engage in pork-barrelling in order to retain their dominance. *Ipsa facto*, the elite has the legitimacy and capacity to enforce zero tolerance. The survival of two separate formal institutions with their own identities and rules (the party and the firm) actually serves the interests of the inner circle better.

⁶⁸⁹ Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, "Developmental patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda.", p381.

⁶⁹⁰ Interview RW4.

Thirdly, the RPF-CVL appears not to have undermined the economy either by allowing CVL to engage in anti-competitive practices, or giving the government false incentives to enact anti-competitive regulation. Disgruntled non-CVL business people sometimes attribute their failure to secure contracts and so on to preferential government treatment, and no doubt this happens.⁶⁹¹ However, if this was really happening in the ubiquitous and systematic manner sometimes alleged we would expect foreign investors to swiftly look elsewhere – they have not thus far. Members of the conglomerate certainly gain from the ability to buy goods and services from each other, but to that extent are not a million miles away from Korean *chaebol*.⁶⁹² It is also true that CVL's financial power and pull gives it access to cheap and reliable credit which other Rwandan firms find difficult to match, but this is an advantage the government seems bent on erasing: the last five years have seen a plethora of attempts to modernise the banking sector,⁶⁹³ increase capital liquidity, and bring capital to Rwanda through their aggressive sponsorship of the Kigali Stock Exchange, and their brokering of a private investment consortium (the Rwanda Investment Group, or RIG), created at the personal instigation of Paul Kagame in 2006 in order to raise funds for investment in the absence of a large local capital market.⁶⁹⁴ The group's mission is described as a form of 'economic patriotism'. From its initial start-up of US\$25 million RIG has expanded to 41 shareholders, 4 companies, and 6 institutional investors (including the Rwandan Development Board and CVL) which 'in effect...bring together nearly all of the richest and best known businesspeople of Rwanda and the diaspora, along with the major public financial institutions'.⁶⁹⁵ Once again, RIG's priorities are a careful mix of venture capitalist and agent of state: they have invested heavily in peat mining and methane extraction from Lake Kivu,⁶⁹⁶ which is about relieving Rwanda's acute electricity shortage, and they are in full partnership with the government for the establishment of the Kigali Investment Park,⁶⁹⁷ a key component of the reconstruction of urban space in Rwanda. RIG notwithstanding, critics of CVL point out that at various stages, some subsidiaries have been in a position to earn monopoly rents, but that is

⁶⁹¹ Interviews RW4 and RW10.

⁶⁹² R.M. Steers, Y.K. Shin, and G.R. Ungson, *The Chaebol: Korea's New Industrial Might* (London: HarperCollins, 1991). See also the section on Korea in Kohli, *State-directed development: political power and industrialization in the global periphery*.

⁶⁹³ Manuel Orozco, "Emerging markets for Rwanda: remittance transfers, its marketplace and financial intermediation," in *Inter-American Dialogue* (Washington, DC2009).

⁶⁹⁴ Charles Mporanyi, "Rwanda Investment Group S.A. (RIG S.A.)," *The Independent* 2009, 27th April.

⁶⁹⁵ Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, "Developmental patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda.", p401-2.

⁶⁹⁶ Interview RW6.

⁶⁹⁷ Interview RW30.

simply what happens to the first firm to enter a given market (which, in the gloomy economic climate of the immediate post-genocidal period, CVL got to do quite often), and the government has not engaged in any practices raising barriers to market entry of the sort which would allow CVL to retain these rents (quite the opposite: no small part of Rwanda's exceptional performance in the World Bank's *Doing Business*⁶⁹⁸ report lies in the government's crusade to lower precisely those sorts of barriers, and it has repeatedly courted the foreign firms which are now most of CVL's competition). The simplest way to parse this is to say that CVL is used to advance core aims of the political elite (i.e. to open up new markets and function as a source of rents for the party), but a competitive capitalist economy is one of those core aims, which is why it has not gone the way of Hastings Banda's Malawian Press Corporation⁶⁹⁹, or the M&S Syndicate in Zimbabwe.⁷⁰⁰

Whether or not this economic complex will ultimately deliver long-term gains in growth to Rwanda is beside the point. The *political* effects are clear. Firstly, this is a system which centralises economic rents, and creates extensive interdependence between those in a position to reap those rents. Secondly, it keeps the institutions of the party central, rather than individuals. Thirdly, it works not through the selective provision of private goods to a 'selectorate', but rather by providing more and better public goods. That this is not to say that the Rwandan elite are especially benevolent or fluffy, but that this system is not about short-term enrichment, rather long-term accumulation. Fourthly, profits from the company reinforce the massive dominance of the party vis-à-vis counter-elites, but also remove pressures on the party to raise funds by other methods which might involve fraud, corruption, etc. Ipso facto, and fifthly, it removes the need for the high elite to engage in that corruption. Sixthly, it explains in part the relative freedom of the RPF to remodel the apparatus of the civil service in the way that it did: the revenue streams the RPF depends on are those they created, on their own terms (a state was not reconstructed after 1994 – it was imported). Seventhly, the private sector is used to advance the aims of state *and* the

⁶⁹⁸ Second-best global improver in 2010. After Kazakhstan, which tells you all you need to know about what aspects of capitalism are being prioritised.

⁶⁹⁹ Jan Kees van Donge, "The fate of an African 'chaebol': Malawi's Press Corporation after democratisation," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 40, no. 04 (2002).

⁷⁰⁰ Martin Dawson and Tim Kelsall, "Anti-developmental patrimonialism in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 30, no. 1 (2012).

market. Contrary to the usual good governance reasoning, the state is not staying away from the market in order to release the productive forces of capita, rather it is directing firms to create markets (CVL, Horizon, and RIG all, in their own ways, act as ice-breakers for other firms entering the Rwandan economy in their wake): these firms invest to meet urgent social needs in sectors where no firms exist, and reap monopoly rents which accrue to the ruling party (which would have accrued to any first comer). Their early ventures were housing for returnees, private security, and services for official buildings during the immediate aftermath of 1994.⁷⁰¹ Then they moved on to basic import substitution: bottled water, dairy, and so forth.⁷⁰² Finally came the move into mobile telephones, construction, housing, building materials, fruit processing, and printing.⁷⁰³ The basic structure throughout is the same: CVL is generally the first mover in sectors which are getting little interest from anywhere else (initial investment is risky, there are high initial learning costs), many of their enterprises were barely profitable (if at all) at the beginning, but were kept going to meet urgent social needs. As noted before, this is all conducted behind a good governance façade which is largely unchallenged:

Rwanda under Kagame is in some respects a star pupil of the Washington consensus...strongly committed to the private sector as the engine of development...adopted a good deal of orthodox best practice thinking in its approach to investment promotion...it has defined its role as facilitating and enabling private investment, with official bodies concentrating on the provision of pure public goods, including policy guidelines, information, standards, and regulation.⁷⁰⁴

Eighthly, this system of rents has not descended into spoils in two key senses: profits accrue in rule-bound ways to institutions bound by law, and promotion, hiring, and so on remains highly meritocratic:

⁷⁰¹ Interview RW30.

⁷⁰² Ibid.

⁷⁰³ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁴ Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, "Developmental patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda.", p385.

Tri-Star firms have had extremely open recruitment policies for managers, engineers, and other technical specialists. In a number of cases, diaspora professionals have been head-hunted but increasingly the firms recruit by means of open advertising within the East African region and beyond. They can and do hire globally to meet needs in some technical areas.⁷⁰⁵

Companies which started out as, in effect, parastatals, have come more and more to be managed like the private businesses they ostensibly always were, and Rwanda has not seen the blurring of the distinction between resources of state and the income/wealth of private individuals or organisations. The formal walls between government operations and the private-sector operations of the RPF have held – if only just. Finally, it is worth noting that although the Rwandan state is historically strong, this particular configuration is not merely a return to form:

...before [1994] there was a one-party state under which clientalistic rent seeking was generalised, competitive, and disorganised. Businesses needed ‘godfathers’ within the administration or the military, and through this mechanism the small business sector financed politics.⁷⁰⁶

Which is to say: the configuration of politics and capitalism in contemporary Rwanda is not merely the continuation of antecedent trends, but new to RPF Rwanda.

Conclusion

Much of this simply takes us back to the classic rule and revenue account set out by Margaret Levi, if not to the general rational choice framework that work seeks to vindicate. Much of the RPF’s behaviour can

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid. p399.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid. p386.

simply be understood from the perspective of revenue-maximising rulers trying to negotiate surveillance and compliance in order to deliver the maximum return to the public purse. What results is not a settlement per se, but rather a relationship between rulers, their agents, and citizens which is continuously being renegotiated. There are two distinct periods: the first stage was of 'booty capitalist' extraction and market creation (during the transition), where the key challenges for the elite were – on the one hand – retaining the autonomy of the central state from citizens who might otherwise have sought to extract concessions the central state were unwilling to give, and – on the other – attracting a sustained influx of capital. The former relates to the Rwandan state's operations in Congo, the latter to their strategy of market creation.

The second phase was about regularising the system in such ways as to perpetuate hegemony as the Rwandan economy recovers and grows. The key problem for many such developmentally authoritarian regimes is that they end up generating the social forces which destroy them: the strong democracy-minded middle classes of Latin America, for example. Here, the Rwandan elite's 'fix' seems to be – for now at least – doing its job. It has adroitly assimilated those aspects of faddish international consensus which serve their purposes (such as new public management), and has moved much of the business of everyday governing to the lower reaches of the state, along with the duty to collect those takes, thus liberating the central state from many of the classical pressures for public goods provision that taxation produces in the accounts of Tilly and Levi. It also creates a situation, such as in contemporary China, where local discontent often manifests as communities requesting the intervention of an (unquestioned, and therefore implicitly good) central state to sort out corrupt local power-brokers who have subverted the intentions of the central authorities. In so doing, this severs the link between the need to raise reliable income from the population and representative institutions.

On the other hand, the RPF have found a way of having functional capitalism along with a ready source of funds with which to perpetuate their dominance. There are certainly other cases of this phenomenon, such as EPRDF Ethiopia, or the Mexico of the PRI. What makes Rwanda's version of this combination

possible is the tiny size of the military, commercial, and political elites, and the extremely close ties between them. This enables the careful balancing between retaining control over sources of income such as CVL and Horizon, and allowing them to operate to a competitive meritocratic logic.

However, the recent arrest of Tribert Rujigiro, one of the richest businessmen in Rwanda and (now former) owner of the UTC Shopping Mall in Central Kigali in the summer of 2013 suggests that the elite may not be able to square the circle forever: ultimately, this growth will create holders of capital with some degree of autonomy from the state, who may form the basis for counter-power. Arresting figures like Rujigiro and seizing their wealth solves the political problem, but directly imperils an economic strategy which remains heavily reliant on attracting foreign investors understandably nervous about such challenges to the robustness of property rights. This may be one of the clearest threats facing Rwanda's rulers in the medium term future.

Chapter Five: Blinded Like a State

When dealing with donors you are dealing with humans, and you have to deal with them as you would milking a cow. Treat them nicely and more milk flows than you would have expected; treat them badly and they kick over the bucket.

- Rwandan Ministry of Finance Official to Rachel Hayman, 26th April 2004⁷⁰⁷

Political language... is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.

- George Orwell⁷⁰⁸

The penultimate component of this account of the contemporary Rwandan state is its relationship to the external world. My core claim is that this relationship is carefully and successfully managed to minimise the influence of external agents and maximise Rwandan elite leverage vis-à-vis such forces. Put differently, the Rwandan elite are masters of extraversion:⁷⁰⁹ that set of strategies aimed at the mobilisation of resources derived from a position of dependence within the international system. Done successfully, this provides the degree of autonomy necessary for Rwanda's elite to pursue strategies at variance with the prescriptions of international creditors and development organisations. Despite the violence and repression which characterises much of Rwandan political life, this autonomy has been, to date, successfully sustained: in the latter part of 2011 alone the Presidential elections were widely described as rigged, a former UN Secretary-General said the RPF held 'co-responsibility' for the shooting down of Juvenal Habyarimana's plane, and a UN report alleged that the Rwandan army perpetrated

⁷⁰⁷ Hayman, "Rwanda: Milking the Cow. Creating Policy Space in Spite of Aid Dependence."

⁷⁰⁸ G. Orwell, "Politics and the English Language," *Horizon* 76(1946).

⁷⁰⁹ Jean-François Bayart, "L'Afrique dans le monde : une histoire d'extraversion," *Critique internationale* (1999).

atrocities in the DRC from 1996-'97 'that could be classified as genocide'.⁷¹⁰ At the time, it looked like a diplomatic perfect storm, and one serious enough to permanently damage the international standing of the regime. With hindsight, what is astonishing is how the anticipated fallout simply did not materialise: the aid continues to flow, Kagame continues to tour the globe collecting prizes for good governance, and the unpleasantness of that year melted away. My core claim in this chapter is that the Rwandan state sustains a degree of imperviousness to international pressure beyond the hopes of other regimes in similar positions of donor dependency, and one which is not accounted for by the current literature. Providing that account is the purpose of this chapter.

The structure here has two parts: firstly, I want to illustrate why Rwanda's external relations are an odd case, and doing so will involve providing a theoretical exegesis regarding contemporary understandings of how competitive authoritarian regimes interact with the outside world which there was not space for in the opening chapter. I'll be using Levitsky and Way's account as the account which gives the most detailed and robustly specified account of those interactions.⁷¹¹ My key point here will be to illustrate that Rwanda does still need a favourable international climate, and it largely gets one. This section was not placed in the introductory theoretical framework because it is only really relevant to this section of the argument, i.e. Rwanda's external relations. Secondly, this chapter will document what explains this state of affairs in three areas: the realist world of hard interests; institutional factors; and ideational and ideological factors. It is this last area that I argue has been most neglected. In general, understanding Rwanda's ability to resist democracy-promoting pressures requires taking seriously Steven Lukes' 'third face' or ideological domain of power⁷¹²: the Rwandan elite's autonomy is a function of its ability to successfully promulgate a simplifying discourse which legitimates their rule internationally, precludes criticism, and makes the reality of Rwandan politics harder to see. Specifically, this discourse inverts the logic described by James C Scott⁷¹³ in *Seeing Like a State*. If 'seeing like a state' is the imposition by bureaucratic elites of conceptual

⁷¹⁰ OHCHR, "Report on most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law between 1993 and 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).".

⁷¹¹ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*.

⁷¹² Lukes, *Power: a radical view*.

⁷¹³ James C Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).

schema upon populations which simplify and organise the cluttered reality of citizens for the purpose of understanding and control *by the state*, information about Rwanda has been positioned by elites within technocratic and political discourses of Western elites such as to preclude precisely that understanding or control *from other states*. The Rwandan state has been able to neuter potential critics from other states by confounding them with their own (statist) conceptual schema: they are blinded as only states are blind.

Part One: does Rwanda need the outside world?

1. Competitive Authoritarianism in Rwanda

Recent work in comparative politics, prompted by the manifest failure of the ‘transition paradigm’ to explain the persistence of post-authoritarian or ‘hybrid’ regimes in the modern era,⁷¹⁴ has returned to the serious study of such states as examples of a distinct non-democratic regime-type, rather than ‘flawed’, ‘partial’, or ‘incomplete’ democracies.⁷¹⁵ Perhaps most prominently, the work of Levitsky and Way⁷¹⁶ has argued that the fall of the Soviet Union heralded the arrival of a new form of political dispensation - competitive authoritarianism – characterised by:

...civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic

⁷¹⁴ Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002); Guillermo A. O'Donnell, "Illusions About Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (1996).

⁷¹⁵ Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*; Eva Bellin, *Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival And Its Demise in Mexico*.

⁷¹⁶ S. Levitsky and L. A. Way, "The rise of competitive authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002); Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*.

because the playing field is heavily skewed in favour of incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair.⁷¹⁷

Such regimes are held to emerge when the requisite propitious conditions are satisfied. Those are, firstly, the absence of sufficient 'leverage' by and 'linkage' with the West, and, secondly, the ability of incumbents to resist opposition challenges (understood as a function of the organisational and coercive capacity of the state and ruling party).⁷¹⁸ Where such conditions obtain, regimes emerge which are *competitive*, in the sense that democratic institutions are largely the means whereby opposition forces attempt to gain power, but *authoritarian*, in that such forces have the odds too heavily weighted against them for the regime to reasonably be described as democratic.

Leverage is here understood as the direct power Western states have to promote democracy through threats, conditionality, and other forms of pressure. According to Levitsky and Way, the factors which would limit such leverage are, firstly, the relative size and strength of the country in question vis-à-vis Western powers, secondly, the presence of countervailing strategic interests on the part of the West (i.e. access to oil resources, military bases, etc), and thirdly, the presence of other powers such that the non-Western state's position of dependency is diminished.⁷¹⁹ *Linkage* is understood as

...the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organisational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods, and services) between particular countries and the US, the EU, and Western-dominated multilateral institutions.⁷²⁰

⁷¹⁷ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War.*, p5.

⁷¹⁸ Previous chapters have covered the organisational and coercive capacity of the RPF party-state in some detail, so analysis here will confine itself to the first part of Levitsky and Way's theory, i.e. the nature of relations with the West.

⁷¹⁹ As should be becoming apparent, Levitsky and Way operate within a fairly crude 'West = democratic, non-West = not' dichotomy. Whilst there are ample reasons to doubt this aspect of the theoretical framework, such a critique is not strictly relevant to the point at hand and, in any case, *hanc marginis exiguitas non caperet*.

⁷²⁰ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War.*, p43.

Linkage is held to contribute to democratisation by: firstly, increasing the international reaction to (and subsequent fallout of) anti-democratic behaviour on the part of the regime; secondly, fostering the emergence of internal constituencies financially and professionally dependent on the West (who are hence in favour of continued amicable relations, and hence democracy); and thirdly, providing resources (financial, organisational, informational) to opposition forces.

Levitsky and Way take it to be a key benefit of their approach that it is, for want of a better term, ‘realist’, i.e. that it only uses material factors (i.e. wealth, organisational density, etc), and understands their impact solely in terms of how they shape actors’ interests, incentives, and the distribution of (hard) power (similarly, interests, incentives, and power are understood solely in terms of the material). For example, the creation of constituencies with professional and financial links to the West is claimed to be relevant not because of the effect such links would have on the socialisation of these individuals, and the consequent ideational shifts, but because such links place valued resources – access to markets, jobs, and so on – at risk if amicable relations with the West are endangered. It is taken as given that the only circumstances under which Western states would *not* seek to promote democracy are those where they either can’t, or pro-democratic sentiment is trumped by supervening *interest-based* goals (i.e. regional stability, access to oil, etc). As they say:

These mechanisms are *material* rather than *normative* or *ideational*. Although linkage may facilitate the diffusion of ideas and norms, it also has a powerful impact on actors’ interests, incentives, and capabilities. We focus on these latter effects.⁷²¹

This is a little duplicitous. Identifying the realm of the ideational with ‘the diffusion of ideas and norms’ is unjustly narrow, and the dichotomy between the ideational and the interests, incentives, and capabilities of actors is untenable: it unhelpfully restricts analysis to a crude and discredited understanding of power

⁷²¹ Ibid. p44-5.

which limits the explanatory power of an otherwise excellent theory, and assumes that the interests they wish to speak about are in some way free of an ideological basis or ideational component, which is simply not true.⁷²²

Finally, it is a virtue of this approach that it neatly avoids the somewhat sterile dispute as to whether 'internal' or 'external' factors are more significant in fostering the emergence of democracy: variations in linkage and leverage will lead to corresponding variation in the importance of international and domestic factors across countries and regions. Although this point has been repeatedly made in the literature on aid⁷²³, Levitsky and Way must be credited with unloosing this particular Gordian knot of comparative politics in a systematic way. However, although Levitsky and Way stress the interrelation of external factors (linkage) and internal conditions (incumbent organisational power), it is implicit in their argument that leverage is unlikely, in the final analysis, to be of much import in the absence of linkage:

...leverage alone generates inconsistent and superficial democratising pressure. Where linkage is low, external monitoring and sanctioning is usually limited to elections and large-scale human-rights violations, which leaves autocrats with greater room to manoeuvre. Even where external pressure succeeds...new governments have weaker incentives to play by democratic rules.⁷²⁴

Put simply, it is only the resources and relationships provided by linkage which make leverage meaningful and effective. Further, high linkage alone is held to be a *sufficient* condition for the downfall of authoritarian regimes:

⁷²² For more on this, see Alexander Wendt, "3. "Ideas All the Way Down?": On the Constitution of Power and Interest," in *Social theory of international politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁷²³ P. Mosley, J. Harrigan, and J.F.J. Toye, *Aid and power: the World Bank and policy-based lending* (London: Routledge, 1995); Lindsay Whitfield, *The politics of aid: African strategies for dealing with donors* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

⁷²⁴ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War.*, p50-1.

High linkage created powerful incentives for authoritarian rulers to abandon power, rather than crackdown, in the face of opposition challenges. It also created incentives for successor governments to rule democratically. Among high-linkage cases, not a single authoritarian government remained in power through [to] 2008 and nearly every transition resulted in democracy. **This outcome occurred even where domestic conditions were unfavourable.**⁷²⁵

Hence, it is important to remember that although this thesis argues that levels of RPF (i.e. incumbent) organisational power are extremely high, the endurance of competitive authoritarianism in Rwanda should be regarded as puzzling regardless, *if* Rwanda does indeed exhibit extremely high levels of linkage. As it so happens, it does.

2. Unseen Linkage to Rwanda

Whilst Levitsky and Way's theoretical framework forms the background against which Rwanda is being assessed in this chapter, it is not necessary – or indeed desirable – to deploy exactly the same quantitative measures they develop to operationalize their key concepts. This is because the 'conceptual stretching' inherent to producing measures so that they can be applied uniformly to a diverse set of cases necessarily involves some violence to specificity, nuance, and the original meaning of the conceptual category under scrutiny.⁷²⁶ For example, Levitsky and Way code 'Intergovernmental ties' (between competitive authoritarian regimes and the democratic West) as a dummy variable measured solely by membership in the Organisation of American States (OAS) or membership (actual or potential) in the EU. Such dichotomous variables always function as a proxy stand-in for the qualitative facts on the ground in regression analyses.⁷²⁷ As this is not a large-n study, there is no reason not to simply bypass the proxy and go straight to the facts themselves when so doing permits a more accurate assessment of Rwanda's 'fit'

⁷²⁵ Ibid. p23. Emphasis mine.

⁷²⁶ David Collier and James E. Mahon, Jr., "Conceptual "Stretching" Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis," *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 4 (1993).

⁷²⁷ Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *The American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (1970).

with Levitsky and Way's conceptual categories (as opposed to merely their measures). Those categories are:

1. Economic ties: measured by the extent of trade with the United States and 15 EU member countries...
2. Social ties: measured by the annual number of a country's citizens travelling to or living in the US and EU...
3. Communication ties: measured by per capita average international voice traffic...and per capita average internet access...
4. Intergovernmental ties...⁷²⁸

In all these cases the US and the EU are a proxy for mechanisms of benign democratic influence, specifically:

Linkage contributed to democratisation in three ways during the post-Cold War period: (1) it heightened reverberation caused by autocratic abuse; (2) it created domestic constituencies for norm-abiding behaviour; and (3) it reshaped the domestic distribution of power and resources, strengthening democratic and opposition forces and weakening and isolating autocrats.⁷²⁹

Levitsky and Way then create log variables of these measures (usually divided by GDP or population) and sort their countries into quintiles. Rwanda should be regarded *as comparably or more linked* than the other countries regarded as high-linkage through these mechanisms, but not in ways visible to these measures.

⁷²⁸ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War.*, p374.

⁷²⁹ Ibid. p44.

Firstly, it should be noted that on Levitsky and Way's own measure of economic linkage (imports and exports with the US and the EU over GDP), Rwanda appears to be a low-linkage country. When compared with other competitive authoritarian regimes (table one), post-genocidal Rwanda comes out bottom of the league, lower even than levels under MRND rule. Given Rwanda's impressive growth record since 1994, this might be seen as surprising. Importantly, we don't have to be wedded to this statistical indicator if there are strong grounds for believing Rwanda matches Levitsky and Way's conceptual criteria in ways that can be seen through close analysis of the single case, despite escaping their measures. Part of what explains this low score is simply that Levitsky and Way use a very rough measure. There are more than a couple of reasons for this. Firstly, it overlooks the character of the goods in question: for example, Belarus transports a large amount of Russian gas to the West. It takes fees for this, but the ways in which such forms of economic activity (i.e. oil and gas-based) actually *weaken* democratic pressures are well documented.⁷³⁰ This gives the Belarusian non-liberalized economy scores higher than might be expected.

Secondly, there is the matter of illicit goods. Consider the value of cocaine or human trafficking. For the purposes of seeing economic integration they are just as valid but totally excluded from these figures. With reference to Rwanda, illicitly obtained coltan which makes its way into Western iPhones ought to be considered 'economic integration with the West' (as is well documented – it was sold on to markets in the West throughout the period in which Congolese coltan was being traded through the Congo Desk), but obviously cannot be captured by this measure.

Thirdly, consider how these figures are calculated: any country which is landlocked is likely to conduct a higher proportion of its trade via regional entrepôts (i.e. much Rwandan coffee will be traded through the Nairobi Coffee Exchange, and poorer countries are likely to engage in larger proportions of (lower cost) regional trade. Nonetheless, linkage through regional middlemen should still have the effects Levitsky and

⁷³⁰ Soares de Oliveira, *Oil and politics in the Gulf of Guinea.*, and Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda and Kevin Rosner, *Belarus: oil, gas, transit pipelines and Russian foreign energy policy* (London: GMB Publishing Ltd, 2006).

Way anticipate. However, Rwanda's score is lower than other comparable countries in this category such as Mali or Malawi. Furthermore, as graph one reveals, economic ties with the West appear to be decreasing, not increasing (and as part of a pre-genocidal trend). One possible explanation might be that the denominator (GDP) is moving too. So a country that experiences a strong domestic growth boom but not corresponding trade increases is thereby marked as having a lower level of integration with the West. Whilst this in general would not be reflected by Levitsky and Way's data, it cannot account for Rwanda's experience: as graph two shows, Rwanda is dramatically more connected to the global economy now than it was in the late 1990s. The other oft-repeated explanation lies in the role of emerging powers (notably China, the Middle East and India), but graph three shows this not to be true either. Whilst it is true that these areas play a larger part in Rwanda's trade balance than before, the overwhelming proportion of Rwanda's economic integration has been with other African economies, specifically the rest of East Africa. Whilst this will not appear as high linkage on Levitsky and Way's measures, it ought to be understood as having an analogous effect, because it creates precisely those mechanisms that Levitsky and Way identify: it heightens the reverberation caused by autocratic abuse within Rwanda (which is covered most scrupulously by the Kampala Monitor, the East African, etc.), it creates domestic constituencies dependent on continued integration with the East African democracies for their economic and social welfare, and hence interested in 'norm-abiding behaviour', and it reshapes the domestic configuration of power (most opposition movements within Rwanda have received logistical or financial support from diasporic groups either in East Africa or beyond: for example, the Democratic Green party of Rwanda held its 2010 Conference in Uganda).⁷³¹

Rwanda's 'social ties' to the rest of the world are high, as graphs 4 through to 9 make clear. Although Levitsky and Way do not analyse the number of immigrants living *within* competitive authoritarian regimes, it is clear that they would have the same postulated effect (i.e. that of creating a set of economic incentives for continued norm-abiding behaviour), and Rwanda is notable for having *more* linkages on this variable than any other competitive authoritarian regimes in Africa (countries bordering South Africa

⁷³¹ Interview UG15.

have been excluded from this sample as – although they have high levels of ‘migration to democracies’, this number is almost solely a function of ‘survival migrants’⁷³² to South Africa, mainly Zimbabweans who have, for a variety of reasons, been unable to act as pro-democracy forces in the way that Levitsky and Way imagine.⁷³³ Similarly, Rwanda has extremely high levels of outward migration compared to both other countries in the neighbourhood, and African competitive authoritarian regimes more generally. Whilst this effect is diminished if we consider only migration to democracies, it is important to remember that, firstly, Levitsky and Way’s understanding of democracy (i.e. Polity IV’s definition) will exclude some states where many Rwandans have substantial freedom to operate in democracy-promoting ways (i.e. Polity IV does not code Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, or Tanzania as democratic, but Rwandans based in exile in all of these countries can engage in political contestation with the regime back home, form parties, fundraise, run dissident newspapers, and so on) and many of the mechanisms Levitsky and Way identify should work whether or not the diaspora in question lives in a democracy, as long as their freedom to engage in political activism is unconstrained.

Nor can the communication ties of Rwanda sensibly be regarded as low either. A substantial part of the RPF’s vision for the new Rwanda is directed at the creation of a high-speed ICT hub with extensive connectivity to the outside world. Rwanda has allegedly achieved the 4th fastest internet in the world, as reported by the latest Ookla NetIndex global internet speed report.⁷³⁴ Where this internet is going is anyone’s guess, but it is at least very fast compared to neighbouring countries. It is well on its way to connection to the East African fibre-optic network⁷³⁵, and has extremely high levels of mobile phone and internet use for a country with Rwanda’s GDP per capita.⁷³⁶

⁷³² Alexander Betts, "Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework," *Global Governance* 16(2010).

⁷³³ Cf. J.A. McGregor and R. Primorac, *Zimbabwe's new diaspora: displacement and the cultural politics of survival* (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2010). for a detailed exposition of the factors undermining the possibilities of political activism by migrants in South Africa. Also the section on South Africa in Alexander Betts, *Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

⁷³⁴ F Kanyesigye, "Rwanda has 4th fastest internet in Africa," *New Times* 2012, 7th March.

⁷³⁵ A Blenford, "Bold Rwanda takes broadband leap," *BBC* 2009, 21st September.

⁷³⁶ J Donner, "The Use of Mobile Phones by Microentrepreneurs in Kigali, Rwanda: Changes to Social and Business Networks," *Information Technologies and International Development* 3, no. 2 (2007); M Futch and C McIntosh, "Tracking the introduction of the village phone product in Rwanda," *Information Technologies and International Development* 5, no. 3 (2009); A Nsengiyumva and C Stork, "Rwanda," in *Towards an African e-index: household and*

Although Rwanda is (obviously) not a member of the EU or the OAS, it should be beyond dispute that the current government has consistently and single-mindedly sought to enmesh the state within organisations of global governance as far as possible. Rwanda's membership of the Commonwealth is only the most recent example: it has been a consistently vocal and activist member of the African Union, it has consistently pushed to expand the role and mandate of both the East African Community and the Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs. The government has been disproportionately loud in the Nile Basin Initiative, and now the NELSAP⁷³⁷ Coordinating Unit is based in Kigali. Kigali has consistently sought to build closer relationships with the AfDB, COMESA, and even the UN through its willingness to deploy peacekeepers to Sudan.⁷³⁸ Whilst the sincerity of these overtures is open to doubt (plenty of Congolese observers,⁷³⁹ for example, see in the government's desire to revive CEPGL a cynical strategy to retain influence over Eastern Congo), what is indisputable is that the Rwandan elite have not sought to reduce the number or depth of their intergovernmental ties with the rest of the world, and regarding them as 'low linkage' in this respect would be inaccurate.

Finally, it is important to remember that whilst Rwandan society in general may not be as tightly enmeshed with the West as, say, Mexico or Croatia, that understates the extent to which the elite in particular are dependent upon a continued deep and cordial relationship with the democratic West. This is true when assessed purely in terms of financial dependence upon donors (as the chapter on the military makes clear), but also for the technical and logistical support required to bring about the high-modernist transformation outlined in the final chapter.⁷⁴⁰ To that extent, the current elite cannot afford for Rwanda to become an international pariah, and should be regarded as highly linked to the West.

individual ICT access and usage accross 10 African countries (Johannesburg: LINK Centre, Wits University, School of Public and Development Management, 2005).

⁷³⁸ Interview UG7.

⁷³⁹ For example, see Mamadou Kouyate to *Hungry for Truth, Peace, and Justice*, 2009, January 9; Justin Murangwa to *Rwanda Today*, 2010, December 14.

⁷⁴⁰ Many of the projects only exist because of substantial technocratic support, i.e. the reform of the RRA, the national parks initiative, the high-speed internet network, and so on.

3. Unused Leverage

On Levitsky and Way's criteria, Rwanda is a high-leverage country (i.e. a regime the West has considerable leverage to deploy in promoting their interests). This criterion is not difficult to meet: all one needs is to not possess nuclear weapons, an economy worth over \$100 billion, an oil industry, nor 'Black Knight Assistance' (defined as receiving bilateral aid worth 1% or more of GDP which is 'overwhelmingly' from a non-EU non-US 'major power'). It might be thought Rwanda might qualify for at least medium levels of leverage on the grounds that it meets criterion three:

3. Competing Security Issues: Country where there exists a major security-related foreign-policy issue for the United States and/or the EU.⁷⁴¹

Although the interest of the US and other powers in the continuing insecurity in the DRC may look major from Kigali, it does not really meet the threshold: Levitsky and Way regard only two countries in their dataset as possessing sufficiently important security-related foreign-policy issues to militate against leverage being used to promote democracy seriously: Russia and Taiwan. In order to seriously consider Rwanda as meeting this criterion, one would have to consider it to be more important to the foreign policy of Europe and the US than Serbia, Haiti, Armenia, Zimbabwe, Ukraine, Belarus, or Mexico. That is not credible: on the criteria as outlined by Levitsky and Way, the leverage of the West with Rwanda should be high.

It might be thought, then, that the West should be in a powerful position to promote change in line with the prescriptions of the 'liberal peacebuilding agenda',⁷⁴² and Rwandan elite in no position to stop them. The puzzle, then, is that this simply isn't true. The Rwandan government appears to have succeeded in

⁷⁴¹ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War.*, p372.

⁷⁴² Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, "Illiberal peacebuilding in Angola," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 02 (2011).

asserting control over policy whilst maintaining donor support despite its pursuit of activities considered 'controversial' by many. Donors make the appropriate noises about wanting reforms, occasionally become critical, and threaten to withdraw support. Ultimately, however, the government has pursued its own policy agenda, and donors have returned to the fold.

This has been true from the outset: there has been considerable tension between what donors expected of the government and what the government expected of the donors since 1994, when the new government in Rwanda became increasingly bitter about the volumes of humanitarian aid flowing to refugees in Zaire, which far outstripped any other types of aid, even when armed insurgents began conducting raids within Rwanda from these camps.⁷⁴³ The international community treated the refugees as a humanitarian issue, rather than a security problem, but did very little when the Rwandan government took matters into its own hands, crossing borders to forcibly close the camps. In April 1995 the Rwandan army emptied by force the last camp for internally displaced people in south-west Rwanda at Kibeho. The killings caused several donors, including Belgium and the European Commission, to partially suspend aid, but only temporarily, and the UK and the USA backed the Rwandan government.⁷⁴⁴ In October 1996, when the ADFL, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, closed the refugee camps in Zaire, pushing over a million refugees back into Rwanda in less than two months, there was some half-hearted condemnation, but it disappeared fairly quickly. Terry⁷⁴⁵ suggests that this ultimately suited an international community with no idea how to resolve the problem, and no political will to get their hands dirty. Most recently, the publication of the UN Mapping Report,⁷⁴⁶ alleging widespread crimes against humanity perpetrated by the RPF throughout Eastern Congo in the late 1990s was greeted with the appropriate noises by the international community, but not by any serious curtailment of aid. The Rwandan government has thus

⁷⁴³ Krishna Kumar, *Rebuilding post-war Rwanda* (Washington, DC: USAID, 1996), p30.

⁷⁴⁴ GoB, "Construction de la paix dans la Région des Grands Lacs: Un plan d'action belge," (Brussels: Chambre des Représants de Belgique, Government of Belgium, 2001), p165-6.

⁷⁴⁵ F. Terry, *Condemned to repeat?: the paradox of humanitarian action* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), p184-5.

⁷⁴⁶ Full title: *Rapport du Projet Mapping concernant les violations les plus graves des droits de l'homme et du droit international humanitaire commises entre mars 1993 et juin 2003 sur le territoire de la République démocratique du Congo*, OHCHR, August 2010 (url: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_FR.pdf).

been able to pursue a policy of their choosing, in the face of some criticism, without being punished by donors.

The government strategy for returning refugees tells a similar story. The policy was villagisation (*imidugudu*-isation), reminiscent of the *ujamaa* experiences in Tanzania in the 1970s. As documented in the next chapter, villagisation in Rwanda was packaged as a vehicle for reintegrating and reconciling the population, facilitating the provision of social and economic services, and ameliorating land shortages. This was supported by UN agencies and NGOs, often with substantial financing⁷⁴⁷, but many bilateral donors were sceptical about what has been, and remains, a controversial policy. Many new villages were beset by problems, from poorly designed housing to failure to provide promised services. Concerns were raised by several commentators that coercion was being used to move people into these settlements.⁷⁴⁸ The argument of these scholars is that this policy, discursively packaged as part of developmental modernity (i.e. living in 'proper' villages), is in reality part of the control of rural populations, much as has been argued by much of the classic literature on African land reforms.⁷⁴⁹ This criticism has been made explicit in advice to donors,⁷⁵⁰ but has not led the Rwandan government to roll back the policy, or donors to withdraw finance.

There are similar dynamics in donor support to the justice sector. Such support was at very high levels following the genocide, when donors were convinced that the '*swift establishment of justice was crucial and urgent*'.⁷⁵¹ Huge amounts of aid were channelled into reconstructing the justice system and into

⁷⁴⁷ NGOs actively involved ADRA, ARC, IRC, Christian Outreach, LWF, WorldVision, and also African organisations including FAH, ACORD, and ARAMET (see Van Leeuwen 2001).

⁷⁴⁸ Johan Pottier, "Land Reform for Peace? Rwanda's 2005 Land Law in Context," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 6, no. 4 (2006); H Musahara and C Huggins, "Land Reform, Land Scarcity, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Case Study of Rwanda," *Security Studies* 3(2004); Saskia Van Hoyweghen, "The Urgency of Land and Agrarian Reform in Rwanda," *African Affairs* 98, no. 392 (1999); Dorothea Hilhorst and Mathijs Van Leeuwen, "Emergency and Development: the Case of Imidugudu, Villagization in Rwanda," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 13, no. 3 (2000).

⁷⁴⁹ R. Chambers, *Settlement schemes in tropical Africa: a study of organizations and development* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1969); G. Hydén, *Beyond ujamaa in Tanzania: underdevelopment and an uncaptured peasantry* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1980); Williams, "Studying Development and Explaining Policies."

⁷⁵⁰ Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen, "Emergency and Development: the Case of Imidugudu, Villagization in Rwanda."

⁷⁵¹ Anton Baaré, David Shearer, and Peter Uvin, "The Limits and Scope For the Use of Development Assistance Incentives And Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations. Case Study: Rwanda," (Paris: OECD Development Assistance Committee Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development Co-Operation, 1999). P20

programmes designed to foster national reconciliation, which jarred slightly with the RPF's repeated insistence upon bringing *génocidaires* to justice.⁷⁵² The UNDP established a justice trust fund to which many bilateral and multilateral donors contributed.⁷⁵³ Hundreds of (sometimes overlapping and competing) projects were initiated in the justice sector, covering support to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (established in 1994), the classic justice system, national reconciliation and human rights commissions, the Ministry of Justice, local human rights organisations, and new systems like *gacaca* courts.⁷⁵⁴

None of this was held back by the clear tensions between the government and donors as to the appropriate direction policy should take. Many donors prioritised reconciliation rather than justice, only advocating trials for those elites responsible for the organisation of the genocide. However, as Baaré et al. point out, '*for the [government] and many others in Rwanda, this was heresy: there could be no reconciliation without justice*'.⁷⁵⁵ Donors and international human rights organisations also wanted transitional justice to be modelled on Western norms of court procedure, due process, and so forth, with particular aversion to the use of the death penalty.⁷⁵⁶ The government vehemently rejected this.⁷⁵⁷ It was the Rwandan government which got its way.

The *gacaca* courts are a particularly pointed example. Adapted from a re-invented 'traditional' community reconciliation process in order to deal with the seriously overstretched prisons and formal courts, *gacaca* was seen as simultaneously innovative and worrying to international observers.⁷⁵⁸ The system did eventually win the support (and funding) of some donors such as Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands,

⁷⁵² Clark, *The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice Without Lawyers*.

⁷⁵³ Interview RW38.

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁵ Baaré, Shearer, and Uvin, "The Limits and Scope For the Use of Development Assistance Incentives And Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations. Case Study: Rwanda.", p20.

⁷⁵⁶ Interview RW24.

⁷⁵⁷ Interview RW8.

⁷⁵⁸ Barbara Oomen, "Donor-Driven Justice and its Discontents: The Case of Rwanda," *Development and Change* 36, no. 5 (2005).

and the European Commission,⁷⁵⁹ but Hayman found substantial discontent in her interviews with the representatives of donor organisations.⁷⁶⁰ Donors were frustrated with the slow progress of the arrangement; they felt that they were being kept in the dark about government intentions. Simultaneously, they were irritated that funds which had been disbursed could not be spent due to the delays caused by judicial reforms and a new law on *gacaca*. There is division as to the cause of the delays: for Oomen⁷⁶¹ the stalling reflected the extent to which the *gacaca* represented a ‘*show staged for the international community*’, a smokescreen to divert attention away from the real injustices taking place in Rwanda and the region, whereas the more generous analysis of Clark⁷⁶² attributes the delays to weak institutional capacity, division over the appropriate course of action, and the back-and-forth one would expect with any project this expansive in scope and innovative in design. However, barring some tokenistic reductions, the donors never pulled the plug. As Hayman remarks,

This highlights how reforms may be donor-driven and donor-funded, with donor involvement in planning, but this does not mean donor-controlled. The government has often explicitly excluded donors from certain policy debates, such as around reforms to the justice sector. The government has pursued controversial policies, such as villagisation and *gacaca*, at its own pace and on its own terms, while also seeking to keep donors on board. Donors have occasionally expressed concerns and frustrations, but generally support has been maintained.⁷⁶³

A similar story emerges with respect to elections and regional security issues. Donors consistently expected a rapid transition towards a democratic system and the normalisation of regional relations soon after the genocide. Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, and Switzerland stated in 1996 that their

⁷⁵⁹ Sophie Da Câmara Santa Clara Gomes, *The European Union's political and development response to Rwanda* (Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2001); Allison Corey and Sandra F. Joireman, "Retributive justice: The Gacaca courts in Rwanda," *African Affairs* 103, no. 410 (2004).

⁷⁶⁰ Hayman, "Rwanda: Milking the Cow. Creating Policy Space in Spite of Aid Dependence."

⁷⁶¹ Oomen, "Donor-Driven Justice and its Discontents: The Case of Rwanda.", p906.

⁷⁶² Adelman and Suhrke, *The path of a genocide: the Rwanda crisis from Uganda to Zaire*.

⁷⁶³ Hayman, "Rwanda: Milking the Cow. Creating Policy Space in Spite of Aid Dependence.", p171.

continuing support would be conditional upon rapid progress in these areas.⁷⁶⁴ Those words proved to be empty: the decision to delay the transition's endpoint to 2003 led to no reductions or cancellations in aid.

As previous chapters have shown, the delayed transition process gave the RPF time to gain full control of the political arena. Although certain practices were condemned, such as the lack of secrecy in the ballot, leeway was given by donors that accepted the outcomes of elections as a step in the right direction.⁷⁶⁵ Similarly, the events of the 2003 Constitutional Referendum led to 'an atmosphere of deep antagonism between the Rwandan government and the international community'.⁷⁶⁶ European Union Observer Missions were particularly critical, threatening at times to withhold financial support for the election process.⁷⁶⁷ The Netherlands finally withheld funding at that point, and the disbursement of EU aid was delayed. Nevertheless, the elections continued, although the government ran into difficulties with international financial institutions as it sought other means to pay for the process.⁷⁶⁸ Despite this 'deep antagonism', many donors were quick to congratulate the government on its progress in the immediate aftermath.⁷⁶⁹ Political space has continued to close since 2003, but donors have accepted the situation 'given the circumstances'.⁷⁷⁰ Official donor statements reiterate the importance of good governance and political dialogue, but there are only rare cases of outright criticism. Even France has not stayed in the cold: despite the Rwandan government's suspension of relations in 2006 after the French Judge Jean-Louis Brugière issued warrants for 9 Rwandan officials for alleged involvement in the shooting down of Habyarimana's plane, and the subsequent publication of the Mucyo Commission Report in 2008 alleging that 'French soldiers were themselves directly involved in the assassinations of Tutsis and Hutus accused

⁷⁶⁴ UNDP, "Round Table Conference for Rwanda: Report of the Conference" (paper presented at the Round Table Conference for Rwanda, Geneva, 20th to 21st June, 1996).

⁷⁶⁵ Peter Uvin, "Difficult choices in the new post-conflict agenda: the international community in Rwanda after the genocide," *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (2001); ICG, "'Consensual Democracy' in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections."

⁷⁶⁶ Jean Paul Kimonyo, Noël Twagiramungu, and Christopher Kayumba, *Supporting the post-genocide transition in Rwanda: the role of the international community* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2004), p20.

⁷⁶⁷ EU, "Mission d'Observation Electorale de l'Union Européenne. Elections Présidentielles et Législatives. Rwanda 2003. Déclaration Préliminaire," (Kigali: European Union, 2003); EU, "Mission d'Observation Electorale de l'Union Européenne. Référendum Constitutionnel, Rwanda 2003. Déclaration Préliminaire," (Kigali: European Union, 2003).

⁷⁶⁸ G. Ahobamuteze, C. Dom, and R. Purcell, *Rwanda country report* (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, International Development Department, 2006), p191.

⁷⁶⁹ EIU, "Country Report: Rwanda," (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003).

⁷⁷⁰ see EU, "Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on the Statement of the Rwandan Government on the Parliamentary Report on Genocidal Ideology," (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2004); HRW, "Country Report: Rwanda," (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007).

of hiding Tutsis',⁷⁷¹ it was only two years later that a contrite Bernard Kouchner was laying a wreath at the Gisozi Genocide Memorial in Kigali, and not long after that the Trévidic-Poux report overturned Brugière's conclusions and exonerated the RPF of any part in the death of Habyarimana.⁷⁷² *Rapprochement* appears to have been conducted entirely on the RPF's terms.

This phenomenon emerges again and again in different policy areas, as painstakingly documented in Hayman's PhD thesis (2005), and shows a regime which resists external attempts to modify their behaviour over and over again.

Part Two: what sustains this autonomy?

The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts: firstly, material 'interests' can account for some of the weakness of Western leverage vis-à-vis the RPF, but not all. Insofar as the interests pointed to here are not explicitly described by Levitsky and Way, they fall straightforwardly within their theoretical logic. Secondly, the institutional arrangements and sociology of international bodies are structured to permit an elite that knows what it is doing to create extensive policy independence, regardless of the intentions of donors. These factors need to be in place to account for the extremely low levels of donor power in Rwanda, which 'shouldn't' happen in a society with high levels of linkage to the West: whilst this account involves substantively complicating Levitsky and Way's narrative, it is not in any deep sense in tension with the basic framework. Thirdly, the new elite of Rwanda enhance their autonomy through the skilful manipulation of ideational frames, discourses, and the deployment of ideology. The post-genocide regime was able to impose a reductive yet persuasive account of Rwanda's history, politics, and society upon international commentators, and manipulate the technocratic and apolitical discourse of state reconstruction in order to preclude criticism and ensure continued support. Rwanda's external relations

⁷⁷¹ A copy of the report is stored online at <http://bit.ly/9hbLON>.

⁷⁷² Interview RW27.

are therefore in part underpinned by the Rwandan state as 'ideological project'.⁷⁷³ This section offers a more thoroughgoing critique of the conceptions of power, interests, incentives, and capabilities which lie at the heart of Levitsky and Way's work, insofar as that framework excludes ideational factors of this form.

1. Interests

Part of this explanation has already been outlined: illegally plundered mineral wealth from the DRC grants a political inner court sources of quasi-monopolistic capital accumulation. This makes it less dependent upon donors than it would otherwise be. However, this is only a partial explanation for two reasons: firstly, even the most generous estimates of the haul from the Congo would not permit the Rwandan state to pay its bills with mineral wealth alone⁷⁷⁴ and Rwanda remained heavily subsidised with aid flows for the entirety of this period (see Table Four). Secondly, alternate sources of revenue cannot explain why the Rwandan state is so effective at resisting conditionality with respect to the aid that it *does* receive.

2. Institutional factors

a. General Ignorance and state-dependence

Rwanda's interlocutors were often inexperienced and reliant upon the government for their information. The genocide brought about a rupture in relations with donors. Most donor agencies withdrew from Rwanda, leaving the UN Mission and the Red Cross as the only representatives of the donor community.⁷⁷⁵ As graph ten shows, the post-genocidal period ushered in a very new donor community. Many of the most prominent donors of the pre-genocidal era never returned with the same force, tainted as they were with their association with the previous regime, and less than sympathetic to the new Anglophone elite installing themselves within Kigali. Whilst some of these bilateral donors, notably

⁷⁷³ Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State."

⁷⁷⁴ Interview RW34. For those estimates, see chapter four, part one.

⁷⁷⁵ Interview RW11.

Germany, Canada, and Switzerland, increased their aid in the immediate aftermath, France, Belgium and Japan did not. The overall trend for these donors was a significant decrease in aid quantities between 1991 and 2001.⁷⁷⁶ This shortfall was more than made up for by the 'Friends of the New Rwanda' – the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. These donors became strong supporters and were particularly important in helping the new government to gain the international legitimacy that France would have wished withheld.⁷⁷⁷

The most obvious consequence of this shift is that those governments giving the most aid were those that knew least about Rwanda. This has been frankly admitted by some of the donors in question:

Our knowledge base of Rwanda and the Great Lakes is low...We, therefore, need to be realistic and use the coming years to build a firmer political, economic and social knowledge base which we can use to judge the effectiveness and progress of our partnership⁷⁷⁸

It should be pointed out that this is not totally new, but merely compounds a pre-existing dearth of knowledge: Uvin claims that World Bank report writers in the 1980s rarely spent more than 15 days in the country and only spoke English.⁷⁷⁹ Arguments that the World Bank are often uninformed about local realities are now very familiar.⁷⁸⁰

The general point is that levels of knowledge in post-genocidal Rwanda were uniquely low even by these (already uninspiring) standards. Many bodies who should know better display the same appalling lack of

⁷⁷⁶ Hayman, "Rwanda: Milking the Cow. Creating Policy Space in Spite of Aid Dependence."

⁷⁷⁷ As graph one makes clear.

⁷⁷⁸ DfID, September 1999 Quoted in Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda: conflict, survival and disinformation in the late twentieth century.*, pVIII.

⁷⁷⁹ Uvin, *Aiding violence : the development enterprise in Rwanda.*, p156.

⁷⁸⁰ J Strelau and F Sagasti, "Preventing Deadly Conflict: Does The World Bank Have A Role?," in *Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Foundation, 1998)., p97.

awareness. A World Bank economist, when asked whether there was not a danger of aid to Rwanda being diverted to finance the war in the DRC, replied:

The Government [of Rwanda] has assured us that it is not interested in the continuation of the war. Which is satisfactory for us... We have no guarantees, but we have their word.⁷⁸¹

This would look slightly millenarian in its confidence even if we did not know anything about Rwanda. In the light of the Rwandan regime's open involvement in the DRC in 1996-1997, and again in 1998,⁷⁸² such an answer is truly astonishing.

This has two immediate consequences. Firstly, new donors were doubly reliant upon the Rwandan state; not just to implement development policy, but also as the primary source of information as to what that policy should be. This ignorance gave the Rwandan state a degree of policy space it would not otherwise have. Secondly, it meant that the development community in the UK and other such countries for whom Rwanda was unfamiliar territory – its experts, journalists, commentators and captive academics – were susceptible to the wholehearted endorsement of the reductive and ideologically loaded narrative of Rwanda which the RPF promoted as the definitive account.

b. Overdonation

The next point is that ignorance and inability to contextualise or coordinate policy is compounded by the sheer volume of development work being undertaken in Rwanda, and the diversity of providers. A

⁷⁸¹ Quoted in Reyntjens, *Talking or fighting?: political evolution in Rwanda and Burundi, 1998-1999.*, p42.

⁷⁸² Ibid. Also covered at length in Prunier, *From genocide to continental war : the 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa.*

perusal of the Rwanda Development Gateway⁷⁸³ reveals some 5,856 projects currently being run in Rwanda, being operated by some 332 different organisations, from the Government of the United States, to Luxembourg's Infectious Disease Control Unit. Given the sheer number of undertakings, the diversity of operators and organisations directing the development efforts and the paucity of resources devoted to coordination, it should not surprise us that it is almost impossible to impose effective conditionality. The more aid is given, and the more diverse the providers, the less effective oversight will be. Rather than trying to be the 'favoured child' with a privileged and deeply entrenched relationship to one or two states as under the Second Republic, the new Rwandan elite are spread-betting: consciously tending a diverse portfolio of donors such as to maximise scope for policy independence despite its high levels of debt and aid dependency.

c. Malcoordination and the impossibility of feedback

It is not just the multiplicity of donors that is significant, but the lack of consensus amongst them, or even internally within a given donor programme. Any given donor is not itself an unchanging, homogenous organisation, and presence and support for Rwanda is not static. The situation is constantly changing in terms of who provides what, how, and why. Historical factors, political and development priorities, preferences for aid instruments, administrative structures, prerogatives to spend budgets, and individual politicians and officials all influence how each donor agency engages with the government, which aspects of policy they focus on, the conditions they apply to aid, and how they react to events in the country.⁷⁸⁴

The result is confusion and mixed messages from donors. The result of that is a situation which an intelligent and responsive governing elite can exploit. Even amongst donors such as the UK, Sweden, the World Bank, and the European Commission, generally considered to be 'like-minded', there is very little

⁷⁸³ http://old.developmentgateway.org/-/countryprofile/index?country_iso=rw.

⁷⁸⁴ Hayman, "Abandoned orphan, wayward child: the United Kingdom and Belgium in Rwanda since 1994."

continuity of policy. For example, the UK withheld instalments in 2004 over Rwanda's policy towards the DRC, and the World Bank continued disbursing.⁷⁸⁵ Inconsistencies are also present within donor programmes. Belgium's cold diplomatic relations with Rwanda after 1994 and its sharp criticism of the Rwandan presence in the DRC contrasted with the remarkable continuity in projects on the ground, many carried over from the pre-genocide period, and its strong support for programmes such as *gacaca*.⁷⁸⁶ The Netherlands has been prohibited by its parliament from providing budget support, but allocated increased support for the justice sector.⁷⁸⁷ Norway reduced its bilateral programme in response to Rwanda's regional belligerence and concerns about human rights abuses, but continues to provide aid through NGOs and acts as a silent partner in the local government and justice sectors.⁷⁸⁸ This divergence may create aid management problems for the Rwandan government but – more importantly – creates space to bypass or subvert official conditions.

This multiplicity of voices precludes the emergence of any consensus on the reality of political processes within Rwanda, nor a single analysis of how aid affects structures, institutions, and politics. Uvin⁷⁸⁹ observes that donors unknowingly 'aided violence' in pre-genocidal Rwanda because of their inability to comprehend the reality of Rwandan social processes. Oomen⁷⁹⁰ argues that a parallel phenomenon can be observed in the inability of contemporary donor agencies to anticipate how the justice systems they fund will play out on the ground. Hayman summarises the process thus:

Political analysis by donor agencies is often weak, and the daily functioning of the aid system deceptively seems like a technical exercise where budgets have to be spent, results produced, and targets met on issues like aid coordination.⁷⁹¹

⁷⁸⁵ Interview RW24.

⁷⁸⁶ Interview RW25.

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁸ Interview RW12.

⁷⁸⁹ Uvin, *Aiding violence : the development enterprise in Rwanda*.

⁷⁹⁰ Oomen, "Donor-Driven Justice and its Discontents: The Case of Rwanda."

⁷⁹¹ Hayman, "Rwanda: Milking the Cow. Creating Policy Space in Spite of Aid Dependence.", p177.

For example, Belgium's overarching framework for aid contains numerous references to political conditionality;⁷⁹² as does its Great Lakes Framework.⁷⁹³ However, these conditions do not appear to be tested, and the application of political conditions is invisible. Regular discussions between Belgium and the government revolve around the technical needs of individual projects.⁷⁹⁴ As Holvoet and Rombouts⁷⁹⁵ painstakingly document, evaluation programmes in Rwanda are systematically under-resourced, poorly conceived, incompletely implemented, dependent upon the Rwandan state for key data inputs, and conceived within a narrow technocratic vision which seriously casts into doubt the ability of donors to effectively know what direct effects their policies and projects are having, let alone their deeper political implications.

d. In for a penny, in for a pound

International donors have their own set of interests: they have strong incentives to make claims for the efficacy of their methods, and the value of their investments (like any accountable organisation which must produce results): they compete for funding like any other department, and face an extraordinarily difficult time convincing 'development sceptics' that the money they spend is not wasted. As such, if there is enough to point to which can be presented as working, the Rwandan government will be let off with the most cursory criticism for the rest. Much as Rwanda's prior status as the '*enfant chéri*' of the Belgians (and the 'Jewel in the Crown' of the Canadian Development Empire) blinded them to the less salubrious aspects of the Second Republic,⁷⁹⁶ the very public applauding of Rwanda as a model case by DfID and USAID makes the reputations of many public figures within both administrations (perhaps most obviously Tony Blair) bound up with the status of Rwanda as a 'success'. For such institutions and persons, the calculation is (correctly) made that Rwanda can more easily be displayed as a success story than changed in aspects viewed as non-negotiable by the regime, and it is politically awkward for DfID to

⁷⁹² GoB, "Note de politique générale du ministre de la coopération au développement pour l'année budgétaire 2004," (Brussels: Chambre des Représants de Belgique, Government of Belgium, 2003).

⁷⁹³ GoB, "Construction de la paix dans la Région des Grands Lacs: Un plan d'action belge."

⁷⁹⁴ Interview RW25.

⁷⁹⁵ Nathalie Holvoet and Heidy Rombouts, "The challenge of monitoring and evaluation under the new aid modalities: experiences from Rwanda," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 46, no. 04 (2008).

⁷⁹⁶ Compendiously documented in Uvin, *Aiding violence : the development enterprise in Rwanda*.

now turn around and say 'actually, we were wrong: Rwanda is not working'.⁷⁹⁷ This implies, perversely, that donors may be less successful at exerting conditionality the more heavily they have 'bet' on a recipient country in the past.

However, these are factors which should be expected to become less significant over time: technical capacity recovers, information deficits are gradually overcome, coordination platforms are slowly brought into existence and given life. Even the strategy of spread-betting should have a half-life, as donors should realise that the Rwandan government is doing almost everything within their power to minimise the influence of any one donor organisation, and shift their resources to where they might command more influence. Equally, generational replacement will eventually remove those for whom it would be problematic to acknowledge that Rwanda may not be quite the developmental dream they had thought it was (Clare Short gives way to Andrew Mitchell, to Justine Greening, and so on). Furthermore, they do not do much to explain an unwillingness to exert leverage where the information *is* clear, and the agendas of donors are such that coordination problems *ought to be* minimal, such as the (lack of) fallout from the publication of the Mapping Report. That Rwandan autonomy appears to be reasonably secure even in these circumstances, and that the Mapping Report was eventually buried with no lasting consequences suggests that we need to look beyond these factors to adequately explain the phenomena.

3. Externally projected discourses and ideology

Factors relating purely to the narrow conceptions of economic rationality will only get us part of the way, however. There is also a role played here by ideology, understood as "the mental frameworks - the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation - which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, figure out, and render intelligible the way society works".⁷⁹⁸ It does not merely reflect or represent, but is also a source of power. Within

⁷⁹⁷ Interview RW29.

⁷⁹⁸ D. Morley and K.H. Chen, *Stuart Hall: critical dialogues in cultural studies* (London: Routledge, 1996), p29.

Rwanda, these factors enhance the ability of the state to penetrate and regulate society. Without, the ideological discourses of both the Rwandan elite and its interlocutors in the global governance complex (i.e. the World Bank, the UN, and the plethora of organisations following their lead) provide political space to the Rwandan government which the strategic and institutional factors of the preceding analysis alone cannot encompass.

a. Technocratic discourses

Strikingly, there is a great deal of continuity in how donors interpreted Rwandan politics through to the post-genocidal period. For example, see the World Bank's two key reports dealing with the last years of the Habyarimana regime; *Rwanda: Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Growth*⁷⁹⁹, and the *Implementation Completion Report: Rwandese Republic: Structural Adjustment Credit*⁸⁰⁰. The former represents the most comprehensive report published by the World Bank in this period, and the latter is the principal report on their failure. Both provide important insights into the background thinking of the World Bank and other organisations which think similarly in ways which have continued up to the present day.

Firstly, the Rwandan state is presented as an essentially neutral if overextended actor in Rwandan society. This is a necessary and generic consequence of WB discourse, arising both from their Articles of Association, which declare that they must be apolitical, and their need to present themselves discursively as 'experts'. The 1994 report therefore represented the state as a benevolent, if occasionally misguided institution, whose 'failings' were itemised without interrogation of the political explanations for the policies in question. Thus:

⁷⁹⁹ Khan, Ngweno, and Beeharry, "Rwanda: Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Growth."

⁸⁰⁰ WB, "Implementation Completion Report: Rwandese Republic: Structural Adjustment Credit (Credit No. 2271-RW)," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995).

Rwanda's regulatory and incentive framework have [sic] worked to the disadvantage of Rwanda's poor by restricting their opportunities to improve their condition. They have also allowed the non-poor who are better connected to earn rents. The proposals for regulatory reform in the adjustment program would have tended to work in favour of the poor had they been fully implemented...Trade restrictions allow a favoured few to enjoy 'rents' and these tend to be better off.⁸⁰¹

All of which is true. What is not said is that those earning the rents in question ('the better connected') were intimately linked to the state itself – either as its agents or recipients of its patronage. This happens in the report more than once. Rwanda's exchange rate policy 'hurts the poor by providing opportunities for the better-off and better-connected to earn "scarcity rents"⁸⁰². This was followed by a rare foray into attempting to explain the reasons behind such a policy (albeit in a footnote):

The beneficiaries of maintaining an overvalued exchange rate and related policy distortions usually are the urban rich. The political economy of distortion favouring the urban elite, the most influential interest group, without doubt explains why such policies prevailed for so long without being challenged, even in the face of obvious economic decline.⁸⁰³

As, Andrew Storey points out, even this analysis is hopelessly reductive:

Who were the 'urban rich' in question, and what was the nature of their influence over state policy? The Bank remained wedded to a conception of the state as an independent arbiter

⁸⁰¹ Khan, Ngweno, and Beeharry, "Rwanda: Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Growth.", p20.

⁸⁰² Ibid., p15.

⁸⁰³ Ibid., p15.

between competing interest groups (one of which was seen as unfortunately influential), rather than seeing the state itself...as a powerful interest group in its own right.⁸⁰⁴

Those same interest groups (i.e. the urban rich) deeply penetrated the state apparatus. The Bank itself does not feature as an actor either in this analysis, nor it is taken to have any interests. Given the almost total capture of the state at this point by the *Akazu*, the prescription of the Bank looked positively surreal:

National policy must counterbalance the lobby of the richer urban residents who are understandably unwilling to allow increased immigration of the poor into their towns...present policies favouring the wealthy...should be eliminated.⁸⁰⁵

It was beyond the Bank's institutional purview to (publicly) reflect upon who was actually living in the villas in question, and what their links to the state might be. There was no lobby of rich urban residents pressuring the state; the 'rich urban residents' the Bank had in mind were indistinguishable from the state. The theme of state neutrality (in the face of all the evidence) was continued in the Bank's 1995 report, in which they exonerate themselves of any complicity with the genocidal regime:

The President of Rwanda travelled to Washington in October 1990 to assure the Bretton Woods institutions of his personal commitment and his government's intention to implement the SAP.⁸⁰⁶

⁸⁰⁴ Andy Storey, "Structural adjustment, state power & genocide: the World Bank & Rwanda," *Review of African Political Economy* 28, no. 89 (2001), p373.

⁸⁰⁵ Khan, Ngweno, and Beeharry, "Rwanda: Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Growth.", p50-1.

⁸⁰⁶ WB, "Implementation Completion Report: Rwandese Republic: Structural Adjustment Credit (Credit No. 2271-RW)."

This appears to be the *sole* evidence cited in the report for the World Bank's confidence in the Rwandan state as a committed implementor (and 'owner') of the appropriately 'rational' economic policies. According to the report, the failure of the SAP was to be attributed to:

The authorities' failure to associate the people with the programme...[their failure to make] the population aware of the need for and objective of the adjustment programme.⁸⁰⁷

[There was] failure to mobilise political and popular support for reform... The SAP was not sufficiently understood by all the agents responsible for implementing it. The authorities underestimated the pressure of social, economic and political interest groups of workers, entrepreneurs, and especially in the national assembly.⁸⁰⁸

Two features stand out from these statements: The first is the arrogance of the implicit assumption that the SAP was simply the only rational and appropriate policy in the circumstances, and critics simply must have been ignorant or misinformed. Secondly, the identification of the interest groups that derailed the policy – workers, entrepreneurs, parliamentarians – did not include the state itself.

There was only one other source of failure admitted, which was the purely technical:

The reorganisation of the customs administration to reduce fraud was slow to materialise...officials in charge of reform were not motivated.⁸⁰⁹

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid., pIV.

⁸⁰⁸ Ibid., p11-2.

⁸⁰⁹ Ibid., p10.

[tax fraud persisted due to] the tax administration's technical and physical problems.⁸¹⁰

Perhaps unconsciously, institutional self-interest compels international aid agencies - including the World Bank - to portray states as apolitical, technocratic implementers of policy, with social divisions within a country downplayed or ignored. States may not, therefore, be explicitly analysed as representing certain sectional interests - instead, they have been seen as representing (or, at least, trying to represent) society as a whole. James Ferguson⁸¹¹ describes how such an analysis worked to the government's advantage in Lesotho: the governmental bureaucracy, heavily supported by the Bank, was portrayed as a 'machine for delivering services' rather than as 'a device through which certain classes and interests control the behaviour and choices of others.' As a result, the Lesotho regime - representing the interest of a particular elite - was able to use World Bank projects to reinforce its bureaucratic state power over rural areas while the World Bank, in turn, was better able to justify the maintenance and extension of its own interventions (on the grounds that they were merely promoting overall societal welfare). In reality, the state served quite a different role, as we have already seen in the example of Rwanda - it was 'the most important instrument of accumulation of wealth and reproduction of a ruling class'⁸¹². But having allowed the ruling class to accumulate wealth and reproduce itself over time would hardly constitute the sorts of outcomes donors could use to claim 'success' vis-à-vis their interventions. Uvin has already analysed this process at work in Rwanda in the early nineties, when he talks of a 'development ideology' that the state promoted and to which international agencies subscribed:

[This] basically consists of an argument that the state's sole objective is the pursuit of economic development for the ... masses; as a result ... [everyone] interested in promoting development should work with the state to make that possible. This ideology legitimises the government's intrusive presence in all aspects of social life, and diverts attention from the very real differences

⁸¹⁰ Ibid., p13.

⁸¹¹ J. Ferguson, *The anti-politics machine: "development," depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).

⁸¹² Reyntjens, "Constitution-making in situations of extreme crisis: the case of Rwanda and Burundi.", p242.

that exist between different classes and social groups. In other words, it diverts attention from all things political, replacing them with a discourse of technicity and collective progress ... [This] discourse has come to serve as a powerful tool for Third World elites, in their dealings both with their own populations and the international system.⁸¹³

As Uvin illustrates, World Bank policy towards Rwanda in the early 1990s perpetuated the diversion of attention from 'the very real differences that exist between different classes and social groups',⁸¹⁴ thus lending implicit support to the agenda of the Rwandan ruling elite, but also allowing donors to better justify business as usual - shifting large sums of money to agents claimed to be committed to the uplift of society as a whole. This stratagem 'situates the World Bank [and the Rwandan state] in a technocratic realm above or outside of politics',⁸¹⁵ although 'this blindness to politics by project planners and managers does not make their political effects disappear; it just renders them unrecognised and undiscussed, to the pleasure of those who stand to benefit'⁸¹⁶. The discourse of state reconstruction itself, and the claims to technical expertise and scientific rationality embedded therein, require that politics be displaced. It entails a particular dualism in which economics and politics are rigidly separate and opposed; the former with rational and universal rules embodied in the market (an allegedly abstract and apolitical entity), the latter implicitly seen negatively, and excluded from discussion. The ideology of state reconstruction, intentionally or not, depoliticises the institutions of the state being constructed, the policies they issue, and the capacity with which those institutions are supposedly imbued. The state itself is no longer political, but an empty vessel providing certain technocratic functions. Such a discourse is a necessary intellectual backdrop to the authority claims advanced by donors, but precludes a *political* critique. As such, the discourse of state reconstruction can be deployed by elites to depoliticise what was from the start a deeply ideological project, in which the elites around Paul Kagame constructed society along their preferred lines. As long as donors persist in thinking of what happened in Rwanda after the genocide as the reconstruction of a bureaucratic state *outside* politics, rather than penetrated and structured by it, they

⁸¹³ Uvin, *Aiding violence : the development enterprise in Rwanda.*, p99-100.

⁸¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p43.

⁸¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p43.

⁸¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p155.

will be blind to why it works. Furthermore, it is precisely that blindness on the part of donors, international commentators, and NGOs that explains how Rwanda's new elites get away with it.

In summary, the World Bank's institutional assumptions and theoretical discourse stood in the way of its being able to understand the reality of Rwandan politics. The institutional dimension is crucial; I am not claiming World Bank policy makers are all of one mind, or unintelligent. That misses the point. Rather it is that the institutions of development, like any institutions, are structured such as to perpetuate certain forms of knowing, understanding and interpreting the world.⁸¹⁷ This is not the product of a particular group of people within the contemporary World Bank, but rather it is deeply entrenched in the institutional structure, as is evidenced by its longevity. It is indistinguishable from the World Bank ideology formed out of the Green Revolution in the 1970s which is so adroitly skewered by Gavin Williams:

[In World Bank discourse] the small farmer is not considered a possible initiator of agricultural development, but as a 'beneficiary'. Rural development is not the business of farmers. It is accomplished by the state, by international agencies and their experts, and sometimes by international agro-capital. It is seen as an administrative process, through which planners design and execute their strategies...

The World Bank's 'philosophy of agricultural development' is an ideology of benevolent technocracy. It treats the state as a machine, which serves the objectives of whichever group directs it, and not as a relation of production, which subjects the producers to the domination of their rulers. The technocrats, and the international experts who advise them, are the ghosts in the

⁸¹⁷ M. Douglas, *How Institutions Think* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986).

machine, costlessly and impersonally allocating resources in accordance with their criteria of economic rationality and social justice.⁸¹⁸

With this in mind, we can comprehend how the Bank took the reasons offered by the state for its policies at face value. For example, restrictions on rural-urban migration, which the Bank wanted to see abolished, were generously attributed to Habyarimana's desire to avoid the 'urban bias' characteristic of other developing countries.⁸¹⁹ Even on its own terms, this is an extraordinary piece of argument as migration, on the simplest assumptions, is a response to 'urban bias' in the policy of states.⁸²⁰ That the migration laws functioned as a mechanism of dictatorial social control was not mentioned. This blindness and credulity became the dominant orthodoxy regarding Rwandan politics. The strength of the Rwandan state and the 'well-ordered' nature of Rwandan aid made the administration of development projects easier, which helps to account for the exceptionally high levels of aid throughout this period. The World Bank, historically, has shown a marked preference for projects which were administered from the top, as they had the capacity to fund them, to relate to local project administrators, and to bring their expertise to bear on them.

b. Selectively appropriated liberal discourses

While individuals within donor agencies are not necessarily ignorant of the political fallout from their actions, they may choose only to 'see' or react to particular phenomena in tune with their broader prerogatives. Although donors in Rwanda are officially following a very similar line on both policy priorities and aid management mechanisms, differences in approach provide the government with considerable space for manoeuvre. Given Rwanda's status as one of the poorest countries in the world and its government's improvement in many areas of development and their progressive credentials vis-à-

⁸¹⁸ Williams, "The World Bank and the Peasant Problem."

⁸¹⁹ Khan, Ngweno, and Beeharry, "Rwanda: Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Growth.", p33.

⁸²⁰ Robert Bates, *States and markets in tropical Africa: The political basis of agricultural policy*, ed. Series on Social Choice and Political Economy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981).

vis areas like female representation, donors have remained largely supportive even in the face of signs of increasing authoritarianism and poor political governance.

Perhaps most obviously, the Rwandan government gains much credit through its administrative successes, and its ability to speak the language of development fluently. This developmental side is one which donors are very willing to engage with, especially those ‘progressive champions of change’ within the government who appear to be on a wavelength with international norms of development.⁸²¹ The government speaks the language of international development to great effect, appealing to the international community through its public trumpeting of neo-liberal economic policies (never mind who the privatised firms are being sold to) and the poverty reduction agenda, as well as superficially participatory procedures such as poverty assessments and the *Gacaca* courts. The extremely high levels of female representation in parliament, for example, gain Rwanda’s rulers huge amounts of credit, but cost the elite nothing (because it is more or less unimportant who fills the seats in parliament).⁸²² Likewise, the government has earned itself credit amongst the African and international community for wholeheartedly supporting the African Union and the African Peer Review Mechanism. This seems very similar to Uganda, where Museveni has given no more than he needs to keep donors on side, and uses the much trumpeted claims for Uganda’s HIV policies – in the early 1990s – to do so.

Rwanda’s elites also skilfully exploit selective tropes of Western liberal politics in such a way as to be able to present themselves as progressive leaders on the continent. The divergence with Uganda makes this difference in the rhetorical presentation of the regime to the outside world clear, and provides support for the claim that such differences make concrete differences for relations with donors. For example, Uganda was consumed by a particularly virulent surge of homophobia in late 2009, culminating in the attempted passage of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill which would have introduced the offence of ‘aggravated

⁸²¹ DfID, *Rwanda: Country Assistance Plan 2003 - 2006*, p6.

⁸²² Which is not to say that there are not many genuinely senior RPF women such as Rose Kabuye, Aloysia Inyumba, and Louise Mushikiwabo. It is merely that the important women in the Rwandan political system are not parliamentarians.

homosexuality' punishable by death.⁸²³ A global diplomatic outcry, including repeated threats to cancel aid eventually forced President Yoweri Museveni to promise to veto the bill, but not before lasting damage was done to Uganda's relations with donors across the board, and international reputation in general, particularly after the re-tabled bill was later passed and signed into law by President Museveni on February 24th 2014.⁸²⁴ Although Uganda continues to perform well on the technocratic measures of governance and development which are held to be key to donors,⁸²⁵ attempts to present Uganda as a donor darling or in the vanguard of an African Renaissance now lack credibility, and sound faintly embarrassing. The regime has lost much political capital the NRM methodically built through their HIV-AIDS policies, their continued crackdown on the Lord's Resistance Army, their progress on poverty reduction, and their military assistance in Somalia. In stark contrast, the moment the Western press (inaccurately) suggested that Rwanda may be tempted to pass a similar law, the Foreign Minister of Rwanda, Louise Mushikiwabo⁸²⁶ wrote an editorial for the *Guardian* rebuffing the allegations in the strongest possible terms. There is no reason to believe this article was written out of any deep sympathy for gay rights, or that life as a homosexual in Rwanda is much better than in Uganda (it remains a deeply conservative society where coming out is almost unheard of). The point, for Mushikiwabo, is that 'false stories in the western media...threatened investment in the region'.⁸²⁷ The professionalism and astuteness of the operation (a rapid response comment piece by an extremely senior government minister in a liberal British newspaper which received wide coverage on the internet) indicates the extent to which, for the RPF, the management of Rwanda's image as a progressive state is a central part of government strategy.

Although this is one small example, it is by no means the only one. One of the clearest tropes to have seeped into common knowledge about Rwanda is that 'the Rwandan government is good on women's issues'. There is an extensive literature on gender in post-genocidal Rwanda.⁸²⁸ Suffice to say, much of it is

⁸²³ It has since been passed, by at the time of writing it remains ambiguous whether or not Museveni will bow again to donor pressure and veto the bill.

⁸²⁴ Interviews UG6 and UG15.

⁸²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁶ Louise Mushikiwabo, "Africa needs responsible reporting: false stories in the western media that Rwanda planned to criminalise homosexuality threatened investment in the region," *The Guardian* 2010, 24 January.

⁸²⁷ *Ibid.*, byline.

⁸²⁸ It is far too large to review here, but the tip of the iceberg would include Jennie E. Burnet, "Gender Balance and the Meanings of Women in Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda," *African Affairs* 107, no. 428 (2008); Jennie E. Burnet,

extremely sceptical, pointing to gaps between laws and implementation, little to no change in legislative outputs despite the high numbers of female parliamentarians, a tokenistic (if not dismissive) relationship with gender-orientated civil society organisations, and so on. My point is not that we should cynically write off all of these policies, nor that the Rwandan government has no interest in the rights of women (on balance, most authors conclude that it seems likely that it genuinely does).⁸²⁹ My point is rather that it is important to recognise that gender mainstreaming policy in Rwanda is often put in place for an international audience, and has an outward-facing character. Regardless of whether or not women in Parliament (or, indeed, *anyone* in Parliament) have any power, being able to point to high levels of female representation is a vital part of the relentless marketing of the Rwandan government internationally as one which shares totemic liberal commitments (such as gender equality) with the West. In July 2011,⁸³⁰ various members of the Rwandan elite found time to demonstrate their commitment to gender equality to an international audience. In Musanze, the military hosted a two-week training session for officers from across Africa, Asia, and the Americas at the Rwanda Peace Academy to teach them about initiatives to fight gender-based violence⁸³¹ – it was at the 2008 iteration of this conference that Lt. Gen. James Kayonga, then Army Chief of Staff, issued a much publicised call for ‘more women at every single level of peacekeeping’⁸³². Back in Kigali, John Rwigombwa, the Minister of Finance, hosted a three-day ‘global high-level meeting’ with the theme ‘Increasing Accountability and Development Effectiveness through Gender Responsive Planning and Budgeting’.⁸³³ The *New Times* helpfully had a big editorial while the leaders were in town calling for a ‘militantly feminist’ RPF.⁸³⁴ One week later Paul Kagame was the keynote speaker at a conference on ‘Women in Business’ in Arusha where he rhetorically called on the

"Women Have Found Respect: Gender Quotas, Symbolic Representation, and Female Empowerment in Rwanda," *Politics & Gender* 7, no. 03 (2011); Elizabeth Powley, "Strengthening Governance: the Role of Women in Rwanda's Transition," in *Women Waging Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Hunt Alternatives, 2003); Timothy Longman, "Rwanda: achieving equality or serving an authoritarian state?," in *Women in African Parliaments*, ed. Hannah Evelyn Britton and Gretchen Bauer (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006); Claire Devlin and Robert Elgie, "The Effect of Increased Women's Representation in Parliament: The Case of Rwanda," *Parliamentary Affairs* 61, no. 2 (2008); Elizabeth Daley, Rachel Dore-Weeks, and Claudine Umuhoza, "Ahead of the game: land tenure reform in Rwanda and the process of securing women's land rights," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 4, no. 1 (2010).

⁸²⁹ Cf. Burnet, "Gender Balance and the Meanings of Women in Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda," or Devlin and Elgie, "The Effect of Increased Women's Representation in Parliament: The Case of Rwanda."

⁸³⁰ This month was picked at random, and is not unrepresentative of the intensity of organised activity of this sort

⁸³¹ Bosco R Asimwe, "Country Commended for Anti-GBV Campaign," *The New Times* 2011, 27th July.

⁸³² Minadef, "Press Release: Kigali Conference Calls for More Women at all Levels of Peacekeeping Operations," ed. Ministry of Defence (Kigali 2008).

⁸³³ Edwin Musoni, "Minister Urges Govts to Increase Gender Budget," *The New Times* 2011, 27th July; Edmund Kagire, "Country to Host Global Meet on Gender Responsive Budgeting," *The New Times* 2011, 24th July.

⁸³⁴ Sunny Ntayombya, "I'm Calling for a Militantly Feminist RPF," *The New Times* 2011, 24th July.

leader of the world to enlist more women leaders in the march towards empowerment, development, and prosperity.⁸³⁵

There are other cases: Rwanda's globetrotting commitment to green development and eco-anything, the carefully modulated liberal internationalist rhetoric surrounding the presence of their troops in Darfur, the liberalisation of rural markets, and so on. These are not 'unreal' policies without impacts or their own independent explanatory logics, but none of that undermines the central point here, which is that the ability of the Rwandan state to present these policies as part of a package of liberal, Western governance to the West, and, further, to promulgate this as the dominant narrative about Rwanda, gives donor departments wiggle room to occlude the more embarrassing side of Rwanda, and weakens the pro-democracy pressure from constituencies in the West which Levitsky and Way takes to be more or less invariable. The eloquent and ubiquitous colonisation of liberal discourses concerning what are – at most – secondary issues to the RPF (homosexuality, gender, environmentalism) crowds out alternate narratives, and in so doing, grants the Rwandan elite more autonomy with regards to what is, for them, primary: the entrenchment of politics in Rwanda in its current form, and the survival of the regime.

c. Liberation discourses

The histories of the RPF, Rwanda and the region provides a further framework through which the wider world interprets the nature of the regime, its policy positions, and how it relates to donors. One of the most striking aspects of Rwandan society is the ubiquitous manner in which everyday events, processes and social relations are spontaneously and consistently interpreted and acted upon with reference to the past as charter and blueprint. These histories are didactic, and serve to rationalise behaviour, legitimate institutions or exclude certain voices from consideration.⁸³⁶ For those donors and international commentators engaging with Rwanda for the first time after 1994, it was – with honourable exceptions –

⁸³⁵ Zephania Ubwani, "Harness Women Potential, EAC urged," *The Citizen* 2011, 8th August.

⁸³⁶ Newbury and Newbury, "A Catholic Mass in Kigali: Contested Views of the Genocide and Ethnicity in Rwanda."; Catharine Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda," *Africa Today* 47, no. 1 (1998).

the RPF narrative that became canonical. This narrative goes far beyond the retelling of events, to a recasting of them in moral terms. It is what Liisa Malkki called ‘mythico-history’,⁸³⁷ which is not to say that these histories are *made up*, but that such history is mythical in the sense that it is concerned with the *ordering* of social and political categories in order to give them moral force. Based on these narratives, the government can be discursively constructed as a progressive, developmental state overcoming the odds to place Rwanda on a path to sustainable long-term prosperity, and developmental modernity. Donors are framed as partners in this process.

In this discursive presentation of modern Rwanda, spokesmen for the RPF endlessly remind their audiences of their origins as a liberation movement, fighting for the right of return to Rwanda of refugees from sporadic ethnic pogroms. The transformation of this armed insurgency movement into a legitimate government is not unique within Africa, and laying claim to this status grants governments a degree of leeway which might not otherwise be granted them. Dorman⁸³⁸ outlines particular characteristics of ‘post-liberation’ states, into which category post-1994 Rwanda falls. The ‘new leaders’ at the helm of these states have international legitimacy and support. At the same time, clampdowns on political freedom are not unexpected. Indeed, Dorman states that ‘when confronted with conditions of political crisis and vulnerability, leaders’ concerns with control take precedence over either liberation or democracy, leading to increasingly authoritarian and exclusivist politics’.⁸³⁹ It is not material to the point at hand whether or not there is a substantive distinction between ‘liberated’ and ‘non-liberated’ states, and I certainly do not want to argue that Rwanda was not liberated, but rather that these discursive presentations legitimate forms of rule that would not be acceptable in other contexts. RPF discourse endlessly returns to 1994, and reads every event in post-genocidal Rwanda through the matrix of the genocide. Insofar as donors accept the narrative of Rwanda as permanently ‘post-liberation’, its leaders may claim the free rein such status grants.

⁸³⁷ Malkki, *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania*.

⁸³⁸ Sara Rich Dorman, "Post-liberation Politics in Africa: examining the political legacy of struggle," *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 6 (2006).

⁸³⁹ *Ibid.*, p1086.

This relentless reiteration of the genocide narrative has a further effect in opening up policy space for the government: by precluding criticism. Many observers have alleged that the government is adept at using its 'genocide credit' to manipulate the international community.⁸⁴⁰ This charge is vigorously denied by government officials, and whilst intentionality is difficult to prove, it is nonetheless true that the legacy of the genocide infuses the policy process. Policy documents and government rhetoric are all set in the context of the consequences of the genocide and, if anything, this influential usage of the genocide has increased over time. Policy documents from 1994 to 1996 tend to refer only to the 'tragic events' of 1994,⁸⁴¹ whereas there is a real discourse built around the genocide by 2004 at the latest. This discourse imbues the government with the moral authority to govern the country on the back of its military victory, and to demand the support of the international community which let the country down so badly. Disappointment at the levels of aid which flowed to Rwanda after the genocide, and at the criticisms levelled at the new regime, led to a hardening of this discourse to the extent that 'Rwanda's new leaders began to argue that no one outside Rwanda should have the right to criticise the regime'.⁸⁴² The reluctance of donors to forcefully apply conditions to aid and to engage in confrontational dialogue with the government is often put down to the guilt felt by the international community which is reinforced by endless reminders of that guilt from the Rwandan government. In another context, that of the military action in the Kivus, Paul Kagame did candidly comment that the RPF 'used communication and information warfare better than anyone. We have found a new way of doing things',⁸⁴³ which appears to imply a conscious manipulation of discourse.

Insofar as other elements of history are mentioned at all, it is in extremely reductive terms, as complex historical realities are truncated into easily digested soundbites. The vision of pre-colonial Rwanda pushed by Maquet and the other *Pères Blancs* is regurgitated in the omnipresent telling of the 'story of the ten cows'. The complex evolution of *Ubutwita* patron-client relations from agricultural relationships, and how

⁸⁴⁰ Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda: conflict, survival and disinformation in the late twentieth century*; Oomen, "Donor-Driven Justice and its Discontents: The Case of Rwanda."

⁸⁴¹ Interview RW19.

⁸⁴² Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda: conflict, survival and disinformation in the late twentieth century.*, p159.

⁸⁴³ IRIN-CEA, "Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes Region," (Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 1996).

Belgian rule crystallised some elements whilst dropping others, comprehensively documented in *The Cohesion of Oppression*,⁸⁴⁴ is rewritten into an idealised pre-colonial period, ruptured by the European imposition of arbitrary and rigid ethnic boundaries (i.e. everyone with ten cows became a Tutsi, everyone with less became a Hutu). The point of this account of history is to reinforce European responsibility for the Rwanda crisis, and legitimate a discourse of ethnic amnesia within Rwanda. This serves an obvious function; if ethnicity is fictive, Tutsification is impossible, and anyone who disagrees can easily be labelled an ethnic essentialist. Similarly, the complex story of the multiple Banyamulenge migrations over the course of the last two centuries is reduced to the repeated trumpeting of the ties between the Tutsi of Rwanda with various groups in the Eastern DRC, thus legitimating intervention. To justify the presence of the RPA in the Kivus, President Bizimungu showed the media a map taken from Abbé Alexis Kagame's *Un abrégé de l'histoire du Rwanda*.⁸⁴⁵ This map projected an image of homogeneity by portraying a 'Greater Rwanda' existing at the end of the nineteenth century, which the Belgians had then (it was suggested) artificially amputated. Never mind that the modern European framework of central states with fixed boundaries was ill-attuned to nineteenth century realities:⁸⁴⁶ it was a simple, easy to understand story which proceeded to resurface in the media and aid reports.⁸⁴⁷ There is no incoherence in the RPF's mixing of this amnesia with the public commitment to consociational ethnic parity; the careful mixing of ethnicities at the top tiers of formal government is not stipulated by law, and presented to the world as arrived at by serendipitous fate – as such it reinforces the public image of the RPF as benevolently disinterested in ethnic labels.

Conclusion

The reason why all of this *works* is that the Rwandan elite has been able, at every stage of the way, to operationalise the practices, discourses, and institution of those states and agencies trying to exert

⁸⁴⁴ Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960*.

⁸⁴⁵ Kagame, *Un abrégé de l'ethno-histoire du Rwanda de 1853 à 1972 (Vol. II)*.

⁸⁴⁶ Indeed, this particular border region during this particular period has been dealt with by two of Rwanda's greatest historians: Newbury, *Kings and Clans: Ijwi Island and the Lake Kivu Rift, 1780-1840*. And Vansina, *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom*.

⁸⁴⁷ See the introduction of Hilsum, "Reporting Rwanda: The Media and the Aid Agencies." and the chapter on 'International Media Coverage' in A. Thompson, *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide* (London: Pluto, 2007).

conditionality upon them in such a way as to maximise their agency within those relations of dependence. In so doing, they rupture Levitsky and Way's generally robust correlation between high linkage and substantive democratisation. This is only possible through the extremely skilful way in which the RPF have played the politics of extraversion, but the point goes beyond the claim that the RPF are particularly wily (although they are): the RPF are practicing a particular form of extraversion with effects beyond the aspirations of most African elites. Nor is this simply to say that the RPF deploy depoliticising discourses in the manner described by Ferguson in *The Anti-Politics Machine*: many of these discourses – the rhetoric of post-liberation, the mythico-history, the mimetic liberalism – are obviously and self-consciously political. Finally, my point is not that all and any discourses contain within them the possibility of resistance as well as power, and that there are ways to evade or undermine ostensibly totalising statist practices. The RPF aren't attempting to evade the influence of donors – rather their strategy simultaneously relies on a wholehearted embrace with the West, but refuses to bend on a core set of non-negotiable policies which are anathema to precisely those donors. This is only possible if those states are 'blinded', as they have been here, through the deployment of their own bureaucratic routines, evaluation mechanisms, and thinking: frames and conceptual schema which occlude those aspects of the political which the donors would find unpalatable.

Chapter Six: Navigation without Seamanship

People begin realizing the new style of life when they get new iron houses.

Press Release, Ministry of Defence

The state is not the reality which stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is.

Philip Abrams⁸⁴⁸

Until this chapter the focus of this thesis has been what Ralph Miliband described as ‘the state-system’:⁸⁴⁹ that complex of institutions and actors involved in the management of domination. That story is incomplete, for the simple reason that what supplies their coherence, purpose, independence, common interest and internal morality qua *state* (as opposed to any other set of actors – economic, criminal, patriarchal, or whatever - which manage domination) is the ideological projection of the state. Following Abrams,⁸⁵⁰ I want to study not just the state as a complex of more-or-less coercive institutions and the elites which command them (the object of the previous four chapters), but also as a ‘not an object akin to the human ear...nor even an object akin to human marriage... [but] a third order-object, an ideological project’.⁸⁵¹ The particular function of this ideology, as with all, is to represent political and economic domination in ways that legitimate a particular set of political arrangements, in this case subjection. In particular, [a] to present the state as the sole and unified expression of the common interest cleanly dissociated from all sectional interests and structures – class, language, ethnicity, and so forth – [b] to present the state as indispensable to certain socially agreed objectives, and [c] justify certain actions taken

⁸⁴⁸ Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State.", p58.

⁸⁴⁹ R. Miliband, *The state in capitalist society* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1969).

⁸⁵⁰ Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State."

⁸⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p79.

by ‘state actors’ in the pursuance of those goals, and exclude others. It is telling that in the Rwandan context, those sympathetic to the regime will present all and any successes within Rwanda as directly attributable to the state, if not the sainted personage of Paul Kagame himself, and critics of the regime behave in precisely the same way. What unites both the friends and enemies of the current Rwandan regime is that they approach the state as theologians: God as prime mover and sole cause of everything is replaced by the omnipotent lawgiver.⁸⁵² It is my hope that the past chapters have successfully unmasked the Rwandan state to the degree that it should be clear that these myths are straightforwardly false: the Rwandan state system is not a unified actor which hovers over and outside Rwandan society as some disinterested expression of the common interest, nor is the state – let alone the RPF or Paul Kagame – the sole explanation of Rwanda’s current condition (valorised or lamented). As such, the ideological projection of stateness in Rwanda needs to be unpacked.

Firstly, the Rwandan ‘state-idea’, born in the refugee camps of Uganda, US Military bases, and the campuses of assorted universities, should be understood as *bricolage*; reimagined and mythologised visions of an authentically traditional Rwanda jostle alongside the revolutionary ideology of Yoweri Museveni’s NRM and a high modernist vision of Singapore, Silicon Valley, and Shanghai, stitched together and regurgitated in the language of the Washington Consensus and McKinsey. This political imaginary is urban, statist, illiberal, and extraordinarily ambitious: it amounts to a totalising project aimed not just at the high-speed transformation of the state and economy, but also at re-engineering the souls of ‘new Rwandans’ that will populate the Singapore of Central Africa. The magpie nature of RPF ideology should not be confused with an absence of vision (or merely playing to various galleries at various points), but as a substantive (if fragmented and inchoate) discourse which serves to explain how the Rwandan state can seem, at times, to be both modern and traditional, liberal and autocratic, or pluralist and aristocratic.

The genealogy of this vision can be traced. It is of importance to understand how legitimisation is achieved, particularly because of the manifest failure of so many attempts at the ideological projection of the

⁸⁵² Schmitt, *Political theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty*.

legitimate state in Rwanda's neighbourhood. This is not merely an exercise in the historical sociology of these ideas, but also explaining how this patchwork coheres for those for whom this is the background intellectual framework. Broadly, I want to argue that this distinct vision is a product of the tension within an elite caught by the necessity of deploying different (and occasionally mutually exclusive) discourses of legitimation, linked to different ambitions for Rwanda, held by different sections of the elite.

Secondly, the policy and institutional choices of the elite can and should be interpreted in the light of this vision, rather than (which is more common) explaining all acts of the Rwandan government with reference to the messianic foresight or diabolical evil of the person Paul Kagame. Much of what the Rwandan elite does looks 'odd' set against the theoretical literature about regime choice in general. For example, Beatriz Magaloni and Ruth Kricheli, in their summary of the literature on one-party rule, argue that

If...a minority has a significant advantage in access to military resources or economic resources to fund violence, this minority might be able to dominate and rule by fear and terror.⁸⁵³

Nobody could seriously deny that the RPF elite in 1994 match this description in terms of their sociological narrowness and military advantage. However, the current Rwandan political system, as this thesis has repeatedly argued, is very much more than an order built on fear and terror. Similarly, this chapter sets itself against accounts of the Rwandan regime's policy choices which purport to explain said choices on the grounds that they increased the robustness, durability, or strength of the regime. The fact that a particular political configuration increases the survival prospects of a regime is no guarantee, historically speaking, that dictators will adopt it, nor is it true to claim that such configurations emerge

⁸⁵³ B. Magaloni and R. Kricheli, "Political Order and One-Party Rule," *Annual Review of Political Science* 13(2010), p132.

because they serve these functions. In John Elster's terminology,⁸⁵⁴ these are functionalist accounts which are logically unrelated to the explanation of the *causes* of the selection of the political arrangements of contemporary Rwanda. For causes, we need to consider the ideology behind the choices of Rwanda's state-builders. Moreover, understanding this political project gives us a much more fruitful conception of what it means to say that 'Rwanda *works*', it is necessary to a more sober and less polemical normative assessment of Rwanda, and is key in speculating on the likely future of the region.

Thirdly, the state-idea sets the terms of politics for a much wider set of actors. As Navaro-Yashin points out in the context of the Turkish public sphere,⁸⁵⁵ attempts to deconstruct and critique the state have the power to reproduce statist identities, beliefs, and frameworks. Much the same can be said of 'civil society' in Rwanda. Social action is configured and structured by the terms set by this ideological projection. The state-idea percolates into the vicious criticism of genocide deniers, but also the homilies of donor professionals, the commentary of even some of the best reportage, and the mouths of academics themselves. The willingness of commentators such as Susan Thompson,⁸⁵⁶ Carina Terksakian,⁸⁵⁷ and Filip Reyntjens⁸⁵⁸ to attribute *any* misdeed within Rwanda to the grand plan of Kagame (usually painted as a diabolical cross between Josef Mengele and Eve Harrington) without even considering the possibilities of independent action on the part of anyone outside the Presidency, reactive and uncertain attempts to grapple with a rapidly changing situation, or just sheer incompetence. Once unmasked, this seems ridiculous, but it speaks to the ubiquity and depth of the success of this state projection that even the harshest critics cannot escape it.

⁸⁵⁴ John Elster, "Marxism, Functionalism, and Game-Theory: the Case for Methodological Individualism," *Theory and Society* 11(1982).

⁸⁵⁵ Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the state : secularism and public life in Turkey*.

⁸⁵⁶ Thompson, "Resisting Reconciliation: State Power and Everyday Life in Post-Genocide Rwanda."

⁸⁵⁷ Tertsakian, C. (2011). "'All Rwandans Are Afraid of Being Arrested One Day': Prisoners Past, Present and Future." Remaking Rwanda. State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence. The University of Wisconsin Press. London, England: 210-222.

⁸⁵⁸ Filip Reyntjens, "Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world: Governance in post-genocide Rwanda," *African Affairs* 110, no. 438 (2011).

This chapter will proceed in three parts: firstly, I will outline what I think are the central background concerns animating the Rwandan state-idea as expressed in public by the political elite. I will then proceed to outline how the new Rwanda is imagined in the concrete context most important to the regime: that of the urban transformation of Kigali. Thirdly, I will outline the ideological reconfiguration of that part of Rwanda the RPF deems most hostile to its vision: that of the rural (predominantly Hutu) peasantry.

My primary data is the statements, laws and policy documents produced by the government, and their reiteration by the largely compliant internal media. As my interest here is with the state as idea, I do not need to worry about the sincerity or accuracy of these visions, but rather how these imaginaries are constructed in public space, and with what consequences. Similarly, I am not contending that this ideological projection is entirely coherent, or uncritically and totally accepted by all Rwandans: the mask does slip, and a few such moments will be indicated.

Part One: Independence, Development, Unity

The key document encapsulating the RPF's vision for Rwanda, and a central archive from which to extract what is distinctive about the Rwandan state-idea, is 'Vision 2020', an all-encompassing development plan promulgated in July 2000. This document is hugely ambitious in its scale, pace, and comprehensiveness: it aims 'to transform Rwanda's economy into a middle income country (per capita income of about 900 USD per year, from 290 USD [at the time of publication]'. This, as Rwanda's rulers are well aware, requires an average growth of over 7% for 20 years – an achievement surpassing that of China in recent history (let alone any of their continental contemporaries). This stated commitment has not budged an iota even in the face of dramatically rising food and petrol prices.⁸⁵⁹ Vision 2020 is ubiquitous in the mouths of politicians, donor professionals, and so on, and is referenced in the names of Kigali's bars, hairdressers, and other small businesses.

⁸⁵⁹ B Namata, "Rwanda targets 7pc growth despite inflation," *The East Africa* 2011, 7th August.

This cannot be discounted as a passive enacting of the priorities of the international community, or merely the tokenistic reiteration of what the Rwandans think donors want to hear. Donor professionals repeatedly remark that, in contrast to PRSP drafting meetings they have attended in almost any other country, their Rwandan counterparts turn up to meetings with concrete, developed ideas.⁸⁶⁰ Four aspects of Vision 2020 stand out as relevant here:

Firstly, Vision 2020 is statist *and* requires considerable changes in how ordinary citizens behave. The statist component is obvious: an autonomous, strong state apparatus is envisioned as necessary to bring about certain key aspects of the plan: the railway network,⁸⁶¹ the new airport at Bugesera,⁸⁶² a laptop for every child,⁸⁶³ are conceived of as delivered *for* Rwandans *by* the state. But Vision 2020 also envisages transformation in the ordinary behaviour of citizens: farmers are to independently begin cash cropping to raise exports, but to an extraordinarily detailed central government plan,⁸⁶⁴ 700,000 men are to voluntarily undergo vasectomies to control population over a three year period,⁸⁶⁵ *everyone* is to learn English. Vision 2020 is not a statement of the government's plan for Rwanda, but a much more expansive document aimed at the mobilisation of an entire society, in which the state is conceived of as the only entity capable of coordinating the efforts of normal Rwandans.

Secondly, the developmental story told in Vision 2020 is one in which Rwanda leap-frogs from peasant farmland to Silicon Valley. The plan uncritically operates with the teleological model of human progress through sequential stages of economic development common to any number of similar development programmes (many of which could have been written as if social science had come to a halt with the

⁸⁶⁰ Interview RW27.

⁸⁶¹ R Mukombozi, "Kagame Meets Railway Expert," *The New Times* 2007, 25th April.

⁸⁶² B Hitimana, "Rwanda's Bugesera Airport Plans Gathering Speed," *East African Business Week* 2011, 24th July; Edwin Musoni, "Bugesera Airport to Cost RwF 200 Billion," *The New Times* 2009, 8th August.

⁸⁶³ N. Wadhams, "Can One Laptop per Child Transform Rwanda's Economy?," *Time*, 18th June 2010.

⁸⁶⁴ G. Majyambere, "Agriculture Budget Increased by Five Percent," *The New Times* 2011, 11th May; Minagri, "Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture - Phase II," (Kigali2009).

⁸⁶⁵ Edwin Musoni, "700,000 Men Expected to Undergo Vasectomy," *New Times* 2011, 2nd February.

modernisation theorists of the 1960s).⁸⁶⁶ The Rwandan grand plan is to bypass the ‘industrialisation phase’ entirely, and proceed directly to a ICT-literate, ‘knowledge-based’, service economy. This vision for a new Rwanda involves doing something that, as far as the Rwandans that wrote it are concerned, has never been done before. The level of self-belief that the Rwandan elites hold, i.e. that their abilities are sufficiently exceptional to change anything they want to (including the ‘iron laws’ of development), is truly exceptional. The presentation here is that development in Rwanda means *escaping* history: if it is accepted that development is a *task* rather than an unfolding process, and one requiring a *deus ex machina* at that, then the business of justifying the preponderant role of the government in those spheres of activity defined as ‘developmental’ (i.e. all of them) is that much easier.

Thirdly, huge stress is placed throughout Vision 2020 on a ‘united Rwanda’. What this term stands for in the RPF narrative is the claim that the new and authentic Rwanda has replaced an old and foreign (i.e. Belgian-inspired) Rwanda. The latter involved a construction of ethnic difference as real, important, and justifying political exclusion (up to and including a genocide), whilst the former involves the reassertion of the ‘traditional’ understanding of Rwandans as undivided, if not indivisible. This is not just another example of where Vision 2020 requires not just actions of the state, but also reconstructs what it means to be a Rwandan citizen. On the one hand, the integration of ethnicity, reconciliation, and historical memory with the rest of Vision 2020 places the rest of the plan within a moralised framework in which macro-economic policy (for example) is linked to shaking off the scourge of ‘genocide ideology’. On the other, state action within this paradigm is not just about development or justice, but about recovering the manifest destiny of ‘true’ Rwanda *from* a populace thoroughly corrupted by genocidal programming. Because the populace of Rwanda has been so thoroughly corrupted, the business of reprogramming Rwanda must be conducted by the state: Rwandanness is defined and defended by the state *against* the people in this inversion of the usual tropes of autochthony. Further to this, Vision 2020 cannot be satisfied by just altering the behaviour of their citizens. To the extent that ordinary Rwandans were ‘corrupted’ by the ideological poison of Habyarimana-era Hutu supremacism, the plan requires the re-

⁸⁶⁶ i.e. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960).

ordering of the internal moral order of every Rwandan citizen. Vision 2020 recognises that the appropriate ‘imagined community’ does not exist, and sets about trying to create it – this is not to say that the Rwandan state is committed to totalitarianism, but that at the very least trying to effect this alongside other commitments of the Rwandan state (such as, to liberal democracy) is tricky, and explains much of how fraught and ambivalent Rwandan policy seems to be when it faces conflicts on these issues.

The final core component of this vision is independence. This elite’s understanding of their recent history is one in which they, *alone*, fought a racist state worse than apartheid South Africa, halted a genocide, and brought the perpetrators to justice, as the international community vacillated whilst mouthing pretty phrases (to say nothing of removing Mobutu, putting troops in Darfur, etc, etc, etc). They don’t expect much from this community (except what some have cynically termed ‘guilt monies’), and they certainly do not feel like they owe the donors anything. As such, aid dependence is both annoying, and deeply shameful. Unlike many politicians for whom reducing aid dependence is something to gesture at in order to make the donors feel better, in Rwanda the desire to not have to take admonishments from anyone seems very real. This independence has a double sense: for those in the ‘struggle generation’ who fought the FAR in the civil war, those Rwandans that were resident in the country at that point are also seen to have been passively complicit in the genocidal state of the MRND. This does not just extend to the Hutu peasantry: much as holocaust survivors migrating to Israel in the ‘50s were viewed with a degree of suspicion by Sabras, *anyone* within the country who survived, irrespective of their ethnicity or social status, is compromised by virtue of their survival. The independence of the new Rwanda needs to be secured both from without and within: the Rwandan state is not projected as gatekeeper, but as closed circuit.

Part Two: The Singapore Delusion and Urban Transformation

Vision 2020 includes the requirement that all towns and larger urban settlements produce ‘master-plans’. Many of these documents exist, and speak to the regime’s insistence that large scale change and progress

can only be brought about by central, state-led planning. In many cases their contents cannot even be fully described by the people that wrote them,⁸⁶⁷ which illustrates their status as documents more to do with the promotion of a particular political discourse than anything else. Not so the plan for Kigali. Perhaps unsurprisingly for an elite which largely grew up outside Rwanda and then settled immediately in the capital upon their return, the plan for Kigali has a level of detail and reality not found in other such documents. The ‘Masterplan for Kigali’ is so prominent, indeed, that the special DVD explaining it can be found almost anywhere, and highlights have been serialised on YouTube.

Much of the plan is pure Corbusier. A shining, modern city is to take the place of the clutter and jumble of the present. Execution is to be top-down: Kigali is to be re-planned from a central perspective, where the untidy products of organic growth are to be brushed aside in favour of a rational, clean, modern metropolis operating under the direction of a single grand design (the term ‘Masterplan’ is deployed without a trace of irony). The High-Modernism does not stop there: Kigali is to be zoned. A diplomatic quarter has been assigned to Gisozi, much to the chagrin of Embassies that have spent considerable amounts of money on buildings in Kacyiru, Remera, and elsewhere. NGOs have been advised that a new, central complex is being planned to house them, and that their current dispersion across Kigali in large old residential houses is no longer appropriate.⁸⁶⁸ The houses in the valley south of Kiyovu have been totally obliterated to build more skyscrapers. The driving motivation often appears to be as much visual as it is with the fetish for rational organisation; the Kigali Tower (a gleaming, just built totem of the new modern Rwanda) is fully flood-lit every night. This is in a city with occasional blackouts, and only two floors of the building have thus far been occupied. The French Cultural Centre, shortly to re-open, has been privately advised that, as the site they occupy is in Mumuji, any new building really should include more storeys. Behind all of this lurks the fundamental premiss: if you want a modern city, you must accept the terms of the plan, and in so doing, the authority of the state to regulate these matters.

⁸⁶⁷ Alleged in interview RW24. Supported by my sense of interviews RW6, RW12, and RW30.

⁸⁶⁸ Interview RW27.

This High-Modernist vision is informed by more than vague desire for ‘rational organisation’ and coveting the appearance of modernity. Two specific places (or, rather, mythologised images of them) inform the elites thinking in this area: Rwandan elites do not turn to the usual models of American or European modernity to fill out their plans, but Singapore, and (to a lesser extent) Switzerland. These two countries are ubiquitously cited as aspirational models for Rwanda. Aside from the simplest aspects in which they fit the description as a Rwandan development model – they are small, and they are successful – they are discursively deployed very differently.

The comparison made between Rwanda and Singapore – never far away in any conversation about Rwanda’s development with a government official – is about ICT, banking, and the service sector. Its status as a small but phenomenally effective autocracy in a dangerous neighbourhood cannot be lost on Rwandan policy makers, but its explicit discursive purpose is as an economic model. This commitment often manifests itself in somewhat bizarre ways; every child in Rwanda is to be given a laptop (and some parents have been ordered overnight to find money to pay for them);⁸⁶⁹ an airport is to be built in Bugesera (outside Kigali) which is to magically become a hub for the region. How this could happen, in the absence of a successful airline, or any obvious reasons for Ethiopian or Kenyan Airlines to relocate from their current hubs, is unclear. Indeed, the government has raised airport fees in order to raise funds for this scheme, making Kigali airport even less desirable as a location. Indeed, there is now some suggestion that the government is quietly dialling things back to save face.⁸⁷⁰ There will be an Oyster card system for Kigali’s buses (if true, this would be the only card many of Kigali’s bus users own apart from their ID card).⁸⁷¹ Rwanda announced it was to make the switch to digital television by December 2011,⁸⁷² and a national fiber-optic network (built with Korean investment and technology) shortly after that.⁸⁷³ These deadlines have not been met, but in a wonderfully Orwellian moment, the newspaper article in

⁸⁶⁹ Interview RW12.

⁸⁷⁰ B Namata, "Rwanda to revise budget for proposed Bugesera airport," *The East African* 2011, 7th August.

⁸⁷¹ EABW, "Passengers in Kigali to use smart cards," *East African Business Week* 2011, 6th August.

⁸⁷² NewTimes, "Shift to Digital Broadcasting on Track," *The New Times* 2011, 5th August.

⁸⁷³ Yoav Cerralbo, "KISA makes Rwanda IT hub for East Africa," *The Korea Herald* 2011, 7th August.

January 2014 announcing a generous ‘extension’ of the digital registration period also congratulates the government on the successful implementation of the trial ‘on schedule’ (in 2013).⁸⁷⁴

This unceasing talk of Singapore does not appear to equate to a deep, reflective understanding of the reasons underpinning Singapore’s success (or, indeed, whether or not it is comparable with Rwanda in any sense). I have yet to interview a government minister or agency chief who actually evinces much by way of a deep familiarity with the historical development of Singapore,⁸⁷⁵ and (in another High Modernist moment) all appear convinced that they can literally ‘just build it’ *ab initio*. There are anecdotes of schools being given computers before they were electrified, fiber-optic cables being bought and laid down only to be found to be the wrong type to connect to the rest of the network, and so on. Whilst these stories usually cannot be verified, they speak to deeper truths in the manner urban legends do in any society: the widespread sense of an unreal plan coming apart when confronted with the mundanities of implementation. The proposals to make Rwanda a regional leader in banking, similarly, seem more to do with theatre than substance. Rwandan banks are not large or familiar with the sophisticated techniques of modern banking, even by the underwhelming standards of East Africa: they are extremely small, don’t have much by way of liquidity, and a recent history of bad loans has left them exceedingly risk-averse (despite much pressure from the government to be otherwise). Nor do they appear to be much interested in changing this: the British High Commission recently ran an event with banks to explore ways to take advantage of the growing interest in carbon credits. It was a total failure: to quote one British official, ‘*it just didn’t compute for them*’⁸⁷⁶.

The Singapore illusion is dominant without being reflective: it is about being shiny, clean, organised, small, and *rich*, and all by the good grace of an effective (if sometimes ‘forceful’) state. It is telling that the oyster cards for the buses were announced simultaneously with a ban on ‘unnecessary hooting’.⁸⁷⁷ There

⁸⁷⁴ Dias Nyesiga, "Rwanda Extends Deadline for Digital TV Migration to July 31st," *The Rwanda Focus* 2014, January 15th.

⁸⁷⁵ In over four years of interviews.

⁸⁷⁶ Interview RW29.

⁸⁷⁷ In2eastafrika, "Kigali City bans unnecessary hooting," (2011, August 6th).

is no real attempt made to understand or mimic, but that doesn't mean that 'Singapore-as-imagined-utopia' is not nonetheless very powerful in explaining otherwise bizarre policy choices.

A similarly superficial construction of Switzerland plays a parallel role. Firstly, it evokes the image of a conflict-free haven of good governance which plays host to a cavalcade of assorted international do-goodery. In this vein, the Rwandan government is continually bidding to host (or organises themselves) any conference under the sun on conflict resolution, good governance, and the like. This is just one way in which they try and present themselves as (and may sometimes genuinely believe themselves to be, however much their neighbours would snort) neutral mediators for the region, or at least a peaceful island in the persistent instability of Central Africa. Rwanda has hosted large-scale conferences on women in business,⁸⁷⁸ peacekeeping in Somalia,⁸⁷⁹ hygiene and cleanliness,⁸⁸⁰ regional water sharing policies,⁸⁸¹ and an evangelical religious conclave⁸⁸² *in one fairly usual month* (August 2011). The policy has been so successful that it was picked out for special commendation by the World Bank⁸⁸³ at the Doing Business in Africa Conference held in March of 2011 (hosted, inevitably, in Kigali). This feeds back into the masterplan for Kigali: an inordinate number of the new buildings going up in Kigali are to be hotels and conference centres (most obviously the Kigali Conference Centre in Kacyiru, build to evoke the structure of the old King's Palace in Nyanza). Within the bracket of 4 to 5 star hotels alone the Serena and the Milles Colline are shortly to be joined by the New Century, the Hilton, and the Marriott. These cannot all be financially viable on current visitor numbers: the Top Tower (one of the larger, nicer hotels in Kacyiru) has an occupancy of 50%.⁸⁸⁴ This is fairly representative, and new hotels are still being built. It is not clear who is paying for all of this: the usual rumours about senior RPF figures owning the land, or the construction firms, and so on, attend all the new builds. However, the Marriott and the Hilton are (obviously) foreign-backed, so clearly the assessment of some is that the strategy has merit. Whether or

⁸⁷⁸ E. Kabeera, "Women Urged to Take Advantage of Regional Conference," *The New Times* 2011, 3rd August.

⁸⁷⁹ C. Kwizera, "Country to Host Conference on Peacekeeping in Somalia," *The New Times* 2011, 5th July.

⁸⁸⁰ C. Wanja, "Kenya wins continental handwashing competition," *Kenya Broadcasting Corporation* 2011, July 21st.

⁸⁸¹ E Kagire, "Kagame urges the region to invest in women," *The New Times* 2011, 6th August.

⁸⁸² G. Mugoya, "Kigali to Host International Religious Conference," *The New Times* 2011, 26th July.

⁸⁸³ W. H. Thome, "Kigali conference on Doing Business in Africa opens," *etn: global travel industry news* 2011, 17th March.

⁸⁸⁴ Interview RW27.

not it will work is less relevant here than what ideological role this endless flurry of activity speaks to: the Switzerland narrative, and the success of policy built on it, relies on the prior acceptance of Rwanda as a stable, peaceful island of competent governance. The corollary is that accepting this as a development narrative for Rwanda entails accepting security and stability as overwhelming concerns: concerns which reinforce the dominance and unquestionability of the state.

In general though, the High Modernist imagining of Singapore and Switzerland are more about an aesthetic than they are considered development policy. Even the most obvious questions about the images (a Switzerland without banks? A Singapore without a port?) go unanswered. The target of 1000 Megawatts in electrical capacity by 2017 (current measures put it at between 200 and 300) was privately described as ‘insane’ by one foreign diplomat⁸⁸⁵. Furthermore, if the surface of this aesthetic is scratched, it is often more about an almost Victorian (and classically Rwandan) conception of *order, cleanliness, and respectability* than it is about actual modernity: Rwandans will use smart cards on the buses, and they will not unnecessarily hoot. A fairly representative article in the *New Times* characterises the Umuganda (‘communal labour’) policy as follows:

Kagame said that he has travelled to different countries across the globe including Japan and the United States of America where authorities commend the concept [Umuganda] as a good idea to maintain a clean society... The President was addressing residents of Kiyovu in Nyarugenge District where he participated in activities to clean the community at Rugunga. He noted that the concept [propagates] a clean society.⁸⁸⁶

⁸⁸⁵ Interview RW27.

⁸⁸⁶ E Kagire, "Umuganda has Earned Country International Acclaim - Kagame," *The New Times* 2009, 29th March.

Many observers trumpet the 'big society' aspects of *Umuganda*:⁸⁸⁷ a democratic and participatory forum for the expression of local concerns, and their transformation into action. That is of course true to an extent, but *umudigudu* are also expected to use *umuganda* for the purpose of advancing national (i.e. state-directed) campaigns. What emerges as a persistent meme in those campaigns is the almost obsessive-compulsive need for things to be *clean*. Kigali's hosting of the AfricaSan Conference in July⁸⁸⁸ is reflective of a broader obsession with how many toilets Rwanda should have, how the streets are to be kept clean, and the breathless coverage accorded to the arrival of every new hygiene orientated NGO⁸⁸⁹. This is not to say that hygiene is unimportant, but that it has a prominence in Rwandan public discourse which is unusually high. With this in mind, these modernist grand plans can be seen for what they are: part of a piece with the more pedestrian social initiatives focussed on the sorts of goals one would normally associate more with a parish council than a thrusting developmentalist state. There are several examples of this sort of thing (more can inevitably be found as 'amusing' anecdotes in every gushing business op-ed written about Rwanda); the use of plastic bags is banned,⁸⁹⁰ as are street traders; public campaigns exist to encourage Rwandans to wear shoes in public (although ostensibly on hygiene grounds, the dirt this policy really aims to fight has more in common with not wearing a tie at the office); littering, begging, and drinking in public are 'strongly discouraged' by agents of the state ranging from the local police forces to cabinet ministers. It is part of this which creates the distinctive atmosphere of Kigali endlessly remarked upon by foreign visitors to Kigali.⁸⁹¹ What links the shining lights of the Kigali Tower to an anti-plastic bag drive is an understanding of modernity which still deems it somewhat infradig to smoke in the street, and getting drunk as something respectable Rwandans would never dream of doing in public.

Part Three: High Modernism in the Collines and Rural Transformation

⁸⁸⁷ Conservativehome to Conservativehome - CentreRight, 2008, <http://conservativehome.blogs.com/centreright/2008/08/umuganda.html>.

⁸⁸⁸ GatesFoundation, "Press Release: Gates Foundation Launches Effort to Reinvent the Toilet," (2011, July 19th).

⁸⁸⁹ For examples, see Edwin Musoni, "Country Needs 70,000 Latrines," *The New Times* 2011, 21st July; Edwin Musoni, "Sanitation Project Launches Chapter," *The New Times* 2011, 18th July.

⁸⁹⁰ BBC, "Rwanda gets tough on plastic bags," *British Broadcasting Corporation* 2006, 17th January.

⁸⁹¹ For a particularly embarrassingly gushing account, see Dambisa Moyo, "Diary," *Financial Times* 2009, 28th February.

It might be thought, given the urban character of the elite, that Rwanda could be grouped with that set of countries where the central state more or less voluntarily withdraws from the countryside and leaves rural populations to sink or swim on their own devices, much like the MPLA in Angola.⁸⁹² There is some 'urban bias' to the RPF (for example: a South African contractor spent much of 2010 completely redoing the road network in Kigali, which is hard to justify as a priority, given how good those roads were before, and the quality of the road network elsewhere),⁸⁹³ but to claim that the RPF's statebuilding agenda ignores rural Rwanda would be false. There is plenty in Vision 2020 concerning agriculture, and the countryside more generally. The expansion of the electricity grid, the network of health clinics, and education provision to the countryside suggest a level of concern which is more than tokenistic or solely concerned with co-opting potential opposition. Again, a distinct 'illiberal peace-building agenda' and related conception of the state inform policy in this area.

In contrast to Juvenal Habyarimana's MRND, whose rhetoric valorised the traditional peasant as paradigmatic Rwandan, backbone of society, and motor of development, the key motifs in contemporary rural development policy are the destruction of the old rural order and the unleashing of the dynamic forces of capital. The idea is not merely to improve the agricultural system as exists, but transform it entirely:

...the most important issue retarding Rwanda's agricultural development is... low productivity associated with traditional peasant-based subsistence farming. Agricultural policy orientation will have to be overhauled, promoting intensification so as to increase productivity and achieve growth rates of 4.5 % to 5% per year. This can only happen through the production of high value crops and modern livestock management. The vision aims to replace subsistence farming by a fully monetized, commercial agricultural sector by 2020.⁸⁹⁴

⁸⁹² de Oliveira, "'O Governo está aqui": Post-War State-Making in the Angolan Periphery."

⁸⁹³ Interview RW9.

⁸⁹⁴ Vision 2020, p18.

The state is envisaged as the key actor in bringing about this great leap forward to modernity: the expansion of rural infrastructure, the compulsory introduction of high-yield varieties and fertilisers, a raft of environmental control measures regulating soil fertility, and so on. Some of these measures could be viewed as the establishment of state preconditions for effectively functioning markets, such as the British funded project to ensure that all the land in Rwanda has an owner (and only one owner) who has papers confirming their title (interestingly, if you ask at the British High Commission, this policy is about giving rural people collateral for credit, if you ask at Minagri it is about monetising the countryside).⁸⁹⁵ Not all of them. There is no question of an invisible hand being allowed to go to work when it may not guarantee the agenda of the state: farmers are *told* to engage in activities like crop diversification to produce for export.⁸⁹⁶

Further to that, although the RPF, as a whole, is genuinely concerned with rural transformation, their policies have in no sense arisen from a deep consultation with those that will be most immediately affected by them. James C Scott's verdict on Tanzanian villagisation is as true here as it was then:

What these planners carried in their mind's eye was a certain aesthetic, what one might call a visual codification of modern rural production and community life. Like a religious faith, this visual codification was almost impervious to criticism or disconfirming evidence⁸⁹⁷

The fact that Ansoms, in her study,⁸⁹⁸ could find any Rwandan farmers at all who were willing to say that they felt such policies were 'handed down to them' is telling, given that Rwanda remains 'a cultural

⁸⁹⁵ Interviews RW24 and RW35.

⁸⁹⁶ Scholarly experts seem to think this is a terrible idea. Cf. Ansoms, "Striving for growth, bypassing the poor? A critical review of Rwanda's rural sector policies."

⁸⁹⁷ James C Scott, *Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).

⁸⁹⁸ Ansoms, "Striving for growth, bypassing the poor? A critical review of Rwanda's rural sector policies."

environment in which concealing or distorting the truth are traditionally regarded as both a virtue and an art'.⁸⁹⁹ In general, that Rwandan agricultural policy is written *for* the countryside but not emerging from those communities themselves is not in dispute.⁹⁰⁰

Once again, though, it would be a mistake to view the political imaginary of rural Rwanda as purely about development (narrowly taken as economic growth), or confined solely to the appropriate behaviour of the state and farmers. A far more expansive and ambitious vision of the countryside links those aspects with a further set of policies and directives intentionally fixed on the transformation of the rural social fabric. Two policies provide ready case studies of how this plays out: *Girinka*, and *Nyakatsi* eradication.

The *Girinka* ('One-cow-per-poor-family') scheme illustrates further ways in which economic and moral transformation are linked in contemporary political imaginary. The idea behind the scheme, 'inspired by the Rwandan culture and initiated by His Excellency the President of the Republic in 2006',⁹⁰¹ is to massively increase cow ownership in Rwanda through gifts of cows to the most vulnerable families and the extension of cheap state loans to permit other families to buy cows. The idea is that when the original cow calves, the calf is given to another vulnerable family, who will do the same, and so on. Developmentally, the scheme is supposed to raise production of milk and meat, improve soil quality (through manure), and grant independent earning capacity (through milk, meat, and manure) to the beneficiaries. The general consensus is that the scheme has worked on this metric: milk production has more than doubled from 15.4 million litres in 2006, to 33.2 million litres in 2010.⁹⁰² Whether this largesse helped the most vulnerable is less clear: although some 90,000 families (out of a target of 257,000) have received *Girinka* cows, Minister of Agriculture Agnes Kalibata was forced to admit that over 20,000 had

⁸⁹⁹ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p19.

⁹⁰⁰ For expansion on this theme, see the chapters by Ansoms, Huggins, and Newbury in Straus and Waldorf, *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights After Mass Violence*.

⁹⁰¹ Explanation of *Girinka*, www.minagri.gov.rw.

⁹⁰² J.-C. Gakwaya, "Girinka Doubles Milk Production," *The New Times* 2010, 31st August.

not gone to their intended beneficiaries, and Minagri is still in the process of trying to recoup and redistribute the cows.⁹⁰³

Regardless, what is relevant to our purposes here is not whether or not the scheme worked, but the conceptual terms within which the project was imagined and conceived. *Girinka* is an ostensibly re-traditionalising programme (the scheme, after all, is ‘inspired by the Rwandan culture’) linked, unblinkingly, to an agenda of modernisation and monetisation which taps into all the normal Vision 2020 tropes: accelerated development through self-reliance and the politics of unity. *Girinka* evokes the romanticism of families ‘pulling themselves up’ through being given independent sources of further wealth; the scheme may be kick-started with a state outlay of cows, but it then requires the continual donation and re-donation of cows by citizens. *Girinka* is ‘modern’ in a double-sense: it corresponds to the imagined modernity of Vision 2020, and it also plays beautifully to donor concerns of the moment (the British Conservatives of ‘Project Umubano’ cannot get enough of it). Yet in an subversion of the conventional dichotomy between ‘African tradition’ and ‘European modernity’, *Girinka* re-indigenises and modernises simultaneously, and it is the state which ‘brings’ this melange of tradition and modernity to the peasants, not the other way round.

The rugged individualism in the marketing of *Girinka* is also seamlessly linked to increased state penetration in the countryside; cow-ownership links rural farmers to the state through the provision of veterinary services, artificial insemination, seeds for animal feeds, vaccination against diseases, and so on. Furthermore, receipt of a *Girinka* cow obliges one to be ‘sensitised’ on how *Girinka* can be complemented by other things like owning a kitchen garden, planting fruits, and intensifying crop production (all Vision 2020 policies). It is expected that the surplus milk produced from *Girinka* cows will be sold at government operated ‘Milk Collection Centres’, and the increase in total milk production is explicitly understood as a precondition for the government’s plan to give out free milk to school children. What the

⁹⁰³ I Niyonshuti, “Minister Owns Up Mistakes in Girinka Project,” *The New Times* 2010, 12th February.

Tories may have missed about *Girinka* is how a policy aimed at increased affluence and economic empowerment also involves a much thicker set of relationships with the state.

Furthermore, the public rhetoric of *Girinka* suggests that it is as much about cultural reprogramming as it is about the making the countryside richer. It is telling that some of the Frisian cows imported for *Girinka* were directed not to immiserated peasants but ex-combatants that had successfully completed re-education.⁹⁰⁴ The public rhetoric surrounding *Girinka* continually emphasises its role in re-moralising the countryside. A human interest piece published in the *Rwanda Focus*⁹⁰⁵ captures this perfectly:

“...when I received a cow and a bull from the President...I started breeding. Later, [an]other came by with their cow to get it impregnated by the bull,” Zibera remembered.

What is more important to him, however, is that it has encouraged a culture of giving. “The President taught us a very good lesson. Initially, you are of course reluctant to give the cows away, but when you start seeing the impact it has on people’s lives, it is very gratifying.”

What this saccharine vignette points to is that the requirement to pass on the calves is more than a way of giving the policy a multiplier effect: the policy is about ‘strengthening communities’. The community to be strengthened is not, of course, the unreconstructed colline from the days of the Second Republic, but the unified Rwanda which is, simultaneously, a return to a mythologically golden pre-colonial era and heralding the brave new dawn of the African Renaissance. Secondly, the key agent is not a ministry, a programme, or even the state, but the person of the President himself. Here, as in so many other places, the state is anthropomorphised into an extension of Paul Kagame. This personalisation of statehood is a double-edged sword: whilst the bare state might be tainted brand in the Rwanda, in much the same way ‘political party’ is (both are instruments of genocide), Paul Kagame in his incarnation as redeemer of

⁹⁰⁴ S Mugisha, "Kicukiro Ex-Combatants Benefit from Girinka Drive," *The New Times* 2011, 2nd April.

⁹⁰⁵ R Rwirahira, "Success of Girinka program symbolic for Rwanda's Progress," *The Rwanda Focus* 2011, 7th March.

Rwanda legitimates policy that might otherwise be seen as unjustified, intrusive, or otherwise unwarranted. Through this identification with the state, the President is thereby reciprocally deified. To the extent that defenders of the current regime bemoan how all problems in Rwanda are attributed to the personal design of Paul Kagame, they are to some extent prisoners of the same rhetorical constructions.

Finally, given Rwanda's ethnic history, the use of cows as a motor for development cannot be innocent of subtext. Even the *New Times* cannot stay away from mentioning it entirely:

Most importantly, 'Girinka Programme' is working as a uniting tool in a society that had for long considered cattle as a factor in their division. Before 1994, only members of the political elite had the privilege of owning 'a cow' (cattle were called a cow, whatever the size of the herd) while they denounced it as a symbol of the superiority that one section of Rwandans enjoyed over other Rwandans.

During the pogroms that were driven by the ruling elite, cattle were targeted as much as the targeted Rwandans and it was taboo to own a cow. Yet, paradoxically, these rulers turned around to milk the benefits of cattle-ownership for themselves. Today, a cow has become a symbol of self-empowerment, equality and unity.⁹⁰⁶

Anyone with the barest acquaintance with Rwandan history should be able to spot the euphemism involved in identifying cow ownership as the mark of 'membership of the political elite' or 'one section of Rwandans'. Indeed, the *New Times* is uncharacteristically accurate in describing *Girinka* as a policy with a reconfiguration of social relations at its heart. *Girinka*, as with so many of these policies, has two readings: the technocratic developmentalist vision marketed to the World Bank and other donors, and a

⁹⁰⁶ P Butamire, "'Girinka' for Unity and Equality," *The New Times* 2011, 26th March.

reimagining of not just Rwanda, but Rwandans themselves. Both visions legitimate a large and invasive role in the direction of rural lives.

The *Nyakatsi* Eradication Policy (sometimes more cheerfully dubbed the ‘Bye-Bye Nyakatsi Programme’) represents another face of RPF rural modernisation. Simply put, it aims to replace every single traditional grass-thatched house in Rwanda (*Nyakatsi*) with ‘modern homes’ built out of bricks, cement, and corrugated iron. Although a long-standing commitment of the state, it has only recently begun to be implemented. Gisaraga District had 11,812 grass-thatched houses at the beginning of 2011, of which only 16 remained on the 18th of January⁹⁰⁷. By mid-February, there were only 45,000 such houses left in the country, down from 91,000 in December 2010⁹⁰⁸. Given that this is a Minaloc policy, ostensibly implemented solely by local government at the *Umurenge* (Sector) level and below, this speed and thoroughness is truly extraordinary, and indicates that this is not half-hearted or symbolic, but something we should take at least as seriously as the more obviously weighty central government policies. Much of the implementation was ruthless, and considerable short-term homelessness was created as people continue to wait, sleeping in schools or with their neighbours, for new houses which have only just started to be built.

The stated reasons for the policy are numerous: *Nyakatsi* are held to be flammable, harbour small animals, be connected to diseases and (once again) a lack of cleanliness in various ways. However, it is not true to say that everyone unequivocally prefers a ‘modern’ house to a grass-thatched one. Prior to the eradication drive, there were those that could easily have afforded new houses, and retained the old ones. Aside from the attachment some might have to ‘tradition’ (a potential reason why more *Nyakatsi* remain in the East, where there is a stronger pastoralist legacy), there are also – perhaps unsurprisingly – ways in which *Nyakatsi* are better suited to the particularities of rural life in Rwanda than the alternative. Various interview subjects pointed out that peasants knew how to repair *Nyakatsi* and keep them in order,

⁹⁰⁷ Retrieved from the front page of www.southernprovince.gov.rw.

⁹⁰⁸ Retrieved, tellingly, from the ‘announcements’ section of www.mod.gov.rw, the website of the Ministry of Defence.

something not true of their new houses-to-be.⁹⁰⁹ Others pointed out that grass-thatched roofs can have milk and other dairy products stored in them at a cool temperature, which is not true of corrugated iron roofs. In several sectors, stories were told of mini-*Nyakatsi* built next to actual (concrete) houses for storage purposes, and even these were destroyed. Part of the reason for this lies in the slavishly uncritical obedience of the Rwandan administrative machine: if a minister says ‘there is to be no *Nyakatsi*’, then local leaders jockeying for advancement will not allow themselves to be seen to fail in that duty⁹¹⁰, even if that has patently silly consequences, such as destroying the milk storage unit. But that cannot be all: plenty of injunctions come down from Minaloc’s central offices to the sector executives without getting this obsessive response. The intensity of the *Nyakatsi* eradication programme can only be understood by looking at how it plays into the mythos of RPF political imaginary. The *most* cited advantage of modern houses, to quote the Ministry of defence, is that ‘people begin realizing the new style of life when they get new iron houses.’⁹¹¹ Which is to say: the proposed transformation of rural life is, at its heart, not just about making more crops for export, or better roads, but about the transformation of rural Rwandans themselves into model, ‘modern’ citizens. That entails the destruction of those elements of social existence which tie them, symbolically or materially, to a peasant existence which is not part of the vision.

The registration and monetisation of land can be understood similarly: the commercialisation and individualisation of relationships to the land (especially in the north, i.e. Gisenyi and Ruhengeri) is not merely the technocratic matter it is spun as by the policy wonks of the World Bank. It involves further shifts from the old clientalistic system of *Ubokonde* ownership. In this (unusually), there is continuity between the RPF’s reforms and the ‘rationalisation’ of the agricultural sector initiated under Juvenal Habyarimana from 1982 onwards. Communal land, common in the sixteenth century, is further eroded today by the rapid depletion of available land by redistribution, which erodes the power of traditional patriarchs. While communal land assured the livelihood of the wider community, individual owners have no such obligations – the rural poor, as a result, have become increasingly dependent upon a new class of

⁹⁰⁹ Interviews RW12 and RW28.

⁹¹⁰ A Kigali canard has it that Minister Stanislas Kamanzi’s animus towards *nyakatsi* stems from an incident when a spare commode stored in the thatch of one such house came loose and fell on his head, leading to the obvious maxim that ‘people who live in grass houses shouldn’t stow thrones’.

⁹¹¹ The ‘announcements’ section of www.mod.gov.rw, the website of the Ministry of Defence.

rural elites. It has eroded those customary institutions of rural life more generally, as they become more difficult to obey. This strengthens an already strong state and weakens available communal paths of resistance to that authority. The transformation of the rural social life is a political reconfiguration as much as an economic one, if not more so. As Johan Pottier observes, 'Modern Rwandan social structure is merely administrative groupings of nuclear families, devoid of a collective spirit and rife with suspicion'.⁹¹² More pointedly, Gérard Prunier notes that the result of such a social system is 'Rwanda's entrenched culture of obedience'.⁹¹³ The upshot of this is that it is possible to talk about Rwanda's political culture as a relevant explanatory factor without slipping into dubious essentialism about some deeply rooted cultural obsequiousness on the part of ordinary Rwandans.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to point towards several key ways in which 'ideology' operates to reinforce state power in contemporary Rwanda. Space means it is not possible to comprehensively outline statist ideology in Rwanda in all its complexity, but rather to show some of the ways in which political and economic domination is represented such as to legitimate Rwanda's current political dispensation. In (successfully) projecting the state as the sole and unified expression of the common interest cleanly dissociated from all sectional interests and structures, and as indispensable to certain socially agreed objectives, the power of the state is enlarged, and courses of action taken by 'state actors' in the pursuance of those goals are thereby legitimated.

This includes many different elements of ideology's 'phenomenology', e.g. between descriptive 'frames' of events, evaluative beliefs, background 'common knowledge', discursive constraints on political language, conceptual models, narratives, and so on. Equally, there are many different units of ideological content, such as images, concepts, arguments, knowledge(s), which are not analytically distinguished here, and in a

⁹¹² Johan Pottier, "Taking Stock: Food Marketing Reform in Rwanda," *African Affairs* 92(1993), p12.

⁹¹³ Prunier, *The Rwanda crisis 1959-1994 : history of a genocide.*, p245.

fuller presentation would merit separate theorising, as their causal power, and the way in which we describe and theorise them, could plausibly be very different. For example, in arguing that the High Modernist dreams of Singapore and so on are more about aesthetic than policy, I am implicitly suggesting that not all aspects of ideology in Rwanda are the same sort of stuff. However, it is also plausible, if near impossible to demonstrate, that the Kigali Tower and the other rationalised spaces of urban Rwanda are not only symptomatic evidence of a state-idea, but also causally reinforce it. The point of these physical representations of modernity is not just to embed existing frames of the modernisation project; they also verify a given narrative of ongoing modernisation and emotively glorify a certain form of advancement, viz. that of Vision 2020 and the RPF elite. They are displays, but also produce the state-idea.

There is a further epistemic problem with all of this: the lack of detailed thoughts on implementation of development plans (computers without electricity, fibre-optic cables laid down that do not connect, etc) all seem to be strong examples of *either* the consequences of ideology, or merely the sorts of processes and errors explained by organisational theory. This is problematic, because if the problem here is just classic bureaucratic inefficiency created by, e.g., different operating procedures and poor lines of coordination and communication, then it is not much evidence for the state idea.

The strongest evidence that I think can be offered here is anecdotal: it is simply that, as this thesis has argued repeatedly in a diverse array of contexts, Rwandan state elites have proved themselves exceptionally adroit at repeatedly overcoming these sorts of organisational barriers to administrative efficiency. Moreover, these projects do not involve coordination across multiple agencies with different procedures of the sort organisational theory needs in order for the theory to work, but rather centralised enclaves of bureaucratic competence, isolated from the rest of the state apparatus such as to give them near-complete institutional autonomy and coherence. It seems, rather, as if the Rwandan elite is systematically blind with reference to matters of policy which come into contact with the modernisation project. Which, if true, is clear evidence for the strong predictive power of ideology in Rwandan political life, and the ongoing strength of the state-idea.

Conclusion: succession in the Court of King Paul

N'akina obulungi yeena ava mu idhiiro

The greatest dancer of all must leave the dance arena at the peak of his performance while the applause is still ringing in his ears, lest by overstaying he undermines his earlier achievements

Lusoga Proverb⁹¹⁴

This thesis opened with a series of general claims about Rwanda. To paraphrase, it suggested that the current debate on Rwanda is polarised between two extreme poles: one that thinks Rwanda does nothing wrong, and another that thinks it cannot do anything right. It pointed towards two key causes of that polarisation which this thesis has sought to overcome. Firstly, the explosion of literature on Rwanda caused scholarship to specialise so much that academics could focus on areas sufficiently small that they could be honestly entirely positive or entirely negative. The synoptic approach of this thesis, linking several aspects of Rwandan political life, instead tries to present Rwanda in all its Janus-faced diversity. The panoptic surveillance in the collines is part and parcel with the best public goods delivery in Central Africa, just as the much vaunted order and harmony in Kigali is a product of oppressively regulated public space.

Secondly, the literature reads contemporary Rwanda through deeply normative frames, either the justificatory mythico-history of the RPF struggle and genocide credit deployed by the regime's defenders, or the uneasy mix of liberal peace precepts with reconstituted Hutu populist nationalism used by its critics. Both literatures sometimes read as if the only important question to ask is 'Rwanda/the RPF/Paul Kagame: nice, or nasty?' In so doing, sober assessment of a wide set of other questions is neglected. By contrast, this thesis has concentrated on three key variables which can be approached with a degree of

⁹¹⁴ Quoted in Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime*. Whilst I don't believe Kagame speaks Lusoga, plenty of the 'Ugandans' of the RPF grew up near enough to Busoga that they might, so I hope it isn't too inauthentic.

moral neutrality: order, state strength, and regime stability. In all three of these cases, I have argued, Rwanda has achieved a high level of ‘success’. It is perfectly reasonable to argue that there is nothing unambiguously good about any of these variables if the state or regime in question is an oppressive one. It is also reasonable to argue that the price Rwanda has paid for this success is far too high, but it is not reasonable – I have argued – to suggest no such trade-offs exist. Those authors who believe Rwanda’s brutal human rights record entails instability are refusing to engage with the difficult moral trade-offs that exist. So too are the regime’s defenders who believe that the system will liberalise on a standard modernisation-theory trajectory without the whole system unravelling.

Instead, this thesis has tried to outline which aspects of political order in Rwanda rely on each other without engaging in wishful thinking. Rather than just repeat the conclusions of each of the chapters, it is possible to read them counterfactually, with a view to specifying – if those arguments are found to be persuasive – the true set of potential pitfalls for the regime, and a less speculative judgment about the future of the state the RPF built. By doing this, it becomes clear that there are some icebergs looming on the horizon, but not the ones usually cited.

The questions which arise from chapter one are those of generational replacement. Put simply: is the cohesion of the elite durable? To the extent that they depend on bonds of solidarity formed in a struggle now fading into the past, the obvious answer is ‘no’. That solidarity will have to be replaced, ultimately, if the RPF is to stay together. The obvious answer would be spoils, but that directly imperils the economic strategy outlined in chapter four, that of retaining key sectors of the economy under the control of the institution of the Front, and privatising out the rest to open-access markets attractive to foreign investment. Chapter one also suggests that the institutions of the military may continue to function as vehicles of socialisation, but as the regime’s middle-management civilianises, this generates a clique at the heart of the regime, rather than cohesion throughout. This generates part of the pattern already visible today: a steady stream of elite defections. There are two conventional reasons why this is dangerous for a regime. The first is that they might form the basis of a counterpower. What makes this unlikely is the

extreme degree of statism in Rwandan society, and the centralised-bureaucratic nature of patronage within it. When elites defect from the state, they are – it seems – unable to take any power with them. Most are forced into exile almost immediately, and can only criticise from afar. Their attempts to form powerful diasporic associations have thus far been completely unsuccessful: the diaspora is fragmented, under-resourced, and unable to find sympathetic patrons in the manner of the MDC. What explains their lack of success in transnational advocacy is given in chapter five: the dense set of factors concerning Rwanda's relationship with the outside world have given it a stickiness that is very difficult to overcome. To that extent, the opposition in exile will remain unable to engage in serious contestation. The second danger is more serious: the flight of senior figures into exile has resulted in an increase in paranoia and insularity at the top. This makes it ever-harder to admit new members to the inner circle, which only reinforces the problem, and undermines the access of the elite to information, and their ability to act strategically. The obsessive micro-management of Paul Kagame, the hysterical overreactions, and the vehemence of crackdowns must be seen in this light.

Chapter two offers slightly more hope for the current dispensation. The reasons which made the attempted restart of the insurgency such a damp squib in 2003 remain true today: the lack of a hinterland or a network through which insurgents could be funded and supplied, and solid military presence in the North-West, and the density of the lower reaches of state *abakada* make it unlikely that any insurgency could get off the ground. It might be thought that the defeat of the M23 rebellion at the hands of MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) changes this calculus by reopening the Masisi Plain as a potential hinterland. However, in this case M23's loss has not been the FDLR's gain. Even if we do think this is the last we have seen of Tutsi-dominated rebel groups linked to Rwanda dominating North Kivu (unlikely), the FDLR remains a shattered ghost of its former self with no more than 1,600 combatants, almost all of whom are pushed deep into the bush far from the Rwandan border, and they may be the FIB's next target in any case.⁹¹⁵ Furthermore, the institution of the new structures of local government have incorporated a new class of Hutu 'wise men' into the state, if only at the shop floor, and whilst

⁹¹⁵ Personal correspondence, Patrycja Stys.

destitution in the collines has increased as communal lands are privatised, enough people are gaining from the marketisation of the countryside and the ongoing rolling out of infrastructure and public goods that it seems extremely unlikely. The structure of the Rwandan state at the local level has only got denser, as the sections on decentralisation (in chapter three) and land reform (in chapter six) make clear.

Chapter three, similarly, offers a picture of a system which is not obviously coming apart anytime soon. The Manichean trap in which the opposition find themselves seems durable: it is difficult to see what could change the basic dynamic of this system, apart from a split in the RPF itself. Short of that, the institutional system currently in place ensures – on the one hand – that the co-opted opposition in the National Assembly and the Forum cannot use those positions to threaten RPF hegemony or assert independence, nor are there obvious ways forward for the uncooperative opposition. Now that Victoire Ingabire, Déo Mushayidi, and Bernard Ntaganda are all serving lengthy jail sentences, these groups are not only small in number and penniless, they are also leaderless and fragmented. To the extent that the RPF can retain control of the vast resources at its disposal, and the security services, there seems to be no prospect of successful electoral contestation.

Chapter Four provides the answer to whether or not that control can be retained. The current structure of capital ownership in Rwanda is necessary for the continued hegemony of the party, and keeping the military and security services bound into the RPF project. Here there is another looming iceberg: the continued strategy of economic growth and diversification relies, ultimately, on the RPF disinvesting, and opening markets up to genuinely even competition with foreign investors. If successful, that is great news for the state, but less so for the party (through CVL) and the military (through Horizon and Zigama). The RPF's calculation, if they do continue to pursue this trajectory, would have to be, roughly, that they can persuade Rwandans to support the regime for programmatic reasons (i.e. service delivery and so on) rather than the hegemonic grip of the party, but itself does not answer how the party itself would be held together under such circumstances, or how compatible that might be with the ongoing war on corruption. Alternately, the regime may decide to pull the brakes on the ambitious economic agenda and retain

control of the apex of the economy in party-military hands (this has already been prefigured in the arrest of Tribert Rujigiro). The problem there is that such a move would take out a pillar of the legitimating discourse of the state both internationally (as outlined in chapter five) and internally (chapter six).

The system also relies on Rwanda sustaining its currently favourable relations with the rest of the world, but the upshot of chapter five is that this is likely. The sheer range of factors contributing to Rwanda's ongoing ability to engage in extraversion create a degree of resilience and room for manoeuvre which the elite do not possess with respect to managing conflict within the elite, governing the military, or sustaining economic growth, where the Rwandan elite have charted an extremely narrow path with little scope for deviation. The ideational and institutional factors pointed to also suggest that although there may be temporary frosting in Rwanda's relationship with its friends, equilibrium should reassert itself before too long. Indeed, although the fallout from the UN reports alleging Rwandan government support for M23 were claimed by some at the time to be a turning point in Rwanda's relationship with the US and the UK, time has vindicated the argument of this thesis: once the furore had died down, the cosy relationship resumed. Arguably, M23's defeat signals Rwanda's willingness to cut adrift those Congolese Tutsi groups they had previously been supported, which would remove one of the few things Rwanda ever receives international censure for. To the extent that Rwanda's presence in DRC may now be either legal (as with the commercial-military structures which reconfigured themselves as legitimate businesses after the Sun City Accords of 2006) or shut down (as with the M23 connections), Rwanda's relationship with the outside world may become even tighter in the coming years.

It is harder to engage in predictive speculation based on the conclusions of chapter six. Ideology and discourse are much harder to operationalise than many of the harder-edged aspects of this thesis. What is clear is that Vision 2020 is not going anywhere, and it is reasonable to assume that there will be an intensification of state action as we draw nearer to the deadlines for various targets and benchmarks. As with the *Nyakatsi* Eradication Programme, or the levelling of slums for the Kigali Masterplan, this process is likely to be illiberal, top-down, and repressive. What is less clear is what will happen if it becomes

obvious that the plan is not going to be met. The decentralised structure of government and the panoply of *imihigo* contracts suggests that the central state will, as it has before, attribute blame for all shortfalls in delivery upon the executive committees of districts, sectors, and cells. However, if that is sufficiently widespread it risks eroding the currently functional relationships with the lower levels of the state which form the core of the Rwandan government's security policy (as outlined in chapter two). What is much less clear is the extent to which the state-idea has been internalised and accepted by the great mass of ordinary Rwandans. This is also, by necessity, unclear to the elite itself, as it has created a society with enormously strong incentives to not reveal discontent. There is little to no protest within Rwanda today, but it is entirely unknown whether the Hutu peasantry would wish, given the opportunity and a sufficiently charismatic populist demagogue, to 'finish the job'. That uncertainty is created by the extremely tight regulations on public space, but also, from the point of view of the ruling elite, necessitates their continuation.

The current elite wants the RPF to join the select ranks of the truly durable ruling parties under a formally constitutional democratic order, such as Singaporean People's Action Party (PAP, 1959 – present), the Japanese Liberal Democrats (LDP, 1955 – present⁹¹⁶), the Italian Christian Democrats (DC, 1948 – 1993), or Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, 1929-2000). The implication of this thesis is that such an outcome is not impossible, although it is difficult. Many plates have to be kept spinning simultaneously. The RPF is clearly now much more than a personalist vehicle for the ambitions of Paul Kagame, but that is not the same as saying the party has the power to remove him if they wanted to, or could manage an orderly succession. For that reason, the next key juncture in Rwandan political history is the Presidential election of 2017, which Kagame is constitutionally prohibited from running again. It is, of course, impossible to know whether Kagame will try to engineer a constitutional re-write in the manner of Yoweri Museveni, or a Putin-Medvedev swap which guarantees his ongoing pre-eminence. If he does though, it is unlikely that the institutions of state or party are in a position to prevent him. However, the RPF have hitherto been very successful at regulating conflict within the elite without too many defections.

⁹¹⁶ Apart from two brief interregna from 1993-'4 and 2009-'12.

It is also worth noting that the RPF managed the transition from the leadership of Rwigema to Kagame, although under very different circumstances, and now quite some time ago. The RPF remains a learning party, and will have watched the fallout from the death of Meles Zenawi carefully, just as they are now paying close attention to ZANU-PF's struggle over a post-Mugabe future.

On the basis of the arguments advanced in this thesis, the most that can be said is that an orderly succession under the current constitutional rules remains possible. It is clear, as with the management of the military, elite cohesion, the structure of the economy, or the delivery of modernity to the countryside, that the key decisions will not be made by ordinary Rwandans, but within the RPF. Ongoing research of the type conducted in this study, combining multiple frames of analysis and linking multiple dimensions of political economy, will be necessary to assess the degree to which the RPF is successful.

Appendix 1: Acronyms used

Note: where there is both an English and a French acronym, as with RPF/FPR, I have listed the more commonly used acronym first

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces (Uganda)
AFDL	L'Alliance des forces démocratique pour la libération du Congo
AFP	Agence France Presse
AI	Amnesty International
ALiR	Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda
AP	Associated Press
APSA	American Political Science Association
BBTG	Broad-Based Transitional Government
BNR	Banque Nationale du Rwanda
BNR/NBR	Banque national du Rwanda/National Bank of Rwanda
BTC/CTB	Belgian Technical Cooperation/Coopération technique belge - l'agence belge de coopération au développement
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNDD-FDD	Le conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie - Forces de défense de la démocratie (Burundi)
CNDP	Le Congres national pour la défense du peuple (DR-Congo)

CVL	Crystal Ventures Limited
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)
DGP	Democratic Green Party (Rwanda)
DP	Democratic Party (Uganda)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
ESRC	Economic and Social Research Council (of the United Kingdom)
FAR	Forces armées du Rwanda
FARG	Fonds pour l'assistance les rescapés du genocide
FDLR	Forces démocratique de libération du Rwanda
FDU-Inkingi	Forces Démocratiques Unifiées-Inkingi
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade (MONUSCO)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPIS	International Peace Information Service
JGA	Joint Governance Assessment
LDF	Local Defence Force (Rwanda)
LTD	Large Taxpayers' Directorate (Rwanda)

M23	Mouvement Vingt-trois (DRC)
MDR	Mouvement Démocratique Républicain
Minadef	Ministry of Defence
Minagri	Ministry of Education
Minecofin	Ministry of Commerce and Finance
Mineduc	Ministry of Education
MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en RD Congo
MRND	Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement
NALU	National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
NELSAP	Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NRM	National Resistance Movement (Uganda)
PALIPEHUTU	Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (Burundi)
PARMEHUTU	Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu (Rwanda)
PDC	Parti Démocratique Chrétien/Centrisme (Rwanda)
PDI	Parti Démocratique Islamique/Independent (Rwanda)
PL	Parti Libéral (Rwanda)
PPC	Parti pour le Progrès et la Concorde (Rwanda)
PSD	Parti Social Démocrate (Rwanda)
PSF	Private Sector Federation (Rwanda)

PSF	Private Sector Federation (Rwanda)
PS-Imberakuri	Parti Social-Imberakuri (Rwanda)
PSP	Parti de la Solidarité et du Progrès (Rwanda)
PSR	Parti Socialiste Rwandais
RADER	Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais
RANU	Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (Uganda)
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
RCD-Goma	Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie - Goma
RDB	Rwanda Development Board
RDF	Rwandan Defence Force
RMIP	Rwanda Military Information Platoon
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPD	Relative Political Capacity
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RRA	Rwanda Revenue Authority
RRA	Rwandan Revenue Authority
RRWA	Rwandan Refugee Welfare Association (Uganda)
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency (Styrelsen för Internationellt Utvecklingssamarbete)
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United National Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNaR	Union Nationale Rwandaise
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPC	Uganda People's Congress
UPDR	Union Démocratique du Peuple Rwandais
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WTO	World Trade Organisation
Zigama-CSS	Zigama-Caisse de sécurité sociale'

Appendix 2: List of Interviews

Many of my interviewees only spoke to me on conditions of strict confidentiality. Others still may have been more forthcoming than was entirely prudent for them to be. As such, I have decided to anonymise all my interviews. A full version of this appendix including the names of interviewees has been included loosely with this thesis upon its submission for examination.

Appendix 3: the Rwandan Military High Command

The following is from March 2010, and has since changed a little, but not substantively. I am grateful to many individuals for helping me compile this, who would not wish to be thanked by name.

NAME AND RANK	ETHNICITY	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN*	(PREFERRED) LANGUAGE
Generals:			
1. James Kabarebe	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
2. Marcel Gasinzi	Hutu	Rwanda	Franco.
3. Charles Kayonga	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
Lieutenant Generals:			
4. Charles Muhire	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
5. Ceasar Kayizari	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
Major Generals:			
6. Fred Ibingira	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
7. Patrick Nyamvumba	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
8. Kareke Karenzi	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
9. Paul Rwarakabije	Hutu	Rwanda	Franco.
10. Jerome Ngendahimana	Hutu	Rwanda	Franco.
Brigadier Generals:			
11. Frank Murokore	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
12. Alex Kagame	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
13. Jack Nziza	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
14. Eric Murokore	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
15. John Bagabo	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.

16. Augustin Turagara	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
17. Muganga Mubaraka	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
18. Richard Rutatina	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
19. Alex Ibambasi	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
20. Geoffrey Byegeka	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
21. Augustin Gashaija	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
22. Frank Kamanzi Mushyo	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
23. Wilson Gumisiriza	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
24. Norbert Karimba	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
25. Steven Karyango	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
26. Jacques Musemakweri	Tutsi	Burundi	Franco.
27. Dan Gapfizi	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
28. Ephraim Rurangwa	Tutsi	Uganda	Anglo.
29. Jean-Bosco Kazura	Tutsi	Burundi	Franco.
30. Emmanuel Gasana	Tutsi	Rwanda	Anglo.

* This is slightly tendentious. It does *not* necessarily mean country of birth, rather it refers to the location that this individual is generally understood to have been raised in and socialised. It more or less correlates to country of residence prior to 1994.

Appendix 4: the Rwandan Political Leadership during the transition (1994-2003)

The following is from November 2002, and was originally compiled by the International Crisis Group for their Africa Report published that month (No. 53). Although there is change over the period in question, this is a reasonably representative snapshot of the character of leadership during the transitional period. There were a couple of blanks and errors in the original, and where possible I have filled those in or corrected them. In general though, I make no claim for the originality of this data.

1. High Ranking State Leadership

	Paul Kagame	President	RPF
	Vincent Biruta	President, <i>Assemblée nationale de transition</i>	PSD
	Bernard Makuza	Prime Minister	MDR
	Siméon Rwagasore	President, Supreme Court	RPF

2. Ministries

Regional and Social Affairs	Désiré Nyandwi	Minister	RPF
	Odette Nyiramirimo	Secretary of State	PL
	Protais Musoni	Secretary General	RPF
Internal Security	Jean de Dieu Ntiruhungwa	Minister	MDR
	Zac Nsenga	Secretary General	RPF
Foreign Affairs	André Bumaya	Minister	PDI
	Joseph Mutaboha	Secretary General	RPF
Finance and	Donald Kaberuka	Minister	RPF

Economy	Célestin Kabanda	Secretary of State	MDR
	Ben Karenzi	Secretary General	RPF
Trade, Industry, and Tourism	Alexandre Lyambabaje	Minister	PSD
	Agnès Kayigire	Secretary General	RPF
Land, Relocation, and Environment	Laurent Nkus	Minister	PL
	Drocella Mugorewera	Secretary of State	PDC
	Patricie Hajabakiga	Secretary General	RPF
Agriculture	Ephraim Kabayija	Minister	RPF
	Aaron Makuba	Secretary of State	PSD
	C. Habamenshi	Secretary General	PSD
Gender and Women	Angelina Muganza	Minister	RPF
	Marie Claire Mukasine	Secretary General	MDR
Youth, Sport, and Culture	François Ngarambe	Minister	RPF
	Marie Agnès Mukazibera	Secretary General	RPF
Justice	Jean de Dieu Mucyo	Minister	RPF
	Eddie Mukabagwiza	Secretary General	MDR
Health	Ezechias Rwabuhiri	Minister	RPF
	?	Secretary General	RPF
Education	Romain Murenzi	Minister	RPF
	Emmanuel Mudidi	Secretary of State	RPF
	Jean Damascène Ntawukulilyayo	Secretary of State	PSD
	Eugène Munyakyanza	Secretary General	RPF
Defence	Emmanuel Habyarimana	Minister	RPF
	Col. César Kayizari	Secretary General	RPF
Work and Public Services	Sylvie Kayitesi Zainabo	Minister	RPF
	R. Fidèle	Secretary General	RPF
Transport and Communication	Silas Kanamugire	Minister	?
	Ephraim Rutaboba	Secretary General	RPF

Energy	Marcel Bahunde	Minister	RPF
	Emmanuel Nsanzumuganwa	Secretary General	RPF

3. Assemblée Nationale de Transition (Parliament)

RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front	13
PL	Parti Liberal	13
PSD	Parti Social Démocratique	13
MDR	Mouvement Démocratique Républicain	13
PDC	Parti Démocratique Chrétien (later Centriste)	6
PDI	Parti Démocratique Islamiste (later Idéal)	2
PSR	Parti Socialiste Rwandais	2
UDPR	Union Démocratique du Peuple Rwandais	2
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army (i.e. the military)	6
	Youth	2
	Women	2

4. Provincial Leaders

Théoneste Mutsindashyaka	Kigali Town	RPF
Aloysia Inyumba	Kigali Rural	RPF
Fulgence Nsengiyumwa	Gitarama	RPF
Pierre Karemera	Butare (now Huye)	PSD
Augustin Mutijima	Gikongoro	RPF
Elisée Bisengimana	Cyangugu	RPF
Déo Nkusi	Kibuye	RPF
Fidèle Mitsindo	Gisenyi	RPF
Boniface Rucagu	Ruhengeri (now Musanze)	RPF

	Appolinaire Rugemintwaza	Byumba	RPF
	Innocent Ntabana	Umutara	RPF
	James Kimonyo	Kibungo	RPF

5. Diplomatic Missions

	Washington	RPF
	New York	MDR
	London	RPF
	Paris	RPF
	Brussels	RPF
	Berlin	RPF
	Geneva	RPF
	Beijing	MDR
	New Dehli	RPF
	Addis Ababa	RPF
	Pretoria	RPF
	Kampala	RPF
	Dodoma	RPF
	Nairobi	RPF
	Bujumbura	RPF

6. Security Services

Army	James Kaberebe	Chief of Staff	RPF
	Kayumba Nyamwasa	Secretary General for Security	RPF
Police	Frank Mugambage	Chief Inspector	RPF
	Ephraim Rurangwa	First Secretary	RPF

	Gacinya Rugumya	Second Secretary	RPF
Internal Security	Jean Pierre Bizimana	Director	MDR
External Intelligence	Patrick Karegeya	Director	RPF
Military Intelligence	Jack Nziza	Director	RPF
Border Control	Richard Masozera	Director	RPF

7. Commissions and similar state institutions

Constitutional Commission	Tito Rutaremara	President	RPF
	Jean Mutsinzi	Executive Secretary	RPF
Electoral Commission	Protais Musoni	President	RPF
	Christophe Bazivamo	Executive Secretary	RPF
Commission for Unity and Reconciliation	Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana	President	PSD
	Fatuma Ndagiza	Executive Secretary	RPF
Human Rights Commission	Ndoba Gasana	President	RPF
National Office of Government Contracting	David Mukwali	Executive Secretary	

8. Banks

Banque Nationale du Rwanda (BNR)	François Kanimba		MDR
Banque Commerciale du Rwanda (BCR)	John Rutayisire		RPF
Rwandan Development Bank (RDB)	Edith Gasana		RPF
Banque de Commerce, de	Alfred Kalisa		RPF

Développement, et d'Industrie
du Rwanda (BDCI)

--

9. Universities

Université Nationale du Rwanda (UNR)	Emile Rwamisirabo	Rector	RPF
Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST)	Silas Rwakabamba	Rector	RPF

10. Directors of State-run Companies, Parastatals, and Joint Ventures

	Sam Nkusi	Electrogaz	RPF
	Hope Murerwa	Caisse Hypothecaise du Rwanda (CHR)	RPF
	Antoine Mugesera	Rwandex	RPF
	James Musoni	Rwandan Revenue Authority (RRA)	RPF
	Mugunga Muhinda	Institut des Sciences Agronomiques (ISAR)	RPF
	John Ruzibuka	Office National de la Population (ONAPO)	RPF
	Dr. Desire Ndushabandi	La Rwandaise d'Assurance Maladie (RAMA)	RPF
	Célestin Kayitare	Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda du Thé (OCIR-Thé)	RPF
	Marie Mukantabana	Société Nationale D'Assurances du Rwanda (SONARWA)	RPF
	Vincent Gatwabuyenge	Office Nationale des Transports en Commune (ONATRACOM)	MDR
	Anastase Nzirasanaho	Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda du Café (OCIR- Café)	RPF

Janvier Kanyamashuri	Fonds d'Aide aux Rescapés du Génocide (FARG)	RPF
Joseph Bideli	Office Rwandais d'Information (ORINFOR)	RPF
Dr. Claude-Emile Rwagacondo	Programme Nationale de Lutte contre le Paludisme (PNLP)	RPF
Bonaventure Niyibizi	Rwanda Investment Promotion Agency	RPF
Jean-Pierre Murenzi	Centre d'Appui aux Petites et Moyennes Entreprises Rwanda (CAPMER)	RPF
Apollinaire Murangira	Imprimerie Scolaire (IMPRISCO)	RPF

(note: most of these companies have been fully privatised and have dropped their French names since 2002. The implications of this privatisation for the Rwandan political system are discussed in the chapter on the economy)

11. Justice Sector

Gérard Gahima	Chief Prosecutor	RPF
Siméon Rwagasore	Chief Justice	
Hodari Nzinga	President, Court of Cassation	RPF
Pierre Ndorimana	President, Constitutional Court	RPF
Tharcisse Karugarama	President, Courts and Tribunals	RPF
Louis-Marie Mugenzi	President, State Council	
Marie-Josée Mukandamage	President, National Audit Office	MDR

Appendix 5: Rwandan Military Figures Raised in Uganda

Name	Place of origin	NRA Rank	Year joined NRA	Highest Position Held in NRA	Position in RPF in 1990	Position in 2000	Position now
Alphose Furuma	Nakivale	Lieutenant	1984	Head of School of Political Education	Major	Aide de Camp to Kayumba Nyamwasa	Exile
Angelo Ssemwanga	Nakivale/ Luwero		1981	Youth Secretary, Recruitment of Banyarwanda Youth		Head of Logistics, RPF Secretariat	
Augustine Iyako	Orukinga	Captain	1984			Captain, Information and Television Ministry	Deceased
César Kayizari	Nakivale	Second Lieutenant		Intelligence Officer – DMI		Army Chief of Staff	Ambassador to Turkey
Charles Muhire			1986			Chief-of-Staff, Air Force	Exile
Chris Bunyenyezi	Mbarara	Major	1982	Brigade Commander	Director of Operations	Deceased	Deceased
Dan Munyuza	Kahungye	Private	1985	Intelligence Officer – DMI	Colonel	Staff, DMI	Director, External Intelligence
Dodo Tukahirwa	Luwero	Captain	1981	Chief Instructor		Retired	
Emmanuel Karake					Director of War Operations		Director-General, NISS ⁹¹⁷
Frank Rusagara					Brigadier General	Special Advisor to the President	Attaché, High Commission in London
Fred Rwigyema	Kahungye	Major-General	1980	Deputy Minister of Defence Deputy Army Commander-in-Chief One of the Kabamba 27 ⁹¹⁸	Chairman	Deceased	Deceased
Geofrey Byegyeka	Orukinga	Captain	1982	Medical Assistant, General Military HQ		Colonel Chief of Administration of Personnel	

⁹¹⁷ National Intelligence and Security Services

⁹¹⁸ The initial group that, with Yoweri Museveni, launched the Ugandan Bush War

J Nyuvumba	Mbarara	Lieutenant	1985	Platoon Commander	Colonel Chief of Ops, Kisangani Sector	
Jack Nziza (Jackson Nkurunziza)	Kisoro	Sergeant		Intelligence Officer - DMI	Director, DMI	Permanent Secretary, Minadef
James Musoni “Rajabu”			1990		Executive Assistance to Chairman of the RPF	Minister of Local Government
James Kaberebe	Orukinga/ Nyabushozi	Second Lieutenant	1985	Intelligence Officer –DMI	Colonel Deputy Chief of Staff	Minister of Defence
John Peter Bagabo		Lieutenant	1985	Company Commander	Colonel Chairman of the Court Martial	Bridagier-General Commissioner, RDRC ⁹¹⁹
Kalaveri	Kyaka II	Lieutenant	1982	Second Brigade Commander	Deceased	Deceased
Kanyangye	Nakivale	Lieutenant	1985	Platoon Commander	Major Former Major, Kigali	
Kasumba	Luwero ⁹²⁰	Captain	1991	Brigade Commander	Brigade Commander	
Kayumba Nyamwasa	Buremba	Second Lieutenant	1985	Assistant District Administrator, Kitgum	Brigadier Chief of Staff	Exile
Kwikiriza	Mbarara	Lieutenant	1985	Brigade Political Commissar	Major and Brigade Commander	Exile
Musutu	Luwero	Lieutenant	1985	Chief Instructor	Retired	Retired
Ndore Rurinda	Kyaka I	Corporal	1097	Company Political Commissar, Tarehe Sita Magazine	Major RPF Secretariat	
Nuliate ⁹²¹	Kyaka II	Lieutenant	1985	Platoon Commander	Retired	
Patrick Karegyeya	Orunkinga/ Nshara	Lieutenant	1984	Assistant Director, Counter Intelligence	Colonel, Chief of Operations and Training	Exile
Paul Kagame	Kahungye	Major	1980	Deputy Director, DMI ⁹²² One of the Kabamba 27	Chairman of the RPF President of Rwanda Minister of Defence	Chairman of the RPF President of Rwanda
Peter Bayingana	Kahungye	Major	1984	Director, Medical Services	Chief of Operations	Deceased

⁹¹⁹ Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission

⁹²⁰ Non-settlement



⁹²¹ There are a few individuals who appear to only ever be referred to by one name, usually with their rank. Lieutenant Nuliate, Lieutenant (later Major) Kwikiriza, and so on.

⁹²² Directorate of Military Intelligence. Note that if cited in the fifth column, it refers to the Ugandan outfit, and if in the sixth or seventh, the Rwandan version.

Sam Byaruhunga	Luwero ⁹²³	Captain	1982	Brigade Commander			Deceased	Deceased
Sam Kaka	Luwero	Major	1980	Commanding Officer, Military Police	Colonel		Retired	Retired
Steven Ndugute	Luwero	Major	1985	Brigade Commander	Chief of Combat Operations		Retired	Retired
Wilson Rutayisire	Orukinga/ Nshara	Lieutenant	1985	Brigade Political Commissar and Jinja Infantry School	Director, Radio Muhabura		Commander, Forces in Eastern Congo	Deceased

⁹²³ Non-settlement


Appendix 6: Graphs Used in Chapter Two




Source: Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, et al. (2009). Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996 - 2008. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4978. Washington DC, World Bank.

Note: 'Government Effectiveness' captures *'perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies'*. 'Political Stability' here measures *'the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism'*. Scores for 1997 and 1999 are interpolated. Data are missing from the original dataset for Rwanda and Burundi in 1996-'97 in graph one.


3. Relative Political Capacity: Rwanda and its Neighbours



4. Relative Political Capacity: Post Conflict States




Source: Arbetman-Rabinowitz, M. and K. Johnson (2008). Relative Political Capacity: Theory, Model, Data, and Updates. Annual Meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention: Bridging Multiple Divides. Hilton San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA.




Source: Arbetman-Rabinowitz, M. and K. Johnson (2008). Relative Political Capacity: Theory, Model, Data, and Updates. Annual Meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention: Bridging Multiple Divides. Hilton San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA.

6. Aid per person



Source: OECD Financial Statistics (<http://stats.oecd.org>)

7. Aid per Square Kilometre



Source: OECD Financial Statistics (<http://stats.oecd.org>)

Fig. 8. Rwandan Army Week

Source: Minadef Archives, Kigali, June 2010

SUMMARY OF THE ARMY WEEK ACTIVITIES DONE COUNTRYWIDE
FROM 27 JUN- 7 JUL 09

Table 1 : Medical Activities per district as of 7 Jul 09

S/N°	DATE	LOCATION	Ophthalmology (Blind cases)	Dental	VCT	Blood donation	Surgery (orthopedics & G.Surgery)	Mosquito nets	Total
1	27Jun- 6 Jul 09		169	3680	7528	626	198	1700	13901
2	7 Jul 09	Musanze	-	-	-	-	8	-	8
3		Burera	-	-	206	-	-	-	206
4		Rubavu-	-	118	178	-	-	-	296
5		Rusizi	-	-	165	-	-	-	165
6		Nyamasheke	-	164	-	-	-	-	164
7		Muhanga	-	-	-	-	15	-	15
8		Nyamagabe	-	125	-	-	-	-	125
9		Huye	-	-	-	67	-	-	67
10		Karongi	-	-	110	-	-	-	110
11		Rwamagana	-	111	-	-	7	-	118
12		Nyagatare	-	-	120	-	-	-	120

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT FROM 27 JUNE - 1 JULY

EASTERN PROVINCE				
	S/N°	DATE	LOCATION	ACTIVITIES
	1	27-28/06/09	Kirehe district	44,000 Bricks made 4 km road repaired in Musanze sector 4 km road repaired in Gahara sector
	2	27-28/06/09	Rwamagana district	Started preparation of land for Banana Planting
	3	27-28/06/09	Ngoma district	3,900 Bricks made 40 ha for coffee planting in Rulenge sector prepared 10 ha for pineapple planting prepared in Jarama sector 8 ha for pineapple planting in Sake sector
	4	27-28/06/09	Kayonza district	64,000 bricks made
	5	27-28/06/09	Gatsibo district	0.5 Km road linking Kabare and Nyagahanga cells
	6	27-28/06/09	Nyagatare district	594 bricks made 5 house foundations prepared 5 plots prepared
	7	27-28/06/09	Bugesera district	3571 bricks made
	8	29/06/09	Kirehe district	6037 Bricks made
	9	29/06/09	Rwamagana district	25 Ha prepared for Banana Planting
	10	29/06/09	Ngoma district	630 Bricks made
	11	29/06/09	Kayonza district	20 plots prepared 630 bricks made
	12	29/06/09	Gatsibo district	7535 bricks made
	13	29/06/09	Nyagatare district	3575 bricks made 16 houses for returnees from Tanzania under construction in Nyabitekeri sector
	14	29/06/09	Bugesera district	3110 bricks made in Mayange and Nyamata sectors
	15	1 Jul 09	Ngoma	8 houses constructed in Rukumberi sector


Appendix 7: Graphs Used in Chapter Six

Table 1:

Time	Economic Ties Score
Mexico	11,880,304,465.78
Macedonia, FYR	131,203,505.02
Gabon	130,151,177.29
Guyana	129,031,696.06
Malaysia	107,859,006.64
Croatia	105,667,731.32
Moldova	104,928,411.01
Serbia	99,031,246.71
Belarus	88,686,171.35
Romania	79,221,316.22
Haiti	79,092,911.18
Dominican Republic	68,134,005.21
Albania	67,052,659.64
Nicaragua	64,762,591.92
Ukraine	62,997,160.63
Russian Federation	62,135,084.08
Armenia	61,782,979.09
Senegal	56,056,380.84
Cameroon	51,538,493.41
Benin	49,320,848.85
Malawi	48,856,651.07
Ghana	47,748,455.40
Mozambique	45,653,564.64
Cambodia	44,880,687.80
Madagascar	41,243,493.29
Zambia	40,227,469.11
Georgia	38,951,411.20
Mali	38,393,041.98
Kenya	36,097,963.34
Peru	32,369,891.95
Rwanda (pre-genocide)	31,994,250.63
Zimbabwe	29,979,487.44
Tanzania	28,215,653.70
Rwanda (post-genocide)	20,810,090.90


Source: World Bank *Direction of Trade Statistics Database (DOTS)*. Economic ties score is a function of the total trade volume of a country (imports and exports, measured in USD millions) divided by GDP (USD billions) over the period in which the country was coded as not democratic on Levitsky and Way's criteria (for Rwanda, I have included the entire period).

Graph 1:




Source: World Bank Direction of Trade Statistics Database (DOTS).

Graph 2:



Source: World Bank Direction of Trade Statistics Database (DOTS).

Graph 3:



Source: World Bank Direction of Trade Statistics Database (DOTS).


Note: if sustained, the final scores for the United States (i.e. in the second and third quarters of 2011) would represent a dramatic shift in how Rwanda's global integration should be assessed. However, it is absolutely too early to comment on this.

Graph 4:




Source: World Bank Global Migration database and Polity IV

Graph 5:




Source: World Bank Global Migration database and Polity IV

Graph 6:




Source: World Bank Global Migration database and Polity IV

Graph 7:




Source: World Bank Global Migration database and Polity IV

Graph 8:



Source: World Bank Global Migration database and Polity IV


Graph 9:



Source: World Bank Global Migration database and Polity IV

Graph 10:

Top Donors to Rwanda:



Figures are in USD millions (2009 constant)
 Source: OECD International Development Statistics

Bibliography:

Books and Journal Articles:

- Aberbach, Joel D., and Bert A. Rockman. "Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 35, no. 4 (2002): 673-76.
- Abrams, P. "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1988): 58-89.
- Adams, J. *The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.
- Adelman, H., and A. Suhrke. *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. Rutgers, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000.
- Adepoju, Aderanti. "The Dimension of the Refugee Problem in Africa." *African Affairs* 81, no. 322 (1982): 21-35.
- Aga Khan, S. "The One Million Refugees in Africa." *Migration News* 20, no. 4 (1981): 3-12.
- Agamben, G. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- Ahobamuteze, G., C. Dom, and R. Purcell. *Rwanda Country Report*. Birmingham: University of Birmingham, International Development Department, 2006.
- Alexander, Jocelyn. "Zimbabwe since 1997: Land and the Legacies of War." In *Turning Points in African Democracy*, edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha and Lindsay Whitfield. Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2009.
- Allardt, E., and S. Rokkan. *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology ; Edited by Erik Allardt, Stein Rokkan*. Cambridge, UK: The Free Press, 1970.
- Allen, Chris. "Understanding African Politics." *Review of African Political Economy* 22, no. 65 (1995): 301-20.
- Anderson, Perry. *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: New Left Books, 1974.
- Ansoms, An. "Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor? A Critical Review of Rwanda's Rural Sector Policies." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 46, no. 01 (2008): 1-32.
- Arendt, Hannah. "We Refugees." *Menorah Journal* 31, no. 1 (1943): 69-77.
- Baker, Bruce. "Reconstructing a Policing System out of the Ashes: Rwanda's Solution." *Politicizing and Society* 17, no. 4 (2007): 344-'66.
- Balmaceda, Margarita Mercedes, and Kevin Rosner. *Belarus: Oil, Gas, Transit Pipelines and Russian Foreign Energy Policy*. London: GMB Publishing Ltd, 2006.
- Barbone, Luca, Arindam Das-Gupta, Luc de Wulf, and Anna Hansson. "Reforming Tax Systems: The World Bank Record in the 1990s." *Policy Research Working Paper 2237*. Washington DC: The World Bank, 1999.
- Bates, Robert. *States and Markets in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policy*. edited by Series on Social Choice and Political Economy Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981.
- . *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Bates, Robert, Avner Grief, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast. *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Bayart, J.F. *L'état En Afrique: La Politique Du Ventre*. Paris: Fayard, 2006.
- . "L'Afrique Dans Le Monde : Une Histoire D'extraversion." *Critique internationale* (1999): 97-120.
- Bayart, Jean-François, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou. *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*. London: International African Institute, 1999.
- Bazenguissa-Ganga, Rémy. *Les Voies Du Politique Au Congo : Essai De Sociologie Historique*. Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1997.
- Bellin, Eva. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics* (2004): 139-57.
- . *Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.

- Berger, Mark T. "From Nation-Building to State-Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-State System and the Changing Global Order." *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2006): 5-25.
- Berry, Jeffrey M. "Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 35, no. 4 (2002): 679-82.
- Berwouts, K. "Le Rwanda Face Aux Élections: Les Fissures Dans Le Miroir." Réseau européen pour l'Afrique Centrale - European network for Central Africa, 2010.
- Betts, Alexander. "Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework." *Global Governance* 16 (2010): 361-82.
- . *Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013.
- Bezy, Fernand. "Rwanda: Bilan Socio-Economique D'un Regime (1962-1989)." *Louvain: Institut d'etudes des pays en développement* (1990).
- Blenford, A. "Bold Rwanda Takes Broadband Leap." *BBC*, 2009, 21st September.
- Booth, David, and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi. "Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda." *African Affairs* (May 16, 2012 2012).
- Brady, H.E., and D. Collier. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.
- Braeckman, Colette. *Terreur Africaine: Burundi, Rwanda, Zaïre: Les Racines De La Violence*. Fayard, 1996.
- . *Rwanda: Histoire D'un Génocide*. Paris: Fayard, 1994.
- Brauman, Rony. *Devant Le Mal: Rwanda, Un Génocide En Direct*. Paris: Arléa, 1994.
- Brownlee, J. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- BTC. *La Coopération Technique Belge Au Rwanda*. Brussels: Belgian Development Cooperation Agency, 2006.
- Bunce, Valerie J, and Sharon L Wolchik. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Burnet, Jennie E. "Gender Balance and the Meanings of Women in Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda." *African Affairs* 107, no. 428 (July 1, 2008 2008): 361-86.
- . "Women Have Found Respect: Gender Quotas, Symbolic Representation, and Female Empowerment in Rwanda." *Politics & Gender* 7, no. 03 (2011): 303-34.
- Byrne, P. D. "Privatisation in the Area of Tax Administration: An Overview." In *Harvard University Development Discussion Papers 508 (Taxation Research Series 24)*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1995.
- Cable, Larry. "Getting Found in the Fog: The Nature of Interventionary Peace Operations." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 7, no. 1 (1996): 97-111.
- . "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 4, no. 2 (1993): 228-62.
- Callaghy, Thomas M. "Lost between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria." In *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World*, edited by Joan M Nelson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Callahan, M.P. *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma*. Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 2003.
- Canovan, Margaret. *Populism*. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981.
- Carothers, Thomas. "The End of the Transition Paradigm." *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002): 5-21.
- Carroll, P. *Science, Culture, and Modern State Formation*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2006.
- Casanegra de Jantscher, Milka. "Administering the Vat." In *Value Added Taxation in Developing Countries*, edited by Malcolm Gillis, Carl Shoup and Gerardo Sicat. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990.
- Centeno, M.A. *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.
- Chabal, P., and J.P. Daloz. *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*. London: International African Institute, 1999.
- Chambers, R. *Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa: A Study of Organizations and Development*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1969.
- Chambers, Victoria, and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi. "Is the Bride Too Beautiful?: Safe Motherhood in Rural Rwanda." (2012).

- Chauvet, Lisa, and Paul Collier. "Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds." *Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University* (2004).
- Chehabi, H.E., and J.J. Linz. *Sultanistic Regimes*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
- Chrétien, Jean-Pierre. "Hutu Et Tutsi Au Rwanda Et Au Burundi." *Au coeur de* 1 (1985).
- . "La Crise Politique Rwandaise." *Genève-Afrique* 30, no. 2 (1992): 121-40.
- . "Les Racines De La Violence Contemporaine En Afrique." *Politique africaine* 42 (1991): 15-27.
- . "Pluralisme Politique Et Équilibre Ethnique Au Rwanda Et Au Burundi." *Enjeux nationaux et dynamiques régionales dans l'Afrique des Grands Lacs*. Lille: CRNS, no. 363 (1992).
- . *Le Défi De L'éthnisme: Rwanda Et Burundi, 1990-1996*. KARTHALA Editions, 1997.
- Clapham, Christopher. "Degrees of Statehood." *Review of international studies* 24, no. 2 (1998): 143-57.
- . "Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking." *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 2 (1998): 193-210.
- Clark, John F. "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Interpretations." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, no. 2 (2001): 261-87.
- Clark, Phil. *The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Clark, Phil, and Zachary Kaufman. *After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond*. Manhattan, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009.
- Coleman, J.S., and C.G. Rosberg. *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1966.
- Collier, David, and James E. Mahon, Jr. "Conceptual "Stretching" Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis." *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 4 (1993): 845-55.
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoefler. *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*. Policy Research Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Bank, Development Research Group, 2000.
- Collins, R. *Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Cooper, F., and A.L. Stoler. *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1997.
- Corey, Allison, and Sandra F. Joireman. "Retributive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda." *African Affairs* 103, no. 410 (2004): 73-89.
- Corrigan, P., and D. Sayer. *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1985.
- Cowen, MP, and RW Shenton. *Doctrines of Development* London and New York: Routledge, 1996.
- Cramer, C. "Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War." *World Development* 30, no. 11 (Nov 2002): 1845-64.
- Cuvelier, J, and T Raemaekers. "European Companies and the Coltan Trade: An Update." Amsterdam: Kertinactie, 2002.
- . "Supporting the War Economy in the Drc: European Companies and the Coltan Trade." In *IPIS*, edited by Marc-Olivier Herman and Pieter Vermaerke. Brussels: Broederlijk Delen, 2002.
- d'Hertefeldt, M. *Les Clans Du Rwanda Ancien: Eléments D'éthnosociologie Et D'ethnohistoire*. Tervuren: Musée Royale de l'Afrique Centrale (MRAC), 1971.
- Da Câmara Santa Clara Gomes, Sophie. *The European Union's Political and Development Response to Rwanda* Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2001.
- Daley, Elizabeth, Rachel Dore-Weeks, and Claudine Umuhoza. "Ahead of the Game: Land Tenure Reform in Rwanda and the Process of Securing Women's Land Rights." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 4, no. 1 (2010/03/01 2010): 131-52.
- Dallaire, R., and B. Beardsley. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. New York, NY: Carroll & Graf, 2005.
- Davies, Philip H. J. "Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services." *Politics* 21, no. 1 (2001): 73-80.
- Dawson, Martin, and Tim Kelsall. "Anti-Developmental Patrimonialism in Zimbabwe." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 30, no. 1 (2012/01/01 2012): 49-66.
- de Lacger, L. *Ruanda: Le Ruanda Ancien*. Grands Lacs, 1939.
- De Lame, Danielle. *Une Colline Entre Mille, Ou, Le Calme Avant La Tempête: Transformations Et Blocages Du Rwanda Rural*. Tervuren: Musée royal de l'Afrique centrale, 1996.
- de Oliveira, Ricardo Soares. "'O Governo Está Aqui": Post-War State-Making in the Angolan Periphery." *Politique africaine*, no. 130 (2013).

- de Wulf, Luc. "Human Resources and Organization Issues in Customs." In *Customs Modernization Handbook*, edited by Luc De Wulf and J. B. Sokol. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005.
- Dean, John, and William Whyte. "How Do You Know If the Informant Is Telling the Truth?". *Human Organization* 17, no. 2 (1958): 34-38.
- Decalo, Samuel. *Psychoses of Power: African Personal Dictatorships*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989.
- Deese, D. "From Executive Crafting to Pluralistic Politics: Politics and Economic Reform as Sequential, Cumulative Processes in Developing States." In *Development and Democracy: New Perspectives on an Old Debate*, edited by S Ramaswamy and J Cason. Hanover, NH: Middlebury College Press, 2003.
- Des Forges, Alison. *Defeat Is the Only Bad News: Rwanda under Musunga, 1896–1931*. edited by D. Newbury and R.D. Forges Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011.
- . *"Leave None to Tell the Story": Genocide in Rwanda*. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch and Fédération internationale des droits de l'homme, 1999.
- Destexhe, Alain. *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*. London: Pluto Press, 1995.
- Devlin, Claire, and Robert Elgie. "The Effect of Increased Women's Representation in Parliament: The Case of Rwanda." *Parliamentary Affairs* 61, no. 2 (April 1, 2008 2008): 237-54.
- Dietrich, C. "The Commercialisation of Military Deployment in Africa." *African Security Review* 9, no. 1 (2000): 3-10.
- Dodd, Robert. "Background Notes on the Possible Reasons for the Current Uganda/Rwanda Refugee Problem." Oxford, Refugees Studies Programme Documentation Centre, 1982.
- Donner, J. "The Use of Mobile Phones by Microentrepreneurs in Kigali, Rwanda: Changes to Social and Business Networks." *Information Technologies and International Development* 3, no. 2 (2007): 3-19.
- Doom, Ruddy, and Jan Gorus. *Politics of Identity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region*. Brussels: VUB Press, 2000.
- Dorman, Sara Rich. "Post-Liberation Politics in Africa: Examining the Political Legacy of Struggle." *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 6 (2006/09/01 2006): 1085-101.
- Dorsey, Michael. "Violence and Power-Building in Post-Genocide Rwanda." In *Politics of Identity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region*, edited by R Doom and J Gorus. 311-48. Brussels: VUB University Press, 2000.
- Douglas, M. *How Institutions Think*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986.
- Downing, B.M. *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.
- Druckman, Daniel. *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage publications, 2005.
- Duran, P., and J. B. Sokol. "Policy and Operational Lessons Learned from Eight Country Case Studies." In *Customs Modernization Handbook*, edited by Luc De Wulf and J. B. Sokol. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005.
- Eizenstat, Stuart E, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy M Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States." *Foreign Aff.* 84 (2005): 134.
- Elster, John. "Marxism, Functionalism, and Game-Theory: The Case for Methodological Individualism." *Theory and Society* 11 (1982): 453-81.
- Eltringham, N. *Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda*. London: Pluto Press, 2004.
- Ertman, T. *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Evans, P.B., D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol. *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Fearon, James D, and David D Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90.
- Feng, Y, and S Swaminathan. "Political Capacity and Demographic Change: A Study of China with a Comparison to India." *Urban transformation in China* (2004): 40.
- Ferguson, J. *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1990.
- First, R. *The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup D'état*. London: Allen Lane, 1970.
- First, Ruth. *The Barrel of a Gun : Political Power in Africa and the Coup D'état*. London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970.
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila. *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

- Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge, L Katera, and E Nagelwa. "Outsourcing Revenue Collection: Experiences from Local Authorities in Tanzania." *Brief 10*. Dar Es Salaam: Research on Poverty Alleviation, 2008.
- Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge, and Mick Moore. "Revenue Authorities and Public Authority in Sub-Saharan Africa." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 47, no. 01 (2009): 1-18.
- François, Monika, and Inder Sud. "Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States." *Development Policy Review* 24, no. 2 (2006): 141-60.
- Freedman, Jim. "Ritual and History : The Case of Nyabingi." *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines* (1974): 170-80.
- French, Howard. "Kagame's Hidden War in the Congo." *The New York Review of Books*, 2009, September 24th.
- Fukuyama, F. *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Penguin, 1992.
- . *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.
- Futch, M, and C McIntosh. "Tracking the Introduction of the Village Phone Product in Rwanda." *Information Technologies and International Development* 5, no. 3 (2009): 54-81.
- Gahima, G. *Transitional Justice in Rwanda: Accountability for Atrocity*. London: Taylor & Francis, 2013.
- Gakusi, Albert-Enéas, and Frédérique Mouzer. *De La Révolution Rwandaise À La Contre-Révolution: Contraintes Structurelles Et Gouvernance, 1950-2003*. L'Harmattan, 2003.
- Gakwaya, J.-C. "Girinka Doubles Milk Production." *The New Times*, 2010, 31st August.
- Gastil, Raymond D. "Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties." edited by Freedom House. New York, 2009.
- GatesFoundation. "Press Release: Gates Foundation Launches Effort to Reinvent the Toilet." 2011, July 19th.
- Geddes, B. *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003.
- George, A.L., and A. Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.
- Gerring, J. *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- . "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?." *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 2 (2004): 341-54.
- Gertz, C.J., Carolyn Louise Baylies, and M. Szeftel. *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.
- Golooba-Mutebi, F. "Collapse, War, and Reconstruction in Rwanda: An Analytical Narrative on State Making." In *Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2*: LSE, 2008.
- Gourevitch, Philip. *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families : Stories from Rwanda*. 1st ed. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998.
- Guichaoua, A. *Enjeux Nationaux Et Dynamiques Régionales Dans L'Afrique Des Grands Lacs*. Lille: Université de Lille, Faculté des Sciences économiques et sociales, 1992.
- . "Le Problème Des Réfugiés Rwandais Et Des Populations Banyarwanda Dans La Région Des Grands Lacs Africains." Geneva: UNHCR, 1992.
- . *Les Crises Politiques Au Burundi Et Au Rwanda*. Paris: Harmattan (1995).
- Hadler, Sandra C. "Best Practice in Tax Administration in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Handbook for Officials (June)." *International Tax Program, Harvard Law School: Boston* (2000).
- Hall, Margaret, and Tom Young. *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence*. London: Hurst, 1997.
- Harrell-Bond, Barbara. *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Harrell-Bond, Barbara, Eftihia Voutira, and Mark Leopold. "Counting the Refugees: Gifts, Givers, Patrons and Clients." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 5, no. 3-4 (1992): 205-25.
- Hatzfeld, Jean. *Dans Le Nu De La Vie*. Paris: Le Seuil, 2000.
- . *La Stratégie Des Antilopes, 3e Volet De Son Récit Sur Le Génocide Rwandais*. Paris: Le Seuil, 2007.
- . "Une Saison De Machettes." Paris, Le Seuil, 2003.
- Hayman, Rachel. "Abandoned Orphan, Wayward Child: The United Kingdom and Belgium in Rwanda since 1994." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 4, no. 2 (2010/07/01 2010): 341-60.
- . "From Rome to Accra Via Kigali: 'Aid Effectiveness' in Rwanda." *Development Policy Review* 27, no. 5 (Sep 2009): 581-99.

- . "Rwanda: Milking the Cow. Creating Policy Space in Spite of Aid Dependence." In *The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors*, edited by L. Whitfield. 165–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. "Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa." *Journal of African Economies* 9, no. 3 (Oct 2000): 270-94.
- . *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Hilhorst, Dorothea, and Mathijs Van Leeuwen. "Emergency and Development: The Case of Imidugudu, Villagization in Rwanda." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 13, no. 3 (September 1, 2000 2000): 264-80.
- Hilsum, L. "Reporting Rwanda: The Media and the Aid Agencies." In *Media and the Rwandan Genocide*, edited by A. Thompson. London: Pluto, 1995.
- Hintjens, Helen M. "Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37, no. 2 (1999): 241-86.
- Hitimana, B. "Rwanda's Bugesera Airport Plans Gathering Speed." *East African Business Week*, 2011, 24th July.
- Hodgkin, T. *African Political Parties: An Introductory Guide*. London: Penguin, 1961.
- Holvoet, Nathalie, and Heidy Rombouts. "The Challenge of Monitoring and Evaluation under the New Aid Modalities: Experiences from Rwanda." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 46, no. 04 (2008): 577-602.
- Hood, Christopher. "A Public Management for All Seasons?". *Public administration* 69, no. 1 (1991): 3-19.
- Hui, V.T. *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Hydén, G. *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1980.
- Ingelaere, Bert. "The Ruler's Drum and the People's Shout: Accountability and Representation on Rwanda's Hills." In *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence*, edited by S. Straus and L. Waldorf. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011.
- Iversen, Vegard, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Godfrey Bahigwa, Frank Ellis, and Robert James. "Private Tax Collection—Remnant of the Past or a Way Forward? Evidence from Rural Uganda." *Public Administration and Development* 26, no. 4 (2006): 317-28.
- Jackson, Paul. "Legacy of Bitterness: Insurgency in North West Rwanda." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 15, no. 1 (2004): 19-37.
- Jackson, R.H., and C.G. Rosberg. *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1982.
- Jackson, Stephen. "«Nos Richesses Sont Pillées» Économies De Guerre Et Rumeurs De Crime Au Kivu." *Politique africaine* 84 (2001).
- Jacobs, B.L. *Administrators in East Africa: Six Case Studies*. Entebbe: The Government Printer, 1965.
- Jänicke, M. *State Failure: The Impotence of Politics in Industrial Society*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990.
- Jayal, Niraja Gopal. "The Governance Agenda: Making Democratic Development Dispensable." *Economic and Political Weekly* (1997): 407-12.
- Jayasuriya, Kanishka, and Kevin Hewison. "The Antipolitics of Good Governance: From Global Social Policy to a Global Populism?". *Critical Asian Studies* 36, no. 4 (2004): 571-90.
- Jefremovas, V. *Brickyards to Graveyards: From Production to Genocide in Rwanda*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002.
- Jerven, Morten. *Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do About It*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013.
- Juergensmeyer, M. *The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1994.
- Kagame, A. *Inganji Karinga, Vol. I*. Kibayi: Éditions Royales, 1943.
- . *Inganji Karinga, Vol. II*. Kibayi: Éditions Royales, 1947.
- . *Le Code Des Institutions Politiques Du Ruanda Précolonial*. Brussels: IRCB, 1952.
- . *Le Pluralisme Éthnique Et Culturel Dans Le Ruanda-Urundi*. Brussels: Éditions du Marais, 1957.
- . *Les Organisations Socio-Familiales De L'ancien Ruanda*. Brussels: ARSC, 1954.
- . *Un Abrégé De L'ethno-Histoire Du Ruanda De 1853 Á 1972 (Vol. II)*. Butare: Éditions Universitaires du Rwanda, 1975.

- . *Un Abrégé De L'éthno-Histoire Du Rwanda Précolonial (Vol. Ii)*. Butare: Éditions Universitaires du Rwanda, 1972.
- Kagwanja, Peter Mwangi. "Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca? The Mungiki, Ethnic Violence and the Politics of the Moi Succession in Kenya, 1987–2002." *African Affairs* 102, no. 406 (2003): 25-49.
- Keane, Fergal. *Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey*. London: Penguin, 1996.
- Kimonyo, Jean Paul, Noël Twagiramungu, and Christopher Kayumba. *Supporting the Post-Genocide Transition in Rwanda : The Role of the International Community*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2004.
- King, Desmond, and Robert C Lieberman. "Ironies of State Building: A Comparative Perspective on the American State." *World Politics* 61, no. 03 (2009): 547-88.
- King, Gary, Robert O Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Kohli, A. *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Kouyate, Mamadou. "Rwanda for Full Congo Solution." In *Hungry for Truth, Peace, and Justice*. <http://hungryoftruth.blogspot.co.uk/2009/01/rwanda-for-full-congo-solution.html>, 2009, January 9.
- Kruger, N.J. *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Kumar, Krishna. *Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda*. Washington, DC: USAID, 1996.
- Kuperman, A. J. "Provoking Genocide: A Revised History of the Rwandan Patriotic Front." *Journal of Genocide Research* 6, no. 1 (2004): 61-84.
- Lambourne, Wendy. "Postconflict Peacebuilding in Cambodia and Rwanda." In *Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice*, edited by Mohammed Abu-Nimer. 311. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2001.
- Land, Anthony. "Developing Capacity for Tax Administration: The Rwanda Revenue Authority." *ECDPM Discussion Paper 57D* (2004).
- Larbi, George A. *The New Public Management Approach and Crisis States*. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1999.
- Larmer, Miles, and Alastair Fraser. "Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zambia's 2006 Election." *African Affairs* 106, no. 425 (2007): 611-37.
- Lasswell, H.D. *Politics; Who Gets What, When, How*. New York, NY: Meridian Books, 1936.
- Lemarchand, René. "The Coup in Rwanda." *Rotberg and Mazrui, Protest and Power in Black Africa* (1970): 924-67.
- . *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa*. University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.
- . "Le Génocide De 1972 Au Burundi." *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines*, no. 3 (2002): 551-68.
- . "Power and Stratification in Rwanda: A Reconsideration." *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines* 6, no. 24 (1966): 592-610.
- . *Rwanda and Burundi*. New York, NY: Praeger, 1970.
- . "Rwanda: The State of Research." *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence* (2013): <http://www.massviolence.org/RWANDA-THE-STATE-OF-RESEARCH,742>.
- Levi, Margaret. *Of Rule and Revenue*. California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1988.
- Levitsky, S., and L. Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Levitsky, S., and L. A. Way. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (Apr 2002): 51-65.
- Lijphart, Arend. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." *The American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971): 682-93.
- Lilleker, Darren G. "Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield." *Politics* 23, no. 3 (2003): 207-14.
- Linz, J.J. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1985.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Political Man*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960.
- Lister, Sarah, and Andrew Wilder. "Strengthening Subnational Administration in Afghanistan: Technical Reform or State-Building?." *Public Administration and Development* 25, no. 1 (2005): 39-48.

- Longman, Timothy. *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*. Vol. 112, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- . "Placing Genocide in Context: Research Priorities for the Rwandan Genocide." *Journal of Genocide Research* 6, no. 1 (2004): 29-45.
- . "Rwanda: Achieving Equality or Serving an Authoritarian State?" In *Women in African Parliaments*, edited by Hannah Evelyn Britton and Gretchen Bauer. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.
- Lonsdale, John. "States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey." *African Studies Review* 24, no. 2/3 (1981): 139-225.
- Lorgen, Christy Cannon. "Villagisation in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Tanzania." *Social Dynamics* 26, no. 2 (2000): 171-98.
- Lukes, S. *Power: A Radical View*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Lund, Christian. "Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa." *Development and Change* 37, no. 4 (2006): 685-705.
- Lustick, Ian S. "History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias." *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 3 (1996): 605-18.
- . "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control." *World Politics* 31, no. 3 (1979): 325-44.
- Magaloni, B. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Magaloni, B., and R. Kricheli. "Political Order and One-Party Rule." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (2010): 123-43.
- Mahoney, J., and D. Rueschemeyer. *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Malkki, L.H. *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Mamdani, M. *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Mann, Arthur. "Are Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities the Answer to Tax Administration Problems in Developing Countries? A Practical Guide." *Research paper for the project: Fiscal Reform in Support of Trade Liberalization* (2004).
- Mann, Michael. "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results." *European Journal of Sociology* 25, no. 02 (1984): 185-213.
- Maquet, J. J. "The Kingdom of Rwanda." In *African Worlds: Studies in the Cosmological Ideas and Social Values of African Peoples*, edited by D Forde. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954.
- . *The Premiss of Inequality in Rwanda*. London: International African Institute, 1961.
- Marenin, Otwin. *Restoring Policing Systems in Conflict Torn Nations: Process, Problems, Prospects*. Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2010.
- Markakis, John. *Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers*. Oxford: James Currey, 2011.
- Marx, K. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Rockville, MD: Arc Manor, 2008.
- Marysse, S, T De Herdt, and E Ndayambaje. "Appauvrissement De La Population Rurale Et Ajustement Structurel: Causalite Au Coincidence." *Le cas de Kirarambogo (Rwanda)*. Antwerp: Centre for Development Studies (1993).
- Marysse, Stefaan. "Regress, War, and Fragile Recovery." In *The Political Economy of the Great Lakes Region in Africa*, edited by Stefaan Marysse and Filip Reyntjens. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.
- Marysse, Stefaan, and Catherine André. "Guerre Et Pillage Économique En République Démocratique Du Congo." In *L'Afrique Des Grands Lacs Annuaire 2000-2001*, edited by Filip Reyntjens. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001.
- Marysse, Stefaan, and Filip Reyntjens. *The Political Economy of the Great Lakes Region in Africa: The Pitfalls of Enforced Democracy and Globalization*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Maton, J. *Développement Économique Et Social Au Rwanda Entre 1980 Et 1993, Le Dixième Difficile En Face De L'apocalypse*. Ghent : UG/Unité d'enseignement et de recherche au développement (1994).
- Mayall, James, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira. *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States*. London: Hurst, 2011.
- McGregor, J.A., and R. Primorac. *Zimbabwe's New Diaspora: Displacement and the Cultural Politics of Survival*. New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2010.

- McLaughlin, K., S.P. Osborne, and E. Ferlie. *New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Means, Gordon Paul. "Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore." *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 4 (1996): 103-17.
- Melvorn, L. *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*. London: Zed Books, 2000.
- Messiant, C. "The Mutation of Hegemonic Domination." In *Angola: The Weight of History*, edited by P. Chabal and N. Vidal. Manhattan, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008.
- Mgbako, Chi. "Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda." *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 18 (2005): 201-24.
- Migdal, J.S. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Miliband, R. *The State in Capitalist Society*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1969.
- Milliken, Jennifer. *State Failure, Collapse & Reconstruction*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.
- Mills, C. Wright. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.
- Mitchell, Timothy. *Colonising Egypt*. Cambridge Middle East Library. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Moiles, Judson C. "Unity, Freedom and Socialism: The Assads, the Ba'ath and the Making of Modern Syria." *Grand Valley Journal of History* 2, no. 1 (2012): 2.
- Moore, B. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1967.
- Morgenthau, R.S. *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.
- Morley, D., and K.H. Chen. *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Mosley, P., J. Harrigan, and J.F.J. Toye. *Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending*. London: Routledge, 1995.
- Mpfungwe, A. R. "Crisis and Response in Rwanda: Reflections on the Arusha Peace Process." Johannesburg: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999.
- Muhoozi, F.X.N. *A Deficit of Logic in the Great Lakes of Africa*. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011.
- Musahara, H, and C Huggins. "Land Reform, Land Scarcity, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Case Study of Rwanda." *Security Studies* 3 (2004).
- Museveni, Y.K., E. Kanyogonya, and K. Shillington. *Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda*. Kampala: Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1997.
- Mushemeza, E.D. *The Politics and Empowerment of Banyarwanda Refugees in Uganda, 1959-2001*. Kampala: Fountain, 2007.
- Muzungu, B. *Histoire Du Rwanda Précolonial*. Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 2003.
- Mwakikagile, G. *Civil Wars in Rwanda and Burundi: Conflict Resolution in Africa*. Dar Es Salaam: New Africa Press, 2013.
- Nagl, J.A. *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
- Nahimana, Ferdinand. *Le Rwanda: Emergence D'un État*. Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1993.
- . "Les Bami Ou Roitelets Hutu Du Corridor Nyabarongo-Mukungwa Avec Ses Regions Limitrophes." *Etudes Rwandaises* 12 (1979): 1-25.
- . "Les Principautés Hutu Du Rwanda Septentrional." *La civilisation ancienne des peuples des grands lacs* (1981): 115-16.
- Nathan, Laurie. "'The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics': A Critique of Collier and Hoeffler on Causes of Civil War." In *Crisis States Research Centre Discussion Papers*: London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, 2005.
- Navaro-Yashin, Yael. *Faces of the State : Secularism and Public Life in Turkey*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Ndahiro, T. "Genocide Laundering: Historical Revisionism and the Rassemblement Républicain Pour La Démocratie Au Rwanda." In *After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond*, edited by P. Clark and Z.D. Kaufman. London: Hurst, 2009.
- Ndekezi, Sylvestre. *Les Métiers Traditionnels Du Rwanda*. Kigali: Imprimerie de Kigali, 1986.
- . *Rituel Du Mariage Coutumier Au Rwanda*. Kigali: Imprimerie de Kigali, 1984.
- Nelson, Craig, and Philip Sherwell. "Business as Usual for Africa's 'Merchant of Death!'" *The Daily Telegraph*, 2001, 22 July.
- Nest, M. *Coltan*. Oxford: Wiley, 2013.

- Nest, M.W., F. Grignon, and E.F. Kisangani. *The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.
- Nettl, J. P. "The State as a Conceptual Variable." *World Politics* 20, no. 4 (1968): 559-92.
- Newbury, Catharine. *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960*. Manhattan, NY: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- . "Deux Lignages Du Kinyaga (Two Kinyaga Lineages)." *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines* (1974): 26-38.
- . "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda." *Africa Today* 47, no. 1 (1998): 9-24.
- Newbury, Catharine, and David Newbury. "A Catholic Mass in Kigali: Contested Views of the Genocide and Ethnicity in Rwanda." *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* 33, no. 2/3 (1999): 292-328.
- Newbury, David. "The Clans of Rwanda: An Historical Hypothesis." *Africa* 50, no. 4 (1980): 389-403.
- . *Kings and Clans: Ijwi Island and the Lake Kivu Rift, 1780-1840*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.
- North, D.C., J.J. Wallis, and B.R. Weingast. *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Nsengiyumva, A, and C Stork. "Rwanda." In *Towards an African E-Index: Household and Individual Ict Access and Usage Across 10 African Countries*. 120-29. Johannesburg: LINK Centre, Wits University, School of Public and Development Management, 2005.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo A. *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1988.
- . "Illusions About Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (1996): 34-51.
- . *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*. Oakland, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973.
- O'Halloran, K. *Rwanda: Unamir 1994/95*. Sydney: Big Sky, 2012.
- Ogot, B. A. "The Great Lakes Region." In *General History of Africa Vol. Iv: African from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century*, edited by D. T. Niane. 498-524. Paris: UNESCO, 1984.
- Olson, Mancur. *Power and Prosperity : Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships*. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
- Omaar, Rakiya. *Rwanda: Death, Despair, Defiance*. London: African Rights, 1994.
- Omaar, Rakiya, and Alex de Waal. *Rwanda: The Insurgency in the Northwest*. London: African Rights, 1998.
- Onana, Charles. *Les Secrets Du Génocide Rwandais.: Enquête Sur Les Mystères D'un Président*. Editions Duboiris, 2002.
- Oomen, Barbara. "Donor-Driven Justice and Its Discontents: The Case of Rwanda." *Development and Change* 36, no. 5 (2005): 887-910.
- Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. *The War Ledger*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
- Orozco, Manuel. "Emerging Markets for Rwanda: Remittance Transfers, Its Marketplace and Financial Intermediation." In *Inter-American Dialogue*. Washington, DC, 2009.
- Orth, Richard. "Rwanda's Hutu Extremist Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 12, no. 1 (2001): 76-109.
- . "Rwanda's Hutu Extremist Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective." In *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives*, edited by S.E. Cook. Livingston, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006.
- Orwell, G. "Politics and the English Language." *Horizon* 76 (1946): 252-64.
- Osoba, Segun. "The Nigerian Political Elite: 1952-1965." In *African Social Studies*, edited by P. Gutkind and P. Waterman. London: Heinemann, 1977.
- Otunnu, Ogenga. "Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda." In *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, edited by H. Adelman and A. Suhrke. 3-30. Livingston, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999.
- Pagès, P. *Un Royaume Hamite Au Centre De L'Afrique*. Brussels: Georges Van Campenhout, 1933.
- Paris, Roland. *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Paris, Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk. *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*. Oxford: Routledge, 2009.
- Peabody, Robert L., Susan Webb Hammond, Jean Torcom, Lynne P. Brown, Carolyn Thompson, and Robert Kolodny. "Interviewing Political Elites." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 23, no. 3 (1990): 451-55.
- Péan, Pierre. *Noires Fureurs, Blancs Menteurs: Rwanda 1990/1994*. Hachette. com, 2005.

- Phillips, Robert. "The Politics of History: Some Methodological and Ethical Dilemmas in Élite-Based Research." *British Educational Research Journal* 24, no. 1 (1998): 5-19.
- Platt, Jennifer. "Evidence and Proof in Documentary Research: Some Specific Problems of Documentary Research." *The Sociological Review* 29, no. 1 (1981): 31-52.
- Pottier, Johan. "Land Reform for Peace? Rwanda's 2005 Land Law in Context." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 6, no. 4 (2006): 509-37.
- . *Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- . "Taking Stock: Food Marketing Reform in Rwanda." *African Affairs* 92 (1993): 5-30.
- Poulantzas, N.A. *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*. London: Verso, 1978.
- Powesland, P.G. "History of Migration in Uganda." In *Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda*, edited by A.I. Richards. Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Powley, Elizabeth. "Strengthening Governance: The Role of Women in Rwanda's Transition." In *Women Waging Peace*. Cambridge, MA: Hunt Alternatives Fund, 2003.
- Prunier, Gérard. *From Genocide to Continental War : The 'Congolese' Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa*. London: Hurst, 2009.
- . "L'ouganda Et Le Front Patriotique Rwandais." In *Enjeux Nationaux Et Dynamiques Régionales Dans L'Afrique Des Grands Lacs*, edited by A. Guichaoua. 45. Lille: Université de Lille, Faculté des Sciences économiques et sociales, 1992.
- . *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994 : History of a Genocide*. London: Hurst, 1995.
- . "Rwanda: Update to End March 1995." In WRITENET. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6b6c.html>, 1995.
- . "The Rwandan Patriotic Front." In *African Guerrillas*, edited by C. Clapham. 119 - 33. Oxford: James Currey, 1998.
- . "The Social, Political, and Economic Situation." In *Issue Paper formerly posted on http://www.writenet.org (now available from the author on request)*, 1997.
- Purdeková, Andrea. "'Even If I Am Not Here, There Are So Many Eyes': Surveillance and State Reach in Rwanda." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 03 (2011): 475-97.
- Record, J. *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win*. Lincoln, NE: Potomac, 2007.
- Reed, William Cyrus. "Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, no. 3 (Sep 1996): 479-501.
- . "The Rwandan Patriotic Front: Politics and Development in Rwanda." *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 23, no. 2 (1995): 48-53.
- Reno, W. *Warlord Politics and African States*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.
- Reyntjens, F. "The Privatisation and Criminalisation Ofpublic Space in the Geopolitics of the Great Lakes Region." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 43, no. 4 (Dec 2005): 587-607.
- . "Chiefs and Burgomasters in Rwanda: The Unfinished Quest for a Bureaucracy." *Journal of Legal Pluralism* 25/26 (1987): 71-97.
- . "Constitution-Making in Situations of Extreme Crisis: The Case of Rwanda and Burundi." *Journal of African Law* 40, no. 02 (1996): 234-42.
- . "Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda." *African Affairs* 110, no. 438 (January 1, 2011 2011): 1-34.
- . "Les Mouvements Armés Des Réfugiés Rwandais : Rupture Ou Continuité?". *Civilisations* 40, no. 2 (1992): 170-82.
- . *Pouvoir Et Droit Au Rwanda: Droit Public Et Évolution Politique, 1916-1973*. Vol. 117: Musée royal de l'Afrique centrale, 1985.
- . "Rencontres Burundaises: Inyenzi Du Rwanda Et Rebelles Du Kivu in Les Rébellions Dans L'est Du Zaïre (1964-1967)." *Cahiers du CEDAF*, no. 7-8 (1986): 123-37.
- . "Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship." *African Affairs* 103, no. 411 (Apr 2004): 177-210.
- . *Talking or Fighting?: Political Evolution in Rwanda and Burundi, 1998-1999*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999.
- Ritchie, Jane, Jane Lewis, Carol McNaughton Nicholls, and Rachel Ormston. *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*. London: Sage, 2013.
- Robinson, Piers. "The Cnn Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?". *Review of international studies* 25, no. 2 (1999): 301-09.

- Rotberg, Robert I. *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*. Medford, MA: World Peace Foundation, 2003.
- Rubin, Michael. "Green Money, Islamist Politics in Turkey." *Middle East Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (2005).
- Rudasingwa, Theogene. *Healing a Nation: A Testimony: Waging and Winning a Peaceful Revolution to Unite and Heal a Broken Rwanda*. North Charleston, SC: Createspace Independent, 2013.
- . *Rwanda: National Unity, Reconciliation, Democratisation, and Justice*. Dar Es Salaam: Thackers Publishers, 1996.
- Rusagara, F.K., G. Mwaura, and G. Nyirimanzi. *Resilience of a Nation: A History of the Military in Rwanda*. Kampala: Fountain, 2009.
- Rusesabagina, Paul. *An Ordinary Man: The True Story Behind Hotel Rwanda*. London: Bloomsbury, 2007.
- Rutanga, M. *Nyabingi Movement: People's Anti-Colonial Struggles in Kigezi, 1910-1930*. Cbr Working Paper Series. Kampala: Centre for Basic Research, 1991.
- . *Politics, Religion, and Power in the Great Lakes Region*. Kampala: Fountain, 2011.
- Ruzibiza, Abdul Joshua, and Claudine Vidal. *Rwanda, L'histoire Secrète*. Paris: Éditions du Panama, 2005.
- Saint-Simon, H. *The Political Thought of Saint-Simon*. edited by G. Ionescu Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Sartori, Giovanni. "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics." *The American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (1970): 1033-53.
- Schedler, A. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.
- Schmitt, C. *Political Theory: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
- Scorgie, Lindsay. "Rwanda's Arusha Accords: A Missed Opportunity." *Undercurrent* 1, no. 1 (2004): 66-76.
- Scott, James C. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Sebareenzi, J., and L. Mullane. *God Sleeps in Rwanda: A Journey of Transformation*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2011.
- Seibert, Gerhard. *Comrades, Clients and Cousins: Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in São Tomé and Príncipe*. Leiden: CNWS, 1999.
- Seidman, Irving. *Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences*. New York, NY: Teachers College Press, 2012.
- Sémelin, Jacques. *Purifier Et Détruire. Usages Politiques Des Massacres Et Génocides*. Paris: Éditions de La Martinière, 2009.
- Shore, Cris, and Stephen L Nugent. *Elite Cultures: Anthropological Perspectives*. Oxford: Routledge, 2002.
- Skocpol, Theda. "Bringing the State Back In." *Items* 36 (1982).
- Soares de Oliveira, Ricardo. "Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 02 (2011): 287-314.
- . *Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea*. London: Hurst, 2007.
- Sorensen, G. "War and State-Making - Why Doesn't It Work in the Third World?." *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 3 (Sep 2001): 341-54.
- Stearns, J. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011.
- Steers, R.M., Y.K. Shin, and G.R. Ungson. *The Chaebol: Korea's New Industrial Might*. London: HarperCollins, 1991.
- Steinmetz, G. *State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Stettenheim, J. "The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda." In *Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict*, edited by M. C. Greenberg, J. H. Barton and M. E. McGuinness. New York, NY: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.
- Storey, Andy. "Structural Adjustment, State Power & Genocide: The World Bank & Rwanda." *Review of African Political Economy* 28, no. 89 (2001/09/01 2001): 365-85.
- Straus, S. *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008.
- Straus, S., and L. Waldorf. *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011.
- Stremlau, J., and F Sagasti. "Preventing Deadly Conflict: Does the World Bank Have a Role?" In *Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Foundation, 1998.

- Taliercio, Robert Jr. "Administrative Reform as Credible Commitment: The Impact of Autonomy on Revenue Authority Performance in Latin America." *World Development* 32, no. 2 (2004): 213-32.
- . "Designing Performance: The Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authority Model in African and Latin America." *Policy Research Working Paper 3423*. Washington DC: The World Bank, 2004.
- Tansey, Oisín. "Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 40, no. 4 (2007): 765-72.
- Taussig, M.T. *The Magic of the State*. Oxford: Routledge, 1997.
- Taylor, B. D., and R. Botea. "Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World1." *International Studies Review* 10, no. 1 (2008): 27-56.
- Taylor, Christopher Charles, and Eckhard Breiting. *Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994*. Oxford: Berg, 1999.
- Terpker, Seth. "Revenue Authorities—a Comparison of the Experiences of Ghana and East African Countries." *International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation* 53, no. 4 (1999): 171-79.
- Terry, F. *Condemned to Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- Thies, C. G. "Of Rulers, Rebels, and Revenue: State Capacity, Civil War Onset, and Primary Commodities." *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 3 (May 2010): 321-32.
- . "The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 3 (Aug 2007): 716-31.
- Thompson, A. *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*. London: Pluto, 2007.
- Thompson, Susan. "Resisting Reconciliation: State Power and Everyday Life in Post-Genocide Rwanda." Dalhousie University, 2009.
- Tilly, Charles. *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984.
- . *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*. Studies in Social Discontinuity. [Rev. ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
- . "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol. 169-92. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Traniello, Marisa. "Power-Sharing: Lessons from South Africa and Rwanda." *International Public Policy Review* 3, no. 2 (2008).
- Tripp, A.M. *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010.
- Turner, T. *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality*. London: Zed, 2007.
- Umutesi, M. Beatrice, and Catharine Newbury. *Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004.
- Uvin, Peter. *Aiding Violence : The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*. West Hartford, Conn: Kumarian Press, 1998.
- . "Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International Community in Rwanda after the Genocide." *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (2001/04/01 2001): 177-89.
- Vallée, Olivier. *Pouvoirs Et Politiques En Afrique*. Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1999.
- Van Der Meeren, Rachel. "Three Decades in Exile: Rwandan Refugees 1960-1990." *J. Refugee Stud.* 9 (1996): 252.
- van Donge, Jan Kees. "The Fate of an African 'Chaebol': Malawi's Press Corporation after Democratisation." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 40, no. 04 (2002): 651-81.
- Van Hoyweghen, Saskia. "The Urgency of Land and Agrarian Reform in Rwanda." *African Affairs* 98, no. 392 (July 1, 1999 1999): 353-72.
- Vansina, J. *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005.
- . *L'évolution Du Royaume Rwanda, Dès Origines À 1900*. Brussels: Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer (ARSOM), 1962.
- Verhoeven, Harry. "Hydro-Agricultural Savants and the Paradoxes of State-Building: The Dam Implementation Unit's "Mission of Rebuilding Civilisation" in Sudan." *Third World Quarterly* (under review).
- Verschave, François-Xavier. *Complicité De Génocide?: La Politique De La France Au Rwanda*. Brussels: Éditions la Découverte, 1994.
- Vidal, Claudine. "Alexis Kagame Entre Memoire Et Histoire." *History in Africa* 15 (1988): 493-504.

- . "De La Contradiction Sauvage." *L'Homme* 14, no. 3 (1974): 5-58.
- . "Enquête Sur Le Rwanda Traditionnel: Conscience Historique Et Traditions Orales." *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines* 11, no. 44 (1971): 526-37.
- . *Sociologie Des Passions: Rwanda, Côte D'ivoire*. Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1991.
- Vlassenroot, Koen, and Timothy Raeymaekers. *Conflict and Social Transformation in Eastern Dr Congo*. Ghent: Academia Press, 2004.
- Voltaire. *Candide, Ou L'optimisme*. Paris: Cramer, Marc-Michel Rey, Jean Nourse, Lambert, and others, 1759.
- von Soest, C. "The African State and the Capability to Raise Revenue: A Comparative Study of the Tax Administration in Zambia and Botswana." Universität Leipzig, 2006.
- Wadhams, N. "Can One Laptop Per Child Transform Rwanda's Economy?" *Time*, 18th June 2010.
- Wallis, Andrew. *Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006.
- Wanja, C. "Kenya Wins Continental Handwashing Competition." *Kenya Broadcasting Corporation*, 2011, July 21st.
- Watson, C. "War and Waiting." *Africa Report* 37, no. 6 (1992): 51-55.
- Waugh, Colin M. *Paul Kagame and Rwanda : Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., Publishers, 2004.
- Weber, Max. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1978.
- . *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. edited by Karl Emil Maximilian, C Wright Mills and Hans Heinrich Gerth London: Kegan Paul, 1947.
- Wendt, Alexander. "3. "Ideas All the Way Down?": On the Constitution of Power and Interest." In *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Whitfield, Lindsay. *The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Willame, Jean-Claude. *Aux Sources De L'hécatombe Rwandaise*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995.
- Williams, Gavin. "The World Bank and the Peasant Problem." In *Rural Development in Tropical Africa*, edited by J. Heyer, P. Roberts and G. Williams. London: MacMillan, 1981.
- . *State and Society in Nigeria*. Idanre: Afrografika Publishers, 1980.
- . Gavin. "Studying Development and Explaining Policies." *Oxford Development Studies* 31, no. 1 (2003/03/01 2003): 37-58.
- Williams, G, A Duncan, P Landell-Mills, S Unsworth, and T Sheehy. "Carrying out a Joint Governance Assessment—Lessons from Rwanda." *The Policy Practice, Brief 5* (2009).
- Young, C., and T.E. Turner. *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013.
- Zakaria, F. *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (Revised Edition)*. London: W. W. Norton, 2007.
- Zartman, I.W. *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1995.
- Zolberg, A.R. *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa*. Chicago. IL: University of Chicago Press, 1966.

Newspaper Articles:

- AP. "Search for High-Tech Ore Fuels Congo's War." *Associated Press*, 2000, 8th April.
- Asiimwe, Bosco R. "Country Commended for Anti-Gbv Campaign." *The New Times*, 2011, 27th July.
- BBC. "Rwanda Denies Using Forced Labour." *British Broadcasting Corporation*, 2001, 22nd March.
- . "Rwanda Gets Tough on Plastic Bags." *British Broadcasting Corporation*, 2006, 17th January.
- Braeckman, Colette. "Entretien Avec Paul Kagame." *Le Soir*, 1999, February 5th.
- Butamire, P. "'Girinka' for Unity and Equality." *The New Times*, 2011, 26th March.
- Cerralbo, Yoav. "Kisa Makes Rwanda It Hub for East Africa." *The Korea Herald*, 2011, 7th August.
- Clark, Phil. "Why the Congo Experts Need More Scrutiny." *Huffington Post*, 2013, 2nd January.
- Duval Smith, Alex. "Uganda to Pull out of Congo Peace Plan." *The Independent*, 2001, April 30th, 13.
- Hubbard, Mark. "Un Alert Urged as Arms Pour into New Rwanda War." *Observer*, 1995, March 26th.
- Johnson, Dominic. "Erzfeinde Im Coltan-Rausch." *Die Tageszeitung*, 2000, 22nd December.

- Kabeera, E. "Women Urged to Take Advantage of Regional Conference." *The New Times*, 2011, 3rd August.
- Kagire, E. "Kagame Urges the Region to Invest in Women." *The New Times*, 2011, 6th August.
- . "Umuganda Has Earned Country International Acclaim - Kagame." *The New Times*, 2009, 29th March.
- . "Country to Host Global Meet on Gender Responsive Budgeting." *The New Times*, 2011, 24th July.
- Kanyesigye, F. "Rwanda Has 4th Fastest Internet in Africa." *New Times*, 2012, 7th March.
- Kimenyi, Felly. "The Life and Times of Michel Rwagasana." *The New Times*, 2013, February 1st.
- Kwizera, C. "Country to Host Conference on Peacekeeping in Somalia." *The New Times*, 2011, 5th July.
- . "Kist Locks Horns with Zigama." *The New Times*, 2010, 27th February.
- LLB. "Des Sociétés Belges Impliquées Dans Le Trafic De Coltan." *Le Libre Belgique*, 2001, 12th April.
- . "Les Rwandais Pillent-Ils De Congo?" *Le Libre Belgique*, 1999, 25th October.
- . "A Qui Profite Le Coltan De L'est Congolais?" *Le Libre Belgique*, 2000, 23rd December.
- . "Trop De Dépenses Militaires." *Le Libre Belgique*, 1999, 2nd November.
- Majyambere, G. "Agriculture Budget Increased by Five Percent." *The New Times*, 2011, 11th May.
- Massimo, Alberizzi. "La Guerra Del Minerale Misterioso Migliaia Di Morti in Congo Per Il Coltan, La Sabbia Nera «Più Preziosa Dell' Oro»." *Corriere della Sera*, 2001, April 26th.
- Moyo, Dambisa. "Diary." *Financial Times*, 2009, 28th February, Life and Arts Section, p2.
- Mporanyi, Charles. "Rwanda Investment Group S.A. (Rig S.A)." *The Independent*, 2009, 27th April.
- Mugabe, Robert. "Conspiracy to Oust Frank Habineza from Green Party in Pipeline." *Great Lakes Voice*, 2013, October 21st.
- Mugisha, S. "Kicukiro Ex-Combatants Benefit from Girinka Drive." *The New Times*, 2011, 2nd April.
- Mugoya, G. "Kigali to Host International Religious Conference." *The New Times*, 2011, 26th July.
- Mukombozi, R. "Kagame Meets Railway Expert." *The New Times*, 2007, 25th April.
- Murangwa, Justin. "The Truth on Rwanda." In *Rwanda Today*, 2010, December 14.
- Mushikiwabo, Louise. "Africa Needs Responsible Reporting: False Stories in the Western Media That Rwanda Planned to Criminalise Homosexuality Threatened Investment in the Region." *The Guardian*, 2010, 24 January.
- Musoni, Edwin. "700,000 Men Expected to Undergo Vasectomy." *New Times*, 2011, 2nd February.
- . "Bugesera Airport to Cost Rwf 200 Billion." *The New Times*, 2009, 8th August.
- . "Country Needs 70,000 Latrines." *The New Times*, 2011, 21st July.
- . "Minister Urges Govts to Increase Gender Budget." *The New Times*, 2011, 27th July.
- . "Sanitation Project Launches Chapter." *The New Times*, 2011, 18th July.
- Nabakwe, Ruth. "Kagame Appeals in French Court against Verdict Favouring Journalist." *The Perspective*, 2002, July 30th.
- Namata, B. "Rwanda Targets 7pc Growth Despite Inflation." *The East Africa*, 2011, 7th August.
- . "Rwanda to Revise Budget for Proposed Bugesera Airport." *The East African*, 2011, 7th August.
- Niyonshuti, I. "Minister Owns up Mistakes in Girinka Project." *The New Times*, 2010, 12th February.
- Ntayombya, Sunny. "I'm Calling for a Militantly Feminist Rpf." *The New Times*, 2011, 24th July.
- Nyesiga, Dias. "Rwanda Extends Deadline for Digital Tv Migration to July 31st." *The Rwanda Focus*, 2014, January 15th.
- Rosenberg, Tina. "In Rwanda, Health Care Coverage That Eludes the U.S." *New York Times*, 2012, July 3rd.
- Rwirahira, R. "Success of Girinka Program Symbolic for Rwanda's Progress." *The Rwanda Focus*, 2011, 7th March.
- Santoro, Lara. "Behind the Congo War: Diamonds." *Christian Science Monitor*, 1998, August 16th.
- Thome, W. H. "Kigali Conference on Doing Business in Africa Opens." *etn: global travel industry news*, 2011, 17th March.
- Ubwani, Zephania. "Harness Women Potential, Eac Urged." *The Citizen*, 2011, 8th August.
- Vick, Karl. "Vital Ore Funds Congo's War: Combatants Profit from Col-Tan Trade." *The Washington Post*, 2001, March 19th.
- Zajtman, Arnaud. "Ore Fuels West's Cellphones, Playstations, and War." *Associated Press*, 2001, April 9th.
- Unattributed reporter:
 ———. "Découverte D'un Gisement De Coltan Au Rwanda." *Agence France Press*, 2001, 21st January.

- . "Kigali City Bans Unnecessary Hooting." *In2eastafrika*, 2011, August 6th.
- . "Opposition Party Registration Is Impossible Say Green Party Boss." *The Rwandan* <http://www.therwandan.com/blog/opposition-party-registration-is-impossible-in-rwanda-said-green-party-boss/> (2013, May 20th).
- . "Passengers in Kigali to Use Smart Cards." *East African Business Week*, 2011, 6th August.
- . "Rwanda and Uganda Reject Report into Plundering of Drc." *Agence France Presse*, 2001, 4th May.
- . "Shift to Digital Broadcasting on Track." *The New Times*, 2011, 5th August.
- . "There's a Plot to Finish Us, Alleges Rwanda's Green Party Boss." *The East African* 2012, October 2th.
- . "Umuganda." *Conservativehome – CentreRight Blog*, 2008, August 1st.
Available at <http://conservativehome.blogs.com/centreright/2008/08/umuganda.html>

International Legal Documents:

Treaties:

Arusha Protocol on the Rule of Law, August 18th 1992, Republic of Rwanda-Rwandan Patriotic Front.

United Nations Documents:

- United Nations Security Council. "Addendum to the Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2012/348) Concerning Violations of the Arms Embargo and Sanctions Regime by the Government of Rwanda ", 2012.
- . "Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/1072)." 2001.
- . "Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2002/1146)." 2002.
- . "Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2003/1027)." 2003.
- . "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo." 2012.
- . "Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2002/565)." 2002.
- . "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/357)." 2001.

Official Reports:

- AI. "Democratic Republic of Congo: Rwandese-Controlled East: Devastating Human Toll (Afr 62/11/01)." Amnesty International, 2001.
- . "Great Lakes Region: Refugees Denied Protection (Afr02/02/00)," Amnesty International, 2000.
- AR. "Briefing Paper on the North-West Region of Rwanda." African Rights, 1999.
- Baaré, Anton, David Shearer, and Peter Uvin. "The Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations. Case Study: Rwanda." Paris: OECD Development Assistance Committee Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development Co-Operation, 1999.
- CIDA. *Canada and Rwanda: Together for Rwanda's Development*. Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency, 2005.
- De Rover, Cees. "Development Assistance to the Gendarmerie and Communal Police Force of Rwanda: Background Report to Facilitate the Elaboration of a Final Project Document." New York, NY: United Nations Development Programme, 1995.
- DfID. "Evaluation of Revenue Projects: Synthesis Report; Evaluation Report Ev." London: Department for International Development, 2002.

- . *Rwanda: Country Assistance Plan 2003 - 2006*. London: Department for International Development, 2003.
- EIU. "Country Report: Rwanda." Economist Intelligence Unit, 2001.
- . "Country Report: Rwanda." Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003.
- EU. "Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on the Statement of the Rwandan Government on the Parliamentary Report on Genocidal Ideology." Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2004.
- . "Final Report: Legislative Elections to the Chamber of Deputies , 15 - 18 September 2008." European Union Election Observation Mission, 2008.
- . "Mission D'observation Electorale De L'union Européenne. Elections Présidentielles Et Législatives. Rwanda 2003. Déclaration Préliminaire." Kigali: European Union, 2003.
- . "Mission D'observation Electorale De L'union Européenne. Référendum Constitutionnel, Rwanda 2003. Déclaration Préliminaire." Kigali: European Union, 2003.
- GoB. "Construction De La Paix Dans La Région Des Grands Lacs: Un Plan D'action Belge." Brussels: Chambre des Représants de Belgique, Government of Belgium, 2001.
- . "Note De Politique Générale Du Ministre Le La Coopération Ua Développement Pour L'année Budgétaire 2004." Brussels: Chambre des Représants de Belgique, Government of Belgium, 2003.
- Goetz, Daniel, Pascal Blacque-Belair, and Jacques Gagnon. "Assessment of Rwandan Local Authorities' Capacity and Formulation of Strategic Framework for Local Government Development." In *USAID Consultancy Report*. Kigali: RTI-USAID, 1994.
- HRW. "Country Report: Rwanda." New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007.
- . "Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity." Washington DC: Human Rights Watch, 1995.
- . "Rwanda: The Search for Security and Human Rights Abuses." Human Rights Watch, 2000.
- . "The Rwandan Patriotic Front." Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 1999.
- ICG. "'Consensual Democracy' in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections." In *Africa Report No. 34*. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2001.
- . "Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary Political Liberalisation." International Crisis Group, 2002.
- . "Scramble in the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War." In *Africa Report No. 26*: International Crisis Group, 2000.
- IMF. *Rwanda: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2008.
- IPIS. "Mineral Exports by Rcd-Goma in 2000." In *Central Africa Minerals and Arms Research Bulletin*. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service, Universiteit Antwerpen, 2001.
- IRIN-CEA. "Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes Region." Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 1996.
- Khan, Qaiser, Amolo Ngweni, and Girindre Becharry. "Rwanda: Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Growth." Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994.
- Kidd, M, and W Crandall. "Revenue Authorities: An Evaluation of Their Impact on Revenue Administration Reforms." In *IMF Working Paper 6/240*. Washington DC: The International Monetary Fund, 2006.
- LIPRODHOR. "Observation Des Élections Locales, Régions Du Nord-Ouest Du Rwanda." In *Photocopy, author's personal collection*, 1999.
- OHCHR. "Report on Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between 1993 and 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Drc)". <http://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/africaregion/Pages/rdcProjetmapping.aspx>: United Nations, 2009.
- SIDA. *Rwanda Looking Ahead: Reconciliation, Reform, and Regional Stability*. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Agency, 2002.
- Spittaels, Steven, and Filip Hilgert. "Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern Drc." Antwerp: International Peace Information Service, Universiteit Antwerpen, 2008.
- UK-IND. "Rwanda Assessment." UK Immigration and Nationality Directorate, 2001.
- USAID. *Rwanda Report*. Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2005.
- USGS. "Alluvial Diamond Mining Project."
- . "Colombium (Niobium) and Tantalum." United States Geological Survey, 1998.
- Watson, C. *Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion*. Arlington, VA: US Committee for Refugees, 1991.

- WB. "Evaluation Du Programme De Repatriement Et De Reinstallation Des Réfugiés Rwandais." Kigali: World Bank, 1995.
- . "A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction." Kigali: World Bank, 1997.
- . "From Crisis to Sustainable Growth." Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989.
- . "Governance and Development." Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992.
- . "Implementation Completion Report: Rwandese Republic: Structural Adjustment Credit (Credit No. 2271-Rw)." Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995.
- WRITENET. "Rwanda: Update to End March 1995." 1995.
- WTO. *Rwanda: Trade Policy Review*. Geneva: World Trade Organisation, 2004.

Rwandan Government Documents:

- Minadef. "Press Release: Kigali Conference Calls for More Women at All Levels of Peacekeeping Operations." edited by Ministry of Defence. Kigali, 2008.
- Minagri. "Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture - Phase II." Kigali, 2009.
- Minaloc. "National Decentralisation Policy and Implementation Strategy for National Decentralisation Policy". Kigali: Republic of Rwanda, 2000.
- RRA. "Annual Report." Kigali: Rwanda Revenue Authority, Republic of Rwanda, 2008.
- . "Annual Report." Kigali: Rwanda Revenue Authority, Republic of Rwanda, 2009/2010.

Conference Papers:

- Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Marina, and Kristin Johnson. "Relative Political Capacity: Theory, Model, Data, and Updates." In *Annual Meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention: Bridging Multiple Divides*. Hilton San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA, 2008.
- Chemouni, Benjamin. "Understanding the Ideology and Organizational Culture of the Rwandan Military: The Case of Salary Management in the Rwandan Army." In *ECAS: European Conference of African Studies*. ISTE-CEU, Lisbon, 2013.
- Clapham, Chris. "War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea." In *Failed States Conference*. Florence, 10-14 April, 2001.
- Torero, Eugene, Max Everest-Phillips, and Richard Stern. "The Rwanda Revenue Authority Project." In *International Workshop on Public-Private Dialogue*. Paris, 2006.
- UNDP. "Round Table Conference for Rwanda: Report of the Conference." Paper presented at the Round Table Conference for Rwanda, Geneva, 20th to 21st June, 1996.
- van der Walle, Nic. "Barrington Moore in the Tropics: The Middle Class and the Prospects for Liberal Democracy in Africa." Paper presented at the African History and Politics Seminars, Oxford, UK, 8th October 2012.

Quantitative Data Sources:

- Arbetman, Marina, and Jacek Kugler. *Political Capacity and Economic Behavior*. Political Economy of Global Interdependence. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.
- Kaufmann, Daniel, Art Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. *Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996 - 2008*. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4978*. Washington DC: World Bank, 2009.
- Marshall, M. G., and K. Jaggers. *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009*. Center for Systemic Peace and Colorado State University, 2009.
- OECD, *OECD Financial Statistics*. Available at <http://stats.oecd.org>
- OECD, *International Development Statistics Online Database*. Available at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm>
- World Bank, *Direction of Trade Statistics Database (DOTS)*. Available at <http://elibrary-data.imf.org/finddatareports.aspx?d=33061&e=170921>
- World Bank, *Global Bilateral Migration Database*. Available at <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-bilateral-migration-database>

Academic Theses:

- Beeland Rehder Jr., Maj. R. "From Guerillas to Peacekeepers: The Evolution of the Rwandan Defence Forces." Masters Thesis, Marine Corps University, 2008.
- Clay, Jason W. "The Eviction of Banyarwanda: The Story Behind the Refugee Crisis in Southwest Uganda." Cambridge, MA: Masters Thesis in Cultural Survival, 1984.
- Gingyera-Pinycwa, AGG. *Uganda and the Problem of Refugees*. Kampala: Makerere University Press, 1998.
- Hoffmann, Kasper. "Militarised Bodies and Spirits of Resistance-Armed Governmentalities and the Formation of Militarised Subjectivities in South Kivu/Dr Congo: The Case of the Mai-Mai Group of General Padiri." Masters Thesis, Universitet Roskilde, 2007.
- Mugambage, Frank. "Community Policing in a Post-Conflict Society: A Case Study of Post-Genocide Rwanda." Masters Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2005.
- Muhirwa, R. "Rwandese Patriotic Army Logistics Unit (G4): Assessment and Recommendations for Change." Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2000.
- Ruhunga, Sam. "Military Integration as a Factor for Post-Conflict Stability and Reconciliation: Rwanda, 1994-2005." Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006.
- Willum, B. "Foreign Aid to Rwanda: Purely Beneficial or Contributing to War?", Masters Thesis. Københavns Universitets, 2001.

Miscellaneous:

- APSA. *A Guide to Professional Ethics in Political Science*. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 2012.
- ESRC. *Framework for Research Ethics*. London: Economic and Social Research Council, 2012.
- Habineza, Frank. "Press Release: Opposition Party Registration Becoming Impossible in Rwanda." *Democratic Green Party of Rwanda* Kigali (2013, 20th May).
Published at <http://www.therwandan.com/blog/opposition-party-registration-is-impossible-in-rwanda-said-green-party-boss/>
- Nyamwasa, General Kayumba, Col Patrick Karegeya, Theogene Rudasingwa, and Gerald Gahima. "Rwanda Briefing." *Retrieved July 9 (2010):* 2012.