

The Impact of Everyday Violence on Identity: An Experimental Study in Nigeria



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Abstract

“Everyday” violence, such as robbery, burglary, or interpersonal assault, is endemic throughout much of the developing world, yet there has been relatively little research about its effects on social identity and intergroup relations. Using original data collected from an experiment embedded in a survey of over 1,000 people in Lagos, Nigeria, I empirically assess the impact of the acute threat of everyday violence, as well as actual victimization, on social identity, trust, and attitudes about violence and politics.

I find that exposure to everyday violence significantly impacts identity – and that its effects vary considerably depending on whether the individual was “merely” threatened by violence or actually experienced it firsthand. The fear induced by an acute threat of everyday violence is broadly identity-affirming, increasing evaluations of and warmth toward the primary in-group and depressing trust in and attitudes toward the out-group. Actual victimization, however, has the opposite effect, leading to a greater openness toward and trust in the primary out-group. Neither threat nor victimization significantly impacts attitudes about politics or the future use of violence.

Drawing on over 70 interviews with violence-affected-Lagosians, I argue that the way expectations about one’s security and community are defied and then rebuilt may account for this effect. Specifically, I point to three contributing factors: 1) disappointment in the apathetic in-group response; 2) “empathy-born-of-violence;” and 3) positive religious coping. These dynamics play out over time and are largely dependent on interactions with others; in this sense, one’s social environment may significantly shape whether victimization leads to openness to others and to what extent.

This research demonstrates, among other things, the profound and diverse ways in which exposure to everyday violence affects identity, and the importance of incorporating the study of everyday violence into research agendas about the dynamics of identity and conflict.

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Chapter 1

The Reach of Everyday Violence

1.1 Introduction

Late one Sunday evening in early 2017, Chibuzor Akinola¹ was walking home from a party in the Mushin district of Lagos. He stopped at a local market on the way back and had just paid for his wares when two young men approached him. One flashed a gun – the first Akinola had ever seen at such proximity – and the other pulled out a knife, threatening to kill Akinola if he refused to cooperate. To underscore the point, the boy with the gun shot twice into the air. Passersby were oblivious, Akinola recalled, because the din of motorbikes, west African pop music, and the evening market bustle drowned out his cries for help. The armed robbers swiftly dispossessed Akinola of a wad of cash, his watch, his belt, even the trainers on his feet, before vanishing into the humid night. Recounting these events months later, Akinola explained that the robbery made him even more self-reliant and less trusting of others in his community. “There’s nobody who can protect you like yourself,” he said. “You should watch the way you walk, you have to watch the way you relate to other people.” As for the possibility of assistance from others after the robbery, Akinola scoffed. “I just moved on,” he said. “That’s life.”

It surely is life for many Lagosians and for millions of residents of megacities throughout the developing world (Muggah, 2012). Today, most Lagosians have either personally been or know someone who has been the victim of a similar incident of “everyday violence,”² defined in this thesis as the *opportunistic and predatory use of physical force by*

¹ Akinola is one of ~70 violence-affected Lagosians who were interviewed for this thesis. As will be discussed in chapter 4, interviews were arranged by the CLEEN Foundation, a non-governmental organization in Nigeria, and were carried out in early 2017. The names of all interviewees have been changed.

² I use a “minimal” definition of direct violence in the thesis, defining it as “an act or behaviour that causes intentional physical harm to an individual or to a group.” This does not negate the fact that psychological harm, deprivation, inequality, etc. can also be conceptualized as “violence.” For more, see Ray, 2018.

*individuals against targets selected for reasons not explicitly related to identity.*³ Everyday violence encompasses, among other things, the violent crime, robbery, carjacking, kidnapping, mugging, and assault that occur regularly in Lagos and many other parts of the world. It is perhaps best understood as the “low-level,” chronic violence with which residents of typically poorer, typically more urban⁴ locales must coexist. As the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report explains, even in the 21st century, violence remains extraordinarily common, but most of it defies easy categorization and very little of it is classified as organized wartime violence. The authors write:

“[...] one in four people on the planet, more than 1.5 billion, live in fragile and conflict-affected states or in countries with very high levels of criminal violence. But because of the successes in reducing interstate war, the remaining forms of conflict and violence do not fit neatly either into ‘war’ or ‘peace,’ or into ‘criminal violence’ or ‘political violence.’” (p.2).

To the extent that these remaining forms of conflict and violence are opportunistic in nature and indiscriminate about the target’s social identity, much of it can be understood as “everyday violence.” These acts of aggression are the reason why young children in Lagos and beyond are taught not to carry large sums of money in public; why fathers mentally rehearse their defence strategy in the event of a break-in; and, why entire sections of cities are considered “no-go” zones after sundown.

Within Lagos, the chronic risk of becoming the next victim of everyday violence occupies large swathes of mental and physical space. According to surveys conducted in 2013 by the Nigerian CLEEN Foundation, almost 20% of Lagosians reported that they had been a victim of a violent crime within the past year and 62% said they were fearful of future

³ A typology clarifying the differences between everyday and other forms of violence can be found later in this chapter. The term “everyday violence” first appeared in Nancy Scheper-Hughes’ work on the indignities of life among the very poor in Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, 1993; see also Moser & McIlwaine, 2006).

⁴ The concept of everyday violence is similar to that of urban violence, but it is not limited to urban locales. The World Bank defines urban violence as the combination of domestic violence, “common violence” between individuals, and collective/organized violence (such as crime and urban gangs), that “interact in urban areas.” (World Bank, 2011, p. 11-12). For more on urban violence, see Muggah, 2012.

victimization (CLEEN, 2013). Other data, including the original survey data I present in this thesis, suggest that these rates may be even higher. Twenty years ago, urban planner Tunde Agbola wrote about the imprint of violence on the city – what he called the “architecture of fear”– describing the “general trend towards the construction of high walls [...] massive gates and strong locks” (1997, p.2). Today, the towering, barbed-wire-topped walls that encircle most buildings, the gates restricting access to many streets, and the prevalence of private security organizations throughout the city are a testament to the profound impact that the fear of everyday violence has on daily life.

In this thesis, I bring everyday violence into the foreground to better understand its micro-level identity effects. Specifically, using experimental, survey, and qualitative data collected in Lagos, Nigeria, I investigate how the proximate threat of, and actual experiences with, everyday violence affect social identity, trust, attitudes about politics and violence, and intergroup relations. The central finding is that the acute fear of everyday violence reinforces in-group identity, whereas actual victimization increases openness to outside groups. Later, I argue that in some places, the effects of everyday violence could have a secondary impact on broader intergroup relations, entrenching identity group divisions over time and potentially contributing to intergroup tension or even strife. In other words, rather than being mere context, everyday violence may, in fact, have profound consequences on intergroup dynamics.

This argument is not a deterministic one: areas that experience high levels of everyday violence are certainly not destined to experience bouts of identity violence. However, as will be discussed, there are compelling theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that everyday violence can change the way individuals view themselves and their neighbours – and these changes are not always benign. To ignore the short- and long-term identity effects of everyday violence is to overlook an important part of the cycle of violence, and an important factor in the lives of millions in the Global South.

1.2 The Scope of the Problem

1.2.1 The Macro-Level Impact of Everyday Violence

The challenge of everyday violence is by no means unique to Lagos. Across broader Nigeria, 33% of respondents to the most recent Afrobarometer survey reported that they fear crime in their home, and almost 20% had been physically attacked within the past year (Afrobarometer, 2015). The statistics are similar in many other rapidly-growing urban centres. In Johannesburg, the reported twelve-month everyday violence⁵ victimization rate was almost 50%; in Port-au-Prince, it was 33%; in Nairobi, 44% (World Bank, 2011). Chronic⁶ violence in cities has been named a global challenge of “epidemic proportions” by the World Bank (2016), and a concern of “policymakers, planners, and development practitioners” (Jütersonke, Muggah, & Rodgers, 2009, p.373).

Moreover, the average citizen of the world’s most violent countries⁷ is significantly more likely to be a victim of everyday violence than she is of an ethnic conflict or civil war (“Global Burden of Armed Violence,” 2008; Fearon & Hoeffler, 2014). In 2012 in Africa, for example, there were an estimated 135,000⁸ homicide deaths not related to war, and “only” 9,507⁹ battle-related armed conflict deaths, suggesting that everyday violence was responsible for roughly 14 times more death in Africa that year than organized collective violence (“Global Study on Homicide,” 2013, p.21; Melander, Pettersson, & Themnér, 2016). Globally, everyday

⁵ The World Bank includes the following categories of violence: robbery, assault, mob justice/witchcraft, sexual violence, and arson (in Nairobi only). More recent data covering similar forms of violence is, to the best of my knowledge, not currently available.

⁶ The World Bank is referring specifically to urban violence here but the concepts are overlapping. If anything, everyday violence is a more expansive category than urban violence and therefore a challenge of greater proportion.

⁷ While the scholarship on armed violence tends to focus on Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, everyday violence occurs worldwide. For example, homicide rates are almost as high in Russia as they are in sub-Saharan Africa (“Global Status Report on Violence Prevention,” 2014).

⁸ This count includes interpersonal, criminal, and social-political violence, so it is not a perfect estimate of the deaths caused by “everyday violence. As reliable homicide data is notoriously difficult to obtain and underreporting is a known concern, these estimates are almost certainly too low.

⁹ This is the high estimate but does not include data from Syria. According to this data, the battle-related deaths were the result of conflicts in the following countries: The DRC, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Algeria, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Mali.

violence is estimated to be responsible for approximately ten times¹⁰ the number of annual deaths of intrastate conflict (Fearon & Hoeffler, 2014; Themnér & Wallensteen, 2014).

This violence is costly.¹¹ Research modelling the economics of violence estimates that three of the most common forms of everyday violence (interpersonal homicide, assault, and intimate partner violence) amount to an incredible 5.67 trillion USD¹² of tangible and intangible costs per year, or 6.6% of global GDP in 2013 (Table 1.1). This represents four times the estimated costs¹³ of intrastate conflict (Fearon & Hoeffler, 2014). Partially for this reason, chronic everyday violence has been identified as a major barrier to development, derailing post-conflict recovery and impeding efforts to lift populations out of poverty (World Bank, 2011, p.2-6).

Table 1.1: Estimated Welfare Costs of Violence in Absolute Terms and as a Share of GDP (2013)

Type of Violence	Cost in USD, billions	Cost in % of global GDP
Collective violence, incl. intrastate conflict	\$167.19	0.19%
Everyday violence	\$1,245.27	1.44%
Domestic violence, incl. child abuse	\$8,017.00	9.39%
Sexual violence	\$103.50	0.12%
Total	\$9,533.0	11.1%

Source: Fearon & Hoeffler, 2014

¹⁰ Using UNODC data from 2008, Fearon and Hoeffler write that there were approximately 418,000 homicides recorded in the reporting countries, and approximately 49,000 civil war-related battle deaths. This suggests that the homicide rate outpaced war-related death by a factor of approximately 8.5. A second source suggests that interpersonal homicide resulted in 475,000 deaths in 2012 (“Global Status Report on Violence Prevention,” 2014). The Uppsala Conflict Data Program estimates that there were just under 40,000 battle-related deaths in 2012 (excluding deaths related to the conflict in Syria). This indicates that non-conflict related deaths occur almost 11 times more frequently than conflict-related deaths (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2014).

¹¹ Research measuring the cost of violence generally considers the indirect costs of violence (lower productivity, stress, trauma, time off work, etc.), and the direct costs (lost economic productivity of those who have been killed) (World Bank, 2011; Muggah 2012; Fearon & Hoeffler 2014). The “true” cost of violence obviously extends far beyond lost economic productivity, and includes other costs like psychological trauma and lost years of education.

¹² The Global Burden of Armed Violence report, by contrast, only calculates the direct economic cost of homicide and arrive at a figure of 171 billion USD in 2010 (2015, p.154).

¹³ Fearon and Hoeffler estimate the “tangible” and “intangible” costs of homicide. They do not take long-run effects, non-lethal crime, and other forms of everyday violence into account (2014, p.4-9).

Finally, everyday violence shows few signs of abating. Although identity-based violence is on the decline, the prevalence and intensity of everyday violence worldwide has only increased over time (Raleigh et al., 2010). In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, persistent low-level conflict over livelihood resources – a form of everyday violence – has increased approximately four-fold over the past twenty years, while political violence (a form of identity violence) has steadily decreased over the same period (Straus, 2012). At a time when some scholars argue that we are living in “the most peaceable era in our species’ existence” (Pinker, 2011, p.xxi), it is important to remember that reductions in violence have not been equally felt everywhere, nor have they been uniform across different forms of violence.

Despite the enormity of the problem, however, everyday violence receives surprisingly little attention in the political science literature, which has, for several decades, been dominated by the study of intergroup violence and civil war (Fearon & Hoeffler, 2014). One way in which this manifests is that scholars often treat the concurrent existence of everyday violence as the context of their study rather than the distinct research focus. Research about an episode of ethnic violence, for example, usually begins at the moment of a conflict’s outbreak and focuses exclusively on the interethnic fighting. Everyday violence is, however, often antecedent and concurrent to intergroup violence, and may persist or even intensify after an episode of acute identity-related violence (Reno, 1999; Catani, 2010). Among the many consequences of the disproportionate focus on civil war is that it “obscures the variety and prevalence” of different kinds of violence and may have the perverse effect of channelling policy interventions toward comparatively rare forms of violence and conflict¹⁴ (World Bank, 2011, p.53).

The gap in the political science literature is particularly surprising given that the causes and consequences of everyday violence are inextricably connected to a country’s political life. For example, chronic insecurity may motivate voters to support a more conservative government (Altemeyer, 1998; Jost et al., 2003) and affect individual decisions about whether

¹⁴ As the World Development Report explains, “It is essential to look across that spectrum [of violence] and to consider local conflicts, social protest, gang violence, organized crime, and transnational terrorism alongside the major civil wars that have been the focus of most academic research” (2011, p.66).

to participate politically (Bateson, 2012; Ley, 2017); the provision of security-enhancing public goods – often a state response to everyday violence – can expand the tax base (Cheeseman & Klaas, 2015; Bodea & LeBas, 2016) and bolster support for the government and democracy more broadly (Bratton & Mattes, 2001); and everyday violence often spikes after organized conflict (Krasner & Pascual, 2005; Le Billon, 2008). Nonetheless, scholarship largely continues to treat this form of violence as “background noise”– a chronic issue that only occasionally rises to a level warranting attention.

1.2.2 The Micro-Level Impact of Everyday Violence

Beyond the economic and political consequences, everyday violence can have profound micro-level effects on individuals and groups. There is a large and varied body of evidence suggesting that living in locales with high levels of everyday violence may affect, among other things, one’s psychological well-being (World Bank, 2011), the functioning of families (Shapland & Hall, 2007), and social cohesion and capital (Rosenfeld, Baumer, & Messner, 2001), rendering individuals and communities more fragile, less integrated, and less trusting (UN-Habitat, 2007).

As Muggah (2012) writes about this type of violence:

“The indirect effects of violence permeate into the social fabric of families and entire societies. [Violence] can negatively affect interpersonal trust and mutual expectations [...] It can also erode the willingness of disparate urban populations to bridge divides, build networks of self-help and reciprocity, or to form associations devoted to positive social change” (p.33).

These outcomes are fairly intuitive. One can easily understand why living with the constant threat of violence might lead to higher levels of anxiety and reduced interest in reaching out to others. Over time, it is also not surprising that chronic threat and actual victimization erode social capital and lead to a variety of undesirable development outcomes. What is less clear, however, is whether exposure to everyday violence might also affects one’s social identity. Might the fear of, and experiences with, commonplace violence drive individuals toward their in-group and increase intergroup animosity? More specifically, does living in an endemically

violent locale affect the extent to which one aligns with her in- and out-group – ethnic, religious or otherwise? Does it impact her behaviour toward these groups as well? These are the questions I take up in the thesis, because understanding how everyday violence affects individuals will help us better understand the broader dynamics of violence in Lagos and beyond.

1.3 The Case

This thesis uses original evidence from Lagos to test how exposure to everyday violence affects intergroup relations. Using a mix of an experimental survey carried out with 1,022 Lagosians across 10 parts of the city, complemented by some 70 interviews and several focus group discussions, I look at the effects of the acute *threat* of everyday violence, as well as the impact of *actual*¹⁵ victimization, on self-identification, attitudes, and trust toward in- and out-groups. Specifically, I ask whether individuals exposed to everyday violence are more likely to express in-group favouritism and out-group antagonism, and whether these experiences affect their expressed and observed levels of trust in in- and out-groups. Additionally, I analyse how different types of exposure to violence impact attitudes about the future use of violence as well as political systems, to see if exposure to violence may have farther-reaching consequences.

Lagos is an excellent place to carry out this research because of its high levels of everyday violence and the enduring salience of religious and ethnic identity. With 21 million estimated¹⁶ inhabitants, Lagos attracts Nigerians from across the country's 36 states and mirrors the diversity of the country at large. It also reflects some of the identity-based tensions of the country. In broader Nigeria, there is a persistent division between northern, predominately Muslim states, and southern, predominately Christian states, with differential access to

¹⁵ “Direct” exposure to violence is defined as personally being, or having a household member who was, the victim of violence within the past year. This is a standard way to classify victimization in crime surveys. See, for example, Hale, 1996, or Ruback & Thompson, 2001, p.134.

¹⁶ This figure is unknown and contested: the last census took place in 2006, and population estimates vary from 12.5 – 21 million, according to the Government of Lagos.

Nigeria's most important commodity, oil, and to political power (Fenske & Zurimendi, 2017). There are also important divisions between Nigeria's many ethnic groups – dynamics and diversity that is, to some extent,¹⁷ reproduced in Lagos.

Ethnicity and religion are highly-salient in greater Nigeria and in Lagos as well. In the 2017 Afrobarometer survey, for example, 22% of Nigerians said they identify exclusively or primarily with their ethnic group, and nearly 60% claimed their ethnicity was as important to them as their nationality. Regarding religion, 90% of Nigerians claimed that religion is “very important” to their lives in an earlier survey (Afrobarometer, 2012, 2017). Within Lagos, evidence from two pilot surveys I conducted in early 2016 showed that ethnicity and religion are overwhelmingly the most important dimensions of identity.¹⁸

In addition to its ethnic and religious diversity and its extraordinary size, the city of Lagos is also known for its elevated levels of crime. As Peter Lewis explained in 2009, “[...] violent crime is barely contained” in Lagos, due in part to a “[...] shadowy layer of trafficking, drugs, money-laundering, and organized violence” (p.115). An article in the (perhaps mildly sensationalist) Nigerian newspaper *Vanguard* agreed with this assessment, publishing the following about Lagos in 2017:

“After what would appear as a period of relative peace, the state has in recent years experienced a disturbing resurgence in crime wave as robbers, kidnappers, hired killers and cultists have returned with vengeful fury and have seemingly been taking turns to unleash terror on the populace” (22 July 2017).

Data from the CLEEN Foundation's 2013 crime victimization survey actually suggests that the high crime victimization rates in Lagos are not unusual: rather, they are roughly equivalent to the Nigerian national average. This reinforces just how common everyday violence is across Nigeria, and makes Lagos a particularly useful place in which to explore the dynamics of this violence.

¹⁷ There are also ways in which Lagos is the exception – this is discussed in chapter 3.

¹⁸ When asked an open-ended question about the group to which they feel closest, nearly 80% of respondents named their ethnic or religious group (responses were roughly split between these two identity dimensions).

Finally, the characteristics of Lagos are arguably representative of many other megacities in developing countries. Like urban centres as diverse as Nairobi, Rio de Janeiro, Cape Town, and Kinshasa, Lagos contends with rapid urbanization, weak institutional capacity, poverty that is compounded by an unequal distribution of wealth, high levels of youth unemployment, and poor infrastructure – all of which are known risk factors for higher levels and repeated cycles of violence (World Bank, 2011, p.79-84; Muggah, 2012). This is not to suggest that the findings in this thesis are necessarily applicable to all megacities; however, the insights may help inform how we think about everyday violence and identity in other global metropolises. Given that the world’s population growth will continue to be “overwhelmingly concentrated” in poor, urban areas, understanding how everyday violence affects individuals and communities, and how this violence may contribute to the “fragility” that defines so many of these places, should be useful to academics and practitioners alike (Muggah, 2012).

1.4 The Approach

To estimate the impact of exposure to everyday violence on identity and preferences, I use two very different identification strategies: an embedded field experiment and observational data from the survey. The experimental intervention was used to assess the effect of an acute *threat* of proximate violence. As will be discussed in chapter 5, an experimental approach provides much more certainty than observational data that any change in outcome (in this case, identity, trust, and attitudes about politics and violence) is caused by the phenomenon being studied (specifically, fear induced by a proximate threat), assuming that the intervention properly captures the quantity of interest. I induced threat, and the corresponding emotion of fear, via a fictitious radio news broadcast, a technique that has gained traction in social science research (Amodio, Zinner, & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Kucera & Haviger, 2012).

The broadcast featured a “breaking news” report about an act of violence that had supposedly occurred nearby earlier that day. Each short broadcast was tailored for the specific sub-area in which it was played with the intent of reinforcing the proximity (and therefore

salience) of the event. This method ensures that participants receive the same “dose” of treatment with the same level of detail, while minimizing risks to respondents. Of course, even the most “benign” experimental threat induction introduces some risk of some subjects being negatively affected, and although there ultimately was no evidence that any participant was adversely affected, these risks should always be – and were – taken very seriously. At the same time, experimental approaches to studying threat offer significant empirical advantages over observational approaches. Rather than turning away from these methods wholesale because of their inherent risks, it is incumbent upon scholars of topics like violence and identity to develop ethical interventions that both protect the subjects and rigorously address the relationships of interest. This tension, and the many ethical considerations of this project,¹⁹ are discussed in more detail in chapters 4 and 5. This project was approved by the University of Oxford’s social science division human subjects committee (C2_R42448, October 2015).

To estimate the effect of actual, recent experiences with everyday violence, I rely on observational data, as an experimental approach to “inducing victimization” would have clearly been inappropriate. The data about past victimization is instead from the survey, in which subjects were asked a series of questions about their direct experiences with violence during the previous year. In the analyses, matching was used before regression to minimize threats to inference. Compared to an experiment, this approach introduces a greater risk of bias, and we cannot be completely certain that the observed relationships are causal. Nonetheless, given the lack of alternatives and the analytical measures taken to improve estimation, it is arguably the most rigorous way of measuring how firsthand experiences with everyday violence shape identity, trust, and preferences.

Finally, both the experimental and observational data are complemented by two other sources of information. First, the impact of threat and victimization on *actual behaviour* was measured with a Trust Game (chapter 7), which every subject played with an in- or out-group

¹⁹ This includes a discussion of the measures taken protect the physical and psychological safety of all subjects.

“partner.”²⁰ This measure of actual behaviour was important, as self-reported attitudes and behaviours do not always correspond. Second, I conducted a series of focus groups prior to launching the survey; later, approximately 70 violence-affected Lagosians participated in interviews (chapter 8). The content of these discussions informed the experimental and survey design, and was also used to further explore mechanisms and possible alternatives.

1.5 The Argument

The overarching argument I advance in this thesis is that exposure to everyday violence shapes identity in important and surprising ways. Specifically, I present evidence that Lagosians are, on average, as fearful of a threat of proximate everyday violence as they are of a threat of nearby ethnic violence. This is a simple but striking result, as it challenges the idea that identity-based violence is uniquely alarming to people in generally violent environments. Instead, this suggests that much less spectacular acts of violence can also capture attention and induce high levels of emotion.

Second, I find that the *fear* induced by the acute threat of violence – independent of whether it is the threat of identity-oriented or everyday violence – has an identity-affirming effect and increases mistrust toward out-groups. Additionally, the threat of everyday violence increases trusting behaviour toward fellow in-group members. This suggests that the looming threat of something as common as a street mugging may have far more consequential and possibly even insidious effects on intergroup relations than one might expect. It also implies that the factors affecting intergroup relations are not always identity-related: the difference between the impact of a threat of identity-based violence and everyday violence on attitudes and behaviour was minimal.

Finally, actual victimization has a very different and surprising effect on subjects: on average, individuals who were directly exposed to everyday violence within the past year

²⁰ In reality, the partner was a pre-programmed algorithm. This is discussed in chapter 7.

reported feeling *less* trusting of their in-group and more positive about and trusting toward out-groups, as compared to non-victims. Violence-affected Lagosians also exhibited more trusting behaviour toward out-group members during a behavioural economics game. Put differently, while the threat of everyday violence tends to drive individuals toward their in-group, actual victimization alienates them.

Interviews suggest that the role of emotion and expectations is key to understanding these results. On an “automatic” level, the way fear affects cognition and the sub-conscious ways in which fear is managed can actually reinforce identity – and these results demonstrate that the source of the fear is less important than one might anticipate. Additionally, at some level, Lagosians may have hoped that their in-group would protect them from violence, although this idea was refuted in interviews. Lagosians *did* expect their in-group to help them get back on their feet after an experience with violence, and many said they were unpleasantly surprised to be left to cope on their own. This disappointment in the apathetic in-group response to adversity likely impacted how violence-affected Lagosians thought about their in-group and about outsiders. Other factors, such as empathy forged through experiences with violence as well as religious coping, may have also contributed to this re-evaluation of the relative merits of the in-group, as discussed in chapter 8.

Collectively, these findings indicate that everyday violence can significantly affect in- and out-group identity, and that the impact of exposure to violence is far from uniform. In focusing on the “non-spectacular” violence that is endemic to many cities, this research addresses a lacuna in the literature, which has largely overlooked how non-identity-based forms of violence impact outcomes that matter to social scientists. As identity is inherently political and intergroup relations can profoundly affect the stability, growth, and overall trajectory of a country, understanding how it may be shaped by something as common as robbery should be of high priority to political scientists.

These findings also have important policy implications. For one, everyday violence induced as much fear as ethnic violence, and this fear was largely identity-affirming. Taken a step further, we can imagine scenarios in which this might have significant second-order effects.

For example, in a context in which voting takes place partially along identity lines, an ominous pre-electoral crime wave could influence identity and resultant vote choice, possibly deepening identity-related political divisions. Moreover, spikes in everyday violence do not just occur around elections – in Lagos, for example, there is a well-established annual spike in crime in Lagos shortly before Christmas. Could it be that this “standard” crime wave actually hardens divisions between identity groups? These are potential consequences that should be of interest to policymakers in Nigeria and beyond.

More positively, the counterintuitive findings about victimization highlight an opportunity: if victims are, on average, less prejudiced against their out-group, community leaders could look for ways to amplify their voices and ensure that this newfound openness endures. As it stands, particularly in countries like Nigeria, those who have experienced everyday violence (and especially domestic violence) are often marginalized or even blamed for their experiences. By bringing the dynamics of everyday violence into sharper focus, this thesis can inform both academic and policy discussions about intergroup relations and violence across the Global South.

1.6 Plan of the Thesis

This project had a three-part research design and the thesis is organized accordingly, with separate chapters for the experimental, observational, and qualitative data. In chapter 2, I explore the differences between everyday, identity-based, and other forms of violence, and propose a typology that distinguishes between them. I also review the literature linking everyday violence to identity and build a theoretical framework from which a series of testable hypotheses are derived. Chapter 3 introduces the dynamics of identity and violence in Lagos and Nigeria more broadly, and addresses two dimensions of the city that may be surprising: its exceptionally low rate of identity-based violence, and the predominance of religious – and not ethnic – identity. I use a mixture of evidence to outline the factors leading to these outcomes and discuss their implications for the thesis more broadly.

In chapter 4, I present the research design, including the experimental set-up and variables, the approach to collecting and analysing the survey data, and an overview of the qualitative data used. Importantly, this chapter also includes an in-depth discussion of the ethical considerations of this and other projects that use an experimental approach to measure challenging concepts like violent threat and social identity.

The core quantitative analysis is presented in chapters 5 – 7. Chapter 5 uses causal mediation analysis to evaluate the hypotheses about the impact of the *threat* of everyday violence on identity, intergroup trust, and attitudes about politics and violence. With these methods, I am able to isolate the impact of threat-induced *fear* and *surprise*, in particular, on the outcomes of interest. In chapter 6, I focus on the impact of *actual* victimization. Controlling for the non-randomized nature of victimization with matched regressions, I estimate the effect of recent experiences with everyday violence on identity and preferences. The final portion of the quantitative analysis is in chapter 7, where I use the results of a Trust Game to understand how exposure to violence affects actual behaviour.

In the final two chapters of the thesis, I unpack the factors driving the thesis's main results: that threat-induced fear is broadly identity-affirming, while victimization is generally identity-moderating. Chapter 8 draws upon qualitative evidence derived from interviews with violence-affected Lagosians and theory from psychology to better understand these dynamics. In chapter 9, I consider the broader implications of these results, including, from the theoretical side, the possible linkages between everyday and identity-based violence, and from a methodological side, the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of violence. I conclude with suggestions for a research agenda to further advance our knowledge of the effects of everyday violence.

Chapter 2

The Theorized Impact of Everyday Violence on Identity

2.1 Introduction

Both violence and identity are fundamental parts of the human experience, yet it is not always clear to what these words refer or how they should be conceptualized. This chapter discusses the theoretical building blocks of the project, reviews the relevant literature, and highlights the gaps in our current knowledge. It then puts forth a testable model of how different forms of exposure to everyday violence might affect identification, trust, and preferences about politics and the use of violence.

The theoretical groundwork of this project is derived from multiple disciplines, including social psychology, political science, criminology, and sociology, and is particularly influenced by four literatures: the first examines the causes and consequences of identity salience; the second explores different forms of violence, particularly everyday versus identity-based violence; the third interrogates the differences between the threat of violence versus actual victimization with an emphasis on the induced emotional responses; and the last discusses links between exposure to violence and identity. This chapter is organized accordingly.

Before continuing, it is worth pausing for a caveat. This chapter engages in the challenging and often unsatisfying work of trying to make distinctions between closely-related concepts, such as personal versus social identity, everyday versus identity-based violence, and even the threat of violence versus actual victimization (in the moments before one experiences violence, she may well be aware of the looming threat). Both identity and violence are complex and fluid processes, whose manifestation and interpretation are informed by the context. And while sharply differentiating between their forms can focus the work and assist in the articulation of answerable questions, it may not be the best representation of how violence and

identity really unfold in daily life. These models should therefore be considered for what they are – stylized, summarizing, and scope-limiting, rather than comprehensive.

Throughout this chapter, I make several overarching arguments. First, like others before me (Chandra, 2005, 2006; Phinney & Ong, 2007; Oyserman, Elmore, & Smith, 2012), I contend that identity is best understood as malleable, and we should therefore expect to observe changes to in- and out-group identification, trust, and preferences as context and circumstances change. Second, I argue that the distinction between everyday and identity-based violence is conceptually and practically important, but commonalities in the emotions they induce and how they are processed may mean that they have a similar impact. And finally, I show how threat and victimization – the potentiality and the actuality of violence – may lead to different outcomes. Taken together, this arguments suggest that both the fear of and actual experiences with everyday violence should meaningfully affect identity, trust, and preferences – propositions I explore empirically in chapters 5-8.

2.2 Identity

2.2.1 Unpacking Social Identity

What do we mean when we refer to someone’s “identity?” In spite of the popularity of identity-related research, there is a surprising lack of clarity about what the word actually means. Across different literatures, “identity” has been used to describe concepts as disparate as one’s professional “affiliation” or “membership;” to descent-related characteristics such as race or ethnicity; to unique, self-ascribed attributes, such as a set of interests. I am not the first to suggest that without additional qualification, the word “identity” is too vague to be analytically useful, and that authors should be sure to specify¹ how they are using the term in their work (Fearon, 1999; Jenkins, 2014).

¹ Fearon, in particular, has stressed the importance of explicating the word “identity,” given its common use in both “ordinary language” and academia (1999; see also Fearon & Laitin, 2000). Other authors have suggested alternatives to the word “identity,” such as “commonality,” “sameness,” or “selfhood” (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000).

A helpful and common way of adding precision is to distinguish between *social* identity and *personal* identity. This distinction was first suggested by social psychology's Self-Categorization Theory (SCT), which contends that individuals define themselves at various levels of abstraction (i.e. personal and social) and may have multiple "identities" on each level (Turner, 1985). Social identity, according to this theory, is "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups), together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978, p.63). Personal identity, by contrast, is characterized as a reflection of an individual's unique attributes and differences, and how the individual values them (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1985; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).

This multi-layered conception of identity allows for the possibility of an individual's personal and social identity/ies differing, while still noting that they are related and therefore constantly influencing each other (Turner, 1985). Consistent with a constructivist approach² to identity, SCT maintains that both personal identity and social identity are dynamic – that they may change, at times quite intentionally for strategic gain – based on the context or proximate events (Chandra, 2007). Although one cannot reliably predict which dimensions of identity will be most salient to an individual at a given time, the social and political environment can provide clues. For example, in countries in which political parties are strongly linked to ethnic groups, ethnicity may become more relevant in the months leading up to an election (Eifert, Miguel, & Posner, 2010).

This project – and indeed most of the existing research on identity politics – is exclusively concerned with an individual's *social* identity. Specifically, it focuses on two politically and socially relevant dimensions of identity in Nigeria, ethnicity and religion. Before continuing, it is important to note that other dimensions of identity, such as state of origin, could

² In contrast to the once-popular "primordial" school, which contends that ethnicity is a given (Shils, 1957; Geertz, 1963, 1973; Lijphart, 1977), constructivists treat ethnicity as a malleable construct that may evolve over time (Barth, 1969; Royce, 1982; Banton, 1997; Chandra, 2005, 2007). Importantly, constructivism does not address the origin of identity groups – the existence of identity is taken as axiomatic (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000).

have also credibly been included in the research design. Yet there is diverse evidence suggesting that the majority of Nigerians articulate their identity primarily in terms of ethnicity and religion. Across three rounds of Afrobarometer surveys (2000, 2001, 2003)³ for example, survey respondents were asked with which identity group, beyond their national identity, they most strongly identified. Ethnic (43%) and religious groups (21%) were the two most common responses (Lewis, 2007). Moreover, in a pilot survey I carried out for this thesis, respondents were asked an open-ended question about their identity. Although some named their profession or other attributes (e.g. “strong,” “a mother”), well over three-quarters cited their ethnic or religious group. I thus felt confident limiting identity to these dimensions.⁴

By “religious identity,” I refer to an individual’s active identification with a particular religious group. This typically requires adherence to at least one of the following: a specific worldview, a set of traditions and/or rites, or participation in a religiously-defined community or institution (Seul, 1999). Much like language, religion becomes a part of an individual’s social identity only when it is expressed or otherwise made “visible” to others (Peek, 2005). In the context of Nigeria, the two most commonly adhered to religions are Islam and Christianity, which collectively accounted for 99% of respondents to the 2012 Afrobarometer survey. As will be discussed in chapter 3, some 65-70% of the population of Lagos State identifies as Christian, approximately 30% as Muslim, and the remaining minority practices either a traditional religion or no religion (Langer & Ukiwo, 2007; Wusu, 2011; Afrobarometer, 2015).

Ethnicity is a more challenging concept. A rich literature has still not fully resolved the question of whether ethnicity is a fixed group attachment (Shils, 1957; Geertz, 1963; Lijphart, 1977) or a fluid construct (Barth, 1969; Royce, 1982; Banton, 1997); that is, whether it is a given or a choice. The preponderance of contemporary literature now approaches the concept judiciously, acknowledging that ethnicity is partially derived from stable characteristics (e.g. family history) but is also highly context-dependent and flexible. This project similarly adopts

³ This question was not asked in more recent rounds of the survey.

⁴ Among other advantages, narrowing identity to two dimensions limited the scope and meaningfully simplified the experimental research design, discussed in chapter 4.

a “middle-ground” understanding, defining ethnicity as a malleable dimension of social identity that is characterized by perceptions of “common descent, history, fate, and culture” (Hale, 2004, p. 473, adopting Weber, 1978). Groups must be larger than a family, and the belief in common descent is a critical point of differentiation between ethnicity and other forms of social identity (Horowitz, 1985; Fearon & Laitin, 2000; Fearon, 2003).

According to this definition, Nigeria has at least 22 socially relevant ethnic groups, and may have over 275 major and minor ethnic groups (Mustapha, 2006; Afrobarometer, 2012). Three of these ethnic groups are particularly dominant in terms of numbers and political impact: the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and the Igbo, and they collectively account for over 60% of the Nigerian population (Afrobarometer, 2012). Within Lagos, these three groups account for over three-quarters of the city's inhabitants.

It is important to note that ethnicity and religion may function as cross-cutting identity cleavages in Nigeria, since individuals in the same religious group may belong to different ethnic groups, and vice versa. Those identifying as ethnically Yoruba, for example, commonly practice Christianity (55%), Islam (35%), or a traditional religion (10%) (Olumide, 1996),⁵ and depending on the context, their ethnicity, religion, or the combination (e.g. Muslim Yorubas) may become socially and/or politically salient. As will be discussed later, both the importance of ethnicity and religion and the fact that different combinations and permutation of these identity dimensions may matter under different circumstances have implications for how in- and out-groups are conceptualized and change.

The existence of identity groups does not, however, necessarily imply that they are salient – a topic I turn to now. Under what conditions does a dimension of identity take on social and political relevance? How might the context affect whether one identity dimension is viewed as more relevant than another? And, perhaps most importantly, what implications does this have for this study of identity and violence in Nigeria?

⁵ One of the distinguishing features of Nigeria's Yoruba population is its diverse religious allegiances. It should be noted that the two other dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria, the Igbo and Hausa-Fulani, are significantly more religiously homogenous. The Igbo are overwhelmingly Christian (with some diversity in the sect), while the Hausa-Fulani are primarily followers of Islam. See chapter 3 for more.

2.2.2 Identity Salience

Over several decades, social scientists have tried to understand how and why certain dimensions of identity become socially relevant, as well as the conditions under which they affect political preferences. Much of this literature focuses on ethnicity, but these theories can be equally applied to other dimensions of identity, including religion.

Although there is now general agreement that the relative size and resource access of identity groups play a role in identity salience (Horowitz, 1985; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Posner, 2004), many other questions about the factors contributing to identity salience are contested. The lack of agreement is certainly not for a lack of theories. Indeed, scholars have put forth an impressive and interdisciplinary range of competing ideas about the conditions that may make an identity dimension relevant. Broadly, these theories fall into one of four schools of thought, ordered roughly from the least to the most flexible conception of identity: (1) that identity is essential or “primordial,” and therefore is intrinsically and consistently salient or, in a variant thereof, that the most distinguishing physical marker of identity becomes salient (Shils, 1957; Geertz, 1963; Lijphart 1977; Hale, 2004); (2) that there are fairly immutable, structural factors that influence whether or not identity is salient, such as the legacy of colonialism, the size of identity groups, and the location of borders (Laitin, 1986; Posner, 2004; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013); (3) that expectations, emotion, and particularly threat may politicize and entrench identity (Posen, 1993; Lonsdale, 1994; Kaufmann, 1996; De Figueiredo and Weingast, 1999; Sambanis & Shayo, 2013); or finally (4) that identity is strategically manipulated to maximize the welfare of the individual or the broader group (Rothschild, 1981; Brass, 1991, 1997; Chua, 2002; Chandra, 2004, 2005; Esteban & Ray, 2008).

While recognizing the importance of structural factors, this work primarily draws from the second and third schools of thought. That is, a basic premise of this thesis is that identity is shaped by the social and political environment (e.g. political dynamics, the size and distribution of identity groups) and by factors operating at the individual level, such as emotion and expectations, among others. It is not taken as a given that ethnicity or religion would matter in

non-private ways in Nigeria, but the fact that they are so socially and politically relevant is viewed as evidence for their responsiveness to external factors. Indeed, as will be discussed, both the macro dynamics of the country (e.g. who is in power, how identity factors into their decision to allocate resources) and the micro dynamics (e.g. the demographics of a specific neighbourhood) can influence whether a Lagosian's ethnic or religious group is viewed as more important to her at a given point in time, and subject responses to questions about in- and out-group identity reflect this fluidity.

What does the preceding discussion mean for this study of the relationship between everyday violence and identity? If we are convinced that identity is a flexible concept, that its strength can wax and wane, and that different, cross-cutting dimensions of identity can become more or less relevant depending on the context, then it is also plausible that both temporary shocks – e.g. a proximate threat – and more significant and lasting life events – e.g. a direct experience with violence – can shift which dimension of identity is prioritized and the extent to which one feels aligned to her in-group and antagonistic toward her out-group. And indeed, this is a foundational part of this thesis, in which the questions centre on how different kinds of violence influence identity rather than the question of *whether* identity can even be influenced. A less flexible understanding of identity would either problematize the premise of this research or suggest that only significant macro-level factors, and not something as “ordinary” as a robbery, could rise to the importance of influencing in-group attachment. Yet as will be demonstrated, there is compelling evidence that identity is responsive to even ordinary elements of life in cities like Lagos.

2.3 Violence

2.3.1 Everyday Violence and Identity-Based Violence

Throughout this thesis, I make two important conceptual distinctions related to violence. The first is between the type of violence itself: everyday versus identity-based, while the second is between the nature of the exposure to violence: threat versus actual victimization, or the

potentiality versus the actuality of violence. There are reasons to think that the first distinction, between the type of violence in question, is less important when it comes to affecting identity than one may initially anticipate, whereas the difference between threat versus actual victimization may significantly affect identity-related outcomes. I address these in turn.

This distinction between everyday versus identity-based violence is implicit in much of the literature on crime, conflict, and violence, but it is not a commonly-invoked paradigm. In attempting to parse out structural commonalities and differences⁶ between types of violence, I am not suggesting that acts of brutality fall neatly into one or the other category, or that they are unrelated entities. Indeed, it is precisely because of these interrelationships that it is so challenging to create a typology and, as will be discussed later, why some places are mired in “cycles” of violence. Moreover, when used incorrectly, typologies can inadvertently create “artificial divisions” between forms of violence, potentially obscuring the fluidity of types of aggression (World Bank, 2011, p.12), and no typology can reasonably capture all of the subtle distinctions and areas of convergence. Nonetheless, the value of a typology of violence is that it can keep us from minimizing important differences between substantively different concepts and from discussing one form of violence without considering the others – both of which may lead to a disproportionate focus on comparatively rare forms of violence. Moreover, given the starring role of everyday violence in this thesis, it is important to state explicitly what it is and perhaps more importantly, what it is not.

The typology I propose (Figure 2.1) is based on distinctions between the *perpetrator’s apparent primary motivation* for committing the act of violence – that is, what was she attempting to accomplish by carrying out this act? To be sure, there are challenges inherent to focusing on motive. For one, motives are usually private, and it can be difficult to get at the “true” reason underlying an individual’s or group’s decision to commit violence. For example,

⁶ In doing so, I follow in the well-trodden path of scholars who have developed typologies of violence, from Galtung’s seminal work on the distinction between personal and structural violence (1969), to Baumeister’s taxonomy of the “root causes of evil” (1997), which was later adapted by Pinker (2011), to Tilly’s paradigm of collective versus individualistic aggression (2003), to the UNODC’s typology of forms of violent deaths (2013).

perpetrators often have incentives to misrepresent the intent of their violent act (e.g. someone who set out to commit a crime against a specific ethnic group may tell the authorities that it was economically motivated, as hate crimes often result in harsher punishment). Moreover, motives are often mixed.⁷ One can easily imagine a scenario in which someone participates in a pre-election ethnic riot both out of animosity toward the rival group and also because she thinks it will curry favour with a political patron (Fearon, 2006; Wilkinson, 2006). This complicates the task of distinguishing between violent episodes.

Even if we are confident in the motivation behind the act of violence, the way the act is interpreted by the victim is also important. Victims are often deprived of the opportunity to interrogate their attacker, which gives them the space to understand the act of violence in a way that fits their world view. For example, someone who feels that her ethnic group is frequently targeted may be more likely to understand a burglary in her home as ethnically-motivated rather than an economic crime. This adds complexity to this research, where the type of violence subjects *believed* they experienced is an important variable in the observational analysis.

Nonetheless, despite this complexity, motives are central to how we understand acts of violence. Consider Fearon and Laitin's illustrative example (2000a):

“[S]uppose a white American is mugged by an African American. We are reluctant to describe such incidents as ‘ethnic violence’ even though in literal terms it is violence between members of two different ethnic groups. Thus, whether we call violence ‘ethnic’ depends on something about our assessment of the participants' motivations, intentions, or mental states. The problem is to say what this is. For a first cut, we might argue that a mugging is not ‘ethnic violence’ in so far as the mugger is motivated by the desire to get money rather than by the desire to harm an ethnic other -- mugging is an ‘economic crime’ rather than a ‘hate crime.’ But it isn't right to say that we term violence ‘ethnic’ only if the motivation is hatred or dislike of ethnic others...Finally, we can turn a mugging into ‘ethnic violence’ as follows: Suppose one guy, who in fact wants to steal money, says to another, Hey let's go beat up a black, and his accomplice agrees simply because he is worried about looking like a wimp if he says no. We are

⁷ A good example of mix-motive violence in the context of Lagos is “cultist” violence. Cults are generally made up of younger, university-linked people who engage in crime, street fighting, and rituals, alongside other activities. Cultist violence is thought to be responsible for hundreds of deaths in Nigeria each year, and the factors motivating the violence are often described as a mix of ritualism, economic predation, and identity-concerns that resemble those of gangs (Rotimi, 2005; Ajayi, Ekundayo, & Osalusi, 2010).

much more likely to accept this as a case of ‘ethnic violence’ than we would the simple mugging described above.” (p.12-13)

In this typology, I focus on the *primary* motivation behind an act of violence (to the extent that it can be identified) and present a typology that clarifies the distinction between everyday, identity-based, and other forms of violence in a way that extends beyond simple heuristics.

Specifically, the typology has five motive-based categories distinguishing between acts of aggression perpetrated for social identity-related beliefs,⁸ such as an ethnically-motivated hate crime (“identity-related violence”); those perpetrated for reasons of personal enrichment, such as a robbery targeting an unsuspecting person leaving a bank (“predation”); and violence committed to gain, maintain, or assert social control,⁹ often at the household level, such as gender-based violence or intimate partner/domestic violence (“social control violence”) (see also: Moser & McIlwaine, 2000).

Throughout the thesis, I use the term “everyday violence” to refer to predatory violence and social control violence – that is, the forms of violence in which the perpetrator is motivated by non-identity¹⁰ concerns (Table 2). The definition of everyday violence used throughout the thesis stems directly from this: everyday violence is *opportunistic and predatory use of physical force by individuals against targets selected for reasons not explicitly related to identity*. In this sense, everyday violence is conceptualized as being wholly distinct from identity, although

⁸ This type of violence is often interpreted as ideology-based violence and the concepts are similar. Here, I specify that the target must be selected because of his or her social identity, which does not always correspond directly to her ideology. For more, see Pinker, 2011 (p.556-569), or Leader Maynard’s work on ideology and mass violence.

⁹ One type of violence that is frequently included in the “social control violence” category is sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), as it is usually based on unequal power relationships and is often an expression of dominance over another person (UNHCR, “Sexual and Gender Based Violence”). In some instances, SGBV is actually a form of identity violence, e.g. when rape is explicitly used as a tool of war and women are targeted during conflict (Cohen, 2013). In this sense, SGBV defies easy classification. Moreover, some episodes of SGBV are likely the product of a confluence of motives, e.g. when a misogynist assaults his wife after arguing about money. SGBV can be particularly traumatic for victims to discuss (Heise, Ellsberg, & Gottmoeller, 2002) and I therefore did not ask about it explicitly in the survey. Subjects were, however, asked generically about household victimization. I expect that the data captures some portion of SGBV experiences, but it is not a focus of this thesis.

¹⁰ This is not to imply that the perpetrator is agnostic to the social identity of the victim. Rather, it implies that the violence is not directed toward a target simply because she is a part of a given social identity group.

surely the victim's identity factors in in varying ways.¹¹ Everyday violence includes, among other things, the violent robbery, burglary, and kidnapping that are chronic problems in many urban centres, along with domestic violence¹² and interpersonal homicide (Figure 2.1).

There are two other categories of motivation for committing violence that are included in the typology but not extensively discussed, as they are not core to this work. Baumeister (1997) and later Pinker (2011), for example, identify impulses that could broadly be classified as pathological, such as sadism or extreme narcissism, as a separate motivation behind acts of violence. In the typology, these motives are grouped, admittedly somewhat inelegantly, into the "pathological violence" category, as they are primarily motivated by a desire to fulfil or alleviate a psychological drive, rather than an externally-oriented desire (e.g. to take someone else's money).

A fifth and final category, "defensive violence" (desperation), encompasses acts that are carried out when a situation seems untenable and violence seems to be the best means of self-preservation or of breaking free of repression (Petersen, 2002; Mann, 2005). This category captures, predictably, self-defence, but also violence carried out by those who were wholly socialized within a culture of violence and may not understand their options beyond using force (Wolfgang, Ferracuti, & Mannheim, 1967; Slutkin, 2012; Noe & Rieckmann, 2013; Østby, 2016). It is, in any case, beyond the scope of this thesis.

¹¹ For example, particularly wealthy or poor individuals may be targeted partially for this reason, and socioeconomic status could be conceptualized as an identity group. In this thesis, however, identity-based violence refers primarily to those targeted specifically for their religion, ethnicity, or political beliefs.

¹² Although one can imagine scenarios where identity impacts the likelihood of domestic/intimate partner violence (e.g. a father-in-law beats his daughter-in-law in part because he does not approve of her ethnicity), I would contend that social identity plays a comparatively minimal role in victim selection. Moreover, like other forms of everyday violence, it is, unfortunately widespread and banal in places like Lagos, and does not attract the attention or have the identity-related ramifications of other forms of violence, hence its inclusion in this category.

Figure 2.1: A Motive-Based Typology of Violence

Everyday Violence						
		Description	Target(s)	Individualistic vs. Collective	Examples	
Social Control Violence		Interpersonal violence perpetrated to exert dominance over a known relation, often meant to increase one's social standing	Household member, friend, contact, or other specifically-targeted individual(s)	Generally perpetrated by individuals against individuals	Domestic violence, child abuse, sexual violence, interpersonal homicide	
		Violence perpetrated for personal gain, usually economic in nature	Generally randomly-selected individuals, or those who appear to be "opportunistic" victims	Generally perpetrated by individuals or small groups against individuals	Violent robbery, carjacking, or burglary; economically-motivated assault	
Predation / Practical Violence						
Identity-Related Violence		Violence perpetrated in the name of a social identity group or ideology, e.g. ethnicity, religion, political affiliation	Individuals and groups who belong to / represent an opposing identity or ideology	Generally collectively perpetrated against groups	Ethnic conflict, sectarian riots, violent political protest	
Psychological Drivers (sadism, ego, fear, culture, repression)		Violence perpetrated to fulfill or alleviate an anxiety, impulse, or tacit societal expectation	Ranges from randomly-selected victims to specific individuals who represent a cause / ideology / opponent	Generally individually perpetrated against individuals; can also take place within the context of collective violence	Serial killing, torture, symbolic murder	

This work centres on everyday violence and on the critical distinction between everyday and identity-based violence. As will be discussed in chapter 4, the actual type of violence operationalized for part of this research is the threat of violent robbery, defined as the “theft of property from a person, overcoming resistance by force or threat of force” (UN, 2005). This form of everyday violence was selected because there is a relatively high likelihood that targets are selected opportunistically and not on the basis of an aspect of social identity,¹³ particularly when compared to other forms of everyday violence (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Moreover, violent robbery poses a direct threat to physical security, which is consistent with the way previous research has conceptualized “exposure to violence” (generally focusing on exposure to civil war or terrorism, in which the threat of physical harm was central). Finally, this form of everyday violence is common and occurs in both developed and developing countries,¹⁴ implying that the research could, in theory, be replicated in a variety of contexts.

In conclusion, it is important to note that existing literature already makes distinctions between forms of violence, but it does so implicitly, with research usually focusing on either political, ethnic, and religious/sectarian violence, or on crime, assault, and urban violence, and this work is usually completed by political scientists or by criminologists/sociologists, accordingly. This thesis considers both, and compares their effects on individual identification, social behaviour, and intergroup relations.

2.4 Threat Versus Victimization

Relative to the previous concepts, the distinction between the threat of violence and actual victimization is straightforward. Threat deals with potentialities – it is the expectation of the “negative utility” of violence, of the emotional, physical, and financial harm and cascading

¹³ Of course, it is possible that some individuals are targeted for robbery for reasons like their profession (e.g. policeman) or their presumed socioeconomic status. Indeed, it is unclear if *completely random* violence even exists. Compared to alternatives, however, robbery is minimally related to social identity.

¹⁴ The best available data from the UNODC indicates that each year, across the approximately 66-75% of countries reporting data, there are roughly 3.5 million incidences of reported robbery. By contrast, there are approximately 500,000 annual reported homicides outside of war.

consequences that a violent event can bring about (Stephan & Renfro, 2002, p.197). Victimization, on the other hand, deals with actualities – it is the oftentimes prolonged process of dealing with the consequences, anticipated or not, of direct contact with violence. It is important to emphasize that I use the word “threat” to refer to a situation where there is a credible possibility of becoming a victim of violence, and not to a direct and personal threat from another, possibly known individual (i.e. intimidation).¹⁵

Formally, one could use a Bayesian updating model to conceptualize the relationship between threat and victimization: our perceived risk of being a victim is in part a product of whether we believe our in-group will help protect us from the “negative consumption” of violence. After actually experiencing violence, a victim updates her prior about the likelihood of such an event happening and may update her preferences for in- and out-groups accordingly. We might have anticipated that our in-group would behave a certain way if we become a victim of violence (e.g. supporting us through it) but update this prior when we actually are affected by violence. As will be discussed below, these differences between threat versus actual victimization – between expectation versus reality – may have substantive implications for the way violence impacts identity.

2.4.1 The Impact of Threat and Fear

At its core, a perceived threat is ultimately a reflection of “the anticipation of negative consequences;” more specifically, as Stephan and Renfro explain, it is a cognitive appraisal of risk (2002, p.197). When we perceive a stimulus that may be detrimental to our survival prospects (Seligman, 1971; Brosch, Pourtois, & Sander, 2010), this information is prioritized in our attention through both “bottom-up,” automatic sensory processing (Öhman, 2005; Bannerman, et al., 2009) and “top-down” processing that incorporates biases and expectations that pre-date the stimulus (Sussman, Jin, & Mohanty, 2016). While not everything that may be

¹⁵ This distinction is important because a specific and credible threat (or series of threats, in cases of harassment) from another individual (e.g. a spouse, a rival gang member) and the actual experience of that violence are conceptually closer on a spectrum.

perceived as a threat is actually dangerous, it is the perception that matters, and perception that affects attention and behaviour (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Chiricos et al., 2001; Scheepers, Gijssberts, & Coenders, 2002).¹⁶

Among its many effects, a perceived threat of violence generates expectations, alters attitudes and beliefs (e.g. about how harmful another person or object is), and importantly, produces emotion (Petersen, 2002; Stephan & Renfro 2002). Our emotions “organize and coordinate ongoing psychological action (e.g., attention, motivation, memory, behavioural inclinations) so that people might respond more effectively to events related to individual survival and success” (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005, p.771); here, they are theorized to be a key part of the response to both threat and actual victimization. It is by now well-established that a threat to one’s safety typically produces higher levels of fear – a “fundamental” emotion that “automatically address(es) recurrent survival-related problems” (Ekman, 1999) – along with other, “secondary” emotions such as anger, surprise, or even disgust (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).¹⁷ But it is fear, above all, that is most commonly associated with perceived threat.

There are a number of obvious reasons why a proximate threat of violence may result in fear: the prospect of direct physical harm, psychological distress, economic loss, pain and suffering; as well as less obvious reasons, such as concerns about violence escalating, the safety of friends and family, or even reputational costs (Rader, 2004; Moser, Hajcak, & Simons, 2005; Carro, Valera, & Vidal, 2010). The amount of fear we feel in response to a threat may reflect, among other things, our assessment of our relative risk of experiencing violence – the more proximate the threat and the more defenceless we feel, the more fearful we may be – and how capable we think we are of protecting ourselves (Rogers, 1975; Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Witte & Allen, 2000). But fear is also at least partially automatic and usually not a carefully planned-

¹⁶ Although a variety of factors influence individual-level perceived threat (e.g. age, gender, past experience with crime, risk tolerance), the experimental research design can account for this variation through randomization.

¹⁷ As discussed in chapter 5, the effects of threat-induced surprise are also empirically tested in the thesis. The impact of other threat-induced emotions (e.g. anger) is an important area for future research.

out response (Öhman, 2005; LeDoux, 2015) – as a result, it can be difficult to predict who will experience fear and to what extent, a proposition that is empirically demonstrated in chapter 5.

Fear is associated with changes to the way we process information, broadly bolstering cognition that is related to harm avoidance (Robinson et al., 2013). These include changes to attention (Eysenck, 1988; Bar-Tal, 2013), the retrieval of information (Bar-Tal, 2013), the use of heuristics (Park & Banaji, 2000), and increased vigilance (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008). Importantly, fear is also thought to increase a sense of vulnerability (Hale, 1996) and reduce our tolerance for the unknown, and it may facilitate identity perception, making it easier for an individual to recognize in-group members whilst under acute threat (Plutchik, 1990; Lazarus, 1991; Öhman, 1993 cited in Bar-Tal, 2001; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; LeDoux, 1995, 2003; see also Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005). In this sense, fear may be identity-affirming; and a threat of any form of violence, assuming it induces fear, may have identity consequences.

A separate way in which the threat of violence may impact identity is by reminding us of our own mortality. As social psychologists have demonstrated, the threat¹⁸ of violence shatters one's expectation for security and leads to a "[...] perception of the world as malevolent and the self as vulnerable to victimization" (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009, p.369). This renewed awareness of our own fragility¹⁹ and limited time on earth is thought to at least temporarily shift our attitudes and preferences, making us more defensive, less open to change, and generally more inclined to gravitate toward the familiar. As a result, as social psychologists have demonstrated,²⁰ the threat may lead us to prioritize our in-group to an even greater degree, as it provides comfort and relief in a time of imbalance and distress (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, &

¹⁸ Here, scholars are referring to the perceived threat of violence, which is the focus of this thesis as well. Among other differences, it is perceived rather than actual threat that produces emotion and alters attitudes and behaviours (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002).

¹⁹ Often, but not necessarily, stemming from an acute threat of violence.

²⁰ This idea is known as the "Terror Management Theory" (TMT). TMT is an influential social-psychological model from which many of the insights above about threat motivating in-group favouritism are derived. The central premise of the TMT is that the anxiety caused by mortality concerns motivates human behaviour and cognition; an extension of TMT is that it may also affect identity and intergroup relations (Greenberg *et al.*, 1986).

Solomon, 1986; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Petersen, 2002; Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, & Johnson, 2006; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; Canetti et al., 2013).

This research also indicates that threat, particularly when it is identity-related, may lead to us to be less tolerant of out-groups and more exclusionist and ethnocentric (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). These exclusionary attitudes toward out-groups then reinforce in-group identity in an iterative process, which can eventually lead to a variety of negative outcomes, such as a general degradation of intergroup relations (Petersen, 2002); discriminatory political policies (Shamir & Sullivan, 1985; Scheepers et al., 2002; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009); and even violence and destruction (Staub, 1990; Pettigrew, 2003). Collectively, this “threat-exclusion” model posits, and has consistently demonstrated, that an acute and credible threat²¹ is a strong predictor of discrimination toward out-groups, and even outbreaks of, and support for, identity-based violence. To date, however, political scientists have only occasionally made use of this and other related insights from social psychology in their work on violence and intergroup conflict (Green & Seher, 2003).

Unsurprisingly, fear has also been shown to affect an individual’s propensity to trust someone else. For example, Albertson and Gadarian argued that emotions of low-certainty, such as anxiety or fear, have a large and usually negative impact on trust²² (2015). At least two²³ other studies directly assessed the impact of fear and anxiety on trusting behaviour, finding that, on average, these emotions moderately depress trust,²⁴ possibly because fearful individuals become more defensive and vigilant (Ng & Lim, 2013). Other researchers have theorized that fear and anxiety contribute to more pessimistic risk assessments, which, in turn,

²¹ Within this literature, the threat described often has an identity component to it, e.g. the threat of a new wave of immigration to economic security, or the threat of ethnic violence in a context of intergroup tension.

²² Their focus is on trust in institutions rather than trust in individuals, but the mechanisms are likely similar.

²³ A key distinction between these studies and the research presented here is the way fear is induced and the nature (general of specific) of the emotion. These studies generally asked the subjects to reflect on or write about a time they felt fear. Although this is an effective way to induce emotion, there can be significant between-subject heterogeneity in the intensity of and source of the emotion. This is discussed in greater detail in chapter 4.

²⁴ For example, after inducing fear, Ng and Lim (2013) find the emotion resulted in an approximately 25% reduction in the money sent in a Trust Game. Myers and Tingley, meanwhile, find a slight, negative impact of acute anxiety – but not of other negative emotions – on trust (2016).

may dampen evaluations of trustworthiness (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Habib et al., 2015; Young, 2016).

The theories described above deal with the impact of fear at the level of the individual. At the level of the community, criminologist and sociologist have generated rich evidence demonstrating that fear – and specifically the fear of crime – reduces social interaction and can lead to the deterioration of social bonds over time (Hartnagel, 1979; Liska, Sanchirico, & Reed, 1988; Liska & Warner, 1991; Hale, 1996). Importantly, the suspicious posture that individuals adopt in response to perceived threat is usually most pronounced vis-à-vis out-group community members (Oliver & Fonash, 2002; King & Wheelock, 2007). After hearing about a rash of nearby burglaries, for examples, a resident may begin to view her out-group neighbours with wariness, avoiding contact with them whenever possible. Over time, this decrease in social-capital-building interactions is thought to damage intergroup cooperation and increase the extent to which communities divide into identity-group enclaves.²⁵

Taken together, these literatures suggest that the fear generated by a threat of violence may have insidious effects on both individual and community-level identity outcomes, reinforcing in-group identity and dampening trust. Importantly, these literatures, and indeed the whole preceding discussion, is agnostic to the type of violent threat. The key dimension is that the violence induced *fear*, which is the element theorized to impact identity-related outcomes. Assuming a threat of everyday violence can induce similar levels of fear as proximate identity-based violence – admittedly a weighty assumption – then a perceived threat of violence should be broadly identity-affirming.

2.4.2 The Impact of Actual Victimization

While the threat of violence can be summarized as the perceived risk of harm and the fear thereof, it is much harder to characterize actual victimization. Experiences with violence are exquisitely complex and so variable, from a life-altering assault to a frightening but ultimately

²⁵ See, for example, Lemanski (2004) for a discussion of these “enclave” dynamics in Cape Town, South Africa.

mostly inconvenient mugging; and their consequences, identity-related and otherwise, are similarly diverse and non-linear. At best, we might summarize the impact of actual victimization as the pain, loss, re-evaluation, and renewal following a first-hand experience with violence.

Among the many ways the fallout of victimization is difficult to anticipate, firsthand experiences with violence have been shown to produce profoundly negative emotions, such as helplessness, depression, trauma, disgust, fear, shame, anger, and resentment (Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983; Fitzpatrick & Boldizar, 1993; Singer et al., 1995), but also positive ones, such as gratitude, relief, motivation, and purpose (Calhoun and Tedeschi, 1990; Powell et al., 2003; Kunst, 2010). Victimization can cause a re-evaluation of who and what matters; and an individual reckoning with victimization is generally a process, oftentimes one that is thoughtful, deliberate, and slow (Kliewer et al., 1998; “The Trauma of Victimization,” 2008). Given the complexity of victimization and the differing temporal dimensions (threat is relatively immediate whereas processing victimization is generally protracted), we should expect that the effects of the threat of violence and actual victimization will also diverge.

Perhaps the most easily anticipated and understood impact of victimization is pain and disillusionment (Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983; Singer et al., 1995; Darby, 2006; De Zulueta, 2006). When one experiences violence, particularly when it is truly unexpected,²⁶ it can be extremely disorienting, and the ensuing period of confusion and distress can trigger a re-evaluation of one’s “place” in the world, the goodness of different types of people, and of who should or should not be trusted. Indeed, much of the literature about the individual-level impact of everyday violence is consistent with this narrative, emphasizing criminal violence’s damaging and alienating effects (see: Frieze, Hymer, & Greenberg, 1987; De Zulueta, 2006).

²⁶ Whether violence is ever truly “expected” is subject to debate, but one could argue that the anticipated probability of experiencing violence during an acute period of war should be higher than during peacetime. For this reason, everyday violence – despite being so routine – can feel very unexpected, and many violence-affected Lagosians told us that they were shocked to be attacked during regular daytime activities, e.g. while driving home from church.

Some of these negative consequences may be related to the social environment in which violence is experienced and processed. For example, Meier et al. argue that a “culture of organized crime” in Italy affects community-wide norms surrounding trust, leading to a “vicious cycle of in-group favouritism and crime” (2016, p.78). And in criminology, the “fear-decline” model posits that the individualized nature of routine crime victimization undermines group attachment, because victims of violent crime are usually left to process their experiences on their own rather than with their group (as might be the case in wartime or after collective violence) (Smith, 1987, cited in Hale, 1996; Vuori, Oksanen, & Räsänen, 2013). As the authors write,

“[...] ‘routine street crimes’ no longer shock the common conscience sufficiently to evoke a collective response that results in solidarity. Street crimes such as most homicides, rapes, and assaults typically injure one person and the victim’s primary networks, not the entire community [...] Since ‘routine crimes’ target individuals, the response to these attacks is likely individualized” (Ryan & Hawdon, 2008, p.6).

Other work has similarly demonstrated that victimization may damage social capital and trust. For example, Alesina and La Ferrara found that recent experiences of trauma are one of the strongest predictors of decreased trust in others (2002), while Nunn and Wantchekon argued that the slave trade – obviously an extremely violent period of history – is broadly responsible for the depressed levels of trust in Africa (2011). Research carried out by psychologists, meanwhile, showed that “betrayal traumas” (violations perpetrated by a “close other”) are consistently associated with depressed levels of trust (Gobin & Freyd, 2014, p.1).

Taken together, the literature broadly suggests that high levels of everyday violence victimization would undermine social capital and degrade intergroup trust in a given community. This narrative seems plausible; intuitively, it makes sense that experiencing violence would make us more careful, withdrawn, and mistrusting, which might harm social capital and intergroup relations more broadly in the community.

Yet an emerging political science literature finds very different effects of victimization, showing, on average, that exposure to wartime victimization actually *increases* prosocial

behaviour.²⁷ Among the many counterintuitive results that are reported in this literature, scholars have shown that victimization can increase social and civic group participation (Voors et al, 2012; De Luca & Verpoorten, 2015), bolster altruism (Voors et al, 2012; Hartman and Morse 2018), enhance cooperation (Gilligan et al, 2014), and increase political interest and participation (Wood, 2003; Blattman 2009; Cassar et al., 2013; Bauer et al., 2014) – although it is not yet clear whether these effects are parochial or more broadly applicable.²⁸

Bellows and Miguel, for example, showed that Sierra Leoneans who were exposed to violence during their country's civil war were more engaged in civic life than those who were sheltered from the violence (2009). They also demonstrated that victims of violence are more likely to join political groups and to vote. Similarly, Blattman's work in post-conflict Uganda showed that exposure to violence increased an individual's propensity to participate politically (2009), while Gilligan and his co-authors' lab-in-the-field study in post-conflict Nepal demonstrated that communities exposed to high levels of civil war violence were more cooperative and likely to contribute to public goods (2014).

In addition to its effects on identity and cooperation, much of this literature has shown that victimization may also increase trusting behaviour. For example, Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii (2014) found that victimization significantly increased trusting and trustworthy behaviour, while Becchetti et al. showed that victims of the 2007 electoral violence in Kenya demonstrated more trusting behaviour in behavioural games (2013). Bellows and Miguel's research similarly demonstrated that victims of violence were more trusting of outsiders (2009).

Why might wartime victimization bolster trust? As Gilligan et al. argue, one possibility is that mankind is adaptively predisposed to cooperate during outbreaks of violence to increase

²⁷ In keeping with Bauer et al., the term "prosocial behaviour" refers to cooperative and altruistic behaviour (2016, p.2).

²⁸ In a meta-review, Bauer et al. (2016) found that the impact of victimization on in-group pro-social behaviour was approximately 0.25 standard deviations, whereas it was 0.04 standard deviations toward out-groups and not statistically significant. As the authors write, "Too few studies define 'out-groups' consistently (or at all), so this in-group bias remains somewhat speculative" (p.250). Moreover, some papers have shown that exposure to wartime violence actually hardens intergroup divisions (Rohner, Thoenig, & Zilibotti, 2013; Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017), decreases trust (Rohner et al., 2013), and that the threat of electoral violence depresses political participation (Bratton, 2008).

their probability of survival (2014). As a result, victims of violence may instinctively trust others more in an un- or subconscious attempt to improve their adverse circumstances (see also Bowles, 2009). Others have argued that this kind of violence results in post-traumatic growth (Blattman, 2009) or alters individual risk preferences in a way that ultimately increases trusting behaviour (Voors et al. 2012; Bauer et al., 2014, 2016; Callen et al., 2014).

Importantly, this literature focuses on the social and political effects of exposure to *identity-related*²⁹ violence, specifically civil war and ethnic conflict, rather than exposure to the more commonplace everyday violence that is at the centre of this thesis. And while the consistency of the main findings within this literature is striking – namely that direct experience with wartime violence is generally³⁰ correlated with increased prosocial behaviour³¹ and trust – it does not support traditional narratives about the victimization’s deleterious and alienating effect, or even the reports of many victims themselves (Frieze et al., 1987; De Zulueta, 2006). At a minimum, the discrepancy between this literature and the way criminologists and psychologists have historically understood the impact of victimization may be a product of different methods. Alternatively, it could indicate that the type of violence experienced substantively changes outcomes. This is explored in more depth below.

Taken together, these diverse literatures about exposure to violence and identity have several implications. First, they suggest that different forms of exposure to violence can profoundly impact identity, intergroup relations, trust, social cohesion, and civic engagement. Second, they indicate that there is heterogeneity in the way that exposure to violence affects individuals, some of which may be accounted for by the differential impact of threat versus

²⁹ The disproportionate focus of social scientists on wartime violence is also evident within this literature. For example, Bauer et al.’s meta-analysis included 16 papers in which the independent variable was exposure to *wartime* violence, and only two papers in which it was a form of everyday violence such as violent crime (2016).

³⁰ This conclusion is not universal. Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti, for example, showed a large and robust *decrease* in intergroup trust and an increase in ethnic identification among those exposed to more intense civil war violence in Uganda (2013).

³¹ Scholars have, however, noted that although exposure to wartime violence tends to increase social cooperation, the effects are strongest for in-group cooperation and adherence to parochial norms. These tendencies may ultimately “...[raise] the risk of future social divisions and renewed intergroup conflict” (Bauer et al., 2016, p.31).

actual victimization. And finally, they suggest that the emotions induced by exposure to violence are likely key to understanding these effects.

Yet there are also large gaps that these literatures do not explain. Despite the general conclusion that exposure to violence may affect identity, we do not yet have a consistent and clear understanding of when and why exposure to different types of violence can lead to in-group bias or out-group antagonism. Moreover, much of the literature reviewed above focused on the impact of larger-scale, organized violence (e.g. civil war). It is less clear whether the observed effects remain when the violence is of an everyday nature. Researchers have convincingly argued that the experience of being a victim of *any* kind can alter cognitive responses and social norms (Cummings et al., 2011), which would suggest that exposure to *all* forms of violence, including everyday violence, might also affect outcomes such as self-identification and intergroup trust. To date, however, there have been remarkably few studies of the *identity*-related effects of everyday³² violence, and our understanding of the impact of this common form of violence is surprisingly limited.

2.5 Theoretical Model and Hypotheses

This project aims to address some of these gaps, focusing on those related to the impact of everyday violence on identity outcomes. Drawing on the literature presented above, I derive a stylized model (Figure 1.2) in which different forms of exposure to violence affect individuals' identity, their treatment of in- and out-group members, and their attitudes about politics and violence, and then derive several testable hypotheses about how banal violence affects in- and out-group identity, trust, and attitudes about violence and politics. Notably, while the above discussion indicates that different forms of violence may have different outcomes, this model

³² Meier et al. (2016) do discuss the in-group related effects of being part of a “culture of crime,” but they focus on highly-organized crime (the Mafia in Sicily), which is not directly comparable to the everyday violence discussed in this thesis.

mostly³³ does not differentiate between the type of violence experienced. The reason for this is simple: the key theorized mechanisms linking threat and actual victimization to outcomes are not specific to the type of violence; rather, they are emotion and the community response / subsequent re-evaluation, respectively. Thus while certain types of violence may make certain types of responses more or less plausible, this is not necessarily the case, and it is not inconceivable³⁴ that threat and victimization could have very different qualities and still result in similar outcomes.

Threat and actual victimization are integrated into one model as these concepts are, of course, related, and likely influence each other in a feedback loop (e.g. responses to one may change if an individual has experienced high levels of the other). However, only the most directly relevant and testable hypothesized relationships are included, and many of the linkages between threat, victimization, and other elements of this model are deliberately left off.

The threat model³⁵ (left-hand side) begins with exposure to a threat of violence – in this research, a proximate violent robbery. As discussed earlier, the credible direct or even indirect³⁶ threat of a horrifying event can induce acute fear and elevate threat arousal levels, causing individuals to view the world as “unpredictable, threatening, and dangerous” (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009, p. 5; see also Breslau et al., 1998; Hobfoll, Tracy, & Galea, 2006). This fear response is a crucial link to many of the identity-related outcomes – formally it is the proposed mediator. And although there is evidence that a threat of robbery (the type of everyday violence operationalized in the experiment) generally results in a fear response (Scheper-Hughes, 1993; Romer, Jamieson, & Aday, 2003; Gale & Coupe, 2005), this is not a given and must be validated empirically. The first hypothesis is therefore as follows:

³³ Except as the different types of victimization relate to post-attack support, see hypotheses H_{5A} and H_{5B}.

³⁴ As per the literature above, there may be differences in the way identity-based and everyday violence impact individuals. However, as there is not agreement as to how these effects might differ, the model remains agnostic.

³⁵ The threat portion of this model is informed by Canetti-Nisim et al. (2009)’s work on exposure to terrorism and exclusionist political attitudes. They posit that exposure to terrorist attacks influences psychological distress, which in turn influences threat perception and results in exclusionist political attitudes. The model below builds on this basic framework, incorporating other insights.

³⁶ Psychologists have demonstrated that the exposure need not be personal or direct: even watching news clips of violence has been shown to provoke anxiety and cause psychological distress (Slone, 2000).

H₁: The threat of proximate everyday violence will induce high levels of fear.


The model leaves open the possibility that a perceived threat will induce other emotions beyond fear, such as surprise or anger (Ekman, 1992; Myers & Tingley, 2016; Chen & Jack, 2017). Anger, in particular, is believed to be closely related to fear and may be similarly identity-affirming, and surprise, like fear, increases tension and motivates attention toward something unexpected (Izard, 1992). Given the primacy of fear as the emotional response to threat and the complexity of possible variations in the mix and intensity of emotions induced by a threat, there are not individual hypotheses for each emotion. I do, however, engage with the significance of other emotions later in the thesis.

The next theorized causal link is from fear to identity-related outcomes. As discussed above, there is evidence that fear can be an identity-affirming emotion, particularly if the fear makes mortality more salient and causes individuals to seek reassurance by affirming their worldview and denigrating outsiders (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986). Fear's identity-affirming effects may also be the consequence of an adaptive strategy of within-group coordination in times of distress, whereby a "range of aversive stimuli" may lead to "increases in pro-normative attitudes towards one's relevant reference groups" (Navarrete et al., 2004). In either case, fear is expected to increase the extent to which an individual affiliates with her identity group and to increase her antagonism or "exclusionary" attitude toward out-groups (Levine & Campbell, 1972; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Struch & Schwartz, 1989; Quillian, 1995; Stephan & Stephan, 2001). These exclusionary attitudes are expected to reinforce in-group identity in an iterative process, as depicted in the model (Petersen, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2000). Collectively, this leads to hypotheses 2A and 2B:

H_{2A}: The impact of threat-induced fear is identity-affirming

H_{2B}: The impact of threat-induced fear increases exclusionist attitudes toward the out-group.

Figure 2.2: A Theorized Model of the Impact of Exposure to Violence on Identity



This model additionally draws on past research that has shown that fear can lead individuals to take a more defensive posture in order to protect themselves from harm (Ng & Lim, 2013) and may also decrease tolerance for risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), both of which are expected to undermine trust. As a result, fear induced by a proximate violent threat is expected to decrease the amount of trust espoused and actually exhibited toward others.³⁷

H₃: Subjects who feel acutely threatened by violence (i.e. fearful) will be less trusting.

Finally, increased in-group identification and out-group exclusion stemming from a proximate violent threat are expected to increase support for the use of violence and for “political intolerance” (broadly meaning parties and systems that minimize the diversity of ideas and minority voices). Why might acutely-threatened individuals be more supportive³⁸ of violence? Alongside a number of factors that are thought to impact attitudes toward violence, including material opportunity (Berdal, Berdal, & Malone, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) and inequality (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010; Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011), emotions are also thought to play a significant role (McDoom, 2012). And across many settings, fear, in particular, has been shown to lead to greater tolerance for violence (Kaufmann, 1996; Lake & Rothchild, 1998; Petersen, 2002; Caspi et al., 2002; Widom & Brzustowicz, 2006; Patel, Simon, & Taylor, 2013) and even to actual acts of aggression (McGregor et al., 1998). As such, I hypothesize that:

H_{4A}: A proximate threat of violence will increase support for the use of violence.

³⁷ This does not lead to clear predictions as to whether and how this will vary by in-group relationship. In theory, we might expect that reductions to out-group trust would be greater, even from a lower starting point, because of some interaction between fear, exclusion, and trust.

³⁸ There is, of course, an important distinction between supporting violence and actually participating in it.

How might fear increase political intolerance? For one, strengthened in-group identity may itself alter political preferences, such that systems thought to be favouring the in-group seem more attractive. Alternatively, a thin rational choice model would predict that individuals under acute threat will seek to maximize their security and will express their political preferences instrumentally in pursuit of this goal, possibly prioritizing a less open but more secure system above rights and freedoms. And indeed, past research has demonstrated that under some circumstances, threat (Canetti et al., 2009; Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014) and fear (Young, 2016) do lead to an aversion to liberal ideas. Consequently, I generate the following hypothesis:

H_{4B}: A proximate threat of violence will increase political intolerance.

The righthand side of the model is concerned with the impact of *actual* victimization and posits that its effects are largely contingent upon the actions of others post-violence. After the immediate shock fades, there is a discrete period of time when expectations of support will or will not be fulfilled. If the violence-affected individual feels supported, if her community rallies around her and provides empathy, advice, money, etc., this may alleviate tendencies to retreat and entrench, possibly contributing to some of the “growth” outcomes that have been documented in the wartime victimization literature (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996; Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006; Staub, 2013; Bauer et al., 2016). Here it is worth noting that the provider of the support likely matters: if it comes from a cross-section of people and not exclusively fellow in-group members, it may soften attitudes towards out-groups and perhaps moderate tendencies toward in-group bias. If, however, the support is purely in-group supplied, this may reinforce in-group identity, even as it potentially also led to other positive forms of growth (e.g. increased civic engagement and cooperation).

This positive experience of feeling supported and cared for after violence may also lead to increased trusting behaviour, for reasons that are adaptive, expectations-based, emotional, or a combination. Once again, we can theorize that the composition of the sources of support may

similarly impact the way any changes to trust manifest – for example exclusively in-group support may lead to an increase in in-group, but not out-group, trust.

Those who do not feel supported after violence, conversely, may find it far more difficult to overcome the well-documented negative psychological consequences to victimization, such as depression, anxiety, and trauma (Hobfoll, Tracy, & Galea, 2006; Johnson & Thompson, 2008; Blattman & Annan, 2010). Moreover, if the apathetic response of others means that these individuals are left *more* fearful of future violence after having been victimized, it may, as others have demonstrated, lead to greater in-group attachment and bias, along with hostile attitudes toward out-groups, potentially for the same reasons discussed about threat-induced fear above. If the world seems dangerous and hostile and unkind, one's willingness to branch out to outsiders may be minimal, and one's propensity to trust others, particularly those not belonging to her group, is likely negatively affected as well. (Chen & Koenig, 2006; Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; Cassar, Grosjean, & Whitt, 2013; Beber, Roessler, & Scacco, 2014).

As discussed above, the type of violence experienced may have important implications for the extent to which the victim feels supported after violence. Coping after the typically individual experience of everyday violence is often a solitary exercise – as a result, it may lead to disillusionment and disaffection. Conversely, coping after an often group-based experience of identity-based violence is frequently collective. As such, it may lead to a feeling of support.³⁹ In this sense, variation in the *category* of violence experienced may impact the events that occur in the post-victimization period which, in turn, is anticipated to impact outcomes as follows:

H_{5A}: Identity-based violence victimization will generally increase trust in others.

H_{5B}: Everyday violence victimization will generally decrease trust in others.

³⁹ To be sure, one can imagine multiple factors that might complicate these hypothesized relationships, including the identity group of the perpetrator of the violence, the extent to which the victim expected in-group support after victimization, and whether the individual had previously experienced violence. The model provides a general framework but cannot comprehensively address all of the potential relationships.

Finally, this model suggests that individuals who do *not* experience “growth” after victimization will be more supportive of political intolerance, for the reasons outlined above. Indeed, evidence from scholars of American and Israeli politics, in particular, has demonstrated that victimization leads to greater support for less inclusive political systems and parties (Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014; Bonanno & Jost, 2006). And, consistent with previous research⁴⁰ about victimization leading to future perpetration (Widom, 1989; Patel, Simon, & Taylor, 2013), the model anticipates increased support for violence among those who experience post-victimization “regression.” Collectively, I hypothesize that:

H_{6A}: Actual victimization will increase support for the use of violence.

H_{6B}: Actual victimization will increase political intolerance.

Finally, it is important to note there may be feedback in the model. That is, increased support for in-group members and for violence, for example, may contribute to feelings of perceived threat. Because of the experimental research design, in which threat is induced and then immediately measured, this does not lead to empirical challenges, however it is a dynamic that is worthy of further exploration in future research, e.g. through an iterative experiment.

2.6 Conclusion

Historically, social science has treated everyday violence and identity-based conflict as two unrelated problems and as two distinct lines of inquiry. They are analysed separately, by distinct groups of scholars and as a result, we know surprisingly little about the similarities and differences in how they affect individuals. Moreover, there are disconnects in the way that exposure to violence is conceptualized and measured. One subset of the literature operates in a

⁴⁰ Miguel, Saiegh, & Satyanath make this point in a 2011 paper about on-field aggressive behaviour by football players whose countries experienced civil war during their childhood. Other scholars note that the effects of war are “clearly associated with more homicide and assault, in the ethnographic record as well as cross nationally” (Ember & Ember, 1994, p.622).

world of potentialities, considering how the “mere” threat of violence influences attitudes and behaviour, while a separate body of work operates at the level of actualities, studying how oftentimes devastating acts of violence affects individuals and communities. It is rare that threat and actual victimization considered in parallel, or as two parts of the broader notion of being “violence-exposed.”

This project bridges some of these gaps, considering both the threat of and actual experiences with different forms of violence. Drawing on multiple and cross-disciplinary literatures, this chapter demonstrated why we might expect exposure to something as “mundane” as a violent robbery to impact identity and preferences, and how the effects might vary depending on whether the individual was “merely” threatened by the violence or actually victimized. And while this theoretical foundation is largely built from social psychology, these are also political questions, as identity itself is inherently political and violence can influence political dynamics in fundamental ways. In this sense, these are questions that should concern political scientists and others working on conflict more broadly. This is, to the best of my knowledge, the first project to experimentally assess the effects of different forms of exposure to *everyday* violence on social identity, trust, and attitudes about politics and violence; in its interdisciplinary approach, it also seeks to contribute methodologically and to point out where the disciplines can learn from each other. With this conceptual foundation, I now turn from the theoretical to the actual, beginning with an in-depth discussion of how the dynamics of violence and identity in Nigeria unfold, and demonstrating some of the surprising ways in which they are expressed specifically in Lagos.

Chapter 3

The Dynamics of Identity and Violence in Nigeria

*Fat fish eat little fish
Big ones arrange executions
And armed robberies.
Our rubbish shapes us all.*

- Ben Okri, 1983

3.1 Introduction

Inching through the packed streets of Ikeja one November day, the car comes to a sudden halt in a “go-slow,” local slang for a traffic jam. The driver of our vehicle sighs, cuts the engine, and rolls down his window to let the dusty wind in – he knows this will take a while. Ahead of us, a flimsy-looking motorcycle, known in Nigeria as an “*okada*,” lies abandoned in the road. It’s driver, a lithe man of perhaps twenty, is on his feet and gesticulating wildly at the owner of an SUV, who evidently bumped into him while attempting to merge. The *okada* rider grows increasingly agitated and then shoves the other man forcefully against his car. The driver responds with a brisk slap across the face and then the two men are fighting in the middle of the road, hot with anger.

Almost immediately, a small crowd forms around them; the oldest of the group manages to insert himself between the two parties and tries to pacify the young man. His words are lost over the blaring horns, but something he says works and the *okada* driver unclenches. This intermediary then turns to the SUV driver, and, after a few nods, collects a small handful of Naira bills from him. He reaches into his own pocket and pulls out a few more notes and then hands the wad to the young man, trading petty cash for revenge and sending him on his way. The crowd disbands and the surrounding traffic resumes its crawl as the threat of the scuffle turning more violent evaporates. The driver of my car is unmoved by the incident and mumbles something about the inconvenience of the delay. The types of violent events that do seem to catch his attention are much more spectacular: large-scale armed robberies carried out

by gangs, clashes between rival cultist¹ groups, retaliatory vigilante justice. Many of our drives through the city begin with him recounting stories of these types of attacks.

He has plenty of material to draw from. Both the brief street fight we witnessed in all of its “tedium,” and the larger-scale acts of violence that interested my driver, are common in Lagos. According to the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics,² there were almost 19,000 reported episodes of “offences against persons” (defined as different forms of murder, rape, and physical abuse, but not including terrorism) and almost 25,000 “offences against property” (robbery, burglary, etc.) in 2017 in Lagos State, easily more than any other state³ within Nigeria, including those with similarly large populations. And while it is certainly possible to have a wholly peaceful day in Lagos, the city’s residents are also used to a lingering threat of violence, be it the possibility of becoming the unlucky victim of a robbery, a routine interaction turning violent, or simply getting caught in the “wrong place at the wrong time.” As will be discussed, the vast majority of this violence is “everyday” in nature and not organized around the axis of ethnicity or religion; nonetheless, these dimensions of identity are a salient part of everyday life and can colour even the most mundane interactions in the city. In Nigeria more broadly, they influence political and economic life in profound and multiple ways.

In this chapter, I examine the contours of identity and violence in Nigeria with a particular focus on how these dynamics unfold in Lagos. I begin with a discussion of the salience of communal identities in Nigeria, as it is certainly not preordained that ethnicity, region, and religion would continue to factor so prominently into everyday, and especially political, life. I draw on Richard Joseph’s now-classic concept of *prebendalism* – an ethno-

¹ Cultists, as will be discussed below, are best understood as members of secretive gangs (or confraternities), known for engaging in violent and ritualistic practices (Rotimi, 2005; Ajayi et al., 2010).

² These figures should be treated with some scepticism, as the data was furnished by the Nigerian Police Force, which has been criticized for giving unreliable and politicized figures (see: Alemika & Chukwuma, 2005; Ikoh, 2011). Nonetheless, other independent sources have confirmed that Lagos experiences particularly high levels of crime (see Nigeria Watch’s 2017 *Report on Violence*, p.9).

³ By way of comparison, there were 50,975 offences against persons, property, or law enforcement in Lagos State in 2017, according to the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) – a victimization rate of approximately 0.4% based 2016 population projections. The majority of the other states had victimization rates between 0.05-0.1%. The relatively high number of crimes reported in Lagos could also be a reflection of the city’s advanced infrastructure (e.g. phone network coverage) making reporting easier, but it is unlikely to *only* be driven by this.

clientelistic patronage system⁴ in which access to state office is appropriated on the basis of identity and expected to be used to benefit a kin group – set against a backdrop of chronic physical, economic, and psychological insecurity, to show how failures of governance reinforce communal identities (Joseph, 1987; Suberu, 2001, 2013; Pratten, 2013).

Thereafter I focus on Lagos and address two related puzzles: why do most Lagosians identify primarily along religious lines, particularly in light of the importance of ethno-regional identity in obtaining access to benefits; and why is identity-based violence objectively and comparatively so rare in Lagos, despite the salience of sub-national identity, the generally high levels of other types of violence, and the intense competition for resources in the city? I contend that, among other factors, the extreme diversity of Lagos, coupled with a religiously-divided Yoruba majority, makes religion a more useful dimension of identification, particularly for those trying to “opt out” of minority status (Posner 2004, 2005). This also has implications for the way violence is expressed in the city. As I argue, the sense of community fostered by the centrality of religion, buttressed by Lagos’ financial independence from the state and its comparatively reformist government, diffuses the risk of large-scale, communal violence. Taken together, these dynamics make Lagos a particularly useful place to study the interaction of violence and identity.

3.2 The Fragile “Big Brother”

Nigeria, *The Economist* declared in 2013, is a country “...tottering along, acclaimed as much for its massive potential as for its actual achievements. It is still a sick man all the same.” “Africa’s Giant” does seem remarkably adept at hindering its own progress. Despite an impressive bounty of resources, including extensive arable land (World Bank, 2019); an

⁴ A “*prebend*” originally referred to assets or “benefices” allocated in feudal societies to those who rendered a service. Max Weber later used the term “*prebend*” to refer to “allowances in kind” (Joseph, 1983, p.30). In Joseph’s description of Nigeria, he defined “prebendal” as “patterns of political behaviour which reflect as their justifying principle that the offices of the existing state may be competed for and then utilised for the personal benefit of office-holders as well as that of their reference or support group” (1983, p.30).

enormous, young, and eager population (Rheault & Tortora, 2008; Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2013) that is expected to become the world's third largest by 2050 (UN Economic & Social Affairs, 2015); a well-educated diaspora (The Economist, 2015); and the world's eighth largest proven crude oil reserves (OPEC, 2017), 86 of Nigeria's estimated⁵ 193 million inhabitants still live in extreme poverty⁶ (World Bank, 2017), and the country is ranked 18/178 (where 1 is the "most fragile" country) on the 2018 Fragile State Index, an assessment of a nation's vulnerability to conflict (The Fund For Peace, 2018).

Nigeria is in many ways defined by contradictions. Adebani and Obadare call it "...the perfect metaphor for postcolonial dysfunction [...] blessed and seemingly cursed in almost equal proportion" (2013, p.4; see also: Osaghae, 1998; Maier, 2000; Obadare, 2008; Adebani & Obadare, 2011). It is a country that, uniquely, is both a petro-state and a democracy,⁷ lurching toward a fairer and more transparent system of governance but not without plenty of stumbles along the way. The 2015 presidential elections, for example, in which power transitioned from the incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan, to the opposition leader, Muhammadu Buhari, were called a "milestone for multiparty democracy on the continent" (Mark & Smith, 2015), but they were also marred by outbreaks of political violence, attempted electoral manipulation, and abuses of incumbent power (EUEA Election Observation Mission Report 2015). In this and many other ways, Nigeria's transition to democracy in 1999 after decades of intermittent military rule has only partially fulfilled expectations about the transformative effects of a more representative system of governance. As Lewis explained, "For many Nigerians trying to cope amid poverty, scarce public services, pervasive corruption, and widespread violence, the dividends of democracy seem more speculative than real" (2011, p.63).

⁵ The exact population of Nigeria is contested. The country's most recent census took place in 2006, and a census scheduled for 2016 was postponed due to a lack of funds (Fawehinmi, 2018; Runsewe, 2018). In June 2018, the NBS released a report with projected population data based on the 2006 census data, arriving at a total of just over 193 million (Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics 2016).

⁶ According to the World Bank, extreme poverty is defined as living on less than \$1.90/day.

⁷ Nigeria's 2017 Polity IV "Democracy" score, which measures the presence and quality of democratic institutions, constraints on executive power, and guarantees of civil liberties, was an 8 out of 10 (Polity IV Project). The *Economist Intelligence Unit* assigned Nigeria a Democracy Index score of 4.44/10 in 2017, which is a measure of "electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture" (2018, p.63)

Although Nigeria is a rare example of an African country that had a first civil war but not a second, there are plenty of moments when intrastate conflict seems distinctly possible. At the time of writing (July 2018), the country is contending with a devastating and ongoing Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, a resurgent Biafra secessionist movement in the southeast, an uneasy ceasefire in the Niger Delta, and escalating communal violence in the Middle Belt (Human Rights Watch, 2018). With its breakneck population growth and multiple, violent challenges to order, Nigeria, at times, seems like a country trying to simultaneously hold the lids down on a dozen boiling pots. As anthropologist Daniel Jordan Smith explained in a 2007 book, there is a common pidgin English phrase often used in laments about the uneasy state of the nation: “*Nigeria na war-o*,” translated as “Nigeria is a war” or “Nigeria is out of control” (p.xii).

This “war” is partially borne out of an extraction-based economy that simplifies the process of stealing from the state, layered onto the country’s inability or unwillingness to move away from a system of *prebendal* politics that ensures that identity-group linkages are the lynchpin to economic and physical security and renders high political office, with its power over budgets, jobs, and other benefits, particularly valuable (Joseph, 1987, p.32-34; see also Adebani & Obadare. 2013).

More generally, even during the era of military rule, when ethnic, regional, and religious differences were forcibly repressed, the political culture of Nigeria was intricately linked to identity groups; it was, and is, difficult to understand one without the other (Adebani, 2009). I turn to this subject now, describing the nature and salience of the most important identity-based divisions in Nigeria and suggesting reasons for the continued relevance of sub-national identification, despite attempts at nation-building. Given the centrality of identity to this thesis, it is important to understand how it is experienced and expressed in Nigeria and especially in Lagos, and why certain dimensions of identity have more political and social salience than others.

3.2.1 Identity in Nigeria

Nigeria is, by any standard, characterized by strong communal identities that are enmeshed, cross-cutting, and “exceedingly complex” (Suberu, 2001, p.3). There are at least⁸ three major identity-group cleavages with contemporary relevance in Nigeria: competition between the largest ethnic groups, the Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa, sometimes referred to as the *wazobia*;⁹ cleavages between the hundreds of “minority” ethnic groups and these three dominant ethnic groups; and a split between the mostly Muslim north and the largely Christian south (Mustapha, 2006).

The dominance of and rivalry between the largest ethnic groups factors prominently into Nigerian political life. In the mid-20th century, each faction of the *wazobia* was assigned by the colonial administration to a geographic region: the Yoruba (roughly 21% of Nigerians) were given the southwest, the Igbo (18%) the southeast, and the Hausa-Fulani (~29%) the north (Afigbo, 1991; Osaghae & Suberu, 2005; Mustapha, 2006). This process of regionalization solidified¹⁰ geographic “homelands” for each ethnic group, and linked ethnicity to region in a fundamental way: as others have pointed out, the word “ethnicity” in contemporary Nigeria is often used interchangeably with “region” or “state of origin” (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005).¹¹ Moreover, regionalization laid a foundation for future contestation over claims to land by the “indigenes,” who have historic links a particular geography, and the “settlers,” who are, in theory, migrants to the area and therefore subject to treatment as second-class citizens (Mustapha, 2006; Adebani, 2009; Langer & Ukiwo, 2009). As Osaghae and Suberu contend,

⁸ Mustapha argues that there are actually seven ethnic and political cleavages in Nigeria: the three named above, plus other majority/minority dynamics, such as interstate rivalries and inter/intraclan divisions (2006, p.7). There is undoubtedly merit to this point, however I would contend that these are second-order divisions, and not the most politically salient cleavages. One additional, important division with an ethno-regional-religious dimension is the indigene/settler rivalry, discussed below (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). Indigene/settler divisions are often the fault line along which violence occurs and resources are distributed. The ongoing herder-farmer conflict, for example, is organized partially along these lines as the herders are viewed as non-indigenes to Plateau State.


⁹ As per Mustapha, *wazobia* is derived from “the Yoruba word *wa*, the Hausa word *zo* and the Igbo word *bia*, all of which mean ‘come’” (2006, p.1).

¹⁰ Some have argued that the status of smaller ethnic groups as marginalized “minorities” was entrenched through the regionalization process (Osaghae, 1986); others claim that they were directly caused by the structure of the state. As Suberu writes, “these communities are not primordial but have been shaped by the evolution and reconfiguration of the federal state itself” 2001, p.1.

¹¹ For this reason, I refer to ethnicity and ethno-region interchangeably in this chapter.

regionalism became a “...a discriminatory system under which people from other regions living in these areas were deprived of rights and privileges and excluded from the political process” (2005, p.6).

Figure 3.1: Ethno-Regional Zones in Modern Nigeria



Regionalization also sharpened delineations between the 270 to 400 “minority” ethnolinguistic groups. This count, which depends on, among other things, whether an individual strategically associates with a larger “umbrella” ethnolinguistic group in order to gain access to resources and privileges (a dynamic exacerbated by regionalism) is unknown and contested;¹² (Mustapha, 2006; Forest, 2012). It is in any case best conceptualized as fluid and inherently political (Suberu, 2001, p.3). Finally, regionalization reinforced divisions between minorities groups and the “indigenes” of the relevant area, and between minorities and the *wazobia*.

¹² Because population figures continue to play a role in the allocation of resources to states, population counts, especially by ethnic group and region, are held infrequently and are usually politicized. This data should therefore be viewed as indicative rather than definitive (Fawehinmi, 2018).

The third major cleavage – the north-south axis – is primarily oriented around the religious diversity of the country and is considered by some to be the “original” identity-group demarcation in Nigeria (Langer & Ukiwo, 2005). The north is a largely Muslim region, although there is plenty of diversity and historical tension between sectarian groups (Casey, 2008; Mustapha, 2014), and a quarter of northerners are believed to be Christian (Mancini, 2009). The south is generally considered the Christian part of the country, although this, too, is something of a misnomer¹³: given the south’s large population of religiously-diverse Yoruba, there is a non-Christian population of around 15% (Mancini, 2009).

This north-south divide is exacerbated by economic disparities between the regions, as the north has historically lagged in development, urbanization, wages, employment levels, health outcomes, and growth (Suberu, 2001; Forest, 2012). As Hoffmann explains, “Northern Nigeria continues to display some of the worst human development indicators in the world. In northeast Nigeria, 71.5 per cent of the population live in absolute poverty and more than half are malnourished, making it the poorest part of the country” (2014, p.5). Since 2011, the situation in the northeast has further deteriorated due to instability generated by the Boko Haram insurgency.¹⁴ Nonetheless, the north also retains significant influence in politics and the military (Hoffmann, 2014), and to the extent¹⁵ that southern politicians have been successful in federal elections since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, it is in part due to an informal pact that codifies the rotation of the presidency between the north and south every eight years (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005; Cheeseman, 2018).

Of course, the mere existence of ethnic, religious, and regional identities does not necessarily imply their political and social relevance. As Mustapha reminds us, “ethnic diversity, on its own, need not lead to the politics of ethnic mobilization” (2006, p.5) – a premise

¹³ As Hoffmann explains “This narrative, while a convenient short-hand, ignores the brimming diversity in both halves of Nigeria and glosses over the intricate ethnic, religious and social ties that have been responsible for holding the country together through many episodes of turbulence. In today’s Nigeria the north and the south are home to an ethnically and religiously mixed population” (2014, p.5).

¹⁴ In Borno State, the centre of the insurgency, Boko Haram-affiliated militants are responsible for nearly 30,000 media-documented deaths between 2011 - 2018 (Campbell, 2019).

¹⁵ It is notable that excepting Nnamdi Azikiwe, who was the first president of independent Nigeria, the country has not had an Igbo president. This is a source of continued grievance among the Igbo.

that could equally be applied to religious and regional identities (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). Yet identity, and especially ethnicity, remains salient in Nigeria, despite the country's many attempts to constrain it through programmatic nation-building efforts (Osaghae, 1991; Obi, 2001; Suberu, 2001, 2013; Mustapha, 2006). In the most recent round of the Afrobarometer survey, for example, 22% of those polled reported that they identify exclusively or primarily with their ethnic group and approximately a third of respondents claim that their ethnic group is treated unfairly by the government – indications of the continued political salience of ethnicity in the country (2017).

Moving beyond survey data, ethnicity matters in profound ways in Nigeria. As Osaghae argued, even among non-elite Nigerians, ethnicity is used strategically in pursuit of “personal and private goals;” it remains an important source of differentiation, cooperation, and access to resources (2003, p.60-61). Individuals who are considered a part of the non-dominant ethnic group and/or “settlers” to the area can, for example, be shut out of university admissions, social services, and even voter registration on the basis of their identity (Matfess, 2016). Politically, ethno-regional identity is central in the allocation of power and its privileges (Obadare & Adebani, 2013). While explicitly ethnic political parties are banned and parties tend to have an inclusive “big-tent” character, appointed offices, government contracts, and other privileges dispersed by elected officials are contested by factions organized along ethnic and regional lines (Diamond cited in Suberu, 2001, p.xv-xvi; Suberu, 2009; Bogaards, 2010), and sub-national identity “remain(s) undoubtedly preponderant” in the political sphere (Obadare & Adebani 2013, p.3-4). In a 2005 survey, Nigerians were asked if their ethnicity affects their chances of getting government jobs and contracts: almost 50% of respondents responded affirmatively (Langer & Ukiwo, 2009). In these and many other ways, subnational identity, and particularly ethnicity, are highly relevant in everyday and political life. As Obadare and Adebani write, “It is not just that ethno-regional and class divisions structure Nigerian politics...the problem is that, despite repeated attempts at institutional reordering, the same divisions continue to distort, if not disfigure, it” (2013, p.3).

3.2.2 *Prebendalism*

What accounts for the continued pre-eminence of sub-national, and especially ethno-regional, identity in social and political life in Nigeria? There are a number of factors with explanatory power, including a security vacuum that has partially been filled by ethnically-aligned militias and vigilante groups;¹⁶ ethnic associations¹⁷ that, in addition to promoting their culture, also advocate for the group's political interests (Ukiwo, 2003; Pratten, 2008); and deficient alternative forms of ideologies that could compete with identity politics (Osaghae, 2003). But these factors are more of a symptom of the salience of ethnic identity than its cause. To the extent that one can identify a main contributor to the contemporary relevance of communal identities, it is arguably the *prebendal* character of Nigerian politics, in which a constituent's probability of benefiting from the spoils of the state depends largely on her communal relationships to elites, and especially to officeholders (Joseph, 1987). The continued relevance of *prebendalism* is, at the same time, partially a consequence of the salience of ethnicity and of the structure of the state, and they mutually reinforce each other. Together, these dynamics at once undermine the provision of public goods and services, reinforce the idea that one cannot rely on the state, and link security to a relationship with a "Big Man" who shares one's communal identity.

Prebendalism's ability to take such firm hold is intricately related¹⁸ to the perversion of Nigeria's federalist system, which came into existence under the colonial state and underwent a series of changes throughout the 20th century to counterbalance the "centrifugal" nature of ethnically-dominated regions (Suberu, 2009, p.71). Although this process

¹⁶ Notably, the Yoruba O'odua People's Congress, the Igbo, Bakassi Boys, Ijaw militants in the Niger Delta region such as the Egbesu Boys, and *hisba* groups in the north (for a review, see Pratten, 2008). The Nigerian government banned these groups in 2000 (LeBas, 2013) but most continue to operate.

¹⁷ Most prominently, the Yoruba Afenifere and the Igbo Ohaneze Ndigbo (Ikelegbe, 2001)

¹⁸ Of course, *prebendalism* alone cannot fully account for the continued salience of ethno-regional identity, and the existence of relevant sub-national groups pre-dates the emergence of this relational system. Other scholars have pointed to, among other things, colonial policies and specific traditions within individual ethnic groups as factors that contribute to the importance of ethno-regional identity. See, for example, Osaghae & Suberu, 2005, or Horowitz 1985 for a general discussion of the formation and politicization of identity groups.

impressively mitigated the risk of large-scale communal conflict,¹⁹ it was incomplete and problematic: newly-created states were given only partial autonomy and deprived of key privileges, such as decision rights over the police force, the income tax rate, and the distribution of oil revenues (Mustapha, 2007; Cheeseman & De Gramont, 2017). As a result, despite the ostensible autonomy of the states, the reference point remains the central government and “...the central government can legitimately intervene in virtually every matter of public importance” (Suberu, 2009, p.75).

The grip on resources and decision-making power retained by the centre set against a backdrop of chronic insecurity means that obtaining access to the spoils of the state is an imperative of the highest order, for one can never be sure that he will otherwise receive his “fair share” (Suberu, 2009; see also Pratten, 2013; Cheeseman, 2015).²⁰ This access is typically relationship-based and facilitated by co- ethnic or ethno-regional identity – i.e. it is *prebendal* in character. As Owen writes, “...in a cultural context where a historically strong communitarian understanding of personhood is reinforced by a political system that deals with its citizens on the basis of their membership of ethno-regional groups...” it is important to “...[have] someone who is there,” in a position of power, to provide access to benefits (2013, p.169-170).

For those in public office, there is a strong expectation that they will use their privileges to benefit their “constituents and kin groups” rather than Nigerian society at large (Joseph, 1987). Indeed, dispersing benefits to co-ethnics is an important part of remaining relevant within the community (Owen, 2013). Forest explains,

“Because of this system of patronage and personal largesse, a political culture has developed in which the government is not seen as a means to serve the people and the state, but rather, the means to wealth. Any member of a family or clan who can get a government job becomes the centerpiece of an extended support system, a type of relational social security built exclusively on who you know or

¹⁹ As Suberu argues, federalism has “...substantially inoculated the country against the type of violent political protests over systemic ethnic inequity or exclusion that have ravaged other African states such as Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya and Sudan” (2009, p.73).

²⁰ This is also legally reinforced by the “Federal Character” principle, a set of provisions, enshrined in the 1979 Constitution, to ensure appropriate levels of inter-region and intergroup power-sharing.

who knows you. It is a system in which anyone who holds a position within the government—even at the lowest levels of authority—is expected by their family and friends to supplement their meager income with alternative sources, stealing money, and sharing the wealth” (2012, p.33).

These dynamics were further powered by Nigeria’s rapid transformation to a major oil producer shortly after the end of the civil war. The sheer quantity of wealth derived from this windfall – “manna from heaven,” as Larry Diamond calls it – and its separation from the body politic²¹ raised the stakes of having a patron and entrenched *prebendal* relationships (2013, p.x). And although the oil revenues themselves are technically allocated by the centre to the regions on the basis of a (contested) formula, the actual disbursement process is mired by administrative confusion and manipulation, fuelling mistrust and reinforcing the importance of a personal relationship with a co-ethnic power-broker (Ahmad & Singh, 2003). Osaghae explains:

“A recurrent element of struggles by minority and majority ethnic groups alike, at least in Nigeria, is that those rights and benefits that should ordinarily accrue to them end up been absorbed by those who have captured the artificial State that lacks the reciprocal capacity, or even the sincere enthusiasm, to promote and protect the rights of ethnic and sub-ethnic groups (1995, p.323-344, in Ukeje & Adebani, 2008).

Collectively, the opaqueness, unreliability, and inequity of the distribution of state resources, compared to the relative effectiveness and security of relying on a co-ethnic or ethno-regional patron, reinforces the salience of sub-national identity among Nigerians who may otherwise not believe that their communal identity defines them. On the other side of the equation, those seeking public office are well-served by exploiting these relationships (Suberu, 2013; Owen, 2013). Given the availability of the natural resources that propel this system, *prebendalism*, and the resultant salience of ethno-regional identity could, as Diamond contends, “...keep going until the oil runs out some decades hence,” although, as he adds, it is difficult to imagine how prebendalism can co-exist with political stability in the long-term (2013, *preface*). For the time

²¹ Unlike taxation, there is no social compact inherent in resource wealth (LeBas & Cheeseman, 2013; Cheeseman & de Gramont, 2017).

being, it is equally difficult to imagine ethno-regional identity becoming less important to social, and especially political, life in Nigeria.

3.3 Welcome to Lagos

Tucked into a narrow coastal plain on the Gulf of Guinea, the megacity of Lagos sprawls across the Mainland centre, with its crowded markets and bus stops, over the Lagos Lagoon, and onto the so-called Island, where rows of office buildings and sterile coffee shops overflow during business hours. The city pulses with activity, its streets teeming at all hours, the idea of finding a bit of solitude as futile as keeping floors clean during the annual Harmattan dust storms. Frenetic, diverse, and unevenly wealthy, Lagos occupies an outsized role in the Nigerian imagination. “Making it” in Lagos is a widely-shared national dream; a *séjour* in the city is an unofficial rite of passage. As Peter Enahoro (1966) writes, “you can never become a true Nigerian until you have passed through the grill, come to Lagos, or at the very least, aspire to come to Lagos” (cited in Whiteman, 2012). The former federal and current economic capital, Lagos is often referred to as a “microcosm” of Nigeria, reflecting back its ethnic, regional, religious, and ideological diversity (Whiteman, 2012; Cheeseman & de Gramont, 2017). Alongside its melting pot demographics, there are many other ways in which the metropole reproduces the broader dynamics of Nigeria: in its tremendous ethos of optimism, its many languages, cultures, rituals, and foods, and also in its dysfunction, poverty, dislocation, and the frequency of violence (Cheeseman & de Gramont, 2017; Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2016a).

Lagos also surprises in the ways in which it differs. For one, the city is comparably wealthy and self-sufficient. Lagos’s gross domestic product was an estimated \$136 billion in 2017, representing a third of Nigeria’s entire output that year and making it the fifth largest *economy* in Africa (“Lagos State is Africa’s 5th Largest Economy,” 2017). The wealth is derived from diverse sources, including booming film, tech, and fashion industries, and, quite unusually, internally-generated tax dollars, which reportedly amounted to ₦247 billion (\$687 million) in 2016 (Ugbodaga, 2017). The ability and will to increase tax-generated revenue has,

as Cheeseman and de Gramont (2017) explain, made Lagos the only Nigerian state to fund its budget without transfers from the central government,²¹ giving it both the political space²² and resources to experiment with innovation in development, infrastructure, and the provision of public goods (LeBas & Cheeseman, 2013; de Gramont, 2015; Cheeseman & de Gramont, 2017). This financial independence also reinforces the ethos of Lagos as a modern “megacity” – a narrative that influences the political culture, economics decisions, and, importantly, the way Lagosians conceptualize themselves (de Gramont, 2015).

Indeed, one of the striking features of Lagos is that in-group identity is defined overwhelmingly along religious lines, even though a significant portion of Lagosians are migrants from parts of Nigeria where ethnicity has greater political and social capital. A second and related point is the way violence presents in Lagos: despite the salience of social identity in the city, the violence in Lagos overwhelmingly presents as “everyday” in nature rather than being identity-based. And while a preponderance of everyday violence is, as I argued in chapter 1, the norm rather than the exception in locales worldwide (and in most²³ of Nigeria), it is nonetheless striking to observe just how comparatively rare identity-based violence is in Lagos.

In the following three sections, I discuss the politics and demographics of Lagos, and then offer explanations for the nature of identity in the city. I suggest that the combination of the city’s cosmopolitan ethos, coupled with the dominance of the religiously plural Yoruba, makes religion the more salient cleavage and minimizes the importance of other identity dimensions with the potential to be more divisive, such as ethnicity. Religious identity is also reinforced through the prominent role of many of Lagos’ religious institutions; by the micro-dynamics of the city’s neighbourhoods; and via the national dynamics, which have become more religiously polarized. I then turn to the nature of violence in Lagos, arguing that these

²² Cheeseman and de Gramont argue that this financial independence is a necessary but not sufficient factor behind the successful reforms pushed through by several governors of Lagos State (2017).

²³ There are at least two important exceptions to this description at the time of writing (July 2018), both of which are partially motivated by religion: the ongoing clash in Nigeria’s Middle Belt between primarily Muslim and Fulani cattle herders, and mostly Christian farmers/villagers sharply, and the continuing Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria (International Crisis Group, 2017). They are discussed below.

identity dynamics, and particularly the religious diversity of the Yoruba, naturally constrains the risk of identity-based violence. The relative wealth and progressive nature of the Lagos State Government, that has on one hand attempted on a sustained basis to be more inclusive and to provide public goods, and on the other is proactive in quashing identity-based unrest, limits both the grounds and opportunity for identity violence. Collectively, these factors make Lagos unfavourable to large-scale outbreaks of identity-based violence, despite the salience of sub-national identity, and particularly of religion.

3.3.1 The “Centre of Excellence”

One cannot pass through Lagos without noticing the sharp contrasts at every corner. The streets are crammed with every variety of rusted-out sedan and motorbike, but also with gleaming luxury vehicles, one of many stark reminders of the city’s astonishing level of income inequality.²⁴ The roads themselves are another: in the city’s poorest areas, they are unpaved, unlit, and overflowing with mounds of trash. In the chicer parts, where the Lagos elite live in columned fortresses, they are paved and gated, repaired with private funds collected through resident association fees.

These roads can also be democratizing: all Lagosians face the same mind-numbing gridlock, blaring horns, and seemingly non-existent traffic laws as they traverse the city.²⁵ And even if the parade of hawkers selling every imaginable snack, electronic, and “get rich in one weekend!” book helps to pass the time, the gridlock is a stark reminder of the dysfunction of the city, despite the government’s ongoing reform efforts. Lagos’s uniformed traffic officials, known more for their proclivity to collect bribes than their help facilitating traffic, are another,²⁶ alongside the notoriously unstable power supply, scarcity of clean drinking water, and alarming regularity of violence. These challenges, coupled with the breakneck pace of urbanization and

²⁴ Oxfam recently deemed Nigeria the country whose government is least committed to reducing inequality (Mayah et al., 2017).

²⁵ It is not uncommon for Lagosians living on the Mainland to wake up before 4am in order to make it to their office job on the Island by 8am, covering a distance of approximately 20km.

²⁶ See, for example, “Eight LASTMA Officials Arrested for Collecting Bribes,” *Punch*, 13 Aug 2017).

the national economic downturn of 2016, have hindered efforts to make Lagos the “Centre of Excellence” described on the city’s license plates. Reflecting on this and the many other hardships of life in the city, *Economist’s Intelligence Unit* ranked Lagos the world’s second “least liveable” city in 2017, slightly better than Damascus and marginally worse than Tripoli.²⁷

In fairness, the challenges of governing Lagos are immense. With an estimated metropolitan population of somewhere around 20 million (this contested figure is 17 million according to the World Bank and 12.5 – 21 million according to the Government of Lagos),²⁸ its “megacity”²⁹ title is well-deserved. Lagos is currently sub-Saharan Africa’s largest urban centre and its population growth is extreme: some say that the number of people in Lagos has more than doubled since the late 1990’s (Rosenthal, 2012; World Population Review, 2017). Nigerians flock to Lagos for opportunity, for excitement, and above all, to make money. It is estimated that thousands of Nigerians arrive in Lagos every week, joining cousins or former neighbours in the hope of improving their economic prospects (Obioma, 2016). Many of them are not successful: despite their “raucous spirit of entrepreneurship” (Lewis, 2009) and oftentimes multiple sources of income, 70% of Lagosians do not have reliable access to the benefits of the “formal structures of the society,” such as education, jobs, electricity, or land (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2016b, p.8). Yet despite these challenges, Lagosians remain almost impossibly optimistic that someday, their fortunes will improve (Leke et al., 2014).

The city’s millions of residents are dispersed across 20 local government areas (LGAs), political-administrative units to which some degree of decision-making authority over issues³⁰ of governance and development is devolved (Diejomaoh & Eboh, 2010). LGAs factor prominently into social and political life in Lagos: they can confer a sense of belonging to a community; they are important points of access to the state; they partially organize and

²⁷ To be fair, *The Economist* has at other points lauded the reforms of Lagos’ governors, and suggested that the city “could also teach politicians in the capital a thing or two” (The Economist, 2015).

²⁸ A census has not taken place since 2006 so the true figure is unknown. The most recent government projections place the population of Lagos at 12.5 million, but to most outside observers, that seems very low.

²⁹ According to the UN, megacities are urban areas with at least 10 million people (UN, 2016).

³⁰ For example, LGAs have decision rights over local infrastructure maintenance, registration functions, and waste management (Diejomaoh & Eboh, 2012).

delineate violence, as some areas are markedly “rougher” than others; and they provide the context and opportunities for social bonds. LGAs are also the place in which the diversity of the city is lived and expressed. Neighbours frequently come from different regions, religions, ethnic groups or sub-groups; intermarriage is common and generally socially-accepted, and different groups regularly interact in markets and other places of commerce (Ogunlesi, 2015; Cowen, 2017). The constant stream of migrants to Lagos ensures that the city remains a demographic melting pot – by way of example, survey respondents came from more than 32 different states and 22 ethnic groups (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Survey Respondent State, Ethnic, and Religious Demographics

State	% of Sample	Ethnicity	% of Sample	Afrobarometer R6 Lagos	Religion	% of Sample	Afrobarometer R6 Lagos
Ogun	18.65%	Yoruba	68.07%	73.91%	Christian	70.37%	68.50%
Lagos	14.03%	Igbo	14.64%	17.39%	Muslim	29.13%	30.40%
Osun	8.93%	Edo	3.63%	2.72%	Traditional	0.20%	1.1%
Oyo	8.34%	Igala	1.57%		Atheist/Agnostic	0.10%	
Kwara	7.56%	Hausa	1.47%	0.54%	Other	0.20%	
Edo	5.59%	Egun	1.38%				
Ondo	5.00%	Ebira	1.28%				
Enugu	3.83%	Efik	1.18%	2.17%			
Kogi	3.83%	Ibibio	0.98%				
Imo	3.73%	Idoma	0.79%	1.09%			
Abia	3.14%	Urhobo	0.59%				
Akwa							
Ibom	2.94%	Awori	0.49%				
Delta	2.94%	Ijaw	0.39%				
Anambra	2.55%	Isoko	0.39%	0.54%			
Ekiti	1.86%	Itsekiri	0.39%				
Benue	1.67%	Ikwerre	0.29%				
Cross							
River	1.08%	Tapa	0.29%				
Ebonyi	0.98%	Calabar	0.20%				
Bayelsa	0.59%	Birim	0.10%				
Kaduna	0.39%	Kalabari	0.10%				
Plateau	0.39%	Tiv	0.10%				
Adamawa	0.29%	Other		1.63%			
Kano	0.29%	Fulani					
Rivers	0.29%	Gwari					
Yobe	0.20%	Jukun					
Borno	0.10%	Kanuri					
Katsina	0.10%	Nupe					
		Shuwa-Arb					
Kebbi	0.10%						
Nasarawa	0.10%						
Niger	0.10%						
Sokoto	0.10%						
Taraba	0.10%						
Bauchi							
Gombe							
Jigawa							
Zamfara							
Abuja							
FCT							

Note: Afrobarometer R6 data is from 2015

At the same time, as a metropole in the heart of Yorubaland, the Yoruba influence is strongly felt: in addition to English and Pidgin English, Yoruba is widely spoken in Lagos and even officially promoted³¹ (Adeyemi, 2018; Wahab, 2018). The Lagos State Government describes the state as “essentially a Yoruba environment” and stresses its “Yoruba indigeneity” (Lagos State, 2018). All three Governors of Lagos State in the Fourth Republic are Yoruba, and, as Cheeseman and de Gramont contend, the Yoruba are generally “not inclined to share political power with other groups” (2017, p.461). Coupled with the broader political relevance of ethnicity in Nigeria, the fact that identity-based violence, although rare in Lagos, is more likely to be organized around ethnic than religious lines, and the tenet that “...ethnicity has prevailed in the South of Nigeria” (Peel, 2015, p.205), one might expect that identity in Lagos is also articulated in ethnic terms.

Yet when directly³² asked whether their religious or ethnic group is more central to their identity, almost 87% of survey respondents said religion (Table 3.2).³³ The centrality of religion to identity in Lagos did not significantly vary by the respondent’s particular religious or ethnic affiliation, nor was there meaningful variation by gender or income. Across a range of backgrounds, religion was named the primary dimension of identity.³⁴

³¹ The 2018 Yoruba Language Preservation and Promotion Law makes Yoruba an “acceptable means of communication” for all business and political interactions and requires all state-owned tertiary institutions to conduct at least some general studies courses in Yoruba (Lagos State Government).

³² Specifically, subjects were asked “If you had to decide, what is more important to who you are as a person, being [ethnic group subject already named] or being [religious group subject already named]?”

³³ In a separate question late in the survey, respondents were asked to choose between ethnicity, religion, gender, occupation/class, or being “Nigerian first.” More than twice as many respondents chose religion as ethnicity.

³⁴ Nonetheless, it would be a stark overstatement to suggest that ethnicity is unimportant in political life in Lagos – to the contrary, elections season in Lagos is almost always marked by at least one episode of ethnic violence, ethnicity is regularly mentioned in the media and in informal conversations, and, as discussed because, it is unlikely that someone who is not Yoruba will be elected Lagos State Governor.

Table 3.2: Percentage Naming Religion as In-Group by Ethnic and Religious Identity

	Christian	Muslim	<i>Average</i>
Yoruba	89.9%	88.4%	89.1%
Igbo	79%	n/a	79.2%
Hausa	100%	92.3%	93.3%
Other	84.6%	71.4%	82.5%
<i>Average</i>	86.7%	87.4%	

Note: "Traditional" religions are excluded from this table, as they made up less than 0.5% of responses

Interestingly, when asked to name their primary *out-group*, responses were almost evenly divided between religious and ethnic groups (Table 3.3). Those who personally identified along ethnic lines were slightly more likely to name an ethnic group as their out-group ($t(-4.2): 984, p=0.000$), but across the full sample, the stated out-group was nearly evenly split between religious and ethnic groups. The predominance of religion, it seems, applies primarily to one's conception of self, and is not a generalized lens through which Lagosians experience social relationships.

Table 3.3: Out-Group Identification by In-Group Identity

	Out-Group			
In-Group		Ethnicity	Religion	Total
	Ethnicity	8.6%	4.0%	12.6%
	Religion	42.5%	44.9%	87.4%
	Total	51.1%	48.9%	

3.3.2 Identity in Lagos

What accounts for the centrality of religion to identity in Lagos, especially considering that half of all respondents conceived of their out-group in ethnic terms? While it is difficult to give a

definitive answer (the question of *why* respondents identified the way they did was not included in the survey), I will suggest five factors that may have explanatory power: the comparative importance of political performance in voter evaluations in Lagos, which undercuts the ethnicity-reinforcing *prebendal* dynamics discussed above; the “cosmopolitan” ethos of the city, with which an active religious life is arguably more compatible than a dominant ethnic identity; the prominence and organising role of religious institutions within the city; the specific demographics of the areas in which the survey took place, in which both the dominant Yoruba as well minority group members have (different) incentives to identify along religious lines; and the national context, in which religion has become more important since the 1999-2000 introduction of Sharia law in multiple northern states. Collectively, these factors reduce the significance of more divisive identities in Lagos and facilitate a situation in which religion emerges as a more inclusive and overarching identity dimension.

The first two points are related and speak to a conception of Lagos as a modern metropolis that avoids many of the regressive tendencies of other parts of Nigeria. The rhetoric of the city’s political elite reflects this idea, with successive governors painting a vision of Lagos as a “model” megacity (see, for example, “Lagos will be Africa’s model mega-city by 2025 – Ambode,” 2018).³⁵ The electorate is also comparatively well-educated³⁶ and discerning: campaign rhetoric about issues such as public goods and employment, for example, resonates among voters and cuts into the “airtime” for identity-group-based appeals. This contributes to political performance and “issue-based” platforms being comparatively more important to voter evaluations in Lagos (Kaplan, 2014; Cheeseman & de Gramont, 2017). Coupled with its

³⁵ This progressiveness can be at least partially attributed to the specific constellation of local and national politics between the return to democracy (1999) and the end of the tenure of Lagos’ second Governor, Fashola, in 2015. As Cheeseman and de Gramont have argued (2017), both Fashola and his predecessor, Tinubu belonged to the opposition party. To prevent the nationally incumbent party from interfering with or challenging them, they were compelled to build their own basis of support among the electorate and did so by demonstrating effective governance. This has contributed to a political culture in Lagos that is intentionally progressive, and one in which performance is an important element of vote choice. As Whiteman points out, this approach to politics is consistent with the generally progressive leadership in southwest Nigeria (2012).

³⁶ The average level of educational attainment in Lagos is approximately a third of a standard deviation higher than the Nigerian average; per capita income in Lagos is thought to be more than double the national average (see Pilling, 2018)

relative political and financial distance from the centre, the system of *prebendalism* has somewhat less traction in Lagos; and as a result, politics in Lagos are self-consciously less linked to ethnicity than they are in many other parts of Nigeria. At the individual level, this may moderate the importance of ethnicity.

This is mutually reinforced by a culture of Lagos as a proudly progressive locale, in which newcomers are expected to tolerate the city's diversity. Indeed, part of the process of becoming a Lagosian is adopting – or at least espousing³⁷ – a more “modern” sense of self; and this modern identity is arguably more compatible with a strong religious identity than it is with an explicitly ethnic one. Several interviewees noted that Lagosians view excessive ethnic pride as “backward;” others mentioned the importance of leaving the “tribal village mindset” behind; and one respondent called tribe “[a concern of] simple people.” During survey audits, it was striking to see how comfortable, even effusive, some respondents were when discussing their religious identity compared to the reticence they exhibited when asked about their ethnicity. At a minimum, this indicates that certain subjects thought outsiders may be less receptive to expressions of ethnic pride; in some instances, it may have reflected that the subjects themselves perceive a strong ethnic identity to be more problematic than a strong religious one. Coupled with the relative premium placed on political performance described above, this “cosmopolitan” ethos may result in ethnicity being somewhat less salient in Lagos than it is in other parts of the country.

The next major factor that may help to explain how religion emerged as a primary and unifying identity dimension in Lagos is the prominence of religious institutions in the city. As Adebani explains, organized religion, in particular, can powerfully “preserve societal functioning” and “lends coherence to social life by providing people with common symbols, a shared collective identity, and systems of meaning and morality that manifest as a shared world view” (Mattis, 2001, p.263, cited in Adebani, 2010). Within Lagos, the strong social and

³⁷ To be sure, the predominance of religion as the central identity dimension may also be related to an observer effect. Even if that is the case, it is noteworthy that religious identity was viewed as more socially acceptable.

organizing function of religious communities, along with some of the specific religious tenants of the main sects practiced in the city, may make religion an attractive way for individuals to relate to large swathes of the population.

For example, Marshall-Fratani contends that charismatic Pentecostalism³⁸ views itself as a transnational movement that prioritizes religion over other communal identities such as ethnicity or nationality (1998). Others have emphasized that followers of Pentecostal churches are expected to go through a process of reconstructing a new religiously-grounded identity after deliverance (Kalu, 1998, 2000, cited in Ukah, 2003). And these dynamics may not be unique to sects of Christianity: Larkin and Meyer liken reformist Islam in west Africa to Pentecostalism, emphasizing that both modern religious incarnates have a transnational outlook and are “profoundly cosmopolitan”³⁹ (2006, p.300).

Additionally, religious communities in Lagos provide institutional alternatives in a context of state weakness. Although this dynamic is not unique to Lagos, it is particularly pronounced in a city that houses some of the largest and most prominent churches in the country. As Peel explains about the rise of Christianity in Yorubaland: “The mainline churches became considerable bureaucracies, employing thousands of people (especially teachers); owning extensive property in church premises, schools, and other facilities like hospitals and clinics, training centers, presses, and bookshops; and developing systematic evangelization strategies” (2016, p.135). Pentecostal megachurches in Lagos similarly compete with the state, serving as “alternative societ(ies)” that seek to fulfil a range of spiritual and economic needs (Ukah, 2008, p.103, cited in Peel, 2016, p.145).

One particularly visible manifestation of the state-like role of Pentecostal churches in Lagos is the Redemption Camp of the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG). The RCCG is said to be the biggest owner of private property in Nigeria, and the church’s grounds, located just outside of Lagos, feature their own police force, supermarkets, post office, and power

³⁸ Some estimates suggest that as many as 30% of all Nigerians are Pentecostal (Pew Research Center, 2006).

³⁹ This viewpoint is contested: see Peel, 2016.

supply (Maclean, 2017; Rosen, 2018). The RCCG religious conventions reputedly attract hundreds of thousands of enthusiastic worshipers to a hangar-sized auditorium, an experience that surely reinforces the extent to which religious identity is prioritised (Gaestel, 2014; Rosen, 2018). Within the city limits of Lagos, there are countless other churches whose Sunday crowds spill into overflow tents, and whose leadership encourages frequent and fervent attendance, reflecting the “explosion of religiosity,” and especially charismatic Christianity, in Lagos over the past three decades (Gandy, 2005, p.51). Although there is not an obvious Redemption Camp equivalent among the city’s Muslim community, the Nasrul-Fatih Society of Nigeria, which has been likened to a “charismatic Islam” group, promotes a similarly zealous religious practice (“‘Praise Allah!’ The untold story of NASFAT’s growth in south-west,” 2017).⁴⁰

More broadly, there are an estimated 2,000 registered mosques and “Islamic organizations” and 10,000 total places of worship across Lagos (Olowoopejo, 2017). These institutions have such a presence that in 2016, the government shut down 70 churches and 20 mosques in response to noise violations – and Lagos is hardly a serene city to begin with (O’Grady, 2016). Despite these measures, religious institutions are still extremely visible in the city; it is difficult to spend a day in Lagos without being repeatedly exposed to displays of organized religion, from massive billboards advertising services to crowds waiting for services. In these and many other ways, the ubiquity, activism, and institutional function of religious organizations in Lagos likely reinforce the salience of religious identity, and, we can speculate, may contribute to religion being more central to identity in Lagos than ethnicity.

To be sure, ethnic groups in Lagos are also organized: among the Yoruba, both the nationalist Oodua Peoples Congress and the Afenifere (a social-cultural group) have traction, and many smaller ethnic groups have an equivalent cultural organization (Ikelegbe, 2001). However, while 90% of survey respondents said that they attend religious services on *at least* a weekly basis and 62% said that they belong to an additional religious association/group

⁴⁰ Indeed, as a religious scholar at Lagos State University explains, “(NASFAT) provided a counter balance to further infiltration of the Christian Pentecostal groups into the territory of the Muslims while providing some social needs of its members and the Muslims in general” (Adetona, 2012).

beyond their place of worship, only 41% of Afrobarometer respondents in Lagos said they belong to *any* other kind of community group, including an ethnic association (Afrobarometer, 2015). This is just one indication of how comparatively peripheral ethnic groups are compared to religious organizations in Lagos.

The fourth factor that may contribute to religion's particular role in Lagos is the city's reaction to national dynamics and debates about religion. In late 1999, the Governor of Zamfara State in northwestern Nigeria successfully pushed for the implementation of Sharia law in his state – a decision that was subsequently adopted by several other northern states, generating significant controversy about whether Sharia is compatible with the 1999 Constitution and galvanizing Muslims throughout the country (Iwobi, 2004; Makinde & Ostien, 2011). In Lagos State, activists also began advocating for the establishment of Sharia courts, claiming that Yoruba Muslims in the southwest were not well-represented by the customary courts and were being discriminated against (Makinde & Ostien, 2011). At both the national level and in Lagos, this debate over Sharia sharply intensified religious consciousness and polarization, even leading to outbreaks of violence in some places, such as the deadly Kaduna riots in 2000 (McGreal, 2000). Sharia was never implemented in Lagos State – as Makinde and Ostien explain, “Most Lagos State Muslim [...] think that [in] a cosmopolitan metropolis where all shades of ethnicity and religiosity and political opinion are represented, the practice of religion, including the administration of Sharia among consenting parties, is best left in the sphere of the private” (2011, p.944). Nonetheless, the debates about whether and how conservative Islam should be implemented both at the national and local level heightened religious consciousness and likely increased the relative importance of religious identity among Lagosians.

Finally, the specific ethnic and religious composition of the LGAs in which the survey took place likely influences the extent to which religious identity was prioritized by respondents. Examining the locales in which religious identity was relatively more or less important compared to the survey averages provides suggestive evidence about how micro-level demographic factors may shape identity at the individual level, and why religion was generally prioritized by respondents.

Specifically, both the Amuwo-Odofin and Apapa LGAs have a significant Igbo minority, exceeding 20% of respondents (Table 3.4). In these two areas, the percentage of survey respondents identifying primarily along ethnic lines also neared or surpassed 20%, compared to the ~14% average across all sampled LGAs (i.e. in those two LGAs, respondents were comparatively and significantly more likely to identify ethnically). Although speculative, it is conceivable that a critical mass of Igbo residents in a given LGA heightens ethnic consciousness and affects the way individuals socially identify. There are good reasons to believe that the size of the LGA's *Igbo* population, in particular, could shape individual identity in a given area. There is a historic Igbo-Yoruba rivalry in Lagos, with the Yoruba viewed as the indigenous "hosts" and the Igbo viewed – at least by some disgruntled Lagosians – as ungrateful "guests"⁴¹ in the city. In contrast to smaller ethnic groups in Lagos, the Igbo are a significant minority in the city (almost 15% across the full sample) and have a reputation as wealthy and savvy, to the irritation of some of their co-residents (Micah, interview, Nov. 2015).

The rhetoric between the Igbo and Yoruba in Lagos can get heated. "[The] Igbo have not only taken us for granted but they have also taken liberty for licence" writes Yoruba politician Femi Fani-Kayode in a widely-shared opinion piece about Yoruba indigeneity to the city. "Lagos belongs to the Yoruba and to the Yoruba alone. ALL others that reside there are guests, though some guests are far closer to us than others. The Igbo are the least close, the most distant and the least familiar with our customs and our ways" (Fani-Kayode, 2017). Memories of the excruciating Biafran War, which have dimmed with time but are not forgotten, as well as contemporary agitation⁴² for an independent Igbo state, also contribute to resentment between the two groups. These and other sources of tension in the relationship may heighten

⁴¹ This is one example of the way that indigeneity factors into everyday life. As the "indigenes" to Lagos, Yorubas expect some prioritization in, for example, positions of power, decision-making, and cultural expression. As "settlers" – even in a city defined by its diversity – Igbo are expected to be deferential in moments of conflict.

⁴² Specifically, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Igbo nationalist groups, have been agitating for an independent Igbo state in the south-east – efforts which have intensified in the past ~5 years. For more, see Obasi, 2015.

Igbo consciousness and render ethnicity particularly salient in LGAs with a substantial Igbo population, such as Amuwo-Odofin and Apapa.




Table 3.4: Religious and Ethnic Identification by LGA

LGA	Reported Primary Identity		Ethnicity				Religion	
	% Religious	% Ethnic	Hausa	Yoruba	Igbo	Other	Muslim	Christian
Agege	84.85	15.15	2.26	69.17	12.03	16.54	31.58	67.67
Amuwo-Odofin	78.31	21.69	1.14	56.82	28.41	13.64	17.05	82.95
Apapa	80.7	19.3	3.39	62.71	20.34	13.56	30.51	69.49
Badagry	95.08	4.92	0	55.74	14.75	29.51	18.03	80.33
Lekki	81.25	18.75	3.12	71.88	12.5	12.5	40.62	59.38
Kosofe	86.59	13.41	1.68	67.6	10.61	20.11	27.37	72.63
Lagos Island	81.48	18.52	0	64.91	12.28	22.81	45.61	54.39
Mushin	95.18	4.82	1.2	81.44	9.58	7.78	28.74	70.06
Somolu	88.79	11.21	1.85	72.22	16.67	9.26	30.56	68.52
Surulere	83.7	16.3	0.74	62.96	17.04	19.26	30.37	67.41

As a second example of how LGA dynamics may shape individual identification, we can examine the two areas in which respondents identified overwhelmingly along *religious* lines, namely Badagry and Mushin. In both LGAs, over 95% of respondents identified foremost with their religious group, compared to the ~87% across all areas.

At first glance, the demographics of these two LGAs are somewhat puzzling, as they are also the areas with both the lowest *and* the highest proportion of Yoruba respondents, respectively. Yet if one looks more carefully at the demographics of these LGAs, there is a plausible and perhaps broadly instructive explanation. Badagry, an area in which only slightly more than half of the residents are Yoruba, has a sizeable population (almost one-third) of individuals from a variety of different minority ethnic groups. It is also one of the most overwhelmingly Christian LGAs in the sample. Consequently, those belonging to one of the many minority ethnic groups in Badagry may find it useful to “opt-in” to their (especially Christian) religious identity, as their individual ethnic group may be too small to meaningfully counterbalance the Yoruba presence.⁴³ Asserting that one shares the religious identity of most of his neighbours, however, may afford an individual the social, political, and economic benefits of belonging to a majority group.⁴⁴

In Mushin, conversely, where the population is overwhelmingly Yoruba (~81%), co-ethnicity is essentially a given. In this case, where the vast majority of residents can already credibly claim majority group status, identifying with a religious group is a useful way to differentiate oneself and “stake an identity claim,” particularly when explicitly asked to do so by researchers. At nearly 30% Muslim, identifying with either of the two main religions in Mushin would still imply membership in a sizeable community within the LGA. This applies more generally to the Yorubas in Southwest Nigeria, who are both dominant and religiously plural, and can therefore comfortably assert their religious identity without fear of

⁴³ For more on the concept of identity salience responding to contextual factors like the size of the identity group, its political usefulness, or the political system, see Posner 2004, 2005.

⁴⁴ Although there may not be direct, material rewards for aligning oneself with the largest identity community in the LGA, there are nonetheless profound psycho-social benefits of feeling like a part of the majority group (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009).

marginalization or reprisal from co-ethnics. Indeed, as others have pointed out, the Yoruba “...have a sense of themselves as being exceptionally tolerant of religious difference [and] particularly as having harmonious relations between Islam and Christianity” (Peel, 2016).⁴⁵

Collectively, these examples provide at least suggestive evidence of how specific community demographics may affect individual calculations about whether it is more advantageous to prioritize one’s religious or ethnic identity; and how they may partially account for the predominance of religious identity in Lagos.

Taken together, the five dynamics named above – the uniqueness of politics in Lagos, which undercuts *prebendal* dynamics; the ethos of the city as modern and not tied to regressive ethnic politics; the significant role of religious institutions within the city, particularly compared to ethnic associations; the impact of national context on identity formation; and the micro-demographics of each LGA, through which “intergroup arithmetic” incentivizes religious identification; may explain why religion emerges as a common and unifying dimension of identity in Lagos and reduces the significance of other divisive identities, particularly ethnicity. What we cannot know based on this survey data is the *extent* to which respondents favour their religious identity: it may be that religion is only marginally or momentarily more important to respondents than ethnicity.

It is perhaps surprising that the salience of identity in Lagos does not translate into frequent outbreaks of identity-based violence. Ethnic, religious, and other forms of communal violence are objectively rare in the city and relatively rare compared to other major Nigerian cities. As the concluding discussion of this chapter, I now turn to the question of why this is the case, and what might account for the overwhelming preponderance of *everyday*, rather than identity-based, violence in Lagos.

⁴⁵ It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that religious identity was frequently named as paramount among the largely Yoruba respondents, although Yorubas were statistically no more likely to identify religiously than other ethnic groups.

3.3.3 Violence in Lagos

Although many descriptions of violence in Lagos are prone to hyperbole – a 2014 article noted that in Lagos, “...armed hoodlums strike at will with insolent ease and gratuitous brutality, robbing, maiming and killing their victims” (Roberts, 2003, p.141) – the threat of violence is nonetheless a hardship with which Lagosians from every background must contend. This risk is physically present, in the way houses are encircled with towering barbed-wire-topped fences; the legions of security officials at every intersection; and the pervasive reminders of recent violence, from the remnants of shantytowns razed by the state to abandoned cars with smashed-out windows that decorate the main motorways.

Everyday violence is by far the most prevalent form of insecurity in Lagos, a reality that is clear not only in victimization statistics,⁴⁶ but is also reflected in interviews with Lagosians, the relentless media reports about the latest assault or kidnapping, and the sardonic musings of writer Chigozie Obioma who said: “I had heard the warning many times before: in Lagos, anything could be stolen – even a human being” (*The Guardian*, 2016). When asked about exposure to violence in the previous year, almost 40% of survey respondents said they had directly experienced or witnessed at least one act of everyday violence.⁴⁷ By contrast, despite descriptions of Lagos as a “volatile” city “that can easily explode into inter-communal violence” (Gandy, 2005), only ~3.7% of respondents had experienced some form of identity-based violence in the previous year. In other words, everyday violence was approximately ten times more common than identity violence in Lagos (a more granular breakdown of the rates of exposure to different forms of violence is in chapter 6), which is consistent with the global statistics comparing everyday and identity-based violence, presented in chapter 1.

⁴⁶ As will be discussed in chapter 6, approximately 38% of the sample reported being a victim of everyday violence in the previous year, and roughly 15% had specifically been a victim of robbery. Other victimization surveys showed similar results. The CLEEN Foundation’s 2011 victimization survey, for example, found that 16% of Lagosians had experienced robbery/attempted robbery; almost 20% had experienced domestic violence; ~17% were victims of physical assault; and ~20% experienced economic theft. In the 2017 Afrobarometer survey, 22% of Lagosians been physically attacked in the previous year.

⁴⁷ This includes: robbery, assault, domestic violence, and cultism.

The most frequently-reported experiences of everyday violence were experiences with robbery (~15% of respondents), cultism (12.5%) and acts of domestic violence (~25%). Robberies were reported in commercial busses,⁴⁸ on *okada* bikes, at home, in parking lots, while walking at night, or while stopped in traffic. Indeed, at the time of this research, traffic robbery – in which small groups of robbers would target Lagosians trapped in traffic, break their windshields, sometimes brutalize the passengers, and then abscond with whatever they could grab – was a particularly common source of anxiety. The perpetrators were generally reported to be armed, usually with a pistol or a cutlass (a curved sword), and were, on average, impressively thorough in depositing victims of their valuables, often down to their shoes and small change. As Nonso recounted about the man who robbed her on her way home, “He collected the money, he collected all I have on me...he collected *everything*.”

Many interviewees described being victims of larger-scale criminal heists, often affecting entire housing compounds or streets. As Thomas described about an incident in 2015:

“...they called them ‘One Million Boys,’ so there are many... like 50 [boys], and if they want to come and operate they would just enter a whole street. They can operate in – let me just say – three streets at a time...so they enter our house, they just enter like that, started beating everybody. They collected our money and do all sort of rubbish things like that...they even raped some people like that you know, they just call everybody outside, they started harassing us, collecting our money.”

Tunde similarly recounted being victimized alongside the other residents of his building by a (different) group of armed robbers:

“Oh my God, that was a terrible experience...A neighbour of mine works in a bank...as he was driving into the compound, he came down from his car to close the gate and then some [armed robbers] walked into the gate with him, pointing a gun at him, telling him to cooperate. He was shivering. They opened up his boot, brought out a huge sum of money...instead of them going, they use the opportunity in robbing the whole house, the whole building...I got a knock at the door...so I had to open the door and here comes the boys. So they came in, they

⁴⁸ These are known colloquially as “One Chance” busses and are a known security challenge. Criminal gangs collude with drivers of commercial busses or acquire their own busses, and then rob (often violently) unsuspecting passengers (“‘One Chance’ Robbery Increases in Lagos,” 2017).

even had to hit my wife with the tail of the gun, thank God nothing bad happened. They beat the hell out of everybody, took our phones, ransacked the whole house...they had to point guns, pistol, AK-47 at our head, they had to force us to prostrate on the ground, gave us beating, serious beating, a lot of threat, threat to life, threat to family... But at the end of it, we thank God, they left, they took the money, they took phones, a lot of phones, and they drove away with my neighbour's car."

These accounts are fairly typical of the violent robbery that occurs in Lagos, although, of course, not all robberies are carried out by large groups. Yet there are myriad organized violent groups in Lagos that contribute to a sense of insecurity, including gangs of armed robbers such as the "One Million Boys;" "Area Boys," which broadly are predatory groups⁴⁹ operating across specific blocks who are known to engage in both petty criminal activity and political violence (Momoh, 2000, 2003; LeBas, 2013);⁵⁰ groups that target markets (Action on Armed Violence, 2013); and "cultist" organizations – secretive, confraternities that are known to participate in a wide range of anti-social activities (Rotimi, 2005). Although cultist violence is usually aimed at rival groups, spill-over violence can affect bystanders, and in focus group discussions, it was frequently cited as one of the gravest threats to security in Lagos.⁵¹

Expectations and fears do not always correspond to lived experiences – a point that is central to this thesis – and this was also true about the disconnect between violence feared and actually experienced. Despite these articulated fears, the most common type of exposure to violence was actually domestic violence, which almost a quarter of all respondents directly experienced or witnessed in the previous year. This topic, although receiving increasing

⁴⁹ Some have classified Area Boys as a form of vigilante group due to the security function they purport to provide. Others have called them youth gangs. Very few respondents reported that they had personally been a victim of violence carried out by Area Boys, although this form of violence is known to increase around election time (Momoh, 2000), which may explain its relative infrequency in this survey.

⁵⁰ They are known to extort passersby for a "tax," ostensibly in exchange for the protection they offer the community. Moreover, as LeBas explains, Area Boys are regularly coopted by politicians, who "gave these unorganized groups money and relied on them to mount attacks on particular economic or political targets" (2013, p.253).

⁵¹ Despite the acute fear of cultism expressed by focus group participants and in the results of a pilot experiment, I chose robbery as the example of everyday violence because a) it occurs throughout Lagos, unlikely cultist violence which is concentrated in a few LGAs; b) it is easier to replicate research about violent robbery in other cities; and c) there are "mystical" elements of cultism which are interpreted differently depending on the observer, meaning the treatment may have been more heterogeneous.

attention by the Lagos State Government,⁵² is sensitive in Nigeria, and many interviewees were visibly shaken when discussing what had happened. (For this and other reasons discussed in chapter 4, the survey asked only generally about violence in the household and interviews were conducted only with victims who were willing to discuss their experiences). Most interviewees reported that the perpetrator was their intimate partner, and the types of experiences ranged from chronic physical intimidation to attacks resulting in life-threatening injuries. Disturbing acts of sexual violence, including intimate partner rape and being coerced to perform humiliating sexual acts, were also described by interviewees.

As is often true of domestic violence victims, many affected Lagosians explained that it took them years, sometimes decades, to leave their partner. As a *Guardian* article describes, part of this reluctance is related to societal and religious norms. “Marriage in Nigeria,” the journalist writes, “is regarded as a prized attainment, and there is a powerful social stigma around reporting violence, or, worse still, leaving your husband [...] And in many cases there is no support from the family for a woman who is considering leaving her husband” (Udobang, 2018). Attitudes about domestic violence are also complicated. According to a 2008 Demographic and Health survey, some 43% of Nigerian women believe that, for a number of different reasons, a husband is justified in beating his wife; in southwest Nigeria where Lagos is located, however, only 24% of women agreed with this statement – the lowest rate in Nigeria (Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey, 2008). Nonetheless, despite this comparatively progressive outlook, domestic violence was almost 50% more common than the next most prevalent form of violence in Lagos, robbery.

In stark contrast to the rate of domestic violence, there were extraordinarily few reports of ethnic or religious violence in the city: only 10 total reports of this kind of victimization in the previous year. It is, of course, possible that some low-level identity violence was not reported. If one’s point of reference is, for example, the dramatic, ongoing communal violence

⁵² See, for example: Okogba, 2017.

in the Middle Belt,⁵³ one may not describe a non-life-threatening violent interaction with identity overtones as “communal violence.” Indeed, in interviews, some of the violence that seemed to have a clear ethnic dimension (e.g. ethnic taunts) was characterized as “everyday” by the interviewees.

That said, the rare episodes of communal violence that take place in Lagos and are reported by the media generally are “low-scale” rather than dramatic armed identity-based conflicts. There are, for examples, periodic incidences of a market dispute (often between Hausa and Yoruba youth) escalating into a fight, but they are usually quickly contained by bystanders and the authorities (see, for example: Usman, Adelaja, & Olowoopejo, 2016). More serious examples of Hausa-Yoruba violence occurred in the early 2000’s, when the Yoruba OPC openly engaged in hostile activities,⁵⁴ but this kind of larger-scale inter-ethnic clashes in Lagos have not occurred in years. Religious violence, meanwhile, is so rare in Lagos that it is difficult to provide a description of how it “typically” manifests in the city.

The final form of identity-based violence discussed in this thesis – political violence – does occur in Lagos, but it is also comparatively rare: there were 34 reported incidences of political violence, amounting to about 3% of respondents. As is often the case in sub-Saharan Africa, political violence in Lagos is closely linked to electoral campaign season⁵⁵ (Straus & Taylor, 2007), and it is well-documented that political parties coopt area boys and other guns-for-hire to intimidate voters and block access to polling stations and ballot boxes (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Yet within the past decade, Lagos has not witnessed a major⁵⁶ outbreak of political violence.

⁵³ There is a longstanding conflict between primarily Muslim and Fulani cattle herders, and mostly Christian farmers/villagers in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, that is both resource and identity-based. The violence has recently escalated, and, as of 2018, is estimated to be a deadlier conflict than Boko Haram. See: McGregor, 2017; International Crisis Group 2018.

⁵⁴ See, for example: “Nigeria: Causes and consequences of conflict and violence between the Yoruba and Hausa in Lagos, Kosofe Local Government, Ketu Market area in December 1999,” 2000.

⁵⁵ It is possible (albeit unlikely) that the timing of the survey depressed these results, as the timeframe subjects were asked about only covered the time immediately before (and after) the 2015 election.

⁵⁶ The most recent reported episodes of political violence, related to party primaries, affected only a small number of people (Premium Times, 2017). In 2007, there were multiple reported episodes of political “scuffles” in Lagos but no major clashes (Onapajo 2014).

This is not to imply that other major cities in Nigeria are, by contrast, plagued by chronically high levels of political, ethnic, and/or religious violence. Conversely, as argued in chapter 1, identity-based violence is typically rare compared to everyday violence – a fact that equally applies to Nigeria. Across eight of Nigeria’s largest cities for example, average annual fatality rates for political violence were under 3 per 100,000 inhabitants⁵⁷ (Table 3.5). This is perhaps a surprisingly low victimization rate (and potentially artificially low, due to poor data quality⁵⁸), but even if the fatalities caused by this form of violence were consistently underestimated by a factor of 5, political violence would only be responsible for at most an average of some 215 deaths per-city per-year, when calculated in a straightforward⁵⁹ way.

Table 3.5: Estimated Rates of Identity-Based Violence in Major Nigerian Cities

City	Estimated Population	Sum of Fatalities (10 year)	Count of Events (10 year)	Annual Fatality Rate per 100,000	Annual Event Rate per 100,000
Jos	830,000	1519	245	18.30	2.95
Kano	3,875,000	847	191	2.19	0.49
Abuja	2,605,000	484	660	1.86	2.53
Port Harcourt	2,060,000	112	196	0.54	0.95
Benin City	1,445,000	53	153	0.37	1.06
Lagos	13,910,000	323	715	0.23	0.51
Onitsha	7,850,000	76	64	0.10	0.08
Ibadan	3,070,000	18	137	0.06	0.45
<i>Average</i>				<i>2.96</i>	<i>1.13</i>

Population data is from Demographia’s 2015 population survey. Political violence data is from the ACLED database and includes all battles, riots/protests, and violence against civilian from 2009-2019.

⁵⁷ Although scholars often make assertions like “Communal violence is one of the deadliest forms of political violence in Nigeria” (Krause, 2016), it is surprisingly difficult to find reliable estimates of the frequency of identity-based violence in different parts of the country. The NBS does not explicitly separate out communal violence from other forms of violence against individuals. The Council on Foreign Relations’ “Nigeria Security Tracker” (NST) is missing important information about where some of the violent episodes it reported took place, and also claims its data should be used only as an “indication.” Both the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) does not specifically report identity-based violence that is not political. Because of these shortcomings, the data here is at best indicative. The figures in Table 6 are based on the ACLED data (political violence) and are cross-checked with the NST fatality-count (not reported).

⁵⁸ Among other shortcomings, these figures do not capture are the numbers of individuals who were affected but not killed by identity-based violence (there is, to my knowledge, currently not a centralized source of this data).

⁵⁹ I use the flat average of fatalities/cities. Importantly, since this focuses on major cities, these figures do not capture all of the deaths caused by the farmer-herder crisis or Boko Haram.

Even compared to these generally low rates of violence in other major Nigerian cities, Lagos has had particularly little identity-based (in this case, political) violence. While recognizing the limitations of this data (footnote 57), over the past decade, Lagos has had one of the lowest population-adjusted identity violence fatality rates, and an event rate that is less than half of the average across major cities. Compared to other major Nigerian cities with comparatively “high” rates of political violence – Jos, Abuja, and Port Harcourt – Lagos has experienced some 95% fewer political-violence related deaths over the past ten years (on a population-adjusted basis), and 75% fewer events. And major conflicts with overt or implicit communal undertones, such as the religious riots that have reoccurred in Jos, the herder-settler conflict between primarily Muslim cattle herders, and mostly Christian farmers, or the much-discussed Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria, have not reproduced their sectarian divisions in Lagos,⁶⁰ even though Lagosians hail from all corners of Nigeria, and some presumably brought their grievances with them. Despite the healthy flow of money, weapons, and opportunities enabling participation in communal violence, Lagos’ ~3.7% identity-violence victimization rate is strikingly minimal.

What accounts for this especially low rates of identity-based violence in Lagos, and the particularly high frequency of everyday violence in the city? In a broad sense, the relative importance of religion – and its primary role, rather than that of a more divisive identity cleavage – may account for some of this effect, especially because, as will be discussed, the two dominant religious groups have historically positive relations in Lagos. This is compounded by several other factors that also naturally limit the levels of communal violence in the city.

For one, the diversity of the city likely plays an important role: although some LGAs are more ethnically homogenous than others, Lagosians would have to make a proactive effort to avoid regularly interacting with those from other ethnic and religious groups, in marketplaces, shared busses, workplaces, and places of worship. Intergroup contact, meanwhile, has been

⁶⁰ For more on this, for example, Scacco, 2008; International Crisis Group, 2017).

shown to be an important condition for the reduction of prejudice and intergroup conflict – individuals who have positive (even if only transactional) experiences with out-group members exhibit less out-group prejudice (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew et al., 2011). As current Lagos State Governor Ambode said in 2017, the “greatness” of Lagos “...is in our ability to be the melting pot for all cultures and as at today, there is no tribe in Nigeria that is not represented in Lagos...we are also a unique people ready to make fellow human-beings from other lands feel home away from home” (Badmus, 2017). Of course, intergroup contact does not guarantee harmonious intergroup relations, and it is not a panacea for intergroup conflict or prejudice (Scacco & Warren, 2018), but the frequent mixing of ethnic and religious groups in Lagos arguably reduces the space and tolerance for outright out-group hostility (Hewstone, 2003). As Seth Kaplan writes in *The New York Times*, “...in an ethnically and religiously diverse metropolis like Lagos, politicians could not afford to pit ethnic and religious groups against one another” (2014).

Moreover, Lagos is known for its historically good relations between its Christian and Muslim communities, due largely to the Yoruba dominance and indigeneity. The Yoruba, as discussed, are roughly equally divided between followers of Christianity and Islam, and a culture of religious tolerance has existed since the middle of the twentieth century, when religious leaders recognized that their respective communities would be best served by harmonious and equal relationships (Laitin, 1986; Peel, 2003). As Laitin argued, “...the Christian-Muslim divide in Yorubaland of southwestern Nigeria, far from fanning the flames of religious conflict, actually built the foundation for compromise” (1986, p.9). With religion as a cross-cutting cleavage connecting the Yoruba to the other “non-indigenous” ethnic groups in the city (including the larger groups, such as the Igbo and Hausa), there is not an obvious communal fault line along which Lagosians might mobilize. Moreover, the religious leaders in Yorubaland “...have worked to moderate both religious and political matters,” and proactively mitigate and resolve emerging episodes of conflict, often through (Paden, 2005 cited in Dowd, 2016, p.625). One result is that intermarriage between Muslim and Christian Lagosians is now common and generally socially-accepted. As journalist Tolu Ogunlesi points out, “... three of

the region's six state governors are Muslim men married to Christian women; the speaker of the Lagos State parliament is a Muslim married for the last 30 years to a Christian pastor" (2015). This further reinforces religious tolerance and moderates the risk of identity-based conflict.

Another factor that may contribute to the relative harmonious intergroup relations in Lagos is the deliberate effort of the State Government to proactively minimize grounds and opportunities for inter-group conflict. Specifically, since the return to democracy, the government has meaningfully increased tax revenues and pushed through progressive reforms that have increased the provision of public goods, including infrastructure, transportation, and security (de Gramont, 2015; Cheeseman & de Gramont, 2017). If resource competition is, as some have argued, one important ground for intergroup conflict and mistrust (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002), then the proactive provision of public goods, accessible to all groups, may mitigate this risk.⁶¹ This is reinforced by the less formal efforts of other government institutions, such as the Lagos chapter of the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council, which works to promote inter-religious harmony and resolves brewing disputes (Adunola, 2018).

Additionally, as the wealthiest state in Nigeria, the Lagos State Government has comparatively more capacity to project force, both in terms of the police to citizen ratio (which is approximately 1:400, compared to the national average of 1:600), as well as its alleged⁶² ability to execute on policing standards, as assessed by an external evaluation of police stations in Africa (Altus Global Alliance Police Station Visitors Week, 2007; *Premium Times Nigeria*, 2017). Although the security sector in Lagos is notorious for its apathetic response to everyday violence, stopping even the earliest signs of an outbreak of communal violence seems to be a government priority and the security sector responds accordingly, with a no-tolerance approach to even small-scale acts of communal violence. An ethnically-tinged clash at the enormously

⁶¹ This relationship usually studied in the other direction – that is, the impact of ethnic and religious diversity on the provision of public goods (see Easterly & Levine, 1997; Habyarimana et al., 2007). Cheeseman and de Gramont (2017) explain why the Lagos State Government was able to increase access to public goods despite the city's diversity.

⁶² There are also plenty of critiques of the practices of the Lagos State Police. See: Human Rights Watch, 2010.

popular Mile 12 market, for example, resulted in the Lagos State Government shutting down the market and imposing a curfew on neighbouring locales (Usman, Adelaja, & Olowoapejo, 2016).

Moreover, the government has been implicated in responding to the rare episode of ethnic violence with excessive force, although they contest these claims (Amnesty International, 2017). The State also projects force in other, more cynical ways, such as warning would-be political protestors that they will be arrested for demonstrating, thereby trying to eliminate the space for political or communal violence to erupt (Amnesty International, 2017). In the language of Charles Tilly, one could characterize these interventions as an example of the government demonstrating its capacity to maintain existing boundaries, which, as he argues, factors into the probability and intensity of an outbreak of communal violence (2003). Collectively, these projections of state force likely act as a deterrent to those considering engaging in communal violence and limit the number of larger-scale outbreaks.

The comparatively high socioeconomic status of Lagosians likely contributes to lower levels of identity-based violence as well. Research about the determinants of communal violence has shown that poverty and lower levels of education are significant predictors of participation in communal violence (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Verwimp, 2005; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008; Scacco, 2008). The average GDP per capita in Lagos (although surely inflated by the city's many millionaires) is more than double the Nigerian average, and the education levels are almost 1 standard deviation above the national average (Afrobarometer Round 6 analysis; Pilling, 2018). Moreover, as discussed above, the widely-shared ethos of Lagos as cosmopolitan – and therefore less prone to the in-fighting and regressive violence of less sophisticated parts of the country – may result in some degree of introspection among would-be participants in violence, even if it alone is not an outright deterrent.

Related to this point is the way that Lagosians' priorities factor into the frequency of different forms of violence. Lagosians are also famously preoccupied with earning money – the Lagos "hustle" is so core to the city's identity, that entire op-eds and Twitter accounts are

devoted to it (Sote, 2016). And indeed, this relentless drive to “make it” has been credited as a factor contributing to the relative intergroup harmony in the city. Reflecting on the question of why Lagos seems uniquely resistant to outbreaks of religious and ethnic violence, a Lagos-based journalist from the *Wall Street Journal* posited that “Lagosians are too busy” to engage in communal violence. “In the search for work, money, and advancement,” he writes, “[...] there seems to be no time for religious violence in Lagos. Churches and mosques espouse a healthy desire for wealth in most of the country, but Lagos is the physical embodiment of that desire, and people have far too much to do” (Connors, 2009). And although this alone is unlikely to explain the low levels of identity-based violence, it may nonetheless make it socially more challenging to find opportunities and time to engage in communal violence.

Finally, to the extent that participation in violence is motivated by economic self-interest (an instrumental logic) and/or a need to express emotion such as generalized anger, resentment, or frustration (“expressive violence” – see Berkowitz, 1962), it is plausible that participation in everyday violence is a reasonable substitute for communal violence. Of course, those with a specific religiously or ethnically-motivated grievance are unlikely to be satisfied by robbing a random passenger in a shared bus. Nonetheless, for those for whom this is not the case, everyday violence in Lagos requires, on average, less coordination than identity-based violence, and the comparatively anaemic state response⁶³ to this form of violence means that the potential costs of participation, and the likelihood of being caught, are lower. This applies equally to “entrepreneurs” of violence,” whose economic fortunes are linked to mobilizing others to commit acts of violence (for a related discussion, see Tilly, 2003; Guichaoua, 2010). In this sense, it is possible that for a subset of violent perpetrators, everyday violence serves as a reasonable substitutes for identity-based violence.

Taken together, these factors spanning the specific demographic and attitudinal profile of the city, to government intervention, to the existence of relatively compelling substitutes to communal violence, may explain why rates of identity violence are objectively and

⁶³ This observation is based on interviews with over 70 violence-affected Lagosians, many of whom complained about the slow or non-response of the Lagos State Police.

comparatively so low Lagos. And finally, it is worth reemphasizing that everyday violence, by definition, should be significantly more common in most cities, Lagos included. But even by these standards, the infrequency of identity-based violence in Lagos is surprising.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter covered a lot of ground: first, I argued that the continued salience of ethnicity in broader Nigeria is likely a product of the continued *prebendal* dynamics of the political system, in which political elites have disproportionate control over the distribution of resources and privileges, and non-elites rely on kinship to curry favour and access. I then turned to Lagos, introducing the city and presenting two puzzles: the predominance of religious identification, despite the salience of ethnicity on a countrywide basis, and the extremely low levels of identity-based violence. I presented a number of factors that may contribute to these dynamics, including the cosmopolitan ethos and diversity of Lagos; its specific demographics, particularly the Yoruba dominance; the role of the government's space from the centre, undermining *prebendalism*, as well as its prioritization of preventing communal violence; and the outsized role of religious institutions in the city, even compared to generally highly-religious Nigeria. Individually, none of these factors is likely to have sufficient explanatory power to account for these peculiarities of Lagos, but collectively, I contend that they go a long way in clarifying why and how Lagosians – despite their uniquely predominant religious identities – continue to (mostly) avoid much of the ethnic and religious violence that has plagued other parts of Nigeria.

Yet as discussed above, other forms of violence, such as robbery, cultism, and domestic violence, are extremely common in Lagos, and the threat of violence is almost inherent to life in the city. As a result, Lagos is an excellent city in which to test how the fear of and actual experiences with this everyday violence impacts identity, trust, and preferences. I turn to this now and begin the core empirical portion of the thesis: chapter 4 presents the research design; chapter 5 looks at the (experimental) impact of the fear of violence; chapter 6 examines how

first-hand victimization affects identity; and chapter 7 looks at how exposure to violence impacts actual trusting behaviour.

Chapter 4

Research Design and Ethical Considerations

4.1 Introduction

The theory developed in chapter 2 suggests a clear link between exposure to violence and social identity: in general, individuals who are fearful of an acute violent threat are expected to exhibit increased in-group identification and decreased tolerance for outgroup members, whereas the outcomes of those who were actual victims of violence will depend, to a great extent, on the level of support they receive after victimization. But are these theoretical insights consistent with the empirical results? Are there differences between the threat of everyday violence versus the threat of identity-based violence? And finally, how does actual victimization affect identity and preferences? Is there an empirical difference between the impact of threat versus actual victimization, as hypothesized?

With this chapter, I begin the empirical portion of the thesis. Conceptually, it is useful to think about the quantitative analysis as having three layers. The first layer looks at the impact of the *threat* of imminent everyday violence on social identity and attitudes. This is done experimentally, by evaluating how an individual's social identity and preferences change after hearing a radio broadcast about a violent robbery that has ostensibly just taken place nearby. I use causal mediation analysis to estimate the impact of treatment on identity when the fear provoked by the threat is taken into account. This addresses the question "Does the threat of everyday violence impact identity, attitudes, and preferences?" and is the content of chapter 5.

The second layer analyses the impact of previous, direct *exposure* to everyday violence on social identity, attitudes, and preferences. Through a survey, I catalogue the respondent's direct experiences with different forms of violence over the past year and then use this information as the independent variable in matched regression models. This strand of the analysis, presented in chapter 6, addresses the question "Does actual victimization impact identity and preferences?"

The third and final level of quantitative analysis, presented in chapter 7, evaluates how both the acute threat and actual experiences with violence affect trusting behaviour toward in- and out-group members. This addresses the question, “Does exposure to violence also impact identity-related *behaviour*?”

I begin the empirical portion in this chapter with a description of the survey design and sampling procedure and provide an overview of the sample demographics. I then explain the experimental design, variables, and describe the treatment, with attention to the challenge of simulating a proximate threat of violence in a way that is both ethical and credible. The chapter finishes with a discussion about the ethics of experimentally researching the impact of violence, both in this particular project and more broadly. I took a number of measures to protect subjects, from informed consent to extensive debriefs to protocols to monitor for adverse subject reactions, and the project was approved by the University of Oxford’s social science division human subjects committee. Yet the nature of this and similar research meant that some degree of risk was unavoidable, and although there was no indication that subjects were adversely affected, it is important to acknowledge what those risks were and discuss how they can be managed in future research.

4.2 Research Design

4.2.1 Survey and Sample Design

To quantitatively test the impact of exposure to violence on identity, I use data from an experiment embedded in a survey of 1,022 Lagosians, complemented by focus group discussions and some 70 interviews with victims of violence. The survey data was collected in Lagos between March and May of 2016, and the focus groups and interviews were conducted in early 2016 and again in January and February of 2017.

The goal of the survey sample design was to maximize representativeness and participation across Lagos while minimizing cost. As a result, I used a multi-stage cluster design with neighbourhood-level clusters. Determining the appropriate administrative district for the

clusters presented a slight challenge, because the units needed to be small enough to support the geography-based treatment,¹ but large enough that the spreading of news about the experiment and the treatment would not interfere with the research. The most obvious sampling unit, the Local Government Area (LGA), was too large² and unwieldy for these purposes. The only smaller administrative division within each LGA is the Local Council Development Area, but they are not found in equivalent numbers in all LGAs and the ones that do exist vary widely in terms of geographic size and population density.

Consequently, I first randomly³ selected 10 of the 20 LGAs, and then manually created⁴ approximately 16 sub-divisions of roughly equal geographic size within each selected LGA. I then chose two sub-divisions at random from each of the 10 LGAs. Consequently, the final sample consisted of 20 “sub-divisions” from 10 different LGAs in Lagos. (A sample map of an LGA with sub-divisions is included in the appendix). This two-stage cluster sample⁵ was followed by a simple random sample at the household level, with interviews assigned to the LGAs on population-proportionate basis using the most recent census in Lagos, in 2006.⁶ It is important to note that the population of these manually-created sub-divisions is unknown, so the population-proportionate number of interviews assigned to each LGA was evenly split between the two sub-divisions. Because Lagos is urban, however, it is unlikely that there is dramatic variance in population density, as one might expect if the sub-divisions were in both

¹ In two pilot studies and multiple focus group discussions, Lagosians repeatedly emphasized that threats are only considered salient when they are geographically proximate; a report of a violent event in even the neighbouring LGA was generally considered too far away to be threatening. Consequently, sampling units needed to be geographically small – certainly smaller than LGAs.

² There are 20 LGAs in Lagos, but they are large and densely-populated: the average size of the LGAs included in the sample is almost 40km², and the average population in each LGA is approximately 380,000 people.

³ I used a random number generator for both rounds of random selection.

⁴ This was more of an imperfect art than a science. To create sub-divisions, I used Google Maps of each LGA and overlaid a grid of 16 approximately equally sized squares. Where the shape or size of the LGA did not allow for an even grid of 16, I refit a 15-square grid which, of course, impacts selection probability, but was a necessary compromise given a lack of good alternatives.

⁵ Cluster sampling is significantly more cost-effective than taking a simple random sample, however it usually reduces sample diversity and increases standard error. See: Cochran, 1977; Teddli & Yu, 2007.

⁶ These population figures likely dramatically underestimate the population because they are now over a decade old and the 2006 census was widely criticized for inaccuracy (see Yin, 2007; The Economist, 2017).

rural and urban areas. As a result, any impact on the individual-level probability of selection is likely small.

The LGAs and the sub-districts ultimately selected for inclusion varied significantly in terms of the socio-economic demographics, their ethnic and religious makeup, the baseline salience of identity, and the prevalence of violence (Table 4.1). For this reason, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, models included sub-district-level fixed effects.

Table 4.1: Key Demographic Information for LGAs Included in the Sample

LGA	Estimated Population	Number of Residents Sampled	Poverty Score: (1: wealthiest, 16: poorest)	Overall Victimization Rate (includes all violence)	% Yoruba	Baseline Importance of Ethnicity (1: least impt. 5: most impt.)	% Christian	Baseline Importance of Religion (1: least impt. 5: most impt.)
Agege	461,743	133	3.8	36.80%	69.00%	4.7	67.70%	4.8
Amuwo Odofin	328,975	88	1.6	19.30%	56.80%	4.7	83.00%	4.9
Apapa	222,986	59	3.7	39.00%	62.70%	4.7	69.00%	4.8
Badagry	237,731	61	5.1	55.70%	55.70%	4.3	80.30%	4.5
Ibeju- Lekki	117,793	32	3.1	31.30%	71.90%	5.0	59.40%	5.0
Kosofe	682,772	179	3.3	25.70%	68.00%	4.7	72.60%	4.9
Lagos/ Island	212,700	57	2.4	36.80%	64.90%	4.7	54.00%	4.8
Mushin	631,857	167	4.9	57.50%	81.40%	4.2	70.40%	4.4
Shomolu	403,569	108	5.5	61.10%	72.20%	4.4	68.60%	4.5
Surulere	502,865	135	3.8	38.50%	63.00%	4.7	68.40%	4.8

Population statistics are from the 2006 census in Nigeria. All other data is from the field survey. Victimization rate is based on self-reported data

Households were selected within sub-divisions using a date-based random walk technique with a sampling interval of 5 housing units. A gender-alternating Kish selection grid was used to choose the participant within the household. To be eligible to participate, potential subjects were required to be Nigerian, 18 years of age or older, to live in the LGA in which they were located at the time,⁷ and to have at least a minimal command of the English language, as the treatments and control news reports were entirely in English (typical for radio news in Lagos).

Two pilot surveys were carried out in January and March 2016 to evaluate and refine the survey instrument and to test the efficacy of the treatments. Indeed, it was because of these pilots that I realized just how important geographic proximity is to the way Lagosians experience threat and, as a result, created sub-division-specific radio broadcasts.⁸ These replaced the first treatments tested in a pilot, fictional television news reports discussing Lagos-wide events, which were generally considered too geographically broad to be a salient threat. The scripts for the radio broadcasts, as well as a link to the full survey questionnaire, are included in the appendix.

4.2.2 Procedure and Overview of Questionnaire

A team of 13 trained⁹ enumerators of mixed gender, ethnicity, and religion carried out the fieldwork. The enumerators are part of a survey agency in West Africa called Practical Sampling International, with whom Oxford researchers have previously partnered. Research assistants, working in teams of two, approached randomly-selected participants and asked if they were interested in participating in a study about politics and social relations in Lagos,

⁷ This was a requirement because the treatment was LGA-specific, and subjects who were only visiting the LGA would not have necessarily understood the cues about the proximity of violence.

⁸ The pilots (sample size of approximately 80) tested the original research design, which featured a fictitious news broadcast video produced in coordination with TVC New Nigeria, one of the largest news stations in Nigeria. The three broadcasts featured a report about either a violent robbery, an ethnic clash, or road construction. Unlike the intervention ultimately used, these broadcasts mentioned several LGAs and gave an impression of the event being widespread throughout Lagos. When asked about the extent to which they were fearful about the news, only a small minority of subjects reported feeling somewhat or very fearful.

⁹ PSI supervisors assisted with the selection of the highest-performing participants who became the enumerators, and supervised all fieldwork, conducting daily quality checks and periodic audits. I personally trained all enumerators. On a small number of occasions, I also participated in the field audits, however my presence noticeably impacted the willingness of respondents to speak openly.

sponsored by Oxford University in the United Kingdom. If participants expressed interest, a comprehensive informed consent process (in a separate appendix) was carried out prior to beginning the survey. To protect the subjects' anonymity, we did not ask for their names or their contact information. This was particularly important given the sensitivity of the topics covered in the interview, which included questions about identity politics, attitudes about violence, and information about previous victimization and the perpetration of violence.

Enumerators were equipped with small tablet devices containing a logic-enabled version of the survey built on the Qualtrics platform, which they used to record the participants' responses for all but three of the most sensitive questions. For those three questions, which addressed the perpetration of violence, the subjects took hold of the tablet and recorded their answers directly. The survey was offered to subjects in both English and Yoruba,¹⁰ but only 2% of survey respondents chose to carry out the interview in Yoruba. Almost 27% of participants claimed that they primarily speak Yoruba at home, so the dominance of English-language responses is surprising. One possible explanation is that enumerators were trained to introduce themselves and read the introductory and informed consent scripts in English, which may have primed respondents to continue the survey in English. Nonetheless, the English or Yoruba language requirement does not seem to have biased the results: of the subjects who began the survey, only 1 was screened out of participation because of language (the other 11 were screened out due to a lack of interest, not being Nigerian, or not living in the LGA).

Enumerators began by asking respondents a series of demographic questions, and then guided them through a structured interview addressing their social identity, their attitudes about politics and violence, previous exposure to violence, and their perception of security in Lagos and in their LGA. A key part of the demographic information collected was about the subject's religious and ethnic identity. Subjects were requested to name their religious group and their

¹⁰ The vast majority of Lagosians speak English and at least one other language; many speak multiple languages, however English and Yoruba are the most commonly-spoken and understood languages within Lagos. This is corroborated by the survey responses, as 66% of respondents claimed that they most frequently speak English at home, 27% chose Yoruba, and the remaining ~7% of responses were divided.

ethnic group (more on this later) and then were asked whether the specific religious or ethnic group they named was more central to their identity. This answer became the subject's "in-group."¹¹ The process was repeated to identify the subject's "out-group." Note that subjects could identify their ethnic group as their in-group and a religious group as their out-group, and indeed, this "cross-identification" was common. To assess "in" versus "out-group identity," subjects were asked a series of Likert-scale questions about their pride in being *X* or their comfort with their children marrying outside of their group. Most of these questions were adapted from the Afrobarometer and from survey instruments used by social psychologists.¹²

About a third of the way into the structured interview, the software platform randomly assigned the subject to either one of two treatment groups or to control. Following a memorized script, the enumerators then asked the subject if she had heard about the violent robbery nearby (Treatment A); the ethnic clash nearby (Treatment B); or the spike in traffic in Lagos (Control) – almost all subjects responded negatively. Following the script, the enumerator then briefly described the events that had allegedly taken place and told the respondent that she could hear for herself, handing her headphones connected to the tablet. The selected broadcast that was then played was specific not only to treatment assignment, but also to the LGA sub-area (treatment content is discussed in more detail below).

After listening to the radio broadcast, the enumerator then "resumed" the research without indicating that the radio broadcast was actually a part of the study. Subjects were guided through the remaining part of the structured interview, which was designed to measure, among

¹¹ As discussed in chapter 3, the concept of in-group identity was constrained to the subject's religious or ethnic group. This decision is likely to elicit some criticism, but there were theoretical, empirical, and logistical considerations behind this decision. In the social identity literature, there is precedent for similar decisions: identity is frequently limited to the dimensions that are salient within that society, e.g. in the research on identity in Northern Ireland, researchers Paolini et al. do not consider identity facets beyond religion (2004). Empirically, when I conducted pilot studies, respondents were asked a more open-ended question about their social identity, in which they could define themselves in terms of their gender, class or occupation, ethnicity, religion, or something else. Approximately 80% of participants in the pilot chose ethnicity or religion, and in focus groups and interviews, most participants discussed their ethnicity and religion when asked about their identity. I therefore felt confident limiting identity this way, while still allowing for "other" or "no" responses. This decision also dramatically simplified the research design, in which subjects were matched with an "in" and "out" group partner.

¹² Specifically, Miles Hewstone, a social psychologist specializing in intergroup contact, provided language for some of the questions.

other things, post-treatment social identity and attitudes about the use of violence and democracy.

In addition to these post-treatment questions, subjects also played¹³ the Trust Game (Berg Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) with a “partner” supposedly located in another part of Lagos (in reality, the partner was a computer algorithm). Respondents received an initial endowment of 500 Naira, equivalent to approximately \$2.50 USD at the time of the study, and were told that the organizers of the study would triple whatever amount they decided to send to their partner. In return, their partner could send back anywhere from 0 Naira to a maximum of 1500 Naira.¹⁴ The identity of the subject’s Trust Game partner was experimentally manipulated so that he was either a member of the subject’s in-group or out-group, with the information being conveyed via the name of the partner and his alleged location (a church, mosque, or nothing mentioned).¹⁵ Subjects were later asked to guess the ethnicity and religion of their partner and, as discussed later in the thesis, analyses were conducted on the basis of both assigned and perceived partner identity (in other words, both intent-to-treat and treatment-on-the-treated effects were estimated). The quantity of Naira the respondent decided to send her partner was used as a measure of trusting behaviour (although some interpret it as a measure of cooperation, see Sapienza, Toldra-Simats, & Zingales, 2013).

¹³ The Trust Game was one of the last portions of the survey, administered shortly before the debrief. The timing of the game was an important research design consideration, as putting the game too early could have impacted subject responses or their belief about the truthfulness of the research. Of course, subject behaviour in the Trust Game may have similarly been influenced by the earlier questions about intergroup relations. This was a trade-off, and an imperfect one. Alternating the sequencing of the Trust Game in the survey would have been preferable.

¹⁴ The computer was pre-programmed so that the subject received half of the tripled amount of what they sent.

¹⁵ For subjects whose in- or out-group was not one of the three main ethnic or two primary religious groups, their partner had a “neutral” identity, with a name that could come from multiple ethnic groups and whose location was not mentioned. The decision to pair these subjects with a “neutral” partner was driven by practicality, as it was almost impossible to find names and locations that signalled the identity of every “partner” in every religious and ethnic group. This ultimately affected only 33 subjects, of which 28 primarily identified with an ethnic group other than Yoruba, Hausa, or Igbo, and 5 primarily identified with a religion other than Christianity or Islam.

As compensation for their participation in the study, subjects received a small thank you gift and were entitled to keep any money they earned while playing the Trust Game.¹⁶ After completing the interview, all subjects participated in a thorough debrief process with checks for comprehension to ensure that they understood that the news was false (discussed in more detail below), that the candidates and Trust Game partners were fictional, and that there were no new risks to their safety, in spite of the “news” conveyed via the radio broadcasts.

4.2.3 *Sample Demographics*

The median age group of the survey respondents was 25-34 years old (SD of 1.1 age groups, or approximately 9.8 years), with participant ages ranging from 18 to over 65. Almost two-thirds of the sample was under 34 years of age, which is representative of the broader population of Lagos, where the median age is just 18.3 years (CIA World Factbook, 2016). Less than a third of respondents had spent their entire life in Lagos, reflecting the diversity of Lagos and its attractiveness to those considering migration. Subjects had, on average, completed some post-secondary schooling, although a small minority had not even finished secondary school, and almost 14% of subjects reported that they had completed university. Just over 50% of the respondents were male, which was anticipated given gender alternation at the household level.

Household income was measured using a cumulative deprivation score, in which respondents were asked how often they go without food, water, medication, and fuel, and by a separate measure which asked about ownership of non-essential goods, such as televisions and generators. Across both metrics, most respondents came from households with moderate means: the majority (78%) did not regularly go without basic necessities¹⁷ and owned several non-

¹⁶ On average, participants earned 646.5 Naira, equivalent to approximately \$2.30 USD at the time of the study. With regard to incentivizing general participation, it is worth noting the debate about the impact of financial incentives on experimental performance, survey response rates, honesty, and levels of optimism (Camerer et al, 1999; Singer & Kulka, 2002). I cannot rule out the possibilities that incentivizing subjects led to more optimism than might have been the case without incentives. However, any impact should be distributed equally.


¹⁷ Although almost 25% of the sample reported never going without basic necessities, some 10% of respondents said they go without these essential items on a regular basis

essential items such as a mobile phone or television,¹⁸ although very few individuals in the sample belonged to Lagos' burgeoning middle (or small upper) class. Approximately 70% of respondents claimed they currently had a full-time job, with the most common occupations being a trader/hawker/vendor/market seller; white-collar jobs were rare.

A key part of the demographic information collected was about the subject's religious and ethnic identity. Although subjects identified with over 22 distinct ethnic groups, the three largest ethnic groups in Lagos – Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa – accounted for 84.24% of all responses. Specifically, the sample was 68% Yoruba, 14.6% Igbo, and 1.5% Hausa. This data is consistent with the demographic information reported in the 2010 Lagos Household Survey report, which indicates that 76% of Lagosians identify as Yoruba, 16% identifies as Igbo, and 2% identifies as Hausa, and a recent Afrobarometer survey (2015), in which the population of Lagos was measured at 74% Yoruba, 17% Igbo, and 0.5% Hausa. Consistent with this Afrobarometer survey, the primary religious groups among respondents were overwhelmingly Christianity (~70%) and Islam (~29%). Other religious affiliations accounted for less than 1% of responses, and the Yoruba ethnic group was significantly more religiously diverse than the others (Figure 4.1).

¹⁸ Included in this count are all subjects who own at least 3 “non-essential” items and are in the bottom half of the deprivation scale.

Figure 4.1: Subject Religion by Ethnicity



The subject's in- and out-group were established via a series of questions. Early in the survey, subjects were asked to name both the ethnic and religious group to which they felt closest, and the ethnic and religious group to which they felt *least* close. Later, respondents were asked whether their religious or ethnic group is ultimately more central to their identity; their response to this question established their "in-group." The same process was used to establish the subject's "out-group." As discussed in the previous chapter, the vast majority of subjects – approximately 87% – identified primarily with their religious group, and subject out-groups were evenly split between an ethnic group (~51%) and a religious group (~49%). The minority of subjects who viewed their in-group as their ethnic group tended to view their out-group as an ethnic group as well (that is, some subjects were somewhat more likely to see the world in ethnic terms), whereas subjects with a religious in-group were quite evenly divided on the nature of their out-group.

Subjects were also asked extensively about their exposure to violence during the past year. Among respondents, approximately 38% had witnessed or experienced everyday violence within the previous year, but only about 4% reported that they were exposed to political or

identity-based violence during that same time period. Overall, almost 41% of subjects reported that they had experienced or witnessed one or more forms of violence within the previous year. A more in-depth look at the types of violence experienced and the “profile” of a victim is in chapter 6.

When asked about the perpetration of violence, 13.1% of respondents said that they had carried out an act of violence within the previous year. Of the subjects who were themselves victims of violence, 23.2% had also perpetrated violence within the past year, compared to only 6.12% of non-victims ($\chi^2 = 63.13, p=0.000$). This suggests that certain individuals are more prone to be caught in a cycle of violence, also discussed in chapter 6.

4.2.4 *Treatment*

The aim of the embedded experiment was to understand how the proximate, imminent threat of violence – specifically everyday violence and identity-based violence – affects social identity, trust, and preferences. This necessitated finding a credible, but also ethical, way to induce the threat of different forms of violence. The research team obviously could not, and would not, directly threaten subjects with violence, which meant that any intervention needed to approximate a threat and induce fear without actually placing the subject in any danger.

One commonly-employed technique used by researchers studying the impact of threat on behaviour is to ask subjects to think about a time when they felt scared about the possibility of becoming a victim of violence (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lench & Levine, 2005; see Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011 for a discussion of different strategies of emotion inducement). This method of treatment delivery is both cost-effective and parsimonious, but it can also result in heterogeneous treatment delivery. Particularly imaginative subjects might vividly recall a recent and terrifying experience, while other, less imaginative subjects may instead recall relatively minor incidences, or may not be able to think of an appropriate example at all.

To avoid these complications, I instead introduced threat via a fictitious news broadcast, a technique that has gained traction in social science research (Amodio, Zinner, & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Kučera & Haviger, 2012). This method of treatment delivery ensures that

subjects receive the same “dose” of treatment, with the same level of detail and cues indicating that the threat was proximate and still active. The control inherent in this experimental design still does not guarantee that all subjects will feel equally threatened by treatment, and indeed within this experiment, there was still treatment effect heterogeneity, as some subjects felt more fearful about the news than others (see chapter 5). However, this variation can be accounted for with the analytical approach, and, compared to the alternatives, it introduced less unknown variation.

After conducting several pilots designed to test possible treatment delivery mechanisms, the treatment that had the most resonance and credibility in a Lagosian context was a short, fictional *radio* broadcast, which was foreseeable given the importance of proximity to the salience of threat and the fact that most Africans, including Lagosians,¹⁹ still get their news primarily via radio (Afrobarometer, 2012). The broadcast featured a “breaking news” report about an act of violence – either a violent robbery or an ethnic²⁰ clash – that had supposedly occurred nearby earlier that day, and it stressed that the suspected perpetrators had not yet been apprehended (Table 4.2). Each short radio broadcast was tailored for the specific sub-division in which it was played and contained references to prominent streets and landmarks in that smaller area designed to reinforce the proximate location of the event (this means that there were 20 different broadcasts for each of the two treatments).

¹⁹ Almost 80% of subjects claimed that they get news from the radio at least several times a week.

²⁰ By choosing an ethnic rather than a religious clash, there is some risk of differential outcomes for those who identified along ethnic versus religious lines. Religious violence is so exceedingly rare in Lagos, however, that this trade-off between credibility and the introduction of bias seemed worth the risk, and the estimated treatment effect is anyway an average.

Table 4.2: Description of Treatment and Control

Group	Description
Treatment A: Robbery	A news broadcast about a violent, indiscriminate robbery that supposedly occurred nearby earlier that day. Bystanders were reportedly injured during the robbery and the suspects are reported to be at large.
Treatment B: Ethnic Violence	A news broadcast about a violent ethnic clash between Yoruba and Hausa hoodlums that supposedly occurred nearby earlier that day. Once again, bystanders were reportedly injured during the robbery and the suspects are reported to be at large.
Control	A news broadcast about the marked increase in traffic in Lagos. Note that the control was not sub-area specific; rather, it spoke about main motorways that connect the central hubs of Lagos.

The content of these broadcasts was created via an iterative process with focus groups made up of a cross-section of Lagosians (five focus groups in total, made up of 8-14 participants at a time). Participants were asked to discuss what kind of events in Lagos they found personally threatening, and then participants of the subsequent focus group were also specifically asked about the most commonly-cited examples from the previous groups. Through these discussions, the example that emerged most frequently and fit the criteria of everyday violence was violent robbery, and a market clash between Yoruba and Hausa²¹ boys was deemed the most realistic and threatening form of identity-based violence in Lagos at the time.

Robbery was selected as the form of everyday violence in the treatment because it is very common in Lagos (and in Nigeria more broadly) and was widely perceived as threatening. The country's Federal Office of Statistics claims that crimes of theft²² are the most commonly-reported offense country-wide. Key data about the prevalence of robbery and other forms of

²¹ Naming specific ethnic groups involved in the "clash" introduced the risk that members of the group that allegedly perpetrated violence would feel less threatened, or that members of the victimized group would feel particularly threatened. I checked for, and do not find, evidence for such heterogeneity.

²² In theory, the distinction between theft and robbery is that theft involves taking property from someone without his consent. Unlike robbery, theft is not necessarily violent, nor must the property be removed directly from the victim's person. In practice, the distinction between theft and robbery is not always clear or consistent in crime statistics.

violent crime in Lagos include a 25% reported theft victimization rate from 2000-2005; a 73% reported victimization rate for pick-pocketing or purse-snatching; and 31% prevalence of lethal weapons during robbery. Across the whole of Nigeria, 18.5% of Nigerians have either personally experienced robbery or reported that a household member had; a further 8.6% similarly experienced attempted robbery. Moreover, robbery is also the most feared and most discussed crime: nearly 37% of Lagosians say that they fear crime, while only 23.8% claim to fear murder – likely a reflection of the perceived probability of these events (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2005).

To make the broadcasts seem more realistic (as though they were being played live or were a recording from a radio station), they began with the last portion of a pop song that was popular in Lagos at the time of the research. They then transitioned into the ~60 second news report, before ending with another song. These radio programs were created with support from TVC News Nigeria and several Lagosian friends, who generously volunteered to serve as the broadcaster, reporter, and “witnesses” on the recordings. They also provided invaluable help in creating the broadcast scripts, adding local slang and dialect to maximize their believability. Importantly, the scripts for both treatment broadcasts are extremely similar, although they deal with two different forms of violence. This was essential to ensure that any outcome differences observed were due to the difference in the type of violent threat described, and not due to the language used or specific details included when describing the event. The control script also followed this pattern with similar levels of detail and language, although the event described was an increase in traffic.

There are important methodological and conceptual reasons behind the decision to use a placebo control rather than a “pure” control (i.e. none), as well as the choice to have two different treatment groups. Regarding the former, although information-induced emotion was hypothesized to be the variable influencing identity-outcomes, it was possible that “mere” information could have direct identity effects as well. For example, someone who believes she comes from a particularly erudite group may feel in-group pride after being asked by researchers to listen to a news report – an identity-effect that would not be captured with a

“pure” placebo design. From a methodological perspective, as Gerber et al. explain, a placebo control “minimizes problems of noncompliance and enables the researcher to draw unbiased and relatively efficient inferences about the causal effect of the treatment on the treated” (2010, p.298). It also controls for the placebo effect and therefore has high internal validity, as medical researchers have argued (Vickers & de Craen, 2000).²³

The decision to have two treatments was similarly carefully considered. To date, most related research about the threat of violence and/or past exposure to violence has focused on the impact of identity-based violence on a range of outcomes, yet very little work looks specifically at everyday violence. By including the two treatments, I am able to ascertain a) if the *mere* threat of violence, independent of the type of violence, affects identity and social and political preferences and b) if there are differences in response variables that are dependent on the *type* of violence threat.

In manipulation checks, these broadcasts performed well across the two critical dimensions: their believability and their ability to provoke fear about the alleged events. At the very end of the survey, after it was revealed that the newscast was fictional, subjects were asked whether they thought the broadcast was real. The timing of this question meant that subjects might be incentivized to pretend that they knew the broadcast was fake and not admit to being “duped” as such, I was expecting a meaningful portion of subjects to claim they knew the broadcast was not real. To my surprise, just under 91% of subjects said they believed the broadcast was real.²⁴ The control broadcast was most credible (96.4% believability rate), the ethnic violence treatment was least credible (83.9%), and the robbery treatment was considered credible by 91.2% of subjects.

Even in light of the efforts made to create credible broadcasts, these are still extremely high believability rates. They are so high, in fact, that they merited a second look. Using two

²³ The drawback to this method was cost – subjects who could have been assigned to a treatment group were instead in control, and, as will be discussed below, the risk that the placebo had an effect on emotion, and therefore behaved like a weak treatment, rather than a true control.

²⁴ This was a significant improvement over piloted interventions, particularly the television broadcasts that were tested. Both the vehicle of delivery and the location-specific details seemed to have improved credibility.

other data points, I find evidence suggesting that subjects likely did believe the broadcasts, and that this result is not simply due to an unexpected desirability bias, in which subjects tried to appease the enumerator by “playing along,” even though they knew the broadcast was not real.

First, I asked enumerators to provide their own assessment of whether the subject seemed to have believed the broadcast. According to the research assistants, almost 88% of respondents seemed convinced by the broadcast, which is only slightly below the rate reported by the subjects themselves.²⁵ The second data point comes from a question about whether the subject had heard the report before. The report was, of course, fictional, and subjects who claimed that they had heard it before would not have been telling the truth. This question therefore served as a crude “honesty check” of the subject’s answers to questions about the broadcasts. Overall, almost 93%²⁶ of subjects said that they had *not* heard the broadcast before. This suggests that most subjects were largely responding truthfully to questions about the broadcasts and is further evidence that the treatments were generally believed. Finally, the self-reported credibility measure was used in robustness checks of the analyses in the thesis; it consistently did not have a significant impact on the results.

Regarding the ability of the intervention to provoke fear, the treatments performed moderately well: just over 50% of subjects in both treatment groups reported feeling very fearful after hearing the news, compared to only ~17% of those in the control, a significant difference (ANOVA: $F(2, 1012)=66.99, p = 0.000$). It is nonetheless striking that some 16-20% (treatment-dependent) of subjects assigned to hear about a proximate robbery or ethnic clash said they did not feel *at all* fearful about the news, despite these reports being believed by the vast majority of subjects. Some 57% of those who heard about traffic said they were not at all afraid, as expected. The topic of who did and did not feel fearful when exposed to treatment is taken up in far greater detail in chapter 5 as it is a core part of the theorized causal

²⁵ Once again, the control broadcast had the highest reported believability rate (as perceived by the research assistant) at 95%. The robbery treatment rate was 84%, and the ethnic violence rate was 82%.

²⁶ As expected, fewer subjects reported having previously heard the broadcasts for the treatments as compared to the control (which could have more credibly been confused with an actual, previous broadcast).

chain, and the heterogeneity is accounted for with the estimation techniques. This research design and the planned analyses were pre-registered on the EGAP registry in April 2016.

4.2.5 Variables

Independent Variables and Mediators

There are two key independent variables, one indicating whether subjects were exposed to a threat of violence in the experiment, and one indicating whether the subjects were themselves victims of violence within the past year.

1. Assignment to treatment

The primary independent variable for the experimental component of this research was assignment to a treatment group or control, carried out at random by the software. Randomization checks are included in the appendix.

Table 4.3: Assignment to Treatment and Control

Assignment	Count	Percent
Control: Traffic Broadcast	358	35.03%
Treatment 1: Attack by Robbers	352	34.44%
Treatment 2: Ethnic Violence	312	30.53%
Total:	1,022	100%

2. Previous victimization

The variables used in analyses about the effects of actual victimization were a binary indicator of whether the subject was a victim of everyday violence, and a more inclusive indicator about whether the subject was a victim of *any* form of violence, including identity-based violence. These variables were constructed with responses to survey questions, in which subjects were

asked if they had personally experienced or witnessed²⁷ different forms of violence within the previous year.

Mediator Variables

In keeping with the theorized link between exposure to violence and changes to identity and preferences, a mediator measuring the subject's level of fear was included. This variable is the subject's response to a question about how fearful she felt about the news she had just heard in the radio broadcast. Responses were measured on a 3-point Likert scale ranging from 1 ("not at all fearful") to 3 ("very fearful"). For the analyses, this variable was recoded as a dichotomous variable reflecting whether the individual was "very fearful" (1) or "not very fearful" (0), which included both the "not at all fearful" and "somewhat fearful" categories. The variable was transformed both because the original distribution was skewed, with over half of the subjects responding on the extreme ends of the scale, and for conceptual reasons: the theory predicts that high levels of fear, induced by threat, will have the effect, but does not make any predictions about the impact of moderate levels of fear.

Additionally, because the induction of one emotion often results in other, non-targeted emotions also being elicited (Myers & Tingley, 2016), surprise was also measured after the experiment and tested in the analyses. Subjects were asked how surprised they were by the broadcast they heard, with responses measured on a 3-point Likert scale (from "not at all surprised" to "extremely surprised.") This was similarly recoded into a dichotomous variable.

In both instances, the decision to simply ask subjects to self-report their emotional state rather than use a separate biophysical measure (or external assessments) was the result of both literature suggesting that self-reports completed soon after the event can be a valid and reliable measure of emotion (Mauss & Robinson, 2009; Weidman, Steckler, & Tracy, 2017), and the poor performance of piloted alternative measures. Tests of subjects' heartrate, for example,

²⁷ Interestingly, asking about *witnessing* violence is common practice in victimization surveys (see, for example, the Crime Survey for England and Wales), and research has demonstrated that witnessing violence results in elevated levels of trauma, depression, anger, violent behaviour, and anxiety, similar to the effects of direct experiences with violence (Flannery, Wester, & Singer 2001).

both reduced participation (as many respondents said they were uncomfortable with this kind of data being collected) and proved to be unreliable, as the measured values were at times so extreme as to be clearly inaccurate.

Dependent Variables

There are three categories of outcome variables, described in more detail below: the first measures the strength of a subject's social identity, or more concretely, the subject's warmth toward and affiliation with her in- and out-group. The second looks at trust in in- and out-groups, both through reported attitudes and with an actual measure of behaviour during the Trust Game. The final category are measures of support for democracy and for the use of violence under a variety of circumstances.²⁸

1. Strength of identity

Identity index: The identity index is a composite measure that captures the strength of the subject's in-group affiliation. It is constructed using five statements about identity, with responses measured using a Likert scale. The statements are: *"I have a lot in common with other [in-group] members;" "I feel a strong sense of attachment to other [in-group] members;" "I would prefer that my children marry someone who is also [in-group];" "I am proud of being [in-group]" and "Being [in-group] is important to how I feel about myself."*

This set of statements is commonly used in research about identity (Hewstone et al., 2006), and tries to capture the centrality, or lack thereof, of the subject's in-group to her sense of self. The responses to these five questions are summed and then standardized into an index. Cronbach's alpha for this index was adequate at 0.74.

²⁸ Of course, this measure is a static snapshot of identity in time; on a given day, a subject's identity may be more or less salient, or she may feel like another dimension of her identity is more important than the dimension she named during this survey. This research attempts to measure changes in the salient identity dimension at the time of the survey; it does not seek to explain longer-term trends.

In-group and out-group thermometers: Consistent with Cairns et al. (2006), subjects were asked to evaluate their feelings toward their in-group using a thermometer from 1-100, in which 100 means “extremely warm feelings” and 1 means “extremely cold feelings” (a picture of a thermometer was used to assist with comprehension). The same thermometer question was asked about the subject’s feelings toward her out-group.

2. Trusting attitudes and behaviour

Trust in- and out-group members: Trust is measured in two ways. First, subjects were asked how much they generally trust members of their in- and out-group on a 1 (do not trust at all) to 4 (trust completely) scale. Additionally, as previously described, subjects played the Trust Game, in which they were instructed to choose what quantity of money they wanted to send their partner, who was randomly assigned as being either in- or out-group.

3. Attitudes about violence and democracy

A composite measure that captures the subject’s support for the use of violence under four different circumstances: when it is in response to an act of violence carried out against the subject’s in-group; when a violent threat made against the subject’s family; when a violent threat made against the subject herself; or when the subject’s out-group becomes violent. The responses to these four questions were standardized into an index. Cronbach’s alpha for this index was relatively high at 0.87.

To assess attitudes about democracy, subjects were asked three questions, then standardized into an index, adapted from the Afrobarometer: a question about the trade-offs between government speed/efficacy and deliberative democracy; presidential power versus oversight by the National Assembly; and a robust versus accommodating opposition.

Finally, subjects were asked about their overall interest in politics, from “not at all interested” to “very interested,” as measured on a 1-4 scale. This question was used in analyses about the impact of actual victimization on political engagement.

Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables

Outcome Variables	N	Scale	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Median	Max.
Social Identity							
Identity Index	1,000	1 (weakest) - 5 (strongest)	4.5	0.5	2.6	4.6	5
In-Group Thermometer	1,006	1 (coldest) - 100 (warmest)	82.9	16.8	20	85	100
Out-Group Thermometer	997	1 (coldest) - 100 (warmest)	30.7	23.7	0	30	100
In-Group Trust	1,007	1 (least) - 4 (most)	3.3	0.7	1	3	4
Out-Group Trust	999	1 (least) - 4 (most)	1.7	0.8	1	1	4
Sent Naira: In-Group	689	0 – 500	300.7	121.3	0	300	500
Sent Naira: Out-Group	72	0 - 500	268.4	97.2	0	287.5	500
Violence & Political Preferences							
Support of Violence Index	1,000	0 (least) - 4 (most)	1.4	1.04	0	1	4
Support Democracy Index	1,018	1 (most) – 5 (least)	3.52	1.15	1	3.67	5
Political Interest	1,017	1 (very) – 4 (not)	2.58	1.12	1	4	3

Note: Naira sent to in- and out-group refers to perceived in- or out-group partners

Control Variables

There are up to eight variables used as controls, depending on the hypothesis being tested and the model (Table 4.5). The literature suggests that on average, we should expect younger, less educated men to exhibit stronger in-group identity (Robinson, 2009). I also control for previous perpetration and indigeneity to Lagos and include an interaction term for subjects who were

also previously victims of violence, and some models include a baseline measure of anxiety, adapted from the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). Some of the trust game models additionally include a measure of risk preferences. Finally, all models include sub-district fixed effects to account for the significant area-based variation in violence and identity levels. Missing data was imputed using the median with the *Hmisc* package in R.

Table 4.5: Control Variables

Variable	Scale	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Median	Max.
Age	Under 18 – 65+	25 – 34*	10.3	18	25 - 34	65+
Education	1 = no formal schooling 10 = post-grad education	6.8	1.2	2	7	10
Gender	0 = female 1 = male	0.5	0.5	0	0	1
Indigeneity to Lagos	0 = no 1 = yes	0.31	0.46	0	0	1
Perpetration	0 = no 1 = yes (self-reported)	0.13	0.34	0	0	1
Risk Preferences	1 = averse 2 = seeking	1.32	0.47	1	1	2
Baseline Anxiety	1 = least 5 = most	1.86	0.78	1	1.75	4
Past Victimization	0 = no 1 = yes	0.41	0.49	0	0	1

* Extrapolated mean was 31, median was 29.5 years.

4.3 Ethical Considerations

Given the sensitive nature of the research and the methods used to “expose” subjects to a supposed threat of violence, is essential to discuss the ethical dimensions of this project. There

are two elements of this research that are potentially problematic from an ethics perspective. First, because I am interested in the impact of a proximate threat of violence, the treatment necessarily had to induce fear and potentially other negative emotions associated with a dangerous threat. The use of a fake but credible threat of violence introduced the risk that some subjects would be extremely affected by the treatment and would become distressed. More broadly, it presented the challenge that negative emotions are painful and usually private experiences, and therefore need to be induced with extreme caution so as to prevent respondents from being subjected to unnecessary psychological harm (Philippot, 1993). In a setting such as Lagos, where actual victimization rates are very high, it was particularly important to avoid re-traumatizing those who had previously experienced violence or other forms of distress.

The second major ethical consideration was the use of deception. Misleading information was provided to the subjects in regard to the alleged occurrence of a nearby episode of violence and the identity of the respondent's Trust Game partner. Although all subjects went through a thorough debriefing²⁹ process at the end of the study in which the true nature of all three instances was revealed, these false pretences were maintained for the duration of the study (lasting an average of 72 minutes).

The use of deception in the social sciences is the subject of contentious debate. Researchers and institutional review boards are understandably concerned about deceptive methods being used excessively and gratuitously, and there have been documented instances of the "exploitation and abuse" of subjects who were deceived (Boynton, Portnoy, & Johnson, 2013, abstract). Moreover, as the Economic and Social Research Council explains, the use of deception can be problematic because:

"[...] participants may feel upset upon learning that they have been deceived; participants may not have consented to take part in the research had they been aware of its true purpose; the deception may undermine trust in the discipline, which may make it difficult for researchers to collect valid data in the future" (Tapper, 2019).

²⁹ The debrief and informed consent scripts are available in a separate appendix.

Guidelines in both the United Kingdom and United States now specify that deception should only be used if it is a) essential to the research, and the research itself is expected to make an important scientific contribution; b) not expected to lead to anger, harm, or severe emotional distress in subjects; c) exposed and explained to the subjects as quickly as possible; and d) if the study protects the dignity and autonomy of the subjects and employs appropriate risk management and harm alleviation strategies (see: *Guidelines from the British Psychological Society* and the *Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct* from the American Psychological Society). Interestingly, recent research about the use of deception in the social sciences suggests that some of these concerns may be overstated. A study by a team of psychologists testing the risks of deception demonstrated that when coupled with a thorough debriefing procedure and a high level of experimenter professionalism, deception “poses limited psychological harm to participants” and the risks of deception can “largely [be] mitigated” (Boynton, Portnoy, & Johnson, 2013). Nonetheless, these findings do not represent a consensus in the discipline and in light of this uncertainty and the possible consequences, erring on the side of conservatism was clearly appropriate.

Before describing the strategies employed to mitigate any risks to subjects, it is important to explain why I decided to use deception at all, given these risks. As described above, the treatments were designed to introduce a proximate threat of everyday violence and a threat of identity-based violence. Of interest was not solely whether fear, independent of its origin, affects identity, behaviour, and preferences, but whether exposure to *the fear of everyday versus identity-based violence* could induce changes. Had the independent variable of interest been simply the emotion of fear, it could have been induced in a variety of non-deceptive ways, e.g. asking subjects to simply describe a time when they felt scared. As not every subject had personally been threatened by violence (or threatened by a specific type of violence), asking subjects to imagine being the victim of a robbery or of an ethnic clash would not have consistently and uniformly induced the experience of being under threat. *Actually* threatening subjects with violence was very obviously out-of-question. Consequently, presenting subjects

with a seemingly real report about a threat of violence seemed to be the best compromise between experimental efficacy and the protection of subjects.

I would argue that the use of deception in the Trust Game was also a necessary compromise. Pairing subjects with actual in- and out-group partners for the Trust Game would have been too logistically complicated³⁰ and too expensive, and the downsides of pairing them with a computer algorithm, presented as a real partner, were minimal. Moreover, as this section of the research was at the very end of the survey, false pretences were maintained for an extremely short period of time.

Risks stemming from these instances of deception and ethical concerns about the nature of the treatment were mitigated via the following measures: First, all subjects went through a thorough informed consent process in which they were advised that they would be taking place in a research study about politics and security in Lagos, that their participation was entirely voluntary, and that they could end their participation at any time without penalty, including financial penalty. Only four subjects ultimately chose to end their participation early for unspecified reasons.

Second, great care was taken to ensure that the treatment struck a balance between inducing fear but not causing panic or distress. As discussed, the treatment emerged from multiple focus groups and I informally discussed its contents with a number of Lagosians before drafting broadcast scripts. The scripts were then reviewed by other Lagosians, who edited them to make them more believable but also to ensure they were not gratuitously threatening. Indeed, while it may seem like the broadcasts would be shocking to subjects, it is useful to situate them within the context of Lagos. Mainstream media in Lagos, even in comparison to tabloids in Britain or the US, is remarkably graphic. At the time of writing (October 2017), stories in the headlines of major Lagosian media outlets included: “Two lovers found naked, dead in car after

³⁰ Specifically, the traffic in Lagos would have required subjects to invest significantly more time in the study, plus additional grant money would have been required to offset these travel costs and to rent a lab space. It also would have required a lot of coordination, as not all subjects would have been able to immediately participate in the game, and specific identity-group dyads would have had to be created from the subject pool and scheduled for later participation.

sex” (*The Guardian*, 30 Oct. 2017); “Epileptic man butchers friend in Ogun” (*Vanguard*, 31 Oct. 2017); and “Prophets kill, share body parts of gang member’s girlfriend” (*The Guardian*, 25 Oct. 2017). I mention this not to debase the Nigerian media, but to provide context for how violent events are often described and discussed in Lagos. The treatment broadcasts were, in comparison, fairly tame – an assertion which can also be verified empirically, as only half³¹ of subjects who heard a treatment broadcasts reported feeling very high levels of fear, and the majority of subjects reported that they believed the treatment.

Alongside tweaking the content of the treatment, significant attention was paid to the way research assistants were trained. As a key part of the two-day training, all enumerators were taught to recognize verbal and physical signs of distress and were trained on a clear protocol to follow if a subject became agitated or upset while taking place in the study. This protocol contained escalating actions (e.g. providing reassurance, asking the subject to sit down and breath while explaining that the “news” was just a story, asking a trusted family member or friend to intervene) that ultimately required them to call in a supervisor for assistance and to report the event to me. There were, fortunately, no reports of subjects becoming distressed or panicked, and no instances where a supervisor needed to intervene. Additionally, all subjects were given my contact information after participation in case they had follow-up questions or concerns, or simply wanted to discuss the study. Only three individuals contacted me, all with minor questions about compensation and my university affiliation.

Third, all subjects were guided through a thorough debrief process that explained the true purpose of the research, clarified all instances of deception, and then asked subjects a series of questions to ensure that they understood the information that had just been presented. For the protection of the subject and fellow community members, as well as the integrity of the experiment, it was essential that any false notions gleaned from the experiment were dispelled during the debrief and not spread throughout the neighbourhood.

³¹ This is discussed in more detail later in the thesis as it presented analytical challenges, but in the context of ethics concerns, it is helpful to keep in mind that almost half of all subjects reported moderate to low levels of fear after exposure to the description of a nearby threat.

Finally, it is important to mention the ethics of the qualitative portion of the research, in which subjects were asked, either individually or as focus group participants, to discuss previous experiences with violence. The CLEEN Foundation, a Nigerian NGO focusing on security and justice in Nigeria, assisted with the organization of the focus groups and interviews, contacting people in their network who they knew had been victims of violence, who then voluntarily agreed, or not, to participate. I personally carried out all of the focus group discussions and a portion³² of the one-on-one interviews, and then a small team of trained research assistants conducted the rest. As with the experiment, all respondents went through an informed consent process and were told several times that they could stop at any time without any penalty, and the same principles of closely monitoring subjects for distress applied, here culminating in a referral to CLEEN for counselling about supportive resources if the person seemed to need it.³³ The interview questions were deliberately open-ended so that participants could decide how much information to reveal. In three instances, I had post-interview conversations with the participant about how to find resources to help them process their traumatic experience. Interestingly, several interviewees spontaneously told me that they were happy to have had an opportunity to talk about their experiences and thanked me for listening. At the end of the interviews and focus groups, I explained the goal of the research and gave participants the opportunity to retract any responses (no one asked to do so) and provided my contact information for any follow-up questions.

As a result of these measures, I feel confident that the psychical and psychological safety of the subjects was appropriately protected throughout all stages of the research. The study was reviewed and approved by the University of Oxford's social science division human subjects committee (C2_R42448, October 2015).

³² Due to medical constraints.

³³ Respondents were paid for participation and the costs of their travel were offset.

4.4 Conclusion

Understanding the impact of exposure to violence on identity requires several layers of differentiation: between the type of violence – everyday versus identity-based; between the actual threat of violence and actual experiences with it; and between the impact of violence on identity-related attitudes versus behaviours. In this chapter, I described the empirical approach to answering these questions, introducing the survey, the experimental design, and the approach to the interviews and focus groups, along with the key variables used in the quantitative analysis in chapters 5-7. The causal identification strategies used in each stage of the analysis are described in more detail in the respective chapters.

Importantly, this chapter also highlighted the ethical considerations specific to this project. More generally, studying difficult issues like violence and identity often necessitate using methods that may introduce some risk of having a negative impact on participants. This is an undesirable but often unavoidable reality of these lines of inquiry. Rather than simply tabling these important research agendas, it is incumbent on researchers to find thoughtful, context-appropriate and externally-evaluated research methods to pursue them, and to explicitly label any trade-offs between the rigor of the chosen methods and the protection of human subjects. In this chapter, I outlined the steps I took to mitigate any harm to participants and presented evidence that subjects were not adversely affected by the experiment or the interviews; nonetheless, some of the trade-offs mentioned (e.g. a treatment that was believable but did not introduce fear in all subjects) underscore the need for further innovation in these research methods. I now turn to the core quantitative analysis, beginning with the impact of threat on identity.

Chapter 5

Violent Threat

5.1 Introduction

What impact does the acute threat of everyday violence have on identity? Can an event as “ordinary” as an armed mugging change the way individuals feel about their in- and out-groups and their attitudes about politics and violence? In these next three chapters, I quantitatively test the central questions of this thesis: whether exposure to everyday violence, often considered the “background noise” to more spectacular acts of aggression, affects social identity dynamics and attitudes about violence and politics, and whether there is a substantive difference in the way that the *threat* of violence affects individuals versus first-hand victimization.

This chapter presents the first part of the empirical analysis, focusing on the impact of experimentally-induced threat. In what follows, I interrogate how the threat of identity-based violence and everyday violence impacts social identity and corresponding attitudes and behaviours. I also present evidence about the causal mechanism driving these results. Thereafter, I analyse the effect of first-hand victimization on identity (chapter 6) to compare how the potentialities and actualities of violence differentially affect people. In chapter 7, I present the results of the behavioural economics games to assess whether the self-reported attitudes and beliefs also correspond to behaviour.

Collectively, these chapters demonstrate that *fear* induced by both types of threats has a moderate identity-affirming impact, increasing in-group favouritism and depressing favourable views of out-groups. Actual victimization, however, has the opposite effect: victims are less attached to, and, surprisingly, feel more negatively about, their in-group compared to non-victims – results that are largely supported by the behavioural exercise.

This chapter is divided into five sub-sections. After explaining the analytical strategy used to assess the impact of violent threat (part one), I then estimate the average direct effect of each treatment on the outcome variables (part two). Part three then explores the hypothesized

causal mechanisms. I begin this section by assessing how treatment impacts the primary mediator of interest, the subject's level of fear, as well as its impact on an alternative mediating variable, threat-induced surprise. This analysis also serves as a manipulation check, quantifying how successful treatment was in provoking emotion. I then use a modern technique to estimate the causal impact of the hypothesized mechanisms on identity and the related outcomes (Imai, Keele, & Tingley, 2010; Imai, Keele, Tingley, & Yamamoto, 2011) (part four) and demonstrate how the emotional impact of the threat of violence impacts identity and attitudes. Finally, part five of this chapter adjudicates between the competing mechanisms and test the robustness of these findings with sensitivity analysis.

5.2 Analytical Strategy: Measuring and Testing the Threat of Violence

Although threat perception can vary between individuals, there is a common emotional response to being threatened by someone or something violent: we are likely to be alert and vigilant, we are probably surprised by the new information, and we may feel overwhelmingly anxious or scared¹ (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990; Bracha, 2004; Goldin et al., 2009). As discussed in chapter 2, the emotional response to threat is central to the theory advanced in this thesis. Testing the impact of violence on identity therefore requires an analytical strategy that isolates the differential effects of “mere” information about a proximate violent threat from the emotions that this information elicits, particularly the fear of violence. The most appropriate way to disentangle the effect of information about a threat is arguably through a mediation model, in which the effects of information about a threat and the emotional response it induces are taken into account (Imai et al. 2010, 2011).

Before explaining the causal mediation approach, it is important to clarify why the “standard” methods of experimental analysis are insufficient in this case. The advantage of a randomized experimental design, like the one employed in this study, is typically its exceptional

¹ As discussed in chapter 2, we may also feel angry, disgusted, or a range of other emotions (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Kuppen & Yzerbyt, 2012).


ability to control for observed and unobserved confounding variables, thereby allowing the analyst to better isolate the causal effects of a given intervention. As Gerber and Green explain in their 2012 field experiments textbook, “In the contentious world of causal claims, randomized experimentation represents an evenhanded method for assessing what works” (p.7). Assuming that the randomization process is complete and not biased and that a sufficient number of subjects comply with treatment, we are typically able to attribute any difference between the control and treatment(s) group(s) to the intervention.

A simple comparison of average treatment effects, however, is subject to important limitations. Beyond obvious methodological complications such as faulty randomization or subject attrition, it is important to scrutinize what the ATE actually measures. First, when emotions are induced² through an experimental manipulation, the ATE generally does not capture the impact of the emotion – it instead measures the impact of the induction method.³ In this experiment, the ATE therefore tells us what impact a *news report* about a proximate violent event has on identity and preferences, but not what impact fear or other emotions have on those dependent variables, because not everyone who receives the report will feel fear. This is problematic, because the hypotheses predict that *fear* provoked by the threat of violence – and not mere information about a threat – should have an impact on identity and preferences, as depicted in Figure 5.1.

² There are a number of techniques to induce emotion, but there is not yet consensus about the most reliable method. This is an area that is receiving increasing attention, as emotion becomes more central to our understanding of individual and group dynamics. Common strategies include the Autobiographical Emotional Memory Task, in which subjects recall and then write about an experience that invokes a specific emotion; showing subjects material that can induce certain emotions, e.g. films or photos; guided imagery; or even playing evocative music (Gross & Levenson, 1993; Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004; Mills & D’Mello, 2014). In this thesis, the focus is explicitly on a very particular kind of fear: fear induced by the threat of everyday violence, and the threat of identity-based violence. Consequently, it was important to use an induction technique specific to that particular source of fear, rather than a technique that induces fear of unrelated threats.

³ Some studies instead induce emotion, use manipulation checks to demonstrate that the induction method led to high levels of the emotion in question, and then equate assignment to treatment with the emotion (implying that treatment was spontaneous induction of an emotion). Even when the researchers can demonstrate successful induction, this approach is problematic, as the induction technique itself likely had effects that were not measured and accounted for.

Figure 5.1: Simplified Model in Which Identity Outcomes are Mediated by Treatment-Induced Fear



In a world in which we could spontaneously induce⁴ the fear of different forms of violence, we could simply compare ATEs between the treatment and control groups and directly estimate the impact of specific fears of violence on our dependent variables. However, as other researchers have pointed out, there is not (yet) an “anxiety pill” that we can administer to experimental subjects to directly test the impact of emotion on political and social outcomes (Albertson & Gadarian, 2016). Instead, as with most studies in which emotion is hypothesized to have a causal effect, the nature of this project requires that I first induce and then analytically parse out the impact of fear from the impact of the information, as well as from other possible intermediary mechanisms, such as other emotions simultaneously induced by treatment (Imai et al., 2011; Albertson & Gadarian, 2016; Myers & Tingley, 2016). The intuition behind the causal inference and the actual analysis in this thesis are therefore more complex than implied by the relatively straightforward randomized experimental design.

Second, a general critique of only estimating ATEs is that these estimates establish *whether* an intervention impacted a given outcome, but not *why* or *how* the relationship works (Imai et al., 2011). For this reason, experiments that merely demonstrate whether one variable impacts another have, as Imai et al. write, been criticized for being a “black box,” “atheoretical

⁴ Methodologists generally recommend a research design in which both the treatment and the mediating variable are randomly assigned (Imai et al., 2010, 2011). In practice, this is challenging to accomplish when the mediating variables are emotions, even when using the encouragement and parallel designs recommended, because of issues with noncompliance.

and even unscientific” approach to causality (2011, p.765). There has consequently been a movement in the social sciences to encourage researchers to more thoroughly probe *why* interventions impact outcomes, rather than merely checking if they do (Deaton, 2010; Keele, Tingley, & Yamamoto, 2015).

In spite of these critiques, the experimental political science literature is rife with papers that empirically demonstrate the impact of an intervention but only speculate about the reason why it had an effect. Studies about the impact of exposure to wartime violence, for example, generally report on the differences in outcomes between victims and non-victims, but stop short of rigorously testing the underlying mechanisms. A meta-review of this literature mentions several mechanisms that might drive the main, shared result (that exposure to wartime violence increases social cooperation) but does not assess these ideas empirically and qualifies the suggestions with the following: “Each of the above theories is intuitive and plausible, but empirical support is, so far, relatively limited ... Ultimately, there is still insufficient evidence to conclude decisively in favor of one theory over another, but generating such evidence provides a clear direction for future research” (Bauer et al., 2016, p.269).

For this reason, and because of the nature of the experimental treatment itself, I go beyond estimating the ATEs and also employ a causal mediation framework to estimate the impact of treatment on the outcomes as transmitted through the key hypothesized mediator – fear – as well as an alternative. This analysis follows the methodology developed by Imai et al. (2010, 2011), which is an empirical technique to disentangle the effect of the treatment itself from the impact of a causal mechanism (or several alternative mechanisms), helping the researcher to better identify what element, or elements, of the treatment lead to a given outcome. This technique allows for the estimation of the extent to which a given effect is causally “transmitted” via different mechanisms (for more, see: Imai et al., 2010, 2011; Tingley et al., 2014). In non-technical language, causal mediation analysis works by dividing the total treatment effect into the indirect effect (that is, the effect of fear) and direct effects (the effect of treatment while holding the mediator constant at the non-treatment value). The indirect effect represents “one possible explanation for why the treatment works,” and the direct effect

“represents all other possible explanations,” such as treatment’s impact on other emotions, or the subject’s unique demographic profile, or her cognitive response to the news report she heard (Keele et al., 2015).

Causal mediation analysis has gained recognition as a preferred⁵ analytical approach for research in which emotions are hypothesized to mediate a relationship⁶ (Myers & Tingley, 2016; Albertson & Gadarian, 2016; Young, 2016), and is especially useful in contexts in which researchers cannot directly manipulate an emotional response, i.e. where researchers cannot (and probably should not) spontaneously induce fear.

Compared to alternative⁷ methods, causal mediation analysis is more explicit about unobserved causal heterogeneity, allows for the decomposition of effects in situations where there are treatment-mediator interactions, and also accommodates nonlinearities as well as non-binary treatment assignment (Imai et al., 2011; Valeri & Vanderweele, 2013; Keele et al., 2015). The disadvantage, as several scholars have noted, is the central and yet untestable assumption of no pre-treatment confounders (sequential ignorability), which states that there is not an unmeasured variable simultaneously affecting the value of the mediator and the outcomes (Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010; Bullock & Ha, 2011; Montgomery et al., 2017). While concerns about the sequential ignorability assumption are valid, they can be mitigated with sensitivity

⁵ Causal mediation is equally not without its critics. The most common critique is that this technique cannot exclude alternative mediators, and that mediation effects are not usually as generalizable as researchers suggest. Bullock, Green, and Ha (2010), for example, question whether analysts can develop comprehensive models that adequately describe and measure all potential causal pathways, and instead recommend sub-group analysis. Separately, Bullock and Ha (2011) list a number of steps researchers can take to improve causal mediation analysis, including describing unmeasured possible mediators that may co-vary, testing for mediation effects across a number of dependent variables, and demonstrating why the manipulation affects one mediator and not alternatives. More recently, Montgomery et al. (2017) argue that causal mediation analysis, along with any other technique that conditions on a post-treatment variable, introduce unacceptable amounts of bias. I have tried to address some of these critiques in the appendix, but a comprehensive review is out of scope.

⁶ As Albertson and Gadarian (2016) explain, instead of a political anxiety pill, researchers should, when possible, use multiple manipulations to approximate the effects of emotion, use pretesting to create better induction techniques, and use causal mediation analysis. Due to time/budget constraints, conducting multiple manipulations was not possible, but the induction technique was pre-tested and its contents were refined via focus groups.

⁷ Common alternatives to causal mediation are Structural Equation Models, instrumental variables, and using interaction terms as an indication for a mediation effect. More recently, political scientists have adapted a technique used in biostatistics to estimate the controlled direct effect. I address these alternatives in the appendix.

and sub-group analysis, and the many advantages of the approach still make it preferable to alternatives.

5.3 The Direct Effect of Exposure to The Threat of Violence

Although the theorized causal model does not predict a direct treatment effect – that is, mere information about a proximate threat is not expected to affect identity – it is nonetheless important to test this empirically, as a direct treatment effect would have important implications for our understanding of how individuals respond to threat. To test the direct effect of treatment on the outcome variables of interest, I generate between-subject⁸ estimates using the following standard linear regression model:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta T_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y is the outcome of interest for subject i , T is the indicator of treatment status (everyday violence, identity-based violence, or control), and β is the estimate of the causal effect of treatment for subject i (Gerber & Green, 2012; Imbens & Rubin, 2015).

The main results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.1. Columns 2 and 3 present the OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of the p -value are generated using randomization inference⁹ which tests the sharp null – that is, it tests the treatment effect for each subject by reassigning treatment and control status in the sample and re-estimating the treatment effect 1,000 times (see: Gerber & Green, 2012, ch. 3). The p -values in column 4 are based on a comparison of the two different treatment effects; columns

⁸ A within-subjects design would have been preferable from an estimation standpoint, but the added precision of the estimates was balanced against the risk of priming via a series of pre-treatment questions about identity.

⁹ Random inference is becoming more common in political science, as recent work has shown that conventionally significant regression coefficients are often highly sensitive to outliers of individual observations or clusters. The advantages of randomization inference include that it is very robust to outliers, it is not only applicable to normally distributed outcomes, and the precision of its estimates are not dependent on sample size (Gerber & Green, 2012; Imbens & Rubin, 2015; McKenzie, 2017).

5 and 6 show p -values for everyday and identity-based violence versus control respectively, while those in column 7 compare the effect of a pooled treatment value to the control group.

Table 5.1.: Average Treatment Effects

DEPENDENT VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Control Mean	Treatment Coef Everyday Violence	Treatment Coef Identity Violence	Rand Inference p-value (T1-T2)	Rand Inference p-value (Everyday)	Rand Inference p-value (Identity)	Rand Inference p-value (Pooled)
Social Identity Outcomes							
Identity Index	4.42	0.05 (0.038)	0.065 (0.040)	0.71	0.2	0.099*	0.10*
In-Group Thermometer	81.45	0.307 (1.422)	1.042 (1.473)	0.602	0.824	0.474	0.599
Out-Group Thermometer	29.7	0.038 (1.800)	1.467 (1.901)	0.45	0.982	0.44	0.67
Pro-Social Behaviour							
Trust In-Group	3.28	0.082 (0.053)	0.017 (0.056)	0.246	0.117	0.737	0.263
Trust Out-Group	1.62	0.046 (0.061)	0.056 (0.063)	0.852	0.143	0.775	0.379
Attitudes							
Support for Violence	0.33	-0.054 -0.076	0.024 -0.086	0.357	0.482	0.757	0.801
Support for Authoritarianism	3.52	0.062 -0.085	-0.052 -0.09	0.219	0.478	0.575	0.903

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

These results are consistent and clear: across nearly¹⁰ all of the outcome variables of interest, treatment did not have a significant direct effect. The non-significance of these results also holds when demographic covariates¹¹ are included in the OLS regressions, when conventional non-parametric statistical tests (specifically two-sided Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney tests) are used, and when conditional average treatment effects¹² are assessed for demographic subgroups that might be more prone to update attitudes and beliefs based on new information (e.g. those who have higher baseline levels of anxiety, identity-group minorities) (appendix).

The lack of significant ATEs is consistent with the hypotheses. As discussed above, treatment is essentially only information, and was designed as a method to induce specific fears about different forms of violence. It would have therefore been surprising if treatment had substantive direct effects on the outcomes of interest. I now turn to the mediator variables of interest – fear and surprise – which, in contrast, *are* hypothesized to impact the outcomes, and address the important question of the circumstances under which treatment did, or did not, induce high levels of fear.

5.4 Mediating Variables: The Impact of Emotion

5.4.1 Fear and Surprise: An Overview of the Mediator Variables

This section introduces the mediator variables and then estimates the impact of treatment on each hypothesized mediator. Does treatment indeed induce fear, and are there significant differences between the extent to which those in the everyday violence and identity violence treatment groups feel fearful about the news? These estimates answer a key question in the

¹⁰ There was a direct treatment effect (pooled & identity-only) on the identity index, significant at the 10% level.

¹¹ Covariate adjustment in an analysis of a fully randomized experiment can reduce disturbance variability when X_i is thought to predict outcomes (Gerber & Green, 2012, p.103-105).

¹² There are a small number of direct treatment effects in the following sub-groups: past victims, minorities, and women. However, effect sizes are generally small and significant only at the 10% level. The exception is the direct impact of treatment on the identity index outcome variable, which has a sizeable impact among minorities. There were, however, no other significant dependent variables among minorities, which is not strong evidence of CATE.

thesis: is the threat of everyday violence, in spite of its ordinariness, as menacing to Lagosians as the threat of identity-based violence?

Treatments designed to induce one emotion often elicit other, related emotions, which can threaten causal inference. To address this, in addition to testing the extent to which treatment induced acute fear about the threat, I also test the impact of the subject's level of post-treatment surprise, a variable that was designed to capture the extent to which the news was unexpected. Surprise and fear are closely related in that both increase the tension felt by an individual and motivate attention toward the unexpected event (Izard, 1977). Indeed, recent psychological research contends that, at least with regard to facial expressions, fear and surprise may actually comprise one emotional category (Jack, Garrod, Schyns, 2014). This may account for the strong correlation between the two variables (Table 5.2). At a minimum, they are closely related.


Table 5.2: Correlation Between Surprise and Fear

	Acute Fear	Surprise
Acute Fear	1.00	
Surprise	0.69**	1.00

*Spearman's correlation; ** $p < 0.05$*

Despite this relationship, I treat surprise and fear as independent hypothesized mediators (Figure 6), as there is insufficient theoretical evidence to suggest that the mediators are causally related (e.g. that surprise induces fear, or vice versa). Moreover, as is discussed below, the two variables seem to capture very different concepts.

Figure 5.2: Mediated Relationship with Two Independent Mediators (from Imai et al., 2011)



A shortcoming¹³ of the research design is that it did not measure other emotions that might have been induced by treatment, such as anger, disgust, or sadness (Ekman, 1992; Myers & Tingley, 2016; Chen & Jack, 2017). As such, although we can assess the impact of fear and surprise on outcomes, we cannot definitively rule out that other emotions had an effect (which would be captured in the “direct effect” component of the causal mediation analysis below). Additionally, it is important to highlight that subjects were asked to self-evaluate their emotional state. Although there is evidence that self-reports can be a valid measure of emotion – particularly if they are completed soon after the event – some have argued that it is preferable to use multiple measures, potentially including physical¹⁴ measures, such as a skin conductance level, and external assessments by the researcher (Mauss & Robinson, 2009; Weidman, Steckler, & Tracy, 2017). Moreover, in a Lagosian context where pronounced norms of masculinity may make it harder for men to admit to feeling afraid (Olawoye et al., 2004; Smith, 2017), it is possible that some subjects underreported their fear; others may have simply felt less fear as time between treatment and the questions about emotions elapsed. This, in turn, may have depressed effect sizes (Myers & Tingley 2016). These and other potential adjustments to future research designs are discussed in chapter 9.

Overall, just over half of the subjects in both treatment groups reported feeling very fearful about the news report they had heard, and approximately 80% of participants in both groups reported at least a moderate level of fear. The control broadcast induced a surprising

¹³ Ideally, all potential emotions that could be elicited by treatment should be pretested and measured, and then included in the causal mediation analysis (Albertson & Gadarian, 2016).

¹⁴ A heartrate measure was actually tried during the pilot (using a smartphone app), but the results were extremely unreliable and a portion of participants refused to allow measurement.

amount of fear given its benign¹⁵ substance (news about traffic), although it was still significantly less fear than that generated by the treatment broadcasts. The question of who did, and did not, feel fear is discussed below.

Table 5.3: Fear by Treatment Assignment

	Not Fearful	Moderately Fearful	Very Fearful
Control: Traffic Broadcast	56.60%	26.69%	16.85%
Treatment 1: Attack by Robbers	16.33%	31.81%	51.86%
Treatment 2: Ethnic Violence	19.68%	28.39%	51.94%

Treatment also induced high levels of surprise, as reported in Table 5.4, below. Upward of 80% of participants said they were moderately or very surprised by the news, whereas the majority of subjects in the control group expressed no surprise. Based on qualitative responses, it seems that rather than reflecting disbelief that such an event could happen or that it could happen within the LGA, the high levels of surprise were driven more by subjects' astonishment that they had not previously heard about what was supposedly a very proximate, violent attack. Lagos is a city where news travels quickly, especially within sub-areas of LGAs, so it would be unusual for participants to first learn about an attack from an enumerator. Believability rates¹⁶ of the broadcasts, as discussed in chapter 4, were nonetheless very high,¹⁷ and for the

¹⁵ It is also possible that the fear subjects in the control group felt was related to a) the risk of losing time, and therefore valuable income, while sitting in traffic (as one participant said about his fear after the control report, "traffic kills time"), or it might have been related to the spate of robberies taking place in traffic, a well-known problem at the time of the study. Unfortunately, I do not have evidence supporting or disconfirming these theories.

¹⁶ Approximately 91% of subjects claimed post- debrief that they believed that the robbery broadcast was real, compared to 84% of subjects who hear the news about an ethnic clash and 96% for traffic. Enumerators also separately evaluated whether they thought the subject believed the news. Their data indicates that ~84% of subjects believed the robbery treatment, 82% believed the identity treatment, and 95% believed the control.

¹⁷ It is interesting that believability rates were so high, if a large portion of subjects found the news very surprising. It could be that enumerators had high levels of credibility given their university affiliation, or that, as one subject explained "anything can happen in Lagos."

sake of gaining a fuller understanding of the causal relationships, it is still worthwhile to estimate the mediating impact of surprise, even if the measured dimension of surprise is perhaps less closely related to fear than originally intended.

Table 5.4: Surprise by Treatment Assignment

	Not Surprised	Moderately Surprised	Very Surprised
Control: Traffic Broadcast	70.45%	19.60%	9.94%
Treatment 1: Attack by Robbers	13.11%	23.36%	63.53%
Treatment 2: Ethnic Violence	15.86%	22.65%	61.49%

5.4.2 *The Impact of Exposure to Treatment on Fear and Surprise*

A key question, and a possible threat to inference, is whether treatment did indeed have a causal impact on emotion, as intended (relationship a' in the causal mediation model depicted in Figure 6, above). The summary statistics above present suggestive evidence that there was a direct effect of treatment on emotion; in this section, I test this relationship more rigorously.

Table 5.5 contains the results of an OLS regression that estimates the impact of treatment on the mediator variables. The OLS regression coefficients are in columns 2 and 3, and p -value estimates, again generated with randomization inference, are in columns 4 (everyday violence versus control) and 5 (identity violence versus control). The p -values in column 6 are based on a comparison of the two different treatments.

Table 5.5: The Effect of Treatment on the Hypothesized Mediators

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Control Mean	Treatment Coef <i>Everyday Violence</i>	Treatment Coef <i>Identity Violence</i>	Rand Inference <i>p-value (Everyday Violence vs. Control)</i>	Rand Inference <i>p-value (Identity Violence vs. Control)</i>	Rand Inference <i>p-value (T1 - T2)</i>
1. Acute fear	0.64	0.751 (0.057)	0.719 (0.060)	0.000***	0.000***	0.633
2. Surprise	0.40	1.109 (0.052)	1.061 (0.056)	0.000***	0.000***	0.441

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

As reported in the table, exposure to the threat of both everyday violence and identity-based violence has a positive, significant impact on the extent to which subjects felt acute fear (row 1). The effect size was substantive in both instances, and actually slightly larger for the everyday violence treatment ($\beta = 0.751$) than the identity-based violence treatment ($\beta = 0.719$), although this difference was not significant. This confirms hypothesis 1, that the threat of proximate everyday violence will induce high levels of fear.

Treatment also significantly increased self-reported levels of surprise, and the effects were substantively quite large. Interestingly, those in the ethnic violence treatment group were not significantly more likely to report surprise at the news, even though this kind of violence is rare in Lagos today. As discussed above, this may have been driven by subjects expressing surprise about the way the news was conveyed and its timing rather than the events themselves, although this is hard to empirically prove. The significance and approximate size of all coefficients remains constant when conventional statistical tests are used instead (see appendix).

For both mediator variables, there was not a significant difference between being exposed to the threat of everyday violence versus the threat of identity-based violence. This is an important finding, as it suggests that even “banal” violence can induce levels of fear similar to more extraordinary violent episodes. Indeed, the major motivating question of this thesis is how everyday violence impacts individuals. That it induces levels of fear similar to an act of

ethnic violence is one indication that its effects are perhaps more profound than many assume. Moreover, this result partially defies the idea that Lagosians have become desensitized to everyday violence, or that it provokes a comparatively dulled emotional reaction (McCart et al., 2007; Gaylord-Harden, Cunningham, & Zelencik, 2011; Mrug et al., 2016). Responses to follow-up survey questions support the idea that robbery was a more top-of-mind threat prior to treatment and therefore the broadcast reinforced a pre-existing fear, while the threat of identity-based violence was less salient. For example, when asked in a separate question late in the survey if they were worried specifically about becoming a victim of robbery and of becoming a victim of ethnic violence, concerns about robbery were far more prevalent among all participants, independent of treatment, and the difference in concern for those who had been exposed to the robbery treatment relative to control was slightly larger than the difference between the identity violence treatment and control (Table 5.6).¹⁸

Table 5.6: Concern About Different Threats

<i>Worried about...</i>	Control	Treatment: Everyday Violence	Treatment: Identity-Based Violence	Difference Between Relevant Treatment and Control
Becoming a victim of robbery	37.10%	50.86%	42.39%	13.76%
Becoming a victim of ethnic violence	24.10%	22.7%	35.71%	11.61%

When probed about the reason behind their acute fear about the news report, those in the everyday violence treatment group generally cited the proximity of the violence and the corresponding risk that they could be personally affected by it; the fact that the violence occurred during daytime hours; and their surprise that something like this could have happened

¹⁸ It is interesting that levels of concern about becoming a victim (qualitatively different than fear) were “only” between 35-50%. Among other things, this may indicate that the effect of the news was quite fleeting (this question came late in the survey), of participants may be fearful of the violence but ultimately not believe they will actually become a victim.

nearby without them having heard about it. Typical responses to the question probing the reason behind their fear included:

“It was so close to us here and we did not hear [about it], plus the causalities involved.”

– *Young man living in Surulere*

“[The robbers] could also come in the night, and this means that we in this area are not safe now”

– *Middle-aged mother living in Agege.*

“The robbers don’t know who is rich and who is poor.”

– *Woman working as a trader in Apapa*

“I was surprised because my office is located along that road and I did not hear about it”

– *Middle-aged man in Lekki*

“If I was around there I could also be hit by bullet.”

– *Young unemployed man in Kosofe.*

Those who heard the identity violence treatment and had a fearful response generally cited their concern for the people involved in the alleged clash and the unexpectedness of the events, rather than anxiety about their own safety. Some expressed concern that the purported clash could unsettle intergroup relations in their area. Typical responses to the question of why they felt fearful about the news included:

“Some innocent souls were killed”

– *Mid-level professional woman in Kosofe*

“I was extremely surprised because such kind of incident has never happened in this area”

– *Female hawker in Lekki*

“People are being killed unnecessarily”

– *Older man in Apapa*

“This is going to disrupt the peace in this place”

– *Young female fashion designer in Amuwo-Odofin*

“The violence is uncalled for”

– *Young, male factory worker in Kosofe*

In summary, both treatments induced fear about the proximate threat of violence, and they also induced surprise. The lack of a significant difference in the amount of fear and surprise induced

is noteworthy, as it indicates that, perhaps for different reasons (i.e. perceived likelihood of victimization versus severity of the event) the two forms of violence were considered equally threatening by the majority of treated subjects.

5.4.3 *Who Felt Fear? Who Felt Surprise?*

Across all three experimental groups, there are “outliers” whose fear response, or lack thereof, seems incongruent with the news they received, even when their belief in the veracity¹⁹ of the broadcast is taken into account. One could think of these subjects as “non-compliers” with treatment, but it is important to recognize that who did, and did not, feel fear is unlikely to be random, and excluding the “non-compliant” subjects from the analysis would produce biased estimates (Gerber & Green, 2012; Montgomery et al., 2017). Although subjects were randomly assigned to treatment and control, emotion could not be randomly induced. Given the central importance of fear to the theory and empirics of this thesis, it is worth interrogating whether there are common characteristics among Lagosians who reported feeling higher levels of fear and/or surprise, and if there are any commonalities to the “non-compliers” in the sample. If certain demographic traits predict significantly higher levels of post-treatment fear and/or surprise (that is, if there is significant variation in the conditional average treatment effects), we might also expect treatment effect heterogeneity when we run the full causal mediation model and would allow for covariate-moderated mediation accordingly.

To explore possible heterogeneity in the effects of treatment on mediating emotions, I use theory derived from research about the fear of crime. This literature has demonstrated that in general, individuals who are more regularly exposed to news about violent crime, women, older people, those who are lower income, the less educated, and previous victims, are more likely to be fearful of future victimization (Pantazis, 2000; Smolej & Kivivuori, 2006; May, Rader, & Goodrum, 2010; Hummelsheim et al., 2011). Consequently, I would expect these

¹⁹ Sub-group analyses of “believers”-only, conducted as a robustness check, were not significantly different from the overall results of the full sample.

demographic covariates to predict higher levels of fear, and of surprise,²⁰ given the close relationship between the two emotions, even when controlling for treatment assignment. I also assess the impact of being a religious or ethnic minority, as we might expect identity-group minorities to feel more threatened by violence (especially when it is identity-based) than the Christian, Yoruba majority in Lagos.

I use an ordinary least squares regression with sub-district²¹ fixed effects to estimate the impact of each of these demographic characteristics on reported acute fear of the news in the broadcast (column 1) and surprise (column 2). The results of the OLS regressions are reported in Table 5.7.

²⁰ Furthermore, there is not a robust literature about predictors of surprise.

²¹ Rather than including LGA effects, I instead use the smaller sub-district area. Randomization and interviews took place within sub-districts and, compared to LGAs, sub-districts are more internally homogeneous yet distinct from each other.

Table 5.7: Predictors of Post-Treatment Emotions

VARIABLES	(1) Acute Fear	(2) Surprise
Treatment: Everyday violence	0.757*** (0.090)	1.106*** (0.073)
Treatment: Identity violence	0.740*** (0.095)	1.080*** (0.098)
Wealth	0.024 (0.029)	0.056** (0.022)
Exposure to modern news	-0.000 (0.042)	-0.004 (0.033)
Female	0.003 (0.039)	0.030 (0.039)
Age	0.032 (0.026)	0.041** (0.018)
Education	-0.010 (0.025)	-0.040 (0.034)
Perpetrator of violence (binary)	-0.110 (0.089)	-0.122 (0.079)
Past victimization (binary)	-0.123 (0.075)	-0.151** (0.054)
Pre-treatment anxiety	-0.017 (0.036)	0.048* (0.028)
Muslim	-0.047 (0.057)	-0.090** (0.043)
“Other” religion	-0.510 (0.311)	-0.404** (0.193)
Hausa	0.004 (0.201)	0.240 (0.184)
Igbo	0.078 (0.076)	-0.001 (0.068)
“Other” ethnicity	-0.110 (0.071)	-0.068 (0.064)
Observations	1,011	1,008
R-squared	0.222	0.402
Sub-district Fixed Effects	X	X

Robust standard error in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Fear of violence post-treatment is, surprisingly, not significantly correlated with the demographic variables that are predicted by the literature. Women, poorer people, the less educated, older people, and those who regularly consume modern news, and religious and ethnic minorities are not more likely to express fear of the acute threat of violence after

exposure to treatment. It is, of course, possible that unmeasured factors influenced the extent to which individuals felt fear. For example, there may have been variation in the salience of the “proximate” street/landmark mentioned in the broadcast, e.g. for one subject they may have coincidentally named the street she spends most of her time on, while for another subject, the name of the street or landmark may have been only vaguely familiar.

Surprise is also not strongly predicted by demographic variables. There is a very slight age, anxiety, and wealth effect, in which older, richer, and more anxious Lagosians were minimally more likely to express surprise, and a small, negative effect of victimization, whereby previous victims were, on average, less surprised. There is also a negative effect of being in a minority religious group, and a very small negative effect of being Muslim, although the small n in both instances should engender some cautiousness in interpreting this result (Austin et al., 2015). Effect sizes, compared to those of treatment, were generally quite small, indicating that there is collectively weak evidence that surprise is a function of demographic characteristics.

In summary, neither of the hypothesized mediator variables are strongly correlated with specific traits, apart from assignment to a treatment group. Although fear and surprise could not be spontaneously induced in a randomized fashion (as would be ideal for a study in which emotion is the hypothesized mediators), reports of a fearful and/or surprised response to treatment seem to be roughly balanced across different types of subjects. One implication of this finding is that the “non-compliers,” who felt unusually little fear or surprise despite treatment, did not have a strong and shared demographic profile, and any causal effects of fear are unlikely to be driven by a small sub-group of Lagosians. There is therefore weak evidence for heterogeneous treatment effects, and the causal mediation model accordingly does not include moderated mediation.

A second implication of this finding is that the type of fear induced – that is, acute fear in response to a proximate threat – may be substantively different than the chronic fear that features in most literature about the fear of crime; otherwise, we should have seen similar sub-


group heterogeneity. This will be examined in more detail in chapter 9, as I discuss the generalizability of these findings.

5.5 Causal Mediation Analysis

5.5.1 The Direct Impact of Mediators on Outcome Variables

I have estimated the direct impact of treatment on the outcomes (c' in the causal mediation model once again depicted in Figure 5.3) as well as the impact of treatment on the mediator variables (a'). As the penultimate step, I now estimate the direct effect of the hypothesized mediators on the key dependent variables (b'), once again using OLS regression with sub-district fixed effects. The key independent variables in these models are the two mediators, acute fear and surprise. Given the lack of significant difference in the levels of emotion induced by treatment, I use a pooled mediator variable that includes the subjects from both treatment groups, although tests of the individual treatments compared to control yield similar results. The models include covariates that might confound the relationship between the mediators and the outcomes, which is necessary because the mediators were observed post-treatment and not randomly assigned (Imai et al., 2010, 2011).

Figure 5.3: Mediation Model



The results are presented thematically. Columns 1-5 contain the impact of mediators on social identity outcomes; the measures of support for violence and democracy are in columns 6 and 7 respectively. The primary finding of this analysis is that acute fear was identity-affirming, increasing the strength of and positive feelings about in-group identity, and eroding positive feelings about and trust of the primary out-group. Fear did not have a significant direct impact on in-group trust. The effect sizes were moderate, especially with regard to feelings toward the outgroup. Fear, on average, decreased out-group evaluations by approximately 16% and decreased out-group trust by approximately 7%, compared to the control means with the mediator value set to zero. The in-group effects were smaller: fear increased in-group affiliation by approximately 2.5% and in-group warmth by approximately 3% compared to the same baseline.

Surprise had no significant effect on in-group identity and, counterintuitively, it actually increased out-group evaluations and trust. It is difficult to explain this finding with theory, unless the surprise and fear variables are capturing substantively different emotional dimensions, and/or surprise is, as discussed, reflecting subjects' disbelief about not having previously heard the news. One possible explanation is that those who were surprised by the news are generally more inclined to view the world as a more peaceful and less violent place, and therefore may hold similarly optimistic views about their outgroup. Alternatively, there could be an unmeasured confounding variable.

Table 5.8: Direct Impact of Mediator Variables on Outcomes

VARIABLES	Social Identity				Attitudes		
	(1) Identity Index	(2) In Group Thermometer	(3) Out Group Thermometer	(4) Trust In- Group	(5) Trust Out-Group	(6) Support for Violence	(7) Support for Authoritar- ianism
Mediators							
Acute fear	0.102*** (0.029)	2.417** (1.056)	-4.468*** (1.309)	-0.013 (0.045)	-0.107*** (0.037)	0.004 (0.062)	0.015 (0.063)
Surprise	-0.039 (0.029)	1.041 (1.085)	2.694** (1.275)	0.032 (0.052)	0.133*** (0.026)	0.114* (0.055)	-0.049 (0.041)
Controls							
Age	0.017 (0.014)	-0.028 (0.448)	2.112** (0.996)	0.005 (0.022)	0.037 (0.022)	-0.052** (0.024)	-0.008 (0.030)
Education	-0.087 (0.053)	3.365 (3.282)	-7.213** (2.714)	0.030 (0.076)	-0.204 (0.155)	-0.118 (0.161)	-0.297** (0.132)
Full life in Lagos	0.193*** (0.041)	0.620 (2.122)	5.389* (2.606)	-0.082 (0.060)	0.118** (0.043)	-0.057 (0.134)	0.187* (0.097)
Female	0.034* (0.019)	2.668** (1.027)	2.363** (0.843)	0.071 (0.044)	0.055 (0.044)	-0.198*** (0.046)	0.208*** (0.054)
Deprivation score	-0.036*** (0.004)	-1.293*** (0.258)	1.472*** (0.397)	-0.004 (0.009)	0.025** (0.011)	-0.052*** (0.012)	-0.038*** (0.012)
Previous victim	-0.097** (0.039)	-1.498 (1.975)	7.684*** (2.261)	-0.103* (0.057)	0.165** (0.077)	0.161 (0.095)	0.035 (0.121)
Anxiety index	0.095*** (0.017)	-1.370 (0.949)	0.549 (1.608)	0.152*** (0.048)	-0.083 (0.052)	0.154*** (0.068)	0.097* (0.048)
Sub-District Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Observations	987	995	992	994	986	975	1,005
R-squared	0.156	0.103	0.108	0.047	0.047	0.069	0.037

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Finally, acute fear had no significant impact on support for violence or authoritarianism, while surprise slightly increased support for violence, but the result was significant only at the 10% level. This defies the hypotheses, which anticipated that higher levels of fear would engender greater support for the use of violence and for more authoritarian forms of governance. Interestingly, the variable that had a significant and substantive impact on both attitudes about violence and authoritarianism was gender – women were, on average, more supportive of authoritarianism and less supportive of the use of violence. This is, however, outside of the scope of this thesis.

Having estimated the effects of treatment on the mediator variables (Table 5.5) and the impact of each mediator on the outcome variables (Table 5.8), I now combine these elements and develop a full causal model that assesses the mediated impact of the threat of different forms of violence on social identity and attitudes about violence and democracy.

5.5.2 *Causal Mediation Framework*

The analysis uses the causal mediation methodology developed by Imai et al. (2010, 2011), which is a framework based on the concept of potential outcomes (Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986). In plain language, causal mediation analysis answers the question “What change would occur to the outcome if one changes the mediator from the value that would be realized under the control condition, $M_i(0)$, to the value that would be observed under the treatment condition, $M_i(1)$, while holding the treatment status at t ?” (Imai et al., 2010). It produces simultaneous estimates of the direct effect of treatment and the mediated effect of treatment, analysing the extent to which news about different forms of proximate violence, and the fear – or alternatively, surprise – induced by news about this violence, impacts outcomes.

Formally, using the notation of Imai et al (2010), let $M_i(t)$ denote the potential value of the primary mediator of interest (in this case, fear measured on a continuous scale) for unit i in treatment condition $T_i = t$. The potential outcome is therefore $Y_i(t, m)$ when the treatment and mediator are equal to t and m . As we can only ever observe one potential outcome in the

experiment, Y_i will equal $Y_i(T_i, M_i(T_i))$, or in other words, the outcome variable of interest depends on the treatment status and the mediator value observed for that treatment status (Imai et al., 2010).

Consequently, the causal mediation effect (CME; also called the indirect effect or the mediation effect), which is the change in the outcome corresponding to the change in the mediator induced by treatment, for each unit i , is

$$\delta_i(t) = Y_i(t, M_i(1)) - Y_i(t, M_i(0)),$$

This CME is equal to the change in outcome “corresponding to a change in the mediator from the value that would be realized under the control condition, i.e., $M_i(0)$ to the value that would be observed under the treatment condition, i.e., $M_i(1)$, holding the treatment status at t ”²² (Imai et al., 2010). In this thesis, the CME $\delta_i(t)$ is the difference between the subjects’ outcomes when s/he heard new about a violent threat and the counterfactual, in which s/he heard the same news broadcast about a violent threat but had a fear or surprise level as if s/he had heard the control news story. This difference, as Imai et al. (2010) write, “...represents the effect of the change in the mediator that would be induced by the treatment, while the direct impact of the treatment is suppressed holding its value constant.” Researchers are generally interested in the population average causal mediation effect (ACME), defined as:

$$\bar{\delta}_i(t) = Y_i(t, M_i(1)) - Y_i(t, M_i(0))$$

The direct effect, which captures all other causal mechanisms, is the effect of treatment that is not transferred through the mediator of interest. Formally, the average direct effect (ADE) of treatment is

²² The CME $\delta_i(t)$ is also referred to as the natural indirect effect (Pearl, 2001), or the total indirect effect when $t=1$ (Robins, 2003).

$$\bar{\zeta}_i(t) = Y_i(1, M_i(t)) - Y_i(0, M_i(t))$$

Consequently, it is possible that the direct treatment effect could be zero, but treatment could nonetheless have an effect via the mechanism of interest (Keele et al., 2015). In this thesis, the direct effect is the difference in the social identity outcomes and preferences under treatment and control, when the level of fear is kept constant at its treatment level. Assuming that the ACME and ADE do not vary according to treatment status, then the average treatment effect (ATE) $\bar{\tau}$ of the broadcasts themselves can be decomposed into the sum of the ACME and ADE.

$$\bar{\tau}_i = Y_i(1, M_i(1)) - Y_i(0, M_i(0)) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{t=0}^1 \{\delta_i(t)\}$$

Importantly, these estimates are predicated on the assumption of sequential ignorability – that is, it is assumed that there is not an unmeasured variable that simultaneously affects the value of the mediator and the outcomes, thereby threatening identification. In theory, to satisfy this assumption, we must “...measure the complete set of covariates that affect both [the mediator] and [the dependent variables], and they all must not be affected by the treatment” (Imai et al., 2011, p.770). In practice, this is a strong and ultimately non-refutable assumption (we can measure and test limitless potential confounders), so researchers typically conduct sensitivity analysis to quantify the extent to which the underlying assumptions must be violated for the conclusions of this analysis to be reversed. This is discussed in more detail below.

5.5.3 Causal Mediation Analysis Results

I now turn to whether the acute threat of violence influences social identity and related beliefs through acute fear and surprise. The causal mediation analysis assesses the extent to which treatment-induced emotion affects our outcomes of interest, while allowing for treatment itself to affect the outcomes in other ways (and consequently, for there to potentially not be a significant average treatment effect despite there being an average causal mediated effect). Both the relationship between the treatment and mediator and the relationship between the outcome,

treatment, and the mediator, are modelled with OLS regression. The variation of the mediators tested is a pooled variable, including subjects from both treatment groups: given the lack of a significant difference between the two treatments on the mediator variables, a pooled variable reduces complexity without meaningfully affecting precision. I do test the mediators from each treatment group individually, and the effects are similar in magnitude and significance to the pooled version presented here. A treatment-mediator interaction term is included, although the results do not change significantly when this term is excluded. Statistical uncertainty is computed with nonparametric bootstrapping with 1000 resamples, as commonly recommended (King et al., 2000). The analysis was conducted in R, using the Mediation software package developed by Tingley et al. (2014). A table with all of the results of the causal mediation analysis, including confidence intervals, is in the appendix.

In order to satisfy the conditionally unconfounded assumption (to the best of my ability), I control for pre-treatment variables that could be related to fear and the outcomes of interest, specifically age, education, gender, indigeneity within Lagos, previous victimization, and subdistrict fixed effect, and test the robustness of the findings to an omitted variable in the sensitivity analysis, below. Results are presented as point estimates with confidence intervals, where the solid line reports the average result for the treated group, and the dotted line reports the control group result.

In- and Out-Group Identification

I begin with acute fear as the mediator variable. As shown in the point estimates in Figures 5.4-5.6, the confidence intervals for the total effect for all three outcomes – the identity index, in-group, and out-group thermometers – overlap with zero, meaning there was no overall effect (this is consistent with the lack of significant average treatment effects as estimated in Table 5.1). However, the ACME of treatment-induced fear is significant in all three instances, and it consistently has an identity affirming effect. Again, the ACME is the average change in the social identity outcome that is due to the change in the level of fear induced by the difference in being in treatment or control (Imai et al., 2011).

Plot 5.4, on the left, demonstrates that acute, threat-induced fear (pooled) has a significant, positive effect on the strength of in-group attachment, supporting hypothesis 2A, that threat-induced fear is identity-affirming. The effect size is substantively small at about 0.075, representing approximately a 2% increase in expressed allegiance to and identification with one's in-group. Nonetheless, the possible implications of this result are important: for one, it indicates that threat-induced fear, including fear induced by extremely common forms of everyday violence, can actually *change* the way individuals feel about their in-group. Given the many major, structural factors influencing identity – our family, our friend group, political dynamics, and so forth – it is striking that the fear experienced after hearing about a proximate robbery nonetheless has a significant, if small, effect.


There are two other elements of this graph that warrant discussion. First, it is interesting to note that the point estimate for the control group is also positive, although the confidence interval just overlaps with zero. This indicates that fear induced by factors other than violence (such as the traffic problems discussed in the control treatment) has an identity-affirming effect as well, albeit a more moderate one. Although this may be surprising, upon reflection it is consistent with the theory outlined in chapter 2: that is, that sources of fear and anxiety, independent of whether they stem from a threat of largescale conflict, “mundane” everyday violence, economic threat, or even, in this instance, increased traffic.²³ The other noteworthy aspect of these results is that the average direct effect (ADE) of induced-fear is anywhere from neutral (treatment-induced fear) to somewhat negative (control-induced fear), although in both instances, the confidence intervals overlap significantly with zero. This suggests that other factors resulting from exposure to news about proximate violence, and especially to news about traffic, may be working in the other direction, offsetting the identity-affirming impact of fear and leading to a total effect that was positive, but whose confidence interval overlapped with zero. Possible reasons for the negative direction of this effect are discussed below.

²³ Which, as previously discussed, may be a partial proxy for physical threat, as being caught in a traffic jam was a widely-discussed risk factor of being robbed, and/or economic threat, because traffic was viewed as a major obstacle to job performance (interviews with Micah, Sarah, Yemi, 2016).

Plot 5.5 (right) shows that acute fear also increases in-group evaluations when they are measured on a 1-100 thermometer scale. Here, the estimated effect of treatment-induced fear is sizable, at approximately 5 points, or a 6% increase over the average in-group evaluation. Notably, the impact of control-induced fear on in-group thermometer evaluations is essentially zero, suggesting, perhaps, that the starkness and clarity of this measure (as opposed to the composite identity index) better distinguishes between the effects of different forms of fear. Once again, however, total effects are offset by the negative (control group) to neutral (treatment) ADE, representing other unmeasured mechanisms.

Finally, plot 5.6 (below) demonstrates that treatment-induced fear decreases out-group evaluations, again as measured on a 1-100 thermometer scale, roughly to the same extent (-5) as it increases in-group evaluations, supporting hypothesis 2B, that threat-induced fear increases out-group exclusion. The dynamics of the ADE's of treatment and especially control offsetting the ACME are analogous for this outcome as well, with the similar overall result that the estimated total effect hovers around zero. Indeed, across all three results, the mediating effect of treatment-induced fear was identity affirming but ultimately fully offset by other treatment-induced mechanisms (captured in the ADE). This decomposition of the effects highlights the importance of conducting a causal mediation analysis, as it reveals both the (approximately) opposite direction of the ACME and ADEs, and the fact that there *is* an identity-affirming fear effect, which would have been masked had one only focused on total treatment effects.

Figures 5.4-5.6: ACME, ADE, and Total Effects estimates of the pooled fear variable on attitude outcomes. Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals. Dotted line is control group, solid line is pooled treatment group



One important question stemming from these results is why the ADE seems to work in the opposite direction of the ACME, and what implications this could have for our understanding of how threat, fear, and identity relate to each other. Again, the ADE is the causal impact of information about a threat or traffic on these identity-related outcomes, while holding fear at the higher level realised under treatment. Because only the theorized mediator variables (i.e. fear and surprise) were measured after treatment, this discussion is effectively a thought exercise; nonetheless, it is useful to briefly speculate, as these ideas could inform follow-on research.

One possibility is that the information about threat contributes to a sense self-preservation. If you believe fellow in-group members are, in fact, unreliable and unlikely to come to your aid, the fear may draw you toward them, but this more measured, rational

evaluation may push you away. Put differently, a reminder of proximate danger may elicit feelings of self-dependence, thereby depressing in-group allegiances (and potentially increasing relative openness to outsiders). Indeed, the idea that one is ultimately responsible for her own security was expressed by many of the actual victims of violence interviewed for this thesis (discussed in chapters 6 and 8).

A second possibility is that those who heard news about a threat simply assumed that the perpetrators were in-group and felt frustrated or somehow disappointed by information about norm violations by fellow group members. Although actual victims of violence rarely reported that the perpetrator was an in-group member, the immediate response to news about a threat in the community may be to think (negatively) about the most “proximate” people.

Finally, it is possible, indeed probable, that this information about a threat elicited other emotions beyond fear and surprise such as anger, which may have differentially impacted the way in- and out-groups are viewed. Although the theoretical links between anger and social identity are less clear, it seems plausible that news about a proximate threat may have induced a complicated mixture of emotions, and that these emotions have had divergent effects. Future research designs would do well to pre-emptively identify a broader range of possible causal mechanisms connecting threat and identity (including additional emotions) and ensuring they are measured or even experimentally manipulated, as per Imai et al. (2013). For now, however, the empirically knowable and demonstrated takeaway from the above causal mediation analysis is that fear induced by a proximate threat of violence is consistently and significantly identity-affirming, albeit to a limited substantive extent.

Intergroup Trust


I now turn to the causal mediation analysis with self-reported levels of trust as the outcome. Plots 5.7 and 5.8 contains the point estimates for treatment-induced fear on in-and out-group trust levels. The ACME on in-group trust is substantively quite small, at less than 0.05 (the median value for in-group trust was 3.0), and the confidence interval contains zero, suggesting that there is not a causal mediation effect of treatment-induced fear on in-group trust levels.

There was also not a significant ACME of control-induced fear, and the total effect was close to zero and non-significant. From this we can conclude that fear did not have a causal mediation effect on espoused levels of in-group trust.

Conversely, the ACME of fear on out-group trust (Plot 5.8) is significant and negative, albeit the effect size is substantively quite small. Both direct and total effects are insignificant, again indicating that the causal mediation impact of fear on out-group trust is offset by other mechanisms. Lastly, it is interesting to note that the impact of fear induced by the control story was positive, but the confidence interval overlaps with zero. Nonetheless, the fact that the source of the fear seems to have had a directionally different effect on in- and out-group trust is noteworthy, and may constitute further evidence that fear is not homogeneous, and that the source of fear matters considerably.

Collectively, the mediation analysis of fear's causal impact on in- and out-group trust provides some evidence that threat-induced-fear slightly depresses levels of out-group trust, but again, this was one factor of many, and the total effect was therefore not significant. Fear did not significantly mediate the relationship between treatment and in-group trust, which does not support hypothesis 3.

Figures 5.7-5.8: ACME, ADE, and Total Effects estimates of the pooled fear variable on identity-related outcomes. Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals. Dotted line is control group, solid line is pooled treatment group.




Attitudes About Democracy and Violence

Finally, Figures 5.9 and 5.10 show the effects of treatment-induced fear on attitudes about democracy versus authoritarianism, and attitudes about the use of violence. As a reminder, the democracy index measures individual preferences for a more autocratic leader and system of government versus more democratic governance, while the violence measure captures individual willingness to use violence under a variety of difficult circumstances (e.g. when one's family is threatened with violence). In chapter 2, it was theorized that individuals who are acutely fearful of a threat of violence (independent of the source of threat) would be more likely to support the use of violence as well as more autocratic systems of government. As shown in the plot on the left, the ACME of violent threat-induced fear is very slightly positive, but the confidence interval contains zero. Interestingly, the ACME of fear induced by news about traffic is slightly negative, albeit not significant. Although we could speculate about reasons behind this (e.g. a sense that government projects, including infrastructure, would function more smoothly if decision-making processes were more democratic), causal claims are not possible in the absence of further data. This discrepancy does, however, again suggest that there may be tangible differences in fear induced by different sources, and in its ensuing effects. The ADE is similarly not significant and the wide confidence interval suggests it is imprecisely estimated. Here, as earlier, the total effect approaches zero and is also not significant.

Figure 5.10 reports the point estimates when support for violence is the outcome of interest. The ACME of threat-induced fear is minimally positive but not significant, indicating that fear induced by treatment does not engender significantly stronger levels of support for violence. When the source of fear is a traffic spike, this effect, although substantively small, is significant. For both the treatment and control groups, the ADE is negative and offsets any effect, suggesting there are a number of other causal mechanisms affecting the acceptability of the use of violence. Overall, we can conclude that violent-threat-induced fear does not mediate the relationship between the proximate violence and support for violence, and that there is evidence that source of fear substantively matters. This does not confirm hypotheses 4A and

4B, which had anticipated that threat-induced fear would increase support for violence and political intolerance.

Figures 5.9-5.10: ACME, ADE, and Total Effects estimates of the pooled fear variable on attitude outcomes. Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals. Dotted line is control group, solid line is pooled treatment group.



Considered together, the preceding causal mediation analysis supports several conclusions. First, it provides evidence for the identity-affirming role of threat-induced fear. Across multiple measures, violent threat-induced-fear positively mediates the impact of a proximate threat on identity-related outcomes. Second, in several instances, fear induced by a non-violent threat mediates the relationship between treatment and outcomes differently, i.e. works in the opposite direction. Although it is difficult to ascertain the drivers of this effect with certainty, at a minimum it underscores the substantive differences between different sources of fear. Third, the preceding results indicate that violent-threat-induced-fear does not mediate the relationship between treatment and support for democracy and violence, suggesting that attitudes about systems and governance and the acceptability of using violence could be at least minimally robust to a “burst” of fear. And finally, across multiple outcome variables, causal mediation effects were ultimately “offset” by other mechanisms, meaning that the total effects were consistently not significant. This does not mean that the mediation effect of fear does not matter: fear did substantively impact subjects, and these results underline the importance of conducting causal mediation analysis in order to have visibility into the decomposed effects. It does,

however, also show that the impact of fear was one of multiple mechanisms impacting overall outcomes.

Practically, these findings underscore that fear induced by violence, independent of whether the source of threat was everyday or identity-based violence, increases parochialism, but the level of induced fear would likely have to be very high – indeed, higher than it was on average in the two treatment groups – to have an identity effect that is robust to all of the other factors that might constrain, or even actively undermine, in-group favouritism. Inducing higher levels of fear is difficult to accomplish in the context of an experiment, and from an ethical perspective perhaps not desirable, but we could imagine real-world scenarios in which exposure to *actual* proximate violence, rather than a newscast reporting about an event after-the-fact, could induce greater levels of fear that would potentially have stronger and more durable identity effects.

One caveat to this proposition is that in several instances, the average direct effect (i.e. the estimate of the other causal mechanisms beyond fear) worked in the opposite direction, thereby offsetting any mediation effect. Earlier in this section, I theorized about possible reasons for this, including the possibility that treatment induced an array of emotions, not all of which were measured, and that these emotions impact outcomes such as social identity quite differently. Without more information about the other mechanisms, however, it is difficult to speculate about whether an intensification of fear would also intensify the other mechanisms, resulting in similar total effects to those reported above, or whether more profound fear would *not* be offset. One ethical and feasible way to extend this research would be to look for real-world instances of violence-induced “fear spikes” and measure the impact of this fear, as well as an array of other possible mechanisms such as other emotions, on these impacts. Although this would be subject to the normal limitations of non-experimental work, it could provide helpful complementary evidence. For now, the results presented above support the proposition that violence-induced fear is broadly identity affirming, even if the source of the fear is “banal” everyday violence.




5.6 Alternative Mechanisms and Sensitivity Analysis

Although I do not have measures for all other possible causal mechanisms, I do have a measure of the surprise induced by news about a proximate threat. In this final portion of this analysis, I can therefore test the causal mediation effect of surprise on social identity and attitudes about democracy and violence. Recall that surprise is hypothesized to be an independent mediator rather than a part of a broader causal chain, which implies that its effects can be tested separately and do not need to be conditioned on fear.²⁴ The estimation parameters of the effects of surprise are the same as those for acute fear, and I once again use the pooled surprise variable from both treatment groups, although the results are similar when surprise from each treatment group is individually tested.



Figures 5.11-5.13 contains the estimates of treatment-induced surprise on social identity. Across all dependent variables, there is not a significant effect of surprise on social identity. Indeed, the estimated effect is consistently close to zero, with a high degree of confidence, and are similar for surprise induced by treatment and by control. The averaged direct effects also approach zero, however they are imprecisely estimated, and the total effects are insignificant. The implication of these results is, quite definitively, that threat-induced surprise does not impact social identity, nor does it affect attitudes about authoritarianism or the use of violence. This could potentially be due to the dimension of surprise captured by the variable, or to there being a greater substantive divide between fear and surprise than anticipated. In either case, this supports the conclusion that violence-induced fear, and not surprise, has an effect on identity.

²⁴ It is worth mentioning that some psychologists have argued that emotional experiences are enhanced by surprise (Mellers et al., 1997), which could be an argument in favour of a model in which surprise precedes fear. However, there is insufficient evidence about the relationship between fear and surprise to justify this model specification.


Figures 5.11-5.13: ACME, ADE, and Total Effects estimates of the pooled surprise variable on identity-related outcomes. Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals. Dotted line is control group, solid line is pooled treatment group.



Figures 5.14-5.15: ACME, ADE, and Total Effects estimates of the pooled surprise variable on trust-related outcomes. Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals. Dotted line is control group, solid line is pooled treatment group.



Figures 5.16-5.17: ACME, ADE, and Total Effects estimates of the pooled surprise variable on attitudes about politics and violence. Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals. Dotted line is control group, solid line is pooled treatment group.




As the final step, I use sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of the finding that threat-induced fear has a significant, indirect effect on identity. This is recommended by Imai et al. (2010) because of the strong and ultimately non-refutable nature of the sequential ignorability assumption. This analysis tests how robust the ACME estimates are to an unobserved mediator (Imai et al., 2010). I do this by plotting the ACME against the sensitivity parameter ρ , which is equivalent to the correlation in error terms between the mediator and outcome models.


Figures 5.18-5.21 depict this test for the significant identity-related results. The dashed line is the estimated mediation effect assuming true sequential ignorability, and the solid line, surrounded by 95% confidence bands in grey, shows the mediation effect under different levels of ρ . The intersection of this line with zero on the y-axis can be thought of as the point at which unmeasured confounders would “counteract” the mediation effect. As the graphs show, on average the results are somewhat robust to an omitted confounding variable. The analysis indicates that the conclusions drawn about the direction of each ACME would be upheld unless ρ exceeded approximately 10-20% (outcome-dependent). Although there is no scientific consensus about what an acceptable value of ρ is, 10-20% suggests some robustness, but does not exclude the possibility of omitted pre-treatment confounders.

Figures 5.18- 5.21: Sensitivity Analysis


5.18. Identity Index




5.19. In-Group Thermometer



5.20. Out-Group Thermometer



5.21. Out-Group Trust



5.7 Conclusion

This chapter asked how the potentiality of violence, and particularly everyday violence, affected individual identity and attitudes about others. It focused specifically on the intermediary impact of threat-induced *fear*, using causal mediation analysis to isolate the causal effect of threat-induced fear from other possible mechanisms.

These empirical results lead to several conclusions. First, both the threat of everyday violence and the threat of identity-based violence induced high levels of fear in subjects. This defies the idea that proximate identity-based violence, but not everyday violence, would be considered particularly frightening to Lagosians. Indeed, despite the stark difference in their

prevalence, the threat of the two forms of violence seems to have similar emotional effects on Lagosians. Moreover, fear responses to the treatments, including outlying, “non-compliant” responses, were not well predicted by demographics, suggesting that the proximate threat of violence impacts Lagosians from a diverse range of backgrounds. These results highlight the relative importance of everyday violence.

Second, fear (but not surprise) induced by both forms of violent threat had an identity-affirming impact on Lagosians, increasing in-group affinity and identification and decreasing warmth and trust toward the primary out-group. This intervention-induced fear, however, was one factor among many, and the total effect of hearing about a proximate threat was not significant. Additionally, as Myers and Tingley (2016) explain, the way fear and other emotions were measured – that is, self-evaluated after treatment – may have depressed effect sizes.²⁵ It is possible that a more sustained level of threat would result in stronger and more robust effects, but this is difficult (and probably not desirable) to test experimentally. One could, however, imagine conducting follow-up research in an area experiencing particularly acute everyday violence – e.g. an area experiencing a gang violence epidemic – to test whether prolonged exposure to the violent threat of everyday violence compounds these effects, if there is a tipping point at which individuals do become desensitized, and if an increase in fear also increases other “counterbalancing” effects, such as other emotions induced by threat.

Third, both fear and surprise, somewhat surprisingly, did not significantly influence attitudes about the use of violence and democracy. From a normative perspective this is good news, as it suggests that attitudes and beliefs about when it is okay to respond violently, and when it is okay for the state to behave more oppressively, demonstrate at least some robustness. Future research could probe whether fear, in particular, influences actual political *behaviour*. To date there is a growing body of evidence that it does (see: Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014; Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Young, 2016).

²⁵ They recommend alternative, non-self-reported measures such as allowing coders to assess the subject’s emotional state).

Finally, in spite of the extensive measures taken to create an effective and credible treatment, to accurately induce and measure emotion, and to capture responses about sensitive topics thereafter, it is important to be aware of the limitations of the experimental design. We cannot, for example, comment on the durability of any effect, nor do we know how effects might have varied had treatment induced more intense, acute fear, or prolonged fear. Nonetheless, even with the limitations of this experimental design, the preceding offers evidence of the extent to which everyday violence is threatening, and the ways in which threat-induced fear can further entrench identity.

Chapter 6

Actual Victimization

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I explore the second dimension of exposure to violence: actual victimization. If chapter 5 focused on the world of hypotheticals – perceived threat, anticipated harm, fear-based expectations – this chapter is grounded in the dark reality of first-hand experiences with violence, the world of actualities. As a starting point, it is important to emphasize the conceptual difference between the fear of violence and actual experiences of victimization, and to reiterate why we may not expect them to have a similar impact on individual attitudes, beliefs, and preferences.

The fear of violence, as discussed in chapter 2, stems from an appraisal of a specific threat, which, in turn, may induce defensive attitudes, beliefs, and actions (Folkman, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). In this sense, fear is often considered to be a motivating emotion (Bandura, 1977; Witte & Allen, 2000), and one that has been shown to, among other things, increase pessimism about risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2001) and feelings of vulnerability (Hale, 1996). Consequently, fear that is induced by the threat of violence can activate basic, protection-oriented heuristics, including – as demonstrated in chapter 5 – in-group bias and out-group prejudice.

Actual victimization, by contrast, is associated with a wide range of emotions including anger, guilt, and sadness, and its lasting psychological impact has been shown to range from depression, helplessness, and trauma (Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983; Singer et al., 1995; Galovski & Lyons, 2004) to, more positively, the reinforcement of resilience and “pro-social” behaviour (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 1990; Schaefer & Moos, 1992; Dutton & Green, 2010; Bauer et al., 2016). The divergent emotional effects of victimization are one element that make its impact arguably more complex and less linear than that of violent threat, and why it is essential to distinguish between these two types of exposure to violence.

Beyond this key difference, there are at least three other varying dimensions between the impact of a violent threat versus actual experiences with violence: time, the private versus public nature of the event, and the role of expectations. First, whereas a credible violent threat generally triggers a quick emotional reaction and motivates an immediate¹ response, a direct experience with violence may impact a victim slowly, at times weeks or even years after the event (McCann, Sakheim, & Abrahamson, 1988). This gives victims the opportunity to develop and refine a narrative about what took place and why, which consequently can impact, or entrench, their feelings about the actor(s), bystanders, and others implicated in the violence (Pemberton & Aarten, 2017).

Second, unlike the very private² experience of threat-induced fear, everyday violence victimization is often³ public, or at least is often processed within the context of a social group or a community (Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983; Park & Folkman, 1997). The public (although not necessarily *collective*) nature of actual victimization implies that the actions of others will impact how the event is perceived by the victim and how it affects her, in ways that are not always easily predictable. And finally, while the primary expectation stemming from a violent threat is generally one of possible harm, actual victimization generates a range of other expectations, including beliefs about what should happen after such an event, what kinds of people and institutions should be supportive and helpful, and about how the person should feel, and be treated, after victimization (Bard & Sangrey, 1986).

Indeed, as will be discussed below, expectations seem to play a key role in how actual experiences with violence impact individuals. As is well-documented in psychology, our expectation about the probability and the impact of an event are often quite different than the

¹ To be sure, not all violent threats motivate immediate action. Non-proximate threats (e.g. natural disasters, the possibility of war) or threats that are highly abstract (e.g. global warming) may induce minimal or even no response (Doveling, von Scheve, & Konijn, 2011).

² Depending on the circumstances, fear can also be experienced alongside others and heightened or ameliorated by those alongside us. Nonetheless, emotions are fundamentally a personal and private experience (Sturdy, 2003).

³ Of course, this is not always the case. Domestic violence, for example, often occurs in private settings, although scholars and activists have argued that there are often bystanders who are aware of its occurrence or that an episode is imminent (Banyard, Plante, & Moynihan, 2004).

reality (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974); and, to the extent that our expectations about preventing and mitigating the effects of violence are not fulfilled, our feelings about ourselves and others may change after the violent episode (Zeelenberg et al., 2000). It therefore should not be a surprise actual victimization may impact individuals very differently than the “mere” threat of violence; what is less clear is exactly how this impact differs, particularly with regard to social identity and preferences.

Although there is a large body of research in psychology and sociology about the impact of victimization on outcomes including mental health (Barnes & Ephross, 1994; Pico-Alfonso et al., 2006; Romito & Grassi, 2007), future violent behaviour (Anderson et al., 2003), and social development (Macmillan, 2001), there is comparatively little⁴ work about the impact of violence on social identity *per se*. Within political science, the literature about the micro-level impact of victimization on identity and intergroup relations is still emerging. As discussed in chapter 2, while some political scientists have argued that exposure to violence can entrench social identity (Wood, 2008; Hadzic, Carlson, & Tavits, 2017), and political identity (Balcells, 2012), a new body of research has demonstrated that first-hand experiences with violence may, counterintuitively, lead to greater levels of social cohesion, cooperation, and intergroup trust, suggesting that victimization may moderate identity (Bauer et al., 2016).

These studies, while instructive for this thesis, generally do not explicitly address how victimization impacts individual attitudes toward in- and out-groups,⁵ and this research is typically carried out in the aftermath of a civil war, after a period of intense identity-related fighting (see: Grossman, Manekin, & Miodownik, 2015; Bauer et al., 2016; Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017). As such, it does not consider the effects of more ordinary and proximate forms of violence, such as the everyday violence discussed here.⁶ Additionally, within this literature,

⁴ An exception to this is the literature about the impact of hate crimes, defined as “discriminatory violence targeted on the basis of social and/or political identity” (Pain, 2000).

⁵ As a meta-review of this literature explains about increased cooperation being particularly directed toward the in-group, “Too few studies define ‘out-groups’ consistently (or at all), so this in-group bias remains somewhat speculative” (Bauer et al., 2016).

⁶ There are some exceptions, such as a large-n study of the impact of crime victimization on political participation (Bateson, 2012) and a study of criminal violence’s impact on voter turnout in Mexico (Ley, 2018).

there is comparatively little attention given to the possible dark sides of exposure to violence, particularly as it relates to attitudes about the use of violence⁷ and more repressive systems of government.⁸

This chapter addresses these gaps and clarifies how the effects of actual victimization differ from “mere” threat. Using victimization data collected during the survey, I assess how direct encounters with everyday violence impact social identity and attitudes about in- and out-groups, including intergroup trust. Additionally, I examine the impact of victimization on attitudes about politics and violence. Finally, I probe the main finding: that victims of everyday violence are, on average, more positive about and trusting of their out-groups (reduced out-group prejudice) and less trusting of their in-group than non-victims. This is a striking result and contrasts starkly with the impact of the threat of violence, discussed in chapter 5. Instead, these findings, complemented with insights gleaned from interviews, suggest that everyday violence victimization can trigger a re-evaluation of who is or is not worthy of trust and positive regard.

This chapter proceeds with details about how victimization was measured and then provides an overview of the dynamics of violence within Lagos. Within that sub-section, I address the question of whether everyday violence is indeed “identity-agnostic,” as argued in chapter 2, and examine what types of Lagosians are, and are not, more likely to actually become victims of violence. Then in part two, I explain the analytical strategy used for the analyses in this chapter and then present the results thematically: the impact of victimization on social identity; intergroup trust; and finally, on attitudes about violence and politics. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of these results, which are then explored in more detail in chapter 8.

⁷ These topics have, however, been extensively covered by social psychologists. See Riggs, Caulfield, & Street, 2000; Scarpa, Haden, & Hurley, 2006.

⁸ This topic has been addressed in a separate literature. See: Fernandez & Kuenzi, 2010; Canetti & Lindner, 2015; Corbacho, Philipp, & Ruiz-Vega, 2015; Ley, 2017.

6.2 Victimization in Lagos

6.2.1 *Measuring Violence and Victimization*

Just how common is violence in Lagos? Are certain types of Lagosians more prone to victimization than others? An accurate understanding of the prevalence and contours of violence in the city is essential to this analysis and is accomplished in two ways. First, while participating in the survey,⁹ subjects reported whether they had witnessed and/or experienced different forms of violence within the previous year. Allowing subjects to self-report victimization – although this introduces risks of both under- and over-reporting – is consistent with the approach used in research about the micro-effects of violence, as well as much of the crime victimization literature (see Blattman, 2009; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009, Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017).

Moreover, it is almost certainly more reliable than collecting data from the Lagos State Police Command, whose victimization records are notoriously patchy¹⁰ (Ayodele & Aderinto, 2014). Asking about both directly experiencing and *witnessing* violence – which may seem like a particularly inclusive formulation of victimization – is common-practice in victimization surveys (see Elias, 1986 or the Crime Survey for England and Wales), and takes seriously the elevated levels of trauma, depression, anger, and anxiety that can develop after witnessing violence (Flannery et al., 2001; Eitle & Turner, 2002; Weingarten, 2003; Weaver et al., 2008). The one-year time frame, which is standard in regional barometer surveys, ensures that the victimization captured was recent enough that the episode could be recalled with some degree of accuracy, and that its impact would still be observable on the outcomes of interest, i.e. social identity and attitudes about politics.¹¹

⁹ These questions were asked prior to treatment.

¹⁰ There are a number of issues contributing to the poor quality of this data, one of which is the reluctance of Lagosians to report crime to the authorities. Among the victims of violence who were interviewed for this research, the vast majority chose not to report the episode to the police, explaining that doing so was “pointless” and that the police generally arrives long after the perpetrators have fled.

¹¹ It is important to note that the salience of the effects of victimization are not merely a product of time. There is a large body of literature demonstrating that untreated post-traumatic stress can persist, or even intensify, over time (Smith et al., 2008). More recently, political scientists have shown that the effects of wartime victimization can be transmitted over generations (Balcells, 2012; Grosjean, 2014; Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017).

From this survey data, I create three indicators of victimization. The primary indicator, and the variable used in the analyses below, is a binary measure of whether the subject was the victim of everyday violence – that is, of violent robbery, assault, cultism, or domestic violence – within the previous year. The second indicator, used primarily in analyses in the appendix, is the continuous version of the everyday violence variable, which is simply an additive index of the number of direct violent experiences that the subject had in the previous year. This variable is used to answer questions about whether the degree of violence impacts the outcomes of interest, which some scholars have previously argued (Pfefferbaum, 1997; Balcells, 2012). Finally, I include a binary indicator of whether the subject was a victim of “political-identity” violence, which comprises acts of violence thought to be motivated by the person’s religious, ethnic, or political identity. As these events were rare ($n=42$) and there were only two subjects who reported experiencing more than one event of identity-based violence, there is no continuous version of this variable, and the binary version is used for descriptive analysis only (appendix).

In addition to these quantitative measures, qualitative data about the effects of victimization is included throughout this chapter and is the primary source of evidence in chapter 8. This data is drawn from approximately 70 interviews conducted with Lagosians who were recent victims of (primarily) everyday violence. Their reflections about the nature of the violent act and its impact add important context to the analyses, and provide insight into mechanisms that may be driving the results.

6.2.2 *The Dynamics of Victimization in Lagos*

I begin by exploring the nature and prevalence of violence in Lagos. As discussed in chapter 3, the most recent¹² national victimization survey data indicates that the dynamics of everyday violence in Lagos State are somewhat representative of Nigeria more broadly (CLEEN Victimization Survey, 2013). For example, the percentage of Lagosians (62%) reporting a fear

¹² Unfortunately, the most recent national survey data is from 2013.

of crime in the national survey was slightly below the Nigeria-wide average of 72%, while the percentage of individuals (18%) claiming actual crime victimization corresponds exactly with the national average (CLEEN, 2013). Earlier national victimization surveys suggest that Lagos may actually have a comparatively low *overall* victimization rate (estimated then at approximately 30%), as some states reported 3-year victimization rates above 70% (CLEEN, 2009). Being a comparatively less violent locale could mean that individual acts of violence have a greater impact on victims and communities, and that individuals are, on average, less desensitized to violence than they may be elsewhere. Nonetheless, one would hardly describe Lagos as “low violence,” and many Lagosians have, in fact, spent a large portion of their life elsewhere (potentially in a more violent state) before relocating. As such, the dynamics of everyday violence victimization in Lagos are probably reasonably representative of other diverse cities in Nigeria.¹³

As a first step, I test two assumptions about everyday violence that are central to this thesis: that it is ubiquitous (and indeed, far more common than identity-related violence), and that it affects Lagosians from different identity groups relatively evenly, rather than disproportionately affecting certain ethnic or religious groups.

Table 6.1 reports the previous-year victimization rates for different forms of violence. The difference in the frequency of everyday and identity-related¹⁴ violence is striking: while the sample of just over 1,000 people reported 583 acts¹⁵ of everyday violence, there were only 44 reported episodes of identity-related violence, suggesting that everyday violence was roughly thirteen times more frequent than identity-related violence in the previous year. In total, 412 participants claimed that they had been the victim of *any kind* of violence within the past year, an overall previous-year victimization rate of

¹³ Replicating this research in another locale would, of course, be the strongest evidence for this proposition.

¹⁴ I include political violence in the identity-related violence category, as political violence, especially in Nigeria, is often closely linked to ethnicity. See, for example, Ukiwo, 2003; Smith, 2004).

¹⁵ It is possible that more than 583 acts of everyday violence were witnessed/experienced in the previous year, as the measure for each individual form of violence was binary, and some subjects may have been exposed to one form of violence multiple times within the year.

approximately 40% within the sample; 383 subjects (approximately 38% of the sample) had experienced at least one form of *everyday* violence in the previous year.¹⁶

Table 6.1: Exposure to Different Types of Violence

	Experienced		Witnessed		Both		TOTAL	
	Count	Percent*	Count	Percent	Count	Percent		
Everyday Violence								
Robbery	21	3.0%	71	10.2%	63	9.0%	155	22.2%
Cultism	30	4.3%	43	6.2%	55	7.9%	128	18.3%
Assault	27	3.9%	32	4.6%	15	2.1%	74	10.6%
Domestic Violence ¹	-	-	-	-	-	-	226	32.4%
<i>Category Sub-Totals</i>	78	11.2%	146	20.9%	133	19.1%	583	83.5%
Identity-Related Violence								
Ethnic Violence	2	0.3%	1	0.1%	3	0.4%	6	0.9%
Religious Violence	3	0.4%	1	0.1%	-	-	4	0.6%
Political Violence	16	2.3%	15	2.1%	3	0.4%	34	4.9%
<i>Category Sub-Totals</i>	21	3.0%	17	2.4%	6	0.9%	44	6.3%
Other								
Police Violence	16	2.3%	16	2.3%	9	1.3%	41	5.9%
Other forms	2	0.3%	26	3.7%	2	0.3%	30	4.3%
<i>Category Sub-Totals</i>	18	2.6%	42	6.0%	11	1.6%	71	10.2%

¹ Due to the sensitive nature of this topic, subjects were only asked a general question about whether they had been exposed to violence in their household in the past year

² As discussed in chapter 3, police violence in Lagos is particularly challenging to classify. For this reason, it is included in the “other” category.

* The percent is of the total reported acts of violence. Note that the same individuals may have experienced multiple forms of violence, and these figures therefore should not be interpreted as a victimization rate.

Interestingly, the single most common form of violence reported by participants was domestic violence. In interviews, many Lagosian women relayed grim stories of being beaten, burned, cut, and sexually assaulted by their intimate partner; other data sources suggest that as many as a third of Nigerian women have experienced physical violence within the household (Nigeria Health and Demographic Survey 2008; The Guardian, 2018). As discussed in chapter 2, domestic violence is included in the everyday violence category because of its frequency, banality, and the comparatively minimal role that social identity plays in victim selection.

¹⁶ This is consistent with the overall victimization rate in Africa, which, according to the Afrobarometer Wave 4 results (2008-2009), was 36.5%.

However, the topic of violence within the household is generally fraught,¹⁷ and I was wary of making survey respondents uncomfortable by asking them to reveal potentially difficult or embarrassing information about their home life. This was of particular concern because subjects were not always alone¹⁸ while responding to questions, possibly presenting a risk to subjects who revealed incriminating details about family members. Consequently, the survey asked about domestic violence only once and did so very broadly.¹⁹ Of the survey respondents who reported exposure to domestic violence, a surprisingly low 41.5% were female. Given that both the interviewees and the literature contend that the vast majority of domestic violence victims in Nigeria are female, it is possible, indeed probable, that women were underreporting domestic violence in the survey.²⁰

Beyond domestic violence, the general distribution of exposure to violence is worth examining. In particular, these figures elicit the question of whether the same Lagosians are being repeatedly victimized, and whether there are any common characteristics among victims. As shown in Figure 6.1, which depicts the cumulative frequency of exposure to violence, the vast majority of subjects reported that they were either not directly exposed to violence in the previous year or that they had experienced violence “only” one time. Just under 20% of the sample was exposed to a comparatively “moderate” amount of violence – that is, more than one violent event but fewer than five. (Lest the dryness of the statistic obscure the startling reality, this implies that one in every five subjects was the victim of violent robbery, assault, cultism/gang fighting, or other forms of violence *multiple times over* in the previous year). A

¹⁷ In interviews with victims, those who had experienced domestic violence were markedly more emotional than other victims while recounting the events.


¹⁸ From a research methods perspective, this was not ideal, as it introduces the risk of subjects giving untruthful responses due to the presence of a family member or neighbour. To the extent that it was possible, we tried to keep respondents separated from others, however given the small homes in which these conversations often place and the number of household members and neighbours in the immediate area, this was not always feasible.

¹⁹ The question asks: “Within the past year, have you witnessed or experienced violence with the home?”

²⁰ Moreover, in follow-up interviews with victims of violence, *all* domestic violence victims were female (however, victims to be interviewed were not selected randomly, so this may not be a particularly representative data point). It is possible that male survey respondents were simply more willing to report having witnessed domestic violence in their household than women, perhaps because they were less fearful of retribution.

very small minority (less than 2% of the sample) was exposed to extreme levels of violence, that is, more than 5 violent events in the previous year.

Figure 6.1: Cumulative Frequency of Exposure to Violence



Of the “extreme victims,” 36% reported that they had personally perpetrated²¹ violence within the past year. This rate, when compared to the 12.5% perpetration rate for the rest of the sample, is significantly higher ($z=-3.45$, $p=0.001$) and may be partially related to the nature of the violence in which these individuals are engaged – e.g. cultist violence, in which participants may well be at once the perpetrator and the victim. Indeed, approximately a third of all


²¹ Eliciting honest responses about the perpetration of violence is challenging. To mitigate desirability bias and/or concerns that answers might be reported to the authorities, research assistants handed the electronic tablet to subjects and allowed them to directly respond to three yes/no questions about having carried out different forms of violence over the previous year. Subjects were also guaranteed during both the informed consent process and the post-survey debrief that their identity would remain confidential and that we would not link responses to their name. Nonetheless, perpetration is likely underreported here.

perpetrators reported that they had witnessed or experienced cultist violence in the previous year, compared to 9.6% of non-perpetrators. A second possible explanation for the elevated perpetration rate among extreme victims is that violence does indeed beget violence, as a substantial body of research has demonstrated (Widom, 1989; Slutkin, 2013). Certainly, these two explanations are not mutually exclusive.

6.2.3 Factors Affecting Victimization in Lagos

Victimization in Lagos is also closely linked to geography, and even to “micro” geographical unit within the city, i.e. the sampling sub-districts. Figure 6.2 reports the victimization rate for everyday violence (blue) and identity violence (red) by sub-district. As the graph makes clear, there are areas with meaningfully higher victimization rates (e.g. Somolu, where the average everyday victimization rate is approximately 60% and the political violence rate was approximately 15%), and a surprising amount of within-LGA variability (e.g. Ibeju-Lekki, where there is a spread of roughly 30 percentage points between victimization rates in sub-districts 1 and 2).

Figure 6.2: Victimization by LGA Sub-District



The importance of geography – or “area,” to use the vernacular of Lagosians – as a factor affecting the likelihood of victimization was a point made by a number of interviewees. As Emmanuel, whose shop was robbed at gunpoint, explained “This robbery will never stop as long as we are in Mushin so the most you can do is be extra careful.” Adewale, whose compound was pillaged by a group of heavily armed men, agreed. “All those armed robbers, is it anybody special [they choose to] rob? We are living in this area, [robbers] can come at any time unless God saves us.” Among subjects who believed that they were victimized more frequently than other Lagosians, the most common responses to a follow-up question about the primary reason for their misfortune were related to the area in which they live. Only a total of ~20% of subjects attributed their more frequent victimization to any form of social identity, including religion, ethnicity, gender, place of origin, and socioeconomic status.

Across these geographic sub-units, does identity violence and everyday violence affect Lagosians from different identity groups at roughly similar rates? The theory and typologies presented in chapter 2 imply that episodes of everyday violence should be relatively²² proportionally distributed between identity groups, while identity violence is, of course, expected to affect some ethnic and religious groups more than others.

Table 6.2 disaggregates victimization rates for everyday and identity-based violence by ethnicity and religion.²³ Consistent with the typology, experiences with everyday violence were mostly balanced between identity groups, although everyday violence was somewhat more common among participants identifying as Igbo. This difference, however, was not significant in a Fisher’s exact test ($p=0.320$). The difference in everyday violence victimization rates between Christian and Muslim subjects (who collectively accounted for 99.21% of the sample) was similarly not significant in a proportion test ($z=-1.09$, $p=0.276$). Together, this

²² It is possible that some identity groups are more tolerant of intragroup violence, including everyday violence (e.g. intragroup robbery), or otherwise more prone to violence, and that group members would therefore be victimized at a higher rate. There is not sound qualitative evidence to support this proposition, and, in interviews, the use of violence was generally described as antisocial behaviour.

²³ To avoid concerns about the enumerators being linked to political parties, we did not ask subjects to reveal their political affiliations or vote choices. The data can therefore not be disaggregated by political affiliation.

suggests that victims of everyday violence in Lagos are not more likely to become victims because of their religious or ethnic identity.

Table 6.2: Victimization by Identity

		<u>Percent Victimized</u>	
	<i>n</i>	Identity Violence	Everyday Violence
Ethnicity			
Hausa	15	6.70%	33.30%
Yoruba	693	4.50%	36.20%
Igbo	149	5.40%	44.30%
Other	162	1.20%	37.70%
Religion			
Christian	715	3.90%	36.20%
Muslim	296	4.70%	39.90%
Other ¹	8	0.00%	25.00%

Surprisingly, rates of identity violence were also not significantly different between ethnic groups (Fisher’s exact test $p\text{-value}=0.118$) or religious groups ($p=0.71$), although both Hausa and Muslim respondents reported slightly elevated incidences of victimization. This may be because there is not currently an active²⁴ ethnic or religious conflict in Lagos, and, as will be discussed, because acts of identity-related violence are sometimes interpreted by the victims as “random” in nature. Or, this may simply be a product of the small n -size for victims of identity-related violence.

²⁴ Of course, the definition of an “active” conflict is relative. At the time of the survey, agitation by the so-called “Indigenous People of Biafra” (IPOB), an Igbo ethnic separatist group, was often featured in the news, although there were not demonstrations in Lagos. Similarly, the threat of Boko Haram and other terrorist organizations affiliated with extremist Islamist groups was often discussed but generally not viewed as a salient threat.

6.3 Profile of a Victim

6.3.4 *Quantitative Evidence*

Beyond geography, which is closely linked to the likelihood of victimization, and identity group membership, which is not, are there other “determinants” of everyday violence victimization in Lagos? Put differently, is it possible to predict victimization in Lagos on the basis of certain attributes, or are victims of everyday violence selected on an “as-if random” basis, once neighbourhood is taken into account? Recognizing that it is difficult to quantify all possible victimization risk factors,²⁵ I nonetheless test whether attributes that were repeatedly identified in focus group discussions as risk factors do indeed predict everyday violence victimization. If everyday violence victimization is poorly predicted by demographic and other attributes, we can be more confident that everyday violence victimization behaves (somewhat) like an exogenous variable.

The predictors included in the model are gender (men were perceived as being more likely to get “caught up in violence”); age (younger people were believed to be at a higher risk); wealth (poorer people were thought to be more vulnerable to victimization – an idea that is generally supported in the crime literature; see Levitt, 1999); and being violent oneself.²⁶ Additionally, I test the role of education (I expect higher levels of education to be associated with reduced risk), as well as whether the subject has spent her full life in Lagos, since those who are “indigenous” to the city may face less discrimination and therefore be less likely to be victimized.²⁷ Finally, I include indicators of the respondent’s ethnicity and religion to verify that everyday violence victimization is indeed independent from these dimensions of social identity.

²⁵ This is particularly applicable to the risk of domestic violence victimization.

²⁶ In focus group discussions, participants often mentioned that the greatest victimization risk factor is engaging in violent behaviour, and particularly, in engaging in cultist violence and/or being an “Area Boy.” Although I ask broadly about the perpetration of violence in the survey, for safety as well as ethical reasons, I did not ask subjects to self-identify as cultists and/or Area Boys, therefore I cannot directly test this theory.

²⁷ For a more in-depth discussion of indigeneity and citizenship in Nigeria, see Sayne, 2012, or Ibrahim, J., & Hassan, 2012.

I use a mixed-effects (multilevel) logistic regression model with random intercepts for the twenty sub-districts, as there is across-district heterogeneity (see column 1, which is an intercept-only model).²⁸ Allowing for sub-district level variation mitigates the risk that the results are confounded by some other variable that is the root cause of the sub-district variation (Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2003; Snijders & Bosker, 2012). The following two-level logit regression is used for these analyses:

$$\log\left(\frac{\pi_{ij}}{1 - \pi_{ij}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{ij} + u_j$$

Where β_0 is the log-odds that $y = 1$ when $x = 0$ and $u = 0$; β_1 is the cluster-specific effect of x ; and u_j is the effect of being in group j on the log-odds that $y = 1$. All mixed effect models in this chapter were fit using the *Mixed* command in Stata 14.2, and use maximum likelihood estimates. Table 6.3 presents the results of this analysis, with all results reported as odd ratios.

²⁸ As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the demographics of sub-districts varied considerably. Some were more homogeneous “identity enclaves” while others were more ethnically and religiously diverse; there was heterogeneity in income levels, access to and the proximity of security infrastructure (e.g. police stations, local security forces), victimization rates, and perpetration rates. Importantly, outcome variables – i.e. social identity, trust, and attitudes about violence and politics – also varied by sub-district.

Table 6.3: Predictors of Everyday Violence Victimization, Odds Ratios

	(1) Victimization Odds Ratio – Null Model	(2) Victimization Odds Ratio - Random Effects	(3) Victimization Odds Ratio – Sub-District Fixed Effects
Ethnicity - Hausa		0.569 (0.482)	0.536 (0.384)
Ethnicity - Yoruba		0.725* (0.122)	0.704* (0.147)
Ethnicity - Igbo		1.170 (0.312)	1.185 (0.310)
Religion - Christian		0.358 (0.287)	0.378 (0.354)
Religion - Muslim		0.462 (0.407)	0.501 (0.473)
Age Group		1.105 (0.074)	1.105 (0.072)
Female		0.568*** (0.072)	0.553*** (0.080)
Deprivation		1.080*** (0.032)	1.065*** (0.025)
Education		0.969 (0.057)	0.975 (0.060)
Full Life in Lagos		1.260 (0.219)	1.234 (0.207)
Perpetrator		2.894*** (0.749)	2.653*** (0.632)
Intercept	0.562*** (0.092)	1.253 (1.446)	1.536 (1.701)
Sub-District Variance	1.517** (0.259)	1.275** (0.126)	
N	1,019	1,016	1,016
Intraclass Correlation	0.112	0.069	
Log Likelihood	-643.7	-604.3	
Number of groups	20	20	

Robust standard error in parentheses; column 3 includes sub-district fixed effects but results are not reported

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

As shown in Table 6.3 and consistent with the discussion above, everyday violence victimization is generally not predicted by the subject's ethnic or religious affiliation, although those identifying as Yoruba are somewhat less likely, on average, to be victimized (significant at the 10% level). Consistent with the prediction of the focus groups, men are roughly a third

more likely to be a victim of violence than women,²⁹ although given the somewhat dubiously low rates of reported domestic violence by women, it is possible that the true likelihood of victimization is more gender-equal. There is also an extremely slight, albeit statistically significant, deprivation effect: poorer individuals are minimally more likely to become victims of everyday violence. By far the strongest, significant predictor of victimization in terms of effect size was perpetration of violence: those who admitted to carrying out violence were more than 2.5 times more likely to have also been victims, but of course, it is difficult to disentangle the direction of causality, and, as discussed above, it is possible that many perpetrators are trapped in a cycle of (or perhaps even simultaneous episodes of) victimization and retaliatory predation (see Walklate, 2007).

Collectively, these findings suggest that victimization is fairly evenly dispersed among different types of Lagosians, and that beyond perpetration,³⁰ which is clearly a powerful risk factor for future victimization, “everyday” violence seems to be largely exogenous to group membership and to other demographic predictors. Given its prevalence and non-discriminating nature, everyday violence is quite clearly a normal part of life for a broad range of Lagosians.

6.3.2 Reflections on the Risk of Victimization

Interviews with violence-affected Lagosians underscored the unpredictability and ubiquity of violence in the city, as well as the idea that there is a constant risk of victimization, independent of one’s background, identity, or status. Multiple interviewees who had experienced everyday violence emphasized that the event happened suddenly, and seemingly without reason, and that their attackers “came out of nowhere” (interview with Kelechi, 2016). The vast majority said that they could not guess at the motive of the perpetrator; many blamed the attack on the late

²⁹ The predicted probability of victimization for women is 32% and 43% for men when all other values are set to the mean.

³⁰ It is important to note that rates of perpetration are also fairly evenly distributed between identity groups. The rate of self-reported perpetration varied from approximately 13%-16% between the three main ethnic groups and was approximately 10% for the “other” ethnic category. Across religious groups, perpetration was approximately 12% among Christians, and 16% among Muslims.

hour of the day during which they were out or considered it an unfortunate reality of life in such a sprawling, bustling city. Consider the exchange with Damilola, from Mushin:

Research Assistant (RA): Okay Ma, can you please tell me about what happened [when you experienced violence]?

Damilola: It happened last year. I was on my way home from work, in this area that I normally pass. So that day, I pass that area on that day, and it was around eleven in the night. A guy just come out from nowhere with cutlass and asked me to give him my phone [...] And I look around and say ‘What happened, what for?’ I refused to do so. But unfortunately [for] me, before I can look back and turn around, to see somebody to rescue me or to help me from the guy, he just give me cut, slap. Down on my face, all around. Before I can do anything, he started beating me seriously, he even dragged me [and there was] no one to rescue me

RA (later): So why do you think you of all people was chosen as the victim?

Damilola: I really don’t know...it could be coincidental.

In several other interviews, victims described acts of violence which, from an external perspective, may have had overtones of identity-related violence, as having been random and inevitable. For example, recounting an episode in which he was attacked at a local bar, Samuel explained:

“...so while we are drinking, enjoying and listening to the music, some guys come, I mean tauts or hoodlums, I don’t know how to describe them. They say ‘no, no, that is not the type of the music they want to hear, that they are Yoruba and they prefer listening to Yoruba songs.’ We said well, in that case, since we are not Yoruba, let them play the music that both of us can share so there won’t be any issue that can bring about a misunderstanding. So as we are talking, exchanging words, some of them started breaking bottle, becoming violent, and during the experience of that I was stabbed by a bottle, in my palm, and the other one at my shoulder. So the whole thing [became] very, very messy, and it was the kind of assault I was not expecting.”

RA: [...] so do you feel you can still trust people?

Samuel: This issue is that this is Lagos [...] things like this do happen most of the times, and even when things like this is not even happening you don’t trust people just for the main sake of trusting them.

RA: So why do you think you of all people were chosen as a victim of this assault?

Samuel: Well I don't know their motive, I don't know why they decided to start attacking us.

Similarly, Chidozie described an episode in which a gang of Yoruba boys attacked his compound, robbing and assaulting its inhabitants. In the course of recounting the events, he repeatedly emphasised the perpetrators' Yoruba identity. However, when asked why he thought the attack happened and why he was a victim, Chidozie explained: "There is a word called destiny...destiny said they are going to rob you, you don't have any option."

It is ultimately difficult to assess how frequently violence that may have been identity-related, or at least had a strong identity component, was perceived as being "everyday" in nature.³¹ Ultimately, it is the victim's perception and interpretation of the episode that would influence any ensuing identity-related or other consequences, and not the "true" motive of the perpetrator, which, as discussed in chapter 2, is generally difficult to assess. That violent acts with identity overtones were nonetheless often interpreted as random violence underscores how common everyday violence is perceived to be in Lagos, as well as the high threshold for a violent event to be considered identity-related.³²

In summary, this preliminary evidence supports three conclusions about the nature of violence in Lagos. First, victimization rates are generally high within the sample (and more generally, within the city), with the vast majority of violence being – or at least being interpreted as – everyday in nature. Indeed, for every reported act of identity violence, there were over 13 reported acts of everyday violence. Second, violence, and the risk of victimization, varies significantly by geography – a survey participant in sub-district 2 of Somolu, for example, had nearly twice the odds of victimization as the average Lagosian elsewhere – while demographic

³¹ The inverse of this – everyday violence being interpreted as identity-based – is also possible, although it was rarely mentioned in interviews.

³² Of course, this could also reflect the reluctance of subjects to discuss things in identity terms.

factors, including, most notably, identity group affiliation, are weak predictors of victimization. And finally, there is some degree of resignation among Lagosians about the inevitability of violence, and the lack of control they have over their risk of personally being victimized.

6.4 Victimization and Social Identity: Results

6.4.1 Analytical Strategy and Suggestive Analyses


The dynamics described above indicate that identity does not significantly impact the risk of victimization in Lago. In the next segment of the chapter, I use quantitative analysis to interrogate whether the reverse is true: that is, whether, and to what extent, victimization impacts identity.

I begin with visualizations of the impact of victimization on attitudes about in- and out-group members. Figure 6.3 shows how evaluations of one's in- and out-group, measured with pre-treatment thermometer scales, vary by the level of everyday violence experienced by the subject. Surprisingly, those who experienced the most violence evaluated their in- and out-group similarly, demonstrating little-to-no apparent in-group bias or out-group prejudice, whereas subjects who experienced no or "only" one episode of everyday violence showed clear in-group favouritism. The difference in average assessment score is pronounced: on average, non-victims evaluated their in-group at about 85 "warmth points" and their out-group at about 27 points, while those who were "extreme victims" evaluated their in-group at about 70 points and their out-group at about 50 points. A non-parametric difference of means test for group evaluations by level of victimization (across all levels) is significant for both in-group evaluations (Kruskal-Wallis test, $\chi^2=56.09$, $p<0.0001$) and out-group evaluations ($\chi^2=46.41$, $p<0.0001$).

When everyday violence victimization is considered as a binary rather than continuous indicator, these differences persist. Average out-group evaluations among non-victims are 27.3, while they are 36.3 among victims (Kruskal-Wallis test, $\chi^2=35799$, $p<0.0001$); for in-group evaluations, the average non-victim score is 85 compared to 79.3 for victims (Kruskal-Wallis

test, $\chi^2 = 24.60, p < 0.0001$). This supports the idea that victimization has a moderating effect on in-group bias and a bolstering effect on out-group evaluations.

Figure 6.3: In- and Out-Group Evaluations by Exposure to Everyday Violence



These preliminary analyses are surprising. On one hand, they are relatively consistent with literature examining the impact of wartime victimization, which has demonstrated that exposure to violence can have micro-level prosocial effects.³³ On the other hand, these patterns contrast sharply with the findings about the identity-affirming impact of acute threat, and they are counterintuitive. There is not an immediate explanation for the apparent identity-moderating impact of everyday violence victimization.

In what follows, I interrogate this relationship more rigorously. Beyond possible risks of under or over-reporting acts of violence discussed above, the primary obstacle to unbiased

³³ This, of course, assumes that reduced in-group bias and greater openness to out-groups is a form of “pro-social behaviour.”

estimation of the impact of victimization is the risk of endogeneity bias – that is, given the observational nature of this data, the individuals who became victims may be unlike those who did not. Although the preliminary analysis reported in Table 6.3 indicates that there are not strong predictors of victimization, it is nonetheless possible that there are unobserved differences between victims and non-victims that may also impact that outcome variables of interest.

In order to address these concerns and generate reliable estimates of the causal impact of victimization, I use a three-part estimation strategy. First, using coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus, King, & Porro, 2012), I pair victims of everyday violence with a “control” – that is, non-victim – who shares a similar demographic profile, including a shared sub-district of residence. I then include these demographic variables, along with additional controls that may impact the outcome variables, in the CEM-weighted regression models, and estimate the sample average treatment effect for the treated (SATT). Finally, I check the robustness of these results to different model specification, to test the extent to which the estimates depend on modelling decisions and assumptions.

Matching victims and non-victims is an important step to modify the data so that it better resembles experimental data, and is an effective way of minimizing the risk of endogeneity in the absence of an appropriate instrumental variable (Stuart, 2010). The coarsened exact matching technique, carried out using the *cem* package in Stata, creates a finite number of strata for each combination of characteristics specified and then matches a “treated” observation only if that person can also be paired with a control from her strata. Control cases that are not paired with a treatment group member are then discarded. The advantage of CEM is that the extent of covariate balance can be guaranteed *ex ante*, although one must accept a potentially higher number of unmatched observations (i.e. there is a trade-off between the exactness of the matches and the number of paired observations) (Iacus et al., 2012). Coarsened matching removes observations with extreme values and, of course, greatly improves balance between the “treatment” and “control” groups, resulting in less model-dependence and inefficiency (King & Zeng, 2006; Ho et al., 2007; Iacus et al., 2012).

I match subjects on key demographic variables – that is, gender, age, education, wealth, lifetime residency in Lagos, perpetration status, and whether they are a religious or ethnic minority (as minorities may feel more strongly about their in-group (Porter & Washington, 1993), as well as the sub-district in which they reside. The covariate imbalance pre- and post-matching are reported in the appendix. Through this process, I prune 155 “treated” (that is, victimized respondents) and 278 control subjects, and retain 228 treated and 358 control subjects. In doing so, I meaningfully improve balance, from an $\mathcal{L}_1$ imbalance score of 0.853 to an $\mathcal{L}_1$ score of 0.763, an improvement of 10.5%.

Thereafter, I use the CEM-weighted data in regression analysis to estimate the impact of exposure to everyday violence on social identity, as well as attitudes about violence, politics, and democracy. Assuming proper model specification, this “double-robust” estimation method should reduce estimation bias (Stuart, 2010; Abadie & Imbens, 2011). In addition to including the matched variables as covariates in the regressions, I also include a measure of baseline anxiety adapted from the anxiety subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, as higher baseline levels of anxiety may contribute to stronger in-group attachments and greater out-group prejudice (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).

Depending on the nature of the dependent variable, models are estimated using OLS or logistic regression with sub-district fixed effects. In all models, the key predictor variable, or “treatment,” is the binary³⁴ indicator of everyday violence victimization. As in the previous chapter, the outcome variables are measures of social identity: *In-Group Thermometer*, *Out-Group Thermometer*, and the *Identity Index*, as well as a dichotomous³⁵ variable of high (1) or low (0) levels of *In-Group Trust* and *Out-Group Trust*. Because the questions about trust were measured post-treatment, these models also include dummy variables for treatment status, post-treatment fear, as well as an interaction term for treatment status*fear. In the last section, the

³⁴ These analyses are repeated with the continuous version of the victimization index to test whether the extent of victimization matters (appendix).

³⁵ Trust was originally measured on a four-point scale, but it exhibited high levels of skew and, more importantly, the theoretical and practical value of a distinction between “moderate” and “high” levels of trust was minimal. As a result, it was recoded as a binary variable.

dependent variables are measures of attitudes about violence and politics, specifically *Interest in Politics*, *Support for Democracy*, and *Support for Violence*. Once again, as these questions were asked at the end of the survey, these models also account for the possible intervening effect of treatment.

Before presenting the results, it is worth emphasizing that even with well-matched data and appropriately specified regression models, we cannot be completely confident that any effects are indeed causal, and not caused by an unobservable variable— a challenge inherent to all studies using observational rather than experimental data (Rosenbaum, 2002; Gerber & Green, 2012). Yet there was not a clearly preferable estimation strategy: there are no obvious and demonstrable factors forcing “as if random” assignment to victimization that might have allowed for semi-experimental methods such as a regression discontinuity or a difference-in-differences design, and for obvious reasons, we cannot experimentally manipulate actual victimization. Coarsened exact matching paired with regression models that control for a wide range of possible confounders provides the greatest amount of certainty possible that we are estimating the relationships of interest.

6.4.2 *The Impact of Victimization on In- and Out-Group Identity*

Table 6.4 reports the estimated impact of victimization on the *In-Group Thermometer* and *Out-Group Thermometer* scores, as well as the in-group *Identity Index*, which measures the strength of identity rather than just the warmth of in-group feelings. The first column for each dependent variable contains the results of OLS regression with the matched data, thereby reporting the SATT, while the model in the next columns (2, 5, and 8) contains covariates, including sub-district fixed effects.

Table 6.4: The Impact of Victimization on Identity-Related Outcomes

VARIABLES	In-Group Thermometer		Out-Group Thermometer		Identity Index	
	(1) Matched data, no covariates	(2) Sub-District Fixed Effects, matched + covariates	(3) Matched data, no covariates	(4) Sub-District Fixed Effects, matched + covariates	(5) Matched data, no covariates	(6) Sub-District Fixed Effects, matched + covariates
Victimization	-1.493 (1.638)	-1.341 (1.431)	8.118*** (2.127)	7.028*** (1.944)	-0.051 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.046)
Age		0.649 (0.761)		2.353** (1.144)		0.044* (0.027)
Education		-1.202* (0.709)		-2.385*** (0.896)		-0.083*** (0.023)
Female		4.202*** (1.421)		-1.683 (2.057)		0.030 (0.049)
Full Life in Lagos		0.431 (1.691)		5.139** (2.223)		-0.059*** (0.009)
Deprivation		-1.064*** (0.234)		1.822*** (0.358)		0.225*** (0.055)
Anxiety Index		-0.429 (0.956)		0.426 (1.356)		0.448*** (0.111)
Minority		-2.254 (7.934)		-12.904 (8.537)		-0.139*** (0.033)
Perpetrator of Violence		-10.529*** (2.853)		10.380** (4.037)		0.186** (0.088)
Intercept	83.457*** (1.151)	97.626*** (6.598)	25.124*** (1.510)	31.114*** (8.336)	4.388*** (0.042)	5.459*** (0.223)
N	577	577	575	575	575	575
R2	0.002	0.182	0.032	0.212	0.002	0.316

Robust standard error in parentheses; coefficients for sub-district fixed effects, as well

treatment, mediator, and interaction term coefficients, are not reported

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

As reported above, victimization has a consistent, positive effect on out-group warmth, increasing evaluations by approximately 7-8 points, model-dependent. This represents an increase in out-group evaluations of approximately 30% over the average non-victim (“control”) out-group assessment. The effect of victimization on in-group assessments is, by contrast, not significant, nor is the impact of victimization on the in-group identity index. Collectively, these results indicate that everyday violence victimization results in a more positive view of one’s out-group, but it does not have a significant impact on in-group assessments.


Among the covariates with a significant effect on in- and out-group evaluations, the magnitude of the effect of previous perpetration of violence is noteworthy. Perpetration has a consistent and large positive effect on out-group warmth and dampens in-group evaluations by approximately 10 points. There is, as previously discussed, fairly significant overlap between perpetration and victimization: 24% of victims are also self-reported perpetrators of violence, compared to ~6.5% of non-victims. However, the matched data also matches by perpetration status, and therefore the comparisons are like-for-like. Moreover, when the analyses are repeated using a sub-group that excludes all subjects identifying as perpetrators, the results of victimization on identity are consistent, and the coefficients only minimally change. This suggests that the effects described above are uniquely related to victimization, and not to generally being exposed to violence as the perpetrator of a crime.

6.4.3 *The Impact of Victimization on In- and Out-Group Trust*

For the final step in the analysis of the impact of everyday violence victimization on social identity, I estimate the effect of exposure to everyday violence on levels of *In-Group Trust* and *Out-Group Trust*. Trust is measured as a dichotomous variable, in which subjects are classified as either having high (1) or low (0) levels of trust in their in- and out-group. Figure 6.4 depicts the proportion of subjects reporting a high level of trust in their in- and out-group, by victim status. Lagos is characterized by generally low levels of trust – almost 30% of subjects expressed low trust in their own friends – so it is striking to see just how *high* in-group trust

levels are across both victims and non-victims, although the difference in trust levels by victimization status is minimal (and not significant when tested [$z=1.63, p=0.103$]). The other notable element depicted in the graph is that levels of out-group trust are higher among victims by some 11 percentage points than among non-victims. This difference in out-group trust proportion is significant when tested ($z=-4.43, p=0.000$).

Figure 6.4: *The Impact of Victimization on Trust*



I use similar estimation parameters to estimate the causal impact of victimization on trust, with logistic rather than OLS regression. Because the questions about trust were measured post-treatment, I also include dummy variables for treatment status, post-treatment fear, as well as an interaction term for treatment status*fear. Table 6.5 reports the results of this analysis, presented as odds ratios.

Table 6.5: The Impact of Everyday Violence Victimization on Trust, Odds Ratios

VARIABLES	In-Group Trust		Out-Group Trust	
	(1) Matched Data, No Covariates, Odds Ratios	(2) Fixed Effects, Matched Data with Covariates, Odds Ratios	(3) Matched Data, No Covariates, Odds Ratios	(4) Fixed Effects, Matched Data with Covariates, Odds Ratios
Everyday Violence Victimization	0.555*	0.496*	1.898**	1.920**
	(0.176)	(0.181)	(0.568)	(0.563)
Age		1.167 (0.277)		1.023 (0.148)
Education		0.774 (0.132)		1.021 (0.160)
Female		2.306** (0.802)		1.316 (0.388)
Full Life in Lagos		0.892 (0.065)		1.126** (0.066)
Deprivation		0.724 (0.297)		1.791* (0.619)
Anxiety		0.487** (0.158)		1.042 (0.219)
Minority Identity				0.969 (1.251)
Perpetration		5.074 (6.723) (0.369)		2.705** (1.331) (0.148)
Constant	7.704*** (2.911)	282.837*** (578.529)	0.094*** (0.036)	0.043** (0.053)
N	575	538	574	558
Log Pseudo Likelihood	-179.36	-139.928	-247.32	-218.142
Pseudo R2	0.281	0.222	0.04	0.145

Robust standard error in parentheses; coefficients for sub-district fixed effects, as well treatment, mediator, and interaction term coefficients, are not reported

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

As shown in Table 6.5, everyday violence victimization has a significant impact on levels of intergroup trust, once again in a counterintuitive direction. Specifically, the odds of expressing a high level of in-group trust among those who have been victims of everyday violence are approximately half of those of non-victims, while the odds of everyday violence victims expressing a high level of out-group trust were approximately 2 times larger than those of non-victims. Expressed in terms of margins, the average marginal effect of victimization on the likelihood of expressing a high level of in-group trust is approximately -3.5 percentage points (CI : -0.07, -0.004), while the marginal effect of victimization on expressing high out-group

trust is 8.2 percentage points (*CI*: 0.014, 0.15). Although in-group members are still, on average, considered significantly more trustworthy than out-group members even with this victimization effect, it is nonetheless surprising that being violently robbed, or assaulted, or otherwise victimized would have a positive effect on broad levels of trust, and particularly on out-group trust.

Considered cumulatively, these results support a striking finding: everyday violence victimization appears to make Lagosians more positive about and more trusting of their out-group and less trusting of their in-group. These effects are stable across different model specifications and robust to a wide range of control variables and to a matching technique that ensures that demographically-similar Lagosians are compared. This finding runs contrary to a common perception of the effect of victimization that anticipates victims of everyday violence becoming more cynical about and distrustful of others, or at least of their out-group, after the event. Instead, these findings indicate that first-hand experiences with everyday violence appears to trigger a re-evaluation of what types of people are, and are not, worthy of trust and positive regard.

6.4.4 The Impact of Victimization on Attitudes about Politics and Violence

Before addressing possible explanations for this finding, I explore one final facet of the effects of victimization: its impact on attitudes about the use of violence and about politics. I begin with the effect of victimization on political engagement, a relationship that previous research has shown to be positively correlated³⁶ (Blattman, 2009; Bellows & Miguel, 2009; Gilligan, Pasquale, & Samii, 2014). A second literature about the impact of terrorist violence on political engagement has similarly demonstrated that experiences with violence generally motivate citizens to participate politically, and in particular, to vote (Bali, 2007; Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014).

³⁶ There are dissenting views: see, for example, Trelles and Carreras (2012) who find that citizens of Mexico exposed to the highest levels of crime are less likely to vote.

Although there are limited empirical studies about the impact of *everyday* violence victimization on political participation, a 2012 article reported the results of a large-n study about the impact of crime victimization³⁷ on political participation across five global regions. This analysis showed a strong, positive impact of crime victimization on political participation across all regions, including Africa, where victimization was associated with increased community engagement, group leadership, levels of protest, political interest, and political conversations (Bateson, 2012). Taken together, this evidence implies that we should expect Lagosians who were victims of everyday violence to exhibit higher levels of political engagement than non-victims.

Closely related to levels of political engagement are attitudes about systems of governance. Specifically, past research suggests that victimization may decrease satisfaction with democracy, although it does not necessarily impact the preference for democracy as a system of government (Ceobanu, Wood, & Ribeiro, 2011). Within Africa, a 2009 study using Afrobarometer data found that individuals who were victims of crime within the past year were less likely to support democracy. The authors argue that security is viewed as a basic function of government and a regime that is unable to provide high levels of security is likely to suffer from a loss of confidence and public support. As the authors write, when the government is perceived as incapable of addressing the heightened risk of violence, "...we might well expect to see citizens become nostalgic for the old days of authoritarian rule or receptive to a new authoritarian alternative" (Fernandez & Kuenzi, 2010, p.466). I test whether this proposition also holds true in a Lagosian context, where chronic insecurity, high levels of everyday violence, a vacuum created by weak formal security institutions and a robust alternative security architecture (e.g. local neighbourhood watch-groups; armed guards; vigilantes) may have long ago undermined the expectation of the state providing security (Lewis, 2009; LeBas, 2013).

³⁷ Bateson's interpretation of crime victimization includes assault and robbery. In this sense, it is a similar indicator to my "everyday violence" variable, although her analysis does not include domestic violence.

Finally, alongside the possibility of increased support for more heavy-handed, repressive systems of government, I test another potential “dark side” of the impact of victimization: increased support for the future use of violence. Across a range of disciplines, research has demonstrated that victimization can substantially increase support for the use of violence and may also increase the likelihood that the victim herself engages in violent acts (Widom, 1989; Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 1990; Patel, Simon, & Taylor, 2013). Indeed, as previously discussed, there is a clear relationship between victimization and the perpetration of violence within the sample. I therefore expect that victims of everyday violence will exhibit greater support for the future use of violence.

To test these theorized effects of victimization, I use similarly³⁸ specified models to the ones described above with the following dependent variables: the subject’s self-reported level of interest in politics; an additive index which measures the subject’s preference for more democratic versus more authoritarian government and electoral systems; and an index capturing the subject’s level of agreement about whether the use of violence could be justified in various situations.

³⁸ For consistency and future replicability, the analysis of victimization’s impact on political interest uses a similar regression model to the one specified in Bateson’s large-n study of the impact of crime victimization on political participation (2012), including the same set of controls with the addition of a treatment*mediator interaction term., I include sub-district rather than country-fixed effects and do not include an urban / rural indicator. The model for support for democracy also includes a measure of the subject’s level of “modern” news consumption, as those exposed to greater levels of modern news are expected to be more supportive of democracy.

Table 6.6: The Impact of Everyday Violence Victimization on Political Preferences and Support for Violence

VARIABLES	(1) Interest in Politics - Fixed Effects, Matched	(2) Support for Authoritarianism - Fixed Effects, Matched	(3) Support for Violence - Fixed Effects, Matched
Everyday Violence Victimization	0.014 (0.101)	-0.062 (0.104)	-0.030 (0.084)
Age	0.048 (0.053)	0.008 (0.053)	-0.047 (0.044)
Education	0.046 (0.043)	-0.061 (0.053)	-0.052 (0.040)
Female	-0.506*** (0.097)	0.166 (0.114)	-0.288*** (0.083)
Deprivation	0.032* (0.017)	-0.032 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.016)
Exposure to Modern News		0.018 (0.073)	
Anxiety			-0.034 (0.060)
Constant	1.629*** (0.420)	3.672*** (0.455)	2.165*** (0.420)
Sub-District Variance			
N	581	579	564
Intraclass Correlation			
Log Likelihood			
R-squared	0.197	0.216	0.223

Robust standard errors in parentheses; coefficients for sub-district fixed effects, as well treatment, mediator, and interaction term coefficients, are not reported

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

As shown in Table 6.6, these results do not support the proposition that victimization increases political engagement, approval for more repressive forms of government, or support for the use of violence. Beginning with the impact of victimization on political engagement and preferences, the robustness of attitudes about democracy to victimization is, from a normative perspective, encouraging, as it indicates that even first-hand experiences with violence, which may have partially been the product of low state capacity, do not meaningfully depress support for more democratic forms of governance. This finding is consistent with research that has demonstrated that preferences for the *system* of democracy are more stable than satisfaction with democratically-elected governments themselves (Inglehart, 2001; see also Canache, Mondak & Seligson, 2001). In Nigeria, the relative, recent success of democracy – and particularly the successful transfer of power in the 2015 presidential elections from the incumbent (Goodluck Jonathan of the People’s Democratic Party) to the representative of the Lagos-backed All Progressives Congress (Muhammadu Buhari) – may have entrenched more positive views of democracy and could help explain this result. Additionally, as other scholars have noted about Nigeria, even a minimal provision of political goods (e.g. civil rights) help sustain a preference for democracy (Bratton & Lewis, 2007).

Regarding interest in politics, given the robustness of the literature demonstrating a positive relationship between victimization and political participation, it is somewhat surprising that in this sample, victimization does not have a significant impact on subject’s reported interest in politics. Although one could theorize that this is due to the perceived futility of political engagement in Nigeria, previous research demonstrating a positive effect of victimization on participation was carried out in countries in which the perceived utility of participating should be similarly limited (see, for example, research conducted in Sierra Leone by Bellows and Miguel, 2009 or Uganda, by Blattman, 2009).

Finally, the lack of a victimization effect on support for the use of violence was surprising, given the rich evidence in psychology suggesting otherwise. Support for violence was generally low among both victims (mean score of 1.57 on a 0-4 scale) and non-victims (mean score 1.24), and it is encouraging that, at least in response to survey questions, victims

are not significantly more likely to support the use of violence. At the same time, as is always the case when attitudes rather than actual behaviour are measured, how individuals responded to questions about the appropriateness of the use of violence may not necessarily correspond to their behaviour. Indeed, when the responses of perpetrators of violence – individuals who admitted to having carried out an act of violence in the previous year – are examined, their self-reported support for violence is also relatively low, at a mean level of 2.01. This underlines the fact that the “support for violence” variable captures only the subject’s conceptual support for the use of violence, rather than her propensity to engage in future violent acts.

6.5 Conclusion

Using original survey data about victimization and identity, as well as the insights gleaned from a series of interviews with victims, this chapter demonstrated that on average, first-hand experiences with everyday violence decrease in-group trust, and increase warmth toward and trust in the out-group. Victimization does not significantly affect attitudes about political or the use of violence, results that are robust to different model specifications and to a range of covariates.

These results are, upon initial examination, surprising, particularly in relation to the findings presented in chapter 5, in which threat-induced fear was shown to be identity affirming. Over time, one can imagine two potential implications of the results presented in this chapter: the first, more optimistic perspective would point to increased out-group warmth and trust as a “positive externality” of everyday violence victimization, and one might accordingly theorize that societies with higher levels of everyday violence victimization may, in fact, also have more harmonious intergroup relations. There is, however, little empirical support for this idea, and it is important to remember that the positive *changes* in feelings toward and trust in the out-group do not mean that absolute levels of both were high. Victims were still generally negative about their out-group after an attack – just less negative than before.

The second, more cynical interpretation of these findings is that the cycle of threat–actual victimization, and the “dashed expectations” following an attack, may have deleterious effects on the links victims have to their community, reinforcing the idea that “the only person you can rely on is yourself,” as one victim of violence put it. Although increased self-reliance is not inherently negative and the idea of “decreased in-group bias” may sound like a desirable end-state, the sentiment of being unsupported by one’s community in a time of need, espoused by many interviewees, may have damaging effects on their calculations about the future (Hill et al., 2010). This disillusionment could, over time, have a corrosive effect on the way individuals and groups interact. This is a proposition I consider in more detail in chapters 8 and 9.

Chapter 7

Violence and Trusting Behaviour

7.1 Introduction

The empirical analysis thus far demonstrates that both the fear of and actual experiences with violence alter attitudes about in- and out-group members. Independent of the type of violent threat described, the acute fear it induces has a moderate identity-affirming impact, increasing in-group favouritism and depressing views of and trust in out-groups. Recent victimization, on the other hand, actually slightly depresses reported levels of in-group trust and bolsters out-group trust, indicating that expectations about violence and actual experiences of victimization impact attitudes in strikingly different ways.

But does exposure to violence also change *behaviour*? As is well-documented across disciplines, what an individual claims to believe does not necessarily correspond to her behaviour (LaPiere, 1934; Wicker, 1969; Armitage & Christian, 2003). This attitude-behaviour discrepancy is particularly relevant to the study of trust, as we know from past research that measures of trusting attitudes are not always good predictors of trusting behaviour (Glaeser et al., 2000; Sapienza et al., 2013). Social scientists have suggested a number of factors that might explain this discrepancy, including the specificity of the attitude and of its measurement (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), the extent to which the attitude is personally involving (Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995), and the impact of the social context (Terry & Hogg, 1999). Moreover, when individuals are asked about sensitive topics such as identity or trust in others, social desirability bias may also affect responses,¹ further increasing the importance of including behavioural measures if possible.

¹ In some instances, however, subjects may feel comfortable expressing a “less preferred” viewpoint that is still socially acceptable (e.g. expressing pride in one’s in-group in Lagos), but may be uncomfortable actually acting on that belief when given the opportunity, or the belief may not be strong enough to motivate a change in behaviour. For a discussion of these issues and other questions of bias in measuring behaviour, see Nederhof, 1985; Ajzen et al., 2005; Levitt & List, 2007.

In this chapter, I contend with the possibility of a discrepancy between attitudes and behaviour and empirically assess the impact of exposure to violence on trusting behaviour. Specifically, I present the results of a “one shot” Trust Game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Wilson & Eckel, 2011) played during the survey to assess whether acute, threat-induced fear as well as actual victimization impact the amount of trust² individuals demonstrate toward their partner. Does an individual fearful of a proximate violent threat trust her in-group more, as shown in chapter 5? Do actual victims of violence trust their in-groups *less* and their out-groups more, as the self-reports in chapter 6 indicated? In what follows, I take up these and other questions and evaluate whether the attitudes and beliefs presented in the previous two chapters correspond to behaviour exhibited in a stylized game.

The results of this exercise at once underscore earlier findings about the identity-affirming effects of everyday violence on individuals, while also suggesting there is some lingering uncertainty about the mechanism(s) through which violent threat influences identity. Specifically, I find that a threat of everyday – but not identity-based – violence increases trusting behaviour when the partner is perceived to be in-group; however, the fear induced by this threat does not seem to mediate the relationship, suggesting that in this instance, a mechanism beyond fear is at work, and highlighting the need for further research.

Additionally – and consistent with earlier results – I find that those who were victims of everyday violence behave in a more trusting way toward perceived *out-group* partners, an indication that firsthand experiences with violence may significantly affect ideas about who can and cannot be trusted. Finally, the existence of an “in-group trust premium” is once again confirmed in this game, as individuals sent approximately 16%³ more to perceived co-

² There is some disagreement about whether the Trust Game truly measures trust or if it captures other qualities, such as hereditary cooperativeness (Cesarini et al., 2008), altruism (Barclay, 2004; Cox, 2007), or risk preferences (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Fairley et al., 2016). More recently, researchers have demonstrated that trust is indeed the “dominant motivation for ‘trust like’ choices” (Brühlhart & Usunier, 2012), and the game is still considered a reliable measure of trust.

³ Model-dependent, with estimates ranging from 8 – 25%. The 16% premium cited here is a flat average of the estimates from the four models reported below.

communal partners. This finding adds to the broader literature about the way perceptions of shared group identification shape prosocial behaviour.

Collectively, these results provide additional evidence for the identity-affirming effects of the threat of everyday violence and the bias-reducing effects of actual everyday violence victimization, and underscore that “ordinary” violence should be taken seriously in studies of intergroup relations and conflict.

This chapter begins with a review of the theoretical reasons why levels of trust may differ depending on the individual’s in- or out-group relationship to her partner, and a discussion of why we might expect the acute fear of violence and actual victimization to impact dyadic trust. Part three discusses the specifics of this particular implementation of the Trust Game, and then addresses research design complications that resulted from the way subjects defined their out-group. In part four, I present the analytical strategy and the results. The chapter concludes with a discussion of these findings, particularly as they relate to the two preceding chapters.

7.2 Trust, Violence and Identity

The previous chapters demonstrate that exposure to both everyday and identity-based violence impacts self-identification, trust, and attitudes toward in- and out-groups, and that fear and actual victimization have starkly differing effects. Here, the focus is exclusively on the impact of exposure to violence on intergroup *trust*, and specifically, on its impact on trusting *behaviour*. As a starting point, I briefly review how co-communal identity, emotion, and violence may impact trust.

First, we know that group identity can powerfully shape trust. In-group members are generally perceived as more trustworthy than out-group members (Moy & Ng, 1996; Dovidio et al., 2002), and this in-group “trust premium” (Robinson, 2017) has been shown to change an array of behaviours, including performance in a group task (Dirks, 1999) and the extent of cooperation when sharing public goods (Solow & Kirkwood, 2002; Chen & Li, 2009). Yet co-

communal identity is not always sufficient to motivate trusting behaviour: macro, contextual factors, such as the amount of intergroup contact (Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008; Rydgren Sofi, & Hällsten, 2013), the political culture of the country (Miguel, 2004; Robinson, 2016; Burbidge & Cheeseman, 2017), and the specific communal composition of the sub-national space (Kasara, 2013; Robinson, 2017), may also play a role, and can limit the extent to which the in-group trust premium actually materializes.

In Nigeria and particularly in Lagos, there are good reasons to believe that social identity meaningfully impacts intergroup trust. As discussed in chapter 3, nation-building efforts were largely unsuccessful, and communal identity is highly salient in social and political life. As a result, as Igwara explains, “Reciprocal ethnicity [...] [remains] a source of trust, certainty, help, and protection against neglect of one’s interests” in Nigeria (2001, p.88, see also Horowitz, 1994, p.49).⁴ This is despite the fact that neighbourhoods are generally ethnically and religiously heterogeneous and intergroup mixing is common – factors that often mitigate the relevance of co-communal identity.⁵

In interviews, Lagosians were quick to cite reasons why others should not be trusted, often pointing to differences in ethnic or religious identity. “No, no, no, Yoruba people cannot be trusted!” exclaimed Leke, clarifying that he generally does not trust others, but *especially not* Yoruba people. Damilola declared that “nobody can be trusted... [not] any tribe” but went on to say that she would probably still trust members of her ethnic group.

More broadly, when asked whether they trust in- and out-group members, almost 91% of all survey respondents claimed that they trust fellow in-group members somewhat or completely, while only 18% said the same about out-group members. This is consistent with other research carried out in Nigeria: in response to an Afrobarometer question, for example,

⁴ This characterization of the negative impact of diversity on trust has been particularly applied to African states, which are among the most ethnically diverse in the world (Easterly & Levine, 1997) and exhibit the lowest levels of generalized trust across regions (Uslaner, 2008b). According to the 2012 World Values Survey in Nigeria, 85% of Nigerians believe that people generally cannot be trusted; among respondents to the survey carried out for this thesis, a similar proportion (~80%) said that strangers cannot be trusted.

⁵ For more on how intergroup contact can reduce prejudice, see Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006.

Nigerians espoused significantly higher levels of trust in those who shared their ethnicity identity than non-co-ethnics.⁶ Collectively, these responses suggest that Lagosians may be more inclined to trust someone who shares their identity.

Alongside co-communal identity, emotions have also been shown to affect an individual's propensity to trust someone else. For example, studies of the impact of fear and anxiety on trusting behaviour have demonstrated a moderate, negative effect, with fear reducing money sent in a Trust Game by up to 25% in one experiment (Ng and Lim, 2013). The authors of this study contend that fearful individuals adopt a more defensive posture and may show reduced levels of trust in order to protect themselves from harm. Others have theorized that fear and anxiety lead to more pessimistic risk assessments, which may negatively affect appraisals of trustworthiness (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Young, 2016). As a result, I anticipate that acute fear will depress trusting behaviour.

In addition to assessing the impact of threat-induced fear, I also test the impact of surprise on trusting behaviour. The surprise generated by news about violence has a negative valence,¹ and, consistent with Albertson and Gadarian (2015), I expect that the more profound the surprise, the greater the ensuing sense of uncertainty. As a result, I anticipate that surprise will have a negative impact on trusting behaviour, although it should be noted that there are, at best, only weak theoretical links between surprise and trust.

Finally, previous victimization has been shown to increase trust after wartime violence (Bauer et al. 2016), but may decrease trust if the type of violence experienced was more solitary, or if the person did not feel well-supported by her community thereafter (Smith, 1987, cited in Hale, 1996; Vuori, Oksanen, & Räsänen, 2013). I consequently anticipate that the type of victimization experienced will impact the amount of trust exhibited. These ideas are tested below; together, they make up the final component of the quantitative analysis.

⁶ In general, Nigerians expressed very low levels of overall trust. Of the 16 African countries included in an article about diversity and intergroup trust that drew on Afrobarometer (2005-2006) data, Nigerians expressed the lowest level of trust (Robinson, 2017).

7.3 Trust Game Protocol

To test the impact of a proximate threat of violence on intergroup trust, I conduct a single-round (“one-shot”)⁷ version of the Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995). Traditionally, the game consists of two players, a sender (Player A) and a receiver (Player B). Player A is given an initial endowment of money and told she can send any portion of the funds to her partner, including nothing. The amount she sends is typically tripled by the researchers before Player B receives it. Player B then decides how much of that money, if any, she would like to send back to Player A. The logic of the game is that although both players would be better off if Player A sends all of the initial endowment (and Player B accordingly sends back any amount that is greater than Player A’s initial endowment), the suboptimal Nash equilibrium is for Player A to send nothing, since she has no way of ensuring that Player B will reciprocate. Any amount above 0 that Player A sends is therefore widely (although not exclusively) considered a measure of trusting behaviour, and, controlling for the amount sent, the money Player B returns⁸ is considered as, a measure of trustworthiness (Glaeser et al., 2000; Sapienza et al., 2013; Burbidge & Cheeseman 2017). In a meta-study of the Trust Game, the average proportion of the initial endowment sent by Player A was just over 50% worldwide and 45.6% in Africa, indicating that factors beyond pure, rational self-interest affect decisions to trust (Uslaner, 2002; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011).

There are a number of strategies⁹ researchers use to create the Players A/B trust dyads. As discussed below, I ultimately chose to pair partners with a fictional Player B (a computer algorithm) and claimed that the “partner” was participating from another location in Lagos.

⁷ In a one-shot game, each player makes a decision only once. The version is a “clean” measure of trusting behaviour and therefore best suited for the concepts tested here (Kiyonari et al., 2006; Burbidge & Cheeseman, 2017).

⁸ In this iteration of the game, the algorithm was pre-programmed to return 50% of the quantity sent by the subject (Player A). As a result, the actual payoff matrix was between 500 – 750 Naira, meaning that independent of behaviour, all subjects ultimately retained at least their initial endowment. The average pay-out across all participants was 647 Naira, about \$3.25 at the time of the study.

⁹ For example, one could invite respondents to return to a lab-in-the-field at a later point to play the Trust Game; run interviews in different locations in the city and to attempt to find real-time matches; inform the subject of the identity of her (fictional) partner or merely tell her that she is playing with a co-ethnic/co-religious partner or not; or show the subject a picture of their partner, as outward appearance may signal identity. For a mixture of substantive and logistical reasons, I decided on the algorithm instead.

After the game, the subject was asked how she decided on the particular quantity of Naira to send to Player B; what ethnicity she believed Player B was; and what religious group she believed Player B belonged to. These guesses about the partner's identity were then used to evaluate whether the subject "complied" with treatment assignment (i.e. to an in- or out-group partner), which will be discussed in more detail below.

The Trust Game was one of the last portions of the survey, administered after exposure to treatment, post-treatment questions about identity, violence, and political beliefs, and shortly before the final debrief. The timing of the game was an important design consideration: had it been one of the early components of the survey before the questions about feelings toward in- and out-groups, subjects who had a particularly positive or negative experience with an in- or out-group partner may have subsequently given answers that were positively or negatively biased. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 4, it was important for ethical reasons to reveal the deception (that Player B was an algorithm) as quickly as possible after its occurrence, making an early placement in the survey undesirable.

Of course, by situating the Trust Game at the end of the survey, there may have been unintended consequences. For example, it is likely that treatment, and more specifically, the fear induced by a proximate threat of violence, became less salient over the course of the survey, such that subjects were no longer actively thinking about the threat of violence by the time they played the Trust Game. In this case, there is a possibility of underestimating the effect of treatment on Trust Game behaviour. A second consequence of placing the Trust Game toward the end of the survey is that subject behaviour may have been influenced by the preceding survey questions. For example, questions about past experiences with violence and the safety of Lagos may have reinforced a sense of danger and made risk preferences during the Trust Game more conservative. The possibility of this kind of bias cannot be excluded, although there is little reason to believe that these preceding questions, which were asked of all subjects, would have disproportionately affected subjects in the treatment group. Even if these questions did impact the absolute level of Naira sent across subjects, any effect should have therefore been

roughly evenly distributed across groups. It is nonetheless worth keeping the possible impact of the design in mind while considering the results and their implications.

7.4 Partner Assignment

Central to this implementation of the Trust Game and to the hypotheses it was designed to test is the identity of Player B, who was meant to be a member of the subject's in- or out-group, depending on random assignment. Because participants were given the option to personally identify along two dimensions of identity – ethnicity and religion – and to select from a theoretically unlimited number of ethnicities and religions when naming their in- and out-group, the number of potential partner permutations was also very large. The research design needed to accommodate this complexity while also addressing the risk of non-random subject attrition if a suitable partner was not found for minorities. As a result, subjects were paired with fictional partners by the software platform, which viewed the subject's responses to the early survey questions about in- and out-group identity and then selected a “partner” whose name and location conveyed that he was in- or out-group, accordingly (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Trust Game Player B Identity

Intended Identity of Partner (Player B)		Identifying Information for Player B	Subject Guessed Ethnicity Correctly	Subject Guessed Religion Correctly
Ethnicity	Igbo	Chidike Okpara	96%	n/a
	Yoruba	Segun Adeyemo	94.90%	n/a
	Hausa	Ibrahim Danjuma	86.90%	n/a
Religion	Christian	Chidike Okpara, “playing from his church”	n/a	98.60%
	Muslim	Ibrahim Danjuma, “playing from his mosque”	n/a	97.30%
Other	All other	Tunde Akindele	100% guessed Yoruba	81.6% guessed Christian; 18.4% guessed Muslim

In Nigeria, first and especially last names convey information about ethnicity – and in certain contexts, also about religion (Scacco & Warren, 2018), so telling someone the name of her partner is a reasonable way to signal that person’s identity. When religion was a relevant in- or out-group dimension, Player B’s religious identity was reinforced through a reference to the location from which he was allegedly participating – in his church or mosque. In all other ways, the information provided about Player B was the same (script in appendix).

As shown in Table 7.1, the Player B names with whom subjects could be paired represented the three largest ethnic groups in Lagos – Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa – and the two main religions, Christianity and Islam. The decision to create primes for these particular groups was based on the results of a pilot survey question, in which 70% of respondents named one of the five aforementioned groups as their in-group in an entirely unrestricted question (i.e. they could have equally named their state, profession, economic status, etc.). Fifty-five percent of respondents named an out-group corresponding to one of these categories as well. Additionally, in focus group discussions and interviews with country experts, there was broad consensus that most Lagosians would cite one of the dominant¹⁰ ethnic or religious groups if asked explicitly about their identity.

Subjects whose in- and/or out-group did not fall into one of the aforementioned categories were assigned to a partner with the generic name of “Tunde Akindele” and no information given about his religion. The name lightly signalled membership to the most dominant¹¹ demographic profile in Lagos – a Christian Yoruba – but was ambiguous enough to also credibly represent other groups. And while it was clear during the design stage that this ambiguity might complicate “matches” for those assigned to Akindele, I had expected that the name would be used only rarely; and the trade-off ensured a match for every participant. In manipulation checks, the prompts performed well, with an average of 95% correct (i.e.

¹⁰ Indeed, almost 85% of subjects identified as being Hausa, Yoruba, or Igbo, and 99% identified as Christian or Muslim. Arguably the next largest “minority” ethnic group, Edo (to which 3.6% of subjects belonged) could have also been represented in this experimental design. The challenge with the design, as will be discussed, stemmed from *out-group* identification. It is possible that most respondents in focus groups and interviews were thinking in terms of in-group, rather than out-group, when asked.

¹¹ 42% of all subjects identified as both Christian and Yoruba.

consistent with the research design) guesses about ethnicity and religion for the names that were designed to signal an identity group. There was similarly broad agreement about Tunde Akindele's identity, with the majority of subjects believing he was Yoruba and Christian.

Despite the high level of agreement about the identity of each Player B, there were research design complications that resulted in highly uneven numbers of in- and out-group Trust Game dyads. Specifically, considerably more subjects believed they were playing with an in-group partner than were actually assigned to this condition, and very few believed that they were playing with an out-group partner. The root cause of this issue was that three-fourths of participants said – very unexpectedly¹² – that their religious out-group was *not* Christianity or Islam.¹³ Consequently, many more individuals than anticipated defaulted to the “other” Player B condition – Tunde Akindele – if they were randomly assigned to an out-group Trust Game partner. As discussed above, Akindele was widely perceived to be Christian, and some 60% of participants also personally identified as Christians. As a result, many of the participants who were assigned to Akindele as their *out*-group partner believed that he was, in fact, *in*-group, inflating the number of perceived in-group pairs¹⁴ (Table 7.2) and making it more difficult to estimate differential in- versus out-group effects. The analyses below try to account for this imbalance by estimating both the objective (assigned) and subjective (perceived) relationship to the partner; by looking at subgroups of those who “complied” with their partner assignment; and through matching. In any case, this unanticipated design complication is an important

¹² This was not well-predicted by my preparatory research and was surprising, given that 99% respondents said their religious in-group was either Christianity or Islam. One possibility is that there was a strong observer effect, whereby participants felt that it was socially unacceptable to identify the “opposing” religious group as their out-group. Because ethnic groups are far more fragmented, there might have been less stigma around identifying one of them as an out-group. Another ground could be the prominent efforts to diffuse religious tensions by local religious leaders in Lagos, a message to which respondents were likely regularly exposed via attendance at church/mosque. Alternatively, as religiosity is generally viewed positively in Lagos (chapter 3), it is possible that respondents *did* feel that those who were not believers “of the Book” were their out-group, and that this answer did not occur as frequently in preparatory research because it was not explicitly listed as a possibility.

¹³ Most of these individuals named their religious out-group as “traditionalists/animists” (45%), followed by “atheists” (23%), or “other” (5%).

¹⁴ As a point of reference, of the subjects assigned to an out-group partner who then, for the reasons described above, defaulted into the generic “Tunde Akindele” category, only 4% believed that Akindele was an out-group member. 57% believed he was in-group, and 39% said they had no particular in- or out-group relationship to him.

lesson for those using behavioural exercises to understand identity-related outcomes, and for studies in which researchers attempt to signal identity.

Table 7.2: Player B Assignment and Perception

STATUS	Perceived In-Group	Perceived Out-Group	“Neutral” Relationship*	Total
Assigned to In-Group	442	8	67	517
Assigned to Out-Group	255	62	185	502
<i>Total</i>	<i>697</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>252</i>	<i>1019</i>

* Among those who did not perceive a specific in- or out-group relationship, 55 believed their partner shared an identity dimension with both their in- and out-group

I now turn to the results, first estimating the impact of co-communal identity (assigned and perceived) on trusting behaviour, then the impact of the acute fear of everyday and identity-based violence, and finally, the impact of firsthand victimization.

7.5 Results

7.5.1 The Impact of Co-Communal Identity on Trusting Behaviour

I begin by probing whether participants did indeed exhibit more trusting behaviour toward fellow in-group members. Table 7.3 presents summary statistics of player behaviour by the assigned and perceived relationship to Player B. As reported below, when partner assignment, and not perception, is considered, the quantity of money sent to out-group partners (295 Naira) was actually slightly (but not statistically significantly) higher than that sent to in-group partners (292 Naira), indicating that simply being assigned to an in- or out-group partner did not meaningfully impact trusting behaviour.

Table 7.3: Sent Naira by Player Assignment and Perception

	Mean (Naira)	Min	Percent Sending Min (0 Naira)	Max	Percent Sending Max (500 Naira)	n
All Participants	293.4	0	0.5%	500	14.6%	1019
Assigned Partner						
Assigned In-Group Partner	291.95	0	0.4%	500	13.5%	517
Assigned Out-Group Partner	294.97	0	0.6%	500	15.7%	502
Perceived Partner						
Perceived In-Group Partner	300.1	0	0.4%	500	16.8%	697
Perceived Out-Group Partner	268.1	0	1.4%	500	1.4%	70
“Neutral” Relationship*	290.5	0	0.5%	500	15.2%	197

* Includes all those who perceived their partner as not having any relationship. Does not include the 55 individuals who perceived their partner as sharing both an in-group and out-group identity dimension.

By contrast, there was a substantive difference in Naira sent to a *perceived* in- versus out-group partner. When Player B was viewed as in-group, subjects sent, on average, some 300 Naira, compared to the 268 Naira they sent when the subject was believed to be out-group. This suggests an in-group premium of 12% over an out-group partner (and 3.5% over a perceived “neutral”¹⁵ partner) – a difference that was significant at the 10% level in a Kruskal-Wallis test (Chi-Squared = 3.04, $p=0.081$, $df = 1$). However, while assignment to treatment was done at random, there is no way to verify that the perception of one’s relationship to her partner is also orthogonal to other covariates. As a result, we cannot exclude the possibility of biased estimates (Gerber & Green, 2012).

¹⁵ A “neutral” partner is one to whom the subject did not believe she had a particular in- or out-group relationship, or where she believed the person was simultaneously both in- and out-group, e.g. Christian, like her, but also Efik, like her ethnic out-group.

To account for this risk, I use two estimation strategies. First, I use OLS and Tobit regression to estimate both the average treatment effect¹⁶ of being assigned to an in-group partner and the impact of perceived co-communal identity, providing a measure of the impact of an “objective” and “subjective” relationship to a partner. As a second check, I treat this experimental data as observational and operationalize perceived in-group partner as the independent variable in matched-regression estimation. Of course, a properly randomized experiment is the “gold standard” of causal inference and discarding the expected even distribution of observed and unobserved covariates in favour of observational methods rarely makes sense.¹⁷ However, given the large discrepancy between assigned and “received” treatment, these methods arguably provide a more relevant estimate, and they are, in any case, used here as a robustness check.

I begin by estimating the average treatment effect of objective and subjective co-communal identity on trusting behaviour with the following standard linear regression model

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta T_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y is the quantity of Naira sent by subject i , T is the indicator of partner assignment (objective or subjective in- or out-group), and β is the estimate of the causal effect of an in-group partner for subject i (Gerber & Green, 2012; Imbens & Rubin, 2015). The results are presented in Table 7.4, which reports the OLS regression coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses. Each model is also re-estimated with a double-censored Tobit model, which

¹⁶ One justifiable approach is to treat the perception of the partner as a compliance issue, in which compliance is defined as accurately interpreting the intended identity of Player B. Under this framework, we could calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (the CACE), which is an estimate of the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect for the share of compliers in the population, given two-sided noncompliance (Gerber & Green, 2012). The challenge with this approach is that in situations such as this one where non-compliance is so high that it arguably distorts the ITT, the CACE, which is the ITT among compliers, is a statistically conservative but substantively uninteresting estimate.

¹⁷ Estimates in which the data is treated as observational may be more biased and/or model-dependent, potentially limiting the reliability and validity of the results (Dunning & Hyde, 2007).

accounts for the lower (0) and upper (500) bounds on the quantity of Naira subjects are allowed to send their partner.¹⁸ The Tobit model is specified by the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_t &= X_t\beta + u_t && \text{if } X_t\beta + u_t > 0 \\
 &= 0 && \text{if } X_t\beta + u_t \leq 0 \\
 &&& t = 1, 2, \dots, N,
 \end{aligned}$$

Where y_t is the quantity of sent Naira, X_t is a vector of independent variables, β is a vector of unknown coefficients, u_t is the normally-distributed error term, and there is an assumed unobserved latent variable (Tobin, 1958; Chappell, 1982). To check for robustness, models are re-run with covariates that might impact trust, including ethnicity and religion, as well as gender, baseline anxiety, and risk preferences¹⁹ (not reported). The significance and approximate size of the estimated coefficient does not change.

Table 7.4: Impact of Co-Communal Identity on Sent Naira

	<u>Objective Co-Communal Sent Naira</u>		<u>Subjective Co-Communal Sent Naira</u>	
	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit
In-group member	-3.01 (7.41)	-4.35 (8.67)	32.63*** (12.48)	42.71*** (13.4)
Observations	1,019		767	
R-squared	0.0002		0.006	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Results are robust to ethnic and religious identity group effects, as well as to a range of demographic co-variables, including baseline level of anxiety and risk preferences.

¹⁸ Although studies analysing the Trust Game often use simple OLS regression, some have argued that a Tobit model is more appropriate, as the predicted values from OLS estimates can be negative, but the Trust Game is bound at 0. For more, see Tobin (1958) or Angrist and Pischke (2009).

¹⁹ Risk preferences were measured with a simple hypothetical gamble, derived from Gneezy and Potters (1997), in which subjects could either choose a lower, more certain payoff, or the chance to win a greater amount, but with less certainty. The expected value of the high-risk option was 50% more than the conservative option.

As reported in Table 7.4, there is a stark difference in the quantity of Naira sent to Player B that is dependent on whether the partner was actually *perceived* as in-group. When only the subject's *assigned* relationship to an in- or out-group partner is considered (left-hand side of the table) there is, unsurprisingly, not a significant difference in the quantity of Naira sent to an in versus out-group partner. As discussed above, given that only ~16% of subjects assigned to an out-group partner actually perceived Player B as such (and the rest perceived him as being either in-group or having no particular communal relationship, likely inflating the quantity of Naira sent to this person), the lack of a significant in-group effect is unsurprising.

The estimates on the righthand side of Table 7.4, which report the in-group premium when Player B is *perceived* as co-communal, indicate an in-group bonus of some 33-43 Naira, model-dependent. This is approximately 13-17% more than the average quantity sent to a perceived out-group member (and 11-15% more than the amount sent to a communally “neutral” partner) and is consistent with the 14% co-ethnic premium estimated by Robinson (2017) across 16 African countries.²⁰

Taken together, these results offer some evidence of the existence of an in-group premium. To be sure, the endogenous nature of one's *perceived* relationship to Player B means we cannot definitively state that it is the nature of the co-communal relationship, and not some other variable, that is driving this result. However, the robustness of these results to the inclusion of an array of covariates suggests that this may not be mere correlation.

As a second estimation technique and robustness check, I employ methods typically reserved for observational data²¹ that may better account for the possibility of bias. Specifically, I once again conduct a coarsened exact matching (CEM) exercise, in which subjects are matched on the basis of qualities that might impact their propensity to trust, and where the

²⁰ Specifically, Robinson presents results from the 3rd round of the Afrobarometer (2005-2006), in which 57% of respondents said they trust co-ethnics “somewhat” or “a lot,” while only 43% said the same about non-co-ethnics.

²¹ There are limitations inherent in matching techniques that may be mitigated by CEM. For more, see Henderson & Chatfield, 2011; King & Nielsen, forthcoming.

“treatment” variable is defined as the individual’s perceived in-group (“treatment”) or out-group (“control”) relationship to her partner.

Specifically, I match subjects on the following demographic qualities:²² gender, age, education, socioeconomic status, as well as whether they have recently been a victim of violence, their risk profile, and a baseline measure of anxiety (covariates imbalance pre- and post-matching is in the appendix). I anticipate that younger men with higher levels of education and income (Helliwell & Putnam, 1999) who have not been a victim of violence (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002), have low dispositional anxiety levels (Delhey & Newton, 2003) and who have a greater preference for risk (Fehr, 2009), will demonstrate the most trusting behaviour.

Through this matching process, I improve the balance across the two groups from an $\mathcal{L}_1$ score of 0.946 to an $\mathcal{L}_1$ score of 0.815, an improvement of around 14%. This prunes 546 “treated” subjects (those who perceived their partner as in-group) and 23 control subjects (partner perceived as out-group) and retains 151 treated and 47 control subjects. This is obviously a significant reduction in sample size and the untreated group is small. However, the baseline number of untreated subjects was in any case only 70, and this process meaningfully improves the ratio of treated versus untreated subjects.

I follow this matching process with CEM-weighted regression analysis to estimate the causal impact of the perceived relationship to one’s partner on trusting behaviour (Iacus et al., 2003). The models are once again estimated using OLS and double-censored Tobit regression. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 7.5, the treatment variable is defined narrowly, and only those who perceived their partner as explicitly in-group or explicitly out-group are included. In Columns 3 and 4, this definition is relaxed, and the 252 participants who did not perceive an explicit in- or out-group relationship to their partner are also included in the “control” group. With a relaxed

²² One covariate that was not included in the matching was subdistrict. This was done for both substantive reasons – there are not good reasons to expect significant, geographically-linked variation in trust – and statistical reasons – matching on subdistrict dramatically reduced the number of retained subjects, and I evaluated the added power of a greater sample size to be worth the possible reduction in precision resulting from excluding this covariate.

definition, significantly more subjects – an additional 224 “control” and 413 “treated” – are retained after CEM.

Given the timing of the Trust Game at the end of the survey, models also include dummy variables for treatment status (this refers to the original treatment, i.e. exposure to news about proximate violence), the primary mediator of interest (post-treatment fear) and the alternative (surprise), as well as the interaction terms, to account for the possible intervening effects. Sub-district effects are also included but not reported.

Table 7.5: Sent Naira, Matched OLS and Tobit Models

VARIABLES	(1) OLS <i>Narrow Definition</i>	(2) Tobit <i>Narrow Definition</i>	(3) OLS <i>Relaxed Definition</i>	(4) Tobit <i>Relaxed Definition</i>
Perceived in-group partner	56.447** (28.534)	64.849** (29.072)	19.608* (10.943)	22.585* (12.786)
Covariates				
Age	-4.622 (12.086)	-4.887 (12.326)	-2.286 (4.578)	-1.035 (5.635)
Female	17.037 (19.330)	22.093 (20.610)	-12.065 (9.406)	-16.292 (11.355)
Education	7.948 (8.623)	9.869 (9.271)	10.195** (4.332)	12.040** (5.307)
Deprivation	6.304* (3.738)	7.229* (3.891)	3.688* (1.990)	4.298* (2.266)
Assigned in-group partner	4.269 (16.711)	6.931 (17.691)	10.009 (9.665)	14.432 (11.391)
Risk-seeking	1.593 (21.369)	0.302 (22.747)	-6.698 (12.103)	-8.692 (14.452)
Anxiety Index	3.679 (12.296)	2.339 (12.553)	12.248*** (4.486)	13.174** (5.106)
Past victimization	-3.367 (20.344)	-1.371 (21.315)	-9.720 (10.138)	-9.811 (11.973)
Treatment				
Robbery treatment	41.118 (50.772)	42.787 (52.674)	63.756** (28.820)	64.635** (31.905)
Ethnic violence treatment	7.211 (43.662)	6.857 (41.834)	26.449 (21.933)	30.206 (23.760)
Mediators				
Fearful	31.078 (38.274)	37.938 (40.058)	20.153 (21.967)	20.724 (25.708)
Surprised	22.853 (24.302)	28.573 (25.767)	-17.712 (14.131)	-21.551 (16.179)
Constant	134.614 (104.665)	105.220 (110.929)	161.072*** (49.915)	137.194** (58.922)
Observations	193	193	615	615
R-squared	0.352		0.347	

Robust standard errors in parentheses; sub-district effects and treatment-mediator interaction terms not reported

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

As shown in Table 7.5, across all four models, having a perceived in-group partner has a significant, positive impact on trusting behaviour. The results are sizeable, especially when the strict definition of an out-group partner is used: on average, those who perceived their partner to be in-group sent between 56-65 more Naira versus those who believed they were playing with an explicitly out-group partner, and 20-23 additional Naira to a more broadly defined “out-group” member. This represents an in-group premium of approximately 8-25% over the average quantity sent to out-group partners (and is consistent with the 13-17% premium estimated above). Once again, these results largely align with the existing literature about the positive impact of co-communal identity on trust.

Collectively, the evidence presented above suggests that there is a trust premium when one interacts with a perceived in-group member, and that this effect is primarily the result of the belief in co-communal identity. The size of the effect is moderate, representing a premium of somewhere between 8-25%, depending on the model and the definition of “out-group.” In what follows, I evaluate whether the acute fear of violence and actual victimization impact trust, and, when theoretically relevant and empirically feasible, assess whether these effects vary by the perceived in- versus out-group relationship to Player B.

7.5.2 *The Impact of Emotion on Trusting Behaviour*

I now turn to the impact of the study’s primary treatment – exposure to a proximate violent threat – on trusting behaviour. Specifically, I test whether acute fear, or alternatively, surprise, induced by treatment affects not just attitudes but also actual behaviour in the Trust Game. Because these emotions are theorized to decrease trust among both in- and out-groups, I carry out the analysis with the full sample. However, I repeat the estimation process for the subgroups of individuals who “complied” (that is, interpreted relationship to Player B as intended) with their in- or, when possible,²³ out-group treatment assignment to assess whether the effects

²³ This is challenging due to the small number of individuals who were both assigned to an out-group partner and perceived the person as being out-group. Furthermore, the ~16% of subjects who complied with their out-group partner assignment are then further distributed across the two treatment and one control group. As a result, treatment is pooled and results are conservatively interpreted.

of acute fear vary depending on the nature of the communal relationship. This provides important, if indicative, information about the ways in which acute fear impacts intergroup trust.

I begin with a breakdown of Trust Game behaviour by treatment assignment and by the subject's level of treatment-induced fear and surprise, recognizing, of course, that these emotions are not exogenous, as they are impacted by treatment and other observed and unobserved covariates.

As reported in Table 7.6, those exposed to the threat of robbery or ethnic violence sent, on average, slightly more Naira to their partner than those who heard news about traffic. Subjects who were exposed to a threat of everyday violence demonstrated the highest level of trust, sending some 6.5% more Naira to their partner than those in the control condition – a difference that is significant in a Kruskal-Wallis test ($\chi^2 3.7$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.054$). Interestingly, almost one-fifth of subjects exposed to the robbery treatment sent the maximum quantity of Naira (500) to their partner, compared to 13% and 12% for the ethnic violence treatment and control, respectively. Participants who were exposed to a threat of identity-based violence were slightly less trusting, sending on average 3.5% more Naira to their partner than those in control, which was not significantly different (Kruskal-Wallis test: $\chi^2 0.962$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.33$).

Table 7.6: Sent Naira by Treatment and Mediator Status

	Mean	Min	Percent Sending Min (0 Naira)	Max	Percent Sending Max (500 Naira)	n
Treatment						
Robbery	302.49	0	0.57%	500	18.52%	351
Ethnic Violence	293.99	50	0.00%	500	13.18%	311
Control	284.1	0	0.84%	500	12.04%	357
Mediators						
Not Fearful	277.79	0	0.82%	500	9.95%	613
Fearful	317.73	100	0.00%	500	21.90%	402
Not Surprised	285.97	0	1.17%	500	11.66%	343
Surprised	297.6	0	0.15%	500	16.29%	669

There is also a noteworthy difference between those who felt fear after hearing a news report and those who did not feel fear: fearful individuals sent, on average, almost 15% more Naira than those who reported that they were not fearful (Kruskal Wallis: $\chi^2 = 22.38$, df: 1, $p=0.0001$). Moreover, among those who felt fearful, the minimum quantity of Naira sent was, unusually, 100 Naira rather than the true minimum of 0, and almost 22% of fearful subjects sent the maximum (500) to their partner compared to 10% of those who were not fearful. Surprised individuals also sent slightly more Naira (4%) to their partner as compared to control, but the difference was not significant ($\chi^2 = 1.17$, df: 1, $p=0.28$). This is, however, only suggestive evidence, as the subject's level of fear and surprise may be a product of other covariates that also impact trusting behaviour.

As a second, preliminary look at the impact of treatment on trust, I check how in- and out-group “compliers”²⁴ behaved by treatment group assignment. As shown in Table 7.7, those

²⁴ That is, those whose assigned and perceived relationship to Player B matched

with an in-group partner were, on average, somewhat more trusting than those with an out-group partner. Additionally, there is an interesting trend whereby the quantity of Naira sent to an in-group partner among those exposed to the everyday violence treatment (316 Naira) was significant higher than in the control (287) or the ethnic violence (290) groups (Kruskal Wallis: $\chi^2 = 5.314$, $df: 2, p=0.0701$), but significantly lower among those who then played with an out-group partner (239)²⁵ as compared to control (260) or the ethnic violence condition (272) (Kruskal Wallis: $\chi^2 = 1.608$, $df: 2, p=0.4476$). Although this is only descriptive evidence, it does suggest an interaction between one's communal relationship to a partner and the type of violent threat, in which a proximate threat of robbery bolsters in-group trust and depresses out-group trust.

Table 7.7: Sent Naira by Treatment and Partner Compliance

	In-Group Compliers	Out-Group Compliers	In-Group - Out-Group Difference
Control	287.4 (158) 122.9	260.2 (31) 90.3	27.2
Robbery	315.9 (150) 122.3	238.8 (25) 103.3	77.1***
Ethnic Violence	290.3 (134) 107.8	272.3 (24) 93.5	18.0
<i>Average</i>	<i>298 (442)</i> <i>118.7</i>	<i>257.2 (80)</i> <i>95.2</i>	<i>40.8***</i>

N in parenthesis, standard deviation below. Differences tested with Welch's t-test.

**** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Testing these relationships more rigorously requires a strategy that accounts for the endogeneity of the emotion induced by proximate threat and disaggregates their causal impact from mere exposure to treatment. As with earlier analyses of the impact of emotion on identity-related outcomes (chapter 5), I employ causal mediation analysis (Imai et al 2010, 2011). This enables

²⁵ Again, the number of out-group compliers was very small (approximately 27 individuals per group), especially compared to an average for in-group compliers (approximately 147, over 5x the amount). Consequently, out-group results should be cautiously interpreted.

me to estimate the direct effects of exposure to news about a violent threat and the indirect impact transmitted via the fear and surprise that this news induces – the elements of treatment that are theorized to be doing the work.

I begin by testing whether there is a direct effect of treatment on trust with between-subject estimates, using the following standard linear regression model

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta T_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y is the quantity of Naira sent by subject i , T is the indicator of treatment status, and β is the estimate of the causal effect of treatment for subject i (Gerber & Green, 2012; Imbens & Rubin, 2015). The results are in Table 7.8, which reports the OLS regression coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses. Once again, estimates of the p -value are generated using randomization inference (see: Gerber and Green, 2012, ch. 3).

Table 7.8: Average Treatment Effects on Sent Naira

Treatment Assignment	Mean Naira Sent (Std Dev)	OLS Coefficient (Robust S.E.)	Rand Inference <i>p</i> -value (versus control)	Rand Inference <i>p</i> -value (T1 - T2)
Control	284.1 (117.2)			
Robbery (T1)	302.5 (123.7)	18.4 (9.1)	0.03**	0.34
Ethnic Violence (T2)	294.0 (111.9)	9.9 (8.9)	0.26	
Treated (binary)	298.5 (118.3)	14.4 (7.7)	0.05**	

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

As shown in Table 7.8, there is a direct effect of a proximate threat of everyday violence (robbery) on trusting behaviour. Compared to those who heard the news about traffic, subjects who heard about an episode of violent robbery sent their partner 6% more Naira – a moderately-sized but statistically significant display of greater trust. These results also hold when demographic covariates,²⁶ including a measure of risk preferences and baseline anxiety levels, are included in the OLS regressions and when non-parametric statistical tests are used. The results are also similar when a Tobit regression model is employed rather than OLS. Consistent with the preliminary analyses above, the positive effect of the robbery treatment on trusting behaviour is present only among in-group dyads but not out-group dyads (sub-group analyses in appendix), suggesting that any trust-bolstering impact of the everyday violence treatment is specific to co-communals.

This outcome is unexpected across two dimensions. First, it is interesting that there was *any* direct treatment effect on trusting behaviour – recall that treatment did not have a direct effect on the earlier outcome measures, including self-reported levels of trust. As discussed in chapter 5, treatment is essentially “mere” information about a threat; it is the emotions elicited

²⁶ As Gerber and Green explain, covariate adjustment in a randomized experiment can reduce disturbance variability if the included term is thought to predict outcomes (2012, p.103-105).

by this information, and specifically, the fear of different forms of violence, that is theorized to influence outcomes related to social identity and trust. Moreover, that information about a threat of violent robbery, but not ethnic violence, influences trusting behaviour provides further evidence that different forms of threat have a varied impact on identity-related outcomes, but also elicits the question of why the effects differed. One possible reason is that robbery was viewed as more likely to occur, and the credibility of the threat may have resulted in its more pronounced impact on behaviour. Indeed, the timing of the Trust Game at the end of the survey may have resulted in generally weakened treatment effects, possibly to a greater extent for the less credible threat.

The second surprising dimension of the results is the direction of the relationship. Although chapter 5 demonstrated that an acute threat of violence was broadly identity-affirming, recall that the theory anticipated that those who felt acutely threatened by violence would exhibit *less* trusting behaviour during this game. Although treatment alone is not a perfect proxy for feeling acutely threatened (hence the causal mediation analysis that follows), it is notable that information about proximate violence actually *increased* trusting behaviour rather than depressing it.

Why might information about everyday violence increase (particularly in-group) trusting behaviour? Although I can only speculate, there are several conceivable possibilities. The first is that the news about the robbery made subjects angry – an emotion that was unfortunately not explicitly measured after the experiment – and that the direct effect of the robbery treatment is, in fact, capturing the impact of the induced anger rather than the information itself.²⁷ From interviews, anger seems like a plausible response to treatment. As Jonah said about armed robbers, “[Thinking about it] makes me feel so angry towards [the

²⁷ In addition to fear, surprise, and anger, this news may elicited other emotions. For example, participants may have been disgusted by the described events, frustrated by the commonness of the event, or exasperated by the lack of an adequate government response, or sad about the loss suffered by others. Disgust, which often results an unfulfilled expectation or deviation from expected moral behaviour, has been shown to reduce dyadic trust (Ng and Lim 2013). It is less clear how frustration/exasperation would impact trust. At best, we can hypothesize that, like sadness, they would decrease trust, as negative emotions in general tend to decrease dyadic trust (for more, see Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Ng and Lim, 2013; Myers & Tingley, 2016).

perpetrators]. If [in the future] I see anywhere people are shouting and maybe the armed robber is being caught and all that, I will not hesitate to join them, I will make sure that that person is probably burnt alive [...] I feel so angry toward them.” Given the frequency of robbery in Lagos and the broadly perceived²⁸ anaemic state response, an angry reaction to yet another episode of everyday violence would not be unusual.

There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that anger might increase²⁹ trust, particularly among in-groups. Past research has demonstrated that individuals experiencing acute anger generally make more optimistic risk assessments because, as Habib et al. explain, “anger is associated with a sense of certainty and individual control,” which can contribute to increased risk-seeking and generally more optimistic behaviour (2015, p.2; see also Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).³⁰ Moreover, risk assessments may be particularly bullish if the partner is perceived as being in-group (Watson & Kumar, 1992; Song & Schwarz, 2009), leading to increased trusting behaviour *particularly* among in-group dyads (Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; see also Litvak et al., 2010).

A second possibility is that the specific nature of the threat – an episode of robbery – influenced the salience of financial gain/loss in a way that the ethnic violence prime did not. Although the most immediately obvious impact of hearing about a robbery is a greater awareness of possible *loss*, there is also a plausible scenario whereby this news prompted feelings of relief and perhaps even happiness that they were spared. Reflecting on a time she narrowly escaped an armed robber, Miriam said she felt “so happy” and grateful to God that she avoided serious injury or loss. Happiness has been demonstrated to produce similar levels of optimism to anger and could impact risk preferences and corresponding trusting behaviour in similar ways (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Because these other emotions were not measured, I

²⁸ Discussed below.

²⁹ There is some dissent in the literature about the impact of anger on trust. For example, Dunn and Schweitzer 2005 and Ng and Lim (2013) demonstrated that anger reduced trust, while Myers and Tingley (2016) did not find a significant effect of anger on trust. It is unclear if event-specific anger, rather than a non-specified induced form of anger (as is used in these three studies) would affect the impact on trust.

³⁰ If this were the case, the observed increase in money sent would primarily reflect the change in risk preferences rather than a true shift in levels of trust.

unfortunately cannot assess whether one or a combination of them mediated the impact of treatment – this is a clear next step for future research.

I can, however, estimate the effects – direct and mediation – of the emotions that were measured, namely threat-induced fear, which is the primary mediator of interest, as well as the alternative, surprise. I begin with OLS and Tobit regression estimates of the direct effects of these mediators, with models including covariates (this is important because these variables were observed post-treatment) (Imai et al., 2010, 2011). The results are presented in Table 7.9: columns 1 and 2 report the results for a pooled mediator variable, while columns 3 and 4 report the results for robbery- and ethnic violence-induced fear, respectively.

Table 7.9: Direct Mediator Effects on Sent Naira

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	OLS	Tobit	OLS - Robbery Treatment Only	OLS - Ethnic Violence Treatment Only
Mediator				
Acute Fear	5.925 (7.837)	6.980 (9.089)	15.773 (13.696)	-2.115 (13.023)
Surprise	-9.318 (7.874)	-9.538 (8.765)	-64.881*** (18.930)	-24.724 (18.152)
Controls				
Age	1.520 (2.921)	2.497 (3.370)	0.168 (5.213)	2.763 (4.957)
Education	8.517*** (2.858)	10.352*** (3.382)	3.509 (5.556)	17.329*** (4.944)
Perceived in-group partner	-0.627 (8.607)	-1.424 (9.941)	0.151 (15.077)	-20.282 (15.902)
Female	-1.445 (6.544)	-1.643 (7.537)	0.803 (11.621)	-0.569 (11.982)
Deprivation score	1.524 (1.077)	1.817 (1.184)	-0.009 (2.053)	2.119 (1.832)
Past victimization	-0.722 (7.126)	0.628 (8.122)	-10.723 (12.402)	19.663 (12.758)
RA assessment of anxiety	13.373*** (2.839)	13.562*** (3.113)	15.868*** (4.857)	5.918 (5.217)
Risk preferences	5.707 (7.219)	4.479 (8.331)	8.042 (12.809)	15.624 (13.215)
Observations	965	965	339	297
R-squared	0.324		0.386	0.349

Robust standard errors in parentheses; sub-district fixed effects not reported

**** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

The results suggest that treatment-induced fear, independent of whether it is pooled or specific to a certain type of violence, does *not* have a direct causal effect on trusting behaviour, indicating that the impact of information about proximate everyday violence is likely mediated by another emotion or cognition, as will be discussed. Interestingly, the alternative mechanism, surprise, did have a significant, direct effect when the emotion was induced by information about everyday violence. Subjects who were surprised by this news exhibited *less* trusting behaviour than those who were not surprised. The size of this effect is noteworthy: on average, among the subjects who heard about the threat of everyday violence, feeling surprise resulted in approximately 25% fewer Naira being sent to Player B compared to the control mean with the mediator value set to zero.

In sub-group analysis, this effect was present among in-group compliers (that is, those who were both assigned to and perceived their partner as in-group), but not out-group compliers. This is broadly consistent with the result presented in chapter 5, whereby surprise about a proximate threat of violence actually *increased* self-reported levels of out-group trust. One interpretation of these two results is that the participants who were surprised by the news had expected a fellow in-group member to inform them about the threat. Upon hearing this news, these individuals may have updated their levels of trust accordingly, becoming somewhat less trusting of those who “should have” informed them (in-group members) and somewhat more open to outsiders. Given the overall positive effect of news about everyday violence on trust, however, this result is not of particular importance. Moreover, as Imai et al. emphasize, “... identifying the effect of the mediator itself is not sufficient” (2011, p.772). As a final step, I therefore develop the full causal mediation model to better understand how a proximate threat of violence impacts trusting behaviour.

7.5.3 Full Causal Mediation Model

Again, under a causal mediation framework, the total effect of a given treatment is decomposed into the direct and indirect effects. The average direct effect (ADE) is the difference in sent Naira between those exposed to a threat of violence versus control, while holding the level of

fear at higher level induced by the respective treatment condition, and it represents all mechanisms beyond fear/surprise that impact the quantity of Naira sent. The average indirect effect, or average causal mediation effect (ACME) is an estimate of the change in the quantity of Naira sent corresponding to a change in the level of fear from that observed under control to that observed under treatment, holding the treatment status constant. Together, they answer the question “to what extent is the change in the outcome attributable to the treatment-induced change in the theorized mediating variable?” (Imai et al., 2011).

As with previous causal mediation analyses, these estimates are predicated on the assumption of sequential ignorability, meaning that there are not unmeasured confounders. To satisfy this condition (to the best of my ability), I control for pre-treatment variables that could be related to both fear or surprise and the quantity of sent Naira, specifically age, education, gender, previous victimization, indigeneity to Lagos, socioeconomic status, dispositional anxiety, and sub-district. The estimates presented below include the full sample (that is, they do not distinguish between those who played with an in- or out-group partner). However, when I redo the analyses for in-group³¹ compliers, the results are not meaningfully different (appendix).


I begin by testing whether fear mediates the impact of treatment on trusting behaviour and am specifically interested in whether fear mediates the significant positive effect of information about everyday violence on trusting behaviour. The results are presented as point estimates in Figures 7.1 (the effect of the robbery treatment versus control) and 7.2 (ethnic violence treatment versus control).

As shown below, for both the robbery treatment and the ethnic violence treatment (as well as for the control condition), the point estimates for the ACME approach zero and the confidence intervals overlap significantly with zero. Accordingly, in Table 7.F (appendix),

³¹ I cannot carry out a sub-group causal mediation analysis for out-group compliers because the sample sizes are too small. The lack of significant effect for in-group members is, however, already strong suggestive evidence that it is not fear but some other variable is mediating the relationship – while potentially amplified/depressed depending on the relationship to Player B – and that variable is unlikely to be dependent on whether the partner is in- or out-group.

which reports the point estimates, confidence intervals, and p -values based on 1,000 bootstrapped resamples, the estimates of the ACME of fear are not statistically significant. We therefore cannot conclude that there is a fear-mediated relationship of treatment on trusting behaviour, independent of the form of violent threat. Or put differently, this result indicates that if there is a significant, indirect impact of treatment on trusting behaviour, it is not because of the fear induced by threatening news. This does not support the earlier hypothesis (H3), that anticipated that fear induced by proximate violence would undermine trusting behaviour.

Figures 7.1-7.2: ACME, ADE, and Total Effects estimates of fear on trusting behaviour. Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals. Dotted line is control group, solid line is treatment group.



Turning to the average direct effect – which again is “the causal effect of the treatment on the outcome that is not transmitted by the hypothesized mediator” (Imai et al., 2011, p.769) – all three conditions have a positive impact on the quantity of sent Naira, with point estimates hovering around approximately 20 Naira. This is consistent with the idea that other emotions induced by treatment, possibly including anger or relief, may result in greater risk tolerance and, as a result, more trusting behaviour (as they are unmeasured, they would be captured in the ADE as part of the direct effect of treatment). That said, the confidence intervals for the

average direct effect of both treatments are large and they overlap with zero (estimates are significant at the 10% level), suggesting that the information about a violent threat may affect trusting behaviour in multiple ways via multiple channels, not all of which are positive.

Finally, the total effects (the sum of the ACME and ADE) of both the robbery and ethnic violence treatments on trusting behaviour are positive and significant (the p -values are significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively), indicating that, on average, news about both forms of violence has a positive impact on trusting behaviour.

Collectively, these results suggest that news about proximate violence has a positive impact on trusting behaviour, particularly when the partner is in-group. Nonetheless, the causal mediation analysis carried out above indicates that a mechanism other than acute fear is responsible for this effect.

As a final step, I test whether the alternative mediator, surprise, mediates the impact of treatment on trusting behaviour. The results of this analysis are in Figures 7.3 (robbery treatment) and 7.4 (identity-based violence). As shown by the point estimates, surprise induced by the threat of violence (and particularly of everyday violence) does mediate the impact of treatment on trusting behaviour, and, consistent with the hypothesis, it has an overall negative impact (estimated at approximately -30 Naira) on the amount of money sent to a partner. The ADE is once again positive, indicating that there are likely other, unmeasured mechanisms induced by this information, and it offsets the ACME to a sufficient extent that the total effect of treatment on trusting behaviour remains positive. Only additional research could clarify what the other mechanisms that mediate the impact of information about violence on trusting behaviour are, and the extent to which they impact trust versus other alternatives.

Figures 7.3-7.4: ACME, ADE, and Total Effects estimates of surprise on trusting behaviour. Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals. Dotted line is control group, solid line is treatment group.

Figure 7.3: Robbery Treatment: Surprise on Trusting Behaviour





Figure 7.4: Ethnic Violence Treatment: Surprise on Trusting Behaviour



What should we conclude from these analyses? The first important takeaway is that information about proximate everyday violence, delivered via a news broadcast, *does* have a significant – albeit substantively small – impact on trusting behaviour toward a co-communal partner, and, unexpectedly, this effect is positive. This is particularly noteworthy since a meaningful amount of time elapsed between treatment and the administration Trust Game itself, likely weakening treatment effects.³² There is not a significant effect of treatment on trusting behaviour toward an out-group partner, indicating that the mechanisms responsible for any effects are specific to playing with a co-communal partner.

The second important takeaway is that fear does not meaningfully mediate the relationship between information about a violent threat and trusting behaviour. Recall that in chapter 5, fear did not significantly affect levels of trust in one's in-group, although it did depress out-group trust. When considering these two findings together, we can tentatively

³² In contrast, levels of fear are measured soon after treatment, so the impact of this variable is not impacted by the timing of the Trust Game.

conclude that in-group trust is robust to certain situational emotions, such as acute fear. An important but presently unanswerable question is how durable any of these effects are.

Finally, these results are inconclusive about the mechanism through which the threat of everyday violence affects co-communal trusting behaviour. Given that surprise negatively mediates the impact of threat but the overall impact was positive, there must be other, unmeasured mechanisms that account for the main, positive effect of the information. This is a clear area for future research.

Having demonstrated that there is an in-group premium through which individuals exhibit more trusting behaviour toward perceived in-group members, and that the proximate threat of *everyday* violence slightly increases co-communal trusting behaviour but not because of the fear or surprise it induces, I turn to the final line of inquiry about the causal impact of past victimization on trust.

7.5.4 *The Impact of Previous Victimization on Trusting Behaviour*

The final component of the analysis is concerned with whether subjects who were recently victims of everyday violence exhibit less trusting behaviour toward their partner, and if those who were victims of political/identity-based³³ violence exhibit more trusting behaviour toward Player B. I also check if these results vary by one's communal relationship to her partner.

I begin with a summary of the mean Naira sent by victims versus non-victims, broken out by the perceived in- versus out-group relationship. As show in Table 7.10, on average, non-victims sent their partner slightly more Naira than victims of political/identity-based violence, and almost 10% more Naira than those who had been victims of everyday violence in the past year (this difference is significant in a Kruskal-Wallis test ($\chi^2 = 14.33$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.0002$)). For both victims and non-victims, those who believed that Player B was in-group

³³ For this section, I relax the definition of political/identity-based violence to include those who were victims of police violence. As Nolte (2007) explains, police violence in Lagos often has an ethnic dimension to it, and by including these individuals as well, I am able to increase the “sample” and include additional covariates.

exhibited the most trusting behaviour, whereas perceived out-group partners demonstrated less trust and sent fewer Naira.

Table 7.10: Sent Naira by Previous Victimization

	Mean	Std Dev	Percent Sending Min (0 Naira)	Percent Sending Max (500 Naira)	n
Victims of Everyday Violence					
Overall	276.72	(119.62)	0.26%	11.23%	383
Perceived In-Group Partner	280.1	(126.53)	0.42%	13.14%	236
Perceived Out-Group Partner	258.5	(90.57)	1.52%	1.52%	66
Victims of Political/Identity Violence					
Overall	294.86	(118.5)	1.39%	6.94%	72
Perceived In-Group Partner	281.5	(118.4)	2.04%	10.20%	49
Perceived Out-Group Partner	260.9	(95.8)	0.00%	6.67%	15
Non-Victims					
Overall	303.5	(116.03)	0.63%	16.67%	636
Perceived In-Group Partner	311.36	(116.41)	0.43%	18.66%	461
Perceived Out-Group Partner	255.75	(95.76)	1.69%	1.69%	59

But of course, like the perceived relationship to Player B, victimization status is not orthogonal to other covariates that may influence trust, and the analytical strategy must account for the possibility of this non-random variation. Consequently, I use matching (CEM) followed by CEM-weighted regressions to estimate the impact of victimization on trust (Iacus et al., 2012).

I match subjects on the same set of demographic variables as in the previous set of analyses (chapter 6) focusing on the impact of victimization: gender, age, education, wealth, and a baseline measure of dispositional anxiety. Additionally, I match subjects on their risk profile and their perception of their relationship to their partner.³⁴ Although it reduces sample size, matching on partner perception ensures that the results are not influenced by the subject's relationship to Player B, and better isolates the causal impact of victimization. This is

³⁴ Once again, subdistrict is not included as a matching factor due to its profound impact on the number of matches. Subdistrict is, however, included in the regression models.

particularly important since non-victims were, on average, more likely to interpret their partner as being in-group (Kruskal Wallis: 6.719,1 DF, $p = 0.0095$), and therefore may have appeared to be more trusting.

Table 7.E in the appendix reports the covariate imbalance pre- and post-matching. When matching victims of everyday violence, I prune 84 “treated” (previously victimized) and 102 control subjects and retain 299 treated and 534 control individuals. This improves balance by about 9%, from an $\mathcal{L}_1$ imbalance score of 0.722 to 0.659. Among victims of political/identity-based violence (henceforth PIB violence), I prune 7 “treated” and 518 “untreated” individuals and retain 65 treated and 429 control subjects ($\mathcal{L}_1$ imbalance score improved from 0.882 to 0.793).

The models are estimated using OLS and Tobit regression. The key predictor variable, or “treatment,” is the binary indicator of everyday violence victimization or PIB violence. For the estimates of the impact of everyday violence, the models include all of the covariates used in the matching process as well as an interaction between victimization and the perceived identity of the partner, a measure of the subject’s dispositional anxiety, and sub-district. Estimates also account for the possible intervening effects of treatment, the mediators, and their interactions with dummy variables. The estimates of the impact of PIB violence contain the most parsimonious list of covariates³⁵ because of the small sample size for this kind of victims.

Table 7.11 reports the results. Columns 1 and 4 contain the OLS regression estimates using only the matched data, while the models reported in columns 2 and 5 (OLS) and 3 and 6 (Tobit) contain covariates. I begin with the impact of everyday violence (columns 1-3). As reported in the table, the “sample average treatment effect on the treated” (SATT) (Iacus, King, & Porro, 2012), when only CEM-weighted data is considered and additional imbalance is not adjusted via a statistical model, indicates that previous victims of everyday violence behave in a less trusting manner than those who were not victimized. However, when covariates are

³⁵ The covariates that are not included in the regression models are still used in the CEM process (age, gender, socioeconomic status, risk preferences, anxiety levels).

included in the models, the effect is no longer significant.³⁶ This indicates that previous, first-hand experiences with everyday violence do not alone have a significant impact on trusting behaviour.

³⁶ This is also true when the interaction terms are not included in the models.

Table 7.11: Sent Naira by Past Victimization, OLS and Tobit Models

VARIABLES	Everyday Violence Victimization			Political/Identity Violence Victimization		
	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Tobit	(4) OLS	(5) OLS	(6) Tobit
	Matched data, no covariates	Sub-District Fixed Effects, matched + covariates	Sub-District Fixed Effects, matched + covariates	Matched data, no covariates	Sub-District Fixed Effects, matched + covariates	Sub-District Fixed Effects, matched + covariates
Victimization	-28.059*** (10.466)	-22.609 (19.392)	-26.383 (23.923)	-23.635 (15.422)	13.665 (37.583)	13.445 (36.936)
Victimization x OG Partner		93.048** (43.649)	98.339** (47.290)		19.843 (58.073)	22.342 (57.029)
Victimization x IG Partner		14.443 (21.087)	20.404 (25.926)		-29.468 (39.568)	-30.601 (39.460)
Perceived Out-Group Partner		-87.609*** (30.941)	-97.786*** (34.626)		9.624 (28.069)	7.397 (28.355)
Perceived In-Group Partner		-15.336 (14.877)	-22.364 (19.860)		3.379 (15.174)	3.112 (15.879)
Education		10.535*** (3.740)	13.140*** (4.438)		22.732*** (5.289)	25.046*** (5.650)
Deprivation		0.171 (1.345)	0.268 (1.509)			
Female		-8.907 (7.936)	-11.774 (9.279)			
Risk Seeking		2.040 (9.027)	-0.071 (10.701)			
Anxiety Index		14.702*** (3.720)	15.657*** (4.219)			
Age		3.660 (3.736)	5.512 (4.498)			
Intercept	305.283*** (7.556)			291.989*** (7.304)	118.206*** (40.938)	103.070** (43.248)
N	833	808	808	494	491	491
R2	0.012	0.410		0.005	0.337	

Robust standard error in parentheses; coefficients for subdistrict effects, as well treatment, mediator, and interaction term coefficients (for everyday violence only), are not reported; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

However, although participants penalized perceived out-group players, the interaction between everyday violence victimization and a perceived out-group partner is positive and the effect is significant, indicating that victims of everyday violence who believed they were playing with an out-group partner behaved in a significantly more trusting way than non-victims playing with out-groups partners. The coefficients are large, roughly equivalent to the average out-group penalty assigned across participants. Although counterintuitive, this effect is consistent with the results presented in chapter 6, in which victims of everyday violence espoused more trusting attitudes toward out-group members (and less trusting attitudes toward in-groups) than non-victims, and constitutes further evidence that everyday violence changes the way individuals feel and behave toward their out-group, and, to a more limited extent, their in-group.

Columns 4-6 report the impact of PIB violence on trusting behaviour. Independent of the estimation parameters or the perceived partner, there is not a significant impact of this form of victimization on trusting behaviour. This is not consistent with hypothesis 5A, which expected that victims of PIB violence would be *more* trusting of their partner than non-victims, as much of the literature about wartime violence has demonstrated. We can speculate about a variety of reasons for this non-effect, including the possibility that victims of this form of violence may have attributed it to state and institutional actors³⁷ – the government, the security sector, political operatives – and not to normal Lagosians, e.g. the participant's partner during the Trust Game. As a result, victims of PIB may not have been particularly inclined or disinclined to trust a partner, but their trust in institutions may have suffered.

Taken together, these results indicate that victimization alone, independent of its form, does not directly affect general levels of trusting behaviour. First-hand experiences with everyday violence *do*, however, significantly and positively affect trust when the recipient is a perceived out-group member. In the concluding two chapters, I use evidence derived from

³⁷ It is possible that victims of PIB in Lagos are less likely to know the perpetrator (because the violence likely took place in a mass setting, e.g. a market riot) than victims of wartime violence, who may have been victimized by their neighbour (see, for example, Fujii, 2009; Weidmann, 2011). If so, it would follow that victims of PIB in this sample would be less likely to personalize these experiences in a Trust Game as compared to victims of everyday violence.

interviews with victims of violence to better understand the mechanisms connecting victimization to identity-related preferences and behaviours.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter began with a basic question: alongside attitudes and beliefs, does exposure to different forms of violence also impact behaviour? Using an experimental Trust Game, I first tested whether co-communals were more apt to trust each other merely on the basis of shared identity, and then assessed how a proximate threat of and firsthand experiences with violence impacted trust, and whether these effects varied depending on the nature of the communal relationship.

I find evidence for an in-group “trust premium,” as well as differential effects of both threat and victimization on trust. Specifically, those who perceived their partner to be co-ethnic or co-religious sent them, on average, some 13-17% more Naira than the average quantity sent to out-group partners. The effects of exposure to violence were more complicated. Information about a proximate threat of everyday violence somewhat increased trusting behaviour, specifically among co-communals, but did so via a mechanism *other than* fear or surprise. I speculate that anger and perhaps the relief of avoiding victimization may have impacted risk preferences in a way that also increased trusting behaviour – propositions to which I return in the final two chapters of the thesis. Recall that in chapter 5, threat-induced fear increased self-reported in-group affinity and decreased warmth and trust toward the out-group. Taken together, these results suggest that the threat of violence – and particularly everyday violence – may increase positive attitudes about, identification with, and trusting behaviour toward in-groups, and somewhat depress expressed warmth toward and trust in out-groups. And while fear plays an important causal role in this relationship, fear alone cannot account for the entirety of these effects. I theorized about the mediating role of other emotions induced by the threat of violence

such as anger, but only future research could verify whether these emotions do indeed serve as a mechanism connecting violent threat and identity.

Finally, actual, recent victimization (particularly everyday violence victimization) surprisingly seemed to *increase* both trusting attitudes and behaviour toward out-groups. This is a striking finding, as it contradicts the intuition that firsthand experiences with violence reinforce existing prejudices and make individuals more insular, sceptical, and closed-off to outsiders. And although the evidence in chapter 6 suggested that victimization may also lead to an in-group trust *penalty*, there is no evidence of this in the Trust Game. It may be the case that in-group trust is somewhat more robust and out-group trust somewhat more responsive.

Collectively, the quantitative results presented in these three chapters indicate that actual victimization seems to reduce prejudice against out-groups and potentially even reduce in-group favouritism. The threat of everyday violence, on the other hand, is generally identity-affirming through a variety of mechanisms. These results underscore that far from being background “noise,” different forms of exposure to everyday violence meaningfully affects the way people identify, how they relate to others, and may even impact macro-level intergroup relations.

Chapter 8

Threat Versus Victimization: Understanding the Results

“In violence, we forget who we are”
- Mary McCarthy, 1961

8.1 Introduction

Above all, the quantitative evidence presented in chapters 5, 6, and 7 illustrates the profound impact of everyday violence. Even in a city as insecure as Lagos, where some 40% of residents were victimized within the previous year, exposure to everyday violence still affected how people saw themselves, their group, and how they interacted with others.

The second striking high-level finding is that the effects of an acute threat of violence versus actual victimization were almost diametrically opposed. Threat-induced emotion broadly enhanced parochial tendencies, while victimization increased openness to outsiders and slightly reduced in-group trust.¹ What accounts for this divergence? And in particular, why were victims of violence more open to out-groups thereafter?

In the remaining two chapters, I use a combination of social psychology theory and qualitative evidence from over 70 semi-structured interviews² to better understand the variation in these effects and consider their wider significance. This chapter begins with a discussion of the identity-affirming impact of threat-induced fear and evaluates the qualitative evidence for two competing theories: that this is an instinctive and psychologically protective response, or that these effects are deliberately strategic and adaptive. Thereafter, I explore several mechanisms that could account for the increased openness to outsiders – or, more aspirationally, the “posttraumatic growth” – after actual victimization, and compare their explanatory power to possible alternatives.

¹ Recall that actual victimization slightly reduced reports of in-group trust, but it did not significantly affect behaviour in the Trust Game.

² The interviewees were a wholly distinct group from the survey respondents and therefore had no exposure to any treatment or the survey. Additionally, it is important to note that all interviewees had personally experienced the violence, whereas the survey defined direct experience with violence as personal exposure to violence or having a household member who personally experienced violence.

While recognizing the difficulty of full understanding complex individual attitudes, this chapter develops an explanation of these findings that is grounded in the way that threat versus victimization are experienced and cognitively processed. Unlike an acute threat, which operates on an automatic, individual level, victimization in Lagos is generally dealt with socially and over time, enabling an active reappraisal of the events and their aftermath. Put differently – and to borrow Daniel Kahneman’s famous framework – the threat of violence operates at the level of “System 1,” the brain’s automatic, quick, and low-effort approach that relies heavily on heuristics and is particularly prone to stereotype. The effortful processing of a traumatic event engages System 2, which is analytical, purposeful and more likely to scrutinize basic assumptions about, for example, who can and cannot be trusted (2011, ch. 1).

One result of the differing ways threat versus victimization are processed and of the highly individualistic culture in Lagos (Ojumu, 2010) is that few Lagosians anticipate protection from others in a moment of acute crisis, expecting instead to be responsible for their own safety. The identity-affirming impact of threat is, as I argue, unlikely to be a strategic response designed to elicit protection from fellow out-group members, and more likely reflects underlying psychological coping mechanisms.

The dynamics at play *after* victimization are quite different. There is compelling theoretical and qualitative evidence that the mixture of feeling disappointed about the lack of support *after* an experience with violence, coupled with the way hardship can foster empathy, and the adaptive role of religious coping, may lead to increased tolerance of out-groups after victimization. Religious coping in particular, which has consistently been linked to posttraumatic growth, may play a uniquely important role in a Lagosian context. And although the individual circumstances of one’s experiences with and after violence will impact the extent to which these three factors matter, they are, as I will argue, individually and collectively more persuasive than alternative explanations, such as within-group victimization (i.e. that people are being attacked by their in-group members and accordingly become more tolerant of out-groups) or strategic realignment toward out-groups (i.e. that victims realize “strength in

numbers” is the best way to avoid future victimization and align themselves with others, including out-groups, accordingly).

Collectively, the interviews and theory presented below tell a story about the difference between our expectations and the reality of adversity. They also illustrate how people may grow through hardship and disappointment, their reliance on their faith, and through the reminder that suffering is ultimately not an experience unique to any one group or tribe.

8.2 The Interviewees

Before beginning, it is important to say a word about the interview process and the interviewees themselves. Between January and March of 2017 (i.e. approximately 9 months after the survey), I worked together with a team of four trained researchers³ to conduct just over 70 interviews with individuals who had reported to the CLEEN Foundation (a non-profit in Lagos) that they had recently⁴ been victims of everyday violence in one of two selected LGAs.⁵ With the explicit consent of these individuals, my contacts at CLEEN arranged interviews, usually in their home or a neutral location like a hotel lobby.

The semi-structured interviews typically lasted about 45 minutes and were audio-recorded with consent. Interviewees were requested to narrate their experience with everyday violence and then were asked a series of questions about how these events made them feel, how they coped, who they expected to protect and help them, who actually did support them, and to reflect more broadly on security, violence, and identity in Lagos. Questions were designed to be a guide but not leading, and priority was always given to the comfort and

³ Although I would have preferred to conduct all of the interviews myself, medical constraints prevented this. I consequently employed the four top performing research assistants who had also participated in the large-scale survey. All of the RAs had previously conducted qualitative research on sensitive topics and they received additional training for this. In particular, RAs practiced recognizing signs of distress and respecting the limits of the interviewee rather than always probing for more information.

⁴ Although the survey asks specifically about violence experienced within the previous year, I was more lenient during interviews, allowing for experiences that occurred within the previous 18 months.

⁵ CLEEN helped us identify a particularly “high violence” and a “lower violence” LGA for these interviews, as I was interested in variation in the responses of those exposed more regularly to violence.

psychological safety of the interviewee, allowing them to tell their story in their own way, at their own tempo, with as much detail as they felt comfortable sharing, and with the freedom to discontinue at any time. Interestingly, no one asked to stop the conversation and several individuals spontaneously thanked us for the opportunity to share, which is consistent with the idea of narration being an important part of healing processes after violence (see, for example, the literature on Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, e.g. Phelps, 2004; Androff, 2012).

About half of the interviewees identified as male, half as female; they ranged in age from 18 to 54 years old; and only about 10% said they were originally from Lagos State, reflecting the diversity of the population in the city. Similar to the broader demographics of the city, about two-thirds of respondents identified as Yoruba and 20% as Igbo; the remainder was fragmented across five other ethnic groups. There was only one individual identifying as Hausa in this sample and, accordingly, a disproportionately high number of interviewees identified as Christian (Table 8.1). All interviewees resided in either Mushin – an area with a particularly high rate of everyday violence – or Amuwo-Adofin, where everyday violence is comparatively rare.

Table 8.1: Interviewee Demographics

	Interviewees	Survey Sample	Afrobarometer R6 Lagos
% Female	45%	50%	-
% from Lagos	13%	14%	-
Median Age	29 years	24-35 years	29 years
% Yoruba	66%	68%	74%
% Igbo	17%	15%	17%
% Hausa	2%	1%	0.5%
% Christian	80%	70%	69%
% Muslim	20%	29%	30%

Their experiences with violence ranged from the extreme – one person was a bystander during a cultist gang fight in which close to a hundred people engaged in a street battle – to the tragically common – a woman who was emotionally and physically abused by her husband

from her wedding day onward. Most frequently, interviewees told us about different forms of armed robbery, happening on the street, in parking lots, on *okadas*, and often at home. A number of interviewees sustained physical injuries and essentially all of them spoke of the intense terror in the moments before and during the attack.⁶ To better understand the impact of a violent *threat*, I draw on some of these recollections about the moments before the actual violence, although of course, their thinking about this time is affected by the events that actually transpired and their recovery (for this particular line of inquiry, speaking to individuals who were *almost* victims of violence would have been preferable, but was difficult to carry out in practice). Here and throughout the thesis, all interviewee names have been changed for confidentiality.

8.3 Better Understanding the Impact of Threat and Fear

One of the primary hypotheses of this thesis was that the *fear* induced by a proximate threat of violence – independent of whether the threat was robbery, an ethnic riot, or something else – would be identity-reinforcing. As the previous three chapters illustrated, fear did strengthen in-group identity and, in this sense, is a primary mechanism connecting a proximate threat to identity-related outcomes. Although it would be possible to stop the inquiry there, it is interesting to further unpack this result and consider, in a more in-depth way than was done in chapter 2, why fear may have this identity-affirming impact.

In what follows, I discuss two theories about the function of fear – one suggesting that it is psychologically adaptive, the other arguing for its strategic purposes – and evaluate the evidence in favour of each. Before doing so, however, it is helpful to say a few words about our understanding of how fear affects cognition.

⁶ As discussed in chapter 4, the interview team was trained to guide participants through difficult questions and to stop whenever the interviewee wanted to. They also offered to put interviewees in touch with supportive services if they suspected the person needed additional counselling/assistance.

In the broadest terms, fear bolsters cognitive processes that are related to harm avoidance (Robinson et al., 2013). As Bar-Tal explains, “Fear constitutes combined physiological and psychological reactions programmed to maximize the probability of surviving in dangerous situations in the most beneficial way” (2001, p.603). More precisely, fear:

“...gives priority to processing information about potential threats, it extends associative networks of information about threats, it causes overestimation of dangers and threats, it facilitates the selective retrieval of information related to fear, it increases expectations of threat and danger, and it increases accessibility of procedural knowledge that was effective in coping with threatening situations in the past” (Bar-Tal, 2001, p.604).

This primarily happens unconsciously; it is our automatic defence system in the presence of possible harm, “that floods consciousness” and overpowers deliberate, rational thinking in a classic “System 1” response (Bar-Tal, 2001, p.603; Kahneman, 2011). Alongside physical signs of fear – higher blood pressure, faster heartrate, tensed muscles, and a high state of arousal preparing us for confrontation – fear also reduces our tolerance for the unknown, and for new people, ideas, places, and things (Eibl-Eibesfeldt & Sütterlin, 1990; Lazarus, 1991; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; LeDoux, 1995, 1996; Öhman, 1993). In these ways, fear is evolutionary adaptive and harm-avoidant.

Recent research has tried to better understand the neurological drivers of fear’s harm-avoidant function, and has demonstrated that threat facilitates the cognitive processing of identity group cues (especially in-group cues), making identity perception faster and more salient during moments of terror (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005). In other words, an acutely fearful person will be better able to recognize who is in her in-group whilst threatened and will instinctively prioritize that person/group. This cognitive process may largely explain *how* in-group prioritization occurs when one is fearful but it does not fully explain *why*. Yes, the familiar could pose less of a risk than the unknown, but this is not necessarily the case, nor does it necessarily account for the full effect. And there are,

accordingly, two competing points of view in social psychology about the “why” behind the identity-affirming effects of fear.

The first theory stems from an influential school of thought arguing that instinctual in-group prioritization helps us deal with the anxiety provoked by awareness of our own mortality. This idea – broadly referred to as the “Terror Management Theory” (TMT), also introduced in chapter 2 – posits that a) human beings have a basic drive toward self-preservation; b) reminders of our own mortality are almost unbearably painful; and c) to continue functioning despite the anxiety induced about our inevitable mortality, we need the “anxiety buffer” that our relationship to our in-group provides. Our belief in our in-group’s shared worldview, the TMT argues, as well as the comfort of knowing that our group will continue to exist long after our demise “imbues the universe with order, meaning, stability, and permanence” and provides us with self-esteem and a sense of security (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991, p.147). This allows us to cope with, or at least repress, our anxiety about our own mortality (Solomon et al., 1991, p.101; Greenberg & Kosloff, 2008). Religious and spiritual in-groups, with their narratives about continuity after death, are particularly helpful in easing mortality fears among active believers, as others have pointed out (Jonas & Fischer, 2006; Koenig, 2009).

Although terror management theorists are primarily trying to understand how it is that mankind can “get on with it” despite the inevitability of death, the theory has implications for acute episodes of threat as well, including threats of everyday violence. Any reminder of mortality, be it the threat of a proximate armed robbery or a difficult medical diagnosis, should increase the need for this buffer, thereby reinforcing in-group identity (Solomon et al., 1991, p.102). In summary, the TMT suggests that independent of the cause, we manage our existential dread by “doubling down” on our cosy in-group world which would, of course, explain why the fear of a proximate robbery would lead to more favourable in-group evaluations.

The involuntary nature of this reaction (and of the TMT more broadly) makes it difficult to find supportive or critical qualitative evidence in its favour.⁷ By definition, individuals are not conscious of unconscious responses, and asking people to actively reflect on times when they are afraid of death naturally invokes more effortful, “System 2” cognition, changing the responses. Instead, it is perhaps helpful to consider the dominant alternative theory about why fear is identity-affirming and to evaluate whether the supporting evidence is compelling enough to discount the TMT.

The primary competing perspective advances an evolutionary rational choice model, in which individuals deliberately form “coalitions” and alliances with others to “meet adaptive challenges” (Navarrete & Fessler, 2005). This point of view argues that fear, reminders of mortality, and a host of other difficult situations all constitute reasons to build a stronger alliance to one’s in-group with the goal of better meeting the challenge through the in-group’s support (Navarrete et al., 2004). Co-in-group members, the argument continues, have lower coordination costs and a shared point of view that makes it both easier and adaptive for them to support each other. As Navarrete and Fessler explain:

“...if the social benefits of norm adherence are the ultimate cause of the individual’s subscription to worldviews, then the focus and salience of a given individual’s ideology can be expected to vary as a function of their need to ally themselves to relevant others. Moreover, if the benefits of social inclusion are particularly important in times of need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996), then natural selection can be expected to have shaped human psychology such that, when confronted with emergency situations that are best addressed using coalitional support, individuals should exhibit a strongly pro-normative orientation in order to enhance the maintenance and formation of alliances” (2005, p.307).

Under this line of reasoning, the relationship to the in-group is self-interested and strategic, and increasing one’s in-group allegiance is an explicit strategy invoked during moments of acute

⁷ There is an expansive, decades-old literature demonstrating that mortality prompts increase parochial tendencies, and in this sense the TMT is empirically well-established (for a review, see Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010). Yet there is surprisingly little literature that attempts to better understand *why* this effect is observed – i.e. is one’s in-group truly a “psychological buffer,” do thoughts of death increase the relevance of possible “protectors” such as fellow in-group members, etc.

need. We would therefore anticipate that individuals a) deliberately try to align themselves with in-group members whilst threatened and b) express a reciprocal expectation of in-group protection, particularly during moments of vulnerability.

One way of testing whether this holds in this context is to check whether Lagosians articulated an expectation of in-group help in the face of violence, and whether they claimed that they try to align themselves to in-group members whilst fearful. To evaluate this proposition, research assistants were instructed to ask victims of everyday violence if they expected their in-group to have protected them from the attack; who they turned to in a moment of need for assistance; and who they expect to protect them from any future violence.

Overwhelmingly, respondents were sceptical of the idea that their in-group could or should have done anything to protect them, and largely rebuffed the idea that they would turn specifically to an in-group member during a future time of need. Of the 73 people asked, only six said they expected any form of protection from their in-group, and many challenged the idea that their group would have even been *capable* of effectively intervening.

Consider, for example, the following exchange with Thomas, whose compound was ransacked by the “One Million Boys,” a notorious gang known for committing large-scale armed robberies. Thomas claimed that gang members knew his neighbour had brought home a large amount of cash and targeted their compound for that reason.

Research Assistant (RA): You say you are a Christian. Did your Christian group do anything to prevent this armed robbery from happening to you?

Thomas: What could they have done? What do you think they could have done? I – or do you think they could have rang the prayer [bell] from the church to prevent them from entering the house or what? I don’t see anything that the church could have done, but still, they sympathized with me [...] upon hearing the situation.

RA: So who do you think should have protected you from all this, from the incident?

Thomas: From the incident? First of all, I think we should – the first protection should start from us individually. If my neighbour had not come home with such

a huge sum of money, I don't think such an attack could have taken place [...]
So, security starts from ourselves first.

RA: So in the future, who would you turn to for protection or help [from violence]?

Thomas: I turn to God, oh! It's only God who can protect me!

RA: Okay but apart from God, in the outside world...

Thomas: The outside world? Nobody's trusting the outside world!

This sentiment was echoed by a number of Lagosians. When asked about who *should* protect them from future violence, the majority of respondents cited God, even when the research assistant pressed them for other ideas. For example, Wuraola in Amuwo-Odofin, who was robbed by cultists, said she expected “only God” to protect her from violence. As for the role of other in-group members, she added “I don't think anybody can really protect anyone. You can only protect yourself. That is one thing I have learned.” Emeka, who was assaulted by local area boys during a dispute, agreed with Wuraola. “As a believer of God, I leave the matter in the hand of God,” he offered. “It is only God who protects, I can't leave my protection in the hands of a human being.” Besides, he added with a laugh, “...this is Nigeria [...] you gotta look out for yourself.”

Several interviewees seemed to find the idea of their in-group members protecting them during an act of violence outlandish (or even funny). Some questioned whether in-group members would be physically capable of stopping the attack, especially since perpetrators are often heavily armed. As Gabriel said about the proposition of fellow Christians having protected him from the robbery he experienced, “They are not military, now. The only thing for them to do is to pray.”

Dele, who was caught up as a bystander in an armed heist at a fuelling station, was similarly critical of the idea that his group could have protected him, or that they should do so in case there is a need in the future.

RA: Did your group Christians, did they protect you at all?

Dele: They were not there to protect me.

RA: Do you think they should have done anything, should they have protected you in the first place?

Dele: It's actually, it's not as in – the only thing they can do is just to pray, they can't do anything. They are not God, so it's God that protects each and every one of us. Even the pastors don't have power over themselves, so...

RA: Who do you think should have protected you from what happened?

Dele: (Laughs). God, man.

The nature of everyday violence in Lagos may make it difficult for in-group members to intervene on someone else's behalf.⁸ In contrast to settings of collective violence where divisions and allegiances are generally clear, everyday violence in Lagos is unpredictable⁹ and opaque, and in the moment of a scuffle, it may not always be clear who the perpetrator even is. Victims were attacked in their homes, at their place of work, on the road, in shared buses, in

⁸ To be sure, there are a number of informal institutions and associations in Nigeria that provide for the security of sub-national groups. Vigilantes, night guards, neighbourhood security associations, ethnic militias, secret societies, and youth associations, among others, partially fill security vacuums and in some instances, collaborate with the state to manage ungoverned spaces (Nolte, 2004; Pratten, 2008a, 2008b; Ismail, 2009; LeBas, 2013). These groups are widespread in Lagos and play a prominent role in the lives of the city's inhabitants: in 2005, for example, the vast majority of Lagosians reported that vigilante group provided security to the people in their area (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2005, p.34). In some cases, these associations are closely aligned with an identity group. The Yoruba O'odua People's Congress or the Igbo Bakassi Boys, for example, are ethnically-based security organisations (Pratten, 2008a). Yet can these sub-national organisations really protect fellow in-group members from an act of everyday violence? Although many of these groups are, as others have argued, driven by a "moral imperative" to stop perpetrators of everyday violence, very few Lagosians who spoke to us said that they would rely on them for protection in the midst of an attack. Episodes of everyday violence were described as too fast and too disorienting for victims to find a way to summon this kind of help. Instead, vigilante groups and neighbourhood security associations, in particular, were often mentioned as a way in which communities can deter/prevent violence from happening in the first place, and as a means of carrying out justice/retribution after violence, in the absence of a strong state. In this sense, informal security associations reflect a way that Lagosians plan for their longer-term (preventative) security, often in the context of their in-group community, but are rarely called-upon in the moment to protect.

⁹ One noteworthy exception to this are robberies in which the residents of the targeted compound or streets are actually forewarned, which is a phenomenon that happens occasionally in Lagos according to several interviewees and the Nigerian press (see, for example, Sunday, 2018.) In these instances, groups of armed robbers leave letters in areas they intend to strike, presumably to encourage residents to cooperate and/or to extract a payoff to prevent the attack from happening.

markets, even in a church parking lot; and with few exceptions,¹⁰ they generally did not know the identity of their attacker(s) or why they were “selected” as a victim. With this amount of suddenness, volatility, and confusion, it follows that there are at best very weak expectations of in-group protection.

Additionally, many of the Lagosians we spoke to were sceptical that their fellow group members would risk their personal safety to protect a stranger, even if that person was from the same group. As Chibuzor said, “We live in an environment where people don't give a shit! [So instead] I just turn to myself.” Aderonke added, “Nobody’s protecting anybody now! It’s Nigeria, no one cares.”

Some went even further, insisting that their group should actually *avoid* getting involved in such incidences. Tunde’s compound was invaded and pillaged by a large group of armed robbers. He was “seriously” beaten by the robbers and, like many other respondents, complained that the police¹¹ showed up hours after the event took place. When asked about protection from his Yoruba ethnic group, particularly in light of the police’s inaction, he responded as follows:

Tunde: Protect me?

RA: Yes.

Tunde: In what way?

RA: Like did they protect you from – when the incident was happening, did they protect you?

Tunde: Okay. No, they did not, oh. It’s none of their business. They are not the cause. It’s none of their business at all.

¹⁰ Victims were occasionally able to guess the attacker’s identity based on the language he spoke or unusual tribal markings.

¹¹ Complaints about the police were common among interviewees, many of whom described the ineptitude or indifference of the police to their plight. Survey respondents similarly expressed a profound lack of trust in the police, and 4% reported being directly victimized by the police in the previous year. This is consistent with earlier studies of the police in Nigeria, e.g. a 2013 report by the CLEEN foundation that stated “The public do not respect, trust and support the Police because their performance is poor. Also, the public regards the character and level of accountability of the Police as grossly unsatisfactory” (p.16), and a 2010 Human Rights Watch report that describes a culture of impunity and corruption in police force.

As to who *ought* to be protecting them from violence, many respondents insisted that it is the job of the government to provide security, but they also criticized the ineffectiveness of the police in preventing and stopping everyday violence. “You just disturbing yourself when you go to the police, every time,” said Akintayo, whose compound was robbed. “They do not do anything at all.” Tunde agreed. “It is [the police’s] own duty to protect the citizens now, but unfortunately, when you call them, they won’t come, or they come late.” Adedayo noted that the police *can* be helpful, but only if bribed. “It’s not as if the police work for free,” he said. Due to their ineffectiveness, some Lagosians said they expect local security collectives and vigilante groups to protect them from violence rather than the police. It was the “people living around and the vigilantes” who helped Femi after he was robbed and shot on his way back from church. And above all, Lagosians emphasised that they are responsible for their own security.

To the extent that respondents said there may be a protective role for their in-group, the majority spoke about their group trying to prevent others from turning to violence in the first place, particularly through prayer and religious teachings. For example, Olu of Mushin, who was a bystander during an armed robbery of a gas station, explained, “The best they [Christians] can do is just to preach to their members [...] to shun violence, to stay away from violence [...] I think pastors are doing their best, but you know our environment and the state of the country at the moment is very, very terrible.” Miriam, who was assaulted on a pedestrian bridge, claimed that the leaders of her mosque “...are always preaching it, telling you, telling the unemployed, preaching to them that no matter what circumstances they find themselves, that they should not result to, you know, robbing people, kidnapping, doing evil. So my Muslim group they’ve been trying, they’ve been really, really trying [to prevent violence].”

Collectively, the interviewees’ responses offer little support for the existence of an in-group protection norm. Moreover, many respondents rejected the premise that their in-group members were even capable of helping, and therefore looked to other sources of security and, above all, to themselves, during moments of need. This is not to entirely discount the idea of in-group alliances being at least partially strategic: there is a rich literature about the way that identity can be differentially expressed and “manipulated” for self-interested gain, be it

security, access to power, or material benefits (Varshney, 2003; Chandra, 2005). But in this context of acute fear of violence in Lagos, there is little evidence of identity being expressed in such a calculated way.

That there is not compelling evidence for in-group favouritism being an explicit and deliberate strategy during times of acute vulnerability does not necessarily imply that the psychological protection theory (TMT) explains this effect. For one, this discussion has focused on *fear's* identity-affirming effect, but the Trust Game analysis indicated that something other than fear was accountable for the increase in trusting behaviour toward in-group members after a violent threat. The TMT has little to say about emotions that are not closely linked to mortality anxiety and is therefore only so helpful in explaining this result. And while the TMT is, on balance, a more plausible explanation, this is clearly an area ripe for additional research.

I now turn from the impact of the threat of violence to the impact of *actual* victimization. This next section explores the more counterintuitive main analytical result, specifically that victims of violence were more open toward and trusting of their out-group, and slightly less trusting of their in-group (in self-reports). In addition to highlighting the role of empathy born of violence and religious coping, this section demonstrates how expectations of one's in-group change after actually experiencing violence, and how the disillusionment that can follow victimization may affect attitudes toward in- and out-groups.

8.4 The Surprising Impact of Victimization on Social Identity

As a starting point, it is important to state the following, however obvious: direct experiences with violence can cause tremendous pain, distress, suffering, and confusion (Coker et al., 2002; Pico-Alfonso et al., 2006). Accordingly, there is a popular narrative that victims of violence are often devastated by these experiences; that violence leaves people traumatized, withdrawn, less trusting, and possibly hostile; and that victims retreat to their own “safer” corner of the world, away from outsiders who might harm them (Gutner et al., 2006; Staub & Vollhardt, 2008). Although this narrative is particularly common when describing those exposed to wartime

violence, it is also used in reference to victims of everyday violence. For example, Morton Bard, a pioneering researcher of the micro-level impact of crime, explained the effect of victimization this way: “[It] is far more devastating than a natural disaster like a tornado because it is a *person* doing this to you. In an instant, the crime creates a social world for you in which people are threatening, and you are no longer safe” (Pace, 1997). The US National Center for Victims of Crime similarly explains that:

“Crime victims suffer a tremendous amount of physical and psychological trauma. The primary injuries victims suffer can be grouped into three distinct categories: physical, financial and emotional. When victims do not receive the appropriate support and intervention in the aftermath of the crime, they suffer ‘secondary’ injuries [...]. Frequent responses to a criminal victimization include, but are not limited to: shock; numbness; denial; disbelief; anger; and, finally, recovery” (2012).

Women’s Aid, meanwhile, a charity in the UK supporting victims of domestic violence, writes that violence in the household “...is often the main factor in the development of depression, anxiety and other mental health disorders, and may lead to sleep disturbances, self-harm, suicide and attempted suicide, eating disorders and substance misuse” (Women’s Aid, *The Survivor’s Handbook*). Reflecting on the warnings of those supporting victims, one may get the impression that experiences with violence are profoundly and unequivocally negative.

To be sure, there is good reason for this narrative: by some counts, nearly a quarter of individuals exposed to assaultive violence develop Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)¹² – a clear, clinical indication of just how serious exposure to violence can be (Breslau, 2009). And, as others have emphasized, exposure to violence at a young age can have *lifelong* consequences on development, mental health, economic outcomes, and even physical health (Moffitt, 2013). In this and many other ways, victimization can be uniquely damaging.

¹² The article looks at the conditional risk of PTSD by sex and type of violence experienced. I take the flat average across men and women.

Yet as the previous three chapters have demonstrated, direct exposure to violence can also have surprising and even “positive” consequences over time. Indeed, the roughly 40% of subjects who had experienced everyday violence within the previous year actually exhibited more trust in their out-group than non-victims. Moreover, assessments of one’s out-group were an average of 33% more positive among violence-affected Lagosians. Alongside this new openness to outsiders, those who had recently experienced violence also voiced slightly less in-group favouritism when discussing who can and cannot be trusted.

These counterintuitive “pro-social” responses to violence are consistent with the phenomenon of “posttraumatic growth,” a now widely-accepted idea in psychology in which “...the struggle with highly challenging life crises” can lead to “positive change” (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004, p.1). This phenomenon has, over the past decade, also become more prominent in the political science literature about wartime victimization¹³ (see, for example, Blattman, 2009; Bellows & Miguel, 2009; Bauer et al. 2016; also note the dissenting point of view, e.g. Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017).

In what follows, I suggest three factors that may account for the “constructive” dimensions of the otherwise destructive experience of everyday violence in Lagos. First, although victims of violence resoundingly did not expect their group to *protect* them from violence, there *was* an expectation of in-group support (emotional and financial) thereafter. Very often, however, in-groups did not show up in any meaningful way, leaving victims doubly disappointed in a case of “dashed expectations.” Rather than harshly penalizing their in-group, however, violence-affected Lagosians reported that they were instead reminded that they are ultimately “on their own,” a realization that may have reduced bias against out-groups, who no longer seemed so uniquely inferior.

The second point is that experiences with violence may have actually increased empathy. Consistent with the idea of altruism or empathy “born of violence” (Staub, 2005;

¹³ Within the wartime victimization literature, “posttraumatic growth” is generally interpreted to mean increased pro-social tendencies (e.g. reduced in-group favouritism, reduced out-group bias, greater cooperation) after exposure to violence.

Staub & Vollhardt, 2008), there is evidence that direct experiences with violence may have increased the capacity of Lagosians to understand the perspective of others who have experienced similar hardships, including out-group members. This particular type of empathy, as Hartman and Morse explain in a recent article, can “serve as a cross-cutting tie that bridges outgroup identities” possibly accounting for some of the reduction in out-group bias and increased out-group trust (2018, p.8).

The final argument is that the process of coping with their experiences religiously and spiritually likely reduced out-group prejudice. Victims of violence widely reported relying upon their faith to work through and overcome their trauma, which repeatedly exposed them to messages about tolerance, forgiveness, and redemption; reminded them of the higher power of God; and encouraged them to focus on hope rather than loss. Religious coping has been shown to lead to posttraumatic growth and may have reduced prejudice directed at an out-group, too. Additionally, more frequent visits to one’s church or mosque likely increased the amount of contact Lagosians had with other ethnic groups, which may also contribute to this effect.

Before exploring these three arguments in more detail, it is important to emphasize that even after “posttraumatic growth,” victims still expressed strong¹⁴ in-group favouritism. In this sense, victimization did not “flip” preferences or even significantly damage in-group evaluations, and interviewees were often quick to point out that their in-group was not at fault for their misfortune. As Nonso, whose home was robbed by a large gang, explained, “I’m a realist. I can’t blame my Christian brothers and sisters, they are not God. Instead I thank God for being alive.” It is therefore primarily the greater openness toward the out-group that this section of the chapter seeks to explain.

8.4.1 The Isolation and Disillusionment of Victimization

What is it that we actually expect from our in-group in a time of need? Above, I argued that Lagosians are not, in fact, expecting fellow in-group members to *protect* them from danger or

¹⁴ For example, recall from chapter 6 that victims of violence still evaluated their in-group approximately twice as favourably as their out-group in a thermometer measurement exercise.

from harm. Between the practicalities of trying to address a threat as unpredictable and omnipresent as everyday violence and the surprising lack of a shared¹⁵ moral imperative to protect others, Lagosians seem to be more of the mindset that self-preservation is an individual activity.

But what happens after the violence? Those who shared stories of victimization emphasized not just their fear, trauma, and the extent of their injuries, but also the damages they incurred and the tangible help they needed to get back on their feet. Many of these losses were financial. For example, Nonso, whose house was invaded by a group of armed robbers, recounted the following: “They ransacked *everywhere*. Collected *everything*. Took my phone, took the money I just collected from the bank, took all personal effects from us, to the extent they were even fighting over jewelleries.” Not only were victims often stripped of their valuables, they were sometimes left to plead for the bus fare to get home. Said Damilola about the man who assaulted and robbed her, “He collected my slippers [and] because it was raining that day, he collected my umbrella [...] he collected *everything* [...] and now I beg him, ‘Now give me 200 Naira to try to put myself home.’”

One must keep in mind that the average victim of everyday violence in the sample struggled economically even before the episode. On average, a violence-affected Lagosian was likely to own only a small number of assets, such as a television and mobile phone, and about 15% said they went without basic necessities, such as food or medicine, on a more than exceptional basis. And while there is extreme wealth in Lagos, it is rare and concentrated among a small number of people; most Lagosians are unable to draw on wealth reserves after experiencing such an unexpected loss. This meant that for many, as Samuel said about his shop being burglarized, “After, I had nothing left.”

¹⁵ Of course, some interviewees voiced a duty to protect other people and told stories of trying to help others in a time of need. Yet the majority claimed they were ultimately only responsible for themselves and their immediate family/dependents. Moreover, many interviewees said that they had hoped civil defence/vigilante groups, the government, or the police would come to their aid, but did not expect other civilians to do so.

This economic precariousness meant that victims often saw significant portions of their livelihood wiped out in one fell swoop. Yet violence-affected Lagosians only rarely reported receiving any financial support from their in-group to get back on their feet – indeed, only two respondents mentioned receiving any monetary assistance thereafter – and many were frustrated by the perceived callousness of others to their plight. “Nobody helped me, nobody cared [...] so much money gone [but] no one cared [...] Where should I find this money again, now?” asked Emmanuel.

Of course, it is not just financial support that is helpful to someone experiencing the acute hardship of violence – empathy, advice, encouragement, even just a patient listener can make the difference between feeling abandoned or supported after trauma. Here too, however, interviewees reported feeling left to their own devices after a traumatic event. Aderonke, whose compound was robbed, explained that the church should have supported her through this difficult period, “[...] but at the end of the day, if something will happen to you, even the church will not be there for you.” She continued, “for me to leave my [village], my family, to attend to a church, I will take that church as my own, as my family, if something should happen to you, you know, those people should be there for you, but these days you don’t see all that.” When asked if her Christian community offered money or advice or other support, she said “No, no, they didn’t do anything.”

To be sure, a small number of respondents claimed that they *did* feel supported by their in-group after experiencing violence. Amina, who was robbed, explained that her Muslim community “stood by me all through the incident.” She continued, “[Being] Muslim is one big family, we help each other.” Several other interviewees noted that their congregation prayed for them after hearing about their misfortune. And interestingly, some violence-affected Lagosians said they did not even mention their experience to fellow in-group members because they thought it would be considered too insignificant or irrelevant to motivate help. “I don’t want to bother them with it, it is not their problem,” Emaedo explained about his decision not to inform fellow church-goers after being robbed at gunpoint. Jonah, who was assaulted and whose phone was stolen by an *okada* driver, also said that he did not tell others about the

episode, in part because beyond the scar on his face, he “did not have any evidence” that he was actually robbed. This indicates that there is, at best, a highly uneven norm around getting in-group support after a violent attack, and that any help may be conditional on proof.

Above all, however, the vast majority of interviewees reported feeling acutely and unexpectedly alone after the violent episode. As Wole, who was caught up in an armed robbery, explained, “Nobody was helpful [after the robbery], everybody was down, everybody was just, like, struggling for himself.” Emeka echoed this sentiment, emphasizing his fear and isolation after experiencing violence:

RA: How has [your experience with violence] made you feel?

Wole: I feel I am not secured, I feel I am not secured among my people and – the unity of the country we are trying to preach about is not real. We are not one, you know?

RA: So how has this made you feel now, do you feel more afraid of being a victim [again]?

Wole: Yeah even when I'm sleeping, I see it coming around me, it gives me fear, it gives me great fear – and, how to relate to people, not to mingle with people [...] it makes me stay clear from people these days, to live a solitary life.

Bimbola agreed. She said that her experience being assaulted by an *okada* driver taught her that “it’s only you you have,” and added that reporting the violence would have been pointless “There’s nobody to help, I just surrender myself.” Chibuzor noted that victimization “[...] makes you understand nobody really has time to help you [other than] yourself.”

This sense of being let down was also present among individuals exposed to violence inside of the household. Adefolake, who brutally beaten by her husband, said she was disappointed by the apparent indifference of fellow community members, explaining that her in-group neighbours were well aware of the pattern of domestic violence but did not attempt to speak to her husband or intervene on her behalf. Given the patriarchal norms in Nigeria

(Makama, 2013), it is possible that Adefolake's in-group members even *sided* with her husband, despite evidence that he was physically abusing her. Similarly, Fatima explained that not even her aunts or uncles protected her from her husband's long-term abuse. "You cannot rely on anyone [after violence]," she concluded.

In summary, the majority of those who spoke about their firsthand experiences with everyday violence claimed that their in-group offered limited or no support thereafter. Instead, they spoke of taking matters into their own hands: staying indoors more often, altering their routes, going out only during daytime hours, and trying to move on the best they could. And many did not even bother to inform those beyond their immediate family about their plight. In an environment where violent events regularly take place, this may be a reflection of a certain level of societal "misery fatigue," with the result that many violence-affected Lagosians self-censored (for a related discussion, see Seu, 2003; Kennedy & Ceballo, 2016).

What happens when our expectations of others, and particularly of our own group members, are not fulfilled in a time of acute need? Research in social psychology suggests that the trauma of violence can "pose major challenges to individuals' basic assumptions about the world as meaningful, predictable, and benign" (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Canetti et al., 2013). When this "shattered worldview" (Canetti et al., 2013) is coupled with an apathetic response from fellow in-group members, victims may reappraise their relationship to their own community and reconsider the relative merits of out-groups (McKimmie et al., 2003). Indeed, if part of the reason for in-group favouritism is the belief that your group is inherently "better" than others, then their lacklustre response might make you reconsider whether your out-group is truly so distinctively bad. Reducing our trust in our in-group and softening our feelings toward our out-group may allow us to overcome some of the cognitive dissonance¹⁶ generated by a lack of in-group support (Festinger, 1957; McKimmie et al., 2003). Or, as Aisha, who was attacked on by a group of cultists, explained: "When you're expecting someone to help you or to show you care after any incident, like what happened to me, and nobody was ready to help

¹⁶ Cognitive dissonance is the discomfort caused by holding conflicting beliefs or acting in ways that are inconsistent with her beliefs (Festinger, 1957).

you, you be disappointed [...] [and think] these people, they won't do anything for me [...] so maybe other people aren't so bad anyway.”

8.4.2 “*Empathy Born of Violence*”

The second mechanism that may account for the increase in out-group trust after violence is an increase in empathy. Empathy, which is an affective response enabling someone to take on another person's perspective and share that other person's emotional state (Hodges & Wegner, 1997; Decety & Ickes 2009), is thought to be a core process allowing individuals to build bridges between themselves and others. As Decety and Moriguchi write, “An essential aspect of empathy is to recognize the other person as like the self, while maintaining a clear separation between self and other” (2007, p.10).

It is believed that tendencies toward higher or lower levels of empathy are partially a product of genetics, but they can also be shaped by environmental factors, including periods of adversity (Caspi et al., 2004; Knafo et al., 2008). Those who have experienced acute suffering – be it contending with the aftermath of a natural disaster, coping with a serious illness, or coming to terms with experiences of violence – are generally more aware of and sensitive to the suffering of other people and better able to understand another person's perspective (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1984; Vollhardt & Staub, 2008). As Hartman and Morse explain, “Hardship and suffering increase the capacity to understand another's condition, which amplifies the vicarious arousal and sympathetic components of empathy” (2018, p.7).

Having experienced violence may also lead individuals to perceive greater similarities with others who have faced similar challenges, including out-group members (Dovidio et al., 1997; Staub & Vollhardt, 2008; Vollhardt, 2009). Indeed, as Vollhardt explains, adversity can cause individuals to believe they and other victims belong to a “superordinate shared category” which supersedes in- or out-group identity. This, in turn, may “...reduce intergroup bias and increase prosocial behavior toward outgroup members” (2009, p.136; see also Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Finally, victimization can increase “sympathetic capacity” and make out-group

members seem less threatening¹⁷ (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004; Staub & Vollhardt, 2008, cited in Hartman & Morse, 2018).

Collectively, these pathways make it more likely that a person who has experienced serious adversity, such as a violent attack, will have higher levels of empathy for others who have suffered in similar ways, independent of their group identity. As Hartman and Morse write (2018, p.7):

“An important characteristic of empathy is its ability to transcend identity boundaries and motivate altruism toward outgroup others (Batson et al. 1997; Shechter and Salomon 2005.). The capacity to feel sympathy for another’s suffering cuts across group divisions, even if less sympathy may be felt for those of outgroup status (Dovidio 1984; Krebs 1975) The ability to empathize is enhanced by perspective taking, which does not depend on identity group status. To the extent that violence-affected individuals feel solidarity with those currently in need, the shared experience of violence may serve as a cross-cutting tie that bridges outgroup identities, just as cross-cutting economic or social ties counteract the salience of ethnicity (Dunning and Harrison 2010).”

Hartman and Morse test this proposition in Liberia and demonstrate that Liberians who were exposed to high levels of civil war violence were less prejudiced and more helpful to Ivoirian refugees. They use a mix of evidence to show how violence, and specifically the “hardship, trauma, and victimization” (p.13) of wartime experience, result in an “empathetic preference shift,” (p.27) which, in turn, motivates more altruistic behaviour and less prejudice toward others experiencing similar distress. More broadly, other research on the effectiveness of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in countries like South Africa and Rwanda has demonstrated that greater and more sincere displays of empathy by perpetrators increases the prospects for forgiveness and reduces intergroup conflict (see, for example, Staub, 2006; Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher, 2008).

¹⁷ Although Hartman and Morse (2018) focus on the impact of wartime victimization on empathy and ensuing altruism, the theory is, I argue, applicable to other forms of violence and adversity as well. Also, Hartman and Morse suggest that priming memories of experiences with violence can actually strengthen the empathetic response.

In a Lagosian context, where everyday violence is a widespread, frequent, and largely indiscriminate phenomenon with regard to ethnicity and religion, a person affected by violence may at some point encounter members of their out-group who have experienced something similar, or will at least hear stories of such occurrences. And while most Lagosians may have been vaguely aware of others experiencing everyday violence, they are likely to be newly sensitive to this information after their own victimization and may feel greater solidarity with fellow victims (Staub & Vollhardt, 2008; Hartman & Morse, 2018). As a result, their feelings about out-group victims, and potentially even about out-group members more generally, may become more positive.

In interviews, a number of Lagosians reflected this perspective, noting that the violence they experienced is common and that they feel sympathy for other victims. Attacks similar to the one he endured “[are] happening all the time,” Tosin said. Olu added that “in Lagos, you have the Yoruba, you have the Igbo, you have the Hausa, you have many tribe, and in all of [the ethnic groups] you have bad people [...] who are doing this [violence] and also who are experiencing it.” Yegwa, meanwhile, said that it “...makes me feel bad, it makes me feel sorry” to think about others who have also experienced armed robbery. And Blessing, who experienced domestic violence, said she feels “unity” with all women who have had such an experience, independent of their background.

As a concluding point, it is important to emphasize that “empathy born of violence” does not happen instantaneously after an episode of violence. Instead, as theorists explain, it is part of a protracted recovery process that individuals who have experienced trauma generally go through. Interestingly, according to Staub and Vollhardt (2008), receiving help and “caring connections” after victimization is considered a precursor to the development of empathy born of violence, which could account for heterogeneity in the extent to which individuals exhibited empathy after victimization – i.e. those who felt entirely unsupported after violence may not develop posttraumatic empathy. But as the interviews and previous research demonstrate, an empathetic response to hardship is surprisingly common.

In summary, this discussion suggests that experiences of violence, and the suffering, hardship, and pain they cause, may lead to higher levels of empathy, directed particularly at those facing similar types of adversity. This empathy may transcend group lines, reducing bias against out-groups and motivating pro-social behaviours, including greater trust.

8.4.3 *Religion as a Refuge*

When asked who they turn to for protection from violence, who supported them in moments of acute need, and how they coped after victimization, Lagosians repeatedly stated that they rely on God. “The only person who can save us is God. I know that God is in control” said Funmilayo, summarizing an extremely common sentiment amongst violence-affected Lagosians. In what follows, I make three broad points about the role of religion after experiences with violence: first, that those facing adversity or loss in Lagos are likely to turn to religion to cope; second, that religious coping can lead to posttraumatic growth; and finally, that the specific channels through which religious coping leads to growth may partially account for the increased out-group warmth and trust after experiences with everyday violence.

To begin, scholars of the psychology of religion argue that a reliance on one’s faith is a common coping mechanism in periods of adversity. Positive¹⁸ religious coping refers specifically to the process of using one’s faith to understand, overcome, and reframe the events, such as “praying for relief, seeking God’s comfort through a faith community, or believing that God was present at the time of the trauma and will provide divine justice” (Bryant-Davis & Wong, 2013, p.677). As Pargament explained in a seminal book on this subject, we “...cope with the tools that are most available to us [...] [Religion] can be accessed easily and quickly during times of acute distress, especially ‘compared to the availability of alternatives’” (1997,

¹⁸ Positive religious coping encompasses psychologically adaptive responses to hardship, e.g. feeling a greater sense of spirituality and meaning in life, greater connectedness to God and to others, seeking spiritual support and strength from other members of the religious community. Negative religious coping, by contrast, can be a manifestation of anger, insecurity, and helplessness during a time of hardship, and includes feeling abandoned by God, feeling more cynical about the world, experiencing discontent with one’s religion and religious community, and isolating oneself. For more on this distinction, see Pargament et al., 1998.

p.145). Alongside its accessibility, religion is thought to be a “more compelling route to significance than nonreligious alternatives,” (1997, p.162), providing meaning and orientation in a time of confusion when people must rebuild “shattered assumptions” about the goodness of others and the fairness of life (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Calhoun et al., 2000 cited in Shaw et al., 2005). Victimization can lead to a greater recognition of one’s vulnerability and, in turn, greater reliance on sources of strength and comfort, such as one’s faith (Collins, Taylor, & Skokan, 1990; Tedeschi et al., 1998; Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2000).

Many violence-affected Lagosians spoke about deepening their relationship with God and intensifying their faith after the attack. After being robbed at gunpoint, Gabriel said he became more religious, praying not just in the morning, but also at night. He relied on “lots of prayers and motivational words from [the church’s pastor] and the Bible” to get through the worst part of his recovery, he added. Leke, who also experienced violent robbery, responded that he depended entirely on Allah to guide him through the difficult period and to protect him from future violence. In total, almost two-thirds of all interviewees mentioned the role of God, their church or mosque, prayer, or other elements of spirituality and religion when discussing what helped in their recovery.

Before continuing, it is important to clarify that most interviewees spoke about intensifying their beliefs and faith in God – their “intrinsic” religion – rather than depending on the supportive or social “extrinsic” function of the religious community (Maltby, & Lewis, 1996; see also Shaw, Joseph, & Linley, 2005). This is an important point of differentiation, because an increase in extrinsic religion could actually imply deeper connections to one’s in-group (particularly in Lagos, where in-group is so commonly defined in religious terms) and possibly a corresponding increase in in-group favouritism.¹⁹ Jonah’s comment about his expectations after experiencing violence nicely illustrate this distinction:

"We also believe in supernatural power from God. God can also guide you so that such thing [violence] will not happen, but the truth of the matter is that when

¹⁹ Interestingly, there is also no indication that victims of everyday violence attend their place of worship on a more regular basis than non-victims.

the thing happened, I did not tell any church member because I feel even if I tell them, the Church cannot come [...] and [help] me. They cannot, it is my own responsibility. So the only person I need to tell is God."

Consistently, religious coping has been shown to be positively correlated with psychological growth, including better adjustment to stress, positive affect, higher self-esteem, and decreased depression and anxiety (Linley & Joseph, 2004; Hill & Pargament, 2008; Gerber, Boals, & Schuettler, 2011; for a meta-review, see Ano & Vasconcelles, 2005; Prati & Pietrantoni, 2009). This size and stability of this effect is striking and generally²⁰ does not depend on the individual's specific religion, the nature of adversity the person faced, her age, or her gender, among other factors. A recent meta-review showed that compared to other coping strategies such as seeking social support, religious coping had the largest, positive effect on posttraumatic growth, along with positive reappraisal coping (Prati & Pietrantoni, 2009). And although causality is difficult to establish, studies employing a longitudinal design found consistency in these outcomes over many years, while others evaluating the explanatory strength of alternative mediators, such as cognitive restructuring, found that religious coping "...added a unique component to the prediction of psychological adjustment" (Tix & Frazier, 1998, cited in Ano and Vasconcelles, 2005, p.474). Stated differently, there seems to be something specific to religious coping that results in better-adjusted individual who have more positive mental health outcomes after adversity. And significantly, it is the *intrinsic* religiousness, above all, that has been shown to contribute to posttraumatic growth (Shaw et al., 2005).

That religious coping contributes to general posttraumatic growth does not necessarily imply that it is responsible for the specific outcomes being focused on here, namely the higher levels of trust in and warmth toward the primary out-group. Nonetheless, there are several possible channels through which religious coping may specifically contribute in this way.

²⁰ Of course, within the expansive literature on religious coping, some studies have found demographic heterogeneity in this effect.

First, adversity and religious coping can uniquely facilitate a new, more tolerant perspective. Pargament explains, “Much of religion’s power lies in its ability to appraise negative events from a different vantage point. [...] Suffering and failure become a chance to redress one’s sins and achieve redemption” (1997, p.172-173). As de Castella and Simmonds write about trauma victims they interviewed, those who experience violence may be “...more willing to tolerate ambiguity and [become] less judgemental of themselves and of other people” (2013, p. 550). Religious coping after victimization can also foster a greater appreciation for life and a reprioritization of values. Interviews in Lagos reflected this as well. Samuel, who was a victim of a largescale burglary, said “I just thank God for being alive,” adding that he does not blame other people for the violence he experienced, and instead tries to focus on the “gift of life.” Several other Lagosians said they immediately went to their place of worship after experiencing violence to offer a “thanksgiving” for their life (interviews with Femi, Gabriel, and Nneka, 2016). This gratitude-oriented perspective may contribute to a gentler point-of-view toward others, including out-group members.

Second, it is implicit that victims who cope religiously generally spend significant periods of time focusing on a higher power who may supersede their identity group. Among those who identified ethnically, an increased reliance on God may serve as a cross-cutting cleavage, reminding the individual of her spiritual linkages to others, including those who are a part of her out-group. But even among those who identify religiously, the focus on the teachings of a tolerant and benevolent God/Allah could remind one that we are, as Micah said, “all children of God,” undermining tendencies toward out-group prejudice and shifting focus away from group identity. “All the glory goes to God,” Emeka agreed, adding that he felt comforted thinking that God decides all of our fates, while Olivia said she has “surrendered herself” to her faith after violence and focuses on God rather than “tribe or group.”

A third pathway is via the hope and optimism that religious coping can foster. As Hill and Pargament (2008) argue, the mere act of having faith – especially in times of loss, trauma, or adversity – requires optimism about the future. Indeed, the vast majority of violence-affected Lagosians said they thought it was unlikely that they would become victims again, belying a

certain hopefulness in the face of suffering. As Nneka explained, “[my] prayer life has increased because such kind of thing [being a victim] [...] and God will not allow me to be a victim again, it can never happen to me again.” In addition to improving overall mental health indicators, this kind of optimism may also translate into a more positive outlook on others, including outsiders, possibly leading to more positive out-group expectations, more optimistic risk assessments, and greater trust (Bryant-Davis & Wong, 2013). Moreover, it is important to emphasize that most churches in Lagos are multi-ethnic, and that those who deepened their involvement in their church after experiencing violence may have also increased their contact with out-group members.²¹ As a result, the increase in positive intergroup contact in a religious setting may also reduce out-group prejudice, as a rich literature in social psychology has demonstrated (for a review of intergroup contact theory, see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

Finally, religious coping encourages compassion and forgiveness in the face of adversity, which has clear implications for how “outsiders” should be viewed (Hill & Pargament, 2008). In Lagos, there is more generally a culture of encouraging those negatively affected by another person to move on rather than to mete out punishment – and this ethos is often reinforced in religious settings.²² Narrating his story of being assaulted by an Area Boy, Akpe explained, “So people are like trying to beg [the Area Boy] to forget what happened and they ask me to do the same, but me I refuse because I knew I wasn’t at fault.” But later, as he tried to make sense of the events in church, he became more willing to forget and move on. “[Church members] just came up to me and started preaching and telling me I should let it go [...] citing examples in the Bible. I think that was a very good [intervention].” Other violence-affected Lagosians, such as Sarah, explained that their pastor taught them just to “forgive and forget.” Or as Marjorie explained, being robbed gave her an opportunity to practice her Christian value of forgiveness, and to “take pity” on the perpetrator.

²¹ Assuming, of course, that their out-group was defined as a different ethnic group, as was the case for approximately half of the respondents.

²² Those who are part of a fender-bender in Lagos traffic, for example, are often encouraged to simply let it go by intervening bystanders. Similarly, market disputes are often mediated by passersby, who frequently try to convince both parties to simply move on.

To be sure, establishing the causal role of any one of these specific elements of religious coping would require further research. What is clear, however, is that religious coping is consistently associated with posttraumatic growth. And, as both the theory and interviews suggest, there are specific elements of religious coping that may be responsible for the changed attitudes and actions toward out-groups after violence.

In summary, I have presented three mechanisms that may contribute to the increased openness toward outsiders and slightly reduced in-group favouritism after violence: disappointment over the anaemic response from in-group members, particularly given the ensuing financial hardship many victims of violence endured; empathy born of hardship; and several ways in which positive religious coping can foster tolerance, forgiveness, and exchange. Certainly, different combinations of the mechanisms may be differentially responsible for the effect – religious coping is clearly irrelevant for those who are neither religious nor spiritual, just as individuals who felt well-supported by their in-group are unlikely to have experienced in-group disappointment. Yet for the “average” violence-affected Lagosian, a combination of these three factors may explain identity-related growth after victimization.

8.5 Alternative Mechanisms

In this final section, I briefly take up the topic of alternatives to the mechanisms presented above, and present evidence that they are unlikely to be driving the increase in openness toward out-groups after violence.

To begin, it is possible that subjects are being victimized by fellow members of their in-group, which might serve to decrease reported trust in fellow in-group members and increase openness toward outsiders. Although the survey collected data about perpetration as well as victimization, for practical as well as ethical reasons, it did not ask perpetrators about the identity of their victims, not did it ask victims about the identity of their attacker (this, however, was addressed to some extent in interviews). Consequently, I can only conduct rudimentary analysis in search of patterns supporting this “within-group victimization” hypothesis.

First, I check whether the quantitative results reported in chapter 6 are robust to a change in the definition of everyday violence, in which victimization is narrowed to exclude victims of domestic violence. Given the high probability that those who experienced domestic violence were victimized by in-group members and the frequency of domestic violence in the sample, these effects should diminish or disappear if they are indeed driven by in-group perpetration. However, the results are robust to this narrowed definition, and their magnitude is not meaningfully different when domestic violence victims are excluded. Moreover, when the definition is restricted in this way, victimization has a significant, negative effect on in-group thermometer evaluations suggesting that, if anything, within-group perpetration may be moderating the impact of victimization on in-group evaluations.

As an additional quantitative heuristic for the in-group victimization hypothesis, I can also check if subjects in more homogeneous areas, where we might expect²³ more in-group perpetration of violence, exhibit systemically different attitudes about in- or out-groups compared to those in more heterogeneous areas. A basic bivariate analysis of neighbourhood heterogeneity and attitudes about in- and out-groups does not reveal a consistent pattern – low levels of in-group favouritism are found in both diverse and relatively homogenous areas. This analysis provides a second form of indicative evidence that within-group victimization is unlikely to be the underlying mechanism.

Finally, the most robust check of this potential mechanism is evidence from the interviews. We asked all interviewees if they could guess the ethnicity and religion of their attacker to see if people would even be aware of in-group perpetration. More than two-thirds of victims could not ascertain a perpetrator's identity group. This was often attributed to the

²³ When asked whether they believed the perpetrator was from their area or from an “outside” area, many residents of homogenous areas said they believed the person was an outsider, so it does not necessarily follow that violence in more homogenous areas is always carried out by neighbours who are also in-group members. Additionally, other research has demonstrated that perpetrators of violence are often not neighbours. For example, a study of female hawkers in southwest Nigeria (although not in Lagos) demonstrated that the most common perpetrators of violence against these women were non-local drivers and bus conductors (Fawole et al., 2002).

lack²⁴ of distinctive physical characteristics distinguishing Lagosians from different ethnic and religious groups (as Jonah said, “there's no way I could figure out the particular ethnic or religious group” to which the attacker belonged), and because perpetrators often spoke Yoruba – a language used widely by all ethnic and religious groups in Lagos – during the attack.

Guessing the religion of a perpetrator was deemed even more challenging. When asked to do so, only a handful of interviewees even ventured a guess, generally based on the clothing the person was wearing (e.g. a prayer cap was often considered a sign that the person was Muslim), while the vast majority said that guessing a perpetrator’s religion is “impossible” or that one “cannot know” (interviews with Chibuzor and Jonah, 2017). Moreover, several subjects mentioned that the attacker obfuscated his/her face with a mask or was simply too difficult to see under the cover of night. Of the subjects who ventured a guess about the identity of their attacker, most did so with significant hesitation, and only a handful claimed they were certain about the perpetrator’s identity, generally because of the unique language he was speaking during the attack.

Importantly, many interviewees *did* leave open the possibility of an in-group *accomplice* to the violence. A number of violence-affected Lagosians suggested that a fellow community member may have tipped off those who carried out the crime in exchange for a cut. “The thief of the house opens the door for the thief that lives outside,” said Folu, citing a version of a proverb in Lagos. Wuraola offered a more colourful variation on the same idea: “The ones that eat vegetables are in the refrigerator,” she explained. Still, Wuraola, like most other interviewees, said she felt hatred toward those who robbed her but not toward anyone else, suggesting that even if there was an in-group collaborator, it may not necessarily affect attitudes about that person’s identity group. “Some people think their group can provide everything [...] [they have] too much expectation,” she explained, and then added that her feelings about her Christian in-group were “in no way” affected by what happened.

²⁴ There are some notable exceptions to this. For example, Nigerians from the northern part of the country often have physical features that are distinct from those of southerners, and certain ethnic groups have distinctive tribal marks/scars on their faces (interviews with Micah, Sarah, and Folu, 2016).

Among subjects who did a) claim to know their perpetrator's or collaborator's identity and b) shared his identity group, most victims argued that their shared identity, if anything, actually attenuated any negative feelings. As Damilola, who experienced armed robbery and sexual assault, explained about her Yoruba perpetrator, "I am a Yoruba myself, so I cannot change my feeling about other Yorubas." Ifechukwu, who identifies as Igbo and suspected that her attackers were as well, voiced a similar point of view. "I didn't feel anything about [the Igbo perpetrators]," she said, "because you know, all this, there are bad people, not tribes [...] it can be any tribe, so I don't have anything wrong with Igbos."

Collectively, there is little indication of substantial within-group victimization, and suspicions of in-group perpetration or collaboration do not appear to meaningfully change attitudes toward in- and out-groups. Although this cannot be definitively ruled out as a mechanism, the cumulative evidence in its favour is thin.

The second alternative mechanism that could drive these results is "strategic realignment" after victimization. If one feels that they were left to their own devices to protect themselves – or if an out-group member actually came to their aid – they might realign their in- and out-group preferences accordingly. Being more open to out-group members might be a helpful, adaptive strategy in and after moments of crisis, and the experience of victimization may have reinforced this point. Narrating the time she was assaulted on a bridge, Miriam articulated this sentiment. "I don't think I will be afraid anymore because, whenever I will be [confronted by] any person I will make sure I align to whatever people are much, so that even if something should happen, I'll immediately have lots of people around there," she said.

Although compelling, Miriam was very much in the minority in expressing this point-of-view. Overwhelmingly, interviewees said that the experience of victimization made them realize they can only rely on themselves and on God/Allah, and very few mentioned the idea of searching for other sources of protection in the future, let alone out-group protectors.

Interestingly, Miriam was also one of the few interviewees who spoke of being *rescued* by a passer-by; in this case, someone who she identified as not being from her group, which may explain her somewhat unusual perspective:

“So all of the sudden, thank God, there was a man [...] an Igbo man who was just coming across from me. The man had seen what was happening from afar [...] So thank God for my star, he just walked up to us and he challenged those guys. [...] I am very grateful to that Igbo man that really rescued me because I didn’t know what would have happened, maybe they would have kidnapped me.”

When one feels so indebted to an out-group member, it follows that attitudes toward the broader out-group may also soften. Yet extremely few violence-affected Lagosians spoke of getting protection or support from *anyone*. The few who did mention receiving assistance from others generally commented that it was an ethnically and religiously mixed crowd that helped or they were not in a state to take note of those assisting them. As such, the “strategic realignment” mechanism is unlikely to be driving this effect. At best, it may have been relevant to only a small number of people.

8.6 Conclusion

Using a mix of social psychological theory and qualitative evidence from some 70 interviews with violence-affected Lagosians, this chapter addressed two main questions: why did threat-induced emotion – and specifically fear – enhance parochial tendencies, and why were victims of violence generally more open to their out-group thereafter?

The discussion of fear stressed its instinctual nature, and then outlined two competing theories: that fear is psychologically protective, or that fear motivates strategic alliances in times of acute crisis. Although it is difficult to prove the former without further experimentation, I argued that the profound *lack* of evidence for the latter, as evidenced by statements made by the overwhelming majority of interviewees, make it unlikely that strategic realignment is driving this effect. Conversely, the psychological reassurance of in-group identity during a time of existential threat, particularly when coupled with fear’s identity-related impact on cognition

(e.g. faster and better recognition of group identity), are a compelling, albeit not yet full conclusive, explanation for why threat-induced fear was identity-affirming.

The more puzzling question stemming from the results is why victimization led to a slight reduction in professed in-group trust and meaningfully more trust in, and openness toward, the out-group. I explored a variety of mechanisms that might contribute to this effect: disappointment about a lack of in-group support after victimization; empathy-born-of-adversity, in which difficult experiences cultivated greater identification with others facing similar challenges; and positive religious coping, which has been shown to lead to posttraumatic growth. Ultimately, some combination of these mechanisms is likely at work at varying extents for different individuals. I then used a range of evidence to show that the “prosocial” impact of victimization is unlikely to stem from other mechanisms, such as within-group victimization or a deliberate strategy of relying on outsiders, although there are surely instances when the circumstances of victimization (e.g. a known out-group member coming to one’s aid) might make these mechanisms more relevant.

As a concluding thought, it is worth emphasizing that just as threat-induced fear was not universally identity-affirming, victimization, of course, did not always result in “growth” outcomes, and there were certainly those individuals who articulated high levels of out-group mistrust and in-group pride after victimization. More importantly, due to scope limitations, this and the preceding chapters could not properly address the full impact of victimization on physical and mental health, economic security, education, job prospects, family dynamics, and so forth. In that sense, it is worth remembering that any “positive” outcomes stemming from first hand experiences with everyday violence are almost certainly outweighed by the generally negative, and at times extremely devastating, impact of victimization. My argument should not be misconstrued as one that celebrates the “silver lining” of violence, or one that downplays the suffering of victims – in almost every sense, the Lagosians we spoke to would have been better off had they avoided victimization in the first place.

In the next and final chapter of the thesis, I take up the broader implications of these findings, suggest how the differential impact of threat versus victimization might have general

consequences for the relationship between everyday and identity-based violence, and offer a preliminary research agenda that would build on this work.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

The motivation for this thesis came from a simple observation: countries struggling with civil war, ethnic violence, and other forms of organized conflict also experience everyday violence; and unlike the former, everyday violence is usually chronic and widespread, affecting huge swathes of the population with little regard to demography. Despite its ubiquity, political scientists have paid everyday violence little attention: the preponderance of recent scholarship centres on civil war, and even an important new literature about the political and social effects of exposure to violence focuses overwhelmingly on organized conflict (Bauer et al., 2016). The central question of this thesis is a direct result of this gap: if we believe that the impact of organized violence is partially a product of the fear it induces and of the recovery processes thereafter, might other, less extraordinary forms of violence impact people in similar ways? Although being brutalized because you are part of the “wrong” ethnic group is qualitatively different than getting caught up in the crossfire of an armed robbery, the victims in both instances may grapple with similar physical, emotional, social, and economic consequences; and fears driven by the possibility of becoming a victim of either form of violence may not be so qualitatively different after all.

This thesis confirmed that exposure to everyday violence significantly impacts identity – and that its effects varies considerably depending on whether the individual was “merely” threatened by violence or actually experienced it. Using a mix of survey, experimental, and qualitative data, I demonstrated that the proximate threat of everyday violence elicits as much fear in Lagosians as a threat of identity-based violence, suggesting that – at least up to a certain point – the regularity of this form of violence does not necessarily lead to callousness about it. This fear is broadly identity-affirming, increasing evaluations of and warmth toward the primary in-group and depressing trust in and attitudes toward the out-group. News about

proximate everyday violence also slightly increased trusting behaviour in a stylized game, indicating that the threat of violence can impact both attitudes and actual behaviour. And interestingly, in contrast to previous research, threat did not significantly impact attitudes about the use of violence or the system of governance, indicating some degree of robustness to these preferences.

Many of the effects of threat on identity were ultimately offset by other intermediary factors, which raises an important line of questioning about the conditions under which the fear of everyday violence would be sufficiently salient to overwhelm the response. At a minimum, these results indicate that hearing about something as commonplace as a nearby robbery elicits a significant reaction – a fact that belies narratives about generations of “desensitized” people living in violent urban centres in and beyond the developing world.

The second line of questioning asked what happens when the potentiality of violence materializes – and the results were quite unlike those of fear. Matched regression analysis showed that Lagosians who had experienced everyday violence within the previous year were more open to outsiders, demonstrating, on average, significantly more self-reported and behavioural trust and warmth toward their out-group than those who had not been victimized. Violence-affected Lagosians were also slightly less trusting of their in-group in self-reports. Although these findings are broadly consistent with the emerging literature about the “pro-social” effects of exposure to (typically wartime) violence, they are still counterintuitive. Why would the hardship, pain, and distress of violence result in greater openness toward outsiders and less in-group favouritism? When we hear stories of victimization, it is often couched in language of trauma and isolation, not in the newfound openness to the explicitly named out-group.

Drawing on over 70 interviews with violence-affected Lagosians, I argued that the way expectations are shattered and then rebuilt after violence may account for this effect. A combination of disappointment with the stoicism of ingroup members – people who were, perhaps, expected to have shown somewhat more compassion and support – alongside “empathy-born-of-violence,” through which the shared experience of victimization fosters a

sense of commonality with others who have also been through hardship, and the hopeful, adaptive role of religious coping, may individually or collectively account for this effect. These dynamics play out over time and are largely dependent on interactions with others; in this sense, one's social environment significantly shapes whether victimization leads to openness and to what extent. By contrast, the identity-affirming effects of a threat of everyday violence are sudden and automatic – a “System 1” response. Drawing on theory from psychology, I show how this reaction is psychologically adaptive and likely too instinctive to be a deliberate strategy. A threat, after all, is often perceived, processed, and acted upon in an instant (Öhman, 1997; Lang, Davis, & Öhman, 2000).

Finally, victimization surprisingly did not impact interest in politics, attitudes about comparatively democratic versus repressive forms of government, or support for the use of violence. This first result, in particular, stands in contrast to a growing literature about the impact of violence (Bauer et al., 2016) – including criminal violence (Bateson, 2012) – on political engagement, and raises questions about whether the nature of the victimization (e.g. how violent or shocking it was) or timing (e.g. how recent) impact this relationship.

Taken together, these findings illustrate that everyday violence, in all of its comparative mundanity, can impact something as profound as one's identity in significant and multifaceted ways. This complexity should not be understated: the effects of threat and actual victimization worked essentially in opposite directions, nuance which would have been lost had exposure to violence not been disaggregated into threat and actual recent experiences. With this in mind, I turn to the other implications of these results, considering their relevance in settings beyond Lagos as well as potential extensions of this research.

9.2 Contributions and Broader Implications

This thesis makes several theoretical and empirical contributions. First, it underlines that everyday violence should be given serious consideration by scholars of identity and conflict. As I have argued throughout the thesis, political scientists interested in the effects of exposure

to violence have focused excessively on civil war, terrorism, and other forms of identity-based violence. There have now been a number of studies carried out about the identity-related impact of exposure to the *same* conflict, and increasingly, about wars that took place decades ago.¹ Such an imbalanced focus might be justified if we did not have evidence that other forms of violence also significantly impact outcomes that matter to political scientists. But this thesis, along with a small number of other studies (see: Bateson, 2012; Trelles & Carreras, 2012; Rojo-Mendoza, 2014; Ley, 2018) shows that the everyday violence impacts attitudes and behaviour to a similar extent as other types of violence – a result that extends our understanding of the way individuals are affected by violence and should motivate scholars of conflict and identity to reallocate some attention to everyday violence.

This thesis also provides new, granular data about the nature of insecurity in Lagos, confirming that everyday violence is widespread and not concentrated within certain identity groups. The survey data presented in chapter 6 also hints at some of the challenges perpetuating the cycle of violence in the city, such as the 41 reported acts of police violence in the previous year, and the extremely high rates of household violence, the most commonly-experienced form of victimization among respondents. My hope is that this information – which is, to the best of my knowledge, the most up-to-date portrait of violence in Lagos – is useful to policy makers trying to address the city’s security challenges and to other scholars of urban violence who are looking for rigorous points of comparison. The qualitative evidence from interviews with violence-affected Lagosians adds important colour to these statistics, illustrating both the brutality of many of these attacks as well as the surprising ways many Lagosians processed their victimization. These narratives challenge stereotypes about disempowered and despondent victims, and demonstrate that, for some Lagosians, an experience with violence set them on a different and not necessarily wholly inferior path.

¹ To be sure, these are worthwhile endeavours in their own right, studying important questions like the inter-generational effects of war and the impact of conflict on specific sub-populations. And this must not be an “either-or” question; rather, efforts should be divided between this existing line of work and new research about the effects of everyday violence.

From a methodological perspective, this project demonstrated how a careful experimental design that is pre-tested, sensitive to the local context, and keeps ethical considerations at the forefront, can be used to research difficult topics, such as the impact of an acute violent threat. To date, the political science literature addressing the impact of exposure to violence has focused overwhelmingly on *actual* victimization, or, to the extent that threat has been considered, on lingering feelings of threat after terrorism (see: Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014; Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Peffley, Hutchinson, & Shamir, 2015). Yet as this thesis demonstrates, there are substantive differences between the impact of victimization and threat. Researching the latter requires both methodological innovation and a willingness to learn from other disciplines, like psychology, where threat has been a central part of the research agenda for decades.

Related to this, a clear implication of this thesis is the urgent need for a more interdisciplinary approach to the study of violence and identity. I am not the first person to criticize the siloed nature of these literatures or to point out the immense size of the opportunity: there have been calls for political scientists to draw on psychology when studying identity conflict (Green & Seher, 2003); scholars of modern civil warfare have demonstrated the usefulness of applying theory from criminology (Mueller, 2003; Thyne & Schroeder, 2012) and searching for areas of productive cross-fertilization (Kalyvas, 2015); and a growing field in international relations integrates emotion into formal models of state behaviour (Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2008; Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2014). But these examples remain the minority, and multiple literatures all broadly dealing with the causes and consequences of violence continue to develop largely in isolation from each other, to the detriment of our understanding.

In this thesis, emotion was instrumental in producing the identity-related effects of violence, and several of the proposed mechanisms linking actual victimization to identity were drawn directly from psychology. A failure to turn to these literatures would have meaningfully changed the interpretation of the results: because the *direct* impact of threat did not significantly affect outcomes (but induced emotion did), one might have assumed participants were simply desensitized to proximate violence; and without the insights of psychology, the counterintuitive

effects of victimization may have simply, and erroneously, been interpreted as a sign of in-group perpetration. Despite the clear value of this interdisciplinary approach, everyday violence continues to be the domain of criminologists and sociologists, intergroup threat is central to social psychology, while political scientists and economists dominate the study of ethnic, religious, and political violence – something that has surely limited our understanding of violence as a dynamic system and has prevented us from recognizing how they may jointly contribute to outcomes of interest.

Finally, this thesis provides important, albeit very preliminary, insight into the circumstances under which everyday violence may or may not contribute to the likelihood of identity-based violence. These links are hinted at throughout the thesis; in what follows, I review them more explicitly and comprehensively, and then present a stylized model of the relationship between these two forms of violence that suggests that in most cases, everyday violence will *not* lead to identity-based violence – instead, an uneasy equilibrium will emerge. To be sure, these linkages could form the basis for an entire research agenda; establishing them more formally would be a valuable contribution to our understanding of cycles of violence but cannot be done in such limited space. The discussion and the model that follow should therefore be understood as preliminary rather than definitive, and as input into hypotheses that could be tested in later work.

9.3 Linkages Between Identity-Based and Everyday Violence

We already know that there are links between different forms of violence, and that – similar to a virus – violence can spread throughout communities, changing form as it propagates (Slutkin, 2013; Østby, 2016). The ways in which civil war and ethnic conflict, in particular, can contribute to a subsequent increase in criminality has been a particularly fruitful area of research, with scholars noting that there is often a spike in violent crime after a war.² This is attributed

² For example, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime claims that homicide rates increase by approximately 25% in the five years after a civil war (UNODC 2005).

variously to the breakdown in the legitimacy and efficacy of public security institutions (Call & Stanley, 2001; Deglow, 2016); the existence of wartime social networks that facilitate violence (Daly et al., 2016); the community-level impact of wartime violence on threat perception, norms, and institutions, (Bateson, 2013); economic incentives (Blattman & Annan, 2016; Blattman, Jamison, & Sheridan, 2016); and psychological factors, such as distress following war (Blattman et al., 2016).

But the linkages in the other direction – that is, how everyday violence might contribute to organized conflict – are less developed. Understanding how and why everyday violence may ultimately contribute to other forms of violence is important, since it is, as I have consistently argued, a far more common and widespread form of violence – and one that is rapidly increasing in many parts of the world (Muggah, 2012; Cederman & Vogt, 2017).

Broadly, the literature suggests at least four macro and four micro-level reasons why a spike in everyday violence might increase the risk of identity-based violence. At the macro level, particularly high levels of everyday violence coupled with low state capacity could present some of the same challenges to order as armed conflict, and to similar effect. For example, the perception that everyday violence is uncontrolled may erode support for regimes and for political institutions, fomenting discontent and potentially unrest (Carreras, 2013). As Trelles and Carreras write, “High crime rates signal the failure of the government to perform one of its most basic functions – to supply law and order. Under these circumstances, citizens tend to become dissatisfied with the way democracy works and with the government’s handling of public affairs,” which, they continue, negatively affects political trust and regime legitimacy (2012, p.100). As this dissatisfaction builds over time, it could provide fodder for anti-regime uprisings or other forms of political conflict.³ To be sure, it may take particularly uncontrolled or spectacular violence for this dissatisfaction to emerge – recall that the political attitudes of the Lagosians in this study were ultimately robust to threat and actual victimization. But there

³ Of course, other factors would need to be in place for this violence to actually occur.

also has not been a recent *spike* in everyday violence in Lagos – and it is unclear how political attitudes might change after, for example, a frightening crime wave.

The costs of the state responding to a spike of everyday violence may also increase the likelihood of future identity-based violence. A surge in crime, for example, may divert security resources and the attention of policymakers, opening up space for new grievances to fester and contributing to the sense that the government would be too weak or otherwise preoccupied to respond to an outbreak of identity-based violence. Alongside their divided attention, specific acts of everyday violence may also intimidate political elites and change their behaviour in ways that allow for future violence. In Italy, for example, scholars demonstrated that coercive criminal violence in the run-up to elections prevented politicians from introducing legislation that would constrain these gangs, perpetuating a cycle of violence (Alesina et al., 2019).

These risks may be compounded by the perception that a certain group is responsible for the violence. For example, some have argued that the resurgence of right-wing populism in Europe is partially a product of the perceived danger, often in a criminal sense,⁴ of new immigrants to the continent (Koehler, 2016). And other research has demonstrated that perceptions of high levels of violent crime can increase support for repressive policies and authoritarianism (although this relationship was not observed in this thesis), which, when coupled with the scapegoating of certain groups, may increase the likelihood of political or identity-based violence (Pérez, 2003; Fernandez & Kuenzi, 2010; Bateson, 2012).

In countries where everyday violence is very organized,⁵ the infrastructure of armed criminality – the networks, weapons, and money – could also be mobilized for other violent purposes (International Crisis Group, 19 Dec 2017). Just as wartime social networks and

⁴ It is not only the criminal risk that stokes anti-immigrant sentiment: concerns about terrorism, violence against women, the economy, and the “identity” of the country, among other factors, also affect this backlash (Cutts et al., 2011; Lesińska, 2014)

⁵ Indeed, in many places, including much of Latin America, the lines between everyday and political violence are quite blurred – a point made by a number of scholars of organized crime and civil war (Kalyvas, 2015). In some places, the violence perpetrated by gangs and drug cartels may be significant enough to constitute an existential threat to the state, which has led some to question whether this violence should actually be described as a “criminal insurgency” (Bunker, 2013). At a minimum, this debate indicates that everyday and identity-based violence do not operate in wholly distinctive spheres.

relationships are thought to facilitate criminality (Daly et al., 2016), criminal networks may also facilitate identity-based violence within and beyond the country. As a recent example, arms were criminally trafficked from Libya to terrorist groups including Boko Haram, and were then used in the perpetration of large-scale acts of identity-based violence (UNODC, n.d.). This is one way in which entrepreneurs of everyday violence can contribute to the outbreak of other forms of violence, and an indication of the complex, macro-level interrelationships between different types of violence.

At the individual level, there are also multiple pathways through which exposure to everyday violence may increase one's propensity to engage in other forms of violence. For one, psychologists have suggested that the trauma of experiencing violence, particularly during formative early childhood years, can make it more likely that individuals will later struggle to develop meaningful interpersonal relationships, and may "substitute" these bonds with membership in a violent group (Hill et al., 1999; Gordon et al., 2004). Put differently, children who witnessed high levels of, for example, domestic violence may be more likely to join an armed group when they are older, assuming they do not get adequate support along the way. Among the many factors that may contribute to this, scholars have suggested that changes to cognitive scripts; desensitization and dysregulated arousal; and an increase in depression, anxiety, and aggression, may all play important roles (Fitzpatrick & Boldizar, 1993; Singer et al., 1995; Kilpatrick et al., 2003; Basile et al., 2004). As a result, exposure to everyday violence may beget future violence, potentially taking on a different shape and form – and much of the research on perpetration and recidivism supports this proposition (Gendreau, Little, & Goggin, 1996; Haer & Böhmelt, 2015).

Elevated levels of everyday violence may also change individual understanding of societal norms around the use of force. As others have pointed out, high levels of exposure to violence and "socialization for aggression" may make violent conduct more socially acceptable (Ember & Ember, 1994, p.621; Miguel, Saiegh, & Satyanath, 2011). In a context where the risk of violent crime is pervasive and the state's security response is unreliable, the use of violence may be seen as appropriate, even honourable. More broadly, it has been argued that high levels

of (particularly wartime) violence legitimizes the use of violence in other contexts,⁶ possibly because the repeated transgression of norms changes individual beliefs about what is normatively acceptable (Gurr, 1989; Ember & Ember, 1994; Miguel et al., 2011). And although this relationship was not observed in the thesis – indeed, attitudes about the unacceptability of the use of violence were remarkably stable – the very high rates of violence actually observed bely the idea that perpetration is truly “taboo” in Lagos, and suggest that there may be a discrepancy between self-reported attitudes about violence and actual behaviour.⁷

Fear of everyday violence may also affect voting behaviour. A frightening rash of armed robberies shortly before an election, for example, might induce enough individual-level fear to “tip the balance” in individual vote choice toward a more militant party promising a crackdown on violence, or toward a party making explicitly ethnocentric claims – and indeed, the threat of other forms of violence, such as terrorism, has been shown to have this effect (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009).

Moreover, across contexts as diverse as Italy (Alesina et al., 2019), Mexico (Trelles & Carreras, 2012), and in separate work on Nigeria (Collier & Vicente, 2013), pre-electoral violence⁸ perpetrated by gangs and other “non-political”⁹ actors has been shown to depress voter turnout, particularly among those potentially favouring the opposition. And while the link between suppressed voter turnout and the outbreak of collective violence is less linear, one could speculate that frustrations with the democratic system, concerns about electoral integrity, and a sense of the system being “rigged” may all contribute to grievances that might later motivate identity-based violence. Although threat did not change the level of political *interest* expressed by survey participants, it is unclear if it might have changed later decisions to actually

⁶ In one of the more memorable examples, exposure to wartime violence was shown to contribute to higher levels of aggression on the football pitch (Miguel et al., 2011) – a clear instance of exposure to one form of violence leading to a separate type of violence in another context.

⁷ Measuring actual violent behavior is challenging from a logistical and ethical perspective. At a minimum, it would have required longitudinal perpetration data, which was unrealistic in this case.

⁸ Or, in some instances, the mere threat of electoral violence. See Bratton, 2008, who demonstrated that the threat of electoral violence depressed intentions to vote in Nigeria.

⁹ Of course, non-political can be a misnomer, as criminal groups and gangs often freelance as “guns-for-hire” for political elites. In Nigeria, Area Boys frequently play this dual role, engaging in petty crime and extortion much of the time, and then mobilizing on behalf of politicians around elections. For a discussion of these dynamics in Nigeria and Kenya, see LeBas 2013.

vote. Indeed, in follow-up interviews, multiple Lagosians spoke about “not bothering” to vote because it “doesn’t matter” and that it is generally best to “stay safe out there and away from election mess” – which, they clarified, meant the hoodlums, robbers, and other “crooks” who try to profit from the uncertainty around election time – tentative evidence that decisions to vote may indeed be affected by insecurity (interviews with Miriam, Tayo, and Marcus, 2018).

Finally, the threat of everyday violence might lead individuals to spend more time with in-group members. If acute fear enhances identity, and if one believes she is safest around those who are like her, then over time, this could lead to more pronounced “identity-group enclaves” that undermine the benefits of intergroup contact. Reduced contact has been shown to harden intergroup attitudes and possibly increase prejudice; over time, it may lead to an environment that is more conducive to intergroup strife (Pettigrew, 1998; Hewstone & Swart, 2011).

Collectively, these pathways suggest that at both the macro and micro level, a spike in or particularly virulent displays of everyday violence might increase the risk of collective and individual perpetration of identity-based violence. Taken a step further, this suggests that countries that experience high levels of everyday violence should also experience relatively high levels of identity-based violence, keeping in mind that the latter is generally rare. Yet when we observe the twenty countries in which everyday violence is currently an acute problem or even a crisis (as measured both by the recent intentional homicide rate and by the crime victimization rate from a similar time period), there is an ongoing identity-based conflict in only one of them (South Sudan). Beyond simply reinforcing the fact that largescale identity-based-conflict is very uncommon and that there are, of course, other factors¹⁰ that contribute to

¹⁰ Indeed, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that the same underlying factors that allow for the proliferation of one type of violence also give rise to the other, such as low state capacity and a lack of economic opportunity (Collier, 2000, 2003; Sobek, 2010; Richani, 2013). For a review of factors contributing to civil war, see Cederman & Vogt, 2017. Others have argued that civil society groups and international actors may increase efforts to spread peace messages (and additional security forces may be deployed) when they observe a fear of violence (e.g. around elections), decreasing the likelihood of identity-based violence actually erupting (Lynch, Cheeseman, & Willis, forthcoming).

or constrain¹¹ its outbreak, it also suggests that the impact of everyday violence on the likelihood of identity-based violence is not linear.

The evidence presented in this thesis suggests one of many plausible reasons why this may be the case. Specifically, the tension between the impact of the *threat* of everyday violence, on the one hand, and actual victimization, on the other, may be a self-moderating mechanism that naturally limits the probability that everyday violence will lead to identity-based violence. In Figure 9.1, I summarize this relationship in a simple and highly-stylized model, with threat and actual victimization plotted on separate axes, and the relationship between the two determining how likely identity-based violence is as an outcome (again keeping in mind that the threshold for an outbreak of identity-based is generally very high, hence its low occurrence worldwide). This model suggests that most of the time, if there is a wave of everyday violence, the stronger “growth” effect (that is, increased openness to outsiders) of actual victimization will prevent the devolution into other forms of violence, even when levels of threat are moderately high.

Figure 9.1: A Stylized Model of Threat and Actual Victimization



¹¹ Recall, for example, the discussion in chapter 3 about the factors contributing to the relative lack of identity-based violence in Lagos.

As shown in the model, as the threat of everyday violence increases – and specifically the threat-induced fear – the risk of identity-based violence also increases. As threat, however, “converts” into actual victimization, this risk is moderated by the openness and growth resulting from victimization, leading to an equilibrium. Given that the size of the effects of victimization was significantly larger than those of threat-induced fear, the “danger zone” of threat contributing to identity-based violence is significantly smaller than the region in which this risk would be attenuated by the “growth” of actual victimization. Alongside the many other factors that are thought to contribute to identity-based violence, the relatively small area in which threat-induced fear is high but actual victimization is minimal – a relatively unlikely confluence of circumstances – may be one reason behind the rarity of identity-based violence in Lagos and elsewhere, despite very high levels of everyday violence.

Underlying this model are, of course, several assumptions. First, as discussed in chapter 8, an important condition to the “growth” observed after direct experiences with everyday violence seems to be disappointment with a relatively lacklustre in-group response. This implies that in communities where the response to victimization is robust and positive, the model may not hold. Indeed, in some¹² of the literature about wartime victimization, the authors note that the growth actually appeared to be parochial, perhaps because of the experience of *collective* victimization and a subsequent within-group-coping meant there were no “dashed expectations,” and hence no out-group-directed growth effect. There are likely many places where the in-group reaction to everyday violence is more supportive than it is in Lagos – a city known more for the hardness and self-sufficiency it fosters than its empathy – and where more community resources are available to assist the victim. And while this discussion suggests, somewhat perversely, that a robust response to everyday violence victimization may actually push the locale further to the right on the graph, this does not necessarily have to be the case: a

¹² As discussed in chapter 2, the wartime victimization literature has not yet concluded whether this kind of exposure to violence may actually harden intergroup divisions over time. This is in part because many of these studies did not define an out-group, and therefore cannot comment on whether the increased cooperation observed among subjects was merely a within-group effect (Bauer et al., 2016).

strong and demographically mixed response, where the violence-affected person experiences support from those within and outside of her community, may, for example, be stabilizing.

A second assumption is that the everyday violence experienced cannot be clearly attributed to a certain identity group. In Lagos, it is unusual for victims of everyday violence to know who perpetrated the act, which naturally limits the extent to which a given group can be scapegoated for the violence. In many other contexts, however, this is not the case. In places where everyday violence is more organized along identity lines – for example, in South Africa during and immediately after apartheid, where violent crime operated around socioeconomic axes (see Kynoch, 2005; Charman & Piper, 2012) – violence-affected individuals may personally attribute their misfortune to a specific group, limiting the potential for “post-traumatic” growth and decreasing the likelihood that this model holds. More generally, in contexts where social identity is not particularly salient, we would of course anticipate that the risk of identity-based violence would be even lower than this model predicts.

Finally, in places where the fear response to a violent threat is substantively different than the one that was observed in Lagos – be it significantly more pronounced or surprisingly tepid – the relationship between the impact of threat versus victimization would change, and it is unclear if this model would hold. Recall that there were not factors that reliably predicted which Lagosians felt high levels of fear after hearing about a proximate violent threat. One reason for this may have been the generally high rates of exposure to everyday violence, and the fact that victimization was evenly distributed across different demographic groups. In other contexts, however, there may be identity groups who experience particularly low levels of everyday violence and might therefore respond to a violent threat with particularly high levels of fear, potentially changing the fear-victimization effect ratio in a way that affects the overall model. Alternatively, in places where the threat of everyday violence has become so extraordinarily mundane that it barely elicits an emotional reaction, there may not be a tangible identity ramification of violent threat.

Of course, one would need to carry out a much larger study to understand whether the effects of threat and actual victimization are similar in direction and magnitude in different

contexts and, consequently, whether this model is truly generalizable to places beyond Lagos. More broadly, while this thesis now adds to a growing literature demonstrating the “perversely positive” effects of exposure to violence – or as Gilligan et al. write, the “comparative advantage in social cohesion” that “violence-affected communities may actually have,” (2014, p.35) – it is one of only a few studies that examines whether *everyday* violence also has this “stabilizing” effect. It is, in this sense, critical that future research validates whether everyday violence victimization in other countries has consistently “prosocial” outcomes, for this would have important implications for both this model and our understanding of everyday violence more broadly.

9.4 Future Research Agenda

Along with replicating the victimization-focused portion of this work in other countries, this thesis generates a number of other questions about the scope and conditions of these findings, which together form an exciting research agenda about the impact of everyday violence. For one, the experimental results about the impact of threat-induced fear elicit questions about whether the “type” of fear matters. That the fear of *proximate violence* is identity-affirming is likely to be generalizable to contexts beyond Lagos, as this particular kind of fear – i.e. one that has survival implications – is a basic human emotion (Ekman, 1992), and presumably operates similarly in other contexts where identity is also salient.¹³

What is less clear is whether these findings are generalizable to sources of fear *beyond* violence, like fear elicited by the possibility of a natural disaster, a disease, or even social humiliation. Was it the fear of *everyday violence* in particular, or fear more generally, that impacted identity? Although the psychological theory underlying this thesis as well as the actual experiment carried out supported the former – recall, for example, that the fear induced

¹³ Moreover, we may even expect similar identity-related effects assuming that sub-national identity is also salient in that specific context. In contexts where sub-national social identity is less salient (e.g. in countries where national identity is actively encouraged by the state) and there are not clear in- and out-group divisions, it is possible that the fear induced by a proximate threat would have different effects.

by the control broadcast affected outcomes to a much lesser extent – it is an open question worthy of future research.

There are also open questions about the impact of other emotions elicited by a proximate violent threat, as fear's identity-affirming effect was mostly offset by other, unmeasured variables. From a methodological point of view, this result underlines the importance of employing techniques that disaggregate mechanisms from treatment, such as the causal mediation analysis used in this thesis. Substantively, it raises the question of what other factors, and particularly what other emotions, provoked by a proximate violent threat might have affected identity. Earlier in the thesis, I theorized that anger may partially offset the impact of fear. As a next step, it would be useful to test the effect of threat-induced anger, disgust, and possibly even the relief one feels upon narrowly avoiding victimization. This thesis demonstrated that a radio news report can effectively induce emotion, and self-reports have been shown to be a reliable way of capturing an individual's subjective emotional experience in-the-moment (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). Drawing on a modified version of this design (perhaps with additional, modern techniques to induce emotion, see, for example, Madsen, 2016) and the causal mediation analysis techniques used in this thesis, one would be able to build to a fuller model of the emotional impact of the threat of proximate violence, along with its corresponding identity implications.

Regarding *actual* victimization, one important question is how to integrate its effects into a more generalizable, individual-level theory of victimization. As discussed early in the thesis, there is a stark division in the literature about how firsthand experiences with violence impact individuals, with some studies highlighting the negative psychological effects, trauma, and withdrawal, and another, more recent literature calling attention to its “growth” effects – a finding broadly replicated in this thesis. It is possible that these disparate findings could be reconciled if the literatures looked at the same outcome measures at similar periods of time – someone may experience trauma in the short term, but still exhibit greater cooperation and trust later on in the recovery process.

As a next step, this could be tested by speaking to victims of violence very soon after the event – when, in theory, none of the social factors would yet be manifest – and then much later, when there would have been time and space for the theorized “social” processing and growth to occur. Of course, there are important ethical considerations inherent to any research involving violence-affected populations (see Goodhand, 2000; Wood, 2006), and the “do no harm” principle would trump any insight that could be gained by speaking to victims. Informed consent, working with trained local researchers who can direct violence-affected individuals to appropriate resources, and the involvement of mental health professionals would all be important considerations in designing this follow-up research.

To disaggregate the impact of the three mechanisms discussed in chapter 8 (dashed expectations, post-violence empathy, and religious coping), one might partner with an organization that supports victims to carry out a trial with individuals who have been personally affected by different forms of violence (i.e. everyday violence and identity-based). Participants could, for example, be randomly assigned to receive support from a circle of fellow in-group members, to spend time with out-group members who had experienced similar forms of violence, or to attend religious counselling sessions. This would demonstrate the individual effect of each mechanism and would add to our still-tenuous understanding of why firsthand experiences with violence at times increase “pro-social” behaviour and at times do not.

This thesis also raises a number of important methodological questions, particularly about measuring complex concepts. Indeed, one of the most challenging parts of this research was finding ethical, valid, and reliable measures for threat, emotion, and identity-related outcomes, and it is important to validate the durability of these findings when other measures of violent threat, emotion, and identity are used.

For example, levels of fear were captured with self-reported evaluations, and although they are generally considered reliable (even when compared to the precision of brain monitors, see Choi et al., 2015), it is worth considering whether other physiological measures¹⁴ might be

¹⁴ For example, facial temperature has been shown to reliably capture levels of fear (Choi et al 2015).

used as supplements, and to think critically about how other emotions might be quantified (Balters & Steinert, 2015). To date, as one meta-review explained, there is “no gold standard” for measuring emotion¹⁵ (Mauss & Robinson, 2009, p.1), but the importance of accurately capturing these concepts cannot be understated. In this sense, political scientists would be well served by turning to neuroscience and psychology for measurement ideas and other methodological considerations when designing these projects.

Developing other robust measures to define in- and out-group and to assess the strength of these relationships would also extend this work in valuable ways. For example, group identity could be established with a conjoint analysis exercise, whereby participants would be asked to choose a partner from a list of names paired with pictures and information about each individuals’ ethnicity and religion. By repeating this exercise several times with small modifications, this analysis would make the “invisible” trade-offs (e.g. between the person’s race and religion) clear and establish the “highest priority” identity group for each individual, without directly asking her to articulate it (see, for example, Hainmueller, Hopkins, & Yamamoto, 2014 for an application of conjoint analysis to politics). Feelings about in- and out-groups could similarly be assessed through behavioural exercises such as a dictator game¹⁶ played with an in- or out-group partner whose co-communal identity status was simply announced (thus avoiding some of the design complications discussed in chapter 7). This may provide a more reliable, or at least complementary, measure of feelings toward in- and out-groups than “mere” self-reports, although one would need to be aware of the additional time this would add to the survey process, and the risk of the interviewee making a different set of calculations if she knew she would play multiple behavioural games (Bednar et al., 2012).

¹⁵ It should also be noted that in instances where an emotion is theorized to be the causal mechanism, randomizing the mediator (that is, the level of the emotion a person receives) is, from a statistical point of view, preferable (Imai et al. 2010), but practically quite difficult to accomplish.

¹⁶ The dictator game pairs two individuals and assigns one of them to be the dictator, endowed with a certain amount of money. The dictator is then asked to give any quantity of the money, including zero, to her partner, and then the game ends. This is a derivative of a game originally developed by Daniel Kahneman and measures, among other things, altruistic behaviour (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982).

Finally, finding new, innovative, and ethical ways of simulating a proximate violent threat would not only allow us to extend this thesis in important ways – for example, by testing how a prolonged or more pronounced threat impacts identity – but it could also open an exciting new research area about the effects of the threat of different forms of violence. For example, it would be interesting to know if the threat of political violence shortly before an election affected identity, and whether these effects were powerful enough to actually impact vote choice. Other scholars have demonstrated that exposure to terrorism strengthens preferences for more conservative political parties and policies (Bonanno & Jost, 2006), but it is not clear if these effects are, for example, a product of identity-related changes, rather than simply a calculation about the party most likely to provide security. Testing this experimentally could have profound implications for our understanding of the way violence, identity, and politics interact.¹⁷

9.5 Conclusion

Every day, people around the world worry that they or a loved one might become the next victim of everyday violence. Parents advise their children to stay home after dark; young people dream about moving to a better neighbourhood; women silently pray that their home will be a refuge that evening rather than a source of terror; fences are built, guards are hired, arms are purchased. The pernicious grind of this violence can get lost in the headlines, itself a victim to more dramatic news and events. But its consequences are felt even when it receives little attention. As a journalist covering gun violence in Chicago said, even a “single act of violence [...] shapes who people are. It gets in their bones” (Kotlowitz, quoted on *NPR’s Fresh Air*, 5 Mar 2019).

¹⁷ It is, however, probably inadvisable to carry out this research in real-time, given the potential impact on electoral outcomes. This underlines the difficulty and importance of searching for better ways to measure complex concepts like identity and threat.

This thesis demonstrated the destructive and also surprisingly constructive ways different types of exposure to everyday violence affects Lagosians. For scholars, these findings valuably extend the research about the impact of exposure to war to a much more common form of violence. It also highlights the profound need for more interdisciplinary studies of violence that draw on insights from criminology, psychology, neurology, and other fields, alongside political science. In the policy realm, the observed “growth” after everyday violence victimization suggests there may be an opportunity to focus on properly supporting victims in the year following their exposure to violence, both to mitigate the effects of trauma and to ensure that any positive effects endure. The high rates of exposure to violence in Lagos, and the fact that information about proximate violence induced high levels of fear, indicates that everyday violence remains a fundamental challenge in Lagos and many other cities like it, both for policymakers and for the cities’ inhabitants. Given that the vast majority of the world’s population is expected to live in urban areas by 2050 (UN DESA, 2018), better understanding the effects of everyday violence in these locales is an imperative of the highest priority.

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Chapter 4

4.A Survey Link

Note: expires October 2019

https://cessoxford.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_eX8eIWSP2URBrVj?Q_DL=agHo3LnTEeTESVL_eX8eIWSP2URBrVj_MLRP_a05pxbwFh2ZiLhH&Q_CHL=gl

4.B Example Armed Robbery Script, Kosofe #6

Hello, and thank you for joining us for this special broadcast from TVC News Nigeria.

This is **Tunde Lawau** and I'm reporting live from **Bamidele Adebule Street in Kosofe**, where we are following up on reports of a vicious attack by armed robbers at the **Sunmola Street – Akinfe Street** intersection early this morning.

The rampage by these armed robbers left 3 **Kosofe** residents dead and several more injured with gunshot and cutlass wounds.

According to a police spokesperson, a group of approximately 6 gunmen stormed into **Kosofe** in the early hours of the morning. The boys were heavily armed with shotguns, machine guns, and cutlasses.

Once they arrived at the junction, the robbers opened fire on several houses and cars, spraying the street with bullets. They then looted freely, stealing a carload worth of wares from nearby shops, homes, and vehicles.

Eyewitnesses described a terrorizing and confusing scene. We spoke with one resident of **Kosofe**, who asked not to be identified because she feared for her safety.

Eyewitness one: "It was terrible. The robbers came speeding down **Sunmola Street** very early this morning. They just shooting anyhow. I don't even understand why they were shooting so much if all they wanted to do was rob."

Another eyewitness, identified only as Iya Alagbo, told us that the gunmen dragged a victim from his house because he refused to hand over money to the robbers. Then they shot him in the head on **Igbile Street**, slaughtering him in front of bystanders.

Eyewitness two: "The robbers kept firing their guns. I saw a young boy get shot in the back. They were just attacking innocent people, unchallenged."

Among the other victims are two residents of **Kosofe**: a 46 year-old-woman and a young boy of 15, both of whom were hit by stray bullets while trying to escape the violence. A second boy is also being treated for gunshot wounds after being shot in the leg and arm. Several other bystanders are currently being treated for cutlass wounds.

Residents said that police arrived at the scene of the crime in **Kosofe** only after the robbers had left. The suspected robbers have not yet been apprehended and believed to be at large in or around **Kosofe**.

We will continue to report as this story develops.

4.B Ethnic Violence Script, Kosofe #6

Hello, and thank you for joining us for this special broadcast from TVC News Nigeria.

This is **Tunde Lawau**, and I'm reporting live from **Bamidele Adebule Street in Kosofe**, where we are following up on reports of a deadly ethnic clash at the **Sunmola Street – Akinfe Street** intersection early this morning.

The bloody outbreak of violence left 3 **Kosofe** residents dead and several more injured with gunshot and cutlass wounds.

According to a police spokesperson, rival groups of Hausa and Yoruba hoodlums stormed into the streets of **Kosofe** in the early hours of the morning. The boys were heavily armed with shotguns, machine guns, and cutlasses.

Upon meeting in the junction, the hoodlums attacked each other, leaving a sea of destruction in their wake. The exact cause of the ethnic clash is unknown, but it is believed to be related to an ongoing property dispute.

Eyewitnesses described a terrorizing and confusing scene. We spoke with one resident of **Kosofe**, who asked not to be identified because she feared for her safety.

Eyewitness one: "It was terrible. The miscreants came speeding down **Sunmola Street** very early this morning. At first we thought they were bank robbers but they were shouting about revenge. They were trying to start a war in the street."

Another eyewitness, identified only as Iya Alagbo, told us that one hoodlum dragged a rival from his house on **Igbile Street** and shot him in the head, slaughtering him in front of bystanders.

Eyewitness two: "I don't understand why this happened. The boys just kept firing their guns at each other. I saw a young boy get shot in the back."

Among the victims are two boys from **Kosofe** who were involved in the fighting. One other hoodlum was reportedly killed from a gunshot wound sustained in the clash, but his identity is not yet known. Several other perpetrators were reportedly injured with cutlass wounds.

Residents said that police arrived at the scene in **Kosofe** only after the rival ethnic gangs had left. The suspected miscreants have not yet been apprehended and believed to be at large in or around **Kosofe**.

We will continue to report as this story develops.

4.B Control Script

Hello, and thank you for joining us for this special broadcast from TVC News Nigeria.

This is **Tunde Lawau** and today I'm bringing you a special report about what some have called the "intolerable" traffic situation in Lagos and worsening traffic indiscipline.

From frequent holdups on Third Mainland Bridge to endless gridlock on Lagos-Ibadan Expressway, exceptionally slow-moving traffic has made Lagosians' daily commute even more frustrating than usual. In interviews with commuters, motorists reported spending upwards of 5 hours in traffic while commuting between the Island and Mainland, even when they purposefully avoided peak hours.

Motorist one: "God, it is getting ridiculous. I leave Ojodu before 5am and sometimes only reach work at 10. My boss is getting angry-oh, but I don't know what else I can do, it's no better when I leave home earlier."

A senior official at the Government House, Alausa, confirmed that motorways have indeed been particularly congested recently, in spite of government efforts to improve traffic flow. When asked to identify the cause behind this increased traffic, the official pointed to long queues at fueling stations, which, he said, can obstruct motorways and lead to traffic jams. He appealed to motorists to stay in their vehicles and avoid blocking the roads while waiting for fuel.

But many of the motorists we interviewed said that this intolerable traffic began even before recent fuel shortages.

Motorist two: "The traffic is just too bad these days. For months the roads have not been free. I try to avoid driving because of this traffic and because the drivers are just too crazy. Last time I was on the roads I saw many cars driving on the wrong side."

A Lagos State government spokesperson highlighted several measures the government has taken to address the frustrating traffic situation. In late February, the government launched a new mobile court system for traffic offenders. This program means that those breaking traffic laws or obstructing the flow of vehicles can be prosecuted on-the-spot. Already, scores of reckless drivers have been slapped with fines or arrested for violating traffic laws.


Additionally, the government recently unveiled plans to install 10,000 traffic cameras around Lagos State. They claim the cameras will help officials catch undisciplined drivers and keep habitual rule-breakers off the road.

For now, however, motorists have little choice but to endure the gridlock.


We will continue to report as this story develops.

4.C Example Sub-Area Maps

AGEGE SUB-AREA MAP



IBEJU-LEKKI SUB-AREA MAP



4.D Randomization Checks

	Mean			Difference		<i>p-value</i>	
	EV	IV	C	EV-C	IV-C	EV-C	IV-C
Female	0.49	0.52	0.49	0.00	0.03	0.995	0.44
Education (10-pt scale)	6.89	6.78	6.80	0.09	-0.02	0.68	0.34
Age Group	3.31	3.38	3.30	0.01	0.08	0.36	0.94
Deprivation (16-pt scale)	3.67	3.90	3.96	-0.29	-0.06	0.80	0.24
% Yoruba	0.72	0.66	0.66	0.06	0.00	0.14	0.92
% Christian	0.66	0.70	0.75	-0.09	-0.05	0.01	0.11
% Indigenous to Lagos	0.32	0.35	0.27	0.05	0.08	0.17	0.02
Victim	0.38	0.30	0.37	0.01	-0.07	0.63	0.81
Perpetrator of Violence	0.13	0.14	0.12	0.01	0.02	0.52	0.84

EV = Everyday Violence Treatment

IV = Identity Violence Treatment

C = Control

Chapter 5

5.A Causal mediation - Explanation of alternative methods

Creating an appropriate model for a causal relationship that is hypothesized to have one or several intermediary variables can be challenging, and the best method is still subject to debate. In the past, analysts often used structural equation models, in which the indirect effect of A on C, assuming a mediator B, can either be calculated as $(A \rightarrow B) \times (B \rightarrow C)$, or, using the difference heuristic, as $(A \rightarrow C) - (A \rightarrow C|B)$. This method, however, does not provide reliable estimates when we have models with heterogeneous treatment effects and/or interactions (Glynn, 2012). Moreover, the linear structural equation model (LSEM), specifically, is not easily applied to nonparametric or nonlinear models. In the analyses in this thesis in which the binary *Trust* variable is the dependent variable, LSEM would not be an appropriate choice (Imai et al., 2010; VanderWeele, 2009).

A second, commonly-used alternative is to use an instrumental variable (IV) approach, in which assignment to treatment would be the instrument for the main hypothesized mechanism, fear (Angrist et al., 1996). However, as Imai et al. explain about the IV approach, (2011), “In particular, although the existence of unobserved confounders is allowed, the direct effect is assumed to be zero... This means that the instrumental variables approach eliminates, a priori, alternative causal mechanisms. For this reason, we believe that it is less than ideal for the causal mediation analysis used in social science research.” In this instance, estimating the impact of (one, although more would have been preferred) alternative mechanism(s) is an important part of clarifying the causal chain, plus assignment to treatment did not perform particularly well in tests of the instrument strength (see also Deaton, 2010).

A third alternative is to include interaction terms and to interpret significant results as evidence for a causal mechanism. One form of this is to include a treatment-mediator interaction term. In situations where treatment is randomly assigned, a statistically significant interaction term can provide evidence for the mediator indeed being a causal mechanism. However, this technique cannot estimate the size and confidence interval of the causal mechanism (Imai et al., 2011). A second alternative is to include treatment/pre-treatment variable interaction terms. When the average direct effect size is not dependent on a pre-treatment covariate, and when the interaction term between that covariate and treatment is statistically significant, this can be considered evidence for the hypothesized causal mechanism. However, this strategy is only indirect evidence about the causal mechanism and cannot even identify the sign of the mechanism (Imai et al., 2011). As a result, it is, at best, suggestive analysis.

Finally, a recent addition to this literature has developed an approach to estimate the “controlled direct effect” (CDE), which is the effect of manipulating both the mediator and the treatment and, in theory, allows researchers to rule out competing causal explanations (i.e. mechanisms) (Acharya et al., 2016). This technique estimates the direct effect of a treatment when a mediator is set to a certain value for all units, which means it is particularly well-suited for questions about whether a particular intervention was successful (Imai et al., 2013). The decision to estimate the ACME versus the ACDE is largely driven by the specific research question that one is trying to answer. In this instance, the causal chain, and particularly the effect of the mediator, are the focus, and the ACME is therefore the causal quantity of greatest interest.

5.B Conditional average treatment effects for the direct effect of treatment on outcomes OLS coefficients

Robbery Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Past Victims	Ethnic and Religious Minorities	Women	High-Anxiety
Identity Index	-0.002	0.362*	0.063	0.050
In-Group Thermometer	2.817	8.948	-1.118	0.999
Out-Group Thermometer	3.128	-3.117	-1.360	1.224
In-Group Trust	0.094	0.013	0.138*	0.010
Out-Group Trust	0.230**	-0.357	0.102	0.107
Support for Violence	-0.101	0.544	0.036	-0.075
Support for Authoritarianism	0.064	-0.095	0.007	0.024
Observations	414	56	506	418

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Identity Violence Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Past Victims	Ethnic and Religious Minorities	Women	High-Anxiety
Identity Index	0.013	0.292*	0.093*	0.007
In-Group Thermometer	-1.277	4.491	1.740	0.721
Out-Group Thermometer	0.559	-2.995	-1.488	1.286
In-Group Trust	0.043	-0.023	0.001	-0.018
Out-Group Trust	0.188*	-0.300	0.056	0.073
Support for Violence	0.087	0.117	-0.013	0.011
Support for Authoritarianism	-0.189	-0.333	-0.085	-0.092
Observations	414	56	506	418

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

5.C *P*-Values for Conventional Tests of Average Treatment Effects

Average Treatment Effects

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	Robbery vs. Control	Ethnic Violence vs. Control	Treatments vs. Each Other	<i>Wilcoxon</i> (<i>Mann-Whitney</i>)	<i>T-Test</i>
Identity Index	0.13	0.07*	0.71	<i>x</i>	
In-Group Thermometer	0.93	0.49	0.47	<i>x</i>	
Out-Group Thermometer	0.99	0.52	0.47	<i>x</i>	
In-Group Trust	0.2	0.86	0.3	<i>x</i>	
Out-Group Trust	0.44	0.39	0.91	<i>x</i>	
Support for Violence	0.67	0.91	0.89	<i>x</i>	
Support for Authoritarianism	0.46	0.56	0.21		<i>x</i>

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

5.D Average Treatment Effects – OLS and Logistic Regression with Covariates

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
	Identity Index			In-Group Thermometer			Out-Group Thermometer			In-Group Trust			Out-Group Trust		
Robbery Treatment	0.031 (0.035)	0.032 (0.032)	0.024 (0.033)	0.200 (1.345)	0.187 (1.278)	0.087 (1.283)	-0.377 (1.679)	-0.715 (1.669)	-0.196 (1.639)	0.389 (0.274)	0.431 (0.278)	0.431 (0.305)	0.287 (0.205)	0.284 (0.205)	0.284 (0.277)
Identity Violence Treatment	0.037 (0.036)	0.024 (0.033)	0.025 (0.033)	0.498 (1.376)	0.146 (1.315)	0.243 (1.306)	1.449 (1.836)	1.481 (1.825)	0.908 (1.803)	0.052 (0.259)	0.080 (0.261)	0.080 (0.315)	0.252 (0.215)	0.241 (0.215)	0.241 (0.264)
Demographic Covariates	x			x			x			x			x		
Covariates + Baseline		x			x			x			x			x	
Identity Significance															
Sub-District FE			x						x						x
Observations	997	993	993	1,005	1,001	1,001	1,002	998	998	1,004	1,000	1,000	996	992	992
R-squared	0.182	0.312	0.345	0.129	0.226	0.259	0.130	0.148	0.195						

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Support for Violence			Support for Authoritarianism		
Robbery Treatment	-0.062 (0.074)	-0.069 (0.073)	-0.073 (0.069)	0.048 (0.084)	0.051 (0.081)	0.001 (0.075)
Identity Violence Treatment	0.018 (0.083)	0.033 (0.083)	0.005 (0.081)	-0.074 (0.089)	-0.086 (0.087)	-0.099 (0.080)
Demographic Covariates	x			x		
Covariates + Baseline		x			x	
Identity Significance			x			x
Sub-District FE						
Observations	984	980	980	1,015	1,011	1,011
R-squared	0.079	0.101	0.197	0.026	0.096	0.255

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

5.E Treatment on Hypothesized Mediators – Treatments tested individually against control

	(1) Rand Inference <i>p</i> -value T1 vs. Control	(2) Rand Inference <i>p</i> -value T2 vs Control	(3) T-Test <i>p</i> - value T1 vs. Control	(4) T-Test <i>p</i> - value T2 vs Control	(5) T-Test <i>p</i> - value T1 vs T2
1. Acute fear (0-2)	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.584
2. Surprise (0-2)	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.403

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

5.F *P*-Values for T-Tests of Direct Effect of Treatment on Mediators

	Robbery vs. Control	Ethnic Violence vs. Control	Treatments vs. Each Other
1. Acute Fear	0.000***	0.000***	0.584
2. Surprise	0.000***	0.000***	0.403

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

5.G Full Causal Mediation Analysis Results

<i>Fear</i>	Everyday Violence-Induced Fear (Robbery)		Identity Violence-Induced Fear (Ethnic Violence)		Fear (Pooled)	
	ACME	ADE	ACME	ADE	ACME	ADE
Composite Identity Index	0.045* (-0.0001, 0.10)	-0.011 (-0.08, 0.06)	0.083*** (0.03, 0.14)	0.005 (-0.07, 0.08)	0.056*** (0.03, 0.10)	-0.004 (-0.07, 0.07)
In-Group Thermometer	4.766*** (2.86, 6.71)	0.635 (-2.76, 3.58)	4.399*** (2.48, 6.49)	0.759 (-2.2, 4.15)	4.58*** (3.06, 6.10)	0.738 (-2.3, 3.51)
Out-Group Thermometer	-4.669*** (-7.37, -2.09)	-0.683 (-5.18, 3.73)	-4.716*** (7.7, -2.09)	-0.139 (-4.57, 4.32)	-4.70*** (-6.8, -2.86)	-0.216 (-4.47, 3.49)
In-Group Trust	-0.01 (-0.1, 0.07)	0.14* (0.02, 0.28)	0.08* (-0.002, 0.16)	0.101 (-0.03, 0.22)	0.036 (-0.02, 0.10)	0.115** (0.005, 0.23)
Out-Group Trust	-0.068 (-0.16, 0.02)	-0.039 (-0.19, 0.11)	-0.111*** (-0.21, -0.03)	-0.037 (-0.19, 0.10)	-0.090*** (-0.16, -0.02)	-0.042 (-0.18, 0.08)
Support for Violence	0.055 (-0.06, 0.15)	-0.228** (-0.41, -0.06)	0.001 (-0.01, 0.12)	-0.016 (-0.04, 0.04)	0.028 (-0.06, 0.12)	-0.203** (-0.38, -0.04)
Support for Authoritarianism	0.033 (-0.09, 0.15)	0.998 (-0.08, 0.29)	0.059 (-0.06, 0.19)	0.014 (-0.19, 0.19)	0.046 (-0.05, 0.14)	0.057 (-0.11, 0.22)

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$
The ACME is the Average Causal Mediation Effect. The ADE is the Average Direct Effect.
Mediator is continuous, interaction included, only outcomes for treated groups reported

Surprise

	Everyday Violence-Induced Surprise (Robbery)		Identity Violence-Induced Surprise (Ethnic Violence)		Surprise (Pooled)	
	ACME	ADE	ACME	ADE	ACME	ADE
Composite Identity Index	0.0003 (-0.005, 0.01)	0.039 (-0.032, 0.11)	0.0004 (-0.004, 0.01)	0.024 (-0.05, 0.09)	0.0004 (0.003, 0.00)	0.031 (-0.029, 0.09)
In-Group Thermometer	-0.013 (-0.226, 0.15)	0.704 (-1.987, 3.38)	0.021 (-0.215, 0.28)	0.142 (-2.38, 2.64)	0.006 (0.089, 0.11)	0.363 (-2.17, 2.64)
Out-Group Thermometer	-0.031 (-0.392, 0.29)	1.039 (-2.405, 4.52)	-0.011 (-0.255, 0.23)	0.448 (-2.65, 3.99)	-0.0187 (-0.282, 0.18)	0.7082 (-2.211, 3.66)
In-Group Trust	0.0003 (-0.006, 0.01)	0.015 (-0.095, 0.12)	0.001 (-0.01, 0.01)	0.061 (-0.037, 0.17)	-0.0187 (-0.282, 0.18)	0.7082 (-2.211, 3.66)
Out-Group Trust	0.0002 (0.007, 0.01)	0.036 (-0.089, 0.16)	0.0001 (-0.008, 0.01)	0.04 (0.077, 0.15)	0.0001 (-0.004, 0.00)	0.039 (-0.06, 0.14)
Support for Violence	-0.0003 (-0.013, 0.01)	0.003614 (-0.161, 0.15)	0.0002 (-0.0001, 0.01)	0.056 (-0.196, 0.08)	0.00014 (-0.0057, 0.01)	0.034 (-0.165, 0.10)
Support for Authoritarianism	0.002 (-0.014, 0.02)	-0.086 (-0.243, 0.08)	-0.001 (-0.016, 0.01)	0.004 (-0.155, 0.16)	0.0004 (-0.006, 0.01)	-0.036 (-0.017, 0.09)

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$
The ACME is the Average Causal Mediation Effect. The ADE is the Average Direct Effect.

Mediator is continuous, only outcomes for treated groups reported

Chapter 6

6.A Witnessing versus experiencing everyday violence

Witnessed everyday violence only	138
Experienced everyday violence only	67
Witnessed and experienced everyday violence*	383
* Includes domestic violence, whereas other two categories do not	

6.B Models with victimization on a continuous scale, and with disaggregated metrics for witnessing vs. experiencing violence

<i>Witnessed everyday violence only (matched data)</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
VARIABLES	In-Group Thermo- meter	Out- Group Thermo- meter	Identity Index	In-Group Trust	Out- Group Trust	Authoritar- ian Index	Support for Violence
Witnessed everyday violence	-3.635* (1.975)	13.098*** (2.470)	0.107* (0.064)	-0.067 (0.092)	0.402*** (0.106)	0.204 (0.137)	-0.240** (0.119)
Age	0.837 (0.988)	5.501*** (1.432)	0.050* (0.028)	-0.039 (0.057)	0.099* (0.058)	0.035 (0.075)	-0.051 (0.057)
Education	0.003 (0.929)	0.973 (1.037)	-0.088*** (0.031)	0.022 (0.032)	0.060 (0.051)	-0.013 (0.067)	-0.095* (0.052)
Female	0.612 (2.020)	1.058 (2.543)	-0.108 (0.068)	0.085 (0.088)	0.197* (0.107)	0.148 (0.145)	-0.298** (0.115)
Deprivation	-0.665* (0.362)	2.009*** (0.389)	-0.056*** (0.014)	0.018 (0.017)	0.026 (0.019)	-0.057** (0.029)	-0.080*** (0.021)
Full life in Lagos	-0.621 (1.991)	0.423 (2.549)	0.280*** (0.065)	-0.039 (0.106)	0.055 (0.111)	0.262* (0.137)	-0.323*** (0.122)
Minority status	2.545 (7.986)	-7.148 (8.627)	0.354** (0.150)	0.216 (0.263)	-0.164 (0.237)	0.021 (0.574)	-0.003 (0.245)
Baseline anxiety	-1.162 (1.265)	3.544** (1.702)	-0.187*** (0.044)	-0.228*** (0.070)	0.111 (0.071)	0.076 (0.099)	-0.003 (0.091)
Perpetration	-5.035 (4.031)	1.847 (4.768)	-0.109 (0.140)	-0.141 (0.149)	-0.004 (0.216)	0.295 (0.266)	0.014 (0.222)
Constant	90.552*** (8.612)	-9.503 (11.773)	5.616*** (0.284)	3.892*** (0.398)	0.349 (0.471)	3.080*** (0.607)	2.790*** (0.629)
Observations	340	337	338	341	338	344	336
R-squared	0.260	0.346	0.349	0.225	0.241	0.251	0.276

Robust standard errors in parentheses
Excludes domestic violence as it was not disaggregated during the survey
 *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Experienced everyday violence only (matched data)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	In-Group Thermometer	Out-Group Thermometer	Identity Index	In-Group Trust	Out- Group Trust	Authoritarian Index	Support for Violence
Exp. everyday violence	-1.264 (2.852)	9.477** (4.629)	0.014 (0.104)	-0.051 (0.144)	0.475*** (0.160)	0.097 (0.201)	-0.304 (0.220)
Age	0.965 (1.895)	1.874 (3.116)	0.022 (0.059)	-0.027 (0.085)	0.119 (0.088)	-0.040 (0.134)	-0.044 (0.156)
Education	0.455 (1.254)	-3.469* (1.799)	0.023 (0.033)	-0.031 (0.048)	-0.053 (0.060)	-0.064 (0.077)	-0.047 (0.072)
Female	3.049 (2.988)	-4.446 (5.464)	0.027 (0.112)	-0.256* (0.142)	-0.249 (0.169)	0.584*** (0.212)	-0.259 (0.232)
Deprivation	-0.689 (0.548)	1.084 (0.888)	-0.015 (0.017)	0.002 (0.025)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.041)	-0.064* (0.035)
Full life in Lagos	-5.132 (4.392)	-2.078 (6.118)	0.307*** (0.112)	-0.207 (0.179)	-0.229 (0.194)	-0.193 (0.246)	-0.594* (0.331)
Minority status	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baseline anxiety	-1.029 (2.625)	-0.516 (3.466)	-0.143** (0.069)	-0.241** (0.110)	-0.129 (0.094)	-0.194 (0.155)	-0.117 (0.168)
Perpetration	-9.931*** (3.220)	15.175** (6.473)	0.029 (0.122)	-0.268 (0.179)	0.385* (0.207)	0.215 (0.302)	-0.077 (0.320)
Constant	95.321*** (14.181)	41.719 (30.532)	4.871*** (0.385)	4.208*** (0.611)	2.404** (0.936)	3.577*** (1.024)	3.861*** (1.014)
Observations	183	185	183	184	186	186	181
R-squared	0.416	0.363	0.393	0.279	0.429	0.368	0.319

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Excludes domestic violence as it was not disaggregated during the survey

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Impact of increasing exposure to everyday violence (unmatched)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	In-Group Thermometer	Out-Group Thermometer	Identity Index	In-Group Trust	Out-Group Trust	Authoritarian Index	Support for Violence
Level of exposure to violence	-1.443***	1.674***	0.003	-0.005	0.076***	0.009	-0.082***
<i>(1 = least; 10 = most scale)</i>	(0.406)	(0.539)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Age	0.234 (0.482)	1.811*** (0.680)	0.023* (0.013)	0.003 (0.019)	0.042* (0.024)	-0.004 (0.031)	-0.026 (0.028)
Education	-0.239 (0.510)	-1.761*** (0.563)	-0.061*** (0.014)	-0.003 (0.019)	-0.051** (0.021)	-0.034 (0.028)	-0.002 (0.027)
Female	2.375** (1.018)	1.824 (1.394)	0.025 (0.030)	0.074* (0.043)	0.074 (0.048)	0.181*** (0.067)	-0.211*** (0.060)
Deprivation	-0.910*** (0.162)	1.479*** (0.224)	-0.043*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.018** (0.008)	-0.038*** (0.012)	-0.052*** (0.010)
Full life in Lagos	1.266 (1.140)	3.005** (1.499)	0.171*** (0.033)	-0.091* (0.051)	0.081 (0.057)	0.194** (0.075)	-0.038 (0.069)
Minority status	-2.745 (2.137)	4.719 (3.545)	0.014 (0.062)	-0.052 (0.081)	0.212* (0.110)	-0.178 (0.144)	0.098 (0.124)
Baseline anxiety	-0.757 (0.671)	-1.257 (0.837)	-0.103*** (0.020)	-0.158*** (0.029)	0.087*** (0.031)	-0.095** (0.047)	-0.158*** (0.043)
Perpetration	-6.824*** (1.637)	12.576*** (2.320)	0.039 (0.051)	-0.129* (0.069)	0.256*** (0.091)	-0.076 (0.105)	0.448*** (0.115)
Constant	91.437*** (5.227)	39.197*** (5.857)	5.155*** (0.137)	3.820*** (0.190)	1.573*** (0.242)	3.768*** (0.285)	2.465*** (0.279)
Observations	1,003	994	995	1,004	996	1,015	984
R-squared	0.145	0.206	0.215	0.110	0.127	0.205	0.209

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Impact of increasing exposure to everyday violence (unmatched)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	In-Group Thermometer	Out-Group Thermometer	Identity Index	In-Group Trust	Out-Group Trust	Authoritarian Index	Support for Violence
Level of exposure to violence	-1.443***	1.674***	0.003	-0.005	0.076***	0.009	-0.082***
<i>(1 = least; 10 = most scale)</i>	(0.406)	(0.539)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Age	0.234 (0.482)	1.811*** (0.680)	0.023* (0.013)	0.003 (0.019)	0.042* (0.024)	-0.004 (0.031)	-0.026 (0.028)
Education	-0.239 (0.510)	-1.761*** (0.563)	-0.061*** (0.014)	-0.003 (0.019)	-0.051** (0.021)	-0.034 (0.028)	-0.002 (0.027)
Female	2.375** (1.018)	1.824 (1.394)	0.025 (0.030)	0.074* (0.043)	0.074 (0.048)	0.181*** (0.067)	-0.211*** (0.060)
Deprivation	-0.910*** (0.162)	1.479*** (0.224)	-0.043*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.018** (0.008)	-0.038*** (0.012)	-0.052*** (0.010)
Full life in Lagos	1.266 (1.140)	3.005*** (1.499)	0.171*** (0.033)	-0.091* (0.051)	0.081 (0.057)	0.194** (0.075)	-0.038 (0.069)
Minority status	-2.745 (2.137)	4.719 (3.545)	0.014 (0.062)	-0.052 (0.081)	0.212* (0.110)	-0.178 (0.144)	0.098 (0.124)
Baseline anxiety	-0.757 (0.671)	-1.257 (0.837)	-0.103*** (0.020)	-0.158*** (0.029)	0.087*** (0.031)	-0.095** (0.047)	-0.158*** (0.043)
Perpetration	-6.824*** (1.637)	12.576*** (2.320)	0.039 (0.051)	-0.129* (0.069)	0.256*** (0.091)	-0.076 (0.105)	0.448*** (0.115)
Constant	91.437*** (5.227)	39.197*** (5.857)	5.155*** (0.137)	3.820*** (0.190)	1.573*** (0.242)	3.768*** (0.285)	2.465*** (0.279)
Observations	1,003	994	995	1,004	996	1,015	984
R-squared	0.145	0.206	0.215	0.110	0.127	0.205	0.209

Robust standard errors in parentheses

6.C Descriptive analyses with identity violence victimization as the IV

VARIABLES	(1) In-Group Thermometer	(2) Out-Group Thermometer	(3) Identity Index	(4) In-Group Trust	(5) Out-Group Trust	(6) Authoritarian Index	(7) Support for Violence
Political-Identity Violence[‡]	-1.835 (2.316)	9.038*** (3.438)	0.111 (0.086)	0.007 (0.134)	0.365** (0.141)	0.143 (0.163)	-0.259 (0.168)
Age	-0.715 (1.347)	4.764** (2.354)	0.001 (0.061)	0.125* (0.065)	0.032 (0.074)	-0.059 (0.100)	-0.054 (0.094)
Education	0.435 (1.060)	-1.591 (1.266)	-0.124*** (0.038)	0.042 (0.051)	0.039 (0.061)	-0.048 (0.076)	0.033 (0.068)
Female	4.406* (2.597)	-1.616 (3.890)	0.057 (0.120)	0.041 (0.146)	-0.018 (0.151)	0.172 (0.232)	-0.142 (0.200)
Deprivation	-1.326*** (0.421)	1.568*** (0.534)	-0.051*** (0.013)	-0.008 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.023)	-0.052 (0.035)	-0.113*** (0.030)
Full life in Lagos	4.499* (2.470)	9.402*** (3.382)	0.399*** (0.088)	0.104 (0.124)	0.229* (0.135)	0.307 (0.202)	-0.128 (0.153)
Baseline anxiety	2.851* (1.681)	0.287 (2.155)	-0.141*** (0.052)	-0.079 (0.098)	-0.206** (0.104)	0.067 (0.170)	0.020 (0.120)
Perpetration	-10.901*** (2.769)	7.305* (3.902)	-0.074 (0.114)	-0.120 (0.175)	0.297* (0.172)	-0.041 (0.235)	-0.056 (0.200)
Constant	83.999*** (10.808)	8.336 (15.485)	5.838*** (0.425)	2.880*** (0.713)	1.541** (0.710)	3.740*** (0.915)	1.496* (0.853)
Observations	219	221	219	219	221	222	217
R-squared	0.492	0.425	0.452	0.238	0.331	0.283	0.283

[‡] Includes police violence, $n = 72$

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Chapter 7

7.A Trust game protocol

1. Shortly before the end of the survey, subjects were informed that they would be playing a game with a partner located in another part of Lagos. Enumerators explained to the subject that she would be Player A and would receive an initial endowment of 500 Naira (roughly half of the daily income of an unskilled labourer and 15% of the daily income of a resident in the middle class) (Sessou, 2018; Robertson, Ndebele, & Mhango 2011).

At that point, without the participant's knowledge, the Qualtrics software platform randomly assigned the subject to play with either an in- or out-group partner (Player B). Player B, however, was not a real person, and was instead a pre-programmed computer algorithm. To assign the participant to a partner, the software "viewed" the subject's responses to the key questions about in- and out-group identity and selected a "partner" whose name and location conveyed that he was in- or out-group, accordingly.¹

2. The enumerator told the subject the name of her partner (Player B) and informed her that this person would be playing from another part of Lagos, similarly with the assistance of an enumerator.
3. The research assistant then explained to the subject that she could decide how much, if any, of her initial endowment, x , to send to her partner $s \in [0, x]$, and that any amount sent would be automatically multiplied by 3 by the organizers of the study. Player B would then decide how much, if any, of that money to return, $y \in [0, 3s]$. The subject's payoff would consequently be $x - s + y$.
4. The research assistant further explained that the subject's decision would be entered into the tablet and that the information would be automatically sent to Player B. The amount sent back by Player B would similarly be transmitted electronically – the two players would therefore never meet in person. Research assistants did not explicitly tell subjects that their name would be revealed to Player B, but also did not suggest that they would remain anonymous.
5. Finally, the subject was informed that she would be able to keep any money she earned during the game, to be paid out in cash at the end of the study.

¹ There is some evidence that individuals send less money to a counterpart if they know they are playing with a computer (Bottom et al. 2006; Sanfey et al. 2003). Even if this is the case, the manipulation checks (presented below) demonstrate roughly equal believability rates across assigned Player B, indicating that there is no reason to think that any one group would be disproportionately more likely to believe they are playing with a computer and send fewer Naira accordingly.

7.B Trust game prompt:

Enumerator: Ok, this is your last task. You're now going to play the short game I mentioned in my introduction. As I said, through this game you will have an opportunity to win and keep money.

Here is how it works: this game is played by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. You will play this game with someone else from Lagos who is also participating in this research in a different part of the city.

You are going to be Player 1 today. I am going to give you 500 Naira to play the game with, and Player 2 will also receive 500 Naira for the game.

You will begin the game today by making a decision. You will have to decide if you would like to send any of your 500 Naira to Player 2. You can send anywhere from 0 Naira to all 500 Naira to Player 2. You will be able to keep the balance of what you don't send. So, as an example, if you send 100 Naira, you will keep the remaining 400 Naira.

I will take whatever quantity of Naira you decide to send to Player 2 and I will triple it. So, as an example, if you decide to send 250 Naira, I will triple it, and Player 2 will receive 750 Naira (and you will hold on to the balance of 250 Naira). If you decide to send 10 Naira, I will triple it and Player 2 will receive 30 Naira, and you will hold on to the balance of 490 Naira. If you send 0 Naira, Player 2 will not receive any additional Naira, and you will hold onto the full 500 Naira. And so on.

Player 2 will then get to decide how much, if any, of the Naira he would like to send back to you. Remember that Player 2 will have the tripled Naira, plus the 500 Naira he started with. Player 2 may decide to send any quantity back, from 0 Naira to all of the Naira he now has. It is his decision.

After Player 2 sends back Naira, the game is over. Since Player 2 is participating in the game from a different part of Lagos, you will not meet this person, nor will Player 2 meet you. I will tell you Player 2's name before we begin, though. I will send your response over this tablet and get the answer back this way.

You will get to keep any money you earn in the game today. Do you have any questions? Do you understand the rules?

[Make sure the subject understands before continuing. Take time to clarify if she/he does not understand].

Your partner, Player 2, today will be: **[Partner's Name]**

7.C In-group premium CEM

Co-communal relationships – CEM Imbalance

<u>Pre-Matching</u>			<u>Post-Matching</u>		
	<u>L1</u>	<u>mean</u>	<u>L1</u>	<u>mean</u>	
Univariate imbalance					Number of strata 307
Age	0.18095	0.26435	0.03311	0.03311	Number of matched strata 39
Gender	0.05682	0.05682	1.10E-16	0.00E+00	
Education	0.1557	0.44721	1.29E-01	9.60E-02	<u>0</u> <u>1</u>
Deprivation	0.2845	-1.2242	0.03642	(0.03)	All 70 697
Risk	0.0875	-0.0875	8.70E-17	-1.70E-16	Matched 47 151
Baseline anxiety	0.17974	-0.1032	1.99E-02	1.99E-02	Unmatched 23 546
Prev victimization	0.21307	-0.2130	8.3E-17	-1.7E-16	
Multivariate L1 Distance	0.94642857		0.81456954		

7.D Impact of threat – sub-group analyses


Direct Effect of Treatment

VARIABLES	(1) In-Group Compliers	(2) Out-Group Compliers
Robbery	28.482** (13.486)	-17.140 (30.156)
Ethnic Violence	2.881 (13.892)	1.571 (29.691)
Constant	287.418*** (9.411)	263.640*** (19.511)
Observations	442	62
R-squared	0.012	0.007

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Fear as a Mediator Among In-Group Dyads



Note: Estimates include LGA-level instead of sub-district effects because of the smaller sample size
Dotted Line: Control; Solid Line: Treated

7.E Victimization CEM

CEM Imbalance – Everyday Violence

	Pre-Matching		Post-Matching			
	L1	mean	L1	mean		
Univariate imbalance					Number of strata	21
						8
Age	0.09778	0.07977	0.04288	-0.04288	Number of matched strata	93
Education	0.02311	-0.0231	6.00E-17	1.10E-16		
Gender	0.15094	-0.1509	1.00E-15	1.20E-15		
Deprivation	0.17931	1.2212	0.09737	0.36	All	636
Risk	0.0671	0.0671	4.80E-16	-8.90E-16		38
Partner perception	0.11619	0.15032	2.70E-16	2.20E-16	Matched	534
Baseline anxiety	0.18495	0.11259	0.15253	0.06821	Unmatched	102
Multivariate L1 Distance	0.72222916		0.6558736			84

CEM Imbalance – PIB Violence

<u>Pre-Matching</u>			<u>Post-Matching</u>			
Univariate imbalance	<u>L1</u>	<u>mean</u>	<u>L1</u>	<u>mean</u>	Number of strata	218
Age	0.11633	0.11997	0.00236	0.00236	Number of matched strata	42
Education	.04185	-.04185	1.2e-16	2.2e-16		
Gender	0.24049	-0.241	1.4e-16	5.6e-17	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Deprivation	0. .2925	1.7442	0.15261	0. 49628	All	947 72
Risk	0.12269	0.12269	8.0e-16	2.4e-15	Matched	429 65
Partner perception	0.09648	-0.0778	5.3e-16	0	Unmatched	518 7
Baseline anxiety	0.22315	0.26509	0.13349	0.03659		
Multivariate L1 Distance	0.88201366		0.6558736			

7.F Causal mediation analysis

<i>Fear</i>	Everyday Violence-Induced Fear (Robbery)		Identity Violence-Induced Fear (Ethnic Violence)		Fear (Pooled)	
	ACME	ADE	ACME	ADE	ACME	ADE
Sent Naira	4.68 (-10.35, 18.39)	13.05 (-24.26, 47.75)	-3.4 (-16.65, 7.59)	-1.85 (-40.24, 29.06)	4.12 (-9.78, 19.66)	13.78 (-20.8, 44.42)

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$
Mediator is dichotomous, only outcomes for treated groups reported

<i>Surprise</i>	Everyday Violence-Induced Surprise (Robbery)		Identity Violence-Induced Surprise (Ethnic Violence)		Surprise (Pooled)	
	ACME	ADE	ACME	ADE	ACME	ADE
Sent Naira	-35.0** (-67.30, -5.78)	35.21* (-2.87, 75.18)	-45.91*** (-76.86, -19.0)	16.73 (-23.19, 53.79)	-35.0** (-64.31, -3.93)	35.40* (-3.46, 71.29)

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$
Mediator is continuous, only outcomes for treated groups reported

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Chapter 3

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