Verification Pathologies: An Analysis of Ceasefire Verification Missions in Angola, Mozambique and Kosovo.

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Abstract

The UN and other international organisations (IO) routinely deploy ceasefire verification missions (CVM) in support of international peacekeeping. The positive contributions CVMs can make are reliant on understandings by the conflict parties and by the international community that CVM reporting is impartial, the product solely of data gathered and analysed in a manner that is rational and objective. This thesis examines this assumption by asking, 'To what extent can factors other than monitoring data affect the content of ceasefire verification reports?'

The research constitutes a series of plausibility probes on groups of factors that could theoretically affect a CVM's output so as to result in some non-trivial change to the international effect that output would likely have. Factor indicators and counter-indicators were derived and applied to three typical cases from a universe of 68 post-War CVMs: the UN Angola Verification Mission II (1992), the UN Operation in Mozambique (1992-4), and the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (1998-9). Sources (many previously unpublished) were drawn from archives in New York, Prague and Oxford, and from private collections, and supplemented with interviews with former CVM participants and expert commentators.

The thesis demonstrates that the following 'verification pathologies' can substantially affect ceasefire verification reports: productive language and proscriptions in the CVM mandate and the ceasefire agreement(s); organisational dysfunction in the CVM, the conducting IO and the nexus between them; certain processes upon which CVMs are based; certain CVM procedures; moderation or suppression of information by the conducting IO in pursuit of its strategic purposes; manipulation by powerful actors. The thesis offers ways in which those who conceive, design and conduct CVMs could seek to moderate the influence of these pathologies, and urges a more critical reading of CVM outcomes and consequent historical events.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AA	Assembly Area
ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CCF	*Comissã do Cessar Fogo*
CCFA	Joint Commission for the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces
CCPM	*Comissão Conjunta Politico-Militar*
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe
CiO	Chairman-in-Office
CLO	Chief Liaison Officer
CME	Collectible Military Equipment
CMO	Chief Military Observer [UN] / Chief Monitoring Officer [OSCE]
CMVF	*Comissão Mista de Verificação e Fiscalização*
CNDD-FDD	*Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie*
COGN	Chief of Observer Group North
COO	Chief Operations Officer
COS	Chief of Staff
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre
CPO	Causal Process Observation
CRLO	Chief Regional Liaison Officer
CRMO	Chief Regional Military Observer
CSC	*Comissã de Supervisão e Control*
CSCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTNA	*Centro de Tropas Não Acantonadas*
CUREC	Central University Research Ethics Committee
CVM	Ceasefire Verification Mission
DAM	Department of Administration and Management
DCiP	Documentation Centre in Prague
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EC	European Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EOSG	Executive Office of the Secretary-General
EU	European Union
FAA	*Forças Armadas Angolanas*
FADM	*Foças Armadas de Defensa de Moçambique*
FALA	*Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola*
FAM	*Foças Armadas de Moçambique*
FAPLA	*Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola*
FLEC	*Frente de Libertação del Enclave de Cabinda*
FNLA	*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*
FOD	Field Operations Division
FPDM	Foreign Policy Decision-Making

FRELIMO	*Frente da Libertação de Moçambique*
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GoA	Government of Angola
GoM	Government of Mozambique
GPA	General Peace Agreement
HoM	Head of Mission
HQ	Headquarters
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IO	International Organisation
IR	International Relations
JVM	Joint Verification Mechanism
KDOM	Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KVCC	Kosovo Verification Coordination Centre
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
KVMSU	Kosovo Verification Mission Support Unit
LO	Liaison Officer
MilOb	Military Observer
MONUA	*Missão de Observação des Nações Unides em Angola*
MPLA	*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*
MUP	*Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova*
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OGN	Observer Group North
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSPA	Office for Special Political Affairs
PRM	Police of the Republic of Mozambique
PTS	Purchase and Transportation Section
RAD	Regional Arms Depot
RAF	Royal Air Force
RC	Regional Centre
RCCF	Regional Ceasefire Commission
RENAMO	*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*
ROK	Republic of Korea
RRT	Rapid Response Team
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SITREP	Situation Report
SLMM	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SMM	Special Monitoring Mission
SPA	Senior Political Advisor
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
STRATCOM	Strategic Communications
TC	Team Commander
TELECON	Telephone Conversation
TLE	Treaty Limited Equipment

TU	Technical Unit
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UÇK	*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosoves*
UN	United Nations
UNARMS	United Nations Archives and Record Management System
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNITA	*União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola*
UNMO	United Nations Monitoring Officer
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNOHAC	United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
USG	Under-Secretary-General
VERTIC	Verification Research, Training and Information Centre
VJ	*Vojska Jugoslavije*
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Language used in the Thesis

This thesis draws on sources originally produced in various foreign languages which have subsequently been translated into English, often by amateur interpreters. In quoted extracts, spelling mistakes and minor grammatical errors have been corrected without annotation provided the meaning remains unaffected.

In Chapter V I follow the OSCE's practice of naming towns and villages by giving the Serbian name followed by the Albanian name where they differ (e.g. Kushnin/Kušlin).

Having set out to write this thesis using gender-neutral language, my 'cast' - the great majority from peacekeeping missions in the 1990s - is so overwhelmingly male that I have elected to use masculine pronouns throughout. For this I beg the forgiveness of Dame Margaret Anstee (UNAVEM II), Kristin Heinrich (ONUMOZ), Yvonne Lodico (UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ), Sophie Picavet (OSCE KVM), Janne Teller (ONUMOZ) and Malgorzata Twardowska (OSCE SMM).

Note on Signals and Reports

code cable - A confidential and encrypted text message, commonly exchanged between the HQ of a diplomatic mission and the foreign ministry of its parent country. Chapters III and IV refer to various code cables between executive members of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ (respectively) and senior individuals in UN HQ.

cryptofax - An encrypted fax used by UN field missions in the 1990s.

flash report - A report submitted more rapidly than routine requires due to the time-critical nature of the information therein.

SITREP (Situation Report) - Reports, standardised in format, normally submitted at set times (daily, weekly etc.) to a higher HQ to communicate information and request assets and direction.

TELECON (Telephone Conversation) - A written account of a telephone conversation (also a direct abbreviation e.g. ‘our TELECON of yesterday’).

I Introduction

> If we had perfect verification, how would we know? Would the absence of noncompliance mean that nothing was happening or that we were not seeing it?
>
> − Mark Lowenthal and Joel Wit, *The Politics of Verification*

1.1 The Imperative to Study Ceasefire Verification Missions

Whilst the practice of international verification may be traced as least as far back as the Treaty of Versailles, the commencement of the verification of ceasefire agreements by international organisations (IO) is most commonly associated with the founding of the UN.[1] With hindsight, the deployment of a UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) to Palestine in 1948 presaged the now common practice of IOs deploying 'ceasefire verification missions' (CVM) under internationally created mandates. Though the 1990s represented a 'peak' of UN CVMs (Figure 1.1) the mantle has been taken up by other IOs: on 1 December 2018 the AU, the EU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the OSCE and various ad hoc groups were also each conducting one or more CVMs.



Figure 1.1. Post-War CVMs: ongoing by decade (as at 1 December 2018). Source: Annex A.

[1] Article 203 of the Treaty established Inter-Allied Military Commissions of Control to ensure the destruction of German materiel.

The output of a CVM is a series of reports issued by its conducting IO. These reports have international significance. Declarations of compliance are commonly linked to benefits such as external assistance, the lifting of sanctions and international recognition. Declarations of non-compliance can designate pariah status and may constitute legal and moral bases for retaliatory actions up to and including military intervention. Several commentators claim that CVMs can enable peacekeeping (and, consequently, peacebuilding) by allowing conflict parties to demonstrate compliance with a ceasefire agreement in a way that offers their opponents the security guarantees to likewise comply.[2] However, none of these effects are likely to be realised unless a CVM's processes and procedures are widely accepted to be rational and unaffected by the personal opinions or feelings of those who conduct it.[3] Without such objectivity it is unlikely a verification can be impartial and unless a CVM is anticipated to act impartially conflict parties are unlikely to stake their futures upon the security guarantees it offers and its audits of their own compliance. The discourses of conducting IOs articulate these sentiments: the verification conducted by the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (1993-4) was "directed ... at an objective recording of facts"; the EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh (2005-6) was "completely impartial by nature"; the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM, commenced 2014) was constituted "to observe and report in an impartial and objective way."[4] (The UN, furthermore, identifies 'impartiality' as

[2] Virginia Fortna has calculated that the presence of an unarmed monitoring mission reduces the risk of another war by 85% relative to its absence. Virginia Page Fortna, "Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects," *World Politics* 56, no. 4 (July 2004): 500. See also Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 26-7; Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System,* 2nd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 2007), 138-45; United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008), 19.

[3] This inquiry understands 'processes' to be the *conceptual* series of actions which may cause an intention to be realised and 'procedures' as the *practical* activities by which a verification process is conducted e.g. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).

[4] "El Salvador-ONUSAL," UN Department of Public Information, last modified September 1996, accessed 25 May 2018, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onusal_b.htm; "EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia)," EU Council Secretariat, factsheet, 15 December 2006, accessed 25 May 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/aceh-amm/pdf/15122006_factsheet_aceh-amm_en.pdf; "OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine," OSCE, accessed 25 May 2018, https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine.

one of 'the three basic principles of UN peacekeeping'.[5]) It appears that the utility of a CVM as a tool for making and keeping peace depends on assumptions that a CVM gathers data in unbiased ways, that this data is (consequently) representative of the situation 'on the ground', and that the CVM subsequently draws conclusions from this data in a rational manner. To put it another way, those who read and employ ceasefire verification reports assume they are based on nothing but the data a CVM has been able to collect and that the CVM is not itself a factor in the reports the conducting IO disseminates to its target audience(s).

This thesis examines the validity of these assumptions via the following research question: *To what extent can factors other than monitoring data affect the content of ceasefire verification reports?* If one accepts that international practice assumes ceasefire verification reports to be the product of monitoring data only (the 'base hypothesis'), this question constitutes a test of the hypothesis that this is indeed the case. Several factors that could affect ceasefire verification reports may be proposed on the basis of studies of Cold War arms verification processes and of established approaches to analysing power and decision-making in complex organisations. Eliminating each of these would strengthen the base hypothesis; conversely, demonstrating that one or more of these factors can substantially affect ceasefire verification reports would simultaneously disconfirm the base hypothesis and suggest a new one: 'In addition to monitoring data, factor X can affect ceasefire verification reports'. The thesis' research objective is to conduct plausibility probes upon groups of factors that could theoretically affect a CVM's output to such an extent as to result in some non-trivial change to the international effect those outputs would likely have.[6] Factors that are shown to have the

[5] United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 31.
[6] In this project the extent of effect was coded solely as whether a factor did or did not substantially affect the content of at least one ceasefire verification report, 'substantially' indicating some non-trivial variation in the effect on the international audience the report would likely have (e.g. in many scenarios a reported series of ceasefire violations would be likely to affect an international audience to a non-trivial extent whilst a reported minor variation in percentage of weapons collected would likely not).

capability to affect ceasefire verification reports are subsequently described as 'verification pathologies'.[7]

The question as to why some ceasefires take hold to such extent as to enable peacebuilding whilst others fail is, of course, a major concern of the peacebuilding canon. As noted, many commentators argue that the presence of a CVM may be a significant factor in this consideration; however, it is not widely doubted that this can only be one of several potential variables, many of which will be domestic and/or environmental and quite discrete from the potential influence of external interventions. Situated within this broad and important context there are several reasons to study the factors that could affect ceasefire verification reports. Firstly and fundamentally, if it is shown that CVM reports are sometimes a function of their internal processes in addition to their inputs then those commentators who recognise CVMs as important peacebuilding tools must understand those processes as related to the creation of both national and international peace and security. This interest in CVM processes must be shared by the increasing number of IOs which conduct CVMs and the many states which contribute their resources and risk their civilian and military nationals in their pursuit. For IOs, an understanding of verification pathologies will likely contribute to the better design and conduct of CVMs, improved training of (and provision for) the personnel that man and administer them, and more circumspect interpretation of their results. It may encourage IOs to consider the use of alternative or complimentary peacekeeping strategies. Where exogenous influences are in play such an analysis should enable strategies for their detection. For the parties that receive and may act on ceasefire verification reports such understandings may cause them to regard such reports more critically, to factor the reports' limitations into their decision-making, and to triangulate the reports' conclusions with other sources. For those who study historical events in which a CVM outcome has played a significant role such

[7] The usage of 'pathology' follows Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," *International Organization* 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 699-732.

understandings may aid historical interpretation and, perhaps, invite the reconsideration of certain extant narratives. From the perspective of IR as a discipline the study will improve understandings of a prevalent and important practice in the field of peacebuilding and, as CVMs constitute examples of complex multi-level organisations, should improve understandings of the dysfunctions which can permeate such structures. In that ceasefire verification reports constitute 'verification narratives' the study will offer original insights into ways in which narratives can be taken up and translated into political power. Research on specific CVMs will contribute to the body of knowledge on those missions and on the manner in which the IOs that conducted them were organised and acted in the periods in question.

1.2 Definitions and Literature Review

To specify which of the many international deployments constitute CVMs requires a prior understanding of the difference between 'monitoring' and 'verification'. Monitoring concerns the collection of what Charles Taylor described in his discussion of the philosophy of social science as 'brute data': "data whose validity cannot be questioned by offering another interpretation of reading, data whose credibility cannot be founded or undetermined by further reasoning."[8] In terms of verification practice, brute data concerns material objects; examples would include the result of a weapons count or a map showing the deployment of troops at a particular time. The characteristics of brute data determine that (discounting error) a discrete monitoring event will be associated with a single and replicable monitoring outcome. Conceptually, thus, monitoring is the objective recording of brute data. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'verification' as "the establishment by empirical means of the validity of a proposition." In the context of a ceasefire verification the 'empirical means' will be monitoring and the 'proposition' will be the understanding that the parties are adhering to the terms of the ceasefire agreement. As a consequence, ceasefire verification requires analysis

[8] Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," *The Review of Metaphysics* 25, no. 1 (September 1971): 8.

of (1) the monitoring data, (2) the ceasefire agreement, and (3) the extent to which the former conforms to the latter.

Whilst the meanings of monitoring and verification are precise and discrete, IOs commonly use the terms (along with 'observing') as though they are interchangeable: the original mandate of the UN Iraqi-Kuwait *Observation* Mission was to *monitor* a demilitarised zone, the UN *Observer* Mission in El Salvador was mandated to *verify* the implementation of agreements, etc.[9] However, even those missions labelled as 'monitoring' or 'observing' must conduct some process of assessment upon the information they gather to produce their reports. As the product of processes which select and arrange brute data into a chronological sequence to assist understanding, these reports may be understood to constitute 'narratives'.[10] In view of the inevitability of such internal assessments, this inquiry takes a broad understanding of CVMs to encompass *any deployment of personnel by an established or bespoke IO acting under a mandate that identifies itself as wholly or partly concerned with the verification, monitoring or observing of a ceasefire or armistice agreement.*[11] As a consequence CVMs may be one component of an international deployment (e.g. a multidimensional peacekeeping operation) which may both support and be supported by the CVM in various ways. They may be composed of civilian, civilianised or military personnel or combinations thereof.[12]

[9] Alan Doss, interview by author, Skype, 6 June 2018. Trevor Findlay suggests 'monitoring' is sometimes preferred because it is "perceived to have less rigorous and coercive connotations" rather than for reasons of explication. Trevor Findlay, "The Role of Monitoring and Verification," *Contemporary Security Policy* 22, no. 3 (December 2001): 170-1.

[10] The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'narrative' as "a spoken or written account of connected events; a story." In that the procedures employed by 'verification' / 'monitoring' / 'observation' missions infer a plurality of narrative possibilities the 'objectivity' of such missions must be consequent of the objectivity of their processes (as opposed to the objectivity of their outputs). For illustrations of how a spectrum of narratives may be produced from a single chronology see Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987), 1-57.

[11] The term 'bespoke IO' refers to situations where a group of states agree to act as an IO for the single purpose of delivering a CVM e.g. the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in DPRK and ROK (1953-ongoing).

[12] 'Civilianised' personnel are serving military who wear civilian clothes throughout their deployment (as opposed to retired military personnel who are civilians).

The literature on peacekeeping and peacebuilding is, of course, extensive, and a modest body of Western literature concerning strategic arms verification during the Cold War (from which most of it dates) also exists.[13] However, in the last two decades only Trevor Findlay and Ryan Grist have published papers on the field of monitoring and verification in peace operations (and those both in 2001).[14] Findlay suggests verification is an inherently political activity, and that CVM thinking needs to be disentangled from previous work on strategic arms control:

> While [verification] judgments are meant in theory to be impartial, verification judgments take place in a political context: they are invariably made by a political body which perforce is obliged to take into account the political implications of any verification judgment reached. ...
>
> The conceptualization of verification and monitoring with regard to peace agreements owes more to traditional arms control theory than to thinking about conflict resolution, while the practice often owes more to standard military concepts of operations than to any innovations designed specifically with monitoring and verification in mind.[15]

Noting the increasing relevance of surveillance technologies such as air and satellite monitoring and ground sensors, Findlay nevertheless warns that "new technology may produce information overload, overwhelming the capacity of missions in the field to successfully use the information that becomes available."[16] Instantaneous reportage, furthermore, now curtails the time CVMs are granted to investigate and assess the meaning of incidents. Grist concurs with Findlay's scepticism of 'objective' verification: "Objective reporting, beyond clear evidence ... is difficult ... Reporting is always evaluative and selective,

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[13] E.g. Canada, *Verification in all its Aspects. A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Pursuant to UNGA Resolution 40/152(o)* (Ottawa, Ont.: Canadian Government, 1986); Nancy W. Gallagher, *The Politics of Verification* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999); Allan S. Krass, *Verification: How Much is Enough?* (Massachusetts and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1985); William Potter, ed., *Verification and Arms Control* (Lexington, M.A.: Lexington Books, 1985).

[14] Findlay, "The Role of Monitoring and Verification"; Ryan Grist, "More than eunuchs at the orgy: Observation and monitoring reconsidered," *International Peacekeeping* 8, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 59-78. Findlay's paper is partly a development of Jane Boulden, "The Verification and Monitoring of Peace Accords," *Disarmament Forum* 3 (2000): 45-52.

[15] Findlay, "The Role of Monitoring and Verification," 170.

[16] Ibid., 180.

even when 'hard facts' are involved. Which facts should be reported and which not?"[17] Observer objectivity, furthermore, may deteriorate as a mission proceeds. "There is ... an understandable human inclination for observers and monitors to 'go ethnic', to begin to side with one party, if they remain for long periods on one side of a confrontation line ... [As a consequence] Mandates must allow observers and monitors to access both sides of a confrontation line."[18]

Of the small number of papers that concern a single CVM two have utility to the research question and hypotheses. On the basis of interviews with members of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM, 2002-8), Kristine Höagland and Marcus Wennerström suggest CVMs become less able to satisfy their mandates as the security environment deteriorates. The success of a CVM may depend upon the mandate being "clear and adequate": "Specific lobby groups may be able to direct a mission with an unclear mandate on a track opposite to the one originally intended."[19] However, an ambiguous mandate "can be an asset to the operation by allowing it to adjust to changing circumstances."[20] This latter suggestion is contested by Hilde Haug's commentary on the OSCE SMM which complains that the associated Minsk Agreements are so lacking in technical details (e.g. pertaining to weapon calibres) as to "in many cases [have] made monitoring challenging and ... rendered verification extremely difficult."[21] One way it has done this is by enabling different conflict parties to 'cherry-pick' those points advantageous to their interests. A procedural concern the SMM has encountered relates to 'baseline' information on which to base verification standards: "the non-provision by the sides of baseline information meant that the SMM could

[17] Grist, "More than eunuchs at the orgy," 64.
[18] Ibid., 65.
[19] Kristine Höglund and Marcus Wennerström, "When the Going Gets Tough ... Monitoring Missions and a Changing Conflict Environment in Sri Lanka, 2002-2008," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 26, no. 5 (2015): 841.
[20] Ibid., 840.
[21] Hilde Haug, "The Minsk Agreements and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission," *Security and Human Rights* 27, nos. 3-4 (September 2016): 351.

monitor but not verify weapons declared as withdrawn."[22] Finally, as with the SLMM the SMM's activities are impeded by the security situation and by the denial of certain areas by the parties. As a body, the tiny literature on CVMs identifies several factors other than monitoring data that could affect the output of a CVM - political considerations, inadequate conceptualisations, inevitable human subjectivities, mandates, external lobbyists, various environmental 'frictions' - but none places a deep analytical lens upon them. There is, however, a general consensus that the topic represents a gap in the literature and that there is value in filling it. Grist notes that CVMs are "poorly understood, poorly researched, and consequently poorly operationalised. Similarly, ways to improve their success are poorly discussed. The few missions that have been mounted in any strength seem to represent forgotten prototypes."[23] By returning to some of those 'forgotten prototypes' this inquiry aims to narrow this particular knowledge gap.

1.3 Hypotheses

Alexander George and Andrew Bennett define ‘causal effect’ as "the expected value of the change in outcome if we could run a perfect experiment in which only one independent variable changes."[24] The base hypothesis introduced in Section 1.1 concerns a causal relationship in which the content of a series of ceasefire verification reports issued by a CVM conducting IO (dependent variable) varies as monitoring data gathered by that CVM (independent variable) varies. It is imagined that no other independent variable can do this. The alternative hypothesis which this inquiry considers is that change can also be created in this dependent variable by change in one or more additional independent variables which, unlike monitoring data, only have causal effect in some of the instances in which they are

[22] Ibid., 354.
[23] Grist, "More than eunuchs at the orgy," 60.
[24] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press, 2005), 138. See also Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 85.

present. (A moment's reflection on the complex and diverse nature of CVMs - which vary in such fundamental characteristics as historical period, duration, geographical location, nature of the conducting IO and the nature of the conflict to which the ceasefire applies - indicates how improbable it would be for any additional independent variable to have causal effect in every case.) On the basis of hints from the literature review, on studies of Cold War arms verification processes, and of established approaches to analysing power and decision-making in complex organisations this Section describes various groups of factors which should be tested to see whether they contain independent variables which can (but not necessarily will) affect ceasefire verification reports.

Power in institutions is commonly exercised via and otherwise manifests as 'institutional power', which is power that derives from actors' relative positions in institutional structures. Institutional power includes the ability to prevent decisions being made and the ability to conceal the fact that opportunities to make decisions exist.[25] As institutions, IOs are likely to control CVMs through institutional power and - in that institutional power is commonly associated with rules and procedures - they are likely to accomplish this through the mission's mandate. IOs can derive and maintain power through their ability to structure knowledge, which includes the ability to define and classify. They can exercise power by fixing meanings: as Barnett and Finnemore note, "naming or labelling the social context establishes the parameters, the very boundaries, of acceptable action."[26] A mandate could directly bound the narrative a CVM produces in such ways, for example by influencing the mission's conceptualisation or its processes. Alternatively, a CVM narrative could be indirectly bounded by a mandate which proscribes or limits the mission's procedures or location of its structures (its 'laydown') e.g. by restricting the physical assets available to it or by requiring

[25] Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *The American Political Science Review* 56, no. 4 (December 1962): 947-52.
[26] Barnett and Finnemore, "Politics, Power, and Pathologies," 711. See also Stewart Clegg, "Weber and Foucault: Social Theory for the Study of Organizations," *Organization* 1, no. 1 (1994): 149-78.

its monitors to operate only in certain areas. In that a CVM's mandate must attend to the ceasefire agreement that the mission must assess the parties' accordance with, in some circumstances a ceasefire agreement could also constitute an exercise of institutional power. Accordingly, those aspects of mandates and associated ceasefire agreements which are capable of bounding a CVM's processes and procedures constitute a group of factors which could affect ceasefire verification reports.

A second group of factors is suggested by writings on Cold War arms verification which depict certain verification procedures as based upon suspect processes. Allan Krass describes the US's attitude to strategic arms control in the 1980s as being "not that the Soviet Union demonstrate *compliance* with arms control treaties, but that it prove the *absence of non-compliance*," a stipulation which Krass observes is *in principle* impossible.[27] A similarly constructed requirement featured in the run up to the Third Gulf War when Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf argued Iraq could only reassure the Security Council by "[A]dmitting openly ... that it had and has WMD and WMD programs. ... Iraq [would] voluntarily take inspectors to the secret hide sites. Iraq would have shown the facilities where production has/is taking place."[28] Whilst Iraq's claim that it had disposed of all WMD might have been disproved by the discovery of a single prohibited item, under Wolf's logic the regime could never prove adherence with the agreements to disarm.[29] One may reasonably hypothesise that some CVM procedures could similarly be based on processes which ignore what Findlay terms "the eternal difficulty of verification: that it cannot prove a negative ...

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[27] Krass, *Verification*, 144; italics Krass'. Michael Krepon offers a variation on this theme: "the United States has never found anything that the Soviets have successfully hidden." Michael Krepon, "The Political Dynamics of Verification and Compliance Debates," in *Verification and Arms Control*, ed. William C. Potter (Lexington, M.A.: Lexington Books, 1985), 137.

[28] Cited in Hans Blix, *Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction* (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), 201-2.

[29] This was not a unique position; the CIA opined that "years of fruitless searches by UNSCOM [for biological weapon production units] indicate they are well hidden." CIA memorandum dated 19 September 2001, quoted in Laurence H. Silberman et al., *The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction* (31 March 2005), 93, accessed 12 January 2017, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf.

'one can never know what one does not know'."[30] Another factor relating to processes concerns the impossibility of observing every verifiable object all of the time. Whilst procedures may be designed to sample an environment to produce representative monitoring data, phenomena such as path-dependency and a tendency to focus on activity at the expense of absences of activity could result in the gathering of unrepresentative monitoring data and, accordingly, an unrepresentative narrative. If one devotes an inequitable proportion of assets to monitoring a certain party the detection of a greater number of ceasefire violations on that side cannot in itself indicate that party's especial culpability in relation to others. A third factor concerns the acquisition of reliable baseline data, an essential component of the 'proposition' the CVM is created to assess. If, for example, a CVM is to verify that a party has surrendered all of its weapons, the act of counting collected weapons can only be meaningful if it is known how many weapons the party originally held.

Further groups of factors which could affect ceasefire verification reports may be derived from Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM) analysis, an approach most commonly associated with explaining the foreign policy decisions of US Presidents. FPDM analysis identifies the individual decision-maker as a key unit for understanding how organisations process knowledge and make decisions. Psychological influences are recognised as potential independent variables, as are the influences of the group on the individual, and the influences of the organisation on both the individual and the group.[31] There are several reasons to suppose the same factors which influence FPDM would influence a CVM. FPDM and ceasefire verifications are similarly processes; as Brian Ripley states, "Foreign policy can best be understood as an unending task of sequential problem-solving by goal-directed elites

[30] Trevor Findlay, "Introduction: Verification under Challenge," in *Verification Yearbook 2001*, eds. Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier (London: VERTIC, 2001), 21.
[31] Richard C. Snyder, Henry W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds., *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, no. 1 (March 2005): 1-30.

operating within organizational and cognitive constraints."[32] FPDM and CVMs are both enabled and bounded by organisational structures. Whilst a US President or the head of a CVM conducting IO may possess the 'final say', the information and advice that is presented to (or withheld from) either of them has passed through, potentially, many decisional layers, each of which may have acted upon it in some way. The ultimate outcome of a FPDM process and a CVM is similarly a decision at the highest and tertiary level which leads to activity (in the former this might be an order by a US President to take military action, in the latter a declaration by the conducting IO of a breach of a ceasefire agreement). This inquiry will consider previously established pathologies which could reasonably be anticipated to manifest within and between the organisational structures of a CVM and its conducting IO, the groups of people the CVM is composed of, and the individuals who carry out the CVM's procedures.

A final two groups of factors may be derived from the fact that the purposes and interests of the conducting IO and other powerful actors may translate into imperatives to influence a verification narrative. IOs deploy CVMs for the strategic purpose of creating conditions to enable peacebuilding which involves long term processes of structural and cultural transformation. CVMs contribute to this by enabling peacekeeping (the containment of direct violence): however, in certain circumstances the issuance of an accurate narrative of the parties' activities could be counter to this effort, for example by advertising a party's violations of a ceasefire which subsequently causes it to disengage from other peacebuilding activities. An IO could decide that moderating or suppressing such 'reports from the field' is justifiable if to do so might keep a peacebuilding effort on track. Accordingly, the strategic purposes of a conducting IO could cause it to moderate the ceasefire verification reports it issues for reasons other than the impartial assemblage of a verification narrative. It is also

[32] Brian Ripley, "Psychology, Foreign Policy, and International Relations Theory," *Political Psychology* 14, no. 3 (September 1993): 408.

possible that powerful actors additional to the conflict parties could be motivated to affect ceasefire verification reports to accord with their own interests. A state which, for example, shares an ideological sympathy with one of the conflict parties might prefer a narrative that places the conflict's cause at the doors of others. Situations can be imagined in which the ability to subjugate certain facts and to otherwise manipulate a verification narrative could equate to an exercise of power.

1.4 Research Design

This Section describes how research was conducted to show the extent to which certain factors within the groups of factors introduced in the previous Section can affect ceasefire verification reports. Section 1.4.1 states how plausibility probes were undertaken on each of the groups of factors. The investigation adopted a small-N case study method incorporating both within-case analysis and cross-case comparison. Section 1.4.2 describes the way in which three typical cases were sampled from a universe of 68 CVMs. Section 1.4.3 outlines how archival and interview data was collected, and notes associated ethical and safety considerations.

1.4.1 Methods

The objective of this research is to undertake plausibility probes upon groups of factors hypothesised to possess the potential to have causal effect on ceasefire verification reports. Plausibility probes are preliminary studies on relatively untested hypotheses to signpost those where the potential validity is sufficiently high to warrant the effort and expense of more intensive testing.[33] As outlined in Section 1.1, these studies will either increase confidence in

[33] Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 7, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, M.A.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 108-13; George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 75-6. For a recent employment of plausibility probes see Holger Albrecht and Keven Koehler, "Going on the Run: What Drives Military Desertion in Civil War?" *Security Studies* 27, no. 2 (2018): 179-203.

the base hypothesis (that only monitoring data affects ceasefire verification reports) or suggest new hypotheses for subsequent development. Accordingly, the main thrust of the research is X-centred[34] and exploratory with the purpose of generating new provisional hypotheses with the adjunct project of testing the base hypothesis. With respect to any factor other than monitoring data that is discovered to have substantially affected ceasefire verification reports in one or more cases, unless and until a subsequent hypothesis-testing project is undertaken the preliminary nature of these studies means the generalisability of the resultant hypothesis / hypotheses will be severely limited. However, this project aims to determine only the extent to which such factors can have causal effect, not how widespread such phenomena are. The investigation adopted a small-N case study method, incorporating both within-case analysis and the comparison of a small number of cases. Presuming a 'unit' to be an instance of a spatially and temporally bounded phenomenon, John Gerring defines a case study as "an in-depth study of a single unit ... to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena."[35] At the expense of breadth and insight into causal effect, case studies offer explanations that are rich in depth and that may reveal the components and arrangements of causal mechanisms: they "allow one to peer into the box of causality to the intermediate causes lying between some cause and its purported effect."[36] Furthermore, case studies are highly suitable for falsifying established hypotheses and for undertaking preliminary assessments of new ones.[37] The period 1945-2018 offers a universe of 68 CVM cases: these are listed at Annex A.[38] This number could be sufficient for a large-N statistical study (or a mixed-methods

[34] That is, the research is primarily an investigation into the effects of particular causes. See John Gerring, "Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, eds. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 646-8.
[35] John Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?" *The American Political Science Review* 98, no. 2 (May 2004): 341.
[36] Ibid., 348.
[37] Bent Flyvbjerg, "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research," *Qualitative Inquiry* 12, no. 2 (April 2006): 227-8; Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Oakland, C.A.: University of California Press, 2014), 52.
[38] From the author's database of 175 post-War deployments by ASEAN, AU, CEMAC, ECOWAS, EU, IGAD, NATO, OAS, OAU, OSCE, UN and various bespoke groupings. Coding information for all missions commencing before 1989 and for all interstate missions commencing after 1989 was taken from the missions' mandates. Secondary sources were used when mandate documents were unavailable, insufficiently detailed or

approach): however, the magnitude of the task, the difficulty in obtaining sufficient data (see Section 1.4.2), and issues regarding the subjectivity of coding all weighed against such an approach for this project.

The probe into exercises of institutional power via CVM mandates and associated ceasefire agreements commenced by developing a list of potential generic pathologies. Indicators and counter-indicators of these generic pathologies' presence / absence were derived: a complete list is at Annex B. Generically these indicators are graded 'strong' or 'weak': in context they were further graded in indicative strength e.g. 'very strong'. The next step was to systematically describe the relevant parts of each mandate and agreement and to then search those descriptions for the presence of indicators. Finally, an examination of relevant verification events was used to demonstrate the ways these pathologies affected the CVM's processes and procedures and the extent to which this may have affected the consequent ceasefire verification reports. This step utilised records from the archives of conducting IOs, interviews with former mission members and IO staff, and secondary sources. The probes into organisational pathologies were conducted in a similar manner. A list of potential pathologies considered likely to occur within and between a CVM and its conducting IO was drawn up and associated indicators derived. Using archival records and interviews the organisational structures of the CVM and the IO were described and these descriptions then searched for the presence of indicators.

To conduct probes into the potential effects of process, procedural, cognitive and group pathologies required a mapping of the ways in which monitoring information flowed through each CVM. What may be described as the 'verification narrative path' is a combined product

ambiguous. Data for all intrastate missions commencing after 1989 is from the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies' Peace Accords Matrix. See Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick M. Regan, "Annualized implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords, 1989-2012," *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 4 (2015): 551-62.

of a mission's procedures and its physical laydown. This may be represented as a number of nodes - the monitor, the regional HQ, the mission HQ etc. - each of which receive data, process it and transmit it as reports. Once these paths had been mapped they were described using archival records and interviews with individuals who served at each of the path's nodes. With this complete, the procedures conducted at each of the nodes could be reconstructed to discover whether any depended upon conceptualisations (processes) that were not rational or were conducted in a manner which inadequately accounted for the presence of human subjectivities. Whilst a certain number of indicators could be derived to aid this, the impossibility of predicting every procedural variation necessitated a close analysis of each node. The presence and influence of cognitive and group pathologies was similarly assessed by drawing up lists of generic pathologies and indicators and applying them to each of the nodes which made up the verification narrative path. Having identified where these pathologies might occur generically the path was used to reconstruct and analyse specific verification events to provide deeper understandings of the extent to which these pathologies affected the consequent ceasefire verification reports. In addition to assisting the probes described above, mapping and describing the final stages of the verification narrative path were important preliminary steps towards identifying whether tension between the mandated purposes of a CVM and the broader purposes of its conducting IO affected the ceasefire verification reports the IO issued. Using archival material, the reports submitted to the IO by the CVM were compared with the IO's subsequent reports. Where a difference was significant, analysis of the IO's broader purposes informed the identification of credible explanations which were evaluated comparatively.

Rather than by the derivation of indicators, the detection of interference by powerful actors commenced with the development of hypothetical strategies by which such actors might attempt to influence a ceasefire verification narrative. These were presented as mechanisms

with causal process observations (CPO) and tests for each stage.[39] Actors motivated to influence a CVM's output were identified using secondary sources. Material in support of CPOs was sought in the archival records and the tests were applied to it. As with the probe into an IO's strategic interests, where evidence was found to support the existence of such a mechanism's causal effect it was comparatively evaluated against alternative credible explanations. (The reason for the subsequent comparative exercise is that whilst process tracing may show that a mechanism was present and functioned it cannot show that the mechanism was *solely* causal of any affect on a dependent variable.)

The suggestion that ceasefire verification reports can be affected by potentially several different independent variables forefronts the problem often associated with qualitative methods which Arend Lijphart terms "many variables, small N."[40] A requirement thus, if one is to produce valid insights into causal effect, is to delineate and marshal those variables so that the presence and influence of each may be tested independently of the influence of the others. The mapping of a verification narrative path as a sequence of discrete nodes should enable the isolation of any factors operating within each node from those operating externally. However, unless one can distinguish between the effects of the small number of variables potentially acting *within* each node, indeterminacy as to the causal effect of each may still result. This possibility was mitigated by restricting the inquiry's scope to the independent

[39] CPOs are "diagnostic pieces of evidence that yield insight into causal connections and mechanisms, providing leverage for adjudicating between alternative hypotheses ... [T]he decision to focus on particular CPOs is guided by the researcher's theoretical framework, hypotheses ... and judgment that they have strong probative value in evaluating specific explanatory claims." These mechanisms will be analysed using process tracing tests which are based upon determinations as to whether evidence is (1) necessary for affirming causal inference, and (2) sufficient for confirming causal inference. 'Smoking-gun tests' concern sufficiency: passing a smoking-gun test confirms a hypothesis (failing weakens the hypothesis but does not eliminate it). 'Hoop tests' concern necessity: failing a hoop test eliminates a hypothesis (passing affirms the hypothesis' relevance without confirming it). Smoking-gun tests and hoop tests may be graded by severity; passing a 'hard' hoop test increases confidence in a hypothesis to a greater extent than passing an 'easy' one etc. Passing / failing a 'straw-in-the-wind' test, finally, affirms a hypothesis' relevance / weakens a hypothesis without confirming / disconfirming it. David Collier, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright, "Outdated Views on Qualitative Methods: Time to Move On," *Political Analysis* 18, no. 4 (2010): 506. See also David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," *Political Science and Politics* 44, no. 4 (October 2011): 823-30; George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 205-32.

[40] Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *The American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (September 1971): 686.

variables which the relevant literatures suggested were likely to have the greatest effect (Chapter II), by drawing as many observations as possible from available primary and secondary material including by using in-case studies (Chapters III, IV and V), and by a subsequent cross-case comparison exercise (Chapter VI).[41]

1.4.2 Case Selection

Whilst a project to ascertain simply whether any factor other than monitoring data can affect ceasefire verification reports could be completed with a single case, to determine *which* of several hypothesised factors have had causal effect and the *extent* to what those effects are causal requires consideration of a sample representative of a universe of cases. To ensure that a sample is both representative of a universe and that it provides variation along the dimensions of theoretical interest a small-N case study method should employ a non-random case selection procedure, requiring that a researcher attend to the possibility of selection bias and the associated introduction of systematic errors.[42] Beyond this, the method of case selection will depend primarily upon the uses the cases are to be put to. This inquiry examined a small number of 'typical' cases as a means of testing the various factors proposed. Typical cases are representative of phenomena widely existent in the broader universe of cases. When selected correctly, typical cases enable a researcher to explore the causal mechanisms which manifest in general cross-case relationships.[43] It is hard to fully define a 'typical' CVM but some factors can be ventured: the conducting IO should be an established organisation (as opposed to a bespoke IO assembled solely for a single ceasefire verification task) and possess a basic corpus of experience on the basis of having previously conducted a minimum of one CVM. In parallel with these criteria were the identification and elimination

[41] King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 121, 217-8.
[42] Jason Seawright and John Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options," *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (June 2008): 295-6; David Collier and James Mahoney, "Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research," *World Politics* 49, no. 1 (October 1996): 59; King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 115.
[43] Gerring, "Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis," 648-50.

of CVMs which are atypical in terms of environment, conceptualisation or conduct. Examples of atypical CVM cases include the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (1964-ongoing) which monitors a conflict that has been benign for decades, and the first deployment of the OAU's Neutral Force in Chad (1981-2) where "the force was largely confined to the local police barracks for the duration of the mission."[44] (The difficulty in differentiating atypical cases from 'extreme cases' was one of the disqualifying criteria for an extreme cases approach.) The second selection filter rejected cases which were not associated with the comprehensive and accessible sets of records the research methods required. This restricted sampling to cases possessing (1) an accessible archive with the bulk of material in English (the author's only working language) - this excluded UN missions mounted after 1996 due to the UN Archive's 20 year rule, NATO missions due to that organisation's particularly stringent restrictions on archival access, and all OAU, ECOWAS, AU, Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and IGAD cases for which no substantial archive exists - and (2) available interview subjects, in practice excluding all CVMs mounted before the late 1980s. Sixteen cases satisfied these criteria (annotated at Annex A).[45] To reduce the potential for selection bias it is generally desirable to choose the largest possible number of cases; however, the project's practicable duration and the extent of the data collection and analysis associated with the research methods limited the sample to three. Consequently, a deliberate selection of three cases was made from the sixteen on the basis of the following. Firstly, within the constraints noted maximum variation was sought on criteria including conducting IO, location, mission size, mission budget and major participating nations. In so doing the author aimed to reduce the possibility of unrepresentativeness

[44] Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (New York: United Nations, 2000), 50.
[45] In that this restricts the sample to many of the most established and best resourced IOs this is a possible source of bias. It would be desirable to extend the cross-case analyses to a case concerning, for example, the AU were sufficient sources to become available.

associated with a strategy of selecting on the dependent variable.[46] Within practical constraints the case selection should have the maximum opportunity to confirm the base hypothesis. Secondly, a preferential weighting was given to cases which offered likely interviews with key figures and access to personal archives. The final case selection is at Figure 1.2.

IO	CVM	Period of Study
UN	UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	February - October 1992
UN	UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)[47]	April 1993 - December 1994
OSCE	Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)[48]	October 1998 - March 1999

Figure 1.2 Selected typical CVM cases.

To further contain the analytical workload within practicable limits only the key period of each case was studied. For UNAVEM II this comprised 6 February 1992, when a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) was appointed to superintend an enlargement of the mission's mandate to include the verification of national elections, to the end of October 1992, by which time the ceasefire had comprehensively broken down. The period of study for ONUMOZ was between April 1993, when the mission's verification components achieved partial operating capacity, and December 1994, shortly after RENAMO had accepted its national election defeat. For KVM the period was the entirety of the mission's deployment in Kosovo, delineated by the announcement of the Milošević-Holbrooke Agreement (13 October 1998) and the evacuation of the mission's international personnel (20 March 1999).

[46] Barbara Geddes, "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics," *Political Analysis* 2 (1990): 131-50; George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 23.
[47] During the research phase a marginal relationship between UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ was discovered in that the UN claimed that 'the lessons' of the former CVM had informed its conduct of the latter (see Section 4.7). However, it is not believed that this is a source of sampling bias as (1) any case *may* be affected by the lessons of former CVMs (whether conducted by that IO or others) and (2) as discussed in Chapter IV, the UN's performance in Mozambique did not especially suggest that it had learned many lessons in Angola.
[48] The author was a civilianised member of KVM for the entire mission duration. However, in that he fulfilled a technical role at KVM HQ and was not a member of any node in the mission's verification narrative chain any consequent inherent biases are unlikely to substantially affect the inquiry.

To conclude the matter of case selection, it is worth reflecting on the extent to which cases dating from the 1990s may possess contemporary relevance. Whilst none of the factors under investigation are obviously consequent of the cases' periods of study (in a way that, for example, factors directly relating to technology could be) certain questions may be explored. Are the latter cases somehow consequent of the earlier: did KVM, for example, have improved procedures because its designers had learned from the experiences of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ? Are contemporary IOs, in fact, better conceptualised, designed and conducted as a consequence of historical learning? On a related theme, have technological advances in areas such as surveillance, communication and information handling changed the nature of verification? These matters are considered in Chapter VI which draws on additional interviews with subject matter experts (SME) and a visit by the author to OSCE SMM in October 2018.

1.4.3 Data Collection

Data collection commenced with a review of secondary and tertiary sources. This informed the drawing up of a list of interview targets and the writing of mission chronologies to guide the archival research phase. In December 2015 and April 2016 (respectively) scoping visits were paid to the OSCE Documentation Centre in Prague (DCiP) and the UN Archive in New York. These visits afforded opportunities to create relationships with archivists, to ascertain the size, scope and arrangement of the holdings, and to obtain and understand the relevant finding aids. Subsequently, the author worked at the DCiP under the OSCE Researcher-in-Residence scheme between October and December 2016 and at the UN Archive whilst a Visiting PhD Scholar at Columbia University between February and April 2017. The DCiP's holdings on KVM are comprehensive but not vast (a consequence of the mission being relatively short) and the author was able to review all relevant paper and electronic documents

and to create a set of indexed notes.[49] In accordance with the author's arrangement with the DCiP a copy of this thesis will be deposited therein. The UN Archive's holdings on both UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ extend to hundreds of boxes, and an initial filter for relevant material was conducted using the respective finding aids.[50] The chosen folders were then systematically reviewed and 872 documents photographed, indexed and stored in a database. In all cases document selection was based upon the requirements of the indicators and tests developed in Chapter II; a particular effort was made to capture records concerning every node in the relevant verification chains. Other priorities included formal minutes and informal records of the proceedings of key decision-making groups. The project also draws on the archive of the late Dame Margaret Anstee, which was deposited in the Weston Library in 1996 and catalogued and made available following the author's request,[51] and various personal collections which are listed in the Bibliography. All quotes from personal collections are made with the permission of the document's owner.

Certain matters pertaining to the archival sources should be noted. Firstly, the DCiP does not permit direct quoting from its holdings. However, the author has the written permission of Major General Drewienkiewicz to quote from those papers deposited in the DCiP by him and organised collectively as the 'DZ Papers'. Secondly, special requests must be made for access

[49] The DCiP's holdings have been scanned into a computer system which has been reorganised more than once and no reliable finding aid exists. However, the holdings are sufficiently small that the author was able to organise and subsequently review every document held. Within the DCiP's holdings are a set of papers donated by Major General John Drewienkiewicz ('DZ'), the KVM's Deputy Head of Mission (Operations). The organisation of the DCiP's holdings are such as to preclude referencing by electronic file structure: in this thesis documents from the DCiP are referenced solely as 'DCiP' or 'DZ Papers'.

[50] Records relating to UNAVEM II have been integrated into subsequent UN missions in Angola; the relevant finding aid is that relating to the UN Observer Mission in Angola (*Summary of AG-027 United Nations Observer Mission Angola (MONUA) (1997-1999)*, https://archives.un.org/sites/archives.un.org/files/files/Finding%20Aids/2015 Finding_Aids/AG-027.pdf). The ONUMOZ finding aid is straightforward (*Summary of AG-039 United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (1992-1994)*, https://archives.un.org/sites/archives.un.org/files/files/Finding%20Aids/2015_Finding_Aids/AG-039.pdf). The referencing of UN archival documents in this thesis follows UN Archives and Records Management System (UNARMS) protocols. Where the figure *S-aaaa-bbbb-cccc* appears, *aaaa* is the mission designator (as noted these are sometimes combined with other missions, and there are sometimes more than one), *bbbb* is the box number and *cccc* is the file number. The thesis also uses UN documents from the online UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library (http://dag.un.org): these are indicated as 'DAG Repository'.

[51] This thesis references these documents in the form Anstee-*aa-bb*, where *aa* is the box number and *bb* is the file number.

to UN records marked 'Strictly Confidential', and this concerns a substantial minority of the UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ holdings. These security classifications (the great majority of which are likely now irrelevant) present the difficulty that it is hard to justify a research need for access as the respective boxes' contents are unknown beyond the most basic description e.g. 'Military Records'. As the UN declassification processes are time consuming (generally involving consultation with originating nations) only the most targeted requests are practicable. Accordingly, this project does not incorporate UN records designated 'Strictly Confidential'. A third issue concerns language. A small number of the UNAVEM II files and a substantial minority of the ONUMOZ files are in Portuguese, including minutes of key meetings, letters between the missions' HQs and national political and military parties, and newspaper cuttings. The great majority of those concerning the verification of the respective ceasefire agreements are appended with English translations produced by the missions and it is these translations which are used in this thesis unless otherwise annotated.

A list of 58 interviews conducted with mission participants and SMEs is at Annex C. These were generally initiated by letter.[52] Where possible interviews were conducted face-to-face; others were conducted over Skype. Rather than selecting randomly, interviewees were deliberately selected as having held positions within the missions' verification narrative path or as otherwise being likely to possess information identified as required by the research design.[53] Some of these constitute 'elites', in some cases because of their rank and/or position during the periods under study, in others as a consequence of subsequent advancement to ranks / positions which afford them an 'elite' perspective. Many interviews were obtained through introductions arranged by other interviewees; for example, several of the interviews

[52] Kenneth Goldstein, "Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 35, no. 4 (December 2002): 671.
[53] Non-probability sampling of interviewees is suitable for process tracing approaches as it is more likely to focus upon respondents who possess important information than a technique of random selection. Oisín Tansey, "Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 40, no. 4 (October 2007): 765, 769.

concerning UNAVEM II are with former members of the New Zealand Army because those individuals maintain a social network. When a key interviewee did not respond one or more individuals who worked alongside him/her was sought.[54] The value of such data must be weighed against the possible introduction of bias associated with this 'snowball sampling'. Another potential source of bias is that it is easier to locate individuals who served in Western military forces than in others due to their greater usage of professional and social networks. Unless practical considerations directed otherwise (e.g. interviews in North America during the visit to the UN Archive), interviews were conducted after archival data had been analysed. Accordingly, interviews served the dual functions of addressing gaps in the records and improving data assurance through triangulation, the latter of particular importance when the views and recollections of different interviewees varied.[55] Whilst interviewees were requested to provide factual information on matters such as structure and procedure, questions of a deeply perceptual or psychological nature were not posed. This was because the author is not qualified to design or interpret the results of such approaches, and because self-reflection on even conscious cognitive experiences (for example, remembrance of stress) would likely be compromised by the passage of time. The difficulties associated with verbalising organisational subcultures should also be recognised. As Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn note, "The many subtle and unconscious factors which determine a frame of reference are not susceptible to direct questioning."[56]

Ethical factors and researcher safety were important considerations in the development of the data collection plan.[57] A CUREC 1A checklist with example Participant Information Sheets

[54] The key interview targets who failed to respond were Aldo Ajello (ONUMOZ), Ambassador William Walker (KVM), Ambassador Gabriel Keller (KVM) and Kåre Eltervåg (KVM).
[55] Darren G. Lilleker, "Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield," *Politics* 23, no. 3 (2003): 211-2; Marc Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 146-62.
[56] Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1966), 66.
[57] Diana Kapiszewski, Lauren M. Maclean, and Benjamin L. Read, *Field Research in Political Science: Practices and Principles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 176-8.

and Consent Forms was submitted to the Departmental Research Ethics Committee: research ethics approval was granted in June 2016.[58] In that the interviews were based on open-access archive material and secondary sources and regarded events that occurred a minimum of 17 years prior it was assessed as unlikely that issues of particular sensitivity would pertain or that the research could affect the subjects in other ways. (Interviews conducted in Ukraine were limited to personnel working in Kiev and solely concerned matters which the OSCE SMM is willing to place in the public domain.) As there were no special security concerns relating to the locations where the author was to live or interviews be conducted, the research topics did not impact host nation policy or activities, and the author was a man with a background of overseas work for the security services, a risk assessment indicated the threat to the author's physical and psychological well-being to be low. Accordingly, only 'common-sense' personal security measures were implemented.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

This Chapter described CVMs as internationally significant practices undertaken by an increasing number of IOs. It argued that the international consequences CVMs can bring about are predicated on the perceived impartiality of the reports they issue, which is itself a function of the understanding that their processes and procedures are rational and their procedures are conducted objectively. There is, accordingly, value to both the practitioner and the academic in investigating the extent to which factors other than monitoring data ('verification pathologies') can affect ceasefire verification reports. On the basis of various established approaches and literatures, seven groups of potential independent variables were identified as worthy of investigation: institutional power operating through a CVM's mandate and the associated ceasefire agreement(s); organisational pathologies within and between a CVM and its conducting IO; pathologies existent in a CVM's processes and procedures;

[58] Research Ethics Approval No. SSH_DPIR_C1A_16_027. Following a change in Departmental policy, e-mails of consent for attribution were used in some cases.

'cognitive' pathologies relating to the individuals who participate in CVMs; the influences of the groups those individuals operate within; the strategic purposes of a conducting IO; attempts by actors other than the immediate conflict parties to influence a CVM's output. The Chapter then described strategies by which the causal effect of factors within each of these groups would be determined, the way in which a universe of CVM cases would be sampled, and the manner in which data concerning the selected cases would be collected.

The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter II refines the groups of factors highlighted in Chapter I into discrete phenomena and develops ways in which their presence (or absence) and extent of their influence can be assessed. A tool by which to analyse a CVM (the verification narrative path) is developed: with acceptable simplifications, the effects of potential verification pathologies on verification reports can be analysed by separately analysing each of the path's nodes. By considering the extent to which a verifier could be objective under ideal circumstances it is shown that relevant practical tests for verifier objectivity can be derived from theory. The Chapter then sequentially considers each of the groups of factors, identifying specific phenomena and proposing such indicators and counter-indicators as might reasonably be identified using archival records and interviews. The final potential verification pathology ('manipulation by powerful actors') is handled differently in that illustrative potential strategies by which such actors might attempt to manipulate a verification narrative are presented as mechanisms with CPOs and tests to assess the presence and operation of each of the mechanisms' stages.

The aims of Chapters III, IV and V are to analyse the selected cases to determine the presence / absence of the specified potential verification pathologies and, where present, to assess the extent of their effect on the conducting IO's reporting output. Each of these Chapters are organised as follows. Relevant aspects of the verification environment, the CVM and the

CVM's output are described. The presence of pathologies in the mission's mandate and the agreement(s) on which it was based are considered. Organisational pathologies are sought in the structure of the CVM, the conducting IO, and the relationships between them. The mission's processes are then discussed, including the manner in which the mission conceptualised, obtained and utilised baseline data. The mission's procedures are analysed and the verification narrative path mapped. The presence and effect of cognitive and group pathologies on the verification narrative path are discussed. Having examined the CVM in general terms, specific verification events which demonstrate the influence of the IO's strategic purpose or manipulation by powerful actors are described and analysed. The Chapters conclude by reviewing the extent of individual and combined effects of identified verification pathologies upon the ceasefire verification reports.

The Conclusion (Chapter VI) commences with a comparative analysis of the cases analysed. Sequentially, the causal effects of each verification pathology are considered, firstly as a cross-case phenomenon and secondly in relation to the proposed hypotheses. It is found that the following verification pathologies can substantially affect ceasefire verification reports: productive language and proscriptions in the CVM mandate and the ceasefire agreement(s); organisational dysfunction in the CVM, the conducting IO and the nexus between them; certain processes upon which CVMs are based; certain CVM procedures; moderation or suppression of information by the conducting IO in pursuit of its strategic purposes; manipulation by powerful actors. The extent to which these findings (which pertain to cases from the 1990s) may be applicable today is discussed with reference to the OSCE SMM. Next, the implications of the findings for theory, policy and practice are considered. Recommendations are made to aid practitioners in the conceptualisation, design and conduct of future CVMs, and to aid academics and others in the interpretation of the results of historical and contemporary CVMs. The results are situated within broader debates in IR

concerning peacebuilding, organisational theory and specific IOs. Finally, the Conclusion identifies potentially productive avenues for future inquiry and offers some remarks on the future potential of CVMs as important peacebuilding tools.

II Potential Verification Pathologies

> Large acts are the consequences of innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organizations in the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and political objectives.
>
> − Graham Allison, *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis*

2.1 Introduction

The aim of this Chapter is to identify factors other than monitoring data which could reasonably be anticipated to affect ceasefire verification reports, and to develop ways to assess their presence (or absence) and the extent of their effects. The outcome is a series of potential verification pathologies and associated indicators and counter-indicators as might be identified using archival records and interviews. These are summarised at Annex B. Consideration of the potential verification pathology 'manipulation by powerful actors' is handled differently in that illustrative potential strategies by which such actors might attempt to manipulate a verification narrative are presented as causal mechanisms with CPOs and tests to assess the presence and operation of each of the mechanisms' stages. The identification of all of these factors and the development of tools with which to evaluate them will enable the conduct of plausibility probes upon the selected cases (described in the three subsequent Chapters).

The thesis uses the idea of a verification narrative path to explain and analyse the ways information flows through a CVM and where and how factors other than monitoring data could have an effect. The verification narrative path is a combined product of a mission's procedures and its physical 'laydown' (location of the mission's structures i.e. patrol bases and HQs at various levels). Figure 2.1 shows a generic laydown of a CVM.



Figure 2.1 Generic laydown of a CVM.

A conducting IO will arrange for the establishment of a deployed mission HQ within or near the verification area of operations, commonly in a capital city. The mission HQ will divide the geographical terrain across which verification will take place into manageable sectors and establish a regional HQ within each one. Each regional HQ will be responsible for a number of monitors. In this simple description (there are often additional hierarchical layers) it can be seen that the data collected by any monitor flows to a regional HQ, on to the mission HQ and ultimately to the conducting IO HQ. As the path between every monitor and the IO HQ is identical, analysis of this CVM can be reduced to the analysis of a single verification narrative path (Figure 2.2). In this generic map the input is monitoring data and the output is a ceasefire verification report to an 'audience': this could include both international bodies, such as the UN Security Council, and the general public. At each of the nodes on the path a person or persons receives data, processes it - that is, rejects it or combines it with other data to form a narrative - and transmits that narrative as a report. If it is assumed that information transmission between the nodes is perfect (i.e. whatever information a node intends to transmit is received by the next node without error) and that there are no linkages between nodes on different paths (e.g. formal or informal communications between two regional

HQs[1]) then it may be said that the output - a ceasefire verification report - is solely a product of the monitoring data and the factors that affect each of the nodes. Within the parameters of these assumptions, thus, any factors other than monitoring data which affect the ultimate ceasefire verification reports may be sought and analysed by individually analysing each of the nodes.



Figure 2.2 Generic map of a verification narrative path.

Before discussing factors that could impact CVM objectivity it is useful to consider the extent to which a verifier could be objective (i.e. unaffected by opinions or feelings) under ideal circumstances. Conceptually, verification could be described using rational choice theory, an approach which assumes an actor whose cognitive functionality is unencumbered by habits or considerations exogenous to utility-maximisation. 'Rational actors' update their beliefs in response to new information solely in accordance with the laws of probability.[2] A 'rational verifier', it follows, would create a narrative through the solely probabilistic assessment of each new piece of evidence that presents. This may be illustrated with a thought experiment involving a rational verifier whose decision-making is based solely upon Bayes' theorem:

[1] The case Chapters comment on the rare occasions when this does occur.
[2] Andrew H. Kydd, "Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice," in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 427-9; Paul K. MacDonald, "Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory," *The American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (November 2003): 552-3.

A and B hold separate territories, each composed of 100 zones (a zone can host one monitor). A rational verifier randomly deploys 50 monitors across each of the parties' zones. At regular intervals ('turns') each monitor reports 'violation' or 'no violation'. At each turn both parties commit one ceasefire violation in one of their zones: with 50% of the zones occupied by a monitor the probability of a violation report against either is 50%. Consider now the consequences if after four turns three reports have been raised against A (statistically there is a one in four chance of this occurring). If the rational verifier's initial assessed probabilities that A (and B) was ceasefire accordant was 50%, and his assessed probabilities of an accordant party committing more than two violations in four turns was 25% and of a non-accordant party doing this was 75%, then by employing Bayes' theorem the verifier's revised assessed probability that A is accordant is 25%.[3]

Thinking about a rational verifier in this way suggests the very significant distance between hypothetical rational actors and lived human experience; as experimental work has demonstrated, individuals are not 'natural Bayesians' who update their beliefs solely in accordance with logical thought processes.[4] Herbert Simon describes the human decision-maker as resembling more a "boundedly rational *Homo psychologicus*" whose behaviour is constrained by the individual's internal capacities (knowledge and 'computing power') and by his external situation.[5] As the experiment also shows, the rational verifier can only estimate his coding inputs (thus likely introducing subjectivity); furthermore, he possesses no objective mechanism to identify *which* of the many pieces of data he receives should trigger a probabilistic reassessment. In Robert Jervis' words, "[I]n many cases it is impossible to objectively describe the new information that a good Bayesian should incorporate."[6] This

[3] If P is probability, H is a prior hypothesis and E is new evidence, then Bayes' theorem may be stated as $P(H/E) = \frac{P(H)}{P(H) + P(\sim H)(P(E|\sim H) \,/\, P(E|H))}$. In the given example $P(H/E) = \frac{0.5}{0.5 + 0.5\ (0.75\ /\ 0.25)}$ i.e. 0.25.

[4] Jon Elster, "Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition," *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 3 (September 2000): 694; Gross Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, 2nd ed., eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 371-6.

[5] Herbert A. Simon, "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science," *The American Political Science Review* 79, no. 2 (June 1985): 294, 303. See also Bryan D. Jones, "Bounded Rationality," *The American Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 297-321; Miriam Steiner, "The Search for Order in a Disorderly World: Worldviews and Prescriptive Decision Paradigms," *International Organization* 37, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 373-413.

[6] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (1976; repr., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017), xxiii. See also John Earman, *Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory* (Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press, 1992), 138-41.

Chapter's concern is theory; in many places imagining rational verifiers and 'ideal' CVM structures is a useful starting point to hypothesising ways in which verification pathologies may manifest. Whenever possible empirical examples are included to show where and to what extent those theories may translate into practice.

2.2 Mandates and Agreements

CVM mandates are commonly derived from ceasefire agreements and sometimes also other sources such as resolutions of the UN Security Council. Such mandates' texts commonly reflect commitments towards the relevant IO's guiding principles, and they will always include broad statements as to the mission's authority, its purposes and the tasks to be carried out.[7] (Finer grain detail may be described in subsidiary and/or subsequent documents which for the purposes of this discussion are incorporated within the term 'mandate'.) The drafting of a CVM mandate represents an opportunity for an IO and those states and organisations willing to provide it with personnel and resources to apply some measure of control upon the ongoing situation and to structure the understandings which surround it in manners akin to exercises of 'institutional power' (the power that 'A' may exert over 'B' by limiting 'B's' decision-making). However, any of the following pathologies could equally be an unintended consequence of bureaucratic process or of decision-making by states and organisations for reasons other than the deliberate exertion of control; the indicators proposed will not identify the *reason* that any particular pathology exists. In that CVM mandates are often inextricably related to the relevant ceasefire agreement(s) such agreements may also incorporate exercises of power on a CVM and, consequently, the verification reports it will produce.

[7] Kristine Höglund and Marcus Wennerström, "When the Going Gets Tough ... Monitoring Missions and a Changing Conflict Environment in Sri Lanka, 2002-2008," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 26, no. 5 (2015): 839.

To outline verification strategies mandates must describe conflict and transitional situations in clear and unambiguous language.[8] This creates at least three problems. Firstly, it requires that a mandate anticipate, define and address every possible future circumstance relating to the ceasefire process. As Jeanette Voas notes in the context of strategic arms-control treaties, "anticipating every contingency and closing every loophole may well be impossible."[9] Secondly, omissions, ambiguities and inconsistencies in a mandate's text may have unintended consequences, including enabling conflict parties to bound a verification narrative in various ways. Thirdly, by defining mandates classify (explicitly or implicitly) situations and the parties pursuant to them. By classifying, mandates play a role in *constituting*, thus according or withholding status and, potentially, political power. An experienced IO should be aware of and take steps to counter, for example, the granting of equivalent status to a regime and an insurgency (as opposed to treating them in an equally fair and impartial way). This will be complicated when multiple parties (of, potentially, varying significance) are involved: the Arusha Accords upon which the African Union Mission in Burundi (2003-4) was based was signed by seventeen political parties, the Government and the National Assembly. The *denial* of recognition can be similarly problematic; in certain contexts it can diminish political status, in others it could exempt actors from accountability.[10] Attempts to achieve fairness through equivalency can also face difficulties when it comes to practical strategy. In the case of an insurgency the differences between the troops, weapons and deployments of a conventional and an unconventional force could result in the application of identical verification conditions being grossly unfair as the troops and military equipment of the former is likely easier to recognise and locate than the latter's. These and other nuances

[8] Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, *Evaluating Peace Operations* (Boulder, C.O.: Lynne Rienner, 2010), 25; United Nations, *Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations* (New York: United Nations, 2008), 13; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), 25.
[9] Jeanette Voas, "The arms-control compliance debate," *Survival* 28, no. 1 (January-February 1986): 10.
[10] Antonio Potter, "Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification: Identifying Best Practice," background paper, Mediators' Retreat - Oslo (10-11 June 2004): 5-6, accessed 30 May 2016, https://www.osloforum.org/sites/default/files/Ceasefire%20monitoring%20and%20verification.pdf.

and complexities represent an environment in which CVM mandates may limit and shape the subsequent verification narrative in the following ways: by framing a situation and/or conflict parties such that political capital unfairly accrues to one or more parties relative to others; by classifying a party so as to set it outside of the mission's parameters; by describing the conduct of verification in terms which, when translated into practical activity, favour certain parties over others. Such effects may be unintentional consequences of the mandate drafting process; conversely, they may indicate machinations of interested parties.

Another way in which CVM mandates and ceasefire agreements could influence a verification narrative is by placing practical restrictions upon the verifiers' freedom of action.[11] This could be done by introducing rules stating what can and cannot be verified (organisations, locations etc.) or by directing restrictive procedures such as the obligatory presence of national 'minders' or restrictions on travel at night.[12] The mandate of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (2002-8) required that the mission "... enquire into *any* instance of violation of the terms and conditions of this agreement ... through on-site monitoring" but limited its monitors to areas of the country dominated by one of the two major conflict parties.[13] Alternatively, limits may be placed on a mission's budget, personnel numbers or key equipments (e.g. helicopters, ground vehicles, communication systems) to such extent as to restrict the mission's capability to verify certain parties in comparison to others. CVMs are commonly as over-regulated and under-equipped as other international peacekeeping deployments (the number of EC ceasefire monitors originally considered for Yugoslavia in

[11] John Drewienkiewicz and Alexander E. R. Woodcock, "Getting Missions Started," in *The Cornwallis Group V: Analysis for Crisis Response and Societal Reconstruction*, eds. A. E. R. Woodcock and David F. Davis (Clementsport, N.S.: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2000), 17-18.
[12] For a description of Iraq's efforts to dilute / subvert the strong mandate granted UNSCOM by the UN Security Council see "UNSCOM: Inspecting for Peace," *Strategic Survey* 98, no. 1 (1997): 55-66; Richard Butler, *The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Growing Crisis of Global Security* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2000).
[13] Ingrid Samset, "Trapped in the Peace Process: Ceasefire Monitoring in Sri Lanka," occasional paper, Nordic Research Programme on Security (2004): 11, accessed 11 December 2016, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/1854-trapped-in-the-peace-process.pdf; italics Samset's.

1991 was ten).[14] The ability of a CVM to deploy and commence verification within an apposite timeframe – for example, before a party can conceal troops and weapons – will depend on factors such as budgetary considerations and the provision of personnel. Once commenced, the conduct of verification may further be restricted by national caveats ('red lines') which member states introduce into a mandate or insist upon on the ground.

2.3 Organisational Pathologies

Max Weber's depiction of 'bureaucratic rationality' concerns structures delimited in scope, governed by explicitly formulated rules, and in which specialisations are systematised into a coherent whole. A 'rational organisation' would apply a unitary set of objectives consistently throughout its depth and breadth in a manner that seeks solely to maximise those objectives' achievement.[15] Such an organisation would conduct a CVM by implementing 'rational' processes such that the organisation *facilitates* but in no way *influences* the verification outcome. However, such expectations would discount the influences organisational structures can exert on decision-making.[16] It may be hypothesised that ceasefire verification reports are affected by the organisational structures of the conducting IO, the structures of the CVM the IO creates, and the structures which develop between them.

Organisations are made up of sub-units in various natures of inter-relationship, including hierarchies. To operate successfully organisations must instil a unity of purpose between these sub-units. The sociologist Robert Merton suggested a bureaucracy "must obtain a high

[14] James D. D. Smith, *Stopping Wars: Defining the Obstacles to Cease-Fire* (Boulder, C.O.; Oxford: Westview, 1995), 239.
[15] David Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 68; Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 2nd ed. (New York; Harlow: Longman, 1999), 11, 13; James J. Chriss, "Alvin W. Gouldner and Industrial Sociology at Columbia University," *Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences* 37, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 254-5.
[16] Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Power of Liberal International Organizations," in *Power in Global Governance,* eds. Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 161-84; Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1980), 109-19.

degree of reliability of behaviour, an unusual degree of conformity with prescribed patterns of action," but that overemphasising discipline could result in "transference ... from the *aims* of the organisation onto the particular details of behaviour required by the rules. Adherence to the rules (originally conceived as a means) becomes transformed into an end-in-itself; there occurs [a] *displacement of goals* whereby "an instrumental value becomes a terminal value"."[17] 'Goal displacement' is a pathology by which an organisation interprets and shapes incoming goals and tasks to align with its proven competencies and to accord with that which it best understands.[18] Rather than ascertaining and resourcing the most appropriate responses, the focus transfers to demonstrating the appropriateness of existent structures and procedures. Goal displacement could cause a conducting IO to frame the unique requirements of a new verification task as accordant with previously executed processes, resulting in inadequate or distorted analyses or the resourcing of tasks with assets because they happen to be available rather than because they are particularly appropriate. Goal displacement might also lead to a reluctance to optimise structures to achieve new mission parameters, or to employ personnel with unfamiliar skill-sets, or to a lack of external curiosity thus reducing possibilities to learn from the relevant experiences of other IOs (these latter three phenomena would each constitute weak indicators).

A second and outwardly similar organisational pathology is what Barnett and Finnemore term 'bureaucratic universalism'.[19] Whilst goal displacement involves framing new situations to fit existent structures and procedures, bureaucratic universalism causes organisations to believe

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[17] Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," *Social Forces* 18, no. 4 (May 1940): 562-3; italics Merton's. For an example of 'means' becoming 'ends-in-themselves' consider Max Weber's depiction of *beamtenherrschaft* (government by officials). Beetham, *Max Weber*, 75-6.

[18] Séverine Autesserre, "Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention," *International Organization* 63, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 249-80; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," *International Organization* 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 720; Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 177; Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, *The World in their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 1990), 210; James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine* (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).

[19] Barnett and Finnemore, "Pathologies," 721.

their structures and procedures are applicable to a broader spectrum of contexts and tasks than they actually are (that is, goal displacement involves framing of that which is external whilst bureaucratic universalism involves imagining of that which is internal). Bureaucratic universalism might cause an organisation to understand that structures and procedures which proved appropriate in a low-risk environment could be transferable to a higher-risk one, or that those which have successfully superintended one nature of verification (e.g. election monitoring) may similarly suit a CVM. This pathology could also facilitate the selection of personnel for key positions on the basis of competences and track-records which the organisation believes to be more generalisable than they actually are. The widespread employment, for example, of serving and retired military personnel in the upper echelons of CVMs indicates a widespread but potentially inadequately substantiated belief that experience in conceiving, planning and managing military operations constitutes a skill-set that is highly transferable to the verification of ceasefires.

Concepts of 'organisational culture' are predicated on the assumption that the individuals who man an organisation's sub-units (including superintending sub-units and sub-units responsible for the organisation's structures) possess a common sympathy with a distinct and discernible set of beliefs.[20] However, in that structuration along specialist lines is a widely employed organisational principle, organisations are very likely to incorporate cultural diversity. According to Diane Vaughan:

> [M]ost organizations are segmented and potentially have as many cultures as subunits. It cannot be assumed that these subunits are linked culturally, in some uniform way, to the larger organization or to each other. ... Different segments of the organization may develop different ways of making sense of the world, experience different local environments, and receive different stimuli from outside.[21]

[20] Barnett and Finnemore, "Pathologies," 719; Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 153.
[21] Diane Vaughan, *The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 64-5. See also Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 187-8.

'Cultural contestation' occurs when sub-units develop such diverse understandings (and, potentially, *ways* of understanding) as to affect an organisation's internal communications and its ability to refine priorities and strategies. Sets of individuals who collectively identify as a sub-unit may come to understand that sub-unit's interests (as moderated through some collective perceptual prism) to be those of the organisation as a whole.[22] Rather than focusing on the organisation holistically these individuals may prioritise 'protecting their turf', attaching themselves to successful initiatives (and disassociating themselves from failures) and taking other actions which are *at their level* rational but may cause the organisation to depart from the rational organisation model.[23] Such individuals may attempt framing moves to advantage their part of an organisation over others.[24] CVMs possess several features that might lead to the cultural segregation of organisational sub-units (and which constitute weak indicators of this potential verification pathology): as already noted they may have unclear mandates; inadequate informational feedback procedures are likely in the early stages of a deployment; they may be widely physically dispersed; they will likely include many seconded individuals with little knowledge of the CVM's structures and ethos. The possibility that, for example, different sub-units (e.g. different regional HQs) handle information differently has profound implications for the subsequent assessment of the narratives they transmit along the verification narrative path. It seems quite possible that individuals within different elements of a verification network deployed to different areas at different times might accrue different *initial* understandings of their local situations, and that these initial understandings could result in a plurality of verification narratives.

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[22] Francis E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 47; Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1966), 65.
[23] Richard C. Snyder, Henry W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 161.
[24] For an example of a sub-unit conducting an advantageous framing move see Paul DiMaggio's description of the 'reorientation' of the US art museum from an educational institution to a curatorial one. Paul J. DiMaggio, "Constructing an Organizational Field as a Professional Project: U.S. Art Museums, 1920-1940," in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, eds. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 269.

2.4 Process and Procedural Pathologies

Even where practical reasons cause CVM procedures to be evidently suboptimal it is likely that the *processes* ('conceptual series of actions which may cause an intention to be realised') which ground such procedures will be assumed to be sound. There have, however, been instances where processes that could never 'establish by empirical means the validity of a proposition' have been proposed. In Chapter I it was described how the US demanded that the USSR and, later, Iraq prove an 'absence of non-compliance', a stipulation which contradicted the Popperish position that hypotheses may be refuted but not confirmed by observation and evidence.[25] Another conceptual problem relates to objects that possess both compliant and noncompliant potentialities which, as reliant on the relevant parties' intentions (which at the time of inspection they may not even have established themselves), cannot provide the data required to inform an objective ceasefire verification assessment.[26] An example would be a party leader's personal guard which in every respect (weapons, organisation etc.) except unknowable intentionality is identical to a military force.

A different basis for procedural pathologies concerns 'path-dependency', the phenomenon by which an outcome is consequent of a prior sequence of decisions which incrementally disqualify alternative possibilities.[27] Given that a CVM cannot monitor every relevant object all of the time it will likely deploy monitors where activity is most anticipated, such as formal or informal boundaries or known trouble spots. However, the natural tendency to focus on activity at the expense of its absence has the potential to cause two separate path-dependent

[25] Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Basic Books, 1959).
[26] For further discussion of the verification difficulties 'dual-purpose' systems present see James A. Schear, "Arms Control Treaty Compliance: Buildup to a Breakdown?" *International Security* 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 154-8.
[27] James Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," *Theory and Society* 29, no. 4 (August 2000): 510-11; William H. Sewell Jr., "Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology," in *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, ed. Terrence J. McDonald (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 262-5.

procedures to simultaneously and incrementally exacerbate the other. This may be illustrated with the thought experiment introduced in Section 2.1:

> It will be recalled that A and B hold separate territories, each composed of 100 zones, and that a CVM has randomly deployed 50 monitors across each of the parties' zones. At regular intervals ('turns') each monitor reports 'violation' or 'no violation'. Each turn both parties commit one ceasefire violation in one of their zones. Consider the consequences if after four turns three reports have been raised against A and one against B. As the CVM's strategy is to focus on activity it redeploys 25 of its monitors from B to A. As A and B now have 75 and 25 monitors respectively the probability of a violation report against A in each turn is now 75% (and 25% against B). Accordingly, in subsequent turns there is a greater likelihood of more violation reports being raised against A than B and of a narrative of A's greater culpability developing *even though A and B are committing violations at an equal rate.*[28]

The experiment shows how a path-dependent procedure (the re-deployment of monitors) influences a path-dependent cognitive effect (an increasing belief of A's relative belligerence) and vice versa. It also demonstrates two relevant features of path-dependency. Firstly, the outcome is particularly sensitive to initial conditions and events that take place early in the sequence. Had three reports initially been raised against B rather than A it is statistically likely that the narrative path would have developed quite differently.[29] Secondly, the narrative path tends towards a condition of inertia whereby it 'tracks' a particular outcome and tends away from possible alternatives. The verification as depicted is self-reinforcing; as a narrative of A's belligerence develops the chance of a report against B becomes increasingly unlikely. Even if a report against B does occur it is increasingly unlikely that this could alter the *direction* of the narrative path, a phenomenon known as 'lock-in'.[30] Yaakov Vertzberger

[28] If this seems implausible consider the verification of an agreement between a conventional force with easily identifiable troops and equipments and an insurgency able to conceal its presence within an indigenous population.

[29] The example is analogous to the 'Polya urn' with the initial round of reports which disadvantaged A equating to first drawing a red ball rather than a white. See W. Brian Arthur, *Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 6-7.

[30] James Mahoney and Daniel Schensul, "Historical Context and Path Dependence," in *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*, eds. Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 463; Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 38-9.

describes cognitive lock-in thus: "Time acts as a misperception multiplier. The longer misperceptions remain uncorrected, the more difficult they are to adjust because of their cumulative effect. Cumulation increases dependence on existing judgments and perceptions, compounding their centrality and, as a result, their rigidity."[31] An individual who has 'locked-on' to a particular narrative is unlikely to be able to assess future monitoring evidence objectively. This could occur even before the individual joins a CVM, for example through the individual's previous experience or his exposure to media reporting. A verifier who has locked-on to a particular narrative will likely exhibit 'confirmation bias' (see Section 2.5).

A third potential source of procedural pathologies concerns baseline data, an essential component of the 'proposition' which CVMs are created to assess. Without reliable baseline data against which to compare monitoring data an accurate verification assessment cannot be made.[32] In a ceasefire verification context baseline data on matters such as troop and weapons holdings is likely to be known only to the conflict parties, and there are reasons why their declarations should be treated with suspicion. A party could under-declare its capabilities to hold back troops or equipment, either to cheat (e.g. as a preliminary for a surprise attack) or as a security guarantee in case the other side does so. Alternatively, a party could decide to over-declare its capabilities to intimidate its opponents or because it feels unable to walk back exaggerated declarations it has previously made. In some situations, furthermore, a party may not itself possess reliable baseline data; for example, dispersed insurgencies may lack the capacity to track those who fight in its name or the weapons they have obtained. It is important that ceasefire agreements unambiguously state how and when baseline data is to be provided to a CVM. CVMs and conducting IOs should seek to test the baseline data the parties provide: possible sources of information include satellite imaging,

[31] Vertzberger, *The World in their Minds*, 347.
[32] Mats R. Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?: An analysis of the changing military requirements of UN peacekeeping with proposals for its enhancement* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), 44.

registers of international weapons sales, archived media and the parties' prior statements. CVM processes must recognise the inherent limitations of any baseline data which cannot be confirmed independently of the parties' assurances.

2.5 Cognitive Pathologies

Since the 1970s a small but influential body of IR scholars has drawn upon psychology to account for important occurrences involving decision-making which solely structural models fail to adequately explain. In that the corpus of psychology is large and often highly specialist a researcher seeking to employ its insights is confronted with the difficulty that a myriad of cognitive processes could potentially play *some* role in an actor's decision-making in any particular situation. As no study can hope to model every possible cognitive influence choices as to the most likely psychological causalities must be made. From a review of the extant canon of political psychology this inquiry focuses upon the two fundamental cognitive phenomena which seem most likely to influence the output of a CVM: a preference for consistency and simplicity, and a reluctance to accept additional cognitive load.

A widely explored psychological phenomenon is the subconscious preference for consonance over dissonance (inconsistency) which has been shown to invoke forms of 'motivated reasoning'.[33] The psychologist Leon Festinger examples a smoker seeking consonance with that habit's effects on his health.[34] A possible course of action for the smoker would be to change a behavioural element (stop smoking): this would be responding to 'physical' reality. Alternatively, the smoker could amend his personal *social* reality in which smoking is *understood* to be bad for him; for example, by surrounding herself with assenting fellow smokers or by adding new cognitive elements such as literature criticising the majority

[33] Norman Feather, "A Structural Balance Approach to Analysis of Communication Effects," in *Advances in Social Psychology*, vol. 3, ed. Leonard Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1967), 100.
[34] Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 1957), 18-22.

medical opinion (a strategy known as 'bolstering').[35] Cognitive dissonance can invoke both 'disconfirmation bias' and 'confirmation bias':

> [S]ubjects with strong prior affect ... are biased in their processing of counter-attitudinal arguments - they spend more time reading them than reading pro-attitudinal arguments, and that time is spent "arguing against." They also display "confirmation bias" in their attitudinal focus on *pro*-attitudinal arguments. The result is not only resistance to persuasion, but that subjects *polarize* in the direction of previously held attitudes in response to counter-attitudinal arguments.[36]

The imperative to cognitive consistency encourages individuals to disproportionately contest information that does not conform with their pre-existing worldviews and to uncritically incorporate that which does. Individuals become overly resistant to evidence which challenges their preconceptions, processing all incoming evidence through a spectrum of pre-existing understandings. Not only does the imperative for consistency impair decision-making processes but exposure to contradictory information can, paradoxically, encourage the strengthening of beliefs.[37] In a CVM this imperative could encourage a verifier to uncritically accept and incorporate information that accords with the prevailing narrative and to overly interrogate and potentially reject that which does not. Brian Rappert describes how the failure to discover prohibited Iraqi weapons in 2002 "simply hardened the pre-war views of some that meticulous concealment was afoot."[38] Verifiers might also exhibit 'selective exposure',

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[35] 'Bolstering' is the seeking out of information and opinions which support pre-formed views. Tactics include: exaggerating favourable outcomes; minimising unfavourable consequences; denying adverse feelings; exaggerating the remoteness of a subsequent action related to the decision; minimising social surveillance; minimising personal responsibility. Robert P. Abelson, "Modes of Resolution of Belief Dilemmas," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3, no. 4 (December 1959): 345; Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York: Free Press, 1977), 91-5.

[36] Charles S. Taber and Everett Young, "Political Information Processing," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, 2nd ed., eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears and Jack S. Levy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 546; italics Taber and Youngs'. See also Eva Jonas et al., "Confirmation Bias in Sequential Information Search after Preliminary Decisions: An Expansion of Dissonance Theoretical Research on Selective Exposure to Information," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 80, no. 4 (2001): 557-71.

[37] Craig A. Anderson, Mark R. Lepper, and Lee Ross, "Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 39, no. 6 (1980): 1037-49; Edward R. Hirt and Steven J. Sherman, "The Role of Prior Knowledge in Explaining Hypothetical Events," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 21, no. 6 (1985): 519-43; Robert Jervis, *How Statesmen Think* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017), 120.

[38] Brian Rappert, *How to Look Good in a War: Justifying and Challenging State Violence* (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 16.

exposing themselves solely to information which accords with their preconceptions and actively avoiding any other.[39]

Separate to excessive cognitive closure, individuals may experience *premature* cognitive closure, the arrival at an opinion or decision and consequent reluctance to depart from it before sufficient information has been evaluated. In common with path-dependent processes, premature cognitive closure can result in an initial assumption or world-view strongly influencing assessments of subsequent information received. Robert Jervis' distinction between a refusal to change attitude in the light of new evidence that is rational from that which is irrational is useful here:

> [A pattern of minimal attitude change] is rational if the central and important elements not only support a wide range of beliefs but also are substantiated by a solid base of theories and evidence. ... But the tendency toward minimum change is irrational if the central elements do not have this kind of backing but rather receive their power of resistance from the fact that to change them would require changing many other perceptions, beliefs, and plans that rest only on them. For in that case, in preserving the central elements of his belief system the person is preserving his psychological well-being, but this is no reason why the beliefs should be right.[40]

Whilst phenomena such as premature cognitive closure and cognitive dissonance illustrate that human thought is not necessarily 'logical', such processes are rational as strategies which enable individuals to make timely and executable decisions in data-rich environments. A routine assimilation to established belief systems is required else decision-making paralysis result: "Only when the assimilation of incoming information involves violations of generally agreed-upon rules for treating of evidence can we detect irrationality."[41] In a CVM, however, where rules *are* 'generally agreed-upon', such activities could result in divergence from an

[39] Alice H. Eagly and Shelly Chaiken, *The Psychology of Attitudes* (Fort Worth; London: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1993), 591-5; Leon Festinger, *Conflict, Decision, and Dissonance* (London: Tavistock, 1964), 96, 155.
[40] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 306. See also James Goldgeier and Philip Tetlock, "Psychological Approaches," in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 463.
[41] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 172.

objective verification process. Jervis' distinction between rationality and irrationality requires that the relevance of incoming information be assessed in the context of the prior verification narrative. It is rational to adhere to a narrative which explains the body of extant information in a manner that is both comprehensive and convincing unless and until convincing contrary evidence is received, but only provided the verifier remains willing to assesses this new information in a manner similar to the prior. A reluctance to process contrary new evidence to avoid additional cognitive load would indicate irrationality. Whilst it might be assumed that knowledge of such cognitive distortions would enable their identification and consequent elimination such influences are surprisingly resistant to 'debiasing' (interventions which aim to reduce or eliminate such biases from a decision-maker's cognitive processes).[42]

Confirmation bias and premature cognitive closure are more likely and can more easily be exacerbated when the decision-maker's environment is a source of additional cognitive load. Stress ("an excess of demands over capacity"[43]) is resultant of situational and/or informational overload. Mild levels of stress may improve attention and performance; however, beyond a certain threshold stress can result in 'cognitive rigidity' manifesting as "reduced receptivity to information that challenges existing beliefs ... [and] increased stereotypic thinking ... [and] reduced tolerance for ambiguity, which results in a tendency to cut off information search and evaluation and make decisions prematurely."[44] Stress can also lead to a narrowing of perception whereby the individual's search for relevant information becomes dominated by past experiences and familiar solutions. This may result in the rejection of ambiguous evidence and, potentially, the overlooking of essential aspects of a situation. A common

[42] Jonathan Renshon and Stanley A. Renshon, "The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making," *Political Psychology* 29, no. 4 (2008), 527; Max H. Bazerman, *Judgement in Managerial Decision Making*, 6th ed. (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2006), 193.
[43] Renshon and Renshon, "Foreign Policy Decision Making," 512.
[44] George, *Presidential Decisionmaking*, 49. See also John R. Oneal, "The Rationality of Decision Making during International Crises," *Polity* 20, no. 4 (Summer 1988): 621; Giora Keinan, Nehemia Friedland, and Yossef Ben-Porath, "Decision Making Under Stress: Scanning of Alternatives Under Physical Threat," *Acta Psychologica* 64, no. 3 (1987): 219-28.

strategy to deal with heavy cognitive load is the use of 'heuristics', intuitive processes which simplify complex judgment tasks by emphasising certain properties of new data and reducing others. Heuristics infer deviations from rational verification in (at least) two ways: the incorporation of only parts of the updating data set, and decision-making by 'rule of thumb' methods rather than processes that are systematic and probabilistic.[45] Individuals may employ defensive avoidance strategies such as ignoring incoming information, filtering out information that does not accord with the enduring narrative, procrastinating, satisficing (selecting the first satisfactory solution and ignoring subsequent possibilities) and bolstering.[46] In an organisational setting stress can result in overreliance on standard operating procedures (SOPs) or other established decision-making aids.[47] In a CVM environment stress may result from excesses of both cognitive and physical demands over cognitive capacity. This is most likely during the mission's rollout when structures, processes and procedures are not yet established, when the verifiers are unfamiliar with their environment and their tasks, and/or when the number of verifiers is inadequate to the developing situation. At such times verifiers will need to interpret an especially unfamiliar environment (high cognitive load) without the structures that infer support to their cognitive capacities such as practiced information handling procedures, efficient communication systems and, especially, other trained and experienced individuals with which to share the workload. Verifiers may experience many of the factors associated with stress (anxiety, sleep deprivation, physical fatigue) at almost any time. The working environment may be dynamic and otherwise uncertain, the responsibilities may be very high. Stress-accentuated premature

[45] Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," *Science* 185, no. 4157 (27 September 1974): 1124-31; Steven J. Sherman and Eric Corty, "Cognitive Heuristics," in *Handbook of Social Cognition*, vol. 1, eds. Robert S. Wyer Jr. and Thomas K. Srull (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1984), 270-6.
[46] Janis and Mann, *Decision Making*, 50-1; Klaus Knorr, "Threat Perception," in *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence, K.A.: University Press of Kansas, 1976), 113; Zeev Maoz, *National Choices and International Processes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 15-18.
[47] Barry M. Staw, Lance E. Sandelands, and Jane E. Dutton, "Threat-Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 26, no. 4 (1981): 501-24; Vertzberger, *The World in their Minds*, 210, 346.

cognitive closure has been associated with the failure of UN HQ in New York to react appropriately to the Rwandan crisis, even though that HQ was insulated from many of the stress factors which its deployed personnel would have experienced.[48] Stress may also be exacerbated by time, or rather lack of time. Once established, CVMs will report at evenly spaced and pre-determined intervals: time will become a factor when unanticipated responses are required or when systemic malfunctions create situations where deadlines may be missed. Under such circumstances individuals may find it impossible to absorb all incoming data and, thus, carry out rational calculations. In that stress may constitute an exacerbator of confirmation bias and premature cognitive closure its detection represents only a weak indicator. However, the presence of stress may be directly identified and recorded by individuals, as may many of the factors associated with stress such as physically demanding and/or dangerous working environments. Most of the defensive avoidance strategies listed could also be discerned from archival records.

As cognitive influences are inherently subconscious confirmation bias and premature cognitive closure are difficult to detect and isolate.[49] However, indicators could possibly be derived and applied to a CVM provided sufficient material can be obtained to produce a detailed map of the verification narrative path. Confirmation bias is likely to manifest as combinations of activity (seeking out information which accords with prior opinions or established narratives) and passivity (refusal to consider alternative possibilities, or to investigate data that does not accord with presumptions or established patterns). In that activity is generally more visible than passivity, evidence of selective exposure is more likely to indicate the underlying phenomenon. Strong indicators could include failures to

[48] Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the World*, 150. See also Vertzberger's description of stress as contributing to Jawaharial Nehru's poor decision-making in the face of Chinese aggression in 1962. Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, *Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959-1962* (Boulder, C.O.: Westview, 1984), 284.
[49] Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 114.

adequately consider information that diverges from the extant verification narrative, bolstering activities such as gathering information in a manner which displays a mind that is 'closed' to the full spectrum of reasonable narrative possibilities, and evidence of restricting key mission posts to those who accord with the extant narrative and 'shutting out' those who do not. Weak indicators might be derived from Donald Kinder and Janet Weiss' observation that "Decision makers perceive more order and certainty than exists in their uncertain, disorderly environments. In their construction of stable, internally consistent belief systems, decision makers fashion pictures of the world that are much more regular and orderly than is reality itself."[50] As a CVM deploys monitors and its information gathering structures become increasingly complex - potentially incorporating additional intermediary nodes - the information flowing into the fusion centres is likely to become more 'noisy' as a greater number of opportunities for recording, assessment and transmission errors are introduced into the system. Under such conditions, Janice Stein suggests, decision-makers will "unconsciously strip the nuance, the context, the subtleties out of the problems they face in order to build simple frames."[51] The sequential and multi-stage nature of verification narrative assembly, I suggest, affords the potential to detect such 'narrative smoothing' by examining series of reports as they enter and depart information processing sequences interspersed with fusion centre 'nodes'. Logically, the narrative should accrue greater probabilistic (and other) caveats as it passes along these chains. If the process is significantly affected by confirmation bias, however, the opposite may be the case.

In that experience is a quality prized in decision-makers it might be reasonable to believe that a corpus of experience both specific to a decisional environment and to decision-making per se will likely improve the outcome of a decision-making process. If one accepts that

[50] Donald R. Kinder and Janet A. Weiss, "In Lieu of Rationality: Psychological Perspectives on Foreign Policy Decision Making," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22, no. 4 (December 1978): 723.
[51] Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," 371-2.

decision-makers employ heuristics and other cognitive shortcuts it seems preferable that these be informed by relevant experience than not. 'Analogies' are a type of heuristic whereby meaning is imparted to a new situation by finding structural similarities with a prior that is believed to be 'understood'. Analogies are applications of experience; a well taken analogy may be a rational aid to interpretation. However, particularly under conditions of excessive cognitive load, analogies can dominate decision-making processes by screening out competing interpretations and, potentially, encouraging premature cognitive closure.[52] Decision-makers are most likely to employ analogies based on their personal experiences, or when the event which forms the basis of the analogy is recent ('cognitively proximate').[53] Analogising is such a powerful cognitive tool that individuals may attempt analogical reasoning even when no obviously relevant analogy exists, leading to the use of 'partial analogies' (potentially in a 'mix and match' fashion) or to the enhancement of similarities between a prior and the current situation.[54] In extreme cases, Jervis notes, "analogies [may be] seized upon only to bolster pre-existing beliefs and preferences."[55] Accordingly, analogies - which may be identified from written records, especially if combined with knowledge of the personal history of the individuals who made them - may constitute weak indicators of premature cognitive closure.

2.6 Group Pathologies

Whilst the individual will normally constitute the fundamental unit of decision-making analysis, the more important decisions made in organisations tend to emerge from (or at least be heavily affected by) groups. Groups may be formal, such as standing committees, or

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[52] Margaret G. Hermann, "Indicators of Stress in Policymakers during Foreign Policy Crises," *Political Psychology* 1, no. 1 (Spring 1979): 40; Kinder and Weiss, "In Lieu of Rationality," 720-1, 724; Vertzberger, *The World in their Minds*, 323-39.
[53] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 239-46; Maoz, *National Choices and International Processes*, 193.
[54] David P. Houghton, "The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situations," *British Journal of Political Science* 26, no. 4 (October 1996): 525-6; Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 14.
[55] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 217.

informal, such as a body of trusted advisors. Group decision-making processes may be distinguished from organisational procedures as resultant of the direct interactions between all of the group's members. There are several ways in which group-based decision-making can ameliorate individual cognitive irrationality: by introducing multiple knowledge bases and perspectives; by expanding the range of decision options through discussion; by requiring individuals to justify their positions, thus exposing biases.[56] However, like organisations, groups are subject to pathologies which may result in irrational decision-making. In that each of the nodes subsequent to the monitor on a CVM's verification narrative path constitutes a group (for the nodes representing higher HQs, potentially several groups) it seems likely that group decision-making pathologies could affect ceasefire verification reports.

Groups may be modelled as a confluence of their constituent individuals and the ways in which those individuals interact: the latter will be heavily affected by (formal and informal) hierarchies. Hierarchies can affect both the contribution different members make and the relative importance the group attaches to each contribution. An individual may experience psychological pressure to conform to the understandings and decisions of the group's other members.[57] Individuals are generally reluctant to reveal information or to expose their opinions if they feel it may show them in a poor light. In a group setting this may result in members - particularly those lower down the hierarchy - withholding information which counters the prevailing view or failing to challenge others whom they understand to possess specialist knowledge or status. The original and (despite numerous critiques and developments) still the most influential explication of these phenomena is Irving Janis' theory of 'groupthink'. Groupthink represents "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the member's strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action ... [they

[56] Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds*, 223, 235.
[57] Leon Festinger, "Informal Social Communication," *Psychological Review* 57, no. 5 (1950): 272.

experience] a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgement that results from in-group pressures."[58] Under groupthink the views of others are accepted as valid evidence about the nature of reality. Rather than exercising their critical powers, individuals seek a consensus view and are overly affected by the opinion of the individual or sub-group which they perceive to possess the greatest knowledge, experience, or political or social status. Dissenters - particularly those who raise truths so inconvenient as to threaten the status quo - are strongly dissuaded or even ejected from the group. As a consequence groupthink is associated with suboptimal decision-making: information searches may be inadequately carried out, thinking may be conformist rather than analytical, and decisions will rarely be revisited once made. Circumstances which increase the likelihood of groupthink include: when the group is isolated (or isolates itself) from SMEs; when the group's leader feels unconstrained by organisational tradition; when the organisation to which the group is responsible fails to apply or to require the existence of formalised decision-making processes.[59]

There are several reasons to believe groupthink may affect CVMs. The dispersal of verifiers and monitors over large areas routinely necessitates multi-level organisational laydowns, resulting in information being handled by multiple 'rounds' of comparatively isolated decision-making groups. CVMs are always 'bespoke': whilst, over time, an IO may develop experience of deploying CVMs, the great majority of verifiers (including those in the most senior positions) will be provided by contributing nations, meaning they are likely to view the mission and its procedures as something to be developed 'from scratch'. Accordingly, CVM decision-making processes take time to develop and embed. The training and prior

[58] Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 9. For a summary of criticisms of groupthink see Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, *Groupthink Versus High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 25-30.
[59] Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 175, 248-9.

experiences of verifiers may vary: qualities such as proficiency in the mission's working language, military or civilian rank or simply the relative status of their sending nation may make some individuals appear more competent than others. (In military or pseudo-military structured CVMs conformity may be institutionalised: "Groups characterised by a rigid rank hierarchy are likely to exhibit groupthink patterns even if they are organisationally diverse."[60]) Groupthink can be exacerbated by severe decisional stress, a common experience on CVMs.[61] Also, a CVM may incorporate many of the factors associated with 'newgroup syndrome' whereby newly formed groups are particularly susceptible to pathologies of group deliberation.[62] In a 'newgroup' the leader (potentially the group's convener) is likely to possess more knowledge than other members, members may be uncertain about their roles and status, and the group's procedures and 'culture' may not yet be established or familiarised. Denied the normal cues as to what behaviour is 'appropriate' newgroup participants may draw on their past experiences (analogise). Newgroup syndrome is more likely in groups where leaders fail to set norms and ground rules which suspend extra-group status considerations (e.g. military rank) and encourage critical participation.[63]

The design of indicators for groupthink effects on ceasefire verification reports is aided by Alex Mintz and Carly Waynes' argument that such a phenomenon is better described on a spectrum delineated by groupthink and 'polythink', the latter the 'disjointed' decision-making which pertains to groups characterised by plurality, fragmentation and conflict.[64] In that

[60] Maoz, *National Choices and International Processes*, 345.
[61] Janis, *Victims of Groupthink*, 13; Paul 't Hart, *Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 184.
[62] Eric K. Stern, "Probing the Plausibility of Newgroup Syndrome: Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs," in *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making*, eds. Paul 't Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 154.
[63] Eric K. Stern and Bengt Sundelius, "Understanding Small Group Decisions in Foreign Policy: Process Diagnosis and Research Procedure," in *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making*, eds. Paul 't Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 127-8; Jeanne Longley and Dean G. Pruitt, "Groupthink: A Critique of Janis's Theory," in *Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 1, ed. Ladd Wheeler (Beverly Hills, C.A.: Sage, 1980), 87.
[64] Alex Mintz and Carly Wayne, "The Polythink Syndrome and Elite Group Decision-Making," *Advances in Political Psychology*, 37, Suppl. 1 (2016): 3-21.

polythink "is essentially the opposite of Groupthink," strong indicators of polythink may usefully serve as strong counter-indicators of groupthink and vice versa.[65] An analysis of the potential influence of groupthink upon a CVM should commence with the mapping of the pertinent decision-making groups (which will likely be fusion centres or informal in-groups associated with key figures such as the mission's head) and the identification of those groups' decision-making processes and associated formal and informal intra-group hierarchies. Adapting the symptoms of groupthink identified by Janis suggests the following strong indicators which could manifest in archival sources such as the minutes or private accounts of meetings: group controls access to key information; uncritical accordance with group member with greatest apparent experience, rank, status etc.; narrative 'lock-in'; group attempts to isolate itself from dissonant information; pressure brought to bear on dissenters, who may be barred from the group (i.e. presence of an 'out-group').[66] Weak indicators may include: multi-node mission laydown; newly formed group (e.g. a recent addition to the mission structure); absence of detailed orders or SOPs; group leader privy to more information than other members; group members' status ill-defined, provisional or contingent; working environment accords certain members particular influence; decisional stress. Conversely, counter-indicators of groupthink may include: intra-group conflict; leaks; framing moves; adoption of lowest common denominator positions; decisional paralysis.[67]

2.7 IOs' Strategic Purposes

On 1 December 2018 the following IOs had conducted and/or were conducting at least one CVM: ASEAN, AU, CEMAC, ECOWAS, EU, IGAD, NATO, OAS, OAU, OSCE, UN. All but one of these are/were mandated to create and maintain peace (CEMAC is the exception) and they deploy / deployed CVMs on the understanding that to do so will assist them in this

[65] Ibid., 4.
[66] Janis, *Groupthink*, 174-7, 256-9.
[67] Mintz and Wayne, "The Polythink Syndrome," 4-7.

goal.[68] A major obstacle to bringing about a ceasefire concerns the security dilemma whereby conflict parties are suspicious that their opponents will turn a cessation of hostilities to their military advantage (re-arming and re-deploying troops, repairing weapon systems etc.). As Virginia Fortna notes, "Both sides are likely to have strong incentives to cheat on a cease-fire ... The cease-fire marks a decision to stop fighting, but this does not mean that both sides now prefer peace to victory, only that they have calculated peace to be preferable to the ongoing costs of war, perhaps only temporarily. There is nothing to guarantee that belligerents are not biding their time, waiting for a better opportunity to resume battle."[69] Verification by an IO that is trusted by the parties to be both neutral and competent can overcome this by policing the parties' adherence to the agreement thus providing mutual security guarantees. The conduct of CVMs by IOs is predicated on the understanding that discovering and reporting the truth is more likely to contribute to the creation of negative peace and, consequently, positive peace than not. However, on at least one occasion a CVM conducting IO has suppressed an important discovery because it considered it likely to *impact* the maintenance of peace. The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) has operated on the Indian-Pakistan border since 1949. In August 1965 UNMOGIP reported to UN HQ

[68] Article 1 of the ASEAN Charter (2007) states one of ASEAN's purposes to be "To maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and further strengthen peace-oriented values in the region"; Article 1 of the Constitutive Act of the AU (2001) identifies an objective "[To] promote peace, security, and stability on the continent"; Article 4 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty (1975) identifies as a Fundamental Principle "[the] maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness"; the EU claims it "supports partner countries around the world in their efforts to secure lasting peace [or] promote their political stability" (European Commission, "Peace and Stability," accessed 9 January 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/human-rights-and-governance/peace-and-security_en); the IGAD's vision is "[T]o be the premier Regional Economic Community (REC) for achieving peace and sustainable development in the region" (IGAD, "What We Do," accessed 9 January 2019, https://igad.int/about-us/what-we-do); Article 2 to the NATO Charter (1949) states "The Parties will contribute to the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations ... by promoting conditions of stability and well-being"; Article 2 to the OAS Charter (1967) "proclaims the following essential purposes ... To strengthen the peace and security of the continent"; Article 3 to the OAU Charter (1963) identifies as a Principle "[The] Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration"; Article 5 of the Helsinki Act (1975) (effectively the OSCE's original Charter) states "The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger international peace and security"; Article 1 of the UN Charter (1945) describes the organisation's purposes as "To maintain international peace and security ... [and] to bring about by peaceful means ... adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."

[69] Virginia Page Fortna, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 13.

that a ceasefire line in Kashmir had been crossed by armed men from the Pakistan side and Indian military positions attacked. Under pressure from Pakistan, Secretary-General U Thant elected to sacrifice his verifiers' impartiality for a 'greater good':

> Weighing carefully all considerations, I came to the conclusion that a public statement by the Secretary-General at that time would serve no constructive purpose and might well do more harm than good. My first and primary objective had to be to see the fighting end rather than indicting or denouncing any party for starting and continuing it.[70]

In that the utility of a CVM as an instrument of peace relies upon the trust the parties place in it, the idea that an IO could alter the tone or content of its own CVM's reports seems surprising. However, it may be understood as a pragmatic response to situations which place a CVM's purpose (assist a peace process) in tension with processes designed to discover and report the truth.

There is some evidence that what may be termed its 'strategic purposes' has previously affected the UN's dissemination of its CVMs' reports on more than one occasion. Talking on this topic, former Under-Secretary-General Dr Shashi Tharoor confirmed that "Moderation of reports did happen for the higher political purpose," adding that this could sometimes frustrate those in the field who felt UN HQ was preventing them from getting 'their' message across. UN HQ had to have 'the final say' because "we [the Executive Office of the Secretary-General] know what the Security Council wants to hear" and is thus able to moderate the public narrative towards the most desirable outcome. The Secretariat felt able to turn an "explosive report" into "a bland one for public consumption," reserving contentious material for engagement out of the public eye.[71] Former Under-Secretary-General Alan Doss agreed that UN HQ is capable of moderating public reports in an attempt to keep a peace process on

[70] Security Council, "Report by the Secretary-General on the Current Situation in Kashmir with Particular Reference to the Cease-Fire Agreement, the Cease-Fire Line and the Functioning of UNMOGIP," S/6651, 3 September 1965, ¶11, DAG Repository.
[71] Shashi Tharoor, interview by author, Oxford, 6 June 2018.

track, and that this can include the HQ strengthening a position ("upping the ante") in a manner those working with the parties in the field may be constrained from doing. "People in the field feel the need to report what happened to the best of their ability in an objective fashion, but that is going to upset somebody somewhere and therefore the larger policy responses, so the question arises: should we put that aside or tone it down a bit?"[72] Former Deputy Spokesman of the Secretary-General Ahmad Fawzi accorded with Doss' opinion that UN HQ is unlikely to moderate a CVM report by altering facts ("I don't believe there was ever an attempt to change the substance") but rather the manner in which the narrative is assembled, a process Fawzi referred to as "massaging the text."[73] Tone is also important: as Doss noted, "The language and the adjectives you use can make a big difference in the way an element of a report is perceived."[74] Doss further suggested that UN HQ would be more likely to have reason to alter verification reports in multidimensional missions (where verification is but one component of a broader effort) as such missions will possess a multitude of interconnected objectives, any one of which could be affected by the parties' response to objective public reporting.

The detection of an IO moderating its own CVM's reports for reasons other than the impartial assemblage of a verification narrative will emerge from comparison of the reports submitted by the CVM to the IO and the reports the IO subsequently issues to its audiences. On the basis of the prior discussion, the direct alteration of facts seems unlikely (the *omission* of facts perhaps more likely). The bases of strong indicators are likely to be changes of tone, usages of language, emphases / lack of emphases etc. such as to substantially alter the narrative's overall effect. Examples would include the 'softening' of a field report carrying a narrative of a parties' serious ceasefire violation by failing to emphasise it over a body of less contentious

[72] Alan Doss, interview by author, telephone, 6 June 2018.
[73] Ahmad Fawzi, interview by author, Skype, 30 May 2018.
[74] Doss, interview.

material, or an attempt to find 'equivalency' with other parties' activities by unreasonably adjusting temporal or geographical frames. Such observations would have to be analysed in the context of the conflict's history (e.g. a crucial moment in a peace process) and the IO's strategic purpose (e.g. a wish to keep the peace process on track). Following Doss' suggestion, a CVM being a component of a multidimensional effort could be a weak indicator of a conducting IO adjusting a verification narrative for its own strategic purposes.

2.8 Manipulation by Powerful Actors

As noted in Chapter I, the presumed impartiality of CVMs accords legitimacy to international activities up to and including military intervention which may follow from the contents of ceasefire verification reports. In that authority (a form of power exercised through obligation rather than force) derives from legitimacy, CVMs constitute a source of power.[75] Certain actors, it follows, could wield power were they able to ensure a CVM delivered a particular result. Actors sympathetic to a particular conflict party's ideology, which believed that if a certain party gained power it would grant them concessions, sales or other benefits, or that could otherwise expect to benefit by a particular CVM outcome could attempt to achieve this. Section 2.2 pointed out that actors involved in writing a CVM's mandate could affect its eventual reports through actions taken in the pre-deployment phases. This Section offers two strategies by which states (which may or may not be a member of the conducting IO) or other actors could attempt to affect a CVM's reports once the mission has deployed. These strategies are representative; it is not suggested that they are the *only* possible ways in which powerful actors could attempt to shape or otherwise affect a developing verification narrative. The strategies are presented as causal mechanisms with CPOs and tests by which to assess their presence and causal status.

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[75] David A. Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics," *International Security* 32, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 50-1; Christian Reus-Smit, "International Crises of Legitimacy," *International Politics* 44 (2007): 158; Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 381.

2.8.1 Discursive Mechanism

Unless and until a peace agreement irrevocably breaks down, conflict parties and other interested actors are likely to communicate narratives of compliance with a verification process to influential audiences. In that such communications seek to frame a developing situation to advantageous political effect they may be understood as 'discourses', plays of power simultaneously creative and derivative of monopolisations of political and media narratives.[76] As strategic communications (STRATCOM) such discourses may be promulgated openly through such means as political platforms, press briefings and social media campaigns. Actors may also promulgate negative discourses (e.g. briefing against their opponents) and they may introduce discourses in which their originating role is concealed.[77] Whilst a conflict party's discourses will likely focus upon its internal power base, a powerful external actor may attempt to influence an audience that includes both other powerful actors and the audiences which those actors respond to (allies, their own populations etc.). Such discourses will forefront certain 'facts' (real or manufactured) and reject or downplay others.[78] A discourse can frame and thus attempt to constitute an object or situation in a certain way, such as the Rwandan Hutu's verbal and visual references to Tutsi 'cockroaches' in the run up to the disaster. The audience for an actor hoping to influence a ceasefire verification narrative through discursive activity will be the individuals within the nodes in the verification narrative path. If successful, such a discourse would encourage these individuals to cognitively lock onto the actor's preferred narrative. If, for example, verifiers can be convinced that a party has been duplicitous in respect of a certain element of an agreement, the verifiers are likely to become incrementally accepting of evidence which supports other

[76] Simon Dalby, "Geopolitical Discourse: The Soviet Union As Other," *Alternatives* 13, no. 4 (October 1988): 416-7.
[77] Ryan Grist, "More than eunuchs at the orgy: Observation and monitoring reconsidered," *International Peacekeeping* 8, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 71.
[78] For an account of how radically different accounts of a conflict were created from a common historical chronology see David Campbell, "MetaBosnia: Narratives of the Bosnian War," *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 2 (April 1998): 261-81.

elements of a more broadly negative narrative path and more questioning of evidence which opposes it (akin to cognitive dissonance). Such discourses could influence verifiers, verifying groups and/or key individuals within the conducting IO. This strategy is described as a 'discursive mechanism' with associated tests at Figure 2.3.

2.8.2 Smoking Gun Mechanism

As a metaphor, a 'smoking gun' suggests some piece of evidence which strongly indicates guilt. Whilst discourses comprise a series of claims which form a coherent narrative over time, a smoking gun possess the potential to lock or switch cognitive adherence to a narrative path all by itself. To have this effect a smoking gun must be both dramatic and substantial; in a verification context the revelation of some prohibited object (ideally in a prohibited place) at a sensitive moment would be ideal. (In the language of path-dependency the ideal moment would be a 'critical juncture', a point in the narrative's development from which once a certain path has been selected it becomes especially difficult to return to a point from which an alternative narrative path could instead be taken.[79]) However, as exogenous actors are unlikely to possess meaningful control over such events they may instead attempt to 'produce' smoking guns by marrying objects (documents, weapon systems, factory complexes etc.) with discourses. The US's attempts to produce smoking guns which 'proved' Iraq was in material breach of Security Council Resolution 1284 from a drone and a cluster bomb relied upon discursive attempts to convince the international community rather than the qualities of the hardware in question.[80] An actor could produce a smoking gun by re-framing existent information in an advantageous way. Whilst some smoking guns are, of course, nothing more than factually grounded indicators of important truths, a smoking gun might also be produced through the provision of partial or false intelligence such as the forged 'contract' for the sale of Niger uranium oxide ('yellowcake') to Iraq which featured in George W Bush's 2003 State of

[79] Mahoney and Schensul, "Historical Context and Path Dependence," 460.
[80] Blix, *Disarming Iraq,* 221-8, 238.

the Union address.[81] Such a strategy as it might be applied to a verification audience is described as a 'smoking gun mechanism' with associated tests at Figure 2.4. (A discursive mechanism and a smoking gun mechanism could potentially be combined such that the former 'ripens' a verification narrative for the subsequent application of the latter. By promulgating the right discourse an actor could ensure that the opportunely timed revelation of its smoking gun has the maximum chance of locking a verification onto its preferred verification narrative path.)

2.9 Conclusion

This Chapter has individually examined the groups of factors proposed in Chapter I as having the potential to substantially affect a CVM's output. From each, it has drawn out those factors which seem most likely to represent verification pathologies, and it has derived tests by which those potential pathologies' presence and causal effect may be assessed. As previously noted, it is neither suggested that these are the *only* possible verification pathologies nor that they will *inevitably* substantially affect ceasefire verification reports in every CVM in which they occur. It seems very likely that CVMs, the IOs which conduct them and the particular environments in which they occur will contain too many other variables for that. What has been created is the toolset required to undertake a series of plausibility probes on archival and interview data relating to CVM cases from Angola, Mozambique and Kosovo. This work and its results are described in the next three Chapters. Together, the outcome of these probes can be anticipated to indicate which of the chosen factors can affect ceasefire verification reports and the extent to which they are able to do this. This summative outcome is then analysed in the thesis' Conclusion.

[81] Ibid., 233-4; George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 449-50.

	X Actor motivated to influence verification →	Step 1 Actor promulgates discursive environment →	Step 2 CVM's key decision-makers *cognitively* accept discourse's premises →	Step 3 CVM locks onto actor's preferred narrative path →	Y Reports accord with actor's interests
CPOs	For an historical investigation, determination that an actor was interested in a verification outcome may straightforwardly be ascertained from secondary sources. Determination that the actor assessed it possible that the outcome would be contrary to its interests may be made from primary sources e.g. interviews.	A cross-referencing of (1) material (press releases, media etc.) in which actors promulgate particular discursive positions with (2) the verification narrative chronology.	Failure to investigate monitoring data that does not accord with previous patterns. Bolstering. Avoidance of exposure to dissenting information. (Confirmation / disconfirmation bias?) Early applications of pre-established (institutional, national) frames. (Premature cognitive closure? Groupthink?) Close accordance with positions which are not supported by monitoring data but do accord with the opinions of influential individuals associated with key actors. (Groupthink?) (In the initial nodes) a 'neat' verification narrative, possibly with unequivocal conclusions, that does not reflect the partial, inconsistent and contradictory nature of empirical monitoring data.	Discounting of realistic narrative possibilities demonstrated through the trail of monitor reports → regional HQ reports → mission HQ formal verification reporting.	Comparison of the actor's known interests (column 'X') with ceasefire verification reports.
Tests		<u>Smoking Gun Test</u> Actor's public pronouncements across different sources sufficiently similar to indicate coordination. *A reasonably strong confirmatory test (which would be considerably strengthened by revelation of a strategy to create a particular discourse).*	<u>Smoking Gun Test</u> Verifiers demonstrate the various symptoms of cognitive verification pathologies and/or verifying group demonstrates symptoms of groupthink. *This confirmatory test would be strengthened by evidence of a stressful decision-making environment, or the 'freezing-out' of dissenters from the decision-making group, or newgroup syndrome.*	<u>Smoking Gun Test</u> Alternative realistic narrative path(s) disqualified from <u>consideration</u> as a 'truth'. *The test's confirmatory strength relates to the strength of empirical evidence in support of the abandoned narrative path.*	<u>Straw-in-the-Wind Test</u> Ceasefire verification reports accord with actor's interests. *Failure to observe this will not indicate that an actor did not attempt a discursive strategy as it may have ultimately been unsuccessful.*

Figure 2.3 Discursive Mechanism.

	X Actor motivated to influence reports →	Step 1 Actor *produces* a 'smoking gun' →	Step 2 CVM's key decision-makers cognitively accept smoking gun's premise →	Step 3 CVM's key decision-makers lock onto actor's preferred narrative path →	Y Reports accords with actor's interests
CPOs	For an historical investigation, determination that an actor was interested in a verification outcome may straightforwardly be ascertained from secondary sources. Determination that the actor assessed it possible that the outcome would be contrary to its interests may be made from primary sources e.g. interviews.	An influential individual places particular emphasis on a potentially influential piece of information or occurrence, or an influential individual claims access to privileged information such as a national intelligence feed.	Evidence the 'smoking gun' was accepted into the verification narrative.	Discounting of realistic alternative narrative possibilities demonstrated through the trail of monitor reports → regional HQ reports → mission HQ formal verification reporting.	Comparison of the actor's known interests (column 'X') with ceasefire verification reports.
Tests		<u>Hoop Test</u> Actor or its agent reveals significant piece of 'evidence' which aligns with actor's interests. *A strong disconfirmatory test.* <u>Smoking Gun Test</u> Evidence that the revealer of the smoking gun possesses hidden links with an actor who would benefit from such activities and/or that the 'smoking gun' is false. *A strong confirmatory test.* <u>Smoking Gun Test</u> Pre-revelatory discursive 'ripening'. *A reasonably strong confirmatory test.* <u>Straw-in-the-Wind Test</u> Smoking gun revealed at opportune time (i.e. a potential critical juncture).	<u>Hoop Test</u> Verifiers take smoking gun into evidence (i.e. they accept that it is factually correct and that it is relevant) despite lack of corroborating evidence or despite strong dissenting evidence. *A strong disconfirmatory test.*	<u>Smoking Gun Test</u> CVM key decision-makers fail to consider realistic narrative path(s) that do not fit smoking gun evidence. *The test's confirmatory strength relates to the strength of empirical evidence in support of the abandoned narrative path.*	<u>Straw-in-the-Wind Test</u> Ceasefire verification reports accord with actor's interests.

Figure 2.4 Smoking Gun Mechanism.

III. UN Angola Verification Mission II

> As far as UNAVEM II observers are concerned, we are aware that [they] have been in the region for only a short time, which does not allow them to study in detail the area, the terrain, the people and all necessary conditions for a good observation.
>
> – Brigadier Estevao Rhino, UNITA Commander[1]

3.1 Introduction

The history of Angola in the last four decades of the 20th Century is a history of conflict. Commenced in 1961, the 'war of independence' from Portuguese colonial rule involved a plurality of national factions which alternatively allied with and fought each other until 1974, when the Lisbon government was overthrown by a military coup. The successor Portuguese regime entered into transitional arrangements with the largest Angolan military movements, the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), the *União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola* (UNITA), and the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA) (which was shortly after overcome by the MPLA). The rapid breakdown of the colonial truce presaged a new 'war of colonial intervention' in which the MPLA's Government of Angola (GoA) (supported by Cuban troops and bankrolled by the Soviets) occupied the north and centre of the country and UNITA (supported by South Africa and subsequently the US) occupied the south. In the late 1980s improving superpower relations enabled a set of agreements which linked the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola with the granting of independence to Namibia. Under pressure from a 'Troika' of Observer States (the US, the Soviet Union and Portugal), the GoA and UNITA signed the comprehensive Peace Accords for Angola known as the 'Bicesse Accords' on 31 May 1991. An uneasy peace held until October 1992 when the inaugural national election results were announced in favour of the MPLA. UNITA's claims of electoral fraud initiated a further

[1] Record of a Welcome Address to representatives of UNAVEM II, the CCPM and the CMVF at UNITA South Eastern Regional Command (Mavinga), 25 April 1992, S-1036-0035-0002, UN Archives.

round of violence which only truly concluded after its political and military leader Dr Jonas Savimbi was killed in February 2002.[2]

The first UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) was deployed in January 1989 at the dual requests of Angola and Cuba. UN Security Council Resolution 626 established a mission of 70 military observers to monitor the withdrawal of the Cuban force, and this was completed successfully in May 1991. Concurrently, the GoA requested "the participation of the United Nations in verifying the implementation of the [Bicesse] Accords."[3] A plan to enlarge the mission to 350 military observers was adopted by the Security Council on 30 May (Resolution 696). Between June 1991 and March 1992 this UNAVEM II focused on verifying the ceasefire and the demobilisation of the GoA's *Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola* (FAPLA) and UNITA's *Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola* (FALA), the demobilisations to be achieved through a process of troop confinement and weapon centralisation within designated assembly areas (AA). In March 1992 the Security Council authorised an enlargement of the mission's mandate to incorporate the observation and verification of national elections (Resolution 747). A senior UN official Margaret Anstee was appointed SRSG, responsible for coordinating all UN activities connected to the peace process. The Security Council responded to the violence which followed the national elections by incrementally extending the mandate as successive rounds of peace talks took

[2] David Birmingham, *A Short History of Modern Angola* (London: Hurst, 2015), Chapters 6-9; Chester A. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood* (New York; London: W. W. Norton, 1992), Chapter 2; Norrie MacQueen, "Elusive Settlement: Angola's 'Peace Processes', 1975-2002," in *Ending Africa's Wars: Progressing to Peace*, eds. Oliver Furley and Roy May (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 135-52; Alex Vines and Bereni Oruitemeka, "Bullets to ballots: The reintegration of UNITA in Angola," *Conflict, Security & Development* 8, no. 2 (June 2008): 241-5; Christopher Pycroft, "Angola - 'The Forgotten Tragedy'," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20, no. 2 (June 1994): 241-62.

[3] Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem, "Letter dated 8 May 1991 from the Minister for External Relations of Angola to the Secretary-General," annex to Security Council, "Letter dated 17 May 1991 from the Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Angola to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General," S/22609, 17 May 1991, DAG Repository.

place. In November 1994 a new peace agreement was signed and the UN deployed a UNAVEM III of over 8,000 peacekeepers, observers and other staff.[4]

Figure 3.1. Map of UNAVEM II deployment in June 1992, showing Regional Areas, Assembly Areas and Critical Points.[5]

[4] Margaret J. Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-3* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996) (subsequently *OOTCW*); Caroline Guyot and Alex Vines, "United Nations Angola Verification Missions II and III (UNAVEM II and III)," in *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, eds. Joachim A. Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 338-51.

[5] Several of the AAs and critical points shown are different to those listed in the Accords: this is because the original sites were subsequently recognised as logistically unsustainable. The two AAs in the Cabinda enclave were never established due to the conflict between the FALA and the FLEC. Reproduced from Security

The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the conceptualisation, organisation and conduct of UNAVEM II to determine whether any of the verification pathologies described in Chapter II affected the content of the mission's verification reports to a non-trivial extent. The period under study is 1 February 1992, when Anstee was appointed to superintend the enlargement of the mission's mandate, to 30 October 1992 by which date the ceasefire had comprehensively broken down. Over this period the UNAVEM II verification narrative was constituted of four reports issued by the Secretary-General to the Security Council.[6] Whilst other conflict parties were active in Angola at that time the Chapter focuses upon the two signatories of the Bicesse Accords. The analysis concerns those elements of UNAVEM II which constitute a CVM and associated mechanisms set up by the Accords in which UNAVEM II participated: the supervisory Joint Political-Military Commission (*Comissão Conjunta Politico-Militar* - CCPM), its subsidiary Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (*Comissão Mista de Verificação e Fiscalização* - CMVF), and joint police monitoring teams. It does not attend to those elements of UNAVEM II related solely to the verification of the national election, nor does it consider the question of why the ceasefire failed shortly after the national elections except where this is directly related to the design, resourcing and conduct of UNAVEM II.

The remainder of the Chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 analyses how the mission's mandate bounded the mission in ways likely to have affected the verification narrative. Section 3.3 considers the effects of organisational pathologies within and between UNAVEM II and UN HQ in New York. Section 3.4 analyses the mission's verification processes,

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Council, "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)," S/24145, 24 June 1992, DAG Repository.

[6] Security Council, "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)," S/23671, 3 March 1992, DAG Repository; S/24145, 24 June 1992; Security Council, "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)," S/24556, 9 September 1992, DAG Repository; Security Council, "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)," S/24858, 25 November 1992, DAG Repository.

including the concepts in relation to which the processes were designed and the ways in which the situation in Angola was baselined. Section 3.5 concerns the mission's verification narrative path and the procedures the verifiers attempted to carry out. Section 3.6 demonstrates that the UN's strategic purposes caused senior decision-makers within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and/or the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) to moderate key aspects of reports from the field. Section 3.7 argues that the US's and UNITA's coordinated condemnation of the GoA's 'Emergency Police' constituted an (unsuccessful) attempt to manipulate the verification narrative six weeks before the national elections. The Chapter's conclusions are at Section 3.8.

3.2 Mandate Analysis

The UNAVEM II's original mandate was derived from the Bicesse Accords which resulted from several rounds of Portuguese mediated negotiations between April 1990 and May 1991.[7] The Accords represented a compromise of the interests of the parties and of the parties' powerful sponsors. Whilst the war within Angola had become a 'mutually hurting stalemate' the global situation had been energised by the thawing of superpower relations and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. With the imperative for ideological proxy wars diminishing, Washington and Moscow sought to extract themselves from Angola in a manner that would leave their respective clients ascendant.[8] The final agreement was seen as balancing UNITA's wish for an early election - which it and the US believed it would win - with the GoA's wish

[7] The Bicesse Accords comprise the following: I. Cease-fire Agreement; II. Fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola; III. Concepts of resolving the issues still pending between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA; IV. The Protocol of Estoril. The full text is an enclosure to S/22609. The decision to direct a new UNAVEM II was made by Security Council Resolution 696 (30 May 1991); the mandate is described in Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)," S/23191, 31 October 1991, DAG Repository.
[8] Philip Sibanda, "Lessons from UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From UNAVEM to MONUA," in *From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa*, eds. Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999), 123-4; Virginia Page Fortna, "A Lost Chance for Peace: The Bicesse Accords in Angola," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 4, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2003): 75.

for a small UN oversight mission that would not impact its 'governmental sovereignty'.[9] Despite its central role in this plan the UN was only invited to observe the negotiations (although its representative made some small contributions to the military arrangements). Accordingly, the UN's leverage over the peace process and its ability to shape the mission's mandate were very limited.[10]

The Accords' most striking feature was the investment of direct responsibility for verifying the ceasefire in the signatory conflict parties, an arrangement Anstee described as an "extraordinary set-up."[11] This would be conducted through CMVF 'monitoring groups'[12] consisting of equal numbers of GoA and UNITA representatives deployed at 50 AAs and other specified 'critical points' such as major ports and airports. The neutrality of the police would be verified by jointly constituted police monitoring teams who would "visit police facilities ... [and could] move freely throughout the entire territory of Angola."[13] Local CMVF monitoring groups would report to the central CMVF in Luanda, the police monitoring teams directly to the CCPM. Within this construct UNAVEM II would undertake the following:

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[9] Ambassador Antonio Monteiro, interview by author, Lisbon, 19 October 2017; Herman J. Cohen, *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000), 111-12, 123; James Hamill, "Angola's Road from under the Rubble," *The World Today* 50, no. 1 (January 1994): 8.
[10] Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission," S/22627, 20 May 1991, ¶3, DAG Repository; Marrack Goulding, *Peacemonger* (London: John Murray, 2002), 177; Guyot and Vines, "United Nations Angola Verification Missions II and III," 345; Anstee, *OOTCW*, 13; Gwinyayi Albert Dzinesa, "A comparative perspective of UN peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia," *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 4 (2004): 647.
[11] Bicesse Accords, Document I, §I, ¶4; Margaret J. Anstee, *Never Learn to Type: A Women at the United Nations* (Chichester: Wiley, 2004), 468. See also Goulding, *Peacemonger*, 177-9.
[12] UNAVEM II is a good example of loose usage of verification terminology. Both the CMVF and UNAVEM II employed 'monitors', the former in military 'monitoring groups' and police 'monitoring teams', the latter termed 'United Nations Monitoring Officers' (UNMOs). However, the role of the UNMOs is identified in several parts of the Accords as 'to verify'. (Unhelpfully, the Reports of the Secretary-General speak of UNAVEM II military and police *observers*.) Whilst this Chapter follows the contemporaneous usage of 'UNMO' it should be understood that the role of a UNMO was to verify the activities of Angolan monitors.
[13] Bicesse Accords, Document IV, §III, ¶2.2.

> [V]erify the arrangements agreed by the two Angolan parties ... for monitoring the cease-fire, as set out in the Cease-fire Agreement ...
>
> [V]erify the arrangements agreed by the two Angolan parties for monitoring the Angolan police during the cease-fire period, as set out in Section III of the Protocol of Estoril.[14]

Although the Troika's representatives would enjoy observer status at both the CMVF and the CCPM, a UN representative "will be *invited* to the CMVF meetings"[15] and "*may* be *invited* to participate in the meetings of the CCPM."[16] Allied with its limited mandate (well summarised by Virginia Fortna as "to watch the watchers"[17]) these rules - which constituted a structural subservience to the conflict parties - both directly reduced the mission's ability to verify the ceasefire and indirectly reduced it by generating confusion and consequent hostility against UNAVEM II amongst the Angolan population.[18]

Structural deficiencies in the verification strategy impacted UNAVEM II as they did the national verification effort. The CMVF was charged to "monitor compliance with the rules of conduct previously agreed on for the troops in the areas of assembly ... and rule on the complaints and claims presented in relation to possible violations of the cease-fire."[19] This meant that the CMVF (and thus UNAVEM II) could *react* to claims of ceasefire violations but would not proactively verify ceasefire prohibitions on actions such as "Attempts to occupy new ground positions and the movement of military forces and resources from one area to another without prior agreement" and "Patrol activities outside the areas to be demarcated around the areas of assembly."[20] Given the vastness of the terrain, the paucity

[14] S/23191, ¶3.
[15] Bicesse Accords, Document I, §III, ¶1; italics mine.
[16] Bicesse Accords, Document II, Annex, ¶2; italics mine.
[17] Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission II," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 393.
[18] Guyot and Vines, "United Nations Angola Verification Missions II and III," 346.
[19] Bicesse Accords, Document I, §IV, ¶1.
[20] Bicesse Accords, Document I, §II, ¶6(c), ¶6(e).

and war-damaged nature of communications infrastructure and the GoA's limited air assets, such a static and reactive approach was likely the only practicable option. However, the absence of a proactive verification stance is also a foreseeable consequence of the mandate imposed 'self-verification' strategy, a construct in which either party could delay or veto the inspection of any particular area or object.[21] A further important limitation was that the security of (unarmed) UN personnel was to be "the responsibility of the party that controlled the zone where they were present."[22] With large parts of Angola either under uncertain ownership or actively contested, and with FAPLA and FALA soldiers neither easily distinguishable from civilians nor each other, these mandate rules constituted further limitations upon the mission's ability to verify the parties' compliance with the ceasefire agreement.[23]

Whilst the Accords devoted considerable attention to military matters, arrangements for the verification of police forces were inadequately described.[24] The GoA retained complete control over the national police, enabling it to limit the flow of UNITA recruits into its ranks and to develop an 'Emergency Police' of such scale and capability as to constitute a paramilitary force (see Section 3.7). However, whilst UNITA's participation in the nation's police would be only "Consonant with the invitation from the Government,"[25] UNITA personnel with responsibility for the safety of its leaders would be granted "police status,"[26] raising unanswered questions as to the numbers that would enjoy this status, how these individuals might be distinguished from other members of the FALA, how they might be

[21] Theoretically a deadlock in the CMVF over such a 'military' matter would be referred to the CCPM; however, that body refused to deal with non-political matters. Bicesse Accords, Document I, Annex I, §A, ¶7, ¶10.
[22] Bicesse Accords, Document I, Annex I, §B, ¶6.
[23] S/24145, ¶13.
[24] Yvonne C. Lodico, "A Peace that Fell Apart: The United Nations and the War in Angola," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1997), 116.
[25] Bicesse Accords, Document IV, §III, ¶3.1.
[26] Bicesse Accords, Document IV, §III, ¶4.

armed, and the meaning of 'police status' in practice. A senior UNMO recalled the implications of the mandate's classification of these personnel outside of the verification mechanisms:

> Soon, every hamlet, village, town, and city had its own armed force of FALA, predesignated as the UNITA Personal Safety Corps, and re-designated with the status of police. While they were legitimate in accordance with the agreement, they ... served to raise tension. ... Their police status put them outside the immediate scrutiny of the CMVF and UNAVEM as the mandate gave no powers of demobilisation of police.[27]

Such a transference of UNITA personnel into the police sphere confused the already poorly defined mandate of the UNAVEM II's police monitors, who were seldom able to verify the activities of joint police monitoring teams and were often mistaken by the population for a functioning police presence in themselves. By classifying an under-defined group of personnel so as to set it outside of the mission's parameters, the Accords further reduced UNAVEM II's already limited mandate to verify a 'police' force, elements of which both sides maintained (in different ways) as their own unverifiable military force.

As already illustrated (and will again be seen in Section 3.4) the Accords were riddled with omissions, ambiguities and inconsistencies. However, an area in which the Accords were quite definitive concerned the framing of the situation and the parties which the ceasefire agreement pertained to. The 'Fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola' described UNITA's interim recognition of the GoA and determined UNITA's status as a political party, the latter necessitating a change in the constitution to allow multi-party democracy.[28] These principles produced the GoA and UNITA on a theoretically equal political footing, a move criticised as strengthening UNITA's claim to equal status and

[27] Roger Mortlock, "On Angola," unpublished paper, private papers of Brigadier Mortlock.
[28] Bicesse Accords, Document II, Points 1, Point 2.

consequently encouraging its post-election decision to return to war.[29] By failing to recognise other conflict parties, furthermore, the principles disqualified the political possibilities of other insurgent groups.[30] This affected the verification of the ceasefire between the MPLA and UNITA in the northern Cabinda enclave as a determined insurgency by the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (*Frente de Libertação del Enclave de Cabinda* - FLEC) disqualified the possibility of FALA and FAPLA demobilisations in that area. More broadly, it contributed to the 'meta-frame' through which the overarching situation at that point came to be viewed, and thus inevitably affected the subsequent verification of that situation. In summary, thus, the UNAVEM II mandate bounded the conduct of verification and the consequent ceasefire verification reports by the application of 'extraordinary' rules, by the ill-considered classification of certain entities, by the framing of the situation and of the parties pursuant to it, and by a general failure to anticipate the ways in which ambiguous passages might be used to the parties' partial advantages. As the next Section will show it also bounded the mission's ability to conduct verification by the practical limitations on personal and equipment given to it to achieve its many tasks.

3.3 Organisation Analysis

This Section considers ways in which organisational pathologies may have affected the verification narrative. The organisations of interest are the conducting IO (UN HQ in New York) and its subsidiary CVM (UNAVEM II). Section 3.3.1 discusses issues internal to UNAVEM II which may have affected the verification reports submitted to UN HQ. Section 3.3.2 considers the nexus between the mission and relevant sub-units within UN HQ to explain these issues.

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[29] Edward Newman, "Secretary-General," in *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*, eds. Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 187; Pycroft, "Angola - 'the forgotten tragedy'," 253.
[30] Anstee to Goulding, "Political Report," code cable, 15 July 1992, S-1036-0029-0001, UN Archives.

3.3.1. UNAVEM II

The Bicesse Accords described the assembly, disarmament and demobilisation of an estimated 200,000 soldiers, the creation of a new Angolan Armed Forces (*Forces Armadas Angolanas* - FAA) of 50,000 and the reintegration of 150,000 combatants into society. To verify the parties' monitoring of these and other processes the Secretary-General proposed a mission of 350 military UNMOs and 90 police observers, supported by an air unit of three fixed-wing aircraft and 12 helicopters. The estimated budget for the mission's envisaged 18 months duration was $132.2 million, a figure subsequently revised down.[31] Whilst requiring simplifications, it is valid to compare these figures with contemporaneous UN missions because such comparisons were made by the conflict parties and by the SRSG herself:

> The adequacy of resources is a common concern of all the parties, the observers, and the diplomatic community here. When Security Council Resolution 747 was discussed at CCPM last week the UNITA representative launched a broadside on this issue, asking why the Angolan mission had so small a budget compared with Yugoslavia and Cambodia ... the Government [of Angola] representative expressed full accord with these views and the same concerns were echoed by both Portuguese and U.S. observers.[32]
>
> [Even noting that the mandate of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia included additional elements] the 1:4 difference in funding is surely considerable, particularly taken in the larger size of Angola with a population of nearly 10 million ... compared to Namibia with a population of 1.8 million ... not to mention that Namibia had a functioning infrastructure and administration.[33]

Throughout its duration UNAVEM II lacked key physical resources, notably the air assets which represented the only reliable way of transporting and supplying its personnel across its vast area of operations. Poor living conditions, poor diet (partly consequent of an inadequate supply system) and the prevalence of cerebral malaria contributed towards the Secretary-General's assessment that conditions experienced by UNMOs outside of Luanda were

[31] S/22627, ¶15; Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission," S/22627/Add.1, 29 May 1991, DAG Repository.
[32] Anstee to Goulding, "TELECON of 31 March," code cable, 31 March 1992, Anstee-15-01, Weston Library.
[33] Anstee to Goulding, letter, 23 April 1992, Anstee-15-01, Weston Library.

"amongst the most difficult that have ever been faced by United Nations peace-keeping personnel."[34] Despite its modest size, the mission received many requests to second personnel to other UN missions (dispatching 12 to the former Yugoslavia): this continued even after the Secretary-General's report of 9 September had identified "noticeably rising tensions."[35] Partly as a consequence, the AAs were routinely undermanned. The abilities and qualities of some of the mission's available personnel impacted mission performance. The lack of Portuguese speakers affected the UNMOs' ability to carry out core tasks such as participating in political negotiations. One regional commander reported that "On occasions, use has had to be made of an English-speaking FALA officer. It is felt that this necessity risks compromising UNAVEM neutrality."[36] In that these various limitations in equipment and personnel reduced the mission's ability to verify the parties' activities and conduct it may reasonably be assumed that they affected the content of the reports the mission submitted to UN HQ.

Within the mission's executive, the support provided to Anstee by both her civilian deputy and the Chief Military Observer (CMO) was poor. Of the former, Anstee described his reluctance to attend morning meetings following late-night drinking sessions and alleged that "his aim was to run the show through direct contact with colleagues in New York behind my back."[37] The latter obstructed Anstee in various ways and failed to support her when her personal safety was threatened.[38] (Ambassador Monterio, who headed Portugal's Observer

[34] S/23191, ¶35.
[35] S/24556, ¶4; Goulding to Anstee, "Request for Loan of Military Observers," code cable, 9 October 1992, S-1036-0025-0006, UN Archives; "Briefing by Major General E. U. Unimna, Chief Military Observer of UNAVEM II, to Ms Anstee, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and her Team at UNAVEM on 17 February 1992," note, undated, Anstee-21-02, Weston Library.
[36] Commander Central Region, "Central Region Monthly Report for July 1992," 6 August 1992, private papers of Brigadier Mortlock. See also Anstee, *OOTCW*, 34.
[37] Anstee, *Never Learn to Type*, 470-1.
[38] Ibid., 470-1, 484; Ambassador John Flynn, interview by author, London, 30 October 2017; Colonel Robert Griffiths, interview by author, Oxford, 10 October 2017; Major Rob Hitchings, e-mail message to author, 6 November 2017; Goulding, *Peacemonger*, 186, 194; David Birmingham, "Orphans of the Cold War: Angola's People," *African Affairs* 96, no. 384 (July 1997): 444.

Group, suggests this officer's poor leadership affected the mission's ability to understand the degree of UNITA's compliance with the Accords.[39]) A senior UNMO who became the mission's chief of staff following a deployment outside of Luanda described UNAVEM II HQ as "not a homogenous place to work in," and the relationship between the HQ and its deployed commands as "not good, it wasn't the manner in which a command should be run at all."[40] Another senior UNMO offered the following analysis:

> At one pole of an attitudinal spectrum, there are observers who desire only to achieve the mission. In the centre are those who see their role as the acquisition of personal wealth and comfort. At the other pole are those whose dominating desire is to avoid work and personal risk without a loss of personal status.
>
> ... Superimposed on the observer contingent is a headquarters infrastructure which almost defies description. The UN civilian executive component is marked by over-manning, reverse racial conflict, intrigue, and the blatant acquisition of symbols of status. While in the field there was a desperate need for ... virtually all stores and supplies, in the Headquarters activity was focused on obtaining personal vehicles, comfortable quarters, and imported lounge suites.
>
> ... The end result is a strongly divided mission marked by mutual suspicion and dislike between the groups. The observers have held the civilian component in contempt for their inadequacies, and the civilians have seen the observers as second-class citizens.[41]

The view that UNAVEM II was divided between those who prioritised the mission and those who prioritised their own interests was shared by other verifiers and external observers. There is considerable evidence that cultural contestation affected the mission both 'horizontally' (within the Mission HQ) and 'vertically' (between the Mission HQ and its subordinate deployed commands).[42] Apart from further reducing the ability of an under-manned and under-resourced mission to verify the parties' monitoring of the ceasefire, the presence of pervasive cultural contestation raises questions as to whether monitoring

[39] Monteiro, interview; Colonel Cameron Ross, interview by author, Skype, 3 October 2017.
[40] Ross, interview.
[41] Mortlock, "On Angola."
[42] Griffiths, interview; Hitchings, e-mail; Captain Noel Rings, e-mail message to author, 19 October 2017; Goulding, *Peacemonger*, 190.

information was handled and assessed homogenously throughout the different branches of the verification narrative chain.

3.3.2. The UNAVEM II-UN HQ Nexus

To determine whether organisational dysfunction between UNAVEM II and UN HQ affected the ceasefire verification reports that the UN ultimately issued requires some understanding of the structures which directed UN peacekeeping operations in 1992. UNAVEM II had been deployed and, until 1992, controlled by the Office for Special Political Affairs (OSPA) under Under-Secretary-General Marrack Goulding. OSPA had lead responsibility for the planning, managing and reporting on the performance of peacekeeping operations; in this it was supported by the Field Operations Division (FOD) and the Peacekeeping Finance Division which provided personnel and logistic support and financial support respectively. Whilst OSPA's performance was greatly dependent upon these two Divisions, Goulding did not exercise direct authority over them (as they were both constituent parts of the Department of Administration and Management - DAM). Neither could Goulding determine a mission's budget: the Secretary-General's budgetary recommendations to the Security Council were drawn up by the FOD and reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). In February 1992 a newly appointed Secretary-General implemented a programme of reform, renaming OSPA the DPKO and granting Goulding a deputy at Assistant-Secretary-General level.[43] The transfer of some of FOD's functions to DPKO would eventually improve that Department's ability to support field operations, but this was not enacted until late 1992 (see also Section 4.3.2).[44]

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[43] This was Kofi Annan who became responsible for field operations in Africa. Despite this, Goulding (a previous UK Ambassador to Angola) retained direct responsibility for UN operations in that country "for old times sake." Goulding, *Peacemonger*, 31.

[44] Alvaro de Soto, interview by author, Paris, 6 December 2017; Dick Thornburgh and Marrack Goulding to Secretary-General, "Field Operations Division," memorandum, 15 October 1992, S-1036-0027-0002, UN Archives; United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1992* (Dordrecht / Boston / London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), 44.

The creation of DPKO represented part of the UN's response to the increased number and size of UN peacekeeping missions in the initial post-Cold War period, which its structures had struggled to manage.[45] In March 1992, Anstee (a highly experienced UN official) wrote confidentially to Goulding: "I believe there are, besides the resources question, problems of structures, procedures and attitudes in other quarters that can only be addressed by organisational change."[46] Three weeks later she wrote again: "[T]he UN will simply not be able to cope with the increase in peace-keeping operations unless there is a much more streamlined, field-orientated administration for that purpose, with a single line of command, under one person with proven experience of complex international field operations."[47] Goulding's reply to the first of these letters indicates the issue's breadth:

> I have been disheartened by our experience in recent weeks in trying to establish the new operations in Cambodia and Yugoslavia and expand existing operations in Angola and El Salvador, all at the same time. I wonder whether the United Nations now has the capacity to manage operations on this scale. This is partly a matter of resources ... but is also a matter of our own procedures which have become extraordinarily sclerotic.[48]

Whilst these problems were recognised at the most senior levels, the influence of organisational pathologies in New York can be shown to have substantially affected the mission's ability to discharge its mandate. The first of these (bureaucratic universalism) concerned the slowness to appreciate and respond to the more complex support requirements of a new type of 'multidimensional' peacekeeping mission. Whilst 'first generation' peacekeeping had involved only the supervision of ceasefires and buffer zones, multidimensional peacekeeping required UN personnel to temporarily discharge governmental functions such as the restructuring of armies and police forces and the

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[45] de Soto, interview; Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," *International Affairs* 69, no. 3 (July 1993): 460, 463; Stephen F. Burgess, *The United Nations under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992-1997* (Lanham, M.D.; London: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 60.
[46] Anstee to Goulding, "TELECON of 31 March," code cable, 31 March 1992, Anstee-15-01, Weston Library.
[47] Anstee to Goulding, letter, 23 April 1992, Anstee-15-01, Weston Library.
[48] Goulding to Anstee, letter, 14 April 1992, Anstee-15-01, Weston Library.

supervision of national and local administrations. As one of the first multidimensional peacekeeping operations it is unsurprising that the UN considered its existing structures appropriate to the management of UNAVEM II. This was demonstrated in the Secretary-General's decision that the mission's electoral operation could be "limited in scale," similar to and based upon UN missions recently completed in Nicaragua and in Haiti,[49] a comparison to which Anstee responded "the circumstances [in Angola] are very different, and those earlier experiences can provide no blueprint that can be exactly copied here in practice."[50] A second outcome of bureaucratic universalism manifested as restrictions applied by New York on the recruitment of civilian personnel. Whilst the expansion of UN peacekeeping had greatly increased the call on internal candidates, external recruitment remained forbidden:

> The overriding consideration, which was made very clear to me, was that the Secretary-General wished me to give preference to staff from developing countries ... Normally this would cause me no problem ... But it is quite another thing to impose conditions - any conditions - on the selection of staff, at very short notice, for a difficult operational mission ... Inevitably this led to compromises, some of which were later to make an already difficult mission even harder.[51]

To the extent that the cultural contestation *within* UNAVEM II was a product of the variable quality of its staff it may be said that that pathology and its implications for the mission's conduct and outputs was partly consequent of bureaucratic universalism within New York. Furthermore, recalling that the mission's leader and most of its other senior civilian staff were seconded from New York, in an organisational pathology analysis UNAVEM II represented a sub-unit of UN HQ. Accordingly, the fundamentally different approaches to the planning and conduct of the mission between the UN's personnel in Angola and the UN's personnel in New York constituted vertical cultural contestation *between* the CVM and its conducting IO.

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[49] S/23671, ¶19; Boutros-Ghali to Anstee, letter, 1 May 1992, Anstee-15-01, Weston Library.
[50] Anstee to Boutros-Ghali, letter, 7 May 1992, Anstee-15-01, Weston Library.
[51] Anstee, *OOTCW*, 33-34.

The Secretary-General's recommendations as to the mission's size and budget had been bounded by his assessment of 'what the traffic would bear' i.e. the maximum commitments the major contributing powers might agree to.[52] This lead was followed by a visiting senior UN official, who responded to the regional commanders' requests for resources with a statement which closely parallels the precepts of goal displacement: "You speak as military men, starting from the premise of the resources that you need to do a particular job. I am an economist and I therefore start from the premise of the resources that are available and then tailor the job to fit them."[53] Anstee's response to this official illustrates a very significant difference in her strategy to resourcing and thus accomplishing the mission from that adopted in New York: "[Y]ou start from the premise that resources are by definition likely to be extremely limited and that we should therefore cut corners with this in mind. I think that we have a responsibility to say what are the minimum resources needed in order to prove the basis for a reasonable outcome."[54] With the Security Council focused upon emerging crises such as the disintegration of Yugoslavia, New York had come to understand that 'the traffic' would bear comparatively little in terms of international support for the Accords. Having arrived at this understanding, individuals with limited experience of the operating environment reframed their understandings of the mission's requirements to accord with the resources that might be available to undertake it. Whilst this might appear pragmatic, in the context of a CVM the possibility that mission realities may be 're-constructed' to accord with factors *internal* to the IO cannot accord with an enterprise whose purported purpose is to discover truth rather than to make it. It appears likely that the effects of goal displacement within New York and cultural contestation between New York and UNAVEM II affected the ability of those senior decision-makers in UN HQ who received the mission's verification

[52] Boutros-Ghali to Anstee, letter, 1 May 1992, Anstee-15-01, Weston Library.
[53] Anstee to Goulding, letter, 23 April 1992, Anstee-15-01, Weston Library.
[54] Anstee to Boneo, "Electoral Verification," fax, 4 May 1992, Anstee-15-01, Weston Library.

reports to appreciate the limitations of the ways in which they were produced. The reports the Secretary-General placed before the Security Council do not recognise the likelihood of such inherent limitations. This gives the reports an appearance of greater certainty, and thus authority, than their method of production enabled them to realistically possess.

3.4 Verification Processes

The FAPLA and FALA demobilisations were to be verified at a total of 50 AAs, each comprising one or more camps which were mostly in remote locations. Theoretically the process was simple: on arrival a soldier would hand over his weapons and ammunition and be 'counted in'; during his stay he would parade and be physically counted at regular intervals; eventually he would be 'counted out', either as a civilian or as a recruit to the fledgling FAA. The counting of those 'unassembled troops' who were granted dispensation from assembly (mostly FAPLA personnel in HQs and specialist units in Luanda, but also FALA soldiers in structures such as the CMVF) would be undertaken during periodic visits to their formalised locations.[55] By this rubric troop verification was a 'numbers game' with UNAVEM II verifying that the numbers were being properly collected, recorded and transmitted by the parties' monitoring groups. The verification of weapons and ammunition was also conceptualised as a numbers game, albeit a more complex one. Following their surrender, weapons and ammunition were to be gathered and registered at collection points. Once Luanda had received information concerning their nature, physical state and location, orders would be issued for the stocks to be destroyed in-situ, centralised as a FAA resource, or transported to other sites for destruction, deactivation or international sale. Throughout, the various holdings were to be physically counted at least weekly.[56] This plan represented a

[55] CMVF, "Verification and Monitoring of Unassembled Troops," circular, 19 March 1992, S-1035-0148-0001, UN Archives.
[56] CMO to Regional Commanders, "Verification in Assembly Areas (AAs)," memo, 3 September 1991, S-1035-0102-006, UN Archives; COS to Regional Commanders, "Directive for Custody of Armament and Norms for Closing Troops Assembly Areas," memo, 21 July 1992, S-1035-0092-0005, UN Archives.

pragmatic response to the vast battlefield upon which neither the front lines nor the soldiers were always easily identifiable. Such a strategy of assembly may be understood as the creation of multiple 'zones of separation' between the conflict parties, each zone wider than the range of any weapon held. Such a strategy reduces monitoring within designated areas of assembly to an exercise in bookkeeping, and there are advantages to this. In Angola assembly enabled the verifiers to avoid narrative lock-on: the problems relating to path-dependency discussed in Section 2.4 could not occur were every zone monitored on every 'turn'.[57] The UNMOs' presence should also have detected and overcome the predictable (and frequently recurrent) relapses of monitoring group participants to their FAPLA / FALA loyalties.[58] Conceptually, within the AAs the verification procedures conducted should have been highly objective. There are, however, two considerable problems with this type of approach. Firstly, whilst the verifiers might account for the soldiers, weapons and ammunition counted into the AA, without accurate baseline data this alone would be insufficient to determine the conflict parties' compliance with the agreement to assemble all of their soldiers, weapons and ammunition (see below). Secondly, such a process cannot deal with the potentially dynamic space *outside* of the AAs.

Even at the time it was evident that the baseline for the verification of the disbandment of all military forces in Angola had to be the numbers of troops each side possessed and that inaccuracies in those numbers would compromise the verification process. The key baseline problems may be illustrated using an extract from the Secretary-General's report of 3 March 1992:

[57] It was intended that counting be conducted simultaneously on the same day in all regions. UNAVEM II Standard Operating Procedures, September 1992, §3, S-1035-0156-0007, UN Archives.
[58] COS to all Regional Commanders, "Functioning of Monitoring Groups," memo, 23 March 1992, S-1035-0092-0006, UN Archives.

> As at 26 February 1992, UNITA had confined 93 per cent of the troops it is supposed to assemble, while the percentage of government troops accounted for by UNAVEM II had dropped to 54 per cent of the already revised projected total.[59]

The fundamental concern was that only the conflict parties knew the true size of their respective force, allowing them to declare whatever baseline figures they wished.[60] During the negotiations both parties had inflated their troop numbers to improve their bargaining positions: simultaneously, it was suspected some troops remained undeclared as a strategic reserve (leading to 'hidden army' accusations).[61] The figure of 93% of UNITA forces is a product of UNITA forces counted and UNITA forces declared, a ratio predicated on the number of troops UNITA had agreed to assemble as opposed to the number it actually controlled. As assembly progressed both sides revised their figures down, creating another basis for concern that 'missing' troops were being held back. Also, a 'dropping off' in assembled troop numbers could not necessarily be attributed to the conflict parties' machinations, as individual soldiers who had lost patience in the repeatedly-delayed demobilisation process and poor living conditions 'self-demobilised', drifting away into the bush. (Many of the government troops that self-demobilised took their personal weapons with them resulting in increased criminal activity around certain camps.[62]) Whilst UNAVEM II could verify the counting of troops inside the AAs, without reliable baseline figures the painstaking counting of troops could never equate to verification of the Accords.

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[59] S/23671, ¶11.

[60] A similar point applies to weapons, on which there was effectively no baseline data at all. Former UNMOs have noted that the weapons surrendered by UNITA were of low quality and/or appeared not to have been used for some time, suggesting that the better weaponry was being held back. Griffiths, interview; Flynn, interview.

[61] Anstee, *OOTCW*, 47, 59; Monteiro, interview.

[62] Another reason for this 'dropping off' was that the centralised reports failed to identify when certain counts had simply not been conducted. LO Ops to CMO, "CMVF Meeting on 16 Apr 92," minutes, 17 April 1992, S-1035-0147-0007, UN Archives; HQ Southern Region to CMO, "Monthly Report for May 1992," memo, 11 June 1992, S-1035-0144-0002, UN Archives; Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission II," 400; João Porter and Imogen Parsons. *Sustaining the Peace in Angola: An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 21.

Although the concept of 'unassembled troops' is not specified in the Accords, stipulations such as the grant of 'police status' to certain UNITA personnel rendered it inevitable. As UNAVEM II's manning had been determined on the understanding that military verification would be undertaken at 50 AAs only (five verifiers to an AA) the unanticipated requirement to additionally verify personnel in situ placed a considerable strain upon the UNMOs. In June, HQ Northern Region reported that "Approximately, 11691 unassembled troops ie 90% of projected total of Region are located at Luanda. These troops are spread out in 43 different locations ... [As a result] The exercise of verification has been having major problems ... The present ad-hoc arrangements at best could be described as [a] daily fire-fighting exercise."[63] In addition to the physical difficulty of visiting so many locations (and the consequent impossibility of conducting every count on the same day of the week), the verification of authorised unassembled troops was stymied by further baseline issues. The CMO briefed the CMVF that "[I]n an attempt to relate all the unassembled troops to the established assembly areas, they have been included in the nearest AA, but the lack of enough information makes that task difficult and imprecise."[64] This, furthermore, made identifying unauthorised unassembled troops very difficult.[65] A further problem concerned the failure to define the AAs' territorial boundaries. Whilst the Accords specified that "The areas of assembly shall be surrounded by security zones having a maximum radius of 10 kilometres," the AAs were specified only by locality, leaving the AAs' extent (and consequently the extent of their security zones) open to interpretation.[66] On one occasion UNMOs were unable to verify the FALA's claim that the FAPLA had broken the ceasefire by moving an entire brigade out of an

[63] HQ Northern Region to HQ UNAVEM II, "Northern Region Monthly Report for June 1992," memo, 30 June 1992, S-1035-0144-0002, UN Archives.
[64] LO Ops to CMO, "CMVF Meeting on 30 Apr 92," minutes, 4 May 1992, S-1035-0147-0007, UN Archives.
[65] HQ South Eastern Region to HQ UNAVEM II, "Verification of Unassembled Troops Report - August 1992," memo, 1 September 1992, S-1035-0144-0001, UN Archives.
[66] Bicesse Accords, Document I, Annex I, Part C, ¶4; Bicesse Accords, Document I, Annex I, Appendix 2.

AA as that AA's boundary was undeterminable in practice.[67] Under such circumstances it is hard to disagree with a senior UNMO's depiction of the verification process as "a numbers game, it was clearly nonsensical but it was something that pleased the politicians and diplomats."[68] Both the mission's failure to interrogate the assumptions which lay behind the parties' baseline figures and practicable difficulties resultant of absences and ambiguities in the Accords substantially affected aspects of the consequent ceasefire verification reports.

Whilst the targets of the AA based military verifiers were static and territorially bounded, the UNAVEM II police monitors accompanied joint GoA / UNITA police teams to verify their 'neutrality' in the conduct of their duties. Whilst this should have granted the police monitors a limited active and investigatory capability, the national police were almost entirely dependent on UNAVEM II for transport and communications, which rendered their neutrality somewhat moot (as one UNMO observed, "it is easy to be neutral when doing nothing.")[69] However, the mission had also been charged to develop 'rapid reaction teams' to carry out investigations outside of the AAs, and the UNMOs were often involved in verifying the parties' joint investigations of alleged breaches of the military parts of the Accords. Two of these incidents demonstrate the conceptual problems relating to the verification of allegations. The first involves an allegation circulated in an Angolan News Summary that the FALA had kidnapped a tribal chief. By physical inspection a joint CMVF / UNAVEM II patrol was able to ascertain that the report emanated from little more than village hearsay: the chief was discovered to be "as free as the air."[70] Trivial in itself, this example demonstrates that an allegation phrased in the language of physical conditions (as opposed to, for example,

[67] HQ Northern Region to HQ UNAVEM II, "Northern Region Monthly Report for June 1992," memo, 30 June 1992, S-1035-0144-0002, UN Archives.
[68] Colonel Roger Mortlock, interview by author, Skype, 19 October 2017.
[69] Commander Central Region to COO, "Central Administration in Central Region," letter, 2 April 1992, S-1035-0144-0003, UN Archives; S/24145, ¶21.
[70] Northern Region HQ to COS, "UNITA Kidnaps Traditional Chief (Malange)," memo, 22 May 1992, S-1035-0144-0002, UN Archives.

intentions) may be practically falsified to a high degree of assurance. The second incident involves the GoA's allegations that UNITA had concealed up to 30,000 troops in the south eastern part of the country. Despite the enormity of this claim (as Goulding noted, "it would be very difficult to conceal the presence of tens of thousands of troops, even in the vastness of Angola"[71]) details were vague, the FAPLA suggesting that "the local populace can provide the information but are scared to do so."[72] These allegations were potentially so disruptive to the peace process that the CMVF mounted its own reconnaissance involving all the heads of delegations, representatives of UNAVEM II and the three observer delegations to the CCPM. As the GoA was unable to specify the 'hidden army's' precise locations this was planned as an aerial survey of parts of the South Eastern Region delineated by locations as far apart as Couto Canaveral and Jamba, thus constituting thousands of square miles of savannah. Between 28 May and 2 June three UN helicopters flew over the terrain, landing to investigate encampments sited from the air. At the end of this process around 300 undeclared UNITA soldiers and policeman had been detected (the great majority in a single logistic base), an outcome which simultaneously allowed the GoA to infer its claims had been supported and UNITA to suggest they had been disproved.[73] As far as UNAVEM II was concerned the exercise had achieved neither of these things. Conceptually, the existence of a 'hidden army' and consequent breach of the Accords could have been proven to a high degree of assurance had tens of thousands of undeclared UNITA troops been discovered. However, given the vastness of the terrain the failure to discover such troops was never likely to constitute sufficient evidence to disprove such a force's existence, and in fact the reconnaissance did little to assuage the belief in UNITA's 'hidden army' amongst Angolans and foreign

[71] Goulding to Anstee, "Meeting with Angolan Foreign Minister," code cable, 22 April 1992, Anstee-15-01, Weston Library.
[72] Anstee to Goulding, "Allegations of "Hidden" Army," code cable, 24 April 1992, Anstee-15-01, Weston Library.
[73] LO FAPLA to CMO, "Report on CMVF Investigation of the Alleged UNITA Secret Army," memo, 2 June 1992, S-1035-0147-0007, UN Archives; S/24145, ¶14(b).

observers.[74] Whilst possibly useful in demonstrating the CMVF could act cooperatively, in verification terms the activity could only have been meaningful had its objectives been limited to assessing UNITA's counter-claims that its troops were not concealed at specific locations.[75] Such a verification would have further been limited to the dates the inspections had taken place.

3.5 Verification Procedures: the Verification Narrative Path

The UNAVEM II laydown is at Figure 3.1. For coordination purposes the mission divided Angola into six regional commands, each comprising a Regional HQ and a number of outstations at or near AAs or critical points. This laydown informs a map of the mission's verification narrative path (Figure 3.2).[76] The first node is the monitor, here represented by a UNMO sited at an outstation. The second node is the Regional HQ, the first level at which fusion occurred. The third node is Mission HQ in Luanda, the highest level of the deployed elements. The fourth node comprises two elements: DPKO and EOSG, both within UN HQ in New York. The primary audiences for the verification narrative are the Security Council and the General Assembly. The unusual arrangements by which the verifiers monitored the CMVF's monitoring teams is also represented, a point of interest being that the UNAVEM II HQ node was in regular communication with both the CMVF *and* the CCPM. The verification narrative would have been consequent of this path and of the procedures conducted by the individuals at each of the nodes that constituted it.

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[74] "Meeting between SRSG and President of Partido Democratico Angolano (PDA) on 5 June 1992," note, 9 June 1992, S-1035-1048-0007, UN Archives; Anstee to Goulding, "Political Report," code cable, 6 August 1992, S-1036-0029-0001, UN Archives.
[75] Monteiro, interview.
[76] For a generic account of reporting between a UN mission and New York see Joel Gywn Winckler, "Managing the Complexities of Intervention: United Nations Peace Operations as Organisational Action," *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development* 18 (December 2011): 94-6.



Figure 3.2. UNAVEM II Verification Narrative Path.

A UNMO deployed to an AA had, essentially, two roles: to verify the periodic counts of troops, weapons and ammunition by the local CMVF monitoring group and to verify the monitoring group's investigation of incidents. Although nominally in groups of five, sickness, leave and other duties commonly reduced the number of UNMOs at an AA to two or three. Often hundreds of kilometres from their Regional HQs, the UNMOs had little situational awareness beyond their immediate area. A UNMO who spent six months at a UNITA AA recalled, "We had very little information from our Regional HQ or UNAVEM HQ ... the UNAVEM information was hopeless and we relied on our own contacts and [communications] to be situationally aware."[77] The UNMOs often lacked a common language; this, it was observed, "subscribes to a feeling of psychological insecurity which can lend itself to panic or incorrect action when a crisis does occur."[78] Without a common language the reports were generally drafted by a single officer (the one with the best written English) before radio transmission.[79] Language also isolated many of the UNMOs from the Angolans; an outstation would commonly have only one 'language officer' proficient in Portuguese.[80] The UNMOs' duties could be dangerous: one of their tasks was to supervise the

[77] Hitchings, e-mail; Captain Boris Legner, interview by author, Skype, 27 October 2017.
[78] Colonel Mortlock, "Report on the Security Situation of Central Region," 21 November 1992, private papers of Brigadier (Retired) Mortlock.
[79] Mortlock, interview.
[80] "Military Staff Deployment List of UNAVEM II as at 12 August 92," record, 12 August, S-1035-0146-0005, UN Archives.

counting of hundreds of tons of ammunition and other hazardous material. Kept under rudimentary conditions the ammunition deteriorated, rendering it volatile and unsafe to approach. Several stores exploded; one that blew up in the Menongue AA killed or injured 14 people and burnt down 65 houses.[81] On 3 September UNMOs filed the following inspection report concerning a FAPLA AA in the Northern Region (*this* store blew up three days later):

> Upon inspection of the main (biggest) store ... we could notice that ALL roof materials have disappeared. ... The store is over-crowded with ammunition of all kinds ... Counting of the store is simply impossible, or the counting will take weeks to complete. Counting can be dangerous since ammunition is just put into the store without any kind of system ... Counting of ammunition is more or less a waste of time for the moment.[82]

To share the burden of serving at the 'harder' positions UNMOs were rotated between different outstations and sometimes the Regional HQs and/or Mission HQ every few months. Despite this, their duties and working conditions undoubtedly constituted a stressful environment, a weak indicator of both confirmation bias and premature cognitive closure.

Charged with verifying the CMVF monitoring groups' activities at the AAs, the UNMOs developed a first-hand understanding of the inadequacy of the verification procedures. Sometimes one or both of a CMVF's constituent factions would be absent, in which case the UNMOs would undertake the counts and investigate incidents themselves.[83] The factions within the CMVF monitoring groups often refused to cooperate with each other: one UNMO recalls an ammunition count where the two parties' representatives "were counting individually, so FALA was counting in their way and FAPLA was counting in their way and then when they came to the end they said they had different figures ... it was quite time

[81] Lubango HQ to COS, "Explosion at Menongue," message form, 15 September 1992, S-1036-0030-0005, UN Archives; Xangongo Outstation, "Military Briefing for the SRSG, Miss Margaret Anstee," note, 22 August 1992, S-1036-0034-0001, UN Archives.
[82] HQ Northern Region to COS, "Follow-up: Incident at FUNDA," memo, 7 September 1992, S-1035-0144-0001, UN Archives.
[83] Mortlock, interview; Captain Nick Nelson, e-mail message to author, 20 October 2017; Major Anthony Kippax, e-mail message to author, 31 October 2017.

consuming."[84] The troop counts presented different problems. As noted, the boundaries of the AAs were ill-defined with individuals wandering in and out at will. Reasons for temporary absenteeism (as opposed to permanent self-demobilisation) included hunting for food, sickness, unauthorised visits to families and boredom.[85] Demobilisation delays resulted in low morale which led to ill-discipline, making it hard to organise the counting parades. The following account concerns a FAPLA AA in the Southern Region:

> The troop and weapons counting take place every Wednesday to the AA and BCA (Supply Unit) at 08.00 hours. But during all this month we never began at 08.00 hours and we have always more than [a] thousand absent without any official reason. The main problem here is the lack of discipline and leadership. Nobody is interested by the CMVF mission.[86]

When demobilisation did occur its procedures further complicated the counting, the indigenous AA commanders often unwilling or incapable of organising the two simultaneously.[87]

A Regional HQ was nominally staffed by ten UNMOs, including a commander, operations officer and signals officer. Even with routine absences this was normally sufficient to allow the dispatch of a rapid reaction team to an incident rather than relying on the outstations (proximity and transport availability being the deciding factors). Despite the presence of a staff, as with the outstations the drafting of reports for the higher HQs was generally undertaken by a single individual (the operations officer) who would have been selected for

[84] Legner, interview.
[85] Griffiths, interview; Menongue Team, "Visit by Miss Margaret Anstee," note, 12 August 1992, S-1036-0035-0001, UN Archives.
[86] Namibe Team, "Briefing for SRSG to Visit in Namibe," note, 10 April 1992, S-1036-0035-0002, UN Archives. This is not an extreme example: at the UNITA AA in Muconda "The troop count each week ... was around 600-700 with 2000 away on "gathering duties"," whilst at the UNITA AA in Quirima "around 50 troops (out of a brigade)" would be counted each week. Captain Chris Graham, e-mail message to author, 19 October 2017.
[87] Northern Region HQ to COO, "Special Report on Physical Counting," memo, 9 April 1992, S-1035-0144-0002, UN Archives.

his general competence married with the ability to write in English. Reports of more than routine importance were commonly reviewed by the commander before fax transmission.[88] Whilst the timing of reports was directed by Mission HQ the manner of their preparation and their format varied between the regions as, despite requests, standard operating procedures (SOPs) were not issued until September 1992.[89] As with the outstations, feedback from higher HQs was poor: "Information passage - improvement remains urgent"[90] (Central Region); "Repeated messages to Luanda have evoked a very limited and delayed response"[91] (Southern Region); "We had very little to zero feedback on what was going on in the rest of the country"[92] (South Eastern Region). Generically, such a setup demonstrates many of the weak indicators of groupthink (and no counter-indicators): a group leader (the commander) unconstrained by organisational tradition; a parent organisation (Mission HQ) failing to provide a formalised decision-making process; a working environment which prioritised the English speakers over others. Furthermore, the constant rotation of personnel would have created many of the weak indicators of newgroup, the commander's small team so often changing that one of them recalled that he "had to retrain [the] staff every three months."[93]

Within UNAVEM II HQ in Luanda the receipt of reports from the Regional HQs and the preparation of reports for transmission to DPKO was undertaken by the Operations Branch. Whilst the Operations Branch had a nominal staff of 14, a single officer ('Operations Officer 1') was responsible for compiling the mission's daily situation reports (SITREP) and monthly

[88] Ross, interview; Mortlock, interview.
[89] "Minutes of the CMO's Bi-Monthly Conference held at HQ UNAVEM II on 16 Sep 92," minutes, 2 October 1992, S-1035-0146-0006, UN Archives.
[90] Commander Central Region to HQ UNAVEM II, "Central Region Monthly Report for April 1992," memo, 6 May 1992, S-1035-0144-0002, UN Archives.
[91] HQ Southern Region to HQ UNAVEM II, "Monthly Report for June 1992," memo, 4 July 1992, S-1035-0144-0002, UN Archives.
[92] Ross, interview.
[93] Mortlock, interview.

reports.[94] The word 'compilation' is key here: comparisons of randomly selected mission reports with the regional reports that informed them show that the reports transmitted to New York were essentially syntheses of whatever the regional commanders transmitted without additional analysis or commentary. Importantly, whilst these syntheses might report upon the activities of the local CMVFs (if such information had been included in the regional reports) the process precluded the incorporation of information from the national CMVF, even though another officer in the Operations Branch (Liaison Officer (Operations)) was the secretary of that body. It should also be noted that whilst the daily SITREPs and monthly reports were transmitted in the name of the CMO neither he nor other senior mission staff saw them until *after* they had been dispatched.[95] A UNMO who worked closely with the Operations Branch described the process as "offering a high degree of 'sanitation' as the comprehensive and informative material that was generated from the regions was diluted into a consolidated operations report."[96] This system was regularly bypassed by the SRSG who dispatched code cables on any matter of note directly to Goulding or the Secretary-General. Whilst the comparative isolation in which Operations Officer 1 performed his duties would have insulated him from groupthink, the systematic way in which he carried out this particular task meant that the individual would neither have been motivated nor able to adjust from the prevailing narrative on receipt of 'credible, dissenting evidence'. In systematising the eradication of ambiguity, perversely, the report compilation procedure in the UNAVEM II HQ node had the systemic potential to introduce a path-dependency which could have affected the verification narrative to a non-trivial extent.

[94] Additional 'special reports' were prepared whenever a notable incident occurred. UNAVEM II Standard Operating Procedures, September 1992, §3, p.3, S-1035-0156-0007, UN Archives; COS to CMO, "List of Reports and Returns sent to New York," memo, 27 February 1992, S-1035-0092-0006, UN Archives.
[95] This system was changed in January 1993 when a new COS insisted on reviewing the reports before transmission. Ross, interview.
[96] Hitchings, e-mail.

The final node in the verification narrative path was located in UN HQ in New York. Whilst DPKO and EOSG were structurally and hierarchically discrete, the method by which the two combined to create the final verification narrative makes it appropriate to model them as a single node. Reports received from Luanda were circulated simultaneously to the mission's desk officer in DPKO and to key individuals in EOSG, including the Secretary-General, his *chef de cabinet* and his Senior Political Advisors (SPA). Within DPKO the desk officer would initially edit the report, "sometimes quite extensively, consulting various stakeholders within the UN Secretariat" (the desk officer described the process as "chiselling" i.e. shaping and/or cutting).[97] It was these edited reports that Goulding received, giving the peculiar result that EOSG was reading 'raw' field reports which the head of its subordinate node was not. (Code cables from Anstee to Goulding *did* go directly to Goulding.) The Secretary-General developed his reports in meetings attended by the heads of DPKO and DPA, various SPAs, legal counsel and others. In these Goulding would normally take the lead and (this because the Secretary-General recognised him to be an excellent drafter) he would also draft the report in the hours subsequent to the meeting. This draft would be transmitted to Luanda for the SRSG's comments and corrections, which were normally turned around overnight (Luanda being several hours ahead of New York). Only once this consultation had been completed would the draft be approved by the Secretary-General.[98]

It is widely acknowledged that the rapid increase in responsibilities and other factors discussed in Section 3.3.2 made DPKO a stressful environment in which to work. Two recurrent complaints of mission personnel were that New York's decision-making was too slow and that DPKO was not manned on a 24-hour basis. A UNMO posted from the mission to New York noted "a surprisingly rudimentary operations centre ... no wonder we weren't

[97] Dmitry Titov, interview by author, Skype, 14 December 2017.
[98] de Soto, interview; Titov, interview; Ahmad Fawzi, interview by author, Skype, 30 May 2018.

getting the decisions we needed in Luanda."[99] Meanwhile the desk officer was attempting to provide 24-hour manning "to the extent your physique would allow ... [the working environment was] high pressure, very intense, high volume of information."[100] However, whilst stress is a weak indicator of cognitive verification pathologies none of the strong indicators were obviously present. Neither were strong groupthink indicators: on the contrary, the Secretary-General "liked a good argument," was both inclusive and welcomed intelligent dissenters, and would deliberately introduce a contrary opinion if he felt a groupthink product was being tacitly shaped.[101] Instead, this arrangement suggests a procedural verification pathology relating to the location of the 'penholder', the individual who produces the first draft of the Secretary-General's reports. It was (and remains) normal practice on UN missions for penholders to be the SRSG or a senior member of the SRSG's staff in the deployed HQ. That the UNAVEM II penholder was the Head of DPKO possesses significant implications.[102] As noted, the compilation and transmission of military verification information by Operations Officer 1 and political commentary by the SRSG were independent processes such that these two narratives only truly combined in New York. This disconnect (which was likely consequent of the poor working relationship between the CMO and the SRSG) meant that Goulding - who, as noted, was working with pre-edited reports - was responsible for both fusing the military and political reports and interpreting the result (i.e. Goulding was creating the final version of the report which he then analysed.) Evidently, such a procedure would be vulnerable to the introduction of subjectivities; furthermore, the need to attend to DPKO's many other missions and commitments make it unlikely that Goulding could have given this task the consistently rigorous consideration which objective verification requires. Whilst these factors would have increased the importance of the SRSG

[99] Ross, interview.
[100] Titov, interview.
[101] de Soto, interview.
[102] Possible reasons for this anomaly include Goulding's historical association with Angola (ftn 43) and Goulding's recognition that Anstee's staff was inadequate for the mission's purposes.

commenting on the drafts, given the requisite rapid turnaround and the SRSG's extensive and oft changing commitments this is unlikely to have constituted a satisfactory procedural check. More worryingly, such confusion of the verification narrative path introduces the possibility that the IO's strategic imperatives could subvert the information upon which such activity should exclusively be based. This latter concern is the subject of the next Section.

3.6 The UN's Strategic Purposes

The overarching aim of the Bicesse Accords was to establish peace in Angola. The UN established UNAVEM II in the belief that in providing security guarantees the mission would support this strategic objective. Accordingly, if the mandated operation of UNAVEM II came to unbalance the process by publicly reporting that one of the parties was violating the peace agreement the Secretary-General may have felt justified in acting to mitigate these effects. An academic who worked in UN HQ in 1993 commented: "DPKO and the Secretary General's office usually had an incentive to put the best face on things because they didn't want to cause any stir. They also worried about jeopardising their relations with the parties being verified. So, these things [the Secretary-General's reports] got sanitised and spun for the target audience."[103] The Head of Portugal's Observer Group to the CCPM suggested this imperative made EOSG's priority in Angola "to report things in a way that the trust and the confidence in the electoral process would not be jeopardised ... the Secretary-General was very careful in reporting because the main thing would be to make the elections [a success]."[104] The desk officer in DPKO agreed: "There was an attempt to salvage the peace process and that required [one] to be a little bit more diplomatic."[105] This Section demonstrates that UN HQ acted on more than one occasion to moderate the tone and content

[103] Professor Michael Barnett, e-mail message to author, 7 November 2017.
[104] Monterio, interview.
[105] Titov, interview.

of the Secretary-General's updates to give the impression that there was a greater equivalence between the conflict parties' adherence to the Bicesse Accords than the situation ascertained and reported by UNAVEM II truly represented. This was done, I argue, so as not to dissuade either of the parties from participating in the national elections and to encourage them to be prepared to accept the election's results.

3.6.1. FALA Deployment out of Quilengues AA, 2-6 April 1992

On 2 April a FALA soldier was shot dead by a GoA policeman during a clash between MPLA and UNITA supporters in the town of Chongoroi. Only a few kilometres above the southern boundary of the mission's Central Region, Chongoroi was approximately 70 kilometres from the FALA AA at Quilengues (within the Southern Region.) At that time the Central Region was composed of a HQ (Huambo), nine FALA AAs, and eight FAPLA AAs including one at Lobito. By coincidence, the Lobito CMVF monitoring group was in Chongoroi on 2 April. They arrested the policeman and had him transported to the city of Beguile. On 6 April Central Region signalled Luanda:

> [FALA has sent] 30-50 soldiers in a vehicle from Quilengues ... This body arrived at Chongoroi at approx 1000 hrs equipped with personal weapons including battalion support weapons. They attacked all government buildings, HQ of Ministry of Womens Affairs, Governor's HQ, Governor's Residence, Police HQ ... They also arrested 3 police officers and two constables and took them away to Quilengues. After that they attacked Chongoroi police armoury and took away all police weapons.[106]

The next day the five policemen were released from the Quilengues AA and the captured weapons surrendered. The seriousness of the incident invoked a hurried assembly of a CMVF Commission headed by senior GoA and UNITA officers with representatives of the three observer states and UNAVEM II. On 7 April this Commission visited Chongoroi where it interviewed members of the local government and the Lobito CMVF monitoring group. On 8

[106] Central Region to COS, message, 1330 6 April 1992, S-1035-0144-0002, UN Archives.

April it interrogated the AA commander (a Lieutenant Colonel Katu) who had led his soldiers into Chongoroi.[107] On 9 April the Commission issued a joint report which concluded that a ceasefire violation had occurred: "Lt. Col. KATU ... violated the Peace Accords by moving the troops from the Quilengues Assembly Area to Chongoroi."[108] A week later the SRSG reported to New York that "The CCPM agreed to issue a press statement making clear that the UNITA commander violated the ceasefire."[109]

The unusual concurrence of the conflict parties at military (CMVF) and political (CCPM) levels constitutes a strong datum from which to analyse the development of the UNAVEM II verification narrative. The incident is one of two detailed in the Secretary-General's second report to the Security Council as examples of "a number of serious incidents which have threatened the cease-fire and the peace process."[110] (The other concerned the 'hidden army' discussed in Section 3.4.) This begs the question of how the parties' agreed conclusions that a ceasefire violation *had occurred* was transformed into an incident that *threatened* the ceasefire, a transformation without which the following 'fundamental positive fact' adduced by the Secretary-General could not exist: "The fundamental positive fact in Angola's fragile political and security environment is that the cease-fire ... has held for more than one year with no major violations ... this is proof of great restraint by the Government and UNITA leaders and troops."[111] In that it contradicts conclusions reached at the apexes of the military

[107] Central Region to COO, "Investigation of Chongoroi Incident," message, 1900 8 April 1992, S-1035-0144-0002, UN Archives.
[108] Major-General Ciel da C. Cristovao 'Gato' and General Augusto D. L. Liahuka 'Wiyo', "CMVF Report on Chongoroi Incident," note, 9 April 1992, S-1035-0147-0007, UN Archives. This conclusion could have been based upon any of the following prohibitions in the Bicesse Accords: an "armed land attack"; an "offensive movement of troops or armed groups"; a “movement of military forces ... without prior agreement between the parties"; "acts of violence against the civilian population"; "Any other actions that may impede the normal evolution of the cease-fire process." Bicesse Accords, Document I, §II, ¶¶6(a), 6(b), 6(c), 6(f), 6(i).
[109] Anstee to Goulding, "Chongoroi incident," code cable, 17 April 1992, S-1035-0133-0002, UN Archives.
[110] S/24145, ¶14.
[111] Ibid., ¶9.

and political structures which the mission was charged with verifying this transformation is significant.

The similarities between the Central Region's and the Commission's conclusions focuses attention upon nodes subsequent in the verification narrative path. An initial hypothesis then emerges from the dysfunctional report writing procedures in UNAVEM II HQ. The SRSG had signalled the CCPM's conclusions to DPKO on 17 April. There is no indication that this code cable was copied to the CMO (certainly not to Operations Officer 1), and these conclusions were not mentioned at the SRSG's weekly meetings with her military and civilian heads.[112] The CMO's monthly report for April stated that in neither the Central Region nor the Southern Region had any ceasefire violation been reported.[113] In the context of the events on Chongoroi this seems remarkable until one considers the Central Region's monthly report for that period in a section entitled 'Violations of the Peace Accord': "Central Region remains relatively quiet, with the exception of the incident at Chongoroi, *which has been reported separately*."[114] Without reviewing the total of 180 daily SITREPs the Regional HQs would have transmitted in April (reports that would have alerted him to 'credible, dissenting evidence'), Operations Officer 1's sanitising syntheses of the Regional HQs' monthly reports *erased* the identification of the Chongoroi incident as a violation of the ceasefire from the verification narrative path.[115] However, Goulding was also in possession of Anstee's political code cable which clearly identified the parties' joint recognition of a ceasefire violation. This supports a second hypothesis that, given the imperative to keep the peace process on track, the

[112] "SRSG's Meeting held at UNAVEM II HQ on 13 April 1992, 08.00 A.M.," minutes, 17 April 1992, S-1036-0033-0006, UN Archives; "SRSG's Meeting held at UNAVEM II HQ on 21 April 1992, 08.00 A.M," minutes, 21 April 1992, S-1036-0033-0006, UN Archives.
[113] Unimna to Goulding, "Monthly Report April 92," fax, 26 May 1992, S-1035-0052-0001, UN Archives.
[114] Commander Central Region to UNAVEM II HQ, "Central Region Monthly Report for April 1992," memo, 6 May 1992, S-1035-0144-0002, UN Archives; italics mine.
[115] The description of the incident which features in the Secretary-General's report appears to have been drawn from an unarchived daily SITREP as it bears marked similarities to the report made by Central Region HQ on 6 April.

conflicting nature of these two reports represented sufficient ambiguity to justify a downplaying of the seriousness of the incident in accordance with EOSG's strategic pacific imperative. Recalling that drafts of such reports were communicated to Anstee for comment, it should be noted that there is no indication within her subsequent publications (including her autobiography, published two years *after* Goulding's) or what is available of her private communications that she was party to such a strategic decision or that she commented on this change but was ignored. Given Anstee's difficult working environment and the requirement to turn the draft around overnight, amongst the possible explanations for this are that she failed to spot the relatively subtle transformation in the limited time available to her or that she elected to 'let it go' ten weeks after the fact. Without further evidence the true reason will remain unclear. What may be said is that a narrative of the ceasefire holding and the parties exercising 'great restraint' could not have been achieved objectively on the basis of the material available to UN HQ. It appears likely that the conducting IO's broader imperatives were introduced into the narrative within and by DPKO / EOSG.

3.6.2. Incidents in the Northern, North Eastern and Central Regions, July-August 1992

Whilst the Secretary-General's report of 9 September argued "there has been no major violation of the cease-fire" since his previous report it further noted that:

> [T]he political and security situation throughout the country has deteriorated significantly. There are reports of intimidation and provocation by both Government and UNITA supporters. Violent incidents, accompanied by killings, have erupted since my last report, notably in Malange in early July and early August, as well as in Huambo, Saurimo and the provinces of Benguela and Bié.[116]

The following paragraphs consider both the explicit narrative that there had been no major violation of the ceasefire and the implicit narrative that the 'deteriorating' security situation

[116] S/24556, ¶4, ¶6.

was consequent of the actions of both parties such as to represent an equivalency of fault. To do this it analyses the verification of each of the 'notable violent incidents' alluded to by the Secretary-General. In that the extract turns out to reference seven separate incidents the discussion is necessarily lengthy but it provides a significant result.

In July 1992 the Northern Region's laydown comprised a HQ (Luanda), seven FAPLA AAs, six FALA AAs and five critical points. Situated 200 km to the east of Luanda, the provincial capital Malange constituted a MPLA stronghold surrounded by UNITA dominated countryside.[117] On 12 July the UNMOs at a FAPLA AA near Malange reported "A political meeting ... was disrupted by unknown persons who killed 1 x FALA Capt[ain]. It was further reported that 4 x other persons were also killed ... [6 hours later] Intermittent shooting [was] carrying on ... Unconfirmed reports say soldiers with weapons [are] moving on [the] town."[118] The next day the heads of delegations to the CCPM and the CMVF, accompanied by the SRSG and the CMO, conducted an inspection visit to Malange. On 14 July Anstee informed New York that "The incident was sparked off by an attack on a UNITA rally ... allegedly by a well-known bandit group "Fubu"." She also noted there had been "information going around that 300 (later 104) armed UNITA troops were on their way to Malange from the Mussende Assembly Area."[119] This FALA troop movement (which constituted a clear and serious breach of the Accords[120]) was corroborated by the Central Region commander in whose area

[117] Anstee, *OOTCW*, 80.
[118] Malange to Northern Region Operations, "Incident Report 121610Z Jul 92 (NR/12/08)," message, 12 July 1992, S-1035-0144-0002, UN Archives.
[119] UNITA later claimed 'Fubu' was a gang associated with the GoA; additionally, a paper by Alex Vines in 1993 identifies 'FUBO' as a government special forces unit which operated in Malange. However, this would not have been available to the Secretary-General in 1992. Anstee to Goulding, "Serious Incidents at Malange and Saurimo," code cable, 14 July 1992, S-1035-0133-0001, UN Archives; "Major Incidents Affecting the Cease Fire Since 24 Jun 92," table, Annex F to unidentified UNAVEM II document, undated, S-1035-0146-0005, UN Archives; Alex Vines, "One Hand Tied: Angola and the UN," *Catholic Institute for International Relations*, briefing paper (June 1993): 5.
[120] Both as an "offensive movement of troops," and as a "movement of military forces ... without prior agreement between the parties." Bicesse Accords, Document I, §II, ¶6(b-c).

the Mussende AA was situated.[121] A second period of violence erupted in Malange on 7 August when a firefight near the Governor's Place resulted in five deaths. The UNMOs rapidly identified this to have taken place between "a civilian lawless gang and its civilian opponents"[122]; nevertheless, at a CCPM meeting on 15 August UNITA demanded "immediate action on [this] new incident."[123] The next day shooting and explosions were heard in the town: the situation was still tense on 26 August.[124] However, the verifiers never attributed this or the July incident to either party.

In July 1992 the North Eastern Region's laydown comprised a HQ (Saurimo), three FAPLA AAs and four FALA AAs. On 12 July it was reported that UNITA had attempted to attack a senior MPLA representative at a political rally in Saurimo.[125] The next day representatives of the CCPM and the CMVF accompanied by the Deputy CMO conducted an inspection. Two or four (sources vary) members of UNITA had been arrested by the local police following which FALA troops had stormed a police station and released them.[126] It was subsequently determined that the allegations against the men were unfounded. Also in Saurimo, on 4 August it was reported that a FALA soldier had been shot when the driver of his vehicle "refused to stop when ordered to do so by persons FALA suspected to be government police.

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[121] Commander Central Region, "Central Region Monthly Report for July 1992," 6 August 1992, private papers of Brigadier Mortlock.
[122] Unimna to Goulding, "Daily Situation Report No 269," fax, 10 August 1992, S-1035-0152-0002, UN Archives.
[123] Anstee to Goulding, "CCPM Heads of Delegation Meeting on the Police," code cable, 15 August 1992, Anstee-15-03, Weston Library.
[124] Unimna to Goulding, "Daily Situation Report No 274," fax, 17 August 1992, S-1035-0152-0002, UN Archives; Unimna to Goulding, "Daily Situation Report No 282," fax, 27 August 1992, S-1035-0152-0002, UN Archives.
[125] Anstee to Goulding, "Serious Incidents at Malange and Saurimo," code cable, 14 July 1992, S-1035-0133-0001, UN Archives.
[126] For the various grounds on which this act likely breached the Accords see Bicesse Accords, Document I, §II, ¶¶6(a), 6(b), 6(f), 6(i). Anstee to Goulding, "Political Report," code cable, 15 July 1992, S-1036-0029-0001, UN Archives; Unimna to Goulding, "Monthly Summary of Events for the Month of July 92," fax, 5 August 1992, S-1035-0052-0001, UN Archives.

The police have denied responsibility and attributed the shooting to bandits."[127] The verifiers neither investigated this incident nor attributed it to either party.

All the other incidents occurred in the Central Region. On 14 August approximately 25 UNITA supporters attacked the police station at Ganda (Benguela province) in response, according to UNITA representatives, to "the closure of a road and as protest at the lack of neutrality of police."[128] Two policemen and a bystander were injured. On 29 August a serious incident occurred in Bié province:

> [At 1100] Following a MPLA political rally, a car was stopped and subsequently fired upon by a FALA soldier in the vicinity of a UNITA building. Three people were injured comprising a FAPLA [Lieutenant Colonel] and 2 women who were in the car. In retaliation, FAPLA troops from the nearby AA [Kuito] moved to the town, and tanks approached to within 5 Km. Exchanges of fire between both parties continued until 1900.[129]

With the Ganda incident, the Kuito incident (to which the FAPLA's response constituted a breach of the Accords, a fact seemingly unrecognised by the mission) alerted the UNMOs to the potential for unrest amongst UNITA supporters as the election date approached. In view of the limited feedback from UNAVEM II HQ this constituted the narrative context within which the Regional HQ responded to a reported fatal shooting in Longonjo on 30 August. The initial investigation into this incident was conducted by the local CMVF accompanied by a UNMO from the Regional HQ and a UN police monitor. The previous day the chief of the local MPLA election campaign had arranged a picnic for young MPLA members. The

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[127] Unimna to Goulding, "Daily Situation Report No 266," fax, 5 August 1992, S-1035-0152-0002, UN Archives.
[128] Unimna to Goulding, "Daily Situation Report No 274," fax, 17 August 1992, S-1035-0152-0002, UN Archives.
[129] In 1992 this city was known as Kuito by the Government and Bié by UNITA. Commander Central Region to HQ UNAVEM II, "Central Region Monthly Report for August 1992," memo, 5 September 1992, S-1035-0143-0006, UN Archives.

verifiers' initial report firstly describes MPLA supporters taunting UNITA political personnel (a black rooster was a UNITA symbol):

> On the way to the "picnic" area west of Longonjo many halts of several MPLA cars near the UNITA Committee house on Longonjo: shooting on the wall (picture of Dr Savimbi), showing of [a] dead cock, throwing of stones in the direction of UNITA members ... In the evening around 1600 hrs the UNITA members prepared to give the reply when the MPLA cars will be back ... Three soldiers of FALA were waiting with automatic rifles behind a parapet close to the UNITA house. They opened fire in the direction of the Land Rover and the MAC truck ... In the Land Rover 5 wounded, 1 dead, MAC truck 3 wounded, one man of Longonjo [a bystander] wounded.[130]

The investigation continued into the following day. The verifiers counted bullet holes in the Land Rover. Statements were taken from survivors in a hospital in Huambo. An injured MPLA youth leader claimed that "The UNITA member who was talking with the driver Paulo told them not to run away because there is an ambush along the road ... They continued firing [at] the two vehicles until they cleared off the ambush area."[131] A GoA policeman confirmed that "One UNITA member who was talking with Paulo the driver ... declared that the cars could not proceed because the passengers were armed ... When the cars began to move the UNITA members started to fire ... it was a planned trap for our Land Rover because all other cars were allowed to pass."[132] A third survivor's statement corroborated these accounts. None of this evidence conflicted with the verifiers' initial report and they did not revise it. The verifiers also met with local UNITA representatives to record their side of the story. Noting the prior narrative of UNITA attacks on MPLA supporters and the verifiers' unhurried and comprehensive investigation, their reporting appears as objective as practical circumstances allowed. However, the GoA (MPLA) and UNITA factions within the local CMVF were unable to agree a common conclusion and submitted separate reports to the

[130] Captain Mendy and Sergeant Ronaldo, "Investigation of Incident at Longonjo," memo, 31 August 1992, S-1035-0144-0001, UN Archives.
[131] Captain Mendy, "Statements by the Wounded MPLA members in Huambo," memo, 2 September 1992, S-1035-0144-0001, UN Archives.
[132] Ibid.

CMVF in Luanda.[133] The Regional HQ transmitted a narrative unchanged from that received from its outstation.[134] UNAVEM II HQ, too, reported a generally unrevised version, adding only that the events were "alleged" (indicating that the factions within the local CMVF could not agree a common report).[135] Despite the factional disagreement, on 4 September UNAVEM II and the Observers to the CCPM issued a joint communique which drew parallels with the incident in Bié province and unequivocally attributed fault. "In relation to the events occurred during the incidents in Bie (Kuito) and Huambo (Longonjo), the Observers to CCPM and UNAVEM II consider that ... In both cases armed UNITA elements had taken positions outside of their facilities [and] In both cases UNITA elements fired shots at MPLA vehicles."[136] The formulation of this communique seems to infer that attributions could be discerned through some pattern represented by these two incidents (incidents which, whilst occurring on consecutive days, took place 220 kilometres apart). However, as the two UNITA attributions were arrived at independently on the basis of the evidence placed before them their conclusions may be understood to be objective within the bounds of practicable circumstances. Despite this, the factions within the central CMVF were unable to agree a common narrative account of the incident.[137] Each submitted their own report to the CCPM, which had not reached a position before the post-election violence rendered the exercise moot.

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[133] Huambo [Central Region] to COS [UNAVEM II HQ], "Investigation Longonjo Incident," 3 September 1992, S-1035-0144-0001, UN Archives.
[134] Commander Central Region to HQ UNAVEM II, "Central Region Monthly Report for August 1992," memo, 5 September 1992, S-1035-0143-0006, UN Archives.
[135] Unimna to Goulding, "Daily Situation Report No 286," fax, 1 September 1992, S-1035-0152-0001, UN Archives.
[136] Unimna to Goulding, "Observers to CCPM and UNAVEM's Communique on Bie (Kuito) and Huambo (Longonjo) Incidents," cryptofax, 4 September 1992, Anstee-16-01, Weston Library.
[137] DCMO to SRSG, "Notes on CMVF Meeting - 07 Sep 92," memo, 7 September 1992, S-1036-0031-0003, UN Archives.

Location	Incident, Date	UNAVEM II attribution	Ceasefire Violation?
Malange	Attack on UNITA political meeting, 12 July	bandits (?)	N/A
Malange	Firefight near Governor's Palace, 7 August	civilian lawless gang	N/A
Huambo	Ambush of MPLA convoy, 30 August	UNITA	yes
Saurimo	Attempted attack at GoA political rally, 12 July	unattributed	N/A
Saurimo	Shooting of UNITA soldier, 4 August	unattributed	N/A
Benguela	Attack on police station, 14 August	UNITA	arguable
Bié	Shooting of GoA soldier and two civilians, 29 August	UNITA	yes

Figure 3.3. Summary of incidents referenced in the Secretary-General's report of 9 September 1992, ¶6.

Figure 3.3 shows the extent to which the Secretary-General's report is at odds with the reports made to him by his own CVM. Rather than 'no major violation of the cease-fire' there had been two. Rather than 'fault on both sides' the verified (as opposed to alleged) fault in every attributed case was UNITA's. With respect to the two major ceasefire violations Anstee had written to Goulding that "[we] have reported to you ... on the detailed, even-handed judgements made by the three observer countries and UNAVEM concerning responsibility for these incidents."[138] To the extent that it can be demonstrated, the mission's verification reports constitute objective representations of and deductions from the evidence the mission was able to gather. Accordingly, the site of the transformation of the ceasefire verification narrative must have lain within New York, and a key piece of evidence is contained in Goulding's autobiography: "Three weeks before the elections the Secretary-General issued another report [the report in question]. This time he expressed 'cautious optimism'. Rereading the report nine years later, I am surprised that we advised him to do so; *presumably we calculated that a pessimistic report would increase the risk of disaster*."[139] Whilst the UN's reporting ambiguities in the Quilengues incident (Section 3.6.1) might have justified a downplaying of its seriousness, the only ambiguities in the verification of this series of incidents concern unsubstantiated accusations raised by UNITA and disagreements between

[138] Anstee to Goulding, "Political Report," code cable, 9 September 1992, S-1036-0025-0002, UN Archives.
[139] Goulding, *Peacemonger*, 187; italics mine.

the factions in the local and national CMVFs (and thus the CCPM). Given Goulding's comments, the closeness of the report's release to the national elections, and the general absence of indicators of any other verification pathology, it seems likely that Goulding and the Secretary-General here moderated the verification narrative to better support the UN's strategic purposes. It is hard to summon an alternative hypothesis which satisfactorily accounts for the empirical evidence.

3.7 Attempted Manipulation by a State Actor

The cluster of conflicts in Angola between 1974 and 1991 are sometimes summarised as a proxy war in which the MPLA and UNITA acted as clients of the USSR and US respectively. Although reductive and partial, this understanding was widespread within the Reagan administration (1980-88) which pursued a 'Reagan doctrine' of destabilising those Third World governments that were supported by the Soviet Union. That the apparently Marxist MPLA was supported by (at its peak) 50,000 Cuban troops further elevated support for UNITA to something akin to a Republican article of faith.[140] What is less obvious is why the US continued to support UNITA politically (if no longer with war-making equipments) from the end of the Cold War and the signing of the Bicesse Accords up to and even after the national elections. Of the number of explanations advanced (each of which likely played a part) possibly the most significant is a legacy commitment to a long-term ally. Professor Ricardo Soares de Oliveira describes "[A] path-dependency ... the enmity that existed towards the MPLA was deep, the proximity that existed especially in the military industrial complex and the CIA and in the MOD with UNITA was very close, so it took a long time for the ship of state in the US to change."[141] Very probably another influential factor was the highly

[140] Elaine Windrich, *The Cold War Guerrilla: Jonas Savimbi, the US Media, and the Angolan War* (New York; London: Greenwood Press, 1992), 45; Karl Maier, *Angola: Promises and Lies* (London: William Waterman, 2007), 47; Birmingham, *Short History*, 103-5; Crocker, *High Noon,* 52.
[141] Professor Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, interview by author, Skype, 2 July 2018.

effective Washington UNITA lobby, which was assisted by a public relations company on which UNITA expended $600,000 a year. According to James Ciment, "Virtually every analyst agrees that UNITA's public relations efforts in Washington were superb ... Savimbi himself was adept at gauging the mood in Washington and customizing his rhetoric to exploit it."[142] Savimbi's depiction of himself as a democratic leader who truly represented Angolans was seldom challenged by the MPLA, whose occasional forays into international public relations were lacklustre and ineffective by comparison.[143] A further likely reason for the US's support is that it firmly believed Savimbi / UNITA would win the national elections and form the next GoA. With many potential economic benefits at stake, and with several other Cold War allies fallen, the US understood that at least in Angola it had backed the right horse.[144] As UNITA's political 'sponsor' the US was inevitably interested in the UNAVEM II ceasefire verification narrative. This Section argues that in August 1992 the US attempted to promulgate a discursive environment advantageous to UNITA but that this ultimately failed to influence the UNAVEM II ceasefire verification reports.

The Emergency Police (also 'anti-riot police' or 'ninjas') was a paramilitary unit set up by the GoA purportedly as a defensive guard force. In August 1992 Savimbi and other senior UNITA personnel in Angola and New York made a series of allegations about the Emergency Police: it was "a 'parallel army' to crush UNITA and their supporters"[145]; it comprised 27,786 demobilised FAPLA soldiers[146]; it was being trained at eight schools across the country[147];

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[142] James Ciment, *Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa* (New York: Facts on File, 1997), 166.
[143] William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique* (London: Zed Books, 1994), 153.
[144] Contrarily, Ambassador Cohen notes that Chevron operated comfortably under the MPLA regime prior to the elections and that the US did not believe a UNITA victory would improve US oil interests in Angola. Ambassador Herman J. Cohen, e-mail message to author, 4 July 2018; de Oliveira, interview.
[145] LO FALA to CMO, "SecGen's Report to Security Council," memo, 14 August 1992, S-1035-0146-0005, UN Archives.
[146] Anstee to Goulding, "CCPM Heads of Delegation Meeting on the Police," code cable, 15 August 1992, Anstee-15-03, Weston Library.
[147] Ibid.

970 anti-riot squads had been detected in Huambo City in 48 hours.[148] These claims formed the basis of a special meeting of the CCPM on 15 August at which the US Head of Delegation circulated a statement by Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen made in Washington D.C. the previous day:

> We believe the newly created anti-riot police are a principal cause of rising tensions ... well-trained, well-equipped, anti-riot police have acted in ways which appear to violate both the letter and spirit of the accords. We have shared these concerns with the [Government] on numerous occasions ... Solutions must be found to the question of the riot police which reduce rather than exacerbate existing tensions.[149]

On 13 August UNITA's representative to the UN had similarly complained about the Emergency Police:

> The FAPLA forces that were at the assembly areas are moving in large numbers into the cities dressed in anti-riot squad police uniforms ... FAPLA commanders that were at assembly areas and are very famous for the role they played during the civil war are now commanding these para-military forces.[150]

Section 2.8.1 offered a 'discursive' mechanism by which an actor might seek to influence a verification narrative. By this account an actor motivated to influence a CVM would initially promulgate a 'discursive environment' favourable to the position it wished to steer the CVM towards. A confirmatory test for such actions would be the presence of coordination with a favoured party, and here the evidence that this occurred is strong. On or very shortly before 13 August Savimbi "was trying to reach Amb. Cohen on the telephone concerning the recent developments [UNITA's concerns about the Emergency Police]."[151] Very shortly afterwards,

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[148] Marcos Samondo [UNITA's Representative to the UN in New York] to Dmitry Titov, "Political and military situation in Angola in the last 48 hours," memo, 13 August 1992, Anstee-15-03, Weston Library.
[149] State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher, "Angola: Police Neutrality," dispatch, vol. 3, no. 33, 17 August 1992, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. In correspondence with the author Ambassador Cohen noted that his memory of the riot police was vague but that he believed his statement "reflected the tendency for the riot police to intimidate UNITA supporters."
[150] Marcos Samondo to Dmitry Titov, "Political and military situation in Angola in the last 48 hours," memo, 13 August 1992, Anstee-15-03, Weston Library.
[151] Goulding to Anstee, "Military situation in Angola," code cable, 13 August 1992, Anstee-15-03, Weston Library.

within 24 hours of each other, and immediately before the special meeting of the CCPM, the US's and UNITA's statements were released in the US. In that the CCPM was controlled jointly by the accused and the accusing parties (and could thus never realistically be anticipated to agree a common position upon the allegations) it seems likely that the primary audience for these statements was instead the most senior UN officials in New York.[152]

By the rubric of a discursive mechanism, the successful promulgation of an advantageous discursive environment would be followed by the acceptance of the discourse's premise by key decision-makers within the CVM and/or the conducting IO and subsequently by lock onto the preferred narrative path. In this case there is no evidence this occurred. Although the CCPM set up a joint investigation group to examine UNITA's allegations those parts of the Accords dealing with policing matters were so poorly drafted that none of UNITA's accusations would have actually constituted a breach of the ceasefire had they been verified as correct. UNAVEM II was unconvinced by the claims, Anstee noting that the claim of 970 anti-riot squads in Huambo City "seems rather far-fetched since it implies that there are 9,700 antiriot policemen in Huambo City alone!"[153] The GoA submitted a frostily polite letter to the CCPM which debunked many of the claims.[154] UN HQ also refused to be drawn, copying all of the figures from the GoA's letter directly into the Secretary-General's subsequent report:

> [A] major problem has arisen over UNITA's contention that the Government has unilaterally and clandestinely transferred about 30,000 FAPLA troops into the "anti-riot", or emergency, police. The Government has refuted the numbers cited in this allegation, stating that the total strength of all its police, including the "anti-riot" police, is 39,830; that the total strength of the "anti-riot" police is currently only 1,030 and is

[152] Noting that the US presidential elections were due only two months after the Angolan elections, an alternative although less likely explanation is that the primary audience related to US political entities and/or the US electorate. See Pycroft, "Angola - 'the forgotten tragedy'," 253.
[153] Anstee later speculated that the 'anti-riot police episode' was a counter-narrative to the 'UNITA hidden army', and it is notable that the figure of 30,000 was employed in both cases. Anstee to Goulding, "Military situation in Angola," code cable, 14 August 1992, S-1035-0147-0004, UN Archives; Anstee, *OOTCW*, 72.
[154] Lieutenant General Antonio dos Santos Franca "N`Dalu" [Chief of Government Delegation to CCPM] to Mr Engineer Salupeto Pena [Chief of UNITA Delegation to CCPM], letter, 20 August 1992, S-1035-0135-0004, UN Archives.

> planned to reach a strength of 1,516 by the end of December 1992; that Armed Forces personnel were incorporated into the police even before the Peace Accords took effect; and that the Government has so far recruited only 4,080 of its demobilized troops into the police.[155]

If, as was argued in Section 3.6, the UN sought a narrative of equivalency between the parties, it might be imagined that the environment was ripe for acceptance of such a UNITA narrative. It may however be that (as Anstee observed) without supporting evidence the claims were just too extreme to be credible, meaning that the second step of the discursive mechanism was never likely to be achieved by such means.

3.8 Conclusion

Lecturing in 1993, Anstee described UNAVEM II as "a virtually impossible task that [the UN] should probably never have accepted in the first place."[156] Her intention was to warn against deploying missions without either the physical resources or the political investment with which to achieve their intended tasks. This position (which is supported by many subsequent commentators) relates the UN's failure to bring peace to Angola in 1992 to the inadequacy of the UNAVEM II mandate. It is undoubtedly true that the verification structures created under the Bicesse Accords were weak: the bicephalous characters of the local and national CMVFs and the CCPM were never likely to produce security guarantees acceptable to the parties. However, given the history of the conflict and, particularly, Savimbi's behaviour to that point, it seems probable that the international community's failure to compel UNITA to disarm and demobilise the bulk of its force had always meant that an electoral defeat would result in Savimbi resuming his attempt to take political power by other means. It may be that the best a verification mission which suffered none of the pathologies

[155] S/24556, ¶19.
[156] Margaret J. Anstee, "Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy. A Test Case for U.N. Peacekeeping," *International Relations* 11, no. 6 (1993): 505.

this Chapter has identified could have done would have been to alert the international community to this likelihood at an earlier time. Consequently, *within* the narrow terms of its mandate UNAVEM II should be interpreted more positively as, despite its limited assets, it did generally succeed in verifying the arrangements between the parties to monitor the ceasefire (and the Angolan police) until that ceasefire began to break down. Rather than practical matters, in terms of mandate pathologies the areas of greatest import concerned the framing of the overarching narrative of which parties were to be accorded political status and the classification of certain objects outside of the verifiers' remit, as these constituted the stage and the actors upon which the UNAVEM II verification drama subsequently played out. It is almost an understatement to conclude that these pathologies had substantial effects on the ceasefire verification narrative; they were significant elements of the meta-narrative within which the ceasefire verification narrative was created.

In terms of the mandate the UN merely played the bad hand dealt it by others. What cannot be placed at others' doors are the organisational pathologies which permeated the mission but which originated in New York. This Chapter has demonstrated the presence of all three of those organisational pathologies which might theoretically influence a CVM. It has also shown how these pathologies can act across a CVM-IO nexus to influence a verification narrative. Bureaucratic universalism in New York contributed to (horizontal and vertical) cultural contestation within UNAVEM II, very likely reducing the ability of the mission to undertake its verification tasks and potentially causing variation in the ways that different branches of the verification network assessed and handled information. Allied with goal displacement within New York, cultural contestation between New York and Luanda is likely to have affected the ability of decision-makers within DPKO / EOSG to appreciate the limitations of the mission's verification methodologies (consequent of the mandate and the inadequate resources available to the mission). This would have reduced those Departments'

ability to properly interpret the CVM's verification reports; furthermore, these limitations were not recognised in the reports the Secretary-General placed before the Security Council, suggesting the reports carried an authority greater than their method of production entitled them to possess. On the basis of these two factors it may be concluded that UN HQ exhibited a flawed verification structure in terms of UNAVEM II.

UNAVEM II clearly demonstrates how the ability of verification procedures to create an objective verification narrative can depend upon the conceptualisation of verification processes. That the literature has focused on the mission's under-resourcing has occluded the fact that some of its processes encapsulated *conceptually* impossible elements. The greatest difficulty concerned the troop baseline figures which underlay the whole verification concept and yet were entirely reliant upon the conflict parties' interested claims. Allied with the practical impossibility of conducting all of the counts at the same time, once revealed the frangibility of these figures should have caused the mission to reconsider a core strategy depicted by one senior UNMO as 'a nonsensical numbers game'. It is clearly demonstrable that the failure to interrogate the assumptions which lay behind these figures substantially affected aspects of the consequent ceasefire verification reports. The importance of thinking carefully about verification processes is further demonstrated by the mission's attempts to verify claims constructed in ways to make their verification impossible. However, whilst this conceptually deficient 'wrap' rendered some of the mission's procedures moot they remain worth examining. Few strong indicators of cognitive verification pathologies are detectable despite the undoubtedly stressful environment (a weak indicator). Neither do strong indicators of groupthink seem to feature, not even at the Regional HQ level where many weak indicators of groupthink and newgroup are apparent. With the marked exception of the procedural isolation of Operations Officer 1 in UNAVEM II HQ (a situation so peculiar as to

seem a likely outlier in the universe of CVM cases), thus, the mission's procedures appear both objective and to have been undertaken objectively.

Aside from the mandate, the strategic purposes of the conducting IO had the greatest effect on certain UNAVEM II verification reports. DPKO's / EOSG's willingness to subvert the verification narrative is both an important outcome of this analysis and a predictable one because the mandate created for the mission by external agents was misaligned to the UN's overarching imperatives. The UN deployed a CVM to Angola because it believed that verifying the ceasefire would assist the establishment of peace. This became a fundamental difficulty when it became apparent that the telling of 'verification truth' might have the opposite effect. The UNAVEM II mandate framed (and thus attempted to produce) the GoA and UNITA as equivalently political bodies engaged in a common pacific project. Having established this narrative the UN was subsequently reluctant to depart from it as its own CVM's reports mounted up against it. Fortna suggests that a "serious" and better resourced UNAVEM II might have prevented the country's return to war by making the parties' various non-compliances more obvious.[157] This would have essentially been the converse of DPKO's / EOSG's strategy of 'narrative production' which I have demonstrated. Whether DPKO's / EOSG's strategy was legitimated by the broader pursuit of peace is an open question, but concern must now exist that the subversion of a CVM's verification narrative and consequent ceasefire verification reports by its conducting IO for reasons other than the presentation of objectively determined and assembled information may not be an isolated instance.

The aim of this Chapter was to determine the presence and influence of verification pathologies on the UNAVEM II verification narrative as articulated in the Secretary-General's

[157] Fortna, "A Lost Chance for Peace," 78.

reports to the Security Council. The presence of several pathologies has been determined, most notably relating to the mission's mandate, to its organisation and to the organisation of its conducting IO, to several of its processes, to some of its procedures, and to the conducting IO's strategic purposes. Of these it has been demonstrated that certain mandate pathologies, process pathologies, and the conducting IO's strategic purposes had a substantial effect upon the final ceasefire verification reports. It has also been demonstrated that a powerful actor can coordinate with a conflict party to manipulate a ceasefire verification narrative, although unsuccessfully in this case.

IV. The UN Operation in Mozambique

> [T]hroughout this process there had been a lot of shadows on which the CCF had been able to cast light. Nevertheless, the CCF would not be able to clarify all things, unless the parties would shed light on matters still in the dark.
>
> – Colonel Segala, Chairman of the Cease Fire Commission (CCF)[1]

4.1 Introduction

Created through an amalgamation of groups of Mozambican exiles in 1962, *Frente da Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) prosecuted a guerrilla campaign against Mozambique's colonial administration until the 1974 coup in Lisbon instigated Portugal's retreat from Africa. Inheritors of weak state structures and massive economic problems, in 1975 an unelected FRELIMO regime became the first independent Government of Mozambique (GoM). Avowing a Marxist-Leninist ideology, the GoM's socialist economic strategies alienated much of the peasantry. On the regional stage, the GoM declared solidarity with movements contesting minority rule in its two large southern neighbours, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Southern Rhodesia countered by instigating an insurgent group *Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO), the sponsorship of which was taken up by South Africa following the creation of Zimbabwe. Allied with South Africa's own raids into Mozambique, RENAMO's military successes encouraged the GoM to raise militias and 1-1.5 million assault rifles were distributed amongst the civilian population. In 1982 the GoM permitted troops from Zimbabwe and Tanzania to deploy into Mozambique to guard strategic transport corridors. Whilst FRELIMO's ideology attracted Soviet military training and materiel, RENAMO's reported violence against civilians discouraged US support. With neither side able to impose a military solution, in 1989 contact was made through intermediaries associated with the Italian Lay Community of Sant'Egidio. After a protracted series of negotiations latterly involving UN technical advisors, on 4 October 1992 President

[1] "Minutes of the Cease Fire Commission," minutes, 17 October 1994, S-0295-0002-0001, UN Archives.

Joaquim Chissano and RENAMO President Afonso Dhlakama signed a General Peace Agreement (GPA). National elections in October 1994 granted the Presidency to Chissano and accorded FRELIMO the greatest number of seats in the Assembly. These results were accepted by Dhlakama who contested the four subsequent national elections as the leader of the largest party in opposition.[2]

The signing of the GPA triggered a request by the parties for the UN to monitor and ensure the implementation of the GPA's terms. Hurriedly appointed 'interim' SRSG, a senior UNDP official Aldo Ajello and 21 military observers (MilObs) arrived in the capital Maputo on 15 October, the day on which the ceasefire entered into force ('E-Day'). In December 1992 the Security Council formally established a United Nation Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) to exist until national elections in October 1993.[3] ONUMOZ would be a multidimensional mission with political, military, electoral and humanitarian components. 354 MilObs would verify the ceasefire, the assembly, disarmament and demobilisation of the *Foças Armadas de Moçambique* (FAM) and RENAMO forces, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and the disbandment of irregular armed groups. Separately, a 6,979 strong multinational force would provide security until the creation of a new *Foças Armadas de Defensa de Moçambique* (FADM). Whilst the deployment of the MilObs and the multinational force took several months, in June 1993 the last foreign troops withdrew from Mozambique. By that time it had became apparent that the GPA's timetables were

[2] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction," in *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995*, ed. unknown (New York: The United Nations, 1995), 3-69; Malyn D. D. Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (London: Hurst, 1995), Chapter 6; Jeremy M. Weinstein and Laudemiro Francisco, "The Civil War in Mozambique: Balance Between Internal and External Influences," in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, eds. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2005), 157-92; Andrea Bartoli, Aldo Civico, and Leone Gianturco, "Mozambique - Renamo," in *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding*, eds. Bruce W. Dayton and Louis Kriesberg (Oxford; New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2009), 140-8; Andrea Bartoli, "Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant'Egidio," in *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 1999), 254; Aldo Ajello and Patrick Wittmann, "Mozambique," in *The UN Security Council*, ed. David Malone (Boulder, C.O.: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 439; Christopher Smith, "The International Trade in Small Arms," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 7, no. 9 (1995): 429.

[3] Security Council Resolution 797 (16 December 1992).

overambitious: the elections were pushed back a year and the mission's mandate extended to, eventually, 15 December 1994.[4] Under revised timetables, troop assembly commenced in November 1993 with demobilisation (but limited disarmament) effectively completed in August 1994. ONUMOZ accepted many responsibilities additional to its original mandate, including chairing the body responsible for forming the FADM and the incorporation of 1,086 international civilian police to monitor the nation's police force.[5] On 19 November 1994 Ajello declared the national elections to have been free and fair. Dhlakama's acceptance of the results signalled the mission's drawdown, which was effectively completed by January 1995. Two decades later the majority of academic opinion accords with the Secretary-General's depiction of ONUMOZ as "one of the most effective peace-keeping operations in the history of the United Nations."[6]

The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the conceptualisation, organisation and conduct of ONUMOZ to determine whether any of the verification pathologies described in Chapter II affected the content of the mission's verification reports to a non-trivial extent. The period under study is April 1993 (before which time the mission's verification components had not achieved even partial operating capacity[7]) and December 1994. Over this period the ONUMOZ verification narrative was constituted of nine reports issued by the Secretary-General to the Security Council.[8] The analysis concerns those elements of ONUMOZ directly

[4] Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique," S/25518, 2 April 1993, ¶54, ¶63, DAG Repository; Security Council Resolution 882 (5 November 1993); Security Council Resolution 916 (5 May 1994); Security Council Resolution 957 (15 November 1994).
[5] Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique," S/26034, 30 June 1993, ¶11, DAG Repository.
[6] Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction," 69.
[7] S/25518, ¶6, ¶19.
[8] S/26034, 30 June 1993; Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique," S/26385, 30 August 1993, DAG Repository; Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique," S/26666, 1 November 1993, DAG Repository; Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique," S/1994/89, 28 January 1994, DAG Repository; Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique," S/1994/511, 28 April 1994, DAG Repository; Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique," S/1994/803, 7 July 1994, DAG Repository; Security Council, "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique," S/1994/1002, 26 August 1994, DAG Repository; Security Council, "Progress Report on the

concerned with the verification of the ceasefire described in the GPA. Accordingly, it focuses upon those mechanisms set up to ensure the effective observance of the ceasefire: the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (*Comissã de Supervisão e Controle* - CSC) and its subsidiary Cease-Fire Commission (*Comissã do Cessar Fogo* - CCF). It does not attend to those elements of the GPA or ONUMOZ related solely to the verification of the national elections, nor does it consider the question of why the ceasefire held following RENAMO's defeat in the national elections except where this is directly related to the design, resourcing and conduct of ONUMOZ.

The remainder of the Chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 analyses how the mission's mandate bounded the mission in ways likely to have affected the verification narrative. Section 4.3 considers the effect of organisational pathologies within and between ONUMOZ and UN HQ in New York. Section 4.4 analyses the mission's verification processes, including the concepts on which they were designed and the ways in which the situation in Mozambique was baselined. Section 4.5 concerns the mission's verification narrative path and the procedures the verifiers attempted to carry out. Section 4.6 demonstrates how the SRSG and DPKO / EOSG separately moderated the ONUMOZ verification narrative in support of the UN's strategic purposes. The Chapter's conclusions are at Section 4.7.

4.2 Mandate Analysis

The initial ONUMOZ mandate was derived from various provisions within the GPA.[9] In October 1991 the GoM and RENAMO agreed Basic Principles including the establishment of

United Nations Operation in Mozambique," S/1994/1196, 21 October 1994; Security Council, "Final Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique," S/1994/1449, 23 December 1994, DAG Repository.

[9] The GPA is annexed to "Letter dated 4 October 1992 from the President of the Republic of Mozambique addressed to the Secretary-General," enclosure to "Letter dated 6 October 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General," S/24635, 8 October 1992, DAG Repository.

a commission (subsequently the CSC) "composed of representatives of the Government, RENAMO, the United Nations and other organisations or Governments to be agreed upon" which would supervise and monitor the parties' compliance with the Agreement's terms.[10] In August 1992 the parties issued a Joint Declaration that they would accept the international

Figure 4.1. Map of ONUMOZ military deployment in May 1993, showing Regional Areas and Transport Corridors.[11]

[10] GPA, Protocol I, ¶5. Done on 18 October 1991, the Basic Principles became Protocol I of the GPA.
[11] Reproduced from *The United Nations and Mozambique*, 30.

community,[12] especially the UN, in both monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the GPA.[13] The GPA, when completed, outlined how this monitoring would be achieved. The CSC would be chaired by the Secretary-General's appointee: it would "supervise the cease-fire and monitor respect for and implementation of the [GPA]"[14] and would be responsible for the "authentic interpretation" of the GPA and for settling disputes between the two parties.[15] At the same time, its decisions would be taken by consensus between the parties.[16] Supervised by the CSC, the CCF would also be presided over by a representative of the UN.[17] Like the UN's other organs in Mozambique, the CCF would "assist in the implementation, verification and monitoring of the entire demobilization process."[18] Specific to the cease-fire the CCF would have the following functions: "to plan, verify and guarantee the implementation of the cease-fire rules; … to analyse and verify the accuracy of the statistics provided by the Parties on troop strength, arms and military equipment; to receive, analyse and rule on complaints of possible cease-fire violations."[19] The CCF would also monitor and verify the withdrawal of foreign forces, and monitor and verify the disbanding of "private and irregular armed groups" and the collection of those groups' weapons and ammunition.[20]

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[12] In addition to the GoM and RENAMO the Commissions chaired by the UN had the following members: CSC - France, Italy, Portugal, OAU, UK, US (and later Germany); CCF - Botswanna, Egypt, France, Italy, Nigeria, Portugal, UK, US (and later Kenya and Zimbabwe).
[13] Security Council, "Letter dated 10 August 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General," S/24406, 10 August 1992, Annex, 4(iii), DAG Repository.
[14] GPA, Protocol V, §II (title).
[15] GPA, Protocol V, §II, ¶5(c-d).
[16] GPA, Protocol V, §II, ¶3.
[17] GPA, Protocol IV, §VI, ¶2(b).
[18] GPA, Protocol IV, §VI, ¶2(e).
[19] GPA, Protocol VI, §I, ¶2. The following actions were specifically prohibited: "carry out any kind of attack by land, sea or air; organize patrols or offensive manoeuvres; occupy new positions; lay mines and prevent mine-clearing operations; interfere with military communications; carry out any kind of reconnaissance operations; carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism; acquire or receive lethal equipment; carry out acts of violence against the civilian population; restrict or prevent without justification the free movement of persons and property; carry out any other military activity which, in the opinion of the CCF and the United Nations, might jeopardize the cease-fire." GPA, Protocol VI, §I, ¶5(b).
[20] GPA, Protocol IV, §III, ¶2; GPA, Protocol IV, §II, ¶3.

On the basis of the GPA the Secretary-General drafted a mandate for ONUMOZ which distinguished political, military, electoral and humanitarian components. The mission's responsibilities towards the verification of the cease-fire would be:

> Political: to facilitate impartially the implementation of the agreement, in particular by chairing the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and its subordinate commissions;
>
> Military:
>
> (i) To monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons;
>
> (ii) To monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces;
>
> (iii) To monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups; … [21]

This mandate was approved by Security Council Resolution 797 (16 December 1992). In January 1994, at the request of the two parties the Secretary-General recommended a broadening of the mission's mandate to ensure the impartiality of the national police. The responsibilities of the ONUMOZ police component (CIVPOL) would be:

> (a) To monitor all police activities in the country, including those of PRM [Police of the Republic of Mozambique] and any other police and security agencies and verify that their actions are fully consistent with the general peace agreement ...
>
> (e) To verify the strength and location of the government police forces, their matériel, as well as any other information which might be needed in support of the peace process;
>
> (f) To monitor and verify the process of the reorganisation and retraining of the quick reaction police and its activities, as well as to verify their weapons and equipment; … [22]

This mandate addition was approved by Security Council Resolution 898 (23 February 1994).

[21] Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)," S/24892, 3 December 1992, ¶18, DAG Repository.
[22] Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)," S/1994/89/Add.1, 28 January 1994, ¶9, DAG Repository.

In December 1994 the Secretary-General suggested that the "clarity" of ONUMOZ's mandate had been a key factor in the mission's success.[23] Whilst the mandate is indeed 'clear', the GPA which grounded it and to which the parties frequently referred contained omissions and ambiguous passages which caused ONUMOZ major problems and resulted in significant delays to the peace process. A former member of the US observer team to the peace negotiations argues the GPA was flawed in that it imagined a complex array of structures but insufficiently attended to the practicalities of delivering them.[24] Allied to the requirement that the CSC settle inter-party disputes 'by consensus', this lack of detail afforded the parties space in which to interpret certain provisions to accord with their partial interests. A case in point concerned the absence of a list of agreed assembly area (AA) locations, which enabled both parties to identify sites on the basis of the strategic control of territory rather than proximity to roads or water supplies or other logistic considerations. Several AAs had to be moved following the UN's own inspections; the resultant poor conditions in others contributed to disturbances by assembled troops awaiting demobilisation.[25] A key cause of these disturbances emanated from a critical inconsistency in the GPA between the requirement that the 30,000 man FADM be formed equally of demobilised GoM and RENAMO troops and that it be a solely volunteer force.[26] To achieve these seemingly irreconcilable criteria both parties resorted to 'volunteering' their troops without those soldiers' knowledge or consent, leading to disturbances in and around the AAs, a high number of 'self-demobilisations' and

[23] S/1994/1449, ¶35. See also T.K., "ONUMOZ - How to make a successful UN peacekeeping operation," *International Peacekeeping* 1, no. 4 (September-November 1994): 132, 134; Richard Edis, "Mozambique's successful peace process: An insider's view," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 9, no. 2 (1995): 14.
[24] Cameron Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), 138.
[25] Ajello to Annan, Eliasson and Jonah, "ONUMOZ Biweekly Briefing Note," fax, 3 June 1993, S-0295-0008-0005, UN Archives; Ajello to Annan, "Press reports," code cable, 29 November 1993, S-0295-0001-0004, UN Archives; Chris Alden, *Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State: From Negotiations to Nation Building* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 53.
[26] GPA, Protocol IV, §I, pt ii, ¶2; GPA, Protocol IV, §I, pt i, ¶2(b).

other occurrences which complicated and hindered ONUMOZ's ability to verify the demobilisation process.[27]

Another significant omission in both the GPA and in ONUMOZ's mandate concerned the GoM's Presidential Guard. Whilst the mandate extension made ONUMOZ responsible for monitoring and verifying all police agencies, the GoM contended the Guard lay outside the scope of ONUMOZ's mandate as it was neither a police nor a military unit. Consequently, ONUMOZ was denied access to all Guard sites, preventing the verification of RENAMO's claims of the presence of large weapons stores transferred from the FAM (claims Ajello's sources suggested were correct).[28] This issue was sufficiently serious for the SRSG to refer it to the UN Secretary-General who agreed that pressure should be placed on the GoM to declare the Guard's status.[29] As with UNITA's 'Personal Safety Corps', by failing to *classify* the Presidential Guard the GPA accorded the GoM the ability to classify it to lie outside of the set of objects the mission was mandated to monitor and verify.

Many of the problems ONUMOZ encountered were caused or enabled by ambiguous passages in the GPA or by the GPA's failure to address the status of certain objects. The parties' most frequent complaint to the CCF concerned troop movements as the possibility of conflict resumption following the national elections encouraged jockeying for territorial advantage. Whilst the GPA prohibited 'patrols', 'offensive manoeuvres' and 'reconnaissance

[27] Operations Team to SA to Acting Executive Director, "Minutes of 06 January Meeting," memo, 12 January 1994, S-0295-0025-0003, UN Archives; Ton Pardoel, "Demobilization Programme in Mozambique," draft report, 4 October 1995, Synge Papers; Alex Vines, "Renamo's Rise and Decline: The Politics of Reintegration in Mozambique," *International Peacekeeping* 20, no. 3 (2013): 380.
[28] RENAMO also had a Presidential Guard (the *Nfuza*); however, RENAMO never claimed that ONUMOZ was not mandated to monitor and/or verify it.
[29] Ajello to Annan, "Verification Activities," code cable, 28 September 1994, S-0295-0007-0001, UN Archives; Ajello to Annan, "Verification Activities," code cable, 14 October 1994, S-0295-0040-0005, UN Archives; James L. Woods, "Mozambique: The CIVPOL Operation," in *Policing the New World Disorder*, eds. Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), 165-6.

operations',[30] one of the CCF's first requisite actions was to attempt to agree a meaning of a 'troop movement', a debate which was only finally resolved in October 1993.[31] The GPA's failure to specify the conditions under which a troop movement would constitute a ceasefire violation was to complicate the CCF's investigations into many of the parties' complaints, notably the GoM's attack on villages in Tete Province in July 1993 (Section 4.6). Another definitional problem related to the 'private and irregular armed groups' the CCF was to monitor and verify the disbandment of. In late 1992 at least 32 militias existed in Mozambique, many in possession of large quantities of equipment and materiel including tanks, mines and explosives. As these groups were often responsible for the guarding of government installations they were hard to distinguish from the many private security companies that performed similar functions; furthermore, these militias had become so decentralised as to raise concerns that the GoM was not fully aware of the locations in which their weapons were held (the GoM denied this).[32] The GPA entirely failed to address the status of RENAMO's *mujibas*, an organisation RENAMO dismissed as comprised of only civilian "messengers, guides and informants," but which the GoM argued should be verifiably demobilised as, they claimed, it incorporated a paramilitary police group and "saboteurs."[33] The GPA also omitted guidelines for the easily anticipatable movement of disbanded GoM troops into the PRM, which RENAMO described as "a serious violation of the peace agreement and a ploy by the Government to remove troops from the demobilization process."[34] Each of these issues affected ONUMOZ's ability to verify the ceasefire as they

[30] Ftn 19.
[31] "Minutes of the Cease Fire Commission 9 November 1992," minutes, 9 November 1992, S-0295-0067-0005, UN Archives; Ajello to Riza, "Contribution to the Secretary General's Report on Mozambique," code cable, 12 August 1993, S-0295-0009-0001, UN Archives; S/26385, ¶26; *O Chefe da Delegaçã do Governo* [and] *O Chefe da Delegaçã da RENAMO*, "Criteria for Repositioning and Deployment of Troops," agreement, 23 October 1993, S-0295-0003-0004, UN Archives.
[32] "Minutes of the Cease-Fire Commission 7 January 1994," minutes, 7 January 1994, S-0295-0003-0001, UN Archives; "ONUMOZ Weekly Situation Report, Covering period from 19-25 January 1994," memo, 26 January 1994, S-0295-0036-0001, UN Archives; "Minutes of the Cease-Fire Commission 28 January 1994," minutes, 28 January 1994, S-0295-0003-0001, UN Archives.
[33] "Minutes of the Cease Fire Commission 4 November 1993," minutes, 5 November 1993, S-0295-0003-0003, UN Archives.
[34] Ajello to Annan, Eliasson and Jonah, "ONUMOZ Biweekly Briefing Note," fax, 3 June 1993, S-0295-0008-0005, UN Archives.

constituted a subjective element within the propositional component of the verification assessment.

In terms of consequences the most significant ambiguity in the GPA concerned arrangements for public administration in RENAMO controlled areas. The parties had agreed that "the public administration ... will continue to obey the law in force and to be conducted through the institutions provided for by law" and that "the institutions provided for by law for the conduct of the public administration in the areas controlled by RENAMO shall employ only citizens resident in those areas, who may be members of RENAMO."[35] This poor wording (a consequence of last minute re-drafting in Rome) enabled Dhlakama to claim that the notion of "two administrations" was implicit in the agreement and that RENAMO could continue to regulate economic and political activity in those areas under its control without contradicting the vision of a unified Mozambique.[36] RENAMO then used this 'two administrations' position to deny Governmental officials access to 'its' territory and to contest the CCF's findings that the movement of RENAMO troops within 'its' territory constituted violations of the ceasefire.[37] In summary, thus, contra the Secretary-General's remarks the clarity of the ONUMOZ mandate occluded the fact that its master source document was riven with omissions, ambiguities and inconsistencies which affected the ONUMOZ verification narrative in various non-trivial ways. Furthermore, the GPA's failure to classify the GoM's Presidential Guard or to properly describe arrangements for public administration in RENAMO controlled areas bounded the conduct of verification and the consequent ceasefire verification reports by enabling one or other of the parties to place certain objects outside of the verification purview.

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[35] GPA, Protocol V, §III, ¶9(a), ¶9(d).
[36] Ajello to Annan, Eliasson and Jonah, "ONUMOZ Biweekly Briefing Notes," fax, 3 June 1993, S-0295-0008-0005, UN Archives; Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War*, 137.
[37] "Minutes of the Cease Fire Commission 30 July 1993," minutes, 30 July 1993, S-0295-0068-0004, UN Archives; Alex Vines, *RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique*? 2nd ed. (Oxford: James Currey, 1996), 149-50.

4.3 Organisation Analysis

This Section considers ways in which organisational pathologies may have affected the ONUMOZ verification narrative. The organisations of interest are the conducting IO (UN HQ in New York) and its subsidiary CVM (ONUMOZ). Section 4.3.1 discusses issues internal to ONUMOZ which may have affected the ceasefire verification reports submitted to UN HQ. Section 4.3.2 considers the extent to which these were consequent of organisational pathologies in New York.

4.3.1 ONUMOZ

According with the GPA's requirement that the CCF open regional offices, in the weeks following his arrival Ajello deployed some of his 21 MilObs to Nampula (North) and Beira (Centre) (Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2).[38] With ONUMOZ HQ established in Maputo and the Southern CCF Office in Matola (essentially a suburb of the capital) this spread ONUMOZ's vanguard across 2,000 km of a territory within which the ground transport network was incomplete, war damaged and heavily mined.[39]

[38] These three 'regions' seem to have been derived from the FAM's three regional commands. They divided the country's ten provinces as follows: Southern Region - Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane; Central Region - Manica, Sofaia, Tete, Zambezia; Northern Region - Nampula, Niassa, Cabo Delgado (Figure 4.2). GPA, Protocol IV, §VI, pt (i), ¶2(c).

[39] Pamela L. Reed, "The Politics of Reconciliation: The United Nations Operation in Mozambique," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1997), 289.



Figure 4.2. Map of Mozambique showing Provinces and Assembly Areas in November 1993.[40]

[40] United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination, attachment, undated, S-0295-0065-0006, UN Archives.

Until the final months of its existence ONUMOZ's verification components were materially affected by matters relating to the provision of equipment, facilities and staff. In June 1993 the mission's Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) wrote formally to the SRSG, a letter Ajello forwarded unedited to DPKO:

> [T]his mission has from its inception been bedeviled by its inability to acquire the "resources in kind" it requires, in anything close to resembling a timely basis. As a result, implementation of the mission's mandate has been slowed, project schedules have had to be postponed, and certain unnecessary hardships visited on members of the Force. ... [F]or example, our vehicle requirements which were faxed to [UN] Headquarters on 3 January 1993. Of a total of 327 various type vehicles requested, 246 are still due ... Delays such as those we are experiencing now are crippling ... [41]

The size and nature of the mission's operating environment meant both fixed wing aircraft to cover long distances and helicopters to access locations without landing strips were critical assets, especially during the rainy seasons (January to March) when roads became impassable. In March 1994 Ajello signalled New York that a paucity of air support "jeopardizes the implementation of all vital aspects of the mission's mandate ... It is imperative that the problem of air support be solved immediately in order to prevent the collapse of the operation."[42] A week later he signalled again: "The continued limitations in air-support has resulted in a halt in the collection of arms from para-military troops in the northern region, as well as severe delays in the distribution of medical and other supplies to the assembly areas."[43] Despite these pleas UN HQ reduced the mission's helicopter fleet from 24 to 11, directing that the balance be made up with cheaper fixed wing aircraft.[44] Other critical resourcing problems included helmets and body armour (issued to the MilObs only six months into the mission, arguably when the most dangerous phase had passed), communications systems (the weakness of which was declared "astounding" by the FOD's

[41] CAO to SRSG, "Procurement Matters," memo, 26 July 1993, S-0295-0008-0004, UN Archives.
[42] Ajello to Annan, "Weekly Report," code cable, 8 March 1994, S-0295-0035-0007, UN Archives.
[43] Ajello to Annan, "Weekly Report," code cable, 15 March 1994, S-0295-0035-0007, UN Archives.
[44] "Final Minutes of the 17 March Operations Meeting," minutes, 17 March 1994, S-0295-0025-0003, UN Archives.

Director during a visit) and malarial prophylaxis of which the mission's New York arranged supplies were actually exhausted in June 1994.[45] Beyond the practicable implications of such deficiencies, Ajello worried the *image* the mission was projecting affected the parties' confidence in the UN's security guarantees:

> [T]he symbolism of objects and events has played a decisive role. Dhlakama, like everyone else in Mozambique, was expecting a spectacle of drive and efficiency from the United Nations equal to the architectural boldness of its headquarters. Instead, they encountered a straggling group of pilgrims who have been going around for months in dubiously trustworthy rented cars, which are not even marked. ... Our procurement system may be transparent and possibly save us money, but its impact in terms of efficiency, and above all in terms of our public image, is absolutely devastating. Dhlakama naturally has noticed this and has begun to take us less seriously. He has come to think more and more that he has to rely on his forces, rather than on our protection.[46]

Another reason ONUMOZ took six months to achieve partial operating capacity was the slow deployment of MilObs. By the third week of January 1993 all but five of the first 25 MilObs had departed Mozambique; only in mid-March did their numbers rise to 154.[47] The absence of MilObs in the first months of the ceasefire affected the mission's credibility in the eyes of the parties and denied the SRSG situational awareness on which to base his operational decision-making.[48] Additionally, the bulk deployments of MilObs around March 1993 meant these individuals (the great majority of which were seconded to the UN for fixed twelve month periods) commenced rotating home just as the demobilisations finally commenced in March 1994. In November and again in December 1993 Ajello flagged this issue to New York: "The military observer group is already grossly understaffed and the foreseen rotation will severely jeopardize the smooth implementation of the process ... the staff selected have a

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[45] Captain Fernando Goulart, e-mail message to author, 8 May 2018; "Minutes of the 9 June Operations Meeting," minutes, 9 June 1994, S-0295-0025-0002, UN Archives; "Draft Minutes of the 16 June Operations Meeting," minutes, 16 June 1994, S-0295-0025-0002, UN Archives.
[46] Ajello to Secretary-General, "Assessment of Peace Process Prior to Security Council Meeting," code cable, 29 March 1993, Salomons papers.
[47] S/25518, ¶6.
[48] Mats R. Berdal, "United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)," in *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, eds. Joachim A. Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 420; Agostinho Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 95.

vital institutional memory."[49] However, the imperatives of individual sending nations meant that hardly any extensions were granted: the consequent loss of cultural knowledge and trust developed with key individuals within both parties caused one of the regional HQs to complain that the matter was "seriously affecting operational efficiency."[50] Also at issue was the quality of the staff supplied to the mission HQ. A senior staff member depicted many of the administrative personnel (who were sent forward from UN HQ) as solely motivated by the enhanced pay the posts commanded.[51] According to another senior staff member, "the staffing at ONUMOZ was so lacking ... [and] many staff members who were actually there didn't fill the shoes and/or carry the load of their positions, so you have a few people who then do most of the work in a 24/7 atmosphere ... the lack of competent staff for many positions was ... part of the difficulties for ONUMOZ which must be attributed to UN HQ."[52] To understand why the ONUMOZ's verification components were so poorly resourced it is necessary to examine its superintending IO.

4.3.2 The ONUMOZ-UN HQ Nexus

As described in Section 3.3.2, in the early 1990s dramatic increases in the UN's peacekeeping responsibilities occasioned a period of significant internal restructuring. Inevitably, some of the material problems ONUMOZ encountered were consequent of the UN's outdated processes and/or difficulties relating to managing CVMs and other deployments whilst undertaking institutional reform. The most fundamental of these related to the mission's ability to conduct budgetary expenditure.[53] Whilst the Security Council approved the

[49] Ajello to Annan, "Turnover of Military Observers," code cable, 30 December 1993, S-0295-0024-0002, UN Archives; Ajello to Annan, "Turnover of Military Observers," code cable, 24 November 1993, S-0295-0024-0002, UN Archives.
[50] Northern Region HQ to ONUMOZ HQ, "Daily Situation Report," fax, 3 February 1994, S-0295-0014-0002, UN Archives; Kristin Heinrich, interview with author, Skype, 28 March 2018.
[51] Heinrich, interview.
[52] Janne Teller, e-mail message to author, 3 April 2018.
[53] In a report to the Secretary-General in March 1993, Under-Secretary-General Dick Thornburgh described the UN's regular budgeting process as "almost surreal. It is overly complicated ... in many ways, out of touch with reality." This, he explained, was a consequence of "[a] futile attempt of the General Assembly to micro-manage each department, office, division, unit, etc. through control of staffing tables and expenditures." Dick

Secretary-General's cost estimates of $331.8 million on 16 December 1992 the mission could not immediately draw on this. Instead, a detailed budget had to be drawn up by the Budget Division of the Bureau of Administration and Finance, submitted for review to the ACABQ and subsequently for comments to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. The Fifth Committee had to then send a draft resolution to the General Assembly for adoption, which did not occur until 16 March 1993 when an initial appropriation of $140 million was made. As a consequence, the mission's spending in its first six months was limited to an advance of $9.5 million authorised by the ACABQ to meet "immediate operational requirements."[54] Interviewed by the UN Department of Public Information in March 1993 the SRSG described this situation as follows: "It's nonsense ... we couldn't place any orders, we couldn't order any vehicles, any equipment ... I cannot use military observers without vehicles, without radio, without anything."[55] A later signal by the Deputy SRSG illustrates UN HQ's apparent difficulties in adhering to its own procedures:

> A [budgetary] submission was made by ONUMOZ on 23 December 1993. Nothing was heard from New York until 8 February 1994 ... [when] it was noted that none of the requirements of the mission had been taken into account [with one exception]. An immediate review of the document as well as the actual requirements of ONUMOZ was undertaken ... this was some 48 hours before the schedule of ACABQ to review the ONUMOZ budget ... [T]he requirements presented at this stage are not repeat not additional requirements, but actual requirements which had been neglected in the presentation of the document by New York to the ACABQ ... There is a need to establish basic organisational structures in ONUMOZ to enable it to carry out its mandated responsibilities. The insinuations of difficulties and over-burdened staff in New York cannot and would not justify a budget for ONUMOZ which would not allow it to carry out its tasks and mandate.[56]

Thornburgh, "Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations," 1 March 1993, online archives of the University of Pittsburgh, accessed 12 May 2018, www.digital.library.pitt.edu.

[54] General Assembly, "Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Forty-Seventh Session - Financing of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique," A/47/881/Add.1, 8 February 1993, ¶9, DAG Repository; General Assembly, "Financing of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique," A/RES/47/224, 16 March 1993, DAG Repository.

[55] Aldo Ajello, interview by UN Department of Public Information, 13 March 1993, quoted in Richard Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action 1992-94* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 38.

[56] Sadry to Annan, "ONUMOZ Budget," code cable, 15 February 1994, S-0295-0045-0002, UN Archives.

More than a year after Ajello's description of bureaucratic 'nonsense' the US Embassy in Maputo privately noted UN HQ's "apparent indifference to field protestations of urgency."[57]

In his analysis of UN HQ's response to the Rwanda crisis in 1994, Herman Salton notes that "If diplomats in New York are bureaucratically divided and conceptually confused, UN personnel on the ground are likely to reproduce that division and confusion."[58] Allied to an unwieldy bureaucracy undergoing institutional change, there are several indications that cultural contestation within UN HQ in 1992-3 affected ONUMOZ's execution of its mandate. The restructuring constituted an environment in which new and established sub-units jostled to establish / retain their areas of responsibility. The setting up of a new Department of Political Affairs (DPA) created systematic ambiguities concerning field missions relating to the boundaries between "operational work" (DPKO) and "political work" (DPA).[59] ONUMOZ's former Executive Director depicted UN HQ in late 1992 as resembling "a medieval network of fiefdoms in a collapsing empire ... all the various departments in the UN really ran like semi-independent autonomous entities ... the relationship between DPKO and DPA was dismal ... as if they were two different universes spinning around each other."[60] "Institutional pressures" led to a newly created Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) being given a major role in the mission; however, its relationship with DPKO was ill-defined and its in-country UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) - which reported directly to DHA rather than to the SRSG - was not directly obliged to cooperate with

[57] American Embassy Maputo to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., "Mine Clearance in Mozambique, Progress since October 1992," signal, 17 May 1994, Synge Papers.
[58] Herman Salton, *Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics, and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 54.
[59] Mats R. Berdal, "Reforming the UN's Organisational Capacity for Peacekeeping," in *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s*, eds. Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (Boulder, C.O.; Oxford: Westview, 1995), 186; Thant Myint-U and Amy Scott, *The UN Secretariat: A Brief History (1945-2006)* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 85.
[60] Dirk Salomons, interview by author, Skype, 16 April 2018. See also Chris Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 33, no. 1 (March 1995): 115.

ONUMOZ's strategic objectives.[61] Of significance too was the *individual* status of the Head of DPA Under-Secretary-General James Jonah who, it was widely understood, would replace the 'interim' SRSG if not granted a further term in UN HQ. Aside from weakening Ajello's standing with the parties, in anticipation that Jonah would wish to select his own senior staff many key posts were left unfilled, resulting in high level functions being performed by overworked junior staff members. This particular situation was not resolved until Jonah was reappointed in March 1993 after which "it was like a cork off a champagne bottle and people came streaming in."[62] Buckpassing occurred, both between sub-units in New York and from New York onto ONUMOZ. Following a visit to UN HQ in March 1994 the Deputy SRSG reported that, "Delays in procurement are likely to continue as PTS [Purchase and Transportation Section] is blaming FOD and FOD is blaming PTS and neither has identified the true cause(s) for the delays."[63] Six weeks later he noted that, "[O]ur colleagues in New York had placed the blame for late submission [of the ONUMOZ budget] on delays in the field ... New York [should] be reminded that ONUMOZ had not been given sufficient time for review due to delays at [UN] headquarters."[64] The US Ambassador to Mozambique diagnosed ONUMOZ as afflicted with "highly politicized senior staff, ... Byzantine bureaucratic intrigue involving New York in mysterious ways, a completely unresponsive home office that retains most authority, and a weak field hierarchy (reflecting rifts in New York) that limits severely the SRSG's control over his own staff."[65] Such extensive cultural contestation in New York bounded the SRSG's ability to effectively deploy the significant resources the Security Council had authorised to verify the parties' compliance with the GPA, especially in the mission's first six months. In that the consequent limitations in equipment

[61] Synge, *Mozambique*, 71-2, 78; American Embassy Maputo to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., "Demobilization, Reintegration and Mine Clearance: Summary of the United Nations' Performance," code cable, 15 July 1994, Synge Papers.
[62] Salomons, interview. See also Synge, *Mozambique*, 37.
[63] "Final Minutes of the 31 March Operations Meeting," minutes, 31 March 1994, S-0295-0025-0003, UN Archives.
[64] "Final Minutes of the 12 May Operations Meeting," minutes, 12 May 1994, S-0295-0025-0003, UN Archives.
[65] American Embassy Maputo to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., "Demobilization, Reintegration and Mine Clearance; Summary of the United Nations' Performance," signal, 15 July 1994, Synge Papers.

and personnel reduced the mission's ability to verify the parties' activities and conduct it may reasonably be stated that they affected the content of the reports the mission submitted to UN HQ to a non-trivial extent.

4.4 Verification Processes

The CCF was conceived as a pacificatory mechanism; requiring the parties to expose and discuss their grievances in an adjudicated setting would, it was hoped, enable resolutions without resort to violence. As a facilitator in this process the UN appointed chairman possessed two sources of leverage: the 'neutrality' (and thus the legitimacy) of the UN-led investigatory capacity, and the ability to refer matters to the CSC. Beneath the CCF sat three Regional CCFs (RCCFs), each chaired by a UN officer possessing jurisdiction of first instance over alleged ceasefire violations within his region. On receipt of a complaint a RCCF chairman would offer the parties the opportunity to reach an understanding. If the complaint stood the parties would be invited to participate in an investigation, normally involving a site visit by representatives of the parties and ONUMOZ who would take witness statements and produce a report.[66] Consideration of this report at a subsequent RCCF meeting would lead to one of several actions. The chairman could dismiss the complaint as not complying with the rules of procedure, or as not constituting a ceasefire violation e.g. if the alleged activity was found to be criminal in nature, in which case it would be referred to the PRM. The chairman might decide the allegation was undeterminable, common when a complaint was raised several months after an alleged event. If the parties were able to agree that a ceasefire violation had occurred they might negotiate a remedial measure, such as redeployment out of an improperly occupied area. If, however, the parties were unable to agree the RCCF chairman would refer the matter to the CCF for discussion by the parties' representatives at a national level. If resolution still proved unachievable the CCF chairman

[66] From February 1994 ONUMOZ participation in investigations was undertaken by regional 'rapid reaction teams'.

could then further elevate the matter to the CSC for consideration in a specifically *political* forum.[67] In requiring the parties' to register their grievances in a structured manner and to participate in an investigatory process the CCF ensured that issues were captured, recorded and addressed in accordance with procedures to which the parties had agreed. As a consequence, an attempt by a party to hinder such procedures (by refusing to participate, or by denying access to an area of interest or possibly a key witness) would be highlighted to audiences of increasing importance and influence culminating in the UN Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council. By accepting and participating in the CCF mechanisms the parties became participants in the policing of and thus ensuring their own security guarantees. Additionally, this carefully designed structure offered ONUMOZ a further tool with which to verify the parties' adherence to the terms of the GPA in a transparently objective way.

The concept for the demobilisation of the FAM and RENAMO forces and the selection of personnel for the FADM comprised a strategy of assembly (see Section 3.4). Commencing on E-Day, troops would proceed to one of 49 AAs (29 for the GoM, 20 for RENAMO - Figure 4.2) where they would be received by a joint monitoring team composed of FRELIMO, RENAMO and UN personnel.[68] Collectable military equipment ('CME' - ammunition, weapons and weapon platforms such as tanks) would be surrendered, recorded and secured until it could be moved to a Regional Arms Depot (RAD). A limited number of static facilities (e.g. military hospitals and air and naval bases) would be designated as *Centro de Tropas Não Acantonadas* (Centres for Unassembled Troops - CTNA). The locations of CTNAs were to be specified by the parties no later than seven days after the signing of the

[67] "Procedures for the Disposition of Complaints Concerning Cease-Fire Violations," attachment to Ajello to Annan, "Cease-Fire Violations - Inspections and Investigations," fax, 8 October 1993, S-0295-0003-0004, UN Archives.
[68] In practice FRELIMO / RENAMO personnel might not participate in joint monitoring teams in RENAMO / FRELIMO AAs because they were "not very welcome." Major Bengt-Åke Folkeson, interview by author, Skype, 8 March 2018.

GPA.[69] Personnel based at CTNAs would be exempted from assembly and would instead be monitored through periodic visits.[70] Whether reporting to an AA or stationed at a CTNA, ONUMOZ would track the location of troops and CME and compare it to inventories the parties were to have supplied six days prior to E-Day.[71] However, whilst the UN had imagined that troops exempted from assembly would be "strictly limited and regularly verified," no numerical limit was specified in the GPA and the parties eventually identified more CTNAs (107) than AAs.[72] To further complicate ONUMOZ's response, the majority of these were notified only well after the deadline specified in the GPA. As a direct consequence, ONUMOZ possessed insufficient MilObs to conduct enough visits (certainly not simultaneous visits) to verify compliance with the GPA, and this inevitably had a non-trivial effect on the ceasefire verification reports.[73]

Unanticipated by the GPA, a programme of 'post-assembly verification' was RENAMO's condition to accept the GoM's major revisions to its declared troop numbers in June 1994 (below).[74] Its objectives were: "Determine, on the spot, to what extent the work of the CCF, according to its mandate, has been accomplished [and] To assess all irregular situations still found with regard to the implementation of the CCF mandate and take immediate corrective measures."[75] The parties would provide lists of CME which had not been registered and/or

[69] GPA, Protocol VI, §I, ¶7(e).
[70] "Minutes of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission," minutes, 15 August 1994, S-0295-0067-0001, UN Archives
[71] GPA, Protocol VI, §I, ¶10(a)1.
[72] Ajello to Representatives of CSC Observer States, fax, 7 July 1994, S-0295-0002-0002, UN Archives; S/24892, ¶22. The Government specified 18,912 troops and included formations and units that were hardly static e.g. the Sixth Tank Brigade.
[73] Heinrich to Ajello, "Memorandum to Mr. Ajello, SRSG," memo, 28 February 1994, Heinrich papers; Segala to Ajello, "Problems of the CCF," memo, 11 May 1994, S-0295-0072-0002, UN Archives; "Statement by the International Members of the CSC at the CSC Meeting of April 22, 1994," letter, undated, S-0295-0031-0006, UN Archives; Vines, *RENAMO*, 154.
[74] Joseph Hanlon, Rachel Waterhouse, and Gil Lauriciano, "Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin," no. 10 (July 1994): 3, accessed 3 April 2018, https://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/pics/d75947.pdf.
[75] Brigadier João Aleixo Malunga and Lieutenant Colonel José Bute, "General Procedures for Post-Demobilization Verification Activities," 26 August 1994, ¶2, S-0295-0014-0005, UN Archives.

collected. Special joint verification teams would visit these sites to conduct registration and subsequent collection: they would furthermore verify "whether or not there are further troops or arms in barracks or bases [and] the extinction of paramilitary troops ... [and] any information provided to the United Nations by the Parties or any other source of information, related to the presence of troops, undeclared arms depots or caches."[76] Whilst post-verification demobilisation was incomplete on ONUMOZ's drawdown, the mission verified 432 of 435 (99%) declared GoM sites and 176 of 287 (61%) declared RENAMO sites, and identified and verified a further 67 undeclared GoM sites and 79 undeclared RENAMO sites.[77] Many of the Government sites were significant: 5,000 undeclared weapons were discovered near a school and a hospital in a Government area; a military base was found to contain "arms and heavy equipment [covering] the size of a football field."[78] (The CCF accepted such sites had generally been abandoned rather than actively concealed.) However, as the difference between inspection ratios indicates, the prevalence of Government finds was at least partly a consequence of the difficulty in locating RENAMO caches, which were often concealed in the jungle. As Central Region HQ reported: "There have been large discoveries of CME at ... Government sites but to date nothing has turned up at RENAMO sites. This can easily be attributed to the ease with which Government weapons depots are found in comparison to the difficult task of trying to locate RENAMO caches."[79] ONUMOZ's programme of employing RENAMO guides to address this problem was generally unsuccessful, with guides either failing to show up or unable to locate caches when they did.[80] The different natures of the parties' forces and the different ways in which they had

[76] Ibid., ¶3e.
[77] Sadry to Annan, "Weekly Situation Report," code cable, 13 December 1994, S-0295-0035-0006, UN Archives.
[78] Ajello to Annan, "Verification Activities," code cable, 8 September 1994, S-0295-0007-0001, UN Archives; "Final Minutes of the 21 September Operations Meetings," minutes, 21 September 1994, S-0295-0025-0002, UN Archives.
[79] OGB/Ops to ONUMOZ HQ, "Verification Progress Report for Central Region: 30 Sep-08 Oct 1994," message, 8 October 1994, S-1114-0006-0004, UN Archives.
[80] CMO to COS, "Monthly Report for September 1994," memo, 30 September 1994, S-0295-0071-0005, UN Archives; Heinrich, interview.

prosecuted the conflict had the unfortunate result that the application of identical verification conditions causing an inequitable verification outcome. This 'inequality of inspection' was subsequently taken up by the GoM as a reason to restrict the MilObs' access to certain governmental institutions.

As discussed in Section 3.4, a strategy of verification by assembly is predicated upon the parties supplying the verifying organisation with accurate troop and equipment lists. However, from the first meetings of the CCF until (and indeed after) the first AAs were opened over a year later the GoM and RENAMO failed to provide ONUMOZ with complete and accurate registers.[81] There are several possible reasons for this. The possession of troops afforded the parties leverage over each other and over the international community and retaining information essential for demobilisation delayed the date when they would have to give this up. As Ajello reported in March 1993, "The reasons for which Renamo takes its time are obvious ... As long as Dhlakama holds his troops ... he will be able to negotiate from a position of strength. The day he agrees to demobilization and therefore loses control over his territory, he will be completely at the mercy of the Government."[82] RENAMO's early refusal to provide lists of CME because they were "military secrets" should be understood in this context.[83] Indications that a disproportionate number of RENAMO troops reporting to the AAs were teenagers, above 50 years old or disabled, and that many of these were without weapons or with weapons that were old and/or poorly maintained, caused both the GoM and the UN Force Commander to suggest RENAMO was holding its best troops and CME back as

[81] When the first twenty AAs were opened on 30 November 1993 ONUMOZ had been forced to accept that these lists would only be presented as soldiers actually began to arrive. "Minutes of the Cease Fire Commission 03 December 1993," minutes, 3 December 1993, S-0295-0003-0003, UN Archives.
[82] Ajello to Annan, "Assessment of Peace Process Prior to Security Council Meeting," code cable, 29 March 1993, Salomons papers.
[83] "Minutes of the Cease-Fire Commission, Sixth Session," minutes, 8 December 1992, S-0295-0067-0005, UN Archives.

late as January 1994.[84] On the Government side, Ajello believed the military had a special reason to delay the demobilisation:

> The funds of the Defense Ministry seem to "evaporate" without a trace. Reliable sources have informed us that the "evaporation" of the Defense Budget was an important part of a deal made between the President, the Minister of Defense and the High Command of the FAM, in order to obtain their concurrence to dismantle the FAM and to demobilize the old guard. This deal allowed the Ministry of Defense and the High Command of the army to spend the entire defense budget for two years, 1993 and 1994, without any accountability requirements. If elections were to be postponed until June 1995, one more budget would be at their disposal. This has led the military to do everything in its power to paralyse the process of demobilization and formation of the new army for many months.[85]

In addition to this 'deal' ONUMOZ suspected that FAM commanders at various levels had systematically inflated troop figures to misappropriate the salaries of non-existent soldiers.[86] As the UN supervised demobilisation would effectively constitute an external audit the military stalled, presented inflated figures, and finally offered a series of statistically unconvincing excuses when a 12,000 man discrepancy was revealed to the CCF in April 1994.[87] Because ONUMOZ had relied exclusively on the GoM's declared figures for its verification baseline the implications for this adjustment were profound. All of the mission's reference figures reported to New York to that point had to be recalculated and the number of FAM troops requiring demobilisation had to be reassessed. Also, much of the trust created between the parties evaporated: when the new baseline figures were finally presented in June 1994 RENAMO stated they could only accept these as "working figures ... a point of

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[84] "Tripartite Meeting of the Cease Fire Commission," note, 31 January 1994, S-0295-0003-0001, UN Archives; Force Commander to Annan, "Demobilization - Certain Observations," fax, 22 January 1994, S-0295-0014-0002, UN Archives; "Final Report of the Chairman of the Cease Fire Commission," 5 December 1994, S-0295-0072-0007, UN Archives. See also Vines, *RENAMO*, 155; Susan Willett, "ONUMOZ the Omnipotent: An Analysis of the UN Peace Keeping Mission in Mozambique," unpublished paper, 1995, Synge Papers.
[85] Ajello to UN Secretary-General, "Progress Report," code cable, 4 August 1994, S-0295-0026-0007, UN Archives.
[86] Janne Teller, interview by author, Skype, 23 March 2018; Hanlon, Waterhouse, and Lauriciano, "Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin," 2; Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique," 118.
[87] Sadry to Annan, "Weekly Situation Report," code cable, 10 May 1994, S-0295-0035-0007, UN Archives; CCF Chairman to CSC Chairman, "Discrepancies in Reported Totals of Government Troops," memo, 25 May 1994, S-0295-0031-0005, UN Archives; "CSC Tripartite Meeting between the United Nations the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO," note, 15 June 1994, S-0295-0062-0004, UN Archives.

reference ... a basis for conducting the process of assembly and demobilization of government forces" until an entirely new post-demobilisation verification process had been completed.[88]

Aside from such machinations, the ability of either party to supply ONUMOZ with accurate lists was affected by the parties' lack of efficient data management systems with which to record and track their troops' enrolments, discharges (or deaths) and locations.[89] Senior FAM officers would not have welcomed record systems that could reveal the FAM's actual strength. For RENAMO, the concealed and dispersed nature of its operational structures rendered its leadership uncertain both as to the CME it actually held and where it was concealed (RENAMO made claims to this effect in the CCF.)[90] ONUMOZ's use of computerised systems to register soldiers on arrival at the AAs or registered at CTNAs and to track them through the demobilisation process progressively accorded the mission greater assurance of the numbers of soldiers that reported than the parties possessed. This enabled it to detect duplications and double registrations (the latter by soldiers seeking a second round of demobilisation benefits.) In this respect accurate baseline figures were only produced on assembly and by ONUMOZ rather than prior to assembly and by the parties. Despite this, RENAMO insisted on establishing its own demobilisation lists, further complicating ONUMOZ's data processing with matters as trivial as the spelling of names.[91] Susan Willett concluded that ONUMOZ's attempts to baseline troop and CME levels were essentially "fruitless": "In the end, because of the game of strategic parity with the dissemination of information, played by the two protagonists, the UN failed to ascertain the total numbers involved [and this] undermined the disarmament process."[92] ONUMOZ's use of technology

[88] Ajello to Annan, "Agreement on Government Troop Totals," code cable, 17 June 1994, S-0295-0013-0005, UN Archives.
[89] Ton Pardoel, "Demobilization Programme in Mozambique," draft report, 4 October 1995, Synge Papers.
[90] "Minutes of the Cease Fire Commission 9 November 1992," minutes, 9 November 1992, S-0295-0067-0005, UN Archives; "CCF Tripartite Meeting, 1500 5 October 1994," note, undated, Heinrich papers; Teller, interview.
[91] Heinrich to Ajello, "Lists for Demobilization," memo, 1 March 1994, Heinrich papers.
[92] Willett, "ONUMOZ the Omnipotent," Synge Papers.

(systems which had not been available to UNAVEM II) enabled it to quickly respond to the discovery that all of the GoM demobilisation percentages reported prior to April 1994 were inaccurate as calculated from falsified baselines. However, their processes depended upon troops reporting for assembly; without baselines they could offer no assurance that further unassembled troops did not exist and could not, thus, verify the parties' accordance with those parts of the GPA requiring assembly and demobilisation. As in Angola, the absence of reliable baseline data had a substantial effect on the consequent ceasefire verification reports.

4.5 Verification Procedures: the Verification Narrative Path

The ONUMOZ laydown shows Mozambique organisationally divided into three regions, each with a Regional HQ controlling teams of MilObs sited at or near one of the 49 AAs (Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2). This laydown informs a verification model of the mission (Figure 4.3). One may consider the verification narrative path as initially composed of two branches - the first ('A') commencing with monitoring data collected by the MilObs, the second ('B') with data gathered by dedicated ONUMOZ investigation teams - converging on the SRSG in ONUMOZ HQ.



Figure 4.3. ONUMOZ Verification Narrative Path.

The first node of Branch A is the MilOb, here shown as a component of a joint monitoring team. The second node is the Regional Observer Group HQ, the first level at which fusion occurred. The third node is the Observer Group HQ, a component of ONUMOZ HQ in Maputo. The fourth node is the Office of the SRSG at ONUMOZ HQ. The fifth node comprises DPKO and EOSG in UN HQ (New York). The primary audiences for the verification narrative are the Security Council and the General Assembly. The first node of Branch B is a RCCF, capable of directing investigations and considering the resultant data. The second node is the CCF which, as it is also capable of directing investigations, receives both reports from the RCCF and investigatory data direct. The third node is the CSC, chaired by the SRSG and attended by the CCF chairman who supplemented the minutes of prior CCF meetings with verbal reports. As for Branch A the fourth node is the Office of the SRSG and the fifth DPKO and EOSG in UN HQ.

Considering first Branch A, an AA was normally manned by four or five MilObs who monitored the disarmament and registration of soldiers and oversaw the storage of CME. They were accompanied by an ONUMOZ Technical Unit (TU) representative who prepared lists of soldiers to be demobilised, and issued demobilisation subsidies and documentation, food, clothing and other items. The MilOb team leader produced a daily report which accorded with a standard template and was commonly a product of informal consultation between the MilObs and the TU officer.[93] Those at Government AAs (generally a permanent barracks or depot) would transmit this to their Regional HQ by fax; those at RENAMO AAs in the bush resorted to satellite or radio systems, the latter intermittent due to weather.[94] Formally, a MilOb team included a minimum of two Portuguese speakers; however, many of these were unable to also communicate effectively in English (in which the reports were

[93] Captain Alejandro Bordagorri, interview by author, Skype, 19 March 2018; Goulart, e-mail.
[94] "Minutes of October 21 October Meeting," minutes, 22 October 1993, S-0295-0025-0004, UN Archives; Kol to Teller, "Field Visit Report: 05/12/93," memo, 6 December 1993, S-0295-0001-0004, UN Archives.

written), affecting the team leader's ability to understand and report the concerns of the soldiers within the AA.[95] Whilst the passage of information about the broader mission picture down to the AAs was generally poor, MilObs remained abreast of regional events as they regularly rotated back to the Regional HQs for periods of rest.[96] The MilObs and TU officers based at the AAs followed separate chains of command which converged only at SRSG level, creating potential for contestation (as the Chief TU officer noted, "a group of five military observers and one TU Camp Officer formed an 'unbalanced group'").[97] However, the few such incidents recorded are limited in scope. Stress resultant of environmental factors was likely of greater significance. The delayed opening of the AAs had enabled the UN to import sophisticated temporary living quarters for their staff (unlike those for the assembled troops, for whom accommodation was generally poor).[98] However, many sites were reliant on fragile air bridges for food and water, and were heavily malarial.[99] Already in close proximity to mines, unexploded ordnance and booby-traps, unstable ordnance was routinely presented by soldiers reporting for demobilisation.[100] Surrendered weapons and ammunition were initially locked in shipping containers: however, the parties took so long to agree how to dispose of CME that these became full and the overflow had to be stored in insecure tents.[101] As the demobilisation process dragged on the AAs' occupants increasingly vented their frustrations upon the MilObs. UN helicopters and vehicles were attacked and MilObs were threatened by

[95] Folkeson, interview; Bordagorri, interview; Goulart, e-mail; Observer Group Nampala to CMO, "ONUMOZ End of Mission Report," memo, undated, Bordagorri Papers.
[96] As with UNAVEM II, MILOBs sited at AAs appear to have got much of their information through informal national networks of mission members. Bordagorri, interview; Folkeson, interview; Major Gabriel Guerrero, e-mail message to author, 8 June 2018.
[97] Ton Pardoel, "Demobilization Programme in Mozambique," draft report, 4 October 1995, Synge Papers; Bordagorri, interview.
[98] The UN had intended conditions in the camps to be sparse to encourage soldiers to move rapidly through the demobilisation process. Vines, *RENAMO*, 153-4.
[99] Bordagorri, interview; Goulart, e-mail.
[100] CCF Tripartite Meeting, "Mines in and around Assembly Areas," note, 2 November 1993, S-0295-0001-0005, UN Archives; "Meeting of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission 12 September 1994 - Minutes," minutes, 13 September 1994, S-0295-0067-0002, UN Archives; C/OGN to CMO, "Demobilization Report - Northern Region," fax, 21 December 1993, S-0295-0014-0002, UN Archives.
[101] Ghobashi to Ajello, "Transport of Arms from the Assembly Areas," memo, 28 February 1994, Heinrich papers; Heinrich, interview.

drunken soldiers, injured in riots and shot at with weapons seized from their custody.[102] In July 1994 the Northern Region commander reported that, "almost every day at least in one of the AAs ... UN members are facing riot, road blocks or threat to their life."[103] Stress was a normal component of the MilObs' working environment: as the British Ambassador noted, in comparison to the UN troops patrolling the transport corridors the unarmed observers "bore the brunt of the work and the danger."[104] However, whilst the MilObs' duties and working conditions undoubtedly constituted a stressful environment (a weak indicator of both confirmation bias and premature cognitive closure) no strong indicators of cognitive verification pathologies have been discovered.

Regional Observer Groups were led by a Chief Regional Military Observer (CRMO) supported by a deputy, a chief operations officer and other staff. A member of the group (commonly the chief operations officer, for whom good written English would be prerequisite) would compile information from the daily reports received from the AAs to create a regional daily report. In additional to numerical data (soldiers in AAs, weapons collected etc.) regional daily reports included 'critical points', enabling the author to select that information he regarded to be 'critical'.[105] These reports would be transmitted to the chief operations officer in the Observer Group HQ by satellite or radio, neither of which were reliable. Partly because of this and partly because key commanders and staff from Observer Group HQ or ONUMOZ HQ did not visit very often, the Regional Observer Groups received

[102] Regional Commander Beira to Force Commander, "Report on Incident in Chiramba on 20 Dec 93," fax, 20 December 1993, S-0295-0014-0002, UN Archives; Ajello to Annan, "Weekly Situation Report," code cable, 24 May 1994, S-0295-0035-0007, UN Archives; Ajello to Annan, "Weekly Situation Report," code cable, 26 April 1994, S-0295-0035-0007, UN Archives; Ajello to Annan, "Weekly Situation Report," code cable, 26 July 1994, S-0295-0035-0007, UN Archives.
[103] Commander Northern Region to Force Commander, "Security Situation in the AAs," fax, 22 July 1994, S-0295-0020-0005, UN Archives.
[104] Edis, "Mozambique's successful peace process," 17. American Embassy Maputo to US Mission UN New York, "Lessons Unlearned -- Or Why Mozambique's Successful Peacekeeping Operation Won't be Replicated Elsewhere," code cable, 10 January 1995, Synge Papers.
[105] Folkeson, interview; Bordagorri, interview.

little feedback from Maputo.[106] Generically there are no indicators of verification pathologies at the Regional level on Branch A.

An integral part of the Force HQ in Maputo, the Observer Group HQ was commanded by the ONUMOZ Chief Military Observer (CMO).[107] It comprised an operations section, other staff and the Rapid Reaction Team (RRT) which directly supported the CCF (see below). The operations section was commanded by an officer with previous UN peacekeeping experience; both he and the three officers who worked for him possessed good working English. Synthesising the regional daily reports, the operations section produced a daily chart showing numbers of troops assembled, demobilised etc. This report was signed off by the chief operations officer and copied to the SRSG. The CMO personally wrote a weekly narrative summary ("a kind of short or even rather sketchy update"[108]) which was routinely provided to the SRSG as a component of the Force Commander's report. As access to the CMO's weekly reports in the UN Archive is restricted they have not been read. With that caveat, generically there are no indicators of verification pathologies at the level of the Observer HQ.

Turning now to Branch B, both the RCCFs and the CCF possessed the ability to investigate the parties' complaints of ceasefire violations. (The RCCFs convened relatively few times due to a lack of representation by the parties; accordingly the procedures which follow were mostly conducted by the CCF.) An aim of the ONUMOZ investigatory process was to achieve reconciliation at the lowest possible level. Reconciliation required that, initially, the parties agreed the facts of an allegation. Accordingly, all the stages of the investigatory process were tripartite (initially, either party could veto an investigation but this was revised

[106] Folkeson, interview; Goulart, e-mail; Bordagorri, interview.
[107] This paragraph is informed by correspondence with a senior military officer who served at ONUMOZ HQ (subsequently 'a senior military officer').
[108] Teller, interview.

after RENAMO vetoed the investigation of several GoM complaints).[109] On receipt of a complaint a ceasefire investigation team would be formed, comprising two representatives of each party and a RRT, the latter a group of between three and five MilObs who carried out all such investigatory tasks. The investigation team would visit relevant sites, interview witnesses and produce a factual report of the investigation (the MilObs taking care to avoid "all controversial views ... [and] limit the findings to actual documented facts ... phrases such as 'probably', 'maybe', 'in all likelihood' are not to be included").[110] Parties could declare their disagreement with the facts as presented and/or their belief that not all the facts had been disclosed. This report would then be presented to a RCCF / CCF meeting by the RCMO / CMO where, it was hoped, the parties would accord with the chairman's recommended findings and solution. The complaint, the conclusion of fact and the parties' responses would be recorded in these meetings' minutes. With a RCCF, if the parties were unable to agree a resolution the matter would be referred to the CCF. With the CCF, if the parties were unable to agree *and* the alleged violation was somehow political in nature the matter would be referred on to the CSC.[111] Generically, the tripartite nature of the RCCFs' / CCF's investigatory compositions, their exhaustively codified procedures, their employment of the same informed and experienced teams for each investigation, and their insistence on limiting reporting to empirically verifiable data all indicate processes likely devoid of structural pathologies and in which agentive pathologies are minimised. However, the inclusion of the parties' representatives in the ceasefire investigation teams granted the parties ample time to remove evidence of any violations, reducing the likelihood of the investigatory procedures producing a positive result.[112]

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[109] Ajello to Annan, "Possible Elements of Draft Resolution on ONUMOZ," code cable, 5 April 1993, Salomons papers.
[110] "Internal Guidelines for the Processing of Investigations," note, undated, Heinrich papers.
[111] Salomons, interview; Heinrich, interview; "Minutes of the Cease Fire Commission 25 November 1992," minutes, 25 November 1992, S-0295-0067-0005, UN Archives; "Meeting of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission 3 August 1993 - Minutes," minutes, 4 August 1993, S-0295-0032-0003, UN Archives.
[112] A senior military officer noted that an alternative approach - forming mobile 'joint monitoring groups' - was unworkable in an environment infested with land mines and uncontrolled armed groups. E-mail to author.

Chaired by the SRSG, the CSC incorporated the parties' delegations, the chairman of the CCF, ambassadors from observer countries and personnel from the ONUMOZ Commissions Secretariat. As noted, the CSC was constituted to consider only alleged ceasefire violations possessing a political (rather than a solely 'technical') component: as the SRSG reminded the meeting, "it served no purpose to discuss matters at the CSC which were already discussed at the CCF. The CSC had to identify political problems and had to provide the CCF with correct guidelines in order to allow them to solve the problems tabled at their meetings."[113] Despite this, the CSC cannot be peremptorily discounted as a node on the verification narrative path as its chairman (the SRSG) sometimes called upon the CCF chairman to report verbally on violent incidents in the AAs and because the discussion occasionally touched on contested verifications in other ways.[114] It should also be noted that as most of the ambassadors were members of both the CCF and the CSC several members of the CSC were regularly directly updated by the CMO via his briefings to the CCF.[115]

Branches A and B of the verification narrative path coalesced in the Office of the SRSG, which comprised the principal and a small consultative group of special assistants, special advisors and members of the Commissions Secretariat. This group produced not only routine and special reports for DPKO and EOSG but initial drafts of the Secretary-General's reports and even drafts of Security Council Resolutions.[116] The penholder was initially Kristin Heinrich (Commissions Secretariat) who handed over to Janne Teller (special assistant) in July 1993. Both the SRSG's reports and draft Secretary-General reports were prepared as

[113] "Meeting of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission 12 August 1993 - Minutes," minutes, 12 August 1993, S-0295-0032-0003, UN Archives.
[114] "Meeting of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission 25 July 1994 - Minutes," minutes, 25 July 1994, S-0295-0031-0004, UN Archives; "Meeting of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission 1 August 1994 - Minutes," minutes, 2 August 1994, S-0295-0067-0001, UN Archives.
[115] A senior military officer, e-mail.
[116] Annan to Ajello, "Security Council resolution on ONUMOZ," code cable, 13 September 1993, S-0295-0006-0005, UN Archives.

follows. The heads of the mission's functional components (Commissions Secretariat, CMO, CCF chairman etc.) drafted contributions for the penholder.[117] Teller describes the next stage:

> Working next to Ajello, and being in most political meetings, as well as being the one to screen all pieces of incoming mail to the SRSG, i.e. field reports as well as [messages] from [UN] HQ etc., I was normally well informed enough to have most of the substance needed for the reports - and any specific outstanding facts required, I'd get from the relevant departments, before drafting the actual report - which Ajello would then comment on, before I finalised it and we sent it to UN HQ.[118]

Ajello's comments and guidance to the penholder were informed by many different sources: reporting from Branches A and B, his consultative group, consultation with key mission members such as the CMO and the CCF chairman and, importantly, regular meetings with the ambassadorial representation to the CSC and with other ambassadors in Maputo.[119] By consulting on his draft reports with the ambassadors and ensuring their agreement with their content (that is, their capitals' agreement), Ajello sought to steer the peace process in both Mozambique and New York by encouraging or admonishing either party as he believed the situation warranted.[120] In the Executive Director's words, "[E]verything we asked the Security Council we cooked and cleared with the ambassadors first who then made sure that the capitals would play ball ... Janne [Teller] wrote this stuff, Ajello checked it, he basically sat down with Janne and said this is what we go and tell them, write it up, based on the reports that came from the [Commissions] Secretariat."[121] According to a senior US Embassy official, "Aldo was very adroit about using the ambassador group to push the Mozambicans, and getting us to use our capitals to push the UN system."[122] The UK Permanent Representative to the UN over the period opined that "[Ajello] was more effective at working

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[117] "Final Minutes of the 08 April Operations Meeting," minutes, 8 April 1994, S-0295-0025-0003, UN Archives; Cease Fire Commission, "Contribution to SG's Report: 1 November 1993 - 17 January 1994," undated, S-0295-0064-0005, UN Archives.
[118] Janne Teller, e-mail message to author, 14 March 2018; Heinrich, interview.
[119] Aldo Ajello, "Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement," in *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 1999), 628.
[120] Teller, interview; Ajello and Wittmann, "Mozambique," 442-3.
[121] Salomons, interview.
[122] Christopher Dell, interview by author, Skype, 12 July 2018.

through the P5 ambassadors in Maputo to convey the real situation on the ground (often a better route than the formal reports to the Council) than Anstee was in Luanda."[123] Whilst there are, perhaps, limited weak indicators of groupthink in this (e.g. the absence of a formally codified procedure), Ajello's wide consultations and communicative approach represents almost the antithesis of that pathology. There is however the obvious concern that in 'cooking and clearing' the reports with the political representatives of various interested capitals the narrative transmitted to New York would have been written as a tool of political purpose in preference to an objective telling of empirically determined reality.

The final node in the ONUMOZ verification narrative path was in UN HQ in New York. As discussed in Section 3.5, it is convenient to consider DPKO and EOSG as a single node because of the consultative manner in which the Secretary-General fashioned his reports to the Security Council. Chapter III considered UN HQ in 1992: the structures which applied to ONUMOZ were the same (reports circulated simultaneously to the Desk Officer in DPKO and to key individuals in EOSG). However, with Kofi Annan becoming Head of DPKO in March 1993 a key individual had changed (Goulding moving to DPA). With the SRSG's office transmitting full drafts of the Secretary-General's reports, in comparison to UNAVEM II the need for DPKO / EOSG to develop them was much reduced. Once amended, the drafts were transmitted back to Maupto for the SRSG's further comments; however, as the SRSG would have generally consulted on his draft with key international members of the CSC and secured their agreements (their capitals' agreements) "the final text of the SG's report generally remained unchanged from the SRSG's draft."[124] In terms of creating the Secretary-General's reports the location of the penholder in Maputo rendered ONUMOZ's routine reporting far less important than UNAVEM II's (where the penholder was in UN HQ) as the information that informed those reports was simultaneously informing the SRSG's drafts 'at

[123] Sir David Hannay, e-mail message to author, 7 November 2017.
[124] Ajello and Wittmann, "Mozambique," 443.

source'. As a consequence, an inquiry into whether the conducting IO was shaping the verification narrative for strategic purposes must examine its agents in Maputo as well as in New York. This is the subject of the next Section.

4.6 The UN's Strategic Purposes

The GPA was intended to achieve a lasting peace in Mozambique and the UN's strategic purpose in establishing ONUMOZ was to support that effort. Section 3.6 discussed how the UN's aim of ensuring peace in Angola came into tension with the truth telling that UNAVEM II was purportedly created to deliver; however, with ONUMOZ it might be imagined that the SRSG's political acuity combined with his supervision of the penholder would have meant UN HQ would have little requirement nor indeed be able to moderate his draft reports. As one of the penholders commented "I don't think they [UN HQ] could change that much because we had the facts and the substance."[125] However, there is evidence that DPKO / EOSG adjusted certain ONUMOZ reports to better support the UN's strategic purposes. The mission's desk officer in DPKO recalls that the Secretary-General's drafts "were worked to meet the following criteria: what is fair; correct use of diplomatic language; *the requirements of the peace process*." The intention in doing this "was to be fair to each party." According to this officer, when one party is more available to a mission than the other it may be that their violations are more apparent or that one comes to sympathise with them, and "one has to balance with experience." UN HQ had perhaps a better perspective than the mission, which was "close" i.e. sometime too actively involved.[126] Teller confirms that UN HQ contested certain ONUMOZ drafts for political reasons: "Sometimes there would be some wrangling as to specifics ... [e.g.] admonishing the government / RENAMO, or other politically sensitive issues."[127] With reference to the period between March and June 1993 when RENAMO

[125] Teller, interview.
[126] Dmitry Titov, interview by author, Skype, 27 March 2018; italics mine. Titov was also the desk officer for UNAVEM II.
[127] Teller, e-mail.

refused to participate in the CCF or CSC, "[Ajello] was not allowed to admonish RENAMO enough in the Security Council report on that, and later it became the government when we knew they were training and hiding soldiers and we couldn't get the [UN] HQ on board to go mostly after the government."[128] To demonstrate that DPKO / EOSG adjusted the ceasefire verification narrative to better align with the contemporaneous strategic imperative the remainder of this Section focuses on two alleged sets of ceasefire violations, both of which were investigated by ONUMOZ in July 1993.

On 30 August 1993, the Secretary-General identified that there had been 47 complaints of ceasefire violations since the signing of the GPA. Of these:

> The most serious complaints are the following: in late June and early July 1993, RENAMO has detained 27 Mozambican hunters in the area of Salamanga (Maputo Province) ... Meanwhile, complaints concerning government encroachment on three villages in Tete Province and on a RENAMO base at the village of Mangole in Gaza Province during the third week of July were filed by RENAMO. While acknowledging that its forces had attempted to dislodge RENAMO from the Tete villages, the Government presented arguments that implied that it reserved the right to use military force in order to reclaim territory that it considered rightfully under its control.[129]

First, the 'hunters'. As noted in Section 4.2, RENAMO claimed the right to regulate economic activity in areas under its control. Dhlakama had previously informed the SRSG that "Freedom of movement in RENAMO areas would be extended to all Mozambican citizens, except for persons engaged in hunting or woodcutting."[130] (There is evidence that RENAMO suspected 'hunters' discovered in RENAMO controlled areas of being militia or spies.[131]) A CCF meeting on 5 July discussed the 'Salamanga incident', the detention of 19 persons whom RENAMO had initially committed but subsequently failed to release into the custody of the

[128] Teller, interview.
[129] S/26385, ¶10.
[130] Ajello to Annan, "Progress Report," fax, 19 May 1993, S-0295-0008-0005, UN Archives.
[131] CLO/OGN to COGN, "Minute on the Seventh Weekly Meeting [of RCCF (North)]," memo, 22 January 1994, S-1114-0004-0007, UN Archives; Teller, interview.

UN.[132] Whilst the parties agreed to an investigation, at a subsequent meeting the head of the RENAMO delegation noted that RENAMO considered the detention of hunters "a political question ... RENAMO was against hunting while the Government favored it [and] such a political difference between the two parties should be addressed by the CSC."[133] Following an investigation, on 30 July the CCF chairman recommended that the incident be considered "a clear indication of a cease-fire violation [as] the detention of anyone is unacceptable by law and not sustainable under the GPA."[134] However, the head of the RENAMO delegation "strongly urged that RENAMO should not be condemned for detaining 25 people carrying out illegal hunting in an area under its control" and reiterated his demand that the issue be addressed in the CSC.[135]

Considering now the alleged government encroachments, on 20 July the CCF received complaints from RENAMO that GoM forces had attacked the following RENAMO controlled villages in Tete Province: Samoa, Chiritze and Necungas.[136] On 21 July an unofficial tripartite meeting jointly recommended that investigations be carried out, the reports of which were presented to a CCF meeting on 5 August.[137] These may be summarised as follows:

[132] "Minutes of the Cease Fire Commission 5 July 1993," minutes, 5 July 1993, S-0295-0068-0002, UN Archives.
[133] "Minutes of the Cease Fire Commission 8 July 1993," minutes, 9 July 1993, S-0295-0068-0002, UN Archives.
[134] "Minutes of the Cease Fire Commission 30 July 1993," minutes, 30 July 1993, S-0295-0068-0004, UN Archives.
[135] Ibid. Further RENAMO detentions had increased the numbers from 19 to 25 and ultimately the 27 reported by the UN.
[136] Ajello to Annan, Jonah and Gharekhan, "RENAMO Complaints to the CCF," code cable, 21 July 1993, S-0295-0009-0001, UN Archives.
[137] "Minutes of the Cease Fire Commission 5 August 1993," minutes, 5 August 1993, S-0295-0068-0004, UN Archives; "Investigation Result CCF/COMP/100793," report, 26 July 1993, S-0295-0003-0005, UN Archives; "Investigation Result CCF/COMP/090793," report, 26 July 1993, S-0295-0003-0005, UN Archives; "Investigation Result CCF/COMP/110793," report, 26 July 1993, S-0295-0003-0005, UN Archives.

Village	RENAMO Complaint	Report's Conclusions re. GoM	Report's Conclusions re. RENAMO
Samoa	GoM forces attacked a RENAMO base.	GoM violated the ceasefire by moving troops, by occupying Samoa for eight days and by forcing members of RENAMO to leave the village.	Complaint is false as no RENAMO base existed.
Chiritze	GoM forces attacked a RENAMO base, detained RENAMO soldiers, stole items.	GoM violated the ceasefire by moving troops, by using force and by occupying Chiritze for two days.	Complaint is partially true. RENAMO violated the ceasefire by occupying Chiritze in January 1993.
Necungas	GoM forces attacked a RENAMO base.	GoM violated the ceasefire by moving troops and by occupying Necungas for two days. However, GoM activity constituted a show of force, not an attack.	Complaint is partially true. RENAMO violated the ceasefire by occupying Necungas after signature of GPA.

Figure 4.4. Summary of investigation reports into RENAMO allegations of GoM attacks in Tete Province, July 1993.

On 3 August the CSC (convened by the SRSG under special procedures for urgent cases) discussed both the Salamanga incident and RENAMO's three complaints against the GoM in the context of ceasefire violations and the control of terrain (but without mention of the 'hunters').[138] Ajello's immediate concern was countering bellicose statements by GoM officials claiming the right to employ force to recover areas illegally occupied by RENAMO; he coordinated with the international members of the CSC to issue statements deploring such possibilities. A few days later he accused both sides of "playing stupid games."[139]

On 12 August Ajello transmitted to New York a full draft of the report the Secretary-General would give on 30 August. On the basis of ONUMOZ's findings it might be anticipated that this would incorporate commentary to the effect that (1) the Salamanga incident constituted a ceasefire violation by RENAMO, and (2) two of the three alleged encroachments in Tete

[138] "Meeting of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission 3 August 1993," minutes, 4 August 1993, S-0295-0032-0003, UN Archives. No record of an investigation or subsequent action relating to the alleged attack on a RENAMO base in Mangole was discovered in the UN Archives.
[139] Joseph Hanlon, Rachel Waterhouse, and Gil Lauriciano, "Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin," no. 5 (August 1993): 5, Synge Papers; Ajello to Annan, Jonah and Gharekhan, "Statement of the International Members of the CSC," code cable, 3 August 1993, S-0295-0009-0001, UN Archives.

Province constituted a ceasefire violation by the GoM, both of which were reactions to previous ceasefire violations by RENAMO. However, the draft made no mention of the Salamanga incident, or the issue of hunters in general, and referred to RENAMO's complaints of the three encroachments without mentioning that an ONUMOZ-led investigation had concluded that one complaint was false and the others concerned GoM reactions to RENAMO's own ceasefire violations.[140] This poses two questions. Firstly, why did the SRSG produce a narrative which massaged the facts in favour of RENAMO? Secondly, why did UN HQ subsequently adjust this narrative to give a purportedly more 'balanced' account but which in fact occluded RENAMO's significant role in provoking the GoM's encroachments in Tete Province?

To suggest answers to these questions it is necessary to recall that the SRSG and UN HQ similarly understood the UN's strategic imperative to be the encouragement of peace in Mozambique and that both of them were invested with the ability to construct a narrative to support this. In July 1993 RENAMO had only just recommenced participation in the CSC and CCF mechanisms following a four month hiatus which had stalled the peace process and alarmed the international community. It had also become apparent to ONUMOZ that RENAMO's delegations to those mechanisms were, by education, training and experience, significantly less able to participate in the associated bureaucratic procedures than the GoM's.[141] In early August the IO's strategic purpose would have been best supported with a narrative which encouraged RENAMO, and by excluding any mention of RENAMO's role in ceasefire violations that is what the SRSG drafted for New York. Nine days after Ajello's cable Chissano and Dhlakama met for the first of a series of meetings in Maputo, an event the Secretary-General identified as "the most serious development since my last report [30

[140] Ajello to Riza, "Contribution to the Secretary General's Report on Mozambique," code cable, 12 August 1993, S-0295-0009-0001, UN Archives.
[141] Heinrich, interview.

June]."[142] From this point (21 August) the IO's strategic purpose would have been best supported with a narrative of equivalency, and in introducing the Salamanga incident whilst continuing to exclude mention of RENAMO's role in the encroachments that is what DPKO / EOSG produced. (As Titov noted, one had to be 'fair to each party'.) Whilst either the SRSG's *or* UN HQ's changes to the verification narrative might be explained by other factors it is hard to summon an alternative hypothesis to the influence of the UN's strategic purposes on the ceasefire verification narrative which could account for both.[143]

4.7 Conclusion

As a preliminary to comparing ONUMOZ with UNAVEM II it should be recognised that the former's structures were to some extent purportedly consequent of the latter's and of the perceived failure of that mission. Goulding later explained that "the UN's failed endeavor to help the Angolan parties implement the Bicesse Accords ... taught us important lessons which we were able to apply almost immediately [in Mozambique]."[144] Annan claimed that "major lessons from our first experience in Angola ... have been taken into consideration in the formulation of the mandate of ONUMOZ."[145] It may, of course, be that the peaceable outcome in Mozambique and the disastrous outcome in Angola had little to do with the UN's efforts to verify those two ceasefires, but were rather resultant of the investment of ONUMOZ with a potent multinational force, of Italian funds provided to RENAMO to assist it transform into a political body, of the respective personalities of Dhlakama and Savimbi, and/or of several other potentially interacting factors. However, this interesting matter is not the direct concern of this project. What *is* of immediate interest is the question as to why, following a

[142] S/26385, ¶2.
[143] The absence of most of the SRSG's other drafts of the Secretary-General reports from the UN Archives prevented the author from investigating whether this occurred on other occasions.
[144] Marrack Goulding, *Peacemonger* (London: John Murray, 2002), 197.
[145] Kofi Annan, "The Status of UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa," address to Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations (US Senate), 2 May 1994, Congressional Record Index (www.gpo.gov).

very similar occurrence in Angola (and given these self-congratulatory statements by senior UN officials), did a failure to classify in the GPA enable one of the parties to classify a force entity (in this case the Presidential Guard) so as to place it outside of the mission's verification remit, thus denying the MilObs access to possible sites of weapons concealment. Following Angola it is also surprising that the movement of GoM forces into the PRM was not anticipated by the mandate, that essential terms such as 'troop movement' were left undefined, and that other substantial ambiguities survived the internationally supervised drafting process. Some of these ambiguities (the 'two administrations' issue the best known example) may be understood to have substantially bounded the conduct of verification, and thus the resultant ceasefire verification reports, by rendering the verification proposition insufficiently certain for it to be established by empirical means. A further key mandate omission was the failure to specify the locations of the AAs which, by enabling the parties to site them in often logistically unsustainable locations, greatly contributed to the stress under which the MilObs performed their tasks. This stress was exacerbated by the considerable disruption amongst troops awaiting demobilisation which partly originated in the mandate's inconsistency of requiring a 'volunteer' FADM be formed equally of GoM and RENAMO personnel. Previous comparisons of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ have identified their mandates as major factors in the respective failure and success of those missions.[146] Even recalling the 'extraordinary setup' which restricted UNAVEM II to 'watching the watchers', when one examines those two deployments through a critical lens the relative superiority of the ONUMOZ mandate becomes less apparent.

In March 1993 the SRSG signalled New York that the UN's procurement system was so affecting the mission that Dhlakama might reasonably assess ONUMOZ as unable to deliver the security guarantees necessary for RENAMO to participate in the peace process. More

[146] Assis Malaquias, "The UN in Mozambique and Angola: Lessons learned," *International Peacekeeping* 3, no. 2 (June 1996): 88; Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 67-71.

serious, even, than imperilling the military and civilian staff deployed outside of Maputo, an internal process of the UN was reducing the possibility that the UN would achieve its strategic purpose in Mozambique. Whilst partly a consequence of an outdated and sclerotic bureaucracy which the Secretary-General was struggling to address, that same change management process had resulted in such levels of cultural contestation that UN departments had come to prioritise their internal imperatives over the CVMs and other missions they were created to support. As a consequence key staff posts were left unfilled, others were rotated at crucial times, and others still were manned by personnel who prioritised their careers over the mission's objectives. As several former mission members have explained, the sum total of issues relating to absences or deficiencies in equipment, facilities and staff significantly affected the ONUMOZ verification narrative. Furthermore, the most substantial impact was suffered over the period when the majority of alleged ceasefire verifications occurred. Given that UNAVEM II had been similarly impacted by cultural contestation in New York it appears that UN HQ had either failed to learn 'major lessons' about its own structures or had simply been unable to realise those lessons to ONUMOZ's benefit.

As in Angola, the GPA's strategy of verification by assembly was dependent on the parties' provision of accurate baseline data; however (as in Angola) this was not forthcoming. Whilst RENAMO's motivation in stalling was primarily strategic, the GoM was hostage to corrupt agents who 'hung on' for 18 months after the signing of the GPA for purposes of financial gain. As a consequence, ONUMOZ had to carry out the major additional tasks of reassessing its demobilisation data and planning a second verification process which in its investigatory nature was more dynamic and resource intensive than the first. Both the baseline issue and the requirement to verify large numbers of troops at unassembled areas (also experienced in Angola, also unanticipated by the UN) constitute process failures because they could reasonably have been predicted and counters introduced pre-emptively. In that the

demobilisation percentages the Secretary-General published for the first 13 months of the mission's duration had subsequently to be discarded and additional post-assembly reporting introduced it is beyond question that the baseline issue substantially affected the ONUMOZ ceasefire verification reports. The verification difficulties relating to the additional unanticipated and thus initially unplanned verification phase were a further (albeit indirect) consequence of the baseline failure. That the GoM exploited the 'inequality of inspection' which resulted from factors that made verifying its CME holdings easier than verifying RENAMOs does not disqualify that this phenomena (a verification pathology resultant of the parties' different natures) also affected the subsequent ceasefire verification reports. Turning now to procedures, that the stress the MilObs experienced was accentuated through pathologies relating to the mandate, and to the organisation of ONUMOZ and the UN and the relationship between the two, was noted above. However, whilst stress is a weak indicator of both confirmation bias and premature cognitive closure, no strong indicators of those pathologies in the mission's procedures were detected (and neither were strong indicators of groupthink).

Chapter III demonstrated the willingness of senior decision-makers in UN HQ to adjust the UNAVEM II verification narrative in case "a pessimistic report ... increase the risk of disaster."[147] This Chapter has shown that this willingness was not confined to a single CVM. Likely encouraged by the foreseeable ramifications of the GoM's stated bellicosity, in his draft of the Secretary-General's report Ajello constructed a narrative which, in its selectivity, cannot be considered an objective representation of the facts as he was aware of them. By this action, this rightly lauded CVM leader expanded the remit of his office from what could be termed 'operational politics' into the strategic politics that many would consider the exclusive preserve of UN HQ. This narrative was then further 'worked' by DPKO / EOSG as

[147] Goulding, *Peacemonger*, 187.

the political ground shifted a second time. Whatever the intentions, impartiality is lost when, as in this case, the existence of a complaint is transmitted without noting that it has been investigated and found to be false or when verified facts are flickered in and out of a narrative to accord with some 'greater good'. The effect of the IO's strategic purposes upon the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council of 30 August 1993 was very great.

The aim of this Chapter was to determine the presence and influence of verification pathologies on the ONUMOZ verification narrative as articulated in the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council. The presence of several pathologies has been determined, most notably relating to the mission's mandate, to its organisation and to the organisation of its conducting IO, to some of its processes, and to the conducting IO's strategic purposes. Of these it has been demonstrated that certain mandate pathologies, certain process pathologies, and the conducting IO's strategic purposes had substantial effect upon one or more ceasefire verification reports. Furthermore, given the statements by senior UN decision-makers that the UN had 'learned the lessons' of UNAVEM II, it could reasonably be said that the presence of every one of those verification pathologies in ONUMOZ which had previously been detected in UNAVEM II constitute a further process failure at the level of the conducting IO.

V. The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission

> We are going to have 2,000 or more OSCE verifiers on the ground, and I want to stress a couple of points about them. First, they are verification people; they are compliance verifiers. I know you are not going to find that phrase in your dictionary; but they are not monitors, they are not observers. They are verifiers. Milošević wanted the words observer and monitor. Those are bureaucratic babble words. Verification, compliance are active words. This is going to be a hands-on activist mission.
>
> – US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke[1]

5.1 Introduction

In 1945 Serbia became a constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the region known as Kosovo-Metohija ('Kosovo') became an autonomous region of Serbia. The SFRY constitution of 1974 granted Kosovo a strong federal status; in 1980 Marshal Tito's death precipitated demonstrations by the majority ethnic Albanian population demanding independence from Serbia. With percentage decline of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo, perceptions of prejudice against them, and an idea of Kosovo as Serbia's 'heartland', this agitation resulted in a backlash from the Serbian centre. Discriminatory legislative acts against Kosovo Albanians were married with the abolition of Kosovo's independent powers by the Serb constitution of 1990 and then by the 1992 constitution of the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In 1997 an indigenous 'Kosovo Liberation Army' (KLA, in Albanian *Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosoves* - UÇK) commenced a guerrilla campaign in Kosovo against the police units of the Ministry of the Interior (*Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova* - MUP) and the army (*Vojska Jugoslavije* - VJ). By the Summer of 1998 counter-actions by the security forces had resulted in the displacement of 230,000 Kosovans. On 23 September the UN Security Council affirmed that the situation constituted a threat to regional peace and security[2]; on 24 September NATO commenced the generation of forces for a strike against the FRY. Under threat of imminent NATO action, on 13 October FRY President Slobodan

[1] "Richard Holbrooke and William Walker, Press Conference, 28 October 1998," quoted in Marc Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999* (Cambridge: Documents and Analysis Publishing, 1999), 296.
[2] UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (23 September 1998).

Milošević announced the withdrawal of certain MUP and VJ forces from Kosovo, the garrisoning of others and the deployment of an OSCE ground verification mission and a NATO air surveillance mission. The period mid-October 1998 - March 1999 featured military actions and reactions by both parties, the killing of Kosovo Albanians at the village of Račak garnering considerable international attention. Talks between the parties in February (the Rambouillet conference) culminated in Kosovo Albanian representatives signing an Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (18 March 1999) and the FRY rejecting that Agreement. On 20 March the ground verification mission withdrew; four days later NATO commenced an air campaign against Serb targets in Kosovo and the broader FRY. On 10 June Milošević accepted the withdrawal of all MUP, VJ and FRY paramilitary elements from Kosovo and the ground entrance of a NATO-led peacekeeping force.[3]

The OSCE is an intergovernmental organisation whose membership includes most European states, the Russian Federation, the US and Canada. In 1998 the OSCE possessed a modest track record in small civilian conflict resolution missions in the Balkans and the former Soviet Socialist Republics.[4] Prior to Milošević's announcement the OSCE had been unaware of its proposed new role in the Balkans; however on 16 October its Chairman-in-Office (CiO) Bronisław Geremek announced that there would be a 'Kosovo Verification Mission' (KVM) of 2,000 unarmed verifiers from OSCE member states.[5] The next day an OSCE activation

[3] Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin Books, 1996); Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 3rd ed. (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 2009); Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo*; Dennison Rusinow, "The Yugoslav Peoples," in *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Peter F. Sugar (Washington D.C.: American University Press, 1995), 305-412; David L. Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and US Intervention* (Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press, 2012); Richard Caplan, "International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo," *International Affairs* 74, no. 4 (October 1998): 745-61.

[4] Alex J. Bellamy and Stuart Griffin, "OSCE peacekeeping: Lessons from the Kosovo Verification Mission," *European Security* 11, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 8-12.

[5] The CiO is a one year rotational appointment between OSCE member states' Foreign Ministers. On operational matters the CiO is advised by the OSCE Secretary General, the OSCE's chief administrative officer with responsibilities for the management of structures and operations.

team arrived in Pristina and the CiO appointed veteran US ambassador William Walker to be Head of Mission (HoM). As KVM rolled out it absorbed most of the participants and equipments of the six 'Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Missions' (KDOM) which had operated in Kosovo since July. The KVM's first public report was published on 12 November. In January the FRY regime gave the HoM 48 hours to leave the country following his condemnation of the killings at Račak - under intense international pressure this was subsequently 'suspended'. On 17 March the UN Secretary-General reported that "Further fighting has rendered the October 1998 ceasefire agreement almost meaningless"[6]: three days later KVM evacuated 1,300 international staff into FYROM. In anticipation of a significant role for the OSCE in Kosovo after a short NATO air campaign a rump KVM was maintained until June 1999. It was then dissolved into a transitional 'OSCE Task Force for Kosovo' which became the OSCE Mission in Kosovo a month later.

The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the conceptualisation, organisation and conduct of KVM to determine whether any of the verification pathologies described in Chapter II affected the content of the mission's verification reports to a non-trivial extent. The period under study is the entire duration of the KVM's presence in Kosovo (17 October 1998 to 20 March 1999). For this period the KVM verification narrative was constituted of six reports issued as annexes to reports by the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council, to which should be added statements made by the HoM following the killings at Račak (Section 5.6.2).[7] The

[6] Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council," S/1999/293, 17 March 1999, ¶34, DAG Repository.
[7] Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council," S/1998/1068, 12 November 1998, Annex I; Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council," S/1998/1147, 4 December 1998, Annex; Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council," S/1998/1221, 24 December 1998, Annex I; Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council," S/1999/99, 30 January 1999, Annex I; Security Council, "Letter dated 26 February 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/1999/214, 26 February 1999, Enclosure; Security Council, "Letter dated 23 March 1999 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council," S/1999/315, 23 March 1999, Enclosure. All in DAG Repository.

analysis focuses upon those elements of KVM which were directly concerned with verifying the ceasefire; it also discusses human rights verification to the extent that KVM co-joined that topic with ceasefire verification. It does not attend to those elements of KVM related solely to the transformation of political structures or preparing for elections, nor does it consider the question of why the ceasefire failed except where this is directly related to the design, resourcing and conduct of KVM.

Figure 5.1. Map of Kosovo showing Regional Boundaries and KVM locations on 28 February 1999. With additions (thick boundary lines and RC labels).[8]

[8] Enclosure to ICTY Witness Statement by Brigadier General Joseph Maisonneuve, 15 February 2000, Maisonneuve papers.

The remainder of the Chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 analyses how the mission's mandate bounded the mission in ways likely to have affected the verification narrative. Section 5.3 considers the effect of organisational pathologies within KVM, between KVM and OSCE HQ in Vienna, between KVM and the various KDOMs, and between KVM and NATO. Section 5.4 analyses the mission's verification processes including the concepts in relation to which the processes were designed and the ways in which the situation in Kosovo was baselined. Section 5.5 concerns the mission's verification narrative path and the procedures the verifiers attempted to carry out. Section 5.6 demonstrates that the HoM's statements concerning the killings at Račak constituted a successful attempt to manipulate the KVM verification narrative. The Chapter's conclusions are at Section 5.7.

5.2 Mandate Analysis

On 25 October 1998 the OSCE Permanent Council established KVM "in accordance with the mandate contained in the agreement signed by the CiO [the 'Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement', see below]."[9] In reality, the KVM's mandate derived from half a dozen Resolutions, Agreements, statements and letters, all of which the verifiers carried to Kosovo where they attempted to knit them into a coherent whole.[10] The KVM's existence, purpose and functioning were supposedly outlined in a verbal agreement concluded between Milošević and Holbrooke on 13 October 1998; however no record of this meeting was ever publicly produced.[11] As far as the outside world was concerned the 'Milošević-Holbrooke Agreement'

[9] OSCE Permanent Council Decision 263, 25 October 1998, ¶1, quoted in Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo*, 295.
[10] Marc Weller describes the deal as "a haphazard collection of ill-thought out and unclear commitments generated in late night negotiating sessions." Marc Weller, *Contested Statehood: Kosovo's Struggle for Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 106; Transcript of evidence by Colonel (Retired) Richard Ciaglinski to the ICTY on 2 June 2009, 5329, accessed 12 May 2016, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/djordjevic/trans/en/090602IT.htm; Transcript of evidence by Major General (Retired) John Drewienkiewicz to the ICTY on 22 June 2009, 6314, accessed 12 June 2016, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/djordjevic/trans/en/090622IT.htm.
[11] According to Ambassador Christopher Hill, who participated in the meetings, neither did Milošević sign any document. However, in evidence to the ICTY Walker's US military assistant admitted that he had himself been in possession of a copy in Pristina: if true this strongly indicates that the written text of the Agreement was available to Walker (an alternative possibility is that Walker's assistant confused the Milošević-Holbrooke Agreement with the Clark/Neumann letter). Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Phillips, "Victory by Accident: An Assessment of the Political and Military Dimensions in Kosovo," research paper, US Air University (2003): 21

was articulated across three different texts: a statement by the Serbian Government, a record of a meeting between senior military representatives of NATO and the FRY, and an Agreement done between the head of the US KDOM and the FRY's Chief of Public Security. The first of these (the '11 Point Plan', 13 October 1998) confirmed that an OSCE mission could conduct "full-scale monitoring of the situation in Kosovo-Metohija," agreed that "Within nine months, there will be free and fair elections for Kosovo authorities," but caveated that "Any solution for Kosovo must respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty and internationally recognized boundaries of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."[12] The second (commonly known as the 'Clark/Neumann letter', 25 October 1998) stated the FRY would "bring down the level of presence and the equipment of security forces (MUP and VJ) throughout [Kosovo] to normal levels i.e. to the levels preceding the outbreak of terrorist activities" and that the FRY "were counting on the assistance and support of the OSCE Verification Mission" to achieve this.[13] The special police and VJ deployed into Kosovo after February 1998 would be withdrawn and VJ units normally based in Kosovo would be garrisoned (with the exception of three company-sized teams at strategic points). Those MUP and VJ commanders who remained in Kosovo would provide the OSCE with "detailed weekly reports of manning, weapons, and activities of their forces" and would immediately notify the OSCE of any contrary deployments and the reasons for them.[14] The third text was an unexpected consequence of the participation of the head of the US KDOM (Shaun Byrnes) in a working group on the MUP adjunct to NATO's military negotiations. The 'Byrnes-Djindjic Agreement' (25 October 1998) required the dismantling of all police checkpoints in Kosovo, permitted the establishment of 27 observation points (of which one third would be

(ftn 8), accessed 20 June 2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a424572.pdf; Transcript of evidence by Colonel (Retired) Michael Phillips to the ICTY on 1 September 2009, 8745-6, accessed 14 June 2016, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/djordjevic/trans/en/090901ED.htm.

[12] "Serbian Government Endorses Accord Reached by President Milosevic, Belgrade, 13 October 1998," preamble, pt 7, pt 3, quoted in Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo*, 279.

[13] "Record of NATO-Serbia / FRY Meeting in Belgrade, 25 October 1998," quoted in Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo*, 283.

[14] Ibid.

manned "initially"), and further permitted the police "[i]n case of incidents or increased tension" to conduct armoured patrols provided notification was provided to "KDOM / OSCE."[15] A notable feature of these three components of the Milošević-Holbrooke Agreement is that the sum total of permitted *quantifiable* requirements comprises the number of company-sized teams the VJ could deploy (Clark/Neumann letter) and the number of permissible MUP observation points (Byrnes-Djordjevic Agreement).

The Milošević-Holbrooke Agreement was done without consulting or even informing the OSCE of the roles it was being offered up to take (Holbrooke later noted the CiO was "somewhat taken aback by the size and potential expense of the role devised for the OSCE in Kosovo").[16] The threat of NATO action impelled the FRY to rapidly reach an agreement with the OSCE (the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement, 16 October 1998) to establish a KVM "To verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council Resolution 1199, and report instances of progress and/or non-compliance to the OSCE Permanent Council, the United Nations Security Council and other organisations."[17] In itself, the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement was vague on what KVM would verify, stating only that the mission "will travel throughout Kosovo to verify the maintenance of the cease-fire by all elements" and that it would "look for and report on roadblocks." However, Security Council Resolution 1199 inferred that KVM would also verify the cessation of "all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population ... [and] the withdrawal of security units used for civilian

[15] Colonel General Vlastimir Djordjevic and Shaun M. Byrnes, "Understanding between KDOM and the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia," document, 25 October 1998, author's private collection. For an explanation as to how Byrnes came to act as a NATO signatory see Transcript of evidence by Shaun Byrnes to the ICTY on 21 August 2009, 8239, accessed 20 December 2016, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/djordjevic/trans/en/090821IT.htm.

[16] Jane Perlez, "Milosevic Accepts Kosovo Monitors, Averting Attack" *New York Times*, 14 October 1998. Despite several requests, the US never informed the CiO of the Agreement's contents and this, he recalled, created problems when he spoke to Milošević about KVM: "Milosevic would simply say: "No, that was not what I agreed with Mr Holbrooke"." Knut Vollebæk quoted in Dag Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998-1999* (Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 156. See also Marc Weller, *Peace Lost: the Failure of Conflict Prevention in Kosovo* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 83.

[17] "OSCE-FRY Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement, 16 October 1998," quoted in Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo*, 293-4.

repression" and that every element in the Kosovo Albanian community was pursuing their goals by peaceful means.[18] To enable this (the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement stated), the FRY, Serbian and Kosovan authorities would provide "full cooperation and support to the Verification Mission," whose personnel would have "full freedom of movement and access throughout Kosovo at all times." The FRY guaranteed "the safety and security of the Verification Mission and all its members." KVM would be permitted "2000 unarmed verifiers from OSCE member states." It would absorb the KDOMs "once operational." Negotiated in haste and without knowledge of the details of the Milošević-Holbrooke Agreement, and done prior to the Clark/Neumann letter and the Byrnes-Djordjevic Agreement, the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement contained no quantifiable data or identifying information on the objects or situations which were to be verified. As the mandate's various source documents contained few quantifiable requirements either, the KVM's ability to verify through (objective) systems of numerical comparison would inevitably be limited.

The most immediate and fundamental problem with the KVM mandate jigsaw was that none of its elements had been negotiated with, agreed by or even informed to one of the two conflict parties, the KLA. Whilst the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement committed KVM to 'verify compliance by *all* parties' with UNSCR 1199 (the reference to 'every element in the Kosovo Albanian community' an obvious reference to the KLA) the failure to name the KLA in any of the texts effectively constituted the Serbs as the sole conflict party. Confident that the KLA could be persuaded to agree to a ceasefire, the US State Department deployed Ambassador Christopher Hill into Kosovo to negotiate with the insurgents. However, this effort was aborted in the middle of December.[19] This gave credence to the Serbs' (and the Russians') complaints that the activities of legitimate governmental structures were being

[18] UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (23 September 1998), ¶4(a), ¶6.
[19] Major General (Retired) John Drewienkiewicz, interview by author, Cambridge, 3 October 2018; Christopher Hill, *Outpost: Life on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 134-47.

verified whilst the activities of insurgents were not.[20] Later testifying at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Walker recalled that "there was no formally arranged or secured agreement with the KLA, but there had been, I assume, verbal assurances by the KLA that they would abide by a cease-fire as long as the government abided by the cease-fire. So we felt we were there to enforce and tell about non-compliance with an agreement for a cease-fire."[21] However, whilst the verifiers tried to persuade the KLA to adhere to the ceasefire, and went so far as to tell the FRY authorities that they would be verifying "organized armed civilian groups," the KLA felt no commitment to exercise restraint.[22] A senior verifier recalled that "Each time I had to deal with the UÇK I told them that I had a legitimacy due to the Holbrooke Agreement ... each time they told me "but we never signed this agreement"."[23] In failing to classify the KLA the KVM's mandate situated that conflict party outside of the CVM's parameters. As a consequence, the verifiers were unable to verify the KLA in any meaningful way and the KVM's activities manifested as systemically biased to the party that *had* agreed to a ceasefire.

Omissions and inconsistencies within and between the mandate source documents offered the Serbs opportunities to bound the KVM's activities through 'rule setting'. On 10 November the FRY submitted a non paper to the OSCE in which they attempted to establish several 'rules' additional to what had previously been agreed.[24] Equal representation of OSCE member states in KVM was deemed necessary (an obvious nod to the Russian Federation). Noting that the KDOMs were to be absorbed into KVM (and perhaps cognisant that the meaning of

[20] A KVM delegation to Moscow was pressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs as to why the mission was not verifying the KLA as much as the authorities. BGen Michel Maisonneuve to LCol Meiklejohn, "Update 11 - RC Prizren KVM," fax, 15 February 1999, Maisonneuve Papers.
[21] Transcript of evidence by Ambassador William Walker to the ICTY on 12 June 2002, 6918, accessed 26 August 2017, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/020612IT.htm.
[22] I R Sinclair, "Record of a Meeting Between Major General DZ, Deputy Head of Mission for Operations and General Loncar, Head of the FRY Co-operation Commission, at the Commission Offices 1100-1300 Hours 4 December 98," memo, 6 December 1998, DZ Papers.
[23] Major General (Retired) Emmanuel Legendre, interview by author, Skype, 14 September 2018; BGen Michel Maisonneuve to LCol Meiklejohn, "Update 3 - RC Prizren KVM," fax, 14 January 1999, Maisonneuve Papers.
[24] Dubravka Zverzhanovski to Giancarlo Aragona, letter, 10 November 1998, DCiP.

'once operational' might prove fluid in practice) it was expected that the KDOMs - which at that time constituted national diplomatic entities with the protections that status allowed - would henceforth copy their reports to the FRY. Responding to moves by Walker to expand the mission's activities to include human rights verification, it was emphasised that the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement made no provision for human rights. Separately, in Kosovo the KVM activation team was forced to rebuff an attempt by the FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 'clarify' details in the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement.[25] By attempting to 'set the rules' the Serbs sought to control the 'empirical means' by which KVM might establish the parties' adherence to the ceasefire and, consequently, to have influence on the ceasefire verification narrative.

Reflecting on KVM, Walker suggested that "Agreements based on ambiguities, implicit understanding between parties may have their place ... [but when] Dealing with a Slobodan Milošević, a proven manipulator of the truth and unreliable on promises made, the clarity of intent and language cannot be left to later interpretation."[26] This had been repeatedly demonstrated by the verifiers' difficulties in holding the Serbs to conditions which were inadequately defined, ambiguous or absent. A month into the deployment Walker and his Deputy HoM for operations (Major General John Drewienkiewicz) were still attempting to agree with the Serbs what key terms in the mandate documents ('company-sized team', 'checkpoint', 'observation point', 'heavy weapons' etc.) actually meant.[27] Whilst the mission might reasonably hope to define such tangible objects they were unlikely to ever clearly bound terms such as 'actions by the security forces affecting the civilian population' or 'security units used for civilian repression'. Were the KLA to be considered members of the

[25] OSCE, "Note for the Record of a Meeting at the FRY Ministery of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade at 1400 hrs on Saturday, 17 October 1998," note, undated, DCiP.
[26] William Walker, "OSCE Verification Experiences in Kosovo: November 1998 - June 1999," in *The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions*, ed. Ken Booth (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 138.
[27] Ambassador Walker to President Milosevic, letter, 23 November 1998, DZ Papers; "Talking points for Belgrade Meeting (27 November 1998)," notes, undated, DZ Papers.

'civilian population'? How could one objectively distinguish 'civilian repression' from routine policing? Of great consequence was the Clark/Neumann letter's acceptance that "as a last resort, and consistent with the right of self defense, the State authorities retain the right to respond adequately and proportionately to any form of terrorist activity ... which could jeopardize the lives and safety of citizens and representatives of the State authorities." In Marc Weller's words, "essentially it was a ceasefire without an obligation to cease fire entirely," an introduction of structural subjectivity which made it difficult for the *Serbs* to understand whether they were breaching the ceasefire, let alone the verifiers.[28]

At various times, both the MUP and the VJ employed the FRY government's guarantee of 'the safety and security of the Verification Mission' to prevent verifier access to ongoing operations.[29] Another mandate ambiguity which resulted in significant restrictions on the verifiers' activities concerned access to the border regions. The following parts of the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement's 'Specific Terms of Reference' apply:

> [¶1] The Verification Mission will travel throughout Kosovo to verify the maintenance of the cease-fire by all elements. It will investigate reports of cease-fire violations. Mission personnel will have full freedom of movement and access throughout Kosovo at all times. ...
>
> [¶4] The Verification Mission will maintain liaison with FRY activities about border control activity and movements by units with border control responsibilities through Kosovo away from the border. The Verification Mission, when invited by the FRY authorities or upon its request, will visit border control units and accompany them as they perform their normal border control roles.

On the basis of ¶1 KVM insisted that 'full freedom of movement and access throughout Kosovo at all times' applied to the border regions. The Serbs countered that it applied only to

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[28] Weller, *Peace Lost,* 84.

[29] This concern for the verifiers' safety did not extend to permitting KVM to operate a medical evacuation helicopter or allowing the HoM's personal security detail to carry small arms (because KVM was to be made up of '2000 *unarmed* verifiers'). Drewienkiewicz, "KVM Operations Branch Internal Daily Review as at: Close of 14 Mar 99," note, undated, DZ Papers; John Drewienkiewicz and Alexander E. R. Woodcock, "Getting Missions Started," in *The Cornwallis Group V: Analysis for Crisis Response and Societal Reconstruction*, eds. A. E. R. Woodcock and David F. Davis (Clementsport, N.S.: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2000), 17.

the investigation of reported cease-fire violations and that, furthermore, ¶4 specified liaison 'away from the border'. These differences were explored at the ICTY when a senior verifier appeared as a witness:

> [Defence Counsel] Let us go back to para 4 [of the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement]. It says: "... through areas of Kosovo away from the border." That is the end of the first sentences. This para concerns the areas away from the border.
>
> [Witness] It doesn't talk about access, it says that we will maintain liaison about border control activities away from the border. Nothing about access.
>
> [Defence Counsel] Yes, but look at the next sentence, that such missions will be conducted when invited by the FRY authorities or upon its request. Therefore, there must have been a request. There should have been for you to be able to do that.
>
> [Witness] Yes, a request was required from either side. However, it does say: "... to visit border control units and to accompany them on their normal border patrols." But the border belt, as you say, was enormous and so you couldn't prevent us entering the border belt to see what was going on. ... I didn't write these rules, and I didn't -- I didn't, sort of, screw up the meaning of these -- of what was actually meant. Unfortunately, many agreements are writing [sic] very badly.[30]

Exploiting these ambiguities, the Serbs required the verifiers to both give notice and seek permission to enter the border regions.[31] As several of the most serious alleged ceasefire violations occurred in those areas this constituted a serious constraint upon the KVM's ability to investigate those complaints. In February a senior verifier noted that "The VJ insist that we be accompanied by [liaison officers], but something always happens to make it impossible (eg, they show up late, or without vehicles, etc). In essence, we are being played with in the most obvious Balkan way."[32] There is, accordingly, much to support the opinion of the Principal Deputy HoM (Ambassador Gabriel Keller) that the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement contained both insufficient detail and too many ambiguities to enable the OSCE to deliver an

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[30] Ciaglinski, ICTY (2 June 2009), 5352-3.
[31] D Wilson, "Key Points from Meetings with VJ and MUP 16 Dec 98," memo, 16 December 1998, DZ Papers; D Wilson, "Background Notes on Kosovo," note, 27 December 1998, Maisonneuve Papers.
[32] BGen Michel Maisonneuve to LCol Meiklejohn, "Update 9 - RC Prizren KVM," fax, 1 February 1999, Maisonneuve Papers. See also Transcript of evidence by Major General Joseph Maisonneuve to the ICTY on 29 May 2002, 5828, accessed 12 August 2018, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/020529ED.htm.

effective CVM.[33] Several of the resultant ceasefire verification reports were substantially affected as a consequence.

5.3 Organisation Analysis

This Section considers ways in which organisational pathologies may have affected the KVM verification narrative. The organisations of interest are the conducting IO (OSCE HQ in Vienna), its subsidiary CVM (KVM), the various KDOMs set up in Kosovo some three months before KVM, and various NATO elements including some of those deployed in neighbouring FYROM. Section 5.3.1 discusses issues internal to KVM which may have affected the verification reports submitted to OSCE HQ and onwards to UN HQ in New York. Sections 5.3.2, 5.3.3 and 5.3.4 analyse the nexus between KVM and OSCE HQ, the KDOMs, and NATO (respectively) to explain those issues.

5.3.1 KVM

Given the OSCE had no advance warning of the Milošević-Holbrooke Agreement, it deployed the KVM's initial elements remarkably quickly. Seconded to OSCE HQ by the UK, a team of serving and retired military officers rapidly set up a 'KVM Support Unit' (KVMSU) to assist in planning the mission and to then support it. An early decision was to base the KVM's laydown on the separation of the province into the same five regions (based on municipal boundaries) the KDOMs had employed (Figure 5.1). Each region would be managed by a Regional Centre (RC) reporting to a mission HQ in Pristina. KVM HQ was established within a month of the Agreement; on 28 November the first verifiers deployed into the regions. By that time over 1,500 personnel had been offered by member states and

[33] "Speaking notes of Ambassador Gabriel Keller on the occasion of his address to the Informal Ad Hoc Meeting (Kosovo-Sandjak-Voijvodina) Tuesday, 25 May 1999," notes, 27 May 1999, DCiP.

the KVMSU was anticipating expanding the mission by up to 250 verifiers a week.[34] However, the pace could not be maintained: by the time of the evacuation only the first RC to be activated (RC 1, Prizren) had achieved even 50% manning. This severely limited the RCs' abilities to deploy verifiers throughout their regional areas.[35] Furthermore, whilst the majority of senior appointments were filled relatively quickly, personnel for the more junior posts - which included many of the actual verifiers - took much longer to arrive.[36] There were also concerns about verifier suitability. The early imperative towards visible activity had resulted in many of the most important posts being filled primarily on the basis of rapid availability, and national sensitivities and contractual obligations made it hard to replace these people when better qualified individuals came along.[37] (Drewienkiewicz did actually replace the head of the mission's Fusion Cell as demonstrably unsuitable, but only after a prolonged struggle.[38]) In certain instances jobs with little actual meaning were created to accommodate senior individuals. The mission HQ became large and unwieldy (on 15 January accommodating 30% of the entire mission strength) with six Deputy HoMs jostling to influence the conduct of the mission and the man who headed it.[39] By Keller's account the mission's structure was a cause of cultural contestation, the gathering of the most significant political elements closely around the HoM and the primacy of Drewienkiewicz's 'militarised' Operations Department resulting in each Department developing its own priorities and working practices. This had an overall detrimental effect upon diplomatic unity and, importantly, to generating a clear and common understanding of the mission's mandate.[40] To

[34] Head, KVM Support Group, "Statement of Requirements for Personnel," memo, 5 November 1998, DZ Papers; "Kosovo Verification Mission - Number of candidates offered per country," memo, 10 November 1998, DZ Papers.
[35] Brigadier General Michel Maisonneuve, interview by author, Montreal, 13 March 2017.
[36] Head KVM Support Unit to Director CPC, "Selection of Personnel for KVM Start Up," memo, 5 November 1998, DZ Papers.
[37] "Notes Taken at Debriefing General DZ," note, 23 April 1999, DZ Papers; Drewienkiewicz, interview.
[38] Drewienkiewicz, "KVM Operations Branch Internal Daily Review as at: Close of 12 Jan 99," note, 12 January 1999, DZ Papers.
[39] Drewienkiewicz described the Deputy HoMs (of which he was one) as playing "a so-called land grab 'stake their claim'." "Notes Taken at Debriefing General DZ," note, 23 April 1999, DZ Papers.
[40] Keller, "Speaking notes," 27 May 1999.

understand why the mission's ability to physically conduct verification, and to possess a homogenous understanding of the bases upon which it was to do this, were impacted in these ways it is necessary to consider the mission's genesis in Vienna.

5.3.2 The KVM-OSCE HQ Nexus

As an IO used to delivering small missions in an incremental manner, the OSCE's structures were poorly matched to the imperative to commence verification in Kosovo as fast as possible. Since 1990, the Vienna based Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) has coordinated the operational aspects of establishing and running OSCE field missions. Today the CPC is tasked with documenting field practices that might be useful on other OSCE deployments: however, in 1998 the KVMSU discovered that the OSCE lacked the 'corporate memory' upon which KVM could be designed and its construction enabled. Few CPC personnel possessed the experience to deal with the scale and tempo of the requisite operational planning and senior members were distracted by other tasks.[41] The OSCE sought to alleviate this by importing personnel from ongoing missions. However, very few of those individuals volunteered to transfer to KVM and under its contracting arrangements the OSCE could not require them to do so.[42] The OSCE also heavily augmented the CPC and its Department for Administration and Budget (57% and 28% increases in posts respectively) and upgraded the status of the individuals in charge of those structures.[43] Despite this, the inefficiency of requiring the KVMSU to coordinate through the CPC to other OSCE departments soon became so apparent that the OSCE Secretary General removed the KVMSU from the CPC's control and directed that the head of the KVMSU coordinate directly with him.[44] This

[41] Ettore Greco, "The Role of the Conflict Prevention Centre in the Security System of the CSCE," *Helsinki Monitor* 5 (1994): 5-15; OSCE, "The OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre," factsheet, 1 September 2015, accessed 18 March 2018, https://www.osce.org/cpc/13717; COS KVMSU, "Lessons Learned from the KVMSU Planning Group," fax, 7 December 1998, DCiP; Drewienkiewicz, interview.
[42] "Notes Taken at Debriefing General DZ," note, 23 April 1999, DZ Papers; Drewienkiewicz, interview.
[43] Secretary General to Heads of Delegation, "1998 Budget Proposal for the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)," memo, 9 November 1998, DCiP.
[44] Ambassador Giancarlo Aragona, e-mail message to author, 1 October 2018; Secretary General to All Heads of Delegation, "Kosovo Verification Mission-Support Unit," memo, 2 November 1998, DCiP.

transformation of the KVMSU into a semi-autonomous entity proved a double-edged sword. Whilst the planners became empowered to coordinate across the IO, they were unfamiliar with its operating procedures as the Defence Ministries that had loaned them had little experience of cooperating with the OSCE.[45] Also, the OSCE's inability to determine a formal position on the mission's mandate severely hindered the planning effort, the first head of the KVMSU receiving almost no guidance on the operational concept for verification.[46]

Contrary to the desired tempo, it rapidly transpired that the deployment's pace would be set by the response of the IO's enabling elements. Whilst the KVMSU planned to set up a number of RC HQs concurrently, the rollout became sequential when it was discovered that the contractor the OSCE had deployed was only capable of setting up one major infrastructure contract at a time. The OSCE's Department for Human Resources similarly lacked urgency:

> I said, please can we have 2,000 people as quickly as you can let us have them. The question I got back was, would you please write the 2,000 job specifications for the 2,000 posts. And so that was the ethos of the organisation ... procedural bureaucracy frustrated our wish to get people on the ground as quickly as possible ... we had a similar amount of foot-dragging with regard to providing vehicles for 2,000 people, for providing radios and computers and even locations.[47]

The recruiting and selection of personnel was impacted by availability, patronage and the imperatives of representatives to the OSCE Permanent Council to secure high profile posts for their nationals sometimes irrespective of qualifications or ability.[48] Without the insulation the CPC had provided, KVM HQ was expected to respond to uncoordinated inquiries from 54 national delegations who would often simultaneously solicit information directly from their

[45] Drewienkiewicz, "KVM Operations Branch Internal Daily Review as at: Close of 14 Nov 98," note, 14 November 1998, DZ Papers; Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 104.
[46] COS KVMSU, "Lessons Learned from the KVMSU Planning Group," fax, 7 December 1998, DCiP; Drewienkiewicz, ICTY (22 June 2009), 6314.
[47] Drewienkiewicz, ICTY (22 June 2009), 6312-3.
[48] BGen Maisonneuve to LGen RR Henault, "Update," fax, 26 November 1998, Maisonneuve papers; Phillips, "Victory by Accident," 10; J. Cohen, *Conflict Prevention in the OSCE* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations *Clingendael*, 1999), 87.

nationals on the ground. Over time, KVM's perceptions of slow responses to demands for specialist personnel and mission-critical equipments, of micromanagement by the IO, the lack of 24-hour manning in the CPC, and the OSCE HQ's general shutdown over Christmas resulted in what Drewienkiewicz described as "an unfortunate Us and Them mentality of Mission versus Vienna."[49] One implication of this was that senior personnel in KVM HQ ceased making written records of important meetings and decisions.[50]

A different source of friction pertained to the number of serving and retired military personnel involved in the 'civilian' mission, particularly in the early stages when decisions about the KVM's structures and processes were made. This 'militarisation' occurred because member states were best able to provide military personnel at short notice and because the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement's focus upon the VJ (and its failing to recognise the MUP's paramilitary character) suggested a requirement for personnel with detailed military knowledge.[51] Some of the civilian verifiers found this difficult to accept: according to one human rights verifier, "these big military guys somehow take over and create this kind of macho attitude in the mission where human rights is seen as something very soft and not very serious."[52] This approach also sat uneasily with the OSCE which attempted to prioritise those aspects of the Agreement in which its track record lay (i.e. elections and human rights, the former evidently belonging to a subsequent mission phase, the latter not included within the mission's mandate).[53] The OSCE's decision to delegate the planning of KVM to the KVMSU rather than restructuring (as opposed to uplifting) the CPC, its inability to interrogate its own previous missions to assist the process, its suspicion of personnel with military skill-sets, and

[49] "Notes Taken at Debriefing General DZ," note, 23 April 1999, DZ Papers. See also Phillips, "Victory by Accident," 11.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Walker additionally noted that the salaries of military personnel are 'relatively modest'. Walker, "OSCE Verification Experiences in Kosovo," 141 (ftn 5); Maj Gen K J Drewienkiewicz, "The Limits of Unarmed Peacekeeping," slides, 2000, Drewienkiewicz papers; Alex Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society*, 104.
[52] Annette Lyth, interview by author, Skype, 7 September 2018; Keller, "Speaking notes," 27 May 1999.
[53] Drewienkiewicz, interview.

its preference for those elements of the Agreement which most accorded with its extant processes indicate goal displacement from the mission it had been volunteered for towards the mission it would have preferred. However, the nature of the relationships between the KVMSU and the permanent departments in Vienna, and between KVM and the Permanent Council, suggest the slowing of the KVM's initially rapid rollout was also consequent of cultural contestation within OSCE HQ and between OSCE HQ and KVM. Both of these verification pathologies, accordingly, affected the KVM's ceasefire verification reports, particularly in the early stages of the mission when the KVM's reporting was primarily limited by its ability to deploy verifiers throughout the mission area.

5.3.3 The KVM-KDOM Nexus

The KDOMs (which Holbrooke and Hill both claimed to have 'invented') were formed on the basis of a communique between Milošević and Boris Yeltsin which assured, without restriction, "Full freedom of movement on the whole territory of Kosovo" to diplomatic representatives of foreign governments and IOs accredited in the FRY.[54] Their appearance was welcomed by the UN as a step towards establishing "effective international monitoring" in Kosovo.[55] From July 1998 Canada, France, the EU, the Russian Federation, the UK and the US operated KDOMs to enable those countries to determine what was occurring on the ground. The Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement stated that the KDOMs would be incrementally absorbed into KVM as the mission rolled out: accordingly, there would be an interim period when the KDOMs and KVM co-existed. Each KDOM operated in a different way. Some of the KDOMs provided useful situational awareness and introductions to the KVM's verifiers: the EU KDOM, conversely, refused to share its reports. The EU and US KDOMs generally refused to coordinate their patrols with KVM, and this confused the relationships between

[54] "Joint Statement by President of Russian Federation and President of FRY, Moscow, 16 June 1998," quoted in Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo*, 292.
[55] UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (23 September 1998), ¶8; Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 177; Hill, *Outpost*, 131.

KVM and the conflict parties.[56] The US claimed that its KDOM needed to remain a separate entity to enable it to support US efforts to secure a KLA ceasefire agreement: however, once this effort had failed the US sent its key liaison officers home and continued to operate a KDOM independent of KVM.[57] In addition to annoying the Serbs (who correctly pointed out that this breached the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement), the sudden and unexpected departure of those personnel who had previously insisted on reserving KLA liaison to themselves meant that KVM had to commence building its own links with the KLA from scratch. According to Drewienkiewicz, the consequent two month delay from when KVM commenced its deployment to when it commenced building relationships with one of the two conflict parties constituted "a major factor in the inability of the mission to fulfil its mandate" as it starved the mission of information it would otherwise have received from the KLA.[58] This may be modelled as an organisational pathology as a constituent element of the Milošević-Holbrooke Agreement (the Byrnes-Djindjic Agreement) co-joined the KDOMs and KVM as an organisation for the limited purpose of verifying the compliance of all parties with UN Security Council Resolution 1199. In that the EU and, especially, the US apparently regarded the perpetuation of their dedicated information gathering missions to be of greater importance than the effective operation of KVM their actions may reasonably be described as cultural contestation.

5.3.4 The KVM-NATO Nexus

The Clark/Neumann letter having specified that KVM and the NATO air surveillance mission would be coordinated between KVM HQ and NATO, KVM engaged closely with NATO throughout the mission's duration. Once cooperation arrangements had been agreed between

[56] "CC1 CS R17 Patrol Report," report, 15 December 1998, DCiP; BGen Michel Maisonneuve to LCol Meiklejohn, "Update 2 - RC Prizren KVM," fax, 8 January 1999, Maisonneuve papers.
[57] Weller suggests the US desired to maintain an independent verification presence in Kosovo: he notes the US KDOM was made up of 143 personnel in comparison to 33 personnel for the other five KDOMs combined. Weller, *Contested Statehood*, 103.
[58] Drewienkiewicz, e-mail message to author, 30 August 2018.

the OSCE and NATO Secretary Generals a 'Kosovo Verification Coordination Centre' (KVCC) was established in FYROM. There KVM and NATO personnel routinely met to discuss the coordination of the ground and air verification efforts and the sharing of information.[59] In December CINCSOUTH (the commander of the NATO HQ with responsibility for the Kosovo area of operations) was tasked to "share information with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo, and assist the OSCE in synchronising inspections to ensure the maximum probability of detecting non-compliance with UNSCR 1199."[60] A secure phone was installed in KVM HQ to enable the exchange of NATO classified information with approved KVM personnel from NATO countries. KVM provided the KVCC with human source information that NATO regarded as "very good, very accurate ... very valuable" and NATO officers contacted verifiers directly on many occasions.[61] However, the passage of information from KVM to the KVCC was never meaningfully reciprocated. Even though Walker personally raised the issue with CINCSOUTH the KVM's requests for air surveillance imagery and other information were repeatedly de-prioritised or 'lost'.[62] At the end of January Drewienkiewicz recorded:

> The Head of Mission had a frank exchange with the Director of the KVCC ... It was agreed that the flow of information was one-sided, and that KVCC had access to much information which it was not able to send to KVM because of NATO security rules. It is ironic that when HoM visited [RAF] Molesworth he saw many specific to KVM products, which are currently unavailable to KVM.[63]

[59] Javier Solana to Secretary General of the OSCE, letter, SG(98)1129, dated 4 November 1998, DCiP; Drewienkiewicz, "KVM Operations Branch Internal Daily Review as at: Close of 30 Nov 98," note, 30 November 1998, DZ Papers.
[60] CINCSOUTH to Ambassador Walker, "Eagle Eye and Extraction Force Operations," slides, 17 December 1998, DZ Papers.
[61] Brigadier David Montgomery, interview by author, Skype, 16 October 2018; Phillips, ICTY (1 September 2009), 8761.
[62] Drewienkiewicz, "KVM Operations Branch Internal Daily Review as at: Close of 17 Dec 99," note, 17 December 1998, DZ Papers; Drewienkiewicz, "KVM Operations Branch Internal Daily Review as at: Close of 28 Jan 99," note, 28 January 1999, DZ Papers; Major General Drewienkiewicz to Brigadier Montgomery, letter, 5 February 1999, DZ Papers.
[63] Drewienkiewicz, "KVM Operations Branch Internal Daily Review as at: Close of 31 Jan 99," note, 31 January 1999, DZ Papers.

Despite his order to CINCSOUTH, the commander of NATO forces in Europe later wrote that "we didn't want to pass NATO information to OSCE for their assessment. Rather, we wanted an independent NATO voice in assessing compliance."[64] NATO forces gathered intelligence in Kosovo disguised as members of KVM.[65] Like the KDOMs, NATO combined the KVM's verification reports with its own monitoring to construct accounts of the developing situation in Kosovo which offered an alternative verification narrative to that represented in the KVM's ceasefire verification reports.[66] Furthermore, the KVM's engagement with NATO contributed to a perception amongst the Serbs (and some of the verifiers) that KVM was neither independent nor impartial. The Principal Deputy HoM subsequently described this as a major factor in disincentivising the Serbs from cooperating with the mission, but as there are several other significant factors it is impossible to assess the extent of the effect of this.[67] However, given the quantity, variety and sophistication of NATO's surveillance technology in 1998-9 it is reasonable to state that NATO's failure to conduct the information sharing with KVM that its political and military leaders had agreed did have a substantial effect on the KVM ceasefire verification reports. As with the KVM-KDOM nexus, this may be modelled as an organisational pathology as a constituent element of the Milošević-Holbrooke Agreement (the Clark/Neumann letter) co-joined the OSCE and NATO as an organisation for the limited purpose of verifying the compliance of all parties with UN Security Council Resolution 1199. In that NATO quite obviously regarded its interests to be of greater importance than the overall international verification effort its actions may similarly be described as cultural contestation.

[64] General Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (Oxford: PublicAffairs Ltd, 2001), 132.
[65] General Sir Mike Jackson, *Soldier: The Autobiography* (London: Bantam Press, 2007), 226.
[66] Drewienkiewicz, interview.
[67] Keller, "Speaking notes," 27 May 1999.

5.4 Verification Processes

Holbrooke's strange distinction between 'monitor' (a "bureaucratic babble word") and 'verification' ("compliance verifiers ... hands-on activist") was likely intended to signal that KVM would act in a more intrusive way than CVMs had previously done.[68] It was, however, evident that for the OSCE's 'compliance verifiers' to assess whether the VJ's and the MUP's presence and equipment had been brought down to 'normal levels' they would need to know what those normal levels were. The OSCE understood that establishing verification baselines would be critical to mission success: as Drewienkiewicz wrote, "in order to conduct verification (not just observation or monitoring), we need to begin with a complete and detailed baseline - provided by FRY."[69] Accordingly, on 23 November Walker wrote to Milošević:

> OSCE requires detailed information on all FRY/Serbian security forces in Kosovo. ... [Informational elements] must be provided for each separately identifiable formation, unit or sub-unit of the security forces. ... It is important that this information accurately reflects the situation on the ground, including identifying all barracks and cantonment areas ... OSCE also requires information on all FRY/Serbian security forces, including weapons and equipment, which were withdrawn from Kosovo.[70]

Whilst the Serbs then gave KVM certain baseline information, despite several further requests they failed to provide data from either February 1998 or November 1998 concerning the

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[68] Ftn 1. Additionally, Walker wanted KVM to *actively* prevent conflict rather than enable conflict transformation by providing security guarantees. In February he spoke to *Newsweek*: "Let me be clear about KVM's mission ... we are in Kosovo to keep the two sides apart until a political solution can be reached. ... That means being everywhere on the ground, reporting on ceasefire violations and attempting to keep isolated clashes from spiralling into broader conflict." By that date his unarmed verifiers had interposed themselves between the VJ / MUP and the KLA on several occasions and Walker and Drewienkiewicz had participated in mediations for the release of both parties' hostages. William Walker, "Improvisational Peace," *Newsweek*, 1 February 1999; "Remarks by Ambassador Walker, January 8, 1999," quoted in Philip E. Auerswald, David P. Auerswald, and Christian Duttweiler, *The Kosovo Conflict: A Diplomatic History through Documents* (Cambridge, M.A.: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 405; Gabriel Keller, "Points of interest for the incoming chairman in office," note, 7 January 1999, DCiP; Drewienkiewicz, "KVM Operations Branch Internal Daily Review as at: Close of 12 Jan 99," note, undated, DZ Papers; Ettore Greco, "The OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission: A Preliminary Assessment," *International Peacekeeping* 4 (1998): 116.

[69] Drewienkiewicz, "Talking Points for 3 December Meeting with General Lazdrević," note, 27 November 1998, DZ Papers; Adam Kobieracki, "OSCE KVM Mission Analysis Brief," slides, 29 October 1998, DCiP.

[70] Ambassador Walker to President Milosevic, letter, 23 November 1998, DZ Papers.

identities and strengths of VJ units or the strengths and weapon holdings of the MUP.[71] Challenged at the ICTY in 2002 by Milošević (then conducting his own defence) that the FRY's forces had been reduced to the numbers required, Walker replied:

> It is not true ... we were constantly asking you and your commanders for baseline information as to how many police, how many military, how many weapons, how many tanks, how many artillery pieces you had in Kosovo at the time of the agreement so we could determine whether the numbers were going up or down or sideways. ... maybe you did withdraw 6,000 [police officers], but we were never able to confirm that because we had no baseline information from which to determine whether the numbers were going up or down.[72]

To generate a working baseline the verifiers fell back upon archived lists of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) collected by the OSCE under Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) arrangements. As TLE figures were seldom updated they could be used to estimate the numbers of VJ units and heavy equipments (tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery pieces) garrisoned permanently in Kosovo before February 1998. However, the MUP also possessed a certain number of armoured vehicles and the TLE data did not distinguish between police and military equipments. As regards the KLA, despite the KVM's optimistic statements as to their eventual incorporation in the verification effort no serious attempt was ever made to formalise baselines and instigate a KLA inspection regime.

A significant consequence of the KVM's inability to obtain baseline data was that the mission was unable to issue its verifiers with adequate verification standards.[73] At the end of

[71] February 1998 was identified in the Clark/Neumann letter as the baseline of "normal peacetime activities" prior to the "outbreak of terrorist activities" which signaled the build-up of Serbian forces. Drewienkiewicz, "KVM Operations Branch Internal Daily Review as at: Close of 1 Dec 98," note, 1 December 1998, DZ Papers; Ambassador Walker to Deputy Prime Minister Šainović, letter, 12 December 1998, DZ Papers; Drewienkiewicz, ICTY (22 June 2009), 6317, 6327.
[72] Walker, ICTY (12 June 2002), 6900-1.
[73] It is, thus, surprising that a 'KVM Mission Director's Verification Task List' was produced as early as 2 November 1998. This complex document - which specifies "11 key areas that require verification" and lists "KVM Verification and Reporting Standards" for each - appears to have been produced by Walker's internal US advisors (or possibly the State Department). The reason these standards were not passed to the verifiers is unclear. "KVM Mission Director's Verification Task List for the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission," planning document, 2 November 1998, DZ Papers.

December a verifier wrote, "Although "Verification" is at the heart of the OSCE mission, what this actually involves for individual Verifiers remains rather blurred"; a month later the Head of RC 2 (Mitrovica) complained that "the lack of baseline data is an impediment to the verification process."[74] Like the OSCE, Walker seemed unable to provide his senior verifiers with adequate operational guidance, in January describing KVM as "designing as we proceed."[75] The Head of RC 1 (Prizren) later concluded that:

> There was a lack of guidance from the Mission headquarters on the approach to be taken in performing tasks ... standards were required against which the performance of the parties could be measured; for example, the number of weapon systems in certain areas, human rights standards, court monitoring standards, etc. It was therefore impossible to compare (*verify*) the performance of the parties against accepted standards. What was required was to translate the agreements and the UN Security Council resolutions regarding Kosovo into practical, usable information for the Verifiers on the ground.[76]

This lack of baseline data constituted a severe impediment on KVM's verification processes. Without verification standards the verifiers were uncertain as to the circumstances which would constitute a ceasefire violation and, consequently, lacked the ability to identify such an occurrence. Whilst military ceasefire violations might be determined by sightings of TLE or by comparing the 'three deployed company-sized VJ teams' allowable under the Clark/Neumann letter with what was encountered on the ground, beyond counting MUP observation points (Byrnes-Djordjevic Agreement) police ceasefire violations were often impossible to identify.[77] This led to each RC Head developing his RC's procedures on the basis of his individual analysis of the mandate documents. Given the KVM's decentralised laydown, this resulted in significant disparities in the conduct of verification between each

[74] David Wilson, "Background Notes on Kosovo," memo, 27 December 1998, Maisonneuve Papers; E Legendre to MGen J Drewienkiewicz, "Plan for Establishing of Field Offices," letter, 25 January 1999, DCiP.
[75] Walker, "Improvisational Peace"; Legendre, interview; Major Andrew Lefever, interview by author, Skype, 4 October 2018; BGen Michel Maisonneuve to LCol Meiklejohn, "Update 3 - RC Prizren KVM," fax, 14 January 1999, Maisonneuve Papers.
[76] Brigadier General J. R. Michel Maisonneuve, "The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission," *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2000): 53; italics Maisonneuve's
[77] John Voss, interview by author, Skype, 31 August 2018; Transcript of evidence by Joseph Maisonneuve to the ICTY on 3 June 2009, printed record, 5457-8, Maisonneuve Papers.

region with the result that the reports submitted to KVM HQ by its five subordinate RC nodes were created in differing ways.[78]

Circumstances in Kosovo caused KVM to vary its processes in ways likely to introduce verification pathologies. Presuming 'full freedom of movement and access', it was originally intended to verify the VJ and MUP in a deliberate and systematic way. Having selected a target (a barracks, a military position etc.) a team of verifiers would arrive with little or no notice and record the numbers and dispositions of personnel on site and the natures of heavy weapons and equipments present.[79] However, as the Serbs routinely denied the verifiers access to VJ or MUP barracks, the border area and, in the latter stages of the mission, other areas where troops were deployed, the process was changed to one more ad hoc:

> [W]hen we requested permission to inspect the barracks at the Commission of Cooperation, we were told we ... would not be able to do that. So the only way to try and carry out the inspection was to actually turn up at the barracks at the main gates and confront the problem. And, you know, try and get in, try and discuss with the commander, even obstruct the gates if necessary, and to spend as much time as possible at the barracks observing what was going on just outside the barracks, which wasn't appreciated by the VJ; and so, therefore, you can only describe this as a confrontational technique. It's the only option we had left.[80]

At other times verifiers would attempt to follow VJ or MUP convoys to see where they would lead. Beyond the possibility of observing a unit identification mark that could be linked to a post-February 1998 reinforcement, such unsystematic processes were unlikely to generate usable evidence of ceasefire violations.

In addition to 'confrontational' verification KVM undertook vehicle patrolling, normally to routine schedules on established routes and always by day. However, whilst the Serb's force elements were highly visible the KLA's were not as they seldom wore uniform (and then

[78] Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society,* 108.
[79] "Talking Points for Belgrade Meeting (27 November 1998)," notes, undated, DZ Papers.
[80] Ciaglinski, ICTY (2 June 2009), 5326.

generally at night) and possessed no heavy weapons or large military equipments. As one verifier recalled, "The KLA was an illusive client ... in reality all we could lay hands on was the MUP. Given that [the KLA] were just ordinary locals with weapons hidden somewhere we never knowingly came upon them."[81] According to Drewienkiewicz, the conflict parties' relative capabilities resulted in more reports concerning the VJ and the MUP even when, as often happened, the Serbs were responding to KLA provocations:

> If the KLA wanted to do a real spectacular then they would roll, as they did, three hand grenades into a café ... for the Serbs a really big event was lining up a regiment of artillery and flattening a village which was much more noticeable ... everything the KLA are doing is below the threshold for international reporting and everything the Serbs are doing is above the threshold for international reporting ... if you say what's the intention here both sides intended to be really bad, but the worst the KLA could do was so much less in impact, so if you're measuring impact as opposed to intention then the Serbs are the guilty ones, if you're measuring intention each is as bad as the other.[82]

Another potential consequence of the enforced change from proactive to reactive verification processes was the introduction of path-dependency. The mission laydown had been planned on the basis of municipal boundaries (rather than, for example, areas controlled by one or other party); this might be anticipated to eliminate the potential for certain biases such as those resultant of ethnic laydown or conflict lines which pre-dated the ceasefire agreements. However, as the mission progressed verifiers were deployed for the purpose of reassuring the Kosovo Albanian population in locations which had been or were anticipated to be attacked by the VJ or MUP.[83] Without an equivalent effort to reassure indigenous Serb civilians who might be attacked by the KLA, this strategy had the potential to direct the KVM's verification narrative along inter-related procedural and cognitive 'paths' which could incrementally

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[81] Voss, interview.
[82] Drewienkiewicz, interview. A similar point about equivalency was made by Walker on 8 January: "In our view the majority of the instances of non-compliance have emanated from the government side. But that is also perhaps a function of the fact that we have asked more of them. When I say that they're not cooperating in terms of landing rights for planes that might br bringing in supplies or quibbles at the border over customs ... those are things that you ask for from a government; you don't ask that from the KLA." See Auerswald, Auerswald, and Duttweiler, *The Kosovo Conflict*, 406.
[83] Leif Windmar, "Staff Directive to Establish Field Office Priluzje," memo, 8 March 1999, DCiP; Masionneuve, "The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission," 50.

produce more reports of ceasefire violations by the Serbs whatever the actual incidence ratio (see Section 2.4). Allied to the Serb's greater visibility and capabilities, this could have resulted in the Serbs appearing a *comparatively* greater violator of the ceasefire than was actually the case. However (effectively by design) the verifiers failed to collect the data which would have been required to calculate the true incidence ratio so the possibility that this verification pathology had causal effect remains solely theoretical in this case.

5.5 Verification Procedures: the Verification Narrative Path

Figure 5.1 shows the KVM laydown on 28 February 1999. For coordination purposes the mission divided Kosovo into five regional areas, each comprising a RC HQ and between three and five subordinate Coordination Centres (CCs) each controlling a number of field offices. This laydown informs a map of the mission's verification narrative path (Figure 5.2). The first node is the verifier working from a field office (a minority of verifiers worked directly from CCs, RC HQs or KVM HQ). The second node is the CC. The third node is the RC HQ, the first level at which 'formal' fusion occurred. The fourth node is KVM HQ in Pristina, the highest level of the deployed elements. The fifth node is OSCE HQ in Vienna and the sixth is UN HQ in New York. The primary audiences for the verification narrative are the Security Council and the General Assembly.



Figure 5.2. The KVM Verification Narrative Path.

Ceasefire verifiers commonly operated in four-man teams (three international personnel and a national interpreter) from a field office in the team's designated sector. By living amongst the population the teams were meant to develop rapports with local inhabitants and officials; however, many field offices were only manned during the day.[84] (Human rights verifiers and liaison officers to the MUP, VJ and KLA usually operated from a CC or a RC HQ.) The teams conducted foot and vehicle patrols along established routes, stopping to interact with civilians, the MUP and the VJ. Occasionally they would participate in tasks planned and controlled at a higher level, such as manning static observation posts on key routes or visiting all the police stations in a region on the same day.[85] The danger of a KVM vehicle being mistaken for one of the conflict parties meant the verifiers seldom operated at night (one of them wrote "we are a 0900-1600 monitoring force!"[86]) Not all of the verifiers could communicate in English and care had to be taken to ensure each patrol had at least one individual who could use the radio network. Care was also required to ensure verifiers were not imperilled by their nationalities, the KLA understanding the Russians and Ukrainians to be natural Serb supporters, the Serbs contemptuous of certain Western European nations they regarded as 'weak'.[87] The human rights verifiers, who were generally less confident operating in a militarised environment, normally accompanied ceasefire verification patrols rather than venture out on their own.[88] Alongside the lack of common verification standards, this could make the distinction between ceasefire and human rights verification unclear, and this sometimes caused tension within the patrols when ceasefire and human rights verifiers

[84] "Regional Centre Activation Operations After Action Review and Lessons Learned 15 Nov 98 - 15 Jan 99," slides, 15 January 1999, DZ papers.
[85] CC3 Srbica, "Summary of events in Srbica from 24 Jan 99 to 20 Mar 99," note, 27 March 1999, DCiP; Brigadier General Michel Maisonneuve, "Letters from Kosovo," blog printout, 11 February 1999, Maisonneuve Papers; Donna Phelan to MG Drewienkiewicz, "Verification Mission - 11 January 1999," memo, 11 January 1999, DZ Papers; Voss, interview; Maisonneuve, interview.
[86] Christopher Cobb-Smith to HQ UKLF, e-mail, 23 December 1998, Cobb-Smith papers.
[87] Drewienkiewicz, interview.
[88] On 18 January one KVM verifier out of eight was a human rights verifier. OSCE Secretary General, "KVM International Staff Affiliation," memo, 18 January 1999, DCiP.

differently interpreted their priorities and appropriate ways of working.[89] Contrarily, the liaison officers (all of whom were experienced military or police officers) operated in a very independent manner. At the end of each day the ceasefire and human rights verifiers produced either a consolidated report or two separate reports (practice varied between RCs) which they transmitted by fax, e-mail or radio. The ceasefire verifiers reported to their CCs, the human rights verifiers either to their CC or directly to their RC HQ (again, practice varied) where their human rights supervisor would be based. These reports were produced in a variety of formats. In the absence of comprehensive baselines and verification standards the verifiers' reports concerned mostly monitoring information, the rare attempts at analysis constituting (at best) informed conjecture. In a confusing and often dangerous environment within which many verifiers became proximate to violent death, reports were sometimes produced immediately following periods of great stress. A senior verifier (a general) recalled that "there was a lot of stress at times ... I remember being on the radio with folks that were being shot at ... a verifier climbing up on the back of a Serb tank that's firing into a house and knocking on the cupola and saying "Why are you firing into that house, there's no-one firing back?" ... stress definitely impacted on the mission."[90] Inexperienced verifiers could suffer stress disproportionately; an ex-military verifier described others being "too frightened to go to any incident ... the first incident I was aware of everyone piled into camp, they were terrified."[91] This resulted in those higher up the chain modifying their understandings on the basis of their perception of the particular report's author:

> [A] Russian or Ukrainian sent to watch a Serbian policeman in action would say, "nothing to worry about there," whereas a Norwegian will come in ... saying "this is awful, it's a dreadful human rights violation." You're having to look at who the author of the report is and apply a factor to it, you either halve the emotion if it's coming from the Norwegian or double it if it's coming from the Russian.[92]

[89] Lyth, interview; Paulin Regenard, interview by author, Skype, 7 September 2018; Sophie Picavet, e-mail message to author, 12 October 2018.
[90] Maisonneuve, interview.
[91] Cobb-Smith, interview by author, Skype, 28 September 2018; Lefever, interview.
[92] Drewienkiewicz, interview.

As a consequence, even though the verifiers were essentially producing monitoring information (which by its nature should have been reasonably objective) a subjective element was introduced when their reports were read and interpreted.

The CCs, which were located in urban hubs, controlled between four and seven field offices. Unlike the field offices all of the CCs were manned around the clock. A CC HQ comprised a director, a two-man operations cell and administrative staff. The director and the operations cell created a daily report which was meant to be transmitted to their RC HQ by 1800.[93] A patrol report received after this time would be reserved for the next day unless it contained time-critical information in which case an additional 'flash' report would be sent. With no sources of information beyond the patrol reports and perhaps some local liaison and 'walk-ins', the CCs' reports were little more than summaries (some were literally patrol report assemblages) appended with the director's commentary, which commonly situated the daily reported events in the context of what had previously occurred in that CC's area. Mindful of their lack of organic analytical capacity, CCs invariably passed any and all monitoring information to their RCs on the understanding that it might inform an analytical product further up the chain. Simply 'postboxes', thus, it is unlikely that the CC node affected the development of the KVM verification reports in any meaningful way.

The RC HQs were located in the largest town in their region. Each RC HQ had an operations / fusion centre: under a chief of operations these comprised a fusion cell of two reports and analysis officers, an operations cell of five operations officers, and liaison officers to the MUP, VJ, KLA, NGOs and the local population. Human rights verifiers were organised separately under a human rights supervisor. RC HQs produced a daily activity report which was meant to be faxed or e-mailed to KVM HQ before midnight. The format of these reports

[93] Leif Windmar, "Staff Directive for establishment of CC1 Sipolje," memo, 1 February 1999, DCiP.

(which could run to 8-10 pages) was standardised across the mission. The RC head wrote an overall assessment of the developing situation. The chief of operations or the duty operations officer summarised the most recent verification tasks any of which might be appended with comments from the fusion cell. The human rights supervisor summarised the work of the human rights verifiers.[94] Like the CCs, the RC HQs transmitted additional flash reports when circumstances required. Whilst the RC HQs submitted considerable amounts of information to KVM HQ they were seldom provided with analytical feedback on the developing situation as it applied to the mission area (one of the RC heads described KVM HQ as a "black hole").[95] Allied with the absence of baseline data, the resultant absence of context limited the abilities of the RC HQs' fusion centres to analyse the monitoring information they received.[96] Both this and the fact that each RC was employing different verification standards would have circumscribed the value of the RC reports to KVM HQ's attempts to verify the parties' activities within Kosovo as a whole.

KVM HQ was sited in an office block in Pristina. Headed by the HoM's executive office, this large organisation was nominally divided amongst six Deputy HoMs; however, with the exception of the Deputy HoM (Democratic Development) whose brief included human rights, until January all of the KVM's formal verification structures fell under the Deputy HoM (Operations). These comprised a shift-organised operations centre with 8-10 people on duty at any one time and a fusion centre of 16 analysts. The operations centre was responsible for assembling a daily 'Kosovo Verification Mission Report' "in co-operation" with the fusion centre.[97] Unlike the CC reports and RC HQ reports, these were limited to two pages of which

[94] Survey of 30 daily activity reports from RCs 1, 2, 3 and 4; Michel Maisonneuve, "Guidance for the Conduct of Operations," memo, 27 December 1998, Maisonneuve Papers; E. Legendre, "Guidance for the Conduct of Operations - Mitrovica," memo, undated, DCiP; Legendre, interview; Maisonneuve, interview.
[95] BGen Michel Maisonneuve to LCol Meiklejohn, "First Impressions - RC Prizren KVM," fax, 23 December 1998, Maisonneuve papers.
[96] Lefever, interview; Picavet, e-mail; Colonel Richard Heaslip, interview by author, Skype, 12 October 2018.
[97] "Mission Statement - OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission Ops/Fusion," slides, undated, Maisonneuve Papers.

a maximum of 75% was devoted to developments in the mission area and the security situation (the security situation simultaneously a verification product and a barometer of verifier risk). Accordingly, the operations centre night shift which produced them was required to pick out incidents with possible theatre-level importance and to summarise whatever else the RC HQs, the KDOMs and the HQ's Human Rights and Media Monitoring Department submitted. These reports were approved by Walker or Drewienkiewicz in the morning and transmitted to the CPC in Vienna.[98]

In that the prior nodes were structurally unable to undertake much of the informed analysis which would have resulted in meaningful verification products, the onus 'to verify' fell heavily upon KVM HQ. It is, consequently, surprising how devoid of analysis the 80 or so surviving examples of the Kosovo Verification Mission Reports are. This is particularly evident in the 'General Situation' paragraph that headlines each report and which seldom does more than summarise events described in the remainder. There are essentially two reasons for this, the first directly concerning the fusion centre. Unlike every other part of KVM HQ, the fusion centre was dominated by a single OSCE member state, 13 of its 16 members being US nationals (mostly previous employees of US military or civilian intelligence agencies).[99] Additional to all of the reporting products the operations centre received, the fusion centre received information from NATO, talking with the KVCC several times a day.[100] The fusion centre used these enhanced information feeds to produce predictive analysis for Walker and Drewienkiewicz, but this was not provided to the operations centre or otherwise to the OSCE.[101] According to Drewienkiewicz the reason for this (and the second reason the

[98] Lieutenant Colonel Michael Baston, e-mail message to author, 26 September 2018; Drewienkiewicz, "KVM Operations Branch Internal Daily Review as at: Close of 14 Nov 98," note, 14 November 1998, DZ Papers.
[99] As at 15 January 1998. "International Staff Members - HQ," roll, 15 January 1998, DCiP; Phillips, ICTY (1 September 2009), 8752-3; Baston, e-mail.
[100] Montgomery, interview; "Mission Statement - OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission Ops/Fusion," slides, undated, Maissoneuve Papers.
[101] It has, however, been suggested that the fusion centre's products were provided to the US State Department. Heaslip, interview; Director Fusion Centre to DHOM/ChOps, "Handling of RC Daily Reports," memo, 10 February 1999, DCiP; Ciaglinski, ICTY (2 June 2009), 5328, 5340; Phillips, ICTY (1 September 2009), 8756.

mission reports are 'bland') was that he and Walker were resolved to deny information to the OSCE that they felt might have caused it to prematurely withdraw the mission:

> If they [the fusion centre] ever said all hell is about to break loose and we sent that to Vienna, Vienna would say well get out, so if the fusion centre says all hell is about to break loose we'd use that information to try to head off at the pass whatever is about to happen, but meanwhile we don't tell Vienna because Vienna would panic ... The main role of the daily report to Vienna was to say "nothing significant to report."[102]

In January 1999 the OSCE's rotational CiO post was assumed by Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk. Shortly afterwards, the KVM's reaction to the killing of Kosovo Albanians at Račak (Section 5.6) prompted Vollebæk to direct the creation of a 'Reports Coordination Cell' in KVM HQ to improve the supply of information to him. This cell was led by a Norwegian (Kåre Eltervåg) and superintended by the mission's Norwegian chief of staff. The cell (which never numbered more than three people) produced a weekly 'Kosovo This Week' report which, whilst somewhat idiosyncratic, provided Vienna with the political-military-social fusion product which the fusion centre continued to fail to do.[103]

In comparison to the 'thin' content of the Kosovo Verification Mission Reports, the reports the OSCE submitted to the UN on a monthly basis were rich in detail and analysis. Each report addressed the same four basic areas: the security situation, the situation of civilians and refugees, the 'Kosovo spillover potential', and measures taken by the OSCE (the latter two combined information on KVM with information from other OSCE missions and broader geo-political commentary). The reports were drafted by the KVM desk officer in the Secretariat (an individual seconded from the UK Foreign Office for that particular task) on the basis of formal KVM reporting, knowledge acquired during the officer's visits to the mission,

[102] Drewienkiewicz, interview.
[103] In *NATO's Gamble*, Henrikson describes Eltervåg as "the leader of a small team that wrote KVM's daily reports to the OSCE headquarters in Vienna and the monthly reports to the UN secretary-general" (251). However, multiple sources indicate the arrangement was instead as described here. Eltervåg declined to be interviewed for this project.

and the officer's telephone calls to individual mission members likely to possess requisite pieces of information.[104] The drafts were approved by the CPC director and then transmitted to New York where they were appended to the Secretary-General's monthly reports without adjustment. Certain observations may be made of this procedure. Firstly, as inevitably less familiar with the information coming out of Kosovo than the desk officer, the CPC director would have had little basis on which to review those parts of the drafts which relied solely on KVM reporting. This expertise resided in the mission; however, the drafts were not copied to KVM HQ for comment. Secondly, the desk officer's ability to populate the reports with his own knowledge and the information he personally sought from the mission represented a circumvention of the KVM verification narrative path. This was made inevitable by the paucity of information contained in the KVM's daily reports (which, as noted, was partly consequent of imperatives other than verification within KVM HQ). In effect, both OSCE HQ and UN HQ operated a procedure whereby the sum product of up to 1,300 peoples' activities - by far the largest and most significant mission the OSCE had ever undertaken - was channelled between Kosovo and the Security Council through a lone individual working with inadequate and deliberately distorted verification material and without any mechanism of effective review. That this individual, furthermore, was a governmental employee of a member state introduced a critical access point by which that state could have ensured the reports the OSCE submitted to the UN aligned with its interests. (There is no suggestion that this occurred.)

5.6 Manipulation by a State Actor

This Section discusses whether a powerful actor affected the KVM's ceasefire verification reports to accord with the interests of the actor's sending nation. To do this it considers the KVM's response to the mass killing of Kosovo Albanians at the village of Račak on 15

[104] Mark Etherington, interview by author, Skype, 20 December 2018.

January 1999. The discussion does not attend to Milošević's allegations that Račak was 'rigged' (that is, that an engagement between FRY forces and the KLA was presented as a massacre of Kosovo Albanian civilians)[105] nor otherwise debate the events or perpetrators: it focuses solely on Diana Johnstone's suggestion in 2002 that Walker seized on Račak as a "*casus belli* for NATO."[106] (Walker did not respond to requests for interview for this project; however in appearing as a witness at the ICTY in 2002 he stated, "I categorically deny that either I or anyone on my mission, that I know of, was involved in any conspiracy to bring NATO into the game."[107]) Firstly, the way in which KVM normally responded to mass killings is reviewed. Having established this baseline, comparisons are drawn between the KVM's response to the Račak killings and a smoking gun mechanism (described in Section 2.8.2).

5.6.1 The Routine Verification of Mass Killings

KVM attended a total of eleven mass killings during its period of operating in the province.[108] With the exception of Račak these were all verified in a similar way. The following description of the verification of a mass killing is typical of the KVM's procedures in the face of such incidents. At around 0200 on 14 December the VJ ambushed a KLA column crossing into Kosovo from Albania near the village of Kushnin/Kušlin. Thirty-one Kosovo Albanians were killed. Kushnin/Kušlin lay in the RC 1 (Prizren) regional area and the VJ notified its RC HQ at 0800. Later that morning the VJ guided two patrols from CC 3 (Suva Reka) around various rural sites. Patrol 21 was shown a military position from which the VJ claimed to

[105] Milošević first made this allegation on 17 January 1999 and repeated it when appearing as a defendant at the ICTY.
[106] Diana Johnstone, *Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO, and Western Delusions* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 238.
[107] Walker, ICTY (12 June 2002), 6913.
[108] This Section follows common media reporting practice of the time to understand a 'mass killing' as one comprising three or more deaths. Five of these occurred before Račak (Gorozup, 3 December; Pristina, 3 December; Kushnin/Kušlin, 14 December; Peć, 14 December; Shtime/Štimlje, 8 January), five after (Rakovina-Jablanica road, 24 January; Rakovina, 25 January; Rogovo, 29 January; Istinic-Gornja Lika road, 4 February; Pristina (mini-market bombing), 6 February).

have ambushed KLA soldiers crossing the border. Light weapons, military equipment and a body were strewn around. The verifiers' assessed that a large KLA resupply patrol had been ambushed from a bunker position. Patrol 22 were shown four bodies, all with head wounds and all dressed and equipped in a manner consistent with the KLA. The verifiers' assessment was that the high number of head wounds and the fact the bodies had been moved before their arrival rendered the circumstances suspicious. Patrol 22 was then taken to a second location where it saw seven prisoners and 25 bodies, all but one dressed in military uniforms. The verifiers' assessment was that a large group of KLA had been ambushed whilst withdrawing from a contact at a different location.[109] RC 1 first reported the incident to KVM HQ sometime after 1735, following up with a SITREP at 1900 with the patrols' reports and assessments appended (a common practice when rapid reporting was required).[110] RC 1 HQ's fusion centre appended the report with the assessment that the sites visited by Patrol 21 and Patrol 22 probably concerned the same incident. At 1900 the next day (15 December) RC 1 transmitted a further SITREP which concluded that the scenes visited were probably genuine.[111] On a date unknown (probably 15 December) KVM HQ transmitted a 'special report' to Vienna comprising a narrative account of the details in RC 1's 14 December SITREP.[112] KVM HQ's daily report to Vienna for the period covering 14 December (which was actually transmitted on 16 December - likely due to Walker and Drewienkiewicz being occupied with unrelated tasks on 15 December) merely summarised the special report. The incident subsequently featured in the UN Secretary General's report in neutral terms: "Armed clashes between uniformed groups of Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian security force continue to occur. The most significant of these occurred on 14 December where 31 Kosovo

[109] "Border Incident(s) in the Planayi / Liken Area - 14 Dec 98," note, 14 December 1998, DCiP.
[110] RC 1 to KVM HQ, "Subject - Kushin (GR DM 6280) - Incident," fax, 14 December 1998, DCiP; RC 1 to KVM HQ, "KVM RC1 SITREP as of 1900 Hrs 14 Dec 98," fax, 14 December 1998, DCiP.
[111] RC 1 to KVM HQ, "KVM RC1 SITREP as of 1900 Hrs 15 Dec 98," fax, 15 December 1998, DCiP.
[112] KVM HQ to OSCE Vienna, "Kosovo Verification Mission - Special Report. Activity Covered - Major Incident in the Prizren Border Area, 14th December 1998," fax, 15 December 1998(?), DCiP.

Albanians were killed in the border region near Prizren and 9 were taken prisoner."[113] From the verifiers' initial report to the UN's primary audience, information was transmitted and processed in accordance with established KVM procedures along the established verification narrative path. As with all of the other verifications of mass killings (less Račak) the HoM did not visit the site, hold a press conference, issue a statement or otherwise act in the manner described below.

5.6.2 Extraordinary Verification: Račak, 15 January 1999

Račak is a small village, close to the larger village of Shtime/Štimlje and 20 km south of Pristina. In 1999 it lay just on the RC 5 (Pristina) side of that region's boundary with RC 1 (Prizren).[114] On 15 January the VJ and MUP conducted a combined operation against KLA positions in and around villages southwest of Shtime/Štimlje. (It was later discovered that the MUP had given advance notification of this operation to a KVM verifier but that the verifier had not passed this information on.) At 1730 verifiers from RC 1 entered Račak. They saw one body and three burning houses and were informed by villagers that the MUP had shot and wounded several people and taken away around 20 men. The verifiers took five injured villagers to a local hospital. The RC reported this to KVM HQ in its daily SITREP some time after 1800.[115] Early the next morning some of the verifiers returned to Račak where they encountered a heavy KLA presence. They were shown the bodies of men and a woman dressed in civilian clothing, 20-25 of which were gathered in a small ravine. One body had been decapitated, several others had gunshot wounds to the head. The verifiers made a radio report to RC 1 and the RC head (Brigadier General Michel Maisonneuve) moved to the site.

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[113] S/1998/1221, Annex I, ¶4.

[114] The following verifiers who attended Račak have contributed to this account: Major General Drewienkiewicz (DHoM / Chief of Operations), Brigadier General Maisonneuve (Head RC 1), Cobb-Smith (KLA Liaison Officer). It also draws on the transcripts of evidence by Ambassador Walker (HoM) to the ICTY on 12 June 2002 (6798-6814).

[115] RC 5 to KVM HQ, "KVM RC Pristina Daily Activity Report as at 1800 Hrs 15 Jan 98," fax, 15 January 1998, DCiP.

He in turn communicated with KVM HQ following which Drewienkiewicz arrived, followed by Walker. Having viewed the ravine Walker spent 90 minutes in the village's mosque where he met with villagers and members of the KLA unaccompanied by other verifiers. He then returned to Pristina and called a press conference which he awaited in his office. At about 1800 Walker gave the following statement:

> [T]his afternoon I personally visited the village of Račak... an area where KVM verifiers have been reporting on what appeared to be a wholescale violation of the cease fire by the VJ and MUP over the past several days.
>
> ... I do not have the words to describe my personal revulsion ... at the sight of what can only be described as an unspeakable atrocity.
>
> ... [F]rom what I personally saw, I do not hesitate to describe the event as a massacre, a crime against humanity. Nor do I hesitate to accuse the government security forces of responsibility.
>
> Several days ago the KLA released 8 VJ detainees. We were expecting, hoping for a reciprocal confidence building gesture by the Government. Instead, we have this. Is this the answer?[116]

KVM HQ then produced a 'spot report' entitled "Massacre of Civilians in Racak" which reproduced the majority of Walker's statement, adding, "The facts as verified by KVM include evidence of arbitrary detentions, extra-judicial killings, and the mutilation of unarmed civilians of Albanian ethnic origin in the village of Račak by the MUP and VJ. ... these gross violations constitute clear violations of the commitments of the FRY under the 16th October Agreement and Security Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203."[117] KVM HQ's daily SITREP to Vienna also referred to "The massacre by FRY security forces of 45 Albanian civilians in Racak."[118]

[116] "Press Conference: Racak/Stimlje Massacre," note, 16 January 1999, DZ Papers.
[117] ICTY exhibit no. 230 in the trial of Slobodan Milošević, "Massacre of Civilians in Racak," report, undated, accessed 12 July 2018, http://icr.icty.org.
[118] "Kosovo Verification Mission Report: Period Covered 16th and 17th January 1999," report, undated, DZ Papers.

Modelling Johnstone's claim about Walker's reaction to Račak as a smoking gun attack relies initially on the presence of an actor (Walker) motivated to influence the KVM's verification reports. This would require both of the following: (1) a preference by Walker for an anti-Serb / pro-KLA narrative, and (2) an assessment by Walker that KVM was otherwise unlikely to produce this. There are several indicators that Walker sought an anti-Serb / pro-KLA narrative prior to Račak. Following "an absolute flaming row" with FRY Vice Prime Minister Nikola Šainović in November Walker had refused to deal directly with the Serbs, doing so solely through Keller and Drewienkiewicz.[119] On a number of occasions Walker refused to blame the KLA for actions whose authorship had been determined by his verifiers. Once KVM had established that the mass killings at Kushnin/Kušlin (above) were the result of legitimate FRY military activity, Walker resisted confirming this and engineered the sacking of the KVM press officer when he put out a statement to that effect. Walker refused to condemn the KLA's occupation of abandoned Serbian military positions following the VJ's pullback in accordance with the Clark/Neumann letter. When Keller (acting as HoM whilst Walker was in the US) issued a statement condemning the KLA's shooting of a policeman near Shtime/Štimlje, Walker called him "incandescent with rage ... [on Walker's return] there was a fearful row between Walker and Keller."[120] The Head of RC 2 (Mitrovica) also noticed adjustments in an anti-Serb / pro-KLA direction:

> When I sent my reports [to KVM HQ] I was surprised that some information ... were [sic] a little bit transformed in a way that they could be understood in a good way by Mr Walker. For example, I remember if one day I told that in my report there were a small group of Serbian police walking about a Kosovar village the translation was that there was a company [of] tanks around a village so the poor UÇK are under pressure of the Serbs.[121]

Whilst the very basis of the KVM's existence was a serious of events which had resulted in a Western anti-Serb narrative, in January KVM reporting was moving from this position

[119] Drewienkiewicz, interview.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Legendre, interview.

towards one of fault on both sides.[122] The UN Secretary-General's report of 4 December had noted how "for the first time in the conflict, self-appointed groups on both side of the ethnic divide" had engaged in "arbitrary detentions, killings and kidnappings."[123] Since the conclusion of the Serb's 'Christmas offensive' small guerrilla attacks (KLA) and counter-insurgency actions (mostly MUP) had been occurring on a fairly regular basis, the majority of which were initiated by the KLA. Like the Serbs, the KLA denied KVM access to some of the areas under its control. On 8 January Keller stated in an interview, "Generally speaking ... the KLA is responsible for most provocations, and the Yugoslav authorities and Serb police are responsible sometimes for exaggerated actions or are reacting heavy-handedly."[124] The next day the OSCE emphasised that the FRY's reaction to "these KLA provocations" had been "very restrained."[125] With several positive indicators of both criteria 1 and 2, thus, it appears likely that Walker was motivated to influence the KVM's ceasefire verification reports.

Step 1 of a smoking gun mechanism is that an actor produces a smoking gun. For Walker to have produced Račak as a smoking gun would require that he married the scene (the 'object') with partial discourse. Indicators that this occurred may be found in Walker's statement and in his actions in the period between visiting the scene and the press conference. Important parts of the HoM's statement are selective or incorrect. Račak is described as "an area where KVM verifiers have been reporting on what appeared to be a wholescale violation of the cease fire by the VJ and MUP over the past several days." This was untrue: KVM reported no ceasefire violations by the VJ and MUP near Račak before 15 January and Walker later testified that the first time he had heard of Račak was "maybe 14 hours before the night of the

[122] Drewienkiewicz, interview.
[123] S/1998/1147, Annex I, ¶22.
[124] Quoted in Babak Bahador, *The CNN Effect in Action: How the News Media Pushed the West Towards War in Kosovo* (New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 85 (ftn 31).
[125] OSCE, "Irresponsible acts by Kosovo Liberation Army increase tension," press release, 9 January 1999, Maisonneuve papers.

15th [January]."[126] What had been reported by KVM over the past several days was the killing of three policemen by the KLA near Shtime/Štimlje on 8 January and the killing of a fourth in the same area on 11 January. (On the day of Walker's press conference a senior MUP officer informed Maisonneuve that the assault on Račak was in reaction to these events.[127]) On 15 January KVM reported a deterioration of the situation in the Shtime/Štimlje area which constituted a "serious breach of the ceasefire": however, KVM did not ascribe fault to either of the conflict parties.[128] In a framing move, Walker contrasts Račak with the KLA's releasing of eight VJ detainees whom the KLA had kidnapped a week earlier. Walker had expected "a reciprocal confidence building gesture" - he neither mentioned that the Serbs had agreed to release nine KLA prisoners in a reciprocal agreement or that the kidnapping (and threats to kill the captives) was itself a major ceasefire breach.[129] The second set of indicators concern the individuals and organisations that Walker did and did not consult with prior to the press conference. In 2002 Walker testified that he was not the sole person on the mission authorised to decide what was and was not a ceasefire violation: "I certainly ... did not unilaterally or with my immediate staff determine ... what we thought was non-compliance."[130] Accountable on a day-to-day basis to the OSCE CiO, a HoM would be anticipated to consult with or at the very least inform the CiO prior to declaring a ceasefire breach of such magnitude. However, Walker neither informed Vienna nor any of his deputies of the contents of his statement prior to the conference.[131] Walker also testified that the statement "was totally my creation. These were all my words."[132] Interviewed in 2000, he

[126] Walker, ICTY (12 June 2002), 6893-4. On the evening of 14 January the DHoM for operations assessed the situation as "[B]usiness as usual. The Serbs doing what they said they would in withdrawing, but slowly. The KLA continuing to respond willingly to provocation." Drewienkiewicz, "KVM Operations Branch Internal Daily Review as at: Close of 14 Jan 99," note, undated, DZ Papers.
[127] Michel Maisonneuve, "[ICTY] Witness Statement," written statement, 6-8, 10 March 2000, Maisonneuve papers.
[128] 'Kosovo Verification Mission Report: Period Covered 15th January 1999," report, undated, DZ Papers.
[129] Drewienkiewicz, interview; Judah, *Kosovo,* 192.
[130] Walker, ICTY (12 June 2002), 6904.
[131] Drewienkiewicz, interview; Phillips, ICTY (1 September 2009), 8757-8; Cohen, *Conflict Prevention in the OSCE*, 88.
[132] Walker, ICTY (12 June 2002), 6805.

denied he had "called any of my capitals" before the press conference.[133] Confronted at the ICTY with evidence that he had, he stated "I frankly have no memory, no recollection of -- of talking to any of these people. I'm quite positive I didn't talk to Madeleine Albright."[134] Despite this, whilst Walker did not call Vollebæk there is strong evidence that he had telephone conversations with US Secretary of State Albright, US Ambassador Holbrooke, US General Clark (NATO's supreme military commander) and US Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg.[135] Walker's (non-US) political advisor Kåre Eltervåg later stated that the HoM's actions on that day "felt strange, as if he had received a go-ahead from Washington to stage a press conference even though the situation had not been fully investigated."[136] It has been suggested that Walker's statement was a product of shock brought on by witnessing the killings at close quarters, but it seems unlikely that a career diplomat with considerable field experience could be so affected by a scene that was not uncommon in the Balkans in the 1990s. Walker exhibited none of the classic symptoms of shock at the site or afterwards.[137] In the absence of a credible alternative hypothesis, the likelihood that Walker produced Račak as a smoking gun is high.

Step 2 of a smoking gun mechanism is that key-decision makers within the CVM cognitively accept the smoking gun's premise. In this case the location of the smoking gun's producer at the apex of the KVM hierarchy requires that acceptance of the premise be elevated to the key decision-makers of the conducting IO. Noting that Walker's press conference took place around 1800 16 January and that the KVM's first 'spot report' must have been written after

[133] Footage of William Walker, *Panorama*, "Moral Combat: NATO At War," aired 12 March 2000, transcript, accessed 3 April 2017, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/events/panorama/transcripts/transcript_12_03_00.txt.
[134] Walker, ICTY (12 June 2002), 6799-800, 6896.
[135] Walker's conversations with Albright and Holbrooke were witnessed by Drewienkiewicz. See also Richard Holbrooke, interview, *Frontline*, accessed 12 January 2017, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html; Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 158; Barton Gellman, "Slaughter in Racak Changed Kosovo Policy," *The Washington Post*, 18 April 1999, accessed 12 March 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/policy041899.htm.
[136] Quoted in Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 163.
[137] Holbrooke, *Frontline*; Drewienkiewicz, interview.

that time (as it quotes Walker's statement in full), the OSCE's press release of 16 January can have been based on very little more than the spot report:

> [The CiO] expressed shock and outrage over the killings of ethnic Albanian civilians ... He condemned these atrocities, which were committed against innocent civilians ... [he] urged the FRY to put an immediate end to its military activities in Kosovo ... He expressed dismay concerning the recent upsurge in violence, which was all the more regrettable in light of the restraint which on 13 January led to the release of eight Yugoslav soldiers held captive by the Kosovo Liberation Army."[138]

In an action similar to Walker's framing move Vollebæk counterpoised Račak with the KLA's prisoner release, subjugating the context of the KLA's kidnapping of soldiers, threatening to kill them, actually killing four policemen, and the fact that the prisoners were only released as part of an exchange. As the OSCE Permanent Council reaffirmed two days later, "The FRY must put an immediate end to its use of force in Kosovo," a holistic adjunction which (perhaps unthinkingly) proscribes the use of force previously permitted under the constituent texts of the Milošević-Holbrooke Agreement and/or other legitimate exercises of force by the FRY as a sovereign state.[139] This requirement is not placed upon the conflict party which the OSCE a week earlier deemed most responsible for the 'recent upsurge in violence'. (The UN was more circumspect: despite receiving "a full briefing" from Vollebæk, on 16 January the Secretary-General called only for "a full investigation by the competent authorities."[140])

Step 3 of a smoking gun mechanism is that key decision-makers within the CVM (as noted, in this case within the OSCE) lock onto the actor's preferred narrative path. There is no indication that key OSCE decision-makers did this; if anything, the OSCE's subsequent monthly updates to the UN Secretary-General became more objective, large sections

[138] OSCE, "OSCE Chairman-in-Office condemns atrocities in Kosovo," press release, 16 January 1999, Maisonneuve papers.
[139] OSCE, "OSCE Permanent Council Chairman shocked over killings in Kosovo," press release, 18 January 1999, Maisonneuve papers.
[140] "UN Secretary-General, Statement on the Racak massacre, New York City, 16 January 1999," quoted in Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo*, 320.

describing both parties' violent acts with little more than a chronology as analysis. However, if the OSCE did not lock onto a narrative of Serbian fault then key elements of the international community did in a manner making Step 3 redundant to an actor aspiring to some anti-Serb / pro-KLA outcome. Walker himself depicted Račak as "a turning point ... of the outside world's understanding of what was occurring in Kosovo," and the understanding that Račak constituted a 'turning point' in the West's approach to Kosovo is accepted by Albright, Holbrooke, Hill and many other commentators.[141] That this 'turn' directly accorded with Walker's personal interests (the outcome of a successful smoking gun attack) seems unlikely. However, Walker's extensive consultations with his capital prior to his statement suggests some likelihood that it accorded with the interests of key individuals in the State Department, and it may be concluded with a high degree of confidence that the narrative did not run against these interests else Walker would have been barred from producing it. Račak constituted a critical juncture on a verification narrative path that was otherwise drifting away from a narrative of primarily Serbian guilt. Walker's several attempts to 'ripen' that particular narrative show that he preferred it. Following extensive consultation with his capital (but not with his conducting IO), Walker's statement contained such significant discursive and framing moves that it is hard to summon a credible alternative hypothesis than that his actions constitute the deliberate production of a smoking gun. Certainly the KVM's previous and subsequent procedures for reacting to such events became redundant at that point. That the OSCE so readily accepted this smoking gun's premise is demonstrated by the CiO's willingness to abandon key terms of the Agreement on which his own IO's CVM was based before receiving any corroborating evidence. The killing of Kosovo Albanian civilians

[141] Walker, "OSCE Verification Experiences in Kosovo," 141 (ftn 10); Madeleine Albright, *Madame Secretary: A Memoir* (New York: Macmillan, 2003), 394; interview with Richard Holbrooke, *The Fall of Milosevic*, episode 1, directed by Dai Richards, aired 5 January 2003 on BBC 1; Hill, *Outpost*, 147; Carole Rogel, "Kosovo: Where It All Began," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 17, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 176; Judah, *Kosovo,* 194; Weller, *Peace Lost*, 85, 92; Barton Gellman, "The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War," *The Washington Post*, 18 April 1999, accessed 20 October 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/04/18/the-path-to-crisis-how-the-united-states-and-its-allies-went-to-war/52533b73-cf3e-4e21-a771-8f1806bc0577/?utm_term=.378b632dae7d.

by FRY forces at Račak diverted Western policy along a path which led to the Rambouillet peace conference and NATO's military intervention. Whatever the motivation, through the lens of a smoking gun mechanism it may be said that there is a high degree of likelihood that Walker did indeed seize on Račak as a *casus belli* for NATO as Johnstone suggested.

5.7 Conclusion

Chapter III described how the UN was kept on the sidelines as the mandate of what would become UNAVEM II was negotiated between the major conflict parties' powerful sponsors. From the standpoint of a potential conducting IO such a situation would be regrettable but preferable to one in which a single powerful state agrees a CVM mandate with one of two conflict parties, following which it informs the IO of the role it has created for it but refuses to reveal to it the Agreement it has made. Denied the exact terms of the Serbian ceasefire, it is unsurprising that the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement inadequately described that which KVM would verify. This placed the verifiers at a considerable disadvantage in their dealings with the Serbs, who exploited various textual ambiguities to justify controlling the verifiers' movements and thus the flow of information upon which the KVM verification narrative depended. However, it should also be recognised that the Serbs were themselves disadvantaged by the ambiguous and apparently fluid parameters of the Agreements and the various texts through which they were articulated. Of even greater import, the failure to achieve a separate KLA ceasefire agreement compromised the KVM's impartiality to an extent that could not be concealed by committing to verify the KLA's adherence to an Agreement it had neither made nor were directly mentioned within. It is hard to imagine how a CVM could play a pacifying role by providing security guarantees to only one side. In terms of the mandate it may be said that both the sum total of ambiguities and omissions and the crucial failure to classify the KLA substantially affected the resultant ceasefire verification reports. Recalling Anstee's conclusion that the UN should probably never have mounted

UNAVEM II given the restrictions placed upon it, it is notable that the OSCE accepted its assigned role with such apparent alacrity.

The discussion of organisational pathologies in Chapter II might suggest that a good way to bring them about in a CVM would be to select an IO experienced in a different type of mission and provide it with a mandate made as unclear as possible. Placed in this situation, the OSCE gratefully handed planning to a small team of outsiders which, in the absence of a clear mandate or other strategic direction, created structures that accorded with the experience of its senior military representative and de-prioritised the issues for which the other Deputy HoMs were responsible. This resulted in cultural contestation within KVM HQ, rendering it yet harder to agree the mission's purposes and consequently its strategy. Having divested itself of planning responsibility the OSCE proved reluctant to deviate from its familiar delivery processes, with the result that the availability of personnel, equipment and infrastructure became key limiting factors in the KVM's ability to conduct verification throughout the mission area. At the same time, the OSCE's preference for doing what it was good at rather than that which it *was* mandated to achieve meant that goal displacement within Vienna joined cultural contestation between Vienna and Pristina as further verification limiting factors. In that these pathologies materially affected the conduct of verification by KVM they may be understood to have substantially affected the KVM ceasefire verification reports. The US's management of its KDOM starved KVM of critical information about the KLA and, by its failure to disband its KDOM, advertised the dangerous reality that the terms of the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement could be fluid. The former of these occurrences directly affected certain KVM ceasefire verification reports to a non-trivial extent, the latter may have affected them indirectly. NATO treated KVM as a useful information gathering tool whose impartiality and consequent ability to cooperate with the Serbs was subordinate to NATO's requirements. NATO's failure to share information with KVM had a substantial

effect on the KVM ceasefire verification reports, which were provided to the UN via the OSCE in a manner and to an extent that NATO reporting was not.

Overlooked, perhaps, during the shuttle diplomacy which resulted in the KVM mandate jigsaw was the fundamental issue of baseline data. Beyond the promise of 'full cooperation and support', in no text available to KVM did the Serbs commit to provide detailed information as to the 'normal levels' of the presence and equipment of their security forces in Kosovo. The ingenious use of TLE data notwithstanding, this oversight denied KVM the ability to adequately verify the absence / presence of discrepancies between what was allowed and what was in place. Allied to the vagueness of the mandate documents, the absence of baseline data prevented the production of mission verification standards, resulting in different regions reporting in different ways. Additional to this critical verification process failure, KVM processes which clustered verifiers in areas prone to Serb activity and failed to recognise the relative visibility of the VJ, the MUP and the KLA would likely have encouraged path-dependency towards an anti-Serb narrative. Furthermore, the mission's failure to make a meaningful attempt to obtain KLA baseline data meant that whilst KVM attempted to verify the Serbs the mission (at best) attempted only to *monitor* the KLA's vague commitments to the ceasefire. There is a high degree of likelihood that lack of baseline data substantially affected the KVM ceasefire verification reports and there is some likelihood that the other process failures had some effect. Allied with the absence of mission verification standards, the failure to push contextual information and analytical products down to its subordinate nodes meant the ability to undertake the analysis required to produce verification products was centred in KVM HQ. Here it was affected by the fusion centre's occupation with tasks other than producing verification analysis in support of the mission's mandate, and by the determination of parts of the KVM executive to deny information to the OSCE that might have caused it to order a withdrawal. Almost by definition, the deliberate distortion of

KVM HQ reporting to OSCE HQ to such extent substantially affected the KVM ceasefire verification reports. The consequent 'thinness' of the mission's reports in turn caused the lone Kosovo report writer in OSCE HQ to augment KVM reporting with his own knowledge and investigations to produce OSCE reporting that was subsequently incorporated within the reports of the UN Secretary-General without meaningful review. There are several ways in which such procedures could have had a substantial effect on the ceasefire verification reports, but there is no evidence that this actually occurred.

It is widely accepted that the killing of Kosovo Albanians at Račak was a key factor in setting international opinion against the Serbs and invoking an international military response. That this event garnered major international attention whilst ten other mass killings in Kosovo did not was primarily due to international media reporting from the site and Walker's unequivocal pronouncement of a 'massacre' committed by government security forces. Walker's actions prior to 15 January strongly indicate that he was motivated to influence KVM reporting in an anti-Serb / pro-KLA direction. It has been argued that in overriding the mission's established verification procedures and by the partial framing contained within his statement Walker produced Račak as a 'smoking gun' of Serbian guilt. It has been demonstrated that he consulted extensively with his capital but not with his immediate deputies or the political leader of the OSCE before doing so. It was then argued that the OSCE was 'bounced' into accepting the smoking gun's premise and that whilst that IO did not subsequently lock onto an anti-Serb / pro-KLA narrative path, certain powerful international actors did. Employed by the leader of the in-country CVM, this smoking gun attack upon a verification narrative was very powerful. Furthermore, Walker’s position as a serving US Ambassador and the timing of his consultations with senior US diplomats and military commanders indicate this manipulation was an action of a *state actor* rather than an individual personality. This

employment of KVM as an instrument of international power profoundly affected certain KVM ceasefire verification reports.

The aim of this Chapter was to determine the presence and influence of verification pathologies on the KVM verification narrative as articulated in the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council. The presence of several pathologies has been determined, most notably relating to the mission's mandate, to its organisation and to the organisation of its conducting IO, to its relationships with the KDOMs and with NATO, to some of its processes, to some of its procedures, and to manipulation by an actor whose actions represented the influence of a powerful state. Of these it has been demonstrated that certain mandate pathologies, certain organisational pathologies (including the relationships with the US KDOM and with NATO), certain process pathologies, certain procedural pathologies, and the manipulation by an actor in a single but highly important instance all had substantial effects upon some or all of the mission's ceasefire verification reports.

VI Conclusion

> In war ... the Commander of an immense whole finds himself in a constant whirlpool of false and true information, of mistakes committed through fear, through negligence, through precipitation, of contraventions of his authority, either from mistakes or correct motives, from ill will, true or false sense of duty, indolence or exhaustion, of accidents which no mortal could have foreseen. In short, he is the victim of a hundred thousand impressions ...
>
> − Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

6.1 Introduction

Since especially the end of the Cold War, international peacekeeping efforts have employed CVMs to enable and maintain a negative peace so that peacebuilding can commence. To succeed in this endeavour CVMs rely on a widespread understanding that their processes and procedures will be objective and, consequently, their outputs will be impartial. To put it slightly differently, conflict parties and the international community accept CVMs because they believe the reports their conducting IOs issue will derive solely from empirical monitoring data. Colloquially, CVMs are believed to 'tell the truth' (unless some party moves to prevent them in which case it is believed that those moves will be plain for the world to see). What has not been generally anticipated is that the bespoke and complex organisations which constitute CVMs and the (also complex) IOs which conduct them are inherently subject to *endogenous* factors that can substantially affect their consequent ceasefire verification reports. It has not, furthermore, been anticipated that such endogenous factors may create opportunities for powerful actors to affect ceasefire verification reports, nor that CVM conducting IOs may themselves moderate such reports for reasons other than the impartial assemblage of a verification narrative. The demonstration that CVMs do sometimes fall under such influences would necessitate a reconsideration of the utility of CVMs as peacekeeping tools, changes to the conceptualisation, design and conduct of future CVMs, and potentially the reassessment of historical events in which CVM outcomes played significant roles.

This inquiry is constructed on the hypothesis that one or more factors additional to monitoring data can affect the content of ceasefire verification reports to a non-trivial extent. On the basis of studies of Cold War strategic arms verification processes and of established approaches to analysing power and decision-making in complex organisations, groups of factors with the potential for non-trivial causal effect were proposed. The thesis' research objective was to conduct plausibility probes upon these. Indicators of the causal effect of each of these potential 'verification pathologies' were derived. To determine which factors can have effect (and the extent of such effect) typical cases upon which sufficient research material could be obtained were selected from the universe of post-War CVMs. This material was sought in the archives of conducting IOs and other public collections, and in private collections, and was supported with interviews conducted with former mission participants, individuals who had worked in key positions in the associated conducting IOs, and other SMEs. In each case the material was systematically analysed to determine the presence / absence of each verification pathology and, where present, to assess the extent of causal effect on the content of that CVM's reports.

The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 conducts a comparative analysis of the cases analysed individually in Chapters III, IV and V. Sequentially, the causal effect (if any) of each verification pathology is considered, firstly as a cross-case phenomenon and secondly in relation to the base and proposed hypotheses. Section 6.3 inquires as to the extent to which the previous Section's findings, which pertain to cases from the 1990s, may be applicable today. This is undertaken by considering a contemporary CVM, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) which was ongoing in December 2018. Focus areas include the extent to which SMM has learned from the lessons of previous CVMs and the extent to which technological advancements have changed the nature of CVMs and ceasefire verification per se. Section 6.4 considers the implications of the thesis' findings for

verification as a concept (both of ceasefires and as a broader category) and as a practice. Suggestions are made that could assist practitioners in the conceptualisation, design and conduct of future CVMs, and which could aid academics and others in the interpretation of the outcomes of historical and contemporary CVMs. Section 6.5 identifies potentially productive avenues for future inquiry and Section 6.6, finally, offers concluding remarks.

6.2 Comparative Analysis

The research phase constituted a series of plausibility probes to signpost hypotheses which might better represent reality than the extant understanding that CVM outcomes are exclusively resultant of monitoring data. As noted in Chapter I, the generalisability of such results must be severely limited until a subsequent hypothesis-testing project is undertaken. Also, even were all atypical cases expunged, there are limits to how representative three cases can be of a universe of 68 which, as noted, is composed of cases that vary in many different ways. However, the rich and detailed analysis of three CVM cases of comparable vintage offers something more than three discrete historical explanations, particularly if strict scope conditions are maintained. A conclusion, for example, pertaining to the structures of one or more CVMs will be of interest to a researcher (or practitioner) faced with a similar structure in a different CVM case. Accordingly, there is value in a cross-case comparison by factor group.[1]

6.2.1 Mandates and Agreements

On the basis of understandings of institutional power it was hypothesised that the reports a CVM produces could be affected by its mandate which could in turn be affected by the ceasefire agreement on which the mandate was based. In all three cases the verification narrative was substantially affected by the CVM's mandate. UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ

[1] Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 7, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, M.A.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 110.

suffered from mandate failures to classify all of the conflict parties' armed elements, which enabled UNITA and the GoM (respectively) to insist those elements could not be subject to the international verification process.[2] The failure to classify a conflict element also affected KVM although to a far greater extent and for reasons other than inadequate drafting. The Serbs agreed to the KVM's deployment in the belief that the KLA would be verified in a similar manner. If one accepts KVM as the ceasefire verification mechanism it was presented to be, then the propriety of the mission's continuance once it had been established that the KLA would not agree to a ceasefire was doubtful. Whilst both the conflict parties cooperated with KVM only sporadically, the Serbs could reasonably claim that they had been misled and the KLA could legitimately claim that they could not be verified to the standards of an agreement which they had neither entered into nor were specifically mentioned within. If one also considers the remarkable situation in which the OSCE was prevented from seeing the Agreement it was meant to verify it becomes apparent that the KVM's verification reports were significantly bounded both by its mandate and by an absence of mandate.

In two of the three cases mandate ambiguities and inconsistencies were shown to have affected the consequent ceasefire verification reports. In KVM ambiguous drafting in one of the several mandate source texts (the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement) enabled the Serbs to deny the verifiers access to large areas of potentially critical terrain. Even more fundamentally, the allowance made in the Clark/Neumann letter that the Serbs could engage the KLA in under-defined and partially subjective circumstances meant that the *Serbs* were sometimes unable to determine whether they were breaching the ceasefire, let alone the verifiers. Drafted in haste (like the KVM mandate), the ONUMOZ mandate created many problems for the mission which was forced to expend much time and energy urging the

[2] This could have been addressed with a catch-all provision such as "... and all other armed entities."

parties to agree the practical meanings of key operational terms.[3] Ambiguities in the ONUMOZ mandate enabled RENAMO to claim control over certain parts of Mozambique in a manner that had not been anticipated in the GPA but which made it very hard for ONUMOZ to declare whether this activity constituted a ceasefire violation or not.

In two of the three cases the verification reports were affected by rules consequent of the CVM's mandate. The arrangement by which UNAVEM II was restricted to, essentially, verifying the parties' verification of each other, and the enforcement of a static / reactive situation of verifiers at the AAs, severely limited the mission's ability to accurately report on the situation across the country. In Kosovo, omissions and inconsistencies both within and between the mandate source documents enabled the Serbs to create rules which further restricted the verifiers' access to key areas 'for their own safety'. In contrast, in only one of the cases was the verification narrative affected by the mandate framing the situation or the conflict parties (UNAVEM II) and there were no instances of a mandate describing the conduct of verification such as to give a partial result. Finally, in all three cases the ability of the mission to objectively and impartially verify the ceasefire agreement was bounded by limits upon personnel and resources, although to different extents. Accordingly, this first plausibility probe signposts the replacement of the base hypothesis with a potential new hypothesis: *In addition to monitoring data, CVM mandates can substantially affect ceasefire verification reports.*

6.2.2 Organisational Pathologies

On the basis of observations associated with organisational theory it was hypothesised that ceasefire verification reports could be affected by the organisational structures of a CVM, of the IO which conducts it, and of the relationship between them (which constitutes a further

[3] This issue, which similarly impacted UNAVEM II and KVM, could have been addressed by appending the mandates and agreements with glossaries.

organisational structure in its own right). In all three cases the verification narrative was substantially affected by organisational pathologies, sometimes by the interaction of different natures of pathology at different levels. In all cases organisational pathologies contributed to the CVM's delayed deployment or rollout, inevitably affecting the reports of missions inadequately formed to properly collect the monitoring data with which to create those reports. Notably, cultural contestation featured in each of the five accounts of organisational pathologies found across the three cases, appearing within a CVM (UNAVEM II), within a conducting IO (the UN in the case of UNAVEM II, the OSCE in the case of KVM), and between CVMs and IOs (UNAVEM II and the UN, KVM and the OSCE). In the KVM-OSCE HQ nexus cultural contestation within KVM combined with goal displacement and cultural contestation in Vienna to slow the mission's rollout in terms of personnel and equipment. In the UNAVEM II-UN HQ nexus cultural contestation between UNAVEM II and New York combined with goal displacement in New York to both contribute to the mission's under-resourcing and to subsequently occlude the UN HQ's ability to understand the effect this was having on the verification reports they received in ways that likely affected their interpretation of those reports. Aside from mission resourcing, cultural contestation within UNAVEM II combined with bureaucratic universalism in New York to create a situation in which it is likely (although not fully demonstrated) that different parts of the UNAVEM II structure assessed and handled information in different ways. With respect to KVM, cultural contestation in Pristina provoked cultural contestation in Vienna which affected the executive's ability to agree and disseminate universal verification standards for the use of the verifiers on the ground. In sum, the presence and influence of organisational pathologies across the three cases is such that it may reasonably be stated: *In addition to monitoring data, organisational pathologies can substantially affect ceasefire verification reports.*

6.2.3 Process and Procedural Pathologies

On the basis of writings on Cold War arms verification and other observations it was hypothesised that ceasefire verification reports could be affected by the manner in which CVM designers conceptualise verification (processes) and the practical ways in which they attempt to realise those concepts (procedures). In all three cases the verification narrative was substantially affected by process pathologies. All of the CVMs were reliant on the conflict parties for baseline data, and in all of the cases what was provided was partial and/or otherwise inadequate to ensure the accuracy of the consequent verification reports. Obtaining reliable baseline data is likely to be a perennial issue for CVMs as accurate figures will often be the sole preserve of conflict parties possessing strong motivations to conceal them (also insurgent groups may not themselves possess accurate figures). A constituent, effectively, of the 'proposition' in this inquiry's understanding of verification, baseline data is so central to a ceasefire verification process that it seems unwise for a CVM to commence without a clear and auditable method for obtaining it. In Angola, the parties' suspicion of each other led to the only incidence of the second hypothesised process pathology when the parties and UNAVEM II personnel took to the air in an attempt to disprove a claim which was not conceptually disprovable. A path-dependent process pathology was also seen only once, a potential underlying consequence of the KVM's focus on Kosovo Albanian areas 'most at risk' of attack by the comparatively visible Serbs. Unlike the baseline process pathology (which *was* shown to have substantially affected the verification reports of all three CVMs), it could not be shown that either of these latter pathologies had such causal effect.

Considering now procedural pathologies, whilst detected in all of the cases in only one was a CVM's reports demonstrably affected to a substantial degree. CVM procedures are initially created under such time pressures that the occasional appearance of issues which might be described as 'one-offs' should probably be anticipated. Some of the practical difficulties the

UNMOs faced in counting troops at AAs (UNAVEM II) and the potential for the parties' interference in ONUMOZ's investigatory procedures fall within this category. The limitations of such procedures will be (or at least should be) apparent to the missions' principals: rather than a failure of imagination they will likely represent a paucity of resources or some practical environmental accommodation. Of greater interest are procedures which systemically introduce subjectivities into the verification narrative path. The isolation of Operations Officer 1 in UNAVEM II HQ shows how in a latter node an inadequately conceived and poorly supervised procedure can subvert a narrative which literally hundreds of individuals sited in prior nodes have worked to create. In that case, furthermore, the potential to create irrational deviations in the verification narrative could have been moderated had the pen-holder been or sat with the SRSG, but the unusual decision by the Head of DPKO to own this function prevented the UN's presence in Angola from either detecting the structural problem or correcting its potential results. However, whilst either of these procedural pathologies had the potential to subvert the UNAVEM II verification narrative it has not been demonstrated that they did. The one case in which a mission's verification reports were undoubtedly affected by a procedural pathology was KVM in which the deliberate manipulations by principals in KVM HQ were able to pass unchecked by an absence of either auditing KVM structures or adequate supervisory OSCE structures. As a consequence it may be stated that: *In addition to monitoring data, both process and procedural pathologies can substantially affect ceasefire verification reports.*

6.2.4 Cognitive and Group Pathologies

Drawing on FPDM analysis it was hypothesised that ceasefire verification reports could be affected by certain cognitive processes and by phenomena which influence the ways individuals act and make decisions within groups. Modelling a verification task as a cognitive load suggests that various cognitive verification pathologies would pertain, and that

these would be exacerbated by the inherently stressful environments verifiers routinely operate within. However, whilst stress (a key weak indicator of confirmation bias and premature cognitive closure) was demonstrably experienced in all of the cases by many of the verifiers 'on the ground', none of the proposed strong indicators were detected in any of them. Similarly, whilst all of the cases demonstrated many of the weak indicators of both groupthink and newgroup none of the proposed strong indicators were detected. Assuming that the indicators possess validity this may be because the phenomena did not manifest or (perhaps more likely) because the information the indicators rely upon failed to transfer into archival records and interviews conducted many years after the event.[4] Consequently, as regards cognitive and group pathologies this inquiry can advance no further than the hypotheses offered in Chapter II.

6.2.5 IOs' Strategic Purposes

Noting the potential for the strategic purposes of a CVM conducting IO to diverge from the imperative to issue an objectively created narrative, it was hypothesised that an IO could elect to moderate or suppress certain ceasefire verification reports it receives before placing them before its client audience. In two of the three cases the verification narrative was substantially affected in this way. With respect to Angola UN HQ moderated the tone and content of the Secretary-General's updates to give the impression that the parties' levels of adherence to the Bicesse Accords were more comparable than was reported by UNAVEM II. With respect to Mozambique the UN HQ and its SRSG independently acted to moderate the content of the Secretary-General's updates to (as they saw it) best support the parties' peacebuilding efforts. In that the UNAVEM II and the ONUMOZ verification narrative paths share a common node (UN HQ), with regard to this particular pathology there is evidently linkage between the two cases. This does not, however, disqualify the conclusion that: *CVM conducting IOs can*

[4] It will be recalled that the author's interviews excluded questions of a perceptual or psychological nature.

deliberately and significantly affect ceasefire verification reports for purposes other than objective reporting.

6.2.6 Manipulation by Powerful Actors

From the position that ceasefire verification narratives are potentially sources of power it was hypothesised that powerful actors could attempt to affect ceasefire verification reports to accord with their own interests. Mechanisms by which actors might achieve this were proposed. There is some evidence that the US attempted a 'discursive attack' on the UNAVEM II verification narrative in favour of UNITA, but that it failed. There is strong evidence that the KVM's HoM (a US Ambassador) successfully conducted a 'smoking gun attack' on the KVM verification narrative in favor of the KLA, and there is some evidence that this was done with (at the very least) the agreement of the US State Department. Within KVM HQ, also, this individual and other senior mission members shaped the reports the mission submitted to Vienna for the purpose of preventing the conducting IO making (as they saw it) a premature decision to withdraw the mission. In that this latter activity was not shown as done to accord with any particular actor's interests it merely demonstrates that there are more ways that a powerful actor might influence a CVM than first proposed. On its own, however, the smoking gun attack on the KVM verification narrative is sufficient basis to state that: *Powerful actors can deliberately and substantially affect ceasefire verification reports for purposes other than objective reporting.*

6.3 Contemporary Relevance of Findings

A cross-case comparison of analyses of three cases from the 1990s has shown that various factors additional to monitoring data can substantially affect ceasefire verification reports. Whilst, as noted, the generalisability of the outcomes of these plausibility probes across the universe of CVMs is highly limited, the results' utility to researchers and practitioners alike

would be improved if something could be said about the extent to which the presence and effect of these phenomena apply today. Two questions appear especially pertinent. Firstly, to what extent have contemporary CVMs identified and eradicated verification pathologies on the basis of previous experiences (including but not limited to the CVMs considered in this project)? Secondly, have technological advances in areas such as surveillance, communications and information handling changed the nature of verification? It will be recalled that the project selected cases from the 1990s because access to the archives of more recent CVMs was denied: prospective fieldwork on ongoing missions faces issues of informational security, researcher safety, and permissions by the conducting IO and, potentially, the conflict parties. However, the author was granted sufficient access to the OSCE SMM to comment on these two matters in the strictly limited context of this single contemporary CVM.[5]

6.3.1 Lessons Learned?

The OSCE SMM (2014-ongoing) is the first CVM conducted by the OSCE since KVM (1998-9). Like KVM, the SMM's mandate is poorly matched to the conflict, although in the SMM's case this is because the Agreements which specify the ceasefire were created subsequent to the mandate which could not then be altered because the concurrence of the parties and the Russian Federation could not be guaranteed.[6] Since its deployment SMM has enlarged incrementally from 100 civilian monitors to around 800, the great majority of which are sited along a 487 km long contact line (which now theoretically constitutes a 30 km wide zone of separation) that divides Government of Ukraine forces and separatist elements. The monitors' access is regularly restricted (2,442 incidences in 2017) and the mission records

[5] Interviews with key individuals at the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (Vienna) in August 2018 and three days at SMM HQ (Kiev) in October 2018.
[6] Interviews with CPC personnel, Skype, 2 August 2018. See also Hilde Haug, "The Minsk Agreements and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission," *Security and Human Rights* 27, nos. 3-4 (2016): 342-6.

many ceasefire violations each day.[7] The OSCE regards the SMM's Chief Monitoring Officer (CMO i.e. the HoM) as 'owning' the mission's reports, which SMM issues having familiarised them with Vienna for 'light touch' political assurance. Apart from being an unarmed civilian mission there are many similarities between SMM and KVM: the conflict is between a state's forces and an insurgency, and is ongoing; the mandate is under-defined; the mission deployed rapidly and then built up in theatre; the monitors verify heavy weapons.[8] Following its experiences with KVM the OSCE charged its Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) to identify lessons and best practices by which to continuously improve the conduct of field operations.[9] It does not, however, appear that the OSCE made much effort to apply the many lessons of KVM to SMM.[10] Both officers in the CPC and monitors in Kiev suggested that because SMM developed in directions that could not have been foreseen and to an extent that was not initially anticipated there would have been limited value in attempting to learn lessons from a prior mission. During the deployment phase people were 'too busy' to refer to lessons learned; instead, SMM has been 'learning as it goes' and 'reacting to situations on the ground'. A former KVM member who now holds a senior position in the UN recalled, "Whenever I talked to people [from SMM] they would say this is so new for the OSCE and I would say no this is a total duplication of what we did in Kosovo with no lessons learned whatsoever ... it was exactly the same, the same issues, the same setup."[11] Even had this not been the case, the argument that there is little point learning lessons from past missions because no two missions are identical appears facile. It may be that lessons learned from KVM (and other CVMs)

[7] For 2017 SMM reported the incredible figure of 401,336 ceasefire violations; to make sense of this it must be understood that, for example, a military contact involving twenty reported individual bursts of gunfire would be coded as twenty violations. OSCE, "2017 OSCE SMM activities in figures," accessed 13 December 2018, https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/368246?download=true. The SMM mandate is at: OSCE, "Decision No. 1117 - Deployment of an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine," PC.DEC/1117, 21 March 2014, accessed 12 June 2018, https://www.osce.org/pc/116747?download=true.

[8] This latter requirement appears in Article 3 of the Minsk Memorandum (19 September 2014) but not in the SMM mandate.

[9] OSCE, "OSCE Factsheet: The Conflict Prevention Centre," 1 September 2015, accessed 18 March 2018, https://www.osce.org/cpc/13717.

[10] In the setting up stages the CPC did discuss SMM with two senior former members of KVM but no consequent actions were identified.

[11] Annette Lyth, interview by author, Skype, 7 September 2018.

could have *saved* time and energy during the planning and deployment stages as well as reducing the likelihood of repeating previously made mistakes. Perhaps the OSCE might have been less willing to grant the CMO such autonomy had it appreciated the extent to which a previous HoM had manipulated the reports it received. (The OSCE cannot be regarded as unique in its reluctance to re-examine hard-learned lessons: whilst the EU has sent delegates to SMM to learn about its cutting-edge use of surveillance technologies the UN has not.)

6.3.2 Implications of Technological Change

In vivid contrast to the UNAVEM II's under-conceptualised helicopter reconnaissance and the KVM's unsuccessful pleas for NATO overflight products, SMM operates a number of advanced surveillance systems. In 2018 SMM expended approximately 15% of an annual budget of approximately 100 million euros on remote surveillance systems, including commercial satellite imagery, mini, medium range and long range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), fixed cameras and thermal-imaging devices.[12] Image analysis is undertaken by around twenty specialist personnel in SMM HQ. These systems afford SMM several advantages denied to CVMs in the 1990s. Verifier safety is enhanced by the ability to undertake their tasks whilst 'standing off' from potentially hazardous areas and situations.[13] The tactical and operational employment of UAVs can overcome the parties' ability to deny verifier access to key terrain or events. Certain systems (long range UAVs, static cameras) possess night vision capabilities which allow the mission to monitor points of interest at any time its patrols cannot be on site. In Ukraine the success of such systems has resulted in an 'arms race' between monitoring and counter-monitoring technologies; SMM UAVs are electronically jammed or shot down on a fairly regular basis, and static cameras have been disabled by gunfire (although possibly unintentionally). The availability of such systems

[12] Unpublished figures provided by the CPC.
[13] A point also recognised by the UN. See United Nations, *United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) in Peacekeeping Operations* (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2017), 8.

requires any modern CVM to balance the significant financial costs involved in fielding both the equipments and the specialist personnel that support them against the financial costs and human risks involved in maintaining verifiers on the ground. Advanced surveillance systems pose questions not previously encountered by CVMs, such as whether electronic jamming constitutes a freedom of movement violation and, fundamentally, whether the ability to potentially *see* more necessarily equates to *understanding* more. The vast amounts of often real time information the SMM's systems produce has necessitated the use of automated information management processes, and considerable effort is devoted to synchronising technical and human information gathering activities. Increasing the number and/or the capabilities of (human and non-human) sensors is unlikely to reduce the subjectivity inherent within the deciding of the locations where the sensors will be placed and the directions in which they will observe. Such decision-making in SMM continues to be informed by factors including individual verifier knowledge, media monitoring, international events and seasonal patterns. There are, furthermore, limits to the degree that technology can substitute for verifier-combatant and verifier-civilian interactions which can pick up on and pursue feelings and understandings in ways that non-human sensors cannot.[14] Despite their evident utility, the SMM's experience suggests that the usage of advanced surveillance systems is unlikely to moderate the influence of any of those verification pathologies with the potential to substantially affect ceasefire verification reports.

6.4 Implications for Theory, Policy and Practice

By applying an unusual group of methods to new and existent data this inquiry has shown that ceasefire verification reports can be substantially affected by verification pathologies relating to CVM mandates and ceasefire agreements, organisations, processes and procedures, IO's strategic purposes, and manipulation by powerful actors. Without intervention there is no

[14] SMM monitors further suggest that whilst both parties in Ukraine demonstrate a 'culture of impunity' when aware they are being monitored remotely, the presence of human monitors has a (temporary) deterrent effect.

reason to assume these pathologies cannot affect CVMs which are ongoing at present or those which will be conducted in the future. On the basis of the thesis' results this Section offers ways in which those who conceive, design and conduct CVMs could seek to moderate the influence of these pathologies, and suggests that those who interpret CVM outcomes may wish to do so in a critical way.[15] Consideration is then given to the results' implications for broader debates in IR.

In that verification constitutes the establishment of the validity of a proposition it is essential that any verification enterprise commences with clear sight as to what that proposition is. Ceasefire agreements should specify terms in language which is sufficiently well defined and otherwise unambiguous that it be empirically determinable if and when those terms are broken. Those terms must be faithfully represented in the CVM mandate such that practicable verification standards can be derived for use by verifiers on the ground. In situations where the imperative to achieve an agreement and commence a CVM are very pressing it should be remembered that a careful drafting and review process at the pre-deployment stage may save problems up to and including mission failure later on. Care must also be paid to ensuring the mandate does not inadvertently *produce* the conflict or any of the parties to it by framing it/them in some partial way or by omitting some agentive party altogether. Whilst mandates must be impartial they should not necessarily be neutral when the parties are different in nature. Only in exceptional circumstances should an arrangement to verify some but not all of the conflict parties be considered. The mandate must include a clear plan to obtain reliable baseline data. Finally, the mandate must be achievable. As Anstee suggested after her UNAVEM II experiences, in the long term the pursuit of peace

[15] As the thesis failed to demonstrate the theorised effects of groupthink, suggestions cannot reasonably be made as to the moderation / elimination of its (theoretical) effects on a CVM. However, in that the discussion in Section 2.6 identified several reasons to believe that CVMs are especially prone to groupthink, a prudent future CVM designer might at least consider whether any of those factors rehearsed could be pre-emptively mitigated by design.

(and the interests of the potential IO) may be better served by refusing to commence with an agreement that is fundamentally flawed. This includes resourcing: whilst the cost of a properly resourced CVM can be high, in terms of blood, reputation and treasure the cost of the failure of a peace process will very likely be higher. Powerful states who involve themselves in shaping a CVM mandate might be wise to remember this.

When considering whether to deploy a CVM an IO should seek to identify the requisite tasks and goals independently and prior to considering how its existing structures might undertake them.[16] Unless and until dispassionate analysis demonstrates otherwise, the default position should be that internal restructuring will be required to undertake such a complex additional task (rather than that the task be reimagined to accord with existing structures and procedures). Once an IO has decided to proceed, strong leadership - particularly effective internal communications - should be ensured within the IO to identify and minimise the debilitating effects of cultural contestation. For the same reason, clear channels of communication should be created between the IO and the CVM and built into the CVM's nascent hierarchy and structures. When designing a CVM's laydown, preference should be given to structures offering the shortest possible verification narrative path as this will reduce the number of nodes in which pathologies could occur and improve greater visibility of them when they do. As John Ries noted, "If the chain of communications is very long, each link must take the judgments of lower echelons and use them as facts."[17] Evidently procedures that represent paths in which an individual or small group of individuals can subvert the efforts of all of the prior nodes in an unmonitored fashion should be avoided. CVM designers could seek to reduce path-dependency by incorporating structures which are deliberately isolated from the verification narrative path and which periodically re-evaluate the mission's

[16] For example, by using an external agent.
[17] John Ries, *The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the US Armed Services* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964), 49-50.

analysis.[18] The mission's processes and the conduct of its procedures should also be independently examined at routine intervals. Finally, those who ultimately lay ceasefire verification reports before an audience should be clear as to the limitations inherent in the manner in which they were created. Robert Jervis notes that policy-makers desire clarity to inform their actions and that they dislike ambiguous reports as a consequence. Report writers must resist pressure to 'smooth' verification narratives by concealing thin data and dissenting indicators to satisfy such imperatives.[19]

Whilst the effects of certain verification pathologies could be avoided or minimised by informed CVM design, others - especially those relating to the human condition (a 'boundedly rational *Homo psychologicus*') - may be inherent to an empirical verification process of this kind. On the basis that even the sum of these prescriptions are highly unlikely to eliminate the effects of all possible verification pathologies, those who would interpret and potentially act upon ceasefire verification reports are warned to regard them critically, to seek and understand the limitations of the ways in which they were created, and to triangulate the reports' conclusions with other sources wherever possible. (Those who have studied an historical event in which a CVM outcome played a significant role might wish to review their conclusions in light of the findings presented here.) Certain questions should always be posed. Firstly, do circumstances indicate that the CVM could reasonably have created a verification narrative that diverged from the IO's strategic imperatives? If so, a policy-maker (or historian) might review and compare the reports the CVM submitted to the IO with those the IO subsequently produced.[20] A second line of inquiry should concern the degree of

[18] See Yaacov Vertzberger, *The World in their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 1990), 355.
[19] The author agrees with Robert Jervis' recommendation that such dissenting material be included as footnotes (and notes that in three years of reading verification reports he has not seen a single one). Robert Jervis, *How Statesmen Think* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017), 138, 151.
[20] Recalling that the ONUMOZ's SRSG created reports which were informed by his understanding of the UN's strategic imperatives a careful policy-maker or historian might also wish to review the reports created at the node *prior* to the CVM's HQ.

alignment of political will between the conducting IO and the conducting IO's most powerful member states. This inquiry has suggested (and in one case provided substantial evidence for) two mechanisms by which powerful actors may attempt to affect a CVM's reports. There will undoubtedly be others. The careful reader of ceasefire verification reports may wish to determine the existence of any powerful actors which desired particular verification outcomes and which believed there was a reasonable chance that these might not come about.

Beyond their utility to CVM practitioners and those who utilise and study the outcomes of CVMs, the thesis' results represent modest contributions to certain debates in IR. As discussed in Chapter I, CVMs are simultaneously under-studied and yet as practices seemingly ubiquitous in the peacebuilding field. In that it has been understood that CVMs can enable peacekeeping by offering conflict parties mutual security guarantees, the demonstration that CVM outcomes are less objective than commonly supposed may encourage a reconsideration of CVMs as peacekeeping tools and greater focus on complimentary or alternative peacebuilding approaches. Considering next organisational theory, the thesis has shown how some of the dysfunctions that are understood to manifest in complex hierarchical structures can also act between two such structures (an IO and a CVM) when co-joined in a hierarchical way. It has offered a way to map and analyse the ways in which complex organisations convert information into understandings: this could have utility in studying topics such as media or law. Specific to IOs, the thesis has added to the body of knowledge on historical organisational dysfunction within the UN and to the (considerably smaller) body of knowledge on historical organisational dysfunction within the OSCE. It has uncovered an unsuspected agency within DPKO / EOSG to act in pursuit of an internal agenda. This demonstration that the UN's independence from its most powerful members in the early 1990s was in certain ways less constrained than previously thought infers both a narrow review of accounts of UN influence in that period (and possibly thus the *legitimacy* of

some of the UN's actions in that period) and a broader reassessment of the principal-agent account as it applies to that IO.[21] Furthermore, it begs the question of whether DPKO / EOSG engages in such practices today (see below). If such an important IO is capable of using such methods to shape states' actions, should states be more wary of creating IOs and delegating certain functions to them? Finally, following the body of poststructuralist work which focuses upon the role of language in constituting the world the thesis has made new demonstrations of ways in which discourses (verification narratives) can be created, manipulated and subjugated by state actors as sources of power.

6.5 Future Research

Plausibility probes are preliminary studies to signpost hypotheses with sufficient potential validity to warrant more extensive testing. Contra the base hypothesis that ceasefire verification reports are affected solely by monitoring data, it has been shown that several other factors can also have causal effect. Programmes of more rigorous hypothesis-testing on each of these verification pathologies is inferred. However, whilst this would probably lead to a greater understanding of the ways in which each pathology operates it would be unlikely to indicate any generalisable causal relationships (with one exception, below). CVMs are so complex and, as structural *reactions* to historical situations, so individual that it is hard to imagine the emergence of any general rules applicable to the universe of CVMs. It has, for example, been demonstrated that organisational pathologies can substantially influence ceasefire verification reports, but no direct or conjunctural causal link has been suggested nor does it seem likely that there could be one. What is perhaps likely is the existence of probabilistic relationships e.g. that a high degree of cultural contestation within a CVM is more likely to substantially affect its ceasefire verification reports than a low degree.

[21] Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), 2; Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 1 (February 1998): 5.

Possibly trivial in themselves, a comparison of such relationships (if demonstrated) could offer the useful result of grading the effect severity of different verification pathologies. The researcher identified 18 cases (15 with records mostly in English) which were potentially researchable and this number will rise as the UN Archive incrementally permits access to the records of the UN CVMs of the late 1990s. Theoretically, this could constitute sufficient case numbers for a quantitative analysis: however, even putting aside the very considerable scale of such a project, the researcher would have to overcome the problems of coding the dependent and independent variables to a sufficiently objective degree.

Probably more fruitful would be the further qualitative pursuit of those verification pathologies whose implications are potentially broader than the narrow grain topic of CVMs. The topic of mandate pathologies is one of these. Mandates are employed in many different international monitoring and verification activities (strategic weapons inspection, election monitoring etc.); furthermore, certain mandate pathologies (framing, classifying, describing) likely possess applicability to the even larger class of all international agreements. Allied to this importance, unlike all the other demonstrated verification pathologies much of the primary material required to analyse mandate pathologies is available outside of often inaccessible archives. Several productive lines of inquiry concerning the intentional and unintentional bounding or other shaping of international activity through the setting of agreements in text could be imagined. A second topic of more general interest concerns organisational pathologies for which an extensive scholarship - in fact a whole 'school' (Columbia School) - already exists. Here the thesis has suggested the idea of 'vertical' cultural contestation between an organisation and a sub-unit (a CVM) which the organisation has created to undertake a specific task; it also demonstrated how different organisational pathologies have causal effect by interacting in 'horizontal' and/or 'vertical' ways. These observations and the historical interpretations on which they are based have the potential to

shed new insights into the discipline of organisational theory and the practical design and management of complex organisations, the latter an area in which extensive fieldwork and researcher 'immersion' will often be achievable.

Potentially the thesis' most important discovery is the UN's historical willingness to shape verification narratives for purposes other than those mandated in the agreement(s) on which a CVM is based. To the previously known case involving UNMOGIP must now be added UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ. This raises several questions worthy of further investigation. Firstly, given that the organisation and manning of the executive of the IO that conducted UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ was mostly the same (the exception being the replacement of Marrack Goulding with Kofi Annan as Head of DPKO), were any of the other 16 CVMs the UN conducted during Boutros Boutros-Ghali's term as Secretary-General (January 1992 - December 1996) similarly affected? Reducing the case diversity to the sub-set of UN CVMs conducted over this five year period might better illustrate the causal effects of both this and potentially other verification pathologies. A second question - which, in that the UN was conducting ten CVMs on 1 December 2018, is pressing - is whether UN HQ is moderating any of its CVM's ceasefire verification reports *now.* In general terms, given that any conducting IO will have such authority over a CVM it creates and deploys, and given also that such an IO's situation as the final node on the verification narrative chain will inevitably grant it the 'final word', for this single verification pathology it does appear conceivable that a direct causal relationship could exist between a conducting IO interfering with a verification narrative for its own strategic purposes and substantial affect on the ceasefire verification reports it releases to its key audience(s). On the surface there seems, furthermore, no reason why this pathology which has now been observed in three UN CVMs could not similarly affect other IOs' CVMs i.e. that a causal relationship with significant generalisability could exist across the universe of cases. Were this shown the implications for the future conduct of

CVMs as peacebuilding mechanisms would be profound. However, as previously noted there are many practical barriers to investigating the majority of historical CVMs, and there are different practical barriers to investigating probably all of the ongoing ones. As a minimum, a partial set of the draft reports which the penholder (assuming he sat in the CVM, which was not the case in either UNAVEM II or KVM) submitted to the conducting IO must be accessible for comparison with the IO's final reports. In both the UN cases these drafts were found to exist only in a very partial state in the UN Archives, and these are likely the most complete archives for these purposes that exist. Interviews with previous pen holders and/or SRSGs would represent a second possible avenue to pursue.

Given that three CVMs are now known to have been affected by a conducting IO's strategic purposes, a related matter of interest concerns the conditions which cause an IO to seek to affect a ceasefire verification narrative. Noting the political capital and financial expense member states invest in creating CVMs - at its peak ONUMOZ famously cost one million US dollars *a day* - it may be inferred that considerable pressure would have to be exerted upon an IO's executive for it to pursue whatever it considers 'the greater good' in such a way. An IO, furthermore, must be aware that in so acting it not only imperils the legitimacy and consequently the utility of the CVM in question, but the utility of CVMs as an important tool of international peacebuilding per se. Do particular structural conditions enable and/or encourage an IO to act in this way? Do the 'bespoke' IOs which assemble to conduct a single CVM, such as those which conduct the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in DPRK and ROK or the Temporary International Presence in Hebron, experience this pathology? Are certain executive personnel (the Secretary-General of the day in the UN's case) willing to consider acting in this way whilst others are not? If so, why? To address these questions would potentially lead to ways to better detect this pathology and to minimise opportunities for its occurrence through structural design.

6.6 Concluding Remarks

It is virtually *de rigueur* for a conflict party to contest a verification outcome that finds against it. Accusations as to opponents' political machinations, the conducting IO's biases and the incompetence of the verifiers are as predictable as they are wearisome, yet it is rarely suggested that a verification outcome is flawed because the agreements, the processes or the procedures which created it are *themselves* inherently problematic. This inquiry has shown that several factors other than monitoring data can substantially affect ceasefire verification reports and, having suggested ways to minimise the effects of verification pathologies, it has noted that remnants of their presence are probably inevitable. CVMs will be manned by individuals who are incapable of excluding their unique experiences and knowledge from their decision-making because 'rational verifiers' do not actually exist. CVM processes and procedures will likely not be completely objective. Their structures may prove partially dysfunctional. The conducting IO may interfere with its CVM's reports. Powerful actors may find ways to affect verification reports to accord with their own interests. Would conflict parties accept, coordinate with and rely upon CVMs if this was widely realised? Is the CVM in fact a credible international peacekeeping tool?

Reflecting on ONUMOZ's efficacy, Ambassador Christopher Dell suggested that "Verification is more of an art than a science."[22] Whilst not, perhaps, deliberately staking out a metaphysical position, the Ambassador evidently understood there had been a point in Mozambique at which verification had segued from that which was objective and neutral to something more subjective and, potentially, normative. Perhaps it was legitimate for the UN to interfere with that mission's verification narrative in pursuit of the 'greater good'? To accept this, however, is to accept that it is legitimate to misrepresent a CVM's output as solely 'scientific' rather than the mix of 'science' and 'art' practitioners know it to be. If verification

[22] Interview by author, Skype, 12 July 2018.

is inherently subjective its output should not be depicted and acted upon as though it is not. But this is not necessarily grounds for pessimism. In better understanding the structures, the processes, the procedures and, most importantly, the individuals which together constitute CVMs one may hope to increase the science, to (correspondingly) reduce the art, and to more accurately locate the points at which the former becomes the latter. In this way one may aim to practically situate the limitations of objective processes and procedures in order to better operate within them and to thus continue to utilise CVMs as important tools for building and maintaining peace.

Annex A Ceasefire Verification Missions, 1945-2018

* Denotes cases with potential for investigation (see Section 1.4.2).
† Denotes cases with potential for investigation and with archival records primarily in a language other than English.

Location	IO	CVM	From	To[1]	Agreement(s) / UNSCR(s)	Notes
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syrian Arab Republic	UN	UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	1948	ongoing	UNSCR 50 (29 May 1948); subsequently the 1949 Armistice Agreements.	UNTSO personnel are additionally attached to various peacekeeping forces in the Middle East.
India, Pakistan	UN	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	1949	ongoing	Karachi Agreement (27 July 1949).	Following hostilities in 1971 an agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir was signed in July 1972.
DPRK, ROK	[2]	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)	1953	ongoing	Korean Armistice Agreement (27 July 1953).	
North Vietnam, South Vietnam	[3]	International Control Commission (ICC)	1954	1973	Geneva Accords (20 July 1954).	Replaced by the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC).
Egypt	UN	UN Emergency Force 1 (UNEF 1)	1956	1967	Statements to the UN General Assembly in November 1956 by Egypt, Israel, France and UK.	
Dominican Republic	UN	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	1965	1966	UNSCR 203 (14 May 1965); UNSCR 205 (22 May 1965).	
India, Pakistan	UN	UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)	1965	1966	See UNMOGIP.	UNIPOM was an administrative adjunct of UNMOGIP to supervise the ceasefire along the India-Pakistan border outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

[1] 'Ongoing' indicates as at 1 December 2018.
[2] The NNSC was originally composed of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland; from December 2018 Sweden and Switzerland only.
[3] The ICC was composed of Canada, India and Poland.

Honduras, El Salvador	OAS	Deployment of military and civilian observers following the Honduras-El Salvador conflict ('Football War').[4]	1969 1976	1971 1976	Ceasefire between Honduras and El Salvador (18 July 1969).	
Suez Canal	UN	UN Emergency Force 2 (UNEF 2)	1973	1979	UNSCR 340 (25 October 1973).	
North Vietnam, South Vietnam	[5]	International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS)	1973	1974	Paris Peace Accords (23 January 1973).	
Golan Heights	UN	UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	1974	ongoing	Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces in UNSCR 338 (22 October 1973).	
Cyprus	UN	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	1974 [1964]	ongoing	De facto ceasefire declared by Turkish forces in Northern Cyprus ('Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus') (16 August 1974).	UNFICYP, established as a peacekeeping force in 1964, became a CVM in 1974 when its mandate was enlarged to supervise the de facto ceasefire.
Lebanon	UN	UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	1978	ongoing	Unilateral ceasefire declared by Israel (21 March 1978).	
Chad	OAU	Neutral Force in Chad	1981	1982	Lagos Accord (21 August 1979).	
Sinai Peninsula	[6]	Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)	1981	ongoing	Egyptian-Israel Peace Treaty (26 March 1979).	Between 1979 and 1981 Treaty observers were provided by the US Sinai Field Mission.
Afghanistan, Pakistan	UN	* UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	1988	1990	The Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan (14 April 1988).	
Iran, Iraq	UN	* UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	1988	1991	UNSCR 598 (20 July 1987).	

[4] L.T.G., "A Microcosmic View of the OAS: The Honduras-El Salvador Conflict," *Virginia Law Review* 57, no. 2 (March 1971): 291-314; Mary Martz, "The Central American Soccer War: Historical Patterns and Internal Dynamics of OAS Settlement Procedures," *Papers in International Studies Latin American Series* no. 4 (1978): 73-81.

[5] The ICSS was composed of Canada (replaced by Iran in July 1973), Hungary, Indonesia and Poland). It was supported by a Joint Military Commission composed of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, US and Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government.

[6] The MFO is an "independent international organization" established by a Protocol between Egypt and Israel "as an alternative" to an envisioned UN force. MFO, "About Us," accessed 16 March 2019, http://mfo.org/en/about-us.

Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua	UN	† UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)	1989	1992	Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America (known both as the Esquipulas II Agreement and the Guatemala Procedure) (7 August 1987).	The Declaration of San Isidro de Coronado (12 December 1989) requested the expansion of ONUCA's mandate to include verification of any cessation of hostilities.
Western Sahara	UN	* UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	1991	ongoing	Settlement proposals accepted by Morocco and the *Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro* (Frente POLISARIO) (30 August 1998).[7]	
El Salvador	UN	† UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	1991	1995	Agreements between the Government of El Salvador and the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional.*	
Iraq, Kuwait	UN	* UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)	1991	2003	UNSCR 687 (3 April 1991).	Terms of UNSCR 687 accepted by Iraq.
Angola	UN	* UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	1991	1995	Bicesse Accords (31 May 1991).	UNAVEM III commenced February 1995.
Rwanda	OAU	Military Observer Group (MOG) / Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) I / NMOG II	1991	1993	Series of rapidly broken ceasefires between belligerents in Rwanda.	NMOG II personnel transferred to UNAMIR in December 1993.
Mozambique	UN	* UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	1992	1995	General Peace Agreement for Mozambique (4 October 1992).	
Somalia	UN	* UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)	1992	1993	Agreement on the implementation of the cease-fire (3 March 1992).[8]	
Croatia	UN	* UN Protection Force I (UNPROFOR I)	1992	1995	Vance plan (23 November 1991).[9]	
Somalia	UN	* UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	1993	1995	Addis Ababa Agreement (27 March 1993).[10]	
Liberia	UN	* UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	1993	1997	Cotonou Agreement (25 July 1993).	

[7] UN Secretary-General to Security Council, "The Situation Concerning Western Sahara," 18 June 1990, S/21360, DAG Repository.
[8] Security Council, "The Situation in Somalia - Report of the Secretary-General," 11 March 1992, S/23693, Annex III, DAG Repository.
[9] Signed by the Croatian Serbs on 2 January 1992. See Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991)," 11 December 1991, S/23280, Annex III, DAG Repository.
[10] This Agreement represented a reaffirmation and consolidation of three different agreements by the Somali parties made at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, 4-15 January 1993.

Georgia	UN	* UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)	1993	2009	Agreement between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities in Gudauta (27 July 1993); Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces (14 May 1994).	
Rwanda	UN	* UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda I (UNAMIR I)	1993	1994	Agreement between the Rwandan Government and Rwandan Patriotic Front (4 August 1993).	
Burundi	OAU	Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB)[11]	1993	1996	Ceasefire Agreement Between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Burundian Political Parties and Armed Movements (7 October 2002); Global Ceasefire Agreement Between the Transitional Government of Burundi and CNDD-FDD (16 November 2003).	
Tajikistan	UN	* UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)	1994	2000	Agreement on a Temporary Cease-fire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts on the Tajik-Afghan Border and within the Country for the Duration of the Talks[12] (17 September 1994); General Peace Agreement (27 June 1997).	
Georgia	OSCE	* OSCE Mission to Georgia	1994 [1992]	2008	Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces (14 May 1994).	Mandate expansion in 1994 constituted a CVM.[13]

[11] Wiesław Lizak, "Peace Operations in the Activity of the Organisation of African Unity and the African Union," *Politeja - Pismo Wydziału Studiów Międzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego* 42 (2016): 83; Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (New York: United Nations, 2000), 68-70.

[12] Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Tajikistan," 27 September 1994, S/1994/1102, Annex I, DAG Repository.

[13] OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, *Survey of OSCE Field Operations*, June 2018, 51-2, accessed 14 August 2018, https://www.osce.org/cpc/74783?download=true.

West Bank	[14]	Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)	1994	ongoing	Declaration of Principles between the Government of Israel and the PLO (13 September 1993); Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ('Oslo II') (28 September 1995); Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron (27 January 1997).	TIPH withdrew between 8 August 1994 and 26 April 1996.
Bosnia-Herzegovinia	NATO	Implementation Force (IFOR) | Stabilization Force (SFOR) (from 1996)	1995	2004	The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovinia (14 December 1995).[15]	
Croatia	UN	* UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO)	1995	1996	Cease-Fire Agreement of 29 March 1994 (29 March 1994).[16]	
Guatemala	UN	† UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)	1997	1997	Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire between the Government of Guatemala and the *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca* (4 December 1996).	
CAR	[17]	*Mission Inter-Africaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui* (MISAB)	1997	1998	Bangui Agreements (25 January 1997).	Replaced by UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA).
Papua New Guinea	UN	UN Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB); UN Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB)	1998	2004	Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development in Bougainville (23 January 1998).	UNPOB replaced by UNOMB in 2003.
Guinea-Bissau	ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 3 (ECOMOG 3)	1998	1999	Abuja Peace Agreement (1 November 1998).	

[14] Denmark, Norway, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey co-sponsor the TIPH and act as the conducting IO (with Norway as the coordinator). See "Background," The Temporary International Presence in Hebron, accessed 21 August 2018, http://www.tiph.org/background/; "The Hebron Protocol," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 131-45.

[15] "The Parties shall cooperate fully with any international personnel including ... monitors, observers ..." (Annex 1A, Art II, ¶4); "IFOR shall have the right: (a) to monitor and help ensure compliance by all Parties ... (including, in particular, withdrawal and redeployment of Forces within agreed periods, and the establishment of Zones of Separation)" (Annex 1A, Art VI). NATO, "Annex 1A: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement," accessed 20 January 2018, https://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an1a.htm.

[16] Security Council, "Letter Dated 30 March 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," 30 March 1994, S/1994/367, Annex, DAG Repository.

[17] Composed of Burkino Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal and Togo, the MISAB was set up under the Nineteenth Summit Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of France and Africa and under the political authority of the President of that organization. See Security Council, "Identical Letters dated 18 July 1997 from the Chargé D'affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of the Central African Republic to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council," 22 July 1997, S/1997/561, DAG Repository.

Serbia (Kosovo)	OSCE	* Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)	1998	1999	Milošević-Holbrooke Agreement (13 October 1998); Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement (16 October 1998).	
Sierra Leone	UN	UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	1999	2005	Lomé Peace Agreement (18 May 1999).[18]	
Democratic Republic of Congo	UN	UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) / UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)	1999	2010	Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (10 July 1999).	MONUC was renamed MONUSCO on 1 July 2010.
DRC	OAU	OAU Observer Mission to the DRC	1999	2000	Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (10 July 1999).	
Ethiopia, Eritrea	UN	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	2000	2008	Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea (18 June 2000); Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea (12 December 2000).	
Ethiopia, Eritrea	OAU	OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE) (from 2002, AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea)	2000	2008	Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea (18 June 2000).	
Union of the Comoros	OAU	Observer Mission in Comoros II (OMIC II)	2001	2002	Fomboni Agreement (17 February 2001).	OMIC II monitored a disarmament program on the island of Anjouan.
Sri Lanka	[19]	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission	2002	2008	Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (22 February 2002).	

[18] Security Council, "Letter Dated 19 May 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Togo to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council," 20 May 1999, S/1999/585, Annex, DAG Repository.

[19] Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden co-sponsored the SLMM and acted as the conducting IO. See Dag Leraand, ed., *The SLMM Report: 2002-2008* (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).

CAR	CEMAC	*Force Multinationale en Centrafrique* (FOMUC)	2003 [2002]	2008	FOMUC constituted a CVM from 2003 when its mandate was expanded to include the monitoring of the transition and reconciliation process initiated by François Bozizé following his seizure of power.[20]	In 2008 the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) took over CEMAC and transformed it into the *Mission de consolidation de la Paix en République Centrafrique* (MICOPAX).
Liberia	ECOWAS	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)	2003	2003	Ceasefire Agreement (17 June 2003); Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (18 August 2003).	ECOMIL converted to UNMIL on 1 October 2003.
Liberia	UN	UNMIL	2003	2018	Ceasefire Agreement (17 June 2003); Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (18 August 2003).	
Burundi	AU	African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)	2003	2004	Arusha Agreement (28 August 2000);[21] further ceasefire agreements (October 2002).	Handed over to ONUB on 1 June 2004.
Cote d'Ivoire	ECOWAS	ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI)	2003	2004	Agreement for a cessation of hostilities (17 October 2002).	
Sudan	AU, IGAD	Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT)[22]	2003	2004(?)	Machakos Protocol (20 July 2002).	
Burundi	UN	UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	2004	2006	Arush Agreement (28 August 2000).	
Sudan	AU[23]	African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)	2004	2007	Ceasefire agreement between the Sudanese government, the Sudab Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement (8 April 2004).	Became AMIS II-Enhanced (AMIS II-E) at the end of 2005. Handed over to UNAMID in July 2007.
Philippines	[24]	International Monitoring Team (IMT)	2004	ongoing	Agreement on Peace between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (22 June 2001).	The IMT's activities were suspended between 2009 and 2010.

[20] Angela Meyer, "Peace and Security Cooperation in Central Africa: Developments, Challenges and Prospects," discussion paper 56, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (2011): 20-21.
[21] 13 out of 19 delegations signed the Arusha Agreement on 28 August 2000; the remaining six signed the following month.
[22] Tim Murithi, "Inter-governmental Authority on Development on the Ground: Comparing Interventions in Sudan and Somalia," *African Security* 2, nos. 2-3 (2009): 145.
[23] Additionally, the EU contributed an average of two military observers over the mission's duration. "EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur - AMIS," AMIS, January 2008, accessed 23 December 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eu-support-amis-darfur/pdf/01012008_factsheet_eu-support-amis-darfur_en.pdf.
[24] The IMT comprised 50 unarmed members of the armed forces of Malaysia, Libya and Brunei; in 2009 it was reinforced with two officers of the Norwegian Army and two human rights experts from the EU. Kristian Herbolzheimer, "The peace process in Mindanao, the Philippines: evolution and lessons learned," report, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, December 2015, accessed 12 January 2019, https://www.c-r.org/downloads/a6c4f7339db9c90cd15a63c85405404e.pdf.

DRC	AU	Joint Verification Team - Democratic Republic of Congo (JVT-DRC)[25]	2005	2009	Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM) (22 September 2004).	Terms of reference for the JVM made between the governments of DRC and Rwanda.
Sudan	UN	UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	2005	2011	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (9 January 2005).	Replaced by UNMISS on creation of South Sudan.
Indonesia (Aceh)	EU, ASEAN	Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)	2005	2006	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (15 August 2005).	
Sudan (Darfur)	UN, AU	UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	2007	ongoing	Darfur Peace Agreement (5 May 2006).[26]	UNAMID replaced AMIS II-E and augments AMIS.
Georgia	EU	EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM)	2008	ongoing	Six Point Agreement (12 August 2008).	
Sudan (Abyei)	UN	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)	2011	ongoing	Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area (20 June 2011).	
South Sudan	UN	UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)	2011	ongoing	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (9 January 2005); Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (23 January 2014).	
Syria	UN	UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS)	2012	2012	Six-Point Proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the League of Arab States (25 March 2012).	
Mali	UN	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUMSA)	2013	ongoing	Agreement between the transitional government, the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the *Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad* (HCUA), and the *Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad* (MAA) (18 June 2013).	The *Coordination des Mouvements et Forces Patriotiques de Résistance* also agreed to officially adhere to the Agreement.[27]

[25] Ted Dagne, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments," *Congressional Research Service*, 7-5700 (October 2010): 3.
[26] "AMIS shall verify the information provided by the Parties as disclosed to the AU Mediation and the Ceasefire Commission concerning the locations of their forces. The exact position of each unit shall be verified." Darfur Peace Agreement, Article 27, ¶310, accessed 1 December 2018, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_050505_DarfurPeaceAgreement.pdf.
[27] Walter Lotze, "United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUMSA)," in *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, eds. Joachim A. Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 860-1, ftn 15.

South Sudan	IGAD	IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (IGAD MVM)[28]	2014	ongoing	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (23 January 2014).	IGAD MVM operates within UNMISS.
Ukraine	OSCE	OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM)	2014	ongoing	Minsk Agreements (Minsk Protocol, 5 September 2014; Minsk Memorandum, 19 September 2014; 'Package of measures for implementation of the Minsk Agreements, 12 February 2015).[29]	

[28] "Factsheet: IGAD Monitoring & Verification Mission," IGAD MVM, accessed 12 December 2018, https://southsudan.igad.int/attachments/article/229/Factsheet-MVM%20Final%20ENG.pdf.
[29] Hilde Haug, "The Minsk Agreements and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission," *Security and Human Rights* 27, nos. 3-4 (2016): 345-6.

Annex B Summary of Potential Verification Pathologies with Indicators and Counter-Indicators

Pathology	Indicators
Mandates and Agreements	**Omissions**, **ambiguities** and/or **inconsistencies** may enable conflict parties to bound a verification narrative in various ways. **Framing** • [Strong Indicator] Framing a situation and/or conflict parties such that political capital accrues to one or more parties over others. **Classifying** • [Strong Indicator] Classifying a party so as to set it outside of the mission's parameters. **(Political) Describing** • [Strong Indicator] Describing the conduct of verification in terms which, when translated into practical activity, favour certain parties over others. **Rules** • [Strong Indicator] Introducing rules stating what may / may not be verified or by directing restrictive procedures. **Limits** • [Strong Indicator] Limiting the mission's budget, number of personnel, key equipments etc. in ways that restrict the mission's capability to verify certain parties in comparison to others. Setting national caveats ('red lines').
Organisational	**Goal displacement** • [Strong Indicator] Requirements of a new task framed as accordant with previous processes → inadequate / distorted analyses. • [Strong Indicator] Resourcing with assets because they are available rather than because they are appropriate. • [Weak Indicator] Reluctance to re-structure. • [Weak Indicator] Reluctance to employ personnel with unfamiliar skill-sets. • [Weak Indicator] Lack of external curiosity. **Bureaucratic universalism** • [Strong Indicator] Inappropriate applications of organisational solutions which proved successful on previous occasions. • [Weak Indicator] Selecting key personnel on the understanding their skills are generalisable beyond their experience. **Cultural contestation** • [Strong Indicator] Members of identifiable 'sub-units' act in the interests of that sub-unit in preference to the mission. May include framing moves to advantage their sub-unit over others. • [Weak Indicator] Unclear mandates. • [Weak Indicator] Poor informational feedback. • [Weak Indicator] Widely physically dispersed. • [Weak Indicator] Seconded individuals possess little knowledge of the IO's structures or ethos.
Process and Procedural	**Inadequately conceptualised processes** • [Strong Indicator] Parties required to prove an absence (e.g. 'no unregistered weapons') without specifying how this could be achieved. • [Strong Indicator] Systems / infrastructure simultaneously prohibited and unprohibited (dual-purpose systems).

Process and Procedural [cont.]	**Path dependency** • [Strong Indicator] Failure to record or attend to negative data. • [Strong Indicator] Cognitive lock-on: as for Confirmation Bias. **Inadequate baseline data** • [Strong Indicator] Baseline data unavailable. • [Strong Indicator] Baseline data demonstrably false. • [Strong Indicator] Failure to test parties' baseline data. • [Weak Indicator] Processes / procedures fail to recognise baseline data's limitations.
Cognitive	**Confirmation Bias** • [Strong Indicator] Failure to adequately interrogate assenting information / Failure to adequately consider dissenting information. • [Strong Indicator] Selective exposure / bolstering. • [Strong Indicator] Restricting key posts to assenters / 'shutting out' dissenters. • [Weak Indicator] 'Narrative smoothing'. **Premature Cognitive Closure** • [Strong Indicator] Failure to assess new information using the same procedures as used for prior information and/or with the same rigour throughout the mission's duration. • [Weak Indicator] Excessive / inappropriate analogising. **Confirmation Bias + Premature Cognitive Closure** • [Weak Indicators (**Stress**)] Reported stress; Overreliance on SOPs; Ignoring incoming information; Filtering out dissenting information; Procrastinating; Satisficing; Bolstering.
Group	**Groupthink** • [Strong Indicator] Uncritical accordance with group member with greatest apparent experience, rank, status etc. • [Strong Indicator] Narrative 'lock-in'. • [Strong Indicator] Group attempts to isolate itself from dissonant information. • [Weak Indicator] Pressure brought to bear on dissenters, who may be barred from the group (i.e. presence of an 'out-group'). • [Weak Indicator] Multi-node laydown (isolation from SMEs). • [Weak Indicator] Newly formed group. • [Weak Indicator] Absence of detailed orders or SOPs. • [Weak Indicator] Group leader privy to more information than other members. • [Weak Indicator] Group members' status ill-defined, provisional or contingent. • [Weak Indicator] Working environment (language, environmental familiarity etc.) advantages certain members over others. • [Weak Indicator] Decisional stress. • [Weak Indicators (**Newgroup syndrome**)] Newly formed group; Group leader possesses more information than other members; Members uncertain about roles and status; Group's procedures / 'culture' not established / familiarised. • [Strong Counter-Indicators (**Polythink**)] Intragroup conflict; Framing moves; Adoption of lowest common denominator positions; Decisional paralysis.
IO's Strategic Purposes	• [Strong Indicator] Change of facts between CVM's and IO's reports (unlikely). • [Strong Indicators] Change of tone, usage of language, emphasis/lack of emphasis such as to more accord with the IO's strategic purpose. • [Weak Indicator] CVM a component of a multidimensional mission.
Manipulation by Powerful Actors	See representative mechanisms (Figures 2.3, 2.4).

Annex C Interviews and Correspondence

Note: Titles given are those which applied at the period of the case in question.

Anonymous	Senior advisor, KVM HQ, KVM.	March 2017, US
Anonymous	Senior military officer, ONUMOZ HQ, ONUMOZ.	May 2018, Middle East [e-mails]
Aragona, Ambassador Giancarlo	OSCE Secretary-General, 1996-8.	September-October 1998, Italy [e-mails]
Baker, Captain Mike. New Zealand Army.	UNMO, Central Region, UNAVEM II.	20 October 2017, New Zealand [e-mail]
Barnett, Dr (later Professor) Michael	Visiting Scholar, UN HQ, 1993-4.	7 November 2017, Washington D.C. [e-mail]
Bartoli, Dr Andrea	Spokesman, Sant'Egidio.	4 April 2017, New York
Baston, Lieutenant Colonel Michael. Irish Army.	Operations Specialist, KVM HQ, KVM (December 1998-March 1999).	26 September 2018, Ireland [e-mail]
Bordagorri, Captain (later Colonel) Alejandro. Uruguayan Army.	UNMO, Northern Region, ONUMOZ.	19 March 2018, Uruguay [Skype]
Campion, David	Verifier, SMM.	2 August 2018, Vienna [Skype]
Cobb-Smith, Chris	UK KDOM (October-November 1998); KLA Liaison Officer, RC 1 (Prizren) (November 1998-February 1999); Commander CC 1 (Orahovac) (February-March 1999), KVM.	28 September 2018, UK [Skype]
Cohen, (later Ambassador) Herman J	Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, US State Department, 1992.	June-July 2018, US [e-mails]
Dell, Christopher (later Ambassador)	US Embassy, Maputo (1992-4).	12 July 2018, New York [Skype]
Dittmer, Captain Christopher. New Zealand Army.	UNMO, Central Region, UNAVEM II.	19 October 2017, New Zealand [e-mail]

Doss, Alan	President, Kofi Annan Foundation (former Under-Secretary-General, UN).	6 June 2018, Geneva [telephone]
Drewienkiewicz, Major General John. British Army.	Head KVMSU (November 1998); DHoM/Chief Ops, KVM HQ, KVM (December 1998-April 1999).	3 October 2018, Cambridge
Etherington, Mark	KVM Desk Officer, OSCE Secretariat, 1998-9.	20 December 2018, Kiev [Skype]
Fawzi, Ahmad	Deputy Spokesperson, UN Secretary General, 1997-2003.	30 May 2018, The Hauge [Skype]
Flynn, Ambassador John	British Ambassador to Angola, 1992.	30 October 2017, London
Folkeson, Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Bengt-Åke. Swedish Army.	Chief Operations Officer, Observer Group (North), ONUMOZ.	March-April 2018 Sweden [Skype, e-mails]
Goulart, Captain (later Lieutenant General) Fernando. Brazilian Army.	Liaison Officer, Northern Region, ONUMOZ, January 1993-January 1994.	8 May 2018, Brazil [Skype, e-mails]
Graham, Captain Chris. New Zealand Army.	UNMO, North East Region, UNAVEM II.	19 October 2017, New Zealand [e-mail]
Griffiths, Colonel Robert. British Army.	Senior British Officer, Committee for the Formation of the New Army [Angola], January 1992-January 1993.	10 October 2017, Oxford
Guerrero, Major (later General) Gabriel. Argentine Army.	UNMO, Southern Region, ONUMOZ, January-December 1994.	8 June 2018, Argentina [e-mail]
Hannay, Sir David (later The Lord Hannay of Chiswick).	UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1990-5.	7 November 2017, London [e-mail]
Heaslip, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Richard. Irish Army.	Head of Activation Team, RC 4 (Gnjilane) and later senior Liaison Officer, KVM (December 1998-March 1999).	12 October 2018, Ireland [Skype]
Heinrich, Kristin	Commissions Secretariat, ONUMOZ, 1992-4.	28 March 2018, Norway [Skype]
Hewson, Major Brian. New Zealand Army.	UNMO, Central Region, UNAVEM II.	19 October 2017, New Zealand [e-mail]

Hitchings, Major Rob. New Zealand Army.	UNMO, Northern Region, UNAVEM II (January-June 1992); HQ UNAVEM II (July-November 1992).	October, November 2017, New Zealand [e-mails]
Kippax, Major Anthony. New Zealand Army.	UNMO, Central Region / South East Region / North East Region, UNAVEM II.	31 October 2017, New Zealand [e-mail]
Lefever, Major Andrew. British Army.	UK KDOM (October-November 1998); Chief Operations, RC 1 (Prizren) (November-December 1998); KLA Liaison Officer (January-March 1999), KVM.	4 October 2018, UK [Skype]
Legendre, Lieutenant Colonal (later Major General) Emmanuel. Armée de Terre.	Head, French KDOM (November 1998); Head RC 2 (Mitrovica), KVM (December 1998-March 1999).	14 September 2018, France [Skype]
Legner, Captain Boris. Yugoslav Peoples' Army.	UNMO, South East Region / UNAVEM II HQ, UNAVEM II.	27 October 2017, Wellington [Skype]
Lodico, Yvonne	Legal Officer, UNAVEM II; Chief of Complaints & Legal Unit, Electoral Division, ONUMOZ.	23 March 2017, New York
Longsdale, Charles	Deputy Director, CPC, OSCE HQ.	2 August 2018, Vienna [Skype]
Lyth, Annette	Human Rights Verifier, RC 4 (Gnjilane), KVM (January-March 1999).	7 September 2018, New York [Skype]
Maisonneuve, Brigadier General (later Lieutenant General) Michel. Canadian Army.	Head KVMSU (December 1998); Head RC 1 (Prizren), KVM (December 1998-March 1999).	13 March 2017, Montreal
Monteiro, Ambassador Antonio	Chair of the Bicesse Accords Military Working Group; Head of Portugal's Observer Group to the CCPM.	19 October 2017, Lisbon
Montgomery, Brigadier David. British Army.	Commander KVCC, November 1998-June 1999.	16 October 2017, UK [Skype]
Mortlock, Colonel (later Brigadier) Roger. New Zealand Army.	Commander Central Region, UNAVEM II.	19 October 2017, New Zealand [Skype]

Nelson, Captain Nick. New Zealand Army.	UNMO, Central Region, UNAVEM II.	20 October 2017, New Zealand [e-mail]
de Oliveira, Professor Ricardo Soares	Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford.	2 July 2018, France [Skype]
Picavet, Sophie	Human Rights Verifier, RC 4 (Gnjilane), KVM, February-March 1999.	12 October 2018, France [e-mail]
Regnard, Paulin	Verifier, RC 3 (Pec), KVM (February-March 1999).	7 September 2018, France [Skype]
Rings, Captain Noel. New Zealand Army.	UNMO, Central Region / HQ UNAVEM II, UNAVEM II.	19 October 2017, New Zealand [e-mail]
Rognoni, Alessandra	Senior Political Analyst, SMM, OSCE.	22 October 2018, Kiev
Ross, Colonel (later Major General) Cameron. Canadian Army.	Commander South East Region, UNAVEM II (July 1992-January 1993); Chief of Staff HQ UNAVEM II (January-March 1993); Military Desk Officer for Africa, DPKO (March-July 1993).	3 October 2017, British Columbia [Skype]
Salomons, (later Professor) Dirk	Executive Director, ONUMOZ (September 1992-September 1993).	16 April 2018, New York [Skype]
Sands-Pingot, Dr Guy	Planner, HQ KVM, KVM.	31 January 2017, Washington D.C. [Skype]
Skog, Per Gunnar	Verifier, HQ KVM, KVM (October 1998-March 1999).	22 September 2018, Spain [Skype]
de Soto, (later Ambassador) Alvaro	Senior Political Advisor to the Secretary General, EOSG, 1992.	6 December 2017, Paris
Synge, Richard	Senior Member, Wolfson College, University of Cambridge.	23 May 2018, Cambridge
Teller, Janne	Special Advisor to SRSG, ONUMOZ, 1993-4.	23 March 2018 and 3 April 2018, Denmark [Skype].
Titov, (later Assistant-Secretary-General) Dmitry	Desk Officer for Angola (1992) and Mozambique (1992-4), DPKO.	14 December 2017 and 27 March 2018, New York [Skype]

Tharoor, Dr (later Under-Secretary-General) Shashi	Special Assistant to Head SPA (from 1992 DPKO), 1991-7 .	6 June 2018, Oxford
Turner, David	Deputy Head of Operations, SMM.	23 October 2018, Kiev
Twardowska, Malgorzata	Head of Ukraine Desk, CPC, OSCE HQ.	2 August 2018, Vienna [Skype]
Voss, John	Verifier, RC 3 (Pec), KVM, December 1998 - March 1999.	31 August 2018, Germany [Skype]
Whatley, Matthew	Chief of Operations, RC 1 (Prizren), KVM.	October 2018, Ukraine [e-mails]

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