

**Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus:  
Factionalism and Shifting Power Dynamics in Early Eighteenth-  
Century Tibet  
(1697–1705)**

Darig Thokmay

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Wolfson College  
University of Oxford  
Michaelmas 2023

## **Declaration**

I hereby declare that this thesis is the product of my own work and was written by me only. All sources acknowledged are indicated clearly to the best of my knowledge within copyright laws.

The thesis does not exceed the relevant word length specified in the regulations set by the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Oxford.

## Abstract

After the enthronement of the Sixth Dalai Lama in 1697, an internal power struggle ensued within the dGa' ldan pho brang government. On one side, the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, a leading figure among the dGe lugs purists<sup>1</sup> in central Tibet, allied with lHa bzang Khan to challenge the legitimacy of sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho's leadership. On the other side, the sDe srid, who was the head of the dGa' ldan pho brang at that time, invoked the legacy of the Fifth Dalai Lama and the religious status of the Sixth Dalai Lama to reassert his authority and undermine the opposing voices of the dGe lugs purists. In this battle of rhetoric, as documented in primary sources, both factions levied accusations and propagated rumours to challenge the leadership and damage the public reputation of the other side. The conflict ultimately escalated into a physical confrontation, with each party aiming to eliminate the other. This eventually led to the assassination of the sDe srid in 1705 and the political takeover of lHa bzang Khan, which would have long-term consequences for Tibetan history. It is therefore crucial to understand the events of this period based on original sources.

I have analysed a broad range of Tibetan sources, supplemented with official documents from the Manchu court, to provide an in-depth investigation of the period in question. The primary sources across multiple languages give the impression that the power shift in the dGa' ldan pho brang between 1697 and 1705 was primarily driven by the internal rivalry between two factions in central Tibet. Although they issued diplomatic threats, the Mongols and the Qing court appear to have had no actual control over the internal power struggle within the dGa' ldan pho brang. It appears that modern scholarship to date has mostly overlooked the internal power dynamics of the dGa' ldan pho brang from this bi-factional perspective. Consequently, an analysis of the role of the dGe lugs purists is largely missing from current historical accounts of the power struggle within the dGa' ldan pho brang. To address this lacuna in the existing scholarship, this thesis, drawing on primary sources, closely analyses the internal power competition between two factions within the dGa' ldan pho brang with the aim to get a better understanding of the internal and international dynamics during this tumultuous period of Tibetan history.

---

<sup>1</sup> The term "purist" will be introduced in more detail later (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.4).

## Acknowledgements

I wish to convey my gratitude to the Tibetan and Himalayan Studies Centre at Wolfson College, the Frederick Williamson Memorial Fund, The Dalai Lama Trust, the Khyentse Foundation, the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation, and the Marks Family Trust for supporting my research through scholarships and grants. These scholarships have not only provided me with financial assistance but have also imbued me with a sense of confidence and motivation to excel in my academic pursuits.

I will remain eternally indebted to Professor Ulrike Roesler for helping me realise this academic dream. I would not be here today, submitting my DPhil thesis, without her unwavering support, guidance, and patience. Her genuine sincerity, steadfast integrity, and exemplary work ethic have profoundly inspired me, serving as an invaluable role model.

I wish to extend my gratitude to Professor Ulrike Roesler, Gen Lama Jabb, George Fitzherbert, Henrietta Harrison, Ryan Jacobson, and Peter Arvo, who kindly provided their assistance in the scholarly critique and language fluency of my work, contributing significantly to the depth of this thesis.

I would also like to acknowledge and convey my gratitude to Geshe Palden Gyatso (Tibetan), Professor Ulrike Roesler (Tibetan), Ryan Jacobson (Tibetan), Tenzin Wangmo (Chinese), Dànzhēn Wàngjiā (Chinese/Manchu), Batsaikhan Norov (Mongolian), and Daniel Wojahn (German) for their invaluable translation assistance. Without their kind and sincere assistance, I would not have been able to incorporate such a multitude of primary sources in various languages into this thesis.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family, friends, and all Tibetans across the world, who have been a source of inspiration and motivation for me to work hard and continue this academic journey.

## Leaders in Inner Asian Polities during the 17th and 18th Centuries

### The Dalai Lamas

dGe 'dun grub pa	1391–1474
dGe 'dun rgya mtsho	1475–1542
bSod nams rgya mstho	1543–1588
Yon tan rgya mtsho	1589–1617
Blo bzang rgya mtsho	1617–1682
Tshang dbyangs rgya mtsho	1683–1706
Ngag dbang ye shes	1707–1717 <sup>2</sup>
bsKal bzang rgya mtsho	1708–1757

### Reigns of Manchu Rulers

Nurhaci	1616–1626
Hong Taiji	1626–1643
Shunzhi	1644–1661
Kangxi	1661–1722
Yongzheng	1722–1735
Qianlong	1735–1796

### Reigns of Tibetan sDe srids

bSod nam rab brtan	1642–1658
'Phrin las rgya mtsho	1660–1668
Blo bzang mthu stobs	1669–1675
Blo bzang sbyin pa	1675–1679
Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho	1679–1703
Ngag dbang rin chen	1703–1706

### Reigns of Khoshut Khans

bsTan 'dzin Gushri Khan	1642–1655
bsTan 'dzin Dayan Khan	1658–1668

---

<sup>2</sup> He was formally enthroned and resided in the Potala Palace, assuming the role of the Sixth Dalai Lama for ten years. However, his tenure lacked recognition and legitimacy from both Tibetans and Mongolians. Consequently, he was customarily excluded from the list of reincarnations of the Dalai Lamas.

bsTan 'dzin Dalai Khan	1671–1701
lHa bzang Khan	1703–1717

### **Reigns of Dzungar Leaders**

Erdeni Batur	1632–1653
Sengge	1653–1671
Sechen Khan	1671–1676
dGa' ldan Khan	1676–1697
Tshe dbang grab brtan	1697–1727
dGa' ldan Tshe ring	1727–1745

## A Note on Transliteration, Footnotes, and Calendar Conventions

### Wylie Style

In this thesis, Tibetan words and non-Tibetan words written in Tibetan script are transliterated using the Wylie system. However, commonly known names like Dalai Lama, Panchen Lama, Lhasa, Amdo, and Kham are given in their phonetic forms to enhance readability.

### Pinyin Style

Chinese characters, whether they render Chinese, Manchu, Tibetan, or Mongolian names and titles, are transliterated using the Pinyin format rather than the older Chinese transliteration system, except for a few common names such as Peking and Beijing.

### Footnotes and Bibliography

In the interest of readability, the titles of frequently cited Tibetan works, such as the *Biography of the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, are provided in English. The original Tibetan titles for these works are listed in the Bibliography, followed by their English equivalents. Works that are contained in the Collected Works (*gsung 'bum*) of an individual are cited according to the name of the respective author, the date of publication, and the volume number.

### Calendar Format

Tibetan and Qing Imperial dates are presented in terms of months, such as the sixth month of 1703, which frequently differ from the Gregorian calendar. To ensure key dates in the thesis correspond with the Gregorian calendar, Schuh's Tibetan calendar table is used for comparison.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Schuh 2012, vol. ii: 239–477. Professor Ulrike Roesler assisted me in comparing various historical dates using Schuh's table.

## Table of Contents

Declaration	1
Abstract	2
Acknowledgements	3
Leaders in Inner Asian Polities during the 17th and 18th Centuries	4
A Note on Transliteration, Footnotes, and Calendar Conventions	6
Table of Contents	7
<b>Chapter One</b>	<b>1</b>
<i>Introduction: Recentring the Analysis of dGa' ldan pho brang Politics in Inner Asia</i>	<b>1</b>
<b>1.1. Historical Terminology</b>	<b>2</b>
1.1.1. dGa' ldan pho brang	3
1.1.2. Mongols	3
1.1.3. Manchu and Qing	4
1.1.4. mChod yon	5
<b>1.2. Historical Background</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>1.3. Key Governmental Features</b>	<b>10</b>
1.3.1. Legitimising Leadership	10
1.3.2. Relationship with Khoshut Mongols	11
1.3.3. Building a Power Structure	13
1.3.4. Centring Around a Religious School	15
<b>1.4. Theoretical Approach and Framework</b>	<b>18</b>
1.4.1. Misconception in terms of Modern Nation-Statehood	19
1.4.2. Misconception of Eurocentric International Relations	20
1.4.3. Inner Asia-centric Approach	21
<b>1.5. Literature Review</b>	<b>23</b>
1.5.1. Primary Tibetan Sources	24
1.5.2. Non-Tibetan Primary Sources	26
1.5.3. Secondary Literature	27
1.5.3.1. Secondary Literature in English	27
1.5.3.2. Secondary Literature in Tibetan and Chinese	28
<b>1.6. Chapter Outline</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>Chapter Two</b>	<b>30</b>
<i>An Overview of the Key Figures in the dGa' ldan pho brang Political Realm</i>	<b>30</b>
<b>2.1. The Qing Empire</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>2.2. The Kangxi Emperor</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>2.3. Khalkhas and Other Eastern Mongols</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>2.4. The Four Tribes of the Oirat Mongols</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>2.5. The Khoshut Mongols</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>2.6. The Khoshuts in mTsho sngon</b>	<b>42</b>

2.7. lHa bzang Khan _____	44
2.8. dGe lugs Purists _____	46
2.9. First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa _____	48
2.10. sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho _____	49
2.11. Conclusion _____	53
<b>Chapter Three: _____</b>	<b>55</b>
<b><i>Struggle for Legitimacy: The dGa' ldan pho brang's internal and external diplomacy</i> _____</b>	<b>55</b>
<b><i>(1697–1700)</i> _____</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>3.1. Official Announcement and Surrounding Conflicts _____</b>	<b>55</b>
3.1.1. Delivering the News to the Mongols _____	55
3.1.2. Delivering the News to the Manchus _____	56
3.1.3. Announcing the News to the Tibetans _____	59
<b>3.2. Ascending the Throne in the Potala Palace _____</b>	<b>60</b>
3.2.1. A Complex Journey to Lhasa _____	62
3.2.2. The Purists' disapproval of the Sixth Dalai Lama _____	63
3.2.3. Diplomacy in the Enthronement Ceremony _____	64
<b>3.3. The Emergence of the Purists and their Politics of Accusation _____</b>	<b>66</b>
3.3.1. Expanding the Influence of the Purists _____	66
3.3.2. First Power Negotiation with the Purists _____	67
3.3.3. Escalating Direct Criticisms from the Purists _____	70
<b>3.4. Spreading Rumours among the Mongols and Manchus _____</b>	<b>73</b>
3.4.1. The Mongols' Reaction to the Rumour _____	73
3.4.2. The Qing Court's Reaction to the Rumours _____	78
3.4.3. Strategic Challenges Facing the Dzungars and Manchus _____	80
<b>3.5. Conclusion _____</b>	<b>83</b>
<b>Chapter Four: _____</b>	<b>85</b>
<b><i>Power Disintegration: The Dynamics between the Dalai Lama, the sDe srid, and the Purists</i> _____</b>	<b>85</b>
<b><i>(1700–1703)</i> _____</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>4.1. Border Conflicts in the Dar rtse mdo Region _____</b>	<b>85</b>
4.1.1. Contested Narrative about Dar rtse mdo _____	85
4.1.2. War over Dar rtse mdo _____	87
<b>4.2. The Sixth Dalai Lama's Libertine Lifestyle _____</b>	<b>91</b>
4.2.1. The Young Dalai Lama under Pressure _____	91
4.2.2. Changes in the lifestyle of the Dalai Lama _____	91
4.2.3. Unsuccessful Attempts to Redirect the Dalai Lama _____	93
4.2.4. Dalai Lama's Renunciation of Monastic Vows _____	96
4.2.5. Diverse Reactions to the Dalai Lama's Behaviour _____	99
<b>4.3. Resentment Between the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama _____</b>	<b>102</b>
4.3.1. Disagreements at the Personal Level _____	102
4.3.2. Rift Between the Followers of Two Leaders _____	106
4.3.3. A Failed Assassination Attempt Undermines the Relationship _____	107
<b>4.4. lHa bzang and His Association with the dGe lugs purists _____</b>	<b>108</b>
4.4.1. lHa bzang's Initial Relationship with the sDe srid _____	109
4.4.2. Internal Shifts in the Khoshut Mongol Family _____	111

4.4.3. Casting the sDe srid as an Enemy of the dGe lugs School	114
4.4.4. Direct Clash Following Power Transition	115
<b>4.5 Conclusion</b>	<b>119</b>
<b>Chapter Five:</b>	<b>120</b>
<b><i>Collapse of the Alliance: The Final Struggle Between the Former sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan</i></b>	<b>120</b>
<b><i>(1704–1705)</i></b>	<b>120</b>
<b>5.1. The Former sDe srid and the Fifth Panchen Lama</b>	<b>120</b>
5.1.1. Complexity of the Relationship	120
5.1.2. The Fifth Panchen Lama and the dGe lugs purists	122
5.1.3. Consequences of the Rumour in gTsang	123
<b>5.2. lHa bzang Khan and the dGe lugs purists</b>	<b>124</b>
5.2.1. A Planned Arrest is Leaked	124
5.2.2. Utilising the Dalai Lama against sDe srid	125
5.2.3. Direct Clash Between the Khan and the Former sDe srid	127
5.2.4. The Khoshuts' Tactical Withdrawal from Lhasa	129
<b>5.3. Rumours of Poisoning as a Political Strategy</b>	<b>130</b>
5.3.1. The Enigmatic Spread of Poisoning Rumours	130
5.3.2. Debates and Conflicts Arising from the Rumour	132
<b>5.4. Negotiations Between the Khan and the Former sDe srid</b>	<b>135</b>
5.4.1. Formal Assembly and Dialogue for Resolution	135
5.4.2. Outcome of the Assembly	138
5.4.3. lHa bzang's Departure	139
5.4.4. Portrayal and Predictions from the Purists	141
<b>5.5. Final Collapse of the Relationship between the Khan and the Former sDe srid</b>	<b>142</b>
5.5.1. Preparations for Strategic Military Attacks	142
5.5.2. Tactical Negotiation in Military Context	145
5.5.3. A Test of Loyalty, and Inevitable Renegotiation	147
<b>5.6. Achieving Military Victory and Establishing Power</b>	<b>150</b>
5.6.1. The Purists' Role in Legitimising the New Leadership	150
5.6.2. Eliminating the Former sDe srid to Prevent Rebellion	152
5.6.3. Seeking Support from Tibetans, Mongols, and the Qing	157
5.6.4. Debates Regarding the Khan's Ties with the Qing	159
<b>5.7. Conclusion</b>	<b>160</b>
<b><i>Concluding Remarks</i></b>	<b>162</b>
<b><i>Bibliography</i></b>	<b>166</b>
<b>Sources in Tibetan</b>	166
Primary Sources	166
Secondary Sources	168
<b>Sources in Chinese</b>	170
Primary Sources	170
Secondary Sources	170
<b>Sources in Other Languages</b>	170
Primary Sources	171
Secondary Sources	171
<b>Appendix One</b>	<b>177</b>
清实录藏族史料	177

<b>Appendix Two</b>	<b>190</b>
ལངས་རྒྱས་རྒྱ་མཚོ་གངས་རྒྱུ་བདག་པོ་བསྐོ་བཞག་གི་བཀའ་ལུང།	190

## Chapter One

### Introduction: Recentring the Analysis of dGa' ldan pho brang Politics in Inner Asia

This thesis investigates the inner power dynamics of the dGa' ldan pho brang, examining its consequential impact on relations with the Mongols and the Qing Empire between 1697 and 1705. This may appear like a short time span; however, this period witnessed events unfold that would shape the fate of the dGa' ldan pho brang for centuries to come, and therefore deserves our attention. This crucial period commenced with the disputed enthronement of the Sixth Dalai Lama (1683–1706), who succeeded the Fifth Dalai Lama (1617–1682) in 1697. In 1703, lHa bzang (c.1660–1717) became the Fourth Khan (*rgyal po*) of the Khoshut Mongols<sup>4</sup> and, as will be discussed in this thesis, became a direct rival to sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho (1653–1705).<sup>5</sup> By 1705, the political landscape in the dGa' ldan pho brang had dramatically changed because of the assassination of the sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan's harsh rule over the Tibetans. Between these significant events, the dGa' ldan pho brang experienced profound shifts in its internal and external power structure. These changes established the basis for the interactions between the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Mongols, and the Qing Empire during the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries. Thus, this era represents a crucial turning point in the history of the dGa' ldan pho brang, defining its political standing within the cross-Asian political framework.<sup>6</sup>

This thesis seeks to address research questions such as: What were the social and political power factions and mechanisms of decision-making within the dGa' ldan pho brang in the late 17th and early 18th century? How did these Tibetan factions exercise their influence in the shifting power dynamics among the leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang? Did external political entities, such as the Mongols and the Qing court, exert any direct influence over the dGa' ldan pho brang in the early 18th century? From these initial inquiries, further questions emerge: Who held power within the dGa' ldan pho brang government, and why? How did the internal power dynamics manifest among the political leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang? Furthermore, how significant was the period from 1697 to 1705 for the dGa' ldan pho brang? In investigating these questions, this research revealed profound internal power conflicts between the sDe srid and the dGe lugs purists within the dGa' ldan pho brang. It then delves into how Lha bzang Khan became involved in this struggle and allied with the dGe lugs purists to counter the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. In conclusion, this work investigates the ramifications of this internal power struggle for the dGa' ldan pho brang, particularly its impact on the polity's relationships with the Mongols and the Qing Empire.

---

<sup>4</sup> The status of Khoshut Khans in central Tibet and in the mTsho sngon regions will be discussed later (Chapter 5, Section 5.5 and 2.6).

<sup>5</sup> In this thesis, the term “sDe srid” will be used to refer to sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho. The Tibetan title “sDe srid” corresponds to “Regent” in English.

<sup>6</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig (2008: 90) argues that the events leading to the 1705 civil war represent a pivotal political juncture which “paved the way for the unification of the Qing Empire” (Chinese. *wèi qīngcháo de tōngyī pū pín*). However, the meaning of “unification” in the context of 18th-century Inner Asian political dynamics is ambiguous, with multiple interpretations. Therefore, this concept of “unification” could not be understood in the context of the modern nation-state (Chapter 1, Section 1.4).

An examination of primary historical sources in this thesis led to the conclusion that it was most probably, first and foremost, the internal Tibetan power factions who dictated and moulded the politics of the dGa' ldan pho brang in the late 17th and beginning of the 18th century. Until 1705, neither the Mongols nor the Qing seemed to possess sufficient leverage to directly interfere in the internal affairs of the dGa' ldan pho brang. The Mongols, captivated by the religious aura of the Fifth Dalai Lama and Tibetan Buddhism, gradually embraced the various levels of influence of the dGa' ldan pho brang. For example, starting from the 1620s, the Dalai Lama and the dGa' ldan pho brang began to confer official titles, including that of “Khan”, to leaders of different groups, promoting them within their hierarchical ranks.<sup>7</sup> In the same way, the Qing Empire relied heavily on Tibetan Buddhist Lamas, including the Dalai Lama, to manage their relations with the Mongols and to bolster the legitimacy of the Empire among Mongols and Tibetans.<sup>8</sup> The Qing court acknowledged “the fact that all the Tibetans and Mongols obeyed the words of the Lama [the Fifth Dalai Lama].”<sup>9</sup>

In the context of Inner Asia's diverse political and cultural ideologies of rulership, a variety of local political concepts existed and co-existed, such as the “Son of Heaven”,<sup>10</sup> the “Power of Eternal Heaven”,<sup>11</sup> and the “Preceptor-patron” (*mchod yon*)<sup>12</sup>. However, in the interactions between the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Mongols, and the Qing Empire, the concept of the “Preceptor-patron” relationship most of the time became the common ground in their communication and diplomacy. Because this religious and diplomatic concept of Tibetan Buddhism played a significant role in harmonising the interests of these three neighbouring polities.<sup>13</sup>

## 1.1. Historical Terminology

To engage in a nuanced research work, it is essential to grasp the intricate and subtle implications of the historical terms employed in this thesis. The meaning and significance of many historical terms evolved over time, influenced by social, cultural, and political contexts.

---

<sup>7</sup> Ishihama 1992:501–513.

<sup>8</sup> *Qīng shìlù zàngzú shìliào* (1982, vol. i: 133–134) highlights the importance of the Dalai Lama in dealing with the Mongols. Sneath 2018: 61 and 185.

<sup>9</sup> Rockhill 1910:14.

<sup>10</sup> The “Son of Heaven” (*tiānzǐ*) represents an ancient Chinese philosophy of rulership, where it is believed that “Heaven” bestowed upon rulers the mandate and legitimacy to govern all residing “Under Heaven” (*tiānxià*). In this context, “Heaven” is regarded as the most sacred and multi-dimensional natural power (Eno, Robert. 2017: 261-286).

<sup>11</sup> In many traditional philosophies, the concepts of “Heaven” or “sky” are often symbolic of divine will or natural force. In the case of classical Mongolian political doctrine of rulership, the concept of the “Power of Eternal Heaven” (Mongolian: Мөнх тэнгэрийн хүчин дор. Tibetan: *Tshe ring gnam gyi shed mong*) was instrumental in upholding authority and power (Baumann 2013: 233–284). Regarding the broader political structure of the Qing Empire, it is also imperative to acknowledge that the Qing's “unique capacities were their ability to simultaneously embody crucial elements of the political traditions of the several peoples,” or polities, with which they were engaged (Tsyrempilov 2006: 49).

<sup>12</sup> Historically, a dual governance system, balancing religious and secular authority, is and has been a prevalent political practice in numerous regions worldwide. In the Tibetan Buddhist context, the dual system bears two primary characteristics. Firstly, governance was regarded as anchored in Buddhist principles. Secondly, governance was presided over by a singular Buddhist figure wielding both spiritual and temporal power. The subchapter “The Tibetan Buddhist World” in *Sacred Mandates* (Brook, van Praag and Boltjes 2018: 91–101) elucidates the intricacies of this Buddhist governance both in theory and in practice. For additional details, among many scholarly works, refer to Dung dkar Rin po che 1981, and Seyfort Ruegg 2004: 9–14, 1997: 857–872 and 1991: 441–453.

<sup>13</sup> Schwieger 2015: 166.

Thus, the terms discussed in this section are examined explicitly within the late 17th/early 18th-century context of Inner Asia, encompassing the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Mongols, and the Qing Empire.

### 1.1.1. dGa' ldan pho brang

In 1518, a modest residence of sNe'u gdong leaders within the 'Bras spungs monastery, known as “Blue Stone House” (rDo khang sngon po), was offered to the Second Dalai Lama. This gesture followed the Second Dalai Lama's relocation from bKra shis lhun po to 'Bras spungs monastery. In recognition of its significance and for auspicious reasons, the Second Dalai Lama renamed the residence “dGa' ldan pho brang”. After the Fifth Dalai Lama secured control over substantial regions of Tibet with the help of Gushri Khan (Chapter 2, Section 2.5 and 2.6), the dGa' ldan pho brang became the political epicentre for governmental operations.<sup>14</sup> Consequently, the newly established government adopted the name “dGa' ldan pho brang”. In 1645, the Fifth Dalai Lama, in consultation with his ministers, made the decision to relocate the government to the Potala Palace in Lhasa but kept the same name. From that point onwards, the Potala Palace served as the principal seat for the dGa' ldan pho brang government.<sup>15</sup>

As we will see in the following chapters, during the period examined in this thesis, the dGa' ldan pho brang was a fluid and malleable government with both political and spiritual characteristics. It continually recalibrated its sphere of influence, power, authority, and diplomatic engagements with neighbouring powers. The government has the ability and acts as a symbiotic model, bringing together resources and influence from other polities to govern. The religio-political paradigm of a “dual government” combining secular and religious authority served as the foundational framework of the dGa' ldan pho brang, exerting a diverse influence and authority over many people.<sup>16</sup> In this government, powers and authorities coexisted at different levels of political and cultural dimensions, yet they often cohesively collaborated and functioned. Therefore, this government is better conceptualised through its engagements and influence rather than merely through the norms of political status and territorial jurisdiction.

### 1.1.2. Mongols

The term “Mongol” has been flexible and has had different meanings in various historical contexts. For instance, before Chinggis Khan, the term referred to a small group of people, but it later applied to most of the steppe peoples subjugated under his empire.<sup>17</sup> For centuries, many Mongol tribes primarily identified themselves by their clan names instead of using the overarching term Mongol.<sup>18</sup> In this thesis, Mongol will be used to reference three primary Mongol groups: Khalkha, Oirat, and other Eastern Mongols. Firstly, the Khalkhas, also known as Eastern Mongols, became four Khalkha *aimags* (domains/administrative divisions) in the

---

<sup>14</sup> Buswell and Lopez 2014: 461–462. From this time onward, the religious and private dGa' ldan pho brang became the religious and political dGa' ldan pho brang. Gushri Khan's relationship with the dGa' ldan pho brang will be discussed later (Chapter 2, Section 2.5 and 2.6).

<sup>15</sup> rTse mgron bar zhi Ngag dbang bstan skyong 2012: 2–5.

<sup>16</sup> Commencing in 1642, the dGa' ldan pho brang exercised varying levels of authority and influence over many Tibetans and Khoshut Mongols. In 1681, the Dzungar leader dGa' ldan Khan ordered two hundred thousand households in Yarkand (莎车) to pay tax to the dGa' ldan pho brang (Chab mdo Shes rab (online) 2022: Accessed 16 February 2023).

<sup>17</sup> Sneath 2018: 42.

<sup>18</sup> Vaissière 2021: 266–270.

early 18th century and were predominantly located in central and eastern parts of present-day Mongolia.<sup>19</sup> Secondly, the Oirats, identified as Western Mongols, were composed of four primary tribes: Dzungar, Torghut, Dorbet, and Khoshut. In the 17th century, the Dorbet and many Torghut Mongols merged with the Dzungar, culminating in the formation of the Dzungar Empire, which became a close ally of the dGa' ldan pho brang. Thirdly, the other Eastern Mongols encompassed several Mongol groups, including the Chahar, Ordos, and Tümed and most of these groups presently inhabit regions in Inner Mongolia within modern-day China.

In the Tibetan language, terms such as “Sog po”, “Hor”, and “Hor Sog” are used to refer to the Mongols. However, the meaning and scope of these terms has undergone changes throughout Tibetan history and Tibetan scholars do not have a commonly agreed understanding of these terms.<sup>20</sup>

### 1.1.3. Manchu and Qing

In 1616, Nurhaci (1559–1626), the first Manchu leader, officially established the Later Jin Dynasty after unifying several tribes residing in the region of present-day Manchuria (primarily Hēilóngjiāng, Jílín and Liáoníng in PRC). He began the process of forging a new collective identity for these people by changing their name from “Jurchen” to “Manchu”. This was aimed at unifying them and erasing the historical memory of subjugation under other powers.<sup>21</sup> The origin and historical meaning of the term “Manchu” have been debated among scholars for decades, and many, such as Sēn Mèng and Andreas Hölzl, have their own interpretations.<sup>22</sup> Historically, the inhabitants of this region identified themselves as Jurchen or, more broadly, as Tungus.<sup>23</sup> The new name only became official in 1635, after Hong Taiji (1592–1643), the second leader of the Manchus, issued an official decree renaming his people from Jurchen to Manchu. In 1636, to differentiate themselves from the earlier Jurchen dynasty and to legitimise their overarching leadership, Hong Taiji announced the dynastic transition from the Later Jin to the Great Qing (*Dà qīng*). This Manchu-led regime subsequently took control of China and its neighbouring regions, leading to the establishment of the Great Qing Empire in 1644.<sup>24</sup> However, it is also important to acknowledge that scholars like Lhamsuren Much-Erdene argue that “the Qing Empire was a Manchu-Mongolian aristocratic empire that conquered and colonized China”.<sup>25</sup>

Inspired by the “New Qing History” approach that began in the 1990s, this thesis consistently employs the terms “Qing Empire” and “Manchu” instead of the terms “China” and “Chinese.”<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> Sneath 2018: 108.

<sup>20</sup> Details of this topic are analysed by the Tibetan scholar gNyan Thar (2018: 175–186) in his article. And see the work of Sher dbang (online, 2018), and Chab mdo Shes rab (online, 2023), accessed on 3 January 2024. Even in the past, traditional Tibetan scholars used these terms flexibly in various ways. See the work of dBang chen skyabs (1848), Blo bzang don 'grub (n.d) and gTer bdag gling pa 'gyur med rdo rje (n.d., vol-i).

<sup>21</sup> Elliott 2001: 47–56 and Crossley 1999: 3.

<sup>22</sup> Mèng 2006:4–5 and Hölzl (online) 2023: 160–208. Accessed 02 June 2014.

<sup>23</sup> Millward 2004: 94–98.

<sup>24</sup> Elliott 2001: 47–56. For more information, Crossley’s work *The Manchus* (1997) offers a concise yet nuanced history of the Manchus.

<sup>25</sup> Munkh-Erdene 2022: 2.

<sup>26</sup> Following the significant academic contributions of Qing scholars, notably Rawski (1993: 63-102 and 1996: 829-850) and Crossley (1997 and 1999), the “New Qing History” emerged in the 1990s as a fresh historiographical approach. This fresh perspective underscored the unique attributes of the Manchu rulers during the Qing Empire and their administration over a multi-ethnic empire. This research robustly contested conventional Sinocentric views, depicting the Qing Empire as a purely “Chinese Dynasty.” This methodology was later refined and expanded upon by subsequent Qing scholars, including Elliott (2001 and 2009), Millward,

This distinction recognises the unique role of the Manchu people in shaping and governing the Qing Empire with its distinct Manchu attributes. Moreover, this thesis also draws on Rawski's concept of "de-centring China" to view its history from the peripheries,<sup>27</sup> thus challenging the Han China-centric historical approaches of earlier studies.

Concerning the relationship between the Manchu and Han peoples, until the early 20th century, the Manchu and Han people did not view the Qing Empire as a Chinese dynasty. From the late 19th to the early 20th century, many Han Chinese leaders characterised the Qing emperors as foreign aggressors, while emphasising the restoration of Han China, an ethnicity that today encompasses 92 percent of the population of the present-day PRC.<sup>28</sup> Han Chinese leaders called to "Oust the Tatars (referring to the Manchus) and restore China" and "Abolish the Qing and rejuvenate the Han".<sup>29</sup>

#### 1.1.4. mChod yon

The *mchod yon* (preceptor and patron) relationship, fundamentally rooted in religious principles, could be established and operated between individuals, groups, or entire political regimes. It was used in political as well as in non-political contexts, or a combination of both. The first high-level *mchod yon* relationship between political regimes was established between the Sa skya hierarchs of Tibet and the Mongolian Yuan dynasty.<sup>30</sup> Theoretically, the preceptor (*mchod gnas*) was a religious authority who provided religious services and instruction to the patron, and the patron (*yon bdag*) acted as the secular benefactor and supporter of the preceptor. However, in practice, the power dynamics within the *mchod yon* bond were very adaptable, determined by the specific circumstances and the individual leaders engaged in this partnership. In politics, high-ranking Tibetan lamas were described as preceptors and the emperors of the Qing or the leaders of the Mongols as patrons, which allowed both sides to retain authority within their domain.<sup>31</sup> However, this model is slightly simplistic. Based on an analysis of diplomatic power dynamics, Elverskog offered a fuller perspective on the role of Buddhism through the *mchod yon* relationships among the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Mongols, and the Qing Empire. He explains that this relationship possesses profound complexity, with the delineation between spiritual and temporal powers frequently becoming indistinct.<sup>32</sup> These powers, indeed, sometimes intersected or manifested differently depending on specific social and political contexts. As such, one must exercise caution against reducing this relationship to a binary perspective or constraining it to a singular definition across circumstances. For this thesis, this means that we need to pay particular attention to the exact ways the *mchod yon* relationship was employed in the diplomacy between the Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus in the early 18th century.

---

Dunnell and others (2004), Elverskog (2006), and Perdue (2005). However, there are also numerous divergences and disputes among these Qing scholars on various subjects, such as whether the Qing Empire should be acknowledged as a "Chinese Dynasty" or not. We shall explore the works of the Qing scholars in this chapter.

<sup>27</sup> Rawski 2015: 3–4.

<sup>28</sup> Rawski 1996: 839. In the same vein, Elliott (2001: 23–24) discusses how the Han Chinese viewed the Manchu and the Qing Empire.

<sup>29</sup> Elliott 2001: 16–26. The first slogan was initially coined by the Ming Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang in the 1360s to eliminate Mongolian influence on Chinese culture (Bulag 2002: 4).

<sup>30</sup> Seyfort Ruegg 1997: 859 and 2004: 9.

<sup>31</sup> Tshe ring bDe skyid (ed)1987: 83.

<sup>32</sup> Elverskog 2006: 1–6.

In the *Autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama*, the term *mchod yon* delineates the relationship between two eminent leaders, Gushri Khan and sDe pa bSod nam chos 'phel, who served under the aegis of the Fifth Dalai Lama.

Describing a plot planned by the leaders of the bKa' brgyud school in 1643, which was leaked to the Khoshut and dGe lugs leaders by a prisoner:

སྐར་པའི་མི་སྣ་ཇ་མ་ཚོས་དབྱིངས་བཙོན་དུ་བབྱང་བའི་གཞུང་ནང་དུ་རྒྱལ་པོ་མཚོ་དཔོན་བཀོད་སྟེ། བཤེན་ཆེན་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་  
དང་དེད་དཔོན་སློབ་གཉིས་ཀོང་པོར་བཙོན་ལ་བྲིད།

[A letter found] in Chef Chos dbying's amulet box, the bKa' brgyud (sgar pa) representative, [instructs] to kill the rGyal po patron and preceptor (bSod nam chos' phel)<sup>33</sup>. [It also orders] bringing the Panchen Lama and me (the Dalai Lama), the teacher and student, to Kong po for imprisonment.<sup>34</sup>

At another occasion, while describing the welcoming ceremony at the dGa' mo place for the Dalai Lama's return from Beijing, the Dalai Lama writes:

དགའ་མོ་ནང་དུ་རྒྱལ་པོ་མཚོ་དཔོན་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་དབུ་མཛད། སེར་འབྲས། ལྷོ་ལུང་སོགས་སྐྱིད་སྤང་གྱི་ཚོས་ལྷོ་ལག་གི་ལྷ་  
མ་དང་སྣེ་མོ་བ། རྒྱུ་ལོ་ལོ་བ། ལྷ་སའི་གནས་ཆེན་སོགས་ཀྱི་རྩ་བསྟེན།

In the dGa' mo, [the welcoming ceremony was] led by both the rGyal po patron and the preceptor (bSod nam Chos 'phel). The lamas from Ser 'Bras, sKyor lung, and other monasteries from the upper and lower valley of skyi smad (participated). Head officers, clerks, and people from Lhasa joined the horse-welcoming [procession].<sup>35</sup>

These passages illustrate the power structure between Gushri Khan, sDe srid bSod nam chos 'phel and the Fifth Dalai Lama. These statements implicitly indicate that the Dalai Lama himself was not bound by this *mchod yon* relationship and was positioned above this power equation. To explain these phrases, Karmay also writes “Lobzang Gyatsho addressed these two men as the Prelate and Patron, in the sense of the Tibetan political concept choyon, which in turn put Lobzang Gyatsho himself in the position of supreme head of the country, not bound by the conflation of the choyon system”.<sup>36</sup> It is also important to acknowledge that this is just one way, among others, to describe the *mchod yon* concept in the dGa' ldan pho brang government. For example, the early legal code of the dGa' ldan pho brang, possibly written by sDe srid bSod nam chos 'phel, uses the phrase *mchod yon nyi zla zung* to refer to the Fifth Dalai Lama and Gushri Khan.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>33</sup> This is a well-known event in the power struggle between the dGe lugs school and the bKa' brgyud school, along with their respective patrons. In this plot, the main targets were Gushri Khan and sDe srid bSod nam chos 'phel. If one wonders why the Dalai Lama mentioned rGyal po but not sDe srid apart from the preceptor (*rGyal po mChod Yon*), it is due to his style of phrasing these two leaders throughout his autobiography. In Tibetan literature, it is very common for writers to create short phrases to refer to certain topics and issues for various reasons.

<sup>34</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v:172. The same phrase is found throughout the autobiography, referring to the Khan and bSod nam Chos 'phel (2009, vol. V: 157, 171, 196, and 209).

<sup>35</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v: 324.

<sup>36</sup> Karmay 2014: 5.

<sup>37</sup> Tshe ring bDe skyid (ed)1987: 83.

The nature of the *mchod yon* concept must be understood within the Dual System of Governance (chos srid zung 'brel or Chos srid gnyis ldan), a fusion of religious and political systems sometimes referred to as a “Buddhist Government” by modern scholars.<sup>38</sup> Under this perspective, the *mchod yon* system represents the intrinsic political and legal architecture (*mchod yon nyi zla zung 'brel gyi khirms bstan po*)<sup>39</sup> that adheres to the dual system of government, rather than a relationship between a Tibetan religious and a foreign secular authority.

There were variations in *mchod yon* systems across different social and political structures and varying levels of power hierarchies.<sup>40</sup> For example, the *mchod yon* system between the dGa' ldan pho brang and the Qing Empire differed from the *mchod yon* system within the dGa' ldan pho brang itself. Similarly, the *mchod yon* system under the Dalai Lama was not the same as the *mchod yon* system between local Tibetan monasteries and their lay benefactors. Thus, in this thesis the *mchod yon* system will be interpreted in light of its social and political contexts of the late 17th and early 18th centuries.

## 1.2. Historical Background

To fully understand the power dynamics of the dGa' ldan pho brang and its interactions with the Mongols and the Qing Empire between 1697 and 1705, it is imperative to briefly revisit the events that led to the formation of the dGa' ldan pho brang as well as subsequent historical occurrences.<sup>41</sup>

Initially, the Fifth Dalai Lama harboured no ambitions to dismantle the gTsang Dynasty or to establish a new Tibetan political regime under his leadership.<sup>42</sup> However, due to the desperate circumstances caused by the tensions between dBus and gTsang, the leaders of the dGe lugs school discretely asked the Khoshut Mongols to safeguard the dGe lugs tradition. Under Gushri Khan's leadership, the Khoshut Mongols defeated a group of Khalkha Mongols under Tsogtu Taij in the mTsho sngon (in Mongolian: Kokonor) area of Amdo and then the Be ri kingdom in Kham. After this, most Khoshut Mongols, along with a large number of Torghut Mongols, moved to the mTsho sngon region permanently.<sup>43</sup> Subsequently, the Khoshut Mongol forces allied with the dGe lugs supporters in central Tibet and jointly eradicated the gTsang dynasty.

---

<sup>38</sup> Ishihama 2004: 15–30. Ishihama, according to my research, is the first scholar who coined the English term “Buddhist Government” based on Mongolian and Manchu historical terminologies. See also Ishihama and Tachibana et al. 2019.

<sup>39</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-xxii: 190. In the legal works of the Dalai Lama, *mchod yon* is not only a relationship between preceptor and patron but also a concept of Buddhist government, along with the *Chos srid zung 'brel*. See the works of the Fifth Dalai Lama (2009, vol-xxii and xxiii).

<sup>40</sup> For more information, see Cüppers (ed) 2004.

<sup>41</sup> For this thesis, I have briefly touched upon some pivotal events in the early years of the dGa' ldan pho brang. For a thorough history of the foundation of the dGa' ldan pho brang, refer to primary sources such as the works of the Fifth Dalai Lama (2009, vol-v to vol-xi), the sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho (1980, 1989, 1990, 2007 and 2016), and *Qing shilü zàngzú shiliào* (1982, vol-1 to vol-ix), among others. For secondary sources, consult the writings of Petech (1959: 1966), Ahmad (1970), Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan (1976, vol-i), Schwieger (2015), Karmay (1998: 504–518, 2002: 21–40, 2005: 12–13, and 2014), Cuevas and Schaeffer (2006), Ishihama et al. (2019), Bar zhi Ngag dbang bstan skyong (2012), and Travers and Fitzherbert (2020), among others. For further information, please see the Literature Review (Chapter 1, Section 1.5).

<sup>42</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v: 161–162.

<sup>43</sup> sKal bzang dar rgyas 2007: 330–331.

In 1641, following their triumph over the gTsang Dynasty, Gushri Khan announced the offering of the thirteen myriarchies (*khri skor*)<sup>44</sup> of Tibet to the Fifth Dalai Lama:

ཇ་སྐྱུ ལི་མ། རྒྱ་ནག་མས་མཚོན་པའི་རྟེན་མཚོད་མང་པོ་དང་གཞིས་ཀ་བསམ་འགྲུབ་ཅེས་ཐོག་དངས་བོད་ཁྲི་ཚོར་བཅུ་  
གསུམ་ཡོངས་སུ་རྗོགས་པ་འབུལ་བ་ཡིན་ཞེས་དྲིལ་བསྐྱགས།

Along with many offerings, such as a statue of Ja made with Chinese bronze, the palace of bSam 'grub rtse<sup>45</sup>, and thirteen myriarchies were announced to be offered.<sup>46</sup>

The passage shows that Gushri Khan offered thirteen myriarchies to the Fifth Dalai Lama. Moreover, in the official decree of the Fifth Dalai Lama appointing Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho as the sDe srid of the dGa' ldan pho brang (Appendix Two), it is explicitly mentioned that Gushri Khan offered himself and his entire family lineage to the Dalai Lama:

ཚོ་འིང་གནམ་གྱི་གཤེ་མོང་གིས་ཡངས་པའི་ས་ཀུན་ལ་དབང་བསྐྱར་བ་བསྟན་འཛིན་ཚོས་ཀྱི་རྒྱལ་པོའི་ལྷག་བསམ་དང་།  
སྤིང་སྟོབས་བརྩོན་པའི་མཐུས། རྒྱལ་དབང་བཅོང་ཁ་བ་ཚེན་པོའི་བསྟན་པ་སྐྱེས་སྐྱེས་འདེགས་པར་མཛད་སྐབས་ཚུ་ཉ་པོ་  
བང་ཚེན་པོ་བསམ་འགྲུབ་ཅེས་གཙོས་པའི་མངའ་འབངས་དང་། རྒྱལ་པོ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རིགས་རྒྱུད་དང་བཅས་པ་མཐའ་དག་  
གཏན་བ་མེད་པའི་མཚོད་སྤྱིན་དུ་སྦྱོར་འཇགས་མཛད་པའི་ཚོ།

Through the virtues of selflessness, courage, and diligence, the king — bsTan 'dzin chos kyi rgyal po<sup>47</sup>— who is blessed by the eternal heaven (*tshe ring gnam gyi gshe mong*)<sup>48</sup> and reigns over the vast lands, has elevated the teachings of the victorious Tsong kha pa to greater heights. In the water-horse year (1642), the king primarily offered me the territories and subjects (mnga' bangs), including the palace of bSam 'grub rtse, and offered himself and his entire family lineage as an eternal religious offering.<sup>49</sup>

These passages show that, for the first time, the Dalai Lama, who was formerly merely the head of one of several religious schools, ascended to the dual role of political and spiritual leader of the newly established dGa' ldan pho brang government.<sup>50</sup> The difference between these two passages written by the same author is probably due to their respective times of writing. The first passage is from the *Autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama*, which might have been recorded in 1642, while the official decree was declared in 1679. At the time of the first record, Gushri Khan was still alive, but he had passed away by the time the second document was written. Thus, the second document perhaps purposely exaggerated the actual

<sup>44</sup> It is essential to understand that the names and boundaries of the thirteen myriarchies have evolved throughout history. Sometimes, this term refers exclusively to central Tibet, while at other times it encompasses the traditional three provinces of Tibet (Chu dbar bu (online) 2020: Accessed 3 July 2024). Therefore, it is crucial to consider the historical context in which they are mentioned.

<sup>45</sup> The reason for mentioning this palace name is that it was the power throne of the gTsang Dynasty, symbolising the centre of power that ruled many regions of Tibet before the dGa' ldan pho brang. Therefore, it represents the transition of power.

<sup>46</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v:162, and dKon mchog rgyal mtshan 1990: 68.

<sup>47</sup> The title bestowed upon Gushri Khan by the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1638 in Lhasa was in recognition of his services in protecting the dGe lugs school. Since then, he had been known as the *rGyal po* in the works of the Fifth Dalai Lama.

<sup>48</sup> Richard (1980: 332) explains this phrase as “a non-Buddhist phrase describing the divine source of the authority of the Mongol Khans from the Yuan dynasty onwards.”

<sup>49</sup> This was written by the Fifth Dalai Lama, placed on the wall of the Potala Palace, and his fingerprints were at the end of this official decree (Appendix Two). And see the work of Petech (1959: 372).

<sup>50</sup> Among contemporary scholars such as Karmy (1998: 511) made the same argument.

event to enhance the image of the Dalai Lama himself. As we will discuss later, the relationship between Gushri Khan and the dGa' ldan pho brang has undergone several transitional stages (Chapter 2, Section 2.5).

Regarding the Dalai Lama himself, this sudden change in his position to become the leader of the government appears somewhat unprepared and not entirely desired. His autobiography explains why he decided to accept the offer:

འདི་རིགས་དམ་ཚཱ་སྐྱབ་པའི་སྲོགས་སུ་ནི་ག་ལ་འགོ་འོན་ཏེ་བོད་འདིར་མགོ་ཚེངས་ཤིག་ཡོད་ན་དུས་ཀྱང་བདེ་ཞིང་། ས་  
ཀར་རྗེ་དག་གི་སྲོགས་སྐྱབ་མཐའ་གཞན་རྣམས་དམིགས་པ་མེད་པའི་དབྱིངས་སུ་རྒྱས་མི་འདེབས་པར་ཕན་ནམ་སྐྱམ་པ་  
བྱུང་།

Undoubtedly, this endeavour [of taking a political role] is not conducive to the practice of dharma; however, it occurred to me that if Tibet possesses leadership, it may well serve to uphold peace and prevent other religious schools, including the Sa [skya], [d]Kar [rgyud] and rNying [ma] traditions, from being cast into oblivion.<sup>51</sup>

According to his own account, his acceptance was primarily motivated by a commitment to maintain peace and protect other religious schools in Tibet. But, since this autobiography was written later, it could be argued that this was his diplomatic expression to promote his positive image not the practical policy. However, we have evidence that after his government was firmly established, the Fifth Dalai Lama sought to build good relationships with other religious schools, including bKa' brgyud. For example, in 1673, the Fifth Dalai Lama received the Tenth dKar ma Chos dbyings rdo rdje at the Potala Palace with great respect.<sup>52</sup> He also recognised the son of the Tenth dKar ma Chos dbyings rdo rdje as the reincarnation of another Lama, in accordance with the wishes of the followers of the bKa' brgyud school.<sup>53</sup> However, this close engagement with other religious schools thus became the root cause of conflict among different ideological factions within the dGe lugs school.<sup>54</sup>

In 1649, the Fifth Dalai Lama, along with the dGa' ldan pho brang, formally relocated from 'Bras spungs monastery to the Potala Palace in Lhasa.<sup>55</sup> Recognising its historical, symbolic, and strategic significance, the leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang ordered the immediate renovation and reconstruction of the Potala Palace, named after the residence of the Bodhisattva sPyan ras gzigs and associated with king Srong btsan sgam po. Relocating the governmental head office to the Potala Palace and establishing it as the head office of the dGa' ldan pho brang reinforced its significant connection with Avalokiteśvara's activities in Tibet and the historical Tibetan Empire.<sup>56</sup>

The Fifth Dalai Lama's exceptionally eventful and historic visit to meet the Qing Emperor, Shunzhi, assisted the newly established dGa' ldan pho brang in forging direct connections with many Tibetans, Mongols, Manchus, and even Chinese in Amdo, Kham, Mongolian regions,

---

<sup>51</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v: 161–162.

<sup>52</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-vi: 262.

<sup>53</sup> *ibid*: 262.

<sup>54</sup> Tsyrempilov 2006: 47–64.

<sup>55</sup> rTse mgron Bar zhi Ngag dbang bstan skyong 2012: 5.

<sup>56</sup> MacCormack 2018: 166. Regarding the Lhasa, drawing on numerous prophecies and passages from the Buddhist texts, sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho (1990: 90–106) constructed a narrative portraying Lhasa as the world's epicentre, the alternate realm of Avalokiteśvara and its unique connection with the Tibetan emperors of the past and the Dalai Lamas of the present.

and Peking, the capital of the Qing.<sup>57</sup> This successful journey and close interactions with high-ranking leaders beyond central Tibet shaped the framework of the dGa' ldan pho brang's relations with the Mongols and the Qing Empire in the subsequent decades.<sup>58</sup> In the 1660s, the division of power between the Tibetans and Khoshuts within the government appeared to have become more formalised (Chapter 1 Section 1.3.2). The Tibetan leaders administered the government while the Khoshuts provided military assistance.<sup>59</sup> The Khoshuts settled in Lhasa and the northern pastures of central Tibet and Amdo mTsho sngon regions.<sup>60</sup> Subsequently, the Fifth Dalai Lama conferred the stable political position of the sDe srid in the government to his candidate of choice, Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho in 1679.

### 1.3. Key Governmental Features

The dGa' ldan pho brang government was established on a foundation of specific basic structures. Intriguingly, these very structures could, under certain conditions, challenge or even impede the government's functionality. To truly understand the dGa' ldan pho brang, one must embrace a nuanced approach and delve into these characteristics. Four aspects that are of particular relevance for our context will be outlined below.

#### 1.3.1. Legitimising Leadership

Through the joint efforts of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, the authority and legitimacy of the Dalai Lama were robustly embedded within the beliefs of his followers, drawing upon prophecies, mythologies, and revised historical narratives. Many dGe lugs scholars present the Dalai Lamas as the undisputed reincarnations of the lineage of the Tibetan Emperor Srong btsan sgam po, who was the embodiment of Avalokiteśvara, the divinely ordained leader of Tibet. For instance, the Fifth Dalai Lama himself authored biographies that “form part of a political and sociological complex in which the 5th Dalai Lama seeks to establish the theological inevitability and legitimacy of his office, himself, and his institution as the rightful ruler of Tibet.”<sup>61</sup> Moreover, Schaeffer notes that “Sanggye Gyatso spent much of the 1690s molding a public figure of the 5th Dalai Lama.”<sup>62</sup> Thus, the historical and mythological authority and legitimacy of the Dalai Lamas, deeply rooted in the psyche of Tibetans as the leader of the dGa' ldan pho brang, were irreplaceable. However, the practical political power of the Dalai Lamas was often conditional.<sup>63</sup>

The dGa' ldan pho brang under the Fifth Dalai Lama emerged as a diplomatic nexus, assisting the Qing in maintaining peace on their northern borders and mediating to reconcile disputes amongst the Mongol tribes. For example, the Fifth Dalai Lama dispatched his representative, Ngag dbang 'phrin las lhun grub, to mTsho sngon to reallocate the region among Gushri Khan's

---

<sup>57</sup> Tuttle 2006: 65–87. Tuttle (2006: 66) also argues “that the visit of the Fifth Dalai Lama to Beijing must also be seen in the context of missionary activity, rather than strictly as a matter of political expediency.”

<sup>58</sup> Tuttle 2006: 84.

<sup>59</sup> Petech (1966: 267) describes the appointment of Dayan Khan after the death of Gushri Khan, “This meant that he (Dayan Khan) inherited the Qosot rights in Tibet, consisting of the military protection of the Dalai-Lama and of the country [...]”

<sup>60</sup> Refer to the history of Khoshut Mongols by dKon mchog rgyal mtshan (1990).

<sup>61</sup> Van der Kuijp 2005: 15.

<sup>62</sup> Schaeffer 2005: 80.

<sup>63</sup> For example, the practical power of the Sixth and Seventh Dalai Lamas was replaced by other political rulers, but the historical and mythological authority of the Dalai Lamas remained unchanged in the following centuries.

descendants, effectively resolving the territorial disputes amongst the Khoshut Mongols.<sup>64</sup> Another leading figure of Tibetan Buddhism among the Mongols, Zaya Paṇḍita Blo bzang 'phrin las “was the key mediator between the left and right wings of the Oirats when they went to war against each other after 1657, and he attended the large assembly (*chulgan*) held in 1660 to reconcile the opposing factions.”<sup>65</sup>

At a cursory glance, the ascendant prestige of the Fifth Dalai Lama appears advantageous for the dGa' ldan pho brang. However, in practical terms, the centralisation of authority and legitimacy with a singular leader jeopardised the sustained political stability of the government. This engendered a scenario wherein, in the absence of the Fifth Dalai Lama, no individual could aptly fill his leadership void, potentially leading to tumult within the leadership ranks of the dGa' ldan pho brang. This precise scenario unfolded in 1697 following the disclosure of the Fifth Dalai Lama's demise.

Aware of this power disequilibrium, the Fifth Dalai Lama, in 1679, purposely designated Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho as the new sDe srid of the dGa' ldan pho brang. Furthermore, he issued an official proclamation stipulating that the newly appointed sDe srid should be accorded the same level of esteem and deference as the Fifth Dalai Lama himself.<sup>66</sup> Nonetheless, the influence of the sDe srid still could not substitute the profound impact of the Fifth Dalai Lama amongst Tibetans, Mongols, Manchus, and beyond. In this situation, the sDe srid either opted for or was counselled to conceal the demise of the Fifth Dalai Lama for fifteen years. This decision was aimed to preserve stability within the domains of the dGa' ldan pho brang, to maintain a power equilibrium between the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Mongols, and the Qing Empire, and possibly to protect the position of the sDe srid himself (Chapter 3, Section 3.1). However, it also led to significant diplomatic and political complications and repercussions, as will be discussed in this thesis.

### 1.3.2. Relationship with Khoshut Mongols

The dGe lugs leaders discretely sought Mongol support to safeguard the dGe lugs school, possibly without fully comprehending the implications of such an alliance.<sup>67</sup> According to his own account, the Fifth Dalai Lama had objected to summoning the Mongols to combat the gTsang Dynasty in central Tibet, perhaps foreseeing the potential Mongol establishment in the region.<sup>68</sup> However, following consultation with a divine oracle, they opted to invite the Khoshut Mongols to central Tibet. In the aftermath of their triumph over the gTsang Dynasty, Gushri Khan presented his conquered Tibetan regions, along with his familial lineage to the Fifth Dalai Lama and permanently settled in central Tibet with his army (chapter 1 Section 1.2). As we will discuss below, the political and administrative power was given to the Tibetan leaders, while the Mongol military power consistently remained under the control of the Khoshut Khans.<sup>69</sup> Since the main Mongolian military forces were also Khoshut people, there was no alternative to this.

During this period, apart from a small group of government military personnel (*gzims pa*) in Lhasa under the command of the sDe srid, there was no permanent military unit in the dGa'

---

<sup>64</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1982: 18 and dKon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas 1982: 41.

<sup>65</sup> Perdue 2005:104.

<sup>66</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-xxiii: 147–150.

<sup>67</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1992: 1002–1003.

<sup>68</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v: 150–153.

<sup>69</sup> Chayet 2003: 83.

ldan pho brang (Chapter 5 Section 5.5.1). This was also true for many parts of Inner Asia at the time. During times of war, the male civilians formed the army. In this regard, the Tibetans were vastly outnumbered by their counterparts, the Khoshut Mongols in central Tibet. However, as we will discuss in chapter fifth, the Khoshuts in central Tibet were more united and experienced in warfare compared to the Tibetans. This was partly due to their continuous military expeditions and strong leadership. This situation was clearly demonstrated during the war between the Tibetans and Khoshuts in 1705 (Chapter 5 Section 5.5.1). As a result, the Khoshut Mongols became the primary military force of the dGa' ldan pho brang, operating under the command of the Khoshut Khans. This pivotal power division within the dGa' ldan pho brang posed a significant challenge for Tibetan political leaders in maintaining a balance of power against the Khoshut Mongols, especially when the Khoshuts began to turn against the Tibetan leadership, as in the case of lHa bzang Khan.

It is not known exactly whether the Fifth Dalai Lama established this power division between the Khoshut Khans and Tibetan political leaders, aware of the inherent risks of having the military force under Khoshut command. However, the power division was very clear as early as the 1640s. Five official correspondences between Gushri Khan and the leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang, dated between 1644 and 1655, and collected in volume called *Tibetan Document Collection* (bod kyi yig tshags phyogs bsgrigs), clearly demonstrate the power demarcation between the Tibetans and the Khoshuts.<sup>70</sup> For example, in 1644, the dGa' ldan pho brang responded to Gushri Khan's request to permit Kun dga' lhun grub, a servant of a cabinet minister Bu Chung, to marry a lady from the aristocratic family of lHa 'og gshong:

ཁོ་པ་ལྷ་གཤོང་པའི་པའི་མག་པར་སྤྱིན་ཚེ་ཡང་རྟིག་ལྷ་གཤོང་པ་རང་གི་གཞུང་འབྲི་སྐབ་དམག་གི་མཚོན་སྐབ་ཆ་གང་ཡིན་  
 ལྷ་ཆག་མེད་པ་ས་འཛོན་ཚོན་མའི་དུས་ལྟར་ཞི་དྲག་གང་ཅི་བཀའ་བྲུང་དམག་ལམ་ཁོངས་ནས་བསྐྱབ་ཅིང་། ཁོ་རང་ངོ་  
 གཡོག་ད་ལྷའི་ལྷ་བཞིན་ཡ་མ་བྲལ་བའི་ཐོག་གཞུང་སྐབ་ལྷ་ཆག་མེད་པ་བྱུང་རྗེས་ཀུན་དགའ་མག་པར་སྤྱིན་གྲུང་བྱུང་མེད་  
 འདྲ་བསམ་པ་འདྲ་རང་གི་བསམ་པར་འདུག་ཅིང་། ཡིན་ནའང་རང་ངོས་སོག་པོར་སོང་གཤེས་བོད་ལྷགས་འདི་རིགས་ཀྱི་  
 ཞིབ་ཆ་ཉ་ཅང་མ་གཏོགས་པ་བཅས་གཞུང་གཞོན་ཐལ་ཆ་སོགས་ཡོང་བ་འདུག་མིན་ཁྱོད་རང་བཀའ་རྒྱོན་ཚེ་མོལ་སྐྱར་  
 ཐོག་ནས་མཛོན་མཚོན་ངོ་འཛོན་དུ་མ་སོང་བའི་གསལ་བྱུང་བསྐྱབ་ཁོ་པར་རྒྱ་མཚན་བྱེད་དགོས་འདུག་པས་དེ་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་  
 གསལ་འབྲལ་གཏོང་ཡོང་བ་གྱིས་པ་འབེབས་འབྲས་བཞིན། འདི་གར་འདྲ་རང་རྣམས་མོལ་སྐྱར་བྱས་པར་བཀའ་བྲུང་  
 དམག་ལམ་ཁོངས་སུ་ལྷ་གཤོང་པའི་ས་རིགས་ཀྱི་ཞི་དྲག་སྐབ་འབྲེང་ལྷ་ཆག་མེད་པ་བྱུང་རྗེས་གཞུང་གཞོན་གྲུང་ཡོང་དོན་  
 མེད་འདྲ་བསམ་[...]

If he (kung dga') were given as the bridegroom, all the civilian and military duties, such as government military service of the lHa 'og gshong family, like during the time of previous landlords, would be gathered from the army of Minister Bu Chung. Moreover, if they remained together as lord and servant as they do now and did not neglect or delay the government duties, then I think it would not make a difference even if Kun dga' were given as the bridegroom. However, you requested us, the cabinet ministers, to discuss this issue to determine if it would harm the government, since you are Mongolian and do not know the details of Tibetan tradition. You also requested reasons for the decision without being fake or polite. So, with this request, the clear decision we sent is as follows: After our discussion, we decided that if the civilian and military duties of the lHa 'og gshong family are provided by Minister Bu Chung without neglect or delay, then there is no harm to the government [...].<sup>71</sup>

<sup>70</sup> rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997: 49–58.  
<sup>71</sup> rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997: 49.

Moreover, another government letter dated 1655, sent under the name of sDe srid bSod nam chos 'phel, asked Gushri Khan, who was living in the 'dam region at the time, to assist and see off the government officers transporting military expenses remaining from the southern war to the Amdo regions:

དབུས་གཙང་གི་ག་ཁལ་ནོར་ལུག་ལྷོ་དམག་གོ་ཚས་སུ་མ་སོང་བ་གང་ཡིན་དེ་ཆ་ཐག་ཉེ་རྒྱམས་ལྷ་བ་བརྒྱད་པ་རྟིང་མའི་  
མཚུག་དང་རིང་བ་རྒྱམས་ལྷ་བ་བརྒྱ་བའི་གནམ་གང་ཚུན་ལ་འདམ་དུ་འབྱོར་ངེས་རྗེས་བདེ་དགོས་པའི་བཀོད་པ་སོང་  
ཡོད་པས་མཚོ་ཁར་རྗེས་བདེ་སོགས་རྒྱམ་མཁུན་རིན་པོ་ཆེར་བཅགས་པ་དང་།

The remaining yaks and sheep from the dBus gTsang military tax (*ga khral*), which were not used for food in the southern war, are now arriving in the 'dam region. The nearby [herds] will arrive by the end of the later (*rting ma*) eighth month, while the distant ones will arrive by the 30th of the tenth month. The order for assistance with their send-off has been issued. So, Your Honour, please keep in mind the assistance needed for seeing them off (*rdzong bda*) and other related matters.<sup>72</sup>

If Gushri Khan was the king of the dGa' ldan pho brang, it would have been nearly impossible for the sDe srid to make this government tax decision and issue orders to Gushri Khan. These are some of many similar exchanges in the correspondence between the dGa' ldan pho brang and Gushri Khan. It discusses various topics, including the sDe srid's decisions on government tax, sending a governmental envoy to Amdo, and Gushri Khan's request for medical assistance for his queen. These passages illustrate the power division and power mechanism between the Tibetans and Khoshuts within the dGa' ldan pho brang. These primary sources generally validate the points made by many modern scholars.<sup>73</sup>

Therefore, the power structure of the dGa' ldan pho brang was generally designed to divide authority between the Khoshuts and Tibetans, preventing the Khoshuts from intervening in internal politics. Moreover, in many cases, the Khoshuts were excluded from attending regular governmental assemblies to discuss political matters. A notable example is the government assembly in 1705, which addressed the conflict between sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho and lHa bzang Khan (chapter 5, Section 5.4).<sup>74</sup>

However, as anticipated, this demarcation of power between the Khoshuts and Tibetans was neither unconditional nor permanent. This fundamental structural problem has existed since the establishment of the dGa' ldan pho brang. Thus, the equilibrium started to waver when lHa bzang Khan aligned with a faction of dGe lugs purists, subsequently assuming the title of Khan in 1703 (chapter 4 Section 4.4.4).

### 1.3.3. Building a Power Structure

In 1621, following a civil war in central Tibet, negotiations were held between the dGa' ldan pho brang, sDe pa Kyid shod, and the gTsang Dynasty. They concluded that the Lhasa would be given to the dGa' ldan pho brang, and 'Phan po would be given to the sDe pa Skyi shod family. Since then, under the broader political umbrella of the gTsang Dynasty, Lhasa more or

<sup>72</sup> rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997: 54–55.

<sup>73</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 441. Zhwa sgab pa was clearly a pro-Tibet historian with a noticeable political agenda, but he also provided some vital insights into this period of history.

<sup>74</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 98a and PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 363–364.

less remained under the control of the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>75</sup> In this situation, there was no powerful secular aristocratic family in the Lhasa region that could challenge or undermine the authority of the dGe lugs religious leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang. Secondly, in 1642, while establishing the political dGa' ldan pho brang government, the monks and leaders of the major dGe lugs monasteries made significant contributions alongside the allied Tibetan and Khoshut military forces.<sup>76</sup> As a result, the monastic leaders of the major dGe lugs monasteries naturally became the political leaders in this new government. Finally, the dGa' ldan pho brang was initially a religious institution before it evolved into a political and religious government. Its core values and success often depended on the religious leaders of the dGe lugs monasteries.

Given this historical context, political contributions, and religious affiliation, it is not surprising that the central authority of the dGa' ldan pho brang predominantly remained in the hands of the mKhan pos and Khri pas, along with their associated dGe lugs monasteries, until 1705.<sup>77</sup> The structure of the government is shown in figure 1:




Figure 1 The power structure of the dGa' ldan pho brang government

As seen in this diagram, the power of the dGa' ldan pho brang was predominantly overseen by the mKhan pos and Khri pas from the three main dGe lugs monasteries: Se ra, 'Bras spungs, and dGa' ldan. Se ra and 'Bras spungs monasteries exhibited greater political activity compared to the dGa' ldan monastery, potentially due to their closer proximity to Lhasa. Each monastery in Se ra and 'Bras spungs housed at least two mKhan pos and a Khri pa, all of whom were actively engaged in the political affairs of the government. For example, the religious diplomats dispatched to the Qing court, as well as the religious mediators or representatives of the Dalai Lama sent to various Mongolian leaders, demonstrate the influence of the dGe lugs religious leaders in the dGa' ldan pho brang government (Chapter 3, Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2). Aside from the main Khri pa of the dGa' ldan monastery, the golden throne holder and official head

<sup>75</sup> Yon tan rgya mtsho 2001: 3. Perhaps Yon tan rgya mtsho was the only modern scholar to have written an exclusive book about the history of the sDe pa Skyid shod family. See also *dBus gtsang lo rgyus chen mo*, edited by gTsang phrug sTobs lags et al., 2020, vol-i: 10–12.

<sup>76</sup> Refer to the chapter on the civil war between the gTsang Dynasty and the dGa' ldan pho brang, along with their respective supporters, in the *Autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama* (2009, vol-v: 149–157).

<sup>77</sup> The information regarding the political hierarchy of the dGa' ldan pho brang is sourced from various primary materials, such as biographies, legal documents, official records, and more. For instance, the *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama* and the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, along with the *Autobiographies of the Fifth Dalai Lama* and the *Autobiography of the Fifth Panchen Lama*, detail the mKhan pos and Khri pas, who frequently participated in governmental assemblies and contributed to decision-making.

of the dGe lugs pa tradition, none of the primary sources I have perused document the attendance of mKhan pos and other Khri pas at government assemblies.<sup>78</sup>

Each mKhan po and Khri pa was selected primarily based on their distinguished Buddhist scholarship, and they thus possessed a considerable number of faithful monk students. As their prominence and power grew, their circle of followers broadened to encompass lay followers, such as the case of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (Chapter 2, Section 2.9). In his thesis, Maher argues that “the authority religious figures are able to wield is a reflection of the legitimacy they have been granted by their followers.”<sup>79</sup> Due to their strong support base, their combined religious and political influence was unparalleled by their non-clerical or secular political counterparts in the dGa' ldan pho brang.

In these circumstances, the decisions of the dGa' ldan pho brang were profoundly shaped by the mKhan pos and Khri pas. However, these monastic leaders were akin to religious politicians, and they shouldered greater responsibilities in monastic activities. For instance, the mKhan pos and Khri pas of the monasteries had to oversee their monasteries both financially and spiritually, which often limited their productive input into governmental functions. Moreover, due to their close relationship with their religion, they often prioritised the interests and religious ideologies of their respective monasteries over the broader concerns of the political establishment. A perfect example of this is the decision made by the religious leaders of 'Bra spung Monastery in 1705 to welcome the victory of lHa bzang Khan (Chapter 5, Section 5.6.1).

There are two fundamental issues regarding this feature. Firstly, there was no political mechanism to prioritise the interests of the government over those of the major dGe lugs monasteries or to create a pure political plan for the dGa' ldan pho brang government. The two interests should always align; otherwise, religious leaders will obstruct any initiatives. Secondly, the religious leaders, under the guise of protecting their religion, could destroy anyone who opposes the exclusive or narrow interests of the monasteries (Chapter 3, Section 3.3). In the long term, this power structure poses a high risk to the stability of the government.

#### 1.3.4. Centring Around a Religious School

The foundation of the dGa' ldan pho brang was principally rooted in the dGe lugs school, with its highest leadership comprising dGe lugs lamas. In the dGe lugs school, there had been a persistent ideological schism within their leadership and respective followers. After the demise of Tsong kha pa (1357–1419), the founder of the dGe lugs tradition, his followers divided into two groups, respectively represented by his two principal students, rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364–1432) and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang (1385–1438). These two students, however, held differing views regarding the maintenance and evolution of the dGe lugs tradition, each embodying “pluralist” and “purist” perspectives, respectively. After these two principal students, the ideological divisions within the dGe lugs tradition seems remained consistent throughout the subsequent centuries.<sup>80</sup> The historical background details of these two ideological factions in the dGe lugs tradition will be discussed later (Chapter 2, Section 2.8).

---

<sup>78</sup> For example, the 45th Khri pa 'Jam dbyangs tshul khri ms dar rgyas and the 48th Khri pa don 'grub rgya mtsho, two golden throne holders at the dGa' ldan monastery, served as principal tutors to the Sixth Dalai Lama and were both actively engaged in governmental politics (Ser smad Grags pa mkhas grub n.d.: 35).

<sup>79</sup> Maher 2003: Abstract.

<sup>80</sup> rMe ru Phag mot tshe brtan (online) 2020: Accessed 1 July 2024.

The term “pluralists” refers to the group of dGe lugs followers who share rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen’s approach of respecting and appreciating other schools while maintaining the dGe lugs tradition.<sup>81</sup> This group had, for the most part, constituted the mainstream faction within the dGe lugs tradition. I have coined the term “pluralist” for this thesis, as I did not find an equivalent term within the literature of the dGe lugs school to describe the traits of this faction. While the term “ris med” exists, it has multiple connotations and is interpreted differently by various practitioners. Additionally, the scope of “ris med” is broader than that of “pluralist”. Furthermore, the term “pluralist” is used in this thesis specifically to refer to this group of dGe lugs adherents. In this regard, the Fifth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid were the most visible figures from this group. They attempted to embrace most Tibetan religions, including Bon, treating them with equal regard under their governance (Chapter 2, Section 2.10 and Chapter 3, Section 3.3).

Regarding the term “purists”, in the dGe lugs literature, the term “odourless, stainless” (Tib. *dri ma med pa*) corresponds closely to the English expression “purist.” The first *Biography of Tsong kha pa* and many other works penned by dGe legs dpal bzang, repeatedly employed the term “odourless” to denote the purity and superiority of the dGe lugs tradition over others.<sup>82</sup> In defense of Tsong Kha pa’s teachings, dGe legs dpal bzang strongly urged his fellow dGe lugs scholars to preserve the tradition without incorporating elements from other traditions, as exemplified by the case of Gung ri rgyal mTshan bzang po (Chapter 2, Section 2.8). After this, many subsequent followers of dGe legs dpal bzang in the dGe lugs tradition, such as Chos dbang grags pa (1404–1469), repeatedly mentioned the term “*dri ma med pa*” in their works, emphasising the importance of preserving the purity of their tradition.<sup>83</sup>

In modern scholarship, Kay and Dreyfus employed terms such as “purist” and “purely Geluk”, respectively, to denote the followers of the dGe lugs tradition in its unadulterated form, free from the influence of other religious schools in Tibet.<sup>84</sup> On the other hand, tsyrempilov and Maher also used the terms “Dge lugs pa purists” and “pure Geluk” to describe those who resisted the Fifth Dalai Lama’s initiative to incorporate non-dGe lugs schools within the dGa’ ldan pho brang.<sup>85</sup> All these scholars describe the same group but in different historical contexts.

In the late 17th and early 18th century, the period under investigation here, the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, became more visible figure among the dGe lugs purists at the time. In his own autobiography, he claimed to have used philosophical logic to dismantle positions that did not align with Tsong Kha pa’s teachings, portraying himself as a defender of the dGe lugs tradition.<sup>86</sup> Moderover, in his works, ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa refuted scholars like Gung ri nam mkha rgyal mtshan, whose views opposed those of dGe legs dpal bzang.<sup>87</sup> Furthermore, in 1700, the sDe srid requested the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa to compose a commentary on the *Pramānavārttika* to disprove the arguments presented by dGe legs dpal bzang. However, rather than opposing dGe legs dpal bzang’s views, the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa wrote a logical treatise that upheld the points made by dGe legs dpal bzang, to the dismay of sDe srid.<sup>88</sup> This

<sup>81</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1980: 119–121.

<sup>82</sup> mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang 2021: 99–100.

<sup>83</sup> The term “*dri ma med pa*” or the shortform “dri med” is the most popular term used by the followers of the dGe lugs tradition, who share the approach of dGe legs dpal bzang. For example, Chos dbang grags pa (2006: 14, 20, 29 and 61) repeatedly used this term in his works.

<sup>84</sup> Kay 1997: 279 and Dreyfus (online) 1998: Accessed 1 July 2024.

<sup>85</sup> Maher 2003: 20 and Tsyrempilov 2006: 54.

<sup>86</sup> ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa 2015, vol-i: 6.

<sup>87</sup> ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa 2015, vol-vx:168.

<sup>88</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 76a–77b

purist group represented by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa repeatedly accused the government leaders of adulterating the pure form of the dGe lugs tradition and contested the governmental policy of equitably treating other Tibetan religious schools (Chapter 3, Section 3.3).

After the establishment of the dGa' ldan pho brang government, this ideological division began to intertwine with political power struggles. The dGa' ldan pho brang, led by the Fifth Dalai Lama and later by the sDe srid, became a pluralist government that repeatedly attempted to accommodate most of the Tibetan religious orders, including the Bon tradition.<sup>89</sup> However, due to the Fifth Dalai Lama's unparalleled charisma and leadership skills, none of the dGe lugs purists were able to challenge this policy under the Dalai Lama directly. When they discovered that the Fifth Dalai Lama had passed away, they began to criticise the sDe srid and later the Sixth Dalai Lama (Chapter 3, Section 3.3 and 3.4).

The two factions of the dGa' ldan pho brang are shown in figure 2:




Figure 2 The two factions of the dGa' ldan pho brang government

As shown in this diagram, the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama followed the Fifth Dalai Lama in adopting a pluralistic government policy towards Tibetan religious schools, including the Bon. However, the dGe lugs purists resisted the pluralistic ideology, positioning themselves as the ideological faction opposing the government and thereby challenging the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. This inherent ideological and political division posed subsequent challenges for the leadership of the dGa' ldan pho brang and ultimately destroyed the alliance between the Khoshut Mongols and Tibetan leaders.

Understanding these four fundamental governmental characteristics of the dGa' ldan pho brang discussed above – the ideological underpinning of the role of the Dalai Lamas which made him irreplaceable, the impact of the alliance with the Khoshuts, the dominance of religious dGe lugs leaders in the government, and the split into two dGe lugs factions – aids in comprehending the interplay between political events and the inherent causes embedded within the structure of the dGa' ldan pho brang. These characteristics also provide the necessary background to explain why and how certain distinctive political structures established by the dGa' ldan pho brang leaders later contributed to its political instability.

<sup>89</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v: 185, 446–459, and 487–501. Samten Karmay (trans. 2014: 7–10) summarises the Fifth Dalai Lama's approach to other Tibetan religious schools based on the latter's biography.

#### 1.4. Theoretical Approach and Framework

Scholars of the “New Qing History”, such as Rawski and Crossley, inspired and paved the way for this thesis to examine the dGa’ ldan pho brang’s interactions with the Mongols and the Manchus from a new perspective. They used Manchu and Mongolian sources to explore Inner Asia’s political structure, recognising the significant role of the dGa’ ldan pho brang under the Fifth Dalai Lama:

The success of dGe lugs pa missionizing in Amdo, Khams, and Mongolia laid the basis for the great influence wielded by the Dalai lama in seventeenth-century Inner Asia. The Dalai lama issued titles and seals that formalized the accession of Mongolian khans. He could and sometimes did order Mongol troop movements outside Tibet; he could also make peace between warring Mongol tribes, and his influence over the Mongols surpassed the influence of the Qing court.<sup>90</sup>

This passage by Rawski resonates with the notion of scholar Crossley, who also highlights the significant role of the Dalai Lama in the diplomacy between the Mongols, Manchus, and Tibetans.<sup>91</sup> According to the traditional Mongol social structure, Sneath proposes viewing the Inner Asian political landscape as a “headless state” and to “rethink traditional dichotomy [of Inner Asia] between state and nonstate society.”<sup>92</sup> This approach helped to understand the diverse and decentralised social and political structure of Inner Asia. Using a multi-disciplinary approach, Dawa Norbu was one of the pioneering scholars to study the dGa’ ldan pho brang outside of both the colonial and Sinocentric frameworks.<sup>93</sup> His analysis laid the foundation for an approach that acknowledges the role of Tibetan Buddhism in the political relationships between the Mongols, the Qing, and the dGa’ ldan pho brang.

Mill contended that the dGa’ ldan pho brang government was founded upon the ritual authority and societal ascendancy of Buddhism, a concept he subsequently termed the “ceremonial state.”<sup>94</sup> This extends beyond territorial notions, as the Buddhist and ceremonial aspects of governance also influenced the Mongol realms and the Qing Empire. Ishihama, studying Tibetan Buddhism in Inner Asia, termed the shared political foundation among Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus as a “Tibetan Buddhist Government” (*chos srid*) where polities “developed personal, material, and spiritual exchange through this sharing of the values of Tibetan Buddhism.”<sup>95</sup> Similar ideas were developed in the volume *Sacred Mandates*, in which eighteen scholars from diverse fields explore Asian international relations in a historical perspective. The editors of this volume explains in this context that “the distinctive characteristic of the Tibetan Buddhist world was the singular manner in which spiritual and worldly affairs domains were interwoven.”<sup>96</sup> To further deepen these theoretical concepts, Praag and Boltjes’ *Tibet Brief 20/20* emphasises the traditional Inner Asian International Relations focus on the dGa’ ldan pho brang.<sup>97</sup> Cheney examined the transition from the

---

<sup>90</sup> Rawski 1998: 250.

<sup>91</sup> Crossley 1997: 75–100.

<sup>92</sup> Sneath 2007:1.

<sup>93</sup> Dawa Norbu’s book was published in 2001.

<sup>94</sup> Mill 2003: 327–346. Mill (2023) also delivered a lecture titled “Ceremonial State” at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This will be featured in an upcoming book titled, *Greater Tibet and Its Governments: Historical Developments throughout the Ages (7th-the 20th Centuries)*.

<sup>95</sup> Ishihama 2004: 15–30 and her collaborative work with Tachibana, Kobayashi, and Inoue published in 2019.

<sup>96</sup> Brook, Praag and Boltjes (eds) 2018: 90.

<sup>97</sup> *Sacred Mandate* (2018) is a collaborative endeavour involving numerous international scholars, and *Tibet Brief 202/20* (2020) serves as a summary of the scholarly discourse presented in *Sacred Mandate*.

traditional Inner Asian world order outlined above to the modern Westphalian international system of nation-statehood and its effect on our understanding of historical relationships within Inner Asian polities.<sup>98</sup>

Recent scholarship has thus provided important insights into Inner Asia as a vibrant arena of multiple nationalities such as Mongols, Manchus and Tibetans, held together in its diplomatic and political interactions by notions of Tibetan Buddhist governance. Despite these achievements, research into the history of the dGa' ldan pho brang during the early 18th century still has often been marred by two theoretical misconceptions that have hampered our understanding of the dGa' ldan pho brang as a polity and its interactions with the Mongols and the Qing Empire.

#### 1.4.1. Misconception in terms of Modern Nation-Statehood

The first misconception views the dGa' ldan pho brang as a facsimile of the modern nation-state, characterised by a vertical power hierarchy, a centralised internal political system, and unmalleable territorial sovereignty. For example, among many well-known works on the topic, Richard Lachmann's subchapter "Nation-State Formation" briefly but critically explains the historical formation of this political notion which started in European countries in the 16th century.<sup>99</sup> Moreover, Wimmer and Feinstein discuss the complexities of the rise of nation-statehood across the world.<sup>100</sup> However, as emphasised by Brook, Praag and Boltjes, "The Tibetan Buddhist world was not centrally or uniformly ruled and needs to be understood in terms of relationship rather than territorial authority."<sup>101</sup> The dGa' ldan pho brang was established through collaboration between the dGe lugs and Khoshut Mongolian leaders. The Khoshut Mongols in central Tibet and mTsho sngon became Khoshut "Mongolian Government" (*gzhung sog*)<sup>102</sup> of the dGa' ldan pho brang and played a vital role in maintaining the military power of the dGa' ldan pho brang in central Tibet, Kham and Amdo. The demarcation of power between Tibetans and Khoshuts often manifested ambiguity, exhibiting fluidity and transcendence of political and religious borderlines depending on the context. Due to the overlaps and entanglement between their political domains, the power struggle between the sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan easily broke out when the dGe lugs purists incited the Khan in the 1700s, as explained in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

Although the Khoshuts in central Tibet and the mTsho sngon regions were under the authority of the dGa' ldan pho brang, their practical and operational dynamics were asymmetrical and contingent. Due to its internal political structure, the dGa' ldan pho brang's relationships with the Mongols and the Qing Empire operated on multiple levels and from various power centres. For instance, in 1697, the Khoshuts in the mTsho sngon region initiated a direct relationship with the Qing Empire, while the Khoshuts in central Tibet remained outside the influence of the Qing Empire. Furthermore, as outlined above, the central authority of the dGa' ldan pho brang was predominantly wielded by mKhan pos and Khri pas of dGe lugs monasteries rather than by politicians or aristocrats. Thus, the power structure and the power mechanism of the dGa' ldan pho brang were very different from the modern nation-state.

---

<sup>98</sup> Cheney 2017: 769–701 and 782.

<sup>99</sup> Lachmann 2020: 458–479.

<sup>100</sup> Wimmer and Feinstein 2010: 764–790.

<sup>101</sup> Brook, Praag and Boltjes (eds) 2018: 98.

<sup>102</sup> bKa' drung Nor nang pa 1981: 36a.

During this period, individuals under the authority of the dGa' ldan pho brang were not perceived through contemporary conceptions of “citizenship” but rather as religious adherents or patrons. This attitude is eloquently expressed in Sum pa mKhan po's description of the newly established dGa' ldan pho brang:

དེ་ལྟར་དགེ་ལུགས་རྣམས་པར་རྒྱལ་བའི་བསྟན་པའི་རྒྱལ་མཚན་ལྷ་ཡུལ་བར་དུ་བསྐྱེད་འགྲན་གྱུར་ཏེ། གངས་ཏེ་སེ་ནས་མདོ་  
ལམས་ཡན་ཆད་ཀྱི་བོད་དུ་གཏོགས་སོ་ཙག་དགེ་ལུགས་པའི་སྤྱིན་བདག་ཏུ་བསྐྱེད་ནས་ལྷ་མ་དགོན་སྐྱབ་ལྷ་ལྷ་སེར་གུན་  
བདེ་སྦྱིད་དཔལ་ལ་སྦྱོར་བར་མཛད་དོ།

In that way, the triumphant flag of the victorious dGe lugs school competitively soared high up to the heavens. Everyone from Mount Tise to the mDo khams region in Tibet was converted into patrons (*sbyin bdag*) of the dGe lugs pa. [Thus,] everyone, including lamas, monasteries, meditative schools, sacred patrons, monks and lay individuals, was infused with joy and happiness.<sup>103</sup>

In this passage, the author explains the founding of the dGa' ldan pho brang in 1642 and its subsequent societal impact. It is evident from the author's perspective that those who fell under the authority of the dGa' ldan pho brang were regarded more as converted patrons rather than as mere political or legal citizens. In this passage, Sum pa mKhan po treated the dGe lugs tradition and the dGa' ldan pho drang as the same entity.

Therefore, Max Oidtmann states that “during the 1790s the Geluk church had not as yet been weaponized as an instrument of Tibetan nationalism. The Geluk counted among its monk adherents not just Tibetans but also people from across Eurasia and the Qing Empire.”<sup>104</sup> This means that even in the 1790s, almost a century later, there was still no notion of a state-citizen relationship in Tibet. The dGa' ldan pho brang's relationship with the dGe lugs followers was primarily based on religion, cultural connections, and personal relationships.<sup>105</sup> All this evidence suggests that the internal governance of the dGa' ldan pho brang greatly differed from the nation-state framework.

#### 1.4.2. Misconception of Eurocentric International Relations

The second methodological problem frequently encountered in academic literature as well as in popular perception is that the interactions between the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Mongols, and the Qing Empire are viewed through a Eurocentric paradigm of International Relations. This political paradigm, rooted in concepts and terminology derived from the Peace of Westphalia, assumes an equable, dichotomous, and insular political mechanism. The Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648, marked the end of the eighty-year conflict involving many European countries such as Holy Roman Empire, France, Sweden and among others, establishing sovereign nation-states with defined borders based on European paradigms of governance and socio-cultural norms. This concept of statehood and international relations, later facilitated globally through colonial expansion, has often been applied at a global level, overlooking indigenous forms of governance and regional norms of relations between polities. The idea that the Peace of Westphalia inaugurated a new and lasting model of European statehood has been challenged, and some have argued that it emerged not before the nineteenth century. Whenever one pinpoints its beginnings, scholars of international relations have

<sup>103</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1982: 16.

<sup>104</sup> Oidtmann 2018: 14.

<sup>105</sup> Boltjes and Praag 2020: 59–62.

highlighted the problem of projecting this European model onto other parts of the world. Among many scholarly critics, Kayaoglu argues:

[This concept] was first developed by nineteenth century imperial international jurists and that the Westphalian narrative perpetuates a Eurocentric bias in international relations theory. This bias maintains that Westphalia created an international society, consolidating a normative divergence between European international relations and the rest of the international system.<sup>106</sup>

Praag and Boltjes summarise the application of the Eurocentric approach to the relations between the dGa' ldan pho brang and the Qing Empire in the early 20th century as follows:

The norms and protocols of the Inner and East Asian legal orders that informed inter-polity relations, including the cho-yon relationship in which Qing-Tibetan relations were largely grounded, came under stress and were severely tested as Westphalian concepts were increasingly deployed to serve the interests of the rival empires.<sup>107</sup>

As explained in these passages, colonial empires overlooked the intricacies of Asian historical contexts, recasting Asian inter-polity dynamics through the reductive and territorially bound prism of European nation-state constructs. The formalisation of the dGa' ldan pho brang's relations with the Qing Empire was consummated via colonial political machinations. In 1907, the British and Russian Empires, acknowledging the geostrategic value of Tibet amidst the Great Game, delineated the dGa' ldan pho brang's relations with the Qing Empire in terms of "suzerainty." In the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, the two Empires stated:

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognising the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations of Thibet, have made the following arrangement.<sup>108</sup>

This oversimplified conception became the standard legal narrative in UK foreign policy until 2008, which many regarded as a historical approach to examining the relationships between the Qing and the dGa' ldan pho brang. Anand described this shift in British policies as the hypocrisy of colonial power.<sup>109</sup> Furthermore, many scholars have construed the historical affiliation between the dGa' ldan pho brang and the Qing Empire through the simplistic lens of a protector-protégé political paradigm. Such a reductionist binary perspective fails to recognise the intricate interplay of asymmetrical, relative, intersecting and yet distinct power matrices between the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Qing Empire and the Mongols.

### 1.4.3. Inner Asia-centric Approach

---

<sup>106</sup> Kayaoglu 2010: 193.

<sup>107</sup> Boltjes and Praag 2020: 79–80. To the best of my knowledge, this concept was primarily brought forth by Dawa Norbu in his 1990 article titled "The Europeanization of Sino-Tibetan Relations, 1775-1907: The Genesis of Chinese Suzerainty and Tibetan Autonomy."

<sup>108</sup> *Tibet Justice Centre* (online): Accessed 10 October 2023. For details of treaties and diplomacies between the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Qing and the British Empire in the late 19th and early 20th century, see the work of British diplomat officer Bell (1924: 90) and Norbu (1990: 31–49).

<sup>109</sup> Anand 2009: 227.



and China had been that of patron and priest and had not been based on the subordination of one to the other.<sup>113</sup>

This statement is merely a political gesture by the Dalai Lama, reflecting his actual political power in comparison to the Qing court and considering that the statement dates to the early 20th century. However, a similar statement was declared in the decree of the 5th Dalai Lama when he appointed Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho as the sDe srid of the dGa' ldan pho brang in 1679 (Appendix Two). This demonstrates that, nevertheless of the reality, the notion of this patron-preceptor relationship has persisted for centuries.

However, in this political game of European powers, the significance of regional international orders disappeared, and the world began viewing historical international relations through this singular Westphalian approach without acknowledging the past regional differences.<sup>114</sup> In this forceful transition from traditional polity to the modern nation-state, many regimes, including the dGa' ldan pho brang, experienced a loss of the intrinsic meaning and historical context of their past existence.<sup>115</sup>

In the following chapters, we will not directly discuss these theoretical approaches, such as the concepts of *mchod yon* and the modern nation-state. However, understanding these theories is crucial for comprehending each chapter and the events discussed in this thesis. Knowledge of these theoretical approaches will provide a nuanced understanding of the events that unfold within the dGa' ldan pho brang, as well as its relationships with the Mongols and Manchus.

## 1.5. Literature Review

In this thesis, Tibetan, Chinese, Mongolian, and translated Manchu sources from the relevant period were analysed and compared. As mentioned in my acknowledgements, the translations of Tibetan and Chinese sources in this thesis were solely mine but were closely reviewed by relevant experts. However, I must clarify that the translations of the Mongolian sources in this thesis were rechecked and revised with Batsaikhan Norov, a Mongolian historian.<sup>116</sup> Despite this, errors may still be present due to my intermediate knowledge of Mongolian. Therefore, any inaccuracies in the Mongolian translations are my responsibility.

I do not read Manchu, so the Manchu sources in this thesis were read in Chinese translations. Therefore, as I will discuss later, those translations should be approached with caution. Dànzhēn Wàngjiā, an expert on the Manchu language from Tsinghua University, confirmed to me that the Manchu version of the *Qīng shílù zàngzú shìliào* is similar to the Chinese version in the main *Qīng shílù*.<sup>117</sup> However, I would like to clarify that the version I used in this thesis

---

<sup>113</sup> Both the Tibetan text and its English translation were taken from the website of Tibet House US. Accessed on 3 July 2024. I have also verified the Tibetan text with the original found in the collected works of the 13th Dalai Lama.

<sup>114</sup> Boltjes and Praag 2020: 79–86.

<sup>115</sup> *ibid*: 86–93.

<sup>116</sup> For example, as mentioned in the acknowledgements, some passages from the Mongolian source *Daiching gurun u dotogod u yaman u mongol bichig un ger iin dansa* were translated with Mongolian scholar Batsaikhan Norov.

<sup>117</sup> The *Qīng shílù* exists in several different versions in both Manchu and Chinese, with some minor differences. However, the *Qīng shílù* used in this thesis is the Beijing version republished in 1982. Dànzhēn Wàngjiā's forthcoming article (2024) is about the variations between the different versions of the *Qīng shílù* in various languages and different parts of the world. I will discuss *Qīng shílù* below (Chapter 1, Section 1.5.2).

is the Chinese version, not the Manchu version. Moreover, I am also aware that there are variations between the Chinese and Manchu versions in other documents, and some documents exist solely in the Manchu language.<sup>118</sup>

To crosscheck the facts and the narratives presented within these materials, this research undertook a comparative analysis of diverse materials, each offering disparate perspectives on individual historical events. Some materials employed were previously untouched in academic scholarship, while others, though studied, required further analysis. Certain materials, though widely studied, merited re-examination through a new approach in light of the theoretical discussion presented above. Hence, each primary source contributed distinctively to the scholarly depth of this thesis.

### 1.5.1. Primary Tibetan Sources

For my thesis, six sets of primary Tibetan sources constituted the foundation for the comparative examination.<sup>119</sup> They were chosen to gain a variety of positions and perspectives that could aid in understanding the diverse voices within the dGa' ldan pho brang and their interactions with neighbouring polities. Attention to the multi-vocality of these sources and their discourses gives the analysis depth and will facilitate a better understanding of the complexities of the political and diplomatic constellations in the period under investigation.

The first set of sources consists of the two *Biographies of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* (1648–1721), penned by bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis (1678–1738) and the Second 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, (1728–1791) respectively. These accounts are based on firsthand testimonies from the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa himself and his immediate attendants, occasionally interspersed with the authors' remarks. Additionally, the *Biography of bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis* written by Blo bzang don 'grub (c.1690–c.1750) has also been consulted. These works are significant because they encapsulate the perspectives of the dGe lugs purists who opposed the policies of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. Furthermore, these biographies illuminate the complex internal politics of the dGa' ldan pho brang, illustrating how the purists collaborated with lHa bzang Khan to oust the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama.

The second collection of sources under consideration includes the *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama* (683–1707), *Mchod sdong 'dzam gling rgyan gcig*, *Bai dur+ya ser po 'i me long*, *Khrims yig dwangs shel me long* and *lNga ba drug par 'phos pa 'i gtam* composed by the sDe srid (1653–1705). The biography intricately details the Sixth Dalai Lama's daily activities and his interactions with diverse figures, including the Mongols and Manchus. The other four works provide insights into the formal events and legal system of the dGa' ldan pho brang, aspects not thoroughly covered in the Sixth Dalai Lama's biography. Furthermore, the *Autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama* and the *Biography of the Fifth Dalai Lama* by sDe srid was utilised to investigate the early years of the dGa' ldan pho brang. Given the two authors' positions as leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang, these accounts can be viewed as representing the governmental stances on various political events in central Tibet.

---

<sup>118</sup> Crossley and Rawski (1993: 69) observe that “There are instances of error, omission, and deliberate censorship in materials generated in Manchu and later rendered into Chinese.” And Bartlett (1985: 26) argues that some historical information is recorded only in the Manchu language for various reasons.

<sup>119</sup> All Tibetan translations are mine unless otherwise stated. However, Geshe Palden Gyatso, Professor Ulrike Roesler, and DPhil Candidate Ryan Jacobson tirelessly helped me to improve the accuracy of the Tibetan translations.

The third group of sources includes the *Autobiography of the Fourth Panchen Lama* (1570–1662) and the *Autobiography of the Fifth Panchen Lama* (1663–1737), both authored by the Fifth Panchen Lama. He was the second most significant religious leader in the dGe lugs school and the paramount leader of the bKra shis lhun po monastery, symbolising the power of the gTsang region. These biographies offer a unique viewpoint, showcasing the perspectives from the gTsang region and shedding light on the Fifth Panchen Lama’s complex relationships with the sDe srid, the Sixth Dalai Lama, the Kangxi Emperor, and the Khoshuts. To understand the view of the Mongols towards bKra shis lhun po and its relationship with the dGa’ ldan pho brang, I also examined *rGya bod hor sog gi lo rgyus* by dKon mchog rgyal mtshan (1764–1853), the 24th Khripa of Bla brang Monastery and *Deb ther mes po’i zhal lung* by dBang chen skyabs, a Khoshut Mongolian scholar, probably authored in 1848. These materials explain the evolving attitude of the Mongols toward Tibetan Lamas in the dBus and gTsang regions.

The fourth collection of resources includes the *Autobiography of Sle lung bZhad pa’i rdo rje* (1697–1740) and the *Biography of Che mchog ’dus pa rtsal* (1651–1726), both written by Sle lung bZhad pa’i rdo rje. The author was a keen observer of the intricate political events of the early 18th century, and he documented them in detail. His integration of dGe lugs and rNying ma doctrines might have inclined him towards the viewpoints of the sDe srid. Nonetheless, he critiques the sDe srid’s ethical practices and his treatment of officials. Sle lung Lama’s narratives appear more even-handed compared to other sources. Che mchog ’dus pa rtsal, being a rNying ma master, had a perspective on the dGa’ ldan pho brang, the sDe srid, and the Sixth Dalai Lama that was distinct from his dGe lugs peers. The biography of this rNying ma master provides unparalleled insights, highlighting internal aspects often missed in other accounts, particularly about the internal politics of the dGa’ ldan pho brang.

The fifth set of materials illustrates the relationship between the dGa’ ldan pho brang and the rNying ma tradition. It includes the two-volume *Biography of gTer bdag gling pa ’gyur med rdo rje* (1646–1714), authored by Chos dpal rgya mtsho (1654–1718), as well as the *Autobiography of Chos dpal rgya mtsho*. This set also includes the *Autobiography of rDo brag Rig ’dzin pad ma ’phrin las* (1641–1717), a reincarnate Lama of the rNying ma institution of rDo rje brag who was ordained by the Fifth Dalai Lama. These accounts have unique information because these figures shared intimate relationships with the sDe srid and the Fifth Dalai Lama yet largely stayed detached from the internal governmental power politics. The first two biographies convey the official narrative of the sMin grol gling monastery, a significant entity in upholding the non-sectarian policy of the dGa’ ldan pho brang. The narratives of the third biography sustain a more balanced perspective, offering relatively impartial information about the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama.

The sixth group of sources consists of official political records, administrative documents, and correspondence. It encompasses *Bod kyi yig tshags phyogs bsgrigs*, a collection of official letters by the Qing, Mongolian and Tibetan leaders, edited by rDo rje tshe brtan, *Tham deb long pa’i dmigs bu*, *Chu glang wang shu tshur phul gyi deb gzhung* and other governmental documents. These volumes include correspondence between diplomats, official records of titles, seals, and events, as well as tax and revenue documents. These materials offer significant information about the dGa’ ldan pho brang and its relationships with the Mongols and the Qing. The first volume sheds light on the politics between Tibetan leaders and Qing diplomats and the sDe srid’s intricate relationship with dGa’ ldan Khan (Galdan Khaan in Mongolian). The second, a historical work composed in the 19th century, delineates the dGa’ ldan pho brang’s official stance towards the Mongols and the Qing Empire, illustrating the complex politics of

the early 18th century. Chinese scholars selected and edited the third volume with the purpose to empower the official narratives of the PRC. Despite this political agenda, a careful reading reveals substantial information about historical events in the dGa' ldan pho brang hidden between the lines.

### 1.5.2. Non-Tibetan Primary Sources

The first source is the *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* (Tibetan Historical Records of the Qing Empire), which comprises a nine-volume compilation of Tibet-related records sourced from the Beijing version of *Qīng shǐlù*, “Veritable Records of Successive Reigns of the Qing”.<sup>120</sup> This collection provides an extensive official narrative of the Qing Empire’s relations with the dGa' ldan pho brang and the Mongols. The material primarily stems from reports by Qing diplomats and direct correspondence between the Qing, the dGa' ldan pho brang, and the Mongols. It is worth noting that the collection occasionally features accounts based on public rumours and testimonies of travellers, introducing potential inaccuracies. Moreover, the materials evidently demonstrate that the scribes of the Qing court occasionally embellished the account of events, presumably to curry favour with the emperors. The *Qīng shǐlù* is a recognised source among scholars, but I have not found anyone who has specifically researched the *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào*.

The second set of sources is the *Qīng dài xīzàng dìfāng dǎngàn wénxiàn xuǎnbiān*, a collection of primary materials from the Archives of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. This eight-volume collection contains 1,522 original photocopies of official letters, edicts, records of events, and more. This source provides new insights into several political events of the dGa' ldan pho brang during the early 18th century. In addition, *Kāngxī cháo mǎn wén zhūpī zòuzhè*. (Kangxi Court Memorial Record in Manchu) was utilised to compare and verify the narratives within the mainstream sources.<sup>121</sup> These sources encompass numerous letters and reports from Qing diplomats stationed in border regions, including the city of Xining in Amdo. The reports and letters provide additional detailed information, which is absent in other documents. For instance, the activities of lHa bzang Khan are documented in these records.

The third source is *Xīzàng zìzhìqū dǎngàn guǎn guǎncáng méng mǎn wén dǎngàn jīng xuǎn*, a 12-volume compilation, encompassing texts in Chinese, Tibetan, Manchu, and Mongolian, published in 2019. These materials, sourced from the Archives of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, have been translated into Chinese. This anthology includes images of official documents spanning the period from 1324 to 1928, shedding light on the official stances of the Yuan, Ming, and Qing Dynasties towards the Tibetan dynasties and the Mongols. However, its primary emphasis lies in the socio-cultural and political interactions between the Qing Empire and the dGa' ldan pho brang and the internal politics within the dGa' ldan pho brang.

Furthermore, the extensive compilation of Mongolian documents, titled *Daiching gurun u dotogod u yaman u mongol bichig un ger iin dansa* (Qing Cabinet Mongolian Hall File), contains numerous correspondences between the Qing, the Mongols, and the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>122</sup> It contains details about the Khoshut Mongols and their complex relationship with the Qing and the dGa' ldan pho brang. Additionally, another Mongolian document, *A*

---

<sup>120</sup> Translations from the Chinese are mine unless otherwise stated. However, I would like to acknowledge that Tenzin Wangmo and Dànzhēn Wàngjiā kindly helped in correcting and improving all the Chinese translations, especially the classical Chinese translations.

<sup>121</sup> The original source was written in the Manchu language, but I referred to the translated version in Chinese.

<sup>122</sup> Batsaikhan Norov offered support in translating and authenticating Mongolian references for this thesis.

*Mongolian Textfragment: dGa' ldan, the Khan of Oirat*, translated by Walther Heissig, was examined.<sup>123</sup> This text offers a non-official and personal approach towards the conflict between the sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan. These documents elucidate the Mongolian viewpoint on the dGa' ldan pho brang and the nuances of Tibetan politics.

### 1.5.3. Secondary Literature

Contemporary scholars, utilising a variety of primary sources, have advanced research on the dGa' ldan pho brang from the late 17th to the early 18th centuries in terms of scope, depth, and diversity. These outstanding contributions that I have examined in this study are written in, among others, English, Tibetan, and Chinese.

#### 1.5.3.1. Secondary Literature in English

Rockhill was the first to begin utilising both Tibetan and Chinese sources to study the historical relationship between the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Mongols, and the Qing Empire.<sup>124</sup> Though not in-depth, the works of Sarat Chandra Das and Bell illuminate the evolution of the colonial interpretation of international affairs concerning Inner Asian polities.<sup>125</sup> Utilising a broad array of Tibetan materials, Giuseppe Tucci began a detailed analysis of the dGa' ldan pho brang and its foreign relations with other regimes in his monumental *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*.<sup>126</sup> Petech and Ahmad incorporated numerous primary Tibetan and Chinese resources into their research, rendering their works detailed and nuanced.<sup>127</sup> The contributions of these two scholars remain highly regarded in the study of the dGa' ldan pho brang and have also been of value for my research. As mentioned in section 1.4 of the first chapter, scholars from the “New Qing History”, including Peter Perdue, Jonathan Spence, and Pamela Crosslay, enhanced the analysis of the dGa' ldan pho brang by viewing it within the wider context of Inner Asian political networks.

Samten Karmay's in-depth analysis of the works of the Fifth Dalai Lama offers significant insights into the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>128</sup> Similarly, using multilingual sources, Elliot Sperling provides nuanced insights into crucial issues of the dGa' ldan pho brang, including the relationship between the Fifth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid.<sup>129</sup> Ishihama's work on niche topics, like the Dalai Lama's seals, helps to assess how these epitomised the power of the Dalai Lama and the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>130</sup> Recent contributions from scholars like Schwieger and Oidtmann have furthered the scholarly understanding of the relationship between the dGa' ldan pho brang and the Qing Empire from multiple perspectives.<sup>131</sup> Scholars focused on border regions, such as Gray Tuttle, Yudru Tsomu, and Brenton Sullivan, have made important contributions to our understanding of the dGa' ldan pho brang from the fringes of historical Tibetan borderlands.<sup>132</sup>

---

<sup>123</sup> I have read the English translation of Heissig's work and then counter-checked specific passages against the German original with the help of DPhil candidate Daniel Wojahn.

<sup>124</sup> Rockhill 1910: 1–104.

<sup>125</sup> Das 1904:80–93 and 1905a:152–155. Bell 1924.

<sup>126</sup> In referencing Tucci's book, the 1999 edition (vol-i) was utilised, originally published in 1949.

<sup>127</sup> Petech 1959: 368–394, 1966: 261–292, 1972, and 2013. Ahmad 1970.

<sup>128</sup> Karmay 1998: 504–518, 2002: 21–40, 2005: 12–13, and 2014.

<sup>129</sup> Sperling 2004, 2011, and 2014: 202–221.

<sup>130</sup> Ishihama 1992:501–514, 2004: 15–32, and 2019.

<sup>131</sup> Schwieger 2015, and Oidtmann 2018.

<sup>132</sup> Tuttle 2012: 126–140, 2006: 65–87, Yudru Tsomu 2015, and Sullivan 2013.

### 1.5.3.2. Secondary Literature in Tibetan and Chinese

Among contemporary scholars, Zhwa sgab pa's two-volume work on Tibetan history provides a standard Tibetan official account of the dGa' ldan pho brang and its ties with the Mongols and the Qing.<sup>133</sup> To counter this official account, a three-volume publication by Chab spel and Nor brang distinguishes itself from other works, aiming to present alternative narratives of the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>134</sup> Yáhán Zhāng's works are regarded as the "guidebook" of official Sino-Tibetan historical narratives in the PRC. Wáng Yáo's works hold greater value among modern Chinese scholars. The works of both scholars are frequently cited by colleagues from the PRC.<sup>135</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig, using Mongolian and Chinese sources, chronicled the dGa' ldan pho brang's history from both historical Mongol and contemporary Chinese perspectives. However, Borjigidai Oyunbilig generally endeavours to align his works with the official historical narrative prevalent in China.<sup>136</sup> The two volumes by rNam rgyal dbang 'dus on the military affairs of the dGa' ldan pho brang provide a fresh perspective on the dGa' ldan pho brang, a viewpoint further expanded upon by Travers and her research team.<sup>137</sup> Analysing the civil war between the dBus and gTsang regions and between the Tibetans and Khoshuts, the writings of Thub bstan rnam rgyal and Nor bu bsam 'phel endeavour to present an alternative historical account.<sup>138</sup> Finally, modern analyses of border regions like Dar rtse mdo, mGo log, and Tsong Kha in Amdo and Kham regions have further decentralised the historical approach to the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>139</sup>

As the above survey shows, a wide range of primary and secondary sources is available and has been utilised in this thesis, and my work is deeply indebted to previous scholarship. However, I hope to make a fresh contribution through providing a close comparative analysis of primary sources from the period, with the aim to generate a better understanding of the religio-political constellations and momentous events that would ultimately lead to the death of sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho and the Sixth Dalai Lama, and the takeover of lHa bzang Khan in Lhasa.

## 1.6. Chapter Outline

The first chapter has elucidated the unique structural characteristics and historical backdrop of the dGa' ldan pho brang and discussed theoretical approaches and methodological questions. Furthermore, it has provided a concise survey of the primary and secondary sources in various languages that were utilised in this thesis.

Chapter two will introduce the main players who will play a role in this thesis, namely, the political leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Mongols, and the Qing from the late 17th to

---

<sup>133</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyg bde ldan's historical work (1976, vol-i) and the English version of this work translated and annotated by Maher (2010, vol-i) have been compared and consulted.

<sup>134</sup> Chab spel Tshe brtan phun tshogs 2007 and 2009 and his co-authored work with Nor brang o rgyan (1989) have been consulted.

<sup>135</sup> Yáhán Zhāng 1984 and Wáng yáo 1980: 183–199.

<sup>136</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 1988: 103–107, 1989: 70–77, and 2008: 82–91.

<sup>137</sup> Two volumes of rNam rgyal dbang 'dus's work (2003), edited volume of FitzHerbert and Travers (2022) and other publications under the Tibetan Army project are consulted.

<sup>138</sup> rNam graw Thub bstan rnam rgyal's research work (2018), and two volumes of Nor bu bsam 'phel (2017) are consulted.

<sup>139</sup> dMu dge bSam gtan's historical work (1987), two volumes of Dam chos dpal bzang on the *History of mGo log* (2000) and Rig 'dzin bstan srung's book (2015) are consulted.

the early 18th century. This survey begins with the Kangxi Emperor and the Qing Empire, followed by the roles of the Khoshut and Other Eastern Mongols. Furthermore, this chapter examines the Oirats and dGa' ldan Khan and delves into how the Khoshut Mongols found themselves in Tibet. Lastly, this chapter addresses lHa bzang Khan and dGe lugs purists, concluding with a discussion on the sDe srid and his administration of the dGa' ldan pho brang.

The third chapter delves into crucial historical events of the dGa' ldan pho brang from 1697 to 1700, providing context for the intense internal conflicts. This chapter begins by addressing the controversies linked to the enthronement of the Sixth Dalai Lama in 1697 and then moves on to the resurgence of the dGe lugs purists within the political sphere of the dGa' ldan pho brang. The chapter concludes by exploring the increasing influence of the dGe lugs purists and their allegations against the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama.

The fourth chapter covers the historical events spanning from 1700 to 1703. It begins by examining the Dar rtse mdo conflict, marking a direct confrontation between the dGa' ldan pho brang and the Qing, and then addresses the deteriorating behaviour of the Sixth Dalai Lama. This chapter delves into the escalating tensions between the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama, concluding with the dGe lugs purists aligning with the Khoshut leader, lHa bzang, to counter both the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama.

The fifth chapter explores the events unfolding within the dGa' ldan pho brang from 1703 to 1705. The chapter explores Kangxi's contentious invitation to the Fifth Panchen Lama and the concerted efforts of the dGe lugs purists, who utilised rumours to stir animosity amongst the Panchen Lama's followers towards the sDe srid. The chapter then delves into the direct rivalry between the lHa bzang Khan and the sDe srid, heightened by the interventions of the dGe lugs purists. Furthermore, the chapter concludes by addressing the allegations of poisoning, leading to a military confrontation between the sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan, which ultimately resulted in the assassination of the sDe srid and the subsequent rise of lHa bzang Khan to leadership. Thus, this section concludes the investigation of the chain of events from the enthronement of the Sixth Dalai Lama to the takeover of lHa bzang Khan. It is hoped that the evidence from primary sources provided in this thesis will help to throw new light on the political relationships and the shifting power dynamics during this crucial time in Tibetan history.

In addition to the main chapters, the appendix of this thesis includes translations of notable images and documents, encompassing the complete records of *Qīng shílù zàngzú shìliào* from 1696 to 1706. Furthermore, to provide a clear timeline of the unfolding events, this thesis includes a detailed chronicle of historical events presented in both Tibetan and Western calendars.

## Chapter Two

### An Overview of the Key Figures in the dGa' ldan pho brang Political Realm

This chapter will examine the religious and political leaders among the Manchus, Mongols, and Tibetans, providing detailed backgrounds of these individual leaders. It will also explore how the backgrounds of these individuals influenced the social and political events of Inner Asia. Additionally, the chapter will analyse the societies of the Qing, Mongolia, and Tibet, examining how their evolution had shaped the multifaceted relationships among these three polities.

#### 2.1. The Qing Empire

The relationship between the Qing and Tibetan Buddhism began well before the reign of the Kangxi Emperor, the fourth Qing Emperor. The first Qing emperor, Nurhaci, invited a Tibetan Buddhist Lama, Olug Darhan Nangso or Nang so slob dpon, who visited the emperor's capital three times between 1615 and 1621.<sup>140</sup> Since then, Tibetan Buddhist temples such as the Mahākāla temple in Mukden were built, and Lamas, including the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, were also later invited to the Imperial court. Tibetan Buddhism played a very important role in the Qing court and the lives of subsequent emperors.<sup>141</sup> After the establishment of the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Qing emperors maintained contact with it through Tibetan Buddhism and Buddhist Lamas.

In the dGa' ldan pho brang government, Tibetan Buddhist Lamas were an inseparable part of the political structure and governance. During that period, the dGe lugs school and the dGa' ldan pho brang government were intricately intertwined, appearing indistinguishable to external polities (Chapter 1, Section 1.3). Thus, this characteristic was called “religious and governmental prestige” (*bstan srid la rgya*).<sup>142</sup> Under this notion, if you respect or honour the religion, you must also respect the government, and vice versa. dGe lugs Lamas at the Qing court or in Mongolia inherently represented the interests of the dGa' ldan pho brang and the Dalai Lama, such as the case of lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan.<sup>143</sup> Thus, within the Buddhist political sphere, serving the dGa' ldan pho brang equated serving the Dalai Lama, which, in turn, served the broader cause of Buddhism.

The power dynamics and relationships among the Qing and Mongol leaders and the Tibetan government manifested in multiple ways, yet they were unified through a Buddhist framework with the Dalai Lama at its head. Therefore, numerous Qing and Mongolian documents addressed the Dalai Lama as a means of communicating with the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>144</sup> The

---

<sup>140</sup> Grupper 1984: 51, Tuttle 2006: 70, and Rig smon Tshe ring bsam grub (online) 2023: Accessed 12 September 2023.

<sup>141</sup> Grupper 1984: 47–59.

<sup>142</sup> This phrase refers to the combined high status, honour, reputation, respect, or admiration that religious and governmental institutions or their representatives hold in society. In primary materials, this phrase is written in slightly different forms over time — examples include *gzhung bstan la rgya*, *mchod yon la rgya*, and *chos srid la rgya* — but essentially retains a consistent meaning across these variations.

<sup>143</sup> lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (a) n.d.: 23a–23b.

<sup>144</sup> For example, an official record of the Qing (*Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-1: 133–135) dated 27 August 1696 addresses the Mongols in the mTsho sngon region (Appendix One).

claims by the Manchus and Mongols to be patrons of Tibetan Buddhism, and specifically of the Dalai Lama, were effectively equivalent to declaring their patronage of the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>145</sup> Academic scholarship that does not recognise this interconnection, the influence of Tibetan Buddhism, the dGa' ldan pho brang, or the Dalai Lama, misrepresents this situation. Marina Illich has pinpointed such misrepresentations in academic work and expressed her “critique of how Western academic constructions of Qing history have radically marginalised and often mischaracterised the influence of Tibetan Buddhism on Qing court culture and imperial policy.”<sup>146</sup>

## 2.2. The Kangxi Emperor

In the 1670s, with the assistance of his grandmother, Bù Mù Bù Tài, also known as Xiào Zhuāng Wén (1613–1688), the Kangxi Emperor (1654–1722) successfully wrested power from his four regents.<sup>147</sup> Although raised in the Shamanic culture brought to Peking by his forebears, Kangxi immersed himself in Chinese language and culture, mastering the Confucian *classics* in the process.<sup>148</sup> In the early years of his reign, he commenced his governance over China by utilising the Chinese bureaucratic system and embracing Confucian ideology while also maintaining Manchu Shamanic traditions.<sup>149</sup> For example, Kangxi frequently cited Confucian *classics* to support his decisions and regularly participated in sacrificial rituals at Manchu shamanic shrines within the palace.<sup>150</sup>

Tibetan Buddhism reached Manchuria through the other Eastern Mongols early in the Manchu unification period.<sup>151</sup> However, the first direct contact between the Dalai Lama and Manchu rulers occurred in 1637, when ruler Hong Taiji extended his invitation to the Fifth Dalai Lama to his capital, Mukden.<sup>152</sup> Early scholars posited that the Qing emperors, including Kangxi, were closely affiliated with Tibetan Buddhism solely to manage relations with the Mongols and Tibetans.<sup>153</sup> However, some primary sources document the Kangxi Emperor as a devoted follower of Tibetan Buddhism, demonstrating significant reverence towards Tibetan Buddhist lamas.<sup>154</sup> Hung's book chapter titled “Aisin Gioro Xuanye, Emperor Kangxi of the Qing Empire” delves into the intricacies of the Kangxi Emperor's life and the historical context that saw him emerge as one of the most accomplished emperors of the Qing Empire.<sup>155</sup>

The Kangxi Emperor was also an open-minded individual who introduced a breadth of cultural diversity to the Qing Empire.<sup>156</sup> He harboured interests in various scholarly fields, including geometry, mechanics, astronomy, cartography, optics, medicine, music, and algebra, from other civilisations and sponsored numerous scholarly and professional projects within the country.<sup>157</sup> He highly regarded Christian Jesuits, such as Antoine Thomas, for their specialised

---

<sup>145</sup> *Qīng shǐ lù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-1: 133–135

<sup>146</sup> Illich 2006, Abstract.

<sup>147</sup> Du Halde vol-i, 1741: 489, Hung 2017: 69–80 and Wu 2014: 19–20.

<sup>148</sup> Hung 2017: 63.

<sup>149</sup> Spence 1974 : xiv, xvi and xviii.

<sup>150</sup> Spence 1974 : xviii, xii and 85.

<sup>151</sup> Rig smon Tshe ring bsam grub (online) 2023: Accessed 12 September 2023.

<sup>152</sup> Farquhar 1978: 19.

<sup>153</sup> Köhle 2008: 73–119, Farquhar 1978: 20 and Schwieger 2015:11–114.

<sup>154</sup> ICang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (b) n.d.: 1b–2a.

<sup>155</sup> Hung 2017: 63–184.

<sup>156</sup> Spence 1974 : xviii and 65.

<sup>157</sup> Spence 1974 : xx and xviii.

skills, offering them various positions of differing capacities within his court.<sup>158</sup> Kangxi, however, did not tolerate the attempts of Christian missionaries to dominate Manchu and Chinese culture, and he firmly rejected the proposal of the Pope in Rome to appoint an emissary to Peking.<sup>159</sup> Kangxi adopted a similar approach towards Muslim chieftains and Russian Orthodox leaders; he was willing to accommodate them within his empire as long as they showed respect for Manchu traditions.<sup>160</sup>

Regarding Tibetan Buddhism, the Qing emperors, including Kangxi, were apprehensive about the Mongols' obsession with Tibetan Buddhism and their complete submission to Tibetan Lamas. A Manchu document, the *Tàizōng Wén Huángdì Shílù*, records, "The Mongolian princes are abandoning the Mongolian language; their names are all in imitation of the lamas'; in the end this will bring the fortunes of the state into decline!"<sup>161</sup> This concern might have stemmed from jealousy towards the influence that Tibetan Buddhist lamas wielded over the Mongols. There were also concerns about the extensive growth of monasticism, which could impact the military and workforce of the government.<sup>162</sup> Perhaps this is the reason why there were not large numbers of monks among the Manchus. However, at the same time, Kangxi personally copied various Buddhist texts, including the Heart Sutra, Diamond Sutra, Medicine Sutra, and Lotus Sutra, for more than 30 years.<sup>163</sup> He expended a fortune on the woodblock printing of Buddhist canons and personally contributed to the construction of significant temples in various locations across China.<sup>164</sup> Moreover, he accommodated hundreds of Tibetan Buddhist lamas in Peking to carry out rituals for his royal family and to perform diplomatic duties for the court.<sup>165</sup> Kangxi also extended numerous invitations to the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama to visit Peking for the spiritual betterment of sentient beings (Chapter 5, Section 5.1). Furthermore, Kangxi never seemed to share such a close relationship with representatives of any other religions although there were many religious leaders in the Qing court.

In return, Tibetan Buddhism aided him in managing relations with the Mongols, who were a significant threat to the early Qing Empire, and the Tibetans, whose lamas played a crucial role in handling diplomatic matters. For example, the Qing court employed the Second ICang skya Lama to persuade the Khoshut Mongols to meet with the Kangxi Emperor in 1697.<sup>166</sup> Kangxi realised that it was easier and more effective for the Qing to interact with the Mongols and Tibetans through Buddhism and Buddhist lamas, as these held significant meaning for these people. Uspensky posited that "it was the policy of the Qing to communicate with each group [of the Mongol tribes] in a manner that was meaningful to them."<sup>167</sup> The Kangxi, therefore, engaged with both the Mongols and the Tibetans through Tibetan Buddhist Lamas or under the guise of Tibetan Buddhism, an approach that resonated well with both Tibetans and Mongols.<sup>168</sup> Moreover, with the help of the Tibetan Buddhist lamas, the Kangxi Emperor portrayed himself as the protector or patron of Tibetan Buddhism to convince Mongols and

---

<sup>158</sup> Spence 1974 : xviii.

<sup>159</sup> *ibid*: xix.

<sup>160</sup> Elliott 2001, pp. 120-121.

<sup>161</sup> *Qīng shèng zǔ shílù* 2008, vol-v: 25 and Farquhar 1978: 21.

<sup>162</sup> Farquhar 1978: 22.

<sup>163</sup> Thokmay 2021: 311.

<sup>164</sup> Farquhar 1978: 23-24.

<sup>165</sup> ICang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan n.d. (a): 15b-19a, and Wángyào Kē 2019: 132. And see the *Autobiography of Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor* (1997).

<sup>166</sup> ICang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan n.d. (a): 18b-19a

<sup>167</sup> Uspensky 2003: 107.

<sup>168</sup> Hung 2017: 145-146.

T Tibetans of his religious and political integrity.<sup>169</sup> Oidtmann said that for gaining the trust and loyalty of Tibetans and Mongols, the Qing Empire “actively sought to remold its subjects’ faith.”<sup>170</sup>

To legitimise his rule over Han China and maintain the loyalty of the Chinese people, Kangxi adopted Confucian philosophies and followed the virtues of Confucian social structure within his empire.<sup>171</sup> In addition to this, Kangxi used Tibetan Lamas to present himself as the emanation of the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, enhancing his legitimacy not only as a ruler over the Han Chinese but also as a universal ruler. For example, upon the request, the Second ICang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (1642–1714) composed a long-life prayer for the Kangxi Emperor. In this prayer, ICang skya Lama described the emperor as the emanation of Mañjuśrī:

ཐུལ་ཀུན་མཁུན་རབ་གཅིག་བསྐྱུས་འཇམ་པའི་དབྱངས།། འཛིན་མའི་ཁྱེན་ལ་གནས་པའི་སྐྱེ་འགོ་ཀུན།། བན་བདེའི་དཔལ་  
ལ་འགོད་ཕྱིར་མའི་དབང་པོར།། རབ་སྐྱུས་སྐྱེས་བུ་ཆེན་པོ་ཞབས་བརྟན་གསོལ།།

Mañjughoṣa, the embodiment of the wisdom of all buddhas, manifested as the Mi'i dbang po (emperor) to establish happiness and benefit for all sentient beings all over the earth. May this great man live a long life.<sup>172</sup>

This passage depicts Kangxi as the embodiment of Mañjuśrī and explains that he was born to bring happiness and benefit to all sentient beings. This portrayal especially garnered significant respect for the emperor among Tibetans and Mongols, solidifying the image of Kangxi as the emanation of Mañjuśrī in their minds.<sup>173</sup> Thus, under this perception, his role as a leader destined to bring happiness and benefit to all sentient beings naturally legitimised his claim to universal rulership.

However, scholars have debated to what degree the Kangxi Emperor himself identified with this Buddhist interpretation of his role. Peter Perdue argues that Kangxi had no genuine commitment to Tibetan Buddhism beyond his political engagement. He noted that Kangxi was critical of the Mongols' obsession with Tibetan Buddhism and mercilessly killed many Buddhist lamas during his military campaigns.<sup>174</sup> Scholars like Wáng Yáo, on the other hand, think that Kangxi was a follower of Buddhism.<sup>175</sup> Thus, despite his active role among Tibetan Buddhists, further evidence from both sides is needed to confirm Kangxi's genuine approach toward Tibetan Buddhism and Buddhist lamas.

During the first Dzungar-Qing war (1687–1697), both Kangxi and dGa' ldan Khan, the leader of the Dzungars, made persistent efforts to secure the support of the dGa' ldan pho brang, under

<sup>169</sup> ICang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (b) n.d.: 1a.

<sup>170</sup> Oidtmann 2018: 21.

<sup>171</sup> Spence 1974: 80

<sup>172</sup> ICang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (b) n.d.: 1a. Moreover, in his autobiography, Ngag dbang chos ldan repeatedly referred to Emperor Kangxi as Mañjuśrī Emperor (*'jam dbyangs gong ma*) to acknowledge the emperor's divine association with Mañjuśrī (ICang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (a) n.d.: 19a, 20b and 34a–36a). For additional information, see Berger's article of Buddhist portraiture in the Manchu court (2003).

<sup>173</sup> Since then, the title “Mañjuśrī Emperor” has become a common term for referring to Qing emperors in Tibetan and Mongolian literature, as well as in everyday language (Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1997). I would also like to acknowledge that the tradition of interpreting Chinese emperors as Buddhist deities existed long before the Qing Empire.

<sup>174</sup> Perdue 2005: 204.

<sup>175</sup> Wáng Yáo 1980:17.

the leadership of the Dalai Lama.<sup>176</sup> To secure support from Tibetan leaders, Kangxi dispatched his emissary to the dGa' ldan pho brang and informed the sDe srid that their actions aimed to benefit sentient beings and peace.<sup>177</sup> Aware of the Dalai Lama's influence, Kangxi repeatedly appealed to him to mediate in the conflict between the Khalkhas, Dzungars, and the Qing to resolve the war. Perdue translated a quote from *Dà Qīng Lìcháo Shìlù*:

My goal is to dissolve the contention between Khalkha and Olod (Oirat) and create peace. If you [the Dalai Lama] can send Lamas to Galdan [dGa' ldan Khan], urging him to make peace, he will follow your orders.<sup>178</sup>

As this passage explained, the Qing sought the Dalai Lama's assistance in safeguarding the Khalkhas from attacks by dGa' ldan Khan, aiming to curtail the expansion of the Dzungar power. Many letters exchanged between Tibetan and Manchu leaders contain similar entreaties.<sup>179</sup> Protecting the Khalkhas appeared to help maintain Khalkha territory as a buffer region between the Dzungar and Qing Empire.

However, the Dalai Lama shared a profoundly intimate relationship with dGa' ldan, characterised by significant spiritual and personal bonds.<sup>180</sup> It is plausible that the Dalai Lama may have favoured the expansion of the Dzungar Empire, understanding that such an enlargement would bring prosperity to the dGa' ldan pho brang. Owing to this tradition, the sDe srid, who kept the death of the Dalai Lama a secret and governed the dGa' ldan pho brang at the time, sided with dGa' ldan Khan during this Dzungar-Qing war.<sup>181</sup> Kangxi frequently expressed dissatisfaction, stating that “the Dalai Lama appeared to diverge from the Qing emperor's goals.”<sup>182</sup> In 1697, Kangxi finally triumphed over the Dzungars and uncovered that the sDe srid had hidden the Dalai Lama's death, possibly in favour of dGa' ldan Khan. Henceforth, the Kangxi Emperor harboured deep resentment towards the sDe srid, as evidenced by many events detailed in the following chapters.

### 2.3. Khalkhas and Other Eastern Mongols

The Khalkhas, also known as Eastern Mongols in the late 17th and early 18th century, consisted of seven Khalkha *hoshuun* (banners) and four Khalkha *aimags* (domains).<sup>183</sup> The most powerful Khalkha leaders active in Inner Asian politics during this period were Zasagtu Khan and Tüshiyetü Khan,<sup>184</sup> predominantly based in the central and eastern regions of present-day Mongolia.<sup>185</sup> Tibetan Buddhism, once popular among the Mongols, was reintroduced and revitalised by the Third Dalai Lama (1543–1588). Under the influence of the Third Dalai Lama, the Khalkha Mongols, particularly those from noble families, established monasteries in

---

<sup>176</sup> rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997: 74. This important volume entitled, “*Bod kyi yig tshags phyogs bsgrigs*,” included 271 letters exchanged between Tibetan, Mongolian, Chinese, and Manchu leaders and diplomats. The editor, rDo rje tshe brtan, compiled these letters from various archives, including the Potala Palace. These letters bring new light to many social and political events in Inner Asia from the 14th to 18th centuries.

<sup>177</sup> *ibid*: 94–97.

<sup>178</sup> Perdue 2005: 150–151.

<sup>179</sup> rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997: 85–86, 87–93 and 94–96.

<sup>180</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v: 271, 292 and 363.

<sup>181</sup> *Qīng shèng zǔ shìlù* 2001, vol-ii: 165–166.

<sup>182</sup> Perdue 2005: 152.

<sup>183</sup> Ichinnorov 2010: 675.

<sup>184</sup> Sneath 2018: 44.

<sup>185</sup> Sneath and Kaplonski 2010, vol-ii: 508–517.

Khalkha regions and began sending their princes to central Tibet for Buddhist studies.<sup>186</sup> Gradually, Tibetan Buddhism, particularly the dGe lugs school, became the dominant religion in the region, and the Khalkha leaders submitted to Tibetan Buddhist lamas. Aware of this situation, Gerbillon's memoirs, as described in Du Halde's work, state that "the Mongols have such a profound veneration for their idol-priests called Lamas, that they not only pay them blind obedience but also present them with the best of everything they have."<sup>187</sup> Due to their close connection with Tibetan Buddhism, the Khalkhas naturally began to embrace the influence of the dGa' ldan pho brang when it was established in 1642 under the leadership of the Dalai Lama. For example, the representatives of the Dalai Lamas appointed by the dGa' ldan pho brang presided over annual Khalkha tribal gatherings, where they addressed internal disputes and other collective political matters.<sup>188</sup> Moreover, influenced by the Tibetan Buddhist world order, the First Khalkha rJe btsun dam pa (1635–1723) emerged as both the political and spiritual leader of the Khalkhas.<sup>189</sup>

The other Eastern Mongols, including the Tümed Mongols, historically resided in the territory between traditional China and the Khalkha Mongols. The most eminent leader of the other Eastern Mongols was Altan Khan, who had an interest in Tibetan Buddhism and met the third Dalai Lama in 1578.<sup>190</sup> The Khan and the Third Dalai Lama constructed several dGe lugs monasteries in the region, including Theg chen monastery.<sup>191</sup> Through these other Eastern Mongols, Tibetan Buddhism initially spread among the Manchus in the early 17th century (Chapter 2, Section 2.1). During the early years of the dGa' ldan pho brang, most of the other Eastern Mongols already became part of the Qing Empire. Some Tibetan Buddhist monks, such as Phyag na rdo rje (Chagnadorj in Mongolian), from these regions served as diplomats among the Qing, the Mongols, and the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>192</sup>

To maintain their relationship with the dGa' ldan pho brang, these Mongol leaders started a custom of paying a visit to central Tibet at least once a year to make donations to Tibetan Lamas, politicians, and monasteries, to earn both religious merits and political benefits.<sup>193</sup> Maintaining a high status in the political hierarchy of the dGa' ldan pho brang was crucial for Mongol chieftains for their prestige back in their homeland. For example, the Khoshut Mongols initiated a war against the Qing Empire over the hierarchy of seating arrangement and political recognition in the dGa' ldan pho brang in 1723, which shows how much importance they placed on their status within the Tibetan government.<sup>194</sup> Moreover, despite the efforts of the

---

<sup>186</sup> The Biography of the Third Dalai Lama (*bSod nams rgya mtsho'i rnam thar dngos grub 'dren pa'i shing rta*), written by the Fifth Dalai Lama (2009, vol-xii: 1–160), delves into the relationship between the Eastern Mongols and the dGe lugs school leaders under the Third Dalai Lama. The biography often notes that the children of the Mongolian elite frequently travelled to central Tibet for Buddhist education and spiritual pilgrimages, a practice that grew increasingly popular under the subsequent Dalai Lamas.

<sup>187</sup> Du Halde 1741, vol-iv:150. I have transcribed some old-style spellings into modern English, but one can verify the original spellings in the book cited here.

<sup>188</sup> dKon mchog rgyal mtshan.1990: 73 and 166.

<sup>189</sup> See the Biography of the First Khalkha rJe btsun dam pa (*rJe btsun dam pa Blo bzang bstan pa'i rgyal mtshan gyi rnam thar skal bzang dad pa'i shing rta*) written by Ngag gi dbang po (Ngag gi dbang po 1982).

<sup>190</sup> Karmay 2002: 66.

<sup>191</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-xii: 70–95. And Perdue 2005: 66–68.

<sup>192</sup> Schwieger 2015:116.

<sup>193</sup> The autobiographies of the Fifth Dalai Lama (2009) and the Fifth Panchen Lama (2014) repeatedly document visits from Mongol leaders, who brought various offerings. In return, they were bestowed with titles and religious empowerments (Ishihama 1992: 513).

<sup>194</sup> Sum pa ye shes dpal 'byor 1982: 24–25. In his Biography of the Third Lcang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, Thu'u bkwan chos kyi nyi ma discussed the details of this conflict (1989: 77–81). His narrative is different from Sum

Manchus and Dzungars to sow discord between the Khalkhas, other Eastern Mongols, and the dGa' ldan pho brang, these Mongols consistently invited the representatives of the Dalai Lama to resolve internal disputes and remained loyal to the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>195</sup>

## 2.4. The Four Tribes of the Oirat Mongols

The Oirats, identified as Western Mongols, were composed of four primary tribes: Dzungar, Torghut, Dorbet, and Khoshut. While not acknowledged as direct descendants of Genghis Khan, the Oirats received political titles such as Khan, Noyon, and Junang from the Dalai Lama and the subsequent leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>196</sup> In the 17th century, the Torghut and Dorbet Mongols merged with the Dzungar, culminating in the formation of the Dzungar Khanate.<sup>197</sup> Erdeni Batur, proclaimed as the First leader of the Dzungar Khanate, dedicated his life to uniting the Dzungar Mongols and sought to extend his dominion to neighbouring groups, such as the Kazakhs, to create a unified Khanate.<sup>198</sup> However, his legitimacy was consistently challenged by the Khalkha Mongols, primarily because Erdeni Batur was not a direct descendant of Genghis Khan. Additionally, within the noble families of the Oirat groups, some leaders, such as Ochirtu Chechen Khan, opposed Erdeni Batur's rule. However, scholars generally agree that these efforts did not immediately result in a fully established khanate, they certainly laid a solid foundation for one.<sup>199</sup>

Some contemporary scholars, such as Miyawaki and Perdue, posit that the true unification of the Dzungar Khanate transpired in the 1670s under the leadership of dGa' ldan Khan (1644–1697), the fourth son of Erdeni Batur (c. –1653).<sup>200</sup> dGa' ldan was a monk studying Buddhism in Tibet. However, upon hearing about the assassination of his elder brother Sangs rgyas (Sengge) in 1671, he immediately renounced his monastic vows and returned to Dzungaria. Once there, dGa' ldan quickly assumed the Dzungar leadership and avenged his brother's death by killing Ochirtu Chechen Khan, the murderer of Sangs rgyas.<sup>201</sup> For the Oirat Mongols, claiming the title of Khan was not possible traditionally because only Genghis Khan's direct male descendants could assume this title.<sup>202</sup> However, in 1678, the Fifth Dalai Lama granted the title of Boshoktu Khan to dGa' ldan, making him the Khan of the Dzungars.<sup>203</sup>

While the Manchus were engaged in their conflicts with the last Ming forces and the feudatories in southern China, dGa' ldan Khan quickly rose in power, extending his Khanate from the western to the eastern Mongols.<sup>204</sup> Initially, dGa' ldan Khan had a friendly relationship with the Kangxi Emperor, exchanging lavish gifts and making trade concessions, but they had several minor disputes starting in the 1670s.<sup>205</sup> The direct confrontation only developed later

---

pa mKhan po's. Moreover, Manchu official documents such as *Dà qīng lǐcháo shìlù* recorded this war as an internal revolt against the Qing.

<sup>195</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 723.

<sup>196</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig (1988: 106) states that the Khoshuts are descendants of Genghis Khan, but the primary reference is unknown.

<sup>197</sup> Miyawaki's article (online, 1981) discusses the scholarly debate on the nature of the Dzungar Khanate in the 17th century. Accessed 01 June 2024.

<sup>198</sup> Perdue 2010: 651–652.

<sup>199</sup> See further Lkhagvasürén and Konagaya 2014.

<sup>200</sup> Perdue 2005: 104–105.

<sup>201</sup> Du Halde (1741, vol-i: 151–156) explains the rivalry within the Dzungars in more detail.

<sup>202</sup> Perdue 2005 :104.

<sup>203</sup> Ishihama, Yumiko 1992: 503 and Perdue 2005: 104.

<sup>204</sup> Perdue 2010: 651–652.

<sup>205</sup> *ibid*: 138–140.

due to two incidents during the conflict between Tusiyetu Khan and Jasaktu Khan, leaders of two powerful tribes from Eastern Mongolia: Firstly, according to *Dà qīng lìcháo shílù*, in 1686, at the Kuleng Barqir gathering, the Khalkha lama rJe btsun dam pa disrespectfully sat opposite the Dalai Lama's representative, drawing strong criticism from dGa' ldan Khan.<sup>206</sup> Secondly, Tusiyetu Khan, the brother of rJe btsun dam pa, ambushed dGa' ldan Khan's allies in Eastern Mongolia, killing his younger brother.<sup>207</sup> Consequently, dGa' ldan Khan launched a war against the Khalkhas, which led to the Qing's involvement as supporters of the Khalkhas. Over time, this conflict escalated into the Dzungar-Qing war. During this Dzungar-Qing war, along with his diplomatic pleas to the Muslims and Russians,<sup>208</sup> Kangxi persistently solicited the Dalai Lama to mediate between him and dGa' ldan Khan. Knowing the power of Tibetan lamas, Kangxi also attempted to invite the Fifth Panchen Lama to garner additional support from the Mongols.<sup>209</sup> Concurrently, Kangxi and his diplomatic envoys criticised the dGa' ldan pho brang leaders, including the sDe srid, for their allegiance to the Dzungar Khanate.<sup>210</sup> Additionally, in the late 1690s, the Qing court attempted to obstruct communication between the sDe srid and dGa' ldan Khan.<sup>211</sup>

On 4th April 1697, dGa' ldan Khan suddenly passed away at Aca Amtatai, a region situated between Kara Usu Lake and Khobdo. dGa' ldan Khan's brother and Dzungar general Danjila and Cembu Sangbu, dGa' ldan's trusted doctor, affirmed that dGa' ldan succumbed to natural causes. However, the Kangxi Emperor upheld his prediction that dGa' ldan would take his own life, aligning with the concept of the "Will of Heaven" as this narrative resonated with the philosophy of Confucianism. Thus, the Qing court historians were obliged to concoct the suicide narrative to endorse their emperor.<sup>212</sup>

Historically, the Dzungars gained renown for their pivotal support of the dGe lugs purist leaders. During the era of the Fifth Dalai Lama, the Dzungars were the primary patrons of two eminent figures representing the dGe lugs purist movement: Grags pa rgyal mtshan, the reincarnate from the upper chamber, and the Fourth Panchen Lama (Chapter 2, Section 2.8 and 2.9). However, during the leadership of dGa' ldan Khan, the Dzungars became strong supporters of the Fifth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid, due to dGa' ldan Khan's close relationship with them.<sup>213</sup> After Tshe dbang rab brtan (r.1697–1727) or Tseveenravdan (in Mongolian) became the new leader of the Dzungars, the Dzungars again became strong supporters of the dGe lugs purists in central Tibet (Chapter 3, Section 3.4). The ideological transition of the Dzungar leaders is crucial for understanding the events discussed in this thesis.

Given the Dzungars' ideological stance, the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa communicated with their leader through an official emissary to discuss the removal of the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>214</sup>

---

<sup>206</sup> *ibid*: 197.

<sup>207</sup> *ibid*: 148.

<sup>208</sup> Muslims from oasis towns like Hami and Turfan are originally Turkic Muslims who migrated there in the 9th to 10th centuries from the Middle East. In the 13th century, they were absorbed into the Mongol Empire, thus joining the Chagatai Khanate for many years. When the Dzungar Empire rose to power in this area, several Muslim leaders, such as King Afaq Khoja, became Dzungar vassals. However, in the Dzungar-Qing war, the Muslims sided with Kangxi and yielded to Manchu rule. Subsequently, they instigated several uprisings against the Qing, but to no avail. For more information, refer to the work of Millward and Dunnell et al (2004).

<sup>209</sup> Sūfā Xiáng et al., (eds) 2018: 238–240.

<sup>210</sup> *Qīng shílù zàngzú shīliào* 1982, vol-i: 130 and 162–163.

<sup>211</sup> *ibid*: 129.

<sup>212</sup> Perdue 2005: 202–204.

<sup>213</sup> Perdue 2005: 148–149.

<sup>214</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 113b–114a.

They disseminated rumours and accusations about the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama to tarnish their reputations among Tibetans, Mongols and Manchus.<sup>215</sup> These historical events demonstrate the religious perspective of the Dzungars, their association with the dGe lugs purist leaders in central Tibet, and their cooperation in efforts to eradicate sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho and the Sixth Dalai Lama.

## 2.5. The Khoshut Mongols

The Khoshut Mongols were already powerful in the early 17th century before they moved to Tibet from Dzungaria.<sup>216</sup> According to Tibetan sources, the Khoshut Mongols moved to the mTsho sngon region and central Tibet to safeguard the dGe lugs school.<sup>217</sup> Ultimately, under the leadership of Gushri Khan, aka Toral Behu (1582–1654), the Khoshut Mongols became the principal military force of the dGa' ldan pho brang (Chapter 1, Section 1.2).<sup>218</sup> In 1638, the Khoshut Mongols defeated Khalkha Choghtu Khong Tayij's army in Amdo mTsho sngon and occupied the region.<sup>219</sup>

In the subsequent years, collaborating with supporters of the dGe lugs school, the Khoshuts vanquished the opponents and helped to establish the dGa' ldan pho brang government in 1642.<sup>220</sup> FitzHerbert and Travers write, “As is well-known, the military power which brought the dGa' ldan pho brang to power as the government in 1642 was an alliance of Tibetans and Mongols.”<sup>221</sup> From this time on, a group of Khoshut Mongols settled in Amdo mTsho sngon and others in central Tibet. Upon the establishment of the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Khoshuts in central Tibet and mTsho sngon were referred to as the “Mongolian Government” (*gzhung sog*). The term first appears in the *Autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama*, referring to Khoshut leaders from the mTsho sngon region.<sup>222</sup> Then, again, the term reappears in the *Biography of the Fifth Dalai Lama* by the sDe srid, referring to the Khoshut Mongols both in central Tibet and Amdo mTsho sngon.<sup>223</sup> In this context, “Mongolian Government” refers to the Khoshut Mongols, who provided military support to the dGa' ldan pho brang government.<sup>224</sup> For example, they served the dGa' ldan pho brang as a military force in many wars, such as the Tibet-Bhutan war.<sup>225</sup> To recognise their service, bKa' drung Nor nang pa's booklet on government officials notes that the dGa' ldan pho brang included their representatives in cultural festivals such as sMon lam.<sup>226</sup>

The Fifth Dalai Lama bestowed the title of bsTan 'dzin chos kyi rgyal po (lit. “*dharma* king”) upon Gushri Khan in recognition of his service to the dGe lugs school approximately in the seventh month of 1638.<sup>227</sup> At this time, the dGa' ldan pho brang had not yet been established,

---

<sup>215</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 75a and 91a, and Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje 1983: 183a–183b.

<sup>216</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 1988: 103–107.

<sup>217</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1992: 1002–1003.

<sup>218</sup> Das 1995: 152–153.

<sup>219</sup> dKon mchog rgyal mtshan 1990: 65–66.

<sup>220</sup> Das 1995: 153–154.

<sup>221</sup> FitzHerbert and Travers 2020: 11.

<sup>222</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2019, vol-vii:100.

<sup>223</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2019, vol-ix:306.

<sup>224</sup> Maher (trans) 2010, vol-i: 359. The original Tibetan quotation is in Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan's history book (1976, vol-i: 441).

<sup>225</sup> Venturini 2020: 53.

<sup>226</sup> bKa' drung Nor nang pa 1981: 36a.

<sup>227</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v: 127–128, and dKon mchog rgyal mtshan 199: 66.

so this title could refer to Gushri Khan’s leadership over the Khoshut Mongols or simply serve as an honorary recognition. Then, on the 25th day of the second month of 1642, Gushri Khan conquered three provinces of historical Tibet and became the king of Tibet. according to the Tibetan historical work of the Fifth Dalai Lama authored in 1644.<sup>228</sup>

The Fifth Dalai Lama writes:

ཚུ་རྩ་ལྷོ་བ་གཉིས་པའི་ཉེར་ལྔ་ལ། བོད་ཤིང་སློ་ཅན་ཡོངས་ཀྱི་རྒྱལ་སློན་རྣམས་ཀྱང་ང་རྒྱལ་གྱི་གཞོན་པ་སྤང་དེ་གུས་འདུད་  
སྤྱར་ལེན་གྱི་སྦྱོར་བ་ལ་ཉེ་བར་ཞུགས། ཚུ་ཤེལ་གྱི་དབང་བོ་ནག་པས་ཉེ་བ། དུས་འཁོར་བའི་ལོའི་ཐོག་མའི་དུས་ཚོས་རྣམས་  
བོད་ཚོས་ལ་གསུམ་གྱི་རྒྱལ་པོར་གྱུར་ཏེ། བཀའ་ཁྲིམས་ཀྱི་གདུགས་དཀར་པོ་སྲིད་ཅེས་བར་དུ་འཁོར། རིས་བྲལ་གྱི་གྲུབ་པའི་  
མཐའ་རྣམས་ལ་གུས་འདུད་སྤྱར་ལེན་གྱི་སྟག་པའི་བསམ་པ་མངའ་ནའང་།

On the 25th day of the second month in the water-horse year (1642), the kings and ministers of all the wood-doored regions of Tibet lowered their proud faces and began to bow down with respect. From the black, the water-crystal lord, from the second month according to the Kalachakra calendar’s year start, [Gushri Khan] became the king of the three provinces of Tibet, and the white canopy of his legal command reached the peak of Samsara. [He] had the higher intention to serve all religious schools with respect and devotion without partiality. However.<sup>229</sup>

The same event is recorded by the Fifth Dalai Lama in his autobiography, probably written later:

ཟླ་བ་གསུམ་པའི་ནང་དུ་བསྟན་འཛིན་ཚོས་ཀྱི་རྒྱལ་པོའི་མངའ་འོག་དུ་བོད་ཤིང་སློ་ཅན་རྣམས་ཚུད་པའི་གནས་ཚུལ་འབྱོར་  
བ་བཞིན་ཡིད་དམ་ཚོས་སྤྱང་རྣམས་ལ་ལེགས་སའི་ཚོགས་བཅད་ཀྱི་སྟན་དར་དང་བཅས་གཏང་རག་རྒྱས་པར་ཕྱལ་ཞིང་  
སེར་འབྲས་ལྷ་ས་སོགས་ནས་དར་འཕྱར་ཡང་གཟབ་རྒྱས་བསྟར།

In the third month, upon receiving the news that bsTan ’dzin chos kyi rgyal po had conquered all the wood-doored regions of Tibet, [I (the Fifth Dalai Lama)] offered a lavish gratitude feast to the sacred deities and Dharma protectors, accompanied by verses of praise and scarves. [People] in Se ra, ‘Bras spung, and Lhasa raised elaborate flags.<sup>230</sup>

The first passage explicitly mentions Gushri Khan as the king of Tibet, but the second passage about the same event does not mention his kingship role over Tibet. There are several reasons for this discrepancy. Firstly, this historical work was authored just after Khan conquered the three provinces of Tibet, at the peak of Gushri Khan’s power in the 1640s. Secondly, Gushri Khan personally requested the Dalai Lama to author this historical work, probably for the Mongols.<sup>231</sup> Thirdly, the Dalai Lama’s autobiography was written after the death of Gushri Khan and after the Dalai Lama had established his own power in central Tibet.<sup>232</sup> The Fifth Dalai Lama was a politician, and these passages show his political games in central Tibet.

<sup>228</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v: 179.

<sup>229</sup> *ibid*, vol-xxii: 155.

<sup>230</sup> *ibid*, vol-v: 159.

<sup>231</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v:179. It also said that the book was immediately translated into Mongolian, but the translators failed to do it accurately.

<sup>232</sup> The last volume of his autobiography extends until 1682, but the passage quoted above is in the first volume of his autobiography. Thus, we could not locate the exact date of this recording. However, we know that he started writing his autobiography in 1667 (Karmay 2014: 2).

Another important observation regarding this issue is that the *Autobiography of the Fifth Panchen Lama*, based near the capital of the gTsang Dynasty, recorded the details of the unfolding events and the victory of Gushri Khan. However, he did not mention that the Khan became the king of Tibet.<sup>233</sup> Similarly, this issue was not mentioned in both the *Autobiography* and *Biography of gTer bdag gling pa 'gyur med rdo rje*, who had a very close relationship with the Fifth Dalai Lama.<sup>234</sup> Thus, although the Fifth Dalai Lama regarded the Khan as the king of Tibet, this status was either not well known among Tibetans or these leaders simply did not mention this significant event for various reasons.

The significant power transition I am clarifying here is that, upon becoming the king of Tibet, Gushri Khan invited the Fifth Dalai Lama to bSam 'grub rtse, the palace of the gTsang dynasty, on the 11th day of the second month of 1642.<sup>235</sup> On the 25th of the third month, Gushri Khan organised a lavish gathering of monastic leaders as well as Mongolian and Tibetan leaders at the bSam 'grub rtse palace. In front of this massive gathering, he offered the three provinces of Tibet, along with his entire family's lineage, to the Fifth Dalai Lama (Chapter 1, Section 1.2).<sup>236</sup>

After this transfer of power, Gushri Khan retained his title as the king of the Khoshut Mongols. In reference to this transition, Karmay noted that “Gushri Khan was the khan (*rgyalpo*) of the Qoshot Mongols who had migrated from Mongolia and settled in the Kokonor region. Because of this Lobzang Gyatsho always addressed him as “king,” not because he was the king of Tibet, as often misunderstood by writers on Tibetan political history, but because he was the khan of the Qoshot tribes in Kokonor (*mTsho sngon*)”.<sup>237</sup> Moreover, the official letters from the Kangxi Emperor to the Khoshut Khans in central Tibet addressed them as the kings of the Oirats. For example, in a letter dated 1681, Kangxi writes:

ཧོང་མུང་དེའི་བཀའ། ཨོ་རོང་གྱི་བཟུན་འཛིན་ལྷ་ལའི་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལ་སྤྲོད་སྲོལ།

By the command of Huángdì, [this is] sent to bsTan 'dzin Dalai rGyal po of the Oirats.<sup>238</sup>

Without understanding this power transition, some scholars have misunderstood the role and position of the Khoshut Khans, such as Gushri Khan, in the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>239</sup> This confusion may have originated from Sum pa mKhan po, who wrote in his *History of mTsho sngon* that Gushri Khan declared himself the king of Tibet on the 15th of the third month of 1642.<sup>240</sup> According to the Fifth Dalai Lama's records mentioned above, Gushri Khan conquered Tibetan regions on 25th of the second month of 1642. Thus, the relationship between the Khoshut Mongols and the dGa' ldan pho brang was quite unique. For example, after Gushri Khan offered his power to the Fifth Dalai Lama (Chapter 2, Section 2.5 and 2.6). Then, the Khan told the the Dalai Lama that he intended to return to his homeland, referring to the Amdo

<sup>233</sup> PaN Chen Blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan vol-i, 2009: 165–173.

<sup>234</sup> The autobiography written by 'Gyur med rdo rje (n.d., vol-i) and the biography by Chos dpal rgya mtsho (1999) do not mention the kingship of the Khan over Tibet.

<sup>235</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v: 159–160.

<sup>236</sup> *ibid*: 162. And refer to the official decree of the Fifth Dalai Lama (Appendix Two).

<sup>237</sup> Karmay 2014:4, 1998: 551, and 2005: 12.

<sup>238</sup> rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997: 74 and 81.

<sup>239</sup> For example, Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 82–83.

<sup>240</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1982: 15 and 17.

mTsho sngon region. Thus, the Dalai Lama had to persuade the Khan to remain in central Tibet in the name of protecting the teachings of Tsong Kha pa.<sup>241</sup>

In this relationship, representing the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Fifth Dalai Lama oversaw political, social, and religious issues within the Khoshut Mongolian societies. For example, to resolve the internal conflict in the mTsho sngon region, the Fifth Dalai Lama sent his representative, Hor Ngag dbang 'phrin las lhun 'grub, who divided the region among the Khoshut leaders and established a Mongolian Welfare Association to address internal disputes under the oversight of the Dalai Lama's representative.<sup>242</sup> Even though Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor was usually very critical of the dGa' ldan pho brang's political influence among the Mongols, he also acknowledged the role of the Dalai Lama in building the political structure of the Khoshut Mongols for their unity.<sup>243</sup>

In 1658, three years after the death of Gushri Khan in 1654, the Fifth Dalai Lama bestowed the title of bsTan 'dzin rdo rje rgyal po (lit. "vajra king, holder of the *dharma*") upon bsTan 'dzin Dayan, the eldest son of Gushri Khan, making him the Second Khoshut Khan.<sup>244</sup> It is evident that different Tibetan names, such as bsTan 'dzin rgyal po, bsTan 'dzin Dalai Khan, Dayan Khan were used for the title, even though all instances refer to the same individual. Some scholars contend that the Khoshut did not hold much power until lHa bzang Khan took control of the dGa' ldan pho brang in 1705.<sup>245</sup> Sum pa mKhan po, on the other hand, gives the impression that Gushri Khan held power over the dGa' ldan pho brang following 1642.<sup>246</sup> Gǎmǎ Dīngbā Jiāngcuò argues that the power of the Khoshuts in Tibet was enhanced following the era of Gushri Khan.<sup>247</sup> However, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the Khoshuts wielded actual political power within the dGa' ldan pho brang, apart from their military importance (Chapter 1, Section 1.2 and 1.3.2).

Following Gushri Khan's reign, the influence of the Khoshut Khans in the dGa' ldan pho brang began to diminish swiftly, and ultimately, they became merely symbolic leaders.<sup>248</sup> Several factors contributed to this power shift: Firstly, the sons and grandsons of Gushri Khan, including Tenzin Dayan Khan, lacked "the political wisdom and personal prestige" of their father.<sup>249</sup> Secondly, unlike in his father's era, the Fifth Dalai Lama's stature overshadowed other leaders, like the Khoshut Khans. Thirdly, the Khoshut leaders were embroiled in continual internal disputes over hierarchy and territory in central Tibet and the mTsho sngon regions.<sup>250</sup> Amid these challenging times, bsTan 'dzin Dayan Khan met a premature death in 1668, following a brief reign as the Khan of the Khoshuts.

---

<sup>241</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v: 178.

<sup>242</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho.1989: 631 and Borjigidai Oyunbilig 1989: 75.

<sup>243</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1982: 18

<sup>244</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v.vi: 382.

<sup>245</sup> Petech 1972: 8–12, and Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 441. Regarding this issue, Maher, the English translator of Zhwa sgab pa's historical work, rendered the phrase as "Thus, Gushri Khan had been the 'King of Tibet' in name only" (2010: 359). Nevertheless, in the original Tibetan version, Zhwa sgab pa used only the term "king", without specifying 'King of Tibet.' As referenced above, Gushri Khan was designated the king of the Khoshuts, not of the Tibetans (Karmay 2014:4).

<sup>246</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1982: 15.

<sup>247</sup> Gǎ mǎ dīng bā jiāng cuò 2018: 31.

<sup>248</sup> Petech 1966: 267.

<sup>249</sup> Tucci 1999, vol-i: 70.

<sup>250</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 445.

In 1671, four years following Dayen Khan's demise in 1668, his son dKon mchog bstan 'dzin was bestowed the title of Dalai Khan by the Dalai Lama, becoming the third Khan of the Khoshuts.<sup>251</sup> During those years, the Fifth Dalai Lama was "conferring titles on Mongol leaders and not the other way around, which strengthened the position of each respective Dalai Lama among the Mongols."<sup>252</sup> Similar to his predecessors, it seems that dKon mchog bstan 'dzin Dalai Khan also did not have political role in the dGa' ldan pho brang apart from leading his Khoshut Mongols.<sup>253</sup> Petech describes Dalai Khan as "a quite shadowy figure and played no role at all in the tortuous politics of the Tibetan regent (the sDe srid)."<sup>254</sup> Although Dalai Khan held the title of Khoshut Khan for three decades from 1671 to 1701, he remained a nominal leader, while the sDe srid in the dGa' ldan pho brang held the dominant leadership position(Chapter 4, Section 4.4.2).

However, in 1698, during his final years in the position, Dalai Khan invited the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, the leader of the dGe lugs purists, and received a religious empowerment from him. After this meeting, the Khoshut king and queen requested the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa to be their principal spiritual lama and to visit them frequently.<sup>255</sup> This relationship between the Khoshuts and the dGe lugs purists laid the foundation for the alliance between lHa bzang Khan, the younger son of Dalai Khan, and the dGe lugs purists under the leadership of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter four.

## 2.6. The Khoshuts in mTsho sngon

Regarding the Khoshut Mongols in mTsho sngon, after the Dalai Lama helped to redistribute the mTsho sngon region among the Khoshut chiefs and counselled them against the internecine conflict, they began to launch assaults on the northern borders of the Qing Empire.<sup>256</sup> According to *Deb ther mes po'i zhal lung*, the detailed genealogy of the Khoshut Mongols, edited and authored by dBang chen skyabs in 1848, the Qing had already gained control over the Khoshut Mongols in the 1640s.<sup>257</sup> However, this was not the case in reality. In the 17th century, the Khoshut Mongols played a pivotal role in the diplomatic relations between the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Qing, and other Mongol groups. Knowing this, the Qing endeavoured to assert their influence over the Khoshut Mongols.<sup>258</sup> In the late 17th century, the Khoshut appeared reluctant to provoke the Qing while also desiring to maintain their traditional relationship with the dGa' ldan pho brang. Thus, they consulted with the leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang for guidance.<sup>259</sup>

Borjigidai Oyunbilig highlights bKra shis ba thur's response to the Qing envoy in 1696, referencing it from the *Qīng shèng zǔ shìlù* (Records of the Holy Ancestors of the Qing):

在康熙三十五年的会盟上，扎什巴图尔对清朝使节说，他们都是达赖喇嘛的信徒，重大事情必定要向达赖请示。

<sup>251</sup> bKa' drung Nor nang pa 19981: 35a.

<sup>252</sup> Schwieger 2015: 34.

<sup>253</sup> bKa' drung Nor nang pa 1981: 35b.

<sup>254</sup> Petech 1966: 268.

<sup>255</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 71b.

<sup>256</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig (1989: 75) cites the *Qīng shìlù* as the source of this information.

<sup>257</sup> Dbang chen skyabs 1848: 208–221.

<sup>258</sup> lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (a) n.d.:19a–20b.

<sup>259</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 312–313.

At a meeting during the 35th year of the Kangxi’s reign, Zhā shén bā tú ěr (bKra shis ba thur) informed the Qing envoy that they were all disciples of the Dalai Lama and that they must seek guidance from the Dalai Lama on important matters.<sup>260</sup>

This passage demonstrates the political position of the Khoshut Mongols in mTsho sngon at the end of the 17th century. This position is crucial for the dGa’ ldan pho brang to maintain their power and influence over Amdo and Kham and sustain relationships with the Khalkha and other Eastern Mongols.

Karmay briefly summarises:

Under the Fifth Dalai Lama’s rule, as under the ancient Tibetan empire, mTsho sngon in Amdo became one of the most strategic regions. He was quick to realize this as he travelled the region in 1652 and 1653. Eight of Gushri Khan’s ten sons and their respective tribes had settled there in 1638, after their arrival from western Mongolia, and constantly quarrelled over territory. In 1656 and 1659, the Fifth Dalai Lama sent several governors to mTsho sngon. Over time the region’s Mongols were completely Tibetanized but continued to enjoy prestige among the Tibetans as Gushri Khan’s descendants and played a significant role in the Gelug Order’s expansion in Amdo.<sup>261</sup>

This passage elucidates the significance of mTsho sngon to the dGa’ ldan pho brang and their longstanding dynamic relationship. Similarly, this area was also pivotal for the Qing Empire to uphold political stability in the northern region and preserve relations with the Mongols. Thus, in 1697, Kangxi utilised the Second lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan<sup>262</sup> from dGon lung Monastery<sup>263</sup> to persuade the Khoshut leaders to meet with the emperor in Ningxia.<sup>264</sup> This is an attempt of Kangxi to forge long-lasting political alliances with the Khoshuts. However, before deciding to meet with Kangxi, the Khoshuts in mTsho sngon dispatched their representatives to Lhasa to seek permission and guidance from the dGa’ ldan pho brang. Dated the 15th of the eighth month in 1697, the *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama* notes:

འདི་ཉིན་མཚོ་ཁ་ནས་དཔོན་སྤྱིས་བཏང་བའི་རྟ་ལམ་མི་དཔོན་པ་འབྱོར་བ་དུར་ཐའི་ཇི་དང་ཨེར་ཏེ་ན་ཉོང་ཐའི་ཇི་སོགས་  
རྒྱུར་ཕེབས་དགོས་པ་གོང་མའི་བཀའ་ནན་ཆེ་ཞིང་ལྷང་སྐྱ་སྐྱུས་ཀྱང་མ་ཕེབས་ན་གཞུང་བསྟན་ལ་རྒྱུར་ལེགས་པོ་མི་ཡོང་  
ཚུལ་བྱུང་བས་ཅི་འགའ་ཀྱི་དྲི་བ་བྱུང་བ་ཚོན་དུ་སྤོའ་བྱ་སྤྱོད་གོ་ཆེས་ཟེར་བ་བཞིན་ཕེབས་དགོས་པའི་ཡི་གེ་ཕུལ་གྲུབ་པ་  
ལྟར། བཀའ་བཞིན་ཕེབས་ནས་གཞུང་བསྟན་དུ་འཁོས་ཁྱབ་གང་ཆེ་དགོས་ཚུལ་དང་བཅས་འཕྲལ་སློག་བྱས།

On this day, an envoy, dispatched by all the chiefs from mTsho sngon, arrived to enquire, “Ba thur tha’i ji, er te na (Mong. *erdeni*) Hong tha’i ji, and the rest have been

<sup>260</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 1989: 75.

<sup>261</sup> Karmay 2005:13.

<sup>262</sup> lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan became a significant Manchu-court lama in Peking and contributed to the Qing’s political stability and foreign diplomacy. His autobiography is an essential historical source for the Qing’s relations with the dGe lugs lamas and their religious and political roles at the Qing court. See Sagaster’s work about the Second lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan published in 1967. Furthermore, read the second chapter of Illich’s thesis, published in 2006.

<sup>263</sup> Historically, this monastery served as the pivotal cultural and political hub for the Khalkha, Southern, and Khoshut Mongols in the Amdo regions. Furthermore, the Qing court regarded this monastery as crucial for religious interactions and political engagement with the Mongols and Tibetans. For a deeper understanding, Sullivan’s work provides extensive information on dGon lung byams pa gling (Sullivan 2021: 52–55).

<sup>264</sup> lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (a) n.d.:19a-20b, Sum pa Ye shes dpal ’byor 1982: 18–19 and dKon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas 1982: 41.

summoned to China (i.e. the Qing court). [We] have received a compelling directive from the emperor, and the [Second] lCang skya Lama has also spoken—it would seem disadvantageous for both Buddhism and governance if we did not comply. What action should we take?” In response, [I, the sDe srid] dispatched a letter advising, “Proceed as directed by sPo’u cu sbyar go che<sup>265</sup> and act in the interest of both government and Buddhism upon your arrival as instructed.” Promptly, [I sent the messenger] back.<sup>266</sup>

This excerpt illustrates the quandary faced by the Khoshut Mongols, caught between the dGa’ ldan pho brang and the Qing Empire, and demonstrates the allegiance of the Khoshut Mongols to the dGa’ ldan pho brang. This passage also encapsulates the intricacies of the power dynamics between the dGa’ ldan pho brang and the Qing, as well as the role played by Tibetan Buddhist Lamas in these diplomatic exchanges. However, it is important to note that this is the sDe srid’s narrative of the event, which understandably highlights the positive aspects of the dGa’ ldan pho brang’s relationship with the Khoshut Mongols. Modern scholars in China, including Borjigidai Oyunbilig, do not mention both the role of the Second lCang skya Lama and the Khoshut’s consultation with the dGa’ ldan pho brang regarding this event.<sup>267</sup>

## 2.7. lHa bzang Khan

lHa bzang klu dpal (c. 1658–1717),<sup>268</sup> more commonly known as lHa bzang, was the second son of bsTan ’dzin Dalai Khan. According to Petech, lHa bzang Khan was likely born in 1658. This is based on his research in *Missionari italiani nel Tibet e nel Nepal*, in which he mentions that Domenico da Fano’s *Breve Relazione* notes that lHa bzang was 55 years old in 1713, which aligns with a birthdate of 1658.<sup>269</sup> He had an elder brother named bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal (c. –1704). Born in central Tibet and spending his childhood in Lhasa, lHa bzang studied Buddhism in Lhasa alongside other aristocratic children and became a proficient scholar in Tibetan Buddhism. Studying Tibetan Buddhism was a prevalent trend among the Mongolian elites, who produced many renowned Tibetan Buddhist scholars during the 17th and 18th centuries. Concerning the Buddhist scholarship of lHa bzang klu dpal, dKon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas (1801–1866) writes:

སྲིད་སྐྱོད་གི་བྱ་བ་ལ་མཁས་པར་མ་ཟད་ཆོས་ལྟོགས་ལ་མཁུན་པ་ཡང་སྲིད་སྐྱོད་གཉེས་ལོངས་སྐྱེ་བའི་པ་ལྔ་  
ལྟན་ཡིན་མེན་བརྒྱུད་དེ། ལྷུ་ལོ་མེ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ལོངས་སྐྱེ་བའི་པ་ལྔ་ལྟན་མི་བཞེད་ཟེར། ལྷེ་བས་བཞེད་ཅེས་ཐག་མ་ཚོད་པ་  
ཀུན་མཁུན་གོང་མར་ཞུས་པས་གསེར་འབྲེང་ཚོག་ཟེན་ལ་མི་གསལ་ཀྱང་དོན་ལ་བཞེད་ཅེས་གསུངས་པས་ལྷེ་སྲིད་ཆེན་མོ་  
ཡང་ཐུགས་མཉེས་པ་དང་།

སེ་ར་བ་སྐོ་བཟང་འོ་ར་བྱ་ལ་འཕྲོས་པ་མཚན་པར་དོན་གྱི་འོད་གསལ་སྐབས་སུ་སྐྱེ་ལུས་མེད་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་ལུས་ཀྱི་སྣང་བ་ཡོད་  
བྱས་པས་ལྷུ་ལོ་མེ་ཐུག་བརྒྱུད་ནས་བཞེད་པར་འོ་ལ་འཁྲི་རང་རྣམ་ལས་བྱུང་།

<sup>265</sup> The identity of the individual mentioned is unknown to me, but he might have been a diplomat or officer in the Qing court according to the context.

<sup>266</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 312–313.

<sup>267</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 1989: 75.

<sup>268</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (2019, vol-vii: 148) refers to him as lHa bzang klu dbang in his works.

<sup>269</sup> Petech 1966: 268.

As he was not only skilled in governance but also possessed extensive knowledge of Buddhism, the Khan debated with the sDe srid about whether the Saṃbhogakāya possessed the ‘five certainties’. While the Khan argued that Tsong kha pa did not agree on it having the ‘five certainties’, the sDe srid asserted the opposite, leading to an unresolved discussion. They sought insight from the First ’Jam dbyangs bzahd pa (*kun mkhyen*). He responded that the *gser phreng* (a work by Tsong kha pa) did not literally mention the five certainties of Saṃbhogakāya; however, in reality, [Tsong kha pa] did agree with the five certainties. Thus, the sDe srid was delighted.

The *Autobiography of Sle lung Lama* (’Ol kha) records that the Khan conversed with Blo bzang nor bu from Se ra [monastery]. The latter stated that during the time of luminous awareness, there is no illusory body but the appearance of an illusory body. Consequently, the Khan [joyfully] clapped and laughed.<sup>270</sup>

These two examples underscore the fact that, like many other Mongol elites, lHa bzang was a highly knowledgeable scholar of Tibetan Buddhism.<sup>271</sup> lHa bzang also appeared to be well-trained in the nine traditional manly skills, including archery and swimming, and proficient in other artistic endeavours, such as music and dance.<sup>272</sup> Beyond this, no information seems to be available regarding lHa bzang’s early years in central Tibet and mTsho sngon.

In the early 1690s, lHa bzang primarily resided in the mTsho sngon region, traveling back and forth to Lhasa, furthering the interests of the dGa’ ldan pho brang there.<sup>273</sup> From Amdo, lHa bzang made occasional official visits to the Kham region.<sup>274</sup> In 1697, lHa bzang was in mTsho sngon, engaged in constructing Tibetan Buddhist temples under the directive of the leaders from the dGa’ ldan pho brang.<sup>275</sup> Quoting from *Huángcháo Bōbù Yàoliùè*, Petech notes that lHa bzang was constructing the Dalai Lama temple in mTsho sngon in 1697, but it remains unclear why this document named the temple as “the Dalai Lama temple”.<sup>276</sup> According to Tibetan sources, these temples were named “War Repelling Security Temples” (mTha’ dmag zlog pa’i bde thabs lha khang).<sup>277</sup> Around this period, the Qing were active in the mTsho sngon region, seeking to assert their influence over the Khoshut Mongols (Chapter 2, Section 2.6). Consequently, this temple construction was likely a response from the dGa’ ldan pho brang to the growing unfavourable situation.

During this period, lHa bzang appeared discontented with those Khoshut leaders who were beginning to favour the Qing over the dGa’ ldan pho brang. Because lHa bzang threatened other Khoshut leaders, such as mGon po, with a potential military strike and he threat prevented mGon po from visiting Kangxi in 1697.<sup>278</sup> Moreover, lHa bzang participated in a Khoshut meeting to discuss their relationship with the Qing. Following the discussion, the Khoshut

---

<sup>270</sup> dKon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas 1982: 37. The origin of this event is recorded in the Biography of the First ’Jam dbyangs bzahd pa (bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 94a)

<sup>271</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 94a.

<sup>272</sup> Although it is not explicitly stated, lHa bzang’s reference to the manly skills of his court attendants in Lhasa suggests that he himself possessed these traditional skills. The implication is subtly conveyed between the lines (mDo mkhar Tshe ring dban grgyal 2002:141).

<sup>273</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 86.

<sup>274</sup> rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997: 433.

<sup>275</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 287.

<sup>276</sup> Petech 1966: 268.

<sup>277</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 287.

<sup>278</sup> Petech 1966: 268–269.

leaders resolved to dispatch envoys to the dGa' ldan pho brang and seek guidance.<sup>279</sup> It appears that lHa bzang suggested to the other Khoshut leaders to contact the dGa' ldan pho brang before making the final decision on their relationship with the Qing. On the one hand, lHa bzang expressed his desire to meet the Kangxi Emperor, probably for diplomatic reasons, but on the other hand, he chose to return to central Tibet with his followers instead of visiting Peking.<sup>280</sup> During this period, according to the events above, lHa bzang seemed to try to uphold the authority of the dGa' ldan pho brang while carefully avoiding any overt offence to the Qing court.

## 2.8. dGe lugs Purists

After the dGe lugs tradition emerged as a distinct religious school following Tsong Kha pa, two main approaches developed simultaneously regarding how to preserve and practice this new tradition. Two principal students of Tsong Kha pa, rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang, became the leading figures representing these approaches: the pluralist and the purist (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.4). rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen was the first throne holder of dGa' ldan Monastery after Tsong Kha pa. He continued Tsong Kha pa's teachings and appeared to have a gentle and neutral character. The followers of the dGe lugs school who embraced his approach were known as pluralists (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.4).

In 1431, rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen asked mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang to succeed him, making him the third throne holder of the dGe lugs school. mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang was quite different from his predecessor. He consistently argued that Tsong Kha pa's teachings represented the purest form (*dri ma med pa*) of Buddhism, and he thus held the conviction that their school should remain untainted by the influence or admixture of other religious schools.<sup>281</sup> In his words, mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang portrayed "himself as the defender of his master's (Tsong Kha pa) view."<sup>282</sup> In this regard, he was renowned for publicly inviting his contemporaries from other religious traditions, such as Rong ston Chos rje (1362–1435), to debate with him if they disagreed with the views of his master, Tsong Kha pa.<sup>283</sup> mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang not only argued with scholars from other religious traditions but also with those within his own school who expressed appreciation for other philosophical positions. For example, he had strong disagreements with Gung ri rGyal mstan bzang po (1383–1450), another prominent scholar in the dGe lugs tradition, who incorporated other philosophical views of Madhyamaka alongside those of Tsong Kha pa in his work.

PaN chen bSod nams Grags pa (1478–1554) records mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang's reaction on this incident:

དེ་ཡང་སྣོད་ཐུན་དུ་ཡང་ན་གསུངས་ནས་དབུ་མའི་རྒྱུ་ཆེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་གསུང་ལས་བཞུགས་པའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་གཅིག་གཉིས་  
མཛད་པ་སོགས་ལས། མཁས་གྲུབ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་གྲགས་མ་དགུས་ནས་བཀའ་བཀྲོན་ཏེ་ཕྱག་འཁུལ་མ་བཞེས་པ་ཡིན་སྣང་།

In [his (Gung ri rGyal mstan bzang po's)] commentary volume (stong thun), [he] introduced one or two philosophical positions beyond the two major commentaries of

<sup>279</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 723.

<sup>280</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 86 and Petech 1966: 270.

<sup>281</sup> Dreyfus (online) 1998: Accessed 1 July 2024.

<sup>282</sup> Cabezon 1992: 6.

<sup>283</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan 2019, vol-i: 25–29.

Madhyamaka [by Tsang Kha pa], attributing them [to others]. Thus, mKhas grub Rin po che was displeased, reprimanded him, and refused to acknowledge his greetings.<sup>284</sup>

mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang's strong personality and strict philosophical approach towards the teachings of Tsong Kha pa gave rise to a group of dGe lugs purists within the dGe lugs school.<sup>285</sup> This group of purists regards dGe legs dpal bzang not just as a follower of Tsong Kha pa, but as someone who was purposefully born to protect and preserve his teachings in this world. Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, one of his main students, portrayed the image of dGe legs dpal bzang as follows:

འོན་ཀྱང་རྗེ་སྐྱེ་མ་འདི་ནི་སྐྱེ་བ་དུ་མ་ནས། རྗེ་ཙོང་ཁ་བས་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་དགེ་བའི་བཤེས་གཉེན་མཛད་ཅིང་རྒྱལ་པ་  
གཉིས་པ་དེའི་བསྟན་པ་དྲི་མ་མེད་པ་འཇིག་རྟེན་དུ་གསལ་བར་བྱ་བའི་སྐྱེ་བ་བསམ་བཞིན་དུ་སྐྱེ་བ་བཟུང་བ་ཡིན་པས།

However, for several lifetimes of this Lama (mKhas grub), Tsong Kha pa had been his Mahamaya teacher. With the purpose of illuminating the pure (dri ma med pa) teachings of this second Buddha (Tsong Kha pa) in the world, this lama knowingly chose to reincarnate.<sup>286</sup>

Such strong passages, along with other biographies related to dGe legs dpal bzang, solidified his image as the leading defender of the dGe lugs school.<sup>287</sup> Elijah Sacvan Ary writes that mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang's interpretation of Tsong Kha pa's doctrine "constitutes a fundamental part of that tradition's infamous orthodoxy and conservatism."<sup>288</sup> Since then, this ideological tradition continued within the dGe lugs school, existing side by side with its dGe lugs counterpart, the pluralists.<sup>289</sup> However, this division was purely religious and ideological within the school before 1642.<sup>290</sup>

With the establishment of the dGa' ldan pho brang government, this religious division transformed into political factions within the dGa' ldan pho brang administration.

Tsyrempilov explains the situation:

Many followers of the Dge lugs pa tradition thought their sect's interests more important than Tibetan state interests, which is why they could consider the course pursued by the Fifth Dalai Lama, of rapprochement to the other Tibetan Buddhist sects, if not as a betrayal of the Yellow church, then at least as an adverse situation for the sect.<sup>291</sup>

Moreover, in his article about the Shugs ldan affair, Georges Dreyfus writes:

---

<sup>284</sup> PaN chen bsod nams grags pa 2008: 134. A similar account of this disagreement between the two scholars was also documented by the Fifth Dalai Lama (2009: v-ii: 221).

<sup>285</sup> rMe ru phag mo tshe brtan (online) 2020: Accessed 12 August 2022.

<sup>286</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan 2019, vol-i: 42.

<sup>287</sup> Ary (PhD.Theis) 2007: 78–125.

<sup>288</sup> *ibid*: 79–80. However, Ary seems overlooked the ideological difference between the two main students of Tsong Kha pa in his thesis (2007).

<sup>289</sup> Dreyfus (online, 1998: Accessed 1 July 2024) states, "It (idea of pure dGe lugs tradition) may even date to Kay-drub's tenure as the second Holder of the Throne of Ga-den during the first half of the fifteenth century. It appears that Kay-drub urged his followers to stick to Dzong-ka-ba's views and scolded those who did not."

<sup>290</sup> rMe ru phag mo tshe brtan (online) 2020: Accessed 12 August 2022.

<sup>291</sup> Tsyrempilov 2006: 56. Although the author did not explicitly label these followers of the dGe lugs tradition, they clearly exhibit the characteristics of "dGe lugs purists".

The resentment against the power of the Fifth Dalai Lama was primarily connected to a broad and far-reaching issue, the desire of some of the more sectarian Ge-luk hierarchs to set up a purely Ge-luk rule.<sup>292</sup>

These excerpts demonstrate that the dGe lugs purists made a clear distinction between the dGa' ldan pho brang government and their religious school, assigning greater significance to the latter. During the early years of the Fifth Dalai Lama, Grag pa rgyal mtshan (1618-1655), who later became the Shugs ldan deity protector, was “symbol of opposition”.<sup>293</sup> Grag pa rgyal mtshan and his followers challenged the Fifth Dalai Lama in the name of protecting the purity of the dGe lugs tradition.<sup>294</sup> The impact of this brutal conflict has lasted until the present day.

Nevertheless, despite the challenges, leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang, such as the Fifth Dalai Lama, viewed the government as broader than just one religious school. He attempted to accommodate other religious schools under the political umbrella of the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>295</sup> Upholding this legacy, the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama ruled the dGa' ldan pho brang in collaboration with many religious leaders from non-dGe lugs schools.<sup>296</sup> Thus, the dGe lugs purists at the time, spearheaded by the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, began to challenge the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. Like their predecessors, the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and his followers asserted their power and influence under the guise of safeguarding the dGe lugs school.<sup>297</sup>

## 2.9. First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa

The First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (also known as dBal shul Ngag dbang brtson 'grus) was born in rGan rgya, in the northeastern region of Amdo, and was raised under the attentive guardianship of dGe lugs scholars, including 'Dul 'dzin khyu mchog Ye shes rgya mtsho, who adhered rigorously to the teachings of the dGe lugs school. This upbringing might have shaped the religious ideology of the young 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa during his teenage years.<sup>298</sup> In 1668, aged twenty-one, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa arrived in Lhasa and enrolled at the sGo mang college of 'Bras spungs monastery.<sup>299</sup> At that time, for reasons that are not clear, 'Bras spungs monastery was the centre of dGe lugs purists and their power base in centre Tibet. For example, several leading dGe lugs purists, such as Chos kyi rgyal mtshan and Grags pa rgyal mtshan, studied and lived in this monastery, actively promoting the ideology of mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzang.<sup>300</sup>

---

<sup>292</sup> Dreyfus (online) 1998: Accessed 1 July 2024.

<sup>293</sup> Dreyfus (online) 1998: Accessed 1 July 2024.

<sup>294</sup> *dGe ldan lhan tshogs gsum (ed)*. 2013:206–209.

<sup>295</sup> For example, the Fifth Dalai Lama initiated a non-sectarian monastic prayer congregation (sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 696–697) and invited various religious leaders to the Potala Palace, including the Tenth dkar ma pa Chos dbying rdo rje (Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-vi: 262).

<sup>296</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 696–697.

<sup>297</sup> Maher 2003: Abstract.

<sup>298</sup> Chhosphel (online) 2023: Accessed 15 September 2023. For more information, see the biographic work of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po (1987).

<sup>299</sup> dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po 1987: 22.

<sup>300</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1980: 67–73 and 56–60. And see the special volume published by dGe ldan lhan tshogs gsum in 2013.

The reason is unknown, but at the center of this purist power, the old textbook of sGo mang College had been the works of Gung ri rGyal mtshan bzang po, who disagreed with mKhas rgub dGe legs dpal bzang.<sup>301</sup> As 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's influence grew in the college, he began to criticise the textbooks, which were incompatible with those of Tsong Kha pa.<sup>302</sup> Finally, these textbooks were accused, banned from study, and the woodblock prints were reportedly destroyed.<sup>303</sup> Following this, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa authored an entirely new set of textbooks, including Logics, prajnaparamita, Madhyamika, Abhidharmakosha and Vinaya, for sGo mang college.<sup>304</sup> Furthermore, although Tibetan Buddhist masters refute their opponents in scholarly works, they rarely name them directly out of courtesy and respect. However, in his works on religious doctrines (grub mtha' rtsha pa), 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa explicitly named Gung ri rGyal mtshan bzang po and refuted his philosophical positions.<sup>305</sup>

Around this time, dGe lugs purists from sGo mang College became increasingly active in resisting the influence of other religious schools within the dGa' ldan pho brang government.<sup>306</sup> During this period, the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa not only emerged as a fervent dGe lugs purist but also appeared to become the leading figure representing the dGe lugs purists (Chapter 3). However, his biography written by his student bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis attempted to depict the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa “as apolitical and uninvolved in the daily course of events.”<sup>307</sup>

Due to the vital and active role of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, studying this religious figure is key to understanding the dGa' ldan pho brang government during this period. Tsyrempilov argues that without understanding the significance of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's role, our understanding of the dGa' ldan pho brang “remains poor and incomplete”.<sup>308</sup>

## 2.10. sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho

Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho was born in Grong smad and later moved to the Potala at the age of eight, where he met the Fifth Dalai Lama. This meeting occurred when his uncle, 'Phrin las rgya mtsho, assumed the role of the Second sDe srid of the dGa' ldan pho brang in 1600. Since then, Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho was brought up under the personal guidance of the Fifth Dalai Lama and had the prime opportunity to learn Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan sciences from the leading scholars of the time.<sup>309</sup> Due to this close relationship, in 1717, the Dzungars accused the Fifth Dalai Lama of being the biological father of Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho. The *Autobiography of Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje* is the earliest document that mentions the accusation, propagated by the Dzungar Mongols, suggesting a father-son relationship between the Fifth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid.<sup>310</sup> Tucci was one of the first Western scholars to acknowledge the alleged biological relationship between the Fifth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid

<sup>301</sup> rMe ru Phag mot tshe brtan (online) 2020: Accessed 1 July 2024.

<sup>302</sup> dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po 1987: 96.

<sup>303</sup> Since then, sGo mang college ceased studying these textbooks, leading to the loss of many works by Gung ri rgyal mtshan. The story of the destruction of the woodblock prints has been passed down orally, but the monks from this college still proudly recount it today.

<sup>304</sup> dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po 1987: 97–99.

<sup>305</sup> 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa 2015, vol-vx: 404.

<sup>306</sup> See also the third chapter of Maher's thesis (2003: 112–168).

<sup>307</sup> Maher 2003: 169.

<sup>308</sup> Tsyrempilov 2003: 441.

<sup>309</sup> Mǎzhàn Lín 1985: 88–89.

<sup>310</sup> sLe lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje 1983: 183a–183b.

as historical fact, later followed by early Chinese scholars.<sup>311</sup> However, Sperling and 'Jigs med bsam grub debunked the claims using Tibetan and Qing official sources. They highlighted that the Fifth Dalai Lama left for Peking on 15 March 1652, returning to Lhasa on 8 October 1653.<sup>312</sup> Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho was born in Lhasa in the seventh month of 1653, while his mother remained in Lhasa throughout.<sup>313</sup> Hence, the alleged biological relationship implies an implausible nineteen-month pregnancy.

In 1675, the Fifth Dalai Lama offered the position of sDe srid to Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho. However, Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho expressed a desire to focus on religious practice rather than engage in temporal affairs. In 1679, when Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho was 26 years old, the Fifth Dalai Lama strongly persuaded him to take up the position of the Fifth sDe srid of the dGa' ldan pho brang. The *Autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama* documents how he persuaded Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho to assume the role of the sDe srid:

[...]ངེད་ན་ཇི་མཐོར་སླེབས་པའི་ཚོས་འཇིག་རྟེན་གང་ཡང་མི་སྟོན་པ་གཞན་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རེ་བ་མེད་པས་ངེད་སློབ་གཏོང་ན་  
 སློལ་ཆ་ཡོད། དེ་མིན་སློལ་ཆ་མི་ཡོང་ཞིང་[...]ཁྱོད་ལོ་སྟོན་མ་བརྟག་པར་ཅེ་ཐོན་པར་མ་བཟང་ཅ་བ་གསུམ་གྱིས་ལུང་བསྟན་  
 པ་ལས་ལྷག་པའི་བརྟག་པ་དགོས་དོན་ཀྱང་ཅི་ལ་ཡོད། [...] ཁྱོད་དེ་ཚོ་དང་མི་འདྲ་བར་མཚོག་དམན་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱིས་ངེད་  
 རང་དང་བྱུང་མེད་བྱུག་བཀུར་བྱེད་པའི་བཅའ་བསྐྱིགས་ཀྱི་ཡི་གེའང་ཡོད་པས་ངེད་ཞེ་ཐག་པ་ནས་སློབ་གཏོང་ན་མ་  
 གཏོགས་ལུང་འཁུར་གྱི་ཚེས་ལེན་བྱེད་དགོས་པའི་ཚེ་ནན་གྱིས་མོལ་བར་ལུགས་ཟུང་ནས་ལན་གྱི་སླེང་མོ་རྒྱས་པར་བྱུང་ཞིང་།

[...] I (the Dalai Lama) am getting older and unable to handle either religious or temporal affairs, and [I] do not have any hope that others would do this. Hence, [you-Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho] will be excused [from taking on this role] only if [you] abandon [me]. Otherwise, [you] will not be excused. [...] You came out on top during last year's examination. Moreover, you have prophecies of three roots. There is no reason for further investigation beyond this. [...] You are different from others as [you] have a legal document that guarantees that everybody from the high and low classes must treat and respect you like me. Hence, [you] must take on the responsibility unless you abandon me from [your] heart." Then, [the Dalai Lama and Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho] had a lengthy discussion on both religious and temporal matters.<sup>314</sup>

According to this passage, Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho was reluctant to take on the role of sDe srid, but the Fifth Dalai Lama insisted on him assuming the position. This insistence perhaps stemmed from the Dalai Lama's previous experiences with three short-lived sDe srids, leading him to understand the importance of having a robust and reliable sDe srid to ensure the sustainability of the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>315</sup> To solidify Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho's authority, the Dalai Lama issued a renowned proclamation, urging his followers to respect and heed the new sDe srid in the same manner as they had towards him.<sup>316</sup> For Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho, the official endorsement from the Fifth Dalai Lama became the cornerstone of his authority

<sup>311</sup> Tucci 1999, vol-i: 76 and Wáng Yáo 1980: 191–192.  
<sup>312</sup> Sperling 2014: 214 and Reb gong 'Jigs med bsam grub (online) 2016: Accessed 21 January 2019.  
<sup>313</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1990: 819.  
<sup>314</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-vii:176–177.  
<sup>315</sup> Mǎzhàn Lín 1985: 89.  
<sup>316</sup> *ibid*:178–179. Richardson's (1980: 329–344) translated version of this decree possesses several significant inaccuracies. Thus, I have re-translated it in Appendix Two.

throughout the following twenty-six years of his political tenure as the leader of the dGa' ldan pho brang (Chapter 4 and 5).

The Fifth Dalai Lama passed away on the 2nd day of the fourth month of 1682, three years after Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho was appointed as the sole leader of the dGa' ldan pho brang. On his deathbed, the Dalai Lama imparted his final and most significant advice to the sDe srid and other senior leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang government. The sDe srid records this advice in his *Biography of the Fifth Dalai Lama* in the following way:

[...] དེ་དུ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ད་ཆ་གསང་སྐོ་དགོས་སམ་ཇི་ལྟར་དུག སྐུ་སྐྱེ་བ་ལྷུ་ར་དུ་ངེས་ཤེས་འདྲོངས་པ་དང་། དེ་འདྲ་དེད་  
རང་ཚོའི་ཉེ་རིགས་མིན་པར་མེད་པས་དགོས་ཞེས་སོགས་སྒྲིག་སྒྲུག་ཕྱག་དང་བཅས་ཞུས་པ་ན། སྐུ་དངོས་སུ་སོས་པའི་སྐུན་  
གཟིགས་ཤིང་སྐྱོན་མེད་ལས་སྒྲ། གསང་སྐོ་དགོས་པ་ནི་ཡོང་། ང་ཡོད་པ་ལྟར་གྱིས། རྗེ་གོང་མ་ན་རིམ་གྱིས་ལྷ་མོར་ལྷང་  
བསྟན་ཞུ་བ་གནང་བ་བཞིན་དེད་རང་གི་ཚོས་སྐྱོང་གི་འདུག་གཅོ་བོ་ཡིན་པས་སྐོས་མ་ཚོད་རིགས་ལྷ་མོར་བཟླ་བ་སྐྱིལ་དང་  
མོ་ཕུ་བཟླ་ཞེས་སྐྱེལ་[...]

[...] While weeping and prostrating, I inquired, “Should we keep this a secret, or what ought we to do? Certainty about the reincarnation must be gained swiftly. And the [reincarnation] should not be from our relatives.” The Dalai Lama looked [at me] seeming revived and responded, “It will be simple, not a problem. The secret needs to be kept. Act as if I am still alive. Like my predecessors who sought prophecies from Lhamo, my primary Dharma protector is also Lhamo. Therefore, consult Lhamo through zan and mo divinations for matters you’re unsure about [...]”<sup>317</sup>

Given that this account was written by the sDe srid himself and attempted to legitimise his actions retrospectively, it could be contended that the sDe srid might have fabricated this narrative for various motives. Nevertheless, firstly, it is evident that the Dalai Lama gave this advice in the presence of many senior leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang. They then collectively pledged to conceal the passing of the Fifth Dalai Lama until his reincarnation, the Sixth Dalai Lama, was recognised. Secondly, most primary Tibetan sources, including Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje, alongside the 48th golden throne holder of the dGa' ldan monastery, concur that the Fifth Dalai Lama indeed offered such advice to the senior leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>318</sup>

However, Kangxi and his court officials accused the sDe srid of fabricating the account regarding the Fifth Dalai Lama in order to retain his political power in the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>319</sup> Following the Qing documents, some scholars, including Rockhill and Sam van Schaik, believed that this advice from the Fifth Dalai Lama was fabricated for political purposes.<sup>320</sup> Tucci believed that the sDe srid utilised the plan to enable “Tibet to choose its future alliance between the Qing and the Dzungars.”<sup>321</sup> Ahmad contends that the Qing court’s accusation against the sDe srid of concealing the Dalai Lama’s death is perhaps “due to the misunderstanding between Hindu-Buddhist ideas of transmigration and rebirth, and the

<sup>317</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 2009, vol-viii: 344. This work is included in Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho’s work collection (*gsung ’bum*), published in 2009.

<sup>318</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje 1983: 78b–79a.

<sup>319</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 151–152.

<sup>320</sup> Rockhill 1910: 25–27 and Schaik 2011: 129.

<sup>321</sup> After examining the role of the sDe srid in relations between the Dzungar and the Qing and noting how the sDe srid opted to back the Dzungar Mongols without overtly antagonising the Qing, Tucci (1999, vol-i:76–77) formulated this argument.

Shamanistic ideas [referring to Manchu's belief] of mediums and possessions.”<sup>322</sup> Goldstein, on the other hand, argues that the sDe srid concealed the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama to avert possible disturbances among the Mongols and Tibetans.<sup>323</sup> The last argument carries considerable weight, given the context. For example, announcing the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama during such a tumultuous period would inevitably lead to substantial internal strife and external political meddling for the Khoshut Mongols and Tibetans. As history has shown, following the news of the Dalai Lama's death 1697, the Qing started to assert control over the Khoshut Mongols in the mTsho sngon region (Chapter 3, Section 3.2).

The scenario during this period was delicate and precarious. The sDe srid, still in his youth, had only held the reins of the dGa' ldan pho brang for three years.<sup>324</sup> Simultaneously, in Inner Asia, the Dzungar and Qing Empire rapidly expanded, while the unity among the Khoshuts in central Tibet and the mTsho sngon region was deteriorating.<sup>325</sup> The Fifth Dalai Lama was a visionary, and he undoubtedly realised that the news of his death would be a disaster for his followers, particularly for the Khoshut Mongols and Tibetans at this critical juncture. Thus, he might have indeed guided the sDe srid and senior leaders to conceal his death to maintain stability in Inner Asia, especially among the Khoshut Mongols and Tibetans.

Following the Dalai Lama's demise, to further enhance the legitimacy of the dGa' ldan pho brang both historically and theologically, the sDe srid championed the concept of an “ideal Buddhist State” within the “Buddhist World.” He narrated that these events unfolded during what is referred to as the “Perfect Age” in Tibetan history.<sup>326</sup> MacCormack's observations focus on the sDe srid's significant contributions to the dGa' ldan pho brang, including modelling public speaking, creating a holiday to commemorate the Fifth Dalai Lama, and building the red Palace at the Potala. MacCormack traced the history of the Avalokiteśvara myth in Tibet, which was employed to legitimise the dGa' ldan pho brang's religio-political role in building the Potala Palace and establishing the government in Lhasa. The identification of Tibet's first Buddhist king and the Dalai Lama incarnation line as continuous evidence for the activities of the Bodhisattva in Tibet established a connection between the Fifth Dalai Lama and Srong btsan sgam po and enhanced the status of the Fifth as a manifestation of the Bodhisattva on earth.<sup>327</sup>

In subsequent years, under the leadership of the sDe srid, the dGa' ldan pho brang waged war against Ladakh and signed a historical treaty in Tingmosgang in 1684. The sDe srid also continued the construction of the Red Palace of the Potala, which was first initiated during the reign of the Fifth Dalai Lama. Most importantly, the sDe srid tried to maintain the power balance between the Mongols and the Qing to ensure the stability of the dGa' ldan pho brang and retain the loyalty of the Khoshut Mongols.<sup>328</sup> During the first Dzungar-Qing war, the Kangxi Emperor repeatedly requested the Dalai Lama to mediate between the Qing and the Dzungars, unaware that the Dalai Lama had passed away years earlier.<sup>329</sup> However, acting on behalf of the Dalai Lama, the sDe srid appeared to lend support to dGa' ldan Khan of Dzungar whilst attempting to avoid offending the Qing directly. dGa' ldan Khan had been loyal to the

---

<sup>322</sup> Ahmad 1970: 50.

<sup>323</sup> Goldstein 1997: 10.

<sup>324</sup> Mǎzhàn Lín 1985: 90–91.

<sup>325</sup> *ibid*: 91.

<sup>326</sup> MacCormack 2018: 23–31.

<sup>327</sup> See the detail analysis of MacCormack's work in the first chapter of this thesis.

<sup>328</sup> Rockhill 2010: 21.

<sup>329</sup> Pānzhènpíng (ed) 2017: 67–70.

dGa' ldan pho brang and had an exceptional relationship with the Fifth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid. Thus, the Khan provided thousands of households in Yarkend (*yar khan*) for the subjects of the dGa' ldan pho brang, as demonstrated by Chab mdo Shes rab based on a variety of primary sources.<sup>330</sup> It seems that the sDe srid and dGa' ldan Khan shared a vision to govern Tibetans and Mongols under the framework of a patron-preceptor alliance. In this sense, Schwieger asserts that the sDe srid concealed the death of the Dalai Lama to unify the Mongols and Tibetans under a dual government system.<sup>331</sup> The leaders believed that if the Dzungars, led by dGa' ldan Khan, controlled the entire Mongols, the dGa' ldan pho brang would subsequently have increased political and cultural influence over a vast area in Inner Asia.<sup>332</sup> This plan did not unfold successfully, and the sDe srid lost his political allies and consequently making more enemies (Chapter 3, Section 3.1).

## 2.11. Conclusion

The dGa' ldan pho brang's association with the leaders of several Mongols, including Khalkhas, Dzungars and Khoshuts, extended beyond mere political interactions, encompassing social, cultural and Buddhist religious dimensions. The Mongols sought the mediation of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan leading figures to resolve their internal disputes and validate their titles and ranks, as they lacked a unified ruler to oversee Mongols. The Qing recognised the unparalleled ability of Tibetan lamas to appease and negotiate with the Mongols, which proved beneficial given the frequent issues the Mongols posed in the northern borderlands of the Qing Empire. With the aid of Tibetan Buddhist lamas, Qing emperors reshaped their image as Mañjuśrī to legitimise their "universal rule" among the Mongols, Tibetans, and other regions.

The sDe srid strategically maintained the equilibrium of the dGa' ldan pho brang's relations with the Mongols and the Manchus to amplify Tibetan influence and presence both in politically and religiously. The sDe srid leveraged the significant influence of the Fifth Dalai Lama to consolidate the dGa' ldan pho brang's standing among the Mongols, utilising both political and religious avenues.

Under the leadership of dGa' ldan Khan, the Dzungar Mongols significantly contributed to the complexities encountered in the relations between the dGa' ldan pho brang and the Qing Empire, owing to various political and religious considerations. dGa' ldan Khan's steadfast allegiance to the dGa' ldan pho brang, coupled with his close ties to the sDe srid, led the Qing to harbour suspicions in the 1690s that the dGa' ldan pho brang might support the Dzungars. However, as evidenced by the extensive diplomatic correspondence with the Dzungars and the Manchus, the dGa' ldan pho brang steadfastly maintained their close relationship with the Dzungars whilst at the same time endeavouring to avoid directly affronting the Qing.<sup>333</sup>

---

<sup>330</sup> Chab mdo Shes rab (online) 2022: Accessed 18 September 2023. In this regard, Chab mdo Shes rab explains how the inhabitants of the Yarkend region paid their taxes to the dGa' ldan pho brang in the following years.

<sup>331</sup> Schwieger. 2015: 219.

<sup>332</sup> Regarding this issue, Wang's thesis (2021: 1–59), titled "The Tibet-Dzungar Ideological Alliance's Challenge to the Qing Empire and the Adaptation of Qing Ideology in the mid-18th century," provides a fresh viewpoint by comparing the political governance philosophies of the Qing and the Dzungars.

<sup>333</sup> Refer to the collection of letter exchanges between Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus, edited by rDo rje tshen brtan (1997).

Overall, the politico-diplomatic dynamics involving the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Mongols, and the Qing Empire during the late 17th and early 18th centuries were predominantly orchestrated by the leaders of these respective polities. The personalities and political philosophies of these leaders directly influenced the domestic political structures and foreign relationships with other polities. In Inner Asia, these leaders frequently endeavoured to identify or establish a common channel through which they could communicate with each other in a meaningful manner and serve mutual interests. In this respect, Tibetan Buddhism and the Buddhist framework of the patron-preceptor relationship emerged as the principal common medium of diplomacy for the parties concerned.

## Chapter Three:

### Struggle for Legitimacy: The dGa' ldan pho brang's internal and external diplomacy

(1697–1700)

In the late 1690s, the Manchu military, led by the Kangxi Emperor, advanced across the vast Mongolian grasslands, engaging and pursuing the Dzungar forces of dGa' ldan Khan.<sup>334</sup> The dGa' ldan pho brang was reluctantly drawn into this war between the Qing and the Dzungars, creating many challenges for the sDe srid and his government (chapter 2, Section 1.10). During this Dzungar–Qing war (1687–1697), the sDe srid faced significant criticism from the Qing for siding with the Dzungars led by dGa' ldan Khan.<sup>335</sup> Around this time, in central Tibet, despite the uncertainty of the political power dynamics, the sDe srid was resolute in governing the dGa' ldan pho brang in line with the vision and legacy of the Fifth Dalai Lama.<sup>336</sup> Thus, this chapter will explore the subsequent events that unfolded in central Tibet, as well as among the Mongols and Manchus.

#### 3.1. Official Announcement and Surrounding Conflicts

Having concealed the passing of the Fifth Dalai Lama for 15 years, the sDe srid intended to announce the death of the Fifth and enthrone the Sixth Dalai Lama in the Potala Palace. There are several reasons for this move. Rumours of the Dalai Lama's passing began circulating among the Mongols and the Manchus, leading to a diplomatic crisis between the polities.<sup>337</sup> Secondly, the reincarnated Sixth Dalai Lama had now reached an age where he could uphold the role of the Dalai Lama. Thirdly, divinations and prophecies confirmed that the fire-ox year was the auspicious time to announce the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>338</sup> Therefore, as we will discuss below, beginning in 1697, the sDe srid discretely orchestrated the official enthronement ceremony of the Sixth Dalai Lama, revealing the news to the Mongols, the Qing, and then, the Tibetans.

##### 3.1.1. Delivering the News to the Mongols

The sDe srid dispatched his official representative, gSol dpon sNgags rams pa, to notify the Khalkha and Khoshut Mongols about the passing of the Fifth Dalai Lama and the enthronement of the Sixth Dalai Lama. gSol dpon sNgags rams pa was among the representatives regularly dispatched by the dGa' ldan pho brang to address various matters with the Mongols.<sup>339</sup> On this occasion, he was tasked with announcing the passing of the Fifth and the enthronement of the Sixth Dalai Lama to the Khoshut and Khalkha Mongols.<sup>340</sup> As per the instruction, gSol dpon sNgags rams pa relayed the news about the Dalai Lama to various Mongol leaders and then

---

<sup>334</sup> Perdue 2005: 174–193.

<sup>335</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 151–154.

<sup>336</sup> Tsyrempilov 2006: 56.

<sup>337</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 151 and sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 110.

<sup>338</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 2007:168–174 and 167–177.

<sup>339</sup> gSol dpon sNgags rams pa was not his real name but a title bestowed upon him by the government and monastery. Although he is believed to have studied at the Se ra monastery, beyond this, specific details about him are sparse.

<sup>340</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 302.

gradually to the wider public. It seems the Mongols accepted the news of the Fifth and Sixth Dalai Lamas without hesitation. The *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama* records:

དར་ཁན་ཞེས་ཆེ་དང་རྫོ་རིག་རྟོང་ཐའི་ཇི་མི་གསལ་ཁང་གི་ཚོམ་སྤོ་ལོ་གཉིས་འབྱོར་བར་ཞེས་ཆེས་གསང་བརྟོན་ལུས་  
 བར་ད་ཆ་སྐྱུ་དྲུག་པ་ལེབས་པར་དེད་ཚོས་བྱེད་ལྷགས་གཤམ་བྱེད་གྱི་སློའོ་འདྲི། ལྷ་ནག་གི་བབས་ཡུལ་ལ་ཡང་ཇི་ལྟར་བྱེད་  
 དགོས་སོགས་ལྔར་རྒྱན་གྱི་གསུང་ཤིན་ཏུ་ལེགས་པ་གསུང་བར་དེ་ལན་གང་མཚམ་དང་བཅས་ཉེར་གསུམ་ལ་ཐོན།

Darkhan Emchi and Tsha’o sba lo of gSal khang, a representative/man of Jo rig Hongtaij, arrived [in Lhasa]. Dar khan Em chi discussed revealing the secret about the Dalai Lama and inquired what they should do as the Sixth Dalai Lama was about to arrive and how they should deal with the situation with China (the Qing Empire), among other topics. As before, he spoke with eloquence. After receiving some answers, they left [Lhasa] on the 23rd [of second month in 1697 ].<sup>341</sup>

This passage suggests that the Mongols, represented here by Darkhan Emchi and Tsha’o sba lo, warmly received the news and were fully prepared to fulfill their responsibility in ensuring the successful enthronement of the Sixth Dalai Lama. In the fifth month of 1697, word reached back to Lhasa that the Khoshut Mongols had been informed about the passing of the Fifth Dalai Lama and the enthronement of the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>342</sup> However, this is the narrative of the sDe srid, the leader of the dGa’ ldan pho brang, and it needs to be analysed alongside other historical sources, such as Qing court’s narrative (Chapter 3, Section 3.1.2).

### 3.1.2. Delivering the News to the Manchus

To convey the secret news to the Qing court, the sDe srid dispatched Nyi thang zhabs drung (1640–1717) to relay the information to the Kangxi Emperor. Nyi thang zhabs drung served as one of the primary official diplomats for the dGa’ ldan pho brang in Peking and the Mongolian regions during the sDe srid’s rule.<sup>343</sup> It appears that gSol dpon sNgags rams pa and Nyi thang zhabs drung began their significant journeys from Lhasa around the same time. However, given the distance, it is likely that the Mongol leaders were informed before Kangxi. The Official Qing record notes Kangxi’s reaction to the news of the Fifth Dalai Lama’s demise and the Sixth Dalai Lama’s enthronement, dated 11th April 1697:

谕领侍卫内大臣 索额图、内大臣 明珠、大学士伊桑阿：「前者，朕以达赖喇嘛身故已久，第巴隐之，附和噶尔丹行事，故差保住严诘第巴。预料第巴必自陈达赖喇嘛已故，乞为彼隐讳，向亦曾与尔等言之。今彼差尼麻唐胡土克图至，果密奏：[达赖喇嘛身故已十六年，再生之小达赖喇嘛已十五岁，乞皇上暂隐之，勿闻于众。]与朕昔语尔等之言略无少异。」

[The Kangxi Emperor told] interior minister Guānzhí Wéi and Suǒ Qé, and Míng Zhū and scholar Sāng ā: “I already knew that the Dalai Lama had passed away a long time

<sup>341</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 293–294.

<sup>342</sup> *ibid*: 302.

<sup>343</sup> In his work, Gangs can bod kyi gnas bshad lam yig gsar ma, Chos ’phel (2002: 2–5) recounts the life story of Nyi thang zhabs drung. A summary is as follows: Nyi thang zhabs drung Ngag dbang gzhon nu, also referred to as Nimatang Hutuktu in Mongolian and Manchu documents, became the first incarnation of Nyi thang zhabs drung. Additionally, he held the position of throne holder at the Nyi thang monastery, a role later taken on by his reincarnations.

ago, but the sDe srid concealed this matter and acted according to the [benefit] of dGa' ldan. Therefore, I dispatched an emissary to condemn the sDe srid severely. I expected that the sDe srid would take the initiative to tell the truth about the Dalai Lama's death and ask me to keep this secret. Now [the sDe srid's emissary], Nyi ma thang Hutuktu, arrived in the capital and disclosed that the Dalai Lama has been dead for sixteen years, and the reincarnated new Dalai Lama is fifteen years old. [He] also requested me to keep this secret from the public. This is not different from what I told you before."<sup>344</sup>

In this passage, Kangxi said that he dispatched his envoy to chastise the sDe srid for hiding the Dalai Lama's death, demonstrating his authority. This statement was a symbolic gesture by Kangxi to showcase his authority, perhaps intended to impress the Mongols. Because, as we will discuss below, Kangxi sent his representatives to congratulate the new Dalai Lama and participate in his enthronement ceremony. In addition to delivering the news, he sDe srid also requested Kangxi to keep the news confidential before announcing it to the broader public.

Seizing this opportunity, Kangxi stipulated four conditions in return. Firstly, due to the Panchen Lama's consistent refusals, he asked the sDe srid to send him to Peking (Chapter 5, Section 5.1). Secondly, since rJe lung Hutuktu, the dGa' ldan pho brang's representative, assisted dGa' ldan Khan against the Khalkhas and the Qing, Kangxi asked the sDe srid to execute the lama or send him to Peking.<sup>345</sup> Thirdly, Kangxi asked the sDe srid to send dGa' ldan Khan's daughter, who had married a Khoshut prince in Amdo mTsho sngon, to Peking, given that this marriage alliance could lead to future complications.<sup>346</sup> Lastly, as Perdue notes, besides these requests, Kangxi also wanted the sDe srid to "let the Panchen Lama rule the Tibetan faith."<sup>347</sup> However, the Qing court document records that the sDe srid gave various excuses, and none of these requests of the Qing Emperor were fulfilled.<sup>348</sup> The Mongolian document known under the title of the German translation as "Ein mongolisches Textfragment über den Ölötenfürsten Galdan," describes that the sDe srid politely but resolutely declined each of Kangxi's demands, providing various reasons for each refusal.<sup>349</sup>

Despite these refusals from the sDe srid, Kangxi chose to work with the sDe srid and maintain the secrecy of the Dalai Lama's death. Kangxi knew that "the influence of Lhasa (i.e. the dGa' ldan pho brang) was the most powerful he could command to re-establish peace among the Mongols and prevent the founding of another great and united Mongol empire."<sup>350</sup> The dGa' ldan pho brang was based on the principles of the dGe lugs school and was under the guidance of the Dalai Lamas (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.4). In this context, the dGe lugs school and the dGa' ldan pho brang were indistinguishable entities and supporting the dGe lugs school equated to supporting the dGa' ldan pho brang and vice versa. Hence, Kangxi's decision to collaborate with the dGa' ldan pho brang might also have had religious motives in addition to political interests. Using Tibetan materials, Illich argues:

Scholarship on the subject continues to reductively claim that the Manchus patronized Tibetan Buddhism solely to gain the submission of Buddhist Mongols and thus eliminate the perennial threat that a potentially united Mongol military front posed to

---

<sup>344</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 151.

<sup>345</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 127–129.

<sup>346</sup> *ibid*: 129.

<sup>347</sup> Perdue 2005: 194.

<sup>348</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 147–149.

<sup>349</sup> Heissig (trans) 1941: 123–124.

<sup>350</sup> Rockhill 1910: 28.

Manchu hegemony. Though largely unexamined, Tibetan sources offer a different perspective.<sup>351</sup>

Tibetan sources do indeed depict the emperor as a divine figure and a patron of Tibetan Buddhism who possessed a faith in the religion.<sup>352</sup> However, in this context, Tibetan sources could be biased for various reasons. Thus, the question of whether Kangxi was a follower of Tibetan Buddhism remains unresolved (Chapter 2, Section, 2.2). In any case, it appears that his association with the dGa' ldan pho brang and the Dalai Lama extended beyond mere political motivations.

In managing the dilemma of Kangxi's response to the sDe srid, Bǎozhù, the head of Qing envoy to Tibet, had already been ordered by Kangxi to reconcile with the sDe srid and present him with gifts, instead of rebuking the sDe srid.

Dated 20th April 1697, the Qing document records:

嗣后尔宜益加恭顺，勿违朕旨，朕尽弃尔前罪，嘉惠如初。如此，则尔土人民大蒙利赖，尔之荣贵可获长享矣。为此特遣正使理藩院主事保住、副使署主事萨哈连以降敕例，赐币六端。

[The Kangxi Emperor said,] “After this [message], you (the sDe srid) should be more respectful and obedient. Do not disobey my command. Instead of holding yourself accountable for your previous mistakes, I will honour you like before. In this way, the people of your land will significantly benefit. Your honour will be enjoyed for a long time. Therefore, I specially dispatched the chief of the imperial court, Bǎozhù, and the deputy chief of Lǐ fān yuàn<sup>353</sup>, Sà hā lián, to issue an edict and simultaneously give you six coins.”<sup>354</sup>

At first glance this passage might give the impression that the Kangxi Emperor wielded significant authority over the sDe srid. However, as pointed out above, the sDe srid did not meet any of the demands Kangxi set forth, despite Kangxi's warnings of grave consequences. Nevertheless, the emperor still sent this message to maintain diplomatic ties with the dGa' ldan pho brang. This suggests that in reality the sDe srid was independent in his decisions and Kangxi was not in a position to impose anything on the Tibetan government. Another official document issued on the same day records:

---

<sup>351</sup> Illich 2006: Abstract.

<sup>352</sup> ICang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (b) n.d.: 1a–2b.

<sup>353</sup> The Berkshire Encyclopedia of China comments on the Lǐ fān yuàn during the Qing Empire: “Among the agencies supervising the tribute system and trade and the countries involved was the Lǐ fān yuàn (Office to Administer Foreign Barbarians), established in 1638 and staffed by Manchu, that is, members of the multinational banners that constituted the core military and social groups of early Qing society. [...] Later the authority of the Lǐ fān yuàn, along with Qing power itself, was extended more generally westward to take charge of virtually all relationships with the peoples of Inner Asia (Buell 2009, online)”: Accessed 16 October 2022.

The Lǐ fān yuàn was the most pivotal office of the Qing Empire concerning Tibetan affairs. Modern scholars have different views regarding the authority and sway of this office over the dGa' ldan pho brang government. For example, modern Chinese historian, Liú hànchéng (2020: 430–431) argues that the sDe srid never regarded himself as a subordinate to the imperial representatives in the Lǐ fān yuàn office.

<sup>354</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 154.

保住等请训旨，上谕之曰：「尔等到后，待第巴勿如从前举动，宜加和婉。授敕毕，尔等仍前作礼进币。但谓第巴曰：[皇上统领大兵已临宁夏，因前事四款尔皆遵旨，皇上大悦，故不进兵。至尔尼麻唐胡土克图来，密陈达赖喇嘛出定之事，上皆知之矣，亦有密旨谕尼麻唐胡土克图矣。」

When Bǎozhù and the others asked for instruction, the emperor said, “When you (envoys) arrive in Tibet, do not treat the sDe srid as you did before, but be gentler and more polite. After issuing the imperial edict, you can give him the money. However, tell the sDe srid that the emperor’s army has almost reached Níngxià,<sup>355</sup> but you (sDe srid) have fulfilled the first four things according to the emperor’s order. Therefore, Kangxi is delighted, and he will not continue his [military] march. Your (the sDe srid’s) emissary, Nyi ma thang Hothogthu, came to deliver the secret message to me and talked to me about the Dalai Lama’s travels.”<sup>356</sup>

The official responses of the Qing to the dGa’ ldan pho brang frequently encompass such contradictory messages. These conflicting official documents highlight the disparity between the genuine and apparent power dynamics between the Qing and the dGa’ ldan pho brang. These passages also reveal how the Qing portrayed themselves outwardly and approached matters differently in practice. In this passage, Kangxi asserts that his travel to Níngxià was to advance his military campaign against the sDe srid. However, according to modern scholarship, the Kangxi Emperor did not come to Níngxià to launch his military expedition to Tibet but to fight against dGa’ ldan Khan because Níngxià was a strategic place due to its location and cheap food supplies.<sup>357</sup>

Kangxi knew that the Sixth Dalai Lama would be enthroned regardless of his approval, and both Tibetans and Mongols would place their faith in the succeeding Dalai Lama. Therefore, even though Kangxi was displeased with the sDe srid for challenging his authority, he appeared to feel compelled to send a representative to reconcile with the sDe srid and to attend the enthronement ceremony of the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>358</sup> Thus, the emperor dispatched a second delegation shortly after the first one, headed by the Second lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan, to represent him at the enthronement ceremony of the Sixth Dalai Lama on 25th of the tenth month in 1697, demonstrating his respect for the Dalai Lama and for Tibetan Buddhism.<sup>359</sup>

### 3.1.3. Announcing the News to the Tibetans

For the sDe srid, the endorsement and backing of the Tibetans, and especially the dGe lugs followers, were fundamental to his authority within the dGa’ ldan pho brang (Chapter 1, Section 1.3). Thus, to justify concealing the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama and legitimise the reincarnated Sixth Dalai Lama, the sDe srid authored an official document known as *The Transition from the Fifth to the Sixth Dalai Lama: An Account Extracting the Essence for the Ears*.<sup>360</sup> The central and regional officials of the dGa’ ldan pho brang were instructed to read

---

<sup>355</sup> Muslims from Central Asia began moving into Níngxià during the later Yuan and Ming Dynasties. During the Qing period, the region gradually became a centre of Muslim military strength.

<sup>356</sup> In this official report dated 20 April 1697, it is explained how Kangxi dispatched different groups of his representatives to Lhasa (*Qīng shìlù zàngzú shìliào* 1982, vol-i: 154).

<sup>357</sup> Perdue 2005: 201, and Rockhill 1910: 29.

<sup>358</sup> *Qīng shìlù zàngzú shìliào* 1982, vol-i: 151.

<sup>359</sup> lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (a) n.d.:20b–25b.

<sup>360</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 2007: 1-187.

this report in public spaces to announce the passing of the Fifth and the enthronement of the Sixth Dalai Lama:

མི་དཔོན་ཞང་གོང་པ་ཚེ་རིང་གི་འཕྲིན་ལྷན་པའི་འཕྲིན་ལྷན་གྱི་མེ་ཏོག་ལྷུ་མ་རའི་ཐང་དུ་ལྷ་ས་པ་རྣམས་ལ་རྒྱ་བརྒྱུད་བཞགས་  
པར། རྒྱུ་དམན་རྒྱ་པ་ལ་ཅིག་གིས། རྒྱ་བརྒྱུད་ཀྱི་དེ་ཙམ་གྱི་བར་རྒྱལ་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པ་མ་བཞགས་པའི་ས་སྤོང་མིའི་  
སྐྱུ་བཟུལ་དང་ཚོས་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཐུགས་ཁུར་ཐམས་ཅད་ལྷེ་སྤོང་རྒྱ་ཞབས་གཅིག་བྱས་བཞགས། དེ་དུས་ས་ལྷོ་པ་མ་  
ཤིས་པར་ཉི་མ་ཤར་བ་མཐོང་བྱུང་སོགས་ལ་བ་སྐད་བཏང་འདུག།

Superintendent Zhang grong pa rDo rje and Shar bKra shis read the *rNa bcud*<sup>361</sup> to the people of Lhasa at the Flower Garden Ground. It has been told that some elderly ladies exclaimed, “Thank you, [sDe srid], for single-handedly carrying people’s pain concerning the passing of the Fifth Dalai Lama and the political and religious duties for such a [long] time. We saw the sunrise without ever knowing nightfall.”<sup>362</sup>

Given that this passage is sourced from the sDe srid’s own writings, it is reasonable to suspect he might have highlighted only the positive responses of the Tibetans upon learning of the events surrounding the Fifth and Sixth Dalai Lamas. However, in this same work, the sDe srid also acknowledged that there were individuals who did not receive the news favourably beneath this seemingly auspicious atmosphere:

སྤང་སྤོང་ཅན་ལ་ཅིག་མ་གཏོགས་བྱིངས་ཆེ་དགའ་སྤོང་གུན་རྟོག་པན་རྒྱན་འགྲན་པས་མཆི་མ་དབང་མེད་དུ་བྱུལ་བར་  
སྤང་།

Except for a few with the heart of an ox, most were moved by competing emotions of joy and sorrow and appeared to shed tears without control.<sup>363</sup>

Considering the context, it is likely that the adversaries with the “heart of an ox” belonged to two distinct groups. One group consisted of members of the aristocracy who did not like the sDe srid’s authoritarian leadership style, as will be discussed in the fifth chapter, and thought this was a strategy of the sDe srid to maintain his power. The other group were the dGe lugs purists, such as the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, who viewed this plan of the sDe srid as a way to dilute the dGe lugs tradition’s virtuous qualities. Because, from his initial encounter with the Sixth Dalai Lama, the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa perceived the young Dalai Lama in a negative light (Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2). For dGe lugs purists, the purity of the dGe lugs school had to be the top priority of the dGa’ ldan pho brang, and the actions and personalities of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama did not conform to the norms of the strict dGe lugs faction (Chapter 2, Section 2.8).

### 3.2. Ascending the Throne in the Potala Palace

The turbulent and sometimes bizarre odyssey of early 18th-century politics of the dGa’ ldan pho brang increased with the appearance of the Sixth Dalai Lama Tshang dbyangs rgya mtsho

<sup>361</sup> *rNa bcud* refers to “*The Transition from the Fifth to the Sixth Dalai Lama: An Account Extracting the Essence for the Ears*” authored by the sDe srid. This work aims to demonstrate authenticity of the reincarnation and transparency in the Dalai Lama succession to the followers of the Dalai Lamas.

<sup>362</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 324.

<sup>363</sup> *ibid*: 323.

(1683–1706) in the late 1690s.<sup>364</sup> Growing up in his family amidst political conflicts in mTsho sna, the Sixth Dalai Lama, as a child, faced several attempts of assassination by his spiteful relatives. Moreover, owing to miscommunication between the local officers in mTsho sna county and the sDe srid in Lhasa, the Sixth Dalai Lama and his family were placed under house arrest and endured severe treatment for many years.<sup>365</sup>

In his article about the Sixth Dalai Lama, Kalsang Dhondup writes, “Misunderstanding the purpose of Desi’s order for strict secrecy, the Tsona officials kept the boy [the Sixth Dalai Lama] and the parents under virtual house arrest for a long time.”<sup>366</sup> In his critical edition of the Sixth Dalai Lama’s poems, Sørensen explains the childhood of the Sixth Dalai Lama. He writes, “From the very outset, he was detained, shrouded in secrecy, together with his parents, in mTsho-sna rdzong, before being transferred to sNa-dkar-rtse.”<sup>367</sup> Furthermore, under the current political climate in central Tibet as well as in the border regions with Bhutan, nobody, not even the Dalai Lama’s family, knew that their child had secretly been recognised as the reincarnation of the Fifth Dalai Lama.<sup>368</sup>

Later, their living situation improved, but the sDe srid was unable to offer the same scholarly training, religious guidance, and monastic environment that the previous Dalai Lamas had enjoyed. The sDe srid sent some monks to mTsho sna county to look after and educate the Sixth Dalai Lama, but they did not fulfil their duties properly.<sup>369</sup> In these circumstances, the fourteen-year-old Dalai Lama had likely already encountered the intimate adult relationships before committing to the celibate life of monkhood, which subsequently might have influenced his monastic life.<sup>370</sup> Moreover, in his lecture at the University of Lhasa, Nor bu bsam ’phel contends: “According to oral history, it is suggested that Gong sa mchog (the Dalai Lama) had intimate relations (*lus ’brel*) with several local girls in mTsho sna.”<sup>371</sup> Therefore, the Sixth Dalai Lama’s childhood was filled with misery, trauma, and worldly desires. As Schwieger argues, these factors “would later affect the boy’s perception of himself and his acceptance by the political public in Inner Asia.”<sup>372</sup>

---

<sup>364</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 369–420.

<sup>365</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 200–203. In this lengthy passage, the sDe srid regretfully explains the problems that the Sixth Dalai Lama had to endure in his childhood. According to this account, the local officials held the child, and his parents strictly confined in a house, blocked the windows with stones, and locked the door from the outside. Every night, an official servant watched the house with a guard dog. They were not even allowed to light a fire in the middle of freezing winter days and were not allowed to contact people outside without official permission. Their nutrition was so poor that they were ravished by hunger and thirst and lived in constant fear, but gradually their situation improved. The sDe srid reports that he heard later that the officials tried to destroy the family of the Dalai Lama due to, among many reasons, the political rivalry between the dGa’ ldan pho brang, Bhutan, and the Sixth Dalai Lama’s family.

<sup>366</sup> Dhondup 2003: 34.

<sup>367</sup> Sørensen 1988: 258.

<sup>368</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 385–387.

<sup>369</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 224–229.

<sup>370</sup> Tshe ring dbang rgyal 2002: 48–51 and 61–65. The content of these lengthy passages can be summarised as follows: During the time of Pho lha nas in central Tibet, lay people in Tibet would generally begin to engage in adult entertainments such as sexual encounters, alcohol and hunting as early as 13 to 14 years old. Narrating the Pho lha nas’ multiple encounters with young girls, Tshe ring dbang rgyal gave various examples which show how lay people engaged in sexual activities at the time. For example, on many occasions, as a teenager, Pho lha nas joined his male friends to engage in sexual activities with other local girls of similar ages or sometimes even younger ones.

<sup>371</sup> Nor bu bsam ’phel (online) 2022: Accessed 9 September 2022. The lecture is in Tibetan and the translation is mine.

<sup>372</sup> Schwieger 2015:104.

### 3.2.1. A Complex Journey to Lhasa

In the third month of 1697, the young Dalai Lama’s family was informed that their son was the reincarnation of the Fifth Dalai Lama. Subsequently, the Sixth Dalai Lama began his journey to Lhasa with his family, accompanied by several officers of the dGa’ ldan pho brang. In the eighth month of the same year, while the Dalai Lama and his family were residing in sNa dkar rtse, his father, Rig ’dzin bkra shis bstan ’dzin, a forty-year-old rNying ma master, became unwell and passed away. The sDe srid notes that the Dalai Lama’s ailing and bedbound father whispered his final words of advice to his son, the Dalai Lama:

ཡབ་བསྐྱེན་པའི་དུས་གོང་ཞབས་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ཡང་ཡང་ཚོས་རྫོང་གྲིས་བཀག་ཆ་ཞུས་འདུག་ཀྱང་ཕེབས་ཤིང་དེ་སྐབས་ཡབ་  
གྲིས་སྐྱེན་འབྲུལ་གྱི་རིགས་ཞུས་དྲགས་པའི་ཁོ་རང་སྣོད་རྩིས་ཁོ་ན་བྱས་འདུག་ཀྱང་སྐབས་སྐབས་སེང་དབར་དུ་ཕེབས་པར།  
ཁོང་རྣམ་པས་ལེགས་པོ་མ་ཞུས་པ་དང་། ཁོང་རྣམ་པར་གསན་ན་མི་ཡོང་འཕྲུལ་ཕྱགས་སུ་བྱེད་རང་ཡབ་སྲས་གྱི་དབར་དུ་  
སེལ་འཇུག་ཡོང་།

While [his] father was sick, the Sixth Dalai Lama (Gong zhabs rin po che) visited, even though Chos rdor repeatedly attempted to stop [him]. Suspecting that the father would inform [the Dalai Lama] of different issues at the time, Chos rdor always tried to be there. However, in the breaks [between the periods in which he was present], [the Dalai Lama] visited from time to time. [The father told the Dalai Lama], “They [the attendants like Chos rdor] did not speak well. If you listen to them, now and in the future, it will bring a dispute between you two [the sDe srid and Dalai Lama], master and student (*yab sras*)”.<sup>373</sup>

This is a very private event recorded by the sDe srid, making it impossible to verify its accuracy. If it is true, then this counsel from the Dalai Lama implies two things: Firstly, from the time of his official recognition, it seems some individuals within the Dalai Lama’s inner circle were intent on undermining his relationship with the sDe srid. Secondly, the Dalai Lama’s chief attendant even tried to prevent him from visiting his ailing father, suspecting they might converse in secrecy. It appears some attendants sought to sow discord between the sDe srid, the Dalai Lama, and his father. The sDe srid remarks in this context that the deceased father’s advice was a visionary premonition of the occurrences between the Dalai Lama and the sDe srid.<sup>374</sup>

Regarding this claimed incident, some questions still remain unanswered. For example, who chose the Dalai Lama’s attendants and directed them to spy on the Dalai Lama and his family? If the sDe srid chose these attendants, including Chos rdor, why did they attempt to sow seeds of distrust between the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama? Was Chos rdor linked to the dGe lugs purists?

We cannot answer any of these questions with firm evidence based on our current materials. Nevertheless, analysing the context, it is relatively reasonable to infer that these attendants were linked with the dGe lugs purists, given they had ample motive to undermine the Dalai Lama and to damage the relationship between the Dalai Lama and the sDe srid. Moreover, besides the dGe lugs purists, there is no indication in the primary sources that anybody else

<sup>373</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 321. In classical Tibetan literature, “yab sras” often refers to a master and his student. Thus, in this particular context, the term refers to the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama, as there are no other candidates that fit this description.

<sup>374</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 321.

intended to harm the relationship between the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. The purists might have had numerous reasons to contest and disapprove of the Sixth Dalai Lama from the outset, one amongst many being the fact that the Dalai Lama—the foremost reincarnation of the dGe lugs school—was born to a father who was a rNying ma master.<sup>375</sup> Furthermore, the purists might have assumed that if the Sixth Dalai Lama collaborated with sDe srid to govern the dGa’ ldan pho brang, following the principles of the Fifth Dalai Lama that embraced other religious schools, both the Dalai Lama and the sDe srid would gain substantial influence. This situation would potentially pose a direct challenge to the predominance of the dGe lugs school within the dGa’ ldan pho brang government (Chapter 3, Section 3.3). In his thesis about the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, Maher writes, “additionally, there was a sense among some Gelukbas in the seventeenth century, including the Jamyang Shayba, that the integrity of their school was threatened from within by the syncretic inclination of some important figures, including the Fifth Dalai Lama.”<sup>376</sup> Maher also recognises the presence of this conflict “between factions supporting the [Fifth] Dalai Lama’s syncretism and those preferring ‘pure’ Geluk”<sup>377</sup> in the dGa’ ldan pho brang. In this ideological contest, political and religious matters in central Tibet became intertwined, subsequently hampering the efficient governance of the dGa’ ldan pho brang (Chapter 4, Section 4.4).

### 3.2.2. The Purists’ disapproval of the Sixth Dalai Lama

In this religious conflict, the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa gradually became a leading figure who fearlessly raised his voice against those, including the sDe srid, who accommodated other religious schools.<sup>378</sup> In the ninth month of 1697, the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa participated in the welcoming ceremony for the Sixth Dalai Lama. The First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa himself admitted that the main reasons for taking part in this welcoming ceremony were to safeguard his image in the eyes of the dGa’ ldan pho brang’s authorities and to ascertain whether the young boy truly was the reincarnation of the Fifth Dalai Lama.<sup>379</sup> The underlying implication of these two stated purposes clearly suggests that even before meeting the Sixth Dalai Lama, the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa was neither prepared nor inclined to accept this new reincarnation. Thus, the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa recounted an event from the day before he met the Sixth Dalai Lama:

དེ་ནས་ངག་དབང་དོ་རྗེས་སྐྱེ་ཚོས་བཟུང་ནས་ཡོངས་སྐབས་ཤིག་སྐྱེ་ཚོས་བོར་ནས་མི་འདུག་ཀྱང་ལམ་སྐབས་དེར་ལྷུ་མ་  
 ལུས། དེ་ལྟུང་འབྲས་སྐྱེ་ཚོས་ལ་ལེབས། ལྷ་བྱང་རྗེ་བར་བཞུགས་པའི་མཚན་མོར་སྐྱེ་ཚོས་བོར་སོང་ལྷུ་པས། ཅི་ཡང་མི་  
 བཏོན། ད་ལོ་ན་ཚོས་གོས་གཅིག་ཐབས་ཀྱིས་གསུངས། དེ་ནས་ཚོས་གོས་གཅིག་བཅོལ་ནས་ཕུལ་བས་བྱིན་ལྷུ་ཐབས་གནང་ནས།  
 རྟེན་འབྲེལ་མ་ལེགས་སྐྱེ་ཚོས་འདྲིས་བསྐྱབ་པ་མགོ་མི་ཐོན་པའི་ལྷུ་མིན་འདུག་གསུངས།

Then, Ngag dbang rdor rje was carrying the monastic robe. On one occasion, he lost it but [he] was not able to tell [’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] during the journey. That evening, they arrived at ’Bras spungs and when they stayed in the old residence (*bla rang*) for the night, Ngag dbang rdor rje said, “The monastic robe got lost.” [’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] did not scold him at all but said, “Find a way [to get a new] monastic robe!” Then, [Ngag dbang rdor rje] searched for a new robe and offered it.

<sup>375</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 87.

<sup>376</sup> Maher 2003: 35.

<sup>377</sup> *ibid*: 20.

<sup>378</sup> This case is repeatedly recorded in the *Biography of the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* by bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis (bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 75a and 91a).

<sup>379</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 69a.

[’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] blessed it and said, “This is an inauspicious sign, an indication that this reincarnation [the Sixth Dalai Lama] will not be able to keep the precepts.”<sup>380</sup>

Similar to the above passage, the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa also described to his students the first meeting with the Sixth Dalai Lama. His biographer describes this in the following way:

ཆེབས་བསུའི་སྐབས་གཟིགས་སྣང་མི་ལེགས་པ་གཅིག་བྱུང་གསུངས། དེ་དུས་གཟིགས་སྣང་གང་བྱུང་ལྷན་པས། སྐྱ་སྐྱེས་དེ་ལ་  
དབུ་མི་འདུག་པ་སྣམ་པ་ཡུན་རིང་གཟིགས་པས། མ་མཐོང་ཞིབ་དུ་ཡང་ཡང་གཟིགས་པས་རེ་ཞིག་ལ་མ་ཤར་གསུངས། དོན་  
ལ་རྒྱན་མ་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་བདད་རེད།

[’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] said, “There occurred a bad apparition during the welcoming event.” [He was] asked about the apparition, and [he responded,] “[I] saw the reincarnation (*sku skyes*) without his head for a long time. Even though [I] watched him closely again and again, [the head] did not appear for some time.” [The biographer comments that] this was, indeed, a sign that [the incarnation] is was a fake one!<sup>381</sup>

The sole aim of these statements is to question the authenticity of the Sixth Dalai Lama, which indirectly criticises the sDe srid for selecting a fake Dalai Lama. These passages also suggest that the dGe lugs purists, including the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, seemed to have already formed their opinion about the Sixth Dalai Lama even before they encountered the young reincarnation. Simultaneously, these excerpts also serve as a theatrical display to showcase the exceptional foresight of the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa in making predictions about others, including the Sixth Dalai Lama. However, at the time, the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa was merely a scholar from sGo mang college of ’Bras spungs monastery without any official titles like Khen po or Khri pa. Therefore, even though he greatly disapproved of the Sixth Dalai Lama, it had no practical impact. However, this situation would dramatically change after the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa became the mKhan po of sGo mang college in 1700 (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3).

### 3.2.3. Diplomacy in the Enthronement Ceremony

On 25th of the tenth month of 1697, the Sixth Dalai Lama was enthroned in the Potala Palace amid a congregation of Tibetan religious leaders, aristocrats, and Khoshut Mongols. At the ceremony, diplomats from Khalkha and other Eastern Mongols, and Manchus, such as the Second lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan, were present and offered their gifts to the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>382</sup> Rockhill claims that the Qing sent envoys to Tibet to investigate the sDe srid and his misdeeds. At the same time, Rockhill also acknowledged that Tibetan histories have a different narrative.<sup>383</sup> This misunderstanding can be attributed to the lack of awareness that Kangxi had commissioned two distinct delegations to central Tibet. One was tasked with investigating the misdeeds of the sDe srid, while the other was entrusted with the duty of representing the Qing during the enthronement ceremony.<sup>384</sup> These delegations were spearheaded by Bǎozhù and the Second lCang skya Lama, respectively.<sup>385</sup>

<sup>380</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 69b–70a.

<sup>381</sup> *ibid.*: 70a.

<sup>382</sup> lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (a) n.d.: 19a.

<sup>383</sup> Rockhill 1910: 26–27.

<sup>384</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 147–148.

<sup>385</sup> *ibid.*: 147–149.

While in Lhasa, the Second ICang skya Lama became close to the sDe srid, contravening the Qing's diplomatic protocol.<sup>386</sup> It remains uncertain whether the Second ICang skya Lama deliberately overlooked the Qing's diplomatic rules or was simply unaware of them. The Qing officer from the Lǐ fān yuàn in Xining, who observed the diplomatic breach, suggested Kangxi to execute the Second ICang skya Lama.<sup>387</sup> However, Kangxi did not execute the Second ICang skya Lama due to, among other reasons, his influence among the Mongols and his role in establishing diplomatic relationships between the Qing and the Khoshut Mongols in 1697.<sup>388</sup> Kangxi withdrew the title he had bestowed upon the Second ICang skya Lama, but it was also reinstated after a brief interval.<sup>389</sup> These reactions from the Qing officer in the Lǐ fān yuàn and Kangxi highlight the Qing court's animus towards the sDe srid, even though they, at the time, appeared to lack the real authority to sanction the sDe srid. These responses also serve as an example of the Qing court's caution in punishing Tibetan Buddhist lamas, even those residing in the Qing court and benefiting from an imperial stipend. This was probably because the Qing were concerned that anti-Tibetan Buddhist activities might harm the Buddhist image of the emperor and potentially anger the Mongols and Tibetans.

Amid these complex social and political circumstances, Tshangs dbyangs rgya mtsho ascended to the throne and was formally entitled as the Sixth Dalai Lama. The sDe srid acted as the political advisor to the Sixth Dalai Lama, having been instrumental in positioning him as the central political and spiritual figure of the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>390</sup> The question of whether the sDe srid utilised the Sixth Dalai Lama to safeguard his political authority, or whether he supervised the Sixth Dalai Lama and endeavoured to position him as the subsequent spiritual and political leader of the dGa' ldan pho brang, remains unresolved.

However, upon analysing the evidence, it appears that the sDe srid had meticulously nurtured the Sixth Dalai Lama for both purposes. Upon comparing the works of the sDe srid related to the Sixth Dalai Lama, it becomes evident that the sDe srid made every effort to educate the Sixth Dalai Lama, cultivate his career, and uphold his authenticity until his untimely passing in 1705. The sDe srid convinced the Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Sixth Dalai Lama (Chapter 3, Section 3.1). The sDe srid penned a variety of scholarly works to validate the authenticity of the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>391</sup> Simultaneously, he also urged and instructed other dGe lugs Lamas and scholars to safeguard the reputation of the Sixth Dalai Lama, even when the Sixth Dalai Lama started contesting the sDe srid's authority.<sup>392</sup> Kalsang Dhondup elaborated in depth on the sDe srid's contributions to the life of the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>393</sup> On the other hand, it also must be acknowledged that the sDe srid relied on the Sixth Dalai Lama to reinforce his official policies. For instance, the sDe srid joined the Sixth Dalai Lama to emphasise the importance of the annual non-sectarian monastic prayer congregation (*ris med ser tshogs*) and government-endorsed rituals.<sup>394</sup>

<sup>386</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i:167.

<sup>387</sup> *ibid*:167.

<sup>388</sup> ICang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (a) n.d.: 23a.

<sup>389</sup> ICang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (a) n.d.: 23a–23b. For further details, refer to Sagaster's work on Ngag dbang chos ldan, published in 1967.

<sup>390</sup> Until roughly 1701, the entire life of the Sixth Dalai Lama was guided and managed by the sDe srid. For more details, see the *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama* (1989).

<sup>391</sup> This refers to sDe srid's works, such as *The Transition from the Fifth to the Sixth Dalai Lama: An Account Extracting the Essence for the Ears* (2007) and the *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama* (1989).

<sup>392</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 23a,

<sup>393</sup> Dhondup 2003: 32–41.

<sup>394</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 696–697.

Because of these reasons, the bond between the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama extended beyond mere politics and power dynamics, encompassing religious devotion and personal interdependence. Without grasping this intricacy, one might arrive at the misguided conclusion that the sDe srid was “forced to conciliate the furious Chinese Emperor by officially subordinating himself to the sixth Dalai Lama, Tshangs-dbyangs-rgya-mtsho.”<sup>395</sup> This perception reflects the perspective of the Qing empire as documented in the Qing official documents, in which the Qing court secretaries often purposely exaggerated political occurrences to portray the authority of their emperor beyond its reality.<sup>396</sup>

Concerning the Dalai Lamas, if a Dalai Lama could not secure legitimacy and religious endorsement within Tibetan society, external forces, such as the Manchu emperors, could not compel the Tibetans to submit to them. For example, consider the case of Pad dkar ’dzin pa Ngag dbang ye shes rgya mtsho (1686–n.d.), who was declared as the Sixth Dalai Lama in 1707 by lHa bzang Khan.<sup>397</sup> With the staunch backing of lHa bzang Khan, Ngag dbang ye shes rgya mtsho resided in the Potala Palace for 10 years, bearing the title of the Sixth Dalai Lama, and received the support from the Qing court.<sup>398</sup> However, he never gained public legitimacy among Tibetans and Mongols as the authentic Dalai Lama.

Generally, after a Dalai Lama had been officially acknowledged, his status in the religious hierarchy naturally surpassed that of the sDe srid (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1). However, the political authority of an individual Dalai Lama often depended on their political situation, personal scholarship, and leadership charisma. For example, as we will discuss below, the Sixth Dalai Lama’s authority was contested because of above reasons (Chapter 3, Section 3.4).

### 3.3. The Emergence of the Purists and their Politics of Accusation

In the early years of the Sixth Dalai Lama’s tenure at the Potala Palace, he was primarily focused on his intensive Buddhist studies, while the sDe srid managed the affairs of the dGa’ ldan pho brang. At the same time, being still young, the Sixth Dalai Lama also followed the sDe srid’s guidance.<sup>399</sup> If this kind of collaboration between the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama went well, it could facilitate a smooth power transition from the sDe srid to the Sixth Dalai Lama.

#### 3.3.1. Expanding the Influence of the Purists

The First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s rise to prominence as a scholar first captured the attention of dGa’ ldan Erdeni and other Ju nang Khoshut leaders, likely owing to their shared birthplace in Amdo. These leaders subsequently invited him to return to Amdo and establish a monastery

---

<sup>395</sup> Perdue 2005: 228.

<sup>396</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 130–131 and Perdue 2005: 202–204.

<sup>397</sup> Petech 1972:17–18.

<sup>398</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 185–187.

<sup>399</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 394–420 and 531–543. To summarise the lengthy passages from these pages. This biography explains that during this period, the Dalai Lama studied under many religious masters, including the sDe srid himself. The sDe srid managed all affairs with the Mongols and Manchus, as well as internal matters, including rituals and the activities of the Sixth Dalai Lama. Moreover, during this time, no complaints from the sDe srid regarding the behavior of the Sixth Dalai Lama were recorded. On the contrary, the sDe srid was full of praise for the Sixth Dalai Lama’s dedication to his studies and his conduct.

there and later he became the root lama of many Khoshut leaders in Amdo.<sup>400</sup> This established relationship between the Khoshuts and the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa certainly elevated the prominence of the latter in central Tibet. Perhaps owing to this influence, the Third Khoshut leader, Dalai Khan, invited the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa to visit his residence, dGa' ldan khang gsar, in Lhasa in 1698 and requested him to bestow religious empowerments upon both him and his queen:

ལོ་འདིར་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལྷ་ལའི་ཉན་དང་། རྒྱལ་མོ་བཀྲ་ཤིས་རྒྱལ་མོ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་གདན་དྲངས། ཚེས་མང་པོ་ཞུས། དབང་བསྐྱར།  
 རྒྱལ་པོ་རྒྱལ་མོ་གཉིས་ཤིན་ཏུ་དད་ནས་ད་ནས་བཟུང་བྱེད་སླ་མ་བྱེད། ཡང་ཡང་འདིར་ཐེབས་དགོས་ཞུས། འབྲུལ་བ་དང་  
 བསྟེན་བཀུར་ཕུན་སུམ་ཚོགས་བ་བྱས། རྗེ་འདིས་ཀྱང་ཚེས་ཀྱི་ཞལ་བཀོད་མང་པོ་བྱས།

In that year (1698), both the king, Dalai Khan, and the queen, bKra shis rgyal mo, invited [the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa]. They sought many religious teachings and received empowerment. The king and queen were filled with devotion towards [the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] and said, “From now onward, [we will] regard you as [our] lama. Please often visit here.” [They] offered excellent respect and service. The Lord ('Jam dbyangs bzhad pa) also provided many religious advice [in return].<sup>401</sup>

If this narrative is true, this meeting between the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and Khoshut Dalai Khan in 1698 paved the way for the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and his followers to build their relationship with lHa bzang Khan (Chapter 4, Section 4.4). This special meeting and receiving religious empowerment held great significance, marking the dawn of a new relationship between the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and Khoshut Khans in central Tibet. Apart from the associations with the Dalai Lamas and the Panchen Lamas, no records to date have been found documenting Khoshut Khan's personal religious ties with individual Tibetan Buddhist lamas. Furthermore, the Khoshut Khans effectively commanded the Khoshut military force and had significance in the dGa' ldan pho brang (Chapter 2, Section 2.5). This bond between the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and the third Khoshut Khan paved the way for the purists to increase their influence among the Mongol leaders and disseminate rumours about the dGa' ldan pho brang under the leadership of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>402</sup>

### 3.3.2. First Power Negotiation with the Purists

While the exact motivations remain unclear, the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama employed two diplomatic gestures to appease the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and his purist followers. These gestures were perhaps made because the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa had become close to the Khoshuts, thereby potentially increasing their influence among Tibetans and Mongols.

Firstly, the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama appointed De mo Lama and Sems dpa' Lama, two principal students of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, as attendants to the Sixth Dalai Lama, likely to conciliate the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and his purist followers.<sup>403</sup> According to the Tibetan tradition, especially the dGe lugs tradition, being selected for the inner circle of the Dalai Lama is a great honour and a significant way to demonstrate your importance. This is a

<sup>400</sup> In his history of Amdo, Hor gtsang 'Jigs med (2009, vol-iv: 23–26) writes how the Bla brang Monastery became the most influential centre of the dGe lugs school in Amdo. And see the biography of the dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po 1987: 5–6.

<sup>401</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 71b.

<sup>402</sup> *ibid*: 75a–76a.

<sup>403</sup> *ibid*: 86b.

common sense among Tibetans. Moreover, De mo rin po che and Sems dpa' rin po che belonged to the 'Bras spungs sGo mang College, the main base of dGe lugs purists and the college of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (Chapter 2, Section 2.9). Thus, this appointment perhaps aimed to appease the members of sGo mang College as well. In addition to this, the Sixth Dalai Lama's attendants frequently played pivotal roles in forging the Dalai Lama's relationships with the monasteries or estates from which they were selected, such as in the case of the 48th Khri pa don 'grub rgya mtsho.<sup>404</sup> Hence, this is an evidence that the sDe srid sought to foster ties with the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and sGo mnag college through these Lamas.

Secondly, the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama invited the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa on special occasions to observe and witness the debates of Buddhist scholars with the Dalai Lama. Additionally, the sDe srid also appointed 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa as the resource person to judge the debates of other scholars:

སྟོན་དུས་ཚངས་དབྱངས་པ་འབྲས་སྤྱངས་གྲ་ཚང་བཞིའི་ཚོས་གྲ་ལ་མེབས་དུས་ལྗེ་བས་རྗེ་འདི་ལ་ཡང་མེབས་ནས་དགོ་  
 བཤེས་གཞན་ཚོས་རྩོད་པའི་དཔང་པོ་བྱེད་དགོས་ཞུས་ནས། དེ་ལ་མེབས་སྒོ་མང་ཚོས་གྲ་ནས་གྲ་ཚང་ཕན་ཚུན་གྱི་དགོ་  
 བཤེས་གཞིས་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་སྟོབས་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཡོན་ཏན་དུག་ཅུ་རྩ་བཞི་འདྲེན་ལྷགས་ལ་མི་འཆམ་བར་ལྗེ་བས་སྐྱེ་བས་སྐྱེ་བ་  
 འཕེལ་བ་ལ་དྲིས་གསུངས་ནས།

In the autumn, while Tshang dbyangs pa [the Sixth Dalai Lama] visited 'Bras spungs monastery for the debate of the four colleges, the sDe srid requested the Lord ('Jam dbyangs bzhad pa) to oversee the debate of other Buddhist scholars [with the Dalai Lama]. Then, he went there while two Buddhist scholars from two colleges were disagreeing about the order of the sixty-four virtues of the Buddha. The sDe srid then ordered them to consult with the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (bla ma dge 'phel).<sup>405</sup>

As per the tradition, each Dalai Lama had to visit Se ra, 'Bras spungs, and dGa' ldan monasteries to debate with top Buddhist scholars to develop himself and demonstrate his Buddhist scholarship to other dGe lugs scholars.<sup>406</sup> During those times, the dGa' ldan pho brang would invite eminent senior scholars to oversee and judge the debates. As a dGe lugs scholar, being invited to judge scholarly debates in the Dalai Lama's presence was the highest official recognition of the government for a Buddhist scholar.<sup>407</sup> The First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa was not only invited but also appointed as the judge for this debate. Hence, it is evident once more that the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama endeavoured to forge a harmonious bond with the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa.

The sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama made considerable efforts to placate the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and dGe lugs purists. However, the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama did not compromise the core principles of religious inclusivity within the dGa' ldan pho brang to match with the idea of the purists. The dGa' ldan pho brang consistently conducted official annual non-sectarian rituals and sponsored large-scale rituals at venues, including the Potala Palace, and instructed the regional offices to do the same annually. Among many examples, the *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama* records one such event:

<sup>404</sup> Ser smad Grags pa mkhas grub n.d.: 35

<sup>405</sup> *ibid*: 73a–73b.

<sup>406</sup> For instance, the Sixth Dalai Lama's visits to these monasteries to debate with Buddhist masters (sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 649–651).

<sup>407</sup> Scholars of the dGe lugs tradition who were invited or appointed as the study-servant or study-tutor (*mtshan zhabs*) of the Dalai Lama proudly keep the title before their names. For example, mTshan zhabs Dor rje yib.

ས་ཀྱི་དོ་སློབ་ཡོད་པ་རྣམས་སུ་ལྷན་པོ་ལྟེན་ཡོད་པས་ཡུལ་ལྗོངས་གཞི་བདག་ལ་གསོལ་མཚོན། དགོ་གསུམ་ལ་ཇ་ཚུལ་  
 བཅོ་ལྟར་གདུགས་དཀར་རྣམས་དང་། ལྷ་བ་གཉིས་པའི་གནམ་གང་ཞོགས་ཉི་མ་དམར་མཚོན་པའི་ལྷ་ས་རྣམས་གོང་ས་སྐུ་  
 ཞབས་རིན་པོ་ཆེས་དབུས་དགའ་ལྡན་པོ་བྲང་བཟུན་སྲིད་དེ་འཛིན་དང་བཅས་སུ་དན་བསྐྱོག་ཐབས་སུ། ས་དགོ་རྗེས་གསུམ་  
 གྱི་དགོན་ཨང་རྣམས་ལ་ཇ་སུམ་ཟུ། རིས་མེད་ཨང་དང་ལ་ཇ་ཉི་ཤུ། ཨང་གཉིས་ལ་ཇ་བཅོ་གྲུ། ཨང་གསུམ་ལ་ཇ་བཟུ།

There was a tantric Bon ritual practice where the ground was dug out, and rocks were turned over. Hence, [Bonpos] prayed and made offerings to regional deities and local guardians (*yul lha gzhi bdag*). [The government] offered tea bricks to the monks from the three abodes (*dge gsum*) and practitioners of Sitātapatra on the 15th day. On the morning of the 30th of the second month, a day on which the sun was red, the people in Lhasa offered bricks of tea to repel the obstacles of those holding the religion and politics of the dGa’ ldan pho brang, especially the Dalai Lama. Thirty bricks of tea were given to Sa [skya], dGe [lugs], and rNying [ma] monasteries, twenty bricks to first ranking non-sectarian [monasteries], fifteen bricks to those ranking second, and ten bricks to those ranking third.<sup>408</sup>

This is merely one instance of the many initiatives undertaken by the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama to maintain the policy of the Fifth Dalai Lama (Chapter 2, Section 2.10). The *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama* repeatedly notes that, mirroring the era of the Fifth Dalai Lama, the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama extended invitations to other Tibetan religious leaders to conduct such non-sectarian monastic prayer congregations.<sup>409</sup>

During this time, performing rituals on a large scale was considered very significant in demonstrating the dGa’ ldan pho brang’s power, recognition, and legitimacy and accumulating common merit (*spyi mthun bsod nams*) of religious followers. Because, historically, religious rituals have not only upheld the recognition and legitimacy of Tibetan governments but also played a significant role in military warfare.<sup>410</sup> Concerning the dGa’ ldan pho brang, Richardson writes that the Fifth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid reorganised and elaborated government sponsored rituals “with the clear intention of enhancing the grandeur of the new regime.”<sup>411</sup> In the same way, Karmay also notes, “Regarded in this way, we have a corpus of ritual that not only evoked the earlier imperial power and gave political legitimacy to Dalai Lama’s rule, but also mirrored the culmination of the political and military struggle that preceded Dalai Lama’s accession to power as the sovereign of Tibet in 1642.”<sup>412</sup> Moreover,

<sup>408</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 802. For example, throughout the *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama*, numerous events are recorded wherein the dGa’ ldan pho brang initiated and sponsored various such rituals.

<sup>409</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 423–428. The content of this lengthy passage can be summarised as follow: The dGa’ ldan pho brang built religious statues and stūpas in many places on the initiative of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. The sDe srid records the details of where the government built which statues and stūpas according to which religious tradition in Tibet. He explains that the government ordered many monasteries, including the Bon pos, to perform rituals for the dGa’ ldan pho brang from time to time. Moreover, the sDe srid also records the gifts the government offered to various lamas and monasteries to perform rituals for the government. Furthermore, the sDe sri also describes the geomancy of the locations where the government erected statues and stūpas.

<sup>410</sup> According to Dalton, “From the thirteenth century, the violent rites, which had so far been largely the preserve of individuals or small groups of Buddhist practitioners, grew into large-scale rites that were performed on behalf of the state. Violent ritual, in this sense, went from the local to the global” (Dalton 2011:279). Dalton argues that the rise of such magic related to the arrival of Mongols in Tibet during the Yuan period (Dalton 2011: 279–280). These rituals continued to play a major role during the time of the dGa’ ldan pho brang.

<sup>411</sup> Richardson 1993: 7.

<sup>412</sup> Karmay 2002: 24.

Dalton states, “after the fourteenth century, war magic continued to grow in influence, and by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it dominated much of the language of Tibetan military conflict.”<sup>413</sup>

In the process of the formation of the dGa’ ldan pho brang, rituals, including war magic, were vital due to their political adversary, the gTsang Dynasty, supported by religious institutions renowned for their war rituals.<sup>414</sup> Hence, FitzHerbert asserts that the Fifth Dalai Lama oversaw war magic rituals and “ensured their success and institutionalisation as part of the state-building process.”<sup>415</sup> FitzHerbert argues that the war ritual was not just about legitimising the government but also a potent means for the Tibetan Buddhist lamas to display their strength to the Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus.<sup>416</sup>

Another significant activity of the dGa’ ldan pho brang, aimed at treating Tibetan religious schools, including the bKa’ brgyud and Bon, with impartiality, was the annual assembly for the grand non-sectarian monastic prayer congregation (*ris med ser tshogs*) in Lhasa, following the sMon lam chen mo festival.<sup>417</sup> Although the Fifth Dalai Lama initiated this non-sectarian monastic prayer congregation, it initially did not seem to be very large.<sup>418</sup> The sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama scheduled this event immediately after the sMon lam chen mo, when large numbers of monks normally gathered in Lhasa. This timing change transformed it into a massive gathering, with tens of thousands of monks from 441 different monasteries, representing most of the religious traditions in Tibet.<sup>419</sup>

This famous grand non-sectarian monastic prayer congregation was, however, discontinued probably during the rule of lHa bzang Khan or the Dzungars in central Tibet. The reasons for, and the exact timing of, the discontinuation of this gathering remain uncertain. Perhaps this is because the dGe lugs purists, the main supporters of lHa bzang, were strongly against this grand non-sectarian assembly.<sup>420</sup> Notably, biographies and governmental documents from the mid-18th century onwards provide no record of this significant congregation, which suggests that it might have been abolished by this time. Perhaps the cessation of this gathering was a consequence of the assassination of the sDe srid and the expulsion of the Sixth Dalai Lama from Lhasa. Because, as discussed above, these two individuals were the main supporters of this religious congregation.

### 3.3.3. Escalating Direct Criticisms from the Purists

---

<sup>413</sup> Dalton 2011: 316.

<sup>414</sup> In his autobiography, ’Jam dbyangs dpal ldan rgya mtsho (1975, vol-i: 202–252) elaborated on the wrathful rituals performed by various Buddhist masters for the gTsang Dynasty and the consequences of these rituals, indicating the superiority of these ritual practices.

<sup>415</sup> FitzHerbert 2018: 55.

<sup>416</sup> In his article, FitzHerbert (2018: 99–116) discusses the institutionalisation of rituals, including military magic, formulated by the Fifth Dalai Lama based on the Northern Treasures tradition (*byang gter*) and his pure visionary experiences (*dag snang*).

<sup>417</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 696–697. The text repeatedly mentions that the government distributed offerings to monasteries of the rNying ma, Sa skya, bka’ brgyud, dGe lugs, and Bon traditions, and asked them to perform rituals for the welfare of the government. However, I did not come across any mention of a Jo nang monastery being included as a place of official offering.

<sup>418</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 696.

<sup>419</sup> *ibid*: 697–698.

<sup>420</sup> *ibid*: 696–697.

Despite the diplomatic efforts to conciliate the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and his dGe lugs purist followers, as long as the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama continued the non-sectarian policies of the dGa' ldan pho brang, there appeared to be no common ground between the two groups. For example, even after offering special considerations to the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and his two main students, they still levelled accusations against the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama in 1700 concerning the grand non-sectarian monastic prayer congregation:

སྤྱི་ལོ་འཇམ་དཔལ་འཇམ་མེད་མེད་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུན་ཡོད་པ་བཅས་རྗེ་སྐྱ་མ་སྲིད་ཞིའི་གཞུག་རྒྱུན་ལྟ་བུ་པ་མཚོག་གིས་སྤྱན་མོང་དང་དོན་བསྟན་པའི་བསལ་སྤྱང་དང་དུག་པ་ཚེན་པའི་ཞབས་བཏུན་གྱི་ཚོགས་མཚོན་ཚེན་མོའི་དུས་སྟོན་འཇམ་མཐོན་སྐྱ་མ་བཅོང་ཁ་པའི་ཚོ་འཕྲུལ་སྟོན་ལམ་གྱི་རྗེས་སྤྱི་འབྲང་ཉེ་དེ་ལས་ཀྱང་ཆེས་ལྷན་པར་འཕགས་པ། [...] རྣམ་ཕྱོགས་ཁ་རྒྱལ་བའི་རིས་མེད་གྱི་དགོ་འདུན་འཚོག་པ་དགོ་ལྷགས་གྱི་དམའ་འབབས་དང་། ལ་རྒྱ་རྒྱལ་ནས་འབོད་པ་སྟོན་གྲགས་གྱི་ཚེད་ལས་དགོ་མེད་ཚུལ་དང་།

The tradition of the grand non-sectarian monastic gathering existed from previous times. According to the general convention, the Fifth, the crest ornament lama of samsara and nirvana, had this [performed] for religious accumulation and purification. This festival of the great offering ceremony, which is [also] for the longevity prayer for the Great Sixth, was organised just after the sMon lam festival initiated by his eminence Lama Tsong kha pa, which made it even greater. [...] [According to the purists,] the gathering of monks without sectarianism, in which the dark side has won predominance, is a disgrace to the dGe lugs pa. And proclaiming [such a message] far and wide (lit.: crossing passes and rivers, *la chu rgyab*) is without virtue but for the sake of fame.<sup>421</sup>

In this passage, the sDe srid asserts that despite the grand non-sectarian monastic gathering being a tradition initiated by the Fifth Dalai Lama and serving as the longevity prayer for the Sixth Dalai Lama, the dGe lugs purists continued to criticise the sDe srid for continuing this assembly. This passage does not mention a term corresponding to “the purists” explicitly, as this term does not exist in this literature, but it is evident from the context that the purists are those who opposed the sDe srid in this passage. Because, at the same time, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa complained to the sDe srid about his favourable treatment of other religious schools, including rNying ma.<sup>422</sup> This passage also admits that the purists viewed this congregation as a humiliation to the dGe lugs school and allowed the “dark side” (*nag phyogs*) to prevail.<sup>423</sup> Moreover, this passage also recounts the accusation that the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama continuously popularised and promoted this gathering far and wide for their own fame.

Moreover, the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa viewed most of the activities of the dGa' ldan pho brang under the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama as a strategy to undermine the prestige of the dGe lugs tradition. bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis records one incident that was narrated by the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa himself:

དེ་སྐབས་གཞུང་ནས་དུག་ཞན་ཀྱན་རྫིང་མ་ལ་བསྐྱར་འདོད་ནས། ཕ་བོང་ཁའི་རི་ཁྲོད་ན་ཕྱེ་བ་གྲུབ་རྒྱུ་བ་ཟེར་བ་རྫིང་མའི་གན་ལྷགས་གཅིག་ཡོད་པ་ཤི་བའི་རོ་མཚན་མོ་སྤྱི་སྟོན་གྱི་རྣམ་ཁ་ཅིག་ནས་རྩང་བོ་ལ་འཕངས་ནས། ཕྱེ་བ་གྲུབ་རྒྱུ་བ་གྲུབ་པ་ཐོབ་ནས་འཇམ་ལ་སོང་ཞེས་འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་རྣམས་བསྐྱ་བའི་རྒྱ་བྱས། དེ་འདྲི་བྱ་བ་དན་པ་འཇིག་རྟེན་ཐམས་

<sup>421</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 696–697.  
<sup>422</sup> dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po 1987: 85.  
<sup>423</sup> This is a classic example of a Tibetan Buddhist term found in Buddhist literature. It often refers to those evil forces that always oppose pure Buddhism.

ཅད་ཕུང་བའི་རྒྱ་དེ་འདྲ་བྱས་ནས་ད་རྒྱུ་ལོ་ཚོ་དམ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ལུས་བྱེད། དེ་ནས་བོད་ཡུལ་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་རྫོང་མའི་ཤན་  
 ལྷགས་དེ་ཡང་འཇའ་ལྷས་ལ་སོང་ཞེས་དེའི་བསྐྱེད་པས་རྟོག་དཔྱད་མེད་པ་ཀུན་གྱི་བདེན་འདོད་ནས། རྫོང་མ་འདི་ཟེང་  
 ཟེར་ནས་བོད་པལ་ཆེར་ཟེང་ཟེང་པོ་བྱེད།

At that time the government intended to convert both high and low [individuals] to rNying ma, and by night they cast the dead body of an elderly rNying ma practitioner named sDe pa Grub rgya ba, who had been at the hermitage of Pha bong kha, into the river from the upper bank of Lhasa. Subsequently, [the government] fabricated a narrative claiming that sDe pa grub rgya ba had achieved the rainbow body, deceiving the ordinary people. [The government] committed such unvirtuous acts, which caused the decline of all the worldly [people]. Still, they pretended to be virtuous. [The government] then proclaimed throughout Tibet that this rNying ma practitioner had attained a rainbow body, leading most to believe the claim without questioning. As a result, many Tibetans were left in awe, declaring the rNying ma tradition to be more profound than others.<sup>424</sup>

This passage is clearly a reshaped story designed to meet the requirements of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa. However, I did not find descriptions of the same event in the works of opposing factions within the dGa' ldan pho brang, such as those by the sDe srid. In this passage, the purists drew a connection between the government and this rNying ma practitioner, alleging that the government leaders were endorsing the rNying ma and concocting tales about this practitioner. The description of the practitioner as a *rgan zhugs*, someone who has become religious late in his life, adds an additional slur against this rNying ma practitioner. It appears that the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa intentionally misinterpreted or misrepresented the engagement of the dGa' ldan pho brang with the rNying ma tradition.

During these years, the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa made himself popular by accusing the dGa' ldan pho brang in the name of protecting the dGe lugs school.<sup>425</sup> Consequently, at the end of 1699, his purist followers made a very strong petition to the dGa' ldan pho brang to appoint the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa as mkhan po of the sGo mang college:

གྲྀ་ཚང་གི་ལས་སྣ་དང་གྲྀ་བ་ཤན་གཞོན་ཐམས་ཅད་འདུན་པ་གཅིག་དེའི་དུ་གྲུར་ཏེ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱིས་གྲོས་ཐོག་ནས། ད་  
 ལམ་དགོ་འཕེལ་དཔོན་སློབ་སླ་མར་མ་བསྐོས་ཕྱིན། སླ་མ་གཞན་མི་དགོས་ཞེས་གཞུང་ལ་ལྷུས་པས་གཞུང་ནས་ཀྱང་གྲྀ་ཚང་  
 གི་ཐུགས་བཞེད་ལྟར་བསྐོས་བཞག་མཛད།

The on-duty staff of the college and all the monks, young and old, united in one wish. They requested the government, stating that if 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (dge 'phel dpon slob) was not appointed as their mkhan po (bla ma) this time, they did not want any other Lama. Thus, the government granted their request and appointed him.<sup>426</sup>

Moreover, the monks in the sGo mang college warned that if the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa was not appointed as the next mkhan po of the college, the monks would disperse, and the college would cease to exist.<sup>427</sup> This shows the level of loyalty and support that the monks at sGo mang College had for the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa. In this intimate relationship with

<sup>424</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 75a.  
<sup>425</sup> dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po 1987: 83–90.  
<sup>426</sup> *ibid.*: 92.  
<sup>427</sup> *ibid.*: 92.

his purist followers, it appeared to be easy for the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa to lead the monks of his college against the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1 and 5.4.2).

It is uncertain whether the government under the leadership of the Sixth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid failed to recognise the future consequences of this appointment or if they simply underestimated the influence of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa. However, under the permission of the dGa' ldanpho brang, the fifty-three-year-old First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa was formally enthroned in the sGo mang college at 'Bras spungs on the 15<sup>th</sup> of the tenth month of 1700.<sup>428</sup> This appointment marked a significant shift in the political power dynamics among the purists, the sDe srid, and the Sixth Dalai Lama. Because the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa swiftly transitioned from being merely a distinguished scholar to becoming the mKhan po of a major college. This automatically made him a core member of the dGa' ldan pho brang's decision-making bodies, such as the small (*hrag bsdus*) and large assemblies (*rgyas 'dzoms*) (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3).

### 3.4. Spreading Rumours among the Mongols and Manchus

Following the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's appointment, the sway of the dGe lugs purists under his leadership manifestly increased.<sup>429</sup> Now, they wielded direct influence in the dGa' ldan pho brang's decision-making assembly through the First Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3). Furthermore, they had a direct link with the patrons of the sGo mang college, owing to the First Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's recent appointment as the mKhan po of the college.<sup>430</sup> From this newly gained position of strength, as we will discuss below, the purists began circulating adverse rumours about the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama, resonating not only with Tibetans but also with the Mongols and the Manchus.<sup>431</sup> Some of the main rumours pertain to the initiatives by the two leaders to integrate other Tibetan religious schools under the government and treat them equitably.<sup>432</sup> The objective of these allegations was to diminish the authority of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama in the dGa' ldan pho brang and to curtail their backing for other Tibetan religious institutions (Chapter 4, Section 4.4.3).

#### 3.4.1. The Mongols' Reaction to the Rumour

Historically, many Dzungars had a close relationship with the dGe lugs purists, such as Grags pa rgyal mtshan, the champion of the dGe lugs purists during the era of the Fifth Dalai Lama in central Tibet.<sup>433</sup> However, during the reign of dGa' ldan Khan until 1697, the Dzungars did not voice their objections to the sDe srid's non-sectarian government activities due to the Khan's close ties with the sDe srid. Under their new leader, Tshe dbang rab brtan, the Dzungars again began to support the dGe lugs purists against the dGa' ldan pho brang (Chapter 2, Section 2.4). At the same time, the dGe lugs purists spread the rumours about the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama among the Dzungar Mongols and sought their support to fight against the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>434</sup>

---

<sup>428</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 80a.

<sup>429</sup> dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po 1987: 91–100.

<sup>430</sup> *ibid*: 95–96.

<sup>431</sup> *ibid*: 103.

<sup>432</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 75a.

<sup>433</sup> dGe ldan lhan tshogs gsum (ed). 2013: 208–209 and Dreyfus (online) 1998: Accessed 1 July 2024.

<sup>434</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje n.d.: 38b.

There was political tension between Dzungar leader Tshe dbang rab brtan and the sDe srid, rooted in the sDe srid's support for dGa' ldan Khan, the rival Dzungar leader.<sup>435</sup> Tshe dbang rab brtan and dGa' ldan Khan were embroiled in a family feud. Tshe dbang rab brtan's brothers, Tshe brtan bkra shis and bZod pa Batur, murdered dGa' ldan Khan's half-brother, Sangs rgyas (Sengge), the then Dzungar leader in 1671.<sup>436</sup> In retaliation, dGa' ldan renounced his monastic vow and killed Tshe brtan bkra shis and bZod pa Batur, consolidating his control over the Dzungar empire.<sup>437</sup> In his quest for leadership, Tshe dbang rab brtan, the son of Sangs rgyas, mounted a rebellion against dGa' ldan Khan. However, he was defeated and forced to flee Dzungaria. From the 1680s onwards, dGa' ldan Khan waged war against the Khalkhas and the Qing for various reasons.<sup>438</sup> In the final years of the Dzungar-Qing war, Tshe dbang rab brtan assisted the Qing in defeating dGa' ldan Khan.<sup>439</sup> Throughout this conflict, the sDe srid backed dGa' ldan Khan, a move that seems to have antagonised Tshe dbang rab brtan and his supporters.

Under the leadership of Tshe dbang rab brtan, the Dzungars could no longer exert the same influence over the Khalkha and other Eastern Mongols as they had during dGa' ldan Khan's time. The Dzungars' influence diminished due to the expanding Qing Empire, but they knew they could not challenge the Qing's dominance.<sup>440</sup> Given this situation, the Dzungars identified Tibet as a potential avenue for extending their dominion. Thus, from this point onwards, the Dzungar leader, "Tsewang Rabdan had begun to take an interest in Tibetan affairs",<sup>441</sup> possibly to assert his control over the region. Hence, upon hearing the rumours regarding the sDe srid, Tshe dbang rab brtan promptly sent his envoy to condemn the sDe srid. During this period, the Dzungars travelled regularly between Dzungaria and central Tibet for various reasons, including Buddhist pilgrimages, Buddhist studies, and seeking powerful alliances (Chapter 2, Section 2.4). They carried messages back and forth between the two societies. For example, in his *Biography of Che mchog 'dus pa rtsal* (1651–1726), Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje records the intense exchange between the sDe srid and Tshe dbang rab brtan and the latter's attempted military assault:

ཚུང་གར་ནས་ཉོང་ཐའེ་ཇིས་ཟླ་མིང་ལ་ཚུང་མེ་ནག་དཔོན་པོ་ཞིག་གིས་སླ་མ་ཚོ་ལ་ཕྱག་དབང་སྟེར་བ་ཡག་པོ་མ་རེད། དེ་  
འདྲ་མ་བྱེད། སླ་མའི་གལ་མགོར་མ་སྟོད། པོ་ཏ་ལར་རྗེང་མའི་གྲ་ཚང་མ་འཛོག་ དའི་ཁ་ལ་ཉན་པ་བྱུང་ན་དེད་རང་གཉིས་  
འཆམ་པོ་ཡོང་། ཉན་མ་བྱུང་ན་དམག་རྒྱལ་རྒྱ་ཡིན་ཞེས་དགོས་པ་ལྟར་ན་མ་ལམ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་གྱིས་མེ་སྟར་ཕྱིན་དུས་འཕྲིན་  
བསྐྱར་འདུག།

ཟླ་མིང་ནས་མ་གསལ་པར་བརྟེན་དམག་རྒྱལ་རྗེས་གྱིས་གྲ་སྟོན་དང་། མོས་བསྐྱར་ཡང་ཡང་གནང་འདུག་ཟླ། གཞུང་རང་གི་  
རྒྱ་རིམ་བཟང་དྲགས་པས་རྒྱལ་པོའི་ཐོག་ལ་མ་གཏོགས་དམག་འགྲུགས་ཐུབ་པ་བྱུང་མ་སོང་ཞེས་ཚོས་འཕེལ་ཇ་སང་ནས་  
ངོས་གྱིས་ཟེར་བ་ཐོས།

<sup>435</sup> *Qing shilü zàngzú shiliào* 1982, vol-i: 160–161.  
<sup>436</sup> Schwieger 2015: 73–74.  
<sup>437</sup> Heissig (trans) 1944: 113 and Sagaster 1967: 20.  
<sup>438</sup> *Qing shilü zàngzú shiliào* 1982, vol-i: 125–126.  
<sup>439</sup> Perdue 2005:183, and 199.  
<sup>440</sup> Perdue 2005: 127.  
<sup>441</sup> Perdue 2005: 229.

Hong Taiji<sup>442</sup> from the Dzungar sent a letter with the monk Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan, who went there as an envoy: “For a lay-leader (*mi nag dpon po*) like you (the sDe srid), it is not appropriate to offer hand-blessings to other lamas. Do not do this. Do not sit above lamas. Do not set up a rNying ma college in the Potala. If you listen to me, we will be on good terms. But if you do not, I will launch a military campaign [against you].”

I (Che mchog 'dus pa rtsal) heard that Chos 'phel ja sang [a Dzungar general] said, “[the Dzungars] prepared for a military expedition [to Tibet] and discussed the matter many times because the sDe srid did not listen [to them]. [However,] due to the excellence of the government’s rituals, except on the King [IHa bzang Khan in 1717] they could not wage war [against the Tibetan government]”.<sup>443</sup>

Since Sle lung Lama was a neutral figure and many of his narratives were accurate (Chapter 1, Section 1.5.1), this statement is also highly likely to be true. In this passage, Tshe dbang rab brtan states, “do not set up a rNying ma college in the Potala Palace.” It refers to the monks in the Potala Palace (rNam rgyal graw tshang) who performed rNying ma rituals for the government. As previously discussed, these accusations directly reflected the objections made by the dGe lugs purists in central Tibet against the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3). This passage proves that negative rumours or accusations about the sDe srid reached the Dzungars. This raises several questions: Who spread these rumours, and who stood to benefit from their dissemination? Additionally, who were the closest allies of the Dzungars under the leadership of Tshe dban grab brtan in central Tibet? All these questions point towards the dGe lugs purists in central Tibet. In this passage, it is also evident that the sDe srid dismissed the warnings from the Dzungars, suggesting he was confident that the Dzungars lacked the requisite strength to wage war against the dGa' ldan pho brang. This passage also suggests that Tshe dbang rab brtan was unsuccessful in initiating a war against the sDe srid, despite having planned and discussed it numerous times. After realising that the Dzungars alone could not influence the dGa' ldan pho brang, Tshe dbang rab brtan turned toward the Qing court and the Khoshut Mongols in the mTsho sngon region for collaboration.

The *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* records a message, dated 24 February 1698, delivered by the emissary of Tshe dbang rab brtan to Kangxi:

策妄阿喇布坦遣彭苏克喇木扎木巴、多尔济寨桑等进贡，并疏言：「第巴将达赖喇嘛圆寂之事，匿而不宣，斥正传之圣徒班禅，自尊其身，有玷道法。诈称达赖喇嘛之言，以混乱七旗喀尔喀、四厄鲁特。好事乐祸，正未有已。祈皇上睿鉴，俾法门之教无玷，使众生争自濯磨。」

Cè wàng ā Lǎ bù tǎn (Tshe dbang rab brtan) sent Lama Péngsūkè lǎmù Zhāmùbā, Duō ěr jì Zhài sāng and others to pay tribute (to the court) and said: “The sDe srid concealed

<sup>442</sup> In this passage, Hong Taiji refers to Tshe dbang rab brtan. “Hong Taiji” is a high-level title in the Mongolian and Manchu political hierarchy. In Chinese, it is written as Huáng Tàiji, which means “crown prince.” Historically, the title belonged only to the descendants of Genghis Khan among the Mongols. However, the Fifth Dalai Lama began to confer the title on several Mongol leaders, including the Dzungar leader dGa' ldan Khan, who were not descendants of Genghis Khan (Ishihama 1992: 503). These titles made those Mongolian leaders legitimate “Hong Taiji.” In 1694, in the name of the Fifth Dalai Lama, the dGa' ldan pho brang offered the same title to Tshe dbang rab brtan (Ishihama 1992: 504).

<sup>443</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje n.d.: 38b.

the death of the Dalai Lama and abandoned the authentic Panchen Lama, the great living Buddha. He falsely used the words of the Dalai Lama to create chaos between Khalkhas and Oirats. The sDe srid has not yet stopped his evil deeds. I request Kangxi’s guidance so that the Buddhist teachings may not be defiled, and all beings may strive for self-improvement.”<sup>444</sup>

The allegations of concealing the Dalai Lama’s death, undermining the authority of the Panchen Lama, and creating conflict between the Khalkahs and Oirats were longstanding accusations against the sDe srid. Additionally, in this excerpt, the Dzungars now accused the sDe srid of destroying the Buddhist teachings (sometimes termed as Tsong Kha pa’s teaching), which, in this context, refers to the dGe lugs school. This allegation is the primary grievance of the dGe lugs purists against the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. Thus, it is again evident that the dGe lugs purists played a significant role in these spreading rumours about the sDe srid dismantling the dGe lugs school.

While persuading the Qing to support his war against the sDe srid, Tshe dbang rab brtan also urged the Khoshut Mongols to take a firm stand against the dGa’ ldan pho brang to protect the dGe lugs pa tradition. Around this time, the purists had started spreading the same rumours about the sDe srid among the Khoshuts through monks and lay people travelling between central Tibet and mTsho sngon.<sup>445</sup> Given the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s strong ties with the Khoshut Mongols in mTsho sngon, some purist monks and laypeople were likely present in that region. Thus, the rumours about the sDe srid reached the Khoshut Mongols directly from the purists in central Tibet as well as from the Dzungar leaders in Dzungaria.<sup>446</sup>

Aware of these unfolding events, in the seventh month of 1700, the sDe srid dispatched the head teacher (*dpon slob*) of Blo gsal gling college to the mTsho sngon region to delve into the specifics of these rumours and to determine whether they had sown confusion amongst the Khoshut Mongols. According to the *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama*, the Khoshut leaders declined Tshe dbang rab brtan’s request and voiced their staunch support for the dGa’ ldan pho brang:

སློབ་གསལ་སྤྱི་བའི་དཔོན་སློབ་མཚོ་ལར་འབྱོར་བའི་ཚོགས་འདུ་ལྷན་བཞུགས་མའི་ཚེས་བཅོ་ལྔ་པ་ལྷན་ཁག་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་  
གོང་འབས་རིན་པོ་ཆེར་ཐེ་ཚོམ་འགྱུར་བ་མེད་པ་དེད་དུ་འདུག་རྒྱ་རིགས་དང་བོད་དུ་འབྲོ་མིས་སྤྱི་བའི་སློབ་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་ལ་བས་པ་ལས་  
དེད་ཚོས་ཅི་ཤེས། ད་སློབ་གོང་གི་བཀའ་དང་བཅས་ལོག་ལྷ་མི་གནང་ཞིང་། [...]

ཚོ་དབང་རབ་བརྟན་གྱིས་དམག་བྱེད་ཟེར་བའང་སྲོན་ལ་དེད་རང་ཚོ་ཚད་ཚོགས་ དེད་ཚོ་བོད་དང་མ་གཅིག་ན་སློབ་མཚོས་  
སྤྱི་བའི་བཀའ་ཚད་ཡོང་།

At the gathering in mTsho sngon, where Blo gsal gling dPon slob had arrived, concluded on the 15th of the previous month, the [Mongol] leaders declared, “We have unwavering faith in the Sixth Dalai Lama (Gong zhabs rin po che).” To me (the sDe srid), [they] said, “We are only aware of the various rumours spread by monks and people who visited Tibet. Now, along with the special command from the government (*gong*), we will not harbour any negative views towards [the sDe srid].” [...]

<sup>444</sup> *Qing shilù zàngzú shiliào* 1982, vol-i: 160–161.  
<sup>445</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 723.  
<sup>446</sup> *ibid*: 723.

Even though Tshe dbang rab brtan asked [the Khoshut Mongols] to launch a war [against the dGa' ldan pho brang], [the Khoshuts replied], "Fight us first. If we are not united with the Tibetans, the lama and protector deities will punish us."<sup>447</sup>

This is the narrative of the sDe srid, clearly demonstrating the positive relationship between the dGa' ldan pho brang and the Khoshut Mongols in mTsho sngon. This passage should be examined alongside other materials (Chapter 3, Section 3.1.2). However, this passage, at least, shows the complex relations between the Dzungars, Khoshuts, and Tibetans, particularly highlighting Tshe dbang rab brtan's unsuccessful effort to ally with the Khoshuts in challenging the dGa' ldan pho brang. This passage shows that the dGa' ldan pho brang's ties with the Mongols, particularly the Khoshuts, were intricately entwined with political interests and religious devotion. The reason is that the main political figures of the dGa' ldan pho brang were also the primary spiritual mentors of the Mongol leaders, offering them both spiritual and political counsel (Chapter 2, Section 2.5).

Despite the resistance of the Khoshuts of mTsho sngon expressed, Tshe dbang rab brtan kept trying to extend his influence over the Khoshut Mongols and, simultaneously, endeavoured to present himself as the guardian of the dGe lug school.<sup>448</sup> It appeared that if Tshe dbang rab brtan gained the allegiance of the Khoshuts, whether through force or by leveraging rumours, he intended to broaden his influence into central Tibet via these Khoshut Mongols. Using rumours to bolster his position, Tshe dbang rab brtan called upon the Khoshut Mongols to join him against the dGa' ldan pho brang in the name of defending the dGe lugs school. If the Khoshuts declined, he warned them of potential conflict.

The Qing imperial record dated 23rd August 1700 sheds light on the matter:

策妄阿喇布坦人虽狡猾，但由博罗塔拉至土伯特，必经哈拉乌苏等艰险之处，路径甚恶，断不能往伐。何也？策妄阿喇布坦素行奸恶，故其附近哈萨克布鲁特诸部皆相仇讎。欲悉军大举，则路既难行，且无留护其妻孥者。若兵单力弱，断难成事，惟有奋激而行，妻孥与俱。幸而有济则已，无济则有归附土伯特之谋而已。然策妄阿喇布坦奏书之意，特张虚声，欲观青海之动静耳，亦未必果欲争战也。

Tshe dbang rab brtan is a crafty man; however, he would have to travel from Bó luō tā lā to tǔ bó tè (Tibet).<sup>449</sup> He had to go through dangerous places such as Hā lā wū sū. Why were all the tribes on this road, such as the Khazakh (Hāsàkè) and Bù lǔ tèdǐng,<sup>450</sup> hostile to Tshe dbang rab brtan? It is because of his cruel behaviour. The journey presents significant challenges. If he were to mobilise his entire army, no one would be left to safeguard his wife and children. Conversely, if he opts for a smaller, less formidable force, accomplishing his mission becomes daunting. An alternative is to undertake the march alongside his wife and children. If fortune favours him, he may

<sup>447</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 723.

<sup>448</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje n.d.: 38b.

<sup>449</sup> In addition to various other expressions, the documents from the Qing era also mentioned the region and people of Tibet with the term "Tǔ bó tè". This terminology appears as Tǔ bó tè (土伯特) in traditional texts from the Qing period.

<sup>450</sup> Considering the context, this could be the name of Uyghur people, or perhaps a specific name for a sub-tribe of Uyghurs. However, this is still not entirely certain.

succeed[ in gaining the support of the Khoshuts]; however, if he does not, he might choose to journey to Tibet instead. However, Tshe dbang rab brtan's true motive in sending a deceptive message was to gauge [the response of the Mongols in] Qinghai. His intention was not necessarily to engage in combat.<sup>451</sup>

This is a Qing court record analysing Tshe dbang rab brtan's warning against the Khoshut Mongols. The Qing court interpreted the Dzungar leader's message to the Khoshut Mongols in mTsho sngon as a "deceptive message" and believed the Dzungar leader wanted to test the Khoshut Mongols' loyalty towards the dGa' ldan pho brang by sending warnings. This passage indicates that the Qing court was not a genuine ally to the Dzungars under their new leadership. They also lacked confidence in Tshe dbang rab brtan's ability to initiate a war against the sDe srid in Tibet. The main reason is that, without the collaboration of the Khoshut Mongols, Tshe dbang rab brtan would have had to lead his army to central Tibet through hostile regions, including Yarkend, populated by the Kazakh and Bùlù Tèděng people, who were staunch adversaries of Tshe dbang rab brtan. However, the Qing did not resist Tshe dbang rab brtan's war proposal, which was perhaps because the Qing court still harboured negative sentiments towards the sDe srid (Chapter 2, Section 2.1 and 2.2). At this stage, according to Qing official documents, the Qing court did not appear to recognise the security implications of ceding the dGa' ldan pho brang to the Dzungars.<sup>452</sup> This may be because, as mentioned in the passage quoted above, the Qing underestimated the capability of Tshe dbang rab brtan at the time.

### 3.4.2. The Qing Court's Reaction to the Rumours

After the defeat of dGa' ldan Khan, Tshe dbang rab brtan not only tried to join up with the Khoshuts against the Tibetan government but was also actively spreading rumours to undermine the relationship between the sDe srid and Kangxi.<sup>453</sup> Tshe dbang rab brtan told Kangxi that the sDe srid had concealed the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama, had strategically backed dGa' ldan Khan in the Dzungar-Qing war, and obstructed the Fifth Panchen Lama's visit to Kangxi.<sup>454</sup> Most crucially, Tshe dbang rab brtan had accused the sDe srid of destroying the Buddhist teachings in central Tibet.<sup>455</sup> In addition this channel of rumour, during this period, the Qing court also received negative news about the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama destroying the teachings of Tsong Kha pa through their Lǐ Fān Yuàn in mTsho sngon.<sup>456</sup>

Kangxi harboured resentment towards the sDe srid for hiding the Dalai Lama's death, backing dGa' ldan Khan, and disregarding his orders to send dGa' ldan Khan's main supporters to Beijing.<sup>457</sup> Consequently, upon hearing of the rumours that the sDe srid was undermining the Buddhist teachings, Kangxi promptly expressed his full support for Tshe dbang rab brtan's proposal to oust the sDe srid from his political position in Tibet. Dated 13th April 1698, the Qing document records Kangxi's response to Tshe dban grab rbtan:

---

<sup>451</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 173–174.

<sup>452</sup> Later, the Qing recognised the political implications of the Dzungars controlling the dGa' ldan pho brang. Thus, they employed various political strategies to prevent the Dzungars from invading the dGa' ldan pho brang (rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997: 229). And Perdue 2005: 229.

<sup>453</sup> rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997: 225.

<sup>454</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 173–174 and 162.

<sup>455</sup> *ibid*: 160–161.

<sup>456</sup> rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997: 220.

<sup>457</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 160–161.

观此，则其情已极昭著矣。尔所奏良是。尔抒实情，思为法门之教、班禅胡土克图之事而劾奏第巴，朕深许之。为此特差内阁侍读学士伊道、近御侍卫拉锡、二等侍卫克什图、内阁侍读常明、三等侍卫津巴为使。以伴敕例，赐御用彩缎十端。

This is an obvious statement; your (Tshe dbang rab brtan's) intention is clear. It is good that you sent this letter. You have told me the truth. You wish to impeach the sDe srid to uphold Buddhism and the Panchen Hothogthu. I (the emperor) am delighted with this decision. Regarding this matter, I have sent Yī dào and Lā xī, the internal ministers and Kè shí tú and Cháng míng, the second and third-class guards, and Jīn bā, a third-class retainer. As previously decreed, with this decree, ten imperial satin-clothes have been given to you.<sup>458</sup>

This excerpt indicates that Kangxi backed Tshe dbang rab brtan's plan under the guise of safeguarding Buddhism (means dGe lugs tradition in this situation).<sup>459</sup> However, unlike Tshe dbang rab brtan, Kangxi was hesitant to launch a direct war against the dGa' ldan pho brang under the leadership of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama, although he pretended to do so.<sup>460</sup> Firstly, Kangxi was aware that the sDe srid still had strong political support among the Tibetans and Mongol leaders.<sup>461</sup> Furthermore, for most of the Mongols and Tibetans, opposing the Sixth Dalai Lama was unquestionably akin to opposing Tibetan Buddhism.<sup>462</sup> Thus, to be an enemy of Tibetan Buddhism meant being an enemy to a large number of Mongols and Tibetans. If Kangxi directly engaged in conflict with the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama, he might tarnish his reputation as a patron and defender of Buddhism.

Under this dilemma, Tshe dbang rab brtan's suggested plan aligned with Kangxi's aim to undermine the sDe srid without risking his own image as a Buddhist patron. Thus, Kangxi supported Tshe dbang rab brtan's plan of a military expedition. The Qing official document, dated 28 May 1698, records Kangxi's reply to Tshe dbang rab brtan:

命内阁侍读学士伊道等赍敕往谕策妄阿喇布坦曰：「览尔疏言：[第巴掩匿达赖喇嘛圆寂之事，斥班禅而自尊，有玷道法。好事如此，恐祸正无已。]又尔所遣彭苏克喇木扎木巴、多尔济寨桑等口奏尔之言云：[第巴监禁班禅，不使人见。奉事红帽两喇嘛名德尔端、多尔济扎卜者，即现世达赖喇嘛化身，亦以是两喇嘛之言，谓之达赖喇嘛而已，并非班禅之言，是以可疑。第巴坏法门之教，罪不可容。]本朝与达赖喇嘛交往七十余年，第巴原系达赖喇嘛执事下人，因軫念达赖喇嘛，欲使扶持道法，是以优封为土伯特国王。乃以久故之达赖喇嘛诈称尚存以欺众，唆噶尔丹兴戎，所行不轨。今又奏称俟班禅胡土克图往覲之时奏明，而又不遣班禅，且致书求尔勿遣。」

The Emperor ordered the cabinet minister, Yī dào, and others to send an imperial decree to Tshe dbang rab brtan. The decree recorded, "I (Kangxi) have read your (Tshe dbang rab brtan's) statement, which said, 'The sDe srid concealed the death of the

<sup>458</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 163.

<sup>459</sup> Kangxi proclaimed himself as the protector and patron of the Tsong Kha pa (dGe lugs tradition) religion in his official records and correspondence (*Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 162–163).

<sup>460</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: and Nor bu bsam 'phel (online) 2022: Accessed 9 September 2022.

<sup>461</sup> Nor bu bsam 'phel (online) 2022: Accessed 9 September 2022.

<sup>462</sup> Nor bu bsam 'phel (online) 2022: Accessed 9 September 2022.

Dalai Lama, offended the Panchen Lama, and elevated himself to utmost importance. He has destroyed the teachings of Buddhism. His fondness for causing trouble makes me fear it will never end.’ The messengers you (Tshe dbang rab brtan) sent to me, Péngsūkè lǎ mù zhā mù bā and Duō ěr jì zhài sāng, also told me, ‘The sDe srid has imprisoned the Panchen Lama and will not allow anyone to see him. The sDe srid also believes in the two red hat<sup>463</sup> lamas, named Dé ěr duān (bBe ldan) and Duō ěr jì zhā bǔ (rDo rje bkra bu), who claim to be the incarnations of the present Dalai Lama. These claims are their own words, not those of the Panchen Lama, making them suspicious. The sDe srid’s mistake of destroying the dharma teachings cannot be forgiven.’ Our empire has been associated with the Dalai Lama for more than seventy years, and the sDe srid was originally his subordinate in handling his affairs. However, upon the request of the Dalai Lama, I entitled him the king of Tibet.<sup>464</sup> The sDe srid, however, deceived people by acting as if the Dalai Lama was still alive and colluded immorally with dGa’ ldan to start a war. He sent a letter to me, asking me to wait for the Panchen Lama’s journey to the capital, but he did not allow the Panchen Lama to travel’.”<sup>465</sup>

In this extended passage, Kangxi details the accusations against the sDe srid and endeavours to justify the Dzungars’ planned war aimed at the sDe srid and potentially the Sixth Dalai Lama. Kangxi also drew his court ministers’ attention to the historical ties between the Qing and the Fifth Dalai Lama, highlighting the shortcomings of the sDe srid. In conclusion, Kangxi conveyed to Tshe dbang rab brtan, “I am delighted with this decision. For this matter, I have sent Yī Dào, Lā Xī, the cabinet attendant, Kèshí Tú and Cháng Míng, the second and third-class guards, and Jīn Bā, a third-class retainer. Following the tradition and decree, ten copies of imperial coloured satin were given to you.”<sup>466</sup> This clearly indicates Kangxi’s full endorsement of the military option. Considering the political dynamics between the Qing, the dGa’ ldan pho brang, and the Dzungars, it is evident that Kangxi’s decision was a strategic manoeuvre to remove the sDe srid without tarnishing his own Buddhist image.

### 3.4.3. Strategic Challenges Facing the Dzungars and Manchus

In the middle of 1698, Tshe dbang rab brtan, the new leader of the Dzungars, became involved in a prolonged conflict with the Kazakhs, another regional power on the southern border of Dzungaria.<sup>467</sup> The Dzungars, under Tshe dbang rab brtan’s leadership, were not as formidable as they had been during dGa’ ldan Khan’s time. Consequently, Tshe dbang rab brtan was ensnared in this regional clash with the Kazakhs, preventing him from executing his intended campaign against the sDe srid.<sup>468</sup> Tshe dbang rab brtan was unsuccessful in deposing the sDe srid, and the Qing’s objective was not achieved. This seemingly compelled Kangxi to seek an alternative method to exert pressure on the sDe srid. Kangxi was keenly intent on eliminating the important Tibetan figures linked with dGa’ ldan Khan, but the sDe srid declined to hand over any of those individuals to the Qing court.<sup>469</sup> Consequently, even aware of the dangers of

<sup>463</sup> This is the way old Chinese documents refer to the bKa’ brgyud school, one of the Tibetan Buddhist schools in Tibet. Perhaps because of this, modern scholars also sometimes refer to the bKa’ brgyud school as ‘Red Hat.’ However, in Tibetan, ‘Red Hat’ denotes the Shwa dmar pa sub-branch of the bKa’ brgyud school.

<sup>464</sup> This refers to the title Tū bó tè guówáng (King of Tibet) given by Kangxi to the sDe srid upon the request in the name of the Fifth Dalai Lama.

<sup>465</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 162–163.

<sup>466</sup> *ibid*: 163–164.

<sup>467</sup> *ibid*: 163–164.

<sup>468</sup> Pānzhènpíng (ed) 2017: 173–174.

<sup>469</sup> Appendix One (*Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, dated 13 April 1698)

directly opposing the dGa' ldan pho brang, Kangxi opted to intimidate the sDe srid with the potential threat of war. A letter dated 29th May 1699 indicates that Kangxi would wage war against the sDe srid if he continued to defy Kangxi's orders.<sup>470</sup> Based on the rumours he heard, Kangxi levelled various accusations against the sDe srid, portraying him as a destroyer of the dGe lugs school. Kangxi listed what he perceived as the misdeeds of the sDe srid:

第巴原系达赖喇嘛下管事人，朕优擢之，封为土伯特国王。乃阳奉宗喀巴之道法，阴与噶尔丹比，欺达赖喇嘛、班禅而坏宗喀巴之法。前遣济隆胡土克图至噶尔丹所，为噶尔丹诵经，选择战日。朕为众生往召班禅，沮而不遣。

[The Kangxi Emperor] said, “The the sDe srid was initially a steward of the [Fifth] Dalai Lama. However, I supported him and conferred on him the title of Tibetan king.<sup>471</sup> The sDe srid superficially pretended to believe in Tsong kha pa's teachings but secretly schemed with dGa' ldan. [He also] deceived the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama and destroyed Tsong kha pa's teachings. Before sending rJe lung Hutuktu to dGa' ldan's place, [the sDe srid] performed rituals for dGa' ldan and chose the war date. I invited the Panchen Lama for the sake of all sentient beings, but [the sDe srid] prevented him (the Panchen Lama).”<sup>472</sup>

In this passage, amid various allegations, Kangxi specifically accused the sDe srid of “destroying Tsong kha pa's teachings” and “superficially pretending to believe in Tsong kha pa's teachings.” As discussed above, Tshe dbang rab brtan from Dzungar and the First 'Jam dbyngs bzhad pa made the same accusation against the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>473</sup> As demonstrated above, around this time, the dGe lugs purists in central Tibet, the Dzungars, and even Kangxi Emperor in Peking started to speak with one voice, saying, “protect the teachings of Tsong Kha pa.” This is evidence that news of the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama destroying the dGe lugs school came from a single source, which was, as demonstrated earlier, none other than the dGe lugs purists in central Tibet.

Although Kangxi began to warn the sDe srid of possible war if the latter refused to hand over dGa' ldan Khan's supporters to Peking, perhaps the sDe srid believed that Kangxi would not dare to wage war against him.<sup>474</sup> Whatever the reason might have been, the sDe srid did not submit to the power of the Qing court. However, Kangxi was unable to wage war against the

<sup>470</sup> Pānzhènpíng (ed) 2017: 312 and *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 151. In his own words, Kangxi threatened to wage war if his demands were not fulfilled (rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997:99–102).

<sup>471</sup> In the Manchu document, *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* (1982, vol-i:130 and 139), the term Guówáng is frequently employed to denote the leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang. This term is conventionally translated as “the king of a country”, and its significance remains consistent in contemporary Chinese. In classical Chinese, there appears to be a subtle distinction between Wáng and Guówáng. Whilst both terms denote “king”, the latter more specifically refers to the “king of a country.” In classical Chinese, the term “Guó” signifies an independent political entity, although its interpretation varies from the Eurocentric concept of a “nation-state.” Liú Hàchéng (2020: 307 and 383–384) argues that the Qing did not employ the political term Guówáng for those within their jurisdiction. The definition of this term remained consistent in classical Chinese throughout the Qing Empire.

<sup>472</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 130.

<sup>473</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 162–163 and bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 75a.

<sup>474</sup> During this period, it was evident that the military power of the dGa' ldan pho brang was nowhere near that of the Qing Empire. Despite this, the sDe srid did not comply with Kangxi's demands, even after the latter warned of possible war (*Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i:). Therefore, it is evident that the sDe srid was aware that Kangxi could not initiate a war against him (Nor bu bsam 'phel (online) 2022: Accessed 9 September 2022).

sDe srid and remove him from his position. Nor bu bsam 'phel, a modern Tibetan historian specialising in the dGa' ldan pho brang, explains the reasons why:

ཁང་མིས་ཀྱིས་ཉན་ཉན་དམག་བཏང་ནས་བོད་དབང་བསྐྱར་བྱེད་འདོད་ནའང་། ཁོས་ལག་ལེན་ཐོག་ཏུ་བཟུར་ཐུབ་ཀྱིན་མེད། གང་ཡིན་ཟེར་ན། དགའ་ལྷན་པོ་བྲང་སོག་པོ་ཡོངས་ཀྱི་ཁྲིད་དུ་རྒྱབ་སྐྱོར་ཆེན་པོ་ཡོད་པས། གལ་སྲིད་ཆེང་གིས་དགའ་ལྷན་པོ་བྲང་ལ་དམག་བརྒྱབ་ན། སོག་པོ་ཡོངས་རྫོགས་ཆེང་གི་ཁ་གཏད་དུ་ལངས་ནས་ཆེང་ལ་ཉེན་ཁ་བཟོ་མིང་བ་རེད།

Kangxi certainly wanted to send his army to invade the dGa' ldan pho brang. However, he could not put this into practice due to the strong support the dGa' ldan pho brang among all the Mongols. If the Qing fought war against the dGa' ldan pho brang, all the Mongols might have risen against the Qing, posing a significant risk to the Qing.<sup>475</sup>

Although this passage is not a primary source, the statement aptly encapsulates the intricacy of the Qing's stance. It underscores the potential ramifications of initiating a direct conflict against the dGa' ldan pho brang to eliminate the sDe srid. In his work on China published in 1741, based on the memoir of the French Jesuit Gerbillion (1654-1707), Du Halde notes, "it is hardly probable his Majesty (Kangxi) will attempt to carry the War into Thibet (Tibet), it being too far from China, and the Roads too difficult for the march of an army."<sup>476</sup> As it became evident that Kangxi could not directly engage in warfare against the sDe srid, he shifted his focus to the disputes in the Dar rste mdo region, the south-eastern frontier between the dGa' ldan pho brang and the Qing Empire in the late 17th century, which we will discuss later (Chapter 4, Section 4.1).

In late 1700, Kangxi also demanded the sDe srid to return the official Qing title bestowed upon him in 1694. This demand also forms part of Kangxi's political strategy to exert further pressure on the sDe srid, compelling him to surrender the supporters of the dGa' ldan Khan to the Qing court. Dated the eighth month of 1700, the sDe srid writes in his *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama*:

སྐྱུ་གཉེར་དུ་ཤང་ཟེ་ལིང་ནས་འཁོར། རྒྱ་ནག་གོང་མས་ངེད་དུ་ལྷ་སོར་གནང་བའི་ཐམ་ག་ཕྱིར་སྦྱོང་གསུང་བ་སོགས་བཀའ་སྩོལ་བའི་བཀའ་ཤོག་སྐྱུ་ཞབས་སུ་ངེད་ལ་སྦྱང།

The Hwa shang,<sup>477</sup> the general manager, returned from Xining. [He] gave me [the sDe srid] an official letter of the emperor, loaded with heavy words, in front of the sKu zhabs [the Dalai Lama], saying that I had to return the seal that I was given before by the emperor, etc.<sup>478</sup>

<sup>475</sup> Nor bu bsam 'phel (online) 2022: Accessed 9 September 2022.

<sup>476</sup> Du Halde 1741, vol-i: 161.

<sup>477</sup> In this passage, the sDe srid used the Chinese term Héshàng, which means "monk", to refer to a monk diplomat in Xining. Although the sDe srid did not name this monk, according to the context, this monk must be the Mongolian monk Phyang na rdo rje, also known as Shangnandorji, a diplomatic officer of Li fān yuàn in Xining (Schwieger 2015:116).

Borjigidai Oyunbilig is perhaps one of the first scholars to analyse the works of the Qing diplomat Phyang na rdo rje. Borjigidai Oyunbilig describes Phyang na rdo rje as a significant Mongolian diplomat for the Qing Empire, based in Xining, according to the *Gōng zhōngdàng rénming bāo*. (Borjigidai Oyunbilig 1994:82–91). Based on Borjigidai Oyunbilig's work, Schwieger depicts the monk Phyang na rdo rje as a well-known diplomat serving on behalf of the Qing in their relations with Tibet, the Dzungar, and the Khoshuts (Schwieger 2015: 116). I am unaware of the reason, but according to the Qing official documents, diplomat Phyang na rdo rje's approach toward the sDe srid is critical from the beginning of their relationship.

<sup>478</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 738.

This passage indicates that Kangxi took various measures, from revoking titles to issuing war threats, to compel the sDe srid to comply with his demands, including sending the supporters of dGa' ldan Khan to the Qing court. This threat of removing titles also highlights Kangxi's limited power beyond issuing such warnings. During this time, the relationship demonstrates the power balance between the Qing and the dGa' ldan pho brang, with neither polity able to dictate terms to the other by force. Therefore, neither the Dzungars under Tshe dbang rab brtan nor the Qing under Kangxi managed to initiate actual war against the dGa' ldan pho brang under the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama.

There are several reasons for this: both the Dzungars and the Manchus identified themselves as Tibetan Buddhist patrons and protectors of the dGe lugs school.<sup>479</sup> Kangxi Emperor even portrayed themselves as manifestations of Mañjuśrī (Chapter 2, Section 2.2). In this context, initiating a conflict against the dGa' ldan pho brang, the emblematic institution of the dGe lugs school, was obviously not an appropriate behaviour for them. During this period, cultivating the image of a Tibetan Buddhist patron diplomatically assisted the rulers in legitimising their governance and leadership stature among the Mongols and Tibetans.<sup>480</sup> Secondly, the Khoshut Mongols categorically declined the Dzungars' proposition for a joint campaign against the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>481</sup> Thus, the Khoshut Mongols in the mTsho sngon regions and central Tibet would likely have allied with the dGa' ldan pho brang if the government was attacked.

Therefore, it remains uncertain whether the Qing or the Dzungars could have overcome the Khoshut and Tibetan forces backing the dGa' ldan pho brang. Furthermore, the dGa' ldan pho brang enjoyed significant support from the Khalkha and other Eastern Mongols (Chapter 2, Section 2.3). Thus, if the Qing or the Dzungars were to wage war against the dGa' ldan pho brang, it would harm their diplomatic relations with these groups. In this situation, militarily and diplomatically, there was no clear path to victory for the Dzungars and the Qing. Additionally, the Dzungars were embroiled in a conflict with the Kazakhs whilst considering launching a war against the dGa' ldan pho brang. Finally, though there is currently no substantial evidence available to verify this, it is not unlikely that an unwritten diplomatic code or mutual understanding existed between the Mongols and the Qing court that prevented them from engaging in direct war against the dGa' ldan pho brang. For example, after Khoshut Mongol lHa bzang Khan assassinated the former sDe srid and took control of the dGa' ldan pho brang in 1705, the unwritten mutual understanding among Mongols and the Qing related to Tibet had gradually vanished. Thus, the Mongols and Manchus increasingly began to intrude in the dGa' ldan pho brang's politics which culminated in the Dzungar's invasion of Tibet in 1717 and Manchu's permanent military station in Lhasa in 1720.<sup>482</sup>

### 3.5. Conclusion

As the first Dzungar-Qing war neared its conclusion in 1697, there was a gradual shift in the political landscape among the Mongols, including Khoshuts. Concurrently, in central Tibet, the sDe srid was preparing to disclose the demise of the Fifth Dalai Lama and proclaim the

<sup>479</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje n.d.: 38b and lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (b) n.d.: 1a–2b.

<sup>480</sup> Based on the official correspondence between these leaders, both the Kangxi Emperor (rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997: 74 and 76) and the Mongolian rulers (rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997: 73) repeatedly endeavoured to depict themselves as enthusiastic patrons of Tibetan Buddhism.

<sup>481</sup> Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào 1982, vol-i: 173–174 and sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 723.

<sup>482</sup> For details, see Petech's work (1972: 8–90).

ascension of the Sixth Dalai Lama to the throne. Most Mongols and Tibetans swiftly acknowledged the news concerning the Fifth and Sixth Dalai Lamas (Chapter 3, Section 3.1). The Qing dispatched their representatives to partake in the enthronement ceremony and to condemn the action of the sDe srid at the same time. It therefore appears that at this point, only the dGe lugs purists condemned the sDe srid and rejected the legitimacy of the Sixth Dalai Lama (Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2).

Following the announcement of the Fifth Dalai Lama's demise, the dGe lugs purists started voicing criticism towards the leadership of the dGa' ldan pho brang (Chapter 3, Section 3.1). During this development, the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa rose to prominence as the leading figure of the purists in opposition to the sDe srid. To quell the escalating tensions between the dGa' ldan pho brang and the purists, the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama appointed the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa as the mKhan po of sGo mang college. However, rather than becoming amicable towards the dGa' ldan pho brang, the purists intensified their hostility towards the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2).

The purists saw the government's inclusive stance towards other Tibetan religious schools as a threat to the dGe lugs tradition. They perceived the government's non-sectarian rituals and congregations as a strategy by the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama to undermine the dGe lugs tradition. Thus, to counter the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama, the primary tactic of the purists was to spread the news of the sDe srid and Dalai Lama destroying the dGe lugs tradition among the Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3). Upon catching wind of the rumours spread by the dGe lugs purists, the Manchus and Dzungars seized the chance to chastise the sDe srid for undermining Tsong Kha pa's tradition. They even threatened the sDe srid with potential military intervention (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2).

However, for various reasons, neither the Qing nor the Dzungars were able to actualise a war against the dGa' ldan pho brang under the leadership of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. Perhaps due to the Dzungars and the Qing's inability to exert sufficient pressure, and the purists' lack of strength to shift the power balance in central Tibet, by 1700, the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama continued to govern the dGa' ldan pho brang on their own terms (Chapter 3, Section 3.3 and 3.4). This chapter elucidates the balance of power between the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Mongols, and the Qing Empire, as well as the shifts in internal power factions within the dGa' ldan pho brang from 1697 to 1700.

## Chapter Four:

### Power Disintegration: The Dynamics between the Dalai Lama, the sDe srid, and the Purists

(1700-1703)

This chapter will explore the historical background of the Dar rtse mdo region, detailing its integration under Qing rule and the subsequent impact on the power dynamics within the dGa' ldan pho brang. It will also examine the lifestyle transition of the Sixth Dalai Lama and the emerging tensions between the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama. Finally, the chapter will analyse the evolving relationship between lHa bzang Khan and the dGe lugs purists.

#### 4.1. Border Conflicts in the Dar rtse mdo Region

Dar rtse mdo, also known as Dar mdo, was historically the primary base of the lCags la kingdom, one of the eighteen Tibetan kingdoms geographically located between the Qing Empire and the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>483</sup> Dar rtse mdo is also referred to as lCags la, Mi nyag or mDo mi nyag. In classical Chinese documents, the name Dar rtse mdo is phonetically rendered as “Dǎ jiàn lú.” From 1904 onwards, Chinese official documents rendered the name of Dar rtse mdo as “Kāng Dìng.”<sup>484</sup> Dar rtse mdo had been a pivotal meeting point for Tibetan and Chinese rulers for centuries, playing a crucial role in ensuring political stability and offering commercial advantages to both societies, as we will discuss below.

##### 4.1.1. Contested Narrative about Dar rtse mdo

During the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama, the dGa' ldan pho brang was at the height of its power and influence. Under his rule, the dGa' ldan pho brang reunified most parts of the territory of Tibet previously held by the early Tibetan emperors.<sup>485</sup> However, under the leadership of sDe srid, the dGa' ldan pho brang began to lose its grip on the territories in the periphery, such as the mTsho sngon region.<sup>486</sup> In this context, control of Dar rtse mdo was essential to the dGa' ldan pho brang and the sDe srid's reputation.<sup>487</sup>

The Qing Empire began to challenge the dGa' ldan pho brang's historical claim to Dar rtse mdo. The first available record related to this conflict is a Qing official document, *Qīng shìlù zàngzú shìliào*, dated 8th August 1699, that argues that Dar rtse mdo belonged to the Qing Empire:

四川提督岳升龙疏言：「打箭炉原系本朝版图，竟被乌思藏强行侵占。康熙三十五年，钦差兵部郎中金图等会同四川巡抚于养志查勘后，仍霸踞如初，吞占蛮地数千里，侵夺番民数万户。又在木鸦私造銃炮，屯聚粮草。」

---

<sup>483</sup> Refer to the collected volumes for details of this region and its kingdoms (bTsan lha Ngag dbang tshul khriims et al. (eds) 2024).

<sup>484</sup> Mi nyag Thub bstan chos dar 2016: 3–5.

<sup>485</sup> bKra shis dbang 'dus (ed) 1989: 123–124 and Karmay 2005: 13.

<sup>486</sup> lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (a) n.d.:19a, 20b, Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1982: 18–19 and dKon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas 1982: 41.

<sup>487</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 797.

The General of Sichuan, Yuè shēng lóng, reported, “The city of Dǎ jiàn lú, which originally belonged to our empire, was forcibly occupied by Wū sī cáng (Tibet).<sup>488</sup> In the 35th year of Kangxi’s reign (1696), Jīn tú, the minister of military affairs, the Governor, Yú yǎng zhì, and others investigated the region. They discovered that Wū sī cáng (Tibet) continued to occupy thousands of miles of the area as greedily as before, controlling tens of thousands of local families. In the Mù yā region, they (Tibetans under the dGa’ ldan pho brang) have also been secretly building their own cannons and accumulating food and fodder.”<sup>489</sup>

This official record asserts that Dar rtse mdo was originally under the Qing’s rule and that the dGa’ ldan pho brang had invaded the region, but this document does not give the date of the annexation. However, another document from the same official record dated 7th August 1702 indicates that before 1700, none of the leaders in Dar rtse mdo had Qing official titles, which suggests that the Qing did not exercise control over Dar rtse mdo. Otherwise, the official documents would have recorded the Qing titles of the local officials. Moreover, the *Qīng shílù zàngzú shìliào* record dated 7th August 1702 says that the leaders in Dar rtse mdo handed over their Ming titles to the Qing court in 1702.<sup>490</sup> Historically, possessing a title bestowed by the Ming did not necessarily imply allegiance to the Ming empire, as the Ming conferred titles upon numerous foreigners for diplomatic reasons. Nonetheless, officials under the Ming or Qing were expected to have official titles to establish their rank or status.

As mentioned above, Manchu documents contradict one another. Some documents assert that the Qing held authority over Dar rste mdo, while others recount that Dar rtse mdo was governed by Tibetans. This shows that the official position of the Qing on Dar rtse mdo until 1702 was apparently unclear. However, Zahiruddin Ahmad writes that the conflict in Dar rtse mdo “ended with the re-capture of Ta-chien-lu (Dar rtse mdo) by the Manchus on 20th February 1701,”<sup>491</sup> suggesting that in his opinion the place was originally under the rule of the Qing before it came under the control of the dGa’ ldan pho brang government.

Unsurprisingly, this is viewed differently in Tibetan sources. The *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama* by sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho states that Dar rtse mdo was under the rule of the dGa’ ldan pho brang for several decades:

དེ་ཡང་དར་ཅེ་མདོ་ས་སྐྱོང་འཕྲིན་ལས་སྐྱ་མཚོའི་དུས་ལྔ་མ་རབ་འབྱམས་པའི་ལག་ནས་བཞེས་པའི་གཞུང་ཞབས་སུ་ཚུད་པ་  
ལས། ལོང་མ་རྒྱལ་པའི་མངའ་ཞབས་ནས་ཤོར་བ་སྟོགས་མིན་ཅུང་།

<sup>488</sup> Wū sī cáng constitutes one of the numerous designations traditional Chinese literatures employs to denote Tibet. This term is a phonetic rendering of the Tibetan word “dBus gTsang.” Commencing with the Yuan Dynasty, the term Wū sī cáng came into official usage as a reference to Tibet, supplementing other terms such as Tübō. The early Qing emperors subsequently upheld this lexical convention in their references to Tibet. During the reign of the Jiaqing Emperor (1796–1820), the sixth Emperor of the Qing Empire, a new appellation, “Xī zàng,” emerged in the Manchu and Chinese documents as a reference to Tibet.

However, the application and meaning of these various terms had never been rigid and fixed until the 20th century. Ultimately, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) adopted and fixed the term “Xī zàng” as synonymous with “Xī zàng Zìzhìqū,” denoting exclusively the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). For further details, please refer to Sperling’s article, “Tubote, Tibet, and the power of naming,” published in 2016.

<sup>489</sup> *Qīng shílù zàngzú shìliào* 1982, vol-i:169.

<sup>490</sup> *ibid*:179.

<sup>491</sup> Ahmad 1970: 327.

Furthermore, Dar rtse mdo was taken from Lama Rab 'byams pa and came under the control of the government (dGa' ldan pho brang) during the reign of sDe srid 'Phrin las rgya mtsho (1660–1668). It is not [correct] that [Dar rtse mdo] was lost from the realm of [the Qing] emperor.<sup>492</sup>

Like the Qing's narrative below, this is the narrative of the dGa' ldan pho brang. This passage claims that Dar rtse mdo came under the rule of the dGa' ldan pho brang in the 1660s, but no information on the administration of the dGa' ldan pho brang in the region is given in this excerpt. Modern historian Zhwa sgab pa writes that the region was an ancient Tibetan territory situated at a crucial border with the Chinese dynasties.<sup>493</sup> According to Yudru Tsomu, the region came under full control of the Lhasa government in 1639, shortly before the establishment of the dGa' ldan pho brang. “After the Khoshot Mongol Gushri Khan defeated the Beri King Donyo Dorje, between 1639 and 1741, he placed Kham, including the easternmost kingdom of Chakla, under the jurisdiction of the Lhasa government.”<sup>494</sup> On the other hand, contemporary scholar Thub bstan chos dar, who specialises in Dar rtse mdo, sees the incorporation of the region under the central Tibetan government as a result of the establishment of the dGa' ldan pho brang:

རབ་བྱུང་བཅུ་གཅིག་པའི་ཚུ་རྒྱ་ལོ་༡༦༤༢ ལོར་གཙང་བ་རྒྱལ་པོའི་ལག་ནས་སྲིད་དབང་འཕྲོག་ ལྷ་ས་འབྲས་སྐྱངས་  
 དགོན་དུ་དགའ་ལྷན་པོ་བྲང་གི་སྲིད་དབང་བཅུགས། དེ་ནས་དགའ་ལྷན་པོ་བྲང་གི་སྲིད་གཞུང་གིས་མདོ་ཁམས་ཡུལ་དུ་  
 གཞུང་ཚབ་ཁང་འཛུགས་དུ་བཅུགས། མདོ་ཁམས་པལ་མོ་ཆེ་དགའ་ལྷན་པོ་བྲང་གི་མངའ་འོག་ཏུ་གྱུར། ལྷགས་ལའི་ས་  
 ཆ་ར་རྩ་ལའི་ཉེ་འབྲས་དུ་གཞུང་ཚབ་ཁང་འཛུགས། དེང་སྐབས་ཀྱང་ས་ཆ་དེ་ལ་ཚོང་ཞབས་ཞེས་འབོད།

In the water-horse year of the eleventh rab byung, which was in 1642, the dGa' ldan pho brang established their power in 'Bras spungs monastery, having taken control from the gTsang pa dynasty. Following this, the dGa' ldan pho brang founded many local offices or district headquarters across the mDo Kham region, and most of the mDo Kham regions became subjects of the dGa' ldan pho brang. One of these offices or district headquarters was established in the Ra rnga kha region in lCags la [Dar rtse mdo], which is known as the government office to this day.<sup>495</sup>

These primary and secondary sources indicate that Dar rtse mdo came under the rule of the dGa' ldan pho brang during the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama, without entirely agreeing on the exact year. The Tibetan primary sources I have perused do not mention that the Qing had power over Dar rtse mdo. It would be worth investigating primary Chinese documents related to the Ming Dynasty, who might have offered titles to some leaders in Dar rtse mdo.

#### 4.1.2. War over Dar rtse mdo

The circumstances under which the Qing Empire secured control over Dar rtse mdo are subject to multiple interpretations, deriving respectively from the viewpoints of the Qing and the dGa' ldan pho brang. The perspective of the Qing Empire is recorded in the *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shìliào* record, dated 16th June 1699:

<sup>492</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 79.

<sup>493</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 473.

<sup>494</sup> Yudru Tsomo 2015: 21.

<sup>495</sup> Mi nyag Thub bstan chos dar 2016: 52.

四川巡抚于养志疏报：「打箭炉原系内地土司边界，自康熙三十五年勘明地界以来，甚属相安。今因化林坪接壤西域，设汛添兵，乃擦道等处蛮番忽生狡变。事关边情，理应文武会商[...]

The governor of Sichuan, Yú yǎng zhì, reported: “Dǎ jiàn lú (Dar rtse mdo) was originally an inner border area of Tūsī.<sup>496</sup> Since the 35th year of Kangxi’s reign (1696), the area has been peaceful, and the inhabitants were in harmony. Now, an army has been stationed in the area because Huà lín píng<sup>497</sup> borders the western region. As a result, the barbaric foreigners<sup>498</sup> in places such as Cā dào drastically changed their attitudes. Civil and military officials should discuss this concerning the border areas [...]”<sup>499</sup>

Like the Tibetan claim above, this is Qing’s narrative to suit their claims. The Manchu document dated 16th March 1701 explains how the Qing defeated their enemies and invaded Dar rtse mdo.

奉差 师理潘院侍郎满丕、四川提督唐希顺疏报：[康熙三十九年二月二十日，臣等分兵三路攻打箭炉，杀蛮兵五千余人，斩磨西营光碟吧昌侧集烈及大冈营官龙送等。] 得旨：[嘉奖，下部议叙。]

As ordered by Kangxi, General Mǎn pī of the Lǐ fān yuàn and Sichuan General Táng xīshùn reported to the Qing court, “On the 20th of February in the thirty-ninth year of Kangxi’s reign, we divided our army into three groups and attacked Dǎ jiàn lú, killing more than 5,000 of our enemies by surrounding them. The enemy (Tibetan) leaders, such as Chāng cè jí liè<sup>500</sup> and Guān long<sup>501</sup>, the officer of the enemy battalion, were beheaded.” The emperor replied, “I praise this victory and will reward them with gifts. Explain the details of the report in the next letter.”<sup>502</sup>

Almost two years lie between these two records. The first passage explains that Dar rtse mdo was a peaceful border region of the Qing ruled by a minority leader (Tǔ sī). However, during the mid-1690s, “barbaric foreigners” put this region into chaos, which raised concerns among Qing leaders and led to an increased Qing military presence on the border. In the second passage, dated 1701, the Qing army forcibly took control of Dar rtse mdo by killing thousands of enemies. Although these passages use the terms “barbaric foreigners” and “enemy” and do not name the dGa’ ldan pho brang, the Tibetan primary sources cited above, and the broader context of these

<sup>496</sup> Tūsī, also known as Tǔ guān, is a hereditary official position set up in the northwest and southwest regions of the Qing Empire with ethnic minority leaders. Their relationship with the Qing was complex, and most of them were not under the direct rule of the Qing. In this context, Tūsī is referring to a tribe leader located in today’s Sichuan province, sharing the border with Dar rtse mdo.

<sup>497</sup> In Tibet, this area is referred to as lCags zam rdzong (Lú ding), currently situated in the Gānzī zhōu (dKar mdzes) area of China. Since this region is adjacent to Dar rtse mdo, it provided the Qing army with a convenient position to prepare for their attacks on the Tibetans in Dar rtse mdo.

<sup>498</sup> In this context, the Qing document used the term “Fān” to address the Tibetan people in Dar rtse mdo who fought against the Qing’s army. In classical Chinese, “Fān” has several meanings, but they all carry negative connotations. In the context of Qing historical materials, the term is often rendered in English as a “barbaric foreigner” or “barbarian.”

<sup>499</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i:168.

<sup>500</sup> In Tibetan, this name is Tshang sras ’phrin las but his former position in the dGa’ ldan pho brang is unknown.

<sup>501</sup> In Tibetan, this name is dGon lung. However, the Tibetan sources do not mention this officer.

<sup>502</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 177.

quotations indicate that the Qing officers refer to soldiers under the control of the dGa' ldan pho brang. The Qing documents depict the conflict between the Qing and the dGa' ldan pho brang, while downplaying the role of the lCags la kingdom in this conflict.

Representatives of the dGa' ldan pho brang exploited their power to gain unlawful financial benefits, which eroded the people's loyalty toward the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>503</sup> Taking advantage of this situation, the lCags la king, dGra lha grags pa (reign 1681-1700), supported by lamas from the bKa' brgyud school, rebelled against the rule of the dGa' ldan pho brang in the region. In response, Tshang sras 'phrin las, the representative of the dGa' ldan pho brang, killed King dGra lha grags pa in 1700.<sup>504</sup> Thus, the war initially occurred between the lCags la kingdom and the dGa' ldan pho brang. In his *Religious History of Mu li*, Ngag dbang mkhyen rab explains how the bKa' brgyud leaders attempted to rebel against the dGa' ldan pho brang in the Muli and lCags la regions, which ultimately led to this dGa' ldan pho brang-Qing war in 1701.<sup>505</sup> Therefore, the civil war between lCags la kingdom and the dGa' ldan pho brang broke out before the war between the Qing and the dGa' ldan pho brang. The Qing saw an opportunity and sent their military force to Dar rtse mdo under the guise of assisting the lCags la kingdom.

Thub bstan chos dar writes about this in his *History of lCags la Kingdom*:

སྤྱི་ལོ་ ༡༧༠༠ ལོར་ཆང་གོང་མ་དང་ལུ་བྱེའམ་འབྲོང་བ་རྒྱལ་པོ་བཅས་ཀྱིས་ལྷགས་ལ་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཆེད་དུ་ཕ་རོལ་བོའི་སྤེང་དུ་  
 དམག་འབོར་ཆེན་དངས། ལྷགས་དེར་ཆང་གི་དམག་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་གཅིག་བཅས་ཕྱོགས་གཉིས་ཀའི་དམག་མང་གཤེགས་  
 མས་བྱུང་ཡོད།

In 1700, the Qing emperor and King Mu phyi or 'Brong pa,<sup>506</sup> for the sake of the lCags la and others, launched a war against the enemy [the army of the dGa' ldan pho brang]. During this [war], soldiers, including a prominent general of the Qing, died, and many soldiers on both sides were injured.<sup>507</sup>

Moreover, the *Qīng shílù zàngzú shǐliào* record dated 18th December 1702 reported that many soldiers of the enemy (i.e., the Tibetans) were killed in the battle. Thus, the only Tibetan people left in Dar rtse mdo were women.<sup>508</sup> In this context, the Tibetan soldiers were of the dGa' ldan pho brang, not that of the lCags la and 'Brong pa kingdoms, who were also ethnic Tibetans. The war was fought against the dGa' ldan pho brang for the sake of the lCags la kingdom and the Qing empire and the 'Brong pa kingdoms were merely supporters in this conflict. However, the Qing documents omitted the role of the lCags la kingdom and portrayed the Qing as the main opponent against the dGa' ldan pho brang in this war.<sup>509</sup> To provide further evidence, the sDe srid's *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama* details the involvement of the lCags la kingdom in the war and how Dar rtse mdo was defeated by the Qing:

ཕྱིས་རྒྱ་བོད་ཀྱི་སྤྱོ་མོ་བ་འགའི་བྱེད་རྒྱུན་ལ་བརྟེན་དར་ཅེ་མདོ་རྒྱ་འོག་ཡིན་པའི་ཚྭ་སྤེང་དང་། ཉེ་ལམ་ལ་མོ་ཅེ་བ་དང་  
 ལྷགས་ལ་བརྗོས་པའི་མི་ཆེན་དཔོན་བསད་མིན་སྐོར་དང་། [.....] རྫོང་ཚྭ་ལྷ་མ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དུས་མེད་པའི་ངོ་གཤམ་ལས་

<sup>503</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 796–797.  
<sup>504</sup> Mi nyag Thub bstan chos dar 2016: 58 and Ahmad 1970: 326–327.  
<sup>505</sup> Ngag dbang mkhyen rab 1992: 45–46.  
<sup>506</sup> Mu phyi 'brong pa was the head of one of the 18 rGyal rong Tibetan kingdoms. After the Dar rtse mdo war, one of his sons married a princess of the lCags la kingdom, and the two kingdoms became close allies. See Mi nyag Thub bstan chos dar 2016.  
<sup>507</sup> Mi nyag Thub bstan chos dar 2016: 60.  
<sup>508</sup> *Qīng shílù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 180.  
<sup>509</sup> *Qīng shílù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 168 and 177.

བྱེད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུན་གཏན་རྟེན་ལུས་འབམ་ཚོང་སོགས་གསར་སྣོན་གྱི་ལག་བསྟན་མངས་བས་མི་སེར་རྣམས་ཞེན་ཤོར་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཡོད་པའི་གནས་ཚུལ་རིམ་འབྱོར་དང་། རྒྱ་དམག་བྱུང་ཚུལ་ལྷོ་ལོ་སྟོན་མཚུགས་བྱུང་ཡང་གོང་མ་རྒྱལ་པོ་གཞན་དང་མི་འདྲ་བས་ས་སྤེའི་མཁར་དཔོན་སོགས་ཀྱི་ལས་རྒྱལ་པོའི་བཀའ་ལེབས་པ་མིན་འགྲོ་ཞིང་གང་ཅི་ཐམས་ཅད་གོང་མས་མཁུན་ཚུལ་ཉི་ཐང་ཅན་ལ་གནང་གཤེས་མདོ་པ་རང་གིས་འཕྲོད་བཏང་གི་འབའ་ལའི་དམག་ཕྱན་ལས་དམག་མི་འགབ་ཅིང་རང་ཕྱོགས་མ་ཤོར་ཅམ་ལས་ཐལ་སོང་གང་ཚུང་གིས་བྱས་པ་སྟོན་སོང་ལྟ་བུ་སོགས་རྟེན་རྣམ་པ་དུ་མ་ཞིག་ལ་བརྟེན་ཟླ་བ་དང་པོ་སྟོར་ནས་མདོ་མི་ཉག་རྒྱུར་ཤོར་བའི་གནས་ཚུལ་བྱུང་བར།

Later, due to the actions of certain Manchu and Tibetan leaders, a controversy over the Qing’s authority in Dar rtse mdo [emerged], and [the question of] whether Mi chen [the king] of lCags la was murdered in a recent fight with La mo rtse ba, (a local officer). [...]. News continued to arrive about the loss of loyalty from the commoners [of Dar rtse mdo], due to increasing new irritations, including horse corvee and inflated prices, etc., which were not present during the time of previous masters and servants at the *rdzong*. The arrival of the Qing army had occurred at the end of the autumn of the previous year. However, [I, the sDe srid] thought the emperor was unlike others; thus, it might be just the local leaders [who sent the army]. Since, the emperor informed Nyi thang [Lama] that he was aware of [Dar rste mdo], apart from a small group of troops from ’Ba [pa and] Li [thang]<sup>510</sup> residing in mDo pa [Dar rtse mdo], [the dGa’ ldan pho brang] did not send an additional army. [Moreover,] the army did not attack back other than just defending its own territory. Due to these reasons, the news arrived [in Lhasa] around the first month [of 1701] that mDo mi nyag [Dar rtse mdo] had been lost to the Qing.<sup>511</sup>

Based on the dGa’ ldan pho brang’s claims, this excerpt explains the conflict in Dar rtse mdo from the perspective of the dGa’ ldan pho brang and highlights why the dGa’ ldan pho brang lost the region to the Qing. This passage also further shows the shift of the conflict from being between the dGa’ ldan pho brang and the lCags la kingdom to one between the dGa’ ldan pho brang and the Qing. The armies of the Qing, lCags la, and ’Brong pa kingdoms emerged victorious in the war against the dGa’ ldan pho brang in early 1701. After that, the Qing governed Dar rtse mdo through the lCags la kings. Dated February 1702, the Qing document records that Kangxi invited the dGa’ ldan pho brang’s representative to oversee trade in the region, indicating that the Qing accepted a certain amount of influence of the dGa’ ldan pho brang in the region.<sup>512</sup>

There may have been multiple reasons for the Qing’s invasion of Dar rtse mdo, including the Panchen Lama’s visit plan.<sup>513</sup> Ahmad writes: “Manchu rule was now, obviously, well-established at Tachien-lu (Dar rtse mdo). The next step was, through this gate, to enter Eastern Tibet.”<sup>514</sup> This excerpt shows that the Qing aimed to extend their power into Eastern Tibetan regions. On the other hand, for the Qing, their war with the dGa’ ldan pho brang was also motivated by a desire for revenge over the sDe srid’s betrayal of the Qing during their battle

<sup>510</sup> In this context, the term ’Ba li refers to ’Ba pa and Li Thang, two regions in Kham. This same short form can also be found in the works of the Fifth Dalai Lama (Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v: 273).

<sup>511</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 796–797.

<sup>512</sup> *Qīng shílù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 177–178.

<sup>513</sup> Schwieger (2015: 91) argues: “Even though in the eyes of the Qing government the inclusion of Dartsedo in Sichuan Province had never really depended on the Panchen’s visit, the dGa’ ldan pho brang government still believed it had”. See also *Qīng shílù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 168, Schwieger 2015: 89.

<sup>514</sup> Ahmad 1970: 327.

with the Dzungars under dGa' ldan Khan.<sup>515</sup> As illustrated by the example of the Dar rtse mdo conflict, around the turn of the century, the influence of the dGa' ldan pho brang gradually decreased in many critical regions such as mTsho sngon and Dar rtse mdo (Chapter 2, Section 2.6).<sup>516</sup>

## 4.2. The Sixth Dalai Lama's Libertine Lifestyle

The Dalai Lama was central to the authority and legitimacy of the dGa' ldan pho brang government; therefore, the success of the dGa' ldan pho brang during this period depended on the Sixth Dalai Lama (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1). Knowing this significance, this sub-section will explore the changes in the religious studies and personal behaviour of the Sixth Dalai Lama. It will then examine how Tibetan leaders attempted to protect and guide the young Dalai Lama. Finally, it will analyse how Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus responded to these transformations in the Dalai Lama's conduct.

### 4.2.1. The Young Dalai Lama under Pressure

The young Sixth Dalai Lama was burdened with serious and stressful responsibilities. On the one hand, the Sixth Dalai Lama had to prove to the Mongols, Manchus, and the dGe lugs purists that he could fulfil the role that the Fifth Dalai Lama had performed so skilfully, which was undoubtedly a difficult task for the inexperienced young man.<sup>517</sup> Rockhill writes, "So strong did the apprehension become that in 1701, when the Lama was in his twentieth year, he was informed by both the Oelot (Sungan) princes Tsewang-rabtan of ILi and Latsang Khan, and by the Emperor of China that he could not be recognised as the true reincarnation of his predecessor on the pontifical throne."<sup>518</sup> This passage demonstrates that even after his enthronement in Lhasa, the Dalai Lama faced significant opposition from the Dzungars and Manchus. Moreover, it has also been discussed previously that some Tibetans questioned the legitimacy of the new Dalai Lama.<sup>519</sup> Therefore, the new Dalai Lama faced considerable challenges in disproving these opponents.

On the other hand, the staunch supporters of the Dalai Lama, including the sDe srid, expected him to excel in both Buddhist scholarship and charismatic leadership because he was the true reincarnation of the Fifth Dalai Lama.<sup>520</sup> The young Dalai Lama faced the challenge of meeting the expectations of both sides, which continually demanded more of him. Additionally, his traumatic childhood significantly impacted the Sixth Dalai Lama's "perception of himself and his acceptance by the political public in Inner Asia."<sup>521</sup> Thus, the Sixth Dalai Lama faced challenges from many directions.

### 4.2.2. Changes in the lifestyle of the Dalai Lama

---

<sup>515</sup> rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997:

<sup>516</sup> ICang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan ((a) n.d.: 19a) discusses how he encouraged the Khoshut Mongols to establish their first official relationship with the Qing court. And see Gǎ mǎ dīng bā jiāng cuò. 2018: 32.

<sup>517</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 645–646.

<sup>518</sup> Rockhill 2010: 32.

<sup>519</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 324.

<sup>520</sup> *ibid*: 645–646.

<sup>521</sup> Schwieger 2015: 105.

Owing to these stressful pressures and childhood influence, the Sixth Dalai Lama's attitude started changing as early as 1699, only two years after his enthronement. This issue persisted in the following years. In his *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama*, the sDe srid explains the impact of this on the Dalai Lama's perception:

པོ་བླ་ནས་གོང་མ་རྒྱལ་པོ་ཆེན་པོས་ཀྱང་ལྷ་སྐྱ་སྐྱ་སྐྱ་ཅན་ལ་དགོངས་འཕྲོག་དང་དེ་མོ་ཞབས་དྲུང་གི་རྒྱུར་གསེར་ཡིག་གི་  
རྒྱན་ཀྱང་མེད་ལྷགས་སོགས་ཀྱི་སྟངས་ཀྱང་པར་དུ་ལམ་མོ་རོད་ཀྱི་འདིས་ད་སྟེ་སྟོབ་གཉེར་སོགས་གང་ཡང་བྱས་ཤན་འདྲ་  
གནང་བའི་ཐུགས་གཉེར་ཚུལ་ཀུན་སྦྱོང་སོགས་ཚང་མར་བར་ཆད་ཆེ་ཞིང་སྟན་འབྱུང་རིགས་ལ་དགོངས་བཅད་ལས་གསན་  
བཞེས་གཞི་ནས་རྒྱུང་ཁར་དེ་ནས་དེད་ཡུམ་བཅས་སུས་ཀྱང་གསན་བཞེས་ཡེ་མི་གནང་བའི་ཡིད་ཤིན་ཏུ་སྦྱོང་བར་བྱུང་།

The great emperor demoted lCang skya Lama at the palace [for meeting the sDe srid]; moreover, there was no golden messenger along with De mo Zhabs drung [returning from Peking], and, especially at this time, the criticism of Oirats [O rod kyi 'dis] toward [the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama]. Due to these reasons, whatever kind of studies and so on [the Sixth Dalai Lama] undertook, major problems appeared in his effort and behaviour. He usually accepts only specific requests. Now, [he] completely ignored the pleas of everybody, including me [the sDe srid] and his mother (*yum*), which gave me [the sDe srid] cause for serious concern.<sup>522</sup>

In the same biography, the sDe srid repeatedly expressed his concerns that the Dalai Lama ignored others' advice, including the sDe srid's and his mother's. For instance, a similar concern of the sDe srid is recorded in the same work, dated the third month of 1701:

དུས་དབང་གི་ཇི་འདྲ་ཞིག་ཡིན་ནའང་དམ་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་གཉེར་མཛད་པས་མཚོན་གསོལ་བ་བཏབ་རིགས་ལ་དེད་དང་  
ཡུམ་སོགས་སུར་ཡང་གསན་བཞེས་མི་གནང་བ་ལས་གོང་མས་ཞལ་བཞེས་དབྱེར་མེད་རྗེས་སུ་བཟུང་། [.....] གོང་ཞབས་  
པོ་བླ་ནས་གོང་མ་རྒྱལ་པོ་ཆེན་པོས་ཀྱང་ལྷ་སྐྱ་སྐྱ་སྐྱ་ཅན་ལ་དགོངས་འཕྲོག་དང་དེ་མོ་ཞབས་དྲུང་གི་རྒྱུར་གསེར་ཡིག་གི་

Due to the circumstances, His Eminence [the Dalai Lama] did not listen to any request such as to study made by anyone, including me and his mother. However, he accepted [us as disciples] like the previous one (the Fifth Dalai Lama) [.....] During this time, Gong zhabs rin po che (the Sixth Dalai Lama) hardly listened to [anyone], so it is hard to predict what it would become in the future [.....].<sup>523</sup>

These two passages address two key issues. Firstly, the Sixth Dalai Lama ceased his intensive Buddhist studies, which were mandatory for high-ranking dGe lugs lamas during that period.<sup>524</sup> Secondly, he disregarded requests from both his own mother and the sDe srid, indicating that the young Dalai Lama had abandoned his efforts to assert himself as a powerful leader. The *Daiching gurun u dotogod u yaman u mongol bichig un ger iin dansa* (Qing Cabinet Mongolian Hall File) reports that after officially becoming the Sixth Dalai Lama in 1697, the young Lama soon lost interest in cultivating his spiritual and religious life, ignoring the advice of the sDe srid and the Panchen Lama.<sup>525</sup> This behaviour of the young Dalai Lama initiated a substantial

<sup>522</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 645–646.

<sup>523</sup> *ibid.*: 801.

<sup>524</sup> Intensive study in Buddhism is a central tradition among dGe lugs monks and lamas. This is because a scholar's level of expertise in Buddhism is a crucial element within the dGe lugs school, significantly enhancing one's recognition and influence.

<sup>525</sup> *Qīng nàigé ménggǔ táng dàng* (Daiching gurun u dotogod u yaman u mongol bichig un ger iin dansa) v-xvii, 2005: 68–71 and Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 88.

crisis within the dGa' ldan pho brang and in the relationship between the Sixth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid (Chapter 4, Section 4.3).

#### 4.2.3. Unsuccessful Attempts to Redirect the Dalai Lama

The sDe srid recognised the importance of the Sixth Dalai Lama's position within the dGa' ldan pho brang and in its relations with the Mongols and the Qing.<sup>526</sup> To uphold this crucial position, the sDe srid also understood that the Dalai Lama needed to sustain the standards set by the Fifth Dalai Lama in religious scholarship and personal integrity.<sup>527</sup> Thus, the sDe srid urgently sought to protect and lead the young Dalai Lama away from his downward trajectory.

In his *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama*, dated April 1701, the sDe srid writes:

ཚོགས་ཆེན་ཞབས་བརྟན་དང་དཔོན་མོས་སྤྱན་དྲངས་པ་གཉིས་ཀར་ཚོག་མ་ཞུས་ཀྱིས་མ་བཞེས་ཅུང་ཡང་ཉིག་ཤེབས་པའི་  
བཀའ་དྲིན་ཆེ་བྱུང་སྟེ་ལྷགས་བསྟོ་ཞུས་བཞེས་མ་བྱུང་ཡང་གསོལ་འདེབས་ནན་སྐྱུར་བཞུས་པའི་གནང་སོར་བཞག་ཡིན་ཅུང་  
མ་གནང་བར་བརྟེན། གཟིམས་ཚུང་དུ་ཤེབས་ནས་དེད་ཀྱིས་སེམས་སྦྱོང་སོ་བྱུང་ལྷགས། སྟོགས་དུས་འགོ་བ་རྣམས་དད་ལོག་  
གི་གོང་མ་མ་ཡིན་པར་དེད་ཀྱིས་བཟོས་སོགས་བཀའ་ལྷན་དང་། རྒྱ་ནག་གོང་མ་ཆེན་པོར་ཡང་སྟོན་པ་སོགས་སྤྱོད་ཚོགས་དུས་  
ལྷགས་བསྟོ་ཅན་ཡང་མ་གནང་ཅན་དང་། [.....]

Initially, [the Dalai Lama] declined both [participating in] a gathering for a long-life prayer and the invitation from the female leader. However, the visit by Yang Tig<sup>528</sup> proved influential, as [the Dalai Lama] committed to performing the supplication prayer upon insistent request, even though he had refused the dedication prayer. However, [the Dalai Lama] did not perform the supplication prayer. Consequently, I (the sDe srid) visited [the Dalai Lama's] chamber and said to him, “[Your actions have made me] saddened and anxious. In these degenerate times, people have lost their faith. They allege that I fabricated a false incarnation of the predecessor (the Fifth) and spread slanderous rumours about it to the great Qing emperor. In such trying times, you (the Sixth Dalai Lama) declined even a dedication prayer.”[.....]<sup>529</sup>

This excerpt highlights the sDe srid's desperation and his position on the dilemma. This passage also shows that, on one side, the Sixth Dalai Lama kept ignoring his requests; on the other, the dGe lugs purists attempted to damage the reputation of the Sixth Dalai Lama. The sDe srid openly admitted that “the people” (probably referring to the dGe lugs purists) accused him of fabricating a fake Dalai Lama. In this regard, the immoral behaviour of the Sixth Dalai Lama became proof of the others' accusation. Around this time, the Sixth Dalai Lama's behaviour became public, and other dGe lugs leaders expressed their concerns about the future of the Sixth Dalai Lama.

In his autobiography, the Fifth Panchen Lama writes about his concerns, dated to first month in 1702.

འདི་སྐབས་ལོ་ལྔ་ཕྱིར་དགོངས་གཞི་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡང་གོང་ས་མཚོག་གི་སྤྱུལ་སྤྱོད་པོ་ཆེས་མཛད་པ་ཚུལ་སྟོན་ཅི་རིགས་པའི་  
བརྗོད་སྟེང་སྤྱོད་ཚོགས་ཤིག་བྱུང་བར། བསྟན་འགྲོ་ཡོངས་ཀྱི་ཕན་བདེའི་ཚ་བ་ནི་བསྟན་འཛོན་གྱི་སྟེས་ཆེན་དམ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་

<sup>526</sup> Mǎzhàn Lín 1985: 91

<sup>527</sup> Yixī Wángqiū and Lǐ Zhēng 1994: 37-38.

<sup>528</sup> This appears to refer to a Tibetan Buddhist Lama, but the identity of this person remains unknown.

<sup>529</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 812.

ལྷན་སྐྱོད་མཛད་འཕྲིན་ལ་རག་ལས་པ་དང་། དེ་ཡང་གདུལ་བྱའི་ཡུལ་ལ་མོས་སྐྱོ་བཞིན་འཇུག་པ་ཚོས་ཉིད་ནས་གསལ་གྱི་གཞི་བཟུང་། ཚོགས་དངུལ་ཚན་ལ་ཕེབས་པའི་དམ་པ་ཚོས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་བསྐྱོར་བ་སོགས་མཛད་པ་རྣམས་མཐའ་དག་མཁན་ཆེན་གྱི་ལོ་དབང་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་གཟིགས་ཆེན་པོ་བཞིན་གྱི་ཚུལ་བཞིས་བསྟན་འགྲོ་མཐའ་དག་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་སྲིད་ཏུ་ལྷན་སྐྱོད་མཛད་འཕྲིན་ལོ་ལྷན་ཉེན་འབྱུང་དངུལ་གྱི་མཁུ་གསལ་གྱི་ཚོམ་བྱས་སྤྲོས་པས་མཚོན་དངོས་པའི་ཚན་གྲངས་དབང་མཐོ་བ་དང་།

During these years, there have been many rumours about the various behaviours of *Gong sa mchog gi sprul sku* [the Sixth Dalai Lama], whatever his basic intent is. Due to this, I [the Fifth Panchen Lama] sent a request letter, accompanied by a variety of precious material objects, including a silver maṇḍala decorated with clusters of gold, telling the Dalai Lama: The root of the utmost benefit and happiness for those who follow the dharma depends on the compassionate religious activities of great holy Dharma-holder beings and how they appear to the disciples according to their wishes. [You, the Sixth Dalai Lama,] need to perform religious activities such as turning the wheel of the holy dharma while attending monastic assemblies and look upon all disciples with compassion out of your loving-kindness, like the Great Preceptor, the All-knowing Victorious Lord [the Fifth Dalai Lama].<sup>530</sup>

This excerpt reveals the Fifth Panchen Lama’s concern about the future of the dGe lugs school in the absence of the Dalai Lama’s leadership and his call for the Sixth Dalai Lama to emulate the Fifth Dalai Lama. It also shows that the Panchen Lama understood that if the Sixth Dalai Lama followed his predecessor’s footsteps, it could safeguard the future of the dGa’ ldan pho brang. Although the Panchen had his own disagreements with the sDe srid, when it came to the matter of the Sixth Dalai Lama, this excerpt suggests that the Fifth Panchen Lama was likely behind the sDe srid. The Panchen Lama recognised that the Sixth Dalai Lama was not just pivotal for the dGa’ ldan pho brang, but also crucial for the dGe lugs school.<sup>531</sup>

Witnessing the Sixth Dalai Lama heading in the wrong direction, the sDe srid became increasingly restless, as he had staked the future of the dGa’ ldan pho brang, including himself, on the success of the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>532</sup> Tucci states, “The failure of the Dalai Lama’s new incarnation concurred to make Sangye Gyatso’s situation still more intricate.”<sup>533</sup> Tucci thus rightly argues that the future of the sDe srid directly depended on the success of the Sixth Dalai Lama, yet he does not discuss the reasons and mechanisms behind this dependency.

To overturn this devastating situation, the sDe srid and the Fifth Panchen Lama exchanged numerous letters, discussing their concerns about the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>534</sup> Upon the request of the sDe srid, the Panchen Lama sent several letters to the Sixth Dalai Lama, urging him to continue his Buddhist studies and uphold his moral behaviour. The sDe srid, on the other hand, pressured the Dalai Lama to meet the Panchen Lama and take full monastic ordination.

In his autobiography, the Fifth Panchen Lama writes:

[...] དེ་མཚུངས་སྐྱོད་པ་དེ་ལོའི་མཇུག་ཚམས་ལ་གོང་ས་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་ལྷན་སྐྱོད་མཛད་འཕྲིན་ལ་རག་ལས་པ་དང་། དེ་ལྟར་གྱུར་བ་ལྷན་སྐྱོད་མཛད་འཕྲིན་ལོ་ལྷན་ཉེན་འབྱུང་དངུལ་གྱི་མཁུ་གསལ་གྱི་ཚོམ་བྱས་སྤྲོས་པས་མཚོན་དངོས་པའི་ཚན་གྲངས་དབང་མཐོ་བ་དང་།

<sup>530</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 340 and Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 88.

<sup>531</sup> ibid: 340.

<sup>532</sup> Yixi Wāngqiū and Lǐ Zhēng 1994: 37-38.

<sup>533</sup> Tucci 1999, vol-i: 77.

<sup>534</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 340–342.

འདུག་ལྟེ། ཟླ་པས་དེ་ལ་སྐྱུན་འདེན་ཚོས་བཀའ་སྒོམ་དགོས་རང་ཟེར་བར་ཟླ་མ་མཇལ་བར་མི་སྣོ་རྒྱུ་ཡང་མི་འདུག་པས།  
གདན་འདེན་པར་འདི་བ་སོང་བ་ཆར་རྒྱ་མ་རྒྱས་གོང་ལ་ཕྱིར་ལེབས་ཚོག་འདུག་པས་ཡོང་དགོས་ཚུལ་རྟོག་ནས་བཅས་  
འབྱོར་ཡང་། བབས་མ་ལེགས་གཤིས་འགོ་མ་འདོད་ནས་རུང་ཟད་ལམས་མ་བདེ་ཚུལ་གྱིས་སྐར་མི་རིང་བར་ཡོངས་ཚོག་པ་  
སྒོམ་གྱི་བསེད་བགོལ་བྱ་ཡིག་རིམ་པར་སྐྱུ་ཀྱང་། [...] ]

[...] Similarly, around the end of that month [May 1702], the Sixth Dalai Lama sent a secret letter saying: “As [I] have replied to the series of [the Panchen Lama’s] orders, I do not want to hold the legacy of Gong ma [the Fifth Dalai Lama] and lead the assemblies, et cetera. However, the sDe srid insisted that [I] should invite you [the Panchen Lama] and receive teachings. I am also not unhappy to meet the [Panchen] Lama. This man has gone to invite you [the Panchen Lama], allowing you to return before the rainy season; therefore, please come!” However, the situation was not good. [I] did not feel like going and thus clarified to [the Dalai Lama] in a series of letters that I was slightly unwell but would come soon [...]”<sup>535</sup>

Similarly, a Mongolian source, the *Ménggǔ táng dòng bùcè* (Mongolian Hall Archives, rendered below in Chinese), notes that the Fifth Panchen Lama referred to the Sixth Dalai Lama’s letter when speaking to his Khoshut Mongol patron, bKra shis dpa’ thur:

自我从母胎中降生后说过各种应验的话语等，均为我父母及当地人所言，我不知晓。即使略约记事之后，也绝无「自己为」识一切达赖喇嘛转世之念。[...] 如照五世达赖喇嘛而行，将合第巴以及内外众人之意。虽说我为转世，但我不好经卷。我本无占据五世达赖喇嘛之位之意，亦无骗人讲经授戒之意。所以对修学之事不甚用心。

All the omens realised since my birth were owing to my parents and the locals, of which I knew absolutely nothing. Even at the age I started to study, I had no notion of recognising [myself as] the reincarnation of all the Dalai Lamas. [...] If I behave as the Fifth Dalai Lama did, then I will be content with the sDe pa and others. However, I am not keen on studying Buddhist texts, even though I am the reincarnation. I do not purposely assume the role of the Fifth Dalai Lama, nor do I wish to deceive people by teaching Buddhism and receiving ordination, so I do not make an effort to study Buddhism wholeheartedly.<sup>536</sup>

This correspondence between the the Fifth Panchen Lama and Khoshut leader bKra shis dpa’ thur (Dash Baatar in Mongolian) highlights several important issues. Firstly, the Sixth Dalai Lama openly stated that he did not want to follow in the footsteps of the Fifth Dalai Lama and lead big monastic gatherings, which dealt a significant blow to the dGa’ ldan pho brang under the sDe srid. Secondly, the Sixth Dalai Lama only agreed to meet the Fifth Panchen Lama because of the sDe srid’s persistent request. Thirdly, the Sixth Dalai Lama chose to communicate with the Fifth Panchen Lama behind the sDe srid’s back, thus undermining the latter’s role in his life. Finally, the Fifth Panchen Lama politely declined the invitation to the meeting, recognising that nothing good would come of it. The Fifth Panchen Lama’s behaviour

<sup>535</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 342, This same response of the Dalai Lama is recorded in the letter of Mongol diplomats in Xining addressing the sDe srid dated 17th January 1703 (rDo rje tshe brtan (eds) 1997: 219–220).  
<sup>536</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 88.

demonstrates his subtlety and diplomatic skill in dealing with the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama.

#### 4.2.4. Dalai Lama’s Renunciation of Monastic Vows

In the sixth month of 1702, the Sixth Dalai Lama embarked on a journey to bKra shis lhun po monastery in gTsang to meet the Fifth Panchen Lama and to receive full monastic ordination.<sup>537</sup> However, the sDe srid was apprehensive about the outcome of this meeting. He dispatched the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, lHa bzang, and other leaders to accompany and monitor the Sixth Dalai Lama.

The *Biography of the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, written by bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis, states:

དེ་ནས་ཕེབས་ཁར། རྗེ་བས་སྐོག་ནས་རྗེ་འདི་དང་། རྒྱལ་སྐུ་ལྷ་བཟང་གཉིས་ལ་ད་རེས་བྱེད་རྣམ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་རེས་རེས་གནང་དགོས་སྐྱེ་ཕྱིགས་འདིས་མཛད་པ་གང་འདྲ་བྱེད་མི་གོ་བེད། དེ་ནས་ཚངས་དབྱུངས་པ། བདེ་མོ་སྐུལ་སྐྱེ། རྗེ་འདི། རྒྱལ་སྐུ་ལྷ་བཟང་རྗེ་བ་ལྷག་རྗེ་སོགས་བཅས་གཙང་ལ་ཕེབས།

At the time of departure, the sDe srid secretly requested this master [’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] and prince lHa bzang: “Please do help this time as it is unpredictable what this reincarnate [the Sixth Dalai Lama] might do.” Then, Tshang dbyangs pa [the Sixth Dalai Lama], the De mo Tulku, the Lord [’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa], prince lHa bzang, and sDe ba stag rtse, among others, went to gTsang.<sup>538</sup>

The sDe srid’s decision to send his opponent, ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, to look after the Sixth Dalai Lama may seem contradictory at first glance. However, this could have been a strategic move by the sDe srid to include his adversary in an essential mission, making him believe he was trusted and allowing him to witness the sDe srid’s efforts to assist and protect the Sixth Dalai Lama. This way, ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa might have felt closer to the sDe srid, or at least not solely blame the sDe srid for any negative outcome that might result from the meeting. At this point, lHa bzang had not yet become the direct adversary of the sDe srid. Consequently, he continued to obey the directives of the sDe srid while rendering assistance to the Dalai Lama (Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1).

On the 20th of the seventh month in 1702, this meeting, which had been scheduled at short notice, occurred between the Sixth Dalai Lama and the Fifth Panchen Lama at the bKra shis lhun po monastery.<sup>539</sup> This gathering had two objectives: first, to bestow full monastic ordination upon the Sixth Dalai Lama by the Fifth Panchen Lama; second, to address the behavioral issues of the Sixth Dalai Lama. However, the outcome of the meeting was different from what the participants had planned. In fact, it went in the opposite direction.

The *Autobiography of the Fifth Panchen Lama* describes this event:

ལྷན་བསྐྱེད་སྐྱེ་དང་བྱེ་བྱག་ཁམས་གསུམ་འགོ་བའི་སྐྱེ་མ་ཙོང་ཁ་བ་ཆེ་པོའི་བསྟན་པ། གཞུང་བསྟན་ལ་རྒྱ་བཅས་ལ་ཕན་པ་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་གཞིགས་པས་དབྱུང་པ་ཡིན་ན་ལྷ་ཚོད་ཅི་ལ་ཐིངས་ཀྱང་། མཐའ་དབུས་ཀྱི་གདུལ་བྱའི་སྐང་ངོར་བསྟན་འགོ་སྐྱེ་སྐོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལྷགས་རྗེས་མ་བོར་བའི་མཛད་པ་རྣམ་ཐར་མཐའ་དག་མཁན་ཆེན་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་གཞིགས་ཆེན་པོ་ཇི་བཞིན་

<sup>537</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 86a.  
<sup>538</sup> ibid: 86a.  
<sup>539</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i:

གྱི་ཚུལ་བཞེས་དང་། དམ་པ་ཚོས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་བསྐྱོར་བའི་གསོལ་འདེབས་ནན་ཆགས་ལྷ་རྟེན་དབུལ་གྱི་མཚལ་གྱིས་ཐོག་  
 དངས་ཚན་གངས་དབངས་མཐོ་བཅས་ལྷ་ཕྱག་འབུལ་གསུམ་བུས་རུང་བཀའ་ལེབས་མ་གནང་ཞིང་། ལུང་སྟབས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་  
 པར་ལེབས་ཏེ་ཉི་འོད་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་རྣམ་ཕྱག་གསུམ་དང་སླ་མའི་བཀའ་བཅག་པ་མཐོལ་ལོ་བཤགས་གསུང་བ་གསུམ་སྟེལ་མར་  
 གནང་ནས་ལེབས་པ་སོགས་བྱ་ཐབས་མ་བྱུང་བ་དང་།

རྗེས་སུའང་ལྷ་ཡིག་རིམ་པ་བཅས་ལྷ་རྟེན་གང་ཆེ་བུས་ཀྱང་མ་སྟོན་ཁར། ལྷར་ཏོབ་ཀྱི་རབ་བྱུང་དང་དགོ་ཚུལ་གྱི་ཚྲོམ་འབུལ་  
 མ་སྟོན་ན་དེད་བཀྱ་ཤིས་ལྷན་པོ་རང་ལ་ཁ་བཞུས་ཏེ་སྟེབས་པ་དོན་འདམ་གའི་གསལ་དགོས་ལེབས་པ་སྟོས་མ་འབྱུང་པས།  
 རྩ་སྤྱོད་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ནས་གསོལ་བ་འདེབས་གོགས་སུ་རྫོང་སྟོན་གནང་བ་དེ་མོ་སྟུལ་སྟུ། ལེམས་དབའ་སྟུལ་སྟུ། ལྷག་ཅེ་ཞབས་  
 དྲུང་། ལྷུལ་སྟུ་ལྷ་བཟང་། ལེར་འབྲས་དགོ་གསུམ་གྱི་སྟོན་དཔོན། ལྷུ་གཉེར་རྣམས་དང་ཕྱོས་བསྟུན་ནས་མགོན་གཅིག་ཏུ་  
 གསོལ་འདེབས་ལྷས་པ་དང་། ལྷར་གྱིས་རིམ་ལྷས་བཅས་པར་བཀའ་ལེབས་རྗེ་ཞན་ལས་མ་བྱུང་ཞིང་། [.....] ལྷགས་  
 རྫོགས་ལྷ་ཅེ་སྟོས་རབ་བྱུང་སྟེར་བཞེས་ཀྱང་ལྷགས་མ་ལུབ་ཀྱིས་འདོར་གནང་དང་། མཐར་སྟུ་ཆས་སྟུ་ཆས་སུ་མི་བསྐྱུར་བ་  
 དང་། མི་རིང་བར་རབ་བྱུང་ལྷགས་རྫོགས་བཞེས་ཏེ་ཚོས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་བསྐྱོར་བ་སོགས་ [.....] དེད་རང་གིས་དབུས་འདི་  
 གའི་སྟོན་དཔོན་རྣམ་པ། འདུས་སྟེ་དང་བཅས་ནས་གསོལ་འདེབས་ལྷས་ཀྱང་མ་སྟོན་པ་སོགས་ནས།

I [the Fifth Panchen Lama] cannot request anything if this is, according to [the Sixth Dalai Lama’s] primordial wisdom, beneficial to Buddhism in general, and especially for the tradition of the great Tsong kha pa, the Lama of the three realms, and for the politics and religion of the government. However, in the eyes of the disciples in the central region and the peripheries, [I] requested [the Sixth Dalai Lama] to affectionately look after the Dharma and sentient beings like the Great All-knowing Victorious Lord [the Fifth Dalai Lama] and turn the Dharma wheel. To make this persistent request, a silver mandala and many other valuable materials were offered with three prostrations, but [the Sixth Dalai Lama] did not accept the request. He [the Dalai Lama] suddenly stood up and offered back three prostrations outside of [my] chamber while saying: “I am sorry to disobey the order of the [Panchen] Lama” and went out. [Thus], there was nothing that could be done.

After this, several petitions were sent to make serious requests, but nothing was achieved. On top of that, [the Sixth Dalai Lama] said: “If you do not allow me to return my renunciate and novice vows, I have no choice but to commit suicide in front of bKra shis lhun po,” which would have been unbearable. Thus, the De mo and Sems dpa’ reincarnates, sTag rtse zhabs drung, prince lHa bzang, the masters of the three monasteries: Se ’Bras dGe, and the general manager, who were sent by the sDe srid for making joint request, discussed and requested univocally along with my private requests [to the Dalai Lama], but they did not receive any better response [...] Not to mention full monastic ordination, he even abandoned the ordination he had previously taken, as [our request] was to no avail. The requests of not disbanding the [monastic] robes and re-receiving monastic ordination not long after [in the future], turning the Dharma wheel and so on [...] mainly put forth by myself, other masters from here, and the monastic assembly did not achieve any result.<sup>540</sup>

<sup>540</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 344–345. According to the Biography of the Sle lung bZhad pa’i rdo rje, the Dalai Lama often wore a thin light blue silk chupa with jewellery on his fingers and hands, his hair had grown to reach below his ear, and he often carried bow and arrows like his purist attendant lamas (Sle lung bZhad pa’i rdo rje 1983: 33b). According to an old Mongolian Textfragment translated by Walther Heissig, “At this time, His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, returned the [monastic] vows taken from the Panchen Lama. He conducted himself according to the Yogačara and had no equal to him in this way” (Heissig (trans)1944:125). The translator dated this event to 1701, a year earlier than the date recorded in many other primary sources mentioned above.

The preceding paragraphs detail the final attempt by the sDe srid, supported by the Fifth Panchen Lama, to guide the Sixth Dalai Lama onto the right path. Despite their efforts, the Dalai Lama defied their requests and abandoned his vow of celibacy. Ultimately, when the Fifth Panchen Lama and others urged the Dalai Lama to don monastic attire and conduct himself appropriately, he rejected these pleas as well and chose to embrace a libertine lifestyle. Simultaneously, several close companions from the inner circle of the Sixth Dalai Lama also disrobed alongside him.<sup>541</sup> Schwieger also states: “He [the Sixth Dalai Lama] therefore became a layman. Apparently, this step inspired other people in his situation to do the same. One of the most prominent was the De mo rin po che.”<sup>542</sup> As previously mentioned, De mo rin po che was a principal student of the First 'Jam dbyang bzhad pa, a leading figure among the purists (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2).

This raises an intriguing question: Could the inner circle purist attendants have influenced the Sixth Dalai Lama’s libertine lifestyle? According to the *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama*, the more promiscuous and undisciplined lamas and aristocrats joined his inner circle, the more the Dalai Lama became wayward.<sup>543</sup> It is worth noting that the Sixth Dalai Lama, while following his passion for a libertine lifestyle, was much younger than his attendants. Therefore, it is not unlikely that his attendants influenced him. Hence, intentionally or not, the dGe lugs purists in the inner circle of the Sixth Dalai Lama, such as De mo and Sems dpa’ reincarnates, shared the responsibility for ruining the Dalai Lama’s future. Probably for this reason, the sDe srid went as far as attempting to eliminate some attendants of the Dalai Lama’s inner circle to halt their adverse impact on his behaviour (Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3).

After the Sixth Dalai Lama and his attendants returned to Lhasa from gTsang bKra shis lhun po after twenty days, they publically formed a notorious group of hedonists. The Dalai Lama and his attendants engaged in archery games during the day and indulged in writing love poems and frolicking with women at night.<sup>544</sup>

In an article on the love songs ascribed to the Sixth Dalai Lama, Sørensen writes:

His buoyant disposition and affairs with women were ultimately detected and faced the Tibetan government with a singular predicament. The scandal reached a climax when in the year water-male-Horse (*chu-pho-rta*) (1702) he went into the presence of the Second Pan-chen Lama and renounced his religious vows.<sup>545</sup>

According to Sørensen’s account, the Sixth Dalai Lama had engaged in relationships with girls before he renounced his monastic vows in 1702. However, this information is not mentioned in the primary sources I have studied, and Sørensen does not provide a reference for this claim. According to the rigid and traditional Tibetan society in the early 18th century, this brazen behaviour of the Sixth Dalai Lama was a severe blow that destabilised the dGa’ ldan pho brang

---

<sup>541</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 86b.

<sup>542</sup> Schwieger 2015:106.

<sup>543</sup> Reading this biography, it becomes clear that from 1698 to 1701 (the biography abruptly ended this in 1701), as more wild Lamas, like De mo Rin po che, and aristocrats joined the inner circle of the Sixth Dalai Lama, his lifestyle and behavior grew increasingly libertine and promiscuous (sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 429–814).

<sup>544</sup> Sle lung bzhad pa’i rdo rje 1983: 40a–40b. Schwieger (2015: 107) explained the Sixth Dalai Lama’s personal and political life upon returning to Lhasa in 1702.

<sup>545</sup> Sørensen 1988: 258.

and created new doors for the dGe lugs purists to challenge the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama.<sup>546</sup> Petech also recognised this effect and argues that renouncing the monastic vows of the Sixth Dalai Lama “was a serious blow to the position of the sDe-srid, who at the same time was confronted with a new danger from another direction.”<sup>547</sup> Petech did not specify the nature of the “new danger from another direction”, but the current circumstances suggest it might have been linked to the dGe lugs purists within the dGa’ ldan pho brang.

#### 4.2.5. Diverse Reactions to the Dalai Lama’s Behaviour

In this critical situation, the paramount task was to safeguard the reputation of the Dalai Lama. The sDe srid employed two strategies. On the one hand, the sDe srid requested mKhan pos and Khri pas of major dGe lugs monasteries, including ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, to protect people’s faith in the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>548</sup> On the other hand, the sDe srid encouraged Tibetan dignitaries, including the Dalai Lama’s mother, to request the Dalai Lama to follow in the footsteps of the Fifth Dalai Lama.<sup>549</sup> However, instead of listening to these appeals, the Sixth Dalai Lama openly sent letters to the leaders of Mongolian tribes and the Manchu court declaring that he was not the reincarnation of the Fifth Dalai Lama and did not wish to be treated as the reincarnation.<sup>550</sup> In response, the sDe srid also sent messages to the Mongolian leaders and the Manchu court, explaining that the Sixth Dalai Lama did not mean this literally but was merely expressing his modesty.<sup>551</sup> Thus, the situation proved to be highly stressful for the leaders of the dGe lugs school, including the sDe srid and his supporters.

Seizing this opportunity, the dGe lugs purists accused the sDe srid of fabricating a fake Dalai Lama. In his *Biography of Che mchog ’dus pa rtsal*, Sle lung bZhad pa’i rdo rje makes the following sarcastic remark about the criticism aimed at the Dalai Lama:

དང་སང་ཡང་དགེ་བའི་བཤེས་གཉེན་ཆེན་པོ་དུ་མ་ཀུན་མཐུན་དུག་པ་ཚངས་དབྱངས་ཀྱི་མཚོའི་སྐོར་ནས་བརྒྱུམས་ཏེ། བགེགས་དབང་དུ་  
གྱུར་ཚུལ་དུ་མ་ཟེར་མོད་མགོ་རྩལ་བ་སྣམ་མི་ཚོར་བའི་སྐྱོན་ནོ།

Some prominent Buddhist scholars nowadays claim that the All-Knowing Sixth Tshangs dbyangs rgya mtsho had come under the power of various obstructing forces. However, that is the mistake of those who do not even smell their rotten heads with their own nose.<sup>552</sup>

In this excerpt, Sle lung bZhad pa’i rdo rje refers precisely to “prominent Buddhist scholars” (*dge ba’i bshes gnyen chen po*), which, in this context, must refer to the dGe lugs purists for

<sup>546</sup> This instance marks the first and only occurrence in the reincarnations of the Dalai Lamas where such a departure from tradition was observed. The Dalai Lamas have traditionally served as the spiritual heads of the dGe lugs school, where celibacy and moral behavior are fundamental to its teachings. These principles set its followers apart as superior to others. Given this context, the behavior of the Sixth Dalai Lama likely fell far short of the expectations held by many dGe lugs followers during that time.

<sup>547</sup> Petech 1972: 9.

<sup>548</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 88a.

<sup>549</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989:

<sup>550</sup> rDo rje tshes brtan (eds) 1997: 219—222. Based on this letter, two scholars, such as Borjigidai Oyunbilig (2008: 88) and Schwieger (2015: 108), argue that the Sixth Dalai Lama indeed did not want to be the Dalai Lama.

<sup>551</sup> rDo rje tshes brtan (eds) 1997: 226. In classical Tibetan writings, it is common for Lamas and scholars to express their respect for others by placing themselves in a lowly position. Therefore, stating that one is unworthy could be seen as a typical gesture of reincarnated Tibetan Lamas to showcase their predecessors’ greatness by downplaying their accomplishments.

<sup>552</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa’i rdo rje n.d.: 18a.

several reasons. These purists refused to recognise the legitimacy of Tshang dbyangs rgya mtsho as the Sixth Dalai Lama. Moreover, there is no record of any other senior Tibetan Buddhist scholars in central Tibet being critical of the Sixth Dalai Lama. This passage also shows that, at the same time, the purists spread this saying/rumour (*zer*), among Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus. Regarding this rumour (*zer*), Tucci says, “A college of Lamas, instigated by these political currents, declared that the divine spirit had abandoned the young Dalai Lama.”<sup>553</sup> Tucci does not specify who exactly he is referring to, but considering the historical context this “college of Lamas”, presumably refers to the college of ’Bras spungs sGo mang college, under the leadership of the ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, which was the main base of the dGe lugs purists at the time.

The negative image of the Dalai Lama created by his opponents is reflected in the writings of Ippolito Desideri, who was in Lhasa from 1716 to 1721 and must have been told about the events during his stay. His statement also expresses the revulsion of a catholic missionary against the sensual indulgence of a highranking religious figure:

At that time, the Grand Lama [the Sixth Dalai Lama] was a very dissolute youth; in addition to being given over to insatiable lust, he allowed himself to be dominated by gluttony and drunkenness.<sup>554</sup>

When considering Desideri, it is essential to note that he arrived in Tibet a decade after the assassinations of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama in sTod lung and mTsho sngon, respectively. Desideri had a close and friendly relationship with lHa bzang Khan and his inner attendants.<sup>555</sup> Desideri likely received his historical information from these close allies, presenting only one side of the story, and he scarcely mentioned any literary sources. Regarding the behaviour of the Sixth Dalai Lama, Desideri again writes:

As I previously mentioned that Grand Lama [the Sixth Dalai Lama] of Tibet, until about 1707, was a very dissolute and wild young man. His vices were all the more harmful to the people in that they were exhibited by the highest dignitary so greatly revered by the Tibetans.<sup>556</sup>

In the last sentence of this passage, Desideri acknowledges that despite his immoral behaviour, the Sixth Dalai Lama was “greatly revered by the Tibetans.” At that time, it seemed that Tibetans and other Buddhist followers were divided over the authenticity of the Sixth Dalai Lama. The dGe lugs purists and those who follow them claimed that the Sixth Dalai Lama was fake, but others willingly stepped up to protect the Dalai Lama and his dignity.<sup>557</sup> Although the lifestyle of the Sixth Dalai Lama did not fit well within the tradition of the dGe lugs school, many Buddhist scholars found a new reason to defend him. For example, in his *Biography of*

---

<sup>553</sup> Tucci 1999, vol-i: 77.

<sup>554</sup> Desideri 2010:243. Ippolito Desideri was a Jesuit missionary who travelled from India via Ladakh to central Tibet, where he lived for five years. His works are one of the first detailed accounts of the dGa’ ldan pho brang in Western literature. In relation to this, the Capuchin missionaries, including Orazio della Penna, Domenico de Fano, and Francesco Fossombrone, were in Tibet between 1708–1745. However, it seems no detailed account was written by any of them (Houston 1991: 20).

<sup>555</sup> It is well known that Desideri lived in Lhasa with the help of the Khan and his generals. In return, Desideri assisted the Khan with his medical skills. For details, see his work (2010).

<sup>556</sup> Desideri 2010: 245.

<sup>557</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa’i rdo rje n.d.: 18a. In his harsh words, Ser smad Grags pa mkhas grub (n.d.: 20–21, 23–24 and 36–37) repeatedly defends the Dalai Lama and the sDe srid, criticising those who accused them and spreading rumours.

*Che mchog 'dus pa rtsal*, Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje applies the Buddhist concept of “skill in means” (Sanskrit *upāyakauśalya*) to defend the Sixth Dalai Lama by stating:

དེ་བཞིན་པ་ཏེ་ཆེན་པོ་ཆེ་དང་གོང་ས་མཚོག་ཀྱང་སངས་རྒྱས་ཉག་གཅིག་གི་སྨོན་ལུལ་ཡིན་པ་ལ། སངས་རྒྱས་རྣམས་  
 རང་ག་མའི་གོགས་དབང་དུ་འགྱུར་ག་སྲིད། དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་རྣམས་ནི་ཐབས་ལ་མཁས་པས་བཟང་ངན་སྣ་ཚོགས་སུ་  
 ལྷོན་ན། ངན་པར་བསྟན་པ་རྣམས་གོགས་དབང་ཡིན་བྱས་པས་ག་ནས་ཡོང་།

Similarly, the Panchen Rinpoche and Dalai Lama operate solely in the experiential domain of the buddhas. This being the case, how can the buddhas possibly come under the control of a common obstacle? If buddhas manifest various behaviours because of their skill in means, how can one say that displaying bad (behaviour) means that they are influenced by an evil spirit!<sup>558</sup>

Similarly, in his *Biographies of dGa' ldan Khri pas*, Ser smad Grags pa mkhas grub (1750–1808) explains why the Sixth Dalai Lama behaved differently from what was expected of him:

གནས་སྐབས་སུ་དགོས་དབང་གི་མཛད་པ་སྣ་ཚོགས་པ་ཞིག་སྟོན་པར་ལྷང་བསྟན་པ་བཞིན་རྒྱལ་དབང་དུ་ག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ནས་  
 རིག་པ་བརྟུལ་ཞུགས་ཀྱི་སྨོན་པ་འགའ་ཞིག་བསྟན་ནས། འགོ་བ་གངས་མེད་པ་སྟོན་གྲོལ་ལ་འགོད་པར་མཛད་པའི་ཚེ་[...]

Temporarily, the great Sixth Dalai Lama displayed various ascetic behaviours of awareness, just as it had been prophesied that he would behave in various ways for [specific] purposes. And he brought countless sentient beings to maturation and liberation [...].<sup>559</sup>

Both passages are arguments of faith, leaving little room for fact-checking. However, these passages provide insights into the interpretation of the Dalai Lama’s behaviour by the opponents of the Dalai Lama on the one hand and attempts to justify and defend the Dalai Lama’s behaviour and his reputation on the other hand. According to the philosophical theories of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the arguments in defence of the Dalai Lama are valid and logical. However, in the general public’s view, these sophisticated arguments may have seemed ambiguous and vague.

However, some scholars argue that the general public held the Sixth Dalai Lama in high esteem despite the rumours and accusations. Schwieger, for instance, acknowledged that the Sixth Dalai Lama “remained a very popular figure in the memories of the Tibetan people.”<sup>560</sup> Ultimately, public opinion was split, as the population could side with either faction or whatever the majority opinion may have been, the status of the Sixth Dalai Lama was not as undisputed as that of his predecessor, which made his position increasingly precarious.<sup>561</sup>

Since the era of the Fifth Dalai Lama, the political and spiritual governance of the dGa’ ldan pho brang has been the inherent right of the subsequent Dalai Lamas (Chapter 3 Section 1.3.1). However, when unfavourable circumstances arose, subsequent Dalai Lamas often faced challenges in effectively leading the dGa’ ldan pho brang politically.<sup>562</sup> The political authority

<sup>558</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje n.d.: 18a.  
<sup>559</sup> Ser smad Grags pa mkhas grub n.d.: 38.  
<sup>560</sup> Schwieger 2015: 106.  
<sup>561</sup> Ser smad Grags pa mkhas grub (n.d.: 21 and 35–36) explains how internal factions made it difficult for both the Dalai Lama and the sDe srid, complicating their positions and work.  
<sup>562</sup> Petech 2013: 390–391.

of the Dalai Lama was essential for the sDe srid to safeguard the future of the dGa' ldan pho brang, including himself.<sup>563</sup> For the Sixth Dalai Lama to achieve this mission, he needed to excel in Buddhist scholarship and demonstrate leadership charisma and most importantly, he needed to collaborate with the sDe srid to lead the dGa' ldan pho brang. However, due to various factors, the Sixth Dalai Lama was politically and religiously distancing himself from the sDe srid.

### 4.3. Resentment Between the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama

The Sixth Dalai Lama adopted a libertine lifestyle and eventually renounced his monastic vows, disregarding pleas from his well-wishers, including the sDe srid and the Fifth Panchen Lama (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4). Due to his unconventional lifestyle, criticism was directed not only at the Dalai Lama himself but also at the sDe srid and the dGa' ldan pho brang (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.5). With this context, this subsection will discuss how this deteriorating situation, along with other internal issues, disrupted the relationship between the Sixth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid. It will also explore how the sDe srid's failed attempt to remove the attendants around the Dalai Lama, whom he believed had a negative influence on him, further worsened the relationship between the two leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang.

#### 4.3.1. Disagreements at the Personal Level

One might wonder to what extent the causes of this fracture lie in the relationship between the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama, and to what extent they were due to external pressures. It is evident that the personal relationship certainly played a role. Firstly, the sDe srid pushed the Sixth Dalai Lama too forcefully to become a capable religious and political leader in succession to the Fifth without considering the Sixth Dalai Lama's personal choices and difficulties. Secondly, the sDe srid himself failed to show an exemplary lifestyle to the young Dalai Lama.

Regarding the sDe srid's way of life, in his *Biography of Che mchog 'dus pa rtsal*, Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje gives the following reproving account:

མྱེ་སྲིད་རང་ནས་ཡང་ཞག་བརྩུ་རེའི་མཚམས་སུ་གོང་སྤྱད་དུ་ཐེངས་རེ་བྱོན་ནས་ཇོ་མོ་དང་མཉམ་དུ་བཞུགས་པ་ཙམ་ལས་  
 ལྷན་དུ་བག་མེད་ཀྱིས་ཇོ་མོ་བཞེས་པ་སོགས་མཛད་མེ་ཚོག་པ་ལ། དུས་ཕྱིས་འཆི་མེད་དགའ་ཚལ་དང་། དཔལ་རབ་ཁང་  
 གསར་གྱི་བདག་མོ་གཉིས་ཀ་མི་དགུས་མའི་བྱ་མོ་ཆེ་འདོན་གྱི་བདག་ལྷན་ཡོངས་གྲགས་མཛད། སེ་འབྲས་ཀྱིས་མཚོན་པའི་  
 ལྷ་མ་ཚོ་སྤྱེད་དམན་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་བརྩུག་དེ་དུས་ལྷ་ས་བ་རང་དང་། ཕྱོགས་ནས་ཡོངས་པའི་སྐྱེ་དམན་ཁ་སྐབས་དྲག་ཚད་  
 མྱེ་སྲིད་རང་ནས་མ་བཞེས་པ་གཅིག་ཀྱང་མེད། ལྷག་པར་མྱེ་སྲིད་རང་གི་སྲས་མོ་ཞིག་དང་ལྷགས་མཐུན་པས་དེ་སྐོར་གཞིས་  
 ཀྱི་གཞིས་ཚུང་གཅིག་དུ་བརྩུག་ནས་འཛོག་པ་གནང་། མྱེ་སྲིད་རང་གསང་ལྷག་གི་ཕེབས་དུས་སྐྱེ་ལྷང་ནང་དུ་སྐྱས་བཞུགས་  
 རས་ཕེབས། [...]

ཉིན་ལྟར་གྱི་ཕྱག་མཛད་ཕེབས། ཇོང་རྒྱབ་དུ་ཡང་བདག་མོ་གཉིས་གུར་ཡས་མས་ཀྱིས་འཛོག་པ་གནང་སྟེ་གསོལ་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་  
 གོང་ལ་ཇོ་མོ་གཅིག་ལ་གནང་། གསོལ་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱབ་དུ་ཇོ་མོ་གཅིག་ལ་གནང་། དུང་འཁོར་རྣམས་ཐམས་ཅད་སྟོགས་པར་  
 སྤོང་དགོས་པ་དང་། གོང་སྤྱད་པ་ཡང་ཡང་ཕེབས། དུང་འཁོར་ཚོ་ནི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་ཀྱི་ལྷང་གསེབ་ཁྲིད་དུ་ལྷན་པ་མ་སོང་གི་བར་  
 སྐྱེ་ལྷག་གི་སྤོང་དགོས། ལྷན་པ་སྤོང་དེ་སོང་བ་དང་། ད་དེ་དགོང་ལོག་ཚོག་པ་ཅེས་བརྗོད་གནང་ནས་སོ་སོའི་གནས་ལ་འགྲོ།

<sup>563</sup> Māzhàn Lín 1985: 92.

ཕར་ཕེབས་ཚུར་ཕེབས་ཀྱི་དུས་ལམ་འགག་ལ་མི་ཚོས་ཡང་མངོན་ཚན་ཚེན་པོས་བསྟུས་མི་ཚོག་པའི་ཚ་ཉམས་དང་། ལྷ་ལག་  
 ཚོང་གཞིས་ཀྱི་ལས་ཚན་སོགས་གང་ལ་ཡང་བདག་མོ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཞུས་དབང་བཅན་པ་དང་།

The sDe srid himself was not allowed to have multiple women on regular basis, apart from meeting with his own lady once every ten days when he visited Grong smad. Later, the sDe srid publicly married two young women from ordinary families: the ladies of the house of 'Chi med dga' tshal, and the house of dPal rab khang gсар. All lamas, including the ones from Se ra and 'Bras spung, were made to prostrate in front of the wives. At the time, there were no beautiful girls from Lhasa and other places who did not sleep with the sDe srid. Notably, the sDe srid fell in love with his own daughter, and he kept her in a private house. The sDe srid secretly visited her through the window using a ladder. [.....]

The sDe srid went out for archery every day. He kept his two wives in separate tents in the rDzong rgyab park and granted [his attention] to one lady before and to the other after lunch, respectively. [Thus, the sDe srid's] lay officers had to wait for [the sDe srid] with empty stomachs. He visited Grong smad [where his first wife lived] repeatedly, and his lay officers [again] had to wait outside in the willow forest until nightfall. When it became pitch-black night, they were informed to go home.

[The sDe srid] was very strict, so people were not allowed to watch him openly when he came and went. The requests of the two wives carried great weight in official departments, including the institutes of lamas and regional counties.<sup>564</sup>

This passage graphically describes the immorality, hypersexuality and political autocracy of the sDe srid and his two wives in the dGa' ldan pho brang. Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje seemed sympathetic towards the sDe srid and certainly was a firm supporter of the Sixth Dalai Lama. At the same time, it is also clear that he was also honest and forthright in pointing out the mistakes and misbehaviours of the sDe srid without hesitation.

The Sixth Dalai Lama was aware of the sDe srid's behaviour. According to the Dalai Lama, the sDe srid's lascivious lifestyle was a disgrace to the dGa' ldan pho brang and to Buddhism. In these circumstances, it was naturally difficult for the Sixth Dalai Lama to heed and accept the counsel and guidance of the sDe srid. Moreover, the Sixth Dalai Lama found the public's tolerance towards the sDe srid's unscrupulous mode of living to be distasteful and intolerable. His criticism and sarcasm toward the sDe srid are expressed in the poetic writings ascribed to the Sixth Dalai Lama:

སྤྱིན་པ་ཁ་སེར་གཏིང་ནག། སང་དང་སེར་བའི་སྣ་འདྲེན།  
 བན་དེ་སྐྱུ་མིན་སེར་མིན། སང་རྒྱས་བསྟན་པའི་དགྲ་བོ།  
 མ་བྱས་མི་ཁ་སྤང་བ། ང་དང་ཕོ་རོག་ནག་རྒྱང་།

<sup>564</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje n.d.: 39a—40a. Interestingly, none of the contemporary works, including the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, the most critical work about the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama, record such details of the sDe srid's behavioural flaws as Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje did in his *Biography of Che mchog 'dus pa rtsal*. This suggests that the account of Che mchog 'dus pa rtsal's biography is more direct and honest in style than other accounts.

བྱས་ཀྱང་མི་ལ་མི་འདུག། ཁོང་དང་ལྷན་ཏེ་འདུག།

རིག་འཛིན་ཚངས་དབྱངས་ལྷན་མཚོ། ལྷོང་ལྷུག་འཚོལ་གྱི་མ་གཞི།  
རང་ལ་དགོས་པ་ནང་བཞིན། མི་ལ་དགོས་གྱི་ཡོད་འགོ།

Yellow and black cloud  
Is the bringer of frosts and hailstorms.  
He who is neither layman nor monk (lit. neither grey nor yellow)  
Is an enemy of the Dharma.

Innocent but object of slander  
Are the little black raven and I.  
Without scandal even after foibles  
Are the Hor-falcon and he.

Do not tell me,  
“Tshangs dbyangs, you chase girls.”  
Just as you have needs,  
people, too, have needs.<sup>565</sup>

In this first stanza, the Dalai Lama openly criticised the sDe srid’s behaviour of wearing the monk’s robe without celibacy. In the following two stanzas, the Sixth Dalai Lama compared himself with the sDe srid and disapproved of the biased public opinion toward him and the sDe srid. Thus, these stanzas reflect the discomfort and fractions between the Sixth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid at the time. Even though some of these stanzas might not have been penned by the Sixth Dalai Lama himself, they were included in the oldest collection of his poetry and were most likely written during the time of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>566</sup> Thus, these poems still reflect the complex relationship between the Dalai Lama and the sDe srid. Secondly, although these poems do not directly mention the sDe srid by name, it is highly likely that he is the target of the criticism. Moreover, modern scholars of the Sixth Dalai Lama’s works, such as Sørensen and Chab spel, argue that the sDe srid was indeed criticised in these poems.<sup>567</sup> and Chab spel interpret these stanzas. Furthermore, regarding the third stanza, Williams writes that the Sixth Dalai Lama was “entitled to have sex with women as any other layman, including the Regent.”<sup>568</sup>

Whether composed by the Dalai Lama himself or by his contemporaries, these poems vividly illustrate the view of the Dalai Lama towards the sDe srid and the growing rift and resentment between the two leaders. It appears that the Sixth Dalai Lama could not reconcile himself with the fact that Dalai Lamas had unavoidable political and religious responsibility and had to excel in moral behaviour and Buddhist scholarship, while his mentor did not follow the same rules.

<sup>565</sup> The three stanzas above are in the collection of the Sixth Dalai Lama’s poems published by dPal ya chen o rgyan bsam gtan gling monastery (Tshangs dbyangs rgya mtsho n.d.: 12, 27, and 38–39). I cannot find this in the bibliography.

<sup>566</sup> One woodblock print copy, produced in Lhasa in 1751 (*lcags mo lug*) and now held in the ’Bras spungs monastery library, contains these verses. Additionally, another version printed in the 1880s, which includes the first two verses, is now available in the Tibetan collection of the Oxford Bodleian Library.

<sup>567</sup> Sørensen 1988: 282 and Chab spel Tshe brtan phun tshogs 2009: 173–175.

<sup>568</sup> Williams 2004: 43.

Under this impression, the Sixth Dalai Lama not only began to ignore the advice of the sDe srid but also to undermine the significance of the sDe srid.<sup>569</sup> The sDe srid's *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama* concludes in the tenth month of 1701, and he penned nothing further concerning the Sixth Dalai Lama. Therefore, no documents authored by the sDe srid are available to depict the Dalai Lama's daily life or the sDe srid's relationship with him in the following years.

However, other contemporary scholars have documented the relationship between the Dalai Lama and the sDe srid from this point onwards. In his autobiography, Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje recorded a situation in 1702 when the Sixth Dalai Lama disrespectfully ignored the sDe srid:

གྲུ་ཚང་ཁག་མང་ཙམ་གྱི་ཞབས་བརྟན་ལྷན་ཅིག་དུ་ཚོགས་ནས་འདུག ཡས་ལྗེན་ལྷན་རྒྱས་དང་སྟག་ཅེ་ཞབས་བྱུང་བྱང་  
 རིགས་བ་སྣ་ཚོགས་སོགས་བཞུགས་གྲུལ་ཀྱང་ཚན་ཆེ་བར། རྩེ་སྲིད་སྐུ་ཞབས་དང་ཁང་ཉེའི་ཕྱོགས་སུ་གསུམ་གདན་སྟེས་  
 འསོལ་དང་བཅས་པའི་གདན་བཞོས་གནང་། ཤོང་ས་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ཞབས་བརྟན་གྱི་མཚལ་མ་ཕུལ་གོང་དུ་ཉར་གྱིས་བཞེངས་ཏེ་  
 ཚོགས་མེད་དུ་ཕེབས་སོང་བར། རྩེ་སྲིད་སྐུ་ན་སློན་ཅིང་སྐུ་ལྷེ་བས་བཞེངས་ཡང་མ་ཐུབ་ཅིང་དེ་ལྟས་སུ་བཞུགས་སོང་། གསོལ་  
 ལྷོན་གྱི་དུས་གོང་ནས་གསོལ་རས་ཀྱང་བསྟུལ། དེ་དུས་ཞབས་བརྟན་འབུལ་རེས་བཞིན་མཚལ་གོང་ནས་བཞུགས་གྲུལ་དུ་མ་  
 བཞེས་པས་གཟིམས་རྒྱུང་དུ་འབུལ་བར་འགྲོ་གིན་འདུག

Many monastic colleges gathered for a longevity prayer; the Yas ljin family, the sTag rtse zhabs drung, various Northerners (i.e. Mongols), and others participated in this spectacular gathering. [My seat was] prepared with three layers of cushions close to [the seat] of the sDe srid. The Dalai Lama suddenly stood up and went away without being stopped before the maṇḍala offering was made. In this [unexpected situation], the sDe srid could not get up from his seat because he was of a mature age and overweight. During mealtime, [I was] offered gifts. Those, who organised the longevity prayer at the time, were visiting his [the Dalai Lama's] bed chamber to give their offerings because the latter did not receive the maṇḍala offering in the assembly.<sup>570</sup>

As stated in this paragraph, the Sixth Dalai Lama openly disrespected and humiliated the sDe srid in front of many leaders, including the Mongols. Despite his inexperience, the young Dalai Lama, without recognising the potential repercussions, increasingly disregarded the significance of the sDe srid, who was, in fact, the most seasoned political leader in central Tibet at the time.<sup>571</sup> As a result, the sDe srid must have felt resentful, disappointed, and betrayed on a personal level. This situation would have placed him in a dilemma regarding how to deal with the Dalai Lama (Chapter 5, Section 5.2).

In 1702, the sDe srid was only forty-nine years old, but according to the biography quoted above, he “was old and overweight”, so that he could not even rise from his seat. If the sDe srid was unwell and physically unfit, this must have affected his political career in the dGa' ldan pho brang. Zhwa sgab pa, on the other hand, describes the sDe srid as an unparalleled sportsman who excelled in archery, horse racing, and other sports,<sup>572</sup> and the passage from Sle lung's *Biography of Che mchog 'dus pa rtsal* quoted earlier similarly describes the sDe srid as

<sup>569</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 645–646 and 801 and Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 88.  
<sup>570</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje 1983: 34a.  
<sup>571</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 88.  
<sup>572</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 487–488. Zhwa sgab pa (online, 1985) explained the sport-skills of the sDe srid in his teaching record of this book. Accessed 01 October 2022.

a keen Bowman. If this is accurate, he must have been healthy in his 40s unless he suffered a sudden illness. We are thus left with slightly contradictory descriptions.<sup>573</sup>

#### 4.3.2. Rift Between the Followers of Two Leaders

Beyond the personal conflicts between the Sixth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid, a substantial conflict was brewing due to the power struggle between their followers. As per available sources, the two wives of the sDe srid were deeply engrossed in this struggle for power against the Sixth Dalai Lama. Due to their social and political influence, in Lhasa, whoever visited the Sixth Dalai Lama was also expected to visit the wives of the sDe srid as a show of equal respect. In 1702, Sle lung Lama recalls his conversation with the head cook of the Sixth Dalai Lama when he visited the latter to receive a blessing:

དབལ་རབ་ཁང་གསར་དང་འཆེ་མེད་དགའ་ཚལ་གཉིས་ལྗེ་སྲིད་ཀྱི་བདག་མོར་སོང་ཞིང་ཡུལ་གཉན་ཕྱག་དོག་པས་མ་  
མཇལ་ན་མི་ཡོང་ཞེས་གསོལ་དཔོན་ཆེན་མོས་གསུང་བས་མཇལ་ཁར་ཕྱིན་པར།

འཆེ་མེད་དགའ་ཚལ་དུ་དེད་དང་མཉམ་དུ་ལྗེ་འབྲུམ་དང་ཚོང་དཔོན་ཆེ་བ་ཞིག་སེར་འབྲས་ཀྱི་ལྷ་ཁག་བཅས་མཇལ་མི་  
མང་ཚམ་བྱུང་བར་ལྷམ་རྣམས་ལ་ཕྱག་གསུམ་ཕྱགས་སུ་བཅལ། དེད་གལ་འགོ་དང་དེ་འོག་དུ་མི་སྐྱེ་དྲག་རིམ་ནས་བསྐྱོད་  
པའི་མཇུག་དུ་ལྷ་ཁག་རྣམས་འཇོག་པ་གནང་། ཇ་སྐྱོར་གཅིག་གི་རིང་ལྷ་སྐྱེ་མཇལ་བ་ལྷ་བྱ་ལས་དྲི་བ་ནི་མ་བྱུང་། ཞལ་  
མཇལ་བྱུང་བས་དགའ་ཚལ་ཆེ་ཆེ་མོ་བྱས།

དབལ་རབ་དུ་བདག་མོ་ཉིད་བཞུགས་ཁྱི་མཐོན་པོའི་སྟེང་བཞུགས་པའི་སྐྱེ་མདུན་དུ་གྲུམ་ཚའི་སྟེང་འཇོག་པ་བཞིང་ཞིང་།  
དྲི་བ་ཡང་ཅི་རིགས་སྐྱུལ།

The chief steward [of the Dalai Lama] said: “[Now] you must visit [the wives of the sDe srid at] dPal rab khang gsar and ‘Chi med dga’ tshal, because they are dangerously powerful and jealous.” Thus, [I] visited them.

At ‘Chi med dga’ tshal, [the palace of the elder wife], I was accompanied by an aristocrat, a big businessman and some lamas from Se ra and ‘Bras spungs monasteries. [We] prostrated three times in front of the wife. I was allocated the uppermost position of the seating arrangement, followed by high and low lay leaders and then lamas from Se ra and ‘Bras spungs. During teatime, [she] did not ask [us] anything. It was like meeting a statue, but it seemed she was glad for the meeting.

At dPal rab [the palace of the younger wife], [I] stood on a blanket in front of the wife, who was sitting on a high throne. [She] also asked me different questions.<sup>574</sup>

The first paragraph explicitly exposes the abuse of power and jealousy of the sDe srid’s two wives towards the Sixth Dalai Lama. It also illustrates how the latter’s steward handled the situation by requesting visitors to show equal respect to the wives of the sDe srid. The second and third paragraphs highlight that even lamas from prominent dGe lugs monasteries were required to prostrate themselves before the sDe srid’s wives. This is a highly unusual practice within the power hierarchy of the dGa’ ldan pho brang where the dGe lugs monasteries and

<sup>573</sup> Rockhill (1910: 31) notes that the sDe srid was “aged at least 80” in 1700, which must surely be an error, presumably based on limited access to Tibetan sources for this early 20th century scholar.

<sup>574</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa’i rdo rje 1983: 34b—35a.

monks held the centre stage. These incidents in the passages are indicative of the reasons for the tension that existed between the followers of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. This complex relationship exacerbated the challenges of internal etiquette and politics of the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>575</sup>

#### 4.3.3. A Failed Assassination Attempt Undermines the Relationship

The final breaking point of the relationship between the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama surfaced after the failed assassination plan of the sDe srid against one of the Sixth Dalai Lama's inner attendants. As discussed above, there were dGe lugs purists among the attendants of the Dalai Lama, including De mo Lama and Sems dpa' Lama, and the sDe srid and his followers suspected that the Dalai Lama was heavily influenced by his attendants (Chapter 3 Section 3.3.2 and Chapter 4, Section 4.2.4). Thus, the sDe srid plotted to assassinate one of the Dalai Lama's attendants, mThar rgyas nas, to protect him from the latter's evil influence.

According to the *Biography of the Che mchog 'dus pa rtsal*, written by the Fifth Sle Lung Lama:

ལྷན་ཁྲིམས་མཁུན་ལྷན་པའི་དྲུས་མཐར་རྒྱས་ནས་ཀྲིས་སྐྱེ་ཞབས་བསྐྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པས་ད་ལོ་རང་མེད་པ་བཅོས་ན་སྐྱེ་བས་ཆེ་བ་  
ཡོང་བེར་ནས་ལྷན་མེད་ཆེན་མོ་དང་། མདའ་དཔོན་དགའ་ཆགས་པ། དར་བྱུང་ནས། ལྷན་ཡིག་བསྟན་འཛིན་དབང་པོ། ཨ་བོ་  
ལྷ་འཛོམས་སོགས་བཀའ་གྲོས་མཛད། སྐྱེ་ཞབས་རྗེས་སྐྱེ་ལ་ཕྱག་མདའ་ལེབས། ལྷན་མཚམས་གསུང་སྐྱེ་དང་བཅས་ལོག་  
ལེབས་སྐབས་མཐར་རྒྱས་ནས་ལམ་ཐོག་ཏུ་གསོལ་ཆེས་ལ། དེ་ཉིན་སྐྱེ་ཞབས་ནས་བཞེས་པའི་ན་བཟའ་མཐར་རྒྱས་ནས་ལ་  
གཡོགས་པ་གནང་། ལོང་གི་གོས་གཡོག་པོར་གཡོགས་པས་འོར་ཏེ། དགའ་ཆགས་པས་གཡོག་པོར་གྱི་བརྒྱབ་དེ་བཅད་ནས་  
བསད། དེར་འོར་བ་ཤེས་ནས་མཐར་རྒྱས་ནས་ལ་གཞན་ཞིག་གིས་གྱི་གཞུས་པར་དགའ་ཆེན་སྐྱེ་ཏེ་འགྲུལ་ཡང་གསོལ་མ་  
ཐུབ།

དེར་བརྟེན་ནས་སློག་ཆ་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་ཞིང་། ཆོས་སློང་ལག་ལ་ལུང་ལྷུ་གནང་། ལ་མོ་ནས་མདའ་དར་ཆོན་སྐྱེ་ལྷན་པ་ཞིག་  
པ་དང་། སྐྱེ་གྱུ་ཞིག་འབྲུལ་བ་གནང་ནས། མདའ་དཔོན་ལྷ་འཛོམས། ལྷན་ཡིག་བཅས་ཡིན་ཚུལ་གྱི་བརྒྱུ་མཛད། རིམ་གྱིས་  
མཁུན་ཏེ་ཨ་བོ་ལྷ་འཛོམས་ཟངས་ཏེ་མེ་འབར་མར་བསྐྱོན་ཏེ་རྗེས་སྐྱེ་དུ་བྱིད། གཞན་ནམས་ལྷན་སྐྱེ་གནང་། དེ་ནས་མགོ་  
ཉེས་ལྷ་བུའི་འབྲུག་ཟེངས་ཆེན་པོ་དང་། ལྷན་པར་ལྷན་པའི་ཡང་སྐྱེ་ཞབས་མེ་མཉེས་པའི་ཚུལ་དང་།

Previously, during the time of the Sixth Dalai Lama, the great sDe srid, general dGa' chags pa, Dar byung nas, secretary bsTan 'dzin dbang po, and A bo lang 'dzoms discussed and concluded: "mThar rgyas nas has a bad influence on the sKu zhabs (the Sixth Dalai Lama) and thus eliminating him will be beneficial [to the latter]." The Dalai Lama had gone to the rDzong rgyab<sup>576</sup> for archery games. They planned to murder mThar rgyas nas when they were returning in the evening while singing songs. However, that day, mThar rgyas nas wore the Dalai Lama's clothes, and had his clothes put on a servant. Therefore, by mistake, general dGa' chags pa struck the servant with his sword and killed him. Then they realised the mistake. Thus, another assassin attacked and injured mThar rgyas nas with his sword, and the latter was badly wounded and fell on the ground but could not be killed.

<sup>575</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 94a.

<sup>576</sup> The full name of this place is rDzong rgyab klu khang. The landmark is a temple situated amidst a lake directly to the rear of the Potala Palace, encircled by a verdant park. Senior officials of the dGa' ldan pho brang conducted specific official duties, partook in games, and arranged picnics at this location.

Due to this accident, there was great upheaval. [The attendants of the Dalai Lama] consulted with oracles [to find out who was behind this attack]. The La mo oracle offered an arrow covered with five-coloured silk cloths and a reed pen. [With these symbols,] they gradually discovered that General lNga 'dzoms and the secretary were behind this plot. Then, A bo lang 'dzoms putt him on a burning copper horse and led him around the *rdzong*, and others were subjected to corporal punishment. Then, a big fight occurred as if they were out of their minds, and in particular, the Dalai Lama showed his displeasure with the sDe srid.<sup>577</sup>

These passages show several issues: First, despite the well-thought-out preparation of the assassination, it seems the plot was leaked and mThar rgyas nas therefore disguised himself, which saved his life. This indicates that the followers of the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama were spying on each other and knew each other's plan. Second, although the assassins were from the inner circle of the sDe srid and carried out this plot with the good intention of saving the Dalai Lama, they were severely punished without having their intentions taken into account. Based on the *Gōng zhōngdàng rén míng bāo* (Palace Memorial Archives), Borjigidai Oyunbilig and Gǎ mǎ dīng bā Jiāng cuò assert that lHa bzang executed the assassins with the consent of the Sixth Dalai Lama, which initiated lHa bzang's conflict with the sDe Srid.<sup>578</sup> However, in 1702, lHa bzang had not yet become the Khan and relied on the sDe srid for his formal title; hence, this account is dubious. An alternative account suggests that, due to the Mongols' military strength, lHa bzang complied with the Sixth Dalai Lama's directive to execute the assassins.<sup>579</sup>

This consequence also indicates that the nineteen-year-old Dalai Lama commanded a great deal of power in the dGa' ldan pho brang with the support of his attendants and others who disliked the sDe srid. Otherwise, during this period, it would have been challenging to publicly punish the assassins against the wishes of the sDe srid, who still held power. Most importantly, as this passage shows, at this point, the Sixth Dalai Lama openly "showed his displeasure with the sDe srid", and their relationship reached its lowest point. In van Schaik's words, "after this event (assassination attempt) poison seeped into the relationship between the Dalai Lama and his Desi,"<sup>580</sup> separating the two leaders. This situation provided an opportunity for the dGe lugs purists and lHa bzang to consolidate their power and undermine the strength of the dGa' ldan pho brang under the leadership of the sDe srid (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2).

#### 4.4. lHa bzang and His Association with the dGe lugs purists

Under the charismatic leadership of the Fifth Dalai Lama, the Khoshut leaders, who helped establish the dGa' ldan pho brang, maintained a good relationship with Tibetan leaders within the dGa' ldan pho brang (Chapter 2, Section 2.5 and 2.6). With this context in mind, this

<sup>577</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje n.d.: 29b–30a. According to the available materials, it is difficult to determine the precise identity of mThar rgyas, besides that he served as an inner circle attendant to the Sixth Dalai Lama. While his name suggests that he hailed from the mThar rgyas estate or region, it is still unclear whether he had any affiliations with the dGe lugs purists. The Qing document, the *Kāngxī cháo mǎn wén zhūpī zòuzhé* (Kangxi Court Memorial Record in Manchu), named this attendant as "lHa dbang" rather than mthar rgyas, whom the sDe srid's supporters targeted because the Dalai Lama had an affair with both the sDe srid's daughter and lHa dbang (Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 89).

<sup>578</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008:89 and Gǎ mǎ dīng bā Jiāng cuò 2018: 32. In this context, this refers to the memorial records of Mongolian Tibetan Buddhist diplomat Phyag na rdo rje in Xining city.

<sup>579</sup> Gǎ mǎ dīng bā Jiāng cuò 2018: 32–33.

<sup>580</sup> Schaik 2011: 132–133.

subsection will discuss the evolving relationship between the sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan, as well as how this relationship has changed under the influence of the dGe lugs purists.

#### 4.4.1. lHa bzang's Initial Relationship with the sDe srid

There exists considerable uncertainty amongst contemporary academics regarding the relationship between the sDe srid and lHa bzang. Wáng Yáo recounts that lHa bzang harboured resentment towards the sDe srid after the latter revealed the passing of the Fifth and enthronement of the Sixth Dalai Lama in 1697.<sup>581</sup> Wáng Yáo also argue that lHa bzang suspected the sDe srid of poisoning and killing his father, Dalai Khan (1671–1701). lHa bzang believed that the sDe srid was plotting to assassinate him.<sup>582</sup> It is unclear why the date was wrongly noted, but certain old Chinese records state that Dalai Khan passed away in 1697.<sup>583</sup> Owing to this error, contemporary scholars, including Richardson and Goldstein, believed that lHa bzang succeeded as Khan in 1697.<sup>584</sup>

While his father, Dalai Khan, was alive, lHa bzang appeared to be a faithful supporter of the dGa' ldan pho brang under the leadership of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. For example, in the fifth month of 1699, lHa bzang arrived in central Tibet to resolve a domestic dispute between himself and his elder brother, bsTan 'dzin dbang rgyal, regarding the division of properties inherited from their father, Dalai Khan:

ཀླུ་སྲས་ལྷ་བཟང་ཀླུ་པོ་ལོ་ན་མཐོ་བ་དང་བཅས་བསྟན་འཛིན་དབང་ཀླུ་དང་སྐུ་མཆོད་ནང་ཁྱུ་ལ་གསོལ་སྐུལ་མཚམས་  
ཀྱང་ཐག་མ་ཚོད་པས་ཐག་གཅོད་དང་དུས་དབང་བཅས་རེ་ཞིག་བོད་བཞུགས་འགའ་པའི་བཀའ་ཕེབས་སོང་བ། སྲས་རང་  
དགོངས་པར་མ་གཏང་བ་མེད་པའི་འཇམ་འདུག་སྟེ་ཀླུ་པོས་སྐུལ་བའི་མཚམས་སོགས་ཁོངས་དངས་ལྷ་བུའི་ལྷའི་མགོ་  
སྟུང་བཅས་བཏང་བ་བསྟན་པའི་ཞབས་འདེགས་སུ་འགྱུར་ཚུལ་གནང་བ་ལུགས་ཐག་ཚོད་པའི་སྣངས་ཞལ་ལ་ཕེབས་རྗེས་  
ཕྱག་མདུད།

Prince lHa bzang was instructed to remain in [Central] Tibet for a period due to [Dalai] Khan being elderly, and the division of domains between bsTan 'dzin dbang rgyal and lHa bzang, the two brothers, being as yet undecided. Though the prince [lHa bzang] did not object to [this directive], [Dalai] Khan suggested, citing the example of inheritance limitation, that dispatching [lHa bzang to mTsho sngon] to lead and unify [Khoshut leaders] would benefit Buddhism. The suggestion was finalised, and protective knots were given to the couple (lHa bzang and his wife) as a parting gift.<sup>585</sup>

Though not explicitly stated here, it is clear from the context, and we know from other sources that the sDe srid was the mediator between these two brothers, resolving the conflict.<sup>586</sup> Furthermore, as this passage shows, on the recommendation of Dalai Khan, the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama agreed to send lHa bzang to the mTsho sngon region. These events demonstrate that lHa bzang followed the orders of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. It also demonstrates that the sDe srid held influence over the Khoshut Khan's family to dissolve their internal conflicts.

<sup>581</sup> Wáng Yáo 1980: 197–198.

<sup>582</sup> *ibid*: 197–198.

<sup>583</sup> Petech 1966: 270.

<sup>584</sup> Richardson son 1998: 390 and Goldstein 1997: 11.

<sup>585</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 611.

<sup>586</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan (1976, vol. i) named the sDe srid as the mediator in this conflict.

It appears that the Qing diplomat Phyag na rdo rje was aware of lHa bzang's intentions to ensure Khoshut support for the sDe srid's government and, as a result, exhibited his disdain towards lHa bzang. According to the *Ménggǔ táng dàng bǔcè* (Mongolian Hall Archives), Phyag na rdo rje levelled various accusations against lHa bzang, including his association with the sDe srid. Conversely, lHa bzang expressed to Kangxi that he could not reside in mTsho sngon because of the animosity from Phyag na rdo rje.<sup>587</sup> Around this time, due to Dalai Khan's illness in 1700, the sDe srid summoned lHa bzang to Lhasa.<sup>588</sup>

Contrary to earlier assumptions that Dalai Lhan died in 1697, in reality, Dalai Khan fell ill in 1700, and his condition deteriorated progressively, culminating in his death on the 13th of the twelfth month of that year at his Lhasa residence.<sup>589</sup> According to the Western calendar, this date marks the onset of 1701.<sup>590</sup>

Upon the request of the family, the sDe srid guided the funeral of their late father, Dalai Khan:

ལྷོ་ལོ་རང་གི་སྐུ་ཚས་ནས་དགོངས་རྗེས་གཏོང་ལུགས་ཅི་འདྲ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རང་གིས་སློབ་གཙོ་དགོས་ཚུལ་རྒྱལ་མོ་དང་  
ཇི་སང་ཚང་མས་གསུང་བ་ལྟར།

As the Queen and all ministers (*ji sang*)<sup>591</sup> asked me, “You must decide how to conduct the funeral service using the assets of the Khan.”<sup>592</sup>

This passage suggests that the entire Khoshut Khan family trusted the sDe srid to oversee the Khan's funeral. It demonstrates that the sDe srid played a key role within the Khoshut leader's family and highlights the close relationship with the remaining members of the Khoshut royal family, including lHa bzang. Moreover, these events also indicate that lHa bzang harboured no suspicions towards the sDe srid at that time. Observing all these events, Borjigidai Oyunbilig concludes:

拉藏到达西藏后，并没有与第巴对立。史料显示，拉藏到西藏之初，与第巴和六世达赖喇嘛的关系十分融洽。

After lHa bzang arrived in Tibet, he did not oppose sDe srid. Historical records indicate that upon Lazang's arrival in Tibet, he shared a very harmonious relationship with the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>593</sup>

Based on the *Gōng zhōngdàng rénmíng bāo* (Palace Memorial Archives), modern scholar Gǎ mǎ dīng bā jiāng cuò writes:

起初拉藏汗与第巴之间的关系并未有很大矛盾，康熙四十年（1701），第巴·桑结嘉措将前藏商上百余户蒙古喀尔喀人分给拉藏为差户。

<sup>587</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 86.

<sup>588</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 756.

<sup>589</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 757 and bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 77a.

<sup>590</sup> Schuh 2012, vol. ii: 239–477. This table prepared by Schuh compares the Tibetan calendar with the Western Gregorian calendar.

<sup>591</sup> In Mongolian, this title is spelled “Jesang” and refers to ministers and generals in the 17th and 18th centuries.

<sup>592</sup> sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho 1989: 763.

<sup>593</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 87.



last very long. After this, Ratna’s younger son, lHa bzang became king. However, bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal had been killed by poisoning, and [therefore] the lamas of the dGe lugs school and their patron Mongol Khans/generals were cursed with black magic.<sup>600</sup>

According to this passage, bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal was not poisoned by his brother lHa bzang; however, it is not clear who poisoned him. As mentioned above, the misunderstanding and misinterpretation of this passage by Tucci and Petech have reshaped many modern scholars’ view of lHa bzang and his relationship with the sDe srid prior to 1702. For example, Petech describes lHa bzang as “a man of character and energy, who did not intend to tolerate any longer the powerless state to which the Qosot chiefs had sunk.”<sup>601</sup> Similarly, Zhwa sgab pa depicts lHa bzang as an extremely cunning political leader.<sup>602</sup> lHa bzang was repeatedly portrayed as a power-hungry and astute political figure with an insatiable appetite for gaining power. However, I cannot find any record in the primary sources before 1703 of lHa bzang being covetous of Tibetan political power or challenging the authority of the sDe srid (Chapter 2, Section 2.7).

Regarding the successor of Dalai Khan in central Tibet, scholars offer a range of accounts. Tibetan historian Zhwa sgab pa asserts that lHa bzang was summoned from mTsho sngon and became the succeeding Khan, as his elder brother bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal had been adopted by Hong Taiji and was, therefore, residing in Mongolia.<sup>603</sup> Other Tibetan scholars, like Chab spel Tshe brtan phun tshogs and Nor brang O rgyan, have also concurred with Zhwa sgab pa’s account.<sup>604</sup> However, they do not cite any primary sources to substantiate their claims. An early Mongolian source translated by Walther Heissig says: “Then, after Ratna Dalai Khan’s death, his son lHa bzang succeeded him and took over the government affairs of Tibet. The sDe srid was very hostile to this ruler.”<sup>605</sup> Based on this passage, lHa bzang succeeded his father and “took over the government affairs of Tibet” after his father’s demise, and the translator allocated this event to the period before 1700. According to the *Biography of the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, penned by bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis, a contemporary of bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal in Lhasa, the elder prince, bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal, was evidently not in good health and had been unwell for an extended period:

འདི་ལོ་རྒྱལ་སྐྱེས་པ་བཟུང་བའི་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱིས་ན་ནས་ལོ་འཁོར། ལྷན་ཀྱང་མ་ཐུབ་པས་རྗེ་འདི་ཕེབས་དགོས་  
 ལྷན་ནས་རྗེ་འདི་ཕེབས། ཕར་ལམ་ཆེབས་པ་སློ་བུར་དུ་རྐྱེད་པ་ཆག དེ་ནས་རྗེ་འདི་ལྷན་པ་འཇུགས་ནས་ལམ་དེར་དུག་ཅུ་བ་  
 གཅིག་བཞོན། དེ་ནས་ཕེབས་ནས་རྒྱལ་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་རྩེ་སྐབས་པས། ངག་དམ་ནས་ཆོག་བཤད་མི་ཐུབ། རྐྱེད་པ་འཇུགས་འགོ་  
 འདུག་ཡང་མི་ཐུབ་པར་ཐུ་མོར་འདུག [“.....”] རྒྱལ་སྐྱེས་ན་ཆ་དེའི་རྒྱན་གྱིས་གཤེགས་སོང་།

By this year [1700], it had been a year since prince bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal was possessed by an evil planetary spirit and taken ill. No one could help. Thus, [the family of the Khan] requested the Lord [’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] to come, and he visited. On the way, his horse’s back was broken, which made him nervous, and he performed a *torma* offering ritual on the way. Then, the lama [’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] met the prince, but the latter became mute and could not speak. He could not even walk as his

---

<sup>600</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal ’byor 1992: 325.  
<sup>601</sup> Petech 1972: 10.  
<sup>602</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol. i: 490.  
<sup>603</sup> ibid: 473.  
<sup>604</sup> Chab spel Tshe brtan phun tshogs and Nor brang O rgyan 1989: 678.  
<sup>605</sup> Heissig (trans)1944: 124.

legs were bent. The situation was severe. [...] The prince passed away because of this illness.”<sup>606</sup>

This passage suggests that bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal was gravely ill in 1700, and it seems, according to this narrative, bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal might have passed away that same year, though it is not explicitly stated here. In this context, the account by the Qing diplomat Phyag na rdo rje from the *Gōng zhōngdàng rén míng bāo* (Palace Memorial Archives) dated 1703 documents the message of the Sixth Dalai Lama conveyed via a group of Khoshut Mongols returning from Lhasa:

第巴与众人不合，且年纪已老，故将其第巴之职革退，令其子任第巴。达赖汗之位，欲令其长子丹津旺扎勒继承，然伊有病，不明事理，故令其弟拉藏继位。

The sDe srid is old, and he does not always get along with others, so I (the Sixth Dalai Lama) removed him from the position of sDe srid. For the position of Dalai Khan, [I] would like to appoint his elder son, bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal, to succeed to the throne. However, due to his illness, he cannot take charge of the administration. So, [I] have selected his younger brother lHa bzang.<sup>607</sup>

This excerpt suggests that lHa bzang was chosen due to his elder brother’s illness, rendering him unfit for duty. From this passage, it appears that bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal was still alive in 1703. This very account notes that bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal passed away in 1704, a year after lHa bzang took the throne. This account might be accurate. Dated to the 25th of the ninth month of 1704, the Fifth Panchen Lama records the death of bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal in his autobiography:

ལྷོ་ཆེད་ཉོར་ཐའི་ཇི་མི་སྣ་དང་། རྒྱལ་སྐུ་བསྟན་འཛིན་དབང་རྒྱལ་གྱི་དགོངས་ཚོགས་སུ་དབུལ་ལས་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཚན་  
ཉེན་བཞེངས་པར་དྲོ་རྗེ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་འབྱོར།

The emissary of Dha’i ching Hor Tha’i ji and rDo rje rgyal mtshan arrived to construct a silver stupa for the memorial service of Prince bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal.<sup>608</sup>

This indicates that the funeral of bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal occurred late in 1704. Aside from this single sentence from the Panchen Lama regarding the prince, no other sources mention his passing. This suggests that, although the prince lived until 1704, it appears he was unwell and absent from political affairs. Furthermore, bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal did not have any sons. Consequently, the throne naturally passed to his younger brother, lHa bzang.<sup>609</sup> Due to his inactive life, none of the primary sources wrote about him or recorded the details of his death. Thus, according to primary sources quoted above, bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal was not poisoned, and no one was immediately enthroned and succeeded Dalai Khan after his demise in 1701. As per tradition, the Khoshut leaders became Khan only after the dGa’ ldan pho brang officially offered the title (Chapter 2, Section 2.5 and 2.6). In the case of lHa bzang, this did not happen immediately.

<sup>606</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis. n.d.: 76–77.

<sup>607</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 86.

<sup>608</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol. i: 358.

<sup>609</sup> dKon mchog rgyal mtshan 1990: 69.

A significant occurrence that has come to light is the fact that lHa bzang was dispatched back to Kham in 1702 by the dGa' ldan pho brang. As the Qing had taken control of Dar rtse mdo by force in 1701, lHa bzang's journey to Kham was likely in response to it. Aware of the situation, Qing representatives dispatched an official letter to the sDe srid, pressing him to recall lHa bzang from Kham:

མཁམ་བཙུན་ངག་མར། ལྷ་བཟང་ཡར་སློབ་ཁམས་ལ་སོག་པོའི་རིགས་མ་འཛོག་ཟེར་བ། ལྷ་བཟང་གཞི་ནས་འདི་ཁར་ཕེབས་ཕྱིན་གྱི་དུས་ལ་ཆ་བཟུན་གཞུང་ལེགས་འགྲིག་བྱུང་རྗེས་མགྲིན་གཉེར་གཉེས་སོགས་ལོག་ཕྱིན་དང་།

mKhas btsun's (the emissary of the Qing's) oral message said: "Transfer lHa bzang back and do not station Mongols in Kham." [In reply to this message, the sDe srid said], "lHa bzang just arrived here. Now that Buddhism and government are reconciled properly,<sup>610</sup> the two guest managers (*mgron gnyer*) and the others may get ready to return."<sup>611</sup>

This message was recorded on the 5th of the fifth month of 1702, suggesting this event occurred in the early part of that year. This excerpt suggests that lHa bzang was in Kham, presumably dispatched by the dGa' ldan pho brang, leading to suspicion among the Qing officials. As a result, the Qing officials contacted the sDe srid, asking him to call back lHa bzang from Kham. This passage also indicates that the sDe srid still possessed the authority to dispatch lHa bzang to Kham and summon him back in 1702.

#### 4.4.3. Casting the sDe srid as an Enemy of the dGe lugs School

For reasons that remain unclear, from 1703 onwards, the dGe lugs purists became more aggressive, spreading various rumours about the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama to tarnish their reputations. For example, at the beginning of 1703, the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa became ill and thus he accused the rNam rgyal monastery of casting magic spells on him. The *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* says:

གྲགས་རྒྱལ་མའི་ལུང་བཟུན་ལ་བྱེད་ལ་གཞན་གྱིས་མཐུ་བྱེད་བ་འདུག་པས། དེ་ལ་ཐུགས་མཉམ་གྱིས། གཞན་གྱིས་གོ་ན་འདྲིའི་གནས་ཁང་ཤོར་ཡོང་ཞེས་སྐོག་ནས་ལུང་། དོན་ལ་རྣམ་རྒྱལ་གྱི་ཚང་གིས་བྱེད་བ་ཡིན་འདུག།

The deity Grags rgyal ma secretly prophesied: "You ['Jam dbyangs zhad pa] were cursed by others. Be careful with it. If others heard this, the demon would lose his dwelling." This meant that the rNam rgyal monastery did [the magic spell on 'Jam dbyangs zhad pa].<sup>612</sup>

The precise meaning of the phrase "the demon would lose his dwelling" and to whom it refers is not explicitly stated. What is important for our context is that there was a specific reason the purists highlighted the rNam rgyal monastery in this passage: the monastery was established solely to conduct rituals for the Dalai Lamas, and the dGa' ldan pho brang and was a staunch supporter of the sDe srid. Furthermore, the rNam rgyal monastery was the sole dGe lugs monastery that carried out rituals from the dGe lugs, rNying ma, Sa skya, and other traditions.

<sup>610</sup> As previously mentioned, given the context, this reconciliation may refer to the dispute in Dar rste mdo, where the Qing asked the dGa' ldan pho brang to position its envoy to oversee trade alongside Qing officials.

<sup>611</sup> rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997: 433.

<sup>612</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 89b.

In the same year, the dGe lugs purists accused the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama of undermining the purity of the dGe lugs school. bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis, in his *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, openly named the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai as the destroyers of the dGe lugs school for the first time in 1703.

སྐབས་ཤིག་མི་ལམ་གྱི་ཚུལ་དུ་རྒྱུ་ལོ་ནས་གཡལ་ཆེན་པོ་གཅིག་དབུས་ལ་ཡོང་བས་སྐྱིད་ཤོང་ལུང་བ་ལ་ཤོང་མི་ཤོང་བའི་  
 ཚོད་འདུག། གཡལ་དེ་འཁྲབ་འཁྲབ་ནས་རུའི་ཚེ་ལ་དབུས་གྱི་མི་གཉིས་འབྱར་སོང་བས་རུའི་སྤོང་ན་མར་འགོས་པ་བཞིན་  
 འདུག་མནལ་སང་ནས་ལྷགས་ལ། ཚངས་དབྱངས་པ་དང་སྤེ་བ་གཉིས་དགེ་ལྷགས་ལ་མི་དགའ་བ་འདུག་ཚོས་སྐྱོང་ཚོས་ཡུན་  
 མི་རིང་བར་བསྐྱོད་པར་འདྲ།

At one time, as in a dream, a big yak from gTsang came to dBus who hardly fitted in the valley of sKyid shod [Lhasa]. The yak danced around, and two people from dBus were stuck on the yak’s horns like butter. [Then, the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] woke up and thought: “The Sixth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid do not like the dGe lugs school. [Thus] the protector deities will soon destroy them.”<sup>613</sup>

This excerpt openly and decisively portrayed the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama as the destroyers of the dGe lugs school. Firstly, the phrase “the protector deities will soon destroy them” indicates that the dGe lugs purists were confident that the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama would face an imminent downfall. Secondly, this marks the first instance recorded in the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* where the dGe lugs purists directly criticised the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama by naming them explicitly. These two signs suggest that the purists had a strategic plan to challenge the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama, which, in this context, would have involved enlisting lHa bzang to their cause (Chapter 4, Section 4.4.4).

In these accusations, the dGe lugs purists consistently attempted to depict the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama as the destroyers of the dGe lugs school. Behind these assertions, they invariably portrayed themselves as the protectors of the dGe lugs school. For example, the Manchus and Dzungars portrayed themselves as the guardians of the dGe lugs school by criticising the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>614</sup>

#### 4.4.4. Direct Clash Following Power Transition

Whether it was a move to ensure sustained power within the dGa’ ldan pho brang by passing the mantle to a new sDe srid, or simply an effort to appease the dGe lugs purists and reduce criticism towards the dGa’ ldan pho brang, remains a matter of speculation. Either way, the sDe srid chose to pass on his official title to his eldest son, Ngag dbang rin chen. At the same time, in line with the Khoshut political system in Tibet, the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama opted to officially bestow upon lHa bzang the title of the new Khoshut Khan. In the sixth month of 1703, an official ceremony took place to bestow these titles on both Ngag dbang rin chen and lHa bzang Khan as sDe srid and Khan, respectively.<sup>615</sup> In contrast, Sum pa mKhan po notes that the sDe srid retired and appointed his eldest son as his successor in 1702 but no other primary source supports this date.<sup>616</sup> Moreover, the *Autobiography of the Fifth Panchen Lama* and the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* record that the Panchen Lama dispatched

<sup>613</sup> ibid: 91a.

<sup>614</sup> Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào 1982, vol-i: 130 and 163.

<sup>615</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 91b.

<sup>616</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1982: 19.

his envoys to extend congratulations to both lHa bzang Khan and A ba la, the eldest son of the sDe srid in 1703.<sup>617</sup> Thus, the enthronement date must be the sixth month of 1703.

Regarding this appointment of lHa bzang as Khan, Borjigidai Oyunbilig contends that to maintain his power, the sDe srid attempted to use lHa bzang as a “political puppet” by awarding him the title of Khan in 1703.<sup>618</sup> However, Borjigidai Oyunbilig did not provide a reference for this argument. Tibetan primary sources do not suggest that the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama appointed lHa bzang as the Khan to make him a “political puppet”.<sup>619</sup> However, it is clear that the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama conferred the title upon lHa bzang as part of the dGa’ ldan pho brang tradition, especially since his elder brother was ill, making lHa bzang the only suitable successor to Dalai Khan (Chapter 4, Section 4.4.2).

It seems the former sDe srid, Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho, may have hoped that this power transition within the dGa’ ldan pho brang would appease the dGe lugs purists and lessen the criticism directed at the dGa’ ldan pho brang. However, instead of accepting this as a conciliatory gesture of the former sDe srid, the dGe lugs purists viewed this as an opportunity to destroy the former sDe srid once and for all. First, as we will discuss below, the dGe lugs purists tried to bring the newly enthroned lHa bzang Khan on their side. The First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa performed rituals and empowerments for Dalai Khan and Queen Tshe ring and became their main Lama (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1). He also performed ritual prayers for prince bsTan ’dzin dbang rgyal. Moreover, the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa shared his birthplace with the home region of the Khoshut Mongols in mTtsho sngon, which might have strengthened their relationship (Chapter 2, Section 2.9). For example, when the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa attended the sMon lam festival in Lhasa, he often stayed with Mongol Khans at bSam ’grub palace.<sup>620</sup>

This multi-level of relationships likely opened a door for the dGe lugs purists to bring lHa bzang on their side, making him a potential candidate to challenge the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. Thus, upon the enthronement of lHa bzang as the new Khan, the dGe lugs purists immediately portrayed him as a reincarnation of both Gūshi Khan and Tsongkhapa, as an expression of their support for him.

In his *Biography of the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis writes:

ལོ་འདིར་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལྷ་བཟང་ལ་རིང་གི་སེ་ཤུན་ཞེས་མཚན་གསོལ། ཟླ་བ་སངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཚོ་བུར་བཞུགས་བྱས། ལྷ་ས་ཨ་བླ་ལ་  
ཁྱིམ་བཞུགས་དེ་སྐབས་ལོ་ལྔ་ཕྱི་འདིར་དགའ་ལྷན་གསེར་རྟོག་ལ་ཡང་ཡང་མེ་འབར་བས། གཞུང་ནས་ལྷ་ས་དེ་ཡིན་ཞེས་  
ཚོགས་ཚན་ལ་བསྐྱབས།

རྗེ་འདིའི་ཞལ་ནས། དེ་ལྷ་ས་དེ་ཡིན་འགྲོ། རྩོན་འོས་ལོང་རྒྱལ་པོ་ཀོལ་བུ་ཉན་སོག་ཡུལ་ནས་ཡོངས་དུས་ཡང་དགའ་ལྷན་  
གསེར་རྟོག་ལ་མེ་འབར་བ་ཡིན། རྗེ་འདི་པོ་ཚེ་རང་གི་སྐུ་པ་རེ་དངོས་སུ་བྱོན་དུས་དེ་ལྷ་ས་ཡོངས་བས། འདི་ཡང་རྗེ་འདི་པོ་

<sup>617</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 350, and bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 91b. In these quotations, Ngag dbang rin chen, the sDe srid’s elder son, was referred to as “A ba la”, which is another moniker. Literally, “A ba” might be equivalent to “a wa”, which is an honorific term for “son or baby boy.”

<sup>618</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 88.

<sup>619</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 350, and bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 91b. According to the Gōng zhōngdàng rénmíng bāo (Palace Memorial Archives), the Sixth Dalai Lama revoked the title of the sDe srid from Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho and appointed the new Khan (Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 86). However, given the power balance between the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama at the time, this account seems unlikely.

<sup>620</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 85a.

ཆེ་རང་གི་སྐུལ་བ་གཅིག་འབྱོན་ལྟ་ཡིན་པས། དགེ་ལུགས་ལ་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་ཡོངས་པའི་ལྟ་ཡིན་གསུངས། དོན་ལ་རྒྱལ་པོ་  
འདི་ཀོ་ཤི་ཉན་གྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡིན་པས། ཀོ་ཤི་ཉན་རྗེ་རང་གི་སྐུལ་བ་ཡིན་ཞེས་རྟོག་ནས་འཁོར་འགའ་ཞིག་ལ་གསུངས།

This year [1703], lHa bzang was entitled as Genghis Khan, the sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho retired, and his son A ba' la [Ngag dbang rin chen] was enthroned. Between these years (perhaps referring to 1702 and 1703), the golden roof of dGa' ldan Monastery caught fire again and again. Thus, the government declared that this was a bad sign.

[However] 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa said: “This is not a bad sign. In the past, when Gushri Khan came here from Mongolia, the golden roof of dGa' ldan Monastery caught fire. This sign will occur whenever a true reincarnation of rJe rin po che has arrived [in Tibet]. Thus, this [fire] is a sign that a reincarnation of rJe rin po che was coming so that the dGe lugs school would be prosperous.” This means that this king [lHa bzang] was the reincarnation of Gushri Khan. Thus, ['Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] secretly told some of his attendants that Gushri Khan was the reincarnation of rJe [Tsong Kha pa].<sup>621</sup>

In this passage, lHa bzang Khan is portrayed as the reincarnation of Gushri Khan, who was the manifestation of Tsong kha pa. This statement indirectly signalled that it was the responsibility of lHa bzang Khan to eliminate the destroyers of the dGe lugs school, such as the former sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama because, according to the dGe lugs purists, they were the main enemies of the dGe lugs school. These contrasting depictions of the sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan propagated by the purists under the leadership of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa served two purposes: firstly, this message pushed lHa bzang Khan to become the visible competitor of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. Secondly, this open support for lHa bzang earned the trust of the Khan in the dGe lugs purists and gave him the confidence to fight against the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama.

As we will discuss later, the transition in lHa bzang's personality and ambition started with his relationship with the dGe lugs purists. As Schwieger states, after becoming Khan in 1703, “Lhapzang Qan was no longer content with the role of his predecessors, who had more or less withdrawn from any active involvement in politics.”<sup>622</sup> Similarly, Borjigidai Oyunbilig argues that lHa bzang was no longer satisfied with the nominal title of Khan, which inevitably led to a struggle with the sDe srid, as the sDe srid held actual power in the dGa' ldan pho brang at the time:

第巴与拉藏的对立，始于 1703 年。拉藏特别精明能干，他继位后并没有第巴设想的那样满足于徒有虚名的汗号。

The conflict between the sDe srid and lHa bzang began in 1703. lHa bzang was so astute and capable that he was discontented with the mere title of Khan without any authority.<sup>623</sup>

<sup>621</sup> *ibid*: 91b–92a.

<sup>622</sup> Schwieger 2015: 115. Schwieger's book does not provide information about the specific time when lHa bzang Khan became interested in political power. However, during a conference held in Jerusalem, the scholar stated that lHa bzang's political ambition emerged after he was appointed as the Khan in 1703.

<sup>623</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 88.



Idan pho brang. However, reading between the lines, this passage suggests that the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa steered the Khan towards devising a strategic plan to assume control of the dGa' ldan pho brang at a more opportune moment. In Lhasa, the Khan did not have a large military force under his command, and he had not yet gained strong support from the Tibetans because he was newly crowned.<sup>628</sup> Knowing about this power balance between the former sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan in Lhasa, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa advised the Khan that “it is not yet the right time” to deploy military force. It seems the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa knew that the Khan should first win the diplomatic war against the sDe srid before winning the military war. Thus, the Khan said, “I will do as you advise.”

#### 4.5 Conclusion

The Qing invaded Dar rtse mdo in 1701 under the guise of aiding the lCags la king, casting doubts on the competency of the sDe srid who failed to reclaim his authority in the region (Chapter 4, Section 4.1). The situation deteriorated when the Sixth Dalai Lama abandoned his monastic vows in 1702 and refused to accept his religio-political role as the Dalai Lama, and his relationship with the sDe srid soured (Chapter 4, Section 4.2 and 4.3).

In this situation, the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama attempted to mend relations with lHa bzang by naming him the new Khan and enthroning the sDe srid's son as the new sDe srid. However, the purists and the Khan saw this as an opportunity to further undermine the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama, likely intending to remove them from power (Chapter 4, Section 4.4). lHa bzang emerged as a crucial ally for the dGe lugs purists in their bid to challenge the power of the dGa' ldan pho brang under the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>629</sup> The dGe lugs purists portrayed the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama as enemies of the dGe lugs school while also depicting lHa bzang as its defender.<sup>630</sup> This kind of narrative had the potential to lead to a direct confrontation between the sDe srid and the Khan in the dGa' ldan pho brang.

---

<sup>628</sup> Wángyào Kē 2019: 132 and Yixī Wāngqiū and Lǐ Zhēng 1994: 38.

<sup>629</sup> Without lHa bzang Khan, there was no viable competitor to the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama who could potentially replace them in the dGa' ldan pho brang. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa was influential, but for various reasons, he could not directly challenge the sDe srid or depose him. Thus, lHa bzang became a crucial ally for the dGe lugs purists.

<sup>630</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 91b–92a.

## Chapter Five:

### **Collapse of the Alliance: The Final Struggle Between the Former sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan**

(1704–1705)

At the outset of 1704, the enmity between the former sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan intensified to such a degree that both parties harboured concerns regarding a potential military strike from the other (Chapter 4, Section 4.4). Based on this context, this chapter will discuss the complex relationship between the former sDe srid and the Fifth Panchen Lama, as well as the role of dGe lugs purists in this regard. It will also explore the growing direct confrontations between the former sDe srid and the Khan, along with their respective followers. To understand the final military clash between the two leaders, this chapter will closely analyse the rumours of poisoning and the subsequent negotiations. Finally, it will address the aftermath of the Khan's military victory and his subsequent collaborations with the dGe lugs purists and the Qing court.

#### **5.1. The Former sDe srid and the Fifth Panchen Lama**

Kangxi's invitation to the Fifth Panchen Lama caused discomfort not only between the Qing and the dGa' ldan pho brang but also between the sDe srid and the Fifth Panchen Lama.<sup>631</sup> This issue was also closely linked with other conflicts between the sDe srid and the Khan (Appendix One, record dated 24 March 1696). This subsection will discuss the complex relationship between the sDe srid and the Panchen Lama, exploring the role of the dGe lugs purists in creating rumours to disrupt their relationship. It will also analyse how these rumours damaged the bond between the two leaders and eroded the loyalty of the gTsang people towards the sDe srid.

##### 5.1.1. Complexity of the Relationship

To legitimise and maintain the authority of the dGa' ldan pho brang, the leading dGe lugs Lamas, such as the Panchen Lama, played a crucial role by participating in official ceremonies and endorsing the government policy (Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3). The gTsang region had been a hotbed of rebellions, mainly by non-dGe lugs schools, posing a challenge to the dGe lugs school because it was the power base of the gTsang Dynasty.<sup>632</sup> In such circumstances, the Panchen Lama and bKra shis lhun po emerged as the dGa' ldan pho brang's strongest allies in the region. For example, the Panchen Lama helped recognise the Fifth Dalai Lama under the gTsang Dynasty's rule.<sup>633</sup>

At a personal level, the Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lamas held special religious authority to recognise and legitimise each other's reincarnations. According to their seniority, they were also responsible for ordaining, teaching, and guiding each other throughout their careers.<sup>634</sup>

---

<sup>631</sup> Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào. 1982, vol-i: 162–165 and rDo rje tshe brtan (eds) 1997: 219–220.

<sup>632</sup> For this information, refer to the *Autobiography of 'Jam dbyangs dpal ldan rgya mtsho* (1975, vol. i), where he explains both ritual and military rebellions against the Mongols and the dGa' ldan pho brang.

<sup>633</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (2009, vol-v: 32–40) records the details of challenges at the time and the role of the Panchen Lama in recognising him as the Fifth Dalai Lama.

<sup>634</sup> For instance, the Fifth Dalai Lama was recognised by the Fourth Panchen Lama, who simultaneously served as the principal spiritual guide of the Fifth Dalai Lama. Furthermore, the Fifth Dalai Lama identified the Fifth

Although the political leader of the dGa' ldan pho brang was the sDe srid, representing the Dalai Lama, the Fifth Panchen Lama looked after the people and monasteries in the region of gTsang.<sup>635</sup> The sDe srid and the Dalai Lama had limited authority to issue orders to the Fifth Panchen Lama and his autonomous regions in gTsang due to the granted legal autonomy (*khri ms sgo rang btsan*).<sup>636</sup> In addition to the institutional power struggles, the historical tensions between dBus and gTsang added further complexity to the relationship between the dGa' ldan pho brang and bKra shis lhun po.<sup>637</sup> Moreover, as the highest lamas of the dGe lugs school, the respective institutions of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama sometimes viewed each other as competitors for power and prestige.<sup>638</sup>

Furthermore, the Fifth Dalai Lama and the Fourth Panchen Lama had differing views regarding the dGe lugs school and the governance of the dGa' ldan pho brang. The *Autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama* highlights the Fourth Panchen Lama's lack of inclination towards practices such as oracular divination, astrological forecasting, and spirit mediumship.<sup>639</sup> Moreover, the Fourth Panchen Lama composed many ritual works aimed at safeguarding the prestige and purity (*dri ma med pa*) of the dGe lugs school, indicating his religious views.<sup>640</sup> Thus, modern scholars, including Karmay, Fitzherbert, and Hor gtsang 'Jigs med, have put forward the view that the Fourth Panchen Lama's religious approach was distinct from that of the Fifth Dalai Lama.<sup>641</sup>

Following the Fifth Dalai Lama's approach, the sDe srid maintained the policy of excluding the Fifth Panchen Lama from the inner circle of the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>642</sup> The Kangxi Emperor, on the other hand, invited the Fifth Panchen Lama to visit Peking primarily to further his political interests amongst the Mongols. For example, Kangxi believed that the Panchen Lama is "important figure in the Qing court's efforts to prevent the Dsungars from establishing their own empire in Inner Asia"<sup>643</sup> However, for reasons that will be discussed below, the Panchen Lama persistently declined the invitations, leading to a profound political rift between the Qing and the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>644</sup> To avert this unwarranted political strife between them, the sDe srid earnestly requested the Panchen Lama to attend the Qing court despite the Panchen Lama's consistent refusal.<sup>645</sup> This refusal likely further strained the relationship between the sDe srid and the Fifth Panchen Lama.

---

Panchen Lama and acted as his main teacher. The legitimacy of the Sixth Dalai Lama was attested by the Fifth Panchen Lama, who likewise functioned as the primary mentor to the Sixth Dalai Lama. This custom has been sustained for several centuries between the Dalai Lamas and the Panchen Lamas up to the present day.

<sup>635</sup> dKon mchog rgyal mtshan (1990: 68) writes that the region of gTsang was given to the Panchen Lama in 1642.

<sup>636</sup> Jo sras bKra shis the ring 2021: 49.

<sup>637</sup> rNam grwa Thub bstan nmam rgyal 2018: 48–63.

<sup>638</sup> This is a well-known issue in Tibetan history with many cases. At the same time, it is also known that they often became students and teachers to each other.

<sup>639</sup> Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-v: 129 and 146–147, Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje n.d.: 17b and Karmay 2014: 7-8.

<sup>640</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan 2009, vol-i: 140.

<sup>641</sup> Karmay (trans) 2014:133, Fitzherbert 2018: 96, and Hor gtsang 'Jigs med (online) 2023: Accessed 10 August 2023.

<sup>642</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje n.d.: 17b. *Qīng shìlù zàngzú shìliào* (1982, vol-i: 134–144) repeatedly records that the sDe srid treated the Panchen Lama badly.

<sup>643</sup> Schwieger 2015: 84.

<sup>644</sup> rDo rje tshe brtan (ed) 1997:118 and Schwieger 2015: 84–89.

<sup>645</sup> Schwieger 2015: 84–89.

### 5.1.2. The Fifth Panchen Lama and the dGe lugs purists

Seizing this opportunity, the dGe lugs purists cast the Fifth Panchen Lama as a formidable leader within the dGe lugs tradition, possessing the power to dismantle the influence of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama, whom they accused of undermining the dGe lugs school:

In his *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, dated 1703 records:

ཚངས་དབྱངས་པ་དང་སྡེ་བ་གཉིས་དགོ་ལྷགས་ལ་མི་དགའ་བ་འདུག ཚོས་སྐྱོང་ཚོས་ཡུན་མི་རིང་བར་བརྟམ་པར་འདྲ།  
པཎ་ཚེན་འདི་ཡང་རྣམ་པ་ཆེ་བ་བདེན་པ་རེད། ལྷགས་དམིགས་ཚུང་ཟད་རེས་ཀྱང་འདི་ཙམ་བྱས་འདུག་དགོངས་གསུངས།

[’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] thought: “The Sixth Dalai Lama and the sDe srid do not like the dGe lugs school. The deities apparently will soon destroy them. It is true that the Panchen Lama is that powerful. Even a small meditation<sup>646</sup> like this did such [a big] thing.”<sup>647</sup>

This depiction presented the Panchen Lama as a defender of the dGe lugs school and an adversary of the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama, clearly aiming to align the Panchen Lama with the dGe lugs purists. This quotation follows the passage mentioned above (Chapter 4, Section 4.4.3), where the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa dreamt of a yak from the gTsang region arriving in the Lhasa valley and destroying the former sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. In this context, the big Yak from gTsang was the metaphor of the Panchen Lama, representing the power of bKra shis lhun po in gTsang.

According to the interpretation of the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s biography, the Panchen Lama had the power to destroy the sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama, representing the dGa’ ldan pho brang from dBus.<sup>648</sup> Therefore, the dGe lugs purists not only created dissension between the Fifth Panchen Lama and the sDe srid but also between the two powerful regions in central Tibet.

To further complicate this regional relationship between dBus and gTsang, the dGe lugs purists also started circulating rumours alleging that the former sDe srid engaged in black magic rituals intended to harm the Fifth Panchen Lama and bKra shis lhun po. These accusations were likely based on misinterpretations of the dGa’ ldan pho brang’s non-sectarian rituals because the purists perceived these rituals as a threat to the dGe lugs school.

The *Biography of Che mchog ’dus pa rtsal* records this event:

བར་སྐབས་སུ་གཞུང་ཕྱོགས་ནས་པཎ་ཚེན་འདི་པོ་ཚེར་ལས་སྐྱོར་སྐྱོ་ཚོགས་མཛད་ཚུལ་གྱི་ངན་གྲགས་ཆེ་བ་དང་།

<sup>646</sup> Though not explicitly stated, the context indicates that the covert purpose of this passage is to suggest that the focus of the Fifth Panchen Lama’s meditation (potentially as a wrathful deity) was directed against the foes of the dGe school, including figures like the former sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama.

<sup>647</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 91a. Interestingly, dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po (1987: 108), the Second ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, rewrote the *Biography of the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, aiming to soften the narrative concerning the politically sensitive issues addressed in the first biography. However, this revised version still contains passages like the one cited above, which remain provocative and confrontational.

<sup>648</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.:91a.

During this time (1704), the government gained a bad reputation for doing various black magic rituals targeting the Panchen Lama.<sup>649</sup>

This passage explicitly mentions that the government conducted black magic rituals to destroy the Panchen Lama. The term “government” refers to the dGa' ldan pho brang, which was under the leadership of the former sDe srid and the Dalai Lama. Thus, this passage indirectly suggests that the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama performed destructive rituals against the Panchen Lama. On the other hand, as previously discussed, the Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa states that the Fifth Panchen Lama, using his spiritual power, appeared as a yak to destroy the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama.<sup>650</sup> Thus, these rumours and accusations destroyed the trust and damaged the relationship between the former sDe srid and the Panchen Lama, as well as among their respective supporters.<sup>651</sup>

### 5.1.3. Consequences of the Rumour in gTsang

The rumour of magic rituals directed at the Panchen Lama was effective in instilling shock, disruption, and animosity among the populace in the gTsang region, particularly among the monks in bKra shis lhun po. The *Autobiography of the Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje* records:

གང་ལྟར་ལྷོ་སྲིད་སངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཚོས་བཀའ་ཤིས་ལྷན་པོར་ངན་གཏད་མང་དུ་གནང་བ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་ཐོན་པ་ཡིན་ཟེར་  
བའི་གྲགས་ཤིན་དུ་ཆེ་བར་འདུག་ཅིང་། བོད་འཕུང་བྱེད་ཀྱི་འབྱུང་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་རྒྱུད་བརྒྱུ་མས་པའི་སྐྱེ་བའི་གདུག་རྩལ་  
གཡོ་བའི་འགོ་ཚུགས་སྲུབ་འདུག།

However, there were strong rumours saying that there were clear omens that sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho had repeatedly performed destructive rituals targeted at bKra shis lhun po. The viciousness of those beings whose mind had been possessed by spirits intent on the destruction of Tibet had already begun to stir.<sup>652</sup>

The focus of the former sDe srid's purported destructive rituals in the first excerpt was bKra shis lhun po monastery. The mention of this target enabled the dGe lugs purists to incite the followers of bKra shis lhun po against the former sDe srid and the dGa' ldan pho brang. Although Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje does not explicitly identify the individuals whose minds were said to have been “possessed by the evil spirits that would afflict Tibet”, based on the context we may safely assume that they were the dGe lugs purists who sowed chaos and hostility between gTsang and dBus and their respective leaders. The final sentence of this passage brings attention to the cruel reaction exhibited by the followers of the Panchen Lama or bKra shis lhun po in response to these ritual rumours. However, the exact nature of cruelty within this context remains uncertain.

In the same autobiography, Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje documents the hostile reactions of the people in the gTsang region:

<sup>649</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje n.d.: 17b.

<sup>650</sup> dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po 1987: 108 and bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 91a.

<sup>651</sup> Because after this event, the followers of the Panchen Lama publicly portrayed the former sDe srid as evil and a destroyer of bKra shis lhun po (Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje 1983: 51a).

<sup>652</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje 1983: 43b–44a.

གཞན་ཡང་རང་རིའི་གྲ་ཚང་དུ་མ་ནས་ཡོན་ཏན་ཆེ་ཆུང་ལ་མ་བཟོས་པའི་ཕྱི་སྲིད་ཆེན་མོར་སྐྱུར་འདེབས་དང་། བདུད་སྲིག་  
 ཅན་དངོས་ཀྱི་འདུ་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་མ་གཅིག་ལ་བ་སྐྱོན་ལ་ཁག་བཏགས་པའི་ལྷང་བསྐྱོན་གསར་བ་འཚོས་བ་སྲིགས་སྦྱོང་དན་  
 ཚབས་པོ་ཆེ་སྐྱོ་ཚོགས་པ་ཞིག་བཀྱིས་འདུག་པ།

Moreover, [the monks from] a few of our colleges of [bKra shis lhun po monastery], without difference between the educated and uneducated ones, [they all] denounced the Great sDe srid. They regarded the sDe srid as the evil Mara in person and therefore [even] created new prophecies in the name of Ma gcig lab sgron [to condemn the sDe srid] and so on. They behaved extremely badly.<sup>653</sup>

According to this passage, the actions of the dGe lugs purists led to the utter erosion of loyalty and trust among the monasteries in gTsang towards the former sDe srid. The monks in bKra shis lhun po did indeed begin to perceive the former sDe srid as an “evil Mara”, as he is called in the passage above, and desired his demise. Thus, the effects of the rumours described by Sle lung bZhad pa’i rdo rje weakened the power of both the former sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama and undermined the very legitimacy of the dGa’ ldan pho brang. This became evident during the civil war in Lhasa in 1705 (Chapter 5, Section 5.5.3).

## 5.2. lHa bzang Khan and the dGe lugs purists

In early 1704, the former sDe srid encountered unfavourable circumstances. His relationships with the Sixth Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, and bKra shis lhun po became strained and even more difficult than before (Chapter 4, Section 4.3 and Chapter 5, Section 5.1). This subsection will analyse the strategies deployed by the Khan and the purists to undermine the former sDe srid and the Dalai Lama. It will also explore the direct clashes between the leaders and the Khoshut military strategies.

### 5.2.1. A Planned Arrest is Leaked

lHa bzang Khan secretly planned to detain the former sDe srid by force and take control of the dGa’ ldan pho brang.<sup>654</sup> The Khan intended to detain the former sDe srid around the time of the New Year festivities between 1703 and 1704, a time when numerous Khoshut Mongols travelled to Lhasa on religious pilgrimage, coinciding with the annual government ritual and the sMon lam festival (Chapter 4, Section 4.4.4). Unlike other times of the year, the Khan may have had more Khoshut Mongols under his command in Lhasa during this time. However, somehow the news was leaked, and the former sDe srid secluded himself within the Potala Palace, disguised as a retreat, at the beginning of 1704 to avoid the danger.

In the *Biography of the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis writes:

ལོ་གསར་རྗེང་མཚམས་སུ་ཕྱི་བ་བསྐྱུང་ནས། གཞུང་ནས་སྐྱེ་རིམ་མང་པོ་བྱེད་འདུག་ཀྱང་། ཅི་ཡིན་མ་ཤེས་ཁོ་རང་ཚོ་ཡང་  
 དོགས་བ་སྐྱེས་ཡོད་པ་འདྲ། ཕྱི་བ་མཚམས་ལ་བཞུགས་ཡོད་ཟེ།

During the interval between the old and new years (1703/1704), sDe srid became unwell, and the government conducted many rituals, but [the cause] remained

<sup>653</sup> *ibid*: 51a.

<sup>654</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 93a.

unknown. It appears that they [the followers of the former sDe srid] became concerned [that the Khan was plotting to arrest the sDe srid]. [They] stated that sDe srid was in a retreat.<sup>655</sup>

This passage highlights the intensity of the conflict between the former sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan at the beginning of 1704. This passage also implies that the former sDe srid lacked adequate military force under his command to defend himself, or he simply wished to avoid a direct clash with the Khan.<sup>656</sup> The rumours regarding the confinement of the former sDe srid spread beyond central Tibet. For example, Narhan Emchi and Beil Daichin Hoshuuch (Bèilè Dài Qīnghé Shuòqí), two Mongol leaders who returned from Lhasa, respectively, highlighted this matter:

我们于今年正月二十七日从西招出发，三月份到达青海。我们在时，没有发生逮捕第巴事，第巴还在办理事务，与往常一样[...]没有其他事情。

We set out from Tibet on the 27th of January of this year (1704) and arrived in Amdo in March. Throughout our stay, there was no attempt to detain the sDe srid, who carried on with his duties as normal. [...] No further incidents took place.<sup>657</sup>

Another Khoshut Mongol leader, Lu Daichin (Lēi dài qīng) and Son chok (Shuò qí), returned from Lhasa in May 1704 and reported:

我五月十一日到达。拘捕第巴之说是假，他还正常管理事务。

On May 11th [of 1704], I arrived there [Lhasa]. The news of the sDe srid's arrest is fake; he still oversees the administration as usual.<sup>658</sup>

These passages suggest that although the plan was not executed, the news became well-known in Lhasa, leading to a significant diplomatic crisis between the leaders. These excerpts also reveal that news of the intended arrests spread among the Mongols and reached the Qing Empire's court, highlighting the seriousness of this plot. From this time onward, the struggle between the sDe srid and the Khan worsened, eventually escalating into a military clash in 1705 (Chapter 5, Section 5.5).

### 5.2.2. Utilising the Dalai Lama against sDe srid

Aware of the fact that the relationship between the former sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama had deteriorated (Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3), the Khan began initiatives to forge a relationship with the Sixth Dalai Lama, aiming to undermine the authority of the former sDe srid. Based on the *Gōng zhōngdàng rénmíng bāo* (Palace Memorial Archives), Borjigidai Oyunbilig, writes:

拉藏为了改变汗的无权地位，在政治斗争中巧妙地利用了六世达赖喇嘛仓央嘉措和第巴之间的矛盾。

---

<sup>655</sup> *ibid*: 93a.

<sup>656</sup> Apart from the Khoshut Mongol army, the dGa' ldan pho brang in the early 18th century had only a very small group of soldiers called "gzims pa" to look after the Potala Palace and possibly protect leaders such as the former sDe srid (PaN chen blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 363–364).

<sup>657</sup> *Gōng zhōngdàng rénmíng bāo* 1988, vol-i: 86.

<sup>658</sup> *ibid*: 89.

To change the Khan's powerless status, lHa bzang cleverly used the contradiction between the Sixth Dalai Lama Tshangs dbyangs rgya mtsho and the sDe srid in the political conflict.<sup>659</sup>

This passage shows that the Khan was aware of the deteriorating relationship between the former sDe srid and the Dalai Lama and knew how to exploit it for his own benefit. According to the *Gōng zhōngdàng rénmíng bāo* (Palace Memorial Archives), lHa bzang Khan strategically participated in the Sixth Dalai Lama's preferred leisure activities, such as hunting, to earn his trust and friendship and form a strategic alliance against the former sDe srid:

看达赖喇嘛转世，行止如凡人，和拉藏一起经常放鸟枪，射箭。

As I (Beil Daichin Hoshuuch, a Mongol leader) see, the incarnation of the Dalai Lama acts as a layman (*Fánrén*), who always shoots and hunts together with lHa bzang.<sup>660</sup>

This excerpt suggests that the Khan exploited the discord between the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama to win the latter's trust and confidence. It also shows that the Khan used leisure pursuits such as hunting to earn the Dalai Lama's friendship. As discussed above, the relationship between the former sDe srid and the Dalai Lama was crucial for the functioning of the dGa' ldan pho brang (Chapter 4, Section 4.2 and 4.3). Therefore, exploiting this fragile relationship was a significant blow to the former sDe srid.

Upon securing the allegiance of the Dalai Lama, lHa bzang Khan capitalised on this relationship to disrupt the official work of the former sDe srid in the dGa' ldan pho brang. The former sDe srid, according to the *Gōng zhōngdàng rénmíng bāo* (Palace Memorial Archives), once dispatched a message to his ally and close friend, the Khoshut leader bKra shis dpa' thur (Zhā shén bā tú), stating:

前世达赖喇嘛在世示，一切事情我自专办理。如今，这辈达赖喇嘛，拉藏二人凡事不让我管，欲退官不准。今非昔同，日子不好过矣。

When the Former Dalai Lama was alive, I (the former sDe srid) took charge of almost everything. Now, the [Sixth] Dalai Lama and lHa bzang do not allow me to administer anything, nor to resign from my own position.<sup>661</sup> Unlike before, it is really hard for me now.<sup>662</sup>

In the same document, the *Gōng zhōngdàng rénmíng bāo* (Palace Memorial Archives), Sà hǎn qí bù, a courier between the Khoshut Mongols and the dGa' ldan pho brang and an associate of the former sDe srid, highlights the intricacy of the former sDe srid's situation:

看得第巴日子过得似很艰难。达赖喇嘛转世,第巴,拉藏相互不合,事不让第巴管。

---

<sup>659</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 87.

<sup>660</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 89.

<sup>661</sup> At this time, Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho had already transferred his official title to his son Ngag dbang rin chen, appointing the latter as the new sDe srid. However, in practice, the former sDe srid, Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho, still retained all governmental powers. Thus, it is the unofficial position that the former sDe srid is referring to in this passage.

<sup>662</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 89.

The [former] sDe srid seems to be in difficulty. The reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, the sDe srid, and lHa bzang had a tense relationship. The sDe srid was stopped from carrying out [official] duties.<sup>663</sup>

In the first passage, the former sDe srid complains that the Sixth Dalai Lama and lHa bzang Khan jointly disturbed his official works in the dGa' ldan pho brang. The second passage confirms this assessment and shows the tense relationship between them. This indicates that although the title of sDe srid was transferred to Ngag dbang rin chen, the elder son of the former sDe srid, the actual power of the dGa' ldan pho brang was still exercised by the former sDe srid himself. Both passages show that the former sDe srid had not only lost the support of the Fifth Panchen Lama and bKra shis lhun po, but also the close relationship with the Sixth Dalai Lama, who had been appointed and endorsed by him.

### 5.2.3. Direct Clash Between the Khan and the Former sDe srid

In 1704, lHa bzang Khan started to accuse the former sDe srid of undermining the dGe lugs school. In his accusation, lHa bzang Khan portrayed himself as the defender of the dGe lugs school and cast the former sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama as the despoilers, aligning with the views of the dGe lugs purists.<sup>664</sup>

The *Tham deb long pa'i dmigs bu*, an official record of the dGa' ldan pho brang, documents this allegation:

མི་བྱི་ལོ་འི་རིང་ལྷོ་སྤོང་དག་དབང་རིན་ཆེན་སྐུ་རྒྱུང་པ་ས་ཁྲི་བཟུང་། ཤིང་སྤྱེལ་ཙམ་ནས་ལྷ་བཟང་ཁང་གིས་ལྷོ་སྤོང་སངས་  
རྒྱལ་དགོ་བསྟན་ལ་དང་བ་མི་མཛད་པར་བསྟན་ཅིང་།

Until the Year of the fire dog (1706), sDe srid Ngag dbang rin chen single-handedly held the throne. From the wood-monkey Year (1704), lHa bzang Khan accused sDe srid Sangs rgyam of not being faithful towards the doctrines of the dGe lugs school.<sup>665</sup>

Although this is a later document, this statement aligns with the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*.<sup>666</sup> According to this passage, lHa bzang Khan accused the former sDe srid of depreciating the dGe lugs school as if the main concern of lHa bzang was to protect the dGe lugs school. This is clearly a political strategy to garner the trust and support of Tibetans and other adherents of the dGe lugs school. To further substantiate the Khan's allegation against the former sDe srid using religious ideology, the Fifth Panchen Lama remarks upon the ideological discord between the former sDe srid and the Khan:

འདི་སྐབས་གོགས་ཆགས་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡང་ལྷག་པར་རྒྱལ་པོ་མཛད་ཡོན་ལྷ་གྲུབ་དང་། རྒྱ་སོག་ བོད་ས་སྐུ་འབས་རིན་པོ་ཆེའི་  
མཛད་སྤྱོད་སྐོར་སོགས་གཞི་ཆེ་ཙམ་གྱི་ཉེར་ལེན་དང་།

During this period (1704), whatever the obstacle, the main causes were the [different] doctrinal views of the patron (lHa bzang Khan) and preceptor (former sDe srid), [the

<sup>663</sup> ibid: 89.  
<sup>664</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 91b–92a.  
<sup>665</sup> bKa' drung Nor nang pa 1981: 10b.  
<sup>666</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 93a.

relations with] the Manchus and the Mongols, and the behaviour of the Sixth Dalai Lama.<sup>667</sup>

This excerpt clearly indicates the direct ideological clash, which was one of the main disagreements between the Khan and the former sDe srid. It also shows that in 1704, the conflict between the former sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan, backed by the dGe lugs purist faction, escalated significantly in central Tibet.

Under this situation, the Khoshut Mongols stationed in central Tibet behaved aggressively towards the local populace. In his autobiography, Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje observed the contentious situation in central Tibet:

འདི་སྐབས་མཚོན་ཡོན་ནང་མི་གཤིན་པའི་དབུ་ཚུགས་པས་སོག་འགྲུལ་རྣམས་ལམ་ཐོག་ཏུ་གཟན་ཅིང་བཀྲ་ཤིས་སྣུན་པོར་  
ཡང་ཡོང་ཏེ་གཤམ་པ་འདུག་པས་མར་ལམ་ཇི་སྟར་ཡོང་སྟེ་མི་བདེ་བ་བྱེད་ཀྱང་འཛོན་པར་ཐག་བཅད།

During this period [1704], the discord between the priest and patron [the former sDe srid and the Khan] commenced. Hence, Mongol voyagers were hassling [people] on the way and often visited bKra shis lhun po. Therefore, [I, Sle lung Lama] harboured anxieties about potential occurrences on the return trip, yet [I] resolved to continue.<sup>668</sup>

The passage shows the critical situation in central Tibet due to the power struggle between the former sDe srid and the Khan and their respective followers. It also suggests that although the former sDe srid was still in command of the dGa' ldan pho brang, he did not possess the authority to quell the unrest instigated by the Khoshut Mongols.

The precise reason remains unclear; however, during this tumultuous circumstance, the Khan and his generals took decisive action against the former sDe srid. They managed to apprehend several officials from the former sDe srid's inner circle and summarily executed them around the seventh month of 1704. In his *Religious History in India, China, Great Tibet and Mongolia*, Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor asserts:

བོད་སྤྱིའི་བསོད་ནམས་ཉམས་པའི་དབང་གིས་ཚོས་སྡེ་ཆེན་པོ་བཀྲ་ཤིས་སྣུན་པོར་བྱོན་ནས་སྐར་སྡེ་མ་བཤ་ཆེན་ལ་ཕུལ་  
ཏེ་རྒྱལ་སྲིད་བཟུང་ཚུལ་མཚན་ཆོ་སྡེ་སྲིད་ཨ་བར་གྱིས་མ་འདོད་པའི་རྒྱུན་འགའ་ཞིག་གིས་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལྷ་བཟང་གིས་སྡེ་བའི་  
དུང་འཁོར་འགའ་ཞིག་བསད་ཆོ་ [...]

Owing to the diminishing collective virtue of the Tibetans, [the Sixth Dalai Lama] travelled to the great monastery of bKra shis lhun po, renounced his monastic vows to the Panchen Lama, and adopted a secular leadership role. Due to the cause of the sDe srid's (A bar's) opposition to this (*ma 'dod pa'i rkyen*), lHa bzang Khan executed some close supporters of the sDe srid [...].<sup>669</sup>

According to this excerpt, lHa bzang Khan appears to have eliminated the close allies of the sDe srid due to his disagreement with the latter. However, similar to other sources, the passage does not specify the precise timing of this event. Modern historian Wáng Yáo and Borjigidai Oyunbilig asserts that the Khan executed the former sDe srid's attendants in 1703, apparently

<sup>667</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 360.  
<sup>668</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje 1983: 45a.  
<sup>669</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1992: 589.

conflating this with an incident in which some of the sDe srid's adherents were killed by the Khan for attacking the Sixth Dalai Lama's attendants.<sup>670</sup> On the other hand, drawing from public oral history, Tibetan historian Nor bu bsam 'phel recounts that the Khan seized and killed some of the sDe srid's followers at the sMon lam festival of 1705.<sup>671</sup> During this festival, the leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang were in a meeting to resolve the dispute between the Khan and the former sDe srid (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1). Thus, it seems implausible that the Khan murdered the sDe srid's followers in 1705 during the time of this meeting, as it would presumably have tarnished his image and negatively affect the dGa' ldan pho brang's decision regarding this conflict. Therefore, according to the chronology of these events, it appears that officials from the inner circle of the sDe srid were killed around the seventh month of 1704.

#### 5.2.4. The Khoshuts' Tactical Withdrawal from Lhasa

After murdering the inner attendants of the former sDe srid, the Khan and his followers retreated from Lhasa and sought refuge in the 'Dam region to avoid a possible retaliatory strike from the former sDe srid.<sup>672</sup> This event probably unfolded at the end of the seventh month or the beginning of the eighth month in 1704, according to the chronology of events.<sup>673</sup>

During this time, the first 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and his followers in central Tibet became increasingly agitated and dispirited by this unfavourable situation. In his *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, bSe ngag dBang bkra shis records a public speech of the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa:

ཡང་ཐང་ཅེག་ཚས་གྲ་ནས་ཚས་ཐུན་རེ་ལ་མདོ་ཚར་དགུ་རེ་ཐོན། ཚར་གསུམ་རེ་སོང་དུས་སངས་གདོང་མའི་སྒྲིག་པ་གྱིས། ད་  
ལྟ་གྲ་ས་གྲ་ཚང་སྤྱིན་བདག་ཀུན་ལ་ཆག་ཆེ་བཤད་ཉན་ཁོ་ན་བྱས་པས་ཡོང་བ་མ་རེད་གསུངས། ང་ཕྱི་ནས་དགྲ་ལ་འཛིང་  
དགོས། [...] ནང་ནས་འདྲེ་ལ་འཛིང་དགོས། དཀའ་ལས་འདི་རེད།

And one time, at the debating court, ['Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] said: “Chant the Sutra nine times per session and perform the Seng gdong ma repelling ritual after every three chants. We cannot solely teach and listen, as it is a difficult period for the monastery, college, and patrons. [...] I have to fight against enemies outside and demons inside. This is challenging.”<sup>674</sup>

Given the political context, “the difficult time for the patrons” likely refers to lHa bzang Khan and his Khoshuts, who were compelled to withdraw from Lhasa and seek refuge in the 'Dam region. Otherwise, there is no candidate for this phrase. Similarly, the monastic college (*grwa tshang*) must be a reference to sGo mang college because, as the mKhan po of that college, he acknowledged he had to “fight against enemies outside and demons inside. This is challenging.” If this interpretation is right, then the “enemies outside” that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa had to contend with would be the former sDe srid and his supporters.

To further clarify this context and role of dGe lugs purists, bSe ngag dBang bkra shis directly quotes a speech of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa:

<sup>670</sup> Wáng Yáo 1980: 198 and Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 89.

<sup>671</sup> Nor bu bsam 'phel 2017, vol-ii: 856.

<sup>672</sup> Mǎzhàn Lín 1985: 92.

<sup>673</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008:

<sup>674</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 95a.

ཡང་ཐང་ཅེག་ད་ལྷ་བྱེད་རང་ཚོ་ལྷུང་དུ་ཕྱང་ཡོང་། བྱེད་རང་ཚོས་ཡང་བསམ་བཞིན་སྐྱེ་བ་ལྷངས་ནས་སྐབས་འདིར་བཞུན་  
 བ་བཞིག་ཚེས་ཡིན་འདུག་སྟེ། ང་ཡང་བསམ་བཞིན་དུ་བྱེད་ཚོ་རེ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་གཉེན་པོ་ལ་ཡོང་བ་ཡིན། ལུ་ཁེ་བཟླ། ལྷུང་དུ་  
 རིགས་ཡོང་གསུངས།

Again, on one occasion, [’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] said, “You (the former sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama) will soon be ruined. It seems you have purposely reincarnated to destroy the dGe lugs school (*bstan pa*) this time, but I have also purposely come to counteract *one or two*<sup>675</sup> of you. Soon, we will see who prevails.”<sup>676</sup>

Reading this passage in the context of the political situation between the Khan and the sDe srid in the eighth month of 1704, it is evident that ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa was clearly directing these harsh and direct messages to the former sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. This self-assured and confident statement may elucidate two plausible scenarios: Firstly, this might suggest that the dGe lugs purists were in active communication with the Khoshut Mongols in the ’Dam region, who planned to come back to Lhasa to resume the fight against the former sDe srid. Secondly, considering the Khan’s character, ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa could have thought that the Khan would soon return to defeat the former sDe srid. Regardless of the nature of the relationship between the purists and the Khan during the latter’s time in the ’Dam region, the underlying message of the First Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s speech indicates his desire for the Khan to return to Lhasa and destroy the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama.

Sometime between the eighth and ninth months of 1704, the mKhan pos and other leaders of the dGe lugs monasteries intervened to mediate the escalating conflict between the former sDe srid and the Khan.<sup>677</sup> The exact outcome of these negotiations remains unknown; however, we do know that the Khan and his associated Khoshuts were permitted to return to Lhasa, likely towards the end of the ninth month of 1704.<sup>678</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig notes that the sDe srid poisoned the Khan and his generals before August 1704, after which the Khan and his generals travelled to the ’Dam region, remaining there during August and September 1704.<sup>679</sup> However, he does not provide a reference for this chronology. Furthermore, this sequence of events does not correspond with the narratives found in the *Biography of the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* and the *Autobiography of the Fifth Panchen Lama* (Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1).

### 5.3. Rumours of Poisoning as a Political Strategy

After the negotiation, the Khan and his followers returned to Lhasa, where the former sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama were also residing (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4). In this context, this subsection analyses the spread of a poisoning rumour, highly likely promoted by ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, following the Khan’s return, as we will see below. It also explores the debates surrounding the rumour to determine if the dGe lugs purists were its source.

#### 5.3.1. The Enigmatic Spread of Poisoning Rumours

<sup>675</sup> In this passage, the term “you” (*khyed rang tsho*) is in the plural form, indicating that this passage is talking about more than one person. He then mentioned “one or two of you” (*khyed tsho re gnyis*), a common phrase in Tibetan used to refer to one or two individuals without directly naming them.

<sup>676</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 95a.

<sup>677</sup> Wáng Yáo 1980: 198.

<sup>678</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 89.

<sup>679</sup> *ibid*: 89.

Exactly around this time, the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* records the death of one of his closest students due to poison.<sup>680</sup> However, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa did not specify whether this was the result of deliberate poisoning or natural toxins. Following this incident, the Khan and two of his generals fell ill shortly after their return to Lhasa from the 'Dam region.<sup>681</sup> The *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* records that, despite various attempts at treatment, their condition remained unresponsive. Ultimately, the Khan invited 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa to perform a ritual cure in the hope of recovery from this affliction:

དེ་ནས་སྐབས་དེར་རྒྱལ་པོ་དང་ཇི་ས་སང་འགའ་ལྟོ་ལ་གཞན་གྱིས་དུག་བྱིན་པས་ཡུན་རིང་ན་ནས་ཐབས་ཇི་ལྟར་བྱས་ཀྱང་  
མ་དྲག་ དེ་ནས་རྒྱལ་པོས་རྗེ་འདི་གདན་དྲངས་ནས་ཚོས་ལྷུས་པས། རྗེ་འདིས་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལ་ཚོ་རྟ་རྩུང་འབྲེལ་གྱི་རྗེས་གནང་  
མཛད། དེ་ནས་ལྷུང་ལྷའི་རྗེས་གནང་བྱས། ལུས་ཚུ་བྱིན་པས། དེ་མ་ཐག་སྦྱོངས་ནས་དུག་དྲག་ ཇི་ས་སང་ཚོ་ལ་ཡང་རྗེས་  
གནང་དང་བུམ་ཚུ་གནང་པས་དྲག་ རྒྱལ་པོས་ཀྱང་འབྲེལ་བ་བཟང་པོ་སྤུལ།

At that time, the Khan and several generals [*jes sang*] were poisoned by others (*gzhan*) and remained ill for a considerable period. Despite various efforts, they did not recover. Subsequently, the Khan invited this Lord ['Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] and requested religious [cures]. The Lord bestowed upon the Khan the combined empowerment of Amitāyus and Hayagrīva, followed by the empowerment of Variegated Garuḍa and the bestowal of vase water. [The Khan] immediately experienced the purging [of stools] and recovered from the poison. Subsequently, the generals also received the empowerment and vase water and recovered. The Khan also presented ['Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] generous offerings.<sup>682</sup>

In this passage, the author bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis explains the Khan and generals had been poisoned “by others,” (*gzhan*) without specifying the identity of “others”. However, this did not stop the alleged connection of the poisoning with the sDe srid. Given the political climate at the time, it was easy for observers to assume that “the others” in question were affiliated with the former sDe srid and his officers. Furthermore, whether the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa explicitly named the former sDe srid in this accusation or not, the source of this rumour was linked with the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa in many ways (Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2).

In this citation, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa positioned himself as the rescuer of the Khan and his generals, who were crucial allies of the dGe lugs purists in their efforts to contest the former sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama. This passage also obviously aims to bolster 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's ritual power and likely garner additional support for the dGe lugs purists. This claim thus could strengthen the bond between the dGe lugs purists and the Khoshut Mongols. However, according to the imperial document, *Kāngxī cháo mǎn wén zhūpī zòuzhé* (Kangxi Court Memorial Record in Manchu), IHa bzang Khan credited his recovery from illness to a physician named Dāng mù nǎi.<sup>683</sup> Regarding the identity of this doctor, drawing information from the *Kāngxī cháo mǎn wén zhūpī zòuzhé*, Borjigidai Oyunbilig states that he was a disciple of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa.<sup>684</sup> Therefore, given this context, it is likely that the doctor was of Tibetan or Mongolian origin and belonged to the circle of the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, although his name cannot be confirmed through other primary sources.

<sup>680</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 96b–97a.

<sup>681</sup> dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po 1987: 114.

<sup>682</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 97a and Heissig (trans) 1944:126.

<sup>683</sup> *Kāngxī cháo mǎn wén zhūpī zòuzhé*, 1991, vol-xv: 123.

<sup>684</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 89.

### 5.3.2. Debates and Conflicts Arising from the Rumour

The question of whether the former sDe srid actually poisoned the Khan and his generals or whether it is merely a rumour fabricated by the purists remains a contentious subject of debate. The first foreign document is *Qīng shílù zàngzú shìliào* dated 6th January 1707:

先是，达赖喇嘛身故，第巴匿其事，构使喀尔喀、厄鲁特互相仇杀，扰害生灵。又立假达赖喇嘛，以惑众人。且曾毒拉藏，因其未死，后复逐之。

Following the Dalai Lama's death, the sDe srid provoked the Khalkha and Oirat Mongols into lethal conflict, leading to their mutual devastation. [He also] appointed a fake Dalai Lama to mislead the people. Furthermore, [he] made multiple attempts to assassinate lHa bzang through poisoning; however, [lHa bzang] survived. Consequently, [he] exiled lHa bzang from his own tribe.<sup>685</sup>

This information was recorded three years after the incident. According to the chronology, this Qing documentation was likely based on lHa bzang Khan's report to the Qing court after he assumed control of Tibet 1705. The second document mentioning the poisoning is a travelogue memoir by Desideri, the Italian missionary who arrived in Lhasa in 1716, twelve years after the incident. Desideri became close friends with lHa bzang Khan and his associates and recorded that "the king and the prime minister fell gravely ill owing to a powerful poison that had been administered to them on two occasions in the past."<sup>686</sup> However, he does not mention who tried to poison them. Again, this work was written after lHa bzang Khan assumed control of the dGa' ldan pho brang, and the poisoning accounts were obtained from the Khan or his associates. As a result, the narrative of the incident presented in these documents is evidently based on lHa bzang Khan's allegations against the former sDe srid. Furthermore, both documents record that the Khan was poisoned several times but survived, but as far as my knowledge there is no supporting evidence from primary sources for this claim.

Based on the above sources, many contemporary scholars have sided with the view that the former sDe srid indeed poisoned the Khan and his generals. For example, Rockhill writes, "After several years of covert hostility, followed by two attempts by the Regent to poison the Khan and Sonam-gyapo of Khangch'en, one of his ministers[...]."<sup>687</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig also takes the poisoning for granted and regards it as the result of the fact that lHa bzang Khan, allied with the Sixth Dalai Lama, disrupted the former sDe srid from executing the official duties.<sup>688</sup> Petech, in a footnote, mentions that the Fifth Panchen Lama also refers to the poisoning of the Khan.<sup>689</sup> However, Petech overlooked the fact that the Panchen Lama employed the term "gleng", which means "talk" or "rumour", in the context of this dispute over poisoning.<sup>690</sup> In his autobiography, the Fifth Panchen Lama addresses the poisoning incident dated the 17th of the twelfth month of 1704:

---

<sup>685</sup> *Qīng shílù zàngzú shìliào* 1982, vol-i: 185.

<sup>686</sup> Desideri 2010: 182.

<sup>687</sup> Rockhill 1910: 33.

<sup>688</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 89. However, no primary reference is provided to support the argument that the disruption caused by the Khan and the Dalai Lama is the reason the sDe srid attempted to poison the Khan.

<sup>689</sup> Petech 1972:10.

<sup>690</sup> PaN chen blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 360.

དངོས་གཞི་རྒྱལ་པོར་གྱུར་དུག་གི་སློང་སོགས་ལ་བརྟེན་ཐུགས་ཀ་མ་ལེགས་པར་སེར་འབྲས་དགོ་གསུམ་གྱི་སླ་སླྱི་དང་། ལྷག་  
 ཅེ་ཞབས་དུང་རྣམས་ལྷ་སྐྱོར་ཡོད་ཐོག་ འདི་ལ་ནས་ཀྱང་ངོ་ཚབ་དགོས་ཚུལ་གནང་བར་མ་ཟད་ལེགས་ཚར་འགྱུར་རེས་སླེ་  
 སྲིད་རེན་སོ་ཆེ་དང་རྒྱལ་པོ་སོ་སོར་ལུགས་ལེགས་བསྟན་གཞུང་ལ་རྒྱུར་གང་པན་གྱི་དགོངས་ཟབ་གནང་དགོས་ཚུལ་ནན་  
 ཆེའི་ལུ་ཡིག་ཞིབ་ཐུས་ལྷ་རྟེན་དཔངས་མཐོ་བ་བཅས་སླ་བ་བཅུ་གཉིས་པའི་ནང་དུ་མགོན་གཉེར་དཀའ་ཆེན་དོ་རྗེ་རྗེ་རྗེ་རྗེ་  
 ལྷ་བྱས།

Mainly due to the rumour (*gleng*) of poisoning the Khan, the relationship of [the two leaders] were not in a good state. Thus, the governing council of Se ra, 'Bras spungs and dGa' ldan monasteries, along with sTag rtse zhabs drung, made a plea. From here, not only did [I] send a representative upon request, but with hopes of improving [the situation], in the twelfth month, [I] dispatched my treasurer dKa' chen rdo rje, with precious gifts and letters to the former sDe srid and the Khan, requesting them to consider the honour of religion and government.<sup>691</sup>

In this passage, the Fifth Panchen Lama viewed the poisoning incident as a rumour (*gleng*). The Panchen Lama made visits to Lhasa from time to time and maintained a continual relationship with both the former sDe srid and the Khan.<sup>692</sup> He documented this event whilst both the sDe srid and the Khan were alive and in Lhasa. Moreover, at the time, the Panchen Lama was not on particularly good terms with the former sDe srid (Chapter 5, Section 5.1), and thus there was no incentive to shield the sDe srid. Therefore, his account of this incident carries greater historical weight than the earlier records of the Qing and Desideri. Based on this, contemporary historians, including Zhwa sgab pa, have regarded this case as a rumour of poisoning rather than actual poisoning.<sup>693</sup> This issue will become clearer in the subsequent events.

In challenging this accusation against him, the former sDe srid was now determined to uncover the original source of this rumour. Upon the emergence of the rumour, the former sDe srid promptly summoned the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa to inquire into the origin of the matter.<sup>694</sup> In this respect, intriguingly, the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* serves as a testimonial, corroborating the assertion that the poisoning case was merely speculation:

རྗེས་སོར་ཉིན་ཅིག་སླེ་བས་རྗེ་འདི་ལ་ཤོག་ཟེར་མི་བཏང་འདུག་ རྗེ་འདི་ལེབས་པས་སླེ་བ་བཞིན་འགྱུར་ནས། རྒྱལ་པོ་ན་བ་  
 དེ་འགའ་ཞིག་གིས་དུག་ཡིན་འདུག་ ད་ལྟ་སླ་མོ་ཡོད་རེད་ཟེས། ཡང་འགའ་ཞིག་གིས་དུག་ཡིན་པ་འདུག་ཀྱང་སློ་མང་སླ་  
 མས་རྗེས་གནང་དང་བཅས་ཚུ་བྱིན་པས་དུག་འདུག་ཟེས། ལྷོད་ཀྱིས་ཨེ་མཁུན་ཟེར་དྲི་བ་བྱས། རྗེ་འདིས་ལན་དུ་དེ་ནད་ཅི་  
 འདྲ་ཡིན་པ་མ་ཤེས། སླ་རིམ་འགའ་ཞིག་བྱས་པ་ཡིན། དེ་ནས་དགའ་བུ་སོང་ཟེས།

Later, one day, the sDe srid sent someone to summon the Lord ['Jam dbyangs bzhad pa]. When the Lord arrived, the sDe srid's expression changed, and he asked: "Some people said that the Khan fell ill because of poison and that [the illness] is still serious. Others said that even though it was poison, sGo mang lama ['Jam dbyangs bzhad pa]

<sup>691</sup> ibid: 360.  
<sup>692</sup> PaN chen blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i:  
<sup>693</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 480, rNam grwa Thub bstan mnam rgyal 2018: 28–29 and Nor bu bsam 'phel. 2017, vol-ii: 855.  
<sup>694</sup> The fact that the former sDe srid summoned the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa regarding the poisoning rumour strongly suggests that the latter was somehow involved in this issue. Otherwise, there would be no reason for the former sDe srid to further damage his fragile relationship with the dGe lugs purists by dragging them into this conflict.

gave him empowerments and vase water, and thus he recovered. Do you know of this?” The Lord replied: “I do not know what kind of illness it was, but he got better after I performed some rituals.”<sup>695</sup>

This passage suggests that the sDe srid called upon the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa as the first individual following the propagation of the rumour. This action suggests that the former sDe srid might have heard or harboured suspicions that the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa could have been instrumental in spreading the allegation or had a considerable connection with this rumour. Moreover, the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* explicitly contends that the Khan was poisoned by others. However, in this excerpt, he claimed: “I do not know what kind of illness it was.” These contradictory statements increase the likelihood of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's involvement in the diffusion of the poisoning rumour. An almost identical account of this conversation is documented in a primary Mongolian source, suggesting that the rumour was indeed widespread.<sup>696</sup> Furthermore, at the conclusion of this meeting, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa refrained from providing any elucidation; instead, he apologised to the former sDe srid:

གང་ལྟར་ཀྱང་རང་ལོ་སོ་སོ་སྐྱེ་བོ་མ་རིག་པའི་དབང་གིས་བྱིད་རྣམས་སངས་རྒྱས་བྱང་སེམས་ཚིའི་ལྷགས་བྱུར་ལ་ཕོག་  
ཡོད་ན་བཟོད་པ་བཞིས་དགོས་ལྷན་པས་དེ་ནས་ཅང་མི་ཟེེ།

[’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa said]: “Anyway, if we, the ordinary people, hurt the minds of you (the sDe srid), and the buddhas and bodhisattvas, out of ignorance, I ask forgiveness.” Then, [the sDe srid] did not say anything.<sup>697</sup>

Upon reviewing the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, it is evident that he was not the kind of individual to apologise to others, particularly to the sDe srid, if he perceived himself to be blameless. Nevertheless, during this meeting, he apologised to the sDe srid for causing him distress. Given the context, this is likely an indication of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's involvement in fabricating the poisoning rumour. In any case, given 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's hostile attitude towards the former sDe srid, and considering the main objective of the purists to create discord between the former sDe srid and the Khan (Chapter 3, Section 3.3), he had many reasons to promote and spread this rumour.

The accusation was swiftly taken up and propagated as fact by the dGe lugs purists, the Khan, and his followers, who disseminated the rumour widely, including to the Qing court and Mongol regions.<sup>698</sup> Under these circumstances, despite the lack of verifiable evidence, many official and unofficial documents unknowingly recorded this incident as a historical fact of the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>699</sup> Upon analysing the available materials and comparing them with the chronological events in Lhasa, it appears that the dGe lugs purists propagated rumours of the alleged poisoning incident to tarnish the former sDe srid's reputation and incite hostility between him and the Khan (Chapter 5, Section 5.4).

<sup>695</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 97b.

<sup>696</sup> Heissig (trans) 1944: 126.

<sup>697</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 97b.

<sup>698</sup> For instance, *Qing shilù zàngzú shiliào* (1982, Appendix One), the main Manchu official document, records that in 1707, sDe srid attempted to poison lHa bzang several times. An old Mongolian document (Heissig (trans) 1944:125–126) also records that the sDe srid indeed poisoned the Khan and his generals.

<sup>699</sup> As mentioned above (Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2), a large majority of modern scholars, such as Petech (1972:10), consider this issue a historical fact. However, we will address and refute this claim in the following sections.

## 5.4. Negotiations Between the Khan and the Former sDe srid

The rumour spiralled out of control, and the relationship between the sDe srid and the Khan deteriorated towards the end of 1704 (Chapter 5, Section 5.3). Furthermore, this rumour sowed fear amongst the people and undermined the peace and stability of society in central Tibet.<sup>700</sup> Based on this context, this subsection analyses the negotiation and its outcome between the former sDe srid and the Khan. It will then explore the role of the dGe lugs purists in actively supporting the Khan throughout this process.

### 5.4.1. Formal Assembly and Dialogue for Resolution

In the first month of 1705, amidst the sMon lam chen mo festival, the large assembly of the dGa' ldan pho brang was organised to solve the conflict of the poisoning incident and seek a final peaceful resolution between the former sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan.

The *Biography of the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* states:

དགུང་ལོ་ང་བརྒྱད་པ་མེ་བྱའི་ལོ་ཚེ་འཕྲུལ་གྱི་དུས་སུ་ཕྱེ་བ་དང་། རྒྱལ་པོ་གཉིས་མ་འཆམ་བར་རྒྱལ་པོས་ཕྱེ་བ་ལ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་  
ལོ་ལ་དུག་ཅི་འདོད་སླུང་བ་ཞེས་དང་། ཕྱི་བས་ཁྱོད་ན་བ་དེ་དུག་ཡིན་ཟེར་མཁན་སུ་ཡིན་མ་འགྲིགས་པ་ལ། ཉེན་གཅིག་པོ་  
ཏ་ལར་བོད་ཀྱིས་དམག་མང་པོ་བསགས། ལོ་མཚན་ཐོགས་ནས་བསྐྱེད། རྗེ་འདི་ལ་སོགས་པ་སེར་འབྲས་ཀྱི་སླ་མ་ཐམས་ཅད་  
ཀྱང་འཚོགས། ཚངས་དབྱངས་པ་ཡང་ཡོང་ནས་ལ་མོ་སྤྱན་འདྲེན་བྱས་ནས།

During the sMon lam festival, at the age of 57 in the fire bird year, there was a dispute between the sDe srid and the Khan. The Khan said the sDe srid had given him some kind of poison, and the sDe srid asked who said that the illness was caused by poison. Eventually, one day, many Tibetan soldiers armed with weapons gathered at the Potala Palace. All the lamas from Se ra and 'Bras spung, including the Lord ['Jam dbyangs bzhad pa], and even the Sixth Dalai Lama, also congregated there. Subsequently, the La mo oracle was invited.<sup>701</sup>

As per the passage, the Khan was yet to reveal the identity of the individual who initially alerted him of being poisoned by the former sDe srid. As previously discussed, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa could be the likely source of this misinformation (Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2); however, given the gravity of the situation, it is unlikely that the Khan would name 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa.<sup>702</sup> Consequently, a large official gathering was arranged at the Potala Palace under the vigilant supervision of the Tibetan army (*gzims pa*).<sup>703</sup> The presence of the Tibetan army and the choice of venue at Potala Palace suggest that this gathering might have been initiated by either the sDe srid or his supporters within the dGa' ldan pho brang.

Tibetan primary sources mentioned the participants, including the Sixth Dalai Lama, the La mo oracle, the heads of the three major monasteries, the leader of the sTag rtse estate, an official

<sup>700</sup> Dhondup 2003: 41–42.

<sup>701</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 98a.

<sup>702</sup> The First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa actively supported the Khan throughout his struggle against the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama. Therefore, if the Khan blamed this rumour on 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, it could potentially damage his relationship with the dGe lugs purists. This relationship was very significant for the Khan in securing his leadership legitimacy over the dGa' ldan pho brang (Chapter 5, Section 5.6.1).

<sup>703</sup> As explained above, "*gzims pa*" was a small group of the Tibetan army under the command of the sDe srid (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1).

representative of the Panchen Lama, and the leaders and representatives from the mTsho sngon region, who were present at the large assembly in Lhasa.<sup>704</sup> However, neither of these sources makes mention of the Khan and his generals attending the assembly, indicating that the Khan and his generals were most likely excluded from this gathering as usual (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2). Moreover, the following passages of this chapter suggest that the Khan was not in the assembly and the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa spoke to defend the Khan. This exclusion appears to be a calculated move by the former sDe srid, aiming to carry out his plan unhindered. Despite this, he could not exclude the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa from the meeting, given his important role as the head of the sGo mang college (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3).

During the initial day of the momentous assembly, the sDe srid, on the one hand, delved deeper into the source of the rumour concerning the poisoning incident, thereby intensifying the pressure on the Khan's allies. On the other hand, the sDe srid resorted to seeking the assistance of the La mo oracle to drive the Khan out of central Tibet:

མྱེ་བས་ལ་མོ་ལ་རྒྱལ་བོ་ན་བ་བྱེད་ཀྱིས་དུག་ཡིན་གསུངས་ན། རྒྱལ་བོ་ལ་དུག་སློན་མཁན་སུ་ཡིན་གསུངས་དགོས་ཟེས། ལ་  
མོས་ངས་དུག་ཡིན་ཞེས་མ་བཤད། ལྷང་བསྟན་ཡི་གེ་ད་ལྟ་ཡང་ཚོས་རྒྱལ་བྱི་བྱུག་ན་ཡོད་གསུངས།

དེ་ནས་མྱེ་བས་ལྲུང་ནས་ལ་མོ་ལ། རྒྱལ་བོ་རང་ལྷལ་ལ་སོང་ན་བཟང་གསུངས་ཞེས་ཞུས་ཡོད་པའི་ངོར་ལ་མོས་ཡང་དེ་  
མཐུན་གསུངས་ནས། རྒྱལ་བོ་མཚོ་ཁ་ལ་འགོ་བར་ཐག་བཅད། རྗེ་འདིས་ཐུགས་ལ་དེ་རིང་རྒྱལ་བོ་ལ་ཡང་ཆག་ཆེ། ང་རང་ལ་  
ཡང་ལྷེ་བ་འདིས་གཞོད་བ་བྱས་ཡོད་ཤས་ཆེ། དེ་རིང་ལྷེ་བ་འདིས་ང་འཛིན་ན་ཤོར་ཡོད་དགོས།

The sDe srid asked the La mo oracle: “You said that the Khan was ill because of poisoning. Hence, you have to tell us who poisoned the Khan.” The La mo oracle replied: “I never said it was poison. The written record of the oracle’s statement is still in the Chos rgyal’s<sup>705</sup> hands.”

The sDe srid had earlier instructed La mo to inform others that it would be better if the Khan returned to his homeland, and in response to this, La mo spoke accordingly [during the assembly]. Subsequently, it was resolved that the Khan would embark on a journey to the mTsho sngon region. The Lord [’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] ruminated: “Today proves to be a disastrous day for the Khan, and the sDe srid may also threaten me. In case that the sDe srid attempted to apprehend me today, [I] should escape.”<sup>706</sup>

As already discussed in this chapter, the former sDe srid had already questioned the First ‘Jam dbyangs bzhad pa personally about the poisoning (Chapter 5, Section 5.3). During the assembly, he now publicly asked the La mo oracle regarding the poisoning rumour. One possible interpretation is that ‘Jam dbyangs bzhad pa might have told the former sDe srid that he had

<sup>704</sup> PaN chen blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 363–364 and bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 98a.

<sup>705</sup> The term “chos rgyal” in this context likely refers to the individual responsible for documenting the utterances of the oracle. According to Tibetan tradition, oracle deities take possession of human bodies and communicate through a human medium (*sku rten*). These deities often employ a language that is incomprehensible to ordinary people. Consequently, a professional often records the deity’s statement or prophecy. In Tibet, the credibility of an oracle statement is frequently established by comparing it with the written record made by the professional transcriber. Therefore, the “Chos rgyal” referred to in this passage, although the text does not explicitly state his position, is most likely the person responsible for accurately transcribing the La mo oracle’s statements in a professional capacity. For more information on Tibetan oracles, see Peter (1979: 51–56), Sidky (2011: 71–99) and Bell (2021).

<sup>706</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 98a–98b.

received the information from the La mo oracle (though it is not recorded in his biography). Nevertheless, the La mo oracle’s definitive response in this passage made it clear that the oracle was not the source of this rumour. The second passage gives the impression that the La mo oracle was following the suggestion of the sDe srid to send the Khan to mTsho sngon.

In this passage, it appears that the sDe srid’s proposal of expelling the Khan from central Tibet garnered a swift endorsement from the attendees. This support might have stemmed from the Tibetans’ desire to eliminate the Mongol influence from the dGa’ ldan pho brang or their reluctance to oppose the sDe srid.<sup>707</sup> Petech suggests that the decision to send the Khan back to the mTsho sngon region might have been a strategic move by Tibetan leaders aimed at “getting rid of their Mongol protector” from Central Tibet.<sup>708</sup>

It is perhaps because of the overwhelming support for the decision that even the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, a staunch supporter of the Khan, refrained from speaking out against the sDe srid’s proposal during the first day of the meeting. The passage also shows that ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa strategised his escape plan in case that the sDe srid should attempt to apprehend him at the gathering. This scenario demonstrates the high tension at this gathering at the Potala Palace, held under the watchful eye of the Tibetan military.

On the second day of the large assembly, it appeared that the former sDe srid had become overconfident and thus he proposed the arrest of IHa bzang Khan:

དེ་ཉིན་འོགས་ཁ་པོ་ཉ་ལར་ཕེབས་དུས་ནས་ཉིན་དུས་དང་མི་འདྲ་བར་གཏུམ་ལ་གིམས་པ་མཛད། ལྷག་གཡོག་ཚོ་ལ་དེ་  
 རིང་ཁྱེད་ཚོ་བསྐྱེམ་ཚྱོད། ངས་ཚོས་གོས་ལུས་ཡོང་གསུངས་ནས་ཕེབས། དེ་ནས་ལྷོ་བས་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལྷ་བཟང་འདི་འཛིན་དགོས་  
 ཟེར། ལྷ་མ་ཚོ་ལ་གོས་དྲིས་པས། ལྷ་མ་གཞན་ཚོས་ཅང་མི་གསུང་།

རྗེ་འདིའི་ཞལ་ནས། རྒྱལ་པོ་འཛིན་ན་ང་དེའི་ནང་ན་མེད། མཚོ་ཁ་ན་རྒྱལ་བོའི་ཤ་ཉེ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཡོད། དེ་ཚོས་གཞུང་དང་  
 དེད་རང་ཚོ་ཀུན་ལ་བཟང་པོ་བྱས་མི་ཡོང་གསུངས་པས་གཞན་ཚོས་དེས་ཕྱོགས་འདྲ་བ་ཟེར་བས་འཛིན་མ་ལུས། དེ་ཉིན་  
 ཁོང་ཚོས་བསམ་པ་ལ་རྒྱལ་པོ་འཛིན། དེ་ནས་རྗེ་འདི་ཡང་འཛིན་བསམ་ཡོད་འདུག་ཀྱང་། དཀར་ཕྱོགས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱིས་  
 གོགས་བྱས་ནས་དེ་མ་པོད།

That day, in the morning, upon arrival at the Potala Palace, [’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] displayed a fierce and alert demeanour, unlike [his] usual comportment. [He] instructed his aides: “Today, you must remain vigilant and do not leave (*lus yong*) my Dharma robe,” and went. Subsequently, the sDe srid advanced the proposition to apprehend the Khan and sought counsel from other lamas, yet no one spoke out.

The Lord [’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] stated: “If [we] take the Khan into custody, I will not partake in this [scheme]. The Khan has all his kinsfolks in the mTsho kha area who will not treat our government and ourselves favourably.” Other lamas then concurred with his viewpoint, and thus, [the Khan] could not be arrested. On that day, they [the former sDe srid and his followers] intended to detain the Khan and subsequently take the Lord into custody as well. However, they did not dare [to

<sup>707</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal ’byor (1982: 16–17) states that Tibetans were unwilling to accept the rule of the Khoshut Mongols. And Petech 1972: 11.  
<sup>708</sup> Petech 1972: 11.

execute this plan] because of the support from all those who were on the side of virtue.<sup>709</sup>

This excerpt illustrates several significant points. Firstly, the statement once again highlights the intensity of the gathering and the former sDe srid's influence. Secondly, although the reason remains unclear, the sDe srid openly proposed the arrest of the Khan, demonstrating that he possessed sufficient power in Lhasa to execute this plan if the lamas offered him their support. Thirdly, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa took the risk of openly opposing the former sDe srid to safeguard the Khan during the gathering, indicating the significance of the Khan to 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and the dGe lugs purists. This action also showcases the practical power of religious leaders in the politics of the dGa' ldan pho brang (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3).

Relating to this incident, Luciano Petech states that during the “great gathering of the clergy, Sañ-rgyas-rgya-mts'o proposed to seize and kill the Khan.”<sup>710</sup> According to Tibetan sources, the former sDe srid proposed the arrest of the Khan but did not mention his killing. Petech, in support of this claim, quotes a Mongolian source translated by Heissig, but the document does not explicitly mention the killing of the Khan.<sup>711</sup> Moreover, regardless of the former sDe srid's power, it is unlikely that he would have publicly called for murdering the Khan in this tense situation. The former sDe srid was certainly aware that such extreme actions would besmirch his reputation as a leader and provoke additional strife with the Khoshut Mongols in central Tibet.

#### 5.4.2. Outcome of the Assembly

According to the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, it seems that Tibetan leaders and representatives engaged in a two-day discourse on the negotiations between the former sDe srid and the Khan. At the conclusion of the assembly, a mutual agreement was reached, which was subsequently accepted by both the former sDe srid and the Khan. Regarding the 15th of the first month in 1705, the *Autobiography of the Fifth Panchen Lama* records:

མེ་མེད་དང་རྒྱལ་པོ་གཉིས་ནས་དབུ་ཚེ་གནང་ཞིང་། རྒྱལ་པོ་མཚོ་ཚོན་སོགས་ལ་རྒྱང་བཞགས་ཀྱི་བཀའ་བཅས་ལྷགས་ཐག་  
ཚོད་པའི་བྱང་ལ་ཡེབས་རྗེས་གནང་འདུག།

The sDe srid and the Khan both consented [to the judgement]. And, according to this order, the Khan was to remain in remote locations, including mTsho sngon. Following this, the Khan was sent to the north.<sup>712</sup>

This excerpt suggests that the assembly ultimately resolved that the Khan should remain distant from Lhasa and reside in remote locations such as mTsho sngon. This passage does not divulge the details of the final decision concerning both the former sDe srid and the Khan. According to Tibetan historian Zhwa sgab pa, the assembly decided that lHa bzang Khan's official title would remain unchanged, and he would continue to receive his tax income from the dGa' ldan pho brang. Likewise, the former sDe srid would transfer his complete political authority within the dGa' ldan pho brang to his eldest son and relocate to the town of Gong dkar as his new

<sup>709</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 98b–99a.

<sup>710</sup> Petech 1966: 271 and 1972: 10.

<sup>711</sup> Heissig (trans) 1944: 126.

<sup>712</sup> PaN chen blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 364.

residence.<sup>713</sup> However, he does not provide a reference for this information. None of the primary sources I have examined mention that the former sDe srid was ordered to relocate from Lhasa. Therefore, it remains uncertain whether the former sDe srid received orders to move out or not.

If the sDe srid was indeed ordered to relocate from Lhasa, it demonstrates an almost equal status of power between the former sDe srid and the Khan within the political hierarchy of the dGa' ldan pho brang. lHa bzang was a nominal Khoshut Khan in central Tibet, like his father, Dalai Khan, who had no actual political power in the dGa' ldan pho brang. However, due to the strong and public support of the dGe lugs purists for lHa bzang Khan (Chapter 4, Section 4.4.3), his power and influence appeared nearly equal to that of the former sDe srid according to the above passage.

### 5.4.3. lHa bzang's Departure

Utilising his advantage in authority, the former sDe srid exerted pressure on the Khan to leave Lhasa. As evidenced by the primary source examined below, there was a palpable hostility towards the Khan in Lhasa. Sum pa Yes shes dpal 'byor writes in his *History of mTsho sngon*:

ཤིང་བྱར་རྒྱལ་མོ་ཚེ་རིང་བཀྲ་ཤིས་སྐྱམ་མ་ཡིན་བཞིན་དུ་ཕྱེ་སྲིད་སོགས་ཀྱིས་ལྷ་བཟང་ལ་རྫོང་བརྒྱུ་ཏེ་མཚོ་རྫོན་དུ་  
བཏང་ཡང་།

Despite Queen Tshe ring bkra shis being pregnant, the sDe srid and others still sent lHa bzang to mTsho sngon in the wood bird year (1705).<sup>714</sup>

That the former sDe srid was able to compel the Khan and his followers to commence their journey from Lhasa to mTso sngon again indicates the power of the former sDe srid. This passage indicates that it is uncertain whether the Khan truly intended to return to the mTsho sngon region; however, he appeared to be preparing to depart from Lhasa following the assembly's decision even his queen was pregnant.

Amid these distressing circumstances, the Khan and the dGe lugs purists still upheld their loyalty and support for one another. The *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* records:

དེ་ནས་ལྷ་སར་ཕེབས་པས་ཕྱེ་བས་རྒྱལ་པོ་འཕོར་བཅས་བྱང་ལ་སྐྱར་དུ་འགྲོ་དགོས་ཟེར་ནས། རྒྱལ་པོས་རྗེ་འདི་གདན་  
དྲངས་ནས་རྗེས་གནང་འགའ་ཞིག་ཞུས། འབྲུལ་བ་ཕྱལ་ནས་སྐབས་འཇུག་ཞུས་པས། རྗེས་འདིས་ཁྱོད་ས་གང་ལ་སོང་གྱང་  
རྗེས་འབྲུག་པ་ཕྱགས་ལ་བཏགས་དགོས་ཞེས་བ་ཅམ་གྱི་ཞལ་བཀོད་མཛད།

རྒྱལ་པོ་བྱང་ལ་ཕེབས་ཉིན་རྗེ་འདི་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཆེབས་ཏྲ་འཁམ་པ་བཟང་པོ་ཅིག་ཡོད་པ་དེ་རབ་འབྲུམས་པ་ངག་དབང་ལ་  
བསྐྱར་ནས་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལ་ཕྱལ། ངའི་རྟ་འདི་དེ་རིང་ཆེབས་ནས་ཕེབས་ཞེས་གནང་། རྒྱལ་པོས་ཐོག་མར་སྐྱ་མ་རང་གི་ཆེབས་ཏྲ་  
ཡིན་ཞོན་མི་ལུས་ཟེར། རབ་འབྲུམས་པ་ངག་དབང་གིས་སྐྱ་མས་ཅེབས་དགོས་གསུངས་པས་དགོངས་གཞི་ཡོད་ཞུས་པས།  
རྒྱལ་པོས་ཀྱང་ཁྱོད་བདེན་སྐྱ་མས་རྟེན་འབྲེལ་བཏགས་ཡོད་ཟེར་ནས་ཆེབས་ནས་ཕེབས་སོང་།

Upon arrival in Lhasa, the sDe srid urged the Khan and his followers to move swiftly to the northern region. Subsequently, the Khan invited the Lord ('Jam dbyangs bzhad

<sup>713</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 481.  
<sup>714</sup> Sum pa Yes shes dpal 'byor 1982: 19. Tshe ring bkra shis in this passage was the wife of lHa bzang Khan.

pa), sought various empowerments, presented gifts, and requested spiritual protection. Hence, the Lord counselled: “Wherever you go, please keep the teachings of rJe (Tsong kha pa) in your mind.”

On the day of the Khan’s departure [from Lhasa] to the north, the Lord dispatched [his pupil] Rab ’byams pa with his finest chestnut stallion [as a gift] for the Khan and urged him to ride it on that very day. Initially, the Khan said: “This is the Lord’s horse, I dare not mount it.” Rab ’byams pa explained: “The Lama instructed you to ride it, and thus, there must be a purpose [behind it].” Consequently, the Khan acknowledged: “You are correct. The Lord must have considered it as an auspicious omen,” and departed riding the horse.<sup>715</sup>

In the initial paragraph, the Khan invited the ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa to seek his spiritual blessings and advice before his departure, showing trust and respect. According to these passages, the purist leader was the sole Tibetan leader in Lhasa who openly supported the Khan (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2) and he even presented his best horse to the Khan, urging him to ride it for an auspicious omen. In the traditional Tibetan nomadic culture, gifting a horse to a man carries symbolic significance, either to encourage him to engage in robbery as a bandit or to convey a message of victory in a war.<sup>716</sup> The First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, having been born and having spent many years in Tibetan nomadic society (Chapter 2, Section 2.9), would undoubtedly be familiar with this culture and symbolism. Therefore, these passages suggest that the two leaders might have already discussed and planned the subsequent military assault on the former sDe srid before the Khan departed from Lhasa.

Aware of the significance of this gesture, the former sDe srid was enraged upon learning of the dGe lugs purist leader’s gift of his finest horse to the Khan for an auspicious omen. Subsequently, he summoned the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa for questioning:

དེ་ནས་རྗེས་སོར་ཉེན་གཅིག་སྡེ་བས་མི་བཏང་ནས། རྗེ་འདི་ལ་ཤོག་ཟེར་ཕེབས་པས་སྡེ་བ་ལ་ལུག་མི་ལུབ་ཟེར། ཕྱིན་ནས་  
བཞུགས་ཡོད་པ་ལ་མགོན་གཉེར་བཏང་ནས་སློ་མང་སྐྱ་མ་ཁྲོད་ལ་ལྷ་སོར་རྟ་འཁམ་པ་བཟང་པོ་ཅིག་ཡོད་པ་དེ་གང་ནས་  
ལུང་ཟེར། རྗེ་འདིས་ང་ལ་ལ་མོ་དཔོན་ཚུང་གིས་བྱིན་ལྷུས་པས། ད་ལྟ་གང་ན་ཡོད་ཟེར། རྗེ་འདིས་རྒྱལ་པོ་རྩ་བཟང་ང་རང་  
གི་ཕྱིན་བདག་ཡིན་པས་ལུང་ཕེབས་སྐབས་རྗེས་བུས་ལྷུས་པས། ཁྲོད་ལ་རྟ་དེའི་ཚུད་པ་ཡོད་འགོ་ང་ལ་གཅིག་བྱིན་ཟེར།  
རྗེ་འདིས་ད་མེད་ལྷུས་ནས་ཕེབས་ཡོང་། འོན་ལ་མ་འདོད་པ་ཡིན་འདུག།

Then, one day, the sDe srid dispatched a messenger to summon the Lord [’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa], [but] when he went, he was told he would not be able to meet the sDe srid. While [the Lord] was there, [the sDe srid] dispatched his guest manager to inquire: “sGo mang Lama, where did you acquire your finest chestnut stallion?” The Lord responded: “It was gifted to me by the La mo chief.<sup>717</sup>” [The guest manager]

<sup>715</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 99a.

<sup>716</sup> In Tibetan folk literature, the act of giving a horse holds significant importance. Fathers frequently present horses to their sons upon reaching adulthood. For instance, a well-known lyric from a nomad song states, “A grateful father bestowed upon me a horse, a symbol of auspiciousness for conquering the enemy,” while another verse expresses, “A man requires a horse to truly demonstrate his bravery.” Thus, this is a common culture among Tibetans, especially the nomads.

<sup>717</sup> This refers to a lower ranking aristocrat from the La mo estate. Although La mo’s relationship with the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa is not mentioned in the text, he might be a personal patron of the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa. Most of the aristocrats in central Tibet had their own personal lamas from various monasteries.

inquired: “Where is [the horse] now?” The Lord replied: “I presented it to lHa bzang Khan as he departed for the northern region because [he] is my patron.” [The sDe srid] then requested: “You may have foals from the same stallion; give me one.” The Lord responded: “I do not have one presently,” and went back. In fact, [the sDe srid was] displeased with [this gift to the Khan].<sup>718</sup>

This passage illustrates that the former sDe srid was incensed by the sympathetic and symbolic gesture of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa toward the Khan. It also shows that the former sDe srid clearly recognised the strong support of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and his purist followers for lHa bzang Khan. Thus, the former sDe srid expressed his displeasure by not meeting the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa directly but instead complaining about the latter's horse.

Despite their departure from Lhasa, the Khan and his followers delayed their journey, making prolonged stops in the regions of Yangs pa can, sNye grong and 'Dam gzhung.<sup>719</sup> The possible reason for this sluggish travel might have been to observe the situation in Lhasa or to buy more time for the Khan himself to gather the Mongol military force in the northern regions.<sup>720</sup> Petech states that lHa bzang Khan merely “feigned to comply” with the agreement to travel out of Lhasa.<sup>721</sup> Regardless of his motives, it is clear that the Khan had no intention of relocating to the distant mTsho sngon region in Amdo, as he gathered his army upon arriving in the 'dam region.<sup>722</sup>

#### 5.4.4. Portrayal and Predictions from the Purists

According to the account provided by the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa after the Khan departed from Lhasa in 1705, it appears that the Khan had premeditated a military attack on the former sDe srid to acquire power over the dGa' ldan pho brang. The Khan could have shared this information with 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, as he was the Khan's only trusted ally among the Tibetan leaders.<sup>723</sup> During these months, the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa consistently made predictions, indicating that lHa bzang would return to vanquish the former sDe srid and fulfil his duty to protect the dGe lugs school.

དེ་སྐབས་མེ་འདི་འཕེལ་ནས། རེ་མཁའ་ལམ་ན་དམིགས་བརྟེན་དབྱེས་ཅིང་པོ་བྱས་འཐེན་པ་མིས་པས། རྒྱལ་པོ་འདི་མེ་  
 རིན་པོ་ཆེའི་སྤྱལ་པ་ཡིན་འདུག བྱང་ལ་སོང་བ་བཟང་། ད་འདིས་མེའི་བསྟན་པ་ལ་ཕན་བཟང་པོ་ཐོགས་ཡོང་ཞེས་འཁོར་  
 རང་མ་འགའ་ཞིག་ལ་གསུངས།

[.....]

<sup>718</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 99b.

<sup>719</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 481.

<sup>720</sup> Because one reason the Khan returned to Lhasa with his military force was his complaint that the former sDe srid did not comply with the assembly's decision and remained in Lhasa (Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1). Thus, the Khan was possibly monitoring the actions of the former sDe srid during his journey from Lhasa to the 'Dam region.

<sup>721</sup> Petech 1972:11.

<sup>722</sup> Sum pa ye shes dpal 'byor 1982: 19.

<sup>723</sup> Before lHa bzang Khan became the ruler of the dGa' ldan pho brang in 1705, none of the primary sources mention that he had loyal Tibetan allies or supporters apart from the dGe lugs purists.

དེ་སྐབས་མེ་བ་ལ་ཅི་འདྲ་ཡོང་དགོངས་པས། མནལ་ལམ་ན་རི་གཅིག་གི་ངོས་ནས་དྲོ་ཆེན་པོ་གཅིག་འབྲིལ་བྱུང་། དེ་སྐོར་ཨེ་  
 ཐུབ་དགོངས་པས། མ་ཐུབ་པར་རི་རྩར་སྤྱང་ནས་ཆག་སོང་བ་མིས་པས། ད་མེ་བ་འདིའི་ཡུན་རིང་ཐུབ་དཀའ་འམ་སྐྱམ་  
 བྱུང་གསུངས།

During that time, the Lord confided in some followers within his inner circle, saying: “I had a dream where I was reciting the *dMigs brtse ma* <sup>724</sup> with a long tune. Therefore, the Khan is an emanation of Tsong kha pa. It is good that he has gone to the Northern region. Now he will bring benefit to Tsong kha pa’s tradition.”

[.....]

[The Lord] said: “During that time, [I] contemplated what might become of the sDe srid. In a dream, [I] saw a massive rock rolling down in a spiral from a mountain. I was wondering whether I could stop it but I was unable. The rock fell at the base of the mountain and shattered into pieces. Due to this dream, [I] believe it will now be difficult for the sDe srid to sustain his power for a long time.”<sup>725</sup>

These two passages, as recorded in the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, just after the Khan left Lhasa, indicate that the dGe lugs purist already knew about the Khan’s intention to return to Lhasa with his military force. Moreover, the first passage indirectly portrays the Khan’s military plan as an effort to protect the dGe lugs school from the former sDe srid. In the second passage, the dGe lugs purist leader predicted the fateful future of the former sDe srid well before the outbreak of military conflict. These remarks suggest that the dGe lugs purists were involved in planning this military expedition or at least had prior knowledge of the military plan.

### 5.5. Final Collapse of the Relationship between the Khan and the Former sDe srid

The Khan was on his way out of central Tibet, and the former sDe srid appeared to be the winner in this negotiation, remaining in Lhasa (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3 and 5.4.4). Based on this context, this subsection will analyse the military preparations and negotiations between the Khoshuts and Tibetans. It will also explore the role of the dGe lugs purists in these events.

#### 5.5.1. Preparations for Strategic Military Attacks

In the public discourse in Tibet, two reasons were highlighted why the Khan assembled his Mongol military forces in Nag chu and 'Dam and returned to Lhasa to combat the former sDe srid. Firstly, despite the Khan’s departure from Lhasa, the former sDe srid violated the official verdict by remaining in Lhasa and exerting his authority in the dGa’ ldan pho brang.<sup>726</sup> However, this accusation was true only under the condition that the former sDe srid was indeed instructed to relocate from Lhasa.<sup>727</sup> Many scholars have presumed that the former sDe srid

<sup>724</sup> *dMigs brtse ma* is a one-stanza short-form prayer to Tsong kha pa, the founder of the dGe lugs school, composed by Buddhist scholar Red 'da pa gZhon nu blo gros (1349–1412).

<sup>725</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 99a–99b.

<sup>726</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 481.

<sup>727</sup> As mentioned above, there is no primary source to support the claim that the former sDe srid was ordered to relocate from Lhasa. Scholars mention this case without referring any primary source (Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 481 and Wáng Yáo 1980:198).

was ordered to leave Lhasa, even though there is a striking lack of evidence for this claim. For example, Wáng Yáo writes that both parties involved failed to adhere to the agreement, but he does not give a reference to support this claim.<sup>728</sup> Assuming that the sDe srid was expected to leave, they argued that the Khan led his military expedition back to Lhasa because the sDe srid did not follow the order of the assembly.<sup>729</sup>

Contrary to this narrative, according to the *Biography of Che mchog 'dug pa rtsal*, an attendant of the Dalai Lama called mThar rgyas issued a fraudulent letter to lHa bzang Khan in the name of the Dalai Lama, requesting him to assassinate the former sDe srid:

རྗེས་སོར་མཐར་ཐུག་ནས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱེ་ཞབས་ཀྱི་བཀའ་ཡིན་རྒྱུ་བའི་བཀའ་ཤོག་རྒྱས་མ་བཅོས། རྒྱལ་པོར་སྡེ་སྲིད་དགོང་དགོས་  
བའི་རྒྱ་མཚན་བཏང་སྟེ་མཐའ་ཉེས་སུ་སོང་བ་སོགས་བབས་ལོད་ཅིང་།

Later, mThar rgyas forged a letter in the name of the Dalai Lama, urging the Khan to assassinate the sDe srid. This mistake led to a dire situation.<sup>730</sup>

An assassination ordered by the Dalai Lama himself would have been an extreme measure and is perhaps not very likely, although the relationship between the former sDe srid and the Dalai Lama was not on very good terms. Given this information is not found in any other of the primary sources I have perused, it is difficult to ascertain its accuracy. However, Desideri seems to have heard a similar account but in a different circumstance. For example, he recounts that at a slightly later stage, after lHa bzang had taken control of Lhasa, the Mongols counterfeited a letter in the name of the Sixth Dalai Lama, aiming to convince the former sDe srid to leave the fortified stronghold of the Gong dkar region, where he had taken refuge at the time.<sup>731</sup> Although evidence is yet to be found, these two forged letters may well refer to a single letter, even though some sources have linked them to two distinct events.<sup>732</sup>

The existing evidence shown above suggests that the Khan had premeditated his military campaign, possibly with the support of the dGe lugs purist leaders, aimed at eliminating the former sDe srid (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3 and 5.4.4).

In terms of the commencement date of the Khoshut Mongols' military march towards Lhasa, both Sum pa Yes shes dpal 'byor and the Fifth Panchen Lama document the date as the sixth month of 1705.<sup>733</sup> Conversely, two scholars of the 18th century, bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis and Bolur Toli record the date of this event in the fifth month of 1705.<sup>734</sup> According to the sequence of the unfolding events, both dates are possible and it is roughly accurate to infer that the Khan's military march commenced between the fifth and sixth months of 1705.

The *History of mTsho sngon* by Sum pa mKhan po Yes shes dpal 'byor provides the following details about the Khan's military divisions heading to Lhasa:

<sup>728</sup> Wáng Yáo 1980:198.

<sup>729</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 481.

<sup>730</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje n.d.: 30.

<sup>731</sup> Desideri 2010: 243.

<sup>732</sup> Desideri 2010: 243 and Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje n.d.: 30.

<sup>733</sup> Sum pa Yes shes dpal 'byor 1982:19 and PaN chen blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 365.

<sup>734</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 100b and Heissig (trans) 1945: 174.

ནག་ཚུར་སླེབས་ནས་མཚོ་སྔོན་ལ་མ་ལོག་པར་དམག་ཚོགས་བྱས་ཏེ་ལྷ་བ་བྱུག་པར་ཡར་ལོག་ནས་དམག་ཚན་གསུམ་ (མན་མོ་འཕྲང་ནས་རྒྱལ་པོ། མོ་ལ་ནས་བྱ་གུས་ཇི་སང། ལྷོ་ལུང་ནས་ཚེ་རིང་ངམ་ཚེ་དབང་རྒྱལ་མོ།) བྱིང་སོང་ནས་མོ་ལ་དང་མན་མོ་འཕྲང་དང་ལྷོ་ལུང་གསུམ་ནས་བྱིན་ཏེ།

When [lHa bzang Khan] arrived in Nag chu, instead of going to mTsho sngon, he gathered [his Mongol] army and led it back to [Lhasa] in the sixth month with three divisions (the Khan's [division] via rGan mo 'phrang, general Thu grus Jesang's [division] via rGo la, and Tshe ring or Tshe dbang gyal mo's [division] via sTod lung) via rGo la, rGan mo 'phrang and sTod lung.<sup>735</sup>

This passage illustrates the meticulous military strategy employed by the Khan to target Lhasa city from three directions in the sixth month of 1705. Given the situation in Lhasa, this tactic could impede the reinforcement of the Tibetan army from other Tibetan regions or render it challenging for the sDe srid to defend the city in three directions. Borjigidai Oyunbilig, drawing information from the *Kāngxī cháo mǎn wén zhūpī zòuzhè* (Kangxi Court Memorial Record in Manchu), writes:

到达那里后，从拉藏汗的根据地达木地方召集製古军，夺取达赖喇嘛所属畜群，向拉萨进发。

After arriving there, lHa bzang Khan gathered his armies from his base in the 'Dam region and seized the Dalai Lama's herds. Then, [they] marched toward Lhasa.<sup>736</sup>

In contrast to Sum pa mKhan po, this passage identifies the 'Dam region as the primary stronghold of lHa bzang Khan. Furthermore, before his march towards Lhasa, the Khan seized the Dalai Lama's livestock, presumably to sustain his army in this military campaign. This indicates that the Khan did not regard the Sixth Dalai Lama as his ally, despite their former shared interest in similar sports and collaborative efforts against the former sDe srid (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2).<sup>737</sup> This incident again reaffirms the claim of this thesis that the Khan had cultivated his close relationship with the Sixth Dalai Lama to undermine the authority of the former sDe srid.

As for the military strength of the dGa' ldan pho brang, without the Khoshut Mongols, the government had only a small standing military force known as *gzimas pas* stationed under the command of the former sDe srid.<sup>738</sup> Thus, in times of war, the government would have to call upon male civilians aged 18 to 60 (*bco brgyad drug cu*) from each family to serve in the military. Therefore, upon hearing about the Khan's military campaign, the sDe srid immediately began to assemble a vast Tibetan military force from the thirteen myriarchies (*khri skor*) of the dGa' ldan pho brang and the regions of mNga' ris and Khams to counter the Khoshut Mongols if necessary:

བོད་ཁྲི་སྐོར་འདོད་གྲངས་དང་ཁམས་དང་མངའ་རིས་ཚུན་གྱི་དམག་ཚན་ཚེན་མོ་དང་གཡུལ་བཤེས།

<sup>735</sup> Sum pa Yes shes dpal 'byor 1982: 19–20.  
<sup>736</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 89.  
<sup>737</sup> *ibid*: 89.  
<sup>738</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 441 and 482.

The vast military forces, drawn from the [thirteen] Tibetan myriarchies, and stretching from Kham to mNga' ris, were sent into battle.<sup>739</sup>

Similar to this narrative, modern scholar Wáng Yáo, without referencing the sources, states:

第巴桑结嘉错集中十三万户土兵迎击，第巴的士兵不是蒙古骑兵的对手。

sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho gathered 130,000 Tibetan soldiers to confront the Mongols. [However,] the sDe srid's soldiers were no match for the Mongolian cavalry.<sup>740</sup>

However, it is unlikely that the sDe srid was able to gather such a large force in Lhasa. The sDe srid began to assemble his military only upon confirmation that the Khan was returning to Lhasa with his armed forces. Within this short period, the former sDe srid simply did not have sufficient time to assemble a substantial army from across Tibet. The *Autobiography of the Fifth Panchen Lama* gives a more realistic picture when it records that the sDe srid had at this point only assembled soldiers from central Tibet, even though his call had gone out to a much wider region:

གཞུང་ནས་ཀྱང་དབུས་གཙང་། མངའ་རིས། ལམས་སོགས་དམག་བཅུ་ལྔ་པ་ དབུས་གཙང་གི་དམག་རྣམས་ལྷ་སའི་ཉེ་སྤོར་  
དུ་འབྱོར་བ་དང་། རྒྱལ་པོ་དབུང་བཅས་ཀྱང་སྟོད་ལྷང་འཕམ་ཡུལ་རྣམས་ལ་འབྱོར་སྐད་ཐོས།

The government (dGa' ldan pho brang) also summoned soldiers from, among others, dBus gTsang, mNga' ris, and Kham. As the soldiers from dBus gTsang gathered near Lhasa, reports came in that the Khan and his army had also reached sTod lung, 'Phan yul, and other places.<sup>741</sup>

sTod lung and 'Phan yul, situated very close to Lhasa city, signified that the sDe srid could not afford to wait for reinforcements from other Tibetan regions. In this critical circumstance, it seems the soldiers from outside of central Tibet were yet to gather, the former sDe srid continuously attempted to assemble more Tibetan military forces on one hand, while utilising Tibetan Lamas to negotiate with the Khan on the other.<sup>742</sup>

### 5.5.2. Tactical Negotiation in Military Context

The former sDe srid dispatched religious leaders from prominent dGe lugs monasteries, including representatives of the Sixth Dalai Lama and the Fifth Panchen Lama, to halt the Khan's military campaign, as described in the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*:

དེ་ནས་སྐྱོ་བ་ལྡོ་བའི་ནང་དུ་བྱང་ན་རྒྱལ་པོའི་དམག་ཡོང་གི་ན་འདུག དེ་ལ་སེར་འབྲས་དགེ་གསུམ་རྒྱུད་སྟོད་སྐད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་མ་  
ཐམས་ཅད་དམག་བཞོལ་ལ་འགྲོ་དགོས་ཟེར་ནས་གཞུང་གིས་བཅུ་ལྔ་པ་ དེ་ནས་རྗེ་འདི་ཡང་བྱང་ལ་རྒྱལ་པོའི་དམག་བཞོལ་  
ལ་ཕེབས་པས་དམག་ཡོང་གི་ན་འདུག སྐྱེ་མ་རྣམས་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལ་ལྷག་ནས་དམག་བཞོལ་དགོས་ཞུས་པས། རྒྱལ་པོས་ང་སྐད་

<sup>739</sup> Sum pa Yes shes dpal 'byor 1982: 20.

<sup>740</sup> Wáng Yáo 1980:198.

<sup>741</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 365. Sle lung bzhad pa'i rdo rje (1983: 53a–53b) records the dilemma of this civil war in central Tibet.

<sup>742</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 100b.

ཐང་བར་དུ་མ་ཡོང་བས་ཐབས་མེད་ཟེར་ནས་བཤོལ་མ་ཐུབ། ཚུར་ཡོང་ལྷོ་བ་ལ་ཞུས་པས། ཁོ་རང་ཡོང་ན་བོད་དམག་  
ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་འཐབ་འདྲོད་འདུག་ཟེར།

In the fifth month [of 1705], the government announced that the army of the Khan was advancing [towards Lhasa] from the north, and all the lamas of the three monasteries of Sera, 'Bras spungs and dGe ldan and the upper and lower tantric colleges, were asked to journey there to delay the army. Then, the Lord also travelled to the North with other lamas to repel the army of the Khan. [They saw] the approaching army. The lamas encountered the Khan and implored him to keep back his army, but the Khan said: "There is no way [to do this] until they have reached Glang thang", and they were unable to hold off [the Mongol troops]. Upon their return, [the lamas] informed the sDe srid [of the situation]. Thereupon, the sDe srid told [them]: "The whole Tibetan army will want to fight if he (the Khan) approaches."<sup>743</sup>

According to this passage, the religious leaders tried to persuade the Khan to reverse his military march, but they were unsuccessful. This excerpt also shows, at this point, the former sDe srid was still projecting confidence by claiming that the Tibetan army wanted to fight if the Khan advanced towards Lhasa. However, the biography explains that being aware of the grave consequences of a military clash, the former sDe srid made a second attempt at mediation after the Khan arrived in the Glang thang region of 'Phan yul, just north of Lhasa city:

དེ་ནས་ཉི་མ་གཅིག་གཉིས་སོང་ནས། ལྷོ་བས་རྗེ་འདི་ལ་མི་བཏང་ནས། རྒྱལ་པོ་སྤང་ཐང་ལ་སླེབས་འདུག་ཤེད་སློལ་མ་ཚོ་སོང་  
ནས་ཕྱིར་འགོར་ཚུག་ཟེར། རྗེ་འདིས་རྒྱལ་པོས་སློལ་མ་ཚོ་ལ་མི་བཅེ་བ་འདུག་ ང་ལ་ལལ་ཏུ་ཡང་མེད་ཞུས་པས། ལྷོ་བ་ཁྲིམས་  
ནས་ད་རེས་ཕེབས་དང་ཏང་ས་ཕྱིན་ཚོག་ཟེར་བཞིག་བྱུང་། རྗེ་འདིས་ཐུགས་ན་ཏ་གོ་བྱུང་། རྒྱལ་པོ་བྱུག་ཟེར་རྒྱ་རེད་དེ།  
ངེད་རང་གཉིས་སུའི་སློལ་མ་འབབ་ཐུར་དུ་རིག་ཡོང་དགོངས། དེ་ནས་ཡང་སློལ་མ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཕེབས་པས་ཕྱིར་སློག་མ་ཐུབ།  
ཚུར་ཡོང་ལྷོ་བ་ལ་ཞུས་པས། དེ་རེབ་ལྷོ་བས་ཡང་འཐབ་པོ་ལའ། རྗེ་འདི་ལ་སློལ་མ་གཞན་ཚོ་ལ་ཡིད་ཡང་མི་ཆེས། དེ་ཚོས་  
ཅང་མི་ཡོང་། ངས་ཁྱེད་ལ་སློག་གཏད་ཡོད་པས་ཁྱེད་ཀྱིས་སློག་མ་ཐུབ་ན་ད་བྱེད་ཐབས་མེད་ཟེར་བྱུང་། དོན་ལ་ཁྱེད་ལ་ཡང་  
ཡིད་མི་ཆེས་ཟེར་རྒྱ་རེད། རྗེ་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱང་དེ་ཉིན་ཐུགས་སློབ་བྱུང་ཡང་ཁྱེད་ཐབས་མེད་པའི་དུས་ལ་སླེབས་ཚར་གསུངས།

Then, after one or two days, the sDe srid dispatched someone [to convey the message] to the Lord: "The Khan has arrived in Glang thang, and you lamas must go there and send [him] back." The Lord responded: "The Khan does not care about the lamas. I do not even have a pack horse." [Upon hearing this,] the sDe srid became angry and said reproachfully: "Go now. I will give [you] a horse." Therefore, the Lord thought: "I understand. He is [really] saying [he wants to] soak me in the water (i.e. get me into this difficult situation), but we will soon see whose neck will receive [the punishment]." Then, all the lamas travelled there [and tried] but they could not turn [the Khan's army] back. Upon their return, [they] informed the sDe srid [of their failure]. This time, the sDe srid appealed to the Lord gently: "I do not have faith in the other lamas, as they could not do anything. However, I have faith in you. If you cannot turn [the army] back, then there is no other method." In truth, this statement meant, "I do not believe in you either." The Lord said: "On that day, I also felt disheartened, but it had reached the point where nothing could be done about the situation."<sup>744</sup>

<sup>743</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 100b.

<sup>744</sup> ibid: 100b–101a.

This passage portrays the sDe srid as weak, as he helplessly appeals to every lama. It also depicts the former sDe srid as deceptive, given his dishonest interactions with 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and his attempts to put him at risk. As many other sources quoted above, this passage reveals that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa did not truly assist the former sDe srid in halting the Khan's military advance towards Lhasa. The rhetorical language employed by the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa in this passage demonstrates his conviction that the former sDe srid was destined to meet his tragic demise. This certainty suggests that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa was aware of the machinations behind the war instigated by the Khan, possibly revealing the involvement of the purists in this civil conflict. At this time, the Fifth Panchen Lama also began his journey from bKra shis lhun po immediately after sending his swift messengers with advice to mediate the dispute, aiming to avert bloodshed between “preceptor and patron” (*mchod yon*).<sup>745</sup>

### 5.5.3. A Test of Loyalty, and Inevitable Renegotiation

As the Khoshut Mongols continued their advance towards Lhasa from multiple directions between the fifth and sixth months of 1705, the Tibetan civilian soldiers found themselves at a crucial juncture to demonstrate their loyalty towards the former sDe srid and his leadership of the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>746</sup> However, as shown above, the dGe lugs purists had carried out various political strategies, including spreading rumours, to sully the reputation of the former sDe srid (Chapter 4, Section 4.4.3 and 4.4.4). They had also created the rumour of black magic rituals directed at the Panchen Lama to sow discord between the regional powers of dBus and gTsang, represented by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, respectively (Chapter 5, section 5.1.2 and 5.1.3). Moreover, the libertine lifestyle of the Sixth Dalai Lama and his strained relationship with the former sDe srid fundamentally destabilised the strength and authority of the dGa' ldan pho brang (Chapter 4, Section 4.2). Therefore, despite being legally obligated to partake in the war, Tibetan soldiers fought the war in a pretentious manner and readily accepted their defeat. Zhwa sgab pa provides an analytical elucidation of the reasons underlying the Tibetan military's facile acceptance of defeat:

གཞུང་ཕྱོགས་ནས་དབུས་གཙང་གི་དམག་རྒྱུས་གཏོང་ལེན་དུ་གཏོང་གནང་མཛད་ཀྱང་། བར་སྐབས་ལོ་རྒྱུན་མང་པོའི་  
 རིང་རྗེས་བྱང་ཆེན་པོའི་ཨར་པོའི་མཇུག་སྐྱོང་དང་། གསེར་གདུང་གསར་བཞེངས་བཅས་པར་མི་སེར་རྒྱུས་དཀའ་ངལ་ཆེ་  
 བའི་ཐོག་གསང་བྱ་ཡུན་རིང་གནང་བའི་རྒྱུན་དང་། རྒྱལ་དབང་མཚོག་དང་ལྗེ་སྲིད་ལུགས་སྣང་མི་ལེགས་པ་བཅས་ངན་པ་  
 དགུ་འཛོམས་ལྷ་བྱས་དབུས་གཙང་གཟིམ་པ་རྒྱུས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་དམག་ཐོལ་གྱིས་བྱས་པ་སོགས་ལ་བརྟེན།

Ü Tsang troops were dispatched by the government to confront the Mongolians. At the same time, however, the common people endured terrible difficulties, such as the efforts to complete the construction of the Potala Palace, which had been ongoing for many years and the new work on the golden reliquary. Other causes of dissatisfaction and disruption include the fact that the previous Dalai Lama's death had been concealed for so long and the disagreeable feelings between the present Dalai Lama and Sangyé Gyatso. All of these factors made it seem like a time of ill omens had gathered. As a consequence, the residents of Ü Tsang were disingenuous in their war efforts.<sup>747</sup>

This is a modern source written by a pro-Tibet historian. However, this passage offers alternatives explanations behind the Tibetan army's lack of enthusiasm in resisting the Khoshut

<sup>745</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 365–366.

<sup>746</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 482.

<sup>747</sup> ibid: 482. The translation of Maher (2010, vol-i: 398–399) is used for this passage.

Mongols on behalf of the former sDe srid. However, this excerpt does not highlight the primary, subtle, and initially less visible cause that eroded the loyalty of the many people from gTsang towards the former sDe srid (Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3). In this instance, the *Autobiography of Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje*, using the bKra shis lhun po monks as an exemplar, elucidates this underlying cause:

དམག་གི་ཉེན་དོགས་ཆེ་བའི་སྐབས་ཡིན་པར་རྒྱལ་བ་ཡབ་སྲས་ལ་ཁྱད་པར་ཅི་ཡོད་ཀྱང་དབུས་གཙང་གི་ཕྱོགས་སྤང་ཆེ་བ་  
 འདིས་བོད་འཕུང་བྱེད་ཀྱི་གཞི་རྩ་གཅིག་ཏུ་འདུག་པར་དགོ་སྤོང་ཡང་དེ་གའི་མདངས་འབྲིང་པའི་གོང་ཞབས་རིན་པོ་ཆེར་  
 དད་ཞེན་ཚུང་ཞིང་སྟག་པར་ལྷེ་སྲིད་ཆེན་མོར་ཤིན་ཏུ་གནག་པས་རྒྱན་པར་དཔོན་པོ་སངས་རྒྱལ་པ་སོགས་སྐྱར་འདེབས་སྒྲ་  
 ཆོགས་རང་གྲུ་སྟག་པར་བོད་ཏུ་སོག་དམག་འདྲ་བྱུང་ན་བཀྲ་ཤིས་སྐྱོན་པོ་ཡོ་འཁྱོམས་ནི་མི་ཡོད་། ལྷེ་སྲིད་མེད་པ་ཞིག་  
 འཚོས་ཐུབ་ན་སྐྱམ་པ་རང་བྱེད་ཅིང་།

ཕྱིས་རྒྱལ་པོས་སྤང་ཆེར་ལྷེ་སྲིད་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་བཀོངས་པའི་སྐད་ཆ་ཆོར་དུས་འགའ་ཚོར་ཆེ་བ། རྒྱལ་བའི་གྲུ་རིགས་ཀྱན་པོ་  
 གནད་མ་གཏོགས་ཤིང་ཕྱོགས་སྤང་ཅན་འགའ་ཞིག་གིས་ཀྱང་ལྷེ་སྲིད་ནས་དོར་སྤོང་སོགས་ལ་བདག་རྒྱུན་གནད་བ་སྐྱོས་མ་  
 བཟོད་པས་རང་རེའི་གྲུ་སྐྱོས་ལ་བཀའ་དྲིན་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡོད་སྟེ་གཅིག་ཀྱང་མ་བསམས་པའི་སྐྱར་འདེབས་དང་དུས་འགྲུབ་  
 ཀྱི་སྐོན་ལམ་བྱེད། ལྷེ་སྲིད་བཀོངས་དུས་ཀྱི་ག་བཏང་དེ་ལས་ཡུན་རིང་ན་དགོ་ལྷགས་པའི་མིང་གྲག་ཏུ་འཇུག་པ་མི་འདུག་  
 ཅས་ཡང་ཡང་བེར་བ་ཐོས་པས་རང་ན་སོ་གཞོན་ཀྱང་ཡི་མ་རངས་པ་བྱུང་།

At this critical time [of facing] the fear and danger of war, the difference between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama (*rgyal ba yab sras*) was irrelevant. However, the deep divide between dBus and gTsang became the sole cause of Tibet’s downfall. Under its sway, even *dge slong*<sup>748</sup> had little faith in the Dalai Lama (*gong zhabs rin po che*). In particular, the monk held an intense animosity towards the great sDe srid, whom he always deprecated in various ways and derogatorily addressed as leader Sangs rgam pa. [The monk] especially wished the Mongols would come to Tibet and eliminate the sDe srid, as [he believed] this would not disturb bKra shis lhun po.

Subsequently, upon receiving word about the murder of the Precious sDe srid by the Khan in sNang rtse, [the monk] was filled with joy. Unaware of the vital matter, several prejudiced senior Buddhist monks found it unbearable that the sDe srid presented gifts to monasteries, including rDor sMin (rDo rje brag and sMin grol gling Monasteries). Consequently, [they] denigrated the sDe srid and desired an uprising [*dus ’gyur*], oblivious to the gratitude [they owed] for the general and specific benefits to their own monastic seats. Upon the sDe srid’s assassination, [I] repeatedly heard people proclaim: “It is good. If [the sDe srid] had lived longer, he would not have let the dGe lugs school become popular.” Despite my youth, I found this distasteful.<sup>749</sup>

The first paragraph of this excerpt illuminates the regional conflicts between dBus and gTsang and the people’s waning loyalty towards the former sDe srid. This passage also indicates the deep hatred of the monks in bKra shis lhun po toward the former sDe srid and their wish for his defeat in the war. The second paragraph illustrates the adverse reaction of the dGe lugs purists in bKra shis lhun po to the former sDe srid’s close affiliations with rDo rje brag and

<sup>748</sup> Although the personal name is not specified, according to the *Autobiography of Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje* (1983), this monk served as the Dalai Lama’s personal tutor and assistant, likely during his residence at the bKra shis lhun po monastery.  
<sup>749</sup> Sle lung bzhad pa'i rdo rje 1983: 50b–51a.

sMin grol gling—two prominent rNying ma monasteries in central Tibet.<sup>750</sup> This sectarian stance of the purists in bKra shis lhun po aligned precisely with that of the purists in Lhasa, such as the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, signifying a connection between them. Consequently, rather than lending support, many individuals harboured the desire for the former sDe srid's downfall at the hands of the Mongols.

Amidst these conditions, Tibetan armed forces from dBus and gTsang, especially the ones from the region of gTsang, displayed a lack of determination to engage in battle against the Khoshut Mongols for the former sDe srid and the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>751</sup> As a result, a group of Tibetan armed forces, headed by Tibetan General rDo rje rab brtan, engaged in a brief military confrontation with a division of the Khoshut Mongols led by General Thu grus Jaisang in rGo la region.<sup>752</sup> The Khoshut Mongols decisively defeated the Tibetan army and killed the Tibetan commanding general during the engagement, thereby effortlessly securing the triumph in their first battle. A primary Mongolian source translated into German by Walter Heissig records:

Although the monks had now forbidden the advance, it was of no use. The army [of the Khan] advanced, and four hundred Tibetan warriors were killed. The monks then mediated between the two, the sDe srid and the Khan.<sup>753</sup>

This passage confirms that the Khan disregarded the mediation efforts of the Tibetan Lamas, as also described in the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* (Chapter 5, Section 5.5.2). The Tibetan army seemed to accept defeat after losing a general and a few soldiers, which also demonstrates their lack of conviction.<sup>754</sup>

The army of the Khan reached the outskirts of Lhasa, and the Tibetan soldiers from dBus gTsang did not demonstrate the strength and commitment to fight for the former sDe srid. Upon realising this situation, the former sDe srid had no choice but to offer unconditional negotiations to save his own life. Now the religious leaders of dGe lugs monasteries such as Se ra, 'Bras spungs, dGa' ldan, and bKra shis lhun po began negotiations between the former sDe srid and the Khan. The *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* records:

དེ་ནས་ལྷ་མ་རྒྱལ་གྱིས་རྒྱལ་པོ་དང་ཕྱེ་བ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་བར་བཤད་ནས་ཕྱེ་བ་ཁྲི་བཞག་ནས་གོང་དཀར་རྫོང་ལ་བཞུགས།  
གཞུང་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལ་སློང་བ་བྱས་ནས་ཕྱེ་བ་དེར་ཕེབས། རྒྱལ་པོ་གོང་སྤང་ལ་བཞུགས།

The lamas then mediated between the Khan and the sDe srid and decided that the sDe srid must relinquish his throne and reside in Gong dkar rdzong while the government would be handed over to the Khan. [Consequently,] the sDe srid relocated there, while the Khan remained in Grong smad.<sup>755</sup>

The power of the dGa' ldan pho brang was thus handed over to the Khan, and the former sDe srid was expelled from Lhasa. This passage indicates that the former sDe srid immediately

---

<sup>750</sup> In his autobiography, Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (2009) frequently discusses his spiritual and personal relationships with various masters from these rNying ma monasteries, indicating his closeness with them.

<sup>751</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 482.

<sup>752</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1982:19–20.

<sup>753</sup> Heissig (trans) 1945:175 and Petech 1972: 11–12.

<sup>754</sup> As discussed in section 5.5.1 of the fifth chapter, Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor (1982:19–20) narrates that the Khoshut Mongols clashed with the Tibetan army from the thirteen myriarchies, Kham, and mNga' ris. This contradicts his own account of the fight between merely two generals of the Khan and the sDe srid.

<sup>755</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 101a.

moved to Gong dkar after the negotiation, while the Khan remained in Grong smad, a small town near Lhasa city. The *Autobiography of the Fifth Panchen Lama* notes that, in this negotiation, the Khan pledged he would not harm the former sDe srid.<sup>756</sup>

The sequence of events shows that the former sDe srid and the Khan did not engage in a large-scale war in multiple locations, and the former sDe srid accepted his defeat after a single defeat in a small battle at the rGo la.<sup>757</sup> This means the former sDe srid had no time to gather soldiers from many Tibetan regions as originally planned and fight a large-scale war against the Khoshut Mongols and he also perhaps found the lack of loyalty among his soldiers.<sup>758</sup>

## 5.6. Achieving Military Victory and Establishing Power

Under the leadership of lHa bzang Khan, the Khoshut Mongols forcibly seized control of the dGa' ldan pho brang, resulting in the expulsion of the former sDe srid from Lhasa (Chapter 5, Section 5.5.3). Based on this context, this subsection will explore how the Khan and the dGe lugs purists collaborated to establish the Khan's legitimacy while eliminating potential enemies. It will also examine how the Khan sought support from the Mongols and Manchus. Finally, this section will analyse the Khan's relationship with the Qing court prior to 1705.

### 5.6.1. The Purists' Role in Legitimising the New Leadership

During the reign of the Fifth Dalai Lama, the internal political framework of the dGa' ldan pho brang was based on the preceptor-patron model, wherein the Khoshut Khans managed the government's military affairs without engaging in its political activities (Chapter 2, Section 2.5 and 2.6). lHa bzang Khan disrupted this structure. He forcefully expelled the former sDe srid and planned to establish his direct Mongol Khoshut rule over the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>759</sup> In this situation, the Khoshut Khan urgently required the endorsement of Tibetan leaders to legitimise his rule over the dGa' ldan pho brang. As anticipated, the dGe lugs purists led by the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa were the first Tibetans to offer their support and welcome the rule of the Khoshut Khan.

The *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* records:

དེ་ནས་རྗེ་འདིས་ཚོགས་གཏམ་གནང་ནས། རྒྱལ་པོ་ཡང་སྤྱིན་བདག་ཡིན་མོད་ཐུགས་ཁྲིམ་བཞགས་ན་གྲུ་ས་གྲུ་ཚང་ལ་མི་  
བཟང་། བབ་ལ་བསྐྱུན་ན་དགའ་གསུངས། རྗེ་མང་གི་གྲུ་ཚང་མེབས་ནས། རྒྱལ་པོ་ལ་གྲུ་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱིས་ཁ་བཏགས་  
བཏང་།

Then, the Lord then publicly stated: “The Khan was also our patron. It would be detrimental to the monks and monasteries if he became angry. It will be advantageous to act in accordance with the circumstances.” [As a result,] all the monks from sGo mang college went [to Grong smad] and presented scarves (*kha btags*) to the Khan.<sup>760</sup>

<sup>756</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 366.

<sup>757</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1982:19–20.

<sup>758</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor (1982: 19–20) states that the former sDe srid gathered a huge military force from across the Tibetan regions, but he was defeated before that could happen.

<sup>759</sup> Petech 1972: 13.

<sup>760</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 101a.

This paragraph illustrates, through the offering of scarves, the public support of the dGe lugs purists for the Khan and his newly established leadership over the dGa' ldan pho brang. This public and diplomatic expression by the monks from 'Bras spung paved the way for the Khan's new leadership and legitimacy. This was a crucial diplomatic tactic by the dGe lugs purists to stabilise and normalise the direct dominion of the Khoshut Mongols over the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>761</sup> The Mongolian source translated by Heissig into German makes the scene even bigger:

[After the victory of the Khan,] all the monks of 'Bras spungs, Se ra and dGa' ldan monasteries offered Khatas and paid tribute to lHa bzang Khan.<sup>762</sup>

However, this scenario appears highly unlikely given the historical good relationship between the Se ra and dGa' ldan monasteries and the former sDe srid.<sup>763</sup> At a later point, lHa bzang even murdered the head lama of Se ra smad and attempted to destroy the monastery.<sup>764</sup> Moreover, recognising the importance of this support, lHa bzang Khan expressed his gratitude towards 'Bras spungs, but not Se ra and dGa' ldan monasteries. Thus, it is unlikely that the Se ra and dGa' ldan monasteries welcomed the Khan.

The *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* records:

དེ་ནས་རྗེ་འདིས་གཙོ་བྱས་ནས་འབྲས་སྦྱངས་ལྷ་མ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཞུས་ནས། འབྲས་སྦྱངས་སྤྱི་སོ་ལ་མཚོན་གཞི་སྟོན་ལྷང་མཚོ་  
སྟོན་གནང་། རྗེ་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལ་ཞུས་ནས། སློམ་ལ་སྟོན་ལྷང་གོ་བོ་གནང་བས་དེ་ལ་སློམ་ལ་འབོག་ཆེན་པོ་  
གཅིག་གིས་ཆ་ཡོད།

Then, upon the request of the lamas of 'Bras spungs monastery led by the Lord, [the Khan] offered them sTod lung mtsho smad. [Furthermore,] in response to the Lord's request to the Khan, [he] granted sTod lung ge bo to sGo mang College, a piece of land which can [cover the expenses of] a large offering ( 'bog chen po) for [monastic assembly].<sup>765</sup>

According to the chronology of the events, initially, only the monks of the 'Bras spung sGo mang welcomed the Khan, and later, other monks from 'Bras spung might also have joined in welcoming him. During this time, as quoted above, the Khan had been granting estates to monasteries such as sGo mang college on the one hand, to secure their allegiance to his rule in central Tibet. On the other hand, the Khan resorted to brutally suppressing his adversaries within central Tibet, following the Mongol political stratagem of intimidating others into submission.<sup>766</sup> In his emotional poem addressed to the Fifth Dalai Lama, the Fifth Panchen Lama describes the plight of the Tibetans as being like moths falling into a fire without any

<sup>761</sup> Since the major dGe lugs monasteries held substantial power in the dGa' ldan pho brang during the 18th century (Chapter 1, Sections 1.3.3 and 1.3.4), this public recognition from the sGo mang monastery aided the Khan in this situation.

<sup>762</sup> Heissig (trans) 1945:175.

<sup>763</sup> The reason remains unknown, but the former sDe srid was affiliated with Se ra Monastery and had a very good relationship with it (bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 101a–101b). The dGe lugs khri pas he selected from dGa' ldan Monastery were very supportive of both the sDe srid and the Dalai Lama (Ser smad Grags pa mkhas grub n.d.).

<sup>764</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 101a–101b.

<sup>765</sup> ibid: 101a.

<sup>766</sup> Petech 1972: 13.

safeguard.<sup>767</sup> The Fifth Panchen Lama also notes that some Khoshut Mongols took this opportunity to seek personal revenge against certain Tibetan aristocrats.<sup>768</sup> Petech describes the onset of the Khan’s rule in central Tibet as “some act of harshness and oppression.”<sup>769</sup>

For example, the former sDe srid had close affiliations with Se smad college, and thus, the college had provided robust support to him. Consequently, the Khan resolved to dismantle Se smad college and execute several of its leaders. The *Biography of the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* highlights his influence on the Khan and his role in ameliorating the impact of the Khan’s actions:

དེ་དུས་རྒྱལ་པོས་སེར་སྤང་བ་འདིས་ཁོང་ལ་ངན་བ་བྱས་པས་གཏོར་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ཟེར་བས། རྗེ་འདིས་ངོ་ཚེན་བྱས་ནས། ད་དགེ་  
 ལུགས་ཀྱི་སྤྲོ་ཚང་ཅིག་བྱིད་ཀྱིས་གཏོར་ལུགས་མེད་ཞེས་ནན་ཞུས་བྱས་གཏོར་མ་བརྟུགས། འོ་ན་དེའི་དབྱུ་མཛད་དགེ་  
 བསྐོས་སོགས་ལས་སྣ་རྣམས་གསོད་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ཟེར་བས། དེ་ཡང་རྗེ་འདིས་ནན་བྱས་ནས་སོག་ང་ལ་བསྐྱངས། ཚད་པ་གཙོད་ན་  
 དེ་ལྟ་མི་རྣམས་པས་བྱིད་མཁུན་ཞེས་ཡང་ཡང་ཞུས་ནས། རྒྱལ་པོས་ཀྱང་ངོ་ཚེན་བྱས། དེའི་མཚན་ནས་རང་རང་གི་ཤེས་མི་  
 ཤེས་བྱུང་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཐུགས་ཡངས་བྱེད་དགོས་ཞུས་ནས་རྒྱལ་པོས་ཡང་ཞུས་བཞེས་མཛད།

At that time, the Khan announced: “[I will] destroy Ser smad College because they wronged me.” The Lord, using his influence (*ngo chen*), prevented [the Khan from] destroying the monastery by insisting: “How could you possibly destroy a dGe lugs monastery?” [The Khan] then proposed: “I will kill the monastery’s leaders, including the discipline and chanting masters.” Again, the Lord repeatedly requests: “I could not say anything if you just give them punishment but spare their lives for my sake (*srog nga la bslang*).” And the Khan respected his request. Following this example, [the Lord also urged the Khan] to be open-minded about known or unknown things that occurred [during the political struggle], and the Khan accepted it.<sup>770</sup>

This passage highlights the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s efforts to protect the college and save the lives of its religious leaders, demonstrating his influence and close relationship with the Khan. Beyond safeguarding the college and its leaders, ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa also protected the Khan’s reputation and image, as evidenced by his remark, “How could you possibly destroy a dGe lugs monastery?” The dGe lugs purists consistently depicted the Khan as the protector of the dGe lugs school (Chapter 4, Section 4.4.4), which indirectly justified the Khan’s assault on the former sDe srid. If the Khan destroyed Se ra smad, one of the primary colleges of the dGe lugs tradition, this would jeopardise the image of the Khan himself as the protector of the dGe lugs tradition. Moreover, this would also disprove the entire narrative constructed by the dGe lugs purists to create contrasting images between the Khan and the former sDe srid (Chapter 4, Section 4.4.3). According to the Mongolian source mentioned above, the Khan had already murdered the head of Sera smad College before ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa intervened to prevent further destruction, but the *Biography of the First ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* does not mention this,<sup>771</sup> likely to protect the reputation of the Khan.

### 5.6.2. Eliminating the Former sDe srid to Prevent Rebellion

<sup>767</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 369–371.  
<sup>768</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 373–374.  
<sup>769</sup> Petech 1702:13.  
<sup>770</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 101a–101b.  
<sup>771</sup> Heissig (trans) 1945:175.

After establishing dominance over the dGa' ldan pho brang through a combination of ruthless and diplomatic strategies in the late summer of 1705, the Khan appears to have governed the dGa' ldan pho brang through Tibetan aristocrats, such as Chang khyim pa.<sup>772</sup> Subsequently, the Khan decided to depart from Lhasa and embark on a journey to the northern Tibetan pastures in the regions of 'Dam and Nag chu, where most Khoshut Mongols lived as nomads.<sup>773</sup> These actions suggest that, at the beginning of his rule, the Khan did not intend to manage the daily administrative tasks of the dGa' ldan pho brang directly. Instead, he likely planned to govern through Tibetan leaders. While it is understandable that the Khan put experienced Tibetan administrators in charge of the day-to-day business of the government, the rationale behind leaving Lhasa as soon as he took control of it remains undisclosed.

Another event that occurred around this time, as cited in the *Kāngxī cháo mǎn wén zhūpī zòuzhé*, is that Ngag dbang rin chen, the son and current sDe srid of the dGa' ldan pho brang, and his wife attempted to escape from the Khoshut Mongols in Lhasa but were seized.<sup>774</sup> However, according to Borjigidai Oyunbilig, they were subsequently rescued by the Sixth Dalai Lama, who led a force of a hundred soldiers.<sup>775</sup> This information is not clear in Tibetan materials. If this account is correct, it illustrates the Sixth Dalai Lama as a courageous military leader and his close connection with sDe srid Ngag dbang rin chen. According to Tibetan sources, Ngag dbang rin chen was either an attendant or, perhaps more informally, a friend with whom the Sixth Dalai Lama would spend time, relaxing and drinking.<sup>776</sup> Hence, despite the Sixth Dalai Lama's strained relationships with the former sDe srid, the father of Ngag dbang rin chen, he was nevertheless closely connected with his son.

As mentioned above, in the seventh month of 1705, the Khan began his journey from Lhasa, but en route, he surreptitiously proceeded to Gong dkar to confront the former sDe srid.<sup>777</sup> Although there had been prior diplomatic negotiations in which the two leaders agreed that the Khan would not harm the former sDe srid if he relocated to Gong dkar, the Khan nonetheless arrested him (Chapter 5, Section 5.5.3).

Desideri, the Italian Jesuit missionary stationed in Tibet in the early 18th century, provides an account of this incident:

It was not long before they [the Mongols under lHa bzang Khan] had made themselves masters of the city of Lhasa and forced the king [the former sDe srid] to take refuge in a well-fortified fortress, which they besieged, but as they were unable to capture it by force, they resorted to trickery and halted the siege under the false pretext of wishing to come to terms and negotiate a peace. Since the Tibetan king would not trust his safety to the prince [lHa bzang Khan] he had so seriously and repeatedly provoked, the Tartars [i.e. the Mongols] got him to hope for a real peace by making it appear as if the Grand Lama [the Sixth Dalai Lama], the supreme authority whom they so greatly venerated, had intervened to obtain it.

---

<sup>772</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 118b–119a.

<sup>773</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 368.

<sup>774</sup> *Dì yī lǐshǐ dǎng'àn guǎn biānyì* (ed) 1996: 235–236.

<sup>775</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 90.

<sup>776</sup> Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje 1983: 40a–40b.

<sup>777</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 101b.

At that time the Grand Lama was a very dissolute youth; in addition to being given over to insatiable lust, he allowed himself to be dominated by gluttony and drunkenness. The Tartars, by means of large gifts and even greater promises, managed to suborn his favorite and closest minister. The minister then wrote a long and cunning kashok (Kaa-scioà), that is, an edict and letter in the name of the Grand Lama addressed to the Tibetan king, in which he was invited to come out of the fortress and accept the peace terms that the Tartars offered him, trusting in his authority that it would be observed and assuring him of a favorable outcome. After the minister had prepared this letter, he got the Grand Lama quite drunk, and so was easily able to take the seal that the lama wore around his neck. He affixed it to the document and then gave it to the Tartars, who lost no time in getting it into the hands of the besieged king. The great faith and veneration that the king had toward the Grand Lama had rendered him blind and overly credulous, which led him to leave the fortress freely and without the slightest fear. As soon as he did so, the Tartar prince [lHa bzang Khan] and his minister Targum Tashi fell upon him and killed him.<sup>778</sup>

According to this account, the Khan and his army made concerted efforts to penetrate the stronghold of the former sDe srid in the Gong dkar fortress, employing deceptive tactics under the pretence of peaceful negotiations. However, their strategies to capture the former sDe srid proved ineffective. Thus, he invoked the name of the Dalai Lama to lure the former sDe srid out of the fort. Ultimately, the Khan murdered the former sDe srid. This account is based on Desideri's narrative, which does not align with other Tibetan, Mongolian and Chinese sources, as will be discussed below. However, many scholars, such as Rockhill and Das have based their accounts on Desideri's narrative, which then became the mainstream history of how the Khan arrested and killed the former sDe srid.<sup>779</sup>

However, in reality, there are many subtly differing accounts of this event in the primary Tibetan and Mongolian sources. As per the *History of mTsho sngon* authored by Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor, the narrative surrounding this particular event differs from other Tibetan sources:

སངས་རྒྱལ་གོ་གྲུའི་སྤེང་ནས་གོང་དཀར་རྫོང་ལ་ཐོས་པ་རྒྱལ་མའི་དམག་གིས་བཟུང་ནས་སྐྱོར་ལུང་གི་འདབས་སུ་ཐེ་ཐེད་  
 རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ནི་སྤར་འོངས་སའི་རིན་པོ་ཆེའི་སྤོང་དུ་གདན་དྲངས།

Sangs rgyam [the former sDe srid] ran away to Gong dkar rdzong by using a leather boat but was caught by the soldiers of the queen [Tshe ring bkra shis], and near sKyor lung, the sDe srid Rin po che was sent to his treasure-land (death or heaven in this context), where he originally came from.<sup>780</sup>

In a narrative echoing Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor's history, the Mongolian primary source translated by Heissig records:

At that time [when the Khan controlled Lhasa], Tshe ring bkra shis, the wife of prince lHa bzang, accompanied by soldiers, captured the [former] sDe srid and took him to sTod lung.<sup>781</sup>

<sup>778</sup> Desideri 2010: 243.

<sup>779</sup> Rockhill 1910: 33 and Das 1904:91.

<sup>780</sup> Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1982: 20.

<sup>781</sup> Heissig (trans) 1945: 175.

These two passages are similar but contain contradictory information. Firstly, there was no reason for the former sDe srid to abruptly flee from Lhasa, as a peaceful negotiation had been reached, and the Khan had promised no harm would come to him (Chapter 5, Section 5.5.3). Secondly, most sources narrate that the Khan apprehended the former sDe srid after the latter had relocated to Gong dkar, rather than being captured by the Queen's soldiers.<sup>782</sup>

Moreover, according to this translated Manchus source, the *Kāngxī cháo mǎn wén zhūpī zòuzhé*, there is another narrative of the event:

根据时在拉萨的荐良的报告，七月十四日至二十二之间的某一天，拉藏汗擒获第巴及其妻子，交付台吉达里扎布和硕其及根敦二人押回时，他们于途中斩杀了第巴。青海达赖戴青属下人斋桑浑津亲眼看见第巴被杀。

According to the report by Jiàn liáng, who was in Lhasa at the time, between July 14th and 22nd, lHa bzang Khan captured the sDe srid and his wife. While they were being escorted back to Lhasa, Jí dá Lǐ zhā bù hé shuò qí and Gēn dūn (dGe 'dun) killed the sDe srid on the way. Jaisang Hún jīn, a subordinate of Amdo Dá lài dài qīng (Dar rgyas), witnessed the killing of the sDe srid.<sup>783</sup>

This passage suggests that the former sDe srid was sent to Lhasa and murdered by two individuals, although the exact location of his assassination is unclear. Owing to the discrepancies between different sources, contemporary scholars such as Petech and Borjigidai Oyunbilig have adopted varied narratives of these occurrences.<sup>784</sup> However, for information regarding the involvement of the dGe lugs purists in this incident, the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* is the primary source to examine:

In his *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis narrates this event:

དེ་ནས་རྒྱལ་པོ་བྱང་ལ་ཕེབས་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ཟེར་ནས། སྐར་པོ་གཞི་ཁར་ཕེབས། ལུ་བ་མཚན་བྱས་གོང་དཀར་ལ་སོང་སྡེ་བ་བཟུང་  
ནས། རྒྱུ་རྩོད་ལྷང་ངོས་ལ་བསྐྱར་ནས་ཁོད་ཡངས་པ་ཅན་ནས་བྱང་ཁར་ཕེབས་སོང་། སྡེ་བ་རྒྱུ་རྩོད་ཡོང་བ་ཐོས་ནས་སླ་  
མ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཕེབས། རྗེ་འདི་ཡང་ཕེབས་ནས་སྐྱོར་མོ་ལྷང་བ་ཚོ་ལ་དྲིས་པས། འདི་ནས་ཡར་ཁྱེར་མ་ཐག་ཡིན་ཟེར། རྗེས་  
དེད་ནས་སྐྱར་པོ་བྱས་ཕེབས་པས་སྤང་རྩེ་བའི་གཞི་ཁར་རྒྱལ་པོ་ཚོ་རིང་བཀྲ་ཤིས་དང་། སྐར་པོ་གཞི་ཁར་ཡོང་བའི་རྩེ་བ་ཁྱེར་  
ཟེར།

རྗེ་འདིས་ཐུགས་ལ་དེ་རིང་སྡེ་བའི་རྗེས་སྡེ་བ་ན་སོག་པོ་ཚོ་འདི་ལག་ནས་ཕྱོག་གཏོང་དགོངས་ནས་ཕེབས་པས། སླ་མ་གཞན་  
ནམས་རྩོད་ཀྱི་ཟམ་པ་སྐྱར་ནས་ཕེབས། རྗེ་འདིས་ཟམ་ནས་སོང་ན་མི་སྡེ་བ། ཐད་འདི་ནས་རྩོད་ལྷང་རྒྱ་བཀལ་འགོ་གསུངས་  
པས། ཐུག་གཡོག་ཚོས་རྒྱ་ཆེ་བས་ཁྱེར་འགོ་ལྷུང་ཀྱང་མ་གསན་པར་རྒྱ་བཀལ་ནས་ཚོ་རིང་བཀྲ་ཤིས་རྩེ་བ་སྡེ་བ།

སྡེ་བ་གང་ན་ཡོད་དང་ཐུག་དགོས་གསུངས་པས་ད་སྡེ་བ་མེད་ཟེར། རྗེ་འདིས་དེ་འདྲ་མ་ཟེར། ད་དེ་རིང་ཅིས་ཀྱང་ཐུག་  
དགོས་ཞེས་བཀའ་བཏོན་མཛད་པས། སྡེ་བ་ཁོ་རང་གི་ཁོ་རང་བསད་ནས་མེད་ཟེར། རྗེ་འདིས་མི་བདེན་འགྲོ་ང་ལ་ཐུག་གི་

<sup>782</sup> Desideri 2010: 243 and bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 81b.  
<sup>783</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 90. According to Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor (1982: 20), there was only one individual who killed the former sDe srid was Bar cho kha dar rgyab ho'u sho chi, a Mongolian soldier whose identity is not known.  
<sup>784</sup> Petech 1972: 12 and Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 90.

གསུངས་པས་བསང་ཚར། བྱེད་བཞུགས་ནས་གསོལ་ཚོགས་བཞེས་ནས་ཕྱིར་ཕེབས་ཞུས་པས། རྗེ་རང་ཐུགས་རྒྱལ་བཞེས་ནས།  
བྱེད་ཚོལ་ས་མ་རབ་པ་མི་འདུག། སྤེལ་གསོད་ན་ཡང་ངེད་ཚོལ་གོ་བརྒྱུག་ན་ཅི་ཡིན་གསུངས་ནས་མ་དགེས་པ་མཛད།  
གསོལ་ཚོག་ཡང་མི་ཟ་གསུངས་ནས་ཕེབས་ཡོངས།

དེ་ཉིན་ཐུགས་དམ་ཡང་རྒྱན་ལྡན་འཆགས་མེད་མཛད་པ་པལ་ཆེར་ལུས་སོང་། ཐུགས་དབེ་མེད་འཇུགས་ནས་འདོན་མ་  
ཐུབ་གསུངས། དེ་ཡང་སྤེལ་བ་དཔོན་གཡོག་གིས་རྗེ་རང་ལ་བྱ་བྱེད་ལྷ་ཚོགས་བྱས་ཀྱང་དེ་ལ་ལྷོས་པ་མེད་པར་ཕན་འདོགས་  
བའི་ཕྱིར་ལུས་སློག་ལ་མི་ལྷ་བར་འབད་བ་བྱེད་པ་ནི་ས་མཐོན་དོའི་བྱང་སེམས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་ཐར་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།

The Khan arrived at the sKyar bo estate, claiming that he was en route to the Northern region. [However,] that very night, [he] made his way to Gong dkar, where [he] arrested the sDe srid and sent [him] to sTod lung on [his] way back. [Subsequently, the Khan] went to the Northern region. Upon hearing of the sDe srid’s transfer, all the lamas, including the Lord, rushed to [rescue him]. [After] inquiring with the locals in sKyor mo lung, [they were] informed that the sDe srid had just been taken from there. [As they] hastened to catch up, [they] received word that [the sDe srid] had been taken to sTod lung, where Queen bKra shis tshe ring and her two sons were residing.

The Lord pondered that if he could catch the sDe srid today, [he] would snatch the sDe srid away from the Mongols. [Therefore,] although the other lamas made their way to [cross the river] via the upper bridge, the Lord insisted that crossing the bridge would not enable them to capture [the Mongols] and that [they must] cross the river from [their] current location. Despite the warnings of the servants about [the dangers of] drowning, [the Lord] disregarded them and crossed the river. [They finally] arrived at the Queen’s [court].

The Lord inquired: “Where is the sDe srid? [I] have to meet him.” [The Queen replied:] “There is no sDe srid anymore.” The Lord rebuked: “Do not tell such things. [I] must meet [the sDe srid] today.” [The Queen retorted:] “The sDe srid is no longer here, as he killed himself.” The Lord objected: “This cannot be true. Let me see the sDe srid.” [The Queen replied:] “He is already dead. Please stay here for a meal and return.” [Therefore,] the Lord became enraged and declared: “There are no more immoral individuals than you. If you killed the sDe srid, why did you share the information with us?” [Subsequently,] the Lord refused the meal and returned.

[The Lord later] recalled: “[I] missed most of the regular meditation practices on that day and was unable to recite [the prayer] as my mind was highly disturbed.” Despite the risks to [his] life, the Lord sought to assist the sDe srid and his followers, despite [their prior] various misdeeds towards [him]. This [behaviour] is [representative of] the life of a Bodhisattva living in higher realms.<sup>785</sup>

Based on these passages, it appears that ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa made fervent efforts to safeguard the former sDe srid from the hands of the Mongols. Paradoxically, ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa played a significant role in tarnishing the reputation of the former sDe srid through the dissemination of fabricated rumours, thereby instigating inevitable animosity between the former sDe srid and the Khan (Chapter 5, Section 5.3). At first glance, these contrasting actions

<sup>785</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.:101b–102a.

seem contradictory. However, when considering the social and political context of the dGe lugs purists, several potential factors shed light on the motivations behind these divergent behaviours: Firstly, the dGe lugs purists intended to undermine the authority and standing of the former sDe srid and the Sixth Dalai Lama (Chapter 4, Section 4.4.3). However, it is very unlikely that they sought to commit acts of murdering the former sDe srid. Secondly, the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa was apprehensive about his own reputation if the Mongols executed the former sDe srid, given his support for the Khan in the conflict (Chapter 5, Section 5.4). Thirdly, according to these passages, many dGe lugs lamas joined the rescue mission to save the sDe srid after they heard the news of the sDe srid's arrest. If 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa did not join this mission, he would have faced considerable criticism from the Tibetan populace due to his close ties with the Mongols. Knowing this situation, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa complained to the Mongols: "There are no more immoral individuals than you. If you killed the sDe srid, why did you share the information with us?" This passage perhaps indicates that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa rebuked the Mongols for not killing the sDe srid in secrecy. Lastly, taking this precarious opportunity, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa demonstrated his enthusiasm to rescue the former sDe srid in the presence of his fellow lamas, primarily driven by the desire to uphold his reputation. His biographer interprets: "Despite the risks to [his] life, the Lord sought to assist the sDe srid and his followers, despite [their prior] various misdeeds towards [him]. This [behaviour] is [representative of] the life of a Bodhisattva living in higher realms." Rather than acknowledging an involvement in this power struggle between two leaders, the biographer portrays the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa as a Bodhisattva, utilising this fateful incident.

### 5.6.3. Seeking Support from Tibetans, Mongols, and the Qing

On the 17th of the seventh month of 1705, the former sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho met his demise through assassination, effectively bringing an end to the unique alliance between the former sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan in the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>786</sup> Despite eliminating the former sDe srid, the Khan recognised the necessity of securing public acknowledgement as the legitimate leader of the dGa' ldan pho brang (Chapter 5, Section 5.6.1). To accomplish this objective, the Khan employed a series of strategies; firstly, he sought to improve his relations with influential lamas, such as the Fifth Panchen Lama, and generously provided support by endowing new estates to monasteries, including Se ra, 'Bras spungs, and bKra shis lhun po.<sup>787</sup> Regarding the gifts presented to 'Bras spungs and Se ra monasteries, Chos skyid, the wife of

<sup>786</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 368. However, according to the *Biographies of dGa' ldan Khri pas*, written between 1801 and 1808, the sDe srid met his demise on the 19th of the seventh month of 1705 (Ser smad Grags pa mkhas grub n.d.: 36). The official document of the dGa' ldan pho brang, *Tham deb long pa'i dmigs bu*, compiled in the early 20th century, records the sDe srid's assassination on the 29th of Seventh month in 1705 (bKa' drung Nor nang pa 1981: 10a). Since these two documents were composed significantly later than the *Autobiography of the Fifth Panchen Lama*, the date provided by the Fifth Panchen Lama is considered more authoritative in this context. As per Petech's research, these dates correspond to approximately the 6th of September 1705 in the Gregorian calendar (Petech 1972:12). On the contrary, Rockhill, citing Francesco Orazio Della Penna, an Italian Capuchin missionary who visited Tibet in 1707 and 1716, mentions that the "Desi was killed in 1706" (Rockhill 1910: 33).

Regarding the calendar during the dGa' ldan pho brang, Schuh (2012, vol. ii: 239–477) states that there are two major official traditions. He mentions them as the first and second schools. The sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho preferred the first, and the Fifth Dalai Lama preferred the second school. Based on the first school's interpretation, the 17th, 19th, and 29th days of the seventh month in the Tibetan calendar of 1705 correspond to the 6th, 8th, and 18th of September in the Gregorian calendar of the same year (Schuh 2012, vol. ii: 410). Despite the two-month discrepancy between the Tibetan and Gregorian calendars, the date of this assassination event occurred in the year 1705, not 1706. Therefore, the date of the former sDe srid's assassination, as recorded by Francesco Orazio Della Penna, is highly improbable.

<sup>787</sup> PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes 2014, vol-i: 372–373.

Prince bsTan 'dzin dbang rgyal and Tshe ring bkra shis, the Queen of lHa bzang Khan, made their respective visits to the Fifth Panchen Lama and bKra shis lhun po monastery in the seventh and the eighth months, each bearing an array of lavish offerings.<sup>788</sup> Second, the Khan gradually marginalised the family members and political allies of the former sDe srid by either banishing them from central Tibet or removing them from positions of authority.<sup>789</sup> For instance, lHa bzang Khan executed the mKhan po of Se ra smad college, surreptitiously exiled the entire family of the former sDe srid, including his son Ngag dbang rin chen, the newly appointed sDe srid, and forcefully expelled the Sixth Dalai Lama from central Tibet.<sup>790</sup> Third, the Khan dispatched envoys to Peking to secure diplomatic support and recognition from these external entities.<sup>791</sup>

The response of the Qing Empire was much more positive. They congratulated the Khan for his triumph over the former sDe srid and officially acknowledged his leadership within the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>792</sup> Despite the absence of a long-standing relationship between lHa bzang Khan and the Kangxi Emperor, without hesitation, offered him a new official title:

On 6th January 1707, the Qing records give the following account:

先是，达赖喇嘛身故，第巴匿其事，构使喀尔喀、厄鲁特互相仇杀，扰害生灵。又立假达赖喇嘛，以惑众人。且曾毒拉藏，因其未死，后复逐之。是以拉藏蓄恨兴兵，执第巴而杀之，陈奏假达赖喇嘛情由。

爰命护军统领席柱、学士舒兰为使，往封拉藏为「翊法恭顺汗」，令拘假达赖喇嘛赴京。拉藏以为执送假达赖喇嘛则众喇嘛必至离散，不从。

First, when the Dalai Lama passed away, the sDe srid instigated the Khalkha and Oirat Mongols to kill each other and ruin their lives. Later, the sDe srid set up a fake Dalai Lama to deceive the people. Moreover, the sDe srid attempted to kill lHa bzang, the leader of the Khoshut, several times by poisoning, but the latter did not die. So, the sDe srid expelled lHa bzang from his own tribe. Therefore, lHa bzang mobilised the army for revenge and killed the sDe srid.

lHa bzang reported to the court that the sDe srid was killed because he supported the fake Dalai Lama. The Emperor appointed Xí zhù, the commander of the royal guard, and Shū lán, a special officer, as ambassadors, to go to confer the title of “yì fǎ gōng shùn hàn” to lHa bzang.<sup>793</sup> Then, lHa bzang was ordered to arrest the fake Dalai Lama and escort him to the capital. lHa bzang thought that once the fake Dalai Lama was

<sup>788</sup> *ibid*: 372–373.

<sup>789</sup> Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan 1976, vol-i: 489–490.

<sup>790</sup> *ibid*: 490. This information originates from the *Secret Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama* by Ngag dbang lhun grub dar rgyas, published in the year 2000.

<sup>791</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* (1982, vol-i:185) records Kangxi's reply to the Khan's envoys, who were sent after the latter murdered the former sDe srid to gain the emperor's support. Petech 1972: 14.

<sup>792</sup> *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào* (1982, vol-i: 185).

<sup>793</sup> This title is in Tibetan rendered as བསྟན་ཕྱོད་ཀྱང་ཐུན་ཉན་, and in Chinese, 翊法恭顺汗. It translates to “Religious and Devoted Khan.” Similar to other titles bestowed by the Qing court, this does not emphasise his secular power. lHa bzang Khan received this title in 1706 after dispatching his representatives to the Qing court in 1705 to inform the Kangxi Emperor of his victory over the former sDe srid.

sent to the capital, all the local lamas would be dispersed away, so he rejected this order.<sup>794</sup>

According to this passage, Kangxi mentioned many the reasons to justify the killing of the former sDe srid and the Khan claimed that he killed the former sDe srid for the latter's fabrication of a false Dalai Lama. The Qing court endorsed the Khan's reasons and supported his decision to execute the former sDe srid. The Qing court viewed the former sDe srid as an anti-Qing figure for several reasons, including his alliance with dGa' ldan Khan during the Dzungar-Qing war and the concealment of the Fifth Dalai Lama's demise for fifteen years.<sup>795</sup> Thus, it was only natural for the Qing to support lHa bzang Khan, who eliminated their own enemy. Thub bstan rnam rgyal writes, "The emperor was pleased by the news of the sDe srid's demise."<sup>796</sup> Owing to the Khan's gesture, the Qing might have regarded the Khan as a political ally to further their interests in Tibet.<sup>797</sup>

#### 5.6.4. Debates Regarding the Khan's Ties with the Qing

Regarding lHa bzang Khan's control over the dGa' ldan pho brang, Tucci asserted that the Khan seized Lhasa "with China's [the Qing's] full consent", which implies that the Qing had already been informed about this move when it took place—an assertion which, according to my knowledge, represents the first instance of such a claim within modern scholarship.<sup>798</sup> This historical account has subsequently been reiterated by numerous scholars, including Goldstein and Perdue, without critically examining whether lHa bzang sought the support of the Qing before initiating military action against the former sDe srid.<sup>799</sup> The recently published proceedings volume *Sacred Mandates* even states that "in 1705 the Manchu emperor encouraged Lhazang Khan—the grandson of Gushri Khan who had seized power among the Khoshot five years earlier and had claimed his grandfather's title of rgyalpo (king) of Tibet—to invade Lhasa and exercise authority there."<sup>800</sup> However, none of these assertions referred to primary Tibetan, Manchu, Mongolian or Chinese sources to substantiate their arguments.

Based on an examination of primary Manchu documents such as the *Qīng shílù zàngzú shǐliào*, it becomes apparent that the Qing Empire was unaware of the internal political conflicts that transpired in central Tibet from 1700 to 1705.<sup>801</sup> None of these official records mention any internal political strife occurring in central Tibet during this period. The earliest official documentation referencing the internal political conflict emerges in the *Qīng shílù zàngzú shǐliào*, noting the assassination of the former sDe srid in January 1707, more than a year after the incident.<sup>802</sup> Additionally, the same official record reveals that the first two Manchu representatives, Xí zhù and Shū lán, arrived in Lhasa in April 1706 upon the request of lHa bzang Khan.<sup>803</sup> This arrival occurred more than seven months after the Khan had assumed

---

<sup>794</sup> *Qīng shílù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i:185.

<sup>795</sup> *Qīng shílù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i: 173–174 and 162.

<sup>796</sup> rNam grwa Thub bstan rnam rgyal 2018: 103.

<sup>797</sup> For example, the Qing court sought assistance in curbing the expansion of the Dzungars in Tibet and the other Mongolian regions by means of the dGa' ldan pho brang (Petech 1972:14).

<sup>798</sup> Tucci 1999: 77.

<sup>799</sup> Goldstein 1997:12 and Perdue 2005: 228.

<sup>800</sup> Brook, Praag and Boltjes (eds) 2018:114.

<sup>801</sup> The *Qīng shílù zàngzú shǐliào* (1982, vol-i: 185) records this incident only on the 6th of January 1707, and prior to this date, Qing documents offer no information regarding the conflict between the Khan and the former sDe srid.

<sup>802</sup> *Qīng shílù zàngzú shǐliào* 1982, vol-i:185.

<sup>803</sup> *ibid*:185.

governance of the dGa' ldan pho brang in central Tibet in the ninth month of 1705. Furthermore, the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa* documents the arrival of the Qing's first emissary in early 1706:

ཀླུ་པོ་སྐྱེ་བའི་མཁའ་མཚན་མི་ཚེན་པོ་ཅིག་སྤྲེལ་ས་ལ་ཁད་ཡོད་པས། ལོ་མ་ཀླུ་པོ་འདིའི་གསེར་ཡིག་ལ་ཅི་ཟེར་ཡོད་ཚོད་  
མི་ལྷན་ ལྷན་ཏུ་གཞུང་བསྟན་པའི་ལ་ཀླུ་པོ་མ་རང་ལ་ཞུ་དགོས་པ་སོགས་ལྷན་གྲོལ་ཞུས་པས་ཞུ་བའོད་ལེགས་པས་  
མཛད།

The Khan [stated]: “A high-ranking Chinese messenger is about to arrive [in Lhasa], I do not know what the golden letter from the Emperor will tell.” [The Khan also] asked advice on various matters, particularly whether he should ask the Qing Emperor regarding the upholding of the government and Buddhism [in Tibet], and [’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa] gave good advice.<sup>804</sup>

This passage highlights that as of early 1706, the Khan was still uncertain about the Kangxi Emperor’s response to his forceful acquisition of control over the dGa’ ldan pho brang. This uncertainty further supports the notion that the Khan established contact with the Qing Empire after he assumed authority over the dGa’ ldan pho brang, rather than securing their support beforehand. Additionally, this excerpt also demonstrates, unlike the former sDe srid, the Khan’s willingness to accept the intervention of the Qing Empire in the political affairs of the dGa’ ldan pho brang.

After his victory over the former sDe srid, the Khan found himself facing a dilemma and consequently sought support and recognition from the Qing Empire. This allowed the Qing court to exert more influence on the politics of the dGa’ ldan pho brang.<sup>805</sup> This pivotal development in 1706 significantly transformed the relationship between the dGa’ ldan pho brang, the Mongols, and the Qing Empire for the subsequent two centuries.<sup>806</sup> Therefore, the breakdown of the collaboration between lHa bzang Khan and the former sDe srid in 1705 emerged as a landmark event in the political history of the dGa’ ldan pho brang.

## 5.7. Conclusion

Fully aware of the historical dilemma between dBus and gTsang as well as the institutions of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, the dGe lugs purists undermined the loyalty of gTsang towards the sDe srid by disseminating rumours regarding his use of black magic spells against the Panchen Lama. The dGe lugs purists were also implicated in spreading rumours regarding an attempt by the sDe srid to poison lHa bzang Khan, which further undermined the relationship between these two leaders rendering their coexistence in Lhasa unfeasible. Although the conflict between the former sDe srid and the Khan was briefly resolved through negotiations, both parties failed to implement the decisions in practice. As a result, a military clash occurred and the Khoshut Mongols achieved a military victory over the former sDe srid. As expected, the dGe lugs purists embraced the rule of the Khoshut Mongol leader. Despite the negotiated settlement, the Khoshut queen assassinated the former sDe srid, recognising that his existence would inevitably provoke a political uprising.

<sup>804</sup> bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis n.d.: 105b.

<sup>805</sup> After the Khan’s contact with the Qing court, the Qing’s influence and interference in the affairs of the dGa’ ldan pho brang visibly increased (Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào 1982, vol. I:190–205).

<sup>806</sup> Borjigidai Oyunbilig 2008: 90.

In 1704 and 1705, the former sDe srid and lHa bzang Khan and their respective factions had fought fiercely to establish their leadership legitimacy and secure the backing of Tibetan religious authorities in central Tibet. In this power struggle, the dGe lugs purists, staunch allies of the Khan, played a pivotal role in tarnishing the reputation of the former sDe srid. Their efforts proved instrumental in garnering support from influential religious leaders, such as the Fifth Panchen Lama, and securing the support of the monks residing in the gTsang region. In contrast to the prevailing mainstream narrative, the diplomatic and military confrontation between the two leaders and their respective allies took place in central Tibet without external interference from the Qing Empire or other Mongolian forces. According to Manchu sources, the Qing Empire became aware of the internal strife within the dGa' ldan pho brang only in 1706. The clash between the former sDe srid and the Khan profoundly reshaped the political landscape of the dGa' ldan pho brang, influencing its relations with the Qing court and the Mongols for centuries to come.

## Concluding Remarks

The research for this thesis originally commenced with the *Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, written by the First bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis in the 1720s. This compelling and provocative biography immediately offered a window into the internal political tensions among the leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang. Comparing this work with the *Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama* reveals that the significant events of the dGa' ldan pho brang in the late 17th and early 18th centuries were shaped by internal disagreements and rivalries. These conflicts were between the dGe lugs purists, led by the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, and the dGe lugs pluralists, represented by the sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho and the Sixth Dalai Lama. Khoshut lHa bzang Khan later became involved in the conflict between these two factions of the dGa' ldan pho brang. Subsequently, the nature of the conflict evolved into a political power struggle between the sDe srid and the Khan.

As my research progressed, I systematically read a range of sources composed by members and associates of different Tibetan factions, thus capturing the different voices and perspectives of those involved in the conflict. A comparative study of these sources provided an increasingly clear picture of the stance of the dGe lugs purists on one side, and the dGe lugs pluralists on the other. However, the power trajectory of the dGa' ldan pho brang was not merely a simple binary division between two factions. The Fifth Panchen Lama appears to have avoided direct confrontation with either side, as evidenced by his autobiography and his interactions with the factional leaders. Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje and Che mchog 'dus pa rtsal, gTer bdag gling pa 'gyur med rdo rje, as direct eyewitnesses, provided fresh insights without fully siding with either Tibetan faction. Their critical eye often spotted the more nuanced characteristics of both factions within the dGa' ldan pho brang, and in particular, Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje's candid description of the behaviour of persons of high status provides a striking contrast to the usually reverential tone of Tibetan religious biographies. However, as expected, both visible and subtle biases were still found in many of these biographical works, which were highlighted accordingly.

In addition to the biographical works, this thesis analysed official letters, proclamations, legal documents, and records of events during the early 18th century. To cross-check the historical events with multi-vocality and avoid a Tibeto-centric narrative of the relationship between the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Mongols, and the Qing Empire, this thesis has also studied the documents from the Qing court and the various records made by the Mongols. Most of the Qing documents meticulously dated the historical events and thus enabled us to cross-check the chronology of events. These non-Tibetan documents are valuable witnesses for perceptions of the dGa' dan pho brang from the Qing and the Mongol perspective and reveal to what degree the internal mechanisms of the dGa' ldan pho brang's governance were understood outside Tibet.

This thesis is organised into five chapters according to historical chronology. These chapters interlink, providing answers to the three central questions of the thesis: What were the social and political power factions and mechanisms of decision-making within the dGa' ldan pho brang in the late 17th and early 18th century? How did these Tibetan factions exercise their influence in the shifting power dynamics among the leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang? Did external political entities, such as the Mongols and the Qing court, exert any direct influence over the dGa' ldan pho brang in the early 18th century? To address these three core questions

and associated issues, the chapters traced the historical developments and analysed the role of the main players in this period, based on the sources outlined above.

At the theoretical level, this thesis has necessitated a re-evaluation of the applicability of Eurocentric models of nation-statehood and International Relations. All too often, the relationship between the dGa' ldan pho brang and the Qing Empire has been described in terms of sovereignty and suzerainty, terms that presuppose the existence of clearly defined nation-states that enter contractual relations. Contemporary scholarship has begun to question this approach and call for models that are more adequate for an understanding of the Asian context. In this thesis, this approach was further advanced through the incorporation of the Tibetan preceptor-patron (*mchod yon*) system. The analysis of the sources has shown how again and again, political relations are phrased in religious terms. The religious propaganda of the dGe lugs purists has not only had an impact in Tibet but is also reflected in documents from the Mongols and the Qing court. The protection of the "prestige of religion and government" (*chos srid la rgya*) between preceptor and patron plays a major role in the political discourse in Tibet, the Qing court, and among the Mongols. Thus, the emic interpretation of politics in terms of a preceptor-patron relationship plays an important role as a model of international diplomacy.

This thesis has also demonstrated the importance of another Tibetan Buddhist political framework, that of the dual system of religion and politics (*chos srid zung 'brel*). It gave the leaders of the main dGe lugs seats significant influence in the government, which ultimately allowed the purists to overthrow the government. By making the Dalai Lama the unique religio-political authority of the dGa' ldan pho brang, it made the government vulnerable in periods when no suitable candidate was available. The failure to replace the Fifth Dalai Lama with an equally charismatic and powerful successor ultimately led to the political takeover of the Khoshut Mongols. Thus, by highlighting the role of Tibetan Buddhism in politics, this thesis illustrates the effectiveness of employing emic models such as the preceptor-patron system and a dual governmental political framework to explore the nuances of Inner Asian political mechanisms.

Based on these theoretical reflections, this thesis has traced the historical events between the enthronement of the Sixth Dalai Lama in 1697 and the coming into power of lHa bzang Khan in 1705. It highlights the governmental structures of the dGa' ldan pho brang, such as the accumulation of power in the Dalai Lama, the alliances formed with the Khoshut Mongols, the influence of the dGe lugs Lamas in the political realm, and the centrality of the dGe lugs school within the dGa' ldan pho brang. These structural features played a vital role in the historical events of the dGa' ldan pho brang and in shaping the Inner Asian political landscape. Along with the governmental structures, this thesis also closely examines the relationships between various political leaders, such as sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho, lHa bzang Khan, the Kangxi Emperor, and the Sixth Dalai Lama, and the dramatic shifts in these relationships that would be of fundamental historical consequences.

One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the dGa' ldan pho brang was not a territorial government with fixed borders and a binary sphere of political influence. Instead, this government operated through religious interactions, mutual interests, leadership's charisma and personal relationships. The dGa' ldan pho brang, therefore, needed to be defined in terms of its influence, power, relationships, and authority. It was a flexible and fluid political entity with spiritual characteristics.

In the 17th century, before the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama was announced, the political dynamics of the dGa' ldan pho brang, and its affiliations with the Mongols and the Qing court largely revolved around the Dalai Lama. Utilising the name of the Dalai Lama, Tibetan leaders, including the sDe srid, wielded their influence over the Mongols and the Qing Empire. The Mongols adopted the role of Buddhist patrons (*yon bdag*) to enhance their political standing and respect among their groups. In the expansion of his empire, the Kangxi Emperor utilised Tibetan Buddhist lamas to placate the Mongols and cultivate his Buddhist persona. The scenario changed with the public announcement of the demise of the Fifth Dalai Lama and the enthronement of the Sixth Dalai Lama under the leadership of the sDe srid in 1697. These interlinked events elicited both critique and praise towards the sDe srid and the dGa' ldan pho brang. Seizing this moment, the dGe lugs purists began to express open criticism of the policies of the dGa' ldan pho brang and the newly appointed Sixth Dalai Lama, using religion as an argument to undermine the power of the sDe srid. Simultaneously, the sDe srid found himself embroiled in the conflict between the Dzungar and the Qing Empire, owing to his close ties with the Dzungar leader dGa' ldan Khan. The Qing court rebuked the sDe srid for siding with dGa' ldan Khan, while the Kangxi Emperor endeavoured to sway the Khoshut Mongols of the dGa' ldan pho brang to his favour using Tibetan Buddhist lamas. Amidst these challenging circumstances, the sDe srid managed the dGa' ldan pho brang, upholding the core values of a religiously inclusive Buddhist government established during the tenure of the Fifth Dalai Lama. Concurrently, he entrusted the future of the dGa' ldan pho brang to the Sixth Dalai Lama, endeavouring to raise him as appropriate for a Dalai Lama. However, the Sixth Dalai Lama's unconventional behaviour after his enthronement and unpredictable engagement in religion and politics were cause for concern.

The main part of this thesis (in chapters 4 and 5) provides a detailed analysis of the historical events from 1700 to 1705 and the power struggles between the two main ideological factions within the Tibetan government. During this period, the dGe lugs purists, who were in opposition to the ruling dGa' ldan pho brang, strategically turned their conflict with the government into a direct power contest between sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho and lHa bzang Khan. Internal events in the dGa' ldan pho brang, such as the disrobing of the Sixth Dalai Lama, his deteriorating relationship with the sDe srid, the enthronement of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa as mKhan po of 'Bras spungs sgo mang, and the appointment of lHa bzang as Khan, further influenced the power shifts within the government. These observations unequivocally show that the power dynamics within the dGa' ldan pho brang in the early 18th century were primarily controlled and directed by leading factions within the Tibetan government.

Approaching the conclusion of this thesis, it becomes evident that assessing the significance of the period from 1697 to 1705 in the history of the dGa' ldan pho brang is crucial. This period marked a critical political turning point in the 317-year history of the dGa' ldan pho brang. During this eight-year period, the political power structure and the leadership of the dGa' ldan pho brang underwent fundamental changes. In this period, the dGe lugs purists used lHa bzang Khan to strengthen their power, resulting in direct conflict between sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho and lHa bzang Khan to destabilise the historical political alliance. Before this change of power dynamics, the Khoshuts based in mTsho sngon and central Tibet had primarily served as a military force for the Tibetan government. For the first time, the Khoshut Khan was drawn into the internal power disputes of the dGa' ldan pho brang. To exacerbate the situation, lHa bzang Khan assassinated the sDe srid and installed himself as the ruler of the dGa' ldan pho brang. This development dismantled the traditional *mchod yon* and dual governmental structure

of the dGa' ldan pho brang and affected its relationships with the Qing and the Mongols in the following centuries.

These shifts in power and leadership within the dGa' ldan pho brang not only undermined the practical governance structure but also eroded the ideological perception of the dGa' ldan pho brang among Tibetans, Mongols, and the Manchus. The structure of the dGa' ldan pho brang under the Fifth Dalai Lama had been founded on the *mchod yon* framework of dual governance, encompassing both religious and political systems. The authority and legitimacy of this government and its leadership were firmly anchored in religious mythologies and prophecies. For instance, numerous Indian and Tibetan prophecies were cited to demonstrate that the Dalai Lama was the manifestation of Avalokiteśvara, who repeatedly manifested to bring Buddhism to the Tibetan people and implement a rule based on Buddhist principles. This gave rise to a strong ideological perception that the dGa' ldan pho brang and its leadership were the exclusive domain of the Dalai Lamas and their selected Tibetan leaders, with a strong emphasis on religious authority. It appears that under this belief, neither the Mongols nor the Manchus attempted to invade the dGa' ldan pho brang or replace its leadership while the Fifth Dalai Lama was in power, and the situation continued for a few years even after the enthronement of the Sixth Dalai Lama, despite his unorthodox behaviour. However, this ideological belief was profoundly altered when lHa bzang Khan assassinated the sDe srid and assumed control in 1705 with the endorsement of the dGe lugs purists. In this way, the Khan and the dGe lugs purists jointly dismantled both the tangible and ideological foundations of the dGa' ldan pho brang.

lHa bzang Khan became the ruler of the dGa' ldan pho brang through military power, but he lacked recognition and legitimacy among both Tibetans and Mongols. The legitimacy of Tibetan leadership had been underpinned by Buddhist prophecies and rituals; however, lHa bzang Khan lacked these to validate and legitimise his leadership. To address these shortcomings, the Khan, on the one hand, tried to win over Tibetan religious leaders, including the Fifth Panchen Lama, with generous gifts to legitimise his leadership of the dGa' ldan pho brang. On the other hand, he approached the Kangxi Emperor for backing and recognition of his authority over the dGa' ldan pho brang. Unlike prior leaders of the dGa' ldan pho brang, the Khan overtly welcomed the political involvement of the Qing court to secure his leadership in Tibet. This ultimately paved the way for other powers, such as the Dzungars, to meddle in the affairs of the dGa' ldan pho brang.<sup>807</sup> As a result, the dGa' ldan pho brang was never the same following this tumultuous eight-year period.

---

<sup>807</sup> The Dzungars entered central Tibet, assassinated lHa bzang Khan, and put in place a Tibetan puppet leader, sDe pa sTag rtse pa, to manage the administration of the dGa' ldan pho brang between 1717 and 1720 (mDo mKhar zhabs drung tshe ring dbang rgyal 1981:10–13, and 2002: 217–290, and Petech 1972: 51–65). However, these events are beyond the scope of this thesis.

## Bibliography

### Sources in Tibetan

#### Primary Sources

- bKa' drung Nor nang pa (c.1830s–1899). 1981. *gZhung zhabs rnams la nye bar mkho ba bla dpon rim byon gyi lo rgyus tham deb long pa'i dmigs bu*. Delhi: dGe ldan gsung rabs mi nyams rgyun 'dzin khang.
- dKon mchog rgyal mtshan. 1990. *rGya bod hor sog gi lo rgyus*. (1st edition) Zi ling: mTsho sngon mi rigs dpe skrun khang.
- dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po (1728–1791). 1987. *mKhas shing grub pa'i dbang phyug kun mkhyen chen po 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje'i rnam par thar ba ngo mtshar skal bzang 'jug ngogs zhes bya ba bzhugs so* (Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa). Lan gru: Kan su'u mi rigs dpe skrun khang.
- dKon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas (1801–1866). 1982. *Yul mdo smad kyi ljongs su thub bstan rin po che ji ltar dar b'i tshul gsal bar brjod pa deb ther rgya mtsho zhes by aba bzhugs so*. Lan gru: Kan su'u mi rigs dpe skrun khang.
- bKra shis dbang 'dus (ed) 1989. rGyal ba sku phreng lnga pa ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho mchog gis Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho sDe srid du bsko bzhag bstal ba'i bka' rgya. In: bKra shis dbang 'dus (ed.). *Bod kyi lo rgyus dang gzchung yig phyogs bsodus dwa shel me long*. Pe cin: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang. 121–124.
- mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang (1385–1438). 2021. *rJe btsun bla ma tsong kha pa chen po'i ngo mtshar rmad du byung ba'i rnam par thar pa dad pa'i 'jug ngogs zhes bya ba bzhugs so* (Biography of Tsong kha pa). Sera dgon: Ser byes rig mdzod chen mo'i rtsom sgrig khang.
- 'Gyur med rdo rje (1646–1714). n.d., vol-i. *Rig pa 'dzin pa 'gyur med rdo rje'i 'khrul snang rdzun ris chu zal'i rol rtsed ces bya pa bzhugs*. Dehra dun: khochhen tulku.
- Ngag gi dbang po. 1982. *rJe btsun dam pa Blo bzang bstan pa'i rgyal mtshan gyi rnam thar skal bzang dad pa'i shing rta* (Biography of the First Khalkha rJe bstan dam pa). Delhi: Sharada Rani (bdr:WAS00KG09211).
- Ngag dbang mkhyen rab. 1992. *Mu-li Chos 'byung* (Religious History of Mu li). Khrin tu: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang.
- Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (1617–1682). 2009, vols. v–vii. *Za hor gyi ban de ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho'i 'di snang gi 'khrul pa'i rol rtsed rtogs brjod kyi tshul du bkod pa du ku la'i gos bzang las glegs bam dang po* (Autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama, vols. v–vii). Pe cin: Krung go'i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2009, vol-xii. *bSod nams rgya mtsho'i rnam thar dngos grub 'dren pa'i shing rta* (Biography of the Third Dalai Lama). Pe cin: Krung go'i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2009, vol-xxiii. *'Phrin yig dang chab shogs snyan ngag bcas kyi skor bzhugs so*. Pe cin: Krung go'i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang.
- lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan (1642–1714). n.d. (a) *rJe btsun bla ma ngag dbang blo bzang chos ldan dpal bzang po'i rnam par thar pa dad pa'i rol mtsho bzhugs so*. dGon lung byams la gling: Blockprint (bdr:W1KG1321).
- \_\_\_\_\_. n.d.: (b) *'Jam dbyangs gong ma chen po'i brtan bzhugs dge legs char 'bebs bzhugs so*. dGon lung byams pa gling: Blockprint (bdr:W1KG1321).
- Chos dpal rgya mtsho 1999 (a). *Chos dpal rgya mtsho rang nyis kyi lo rgyus bden gtam rnam b'i bdud rtsi zhes bya pa bzhugs so*. Dehra dun: Khochen Tulku.

- \_\_\_\_\_. 1999 (b). *rJe btsun bal ma dam pa gter chen chos kyi rgyal po'i nang gi rtogs pa brjod pa yon tan mtha' yas rnam par bkod pa'i rol mo zhes bya pa bzhugs*. Dehradun: Khochen Tulku.
- 'Jam dbyangs dpal ldan rgya mtsho. 1975. *Bstan pa 'dzin pai skyes bu thams cad kyi rnam par thar pa la gus shing rjes su 'jug pa'i rtogs brjod pha rol tu phyin pa dang gzungs dang ting nge 'dzin gyi sgo mang po rim par phye ba'i gtam*. vol-1. Thimphu.
- 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa. 2015. *'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i gsung 'bum*, vol-i and vx. sGo mang dpe mdzod khang.
- gNyan thar. 2018. Bod kyi lo rgyus su gsal ba'i mong gol dang sog po hor bcas kyi brda chad skor la cung zad dpyad pa. *Bod kyi srid byus nyams zhib dus deb*.vol-5, No-2: 175–186.
- Thu' u bkwan Blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma (1737–1802). 1989. *Khyab bdag rdo rje sems dpa'i ngo bo dpal ldan bla ma dam pa ye shes bstan pa'i sgron me dpal bzang po'i rnam par thar pa mdo tsam brjod pa dge ldan bstan pa'i mdzes rgyan zhes bya pa bzhugs*. Lan dru: Kan su'u mi rigs dpe skrun khang.
- mDo mkhar Tshe ring dbang rgyal (1697–1763). 1981. *Bka' blob rtsogs brjod*. Khrin du: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2002. *dPal mi'i dbang po'i rtogs pa brjod pa 'jig rten kun tu dga' ba'i gtam zhes bya ba bzhugs so*. Khrin du'u: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang.
- rDo rje tshe brtan (eds) 1997. *Bod kyi yig tshags phyogs bsgrigs*. lHasa: Bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun khang.
- sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho (1653–1705). 1980. *dPal mnym med ri bo dge ldan pa'i chos 'byung Bai dur+ya ser po'i me long bzhugs*. New Delhi: Ngawang dGe legs demo.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1989. *Thams cad mkhyen pa drug pa blo bzang rin chen tshangs dbyangs rgya mtsho'i thun mong phyi'i rnam par thar pa du ku la'i 'phro mthud rab gsal gser gyi snye ma* (Biography of the Sixth Dalai Lama). lHa sa: Bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun khang.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1990. *mChod sdong 'dzam gling rgyan gcig rten gtsug lag khang dang bcas pa'i dkar chag thar gling rgya mtshor bgrod pa'i gru gzings byin rlabs kyi bang mdzod ces bya ba bzhugs*. lHasa: bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun khang.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2007. *Pad dkar 'dzin pa ngur smrig gar rol lnga pa sdom brtson rgyal po'i tshul 'chang ba drug par 'phos pa'i gtam rna ba'i bcud len yid kyi kun dga' bzhugs so* (The Transition from the Fifth to the Sixth Dalai Lama: An Account Extracting the Essence for the Ears). Varanasi: Sid rda dpe skrun khang.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2009, vol-vii. *Za hor gyi ban de ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho'i 'di snang gi 'khrul pa'i rol rtsed rtogs brjod kyi tshul du bkod pa du ku la'i gos bzang las glegs bam gnyis pa las glegs bam gsum pa* (Biography of the Fifth Dalai Lama). Krung go'i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2016. *Blang dor gsal bar ston pa'i drang thig dwangs shel me long nyer gcig pa bzhugs so*. rDo sbis Tshe ring rgyal and rDo sbis Tshe ring rdo rje (ed). *Bod kyi khrims srol skor gyi lo rgyus yig tshags phyogs sgrigs*. lHasa: Bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun khang: 364–457.
- Pad ma nram rgyal et al. (eds) 2012. *Chu glang wang shu tshur phul gyi deb gzhung*. 1st edition. Pe cin: Krung go'i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang.
- Pad ma 'phrin las. n.d. *Pad pa 'phrin las kyi rang nyid kyi rtogs pa brjod pa rab dkar shel gyi me long zhes bya pa bzhugs so*. Blockprint (bdr:MW8CZ238).
- PaN chen Blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1570–1662). 2009, vol-i. *Chos smra pa'i dge slong blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan gyi spyod tshul gsal par ston pa nor bu'i 'phreng b zhes bya pa bzhugs* (Autobiography of the Fourth Panchen Lama). Pe cin: krung go'i bod rig pa dpe sprun khang.
- PaN chen Blo bzang ye shes (1663–1737). 2014, vol-i. *ShAkya'i dge slong blo bzang ye shes kyi spyod tshul gsal bar byed pa 'od dkar can gyi phreng ba zhes bya ba bzhugs so*. (Autobiography of the Fifth Panchen Lama). Pe cin: Krung go'i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang.
- PaN chen bsod nams grags pa 2008: *bKa' gdams gsar rnying gi chos 'byung yid kyi mdzes rgyan*. 'bras spungs blo gsal gling dpe mdzod khang.



- Chu dbar bu (online) 2020: Bod kyi khri skor bcu gsum skor mdor bsdus tsam. dBus gTsang. <https://utsangculture.com/?p=7012>. Accessed 3 July 2024.
- Chos 'phel. (eds) 2002. *Gangs can bod kyi gnas bshad lam yig gsar ma*. Pe cin: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang.
- Jo sras bKra shis tshe ring 2021: Bod kyi chab srid yig lam nang “rang btsan” zhes pa'i tha snyad 'di rnying khungs shig red lags. *The Tibet Journal*, Autumn-Winer 2021, Vol-46, No-2: 27-148
- Dam chos dpa'l bzang. 2000. 'Gu log gi lo rgyus gnyan po gyu rtse'i bsang dud. (History of 'Gu log). Dharamsala: Bod kyi dpe mdzod khang.
- Dung dkar Blo bzang 'phrin las. 1981. *Bod kyi chos srid zung 'brel skor bshad pa*. Pe cin: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang.
- bDen 'tshol. 2015. sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho dang 'Jam bzhad ngag dbang brtson 'grus gnyis bar gyi 'gal ba'I 'byung rkyen skor gleng ba. In: *Wokar Net*. (online) <https://wokar.org/2015/03/25/ཐུགས་སྤྱོད་དང་སྒྲིམ་མཁམ་པ་>: Accessed 15 December 2023.
- Nor bu bsam 'phel. 2017, vol-ii. *sDe ba gzhung gi lo rgyus nyin byed snang ba*. Pe cin. Mi rigs dpe skrun khang.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2022. *sDe ba gzhung gi lo rgyus nyin byed snang ba'i skor. gTam bshad*. Bod ljongs slob chen. (online) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=35nFakpQIAA>: Accessed 9 September 2022.
- rNam rgyal dbang 'dus. 2003. *Bod rgyal khab kyi chab srid dang 'brel ba'i dmag don lo rgyus*. Deb phreng gnyis. Dharamsala: Bod dmag rnying pa'i skyid sdug gis par du bskrun.
- rNam grwa Thub bstan rnam rgyal. 2018. *dBus gtsang sde gzar gyi don gnad bskyar zhib (1720 1751)*. Dharamsala: Bod kyi dpe mdzod khang.
- dMu dge bsam gtan gya mtsho. 1980s. *Bod kyi lo rgyus kun dga'i me long*. 1<sup>st</sup> edition. 'Bar khams: Srid gros rnga ba bod rigs cha'ang rigs rang skyong khul u yon lhan khang.
- Mi nyag thub bstan chos dar. 2016. *Khams mi nyag lcags la rgyal po'i rgyal rabs gsal ba'i me long*. (History of lCags la kingdom). 1<sup>st</sup> edition. Khrin tu: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang.
- rMe ru phag mo tshe brtan. (online) 2020. Gung ru rgyal mtshan bzang po'i mdzad rnam dang khong gi dbu ma'i lta ba'i skor la dpyad pa. In: *Krung go'i bod rig pa*: online: [http://tb.tibet.cn/tb/literature/lw/202012/t20201223\\_6926299.html](http://tb.tibet.cn/tb/literature/lw/202012/t20201223_6926299.html). Accessed 12 August 2022.
- gTsang phrug stobs lags et al., 2020, vol-i: *dBus gtsang lo rgyus chen mo*. Dharamsala: dBus gtsang chol kha'i dbus spyi khyab rgyun las khang.
- rTse mgron Bar zhi ngag dbang bstan skyong. 2012. *Bod gzhung dga' ldan pho brang gi lo rgyus dus gsum gsal ba'i me long*. (bdr:MW1KG22297).
- Tshangs dbyangs rgya mtsho n.d.: *Tshang dbyangs rgya mtsho'i mgur glu*. dPal ya chen o rgyan bsam gtan gling monastery. Bookprint (bdr:MW2PD19833).
- bTsan lha Ngag dbang tshul khriims et al. (eds) 2024. *Shar rgyal mo tsha ba rong gi lo rgyus dang rig gnas dpe tshogs*. Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang.
- Zhwa sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan. 1976, vol-i. *Gangs ljongs bod chos srid gnyis ldan gyi rgyal khab chen po'i srid don gyi rgyal rabs gsal bar ston pa zla ba 'bum phrag 'char ba'i rdzing bu'am blo gsal byung ba dga' ba'i rol mtsho zhes bya ba'i glegs bab dang po bzhugs so*. Dharamsala: Shes rig dpar khang.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1985. *Srid don rgyal rabs kyi dpe khrid*. Bod kyi dpe mdzod khang gis sgra phab. (online) [https://soundcloud.com/lwta\\_archive/202-shagabpas-political?in=lwta\\_archive/sets/shagabpas-political-history-of](https://soundcloud.com/lwta_archive/202-shagabpas-political?in=lwta_archive/sets/shagabpas-political-history-of): Accessed 01 October 2022.
- Sher dbang. 2018. Hor dang Hos zhes pa'i gsang pa 'tshol pa. In: *Himalayan Bon*. (online) <https://www.himalayabon.com/review/comment/2018-08-14/1301.html>: Accessed on 3 January 2024.
- Yon tan rgya mtsho. 2001. *sKyid shod sde ba'i skor*. Dharamsala: Bod kyi dpe mdzod khang.
- Rig smon tshe ring bsam grub. 2023. Man ju'i yul du bod brgyud nang bstan gyi lta dgongs thog mar spel mkhan nang so slob dpon gyi rd oring la gsar du dpyad pa. In: *Bodrigpa*. (online) <https://bodrigpa.org/archives/category/མེ་ལྷོ་པོ་/page/2>: Accessed 12 September 2023.
- Rig 'dzin bstan srung. 2015. *Mi nyag gi lo rgyus deb ther ljang khu*. Lan gru: Kan su'u mi rigs dpe skrun khang.

- Reb gong 'Jigs med bsam grub. 2016. *sDe srid sangs rgyas rgya mtsho rgyal dbang lnga pa'i rigs sras yin min la dpyad pa nges don gtam gyi bden dbang zhes bya ba*. (online) <https://ti.tibet3.com>: Accessed 21 January 2019.
- Hor gtsang 'Jigs med. 2009. *mDo smad lo rgyus chen mo*. (Fourth Volume). Dharamsala: Bod kyi dpe mdzod khang.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2013. *Klu sgrub dgongs rgyan gyi dgag lan ci'i phyir bris pa dng lji ltar bris p'i sng gzhug* (Before and After of the Authoring of Refutal Work Challenging the Ornament of kLu sgrub's Mind. (online) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qVgvpXGCj7s>: Accessed 10 August 2023.

## Sources in Chinese

### Primary Sources

- Wáng guān róng et al., (eds) 1982, vol-i. *Qīng shǐlù zàngzú shǐliào*. (Tibetan Historical Records of the Qing Empire). Lāsa: Xīzàng rénmin chūbǎn shè.
- Bǎo yīn dé lǐ gēn et al., (eds) 2005, vols-xvi and xvii. *Qīng nèigé ménggǔ táng dàng*. (Qing Cabinet Mongolian Hall File). Nèiménggǔ: Nèiménggǔ rénmin chūbǎn shè.
- Dì yī lǐshǐ dǎng'àn guǎn biānyì (ed) 1996. *Kāngxī cháo mǎn wén zhūpī zòuzhé*. (Kangxi Court Memorial Record in Manchu). Běijīng: Zhōngguó shèhuì kēxué chūbǎn shè.
- Pānzhènpíng (ed) 2017. *Qīng dài xīzàng dìfāng dǎngàn wénxiàn xuǎnbiān*. Běijīng: Zhōngguó zàng xué chūbǎn shè.
- Sū fāxiáng et al., (eds) 2018. *Xīzàng zìzhìqū dǎng'àn guǎn guǎncáng méng mǎn wén dǎng'àn jīng xuǎn*. Chéngdū: Sìchuān mínzú chūbǎn shè.
- Qīng shèng zǔ shǐlù* (Records of the Holy Ancestors of the Qing). 2001. Běijīng: Zhōnghuá shūjú.

### Secondary Sources

- Mǎzhàn lín 1985. Guānyú dì bā·sāng jié jiā cuò. *China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House*: 88-93.
- Mèng, Sēn. 2006. *Mǎnzhōu kāi guóshǐ jiǎngyì*. Mèng sēn zhùzuò jí.
- Wáng Yáo. 1980. *Dì bā sāng jié jiā cuòzá*. Qīngshǐ yánjiū jí. *Zhōngguó rénmin dàxué*, No-i: 183–199.
- Wángyào Kē 2019: Liù shì dá lài lǎma de rèndìng yǔ xīzàng zhèngzhì dòuzhēng guānxì. *Hā'ěr bīn xuéyuàn xuébào*, vol-40, No-10: 131–133.
- Borjigidai Oyunbilig. 1988. Hé shuò tè de qiyuán yǔ míngchēng. *Qīnghǎi shèhuì kēxué*, vol-v: 103–107.
- Borjigidai Oyunbilig. 1989. Lùn hé shuò tè hàn tíng zài qīnghǎi de tǒngzhì tǐzhì. *Mínzú yánjiū*, vol-i: 70–77.
- Borjigidai Oyunbilig. 2008. 1705 Nián xīzàng shìbiàn de zhēnxiàng. *Zhōngguó zàng xué yuán*, vol-iii: 82–91.
- Gǎ mǎ dīng bā jiāng cuò. 2018. Jiǎn xī dì bā·sāng jié jiā cuò yǔ lǎ cáng hàn de quánlì juézhú. *Sìchuān mínzú xuéyuàn xuébào*, vol-xxvii, no-6: 30–34.
- Yáhán Zhāng. 1984. *Dá lài lǎma chuán*. Běijīng: Rénmin chūbǎn shè.
- Yìxī Wāngqiū and Lǐ Zhēng 1994: Sāng jié jiā cuò jí qí zhèngjì. *Zhèxué shèhuì kēxué bǎn*: 34–38.
- Liú hàncéng. 2020. *Yòng zhōngguó de guānfāng/ quánwēi wénxiàn míngzhèng: Xīzàng zìgǔ yǐlái jiù bùshì zhōngguó de yībùfèn*. Táiběi: Xué yù chūbǎn shè.

## Sources in Other Languages

## Primary Sources

- Desideri, Ippolito. 2010. *Mission to Tibet: The Extraordinary Eighteenth-Century Account of Father Ippolito Desideri*. S.J. Michael Sweet (trans), and Leonard Zwilling (ed). Somerville: Wisdom Publications.
- Du Halde, Jean-Baptiste. 1741. *The General History of China: Containing a Geographical, Historical, Chronological, Political and Physical Description of the Empire of China, Chinese-Tartary, Corea and Thibet*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. London: John Watts.
- Heissig, Walther (trans). 1944. *Ein mongolisches Textfragment über den Ölötenfürsten Galdan*. Sinologische Arbeiten. Deutschland Institut–Peking. vol-2: 92–176.

## Secondary Sources

- Ahmad, Zahiruddin. 1970. *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century*. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.
- Ary, Elijah Sacvan. 2007. (PhD Thesis) Logic, Lives, and Lineage: Jetsun Chökyi Gyaltzen's Ascension and the "Secret Biography of Khedrup Geleg Pelzang." ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
- Anand, Dibyesh. 2009. Strategic Hypocrisy: The British Imperial Scripting of Tibet's Geopolitical Identity. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol-68, no. 1: 227–252.
- Baumann, Brian. 2013. By the Power of Eternal Heaven: The Meaning of Tenggeri to the Government of the Pre-Buddhist Mongols." *Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident*, vol-35: 233–284.
- Bartlett, Beatrice. 1985. Books of Revelations: The Importance of the Manchu Language Archival Books for Research on Ch'ing History. *Late Imperial China*. vol-6, No-2:25-36.
- Bell, Charles. 1924. *Tibet Past and Present*. Oxfordshire: Oxford Press.
- Bell, Christopher. 2021. *The Dalai Lama and the Nechung Oracle*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bilik, Naran. 2015. Reconstructing China beyond Homogeneity. In: Kwak, Jun-Hyeok and Koichiro Matsuda. (eds) *Patriotism in East Asia, Political Theories in East Asian Context*. Abingdon: Routledge: 101–119.
- Boltjes, Miek and Michael van Walt van Praag. 2020. *Tibet Brief 2020*. Colorado: Outskirts Press.
- Brook, Timothy, Michael van Walt van Praag, and Miek Boltjes (eds). 2018. *Sacred Mandates: Asian International Relations Since Chinggis Khan*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2018. Tibetan–Manchu Relations. In: Brook, Timothy, Michael van Walt van Praag, and Miek Boltjes (eds), *Sacred Mandates: Asian International Relations Since Chinggis Khan*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: 113–116.
- Buell, Paul. 2009. Lifu Yuan. *Berkshire Encyclopaedia of China*. *Berkshire Encyclopedia*. (online)<https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780190622671.001.0001/acref-9780190622671-e-389?rsk=y6Qibj&result=1>: Accessed 16 October 2022.
- Bulag, Uradyn E. 2002. *The Mongols at China's Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Bulag, Uradyn Erden, and Hildegard Diemberger. 2007. *The Mongolia-Tibet Interface: Opening New Research Terrains in Inner Asia*. Brill.
- Buswell, Robert and Donald S. Lopez. 2014. Dga' ldan pho brang. *The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cabezón, José Ignacio (trans) 1992. *A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotated Translation of the sTong Thun Chen Mo of mKhas-Grub dGe-Legs-Dpal-Bzang*. State University of New York.
- Chayet, A. 2003. 17th and 18th century Tibet: a general survey. In: McKay, A. (eds). *Tibet and her Neighbours; A History*. Bangkok: Amarín Printing: 83-90.
- Cheney, Amanda. 2017. Tibet Lost in Translation: Sovereignty, Suzerainty and International Order Transformation, 1904–1906. *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol-26, no-107: 769–783.
- Chhosphel, Samten. 2023. The First Jamyang Zhepa, Jamyang Zhepai Dorje. *Treasury of Lives*. <http://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Jamyang-Zhepai-Dorje/6646>: Accessed November 22, 2023.
- Crossley, Pamela. 1997. *The Manchus*. Oxford: Blackwell Publication.

- \_\_\_\_\_. 1999. *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology*. Berkeley: California University Press.
- Crossley, Pamela Kyle, Evelyn Rawski. 1993. A Profile of The Manchu Language in Ch'ing History. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol-53, No-1: 63–102.
- Cueppers, Christoph. (ed) 2004. *The Relationship between Religion and State (chos srid zung 'brel) in Traditional Tibet*. Lumbini: LI.R.I. Press.
- Dalton, Paul. 2011. *The Taming of the Demons: Violence and Liberation in Tibetan Buddhism*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Das, Sarat Chandra. 1904. The Hierarchy of the Dalai Lama. *Journal of Asiatic Society*, vol-18: 80–93.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1905. Tibet, A dependency of Mongolia (1643–1716 A.D). *Journal of Asiatic Society*, vol-n.d.: 152–155.
- Dhondup, Kalsang. 2003. *The Water Horse and Other Years: A History of 17th and 18th century Tibet*. 2nd edition, Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives.
- Dreyfus, Georges. (online) 1998. The Shuk-Den Affair: Origins of Controversy. *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, vol-21, no-2: 227-70. <https://www.dalailama.com/messages/dolgyal-shugden/contempoary-scholars/ganden-tripa-the-shugden-affair-i>. Accessed 1 July 2024.
- Elverskog, Johan. 2006. *Our great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Elliott, Mark. 2001. *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2009. *Emperor Qianlong: Son of Heaven, Man of the World*. New Jersey: Pearson Press.
- Eno, Robert. 2017. Reflections on Literary and Devotional Aspects of Western Zhou Memorial Inscriptions. In: Shaughnessy, Edward. (ed) *Imprints of Kinship: Studies of Recently Discovered Bronze Inscriptions from Ancient China*. Hongkong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press: 261-286.
- Farquhar, David. 1978. Emperor as Bodhisattva in The Governance of The Ch'ing Empire. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic studies*, vol-38, no-1: 5–34.
- FitzHerbert, George. 2018. Rituals as War Propaganda in the Establishment of the Ganden Phodrang State. In: Travers, Alice and Venturi Federica. (eds) *Buddhism and the Military in Tibet during the Ganden Phodrang period (1642–1959)*. Special issue of the Cahiers d'Extrême Asie, EFEO, vol-27: 49–119.
- FitzHerbert, George and Travers, Alice. 2020. Introduction: The Ganden Phodrang's Military Institutions and Culture between the 17th and the 20th Centuries, at a Crossroads of Influences. In: FitzHerbert, George and Alice Travers. (eds) *Revue d'Etudes Tibétaines: Asian Influences on Tibetan Military History between the 17th and 20th Centuries*. *Revue d'Etudes Tibétaines*: 7–28.
- Goldstein, Melvyn. 1997. *The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama*. California: University of California Press.
- Hözl, Andreas. (online) 2023. The Etymology of 'Manchu': A Critical Evaluation of the Riverside Hypothesis. *International Journal of Eurasian Linguistics*, vol-4, No-2: 160–208, <https://doi.org/10.1163/25898833-00420028>. Accessed 02 June 2014.
- Hung, Hing Ming. 2017. *The Brilliant Reign of the Kangxi Emperor: China's Qing Dynasty*. New York: Algora Publishing.
- Illich, Marina. 2006. Selections from the life of a Tibetan Buddhist polymath: Chankya Rolpai Dorje (Lcang skya rol pa'i rdo rje), 1717–1786. *PhD diss*. Columbia University.
- Ishihama, Yumiko and Tachibana, Makoto et al. (eds) 2019. *The Resurgence of 'Buddhist Government': Tibetan–Mongolian Relations in the Modern World*. Tokyo: Union Press.
- Ishihama, Yumiko. 1992. A Study of the Seals and Titles Conferred by the Dalai Lamas. In: *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies*, vol-12, no-3: 501–514.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2004. The Notion of “Buddhist Government” (chos srid) Shared by Tibet, Mongolia and Manchu in the Early 17th Century. In: Cüppers, Christoph. (ed) *The Relationship Between Religion and State (chos srid zung 'brel) in traditional Tibet: proceedings of a seminar held in Lumbini, Nepal, March 2000*. Lumbini: Lumbini International Research Institute: 15–32.

- \_\_\_\_\_. 2019. Introduction. In: Ishihama, Yumiko and Makoto Tachibana et al. (eds) *The Resurgence of 'Buddhist Government': Tibetan–Mongolian Relations in the Modern World*. Tokyo: Union Press.
- Kaplonski, Christopher, and David Sneath. 2010. *The History of Mongolia*, vol-ii. Global Oriental.
- Kayaoglu, Turan. 2010. Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory. *International Studies Review*, vol-12, no-2: 193–217.
- Kay, David. 1997. The New Kadampa Tradition and the Continuity of Tibetan Buddhism in Transition. *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, vol.12, no-3: 277–293.
- Köhle, Natalie. 2008. Why Did the Kangxi Emperor Go to Wutai Shan?: Patronage, Pilgrimage, and the Place of Tibetan Buddhism at the Early Qing Court. *Late Imperial China*, vol-29, no-1: 73–119.
- Lachmann, Richard. 2020. Nation-State Formation: Power and Culture. In: *The New Handbook of Political Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 458–483.
- Lkhagvasürén, I and Konagaya, Yuki. 2014. Oirat People: Cultural Uniformity and Diversification. *Senri Ethnological Studies*. No-86. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
- MacCormack, Ian. 2018. Buddhism and State in Seventeenth-Century Tibet: Cosmology and Theology in the Works of Sangyé Gyatso. *PhD diss.* Harvard University.
- Maher, Derek. 2003. Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukpa (dGe lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba ('Jam dbyangs bzhad pa) in Its Historical Context. *PhD diss.* The University of Virginia.
- \_\_\_\_\_. (trans) vol-i. 2010. *One Hundred Thousand Moons: An Advanced Political History of Tibet*. Brill.
- Mills, Martin. 2003. *Identity, Ritual and State in Tibetan Buddhism: The Foundations of Authority in Gelukpa Monasticism*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Millward, James, Ruth Dunnell et al. (eds) 2004. *New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Miyawaki, Junko. (online) 1981. The Oyirad of the 17th Century: 'The Dzungar Khanate' Revisited. *Shigaku Zasshi*, vol-90, No-10: 1520-1543. [https://doi.org/10.24471/shigaku.90.10\\_1520](https://doi.org/10.24471/shigaku.90.10_1520). Accessed 01 June 2024.
- Munkh-Erdene, Lhamsuren. 2022. *The Taiji Government and the Rise of the Warrior State: The Formation of the Qing Imperial Constitution*. Brill.
- Norbu, Dawa. 2001. *China's Tibet Policy*. London: Curzon Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1990. The Europeanization of Sino-Tibetan Relations, 1775-1907: The Genesis of Chinese "Suzerainty" and Tibetan "Autonomy". *The Tibet Journal*. Winter 1990, vol-15, no-4, Shakabpa Memorial Issue: Part I: 28-74. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives.
- Oidtmann, Max. 2018, *Forging the Golden Urn: The Qing Empire and The Politics of Reincarnation in Tibet*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Perdue, Peter. 2005. *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*. Boston: Harvard University Press.
- Petech, Luciano. 1959. The Dalai–Lamas and Regents of Tibet: A Chronological Study. *T'oung Pao*. Series–II, vol–47: 368–394.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1966. Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century. *T'oung Pao*. Series–II, vol–52, issue–4: 261 – 292.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1972. *China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century*. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2013. The Administration of Tibet During the First Half-Century of Chinese Protectorate Chapter 23. In: Tuttle, Gray and Kurtis Schaeffer. (eds) *The Tibetan History Reader*. New York: Columbia University Press: 389–410.
- Peter, Prince. 1979. Tibetan Oracles. *The Tibet Journal*, vol-4, no-2: 51–56.
- Phuntsho, Karma. 2014. *The History of Bhutan*. Delhi: Random House India.
- Rawski, Evelyn. 1996. Presidential address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The significance of the Qing period in Chinese history. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol-55, no-4: 829–850.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1998. *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2015. *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Richardson, Hugh. 1962. *Tibet and its history*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1980. The Fifth Dalai Lama's Decree Appointing Sangs-Rgyas Rgya-Mtsho as Regent. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*. University of London, vol-43, no-2: 329–344.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1993. Aris, Michael. (eds) *Ceremonies of the Lhasa Year*. London: Serindia.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1998. *High Peaks, Pure Earth: Collected Writings on Tibetan History and Culture*. London: Serindia.
- Rockhill, William. 1910. The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with Qing Emperors of China. 1644–1908. *T'oung Pao*. Series–II, vol–11, no-1: 1–104.
- Sagaster, Klaus. 1967. *Subud Erike: Ein Rosenkranz Aus Perlen: Die Biographie Des Ist Pekinger lČan Skya Khutukhtu Nag Dbañ Blo Bzañ č'os Ldan*. *Asiatische Forschungen; Bd. 20*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
- Samten, Karmay. 1998. The Fifth Dalai Lama and His Reunification of Tibet. In: *The Arrow and the Spindle: Studies in History, Myths, Rituals and Beliefs in Tibet*. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 504–518.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2002. The Rituals and their Origins in the Visionary Accounts of the Fifth Dalai Lama. In: *Proceedings of the Ninth Seminar of the IATS, 2000, Volume-2: Religion and Secular Culture in Tibet*. Leiden: Brill: 21–40.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2005. The Great Fifth. International Institute for Asian Studies. December Newsletter. *IIAS*: 12–13. (online) [https://www.iias.asia/sites/default/files/2020-11/IIAS\\_NL39\\_1213.pdf](https://www.iias.asia/sites/default/files/2020-11/IIAS_NL39_1213.pdf): Accessed 2 September 2022.
- \_\_\_\_\_. (trans). 2014. *The Illusive Play: The Autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama*. Chicago: Serindia.
- Schaeffer, Kurtis. 2005. The Fifth Dalai Lama Ngawang Lopsang Gyatso. In: Martin Brauen. (ed) *The Dalai Lamas, A Visual History*. Chicago: Serindia Publications: 64–91.
- Schaik, Sam van. 2011. *Tibet: A History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Schuh, Dieter (ed). 2012. Teil Tabellen. In: *Contributions to the History of Tibetan Mathematics, Tibetan Astronomy, Tibetan Time Calculation (Calendar) and Sino-Tibetan Divination*. International Institute of Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, Andiast: 239–477.
- Schwieger, Peter. 2015. *The Dalai Lama and the Emperor of China: A Political History of the Tibetan Institution of Reincarnation*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Seyfort Ruegg, David. 1991. mChod yon, yon mchod and mchod gnas/yon gnas: On the historiography and semantics of a Tibetan religio-social and religio-political concept. In: Steinkellner, Ernst. (ed) *Tibetan history and language (Studies dedicated to Uray Géza on his seventieth birthday)*. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien: 441–453.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1997. The Preceptor–Donor (yon mchod) relation in thirteenth–century Tibetan society and polity, its Inner Asian precursors and Indian models. In: Helmut, Krasser, Michael Torsten Much, and Ernst Steinkellner. (eds) *Tibetan studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies*, vol-2: 857–872. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2004. Introductory Remarks on the Spiritual and Temporal Orders. In: Cüppers, Christoph. (ed) *The Relationship between Religion and State (chos srid zung 'brel) in Traditional Tibet: Proceedings of a Seminar Held in Lumbini, Nepal, March 2000*. Lumbini: Lumbini International Research Institute: 9–14.
- Sidky, Homayun. 2011. The State Oracle of Tibet, Spirit Possession, and Shamanism. *Numen*. vol-58, no-1: 71–99.
- Sneath, David. 2018. *Mongolia Remade: Post-Socialist National Culture, Political Economy, and Cosmopolitics*. Amsterdam University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2007. *The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society, and Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sneath, David, and Christopher Kaplonski. 2010. The Twelve Tumen of the Aglag Khuree Khalkha Mongols. *The History of Mongolia*, vol-2: 508–520. Brill.
- Snellgrove, David and Richardson, Hugh. 2003. *A Cultural History of Tibet*. Bangkok: Orchid Press.

- Sørensen, Per Kjeld. 1988. Tibetan Love Lyrics: The Love Songs of the Sixth Dalai Lama. An Annotated Critical Edition of Tshangs-dbyangs-rgya-mtsho'i-mgul-glu. *Indo-Iranian Journal*, vol-31, no-4: 253–298.
- Spence, Jonathan. 1974. *Emperor of China: Self-portrait of K'ang-hsi*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Sperling, Elliot. 2004. The Tibet–China Conflict: History and Polemics. *Policy Studies, East–West Centre Washington*, 7, III.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2011. Tubote, Tibet, and the Power of Naming. *Rangzen Alliance*. (online) <https://elliotsperling.org/tubote-tibet-and-the-power-of-naming/>: Accessed 16 August 2022.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2014. Concerning the Lingering Question of Sde-srid Sangs-rgyas rgya-mtsho's Paternity. *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, vol-67, no-1: 202–221.
- Sullivan, Breton. 2021. *Building A Religious Empire: Tibetan Buddhism, Bureaucracy, and the Rise of the Gelukpa*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Tibet Justice Centre. 2022. Convention Between Great Britain and Russia (1907). (online) [https://www.tibetjustice.org/?page\\_id=58](https://www.tibetjustice.org/?page_id=58): Accessed 10 October 2023.
- Thokmay, Darig. 2021. Game Changers of the Tibetan Buddhist Political Order in Central Asia in the Early Eighteenth Century. *Revue d'Etudes Tibétaines*, No-61(October):300–322.
- Tsomu, Yudru. 2015. *The rise of Gönpö Namgyel in Kham: The blind warrior of Nyarong*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Tucci, Giuseppe. 1999. *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, vol-I. (1st edition in 1949) Thailand: SDI publications.
- Tuttle, Gray. 2006. A Tibetan Buddhist Mission to the East: The Fifth Dalai Lama's Journey to Beijing, 1652–1653. In: Cuevas, Bryan., and Kurtis Schaeffer (eds). 2006. *Power, Politics, and the Reinvention of Tradition: Tibet in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*: PIATS, Oxford, 2003. Leiden: Brill: 65–87.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2012. Building up the Dge lugs pa Base in A mdo: The Roles of Lhasa, Beijing and Local Agency. *Journal of Tibetology*, series-7: 126–140.
- Tsyrempilov, Nikolay. 2006. Dge lugs pa Divided: Some Aspects of the Political Role of Tibetan Buddhism in the Expansion of the Qing Dynasty. In: Cuevas, Bryan, and Kurtis Schaeffer (eds). 2006. *Power, Politics, and the Reinvention of Tradition: Tibet in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*: PIATS 2003: Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the Tenth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Oxford, 2003. Brill: 47–64.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2003. Some Notes on the Biography of the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa. *Archiv orientální*, vol-71, no-3: 441–450. (online) [https://kramerius.lib.cas.cz/search/i.jsp?pid=uuid:c5ff669c-3e3e-11e1-8f8f-005056a60003#periodical-periodicalvolume-periodicalitem-page\\_uuid:afb015b-49be-4a5e-9647-9b18676bc103](https://kramerius.lib.cas.cz/search/i.jsp?pid=uuid:c5ff669c-3e3e-11e1-8f8f-005056a60003#periodical-periodicalvolume-periodicalitem-page_uuid:afb015b-49be-4a5e-9647-9b18676bc103): Accessed 17 August 2022.
- Vaissière, Étienne de la. 2021. The Origin of the Name Mongol. *International Journal of Eurasian Linguistics*, vol-3, No-2: 266–271. (online) [https://www.academia.edu/67401484/The\\_Origin\\_of\\_the\\_Name\\_Mongol](https://www.academia.edu/67401484/The_Origin_of_the_Name_Mongol): Accessed 2 September 2022.
- Van der Kuijp, Leonard. 2005. The Dalai Lamas and the Origins of Reincarnate Lamas, In: Brauen, Martin (ed). *The Dalai Lamas, A Visual History*. Chicago: Serindia Publications: 15–31.
- Wang, Xinyang. 2021. The Tibet-Dzungar Ideological Alliance's Challenge to the Qing Empire and the Adaptation of Qing Ideology in the Mid-18th Century. *Thesis*. Uppsala universitet, Historiska institutionen.
- Williams, Paul. 2004. *Songs of Love, Poems of Sadness: The Erotic Verse of the Sixth Dalai Lama*. I.B. Tauris.
- Wimmer, Andreas, and Yuval Feinstein. 2010. The Rise of the Nation-State across the World, 1816 to 2001. *American Sociological Review*, vol-75, no-5: 764–790.
- Wu, Silas. 2014. *Passage to Power: K'ang-Hsi and His Heir Apparent, 1661-1722*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.



## Appendix One

### 清实录藏族史料 Tibetan Historical Records of the Qing Empire<sup>808</sup>

For this thesis, I have rendered the entirety of the *Qīng shílù zàngzú shìliào* (Tibetan historical Records of the Qing Empire) materials from the period 1696 to 1709 into English. However, in this Appendix, I have opted to include only certain significant records that are directly connected with the arguments presented in this thesis. I have used the XXXX edition and have not verified the accuracy of this record by comparing it with the original *Qīng shílù* (Beijing version), nor have I ascertained if these volumes encompass the entirety of the Tibetan materials within the *Qīng shílù*.

In this translation, aside from widely recognised names like the Dalai Lama, Panchen Lama, and dGa' ldan, all other names have been retained in their original Chinese form to ensure accuracy. The editors of these volumes explain that they have revised certain derogatory titles about ethnic minorities. For instance, the name of different tribes, such as “狃狃” has been altered to “古宗” and “猓猓” to “保保”.<sup>809</sup> Beyond these modifications, they claim that no further changes have been made to maintain the authenticity of the historical materials. Each imperial record translated here concludes with the volume (卷) and page number (页); the volume refers to the actual volume number of the *Qīng shílù* from which decrees are quoted, and the page number refers to the specific page number of that particular volume.

This Qing document employs an original dating system based on the reign of each emperor, and the editors of these volumes subsequently added the contemporary dating system (or Western Calendar). Consequently, each document features two dates: the first is the original Qing date, and the latter is the modern date. For example, in “In the thirty-fifth year of Kangxi [Bingzi Year] Second Month Wushen [24 March 1696],” “Second Month Wushen” represents the Qing imperial dating, while “24 March 1696” is the modern date.

康熙三十五年[丙子]二月戊申[一六九六·三·二四]

先是，遣御史鍾申保等往召班禪胡土克圖。至是，偕達賴喇嘛等使人至西寧。

先以達賴喇嘛、達賴汗疏奏，內稱：「以皇上寵召之意宣告班禪，但伊未曾出痘，不能趨赴。」其班禪胡土克圖亦疏言：「皇上寵召，理應趨赴，但國俗大忌痘疹，不能上副皇上之意。」又，第巴疏言：「噶爾丹聞召班禪之信，遣人阻班禪胡土克圖勿行，班禪遂不果行。」

章下所司，命達賴喇嘛等使人來京。

<sup>808</sup> *Qīng shílù zàngzú shìliào*. 1982, vol-i. This is the version used for this Appendix One.

<sup>809</sup> The original characters of names such as 狃 and 猓 carry connotations of being uncivilised and barbaric, referring to different people in the peripheries of China.

(卷一七一·页一七上-下)

In the thirty-fifth year of Kangxi [Bingzi Year] Second Month Wushen [24 March 1696]

Previously, the emperor dispatched Officer Zhōng shēn bǎo and others to invite the Panchen Lama Hothogthu.

At this point, the officer, along with the Dalai Lama's representative and other envoys, arrived in Xining. Initially, representatives of the Dalai Lama and Dá Lài Hàn<sup>810</sup> delivered a report stating, "The invitation for the Panchen Lama was extended in favour of the emperor. However, the Panchen Lama has not yet been exposed to smallpox and, therefore, cannot make the visit." Then, the report sent by the Panchen Lama Hothogthu also stated, "Since the emperor has invited me, I should attend. However, due to the strict prohibitions against smallpox in our national customs, I am unable to fulfil the emperor's wishes." Later, [the envoy] of the sDe srid also reported, "dGa' ldan sent people to prevent Panchen Lama Hothogthu from going, upon hearing the news that the emperor had invited the Panchen Lama. As a result, the Panchen Lama did not make the visit."

The relevant departments were informed of this news and ordered the envoys of the Dalai Lama and others to come to the capital (京).<sup>811</sup>

(Volume 171, Page: 17 top – 17 bottom)

康熙三十五年[丙子]八月甲申[一六九六·八·二七]

先是，上命员外二郎保赉敕往谕青海诸台吉。

至是，二郎保奏言：「臣至青海之察罕托罗海地方，以部发印文示达赖喇嘛所遣管理青海事善巴陵堪布，又告以击败噶尔丹之事。堪布言：[此事大，我不得独主其议。俟青海诸台吉同来会盟，定议再复。]七月初八日，扎什巴图尔等三十一台吉俱到盟所，以檄文授之。扎什巴图尔言：[噶尔丹杀我鄂齐尔图汗，取我属裔，与我亦有仇。但噶尔丹之女嫁博硕克图济农之子，乃告之于达赖喇嘛而结婚者。我等俱达赖喇嘛之徒，俟启闻达赖喇嘛，视其言何如，遵依而行，非可任我等之意复奏。]」上命议政大臣等会议。

寻议：「应令扎什巴图尔等将达赖喇嘛作何定夺之处备文复部。并将此等情由增入达赖喇嘛敕谕内。」从之。

(卷一七五·页一下-二上)

In the thirty-fifth year of Kangxi [Bingzi Year] Eighth Month Jiashen Day [27 August 1696]

Previously, the emperor ordered Er láng bǎo to carry the [imperial edict] and read it to the Mongol leaders in Qinghai (Qīnghǎi zhū tái jí).<sup>812</sup>

<sup>810</sup> Refer to Khoshut Khan Dalai Khan in central Tibet.

<sup>811</sup> In classical usage, this term refers to the capital cities of dynasties in China, though it is not a specific name. Sometimes, dynasties employed different terms for their capitals. For instance, during the Tang Dynasty, the letter "Jing" was used to denote the capital.

<sup>812</sup> Refers to all the Khoshut leaders (青海诸台吉) of the mTsho kha region in Amdo.

At this point, Er láng bǎo stated, “I arrived at Chá hǎn tuō luō hǎi<sup>813</sup> in Qinghai and delivered the edict with the official seal to Shàn bā líng mKhan po<sup>814</sup>, who was appointed by the Dalai Lama to manage affairs in Qinghai. I informed him about the defeat of dGa’ ldan. The mKhan po replied, ‘This matter is crucial; I cannot make the decision by myself. We must wait for the assembly of all Mongol leaders from Qinghai to discuss it.’ On the eighth day of the seventh month, thirty-one Mongol leaders, including Zhā shén bā tú ěr<sup>815</sup>, arrived at the meeting place, and I handed the letter to them. Zhā shén bā tú ěr said, ‘dGa’ ldan killed our È qí ěr tú Khan, forcibly took our people, and held a grudge against me. However, dGa’ ldan’s daughter married the son of Bó shuò kè tú jì nóng, a marriage arranged by the Dalai Lama. Since we are all faithful followers of the Dalai Lama, we must wait for the Dalai Lama’s consent before arresting Bó shuò kè tú jì nóng’s daughter-in-law. Otherwise, we cannot act as we wish.’” The emperor ordered the ministers to discuss this matter.

After the discussion, the ministers said, “Zhā shén bā tú ěr and others should be instructed to send their envoys to the Dalai Lama before making any decisions. This information should be conveyed promptly to the relevant office, requesting them to incorporate it into the edict for the Dalai Lama.” The emperor considered this suggestion.

(Volume 175, Page: 1 top – 2 bottom)

康熙三十五年[丙子]八月甲午[一六九六·九·六]

「尔果改过，仍思遵宗喀巴之道，奏明达赖喇嘛已故始末，尊奉班禅胡土克图，使主喇嘛之教，应朕之召，遣之使来，执济隆胡土克图以畀我，解青海博硕克图济农所娶噶尔丹之女，朕仍前待尔以优渥之礼。不然，数者或缺其一，朕必问尔诡诈欺达赖喇嘛、班禅胡土克图，助噶尔丹之罪，发云南、四川、陕西等处大兵，如破噶尔丹之例，或朕亲行讨尔。或遣诸王大臣讨尔。尔向对朕使言四厄鲁特为尔护法之主，尔其召四厄鲁特助尔，朕将观其如何助尔也。尔其速办此事，及正月星速来奏，否则后悔无及矣。为此特遣使臣往谕，并发伴敕礼币六端。」

卷一七五·页五上——七上)

In the thirty-fifth year of Kangxi [Bingzi Year] Eighth Month Jiawu Day [6 September 1696]

[The emperor said], “If you, sDe srid, have changed your mind and wish to follow the teachings of Tsong kha pa, then explain to me the circumstances of the Dalai Lama’s death, serve Panchen Lama Hothogthu with respect, and let him govern the lama’s religion.<sup>816</sup> Respond to my messengers and send rJe lung Hothogthu<sup>817</sup> and the daughter of dGa’ ldan, who

<sup>813</sup> Chá hǎn tuō luō hǎi is the eastern region of mTsho kha in Amdo, ruled by the right wing of Khoshut leaders after the land division made by the representative of the Fifth Dalai Lama.

<sup>814</sup> Refers to the dGon lung Byams pa gling monastery, the most significant political and religious centre of the dGe lugs school and the dGa’ ldan pho brang in Amdo during the 17th and 18th centuries. The mKhan pos of this monastery frequently assumed the role of ambassador or diplomat for the dGa’ ldan pho brang in Amdo.

<sup>815</sup> Zhā shén bā tú ěr the youngest son of Gushri Khan and his only son with a Tibetan mother, was appointed as the main leader of the Khoshut in mTsho Khan, with the support of the Fifth Dalai Lama.

<sup>816</sup> The Qing refer to Tibetan Buddhism as Lama religion (喇嘛之教) in their official documents, which was followed by many modern scholars.

<sup>817</sup> rJe lung Hothogthu was initially dispatched by the sDe srid, in the name of the Fifth Dalai Lama, to counsel dGa’ ldan Khan and prevent him from launching a war against the Khalkha Mongols and the Qing. However,

married Bó shuò kè tú jì nóng in Qinghai [to the Qing court]. Then, I will reward you with great gifts as before. However, if any of these demands are not met, I will hold you responsible for aiding dGa' ldan and deceiving both the Dalai Lama and Panchen Hothogthu. I will dispatch a large army from Yunnan, Sichuan, and Shaanxi, similar to what was done in the case of dGa' ldan; I may lead this myself or perhaps send ministers to defeat you. You have consistently informed my messengers that the four Oirats<sup>818</sup> are patrons and protectors of Buddhism. So, you may summon the four Oirats to assist you, and I will see how they can help. You must fulfil these [demands] promptly and report back to me in the first month of the year. Otherwise, you will come to regret it. Finally, this special envoy is sent to deliver the decree to you, accompanied by eight coins as a gift.”  
(Volume 175, Page: 5 top – 17top)

康熙三十五年[丙子]九月癸亥[一六九六·一〇·五]

理藩院议覆：「四川巡抚于养志疏言：[臣遵旨会同乌思藏喇嘛营官等查勘打箭炉地界，自明季至今，原系内土司所辖之地，宜入版图。但番人藉茶度生，居处年久，且达赖喇嘛曾经启奏，皇恩准行，应仍使贸易。]番人之事应行文达赖喇嘛，使晓谕营官遵行管理；关系土司之事，著土司管理，勿致生事。至打箭炉四交界之地，该抚细查报部，编入一统志可也。」从之。

(卷一七六·页七上一下)

In the thirty-fifth year of Kangxi [Bingzi Year] Ninth Month Guihai [5 October 1696]

The Lǐ fān yuàn<sup>819</sup> discussed and reported, “The governor of Sichuan, Yú yǎng zhì, compiled a report saying, ‘I followed the decree and investigated the place of Dǎ jiàn lú with officials of the lama (Dalai Lama) from Wū sī cáng (central Tibet)<sup>820</sup> and others on the ground. From the Ming Dynasty until now, this area was originally under the jurisdiction of Tǔsī<sup>821</sup> and was not included in the territory of our Empire. However, the local fān<sup>822</sup> people used tea to make a living and had resided here for a long time. The Dalai Lama once petitioned that trade could still occur here, and the emperor granted permission’.” [The emperor said], “Matters involving the fān people should be consulted with the Dalai Lama so that local officials can manage them following the rules. Issues related to Tǔsī should be allowed to be managed by Tǔsī themselves without creating disputes. It is sufficient for our relevant departments to record the map of the region bordering Dǎ jiàn lú (Dar rtse mdo).” Ordered to follow the decree.  
(Volume 176, Page: 7 top – bottom)

---

he subsequently became a principal supporter of dGa' ldan Khan and conducted rituals for dGa' ldan Khan's war.

<sup>818</sup> Refers to four groups of the Oirats (四厄鲁特) including Dzungar (also known as Choros or Olots), Torghut, Dörbet and Khoshut.

<sup>819</sup> Lǐ Fān Yuàn is the principal diplomatic office of the Qing Empire for dealing with and communicating with the dGa' ldan Pho Brang and the Mongols. Refer to the previous footnote on Lǐ Fān Yuàn.

<sup>820</sup> One of many names used in the Qing documents refer to Tibet wū sī cáng (乌思藏).

<sup>821</sup> According to the Qing documents, the title “Tǔsī” (土司) is an official position administering ethnic minorities in the northwest and southwest of the Qing Empire.

<sup>822</sup> In classical Chinese, this term fān (番) is used to refer to people on the peripheries of their empires. This term carries a strong connotation of being uncivilised and barbaric.

康熙三十六年[丁丑]二月壬寅[一六九七·三·一三]

奉差达赖喇嘛理藩院主事保住回至御营，以第巴疏呈奏。上以示议政大臣等曰：「第巴之疏，尔等意以为何如？」议政大臣等奏曰：「第巴差尼麻唐胡土克图面奏，今尚未到，应俟伊到日，再行议奏。」

上曰：「朕意与尔等之意不同。朕阅经史，塞外蒙古多与中国抗衡，自汉、唐、宋至明历代俱被其害，而克宣威蒙古并令归心如我朝者，未之有也。夫兵者，凶器，圣人不得已而用之。譬之人身疮疡方用针灸，若肌肤无恙而妄寻苦楚，可乎？治天下之道亦然，乱则声讨，治则抚绥，理之自然也。自古以来，好勤远略者，国家元气罔不亏损，是以朕意惟以不生事为贵。达赖喇嘛，蒙古等尊之如佛；第巴者，即代达赖喇嘛理事之人。噶尔丹叛逆皆第巴之故。因朕遣主事保住严颁谕旨，第巴悚惧，悉遵朕谕，奏辞甚恭，自陈乞怜，畏罪矢誓，此亦敬谨之至矣。至达赖喇嘛身故，朕已悉知，今第巴云，遣尼麻唐胡土克图前来，代彼密陈其情。想尼麻唐胡土克图到后，必奏明达赖喇嘛已经身故，愚朕为伊等掩饰。达赖喇嘛、与我朝交往，六十余年并未有隙，第巴既如此奏恳，事亦可行。即此可以宽宥其罪，允其所请。第巴必感恩，而众蒙古亦欢悦矣。」

诸臣奏曰：「圣算至神，非臣等所及。」

(卷一八〇·页二三下—二五上)

In the thirty-sixth year of Kangxi [Ding Chou] Second Month Renyin [13 March 1697]

The head of the *Lǐ fān yuàn*, *Bǎozhù*, dispatched by the Dalai Lama, returned [from central Tibet] and presented the report of the *sDe srid*. The emperor asked the ministers, “What do you think of the *sDe srid*’s report?” The ministers replied, “The *sDe srid* has stated he will send the emissary *Nyi ma thang Hothogthu*<sup>823</sup> in person, but the messenger has not yet arrived. We should await his arrival and then discuss the matter.”

The emperor said, “My view differs from yours. I have read the ancient classics and discovered that many external Mongols frequently confronted *zhōngguó*<sup>824</sup>. From the Han, Tang, Song or Ming dynasties, there has never been a dynasty that gained the support of Mongols and brought them under control. Thus, in the past, there was no option but to resort to harsh weapons as a final measure. For example, a person would only use acupuncture to treat a sore, but is it reasonable to seek pain if the skin is not diseased? The same applies to governing the world<sup>825</sup>. It is only logical to embark on a crusade during turmoil and restore stability. Since ancient times, there has been neither a ruler who relished war nor a country whose strength was not diminished by war. [So], in my view, only peace is the most valuable thing. The Mongols regard the Dalai Lama as if he is the Lord Buddha, and the *sDe srid* is the director of the Dalai Lama. *dGa’ ldan* ventured to rebel because the *sDe srid* backed him. Since

<sup>823</sup> One of the principal diplomats of the *dGa’ ldan pho brang* for conducting official affairs with the Qing court, especially during the time of the *sDe srid* and the Sixth Dalai Lama.

<sup>824</sup> Today, the term “*Zhōngguó*” (中国) is widely used to refer to the modern Chinese nation-state, but during the time of the Qing and other dynasties, this term meant “middle kingdom”, the classic Chinese name for their regime and location.

<sup>825</sup> In classical Chinese, the terms “under the heaven” (天下) and “all nations” (万邦), in most cases, were interconnected and frequently used interchangeably. This reflects the classic political and religious thought of rulership in China.

I dispatched a senior officer (Bǎozhù) to issue a strict order to the sDe srid, he was frightened and promised to obey my order. The sDe srid respectfully expressed his regret, sought my forgiveness, and made a vow, fearing condemnation. Regarding the Dalai Lama's death, I was fully aware of it. Now, the sDe srid mentioned he had dispatched Nyi ma thang Hothogthu to the capital to discuss this matter confidentially on his behalf. I believed that upon Nyi ma thang Hothogthu's arrival, he would inform me about the Dalai Lama's demise and request me to maintain confidentiality. The Dalai Lama and my empire have maintained contact for over 60 years without conflict. If I pardon the sDe srid and grant his request, he will undoubtedly be grateful, and the Mongol tribes will also be pleased."

The ministers said, "The Emperor's consideration is so profound that it is beyond the reach of us ordinary people."

(Volume 180, Page: 23 bottom – 25 top)

康熙三十六年[丁丑]三月庚辰[一六九七·四·二〇]

遣理藩院主事保住、署主事萨哈连赉敕往谕第巴，偕尼麻唐胡土克图同行。

敕曰：「朕临御天下，统理万邦，溥播仁恩，惩创乱逆。其诚心恭顺者，必加奖赖焉。尔布特达阿卜地前与噶尔丹同谋，凡事必徇厄鲁特而行。济隆胡土克图败乃公事，尔坚留不遣。其时朕谓达赖喇嘛若在，断不至此，故严加诘责。兹尔奏言：[圣上严旨下颁，心甚忧惧，今惟钦遵圣谕，随力报效，倘轸念达赖喇嘛，乞降温纶。]淳切奏请。

尔既知过引罪，朕岂不念达赖喇嘛通使修礼历有年所乎？且朕若不加眷恤，尔土伯特国岂得安其生耶！其济隆胡土克图乃达赖喇嘛所特遣以合喀尔喀、厄鲁特之好者也。彼竟不使喀尔喀、厄鲁特和好，反导厄鲁特入我境内，与我军交战，情罪甚为可恶，务必擒解。彼之身命，朕俱准尔所请，宽而有之。其班禅胡土克图应于何年、月、日来朝，尔从容定期具奏。至噶尔丹与朕抗，我师大克之，凶恶逆贼，情罪重大，其女断不许留于青海，尔必解来。若不解送，则罪归于尔矣。如噶尔丹果悔罪来归，其时另有处分。今尼麻唐胡土克图至，将尔奏请之言俱已密奏朕前，朕亦密有谕旨。朕之素怀，惟愿率土之人，咸跻雍和，共享安乐。断不容摘发隐私，倾人家国。嗣后尔宜益加恭顺，勿违朕旨，朕尽弃尔前罪，嘉惠如初。如此，则尔土人民大蒙利赖，尔之荣贵可获长享矣。为此特遣正使理藩院主事保住、副使署主事萨哈连以降敕例，赐币六端。」

保住等请训旨，上谕之曰：「尔等到后，待第巴勿如从前举动，宜加和婉。授敕毕，尔等仍前作礼进币。但谓第巴曰：[皇上统领大兵已临宁夏，因前事四款尔皆遵旨，皇上大悦，故不进兵。至尔尼麻唐胡土克图来，密陈达赖喇嘛出定之事，上皆知之矣，亦有密旨谕尼麻唐胡土克图矣。此事除皇上与尼麻唐胡土克图、卓尔磨隆堪布及御前侍卫拉锡四人外，余皆不知也。自此以后，皇上一应谕旨，尔惟敬奉而行，则皇上愈眷顾尔矣。况达赖喇嘛讲信修礼已历六十年，有不念及者乎？]

且谓：[尔务使谛穆胡土克图与我等同赴京，上将使之诵经。如服水土，则令驻锡；如不相宜，亦即遣还。较尼麻唐胡土克图更加优待。]再口宣旨云：[噶尔丹之子及其属下大臣以至部伍，皇上俱收而纳之矣。]至尔等前往，可于扎什巴图尔台吉处取谕地里之向导而去。既到西方，归来之时，可于第巴处取驿马乘归。上项事情，尔等备用部印带往。至喇嘛津巴扎木素等，尔等即携之而归。」

(卷一八一·页二七上一三〇上)

In the thirty-sixth year of Kangxi [Ding Chou] Third Month Gengchen [20 April 1697]

The emperor sent the head of the *Lǐ fān yuàn*, *Bǎozhù*, and the chief of the home department, *Sà hā lián*, to deliver a decree to the *sDe srid*, requesting *Nyi ma thang Hothogthu* to accompany them.

The decree reads, “I rule the world as the son of heaven<sup>826</sup> spreading my benevolence widely and punishing rebellion severely. I will surely reward those who obey me in good faith. Previously, *Bù tè dá ā bo de* had a relationship with *dGa’ ldan*, and now all actions are taken in compliance with the will of the *Oirats*. *rJe lung Hothogthu* was involved in the affairs of (*dGa’ ldan’s*) court. However, you (the *sDe srid*) are determined to keep him and not send him to the capital. Things would not have come to this if the Dalai Lama was still alive. So, I severely condemn you (the *sDe srid*). Now, you are saying, ‘I (the *sDe srid*) feel great concern because the emperor has issued a severe decree. I will act prudently in accordance with your order and repay your [kindness] with all my strength. If you remember the Dalai Lama with sorrow, please issue me a gentle decree.’ Your (the *sDe srid’s*) letter is sincere. Now you (the *sDe srid’s*) are aware of your faults.

So, how can I not consider the Dalai Lama’s contributions to the exchange of emissaries and the restoration of rituals and laws with our empire over many years? If I had not shown mercy, how could the country of Tibet<sup>827</sup> live in peace! *rJe lung Hothogthu* was dispatched by the Dalai Lama to facilitate peaceful negotiations between the *Khalkhas* and *Oirats*. However, instead, he led the *Oirats* to invade our territory and engage in conflict with our army. He has committed a grave offence and thus should be escorted to the capital. However, his punishment will be mitigated as you have requested. Regarding the precise timing of *Panchen Hothogthu’s* visit to the capital, you may arrange it and inform me later. Concerning the conflict between *dGa’ ldan* and us (the *Qing*), our army has already defeated him. He (*dGa’ ldan*) is a heinous traitor, and his offences are grave. So, his daughter must not remain in *Qinghai*; she must be dispatched to the capital. The offence will be on your head if she is not sent here. Should *dGa’ ldan* have repented for his crime and chosen to surrender, he would be punished separately. Presently, *Nyi ma thang Hothogthu* has arrived in the capital and has confidentially conveyed your message to me. I wish that all the people of my land would live in harmony and be able to share peace and happiness among themselves. I will not allow people who want to destabilise the country (家國). In the future, you should be more obedient and not disobey my orders. [If you do, then] I will not hold you responsible for your previous mistakes and will give you the same favour as in the past. In this way, the people of your land (尔土人民) will also receive this benefit, and you will be able to enjoy your glory for a long time. Therefore, I have sent you a special emissary, the head of *Lǐ fān yuàn*, *Bǎozhù*, and the head of the home department, *Sà hā lián*, to deliver the decree to you and to present you with six coins simultaneously.”

When *Bǎozhù* and the others asked for instruction, the emperor said, “When you (envoys) arrive in Tibet, do not treat the *sDe srid* as you did before, but be gentler and more polite. After issuing the imperial edict, you can give him the money. However, tell the *sDe srid* that emperor’s army has almost reached *Níngxià*<sup>828</sup>, but you (*sDe srid*) have fulfilled the first four

<sup>826</sup> This is a classic Chinese political thought in which it is claimed that the emperor has the divine right to rule the world, as he is the Son of Heaven (天子).

<sup>827</sup> Land of Tibet Country or Tibetan country (土伯特國). However, during this time, there is still no the modern nation-state notion of country as political entity.

<sup>828</sup> *Níngxià* is situated in the north-western part of present-day China. During the *Qing* Empire, this region emerged as a strategic site for managing relations with the *Mongols* and progressively evolved into a *Muslim* military hub.

things according to the emperor's order. Therefore, Kangxi is delighted, and he will not continue his [military] march. Your (sDe srid) emissary, Nyi ma thang Hothogthu, came to deliver the secret message to me and talked to me about the Dalai Lama's travels. I (emperor) also have a private message to convey to you through Nyi ma thang Hothogthu. Besides these four individuals, including myself (emperor), Nyi ma thang Hothogthu, Zhuó ěr mó long Khenpo, and the imperial guide Lā xī, the rest are not aware of this matter. From now onwards, you will follow the emperor's commands. Subsequently, I will show you greater favour. The Dalai Lama has contributed to trust, honour, and law for 60 years. How can I disregard his advice?

You (emissary) should also inform (the sDe srid), 'Dì mù Hothogthu<sup>829</sup> must come to the capital with us, as the emperor wishes to request his recitation of sutras. Should he find himself comfortable in the capital, he may remain there. If he experiences discomfort, he may return (to Tibet). I will treat him more favourably than Nyi ma thang Hothogthu.' Especially tell him (the sDe srid), 'dGa' ldan's son, his ministers, and soldiers joined our army, and the emperor is keeping them.' On the way, you (emissary) may ask Zhā shén bā tú ěr tái jí for a guide who is familiar with the region for the journey to central Tibet. On your return, you can get fast horses from the sDe srid. All the above-mentioned things will be brought to you in written form with an imperial seal. You are to return with Lama Jīn bā zhā mù and others who were previously sent (to central Tibet)."

(Volume 181·Page 27a – 30a)

康熙三十七年[戊寅]三月戊寅[一六九八·四·一三]

命内阁侍读学士伊道等赍敕往谕策妄阿喇布坦曰：「览尔疏言：[第巴掩匿达赖喇嘛圆寂之事，斥班禅而自尊，有玷道法。好事如此，恐祸正无已。]又尔所遣彭苏克喇木扎木巴、多尔济寨桑等口奏尔之言云：[第巴监禁班禅，不使人见。奉事红帽两喇嘛名德尔端、多尔济扎卜者，即现世达赖喇嘛化身，亦以是两喇嘛之言，谓之达赖喇嘛而已，并非班禅之言，是以可疑。第巴坏法门之教，罪不可容。]本朝与达赖喇嘛交往七十余年，第巴原系达赖喇嘛执事下人，因軫念达赖喇嘛，欲使扶持道法，是以优封为土伯特国王。乃以久故之达赖喇嘛诈称尚存以欺众，唆噶尔丹兴戎，所行不轨。今又奏称俟班禅胡土克图往覲之时奏明，而又不遣班禅，且致书求尔勿遣。观此，则其情已极昭著矣。尔所奏良是。尔抒实情，思为法门之教、班禅胡土克图之事而劾奏第巴，朕深许之。为此特差内阁侍读学士伊道、近御侍卫拉锡、二等侍卫克什图、内阁侍读常明、三等侍卫津巴为使。以伴敕例，赐御用彩缎十端。」

(卷一八七·页一六下—一八上)

In the thirty-seventh year of Kangxi [Wuyin] Third Month Wuyin [13 April 1698]

The emperor ordered the cabinet minister, Yī dào, and others to send an imperial decree to Tshe dbang rab brtan. The decree recorded, "I (Kangxi) have read your (Tshe dbang rab brtan) statement, which said, 'The sDe srid concealed the death of the Dalai Lama, offended the Panchen Lama, and elevated himself to utmost importance. He has destroyed the teachings of Buddhism. His fondness for causing trouble makes me fear it will never end.' The

<sup>829</sup> Dì Mù Hothogthu was one of the four influential lamas in Lhasa, each of whom had their own monastery in the city. In this context, Dì Mù Hothogthu refers to the Sixth Dì Mù Hothogthu.

messengers you (Tshe dbang rab brtan) sent to me, Péngsūkè lǎ mù zhā mù bā and Duō ěr jì zhài sāng, also told me, ‘The sDe srid has imprisoned the Panchen Lama and will not allow anyone to see him. The sDe srid also believes in the two red hat<sup>830</sup> lamas, named Dé’ěr duān and Duō ěr jì zhā bǔ, who claim to be the incarnations of the present Dalai Lama. These claims are their own words, not those of the Panchen Lama, making them suspicious. The sDe srid’s mistake of destroying the dharma teachings cannot be forgiven.’ Our empire has been associated with the Dalai Lama for more than 70 years, and the sDe srid was originally his subordinate in handling his affairs. However, upon the request of the Dalai Lama, I entitled him the king of Tibet<sup>831</sup>. The sDe srid, however, deceived people by acting as if the Dalai Lama was still alive and colluded with dGa’ ldan to start a war unethically. He sent a letter to me, asking me to wait for the Panchen Lama’s journey to the capital, but he did not allow the Panchen Lama to travel. This is an obvious statement; his intention is clear. It is good that you (Tshe dbang rab brtan) sent this letter. You have told me the truth. You wish to impeach the sDe srid to uphold Buddhism and the Panchen Hothogthu. I (emperor) am delighted with this decision. Regarding this matter, I have sent Yī dào and Lā xī, the internal ministers and Kè shí tú and Cháng míng, the second and third-class guards, and Jīn bā, a third-class retainer. As previously decreed, with this decree, ten imperial satin-clothes have been given to you.” (Vol. 187 - p. 16 – 18)

康熙三十七年[戊寅]十一月丙申[一六九八·一二·二七]

理藩院题：「张嘉胡土克图、纳木扎尔格隆等违旨叩见第巴，俱应拟绞。」得旨：「张嘉胡土克图著从宽免绞，革其胡土克图之号。纳木扎尔格隆亦从宽免绞，充发盛京。」（卷一九一·页一一下——二上）

In the thirty-seventh year of Kangxi [Wuyin] Eleventh Month Bingshen [27 December 1698]

The court of the Lǐ fān yuàn reported, “Zhāng jiā hú tǔ kè tú<sup>832</sup>, Nà mù zhā ěr gé long, and others disobeyed the imperial order and met the sDe srid secretly.<sup>833</sup> They should all be sentenced to death.” The emperor’s decree replied, “Zhāng jiā hú tǔ kè tú should be spared from the death penalty, but his official title of Hothogthu should be removed. Nà mù zhā ěr gé long should also not be hanged, but instead, he should be sent to Shèng Jīng<sup>834</sup>, the battlefield.” (Volume 191, Page: 11 bottom – 12 top)

康熙三十八年[巳卯]七月庚辰[一六九九·八·八]

<sup>830</sup> This is a specific way Chinese documents refer to the bKa’ brgyud school, one of the Tibetan Buddhist schools in Tibet. Perhaps because of this, modern scholars also sometimes refer to the bKa’ brgyud school as ‘Red Hat.’ However, in Tibetan, ‘Red Hat’ denotes a sub-branch group of the bKa’ brgyud school.

<sup>831</sup> This title the “King of Tibet” (土伯特国王) refers to the title given by Kangxi to the sDe srid upon the request in the name of the Fifth Dalai Lama.

<sup>832</sup> This refers to the Second lCang skya Ngag dbang chos ldan, one of the main resident lamas in the Qing court.

<sup>833</sup> This is because the sDe srid was on poor terms with the Qing court, and he failed to fulfil any of Kang’s four demands. Therefore, although the Qing representative opted to participate in the ceremony of the Sixth Dalai Lama’s enthronement, they were expressly forbidden from meeting with the sDe srid. However, Zhāng jiā hú tǔ kè tú and other lamas secretly met the sDe srid in Lhasa.

<sup>834</sup> Present day, this region is Shenyang in Liaoning Province, China.

四川提督岳升龙疏言：「打箭炉原系本朝版图，竟被乌思藏强行侵占。康熙三十五年，钦差兵部郎中金图等会同四川巡抚于养志查勘后，仍霸踞如初，吞占蛮地数千里，侵夺番民数万户。又在木鸦私造铳炮，屯聚粮草。臣因化林营兵单汛广，移参将驻防。不意彼处喋吧昌侧集烈等擅发蛮兵数千，占住河东擦道、若仪等堡，不放客商来往。臣一面禁阻茶烟米布，一面密遣臣标中营守备李成瑛，带领官兵五百名，前往化林营贴防。臣已备咨督抚会商。乃抚臣于养志私遣笔帖式额尔济图等往来调停，不使臣与闻，并擅止臣所遣防兵，益见私通外番情迹。」

得旨：「此所奏事情，亦著罗察等一并察审具奏。」

（卷一九四·页三下—四上）

In the thirty-eighth year of Kangxi [Si Mao] Seventh Month Gengchen [8 August 1699]

The General of Sichuan, Yuè Shēng Lóng, reported, “The city of Dǎ jiàn lú, which originally belonged to our empire, was forcibly occupied by wū sī cáng<sup>835</sup>. In the 35th year of Kangxi’s reign, Jīn tú, the minister of military affairs, the Governor, Yú yǎng zhì, and others investigated the region. They discovered that wū sī cáng (Tibet) continued to occupy thousands of miles of the area as greedily as before, controlling tens of thousands of local families. In the Mù yā region, they (Tibetans under the dGa’ ldan pho brang) have also been secretly building their own cannons and accumulating food and fodder. In the Huà lín camp, there are only a few soldiers but a large area to control. Thus, I dispatched a few soldiers there to the region. Unexpectedly, Dié ba chāng zhè Jí Liè and others occupied the Cā dào and Ruò yí regions to the north of the river with thousands of barbarians<sup>836</sup> soldiers without permission and prohibited trade. So, on the one hand, I banned the commercial exchange of tea, tobacco, rice, and cloth; on the other, I covertly dispatched Lǐ chéng yīng lì, a garrison from our army’s Biāo zhōng battalion, with 500 soldiers to defend our Huà lín camp. I discussed this matter with the leaders of the soldiers. However, the governor of Sichuan, Yuè shēng long, privately dispatched his subordinate secretary É er ì tú and others to negotiate between the two sides without my knowledge. Moreover, he also obstructed the soldiers I had sent to defend the camp. He has been privately communicating with foreigners (Tibetans).”

[The emperor] said, “The matters described in this report should be examined by Luō chá and others, who should then report back to me in detail.”

(Volume 194, Page: 3 bottom – 4 top)

康熙四十年[辛巳]二月乙丑（一七〇一·三·一六）

奉差 师理潘院侍郎满丕、四川提督唐希顺疏报：[康熙三十九年二月二十日，臣等分兵三路攻打箭炉，杀蛮兵五千余人，斩磨西营光碟吧昌侧集烈及大冈营官龙送等。]得旨：[嘉奖，下部议叙。]

（卷二〇三·页八上）

<sup>835</sup> In this context, this refers to the officials and soldiers of the dGa’ ldan pho brang in the region.

<sup>836</sup> This term (蛮兵) is one of many terms in Chinese classical literature referring to non-Han people. This term already carries negative connotations.

In the Fortieth Year of Kangxi [Xin Ji ] Second Month Yi Chou [16 March 1701]

As ordered by Kangxi, General Mǎn pī of Lǐ fān yuàn and Sichuan General Táng xīshùn reported to the Qing court, “On the 20th of February in the thirty-ninth year of Kangxi’s reign, we divided our army into three groups and attacked Dǎ jiàn lú, killing more than 5,000 of our enemies by surrounding them. The enemy leaders, such as Chāng cè jí liè<sup>837</sup> and Guān long<sup>838</sup>, the officer of the enemy battalion, were beheaded.” The emperor replied, “I praise this victory and will reward them with gifts. Explain the details of the report in the next letter.”  
(Volume 203, Page: 8 top)

康熙四十五年(丙戌)十月乙巳(一七〇六·一一·二五)

上谕大学士等：「前遣护军统领席柱等往擒假达赖喇嘛及第巴妻子时，诸皇子及诸大臣俱言一假达赖喇嘛擒之何为。朕意以众蒙古俱倾心皈向达赖喇嘛，此虽系假达赖喇嘛，而有达赖喇嘛之名，众蒙古皆服之。倘不以朝命遣人往擒，若为策妄阿喇布坦迎去，则西域、蒙古皆向策妄阿喇布坦矣，故特遣席柱等前去。

席柱等方到其地，策妄阿喇布坦果令人米迎。以此观之，若非遣人前往，则假达赖喇嘛必已归策妄阿喇布坦矣。至西域回子及蒙古今衰弱已极，欲取之亦甚易。但并其地，不足以耕种，得其人，不足以驱使，且现今伊等已俱恪守法度，是以不取。此等情事，汉大学士及九卿等想俱未深悉，尔等可将朕谕示之。」

(卷二二七·页九上一下)

In the forty-fifth year of Kangxi [Bingshu ] Tenth Month Yisi [25 November 1706]

The imperial court scholars read [the emperor’s order], “Initially, when I (Kangxi) sent Xí zhù, the commander of the guards, and others to arrest the fake Dalai Lama<sup>839</sup> and the sDe srid’s wife, all the princes and ministers opined that capturing a fake Dalai Lama was futile. From my perspective, all Mongolians are extremely faithful and devoted to the Dalai Lama. Even though he is an impostor, he still bears the name of the Dalai Lama, and all Mongolians will follow his commands. If we do not arrest him, Tshe dbang rab brtan will invite the Dalai Lama, and then all Mongolians would turn towards Tshe dbang rab brtan’s government.

Therefore, I sent Xí zhù and others under a special order to capture the Dalai Lama. As soon as Xí zhù and the others arrived in Lhasa, the envoys of Tshe dbang rab brtan also reached there to meet the Dalai Lama. Had we not dispatched our emissaries, Tshe dbang rab brtan would definitely have invited the fake Dalai Lama, and then we would have been forced to depend on them. Currently, the western regions, including Muslim areas and Mongolian territories, are very impoverished and weak, making it easy for us to invade them. However, the land is insufficient for cultivation, and we cannot easily utilise and control the population there. [Furthermore], the people in the Jīn yī region are very respectful of our laws. Thus, I could not attack them for the time being. These matters are not familiar to the Han Jiǔ qīng scholars and leaders. Therefore, inform and think about what I have said.”

(Volume 227, Page: 9 top – 9 bottom)

<sup>837</sup> His name is Tsang sras ’phrin las.

<sup>838</sup> His name is dGon lung, but the Tibetan materials did not mention this officer.

<sup>839</sup> This refers to the Sixth Dalai Lama, who was considered a false Dalai Lama by Lha Bzang Khan and his supporters and was forcibly escorted to the Qing court.

康熙四十五年[丙戌]十二月丁亥（一七〇七·一·六）

先是，达赖喇嘛身故，第巴匿其事，构使喀尔喀、厄鲁特互相仇杀，扰害生灵。又立假达赖喇嘛，以惑众人。且曾毒拉藏，因其未死，后复逐之。是以拉藏蓄恨兴兵，执第巴而杀之，陈奏假达赖喇嘛情由。爱命护军统领席柱、学士舒兰为使，往封拉藏为「翊法恭顺汗」，令拘假达赖喇嘛赴京。

拉藏以为执送假达赖喇嘛则众喇嘛必至离散，不从。席柱等奏闻，上谕诸大臣曰：「拉藏今虽不从，后必自执之来献。」至是；驻扎西宁喇嘛商南多尔济果报拉藏起解假达赖喇嘛赴京，一如圣算，众皆惊异。

（卷二二七·页二四上一二五上）

In the Forty-fifth year of Kangxi [Bingxu] Twelveth Month Dinghai [6 January 1707]

Previously, when the Dalai Lama passed away, the sDe srid concealed and instigated the Khalkha and Oirat Mongols to kill each other and ruin their lives. Later, the sDe srid set up a fake Dalai Lama to deceive the people. Moreover, the sDe srid attempted to kill lHa bzang, the leader of the Khoshut, several times by poisoning, but the latter did not die. So, the sDe srid expelled lHa bzang (from central Tibet). Therefore, lHa bzang mobilised the army for revenge and killed the sDe srid. Then lHa bzang reported the details to the court. The emperor appointed Xí zhù, the commander of the royal guard, and Shū lán, a special officer, as ambassadors to confer the title of ‘Yì Fǎ Gong Shùn Hàn’<sup>840</sup> to lHa bzang. He was then ordered to arrest the fake Dalai Lama and escort him to the capital.

[However,] lHa bzang thought that once the fake Dalai Lama was sent to the capital, all the local lamas would disperse, so he rejected this order. Xí zhù and others reported lHa bzang’s reply to the court, and the emperor said to the ministers, “lHa bzang does not obey my order currently, but he will catch the fake Dalai Lama by himself (later) and send him to the capital.” Not soon after, Shāng nán duō ěr jì, a lama stationed in Xining, reported to the court that lHa bzang personally escorted the fake Dalai Lama to the capital, just as the emperor expected. So, everyone was amazed.

(Volume 227, Page: 24 top – 25 top)

康熙四十五年(丙戌) 十二月庚戌(一七〇七·一·二九)

理潜院题：「驻扎西宁喇嘛商南多尔济报称：「拉藏送来假达赖喇嘛，行至西宁口外病故。」假达赖喇嘛行事悖乱，今既在途病故，应行文商南多尔济将其尸骸抛弃。」从之。

（卷二二七·页二八下）

In the forty-fifth year of Kangxi [Bingxu] Twelveth Month Gengxu [29 January 1707]

<sup>840</sup> This is the title (翊法恭顺汗) conferred by Kangxi on lHa bzang khan after the khan assassinated the sDe srid and took control of the dGa’ ldan pho brang.

The Lǐ fán yuàn recorded, “Shāng nán duō ěr jì, the official Lama stationed in Xining reported, ‘lHa bzang escorted the fake Dalai Lama to the capital but (he) died of illness outside Xining.’ The fake Dalai Lama was involved in rebellion, but now that he died of illness on the way, send a letter to Lama Shāng nán duō ěr jì and order him to dispose of the Dalai Lama’s body.’” The permission is approved.  
(Volume 227, Page: 28 bottom)



[In Chinese:] 清朝皇帝敕谕西天大善自在佛所领天下释教普通持金刚大海师之印

གོང་མ་ཉོང་དེའི་ལུང་གིས། ལུབ་ཀྱི་ལྷ་གནས་ཚོས་དགེ་བ་བདེ་བར་གནས་པའི་སངས་རྒྱལ་བཀའ་ལུང་གནས་འོག་གི་སྐྱེ་འགྲོ་ཐམས་ཅད་བསྟན་པ་གཅིག་དུ་ལྷུང་བ་འལྷུང་མེད་དོ་རྗེ་འཆང་བྱ་མཚོའི་ལྷ་མར་དབང་བསྐྱར་བའི་གཏམ།

The declaration of [me (the Fifth Dalai Lama)], who was entitled as “The Buddha dwelling in the great goodness and happiness of the Western Heaven whose injunctions have become the sole doctrine of all sentient beings under Heaven, the holder of the immutable *rdo rje* and the Ocean Lama,” by the order of the emperor Huángdi.<sup>847</sup>

རྒྱ་རྒྱལ་མངོན་པར་མཚན་པའི་ཚོར་འཛིན་གྱི་གཞིར་འཁོད་པའི་ཉི་འོག་གི་སྐྱེ་དགུ་སྐྱེ་དང་། བྱེ་བྲག་གདན་ས་ཆེན་པོ་སེར་འབྲས་དགེ་གསུམ། གམ་དུ་འཁོད་པའི་རྣམ་པར་རྒྱལ་བའི་ཕན་བདེ་ལེགས་བཤད་སྤྱིང་པ་སོགས་རིས་མེད་ཁྲིམས་ལྡན་འདུས་པའི་སྤྱེ། གསང་ལྷགས་འཆང་བ། གཡུང་དུང་བོན་སོགས་ལྷ་སྤེར་གཏོགས་སོ་ཅོག་དང་། སོག་པོ་ཚོ་ཆེན་བཞི་བཅུ། ཨོ་རོང་ཚོ་པ་བཞི། མཚོ་ཁྲི་ཤོར་རྒྱལ་མོའི་འགམ་དུ་གནས་པའི་རྒྱལ་པོ་རྒྱལ་རིགས། ལུ་ནང་། ཐའེ་ཇི། དཔོན་ཆེ་ཆུང་། ཐ་བྱ་ནང་། ཇའི་སང་། མི་བཟང་། སྤེ་དམངས་དང་བཅས་པ། རྫོང་གསུམ་བུ་བཞི། སྤང་དུག་ཅེས་བོད་དང་བོད་ཆེན་པོའི་རྒྱལ་ཁམས་སུ་འཁོད་པའི། དཔོན་ཆེན། དཔོན་སྐྱེ། རྫོང་སྤྲོད། རང་རྣམ། ལྷ་དུང་། གཉེར་ཁ་ལས་འཛིན་སོགས་མངོན་ན་མཚོག་དམན་བར་མ་མཐའ་དག་ལ་སྤྱིངས་པ།

This generally addresses all sentient beings beneath the sun who live on the surface of the wealth-bearing earth, clearly distinguished by the Jambū tree, and in particular, the three great seats of Se ra, 'Bras spungs, and dGe ldan, all non-sectarian monasteries with Vinaya rules, including the neighbouring rNam par rgyal ba'i phan bde legs bshad gling, the tantric colleges, and all who belong to the sacred community (*lha sde*) including the Bonpos. This further addresses the forty great tribes of the (Khalkha) Mongols,<sup>848</sup> the four tribes of the Oirats, the king and royal clans residing by the shores of Lake Khri shor rgyal mo,<sup>849</sup> the Junang, Tha'iji, high and low ranking officers, Tha bu nang, Jaisang and nobles, together with the communities of commoners (*sde dmangs*), the great chieftains, lay leaders, district governors, internal managers, horse secretaries and all those in managerial and other positions. In short, this decree is sent to everyone – high, low, and middle rank – in Tibet and greater Tibet, known as the three *skor*, the four *ru*, and the six *sgang*.<sup>850</sup>

ཚོ་རོང་གནས་གྱི་གཤེ་མོང་གིས་ཡངས་པའི་ས་ཀུན་ལ་དབང་བསྐྱར་བ་བསྟན་འཛིན་ཚོས་ཀྱི་རྒྱལ་པོའི་ལྷག་བསམ་དང་། སྤྱིང་སྤོབས་བཙོན་པའི་མཐུས། རྒྱལ་དབང་བཙོང་ཁ་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་བསྟན་པ་སྤྲོད་པ་སྤྲོད་པ་འདེགས་པར་མཛད་སྐབས་ལུ་རྟ་པོ་བྲང་ཆེན་པོ་བསམ་འགྲུབ་ཅེས་གཅོས་པའི་མངའ་འབངས་དང་། རྒྱལ་པོ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རིགས་རྒྱུད་དང་བཅས་པ་མཐའ་དག་གཏན་པ་མེད་པའི་མཚོད་སྐྱེན་དུ་སྐྱུར་འཇགས་མཛད་པའི་ཚོ། ཚོས་སྤྱིད་ཉེས་འཛིན་དེད་རང་ནས་མ་སྤྲུགས་པའི་འཛིག་རྟེན་སྤྱིད་སྐྱུང་གི་ཁྲུང་ལེན་སྤེ་པ་བསོད་ནམས་རབ་བརྟན་གྱིས་མཛད་པའི་རྗེས་སུ་གཏུང་གཅིག་པའི་མི་ངོ་རྗོགས་པར་བརྟེན། སྤེ་བ་འཕྲིན་ལས་རྒྱ་མཚོ་སོགས་ཁྲུང་ལེན་རིམ་པར་བཞོད་ཅིང་།

<sup>847</sup> The Sanskrit and Tibetan renditions differ from the Chinese version, as the Fifth Dalai Lama dismissed the Tibetan translation of the title done by a Mongolian (Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho 2009, vol-xxiii: 147–150). Furthermore, the initial seven letters, phonetically transcribed into Tibetan, are absent in the Chinese variant and do not form part of the actual title.  
<sup>848</sup> In numerous old Tibetan and Mongolian texts, the term “Mongol” frequently pertains solely to Khalkha Mongols rather than being a general designation for other Mongols (Sum pa Ye shes dpal 'byor 1997: 3). Among Tibetans, the collective term for all aMongols is “Sog po” or “Hor”.  
<sup>849</sup> This lake is also known as mTsho sngon po in Tibetan and Kokonor in Mongolian.  
<sup>850</sup> “The three *skor*, the four *ru*, and the six *sgang*” signify the three areas of upper Tibet (mNga' ris skor gsum), four regions of central Tibet, and six ranges of lower Tibet. (The myriachries are not mentioned here, so no reason to bring them into the picture.)

Through the virtues of selflessness, courage, and diligence, the king — bsTan ’dzin chos kyi rgyal po<sup>851</sup>— who is blessed by the eternal heaven (*tshe ring gnam gyi gshe mong*)<sup>852</sup> and reigns over the vast lands, has elevated the teachings of the victorious Tsong kha pa to greater heights. In the water-horse year (1642), the king bestowed upon me territories and subjects (*mnga’ bangs*), notably including the palace of bSam ’grub rtse, and submitted himself and his entire family lineage [under my command] as an eternal religious offering. At that time, I found myself incapable of overseeing both the religious and secular affairs of the government (*chos srid gnyis ’dzin*). Thus, sDe srid bSod nams rab brtan had executed the responsibilities of the secular leader. However, after [his tenure], no one from his lineage was available. Thus, [I] appointed sDe srid ’Phrin las rgya mtsho and others sequentially to undertake that responsibility.

གོང་སྤྲེད་པ་སངས་རྒྱལ་ལྷོ་མཚོ་འདི་པ་ས་སྤོང་འཕྲིན་ལས་རྒྱ་མཚོའི་རུས་ཚ་ཡིན་པར་མ་ཟད། གཏེར་གསར་རྒྱ་ཅན་སོགས་ལྷང་བསྟན་འགའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་བོད་ཀྱི་རྗེ་བོར་འོས་པ་ལྷང་གིས་བེན་པ་ནས། ཤིང་ཡོས་ལོ་ལྷུར་ལེན་དགོས་ཚུལ་རྒྱ་མཚོན་མཐའ་གསལ་ནན་ཆགས་བྱས་ཀྱང་ལྷན་ཅིག་ཆེས་པའི་ཁྲོལ་ཆ་བྱེད་དགོས་ཤིང་། གཞན་མའི་འོས་ཐོ་མང་བ་ཏུ་ཅང་གི་བརྟག་པར་མ་བབས་ཤིང་། ག་ཚང་གཏེར་པ་སློ་བཟང་སྤྱིན་པ་སངས་རྒྱལ་པའི་འོག་གི་བརྟག་པ་ངོ་དཀར་བ་ཡོད་གཤེས་རྒྱ་མཚོན་སྤོང་པར། ཤེས་འདོད་ནི་མེད། བཀའ་བྱུང་ཚོགས་ནི་མི་ལུས། འོན་ཀྱང་བརྟག་པ་བསྐྱར་ནས་བརྗོད་ཆ་དགོས་ཚུལ་བྱུང་བ། ལོ་གསུམ་གྱི་བར་འཚུབ་ཆ་མེད་ཅིང་བཟང་བས། ལྷར་གོགས་ཞིན་ལུ་མཐུན་བྱེད་ལོང་ཡོང་རྩིས་གྱི་ལོ་གངས་གྱིས་བདེ་འགྲུལ་དང་བཅས་ཁྲིར་བཀོད་པ། རང་འདོད་རྒྱུང་ཞིང་བསྟན་སྲིད་ལ་རྒྱའི་ལྷུར་བསམ་ཆེ་བ་དང་ལྷུང་པར་འདི་གའི་དག་བཀོད་ལས་རྒྱུང་ཟད་ཀྱང་མི་གཡོ་བ་སོགས་ཐམས་ཅད་མཐུན་པ་དགོ་འདུན་རྒྱ་མཚོའི་ཉེ་གནས་གསུང་རབ་པར་གནང་བའི་ཚོགས་གྱི་བརྗོད་དོན་དང་རྒྱུངས་པར་མི་མཐུན་ལྷུང་པར་བྱུང་བ།

This Grong smad pa, Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho, is not only sDe srid ’Phrin las rgya mtsho’s nephew, but was also foretold in several prophecies, like new sealed treasure [texts], to be fit to rule over Tibet. Hence, in the wood-hare year (1675), he was earnestly implored, with the reasons thoroughly explained. However, due to his insistent appeals, [I] found myself obliged to let him be excused [from taking on this role]. Many other candidates were deemed unsuitable for consideration. Thus, [I] approached and outlined the reasons to the monastic manager, Blo bzang sbyin pa, as he was identified as the preferred choice following Sangs rgyam pa<sup>853</sup>. He showed no inclination to understand the reasons, nor did he find himself capable of refusing [my] order. Nonetheless, he (Blo bzang sbyin pa) requested a reassessment for assurance. The outcome indicated no hindrances for three years. Thus, he was inaugurated as the new regent, with his term officially notified and a provision for continuation if obstacles diminished. He exhibits little selfishness and considerable dedication to the honour of the religion and the government (*bstan srid la rgya*).<sup>854</sup> He also had other virtues, including steadfast obedience to my instructions, similar to the way the all-knowing dGe ’dun rgya mtsho described his close student gSung rab, thereby enabling him to serve without interruption.

སྤྱི་བ་རང་ཡང་ལོ་གངས་ཐེངས་ནས་འཚུབ་འདུ་བྱུང་ཉེན་གྱིས་ནན་ལུས་ཆེ་ཞིང་། བརྟག་པ་ལན་གཉིས་གསུམ་བསྐྱར་པ་དང་ཚངས་པ་དུང་ཐོད་ཅན་ལ་ངེ་བ་ལུས་པ་སོགས་ཀྱང་མཚུངས་པ་ནས་གསར་བཀོད་གྱི་སློ་དོད་པར། གཞན་པར་འོས་དཀོན་ཞིང་སྤྲོད་གྱི་བརྟག་པ་ལྷང་བསྟན་སོགས་གང་ས་ནས་གོང་སྤྲེད་པ་སངས་རྒྱལ་པ་རང་ལ་ནན་ཏན་དུ་ལབས་པར་ཡལ་ཡོལ་སོགས་ཐབས་སྤྲོ་ཚོགས་ལས་དང་ལེན་ཞིག་མི་འདུག་ཅུང་། དུང་དཀར་དང་རྒྱ་སྤོང་གྱི་དབེ་བཞིན་དགོངས་པ་གཏན་ནས་མ་ཁྲོལ་ཕྱིན། ཕྱིས་སློར་སློ་སྤྲེད་འགྲུར་པའི་ཚོས་

<sup>851</sup> The title bestowed upon Gushri Khan by the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1638 in Lhasa, in recognition of his services to the protection of the dGe lugs school.  
<sup>852</sup> Richard (1980: 332) explains this phrase as “a non-Buddhist phrase describing the divine source of the authority of the Mongol Khans from the Yuan dynasty onwards.”  
<sup>853</sup> Shortform of Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho.  
<sup>854</sup> Too vague. You could instead add a cross-reference to chapter 2.1, where you discuss the term.

ལ་དུང་སེམས་ཆེ་བ་ཞིག་ཡོད་ཀྱང་ལྷོ་མིང་འདི་གས་སྐུ་མཐུང་གནང་ན་སློབ་མ་དགོས། དེ་མིན་སྤྱི་འདོན་ཞིག་གྲུབ་པའི་སློབ་མ་དོད་གོང་ལ་ལྷུས་ན། མི་དམངས་ཀྱང་རྣམ་རྟོག་གི་འཆར་སློབ་སྐྱོ་ཚོགས་བྱུང་དོགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་ལམ་དུ་ལུས་པ་ཡིན། ད་ཆ་བསྐྱེན་རྫོགས་ཤིག་བྱས་པའི་ལོ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་བར་བཀའ་མ་བཅག་པར་ལྷུས། དེ་ནས་ལྷུས་ཡང་བྱས་ཚོགས་པ་དགོས་ཚུལ་ཟེར་བ།

The sDe srid himself (Blo bzang sbyin pa) urgently sought permission [to step down], apprehensive of potential impediments at the end of his term. Moreover, two to three reassessments, consistent with the consultations with Tshangs pa of the White Conch-shell Headdress,<sup>855</sup> led to the circumstances requiring the appointment [of a new sDe srid]. No other suitable candidates were available, Sangs rgyam pa was [again] emphatically requested, based on assessments and prophecies. [He tried to] decline, citing various reasons and showing reluctance to assume the role. However, [I] did not grant him permission [this time], akin to [the tale of ] the white conch and the sea monster. [Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho] has become highly enthusiastic about religion to deal with the uncertainties of life. If this [current] sDe srid continued to serve, there was no need to speak of [making him the new sDe srid]. Otherwise, if [I] had discussed [Sangs rgyam’s] tenure period as a sDe srid before his appointment, [I] feared it would have prompted widespread doubts and speculation among the populace. Thus, the conversation was not pursued further. Now, [Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho] has requested not to command him [to take on the official responsibility] while he was observing his novice and monk’s vows (*bsnyen rdzogs*) for two years.<sup>856</sup> He said that afterwards, he was going to request [my] approval to take on the burden [of the new office].

དངོས་གཤིས་བ་དུ་བྱུང་ན་ལེགས་པའི་ཆར་འདུག་ཅུང་། ཐམས་ཅད་མཐུན་བ་དགེ་འདུན་རྒྱ་མཚོ་ཡན་བཀའ་གནང་མས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་ཐར་ལོ་ན་སྐུར་བཞེས་ལ་དཔེར་མ་མཚོ་ན། དགའ་ལྡན་པོ་བྱང་ལུགས་གཉིས་ཀྱི་མངའ་ཐང་རེ་འཕེལ་གྱི་འགོ་རྒྱལ་པའི་ཕྱག་མཚན་རྒྱ་སེང་གཉིས་ནས་བཟུང་། ད་ལྟ་པན་སྤེལ་བ་སློབ་བཟང་སྤྱིན་པ་ཅམ་མ་གཏོགས་ཚངས་སྤྱོད་ལ་གནས་པ་མ་བྱུང་ཞིང་། ལྷག་པར་དཔལ་ཕག་མོ་གྲུབ་པ་དང་སྤེལ་གཙང་པའི་སྤོབས་འབྱོར་ལས་བརྒྱལ་བ་ཤར་དར་ཅེ་མདོ་ཡན་གྱི་བདག་པོར་གྱུར་པའི་དམག་དང་སྤྱིམས་སོགས་དྲག་པོའི་རྩལ་སྤྱོད་ཀྱང་སྐྱོ་ཚོགས་དགོས་པར། ཚངས་སྤྱོད་གཅིག་བྱས་རབ་བྱུང་དུ་འགྲོ་བའང་དགའ་ཞིང་། བསམ་པའི་འགྱུར་བྱུང་དྲག་གཞན་ཀུན་ལ་གཏན་མི་ཆགས་པ་ཞིག་ཡོད་གཤིས་ད་ལྟའི་སློབ་མར་སྤོང་པའི་ངེས་པ་ཡང་མེད། ལྷག་དུ་དགེ་འདུན་དང་ངང་པ་ལྷུས་འཚོ་དགོས་པར་གནས་ཤོགས་སོགས་གང་ས་ནས་སྐུས་ཐིངས་དགའ་བར་མ་ཟད། སྤེལ་པོན་ཆེན་པོའི་རིགས་ལ་སློབ་བརྒྱུད་སོགས་བྱུང་འཁོར་དྲག་པ་རྣམས་འཁོར་བ་དོད་སྐྱུགས་ལྟ་བུའི་སློབ་བརྒྱུད་པ་རྟེན་འབྲེལ་ལ་ཡང་མི་ལེགས།

Generally, there are beneficial aspects in being a monk. However, [we] cannot take as our sole example the lamas before the all-knowing dGe ’dun rgya mtsho, who devoted himself to the [pure] lifestyle of the bKa’ gdams school. From the two managers, rGya and Seng<sup>857</sup>, at the onset of the dual government of the dGa’ ldan pho brang’s rise in power to the present, apart from Blo bzang sbyin pa, no other sDe srids have sustained their celibacy. Moreover, the wealth and power of the dGa’ ldan pho brang surpassed that of the Phag mo grub pa and the gTsang pa dynasties, extending its rule as far as Dar rtse mdo<sup>858</sup> in the east. Consequently, [the rulers certainly] needed to perform various administrative works, including violent and severe acts of justice and warfare, [for governing]. Therefore, it would be difficult to maintain the completely

<sup>855</sup> In the initial years of the dGa’ ldan pho brang, “Tshangs pa dung thod can” was the principal deity consulted by the government for predictions and prophecies. Originally known as bSe khrab, legend holds that a non-human spirit followed the Tibetan scholar Blo ldan shes rab to Tibet and subsequently became a protector deity in central Tibet.

<sup>856</sup> It appears that Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho plans to become a monk. Therefore, in the following sentences, the Dalai Lama describes the difficulty of being both a secular leader and a monk concurrently.

<sup>857</sup> Richard (1980: 333) indicates that ‘rGya’ refers to ‘rGya le chos mdzad’ and ‘Seng’ to ‘rGys seng ge Sangs rgyas.’ For further details, refer to the Autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama.

<sup>858</sup> Refers to the chapter fifth of this thesis.

celibate life of a monk. Moreover, given that the nature of the mind is ever-changing among all individuals, high and low alike, there's no assurance that [our] mental state will remain constant. Additionally, monks and geese must dwell in groups, making it challenging in terms of living arrangements and companionship (*gnas grogs*). Furthermore, for noble government officials such as ministers, belonging to the class of highranking leaders, chances are not good to keep their mind focused on things like emptying the pit of *samsāra*.

ལྷ་བའ་དུ་བདག་མོ་བསྟེན་པས་མཚོན་སྟེར་གཞུང་མཉམ་བཤེས་གཞན་སྟོར་མི་རྒྱུད་པ་ནི་ག་ལ་བྱེད། དེ་ཕྱིན་སྟེར་གཞིས་ཀྱི་འཛིན་སྟོང་གུང་སྟོས་མ་བོར་བ་བྱས་ན་ཕྱགས་ལུལ་གཞུང་གི་ཞབས་ཏོག་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་རྒྱ་ལེ་ཀུན་འདུན་རིན་པོ་ཆེའི་དཔེ་དང་བཅས་མོལ་བ་ལྟར་ཡིད་འཛིན་བྱེད་རྒྱ་ཡིན་ཅིང་། གོ་ས་འདི་བོད་ཀྱི་མེ་དཔོན་གཞན་དང་མ་འདྲ་བའི་རྒྱ་བོད་ཏོར་གསུམ་ཚང་མའི་སྡེ་ལེན་སྟབས་བྲེལ་བ་རྒྱུ་མི་འཆད་ལྟ་བུའི་ལག་སྟོང་ཆེ་བར་ལ་ལར་ཉམས་འཆར་རྩེད་མའི་གུང་སངས་ཀྱིས་གཞུང་ལས་ལ་ཐུད་ཤོར་དང་མི་དམངས་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་གུང་འཕྱ་སྟེང་སྡེ་ཚོགས་ཡོང་འདུག་པ་ད་ཆ་ཉམས་ལེན་གྱི་སྟེང་པོ་འདི་གའི་དག་བཀོད་ལ་དང་དོས་ལེན། ཚུལ་འཚོས་བག་ལྷན་གྱི་བར་བཀའ་བཅད་པའི་ཁོ་རང་གི་སྟོ་མཐུན་དང་། ཉ་སྟོང་བརྒྱན་གསུམ་ལ་ཡན་ལག་བརྒྱད་པའི་ཁྲིམས་ལེན་བའམ། དགོ་སྟོར་ཚོལ་སྟོད་གུང་སངས་ལྟ་བུ་གང་བྱེད་ཀྱང་ལྷ་རེར་ཉེན་གསུམ་རེས་ལས་ཀར་ལས་ཤོར་མི་ཡོང་བས་ཁྲོལ་ཆ་བྱས་ཤིང་། ལོ་གངས་དགོས་ཟེར་བ་དེ་བཞིན་བྱས་ཆེ་ཚང་མ་ལག་བསྟན་དང་གཞུང་རང་འགོས་སྟོ་ཆེ་བ་ལས་མི་འདུག་གཤིས། རྣམ་སྟོགས་བར་ཁུར་ལེན་བྱེད་རྒྱ་དང་བཅས་ཕྱག་མཛོད་བསྟོ་བཞག་བགྱིས་པ།

Certainly, [Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho] would not set a bad example by mixing private and public matters, including having a mistress in the official place (*bla brang*),<sup>859</sup> actions inconceivable to others. He (Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho) will bear in mind the advice, exemplified by the case of rGya le kun 'dus rin po che, that retaining the administration of one's private estate can ultimately be of service to the government. In this role, distinct from those of other Tibetan leaders, [he] will encounter numerous challenges, such as the relentless task of hosting Manchu, Tibetan, and Mongolian [dignitaries]. Therefore, sometimes distractions like entertainment and holidays can impede governmental work, leading to public criticism and disdain. Therefore, it is now vital for [Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho] to accept and abide by my instructions and align our thoughts openly, without concealing them under the guise of preference. A three-day holiday per month will not undermine [the government's] effective operation. Thus, [Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho] was granted permission to take [a three-day] holiday each month, whether [he] chose to observe the eight branches of religious fasting on three spiritual days (*nya stong brgyad*), dedicate the time to prayer recitation, or simply use it for relaxation. If I had set [a fixed] term of years as he requested, it would have troubled everyone and merely squandered government expenses. Thus, [he] consented to maintain his duties as long as possible. Then, I appointed him as the sDe srid (*phyag mdzod*)<sup>860</sup>.

འདི་ག་ནས་མི་ཚོས་ཀྱི་ཁུར་ལེན་མ་སྟོགས་པའི་དོ་ཚབ་ཡིན་གཤིས། འདི་པས་གང་བྱས་དེད་རང་ནས་བྱས་པ་དང་ཁྱད་མེད་པའི་འཐེན་ཁྲེར་གྱི་སྟེང་བརྗོད་མེད་པར་ཀུན་གྱིས་བཀོད་པ་གཡོ་མེད་དང་དེད་དང་སྡེ་བའི་བར་སེལ་འཇུག་སོགས་བྱས་ཆེ་གཞུང་དོན་ལར་རྒྱ་རྒྱལ་ཚབས་ཆེ་བས་བདེན་མེད་བརྒྱན་བསྟོགས་ཀྱི་གཡོ་འཕྱལ་བྱས་ཆོག་རྒྱ་མིན། རྣ་ཚོད་སོགས་ནས་མི་སྟོགས་པའི་ཁུར་ལེན་འཛིན་པ་ཤར་ཆོ། རྣམ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་བཞག་པའི་བྱར་བ་སྟེ་འགྲོ་བཞིན་བྱེད་ཕྱགས་སྟོ་དང་སྟུར་ཆོག་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པ་སོགས་གོང་གསལ་གྱི་ཆོག་དོན་རྣམས་ལ་སྟེ་མེར་དྲག་ཞུས་ཀྱང་ཚུལ་བཞིན་བསྟོབས་པར་རྗེས་འཛིན་དང་། ལོག་པར་འཁུར་བར་ཚར་གཅོད་པས་མཚོན་པའི་ལེགས་ཉེས་ཀྱི་

<sup>859</sup> Richard (1980: 334) suggests that ‘Bla brang’ signifies the structures encircling the Jo khang, but in this instance, it refers to the Potala Palace, where keeping a wife or mistress is prohibited. Consequently, the Biography of Che mchog 'dus pa rtsal documents that the sDe srid visited his wife in Grong smad every ten days (Sle lung bZhad pa'i rdo rje n.d.: 39a).

<sup>860</sup> In this context, this term is an alternative designation for ‘sDe srid’, the highest secular role in the dGa' ldan pho brang, which translates to ‘regent’ in English.

བསྐྱབས་འཛིན་འདོད་པ་ལམས་ཀྱི་དབང་ཕྱུག་དམག་ཚོར་རྒྱལ་མོ་དང་། ཚོས་སྐྱོང་བག་ཅོ་ལྷམ་དལ་སོགས་བསྐྱབས་སྲུང་ནམས་ཀྱིས་  
འཕྲིན་ལས་རྣམ་བཞི་སྐྱབས་པའི་བོགས་དན་གཡེལ་བ་མཛད་པར་མཛད་དུ་གསོལ།

Since [Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho] will serve as my proxy in the secular administration, which I cannot manage, everyone must follow his orders unhesitatingly and without any hint of dissent, as whatever he does shall be considered as if done by myself.<sup>861</sup> No one is allowed to be involved in deceitful works or engage in dishonest acts that create discord between myself and the sDe srid (Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho), as this is highly detrimental to the principles of the government. If a time arises when he must cease his governmental duties due to various reasons, including old age, he is permitted to retire at any moment, similar to previous regents, and the procedures should be conducted according to his wishes. [I] invoke dMag zor rgyal mo, the ruler of the desire realm, to shield all — whether monks or laypeople, of high or low standing — who properly adhere to the words and meanings of this edict and, at the same time, to destroy those who intend to oppose it, overseeing the overall judgment of good and evil. [I] also implore the Dharma protector, Bag Tshe lcam dral, and all other guardians of Buddhism to assist in achieving the four [worldly] empowering activities<sup>862</sup> without distraction.

འཕགས་པའི་ཡུལ་དུ་སྤྲོ་རྣམས་ ལྷོགས་འདྲིར་དོན་གྲུབ་ཏུ་གྲགས་ཤིང་འཇམ་དབྱེངས་གོང་མའི་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཏུ་གྱི་ཡི་ཞེས་པ་དབང་ཐང་  
དང་བསྐྱབས་པ་ས་མོ་ལྷག་གི་ལོ་རྟོར་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དབང་ལྷོ་ལྷོ་པའི་དཀར་ཆའི་རྒྱལ་བ་གཉིས་པའི་ཚོས་ལ་སྤེལ་བཞིའི་སྐོ་འཕར་རྣམ་པར་བྱེ་བ་པོ་བྲང་ཆེན་པོ་  
པོ་ཏུ་ལ་ནས་བྲིས་པ་ཇོལ་རྒྱ།

On the 8th of the fifth month of the earth female sheep year in the Hor calendar, which corresponds to the date Siddhartha in India, known in our land as Don grub, and as Gyi yi in the Mañjuśrī emperor’s kingdom, symbolising empowerment, [this decree] was written in the Potala, a palace that fully opens the gateways to four virtuous abundances.

Jayantū (may there be victory)!

<sup>861</sup> This sentence holds great importance for sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho, as it became the foundation of his power and legitimacy throughout the ensuing decades of his rule.  
<sup>862</sup> Four worldly empowering activities are pacifying, increasing, magnetising, and wrathful.