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Aggregating extended preferences

Abstract:

An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi (J Political Econ 61(5):434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people’s so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow’s celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this ...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted manuscript

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, HUM, Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Springer Netherlands Publisher's website
Journal:
Philosophical Studies: an international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition Journal website
Volume:
174
Issue:
5
Pages:
1163–1190
Publication date:
2016-09-02
Acceptance date:
2016-02-27
EISSN:
1573-0883
ISSN:
0031-8116
URN:
uuid:a2b97a12-4db5-4204-9cf8-0ac44f027e37
Source identifiers:
629672
Local pid:
pubs:629672
Paper number:
5
Keywords:

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