Arresting (Non)Citizenship:
The Policing Migration Nexus of Nationality, Race and Criminalization

Alpa Parmar
University of Oxford, UK

Abstract
In this article I examine 'Operation Nexus', a collaborative initiative between the police and immigration enforcement in the UK, and its impact on foreign national and minority ethnic suspects of offending. I explain how strategic policing aims to manage migration around notions such as 'high harm' offenders, target those who appear 'foreign' as well as visible ethnic minority suspects, the latter of which may hold citizenship in the UK. The consequences of Operation Nexus are therefore wider than its stated aim because it legitimizes racial profiling by the police and has negative consequences on notions of belonging for racialized foreign nationals and citizens albeit in different ways. By presenting empirical research with those who implement Operation Nexus as well as those who experience it, I elucidate how the policing of migration revives and extends colonial premises that connect nationality, race and criminalization within the expanding and merging realm of contemporary criminal justice and migration control. I draw on Lerman and Weaver's (2014) thesis that when contemporary criminal justice policies disproportionately affect racial and ethnic minorities, they create an unequal group of people that are exiled within their own society and disenfranchised from public institutions such as the police.

Keywords: race, nationality, colonial, policing migration, high harm, criminalization, citizenship

Introduction
Responsibility for managing migration has increasingly enlisted the police and other actors to work collaboratively in the UK. The enforcement of border control has shifted from ports of entry to the interior of the UK and extends responsibility to both state and non-state actors (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018; Aliverti, 2015). As part of this development, 'Operation Nexus' (Nexus) – a joint initiative between the police and immigration enforcement implemented across the UK – represents both a symbolic and actual change in how foreign nationals and ethnic minority citizens suspected of an offence are treated by the police.

In the following article, I begin by discussing the background to Nexus and the questions that have been raised in relation to the policy over recent years. Second, I describe the methodology adopted for the research. Moving on from this part, third, I discuss the thematic findings including (i) 'high harm' and the impact of Nexus in day-to-day policing and (ii) the relevance of police custody data briefings and the messages they convey and about foreignness and offending. Here I contextualize the links between nationality, racial difference, stereotypes of criminality and evasiveness as a continuation of British colonial

Corresponding author:
Alpa Parmar, University of Oxford, St Cross Building, Oxford OX1 3UL, UK.
Email: alpa.parmar@crim.ox.ac.uk

genealogies. The final section of the paper discusses foreign national and visible ethnic minorities' experience of collaboration between the police and immigration. I connect the thematic findings of the research with broader questions about how police responsibility for migration impacts on the perception and relationship with democracy and citizenship that both recent migrants and previous migrants who are now settled develop. I draw on Lerman and Weaver's (2014) framework in *Arresting Citizenship* which explains how contact with the criminal justice system can fundamentally recast the relationship between (non)citizens and the state. Criminal justice interaction, according to their thesis, organizes racial knowledge in new ways that socialize racial minorities about how to behave when in contact with criminal justice or state institutions. Contact with the police and/or immigration brings to mind a powerful script: that if you are a racial minority you are likely to be mistreated at the hands of the state.

My argument builds on Lerman and Weaver's (2014) claims by applying them to the British context and outlining what happens when criminal justice agents perform immigration duties. When the police are enlisted to carry out the dual function of delineating who belongs, alongside suspecting who might be an offender as part of their routine work, the collateral consequence is that all racialized groups are treated as automatically suspect; both citizens and those lacking citizenship are thought to be offenders and foreign. The identification of people as foreign, 'out of place' or 'not belonging' based on visual cues (e.g. skin colour, somatic features, dress, language, religious dress, language proficiency, accent and so on), therefore becomes woven into to the police responsibility to enforce immigration control. Together with the mandate that the police have to act on 'reasonable suspicion' of those they suspect to be in breach of the law (whether that be immigration or criminal law), this forges the mutually reinforcing relationship between non-belonging and suspicion. This process reorganizes racial knowledge amongst migrants (or foreign national suspects in policing terms) and minority ethnic citizens in the UK, perforating the relationship between citizenship and identity. It reshapes minority ethnic citizens' and new migrants' relationship with the democratic state, diminishing their sense of – and possibility for – full and equal citizenship. I discuss the experience of two groups who bear the egregious consequences of Nexus policing; migrants with insecure immigration status and at risk of removal/deportation from the UK and ethnic minority citizens in the UK who are suspected of being foreign and not 'truly' British. These two groups are distinct yet as shown in this research both are subject to the effects of Nexus and its consequences for citizenship and belonging. I draw on Lerman and Weaver's (2014) framework because whilst there is a wealth of UK scholarship about how policing impacts on notions of belonging and citizenship (Waddington, 1999; Loader, 2016; Bradford, 2017), less research has revealed in empirical detail how *racialized* citizens' relationship with and perceptions of the state are fundamentally altered by interactions with the police. Lerman and Weaver's focus on *politics as a lived experience* then, allows a frame through which to understand the negative consequences when racialized and vulnerable people feel denied a voice, treated as suspect, undervalued and unprotected. In this respect, their approach captures the scope of policing and criminal justice and in particular the ways in these interactions are able to reorganize racial knowledge amongst (non)citizens.

The theory of race adopted in the article supports the view that visual somatic and corporeal differences are racialized and promote uneven surveillance of migrants and minority ethnic groups in society. The findings are contextualized within theories that suggest that racism is more than the logic of prejudice and that race operates as a

contemporary project invested in maintaining the structure of a racial (colonial) state (Goldberg, 2002). The ways in which race operates is increasingly silent, implicit, diffuse and denied (Bonilla Silva, 2015; Goldberg, 1997; Goldberg, 2015) and therefore harder to locate in criminal justice practices despite having clearly racialized outcomes (Lerman and Weaver, 2014; Kapoor, 2013).

Policing Migration in Contemporary Britain: Operation Nexus

In the UK, the police are often the first point of contact with authority for irregular migrants trafficked into the country, and/or who have arrived without documents and were able to pass border controls without questioning. The police are often called to attend to people who look suspicious or 'illegal' and migrants can get caught up with the police as victims or suspects of a crime. The experience of police custody is brutally memorable and significant for all those held there (Woof and Skinns, 2017) and is often where suspected illegal migrants and foreign national offenders are initially placed. The acrimonious relationship between the police and minority communities in Britain has been widely stated (Bowling et al., 2008) and police involvement in enforcing migration control is neither new nor unusual (Gordon, 1985). However, the expanding criminalization of migration (Stumpf, 2006; Aas and Bosworth, 2013) and its racializing impacts (Bosworth et al., 2018) mean that the reach of bordering practices are wider and deeper. Having the police perform migration control duties including advanced checks on immigration status for foreign national suspects, liaising directly with immigration officers, requesting enhanced criminal records checks for those suspected of not having the right to remain in the UK mean that both migrants and minority ethnic citizens can be seen as one and the same, and inherently suspect based on their shared visual appearances. Significantly, the practices designed to control criminalized migrants have evolved into a 'bespoke crimmigration system' (Bowling and Westenra, 2018). The formalization of policing and migration control under Nexus is indicative of this sea change as it sanctions the use of nationality as a filtering mechanism to identify foreign nationals suspecting of offending and that may be eligible for removal from the country.

Nexus was introduced in 2012 and is a scheme to embed immigration officers in police custody suites across the UK. It was first piloted by the Metropolitan Police Service and Immigration Enforcement, and then officially launched by the Home Office and Senior Police in November 2012 followed by Greater Manchester and forces from the East Midlands in 2014. Nexus continues to be rolled out across other areas of the UK (Home Office, 2017). It aims to target individuals who are defined as 'high harm' convicted criminals. A high harm individual is defined as someone who is responsible for a large volume of crime or is wanted for serious crime and deemed to be a threat to the public. Further guidance released in 2017 outlined that foreign national offenders are considered to be high harm 'where their conduct incurs significant adverse impact, whether physical, emotional or financial, upon individuals or the wider community' (Home Office, 2017: 4).

Nexus was launched in areas with high levels of stable ethnic diversity in Britain and where migrants settled when they first came to the UK. London, Manchester, and the West Midlands are areas of recent migration and large cities likely to have organized criminal networks. However, the choice of geographically concentrating Nexus in these police force areas at the outset is ostensibly racially biased as it targets settled ethnic minority communities as well as new migrants, because both groups are likely to be profiled in the similar ways because of their darker skin tone and/or other visual cues that indicate they may belong to a minority ethnic group. Nexus was introduced amidst the government's wider

policy to make the UK a 'hostile environment' for people lacking citizenship status, with the aim to ensure that foreign national suspects brought into police custody and found to have a criminal record, or who were arrested and charged for committing a serious crime, could be swiftly and efficiently removed, thereby avoiding the foreign national prisoner 'crisis' reported in 2006 (see for example Bhui (2007)). More broadly, having the police explicitly perform immigration control, underscores their role in exclusion of those deemed undesirable- both symbolically (politically) and coercively (Jones et al., 2017).

Police enforcement of immigration control is not unique to the UK and is widely practiced across the globe. The Secure Communities programme in the US, for example, requires the cooperation of local law enforcement, whereby once someone is arrested, local law enforcement runs his/her fingerprints through the IDENT/Interoperability system provided by Immigration Control and Enforcement (ICE). This checks simultaneously against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) database as well as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS the immigration database). The programme has been implemented most heavily in areas with Hispanic populations and is reliant on and legitimizes racial profiling (Ramos, 2012; Chacón, 2018). In Australia, immigration authorities rely on largely opportunistic encounters between unlawful non-citizens and police to supplement their more targeted detection efforts. Migration control, which has long been normalized as the business of the police, is transnational and mobilizes a range of enforcement agencies including immigration and customs and both private actors and commercial bodies (Weber, 2013; Weber and Bowling, 2004). Drawing on this established and growing field of research on policing migration, the research described in this article examines how the state impulse to control borders shapes the nature of policing, with what consequences and against who these practices impact upon the most (Loftus, 2013).

Uncovering the Impacts of Operation Nexus

Operation Nexus has received critical attention for its targeting of vulnerable and racialized groups and has been challenged legally (Webber, 2013; Luqmani Thompson & Partners, 2014; Evans, 2018; Webber, 2015). Nexus practices allow nationality to act as a proxy for race, enabling frequent nationality checks for low level offending to be carried out for visible minorities in particular, whilst being framed as ostensibly race neutral (Parmar, 2018a). Despite the stated policy aim of Nexus to target prolific and serious foreign national offenders, in fact, Nexus accentuates criminality amongst non-citizens by using potential future criminality based on police intelligence, as well as low level, ancient convictions (which remain on the police database even if charges are withdrawn) to build cases to deport foreign national offenders. In doing so, Nexus reasserts the long standing link between strangers, danger and criminality (Griffiths, 2017). Nexus advances the racialized application of technology whilst appearing to focus on migration control by ensuring that enhanced previous conviction and nationality checks are primarily directed towards visible ethnic minorities and migrants (Parmar, 2019). Furthermore, under Nexus, when criminal justice techniques are used to forcibly remove foreign national offenders from the UK, foreign national individuals and their families are rendered particularly vulnerable as they are denied the criminal law procedural protections provided to citizens and potentially denied due process rights (Luqmani Thompson & Partners, 2014). Minor offences, such as cannabis possession and driving without insurance, have at times been enough for the Home Office

to enforce deportation[1] proceedings and limited evidence or vulnerability of the suspect have not curtailed legal pursuit of these cases (Carter, 2013).

The police have long been involved in immigration enforcement as part of their routine work in various parts of the world (Weber, 2011). However, in the UK police custody was identified as a site where opportunities were 'being missed' because establishing a detainee's identity on arrest, including their nationality, is part of the booking-in procedure (National Audit Office, 2014). Immigration database checks could be conducted during this process, yet in practice they were rarely being carried out. Consequently, one of the main practical changes introduced by Nexus was to ensure that immigration status checks were carried out in real time, as immigration officers were on-hand or easily contactable to perform the checks whilst a suspect was detained in police custody.

Black and Asian men are more likely to be suspected by the police because of stereotypes of criminality and moral panics (Hall et al., 1978) and it is within this socio-historic context that new developments, like Nexus should be read. White Eastern European groups have been subject to an increasing association with criminality and subject to heightened police and media attention, emphasizing the uneven racialization of whiteness with regard to Polish, Romanian and Albanian groups (Baker et al., 2012). Nexus neatly intersects with ongoing domestic policing practices in the UK, which have been shown to be disproportionate and (racially) discriminatory (Bowling and Phillips, 2007). Patterns of entrenched racial disproportionalities in policing and their cumulative effect throughout the criminal justice system have been variously condemned, yet remain inured to actual change (Lammy, 2017; Bowling and Phillips, 2007). Heightened surveillance towards Muslim and black people as part of pre-emptive counter-terrorist policing has shown how citizenship is used as a disciplinary device and that the right to belong is permanently precarious for some racialized groups even when they are citizens/have obtained official legal status to remain in the UK (Parmar, 2011; Kapoor and Narkowicz, 2017).

Despite the potentially negative impacts of directing policy towards visible minority ethnic groups and providing more scope for discretionary policing through Nexus, the Home Office have endorsed and resourced the programme's expansion. The vague and expanding category of the 'foreign criminal' assists the overall aim in which it is becoming harder to decipher whether it is the crime itself or the foreignness of the offender that is being punished. Nexus is therefore playing a key role in broadening the terms of reference regarding what constitutes a 'foreign criminal' as it is through the application of Nexus that minor convictions and 'high harm' crimes are able to blur. Ancient, petty and spent convictions are all folded into the mix and since 2012 over 3,000 people have been removed under the policy (Trilling, 2018; Jones et al., 2017).

The disjuncture between the lofty, saviour-like image of Nexus identifying harmful criminals (Vine, 2014) against the moral ambivalence and cynicism it engenders amongst those who implement it, has been highlighted, demonstrating the complexities and

[1] Deportation is a statutory power of the Home Secretary and under 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971, and under the UK Borders Act 2007, made provision for the automatic deportation of foreign criminals subject to certain exceptions McGuinness T. (2017) Deportation of Foreign National Offenders *Commons Library Briefing* London: House of Commons Library . 'Foreign criminal' is defined in section 32 of the 2007 Act as a person (a) who is not a British citizen, (b) is convicted in the UK of an offence, and (c) to whom condition 1 or 2 applies. Condition 1 is that the person is sentenced to a period of at least 12 months and condition 2 is that the offence is specified by order of the Secretary of State under section 72(4)(a) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (c41) (serious criminal) and (b) the person is sentenced to a period of imprisonment.

ultimately symbolic limits of the promise to secure the border through such initiatives (Aliverti, 2019). Nexus duties frequently fall within the work remit of police custody detention officers who often belong to minority ethnic groups or were once migrants themselves. Contemporary immigration control is often carried out by post-colonial migrants (Parmar, 2018b; Clayton and Vickers, 2018). This is representative of the changing culture of racism where white state power dons a black mask and minority ethnic groups are pitted against each other in order to find a footing in society; a society in which modes of belonging are imbued with racism (Back et al., 2012).

Methodology

The research was conducted between 2015 to late 2018 and adopted a multi method approach including ethnographic observation of police custody suites, interviews with police officers and custody personnel (including custody detention officers, medical nurses and solicitors), access to custody data records and attendance at police meetings. The exact places are undisclosed in order to protect the anonymity of those who participated and provided access to the research sites. Most of the observations were carried out in inner city police force areas, one was a suburban location. Two hundred and fifty hours of observation were carried out, fifty-eight interviews with custody personnel including police custody sergeants and criminal case workers based at the Home Office. I attended twelve deportation hearings (multiple sittings for the same case in some instances) which relied on police intelligence, allowing a holistic understanding of the application of Nexus procedures at various points in the criminal justice and immigration process. As part of the research I spoke with people who were subject to removal or deportation proceedings following involvement with the police through Nexus. These people were asked to participate in the research after I met them at immigration hearings and others agreed to participate when I met them at two local migrant support groups. The research design aimed to identify how migration policing was implemented at all levels, if/how it was resisted, and with what consequences. A decision was made to include an understanding of migrant people's experiences either through their own voices from interviews and discussions or through my own observations and without jeopardising their anonymity, dignity or security. Informed consent was agreed with all participants who were aware that they could withdraw from the research at any time. Ethnographic field notes and interviews were written up and coded using NVivo qualitative data analysis software, which allowed recurrent themes in the data to be identified.

What's the Harm?

As part of Nexus, once a foreign national suspect is identified as having convictions that are serious or numerous enough to potentially lead to removal or deportation, they are passed on to the high harm team. The team's role is to ascertain whether the individual's known offending justifies referral for immigration enforcement action. Potential action can include administrative removal, conviction-led deportation or intelligence-led deportation. In order to qualify for a 'high harm' referral, the individuals involved would require evidence from police material indicating that they represent a current and ongoing threat to the public and their criminal activity caused harm to the wider community, that they had no valid immigration leave, and that they were subject to active police interest.

As the definitions above intimate, the high harm label is largely reliant on police interpretation and previous police activity. 'Persistent criminal activity' is defined as that

which could be evidenced by five or more convictions within the previous three years. My observations in police custody underlined the pliable and discretionary way in which the high harm designation was applied. For example, Ray[2], a black man brought in on suspicion of theft on public transport was asked his nationality, to which he stated that he was British. The custody sergeant seemed unsure and asked the immigration officer stationed in the custody suite to check his immigration status. The immigration officer stated that he did not have leave to remain in the UK and Ray was a Jamaican national. At this point, the police officer decided to make further checks and pass the case onto the criminal investigation team. Overhearing the conversation, I heard 'check if there's something active we can find to add to the case. Not usually isolated crimes, these.' In this moment, it was apparent that the 'mission aspect' of policing where officers saw themselves as performing an essential role in safeguarding social order (Reiner, 1992) was enacted, and driven by the possibilities that labelling the suspect as high harm offered.

In another instance, Omar, who was brought into police custody and suspected of fraud, was asked to confirm his nationality. He was found not to hold British citizenship and following this, the police decided to delve further into his records and request background checks. Consequently, and whilst the suspect was held in custody, intelligence gathering activities were initiated including interviews with his former employers and neighbours. Requests were made to the Association of Criminal Records Office (ACRO) to establish his offending history in Georgia (the country of origin), and other convicted offenders with Georgian nationality in the same police force area were searched and their histories trawled to identify any networks linking them to the suspect. Although such an approach may have been in line with the procedures prescribed by Nexus, I noted that for another fraud case where the suspect was a white British citizen, the same intelligence gathering procedures were not applied and extensive checks for potential networks were not carried out.

A third case involved a South Asian Indian man, Naresh, suspected of grievous bodily harm and affray. After the nationality check was performed, he was found to have entered the UK on a student visa and overstayed. On discovering this, the police custody sergeant emphasized his immigration violation to the point of side lining investigating the charge of grievous bodily harm. When we discussed the case in more detail, the sergeant told me that the financial goals of Nexus were key, and that removal of a foreign national offender saved time and money in investigating the offence. 'Repatriation to India is one of our success stories' the officer indifferently stated. It was also clear that Nexus allowed for cases to be swiftly 'cleared up' or allocated to another body (in this case the high harm team) in ways that were not possible for cases that were passed to the Crown Prosecution Service, which were often dropped because of a lack of evidence.

Another case exemplified the same sentiment. Following a regular stop and search operation in the area, Javel, a black man, suspected of possession of drugs with intent to supply was brought into police custody. His records were checked on the Police National Computer and he was found to have been booked in and arrested previously a number of times and had served short sentences, both custodial and non-custodial, for similar drug offences. Some of the offences were as dated as far back as fifteen years ago. On this particular occasion, the immigration officer who was sat in the custody suite too, was asked to check the veracity of Javel's claim that he was British. The search showed that he did not have leave to remain and was Jamaican. At this point the police officer seemed visibly

[2] Pseudonyms are used throughout the article to protect all participant's identities.

relieved and said 'I just knew there was something about him. And now [pauses] we have him'. The police custody sergeant went on to explain the process to me and stated that an investigation would be mounted to identify whether the suspect was a member of a gang and whether he had connections or previous convictions in Jamaica or elsewhere in the UK. The sergeant stated:

> Drugs, gangs and firearms often go together unfortunately, particularly when a nominal [suspect] is a prolific offender. We need to ensure that as much information can corroborate that he represents a threat to the community, so we can pass it on Nexus high harm. In the meantime, the onus is on us to detain him and prepare all the material. So… in essence this creates more work for us, as always. But when we get removal of someone like this who impacts vulnerable victims, it's totally worth it. (Custody Sergeant, White British)

As this quote highlights, Nexus scrambles the lines that demarcate policing, widening its remit to include an immigration focus and by introducing different layers of data, avenues to pursue and procedures to follow. The examples also show how the process of attributing high harm was not only subjective, but also reinforced racialized practices of who the police suspected, who they pursued and to what level of detail, affirming that the 'foreign criminal' label is unstable and elastic (Griffiths, 2017). Based on what I witnessed in police custody, my argument is that black and minority ethnic groups' contact with the police, particularly when police functions are directed to enforce migration control, operate to organize racial knowledge in new ways that concur with Lerman and Weaver's (2014) analysis. Thus, black or Asian men who came into custody who did not have leave to remain in the UK, would say that they were British to try and stall for time, to try and slip through the checking process. They expected to be challenged about nationality and at times resisted the question, exercising their right to remain silent only when the question of citizenship was raised. At other times I saw black and Asian people suspected of an offence who would carry their passports on them, ready to prove their 'Britishness' to police officers, expecting to be challenged. This (re)organization of racial knowledge amongst racial minorities is a theme I return to later in the article.

In Custody

Analysis of crime and arrest trends are routinely requested by police custody sergeants and at police force level in order to assist in decisions about how resources should be directed and where implementing the Nexus model would be most effective. The information in these crime analysis reports are most often presented by nationality and types of offending, which from my perspective confirms the straightforward association between certain nationalities and particular types of crime[3]. The briefing documents were produced by police research analysts for the intelligence division of the force and circulated at meetings that included custody sergeants from across the police force area. The briefings presented the association between types of offending and nationality in a simplistic way. Although census population data was included at the start of the briefing paper – to enable comparison between the local population nationality breakdowns and those arrested, the 2011 census data was outdated

[3] The briefings did not specify the gender breakdown of the figures, underlining that the focus was solely on nationality.

given the lifting of migration restrictions on new EU accession countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, which will have resulted in an increase in the population of these nationalities, for example. Further information on how nationality was established (i.e. proven nationality or attributed by the police) that would be important for understanding the figures on arrest was absent. The briefings covered a one-year period from 2014-2015 and were compiled using custody data records and the figures obtained from the ACRO. For example, one of the briefings[4] under the heading 'robbery' stated 'there are 468 arrests in total for all robbery offences; 54 (11.5%) were non-UK nationals', followed by a table showing the 'top' non-UK nationalities recorded in arrests:

Nationality	Total Arrests for robbery (% of all arrests for robbery)
Poland	10 (2.1%)
Portugal	5 (1.1%)
Afghanistan	4 (0.85%)
Lithuania	4 (0.85%)
Eire	3 (0.64%)
Pakistan	3 (0.64%)
Albania	2 (0.43%)
Algeria	2 (0.43%)
France	2 (0.43%)

The section on child neglect or abuse offences described that: '18 out of 109 arrests (16.5%) were non-UK nationals, the breakdown is below'.

Nationality	Number of arrests (% of arrests for child neglect/abuse)
India	5 (4.6%)
Lithuania	3 (2.8%)
Latvia	2 (1.8%)
Zimbabwe	1 (0.9%)
Ukraine	1 (0.9%)
Serbia	1 (0.9%)
Saudi Arabia	1 (0.9%)
Poland	1 (0.9%)
Mauritius	1 (0.9%)
Jamaica	1 (0.9%)
France	1 (0.9%)

Followed by 'UK nationals were linked to a higher number of arrests for all types of sexual offence, with 1264 out of 1532 total offences (82.5%). There were 268 (17.5%) foreign nationals arrested for all sexual offences.' Reoffending was described in the following way:

> A sample of 583 repeat offenders was identified from 1491 detected offences and 477 (81%) had their nationality recorded. Most were UK nationals 414 (87%); Eastern Europeans accounted for 6.5% of the sample (31 offenders). It was identified that the number of Eastern Europeans living in the area was 25,395,

[4] The source of these briefings, tables and figures are purposely not disclosed in order to protect the anonymity of the research settings.

therefore the Eastern European population of this sample were 4 times more likely to be a repeat offender of acquisitive crime.

Briefing documents with details described as above were used and circulated to underline the case for Nexus to be widened, and to monitor its progress and intervention in disrupting organized crime groups. The language used within the documents – 'top-nationalities' and the presentation of national hierarchies of arrest– is of concern as it firmly and repeatedly fixes the association between offending with national and/or racial background. As argued elsewhere, national backgrounds in the sphere of policing migration can act as an open means of talking about ethnic or racial groups without concern about charges of institutional racism in a post-Macpherson policing climate (Parmar, 2018a; Parmar, 2018b). The fact that the proportions of 'foreign offenders' described in some of the statements and tables above are so low (e.g., 0.9%) is downplayed, and the focus of the documents highlights the way that statistics presented in this manner can easily racialize and criminalize by overlooking nuance and without caution towards making causal inferences (Zuberi, 2003). Although in the absence of up to date population figures, census data from 2011 may seem unavoidable, nevertheless the assertions made are particularly insensitive in their repeated attribution of criminality with a person's national background, without any reference to patterns of policing or demographic factors that may go some way towards explaining over-representation of certain groups.

This intertwining of criminality and nationality is of concern at a time in post-Brexit Britain when anti-immigrant sentiment often relies on tropes that criminalize 'foreigners' (Virdee and McGeever, 2017). As with the example of reoffending described above, 'Eastern Europeans' are carelessly conflated as one nationality group and uncomplicatedly described in the document as being four times more likely to be repeat offenders of acquisitive crime. The fact that 87% of the repeat offenders were British is downplayed and instead the attention remains focused on 'foreigners.' These binary representations of foreign offending overlook the reality of the complexities that often disrupt the boundaries between desirable and undesirable migrants, and erase the crossovers between illegal migrants who are also often victims of crime themselves. This system operates by disabling and keeping from view the humanity, pain and suffering that migrants may be under through precarity, scrutiny and lack of leeway with the law. Instead, all foreigners are regarded as divested of morality and straightforwardly constituted as a criminal threat, as undesirable and needing to be controlled and excluded, in the most efficient way possible (Bowling and Westenra, 2018; Barker, 2015).

The Empire Comes 'Home'

In examining the briefings and hearing the discussions between the police and immigration officers, I was struck by the continuities expressed about offending type, nationality (and by implication race) and historical constructions of criminality. The policing migration strategy through Nexus in this respect revived and legitimated the association between tropes of criminality, foreignness and racial difference. Stereotypes of criminality being associated with groups of people belonging to the same nationality and/or ethnic group is not new and was advanced and practiced during colonial rule in places such as India and Jamaica (Nigam, 1990; Brown, 2014; Said, 1978; Agozino, 2003). Ideas about 'native' criminality during the colonial era in India, for example, can be read as part of the same programme that theorized

about identifying criminals in the social body in Britain at the same time (Brown, 2001). In tracing contemporary representational practices or 'stereotyping', Hall (1997) explains that Western ideas about race and images of racial difference were profoundly shaped by the European colonization of Africa. Stereotyping, Hall goes on to outline, occurs more when there are gross inequalities of power, thus in the context of policing, they are all the more salient where the binary between those holding power and those who do not is extremely marked.

Understanding the historical colonial roots of criminalization and nationality then allows schemes like Nexus to be contextualized as visibly extending Empire's historical campaign to identify and categorize people. For example, fingerprinting (still used today in police custody suites as part of the 'Live Scan'[5] procedure) was first used by Herschel in 1858 to identify people to ensure that Indian soldiers were not exploiting the payment system by impersonation (Sengoopta, 2003). It is therefore a practice that was developed abroad and 'led by colonial administrators to devise a means of identification for surveillance on a wide scale' (Azzopardi-Cauchi and Knepper, 2009: 74). It also inscribed the idea of 'natives' as being 'slippery' or 'unknowable', needing to be classified for their inherent evasiveness. Later, the connection between identity, foreignness, migration and (suspected) criminality was further forged by the passing of the Aliens Act 1905 which aimed to prevent paupers and 'alien criminality' from entering Britain (Bashford and McAdam, 2014). Because fingerprints carried the stigma of criminal suspicion in the public mind at that time, and the wider application of government surveillance was objected to, a solution (that did not counter the image of British society as fair and free) was found by choosing to fingerprint suspects, as long as they were immigrants (Knepper, 2007; Azzopardi Cauchi and Knepper, 2009). The idea that fingerprinting was particularly well suited for the identification of members of 'other' races persisted well into the 1910s and was thought to surpass identification by ordinary facial recognition (Cole, 2002).

In my research observing custody suites I saw that, alongside the collection of biometric data (including fingerprinting and DNA extraction), establishing a person's nationality and suspecting them of a crime were all checks carried out as part of the same process by police and immigration officers. This mirrored and extended the procedures of identification and classification which have their genesis in colonial times as discussed above. The mundane inclusion of nationality checks alongside the biometric information reinscribed the link between alien nationality, difference and inherent criminality first established by the Aliens Act 1905. The sharing of space between police and immigration meant that the daily practices and cultures mapped onto the roles of police and immigration, allowing the boundaries between their roles to blur. For example, one of the immigration officers commented that he 'always had a hunch about which ones might need a check' when referring to how to cope with the busy and unpredictable space of police custody. The space had an anticipatory atmosphere because there was never certainty or much warning about what was to come, leaving unforeseen ebbs and flows of activity. Sometimes hours would pass by where nothing would happen – cells would be empty, no arrests made and things were eerily quiet, whereas within a few minutes, the calm and quiet could be upturned by large numbers of arrests being made simultaneously, a queue of people to be booked in, or a particularly difficult detainee that made a shift feel extremely busy. In another instance, an

[5] This term refers to the technology used to capture fingerprints, photographs and signatures electronically which also allows for suspects' fingerprints to be instantly compared with a national database (IDENT1), returning results in minutes.

immigration officer muttered under his breath, 'I just don't know what it is about this lot', when checking the immigration status of Abaeze, a Nigerian man who stated that he was naturalized as British. Expressions of this type of suspicion felt part of the repertoire of police work I had previously witnessed. On the other hand, some police officers saw Nexus as so much part of the police *métier* – which encompasses an intuitive grasp of situations peculiar to policing (Manning, 2010) – that they found it hard to delineate what was so novel about Nexus. 'It's a waste of resources if you ask me… [we've] been doing it all along', one senior police officer commented. Another stated that it was a duplication of work and that he couldn't see it lasting or having proven results. 'old wine in expensive new bottles' was his summation of Nexus.

'Free but not *Free*': Citizenship, Identity and Policing Migration

As discussed at the beginning of the paper, there are potentially broader lessons to be elicited from the Nexus policy and its implementation, its lived experience and harmful consequences for those who subject to the intersection of police and immigration work. As part of the research, alongside observing and interviewing street-level bureaucrats, I was able to hear the views of people who had been questioned about their nationality or were subject to removal or under investigation because of Nexus or because of the submission of police intelligence gathered under Nexus. Below I discuss some of their experiences.

Arresting (Non)Citizenship

Enlisting the police to visibly control migration is profound because 'what the police do (and what they teach by what they do) has implications beyond policing' (Forman, 2004: 2). The impacts therefore reach beyond foreign national suspects that are policed and reverberate to include minority ethnic citizens who come face-to-face with Nexus. Being non-white *and* British continues to confound officers in the way described by Dalal (a participant in my study), who stated 'I was asked to confirm my nationality because they didn't think I could be British. My birth certificate was needed cos…and I'm embarrassed to tell you…I don't even have a passport! I was born here, have a cockney accent and don't know anything more than England. And they don't even see me as them' (Dalal 20, black British Caribbean). The creation of a 'hostile environment', as shown here, indelibly marks those who are citizens or have a legal right to citizenship, as well as the 'high harm' foreign national offenders that Nexus policy is explicitly aimed at. The harmful effects of this kind of misrecognition were not commented on by the police. Instead, they were framed collaterally, as an unfortunate consequence, but insignificant in the face of the overall police 'mission' to maintain social order and remove high harm offenders from the national body. The recent exposure of the Windrush Generation scandal[6] in Britain provides a vivid example of the people caught in the crossfire of the unrelenting adherence to immigration 'rules' and their racializing and disenfranchising consequences (Bulman, 2018; Gentleman, 2018).

The argument advanced by Lerman and Weaver (2014) in *Arresting Citizenship* is that contact with or (expectation of contact with) the police in particular has created a growing

[6] Following World War II in 1948 the British Government invited people from the Caribbean to the British Commonwealth to immigrate to the UK in response to labour shortages. Many of the children that arrived with their parents did not have documentation to prove their right to remain in the UK and now, seventy years later it was revealed that many have been threatened with legal action, held in immigration detention and deported to the Caribbean as part of the hostile environment introduced by the government in 2012. Some people have been removed or deported on the basis of minor criminal convictions.

constituency of second-class citizens whose sense of faith in criminal justice and public institutions is diminished. The expectation of full and equal citizenship, they argue, is likely to be severely eroded by those who come into contact with the police on a regular basis. The way that the criminal justice system has expanded, according to Lerman and Weaver, has deep consequences for the citizens it produces. The expansion of the criminal justice system into migration control and vice versa, or 'crimmigration' (Stumpf, 2006), further exemplifies Lerman and Weaver's point about the reach of the system and its impact on notions of citizenship, equality and democratic participation for some members of society. It is within this framework that I was able to decipher how the enmeshment of police work and immigration control had the effect of disenfranchising both foreign national suspects and visible minority ethnic citizens (albeit in different ways). In the context of Nexus policing, both these groups experienced the same blunt treatment of feeling profiled, unequal and suspected – for criminality and/or immigration violations. 'Today, I feel like a second-class citizen', Ruiz, a British Pakistani arrested on suspicion of dealing drugs, told me. Contact with the police defined his experience of the state, in the way that Lerman and Weaver theorize. Another example was Adele, who had come to Britain from Senegal and arrested by the police from a motorway café, under suspicion of soliciting for purposes of prostitution. She told me:

> I had ideas that this country was good to foreigners. I was trafficked here…and I'm not proud of that…but I thought because of human rights and everything, the reputation that there is equality, rights…that I would be okay, I would be safe…That they treat me with compassion…look me with kind eyes. But no, I was kept in the jail [police custody] for a whole day and night. But it felt like a month. I was so scared and didn't know what to do, what I could ask. So, I just kept quiet. Now, today I always have my papers from the Home Office on my person. But I would never call police if I needed anything. I was robbed last year but didn't go to them. I just cope. (Adele, 34, black Senegalese)

Adele's quote has marked resonance with the 'hidden curriculum' that the criminal justice system engenders and people learn to live by including that one must never be without identification (Justice and Meares, 2013). Lerman and Weaver further explain that institutions that send the message to individuals that they are valued and respected provide citizens with a symbolic civic resource of political standing. Conversely, institutions that fail to reflect democratic values may inhibit civic skills and transmit ideas about government that demobilize and inform citizens that they are not worthy of equal concern and respect.

An expectation by migrants who travel to the UK of access to rights, but the reality of receiving a lack of information and harsh treatment has been widely documented in the way that Adele explains (Nellums et al., 2018). The ambiguous juxtaposition of help and suspicion directed towards migrants by police and border policing agencies has also been highlighted in research which indicates that the truthfulness of migrants' stories are centred upon more than their vulnerability (Aas and Gundhus, 2015).

Racial Knowledge and Perforating Citizenship from Identity

The second area where Lerman and Weaver's argument sheds light onto my findings on Nexus is that they describe how police actions have both reflected and instantiated prevailing racial and class orders. Similarly, the official legitimacy afforded to Nexus policing

and its application of nationality as a proxy for race, means that racial boundaries are (re)formed and racial knowledge is reorganized. Hence, policing as an apparatus of the state operates to invest race with meaning (Capers, 2009). The role that Nexus policing played in reorganizing racial knowledge was illustrated by the way that ethnic minority citizens and migrants expected to be treated with suspicion and how citizens were made to feel as though their membership of British society was precarious. The following quote from Deepak, a British Asian Indian man brought into police custody suspected of arson is evocative:

> I was held on suspicion for arson, which my ex-wife who has mental health issues reported to the police and was totally untrue. As devastating as that was, what hurt me more…most hurtful was that having lived here for over 40 years – I came as a refugee from Africa – I've had a British education and passport all my life, that the police and all the authorities still do not see me as British. I don't know what else I can do. Being British was core to my identity but now I've realized it is not. I am dreaming. Worse than all the racism I have experienced, these police…tipped me over the edge. They searched my home for my passport that they thought they would not find and went to my business associates to ask them about my status, whether they knew me! To them, I'm just another brown face. Another migrant. It was like someone told me that what I had arrogantly believed all my life was an illusion, a lie. I will never be seen as British – I feel it's not part of my identity anymore. (Deepak, 67, British Asian Indian)

Testimonies like these that made me recognize that Nexus and immigration checks being bluntly carried out by the police with increased zeal, were accompanied by collateral consequences. These collaborative practices could work to could reverse feelings of citizenship that minority ethnic citizens, whether through naturalization or birth, had long held: disconnecting a sense of citizenship from identity. Nexus emboldened the police - practically (amongst individual officers) and symbolically (fortifying the police as an apparatus of the state). In this respect, Nexus promoted the everyday denial and forgetting of Britain's colonial legacy as responsible for the visible ethnic diversity we see today, conveniently and productively erasing the reality that colonialism and immigration are part of the same continuum (Hall, 2000; Sivanandan, 2008).

Other participants who had been involved with the police because of Nexus had reorganized their racial knowledge by telling me they would avoid 'being seen and out and about' much in the way that Lerman and Weaver (2014) described the actions of 'custodial citizens' in their study. Keeping a low profile was most often expressed by the young black men I spoke with, who felt as though they were being associated with someone that the police were actively pursuing via Nexus powers and the high harm designation. As Sam explains:

> the police came to me asking about Terry and what my involvement was with him, that they knew we were members of a gang and that they were monitoring us. They said that they were making a strong case for Terry to be deported to Jamaica. That's mad things like. Terry been here since he was two and now he got a girl and two children. His mum needs him, she got cancer. Yeah, he went inside for a while, for dealing, but then he changed his life when his baby came along. They even said that his girlfriend was a lie and that even she was without

> papers. What lies man! She got a British passport, she was born in Homerton [area in London]. All means I just gotta watch it. I don't want no more questions. I support Terry and that in his case, but that's it. I'm scared walking to sign on [for unemployment benefits], scared of coming to court for these hearings and what they gonna do to me, to Terry. What they will use my words for and how. You know? (Sam, 28, black Nigerian)

Arresting Citizenship discusses young black men feeling 'free but not free' and it is here that Lerman and Weaver underline that the most salient interaction with the state for their participants were, by and large, encounters with the police. Criminal justice then, in the same way as the quotes above from those who felt Nexus policing in practice demonstrate, cultivates racial meaning and organizes racial knowledge. Interactions with the criminal justice system are thus instrumental, particularly when they are invested with meaning about who belongs to the nation. Such contact can also bring to mind the powerful notion that if you are black or minority ethnic, you are likely to be treated unfairly by the state (Lerman and Weaver, 2014) and in the context of Nexus, automatically treated as a non-citizen and potentially subject to banishment through police activity (Beckett and Herbert, 2009). If you are without leave to remain in the UK and are a victim of a crime, as Adele's testimony tells us, the police are not seen as people to call on. It was clear in situations such as these that the police were at cross purposes when dealing with victims of crime who had no leave to remain; further exemplifying the role of Nexus in changing the nature (real and symbolic) of policing. Nexus reshaped policing by encouraging an atmosphere of pre-emptive criminalization to be incorporated into everyday policing practices (Pickering and Weber, 2013) and by formalizing nationality based suspicion seamlessly into police working culture. Migrants were readily suspected of criminality and subject to closer scrutiny by means of enhanced checks prior to formal arrest. Symbolically, the police were not seen by migrants as guardians, protectors or those to turn to if you are a victim of a crime in the way that imaginaries of traditional English policing may have evoked (Reiner, 2000). Ethnic minority citizens too feared that their nationality and right to remain may be called into question if they contacted the police, illustrating Loader and Mulcahy's suggestion that 'policing is a vehicle that enables individuals and groups to make sense of their past, form judgements on the present and project various imagined futures' (2003: 45).

Drawing conclusions about research carried out in England against the context of Lerman and Weaver's US-based study should, of course, take account of cautionary tales about analysing different cross-national socio-political contexts within the same conceptual framework. Indeed, the US and British criminal justice and immigration systems differ greatly, in form, function and who is targeted for removal and what role the police play. However, such differences should not detract from the similar collateral consequences for those directly touched by the police and criminal justice system, and the reordering of racial knowledge in both the research described in this article as well as in *Arresting Citizenship*. Police contact under the aegis of Nexus clearly transformed notions of citizenship for the participants I spoke with. The relationship between citizenship, nationality and identity was recast for many of my participants, whether they were regarded to be foreign national offenders, migrants seeking asylum or ethnic minority citizens. It is in this sense that the state impulse to control the border through policing can fundamentally undermine equality and call into question the core ideal of democratic citizenship and whether it is (or can be) available to all.

Conclusion: The Mobius Strip of Policing and Immigration

This article has discussed the practices involved in implementing Nexus, calling into question a policy which provides impetus to the police to identify and expel foreign national offenders from the national body. Symbolically, Nexus fits within the overall strategy of creating a hostile environment for migrants through casting them as an inherent criminal threat (Bowling and Westenra, 2018). Schemes akin to Nexus underscore the reality that access to help, democracy, human rights and membership is always conditional, for some. In addition to the instrumental capacity of Nexus to remove those deemed undesirable or a threat to the public, such policies also convey signals to the wider community. As this article has demonstrated, police performance of immigration control communicates crucial messages to an amorphous constituency including foreign national suspects, recent migrants and settled citizen migrants and their children about *who the police are for* and *the police's power to enforce the boundaries of race and citizenship*. Explicitly investing the police with such powers reasserts, invigorates and continues colonial ideas and practices that fused together criminality, nationality and race decades ago. Arguably, therefore, the (re)organization of racial knowledge according to nationality and assumed criminality in present times is *the* collateral consequence of scrambling the line between police and immigration. When police work becomes immigration enforcement and immigration enforcement becomes police work, co-existing on the same continuum without perceptible boundaries or limits, much like a mobius strip, to use Didier Bigo's (2016) analogy, the impacts also blur and extend far beyond and much deeper than the stated policy aims of initiatives like Nexus, which originally set out to target a small number of 'high harm' foreign national offenders. As others have argued, the symbols and practices of policing are not distinct and both communicate meaning beyond the role of the police to convey messages about power and authority in society (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; Garland, 1990). This article has shown how the pliability of concepts such as 'high harm', that sit at the heart of Nexus, can easily be mobilized, bringing together the symbolic and goal-oriented aspects of policing, to hold racialized meanings. The application of these messages about state (racial) power can come to impact all visible ethnic minority groups, leaving them to feel unrepresented, disenfranchised and exiled within their own society.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the Special Issue editor Dr Ana Aliverti for organizing the Policing Migration workshop at the University of Warwick in May 2017 and its participants for their valuable comments. I am grateful to Professor Mary Bosworth editor-in-chief of *Theoretical Criminology* and the journal's two anonymous reviewers for their insightful contributions towards preparing this article for publication.

Funding

The author acknowledges with great appreciation the support of the John Fell Oxford University Press (OUP) research fund [grant number 151/080] from which this publication arises.

References

Aas KF and Bosworth M. (2013) The ordered and bordered society: Migration control, citizenship and the northern-penal state. In: Aas K and Bosworth M (eds) *The Borders of Punishment.* Oxford Oxford University Press, 21-39.
Aas KF and Gundhus HOI. (2015) Policing Humanitarian Borderlands: Frontex, Human Rights and the Precariousness of Life. *British Journal of Criminology* 55: 1-18.
Agozino B. (2003) *Counter-colonial Criminology. A Critique of Imperialist Reason,* London: Pluto Press.
Aliverti A. (2015) Enlisting the Public in the Policing of Immigration. *British Journal of Criminology* 55: 215-230.
Aliverti A. (2019) The Promise of the Border: Immigration control and belonging at the dawn of twenty first century Britain. In: Koulish R and van der Woude M (eds) *The Promise of the Border: Immigration Control and Belonging in Contemporary Britain.* New York: Fordham University Press.
Azzopardi Cauchi J and Knepper P. (2009) The Empire, the police, and the introduction of fingerprint technology in Malta. *Criminology & Criminal Justice* 9: 73-92.
Back L, Sinha S and Bryan wC. (2012) New hierarchies of belonging. *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 15: 139-154.
Baker S-A, Madoc-Jones I, Parry O, et al. (2012) More sinned against than sinning? Perceptions about European migrants and crime. *Criminology & Criminal Justice* 13: 262-278.
Barker V. (2015) On Bauman's moral duty: Population registries, REVA and eviction from the Nordic Realm. In: Ericksson A (ed) *Punishing the Other: The Social Production of Immorality Revisited.* London: Routledge.
Bashford A and McAdam J. (2014) The Right to Asylum: Britain's 1905 Aliens Act and the Evolution of Refugee Law. *Law and History Review* 32: 309-350.
Beckett K and Herbert S. (2009) *Banished: The New Social Control in Urban America,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bhui HS. (2007) Alien experience: Foreign national prisoners after the deportation crisis. *Probation Journal* 54: 368-382.
Bigo D. (2016) Rethinking Security at the Crossroad of International Relations and Criminology. *British Journal of Criminology* 56: 1068-1086.
Bonilla Silva E. (2015) More than Prejudice: Restatement, Reflections, and New Directions in Critical Race Theory. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity* 1: 73-87.
Bosworth M, Parmar A and Vázquez Y. (2018) *Race, Criminal Justice and Migration Control,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bowling B, Parmar A and Phillips C. (2008) Policing Minority Ethnic Communities In: Newburn T (ed) *Handbook of Policing* Second ed. Cullumpton: Willan.
Bowling B and Phillips C. (2007) Disproportionate and Discriminatory:Reviewing the Evidence on Police Stop and Search. *Modern Law Review* 70: 936-961.
Bowling B and Westenra S. (2018) 'A really hostile environment': Adiaphorization,global policing and the crimmigration control system. *Theoretical Criminology Online First*.
Bradford B. (2017) *Stop and Search and Police Legitimacy,* Abingdon: Routledge
Brown M. (2001) Race, science and the construction of native criminality in colonial India. *Theoretical Criminology* 5: 345-368.
Brown M. (2014) *Penal Power and Colonial Rule,* Abingdon: Routledge
Bulman M. (2018) Government halts 'hostile environment' immigration policy after Windrush scandal. *The Independent.* London.

Capers I. (2009) Policing, Race and Place. *Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review* 44.
Carter C. (2013) New Met Police tactic to deport foreign criminals. *The Telegraph.* London.
Chacón J. (2018) Racialization through Enforcement. In: Bosworth M, Parmar A and Vazquez Y (eds) *Race, Criminal Justice and Migration Control. Enforcing the Boundaries of Belonging.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clayton J and Vickers T. (2018) Temporal tensions: European Union citizen migrants, asylum seekers and refugees navigating dominant temporalities of work in England. *Time and Society*: 1-25.
Cole S. (2002) *Suspect Identities. A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification*, Cambridge Massachussets: Harvard University Press.
Evans M. (2018) New challenge to Theresa May's 'hostile environment' and the unlawful deportation of EU nationals. The AIRE Centre http://www.airecentre.org/news.php/301/new-challenge-to-theresa-mays-hostile-environment-and-the-unlawful-deportation-of-eu-nationals.
Forman J. (2004) Community Policing and Youth as Assets. *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 95: 1-48.
Garland D. (1990) *Punishment and Modern Society* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gentleman A. (2018) The children of Windrush: 'I'm here legally, but they're asking me to prove I'm British'. *The Guardian.* London: The Guardian.
Goldberg DT. (1997) *Racial Subjects: Writing on Race in America*, New York: Routledge.
Goldberg DT. (2002) *The Racial State,* Oxford Blackwell.
Goldberg DT. (2015) *Are we all postracial yet?*, Cambridge: Polity.
Gordon P. (1985) *Policing Immigration: Britain's Internal Controls* London: Pluto Press.
Griffiths M. (2017) Foreign, criminal: a doubly damned modern British folk-devil. *Citizenship Studies* 21: 527-546.
Hall S. (1997) The Spectacle of the 'Other'. In: Hall S (ed) *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices.* London: Sage.
Hall S. (2000) The Multicultual Question. In: Hesse B (ed) *Un/settled Multiculturalisms: Diasporas, Entanglements, Transruptions.* London: Zed.
Hall S, Critcher C, Jefferson T, et al. (1978) *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order* London Macmillan.
Home Office. (2017) Operation Nexus- High Harm. London: Home Office
Jones H, Gunaratnam Y, Bhattacharyya G, et al. (2017) *Go Home? The Politics of Immigration Controversies* Manchester Manchester University Press.
Justice B and Meares TL. (2013) How the Criminal Justice System Educates Citizens. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 651: 159-177.
Kapoor N. (2013) The advancement of racial neoliberalism in Britain. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36: 1028-1046.
Kapoor N and Narkowicz K. (2017) Unmaking citizens: passport removals, pre-emptive policing and the reimagining of colonial governmentalities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*: 1-18.
Knepper P. (2007) British Jews and the Racialisation of Crime in the Age of Empire. *British Journal of Criminology* 47: 61-79.
Lammy D. (2017) The Lammy Review. An independent review into the treatment of, and outcomes for, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals in the Criminal Justice System. London: Ministry of Justice

Lerman A and Weaver V. (2014) *Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American Crime Control,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Loader I. (2016) Policing, Recognition, and Belonging. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 605: 201-221.
Loader I and Mulcahy A. (2003) *Police and the Condition of England,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Loftus B. (2013) Border regimes and the sociology of policing. *Policing and Society* 25: 115-125.
Luqmani Thompson & Partners. (2014) Operation Nexus: Briefing Paper.
Manning P. (2010) *Democratic Policing in a Changing World,* Boulder: Paradigm.
McGuinness T. (2017) Deportation of Foreign National Offenders *Commons Library Briefing* London: House of Commons Library
National Audit Office. (2014) Managing and Removing Foreign National Offenders. London: National Audit Office
Nellums L, Rustage K, Hargreaves S, et al. (2018) The Lived Experiences of Access to Healthcare for People Seeking and Refused Asylum. Equality and Human Rights Commission.
Nigam S. (1990) Disciplining and policing 'criminals by birth', Part 1: The making of a colonial stereotype- The criminal tribes and castes of North India *The Indian Economic and Social History Review* 27.
Parmar A. (2011) Stop and search in London: counter-terrorist or counter-productive? *Policing and Society* 21: 369-382.
Parmar A. (2018a) Policing Belonging: Race and Nation in the UK. In: Bosworth M, Parmar, A. and Vazquez, Y. (ed) *Race, Criminal Justice, and Migration Control: Enforcing the Boundaries of Belonging* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 108-124.
Parmar A. (2018b) Race at the Border In: Fili A, Jahnsen S and Powell R (eds) *Criminal Justice Research in an Era of Mass Mobility.* Abingdon: Routledge, 186-200.
Parmar A. (2019) Policing Migration and Racial Technologies. *The British Journal of Criminology* https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azz006.
Pickering S and Weber L. (2013) Policing Transversal Borders In: Aas KF and Bosworth M (eds) *The Borders of Punishment: Migration, Citizenship, and Social Exclusion.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ramos K. (2012) Criminalizing Race in the Name of Secure Communites. *California Western Law Review* 48.
Reiner R. (1992) Policing a Postmodern Society. *The Modern Law Review* 55: 761-781.
Reiner R. (2000) *The Politics of the Police* Oxford Oxford University Press.
Said E. (1978) *Orientalism,* New York: Pantheon.
Sengoopta C. (2003) *Imprint of the Raj: How Fingerprinting Was Born in Colonial India,* London: Macmillan.
Sivanandan A. (2008) *Catching History on the Wing*. Available at: http://www.irr.org.uk/news/catching-history-on-the-wing/.
Stumpf J. (2006) The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power. *American University Law Review* 56: 367-419.
Trilling D. (2018) How a champion boxer got caught in Britain's immigration dragnet. *Guardian.*

Vine J. (2014) An Inspection of Immigration Enforcement Activity in London and the West Midlands ('Operation Nexus') March-June 2014. . Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration.
Virdee S and McGeever B. (2017) Racism, Crisis, Brexit. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*: 1-18.
Waddington PAJ. (1999) *Policing Citizens: Authority and Rights* London: Routledge
Webber F. (2013) *Operation Nexus Fears Not Allayed*. Available at: http://www.irr.org.uk/news/operation-nexus-fears-not-allayed/.
Webber F. (2015) When Anonymous Hearsay Can Get You Deported. Institute of Race Relations Website: The Institute of Race Relations.
Weber L. (2011) "It Sounds Like They Shouldn't Be Here": Immigration checks on the streets of Sydney. *Policing and Society* 21: 456-467.
Weber L. (2013) *Policing Non-Citizens,* Abingdon: Routledge.
Weber L and Bowling B. (2004) Policing Migration: A Framework for Investigating the Regulation of Global Mobility. *Policing and Society* 14: 195-212.
Woof A and Skinns L. (2017) The role of emotion,space and place in police custody in England: Towards a geography of police custody. *Punishment and Society* 20: 562-579.
Yuval-Davis N, Wemyss G and Cassidy K. (2018) Everyday Bordering, Belonging and the Reorientation of British Immigration Legislation. *Sociology* 52: 228 - 244.
Zuberi T. (2003) *Thicker than Blood. How Racial Statistics Lie,* Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Author biography

Alpa Parmar is Research Associate at the Centre for Criminology, Faculty of Law, University of Oxford.