

**Barriers to the Consolidation of Peace:
The Political Economy of Post-Conflict Violence in Indonesia**

*Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics in the Department of Politics and
International Relations at the University of Oxford*

Patrick Barron

Nuffield College

Hilary 2014

112,166 words

© 2014 Patrick Barron

All rights reserved

Abstract

Barriers to the Consolidation of Peace: The Political Economy of Post-Conflict Violence in Indonesia

**Patrick Barron, Nuffield College
DPhil Politics, Hilary 2014**

What causes post-conflict violence to occur in some places emerging from extended violent conflict and not in others? Why does episodic post-conflict violence take different forms? And what causes episodic violence to escalate into larger renewed extended violence? This thesis contributes towards answers to these questions by examining the experience of Indonesia.

Six provinces saw civil war or large-scale inter-communal unrest around the turn of the century. In each, war ended. Yet levels and forms of post-conflict violence vary significantly between areas. The Indonesian cases are used to build a theory of the sources of spatial and temporal variance in post-conflict violence.

Multiple methods are employed. A new dataset, containing over 158,000 coded incidents, maps patterns of extended and post-conflict violence. Six districts in three provinces are then studied in depth. Comparative analysis of districts and provinces—drawing on over 300 field interviews—identifies the determinants of variations in post-conflict violence levels and forms.

Adopting a political economy approach, the thesis develops a novel actor-based theory of post-conflict violence. Violence is not the result of failed elite bargains, dysfunctional inter-group relations, enduring grievances, or weak states. Instead, it flows from the incentives that three sets of actors—local elites, local violence specialists, and national elites—have to use violence for accumulation. Violence is used when it is beneficial, non-costly, and when other opportunities for getting ahead do not exist. How post-conflict resources are deployed, the degree to which those who use violence face sanctions, and the availability of peaceful means to achieve goals shape incentives and hence patterns of violence. Where only violence specialists support violence, post-conflict violence will take small-scale forms. Where local elites also support violence, escalation to frequent large episodic violence occurs. Extended violence only occurs where national elites also have reason to use violence for purposes of accumulation.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	I
TABLE OF CONTENTS	II
LIST OF TABLES	VI
LIST OF FIGURES.....	VI
LIST OF MAPS	VI
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	VII

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	1
1. THE PUZZLES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE	4
2. THE APPROACH.....	7
2.1 <i>A new approach</i>	8
2.2 <i>Methods</i>	10
3. THE ARGUMENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE	12
4. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS.....	15

PART I: EXPLAINING POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE

CHAPTER 2. STUDYING POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE: APPROACHES AND METHODS	18
1. PREVIOUS APPROACHES TO STUDYING POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE AND THEIR LIMITATIONS.....	19
1.1 <i>The unit of analysis</i>	21
1.2 <i>Forms of extended violence</i>	26
1.3 <i>Forms of post-conflict violence</i>	29
1.4 <i>Explaining variation</i>	31
2. CONCEPTS	32
2.1 <i>Conflict, crime, and violence</i>	33
2.2 <i>The extended violent conflict and post-conflict periods</i>	36
2.3 <i>Types of post-conflict violence</i>	38
2.4 <i>A taxonomy of violence</i>	40
3. METHODS.....	41
3.1 <i>Using different methods to understand post-conflict violence</i>	41
3.2 <i>Quantitative data: a new violence dataset</i>	46
3.3 <i>District case studies</i>	47
3.4 <i>Generating a national narrative</i>	51

CHAPTER 3. EXPLAINING POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE, THEORIES, AND ARGUMENTS.....	53
1. PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS: ELITES, SOCIETIES, AND THE STATE	55
1.1 <i>Post-conflict bargains between conflict elites</i>	55
1.2 <i>Societal residues of past violence</i>	61
1.3 <i>State strength and structure</i>	67

2. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VIOLENCE: AN ACTOR-BASED FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE AND ITS ESCALATION	74
2.1 Actor support for violence and different forms of post-conflict violence	76
2.2 Reasons for supporting violence: the instrumental functions of violence	84
2.3 Conditions under which support for violence increases.....	86
2.4 From incentives to norms	91
2.5 Temporal variance in post-conflict violence	92

PART II: POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA

CHAPTER 4. VIOLENCE AND INDONESIA'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION	96
1. A NEW DATASET ON INDONESIAN VIOLENCE.....	97
1.1 Data sources on Indonesian violence and their limitations.....	97
1.2 UNSFIR-2.....	101
1.3 A new dataset: the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS).....	102
2. VIOLENCE IN EARLY POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA.....	106
2.1 Forms of violence.....	107
2.2 Peace settlements: reduced levels of violence.....	111
3. POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE	113
3.1 Varying levels of post-conflict violence	114
3.2 Varying forms of post-conflict violence	115
4. UNDERSTANDING VARIATION: SIX CONTRASTING DISTRICTS.....	116
4.1 Provinces	117
4.2 The district level.....	117
4.3 Post-conflict violence in the six districts	121
CHAPTER 5. LARGE EPISODIC VIOLENCE IN POST-CONFLICT MALUKU	124
1. VIOLENCE IN MALUKU	126
1.1 The extended violence	126
1.2 The Malino agreement and post-conflict violence	130
2. LOCAL ELITE STRUGGLES IN POST-CONFLICT MALUKU	133
2.1 The benefits of violence: the peace settlement, cooptation, and signalling.....	134
2.2 Low costs: security sector tolerance of violence.....	143
2.3 Limited opportunities for peaceful politics	147
3. VIOLENCE SPECIALISTS AND SOCIETAL SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE	152
3.1 Violence specialists.....	152
3.2 Community support for violence	155
4. TEMPORAL VARIATION	158
4.1 Changing levels of resources	160
4.2 Changing rules of the game: corruption investigations.....	162
4.3 Heightened competition: elections.....	168
4.4 Other factors: identity and ideology.....	168
4.5 A toxic mix: the September 2011 riots.....	169
5. CONCLUSION.....	171

CHAPTER 6. NORTH MALUKU'S PEACE	175
1. VIOLENCE IN NORTH MALUKU.....	177
1.1 <i>The extended violence</i>	177
1.2 <i>The peace settlement and the absence of post-conflict violence</i>	182
2. LOCAL ELITE SUPPORT FOR PEACE	184
2.1 <i>Peace settlements: reconciliation rather than pay-offs</i>	186
2.2 <i>The costs of using violence: responses to threats</i>	195
2.3 <i>New opportunities: pemekaran and the economy</i>	199
2.4 <i>Political fluidity, opportunities, and non-violent political competition</i>	202
3. VIOLENCE SPECIALISTS AND THE LACK OF SOCIETAL SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE	205
3.1 <i>Community-level support for peace</i>	205
3.2 <i>The (relative) absence of violence specialists</i>	212
4. CONCLUSION.....	214
 CHAPTER 7. SMALL EPISODIC VIOLENCE IN POST-CONFLICT ACEH	 217
1. VIOLENCE IN ACEH	220
1.1 <i>The extended violence</i>	220
1.2 <i>The Helsinki MoU and post-conflict violence</i>	224
2. THE ABSENCE OF LARGE EPISODIC VIOLENCE	227
2.1 <i>The peace settlement I: resources for GAM elites</i>	228
2.2 <i>The peace settlement II: the political incorporation of GAM elites</i>	233
2.3 <i>Satisfying other elites</i>	242
2.4 <i>The high costs of using large episodic violence</i>	247
3. FREQUENT SMALL EPISODIC VIOLENCE.....	249
3.1 <i>Ex-combatant expectations and motivations for using violence</i>	250
3.2 <i>Low costs: acceptance of small episodic violence by elites</i>	258
3.3 <i>Alternative explanations for frequent small episodic violence</i>	261
3.4 <i>District level divergence: East and South Aceh</i>	264
4. CONCLUSION.....	271
 CHAPTER 8. WHY HAS EXTENDED VIOLENT CONFLICT NOT RECURRED?	 274
1. NATIONAL ELITE INTERESTS AND INDONESIA'S EXTENDED VIOLENT CONFLICTS	277
1.1 <i>Previous explanations I: local motivations</i>	277
1.2 <i>Previous explanations II: state institutions and the provision of order</i>	280
1.3 <i>The central state and the escalation of violence</i>	288
2. WHY CENTRAL STATE ELITES ALLOWED ESCALATION TO EXTENDED VIOLENCE.....	290
2.1 <i>Heightened competition, uncertainty, and changes to the rules of the game</i>	290
2.2 <i>Expected benefits of allowing violence escalation</i>	298
2.3 <i>Other opportunities for peaceful accumulation</i>	302
3. CHANGING NATIONAL ELITE MOTIVATIONS AND THE LACK OF RECURRENCE OF EXTENDED VIOLENCE ..	303
3.1 <i>The Yudhoyono presidency: reduced uncertainty and more established rules of the game</i>	304
3.2 <i>Expected benefits of allowing violence escalation</i>	307
3.3 <i>Other opportunities for peaceful accumulation</i>	309

3.4 <i>Mechanisms for preventing violence escalation: co-optation of belligerents and more effective security responses</i>	310
4. CONCLUSION.....	316
 CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS	320
1. FINDINGS AND ARGUMENTS	320
1.1 <i>Why post-conflict violence occurs</i>	321
1.2 <i>Why post-conflict violence takes different forms</i>	323
1.3 <i>Why extended violence (re)occurs or does not</i>	325
2. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING (POST-CONFLICT) VIOLENCE	326
2.1 <i>Focusing on incentives to use violence</i>	327
2.2 <i>The links between different forms of violence</i>	329
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY	330
3.1 <i>The use of post-conflict funds</i>	331
3.2 <i>Security responses and legal institutions</i>	332
3.3 <i>Expanding opportunities in post-conflict areas</i>	333
3.4 <i>Building the national state</i>	334
 REFERENCES	336

List of Tables

TABLE 1.1. TYPES OF VIOLENCE	9
TABLE 1.2. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF VIOLENCE	14
TABLE 2.1. A TAXONOMY OF VIOLENCE	41
TABLE 4.1. EXTENDED VIOLENCE BY PROVINCE IN TRANSITIONING INDONESIA	110
TABLE 4.2. POST-CONFLICT PERIODS BY PROVINCE	113
TABLE 4.3. POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE BY PROVINCE.....	114
TABLE 4.4. FORMS OF POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE BY PROVINCE	115
TABLE 4.5. IMPACTS OF EXTENDED VIOLENCE IN THE TEN MOST AFFECTED DISTRICTS	120
TABLE 4.6. IMPACTS OF POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE IN SELECTED DISTRICTS	122
TABLE 4.7. LARGE-SCALE POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE IN SELECTED DISTRICTS	122
TABLE 5.1. SUBNATIONAL REVENUES IN MALUKU AND LARGE EPISODIC VIOLENCE OVER TIME	160
TABLE 7.1. LEVELS OF SMALL-SCALE POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE IN ACEH DISTRICTS MOST AFFECTED BY EXTENDED VIOLENCE	265
TABLE 8.1. INCENTIVES FOR CENTRAL STATE-BASED ACTORS TO SUPPORT VIOLENCE ESCALATION OVER TIME	276
TABLE 9.1. INCENTIVES FOR LOCAL ELITES TO SUPPORT VIOLENCE AND PRESENCE OF LARGE EPISODIC VIOLENCE	324
TABLE 9.2. INCENTIVES FOR LOCAL VIOLENCE SPECIALISTS TO SUPPORT VIOLENCE AND PRESENCE OF SMALL EPISODIC VIOLENCE	324

List of Figures

FIGURE 2.1 DIFFERENT FORMS OF VIOLENCE	35
FIGURE 3.1. SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE FROM DIFFERENT GROUPS AND TYPES OF POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE	84
FIGURE 4.1. FORMS OF VIOLENCE IN EARLY TRANSITION INDONESIA	108
FIGURE 4.2. DEATHS FROM VIOLENCE IN 15 INDONESIAN PROVINCES, 1998-2009	112
FIGURE 4.3. LEVELS OF POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE BY FORM IN SELECTED PROVINCES	117
FIGURE 5.1. LARGE INCIDENTS OF POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE IN MALUKU OVER TIME.....	159
FIGURE 7.1. PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT REVENUES IN ACEH, 1999-2012 (US\$, 2012 PRICES)	233

List of Maps

MAP 4.1. INDONESIAN PROVINCES AFFECTED BY EXTENDED VIOLENT CONFLICT	109
MAP 5.1. MALUKU PROVINCE AND SELECTED RESEARCH DISTRICTS	131
MAP 6.1. NORTH MALUKU PROVINCE AND SELECTED RESEARCH DISTRICTS.....	178
MAP 7.1. ACEH PROVINCE AND SELECTED RESEARCH DISTRICTS	218

Acknowledgments

The debts I have incurred writing this thesis are numerous. Thanks first to my supervisors, Richard Caplan and Anke Hoeffler, both of whom have been a constant source of ideas, critical feedback, and encouragement. In Oxford, a number of others provided useful comments on drafts or otherwise stimulated my thinking. Thanks to Nancy Bermeo, Christine Cheng, Julien Labonne, Alex Scacco, and Maya Tudor. My examiners, Gerry van Klinken and John Gledhill, provided exceptionally useful feedback.

Two fellow scholars of Indonesian politics, Samuel Clark and Chris Wilson, both went well beyond the duties of friendship by commenting on most of the chapters of the thesis. Conversations over coffees and beers with Sam and Chris also shaped my thinking at many points in the research and write-up processes. While I did not incorporate all of their suggestions, and certainly neither will agree with everything I have written, their testing questions about my findings and theoretical and methodological assumptions have made this a far stronger study than it would have otherwise been.

While the thesis largely comprises new empirical research, the ideas that underpin it have evolved slowly over the course of a decade living and working in Indonesia. I'd like to especially thank Scott Guggenheim and Michael Woolcock who brought me to Indonesia and who have served as *mentors extraordinaires* since then. The two, in their own very different ways, are model scholar-practitioners. Both have shown exceptional patience, helping to expand my intellectual horizons while providing me with a grounded training in social theory and research methods and on how to translate ideas into action. Other colleagues from my years at the World Bank in Jakarta and Aceh have played the role of intellectual sparring partners as together we sought to understand the logic behind Indonesia's violence. Muslahuddin Daud, Sana Jaffrey, Dave

McRae, Adrian Morel, Blair Palmer, Sri Kusumastuti Rahayu, Didit Setiawan, Amy Sim, Andi Tama, Rob Wrobel, Matt Zurstrassen: let's work together again soon. Adrian provided particularly helpful comments on the case chapters.

Other friends and colleagues, far too many to list in full, have shaped my understanding of Indonesian violence, politics, and society. Thanks to Paul Adams, Aguswandi, Ed Aspinall, Vic Bottini, Raihana Diani, Rachael Diprose, Byron Good, Jesse Grayman, Suprayoga Hadi, Sandra Hamid, Sidney Jones (who also reviewed early write-ups of some of the chapters), Sri Kuntari, Karrie McLaughlin, Kharisma Nugroho, Ben Olken, Tom Pepinsky, Erman Rahman, Joanne Sharpe, Claire Smith, Matt Stephens, Sudarno Sumarto, Zulfan Tadjoeeddin, Yuhki Tajima, Michael Vatikiotis, and Andrea Woodhouse. Dewi Fortuna Anwar provided useful comments on a draft paper outlining some of my findings.

Beyond Indonesia, conversations and exchanges with many people have provided comparative perspectives that have enriched my thinking. Thanks to Adam Burke, Sarah Cliffe, Nat Colletta, Jim Fearon, Macartan Humphreys, Stathis Kalyvas, Markus Kostner, Rob Muggah, Ben Oppenheim, Tom Parks, Gordon Peake, James Putzell, Nigel Roberts, Pam Tansanguanwong, Ashutosh Varshney, Ingo Wiederhofer, and Susan Wong.

The quantitative data I use in the thesis is from the Indonesian National Violence Monitoring System. Ashutosh Varshney and I originally cooked up the idea to build a comprehensive violence dataset on Indonesian violence. Sana Jaffrey, Imron Rasyid, and Blair Palmer helped make it happen, and their distinctive intellectual interests and experiences shaped the decisions we made on data collection methods and coding choices. Sana and her team deserve particular praise for turning an idea into the largest single country violence dataset worldwide. Thanks to the World Bank and USAID for providing funding, to JRI Research for building the dataset, and to the Indonesian

government's Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare for agreeing for the data to be made publically available.

My fieldwork was financed in part by the World Bank's Conflict and Development team under the leadership of Sonja Litz. Within that team, Inge Tan has been a continual source of administrative and logistical support.

Colleagues from the Center for Security and Peace Studies at Universitas Gadjah Mada helped with the Maluku and North Maluku field research. Najib Azca led the research in Maluku and Imron Rasyid, Jacky Manuputty, and Hilda Rolobessy supported the data collection and drafted initial case study write-ups. Special thanks to Najib whose deep knowledge and sharp analytic thinking I have drawn on continually as the Maluku chapter took shape. Tri Susdinarjanti helped lead the North Maluku fieldwork and Achmad Muhammad Nur, Muhammad Asyikin, Blair Palmer, Adrian Morel, Syahril Sangaji and Didit Setiawan participated in the research. Titik Firawati and Nurul Aini helped me translate many of the interview transcripts and Fransiskus Agustinus Djalong provided research assistance. Some of the arguments and analysis from the Maluku and North Maluku chapters were published in Barron, Azca, and Susdinarjanti (2012).

In Aceh, I conducted most of the new fieldwork with Muslahuddin Daud. Over the course of eight years, Mus has been my guide and co-conspirator in Aceh as we set up and developed the World Bank's program of support to the peace process. The Aceh chapter of the thesis also builds upon many studies I conducted or managed between 2005 and 2009. Parts of the chapter draw on past papers I have written, especially Barron and Clark (2006), Barron (2008, 2009), Barron and Burke (2008), and Barron, Clark, and Palmer (2010). I rehearsed some of the chapter's arguments in a report that was commissioned by The Asia Foundation (Barron, Rahman, and Nugroho 2013).

The core of the case study chapters is the interviews we conducted with over 300 people in Maluku, North Maluku, Aceh, and Jakarta. Because of the sensitivity of the

research's foci, and in order to encourage openness from informants while limiting risks to them, I have largely chosen to keep informants' identities anonymous.

While the World Bank funded much of the data collection, other Oxford grants helped finance my visits to Indonesia and living expenses. The Clarendon Fund provided me with three years of support and two grants from the Politics department helped pay for research trips to Indonesia. Nuffield College also contributed research expenses. In Jakarta, I benefitted from my time as a visiting fellow at the Center for Security and International Studies Jakarta. Thanks to Rizal Sukma and his colleagues for making me feel so welcome. Zejd Muhammad generated the maps used throughout the thesis.

I was also fortunate to be able to present my findings as they emerged in a number of seminars and conferences. Thanks to: Ed Aspinall for organising our panel at the 2011 Indonesian Council Open Conference in Perth, Australia; Kirsten Schulze for inviting me to present at Chatham House; Edo Mahendra for asking me to speak in the Oxford Southeast Asian Studies seminar series; and Asep Suryahadi for giving me the opportunity to run my ideas by Indonesian government personnel and civil society activists in a talk hosted by SMERU as part of the Forum Kajian Pembangunan seminar series. Other talks I gave in Jakarta, Bangkok, and Manila helped me to better articulate my ideas.

A final word of thanks must go to my family. From an early age, my parents, Celia and Sam Barron, instilled in me an appetite for exploring and understanding the world. My brother, Andrew, joined me in early foreign adventures. Amelia Prasetio did not quite realise that not long after agreeing to marry me she would be subject to the four years of the mood swings and anxieties, alternating with seemingly random outbursts of exultation, that characterise the life of a doctoral student, not to mention multiple cross-continent moves. She, more than anyone, is looking forward to my return to 'normal life'. During the DPhil process, she also gave birth to our two children, Kiara and Seamus.

Sleepless nights have no doubt prolonged the time it has taken me to finish this study. But family life has more importantly provided a bedrock of security and happiness. It is to Amelia, Kiara, and Seamus that I dedicate this thesis.

Chapter 1. Introduction

11 September 2011. As much of the world remembered the toppling of New York's twin towers a decade before, the people of Ambon, the capital of the poor eastern Indonesian province of Maluku, had other things on their minds. The previous evening Darfin Saimin, a Muslim *ojek* (motorcycle taxi) driver, had been found dead in Gunung Nona, a Christian part of town.¹ The official story was that the death was accidental. It had been raining, the road was slippery, and motorcycle crashes were frequent in this area. But not everyone was convinced. When the police returned the body to Darfin's family later that night there appeared to be a stab wound on his back. His motorcycle was largely undamaged. What is more, his helmet was full of blood despite the absence of any major head wounds. Rumours started to spread, aided by anonymous text messages, that the driver had been tortured to death by Christians.

The next day hundreds gathered for Darfin's funeral. Tensions soon turned to violence as mourners left the cemetery. A mob set fire to a Christian *ojek* base. A Christian man and two of his grandchildren got caught in the middle of another mob and were attacked with one of the children injured. Claims that the child had been killed spread (she had not) and some Muslim houses were set on fire. Soon text messages were circulating saying that the landmark Silo Church and Mukhlisun Mosque had been attacked. Violence continued until late evening. Early on 12 September, violence flared up in another part of town on the border between Muslim and Christian residential areas. More homes were torched and groups fought through the night. By 14 September, when clashes had largely subsided, eight people, including Darfin, had lost their lives, almost 200 had been injured, more than 300 houses had been burned, and over 3,000 people were displaced.

¹ The following chronology draws on ICG (2011b, 2012a), communications with my research team in Ambon, September 2011, and local newspaper accounts.

Communal passions were ignited but these large episodes of violence did not appear to be entirely spontaneous. Many among the local political elite were under suspicion of corruption and would benefit from a show of violence that might deter investigators. Criminal *preman* (thug) groups in Ambon often caused trouble, sometimes at the behest of local politicians. The actions of the local police and military were also strange. Troops had been withdrawn from Ambon before the violence began despite the obvious potential for unrest. Seven of the deaths were from the bullets of police and military personnel who were sent in to restore peace.

Outbreaks of violence are not new to Ambon city or Maluku province. In January 1999 inter-religious riots erupted following a clash between Muslim and Christian youths in the city. Before long, violence had spread, first to other areas of Ambon Island and then to neighbouring islands. By the time a central government-sponsored peace agreement was signed three years later, almost 2,800 people had died during the extended violence (half in Ambon city), over 15,000 buildings were damaged, and 500,000 people, one-third of the provincial population, were displaced.² The region's economy contracted by one-quarter, access to health, education and other services deteriorated severely, and trauma was widespread (Brown, Wilson, and Hadi 2005).

After the accord was signed violence dropped sharply but did not disappear. From the end of large-scale hostilities in February 2002 until the end of 2012, Maluku saw an average of seven large incidents of violence—riots, group clashes, and large one-way attacks—per year, and smaller-scale episodic incidents have also been common.³ Extended violent conflict, where violence continues for a long period of time at a large

² Unless otherwise stated, violence incidence and impact figures used throughout the thesis are from the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) dataset. More information on the dataset is provided in Chapter 2 and data are outlined more extensively in Chapter 4.

³ I define large episodic incidents as those that resulted in three or more deaths, 10 or more injuries, or 15 or more damaged buildings.

scale, has not reemerged in Ambon or Maluku. Yet the ‘post-conflict’ period has hardly been peaceful.⁴

Maluku was but one of seven Indonesian provinces that experienced large-scale extended violence in the early years of the country’s transition from General Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime to a more democratic polity. Following unrest in Jakarta and other cities in May 1998, a series of extended ethnic and religious violent conflicts erupted across the archipelago—from Indonesian Borneo, to Sulawesi, to the Moluccas. Secessionist conflicts also heated up. East Timor demanded and received independence but 1,400-2,600 lives were lost in the process (CAVR 2005a). The long-standing civil war in Aceh escalated sharply as demands for independence were met by a military clampdown (Aspinall 2009a). In six Indonesian provinces that experienced large-scale extended violence in the early post-Suharto years, over 18,000 people were killed between 1998 and 2003.⁵

A decade on, all of Indonesia’s extended violent conflicts have finished with peace agreements, security responses, and conflict fatigue bringing large-scale hostilities to an end. Yet levels and dominant forms of *post-conflict violence* vary significantly from place to place. North Maluku province experienced its own massive extended inter-communal conflict with over 3,000 killed in less than a year from August 1999. However, from July 2000, when large-scale violence ended, until the end of 2012, in annual per capita terms it has seen only one-third as many violent deaths as has Maluku and very few large violent incidents. The post-conflict experience of Aceh province differs again. Since the signing of a peace agreement between rebel insurgents

⁴ The post-conflict period is that after the end of large-scale hostilities (extended violence). The term is of course not without conceptual problems: in many cases neither the underlying conflict, nor indeed violence, has ceased. Nevertheless, the term is commonly employed in both academic writing and policy discourse and, as such, I use it here. I discuss my use of the term, and other key concepts employed, in Chapter 2.

⁵ This figure excludes deaths in East Timor. Timor is not covered in this study because it gained independence after two decades of illegal Indonesian occupation. A further 693 people were killed in ethnic violence in West Kalimantan in 1997 in the final year of the Suharto regime. Papua and West Papua are also commonly thought of as having experienced extended violent conflicts but violence there has been more sporadic.

and the Indonesian government in August 2005 violent incidents have been common. However, almost all of these have been small disputes with minimal human or material impact per incident.

1. The puzzles and their significance

The short summary of the post-conflict experiences of Maluku, North Maluku and Aceh illustrates the central puzzles this thesis seeks to answer. Each province experienced an intense extended violent conflict and in each place large-scale hostilities came to an end. Yet patterns of post-conflict violence differ. In Maluku, large incidents of episodic violence have continued to occur frequently as have smaller incidents; in post-conflict North Maluku, violence has been largely absent in the post-conflict period; in Aceh, large outbreaks of violence are absent but smaller-scale incidents commonly occur in some areas. As I will show in Chapter 4, such divergence in both levels and forms of recent violence is also noticeable within and between Indonesia's other post-conflict provinces: West and Central Kalimantan, and Central Sulawesi.

Two puzzles immediately stand out. First, *why do levels of post-conflict violence vary between areas?* Existing theories of post-conflict violence have focused on national level conditions that make post-conflict violence more or less likely with factors such as a country's political institutions and social and economic structures identified as having causal significance. In Indonesia, however, these factors do not vary greatly across post-conflict areas yet there has been a clear divergence in levels of post-conflict violence. Why then have some of Indonesia's former conflict zones remained susceptible to episodes of violence while in others peace appears to have consolidated?

Second, *why does post-conflict violence take forms with larger human and physical impacts in some areas and forms that result in smaller impacts in others?* Past studies of post-conflict violence have often viewed post-conflict violence in binary terms: it is

either present or absent. Theories on the causes of different types of violence following peace settlements—on civil war recurrence, on large episodes of violence (such as deadly ethnic riots), and on smaller-scale forms of violence (such as crime and interpersonal violence)—have been developed in isolation with few points of connection. To what extent are these differing forms of post-conflict violence driven by similar factors? Under what conditions does violence escalate into larger forms and conflagrations?

The patterns of violence sketched out above also point to a third puzzle: *Why has large-scale extended violence not recurred anywhere in Indonesia since its peak in the early years of this century?* Globally, such recurrence is common; statistically, we might have expected extended violence to recur in at least some of Indonesia's post-conflict areas. Many of the factors identified in the literature as heightening the risk of recurring civil war are present in Indonesia. These include the presence of abundant natural resources (Ross 2004; Humphreys 2005), high levels of poverty (Blattman and Miguel 2010), ethnic heterogeneity (Besley and Persson 2011; Walter 2009b), large areas of mountainous terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003), and the fact that Indonesia has been experiencing a transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy (Hegre et al. 2001) while remaining a hybrid political regime with elements of both democracy and authoritarianism (Gates et al. 2006). Analysing the deviant case of Indonesia can improve our theories on the sources of extended violent conflict recurrence.

The Indonesian cases, which do not fit closely with our theoretical priors, can thus enhance our understanding of why post-conflict violence occurs (or does not) and why it takes different forms in different areas. Post-conflict violence, as I discuss below, is certainly not unique to Indonesia. The theory developed in this thesis has relevance to other places around the world emerging from large-scale subnational extended violent conflicts such as secessionist civil wars or enduring inter-ethnic violence.

Contributing towards answers to these puzzles also has immense practical significance. On the one hand, it can help policymakers understand how to prevent the recurrence of large-scale extended violence. Recurrence is common: states that have been affected by civil war have a 40% chance of seeing war reoccur within a decade (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008).⁶ Places affected by other forms of extended violence, such as collective communal conflicts between ethnic and religious groups, also often experience renewed unrest. Such violence is of concern because of its human, material and social impacts. Where renewed wars occur GDP declines 2-2.2% per year (Collier 1999; Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol 2003; Restrepo et al. 2008) with a typical civil war resulting in damages and losses of between US\$ 60 billion and US\$ 250 billion (Chauvet, Collier, and Hegre 2008). In such places, incomes are reduced by around 15% and the proportion of people living in absolute poverty increases by almost one-third (Moser 2006). Using the Indonesian experience to improve theory on how to prevent the recurrence of extended violent conflicts, even in unpromising circumstances, can help policymakers work out how to break such tragic cycles of violence.

Beyond this, the thesis can help policymakers prevent frequent episodic violence in post-conflict areas. Where civil war or large-scale communal violence does not resume, other forms of post-conflict violence often emerge. As the case studies in Suhrke and Berdal's (2012) volume illustrate, ongoing violence is the norm rather than the exception in post-conflict regions. Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador have not reverted to civil war but episodic post-conflict violence has led to fatality rates above those experienced during their wars (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008: 51; McNeish and Lopez Rivera 2012).⁷ Of the 740,000 deaths from armed violence across the world each year, 490,000—or two in three—occur outside of war zones (Geneva Declaration

⁶ Walter (2004) and Suhrke and Samset (2007) question the figures of Collier and his colleagues, but they concur that past history of civil war is a robust predictor of further civil war onset.

⁷ Not all of this violence has its roots in the extended violence from before. Much of the recent violence is a result of gang and drug wars, with ambiguous links to the past civil wars. For discussions, see Demombynes (2011) and World Bank (2011b).

Secretariat 2008: 1). A sizeable proportion of these occur in 'post-conflict' countries where wars have formally ended (Muggah 2009b; Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003). The impacts of violence on growth, poverty and development are also not limited only to areas experiencing civil war or other extended forms of violence. In 2006, violence in Central America, where the majority of countries have emerged from recent civil wars, is estimated to have resulted in losses of US\$ 6.5 billion or 7.75% of GDP (Dominguez 2008: 13-14). Indeed, armed violence outside of war zones has larger economic impacts than in areas where wars are ongoing, with losses in productivity of US\$ 95-163.3 billion.⁸

Limiting the incidence and impacts of post-conflict violence is thus vitally important both for domestic policymakers in affected countries and for the international agencies who spend vast resources trying to secure the peace in post-conflict areas. However, attempts to support peace are often stymied by a lack of good theory about the causes of post-conflict violence. In particular, we know little about why episodic post-conflict violence occurs and what causes smaller-scale incidents to escalate into larger, more deadly, conflagrations. Consolidating peace requires a better understanding of why post-conflict violence occurs in some areas and not in others, at some times and not at others, why violence takes different forms in different localities, and why sometimes smaller-scale violence escalates. Contributing to this understanding by building a parsimonious theory of the sources of spatial and temporal variance in post-conflict violence is the thesis's primary task.

2. The approach

In so doing, I adopt a different methodological and analytical strategy than previous studies of post-conflict violence. Cross-country econometric studies have focused on

⁸ This estimate is for just 90 countries (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008).

investigating the correlates of renewed civil war. Country case studies, in turn, have provided in-depth examinations of particular peace processes and post-conflict transitions. This work has collectively generated a range of important insights. But the approaches that have been adopted mean that they cannot explain why post-conflict violence has varied in incidence *within* Indonesia or indeed any other country. Nor do previous studies provide a fully satisfying explanation of why post-conflict violence takes different forms, with differing degrees of human and physical impacts, in different places at different times.

Studies of post-conflict violence have typically taken the state as the unit of analysis. This has meant that the sources of variance in violence within countries cannot be investigated. Studies have usually only looked at the violence after civil wars, where the state was an active party to the conflict, with little consideration of violence that occurs after other types of enduring intra-state conflict, such as extended inter-communal violence. Most work has focused on explaining why civil war reoccurs (or does not) rather than why episodic violence—such as riots or group clashes—emerges in some places. Finally, the few studies that have investigated episodic post-conflict violence have not employed methodological strategies that match areas with divergent patterns of post-conflict violence. The lack of consideration of relatively peaceful cases reduces our confidence that the factors identified are actually causing violence.

2.1 A new approach

My approach differs in significant ways. First, I explore sources of intra-country variation in post-conflict violence. The presence of considerable variation in impacts and forms of post-conflict violence within Indonesia suggests that local level factors and mechanisms play a determinative role. A single country research design is appropriate for isolating what these local factors are. While studies of violence have increasingly focused on subnational variance, to my knowledge there have been no attempts to date

to systematically investigate within-country variation in *post-conflict* violence. My approach is to compare areas within Indonesia that experienced large-scale extended violence but which have seen differing patterns of post-conflict violence. Comparing subnational cases with similar initial conditions—that is, extended violent conflicts with similar impacts fuelled by similar issues—but that diverge in post-conflict experiences can help us identify causal factors leading to outcome variation.

A second difference is that I explain why post-conflict violence takes different *forms* in different areas at different times. Past work has tended to either assess only one type of post-conflict violence (recurring civil war) or has lumped all forms in together (post-conflict violence). Yet some post-conflict areas of Indonesia have seen frequent episodes of violence that result in high per incident fatalities, injuries or damaged buildings, while in other areas violence has been smaller in scale. The thesis develops a taxonomy of violence located in empirically observed differences, distinguishing extended violence from episodic violence and large-scale episodes of violence from smaller-scale ones (Table 1.1). This allows us to assess the extent to which different types of post-conflict violence share similar, or are driven by different, causal processes, and the ways that different forms of violence are linked.

Table 1.1. Types of violence

Type of post-conflict violence	Characteristics	Examples of violence forms
Episodic (small-scale)	Temporally isolated incidents of violence, resulting in relatively small physical and human impacts	Vigilante attacks Small-scale one-on-one fights Small-scale group clashes
Episodic (large-scale)	Temporally isolated incidents of violence, resulting in larger physical and human impacts. Often have level of organization	Riots Large one-way attacks Large group clashes
Extended violence	Where related incidents of violence occur frequently with few temporal gaps, resulting in very large physical and human impacts	Civil wars Long-lasting inter-communal violent conflicts (e.g. inter-ethnic wars)

2.2 Methods

The thesis builds a theory of why post-conflict violence occurs and why it takes different forms. To this end I use both qualitative and quantitative methods.

Large-n datasets allow one to identify broad patterns and trends across a large set of areas and can be used to establish factors that correlate with violence (or its absence). However, econometric methods alone are rarely useful for theory development. They may be able to identify structural factors that make post-conflict violence more likely, whether it is poverty, inequality, ethnic heterogeneity, or weak institutions. However, those seeking to prevent post-conflict violence need a better understanding not only of risk factors but also of the causal mechanisms that produce or constrain violence. In the absence of well developed theories that link cause and effect—something I argue is missing for post-conflict violence—econometric approaches have limited ability to tell us why and how these factors matter.

Qualitative methods are more useful for purposes of theory generation. Case-based process-tracing, where historical information is gathered on the sequence of events leading up to violence, is particularly useful because it allows one to separate cause and effect and to establish how they are linked. Subsequent comparative analysis of cases with different outcomes (e.g. violence of different types or its absence) can help determine the internal validity of findings. However a weakness of case methods is that is difficult to assess the extent to which areas studied are representative of the broader universe of cases.

The thesis builds on the comparative advantages of each method. First, I construct a dataset with information on over 158,000 violent incidents, the largest single country violence dataset anywhere in the world. The data allow for a fine-grained mapping of patterns of violence, not only by incidence but also by form, and the identification of spatial and temporal variation in violence.

Based on the observed variation, I chose six districts in three post-conflict provinces as cases for deeper study.⁹ Each experienced high levels of extended violence; but they differ in terms of both the levels and predominant forms of violence they have seen in the post-conflict period. I develop an analytic narrative (Bates et al. 1998) for each province focusing on the selected districts, which combines an account of the recent post-conflict history of the area with deeper analysis of why violence has occurred with frequency or not.

The narratives utilise a number of data sources. First, I conducted extensive fieldwork in each of my research districts, interviewing over 300 people.¹⁰ Interviews focused on gathering two types of information: data on a range of topics identified in the literature as plausibly impacting on the likelihood of post-conflict violence; and historical information on incidents of post-conflict violence and incidents where violence appeared likely but was averted. The former allowed me to rule out some hypotheses on why post-conflict occurred and to zoom in and develop others. Examining incidents of violence or non-violence then enabled me to see whether the hypothesised violence-producing or constraining mechanisms actually led to these outcomes, allowing me to further refine the hypotheses. My approach was to move iteratively back and forward between deductive reasoning, preliminary testing of resulting hypotheses, and further inductive development of the emerging theory.

Second, I combine insights and information from those interviewed with secondary source material including government statistics, newspaper reports, past studies by academics and other researchers, and civil society reports.

⁹ I chose the district as the unit of analysis because variance in violence is most marked at that level and because the district is so politically and economically important in post-decentralisation Indonesia. The province is the highest level of subnational government in Indonesia. As of 2010, there were 33 provinces in the country. Urban and rural districts (*kotamadya* and *kabupaten*) are the next tier of government. There are around 400 districts in Indonesia, with populations typically ranging from 100,000 to 600,000 people.

¹⁰ Some interviews were also conducted in Jakarta focusing both on case districts and provinces and on national dynamics.

Finally, I dig deeper into the violence dataset to find information on specific incidents of violence and to assess trends in violence at a more disaggregated level within districts.

Structured comparative analysis of these narrative accounts is then used to build a theory that explains spatial and temporal variation in post-conflict violence incidence and forms. To assess why extended violent conflict has varied over time, our third puzzle, I turn to the national level, drawing primarily on secondary source accounts of national elite politics and a more limited number of interviews.

A next step would be to use econometric methods to assess the extent to which the findings hold true beyond my sample of cases, in other post-conflict areas of Indonesia and perhaps beyond. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

3. The argument: the political economy of post-conflict violence

Post-conflict violence is not directly or deterministically produced by poverty, weak state institutions, or fractured social relations, the foci of much of the literature. Rather, to understand why post-conflict violence occurs, or does not, and why it takes the forms it does, we need to focus on the political economy of violence: the ways in which, and the reasons why, violence is used by different actors to shape decisions on the allocation of power and resources. While other factors sometimes matter, and contingency does play a role, focusing on how violence is used to preserve or increase power and resources provides a powerful lens that helps us understand why post-conflict violence of different types occurs.

To this end the thesis develops a novel actor-centred explanation for both spatial and temporal variation in violence incidence and forms. Building on rational-institutionalist foundations, I locate post-conflict violence in the incentives of three different groups—local elites, local violence specialists, and central state elites—to use

violence instrumentally for purposes of accumulation. Violence occurs when members of these groups support its use.

I argue that the extent to which individuals within each group support violence is dictated in large part by the expected benefits that violence affords vis-à-vis non-violent action. Groups are likely to see violence as beneficial where it proves to be a successful strategy in efforts to capture a greater share of power or resources. Where a signal is sent that violence ‘pays’ and where the costs of using violence are low—that is, where the use of violence does not lead to death, injury, or arrest—incentives to use it are strengthened. Where there are few peaceful channels for accumulation, groups will have heightened motivations to use violence as part of the political and economic game. Conversely, where the use of violence is not expected to be beneficial, is costly, or where peaceful means for getting ahead exist, violence is less likely to be used. In short: it is variance in the incentives of groups to use violence or not that produces differing patterns of post-conflict violence.

Why then does violence take different forms in different areas and at different times? Different combinations of support for, or resistance to, violence from each group determine the forms post-conflict violence will take for different kinds of post-conflict violence require the involvement of different sets of actors:

- *Smaller-scale episodic violence* occurs where local violence specialists see benefits in using violence.
- Escalation to *larger-scale forms of episodic violence*, such as riots or group clashes, requires the support of local elites. Absent such support, post-conflict areas will be peaceful or see only smaller-scale episodic violence.
- Escalation to *extended violent conflict* will only occur where elements of the central state elite support or allow such escalation. In the absence of this, violence will remain episodic.

- In *peaceful post-conflict areas* there will be little support for violence from any of the three sets of actors.

Table 1.2 summarises the argument by showing the necessary conditions for each type of violence.

Table 1.2. Necessary Conditions for Different Types of Violence

Level	Group supporting /tolerating violence	Small-scale episodic violence	Large-scale episodic violence	Extended violence
Local (post-conflict area)	Local violence specialists	<i>Necessary</i>	<i>Necessary</i>	<i>Necessary</i>
	Local elites	Not necessary but increases risks	<i>Necessary</i>	<i>Necessary</i>
National	Central state elites	Not necessary	Not necessary	<i>Necessary</i>

Note: bolded factors are necessary conditions for a given type of post-conflict violence. Those also italicised are the extra factors necessary for violence to escalate to that level.

Variation in the incentives of local violence specialists, local elites and central state elites to support violence thus explains in large part why violence occurs (or does not) and why it takes different forms in different areas. It also explains temporal variation in both extended violent conflict and post-conflict violence. Violence occurs at times when motives to support the use of violence are accentuated. This is the case when there is either heightened competition over resources, changes to the level of resources available, or where changes to the rules of the game governing the allocation of power and resources are imminent. Expectations of greater future resources—for example when the state or international donors are about to provide post-conflict funds—will raise the willingness of different groups to utilise or support violence if it is seen as a potentially fruitful strategy. In such situations, individuals and groups tend to trade off the risks of using violence against the expected benefits to be gained from it. Where levels of resources are perceived as being about to drop significantly, violence is also more likely as it can be used as a means to secure a share of a diminishing resource pie. Expected changes to the rules by which power and resources are allocated can also lead

to an upsurge in post-conflict violence as it is used as a strategy to resist changes or shape them in ways that enhance preferential access for some.

4. Structure of the thesis

Following this introduction, the thesis consists of eight additional chapters, arranged in two parts plus a conclusion.

Part I provides a fuller explanation of the arguments and discusses how they were developed. I begin in Chapter 2 by summarising the methods and analytical approaches used in previous investigations of post-conflict violence. I show how research design choices mean that there are fundamental limitations to the extent to which past work can explain why violence varies in incidence and forms within a state. I then outline an alternative approach. I clarify the concepts that are used, develop a taxonomy of violence, and describe the research design employed in the thesis.

Chapter 3 turns from methods to theory. The chapter begins with a discussion of the findings and propositions of past studies of post-conflict violence. I show that no existing theory adequately explains why post-conflict violence varies within Indonesia or any other state. I build on insights from the literature to deductively develop a new framework that helps us explain differences in levels and forms of violence in post-conflict areas.

Part II of the thesis seeks to apply and inductively develop the theory based on research materials from Indonesia. Chapter 4 provides the national picture. It introduces the new dataset and maps out patterns of violence over time and across areas. It provides a brief explanation of Indonesia's extended violent conflicts. It then shows in more detail how post-conflict violence has varied significantly across Indonesia in levels and forms, highlighting both provincial and district level differences.

This variation is then used to justify the selection of provincial and district cases for deeper analysis.

Chapters 5-7 provide materials from Maluku, North Maluku, and Aceh provinces. First, I explain why some post-conflict areas frequently experience large-scale episodes of post-conflict violence while others do not. I do so by comparing two districts from Maluku, each of which has seen frequent incidents of large-scale episodic post-conflict violence (Chapter 5), with two from North Maluku, where such violence has been largely absent (Chapter 6).

Chapter 7 turns to the post-conflict experience of Aceh. In contrast to Maluku, the province has not seen common incidents of large-scale episodic violence in the post-conflict period; unlike North Maluku, some areas have seen frequent small-scale episodic violence. The chapter explains first why post-conflict violence has not taken larger forms in Aceh. Through comparative analysis of two districts, it then explains why smaller-scale post-conflict violence can occur in some areas (and not in others) in the absence of large-scale episodic violence.

While episodic violence has been frequent in some post-conflict regions, no area has seen a return to the extended violence of Indonesia's early democratic transition years. Chapter 8 turns the focus back to the national level to explain why this has been the case.

Chapter 9 performs a number of functions. First, it recaps the central arguments and theory of the thesis. Second, it identifies potential applications for understanding and studying post-conflict violence. The thesis concludes with a discussion of implications for policymakers.

PART I:

EXPLAINING POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE

Chapter 2. Studying Post-Conflict Violence: Approaches and Methods

Studying post-conflict violence is a recent enterprise. After an earlier focus on building understanding of why countries go to war, researchers turned their attention to forms of violence internal to states. The second half of the twentieth century saw the production of vast shelves of books, articles and policy papers seeking to explain why civil wars, rebellions, and more localised episodic violence such as ethnic riots occur. But it was only as that most deadly of centuries drew to a close that scholars started to pay serious attention to the violence that can emerge after the formal end of extended large-scale intra-state violent conflicts.

This new focus was driven primarily by policy concerns. From the end of the Cold War, internationals—including United Nations agencies, regional groupings such as the European Union, international financial institutions, international NGOs, and foreign militaries and diplomats—started to play an ever-increasing role in mediating peace agreements and in providing financial and technical support to their implementation.¹¹ Yet the growth in policy ambition was matched by a growing realisation that many peace settlements fail and that even where wars are brought to an end violence can continue and even increase in their aftermath. New puzzles started to capture researchers' imaginations: Why do some civil wars recur while others do not? Why are some war-to-peace transitions largely peaceful while others are marked by violence?

¹¹ Caplan (2005: 5-11) calls this the “new interventionism”. From 1989-1999, 14 major United Nations peacebuilding operations were deployed to territories that had recently experienced civil war (Paris 2004: 3). Between 1987 and 1994, the annual peacekeeping UN budget increased from US\$ 230 million to US\$ 3.6 billion (Boutros-Ghali 1995). From 1980 and 1998, the World Bank increased lending to post-conflict countries by 800% (World Bank 1998: 1). In December 2005, a Peacebuilding Commission was established within the UN system in recognition of the increased role of ‘soft’ peacebuilding activities that go beyond traditional (‘hard’) peacekeeping duties. Uvin (2002) provides a useful discussion of the evolution of the roles of international development agencies in attempts to build peace.

What types of policies are most likely to lead to the consolidation of peace in places scarred by previous extended violence?

This chapter and the next assess this new and growing literature on the causes of post-conflict violence. In Chapter 3, I consider the empirical findings of various studies and the arguments and theoretical claims they make. Yet before doing so I discuss the methodological and analytic approaches that have been employed in studies to date. This is needed because the various foci of the existing literature flow in large part from the design choices researchers have made and the (usually unstated) ontological understandings of both extended and post-conflict violence that underpin these.

In this chapter, I consider the assumptions, related to the nature of violence and its causes, embodied in two different strands of work on post-conflict violence—large-n cross-country analyses and country case studies—and how these have both shaped research design choices and been shaped by them. I argue for a different way to conceptualise post-conflict violence and to study it. The chapter seeks to show that previous approaches are inadequate to build theories that can answer the central puzzles of this study: why post-conflict violence varies in levels and forms within single countries. New theory is needed. I argue for an approach that: (a) focuses not only on the national level but also subnational factors; (b) that ensures there are cases within the sample that vary in levels and forms of post-conflict violence; and (c) that utilises both quantitative and qualitative methods. The chapter outlines in greater detail the approach adopted, and the methods employed, in the thesis.

1. Previous approaches to studying post-conflict violence and their limitations

Researchers of post-conflict violence have tended to follow one of two paths. The first group of explorers, made up of economists and quantitatively-oriented political

scientists, has focused its efforts on explaining why civil wars recur in some countries and not in others after peace settlements or military victories. Large-n cross-country datasets, which code countries as being either in civil war or at peace, are used with a range of structural environmental factors (such as the type of war; how it was ended; political, economic, and social structures; and geographic characteristics) employed as explanatory variables to test. Econometric analyses isolate the correlates of renewed civil war and case material is sometimes used to show how such correlates are indeed causing renewed civil war although this is not always deemed necessary. The focus has been to develop and test parsimonious explanations that account for a significant share of the variance in the likelihood of civil war recidivism.¹²

The second group—a diverse mix of social scientists (qualitative political scientists, sociologists, historians, anthropologists) and lay researchers (journalists, policy analysts, development practitioners)—have pursued a different approach. Arguing that each country needs to be understood on its own terms, researchers have provided in-depth examinations of particular peace processes and post-conflict transitions, seeking to identify what went wrong or, less frequently, why the war-to-peace transition has been successful. Where such pieces are gathered together in edited volumes, introductory or concluding chapters draw out commonalities and differences although the ambition to use the cases to develop or test any theory is usually limited.¹³ Post-conflict contexts are seen to be exceptionally complex and the search for regularities may be a fruitless one. As Berdal (2012: 312), in his concluding reflections to one recent volume of case studies, writes:

¹² Important work includes: Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001), Walter (2004, 2010), Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006), Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2008), Fortna (2008), and Toft (2010). Licklider's (1995a) pioneering piece is also within this large-n tradition, although he does not use sophisticated statistical analysis.

¹³ Edited volumes include: Licklider (1995b), Zartman (1995), Forman and Patrick (2000a), Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002), Call with Wyeth (2008), Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur (2005), Hoddie and Hartzell (2010), and Suhrke and Berdal (2012). Other single-authored works include Hampson (1996), Paris (2004), Spector (2011), and Call (2012).

Post-war environments do display common features and this has naturally stimulated work on more general studies or ‘approaches’ aimed at explaining post-war violence. While these have undeniably provided valuable insights, bringing to the fore new and potentially significant points of analytical emphasis, the case material collected here makes it clear that *the heuristic value of such general theories is often limited and problematic*.¹⁴

Despite the differences in approach, most researchers in both traditions have tended to share a number of assumptions. First, post-conflict violence is conceptualised as a national-level phenomena. Second, civil wars are viewed as being phenomenologically distinct from other forms of extended violence. Third, post-conflict violence tends to be viewed as being of one type. This has led to research designs that have focused on understanding variance in post-conflict violence between states rather than within them, or on explaining one country’s experience with post-conflict violence; that explore only violence that emerges after civil wars rather than after other forms of extended intra-state violent conflict; and that do not systematically differentiate between different types of post-conflict violence. This section discusses each of these assumptions as well as a further limitation of much of the case study work: the failure to build variance into research designs.

1.1 The unit of analysis

More than four decades ago, Przeworski and Teune (1970) made the simple but important point that comparative analysis does not require comparisons between national units. Rather, the choice of the unit of analysis (the state, the region, the village, the household) should depend on, “an a priori assumption about the level of social systems at which the important factors operate” (*ibid.*: 36).

Many scholars of violence have taken heed. Snyder’s (2001: 93) assertion that “subnational units of analysis play an increasingly important role in comparative politics” certainly applies to the study of violence. Blattman and Miguel (2010: 8) in their summary of advances in understanding civil war argue that, “the most promising

¹⁴ Emphasis added.

avenue for empirical work is on the subnational scale.” Others have reached similar conclusions when studying different forms of violence. Varshney (2002) and Wilkinson (2004), for example, look at how local factors lead to variations in ethnic rioting in India while Straus (2006) assesses sources of local variation in genocidal violence in Rwanda. Econometric papers have also increasingly employed subnational data in order to assess sources of within-country variation in violence (Kalyvas 2008a).¹⁵

However, the study of post-conflict areas has not followed this trend in violence research or comparative political science. Both case-based and large-n studies have overwhelmingly used the state as the unit of analysis with both the dependent variable (the presence of post-conflict violence) and the independent variables (factors or mechanisms that explain it) measured at the national level. Sorpong Peou (2012) thus talks of Cambodia’s post-war violence and situates his explanation of it in the fragility of national-level democratic institutions; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2008) identify factors such as the presence or absence of national elections and national levels of economic development as the reasons why some countries see renewed civil war while others do not.

This is problematic for two reasons: first, extended violent conflicts tend only to affect some areas of countries; and, second, post-conflict violence usually varies in incidence and form within these areas. This variation means that factors or mechanisms at the subnational level must have causal significance.

The majority of civil wars and other extended violent conflicts do not affect all areas of a country. Weinstein (2007: 17) argues that over half of all civil wars since 1945 have been national in scope: rebel groups seeking to control the state account for 56% of all belligerent groups. Yet even in such ‘national’ civil wars, many areas of a country

¹⁵ Papers on Indonesian violence using subnational data include: Barron, Kaiser, and Pradhan (2004, 2009) and Tajima (2012), who use the village as the unit of analysis; and Tadjoeeddin and Murshed (2007), Mancini (2008), Murshed, Tadjoeeddin, and Chowdhury (2009), Tadjoeeddin, Chowdhury, and Murshed (2011), and Østby et al. (2011), who use the district.

will be only minimally affected. At least until recent years, northern areas of Afghanistan were relatively untouched by violence (Stewart 2011). Providing a catalogue of examples across countries as diverse as Spain in the 1930s, Vietnam in the 1960s, and Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Kalyvas (2006: 2) argues that civil war violence, as opposed to civil war presence, is a localised phenomenon. Weinstein's figure also likely overstates the proportion of extended violent conflict that can be deemed to be national in any sense.¹⁶

Indeed, subnational extended violent conflicts, which include secessionist insurgencies and localised extended inter-communal violence, are at least as frequent as civil wars where combatants aim to control the central organs of the state. In South and Southeast Asia alone, there have been 26 active subnational conflicts affecting 10 countries since 1992. Since 1946, such conflicts have killed more than 1.35 million people with almost 100,000 dying between 1999 and 2008. Between 1999 and 2008, subnational conflicts killed more people in Asia than every other form of conflict combined (Parks, Colletta, and Oppenheim 2013).¹⁷

In nations affected by such conflicts, violence has little direct impact in large swathes of the country. In Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army operated in provinces covering 44% of the country while other provinces remained untouched by war (Raleigh and Hegre 2005). Mindanao, the location of a series of secessionist civil wars, accounts for just one-quarter of the Filipino population, but these conflicts have only affected around 6% of the national population (Parks, Colletta, and Oppenheim 2013). More striking still, the conflict-affected south of Thailand houses less than 3% of the country's population (*ibid.*), a similar level to the proportion of the UK population that

¹⁶ This is because: (a) civil war datasets typically use overly restrictive death thresholds for ascertaining when a civil war is taking place; and (b) civil war datasets only include cases of extended violence where the central state is an active player. I discuss these issues further below.

¹⁷ This figure only includes conflicts where the state is one of the fighting parties and not inter-communal conflicts where the state does not actively participate.

lives in Northern Ireland, which was wracked by decades of unrest (Barron, Arthur, and Bartu 2012).

Similarly, Indonesia's bouts of extended violence have affected just some locales. The province of Aceh, which saw three decades of civil war, includes less than 2% of Indonesia's population. Aside from a single terrorist attack on the Jakarta stock exchange building in September 2000, Indonesians in other areas of the country saw little impact from the civil war, one reason why it took so long for a political conflict resolution process to emerge (*ibid.*). Indonesia's inter-communal extended violent conflicts were also concentrated in a relatively small number of areas, with 15 districts and cities, containing just 6.5% of Indonesia's population, experiencing 85.5% of all deaths from communal violence between 1990 and 2003.¹⁸ Describing Uganda, the Philippines, Thailand, the UK, or Indonesia as being either 'in conflict' or 'at peace' is not particularly illuminating, for it masks the extreme variation in violence conditions within each country.

Within countries that have experienced extended violent conflicts that have come to an end, there also tends to be marked differences in the incidence of post-conflict violence across areas. As I show in Chapter 4, there has been significant variation in levels, impacts and forms of post-conflict violence between areas of Indonesia affected by different violent conflicts and, indeed, between areas affected by the same conflict. This is by no means only the case for Indonesia. One may compare levels of post-conflict violence in, say, Bosnia with other post-conflict countries, as Berdal, Collante-Celador, and Buzadzic (2012) do, and conclude that post-conflict Bosnia presents "an encouraging exception" in that it has been largely violence-free (*ibid.*: 75). Yet such cross-national comparisons draw attention away from the fact that some areas of the country have seen continuing violence while others have not.

¹⁸ Varshney, Tadjoeeddin, and Panggabean (2010: 42). Their data excludes the locations of separatist violence (Aceh and Papua) and does not include episodes of violence between individuals that can have significant cumulative impacts.

The presence of subnational variation in both extended and post-conflict violence means that theories of post-conflict violence built solely on national level factors are problematic. One issue is methodological and affects all of the large-n cross-country studies. These studies have developed explanations using variables measured at the national level: the strength and characteristics of central state institutions, national levels of poverty, the ethnic make-up of a country, and so on. Yet national measures of mountainous terrain, GDP per capita, or ethnic fractionalisation, which are deemed to predict civil war recurrence, may be poor proxies for conditions in the areas that actually experienced civil war (Raleigh and Hegre 2009).¹⁹ Even if ethnic fractionalisation at the national level co-varies with the likelihood of a country experiencing civil war recurrence, if such diversity is similar in areas of a country that saw renewed violence and those that did not then it cannot be deemed to be causing recurrence. If a large proportion of a country that sees renewed violence is mountainous, but the actual areas that experience new violence are not, then terrain is not a convincing explainer (Daly 2012).

Beyond these methodological problems, which can be addressed through the use of better measures,²⁰ there is a broader point to be made. Logically, national factors cannot be the source of within-country spatial variation in violence. The presence of a set of structural factors might explain the propensity of a given country to experience extended violence or high levels of post-conflict violence within its territory. But it cannot explain why some areas of the country are affected while others are not for, by definition, national-level factors do not vary across regions of a polity.²¹ To understand such local variation, we need to build theories based on factors that differ from area to

¹⁹ This is a problem not only for the literature on recurring civil war but also for work on why civil war occurs in the first place.

²⁰ One attempt to do this within the cross-country large-n tradition is the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), which geo-codes the exact location of battles. See, for example, Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh (2009).

²¹ National factors may have more utility in explaining *temporal variation* in violence. I argue in the thesis's penultimate chapter that large-scale extended violence has not recurred anywhere in Indonesia because of changes in national institutions.

area. This requires research designs that use disaggregated subnational data, that turn their analytic focus to local factors and mechanisms, and that compare areas within a country.²²

1.2 Forms of extended violence

A second assumption is that civil wars are phenomenologically distinct from other forms of extended violent conflict. This has meant that past work, both in the large-n and case study traditions, has focused overwhelmingly on post-conflict violence that emerges after the end of civil wars. A constituent element of most definitions of civil war is that the central state must be one of the warring parties. Little attention has been paid to the violence that can occur after the end of other forms of extended violent conflict, such as long-lasting collective inter-communal violence.²³ Five of Indonesia's six recent extended violent conflicts were of this type: violence in Maluku, North Maluku, Central Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, and Central Sulawesi was between groups of the population rather than between the state and an armed non-state group. Extended violence in places like Bihar in India and parts of Colombia, Brazil, and South Africa also falls into this category (Cramer 2006: 72-74). Insights from the post-civil war literature *may* have applicability to these areas; but the exclusion of areas that experienced extended inter-communal violence from studies means that it has not been possible to determine empirically whether or not this is the case.

Civil war violence is traditionally studied in isolation from other forms of collective political violence, such as ethnic riots or pogroms, because it is viewed as

²² This mirrors Hall's (2003) broader assertion that dominant ontologies in comparative politics are changing, with causation seen as much more complex and contextually specific than in the past. This requires methods and research designs that can uncover local micro-level processes.

²³ Extended communal violence usually although not necessarily takes the form of conflicts between ethnic or religious groups. This is because, as Horowitz (1985, 2001) along with many others has noted, such ascriptive identities provide a particularly clear basis for mobilisation and the determination of insider-outsider status. However, they may also take place between other identity groups, such as those with different political or ideological affiliations (such as class groups). Because of this, I use the signifier of extended communal violence rather than collective ethnic or religious violence.

distinct in two aspects. First, it is assumed that the causes of civil war are different from those of other forms of violence. Scacco (2009: 6) posits that “the incentive structures and dynamics at work in civil and interstate wars are quite different from those we observe in shorter, more localised but no less deadly episodes of ethnic rioting.” Weinstein (2007) argues that patterns of, incentives for, and collective actions associated with civil war recruitment differ from mobilisation for other forms of violence. Because root causes differ, it is argued that it does not make sense to address both in the same study. Second, it is assumed that the impacts of civil war differ. Gurr (1986), for example, highlights differences in the scale of destruction and Varshney (2007) notes that civil wars are more likely to affect rural areas whereas ethnic riots are an urban phenomenon. One consequence of viewing civil war and other types of violence as distinct is that the literatures on civil war, ethnic violence, and violent crime have developed independently, with few points of connection.²⁴

Yet, as Blattman and Miguel (2010: 6) argue in their extensive survey of the civil war literature, “the distinction between civil wars and other types of political instability has been largely assumed rather than demonstrated.” Observations of differences in causes and impacts are indeed salient when comparing civil wars with Horowitz’s (2001) episodic “deadly ethnic riots” or localised forms of smaller-scale violence. However, the differences between civil wars and other forms of escalated enduring violent conflict are less clear. Tilly (2003), for example, argues that the motivations driving other forms of ‘coordinated destruction’ may be similar to those fuelling civil wars and treats both civil war and other forms of highly organised violence with large impacts as one type of contention. In a recent special edition of *Perspectives on Politics*, a number of contributors call for the inclusion of a wide range of forms of political

²⁴ Kalyvas (2008c), for example, bemoans the fact that constructivist insights from the ethnic violence literature that emphasise the fluidity of identities have not been incorporated into the theoretical or empirical civil war literature.

violence within the same research studies and agendas to allow for an assessment of the ways in which they are related (Isaac 2012).

Indeed, the similarities in patterns of violence in areas affected by civil war and those affected by large-scale extended inter-communal violent conflict are often greater than the differences. Extended communal violence between groups, where the state is not a central conflict party, can result in thousands of deaths and have serious negative impacts on physical, human, and social capital. It can be multi-year in duration, may be spread over a large geographic area, and a large share of deaths may be concentrated in rural areas. Levels of organisation may approximate that of armed parties in civil wars. The state is often not able to ensure order for long periods of time.

Stathis Kalyvas, who has done more than any other contemporary scholar to highlight the conceptual ambiguities and problematic assumptions in commonly operationalised definitions of civil war, notes that non-state extended violent conflicts can be viewed as being a subset of the broader family of civil wars (Kalyvas 2004). In typologising cases of civil war, he identifies 'symmetric non-conventional wars' as one category. These involve irregular armies on both sides battling for control of territory and take place in places where the state has imploded. While he cites failed state examples such as Somalia and the Central African Republic (Kalyvas 2008b) such wars may also occur in transitioning states, where the state is unable, or unwilling, to impose order. Using Kalyvas's taxonomy, the distinction between secessionist civil wars, such as that which occurred in Aceh, and the inter-communal 'wars' of other areas of Indonesia is largely related to the degree of asymmetry in fighting capabilities between warring parties.²⁵

²⁵ Under Kalyvas's typology, Aceh and East Timor are examples of 'asymmetrical non-conventional civil wars', with guerrilla warfare employed by insurgents against the standing Indonesian army. Maluku, North Maluku, West and Central Kalimantan, and Central Sulawesi experienced 'symmetrical' wars, where parties were relatively evenly matched in strength and the state was not a warring party.

Excluding areas that saw extended communal violence that does not meet the restricted criteria that define civil war means that it is not possible to analyse the differences (or similarities) between post-conflict violence in areas that experienced differing kinds of large-scale intra-state violent conflict. Comparing violence patterns in areas that experienced classically-defined civil war and in areas that experienced other forms of highly organised enduring inter-communal violence allows for an assessment of whether and how differences in the kinds of extended violence impact on the likelihood of post-conflict violence occurring and the forms it takes.

1.3 Forms of post-conflict violence

The existing literature has focused primarily on identifying why civil war recurs rather than why other forms of episodic post-conflict violence occur. Such studies explicitly or implicitly treat civil war as a binary condition: countries are either at war or peace. To be counted as experiencing civil war, a country must have suffered at least 1,000 battle deaths in a given year. If this threshold is not met, the country is recorded as being 'peaceful'.²⁶ This is problematic in a number of respects.

²⁶ Civil wars are classically defined as intra-state armed conflicts between two parties, one of whom must be the central state, resulting in 1,000 or more deaths per annum, where the strongest side experienced at least 5% of those deaths. This is the definition employed by the Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Small 1972, 1994; Sarkees 2000). COW records whether a country experienced civil war for each year. Cases where annual deaths are lower than 1,000, where the state is not a direct party to the conflict, or where deaths are one-sided are not included in the dataset. Other datasets, such as the Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) at the University of Uppsala/PRIO, do not use a single threshold. ACD differentiates between 'wars' (where there are more than 1,000 battle deaths in a single year – as with COW), 'intermediate armed conflicts' (where there are more than 25, but less than 1,000 battle deaths per year, and a total conflict history of more than 1,000 deaths), and 'minor conflicts' (where there are more than 25 battle deaths per year but less than 1,000 in total). Armed conflicts still need to be between governments and a rebel group. See Erikson and Wallensteen (2004). However, the Uppsala/PRIO dataset has generally not been used to examine the recurrence of civil war. Elbadawi, Hegre, and Milante (2008) is a rare exception, coding a civil war as having "restarted" where a given conflict resulted in less than 25 deaths in one year and then 25 in the next year (*ibid.*: 452). This is clearly problematic for a number of reasons including: (a) the fact that these are minor conflicts not civil wars according to dataset rules; and (b) a temporary fall in violence below the threshold of 25 deaths is counted as a conflict termination, even though it may just be a reduction in intensity in an ongoing conflict. This second issue probably explains their finding that an "increasing proportion of onsets were recurrences" (*ibid.*: 453). Some other analyses of civil war have employed different thresholds. Fearon and Laitin (2003), for example, require 100

First, small fluctuations in death totals may provide a misleading picture. A rise in battle deaths, for example from 900 per year to 1,000 per year, would result in a country being coded as having gone from peace to war, even though there may be substantively little change on the ground. Given the difficulty of capturing precise measures of deaths during wars (Gleditsch 2004: 233), in particular in rural areas, changes that put a country over (or below) the threshold can easily be a function of measurement error. (This risk is particularly great given that English language news sources are generally used in determining the number of battle deaths.) The problem is compounded by a lack of clarity, and indeed consistency, in coding procedures (Sambanis 2002, 2004).

The use of absolute death totals is also problematic given that countries vary massively in size. Sambanis (2004: 821) points out that conflicts that kill less than 1,000 people in a year in small countries may have higher per capita impacts than those that kill over 1,000 in much larger countries. If we turn to impacts at the subnational level (e.g. in the affected provinces or districts of Indonesia or regions of other countries), per capita death tolls jump significantly and a strong case can be made to categorise conflicts with lower annual death tolls as civil wars. Finally, regression results are extremely sensitive to the coding of when wars start and end, one reason why different scholars have reached such different conclusions on factors associated with civil war onset.²⁷

Beyond these methodological issues, such approaches are not able to solve the thesis's puzzles for they do not allow for an assessment of *why other forms of post-conflict violence occur*. If a dichotomous war/peace distinction is employed, what Suhrke

deaths per year to code a civil war as ongoing. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) add additional criteria that a conflict must fulfil to be counted as a civil war.

²⁷ Sambanis (2004) shows how authors using different measurements of civil war produce vastly different results in explaining its incidence. Mack (2002) calls for the common use of one dataset in order to ensure policymakers do not receive conflicting advice from academics using different data sources.

and Berdal (2012) call the “peace in between” and Nordstrom (2004) terms “not-war-not-peace”, where war has not recurred but violence continues, will go undetected and cannot be investigated.

The country case literature helps fill this gap in part by highlighting a range of forms of post-conflict violence such as revenge killings (Boyle 2012), sexual violence (Samset 2012), violent gang battles (Rodgers 2003, 2006), and violent crime (Andreas 2004). Yet in focusing on one kind of episodic post-conflict violence, we again face the problem that we cannot tell whether or not causal factors differ for different types. Ascertaining this requires more work in developing theoretically and empirically grounded taxonomies of violence and then carefully comparing the causal processes behind each type. Yet there have been few attempts to systematically typologise forms of post-conflict violence and even fewer attempts to use such distinctions to assess variation across countries or areas.

1.4 Explaining variation

A final issue affects much of the case study work. Where studies have considered episodic post-conflict violence, methodological strategies have usually not been employed that carefully match areas with divergent violent patterns. The case study literature has rarely systematically compared ‘successful cases’ (where post-conflict areas have seen little violence) with cases where violence reemerged.

Without such variation in outcomes, it is difficult to attribute causality to factors identified as being associated with violence, peace, or shades thereof. Suppose X represents violence and Y represents its absence. Many explanations of violence have taken the following form: if (a) transmigration, (b) income differentials between two ethnic or religious communities, and (c) demographic imbalances in the local military are present in X, they have been treated as the causes of violence. Methodological discussions inspired by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) have shown some of the

limitations of this kind of causal reasoning.²⁸ Factors (a), (b) and (c) may ‘cause’ X, if one can show that they are *not* present in Y. Conversely, if (a), (b) and (c) are present in both X and Y, then something else is leading to the divergence.²⁹ Studying appropriately chosen cases that vary along the spectrum of post-conflict violence is important to tease out the contribution of different factors to different outcomes. Such variations may take place ‘within a case’: for example, if an area experiences periods of violence and periods when it is absent, comparison of these periods may yield insights.³⁰ Yet relying *solely* on such within-case analysis amplifies a general problem of case-based research: it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which causal claims generated from the case under study can be extended to others not studied.

2. Concepts

I thus argue that our understanding of why post-conflict violence occurs will be enhanced if we turn our focus to the subnational level and ensure that there are cases within the sample that vary in both levels and types of post-conflict violence. I outline the methodological strategy employed in this thesis below. However, as the discussion above also suggests, clarifying concepts and developing taxonomies of violence are important first steps towards building better theories on why post-conflict violence occurs and why it takes different forms in different areas.³¹

²⁸ See also Geddes (2003, Chapter 3) who strongly warns against selecting on the dependent variable, showing how numerous studies of democratisation have reached inaccurate conclusions because of bias in case selection. King, Keohane, and Verba’s arguments build upon Mill’s (1872) method of difference. Van Evera (1997) and Brady and Collier (2004) provide critical discussions.

²⁹ Factors (a), (b) and (c) may still contribute towards causing X, but they cannot alone cause X.

³⁰ Studying periods of violence and its absence within one area satisfies the condition of having divergence in outcomes across units studied. In effect, a single case becomes multiple cases. See George and Bennett (2005) and Gerring (2007).

³¹ Goertz (2005: 4-5) argues that “a concept involves a theoretical and empirical analysis of the object or phenomenon referred to by the word. A good concept draws distinctions that are important in the behaviour of the object. The central attributes that a definition refers to are those that prove relevant for hypotheses, explanations, and causal mechanisms ... Concepts are theories about ontology: they are theories about the fundamental constitutive elements of a

In seeking to understand and explain post-conflict violence, I make a number of conceptual distinctions. First, I differentiate violent from non-violent contention. Second, I distinguish extended violent conflict from post-conflict periods. Finally, I distinguish different types of violence in the post-conflict period.

2.1 Conflict, crime, and violence

The thesis seeks to explain post-conflict violence rather than post-conflict tensions that do not take violent form. Peaceful conflicts are essential features of functioning societies and polities across the world (Coser 1956). In areas emerging from extended violence, too, non-violent conflict may play a productive role. Consolidating peace requires transforming the economic and political structures and distributions of power that gave rise to earlier violence and which often solidified during periods of extended violence. Such transitions often create tensions with groups who benefitted from past violence rejecting change; but the presence of such tensions may be a sign that post-conflict transformation is indeed occurring. Levels of post-conflict tensions are hence not a good measure of the extent to which peace is consolidating. The challenge for policymakers engaged is not to limit conflict and tensions but to ensure that they do not erupt into violence. In ascertaining the strength or fragility of a post-conflict environment, violence is a better, although not perfect, measure than non-violent conflict.

I thus use violence as my outcome measure. Violence is defined as any incident between individuals or groups (including the state) that results in direct physical impacts such as deaths, injuries, rapes, or the destruction of property. There are a number of constituent elements of this definition. First, I focus solely on violence that has observable physical effects and hence do not include what Galtung (1969) has

phenomenon.” Indeed, as Hempel (1965: 113) has written, “theory formation and concept formation go hand in hand; neither can be done in isolation from the other.”

influentially termed ‘structural violence’.³² Structural violence occurs where a society is characterised by underlying conditions of dominance and exploitation meaning that ‘positive peace’, where such inequality is addressed, cannot take hold. Structural violence, however, is only indirectly physically violent—it *may* be a cause of physical violence but it does not *necessarily* lead to physical destruction. Extending the use of the term violence to include structural violence prevents us from assessing why in some cases such underlying conditions lead to *physical* violence while in others they do not.

Second, I include not only violence involving groups but also that between individuals. Researchers have generally differentiated collective and individual violence, sometimes calling the former violent conflict and the latter violent crime.³³ While violent conflicts involve an incompatibility of interests between groups, violent crime is viewed as being driven by private motives. As such, it is assumed that violent conflict and violent crime are driven by different factors. Yet this dichotomy has considerable conceptual weaknesses. Using the presence of a group actor as a proxy for violent conflict (as opposed to violent crime) is problematic because it conflates the parties directly involved in the violent incident with the nature of the contestation that underlies the violence. Violent incidents between individuals are often manifestations of deeper underlying contention. Incidents of violence involving only individuals often stem from deeper-rooted inter-group struggles over material or psychological resources.

Figure 2.1 sets out the logic. Incidents of violence can be differentiated not only by the parties directly involved in the act but also by the nature of the cleavage that underpins it. The bottom-right box contains an example of what is commonly thought of as collective violent conflict: the violence involves groups and violence is driven by

³² See also Akhil Gupta’s (2012) important recent study of structural violence and the state bureaucracy in India.

³³ This discussion draws on Barron and Sharpe (2010). Thanks to Blair Palmer for discussions on the differences and similarities between violent conflict and violent crime.

inter-group contestation. Yet incidents in the top-right box are also motivated by inter-group differences, even though it is individuals who participate in the unrest. In post-conflict contexts, where tensions between groups tend to be high, such incidents can be common. Excluding such incidents from any study of post-conflict violence risks biasing analyses.

Figure 2.1 Different forms of violence

		Cleavages underpinning violence	
		<i>Inter-personal</i>	<i>Group</i>
Parties involved in the violent incident	<i>Individual participants on both sides</i>	Two people fight over a debt = individual expression of interpersonal incompatibility	A local kills a migrant = individual expression of a group conflict
	<i>Multiple participants on at least one side</i>	Individual hires thugs to beat another individual = conflict or criminal act committed by a group	Interethnic riot = mass expression of group conflict

The types of incident set out in the two left-hand boxes are typically thought of as crime. Yet in practice, determining whether an incident fits in the left- or right-hand column can be difficult because it requires information that identifies the motives driving a particular incident of violence. Such information is often lacking. Many incidents of violence are fuelled by a combination of private and group-based motives, ranging from pecuniary interests to efforts to protect a group's cultural heritage or political position. Ultimately, too, the human security impacts on affected individuals are the same, whatever the motive.

Because of this, I include incidents typically thought of as violent conflict and those thought of as violent crime in my primary outcome measure: post-conflict violence. As discussed later, I do attempt to distinguish between the two, based on an interpretative reading of the extent to which a preexisting cleavage is used as justification for the violent act: where such a cleavage is implicated, the incident is coded

as being violent conflict; where it is not, the incident is coded as violent crime. Yet the difficulty in establishing this with any analytic precision means that for general purposes a more encompassing category (post-conflict violence) has greater utility. And, as I discuss below, there are other more theoretically and practically useful ways to disaggregate post-conflict violence than to distinguish between conflict and crime.

2.2 The extended violent conflict and post-conflict periods

Studying post-conflict violence requires determining when a given conflict period ends and hence when the post-conflict period begins. One way to do this is to look at when a prominent event such as a declared military victory or a signed peace accord occurred—the post-conflict period starts at this point. Yet as the recent experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate clearly, these points do not always coincide with a major change in the dynamics of violence. Instead, I define the violent conflict and post-conflict periods by the prominent types of violence that occur in each. The *violent conflict period* is when extended violence occurs, which may take the form of civil war (armed battles for control of the central state or for territory within the state) or extended communal violent conflict (large-scale collective violence between communal groups that endures over a long period). During the extended violence period, large-scale violence with large physical impacts is ongoing with violent incidents, framed as part of a master conflict narrative, occurring frequently. The *post-conflict period* is defined as the time after large-scale extended violence has ended.

Two issues require discussion. First, conflict (and indeed violence) may continue in the post-conflict period. As Astri Suhrke (2012: 6) has observed, “taken literally, ‘post-conflict violence’ is an oxymoron”. Indeed this thesis shows how pervasive violence can be in some ‘post-conflict’ areas. Yet such violence differs from that which occurs in periods of extended violence. While underlying factors and the actors involved may remain the same, although not necessarily so, incidents of violence tend to be

episodic, lasting for shorter periods of time. Impacts are usually (although not always) lower per incident, the nature of organisation of violence tends to be different, and there are longer gaps between sets of incidents.³⁴ Extended violence, in either its civil war or extended communal violence forms, may reemerge during post-conflict periods. But when this happens, as happened in Iraq, it no longer makes sense to call such areas 'post-conflict'. I thus define post-conflict violence as the episodic violence that occurs in areas emerging from extended violence where extended violence has not restarted.

A second issue relates to the length of time for which an area can be viewed as being post-conflict. Strictly speaking, anywhere that has ever experienced extended violence is post-conflict. Yet such a conceptualisation has little practical utility. Using this definition, all societies where large-scale extended violence is not ongoing are post-conflict. Across the world, development has been driven by the use of violence; states have been forged in large part through war, either between states (Tilly 1975, 1992; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Fukuyama 2011) or within countries (Slater 2010a) and development and violence have tended to go hand in hand (Bates 2001). A more useful definition puts temporal bounds on the post-conflict period. Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) ten-year period, the time they argue when places are particularly prone to the reemergence of extended violence, makes as much sense as any, although it should be noted that the remnants of war (and its associated risks) can endure long beyond this. The earliest of Indonesia's post-authoritarian extended violent conflicts (in West Kalimantan province) ended in April 1999, the latest (in Aceh) in 2005. As such, the post-conflict periods analysed in this thesis are between seven and 13 years in length. The focus of the thesis is thus on explaining patterns of violence in roughly the first decade after large-scale extended violent conflict has ended.

³⁴ Kalyvas (2006) has shown that much of the violence within civil wars is often episodic, with violence taking place between neighbours driven by motivations that may be divorced from those of the broader parties organising violence. However, such violence occurs within the context of war making it fundamentally different from the episodic violence that occurs during times of 'peace' or post-conflict periods.

2.3 Types of post-conflict violence

One may classify types of post-conflict violence in a number of ways. One option is to separate out incidents that appear to be driven by different *issues*. Such an approach may, for example, distinguish post-conflict violent incidents over land from those that relate to political competition and those where identity issues appear to be more important. Another approach is to differentiate incidents by the *actors* involved in incidents of post-conflict violence. Thus state-inflicted violence can be separated from that instigated by civilians or violence committed by former combatants. A third approach is to differentiate incidents by the *motives* of actors involved with those driven by greed distinguished from those that seek to address grievances.

In general scholars and practitioners have tended include issues, actors and motives in their typologies of post-conflict violence. Muggah (2009a: 228), for example, includes elements of all three in developing a taxonomy of five types of post-conflict violence: political violence, routine state-led violence, economic and crime-related violence, community and informal justice, and property-related disputes. The World Bank's 2011 World Development Report distinguishes between local inter-group conflict, 'conventional' political conflict, gang violence, organised crime and trafficking-related violence, and local conflicts with transnational ideological connections (World Bank 2011a: 54). Other classifications of violence differentiate types using more than one of the three factors. Horowitz (1985) and Sambanis (2001), for example, distinguish between ethnic and non-ethnic violence. This classification is built upon both actors (ethnic groups and groups which have their basis in another form of identity) and issues (relating to inter-group ethnic differences).

Yet such typologies have a number of analytic weaknesses. First, the categories are not mutually exclusive. Muggah's property disputes, for example, could be driven by political or criminal motives; the World Bank's gang violence may be identifiable by the

involvement of criminal groups, but the actions of gangs may be driven by local inter-group tensions or, indeed, by the inflow of money from political parties or elites. Second, the typologies are not exhaustive. Where, for example, does non-routine state-led violence fit within Muggah's classificatory schema? Under which category of the World Bank's typology would non-local inter-group conflicts fall? The lack of obvious discrete rules for assigning an episode of violence to a type means that different analysts may choose to place different incidents in different categories. This is a result of trying to use too many variables to distinguish cases.

Ultimately the heuristic value of typologies lies in their ability to parsimoniously identify the *key* elements of a given phenomenon that vary across types. In ascertaining which elements are of most importance, and hence which should be used to classify post-conflict violence (or, indeed, any other outcome variable), one must assess which aspects of a phenomenon are most important in determining why important causal variables have differential effects. Different types, in other words, should be identified based on differing causal processes; the greater the difference between causal processes across types, and concomitantly the greater similarity in causal processes underlying incidents within types, the more useful the typology is.

In constructing a simple typology of post-conflict violence I follow Tilly's (2003) argument that more important than motives, actors or issues is the level of damage caused by an incident and the degree of organisation that underlies it. Chapter 3 makes the case for this: I argue that incidents of post-conflict violence that result in greater human and physical impacts tend to have a higher level of organisation, with larger groups usually involved and elites orchestrating the violence; I argue, theoretically, that the factors that explain smaller (less destructive) and larger (more destructive) incidents of post-conflict violence differ to a large extent. As such, I differentiate incidents of post-conflict violence with large impacts—defined as those leading to three or more deaths, 10 or more injuries, or 15 or more damaged properties—from those

with smaller impacts. These cut-off points were defined after initial fieldwork. In that fieldwork, I looked at a number of cases with different physical impacts (in terms of deaths, injuries, and properties damaged) and tried to establish whether there were patterns of levels of organisation across cases with different levels of impact. I then asked a range of informants about which cases they perceived to have been 'large' and which were smaller. Clearly this was a rather subjective exercise. Indeed, as with attempts to measure civil war, there is no first principles basis that leads us to use any particular cut-off point for determining whether an incident is large or small. I ran analyses with slightly different parameters, including two or four deaths rather than three, but findings on spatial variation did not significantly change.

Other factors such as issues (what the violence was ostensibly about) and the form of violence (the way in which it is expressed) are also important. But, I argue that at a deep level the 'causes' of violent incidents driven by contestation over say land or ethnic animosity tend to be more similar than the causes of incidents that result in large-scale and smaller-scale damage.

2.4 A taxonomy of violence

Based on the above distinctions, Table 2.1 presents the taxonomy of violence used throughout the thesis.

Table 2.1. A taxonomy of violence

Dimension	Extended violence (conflict period)	Episodic violence (post-conflict period)	
	<i>I. Civil wars/extended communal violence</i>	<i>II. Large-scale episodic violence</i>	<i>III. Small-scale episodic violence</i>
Common forms	Civil wars, extended inter-ethnic violence	Riots, large group clashes, terror attacks, large one-way attacks	Violent crime, vigilantism, small-scale groups clashes
Level of destruction	Very high	High per incident	Low per incident
Organisation of violence	Highly organised groups on both sides	Usually show a high degree of organisation	Usually little organisation
Duration	Long, usually multiple years	Short per incident	Short per incident
Geographic concentration	Over wider areas (although some areas less affected)	Concentrated	Concentrated

The thesis aims to identify and explain differential patterns of episodic violence (in both aggregate levels and in levels of the two ‘types’: larger-scale and smaller-scale) in areas that experienced extended violence before. Comparisons of areas with high and low levels of post-conflict violence (type II plus type III) can help us identify the factors that lead to such divergence. Comparisons between areas experiencing larger-scale episodic post-conflict violence (type II) and those seeing small-scale incidents (type III) can illuminate the extent and the ways in which the causes of the two are similar or differ.

3. Methods

3.1 Using different methods to understand post-conflict violence

The focus of the thesis is to build theory on why post-conflict violence occurs (or does not) and why it takes the forms it does. In doing so, the thesis relies primarily on newly collected empirical data, both quantitative and qualitative.

Each type of data has utilities and limitations. Large-n datasets typically allow for two kinds of analyses: (a) identification of broad patterns and trends; and (b)

establishment of correlations between independent and dependent variables. Econometric work has greatly added to our knowledge on post-conflict violence, for example by identifying a range of factors that coexist with the recurrence of civil war. This helps policymakers ascertain with some degree of confidence the risks that a country with a certain set of structural characteristics will see renewed fighting.

Yet econometric work alone is rarely able to supply fully satisfying causal explanations for why post-conflict violence occurs. Quantitative research on violence is plagued by problems of endogeneity; it is difficult to clearly establish which structural factors are causing violence and which result from violence. Finding good instrumental variables, or using time series data and assessing Granger causality, can help overcome these constraints. Yet even then, quantitative analyses can rarely move beyond giving us a good assessment of causal effects (what is the effect of X on Y?), to an understanding of causal mechanisms (*how* and *why* did X cause, or lead to, Y?) (Mahoney and Goertz 2006).

One problem is that there are generally multiple observationally equivalent pathways through which a given independent variable may affect the dependent variable. Kalyvas (2008a), in his review of papers on the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, considers the common finding that poverty is correlated with high levels of fatalities. While there does appear to be a robust correlation between the two, it is unclear why this is the case:

It may be, for instance, that insurgents recruit poor individuals who join to seek justice (the 'grievance theory' of civil war); or that individuals in poor areas (which is not the same as saying poor individuals) see joining as a job in places where job opportunities are nonexistent (the 'greed theory' of civil war); or that the government invests more resources to prevent the conflict in wealthier areas which is why the conflict is 'fully expressed' in the rural countryside; or that the opportunity costs of violence are lower for the state in poor areas; or that people in poor areas may be less able to protect themselves from violence, including its 'collateral damage' dimension (*ibid.*: 402).

Of the three papers he assesses, only one recognised the different possible ways in which poverty and violence may be linked but it was unable to distinguish between them.

Mike McGovern (2011), in a review essay of two influential books by Paul Collier (2007, 2009) on development and peace maintenance in the world's poorest countries, provides another powerful critique of the limitations of much econometric work in developing causal explanations. Collier's analytic method, he writes, "is typically a two-step process. First, he states the correlations, and then, he suggests an explanation of what the causal process might be" (*ibid.*: 348). The issue, McGovern argues, is that in the work of Collier and others these explanations tend not to be developed based on empirical work (qualitative or quantitative) that provides convincing evidence on the ways through which the independent and dependent variables are linked. Rather, "much of the intellectual heavy lifting in these books is in fact done at the level of implication or commonsense guessing ... but the chain of [posited] causal relations makes it evident how fragile these models typically are" (*ibid.*: 348). More in-depth ethnographic work, he concludes, is necessary to build explanations of causal processes that fit with the realities in the cases being studied (*ibid.*: 353).³⁵ McGovern's critique is a powerful one, although it should be noted that the books he reviews were aimed at a popular audience. But his basic point stands: carefully executed field or archival work is usually necessary whenever the links between a hypothesised cause and effect are not well understood.

The conventional rejoinder is that the hypotheses tested in econometric studies of violence are generated deductively; logic and past theoretical insights are used to build hypothetical stories that link not only cause and effect but which also specify intervening processes. The observational implications of theories are laid out; the extent

³⁵ McGovern (2011: 353) contrasts such work with that employed by many quantitative researchers: "I am struck by the extent to which economists, at least when they are writing about poor people in out of the way places, seem to rely on half-baked ethnographic insights, the kinds gleaned from corridor talk and by talking with taxi drivers on the way in from the airport and bartenders at business-class hotels."

to which empirical results match with these hypothesised observable implications indicates the strength of the theory. However, while most econometric work on post-conflict violence does follow such an analytic process, empirical testing tends to focus on assessing predicted outcomes without directly testing whether the hypothesised causal *links* stand up.³⁶ The results of the analysis may fit with a theory's observable implications; but this does not necessarily mean that the intervening variables specified in the theory are correct.

Understanding these links, or the processes by which causal variables impact on outcomes, is of great importance for policymakers. The various possible pathways linking poverty to violence that Kalyvas identifies, for example, each have different implications for those seeking to reduce violence. If, for example, the link is a grievance-based mechanism, policymakers should invest in building institutions to deliver redistributive or retributive justice. If the link is a greed-based mechanism, efforts should focus on providing licit employment opportunities and boosting the local economy. Applied social scientists should seek not only to provide evidence of the factors associated with violence but also develop logically sound but empirically grounded theories that show the causal mechanisms through which these factors have an impact.³⁷

How can we build theoretical explanations that illuminate the ways by which a particular causal variable contributes to a given outcome? In generating understanding of such processes or mechanisms, qualitative historical case study work has considerable comparative advantages. Temporal process-tracing of a given case can

³⁶ There are, of course, exceptions. See, for example, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) who look at the reasons why people joined rebel movements in Sierra Leone.

³⁷ In so claiming, I am inspired by the school of analytical sociology, which has put particular emphasis on the need to understand causal mechanisms. Hedstrom and Bearman (2009: 5) quote Jon Elster (1989: 3-4): "To explain an event is to give an account of why it happened. Usually ... this takes the form of citing an earlier event as the cause of the event we want to explain ... [But] to cite the cause is not enough: the causal mechanism must be provided, or at least suggested." On the utility of approaches to social science that focus on causal mechanisms rather than causal effects, see also Hedstrom and Swedberg (1996) and Elster (2007, in particular Chapter 2).

help identify *how* causal factors actually produced an outcome; in so doing, it can help refine a previously hypothesised mechanism or identify new mechanisms that link cause and effect.³⁸

Process-tracing also allows for a deeper consideration of how agency works in producing violence. Econometric studies tend to measure a set of structural factors (be they economic, social, political, or geographic) and to assess how these co-vary with levels of violence. Yet, ultimately, structures do not directly produce violence. Violence is undertaken by people: it is men who kill and maim each other. Structures—be they poverty, inequality, or weak institutions—may shape their motives, interests, and opportunities, but they do not directly inflict violence. A number of scholars have made a convincing case that future advances in understanding the causes of violence are contingent on the extent to which we can build knowledge of its micro-foundations: of why individuals choose to rebel or take part in violence or not (e.g. King 2004; Kalyvas 2003, 2007; Petersen 2002). Approaches that look to the local level are more likely to be able to discover how such agency functions and how local structures create or constrain it. Process-tracing can help identify the ways in which, for a given case, structures shape the choices of individuals, and how this then leads to violence (or non-violent interaction).³⁹ Well-constructed case studies can be used to develop causal stories (or theories) which outline how and why the presence of a set of structural conditions makes post-conflict violence more or less likely in a given place. I follow Tilly's (1995) proposal for comparative politics to focus on lower levels of analysis and on identifying micro-level processes that contribute to outcomes.

³⁸ George and Bennett (2005: 205) cite Tilly (1997a: 48) who argues that theoretical propositions should not be based on "large-N statistical analysis" but on "relevant, verifiable causal stories resting in differing chains of cause-effect relations whose efficacy can be demonstrated independently of those stories."

³⁹ Such a philosophy of social science leads to a degree of methodological individualism in that it sees individual actors rather than structures *per se* as being the "causal agents"; explanations and theories are built on the "causes and consequences of their actions" (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998: 10). This approach provides a means to identify how macro factors or structures drive micro-level behaviour and how this in turn shapes the macro environment (Hedstrom and Udehn 2009: 32-37; Gambetta 1998).

One limitation of developing or testing theory using only case methods is that it is difficult when studying a single case to establish that a factor or mechanism deemed to cause violence actually has a causal rather than spurious relationship; it is necessary to also establish that the identified factor or mechanism is absent in a comparable case where violence did not erupt. This can be addressed through the use of controlled comparisons, whereby cases of violence and of its absence are studied side by side. George and Bennett's method of 'structured, focused comparisons', involves the same questions being asked of a number of cases that vary on the dependent variable. In terms of understanding post-conflict violence, this means comparing areas where violence has frequently erupted with areas where it has not.

A second limitation is that it is difficult to know how representative a case is. Are the identified channels of impact the same for other cases where violence has occurred? This is difficult to address using case methods alone. George and Bennett (2005: 69) write that before conducting structured, focused case comparisons, "the investigator should clearly identify the universe—that is the 'class' or 'subclass' of events—of which a single case or a group of cases to be studied are instances." This leaves the question of how one can identify with any degree of certainty what a case is an example of without being able to systematically measure not only that case's key elements but also those of at least a large sample of the wider universe of cases. It is easier to establish the external validity of findings from case studies if quantitative methods are also used to test whether the causal factors and mechanisms identified are also evident in other places. Combining the insights from, and comparative advantages of, both quantitative and qualitative methods is preferable when trying to understand violence.

3.2 Quantitative data: a new violence dataset

The primary quantitative data source used in this thesis is the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) violence dataset, created as part of this project. The data

cover the 1998 to 2012 period for around one-half of Indonesia's provinces and contains over 158,000 incidents of violence, primarily as reported in local newspapers.⁴⁰ Gaps were filled through the use of other sources including NGO reports, academic analyses and previous datasets. All of the provinces that experienced extended violence are included and additional provinces were selected within each of Indonesia's main regions. For each incident, a series of variables are coded including when and where it took place, its physical impacts, the actors involved, the issue that appears to drive the violence, the form violence takes, the weapons used, and what interventions were taken to try to stop escalation and how successful they were. The dataset allows for a disaggregated analysis of patterns of violence in different areas over time. To my knowledge this is the largest dataset of subnational violence anywhere in the world.

The new dataset is used in three ways: it is used to map incidents of violence in both the extended violence and post-conflict periods for each of Indonesia's post-conflict provinces; it is used to select district-level case studies for deeper investigation; finally, descriptive statistics are used selectively throughout the thesis to illustrate elements of the cases and the extent to which findings are representative of a larger set of cases. The dataset could be used to formally test the findings of the thesis (or other theories of post-conflict violence) across a large set of cases, but this is a task for the future.

3.3 District case studies

Six district-level case studies in three Indonesian provinces were selected using the dataset. Each of these districts experienced high levels of extended violence—two saw civil war, four extended communal violence—which came to an end. Yet levels and types of post-conflict violence vary across districts. Comparing districts that had similar

⁴⁰ See Chapter 4 for a discussion of time periods covered by province and other information on the dataset.

experiences of large-scale extended violence, but which have seen very different post-conflict trajectories, can help to isolate what has caused such divergence.

Selecting only six districts to study has risks—the selected districts may have idiosyncrasies that mean that they are not representative of other districts with similar post-conflict violence patterns. An alternate strategy would be to study more locations. However, I decided not to go down this route because expanding the sample size would prevent me from conducting the in-depth field research necessarily to uncover complex causal processes. The main focus of the thesis is on building rather than testing theory; assessing the external validity of findings is for future research.

I gathered two distinct types of information for each of the district cases. First, I collected information on a range of issues that I hypothesised at the outset of the study could impact on the likelihood of post-conflict violence occurring. Structured comparative case analysis requires asking the same questions of the cases to be analysed with these questions determined by the theory one is seeking to test or develop (George and Bennett 2005: 67-72). My reading of the literatures on post-conflict violence helped identify some areas where I should focus such as how elites reached bargains, the role of the security forces, and the ways in which patronage networks function, and previous experience researching violence in Indonesia provided some ideas on issues that might be of importance.⁴¹ However, as I became more familiar with the district cases, new issues emerged which appeared to have explanatory power. Subsequent rounds of research were thus able to focus in greater depth on a more limited set of issues than initial field trips, which involved surveying a much wider range of topics. The theory built in this thesis thus relies on both deductive and inductive reasoning. The former led to initial hypotheses; but these hypotheses were iteratively amended as I became more familiar with the cases allowing for deeper theory development.

⁴¹ See Chapter 3 for a review of this literature and the hypotheses I developed.

Second, within each case district, I selected a number of incidents where violence either erupted or where tensions were present but violence was averted.⁴² Some incidents were identified through the newspaper dataset; others were the result of tips from people I met in the regions. In selecting incidents, I chose those that were prominent in the area under study, for example land conflicts in places where such conflicts occurred frequently. The quantitative dataset, for example, showed that land conflicts and violent demonstrations related to corruption have been frequent in post-conflict Maluku province. As a result, I made sure that I followed some of these cases. In my high post-conflict violence districts, I made sure to follow some of the incidents that had resulted in the largest destructive impacts. I process-traced each of these incidents building up a historical story of events. These incident-level case studies were particularly useful for identifying the role of particular actors in producing violence.

I meld the two types of material into analytic narratives (Bates et al. 1998) focusing largely on the post-conflict period for each district. These narratives combine stories (of incidents of violence, of attempts at conflict resolution, of people's and groups' actions) with analysis of why events turned out the way they did. They weave together empirical and theoretical materials, looking at the extent to which actual events conform (or not) to the suppositions of theory.⁴³ As with Varshney (2002), the thesis's case chapters are narrated in a way that combines 'stylised facts' with Geertz's (1973) "thick description", with the text interweaving facts and analysis.

⁴² These latter events were more difficult to study. It is relatively easy to identify cases 'where the dog barked', but finding cases 'where the dog might have barked but did not' is tricky. My strategy was to try to find cases where either (a) tensions were present but where violence did not erupt/escalate, and/or (b) where elites took action to prevent violence. This approach built upon that used in a previous study I undertook of local violence in two areas of Indonesia that were not affected by large-scale violent conflict (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock 2011).

⁴³ Bates et al. (1998: 10) note that such an approach "combines analytic tools that are commonly employed in economics and political science with the narrative form which is more commonly employed in history." As such, the approach is a manifestation of the "historical turn in the social sciences" (McDonald 1996) and is a response to Stone's (1979) call to return to the narrative tradition. My approach shares many similarities to that of Bates and his colleagues (for example, by generating historical accounts, using process tracing, focusing on the incentives of different actors, and employing micro-level reasoning) but there are also some differences (such as my use of field research rather than archival methods, attention to case selection, and the use of structured comparative analysis).

Building the cases involved what Fenno (1990) has called “soaking and poking”. This necessitated extensive time in the field. The case studies are primarily built on in-depth fieldwork conducted in each district and provincial capitals. Around one month of on-the-ground research was conducted in each province with around 300 people interviewed. In addition, dozens of informal discussions—in taxis, on the roof of boats, and on the back of motorbikes; in coffee houses and the sitting rooms of friends’ houses; in government offices, waiting rooms, and hotel lobbies—gave me a better sense of local conditions. Most of the fieldwork was conducted with other researchers allowing me to expand the number of interviews that could be done and the geographic areas that could be covered. Every interview did not focus on the same issues. Some informants knew a lot about the history of a peace accord, some about the structure of combatant or militia groups, some about a specific incident of violence I was building a history of, some about local cultural issues. As such, the interviews were largely unstructured, focusing in on particular issues.⁴⁴

Gathering the types of information I needed required creativity and opportunism. The foci of my research were extremely sensitive to many; and knowledge of issues such as why particular incidents of violence happened, who was involved, and why security forces responded in the way they did was not widely or evenly spread across the population. As such, formal randomised sampling of interviewees would not have been productive. Instead, an approach that uses key informants—that is, those with high levels of knowledge of the topics being investigated *and* who are willing to share that knowledge—was needed. The best way to do this is through snowball sampling with informants referring others who may have knowledge.⁴⁵ To limit the

⁴⁴ To ensure that each research team collected the same types of information, I produced an extensive field guide. This listed the questions I wanted to be able to answer after the research, the types of standardised data needed for each district, selection protocols for case studies, guidance on research ethics, and so on. I conducted trainings for my co-researchers to ensure we shared a common understanding.

⁴⁵ Cohen and Arieli (2011) argue for the use of snowball sampling in conflict research. Weiss (1994) provides a more general discussion.

potential biases that could emerge through such network-based approaches to identifying informants, I triangulated information by gaining multiple perspectives on the same issues. I also sought to ensure there was balance in interviews between different groups. Government officials, journalists, (former) rebels, conflict leaders and foot soldiers, civil society activists, police and military men, traditional leaders, rural villagers, men and women: all were interviewed. Interviews were conducted with Muslims, Christians, those who had supported secessionist groups, and those of conflicting ethnic groups. Some interviewees had been involved in violent action, some in trying to stop it, others had been on the receiving end. I tried—and largely managed—to ensure a balance between elite interviews and those of non-elites.

While the core of the district case studies is the field interviews, they also draw on a range of secondary sources. Beyond the newspaper articles, I also use government statistics, NGO reports, and World Bank data. The cases also draw extensively on past writings on conflict in the regions I studied. Most of these studies focus on the years when violence was at its peak rather than more recent developments. But the availability of careful historical accounts of the chronology of the extended violent conflicts provided important background information to help me interpret patterns of post-conflict violence.

3.4 Generating a national narrative

While the core empirical chapters of the thesis concentrate on provincial and district level dynamics, the penultimate chapter focuses on the evolution of central state elite bargains and institutions. Understanding this required generating a historical national level analytic narrative. My analytic approach in the chapter is thus similar to that employed in the chapters on Maluku, North Maluku, and Aceh provinces. However, given the relatively rich body of material already published on national political change,

the chapter primarily uses secondary sources rather than newly-collected primary information.

This chapter has outlined the methods and approach used in this thesis. It has outlined my research design, the kinds of data I am using, how I collected them, and how I am using the data to build a theory of post-conflict violence. The next chapter turns its focus from methods to the causal claims made in the existing literature. It builds upon these to develop a theory of why post-conflict violence occurs and takes the forms it does. Subsequent chapters then test and inductively develop this theory using the Indonesian case materials.

Chapter 3. Explaining Post-Conflict Violence: Evidence, Theories, and Arguments

Previous studies have identified three sets of issues that lead to post-conflict violence. One body of work emphasises the importance of elite bargains in preventing violence. A second focus is on the impact of past violence on societal relations. A third literature considers how state capacity and structure shape the motivations of elites or locals to use violence and the reasons why the state cannot ensure order. This chapter first provides a review of this past work. For each of the foci, I outline both empirical findings and theoretical claims and then discuss some of their limitations, proposing extensions that should be incorporated into an explanatory model of post-conflict violence. Because most studies have sought to explain civil war recurrence rather than episodic forms of post-conflict violence, I also discuss findings and theories from the literatures on ethnic riots and politics, the causes of violent crime and inter-personal violence, the impacts of violence of different types, and state-building.

I argue that no existing theory is able to adequately explain variations in post-conflict violence in Indonesia or, indeed, elsewhere. Identified issues such as state weakness, elite incentives, and dysfunctional societal relations can contribute to violence; but, taken alone, they do not provide explanations of satisfactory causal depth. Theories that highlight the role of only one set of actors—be it elites, groups within society, or the state—fail to recognise that violence is co-produced, that in most instances no single group has the agency to instigate violence. Furthermore, a singular focus on elites, society or the state also limits our ability to explain why post-conflict violence takes *different forms* for different sets of actors will likely be more or less important in producing different types of post-conflict violence. A useful theory must consider all three sets of actors, specify how their attitudes and actions interact with those of others, and how this produces or limits different types of post-conflict violence.

In the second half of this chapter I propose a new theoretical framework for understanding, first, why post-conflict violence occurs (or does not) and, second, why it sometimes escalates into larger, more destructive forms. Building on rational-institutionalist foundations, I argue that observed patterns of post-conflict violence can be explained in large part by the political economy of violence: by the incentives that three sets of actors—local elites, non-state violence specialists, and central state elites—have to use violence or to allow it to occur. The predominant types of violence in an area, I hypothesise, will depend on the combinations of actors supporting the use of violence:

- *Frequent smaller-scale episodic post-conflict violence* is most likely when groups within society who have experience using violence (violence specialists) continue to see benefit in using violence;
- Escalation to *frequent larger-scale episodic violence* requires the support of local elites. In the absence of such support, post-conflict areas are likely to be peaceful or see only smaller-scale episodic violence.
- Escalation to *extended violence* will only occur when elements of the central state support or allow such escalation. In the absence of this, violence will remain episodic (in its smaller and/or larger forms).
- In *peaceful post-conflict areas* there will be little support for violence from local elites, violence specialists, or from the central state.

The chapter develops an explanation for the conditions under which each set of actors has incentives to support the use of violence and the time periods when such support, and hence violence, is most likely. Decisions to use violence in the early post-conflict period are, I argue, determined by the expected benefits of using violence instrumentally and the extent to which there are other avenues to pursue political and economic goals peaceably. Where violence proves to be an effective strategy for capturing resources or power, and where higher-level authorities tolerate or support its

use, future violence is more likely. Under such conditions, over time violence can become normalised as a legitimate strategy in political and economic competition. The level at which violence is normalised will determine which types of post-conflict will occur. Conversely, where violence is not effective, is costly, and where other options exist for accumulation, such norms do not develop and post-conflict violence is less likely to occur.

1. Previous explanations: elites, societies, and the state

1.1 Post-conflict bargains between conflict elites

A first approach locates the sources of post-conflict violence in the difficulties that former belligerent leaders have in finding and sustaining agreements whereby both sides agree to renounce violence. While we might expect such bargains to be frequently reached and maintained—war, after all, is destructive and risky—in practice bargains are often illusive or weak with the result that violence continues or recurs after periods of calm.⁴⁶

Bargaining theorists argue that the source of such sub-optimal outcomes lies primarily in two issues.⁴⁷ The first is *information asymmetries*. Each party has private information on their side's ability to use violence that is not shared with their opponents. In the absence of accurate information on the other side's ability and hence willingness to fight either party may choose to use violence. Second, parties can have difficulties in *credibly committing to settlements*. Renouncing violence creates

⁴⁶ Fearon (1995: 409), in his influential discussion of rationalist explanations for inter-state wars writes, "under broad conditions the fact that fighting is costly and risky implies that there should exist negotiated agreements that rationally led states in dispute would prefer to war." The central puzzle, he adds, is to "explain adequately what prevents leaders from reaching *ex ante* (prewar) bargains that would avoid the costs and risks of fighting" (*ibid.*: 380). This puzzle, as Walter (2009a) has shown, is also salient to understanding why civil wars occur, why they last so long, and why they sometimes recur.

⁴⁷ A third factor is issue indivisibility where some things cannot be compromised over. Toft (2003), for example, argues that wars over territory that is seen as indivisible because of its importance to the identity of an ethnic group are harder to solve and more likely to recur. Powell (2006) argues that issue indivisibility is actually a form of the commitment problem.

vulnerabilities for former conflict leaders. In an environment where trust between sides is lacking, actions to disband can be suicidal, *even* where both sides would prefer that violence ceased. A leader of a conflicting group can see the benefits of peace and may want to agree to give up arms. However, as in the classical Prisoner's Dilemma, a positive payoff from committing to a cessation of violence is contingent on his former adversary also taking similar substantive actions. In the absence of an arbiter-enforcer, such as the state or a strong third party, this can result in a 'security dilemma' with elites on both sides choosing to retain their coercive apparatuses and continuing to use violence to signal strength (Posen 1993).

A range of factors are proposed to shape the likelihood of bargains being reached and maintained and hence the likelihood of post-conflict violence or recurring extended violence. Where past extended violent conflicts endured for longer, the relative capabilities of each side should be clearer and hence bargains should be easier to reach and maintain (Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999; Smith and Stam 2004). Cross-country empirical studies have found a relationship between the duration of violence and the likelihood of civil war not recurring.⁴⁸ How the violence was ended is also deemed to be important. Where extended violence ceases because of a military victory, a single party can impose the terms of peace, which will usually include the demobilisation of the losing party. This removes both information asymmetry and commitment problems. Information on the (lack of) strength of the other party is clear.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ See, for example, Mason and Fett (1996), Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001), Walter (2004), and Fortna (2008). There are other observationally equivalent mechanisms by which longer extended violence could result in more robust post-conflict peace. Some of these—such as conflict fatigue and increased trauma—are discussed below.

⁴⁹ Victors can take full control of the coercive arms of the state, limiting the ability of losers to use violence. This means a victor can credibly commit not to use force excessively because such a commitment does not make him vulnerable to renewed attack. In contrast, negotiated settlements may be more prone to breakdown. Post-conflict power sharing arrangements are likely to be required as no party has a full monopoly on the means of violence. This may make future challenges more likely (Wagner 1994). Indeed, the cross-country evidence shows that peace that results from civil wars that end in military victory is more secure than that following a negotiated agreement. Licklider (1995b) observes that whereas 15% of the former see a renewal

A third factor is the presence or absence of third party guarantees. The provision of such guarantees can help reduce the uncertainty former conflicting parties have in committing to peace (Fearon 2004; Walter 2002).⁵⁰

Elite bargaining theories thus view post-conflict violence as a result of the failure of peace settlements to stick. Violence emerges when one or both sides think that their old adversaries will renege on the terms of the settlement, for example to dispose of their arms or to share power. Because leaders do not trust each other, violence can recur where there are not effective mechanisms to ensure contract enforcement. Post-conflict violence is deemed to be a product of fear and a lack of trust and the information gaps that drive these.

Extension #1: the benefits of (post-conflict) violence

However, while these issues sometimes result in the breakdown of accords allowing extended violence to reemerge, the bargaining models are less useful in explaining episodic forms of violence. One reason is that post-conflict violence can be beneficial for elites. The bargaining literature assumes that renouncing violence is the optimal outcome for a previously warring party, contingent on the other side also doing the same. Because violence destroys multiple forms of capital, the resources available will be larger in its absence. It thus makes sense for former conflicting elites to stop using violence for both will theoretically benefit from the economic growth, and hence the larger pie, that should flow from peace.

There are reasons to question this assumption in cases of (recurring) extended violence. The war economies literature has highlighted how violence can be profitable

of war, the figure is 50% for those finished by negotiations; Fortna (2008) and Toft (2010) reach similar conclusions.

⁵⁰ Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) find that, along with the provision of territorial autonomy, the presence of “third party enforcers” is the most important factor in explaining why negotiated agreements stick. Others have highlighted the importance of third party guarantees, including the presence of peacekeepers (Fortna 2008), security guarantees from foreign nations (Collier 2008), well-equipped United Nations missions (Doyle and Sambanis 2006), and constitutional checks and balances (Walter 2010).

for elites who organise it (e.g. Berdal and Malone 2000). Large-scale violence creates space for rent-making activities including the provision of protection, the monopolisation of different economic sectors (licit or illicit), and trade in drugs or minerals; and predatory motives will in many cases be as important drivers of war as grievances or ideologies.⁵¹ David Keen (1998: 43) reaches a conclusion different to that of many of the bargaining theorists: “The longer a civil war, the more likely that people will find ways to profit from it.” This makes it harder to bring such wars to an end or to ensure they do not recur after periods of calm. If elites do not internalise the costs of violence, and if it is easier to avoid distributing rents in times of escalated violence, then it can make rational sense for them to continue to support extended violence.

Even where elites do accept that they are better off without extended violence—either because of the costs incurred or because of the material benefits provided as part of a peace settlement⁵²—they may see continued utility in using other forms of violence. Episodic violence, or the threat of it, can be used to affect distributive decisions over the allocation of resources and rent-making opportunities. Riots might be instigated to demonstrate enduring coercive capacity to those who make decisions on how public funds are used. Attacks, or threats of them, can be used to ensure that former conflict

⁵¹ Kaldor (1999), Berkeley (2001), and Mueller (2004), for example, argue that civil war violence is now often fuelled by criminal motives and actions. The authors undoubtedly under-emphasise the importance of identities, beliefs and emotions in driving action and it is clear that such wars are nothing “new” (Kalyvas 2001). Yet their basic observation—that predatory motives and actions are important in shaping the dynamics of many recent wars—is correct. Even where extended violent conflicts had their roots in ideological differences, logics of predation often gain increasing importance as violence endures.

⁵² Peace agreements usually provide economic incentives to elites to accept an end to extended violence. Conflict-era economic structures can be allowed to endure into the post-conflict period meaning that conflict elites do not lose wartime sources of rent (Reno 2008; Zaum and Cheng 2011). The provision of post-conflict reconstruction funds, including funds targeted at former combatants and their organisations, may also serve to act as a carrot, shifting cost-benefit calculations and leading to an acceptance of a peace settlement. One function of the provision of such a peace dividend can be to buy out “spoilers” whose interests and powers may be threatened by an emerging peace (Stedman 1997).

elites and their underlings receive state or donor largess. Riots or other forms of violence can be used to consolidate ethnic or religious support bases.⁵³

Beyond distributive motivations, episodic post-conflict violence can also be employed to increase the size of the resource pie. This can work for a simple reason: violence attracts peacebuilding and reconstruction funds. These resources, often massive in scale compared with the size of local economies, can be a boon for former conflict leaders.⁵⁴ In general, the presence of large-scale post-conflict programming is contingent on extended violence not reerupting, although the continued inflow of vast sums of money to Afghanistan shows this is not always the case. The presence of large-scale post-conflict programs should thus disincentivise former conflict leaders from initiating or supporting large-scale extended violence. However, large episodic forms of violence (riots, groups clashes, and the like) can turn on the resource tap again. Using such violence to demonstrate that tensions remain may be an effective means of attracting further funds from the government or international donors, money that can then be captured by former conflict leaders and other elites.

Extension #2: violent bargains

Bargaining models do not explain why supposed adversaries collaborate in producing violence. This can be the case both in times of extended violence and in the post-conflict period.

⁵³ Paul Brass (e.g. 1997, 2003) describes the “institutionalised riot systems” that exist in some localities in India. These systems, controlled and to an extent formed by local politicians and elites, allow small events, such as neighbourly quarrels, to develop into larger episodes of violence such as communal riots. Wilkinson (2004) argues that riots are provoked by local politicians who use them to enhance their chances of election. Riots, he argues, “are best thought of as a solution to the problem of how to change the salience of ethnic issues and identities among the electorate in order to build a winning political coalition (*ibid.*: 1). Similarly, Gagnon (1994: 134), in his analysis of violence in Serbia, concludes that, “violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites in order to create a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity.”

⁵⁴ In the 1990s, more than US\$ 100 billion of international aid was pledged by donors to support countries recovering from violent conflict (Forman and Patrick 2000b: 1). In 2007 alone, more than US\$ 630 million was spent on international programs to disarm, demobilise, and reintegrate former combatants (Muggah 2009b: 7).

Accounts of extended violent conflicts are replete with examples of warring factions working together, in particular when economic interests are at stake. Peter Andreas describes how Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks in Sarajevo collaborated to profit from the smuggling of goods and people:

While the Bosnian Serb leadership played the front-stage role of orchestrating the siege of the city under the official balancing of ethnic grievance and animosity, backstage they profited from the siege through clandestine business dealings that included cross-ethnic economic exchange across the frontlines. Similarly, some of the city's key defenders played the formal role of repelling Serb military incursions while also engaging in illicit trading with their counterparts (Andreas 2008: 8).

Political and military elites and businessmen from all sides would meet together in a bar to make their deals (*ibid.*: 66). The vast profits that could be made created incentives to prolong the violence, one reason why the siege of Sarajevo lasted so long.

Indeed, Staniland (2012: 243) critiques the assumption of many social scientists that both sides in a civil war “are locked in a straightforward struggle for a monopoly of violence”. He identifies six wartime political orders involving differing degrees of state-insurgent cooperation and distribution of control. In four of these, there is some degree of collaboration between sides. “Bargains, deals and tacit understandings between states and insurgents,” he emphasises, “are common in civil war” (*ibid.*).

Such bargains sometimes involve toleration of certain kinds of violence but not of others. Rules of the game emerge regulating acceptable ‘wartime’ behaviour. In Sarajevo, for example:

It was against the rules for the besiegers to shell public places where large groups of people gathered (such as breadlines and marketplaces), but it was within the rules to shell the rest of the city and terrorize civilians with sniper fire (the former had a greater media shock effect, and thus could provoke NATO air strikes, while the latter prompted only routine international condemnation) (Andreas 2008: 42).

As in times of extended violence, post-conflict areas will also vary in the levels and types of collaboration between former adversaries. Post-conflict violence can be the result of a tacit agreement between former conflicting parties whereby violence is, at a minimum,

tolerated, or, at extremes, even co-produced. Where, for example, the provision of post-conflict resources is contingent on a certain level of violence occurring, formerly warring leaders will in cases agree to violence of certain types continuing. Tolerating the use of violence by others can legitimise its use by oneself.

To understand why episodic post-conflict violence occurs it is fruitful to turn our attention from a search for the conditions under which elite bargains break down (which may account for relapse into war) to a consideration of the extent to which post-conflict violence can sometimes be productive for elites.

1.2 Societal residues of past violence

A second approach focuses on the structures of post-conflict societies and how these lead to violent action. The roots of post-conflict violence are viewed as lying in the motivations of individuals or groups within society rather than elites.

Motivations to use violence in the post-conflict period can be a product of past exposure to violence. One body of work has emphasised the *effects of past violence on individual-level behavioural norms*. Where extended violent conflicts are particularly intense or long lasting, trauma levels are likely to be higher (Pouligny et al. 2010; Başoğlu et al. 2005).⁵⁵ Those suffering from such trauma may be more likely to use violence. Kirwin and Cho (2009) find that those who have been victims of a crime are more likely to see future political violence as justifiable. Extended violence can deaden popular sensibilities with regards to the legitimacy of using force to resolve problems (Ross 1993; WHO 2002). As Berdal (2012: 313) observes:

Violence becomes routinized within the private and public sphere through the lived experience of war ... [it] is particularly likely to emerge when the violence perpetrated during war has been especially brutal, intimate and pervasive,

⁵⁵ Recent work showing empirical links between the two includes Blattman and Annan (2010), who find that amongst those abducted during the civil war in northern Uganda, those who experienced more violence show greater levels of psychological distress in the aftermath of war and Good et al. (2006) who reach similar conclusions based on their study of war-affected civilians in Aceh.

where whole societies have been caught up in conflict and where atrocities and outrages have inordinately targeted civilians and their communities.

Yet exposure to violence does not always have these effects. Empirical research in El Salvador (Wood 2003), Sierra Leone (Bellows and Miguel 2006), and Uganda (Blattman 2009) has shown that experience of wartime violence can increase non-violent political participation and collective action. Indeed, longer or more intense violence may be more likely to lead to conflict fatigue and the strengthening of anti-violence norms amongst those who were most affected.

A second set of explanations focuses on the *impact of extended violent conflict on group identities and inter-group relations*. Violence is more likely in areas where social cohesion is weak (Marc et al. 2013; Colletta and Cullen 2000). Constructivist theorists have highlighted how violence essentialises identities that previously played a more limited role in structuring social, political and economic life; ethnic identity, for example, is often a product of war and state failure rather than a cause of it (Kalyvas 2003, 2008c; Bates 2008a: 9-10). Extended violence, in creating a commonly shared master narrative that simplifies group boundaries and patterns of interaction, can thus reify identity categories that then sustain into the post-conflict period.⁵⁶ The process of identity essentialisation, and the endurance of these identities, could occur for any salient wartime identity, but some argue that the risks are greater following ethnic conflicts.⁵⁷ By extension, ethnically divided societies emerging from extended violence are deemed to be more prone to post-conflict violence than those where group differences are

⁵⁶ Elites can play an important role in emphasising, and hence essentialising, old conflict cleavages for political or economic purposes. This is a claim of instrumentalist scholars who explain the salience of ethnic identities in functionalist terms. Wolf (1964, 1999), for example, has argued that cultures are in part derivative of the power relations that prevail within a society. Brass (1991) extends the point to show how these cultures are then used as resources to be mobilised for the acquisition of further political power, economic benefit, or social status.

⁵⁷ This is because ascriptive identities, solidified through past violence, may provide an easier channel for elites to mobilise others for violence than do other identities (e.g. Kaufman 2001). The evidence is mixed on whether extended ethnic violent conflicts recur more often than others extended conflicts. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) argue this is the case, whereas Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) and Walter (2004) find no relationship between what is at stake in the conflict and rates of recidivism. In contrast, Licklider (1995b) argues that negotiated settlements for identity conflicts are less stable.

constructed around other axes. Varshney (2002), in his study of Indian cities, found that where civic associational structures that cut across identity divides are present, riots are less likely. In post-conflict contexts, it can be expected that violence will be less common where such crosscutting institutions and organisations exist.

A final set of society-focused explanations emphasise the *extent to which grievances are redressed* as determining levels of post-conflict violence. Early work on the determinants of civil war and rebellion emphasised inter-group disparities in resource allocation as a source of unrest (e.g. Gurr 1970). For other forms of violence, too, where inter-group horizontal inequalities are marked violence is more likely (Stewart 2008). In more recent years it has become fashionable amongst scholars to downplay the role of grievances and relative deprivation in driving extended violence.⁵⁸ Yet, as Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011: 478) observe, “the debate over grievances is far from dead ... inequality continues to occupy a prominent place in the qualitative literatures on civil wars and has repeatedly been linked to conflict processes.” Using a new cross-country dataset on horizontal inequalities, they show that distributional asymmetries are strongly linked to civil war onset.

Where the peace settlement or post-conflict policies do not address the underlying issues and grievances that led to the extended violence, it is posited that post-conflict violence should be more likely. Indeed, this logic underpins many of the common responses of the international community in post-conflict areas. Truth and reconciliation commissions and other transitional justice mechanisms aim to deal with past wrongdoing in order to ensure grievances do not reemerge (Colson 2000; Clark and Kaufman 2008). Post-conflict growth, OECD DAC (2010) argues, must be ‘balanced’ to avoid reigniting grievances.

⁵⁸ See, for example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Kaldor (1999), and Hoeffler (2011).

The emphasis on the societal bases of post-conflict violence provides a welcome complement to elite-based accounts. It is unlikely that all incidents of post-conflict violence are instigated by former conflict elites; certain forms of localised violence do not require elite-level organisation and can occur when elites do not condone violence. Even where elites do light the blue touch paper they need to mobilise others to engage in violence (Horowitz 1985: 140). Critiquing overly elite-centred explanations for riots in India, Varshney and Gubler (2012: 198) write, “one should not assume that just because it is in the interests of the ruling party to inflame riots, it will be possible for it to do so.” The motivations of members of society to participate in and condone violent action can therefore be an important determinant of post-conflict violence. The literature summarised above would suggest that variance in such motivations and attitudes is contingent on the degree of trauma, the strength of exclusionary identities, the weakness of inter-group relations and institutions that promote cross-group collaboration, and the extent to which past grievances endure into the post-conflict period.

Extension #1: the need to understand incentives to use violence

One problem with such theories is that they are more likely to explain tensions and conflict than violence. The level of enduring grievance, for example, may account for the level of resentment present in a post-conflict area. But it does not alone explain why people would choose to use violence to seek redress. A fuller explanation requires diagnosing what leads people to decide that using violence is the best way to achieve their goals. This will often be a calculated choice. It is a mistake to assume, as many have implicitly done, that it is only elites who partake in violence for instrumental purposes and that the societal bases of violence are less rational. Scacco (2009: 5) in her assessment of the motivations of rioters in Nigeria criticises the tendency of many studies to assume “that elites are highly strategic, if not implausibly cunning, while masses are non-strategic and easily manipulated.” Petersen (2002: 5) similarly argues

that, “social scientists should not assume that participants are ignorant dupes of elites.” We need to identify the individual-level motivations that translate discontent into violent action.

The civil war literature emphasises the provision of incentives to combatants to help them overcome Olson’s (1965) free rider collective action dilemma. Selective incentives—for example, promises of disproportionate access to resources or power in exchange for fighting muscle—may be provided (Popkin 1979; Gates 2002; Weinstein 2005). Even without a top-down distribution of resources, people may have an incentive to use violence during civil war because it can allow them to address local disputes (Kalyvas 2006). Participation in extended violence may also create cognitive satisfaction. Wood (2003: 2), in her study of Salvadorian rebels, argues that their participation in violence came from a “pleasure in agency”, where the very assertion of interests and identity through violence created individual-level utility. It may be easier for elites to remobilise elements of society to participate in renewed extended violence where either, (a) they are able to provide incentives for people to fight, or (b) where (potential) fighters see material or psychological benefit from using violence.

Similar processes may be at play in driving participation in episodic post-conflict violence. The collective action problem can also apply to participation in forms of violence such as ethnic riots where the risks of injury, arrest, or even loss of life are real (Scacco 2009). Lichbach (1995) has identified how the provision of selective incentives can be necessary to motivate participation in riots as well as other forms of non-violent but risky protests.⁵⁹ Conversely, participation in post-conflict violence may also provide a means to generate Wood’s cognitive satisfaction. Work on riots has highlighted the thrill and meaning some people, especially young men, can derive from violence. Tambiah (1996) discusses the ways in which riots can be “performative”, almost festival-like in nature. Petersen’s (2002) study of Eastern European violence also

⁵⁹ See also Tarrow (1998).

highlights the role of a range of emotions—fear, hatred, and resentment—each of which can serve an instrumental purpose whereby “emotion drives the individual to reach a recognizable goal” (*ibid.*: 19). Such goals may include the desire for revenge, a desire to help prevent a preemptive attack, or the wish to put another group ‘back in their place’ (*ibid.*: 20). This may be as true in post-conflict areas as in those experiencing extended violent conflict.

Extension #2: the role of violence specialists

A second issue is that the attitudes and incentives of society at large are probably less important than those of the people who actually participate in post-conflict violence. During civil wars or other extended violent conflicts, the vast majority of people will not directly engage in violence. Extended violence also inflicts vast costs on people who live in the areas where they occur. Beyond the risks of being killed or injured, people typically cannot send their children to school, farm their fields, or access adequate health care. Even in the most divided of societies we can thus expect most people in post-conflict areas not to favour a continuance of violence for such violence raises the risk of costly extended violence recurring.

As such, it is more productive to focus not on broad societal attitudes but on those within society who are predisposed to using violence to achieve their goals, the group that Tilly (2003: 35-41) has called civilian ‘violence specialists’. This group can include former combatants from the extended violence period, militias, and thugs. We can hypothesise that all forms of post-conflict violence will be more likely where: the numbers of such specialists are larger; where they remain organised; where they retain links to elites; and where their participation in violent acts is supported or tolerated by those elites.

Societal norms will matter in as much as they shape the incentives of elites and (potential) violence specialists to use violence. Broader societal tolerance of or support

for violence can shape the extent to which local elites may feel that the use of violence will result in longer-term pay-offs. For those in elected positions, they face the risk of losing office at election time. Even for those with informal bases of power—such as traditional or religious leaders—their ability to retain support will be contingent, at least in part, on the extent to which they satisfy the demands of their constituents. However, the casual arrow also points the other way; indeed, elite preferences may be more likely to shape those of society than vice versa. Brass (2003) and Tambiah (1996), for example, have shown how elite provocation, exaggeration of previous incidents, and the dissemination of propaganda can change societal attitudes almost overnight. As Douglass North (1990: 16) has argued, institutions, which include social norms, tend to be shaped to serve the interests of those who have the bargaining power to devise new rules, that is elites.

Social norms can also affect the willingness of young men to participate in violence. Where communities do not support them using violence the supply of labour for violent action will diminish, driving up the costs for elites who may want to use violence. Elites, in other words, are more able to instigate violence under conditions where communities support their young men participating in such violence.

1.3 State strength and structure

A third literature turns its gaze from elite or societal motivations to the formal institutions and organisations of the state that sustain order. The human impulse to use violence is omnipresent. It follows that states are needed to allow an escape from Hobbes' "war of every man against every man." Only with a strong *Leviathan* that monopolises the use of force and coercion can violence be tamed.⁶⁰ The primary task in areas emerging from extended violence is thus to build a state capable of controlling

⁶⁰ Hobbes [1651] (2008); Weber (1946). Premodern societies have means of retaining order in the absence of a state (e.g. Bates 2001; Fukuyama 2011) and these can be effective in limiting violence (Taylor 1982). However, in almost every post-conflict area, and certainly those in Indonesia, the state pervades most areas of life and hence order will likely be contingent upon it.

violence. This, it is argued, should be the major focus for the international agencies aiming to prevent a return to violence in war-scarred areas or the emergence of frequent episodic violence. A vast literature has developed in the last decade arguing for state-building as a post-conflict peacebuilding strategy and providing advice on how to do it.⁶¹

Cross-country evidence shows the symbiotic, mutually enforcing relationship between state fragility and violence. Besley and Persson (2011: xi), for example, discuss “the observed tendency for effective state institutions, the absence of political violence, and high income per capita to be positively correlated with one another”, both across countries at a given point in time and across time within a country. Of the 17 countries ranked by the World Bank as being fragile in the 1980s and which remained fragile between 1990 and 2008, 16 experienced civil wars (World Bank 2011a).⁶² Other forms of collective violence also tend to be more common in places where the state is weak. Violent conflict in turn can solidify fragility, undercutting existing political settlements and reducing state capacity as resources are diverted to deal with security threats.

Strong states are important in two ways for limiting post-conflict violence. First, as I have discussed, states provide order by *monopolising the means of violence*. Where the coercive arms of the state, such as the police, military and judicial system, have limited capacity, violence becomes more likely. Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) argue that the feasibility of rebellion is more important than the motivations of groups to rebel. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find a statistically significant relationship between poor state administrative, military and police capabilities and the incidence of civil war.

⁶¹ A partial list of recent volumes on internationally supported state-building includes: Milliken (2003), Rotberg (2003), Chesterman (2004), Fukuyama (2004), Caplan (2005), Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur (2005), Chandler (2006), Call with Wyeth (2008), Ghani and Lockhart (2008), Belloni (2008), Paris and Sisk (2009), Newman, Paris, and Richmond (2009), and Berdal and Zaum (2012).

⁶² Another study found that in 60% of the country years in which there were failed states in Africa between 1970 and 1995, there were also civil wars (Ndulu et al. 2007, cited in Bates 2008b: 3).

For other forms of violence, too, it is clear that opportunities matter. Post-war violent crime, for example, is less likely if strong control mechanisms, such as a well-functioning security and justice apparatus, exist (Jutersonke, Muggah, and Rodgers 2009).

Effective states do not, however, provide order solely by monopolising violence. They also do so by promoting *growth and delivering service and public goods*.⁶³ Stronger, more effective states are more likely to generate economic growth. This may reduce the likelihood of fresh violence in two ways (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008). First, it leads to higher incomes, which lower the risk of civil war recurring.⁶⁴ Second, economic growth has peace-preserving impacts in and of itself.⁶⁵ Growth can improve government legitimacy, reducing grievances (Woodward 2002). By increasing public revenues, as tax receipts rise, it can also strengthen the apparatus of the state, enhancing its control. More effective states are more likely to invest in public or club goods that benefit large sections of the population, thus reducing grievances. This should bring down risks of violence recurring in the post-conflict period.

State capacity surely shapes the likelihood of violence emerging in the post-conflict period. Yet post-conflict violence is not solely confined to failing states. Stronger middle- and high-income states such as those in the Balkans, Lebanon, Guatemala, the Philippines (Mindanao), Indonesia, and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) all have functioning states that collect revenues, build roads and fund armies. None makes most state fragility lists. But all have seen substantial violence after their extended violent

⁶³ The distinction here fits with that of Bates (2008b: 2) who defines state failure as having two constituent elements: (a) loss of monopoly on the means of coercion; and (b) the transformation of a state into an instrument for predation.

⁶⁴ This is consistent with other literature that finds strong correlations between income and the outbreak of civil war. See Sambanis and Hegre's (2006) review.

⁶⁵ Dahl and Høyland (2012) question this. Using the Uppsala Armed Conflict Data rather than the Correlates of War dataset, they do not find a robust link between growth and risks of recidivism. Bates (2008a: 13) argues that, theoretically, we should not expect a direct relationship between poverty or low national income and civil war onset. While lower per capita income may reduce the costs of rebellion (because wages are lower), it may also reduce motivations for rebellion (because gains from predation are also lower).

conflicts have ended.⁶⁶ This raises a question: why is post-conflict violence a problem in many countries where the state has strong coercive capacities, where functioning bureaucracies are in place, and where state service delivery penetrates even the most rural of areas?

Others have focused less on state capacity and more on the effect of a state's formal institutional design. Three areas have received attention. First, there is debate amongst scholars and practitioners about the links between levels of *democracy and democratisation* and violence. Democracies do not engage in wars with each other⁶⁷ and they also tend to see much less intra-state collective violence (Tilly 2003: 44). However, on the way to democracy there can be an upsurge in violence. The empirical literature shows that states with hybrid political regimes, which contain elements of democracy and authoritarianism, see higher levels of civil war and this correlation also seems to stand for 'social' forms of violence such as violent crime.⁶⁸ Paris (2004), following Snyder (2000), emphasises how the transition to democracy can be dangerous in post-conflict areas and argues that institution-building should come before democratisation or market expansion.⁶⁹ Indeed, critiques of the 'democratic reconstruction model' (Call and Cook 2003: 233; Ottoway 2003), which calls for quick elections after the end of extended violent conflicts, are now common and there is some empirical evidence of elections having negative impacts in post-conflict areas.⁷⁰ Yet the effect is by no means deterministic. Many countries do manage to go to the polls after large-scale violence ends without violence reemerging. The impact of elections will likely vary by the

⁶⁶ Case studies of post-conflict violence in Kosovo, Lebanon, and Guatemala are provided in Suhrke and Berdal (2012). On violence in post-conflict areas of Mindanao, see Jubair (2007) and McKenna (2008). On recent violence in Northern Ireland, see Walsh (2013).

⁶⁷ Levy (1998: 62) posits that the "absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."

⁶⁸ On hybrid regimes and civil war, see Gates et al. (2006) and Goldstone et al. (2010); on links with social violence and crime, see LaFree and Tseloni (2006) and Fox and Hoelscher (2012).

⁶⁹ See also Caplan (2005: 120-121) who argues that, "elections have been used as an exit strategy [for internationals] ... elections have thus sometime been arranged too soon from the standpoint of a fragile place to withstand the competitive pressures of the electoral process."

⁷⁰ Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom's cross-country analysis (2008: 470) finds that the net effect of an election is to increase the risk of war resumption.

institutional environment. Bermeo (2003) argues that post-conflict elections will only serve their function if the costs of violent competition are raised, for example by ensuring civilian control over the security sector, and the costs of electoral competition are lowered through pacts, federalism, or other means to diffuse power.

Second, *federalism or decentralisation* could impact on the risk of post-conflict violence. Devolving funds and powers can satiate the needs of separatist groups and may quell emerging violence in multi-ethnic states. There is some evidence that federalism is associated with a lower incidence of rebellion (Saideman et al. 2002). Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2008: 471) also find that the risk of war resumption drops from 46.2% (without autonomy) to 12.2% (with autonomy), although the small sample sizes mean that results are not statistically significant. Brancati (2009) argues that decentralisation will have violence-inducing impacts if it encourages the formation of regional parties but peaceful effects if it does not. Devolving resources may lead to more competition at the local level, which could take violent form if institutions to manage this are not in place or are weak. Given that subnational state institutions will often be weaker than those at the central level, there may be more use of episodic forms of violence to capture resources where the size of these resources is larger.

Finally, the extent to which there are *formal rules in place that ensure a division of state resources and positions* across the groups who fought in the past may affect the likelihood of post-conflict violence. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) argue that the absence of power dividing and sharing institutions in a peace settlement is the key determinant of civil war recurrence. Call (2012) similarly observes that civil wars are more likely to reignite where a formerly warring group is politically marginalised in the post-conflict period. There is debate over what types of formal power sharing rules will be most effective in cementing peace. Lijphart's theory of consociationalism (e.g. 1968, 1977) states that in divided societies there is a need to allocate positions in government to ethnic groups, with each forming part of a grand coalition. In response, others have

argued that such group-based democratic institutions can lock in divisive identities. For these reasons, Horowitz (1985) and Sisk (1996), amongst others, prefer rules that incentivise moderation and cooperation across ethnic groups through electoral engineering, what has been called centripetalism. Unfortunately, however, there is little empirical evidence yet on the impacts of these different types of power sharing rules on violence (Jarstad 2008). The theories also have less relevance to areas emerging from subnational civil wars, such as Aceh, where identity divides within the local population are not marked.

Extension #1: informal institutions and state practices

Theories based on state capacity or differing state structures may be able to explain at an aggregate level a share of the cross-country variance in post-conflict violence. However, these theories are unable to show why post-conflict violence varies *within* a country. Whether a country is democratic or autocratic (or somewhere in between) is a national level phenomenon. Rules of electoral competition and constitutional structure are set at the centre and tend to be applied equally across a country's subnational units, although in some cases conflict-prone areas are given special forms of autonomy. Nor can such theories explain why some post-conflict areas within higher capacity, democratic states experience continuing violence.

It may be more useful to focus on how the state functions *in practice*, which can vary substantially between different areas within a country, particularly in countries with high levels of decentralisation, rather than on the formal rules of the game, which tend to be constant across regions of a country. Formal institutions such as elections and criminal codes play a role by providing constraints on action and hence regulating behaviour. But informal practices of the state may be just as important in many places emerging from extended violence. North (1990) observes that even in the most developed countries, formal rules make up just a small part of the sum of constraints

that shape choices.⁷¹ The importance of informal constraints or institutions “can be observed from the evidence that the same formal rules and/or constitutions imposed on different societies produce different outcomes” (*ibid.*: 36). Informal institutions, which include conventions and norms, will be particularly important in shaping the behaviour of state-based actors in countries where the formal rule of law is weak, that is where informal institutions substitute for formal ones (Helmke and Levitsky 2004).

Extension #2: disaggregating the state

To understand why (post-conflict) violence occurs we must also disaggregate the state. One key distinction is between *different levels of the state*. In every country, powers are divided between levels of government. The state at different geographic levels thus has differing abilities to take actions to prevent, or sometimes cause, post-conflict violence. For episodic forms of violence, it is likely that the local state plays a particularly important role. The central state in most countries will tolerate a certain level of episodic violence if it is not challenging to national elites’ status or wealth or to the ability of the state to collect tax revenues. In particular, when such violence is concentrated in remote, less urbanised regions, developing effective responses is unlikely to be a major priority for central state elites (Slater 2010a). In contrast, in most countries there will be less tolerance by national governments of large-scale extended violence where state control (and hence sovereignty) is challenged and where there may be macro-level economic impacts.

Second, we need to disaggregate the state by *the actors who embody it*. The state is usually conceived of as a single body, modelled as a unitary actor that interacts with society (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bates, Grieff, and Singh 2002). Yet North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009: 17) make the important observation that treating the state as one actor or body “assumes away the fundamental problem of how the state achieves

⁷¹ Robert Ellickson’s (1991) case study of conflict resolution amongst rural residents in Shasta County, California, shows how people frequently resolve their disputes without paying any attention to the laws that apply to those disputes. See also Auerbach (1984).

a monopoly on violence.” This, they argue, is a function of the strategic interaction of different elites. Most of the world’s population, including that of Indonesia, lives in “limited access orders” or “natural states” and most extended violent conflicts occur in these countries.⁷² In such places the state is not an autonomous impersonal body, with perpetual legal personality, but the “dominant coalition whose members possess special privileges” (*ibid.*: 18). Elites agree to limit access to power to those within the coalition. Doing so creates incentives for different elites to abide by rules whereby they do not use violence against each other or appropriate each other’s property, hence allowing for gains from rents. “Peace”, they argue, “is not inevitable: peace depends on the balance of interests created by the rent-creation process” (*ibid.*: 20).

North, Wallis, and Weingast perhaps under-emphasise the extent to which societal pressures can shape the actions of elites and how informal rules can constrain elite behaviour even in weaker states.⁷³ Yet the observation that the functioning of the state is, at least in part, a result of the interests of elite groups is key. Violence cannot solely be conceived of as a product of competition for the state but may result from the behaviour of actors within it. In understanding why violence occurs, we need to understand not only how state capacities and formal institutional structures shape the propensity for violence but also why states act in the way they do. And, in doing so, we need to understand the incentives and interactions of those within the state.

2. The political economy of violence: an actor-based framework for understanding post-conflict violence and its escalation

The existent literature provides many useful insights that can help explain why post-conflict violence occurs when and where it does. Collectively, the work identifies a

⁷² North, Wallis, and Weingast suggest that such states include 85% of the world’s population (2009: xii) and that all lower and middle income states are limited access orders, although with varying degrees of maturity (North et al. 2013: 10).

⁷³ The two kinds of state they identify as existing in the modern world (open access orders and natural states) are ideal types. In reality, many states such as Indonesia contain elements of each.

number of mechanisms that can explain the reemergence of violence. However, past explanations are incomplete.

The bargaining literature points to the importance of the security dilemma in some post-conflict areas. This may indeed lead to violence in some cases but this violence is more likely to take the form of recurring extended violent conflict than episodic violence. In many places, post-conflict violence will not be the result of fear and mistrust but will be employed opportunistically for material gain, and may involve elites who were ostensibly on opposite sides of the extended violent conflict collaborating.

Work on the societal residues of violence identifies issues such as trauma, dysfunctional social relations, and enduring grievances. Each can mean that tensions between groups remain high in the post-conflict period. However, most people suffering from trauma, with grievances, or living in areas where divisive identities are strong, will not support the use of violence or engage in it. As such, the theories do not explain why and when such contention will take violent form.

The state-building literature focuses on the importance of the state's coercive capacity and its ability to promote growth and development and the ways in which the formal rules of the game shape the likelihood of post-conflict violence. Yet the theories do not explain why in many cases states choose not to prevent or manage conflict in ways that stop it turning violent where they have the capacity to do so. The ability of formal structures and rules to explain the presence or absence of violence is also undermined by the fact that post-conflict violence may vary within states that have the same formal institutions in place across areas. Informal rules and norms will often be as important as formal institutions in shaping how individuals within the state act and why they support or resist violence.

Previous theories, which focus on only one set of actors—be it elites, members of society, or the state—are also not of sufficient causal depth for they do not consider

the interactions between each of these sets of actors. The ability of any group or individual to use violence with frequency will likely be contingent on the extent to which other actors support or condone (or, conversely, resist) violence. Elites, for example, must be able to motivate individuals to participate in violence if they want it to occur. The extent to which ex-combatants or militia regularly use violence for gain is likely contingent in part on the degree to which they are supported, or at least tolerated by, local elites and the central state. Whether or not weak state capacity will lead to violence will depend on the extent to which elites and/or non-elite groups have motivations to use violence. In short, no actor alone has the agency to produce violence. In understanding the reasons why post-conflict violence occurs, or why it does not, we need a more syncretic theory of post-conflict violence that looks at elites, societal groups, *and* those within the central state.

A unique focus on elites, society or the state also limits our ability to explain why post-conflict violence takes *different forms* across areas and over time. Different actors, factors and mechanisms will likely be more important in producing some forms of violence than others. Elites' incentives to use violence, for example, are likely an important part of an explanation of recurring extended violence or large incidents of episodic violence, each of which require organisation. However, they are probably less important for smaller-scale episodic violence where such organisation is not required. Strong states are important for avoiding the recurrence of extended violence but may be less important for forms of episodic violence that do not threaten the interests of central state elites.

2.1 Actor support for violence and different forms of post-conflict violence

The thesis develops a new theory of post-conflict violence that sees variance in levels and types of post-conflict violence as being rooted in differences in the attitudes of three different sets of actors to the use of violence:

- *Local elites*, whom I define as those residing in post-conflict areas with extensive power. They may hold formal political positions or may have informal bases of authority. Examples include politicians in the regions, other powerful agents of the state (such as local police or military chiefs), traditional and religious leaders, and those who commanded conflicting parties during the extended violence period. The make-up of the local elite will differ between places. But common across all local elites is that they have support bases that they can mobilise. Local elites are subject to the authority of central state elites.
- Non-elite civilian *violence specialists*. This group can include those who fought during the extended violence (ex-combatants or militia members) and other thugs with experience of using violence. They may use violence at the behest of elites or for their own purposes.
- *Central state elites*. National elites play a role in determining the ways in which the state's coercive power is exercised, for example where and when the military and police are deployed. They also control how central state funds are distributed. This group may include those in national government, other influential politicians, and chiefs of the security forces.

The likelihood that violence will occur in the post-conflict period is determined by the level of support for violence from each set of actors. Different combinations of support for or rejection of violence from these groups determines not only whether post-conflict violence is likely to occur but the extent to which it will escalate into larger forms of violence. This is because different kinds of post-conflict violence require the active participation or acquiescence of different sets of actors.

Large-scale episodic violence

H1. Necessary conditions: support for violence from local elites and violence specialists

Where local elites support violence, observable by tracing their participation in instigating violent incidents, and where violence specialists have motivations and opportunities to use violence, large episodic violence will occur frequently.

Large-scale episodes of violence generally involve local elites. Tambiah, for example, in his survey of ethnic riots in Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan, points to the role of local politicians and other elites in instigating violence and encouraging its escalation:

In country after country, police, army, other security forces, paramilitary groups recruited by the state, and even some public officials participated in riots, either as onlookers slow to take preventive action or as vigorous participants favoring the cause of one side (Tambiah 1996: 214).

Local elite support for violence tends to be required for such violence to occur for three reasons. First, riots, group clashes and large one-way attacks all require organisation and hence leadership. Local elites can help organise such violence in a variety of ways including by spreading suspicions or rumours and hiring thugs to participate in violence.⁷⁴

Second, violence usually only escalates to large episodic forms when local state security agencies either (a) do not have the capacity to prevent such escalation or (b) when they actively allow it to occur. In middle income states such as Indonesia, the latter is often more important. Indonesian security bodies possess an intelligence apparatus and technology (water cannons, tear gas, strategies for quick deployment, etc.) to prevent such incidents from occurring. Where riots or clashes occur frequently it is often a result of the coercive powers of the state being applied only selectively. A key strategy for local elites who want violence to occur can be to influence the performance of the local police or military, preventing them from acting upon intelligence or responding once unrest has begun. There is evidence from many places that this dynamic is common. Wilkinson (2004: 5) argues that, “abundant comparative evidence shows that large-scale ethnic rioting does not take place where a state’s army or police

⁷⁴ See, for example, Brass (2003), Tambiah (1996), Horowitz (2001), Kakar (1996), and Berenschot (2011).

force is ordered to stop it using all means necessary,” and the same can be true for other forms of escalated unrest such as two-way group clashes. Wilson (2011), in explaining riots in the Indonesian province of North Maluku, argues that incitement by elites only led to instrumentalist violence after the security forces were immobilised.

Third, even where large episodes of post-conflict violence are not led by elites but by groups within society, where they occur frequently there is usually some level of elite acquiescence. Local elites, who are defined by the power they exercise over the local society, should be able to rein in societal groups who have an interest in perpetrating violence. Frequent large incidents thus indicate a degree of acceptance or support from at least some in the local elite for violence, even where elites are not leading the organisation of such violence. Where local elites do not use or support such violence, violence that occurs is likely to be smaller in scale, involving fewer participants with more limited impacts.

Elite support for violence is, however, not enough to produce large-scale episodic violence. In almost all cases, local elites themselves will not directly engage in violence. Local elites need to be able to mobilise non-elites for this purpose. There thus needs to be support for the use of violence by others who are willing to participate in violent action.

Frequent large-scale violence does not require the support of central state-based actors. In all but the most centralised of countries, the central state will usually devolve authority to control episodic violence to local elites. It is only where episodic violence threatens to spiral out of control, raising the risk of escalation into extended violence, that central states will tend to get involved.

Small-scale episodic violence

H2. Necessary condition: support for violence from violence specialists

Small-scale episodic violence will occur when civilian non-elites have incentives to use violence to achieve their goals but where elite support for the escalation of violence into larger forms is absent.

Not every incident of small-scale violence will involve specialists in violence. Inter-personal squabbles can get out of control and take violent form. Communities may mobilise to respond (violently) to threats from other communities. As I show in the next chapter, and discuss in greater depth in the three case study chapters that follow, forms of violence such as popular justice, which often involve largely spontaneous violent reactions to perceived offences committed by others, have been prominent in post-conflict areas of Indonesia.

However, where episodic post-conflict violence is endemic much of it will usually be committed by violence specialists such as former combatants or criminal thugs. Where small-scale violence is common, the ranks of violence specialists are likely to swell. Communities will often turn to young men to provide protection or use violence to represent their interests. Those who previously just dabbled in violence can over time become experts in it, with strong demand for their services meaning the rewards they receive for using violence accentuate incentives for them to specialise in it.

In contrast, local elite support for violence is not necessary for smaller-scale episodes of violence to occur with frequency. Violent incidents with smaller impacts tend not to require the same level of organisation as larger-scale incidents. Nor is immobilisation of the local security apparatus necessary. Smaller-scale incidents of violence will often be harder to prevent than larger episodes because they tend to last for a shorter time, because (by definition) they do not escalate beyond a certain level, and because they usually involve smaller numbers of people: each factor makes detection and response more difficult. In some instances elites may be involved in instigating small-scale episodic violence, using it to increase their credibility, i.e. by

showing that they have an ability to engage in violence if necessary. However, the support or tolerance of local elites is not a *necessary* condition for small-scale post-conflict violence to occur. Indeed, where elites support the use of violence for their own purposes it is likely that smaller-scale incidents will be accompanied by larger-scale ones that send a clearer signal of strength. Where small-scale incidents exist alone it is unlikely that elite machinations are driving them.

Likewise, small-scale episodic violence can occur with frequency even where the central state does not support it occurring. If the central state is usually not overly concerned with large-scale episodic violence occurring, as long as it does not reach a certain threshold where further escalation is likely, it will be even less concerned with incidents of small-scale violence.

Extended violent conflict

H3. Necessary conditions: support for violence from central state actors, local elites, and violence specialists

For large episodes of post-conflict violence to escalate into (renewed) extended violent conflict, the support or acquiescence of national state-based elites is necessary in states that have a sufficient degree of control.⁷⁵

The theories outlined above on failed bargains and fractured social relations tend to view the scale of violence as being a function of the depth of support for violence from, respectively, local elites and societal groups. The former theories predict that places where there is deeper animosity or less trust between local elites on either side of the conflict divide would see escalated renewed extended violence rather than more episodic outbursts. The latter predict that places marked by deeper inter-group hatreds or grievances will be those where there will be renewed extended violence rather than

⁷⁵ This hypothesis only applies to states with a reasonable level of capacity. As such, the theory is likely to have more applicability to at least moderately strong states than to weak or failing states.

episodic forms of violence. This reasoning is built upon an assumption that local elites and citizens have the agency to produce extended violence if they are motivated to do so.

However, in middle and higher income states this will often not be the case. In such places the central state usually has the ability to control violence before it escalates into extended violence, either through coercive means (sending in the troops), by buying-off belligerents, or through a combination of such tactics. Most extended violent conflicts in such countries will be non-conventional, fought between either two non-state groups, for example religious or ethnic groups, or between a guerrilla movement and a state army. In the former symmetrical conflicts, the central state can act as an arbiter and enforcer, stepping in when things get out of hand. In the latter conflicts, which can be characterised by the asymmetric capacity of the two sides, the state will likely have disproportionate power allowing it to shape to a large extent how violence evolves.

As discussed earlier, most central states will tolerate a certain level of episodic violence in the regions. But they will usually not support extended violent conflicts where their power is seriously challenged, where the cost to the state is significant in lost revenues or post-conflict reconstruction costs, and which may result in a loss of international prestige and investment.⁷⁶ As such, given moderate central state capacity, local elites and/or citizens will only have the ability to produce extended violence—in its communal or civil war forms—where there is support for or acquiescence to this from the central state.

If this is the case, why would the central state allow or support extended violence? Why does the central state choose to employ coercive and/or persuasive

⁷⁶ Slater (2010a) argues that only certain kinds of endemic violence wake central state-based elites into action.


means to prevent extended violence from recurring in some places and not in others, especially given the high costs of extended violent conflict?

To understand these decisions, we need to disaggregate the state and look at the incentives that state-based elites at the national level face to either support extended violence or strategies to prevent it. As with violence specialists and local elites, central state-based elites can receive positive pay-offs from extended violent conflicts. As such, while support for violence from local elites and elements of society are both necessary conditions for extended violence to occur, it is only when key actors within the central state either turn a blind eye to violence escalation or actively support it that extended violent conflict will recur. In the absence of such support it will usually be possible to halt violence before it escalates into enduring high impact violence.

Support for violence and forms of post-conflict violence

Figure 3.1 summarises the logic of the argument, showing how different combinations of support for violence shape the predominant forms of violence that are likely in different post-conflict areas. The different types of violence can usefully be conceptualised as escalated forms of each other. Escalation of violence to more destructive types (from small episodic to large episodic violence, and from large episodic to extended violence) requires support from those with higher levels of authority and hence agency to produce violence.

Figure 3.1. Support for violence from different groups and types of post-conflict violence



2.2 Reasons for supporting violence: the instrumental functions of violence

Individuals and groups may use or support the use of violence for a number of reasons. Sometimes, violence will be emotive, an uncalculated outburst of frustration. Yet more often violence serves instrumental purposes for those who employ it (or who allow it to occur). Violence will be most likely when individuals or groups think it is a useful tactic for achieving their goals.

These goals are likely to be diverse, varying across conflict, place, and individual. As Petersen (2002) has argued, humans desire a range of things in life including safety, wealth, status, and self-esteem. Emotions such as fear (that these are under threat) or resentment (that they have not been reached) can play an instrumental role, triggering individuals to take actions to achieve such goals. Violence may thus be employed for a number of reasons related to both the material and non-material interests of individuals and of groups.

Particularly prominent in most post-conflict areas—and indeed many other places—are the goals of securing resources or power and shaping the rules of the game on how they are allocated. In part, this is because for many financial concerns play a large role in dictating actions. Wealth and status, to use Petersen’s categories, do loom large in people’s lives. However, violence is not always driven by ‘greed’. Beyond the

goals of self-enrichment, access to resources, or to the political positions that control their allocation, can serve *instrumental* functions: they can be important in enhancing the agency of individuals and groups to control other areas of their lives.

Khan and Jomo (2000) see the source of almost all distributive conflicts in rent-seeking. Rents, or incomes that are higher than otherwise could have been earned, include not only monopoly profits, the traditional focus of economic analyses of rent-seeking, but also state subsidies and transfers, legal and illegal. Because rents (and rent-making opportunities) are valuable and scarce, individuals and groups will compete to create and maintain rents. This involves a fight for the establishment of individual or group-specific rights, for “rents [as with Marxian surpluses] are sustained by an underlying structure of economic rights” (Khan 2000: 64). Individuals and groups try to institutionalise rights to rents. The struggle to establish such rights can lead to changes to the formal and/or informal institutions that regulate the distribution of resources and rent-making opportunities. Khan and Jomo (2000: 6) argue that, “almost all institutional change involves creating or destroying rents and almost all conflicts can be described as conflicts where one or both sides are seeking rents.”

Key for our purposes here, the institutions that determine the distribution of rights to rents are often the same as those that determine other rights and protections. North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) point to the confluence of political and economic rights in many developing countries: the political protections and opportunities afforded to an individual or groups are contingent on economic power. Because of this, the fight for resources is linked to struggles to shape the institutions that govern non-economic aspects of life. An individual or group may seek a degree of power to ensure that their customary land rights are not lost. An ethnic group may fight for sizeable representation in the police or military to ensure that they are not threatened. A rich man can buy protection from prosecution or extortion. The control of positions and rent-making opportunities is thus both an end in itself but also an important means to

achieve other desired ends. Individuals and groups compete for power and resources to enrich themselves but also to safeguard the wide range of their interests.

Competition over resources and power—and hence the ability to shape rights and institutions—is particularly important in countries like Indonesia that are ‘patronage democracies’, characterised by a concentration of political and economic power and an overlap between conceptions of the public and the private spheres (Chandra 2004). In these places, Chandra (2007: 86) writes, “the state has a relative monopoly on jobs and services, and ... elected officials enjoy significant discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state.” State offices are regarded as ‘prebends’, with it seen as legitimate for office holders to appropriate material benefits to pass on to those in their patron-client network (Joseph 1987). In such places, “personal relationships, who one is and who one knows, form the basis for social organization and constitute the arena for individual interaction, particularly personal relationships among powerful individuals” (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009: 2). The importance of controlling positions or resources is thus increased because one cannot rely on impartial and impersonal legal institutions to protect the rights and interests of those who do not have direct connections to those in power. With the relative absence or ineffectiveness of such impersonal institutions, and where there are few checks on those in power, control of political positions and/or resources is important both for group- or self-enrichment and because it can provide a bulwark against exploitation by others.

2.3 Conditions under which support for violence increases

The analysis suggests a number of conditions, applicable to each set of actors, under which support for violence will be greater:

- (a) When the expected gains from using violence (in terms of accessing power and/or resources) are high and outweigh the risks associated with using it (in terms of being killed, injured, arrested, or otherwise sanctioned);
- (b) When there is a lack of peaceable ways to access power or resources.

The expected benefits of using violence

Violence is more likely when groups and individuals expect it to be profitable, that is when they perceive the benefits of using violence to outweigh the costs. How do individuals and groups make these cost-benefit judgements? In deciding on whether to initiate, participate in, or support violence (or not), each set of actors will rely in large part on the signals that past acts of violence, and responses to it, have generated.

Nancy Bermeo's (1992) concept of political learning is useful in helping us understand how attitudes towards violence may evolve in post-conflict settings. Focusing on the creation or reconstruction of democracy after periods of dictatorships, she argues that cognitive change or learning is key. Elites (both incumbents and challengers) learn the lessons from past failures and may change their goals or tactics accordingly. "The reconstruction of democracy," she posits, "almost always requires some form of prodemocratic learning" (*ibid.*: 277). It is these changes in beliefs that lead to discontinuities in regime types and the elite strategies that shape them (*ibid.*: 281).

Similarly, political learning is also required in post-conflict areas if violence is not to reemerge. Only where beliefs about the utility of violence change will violence subside after extended violent conflicts end. Individuals and groups use violence during periods of communal or civil war if they think that, strategically or tactically, violence is the best means of achieving their goals. The ending of an extended violent conflict provides a critical juncture where individuals and groups, elites and non-elites alike, can reevaluate whether violence still serves their purposes in a radically changed

environment.⁷⁷ At such points in time, uncertainty is rife: leaders, former combatants, and civilians do not know whether peace will hold, whether the terms of an accord will be applied, whether the continuing use of violence will be beneficial in achieving goals, and whether it will be sanctioned by the central state, peacekeepers, or others with authority. In such information-scarce environments, individuals will look closely for signals that help to reveal whether or not violence will continue to be an efficient and relatively risk-free strategy.

An important source of such information is whether the use of violence in the early post-conflict period results in benefits without significant costs for those who employ it. Particularly important will be the extent to which extra post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction funds are distributed to those who continue to use, or threaten to use, violence. Most peace processes are accompanied by additional resources and these are sometimes used to try to co-opt those who fought before.⁷⁸ Channelling funds to such individuals and groups can help incorporate them into peace settlements. However, if access to these funds is contingent on the use or threat of violence *after* the extended violence has ended, this can inadvertently signal that continuing use of violence is acceptable and profitable.

Indeed, we can hypothesise that responses to violence in the early post-conflict period will play a more important signalling role than responses when the extended violent conflict is still ongoing. This is because peace settlements—whether they take the form of mediated agreements or the forced terms of a military victory or third party military intervention—will be expected to change the rules of the game with regards to the use of violence. Militia members, for example, may have been rewarded handsomely

⁷⁷ Bermeo argues that changes of beliefs are most likely following severe crises, frustrations, and environmental changes.

⁷⁸ Programs aimed at supporting the reintegration of former combatants, for example, often provide cash benefits as a means of generating support from potential peace spoilers for the peace settlement. On the functions of such 'DDR' programs, see UNDDR (2006) and Swedish MFA (2006). The articles in Muggah (2009b) provide a useful critical assessment.

by political leaders during the extended violence but may find that their activities become a nuisance for those same elites in the post-conflict period. A militia member trying to work out whether continuing to use violence will be profitable or not in the post-conflict period will get a far stronger signal from analysing what happened when another member used violence following a peace agreement than from assessing responses and success during the extended violence period. Developing Bermeo's idea, we can thus predict that the period *following* a shock such as a peace settlement will be more important in determining whether and what kind of political learning with regards to violence will take place than the period before the critical juncture.

Where early post-conflict violence leads to the securing of rents or positions, and where those with authority to provide sanctions instead give active or tacit support to this, individuals and groups are more likely to use violence as a political-economic strategy. In contrast, where responses to post-conflict violence show how risky it is (for example, when perpetrators were arrested), or where it has failed to result in benefit, violence will be less likely. The ways in which those with authority respond to acts of violence is thus key. Where violence is rewarded—for example, by providing preferential access to resources or positions for those who perpetrate it—future violence is more likely. In contrast, where the use of violence does not result in rewards, those who may have been tempted to use violence to pursue their goals will be less likely to do so.

These processes apply to civilian violence specialists, local elites, and to central state elites in their decisions on whether or not to use/support violence. The actions of each set of actors will be determined, in part, by whether their use of violence proves to be effective in accumulating resources and/or power.

This leads to the following hypotheses:

H4. Where resources or positions are given out based on the use of, or threats of, violence in the post-conflict period, more future post-conflict violence will occur

H5. Where authorities do not impose costs on those who use violence, more future post-conflict violence will occur

The presence of peaceable means for accumulating resources and/or power

Even where the expected benefits of using violence outweigh the expected costs, each set of actors may prefer not to use it if other ways to achieve their goals exist. This is because, even when costs are expected to be low, violence is still risky and because most people will have a natural tendency to prefer peaceful to violent interaction and to act upon the “better angels of our nature” (Pinker 2011).

What these peaceable means might be need to be distinguished by actor group. For civilian violence specialists, many of whom will be un- or under-employed, the availability of well remunerated jobs may be sufficient to limit the support of some, if not all, for violence. As such, we can predict that where local economic growth is stronger, and where this translates into employment opportunities for young men, fewer will engage in violence. Leaders of criminal or ex-combatant groups may also have political ambitions. Where they are able to fulfil these, without resort to using violence in doing so, they may be less likely to support violence.

Local elites will likely have both economic and political goals. With regards to the former, environments with high levels of growth or where decentralised public sector funds are large (and expanding) may provide more opportunities for local elite accumulation. However, in environments where patrimonial relations determine who benefits, it will be important that some elite groups (and their patronage networks) are not locked out. Where collaboration across elite groups on economic projects is possible, support for violence from local elites will thus be less likely. Similarly, local elites will be more likely to participate in peaceful politics where the costs of losing are not too

great—that is, where there is some degree of power sharing across elite groups. As discussed earlier, the formal rules of the game—for example, different electoral system designs—will shape the extent to which such power sharing occurs. However, informal norms, which lead to cross-elite collaboration or not, will also be important.⁷⁹

For central state elites, a similar logic applies. Where different elite groups have opportunities to profit, and where they perceive an ability to access and maintain political power without resort to violence, they will be more likely to support a political order where extended violence is not deemed legitimate.

We can thus hypothesise the following:

H6. Where opportunities exist to achieve political or economic power through peaceable means, each set of actors will be less likely to use violence in the post-conflict period

2.4 From incentives to norms

The political learning that takes place in the early post-conflict period can have path dependent effects on longer-run patterns of violence.⁸⁰ This is because where violence proves beneficial and not costly, the same individuals will choose to use it as a tactic again and others will also see that it has utility. As violence is used more frequently, and by a wider number of people, norms about the legitimacy of using violence to achieve desired ends can also change. As Robert Axelrod has argued, norms are often a product of learning: “what works well ... is likely to be used again while what turns out poorly is likely to be discarded” (Axelrod 1986: 1097). Where people see that violence is useful, more will engage in it; after a certain threshold is reached, a ‘tipping point’ can occur

⁷⁹ As I show in subsequent chapters, the fact that there is variation in the support of local elites for violence across areas with the same electoral framework demonstrates that these formal rules of the game alone do not determine such support.

⁸⁰ See Mahoney (2000), Pierson (2000), and Thelen (2003) on path dependence.

with violence becoming legitimised as a mode of political or economic interaction, in particular when it is in the interest of elites for this to occur.⁸¹

This can lead to more violence through two different causal mechanisms. First, individuals' calculations change. As more information becomes available showing that violence is not costly, the perceived level of risk of using it will decrease. At the same time, cost-benefit calculations may become less important. This is because violence can change people's conceptions of their goals. Divisive identities or ideologies can harden; destroying, disadvantaging, or achieving victory over 'the other' can become a goal in itself. This can lead to what Varshney (2003) has called 'value rationality' where, in contrast to 'instrumental rationality', individuals or groups will continue to pursue goals despite the high costs and low expected probability of achieving them. Both changed instrumental rationality and value rationality can become drivers of violence.

This in turn leads to feedback effects that can be reinforcing. Where violence is socially sanctioned—where it becomes legitimised under the rules of the game that govern competition between individuals and groups—the likelihood that violence will occur frequently rises substantially. Such social norms can lead people to support the use of violence even when it is not in their immediate best interests. Over time, such norms may be difficult to shift, requiring another exogenous shock that results in a significant change to the costs or benefits of using violence for many.

2.5 Temporal variance in post-conflict violence

The theory points us to time periods when levels of post-conflict violence will heighten within a given area. If post-conflict violence is a function of the expected gains of using violence, the degree of perceived risk, and the absence of peaceable means for reaching goals, changes to each of these may alter the propensity of an area to experience violence. Violence is more likely to be used when there are changes to the perceived

⁸¹ On tipping points and norms, see Schelling (1960).

costs or benefits of using violence or when other opportunities for accumulation that do not require violence diminish. Such changes can operate for any of the three sets of actors—violence specialists, local elites, and national elites—hence affecting levels of different forms of violence.

For each set of actors, incentives to support or participate in violence may be strengthened, and hence levels of violence may rise, when there are either (a) expected changes in the level of resources that can be captured, (b) expected changes to who will control resources, or (c) when the rules of the game governing access to resources are expected to be about to change. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H7. Where resource levels are expected to increase sharply, post-conflict violence will rise

Expectations of greater future resources—for example when the state or international donors are about to provide post-conflict funds—may raise the willingness of different groups to utilise or support violence if it is seen as a potentially fruitful strategy to capture these. In such situations, individuals and groups will tend to trade-off the risks of using violence against the expected benefits to be gained from it. However, we would expect any increases in violence to be conditional on a lack of peaceable opportunities being available for accessing such resources.

H8. Where levels of resources are perceived as being about to drop significantly, post-conflict violence will rise

Violence can also be used as a means to secure a share of a diminishing resource pie. This effect is likely to be stronger where violence was the means used previously to access resources. Where violence was not used for this—because of high risks or because other channels for accumulating resources were available—reductions in resources will be less likely to correlate with higher levels of violence.

H9. Where there is heightened competition over who controls resources, or occupies powerful positions, violence will rise

In democracies, one key time period is when elections are about to be held. We can expect elections to be tenser (and potentially violent) in areas where electoral institutions are the main means through which resources and power are allocated. In places where other means of politicking (for example backroom deals facilitated by the illicit exchange of money or favours) or coercion are more important than elections, elections will be less likely to correlate with spikes of violence.

H10. Where there are expected changes to the rules by which resources or power are allocated, violence will rise

Such changes may relate to the structure of the state. The literature on violence and democratic transitions, for example, has shown that the two often coincide. They may also relate to more micro-level changes in the *practices* of the state. For example, a decrease in the discretion elites have in allocating resources (e.g. where there is increased monitoring of the use of funds and sanctioning those who engage in corruption) may lead to an upsurge in violence. This is because violence can be a useful means to shape the formal and informal rules of the game as they are (re)forged. At these times, bargains need to be renegotiated. When violence is deemed legitimate or normal, there is the potential for it to be used to shape the content of such agreements.

This chapter has developed a theoretical framework aimed at explaining where post-conflict violence is likely to occur, the forms it is likely to take, and when there will be increases in violence. The theory—parsimonious as it is—inevitably under-emphasises some factors that may on occasion lead to violence. As such, the following chapters turn to the Indonesian cases to, first, assess the efficacy of the framework and, second, to inductively develop it.

PART II:

POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA

Chapter 4. Violence and Indonesia's Democratic Transition

This chapter provides an overview of violence in Indonesia since the beginning of the country's democratic transition in 1998. The thesis seeks to explain what causes post-conflict violence to vary between areas and over time. A necessary first step is to map out the extent and nature of this variance. Only after we comprehend the broader patterns of violence can we turn our attention to explaining them.

Such patterns can be seen most clearly if we take a bird's eye view and look at the large-n of violence in Indonesia. The chapter draws primarily on the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) dataset. This new dataset provides the most comprehensive and accurate quantitative picture to date of the nature and impacts of violence in post-authoritarian Indonesia. It records incidents of violence reported in over 100 local newspapers for around half of Indonesia's provinces, including all of those that were previously affected by large-scale extended violent conflict around the turn of the century. This allows us to consider how violence is distributed across the country and how it has changed in incidence, destructive impact, and forms over time.

The chapter serves multiple purposes. First, it introduces the new violence dataset, explaining the advantages it offers over previous sources of quantitative data on Indonesian violence as well as its limitations. Second, the chapter provides a summary of the violence that emerged in the early years of Indonesia's democratic transition, focusing particularly on the extended violent conflicts that erupted or escalated. It provides new evidence on where such violence occurred, the forms it took, and its human and physical impacts. Third, the chapter then maps out patterns of post-conflict violence in areas previously affected by extended violence. It highlights the extent to which there are significant differences across areas in both levels of post-conflict

violence and in the forms it is taking. Finally, the chapter uses this observed variation to select six districts for deeper study.

1. A new dataset on Indonesian violence

Why build a new dataset of violence for Indonesia? Prior to this project, three main types of quantitative data on violence existed: Indonesian government statistics, both police records and from the periodic Village Potential (PODES) survey; NGO and state-mandated watchdog reports on rights violations and violence; and a large newspaper-based dataset put together by the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR). None of these data sources is adequate for assessing patterns of post-conflict violence in Indonesia. To varying extents they suffer from a number of problems: violence is under-reported; incidents are not classified in standardised ways that allow for temporal and spatial analysis; smaller-scale incidents are excluded; and information for recent years is not included. It was thus necessary to put together a new dataset.

1.1 Data sources on Indonesian violence and their limitations

While Indonesian police statistics are used in global assessments of homicide rates the data have significant weaknesses.⁸² One issue is that Indonesian police data substantially under-report violence and its impacts. A study conducted as part of the preparation of the NVMS dataset compared police data with that obtained through a reading of local newspapers for a six-month period in 2005 in Maluku. While police data showed 12 violent incidents leading to 12 fatalities, newspapers reported 67 violent incidents resulting in 24 deaths. The police only recorded cases that were written up for formal processing; this meant that incidents where charges were not pressed, or where

⁸² The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, for example, gathers homicide data. Information for their 2010 statistics comes from national criminal justice systems (police, prosecution, courts, and prison authorities) for 143 of 207 countries/territories, including Indonesia (UNODC 2011).

perpetrators escaped, were not captured (Sharpe 2005: 16, 19). A more recent comparison of police violence statistics in the Greater Jakarta area with incidents reported in local newspapers found that the police data under-estimated murders by 80% and rapes by 65%.⁸³ Where police capacity is lower than in Indonesia's capital, police data are likely to miss even more violent incidents.

A second problem with Indonesian police data is that they are not standardised across areas. Sharpe's (2005) assessment of Maluku and North Maluku police data, for example, found that different categories were used to assign incidents to types in different places. There is no central body within the national police force that systematically gathers and collates violence or crime data collected at more local levels. Hospital records on fatalities, used elsewhere to estimate homicide rates, also tend to be incomplete in Indonesia and do not adequately record information on the cause of death.

Since 2003, the Indonesian government's Bureau of Statistics has collected data on violence through its Village Potential (*Potensi Desa*, or PODES) survey, which is conducted every three years. The nationwide survey asks village heads about violence that has occurred in the past year and the impacts it has had. While providing more comprehensive and standardised information than the police data, PODES still has a number of weaknesses.

First, the accuracy of the violence data is questionable. In areas with large-scale extended violence, PODES appears to over report fatalities. The 2003 survey—which provides data on violence between September 2001 and August 2002⁸⁴—reported that of 4,849 people who died from conflict across Indonesia, 4,106 lost their lives in the extended violence provinces of West and Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Maluku,

⁸³ Police reported that in 2011 there were 68 murders and 64 rapes in the greater Jakarta (MetroJaya) area (Marhaenjati and Arnas 2011). The NVMS reports 328 murders in 2011 and 182 rapes that year.

⁸⁴ The enumeration of the survey was completed in August 2002. Given that PODES was rolled out over a period of time, the preceding 12 months may be different for different areas.

North Maluku, and Aceh (Barron, Kaiser, and Pradhan 2009). NVMS data for the same provinces records 3,415 deaths from violence. In contrast, it appears that in 'lower conflict' areas PODES under-reports violence. Barron and Sharpe's (2005) study of two Indonesian provinces that were not affected by large-scale extended violence compared violence reported in local newspapers with that recorded in PODES for the 2001-2003 period. In twelve districts in the two provinces, they found that local newspapers picked up 2.6 times as many deaths as did PODES.⁸⁵ More strikingly, the 2005 PODES reported that just 276 people were killed from violent conflict nationwide (Vothknecht and Sumarto 2011). NVMS data for the same period for 16 Indonesian provinces, half the Indonesian total, found 1,207 deaths from conflict.⁸⁶

These inaccuracies flow in part from the perverse incentives informants face in responding to survey questions, which can lead to under- and over-reporting of violence. Analysing the 2003 data, Barron, Kaiser, and Pradhan (2009) argue that responses will depend on expectations about how the survey will influence policy decisions. Indonesia's high conflict areas received special sources of assistance; local leaders may feel that exaggerating the number of deaths in their area may lead to more funds arriving. In contrast, respondents in areas that are not experiencing extended violence may want to underplay the local violence that is present in their area given the stigma associated with it.

A second reason for data discrepancies is a result of an inherent problem of most surveys—they rely on recall and on common understanding of the questions asked.⁸⁷ Village heads interviewed for PODES may find it difficult to remember what violence occurred in the past year and what in the year that preceded it. (As we will see, the year

⁸⁵ The PODES figures were estimates based on just one year of data. See Barron and Sharpe (2005: 8) for a discussion.

⁸⁶ A further 864 people were killed from violent crimes, 143 from domestic violence, and 75 from security force responses to crime or conflict. Data are for June 2004-May 2005.

⁸⁷ For this reason, there has been a trend towards embedding behavioural experiment games within survey instruments. Such games, however, cannot generate data on past events.

2000 and early 2001 saw particularly high fatality rates in the areas of Indonesia affected by extended violent conflicts. It may be that village heads reported some of these earlier deaths in the 2003 survey.) Further, the types of incidents that occurred in the areas of extended violent conflict may be more likely to be reported to PODES enumerators than those that occurred in lower conflict areas. Village heads may associate the term ‘conflict’ with only large-scale outbursts of collective violence. If this is the case, smaller-scale violent incidents will likely go unreported, perhaps explaining under-reporting of violence in provinces that were not affected by extended violence.

A final limitation of using PODES to assess patterns of post-conflict violence is that the dataset does not provide full time series data. It contains information on violence that has occurred in the year preceding each enumeration. This means we only have data for one year in every three.

A third source of data is that collected and collated by NGOs and state-mandated bodies. The Setara Institute publishes information on human rights violations and the National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan) records incidents of sexual abuse. The Peace Building Institute (ITP), a local NGO, tracks incidents of violence. Yet the methodology used is unclear and data collection protocols do not appear to be uniformly followed. The ITP data, which has been used by Indonesian policymakers and often makes headlines, records just 600 incidents of “conflict or violence” in 2009 across all of Indonesia, resulting in 70 deaths, 395 injuries and 421 damaged buildings (ITP 2010). In contrast, the NVMS dataset for 16 provinces, found 4,138 incidents of violent conflict in the same period, resulting in 267 deaths, 4,442 injuries, and 828 damaged buildings.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ If we include violent crime, domestic violence, and security force violence, there were 19,929 violent incidents in 2009, resulting in 1,959 deaths, 14,307 injuries, and 1,493 damaged buildings. It appears that ITP use a similar inclusive definition of violence to that employed by NVMS. Their report includes a discussion of small-scale forms of violence including routine violence and mob beatings.

1.2 UNSFIR-2

The weaknesses of existing data motivated an important effort by Ashutosh Varshney and his colleagues at the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) to build a new dataset on Indonesian violence. In doing so, they turned to newspaper reports of violence. Varshney had previously built a dataset on riots in India using newspaper accounts and aimed to do the same for collective violence in Indonesia.⁸⁹ After an initial attempt using national-level sources, a second database (UNSFIR-2) turned to provincial-level newspapers (Varshney, Tadjoeeddin, and Panggabean 2010).⁹⁰ The result—which includes data for 1990-2003—is the best record of violence in Indonesia’s early transition period.

However, there are a number of limitations to UNSFIR-2 for our purposes. First, it does not include Aceh, the site of Indonesia’s most deadly extended violence. Second, the data does not go beyond 2003. As such, the dataset tells us next to nothing on how violence has evolved after the large-scale extended violent conflicts in Indonesia’s regions ended. Third, the dataset does not include most smaller-scale incidents of violence. UNSFIR’s focus was on collective violence with incidents between individuals not included. This made sense given the goal was to assess levels of violence in the early post-Suharto period, when most deaths were likely the result of the large-scale extended violence that hit a number of provinces. However, the exclusion of smaller incidents

⁸⁹ On the Indian dataset, see Varshney (2002) and Wilkinson (2004). The tradition of using newspaper analysis to code conflict and contentious incidents goes back much further. See, for example, Snyder and Kelly (1977) and Tilly (1997b).

⁹⁰ UNSFIR’s first dataset included incidents of collective violence reported in two national newspapers (*Kompas* and *Antara*) for the 1990-2001 period (Tadjoeeddin 2002). It soon became clear that there were considerable limitations to the data. Neither newspaper reported *any* incidents of violent group conflict anywhere in Indonesia in 1990, 1991, 1992, or 1994. One reason for these gaps was that the New Order regime, until its final years, imposed significant restrictions on national press freedoms. The press was not allowed to report on so-called ‘SARA’ issues that could upset relations between Indonesia’s many ethnic and religious groups. (SARA is an acronym for ethnic (*suku*), religious (*agama*), racial (*ras*), and inter-group (*antar golongan*) differences). See Sen and Hill (2006).

means that much of the violence that has occurred since the large-scale extended conflicts have come to an end is missed.⁹¹

Previous studies have also shown that provincial newspapers, while providing a more accurate picture than national ones, still significantly under-report levels of violence. Barron and Sharpe (2005) compared death tolls from UNSFIR-2 with those from a violence dataset using sub-provincial papers for twelve districts in two Indonesian provinces for 2001-2003. Employing the same definition as UNSFIR, they found three times more deaths from collective violence. Other research, such as Welsh's study of lynching (2008), also suggests that UNSFIR underestimates deaths from smaller-scale violence.

1.3 A new dataset: the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS)

The new National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) dataset addresses many of the weaknesses of existing data. It contains information on incidents of violence in 16 Indonesian provinces, which include all of those that experienced extended violent conflict.⁹² It uses sub-provincial as well as provincial sources to ensure that small-scale violent incidents are captured and uses multiple news sources for each area to minimise inaccuracies. The full dataset—which covers the 1998 to 2012 period⁹³—contains 158,363 discrete incidents of violence: 40,176 incidents of violent conflict, 96,378 incidents of violent crime, 14,299 incidents of domestic violence, and 7,510 incidents of violence used by security forces. Collectively, these incidents resulted in 35,594 deaths,

⁹¹ UNSFIR, for example, do not record any incidents of violence in Maluku in 2003 while NVMS records 115 incidents which led to 28 deaths.

⁹² With the exception of East Timor. Provinces included are: Aceh, East Java, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Lampung, Maluku, North Maluku, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, Papua, West Papua, South Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, North Sumatra, and Greater Jakarta (which includes parts of Banten and West Java provinces as well as Jakarta).

⁹³ Time periods covered vary by province. Information is only available from 2005 for Greater Jakarta (until 2012) and East Java, Lampung, West Nusa Tenggara, South Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, and North Sumatra (all until 2009, and then 2012). Full time series data are available for the six post-conflict provinces plus East Nusa Tenggara, Papua and West Papua, although there are some archive gaps for the Papuan provinces for early years. In addition, 1997 is covered for West Kalimantan province.

128,534 injuries, 75,364 damaged buildings, 4,298 kidnappings, and 21,844 sexual assaults. Almost 50,000 of these incidents occurred in the six provinces that experienced extended violence and that are the focus of this thesis. To my knowledge, the NVMS is the largest dataset of violence created for any single country.⁹⁴

Putting the dataset together involved four main steps.⁹⁵ The first was deciding which provinces to cover. Two principles guided this. All of the provinces that experienced large-scale extended violence were included: Maluku, North Maluku, Central Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, and Aceh. Further provinces were then selected to cover all of Indonesia's main islands: Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Papua, and the group of smaller islands that stretches from Bali to East Nusa Tenggara. This ensured that the data included areas with high, medium and lower levels of violence. While the data are not formally representative of all of Indonesia, the large coverage (57% of the Indonesian population live in areas surveyed), wide geographic spread, and inclusion of areas with a range of violence levels gives us confidence that patterns observed extend to other parts of the country.

The second step was to decide on which sources to use in each province. Media assessments were conducted in the selected provinces, aimed at determining coverage (what papers are published, what districts within the province they cover, the availability of archives) and the accuracy of reporting. Newspapers with narrow

⁹⁴ There are 44 times as many incidents in the NVMS database as are included in the UNSFIR-2 dataset, which has a similar time span. The ACLED dataset is probably the largest violence dataset containing events data at the subnational level for multiple countries (see Raleigh et al. 2010). It records 57,000 violent incidents between 1997 and 2012, less than 40% of those in the NVMS, but this is for 50 countries. Indonesia is not covered by ACLED. However, the number of incidents in ACLED for individual countries is often small. In Cambodia, for example, the dataset contains 357 incidents between 1997 and 2010. The Colombia dataset used by Daly (2012) includes 7,729 violent events. Weinstein's newspaper events dataset contains 1,400 violent incidents in Mozambique (1976-2004), 800 in Uganda, and more than 4,000 in Peru (Weinstein 2007: 368).

⁹⁵ More information on the process is provided in Barron, Jaffrey et al. (2009). Since the publication of that working paper, some changes have been made, most notably the exclusion of non-violent incidents from the dataset and changes in province selection. See the methodological notes on the Indonesian National Violence Monitoring System website: <<http://www.snpk-indonesia.com/Methodology/Index?lang=en&randdo=70fa5074-0cb8-4248-ba0c-132dadcd2456&userid=1896624>>

coverage, weak archives, overt political biases, and those that did not employ fact-checking of stories were excluded. The assessments involved extensive interviews with newspaper staff.

After deciding on which papers to use, researchers were sent to each province to collect newspaper articles on violence. Every page of the archives of the selected newspapers was photographed, generating over 2 million images. Teams in Jakarta then combed through the images and ‘clipped’ articles related to incidents of violence, including both conflict and crime. A standardised coding template was completed for each article. For each incident over 30 variables were coded including: when and where the incident took place; whether it was a crime, a conflict, domestic violence, or security force violence; its physical impacts (deaths, injuries, people sexually assaulted, and kidnapped, all gender disaggregated, and buildings damaged); the actors involved; the issue that appeared to drive the violence; the form violence took; the weapons used; and what interventions were taken to try to stop escalation and whether they were successful.⁹⁶ Where articles reported different impacts the more conservative figures were used. A one-week training program was given to coders to learn the concepts employed, how to assign codes, etc. A 156-page manual was produced and systematic quality control procedures, including checking a large proportion of articles,⁹⁷ were also developed.

Finally, data gaps were filled using reports of violence from other sources. This involved systematically going through academic articles and books on violence in Indonesia, in particular monographs on different extended violent conflicts. We also reviewed policy papers including those from the International Crisis Group and Human

⁹⁶ The coding key, and definitions used, can be found at: <<http://www.sn timer indonesia.com/Methodology/Definition?lang=en&randdo=70fa5074-0cb8-4248-ba0c-132dadcd2456&userid=1896624>>

⁹⁷ For each coder, 100% of coded articles were checked until 95% accuracy was achieved. After that 10% of coded articles were checked. If accuracy dropped again, we returned to 100% checking.

Rights Watch. Events recorded in other datasets (UNSFIR-2, ITP, and Barron and Sharpe's two-province database) were incorporated where there were archival gaps. Comparing such data sources also resulted in the recoding of some incidents, for example where the initial type of violence was unclear from the newspaper article or where the death toll from an incident rose over time. Finally, we asked experts on particular conflicts to look at the data on their provinces to assess plausibility and to try to identify any inaccuracies. The process of putting the dataset together took four years.

Prior use of the newspaper method in a number of Indonesian provinces shows that it provides a reasonable picture of violence patterns and trends (Sharpe 2005; CPCR 2009a; Barron and Sharpe 2008). Indonesia's newspapers operated during periods of large-scale violence—the dataset, for example, includes almost 12,000 incidents reported during Aceh's war. The post-New Order press has also been largely free; indeed it is perhaps the most vibrant and open in Southeast Asia (Freedom House 2011). The emerging consensus is that using sub-provincial newspapers is the best means of tracking levels of violent conflict and its impacts in Indonesia in ways that allow for temporal and spatial disaggregation (Varshney 2008). Indeed, the Indonesian government has adopted the National Violence Monitoring System to track violence in real time.

This is not to say that the NVMS dataset is without weaknesses. Reporting in Indonesian newspapers, as elsewhere, can at times be inaccurate and there may be biases in some articles. The coding of an incident's type—that is what the incident was about—sometimes involves a degree of subjectivity. Some information will be missing from reports and may need to be inferred by the coders. Undoubtedly errors crept into the coding of some incidents. But the level of effort put into training for coders, developing manuals, implementing extensive quality control procedures, and triangulating data with other available sources minimised these problems.

2. Violence in early post-Suharto Indonesia

Violence was a defining feature of the three-decade New Order regime. General Suharto came to power on the back of the massive anti-communist killings of 1965-1966 when over half a million people lost their lives (Cribb 1990; Robinson 1995; Heryanto 2006). Throughout the New Order years, the security arms of the state used violence extensively to retain control, build power, and scare off challenges.⁹⁸ Large-scale state-sponsored violence included the *petrus* (or 'mysterious') killings of alleged criminals from 1983-1985, when as many as 2,000 may have died (Bourchier 1990; Barker 2001; Siegel 1998). The military, which only received a small share of its budget from official state sources, also used violence to generate income. At times state repression and coercion led to armed resistance. Separatist violence ebbed and flowed in Papua from 1963 and in East Timor and Aceh from 1976, resulting in harsh counter-insurgency operations that killed many more. Communal rioting also occurred, in particular in the late Suharto period, with outbreaks in Situbondo and Tasikmalaya in Java and Banjarmasin and Makassar in Kalimantan and Sulawesi (Sidel 2006).

However, the violence that accompanied the fall of the New Order was new, both in its scale and nature. The period from 1998 to 2004 was one of major national level political and socio-economic change driven by parallel transitions from authoritarianism to democracy (*reformasi*) and from a centralised to decentralised polity (*desentralisasi*) as well as changes to the structure of Indonesia's economy following the Asian Financial Crisis (*krismon*). These years undoubtedly saw the highest levels of violence since the 1965 killings. In the 17 provinces for which we have data, 21,495 people lost their lives between 1998 and 2003.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ See, in particular, the articles in Anderson (2001) and Colombijn and Lindblad (2002).

⁹⁹ Data are for: Central Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku, Aceh, Central Sulawesi, NTT, Papua, and West Papua (from NVMS); and Banten, Jakarta, West Java, East Java, Central Java, Riau, West Nusa Tenggara, and South Sulawesi (from UNSFIR-2). This figure does

2.1 Forms of violence

The upsurge in violence was a national phenomenon. It is no coincidence that aggregate levels of violence increased as the Indonesian polity and economy was undergoing rapid change. Globally, as a host of scholars have shown, violence often emerges during authoritarian breakdowns¹⁰⁰ and when rapid economic changes are taking place.¹⁰¹ Studies of violence in this period of Indonesia's history have pointed to the ways in which the uncertainty caused by such changes motivated groups to use violence.¹⁰²

Yet the violence of Indonesia's transition was also inherently local. Violence did not encompass the whole country: some regions of the country experienced high levels of violence while others remained largely peaceful.¹⁰³ There was no common master narrative driving the violence in different areas. Changes at the national level interacted with local concerns and goals. As a result, transition-era violence took diverse forms, with different parts of the country affected by varying types of violence. Four different forms of violence emerged, which can be distinguished by scale and duration (Figure 4.1).

not include deaths from East Timor. The figure is an under-estimate. UNSFIR, as I have discussed, does not record most smaller incidents of violence.


¹⁰⁰ Mansfield and Snyder (1995), Snyder (2000), Hegre et al. (2001), and Huntington (1991).

¹⁰¹ Chua (2003), Paris (2004), and Cramer (2006). Uvin (1998) provides a tragic case study of these processes in Rwanda.

¹⁰² Chapter 8 provides a discussion.

¹⁰³ Varshney, Tadjoeeddin, and Panggabean (2010) found that 15 districts, with just 6.5% of Indonesia's population, accounted for 85.5% of all deaths from non-civil war collective violence between 1990 and 2003. It is likely that collective violence is not quite as concentrated as this. UNSFIR-2 under-reports many smaller incidents of violence, which collectively can have large impacts, and which have been occurring outside many of the 'high conflict' areas.


Figure 4.1. Forms of violence in early transition Indonesia



In seven provinces, there was *extended violent conflict*, highly organised with resulting large physical impacts in terms of lives lost, people injured, buildings damaged, and economic effects (Map 4.1). In two provinces, long-running *civil wars* gained new momentum. In Aceh, the war between the secessionist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian military heated up with at least 8,775 killed in the province between 1999 and 2003 and a further 1,521 losing their lives in 2004. In East Timor a further 1,400-2,600 were killed as the province parted from Indonesia, adding to the tens of thousands of deaths during the Indonesian occupation (CAVR 2005a). Papua, too, saw separatist violence, although this was much more sporadic than in either Aceh or Timor.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ Papua is sometimes also thought of as experiencing civil war. However, separatist violence there has tended to be episodic rather than enduring. Impacts—in terms of deaths, injuries, and damaged buildings—have also been much lower than for any of the extended violent conflicts.

Map 4.1. Indonesian provinces affected by extended violent conflict



Other provinces saw escalated *extended communal violence*, new to modern Indonesia. The New Order era had certainly not been free of inter-religious and inter-ethnic unrest but episodes were usually short-lived, burning out after a day or two often after the arrival of the military. In contrast, new communal violence in five Indonesian provinces continued for months or years with resulting large destructive impacts.¹⁰⁵

In Central Sulawesi and Maluku, the cleavage was primarily a religious one; in North Maluku, ethnic violence morphed into inter-confessional battles. Violence in each place started with small-scale clashes between community groups but then escalated into much larger armed confrontation. Violence was not short-lived: in North Maluku it endured for almost a year; in Maluku and Central Sulawesi for multiple years. Extended

¹⁰⁵ Useful studies include: Acciaoli (2001), Aragon (2001), and McRae (2008) on Central Sulawesi; Peluso and Harwell (2001) and Davidson (2008) on West Kalimantan; and Klinken (2000) and Smith (2005) on Central Kalimantan. References on Maluku and North Maluku are provided in chapters 6 and 7. Klinken (2007) covers all five extended communal violent conflicts. Sidel (2006) analyses Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi, as well as riots and terror attacks elsewhere. Bertrand (2004) includes analysis of Maluku, North Maluku, West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan. Anwar et al. (2005), Kingsbury (2005a), and Coppel (2006) gather articles on the extended violent conflicts.

communal violence also broke out in Indonesian Borneo. For around three weeks from late 1996 to early 2007, while Suharto was still in power, ethnic Dayaks in West Kalimantan attacked the migrant Madurese community; a second round of violence two years later set ethnic Malays against the Madurese. In February 2001, Dayaks in Central Kalimantan attacked the Madurese over the course of a few weeks, resulting in 90% of the Madurese population fleeing the province (ICG 2001c). While the violence in West and Central Kalimantan was shorter than that in Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi, there were similarities. Fatalities were high (over a thousand in each province, except Central Sulawesi—see Table 4.1), violence was highly organised, government services halted, and clashes spread over large geographic areas.

Table 4.1. Extended violence by province in transitioning Indonesia

Province	Form	Period of extended violence	Deaths	Injuries	Buildings damaged
Aceh	Civil war	Jan 98 – end July 05 ¹⁰⁶	10,613	8,546	9,230
North Maluku	Communal	Aug 99 – end June 00	3,257	2,635	15,004
Maluku	Communal	Jan 99 – end Feb 02	2,793	5,057	13,843
East Timor	Civil war	Jan 98 – end Dec 99 ¹⁰⁷	1,485-1,585	?	?
West Kalimantan	Communal	Jan 97 – end Feb 97 / Feb 99 – end Apr 99	1,103	646	3,830
Central Kalimantan	Communal	Feb 01 – end Apr 01	1,031	77	1,998
Central Sulawesi	Communal	Apr 00 – end Dec 01	517	579	6,004
Total			20,799-21,799	17,540 +	49,909 +

Source: NVMS. Timor data from CAVR (2005a).

Early transition violence was not confined to the provinces that experienced extended violence. *Episodic violent incidents* rose across Indonesia. The largest of these were the massive riots that engulfed Jakarta in mid-May that preempted the fall of Suharto.

¹⁰⁶ Best estimates are that 1,574-6,074 people were killed in Aceh in the 1976-1998 period. These figures are calculated by subtracting deaths in Aceh for the 1999-2005 period (as reported in NVMS) from Aspinall's (2009a: 2) estimate of the number of deaths over 30 years of violence in Aceh.

¹⁰⁷ Timor figures are calculated from The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR 2005a). They report 17 killings by Fretelin/Falantil in 1998 (p. 244), 29 such killings in 1999 (p. 244), 39 killings by the Indonesian military in 1998 (p. 233), and 1,400-1,500 military killings in 1999 (p. 245). Across the full period of Indonesia's occupation, there were an estimated 18,600 unlawful killings and disappearances (CAVR 2005a: 2) and another 84,200 people died due to excess mortality (hunger and illness) as a result of the conflict (CAVR 2005b: 2).

Further anti-Chinese riots hit other Indonesian cities such as Medan in North Sumatra and Solo in Central Java (Purdey 2006). Death tolls and other impacts were large. An estimated 1,193 died in Jakarta;¹⁰⁸ the riots in Solo led to Rp 457 billion (US\$ 46 million) of damage in a city of just 400,000 people (Pangabbean and Smith 2010). However, such incidents differed from the communal violence of the Moluccas, Sulawesi and Kalimantan, and the secessionist violence at either end of Indonesia's archipelagic stretch. Violence was shorter in duration. The large-scale violence in Jakarta, for example, only lasted for two days. Other high impact episodic violence included terror attacks on international targets. The 2002 Bali bombing killed over 200 people while the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was attacked in 2004 and the Marriot Hotel in Jakarta in 2003 (Vickers 2005: 218-219) and again in 2009.

The incidence of other forms of smaller-scale episodic violence also appears to have risen in the early transition period although we have less data on this. Welsh (2008), using local newspapers, found that over 5,500 people were the victims of lynchings between 1995 and 2004 in just four Indonesian provinces, although this figure appears high when compared with other studies and it is not clear if such victims include those who were injured as well as those killed.¹⁰⁹ Other case studies have found significant levels of 'routine violence' over a multitude of issues including land and other natural resources, administrative squabbles, and elections.¹¹⁰

2.2 Peace settlements: reduced levels of violence

The big wave of violence that followed the fall of Suharto eventually subsided. Figure 4.2 shows deaths from violence in 15 provinces for which we have time series data until


¹⁰⁸ Data from UNSFIR-2.

¹⁰⁹ Data are for West Java, Bali, Bengkulu, and South Kalimantan. Welsh chose these provinces because they were thought of as less violent than other Indonesian provinces. Other work on lynching concludes that it was widespread in the early transition period, in particular on Java, but finds victim numbers lower than Welsh's estimates. See, for example, Barron and Sharpe (2005).

¹¹⁰ See, for example, Barron and Madden (2004) and Tajima (2004; 2008) on routine violence in Lampung province; Barron and Sharpe (2008) on East Java; Vel (2001) on Sumba, East Nusa Tenggara; and Herriman (2007) and Siegel (2006) on 'witchdoctor' killings in East Java.

2009.¹¹¹ Violent deaths peaked between 1999 and 2001 with over 4,500 people killed each year. Deaths then dropped substantially in 2002, when 3,227 were killed, and 2003, when 2,484 died.

Figure 4.2. Deaths from violence in 15 Indonesian provinces, 1998-2009



Source: NVMS and UNSFIR-2.

This reduction in violence was largely a consequence of the extended communal violent conflicts coming to an end. In Kalimantan, violence dropped sharply after the displacement of almost the entire ethnic Madurese population. In Central Sulawesi and Maluku, peace accords mediated by the central government played an important role. In North Maluku, a mixture of conflict fatigue and the imposition by the national government of a state of civil emergency, resulting in new security operations, helped reduce violence. By February 2002, all of the five extended communal conflicts had officially ended although, as we will see, violence did not disappear.

From 2002 until 2005, most deaths from violence in Indonesia were a result of the civil war in Aceh, where violence had escalated sharply in 2001 after a failed peace agreement. In August 2005 a new peace accord was signed by GAM (the pro-independence rebel group) and the Indonesian government. From August 2005, deaths

¹¹¹ Data are for the provinces mentioned in footnote 18 of this chapter, with the exception of Riau, which is not included because we do not have recent data. 2004 data are missing for the four provinces on Java, South Sulawesi, and West Nusa Tenggara. Smaller-scale episodic violence is likely under-reported for the earlier years given that we rely on UNSFIR-2 for some provinces for the pre-2005 period.

from violence in Indonesia have continued to occur but these have largely been the result of episodic violence, both in post-conflict areas and other parts of the country (The Habibie Center 2012, 2013).

3. Post-conflict violence

Determining levels of post-conflict violence requires us to define the temporal bounds of the post-conflict period. These vary for each province because the extended violent conflicts ended at different times. I use two approaches to generate cut-off points for the end of the extended violence and beginning of the post-conflict period. First, I look at when key interventions aimed at ending the conflicts, such as peace agreements and interventions from national-level security forces, occurred. Not all such agreements and interventions were successful. As such, I use the NVMS data to assess when the timing of these interventions correlate with reduced levels of violence. Only where there appears to be a close relationship between the timing of the intervention and a sustained decline in violence is the date of the intervention used as the cut-off point.¹¹² Table 4.2 gives the dates used for the post-conflict period for each province.¹¹³

Table 4.2. Post-conflict periods by province

Province	Post-conflict period	Intervention
Aceh	Aug 05 – end Dec 12	Helsinki peace accord
North Maluku	July 00 – end Dec 12	Declaration of civil emergency
Maluku	Mar 02 – end Dec 12	Malino 2 peace accord
West Kalimantan	May 99 – end Dec 12	Departure of Madurese
Central Kalimantan	May 01 – end Dec 12	Departure of Madurese
Central Sulawesi	Jan 02 – end Dec 12	Malino 1 peace accord

¹¹² It was also necessary to define the starting point for the extended violence period for each province. A similar approach was used. Accounts of each extended violent conflict generally identify a triggering incident (or incidents) that led to violence escalation. The date of the trigger was used as the beginning of the extended violence period if: (a) there appeared to be a direct link between the incident and the larger violence that came after; and (b) NVMS data showed an upsurge in violence following the trigger.

¹¹³ The end dates are a function of when I have data until and, conceptually, do not indicate any change in patterns of conflict or violence for a given province.

3.1 Varying levels of post-conflict violence

Using these cut-off dates we can examine patterns of post-conflict violence by province. While violence declined in all the provinces that experienced extended violent conflict, there is large variation in the extent of the decline. Table 4.3 shows the number of deaths, injuries and damaged buildings in the post-conflict period for each province. I have categorised provinces by whether they have seen high, medium or low levels of post-conflict violence, putting particular emphasis on fatality rates.

Table 4.3. Post-conflict violence by province

Province	Total post-conflict period			Per year / per million people			Level post-conflict violence
	Deaths	Injuries	Buildings	Deaths	Injuries	Buildings	
Maluku	529	4,305	2,300	34	280	150	HIGHER
C. Sulawesi	718	3,666	1,529	27	139	58	HIGHER
C. Kalimantan	547	2,833	166	22	114	7	MEDIUM
Aceh	597	3,345	704	19	108	23	MEDIUM
W. Kalimantan	929	10,730	1,559	16	188	27	MEDIUM
N. Maluku	139	1,356	827	12	115	70	LOWER

Source: NVMS. Population data are from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics and are for 2008.

Of the six provinces, post-conflict West Kalimantan has seen the greatest number of people killed and injured and the second highest number of buildings damaged. However, this is a result of its post-conflict period being longer than elsewhere (extended violence subsided in 1999) and of its population being larger than most of the other provinces.¹¹⁴

Examining annual per capita impacts provides a better indication of levels of post-conflict violence. Using these measures we can see that Maluku has seen more violence than elsewhere. Violence levels in post-conflict Central Sulawesi are also high. North Maluku is notable for the relative lack of violence in its post-conflict period with just 12 deaths per million people per year.

¹¹⁴ West Kalimantan's population was 4,178,498 in 2008. Only Aceh has a larger population.

3.2 Varying forms of post-conflict violence

Forms of violence also vary between the different post-conflict provinces. In some, episodes of violence are frequently large in scale. In other provinces, violent episodes tend to have more minimal impacts per incident.

Table 4.4 divides episodes of post-conflict violence in each province into large and small incidents. Large incidents are defined as those where three or more people are killed, 10 or more injured, and/or 15 or more buildings were damaged. (Small incidents are all incidents with lower impacts.) In every province, the majority of deaths come from smaller incidents of violence. After controlling for the length of the post-conflict period and the population size, the provinces do not greatly differ in the number of deaths from such incidents with the exception of North Maluku. Across the provinces, one-quarter of the 2,514 deaths from small-scale episodic post-conflict violence came from violent crimes rather than conflicts, another 12% came from domestic violence, and 7% from security force violence. This share was fairly similar across the provinces.¹¹⁵

Table 4.4. Forms of post-conflict violence by province

Province	Level post-conflict violence	Large episodic violence (per year/per million people)			Small episodic violence (per year/per million people)	
		Incidents	Deaths	Level	Deaths	Level
Maluku	HIGHER	4.7	10.8	HIGHER	23.6	HIGHER
C. Sulawesi	HIGHER	1.8	5.2	MEDIUM	22.0	HIGHER
C. Kalimantan	MEDIUM	0.4	1.1	LOWER	20.9	HIGHER
Aceh	MEDIUM	0.9	1.4	LOWER	17.9	MEDIUM
W. Kalimantan	MEDIUM	0.6	1.8	LOWER	14.4	MEDIUM
N. Maluku	LOWER	1.5	3.0	LOWER	8.8	LOWER

Source: NVMS. Population data used is from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics and are for 2008.

There is much greater variation between provinces in both the incidence and impacts of large episodes of violence.¹¹⁶ In the post-conflict periods in the six provinces, there have

¹¹⁵ The share is highest in Aceh, where 35% of deaths from small episodic violence were the result of violent crimes.

¹¹⁶ I do not present the number of incidents of small-scale violence because this measure is vulnerable to differences in reporting coverage across provinces. The newspaper assessments, conducted as part of the NVMS database construction, found that in some areas fewer incidents

been 214 large incidents. The most common form such violence has taken has been assaults involving small groups (67 incidents), two-way group clashes (63 incidents), riots (23 incidents), and terror attacks (15 incidents).

Large episodic violence has been much more common in post-conflict Maluku and Central Sulawesi than elsewhere. Seventy-three of the large incidents (over one-third of all such incidents in the post-conflict periods across the six provinces) have occurred in Maluku. This equates to seven large incidents per year. Post-conflict Central Sulawesi has also seen relatively frequent large incidents with 47 such incidents (four per year) in its post-conflict period. Death tolls from large incidents of violence are also much higher in these two provinces, especially Maluku. In Maluku, other physical impacts from large episodic violence in the post-conflict period are also much higher than elsewhere.¹¹⁷

4. Understanding variation: six contrasting districts

There is thus substantive variation between provinces affected by different extended violent conflicts in: (a) levels of post-conflict violence; and (b) the types of post-conflict violence that are occurring. The thesis aims to explain the variation in both. To do this, I look more closely at areas that differ on these two dependent variables. If we studied all six provinces we would only be able to do so in a cursory way. As such, I chose to focus on three provinces.

of violence make it into local newspapers because there are fewer local journalists (e.g. in very remote areas) or because there is a lack of space in the papers (this particularly affects more urbanised areas where there are more stories to report). However, the assessment also found that even in areas where some violent incidents do not get reported in papers the vast majority of incidents that resulted in a death do make it. As such, deaths is a better indicator of levels of small-scale episodic violence than is the number of incidents. In contrast, large incidents with large impacts always get reported. As such, we can use the number of incidents as an indicator of levels of large episodic violence.

¹¹⁷ Large episodic violence in post-conflict Maluku injured 1,148 people, almost triple that in any of the other post-conflict provinces. These incidents also damaged over 1,500 buildings in Maluku.

4.1 Provinces

Maluku is the first selected province. It has seen not only the highest levels of violence in its post-conflict period but also the greatest number of large incidents. Of the Indonesian cases, it is as an example of an area where peace has not fully consolidated. The second provincial case is North Maluku, which stands out from the others with its relative lack of post-conflict violence. The third province chosen for deeper study is Aceh. Since the end of its extended violence, Aceh has seen middling levels of violence. However, almost all of the violence has been the result of small-scale incidents.

Figure 4.3. Levels of post-conflict violence by form in selected provinces

		Large-scale episodes	
		Higher	Lower
Small-scale episodes	Higher	A. Maluku	B. Aceh
	Lower		C. North Maluku

Studying these three provinces allows for a number of comparisons:

- Comparative analysis of Maluku and North Maluku (cells A and C in Figure 4.3) can help us understand why violence occurs with frequency in some post-conflict areas and not in others;
- Comparing Aceh with North Maluku (cells B and C) allows us to assess why small-scale violence occurs in some post-conflict areas and not in others;
- Comparing Aceh with Maluku (cells B and A) allows us to assess why violence takes smaller rather than larger forms in some post-conflict areas.

4.2 The district level

Within each of the three provinces, I selected two districts for deeper study. I chose to focus on the district level for a number of reasons. First, it helps minimise measurement error. In common policy and scholarly parlance, each of Indonesia's extended violent

conflicts is usually referred to by the name of the province in which it took place. Yet such descriptors mask the extent to which violence was concentrated in a limited set of areas within many of the affected provinces. This was particularly the case in the two Kalimantan provinces and in Central Sulawesi.¹¹⁸ Violence was not so concentrated in the provinces chosen for deeper research, yet, even there, some districts saw much more violence than others.¹¹⁹ Selecting (high extended violence) districts to study rather than provinces ensured I focused on geographic areas that had actually experienced extended violence before—that is, that are actually post-conflict.

A second reason to focus on districts is their importance as a level of political administration and economic activity. The New Order state was highly centralised but *reformasi* soon resulted in a rapid and radical transformation of subnational powers. Importantly, Indonesia's decentralisation laws devolved authority to rural and urban district (*kabupaten* and *kotamadya*) rather than to provinces. The provinces were bypassed because of fears that empowered provinces, in particular those with significant natural resource wealth, could be tempted to try to secede from the country. Districts, in contrast, with an average population of around 300,000 outside of Java, were hardly

¹¹⁸ I use 2008 administrative boundaries for the district-level breakdowns throughout the thesis. In Central Kalimantan, which had 14 districts in 2008, 857 deaths (or 83% of the provincial total during the extended violence) occurred in just one district: East Kotawaringan. No other district experienced more than 82 deaths (Kapuas) although there were 584 damaged properties in that district and 119 in Palangkaraya district. In the 1997 extended violence in West Kalimantan, deaths were concentrated in Landak district, which saw 449 of the 669 deaths (67% of all provincial deaths). Two other districts (Pontianak district and Sanggau) saw more than 50 deaths. The 1999 violence was more concentrated, with 381 of 434 deaths (89%) occurring in Sambas district. In Central Sulawesi, 438 deaths (85%) were in Poso district. Other districts saw relatively large numbers of buildings damaged (459 in Tojo Una-Una and 354 in Palu, although this is much smaller than the 4,930 damaged buildings in Poso) but deaths in these districts were relatively low: three and 17, respectively.

¹¹⁹ The impacts of violence in Maluku province were spread out with five districts (out of 11) seeing over 200 deaths. However, almost three-quarters of all deaths occurred in Ambon and Central Maluku districts. Likewise, the extended violence in North Maluku spread across the province with four districts (out of eight) experiencing over 200 deaths. Many other districts while seeing fewer deaths also saw significant impacts. Almost 1,000 properties were damaged, for example, in each of Morotai and Ternate districts. Yet, again, the largest share of violence was concentrated in a limited area. North Halmahera district saw 2,016 deaths, the highest of any district in Indonesia. Aceh's civil war also affected almost every corner of the province: 16 of 23 districts experienced more than 200 deaths during the extended violence. However, a more limited number of districts saw extremely high impacts: six districts saw more than 500 deaths, and three more than 1,000 deaths.

feasible as independent states.¹²⁰ Almost overnight, the revenues of district governments increased massively in one ‘big bang’ (Hoffman and Kaiser 2002; World Bank 2003). Following the reduction of national-level oil subsidies in 2006, the level of funds available to districts again increased greatly, with an average 64% increase in the general allocation across the country.¹²¹ Indonesia is now one of the most decentralised developing countries in the world with 36% of all public expenditures in 2011 made by subnational governments; of these expenditures, three-quarters are by district governments and one-quarter by provincial governments (Shah, Qibthiyyah, and Dita 2012). The importance of the district, both as a locus of competition and (potentially) as a source of policies that could minimise violence, makes it fruitful to focus at this level.

Third, within some provinces, especially Aceh, there is variation in levels of post-conflict violence between districts that saw high levels of extended violence. Studying districts allows us to examine variation in post-conflict violence at this level, holding constant provincial-level factors.

I used three criteria to select districts. First, the districts must have experienced significant levels of extended violence. Second, the districts should be broadly similar to those chosen in other provinces to allow for controlled comparisons to be made. Third, patterns of post-conflict violence in the selected districts should be driving overall provincial patterns, except in Aceh where I deliberately chose an outlier to allow for an intra-provincial comparison.

Table 4.5, which ranks districts by the number of deaths experienced during extended violent conflict, shows the districts selected. Five of the six selected districts are within the ten most affected districts in Indonesia.

¹²⁰ The relevant laws are the Law on Regional Government (22/1999) and the Law on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions (25/1999). The former was revised by a new Law on Regional Government (32/2004), which strengthened the powers of central and provincial governments. Crouch (2010, Chapter 4) provides a useful discussion. See also Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009). Aceh and Papua provinces are exceptions. In both, special autonomy agreements have meant that more powers and resources are held at the provincial level.

¹²¹ Email correspondence with World Bank expert on public finance. May 2012.

Table 4.5. Impacts of extended violence in the ten most affected districts

Rank Indonesia (within province)	District	Province	Deaths	Injuries	Buildings
1 (1)	North Halmahera	N. Maluku	2,016	1,804	5,901
2 (1)	North Aceh	Aceh	1,989	1,955	1,601
3 (2)	East Aceh	Aceh	1,511	1,695	2,032
4 (3)	Bireuen	Aceh	1,443	888	867
5 (1)	Ambon	Maluku	1,413	2,957	3,733
6 (4)	South Aceh	Aceh	904	357	454
7 (1)	East Kotawaringin	C. Kalimantan	857	23	1,133
8 (4)	Aceh Besar	Aceh	838	508	262
9 (5)	Pidie	Aceh	737	440	1,118
10 (2)	Central Maluku	Maluku	557	632	3,714
35 (6)	Ternate	N. Maluku	76	94	961

Source: NVMS. Impacts reported are for the periods of extended violence, as outlined by province in Table 4.1. Bolded districts are those selected as case studies.

In Maluku province, I chose Ambon and Central Maluku districts. Both were at the epicentre of the province's extended violent conflict: collectively, the two districts account for 71% of the deaths that occurred. Ambon is the provincial capital, a bustling town of just over 200,000 people. Central Maluku is its more rural neighbour including parts of Ambon Island outside of Ambon city, as well as the middle swathe of Seram Island and a number of small islands. Demographically, both districts have an almost equal number of Christians and Muslims.¹²²

In North Maluku, I selected North Halmahera district. Almost two-thirds of deaths across the province during the extended violence period were concentrated there. Indeed, of any Indonesian district, North Halmahera saw the highest number of people killed. That the extended violence in North Maluku lasted for only 11 months makes this even more tragic. The district in many ways resembles Central Maluku. As with that district, it is predominantly rural, religiously balanced (Protestants make up 54% of the population, Muslims 45%) and regional GDP is similar (Rp 2.1 million per capita in North Halmahera compared to Rp 1.5 million in Central Maluku). The second chosen North Maluku district is Ternate. This district saw lower, although still significant, impacts from extended violence: 76 people were killed, 94 were injured, and

¹²² In 2005, Ambon was 51% Protestant, 45% Muslim, and 4% Catholic. Central Maluku was 56% Muslim, 43% Protestant, and 1% Catholic (BPS Maluku 2005).

961 buildings were damaged. However, Ternate was—and remains—the locus of political competition in the province and thus shares many similarities with Ambon in Maluku.¹²³ Further, while extended violence was relatively short-lived in Ternate, political competition in the city was a major factor in fuelling subsequent unrest elsewhere in the province. Many of those mobilised to fight on Halmahera Island were residents of Ternate and most returned there after fighting subsided. As such, we might have predicted that Ternate would remain vulnerable to violence in the post-conflict period.

In Aceh, I selected East Aceh and South Aceh districts, two rural districts with similarities to Central Maluku and North Halmahera. Regional GDP on both is similar to Ambon. The two districts saw amongst the highest numbers of deaths from extended violence of any of the Aceh districts. They were both GAM strongholds and the structure of the economy and poverty levels are similar in both places. However, as shown below, the two vary in levels of post-conflict violence.

4.3 Post-conflict violence in the six districts

Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show that the provincial-level variations in levels and forms of post-conflict violence also apply to the districts selected. Ambon and Central Maluku have by far the highest levels of post-conflict violence of the six districts. Indeed, in per capita terms, Ambon has seen more than twice as many post-conflict deaths as has Maluku as a whole. North Halmahera and Ternate both have much lower levels of post-conflict violence, although levels of post-conflict violence in the latter have been above the provincial average with high numbers of injuries occurring there. In Aceh, there has been a divergence in levels of post-conflict violence between the two selected districts. Patterns of post-conflict violence in South Aceh are similar to those of North Halmahera

¹²³ Ternate is slightly smaller than Ambon with a population of 162,247. Both districts have a similar level of urbanisation: 84.9% (Ternate) and 87.3% (Ambon). One important difference is that Ternate is now predominantly Muslim (96%) while Ambon is religiously balanced (BPS Maluku Utara 2005; BPS Ambon 2000).

in North Maluku. In contrast, in yearly per capita terms, East Aceh has seen higher numbers of people killed from violence than in any of the six selected districts except those in Maluku.

Table 4.6. Impacts of post-conflict violence in selected districts

District	Total post-conflict period			Per year / per million people		
	<i>Deaths</i>	<i>Injuries</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Deaths</i>	<i>Injuries</i>	<i>Buildings</i>
Maluku	529	4,305	2,300	34	280	150
Ambon	218	2,656	1,011	74	902	343
C Maluku	163	685	948	38	159	220
N. Maluku	139	1,356	827	12	115	70
N Halmahera	19	98	35	8	42	15
Ternate	40	884	236	19	425	113
Aceh	597	3,345	704	19	108	23
S Aceh	15	84	20	10	55	13
E Aceh	65	275	41	28	120	18

Source: NVMS.

Our two districts in Maluku together account for 51 of 73 large incidents of post-conflict violence. Indeed, provincial patterns of such violence are driven by these two districts and in particular Ambon. In contrast, none of the selected districts in North Maluku or Aceh have seen frequent large episodic post-conflict violence.

Table 4.7. Large-scale post-conflict violence in selected districts

District	Total post-conflict period				Per year / per million people			
	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Deaths</i>	<i>Injuries</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Deaths</i>	<i>Injuries</i>	<i>Buildings</i>
Maluku	73	166	1,148	1,568	4.7	10.8	74.6	101.9
Ambon	34	78	713	748	11.5	26.5	242.0	253.9
C Maluku	17	43	162	670	3.9	10.0	37.6	155.3
N. Maluku	18	35	236	528	1.5	3.0	20.0	44.7
N Halmahera	4	5	26	21	1.7	2.1	11.1	9.0
Ternate	8	0	144	91	3.8	0	69.2	43.7
Aceh	29	42	153	229	0.9	1.4	4.9	7.4
S Aceh	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E Aceh	2	3	11	0	0.9	1.3	4.8	0

Source: NVMS.

This chapter has mapped out patterns of violence in Indonesia. It has shown that there is substantial variation in post-conflict violence across areas of Indonesia that previously experienced extended violent conflict. The observed variation was used to select six districts in three provinces, which differ in both overall levels of post-conflict

violence and in the types of post-conflict violence that are occurring. The next three chapters use case materials from Maluku, North Maluku and Aceh to develop the arguments of the last chapter on why some post-conflict areas continue to see frequent violence while others do not, and why such violence takes larger or smaller forms in different places.

Chapter 5. Large Episodic Violence in Post-Conflict Maluku

In a Catholic settlement outside of Ambon, people have recently prepared an escape route to a safe place in case the conflict erupts again. They expect something to happen. It may be a small trigger: a drunken man, something wrongly said, someone out of his mind. But it could escalate quickly. In Maluku now there are many small clashes. If these are between Muslims or between Christians, it is not a big problem, even if there are impacts. But if it is between [people of different] religions, then there is a big problem. People say they are just waiting for the moment then they want to take revenge.¹²⁴

Every time investigations of corruption are held, psychological terror emerges from thugs (*preman*) or people from the same region as the elites who are going to be investigated ... for example, there are threats of murder through telephone calls, by text message.¹²⁵

Maluku is the most violent of Indonesia's post-conflict provinces. After controlling for the length of the post-conflict period and population size, there have been more violent deaths, injuries and buildings damaged than in any other province that emerged from extended violent conflict. Furthermore, violence in post-conflict Maluku frequently takes larger, more destructive forms such as inter-group clashes and riots. The deadly clashes of September 2011 in Ambon city, a discussion of which opened this thesis, were not isolated events. In annual per capita terms, large episodes of violence have been three times more common in Maluku than in any of Indonesia's other post-conflict provinces except Central Sulawesi.¹²⁶

This chapter builds an explanation for this. I construct an analytic narrative of post-conflict Maluku focusing particularly on Ambon city and Central Maluku, the two districts that have seen the highest levels of post-conflict violence. The narrative combines consideration of local political, social, economic and organisational structures

¹²⁴ Priest, Ambon, 9 December 2010.

¹²⁵ Focus group discussion with Muslim and Christian youths, Ambon, 8 July 2011.

¹²⁶ In annual per capita terms, there have still been two-and-a-half times as many large post-conflict violent incidents in Maluku as in Central Sulawesi. I define large incidents of violence as being those that result in three or more deaths, 10 or more injuries, or 15 or more damaged buildings.

in Maluku with in-depth process tracing of a series of large episodes of post-conflict violence.

I find strong support for the central propositions of the theory laid out in Chapter 3. The roots of Maluku's post-conflict violence lie largely in the material incentives of local elites rather than in societal hatreds, disgruntled former combatants, or a state lacking capacity. Large episodic violence has been frequent because many in the local elite—politicians, security force personnel, thug leaders—have found it to be an effective and relatively risk free strategy for accessing resources and power. Providing jobs and funds to those who used or threatened violence in the early post-conflict period sent out a strong signal that violence pays; this encouraged others to use or threaten violence, too. The propensity of elites to use violence has also been increased by the perception that there are limited peaceable means for accumulation.

Elites have been able to instigate violence because of the presence of groups of violence specialists, many built upon the organisational residues of conflict-era militia, who do their bidding. Elites' space to manoeuvre violently is also enhanced by ongoing tensions between Muslim and Christian communities. Elites have nurtured grievances and consolidated conflict-era networks because this serves their interests. Over time, incentives to use and support violence have translated into elite and societal norms that legitimise the use of violence. The result is that violence has become an important and licit *modus operandi* in Moluccan political and economic life. In this environment, large incidents of violence have occurred when there are resources to be distributed and to prevent corruption investigations.

The chapter begins with an overview of Maluku's experience of extended violence, its peace settlement, and patterns of post-conflict violence. The chapter then uses the thesis's theoretical framework to explain these patterns.

1. Violence in Maluku

1.1 *The extended violence*

On 19 January 1999 a riot broke out between Muslim and Christian youths in Ambon city.¹²⁷ Unrest soon spread encompassing other parts of the Moluccan archipelago. By the end of 1999, 1,460 people had lost their lives, 2,738 had been injured, and 7,795 buildings had been damaged. Violence continued through the year 2000 with another 1,025 people killed. The following year saw lower levels of violence (294 were killed) although 109 people died in June alone. By the time a peace accord was finally signed in February 2002 after three years of communal war an estimated 2,793 people had died, 5,057 were injured, 13,843 buildings had been damaged, and one-third of the provincial population had been displaced.

The violence pitted Muslims and Christians against each other but the causes of the conflict had more to do with local political and economic competition than any primordial hatreds. Historically, Christians had dominated political and higher-level bureaucratic positions in the province.¹²⁸ Nationwide, the rise of ICMI, the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals' Association, which was established in 1990, coincided with and contributed to a push for Muslims to play a larger role in public life (Hefner 2000). This included a drive for Muslims to capture a greater portion of civil service jobs in the regions. Christians perceived a growing Islamisation of Ambon as progressive Muslims argued for a more equal religious composition in local governments at the provincial and district levels (Bertrand 2002). A shift in the local demographic balance from the 1970s due to the migration of tens of thousands of Muslims from Sulawesi heightened

¹²⁷ ICG (2000), Klinken (2001, 2007), and Crouch (2010) provide background and chronological details.

¹²⁸ Crouch (2010: 245) cites Sinansari Ecip (1999: 69-70) in noting that in the late 1990s, 25 of 29 senior posts in the city bureaucracy were held by Christians.

concerns amongst Christians that past access to resources and positions would be diminished.¹²⁹

Such concerns were particularly salient because of the local economy's dependence on the public sector. In 1990 Maluku—which still included what was to become North Maluku province—had nearly 55,000 civil servants, more than the province of East Java, which had a population 17 times larger (Klinken 2007: 90). In the absence of a robust private sector, civil servant employment was one of the few means by which citizens could ensure a stable income and the security of a pension after retirement. Control of higher-level bureaucratic and political positions was key in determining the allocation of such jobs. State development resources, too, tended to be allocated through patronage networks structured along religious lines. Competition over state positions and the control of resources and jobs this afforded was thus fractious.

Local tensions were compounded by two national dynamics. The first was the transition from Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime, which fell in May 1998, to a more democratic polity. This created uncertainty on what the new rules of the game would be and who they would favour (Bertrand 2004). That Suharto was succeeded by B. J. Habibie, who had headed ICMI throughout the 1990s, only served to accentuate Christian worries. Second, the decentralisation of powers and resources from Jakarta to the regions increased the importance for religious groups of accessing key political and bureaucratic jobs. While the decentralisation laws came after Maluku's extended violence had started, it had been clear before that radical devolution was imminent. In

¹²⁹ 'Non-indigenous' inhabitants—those born outside Maluku—increased from 5.2% in 1971 to 14.1% in 1995. Most incomers were Muslims, primarily from Sulawesi, and this altered the province's religious composition. The Muslim population in Maluku increased from 49.9% in 1971 to 54.8% in 1985 (Trijono 2001: 14-15). By 1990, this figure had reached 58.6% (Klinken 2001: 12). In Ambon city, Protestants were a slight majority in 1998 making up 53.6% of the population compared with 41.0% Muslims, 5.3% Catholics, and 0.2% others (BPS Ambon 2000: 127). In 2008, Protestants constituted 50.3% of the local population, Muslims 43.0%, Catholics 6.3%, and others 0.4% (BPS Maluku 2010: 185).

November 1998, a special session of the MPR, Indonesia's upper house, adopted a decree calling for regional autonomy (Crouch 2010: 91). In this environment, violence became a means by which political goals were pursued and, with no effective intervention from Jakarta, episodic violence soon escalated into all-out war.

Local elites emphasised religious difference and the threat of other confessional groups to mobilise masses in violent actions, often for self-serving purposes. Many of those organising the violence were local politicians. Christian leaders came largely from the secular-nationalist Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (PDI-P) while Muslim conflict leaders were mainly attached to Islamic parties such as PAN and PPP as well as the secular party of Suharto, Golkar. Violence was used to signal strength in an attempt to build power in the local political and economic arena. As Farid Husain (2007: 161), one of the mediators of the peace accord for Maluku, has argued: "it was not a religious conflict – it was a conflict of interest using religion to incite unrest."

Political leaders formed close alliances with criminal and militia groups. Violence escalated significantly with the arrival of Laskar Jihad, a radical salafist group who sent more than 3,000 militants to Maluku from April 2000. Other groups of jihadis also arrived, sometimes collectively referred to as Laskar Mujahidin.¹³⁰ These militants worked with local political and religious figures to plan and execute attacks. Local criminal groups also emerged, sometimes to defend their communities, sometimes to take advantage of the new economic opportunities that war provided. In Ambon city, for example, *preman* (thugs) from Haruku Island made profits occupying the houses of fleeing Christians, then selling them on or renting them out.¹³¹ On the Christian side, gangs such as Coker, Agas, and Laskar Kristus had links to elites in local politics, the

¹³⁰ On Laskar Jihad, see Hasan (2006). The groups under the Laskar Mujahidin umbrella included KOMPAK, Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI), Brigade Hizbullah, and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). See Azca (2011) and ICG (2005c).

¹³¹ Interviews with Muslims and Christians in Ambon, December 2010.

Church, and the security forces.¹³² Other community members supported and participated in the violence, sometimes because of the opportunities it afforded for local score-settling and accumulation. Adam (2010) argues that local economic motivations related to the use of land explain the participation of many rural villagers in the extended violence. In many parts of Ambon and Central Maluku, the land of those fleeing was taken over by others who remained in the village or by groups who arrived (Adam 2009). Sidel (2008: 47) argues, “It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the violence served as a means of effecting displacement, rather than displacement coming as a by-product of violence.”

Local political and religious elites and militia groups also collaborated with members of the Indonesian security forces. Christian and Muslim personnel often took the sides of co-religionist fighters (Azca 2006). Soldiers and police rented out their weapons and sold bullets; many security force members deserted, joining the ranks of the *pasukan siluman* (phantom forces) who fought alongside religious militia. Crouch (2010: 256) cites the regional police chief, Firman Ghani, who admitted that 10% of his forces were missing: “I don’t know their location, whether they have deserted or joined the rioters” (The Jakarta Post, 7 August 2000). The army had facilitated the entry of the Laskar Jihad militia to the province, shipping them from Java and providing them with weapons on their arrival; the police were seen as being close to the Christians. From the end of 2001 until mid-2002, some Kopassus (military special forces) troops cooperated with the Christian militia, Coker, in planning attacks (Azca 2004). In June 2000, the Indonesian President, Abdurrahman Wahid, declared a state of civil emergency for Maluku and North Maluku, bolstering the powers of the local security forces. However, this had little impact on the violence in Maluku or on the performance of the police and

¹³² Laskar Kristus (or the Christian Warriors), which had particularly strong links with the Church, was led by Agus Wattimena who was mysteriously killed on 20 March 2001. Schulze (2002: 63) describes him as having controlled a Christian self-defence militia, which incorporated 25 small groups totalling 100-200 members in Ambon city as well as groups on other islands. His funeral was attended by the chief police and military officers in the province (Bohm 2005: 152).

military (Crouch 2010: 255). The causes of such ineffectiveness related more to financial and political calculations than technical capacity. A larger police and military presence would bring bigger budgets and would allow for the generation of off-budget resources through local businesses and extortion (Aditjondro 2001). It would also demonstrate the need for a strong military and police force as the newly democratic Indonesia took shape.


1.2 The Malino agreement and post-conflict violence

On 12 February 2002, three years after the initial outbreak of violence, a peace agreement was signed in Malino, South Sulawesi. The accord, which followed a similar December 2001 agreement for Central Sulawesi, signalled new commitment to peace from Jakarta. Jusuf Kalla, then Coordinating Minister of People's Welfare and later Indonesia's Vice-President, brought together Muslim and Christian leaders to sign an 11-point agreement.

The accord led to a significant drop in violence but violence did not disappear. From March 2002 until the end of 2012, at least 529 people were killed in Maluku, 4,305 were injured, and 2,300 buildings were damaged. Ambon city and Central Maluku district, the epicentres of the extended violence and the focus of this chapter, have been particularly affected by post-conflict violence. Seventy-two percent of the violent deaths, 78% of injuries and 85% of damaged buildings in post-conflict Maluku have occurred in these two districts.¹³³ Large episodes of post-conflict violence have also continued in post-conflict Maluku. Fifty-one of the 73 such incidents that occurred from March 2002 until the end of 2012 in Maluku took place in Ambon city (34 incidents) or Central Maluku (17 incidents).

¹³³ In 2008, Ambon and Central Maluku accounted for 47% of the province's population (BPS Maluku 2010).

Map 5.1. Maluku province and selected research districts



Muslim and Christian dissidents committed most of the early post-Malino violence. Following a series of small incidents that collectively killed three, injured 20, and damaged two buildings in February and March, the first large episode of violence occurred on 3 April. A bomb was thrown from a passing car on Jan Paays street in a busy part of Ambon's Christian sector killing seven people and injuring 56. On 28 April, the Christian village of Soya in Ambon was attacked: 12 were killed, 21 injured, and 27 buildings were damaged, including the old Church that dated from the seventeenth century. In the following days, snipers attacked boats in Ambon Bay and there were attacks near the borders of the Christian and Muslim sectors in Ambon (Crouch 2010: 263). An inter-religious clash on Haruku Island (Central Maluku) in May killed five. In all, 24 people were killed in April 2002 and another 23 died in May. June, July and August were quieter—a total of seven people died—but on 5 September a bomb explosion in a sports field in Ambon killed four schoolgirls marking an up-turn in violence. Many of these attacks were later revealed to have been perpetrated by men

linked to radical Muslim groups (ICG 2005c). Such incidents started to recede in late 2002. There have been seven large inter-religious incidents since 2002, the same number as occurred between the signing of Malino and the end of that year. The group clashes and riots of September 2011 in Ambon, which led to eight deaths, hundreds of injuries and damaged buildings, and the displacement of 3,295 people—and a series of smaller incidents in the months that followed that led to at least 15 injuries—showed, however, that religious identity could continue to be mobilised in violent ways.

Over time, clashes between Muslims and Christians have often been recast as being between defenders of Maluku's place in the Indonesian state and those in favour of separation from Indonesia, supporters of the Republic of South Moluccas, the RMS.¹³⁴ These identities mapped conveniently onto the old inter-religious conflict cleavage. The old RMS rhetoric was revived with the establishment in December 2000 of a new Christian militia group, the Front for Moluccan Sovereignty (FKM), which aimed to continue the RMS struggle. FKM has never had more than a few hundred members and neither the organisation nor its cause has much support amongst Christian Moluccans. Yet its presence, even after it was banned by the Indonesian government in 2001, has allowed for the generation of a narrative that Christians are separatists whose actions must be contained. Many Muslims continue to be suspicious of RMS/FKM activities.

In April 2004, the largest episodes of violence since the end of the extended violence broke out around the anniversary of the RMS's formation. Including smaller incidents that month, 34 people were killed, 162 were injured, and 135 buildings were

¹³⁴ The RMS was formed by Protestant Ambonese who had worked for the colonial Dutch government and, particularly, the colonial military. This group had lived a relatively privileged existence vis-à-vis the local Muslim population. When the Japanese occupied Ambon they began to promote Muslims and those from the nascent Indonesian nationalist movement. In response, there were attempts to establish a state independent from the new Indonesia, initially for eastern Indonesia, then for southern Maluku. The establishment of a Republic of South Moluccas was declared on 25 April 1950 but the RMS was defeated by the Indonesian military in November of that year. Sporadic fighting continued to occur on Seram Island, now in Central Maluku district, until 1962, but in 1963 around 12,000 Moluccan soldiers left Indonesia to resettle in the Netherlands where a government-in-exile was formed. Support for an independent Maluku diminished rapidly in Ambon and surrounding islands. Chauvel (1990) provides a history of the movement.

damaged, with close to 15,000 people displaced. Since 2004, there have been no large incidents of violence related to RMS but smaller episodes have continued. In 2007, six such incidents injured ten people and a further four incidents in Ambon and Central Maluku in 2009 and 2011 killed one and injured 14.¹³⁵

Other large incidents of post-conflict violence have less obvious links to the earlier extended violence. Across the province, these include 13 large land conflicts (which resulted in 14 deaths, 196 injuries, and 242 damaged buildings), a 2006 clash between groups of *kaki lima* (street food sellers) over access to markets that led to 200 damaged buildings, and eight cases of mobs running rampage in response to insults from other groups or in revenge attacks (11 dead, 58 injuries, and 170 damaged buildings).

2. Local elite struggles in post-conflict Maluku

Many of these incidents of large episodic post-violence—both those directly flowing from inter-religious divisions and those with a less clear link to the past extended violence—can be traced to continuing support for and use of violence from members of the local elite. Local elites have played a range of roles from actively organising violence to turning a blind eye to groups who instigate it. They have done so primarily for two reasons.

First, local elites have found that the use of violence is beneficial and relatively risk free. Particularly important was the ways in which resources and positions were distributed in the early post-conflict period, which sent a strong signal that violence pays; this also strengthened patron-client networks between local political elites and

¹³⁵ The unfurling of a RMS flag in front of the Indonesian President during a visit to Maluku in 2007 resulted in a police clamp down. There have been accusations that the police in Maluku have routinely tortured FKM/RMS activists. In September 2010, a Moluccan separatist, Yusuf Sipakoly, who had been arrested in 2007 after the flag incident, died in custody from injuries that his family claim were sustained during torture (The Age 2010).

criminal groups. With the local security forces tolerating the use of violence, often for pecuniary reasons, local elites have been able to mobilise groups to partake in violence when it is in their interest to do so.

Second, the nature of the local political system—with lasting collaboration across old conflict divides difficult—has meant that opportunities to use other more peaceable channels for accumulating resources and power have been limited. These two factors have combined to make the use of violence an important strategy for elites in post-conflict Maluku.

2.1 The benefits of violence: the peace settlement, cooptation, and signalling

Efforts to find and sustain peace in Maluku focused on satiating the desires of local elites: politicians and senior bureaucrats, security chiefs, religious leaders, and those who had led militia groups. Many individuals fitted into more than one of these categories.

The Malino peace agreement itself said very little about the issues local elites were most interested in—how power would be shared and how resources would be distributed. Only clauses 8 and 11 mentioned elliptically resources or the distribution of power in post-conflict Maluku.¹³⁶ The first said that public infrastructure should be rehabilitated by the Indonesian government; the second addressed recruitment to Pattimura University, the prominent state higher education institution in Ambon, stating that it should be “implemented based on the principle of fairness while upholding the necessary standards.” This was interpreted as an agreement to balance the composition of the faculty and students between Muslims and Christians.

¹³⁶ These and the other Malino clauses were rather vague with parties committing to end all conflicts and disputes (clause 1), abide by the process of law enforcement (2), reject separatist movements (3), respect local culture (4), ban illegal organisations (5), establish an investigation team (6), allow for the displaced to return home (7), reequip the security forces (9), and uphold good relationships (10).

Yet while the accord had little specifics on the distribution of resources, positions or power, it soon became clear that this would be the focus of Malino's implementation. The clauses that focused on peacebuilding were not fully implemented. The two *pokja* (working groups) that were to monitor progress on law and order and to oversee social and economic conditions were never established. The reason commonly given was that the provincial government did not provide office space.¹³⁷ However, given the small costs involved, it is clear that this was a political decision. The local government was reluctant to have others provide unwelcome oversight of their tasks, to share the discretion they held in allocating post-conflict money. The independent team that was mandated to investigate the causes of violence was set up but the results of the investigation were never published (Klinken 2007: 89).

Elites focused instead on how the promised post-conflict resources due to follow from the central government would be divided. The Malino agreement was not just between the warring Muslim and Christian groups but between the two of them and Jakarta. Acceptance of the terms of Malino would allow for an in-flow of substantial funds, ostensibly for post-conflict reconstruction.¹³⁸ The provision of such resources was contingent on a degree of calm reigning in the province. For this to happen, the groups and individuals who had resisted the peace process—some for ideological reasons, some because they had been profiting from the violence—would have to be brought on-board.

Providing jobs

Attempts at cooptation took a number of forms. First, jobs in the civil service were provided to some who did not agree with the Malino process. Such jobs were valued. Even though wages were low, civil service positions came with job certainty, a pension, and usually some side benefits such as cuts on contracts.

¹³⁷ Christian Malino delegate, Ambon, 11 December 2010.

¹³⁸ Interviews, elites and villagers in Central Maluku, December 2010.

On the Muslim side, those responsible for the early wave of post-conflict inter-religious violence were targeted. To a greater extent than for Christians, Muslim leaders were split on whether peace was in their interests. On 14 February, Laskar Jihad released a statement arguing that Malino was premature and that the Muslim delegates had not been representative of the Muslim ranks.¹³⁹ In the days following Malino, a group of 11 local leaders, calling themselves the Maluku Muslim Meeting Forum, announced their rejection of the accord. The Team of Eleven, as they subsequently became known, was led by Husni Putuhena of the Maluku chapter of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and included other prominent figures.¹⁴⁰ Putuhena travelled to Jakarta to meet with the then Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who along with Kalla had been instrumental in arranging the Malino talks. His attempt to garner support for the team's stance was rejected but Yudhoyono and Kalla remained in touch.¹⁴¹

While the motivations of many within groups such as Laskar Jihad who disagreed with Malino were in part ideological, those who supported a continuation of violence were often influenced by material considerations. One Muslim delegate to Malino reflected:

¹³⁹ Bohm (2005: 216-217) provides a translation of an article by the central board of Laskar Jihad in their bulletin (original version no longer accessible). It is worth quoting a short section: "It is too early to talk about reconciliation whilst one community is still traumatised with this expression. Those delegates that convened [in Malino] are not sufficiently representative to talk in the name of the people. This reconciliation even turns upside down the Muslim ranks. One by one, those who used to be public figures have been trapped associating with the Christians and now have become people that are good for nothing. Trash. The Muslims also experience filthiness from inside. Day by day those who should lead the community are renouncing their duties. Therefore, be not appalled if the Muslims grow in determination to reject any compromise, let alone reconciliation." On 24 April, Laskar Jihad's leader, Ja'far Umar Thalib, arrived in Ambon and made a speech on the Muslim SPMM radio station urging Muslims to make war on Christians. In a speech at a public religious meeting (*tabligh akbar*) on 26 April, Ja'far again told his audience to wage war on Christians and denounced the Malino agreement as "treason" (*ibid.*: 237).

¹⁴⁰ These included Ustadz Mohammad Attamimi, a lecturer at the Ambon Islamic College in Maluku (STAIN), Djamu Tuani (the local secretary of the Indonesia Ulama Council, MUI), Luqman Ba'abduh (of Laskar Jihad), and retired Brig. Gen. Rustam Kastor.

¹⁴¹ See Crouch (2010: 260-261) and Bohm (2005: 221). This continued when Yudhoyono and Kalla subsequently became President and Vice-President in 2004.

There were hardliners when the conflict was happening but later they became soft. Maybe they had another motivation. For example, they wanted to occupy positions in the government. After this aim was reached, then their attitude that had been merciless suddenly changed and they became soft.¹⁴²

Another Muslim delegate noted that, “the radical groups ended up agreeing with Malino because ... they had conditions and needs. When their needs were fulfilled, they changed their minds.”¹⁴³

The example of Ustadz Mohammad Attamimi, a lecturer at the Islamic College in Maluku (STAIN), illustrates. Attamimi had been the main local counterpart to Laskar Jihad during the conflict and was a strong opponent of the Malino process as a member of the Team of Eleven. Over time, however, his position altered. He was appointed director of STAIN, allegedly by the central government, despite strong opposition from students and many others. Yudhoyono and Kalla maintained contact with Attamimi after Malino and brought him to Jakarta several times (Crouch 2010: 267). STAIN was provided with additional facilities and funding. In 2005, the police found a cache of weapons hidden on the campus. It was unclear whether Attamimi had sanctioned the weapons or whether they were placed there by others. He was questioned by the police but no further action was taken (ICG 2005c). He was subsequently appointed Chief of the Religious Affairs office of Maluku province, a job with plenty of opportunity for rent-taking given its responsibility for organising hajj visits, its oversight of religious schools, and its role in managing the rebuilding of houses of worship that had been destroyed in the earlier violence.¹⁴⁴ Other former members of the Team of Eleven also did well in post-conflict Maluku. Husni Putuhena continued his career in the provincial religious affairs ministry under Attamimi and became a close ally of the West Seram district head, Jacobus Puttileihalat. Azis Fidmatan, another member of the Team and an ex-official in

¹⁴² Jakarta, 2 December 2010.

¹⁴³ Central Maluku, 12 December 2010.

¹⁴⁴ Muslim delegate to Malino, Central Maluku, 12 December 2010.

the provincial ministry of trade, became the sub-district head of the Kur Islands in Southeast Maluku.¹⁴⁵

At lower levels, former fighters and militia leaders on both sides were also given jobs. M. J. Papilaya, Ambon's mayor from 2001 until 2011, outlined the reasoning:

Commanders during the conflict had no role after the conflict and they became a source of problems. They were nothing before the conflict but they became popular, in both Muslim and Christian communities. Some of them like Ongen Pattimura [a Muslim militant] were a big source of problems. After thinking about what to do with them, we decided to give them jobs. Some were recruited as public order officers (Satpol PP) and were given support to become disciplined. Some were given jobs as a parking officer. For instance, those from Kailolo managed the parking area being the Amplaz [Ambon mall], while those from Aboru were in Mardika [the market]. We did this to facilitate them to adjust to the post-conflict situation.¹⁴⁶

People like Ongen would not have been satisfied with a low status, low pay, parking attendant job. But using militant leaders as intermediaries—allowing them to select who would be hired and to control local rackets—gave them status, strengthened their role as patrons of former militia groups, and cemented relationships with political elites that could be used profitably later on.

Funds: civil emergency and *Inpres* 6/2003

A second mechanism for cooptation was the deployment of special post-conflict assistance. Initial emergency funding to the province followed the declaration of civil emergency for both Maluku and North Maluku on 26 June 2000 under Presidential Decree (*Keppres*) 88/2000. With the emergency came resources under the control of the provincial governor in coordination with the local heads of the police and military. Smith (2009: 158) argues that monitoring the use of such funds was not a priority for the central government and that, "it was in the direct interests of central government to unofficially enable regional government elites' access to these funds as doing so 'bought back' regional support to the centre at a time of great unrest." As emergency funds,

¹⁴⁵ Phone discussions with Muslim activist and a journalist, August 2012.

¹⁴⁶ Ambon, 13 July 2011.

money from *Keppres* 88/2000 lay outside the regular budget, did not require national parliament approval, and central government monitoring procedures did not apply.

Civil emergency funds were widely used to pay off those who supported continuing violence and they did succeed, to an extent, in domesticating the hard-line militias and their supporters in the political elite on both sides of the religious divide. Muslim and Christian groups received funds for 'security enforcement' projects. Crouch (2010: 267) argues that Sarundajang, the acting governor from late 2002 to August 2003, was "very adept at dealing with Muslim radicals, particularly by understanding their economic requirements and providing them with appropriate assistance." Christian militia leaders who had organised violence, such as Femmy Souisa and Emang Nikijuluw, also received funds and projects. Both were signatories to the Malino peace agreement as representatives of the so-called '*akar rumput*' (grassroots, a synonym for Christian criminal *preman* or militia groups).

Money also went to senior individuals in the security forces who played a major role alongside the governor in managing funds.¹⁴⁷ Civil emergency funds were allegedly provided directly to the head of the military and police to bind them in to the agreement:

In the time of Governor Saleh Latuconsina [1997-2002], the security apparatus were very late in responding to conflict incidents. But these conditions changed drastically when the position of governor was held by Sarundajang. Saleh Latuconsina was too stingy in using money, but Sarundajang was not like that. During the time of civil emergency, Sarundajang gave big funds [out]. For example, he gave an incentive to the governor [himself] of Rp 100 million, gave the head of police and military Rp 75 million. Maybe the money also made the security forces move fast.¹⁴⁸

While such funds were relatively small they played an important signalling role. Acceptance of the use of emergency funds by local elites for personal benefit, to fuel patron-client networks, and to buy off potential challengers demonstrated the extent to

¹⁴⁷ Interviews in Ambon and Central Maluku, July 2011.

¹⁴⁸ Muslim delegate to Malino, Jakarta, 2 December 2010.

which development effectiveness was not the main priority of the central state. They also indicated that using or threatening violence could be an important tactic to receive a piece of the post-conflict resource pie.

The Malino agreement promised funds for rehabilitation. A large chunk of this money was to be spent on the repair of large-scale infrastructure, a sector where funds could be relatively easily skimmed.¹⁴⁹ Funds started to arrive in large volumes with Presidential Instruction (*Inpres*) 6/2003 after civil emergency had been lifted in September 2003. They came on-line for the 2005 fiscal year and totalled Rp 2.2 trillion (around US\$ 220 million) from 2005 until 2007 in Maluku.¹⁵⁰ This was a major component of the development funds available to the province. The Rp 663 billion of *Inpres* funds in 2005, for example, was equivalent to around one-quarter of Maluku's total revenues, which had to cover personnel and capital expenses as well as development expenditures.¹⁵¹ Beyond their volume, *Inpres* funds were important because of the level of discretion that was afforded to local political elites in allocation and implementation. Despite being central government funds, executed through line ministries, proposals for fund use came from the provincial level and the provincial executive and legislative (as well as the powerful local military and police chiefs) worked with the line ministries to implement projects. Unlike most subnational resources in post-decentralisation Indonesia, *Inpres* funds were largely controlled by the province rather than the districts.

¹⁴⁹ See Klinken and Aspinall (2011) on opportunities for corruption in Indonesia's construction sector.

¹⁵⁰ Some informants in Maluku reported a higher figure of Rp 4.2 trillion (US\$ 420 million). However, it appears that Rp 2.2 trillion was disbursed from Jakarta (World Bank 2010). *Inpres* funds were Rp 663 billion (2005), Rp 741 billion (2006), and Rp 817 billion (2007). Each year, the Maluku local government proposed more than one trillion rupiah in assistance (hence perhaps the higher estimates) but not all proposed projects were funded.

¹⁵¹ *Inpres* funds constituted a smaller share of provincial funds in 2006 and 2007, in large part because national-level reductions in fuel subsidies led to large increases in subnational transfers. However, *Inpres* funds were still substantial. Figures are from the World Bank's (2010) public expenditure analysis for Maluku. *Inpres* funds are not counted in reports of subnational expenditures because they are central government funds executed through line ministries.

Funds were used to consolidate political power and support for the Maluku accord. Money was allegedly spent on building official residential buildings for the Maluku deputy governor, a new house for the Pattimura XI military commander, a new provincial building in Jakarta, and on the local representative board's office.¹⁵² None of these buildings had been damaged during the extended violence. Beyond mismanagement, substantial resources were corrupted. Money allegedly went to individuals within the security forces "who play".¹⁵³ Local politicians and senior bureaucrats reportedly made billions of rupiah during the tender of reconstruction contracts.¹⁵⁴

Signalling the benefits of violence

The provision of funds and positions to satisfy elites and to co-opt those who might disagree with the peace was thus widespread in Maluku and did help reduce support for a continuation of, or return to, communal war. Religious radicals, militia leaders and their followers, criminal gangs, security force chiefs, and local politicians: all benefitted from post-conflict resources. This reduced the incentives of key groups to support a return to extended violence for it was clear that such individuals and groups could do well in times of 'peace'.

But giving jobs, funds and projects to groups and elites in response to threats or acts of violence in the early post-conflict period had the effect of showing that using *episodic* violence could continue to be profitable. Former militia and gang leaders realised that continuing to use or threaten violence was both an effective and acceptable way to access resources. Emang Nikijuluw, the Christian thug leader, notes that:

Pressure, or the threat of violence, has been common in accessing and getting development projects. Those who fail to get projects often use this threat and pressure. If we are getting involved in the process of accessing the projects,

¹⁵² Anti-corruption activist, Ambon, 19 December 2010; Muslim delegate to Malino, Central Maluku, 12 December 2010.

¹⁵³ Interviews in Central Maluku, December 2010.

¹⁵⁴ Interviews in Ambon and Central Maluku, December 2010.

others are forcefully 'stepped back' [prevented from getting funds]. This is our way of feeding our children.¹⁵⁵

Emang and Femmy Souisa collaborated in developing an 'economic empowerment project' employing, in the words of Emang, around 140 'bad boys' with funds from the government. Each established a company, initially receiving projects of around Rp 500 million (US\$ 50,000), but later projects of up to Rp 2.5 billion (US\$ 250,000) from the Department of Public Works. Emang freely admits that threats and blackmail were used by both to get projects with others "forced out".¹⁵⁶

The success of such tactics led others to see the utility of using violence as a way to access political or economic benefits. As a result, other gangs emerged. On Haruku Island, Central Maluku, new gangs sprung up in Pelauw, Kabua, Rohomoni, and Hulalui villages.¹⁵⁷ Other organised groups that used violence and coercion included the Baguala Muslim Youth Forum (FPMB) and the street vendors association (APKLI Maluku), which has around 4,000 members in Ambon, both led by Sulaiman Latupono.¹⁵⁸ Latupono has strong ties to the military, especially intelligence, and political figures.¹⁵⁹

Providing resources and jobs to criminal groups also had the effect of cementing patron-client links between these groups and elites in the local government and bureaucracy and religious leaders. In an environment where there was an influx of resources—both from post-conflict funds and from increases in subnational revenues due to decentralisation—elites have increasingly utilised these relationships with

¹⁵⁵ Ambon, 19 July 2011.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ Parliamentarians, Central Maluku, 14 July 2011; interview, local NGO worker, Ambon, 21 July 2011.

¹⁵⁸ Sulaiman Latupono, Ambon, 10 July 2011. APKLI were allegedly involved in the 2006 clash between street sellers that led to the damage of more than 200 buildings. FPMB may also have played a role in the 2004 RMS unrest. On the eve of the outbreak of violence, Latupono, along with the head of PRM (Youth Reform movement for Maluku), Muhammad Saleh B. Nurlete, announced the establishment of a 'militia to rescue the nation', which would use physical power to combat RMS and FKM (Bohm 2005: 334).

¹⁵⁹ He was appointed a member of the Ambon parliament for the 2007-2009 period, replacing Franky Hewat (of the Islamic PBB party) who had passed away. Latupono then joined the Gerindra party, which is led by the retired army general, Prabowo Subianto, and was appointed deputy chairman of Gerindra Maluku. Muslim youth leader, Ambon, 10 July 2011.

criminal groups in the local political and economic sphere. Violence, or the threat of it, has been used when there were resources to compete for. M. J. Papilaya, Ambon's mayor for most of the post-conflict period, acknowledged the pervasiveness of such tactics:

Currently students cause many conflicts in Maluku, especially those who come from East Seram and Buru. They generally come from poor neighbourhoods in their area and can be paid by the elite to stage political actions such as demonstrations ... There are elite interests involved. And economic interests too, related to projects, behind the demonstrations.¹⁶⁰

The Ambon police chief agreed arguing that many brawls and inter-group clashes are the result of elite actions. "Elites," he noted, "can easily provoke people and they do so to become popular." The provincial police chief similarly reflected, "Clashes that happen within society are usually related to interest groups or political interests."¹⁶¹

Elites have used such networks because they prove to be effective. The initial distribution of the post-conflict spoils to those who continued to use violence indicated that involvement in nasty acts would be an asset rather than hindrance. Groups soon learned that violence continued to be a useful strategy in capturing a piece of the pie and local elites have found it beneficial to use the hand-out of cash, projects and jobs to such groups to cement patronage relationships with local violence entrepreneurs. As a result, violence has become an important currency in local politics.

2.2 Low costs: security sector tolerance of violence

The use of episodic violence by criminal leaders and local elites has proved not only to be useful but also largely risk-free. This is because the local police and military have tolerated, and sometimes supported, such violence. There have been clampdowns on violence when it is perceived to be linked to transnational terrorism, a result of pressure from Jakarta. After the attack on a police station in Loki in 2005, for example, there was a rapid response from the police. But such operations have almost always been led by

¹⁶⁰ Ambon, 13 July 2011.

¹⁶¹ Interview with Ambon police chief (Ambon, 11 July 2011) and Maluku police chief (Ambon, 12 July 2011).

national-level police, especially the elite Indonesian counter-terrorism squad, Detachment 88. Where there has not been a strong signal from Jakarta, local police and military have taken little action to investigate incidents of unrest.

During Maluku's extended violent conflict, many police and military took sides, working with local leaders and militia groups. As Indonesia's polity has stabilised, the motivations and ability of security forces to stoke large-scale extended violence has greatly diminished.¹⁶² However, elements of the local military and police force in Maluku continue to have incentives to allow *episodic* violence to occur.

In large part, motives are financial. In the civil emergency period, and when *Inpres* funds were still flowing (until late 2007), BKO troops (extra non-local forces stationed in the province) received salaries from multiple levels of government. Police BKO have now been fully withdrawn but two battalions of military BKO, totalling around 1,100 personnel, remain.¹⁶³ These troops do not now receive extra salary payments but many are active in the informal economy generating rents that benefit individual personnel and which are channelled upwards through the military structure. Business activities allegedly include running internet cafes, car washes, small cinemas, illegal mining, drugs, running *kosts* (boarding houses), gambling, and renting cars. BKO military also allegedly extort traders bringing fish from Seram Island to Ambon.¹⁶⁴ The police are said to be involved in similar businesses.¹⁶⁵ These financial benefits have created incentives for the military and police to retain high numbers in the province. Allowing a certain level of violence is a means by which the police and military can justify their large numbers.

¹⁶² See Chapter 8.

¹⁶³ The two battalions are Yonif 133 Yudha Bhakti and Armed Bukit Barisan. In total, the current number of military personnel, including civilians, is around 9,000 in Maluku province. Interviews with the military in Ambon, July 2011.

¹⁶⁴ Interviews with a range of informants in Ambon and Central Maluku, December 2010 and July 2011.

¹⁶⁵ Interviews with journalists, activists, and community members, Ambon, 11 July 2011.

According to the former mayor of Ambon, M. J. Papilaya, military and police intelligence sometimes spread false reports of shootings or attacks to justify the presence of BKO forces.¹⁶⁶ Indeed, as one influential peace activist argued, “security has become a commodity in Maluku. If violence occurs, more security personnel are deployed. And then more budget is needed!”¹⁶⁷ A local representative of the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) was not alone in stating that the BKO troops tend to create more problems in communities than they solve. The Commission has called for a removal of the non-local troops from the province.¹⁶⁸

Lack of effective responses to violence are thus a product of the incentives of law enforcers rather than weak state capacity. This has limited the costs to local elites and criminal groups of using violence. Links between individuals within the police and military and large incidents of violence can be drawn in a number of cases, including Maluku’s most deadly episodes of post-conflict violence.

Case: security sector involvement in the RMS riots of 2004

On 25 April each year a celebration is held in Ambon to commemorate the separatist RMS’s anniversary. In 2004, 300 people gathered at the house of Alex Manuputty, FKM’s leader. The police soon arrived, arresting the FKM’s Secretary-General, Moses Tunawakotta, and hauling down UN and RMS flags.

Moses was brought to the provincial police office on foot. Around 200 people followed and another thousand later joined the procession, marching three kilometres to police headquarters. The large crowd led many onlookers to believe that this was a FKM/RMS parade. Rally participants again raised the RMS flag. While the police took away the flag, another appeared. After a short time outside the office, the group left with a police escort.

¹⁶⁶ Ambon, 13 July 2011.

¹⁶⁷ Jacky Manuputty, Ambon, July 2011.

¹⁶⁸ Human rights activist, Ambon, 11 July 2011.

When they passed through the stretch of road from Tugu Trikora to Pohon Pule in central Ambon they were blocked by a group flying Indonesian flags. A clash ensued. Snipers in multi-storey buildings shot eight people, six of whom died. All of the dead were Muslims. Violence then escalated. Houses, a Church and the Christian university were burned. In retaliation, SMA Muhammadiyah, an Islamic senior high school that had been a pilot project for multiculturalism in Ambon through its acceptance of Christian students, was burned. Shootings by snipers and burning took place sporadically until 30 April. Violence only ceased after the intervention of the central government led to extra troops being sent in.

The clashes could be viewed as a natural consequence of continuing tensions between the Christian and Muslim communities of Ambon in the early post-Malino years. Yet the violence appeared to be organised. The snipers seemed to be professionals or to at least have significant experience. How had they been able to access the buildings and why were none arrested? Suspensions soon emerged about the conduct of the security forces. Why had the police allowed for a procession of FKM supporters through Muslim areas of the city? Why were there no efforts from the security apparatus to stop the early violence? Why did it take the arrival of forces from outside of Maluku to stop escalation, despite the long experience the military and police had in dealing with riots and violence in Maluku?

One factor was the need for the military to demonstrate that large numbers of personnel were still required in Maluku. The previous year had been relatively quiet—28 people had been killed in Maluku in 2003 compared to 101 in 2002. In the months leading up to the riots there had been plans to pull out BKO troops.¹⁶⁹ Indeed, both during and following the extended violence, the RMS issue had been consistently blown-up by the military as a way to receive additional funding. The RMS issue was particularly effective for this because of the concerns of the Indonesian state about the vulnerability

¹⁶⁹ Journalist and peacebuilding activist, Ambon, 10 July 2011.

of the country to secessionist threats. Taking harsh actions against supposed RMS separatists was also a sure way for individuals within the military to get fast-tracked promotion.¹⁷⁰ Over time it emerged that some of the snipers were most likely former military men, including some who had joined the *pasukan siluman* but who had retained close contact with other security personnel.¹⁷¹

2.3 Limited opportunities for peaceful politics

Violence has thus proven to be both beneficial and relatively risk free for local elites including politicians, security force leaders, and the heads of criminal groups in post-conflict Maluku. The rewarding of those who have used or threatened violence, and lack of action taken by security forces, sent out a signal that episodic violence paid. However, the decision by local elites to use violence in political and economic competition in Maluku is also a function of the perception that there is a lack of other options. The structure of local politics, where it is extremely difficult for elites to make lasting deals with those from other faith backgrounds, has limited opportunities for peaceful collaboration.

Edward Aspinall has observed that the political saliency of ethnicity in Indonesia has subsided as democracy has consolidated:

Elites' dominance has been accompanied by a culture of deal making and compromise that in the arena of ethnic politics, as well as in some areas of political life, has had important conflict-ameliorating effects. In Indonesia, patronage networks on the whole tend to cross ethnic lines rather than harden them, and to blunt ethnic competition rather than intensify it (Aspinall 2011a: 291).

Patronage is indeed the dominant logic of Moluccan political life. Yet patron-client networks in Maluku continue to be structured along confessional lines.

¹⁷⁰ Interviews in Ambon, December 2010 and July 2011, including with the National Commission for Human Rights.

¹⁷¹ Interviews with senior police by Najib Azca in August 2002.

In national and local legislative elections, Muslim voters tend to vote for Muslim parties while the candidates and supporters of PDI-P, the dominant party in post-conflict Maluku, are almost without exception Christian. Collaboration takes place at election time. From the end of the extended violence, all pairs of candidates for the provincial governor and district head (*bupati/wali kota*) elections have contained both a Christian and a Muslim on the ticket (Tomsa 2009a, 2009b). Such informal power-sharing has minimised tensions during elections. Across Maluku province, there have been 107 violent election-related incidents in the post-conflict period, leading to five deaths, 114 injuries and 80 damaged buildings, with most of these relating to district-level contests.¹⁷² This compares favourably with levels of electoral violence in many other provinces in Indonesia.¹⁷³

Yet while joint tickets limit violence around elections such collaborations tend to be but electoral marriages of convenience, merely preceding within-ticket battles over the distribution of resources after election results are announced. The case of M. J. Papilaya and Syarief Hadler, mayor and deputy mayor of Ambon from 2001-2006, illustrates. Papilaya was a Christian PDI-P politician while Hadler led the Islamic PPP in the province. While at first they worked well together, their relationship soon soured. Papilaya promoted a policy to build a new business centre in Passo village, a Christian area. Hadler opposed the policy on the basis that more Christians than Muslims would benefit. The project continued and, as a result, the two went their own ways during the

¹⁷² Data are until the end of 2012. District elections account for 71 incidents, four deaths, 73 injuries, and 33 of the damaged buildings. Ten such incidents occurred in 2008 (four injured, 13 buildings damaged), 14 in 2009 (one dead, 10 injuries, one building), and 17 in 2010 (36 injuries, 15 buildings). Provincial level contests resulted in five incidents, injuring six people and damaging two buildings (three of these incidents related to the reelection of Governor Ralahalu in July 2008).

¹⁷³ Of the 16 provinces in the NVMS dataset, eight show a higher number of violent incidents related to national, provincial or district elections from 2002 until the end of 2011. These include other provinces that experienced extended violence: Aceh, for example, saw 159 incidents of electoral violence which resulted in 11 deaths; North Maluku and Central Sulawesi saw 103 and 85 incidents, respectively. Other provinces not affected by extended violence also recorded higher levels of electoral violence than did Maluku. South Sulawesi and North Sumatra, for example, had 104 and 90 incidents, respectively. Papua saw the greatest number of deaths from electoral violence with 28 killed.

later period of their term, with little to no collaboration. They did not stand together in the next election.

Continuing efforts by Muslims to balance jobs in the bureaucracy also demonstrate the extent to which resources tend to flow through religiously-based patronage networks:

The equalisation of power [is a big issue]. This can be done in the government or the bureaucracy. For example, if the governor is a Christian, then the deputy-governor will be a Muslim, if the head of local ministry A is Muslim, then the head of ministry B will be Christian.¹⁷⁴

As with joint electoral tickets, attempts at religious balancing have played a role in generating adherence to the post-Malino political settlement for they have ensured that neither side would lose out completely. However, the allocation of jobs and resources by religion has also reinforced systems of religious-based patronage, in so doing cementing networks that have been mobilised for violence. It has ensured that religious identity continues to be emphasised by those seeking positions of power. This is the risk of such 'consociationalist' arrangements, which, in their fullest form, have formal mechanisms for allocating positions of power by ethnic or religious identity. In Maluku, there has not been a formal institutional pact on sharing power between groups. But informal norms around balancing have developed, accentuating conceptions of politics as a zero-sum game and one that is structured by the same divides that were mobilised in the extended violence.

Case: balancing and violence at Unpatti

The series of clashes in the post-conflict period over the balance between Muslim and Christian faculty and students at the state Pattimura University (Unpatti) can be explained by this.¹⁷⁵ Under the colonial Dutch, Christians dominated the formal education sector and this has continued to the present at Unpatti. In 1998, before the

¹⁷⁴ Christian Malino delegate, Ambon, 9 December 2010.

¹⁷⁵ Information is primarily from interviews in Ambon, December 2010 and July 2011.

extended violence broke out, Christians made up around 70% of the teaching staff, students, and administrative officials. As violence escalated from mid-1999 to the year 2000, Unpatti was controlled by the Christians. Indeed, a rumour circulated amongst Muslims that there was a weapon repair shop for Christian soldiers in the polytechnic building at Unpatti. Muslim troops attacked Unpatti in early July 2000 and burned most of the buildings.

Religious imbalance in the composition of Unpatti was included as one of the items in the Malino accord.¹⁷⁶ This item is frequently cited by Muslims as providing a basis for their demands for 'proportionality', both in the recruitment of teaching staff, students, and administrators, as well as in the replacement of officers at the faculty and university levels. While the seat of the Unpatti rector has traditionally been allocated to a Christian, his leadership team always included Muslims. As such, contestation relates to which seats in the leadership team Muslims win. Muslims have tried to ensure they receive the position of first vice-rector (responsible for academic affairs) or second vice-rector (administrative and financial affairs), which they see as being more important than that of the third vice-rector (student and alumni affairs). Tellingly, the opportunities for spreading largess are greater for the first and second vice-rector positions. In many cases, Muslims have ended up with only the unpopular position.

Tensions between Muslims and Christians, on and off the campus, crystallise each time a rectoral or faculty-level election is held. In March 2010, there were small clashes and a riot during the election of the dean of the faculty of economics. Following this, a mediation team was finally created with 10 members of both Muslim and Christian teaching staff chaired by a former Unpatti rector. The team produced a number of recommendations yet problems continued. In July 2011 riots erupted again amidst a heightened political situation that flowed from two developments: the ongoing

¹⁷⁶ Article 11 reads: "To support the rehabilitation of Pattimura University for common progress, as such, the recruitment system and other policies will be transparently implemented based on the principle of fairness while upholding the necessary standard."

selection process of the Unpatti rector; and conflict over control of the student union. Contestation in both areas ran along polarised religious lines. Another trigger—the announcement of the admission results for the new cohort of students, with Muslims rumoured to only account for 15% of new students—made tensions gain heat.¹⁷⁷ The resulting riot did not result in casualties but it damaged many of the campus buildings.

Limits on collaboration and peaceful competition

Voters' choices, the nature of patronage networks and struggles within Unpatti all show the extent to which competition for power and resources within Maluku continues to be structured along religious lines. Efforts at balancing—in the make-up of the Unpatti faculty and student body and by ensuring there are joint Christian-Muslim tickets for local executive elections—can defuse tensions in the short-run. But collaboration and power sharing are usually superficial. While executive political power at the provincial and district levels is shared between Christians and Muslims, the constructed nature of the tickets means that heads and their deputies have their own power bases and networks, each built upon a different religious community. After elections are over, and decisions on the distribution of resources and positions start to be made, tensions between the two often rise sharply with each seeking to satisfy their own group. There is little space for the development of deeper political alliances that cross old conflict divides.

In such a local polity, coercion and violence can be a more effective political strategy than building support around policy positions. When promoting and negotiating ideas and interests through conventional political processes and institutional mechanisms, leaders often find themselves in a cul-de-sac with no way

¹⁷⁷ In fact data released by the Unpatti rector showed that Muslims made up 528 of 1,804 (or around 29%) of those admitted. This is still a far smaller proportion than the 1,196 Protestants admitted (66%). However, Muslims who did apply were more likely than Protestants to be admitted. Forty-eight percent of Muslim applicants were admitted compared to 41% of Protestants and 38% of Catholics.

forward. With deep and mature political alliances difficult to develop and sustain, violence, or the threat of it, becomes a useful strategy.

3. Violence specialists and societal support for violence

The use of violence by elites in post-conflict Maluku has been facilitated by local-level conditions that create willingness amongst many community members to condone and sometimes participate in violence. Religious divisions are marked and structure life, in large part because it is in the interests of local elites to continue to emphasise such differences and identities. Continuing segregation, and a lack of effective local-level reconciliation, ensure that suspicions remain. In this environment, some perceive violence to be in their own interests; these conditions also make it easy for elites to prey upon fears and prejudices to get people to participate in violence. The continuing presence of criminal *preman* groups with strong ties to political elites, many of whom draw upon militia structures from the extended violence, means that there is a large pool of labour that can be easily mobilised for violence.

3.1 Violence specialists

Many of the incidents of large episodic post-conflict violence in Maluku have involved local *preman* groups. During the extended violence Coker, Laskar Kristus, FKM and Agas on the Christian side played active roles. Other organised criminal groups, including a gang of young Muslims from the Hatuhaha area on Haruku Island, worked with outsiders from Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jihad in perpetrating violence. These groups did the bidding of local political elites and received support from elements of the police or military. By and large, they have remained active in post-conflict Maluku.

On the Muslim side, many of the outsiders who arrived in Maluku to take part in jihad were arrested, killed, or drifted away. Laskar Jihad was formally disbanded in October 2002 as a result of internal conflict and pressure from the central government.

A few hundred ex-Laskar Jihad have remained in Maluku but most now criticise violent jihadi ideology and the use of violence.¹⁷⁸

However, links between some in the local political elite and members of the outlawed militant jihadi organisations have remained. Former Laskar Jihad members have developed close links to government officials and community leaders.¹⁷⁹ Members of the other outsider jihadi groups who remained in Maluku have operated in more covert ways, making it hard to detect their extended networks. Many suspect they are protected by local political figures.¹⁸⁰

Local militants such as Ongen Pattimura have also worked closely with political elites. Ongen commanded men from Latu village on Seram Island during the extended violence and he subsequently formed a large urban gang in Ambon. Reportedly receiving training from a member of the terrorist Jemaah Islamiyah organisation, his group was involved in terror attacks including the 2002 Jan Paays bombing and an attack on the 2004 Villa Karaoke café that killed two. Yet despite an arrest warrant being issued in April 2002, and his reported escape to hide in Sulawesi, he was able to continue to cultivate political links. This culminated in his standing for the Islamic PKS party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, the Prosperous Justice Party) in the 2004 Ambon elections.¹⁸¹ PKS needed a local boy like Ongen who had a large network at the

¹⁷⁸ Interviews in Ambon and Central Maluku, December 2010 and July 2011.

¹⁷⁹ Yayasan Abu Bakar Ash-Shiddiq, a foundation established by an ex-Laskar Jihad member who remained in Maluku, has close links to many political players in the province. Its present chairman, Abdul Wahab Lumaëlan, is active in other Muslim organisations in the province, chairing the Coordinating Body of Youth Activists of the Mosque (BKPRM) and acting as provincial secretary of the Coordinating Forum of Muslim Society (FSUI). Another leading figure in the foundation is Nasir Kilkoda, a senior official of the state Coordinating Body for Local Investment (BKPRM). Two businessmen, Haji Nurdin Fata and Pak Erwin, are also involved in its leadership, reflecting the wide network that has been developed by ex-Laskar Jihad members in the province. Interviews in Maluku, July 2011.

¹⁸⁰ Interviews in Ambon and Central Maluku, December 2010.

¹⁸¹ The choice of PKS was an interesting one given that the party is known as having a non-violent platform and was not seen as legitimate amongst most jihadi activists. In an interview with Najib Azca in prison in 2008, a jihadi activist called PKS the most dangerous enemy of Islam because it mixes Islamic identity with an acceptance of the democratic system and an “accommodating” character. He said that PKS actually stood for “*partai kafir sejati*” (the true infidel party).

grassroots level. Ongen, in turn, needed an Islamic political party to transform his influence amongst youngsters into political currency. It was only after the attack on a police post in Loki on Seram in 2005 that he was finally arrested (Tunny 2006).

Many of the other local Muslim gangs who emerged during the extended violence have also consolidated because of the links they have with local politicians and elites. Such groups have been active in violence in the post-conflict period:

There are groups who try to create issues because they will benefit in the event of conflict. These are the people from Hatuhaha: Pelauw, Kailolo, Rohomoni and Kebau. During the height of the conflict, these groups looted abandoned shops. They also occupied homes left by residents. The houses were then rented to someone else. If the owners want their house back, they had to pay because that group said they were looking after the houses that had been long abandoned ... Before the conflict, communities in the four areas had a poor standard of living. But after the conflict, they became suddenly rich with a nice big house and many cars.¹⁸²

On the Christian side, too, many of the old conflict-era gangs and militias have remained strong in the post-conflict period.¹⁸³ The relationship between elites and the militia led by Femmy Souisa and Emang Nikijuluw has endured. Both still live in Maluku and continue to have close relationships with Christian elites in both the bureaucracy and the Church. Their groups continue to be used by local politicians around election times and when other key political events—such as the launch of corruption investigations—occur.

Explaining the continuity of criminal and militia groups

The ongoing presence of militia and criminal gangs is an alternate explanation for why large incidents of violence have been frequent in post-conflict Maluku. Could it be that the endurance of such groups alone explains why violence has been so common?

¹⁸² Muslim driver, Ambon, December 11, 2010.

¹⁸³ Some of the militia from the extended violence period have disappeared. Coker, as an organisation, has not been active since the arrest of Berty and his lieutenants in mid to late 2002. Many of those who were not jailed moved to Jakarta. Agas—a militia group made up of Christian child soldiers—also no longer exists. Agas had merely been an ad-hoc militia group that was established in the midst of communal war and it declined once violence waned after several of its leaders were killed and others left Maluku. Some members joined Coker after Malino while many others drifted away.

It is certainly the case that these groups have played a prominent role in acts of post-conflict violence and that if they were absent post-conflict violence would likely occur with less frequently. However, their enduring strength is best explained by the incentives and actions of local elites. As we have seen, elites have supported and provided protection to thugs. The provision of jobs, contracts and resources—combined with tolerance of their activities by political and religious elites and the security forces—explains their organisational continuity. Politicians and other local elites have allowed such groups to flourish because having them around is very much in their own interests. In contrast to efforts to clampdown on radical Islamic groups with links to transnational terror organisations—which have been led by Detachment 88, the national anti-terrorist arm within the police, and which have led to many arrests—there have been few efforts by security agencies to deal with local gangs.

3.2 Community support for violence

The use of large episodic violence by local elites and violence specialists is supported by community tolerance of, and sometimes active support for, violence. Three factors—historical conflict, ongoing segregation, and a lack of effective reconciliation activities—have shaped societal attitudes towards violence.

Historically, Maluku has been prone to local conflicts stretching back at least to the arrival of the colonial powers (Bartels 1977). The Portuguese and the Dutch supported some local leaders at the expense of others, sowing the seeds of future contention. Traditional communities (*negeri*) developed *adat* (traditional unwritten) laws determining their boundaries but different communities often had different and conflicting *adat*. The encroachment of the modern state in the New Order era, and in particular Law 5/1979 which standardised village governance structures, weakened such traditional systems. In recent years there has been a resurgence of *adat* in Maluku and elsewhere, a result of decentralisation that has created greater space for the

recognition of local customs and identities in public life. This has reinvigorated customary systems of land tenure, which often conflict with private land rights as determined by the state.¹⁸⁴ This has led to a rise in conflicts between villages over the location of their borders. Such long-standing tensions have contributed to post-conflict violence both directly and indirectly. Between March 2002 and the end of 2012 there were nine large land conflicts in Ambon and Central Maluku.¹⁸⁵ Historical tensions have also reduced inter-ethnic solidarity, which could have acted as a counterbalance to religious animosity.

A second issue is the continuing segregation of Muslim and Christian communities in post-conflict Maluku. The province, and in particular Ambon Island, remains heavily segregated with Muslim and Christian communities living in distinct areas (IDMC 2011). Day-to-day interaction is common and Muslims and Christians generally feel free to venture into each other's areas during the day, although there are few mixed residential communities. However, when tensions rise, as they did in the aftermath of the September 2011 riots, interaction drops markedly. Ongoing segregation has led to a lack of trust and fear between groups with the result that small-scale incidents of violence, often between youth groups, are frequent, especially in Ambon city where segregated communities live in close proximity to each other. From March 2002 until the end of 2012, there were 151 incidents of popular justice violence in Ambon, leading to 11 deaths, 187 injuries, and 85 damaged buildings.¹⁸⁶ Small

¹⁸⁴ On these processes across Indonesia, see Davidson and Henley (2007). Adam (2008) discusses the revitalisation of *adat* in Maluku. On land conflicts resulting from incompatibilities between *adat* and national law, see Clark (2004).

¹⁸⁵ These cases have been particularly prominent in rural areas of Ambon Island and Seram Island, both in Central Maluku. Across Maluku, and including both large and small incidents of violence, there have been 194 land conflicts in the post-conflict period (until the end of 2012), leading to 50 deaths, 388 injuries, and 394 damaged buildings.

¹⁸⁶ This includes fights over loss of face (the majority of incidents), violent responses to issues such as accidents, theft, sexual indiscretion, and responses to a range of other moral issues. Central Maluku district saw 36 such incidents leading to 11 deaths, 87 injuries, and 141 damaged buildings in the same period.

disagreements frequently turn violent, especially when the youths involved are drunk. Such clashes in turn solidify inter-religious suspicions and tensions.

A third factor that has kept societal tolerance of or support for violence strong is the limitations of local post-conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding activities. The centrepiece of Maluku's peace process was the Malino accord, the implementation of which focused on satisfying elites. Local efforts to reconcile communities, and to deal with tensions and trauma from the violence, have not been prominent (Indonesian Institute of Sciences et al. 2011). Maluku received aid from international and Indonesian organisations aimed at building peace.¹⁸⁷ But while programs often had positive impacts they tended to operate in a limited set of villages.

The elite construction and nurturing of grievances and tensions

The presence of deep and continuing societal tensions points to another alternative explanation for the continuing high levels of post-conflict violence in Ambon and Central Maluku. It could be that local tensions—between villages and between Muslims and Christians—are more important in accounting for post-conflict violence than elite motivations and behaviour.

Such an analysis ignores the extent to which grievances and mistrust are in large part a product of elite actions in the post-conflict period. This can be seen if we explore why segregation has continued. Fear of return and difficulties associated with the occupation of land are certainly factors. Yet these have not been overcome because of a lack of support from the local government for the repatriation of people displaced by the conflict. The overwhelming focus of government post-conflict programming has been on building infrastructure and paying-off potential spoilers rather than repatriating displaced persons or local-level reconciliation activities. Where funds were used for displaced people, they were used to help them resettle in new areas rather than to

¹⁸⁷ Brown, Wilson, and Hadi (2005: 56-60) provide a discussion of early post-conflict programs.

facilitate their return. The widespread corruption of *Inpres* funds for displaced persons certainly did not help.

The presence of segregation, fear and mistrust means that communities are prone to provocation or to elite manipulation. Indeed, it is commonly argued that ensuring that communities remain segregated has been a conscious political strategy of elites. A Christian leader noted:

I don't like segregation. It provides a bigger chance for provocation to work. It can be misused by actors who play a negative role ... The government has not done much to make people safe ... They have not done much because they are busy with other things [said in a scornful tone] ... It's all about politics! I think the government prefers segregation so they can potentially utilise it later. I really see that. Otherwise, why would it be kept like this?¹⁸⁸

Similarly, the lack of government attention to reconciliation and peacebuilding activities can be explained by the advantages that having separated and tense communities can afford. Government-sponsored peacebuilding activities—such as the creation of a network of local traditional leaders (Majelis Latupati) and the activities of the state-mandated Inter-Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB)—have focused more on strengthening patronage networks, which run along religious lines, than supporting reconciliation.¹⁸⁹

4. Temporal variation

I have argued that large episodes of post-conflict violence occur frequently in Maluku because local elites have continuing incentives to strategically use violence and to tolerate its use by others. The ability of elites to 'play' in this way has been bolstered by the presence of organised violence specialists and continuing tensions between religious communities. Over time the frequent use of violence, by elites and violence specialists


¹⁸⁸ Ambon, 19 December 2010.

¹⁸⁹ For more details on the functioning of these organisations, see Barron, Azca, and Susdinarjanti (2012: 87-90). See also Tomsa (2009b) who discusses how Majelis Latupati was used by the incumbent governor, Ralahu, to spread patronage to bolster his reelection chances in 2008.

alike, has translated into norms where violence is deemed an acceptable strategy in political and economic life.

However, large episodic violence has varied over time in post-conflict Maluku. Figure 5.1 shows that incidents of large episodic post-conflict violence—and their destructive impacts—have been concentrated in 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2011. These years account for 78% of the deaths from large incidents of violence across the 11 post-conflict years, 68% of injuries, and 58% of damaged buildings.¹⁹⁰

Figure 5.1. Large incidents of post-conflict violence in Maluku over time



Source: NVMS.

The theory developed in Chapter 3 predicts that there will be upsurges in post-conflict violence at times when key actors have heightened incentives to support violence. Given that large episodes of violence require the involvement or support of local elites, we can expect that changes to the incentives of such elites will be most important in determining changes in levels of such violence over time. The theory predicts increases in levels of violence: (a) when resources are expected to sharply increase or decrease; (b) at election times, when there is heightened competition over resources; and (c) when there are expected changes to the rules which govern the allocation of resources,

¹⁹⁰ The proportion of damaged buildings is lower because of one incident in August 2006, a riot involving street sellers that led to the damage of 200 buildings, and because of 324 buildings damaged in five incidents in 2012.

for example when there are corruption investigations. The Maluku evidence provides support for some but not all of these hypotheses.

4.1 Changing levels of resources

The relationship between changing levels of resources and large-scale episodic violence is not straightforward. As Table 5.1 shows, there is no correlation between either levels or increases in subnational resources and large incidents of violence. Revenues increased most sharply in 2006. We might expect that there would have been higher levels of large episodic violence in 2005 and early 2006 as competition rose over the allocation of such resources. Instead, levels of large-scale episodic violence were lower in those years.

Table 5.1. Subnational revenues in Maluku and large episodic violence over time

Year	Subnational revenues (Rp billion)	Increase on previous year (%)	Large episodes of violence (#)	Deaths from large episodic violence (#)
2002	189.5	25%	14	55
2003	249.2	31%	3	7
2004	Data not available	-	13	49
2005	309.2	-	8	12
2006	427.7	38%	2	0
2007	544.4	27%	4	0
2008	621.5	14%	7	10
2009	721.3	16%	1	0

Source: World Bank subnational dataset (2012). Data for Maluku are only available until 2009.

There is a closer relationship between levels of special post-conflict funds and large episodes of post-conflict violence. The 2004 up-tick in violence can be partly explained by the expected arrival of *Inpres* funds, which are not counted in subnational revenues as they are executed through national line ministries. In 2004 these funds were not yet flowing but elites knew that the funds would be coming and bargaining over their use began.¹⁹¹ Elites, including criminal leaders, used violence as a means to ensure that they would receive a good share of the resources that started to disburse in 2005. Both

¹⁹¹ Delays from the Presidential Secretariat led to discrepancies between ministerial and departmental planning cycles so funds did not come on-line that year (Smith 2009: 160). In 2004, the provincial government released a new five-year strategic plan (*renstra*) that focused on development and post-conflict peacebuilding (Brown, Wilson, and Hadi 2005: 51) and Bappeda, the provincial planning ministry, prepared an action plan for fund use.

Muslim and Christian leaders had incentives to incite violence. Pictures of Ambon in flames again would likely speed the arrival, and potentially increase the volume, of post-conflict assistance to the province. The FKM mobilisation can be interpreted as a show of strength by some elites in the Christian community. The responses of Muslim groups can be understood in part as local Muslim elites signalling their strength as the pie was to be divided.

Once funds started to flow again in 2005 levels of violence again reduced. No-one was killed from a large violent incident in Ambon or Central Maluku between 2005 and the end of 2007. The availability of plentiful resources, combined with police operations targeting jihadi groups, in particular following the attack on a police station in Loki, reduced levels of violence. However, *Inpres* funds had been fully disbursed by 2008 and many groups who had benefitted (both elites and gangs who supported their agendas with muscle) saw resource channels closed off. M. J. Papilaya, Ambon's former mayor, reported that groups who had been involved in the conflict and who had subsequently received assistance in the form of jobs, money or projects began to cause trouble again as *Inpres* funds tailed off:

They were angry with me. They asked why some received assistance in the past but many did not get this assistance now. I told them that now the situation was back to normal so everybody should follow the rules. Previously the situation was not normal so I could do this or that. But whenever the situation is normal, I am no longer able to do so.¹⁹²

Papilaya's statement points to the reason why there is a stronger relationship between levels of large episodic violence and *Inpres* funds than with the overall levels of subnational resources. The difference lies in the level of discretion available to local elites in the deployment of the special post-conflict funds. As we have seen, at the time they were spent there were few checks and balances on how these funds were used and the central government was happy to ignore any allegations of corruption for the sake of peace. In contrast, there are more constricting rules and accounting procedures in place

¹⁹² Ambon, 13 July 2011.

for regular government funds. This has meant that competition over special post-conflict money has been particularly fierce.

4.2 Changing rules of the game: corruption investigations

Another factor that contributed to the rise of large episodic violence in 2008 was the initiation of investigations of the misuse of *Keppres* and *Inpres* funds. Violence has been frequently used by elites to deter such investigations.

In 2002, the Indonesian parliament established a Corruption Eradication Commission (the KPK), which became active in 2004 (Butt 2011). While the KPK issued just two indictments in 2004, this had increased to 37 by 2007 and 38 people were indicted the following year. Until October 2011, the agency boasted a 100% rate of successful convictions for those indicted (Schütte 2012). This contrasts with a successful conviction rate of 51% between 2005 and mid-2009 for indictments initiated by the Attorney General's Office. Further, the average sentence for those indicted by the KPK and tried under the Anti-Corruption Court was 4.8 years compared to 6.2 months for those found guilty in the general courts (see also ICW 2009).

The changing tolerance of corruption impacted Maluku. Whereas in the early post-Malino period the central state was not concerned with ensuring that post-conflict or other development funds were distributed cleanly, this began to change. A series of corruption investigations from 2008 included investigations of the use of 2006 provincial funds, which were to be distributed to those displaced by the conflict, and 2007-2008 education and sports funds in Central Maluku.¹⁹³ The director and treasurer of the displaced persons project and the head and treasurer of the Central Maluku education department were arrested and convicted. After another scandal emerged relating to graft in provincial-level social department projects, the head of the

¹⁹³ Information primarily from interviews in Ambon and Central Maluku, December 2011 and July 2012.

department, his treasurer, and the tender committee were all arrested in mid-2010. Corruption investigations grew even more frequent in 2011.

No higher-level politicians have been prosecuted despite many alleged cases of corruption. An investigation by the prosecutor with regards to funds allegedly skimmed during the building of the Maluku provincial parliament office in 2006 began in 2007. Another project with alleged corruption was the construction of the Maluku provincial guesthouse in Jakarta where there was reportedly a mark-up of Rp 13.5 billion (US\$ 1.35 million). Allegations about corruption in the building of an official house for the Governor of Maluku also persisted. In both cases, KPK sent a team to Maluku to investigate. In another case in Aru district, Rp 42.5 billion (US\$ 4.25 million) was allegedly corrupted by the district head, Theddy Tengko, who, along with the district finance head, reportedly withdrew funds for personal purposes including to pay for attorney fees in a lawsuit related to the election result and to cover the costs of their children marrying. The case was heard in the provincial high court. Yet all but the last of these cases was not concluded. After the KPK visits there was no follow-up. Tengko was sentenced to 10 years, but this was overturned on appeal in October 2011 (Kristanti 2011). In April 2012, Tengko was sentenced by the Supreme Court but the Ambon district court, stepping beyond its powers, overturned that decision. He was finally arrested in May 2013 but it is unclear whether or not this will lead to jail time (Perdani 2013).

One reason why many corruption cases stall is the use or threat of violence by local elites as a strategy to prevent investigations. While it is usually possible for people to pay off the local branch of the Attorney General's Office to prevent an investigation being conducted, it is much harder to use this tactic to stop KPK investigations.¹⁹⁴ As such, elites often use other approaches. The overturning of the Aru district head's conviction came after a series of violent demonstrations. Even the latest Unpatti riot,

¹⁹⁴ Anti-corruption activist, Ambon, 11 July 2011.

discussed earlier, coincided with the issuing of a permit from the Indonesian President and the Ministry of Home Affairs to undertake an investigation of several local officials for corruption.¹⁹⁵ Two cases illustrate how violence or the threat of violence is often used to deter investigations.

Case: the burning of Letwaru

On 9 December 2008, the village of Letwaru in Masohi, the capital of Central Maluku district, was attacked with fire devouring 71 houses, 10 *warung* (food stalls) and the local Church. The mixed Muslim-Christian village had been attacked during the extended violence on the last day of 1999 but was rebuilt. While trauma remained, Muslims and Christians started to interact again. Few expected violence to return.

Two weeks before the latest attack, rumours spread that a Christian teacher in a local elementary school had told her students that polygamy was a sin.¹⁹⁶ Some Muslim parents took offence and this spread to the broader community with Asmara Wasahua, a candidate for the local parliament, stirring up emotions. On 25 November, in neighbouring Amahai sub-district, rocks were thrown at buildings and a house was torched. A Christian house on the border between Letwaru and the Muslim village of Lehane was attacked. The incident was reported to the Central Maluku police intelligence but no action was taken. Many Christians started to feel that local politicians and security personnel were deliberately stalling despite the risk of violence escalation.

On 8 December, Asmara issued an order to Muslims in Masohi to demonstrate against the schoolteacher and demand her firing. The demonstration, held the next day, started at the district head office, continued to the education department, and then moved on to the district police headquarters. Security forces were drawn from around the town to the city centre. While the demonstration was ongoing, groups equipped with

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ Some informants also reported that the teacher criticised the prophet Mohammed for having many affairs and said Muslims prayed like animals. This case study is based on interviews in Masohi in December 2010 and July 2011.

machetes formed in several parts of Masohi. Metal drums and tree trunks blockaded the main road of the town. Before long, smoke was billowing from Letwaru.

The case was puzzling. The offending teacher was not from Letwaru and did not live there. The demonstration was in the city centre. So why was Letwaru burned? The Central Maluku police, the chief of which boasted when interviewed of the quality of their local intelligence operations, had information that violence was likely to erupt.¹⁹⁷ Yet both the police and military were strangely absent from the streets when violence started to escalate. Security bases were only five minutes away but help did not arrive until after the houses were on fire. Those who came did little but watch. The day before the burning of Letwaru there had been a coordination meeting between the security forces, local authorities and religious leaders. However, the local police chief and military commander left the meeting. Before the riot occurred there was an order from the police chief to close the armoury, which meant that officers who arrived in Letwaru were not equipped with weapons.¹⁹⁸ No legal action was taken against anyone involved in the riot, with no arrests or subsequent investigation.¹⁹⁹

Informants pointed to the riot as being deliberately perpetrated by local elites. Information leaked in mid-November that the KPK would visit Masohi to investigate corruption in the use of health and education projects financed through *Inpres* funds. Many informants, including community members, senior policemen, local bureaucrats, journalists and activists, alleged that those who were concerned about the impending visit of KPK had planned the violence.²⁰⁰ The violence was alleged to be a deliberate strategy aimed at making Jakarta think twice about investigating such sensitive issues. If the environment was tense, then surely such an investigation could do more harm than good.

¹⁹⁷ Senior policeman, Masohi, Central Maluku, 15 July 2011.

¹⁹⁸ Interviews in Masohi, July 2011.

¹⁹⁹ Senior policeman, Masohi, Central Maluku, 13 December 2010; senior policeman, Ambon, 17 December 2010.

²⁰⁰ Multiple interviews in Ambon and Central Maluku, December 2010 and July 2011.

Following the riot, Abdullah Tuasikal (the Central Maluku district head) and Karel Albert Ralahalu (the provincial governor) appeared on television. The talk show was a vehicle to communicate the message to Jakarta that conditions were unsafe and that a visit by KPK would be harmful. In such a situation, national standards on corruption should not be applied to Maluku. The KPK visit was subsequently called off. This was not the first time violence had led to KPK abandoning a visit. Several years before, a riot had broken out in Pulauw in Central Maluku just before KPK were due to visit. The planned visit was also cancelled.²⁰¹

Other motivations may also have played a role. Asmara Wasahua, the organiser of the demonstration, was standing for the local parliament and many people argued that mobilising anti-Christian sentiment was aimed at bolstering his electoral chances.²⁰² The head of the local military intelligence was apparently very close to the district head and other senior local leaders and has been known to create incidents at their behest. A very senior civil servant in Central Maluku boasted:

Intelligence is close with the district head and with me ... Which means if I have a problem, I can ask the Intel to create a small turmoil as a diversion ... After that, they would create provocation.²⁰³

Case: provocative text messages

In late November 2010, an anonymous text message was sent out across Ambon claiming that Muslim villages had been attacked.²⁰⁴ The message came shortly after the KPK had started an investigation of the use of *Inpres* funds. In early November, five staff from the KPK came to Maluku for a week. Beyond suspicions of corruption of *Inpres*

²⁰¹ A former KPK commissioner, interviewed in Jakarta, was not familiar with the case. He did confirm, however, that during his period with the Commission planned KPK trips to Papua province had been called off after reports of rising tensions.

²⁰² Local NGO staff, Ambon, 21 July 2011.

²⁰³ Central Maluku, 16 July 2011.

²⁰⁴ One informant reported the chronology as follows: "On 25 November, a passenger on an *angkot* [public bus] read out an SMS that said that there would be a riot in the city of Ambon. That person then got down from the *angkot*. After he was asked to go to the police station to prove whether there was an issue or not he disappeared. That evening, there was another SMS saying that two Muslim villages had been burned. When I tried to confirm this by phoning the area in question, I found that nothing had happened." Muslim driver, Ambon, 11 December 2010.

funds, the mission was also a response to the finding of the state auditing agency (BPK) in the first quarter of 2009 that Rp 1.7 trillion (US\$ 170 million) of funds were not accounted for. Cases to be investigated included the building of the governor's mansion, the misuse of *Inpres* funds for displaced people, and the construction of the Maluku guesthouse in Jakarta and the Maluku local parliament building. Shortly after the message was sent out, a decision was made to suspend the investigations. Although it is unclear who distributed the text message, informants saw the logic behind it for many in Maluku's political elite who could have been implicated in the corruption cases:

Suddenly the SMS circulated saying that there would be riots so KPK decided not to follow-up. It seems that terror is an effective strategy to prevent the eradication of corruption. Currently the governor is a Christian, while the deputy governor is a Muslim. If the governor was arrested for corruption, this would cause a big problem. So sectarian issues are blown up to resist the efforts of the KPK to investigate. In the end, Jakarta got scared.²⁰⁵

Indeed, many saw the potential for violence being an effective way to fend off investigations:

Regional leaders use their power, as do those in Jakarta. If they are to be inspected then they create an issue. This is to test the power of Jakarta. Will they still be inspected? The rumour [spread by text message] was meant as a signal to the centre that this region needs extraordinary special treatment. What can deter the inspection is a *force majeure*, like a natural disaster. In Maluku, social unrest plays this role. Therefore, it was initiated to avoid the inspection ... Jakarta also thinks, if the inspection follows through what then will be the consequences. If they receive only Rp 2 or 3 billion, but this ultimately leads to losses of trillions [because violence restarts], then they will be against this. This causes the regional rulers to do as they please, to use the funds to their benefit.²⁰⁶

The governor is a Christian while his deputy is a Muslim. If the governor is checked by the KPK, then automatically the deputy will assume the position. The people of Maluku will also automatically think the governor is guilty [if he is investigated]. The Muslims will demonstrate to ask for the governor to be checked and brought to justice while the Christians will undertake retributive demonstrations to support the governor. If the deputy becomes governor, then there will be a lot of Muslims who will hold important positions in the regional government. The strategic positions will change, triggering jealousies from the Christians. Both groups, Muslims and Christians, can play this issue for their

²⁰⁵ Anti-corruption activist, Ambon, 17 December 2010.

²⁰⁶ NGO member, Ambon, 18 July 2011.

benefit. Therefore, after calculation, the investigation is too risky, both for people from the capital and the region.²⁰⁷

Violence has thus proven to be a useful way for local elites to prevent corruption investigations. As the strategy has proven to be successful, it has been adopted more widely.

4.3 Heightened competition: elections

In contrast to expectations, there have not been upsurges in violence in post-conflict Maluku around election times. As we saw earlier, levels of electoral violence have been lower in Maluku than in many other Indonesian provinces. The reason for this is that the informal norm of ticket sharing has limited both the costs and benefits of gaining elected office for each religious group. This has made elections less hot. However such power-sharing has only served to displace such contestation to periods after elections are over and bargaining over power and resources begins.

4.4 Other factors: identity and ideology

The theory, focused as it is on competition over resources and power, is less able to explain the spike in violence in the year following the signing of Malino accord. The year 2002 saw 12 large episodes of mainly inter-religious violence. I have argued that some of these episodes were perpetrated by militants aiming to either ensure pay-offs or to provoke a continuation of the communal war because of the personal economic benefits this would bring. Yet it is certainly not the case that all of those involved in these incidents were driven by such pecuniary concerns. Many members of outsider jihadi groups, and some radicalised locals, favoured a continuation of violence because their initial goal—to purify Maluku of heathens and infidels—had not been achieved. Violence was in part strategic, sending a signal of strength to the other side. Yet it was also sometimes emotive and symbolic, driven by hatreds and a desire for revenge. Over time, such emotive violence became less prominent, in part due to security operations to rid

²⁰⁷ Anti-corruption activist, Ambon, 18 July 2011.

Maluku of outside jihadis in the context of declining tolerance from Jakarta of actions that were increasingly framed as being terrorist.

4.5 A toxic mix: the September 2011 riots

The September 2011 riots, the largest outbreak of violence since the RMS violence of 2004, shows how the factors I have identified in this chapter can combine to form a toxic mix. The riots, summarised in the opening chapter, left eight dead, almost 200 injured, led to the burning of over 300 houses, and displaced over 3,000 people.

Almost three years on, it is not clear who or what caused them.²⁰⁸ Some theories emphasise societal motivations. As I have discussed, communities remain segregated and there is a lack of trust. This explains how easily people could be mobilised to participate in violence once tensions erupted. Criminal *preman* groups are also active in post-conflict Ambon and were undoubtedly involved.

Others have emphasised local elite goals. One theory sees the causes of the riots in intra-Muslim power battles. The Hatuhaha federation of five villages in Haruku Island, Central Maluku, has traditionally produced provincial leaders. However, this elite has declined in recent years and now occupies few prominent positions. Ambon is the last area of Hatuhaha influence in the province. The decline has produced resentment and some have allegedly tried to use the Islamic card, emphasising Christian political dominance, to win over other Muslims. A *preman* leader from Hatuhaha urged friends to take cover before the rioting began. The implication may be that he, or others, took advantage of the motorcycle driver's death to instigate rioting that fitted with their anti-Christian narrative, in the expectation of later electoral or financial dividends.²⁰⁹

Another theory points to the role of corruption investigations. In July it emerged that the governor was being investigated by the state Financial Transactions Reporting

²⁰⁸ See ICG (2011b, 2012a) for a discussion of different theories.

²⁰⁹ Email correspondence with Sidney Jones, September 2011.

and Analysis Centre (PPATK) because of four suspicious financial transactions related to his account in 2009 and one in 2008 (Tempo 2011). He was not the only member of the local elite fending off investigations. In the months before the riots the Ambon high court had been considering a number of cases of alleged corruption against senior figures. Those under pressure included the south Buru district head and figures in West and East Seram, Southeast Maluku, and Tual districts. There were almost daily demonstrations, some pushing for prosecutions, others for the investigations to be cancelled. Groups from outside of Ambon were mobilised when their leaders were being investigated with (sometimes violent) demonstrations occurring.²¹⁰ As with the November incident of the previous year, anonymous text messages provoked both religious communities after the driver's death. It was in this environment that violence erupted again.

Other theories point to collusion from the local security apparatus. Two truckloads of police were moved out of Ambon just before the riots broke out and information that riots were planned at the funeral of the motorcycle driver did not lead to an increased security presence. Seven of those who died were killed by the bullets of the police and military personnel sent in to restore peace. The riots also came just as the National Human Rights Commission released a report recommending that the non-organic BKO troops be withdrawn from Maluku.²¹¹ In the months leading up to the September riots, the provincial police chief had also been pressuring the civilian government to increase police resources in Maluku, requesting extra resources due to the province's archipelagic nature and high living costs.²¹² The outburst of violence

²¹⁰ Interviews with a journalist and women peacebuilding activist, Ambon, 10 July 2011.

²¹¹ Discussions with local sources in Ambon, September 2011.

²¹² According to the Maluku police chief (11 July 2011, Ambon), police in Papua are given an extra living allowance but living costs are higher in Maluku. He also complained that the police did not have the helicopters or speedboats they need. There are 7,000 police personnel in Maluku, distributed across eight *polres*. The *polres* covering Ambon Island and the neighbouring Lease islands (Central Maluku) has 993 personnel.

could strengthen the police's claims for extra resources. On the other hand, police passivity and slowness could simply be a function of a lack of capacity.

It is difficult to adjudicate between the different explanations of the events. Indeed, the search for a single cause may inevitably be fruitless. In all likelihood a combination of the different factors contributed to the September riots.²¹³ However, the outburst of violence is consistent with the thesis' theoretical framework. Members of the local elites had a number of reasons why they might want fresh violence to occur. Violence also served the interests of some non-elites, including criminal groups with links to elites. Tolerance or support for violence from some within the security forces, married to lack of police capacity, created an enabling environment for violence to occur. Threats to interests help explain the timing of the outbreak of violence.

5. Conclusion

This chapter has used the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3 to explain why Maluku has seen frequent incidents of large episodic violence since the end of its extended violence. The theory has proved useful to this end: factors hypothesised as being necessary for large episodic violence to occur have been present.

First, the theory suggests that for large episodic violence to occur frequently local elites and violence specialists should support the use of violence.²¹⁴ The experience of Maluku provides ample evidence that this has been the case. Local elites have been involved in many of the incidents of large episodic violence. They have been able to do so because of the continuing strength of old militia networks supported by many within

²¹³ Six people were arrested in May 2012 for involvement in the series of bombings that followed the September riots. It is unclear whether they were local *preman* or whether they also had links to outside jihadi networks. At the time of writing, the perpetrators of the riots have not been caught.

²¹⁴ In contrast, we should not see support for violence in Maluku from the central state. If such support were present, then we would expect incidents of large episodic violence to escalate into extended violence. I examine the attitudes and actions of the central state to violence in Maluku in Chapter 8.

Moluccan society. This, in large part, has been a function of the ways in which the policies and practices of local elites have led to organisational continuity on the part of criminal and militia groups as well as to the sustaining of issues like segregation that ensure that tensions and fear remain.

Second, the theory suggests that support for violence from each set of actors is, to a significant degree, a function of the extent to which they perceive violence to be a viable and effective strategy for accumulating or protecting wealth or status. The Maluku evidence shows that this has been the case for local elites, including politicians and security force leaders, and for violence specialists. Both have used violence to advance their material interests. Decentralisation and, particularly, the arrival of post-conflict funds meant that there was much to compete over and violence has been used to this end.

Third, the theory highlights the ways in which responses to past acts of violence, in particular in the early post-conflict period, provide information on the expected costs and benefits of using violence. Where past acts of violence were rewarded with resources or state positions, it was hypothesised that people would be more likely to use violence. Again, this has explanatory power in post-conflict Maluku. Providing jobs, contracts and other funds to militia groups and gangs cemented old conflict networks. Giving funds to those who used or threatened violence in the early post-conflict period sent out a signal that violence paid. Local elites protected thugs and violence entrepreneurs because they could be utilised for political and economic purposes. Over time, local elites used violence to protect and advance their own interests. This has been a relatively risk-free strategy, in large part because the local security agencies have tolerated the use of violence. Support for violence has continued because the expected gains of using violence have been high while the risks of using violence have been low.

Fourth, the theory suggests that the propensity to use violence is driven in part by the absence of other channels for accumulation that do not require the use of violence. We would thus expect to observe barriers, real or perceived, for elites and others to gain elected office, jobs in the bureaucracy, or to grow licit economic businesses. This has indeed been the case in Maluku. The focus on the balancing of religious groups in the political sphere has made it difficult for relationships that cut across conflict divides to sustain. This has meant that patronage networks are constructed within religious groups, accentuating conceptions of difference and raising the temptation for leaders to mobilise followers to use violence for their purposes.

The theory also suggests that violence is more likely at times when revenues increase or decrease sharply and when there are changes in the rules about how they can be allocated. We have found that changes in the resources available are important, but that the level of discretion over how such funds can be used is particularly vital. This suggests that competition over resources where there are few institutional checks and balances in place to monitor their use will be more likely to lead to violent contestation. We also found that, in line with the hypothesis, large episodic violence has risen at times when corruption investigations have been launched or are ongoing. The Maluku case does not fit with the hypothesis of increased violence at times of elections for political office. This, I have argued, is because informal institutions aimed at ensuring power-sharing have had the effect of lowering the costs of losing and the benefits of electoral victory; however, this only temporarily limits violence, which often emerges later when decisions on resource allocations are being made. Finally, the theory is not able to explain the spike of large episodic violence in the first year after the Malino accord. While some such incidents may have been driven by criminal and militia groups looking for a slice of the peace dividend, more important was the continuing existence of ideological groups who refused to be co-opted.

The fact that many of the factors hypothesised as contributing to large episodic post-conflict violence are present in Maluku does not, in and of itself, provide solid proof that they are indeed causing post-conflict violence. It may be that the relationships between the hypothesised explanatory variables and mechanisms and violent outcomes are spurious with other factors, omitted from the analysis, more important. Our confidence that the identified factors and mechanisms are indeed causal will be strengthened if we can show that they are not present in a similar place that has not seen frequent large episodes of post-conflict violence. North Maluku is one such area. It is to an analysis of that province's post-conflict 'peace' that we now turn.

Chapter 6. North Maluku's Peace

Now there are no real problems anymore. There are still people feeling bitter, but just one or two. Kao and Makian people interact in peace. Anyway, the problem was never about the Makian who live here, we don't have a problem with them, the problem was the government!²¹⁵

Sometimes now, there are small incidents. People also try to provoke others, for example through text messages. The youth still play! They say 'He's Christian, he's Muslim'. But people already understand how to deal with this and are not provoked anymore. Problems are quickly solved by the community leaders.²¹⁶

The post-conflict experience of North Maluku stands in stark contrast to that of its close neighbour Maluku. Both provinces were devastated by extended violent conflicts, each of which killed thousands. As in Maluku, Christians and Muslims murdered each other en masse. Similar dynamics of heightened local political competition in a time of national transition contributed to the outbreak of violence. Yet since fighting ceased in North Maluku in June 2000 its post-conflict trajectory has been very different to that of Maluku. Annual per capita violence fatality rates are one-third of Maluku's and significantly lower than in any of Indonesia's other post-conflict provinces. Large episodes of violence, of the type that have afflicted post-conflict Maluku, have occurred infrequently with just 18 such incidents scattered across the province in more than 11 post-conflict years.

This chapter explains North Maluku's post-conflict peace, applying the framework developed in Chapter 3. In doing so, it compares the province's experience with that of Maluku. I argue that just as issues related to the expected benefits and costs of using violence, and the availability of other opportunities for accumulation, explain Maluku's continuing violence, these factors allow us to understand why post-conflict

²¹⁵ Former Christian militia leader, Pediwang, North Halmahera, 11 July 2011.

²¹⁶ Muslim community leader, Mamuya, North Halmahera, 13 July 2011.

North Maluku has been largely peaceful. The two provinces differ in three important respects that have led to divergent post-conflict paths.

First, the ways in which resources and positions have been distributed after the end of the extended violence have been very different in the two provinces. In Maluku money and jobs were given to those who used or threatened violence in the early post-conflict period. This consolidated old conflict networks and signalled that violence could be beneficial. In contrast, North Maluku's peace processes focused on local level reconciliation rather than distributing spoils. Unlike Maluku, few local elites have used or threatened violence to try to access jobs or funds in the early post-conflict period.

Second, the costs of using violence have differed. There have been few risks to instigating violence in Maluku. The local security apparatus has been tolerant of violence—indeed, have benefitted from it—and local elites have protected criminal groups. In North Maluku, on the rare occasions when groups did use violence for political and economic purposes in the early post-conflict period it backfired.

Third, opportunities for accumulation through licit political and economic means also differ. In Maluku elites perceive there to be few opportunities to access or sustain power or resources through regular democratic channels. This has created incentives for local elites to use violence and to enact policies that have sustained conflict divides at the local level. North Maluku differs in the ability of local elites from different sides of the conflict divide to collaborate, meaning that political competition has not been seen as a zero-sum game. The establishment of new administrative districts in former conflict hotspots has increased the number of opportunities for aspiring elites.

A further factor limiting violence is the relative absence of networks of violence specialists who can be used for violent purposes. Criminal *preman* exist but they do not map on to the old extended violence-era militia, which have disbanded. Societal support for violence also varies markedly between Maluku and North Maluku and is another

reason why post-conflict North Maluku has been largely peaceful. However, community-level support for peace in North Maluku is largely endogenous to the incentives and thus actions of local elites, in particular in the early post-conflict period. Elites wanted peace and hence took actions that bolstered community-level support for it. This, rather than differences in norms and social relations and structures that either predated or were a product of the extended violence, provides a better explanation for why many communities have continued to support violence in Maluku but not in North Maluku. Over time, local norms that do not condone violence have further strengthened elite incentives to avoid using violence and have limited the ability of violence specialists to do so.

I start with a discussion of the extended violent conflict in North Maluku, the peace settlement, and patterns of post-conflict violence. The analysis focuses on two districts: North Halmahera, which saw the most destructive extended violence anywhere in Indonesia; and Ternate, the former provincial capital and seat of many of the players who led the extended violence and who shape the province's post-conflict economy and politics. I then explain North Maluku's post-conflict peace through structured comparative analysis of the two districts with those in Maluku.

1. Violence in North Maluku

1.1 The extended violence


North Maluku's extended violent conflict began in August 1999 with clashes between the indigenous ethnic Kao and migrant Makian populations in Malifut, a rural area in the north of Halmahera Island.²¹⁷ The violence related to the proposed establishment of a new sub-district (*kecamatan*) in the area where the Makians lived. The Kao opposed this, claiming the area as their traditional ancestral land. The recent discovery of gold in

²¹⁷ Wilson (2008) provides the best overview and analysis of the North Maluku conflict. See also, Duncan (2005). Tomagola (2000) and Nanere (2000), two North Moluccan scholars, present vastly different interpretations of the extended violence.

the area made the issue more contentious. On 18 August, a Makian attack destroyed two villages. Two months later—after calls from the Kao for compensation from the government were ignored—several thousand Kao attacked Malifut, bombing or burning every house in 16 villages and driving the entire community from Halmahera.

After riots on the islands of Ternate and Tidore in November, violence escalated sharply with Christian-Muslim clashes in North Halmahera from December. Over 1,300 people were killed in December 1999 alone, with 1,167 of these deaths occurring in North Halmahera. Violence continued until late June 2000 when the imposition of a state of civil emergency, conflict fatigue, and a stalemate between the two sides led to a sharp fall in violence.

Map 6.1. North Maluku province and selected research districts



As in Maluku, the roots of North Maluku's extended violence lay in heightened political competition in a time of uncertainty on the future rules of the game. During the New Order years the institutions of Golkar (Suharto's ruling party) and the bureaucracy

(which was controlled by Golkar) allowed for control of the region from Jakarta and created a relatively cohesive local elite that benefitted from centre-to-periphery patron-client networks. As in Maluku, the urban middle class was dependent on the state for civil service jobs and contracts. In the last years of the Suharto era, local factionalism increased as different leaders, and their networks, saw the potential for new political opportunities in a time of change. In Ternate, new challenges to existing power structures arose as groups from northern parts of the city, aligned around the traditional Sultan of Ternate, saw opportunities to reassert power at the expense of 'southern' groups—the ethnic Makian, Tidore, and Sanana—who had served as the New Order's regional functionaries (Smith 2009). Competition was heightened by the promise of the establishment of a new province for North Maluku, which had previously been governed from Ambon. This increased the rewards of capturing power. Many in the local elite believed that if the Sultan became governor he would give bureaucratic positions to his supporters—Ternateans and Halamaherans, including Christians—at the expense of others.

The new province was inaugurated in October 1999 just as violence escalated in Malifut. While the initial violence was over local issues, a slow response from district elites, who were preoccupied with the formation of the new province, resulted in escalation culminating in the displacement of the entire ethnic Makian migrant population. At this point, escalating violence was in large part a result of sins of omission from local elites who could feasibly have prevented it, although the conflict was taken advantage of by the Sultan and his political adversaries. But violence was soon to be used as a more overt and conscious political strategy.

As around 15,000 displaced Makians arrived in Ternate city, the administrative heart of North Maluku, some Muslim political figures reframed what had been an ethnic dispute into an inter-religious one. While religion was peripheral to the outbreak of violence in Malifut, the fact that the Makians were Muslim and the Kao largely Christian

set the scene for the development of the inter-religious narrative which defined later stages of the conflict (Wilson 2005).

The Makians had become one of the more important groups in regional politics and many potential candidates for the new governor position were either Makian or closely linked with the group. Bahar Andili, the *bupati* (district head) of Central Halmahera, was one front-runner. While not ethnically Makian, he had close ties with Ternate's Makian community and was backed by the student organisation, Makayoa, who led protests against the Kao and may have played a role in instigating violence in the Kao-Malifut area. A second contender, Thaib Armaiyn, a senior bureaucrat, was Makian. Both leaders supported violent protests by Makian groups against their displacement, which soon took on more political anti-Sultan tones as he was viewed as having supported the Kao in the earlier violence. Local political entrepreneurs started to reframe the violence as being religious in nature, a means of undercutting support for the Sultan who, despite being Muslim, was seen by many to be sympathetic to Christian causes. This was also a way for Makians to rally support from other Muslim ethnic groups. (Many of North Maluku's ethnic groups, including Muslim ones, were resentful of the Makians' rise to power in past decades and had no particular sympathy for them.) Reframing the Malifut conflict as inter-religious allowed Makians to garner support beyond their own group, from the Tidore and others who might field challengers in forthcoming elections.

Anti-Christian riots in Tidore and Ternate in early November displaced the local Christian population with most fleeing to Halmahera. Ethnic Makian Muslims, now residing in Ternate, and Muslims from Tidore left for central and southern Halmahera. These Pasukan Putih (White Forces, so called because of the colour of their headbands) attacked Christian communities there (Duncan 2005). Displaced Christians fleeing to Tobelo, the centre of northern Halmahera, brought with them stories of Muslim atrocities. In late December, Christian militias responded. In northern Halmahera,

hundreds of Muslims died in attacks on villages by the Christian Pasukan Merah (Red Forces). Battles between villages devastated the sub-district of Galela and most Christians fled to Tobelo. The inter-religious carnage taking place in neighbouring Ambon and Seram islands increased suspicions and fears between religious communities in North Maluku. In contrast to the violent political battles in Ternate, the escalation of violence was largely the result of the insecurity felt by both the Christian and Muslim communities that allowed violence to spiral out of control (Wilson 2008: chapter 5).

While Christians and Muslims were fighting across the province, political conflict came to the fore in Ternate. On 27 December, a fight broke out between members of the Pasukan Kuning (Yellow Forces, a militia group representing the Sultan of Ternate) and the Pasukan Putih. The latter group was made up of many who supported other Muslim leaders such as Andili and Armaiyn. Over the coming days, clashes spread throughout the city, ending with the defeat and surrender of the Sultan. He subsequently fled the province after calls spread from figures including the sultans of Tidore and Bacan for his arrest, his gubernatorial hopes in tatters.

As in Maluku, elites' organisation of violence for political purposes had led to an escalation of violence, which soon began to spiral out of control. As the Ternate fighting grew to a close, groups of Muslim warriors (Pasukan Jihad), built upon the networks of the Pasukan Putih, were dispatched to Halmahera, resulting in rapid escalation as Christian and Muslim groups committed a series of atrocities.

As in Maluku, the security forces also facilitated the escalation of violence. Little was done to prevent violence in Tidore and Ternate during the riots of November 1999 or to stop violence reaching Halmahera. Once the conflict had spread, the role of security forces was limited to offering protection to displaced people in camps and assisting their evacuation to other areas, sometimes taking advantage of the situation to extort them.

There are widespread suspicions in North Halmahera that as tensions were building in December 1999 the military fuelled these by circulating fabricated rumours of impending attacks. Manipulations were aimed at securing benefits of various forms: military units posted in conflict areas receive greater funding, higher remuneration and career opportunities, and conflict situations also offer many opportunities for racketeering, extortion, or looting.²¹⁸ A Christian leader in North Halmahera remembered:

In 2000, you could be sure that if the military was stationed in a village, not even a week later the village would be destroyed ... TNI [the Indonesian military] was only after security money. If you didn't pay, they would be the ones burning down houses.²¹⁹

However, specific units, in particular non-local battalions brought in to secure the border between Tobelo and Galela, successfully deterred Muslim and Christian fighters from crossing over the front preventing further escalation.

1.2 The peace settlement and the absence of post-conflict violence

Large-scale fighting in the province drew to a close in June 2000. By this time, an estimated 3,257 people had been killed in less than a year. At least a quarter of a million people had been displaced, and much of the province's infrastructure had been destroyed (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002).

The extended violence ended for a number of reasons. First, there was a stalemate. By 19 June, with the fall of Duma village, all Christians had been expelled from Galela. Christians remained in and around the local regional capital, Tobelo. But an

²¹⁸ Interviewees—Christian and Muslim alike—noted that the military often took sides or were ineffective because of material interests. A Muslim community leader in Mamuya, Galela, argued: "The military didn't help. Satgas 342 were from West Nusa Tenggara province. When the conflict happened, they were here and they should have tackled it soon. But why did the conflict last so long? It's an indication that the TNI [military] had interests. The central leaders of the TNI had interests. You could see this from the behavior of Satgas 342" (Mamuya, 13 July 2011). A Christian leader in the nearby village of Duma recounted his experience: "I saw myself that in 1999 the military backed up the Muslim troops. They gave them weapons. It was the military who shot Christians here, not the Pasukan Jihad. The ones shooting guns, they were not Muslims [meaning jihadis], they were military. I saw it with my own eyes" (Tobelo, 9 July 2011).

²¹⁹ Tobelo, 11 July 2011.

attack on Tobelo by the Muslim militias was not feasible given Christian numbers and weaponry and protection by military troops. Second, many militiamen had spent months in the field and were exhausted. These ad hoc troops had left jobs and families behind for what they thought would be a short period and were keen to get back to ordinary life. In contrast to Maluku, there had not been a large influx of fighters from outside of North Maluku. Third, the imposition of civil emergency on 26 June, which had so little impact in Maluku province, had a positive effect in North Maluku, emboldening the security forces to take more forceful action despite no increase in troop numbers (Wilson 2008: 167). Christian and Muslim communities were cantoned, separated by military troops, preventing tit-for-tat violence. Finally, there was pressure for peace from local elites. Political leaders in Ternate, having achieved their initial goal of ruining the Sultan's electoral chances, met with Christian and Muslim militia leaders explaining to them the importance of the implementation of civil emergency (*ibid.*)

North Maluku's peace settlement was largely made up of a series of informal meetings. There was no government-mediated peace accord like those signed in Malino for Poso and Maluku. Yet, in stark contrast to Ambon and Central Maluku, peace held. Large incidents of post-conflict violence have been infrequent in Ternate and North Halmahera. Of the 12 incidents that have occurred, only two (both in Tobelo, the capital of North Halmahera) have their primary basis in inter-religious issues. The first, which killed one, occurred in August 2002. A second incident occurred on 25 October 2003 when a bomb exploded in a house in Gamsungi village, killing four members of the Muslim Javanese family who lived there. This was not long after Muslims had returned to Gamsungi having fled at the height of the conflict. Before the Javanese family had moved in, the house had been occupied by displaced Christians from Payahe in South Halmahera. A rumour spread that the Christian family had left the bomb behind in their house to kill Muslims. This led to newspaper headlines, tensions and the risk of

retaliatory attacks. Some Muslims sent their wives and children away for protection. Things, however, eventually calmed down.²²⁰

The largest case of post-conflict violence in North Maluku related to the contested 2007 gubernatorial election (ICG 2009a). After a disputed vote count, two candidates claimed victory: the incumbent governor, Thaib Armaiyn, and the losing challenger from 2002, Abdul Gafur. As legal challenges went to the Constitutional Court, both sides mobilised supporters and thugs in an attempt to influence the final verdict. While no-one was killed during the dispute—more by luck than anything else, given that bullets were fired and bombs exploded—at least 50 people were injured and 34 buildings damaged.²²¹ Yet the case did not escalate any further and by late 2010, when my research in North Maluku began, few people felt that there was much potential for new large-scale violence in the province.

Tensions, sometimes resulting in violence, are still present in the province. Gang fights in Ternate and Tobelo are fairly frequent, land conflicts occur, and elections have sometimes been tense. Yet fighting is usually not along religious or ethnic lines and there is little link to the extended violence from before.

2. Local elite support for peace

In contrast to Maluku, the use of violence by local elites for political and economic purposes has not been common in post-conflict North Maluku and elites have tended not to support or tolerate the use of large episodic violence by others. Three factors are particularly important in explaining why this is the case.

²²⁰ It was unlikely that the Christian family had left the bomb behind. During the extended violence, the house was owned by a Muslim who had fled Tobelo. The owner had returned to the house after it was vacated by the Christian family in order to carry out some repairs. It is unlikely that the Muslim owner would not have discovered the bomb if it had been there at that time. Instead, it emerged that a Brimob (police special forces) unit was behind the bomb. After protests from the community about frequent suspicious bombings, the brimob unit was replaced and the bombings stopped. Correspondance with Chris Wilson, November 2012.

²²¹ These impacts were spread over 42 different incidents from October 2007 to October 2008. Many of these incidents were 'small', but cumulative impacts were large.

First, the peace settlements in North Maluku did not focus on power-sharing. At the provincial level, the extended violence resulted in the removal of the Sultan and his followers from local politics. With the initial goal of the violence achieved, few in the local elite in Ternate favoured a continuation of violence. As a result, there was not a large group of dissidents to be bought off as was the case in Maluku.²²² In Halmahera, the post-conflict balance of power was also much clearer than in Maluku. This meant that continuing violence was not a useful tool for local Christian or Muslim leaders.

Second, the peace settlements did not focus on carving up post-conflict money as had been the case in Maluku. Funds arrived long after the end of the extended violence meaning that early peace talks, and subsequent implementation, did not focus on dishing out the spoils of peace, concentrating instead on local-level issues such as the return of displaced people. As a result, and unlike Maluku, few local elites used violence, or the threat of it, to try to access jobs or funds in the early post-conflict period. On the occasions when people tried to use violence for political and economic purposes it backfired. The signal—that violence does not pay—was thus very different to that in Maluku. Local elites in both Ternate and Halmahera found it more beneficial to be seen as champions of peace.

Third, there were plentiful opportunities to compete for power through non-violent institutional processes. The establishment of new districts in some of North Maluku's former violence hot spots, including North Halmahera, created opportunities for aspiring elites. The pragmatism of elites, who often collaborated across formerly hot confessional or ethnic lines, meant that old conflict cleavages did not sustain in the way they did in Maluku. Political competition in North Maluku has not been characterised by a zero-sum logic as has been the case in Maluku. Rather, political life in post-conflict

²²² As I discuss below, the ethnic Ternateans could have been spoilers but they were too weak to demand any concessions, or to use violence to that end.

North Maluku closely resembles that elsewhere in Indonesia, where patronage and money politics tend to be the preferred tools of influence rather than violence.

2.1 Peace settlements: reconciliation rather than pay-offs

Peace came from the people ... It was a natural process; there was little intervention or engineering by local government as happened in Ambon and Poso.²²³

The peace process in North Maluku was very different to that in Maluku. Rather than having one central Malino-like process, a number of localised efforts were initiated in different areas of the province; the central government was not a key player in these. Reconciliation in North Maluku was the product of various initiatives, limited in scope to a particular region, and largely uncoordinated between them, led by local elites and communities rather than central, provincial, or even district governments.

It was decided early on that North Maluku would not have a formal mediated peace agreement. A combination of the largely successful imposition of civil emergency and the leadership of local political, religious and ethnic leaders who took the initiative to start their own peace talks meant that there was little need for the central government, or indeed any other third party, to start a formal process. Large-scale violence in North Maluku ended eighteen months before the Indonesian government first experimented with using a mediated peace accord to end the inter-communal violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Of the key figures behind the use of that strategy, Jusuf Kalla was not in the government at the time civil emergency was imposed and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was minister of mines with no remit to work on security or peace issues. While then Vice-President Megawati attended a peace meeting in Galela in late 2000, the peace process in North Halmahera was already well underway and was

²²³ Catholic Priest, Ternate, 9 December 2010.

being led by local Christian and Muslim leaders.²²⁴ In Ternate, too, there was no formal accord, which was not necessary given that the losers of the war (Christians and followers of the Sultan) were in no place to demand concessions.

The North Maluku peace talks did not involve negotiations over the distribution of benefits—in the form of assistance packages, cash transfers, political access, or other forms of preferential treatment—to militia leaders. North Halmahera illustrates. Following the declaration of civil emergency for Maluku and North Maluku on 27 June 2000, a series of local reconciliation efforts were held.²²⁵ The beginnings were inauspicious. On 9 August, the local military unit (the Banteng Raiders 401) held a meeting with local Christian leaders just before it was rotated out. Only Christians attended because most Muslims from the area were still displaced in other parts of the province. It was agreed that a meeting would be held the next day, facilitated by the navy, which would bring together Muslim and Christian leaders. The subsequent meeting, held on a military vessel off the Galela coast, failed as Muslim leaders, under pressure from their grassroots followers, did not attend. A fresh attempt was made with the organisation of an October meeting in Mamuya, a small town on the Tobelo-Galela border. Facilitated by the military, and in the presence of the district government, the meeting was attended by 30 Christians (led by Hein Namotemo) and 10 Muslims (led by Samsul Bahri Umar). Two contiguous halls housed the delegations and were tightly protected by security forces. Both sides exchanged declarations of good will and Christians agreed to let Tobelo Muslim refugees return for the fasting month.

A second meeting was held in Mamuya a month later. This time more than 200 Muslims and Christians from Tobelo and Galela attended, joined by leaders from the district government and military. Dialogue took place in two rounds with each side

²²⁴ When she visited, Megawati gave a speech calling for reconciliation. However, neither she nor other central government officials played any further substantive role in ongoing peace and reconciliation meetings (village leader, Mamuya, 13 July 2011).

²²⁵ Information from Tindage (2006) and interviews in Tobelo and Galela, December 2010 and July 2011.

making a number of demands. While differences remained, there was agreement that people should be given access to their relatives' graves ahead of Ramadan and Christmas. It was also agreed that small groups from both side would be formed to evaluate the security situation and that further talks should be held. A third Mamuya meeting on 24 December brought together 600 Muslims and Christians and was marked by the presence of Indonesian Vice-President Megawati and officials from the national government and other parts of North Maluku.

Over the next four months a series of smaller follow-on meetings were held involving religious and traditional leaders as well as civil society organisations.²²⁶ Primary topics of discussion were the return of displaced people, weapons surrenders, and how to consolidate support for peace at the grassroots level. They were followed with an 11-day meeting in January in Tobelo of 200 Christian community leaders, known as Halmahera Baku Dapa 1. Attendees enjoined the government to investigate the responsibility of elites in the conflict and agreed to advocate for the formation of a new North Halmahera district. It was agreed that reconciliation efforts should be based on community practices and draw on cultural traditions that crossed religious divides.

On 19 April 2001, a peace declaration was held in Tobelo at the *hibualamo* (traditional *adat*) field, with religious, cultural and community leaders from both sides as well as commanders (*kapita*) from the conflict attending. A traditional *hibualamo* ceremony was held with cultural symbols such as betel and areca nut, tobacco, and clove cigarettes used. A cultural procession involved both Christians and Muslims and was followed by the reading of a peace declaration in the local language. Further peace declarations were signed in Morotai on 29 May 2001 and in Galela on 30 June 2001. On 12 January 2002, an event involving Muslim and Christian leaders from Tobelo, Galela, Morotai, Kao, and Laloda—the five regions of North Halmahera—was held in the

²²⁶ These were held on: 30 December 2000 (Gura village, Tobelo); 2 January 2001 (Gamsungi, Tobelo); 11 January 2001 (Togawa, Galela); 26 January 2001 (Togawa, Galela); 19 February 2001 (Tobelo); 10 March 2001 (Gura, Tobelo); and 7 April 2001 (Gamsungi, Tobelo).

hibualamo field to underline the need for the establishment of a new administrative district. It was agreed that everyone would work together for this and that a prerequisite for the formation of the new district would be the (re)building of traditional bonds of solidarity between the area's different groups.

In the early post-conflict days, decision-makers in North Halmahera made sure that former militia leaders were included in the processes of reconciliation and post-conflict rebuilding. However, this was not attached to the provision of targeted funds or positions. Rather, the focus was on acknowledging people's earlier conflict role:

The way to smoothen reconciliation with the field-level actors [*aktor lapangan*] was to involve them in the process. Every time there was a meeting, we would invite them, make them feel important. Benny Doro [former head of Pasukan Merah, the Christian militia]: we had to make sure to tame him [*kita harus reda*]. For example, we had this meeting with Ibu Mega [then Vice-President of Indonesia] and the head of the TNI [the Indonesian military], Widodo. I introduced Benny and Widodo and said: 'this is the *panglima* [commander] of the Indonesian army, and this is the *panglima* of the North Halmahera army.' This made Benny feel important. We invited him to all the meetings.²²⁷

The contrast between the peace talks and agreement in North Halmahera and in Maluku is clear. The Halmahera talks focused largely on local level issues, for example the acceptance of the return of displaced people in a given village or set of villages and how to guarantee sufficient security to allow farming to begin again. There was little, if any, discussion of resources, spoils distribution, or power-sharing.

Why was the peace settlement so different to Maluku?

North Maluku's peace process differed to that in Maluku for two reasons. First, there was wide acceptance that peace was necessary. This meant that among the local elite there were few dissidents who would need to be co-opted. Second, the level of government assistance was much lower in the early post-conflict period, meaning that peace discussions could focus on repairing relations rather than carving up resources.

²²⁷ Jidon Hangewa, former acting district head North Halmahera, Tobelo, 8 July 2011.

As North Maluku's extended violence drew to a close, few in the local elite supported a continuation of violence. At the provincial Ternate level, and in stark contrast to Maluku, one side—the incumbent elite—had won. The Sultan had been removed as a potential challenger to the southern faction for the leadership of the new province. The ethnic Ternateans could have potentially been spoilers. But with their patron, the Sultan, forced to leave the province, they were politically weak. With the absence of any alliance with other ethnic groups, they realised that violence would not take them far and thus efforts were not necessary to co-opt them. For provincial-level elites violence had served its purpose of consolidating the political status quo (Smith 2009). Other political channels could be utilised for achieving power in the post-conflict era. While the Ternate elite was by no means completely cohesive, as demonstrated by tensions between different challengers in the 2002 and 2007 gubernatorial contests, these cleavages did not map on to those that had been mobilised during the extended violence. There was little political capital to be gained from continuing to emphasise the differences that had been accentuated during the earlier violence, especially given that, as discussed below, conflict fatigue was widespread.

In North Halmahera, where the worst Christian-Muslim violence had taken place, most elites also had little motivation to instigate violence in the early post-conflict period. In contrast to Maluku and Ternate, where violence throughout had been largely driven by elite pecuniary and political incentives, the extended violence in Tobelo and Galela can be better explained as a consequence of a security dilemma, with both religious communities arming and initiating attacks to prevent themselves from being killed or exploited. Throughout the first half of the year 2000, when violence was still raging, leaders of Christian and Muslim leaders were in regular contact making preparations for peace.²²⁸ It was decided that “enough blood had been shed” and that

²²⁸ Muslim militia leader, Ternate, 11 December 2010.

the peace process must focus on genuine reconciliation.²²⁹ By June 2000, the conflict had reached a stalemate with neither side capable of military victory and support for ongoing violence waned. In such an environment, local elites such as Hein Namotemo (the Christian leader who later became the head of the new North Halmahera district) and Samsul Bahri Umar (a former jihadi leader who later became chairman of the North Halmahera district parliament) presented themselves as champions of peace. In Ambon and Central Maluku, elites focused on distributing the spoils of peace and buying off those who might threaten their arrival. In contrast, the lack of support for continuing violence from local elites in Ternate and North Halmahera meant that there were few dissidents in North Maluku who threatened peace to be bought off.

Equally important in explaining the different peace settlement was the relative absence of post-conflict funds in North Maluku, and especially in North Halmahera, in the immediate years after the extended violence ended. This meant that decisions on the distribution of funds did not become the core of elite-level peace negotiations. Reconciliation activities were not coloured by attempts to capture post-conflict money. The province received civil emergency funds of a similar level to those in Maluku.²³⁰ However, this was dwarfed by the funds to finance the start-up costs of the new province and little money flowed to areas such as North Halmahera where the violence had been the most intense. The far more substantial *Inpres* funds for the province were also of a similar level to those received in Maluku. *Inpres* funds were around Rp 1.6 trillion (US\$ 160 million) (Smith 2009: 292). This makes them slightly higher in per capita terms than in Maluku. But, importantly, they arrived in North Maluku a full five years after the extended violence had ended. In Maluku, *Inpres* funds arrived three years after Malino. However, the actual Presidential Instruction, which indicated that funds would arrive, was issued just one year after Malino. Further, the Malino agreement

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁰ Smith (2009: 292) estimates all government post-conflict funds prior to *Inpres* 6/2003 as being around Rp 260 billion (US\$ 26 million).

contained a specific clause on the provision of funds by central government. As such, from the start the implementation of Maluku's peace focused on how expected funds would be allocated. In North Maluku, many of the remnants of the extended violence, such as widespread displacement and destroyed public and private infrastructure, had largely been dealt with by the time funds arrived and there was little desire from local elites or communities to risk a return to violence by squabbling over the distribution of assistance.

Seeking power and resources in post-conflict North Maluku

To be sure, amongst some local elites who had helped to organise the violence—for example, by running jihadi coordination posts, *poskos*, in Ternate and Tidore—there were expectations of rewards in the post-conflict period and many did benefit. However, the peace deal in North Maluku did not structure access to resources and positions and many other former militia leaders did not benefit materially in the post-conflict period. Rather, those who had been active in the extended violence who benefitted later did so through the processes of collaboration and coalition-building that characterise many other areas of Indonesia.

Some examples illustrate. Muhammad Albar was a key organiser on the Galela-Tobelo front. Before the extended violence he ran a library in Tobelo and acted as an intermediary for Ternate businessmen running projects in northern Halmahera. Since the end of the violence his stature rose and he now has large stakes in agricultural and other businesses. He won a seat in the provincial parliament in 2009, heading the PBB-Gerindra fraction. His rise was built upon his ability to cultivate a wide range of political networks and he played a role in securing support for Thaib Armaiyn in the 2007 gubernatorial election. Other prominent leaders or supporters of the militia who have done well in the post-conflict period include, but are by no means are limited to: Sadrak Tongo-Tongo and Alex Supelli, Christians who became members of the provincial

parliament in 2004; Imran Jumadri, a leader in the anti-Sultan clashes of December 1999 who became a member of the provincial parliament for the 2004 and 2009 terms; Abdul Gani Kasuba, a Muslim preacher who helped organise the recruitment and transportation of jihadis to Tobelo and who is now deputy governor; and Wahdah Zainal Imam, one of the organisers of the jihad and anti-Christian riots, who was already a member of the Ternate legislature and who gained reelection in 2004. Others such as Muhammad Selang, another *posko* jihad leader, have not entered politics but have seen their careers advance. Selang, a former teacher, is now head of a department in the provincial Ministry of Social Affairs and also allegedly does well from facilitating contracts.

The rise of such figures, however, tended to be a result of regular processes of political patronage and networking rather than the handout of post-conflict resources or preferential access to jobs based on people's role in the conflict:

Many conflict leaders became politicians, were in the bureaucracy, but this was not because there was deliberate concessions or compensation for them. There are also many people in politics who did not play a role in the conflict. The conflict actors did not get privileged access.²³¹

Some figures did use their networks and their proven ability to utilise street power to gain political office or business contracts. The capacity of former militia leaders to mobilise masses for demonstrations and to collect votes made them useful to politicians during elections. As a result, some militia leaders were adopted by political parties in the 2004 legislative elections and secured seats. Yet the militia leaders who managed to pursue successful careers as political or business figures in post-conflict North Maluku tended to be the organisers who handled recruitment, logistics, and fundraising. Their success relied less on the threat of resumed violence than on their ability to adapt to the post-conflict context by converting the organisational capacity and support networks they had acquired or further strengthened during the conflict into a political commodity

²³¹ Muslim politician and businessman, Ternate, 5 July 2011.

that could be exchanged for favours, such as parliament seats, bureaucratic jobs, or government construction contracts. As one activist remembered:

After the conflict a lot of people got suddenly wealthy. But it was not so much that the conflict leaders became rich. Rather, it was bureaucrats who were in a position to divert funds.²³²

Consequences: less motivations to use violence

This different type of peace process—driven by elite desires for a genuine reconciliation in North Halmahera and the consolidation of the status quo in Ternate, and the absence of extensive post-conflict resources to argue over—lowered the risk of post-conflict violence through its impact on the motivations of local elites and members of society to use violence.²³³

Local elites—almost all of whom did not support renewed extended violence—saw more benefit in championing peace than preaching ethnic or religious hatred. In North Halmahera, because talks did not revolve around the distribution of power or resources (zero-sum issues) but on the return of displaced people and reconciliation (agreement on which would provide simultaneous benefits to both communities), there was little temptation to use violence to affect outcomes. Similarly, in Ternate the incumbent elite had won and the Sultan's followers were marginalised, meaning that violence was not necessary (for incumbents) or possible (for potential challengers). As we will see later, this also meant that old conflict networks did not sustain.

Indeed, leaders from both sides of the conflict attribute the relative success of North Maluku's peace process to the absence of discussion of how resources should be used:

If the government or military had got involved, it would be all about money, not from the heart ... the government approach would fail. So we built from the bottom instead.²³⁴

²³² Muslim politician and activist, Ternate, 5 July 2011.

²³³ I consider the impact on motivations for members of society below.

²³⁴ Former Pasukan Jihad leader, Ternate, 11 December 2010.

A retired academic and politician in Ternate, reflecting on why North Maluku's peace had been more peaceful than that of other areas, argued that the financial dividends that accompanied peace processes in those places incentivised a continuation of violence. In Aceh and Papua, he argued, "conflict was maintained as a way to keep assistance flowing."²³⁵

2.2 The costs of using violence: responses to threats

Most local elites, including militia leaders, were not motivated to continue to use violence and, as such, levels of violence in the early post-conflict period were low. However, there were some incidents of violence being used by those who did not agree with the peace. The responses to these incidents—by local leaders and security forces—sent a signal that, in contrast to Maluku, the costs of using violence were high.

Until 2003, isolated incidents of violence continued in North Halmahera. Some violence was triggered by local leaders who had been involved in the earlier fighting and who were not supportive of peace and reconciliation. In 2002, bombs went off in Morotai, Tobelo, Galela, and Kao.²³⁶ One former Pasukan Merah fighter remembered, "whenever a reconciliation meeting was held, you could be sure there would be an attack the next day."²³⁷ While a large reconciliation meeting was ongoing in Togawa, Galela, in early 2001, a group of Muslims who did not agree with Christians returning to Galela started chopping down clove, nutmeg and coffee plants and coconut trees in nearby fields. The fields were then set on fire. Yet local elites on both sides told attendees of the meeting not to respond. As one community leader put it, "We decided just to let them show their anger. To let it be. If the Christians wanted to respond seriously, then the conflict would happen again. And we did not want that."²³⁸

²³⁵ Ternate, 9 December 2010.

²³⁶ Christian former senior civil servant, Tobelo, 12 July 2011; journalist and peace activist, Tobelo, 13 December 2010.

²³⁷ Tobelo, 9 July 2011.

²³⁸ Tobelo, 13 July 2011.

Such uses of violence were not effective in undermining the peace or in securing resources or power. In post-conflict Maluku, those who threatened or used violence in such ways were usually appeased, receiving jobs or projects. In contrast, there were no efforts at cooptation in North Maluku. Instead, those who opposed the peace were increasingly marginalised as the peace process gained momentum.

Other incidents of early post-conflict violence were provoked or directly committed by members of the military or police. In the early post-conflict period, some in the police and military had been involved in selling the houses and property of displaced persons.²³⁹ They feared that a return to peace would diminish such lucrative opportunities. Villagers in Mamuya, Galela, heard a series of bomb explosions throughout 2001 and 2002, which they suspect local military units set off to try to raise tensions.²⁴⁰ In Maluku, such strategies helped the military retain large numbers of troops in the province. Yet in North Maluku local elites who favoured peace disciplined those within the security forces who were causing trouble. Officials and leaders were often able to get rid of military personnel who they felt were causing problems. In a number of villages including Mamuya and Duma in Galela, complaints about the behaviour of local military personnel led to them being replaced by other units:

The military were there but they were not doing a good job ... An example: one Sunday I was in Duma. Some people from outside the village came in a truck to have a picnic. They drank alcohol. They threw an empty bottle out of the truck and it hit the military post. The military got angry, went to the truck and started to hit people in the truck, very hard. The police were better than the military. The TNI were ready to attack the people ... So we asked the government to send the military away, not just from Duma but from all of Galela. The village head of Duma went to the battalion commander and asked him to withdraw the military. And they did it!²⁴¹

Local officials such as Hein Namotemo, then a sub-district head and later the North Halmahera district head, also complained to the governor about the military presence

²³⁹ Former Christian militia leader, Tobelo, 13 December 2011.

²⁴⁰ Interviews with Muslim and Christian village leaders, 13 July 2011.

²⁴¹ Christian leader from Duma, Tobelo, 13 July 2011. This account was verified by other interviewees.

and was able to reduce the number of non-local BKO troops stationed in North Halmahera:

The TNI's [military's] presence [in North Halmahera] was making the problem worse because of religious bias. Christian military members would defend Christians. Muslims would defend Muslims. Sometimes the TNI triggered conflict by supporting people of the same religion. Not only the military but also the Brimob [military police]... There were incidents between the security forces and civilians in the period of the caretaker *bupati* [Jidon Hangewa, 2003-2005]. These incidents happened because of the negative attitude of security forces. In one particular incident, a civilian was killed. I led a demonstration to reject the presence of security forces. A military boat was due to arrive in the Tobelo port in 2000, and we refused and sent it back. For three months, there were only organic [locally-recruited] forces in the district, no external forces. Sinyo [Sarundajang, the caretaker governor in 2002] called me and told me, 'you already have a bad reputation since you always reject the military. Now accept them.' But I asked, 'can you guarantee us there will be no more disturbances?'²⁴²

Namotemo was successful in making the case for a reduction in troops, arguing that it was necessary to "eliminate external factors."²⁴³ In contrast to Maluku, the military and police played a relatively small role in reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction. In North Halmahera, both sides agreed early on not to include 'outsiders' in the process of reconciliation and this included the security forces. Security forces did benefit from the declaration of civil emergency with extra budget provided for security from Jakarta. But after civil emergency status was lifted their influence became much more limited. In the words of one politician, "they got some small projects but they were not the main player anymore."²⁴⁴ The relative quickness with which stability returned to North Maluku made it difficult for the military to justify keeping large numbers and troop levels began to fall, in particular from 2004 before *Inpres* funds arrived. Unlike Maluku, there are now almost no non-organic (non-local) military in the province.²⁴⁵

²⁴² Hein Namotemo, Tobelo, 11 July 2011.

²⁴³ Namotemo's claims were substantiated by both Muslims and Christians interviewed in Tobelo in July 2011. However, some claimed that it was not only Namotemo who had stood up to the police and military but also other local leaders.

²⁴⁴ Ternate, 6 July 2011. The acting governor at the time, Effendi, was a former military man.

²⁴⁵ There are 100 non-organic (non-local) troops in the province compared to 2,154 organic troops. The non-organic troops are rotated every year (military official, Ternate, 18 July 2011). In contrast, there are still 1,100 non-organic troops in Maluku and many have been in Maluku for long periods of time, allowing them to develop rackets and other side businesses.

Indeed, compared to Maluku, the police, and sometimes the military, have been more effective at dealing with incidents of violence where there is a risk of escalation, such as those where religious identity is implicated.²⁴⁶ This is not to say they always perform effectively. Some interviewees saw them as being negligent in preventing brawls between youths.²⁴⁷ There have been some clashes between the police and the military.²⁴⁸ But beyond the early post-conflict period, there is little evidence of either the military or police systematically stoking violence for their own gain or of being manipulated by members of the local elite to allow violence to occur. As in Maluku, some within the security apparatus continue to engage in illicit activities. For example, some have benefitted from illegal mining around the NHM gold mine in the Kao-Malifut region of North Halmahera, the Weda Bay Nickel mine in Central Halmahera, nickel mines in South Halmahera, and manganese mines in Loloda in North Halmahera.²⁴⁹ They also receive bribes in order to prevent corruption investigations going forward and they are said to be involved in the illegal distribution of alcohol. Corruption of post-conflict funds appears to have been as common in North Maluku and Maluku. Yet politicians under suspicion have not used violence to prevent investigations with the provision of bribes seen as a more effective strategy. One university professor reflected on the success of such strategies: "Every time there's a case against Thaib [the provincial governor], you can be sure there will be wrongdoings in the procedure from the police or at the prosecutor's office"²⁵⁰ The degree to which security forces can profit from such activities has not been contingent on perceptions of insecurity. As such, there has been little need for them to support violence.²⁵¹

²⁴⁶ University lecturer, Ternate, 8 December 2010.

²⁴⁷ Former Muslim militia member, Ternate, 16 December 2010; interview, NGO worker, Ternate, 8 December 2010.

²⁴⁸ North Maluku police chief, Ternate, 14 July 2011.

²⁴⁹ Interviews, Kao-Malifut, 14-15 July 2011. See also D'Hondt and Sangaji (2010).

²⁵⁰ Ternate, 5 July 2011.

²⁵¹ Interviews, Tobelo, July 2011.

2.3 New opportunities: pemekaran and the economy

Pemekaran [administrative splitting] helped peace ... people became focused on their own regions.²⁵²

The thoughts of the elite were channelled by *pemekaran*. They were kept busy.²⁵³

While some former conflict leaders benefitted materially in the post-conflict period others did not. Why did such individuals not use violence to try to secure positions or money? A key reason was the presence of an expanding set of licit channels for accumulation. This meant that it was not necessary or even optimal to employ violence to benefit.

The creation of new districts (*pemekaran*) across North Maluku ensured that public resources remained large even when post-conflict money started to run out. The splitting of administrative provinces, districts and sub-districts has been rife in Indonesian since the beginning of decentralisation. The number of provinces rose from 26 to 33 between 1998 and 2007 and the number of districts increased from 292 to 483 in the same period (ICG 2007b). In many parts of Indonesia, the formation of new areas has been accompanied by (sometimes violent) conflict; indeed, the escalation of the extended violence in North Maluku occurred in this context. The risks of violence are one reason why there has been a moratorium in place on the establishment of new provinces and districts since 2009.²⁵⁴

Yet the creation of new districts in North Maluku had a positive effect on consolidating peace. New districts were created in areas that had previously seen the highest levels of violence. When North Halmahera became a district in 2003 it led to a

²⁵² University lecturer, Ternate, 10 December 2010.

²⁵³ Political leader, Tobelo, North Halmahera, 14 December 2010.

²⁵⁴ The International Crisis Group has produced useful case studies of the link between administrative splitting and conflict in South Sulawesi (ICG 2003), West Sulawesi (ICG 2005a), and Southeast Maluku (ICG 2007b).

massive increase in public money in the area.²⁵⁵ When the district became functional in 2004, it had a yearly budget of just Rp 59 billion (around US\$ 6 million).²⁵⁶ By 2009 the annual budget had increased to Rp 456 billion (US\$ 46 million).²⁵⁷ From 2005-2009, the total budget for North Halmahera district has amounted to over Rp 1.66 trillion (US\$ 170 million), a sizeable windfall for an area with a population of just 171,000 in 2003 and that had previously received little.²⁵⁸

The formation of new districts in North Maluku led to significant economic growth and an infrastructure boom in the district that had experienced the highest toll from the violence (Barron, Rahayu et al. 2010). Muslim and Christian politicians and activists noted the ways in which this helped consolidate peace:

In 2003, North Halmahera became a district. This led to an improvement in job opportunities. *Pemekaran* was indeed a factor. The employment sector expanded and this prevented conflict escalation. People had no reason to complain anymore. There were many civil servant positions. The economic sector began to get going again, the private sector improved, and it helped people forget. The Christian side realised we also needed the Muslims to build North Halmahera.²⁵⁹

Another important factor [in explaining why North Maluku has been peaceful] is *pemekaran wilayah* [the splitting of areas]. People have been busy developing their region and figuring out ways to turn a profit from it ... This has provided a distraction from the conflict. People focus on the opportunities, things like civil servant positions, that they can get in the new districts. They focus on that instead of the conflict.²⁶⁰

Pemekaran also helped reduce conceptions of elite competition as a zero-sum game. It created different realms for political competition. Elites could turn their attention away from provincial politics towards the new district administrations, reducing the (relative) importance of political interests in the provincial capital. Under decentralisation laws,

²⁵⁵ It was created under national Law 1/2003, which also established the districts of South Halmahera, West Halmahera, East Halmahera, the Sula Islands, and Tidore city.

²⁵⁶ Former district parliamentarian, Tobelo, 13 July 2011.

²⁵⁷ Data from World Bank's subnational database (2012a). Values until 2007 are actual revenues; values for 2008-2009 are predicted revenues. Population data are from the Bureau of Statistics' annual statistical yearbooks.

²⁵⁸ In 2001, the provincial budget for North Maluku (population 781,239) was Rp 151 billion. By 2003, this had risen to Rp 249 billion. This is less than the total North Halmahera district has received in any year apart from 2004 and 2005.

²⁵⁹ Christian politician and activist, North Halmahera, 10 July 2011.

²⁶⁰ Muslim politician and activist, Ternate, 5 July 2011.

resources flowed directly from the central government to the districts, in large part by-passing the province. This had the effect of allowing a more diverse set of patron-client networks to develop, limiting reliance on Ternate patrons.²⁶¹

A third way in which *pemekaran* limited post-conflict violence relates to the return of displaced people. The *pemekaran* project for North Halmahera started with a series of meetings between local Christian and Muslims elites from April 2000 in Manado, North Sulawesi. When the extended violence ended, the Chairman of the *Pemekaran* Committee of the North Maluku district parliament made it a condition that before new districts could be formed stability had to be restored and displaced people had to have returned (Tindage 2006). It was rumoured that North Halmahera would not get district status because displacement had reduced its population. This was a major argument used by Hein Namotemo to persuade Tobelo Christians to welcome back their Muslim neighbours.²⁶²

Maluku province also saw the formation of new districts. However, these were not in the places that had experienced the highest impacts from the previous extended violence. Central Maluku, which had become a district in 1957, was split, with two new districts (East and West Seram) carved off from its territory in 2003. With central government allocations for districts determined in large part by population size and landmass, this resulted in a reduction in the revenues Central Maluku district received in 2005.²⁶³ While resources then increased again, they remained rather static thereafter in sharp contrast to the steep increase in revenues North Halmahera received.²⁶⁴ The new districts carved off from Central Maluku saw large increases in revenues of the

²⁶¹ Lecturer, Ternate, 10 December 2010.

²⁶² Christian traditional leader and politician, Tobelo, 12 December 2010.

²⁶³ The largest share of district revenues, around 56% in 2005 (World Bank 2008f), come from the General Allocation Fund (DAU), an unconditional transfer of funds from the central government to all local governments aimed at achieving fiscal balance. The DAU allocation is calculated using a formula based on population, area, regional per capita income, human development indices, salary expenditures, and the level of local revenues.

²⁶⁴ Central Maluku's revenues in 2004 were around Rp 401 billion. This reduced to Rp 362 billion in 2005. Thereafter revenues stabilised at between Rp 553 billion (2006) and Rp 668 billion (2008). In contrast, revenues in North Halmahera almost quadrupled between 2005 and 2009.

same scale as North Halmahera.²⁶⁵ However, while East and West Seram had been affected by the extended violence, it was at a lower level than in Central Maluku or Ambon.²⁶⁶ In short, one of the areas of Maluku that had seen the highest levels of fighting before saw relatively stagnant resources while the epicentre of the North Maluku extended violent conflict saw a sharp rise in resources. Unlike *Inpres* resources, these funds were allocated through regular political processes with checks and balances in place.

2.4 Political fluidity, opportunities, and non-violent political competition

Coalitions are more fluid here [than in Ambon or Poso]. Here, it is already a melting pot. So it is less dangerous in terms of violence.²⁶⁷

This increase in resources in North Halmahera and elsewhere in North Maluku could have led to problems if, as in Maluku, violence was a commonly used strategy for accessing political power and control of resources. The last chapter showed how the growth of public funds in Maluku was accompanied by an increase in violence. However, in North Maluku the new money had a positive effect. One important reason was that, in marked contrast to Maluku, political competition and alliances have been fluid in post-conflict North Maluku. This has had the effect of preventing perceptions amongst aspiring elites of being shut out. The presence of opportunities to use peaceful strategies to achieve power and accumulate resources has lowered the motivations for elites to turn to violence.

There are multiple dimensions to this political fluidity. First, political coalitions amongst elites tend not to be rigid with the membership of networks changing in response to current goals and opportunities. In contrast to Maluku, there has not been an obsession with power sharing between Christians and Muslims and, indeed, this was

²⁶⁵ The new East Seram district saw revenues rise from Rp 100 billion in 2005 to Rp 412 billion (2008); West Seram saw a similar increase from Rp 94 billion (2005) to Rp 342 billion (2009).

²⁶⁶ 205 people were killed during the extended violence in West Seram and 39 were killed in East Seram.

²⁶⁷ Academic, Ternate, 17 July 2011.

not a focus of either the provincial or local peace processes. In some areas, such as Central and East Halmahera districts, there have been electoral tickets made up of two Muslims despite split Christian-Muslim populations.²⁶⁸ Decisions on political collaboration have been built on practical political concerns rather than on ensuring each group gets a share of power:

How the networks change always has something to do with the financial benefits that are available. This is *politik praktis* ... For example in 1999 different groups aligned because they had a common enemy—the Sultan and the traditions within the local government structure. But in the end it's all about financial interests and the groups split up, joining others.²⁶⁹

Second, such practical concerns have meant that political coalitions in North Maluku have often crossed old conflict divides. Muhammad Albar, for example, had been a prominent jihadi leader on the Muslim side, managing Posko Al Isla. He threw his lot in with the incumbent governor, Thaib Armaiyn, for his reelection campaign in 2007. Responsible for mobilising support in Christian-majority North Halmahera, he made contact with Benny Doro, the former leader of Pasukan Merah, the Christian militia.²⁷⁰ One of Benny's *anak buah* (followers), a former Pasukan Merah fighter, was sent to Ternate to join Thaib's success team for the election under Albar's coordination. In 2009, Albar again asked for Benny Doro's help as he sought to run for the provincial parliament. Benny's *anak buah* became the coordinator of Albar's success team in Tobelo. Albar subsequently won, elected in large part by Christian votes from North Halmahera. In Kupa Kupa, Doro's Christian hometown, he received over 80% of the votes. In Leleoto, the village of Doro's protégé, Christians also voted massively for Albar. It was clear that patronage was at play. In 2010, Albar opened a patchouli plantation and factory in Leleoto, the profits of which were shared among locally recruited workers.

²⁶⁸ University professor and activist, Ternate, 8 December 2010.

²⁶⁹ Activist, Ternate, 28 June 2011.

²⁷⁰ Albar's networks cut broadly across ethnic and religious lines before the extended violent conflict and he and Benny had been friends before they ended up on opposite sides of the conflict. This existence of fluid cross-cutting networks before the extended violence facilitated the quick return to business-as-usual after mid-2000. The conflict was a disruption in the web of relationships that were able to reform afterwards. This contrasts sharply with Ambon and Central Maluku, where the extended violent conflict reinforced preexisting cleavages.

Albar's success team coordinator became manager of the factory. Such electoral tactics echo strategies employed in local contests across Indonesia. But, importantly, in North Maluku Muslim and Christian leaders have worked together for mutual gain in the post-conflict period.

More startling was the support of the Sultan of Ternate for his former nemesis, Thaib Armaiyn, in the 2007 gubernatorial election.²⁷¹ Political competition between the Sultan and Thaib, and others such as Bahir Andili, was a major factor in the escalation of North Maluku's extended violence which had ended with the Sultan's banishment from local politics. However, the Sultan realised that his ability to remain a force in the province was reliant on pragmatic compromises—the sultanate is dependent on voluntary contributions from the province and city governments, which he does not control. The Sultan's support for Thaib was followed by one of his wives securing a seat in the national parliament two years later with the Democrat Party, the party of Thaib.²⁷² In the 2010 mayoral election in Ternate, the Sultan supported an ethnic Tidorean, Burhan Abdurrahman, over the candidacy of one of his sons.²⁷³

Different ethnic groups have also tended to collaborate politically. Indeed, the 2010 mayoral election in Ternate city was won by a pairing made up of one ethnic Tidorean and one Ternatean, ethnic groups on different sides of the extended violence.

Ethnic dynamics are fluid. Alliances and divisions between ethnic groups vary depending on the contexts and goals of the moment. Only the [ethnic] Tidore and Ternate hardly ever manage to get along. That said, the 2010 [Ternate] mayoral elections could be seen as a reconciliation between Tidore and Ternate. Burhan [the winning candidate] is Tidore, but his deputy is the Sultan's man [*orang keraton*].²⁷⁴

A consequence of this political fluidity is that the costs of losing an election are lower; losing candidates, and their groups, know there may still be opportunities to benefit

²⁷¹ Although the two had been allies in early 1999 before the violence in Malifut. Thanks to Chris Wilson for this point.

²⁷² Sultan of Ternate, Ternate, 16 December 2010.

²⁷³ NGO and political activist, Ternate, 16 July 2011.

²⁷⁴ Politician and activist, Ternate, 5 July 2011.

later. Indeed, even after the tense electoral battle for the 2007 gubernatorial elections, those who lost were not frozen out. After Thaib was declared the winner, he reportedly accommodated the team of Gafur, the losing candidate, placing them in strategic positions.²⁷⁵

3. Violence specialists and the lack of societal support for violence

In Maluku, the incentives and ability of local elites to use violence for political or economic purposes was bolstered by community-level support for and tolerance of violence. In North Maluku, such societal support for violence has been largely absent in the post-conflict period. There is also a relative absence of longstanding criminal *preman* groups. Where they do exist, they are not organisational residues of past violence and membership cuts across old conflict cleavages. This has had the dual effect of: (a) further reducing the temptations of elites to instigate violence; and (b) making it more difficult for them to do so on the rare occasions where they have tried.

3.1 Community-level support for peace

The last chapter identified three factors as contributing to local support for violence in post-conflict Maluku: historical patterns of conflict; ongoing segregation; and the lack of effective reconciliation. Many in North Maluku—elites and non-elites alike—emphasised the first of these as the reason why violence has been so rare in the post-conflict period. They argue that North Maluku's recent peace is a natural consequence of the long history of economic, political and cultural ties between people from different religious and ethnic groups and the common lineage (*Maluku Kieraha*) of the North Maluku people. It is these ties, it is argued, that allowed the people of North Maluku, and

²⁷⁵ Former head of the North Maluku electoral commission, Ternate, 17 July 2011. He also noted that many of Gafur supporters had been placed in lower level (echelon III and IV) bureaucratic positions. Abdul Gani Kasuba, the deputy governor, confirmed this: "We didn't make a deal with the Gafur side. But Pak Thaib [the governor] has a right, the authority, to put people in positions. He put some of Gafur's people in positions" (Ternate, 17 July 2011).

especially those in Halmahera, where the most vicious fighting occurred, to rapidly repair relations.

On Halmahera, at the heart of such bonds are the traditions and customs of *hibualamo* or 'big house' in the local language. All the ethnic groups of Halmahera are deemed to have descended from a single lineage. The big house, both a physical and metaphorical entity, is a place where the different groups can solve problems together to ensure harmonious living. As we have seen, both Muslim and Christian local leaders placed these traditions at the centre of North Halmahera's peace process. Those who propagated an *adat*-based peace process, such as Hein Namotemo, emphasise the differences between *hibualamo* and *pela gandong*, the traditional *adat* structure in Maluku.²⁷⁶ Namotemo argues that *hibualamo* has historically created bonds between all the people of Halmahera and has mechanisms for including outsiders to a greater extent than is the case in Maluku's *adat*. In contrast, *pela gandong* sustains relationships between a limited number of villages, usually two or three. While the institution may prevent escalation of conflicts between these villages, it is powerless to affect events when other villages or people are involved.²⁷⁷ Namotemo also claims that *hibualamo* has mechanisms for including outside migrant groups to a greater extent than is the case in Maluku's *adat*.

Such an explanation—if true—has significant implications for interpreting why violence continues in some post-conflict areas. If post-conflict violence is historically determined, as Namotemo and others claim, then there may be little scope for policymakers to limit violence in areas without such strong cross-cutting traditions.

²⁷⁶ *Pela gandong* involves relationships of civil reciprocity. Communities support other communities, for example in offering their labour when public works are being built. This reciprocal exchange cements inter-village relationships, including between Christian and Muslim villages. Ceremonies to reinforce these binds (*panas pela*, or heating up the *pela*) remind community members of their obligations to each other. Information from fieldwork in Central Maluku, December 2010. See also, Adam (2008), Dassen (2010), and Bartels (1977).

²⁷⁷ Muslim NGO head, Ambon, 11 December 2010; Christian delegate to Malino, Ambon, 19 December 2010.

Yet different traditional structures, and the strength of inter-group relations preceding the eruption of extended violence, is an unsatisfactory basis for explaining community-level support for peace in post-conflict North Maluku. First, historically North Maluku has probably seen as much violence as Maluku. Halmahera and surrounding islands were at the centre of European colonial battles for control of the spice trade. This led to competition between the different sultanates, which created societal cleavages and often produced violent conflict.²⁷⁸ Second, if pre-extended violence social relations were so strong in Halmahera why was violence able to erupt and escalate so easily? North Halmahera's extended violence was as brutal and sadistic as that which occurred anywhere in Indonesia. Third, it is not at all evident that the system of *hibualamo*, as characterised by Namotemo and other leaders, has existed in the modern era in North Maluku. Many informants argued that *hibualamo* has always been only for the Tobelo people and not for other ethnic groups and, as with *pela gandong*, the system was largely defunct by the time of the extended violence.²⁷⁹

It is more accurate to view the use of *hibualamo* in North Halmahera's peace process as being a *consequence* of the widespread desire for peace, especially amongst elites, in post-conflict North Maluku rather than the cause of it. Local elites such as Namotemo and Samsul Bahri Umar wanted to reinvent or reinvigorate *hibualamo* because peace and reconciliation was in their interests. Many who led such *adat*-based activities had formal positions in the Church or Mosque but were happy to emphasise historical *adat* ties over the tenets of their monotheistic faiths, again because it was in their interests for the violence to come to an end.²⁸⁰ Community members also bought into the *hibualamo* rhetoric because it was in their interests for violence to end. Conflict fatigue was widespread. The levels of violence experienced in North Halmahera shocked

²⁷⁸ See Andaya (1993), Ellen (1993) and, more generally, Ricklefs (2008, chapter 6). This was emphasised by some interviewees: politician and activist, Ternate, 5 July 2011; district head North Halmahera, 11 July 2011.

²⁷⁹ Interviews in North Halmahera, July 2011.

²⁸⁰ One priest argued that, "When you talk about *adat*, people put religion aside." Ternate, 9 December 2010.

even those who had been proponents of religious cleansing. When violence subsided in June 2000, hundreds of thousands has been displaced, whole villages had been torched, and thousands had died—all in a period of seven months and from vicious person-to-person violence with low-tech weapons such as homemade bombs, machetes, spears, and bow and arrows used. Unlike Maluku, where widespread occupation of land and property occurred, few at the community level had benefitted from the violence. The escalation of violence in North Halmahera had been largely the result of a security dilemma rather than deeply entrenched socio-economic grievances. People saw few benefits from continuing violence. Indeed, the costs of new violence could be great. An improved security condition was necessary for displaced families to return home and agricultural activity to commence again:

Before reconciliation started, some Muslim community members who fled from Mamuya came here and asked if they could cultivate their plantations ... When they came here, they were guarded by the TNI [military]. Before they came, we [the Christians] had a meeting amongst ourselves. Hein was there and he asked us to report on conditions. We reported to him saying that the Muslims wanted to come back here to cultivate their land but that we did not want them to return. We were scared it would not just be Muslims from here who returned but also 'outsiders'. Hein said to us, 'do you want to feel secure or not? If you do, then you need to ask them to come back so you can work to cultivate the plantations together.'²⁸¹

Community members were also aware that the planned creation of new districts could bolster employment opportunities but that this would be conditional on violence not reemerging. Community members thus bought into the *hibualamo* rhetoric because they wanted reconciliation; *hibualamo* was a handy platform to build this upon.

A narrative developed on both sides that the extended violence had been driven by 'outsiders': the Jakarta government, the military, outside jihadis or priests, displaced persons from Ambon, people from elsewhere in the province. Similar claims are sometimes made in Maluku but are also accompanied by accusations aimed at other Muslim or Christian locals. In Halmahera, the attribution of blame to outsiders, and the

²⁸¹ Staff of village government, Mamuya, Galela, 13 July 2011.

presence of traditions and myths that emphasise local commonalities, allowed for the construction of a narrative of peace and brotherhood, helping drive reconciliation. It was not that people were reconciled because of *hibualamo*; rather *hibualamo* was successfully revived because people wanted peace. This allowed people to construct a narrative that emphasised commonalities and coexistence.

The result was a peace process that tackled issues that, in Maluku, had led to continuing support for violence amongst many communities. In sharp contrast to Maluku, in most areas of North Maluku conflict-induced segregation was quickly dealt with. By 2003, most displaced people had returned. In some places, such as Mamuya in Galela, where Muslims returned in May-June 2001, the process of return was even quicker. The peace meetings in the early years after the extended violence involved local leaders and community members and focused on finding practical solutions to problems (such as how to ensure enough security so that people could again tend their fields) and on building cross-cutting institutional structures to take the peace dialogue forward. Lack of continuing segregation and sincere attempts to reconcile people who had been on opposite sides of the earlier extended violence were important in limiting societal support for violence in the post-conflict period.

The interaction between societal and elite attitudes to violence

There were candidates who threatened that if they were not elected there would be riots again ... But people didn't like that, they didn't vote for them ... some were even roughed up.²⁸²

The previous chapter showed how ongoing community-level grievances and mistrust in Maluku were largely the result of the actions of local elites. In North Maluku, too, the attitudes and actions of local elites certainly shaped societal preferences, in particular in the early years after the extended violence ended. Their decision to build and utilise a narrative that emphasised peace and cross-cutting kinship ties, and to address problems

²⁸² Former Christian militia member, Tobelo, 13 December 2010.

such as displacement and segregation, bolstered community support for peace in the early period when there was still much uncertainty and trust was lacking.

However, the North Maluku case shows how the causal arrow can also point the other way, in particular later in the post-conflict period when strong societal support for peace minimised any nascent temptations for elites to use violence for political or economic gain. First, it shaped the political platforms of those seeking power, especially from 2004 on. Candidates have tended to emphasise the importance of peace in their electoral strategies. Hein Namotemo, for example, in his successful bid to be North Halmahera's first elected *bupati* (district head), highlighted the role he had played in reconciliation efforts. Syamsir Andili, the former mayor of Ternate, gained power with a platform of 'Ternate for all'. In an environment of conflict fatigue, campaigns avoided incendiary appeals to religious communities. Where such tactics were used, as the Christian pastor and former conflict leader Jacob Soselisa did when seeking reelection to the North Halmahera district parliament, they have been unsuccessful. He was defeated.²⁸³

Second, it has meant that elites have taken actions to check violence when the potential for escalation was there. In Tobelo, North Halmahera, there were widespread allegations of fraud in the reelection of Bupati Hein in 2009.²⁸⁴ Losing candidates took their complaints to the national Constitutional Court and organised a series of demonstrations. However, in the end these were called off and the candidates reluctantly accepted the election results. Frans Manery, one of the losing candidates,

²⁸³ Soselisa was a firebrand pastor from Kupa Kupa, Tobelo, who actively supported the Pasukan Merah crusade, blessing weapons and militia members before battle. He ran successfully for election to the district parliament in 2004 but was voted out in 2009. A number of informants argued that this was because locals did not like his anti-Muslim rhetoric. Interviews with former Pasukan Merah fighters, 13 December 2010 and 15 December 2010, North Halmahera.

²⁸⁴ Benjamin Wagono, the chairman of the local electoral commission (district KPU), was subsequently jailed. Namotemo allegedly gave a Rp 100 million (US\$ 10,000) bribe to Wagono but no action was taken against the district head. There is some evidence that other candidates also provided bribes to the KPU. Journalist, Tobelo, 12 July 2011.

argued that he did this because of the potential for violence escalation.²⁸⁵ The leader of Manery's success team noted:

People still have trauma from the conflict. We realised we had to accept [being defeated in the election] because we were afraid if we did not, it would be diverted into conflict.²⁸⁶

It is questionable whether the acceptance of the disputed result by Manery and others was driven by such concerns or whether it was a function of them coming to the conclusion that they had little chance of success if they escalated protests. Yet, either way, it was clear to local challenging elites like Manery that popularity in post-conflict North Maluku was contingent on appearing to be a peacemaker rather than warmonger.

Lack of local support for violence was also important in preventing the further escalation of the most serious incident of post-conflict violence to take place in North Maluku. After a disputed vote count for the 2007 gubernatorial election, two candidates (the incumbent, Thaib Armaiyn, and the challenger, Abdul Gafur) claimed victory. Both sides mobilised criminal *preman* groups, each numbering around 2,000 people, who clashed.²⁸⁷ At least 50 people were injured and over 30 buildings, including the house of Gafur, were damaged (ICG 2009a). The risk of violence escalation was real. In an echo of the conflict of late 1999, *poskos* were formed to provide logistical support to each group. The Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, told his Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), the National Police Chief and the Minister of Home Affairs to hold a dialogue between local leaders, but this could only be conducted in Ternate airport because the centre of the town was deemed unsafe. Tensions escalated when supporters of the Sultan of Ternate joined sides with Gafur. Eventually, the Constitutional Court declared Thaib the winner and he was inaugurated in November 2008.²⁸⁸ After this, tensions subsided as local

²⁸⁵ Tobelo, 12 July 2011.

²⁸⁶ Tobelo, 12 July 2011.

²⁸⁷ Interviews in Ternate, July 2011.

²⁸⁸ Interviews in Ternate with various officials and community leaders, July 2011.

elites realised that their interests would now be better served through bargaining over power and positions in the new administration rather than by using violence.

Jakarta's intervention was important through shaping the motivations of local elites. But equally key was the lack of community support for violence in Ternate. A senior leader on Thaib's side reflected:

The conflict then [2007-2008] was just an elite thing. It was due to elite interests at that time. Those competing with each other had too much ambition. But the community already understood this ... At the time, elites tried to get people to fight. But people understood well and resisted this.²⁸⁹

A local academic had similar views:

The conflict could be solved because at that time there was an awareness that conflict at the time was nothing, that no-one would benefit. The community below knew there were political interests. Because of this, they were not really influenced by the demonstrations.²⁹⁰

Lack of local support for violence eventually led both sides to back down and larger-scale violence was averted.

3.2 The (relative) absence of violence specialists

The lack of support for violence in the post-conflict period limited the temptation of the local elite to use violence for their own purposes. As important has been the relative absence of violence specialists who can be easily mobilised.

We have seen how in Maluku old conflict networks from the extended violence period continued into the post-conflict period. In contrast, militia groups in North Maluku disbanded leaving little if any organisational remnants in their wake. Both the Christian and Muslim militia who fought in North Halmahera were temporary formations. A former leader of Pasukan Merah recalled:

During the conflict, I was the *kapita* of the Pasukan Merah ... It was the people who chose me. They needed a leader ... We had *pasukan* in every village with a *kapita* under me. But when things were peaceful again, we used the *adat* [traditional culture] structure instead. There was no combatant structure

²⁸⁹ Ternate, 17 July 2011.

²⁹⁰ Ternate, 17 July 2011.

anymore, no *kapitas*. We made them disappear. Now it is forbidden to talk about it ... The *kapita* did not become *adat* leaders after the conflict because of our role in the conflict. The structure was not needed after the conflict ended.²⁹¹

The Muslim militias also disbanded. One reason why the old conflict militia did not continue to operate was because they were not provided with projects or funds in the early post-conflict days. By the time more significant post-conflict resources arrived in 2005, the groups had already disbanded.

The ability to keep organisational structures intact was also diminished when groups split for the 2002 gubernatorial election. Many former jihadis from Tidore backed Gafur while many others, such as Wahdah Zainal Imam, Muhammad Albar, and Muhammad Selang, supported Thaib.²⁹² Some former jihadis entered politics or the bureaucracy. Others, including many religious teachers from Tidore, went back to their old jobs.²⁹³ In North Halmahera, a figure like Samsul Bahri Umar, who had led the Muslim delegation during the peace process, turned to politics and is now head of the district parliament. The conflict networks came together only temporarily, for reasons of immediate expediency, and soon lapsed.

Criminal *preman* gangs continue to operate in North Maluku as they do across Indonesia (Wilson 2010). Yet such groups tend to be opportunistic: as with many politicians, thug leaders frequently swap support. Nor are such groups organisationally strong. One local leader described them as “*preman kampung* [village criminals], *preman leger* [the name for cheap hangout places for poor youth], not professional *preman*.”²⁹⁴ PAKTA (the Special Troops for Thaib Armaiyn) was only formed just before the 2007 elections. They were given uniforms. Yet after the elections PAKTA disbanded with people returning to their regular life: “*orang pulang cari makan*.”²⁹⁵

²⁹¹ North Halmahera, 11 July 2011.

²⁹² Politician and activist, Ternate, 5 July 2011.

²⁹³ Politician, Ternate, 6 July 2011.

²⁹⁴ Politician and activist, Ternate, 5 July 2011.

²⁹⁵ Politician, Ternate, 5 July 2011. It is worth noting that PAKTA was led by Selang, one of the former jihadi organisers. However, it did not draw extensively on old conflict networks.

Importantly, there is not a strong link between the old conflict networks, on either the Muslim or Christian side, and current *preman* groups. Brawls between rival youth gangs frequently occur in both Tobelo and Ternate. Yet there is little evidence of any links to those who were active in militia during the extended violence. New players such as Irwansyah Haris, also known as Ongen Pattimura, a *preman* leader of Kei (Southeast Maluku) descent, have arrived on the scene.²⁹⁶ In contrast, the old militias—built upon ethnic or religious solidarity—have faded away.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the theory presented in Chapter 3 not only explains why large episodic violence can occur (in Maluku) but also the reasons why and how peace can consolidate after large-scale extended violence. My explanation for the absence of frequent post-conflict violence in North Maluku is rooted in an understanding of the lack of incentives for local elites to use violence strategically to secure resources and positions. This, I argue, provides a better explanation for why large episodic violence has been largely absent than rival theories such as historical cross-cutting ties between ethnic and religious groups, the absence of ex-combatant organisations, or the strength of the local state. Community support for peace has been important. However, the incentives of community members and former militia members, at least in the early post-conflict period, were shaped to a large extent by the actions of local elites.

I have argued that, in line with the theory, signalling effects about the utility of using violence and the level of perceived opportunities for peaceful collaboration are the main mechanisms that have shaped local elite incentives in ways that have supported peace. Violence was rarely used in the early post-conflict period by rent-seeking groups; when it was there were sanctions and groups who used violence were marginalised.

²⁹⁶ Ongen should not be confused with the figure of the same name who has been active in Ambon and who is from Seram Island.

This sent a signal that violence would not pay. Further, elites have seen plentiful opportunities to use licit channels to gain power and control of resources. The creation of new districts in areas such as North Halmahera increased opportunities to accumulate through non-violent institutional processes. The ability of elites to collaborate across old conflict divides, again a product in part of relations strengthened and legitimised through the peace processes, meant they could use these opportunities in less conflictual ways.

The comparative analysis with Maluku has pointed to the nature of the peace settlement as playing a large role in shaping incentives in the early post-conflict period and of these having important, if not fully path dependent, downstream effects. In Maluku, the peace process focused on carving up power and resources. This raised the temptation for some local elites, including criminal leaders, to use violence to access jobs and money. It also strengthened old conflict networks linking political patrons to violence specialist clients. In contrast, North Maluku's peace process did not focus on the allocation of resources or jobs, in large part because plentiful post-conflict resources were not available while the peace process(es) were ongoing. Instead there was a greater focus on efforts to promote local level reconciliation. Violent action could not strategically shape these processes and hence it was not frequently used in the early post-conflict period.

The analysis in this and the last chapter has shown how incentives for or against violence can, over time, shape norms relating to the legitimacy of using violence in the local political-economic sphere. In Maluku, violence became normalised early on allowing it to be employed by leaders and groups at times when discretionary resources were increasing, decreasing, or when the rules of the game relating to fund use were changing. In contrast, the absence of support for violence in early post-conflict North Maluku created a virtuous cycle. Elites saw benefit in being seen as champions of peace rather than perpetrators of violence. Norms against the use of violence strengthened

over time. This meant that when there may have been reasons for elites to use violence strategically—such as when *Inpres* funds eventually arrived and when corruption investigations were instigated—elites used non-violent strategies to try to achieve their goals.

Chapter 7. Small Episodic Violence in Post-Conflict Aceh

GAM leaders have not mobilised for violence because they have already received many benefits from peace.²⁹⁷

The big issue is ‘insiders’ versus ‘outsiders’—those combatants who have access to power are less likely to be involved in criminality ... Most crime is related to those who do not have access to resources. Maybe they are forced to use violence because they have no other option.²⁹⁸

The post-conflict experience of Aceh differs to that of the provinces examined in the previous two chapters. As in Maluku, and in contrast to North Maluku, episodes of violence have occurred frequently since the signing of a peace agreement in August 2005. Yet, unlike Maluku, violence has generally taken small-scale forms with few people killed or injured or few buildings damaged in each incident. Violent crimes account for a larger share of the destructive impacts of post-conflict violence in Aceh than in either Maluku or North Maluku.

This chapter explains the patterns of post-conflict violence in Aceh. In doing so, it asks two questions: Why have incidents of violence continued to occur frequently in Aceh? And why have such incidents tended not to escalate into larger more destructive forms of violence? I provide an explanation by building a provincial-level analytic narrative of post-conflict Aceh and compare this with those developed in the previous chapters for Maluku and North Maluku. I then utilise variation in levels of post-conflict violence between districts *within* Aceh, examining the experiences of South Aceh and East Aceh (Map 7.1). Both were highly affected by violence during the civil war; but violence has been rare in the post-conflict period in the former district and frequent in

²⁹⁷ Academic, Banda Aceh, 4 March 2011.

²⁹⁸ Local journalist, Banda Aceh, 3 March 2011.

the latter.²⁹⁹ Comparing the two districts allows me to further develop my argument as to why small-scale violence occurs with frequency in some places and not in others.

Map 7.1. Aceh province and selected research districts



The chapter finds that patterns of violence in post-conflict Aceh can be largely explained by the differing incentives that local elites and local violence specialists, primarily lower-level former rebel combatants, have to use violence for political and economic

²⁹⁹ Fieldwork for this chapter was conducted in 2011 and focused primarily on developments from 2009 on. For information on the 2005-2009 period, the chapter draws heavily on studies I conducted with the World Bank when working in Aceh during those years, cited throughout the chapter.

gain. Large-scale episodes of violence have not occurred with frequency because the local elite—including former leaders of the GAM rebel movement, local government leaders, and senior members of the security forces—has not found it to be in their interests to use such violence or to allow it to occur. In contrast, small-scale violence has regularly occurred in many areas of the province because junior former combatants, and others with a propensity to use violence, have found it to be an effective way to secure resources, and because local elites have found it beneficial to condone and sometimes use such violence.

The peace settlement resulted in a vast increase in Aceh's revenues, incentivising elite commitment to the accord. Importantly, and in contrast to Maluku, GAM elites were incorporated primarily through political participation rather than direct pay-offs. Provisions to fast-track former GAM into politics, in a context where the rebel movement had the deepest and most effective patronage network, led to former combatant leaders participating in electoral competition. The interests of other elites, such as military leaders and local officials, were not threatened by the entry of GAM leaders into politics as both sides collaborated in sharing the economic spoils of power. In general, elites in post-conflict Aceh have chosen to use political deal-making rather than violence for purposes of accumulation.

In contrast, there has been a lack of opportunities for lower-ranked former combatants to get ahead using peaceful means. Flows of funds from elites to the ground have been limited and the real economy has been stagnant. Because of this, many former combatants have used violence, both to directly secure resources and to send a signal to those above. There have been few costs to this because: (a) elites have been happy to let former combatants use violence where it has not impinged on their own interests; and (b) the police have not clamped down on such violence. As a result, the signal that violence pays for local violence specialists has been strong. Only where there have been

opportunities for lower-level ex-combatants to benefit economically, as has been the case in South Aceh, has violence been less common.

1. Violence in Aceh

1.1 The extended violence

Extended violent conflict in late-century Indonesia not only took inter-communal form. The fall of Suharto was also accompanied by a surge in secessionist violence at either end of Indonesia's archipelagic stretch. Separatist rebellion had engulfed Aceh, the country's westernmost province, for long periods since Indonesia's independence.³⁰⁰ In the years following the demise of the New Order, conflict in Aceh morphed from sporadic episodic violence into fully-fledged civil war.

The Acehnese had been strong supporters of, and participants in, the anti-colonialist nationalist movement. However, after Indonesia gained its independence discontent grew when promises from Jakarta that Aceh would become its own province and allowed to implement Islamic law were broken. This led many Acehnese to join the Darul Islam rebellion, which called for an Islamic Indonesian state (Sulaiman 1997). The conflict was largely resolved in 1959 with Aceh given special territory status with broad powers to manage religious, educational, and customary law affairs. Over time, however, as the centralised Indonesian state gained strength, the special territory status became increasingly meaningless. In 1976, Hasan di Tiro, a descendant of an *ulama* (Muslim religious leader) who had been prominent in the war against the Dutch and who had supported Darul Islam, declared the formation of the Free Aceh Movement (or GAM, to use its Indonesian acronym) and independence from Indonesia.

³⁰⁰ The articles in Reid (2006) provide a useful review of the historical background to "the Aceh problem". Reid (2008) notes that since the first Dutch invasion of the independent sultanate of Aceh in 1873, peace has been the exception rather than the norm; Aceh spent 86 of the subsequent 132 years in armed resistance against Jakarta.

The insurgency was largely wiped out by 1979 but the movement grew again from the late 1980s after fighters trained in Libya returned (Barber 2000). In response, the Indonesian military sought to destroy GAM with force, launching a decade-long military campaign in August 1989 that killed thousands and resulted in widespread human rights abuses (HRW 2001).

In the early post-Suharto days Aceh was relatively calm. Just 74 people were killed in the province in 1998. Yet violence rose sharply as the country's democratic transition unfolded. As in East Timor and Papua, the new political environment led to fresh demands from Acehnese civil society, leaders, and combatants. Initially in Aceh these were for an investigation of human rights abuses and for special autonomy to be introduced. However, continuing military abuses in 1999 led to a hardening of attitudes. GAM recruited from those who had lost family members or witnessed atrocities. The remarkable offer in February 1999 by Indonesia's new president, B. J. Habibie, of an independence referendum to the East Timorese led to calls for a plebiscite on Aceh's status. At least 500,000 gathered in November in Banda Aceh, the provincial capital, to call for Acehnese self-determination.

This marked the beginning of GAM's third revolt. The movement grew rapidly, moving beyond its east coast strongholds to gain a significant presence across the province. With security deteriorating—697 were killed in 1999 and a further 1,057 died the following year—the government began peace talks. A Humanitarian Pause was declared in September 2000 but had little effect as GAM used the opportunity to expand its territory to the point where it controlled 70-80% of the province (Schulze 2004). The government turned again to using legal instruments to try to end the violence. National Law 44/1999 offered a basic special autonomy for Aceh and Law 18/2001 extended the scope to include economic issues (a large share of oil and gas revenues were to be retained by the province) and political matters (direct elections of the local government

executive). However, as violence escalated, special autonomy was never fully implemented (McGibbon 2004; Miller 2006).

At least 5,178 people were killed in 2001 and 2002. Fresh talks resulted in the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) of December 2002 but it collapsed in May 2003. The Indonesian government changed tack, declaring martial law. The province was sealed off from outside oversight with international media and aid organisations largely banned. Tens of thousands of additional troops arrived in an attempt to wipe out GAM and separatist sentiment by military means (Sukma 2004). In an echo of strategies in Timor, the military recruited local anti-separatist militia to fight GAM, in particular in the ethnically heterogeneous Central Highlands (Schulze 2004: 42-43; Miller 2009: 109-110).

The impacts of the violence were deep. From the beginning of 1998 until August 2005, when a new peace accord was finally signed, an estimated 10,613 people lost their lives.³⁰¹ The war resulted in serious human rights abuses (HRW 2003; AI 2004; Good et al. 2006, 2007). A representative survey conducted in 2008 found that 39% of all people in Aceh—or more than 1.5 million people—considered themselves to be victims of conflict with the most common reasons being displacement, conflict-related mental or physical illness, and the damage of people's houses (MSR 2009: 22). Poverty levels in 2004 were higher than elsewhere in Indonesia because of the conflict (World Bank 2008a). In monetary terms, damages and losses from the conflict exceeded Rp 107.4 trillion or US\$ 10.7 billion with over half of the province's rural infrastructure damaged (MSR 2009: 32). The economic cost of the conflict was double that of the Indian Ocean tsunami (*ibid.*: 36).

³⁰¹ It is unclear how many people died before 1998. Aspinall (2009a: 112) notes that around 1,000-3,000 people died from military violence from mid-1990 until 1998 although many Acehnese say these figures are too low. An unknown number of people died at the hands of GAM. Killings before 1990 were more rare.

Aceh's extended violence differed in many ways to the violence in Maluku and North Maluku and other sites of inter-communal unrest such as Central and West Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi. The conflict cleavage was different. Whereas Christians fought Muslims in Maluku and North Maluku, war in religiously homogenous Aceh was between an armed insurgent movement—which had support and sympathy from large swathes of the population—and the Indonesian military. There was thus vast asymmetry in fighting technology between the two warring parties, which was not the case in the Moluccas. GAM also had a more organised and hierarchical structure than any of the Muslim or Christian militias in Maluku or North Maluku. Initial causes of the violence also differed. Analysts of the Aceh conflict have emphasised a range of factors that led to the initial rise of the insurgency. GAM built upon the grievances of the many Acehnese who had failed to benefit from the discovery and development of massive natural gas fields off the east coast of the province (Kell 1995; Ross 2005), helping shape a revitalised Acehnese nationalism (Aspinall 2007) and lowering trust in the Indonesia state (McCarthy 2007). This combined with resentment of a perceived domination of Indonesian national culture by the Javanese (Sulaiman 2006). Broken promises that Aceh would receive political and cultural autonomy compounded dissatisfaction (Miller 2009). Military abuses fuelled GAM recruitment (Robinson 1998). Local political and economic competition, so key in Maluku and North Maluku, was not an important cause of the onset and initial escalation of Aceh's war.

Yet, as war continued similarities with the inter-communal violence occurring in other parts of Indonesia became pronounced. As elsewhere, violence increasingly followed a predatory logic. The military made substantial sums from extortion at checkpoints on Aceh's main highways (Olken and Barron 2009) and raised revenue through smuggling, marijuana cultivation and trading, illegal logging, and legal businesses such as palm oil (ICG 2001b; Eye on Aceh 2004; McCulloch 2005; Kingsbury and McCulloch 2006). Aspinall (2009a: 183) notes that "so pervasive were these

activities that many intellectuals, NGO activists, and others argued that the profit motive drove military violence because disorder provided more fundraising possibilities.” At the same time, GAM levied taxes (*pajak nanggroe*) on businessmen and government infrastructure contracts, were involved in the marijuana trade, and took sums for providing protection (Robinson 1998). Ideology motivated many fighters but this diminished as GAM increasingly recruited thugs to the cause (Schulze 2004).

As in the Moluccas there was frequent collaboration between ostensible adversaries in rent-making activities and in ensuring that violence continued. District government heads awarded contracts to GAM contractors, officials provided GAM fighters with satellite phones. GAM also bought weapons and ammunition from the Indonesia military (Miller 2009: 76). In the words of one senior GAM leader:

We’d make deals: for instance, the two sides would say we were having an armed clash, and both would shoot into the air, ha ha. Once the TNI [Indonesian military] withdrew, they’d leave their bullets behind at a spot we’d agreed before. It was usually the TNI who were about to go home who would do this (Aspinall 2009a: 189).

The result was a war where “guerrillas and their enemies were locked not only in mortal combat but also in an intimate embrace” (*ibid.*: 152).³⁰²

1.2 The Helsinki MoU and post-conflict violence

On 15 August 2005—less than nine months on from the devastating tsunami, which killed upwards of 167,000 people in Aceh alone—a peace deal was signed in Helsinki between the Indonesian government and GAM.

The tsunami is commonly viewed as being the main catalyst for the agreement. With tens of thousands of aid workers pouring into the troubled province, all-out offensives could not take place (Awaluddin 2008). The tsunami also created a face-saving opportunity for both sides to acknowledge that different approaches were

³⁰² The degree of collusion between the two sides is emphasised most by Drexler (2008) who argues that the Indonesian military armed and largely controlled GAM.

needed. The preamble to the Helsinki MoU noted that the tsunami created a moral imperative for both parties to work towards peace.

Other factors were, however, more important. The Indonesian government had been courting GAM prior to the tsunami. Vice-President Kalla had used intermediaries to probe the GAM leadership's desire for a settlement (ICG 2005b; Husain 2007; Awaluddin 2009). Crisis Management Initiative, the NGO led by former Finnish President Ahtisaari that brokered the accord, formally invited both sides to negotiate three days *before* the Indian Ocean tsunami struck (Aspinall 2005a: 2; Morfit 2007: 117-118). GAM realised that their goal of an independent Aceh was unattainable, at least in the short to medium term. Their forces had been decimated by martial law. GAM leaders also understood that international support for the independence of a small Muslim state astride the shipping lanes of the Straits of Malacca was unlikely in the post-9/11 world (Barron and Burke 2008: 10-11). On the Indonesian side, a new president and vice-president who favoured a political rather than security approach to solving the Aceh problem had won power. Yudhoyono and Vice-President Kalla had both been involved in the attempts to bring peace to Maluku and Central Sulawesi. Importantly, Yudhoyono, a former military leader, commanded respect from the army's top brass. On coming to power, he replaced some senior military leaders with reformers thereby securing a new ability to guarantee peace once an agreement was found (Morfit 2007).³⁰³

The resulting agreement, the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, or MoU, went further than previous accords. It included provisions to disarm and reintegrate rebel forces and to devolve considerable power from the national level to Aceh, while rebel leaders would recognise the sovereignty of Indonesia. Over 30,000 Indonesian military and police left the province. An unarmed peace mission, the Aceh Monitoring Mission or AMM, was deployed by the EU and ASEAN to oversee the peace process.

³⁰³ The next chapter explores the evolution of executive-military relations in post-Suharto Indonesia.

Presidential Instruction (*Inpres*) 15/2005 set out institutional responsibilities for the accord and then a national Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA, Law 11/2006) implemented many of the elements of the MoU.³⁰⁴

Unlike the Humanitarian Pause and the CoHA, the Helsinki MoU had an immediate and lasting impact. From the beginning of 1999 until July 2005, Aceh had seen an average of 133 deaths per month.³⁰⁵ In contrast, just seven people were killed in the two weeks after the signing of the MoU. The following month saw only five deaths and no more than eight people died in any of the following 12 months. The reduced level of violence continued. From August 2005 until the end of 2012, there were an average of seven violent deaths per month in Aceh. The largest number of people to die in any single month was in March 2010 when 16 people were killed following the discovery by the police of a jihadi camp in rural north-east Aceh. The establishment of the camp had little to do with the past war and former GAM rebels were not involved in any significant way (ICG 2010: 1).

Violence did not disappear as it largely did in North Maluku. From August 2005 until the end of 2012, there were at least 4,975 violent incidents in the province, 670 per year. Yet, in contrast to Maluku, this violence has tended to take smaller forms with less impact per incident. There have been just 29 large incidents of violence—defined as those resulting in three or more deaths, 10 or more injuries, or 15 or more damaged buildings—in the post-conflict period. Whereas over one-third of all deaths in post-conflict Maluku come from large incidents of violence, in Aceh the figure is 7%.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ Aspinall (2005a) provides an initial analysis of the MoU and Barron and Clark (2006: 7-9) examine the clauses of the MoU and the LoGA. See also the articles in Aguswandi and Large (2008), especially May (2008), as well as Aspinall (2007) and ICG (2005d, 2006a). MSR (2009: 133-136) discusses the Presidential Instruction.

³⁰⁵ Violence reduced sharply after the tsunami. In December 2004, 167 people were killed in 121 incidents. In January this fell to 12 deaths (24 incidents). Violence, however, rose again between April and July, with an average of 48 people dying per month in this period.

³⁰⁶ Similarly, 25% of deaths in post-conflict North Maluku have come from large incidents. In post-conflict Maluku 69% of damaged buildings are from large incidents of violence while in Aceh the figure is 33%.

A greater share of violent impacts come from crimes rather than conflicts compared to the other two provinces. Crime accounts for 66% of deaths in post-conflict Aceh, compared with 46% in Maluku and 53% in North Maluku.³⁰⁷ Beyond violent crime, a wide range of issues have led to violence, including elections and vigilante attacks in response to issues such as theft and perceived sexual indiscretion.

Very few of the violent deaths in post-conflict Aceh directly relate to the old GAM-Indonesian government cleavage: only 33 of almost 5,000 post-conflict violent incidents had clear separatist motivations.³⁰⁸ Indeed, as I explore below, violence in Aceh has transformed from being driven by the vertical centre-periphery conflict to being an expression of contestation between different class groups, and occasionally elites, within Aceh.

2. The absence of large episodic violence

Large episodic violence has been infrequent in post-conflict Aceh because elites have not found it to be in their economic or political interests to use or support such violence. This has been the case for three reasons.

First, as in Maluku, the peace settlement prioritised the cooptation of former conflict elites to ensure they did not spoil the agreement. However, in contrast to Maluku, this process of incorporation was largely done by providing the rebel group with opportunities and incentives to compete for power and control of resources through formal political channels. Exceptions were made to national electoral laws to allow independents to stand for election and then for local parties to run. The

³⁰⁷ Incidents are defined as crimes rather than conflicts when a preexisting cleavage between disputing parties could not be identified. See Chapter 2's discussion of the conceptual and methodological difficulties of distinguishing crime and conflict.

³⁰⁸ These incidents resulted in 12 deaths (of a total of 597 in the post-conflict period), 21 injuries (of 3,345), and 78 damaged buildings (of 704). Six of these incidents occurred in the two weeks before the signing of the MoU, five in the two weeks after the MoU, and another four occurred in September or October. After this, these types of incidents largely faded away with just two incidents in 2006, four in 2007, eight in 2008, and two in 2010.

willingness of GAM to enter politics was strengthened by two factors. Extensive special autonomy money, controlled by provincial and district governments, meant that the prizes for winning were large. Further, the strength of support for GAM, and in particular the relative efficacy of its patronage network, meant that success was likely for former combatant elites.

Second, other elites beyond GAM have also had incentives to compete for power and resources without resort to violence. Local government and security force leaders had developed close relations with their ostensible adversaries in GAM during the conflict. This facilitated collaboration in the post-conflict period. Many in the old politico-economic elite have partnered with former GAM in areas such as contracting.

Finally, and as in North Maluku, where there have been attempts to use large-scale episodic violence in post-conflict Aceh it has proven costly. Effective third party monitoring and especially in-group policing by GAM and the Indonesian government sent a signal that large episodes of violence would not be tolerated.

2.1 The peace settlement I: resources for GAM elites

Post-Helsinki Aceh was awash with money. The peace agreement promised assistance for the reintegration of former combatants and other conflict-affected groups and for post-conflict reconstruction. These funds were eclipsed by vast tsunami reconstruction resources. From 2008, additional special autonomy resources came on-line. Beyond their role in reconstructing the province after its natural and man-made disasters, these three types of funds helped bind GAM elites into the peace settlement.

The reintegration programme

A first source of funds for elites within GAM came from reintegration programmes. In line with most internationally mediated peace accords, the Helsinki MoU mandated assistance to former combatants and other conflict-affected groups. This included economic support (clause 3.2.3), farming land, employment, or social security (clause

3.2.5), and the restoration of public and private property (clause 3.2.4). A Reintegration Fund to pay for these programmes was to be established by the authorities of Aceh (clause 3.2.3). By the end of 2008, Rp 3.7 trillion (US\$ 366 million) had been provided for reintegration with just over half coming from donors, NGOs, and the private sector, and the rest from the Indonesian and Acehnese governments (MSR 2009: 51).³⁰⁹ Government funds were under the control of the newly formed Aceh Reintegration Board (*Badan Reintegrasi Aceh*, BRA), which was also to coordinate international assistance.³¹⁰

These funds helped ensure GAM elite support for the peace agreement. Reintegration had not been a priority for GAM negotiators in Helsinki. The impetus for including the reintegration provisions came from the international officials who were brokering the accord (Kingsbury 2006: 41). GAM disliked the term reintegration from the start as they felt it implied a division between combatants and community members that did not exist. Yet as reintegration funds arrived GAM elites found them to be useful. Some money was used to finance 'gifts' for senior former rebel commanders.³¹¹ Off-budget money from Indonesian Vice-President, Jusuf Kalla, helped some GAM leaders establish businesses (Crouch 2010: 318).

More importantly, rebel leaders ended up controlling where much of the money went (ICG 2005d). A large share of the government reintegration resources was allocated at the discretion of elites in GAM who used funds to strengthen patron-client ties with lower-level combatants. Internationally-funded reintegration programmes also

³⁰⁹ The largest contributor by far was the Government of Indonesia (Rp 1.5 trillion, or over US\$ 150 million).

³¹⁰ Reintegration funds decreased after 2008. From 2005-2008, an average of US\$ 78 million was provided per year in reintegration assistance from all sources. From 2011-2012, the annual total was US\$ 14 million. Almost all of the post-2008 reintegration funding came from the national and provincial governments, channelled through the BRA (Barron, Rahman, and Nugroho 2013).

³¹¹ An anecdote illustrates. One evening in late 2005, I was dining at the house of the acting governor of Aceh. Our discussions were interrupted by the arrival of Darwis Jeunib, the former guerrilla commander for Bireuen district. Darwis had come to pick up the keys to a new car, which the governor told us was a personal gift from himself using special off-budget resources provided by Jakarta to help address the 'needs' of ex-combatant leaders.

relied on former GAM commanders to identify beneficiaries. This, as I will discuss later, contributed to grievances among lower-level former combatants with many individuals feeling they did not receive their due share. Yet the reintegration programme also helped bind elites in the movement into the peace settlement. Over time, as GAM came to political power in the province, BRA was taken over by GAM elites, providing a source of employment and largess that could be distributed.

Tsunami funds

GAM elites also benefitted from the vast post-tsunami humanitarian and reconstruction funds. Tsunami funds were around 20 times those allocated for post-conflict needs: US\$ 8 billion, US\$ 5.3 billion of it from outside of Indonesia, was pledged for reconstruction (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008: 6). There were limitations to the extent to which these resources could be used in many conflict-affected areas. The vast majority of resources went to coastal areas that had usually been less affected by the conflict. Many reconstruction programmes deliberately avoided targeting conflict-affected groups or regions, with agencies worried about over-stepping their mandates or dealing with the complexities of the post-conflict situation (Burke and Afnan 2005). Nevertheless, an estimated Rp 5.3 trillion (US\$ 530 million) of tsunami recovery and development funds supported post-conflict recovery in non-coastal areas, eclipsing reintegration funds (MSR 2009: 51)

GAM elites were excited by the scale of such resources, both because of the potential for developing the province and the opportunities they afforded for personal gain and for consolidating their support base. Former rebels were slotted in to the tsunami reconstruction body (*Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi*, BRR), the powerful agency that controlled government tsunami resources and coordinated the international effort.³¹² By November 2007, around 500 former GAM members were employed in the

³¹² Clause 1.3.9 of the Helsinki agreement provided the mandate for this.

BRR (Aspinall 2009b: 14). A former GAM negotiator, Teuku Kamaruzzaman, was appointed secretary of the executing arm of the BRR, the second most powerful position in the agency. Other senior GAM leaders such as Malik Mahmud, Muhammad Lampoh Awe and Muzakir Manaf were given high-salaried positions with little expectation that they ever come to the office (*ibid.*). The presence of GAM elites in the body allowed them influence on how reconstruction funds were to be spent. A new programme was developed to channel around US\$ 3 million to 20 cooperatives of former GAM fighters (*ibid.*: 13-14). GAM figures also had control over the awarding of infrastructure construction contracts.

Special autonomy resources

Tsunami funds would eventually run out. By 2008, the number of international agencies working in Aceh had declined rapidly and BRR shut shop in April 2009. By this point, reintegration and post-conflict money from both government and donors had also dropped steeply. This reduction in aid impacted on Aceh's economy, which had been driven by sectors dependent on the reconstruction effort such as construction, trade, and transport. In 2008, Aceh's economy declined by 8% (World Bank 2009a).

This could have led to problems. We saw that in Maluku that there was a rise in violence as special post-conflict funds finished. However, special provisions in the LoGA (Law 11/2006), which vastly raised regular subnational government revenues for the province, ensured that the amount of money available for developmental purposes—and for satiating the needs and desires of local elites—did not reduce when tsunami and post-conflict funds ran out.

GAM negotiators in Helsinki had focused on ensuring that Aceh would manage the money accruing from the province's natural resources. The final MoU promised that, in contrast to arrangements in most other areas of Indonesia, 70% of "all current and future hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources in the territory of Aceh as well


as in the territorial sea surrounding Aceh” (clause 1.3.4) would remain in Aceh.³¹³ The provision had more symbolic than monetary value as most resources are expected to be exhausted soon.³¹⁴

Far more important was the provision in the LoGA for a larger proportion of the General Allocation Fund (*Dana Alokasi Umum*, or DAU, the block grant from the central government to the regions aimed at equalising the fiscal capacity of the regional government) to go to Aceh. This extra funding stream was not in the MoU and is widely viewed as being included to compensate Aceh for damage from the conflict (Rachmadi and Swamurti 2006). Nevertheless, it amounts to a massive injection of resources into the province, far eclipsing oil and gas revenues. The LoGA mandated that for 15 years from 2008, Aceh would receive an additional 2% share of the national DAU funds then an additional 1% for 5 years after that. These revenues, renamed the Special Autonomy Fund (SAF or *otsus*), led to an extra transfer to Aceh of Rp 16 trillion (US\$ 1.6 billion) in 2008-2011 alone. Over the full two decades, it is estimated that the SAF will amount to Rp 100 trillion (over US\$ 10 billion) (World Bank 2011c). Under Indonesia’s decentralisation laws, most subnational revenues are held at the district rather than provincial level. In contrast, 60% of special autonomy resources in Aceh go to the province and the SAF has more than doubled provincial revenues (Figure 7.1).

³¹³ Law 25/1999, which applies to most other Indonesian provinces, states that 15.5% of oil and 30.5% of gas revenues remain in the province.

³¹⁴ While the implementation of the 2001 special autonomy agreement boosted natural resource revenues kept within Aceh by more than 150 times, from Rp 26 billion (US\$ 2.6 million) in 1999 (or 1.4% of total revenue) to Rp 4 trillion (US\$ 400 million) in 2004 (40%), it is projected that these revenues will drop significantly as oil and gas resources are exhausted. This is largely due to the decline in output at the Arun natural gas plant in North Aceh. Since production began in 1978, more than 90% of natural gas resources have been exploited. Production, which reached 2,200 million cubic feet per day (MCFD) in 1994, fell to 900 MCFD in 2005 (World Bank 2006b). This declined to 111 MCFD for the first six months of 2008 (World Bank 2008b).

Figure 7.1. Provincial and district revenues in Aceh, 1999-2012 (US\$, 2012 prices)



Note: 2012 is based on budget plans; other years use budget realisation. PG = Provincial government funds. Local government includes provincial and district budgets. Sources: 2012 Aceh Public Expenditure Analysis (unpublished document), Ministry of Finance, World Bank database.

2.2 The peace settlement II: the political incorporation of GAM elites

The comparison of Maluku's and North Maluku's peace settlements in the previous two chapters showed how providing additional resources in the early post-conflict period can contribute to continuing violence. In Maluku, cash, jobs and projects were distributed to ensure that former dissident leaders accepted the peace settlement. This lowered the risk of renewed extended violence but it also led to some local elites using violence to capture resources and power. In contrast, fewer post-conflict resources were available in the early years after the end of North Maluku's extended violent conflict. This allowed elites to focus peacebuilding activities on reconciliation rather than the distribution of spoils.

Following this logic we might have expected local elites in Aceh, including former GAM leaders, to use large episodic violence in the early post-conflict period to gain access to funds and positions. This did not eventuate because, in contrast to Maluku, the primary means of incorporating former combatant leaders was not by providing preferential access to jobs or funds but by ensuring their participation in local politics. In an environment where GAM figures have huge advantages over their competitors—including the strongest patronage network and organisational structures

honed through the war—they have chosen to compete for power and resources through political channels rather than by using large episodic violence.

The political incorporation of GAM: the MoU and the LoGA

The peace agreement and its implementing law provided a powerful set of incentives and mechanisms that facilitated the incorporation of former rebels into the local polity. The Helsinki MoU and the LoGA gave the province significant powers. Following from the MoU, the LoGA stated that Aceh had the authority to “regulate and implement government functions in all public sectors except ... [those] of national character, foreign affairs, defence, security, justice, monetary affairs, national fiscal affairs, and certain functions in the field of religion.”³¹⁵ This went far beyond the provisions of past special autonomy arrangements for Aceh. The scope of these powers, along with the vast resources under the control of the provincial and district governments in Aceh, strengthened the incentives of former GAM leaders and others to compete in the elections.

Importantly, the MoU and LoGA also created ways for former guerrillas to access power quickly. The preamble of the MoU stated that the Government of Indonesia and GAM would create conditions for “fair and democratic” government and that direct local elections would be held shortly after the peace agreement was signed. The MoU also stipulated a number of changes to the electoral system, establishing that independent candidates could, for the first time in Indonesia’s history, contest the 2006 election and that local political parties would be allowed, also for the first time, to contest legislative elections from 2009 onwards.³¹⁶

³¹⁵ LoGA, article 7. This differs from the text of the Helsinki MoU, which can be interpreted as only reserving powers in six areas for Jakarta. The sub-clause on areas of ‘national character’ was added for three reasons: (a) some areas are constitutional obligations for the central government, for example in areas of service provision; (b) some are related to international conventions; and (c) the implementation of some areas by the Government of Aceh would affect other areas of Indonesia (May 2008).

³¹⁶ Helsinki MoU clauses 1.2.1-1.2.3.

These were major concessions. There is a long history in Indonesia of seeing local parties as a potential source of national fragmentation (Hillman 2012a). Indeed, Indonesia is the only democracy that does not allow local parties to contest local elections (Hillman 2012b: 151). Requests by GAM in the peace talks of 2001-2002 for local parties to be allowed had been rejected by Jakarta (Miller 2009: 158). The formation of local parties again turned out to be the most divisive issue during the Helsinki negotiations. After the MoU was signed there were continued arguments over whether it allowed for independent candidates. An initial government draft of the LoGA excluded the possibility of this (ICG 2006b). However, after pressure from GAM, the government relented and independent candidates were permitted.³¹⁷

This staged approach—allowing independent candidates first, then local parties—allowed former rebels to stand before GAM had formed a political party, a process that would require time. The MoU also granted amnesty to all persons who had participated in GAM activities and stated that they “will have all political, economic and social rights as well as the right to participate in the political process, both in Aceh and on the national level” (clause 3.2.1). This created a legal right for former GAM rebels to participate in the elections.

The first post-conflict elections

Direct elections for the positions of provincial governor and heads of all 23 rural and urban districts were held in Aceh between December 2006 and January 2008. GAM-affiliated candidates participated as independents. In October 2005, GAM created a new oversight body, the National Council (*Majelis Nasional*), to determine GAM’s political strategy. The Council subsequently established the Aceh Transitional Council (*Komite*

³¹⁷ Local parties were only allowed to contest provincial and district seats and not national ones. However, this was not a problem for GAM who were primarily interested in gaining power in Aceh rather than representing Aceh in Jakarta (Palmer 2010: 289-290). In July 2007, the Indonesian Constitutional Court amended national Law 32/2004 on Regional Government to allow independent candidates to stand in local elections elsewhere in Indonesia (ICG 2011a: 1-2). Local parties are still unique to Aceh.

Peralihan Aceh, KPA) on 28 December. The KPA had the same territorial structure as GAM's armed wing, which had been formally dissolved as part of the peace process. While the goals of the KPA were initially to guide the reintegration process, and to ensure that former fighters followed the terms of the MoU, it was also to become the basis of a future local GAM party (ICG 2006b: 2-3).

GAM did well in the elections, which were widely viewed as a success and to be "free and fair" (EUEOM 2007). The independent GAM-affiliated ticket—of Irwandi Jusuf, a former rebel leader, and Muhammad Nazar, a prominent self-determination activist—won the gubernatorial election in the first round with 38% of the vote, far ahead of the runner-up pair from a national Islamic party (who notably contained a GAM-affiliated vice-governor candidate). GAM-linked candidates also won the district head position in 10 districts. Even in those districts where GAM candidates failed to win, they often fared well. The independent GAM gubernatorial pair was the highest ranked ticket in seven of the 13 districts where GAM failed to win at the district level (Clark and Palmer 2008).

GAM thus became a mainstream and important local political player. This political incorporation of the former rebels was accomplished with a remarkably low level of political violence (Forbes Damai/DSF 2006). Over an eight-month period from July 2006, local newspapers in Aceh recorded 28 election-related incidents, which included physical attacks and kidnappings, serious intimidation, as well as the physical destruction of party attributes.³¹⁸ Violent incidents accounted for just 11% of all election-related conflicts recorded, a similar rate to those recorded in provinces not affected by large-scale communal or separatist violence.³¹⁹

Why GAM participated and why they won

³¹⁸ Data are from a World Bank dataset, which records incidents of conflict (violent and not) related to the elections. See Clark and Palmer (2008).

³¹⁹ A study of the 2004 legislative elections in four other provinces found a similar number of cases of electoral conflict with approximately 11% resulting in violence. In the sole post-conflict province in that study, Maluku, 20% of electoral conflict incidents were violent, a higher rate than in Aceh (Barron, Nathan, and Welsh 2005).

GAM decided to compete in the elections not only because of the vast resources they would control if victorious but also because they knew their probability of winning was very high.

First, they had a better grassroots network than the political parties (ICG 2007a). Whereas in other regions of Indonesia party preferences have endured since the 1955 elections (Bunte and Ufen 2008), in Aceh the long conflict resulted in voters who lacked strong loyalties to national parties. Patronage networks, which rely on vertical connections from villagers to leaders of parties or mass organisations, were also relatively undeveloped in Aceh, even though they are common across Indonesia (Klinken 2009). While war had weakened the networks of political parties and of Islamic mass movements such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, GAM's wartime structure linked its leaders to villagers. Such networks persisted after the peace agreement and were institutionalised with the formation of the KPA. This gave GAM-affiliated candidates a great advantage.

Second, GAM candidates benefitted from a strong desire amongst the electorate for peace to continue and deep cynicism towards existing leaders. While no candidates campaigned against the peace process, many voted for GAM candidates because they felt they were less likely to go back to fighting if they were in power (Clark and Palmer 2008).³²⁰ Voters also considered the track records of those candidates who had served in government positions in the past, many of whom were seen to be corrupt, nepotistic and indifferent to the needs of the people. GAM-affiliated candidates, having never held such positions, were seen as a potentially less corrupt alternative.

Deeper political incorporation: the 2009 legislative and 2012 executive elections

GAM's incorporation into the state was completed with the April 2009 legislative elections. In July 2007, GAM established its own political party, initially called Partai

³²⁰ This kind of 'voting for peace' is common in post-conflict elections (Lyons 2004: 39).

GAM, later renamed Partai Aceh (Aceh Party, PA). PA stood as one of six local parties in elections for the provincial parliament and district legislatures across Aceh. PA won 33 of 69 seats in the provincial legislature and 237 of 645 seats in district elections. It emerged as the biggest party in 16 of Aceh's 23 districts, with an outright majority in 13 of those (Palmer 2010: 291). GAM's success was largely determined by the same factors that had contributed to their victory in the 2006 elections: the strength of the KPA organisational structure; concern from some voters that GAM would return to violence if they did not win; and voters rewarding the former rebel movement for its role in bringing peace to Aceh (*ibid.*; Stange and Patock 2010).

As the elections approached, many observers worried about the potential for unrest (e.g. ICG 2008, 2009b; World Bank 2009b). The military ran an aggressive intimidation campaign against Partai Aceh (ICG 2009b) and there was indeed some violence in the run up to the elections with 73 violent election-related incidents, resulting in five deaths from the beginning of the campaign in July 2008 until the election took place (CPCRS 2009a). However, election day was largely peaceful (The Carter Center 2009).

Three years on, Aceh's third round of post-conflict elections took place with polls for the province's district heads and governor. Since 2009, a split within GAM had emerged and the incumbent former governor, Irwandi Jusuf, stood against the GAM pairing of Zaini Abdullah and Muzakir Manaf.³²¹ In the run up to the 2012 contest, tensions between the two factions were extremely heated and there was a spate of incidents of violence and intimidation. Fourteen people were killed in December 2011 including a series of shootings of Javanese transmigrants (Aspinall 2011b; ICG 2011a, 2012c). There was also intimidation on election day (ANFREL Foundation 2012).

³²¹ Zaini Abdullah was formerly 'foreign minister' of GAM's government-in-exile while Muzakir Manaf had been the leader of GAM's forces on the ground in Aceh. The split first emerged in the run up to the 2006 elections when many in GAM's old guard did not back Irwandi Jusuf but another ticket which included Hasbi Abdullah, the young brother of Zaini (ICG 2006b).

However, extensive post-election violence did not eventuate: an average of six people were killed in each of the four months following the election, lower than the monthly average in the full post-conflict period. Following Zaini-Muzakir's victory, Irwandi did not use violence to contest the result, instead establishing a new local party to compete in future elections (Simanjuntak 2012). Indeed, the elections served to further GAM's incorporation into both the Indonesian state and competitive electoral politics. In addition to winning the governorship, they were successful in 13 of 20 district head contests.

The rewards of power: corruption, contracting, and politics as usual

[Ex-]combatants try to access resources through development projects ... They follow the projects. It's like *pajak nanggroe* [the tax GAM applied during the conflict]. They take the tax, or offer security. Within projects they divide it up through sub-contracting. Combatants are involved in the sub-contracts. Even the big contractors from the government are affected by this. They are powerless. There is pressure from GAM to get parts of projects. Nothing is hidden.³²²

The political incorporation of GAM elites has allowed them to enjoy the spoils that come with power in Indonesia's regions. Driving down Aceh's highways, one can see the grand newly erected houses owned by senior GAM figures. Many now drive imported luxury cars. Former commanders now make visits to Singapore and Kuala Lumpur for shopping or medical checks. Upwards social and economic mobility for many in the elite of the former rebel group has been rapid and extreme.

GAM elites have pursued two related strategies for purposes of accumulation. The first has been corruption. During the war, Aceh's local government institutions were plagued by massive graft. Two 2003 studies by Bank Indonesia and Padjajaran University found that Aceh was the most corrupt province in the country (Miller 2006: 305; McGibbon 2006). In the immediate aftermath of the Helsinki MoU, many in Aceh were confident that corruption would decline as the province gained more control of its

³²² Academic, Banda Aceh, 4 March 2011.

affairs.³²³ Yet this assurance soon diminished. A 2010 survey found that 51% of informants felt that corruption was worse after the tsunami than before it; only 15% of people said that corruption was worse when war was ongoing than now (TII 2010: 15-16). A member of the South Aceh parliament estimated that at least 30% of the local state budget in his district “leaks” and this was probably similar in most other districts.³²⁴ One particularly prominent case involved the North Aceh district head, a former GAM member, corrupting such a large share of the local budget that the district was on the verge of bankruptcy.³²⁵

There is little evidence that GAM leaders are any more corrupt than other politicians. The former governor and rebel leader, Irwandi Jusuf, for example, has a reputation for being clean.³²⁶ Yet many GAM leaders who are now elected officials have quickly learned the local political rules of the game and understand well the opportunities for theft from the state’s coffers. They have benefitted from a general tolerance of corruption from oversight bodies such as the State Audit Agency (BPK) and the police who have been wary about taking actions that could lead to problems. A senior state intelligence officer noted:

The only big cases [that aren’t solved] relate to finance and corruption. The police don’t address these because they want to keep the peace.³²⁷

A second strategy has been to use newfound access to power to enter the business sector. In Aceh, as elsewhere in Indonesia, good relationships to those in power are vital for aspiring entrepreneurs aiming to gain permits, win contracts, and avoid excessive taxation. Most of the senior GAM elite have become businessmen. Muzakir Manaf, the former leader of GAM’s military wing and vice-governor of the province since 2012, runs a large conglomerate, PT Pulo Gadeng, which has been involved in import-export,

³²³ One local activist told me that corruption was an “Indonesian disease” and was confident that special autonomy would lower levels of corruption. Banda Aceh, August 2005.

³²⁴ South Aceh, 21 April 2011.

³²⁵ Anti-corruption activist, Lhokseumawe, 10 March 2011.

³²⁶ Discussions in Aceh, March and April 2011.

³²⁷ Banda Aceh, 4 March 2011.

producing steel for tsunami reconstruction, horticulture, and upgrading ports (Aditjondro 2007). Sofyan Dawood, the former GAM commander for North Aceh, has brokered deals with large public and private companies, including from Malaysia and China (Aspinall 2009b: 11). Aditjondro (2007: 18-19) details numerous other companies run by former combatant leaders. Following his election, the non-GAM district head in Southwest Aceh allocated Rp 12 billion (US\$ 1.3 million) to companies run by KPA (World Bank 2007d).

Indeed, much 'private' business is heavily reliant on state money. Throughout Indonesia, contracts are awarded based on political connections and *kontraktors* play a prominent role in politics (Klinken and Aspinall 2011). Aspinall (2009b) documents how GAM elites have entered the construction sector. One mode of operations has been for GAM/KPA figures to partner with existing companies. On other occasions, GAM leaders have 'borrowed' the names of preexisting contractors to win contracts. Facing the challenge that they have few skills and little experience in contracting, they sometimes bid for contracts and then sell them on to other contractors who have the capacity to do the work, taking a fee of 6-15%.³²⁸ GAM figures win because of their influence and potential for using violence, with their success often preordained. In the words of one observer: "In Aceh, before projects are announced it is as if they are owned by certain groups."³²⁹ With the large state budgets available, the profits that can be made are vast. Aspinall (2009b: 30) concludes that tens of millions of dollars have made their way to GAM networks from contracting.

Given their lack of experience and their predatory motivations one impact of GAM elites' entry into the construction sector has been a reduction in the quality of infrastructure built.

³²⁸ Under national *Keppres* (Presidential Decree) 80/2003 on the procurement of goods and services, companies must be of sufficient size and have sufficient experience to bid for large contracts. Newly established GAM contractor companies do not meet these criteria, hence the need to use existing companies.

³²⁹ Activist, East Aceh, 7 March 2011.

Now that KPA are dominant in contracting, most projects are neglected, not finished. They withdraw money from projects but don't finish them. This is because of a lack of experience but it is also sometimes intentional, where they use the money for other needs. So far, there have been no sanctions.³³⁰

Yet the entry of GAM elites into politics and business has also served to limit their incentives to use large-scale violence in post-conflict Aceh. It has reinforced commitment to a peace settlement from which they are clearly benefitting. Beyond this, it has lowered their motivations to use large-scale episodic violence. The political power of the former rebel group means that such violent shows of strengths are not necessary to win contracts or receive projects.

Former GAM elites have entered a system, which operates across Indonesia, where illicit deals and corruption rather than violence are the main strategies used to achieve, exercise, and sustain power. Elites at the national and local levels in Indonesia use shady means to access power and resources, for example by engaging in money politics. But violence is a rarely practiced political strategy, at least when compared with countries like the Philippines (Hadiz 2010). In this regard, post-conflict Aceh is unexceptional. GAM leaders have entered a local political and economic system structured by norms and institutions that operate in a similar way to those in other parts of the country. Aspinall (2009b: 3) convincingly argues that, "rather than transforming the construction sector, the new GAM contractors are being transformed by it." The analysis can be extended to the involvement of former rebel elites in Aceh's broader politics and economy: in entering the system, GAM elites have effectively been Indonesianised.

2.3 Satisfying other elites

The capture by GAM of political power and the control of resources it affords could have led to violent resistance from others in the local elite such as incumbent politicians and senior security sector personnel. That this did not occur frequently was the result of

³³⁰ Activist, North Aceh, 7 March 2011.

continuing opportunities for these groups to accumulate using peaceable means. This was made possible by opportunities to collaborate with GAM.

The military

On the signing of the MoU, many observers noted the potential for the Indonesian military to wreck the peace accord (e.g. Aspinall 2005a; ICG 2005b; Barron, Clark, and Daud 2005). Throughout the post-Suharto period, the military had resisted attempts by Indonesia's presidents to use a political and economic rather than coercive approach to bringing the war to an end (see Miller 2009). Spoiler actions by members of the military played a large role in the collapse of the CoHA in 2003 (Aspinall and Crouch 2003; Huber 2004). There was also frequently expressed dissatisfaction from some in the military while the Helsinki peace talks were ongoing (Kingsbury 2006). Reluctance to support a peace accord had its roots partly in ideological and strategic concerns: as in many post-colonial states, the Indonesian military still sees itself as the guardians of Indonesia's territorial integrity and many military leaders were inherently sceptical about the wisdom of negotiating with a group they saw as terrorists. There was also resistance because of the vast profits that Aceh's war economy generated for the underfunded organisation.

The military's acceptance of the Helsinki accord, and subsequent adherence to the terms of peace, was largely a result of pressure from the Indonesian president. On assuming power, Yudhoyono removed hardliners within the military, such as TNI chief Ryacudu Ryamizard, and made it clear that the military must support the government's position. However, sweeteners were also provided to the military. The budget for the MoU-mandated troop withdrawal was set well above normal levels at Rp 526 billion (US\$ 58.4 million) (Mietzner 2009: 301). This sum was almost exactly what the military would receive in extra budget if the war had continued (Mietzner 2006: 51) and the armed forces continued to receive special funding for non-combat activities in Aceh

(Mietzner 2009: 301-302). The post-tsunami aid economy also provided ample opportunities for military leaders in the province to turn a profit and many opened new businesses (Aditjondro 2007: 14-17). Military acceptance of the accord solidified as it became clear that the provisions in the MoU on human rights and retroactive justice would not be applied.³³¹ This meant there would be no investigation of past abuses.

Acceptance of the inviolability of the peace accord did not ensure that military elites would not use episodic violence in the post-conflict period. As we saw in Chapter 5, local security sector chiefs in Maluku have continued to use violence to signal their importance as a local political and economic player. Yet in Aceh, the Indonesian military by and large has chosen not to do this because they have found that it has not been necessary to use violence to ensure their place in the province's politics and economy, even with GAM in power. Old wartime patterns of collaboration, discussed above, have found new life in peacetime Aceh. GAM leaders have preferred to work with the security forces in (often illicit) business ventures rather than risk resistance. Successful GAM contractors now sometimes give donations to the local police and military, just as other business people do (Aspinall 2009b: 31). Common interests, and the benefits of reducing contestation and the risk that flows from it, have led to collaboration. In the words of one analyst:

KPA, GAM, and TNI [military] guys are close. They have the same interests. They like to make money, girls, and the discos in Medan [the capital of neighbouring North Sumatra province].³³²

The example of Muzakir Manaf—the former rebel leader turned businessman turned politician—is illustrative. He has allegedly created a company to work on wind energy with a current senior member of Indonesian intelligence.³³³

³³¹ The MoU mandated the establishment of a Human Rights Court for Aceh (clause 2.2) and a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (clause 2.3). As of mid-2014, significant steps have not been taken to establish either. Aspinall (2008) discusses why there has been little progress on the human rights or justice agenda. See also Hadi (2008).

³³² Expert on Aceh conflict, East Aceh, 7 March 2011. Also, NGO worker, Banda Aceh, 6 March 2011.

The ability of the sides to work together has strengthened over time. Particularly remarkable was the decision by former Aceh military commander, Lt. General Sunarko, to join the Partai Aceh campaign team for the 2012 elections. As late as the 2009 elections, Sunarko had taken a strongly anti-GAM position arguing that the movement still posed a threat to Indonesian territorial integrity. Yet by 2012 he was a vocal supporter of GAM's political party. Some suggest that this support was a result of his collaboration with former GAM commanders on economic projects (ICG 2011a: 6).

This is not to say that there have been no tensions between the military and former GAM. In the run up to the 2009 election, for example, a number of incidents occurred including the abduction in late September 2008 of two Partai Aceh figures from East Aceh by the military after a soldier had been kidnapped (World Bank 2008c). Brushes between the military and PA continued over the following months (World Bank 2008d, 2009b). The military rounded up community members to participate in anti-PA 'socialisation events', roads were blocked to stop people attending PA rallies, and there was frequent harassment of PA cadres. Police investigations of the series of grenade attacks that occurred in the run up to 2009 pointed to military support for the perpetrators, although allegedly "the investigation had to stop at the gates of the military barracks".³³⁴ However, after GAM's victory at the polls in 2009, and the new status quo of political power became clear, military tactics changed with collusion prevailing over competition.

Incumbent local politicians

A second group who could have violently resisted the increasing control of GAM in the political and economic realms was local politicians. Their positions as incumbents gave them some control over the coercive apparatus of the state. Even though under

³³³ Defence and security analyst, Banda Aceh, 4 March 2011. Manaf also took one of the daughters of Sunarko, the former Indonesian military commander, as a wife.

³³⁴ March 2013 discussion with Aceh conflict expert based on confidential conversations with police investigators in 2009.

Indonesia's decentralisation control of the security forces is a reserved power for the centre, the local political elite had a long history of collaborating with local police and military commanders and had relations with security agencies in Jakarta. In post-conflict Aceh, some military funding continues to come from local government budgets (ICG 2009b: 7). Some politicians have links to the anti-separatist militias, especially in the Central Highlands.

Despite this, non-GAM political elites have largely chosen not to use violence for political or economic gain in post-conflict Aceh. This has been the case because they have been able to retain a large degree of power even as Partai Aceh increasingly dominates the local executives and legislatures. Of the 16 mayoral contests that took place in December 2006 that did not go to a second round, for example, the victors in eight were incumbents or prominent local officer bearers (Forbes Damai/DSF 2006). In 2009, national parties won 36 of the 69 seats in the provincial legislature, slightly more than GAM's 33 seats (CPCRS 2009a). Senior local politicians standing for national parties also had a free run for national parliament seats as local parties and independents were not allowed to stand. Former rebels and incumbents thus simultaneously won strong mandates showing that competition need not be zero-sum (Barter 2011). Other long-standing local politicians, such as Abdullah Saleh of the PPP party, have continued in politics while changing their allegiance to Partai Aceh.

Collaboration between GAM and other local elites has also lowered incentives for violence. In campaigning for the 2009 election, Partai Aceh worked with the Indonesian President's Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party, PD) with cadres from both parties encouraging voters to select PA for local seats and PD for national ones. PD ended up with six of the 13 seats allocated to Aceh for the national parliament and President Yudhoyono won a massive 93% of Acehnese votes in the presidential poll. Governor Irwandi joined Yudhoyono's campaign as did many grassroots PA supporters

(Palmer 2010; CPCRS 2009a, 2009b). Non-GAM local officials have also collaborated with newly elected GAM members on business projects.³³⁵

Such collaboration is less surprising that might seem given relationships during Aceh's war. It was in the interest of local politicians and bureaucrats for the war to continue for it provided a smokescreen that masked their appropriation of state money. Officials such as Abdullah Puteh, governor of Aceh from 1999 until his arrest for corruption in late 2004, had links to GAM despite his frequent hard-line stance in advocating for a security approach to the conflict (McGibbon 2006: 346). Gaining GAM's support could also be electorally useful. While campaigning to be governor, Puteh met senior GAM figures in Jakarta and gave them money in exchange for backing his campaign (Aspinall 2009a: 187). Other senior officials also developed close links to GAM fighters, buying them cars, giving them cuts of the government budget, and even providing them with satellite phones to aid their operations (*ibid.*: 186-188). Bonds between local officials and rebel fighters were sometimes strengthened by familial ties.³³⁶ When the war ended, old relationships emerged from the shadows.

2.4 The high costs of using large episodic violence

The absence of frequent large episodic violence in post-conflict Aceh can thus be explained in large part by the incentives and opportunities that local elites have had to pursue power and control of resources through political channels and for former adversaries to collaborate to this end. However, as in North Maluku, the choice of local elites to use politics and pacific deal-making rather than violence for purposes of accumulation is also a function of the fact that it quickly became clear that using such large episodic violence was costly.

³³⁵ Interviews in Aceh, March and April 2011.

³³⁶ A few weeks after the MoU was signed, I helped mediate one of the first meetings between senior GAM leaders and local government officials to discuss plans to produce a joint information dissemination strategy for the peace agreement. I was confused when on entering the room members from each side hugged and showed visible joy. It was explained to me that one of the GAM negotiators was the cousin of one of the members of the government delegation and others had been childhood friends.

In the early post-MoU period there was effective third party monitoring from the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). Compared to many peace missions, AMM, which stayed in Aceh until after the December 2006 elections, had relatively few problems to deal with. But where violations of the accord did occur, AMM generally dealt with them in an effective manner (Schulze 2007; Burke 2008). One early incident was the destruction of the local office of SIRA, a civil society movement that had previously supported Acehnese self-determination, by a group of 100 demonstrators, organised by the leader of a pro-government, anti-separatist front. The case was dealt with to the satisfaction of the two Helsinki signatories at a meeting of the AMM Commission on Security Arrangements (CoSA) a week later (World Bank 2006c). A few weeks later, AMM investigated an incident where a police officer had beaten a fish trader to death (World Bank 2006d). With the CoSA proving to be a useful mechanism for elites on the GAM and Indonesian government sides to settle disputes, a number of district AMM offices started to establish 'mini DiCOSAs' which successfully dealt with many incidents of violence (World Bank 2006e, 2006f; Barron and Burke 2008: 24).

Third party monitoring and sanctioning was useful. Yet far more important—and, indeed, one of the reasons for the success of AMM—was the presence of what Fearon and Laitin (1996) have called in-group policing, where opposing parties each punish those in their own group who use violence.³³⁷ Elites on both the GAM and Indonesian government sides favoured the peace settlement and sent strong signals within their own organisations that large incidents of violence, that could put strains on the accord, would not be tolerated.³³⁸

On 1 March 2008, an attack on a KPA office in Atu Lintang in Central Aceh resulted in five deaths, the largest loss of life in a single incident since the Helsinki MoU

³³⁷ Their theory is articulated in relation to ethnic violence and relations but there is no reason why it cannot also apply to other forms of inter-group conflict.

³³⁸ As discussed below, there has been much more tolerance of smaller-scale episodic violence from both sides.

(World Bank 2008c). The background was a dispute between KPA and a local trade union dominated by members of former anti-separatist militias over control of the district's central bus station. The response to the incident was rapid, with the authorities, police, and the KPA hierarchy all acting to contain spillovers. Twenty-five suspects were in detention by 13 March. KPA circulated instructions for its members not to take revenge and Malik Mahmud, the senior GAM leader, led a meeting of all 17 KPA commanders on 4 March. Messages went down through the government and military hierarchy to anti-separatist groups that such actions would not be tolerated.³³⁹

Indeed, in the early years of the peace process elites on both the GAM/KPA and military sides took frequent actions to signal to their members—and indeed to each other—that large-scale uses of violence were not acceptable. After two soldiers and a police officer were badly beaten in a fight with more than a dozen ex-combatants in South Aceh in January 2007, the KPA leadership helped the local police and military investigate the incident, resulting in the arrest of four combatants (World Bank 2007a).

Jakarta has also closely watched the military's behaviour in the province. As I will explore in the next chapter there have been strong directions from the Jakarta military and political leadership for the security forces not to use too much force in performing their roles.³⁴⁰ Communiqués were sent within the Aceh military structure warning that excessive use of violence would not be tolerated.³⁴¹

3. Frequent small episodic violence

³³⁹ This was primarily through the structure of the Coordination and Communication Forum for Peace in Aceh (FKK), a government oversight body for the peace process, which had a strong presence of former military and anti-separatist group members within it. Discussions in Banda Aceh, March-April 2008.

³⁴⁰ Journalists, Banda Aceh, 3 March 2011; analyst of the Aceh conflict, East Aceh, 7 March 2011; Indonesia state intelligence agency officer, Banda Aceh, 4 March 2011.

³⁴¹ Discussions in Aceh, 2008.

I don't exactly know who is doing the violence ... But based on my observation, there are many among them [ex-combatants] who feel unhappy. Some ex-combatants can access existing resources. But there is a gap with some others.³⁴²

While post-conflict Aceh has seen few large incidents of violence, smaller episodic violence, in particular violent crimes, have been common. A large proportion, although by no means all, of this violence has been committed by lower-level former GAM combatants.

Following the end of Aceh's war, many former combatants had high expectations for their future economic wellbeing. Disillusionment has risen as inequalities within the former rebel movement have grown. In this context, many have used violence both to secure resources, for example through violent crime, and to send a signal to those above that they deserve a larger cut. Violence has proved to be profitable, in large part because the costs of using it have been low. The police, wary of alienating a group who could cause trouble, have not clamped down on violence. GAM elites, too, have largely been happy to let their former minions 'play' to keep them happy without having to distribute more rents downwards. This has created a signal that violence can be an effective strategy at the local level, leading others to use it as well.

3.1 Ex-combatant expectations and motivations for using violence

Many lower-level ex-combatants have used violence because of a lack of viable peaceable options for getting ahead economically. After the peace agreement was signed expectations were high amongst former rebels. There is debate about the extent to which lower-level GAM combatants were driven by pecuniary goals; while Schulze (2004) highlights the increasingly predatory motivations of many former combatants, especially those who joined after 1999, others have placed more emphasis on human rights abuses as a motivating factor for joining the rebel movement (e.g. Nessen 2006). However, even amongst those who had joined for ideological reasons, or to exact

³⁴² Academic, Banda Aceh, 4 March 2011.

revenge, there was a concern that after years of privations in the forests and mountains they would do well out of the peace. For these reasons, expectations of economic reward were greater than amongst former fighters in North Maluku and, to a lesser extent, Maluku.

Six months on from the signing of the Helsinki MoU, around three-quarters of ex-combatants did not have work (World Bank 2006a). A needs assessment for the rebel group found that many returnees were eager to take a rest after years of fighting and to spend time with their families. Others were waiting for instructions from their old commanders on what to do next:

Of the combatants who have come back, some have started working, some haven't. Whatever we can do we will do. If we ask our commander about our future, he says we must be patient.³⁴³

Nevertheless, even at this point many former combatants were frustrated about their work situation. Prior to joining GAM, over 96% of ex-combatants had been employed (*ibid.*: 16). The vast majority of former rebels interviewed identified a lack of employment opportunities or ability to generate an income as their greatest concern (*ibid.*: 41).

By mid-2008, the employment picture had changed. A representative survey of ex-combatants found that 85% were in work, a higher rate than those who had not fought before.³⁴⁴ However, these new jobs often did not fit with the expectations of former fighters who felt their service entitled them to jobs with higher incomes and status. The 2006 survey had found that the vast majority of former combatants wanted jobs as traders with only a very small proportion content to farm, the residual occupation in Aceh (World Bank 2006a: 42). Despite this, by 2008 former combatants were more likely than regular civilians to derive their income from rice farming or

³⁴³ Former combatant, Southwest Aceh, January 2006. Quoted in World Bank (2006a: 17).

³⁴⁴ Of 1,024 former combatant men surveyed, 85% had full-time employment, 6% had consistent part-time/contract work, and 6% some part-time/contract work. The figures for civilians (n=1,794) were 78%, 6%, and 4%, respectively. The samples are representative for both populations and the differences are significant at the 95 percent level (Barron 2009: 22).

agricultural wage labour, low paying jobs, and were less likely to be employed as civil servants, traders, or teachers (World Bank 2009a: 44-45)

Disappointment with reintegration aid

The failures of aid programmes, and in particular those aimed at supporting reintegration, to boost the welfare of lower-level ex-combatants contributed to dissatisfaction. Aceh's reintegration programme has been dysfunctional with problems in both its design and implementation.³⁴⁵

One problem related to the number of former rebels who were to receive assistance. The peace agreement (clause 4.2) stated that GAM had 3,000 military troops and it was expected that this group along with the 2,000 or so political prisoners, as well as victims of conflict, would receive benefits. It soon emerged that there were far more GAM than initial estimates. When retired fighters, civilian members and other core figures within GAM were taken into account, GAM's strength was perhaps seven times that stated in the MoU (Barron and Burke 2008: 38).³⁴⁶ The distinction between GAM combatant and sympathiser was a fuzzy one with the movement supported by much of Aceh's population. As GAM rose to political power, the number of individuals claiming to have been active in the rebel movement duly multiplied.³⁴⁷ Two steps were taken to get around the numbers problem. First, a category of 'GAM non-combatants' was added to the list of those who were to receive money from the government (BRA 2008). Second, reintegration money was distributed through former GAM commanders, who then reallocated the resources across the former combatant base as well as to other

³⁴⁵ For descriptions and critical analyses of Aceh's reintegration programmes, see Zurstrassen (2006), Barron (2007), Beeck (2007), ICG (2006a; 2007c), Palmer (2007), Aspinall (2008), Frodin (2008), Barron (2009), Barron and Burke (2008), and Barron, Rahman, and Nugroho (2013).

³⁴⁶ A senior GAM leader told me that there were around 30,000 GAM people in three categories: GAM in the mountains, GAM in the village, and GAM who provided communications support (Zakaria Saman, Banda Aceh, 30 November 2006). Another assessment estimated that there were 14,300 former combatants (a figure that does not include civilian GAM), defined as those who had been in the military structure of GAM for at least a month between 1998 and 2005. Of these, less than 700, under 5%, were women (MSR 2009: 18).

³⁴⁷ Academic, Banda Aceh, 4 March 2011.

supporters. One consequence was that funds were spread widely among former rebels, with some former combatants receiving as little as Rp 30,000 or US\$ 3 (World Bank 2006a: 30). Former combatants asked why they were only being given *uang rokok* (money for cigarettes) (*ibid.*: 31).

Where former combatants did receive assistance, it often had little impact on their longer-run well-being. The government reintegration programmes gave out cash with little technical assistance or monitoring to ensure money was used effectively. After initial 'goodwill' payments were made, BRA developed a system whereby GAM leaders would receive funds to set up micro-projects for groups of their cadres (Zurstrassen 2006). On the face of it, the development of proposals, vetted by a BRA committee, would ensure that funds were used for productive economic purposes. Yet it soon became clear that welfare impacts were less important than satisfying political pressures to disburse the money. GAM elites argued that reintegration funds were compensation for losses from the conflict and were their right under the MoU (ICG 2007c: 9); as such, there should not be rules on how they spent their money. They won the argument, the scheme was scrapped, and additional payments were made in cash to commanders with little monitoring of how money was spent. Internationally-sponsored programmes were generally more effective, providing training and follow-up support in addition to cash. Yet, even then, on average households who received reintegration assistance ended up faring no better than those who did not (MSR 2009: 87).

The reintegration programme served to create new demands for and expectations of assistance amongst former combatants and led to rising disillusionment when this was not forthcoming. Over time, it also increased suspicions amongst some former combatants that Jakarta and the Acehnese authorities did not care about their needs and that they were reneging on the promises of the peace deal (Barron 2008: 26-27).

Rising inequalities within GAM

There is a big difference within GAM: between the high, medium, and low level ... The lower GAM/KPA are very angry because, first, they don't understand government administrative processes for getting access to money and, second, they don't want to be beggars to the upper level. Their position is weak in the communities.³⁴⁸

The failures of reintegration funds to meet the expectations of many former combatants were compounded by growing inequalities within the former rebel movement. As we saw earlier, the primary means by which GAM elites have got ahead has been through entry to politics and attendant opportunities in business and contracting. Access to these areas has been closed for most lower-level GAM; most of the benefits have accrued only to those in the upper echelons of the movement.

GAM had a strict hierarchical structure. Below the senior leaders, exiled in Sweden, were those with Aceh-wide responsibilities such as the *panglima negara* (state commander). Under him, Aceh was divided into 17 regions (*wilayah*) with a *panglima wilayah* controlling each. Within each *wilayah*, there were on average four area commanders (*panglima daerah*). Below the *daerah* level were around 270 *sagoes*, corresponding roughly in size to an Indonesian administrative sub-district (*kecamatan*), each led by a *panglima sagoe*. Under these were the footsoldiers. GAM's civilian apparatus was organised similarly and its post-conflict incarnation, the KPA, largely uses the same structure.

While the war was ongoing the differences in wealth between those at higher and lower levels within GAM were relatively slight. However, after the extended violence ended, sharp disparities emerged that created jealousies and tensions:

I went to rural Bireuen district where the ex-combatants are doing nothing. They are really bitter with KPA. They say, 'Darwis [Jeunib, the former GAM commander for Bireuen]—he has a big house and we have nothing.'³⁴⁹

³⁴⁸ Activist, North Aceh, 7 March 2011.

³⁴⁹ Former AMM peace monitor, Banda Aceh, 9 March 2011.

There is differentiation in the status of higher and lower level ex-combatants. Some ex-combatants now are not depending on their leaders. They do [what they want] by themselves ... This is all creating jealousy. Some have no money to pay for coffee. They see others who have luxury cars. They say, 'before we were the same'.³⁵⁰

Rising inequality has been a consequence of the ways in which GAM-operated businesses, especially contractors, function. Most projects go through the *panglima wilayah* and occasionally through those *panglima daerah* who have political connections.³⁵¹ Resources are often captured at this level.

It is just the GAM elite that relies on government projects. So there are big discrepancies between the higher and lower levels.³⁵²

GAM leaders hire locals, including many lower-level former combatants, to work on large public works projects. However, such jobs tend to last for only a short time and pay low salaries. Increasingly, local level GAM have also found it difficult to gain work on these projects. As GAM entered politics it needed to expand its support base. GAM politicians would have been unlikely to gain sufficient support in 2009 and 2012 if they relied solely on the support of former rebel combatants. One consequence is that the patronage base for GAM political and business elites has expanded to include many who were not involved in the insurgency. Similar considerations led KPA to allow non-combatants to become members of the organisation and PA to court non-GAM activists and cadres of other political parties. The loyalties of former fighters have reduced in importance. As a result, a more limited share of funds has been channelled to lower-level former combatants with more captured at higher levels or spread more widely including to non-GAM.³⁵³

This has led to great frustration, especially among those at the *sagoe* (sub-district) level. Many ex-combatants in villages are illiterate and have lower expectations,

³⁵⁰ East Aceh vice-district head, East Aceh, 8 March 2011.

³⁵¹ Academic, Banda Aceh, 4 March 2011. Interviews in North and East Aceh, March 2011.

³⁵² State intelligence officer, Banda Aceh, 4 March 2011.

³⁵³ Interviews on east and west coast, March and April 2011.

happy to work as labourers or farmers.³⁵⁴ In contrast, those at the *sagoe* level often have greater ambitions yet do not have the sway with higher-level GAM figures to secure projects of their own.³⁵⁵ In this environment, many of these former fighters have turned to violence.

The uses of violence: capturing resources and signalling

I interviewed an ex-combatant in Nisam [in North Aceh] called Rambo. He said his boss [a former GAM commander] gives him only a little money. If it is divided by 70 [the number of ex-combatants in the area] it's only Rp. 25,000 [US\$ 2.5] per month. So he said, 'I still have some weapons. If the situation does not change, I will do myself what needs to be done.'³⁵⁶

There are many criminal incidents in Aceh. This is because people have big expectations. Everybody, especially on the east coast, feels they played a role in making peace. But, in reality, their expectations are not fulfilled in terms of access to the economy. There were a lot of promises made during the campaign for the governor and district head. This creates the foundations of grievances.³⁵⁷

In this context of frustrated expectations, less reliance on their former patrons and a fragmenting KPA structure, former rebel combatants, especially at the *sagoe* level, have increasingly used violence instrumentally. It was this level that was most factionalised and where there was the least discipline during the war (Schulze 2004: 12). For such figures, violence serves two purposes.

First, violence is used to directly secure resources. This explains the rise in violent crime which has been most pronounced in GAM's old heartlands on the east coast. In 2008, the police in Aceh claimed that the number of armed crimes in the province was 22 times higher than before the Helsinki MoU (Jones 2008). A prosecutor in North Aceh, a former GAM stronghold, observed that there were cases of armed violence in her area almost every month. Cases of crime increased rapidly between 2008 and 2011 with crimes involving firearms rising most sharply. In addition to robberies, the kidnapping of children for ransom had also risen with 35 cases in her area in 2009

³⁵⁴ Activist, North Aceh, 7 March 2011.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁶ Academic, Banda Aceh, 4 March 2011. Rambo, who was involved in armed robberies, was subsequently killed in a police raid.

³⁵⁷ Journalist, Banda Aceh, 3 March 2011.

compared to just four in 2008.³⁵⁸ In East Aceh, and no doubt elsewhere, kidnappings of civil servants also occur frequently.³⁵⁹ Lower-level GAM also use violence to ensure they are employed on public works projects.³⁶⁰ An estimated 90% of criminal activity in East Aceh is carried out by ex-combatants many of whom are disappointed that they did not receive their share of the post-conflict spoils (ICG 2009b: 8).

Second, violence is being used to signal discontent and continuing coercive capacity to elites with the aim of increasing downwards patronage flows. Senior GAM figures such as Sofyan Dawood, Ilyas Pasee, and Zakaria Saman have had grenades thrown at their houses.³⁶¹ The attacks were motivated by struggles over economic resources, in particular aid funds and illegal logging (World Bank 2007c). While no-one was caught, it is likely that the perpetrators were disgruntled GAM members who felt their targets had not distributed a large enough share of the lucrative projects they controlled (ICG 2007c: 5). There have been other attacks aimed at politicians who have criticised former combatants' continuing practices of demanding shares of projects and imposing taxes. For example, in May 2011 a local politician was attacked while giving a public speech where he criticised continuing extortion by KPA members (ICG 2011a: 8). Such attacks have usually been intended to intimidate rather than kill—grenades have been thrown at buildings rather than people and in almost every case no-one has been injured, although there are exceptions.

³⁵⁸ North Aceh, 7 March 2011.

³⁵⁹ Activist, Each Aceh, 9 March 2011.

³⁶⁰ Fieldwork on east coast of Aceh, March 2011.

³⁶¹ Sofyan Dawood's house was attacked in April 2007. The same month a box containing an active grenade was found outside the office of Ilyas Pasee, the GAM North Aceh district head, with a letter in Acehnese threatening him if he "continued to commit infractions in his duties". A grenade was also thrown at the house of the Lhokseumawe vice-mayor (World Bank 2007b). Similar incidents continued the following month with grenades thrown at the house of the head of the Pidie district parliament, at the parliament building in Bener Meriah district, and at the offices of two sub-district heads in Central Aceh district (World Bank 2007c). Zakaria Saman's house in Pidie district was burned in March 2012 and grenades were thrown at his residence in Banda Aceh in June 2012. There have also been attacks on KPA offices (World Bank 2008e).

Indeed, Aceh shows that local level violence specialists are not just passive tools of elites as they are sometimes depicted in the literature. They can also use violence instrumentally to shape the decisions and actions of those above them.

3.2 Low costs: acceptance of small episodic violence by elites

The motivations for lower-level former combatants and others to use violence have been strengthened by the fact that the risks associated with such actions have been low. Whereas there has been little tolerance of large episodic violence that could threaten the peace process there has been tacit acceptance by elites of smaller-scale forms of violence.

Security forces

The police and military have been reluctant to investigate small-scale incidents of violence such as violent robberies and local disputes, in particular where former GAM combatants have been involved. Post-MoU, the security forces have generally used a soft approach in Aceh, preferring dialogue to more aggressive forms of investigation. Local police chiefs emphasise the nationwide policy of 'Partnership with the People', or community policing.³⁶² Police and the military argue that such an approach is needed in an environment where they are still not widely accepted by the local population and where they need to be careful not to alienate or offend their former enemies in GAM. As one senior intelligence official noted, "they are afraid people will misinterpret police pressure."³⁶³

The choice of such an approach is also a function of practical concerns about the limited number of police personnel. The MoU set police numbers at 9,100 for a population of 4.4 million. While this figure has been exceeded—by 2008 there were

³⁶² Senior police officer, South Aceh, 21 April 2011.

³⁶³ State intelligence officer, Banda Aceh, 4 March 2011.

around 13,000 police in the province (Jones 2008)—per capita policing levels are still very low:

There are still few police compared to the population number. The MoU limits numbers. The police are also still unwilling to force themselves to be proactive ... They think the people they are facing are 'crazy people'. They think it would create more problems if they are more forceful.³⁶⁴

The careful—some would say hesitant—approach is also related to the widespread availability of guns in the province. The peace agreement called for GAM to surrender 840 weapons. However, this was largely of symbolic value and did not significantly deplete the former rebel group's fighting capacity. The military and others knew that GAM had more guns.³⁶⁵ Indonesian intelligence is also aware that there are still some imports of guns.³⁶⁶ On 7 March 2011, a factory was found producing AK47s and M16s in a rural area of Nagan Raya district. Across Aceh, 14% of all cases of post-conflict violence have involved the use of a firearm, compared to 4% of incidents in post-conflict Maluku and 2% in North Maluku. In East Aceh district, the figure is 35% with 171 incidents of armed violence recorded in the post-conflict period.

Others highlight the extent to which the police and military have not focused on their core tasks because of other concerns. As one analyst noted:

The police and military could address the problem [of the rise in violent crime and conflict] but they are too busy working with GAM on things like illegal logging.³⁶⁷

Indeed, the failure of the police to go after Pasukan Peudeung (Long Sword Forces), a GAM splinter group that has been involved in many armed robberies and kidnappings, is likely a result of collusion between the local police and gang members (ICG 2009b: 9-10).³⁶⁸

GAM leadership

³⁶⁴ Newspaper journalist, Banda Aceh, 3 March 2011.

³⁶⁵ Former AMM peace monitor, Bangkok, November 2012.

³⁶⁶ State intelligence officer, Banda Aceh, 4 March 2011.

³⁶⁷ Acehnese working for international NGO, Aceh Besar, 6 March 2011.

³⁶⁸ On Pasukan Peudeung, see World Bank (2008d), Grayman (2012), and Anderson (2013).

The GAM elite has also done little to sanction former combatants who engage in smaller-scale violence that is not threatening to the peace deal or to their own interests. This is the case because they do not want more pressure from those below them. Allowing violence is seen as a way of enabling ex-combatants to let off some steam while also letting them secure some resources. Coming down hard on such violence could threaten GAM leaders' interests:

They [GAM leaders] could use their channel of command to control incidents ... But they don't because they don't want more problems from those at the lower level ... Partai Aceh have the power to fix the problem. But they are not moving towards this. Some of them are educated, they understand the situation. But everyone is busy securing power, just for personal interests.³⁶⁹

A World Bank report (2009a) that identified extortion and intimidation from former combatants as the main barriers to growth in the province was publically received with hostility by the then governor and former GAM leader, Irwandi Jusuf. Privately, Irwandi acknowledged these issues were a problem but stated that he had to give some space to former combatants otherwise they could cause more problems for the peace process.³⁷⁰

Signalling the usefulness of violence

The absence of effective sanctioning of small-scale violence that does not threaten the peace process or elite interests has shown that it can be a useful and relatively risk-free strategy for accumulating resources. This has resulted in post-conflict violence becoming normalised among many former combatants. It has also encouraged others to use violence for instrumental purposes.

One consequence has been that many common criminals now present themselves as former GAM combatants. They do so because they feel this affords them protection with police more likely to turn a blind eye to indiscretions. It also reduces the risk of community resistance. As one local civil society figure in Peureulak, East Aceh, told me:

³⁶⁹ Acehnese working for international NGO, Greater Aceh, 6 March 2011.

³⁷⁰ Discussions with Irwandi Jusuf, Jakarta, mid-2009.

There is a problem here with people claiming to be GAM. They do so because of the history here. They know people are afraid of GAM.³⁷¹

Lack of effective responses to crime and local violent conflict has also led others to use violence to settle their problems. Anti-separatist militia groups in the Central Highlands have used similar tactics to former GAM to demand projects. Other community members have also increasingly resorted to violence.

3.3 Alternative explanations for frequent small episodic violence

The chapter has developed an explanation for the frequent small-scale episodic violence in post-conflict Aceh that focuses primarily on one set of actors (lower-level former combatants) and one set of motives (economic accumulation). Hypothetically, it could be that the violence is undertaken by other actors (such as non-combatant community members or local elites) and/or that other motives (such as revenge taking) are more important. It is worth briefly considering these alternative explanations.

The torn social fabric?

Frequent post-conflict violence could be the result of destroyed social relations and diminished trust. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the global literature has highlighted how the impacts of past war on group identities, inter-group relations, and behaviours can produce environments where violence can easily emerge. Do such issues explain post-conflict Aceh's frequent small-scale violence?

Most of Aceh's post-conflict violence is not a result of dysfunctional inter-group relations. Unlike many civil wars, Aceh did not have multiple conflicting parties, each commanding loyalty from sections of the local population. Rather, there was strong support for GAM's goals, if not always its means, among the civilian population in most areas. As a result, there was acceptance, indeed often celebrations, when combatants returned home after the peace deal, a situation that has been observed in other post-war

³⁷¹ Activist, East Aceh, 9 March 2011.

cases such as Timor-Leste (Peake 2009). A representative survey of 642 former combatants six months after the MoU found that 90% had experienced no problems on their return despite there being little reintegration money flowing at this point. In more than three-quarters of villages surveyed, traditional *peusijuk* (welcoming) ceremonies were held to celebrate the return of combatants (World Bank 2006a: 25). A World Bank survey of every rural village in Aceh in 2007 found high levels of social capital and improvements in social cohesion and village solidarity since the Helsinki MoU (World Bank/KDP 2007: 78). Only 7% of villagers interviewed said that there were low levels of trust between 'those who returned from the mountain' and other community members (*ibid.*: 77).

As time has gone on, trust has not diminished. Of the more than 1,000 former GAM members surveyed in mid-2008, only seven reported any difficulties with being accepted since they returned to their villages (Barron 2008: 18). In some areas of the Central Highlands, where pro-government militia were strong due to the presence of non-Acehnese ethnic groups such as the Gayo and Javanese, tensions have been greater.³⁷² Yet even there trust has been growing, although there have been some isolated incidents of unrest. Across all of the areas surveyed, 97% of female community members and 96% of civilian men reported that the presence of former combatants was not a source of division in their community. Around 90% of informants said they would be happy to welcome former combatants into their family through marriage and that former combatants could be among their close friends (*ibid.*).

Revenge does not appear to be the primary motive in most incidents of violence. Certainly there were some cases of retributive killings in the early months after the

³⁷² The return of displaced people to ethnically heterogeneous Bener Meriah and Central Aceh in late 2005, for example, raised tensions. However, these did not result in violence (World Bank 2005, 2006a).

peace agreement.³⁷³ But, by and large, instrumental uses of violence, often economically motivated, have been far more common (e.g. ICG 2007c).

The use of small-scale violence by elites?

It could be that Aceh's frequent small-scale episodic violence is driven by local elites such as former GAM commanders, local politicians, or security chiefs. Such elites may feel that using large-scale episodic violence is not in their interests—because it is not necessary to achieve their goals or because it is risky—but that smaller-scale violence is a useful tool in political and economic competition.

Some analyses of recent violence in Aceh have emphasised elite calculations. In particular, the violence in the lead up to the 2009 and 2012 elections, which as I discussed earlier were marked by tensions between different groups in the GAM elite, may have been elite-driven (ICG 2009b, 2012c). In July 2011, Teungku Cagee, a former GAM commander who had defied KPA orders by supporting the incumbent Irwandi in the gubernatorial elections, was assassinated.³⁷⁴ In late 2011 and early 2012 there were a series of shootings, many against migrant Javanese labourers. Some saw these as being organised by Partai Aceh to send a signal to Jakarta that the planned local elections should be postponed so that they would not take place while the incumbent, Irwandi, was still governor (e.g. ICG 2012c).³⁷⁵ Aceh, indeed, has seen much more electoral violence than other provinces and the pattern of assassinations in the run up to recent elections is, within Indonesia, largely unique to Aceh.³⁷⁶ Some other criminal violence is also likely condoned by local elites competing over business opportunities and extortion

³⁷³ The World Bank's Conflict Monitoring Updates document some of these cases, which have been relatively rare compared to other types of violence.

³⁷⁴ Three men were arrested in March 2012 for the killing, but links to senior KPA leaders were not proved (Afrida and Simanjuntak 2012).

³⁷⁵ The elections, which were scheduled to be held in October 2011, were postponed four times, finally taking place in April 2012. Partai Aceh wanted to ensure that Irwandi could not use the advantages that incumbency affords such as using the state apparatus for campaigning. It is also likely that some of the killings were done by the military (expert on Aceh conflict, Jakarta, 24 January 2012).

³⁷⁶ Of the 16 provinces in the NVMS dataset, Aceh has the highest levels of electoral violence. Only Papua has seen more people killed in elections-related violence.

schemes. Indeed, some GAM elites may have an interest in attributing violence to disgruntled rank-and-file to divert attention away from themselves.³⁷⁷

However, in contrast to Maluku, there is little evidence of elites systematically organising violence. Local elites have played a role in sponsoring some incidents of small-scale violence, in particular in the run up to elections. Yet most violence has been fragmented, involving a wide range of actors, suggesting that ground-level motivations explain more than those of local elites.

3.4 District level divergence: East and South Aceh

I have argued that high levels of small-scale episodic violence in Aceh can be largely explained by the incentives former combatants have to use violence instrumentally for purposes of accumulation. Further support for this argument emerges if we look at variation in post-conflict violence between districts within Aceh.

Table 7.1 provides data on incidents and impacts of post-conflict violence in the seven districts that were most affected by the past extended violence. South Aceh is exceptional in having seen relatively little violence since the peace agreement. In contrast, east coast districts such as Aceh Besar, East Aceh, Bireuen and Lhokseumawe have been the sites of much more post-conflict violence. To tease out the reasons for such sub-provincial variation, I conducted fieldwork in East Aceh (which has the second highest per capita death rate in the post-conflict period) and South Aceh (which has the lowest).³⁷⁸

³⁷⁷ Thanks to Adrian Morel for this point.

³⁷⁸ The per capita death toll in Aceh Besar is higher than in East Aceh. However, over one-quarter of the post-conflict deaths in the district were the result of police raids on a jihadi camp in early 2010, which had no link to past violence. If these are excluded, the per capita post-conflict death rate is substantially higher in East Aceh.

Table 7.1. Levels of small-scale post-conflict violence in Aceh districts most affected by extended violence

District	Pop.	EV period	Post-conflict period					
		<i>Deaths</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Deaths</i>	<i>Inj.</i>	<i>Kidnap.</i>	<i>Buildings</i>	<i>Deaths per capita</i>
Aceh Besar	307,362	838	294	73	216	13	43	32
East Aceh	313,333	1,511	494	65	275	61	41	26
Bireuen	355,989	1,443	466	66	321	18	133	25
Lhokseumawe	158,169	415	497	26	391	10	27	22
Pidie	373,234	737	377	49	244	10	21	18
North Aceh	510,494	1,989	705	66	500	33	52	17
South Aceh	209,853	903	114	15	84	4	20	10

Source: NVMS. Impacts reported are for small-scale violence (where less than three people die, 10 are injured, or 15 buildings are damaged in an incident). Post-conflict period is August 2005 until the end of 2012. Per capita rates are per 1 million people per year. Population data are from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics and are for 2008.

There are a number of reasons why we might have expected South Aceh to see more post-conflict violence than East Aceh. First, in the run up to the MoU violence was on the rise in South Aceh. From January-August 2005, there were 50 violent incidents in South Aceh resulting in 42 deaths and 23 injuries, as well as 31 kidnappings. The death toll was the second highest amongst Aceh's districts. In the same time period, there were 31 deaths from 44 incidents and 21 kidnappings in East Aceh.

Second, former combatants make up a greater share of the population in South Aceh than East Aceh. There are around 1,600 ex-combatants in East Aceh, in a population of over 300,000, compared with 1,400 in South Aceh, which has a population of close to 200,000 (MSR 2009: 18).

Third, some have argued that ex-combatants in South Aceh are more likely to have joined GAM for economic reasons than in East Aceh. The rise in violence in South Aceh in 2002 and 2003 coincided with GAM's attempts to expand its influence from its east coast strongholds to other areas of the province that were previously less touched by violence. This involved hiring thugs and other opportunists with a taste for violence,

with the result that GAM was more coercive and ill-disciplined in areas such as South Aceh where it did not have a historical presence (Schulze 2004: 17; Good et al. 2007: 16).

Finally, South Aceh was home to some of the worst human rights abuses during the extended violence. A study in 14 districts in Aceh identified South Aceh's Kluet river valley as being a central hotspot of violations. Exposure to traumatic events in this area was double the sample average and higher than in east coast GAM strongholds (Good et al. 2007: 26-29).

Why then has South Aceh seen so much less post-conflict violence than East Aceh and many of the other east coast districts? There are two important differences between the two districts that explain divergent patterns of post-conflict violence.

Networks and resource flows within GAM

First, a larger share of resources are flowing down from elite-level GAM in South Aceh than in East Aceh. This is a function of differences in the ways the GAM/KPA networks are functioning in the post-conflict period.

In both districts, GAM is a major player in local politics and business. Partai Aceh holds 25 of 35 seats in the East Aceh parliament and 10 seats in South Aceh where it is the largest party. GAM elites are also dominant in the local economy. In East Aceh, most infrastructure projects are now run by GAM. In South Aceh, a local politician estimated that around 90% of projects went to KPA.³⁷⁹ The process of winning such contracts is similar in both areas with a combination of political connections and sometimes intimidation used.³⁸⁰ As in East Aceh, aggression is sometimes used in South Aceh. One

³⁷⁹ Senior government leader, East Aceh, 8 March 2011; local parliament member, South Aceh, 21 April 2011.

³⁸⁰ A senior figure in the South Aceh contractors' association explained how elites collude to divide the contracting pie and how the entry of GAM has affected this: "In total [in South Aceh], there are 300 local contractors. But only 10% of these get projects properly, based on the proper process. The rest win their contracts based on collusion ... KPA don't dare threaten me because I help them in solving their problems. I try to organise their

local NGO activist noted that there have been six recent cases of GAM figures attacking the heads of local government agencies (*dinas/badan*) to put pressure on them to receive projects. There was no follow-up by the police who just replied '*damai*' (peace) when government officials reported the incidents to them.³⁸¹

However, a larger proportion of the money raised at higher levels within the GAM/KPA structure reaches lower-level former combatants in South Aceh than in East Aceh. The main reason for this is that the GAM/KPA structure is less fragmented in South Aceh than in East Aceh.

In September 2004, the powerful GAM *panglima* of East Aceh, Ishak Daud, was killed in battle. His role was taken by Teungku Muhammad Sanusi. He was one of the older commanders, having been trained in Libya. But he had little authority with many of the young combatants who had joined in recent years.³⁸² He was closer to local Islamic leaders (*ulama*) than to former combatants.³⁸³ In the absence of strong local leadership, multiple commanders at similar levels have emerged with often little coordination between them.³⁸⁴

The weak GAM leadership in East Aceh has had two effects. First, those at the pinnacle of the organisation do not rely heavily on lower-level former combatants and do not always have good relations with them. Second, these district level commanders and leaders have little ability to prevent ex-combatants from committing crimes or using violence. Ridwan, a member of the provincial parliament who had been deputy GAM commander for East Aceh during the war, was kidnapped by his former followers.

share of the cake. The contractors' association receives 10% [of the total budget that is being contracted out]. I coordinate to give a certain percentage to KPA, a certain percentage to the district head's team, a percentage to the local parliament. [*When did you make that agreement?*] I tried even before KPA existed. It went well. It was against the regulation, but it did ensure the quality of projects. But now, KPA have destroyed that system" (South Aceh, 21 April 2011).

³⁸¹ South Aceh, 19 April 2011. Corroborated by other interviews in South Aceh, April 2011.

³⁸² A number of respondents in Banda Aceh and East Aceh said that Sanusi has wisdom but not authority. Former GAM combatants, they argued, wanted simple instructions and actions. Sanusi's more philosophical approach to problem solving did not go down well.

³⁸³ Former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 11 March 2011.

³⁸⁴ Expert on Aceh conflict, Banda Aceh, 3 March 2011.

The ex-combatants were unhappy that while their patron was doing well, they had seen little benefit.³⁸⁵

In contrast, GAM in South Aceh is less factionalised and the command structure functions more effectively than in East Aceh. Under the district-level leader, Abra Mudah, are four commanders, each in charge of a different geographic area: Kluet Raya, Bakongan Raya, Lhok Tapaktuan, and Labuan Haji. These four divide up contracts amongst themselves, but coordinate in the process.³⁸⁶ The leaders who get projects tend to distribute a share to those below them. As one *sagoe* GAM leader noted:

There is not a big gap between the low and high level [former GAM] here in terms of wealth or poverty. People below see that. It's about the distribution of resources. If someone from the high level gets a project from the government, normally they employ their followers. There's a strong instruction from above [KPA South Aceh] to not use violence or do crime.³⁸⁷

Such redistribution occurs in part for prudential reasons. A local NGO activist observed:

Here in South Aceh, if GAM get a project and don't share, then others [within GAM] will betray you, steal cement, and so on.³⁸⁸

However, another factor is that there are greater norms of brotherhood and solidarity amongst former combatants in South Aceh than in many of GAM's east-coast strongholds. There are a number of reasons for this including: most GAM in the district being recruited around the same time, meaning that differences in status between fighters are more limited than in other districts; more extensive kinship relations between former combatants;³⁸⁹ the fact that the district is relatively isolated encouraging a common sense of identity, even in the face of a more diverse ethnic mix; and an enhanced need to ensure organisational strength in an environment where GAM

³⁸⁵ Expert on Aceh conflict, South Aceh, 22 April 2011.

³⁸⁶ Development project worker, South Aceh, 19 April 2011; local NGO worker, South Aceh, 19 April 2011.

³⁸⁷ Former *sagoe* GAM, South Aceh, 20 April 2011.

³⁸⁸ NGO activist, South Aceh, 19 April 2011.

³⁸⁹ One former combatant noted: "Overall, we're disappointed with the high rank GAM. The only shield that exists is brotherhood. If there was no brotherhood, it would be the same as in East Aceh, even if the structure was strong ... The sense of brotherhood is very strong here. It stops us doing violent things. For example, the current head of the local parliament, many hate him. But he has family, brothers, who make sure no violence is expressed. I am sure if there was no sense of brotherhood, that guy would be finished" (South Aceh, 20 April 2011).

do not have the same monopoly on political power as in some other districts. While some tensions have emerged between different levels of GAM, these have largely been overcome.³⁹⁰

Local economic activities

The mining really helps. If there was no mining, it would be very difficult to live. If there were no activities like this, probably there would be conflict again. If no money, no activity, headaches. If there was no mining, well there would be problems every day.³⁹¹

A second difference is the presence of local economic activities controlled by *sagoe* level GAM in South Aceh. In East Aceh, lower-level former combatants rely on projects controlled by their leaders at the district level. In contrast, the discovery of gold in South Aceh, and the establishment of local cooperatives to manage mining and selling, has meant that more money-making opportunities are available for former combatants.

South Aceh is rich in natural resources and small-scale mining of resources continued through the war years. With the peace process, larger companies started to move in. By early 2011, 23 companies had permission for exploration, and five had been given permission for exploitation.³⁹² The mining companies rely on local cooperatives for labour. These are largely controlled by sub-district-level KPA commanders and provide work for some former combatants.³⁹³

More important has been the growth of traditional, and illegal, mining operations in a number of areas of the district that were previous conflict hot spots: Central Kluet, Pasir Raja, Sawang, and Sama Dua. These were set up after local leaders observed similar mining techniques being used in Aceh Jaya district and operations were expanded after they proved successful.³⁹⁴ In these areas, 400 stone destroying machines are operating. Villages I visited in Pasi Raja were producing six kilograms of

³⁹⁰ Former combatant, South Aceh, 21 April 2011.

³⁹¹ Village leader and former combatant, South Aceh, 20 April 2011.

³⁹² Activist, South Aceh, 19 April 2011.

³⁹³ Interviews in Manggamat and Central Kluet, South Aceh, April 2011.

³⁹⁴ Development project staff, South Aceh, 20 April 2011.

gold per day. It was estimated that across South Aceh, around 20 kilograms of gold, with a market value of around US\$ 360,000, is being produced each day by traditional mining.³⁹⁵

These operations have many negative consequences. There have been tensions between companies and locals over the destruction of roads by trucks carrying out materials. Mercury used in traditional mining will likely have large environmental impacts in the future. The vice-district head of South Aceh also attributed recent floods in the Kluet area to mining operations—legal and illegal.³⁹⁶ Mining has not led to widespread economic development in South Aceh. One local NGO figure observed that since the MoU the only substantive sign of progress in Tapaktuan, South Aceh's capital, was the installation of a new set of traffic lights.³⁹⁷

However, the traditional mining operations have ensured that more money is captured by former GAM leaders at the local level than has been the case in other districts like East Aceh. *Sagoe*-level KPA manage the cooperatives and also play a role as agents, selling their production to businessmen who then export it from Aceh. They pay no tax. There has been no effort from the police to shut down operations because they are also involved in illegal mining.³⁹⁸ This has meant that there is less welfare inequality within GAM in South Aceh than in most other parts of the province and many, if not all, lower-level former combatants are doing reasonably well economically. In this environment, the incentives for local level former combatants to use violence are minimised.

³⁹⁵ Interviews in South Aceh. Cooperatives can receive between Rp 320,000 – 350,000 (US\$ 32-35) for one gram of gold.

³⁹⁶ South Aceh, 21 April 2011.

³⁹⁷ South Aceh, 19 April 2011.

³⁹⁸ Former combatant and village head, South Aceh, 20 April 2011.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has explained why some post-conflict areas experience frequent small-scale violence that does not escalate into larger conflagrations. I have argued that, as in Maluku and North Maluku, patterns of violence in Aceh can be understood by considering the incentives that local elites and local violence specialists have to support or use violence for purposes of accumulation.

Frequent large episodic violence has been absent in post-conflict Aceh because local elites have not supported its use. In contrast to Maluku, it has not been necessary for elites—including GAM leaders, other local politicians, and security force leaders—to use large episodic violence to access political power or economic resources. It has also not been in their interest to allow others to use such violence as it could pose risks for a peace settlement from which they are benefitting. Because of this, local elites have tended not to engage in large episodic violence and have sanctioned their followers on the rare occasions that such violence has occurred.

However, unlike in North Maluku, smaller-scale incidents, especially violent crimes, have been frequent. This is largely because lower-level former combatants and other violence specialists have found it to be an effective way to secure resources. In North Maluku, expectations amongst those who had fought in the extended violence were lower than in Aceh, in part because their participation in war was driven less by predatory motives, in part because such participation had been shorter, and because combatant organisation structures quickly faded away. In contrast, expectations amongst lower-level former combatants in Aceh were high. In a context of limited economic opportunities at the local level, and growing inequalities within the former rebel movement, this led some to use violence to try to get ahead. Elites in Aceh have generally allowed such violence to occur where it has not impinged on their own interests. This has generated a signal for former combatants and others that engaging in

small-scale violence can be profitable and is not costly. Only where lower-level combatants have had greater economic opportunities has such violence been less frequent.

The Aceh case provides insights on how post-conflict resources can shape the incentives of different groups to use violence. In the last chapter, I argued that the absence of extensive aid in the early post-conflict period in North Maluku allowed local elites to focus on reconciliation activities. I argued that this, in part, explained why that province had not seen the same levels of violence as had Maluku, where there were far greater resources. However, Aceh's experience shows that more important than levels of resources are the mechanisms that dictate how they are allocated. In Maluku, decisions on how resources would be used were often shaped by the use or threat of violence by elites and their underlings. Aceh differed because greater efforts were made to politically incorporate former dissident leaders; their ability to benefit economically flowed from their accession to political power. As in North Maluku, informal norms of collaboration between old adversaries meant that political competition did not become zero-sum. Expansion of subnational resources vastly increased opportunities for everyone to get their share of the cake. In this environment, and as in much of Indonesia, the use of large episodic violence to secure resources or signal strength was not necessary.

However, the Aceh case also shows how growing inequalities in a resource-rich environment can have potentially dangerous consequences. The high level of resources in Aceh has served to raise the expectations of former combatants; the lack of success they have had in benefitting from them has increased frustrations and led some to use small-scale episodic violence strategically to capture resources. To date, local elites have not tolerated the escalation of violence beyond small-scale incidents. However, over the longer run local elite preferences can change, shaped in part by the attitudes of those below them. In the absence of more effective and equitable development in Aceh, which

requires improvements in governance institutions, there is a risk that if elite attitudes to violence do change, the presence of disillusioned former fighters will make it very easy for elites to act on their impulses.

Chapter 8. Why Has Extended Violent Conflict Not Recurred?

The areas of Indonesia previously affected by extended violent conflict vary in the levels and predominant forms of episodic violence they have seen in their post-conflict periods. As previous chapters explored, large clashes have frequently occurred in post-conflict Maluku while Aceh has experienced high levels of violent crime and other small-scale violent incidents. Yet in neither province has post-conflict violence escalated to the point where extended violent conflict has reemerged. Other Indonesian post-conflict regions have also seen frequent deadly incidents. But common across all is the absence of renewed large-scale extended violence such as that which characterised the early post-Suharto years.

This chapter explains why extended violent conflict has not recurred *anywhere* in Indonesia. In so doing, it explores the reasons for temporal variation in extended violent conflict, comparing Indonesia's initial period of democratic transition, when extended violence was present in many provinces, with more recent years, when it has been absent.

I argue that to understand this lack of recurrence we must turn our analytic gaze to the national level and focus on the interests of elites linked to, and battling for power within, the central state. In middle income countries such as Indonesia, where the coercive and bureaucratic arms of the state have wide reach, the central state has the capacity to prevent the escalation of localised violence into extended violent conflict; in contrast to episodic forms of violence, which are largely driven by local actors, escalation to extended violence in such states only occurs when members of the national state-based elite support or condone such intensification. The lack of extended violence anywhere in Indonesia today is thus not primarily a function of changes in the motives

or incentives of local violence specialists or local elites. Rather, organised enduring violence is absent from the current Indonesian landscape because there is now agreement across the national elite that such violence is not beneficial or acceptable. As a result, the central state has been able to take actions to prevent the escalation of large sporadic episodes of violence into wider large-scale unrest.

In the early years of Indonesia's transition, some security agency leaders and national politicians had an interest in allowing localised regional violence to escalate. The Indonesian military, in particular, was concerned with ensuring its power did not diminish in a reforming Indonesia. The presence of escalated extended violence, especially that between warring religious and ethnic groups, amplified worries that diverse Indonesia was on the brink of disintegration. In this environment, military claims for a continuing strong role as guardians of the nation were bolstered. Some politicians, too, saw benefits from extended violent conflicts as they jostled for power and to shape the new rules of the political and economic game. There is scant evidence that the military, police or other national elites caused violence to erupt in the Moluccas, Kalimantan, Aceh, or Central Sulawesi. Yet while violence was initially a result of local interests and grievances, these conflicts only escalated to full-scale wars because of central state inaction and sometimes active meddling.

Over time, the incentives of central state elites to support such large-scale violence have diminished as Indonesia's democracy has consolidated after the turbulent early transition years. There is now shared acceptance from national elites, including the military and police, on rules of behaviour where the promotion of large-scale extended violence is not an acceptable means to bolster power or seek resources. (The use of episodic violence is still tolerated where it is not threatening to the interests of national elites.) This common agreement is a product of two things: the deeper institutionalisation of the Indonesian polity which has created clearer rules of the game; and decisions by Indonesia's democracy-era presidents, and other members of the

national political elite, to share power and resources in ways that allow all central elite factions to benefit. The security forces have retained a strong role and entrenched interests from the Suharto era have not been challenged. The formation of rainbow coalitions, where parties of every political stripe have access to the spoils of government, has provided opportunities for national elites from across the political spectrum to prosper. Indonesia's growing economy has helped cement a bargain where extended violence is not countenanced even while other illiberal practices are.

Table 8.1 uses the thesis's theoretical framework to summarise the changes that have occurred and how these translate into differing levels of extended violent conflict.

Table 8.1. Incentives for central state-based actors to support violence escalation over time

Factor	Early post-Suharto period (1998 - 2003)	Later post-Suharto period (2004 -)
<u>Benefits:</u> Resources distributed to central state elites based on threat of/use of violence?	Yes	No
<u>Costs:</u> Supporting escalation shown to be costly?	No	Yes
<u>Opportunities:</u> Peaceful political/economic channels for accumulation by central elites?	No	Yes
Presence of extended violence	Yes	No

The chapter begins with an analysis of the causes of Indonesia's extended violent conflicts. I argue that while local interests and motivations triggered initial unrest, it was only because some central state elites supported escalation that violence became extended. Employing the theoretical framework, I show that that in a time of uncertainty a combination of high expected benefits, low costs, and a lack of peaceable means for accumulation led members of the national elite to support violence escalation. The chapter then discusses how the benefits and costs of using violence, and other opportunities for getting ahead, have altered as Indonesia's 'reformed' political order has consolidated. The chapter uses case and quantitative evidence to show how changed

responses from the central state have prevented the escalation of conflicts into extended violence, even where local interests supporting such escalation have remained strong.

1. National elite interests and Indonesia's extended violent conflicts

1.1 Previous explanations I: local motivations

Most accounts of Indonesia's extended violent conflicts emphasise the motivations of local actors seeking to redress grievances or achieve power in a changing Indonesia. As Suharto fell in May 1998 following massive protests in Jakarta and many regional capitals there was uncertainty over what form a democratising Indonesian state would take. In this environment, ethnic and religious groups in the regions, and separatist insurgents in Aceh and East Timor, turned to violence.

For Jacques Bertrand (2004), Suharto's fall constituted a critical juncture where the rules of the game on institutional forms, and whose interests they would represent, were to be (re)defined. As with the previous transitions from Dutch rule to independence in the 1940s, and the ouster of President Sukarno in the mid-1960s, violence emerged as the national model and state institutions were being renegotiated. The groups who used violence were those who had felt excluded or who disagreed with the terms of their inclusion under the New Order. "Islamists," he argues, "wanted to reopen questions relating to the role of Islam in the polity, Dayaks [in Kalimantan] refused to continue to be marginalized, East Timorese seized the moment to push for independence, and Acehnese vied to regain new terms of inclusion in Indonesia or independence" (*ibid.*: 5). The extended violent conflicts, in other words, were a consequence of the pent up grievances and ambitions of different ethnic and religious groups (or their leaders) with violence viewed as an effective means of accessing power. National transition and associated uncertainty provided the context, but it is the largely

regional elites representing these groups who are viewed by Bertrand as being the agents behind the violence.

John Sidel (2006) explicitly contrasts his argument with that of Bertrand but it shares many similarities. As with Bertrand, the violence that emerged in the late Suharto and early *reformasi* days is viewed as being driven by the uncertainty groups felt over the terms of their inclusion in times of change. Focusing largely on Islamic organisations, he argues that violent action flowed from anxieties related to the boundaries of authority commanded by local religious elites. Whereas Bertrand emphasises access to, and representation in and by, state institutions, Sidel's focus is wider looking at social and class relations. These, he argues, determined not only when and where violence took place but also its predominant form. A similar logic drove the riots, Church burnings and electoral violence of the late New Order period, the large-scale inter-religious violence in Maluku and Central Sulawesi after Suharto's fall, and the terrorist attacks that occurred from 2000 on: "Each phase of violence in Indonesia over the past ten years has been associated with one or more religious hierarchies and the problems that accompanied efforts to assert and maintain religious authority over, and identity among, one or another religious flock (*jemaah*)" (Sidel 2006: xii).

Violence, he argues, changes in form over time—from riots to pogroms to jihad, to use the title of his book—because different types of religious hierarchy were being challenged at different points in time. At varying points, different types of violent action were seen as being effective for preserving or extending the authority of religious groups.³⁹⁹ Yet all three types of violence are seen as flowing from the actions of local religious leaders. As with Bertrand, the political transition—and broader structural processes of social change—are viewed as being important only in how they affect the interests and motivations of the local elites who organise violence.

³⁹⁹ Sidel never fully develops his explanation for why different types of challenges to different religious hierarchies would lead to different forms of violence being used.

Gerry van Klinken (2007), who studies all of Indonesia's extended communal conflicts but not the separatist civil wars, differs from Sidel and Bertrand in his emphasis on the naked pursuit of power at the local level rather than the more existential struggle for the inclusion of identity groups or preservation of religious hierarchies. Drawing on the theory of contentious politics, in particular McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001), he argues that the post-Suharto extended violence was largely a product of the politico-economic incentives of local elites. Fear, anomie and uncertainty certainly contributed to violence but cannot alone explain it. Building on constructivist insights, he argues that identities were shaped and emphasised by local elites seeking to take advantage of the period of transition to pursue their own largely pecuniary goals. Escalated violence, he concludes, was "local politics by other means" and its key instigators and organisers were those "close to the levers of local power" (Klinken 2007: 138-139).

In emphasizing the interaction between national level changes and local motivations, the three authors each highlight important facilitating conditions for the series of extended violent conflicts that emerged in turn-of-the-century Indonesia. The transition from an authoritarian to an unknown order created uncertainty. Local leaders in different parts of the country responded by using violence to cement or extend their own control (Klinken) or to advance the position of the group and values they represented (Bertrand and Sidel). All three accounts thus emphasise the goals and agency of local elites in using violence for instrumental purposes.

The motivations of local elites to use violence are indeed important in understanding why initial incidents of violence occurred in the areas of Indonesia affected by extended violent conflict occurred. However, while such motivations were necessary for extended violence to occur, taken alone they are insufficient to explain it.

The causal accounts miss an important part of the equation: why the organisations of the Indonesian state responsible for maintaining order did not prevent violence from escalating. A fuller explanation for Indonesia's extended violent conflicts must account not only for why local individuals and groups had accentuated motivations to use violence but also why the state did not check violence escalation. One must understand why the coercive instruments of the state that could have prevented the transformation of violence into fully-fledged war did not perform such a role.

1.2 Previous explanations II: state institutions and the provision of order

To this end, Yuhki Tajima (2009, 2012) provides an important supplement to the local motivation-based arguments, developing an explanation for why the state was unable to provide order in the time of transition. Assuming that tensions and conflict are inevitable in any society, he argues that violence only erupts when the state and/or societal institutions lose their ability to regulate these. In his view, the key violence-producing feature of Indonesia's democratic transition was not the enhanced motivations of communities or leaders to compete but reductions in the capacity and willingness of the state's security organs to intervene in local disputes.

The late New Order period, he argues, saw a process of *keterbukaan*, or political opening, one of the features of which was a restraining of the military. As a National Human Rights Commission was established, and soldiers were court-martialled for abuses committed in East Timor, the military felt less willing to intervene in communal disputes as they had done in the past. After Suharto's fall, the separation of the police from the military, who ostensibly assumed responsibility for internal security despite having little capacity to do so,⁴⁰⁰ and increasing oversight from a civil society growing in strength and confidence, further reduced incentives for the military to repress local

⁴⁰⁰ In 1967, the police were placed under the Minister of Defence and the Commander of the Armed Forces. The police were formally separated from the military on 1 April 1999, but in practice remained part of the armed forces until 1 January 2001 (ICG 2001a). Tajima (2008) quotes Meliala (2001: 425) who observes that the police-to-population ratio of 1:1,200 in 1999 was only one-fifth of that in Malaysia.

conflicts. Drawing on fieldwork in the Sumatran province of Lampung, where frequent episodic violence emerged after Suharto's fall, he argues that in places where the military had had a strong local presence, non-state institutions to ensure order had not developed. As a result, in these areas military withdrawal led to a security vacuum with neither the state nor non-state institutions in place to prevent small-scale incidents from occurring then escalating into regular episodic violence.

This raises the question of why escalation to larger extended violent conflict occurred in some areas (such as Ambon and Poso) and not in others (such as Lampung). Tajima argues that such escalation happened in some locales because of the inability of local elites to coordinate to prevent groups using out-group punishment where violence is used against other communities. This resulted in inter-group polarization that fuelled spirals of violence in an environment where the coercive arms of the state were weak. Thus while initial violence is determined by the strength of state and/or non-state institutions to regulate conflict, escalation is determined by the ability and incentives of local elites to negotiate shared agreements to prevent this in conditions of anarchy.

The argument is theoretically innovative, linking micro and macro factors and encompassing both motivations and opportunities for violence. Drawing as it does on a battery of methods, including ethnographic process tracing, formal modelling, and econometric analysis, the theory is developed and tested with a level of sophistication rare to studies of collective violence or (especially) of political or social phenomena in Indonesia. Tajima's emphasis on the institutions that produce order (or its absence) provides an important supplement to the motivation-based accounts. Tajima is right to view large-scale extended violent conflict as being an escalated version of more localised episodic clashes. His insight that the initial onset of violence in places such as Ambon and Poso, which saw escalation of large episodic violence to drawn-out extended local wars, was very similar to that in Lampung, which did not, is important. However, Tajima's argument for *why* that escalation occurred (or did not) is less convincing.

Continuing military strength

Tajima's foundational assumption that the coercive arms of the state were substantially weakened and incapacitated in the early period following the fall of Suharto should be questioned. The military was one of the main means through which the power of the New Order regime was projected and maintained. Honna (2003: 9) writes, "Political repression and ideological surveillance were the major tools in constructing and maintaining the New Order regime," and the military was the primary organ of the state to undertake these tasks. Suharto, himself a former general, relied heavily on the armed forces (ABRI) to put down any state-threatening unrest with the result that much of the violence that occurred was committed by the state (e.g. Anderson 2001; Heryanto 2006). Under the doctrine of *dwifungsi* (dual function), which legitimated a strong role for the military in social and political affairs in addition to providing national security, ABRI developed a hierarchical territorial command system that placed military personnel in villages across Indonesia. This allowed for extensive military surveillance even in the most remote villages and rapid interventions when communal or separatist tensions arose (Rabasa and Haseman 2002; Crouch 2007).

Tajima argues that the military's power and confidence eroded in the late New Order period as political reforms began. Yet there is little evidence that the military was substantially weakened or that it felt subject to increased civilian oversight in the late Suharto period. *Keterbukaan*, which had been launched in the late 1980s, was wound back from mid-1994 when three high-circulation current affairs magazines were banned and many outspoken critics of the Suharto regime were removed from the political system. This led to greater use of violent coercion by the military in response to street protests (Aspinall 2005b: 44-47). In the final years of his presidency, there was increasing public debate about *dwifungsi* as Suharto sought to balance the power of the military with that of regulated civil society, and in particular the state-supported Muslim organisation, ICMI, which was led by his vice-president, B. J. Habibie (Hefner 2000). In

1995, the national parliament, the DPR, voted to reduce military representation in the legislature from 100 to 75 seats from a total of 500 (Suryadinata 2002). Yet this did not lead to a significant weakening of military power for the military's institutional power basis—which relied on the territorial security structure, intelligence network, and a socio-political command line from headquarters down to villages—remained untouched (Honna 2003: 25). The military compensated for the reduction in seats by developing a closer partnership with Golkar, Suharto's political party (*ibid.*: 26-35).

Nor did the fall of Suharto in May 1998 result in a weakening of the power of the armed forces. In contrast to many other countries experiencing regime transition, Indonesian state security institutions did not collapse (Gledhill 2012). The territorial command structure remained in place and, as discussed below, none of the presidents in the early post-Suharto years succeeded in reigning in military behaviour.

Indeed, Suharto's demise demonstrated the continuing political strength of the armed forces. His ouster was fuelled by a number of factors including student mobilisation (Aspinall 2005b) and the desertion of Suharto's allies in the business elite in the context of the Asian financial crisis (Pepinsky 2009). Violent protests on the streets of Jakarta and many other Indonesian cities in May called for the president's resignation. The killing of protestors by the military was followed by an orgy of violence with attacks on shops and individuals in ethnic Chinese neighbourhoods leading to the loss of around 1,100 lives. However, as Honna (2003: 162) observes, "the military played a crucial role in facilitating and managing these developments." Rather than being a sign of the diminishing power of the military to repress violence before it escalated, the riots bore the signs of military organisation (Panggabean and Smith 2010; Purdey 2006). The final report of a Joint Fact Finding Team (1998), established by the Indonesian government to investigate the May riots, pointed to the involvement of the military. Prabowo Subianto, the head of the powerful Kostrad (the army strategic reserve command), allegedly organised the riots as well as the kidnappings of a number

of activists in a bid to undermine Wiranto, the military chief, with the aim of him assuming the commander role.⁴⁰¹ Indeed, as Slater (2010a: 209) reflects, “it was the regime rather than the masses that appeared to be driving the violence.”

With members of his cabinet deserting him, on 20 May 1998 Suharto met Wiranto who advised him to step down in order to avert a Tiananmen-like bloodbath. Suharto subsequently handed letters to Wiranto and his deputy that authorised them to take power (Mietzner 2009: 134). That neither chose to use their letters, sticking instead to a previously agreed promise to support the ascension of Suharto’s deputy, Habibie, demonstrated the confidence the military felt in their position. Two days later, Habibie dismissed Prabowo from his position. This left the Indonesian military under Wiranto less factionalised than in the past. Wiranto could present himself as a dove and reformer, having avoided the violent removal of Suharto or a military coup while allowing demands for Suharto’s resignation to be fulfilled. This restrained public pressure on the military. As Mietzner (2009: 138) notes:

The defeat of the military hawks [Prabowo’s group] created the impression within society and the political elite that reforming the armed forces in the post-Suharto era was less urgent than initially thought. The removal of those officers viewed as responsible for the kidnappings and May riots temporarily satisfied public demand for a more wide-ranging replacement of the New Order military.

The result was a pact between Habibie and the military whereby the denial of absolute military power was traded off against the certainty that military interests would not be attacked. Indeed, key figures from the armed forces became part of the first post-authoritarian government (*ibid.*: 137). The military thus entered the new era with its structures and privileges largely intact. In such an environment, its capacity to continue to use force remained. As the military concentrated on carving out a role in the post-Suharto era, it may well have focused less on intervening in small-scale disputes of the sort Tajima documents in Lampung. But there is little reason to believe that its ability to

⁴⁰¹ See: Schwartz (2000: 354-355); Honna (2003, Chapter 7); Mietzner (2009, Chapter 3); Lee (2009); and Gledhill (2012).

put down larger unrest in many parts of the country was diminished. Responsibility for security was not devolved to the regions under the decentralisation laws. With a strong centralised command structure, and an ability to send extra troops to regions when violence erupted, the military and police should have been able to deal with escalating unrest if they so chose.

Security force involvement in violence

If a security vacuum was responsible for the escalation of violence in areas such as Maluku, Central Sulawesi and Aceh, we would expect to see limited involvement by the military or other security forces in the areas where escalation occurred. Tajima does indeed provide examples of the passivity of security forces as riots broke out. Yet the fact that such submissiveness was often followed by active participation in violence by the army and police suggests limitations to the security force weakness thesis.

As I discussed in Chapter 5, Christian and Muslim security forces often fought on the sides of co-religionists in Maluku. They provided financial and logistical support to Christian militia. Whereas traditional weapons such as machetes and spears had been used in the first months of the conflict, by mid-1999 standard military weapons were increasingly used with most of these originating from the security forces (Crouch 2010: 251). More startling, and with wider impacts on the escalation of violence, was the support of the military in Jakarta for the Muslim Laskar Jihad militia. In March and April 2000, several thousand Laskar Jihad members were given training by military officers in Bogor, just one hour from Jakarta. Subsequently, at least 3,000 Laskar Jihad members boarded ships to Ambon where they were welcomed by military officers who provided them with guns (Hasan 2006: 186-190). It was the arrival of these outsider jihadis that shifted the conflict from being one of sporadic clashes to prolonged fighting (Azca 2011: 11). Violence escalated sharply with 104 killed in May 2000 compared with an average of 25 for the three previous months. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the role of

the military and police in allowing violence to escalate and endure was an active rather than a passive one. Rather than feeling hamstrung by increased civilian oversight of their behaviour, as Tajima posits, the security forces acted with little constraint.

Similar although not as pronounced processes can also be observed in Indonesia's other sites of extended violent conflict. In Poso, Central Sulawesi, military and police officers took sides as partisans during the riots of May and June 2000, which killed at least 246 people (McRae 2008: 115-119). In North Halmahera in North Maluku, the military fuelled rumours of impending attacks, heightening fears and tensions (see Chapter 6). There were also reports of locally-stationed military forces abetting jihadis attacking villages in Galela and other areas of Halmahera.⁴⁰²

In Aceh, too, explanations for the escalation of violence from late 1998 that focus on military weakness and a resulting security vacuum are unconvincing. In the last four months of 1998, Indonesia's new president, B. J. Habibie, altered the old government's

⁴⁰² I quote at length the testimony of one Christian resident of Duma village in Galela, which saw a series of attacks by jihadis between 19 May and 19 June 2000. The final attack led to the complete destruction of the village and between 150 (Duncan 2005: 78) and 250 Christian deaths (Wilson 2008: 165). I gathered similar accounts from other residents I interviewed in Duma:

If the military were more neutral in the conflict, there would not have been as many victims ... June 19, the last attack, was incredible (*luar biasa*). In the preceding six months there were 21 attacks. The last one was on June 19. The day before, the commander of the military *pelaton* told me that there would be an attack from the Muslims the following day. When I heard this, I said, 'You are the military. You should protect us from the attack.' But the following day the military didn't protect us. In the morning (around 10 a.m.) they attacked Duma. In the morning, I went round the village to check conditions. I saw that every corner of the village was guarded by the military. They were also in the large field. So in my mind, it was impossible for the Muslims to attack us because there were so many military there. If there were only a couple of military people, they could not have stopped the Muslims. But there were many of them ... When they attacked, the military were involved in the attack. We had no weapons. There were more than 100 victims that day ... We were surrounded. We could not escape. I fell down three times. There was a military person there. I called out to him. He asked me whether I was Pasukan Jihad [Muslim militiaman] or Pasukan Merah [Christian militiaman]. I said Merah. He said 'Wait' and went away, said he would call his friend. The friend he called was not military but a Pasukan Putih [Muslim militiaman]. I had a bad feeling so I moved away from where I was while the military guy went to get his friend. I fell down near my home, behind a wall. My glasses had gone so I could not see. But I kept listening to what the military and Pasukan Putih were talking about. The military guy said, 'The man was here just two minutes ago. Look for him.' The Pasukan Putih guy said, 'I'll look for him because his head is worth Rp 50 million. It'll be paid by the Pasukan Putih in Soasio.' He said the heads of Pendeta Dungir and other village leaders were worth the same. The Pasukan Putih would pay Rp 50 million for each (Christian resident of Duma, Galela, 13 July 2011).

security policy for Aceh, ending the military occupation zone (DOM) and withdrawing thousands of non-local military troops (Miller 2009: 21). The military pointed to the absence of troops as being the reason why violence began to escalate in the latter half of that year. Yet in the context of a war where the state was one of the combating parties, we might expect that lower troop numbers would have led to *less* violence with GAM facing little resistance to the expansion of their territorial control.⁴⁰³

Instead, there was a rise in violence resulting from more active engagement by the Indonesian military in Aceh. The government reversed its stance in January 1999, with Aceh policy increasingly under the control of General Wiranto rather than President Habibie (Miller 2009: 29). New military operations commenced including Operasi Satgas Wibawa, which was supported by 2,000 non-local military and police and which killed at least 46 civilians (*ibid.*). Riots in Lhokseumawe in late 2008 precipitated an upsurge in violence, which spread to North and East Aceh. While the police and military blamed GAM for the unrest, locals reported that soldiers had paid Acehnese youths to incite the riots (Miller 2009). Atrocities—such as the Idi Cut massacre of February 1999—continued to be committed by the military, and none of the perpetrators were brought to trial. It can be argued that such acts were organised and committed by renegades with no instructions issued from above. Yet the failure to sanction soldiers involved in the Idi Cut affair, as well as those who participated in other massacres such as that in Cot Murong,⁴⁰⁴ suggests a high level of institutional support for the actions.

Indeed, there is ample other evidence for the military making concerted efforts to fuel the war. As I detailed in the last chapter, security personnel repeatedly sold weapons to GAM and provided other logistical support. Military elites in Jakarta

⁴⁰³ Kalyvas (2006), using data from the Greek civil war, shows that areas with the highest levels of insurgent control saw the least violence.

⁴⁰⁴ On 3 May 1999, soldiers opened fire on 5,000-7,000 villagers who were attending a GAM rally. At least 38 were killed and 115 wounded (Miller 2009: 35-36).

continued to apply pressure on the government for a militarised approach in Aceh; their victory was confirmed with the declaration of martial law in May 2003 after the collapse of an attempted peace agreement, in part due to the spoiler activities of the military and local militia they had armed.

If violence escalation in Aceh and elsewhere was facilitated by the actions of still-strong security forces, explanations for extended violent conflict rooted in the motivations of local elites or the weakness of security forces are at best incomplete.

1.3 *The central state and the escalation of violence*

The missing factor in most previous explanations of Indonesia's extended violent conflicts is the role that elements of the central state—primarily although not exclusively in the military—played in supporting and facilitating violence escalation. Local desires to use violence were certainly a necessary condition for such extended violence and variations in such motivations potentially explain why some areas saw extended violence while others did not. However, absent central state support for or tolerance of violence escalation it is unlikely that initial inter-communal clashes in Maluku, Poso or elsewhere would have led to sustained violence or that violence in Aceh would have escalated so sharply from 1999. It was the confluence of the motivations of local elites to use violence and of some central state elites to allow it to escalate that explains why sporadic episodes of violence could morph into much larger, sustained deadly unrest.

An important clarification is necessary before moving on to explain why some central state actors supported violence escalation in the early *reformasi* period. My argument should not be taken to read that it was Jakarta alone that caused the violence. There is a long tradition in Indonesia of explaining events as the result of mysterious *dalang* (puppet masters) who are invisible when looking at the stage but who direct the actions of those occupy it. Especially in the early democracy years, many commentators,

and in particular Indonesian activists, explained the upsurge in violence as flowing from sinister machinations in the nation's capital.⁴⁰⁵ Some analysts, for example, seized upon the fact that police in Jakarta had repatriated over a hundred Ambonese thugs in December 1998 as evidence that Jakarta masterminded the subsequent violence in Maluku (O' Rourke 2002).

Such conspiracy theories do not stand up to close scrutiny. Klinken (2007: 104), in his analysis of the Maluku conflict, rightly argues that, "the view that 'Jakarta did it', which is very popular in Ambon today is untenable ... 'Jakarta' probably did not select Ambon for a conflagration." As he ably documents, local elites and others had ample reason to use violence in Maluku and elsewhere and indeed they participated in or organised much of the violence that occurred. We have little reason to believe that local leaders or their followers were but ignorant dupes, fooled by those with interests in the nation's capital.

Yet while the conspiracy theories go too far in ignoring local motivations, national-level interests *are* part of the causal story of Indonesia's extended violent conflicts. Local factors led to initial incidents of violence and initial escalation. However, the subsequent escalation to full-blown war was a result of a combination of acts of commission and of omission by the security forces. In some places and at some times, the military and police actively abetted violence escalation; in others, the security forces were less involved but violence escalated because of decisions made not to employ coercive force. The Indonesian state could have limited the tragic explosion of localised violence into all-out wars. It was because elements of the central state, and in particular the military, opportunistically saw advantage in allowing such escalation to occur that it did.

⁴⁰⁵ See, for example, Aditjondro (2001), Loveband and Young (2006), and Liem Soei Liong (2002).

2. Why central state elites allowed escalation to extended violence

In the early post-Suharto years, some members of the national elite had motivations for supporting or allowing the escalation of violence into extended violent conflict. Consistent with the thesis's theory, extended violence emerged at a time when the rules of the game on the allocation of power and resources were being renegotiated and when there was heightened competition between different national elites over what Indonesia's 'reformed' order would look like. Violence was seen as a profitable way to protect or extend the authority of some national elites, in particular military leaders. The costs of using violence were also limited as the fragility of early post-Suharto governments meant that support from the military and other political leaders was still needed. In a context of factionalised national elites, the possibilities for using peaceable means to access or consolidate power seemed limited.

2.1 *Heightened competition, uncertainty, and changes to the rules of the game*

Once Suharto had departed and the old regime had collapsed, institutional reform became inevitable. It was not a question of whether to change the rules or not but rather in which specific ways the rules were to be changed (MacIntyre 2003: 138).

The demise of Suharto was widely celebrated by national elites from across the political spectrum but it brought with it considerably uncertainties. The lack of clarity over what the new rules of the game in democratising Indonesia would be created fear about the potential for exclusion from new constellations of power and that economic interests, developed during three decades of authoritarian rule, would not be protected.

On the one hand, there was substantial continuity between the New Order and the early governments of the *reformasi* era and this limited immediate violence. By mid-May, the Jakarta riots had been brought under control and there was no large upsurge in

violence elsewhere in Indonesia during 1998.⁴⁰⁶ Such continuity was largely a consequence of divisions within the opposition movement. Suharto had been a master of divide-and-control, supporting and then marginalising allies within Golkar, the military and mass movements such as the Muslim Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah to avoid any group becoming too strong (Slater 2010b). The result was a fragmented political and civil society, characterized by suspicion and contradictory impulses to collaborate or oppose the New Order regime (Aspinall 2005b). The Islamic movements, in particular NU, oscillated between staying close to power, benefitting from the attendant patronage that this allowed, and being a force of opposition (Hefner 2000, Bush 2009). With even the keenest of observers failing to predict the end of the New Order regime a year before, forces in favour of democratisation had spent little time considering what a new reformed order would look like and building the solidarity and collective action capacity necessary to ensure they could shape the emerging post-Suharto order. This lack of cohesion and strategy in the reform movement allowed the military to engineer a transition that largely protected their interests. It also meant that the first post-Suharto government, under Habibie his old deputy, consisted largely of New Order figures. Indeed, the new 'democratic' government looked very similar in make-up to those of the previous thirty years.⁴⁰⁷

Such regime continuity reduced national elite uncertainty and contestation. However, over time, competition—primarily between different elements of the old regime—became more marked.

The Habibie presidency

⁴⁰⁶ In 17 provinces for which we have data, 4,794 people were killed in violent incidents in 1999 compared to 1,720 in 1998. Of the 1998 deaths, 1,231 occurred in Jakarta with 1,193 people dying in Jakarta in May of that year. See Chapter 4, footnote 18, for a list of provinces and data sources used.

⁴⁰⁷ Siegel (2001: 92) points out that the rhetorical framing of Suharto's fall as having initiated a process of *reformasi* (reform) rather than revolution indicated a process of gradual refashioning of the political order, something incumbent elites were much more comfortable with than more rapid and power structure-altering change.

While the make-up of the first post-Suharto government differed little from those before, it soon became clear that the policies it planned to pursue were vastly different and that these would challenge entrenched interests. Indeed, the short tenure of B.J. Habibie, a stalwart of New Order politics who lasted but a-year-and-a-half in power, was more radical than any of any of the presidents who followed. Habibie was well aware that he was, as Crouch (2010: 21) calls him, “the accidental president”. His rise to the presidency was a result of his position as vice-president when Suharto unexpectedly fell. He did not have a strong political base and the opposition movement viewed him with scepticism given his past. Understanding the fragility of his position, and the lack of legitimacy he had among the broader populace, being both unelected and a former Suharto henchman, Habibie chose a course of rapid reform.⁴⁰⁸

In his first few weeks after assuming power, Habibie proposed releasing political prisoners, reforming the anti-subversion law, lifting press restrictions, allowing for the formation of new political parties, and holding new general elections (Crouch 2010: 27). Whereas only three political parties were permitted during the New Order period—Suharto’s Golkar as well as the Indonesian national party (PDI) and the Islamic PPP—the new election law allowed for much more open competition and 48 parties ultimately stood in June 1999 elections. What is more, while electoral competition had been manufactured in the New Order era, with many checks in place to make sure that the supposed opposition parties did not win too many seats, suddenly elites were subject to real political competition. Golkar was beaten by PDI-P, which had its roots in PDI, who gathered 33.8% of the vote and three Muslim parties won significant vote shares. Challenges to the interests of incumbent national elites also increased with the passing of radical regional autonomy laws in February 1999 that turned Indonesia from one of the most centralised countries to one of the most decentralised. Together,

⁴⁰⁸ Schwartz (2000: 372) notes that for most of the political opposition, Habibie was just “a more talkative version of Suharto”. He had consistently spoken of Suharto as his hero and had never articulated any other political view beyond endorsing the authoritarian New Order state.

democratisation and decentralisation resulted in a dispersion of power in ways that threatened old patron-client networks. As Aspinall writes fifteen years on:

Democracy [along with decentralisation] has exacerbated the fragmentary effects of clientelism by opening up the marketplace of potential patrons and enabling them to compete with one another without being constrained by a supreme patriarch, as they were under Suharto ... It has also shifted power relations within patron-client relationships, tipping the balance more in favor of the clients, or at least those patron/clients and brokers who are located part way down the patronage distribution pyramids (Aspinall 2013: 31).

To be sure, and as I discuss below, over time many in the national elite managed to adjust to this new institutional setting and were able to ensure they did not lose out politically or economically (Robison and Hadiz 2004). Yet, with the old certainties and norms of the Suharto era suddenly up for renegotiation, incumbent political elites did not know how the cards would fall and whether or not they would hold a winning hand.

The sense of uncertainty was especially great for security force leaders. Their role in leading the transition of power from Suharto to Habibie put them in a strong position as the democracy era began. However, with aggressive demands from below for military reform, and a seemingly listening president, the armed forces (renamed the TNI following Suharto's fall) came under significant pressure. In particular, there were ever more strident calls from activists and some political elites for the TNI to withdraw from the political arena (Bourchier 1999). Mietzner (2009: 199) notes the speed at which political developments threatened to overrun the military: "Labelled as political moderates only weeks earlier for their implicit endorsement of Suharto's removal, key officers around Wiranto suddenly found themselves portrayed as opponents of further reform in the new democratic polity."

Institutional changes that aimed to reduce the power of the armed forces were quick to arrive. In January 1999, the national parliament voted to further reduce the TNI's allocation to 38 seats in the national parliament and 10% in regional parliaments.

A further blow to the military was Habibie's announcement in January 1999 that he planned to hold a 'popular consultation' on the future of East Timor. Since Indonesia's invasion of its neighbour following the departure of the Portuguese in 1975, Timor was effectively governed by the military rather than the civilian arms of the Indonesian government. As a result, the local economy was dominated by the armed forces who had a monopoly over the trade of coffee and who controlled many other plantations and the local population was often compelled to provide slave labour to individual soldiers (Bertrand 2004: 139-140). Many of the military's top brass had gained their stripes fighting there and felt a personal and ideological commitment to keep the restive area within Indonesia. The offer of a referendum was thus a slap in the face for senior military figures who had not been consulted in advance by Habibie. The earlier promises made by Habibie to Wiranto started to ring hollow.

The Wahid presidency

Uncertainty over the new rules of the game continued in the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, in power from October 1999 to July 2001. In line with the constitution, Wahid was chosen as president by Indonesia upper house, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), rather than by the electorate.⁴⁰⁹ With his party winning just 13% of votes in the June general election he was dependent on a complicated web of support from party elites, including from the TNI, to gain power. The distribution of rent-making opportunities to parties in accord with the level of support they gave him resulted in an unwieldy cabinet of 35 people with most parties represented (Kingsbury 2005b). The make-up of the Wahid government did not challenge the interests of those who had done well during the New Order. Golkar was well represented as were the military with six retired or active officers in the cabinet. General Wiranto received the

⁴⁰⁹ The MPR was made up of all 500 members of the lower house (the DPR) along with 135 representatives of the regions and 65 representatives of special groups.

post of Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, one of three top-ranked cabinet positions (Crouch 2010: 137).

However, Wahid's subsequent behaviour in office, in particular during the tenures of his second and third cabinets, threatened the interests of the military and other incumbent elites. Wahid had worked hard to obtain military support to ensure he became president, allegedly promising Wiranto that he would play an important role in government, possibly as vice-president, and that military interests would be "protected" (Mietzner 2009: 205). This led the TNI leadership to instruct its representatives to choose Wahid in the MPR vote. However, it soon became clear that the new president planned to push for extensive military reform. He sought to marginalise officers in the palace bureaucracy and chose a member of the navy, a more liberal body than the army, as the new TNI commander (*ibid.*: 212). He put reformers, such as Agus Wirahadikusumah who had been active in trying to generate debate within the armed forces on military withdrawal from politics, in senior positions within the TNI (Honna 2003: 180-184). *Dwifungsi*, which legitimated a socio-political role for the armed forces, was officially abolished in April 2000 (Mietzner 2009: 202).

Wahid also started to encourage debates about the territorial command system, a major source of off-budget resources for the military.⁴¹⁰ Under political pressure, the TNI initially agreed to initiate changes and a pilot project was established. However, there was immense concern from many within the armed forces about this course of action and resentment about a perceived breaking of Wahid's promise to protect military interests during his presidency.

The president also pursued other policies at odds with the views of the military leadership. He started negotiations with separatists in Aceh, which resulted in a

⁴¹⁰ In 2000, then defence minister, Juwono Sudarsono, estimated that 70% of defence spending came from off-budget resources (Sudarsono 2000). A large share of these resources was collected through the territorial command structure. See also Rieffel and Pramodhawardani (2007) and Mietzner (2008).

Humanitarian Pause in May 2000, suggested federalism as a solution to the country's conflicts, and dismissed Wiranto in February 2000 from his cabinet position after the release of the commission of enquiry's report on the armed forces' behaviour in East Timor. These moves created concern from the TNI leadership, in particular from those who favoured a gradualist approach to military reform.

It was not only the policies pursued that caused consternation for some in the military and political elite but also the confusion and contradiction that marked Wahid's tenure. Prone to autocratic decision-making, key policy decisions were often made outside of cabinet. Wahid was impulsive and inconsistent, sacking cabinet ministers frequently and often making controversial statements, which he then did not follow up on, such as suggestions that he favoured a Timor-style referendum for Aceh.⁴¹¹ Such erraticness and eccentricity did little to sooth the worries and uncertainties of members of the national political elite who soon lost confidence in his leadership. It also meant that the rules of the game were particularly unclear during Wahid's tenure. In July 2001, the MPR voted to impeach Wahid with the military and police factions supporting his removal (Mietzner 2006: 31).

The Megawati presidency

Uncertainty and challenges to incumbent elite interests, including those of the military, started to ebb with the accession of Megawati Sukarnoputri in July 2001 to the presidency. Compared with the first three post-Suharto years, Megawati's reign was markedly conservative. To be sure, there were some significant policy developments including constitutional changes that led to the direct election of future presidents and revisions to the electoral and regional autonomy laws. Yet these were less threatening to national elites because they were the product of long deliberations within the national

⁴¹¹ Following the November 1999 gathering of 500,000 people in Aceh calling for a plebiscite on self-determination, Wahid publically stated that it was unfair that only the East Timorese should decide their political future and that a referendum on Aceh's status should also be held. Following pressure from the parliament and the military, Wahid was forced to abandon the referendum offer the following month (Miller 2009: 67).

parliament, where a wide range of elites were represented, rather than Megawati's government. As Harold Crouch (2010) has argued, building on Grindle and Thomas (1991), policymaking had changed from being 'crisis-ridden', where policies were made quickly in response to rapidly emerging issues, to 'politics-as-usual', where elites were able to focus more on ensuring policy change advanced their own interests. National elites, united in the desire to avoid a return to the unpredictability and divides of the Wahid regime, chose to compromise, ensuring that the new legislation passed but did not affect their core interests. It was now clear, for example, that there was little taste from any part of the national elite for retroactive corruption investigations for these would have the potential to entrap the large proportion of the elite who had risen to prominence during the Suharto era (Robison and Hadiz 2004).

Threats to the power of the military, too, started to receded. In contrast to Habibie and Wahid, Megawati was close to the armed forces, seeing them as a guardian of the people (McIntyre 2005). Beyond her ideological convictions, Megawati chose to grant concessions to the military to avoid challenges to her rule (Mietzner 2009: 226-230). This included giving the TNI largely free reign to decide on policy in Aceh and Papua, allowing for resistance to, and ensuring the ultimate failure of, autonomy deals (Miller 2012; Singh 2012). Megawati also approved a reshuffle of the TNI leadership that marginalised reformers and reduced civilian oversight of the armed forces. When her defence minister Matori Abdul Djalil resigned in August 2003 after suffering a stroke, she chose not to replace him before the expiry of her term more than a year later, leaving the military free to pursue security policies of its own choosing. Reform issues—such as changing the territorial command structure and military financing—disappeared from the mainstream political agenda (Mietzner 2009).

The tenure of Megawati did see an end to the extended inter-communal violence in Poso and Maluku, with government-led peace agreements signed in both areas. However, these were driven not by Megawati but by members of her cabinet, in

particular Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, her Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs and a former military general. The agreements did not negatively impact on the interests of the security forces in those provinces. They continued to have large number of troops stationed there and they also benefitted from the arrival of post-conflict funds.

2.2 Expected benefits of allowing violence escalation

The first years of the post-Suharto era were thus characterised by significant uncertainty over what a newly democratic Indonesia would look like and whose interests would be represented in the changing order. In this environment, the military, supported by some members of the national elite, allowed violence escalation to occur because it proved to be politically and economically profitable.

High benefits of allowing violence escalation

Elements of the military supported and sometimes facilitated the escalation of violence because they believed it was an effective way to retain a place at the centre of the Indonesian polity and to ensure that privileges and funding sources, built up during the New Order era, were not undermined. Over time, as violence in Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi endured and intensified, it became clear that such violence was beneficial for the military and other national political elites.

The violence that appeared to be sweeping across the country from 1999 on provided support for the stance that a strong military was still (or especially) needed in a democratising Indonesia. The destruction in Kalimantan, the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi caused shock amongst politicians and civil society alike in the nation's capital, with stories of the inter-ethnic and inter-religious brutality published in newspapers on a daily basis (Sharp 2012). During the New Order, discussion of ethnic and religious divides had been forcefully censored yet primordialist views of identity groups being essentially different in character and nature remained common. The emergence of

intense and savage inter-communal violence only served to accentuate worries that violent fragmentation of the nation, as had occurred in the Balkans, was likely (HRW 1999; Emmerson 2000; Aspinall and Berger 2001). While calls for a return to the autocratic days of Suharto, when order had been ensured at the barrels of the military's guns, were lacking, support for a stronger projection of state power to hold Indonesia together started to emerge (Chauvel and Bhakti 2004).

This worked to the military's advantage. Mietzner (2009: 221) argues that, "Like in previous periods of Indonesia's modern history, the high levels of political conflict among the civilian elite in 2000 and 2001 allowed the TNI to depict itself as an apolitical institution above partisan interests, a mediator between divided parties, and a defender of national (and now even democratic) interests." As violence swirled across the country, perceptions of the military became more positive. The proportion of opinion poll respondents with a favourable view of the armed forces increased from 28% to 58% between September 2000 and October 2001, while the share with an unfavourable view declined from 61% to 31% (Simanungkalit 2002, cited in Mietzner 2009: 221).

Increasing support from civilians and many in the political elite strengthened the military's hand in resisting pressures for security sector reform. As we have seen, while some changes were made, for example reducing the military's formal political role and by abandoning the ideological framework of *dwifungsi*, more substantive reform soon stalled. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the period of most extensive inter-communal extended violence, and of high levels of violence in Aceh, was the tenure of Wahid, the one post-Suharto president who made concerted efforts to push forward military reform and who notably sacked General Wiranto.⁴¹² Allowing such violence to occur strengthened the military's position in resisting such reforms. As Mietzner (2009:

⁴¹² The training by the military of Laskar Jihad cadres came the month after the sacking of Wiranto. The subsequent decision to ignore the president's request to prevent Laskar Jihad departing for Ambon can be interpreted as a show of strength from the military, aggrieved at Wahid's tinkering in their affairs.

228) notes, “fearing that further experiments with TNI reform could reduce the ability of the armed forces to crack down on separatist rebels, the majority of politicians agreed to suspend their reform efforts until the security situation had stabilized.”

Supporting the escalation of violence in Maluku and elsewhere was also in the interests of other members of the national political elite who wanted to force an end to Wahid’s presidency. Fuad Bawazier, the minister of finance in Suharto’s last cabinet and a sharp critic of Wahid, was among those in the elite who provided financial support to Laskar Jihad (Azca 2011: 30). Others such as Amien Rais, a university professor who had been at the forefront of the *reformasi* movement and who led the modernist and largely moderate Islamic PAN party, also used the violence for political capital in his effort to get rid of Wahid. Addressing a crowd of thousands of Muslim demonstrators in Jakarta in January 2000, he called for a jihad against Christians in Maluku (Schulze 2002: 67). For such politicians, and for military leaders, the violence in Maluku and elsewhere supported efforts to impeach Wahid as it seemingly demonstrated his incapability as a leader (Barton 2006: 332-335).

Low costs of violence

Not only did the escalated extended violence prove beneficial for the military but it also became clear that the risks of supporting violence escalation were minimal. Institutionally, the military experienced no negative consequences from their role in facilitating violence escalation and this sent a strong signal that such actions were permissible. Similarly, almost without exception, individual officers and footsoldiers who allowed escalation—either through active engagement or through their inactivity—were not sanctioned.

The response to the military’s performance in Maluku was typical. President Wahid was extremely angry after the TNI chose not only to ignore his order to prevent Laskar Jihad departing for Maluku but to aid the militants’ passage (ICG 2002). Despite

this, politically weak as he was, Wahid was in no place to discipline military commanders. Indeed, as conflict escalated he was forced to declare a state of civil emergency in June 2000. While this did not afford the military the absolute control they would have had in the case of a military emergency, it did bolster their power in the province and allowed them a large say in the allocation of special funds.⁴¹³

Similarly, reports of the violent conflicts in Central Kalimantan and West Kalimantan describe the military and police standing idly by while massacres took place, even extorting fleeing Madurese before letting them board ships to leave the island (Smith 2005; Davidson 2008). Despite this, no senior figures from the security forces were reprimanded.

In Aceh, the use of violence by the military also bore little risk. Soldiers involved in massacres such as those that occurred in Habibie's tenure in Idi Cut and Simpang KKA were not brought to trial (Miller 2009: 36). An Independent Commission for the Investigation of Violence in Aceh, established by Habibie in July 1999, documented 5,000 rights violations. But when the report was presented to the new president Wahid in November of that year, he did not follow up on the results (*ibid.*: 37). In May 2000, 24 soldiers were convicted of killing a mystic cleric, Teuku Bantaqiah, and 56 of his followers the previous year. Sentences were substantial, ranging from 8.5 to 10 years. But the highest ranking sentenced officer was only a captain and their commanding officer was never tried (Crouch 2010: 170-171). In November 1999, six senior generals were summoned to testify before a parliamentary committee on abuses committed during the martial law period (Miller 2009: 69-70). However, none were prosecuted and the military continued to commit abuses until the signing of the peace deal almost six years later.

⁴¹³ See Chapter 5.

In East Timor, too, the military's role in supporting violence escalation had few negative consequences for them. When militias went on a wild rampage following the overwhelming vote for independence in the August 1999 referendum, it was clear that the Indonesian military was responsible (e.g. Kanmen 2001). Under strong international pressure, the Indonesian parliament first established a special human rights court and then an ad-hoc human rights court to deal with East Timor cases. However, the former court applied the principle of 'non-retroactivity', meaning that only cases that occurred after the law was passed could be considered, and Wahid, under strong pressure from the military, also agreed to a similar principle for the East Timor court. In the end, 18 men including 10 military officers were brought to trial. However, of the 18, only six were found guilty and the appeals of all but two—both East Timorese civilians—were successful (Crouch 2010: 172-173). Even with strong international condemnation of the Indonesian military's post-referendum behaviour, there was limited pressure for its leaders to be brought to trial. With the US and its allies looking for support in the war on terror, foreign powers were concerned with finding ways to reestablish military-to-military ties, which had been suspended in the Suharto years, rather than ensuring that rights violations perpetrated by the military were investigated (Smith 2003).

2.3 Other opportunities for peaceful accumulation

In the early post-Suharto years, allowing violence escalation thus served the interests of the TNI leadership who were working to protect the privileges and status they had built up since Indonesia's independence. Violence was chosen as a political strategy not only because it proved beneficial and non-costly but also because few peaceable options existed to achieve these goals.

The pacted transition did mean that the armed forces remained at the centre of Indonesia's polity. However, over time their formal political role declined. As discussed above, reforms from the year 2000 on forced the armed forces to abandon the ideology

of *dwifungsi*, which had legitimated their role in non-security affairs. Having already seen their representation in the Indonesian parliament cut in half in 1999, constitutional amendments passed in 2002 removed them from the parliament from the 2004 elections on (Crouch 2010: 61). National Law on the TNI 34/2004 included provisions that prohibited the TNI from using its territorial network for political organising purposes (*ibid.*: 147-149). As Golkar's parliamentary representation declined, and as it sought to recover its legitimacy amongst the electorate, the opportunity to use Suharto's old party as a vehicle for their interests also diminished. With active armed forces officers banned from standing in elections, few formal institutionalised political channels existed to ensure that the TNI's interests were protected.

As a result, continuing influence on policy was a product of informal relations between TNI leaders and Indonesia's president and parliamentarians. In the context of demands from below for reform, using violence—ostensibly in the interests of the nation—proved to be the most effective means to push for continuing influence in a reforming Indonesia.

3. Changing national elite motivations and the lack of recurrence of extended violence

By February 2002, all of Indonesia's inter-communal extended violent conflicts had come to an end, although significant unrest continued in Central Sulawesi and Maluku for the first few post-conflict years. The signing of the Helsinki MoU for Aceh in August 2005 ended the province's civil war. Since then, deaths from violence in Indonesia have been the result of sporadic episodic violence.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹⁴ Violence in Papua is ongoing and is sometimes viewed as being of a similar nature to the civil war in Aceh. However, Papuan violence is better characterized as being episodic than extended. NVMS data shows that the largest number of people killed in any single year in the past decade in Papua and West Papua is 182 (in 2012). In contrast, thousands of people were killed each year in Aceh between 1999 and 2004. Furthermore, of the 692 people killed in Papua and West Papua between 2009 and 2012, only 83 died in separatist incidents, just one more than died as a result

There have not been renewed bouts of extended violence in recent years because of changes in the incentives of national elites. The initial post-Suharto period (roughly May 1998 to the accession of Megawati and, to a lesser extent, during her presidency) was one of uncertainty, with the expected benefits of violence escalation high for some in the national elite and a lack of available opportunities for military elites to protect their interests using licit political channels. By contrast, since 2004 the Indonesian polity has become increasingly institutionalised as agreed rules of the game have been forged where support for escalated extended violence is not deemed acceptable.

3.1 The Yudhoyono presidency: reduced uncertainty and more established rules of the game

Whereas the early years of the post-Suharto era were marked by deep and messy contestation over the rules of the game, the two-term presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has seen a stabilization of Indonesia's polity. As the legal framework of Indonesia's democratic order has been fleshed out, uncertainty amongst national elites over the acceptability of the use of large-scale extended violence has declined.

The year 2004, when Yudhoyono rose to the presidency, is commonly viewed as the end of the period of turbulent transition (e.g. Mietzner 2009; Aspinall 2005c). That year saw the first direct popular election of an Indonesian president. This reduced—although did not completely remove—the scope for political deals between parties to determine who would reach the summit of Indonesian state power.⁴¹⁵ Whereas the presidencies of Wahid and Megawati were an outcome of inter-elite bargaining, new and inflexible procedural rules were now in place to determine who the Indonesian

of domestic violence. In contrast, 8,439 of 10,613 deaths in Aceh (80%) in that province's extended violence period were the result of separatist violence.

⁴¹⁵ Political parties still matter because they determine who can stand for the presidency. From 2009, aspiring presidential candidates have had to secure the support of parties holding 15% of seats in the national parliament or who had garnered 20% of the popular vote. In the context of Indonesia's fragmented party system, this has meant that candidates have had to build coalitions of parties to gain nomination. See Crouch (2010: 66, 74).

president would be. Other institutional reforms, some of which predated 2004, also mattered. Particularly important was the establishment in August 2003 of a Constitutional Court with authority to decide conflicts between state institutions, rule on contested election results, and determine the constitutionality of legislation (Wrighter 2005). The court soon established itself as a respected referee in state affairs and its rulings have almost universally been accepted and enforced. Importantly, whereas previously decisions on whether the behaviour of the president or vice-president warranted dismissal were made by the politicised MPR, this decision now lay in the hands of the more apolitical court (Crouch 2010: 61).

Together, these and other institutional reforms have served to move the Indonesian central state in the direction of North, Wallis and Weingast's (2009) 'open access orders' where the state is an autonomous impersonal body with perpetual legal personality and where legal institutions protect the rights of those who do not have direct connections to power. The "normalization of politics" (Aspinall 2005c), with open elections the accepted means to access power, has meant that struggles for power are now largely expressed through formal institutional channels.⁴¹⁶

In addition to changes to formal institutions, political decisions and strategies have played a role in reducing uncertainty. Yudhoyono, following the practices of his predecessors, has chosen to disburse power widely across the political elite. His cabinets have included representation from all major political parties, with the exception of PDI-P. Indeed, of the 35 members of his first cabinet in 2004, only two came from the Democrat Party, his political vehicle, with three representatives from the Islamic PKS party and four retired military officers (Crouch 2010: 69). Ministries are also divvied up between political parties ensuring that within-party patronage flows can be maintained (Aspinall 2013: 10). As a result, the prediction of Linz (1990: 56) that

⁴¹⁶ A recent assessment of the rule of law by the World Justice Project in 97 countries ranked Indonesia as first among 23 lower middle income countries in establishing effective limits on governmental power (Asian Century Institute 2012).

“presidentialism is ineluctably problematic because it operates according to the rule of ‘winner-takes-all’—an arrangement that tends to make democratic politics a zero-sum game, with all the potential for conflict such games portend”, has not come to pass.

Yudhoyono, to a greater extent than any of his predecessors since Suharto, has also been successful in restraining the impulses of the military to use violence for their own purposes. This has involved a combination of the provision of carrots and the use of sticks. On the one hand, military acquiescence to the new rules of the game was effectively bought by ensuring there was little effort to push for deeper ‘second generation’ military reforms that might affect the TNI’s interests (Mietzner 2009). There has been no renewed move to force an abandonment of the territorial command structure and very limited progress on ensuring the military hand over control of the businesses that provide a major source of institutional funding and personal profit.⁴¹⁷ The state’s defence budget almost tripled between 2003 and 2009 (Aspinall 2010: 24).

On the other hand, Yudhoyono, a former general, was able to sideline conservatives within the military such as Ryamizard Ryacudu, the army chief of staff and Megawati’s choice for TNI leader. The leaders Yudhoyono installed were loyal to him and accepted that they were under the authority of Indonesia’s constitutionally-elected leaders, realising that if they did not endorse the new political reality they would be swept away by it (Mietzner 2009: 296). As a result, the military increasingly pulled back from direct engagement or manipulation of national politics. The more highly institutionalised polity means that, in contrast to the tenures of Habibie, Wahid and Megawati, political elites have not turned to the military for support to maintain or access power.

⁴¹⁷ The TNI Act of 2004 mandated that all military businesses must be handed over to the state by 2009. However, subsequent negotiations led to the exclusion of cooperatives and foundations from the definition of military businesses. As a result, the secretary general of defence, General Sjafie Sjamsoeddin, announced that only six or seven of more than 1,500 economic units under military management would be transferred (Mietzner 2009: 308).

This is not to say that Indonesia is now a fully institutionalised liberal democracy. A decade-and-a-half on from Suharto's fall old oligarchic elites have survived and prospered (Robison and Hadiz 2004; Winters 2011), money politics is rife (Aspinall and Klinken 2011), and Indonesia lags on most global measures of the rule of law (Diamond 2010). While national level institutions have strengthened, new subnational governments, empowered by decentralisation, often exhibit even more illiberal tendencies (Hadiz 2010); as previous chapters have shown, lack of institutionalisation of the polity at these levels provides space for elites to use violence for their own purposes. Yet, as Aspinall (2010: 21) convincingly argues, the very compromises that have negatively impacted on the *quality* of democracy have also led to democratic *stability*:

The country has dealt with key challenges in ways that have come with costs. Spoilers have been accommodated and absorbed into the system rather than excluded from it, producing a trade-off between democratic success and democratic quality. This trade-off has not been an unfortunate side-effect of Indonesia's democratic transition; rather, it has been central to its dynamics, and even an important ingredient in its success.

As Sukma (2010) in his analysis of the 2009 elections terms it, Indonesia is a "defective system, resilient democracy," where there is a "high degree of stability and resilience in Indonesia's new democracy, despite the problems" (*ibid.*: 53). Democracy may be "collusive" (Slater 2004). But this collusion provides stability.

3.2 Expected benefits of allowing violence escalation

The protection of old privileges ensured national elites, including military leaders, have found diminishing relative benefit in allowing large-scale violence to occur. The perceived costs of supporting large-scale violence have also increased.

Whereas both the extended inter-communal conflicts and the ongoing civil war in Aceh strengthened the military's position in the early post-Suharto period, supporting such violence has not been necessary during the Yudhoyono years. As it has become

clear that their position is not under threat, military leaders have not had the same incentives to utilise unrest in the regions for their own purposes.

The costs of supporting the escalation of violence have also increased. In the early years of the transition, government leaders were unable or unwilling to impose sanctions on military officials and others who contributed to unrest in the regions. In contrast, clear signals have been sent that while localised episodic violence is acceptable, support for larger conflagrations of unrest is not.

On assuming power Yudhoyono moved to sanction some of those who had been responsible for violence escalation in the past. The removal of Ryamizard, who had played a large role in undermining the 2002-2003 peace agreement in Aceh, sent a strong signal that the new president was prepared to sack generals who did not support government policies (Mietzner 2009: 298-299). This helped ensure compliance from the military when the prospect of renewed extended violence loomed large. On 7 September 2005, less than a month after the signing of the Helsinki peace deal, Yudhoyono called a meeting of senior generals where he made it clear that they must support the peace process (Miller 2009: 160). Following this, Endriartono Sutarto, Yudhoyono's TNI chief, "told the TNI leadership that I don't want any senior officers talking out against government policies. If you want to oppose government policies, then you must leave the TNI" (Morfit 2006: 19).⁴¹⁸ Detractors of the Helsinki MoU within the military were increasing marginalised.

Similar signals were also sent that supporting a renewal of extended inter-communal violence was not acceptable. Following the September 2011 riots in Ambon and a series of bombing in the following months, which threatened to escalate into larger enduring violence, the regional and district police chiefs were transferred to

⁴¹⁸ See also the memoir of Awaluddin (2009: 248), the chief government representative in the Helsinki negotiations. He recalls how, in response to one general continuing to express discordant views about the peace talks, Sutarto called a meeting of 100 senior TNI officers. At the meeting he stated that if anyone in the TNI tried to stir up trouble, he would "personally place his pistol against their head and pull the trigger."

dead-end jobs.⁴¹⁹ While there is no evidence to show that national level elites conspired to cause the violence, such responses did send a message that any such support would not be tolerated.

3.3 *Other opportunities for peaceful accumulation*

As important as changes in the expected benefits of using violence has been the expansion of opportunities to use peaceful means for purposes of accumulation. As I discussed above, the Yudhoyono governments have chosen to distribute rent-making opportunities widely in order to fend off potential challenges. Cabinets and parliamentary commissions include representation of all of Indonesia's major parties. This has meant that national political elites from across the party spectrum have an interest in supporting the current order from which they are benefitting. The disbursal of power and rent-making opportunities has generated buy-in to a status quo that appears beneficial across the political elite. Accelerated economic growth, which reached over 6% in 2011 and 2012 (World Bank 2013), with Indonesia outperforming every major Asian economy but China, has also reduced the impetus of national elites to support escalated violence that could reduce levels of foreign direct investment.⁴²⁰

Similarly, the failure of the Yudhoyono governments to pursue deeper reforms of the military has prevented challenges to Indonesia's democracy. The continuing presence of the territorial command structure, combined with tolerance of illicit business activities, has ensured that senior military and police officials continue to prosper economically in post-Suharto Indonesia. Under such conditions, support for escalated violence is no longer necessary.


⁴¹⁹ Email correspondence with Sidney Jones, International Crisis Group, 16 July 2012.

⁴²⁰ FDI rose a record 27.2% from January-March 2013 compared with a year earlier and Indonesia received credit upgradings to investment status by Fitch and Moody's in late 2011 and early 2012 (Silaen and Sentana 2013).

3.4 Mechanisms for preventing violence escalation: co-optation of belligerents and more effective security responses

Changes to the expected benefits and costs of supporting violence escalation, and to the degree to which peaceful opportunities are present for accumulation, thus explain why military leaders and other national political elites no longer support extended violent conflict. This has led to the absence of recurring or new extended violent conflicts in Indonesia through two mechanisms: (a) increased ability of the state to co-opt dissidents at the local level through peace processes; and (b) more effective state security responses to incidents of violence, which has ensured that they have not escalated into broader enduring unrest (Figure 8.1).

Figure 8.1. Mechanisms for preventing violence escalation



Cooptation of belligerents

The first mechanism is the increased ability of the central state to formulate and implement peace agreements that have allowed for the cooptation of conflict elites at the local level. By early 2002, the central government—less divided with Megawati's accession—was able to bring extended violent conflict to an end in Central Sulawesi and Maluku after the signing of two government-sponsored peace agreements. As I discussed in Chapter 5, the Malino accord for Maluku succeeded in ending the extended violence not by addressing the rhetorical underlying causes of conflict as expressed by belligerents but by using post-conflict funds to buy-off conflict leaders and their

followers as well as satisfying the interests of security force leaders. The Central Sulawesi peace process served a similar function (McRae 2010; Aspinall 2009b). For both peace settlements, reduced incentives by national elites to stoke inter-communal violence allowed for the deployment of state funds to co-opt local elites.

While the Megawati government was less fragile than those of her two predecessors, allowing for progress to be made in ending the inter-communal extended violent conflicts, the military was still able to resist pressures for a peaceful settlement in Aceh where they had more entrenched interests. This changed with the presidency of Yudhoyono who, with strong control over the military, was able to ensure a peace process was forged and then implemented despite the resistance of some national elites.

Improved security responses

While the increased ability of the central state to co-opt elites explains why extended violence in Maluku, Poso and Aceh came to an end, it is improved security responses to violence that explains why episodic violence has not reescalated after the peace settlements. Such improved security responses are apparent if we examine the state's reaction to recent large episodes of violence that appeared to have the potential to escalate into much broader and deadly infernos.

The 2011 riots in Ambon, Maluku, were one such episode. Ineffective local police and military responses to the suspicious death of a Muslim motorcycle taxi driver led to riots and group clashes that resulted in the deaths of seven more people and the displacement of 3,000 people. As radical Muslim websites called for renewed jihad and local residents began to arm themselves and set up security patrols, the prospect of renewed extended violence loomed large. However, in contrast to earlier years, there was relatively rapid intervention by the central state to prevent further escalation. On the evening of the first day of rioting, President Yudhoyono ordered the national police chief to beef up security in Ambon. Four hundred additional police officers, including

200 Brimob (mobile paramilitary police) were quickly deployed to Ambon from Makassar (on Sulawesi island) and Surabaya (Java). Yudhoyono also ordered the coordinating minister for political, legal and security affairs to meet with the national police and military chiefs and Maluku's governor to coordinate preventative actions. The police began to search all passengers bound for Ambon as a precaution against an inflow of provocateurs and sent text messages to Ambon's residents appealing for calm. With the clear signal of the seriousness of the incident coming from above, the performance of locally-stationed police and military improved and by the end of the second day of clashes violence had largely come to an end.⁴²¹ The seriousness and effectiveness of the response contrasted not only with those in the extended violence period but also the response to the 2004 RMS riots where the central government only intervened after five days of violence which had led to 34 deaths and the displacement of 15,000 people.⁴²²

The effectiveness of security force responses to incidents of large-scale violence has also improved in other post-conflict provinces. In Central Sulawesi, ineffective security responses allowed for frequent incidents of violence in the early years following the signing of the Malino agreement. However, after the beheading of three Christian schoolgirls in October 2005, central government security responses started to improve and as a result the death toll in Poso in 2006 was well below that of previous years (McRae 2008: 211-212, 225).

Security force responses to incidents that have threatened to escalate in Aceh have also improved significantly since the Helsinki peace agreement was signed. A 2008 attack on an office of KPA (the organisation for ex-GAM combatants) in Atu Lintang in Central Aceh not only led to five deaths but was the biggest threat yet to the peace process. Militia attacks on peace monitors in the same region had derailed the 2002-2003 peace process. In contrast to the past, the response of the security forces was rapid

⁴²¹ From discussions with research team in Ambon and Sidney Jones, September 2011.

⁴²² Violence only subsided after the national Coordinating Minister for Political, Law and Security Affairs ordered the deployment of additional police and military from outside of the province.

and effective. Within two weeks, 25 suspects were detained and the government sent strong messages to militia through the military structure that any future such actions would lead to harsh security responses.

Beyond Indonesia's post-conflict areas, there have also been rapid and effective deployments of security forces when unrest has threatened to spin out of control. In September 2010 inter-ethnic clashes in Tarakan, East Kalimantan, killed at least five with 40,000 displaced.⁴²³ Local security forces were unable or unwilling to prevent the violence; a video recording of the riot showed both the military and police standing by and merely observing the fighting. Yet violence did not escalate further because of the intervention of the central state. Within two days, the national police and military chiefs had arrived in Tarakan and took to the streets to call for calm. A Brimob unit arrived on the second day of fighting to assist local security forces and prevented speedboats from bringing in reinforcements for the combatants from surrounding islands. The will of the centre to prevent escalation was demonstrated by a statement from President Yudhoyono who said that the security forces must learn from the past extended violence in Central Kalimantan where the response had been ineffective and too late.

Quantitative evidence of improved security responses

The incidents discussed above provide suggestive evidence of improved security responses whenever incidents of violence threaten to escalate significantly. The findings are strengthened further if we consider quantitative evidence on changes in responses to violence by the military and police over time.

Figure 8.2 shows the number of incidents of highly mobilized violence (riots and group clashes) in provinces that have seen high levels of violence over time.⁴²⁴ The

⁴²³ The analysis is from Wilson (2013) who documents and explains the conflict in Tarakan and the security response.


⁴²⁴ Provinces covered are the five that saw extended violence plus Papua and West Papua, which have seen particularly high levels of episodic violence. The argument in this section originates in Barron, Jaffrey, and Varshney (forthcoming).

number of incidents rose sharply from 1998 to 2004, then fell in 2005 when the extended violence in Aceh came to an end. Since 2006, the number of such incidents has been on the rise again, increasing 300% between then and 2012. This appears to show the ineffectiveness of the security forces in preventing riots and group clashes from occurring.

However, the figure also shows how security forces have increasingly intervened in mobilised incidents of violence and how such intervention has increasingly been effective in bringing violence to a halt. There has been a sharp increase in both the proportion of cases where intervention has occurred and the percentage of incidents where interventions have been successful, that is where violence stopped after the intervention. Whereas security forces intervened in less than 3% of riots and group clashes in 2004 and 17% in 2005, this rose to over 50% in 2010, 2011, and 2012. Similarly, while there were successful interventions by the security forces in only 2% of such incidents in 2004 and 12% in 2005, the proportion of incidents where there was successful security force intervention increased to over 42% in the last three years. Over time, the likelihood that a security force intervention where it occurs will be successful has also increased.⁴²⁵

⁴²⁵ In 2006, 63% of security force interventions in riots or group clashes were successful in halting violence. By 2012, this figure had risen to 83%.

Figure 8.2. Incidents of mobilized violence, security force intervention, and successful intervention



Source: NVMS.

Security force interventions in mobilised incidents of violence have thus increased and become more successful in limiting further violence escalation. This can be seen in the reduction in the average number of people killed in each incident. In 2004, 1.2 people were killed for every riot or group clash that occurred. By 2008, it took five riots or group clashes to kill one person and this figure has stayed fairly constant since then.

If security interventions are becoming more effective, why is it that the number of riots and group clashes have been increasing in recent years? This is because local level actors continue to have incentives to use episodic violence and the central state, as well as its government and security representatives at the local level, by and large tolerate this. As I have shown in previous chapters, the continuing use of episodic violence is profitable and non-costly in some post-conflict areas. The resulting high expected benefits of using violence leads to repeat use by some and others also employing it. Toleration of the poor performance of security agencies in preventing such episodic violence, and the lack of follow-up in arresting and prosecuting those involved, has created an environment where local leaders and citizens can use episodic violence

instrumentally.⁴²⁶ Except in cases of strategic importance to central state elites, such as terror attacks, or where there is a large outcry from the media for follow-up,⁴²⁷ the central state rarely puts pressure on local police and military officers to pursue cases or to act effectively.

However, while episodic violence is still often tolerated by the central state, escalation into larger state-threatening extended violence is not. This has led to more effective responses to large incidents of violence that threaten to spiral into extended violence but not to incidents of violence that appear to have a limited timespan or that have little national significance.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has provided an explanation for temporal variation in the presence of extended violent conflict in Indonesia. It has shown how changes in the incentives of national level elites, in particular security force leaders, explain why extended violence occurred in a number of areas in the early transition period and why it is now absent in Indonesia.

The analysis has a number of implications for our understanding of why extended violent conflicts, including subnational civil wars and enduring inter-communal conflicts, can occur in middle income states.

First, the chapter has highlighted that theories of extended violence must consider not only the motivations of rebel groups and local belligerents but also the functioning of the state. The dominant focus of the civil war literature has been on explaining why rebel groups form and use violence with either greed- or grievance-

⁴²⁶ On the limited progress on police reform, see AI (2009) and ICG (2012b).

⁴²⁷ Sukarsono (2013) argues that there has only been sanctioning of local police chiefs who have failed to effectively manage violence when there has been a high level of public pressure. He cites the case of ethnic unrest in Lampung in October 2012 and the failure of the police in Yogyakarta to protect murder suspects from being executed by soldiers in their cells. Both cases eventually led to the replacement of the local police chief, but this was only after public outcry had mounted.

based motivations. I have argued that at least as important in explaining such conflicts is the role the state can play in allowing for, or facilitating, violence escalation. In this respect, my analysis shares some similarities with more recent work on civil wars that emphasises the importance of opportunities for rebellion. However, I see such opportunities not as a function of rough geographic terrain (as do Fearon and Laitin 2003) or the presence of lootable resources to finance rebellion (e.g. Weinstein 2007; Ross 2012), factors that allow rebel groups to flourish. Rather, I place my emphasis on the role the state plays in allowing violence to escalate. For both seemingly horizontal inter-communal conflicts, where the state is not an active party, and separatist insurgencies, understanding state behaviour is key to understanding why violence escalates to the level of war or why it does not.

Second, my emphasis on the role of the state is different than those who see civil wars and other extended violent conflicts as being the product of weak states. Focusing on (a lack of) capacity raises the question of why extended subnational conflicts can occur in states that have strong bureaucratic and coercive capacity. I argue instead that we need to look at why states with the potential ability to control unrest—capabilities that are present not only in developed countries but also in many middle income states—choose not to do so. This is a product not of technocratic capacity but of the incentives of those in the central state-based elite. Following North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), I have argued that we need to disaggregate the state to understand the interests of those who occupy it. Extended violence broke out in a number of provinces of Indonesia following the fall of Suharto not because the state was temporarily incapacitated but because key figures within the state saw such violence to be in their political and economic interests.

Finally, the chapter has shown how the very efforts to end extended violent conflicts can sow the seeds for continuing episodic violence. Peace settlements were achieved in Indonesia in large part through the co-optation of local elites. Bargains were

forged whereby rent-making opportunities were created for local elites, including local security officials, on condition that groups refrained from the use of extended violent conflict. These bargains allowed for the continuation of illiberal practices, including money politics and the use or threats of localised episodic violence. Such practices, through their impact on inter-communal and inter-elite relations, have meant that tensions remain in some of Indonesia's post-conflict provinces such as Maluku and Aceh. Ignoring the illiberal practices of the police and military, which sometimes allow for localised violence to occur, has helped secure their commitment to the state hence ensuring that extended violent conflict has not recurred.

This raises the question of whether Indonesia can be viewed as a success. I have not yet made a normative judgment about whether the continuation of episodic violence and illiberal practices is a price worth paying to secure the stability that was so lacking in the early years of the post-authoritarian transition. In many respects, it certainly is: stability has provided freedom from fear for many Indonesians and the economic growth it has facilitated has certainly had positive effects on the lives of many, even as inequality has risen. However, the question remains as to how strong these new institutional rules of the game are and whether the ongoing presence of violence in Indonesian society, along with old practices such as corruption, collusion and nepotism, may eventually undermine them. As Aspinall (2010: 34) reminds us, "poor governance is often the midwife of authoritarian reversals ... and Indonesian democracy is not yet out of the danger zone."

The question is how strong the new institutional rules of the game, which prohibit and effectively prevent new extended violence from occurring, are. National elite commitment to the current bargain will likely only ebb if there is a major shock which affects national elite interests such as another major economic crisis (which reduces the resources that can be used for patronage) or the rise to power of a president who seeks to reverse recent reforms and to recentralise and restrict access to power

(hence limiting opportunities for rent-taking from some in the national elite). Neither is likely in the near term despite leading candidates for this year's presidential elections being less than committed democrats and Indonesia's economy being heavily dependent on the export of commodities, especially to China. Nevertheless, as Slater (2010a) argues, elite pacts based on the provision of patronage, a finite and contested resource, are always vulnerable. It will take deeper changes to Indonesia's polity for the spectre of future extended violent conflict to fully disappear.

Chapter 9. Conclusions

What causes post-conflict violence to occur frequently in some places emerging from extended violent conflict and not in others? Why does episodic post-conflict violence take different forms in different areas? And what causes episodic violence to escalate into larger renewed extended violent conflict? This concluding chapter seeks to contribute towards answers to these questions by summarising the findings, arguments and theory developed in the thesis. It then points to implications for how we can best understand and study post-conflict violence. The thesis concludes with suggestions for how this new understanding should shape the policies and practices of those aiming to consolidate peace in post-conflict areas across the globe.

1. Findings and arguments

Post-conflict violence is best understood not as the result of dysfunctional inter-group relations, unaddressed grievances, or of low state capacity. These issues can make violence more likely but they do not alone cause it. Rather, I have argued and sought to demonstrate that we can better comprehend why post-conflict violence occurs, or why it does not, by focusing on the incentives that different sets of actors have to use violence for purposes of accumulation. Examining the political economy of violence—the reasons why violence is profitable in some places at some times, and not in others—illuminates why post-conflict violence occurs or does not. Differing incentives for different sets of actors explains why post-conflict violence takes varying forms across areas for combinations of support for violence from different groups determines the forms post-conflict violence will take.

1.1 Why post-conflict violence occurs

Post-conflict violence usually, if not always, occurs because it serves instrumental functions for those who employ it. These include to directly secure resources or power, to signal strength to those in positions of authority (so they distribute resources or power), and to shape the rules of the game on acceptable behaviour. I have argued that three sets of factors determine whether and when individuals have incentives to use violence for these purposes and hence why it occurs.

First, *the ways in which resources are distributed and power is divided* in the early post-conflict period is key. Violence will occur when people find it to be beneficial. In areas emerging from extended violent conflict, individuals and groups do not know whether or not the rules of the game that defined acceptable and unacceptable behaviour during times of war are still in operation. While war rages, violence is an everyday means of pursuing goals. As Kalyvas (2006) has shown, such violence not only serves the ostensible master narrative goal of the conflict, for example to forcibly ensure an area receives independence or autonomy, or for a group to gain power in the local political arena. Violence also occurs because extended violent conflict creates space for individuals to achieve often more mundane personal goals. Indeed, success in war requires leaders of conflicting groups to allow such violence to occur. As the rebel recruitment and war economy literatures emphasise, allowing such personal goals to be achieved is an important way to overcome the collective action dilemma whereby individuals risk life and limb to achieve group goals and goods from which free-riders—those who chose not to fight—can also benefit. For this reason, acts of violence based on personal pecuniary motivations are tolerated and, indeed, often encouraged.

Peace settlements—whether peace accords or military victories—are critical junctures in that the rules of the game that govern the role of violence in political and economic competition are up for redefinition. Leaders and (former) footsoldiers do not know whether peace will hold, whether the terms of peace will be applied, and whether

violence will continue to be profitable for those who use it. In deciding whether to continue to use violence in such uncertain conditions, individuals will look to the signals created by the success (or lack of) of acts of violence in the early post-conflict period. Where such violence continues to be profitable for those who use it, recurring incidents of violence are more likely.

I have argued that the ways in which post-conflict resources are deployed are key to this. Rewarding those who use or threaten violence in the early post-conflict period with money, jobs, or projects creates a signal that violence continues to be a useful strategy for accumulation. This leads to repeated use of violence by some and others to also employ it.

Second, and related, individuals factor in the *expected costs* of using violence in the post-conflict period. Where the risks of using violence are high, individuals will be less likely to use it. Again, the signal sent by those with authority is extremely important. Where those who use or threaten violence face arrest or other sanctions, people will be more likely to use other non-violent means to try to achieve their goals.

Third, and finally, I have argued that the *degree to which peaceable opportunities exist* is important in determining whether or not post-conflict violence will occur. Violence may be beneficial and usually non-costly; but it is still inherently a risky endeavour. I have argued that most if not all people in post-conflict societies will prefer to achieve their goals through channels that do not involve this risk. Where political institutions and economic opportunities exist that allow individuals and groups to get ahead without resort to violence, people will be less likely to use violence as a strategy for accumulation. This points to the importance of ensuring that barriers to political power and to economic achievement are limited.

Variation in such factors explains not only where frequent post-conflict violence occurs (and, conversely, where it does not) but also temporal variation in such violence.

Violence tends to rise at times when there are changes to the expected benefits and costs of using violence and to the extent to which peaceful opportunities for accumulation are available.

1.2 Why post-conflict violence takes different forms

Violence can be of varying types with resulting differing destructive impacts. It may take episodic form, with smaller or larger per incident impacts, or may take the form of extended enduring large-scale violent conflict. I have argued that rather than treating, and studying, each in isolation, it is useful to conceptualise each as being escalated versions of the same class of events. In other words: to understand why large episodic violence occurs, we need to consider what causes small-scale incidents to grow in size; to understand why extended violent conflict happens, we need to consider the factors and processes that lead to large-scale episodic incidents growing in scale and frequency to the point where inter-communal or civil war occurs.

I have argued that the type(s) of violence that will occur in an area depends on combinations of support for the use of violence by different sets of actors. The thesis has identified two key sets of actors who, collectively, determine whether episodic post-conflict violence occurs and the forms it takes: local violence specialists (including, but not limited to, former combatants); and local elites (defined as those with formal or informal authority in post-conflict areas but subject to the authority of the central state). Where only local violence specialists support the use of violence, post-conflict violence will tend to be small in scale. In contrast, where local elites also support the use of violence, large-scale episodes, such as deadly riots or group clashes, will also occur. Such incidents require the organisation and/or tolerance of violence by local elites; as such, without their support for violence escalation, episodes of post-conflict violence will remain small (or will be absent if local violence specialists are not present or face sanction when they use violence). In determining levels of episodic post-conflict

violence, the attitudes and actions of national elites outside of the areas where extended violence took place only matter in as much as they shape the incentives (and hence actions) of local players.

The thesis has used comparative analysis of districts within three Indonesian provinces, which differ in both the presence and scale of post-conflict violence, to show how variation in the three factors identified above lead to different post-conflict outcomes (Tables 9.1 and 9.2).

Table 9.1. Incentives for local elites to support violence and presence of large episodic violence

	Maluku	Aceh	North Maluku
<u>Benefits</u> : Resources distributed to local elites based on threat of/use of violence?	Yes	No	No
<u>Costs</u> : Supporting escalation shown to be costly?	No	Yes	Yes
<u>Opportunities</u> : Peaceful political/economic channels for accumulation by local elites?	No	Yes	Yes
Level of large episodic post-conflict violence	High	Low	Low

Table 9.2. Incentives for local violence specialists to support violence and presence of small episodic violence

	Maluku	Aceh		North Maluku
		East Aceh	South Aceh	
<u>Benefits</u> : Resources distributed to local violence specialists based on threat of/use of violence?	Yes	Yes	No	No
<u>Costs</u> : Use of violence shown to be costly?	No	No	Mixed ⁴²⁸	Yes
<u>Opportunities</u> : Peaceful political/economic channels for accumulation by local violence specialists?	No	No	Yes	Yes
Level of small episodic post-conflict violence	High	High	Low	Low

⁴²⁸ There has been little tolerance by local elites but the security sector tolerates such violence.

In Maluku, which has seen both frequent small and large episodic post-conflict violence, violence has proven to be beneficial and non-costly for local elites and local violence specialists alike, and both sets of actors have faced barriers to using peaceful means to get ahead. In this environment, local elites and local violence specialists have used violence for purposes of accumulation.

In contrast, in largely peaceful post-conflict North Maluku, the costs of using or support violence have been high for both sets of actors and the benefits have been low; there have also been more opportunities for accumulation through non-violent means for both groups. This has led local elites and community members to not choose to use violent means to get ahead.

In Aceh, large-scale episodic violence has been largely absent because local elites have seen few benefits from using such violence, they have faced high costs when they have tried to do so, and because the peace settlement has provided extensive opportunities for accumulation through non-violent institutional means. Levels of small-scale episodic violence vary between districts within post-conflict Aceh because of differing incentives for local violence specialists (primarily former rebel combatants) to use violence.

1.3 Why extended violence (re)occurs or does not

The thesis has argued that extended violent conflict, whether civil war or enduring inter-communal violence, can usefully be viewed as an escalated version of large episodic violence. Drawing on an analysis of the conditions present in the early years after the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime, and how these have changed as Indonesia's democratic transition has consolidated, I have developed a theory of why extended violence can occur even in stronger states. My emphasis is on the role of a third set of actors—national elites linked to, and battling for power within, the central state. Local support for violence by local elites and local violence specialists to use

violence—a primary focus of many analyses of Indonesia’s extended violent conflicts—are necessary conditions for such violence to occur. But, taken alone, they insufficiently explain why episodic violence escalated to fully-blown wars. National elite complicity is also necessary.

I have argued that in states with broad bureaucratic and coercive reach, conditions that characterise most middle income countries, extended violence only occurs when support for further escalation from members of the national elite is present. I have shown how in the early democracy years, members of the central state elite in Indonesia, in particular military leaders, saw high benefits and low costs from supporting such escalation. With pressure to reform the military, and to kick out Suharto-era leaders, some national elites perceived there to be few peaceable means to ensure that old rights and privileges would continue to be protected. In this environment, supporting the escalation of episodic violence into much larger enduring conflagrations proved to be an effective strategy. Only as threats to elite interests have declined, and as more impersonal institutions that provide checks on national elite behaviour have taken form and grown in strength, have incentives to support extended violence diminished.

2. Implications for understanding (post-conflict) violence

The theory developed in this thesis is deliberately and consciously parsimonious. Iteratively skipping back and forward between deductive and inductive reasoning, I developed a theory of post-conflict violence that focuses on a limited set of factors and mechanisms. Bringing in case materials, I have sought to demonstrate that the theory does a good job in explaining differing patterns of post-conflict violence in Indonesia; the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3 appear to have strong predictive power in Maluku, North Maluku, and Aceh. There are some disadvantages to such parsimony, in particular

in explaining specific events rather than patterns of events. The case chapters, in applying and developing the theory, have shown that while the hypotheses hold, in some cases other factors such as pre-existing norms and preferences are important.⁴²⁹ As with all social phenomena, contingency and chance—which cannot be easily modelled by social scientists—also play a role. However, a major advantage of developing a simple, focused theory is that it allows for portability to other contexts beyond Indonesia. The theory should ultimately be judged by the extent to which it can explain patterns of violence in a range of post-conflict areas.

If the theory is right, it has a number of implications for how we should understand and study post-conflict violence. Many of these insights also apply to the study of violence outside zones of past extended violence.

2.1 Focusing on incentives to use violence

First, the thesis has shown that focusing on the political economy of violence, on the incentives that individuals and groups have to use violence (or not) in the post-conflict period, can be a fruitful strategy. Enduring grievances or ‘root causes’ can motivate individuals and groups to take actions to achieve redress. But theories based on such factors need to explain why the aggrieved choose to use *violence*, one of but a number of possible strategies, as a means for this. Similarly, the nature of inter-group relations can explain levels of tensions in a given society. But our theories need to specify why such conflict takes *violent* form. This requires us to zoom in on the factors that shape the decision-making processes and ultimate choices of individuals to use violence or not. In explaining complex social phenomena such as post-conflict violence, researchers need to provide more deeply specified, and empirically grounded, explanations that show how macro-level conditions shape individual decisions (and vice versa).

⁴²⁹ It may be possible to extend my theory by focusing on how different types of goals beyond economic and political accumulation shape the instrumental use of violence, and the conditions under which these different types of goals are more or less important. This complements rather than undermines the basic approach of focusing on three sets of actors and the incentives they have for supporting violence. This is work for the future.

Methodological implications follow. Econometric analyses, which examine how structural factors co-vary with different levels of violence, have limited promise in building theories that demonstrate how differences in environmental factors shape human decision-making. To be sure, many researchers are aware of these limitations and have increasingly collected and employed data that allows for consideration of variation at much lower levels (e.g. villages and even households). This is helpful. Yet most quantitative studies of violence, and even more so of post-conflict violence, have still focused on assessing the extent to which X increases the risk of Y; data, rather than deductive theory often bolstered by just anecdotal examples, has infrequently been used to show *how* and *why* the independent and dependent variables are connected. Qualitative analyses provide opportunities to explore in greater depth the links between purported causes and effects. Unfortunately, many such studies have also failed to build rigorous arguments and theories that show the *mechanisms* through which the two are linked. My study has shown the usefulness of mixed methods approaches which involve the deployment of finally-grained quantitative violence data and comparative micro-level case study work, involving extensive fieldwork and the use of process tracing.

Second, in unpacking such incentives I argue that it is useful to look at the instrumental functions violence can serve in post-conflict areas. There is a long tradition of viewing violence in pathological terms. I have argued instead that there is much to be gained by treating individuals and groups as largely rational. To adapt the title of Christopher Cramer's (2006) book, "violence is not a stupid thing." A logic exists. I have shown for the Indonesian cases that, most of the time, individuals who use violence do so because they feel it is a way for them to achieve their goals. To understand why post-conflict violence occurs, it is necessary to determine what these goals are and why people believe violence may be a useful way to achieve them. Again, rigorous fieldwork is necessary for this.

I have argued that focusing on how violence is used to achieve political or economic power explains much, if not all, post-conflict violence. This is not to say that all individuals in post-conflict areas are cold-hearted chasers of riches. Rather, I have argued that seemingly pecuniary goals are important not only for personal or group enrichment but also to ensure people's wider interests are protected. Where impersonal institutions that protect basic rights and check the actions of those in power are weak or not present—and this is the case in many post-conflict areas across the world—economic and political achievement can prevent exploitation by others. Because getting ahead economically and politically can simultaneously be a goal *and* a means to achieve other goals, there is little to be gained from labelling people's motives for using violence as being driven by greed or grievance. However, focusing on issues normally explored under research agendas that are focused on greed-type issues (such as the use of violence to capture resources or power) can take us far in also understanding violence where there is a prominent backdrop of grievances.

2.2 The links between different forms of violence

The thesis has shown the usefulness of considering different types of violence within one study. The vast majority of studies of post-conflict violence have focused on why civil wars recur or not; such research strategies—where violence is measured in binary terms, either present or absent—do not allow for consideration of why episodic forms of post-conflict violence occur. Studies have also tended to consider the two types of extended violent conflict—civil war and inter-communal extended violence—separately, treating the two as phenomenologically distinct. My research approach, which includes areas (and time periods) that vary in the presence of three different forms of violence (extended, large episodic, small episodic) has allowed me to do a few things.

First, it has enabled me to consider what is similar and what is different about different forms of violence. I have argued that there are common causal factors for all three types of violence (and for the inter-communal and civil war sub-types of extended violent conflict). In particular, for each type of violence issues related to the ways in which resources and power are distributed are key. Each type of violence becomes more likely when those who use violence are rewarded; each type of violence is more likely when few channels exist to allow individuals to get ahead economically and politically using peaceful means.

At the same time, I have also shown that there is a key difference between each type of violence: what makes extended violence different from episodic violence, and what makes large episodic violence different from small-scale episodic violence, is who is organising or facilitating violence. Small-scale violence, I have argued, is largely a product of non-elites at the local level. Larger-scale episodic violence requires the support of local elites. Extended violent conflict, in turn, requires support from national level actors. Considering all three forms of violence together has thus allowed me to develop a theory of violence escalation, which sets out the conditions under which violent acts become more destructive, sometimes ending up as fresh extended violent conflict. Studying any one form alone would not have made this possible.

3. Implications for policy

My initial interest in the thesis's research questions stemmed from frustrations I felt as a development practitioner in Aceh, trying to understand, and design programs to respond to, the new forms of violence that were emerging following that province's peace agreement. Both the academic and policy work I read appeared to contain few answers. If post-conflict violence was the result of failed elite bargains, why was it occurring so frequently in Aceh even as leaders from both the rebel movement and the

Indonesian government seemed so committed to the peace accord? If post-conflict violence was the result of societal factors such as tense inter-group relations, why was violence present even as surveys I commissioned were showing high levels of social cohesion? How could I square theories of post-conflict violence that emphasised weak state capacity as being the prime determinant of violence with the observed reality that Aceh was governed by a strong, and strengthening, Indonesian state? While I hope the thesis breaks theoretical ground, from the genesis of this project I have been at least equally concerned with providing pointers, if not fully developed answers, to policymakers and practitioners working on and in post-conflict areas. The thesis's arguments have a number of implications for the formulation of policies and programs to prevent post-conflict violence.

3.1 The use of post-conflict funds

I have shown how post-conflict violence can be the result of post-conflict resources inadvertently creating incentives for continued violence.

Globally, practitioners and academics alike have highlighted the need for special post-conflict programs to co-opt potential spoilers of the peace. To this end, DDR (disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration) programs are a now-almost-universally employed tactic to buy the allegiance of those who fought before. In essence, paying off elites and former combatants who could derail peace processes is deemed important with the corruption and the lack of justice this entails a price worth paying in the early post-conflict years (e.g. Zaum and Cheng 2011). The thesis does not argue against such programs. Providing funds to former combatant leaders and footsoldiers may be an effective way to ensure they abide by peace accords: the analysis of Aceh, in particular, showed the utility of using resources for purposes of incorporation to ensure that the nascent peace gained strength.

However, the thesis argues against using funds to satiate the desires of belligerents who use violence *after extended violence has come to an end*. Those with the capacity or taste for violence will look to responses to violence that is committed after peace accords are signed, or extended violent conflicts otherwise end, to determine whether violent action is still a legitimate and profitable strategy. Policymakers need to send a clear signal that the rules on the acceptability of violence in the post-conflict era are different to those that were in operation during the extended violent conflict. Distributing resources to those who use or threaten to use violence in the early post-conflict period can send out a signal that violence remains tolerable. As occurred in Maluku, this can lead to violence continuing to be a modus operandi in political and economic competition.

3.2 Security responses and legal institutions

How then to deal with the acts of violence that will almost inevitably occur in the early post-conflict period? My argument points to the importance of ensuring that those who commit such violent acts face sanction. Arresting and prosecuting such people is of vital importance to send out a clear signal that the continuing use of violence is no longer acceptable.

In most post-conflict areas this implies three things. First, there is a need to build the capacity and professionalism of the security agencies, primarily the police, in responding effectively to post-conflict violence. The police in areas emerging from extended violence will often be dysfunctional, with past violence having distorted the incentives for them to do their job properly. While supporting deeper institutional security sector reform will often take years, in part because it will often be resisted, in the short to medium term it may be useful to consider developing an elite branch within the police to investigate and respond to large incidents of post-conflict violence.

Second, there is a need to build up justice institutions to ensure that those who use violence face appropriate sanctions. My concern is not with developing institutions such as truth and reconciliation commissions that deal with past abuses, the predominant focus of law-related post-conflict programs, but on building systems to process those who use violence after the peace settlement. Legal institutions will also often be weak and dysfunctional in areas emerging from extended violent conflict. Again, while longer-term work on building judicial functioning is required, a short to medium term strategy may be to use nationally-appointed special courts—as has been used in Indonesia and elsewhere to address corruption cases—to deal with incidents of post-conflict violence.

Finally, in-group policing can be an effective strategy for limiting the use of post-conflict violence. Providing incentives to leaders of formerly conflicting groups to discipline those under their authority who use violence is potentially a powerful means to limit such acts while state security and justice institutions are being built.

3.3 Expanding opportunities in post-conflict areas

There is also a need to increase the economic and political opportunities for elites and local level violence specialists in post-conflict areas. Where such opportunities exist, individuals within each group may be less tempted to use violence for profit.

There is a need to take actions to boost job-creating growth. High levels of unemployment raise the risk of individuals turning to violence. Ensuring there are economic opportunities for local elites, for example to develop and grow businesses, is also important. The challenge—and not an easy one to overcome—is to ensure those with the capacity to spoil the peace have opportunities, while also ensuring that providing access to economic opportunities is not a response to threats or acts of coercion. Providing additional state resources to support economic development has a role. However, it is important that such resources are channelled through formal

institutional channels, where checks and balances and accountability mechanisms are in place, to prevent funds being captured and used to cement old patron-client networks that can be mobilised again for violence.

Ensuring that former conflict elites are not excluded from achieving political power is also important. In Aceh, provisions in the peace accord that facilitated GAM's entry to local governments and parliaments played a vital role in limiting former rebel leaders' incentives to use violence. In preventing the exclusion of particular groups, the Indonesia cases highlight the limitations in some places of formal power-sharing rules. These, I have argued, can lock-in conflict-era identities and ensure that political divides continue to be structured by conflict cleavages. In many places, rather than dividing power between groups, it may be more effective to focus on ensuring there is a level playing field for leaders of different stripes to compete for power through political channels. Approaches that distribute power and control of resources across more institutions (for example, by allowing for the formation of new subnational administrative regions in post-conflict areas) can expand the set of opportunities, thereby reducing the costs to elites who fail to achieve power in some areas.

3.4 Building the national state

Finally, policymakers and practitioners focused on consolidating peace in post-conflict areas need to also develop strategies to support the development of central state institutions. The risks of extended violence are higher where national elites support such subnational violence. The incentives of leaders and civilians in post-conflict areas are important determinants of post-conflict violence. But, in middle income states, it is only where groups linked to the central state condone or facilitate violence escalation that episodic violence can morph into renewed extended violent conflict.

Efforts to support national states in countries that have experienced past large-scale violence have tended to focus on building capacity in areas such as the security

sector, public revenue collection, and budgetary planning. These are certainly important endeavours. Yet I have shown how the actions of central state elites are driven at least as much by the incentives they have to use violence as a strategy for accumulation as by capacity issues.

Lowering incentives for national elites to support violence requires dual strategies that: (a) ensure that national elites have opportunities to access power and resources using peaceable means; and (b) that build impersonal institutions that provide checks and balances on those in power. In countries in the early stages of political transitions, a situation common to many areas affected by or emerging from extended violent conflicts, the former may mean limiting reform pressures that can undermine the interests of those previously in power. Yet such co-optation-focused strategies alone provide a shaky platform for preventing the reemergence of extended violence. By protecting incumbent interests they limit opportunities for others. Providing preferential access to those who have the capacity to organise or allow violence to occur can also send out a dangerous signal that coercive pressure can be a fruitful strategy for aspiring national elites.

Those seeking to prevent the reemergence of extended violent conflict thus need to focus on building strong state institutions that limit the ability of national elites to use violence for their own purposes. In short, this requires building the rule of law. Efforts focused on this will, when successful, have a larger positive impact in consolidating peace than the more traditional peacebuilding programs often favoured by both donors and governments in post-conflict areas.

References

- Acciaioli, Greg (2001). "Ground of Conflict, Idioms of Harmony: Custom, Religion, and Nationalism in Violence Avoidance in Lindu Plain, Central Sulawesi." *Indonesia* 72 (October): 81-114.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2006). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Adam, Jeroen (2008). "Forced Migration, *adat*, and a purified present in Ambon, Indonesia." *Ethnology* 47(4): 227-238.
- Adam, Jeroen (2009). "The Problem of Going Home: Land Management, Displacement and Reconciliation in Ambon," in Birgit Brauchler (ed.), *Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroots Agency for Peace*. London: Routledge, pp. 138-155.
- Adam, Jeroen (2010). "How ordinary folk became involved in the Ambonese conflict: Understanding private opportunities during communal violence." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (BKI)* 1661(1): 25-48.
- Aditjondro, George Junus (2001). "Guns, Pamphlets and Handie-Talkies: How the military exploited local ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges," in Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer (eds.), *Violence in Indonesia*. Hamburg: Abera, pp. 100-128.
- Aditjondro, George Junus (2007). "Profiting from Peace: The Political economy of Aceh's Post-Helsinki reconstruction." *INFID Working Paper* no. 3. Jakarta: International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development.
- Afrida, Nani and Hotli Simanjuntak (2012). "Six arrested for election terror in Aceh." *The Jakarta Post*. 13 March. Available at: <<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/03/13/six-arrested-election-terror-aceh.html>> (accessed 21 May 2013).
- The Age (2010). "Political prisoner dies as 'truth walks slowly'. 15 September. Available at: <<http://www.theage.com.au/world/political-prisoner-dies-as-truth-walks-slowly-20100914-15aui.html>> (accessed 14 May 2013).
- Aguswandi and Judith Large (eds.) (2008). *Reconfiguring Politics: The Indonesia-Aceh Peace Process*. London: Conciliation Resources.
- Amnesty International (AI) (2004). "New Military Operations, Old Patterns of Human Rights Abuses in Aceh (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, NAD)." 7 October. Available at: <<http://195.234.175.160/en/library/info/ASA21/033/2004/en>> (accessed 15 October 2012)
- Amnesty International (AI) (2009). *Unfinished Business: Police Accountability in Indonesia*. London: Amnesty International.
- Andaya, Leonard (1993). *The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. (ed.) (2001). *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.

- Anderson, Bobby (2013). "Gangster, ideologue, martyr: the posthumous reinvention of Teungku Badruddin and the nature of the Free Aceh Movement." *Conflict, Security & Development* 13(1): 31-56.
- Andreas, Peter (2004). "Criminalized Legacies of War: The Clandestine Political Economy of the Western Balkans." *Problems of Post-Communism* 51(3): 3-9.
- Andreas, Peter (2008). *Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in Sarajevo*. Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Anwar, Dewi Fortuna, Hélène Bouvier, Glenn Smith, and Roger Tol (eds.) (2005). *Violent Internal Conflicts in Asia Pacific: Histories, Political Economies and Policies*. Jakarta: KITLV.
- Aragon, Lorraine V. (2001). "Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi: Where People Eat Fish and Fish Eat People." *Indonesia* 72 (October): 45-74.
- Asian Century Institute (2012). "Rule of Law in Asia." 4 December. Available at: <<http://www.asiancenturyinstitute.com/politics/147-rule-of-law-in-asia>> (accessed 1 May 2013).
- Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL Foundation) (2012). "Preliminary Report." 11 April. Available at: <<http://anfrel.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Aceh-Preliminary-Report.pdf>> (accessed 10 December 2012).
- Aspinall, Edward (2005a). *The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?* Policy Studies no. 20. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.
- Aspinall, Edward (2005b). *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia*. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press.
- Aspinall, Edward (2005c). "Elections and the normalization of politics in Indonesia." *South East Asia Research* 12(2): 117-156.
- Aspinall, Edward (2007). "The Construction of Grievance: Natural Resources and Identity in a Separatist Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(6): 950-972.
- Aspinall, Edward (2008). "Peace without justice? The Helsinki peace process in Aceh." *HD Report*. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
- Aspinall, Edward (2009a). *Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia*. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press.
- Aspinall, Edward (2009b). "Combatants to Contractors: The Political Economy of Peace in Aceh." *Indonesia* 87 (April): 1-34.
- Aspinall, Edward (2010). "The Irony of Success." *Journal of Democracy* 21(2): 20-34.
- Aspinall, Edward (2011a). "Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 11: 289-319.
- Aspinall, Edward (2011b). "Aceh's no win election." *Inside Indonesia* 106 (October-December). Available at: <<http://www.insideindonesia.org/weekly-articles/aceh-s-no-win-election>> (accessed 8 December 2012).
- Aspinall, Edward (2013). "A Nation in Fragments." *Critical Asian Studies* 45(1): 27-54.
- Aspinall, Edward and Mark T. Berger (2001). "The Breakup of Indonesia? Nationalism after decolonisation and the contradictions of modernity in post-cold war Southeast Asia." *Third World Quarterly* 22(6): 1003-1024.
- Aspinall, Edward and Harold Crouch (2003). *The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed*. Policy Studies no. 1. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.

- Aspinall, Edward and Gerry van Klinken (eds.) (2011). *The State and Illegality in Indonesia*. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Auerbach, Jerold S. (1984). *Justice Without Law? Resolving Disputes Without Lawyers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Awaluddin, Hamid (2008). "Why is Peace in Aceh Successful?," in Aguswandi and Judith Large (eds.), *Reconfiguring Politics: The Indonesia-Aceh Peace Process*. London: Conciliation Resources, pp. 25-27.
- Awaluddin, Hamid (2009). *Peace in Aceh: Notes on the Peace Process between the Republic of Indonesia and the Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM) in Helsinki*. Jakarta: CSIS.
- Axelrod, Robert (1986). "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms." *American Political Science Review* 80: 1095-1111.
- Azca, Muhammad Najib (2003). "The Role of the Security Forces in Communal Conflict: The Case of Ambon, Indonesia." MA thesis. Australian National University.
- Azca, Muhammad Najib (2004). *Security Sector Reform, Democratic Transition, and Social Violence: The Case of Ambon, Indonesia*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Azca, Muhammad Najib (2006). "In between military and militia: the dynamics of the security forces in the communal conflict in Ambon." *Asian Journal of Social Science* 34(3): 431-455.
- Azca, Muhammad Najib (2011). "After Jihad: A Biographical Approach to Passionate Politics in Indonesia." PhD thesis. University of Amsterdam.
- Barber, Richard (ed.) (2000). *Aceh: The Untold Story*. Bangkok: Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development.
- Barker, Joshua (2001). "State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto's New Order," in Benedict R. O'G Anderson (ed.) *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, pp. 20-53.
- Barron, Patrick (2007). "Getting Reintegration Back on Track: Problems in Aceh and Priorities for Moving Forward." Paper presented at the conference, "The Peace Process in Aceh: The Remnants of Violence and the Future of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam," Harvard University, 24-27 October.
- Barron, Patrick (2008). "Managing the Resource for Peace: Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in Aceh," in Aguswandi and Judith Large (eds.) *Reconfiguring Politics: The Indonesia-Aceh Peace Process*. London: Conciliation Resources, pp. 58-61.
- Barron, Patrick (2009). "Peace without Reintegration: Lessons for DDR Theory and Practice from Aceh," in Small Arms Survey (eds.) *Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 248-283.
- Barron, Patrick with Paul Arthur and Peter Bartu (2012). "Sub-National Violence in Middle and Higher Income Countries." Background paper for World Development Report 2011. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Barron, Patrick, Muhammad Najib Azca, and Tri Susdinarjanti (2012). *After the Communal War: Understanding and Addressing Post-Conflict Violence in Eastern Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: CSPA Books.

- Barron, Patrick and Adam Burke (2008). *Supporting Peace in Aceh: Development Agencies and International Involvement*. Policy Studies no. 47. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.
- Barron, Patrick and Samuel Clark (2006). "Decentralizing Inequality? Center-Periphery Relations, Local Governance, and Conflict in Aceh." *Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Paper* no. 39. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Barron, Patrick, Samuel Clark, and Muslahuddin Daud (2005). *Conflict and Recovery in Aceh: An Assessment of Conflict Conditions and Options for Supporting the Peace Process*. Jakarta: World Bank.
- Barron, Patrick, Samuel Clark, and Blair Palmer (2010). "Incorporation and Institution-Building: Autonomy and Elections in Postconflict Aceh." *St Antony's International Review* 6(2): 124-144.
- Barron, Patrick, Rachael Diprose, and Michael Woolcock (2011). *Contesting Development: Participatory Development and Local Conflict Dynamics in Indonesia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Barron, Patrick, Sana Jaffrey, Blair Palmer, and Ashutosh Varshney (2009). "Understanding Violent Conflict in Indonesia: A Mixed Methods Approach." *Social Development Paper* no. 117. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Barron, Patrick, Sana Jaffrey, and Ashutosh Varshney (forthcoming). "How Large Conflicts Subside: Evidence from Indonesia," manuscript in progress, based on the National Violence Monitoring System.
- Barron, Patrick, Kai Kaiser, and Menno Pradhan (2004). "Local Conflict in Indonesia: Measuring Incidence and Identifying Patterns." *Policy Research Working Paper* no. 3384. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Barron, Patrick, Kai Kaiser, and Menno Pradhan (2009). "Understanding Variations in Local Conflict: Evidence and Implications from Indonesia." *World Development* 37(3): 698-713.
- Barron, Patrick and David Madden (2004). "Violence and Conflict Resolution in Non-Conflict Regions: The Case of Lampung, Indonesia." *Indonesian Social Development Papers* no. 2. Jakarta: World Bank.
- Barron, Patrick, Melina Nathan, and Bridget Welsh (2005). "Consolidating Indonesia's Democracy: Conflict, Institutions and the 'Local' in the 2004 Legislative Elections." *Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Paper* no. 31. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Barron, Patrick, Sri Kusumastuti Rahayu, Sunita Varada, and Vita Febriany (2010). "Disturbing the Equilibrium: Movements Out of Poverty in Conflict-Affected Areas of Indonesia," in Deepa Narayan and Patti Petesch (eds.) *Moving Out of Poverty: Rising from the Ashes of Conflict*. Washington, D.C.: Palgrave Macmillan and World Bank, pp. 290-377.
- Barron, Patrick, Erman Rahman, and Kharisma Nugroho (2013). *The Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Conflict and International Development Assistance – The Case of Aceh, Indonesia*. Jakarta/Bangkok: The Asia Foundation.
- Barron, Patrick and Joanne Sharpe (2005). "Counting Conflicts: Using Newspaper Reports to Understand Violence in Indonesia." *Indonesian Social Development Papers* no. 7. Jakarta: World Bank.

- Barron, Patrick and Joanne Sharpe (2008). "Local Conflict in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Understanding Variations in Violence Levels and Forms through Local Newspapers." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 8(3): 395-423.
- Barron, Patrick and Joanne Sharpe (2010). "Conflict in Post-Suharto Indonesia: What Local Newspapers Tell Us", in Ashutosh Varshney (ed.) *Collective Violence in Indonesia*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 51-76.
- Bartels, Dieter (1977). "Guarding the invisible mountain: intervillage alliances, religious syncretism and ethnic identities among Ambonese Christians and Moslems in the Moluccas." PhD thesis. Cornell University.
- Barter, Shane Joshua (2011). "The Free Aceh Elections? The 2009 Legislative Contests in Aceh." *Indonesia* 91 (April): 113-130.
- Barton, Greg (2006). *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid*. 2nd edition. Jakarta: Equinox.
- Başoğlu, Metin, Maria Livanou, Cvetana Crnobarić, Tanja Frančičković, Enra Suljić, Dijana đurić, and Melin Vranešić (2005). "Psychiatric and Cognitive Effects of War in Former Yugoslavia: Association of Lack of Redress for Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Reactions." *The Journal of the American Medical Association* 294(5): 580-590.
- Bates, Robert H. (2001). *Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development*. London: W.W. Norton.
- Bates, Robert H. (2008a). *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bates, Robert H. (2008b). "State Failure." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 1-12.
- Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast (1998). *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, and Smita Singh (2002). "Organizing Violence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(5): 599-628.
- Beeck, Christine (2007). "Re-paving the road to peace: Analysis of the implementation of DD&R in Aceh Province, Indonesia." *BICC Brief* no. 35. Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversation (BICC).
- Belloni, Roberto (2008). *Statebuilding and International Intervention in Bosnia*. London: Routledge.
- Bellows, John and Edward Miguel (2006). "War and Institutions: New Evidence from Sierra Leone." *The American Economic Review* 96(2): 394-399.
- Berdal, Mats (2012). "Reflections on post-war violence and peacebuilding," in Asti Suhrke and Mats Berdal (eds.) *The Peace in Between: Post-war Violence and Peacebuilding*. London: Routledge, pp. 309-326.
- Berdal, Mats, Gemma Collante-Celador, and Merima Zupcevic Buzadzic (2012). "Post-war violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina", in Asti Suhrke and Mats Berdal (eds.), *The Peace in Between: Post-war Violence and Peacebuilding*. London: Routledge, pp. 75-94.
- Berdal, Mats and David M. Malone (eds.) (2000). *Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Berdal, Mats and Dominik Zaum (eds.) (2012). *Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power After Peace*. Abingdon: Routledge.

- Berenschot, Ward (2011). *Riot Politics: Hindu Muslim Violence and the Indian State*. New York: C. Hurst & Co.
- Berkeley, Bill (2001). *The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bermeo, Nancy (1992). "Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship." *Comparative Politics* 24(3): 273-291.
- Bermeo, Nancy (2003). "What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn't Say—About Postwar Democratization." *Good Governance* 9: 159-177.
- Bertrand, Jacques (2002). "Legacies of the Authoritarian Past: Religious Violence in Indonesia's Moluccan Islands." *Pacific Affairs* 75(1): 57-85.
- Bertrand, Jacques (2004). *Nationalism and Ethnic Violence in Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson (2011). *Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Blattman, Christopher (2009). "From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda." *American Political Science Review* 103(2): 231-247.
- Blattman, Christopher and Jeannie Annan (2010). "The Consequences of Child Soldiering." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 92(4): 882-898.
- Blattman, Christopher and Edward Miguel (2010). "Civil War." *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(1): 3-57.
- Bohm, C.J. (2005). *Brief Chronicle of the Unrest in the Moluccas, 1999-2005*. Ambon: Crisis Centre Diocese of Amboina.
- Bourchier, David (1990). "Crime, Law and State Authority in Indonesia," in Arief Budiman (ed.) *State and Civil Society in Indonesia*. Clayton, Victoria: Monash University, pp. 177-212.
- Bourchier, David (1999). "Skeletons, Vigilantes and the Armed Forces' Fall from Grace," in Edward Aspinall, Herb Feith, and Gerry van Klinken (eds.) *The Last Days of Suharto*. Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, pp. 149-172.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1995). *Supplement to 'An Agenda for Peace': Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*. A/50/60; s/1995/1. New York: United Nations. January 3.
- Boyle, Michael J. (2012). "Revenge and reprisal in Kosovo", in Asti Suhrke and Mats Berdal (eds.) *The Peace in Between: Post-war Violence and Peacebuilding*. London: Routledge, pp. 95-116.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow (2003). *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
- Bureau of Statistics Ambon (BPS Ambon) (2000). *Kota Ambon Dalam Angka*. Ambon: Badan Pusat Statistik Maluku.
- Bureau of Statistics Maluku (BPS Maluku) (2005). *Propinsi Maluku Dalam Angka*. Ambon: Badan Pusat Statistik Maluku.
- Bureau of Statistics Maluku (BPS Maluku) (2010). *Propinsi Maluku Dalam Angka*. Ambon: Badan Pusat Statistik Maluku.
- Bureau of Statistics Maluku Utara (BPS Maluku Utara) (2005). *Propinsi Maluku Utara Dalam Angka*. Ternate: Badan Pusat Statistik Maluku Utara.

- Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA) (2008). "Economic Section Update." Unpublished document. November.
- Brady, Henry E. and David Collier (eds.) (2004). *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Brancati, Dawn (2009). *Peace by Design: Managing Intrastate Conflict through Decentralization*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Brass, Paul R. (1991). *Ethnicity and Nationalism*. New Delhi, Newbury Park, London: Sage Publications.
- Brass, Paul R. (1997). *Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Brass, Paul R. (2003). *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press.
- Brown, Graham with Christopher Wilson and Suprayoga Hadi (2005). *Overcoming Violent Conflict. Volume 4. Peace and Development Analysis in Maluku and North Maluku*. Jakarta: United Nations Development Programme.
- Bunte, Marco and Andreas Ufen (eds.) (2008). *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia*. London: Routledge.
- Burke, Adam (2008). "Peacebuilding and rebuilding at ground level: Practical constraints and policy objectives in Aceh." *Conflict, Security and Development* 8(1): 47-69.
- Burke, Adam and Afnan (2005). "Aceh: Reconstruction in a Conflict Environment: Views from Civil Society, Donors and NGOs." *Indonesian Social Development Papers* no. 8. Jakarta: World Bank.
- Bush, Robin (2009). *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies.
- Butt, Simon (2011). *Corruption and Law in Indonesia*. London: Routledge.
- Call, Charles T. (2012). *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Call, Charles T. and Susan E. Cook (2003). "On Democratization and Peacebuilding." *Global Governance* 9: 233-246.
- Call, Charles T. with Vanessa Wyeth (eds.) (2008). *Building States to Build Peace*. Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner.
- Caplan, Richard (2005). *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- The Carter Center (2009). *Final Report of the Carter Center Limited Observation Mission to the April 9, 2009, Legislative Elections in Indonesia*. Atlanta, GA.: The Carter Center.
- The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) (2005a). "7.2 Unlawful Killings and Enforced Disappearances" in *Chega! The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR)*. Dili: CAVR. Available at: < <http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/chegaFiles/finalReportEng/07.2-Unlawful-Killings-and-Enforced-Disappearances.pdf>> (accessed 14 May 2013).
- The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) (2005b). *Conflict-Related Deaths in Timor-Leste 1974-1999*. Dili: CAVR. Available at: <

<http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/updateFiles/english/CONFLICT-RELATED%20DEATHS.pdf>> (accessed 14 May 2013).

- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2011). "Horizontal Inequality and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison." *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 478-495.
- Chandler, David (2006). *Empire in Denial: The Politics of Statebuilding*. London: Pluto Press.
- Chandra, Kanchan (2004). *Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic headcounts in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chandra, Kanchan (2007). "Counting heads: a theory of voter and elite behavior in patronage democracies", in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds.) *Patrons, Clients, and Policies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 84-109.
- Chauvel, Richard (1990). *Nationalists, soldiers and separatists: The Ambonese Islands from colonialism to revolt, 1880-1950*. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Chauvel, Richard and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (2004). *The Papua Conflict: Jakarta's Perceptions and Policies*. Policy Studies no. 5. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.
- Chauvet, Lisa, Paul Collier, and Håvard Hegre (2008). "The Security Challenge in Conflict-Prone Countries." Copenhagen Consensus Conflicts Challenge paper Web edition: <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Research-and-Publications/Publication/?oid=186640> (accessed 7 October 2011).
- Chesterman, Simon (2004). *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and Statebuilding*. New York: Oxford.
- Chesterman, Simon, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur (2005). *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance*. Tokyo, New York, and Paris: United Nations University Press.
- Chua, Amy (2003). *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*. New York: Doubleday.
- Clark, Phil and Zachary D. Kaufman (eds.) (2008). *After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Clark, Samuel (ed.) (2004). "More than Just Ownership: Ten Land and Natural Resource Conflict Case Studies from East Java and NTT." *Indonesian Social Development Papers* no. 4. Jakarta: World Bank.
- Clark, Samuel and Blair Palmer (2008). "Peaceful Pilkada, Dubious Democracy: Aceh's Post-Conflict Elections and their Implications." *Indonesian Social Development Papers* no. 11. Jakarta: World Bank.
- Cohen, Nissim and Tamar Arieli (2011). "Field research in conflict environments: Methodological challenges and snowball sampling." *Journal of Peace Research* 48(4): 423-435.
- Colletta, Nat J. and Michelle L. Cullen (2000). *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Collier, Paul (1999). "On the Economic Consequences of Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 50(4): 168-183.

- Collier Paul (2007). *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Collier, Paul (2008). "Postconflict Economic Policy," in Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth (eds.) *Building States to Build Peace*. Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, pp. 103-117.
- Collier, Paul (2009). *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2004). "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4): 663-695.
- Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner (2009). "Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war." *Oxford Economic Papers* 61: 1-27.
- Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom (2008). "Post-Conflict Risks," *Journal of Peace Research* 45(4): 461-478.
- Colombijn, Freek and Thomas Lindblad (eds.) (2002). *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Colson, Aurélien (2000). "The Logic of Peace and the Logic of Justice," *International Relations* 15(1): 51-62.
- Coppel, Charles A. (ed.) (2006). *Violent Conflicts in Indonesia*. London: Routledge.
- Coser, Lewis (1956). *The Functions of Social Conflict*. New York: Free Press.
- Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies (CPCRS) (2009a). "Aceh Peace Monitoring Update: 1st March – 30th June 2009." Banda Aceh: CPCRS, Syiah Kuala University.
- Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies (CPCRS) (2009b). "Aceh Peace Monitoring Update: 1st July – 31st August 2009." Banda Aceh: CPCRS, Syiah Kuala University.
- Cramer, Christopher (2006). *Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Cribb, Robert (1990). *The Indonesian killings of 1965-1966: studies from Java and Bali*. Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.
- Crouch, Harold (2007) [1988]. *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore: Equinox.
- Crouch, Harold (2010). *Political Reform in Indonesia After Soeharto*. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies.
- Dahl, Marianne and Bjørn Høyland (2012). "Peace on quicksand? Challenging the conventional wisdom about economic growth and post-conflict risks." *Journal of Peace Research* 49(3): 423-429.
- Daly, Sarah Zuckerman (2012). "Organizational Legacies of Violence: Conditions Favoring Insurgency in Colombia, 1964-1984." *Journal of Peace Research* 49(3): 473-491.
- Dassen, Julie van (2010). *Maluku Economic Recovery Program II Peace Study*. Jakarta: MercyCorps. Available at: < [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/719559390E0A94C5C12578000036DB53/\\$file/Mercy+Corps+Maluku+Positive+Deviance+Peace+Study+-+for+external+use.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/719559390E0A94C5C12578000036DB53/$file/Mercy+Corps+Maluku+Positive+Deviance+Peace+Study+-+for+external+use.pdf)> (accessed 17 May 2013).
- Davidson, Jamie S. (2008). *From Rebellion to Riots: Collective Violence on Indonesian Borneo*. Madison, WI.: University of Wisconsin Press.

- Davidson, Jamie S. and David Henley (2007). *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism*. London: Routledge.
- Demombynes, Gabriel (2011). "Drug Trafficking and Violence in Central America and Beyond." Background paper for the 2011 World Development Report on Conflict and Development. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- D'Hondt, Laure and M. Syahril Sangaji (2010). "Environmental justice in Halmahera Utara: lost in poverty, interests and identity." Working paper, Leiden University.
- Diamond, Larry (2010). "Indonesia's Place in Global Democracy," in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society*. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 21-49.
- Dominguez, Andrea (2008). "The High Cost of Violence in Central America." Available at: < <http://www.comunidadessegura.org/en/STORY-High-Cost-of-Violence-in-Central-America> > (accessed 7 October 2011).
- Doyle Michael and Nicholas Sambanis (2000). "International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis." *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 779-801.
- Doyle Michael and Nicholas Sambanis (2006). *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Drexler, Elizabeth F. (2008). *Aceh, Indonesia: Securing the Insecure State*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Duncan, Christopher (2005). "The Other Maluku: Chronologies of Conflict in North Maluku." *Indonesia* 80 (October): 53-80.
- Elbadawi, Ibrahim, Håvard Hegre, and Gary J. Milante (2008). "The Aftermath of Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 45(4): 451-459.
- Ellen, Roy (1993). "Faded Images of Old Tidore in Contemporary Southeast Seram: A View from the Periphery." *Cakalele* 4: 23-37.
- Ellickson, Robert (1991). *Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
- Elster, John (1989). *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elster, John (2007). *Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Emmerson, Donald K. (2000). "Will Indonesia Survive?" *Foreign Affairs* 79(3): 95-106.
- Erb, Maribeth and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (eds.) (2009). *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Erikson, Mikael and Peter Wallensteen (2004). "Armed Conflict, 1989-2003." *Journal of Peace Research* 41(5): 625-636.
- European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) (2007). "Aceh, Indonesia: Governor and Regent/Mayor Elections, Final Report." Available at: <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/missions/aceh_final_report_e.pdf> (accessed 21 November 2012).

- Eye on Aceh (2004). *Aceh: logging a conflict zone*. Banda Aceh: Eye on Aceh.
- Fearon, James D. (1995). "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.
- Fearon, James D. (2004). "Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41: 275-301.
- Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (1996). "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 90(4): 715-735.
- Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2003). "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90.
- Fenno, Richard (1990). *Watching Politicians: Essays on Participant Observation*. Berkeley, CA.: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California.
- Forbes Damai/DSF (2006). "Aceh Pilkada Dynamics Update: 5-22 December 2006." Banda Aceh: Forbes Damai/Decentralization Support Facility.
- Forman, Shepard and Stewart Patrick (eds.) (2000a). *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery*. Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner.
- Forman, Shepard and Stewart Patrick (2000b). "Introduction," in Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick (eds.). *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery*. Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, pp. 1-34.
- Fortna, Virginia Page (2008). *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Fox, Sean and Kristian Hoelscher (2012). "Political order, development and social violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 49(3): 431-444.
- Freedom House (2011). *Freedom of the Press 2011 – Indonesia*. 23 September. Available at: <<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e7c84f81e.html>> (accessed 16 July 2012).
- Frodin, Lina (2008). "The Challenges of Reintegration in Aceh," in Aguswandi and Judith Large (eds.) *Reconfiguring Politics: The Indonesia-Aceh Peace Process*. London: Conciliation Resources, pp. 54-57.
- Fukuyama, Francis (2004). *State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century*. London: Profile Books.
- Fukuyama, Francis (2011). *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Gagnon, V. P. (1994). "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia." *International Security* 19(3): 130-166.
- Galtung, Johan (1969). "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6(3): 167-191.
- Gambetta, Diego (1998). "Concatenations of mechanisms," in Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg (eds.) *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 102-124.
- Gates, Scott (2002). "Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 111-130.
- Gates, Scott, Håvard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and Håvard Strand (2006). "Institutional Inconsistency and Political Stability: Polity Duration, 1800-2000." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 893-908.

- Geddes, Barbara (2003). *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor, MI.: University of Michigan Press.
- Geertz, Clifford (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008). *Global Burden of Armed Violence*. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat.
- George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
- Gerring, John (2007). *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ghani, Ashraf and Clare Lockhart (2008). *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ghobarah, Hazem Adam, Paul Huth, and Bruce Russett (2003). "Civil Wars Kill and Main People—Long After the Shooting Stops." *American Political Science Review* 97: 189-202.
- Gledhill, John (2012). "Competing for Change: Regime Transition, Intrastate Competition, and Violence." *Security Studies* 21(1): 43-82.
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede (2004). "A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816-2002." *International Interactions* 30: 231-262
- Goertz, Gary (2005). *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Goldstone, Jack A., Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted R. Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward (2010). "A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1): 190-208.
- Good, Byron J., Mary-Jo M. D. Good, Jesse J. H. Grayman, and Matthew Lakoma (2006). *Psychosocial Needs Assessment of Communities Affected by the Conflict in the Districts of Pidie, Bireuen and Aceh Utara*. Jakarta: International Organisation for Migration.
- Good, Byron J., Mary-Jo M. D. Good, Jesse J. H. Grayman, and Matthew Lakoma (2007). *Psychosocial Needs Assessment of Communities in 14 Conflict-Affected Districts in Aceh*. Jakarta: International Organisation for Migration.
- Grayman, Jesse Hession (2012). "Humanitarian Encounters in Post-Conflict Aceh, Indonesia." PhD thesis. Harvard University.
- Grindle, Merilee S. and John W. Thomas (1991). *Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries*. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press.
- Gupta, Akhil (2012). *Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
- Gurr, Ted Robert (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Gurr, Ted Robert (1986). "The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis," in Michael Stohl and George Lopez (eds.), *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research*. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 45-71.
- The Habibie Center (2012). "Policy Brief: Map of Violence in Indonesia (January-April 2012)." Jakarta: The Habibie Center.

- The Habibie Center (2013). "Peace and Policy Review: Map of Violence in Indonesia (September-December 2013) and Issues Raised in Nine Provinces throughout 2012." Jakarta: The Habibie Center.
- Hadi, Faisal (2008). "Human rights and justice in Aceh: The long and winding road," in Aguswandi and Judith Large (eds.) *Reconfiguring Politics: The Indonesia-Aceh Peace Process*. London: Conciliation Resources, pp. 66-69.
- Hadiz, Vedi R. (2010). *Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective*. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press.
- Hall, Peter (2003). "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Historical Analysis," in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.) *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 373-404.
- Hampson, Fen Olser (1996). *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.
- Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoddie (2007). *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*. University Park, PA.: Penn State Press.
- Hartzell, Caroline, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild (2001). "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables." *International Organization* 55(1): 183-208.
- Hasan, Noorhaidi (2006). *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia*. Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell Southeast Asia Program.
- Hedstrom, Peter and Peter Bearman (2009). "What is Analytical Sociology All About? An Introductory Essay," in Peter Hedstrom and Peter Bearman (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-24.
- Hedstrom, Peter and Richard Swedberg (1996). "Social Mechanisms." *Acta Sociologica* 39(3): 255-342.
- Hedstrom, Peter and Richard Swedberg (eds.) (1998). *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hedstrom, Peter and Lars Udehn (2009). "Analytical Sociology and Theories of the Middle Range," in Peter Hedstrom and Peter Bearman (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25-50.
- Hefner, Robert W. (2000). *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001). "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992." *American Political Science Review* 95(1): 33-48.
- Hegre, Håvard, Gudrun Østby, and Clionadh Raleigh (2009). "Poverty and Civil War Events: A Disaggregated Study of Liberia." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 598-623.
- Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky (2004). "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda." *Perspectives on Politics* 2(4): 725-740.
- Hempel, Carl G. (1965). *Aspects of Scientific Explanation: And Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science*. New York: Free Press.

- Herriman, Nicholas (2007). "Sorcerer Killings in Banyuwangi: A Re-Examination of State Responsibility for Violence." *Asian Studies Review* 31(1): 61-78.
- Heryanto, Ariel (2006). *State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia: Fatally Belonging*. London: Routledge.
- Hillman, Ben (2012a). "Ethnic politics and local political parties in Indonesia." *Asian Ethnicity* 13(4): 419-440.
- Hillman, Ben (2012b). "Power-sharing and political party engineering in conflict-prone societies: the Indonesian experiment in Aceh." *Conflict, Security, and Development* 12(2): 149-169.
- Hobbes, Thomas [1651] (2008). *Leviathan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hoddie, Matthew and Caroline A. Hartzell (eds.) (2010). *Strengthening Peace in Post-Civil War States: Transforming Spoilers into Stakeholders*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hoeffler, Anke (2011). "'Greed' versus 'Grievance': A Useful Conceptual Distinction in the Study of Civil War?" *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11(2): 274-284.
- Hoeffler, Anke and Marta Reynal-Querol (2003). *Measuring the Costs of Conflict*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Hoffman, Bert and Kai Kaiser (2002). "The Making of the Big Bang and its Aftermath: A Political Economy Perspective," paper presented at the conference 'Can Decentralization Help Rebuild Indonesia?' Atlanta, Georgia, 1-3 May.
- Honna, Jun (2003). *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia*. New York: Routledge.
- Horowitz, Donald (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.
- Horowitz, Donald (2001). *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW) (1999). "Indonesia: The Violence in Ambon." March. Available at < <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/03/01/indonesiaeasttimor-violence-ambon> > (accessed 14 May 2013).
- Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2001). "Indonesia: the War in Aceh." Vol. 13, no. 4. August. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/aceh/indacheh0801.pdf> (accessed 10 December 2012).
- Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2003). "Aceh under Martial Law: Inside the Secret War." Vol. 15, no. 10. December. Available at: < <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/12/17/aceh-under-martial-law-inside-secret-war> > (accessed 17 October 2012).
- Huber, Konrad (2004). *The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfall of NGO Mediation*. Policy Studies no. 9. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.
- Humphreys, Macartan (2005). "Natural Resources, Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 508-537.
- Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein (2008). "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 436-455.
- Huntingdon, Samuel (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Normal: University of Oklahoma Press.

- Husain, Farid (2007). *To See the Unseen: Scenes Behind the Aceh Peace Treaty*. Jakarta: Health & Hospital Indonesia.
- Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) (2009). *Hakim Karir Juara Bebasan Terdakwa Korupsi*. Jakarta: ICW.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2000). "Indonesia's Maluku Crisis: The Issues." *Asia Briefing* no. 2. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 19 July.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2001a). "Indonesia: National Police Reform." *Asia Report* no. 13. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 20 February.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2001b). "Aceh: Why Military Force Won't Bring Lasting Peace." *Asia Report* no. 17. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 12 June.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2001c). "Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan." *Asia Report* no. 19. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 27 June.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2002). "Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku." *Asia Report* no. 31. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 8 February.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2003). "Indonesia: Managing Decentralisation and Conflict in South Sulawesi." *Asia Report* no. 30. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 18 July.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005a). "Decentralisation and Conflict in Indonesia: The Mamasa Case." *Asia Briefing* no. 37. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 3 May.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005b). "Aceh: A New Chance for Peace." *Asia Briefing* no. 40. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 15 August.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005c). "Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso." *Asia Report* no. 103. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 13 October.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005d). "Aceh: So Far, So Good," *Asia Briefing* no. 44. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 13 December.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2006a). "Aceh: Now for the Hard Part." *Asia Briefing* no. 48. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 29 March.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2006b). "Aceh's Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)." *Asia Briefing* no. 57. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 29 November.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2007a). "Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh." *Asia Briefing* no. 61. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 22 March.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2007b). "Indonesia: Decentralisation and Local Power Struggles in Maluku." *Asia Briefing* no. 64. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 22 May.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2007c). "Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications." *Asia Report* no. 139. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 4 October.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2008). "Indonesia: Pre-Election Anxieties in Aceh." *Asia Briefing* no. 90. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 23 March.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2009a). "Local Elections Disputes in Indonesia: The Case of North Maluku." *Asia Briefing* no. 86. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 22 January.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2009b). "Indonesia: Deep Distrust in Aceh as Elections Approach." *Asia Briefing* no. 90. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 23 March.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2010). "Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh." *Asia Report* no. 189. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 20 April.

- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2011a). "Indonesia: GAM vs. GAM in the Aceh Elections." *Asia Briefing* no. 123. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 15 June.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2011b). "Indonesia: Trouble Again in Ambon." *Asia Briefing* no. 128. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 4 October.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2012a). "Indonesia: Cautious Calm in Ambon." *Asia Briefing* no. 133. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 13 February.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2012b). "Indonesia: The Deadly Cost of Poor Policing." *Asia Report* no. 218. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 16 February.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2012c). "Indonesia: Averting Election Violence in Aceh." *Asia Briefing* no. 135. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG. 29 February.
- International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2011). "Indonesia/Maluku and North Maluku: Support still needed for thousands of people ten years after their displacement." IDMC/Norwegian Refugee Council.
- Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Current Asia, and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2011). *Conflict Management in Indonesia—An Analysis of the Conflicts in Maluku, Papua and Poso*. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
- Isaac, Jeffrey C. (2012). "New Approaches to the Study of Violence." *Perspectives on Politics* 10(2): 235-241.
- Institut Tititan Perdamaian (ITP) (2010). *Violence Increased Dispersedly: Analysis of Variant, Pattern and Structure of Conflict and Violence in Indonesia in 2009-2010*. Available at: <http://www.peaceportal.org/documents/10156/0/Violence+Increased+Dispersedly+by+Institut+Titian+Perdamaian> (accessed 12 July 2012).
- Jarstad, Anna K. (2008). "Power-sharing: former enemies in joint government," in Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (eds.) *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 105-133.
- Joint Fact Finding Team (1998). *Final report of the Joint Fact Finding Team on 13-15 May Riot*. 23 October.
- Jones, Sidney (2008). "Keeping the Peace: Security in Aceh," in Aguswandi and Judith Large (eds.) *Reconfiguring Politics: The Indonesia-Aceh Peace Process*. London: Conciliation Resources, pp. 72-75.
- Joseph, Richard A. (1987). *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jubair, Salah (2007). *The Long Road to Peace: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process*. Cotabato: Institute of Bangsamoro Studies.
- Jutersonke, Oliver, Robert Muggah, and Dennis Rodgers (2009). "Gangs and Violence Reduction in Central America." *Security Dialogue* 40(4-5): 373-397.
- Kakar, Sudhir (1996). *The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion and Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Kaldor, Mary (1999). *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2001). "'New' and 'Old' Wars: A Valid Distinction?," *World Politics* 54 (October): 99-118.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2003). "The Ontology of 'Political Violence'." *Perspectives on Politics* 1(3): 475-494.

- Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2004). "Warfare in civil wars," in Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (eds.) *Rethinking the Nature of War*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 88-108.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2007). "Civil Wars", in Charles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 416-434.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2008a). "Promises and pitfalls of an emerging research program: the microdynamics of civil war", in Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud (eds.) *Order, Conflict, and Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 397-421.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2008b). "Ethnicity and the Dynamics of Civil War." Paper presented at the conference 'Rethinking Ethnicity and Ethnic Strife', Budapest.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2008c). "Ethnic Defection in Civil War." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(8): 1043-1068.
- Kanmen, Douglas (2001). "The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military, Paramilitaries, and the Final Solution in East Timor," in Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (ed.) *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*. Ithica and New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, pp. 156-188.
- Kaufman, Stuart J. (2001). *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Keen, David (1998). "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars." *Adelphi Paper* 320. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kell, Tim (1995). *The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992*. Singapore: Equinox.
- Khan, Mushtaq H. (2000). "Rents, Efficiency and Growth," in Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo K. S. (eds.) *Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 21-69.
- Khan, Mushtaq H. and Jomo K. S. (2000). "Introduction," in Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo K. S. (eds.) *Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-20.
- King, Charles (2004). "The Micropolitics of Social Violence." *World Politics* 56: 431-455.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994). *Designing Social Enquiry*. New York: Princeton University Press.
- Kingsbury, Damien (ed.) (2005a). *Violence In Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Kingsbury, Damien (2005b). *The Politics of Indonesia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kingsbury, Damien (2006). *Peace in Aceh: A Personal Account of the Helsinki Peace Process*. Jakarta: Equinox.
- Kingsbury, Damien and Lesley McCulloch (2006). "Military Business in Aceh," in Anthony Reid (ed.) *Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem*. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 199-224.
- Kirwin, Matthew F. and Wonbin Cho (2009). "Weak States and Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Afrobarometer Working Paper* no. 111. East Lansing, Michigan: Afrobarometer.

- Klinken, Gerry van (2000). "Ethnic fascism in Borneo." *Inside Indonesia* 64 (June-July).
- Klinken, Gerry van (2001). "The Maluku Wars of 1999: Bringing Society Back In." *Indonesia* 71 (April): 1-26.
- Klinken, Gerry van (2007). *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars*. London: Routledge.
- Klinken, Gerry van (2009). "Patronage Democracy in Indonesia," in Olle Tornquist, Neil Webster, and Kristian Stokke (eds.) *Rethinking Popular Representation*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 141-159.
- Klinken, Gerry van and Edward Aspinall (2011). "Building relations: corruption, competition and cooperation in the construction industry," in Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken (eds.) *The State and Illegality in Indonesia*. Leiden: KITLV Press, pp. 139-163.
- Kristanti, Elin Yunita (2011). "Kasus Korupsi, Bupati Aru Divonis Bebas". Vivanews.com. 25 October. Available at: <<http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/258722-kasus-korupsi--bupati-arudionis-bebas>> (accessed 7 June 2012).
- LaFree, Gary and Andromachi Tseloni (2006). "Democracy and Crime: A Multilevel Analysis of Homicide Trends in Forty-Four Countries, 1950-2000." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 605(1): 25-49.
- Lee, Terence (2009). "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(5): 640-669.
- Levy, Jack S. (1988). "Domestic Politics and War." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18(4): 653-673.
- Lichbach, Mark Irving (1995). *The Rebel's Dilemma*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Licklider, Roy (1995a). *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End*. New York: NYU Press.
- Licklider, Roy (1995b). "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993." *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 681-690.
- Liem Soei Liong (2002). "It's the Military, Stupid!," in Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (eds.) *Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 197-226.
- Lijphart, Arend (1968). "Typologies of Democratic Systems." *Comparative Political Studies* 1 (April): 3-44.
- Lijphart, Arend (1977). *Democracy in Plural Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Linz, Juan J. (1990). "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy* 1(1): 51-69.
- Loveband, Anne and Ken Young (2006). "Migration, provocateurs and communal conflict: the cases of Ambon and West Kalimantan," in Charles A. Coppel (ed.) *Violent Conflicts in Indonesia: Analysis, representation, resolution*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 144-162.
- Lyons, Terence (2004). "Post-Conflict Elections and the Process of Demilitarizing Politics: The Role of Electoral Administration." *Democratization* 11(3): 36-62.
- MacIntyre, Andrew J. (2003). *The Power of Institutions: Political Architecture and Governance*. Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

- Mack, Andrew (2002). "Civil War: Academic Research and the Policy Community." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 515-525.
- Mahoney, James (2000). "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology." *Theory & Society* 29: 507-548.
- Mahoney, James and Gary Goertz (2006). "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research." *Political Analysis* 14: 227-249.
- Mancini, Luca (2008). "Horizontal Inequality and Communal Violence: Evidence from Indonesian Districts," in Frances Stewart (ed.) *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 106-135.
- Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder (1995). "Democratization and the Danger of War." *International Security* 20(1): 5-38.
- Marc, Alexandre, Alys Willman, Ghazia Aslam, Michelle Rebosia, with Kanish Balasuriya (2013). *Societal Dynamics and Fragility: Engaging Societies in Responding to Fragile Situations*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Marhaenjati, Bayu and Farouk Arnas (2011). "Police Say Crime Is Down, as Are Rights Violations." *The Jakarta Globe*. 31 December. Available at: <<http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/police-say-crime-is-down-as-are-rights-violations/488146>> (accessed 14 May 2013).
- Mason, T. David and Patrick J. Fett (1996). "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(4): 546-568.
- Mason, T. David, Joseph P. Weingarten Jr., and Patrick J. Fett (1999). "Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars." *Political Research Quarterly* 52(2): 239-268.
- Masyrafah, Harry and Jock M.J.A. McKeon (2008). "Post-Tsunami Aid Effectiveness in Aceh: Proliferation and Coordination in Reconstruction." *Wolfhenson Center for Development Working Paper* no. 6. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute.
- May, Bernhard (2008). "The Law on the Governing of Aceh: The Way Forward or a Source of Conflicts?," in Aguswandi and Judith Large (eds.), *Reconfiguring Politics: The Indonesia-Aceh Peace Process*. London: Conciliation Resources, pp. 42-45.
- McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2001). *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McCarthy, John F. (2007). "The demonstration effect: Natural resources, ethnonationalism and the Aceh conflict." *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 28: 314-333.
- McCulloch, Lesley (2005). "Greed: The silent force of the conflict in Aceh," in Damian Kingsbury (ed.) *Violence In Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 203-227.
- McDonald, Terence J. (1996). *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*. Ann Arbor, MI.: University of Michigan Press.
- McIntyre, Angus (2005). *The Indonesian Presidency: The Shift from Personal toward Constitutional Rule*. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Meliala, Adrianus (2001). "Police as Military: Indonesia's Experience." *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management* 24(3): 420-431.

- McGibbon, Rodd (2004). *Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?* Policy Studies no. 10. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.
- McGibbon, Rodd (2006). "Local Leadership and the Aceh Conflict," in Anthony Reid (ed.) *Verandah of Violence: the Background to the Aceh Problem*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp. 315-359.
- McGovern, Mike (2011). "Popular Development Economics—An Anthropologist among the Mandarins." *Perspectives on Politics* 9(2): 345-355.
- McKenna, Thomas M. (2008). *Muslim Rules and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA.: University of California Press.
- McNeish, John-Andrew and Oscar Lopez Rivera (2012). "The multiple forms of violence in post-war Guatemala," in Astri Suhrke and Mats Berdal (eds.) (2012) *The Peace in Between: Post-war Violence and Peacebuilding*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 289-306.
- McRae, Dave (2008). "The Escalation and Decline of Violent Conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi, 1998-2007." PhD thesis. Australian National University.
- McRae, Dave (2010). "Reintegration and localised conflict: security impacts beyond influencing spoilers." *Conflict, Security & Development* 10(3): 403-430.
- Mietzner, Marcus (2006). *The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance*. Policy Studies no. 23. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.
- Mietzner, Marcus (2008). "Soldiers, parties and bureaucrats: illicit fund-raising in contemporary Indonesia." *South East Asia Research* 16(2): 225-254.
- Mietzner, Marcus (2009). *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Mill, John Stuart (1872). *A System of Logic*. New York: Harper.
- Miller, Michelle Ann (2006). "What's Special about Special Autonomy in Aceh?," in Anthony Reid (ed.) *Verandah of Violence: the Background to the Aceh Problem*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp. 292-314.
- Miller, Michelle Ann (2009). *Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia: Jakarta's Security and Autonomy Policies in Aceh*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Miller, Michelle Ann (2012). "Self-Governance as a Framework for Conflict Resolution in Aceh," in Michelle Ann Miller (ed.) *Autonomy and Armed Separatism in South and Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 36-58.
- Milliken, Jennifer (ed.) (2003). *State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction*. London: Blackwell.
- Morfit, Michael (2006). "Staying on the Road to Helsinki: Why the Aceh Peace Agreement was Possible in August 2005." Paper given at the international conference on 'Building Permanent Peace in Aceh: One Year After the Helsinki Accord', Jakarta. 14 August.
- Morfit, Michael (2007). "The Road to Helsinki: The Aceh Agreement and Indonesia's Democratic Development." *International Negotiation* 12: 111-143.
- Moser, Caroline O. N. (2006). "Reducing Urban Violence in Developing Countries." *Policy Brief* 2006-1. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute.
- Mueller, John (2004). *The Remnants of War*. Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

- Muggah, Robert (2009a). "Securing the Peace: Post-Conflict Security Promotion," in Small Arms Survey (ed.) *Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 218-247.
- Muggah, Robert (ed.) (2009b). *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Multistakeholder Review (MSR) (2009). *Multistakeholder Review of Post-Conflict Programming in Aceh*. Jakarta and Banda Aceh: MSR.
- Murshed, S. Mansoob, Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeeddin, and Anis Chowdhury (2009). "Is Fiscal Decentralization Conflict Abating? Routine Violence and District Level Government in Java, Indonesia." *Oxford Development Studies* 37 (4): 397-421.
- Nanere, Jan (ed.) (2000). *Halmahera Berdarah: Suatu Upaya Mengungkap Keberaran*. Ambon: Yayasan Bina Masyarakat Sejahtera dan Pelestarian Alam.
- Ndulu Benno J., Stephen A. O'Connell, Robert H. Bates, Paul Collier, and Chukwuma C. Soludo (eds.) (2007). *The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960-2000: Volume 1*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nessen, William (2006). "Sentiments Made Visible: The Rise and Reason of Aceh's National Liberation Movement," in Anthony Reid (ed.) *Verandah of Violence: the Background to the Aceh Problem*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp. 177-198.
- Newman, Edward, Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond (eds.) (2009). *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Nordstrom, Carolyn (2004). *Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century*. London: University of California Press.
- North, Douglass C. (1990). *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, Stephen B. Webb, and Barry R. Weingast (2013). "Limited Access Orders: An Introduction to the Conceptual Framework" in North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, Stephen B. Webb, and Barry R. Weingast (eds.) *In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-23.
- North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast (2009). *Violence and Social Order: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Norwegian Refugee Council (2002). *Profile of Internal Displacement: Indonesia: Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council*. Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project.
- OECD DAC (2010). *Do No Harm: International Support for Statebuilding*. Paris: OECD DAC.
- Olken, Benjamin and Patrick Barron (2009). "The Simple Economics of Extortion," *Journal of Political Economy* 117(3): 417-452.
- Olson, Mancur (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
- O' Rourke, Kevin (2002). *Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Østby, Gudrun, Henrik Urdal, Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeeddin, S. Mansoob Murshed, and Håvard Strand (2011). "Population Pressure, Inequality and Political Violence:

- A Disaggregated Study of Indonesian Provinces, 1990–2003." *Journal of Development Studies* 47 (3): 377-398.
- Ottoway, Marina (2003). "Promoting Democracy after Conflict: The Difficult Choices," *International Studies Perspectives* 4(3): 314-322.
- Palmer, Blair (2007). "The price of peace." *Inside Indonesia* 90 (October-December). Available at: <<http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/the-price-of-peace>> (accessed 22 November 2012).
- Palmer, Blair (2009). "The Aceh Party." *Inside Indonesia* 97 (July-September). Available at: <<http://www.insideindonesia.org/weekly-articles/the-aceh-party>> (accessed 23 November 2012).
- Palmer Blair (2010). "Services Rendered: Peace, Patronage and Post-Conflict Elections in Aceh," in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (eds.) *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 286-306.
- Panggabean, Samsu Rizal and Benjamin Smith (2010). "Explaining Anti-Chinese Riots in Late 20th Century Indonesia." *World Development* 39(2): 231-242.
- Paris, Roland. (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paris, Roland and Timothy D. Sisk (2009). *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Parks, Thomas, Nat Colletta, and Ben Oppenheim (2013). *The Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Conflict and International Development Assistance*. Bangkok and San Francisco: The Asia Foundation.
- Peake, Gordon (2009). "What the Timorese Veterans Say: Unpacking Security Promotion in Timor-Leste," in Robert Muggah (ed.) *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 165-189.
- Peluso, Nancy Lee and Emily Harwell (2001). "Territory, Custom, and the Cultural Politics of Ethnic War in West Kalimantan, Indonesia," in Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts (eds.) *Violent Environments*. Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, pp. 83-116.
- Peou, Sorpong (2012). "Violence in post-war Cambodia," in Asti Suhrke and Mats Berdal (eds.) *The Peace in Between: Post-war Violence and Peacebuilding*. London: Routledge, pp. 192-210.
- Pepinsky, Thomas B. (2009). *Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Perdani, Yuliasri (2013). "Aru Islands regent arrested after a year on the run." *The Jakarta Post*. 30 May.
- Petersen, Roger D. (2002). *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pierson, Paul (2000). "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." *American Political Science Review* 94: 251-268.
- Pinker, Stephen (2011). *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined*. New York: Viking.

- Popkin, Samuel (1979). *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*. Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.
- Posen, Barry (1993). "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35(1): 27-47.
- Pouligny, Beatrice, with Patrick Barron, Paul Francis, Barry Hart, Margarita Puerto Gomez, and Paula Rossiasco (2010). "Resilience, Trauma and Violence." Background paper for the SDV Flagship Societal Dynamic and Fragility. Mimeo. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Powell, Robert (2006). "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization* 60(1): 169-203.
- Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune (1970). *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Purdey, Jemma (2006). *Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
- Rabasa, Angel and John Haseman (2002). *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power*. Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation.
- Rachmadi, Raden and Adida Swamurti (2006). "Further Funds Approved." *Tempo* No. 44/VI. 4-10 July.
- Raleigh, Clionadh and Håvard Hegre (2005). "Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset." Paper presented at the conference on 'Disaggregating the Study of Civil War and Transnational Violence', University of California Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, San Diego, CA., 7-8 March.
- Raleigh, Clionadh and Håvard Hegre (2009). "Population size, concentration and civil war: A geographically disaggregated analysis." *Political Geography* 28: 224-238.
- Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen (2010). "Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(5) 1-10.
- Reid, Anthony (ed.) (2006). *Verandah of Violence: the Background to the Aceh Problem*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
- Reid, Anthony (2008). "The Aceh Conflict: A long-term view for long-term solutions." Annex to Multistakeholder Review (MSR)(2010) *Multistakeholder Review of Post-Conflict Programming in Aceh*. Jakarta and Aceh: MSR. Available at: <https://www.conflictanddevelopment.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=492%253AAnnexes+of+MSR+report&catid=1&lang=en> (accessed 17 October 2012).
- Reno, William (2008). "Anti-corruption Efforts in Liberia: Are they Aimed at the Right Targets?" *International Peacekeeping* 15(3):387-404.
- Restrepo, Jorge, Brodie Ferguson, Jukliana M. Zuniga, and Adriana Villamarin (2008). "Estimating Lost Product Due to Violent Deaths in 2004." Unpublished background paper for the Small Arms Survey. Geneva: Small Arms Survey/CERAC.
- Ricklefs M. C. (2008). *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*. Fourth edition. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press.

- Rieffel, Lex and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani (2007). *Out of Business and On Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia*. Washington, D.C.: USINDO and Brookings Institute Press.
- Robinson, Geoffrey (1995). *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali*. Ithica and London: Cornell University Press.
- Robinson, Geoffrey (1998). "Rawan is as Rawan Does: The Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh." *Indonesia* 66 (October): 127-156.
- Robison, Richard and Vedi R. Hadiz (2004). *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*. London: Routledge.
- Rodgers, Dennis (2003). "Dying for It: Gangs, Violence, and Social Change in Urban Nicaragua, 1997-2002." *LSE-DESTIN Development Research Center Crisis States Programme Working Paper* no. 35. London: DRC.
- Rodgers, Dennis (2006). "The State as a Gang: Conceptualizing the Governmentality of Violence in Contemporary Nicaragua." *Critique of Anthropology* 26(3): 315-330.
- Ross, Marc Howard (1993). *The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ross, Michael L. (2004). "What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 337-356.
- Ross, Michael L. (2005). "Resources and Rebellion in Indonesia," in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds.) *Understanding Civil War: Europe, Central Asia and Other Regions*. Washington D.C.: World Bank, pp.35-58.
- Ross, Michael L. (2012). *The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) (2003). *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Saideman, Stephen M., David Lanoue, Michael Campenni, and Samuel Stanton (2002). "Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled, Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis from 1985-1998." *Comparative Political Studies* 35(1): 103-129.
- Sambanis, Nicholas (2001). "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Enquiry (Part 1)." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(3): 259-282.
- Sambanis, Nicholas (2002). "A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War." *Defence and Peace Economics* 13(3): 215-243.
- Sambanis, Nicholas (2004). "What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 814-858.
- Sambanis, Nicholas and Håvard Hegre (2006). "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(4): 508-535.
- Samset, Ingrid (2012). "Sexual violence: the case of eastern Congo", in Asti Suhrke and Mats Berdal (eds.) *The Peace in Between: Post-war Violence and Peacebuilding*. London: Routledge, pp. 229-247.
- Sarkees, Meredith Reid (2000). "The Correlates of War data on war: An update to 1997." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 18(1): 123-144.

- Scacco, Alexandra (2009). "Who Riots? Explaining Individual Participation in Ethnic Violence." PhD thesis. Columbia University.
- Shah, Anwar, Riatu Qibthiyyah, and Astrid Dita (2012). "General purposes central-provincial-local transfers (DAU) in Indonesia: from gap filling to ensuring fair access to essential public services for all." *Policy Research Working Paper* no. 6075. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
- Schulze, Kirsten E. (2002). "Laskar Jihad and the conflict in Ambon." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9(1): 57-70.
- Schulze, Kirsten E. (2004). *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*. Policy Studies no. 2. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.
- Schulze, Kirsten E. (2007). "Mission Not so Impossible: The AMM and the Transition from Conflict to Peace in Aceh, 2005-2006." *Working Paper* no. 131. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
- Schütte, Sofie Arjon (2012). "Against the Odds: Anti-Corruption Reform in Indonesia." *Public Administration and Development* 32(1): 38-48.
- Schwartz, Adam (2000). *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability*. Second edition. Boulder, CO.: Westview.
- Sen, Krishna and David T. Hill (2006). *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*. Jakarta: Equinox.
- Sharp, Steve (2012). *Journalism and Conflict in Indonesia: From Reporting Violence to Promoting Peace*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Sharpe, Joanne (2005). "Using Newspapers to Monitor Conflict: Evidence from Maluku and North Maluku, Indonesia." Mimeo. Jakarta: World Bank.
- Sidel, John T. (2006). *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia*. Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Sidel, John T. (2008). "The Manifold Meanings of Displacement: Explaining Inter-Religious Violence, 1999-2001," in Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed.) *Conflict, Violence, and Displacement in Indonesia*. Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, pp. 29-59.
- Siegel, James (1998). *A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-revolution Today*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
- Siegel, James (2001). "Thoughts of the Violence of May 13 and 14, 1998, in Jakarta," in Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (ed.) *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*. Ithica and New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, pp. 90-123.
- Siegel, James (2006). *Naming the Witch*. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press.
- Silaen, Linda and I. Made Sentana (2013). "Indonesia Draws Record Foreign Investment." *The Wall Street Journal*. 22 April.
- Simanjuntak, Hotli (2012). "Irwandi ups his political ante by forming National Aceh Party." *The Jakarta Post*. 25 April.
- Simanungkalit, Salomo (2002). *Indonesia dalam Krisis, 1997-2002*. Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas.
- Singer, J. David and Melvin Small (1972). *The wages of war, 1816-1965: A statistical handbook*. New York: John Wiley.

- Singer, J. David and Melvin Small (1994). "Correlates of War project: International and civil war data, 1816-1992." Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Available at: <<http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/9905>> (accessed 28 June 2012).
- Singh, Bilveer (2012). "Autonomy and Armed Separatism in Papua: Why the Cendrawasih Continues to Fear the Garuda," in Michelle Ann Miller (ed.) *Autonomy and Armed Separatism in South and Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 59-76.
- Sisk, Timothy D. (1996). *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace.
- Slater, Dan (2004). "Indonesia's Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition." *Indonesia* 78 (October): 61-92.
- Slater, Dan (2010a). *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Slater, Dan (2010b). "Altering Authoritarianism: Institutional Complexity and Autocratic Agency in Indonesia," in James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (eds.) *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 132-167.
- Smith, Alastair and Allan C. Stam (2004). "Bargaining and the Nature of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 783-813.
- Smith, Anthony L. (2003). "U.S.-Indonesian Relations: Searching for Cooperation in the War Against Terrorism." *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies* 2(2): 1-4.
- Smith, Claire Querida (2005). "The Roots of Violence and Prospects for Reconciliation: a Case Study of Ethnic Conflict in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia." *Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Paper* no. 23. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- Smith, Claire Querida (2009). "The contested state and politics of elite continuity in North Maluku, Indonesia (1998-2008)." PhD thesis. London School of Economic and Political Science.
- Snyder, David and William R. Kelly (1977). "Conflict Intensity, Media Sensitivity and the Validity of Newspaper Data." *American Sociological Review* 42: 105-123.
- Snyder, Jack (2000). *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co.
- Snyder, Richard (2001). "Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36(1): 93-110.
- Spector, Bertram I. (2011). *Negotiating Peace and Confronting Corruption: Challenges for Postconflict Societies*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace.
- Stange, Gunnar and Roman Patock (2010). "From Rebels to Rulers and Legislators: The Political Transformation of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 29(1): 95-120.
- Staniland, Paul (2012). "States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders." *Perspectives on Politics* 10(2): 243-264.
- Stedman, Stephen John (1997). "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." *International Security* 22(2): 5-53.

- Stedman, Stephen John, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds.) (2002). *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.
- Stewart, Frances (ed.) (2008). *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Stewart, Rory (2011). "The Plane to Kabul," in Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus *Can Intervention Work?* New York: W.W. Norton, pp. 1-89.
- Stone, Lawrence (1979). "The Revival of Narrative." *Past and Present* 18: 3-24.
- Straus, Scott (2006). *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda*. Ithica and London: Cornell University Press.
- Sudarsono, Juwono (2000). "The Military and Indonesia's Democratic Prospects." Transcript of Remarks at the United States-Indonesia Society Open Forum, Washington, D.C. 11 April.
- Suhrke, Astri (2012). "The peace in between," in Astri Suhrke and Mats Berdal (eds.) *The Peace in Between: Post-War Violence In Between: Post-war Violence and Peacebuilding*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 1-24.
- Suhrke, Astri and Mats Berdal (eds.) (2012). *The Peace in Between: Post-War Violence In Between: Post-war Violence and Peacebuilding*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Suhrke, Astri and Ingrid Samset (2007). "What's in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War." *International Peacekeeping* 14(2): 195-203.
- Sukarsono, Achmad (2013). "Oversight Needed to Make Police Accountable." *The Jakarta Globe*. 3 May. Available at: <<http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/oversight-needed-to-make-police-accountable/>> (accessed 6 May 2013).
- Sukma, Rizal (2004). *Security Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences, and Lessons*. Policy Studies no. 3. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.
- Sukma, Rizal (2010). "Indonesia's 2009 Elections: Defective System, Resilient Democracy," in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (eds.) *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society*. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 53-74.
- Sulaiman, M. Isa (1997). *Sejarah Aceh: Sebuah gugatan terhadap tradisi*. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan.
- Sulaiman, M. Isa (2006). "From Autonomy to Periphery: A Critical Evaluation of the Acehese Nationalist Movement," in Anthony Reid (ed.) *Verandah of Violence: the Background to the Aceh Problem*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp. 121-148.
- Suryadinata, Leo (2002). *Elections and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies.
- Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (2006). *Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: Final Report*. Stockholm: MFA.
- Tadjoeddin, Mohammad Zulfan (2002). "Anatomy of Social Violence in the Context of Transition: The Case of Indonesia." *Working Paper* 02/01. Jakarta: UN Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery.
- Tadjoeddin, Mohammad Zulfan, Anis Chowdhury, and S. Mansoob Murshed (2011). "Routine Violence in Java, Indonesia: Neo-Malthusian and Social Justice

- Perspectives," in Jürgen Scheffran et al. (eds.) *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict*. Hexagon Series, Vol. VIII, Springer: Germany, pp. 632-650.
- Tadjoeddin, Mohammad Zulfan and S. Mansoob Murshed (2007). "Socioeconomic Determinants of Everyday Violence in Indonesia: An Empirical Investigation of Javanese Districts, 1994-2003." *Journal of Peace Research* 44(6): 689-709.
- Tajima, Yuhki (2004). "Mobilizing for Violence: The Escalation and Limitation of Identity Conflicts: the Case of Lampung, Indonesia." *Indonesian Social Development Papers* no. 3. Jakarta: World Bank.
- Tajima, Yuhki (2008). "Explaining Ethnic Violence in Indonesia: Demilitarizing Domestic Security." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 8(3): 451-472.
- Tajima, Yuhki (2009). "Order and Violence in Authoritarian Breakdowns: How Institutions Explain Communal Violence in Indonesia." PhD thesis. Harvard University.
- Tajima, Yuhki (2012). "The Institutional basis of Intercommunal Order: Evidence from Indonesia's Democratic Transition." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(1): 104-119.
- Tambiah, Stanley (1996). *Levelling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA.: University of California Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney (1998). *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, Michael (1982). *Community, Anarchy, and Liberty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tempo (2011). "Feeding at the regional trough." 27 July-2 August (English edition).
- Thelen, Kathleen (2003). "How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis," in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.) *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 208-240.
- Tilly, Charles (1975). "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in Charles Tilly (ed.) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Tilly, Charles (1992). *Coercion, Capital and European States*. London: Blackwell.
- Tilly, Charles (1995). "To Explain Political Processes." *American Journal of Sociology* 100: 1594-1610.
- Tilly, Charles (1997a). "Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology." *Comparative Social Research* 16: 43-53.
- Tilly, Charles (1997b). "Parliamentarization of Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834." *Theory & Society* 26(2/3): 245-273.
- Tilly, Charles (2003). *The Politics of Collective Violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tindage, Rudy W. (2006). *Damai yang Sejati: Rekonsiliasi di Tobelo, Kajian Teologis dan Komunikasi*. Jakarta: YAKOMA PGI.
- Toft, Monica Duffy (2003). *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

- Toft, Monica Duffy (2010). *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Tomagola, Tamrin Amal (2000). "The Bleeding Halmahera of the North Moluccas." Paper presented at the first annual meeting of Asian Studies, Oslo, Norway, 5 June.
- Tomsa, Dirk (2009a). "Local Elections and Party Politics in a Post-Conflict Area: The Pilkada in Maluku." *Indonesian Studies Working Paper* no. 8. Sydney: University of Sydney.
- Tomsa, Dirk (2009b). "Electoral democracy in a divided society: The 2008 gubernatorial election in Maluku, Indonesia." *South East Asia Research* 17(2): 229-259.
- Transparency International Indonesia (TII) (2010). *Survei Barometer Korupsi Aceh*. Jakarta: Transparency International Indonesia.
- Trijono, Lambang (2001). *Keluar dari Kemelut Maluku: Refleksi Pengalaman Praktis Bekerja untuk Perdamaian Maluku*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.
- Tunny, M. Azis (2006). "Ambon terrorist jailed, supporters run amok." *The Jakarta Post*. February 21.
- United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resources Centre (UNDDR) (2006). *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards*. New York: UNDDR.
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2011). *Global Study on Homicides 2011: Trends, Context and Data*. Vienna: UNODC.
- Uvin, Peter (1998). *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*. West Hartford: Kumarian Press.
- Uvin, Peter (2002). "The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms." *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 1(1): 5-24.
- Van Evera, Stephen (1997). *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Varshney, Ashutosh (2002). *Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Varshney, Ashutosh (2003). "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality." *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1): 85-99.
- Varshney, Ashutosh (2007). "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict," in Charles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 274-295.
- Varshney, Ashutosh (2008). "Analyzing Collective Violence in Indonesia: An Overview." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 8(3): 341-360.
- Varshney, Ashutosh and Joshua R. Gubler (2012). "Does the State Promote Communal Violence for Electoral Reasons?" *India Review* 11(3): 191-199.
- Varshney, Ashutosh, Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, and Rizal Panggabean (2010). "Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia," in Ashutosh Varshney (ed.) *Collective Violence in Indonesia*. Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, pp. 19-50.
- Vel, Jacqueline (2001). "Tribal Battle in Remote Island: Crisis and Violence in Sumba (Eastern Indonesia)." *Indonesia* 72 (October): 141-58.
- Vickers, Adrian (2005). *A History of Modern Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Vothknecht, Marc and Sudarno Sumarto (2011). "Beyond the Overall Economic Downturn: Evidence of Sector-specific Effects on Violent Conflict from Indonesia." *DIW Discussion Papers* no. 1105. Berlin: German Institute for Economic Research.
- Wagner, R. Harrison (1994). "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power." *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 593-607.
- Walsh, Jason (2013). "15 years after Good Friday Agreement, an imperfect peace in Northern Ireland." *Christian Science Monitor* 10 April. Available at < <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2013/0410/15-years-after-Good-Friday-Agreement-an-imperfect-peace-in-Northern-Ireland>> (accessed 10 May 2013).
- Walter, Barbara F. (2002). *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Walter, Barbara F. (2004). "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 371-388.
- Walter, Barbara F. (2009a). "Bargaining Failures and Civil War." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 243-261.
- Walter, Barbara F. (2009b). *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walter, Barbara F. (2010). "Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace." Background paper for the World Development Report 2011. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Weber, Max (1946). "Science as a Vocation, in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 129-156.
- Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2005). "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 598-624.
- Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2007). *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weiss, Robert S. (1994). *Learning from Strangers: The Art and Method of Qualitative Interview Studies*. New York: Free Press.
- Welsh, Bridget (2008). "Local and National: Keroyakan Mobbing in Indonesia." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 8(3): 473-504.
- Wilkinson, Steven I. (2004). *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wilson, Chris (2005). "The Ethnic Origins of Religious Conflict in North Maluku Province, Indonesia, 1999-2000." *Indonesia* 79 (April): 69-91.
- Wilson, Chris (2008). *Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God*. London: Routledge.
- Wilson, Chris (2011). "Provocation or Excuse? Process-Tracing the Impact of Elite Propaganda in a Violent Conflict in Indonesia." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 17(4): 339-360.
- Wilson, Chris (2013). "'Ethnic outbidding' for patronage: the 2010 riots in Tarakan, Indonesia." *Southeast Asia Research* 21(1): 105-129.

- Wilson, Ian (2010). "The Rise and Fall of Political Gangsters in Indonesian Democracy," in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (eds.) *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society*. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 199-218.
- Winters, Jeffrey A. (2011). *Oligarchy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolf, Eric R. (1964). *Anthropology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Wolf, Eric R. (1999). *Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Wood, Elisabeth J. (2003). *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Woodward, Susan L. (2002). "Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds.) *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder, CO. and London: Lynne Rienner, pp.183-214.
- World Bank (1998). *Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. Precis no. 189. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank (2003). "Decentralizing Indonesia: A Regional Public Expenditure Review Overview Report." *East Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Report* No. 26191-IND. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank (2005). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st – 31st December 2005." Banda Aceh: World Bank/DSF.
- World Bank (2006a). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st – 31st January 2006." Banda Aceh: World Bank/DSF.
- World Bank (2006a). *GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment: Enhancing Peace through Community-level Development Programming*. World Bank: Jakarta.
- World Bank (2006b). *Aceh Public Expenditure Analysis: Spending for Reconstruction and Poverty Reduction*. Jakarta: World Bank.
- World Bank (2006c). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st – 28th February 2006." Banda Aceh: World Bank/DSF.
- World Bank (2006d). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st – 31st March 2006." Banda Aceh: World Bank/DSF.
- World Bank (2006e). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st – 30th April 2006." Banda Aceh: World Bank/DSF.
- World Bank (2006f). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st – 31st May 2006." Banda Aceh: World Bank/DSF.
- World Bank (2006g). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st – 30th November 2006." Banda Aceh: World Bank/DSF.
- World Bank (2007a). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st – 31st January." Banda Aceh: World Bank/DSF.
- World Bank (2007b). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st – 30th April." Banda Aceh: World Bank/DSF.
- World Bank (2007c). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st – 31st May." Banda Aceh: World Bank/DSF.

- World Bank (2007d). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st - 30th September." Banda Aceh: World Bank/DSF.
- World Bank (2008a). *Aceh Poverty Assessment 2008: The Impact of the Conflict, the Tsunami and Reconstruction on Poverty in Aceh*. Jakarta: World Bank.
- World Bank (2008b). *Aceh Economic Update: October 2008*. Jakarta/Banda Aceh: World Bank/Bank Indonesia/Multi-Donor Fund.
- World Bank (2008c). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st January – 29th February 2008." Banda Aceh: World Bank.
- World Bank (2008d). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st – 30th September 2008." Banda Aceh: World Bank.
- World Bank (2008e). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st October - 30th November 2008." Banda Aceh: World Bank.
- World Bank (2008f). *Indonesia Public Expenditure Review - Spending for Development: Making the Most of Indonesia's New Opportunities*. Jakarta: World Bank.
- World Bank (2009a). *Aceh Growth Diagnostic: Identifying the Binding Constraints to Growth in a Post-Conflict and Post-Disaster Environment*. Jakarta: World Bank.
- World Bank (2009b). "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st December 2008 – 28th February 2009." Banda Aceh: World Bank.
- World Bank (2010). *Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah dan Pelayanan Publik di Provinsi Seribu Pulau*. Jakarta: World Bank.
- World Bank (2011a). *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank (2011b). *Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank (2011c). Presentation 'Review of Aceh's Special Autonomy Fund Management and Expenditures Utilization'. Jakarta, 16 November.
- World Bank (2012). *Sub-national dataset*. Unpublished.
- World Bank (2013). *Indonesia Economic Quarterly (March): Pressures Mounting*. Jakarta: World Bank.
- World Bank/KDP (2007). *2006 Village Survey in Aceh: An Assessment of Village Infrastructure and Social Conditions*. Banda Aceh/Jakarta: World Bank/Government of Indonesia.
- World Health Organisation (WHO) (2002). *World Report on Violence and Health*. Geneva: WHO.
- Wrighter, Selina (2005). "Questions of Judgement: The New Constitutional Court Combines Law and Politics." *Inside Indonesia* 81 (Jan-March).
- Zartman, I. William (1995). *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Zaum, Dominik and Christine Cheng (eds.) (2011). *Corruption and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Selling the Peace?* Abingdon: Routledge.
- Zurstrassen, Matthew (2006). "An Evaluation of BRA Support to Former Combatants." Unpublished World Bank evaluation report for BRA.