CHAPTER 12

Foreign Military Labour in Early Modern Europe

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The total size of European armies increased ten-fold across 1500–1800, or more than three times the growth in overall population. Meanwhile, the shift to permanent 'standing armies' greatly added to manpower demands and made these a phenomenon of peace as well as war. No government managed to sustain its forces entirely from its own inhabitants, while recruitment beyond state frontiers was attractive for political, military, and socioeconomic reasons. Reliance on foreign military labour thus became a structural feature of European warfare and remained so into the mid to later 19th century.[1]

This chapter presents preliminary findings from the "European Fiscal-Military System 1530–1870" project which investigates how the transfer of military labour, along with other war-making assets, was an important factor in the emergence of a European order based on territorially bounded sovereign states. It will show that the extensive literature on foreign soldiers largely suffers from the same anachronistic national focus that constrains research on early modern European states, and that to understand the interaction between military labour and political development, we need to unravel how such transfers were made. One distinctive element of the project is to shift the focus away from royal courts and governments, and instead examine Europe's 'fiscal military hubs', or cities where the transfer of resources were arranged, as well as investigating the myriad of actors involved in these processes.[2] This chapter employs another of our approaches by examining the different contractual forms which

1 This paper draws on research conducted for the project "The European Fiscal-Military System 1530–1870", which is funded by the European Research Council [ERC] under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 787504). Further details available at https://fiscalmilitary.history.ox.ac.uk/home#/. I would like to thank John Condren, Michael Depreter, Aaron Graham, Michael Martoccio, Katalin Pataki, and Cathleen Sarti for their comments and suggestions.

2 Peter H. Wilson, Marianne B. Klerk, "The Business of War Untangled: Cities as Fiscal-Military Hubs in Europe, 1530s–1860s," *War in History* 29:1 (2020), 80–103; Michael P. Martoccio, "'The Place for Such Business': The Business of War in the City of Genoa, 1701–1714," *War in History* 29:2 (2022), 302–322; idem, "'A Man of Particular Ability': A Jewish-Genoese Military Contractor in the Fiscal-Military System," *Business History* (2021). For the term 'military labour', see *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative History of Military Labour 1500–2000*, ed. Erik-Jan Zürcher (Amsterdam, 2013).

underpinned the exchange of military labour as a way of identifying who was involved in employing and supplying foreign soldiers and how their interrelationships changed in the three and a half centuries after the 1520s.

1 Foreign Soldiers in the Historical Literature

The presence of soldiers from one country in the army of another has long attracted attention, but coverage varies considerably across time and space. It is best for the Swiss and Irish, the two groups which have come to exemplify the phenomenon more generally. The literature on the Swiss is perhaps the most advanced in terms of analytical rather than descriptive studies.[3] There are good studies of the Swiss in French, Spanish, and Dutch service for all or part of the timespan.[4] While less rich overall, there are also fine works on the

3 Recent important general collections include: *Gente ferocissima: Mercenariat et société en Suisse* (*xve–xixe siècle*), eds. Norbert Furrer et al. (Zurich, 1997); *Schweizer in 'fremden Diensten': Verherrlicht und verurteilt*, eds. Hans R. Fuhrer, Robert-Peter Eyer (Zurich, 2006); *Schweizer Solddienst: Neue Arbeiten, neue Aspekte*, eds. Rudolf Jaun, Pierre Streit, and Hervé de Weck (Birmensdorf, 2010); Philippe Rogger, *Geld, Krieg und Macht: Pensionsherren, Söldner und eidgenössische Politik in den Mailänderkriegen 1495–1516* (Baden, 2015); Benjamin Hitz, *Kämpfen um Sold: Eine Alltags- und Sozialgeschichte schweizerischer Söldner in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Cologne, 2015); Marc Höchner, *Selbstzeugnisse von Schweizer Söldneroffizieren im 18. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2015); Jean Steinauer, *Patriciens, fromagers, mercenaires: L'émigration fribourgeoise sous l'Ancien Régime* (Lausanne, 2000); *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würgler (Göttingen, 2018). For Anglophone readers, John McCormack, *One Million Mercenaries: Swiss Soldiers in the Armies of the World* (London, 1993) provides a reasonable digest of the older literature.

4 For France, see Simon Rageth, *Sold und Soldrückstände der Schweizer Truppen in französischen Diensten im 16. Jahrhundert* (Bern, 2008); Jérôme Bodin, *Les Suisses au service de la France, de Louis xi à la Legion étrangère* (Paris, 1988); Benjamin Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten: Berner Militärunternehmer im Dienst des Sonnenkönigs Ludwig xiv.* (Zurich, 2021); Alain-Jacques Tornare, *Les Vaudois au service du roi de France: Révolution française 1789–1798* (Morges, 1998); idem, *Les Vaudois de Napoléon: Des Pyramides á Waterloo 1798–1815* (Morges, 2003). For those serving Spain, see Javier Bragado Echevarria, *Los regimientos suizos al servicio de España en el siglo xviii (1700–1755): Guerra, diplomacia y sociedad military* (unpublished PhD diss., University of Granada, 2017); *Presencia suiza en la milicia Española*, ed. Guillermo Calleja Leal (Madrid, 2017). For Dutch service, see Robert Murray Bakker Albach, "Die Schweizer Regimenter in holländischen Diensten 1693–1797," *Jahrbuch Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Familienforschung* (1989), 57–104; Martin Bundi, *Bündner Kriegsdienste in Holland um 1700* (Chur, 1972); Sébastien Rial, *De Nimegue a Java: Les soldats suisses au service de la Hollande xviie–xxe siècles* (Morges, 2014); H. Amersfoort, *Koning en Kanton: De Nederlandse staat en het einde van de Zwitserse krijgsdienst hier te lande 1814–1829* (The Hague, 1988);

Swiss serving Naples, Britain, and other powers.[5] There are good overviews of the Irish,[6] as well as excellent studies of their service in the Spanish and French armies.[7] Far fewer fought for the Austrian Habsburgs or German princes, though these have also received attention.[8]

The Scots come a close third in terms of coverage, especially thanks to a long-running project coordinated by Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean at the University of St Andrews which concentrated on connections to the Baltic and parts of Northern Europe 1580–1707.[9] The presence of Scottish Jacobites in the

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Philipp Krauer, "Zwischen Geld, Gewalt und Rassismus: Neue Perspektiven auf die koloniale Schweizer Söldnermigration nach Südostasien, 1848–1914," *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 71:2 (2021), 229–250.

5 Robert-Peter Eyer, *Die Schweizer Regimenter in Neapel im 18. Jahrhundert (1734–1789)* (Bern, 2009); Alistair Nichols, *Wellington's Switzers: The Watteville Regiment (1801–1816): A Swiss Regiment of the British Army in Egypt, the Mediterranean, Spain, and Canada* (London, 2014); Rudolf Gugger, *Preussische Werbungen in der Eidgenossenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1997).

6 Harman Murtagh, "Irish soldiers abroad, 1600–1800," in *A Military History of Ireland*, eds. Thomas Bartlett, Keith Jeffrey (Cambridge, 1996), 294–314; David Murphy, *The Irish Brigades, 1685–2006: A Gazeteer of Irish Military Service, Past and Present* (Dublin, 2007).

7 For the former, see *Presencia irlandesa en la milicia Española*, ed. Hugo O'Donnell (Madrid, 2014); Robert A. Stradling, *The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries: The Wild Geese in Spain 1618–68* (Blackrock, 1994); Moisés E. Rodriguez, "The Spanish Habsburgs and their Irish soldiers (1567–1700)," *Irish Migration Studies in Latin America* 5 (2007), 125–131; Eduardo de Mesa Gallego, *The Irish in the Spanish Armies in the Seventeenth Century* (Woodbridge, 2014); idem, "Glimpses of Irishmen in Spanish armies, 1621–1644," *The Irish Sword* 29 (2014), 268–309. For the latter, see *Franco-Irish Military Connections, 1590–1945*, eds. Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac, David Murphy (Dublin, 2009); Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac, "The Irish Regiments and the French Army: A Way to Integration," in *Loyalty and Identity: The Jacobites at Home and Abroad*, eds. Paul Monod, Murray Pittock, and Daniel Szechi (Basingstoke, 2010), 206–228; Sam Scott, "The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France," in *Ireland and the French Revolution*, eds. Hugh Gough, David Dickson (Dublin, 1990), 14–27.

8 András Oross, "Ír ezredek Magyarországon: Adalékok az állandó hadsereg téli beszállásolásának gyakorlatához az 1690-es években [Irish Regiments in Hungary: A Contribution to the Practice of Winter Billeting of the Standing Army in the 1690s]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 124 (2011), 117–144; Andrea Penz, "Irische Netwerke in der Habsburgermonarchie 1750–1918," in *Krieg und Wirtschaft*, eds. Wolfram Dornik et al. (Innsbruck, 2010), 343–361; John L. Garland, "Irish Officers in the Bavarian Service in the War of Spanish Succession," *Irish Sword* 14 (1981), 240–255.

9 Steve Murdoch, Alexia Grosjean, "The Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database (SSNE)," 2004. Available at https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne/. See also *Scotland and the Thirty Years War, 1618–1648*, ed. Steve Murdoch (Leiden, 2001); idem, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603–1660* (East Linton, 2003). More descriptive, though nonetheless useful is James Miller, *Swords for Hire: The Scottish Mercenary* (Edinburgh, 2010).

French and other armies is another well-researched topic.[10] The English and Welsh collectively served in equivalent numbers, but their story has attracted less attention, though that situation is improving for the 16th and early 17th centuries.[11]

Germans comprised the largest single group, but there are no overviews and coverage across time and place is patchy. Literature on the 16th century is dominated by the presence of the *Landsknechte*, or heavy infantry who appeared in the 1480s and who are examined primarily as a cultural and military phenomenon rather than from the perspective of whom they were serving.[12] There are now several good studies of German troops serving in Hungary during the later 16th century.[13] There is an extensive older literature on the provision of auxil-

10 Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac, *Le grand exil: Les Jacobites en France, 1688–1715* (Vincennes, 2007); Matthew Glozier, *Scottish Soldiers in France in the Reign of the Sun King: Nursery for Men of Honour* (Leiden, 2004); David Worthington, *Scots in the Habsburg service 1618–1648* (Leiden, 2003); Stephen Conway, "Scots, Britons and Europeans: Scottish Military Service c. 1739–1783," *Historical Research* 82 (2009), 114–130; Andrew Mackillop, "Military Scotland in the Age of Proto-Globalisation, c. 1690 to c. 1815," in *A Global Force: War, Identities and Scotland's Diaspora*, eds. David Forsyth, Wendy Ugolini (Edinburgh, 2016), 13–31.

11 Adam Marks, *England, the English and the Thirty Years War* (Leiden, 2022); David J.B. Trim, *"Fighting Jacob's Wars": The Employment of English and Welsh Mercenaries in the European Wars of Religion: France and the Netherlands, 1562–1610* (unpublished PhD diss., University of London, 2002); idem, "Calvinist Internationalism and the English Officer Corps 1562–1642," *History Compass* 4 (2006), 1024–1048; Josef Polišenský, "Gallants to Bohemia," *Slavonic and East European Review* 25 (1947), 391–404. Useful summary of the literature in Steve Murdoch, "Nicrina ad Heroas Anglos: An Overview of the British and the Thirty Years War," in *Britain Turned Germany: The Thirty Years War and Its Impact on the British Isles*, ed. Serena Jones (Solihull, 2020), 15–36. Those in Spanish service are now covered by the contributions to *The British Prescence in the Spanish Military*, ed. Benito Tauler Cid (Madrid, 2021).

12 Reinhard Baumann, *Landsknechte* (Munich, 1994); Peter Burschel, *Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts: Sozialgeschichtliche Studien* (Göttingen, 1994); J.W. Hunterbrinker, *'Fromme Knechte' und 'Gartenteufel': Söldner als soziale Gruppe im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (Konstanz, 2010). For a survey of Germans in French service, see Michael Harsgor, "Die Spieße unter der Lilienblume: Deutsche Söldner im Dienste Frankreichs (14.-16.Jh.)," *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte* 16 (1987), 48–81. See also David Potter, "The International Mercenary Market in the Sixteenth Century: Anglo-French Competition in Germany 1543–50," *English Historical Review* 111 (1996), 24–58.

13 For instance, see Béla Sarusi, "Deutsche Soldaten in den ungarischen Grenzfestungen des 16. Jahrhunderts," in *Geteilt – Vereinigt: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Königreichs Ungarn in der Frühneuzeit* (*16.–18. Jahrhundert*), eds. István Fazekas, Krisztián Csaplár Degovics (Berlin, 2011), 157–180; Zoltán Bagi, "Das deutsche Fußvolk in den ungarischen Feldzügen zur Zeit des langen Türkenkrieges," in *Geteilt – Vereinigt: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Königreichs Ungarn in der Frühneuzeit* (*16.–18. Jahrhundert*), eds. István Fazekas, Krisztián Csaplár Degovics (Berlin, 2011), 130–156; idem, "Westeuropäische Reitertruppen auf

iaries to foreign powers from the later 17th century onwards which continues to attract attention.[14] However, this remains dwarfed by the coverage of Germans in British service, particularly during the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745–46 and especially the controversial service of the 'Hessians' during the American Revolutionary War (1775–83) and, more recently, that of the Hanoverians in India.[15]

Coverage of soldiers from other parts of Europe largely reflects the periods and places where they were most prominent. Thus, for Italians and Walloons, more information is available for soldiers in Spanish service where they formed a significant minority until 1820, rather than those in the French or

ungarischen Kriegsschauplätzen: Truppengattungen, Organisation und Rekrutierung in der Zeit des langen Türkenkriegs," *Militär und Gesellschaft in der frühen Neuzeit* 19 (2015), 47–70; idem, "The Life of Soldiers During the Long Turkish War (1593–1606)," *Hungarian Historical Review* 4 (2015), 384–417.

14 For example, Wolfgang Handrick, "Der bayerische Löwe im Dienste des österreichischen Adlers: Das kurfürstliche Auxiliärkorps in den Niederlanden 1746–1749," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 50 (1991), 25–60; Stephan K. Sander-Faes, "Die Soldaten der Serenissima: Militär und Mobilität im frühneuzeitlichen Stato da mar," in *Militärische Migration vom Altertum bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Christoph Rass (Paderborn, 2016), 111–126; *Presencia germánica en la milicia Española*, ed. Enrique García Hernán (Madrid, 2015).

15 Mark Wishon, *German Forces and the British Army: Interactions and Perceptions, 1742–1815* (Basingstoke, 2013); Paul Demet, *'We are Accustomed to Do Our Duty': German Auxiliaries with the British Army, 1793–95* (Warwick, 2018); Christopher Duffy, *The Best of Enemies: Germans against Jacobites, 1746* (London, 2013); idem, "Hidden Sympathies: The Hessians in Scotland 1746," in *Loyalty and Identity*, ed. Paul Monod, Murray Pittock, and Daniel Szechi (London, 2010), 120–31; Jonathan Oates, "Hessian Forces Employed in Scotland in 1746," *Journal for the Society of Army Historical Research* 83 (2005), 205–214. Rodney Atwood, *The Hessians: Mercenaries from Hessen-Kassel in the American Revolution* (Cambridge, 1980) concentrates on the military aspects of the involvement in the American Revolutionary War, while Charles Ingrao, *The Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions and Reform under Frederick II, 1760–1785* (Cambridge, 1987) and Peter K. Taylor, *Indentured to Liberty: Peasant Life and the Hessian Military State, 1688–1815* (Ithaca, 1994) offer contrasting interpretations of the wider impact on Hesse-Kassel. *Die 'Hessians' im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg* (*1776–1783*), eds. Holger T. Gräf et al. (Marburg, 2014) draws together more recent research. For contingents from other principalities, see Stephan Huck, *Soldaten gegen Nordamerika: Lebenswelten Braunschweiger Subsidientruppen im amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg* (Munich, 2011); Benno Freiherr von Canstein, *Der Waldeckisch-Englische Subsidienvertrag von 1776: Zustandekommen, Ausgestaltung und Erfüllung* (Arolsen, 1989). The Hanoverians are covered by Chen Tzoref-Ashkenazi, *German Soldiers in Colonial India* (London, 2017); idem, "German Voices from India: Officers of the Hanoverian Regiments in East India Company Service," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 2 (2009), 189–211. There are also older studies of the Württembergers in Dutch colonial service.

imperial Habsburg armies.[16] The Huguenot diaspora dominates the study of French in foreign service, meaning that there is little coverage either side of the period 1685–1720.[17] Likewise, East Central European soldiers feature primarily in isolated snapshots. Bohemians appear as the soldiers who were widely employed around 1500 in the aftermath of the Hussite Revolt.[18] Poles and Ukrainians ride in as the 'Lisowczycy Cossacks' employed by the imperial army during the Thirty Years' War, though there is also strong interest in the Polish troops serving Napoleonic France.[19] France also frames investigations of those Hungarians and Croatians who did not fight for the Habsburgs, although they were also found in other armies, notably that of Bavaria.[20]

Lastly, given the numbers of men involved and the geographical range of their activities, the recruitment of foreign soldiers is increasingly studied by historians of migration.[21] In addition to the longstanding interest in the use of

16 *Presencia italiana en la milicia Española*, ed. José M. Blanco Núñez (Madrid, 2016); Jose M. Bueno, *Italiani al servizio di Spagna 1700/1820* (Milan, 1989); *Presencia de flamencos y valones en la milicia Española*, ed. Enrique Martinez Ruiz (Madrid, 2018). Greg Hanlon, *The Twilight of a Military Tradition: Italian Aristocrats and European Conflicts 1560–1800* (London, 1998) provides a valuable survey which does include France and especially the Empire.

17 *War, Religion and Service: Huguenot Soldiering, 1685–1713*, eds. Matthew Glozier, David Onnekink (Aldershot, 2007); Matthew Glozier, *The Huguenot Soldiers of William of Orange and the Glorious Revolution of 1688: The Lions of Judah* (Brighton, 2002).

18 Uwe Tresp, *Söldner aus Böhmen im Dienst deutscher Fürsten: Kriegsgeschäft und Heeresorganisation im 15. Jahrhundert* (Paderborn, 2004).

19 Henryk Wisner, *Lisowczycy* (Warsaw, 1995); George Gajecky, Alexander Baran, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War*, 1–2 (Rome, 1969–83); Ruth Leiserowitz, "Polish volunteers in the Napoleonic Wars," in *War Volunteering in Modern Times*, eds. Christine G. Krüger, Sonja Levsen (Basingstoke, 2011), 59–77.

20 The Hungarian diaspora in French service has been studied extensively by Ferenc Tóth whose work is most accessible through his summary article: Ferenc Tóth "Carrières de nobles hongrois à la cour de France sous l'Ancien Régime: Réseaux et intermédiaires dans une intégration sociale," *Bulletin du Centre de recherche du château de Versailles* (2016), 1–26. More detail in: Idem, *Ascension sociale et identité nationale: Intégration de l'immigration hongroise dans la société française au cours de XVIIIe siècle (1692–1815)* (Budapest, 2000), pp. 34–38, 45–82, and 89–106. See also André Corvisier, "Military Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe to France in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in *War and Society in East Central Europe*, 2, eds. Gunther Rothenberg et al. (Boulder, 1982), 513–545.

21 In addition to two important collections, *Krieg, Militär und Migration in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Matthias Asche et al. (Berlin, 2008) and *Militärische Migration vom Altertum bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Christoph Rass (Paderborn, 2016) there are several important case studies, including Mary E. Ailes, *Military Migration and State Formation. The British Military Community in Seventeenth-Century Sweden* (Lincoln, 2002); *British and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, 1603–1688*, ed. David Worthington (Leiden, 2010); *Irish*

non-European military labour, such as the Sepoys employed in India, scholars are also examining European soldiers and sailors as global migrants, though this is better studied for the 19th century than during the early modern period.[22]

Taken as a whole, current scholarship displays great strengths in overarching studies for long sections of the timeframe, as well as detailed examinations of separate cases. However, the underlying organising principle is primarily national, either looking at how soldiers from one location served one or more powers, or how individual armies employed men from different regions, with coverage of Britain and France being better than that for other powers.[23] Studies of individual soldiers offer a useful alternative, since many of these served several different masters across their careers. However, the evidence is invariably richer for specialists, like theorists or engineers, or men who achieved high rank, rather than for their humbler comrades.[24] Singular examples such as these demonstrate that the use of foreign military labour was a transnational

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Migrants in Europe after Kinsale 1602–1820, ed. Mary A. Lyons (Dublin, 2003); Marc Höchner, "Das Söldnerwesen in der Zentralschweiz 1500–1800 als Migrationsbewegung," *Der Geschichtsfreund* 167 (2014), 11–29; Antonio J. Rodríguez Hernández, "La presencia militar irlandesa en el ejército de Extremadura (1640–1668)," in *Irlanda y el Atlántico Ibérico: Movilidad, participación e intercambio cultural (1580–1823)*, eds. Igor Pérez Tostado, Enrique García Hernán (Valencia, 2010), 27–153.

22 Roelof van Gelder, *Das ostindische Abenteuer: Deutsche in Diensten der Vereinigten Ostindischen Kompagnie der Niederlande (VOC) 1600–1800* (Hamburg, 2004); Pius Malekandathil, *The Germans, the Portuguese and India* (Hamburg, 1999); Ulbe Bosma, "European Colonial Soldiers in the Nineteenth Century: Their Role in White Global Migration and Patterns of Colonial Settlement," *Journal of Global History* 4 (2009), 317–336.

23 For Britain, see Stephen Conway, "Continental European Soldiers in British Imperial Service c. 1756–1792," *English Historical Review* 129 (2014), 79–106; and more generally foreigners in Britain's empire: Idem, *Britannia's Auxiliaries: Continental Europeans and the British Empire, 1740–1800* (Oxford, 2017). For France, see Guy Rowlands, "Foreign Service in the Age of Absolute Monarchy: Louis XIV and his Forces Étrangères," *War in History* 17 (2010), 141–165; Christopher J. Tozzi, *Nationalizing France's Army: Foreign, Black and Jewish Troops in the French Military, 1715–1831* (Charlottesville, VA, 2016); Guy C. Dempsey, *Napoleon's Mercenaries: Foreign Units in the French Army under the Consulate and Empire 1799 to 1814* (London, 2002); and more generally Robert W. Gould, *Mercenaries of the Napoleonic Wars* (Brighton, 1995).

24 Examples include *'Een oorlogsman van dezen tijd en beminnaar der sexe.' De autobiografie van Casimir graaf von Schlippenbach (1682–1755)*, eds. Hans Vogel, Marjan Smits (Amsterdam, 2007); Matthew Glozier, *Marshal Schomberg, 1615–1690: The Ablest Soldier of his Age. International Soldiering and the Formation of State Armies in Seventeenth-Century Europe* (Brighton, 2005); Alexia Grosjean, Steve Murdoch, *Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years War 1618–1648* (London, 2014); Eduardo de Mesa Gallego, "Gerat Barry: Swordsman, Military Theorist, Entrepreneur and Servitor of the Spanish Monarchy," *The Irish Sword* 30 (2015), 151–156; David J.B. Trim, "Sir Horace Vere in Holland and the Rhineland, 1610–12," *Historical Research* 72 (1999), 334–351.

phenomenon involving actors in multiple locations, but does not provide a viable way in which to study systemic change across several centuries, or to relate it to other historical developments. Consequently, attempts to do this, while very valuable, have remained at the stage of providing additional case studies rather than a new synthesis.[25]

2 State-Centred Perspectives and Their Implications

The other conventional vantage points are those of the state and the 'military entrepreneur', with the development, expansion and, ultimately, virtual disappearance of foreign military labour all related to the emergence of the sovereign national state and its supposed domestication of military contractors. The model of the 'Fiscal Military State' identifies revenue raising and institution-building as keys to military and political success. It was first applied to Britain and subsequently modified to take greater account of maritime power.[26] A core argument is that the superior capacity of the British state enabled it to augment its forces by paying foreigners when needed. The model has been applied widely to other European states, though with less consideration of their employment of foreign forces.[27] The alternative model is that of the

25 *Söldnerlandschaften: Frühneuzeitliche Gewaltmärkte im Vergleich*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Benjamin Hitz (Berlin, 2014); *Rückkehr der Condottieri? Krieg und Militär zwischen staatlichem Monopol und Privatisierung: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, eds. Stig Förster et al. (Paderborn, 2010).

26 John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State 1688–1783* (New York, 1989) with constructive engagement by the contributors to *The British Fiscal Military States 1660-c. 1783*, eds. Aaron Graham, Patrick Walsh (Farnham, 2016). See also Nicholas A.M. Rodger, "From the 'Military Revolution' to the 'Fiscal-Naval State'," *Journal of Maritime Research* 13 (2011), 119–128.

27 *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe*, ed. Christopher C. Storrs (Farnham, 2009); Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500–1660* (London, 2002); *War, State, and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Rafael Torres S*ánchez* (Pamplona, 2007). Further examples in Rafael Torres Sánchez, *Constructing a Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Spain* (Farnham, 2015); William D. Godsey, *The Sinews of Habsburg Power: Lower Austria as a Fiscal-Military State* (Oxford, 2018); *The Habsburg Monarchy as a Fiscal-Military State c. 1648–1815*, eds. William Godsey, Petr Mat'a (Oxford, 2022); Chester Dunning, Norman S. Smith, "Moving beyond absolutism: Was Early Modern Russia a 'Fiscal-Military State'?" *Russian History* 33 (2006), 19–43; Erol Özvar, "Transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a Military-Fiscal State: Reconsidering the Financing of War from a Global Perspective," in *The Battle for Central Europe*, ed. Pál Fodor (Leiden, 2019), 21–63.

'Contractor State' which concentrates more on how revenue was spent to procure personnel and other military assets.[28] It is closely related to the study of contractors and entrepreneurs as individual actors, as well as their 'business' practices.[29]

These models have been helpful in expanding our understanding of early modern states and those they employed, but two problems remain. The focus on the nation(al) state obscures the fact that states were neither the exclusive employers of foreign soldiers, nor were all military entrepreneurs purely 'private' individuals. Numerous semi-sovereign powers, like the German and Italian princes or civic republics such as Genoa, employed foreigners, supplied soldiers to other powers, or were engaged in both activities. The Swiss cantons also acted as mercenary suppliers through alliances (with France, for example) and the conclusion of capitulations (*Standeskapitulationen*), which allowed warlords to recruit in their respective territories. Exiled rulers provided their forces to others, or hired foreigners to assist in their recovery of their lost lands, like Duke Ulrich of Württemberg who employed Swiss mercenaries in the early 16th century.[30] Occasionally, major powers made agreements with actors whose political legitimacy they questioned, such as those between France and Prince Ferenc II Rákóczi of Transylvania who was in rebellion against the Austrian Habsburgs.[31] The hire of Swiss infantry by the Schmalkaldic League in 1546 demonstrates that troops could also be employed collectively.[32] Later, the English and Dutch East India companies also employed German regiments, in addition to recruiting thousands of soldiers and sailors individually.[33] Given

28 Roger Knight, Martin Wilcox, *Sustaining the Fleet, 1793–1815: War, the British Navy and the Contractor State* (Woodbridge, 2010), with discussion in: Huw V. Bowen, "The Contractor State, c. 1650–1815," *International Journal of Maritime History* 25:1 (2013), 239–274. Further detailed studies in *The Spending of States: Military Expenditure during the Long Eighteenth Century. Patterns, Organization and Consequences, 1650–1815*, eds. Stephen Conway, Rafael Torres Sánchez (Saarbrücken, 2011); *The Contractor States and its Implications (1659–1815)*, eds. Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012); *War, State and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Rafael Torres Sánchez (Pamplona, 2007).

29 David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and the Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012); Rafael Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 2016); Jeff Fynn-Paul, *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800* (Leiden, 2014). See also the special issue of *Business History* 60:1 (2018), on the "Business of War".

30 René Hauswirth, *Landgraf Philipp von Hessen und Zwingli* (Tübingen, 1968).

31 Béla Köpeczi, *La France et la Hongrie au début du XVIIIe siècle* (Budapest, 1971).

32 *Politische Correspondenz der Stadt Strassbourg*, 4, eds. J. Bernays, Harry Gerber (Strasbourg, 1931), nos. 171, 240.

33 See sources in fn. 15 and 24 above.

this diversity, it is helpful to distinguish between 'contractee' (benefitting from the troops) and 'contractor' (providing the troops) with both roles open to a variety of actors, depending on the circumstances.

The second issue concerns the narrow understanding of efficiency that often results from a state-centred perspective. There has been a widespread assumption that 'outsourcing' betrayed a lack of capacity and was employed only as a stopgap until the state could provide defence itself through a monopoly of violence. For example, much of the literature on Gustavus Adolphus as 'father of modern war' attributes his victories to his use of native Swedes who are regarded as inherently superior to 'foreign mercenaries'.[34] This has been reinforced by the historiographical convention regarding the French *levee en masse* of 1792 as creating an army of motivated patriots which unleashed the nation's potential and ushered in a wholly new era of warfare.[35]

Behind these two issues lurks a more fundamental problem bedevilling any discussion of foreign military labour: the uncritical use of 'mercenary' as a supposedly timeless phenomenon 'as old as war itself'. Mercenaries, in turn, are generally perceived as 'foreign' and are contrasted unfavourably with 'native' soldiers, regardless of whether the latter are conscripts or volunteers.[36] Recent developments, such as the abolition or suspension of conscription, casualty aversion amongst Western societies and the global presence of private military and security companies [PMSCs] all suggest that the era of nationalised war-making is historically transient, rather than a teleological endpoint of European military development.

We need to divest ourselves of modern concepts of nationality based on language, culture, and citizenship which are fixed in a territorially bounded

34 Further discussion of this in Peter H. Wilson, *Lützen* (Oxford, 2018), pp. 105–114.

35 Alan Forrest, *The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: The Nation-in-Arms in French Republican Memory* (Cambridge, 2009); *The People in Arms: Military Myth and the National Mobilization since the French Revolution*, eds. Daniel Moran, Arthur Waldron (Cambridge, 2005).

36 Malte Riemann, "'As Old as War Itself'? Historicizing the Universal Mercenary," *Journal of Global Security Studies* 6:1 (2021); Aaron Ettinger, "The Mercenary Moniker: Condemnations, Contradictions and the Problem of Definition," *Security Dialogue*, 45:2 (2014), 174–191; Elke Krahmann, "From 'Mercenaries' to 'Private Security Contractors': The (Re) Construction of Armed Security Providers in International Legal Discourses," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 40:2 (2012), 343–363; Hin-Yan Liu, Christopher Kinsey, "Challenging the Strength of the Antimercenary Norm," *Journal of Global Security Studies* 3 (2018), 93–110; Michael Sikora, "Söldner: Historische Annäherung an einen Kriegertypus," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 29 (2003), 210–238; Sarah V. Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations* (Oxford, 2007); *Miliz oder Söldner? Wehrpflicht und Solddienst in Stadt, Republik und Fürstenstaat 13.-18. Jahrhundert*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Regula Schmid (Paderborn, 2019).

state. Identity was certainly important but its definition in anachronistic national terms is unhelpful. The following defines 'foreign' politically rather than culturally as lying beyond the contractee's jurisdiction, in the sense that a prospective employer lacked direct, legally enforceable claims to service from those performing military labour. Soldiers from different parts of a 'composite' state were not 'foreign' to their common sovereign. Thus, while the British army retained separate English and Scottish establishments until 1707, with that of Ireland continuing until 1802, all were 'native' under this definition. Likewise, Walloons, other Burgundians, and many Italians were not 'foreign' to the Spanish army until 1714 when these territories were definitively lost. Conversely, Irish, English, Swiss, and German troops were 'foreign', as Spain's king had no jurisdiction over their homelands.

3 Motives

The questions why foreigners were employed and why men served are too complex to be covered here, but some general remarks are necessary to delineate the dynamic tensions inherent in this phenomenon. There are three parties to consider when assessing the motives behind foreign service. In addition to the contractor and contractee, there are the soldiers themselves who have been the primary focus since the vogue for 'war and society' from the 1960s. Initially, 'economic' factors were emphasised, partly because of the 'mercenary moniker' and the fashion for materialist explanations.[37] More recent work acknowledges significance of money and other material factors for all three parties, but offers a more nuanced interpretation of the 'business of war'.[38] A similar trend is discernible in the research on larger scale contractors who are no longer perceived as pursuing a 'soldier trade'.[39] Money generally remained a means to an end rather than the overall goal, while receipts rarely covered the true costs which were accepted as the price for political benefits. It should

37 This is pronounced in Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterprizer and His Workforce*, 1–2 (Wiesbaden, 1964–65). In similar vein, but otherwise equally useful is John Casparis, "The Swiss Mercenary System: Labor Emigration from the Semi-Periphery," *Review* 5:4 (1982), 593–642.

38 David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and the Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012); Christian Koller, Peter Huber, "Armut, Arbeit, Abenteuer: Sozialprofil und Motivationsstruktur von Schweizer Söldnern in der Moderne," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 102 (2015), 30–51.

39 Further discussion in Peter H. Wilson, "The German 'Soldier Trade' of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Reassessment," *The International History Review* 18 (1996), 757–792.

also be remembered that not all contractors were entirely willing but could feel compelled to supply troops to please powerful neighbours. Religion was another important factor, particularly during the later 16th and 17th centuries, though it was usually more important for men recruited directly into another army, than in agreements involving the temporary hire of entire units.[40]

Contractees' motives were equally complex. Foreign soldiers could be just 'cannon fodder', hired to make up the numbers or to spare native troops from especially dangerous service, as was the case with Britain's use of French émigrés and others who were deployed to the Caribbean during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. More usually, foreigners were valued both qualitatively and quantitatively, even where doubts were expressed about their reliability.[41] There is also something in the old argument that foreigners provided a valuable alternative source of manpower beyond the influence of traditional elites who might oppose the crown; something that grew more significant with the deepening of the religious schism by the 1530s which often added confessional grievances to existing political differences within states.[42] Moreover, military developments periodically encouraged the view that troops raised by traditional methods were ineffective. This view grew particularly pronounced across much of Europe during the decades around 1500.

A further appeal of foreigners was the belief that they could be used as needed. This suited the 'minimal' character of most European states in the early 16th century, as well as the seasonal character of warfare which saw armies disbanded or at least reduced in winter, only to be reassembled as the grass grew and large-scale operations again became possible with the spring. Native troops, especially those provided by influential nobles, often could not be simply dismissed when no longer needed. As governments are discovering with PMSCs, it was often not easy to remove contractors once they became embedded in military provision, but that did little to diminish the faith in 'hire

40 For good discussions of religious motivations, see Michael Kaiser, "Cuius exercitus, eius religio? Konfession und Heerwesen im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges," *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 91 (2000), 316–353; *Militär und Religiosität in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Michael Kaiser, Stefan Kroll (Münster, 2004); William S. Brockington, "Robert Monro: Professional Soldier, Military Historian and Scotsman," in *Scotland and the Thirty Years War*, ed. Steve Murdoch (Leiden, 2001), 215–243; Glozier, *Scottish Soldiers*; idem, *The Huguenot Soldiers*.

41 For example, Magnus Linnarsson, "Unfaithful and Expensive – but Absolutely Necessary: Perceptions of Mercenaries in Swedish War Policy, 1621–1636," *Revue d'histoire nordique* 18 (2014), 51–73.

42 Classic, if doctrinaire statement of this view by Victor G. Kiernan, "Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy," *Past and Present* 11 (1957), 66–86.

and fire'. Finally, use of foreign soldiers denied these to potential enemies, cultivated clients amongst those who organised them, and could prove strategically expedient, since they could often be sourced closer to where they were needed, removing the need to mount long-distance expeditions.

4 Contractual Forms

A variety of contracts emerged to manage the tensions arising from these asymmetrical relations. These were known by a variety of terms which were not always employed consistently. For ease of analysis, our project identifies three types.[43] The most common were 'capitulations', which can be further classified in two types: the fixed-term service contracts made by individuals enlisting in a military unit, and the agreements whereby a contractor supplied a unit which became an integral part of the contractee's army. Given its social-historical orientation, most research on foreign soldiers has concentrated on the former. Our project focuses on the latter and classifies the units provided as 'foreign regiments'. These were not expected to be returned to their contractor, but nonetheless retained a distinct identity associated with their place of origin from which they usually continued to draw recruits to maintain strength. Most Swiss, Scottish, and Irish units fall into this category, and the arrangements could grant contractors considerable autonomy, such as control over internal administration and the appointment of junior officers, as was the case with Swiss capitulations. There were, however, significant differences between the capitulations agreed with cantonal authorities (*Standeskapitulationen*), and those made with individual without cantonal permission (*Partikularkapitulationen*) in which the contractor's terms were much less favourable.

Contracts for the temporary hire of foreign auxiliaries are classed as 'conventions' defined as the time-limited transfer of troops provided by the contractor into the contractee's service. Contractors generally retained control over the internal management of their units, including the appointment and promotion of officers and the administration of justice, while the soldiers were (supposed to be) paid and fed entirely at the contractee's expense. 'Subsidy treaties' represent a third category, where the contractee secured the call on, or service of the contractor's troops, but did not pay their full cost. As will be

43 Further discussion in Peter H. Wilson, "Mercenary Contracts as Fiscal-Military Instruments," in *Subsidies, Diplomacy and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789: Economies of Allegiance*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Manchester, 2020), 68–92.

shown, various combinations and hybrid forms developed, but these categories nonetheless are invaluable analytical tools.

The terms 'entrepreneur' and 'enterpriser' are often used interchangeably, with the former increasingly predominating in the literature. However, presence of two terms has potential, as we can distinguish between contractors who raised companies or regiments which they subsequently commanded in return for salaries and other benefits, and individuals who organised the recruitment but had no role in command. The following uses the term 'enterpriser' for the individual contractor-commander, and 'entrepreneur' for those whose role was limited to recruitment, whilst recognising that the boundaries could be blurred, for instance when relatives of the entrepreneur subsequently led the unit. In both cases, these individuals were involved predominantly in capitulations, rather than conventions or subsidy treaties where the contractor was a semi-sovereign or sovereign who delegated command to an officer.

All three contractual forms were often cloaked in the language of alliances, especially subsidy treaties and those conventions which included secret articles promising political benefits. The project distinguishes between arrangements between contractors and contractees which were always transactional, and 'alliances', the study of which has long formed part of the history of diplomacy and international relations. Alliances were fundamental to the coalition warfare which dominated early modern European relations, as well as to the gradual demarcation of the continent into sovereign states. Alliances were often combined with one or more of the three contractual forms used to supply foreign troops. Nonetheless, they were a distinct type of agreement based more clearly on mutuality and generally less asymmetrical than contractor-contractee relations. Allies might promise each other assistance if attacked, or plan to divide up enemy territory, but their agreements only fit our analytical categories if that aid had to be recompensed directly by its beneficiary. Likewise, the presence of clauses in capitulations, conventions or subsidy treaties promising mutual aid does not negate their fundamentally transactional character. Instead, it alerts us to the importance of the political aspects already discussed under motivation.[44]

Capitulations were the most numerous. An incomplete compilation of Swiss regiments in foreign service identifies 204 raised between 1551 and 1802. This omits those serving Spain, the Dutch, and powers other than France and

44 For the Swiss experience, see André Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa: Verflechtung und Abgrenzung in der Schweizer Geschichte*, 3rd ed. (Baden, 2021); Andreas Würgler, "Symbiose ungleicher Partner: Die französisch-eidgenössische Allianz 1516–1798/1815," *Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte* 12 (2011), 53–75.

Venice prior to 1660, with the 92 units raised after that date offering a more representative sample. As these figures indicate, many regiments had only a brief existence, usually lasting no more than a single campaign prior to the 1580s when they began to be retained for two or three consecutive years. Other than the *Gardes Suisses*, raised in 1616, no regiment remained in French service longer than ten years until the new ones organised in 1671. Such impermanence was typical. Sweden raised 537 regiments during its involvement in the Thirty Years' War between 1630 and 1648. Of these, 343 were formed in the first six years alone. The vast majority survived no more than two years and only five were still in existence in the 18th century.[45]

Given their considerable numbers, our project has not attempted to record all capitulations, but instead to track general trends and identify representative examples. It is also recording some agreements over the exchange of other war materials and the use of facilities such as fortresses by one power in the territory of another, as well as deserter and prisoner exchange agreements. Nonetheless, auxiliary conventions and subsidy treaties remain the primary focus since these facilitated the service of most foreign soldiers. Currently, there are over 1,200 agreements recorded, of which 899 are conventions and subsidy treaties which we believe is very close to the probably overall number actually signed. Preliminary analysis reveals some important trends which correlate with what is already known about broader changes in warfare, state development and diplomacy, but in some cases challenges the conventional chronology whilst subtly altering our understanding of the processes behind this.

5 The Emergence and Development of Early Modern Military Labour to 1660

Capitulations were the principal way of obtaining foreign troops as Europe's 'Fiscal Military System' emerged and developed between about 1530 and 1660. The predominantly seasonal character of warfare resulted in numerous, short-term agreements for contingents raised as individual companies by captains

45 Calculated from data in Georg Tessin, *Die Regimenter der europäischen Staaten im Ancien Régime des XVI. bis XVIII. Jahrhunderts*, 1 (Osnabrück, 1986), pp. 650–668, 685–694. For the new Swiss regiments raised in 1671–72, see Katrin Keller, "Ein Schweizer Gardehauptmann als französischer Unterhändler: Johann Peter Stuppas Werbeverhandlungen in der Eidgenossenschaft 1671," in *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft,* eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 92–115; Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten*, pp. 69–70.

acting as subcontractors to military enterprisers who, in turn, generally acted with the blessing of the authorities in whose lands they raised their men. The emergence of more durable regimental structures in the 1550s led to capitulations for one or more regiments, though the individual companies were often still subcontracted to company-enterprisers or entrepreneurs.

The numbers recruited in the first half of the 16th century have not yet been computed with any accuracy but were certainly considerable. Information is more reliable for the period after the 1550s. Around 25,000 Germans served the rival Scandinavian kingdoms in the opening phase of the Northern War of 1563–70.[46] Spain issued contracts for 94,000 Germans 1564–78, and though it is unlikely all were recruited, Germans formed a third of the Army of Flanders' infantry until the early 17th century, always outnumbering the Spaniards and Italians and sometimes even exceeding the locally recruited Walloons.[47] Germans and Swiss formed around a third of French royal armies in the early phases of France's Wars of Religion, while 107,600 Swiss had served on both sides by 1598.[48] German Protestant princes supplied over 80,000 men to support the Huguenots 1562–92, while England sent a further 13,000.[49] On average, 3,000 English and Welsh soldiers could be found in the Protestant French and Dutch armies in any year between 1572 and 1610, while 20,000 Irish served Spain across 1586–1611 with 4,000 still in the ranks in 1623.[50]

Another 50,000–60,000 English served the 'Protestant Cause' in the Thirty Years' War, together with a similar number of Scots and Protestant Irish. Around a quarter served Sweden directly, with over 18,000 fighting for Denmark 1625–29, 25,000 with the French 1624–44, 14,000 in the Anglo-Scottish

46 Jason Lavery, *Germany's Northern Challenge: The Holy Roman Empire and the Scandinavian Struggle for the Baltic, 1563–1576* (Boston, 2002), pp. 22–25.

47 Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659* (Cambridge, 1972), p. 271; Friedrich Edelmeyer, *Söldner und Pensionäre: Das Netzwerk Philipps II. im Heiligen Romischen Reich* (Cologne, 2002), pp. 235–258.

48 James B. Wood, *The King's Army: Warfare, Soldiers and Society during the Wars of Religion in France, 1582–1576* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 18–27, 64, and 72–73; Emmanuel May de Romainmôtier, *Histoire militaire de la Suisse et de Suisses dans les différens services de l'Europe* (Lausanne, 1788), p. 59.

49 Jonas A.M. van Tol, *Germany and the French Wars of Religion, 1560–1572* (Leiden, 2018), pp. 197–222; Oskar Bezzel, *Geschichte des Kurpfälzischen Heeres*, 1 (Munich, 1925), pp. 30–40; Paul de Vallière, *Treue und Ehre: Geschichte der Schweizer in Fremden Diensten*, 2nd ed. (Lausanne, 1940), pp. 186–188, 210–211; William A. Heap, *Elizabeth's French Wars: English Intervention in the French Wars of Religion, 1562–1598* (London, 2019), pp. 73–77, 80; L. Eppenstein, "Beiträge zur Geschichte des auswärtigen Kriegsdienstes der Deutschen in der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts," *FBPG* 32 (1920), 283–367.

50 Trim, *'Fighting Jacob's Wars'*, pp. 340–350; Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army 1585–1702* (Oxford, 2006), pp. 62–93, esp. p. 66.

brigade and other units in the Dutch army, and the rest in the various futile expeditions to aid the Palatinate and Bohemians. Only 16,000 of these served the Stuart monarchy directly on official campaigns, while the other 110,000 fought as auxiliaries or in foreign regiments within their host armies. Meanwhile, over 37,500 Catholic Irish served Spain across 1621–53.[51]

Despite the prominence accorded to Scots in some accounts, most of Sweden's foreign soldiers were Germans. On the eve of Sweden's intervention in the Thirty Years' War in 1630 half of its 72,000 troops were foreigners, mainly Germans. Only 15 of the 537 regiments raised between 1630 and 1648 were Swedish or Finnish. Scots composed nine regiments, with English forming five and two being nominally French, while Germans manned the remainder. These statistics include only the units raised directly through capitulations between the Swedish crown with contractors, and those provided by German princes who were tied tightly to the Swedish cause, such as the dukes of Mecklenburg and those of Sachsen-Weimar. They exclude forces provided by Sweden's German allies, notably Saxony (1632–35), Brandenburg (1631–35) and Hessen-Kassel (1631–48). The number of Swedes and Finns never rose much above 45,000, yet the army in Germany peaked at 130,000 in August 1632.[52]

By contrast, the project has only identified 82 conventions and treaties for the period prior to 1660, though this is probably an underestimate. Their relative scarcity reflects contemporaries' reluctance to formalise matters with partners who were not direct allies, partly because many of the loose coalitions involved cooperation with actors like the Huguenots, Dutch, or German princes who were widely considered rebels or lacking full legitimacy at the time of the arrangements. France appears at the forefront of formalising agreements through a string of subsidy treaties with the Dutch and Sweden after 1624. It is characteristic of this stage that contractors' obligations were generally left vague. The 1631 Franco-Swedish treaty is an early example of imposing specific requirements on the number of men Sweden was obliged to maintain against the emperor. France continued this practice in its arrangements with Hesse-Kassel (1636, 1637) and Bernhard of Weimar (1635, 1639). The latter two agreements represent early examples of conventions specifying detailed arrangements for paying the troops, rather than simply providing a subsidy.

51 See the summary table in Peter H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: The Thirty Years War* (London, 2009), p. 322 and the sources cited there.

52 Calculated from Theodor Lorentzen, *Die schwedische Armee im Dreißigjährigen Kriege und ihre Abdankung* (Leipzig, 1894); Tessin, *Regimenter*, pp. 650–668.

6 Transition during the 1660s

France was unable to replicate in Germany its arrangements in Switzerland where a 'perpetual' peace treaty (1516) as well as a renewable alliance (1521) had provided a general framework for repeated capitulations. The Rhenish Alliance of 1658 secured the temporary cooperation of those princes who were disgruntled with the Austrian Habsburgs' management of the Empire. In addition to the common arrangements for mutual assistance, which were activated in 1664 against the Ottomans, France made separate bilateral subsidy agreements with many of the members requiring them to hold troops on retainer. However, these arrangements broke down after 1667 as most princes grew alarmed at growing French aggression.[53]

The impetus for new conventions instead came from the Dutch Republic which not only faced growing tensions with its former French ally but was engaged in 20-year struggle for maritime supremacy with England. England's inability to strike at the Dutch directly led it to contract Christoph Bernhard von Galen, the belligerent prince-bishop of Münster, to invade the Republic across its eastern, landward frontier in 1665. The Dutch responded by hiring 24,000 auxiliaries from north German princes whose mobilisation prompted Galen to abort his invasion. The Dutch conventions formed basis for future agreements between the Republic and German princes in terms of form and content. They also included the first multilateral agreements, as the Dutch signed a collective contract with the Guelph dukes in Hanover, Celle, and Osnabrück (1665), followed by another with the latter two (1668). That agreement was intended to protect the Republic during the volatile aftermath of the Franco-Spanish War of Devolution 1667 as both former belligerents sought to buy up German support not only for auxiliaries, but also access rights across strategic territory. In all, at least 28 conventions and subsidy treaties were signed during 1661–71, a decade which emerges as crucial in consolidating the mechanisms by which foreign troops were obtained.

These years also saw Venice emerge as a major 'consumer' as its long war with the Ottomans over the possession of Crete reached its climax. Between 1645 and 1668, Venice recruited 32 Corsican and Italian regiments, mostly from beyond its own lands, and a similar number from Germans, Swiss, French and Walloons. The papacy and other Italian states provided 11 auxiliary regiments, while a further 10 were hired from German princes, mainly in the 1660s. Around half of the 50 new units added to the Venetian army during the 1684–99 war

53 Joachim Brüser, *Reichsständische Libertät zwischen kaiserlichem Machtstreben und französischer Hegemonie: Der Rheinbund von 1658* (Münster, 2020).

over Morea were foreign, while another 12 German and Swiss auxiliary regiments were hired during the second, disastrous conflict in 1714–18.[54] With its associations of Christian duty against the Turks, Venetian service was initially attractive to German princes, but the high casualties rapidly deterred many and it became a secondary option for those who were unable to place forces in imperial or Dutch service.

7 Consolidation 1672–1714

The shift towards conventions and subsidy treaties was confirmed by the Dutch War (1672–79) which saw 69 such agreements, including 18 in the first year alone. The political alliance between the emperor and the Dutch in April 1672 provided the basis for the more famous Grand Alliance of 1689 at the start of the Nine Years War (1688–97) through the accession of England to the group, and the agreement was renewed during the War of Spanish Succession (1701–14). This anti-French coalition only fragmented in the 1720s and was rebuilt in the War of Austrian Succession (1740–48), persisting until the Franco-Austrian alliance of 1756 wrecked what had become known as the 'Old System' by restructuring European relations more clearly as an unstable balance between five great powers and rather more medium and minor states.[55]

This durable framework spread multilateralism amongst contractees. Each major contractor was encouraged to join the Alliance to bind it politically to the goals of the anti-French coalition, but the three major powers continued to sign separate military conventions and subsidy treaties. This also applied to those made by England and the Dutch Republic, linked as the Maritime Powers through William III's dual roles as king and stadholder after 1688. Though the direct connection ended with William's death in 1702, the Maritime Powers continued to sign joint agreements with individual contractors until their 1751 subsidy treaty with Saxony. The two powers became adept at managing

54 Bruno Mugnai, *The Cretan War, 1645–1671: The Venetian-Ottoman Struggle in the Mediterranean* (Warwick, 2018), pp. 245–247; Wilhelm Kohlhaas, *Candia: Die Tragödie einer abendländischen Verteidigung und ihr Nachspiel in Morea* 1645–1714 (Osnabrück, 1978); Georg Tessin, "Die deutschen Regimenter der Republik Venedig bis 1718," *Zeitschrift für Heereskunde* 299 (1982), 22–26; Viktor Ruckstuhl, *Aufbruch wider die Türken: Ein ungewöhnlicher Solddienst am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Obwaldens und der Kompanie Schönenbüel* (Zurich, 1991).

55 Heinz Duchhardt, *Balance of Power und Pentarchie: Internationale Beziehungen 1700–1785* (Paderborn, 1997); Hamish M. Scott, *The Birth of a Great Power System, 1740–1815* (London, 2015).

their foreign troop contractors, particularly through the duke of Marlborough's diplomacy in the War of Spanish Succession when they ensured that any additional troops from the same supplier were covered by separate arrangements. They also defeated repeated efforts by contractors to concentrate their units in brigades under their own generals in a single theatre, instead ensuring that large contingents were split and deployed in several areas simultaneously to prevent the provider threatening to withdraw them to extract better terms. Multilateralism extended through bundles of related treaties as the major partners in the anti-French coalition signed separate but related agreements with the same German prince. They also exchanged information to improve their negotiating positions and ensure they were not hoodwinked into granting better terms to potential contractors.

Contractors had limited scope to resist this management. They were usually competitors, especially those from the German princes who provided the bulk of foreign troops. Princes sought elevation within the Empire's internal hierarchy to enhance their influence and safeguard their status relative to other European monarchs. They had no desire to leave the Empire's protective shell, nor did they want their peers to obtain the titles they sought themselves, since a wholesale upgrade amongst the princes would negate the purpose of their own elevation. These considerations limited consortia to those within the same dynasty, primarily the Ernestine Saxons and the Guelph dukes. The former signed with the emperor (1676, 1702), Saxony (1689, 1692), and the Franconian Kreis (1692), because collective action was the only way the weaker branches could achieve the capacity required to field a full regiment. The Guelphs continued to sign collective agreements with the anti-French coalition (1674, 1688, 1701, and 1704), emperor (1684, 1692), and France (1679). However, internal disagreements ultimately prevented all three branches cooperating and Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel went its own way, generally siding with France once the emperor granted an electoral title to Hanover in 1692.

The junior Hohenzollern lines in Ansbach and Bayreuth signed joint conventions with Venice (1686) and Saxony (1709), while there were several agreements involving pairs of ecclesiastical principalities when these were held in common by the same bishop. However, bishops were usually compelled by their cathedral chapters to make separate arrangements for each of their sees. The only consortium without prior political ties was that of Saxe-Gotha, Würzburg and Ansbach whose territories were at least proximate. They collaborated for mutual defence and to hire troops to the emperor (1693) and Saxony (1698), but their partnership collapsed as France briefly detached Gotha from its cooperation with the emperor in 1701. Ansbach joined Hesse-Kassel and Mecklenburg-Schwerin to persuade the emperor to hire their auxiliaries

as these were being discharged by the Maritime Powers in 1713, but he refused to make a collective agreement.[56]

Though arrangements were asymmetrical, signing with a consortium of contractees could benefit a contractor by bringing connections to multiple major powers, each offering something different.[57] Spain was the weakest member of the initial anti-French coalition and soon notorious for its inability to pay in full. Contractors appreciated the expansion of agreements during the 1670s and 1690s to include the Dutch and later English who either guaranteed the money promised by Spain or assumed at least part of its financial obligations. The emperor also generally lacked funds but was the overlord of all German and some Italian princes exploited his commanding position within the Empire to manipulate them through offering important concessions in return for troops. The reform of the Empire's collective defence structure in 1681–82 changed the rules governing these practices but did nothing to reduce the emperor's ability to use the constitution to his advantage. Typically, he promised prospective contractors relief from billeting other German or imperial troops on their lands, or agreed to waive demands for war taxes in return for additional troops. Above all, the princes knew that the elevations in status and other political goals they sought required the emperor's approval. Placing troops with the Maritime Powers was often a means to acquire leverage in Vienna to push the emperor into confirming promised concessions, since he was frequently dependent on Anglo-Dutch financial aid himself. The anti-French coalition proved highly effective in securing German, Italian and Scandinavian troops. The contracted total topped 60,000 during the 1670s, peaked at 133,640 in 1695 during the Nine Years War and reached roughly that level for most of the War of Spanish Succession.

France was far less successful. The collapse of the Rhenish Alliance by 1668 left it without a framework to coordinate German contractors, while it remained without significant allies until the establishment of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain after 1700. Few princes were willing to defy the constitutional prohibition on assisting the enemies of the emperor and Empire, despite Louis XIV's frequent claims his actions were to uphold 'German liberty'. French efforts centred on sponsoring princes to remain neutral and achieved some

56 Hans Philippi, *Landgraf Karl von Hessen-Kassel* (Marburg, 1976), pp. 411–424; Georg Tessin, *Mecklenburgisches Militär in Türken- und Franzosenkriegen 1648–1718* (Cologne, 1966), pp. 45–46; Bernhard Sicken, "Truppenstärke und Militäretat des Fürstentums Ansbach um 1703," *Jahrbuch des Historischen Vereins für Mittelfranken* 84 (1967/68), 60–82, pp. 64–65.

57 For more detail on this and the following, see Peter H. Wilson, *German Armies: War and German Politics 1648–1806* (London, 1998).

success with agreements with Bavaria (1678), Brandenburg (1673, 1679, 1682, and 1683), Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel (1701), Cologne (1673, 1682, 1683, and 1687), Gotha (1691, 1701), Hanover (1672, 1675, 1677, and 1687), Mainz (1681), and Münster (1691). Offensive arrangements were limited to contracts with Bavaria, Cologne, and Münster in 1672, and again with the first two in 1701 which led to their defeat and the temporary imperial sequestration of their lands during the War of Spanish Succession.

France cooperated with Britain in treaties with Denmark and Sweden during the brief reversal of alliances in 1727, and with Spain in an agreement with Bavaria in 1741. Austria formally became a party to France's long-standing arrangements with Sweden in 1757 and the two made a joint convention with Saxony in 1758, but otherwise both powers continued to make separate conventions with German princes, though they informed each other of their terms. Thereafter, multilateralism faded. Britain and Dutch were partners in the First Coalition against Revolutionary France, but signed only one joint agreement, the problematic subsidy treaty with Prussia in April 1793. Britain then made separate arrangements with each partner until the closing stages of the Napoleonic Wars when it signed combined subsidy treaties with its principal allies in the final two coalitions.

Britain's membership of the Grand Alliance of 1689 was accompanied by its switch from being a major supplier of foreign military labour to one of its principal consumers. Initially, this included foreign regiments recruited from Huguenot and Waldensian refugees. These were disbanded with the peace in 1697 as their presence was unacceptable to Parliament which remained suspicious of a permanent army. William III's victory over his rival James II by 1691 also led to the 'Flight of the Wild Geese', or transfer of the Irish regiments loyal to the Jacobite cause into French service where they remained until 1792.

The coincidence of the Nine Years War with the ongoing Great Turkish War (1683–99) resulted in 162 conventions and treaties. Another 20 were made before commencement of hostilities in May 1701 in the War of Spanish Succession which saw 156 more. Collectively, these consolidated the system. Agreements during the Spanish Succession frequently simply renewed or adapted those from the previous conflict. In turn, they provided models for future arrangements, notably those between Britain and Hesse-Kassel into the 1790s which referred to that of 1702 as their basis.

The intensification of activity encouraged the emergence of medium German princes as contractees, beginning with Saxony during the 1690s, followed by Brandenburg-Prussia and Hanover after 1701. They hired units from smaller neighbours to make up the numbers required by their own contracts with the Maritime Powers, or as substitutes for their contingents owed under the

Empire's collective security, thereby keeping their own men free to be hired to major states. The Franconian and Swabian *Kreise* (Circles) acted collectively to hire troops to augment their forces after 1692 to increase their weight within the Empire and the Grand Alliance.

8 Contingent Sizes

Consolidation of the system stabilised the size of contingents, making the arrangements more predictable. Münster's promise of 30,000 men to England in 1665 had been wholly unrealistic, as had the bishop's belief that Charles II could pay for such a force. Bavaria and Cologne also pledged too many troops in 1672 and had to revise their commitments downwards in fresh conventions once hostilities began. Brandenburg-Prussia promised 20,000 in its agreements with Spain (1690) and separately with the Maritime Powers (1693) who assumed Spain's responsibilities. Otherwise, 6,000 to 12,000 was the norm for a single agreement with a medium-sized contractor like Bavaria, Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, Naples, the Palatinate, Portugal, Savoy, Saxony, and the two Scandinavian kingdoms. Cologne occasionally contracted for up to around 10,000 during the 18th century, not least as it was often held in common with Münster and other bishoprics. Württemberg briefly joined this group in the 1730s and again during the Seven Years' War (1756–63). Otherwise, 4,000 was the upper ceiling for the smaller German principalities and those Italian states like Modena and Parma which occasionally supplied auxiliaries.

Most German princes contracted for a single regiment which, if provided for the emperor, ranged up to 2,300 men, but was often half that when supplied to other powers. The Scandinavian kingdoms switched their arrangements between France and its enemies but did not sign more than one agreement at a time. The larger German principalities made parallel agreements with different members of the anti-French coalitions which could increase their overall commitments above the normal ceiling of around 10,000 men. A few smaller principalities signed multiple agreements in the hope of consolidating these into a single, large contract which might bring more substantial political benefits. However, as Mecklenburg-Schwerin discovered during the War of Spanish Succession, contractees preferred to spread the risk amongst multiple providers.

Much larger numbers only featured in agreements involving major powers as contractors, such as the Maritime Powers' arrangements with Austria during the War of Austrian Succession and with Prussia in 1793, the Anglo-Savoyard treaty of 1793 and those with Russia 1747, 1755, 1797, and 1805. Sweden briefly

increased its commitments to 30,000 during the Seven Years' War, but Prussia avoided any precise numbers in its agreement with Britain in 1758.

Hesse-Kassel's simultaneous agreements with both sides during the War of Austrian Succession were highly unusual and the contracts contained clauses that the two contingents were not to be employed against each other. Some princes received subsidies from rival great powers simultaneously in peacetime, notably Bavaria and Cologne in the early 1750s, but these had to be concealed from the contractees and there are several instances of major powers terminating or refusing agreements with princes suspected of duplicity.

Both parties normally made great efforts to fulfil their agreements, not least because non-compliance risked reputational damage and harmed their chances of securing arrangements in the future. It was rare for an agreement to collapse immediately because the contractor failed to raise sufficient manpower. More commonly, contractors struggled to maintain their forces at the required strength, while contractees fell into arrears, with these two problems generally compounding each other. Sovereign states acting as contractors generally had sufficient forces to meet their commitments and saw subsidies and payments for auxiliaries as valuable ways of reducing military expenditure in conflicts which they would probably have joined anyway. A good example is Sweden which was in almost continual receipt of French subsidies from the later 17th century. France gained valuable leverage over Swedish domestic politics and pushed the country into war in 1675, 1741, and 1757, but each conflict also suited powerful groups and the country would have had to have maintained a defence establishment to protect its Baltic empire in any case.[58]

By contrast, access to external money encouraged the German princes to raise far more men than they could maintain unaided and whose numbers considerably exceeded what they were obliged to provide under imperial collective security. The imminent end to a conflict prompted a scramble to place troops with other employers to avoid the loss of reputation and influence that would follow their disbandment. The almost seamless sequence of wars after 1665 provided opportunities, not least thanks to the emergence of the second tier of contractees like Venice and Saxony which pursued their own conflicts. Nonetheless, auxiliaries were often discharged with considerable arrears owing, while even the few months it might take to conclude a replacement agreement could prove too expensive for some principalities to maintain their forces.

58 Svante Norrhem, *Mercenary Swedes: French Subsidies to Sweden 1631–1796* (Lund, 2019).

Thus, the conclusion of hostilities was usually accompanied by new agreements either converting the temporary hire of auxiliaries into permanent foreign regiments or transferring units completely into another army. The Habsburgs soaked up much of the German manpower this way, as did Prussia until 1755. Respected contractors such as Hesse-Kassel increasingly bargained additional demobilisation benefits to cushion them against such volatility. Keen to retain opportunities to have first call on German manpower, Britain and France developed flexible arrangements whereby the contractor received a subsidy in peacetime to hold men (at least nominally) in readiness, which could be converted into a full auxiliary convention if the men were required. From the mid-18th century, Britain generally allowed one or more additional years of subsidy payments to continue once the units had been discharged.

9 18th-Century Patterns

In contrast to the innovations and expansion witnessed after 1660, the period after 1714 was characterised by the continuation of established practices amidst an overall, gradual decline in activity. Spain's loss of its Italian and Burgundian possessions transformed its remaining units from these locations into foreign regiments alongside those recruited, nominally at least, from Irish, Swiss, and Germans. Retention of Italian and Walloon regiments was determined not only by a desire to maintain strength, but also to demonstrate pretentions to recovering these regions and to continue connections with families with long-standing traditions of service. Austria retained several 'Spanish' units into the 1730s reflecting Charles VI's reluctance to abandon ties to Spain which he had been compelled to renounce in 1714. The long wars left other legacies as well, notably the presence of Hungarian exiles serving in the French hussars, as well as numerous Huguenot officers in British, Dutch, and German service.

Around 70 agreements were made across 1714–40, including many peacetime subsidy agreements by the major powers to secure German and Scandinavian support. The subsequent War of Austrian Succession saw another 58 conventions and treaties, chiefly made by the Dutch following the crisis of 1745 as French armies overran much of the Austrian Netherlands. These arrangements evolved into lasting connections with German princes as several of the temporary auxiliary regiments transformed into permanent foreign units, while others (Waldeck, Saxe-Gotha, and later Münster also) were renewed regularly. After the Patriot Revolt (1787), the Orange dynasty felt foreigners were more reliable than native Dutch and signed agreements with

Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Ansbach-Bayreuth and Mecklenburg-Schwerin for 5,345 men in 1788.[59]

At least 30 new agreements were made immediately after 1748 as France and Britain competed to buy up German and Scandinavian support. Most of these subsidy treaties were modified as conventions to provide auxiliaries after 1756 with the outbreak of the Seven Years' War which saw nearly 60 additional agreements. There were no major wars outside eastern Europe in the three decades after 1763, and most powers scaled back their military commitments. Around 48 agreements were made during this time, mainly by the French and Dutch keeping Germans and Scandinavians on retainer. The main exception was the clutch of agreements made by Britain securing around 30,000 German auxiliaries during the American War of Independence (1775–83), which represented the first substantial 'export' of foreign troops beyond Europe.

Beneath the surface of the relatively tranquil inter-state relations, there were also deeper, structural changes reducing the demand for foreign military labour. One was the shift from the grand anti-French coalition to a European pentarchy as Prussia and Russia emerged fully as great powers alongside Austria, France, and Britain by the 1750s. Both newcomers were too poor to hire foreign troops, which Russia did not require thanks to its large population. Prussia supplemented its own system of limited conscription by recruiting individuals from the minor German states rather than tying itself through conventions.[60]

Meanwhile, several important contractees no longer hired auxiliaries: Spain and Denmark had stopped doing this by the end of the 17th century, followed by Venice and Saxony by 1718. Both Scandinavian powers retained German regiments into the early Napoleonic era, but these were now long-established units recruiting individually to maintain strength rather than new ones formed through capitulations with princes or enterprisers. Meanwhile, whilst augmenting the number of German troops in the 1740s and 1780s, the Dutch no longer hired on the scale they had done before 1713. Austria refrained from new conventions after 1761 (with Anhalt-Zerbst) until agreements for 3,552 men from Würzburg, Bamberg and Anhalt-Zerbst in 1790 during the twin crises of another Turkish war and the revolt in the Southern Netherlands. Like

59 Oskar Bezzel, *Haustruppen des letzten Markgrafen von Ansbach-Bayreuth unter preußischen Herrschaft* (Munich, 1939), pp. 25–44; Klaus-Ulrich Keubke, Hubertus Köbke, *Mecklenburg-Schweriner Truppen in den Niederlanden 1788–1795* (Schwerin, 2003).

60 Peter H. Wilson, "The Politics of Military Recruitment in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *English Historical Review* 117 (2002), 536–568.

Prussia, it recruited heavily from the minor German principalities and imperial cities, which provided around a third of its infantry, without the need for conventions.

10 Demise and Transformation

French control over Italy, combined with the Empire's destruction by 1806, undermined the Fiscal Military System which was already strained by the collapse of the Dutch Republic 1795. France shifted to extraction through imperial hegemony, imposing asymmetrical alliances on satellite states to send troops at their own expense. By 1809, the Rheinbund was obliged to provide 122,000 for France, far exceeding whatever the Bourbons had been able to muster at any one point through foreign regiments and auxiliaries. The sharp growth in German numbers contrasted with the relative stability of those of the Swiss who were obliged to provide 18,000 infantry after 1798 (reduced to 16,000 from 1803), a significant burden relative to population, but roughly equivalent to the numbers which had served France regularly during the 18th century.

Germany's reorganisation into fewer, sovereign states signalled the end to foreign regiments in the Danish and Swedish armies, as well as depriving Austria and Prussia of a significant proportion of their manpower. The Hanoverians and Brunswickers transferred as exiled armies into British service until 1815, while Russia also formed a German Legion. In the absence of available auxiliaries, Britain returned to practice of recruiting foreign regiments, primarily from Germans, Dutch and Swiss, often commanded by former French royalist officers. Outside Britain, the profound political changes sweeping Europe after 1789 transformed state-society relations, greatly increasing the authorities' capacity to mobilise manpower and resources from their own populations, as exemplified by new forms of conscription adopted by virtually every major and minor state.[61]

As in other spheres, the Restoration era did not fully revive previous practice. Subsidies almost completely disappeared. Britain briefly re-emerged as an 'exporter' of manpower as thousands of demobilised soldiers and other men

61 Alan Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire* (Oxford, 1990), Thomas Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies: Military Service in France and Germany, 1789–1830* (New York, 2008); *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era*, eds. Donald Stoker et al. (London, 2014); *Der Bürger als Soldat: Die Militarisierung europäischer Gesellschaften im langen 19. Jahrhundert: Ein internationaler Vergleich*, ed. Christian Jansen (Essen, 2004).

joined the Latin American armies fighting for independence from Spain.[62] France, Spain, the Netherlands, Naples, and the Papacy all employed significant numbers of foreign troops through formal capitulations, but numbers declined significantly after the 1830 Revolution, and they disappeared with Italian unification which removed the last employers by 1870. That conflict saw surge in 'foreign fighters' at least nominally organised around ideology and exemplified by the Garibaldini. Important politically and sometimes militarily, foreign fighters were never as numerous as their allegedly 'mercenary' forebears.[63]

11 Conclusions

All conclusions are necessarily provisional, as there are still gaps in the data and further analysis to complete. Nonetheless, departing from the conventional vantage point of the sovereign state reveals the transnational character of early modern Europe's use of foreign military labour. Dispensing with the ahistorical figure of the mercenary and identifying 'foreign' politically rather than culturally sharpens our ability to investigate long-lasting and complex practices. Distinguishing between the different contractual forms enables macro-level analysis across time and space, as well as to contextualise micro studies of individual agreements, including those between ordinary soldiers and their employers.

The preceding exposes the cliché of the universal soldier serving the highest bidder. This was not a free market for force. Men were rarely able or willing to serve any power, while prospective employers were also discerning in whom they recruited. Access to manpower was mediated through contractors upon whom contractees depended to organise and supply the bulk of foreign troops. Geography, strategy, dynastic, and religious considerations all further

62 Matthew Brown, *Adventuring through Spanish Colonies: Simon Bolivar, Foreign Mercenaries and the Birth of New Nations* (Liverpool, 2006); Ben Hughes, *Conquer or Die! Wellington's Veterans and the Liberation of the New World* (Oxford, 2010); Moises E. Rodriguez, *Under the Flags of Freedom: British Mercenaries in the War of the Two Brothers, the First Carlist War and the Greek War of Independence* (Lanham, MD, 2009).

63 Fuller discussion in Peter H. Wilson, "Foreign Military Labour in Europe's Transition to Modernity," *European Review of History* 27 (2020), 12–32; Nir Airelli, *From Byron to Bin Laden: A History of Foreign War Volunteers* (Cambridge, MA, 2018). For the Garibaldini, see the special issue on "Foreign Volunteers and the Risorgimento," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 14:4 (2009).

influenced choices, as did perceptions of martial reputation, creditworthiness, and the likelihood of achieving ambitions.

There was a pronounced tendency for clustering of contractees and contractors along established patterns whereby men from certain areas predominately served in the same armies. However, these patterns were not universal across all contractual forms. For example, France employed Irish, Swiss and, to a lesser extent, Scots, and English in foreign regiments, but generally did not employ them through conventions or subsidy treaties. It had German and some Italian foreign regiments but obtained far larger numbers through conventions and treaties with princes from these regions. These patterns were not replicated in the service of foreign fighters as it emerged from the 1820s and reflected the progressive restructuring of states and war-making along national lines.