Education, Islamophobia, and Security: Narrative accounts of Pakistani and British Pakistani women in English universities

Dissertation submitted to the University of Oxford for the degree of DPhil in Education

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Dedicated
to
Ama and Abu
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Abstract

This thesis explores the experiences, encounters, responses and reactions to Islamophobia through a narrative study of forty female Pakistani and British students with a Pakistani heritage in universities across England. In exploring Islamophobia as a ‘racialised’ phenomenon, the participant narratives locate the experiences and encounters of Islamophobia within their ‘intersubjective’ realities, across various ‘communities’ of ‘discourse.’ These realities are informed by the wider socio-political milieu of a war against Al Qa’ida and its affiliates that ‘securitizes’ the Muslim and Pakistani identity(s) particularly in Britain. The university is also implicated in the counter terrorism agenda of the state, depicted as a ‘vulnerable’ space for radicalizing students. However, females in this discussion are predominantly absent within the academic and public narratives. Therefore, this research will explore the experience of Islamophobia, the way it is perceived by the British/Pakistani/Muslim/female student, and the way students respond and react to it within the university.

The research employs a narrative method of inquiry. The narrative analysis is informed by a Bakhtinian notion of ‘dialogics’ to explore the multiplicity of ‘meanings’ that emerge through individual accounts of Islamophobia located within their public and private realms. In exploring these narratives the thesis illustrates how ‘degrees of religiosity’ influences encounters and experiences of Islamophobia, and highlights responses and reactions of students to such experiences, that include individual and group activism to challenge Islamophobia and the insecure meta-narrative about Muslims and terrorism. The research further focuses on both the religious identity of the Muslim student, and their problematic ethnic identity, Pakistani demonstrating how in a securitized socio-political milieu Muslim students are further vulnerable to experiences of Islamophobia, in the form of Pakophobia, where both their religious and ethnic identities are held suspect.

These narratives have implications for the emerging understanding of Islamophobia as a ‘racialised’ phenomenon. They further have implications for universities that are encouraged to participate in the government’s counter-terrorism agenda. The narratives by locating the research within the particularities of a wider socio-political milieu that ‘racialises’ and ‘securitizes’ Muslims raises critical questions about the nature of discrimination in a post 9/11, 7/7 era that may have repercussions for other Muslim minority groups.
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Chapter I
Introduction

I. The Context

a. Universities, Security and the Muslim Question

The on-going war against Al Qa’ida and its affiliates has resulted in a fear of the ‘radical Muslim’ and an apprehension about Islam, often translating into what is called ‘Islamophobia,’ where Muslims are targeted as ‘outsiders’ or ‘foreigners’ for possessing an alien culture or religion (Choma et al 2012; Cesari 2011; Kalin 2011; Allen 2010a; Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010a; Gest 2010; Fekete 2009; Tyrer 2003). This problem is visible within different institutions, including universities that provide a space for young students to engage with radical ideas, yet are considered places where students, especially Muslim students may be radicalized to the point of becoming terrorists or extremists (HM Government 2011a; Glee and Pope 2005). The Muslim problem is repeatedly emphasized in the UK government’s counter terrorism policies, with the 2011 Prevent agenda primarily attempting to solve this problem. Reports such as ‘Prevent, Police and Universities’ that provide ‘guidance for police officers and police staff to help Higher Education Institutions contribute to the prevention of terrorism’ (2012) highlight how universities are continuously included in the security agenda of the UK state. The role of universities within security is further reinforced by ‘The Government’s Response 1

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1 Also known as ‘the war on terror,’ and the more recent ‘Long War or Global War on Terror’ by the US government, the UK government has primarily referred to the on-going war as one against ‘Al Qa’ida’ and its ‘affiliates’ in the Counter terrorism policy of 2011 (HM Government 2011b; Burkeman 25/03/2009). While the repercussions of previous terminology will be discussed in Chapter 3, this thesis in keeping with such changes in rhetoric will refer to this ‘war on terror’ as a war against Al Qa’ida and its affiliates.

to the’ ‘Home Affairs Committee’ ‘report’ ‘Roots of Violent Radicalisation’, clearly stating ‘the need for universities to exercise a duty of care to students who may be at risk of radicalisation’ and their role in challenging ‘extremist ideology where this occurs on their premises’ (Secretary of State for the Home Department 2012:8). The report further highlights the appointment of ‘ten regional co-ordinators’ that will ‘work’ together with ‘colleges and universities… to strengthen the approach to the Prevent agenda on the ground’ (ibid). With ‘the greatest threat’ coming ‘from Al Qa’ida and those they inspire’ (ibid:7) the British government is cautiously striving to work with Muslim communities around Britain in countering the ‘radicalisation’ risk. However, initiatives that are promoted under the guise of ‘security’ are in danger of breeding insecurity, particularly amongst a highly suspect Muslim population. There is no disputing the reality that amongst the convicted ‘Islamist terrorists’ in the United Kingdom, some had attended a higher education institution in Britain, that groups such as the Hizb-ut-Tahrir considered extremist by the British government have attempted to recruit students in universities (Hamid 2007; Glees and Pope 2005). However, the extent of the security response by the British government has implicated Muslim students, Pakistani students and Islamic societies within universities, who as this research illustrates struggle to prove their innocence, their ‘normality’ in the face of growing media rhetoric around the Muslim terrorist in the closet.3 Universities are further perceived as becoming part of this Orwellian state order, with university staff and student societies asked to ‘inform’ on

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‘vulnerable Muslim’ students.\(^4\) The nebulous nature of this vulnerability in relation to radicalization in the state narrative continues to fuel Islamophobia, creating distrust and insecurity for both the Muslim and non-Muslim populations. Given this context, it is important to understand Islamophobia, particularly how it is experienced and encountered in everyday student lives, in their interaction with others within and outside the university.

While Muslims as a group are essentialised with the moderate/extremist binary at play in the public imagination as created through media, specific ethnicities are especially conspicuous. These ethnicities include Pakistanis. Osama Bin Laden’s killing in Pakistan in May 2011\(^5\), the arrest and eventual deportation of Pakistani students in Manchester in April 2009\(^6\), the link between British Pakistanis and frequenting of terrorist training camps in Pakistan\(^7\), not to mention the war against terrorism which is now taking place on Pakistani soil, has made the Pakistani identity prominent within this Muslim narrative of insecurity. This is also echoed in the British government’s counter terrorism policies. According to Prevent 2011, ‘almost 25%’ of ‘Islamist terrorism-related’ convictions ‘over the past ten years’ involved ‘links to Pakistan - either as British nationals with


\(^7\) For more information see BBC News (07/02/2012) ‘Pakistan Training Camp discussed in secret recording’ (Accessed from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16932224 on 03/02/2013).
Pakistani heritage or Pakistani nationals\(^8\) (HM Government 2011a:19). The way in which such stereotypes inform different ‘realities’ and experiences of British/Muslim/Pakistani communities are crucial to research, particularly with discrimination in the form of Islamophobia being reported.

For a study that explores the vulnerability of a juxtaposed religio-ethnic identity, the Muslim-Pakistani and their experiences of Islamophobia, the university provides the ideal space where both British Pakistani and Overseas Pakistani students interact with a non-Pakistani, non-Muslim population. With Pakistani students in 2009 arrested on suspicion of terrorism, notwithstanding student visa problems that potential Pakistani students faced as a consequence of these arrests, (Cobian and Norton-Taylor 18/05/2010; Syal and Helm 26/04/2009; Laville et al 10/04/2009) the macro narrative of Pakistan as situated in the war against Al Qa’ida and its affiliates influences the individual experiences of Pakistani students. As the narratives in this research illustrate such a problematic relationship between being Pakistani, and being Muslim also results in a form of ‘Pakophobia,’ or fear of the Pakistani terrorist. Furthermore, incidents of Islamophobic behaviour have also been reported in universities, where both Muslim male and female students have been either physically attacked or verbally abused (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010a:26-32; Change Institute 2009; Office for Public Management and Serena Hussain 2009; Tyrer 2003). Thus, such a context provides insights into both the micro-narrative of Islamophobia, and the meta-narrative of the war against Islamist terrorist groups, as it relates to the experiences of British/Pakistani Muslim students. These insights are provided through accounts that relate to an ‘intersubjective’ reality of

\(^8\) Others include communities from ‘East Africa (notably Somalia)’ that comprise ‘15%’ of the group (HM Government 2011a:19).
participants located across different ‘communities’ of ‘discourse’ that inform their experiences, but are also influenced by them (Little et al 2003; Bakhtin 1981). The participants through a narrative dialogue with the researcher reflect on these ‘communities’ that range from student societies, such as the Islamic society or Pakistani society within the university; to the more formal classroom ‘community’ of students; the informal ‘community’ of friends, either Muslim or non-Muslim; the more public ‘community’ of individuals on the street whose interactions may illicit Islamophobic exchanges, all (re)presented in the narratives of participants. The narratives themselves provide an opportunity to delve deeper within the experience or encounter of Islamophobia, through an introspective process whereby participants share not only the experience but also reflect on the social context and the ‘dialectics’ therein (Bakhtin 1986; 1981), highlighting the pervasive nature of Islamophobia as encountered in the ‘everyday’ lives (Gardiner 2004) of participants.

Current research on Islamophobia and security primarily focuses on Muslim men with limited work on women (see Spalek et al 2009a; Brown 2008a). Women continue to be viewed as oppressed, in need of being ‘empowered’ (Brown 2008a). However, with terrorist acts being committed by Muslim female students such as Roshonara Choudhry ‘the first Briton to have been inspired by al-Qaida to try to assassinate a politician on British soil’ (Dodd and Topping 03/11/2010), the experiences, perceptions and opinions of female Muslim students within the context of (in)security and Islamophobia are important to explore. Given such an absence of the female narrative especially in relation to the university, this research focuses on British/Pakistani/Muslim female students. According to the initial findings of the ‘Measuring Anti Muslim Attacks’ (MAMA)
project Muslim women are ‘increasingly’ being targeted (Faith Matters 2013a; Townsend 09/03/2013), because of their visible presence in the community, a result of the ‘hijab’ or the ‘niqab’. Tyrer and Ahmad’s study of Muslim women in Higher Education is instrumental in highlighting the anxieties associated with the hijab and Islamophobia. By being ‘more recognizable’ through the hijab, women felt ‘more vulnerable to racialised and gendered stereotyping’ (2006:19). The limited research on this subject has again not taken the ethnic identity into account, or the realities of the security agenda on individual experiences. Hence, the particularity of the contemporary socio-political milieu that renders the Muslim/Pakistani female student ‘suspect’, provides a point of entry into an exploration of Islamophobia, as experienced by participants both inside and outside the university.

b. Research Questions

Building on the premise that the ethnic identity Pakistani and the Muslim identity functions within such a ‘racialised’ (Meer and Modood 2010a) and ‘securitized’ (Croft 2012) narrative on Islamophobia, where gendered and ethnic stereotypes around the oppressed and the radical as presented in the meta-narrative of the war against Al Qa’ida and its affiliates influences student experiences, the following research questions will be explored:

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9 The official report will be published in July 2013. The ‘Tell MAMA national program’ was launched by the NGO Faith Matters in March 2012 to record incidents of and ‘assist individuals’ who had suffered ‘anti-Muslim prejudice or Islamophobia’ (See Faith Matters 2013a; 2013b)
10 ‘Arabic for ‘cover’, conventional word for woman’s veil’ (Halliday 2002:13)
11 A cloth covering the face with only the eyes showing. It is often worn with a jilbab, which is ‘a cloak’ that covers the entire ‘body’ (Vakulenko, 2007:720).
a) Amongst British/Pakistani Muslim female students how is Islamophobia understood?

b) How has Islamophobia been experienced?

c) How does the narrative around radicalization and security influence student experiences?

d) In what ways can the university environment assist students in challenging Islamophobia?

The first question aims at developing a grass roots definition of Islamophobia by exploring the experiences of participants in this research, i.e. British Muslim female students with a Pakistani heritage and Overseas Pakistani female students (henceforth known as British/Pakistani Muslim students). Discussions of Islamophobia have been widely shaped by the Runnymede Trust report of 1997. It was further developed by Dr David Tyrer in his PhD thesis entitled, ‘Institutionalized Islamophobia in British Universities’ (2003), where Islamophobia was described as a ‘discourse’, drawing on post colonial, Lacanian and psychoanalytic theories (Tyrer 2003:62), as well as by Meer and Modood (2010a) who explain the phenomenon in the context of ‘racialising Muslims’. However, what is lacking from these definitions is individual narratives that allow students to reflect on their experiences as located within different arenas of everyday social life. The first question will therefore provide a platform to develop a bottom up conception of Islamophobia.

The second and third questions about the experience of Islamophobia and the meta narrative of security and the Muslim subject are important in locating such experiences of Islamophobia within the wider discussion of security and radicalization as highlighted in
the preceding section. Students’ perception of security and radicalization and its link to Islamophobia are examined. Stereotypes of the Muslim extremist, the Pakistani terrorist, and the oppressed Muslim/Pakistani woman, a victim of both a backward religion which forces segregation and a culture that believes in forced marriages abound media accounts. These accounts impact the way Islamophobia is experienced, both internally and externally. Through both directly and indirectly experiencing discrimination, students have internalized the wider narrative on Islamophobia, often in relation to Pakophobia\textsuperscript{12}, or anti Pakistani sentiments. This internal struggle can take different forms, from negotiating \textit{who they are} in an environment which is largely hostile to different facets of their identity; to \textit{how they behave}, explored through the kind of student campaigns and societies they are involved with, but especially those campaigns they avoid. The more direct experiences examine encounters of discrimination both off and on university campuses, in the form of verbal or physical abuse with the aim to explore how students cope with such experiences. Indirect experiences relate to students who have either heard of, or are acquainted with individuals who might have experienced Islamophobia. These indirect experiences are particularly important in understanding the internal aspect of Islamophobia: how internalizing the wider narrative on Islamophobia and Pakophobia has influenced the way students behave, without having experienced direct discrimination.

The fourth question explores the place of the university within the narrative, a place that can both challenge or reinforce Islamophobia. With higher educational institutions increasingly accused of being potential ‘recruiting’ grounds for extremist groups (Thorne and Stuart 2008; Hamid 2007; Glees and Pope 2005) Muslim and Pakistani students

\textsuperscript{12} The term ‘Pakophobia’ was highlighted in two separate narratives in the research, while the remaining participants alluded to it in their discussion on Pakistan.
continue to be implicated in this narrative of insecurity. In such a context student opinion regarding university support against Islamophobia is important to explore, in light of research that suggests the prevalence of ‘institutionalised’ ‘Islamophobia’ (Nabi 2011; Tyrer 2003) within higher educational institutions. Therefore, in answering this question this thesis explores students’ views about their universities, to what extent they provide both welfare provisions to cope with direct or indirect experiences of Islamophobia, as well as ensure academic freedom that allows debate and discussion. The university’s relationship with Islamic and Pakistani societies is further explored in this context, especially in universities where such student societies are considered too ‘radical,’ by government officials or media.

Through this exploration, the research further contributes to the literature on race and Islamophobia, on securitization and Muslim student experiences within Higher Educational Institutions. It provides in depth narratives of forty British/Pakistani Muslim female students, giving a grass roots account of Islamophobia. While Tyrer (2003) in defining Islamophobia as a ‘discourse’ allows the possibility of other emerging or continuing discourses in the form of orientalism, colonialism, and Islamism to punctuate and penetrate the ‘discourse’ of Islamophobia, this thesis defines Islamophobia as a more fluid phenomenon, linked to the existing socio-political narrative of insecurity. It both ‘racialises’ (Meer and Modood 2010a) and ‘securitizes’ (Croft 2012) Muslims, but is further conceptually problematised when an equally ‘securitized’ ethnic identity like Pakistani is combined with ‘being Muslim.’ While the importance of non religious markers such as ethnicity has been highlighted by academics, (Meer and Modood 2010a; 2009; Allen 2010a; Sayyid 2010) in conceptualizing Islamophobia, what is often
 overlooked is the extent to which a highly securitized ethnic identity contributes to experiences of Islamophobia, where the permeable boundary between the two identities often results in attacks, whether direct or perceived, on being a Muslim extremist, and a Pakistani terrorist, identities that are conceptually more interlinked in experiences of discrimination than has previously been recognized. This link is clearly evident in the term *Pakophobia*, used by participants in the research, and implied by others who spoke of problems related to being Pakistani and Muslim. Caught in this double-bind of Muslim and Pakistani, students’ negotiation or dissociation from one identity or the other, their narratives of self censorship, of avoidance, as well as accounts of activism, illustrate how Islamophobia pervades everyday realities of young British/Pakistani Muslim female students. Islamophobia is not simply about direct discrimination, or about Muslim or Islam bashing in the news, the media, or by politicians. It is more perverse, where the fear of being ‘thought’ ‘radical’, of ‘getting into trouble’ for being Muslim or Pakistani is internalized, where students censor their own actions, and conversations. Furthermore, the research contributes to the debate on Islamophobia and security through an in-depth exploration of females and their experiences, responses and reactions, young women who are often talked about but seldom provided a platform to voice their concerns and opinions. Hence, by providing snapshots of such female student experiences, the narratives reveal how Islamophobia is experienced and encountered, how insecurity is both perceived as well as overcome through individual and group activism.

II. Thesis Structure and Chapter outlines

In exploring the research questions in the preceding discussion, the thesis begins by providing a context to the problem of Islamophobia, security and radicalization as
witnessed in the narratives of the participants. The next two chapters therefore provide a background to the politics of race and identity in Britain, particularly in relation to Muslims and South Asians, a context that is essential in locating the British/Muslim/Pakistani identity of the participant within the British context.

Chapter 2 will therefore provide the first of a two-part exploration of Islamophobia and racism in Britain. In establishing the relevance of the historical narrative on racism for the British/Muslim Pakistani participant, the chapter traces the evolution of racism and race relations in Britain, with particular emphasis on ‘coloured’ and South Asian immigrants. Such a historical overview is important in locating the emergence of a ‘racialised’ narrative on Muslims, which draws on both contemporary and historical tropes of otherization. In presenting a brief history of government responses to ‘coloured’ immigrants, the chapter illustrates the tense relationship between Britain and its immigrants particularly since the 1950s-60s, that witnessed a large influx of people from the Commonwealth. The chapter further traces the evolution of the ‘Pakistani immigrant’, who categorized by the host state as ‘South Asian’, by the anti racists as ‘Black’, instead emerges in the 1980s as a politicized ‘British Muslim’ citizen.

Chapter 3 explores the politicized ‘British Muslim’ subject of the 1980s-90s within the contemporary discussion of securitization. As the second of the two-part exploration of Islamophobia and racism in Britain, the chapter focuses on the ‘British Muslim’ identity after September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005. By exploring counter terrorism measures undertaken by the British government after 7/7, the chapter illustrates a problematic narrative around the Muslim subject, where Islamophobia ‘racialises’ and ‘securitizes’ British Muslims. The discussion is further located within higher educational institutions
focusing on questions of radicalisation, Islamism(s) and the Muslim student, as well as analyzing the emergence of a radicalized, securitized female Muslim identity. This chapter therefore presents a backdrop to the narrative of Islamophobia and the Muslim radical, particularly within the context of the university. This backdrop is essential in understanding the accounts of participants who are located within these universities, their identities submerged in external historical and contemporary narratives about being ‘British’, ‘Muslim’, and ‘Pakistani’, narratives that influence their encounter with other social beings both within and outside the university.

However, before delving into the participant narratives, Chapter 4 highlights the Method for this research. The chapter outlines the narrative framework of inquiry for exploring the experiences of Islamophobia within the diverse ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ of participants. This chapter further describes the narrative categories designed for the purpose of analysis. Discussion of truth, validity and reliability within the method of a narrative inquiry is also undertaken, as well as an exploration of the problematic position of the researcher’s own identity, her insider-outsider dilemma, by highlighting the meaning of self-reflexivity within this research. The rationale of the sampling method is highlighted, and the obstacles encountered in recruiting participants for this research. The chapter further presents profiles of the universities, with particular emphasis on the ‘multi-cultural’ or ‘multi-religious’ character of different universities in the sample, the presence of student societies, as well as their stance on Islamophobia or anti-religious discrimination as highlighted on their websites or in documents that were obtained from university officials.
The findings chapters 5 to 7 provide an exploration of the narratives of the participants. Chapter 5 contributes to a conceptual understanding of Islamophobia through a more in-depth exploration of the realities of British/Pakistani female students, their accounts of Islamophobia within their various ‘communities’ of ‘discourse’ in the university and beyond. The chapter further considers the emergence of Pakophobia as highlighted by the participants, and exposes the intersection between ethnicity and religion within Islamophobia. The experiences and observations demonstrate how the meta narrative on security and Islam as propagated by the media and state actors influences student understanding of Islamophobia, as well as their experiences as young Muslims often held suspect because of their association with both a troubled country Pakistan, and a suspicious religion Islam.

Chapter 6 relocates the lens to the university, particularly focusing on student societies and their experiences and encounters with discrimination. In particular, the chapter highlights the student society activities of Islamic societies (ISocs) and their interaction with the meta narrative on radicalisation and the Muslim student. Expanding on the discussion of radical and moderate from the last chapter, participants present their understanding of radicalisation and student activism within the university. In particular, the problematic nature of ISoc activism, especially around the issue of extremist speakers is further examined, to explore how and why Islamic societies felt targeted and further isolated after the tragedies of 9/11 and 7/7. The chapter further engages with the question of student activism exploring Muslim and Pakistani student support of international campaigns related to Palestine, and the more problematic Justice for North West 10 (J4NW10) campaign. The findings provide insights into what students deem political as
opposed to humanitarian, where students are more willing to engage with Islamic humanitarian campaigns while avoiding politics, in particular political causes related to a problematic and troubled country like Pakistan.

Chapter 7 explores the solutions to the problem of Islamophobia as presented by the participants. In particular, the narratives illustrate how both individuals and student societies are challenging the dominant ‘discourse’ on Muslims and insecurity across their student ‘communities,’ by raising awareness about issues relating to Islamophobia and Islam. Further, the suggestions and actions demonstrate the changing nature of anti-racism efforts on campuses, where Muslim young women are actively challenging the meta narrative of the Muslim-Pakistani terrorist, through individual dialogue. The chapter also highlights the nature of welfare provisions in universities, their successes and limitations.

Chapter 8 discusses the findings in Chapters 5-7 in relation to the literature highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3, with the aim of further developing an understanding of Islamophobia and securitization as experienced and described by the participants. It further explores the implications of this study in the area of racism and Islamophobia, securitization and Muslim student experiences within Higher Educational Institutions. It also highlights the limits of this DPhil thesis as well as identifying potential areas for future research.
Chapter II

Islamophobia: From the Orient to Multicultural Britain

This chapter is the first of a two-part exploration of Islamophobia and racism in Britain. In establishing the relevance of the historical narrative on racism for the British/Muslim Pakistani participant, the chapter traces the evolution of racism and race relations in Britain, with particular emphasis on ‘coloured’ and South Asian immigrants. Such a historical overview is important in locating the emergence of a ‘racialised’ narrative on Muslims, which draws on both contemporary and historical tropes of otherization. In presenting a brief history of government responses to ‘coloured’ immigrants, the chapter illustrates the tense relationship between Britain and its immigrants particularly since the 1950s-60s, that witnessed a large influx of people from the Commonwealth. The chapter further traces the evolution of the ‘Pakistani immigrant’, who categorized by the host state as ‘South Asian’, by the anti racists as ‘Black’, instead emerges in the 1980s as a politicized ‘British Muslim’ citizen.

I. Introduction

Islamophobia as a phenomenon has encountered both criticism and confusion. Consensus on the meaning of Islamophobia, the parameters and situations it encompasses is yet to be achieved (See Modood 2013; 2005; Helbling 2012; Morgan and Poynting 2012; Ernst and Bornstein 2012; Kumar 2012; Lyons 2012; Bleich and Maxwell 2012; Allen 2010a; Sayyid and Vakil 2010; Gest 2010). In attempting to define such a controversial contemporary phenomenon, the historical context that contributed to its inception, and the existing realities that continue to mould and define its meaning are crucial to investigate (See Allen 2010a; Malik 2009; Fekete 2009; Abbas 2004). As Kumar (2012:9) observes ‘…the history of “Islam and the West,” as it is commonly termed, is a story not of religious conflict but rather of conflict born of political rivalries and competing imperial agendas’. Drawing on Britain’s Imperialist history, Islamophobia is situated within an ideological Orientalist struggle, where ‘[a]t the heart of Islamophobia is…the maintenance of the ‘violent hierarchy’ between the idea of the West (and all that it can be articulated to represent) and Islam (and all that it can be articulated to
This ideological struggle has resulted in what Fekete (2009) describes as ‘European Orientalism’ where ‘the Orient’ is ‘not...a separate geographical region but...a problem located... within the boundaries of Europe (the Occident) itself’ (2009:193).

Such agendas as outlined during the Crusades and Europe’s Imperialist ventures are important historical points of intersection between the West and Islam, encounters that led to exaggerated stereotypes and caricatures of a violent Islam (See Sardar and Ahmad 2012:2-3; Kumar 2012; Lyons 2012; Zebiri 2011; Allen 2010a; Sayyid 2010; Fekete 2009; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008; Esposito 1999)\(^{13}\). These stereotypes have gained further meaning in the present day context of a war against Al Qa’ida and its affiliates, often projected as a war against violent Islamist ideology by media and political actors (See Meer 2012; Greenberg and Miazhevich 2012; Esposito and Kalin 2011; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008; Saeed 2008; Frost 2008). Therefore, in exploring Islamophobia especially within Britain both a historical overview, and the present day socio-political context is important to explore. This chapter provides a historical context to the phenomenon of Islamophobia within Britain, while the next chapter will situate it within the contemporary narrative on security and Islam.

This context is important in further locating participants and their various ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ that are informed by the historical and contemporary narrative on Muslims and terrorism. The participants in their discussion of Islamophobia highlight

\(^{13}\) Matar’s (2009:213) account of Muslims in the early modern period is important to consider in this regard as he captures both the stereotypes and prejudices but also the small segment of ‘diplomats or traders’ who promoted a positive, if not less hostile image of Muslims. He notes how ‘it was’ John Locke ‘who, uniquely in early modern Europe, formulated a theory that moved the status of Muslims from the exclusion of prejudice to the inclusion of toleration’ (Matar 2009:216). However, the predominant opinion was nonetheless hostile towards Muslims, reinforced by existing stereotypes.
conversations amongst students and other individuals they encounter in different social settings, from the more private gathering amongst friends and fellow students, to encounters on the street or in a public place. They ‘draw on a variety of conversational resources:…narratives of incidents…general claims about the state of relations…images from the media,’ or provide ‘common-sense explanations’ (Buttny 2003:105), all located in a particular ‘place’ and ‘time’ further narrated to the researcher at another particular ‘place’ and ‘time’ (Bakhtin 1986;1981). These narratives therefore do not take place in isolation but are located within an ‘intersubjective’ reality (Bakhtin 1981), informed by the immediate and distant ‘discourses’ about British/Pakistani/Muslim/female/students. In understanding these ‘narratives’ within such ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ the Bakhtinian notion of ‘dialogics’ provides an important point of entry, where ‘[t]he living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance, it cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue’ (1981:276). Such ‘dialogics’ suggest that social beings by existing in ‘communities’ share ‘common interests…a vocabulary of words and concepts, whose meanings’ continue to evolve, constantly shaped through the interaction of social beings with each other (Little et al 2003:74). These ‘communities’ of ‘discourse’ are ‘fluid’ rather than ‘static’ bounded entities (see Kamberelis 2001). The Bakhtinian notion of ‘dialogics’ goes beyond dialogue to include the ‘context’ in which a particular ‘utterance’ takes place, ‘the intersection of two or more ‘contexts’ in an utterance, that is, the interaction of the social and historical contexts of’ what he calls ‘heteroglossia’, or ‘the languages themselves’ which convey implicit and explicit
meanings through social interactions (Vice 1997:45, discussing Hirschlop 1989 11,16; and 20). Individuals do not belong to just one such ‘community’ but are often associated to and speak the language of multiple ‘discourse’ ‘communities.’ For Bakhtin ‘discourse…is language in its concrete living totality and not language as the specific object of linguists, something arrived at through a completely legitimate and necessary abstraction from various aspects of the concrete life of the word’ (Bakhtin 1984:181). The ‘concrete life of the word’ is situated in a specific place and time, yet influenced by a historical and contemporary ‘discourse’ that exists within the immediate and distant reality of the subject in question. Despite the dominance of a particular ‘discourse’ individuals through their various contexts and ‘communities’ continue to engage in a ‘dialectic,’ influencing and being influenced by different ‘discourses.’ For the participants in this research, these ‘communities’ include the ethnic ‘Pakistani’, the religious ‘Muslim’, and the national ‘British’, to a more localised ‘community’ of university students, of Muslim students, Pakistani students, female students, linked to the more general ‘community’ of citizens and social beings interacting and intersecting with each other, social beings who may belong to similar or different ‘communities’ of ‘discourse’ (Little et al 2003; Bakhtin 1981; 1984). The constant intersection of individuals within and across such ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ and the prevalence of different meanings and expressions, results in the ‘Bakhtinian’ ‘heteroglossia’ of reality, where multiple meanings intersect, being shaped by each other (Bakhtin 1981). Unlike the more pervasive Foucauldian ‘discourse’ (1972) that consumes the individual, the Bakhtinian ‘discourse’ ‘community’ by focusing on various ‘communities’ that inform the realities of participants, provides a lens with which to explore the dynamics at the
grassroots that both informs and are influenced by the more dominant ‘discourse’ of identity and belonging (also see Killingsworth 1992). Exploring the relationship of the individual with fellow individuals is important where ‘[a] fully participa-tive life requires an engaged and embodied—in a word, dialogical—relation to the other, and to the world at large, mainly because the architectonic value of my embodied self can only be affirmed in and through my relation to a concrete other’ (Gardiner 2004:33). The narratives that are (re)presented in Chapters 5-7 take place within such ‘communities’ of ‘discourse’ where individuals belonging to a variety of such ‘communities’ intersect, causing at times friction in the form of an Islamophobic encounter, while at other times promoting understanding through dialogue that draws on and challenges contemporary meanings of being Muslim, and stereotypes that exist beyond the university yet influence student experiences. Hence, these narratives are shaped by personal association of individuals to their various ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ that range from the more ‘local’ to a broader socio-political ‘public realm’ (see Little et al 2003; Killingsworth 1992; Bakhtin 1981). Gardiner (2004:32) captures the ‘Bakhtinian’ nature of ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ when he observes ‘[w]hat Bakhtin is striving to outline … is a phenomenology of ‘practical doing’, one that focuses on our incarnated activities within the lifeworld. Only if we think and act in a ‘participative’ fashion, in tune with the rhythms and tex-tures of everyday life, can we be wholly answerable for our actions, in the sense that we are conscious of and can actively respond to their existential and ethical implications… And a crucial aspect of answerability involves an unconditional recognition of otherness, because for Bakhtin no genuinely moral philosophy can be formulated outside the ‘contraposition’ of self and other.’ This ‘contraposition’ is
captured in the participant narratives, where their interaction in different arenas of social and private life evoke narratives about the British, Muslim and Pakistani identity that is located within a broader history of the Muslim/Pakistani immigrant, and a contemporary ‘discourse’ of the Muslim/Pakistani terrorist.

In exploring the historical narrative that informs such interactions and conversations the chapter presents a brief history of racism, particularly with respect to ‘coloured’ and Muslim immigrants. The chapter outlines important historical encounters between the host community/state and the ‘coloured’ and Muslim immigrant populations, highlighting policy initiatives from immigration and race relations acts, to questions of education, discrimination and identity, events that are important in both the evolution of Islamophobia within Britain, as well as the eventual politicization of the Muslim identity as witnessed in the Rushdie affair of the 1980s. The discussion further draws on politics of identity and multiculturalism, integral in understanding Islamophobia, and the narrative of Britishness, that despite attempting to achieve tolerance of immigrants still suffers from prejudice and discrimination against those labelled as ‘outsiders’, in particular Muslims.

II. Islamophobia: A Racialised Phenomenon

What is the meaning of Islamophobia and where did it originate? There is both a disagreement over the exact origins of the term Islamophobia, and what it truly means (See Bleich 2011; Esposito and Kalin 2011; Sayyid 2010; Allen 2010a; Fekete 2009). The term has been traced as far back as the early twentieth century in a French article ‘by Etienne Dinet and Slima Ben Ibrahim’ who ‘wrote “accès de délire islamophobe”’.

14 Almost translating into ‘Islamophobic’ ‘delirium’ (Correard and Grundy 1995:168)
though the meaning of the term was different from the present day reference to discrimination (Taras, 2012; Allen 2010b:15). However, modern day Islamophobia as understood in the UK may have ‘grassroots in the ‘London Borough of Brent in the early 1980s, where a distinct anti-Muslim prejudice was first being identified almost simultaneously with the emergence of a distinct ‘British Muslim’ identity’ (Allen 2010b:16). While this Muslim identity will be explored in the section on multiculturalism, the term Islamophobia gained institutional importance as a result of the Runnymede Trust. Mentioned in the 1994 Report ‘A Very Light Sleeper’ that ‘not only called for the enquiry which led on to the publication of the…landmark report’ ‘Islamophobia A Challenge for Us All,’ ‘but also already used the term Islamophobia in its conclusion…described as ‘anti-Muslim prejudice,’ and as another form of racism’ (Sayyid 2010:7 discussing the Runnymede Trust 1994).

The Runnymede Trust defines Islamophobia as ‘unfounded hostility towards Islam’, the result of certain ‘closed views’ about Islam (The Runnymede Trust 1997:4-5).\(^\text{15}\) While the Runnymede Trust report was groundbreaking in providing an institutionalized definition of Islamophobia, it was limited to the extent that it gave a generic guidance for ‘practitioners working with Muslims’ (Tyrer 2003:56). It further failed to take into consideration the complexities of Islamophobia, where discrimination may not be as straightforward as problems in gaining employment, or experiencing direct verbal or physical abuse. It also overlooked the historical context of colonialism and imperialism,

\(^{15}\text{These closed views include the following: Islam is viewed as ‘monolithic...static...unresponsive to new realities’; It is a ‘separate’ religion, having nothing in common with or completely opposite to other ‘cultures’; it is viewed as ‘inferior to the West - barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist’; Islam is further viewed as an ‘enemy’ which promotes violence; is ‘manipulative’ to be used for the promotion of ‘political or military advantage,’ rather than a religion in its own right; any ‘criticism’ put forward by Islam about the West is ‘rejected’ rather than ‘debated’; ‘hostility’ towards the religion is used as a justification for ‘discriminatory’ and exclusionary practices against the followers of this faith; Such hostility and discrimination is naturalized, as part of the norm rather than criticized (The Runnymede Trust 1997:5).}
that located the Muslim within Britain’s imperialist conquest, a fact that further
problematizes a historical narrative around the British Muslim subject and belonging,
post Empire.\textsuperscript{16} Examples not just from Britain but other countries around Europe and the
US testify to the relevance of this historical narrative.

In September 2012, 10 New York subways displayed an advertisement stating ‘In Any
War Between the Civilized Man and the Savage, Support the Civilized Man. Support
Israel Defeat Jihad’ (Beaumont 2012; Dabashi 24/09/2012; See Appendix 1-C). This
advertisement caused an outrage for its Islamophobic implications, with Muslims
depicted as ‘savages,’ but more importantly highlighted precisely the ideological battle
that Sayyid (2010) and others (Kumar 2012; Lyons 2012; Zebiri 2011; Tyrer 2010;
Cesari 2010b; Allen 2010a; Fekete 2009) link to the phenomenon of Islamophobia, where
the Orientalist ‘tropes’ of ‘civilized’ and ‘savage’ continue to shape the debate on
Muslims and the West (see Dabashi 24/09/2012). Similar rhetoric was also repeated with
the ‘Ground Zero mosque’ controversy, when a ‘Muslim group’ planning to build a
‘cultural centre and mosque near Ground Zero’ encountered opposition, with ‘Pastor
Terry Jones’ announcing a plan to burn the Quran, the Muslim holy book, in protest
(Rohrer 25/08/2010, Also see See Lambert and Githens-Mazer 2011). In Switzerland, the
ban on minarets in 2009 echoed similar sentiments. As the Swiss People’s Party
representative ‘Martin Baltisser’ observed, “‘[t]his was a vote against minarets as
symbols of Islamic power’” (BBC News 29/11/2009). In Germany, the attitude of the
public towards Muslims could be gauged by the response to a 2010 book by the ‘then-
Bundesbank member Thilo Sarrazin…in which he accused Muslim immigrants of

\textsuperscript{16} However, the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia followed up on the Runnymede Trust
report in 2004 highlighting how the events of 9/11 and the British government’s subsequent response had
further contributed to negative attitudes towards Muslims.
lowering the intelligence of German society’ (Bowen 2012:22). While the book was criticized and Sarrazin was ‘dismissed from his central bank position, the book proved popular’ with ‘one poll’ showing ‘a third of Germans believed that the country was “overrun by foreigners”’ (ibid:22-23). The ‘niqab ban’ in France and Belgium further testifies to the fear of a ‘foreign’ culture invading the landscape of modernity. Carrying the civilizing mission further, the niqab in France was banned in public, to protect its ““republican values” of secularism in the public space’ as ‘France’s Muslims, immigrants and French-born, must accept French norms,’ and to protect ‘Muslim women from religious extremism’ by giving ‘them freedom of choice, rather than taking it away’ (Erlanger and Camus 01/09/2012; also see Jouili 2009; Freedman 2004; Wieviorka, 1996). The niqab in this instance was not considered part of that choice, where a woman wearing a niqab is instantly identified with an extremist religion, in need of being protected and saved. Belgium also suffers from this saviour complex where the niqab is perceived as ‘a symbol of the oppression of women’ (BBC News 23/07/2011). Said in an interview with Eleanor Wachtel observed ‘the rather stubborn continuity between European views of Islam in the twelfth century and European views of Islam in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries: they simply don’t change,’ (Wachtel interviewing Said 2001:238) views that have continued into the twenty first century. The Orient is defined as ‘Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies,’ which also recurs as ‘the Other,’ within the European imagination, where Orientalism is a cultural and ideological representation of this ‘Other’, that has been historically supported by ‘institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles’ (Said 2003:1-2). With Muslims and Islam situated within this
Orientalist narrative through encounters during the Crusades to colonialism and Imperialism, the imagery of a backward and repressive Islam, of violent Muslims continues to be invoked (See Maira 2011:110; Gest 2010; Fekete 2009). The events of 9/11 further reinforced these violent stereotypes, where the ‘fear and hostility’ that was evoked by ‘the earliest European scholars of Islam’ continues, ‘both in scholarly and non-scholarly attention to an Islam … viewed as belonging to a part of the world – the Orient – counterposed imaginatively, geographically, and historically against Europe and the West’ (Said 2003:344). The Muslim community hence in its appearance and mannerism physically manifests an alien presence in the West, perceived as a challenge to Western values of liberalism and enlightenment.

This Orientalist gaze is important in exploring the phenomenon of Islamophobia. By drawing on an essentialized narrative of Muslims, discrimination and racism moves beyond the ‘colour’ of the skin, and targets ‘culture’, leading to a form of ‘cultural racism’ or ‘new racism’ (Modood 2005:27 discussing Barker 1981, Gordon and Klug 1986 and Gilroy 1987). As Ali (2004:79) observes, ‘the “new racism” of the late 1980s was as likely to be based on ethnic and cultural differences as it was on skin color, and the work of academics was to understand the ways in which ethnicities themselves became racialised’ (Ali discussing Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). The changing nature of racism illustrates how the concept is not a static phenomenon, but also changes with time. While a history of race and racism is beyond the scope of this thesis, the works of Hannaford and others (Miles 1993; 2002; Banton 1998; Yeboah 1988; Fredrickson 1988; Gilroy 1987) are nonetheless important in tracing the different meanings of race and racism across different moments in history. Hannaford (1996) for example demonstrates
how race was mostly ‘absent’ during the ancient Greek and Roman era, and only entered ‘Western languages,’ around ‘1619’ with ‘the expulsion of the Jews and Moors from Spain’ and the entry of the ‘black’ slave in the Americas (1996:14, 147). Mosse (1978:2) further traces this evolution from eighteenth century Enlightenment with its struggle to ‘define man’s place in nature,’ and classify the ‘human race’, to the ‘white’ man’s interaction with the colonialist ‘coloured’ subject, and the Nazi obsession with the ‘Aryan’ race (1978:32-50). Furthermore, Rana (2007) illustrates how religion was also an essential feature within the otherization narrative of racism. Rana (2007) provides an exploration of anti-Muslim racism in the US, demonstrating how present-day notion of racism that privileges ‘biological difference as natural difference without including religion,’ was a result of what is termed ‘modern racism’, that displaced religion (2007:153). Religion continued to be a factor in the Otherization process of the ‘White’ masters and Muslim ‘African’ slaves as early as the ‘fifteenth and sixteenth century,’ and continued in the twentieth century with movements like the ‘Nation of Islam,’ under ‘Elijah Muhammad’ who believed that ‘the very nature of the black man is a Muslim’ (ibid:155-156). Thus, whether it is the ‘Moors’ or ‘Arabs’ of the Crusades, or the slaves of the Americas, religion historically has been a factor in the development of a narrative on racism. Hence, in understanding Islamophobia in the contemporary socio-political British context the ‘chameleon-like nature of racism,’ that is ‘capable of changing its appearance, while retaining the same essence,’ needs to be considered (Brown 2000:86). However, while for Brown racism and Islamophobia might be similar yet have distinct features, in conceptualizing Islamophobia as a ‘racialisation of Muslims’ (Meer and Modood 2010:83), these similarities become more prominent. The ‘racialisation’
narrative might be problematic for critics like Miles (2002) who define ‘racialisation’ as ‘those instances where social relations between people’ are ‘structured by the signification of human biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social collectivities’ (2002:75, Italics added by me). Muslims in such a context could not be defined as a racialised group because they are not subject to ‘biological’ reductionism, yet as Sayyid (2010:13) observes ‘[r]acialised bodies were never exclusively biological; they were marked at the same time as religion, culture, history, and territories were marked and used to group socially fabricated distinctions between Europeanness and non-Europeanness’ (Also see Amin 2009; 2010). This particularly holds true in situations where white converts experience Islamophobia who stand out because of their Muslim appearance (Allen 2010a; Afshar et al 2005; Franks 2000). An exploration of Islamophobia therefore requires a two-way process that overcomes this restrictive understanding of race, by incorporating not just biology, but also culture and religion, where cultural tropes of Islam are racialised in a similar mode as biological characteristics of non-White races. Drawing on a form of ‘cultural racism’ especially within Europe, the nature of ‘antipathy’ to Muslims, is not just the result of the assumption of their inferiority but also the perception that they represent ‘an alien culture’ or belief system (Modood 2005:11). Such ‘[r]acialisation does not depend on biology to produce ‘races’; rather it sees the construction of collective identities as a product of social processes’ (Sayyid 2010:14). With symbols like the ‘hijab’ and ‘niqab’ reduced to a form of oppression, where agency and choice are removed from the purview of the Muslim woman, where a bearded man who prays five times in a mosque is reduced to the category of a fundamentalist, Muslims through sociological traits, in place of mere
biology are reduced to a ‘racialised’ group. Such categories of the fundamentalist/moderate encourage a form of ‘racialised governance’ (Tyrer 2010), where Muslims are confined to artificial categories by the state and media. This narrative as echoed in the ‘political arena, on the Internet, on “talk” radio, in the so-called quality press, and, all too frequently, in the academy,’ includes the notion of a violent ‘Islam,’ that is ‘upheld by coercion and force,’ with ‘Muslims’ viewed as ‘irrational and backwards, “medieval,” and fearful of modernity… sexually perverse, either lascivious polygamists or repressive misogynists or both…antidemocratic’ who ‘despise Western notions of civic freedoms…’ (Lyons 2012:3).

While the historical interaction through colonialism and imperialism with Muslims is considered an important component of Islamophobia, as it exists today, other scholars such as Halliday (2002) instead believe that modern day discrimination against Muslims has less to do with this historical perception but more a result of anti-immigration sentiments, taking an ‘anti-Muslim’ form. For Halliday (2002) the term ‘Islamophobia’ is flawed. The problem is anti-Muslim discrimination, not Islam, whereby ‘...anti-Muslimism is a semi-ideology...a body of ideas that, like gender and racial prejudice, is often articulated with others...often overlaps with forms of ethnic prejudice...’ (Halliday 2002:87-88). Islamophobia is further problematic when any critique of Islam, irrespective of its relevance is considered Islamophobic, thus limiting the possibility of a constructive dialogue with Muslims. In response to such criticism, Tariq Modood in his interview explains the difference between constructive criticism and Islamophobia,

‘I think this is always the case against any kind of exclusionary or prejudicial ‘ism’ that you don’t want to block the possibility of criticism against a group of people or a way of thinking or politics and so on. So I don’t call something Islamophobic just because people are criticizing Muslims about something. But how to formulate the
distinction, I suppose I would say that criticism should have a context where dialogue is possible, that criticism should be specific rather than just dismissing Muslims or Islam as a whole and that there should be scope for two way criticisms and scope for mutual learning. So Islamophobia is much more likely to take place where people think we are in the right and you lot are in the wrong, that almost creates a certain kind of racialising perspective, though if people say look there are certain practices that we are seeing that seem to us as inconsistent with democratic freedom or with sexual equality, they should be able to say this but hopefully there should be scope for discussion rather than well we are right and you are wrong. So I think that kind of attitude of we are right and you are wrong. More generally Islamophobia is more likely when people have an Us/Them mentality. That there is a binary. There is one group of us and there is one group of them. And that there are a few good Muslims but on the whole they all have a kind of bad feature, whatever it is. I think those are the kind of characteristics of Islamophobia rather than critical discussion.’

(Interview with Professor Tariq Modood December 14, 2009)

Modood’s response is important in highlighting a distinction between constructive criticism of Islam and a prejudicial critique that evokes an Islamophobic sentiment. Meer and Modood (2010) further define Islamophobia as a racist discourse, which builds on the notion of Us versus Them, creating a binary opposition of the law-abiding citizen and the violent Muslim extremist. It is also noteworthy that while the attacks against Muslims are an outcome of their identity as a religious group, Muslims themselves view these attacks not just on them as individuals but on Islam, as demonstrated by the reaction to the Rushdie affair in the 1980s, the murder of Theo van Gogh, the Dutch film-maker, the Danish cartoon controversy, the New York subway advertisement and the amateur film ‘Innocence of Muslims.’

17 The Rushdie Affair: ‘In September 1988 Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses was published, and various passages relating to Prophet Muhammad, his wives, and the Qur’an caused deep offense to many Muslims who mobilized, especially in India, Pakistan, Britain, and South Africa, to have it banned’ Iran’s ‘Ayotollah Khomeini’ issued ‘a religious edict, a fatwa, proclaiming that it was the duty of all Muslims who have the opportunity to kill the author and publishers,’ resulting in ‘an international crisis’ (Modood 2005:214). Theo van Gogh was murdered for making an anti Muslim film called ‘Submission.’ (BBC News 02/11/2004). Danish cartoon controversy: Outrage across the Muslim world on publication of ‘satirical drawings of the prophet Muhammad’ (MacAskill et al 04/02/2006). The cartoonist was also attacked by a Muslim ‘extremist’ (BBC News 02/01/2010). ‘Innocence of Muslims’ is an amateur film about the Prophet Muhammad that depicts him as ‘a womanizer, religious fraud and child molester’ (The Guardian 02/01/2010).
While Islamophobia draws on such binary constructions, it may also operate in other less direct ways, through what Tyrer (2010) calls ‘degrees of alterity.’ Building on Deleuze and Guattari (2004) he argues that while one cannot ‘…deny the persistence, recoding and recirculation of older modes of racist discourse, it is the dominant form taken by Islamophobia’ that ‘locates Muslims as indeterminate people, racialising them on the basis of degrees of difference from the white male universal self, and even racialising them as incompletely racialised – that is, as purely religious – subjects’ (Tyrer 2010:104; Also see Tyrer and Sayyid 2012). Therefore, racism does not simply function in clear opposition to the ‘White-Man’ but rather is determined in line with ‘degree of deviance’ which are ‘sometimes’ tolerated ‘at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto,’ while at other points simply erased, again dependent on the ‘White-Man,’ who controls how other groups are defined at different points in time (Deleuze and Guattari 2004:197-98 as cited by Tyrer 2010:105). However, while Tyrer’s observation is important to understand how racism operates particularly with respect to Islamophobia, the old ‘tropes’ of ‘civilized’ vs. barbaric are just as relevant in today’s context as demonstrated in the New York subway advertisement campaign against Jihad at the start of this section (Beaumont 2012; Dabashi 24/09/2012; See Appendix 1-C). When and how they are invoked determines the level of what Tyrer (2010) calls ‘alterity’, but the jargon of media and state actors continue to regurgitate the age old imperialist rhetoric.

Therefore, in this research Islamophobia is explored within the context of race and ‘racialisation,’ which rejects ‘Islam, Muslim groups and Muslim individuals on the basis

28/09/2012). ‘[A] 14-minute trailer’ of the film, released on ‘YouTube’ resulted in protest and riots across the Middle East and South Asia, with people including the ‘US Ambassador’ to Libya being ‘killed’ (Flaccus 13/09/2012).
of prejudice and stereotypes,’ having ‘emotional, cognitive, evaluative as well as action-oriented elements (e.g. discrimination, violence)’ (Helbling 2012:5 discussing Stolz 2005:548). It further becomes a form of ‘cultural racism,’ moving beyond just biology to dismiss and discriminate against a group based on a cultural and religious belief system that is deemed inferior and unworthy within the 21st century (Modood 2005, 2006, Interview December 14, 2009). Given the relevance of this intersection of race and religion, another form of discrimination ant-Semitism also needs to be explored to further understand how ‘cultural racism’ functions, hence providing a deeper understanding of how Islamophobia exists in modern British society.

a. Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism: Comparable entities or distinct realities?

Comparing Anti-Semitism to a phenomenon like Islamophobia has generated more debate and disagreement. While some academics explain how Anti-Semitism is a form of cultural racism similar to Islamophobia, others argue that given the distinct nature of immigration and settlement amongst the Jewish community, any comparison would be misleading (Achinger 2012; Lyons 2012; Werbner 2012; Allen 2010a; Joppke 2009a; Meer and Noorani 2008). However, despite the ongoing debate, a discussion on religious discrimination as a form of ‘cultural racism’ would be incomplete without exploring the similarities and distinctions between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.

For the purpose of defining Anti-Semitism, the Runnymede Trust that institutionalized Islamophobia in 1997, also described Anti-Semitism in its 1994 Report, A Very Light Sleeper. According to the Runnymede Trust ‘‘antisemitism’ was first used in 1879 by the German agitator, Wilhelm Marr, to designate the contemporary campaigns against Jews throughout Europe’’ (Runnymede Commission on Antisemitism 1994:23). Distinguishing
between ‘anti-Judaism, i.e. hostility to the beliefs and practices of the Jewish religion; antisemitic racism, i.e. hostility to Jews on the assumption that they constitute a separate ‘race’;’ and ‘anti-Zionism, i.e. hostility towards the expression of Jewish national identity which finds its focus in the state of Israel’ (ibid), the Runnymede Trust highlighted the existing nature of discrimination against Jews in Europe. While all three are ‘dimensions of anti-Semitism,’ its ‘relationship with racism is rather complicated,’ whereby ‘anti-Semitism shares some overlapping features with racism but cannot be subsumed into it’ (Sayyid 2010:9). In comparing this definition to Islamophobia, Sayyid (2010) highlights the Runnymede Trust’s inability to give Islamophobia similar acknowledgement since under the ‘anti-racism laws…Jews’ were considered both a ‘religious’ and ‘ethnic’ group, whereas Muslims continued to be viewed as a religious group, thereby confining ‘Islamophobia’ to ‘a serious issue of social injustice’ (2010:14). However, if Muslims are to be considered a ‘racialised group’ as demonstrated in the preceding discussion, what needs to be examined is whether a comparison between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia will further develop an understanding of Islamophobia.

For Rabbi Firestone (2010) Jews and Muslims have been ‘hated and feared for centuries’, with ‘fantasies of Jewish and Muslim barbarity and evil…deeply embedded in Western culture and remain at all times a latent influence on the perceptions and perspectives of Westerners’ (2010:49). Hence, sharing such a historical link of being outsiders the phenomena of Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have more in common, than is often recognized. Meer and Noorani (2008) further argue that ‘anti-Semitism is cultural racism’s prototype’ (2008:198 citing Balibar 1991:17). While they highlight the different nature of discrimination experienced by the two groups, often dependent on the
exceedingly distinct manner of settlement and immigration, ‘there is’ nonetheless ‘some overlap between the manner in which recently arrived Jews were racialised as ‘undemocratic’ with the way in which ‘funda-mentalista Muslims are feared…today’ (ibid:212). However, one important distinction in any comparison between the Muslims and Jews is the historical location of the two with respect to ‘Christendom’. Unlike the Muslims, the Jewish community despite being ‘regular targets of persecution, discrimination, and organized violence across medieval Europe, … retained a necessary place in Christian theology and exegesis and thus retained a legitimate, if problematic, place in Western thought and society’ (Lyons 2012:14). Furthermore, the nature of the Jewish problem was different from the Muslim problem, whereby ‘strong antisemitic currents in most European countries were not concerned with visible Jewish differences, but…with the fact that Jewish assimilation had been all-too successful. The most important power ascribed to Jews was typically not the power of explosives but the secret power of money and manipulation’ (Achinger 2012:242). However, while ‘assimilated’ Jews were treated differently from the treatment that Muslims receive in present day Britain and Europe, the events of ‘1860’ with ‘anarchist uprisings and bombings throughout Europe’ and the ‘bombing of Greenwich Observatory in 1894 – described…as an ‘international terrorist outrage,’’ shows how the treatment of the ‘recently arrived East End Jews’ is similar to the Muslim immigrant of today (Meer and Noorani 2008:212). Hence, ‘long before the ‘Londonistan’ (Phillips, 2006) thesis characterised the capital as a hot-bed of ‘Islamic terrorists’, it was the recently arrived East End Jews who were said to pose the threat of politically-motivated radical violence’ (ibid). The reaction to different groups within the Jewish community, is similar to the
way different groups within Muslims are accepted, tolerated or condemned, be they the fundamentalist or moderates. The comparison between the two forms of discrimination is therefore important in highlighting the construction of ‘enemies’ and outsiders within the Centre’s imagination. Both the Muslim and the Jew represent ‘disavowed aspects of Western society,’ where ‘the Muslim ‘other’ in contrast to earlier images of the racialised colonial ‘other’, and apparently closer to anti-Semitic images of the Jew is an ‘enemy within’, epitomised in the Islamist terrorist who has been brought up in Bradford or studies in Berlin and who can strike out against the society that surrounds him at any moment’ (Achinger 2012:253-254). While such a comparison provides insights into the workings of ‘cultural racism,’ the phenomenon of racism in Britain also needs to be explored in relation to the more specific ‘coloured’ immigrants of the 1950s and 60s. This history provides the principal backdrop to the eventual emergence of a politicized British Muslim identity in the 1980s.

III. Race and Racism in Britain: From the 1940-50s to the Muslim Awakening

The history of ‘coloured’ immigration to the United Kingdom entails narratives from the Imperial Centre to colonial governments, from legislative bodies to labour unions, with race riots at the grass roots between ‘coloured’ and ‘White’ communities. However, given the scope of this research, this section will highlight important incidents within this history of ‘non-White’ immigration to the UK that is crucial in providing a context to the emerging Muslim identity. In particular, emphasis will be on the South Asian and Pakistani immigrants. It is worth highlighting that this section does not aim to provide a detailed account of the immigration process of all ‘coloured’ immigrants, nor does it
include all the Cabinet discussion and debates, ministerial disagreements and policies by both the Labour and the Conservative governments\textsuperscript{18}. Instead, the section draws on the defining points in the history of ‘coloured immigration’ in relation to Muslims and South Asians as highlighted within the literature on race, history and sociology in Britain, to build a narrative around the question of racism, Islamophobia and ‘non-White’ immigration in the United Kingdom.

The entry of ‘coloured’ immigrants in 1950s was a defining point in the political and racial landscape of Britain. Large-scale migration issues up to the 1950s had primarily concerned white immigrants, from the ‘Irish’ to the ‘Jews’ ‘from Eastern Europe’ (Solomos 2003:39). However, Britain’s encounter with non-White immigrants and the policies that resulted from them, for both immigration and race relations, set the tone for both race and multiculturalism that eventually became central in discussions of Britishness and immigration.

The ‘problem of race’ that was signalled in the 1940s and 50s related to a fear of the prevalent status quo being disrupted. While ‘Britain, with its English national core, had adhered to a “civic” model of nationhood,’ formed through an internal ‘struggle against Catholicism and absolute monarchy, with “liberty” as core value…’ the narrative changed drastically after the Second World War and the collapse of the Empire (Joppke 1996:477; also see Grube 2011). The ‘non-white’ community that was restricted to the colonies had been viewed as ‘…irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, “different”’, while the Self was defined as ‘rational, virtuous, mature, “normal”’ (Said 2003:40). The

migration of the Orientalized Other of the colonial imagination from the periphery to the Centre challenged this sense of Self and superiority that was associated with the civilizing mission of the Empire (Fekete 2009).

Prior to 1950s, ‘non-White’ immigrants had mostly been limited to a small number of seamen settled in port cities and towns of Britain (Solomos 2003; Spencer 1997; The Runnymede Trust 1997). Despite this small number, ‘the two most common responses to black immigration and settlement in this period were political debates on the need to control their arrival and calls for the repatriation of those who had already settled in Britain,’ as they were viewed as ‘seats of social problems’, and a possible threat to the British way of life (Solomos 2003:47)19. This is one of the reasons why the ‘coloured’ population, in particular, ‘Asian’ and ‘black’ communities ‘failed to grow significantly’ both prior to the first world war but also between the two ‘wars’ (Spencer 1997:19). British legislation in this period restricted the number of immigrants that were allowed to enter the country (Solomos and Back 1995:44). Through legislation such as the ‘Aliens’ ‘Order of 1920’ and the ‘Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order of 1925’ that controlled immigration of ‘coloured seamen’ who could be ‘refused permission to land by immigration officers’; ‘the British Shipping (Assistance) Act of 1935’ which resulted in large-scale unemployment of ‘coloured seamen’ as the government tried to encourage employment of a purely ‘British crew’ by providing ‘subsidies’ to companies that primarily employed such ‘British’ nationals, as well as restricting ‘travel documents’ issued by colonial administrators, all resulted in a policy that effectively tried to control ‘entry’ of ‘coloured’ immigrants to Britain (Spencer 1997:10-13; Also see Layton-Henry

19 Also see Solomos 2003 for a brief overview of how ‘race and racialism’ developed as a subject of academic curiosity in the early twentieth century.
The justification for such restrictions was the maintenance of law and order where in the past ‘inter-racial violence’\textsuperscript{20} was blamed on the presence of ‘coloured’ seamen despite the fact that they were attacked by the ‘white’ community (Spencer 1997:9). With the Second World War the demand for soldiers and seamen increased, yet the entry of ‘coloured’ personnel for these jobs often encountered resistance and hostility, (Layton-Henry 1992:23-25), with only ‘temporary’ settlement welcomed in Britain (Spencer 1997:13).

The Orientalist perception of an inferior ‘coloured’ race continued well into the Second World War and persisted. However, in the 1940s, migration was ‘facilitated’ by the ‘British Nationality Act 1948’ that gave ‘members of the British Commonwealth, Colonies and Protectorates…the status of British citizens and … full rights of access to settlement in the UK…’ and also ‘provided a comprehensive classification of…British citizenship, whether it may be citizenship by birth or descent, registration, naturalisation or incorporation of territory’ (Julios 2008:86).\textsuperscript{21} Thus, this ‘Act represents the legislative basis of the creation of ‘multicultural Britain’, even though it did not have this as its aim’ (Panayi 2010:63). As Britain’s colonies gained independence, the movement of communities from the Commonwealth became more difficult to control, with ‘independent and self-governing territories’ making ‘decisions which affected migration according to their own – rather than London’s – interests’ (Spencer 1997:22).\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20} Such as the incident of 1919 in various parts of Britain that left ‘five’ dead and several seriously injured (Spencer 1997:9).

\textsuperscript{21} This piece of legislation is important in both opening the gateway for 1950s migration from the Commonwealth as well as providing and limiting the ‘framework’ for future legislators in addressing the problem of immigration (Julios 2008:86) For more on the chronology of Immigration and Race Acts see Cook and Stevenson 1996:144-147.

\textsuperscript{22} Meer (2010) explains how ‘the work of Michael Banton (1955; 1959; 1967), Ruth Glass (1960), Shelia Patterson (1965; 1969) and E.J.B. Rose (1969)…involved in the then government-sponsored Institute of
The British state and society struggled in accommodating these immigrants within its national narrative (Reeves 1983). ‘In the 1950s, “no blacks, no dogs” signs were no rare sight in houses and shop windows across Britain’ (Joppke 1996:478). As Brown (2006) observes ‘being ethnically Caucasian, having roots in one of the regions of the country…sharing a Christian, and mainly Protestant, culture even if individuals were not personally believers, and bearing a proud political heritage symbolised by the monarchy,’ were the primary characteristics of ‘being British’ ‘in the 1950s and 1960s’ (2006:119). Yet, as Britain took a ‘position of leadership in the British Commonwealth of Nations, a multi-racial institution designed to retain ex-colonies within a web of British influence,’ the Centre was unable and unwilling to formulate an immigration policy that was directly hostile and discriminatory towards ‘coloured immigrants’, as this could damage existing and future business and financial relationship between Britain and its old colonies (Spencer 1997:82). ‘South Asian’ immigrants in this policy proved further problematic, as the immigrants entering Britain from South Asia were of a lower ‘quality,’ nor ‘as readily employable as West Indians’ and were ‘handicapped by their inability to speak English, by illiteracy and by poor physique’, which made ‘it impossible for them to take normal labouring jobs’ (ibid:92).23 Furthermore, the position and ‘place’ of ‘immigrant workers in the post-war period,’ within ‘the labour market, the housing market or other areas of social relations, was’ mostly ‘the lowest’ (Layton-Henry 1992:45). In particular, in the period between ‘1945-

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23 Solomos and Back in exploring immigration in their work ‘Race, Politics and Social Change’ give a more in-depth account of the city of Birmingham which ‘was a centre of migrant settlement from the earliest stages of post-war migration from the colonies’ (1995:43), and was also highlighted in political debates and speeches about race and belonging in Britain.
‘terms’ such as ‘assimilation’ and ‘racial conflict’ inundated ‘writings on the subject of ‘coloured’ immigration…’ with the government unsuccessfully trying a ‘policy of dispersal’ to encourage assimilation

(24) (Spencer 1997:43). ‘Conflicts’ that broke ‘out in Liverpool in August 1948,’ and in ‘Deptford and Birmingham the following year, and…disturbances at the Colonial Office in 1949,’ (ibid:44) reinforced the fear of unrest and anarchy in the Imperial capital. Race riots also started in 1958 in Notting Hill ‘triggered by 300-400 strong “Keep Britain White” mobs, many of them Teddy boys armed with iron bars, butcher’s knives and weighted leather belts,’ with ‘five black men lying unconscious on the first night’ alone (Travis 24/08/2002). The 1960s in particular ‘witnessed three developments’ which had an impact on ‘the way black people were perceived’ that included a ‘growth’ in political activism particularly amongst the youth, in terms of ‘student movement, the anti-Vietnam war movement’; a change within ‘trade unions which took up a more combative position in both traditional trade union struggles and in wider political issues’; and the problem in ‘Northern Ireland’ where the division between Protestants and Catholics aggravated, with ‘the British army…used directly as a mechanism of control’ (Solomos et al, 1982:20-21). These developments were important in creating a narrative around ‘the ‘enemy within’’, where the existence of Britishness, and British values were immediately seen to be under attack (ibid 20). This is clearly echoed in Enoch Powell’s speech, the Shadow Defence spokesman for the Conservative party, when he said in 1968 ‘[t]he Commonwealth immigrant came to Britain as a full citizen, to a country which knew no discrimination between one citizen and another…But while, to the immigrant, entry to this country was admission to privileges and

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24 The policy was unsuccessful because of lack of coordination between different government bodies, problems with ‘accommodation’ in different areas, as well as ‘the… reluctance of immigrants to move away’ from their communities (Spencer 1997:43)
opportunities eagerly sought, the impact upon the existing population was very different. For reasons which they could not comprehend, and in pursuance of a decision by default, on which they were never consulted, they found themselves made strangers in their own country…As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem to see "the River Tiber foaming with much blood" (Powell 2007; Also see Caldwell 2009; Saggar 1992:173-177). This problematic encounter with immigrants resulted in changes to the Immigration legislation. The ‘Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962’ which restricted ‘entry’ of individuals and their ‘families’ with ‘work permits’ was amended in 1968, to prevent ‘British Asians’ facing ‘expulsion’ from ‘Kenya’ from entering the UK (Joppke 1996:478). The 1968 and 1971 ‘Immigration Act’ limited ‘the right to reside in Britain to those’ with ‘at least one grandparent born in the country’ thereby excluding ‘non-whites while including the offspring of those who had recently emigrated’ (Panayi 2010:63). However, despite apprehension and fear of immigrants as highlighted by Enoch Powell, the government while adopting an exclusionary policy towards immigration tried to encourage more cohesiveness within Britain. The ‘Notting Hill riots’ in particular ‘shocked’ ‘the Labour party leadership,’ to such an extent ‘that the National Executive Committee was persuaded to oppose immigration controls and to support race relations legislation’ (Layton-Henry 1992:49). Thus ‘the 1965 Race Relations Act’ came into effect ‘that outlawed discrimination in specific places…while making it a criminal offence to deliberately stir up racial hatred…’ (Julios 2008:96). Even though ‘the 1965 Race Relations Act was’ more ‘declaratory rather than effective,’ it was important in demonstrating that ‘the Conservatives had accepted the principle of anti-discrimination legislation’ (Layton-Henry 1992:50)\(^25\). The Race Relations Act of 1968, was ‘[a]

\(^{25}\) With problems in implementing legislation against ‘discrimination’ after this Act came into effect, ‘[t]he
milestone in equality law...to promote inter-racial harmony through the promotion of universal fair treatment and equal opportunities,’ as well as recognizing ethnicity as a factor in discrimination (Julios 2008:97; Saggar 1992)\textsuperscript{26}. The government was also becoming aware of the importance of education in promoting better ‘race relation’ amongst Britain’s different racial groups. With ‘the Institute of Race Relations, founded in 1958’ aiming to encourage a program of ‘assimilation’ that would transform ‘‘dark strangers’ into brown or black Britons’, ‘the educational system’ was viewed as paramount for this transformation (Addison 2010:255). While an assimilationist strategy was employed in the 1960s, with greater tensions being witnessed amongst the different racial groups, especially in schools, the 1970s adopted a more ‘multicultural approach’, discussed later in the chapter (ibid:255-56). However, tensions between an internal policy to improve Race Relations and an external immigration policy that was often hostile to ‘coloured’ newcomers continued to pose a problem. ‘The Immigration Acts together with the Nationality Act of 1981’ divided ‘the world into patrials (mainly white) with rights normally associated with citizenship and non-patrials (mainly blacks) who are subject to immigration control, deportation and restrictions on taking employment’ (Brah 1987:45). Hence, the confusion between an Immigration legislation that sought to keep migrants out, and Race Relations legislation that aimed towards community building, resulted in an unclear narrative of Britishness and multiculturalism. Further to this

\textsuperscript{26} Resistance to racism was also beginning to take a more organized form through grass roots initiatives such as ‘the Campaign against Racial Discrimination’ started after ‘Martin Luther King’s’ ‘visit to Britain …in December 1964’ (Addison 2010:247).
confusion was added the problem of institutional ‘racism’, not only amongst ‘the immigration service,’ but also ‘the police’ and ‘the judiciary,’ (Panayi 2010:205) as well as ‘educational’ institutions (Brah 1996; Gill et al 1992).

a. Institutional Racism- From Law Enforcement to Education

While the immigration policies of the British government demonstrated a level of control in limiting the number of ‘coloured’ immigrants allowed to enter the Centre, racism against these immigrants was officially recognized after the Brixton riots in April 1981, a result of the ‘Scarman Inquiry.’ According to the BBC (25/11/1981) the inquiry illustrated how ‘racial disadvantage’ was ‘a fact of British life’. The Report highlighted ‘failures on the part of the police’ as a contributing factor to the riots, where ‘racial prejudice’ though not common still existed amongst ‘low ranking’ ‘police officers’ (Scarman 1981:64;73). This according to the report was further compounded by a greater feeling of ‘alienation’ and rejection from the ‘host society’ amongst the black population, facing discrimination in ‘employment’ and ‘housing’, as well as ‘education.’ (ibid: 15;102-108). While the report had its critics (see Profitt 1984: Rex 1984) it was nonetheless important in officially highlighting ‘institutional racism’ in Britain.

However, the existence of institutional racism was also implied in the surveys of the Policy Studies Institute (PSI). Modood and Berthoud (1997) illustrates how ‘the first survey in 1966’ showed ‘the inequalities between whites and the minorities were not just produced by face-to-face discrimination but were the outcome of structural disadvantages.’ (1997:1) These ‘structural disadvantages’ continued to influence not only employment and housing, but also educational access and performance (Also see

27 Clashes between black youth and the police, where ‘the petrol bomb was…used for the first time on the streets of Britain’ (Scarman 1981:1).
Modood 2004). Furthermore, the Scarman Inquiry briefly approached the subject of educational disadvantage, which was explored in detail in the Swann Report\textsuperscript{28}, also known as the ‘Education for All Report’ in 1985, with the aim to address the ‘changing’ educational needs of a ‘multiracial’ ‘British society’ (Swann 1985:xii). The children of ‘coloured’ immigrants who came to Britain in the 1950s and 60s, entered schools at a much later stage, ‘and at different periods of time, with Caribbeans being some years ahead of Asian migrants’ (Modood and May 2001:305-306). In particular, ‘African-Caribbean parents’ by the 1970s opted ‘to establish supplementary schools… for their children,’ as they were underperforming in mainstream schools, were often victims of discrimination, and the recognition of their own ‘identity and history’ was absent in the school curriculum (ibid: 306-307). The Swann report highlighted the underachievement of ‘ethnic minority’ pupils, where racial prejudice and discrimination was recognized as one of the many factors that had contributed to such under performance (Swann 1985:768). Through a multifaceted exploration of the education system, the Swann report underlined the diverse needs of a ‘multiracial’ but also a multi-religious student population. It further highlighted the limitations of The Education Act 1944 in its prescription on religion and ‘collective worship’ at schools, which was problematic in the context of a multi religious British society (ibid: 477; 497). The report directly addressed the religious needs of different groups, including ‘Muslims,’ suggesting the need to do ‘more…to respond to the ‘pastoral’ needs of Muslim pupils, to ensure that there is a real respect and understanding by both teachers and parents of each others concerns and that

\textsuperscript{28} Prior to Michael Swann, Anthony Rampton was assigned the task of investigating the underperformance of “West Indian” children by the “Labour Government” in 1977, where amongst another factors he highlighted ‘teacher racism,’ but amidst ‘controversy’ and criticism and a change in government, he was soon replaced by Michael Swann, with the eventual publication of the Swann Report (Modood and May 2001:307).
the demands of the school place no child in fundamental conflict with the requirements of his faith’ (ibid:773-774). Yet at the same time it was clear in stating that the schools could not ‘reinforce the values, beliefs and cultural identity which each child’ brought with him/her, as this would encourage ‘separatism’ (ibid:321-322). However, despite its critics (Bonnett and Carrington 2000; Williams 1986;) the report was important in uncovering the changing problems and demands of a multiethnic, multicultural Britain, and paved the way for a ‘multicultural’ approach to education. As Modood and May (2001:308) observe, in meeting the diverse needs of a ‘multi-racial’ and ‘multi-ethnic’ society, the report contributed ‘significantly to a high profile academic debate concerning the relative merits of multicultural and antiracist education.’

However, despite ‘the Swann Report’, the Thatcher government did not pass legislation addressing the educational problems of ‘multicultural’ Britain. Gillborn (1997) provides a detailed overview of the limitations of the Education Reform Act 1988 that completely ignored the ‘ethnic’ and racial question (1997:349-50). The specific concerns of ethnic minority students were highlighted again in the ‘Burnage report,’ an inquiry into the stabbing of 13 year old Ahmed Iqbal Ullah, at a Manchester high school by a fellow ‘white’ student ‘in 1986’ (Modood and May 2001:309; Gillborn 1997:350-51). The stabbing took place in a school that prided itself on its ‘anti-racist’ policies, which brought into question the meaning and application of anti-racism (Carrim 1995:25-27) Yet, as Gillborn (2005) observes the ‘race’ question was mostly absent within the education policies of Thatcher and her successor Major. Despite the problem of race and ethnicity highlighted in

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29 As Modood and May further explore, an antiracist agenda was unable to address the racial differences within, where South Asians were often grouped with being ‘black’, where specific ethnicities and in particular the religious identities were overlooked or ignored (Modood and May 2001:308-311, also see Bonnett and Carrington 1996).
academic and policy documents, including the 1994 ‘Fourth national Survey on Ethnic Minorities,’ which further exposed educational disadvantage in access and performance amongst different ethnic communities, the government did not directly tackle this problem (Modood and Berthoud 1997:3; 81; Also see Modood and Salt 2013). While Tony Blair’s government in 1997 more ‘openly’ discussed the problem of discrimination within the education system, it failed to systematically address this problem, instead providing ‘funding to a handful of minority ethnic schools on the basis of a distinctive religious identity…’ (Gillborn 2005:493; Also see Walford 2008). The problem of citizenship in a multi-cultural socio-political milieu was nonetheless recognized, where the education system through the introduction of citizenship education was one of the means through which the minorities could be incorporated within British identity (See Chitty 2009; Crick 1998; Demaine 1999; Epstein 1993). Despite, a growing awareness of the existence of institutional racism, government policies often fell short of addressing the grassroots concerns of students and parents. While improvements in accessing educational institutions and performance amongst a multi-racial student population was witnessed since 1985 through government and educational policies and initiatives, problems of underachievement and discrimination continued to persist at different levels whether ‘racial’, ‘religious’, ‘ethnic’, ‘class’ or ‘gendered’ (See Wakeling 2009; Khattab 2009; Bhopal 2008; Thompson 2008; Brooks 2008; Richardson 2008; Gittoes and Thompson 2007; Rothon 2007; University of York et al 2006; Tyrer and Ahmad 2006; Connor et al 2004; Shiner and Modood 2002; Bhattacharyya et al 2003; Dale et al 2002; Gayle et al 2002; Reay et al 2001; Dwyer 1999a; Leslie and Drinkwater 1999; Haw 1994).  

The relevance of faith schools have also come under the spotlight especially after the tragedies of 9/11.
Furthermore, institutional racism continued to be a problem in Britain, as highlighted in the Stephen Lawrence case, that resulted in the groundbreaking Macpherson report, which showed how the ‘police investigation’ of the murder of a ‘black’ young man, Stephen Lawrence was ‘marred by a combination of professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior officers’ (Macpherson 1999: 317). The report while exposing the existence of racism within the police force, further defined “institutional racism” as ‘the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people’ (Macpherson 1999:321). The report through a comprehensive exploration of the police force in the case of Stephen Lawrence, as well as through its clear definitions and recommendations was important in illustrating the presence of racism but also the need to collectively challenge racism in a multicultural British context. However, as with most policy documents, reports and legislation on race relations and racism, the Muslim question was never directly highlighted, with Muslims viewed solely as a religious group, unlike the ethnically religious Sikhs or Jewish community (Meer 2010). Yet, the Muslim identity of the South Asian or Pakistani community was indirectly mentioned particularly in the ‘parallel lives thesis’ by the Cantle report following the disturbances in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in 2001.  

and 7/7 (See Walford 2008; Bard 2007; Romain 2007; Chitty 2007; Hewer 2001; Osler and Hussain 1995).

31 ‘Oldham’ – ‘took place over three successive night in May and resulted in 86 police officers being injured’; ‘Burnley’ – ‘clashes between hundreds of white and Asian youths and widespread damage to
Bradford was especially highlighted in media reports because of the sheer scale of the rioting, though racial disturbances were not something new to the area. ‘The rise of right-wing politics during the 1970s and 1980s, the Honeyford affair (1980s) which centred on what were perceived to be racist remarks by a head teacher in Manningham on the lack of social integration and the adherence of cultural, religious and ethnic identities by Pakistanis,’ and reactions to ‘the Rushdie Affair,’ which will be discussed in the next section had brought Bradford into the media and public spotlight in the past (Sanghera and Thapar-Bjorkert 2008:546). Attempts to understand the reasons for the riots invoked issues of ‘citizenship’ and belonging, with the ‘Ouseley report’ suggesting the need to promote greater interaction and reinforce a stronger ‘citizenship’ agenda in schools and other institutions to generate cross cultural understanding and appreciation, and the ‘Cantle report’ arguing for ‘community cohesion’ (Hussain and Bagguley 2005; Ouseley 2001; Cantle 2001). Education as a means of community building was underlined in these reports, where the importance of citizenship education in promoting multicultural values was reinforced. However, as Meer notes the reports were at the same time critical of how ‘multiculturalism’ existed in Britain, accusing ‘Muslim communities’ of ‘self-segregation and adopting isolationist practices under the pretence of multiculturalism…’ (Meer 2010:26, also see Sales 2012). Such a response to the riots in 2001 while suggesting the need for ‘community cohesion’ and greater integration nonetheless ‘provided many influential commentators with the license, not always supported by the specific substance of each report, to critique Muslim distinctiveness in particular, multiculturalism in general’ (Meer 2010:26). Hence, the narrative on multiculturalism

property and businesses; ‘Bradford’ – ‘the worst of the violence erupted…when 1,000 young men brought widespread destruction to the Manningham area,’ with ‘120 police officer…injured’ (Casciani, 1/06/2006).
became problematic, where commentators continued to criticize the South Asian community, specifically the Pakistani and Muslim community for not integrating, where the narrative on citizenship and belonging was perceived as a problem, rather than the more ‘structural issues’ related to discrimination (Macey 2007: 166-168; Hussain and Bagguley 2005). The next section explores this problem of multiculturalism and citizenship, particularly for the Muslim and Pakistani population.

b. Multiculturalism, South Asians and The Muslim question

In accommodating immigrants, policies of different British governments had varied from ‘assimilation…to integration in the 1970s, which in turn was replaced by multicultural pluralism in the 1980s, leading to the celebration of difference and diversity under New Labour in the 1990s’ (Sardar and Ahmad 2012:2). ‘Assimilation’ had called for the immigrant community adopting and adapting to the host society, with little ‘change’ within the host society, where as integration according to ‘Roy Jenkins, the UK Home Secretary’ concerned ‘…equal opportunity’ accompanied ‘by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Modood 2013:42-43 discussing Jenkins, 1967:267). British ‘multiculturalism’ however, was ‘the struggle, the political mobilization…the policy and institutional outcomes, to the forms of accommodation in which ‘differences’ were ‘not eliminated or washed away but to some extent ‘recognized’’ (Modood 2010:244, also see Werbner and Modood 1997). This recognition became especially important by the 1980s where the ‘multi-racial character’ of British social life was an ‘irreversible’ fact, with the ‘black and Asian’ communities increasing from ‘1.2 million’ in ‘1971’ to ‘2.1 million’ within a decade (Addison 2010:365-367). However, as this section explores, the importance of ‘multiculturalism’ became a topic of debate,
particularly with the politicization of the Muslim identity, viewed as antagonistic to British values. This further became problematic with the emergence of ‘home-grown’ terrorism, as discussed in the next chapter, which led to academics questioning whether it was ‘the end of multiculturalism?’ (McGhee 2008; Also see Meer and Modood 2012; Modood 2009:204, 207; Allen 2007) Amartya Sen (2006:156) captures the essence of the debate on British multiculturalism when he asks ‘[d]oes the existence of a diversity of cultures, which might pass each other like ships in the night, count as a successful case of multiculturalism?’ a question that is evoked after the problematic encounter with British Muslims. As he further observes, ‘[t]here would be serious problems with the moral and social claims of multiculturalism if it were taken to insist that a person’s identity must be defined by his or her community or religion, overlooking all the other affiliations a person has (varying from language, class, and social relations to political views and civil roles), and through giving automatic priority to inherited religion or tradition over reflection and choice’ (Sen 2006:160). With the ‘New Labour’ policy on ‘difference and diversity’, and the post 7/7 emphasis on ‘community cohesion’ the relevance of multiculturalism’s place in British society is important to address. However, Professor Tariq Modood in his interview addresses the criticisms levied against multiculturalism and further highlights the possibility of a multicultural narrative, that can accommodate, respect and accept a multi-cultural Britain.

‘I think that despite some theoretical positions in multiculturalism which seem to be very open to cultural interaction across groups, across ways of thinking, across traditions in some places multiculturalism has been interpreted - as it were closer to the ground level - has been interpreted as endorsing to some extent or other cultural separatism. And I don’t think anyone actually said that they were endorsing this but they didn’t emphasize sharing, and coming together and dialogue, and belonging to something more than ones minority group sufficiently. So it was more an omission rather than that multiculturalism was against any of that. It was more that it wasn’t
said enough. So I think the community cohesion discourse is a way of saying some of those things that previously were unsaid or not said enough. So I see it as a rebalancing of multiculturalism, and an appropriate and necessary rebalancing except that it can go too far just as multiculturalism perhaps went too far and one way by emphasizing difference and not talking about commonality, so we can go too far in constantly talking about cohesion and integration and they then come to mean nothing more than assimilation. Because we are not at the same time talking about difference, so we need to talk about equality, difference and integration together and I think that’s what a good theory and politics of multiculturalism does, it talks about all those things together, emphasizing what we have in common as well as the differences that need to be recognized and respected, especially preventing of stigmatization on the basis of some actual or perceived difference...

(Interview with Professor Tariq Modood- December 14, 2009)

Multiculturalism, then in a discussion of race relations and racism in Britain, particularly with respect to South Asian and Muslim immigrants becomes important where it is ‘not just about positive minority identities but a positive vision of the whole remade so as to include the previously excluded or marginalised on the basis of equality and belonging’ (Modood 2013:46 discussing Modood, 2007; Also see Triandafyllidou et al 2012; Parekh, 2010; Taylor, 1994). It is also not a static concept but as Werbner highlights one that is historically evolving, the result of ‘repeatedly negotiating difference and dialogical citizenship in the context of national and international conflicts, often beyond the control of actors involved’ (Werbner 2005c: 764) This process is especially evident when situated within the historical encounter with Commonwealth immigrants entering the ‘Imperialist Centre,’ thus visibly altering the social make-up of British society. ‘Belonging’ in this context moves beyond a recognition to an acceptance of the minority community, where as Kureshi (2011:239) observes, a feeling of ‘not having to notice where you are, and, more importantly, not being seen as different, would happen…’ There is a sense of ‘commitment’ and ‘mutual trust’ as well as ‘a spirit of relaxed tolerance’ (Parekh 2011:68). However, the problem with ‘not being seen as different’ is
that Muslims in their religious demands, in their dress and habits are often perceived as different, where the right to practice Islam is often portrayed as antithetical to Britishness, as discussed in the following section.

c. Uncovering the British Muslim: From race to religion

The emergence of a politicized British Muslim identity is primarily located around 1988-89 with the riots against Salman Rushdie’s book ‘The Satanic Verses’, which included offensive ‘passages relating to Prophet Muhammad, his wives, and the Qur’an’ (Modood 2005:214). The book further resulted in Ayottullah Khomeini of Iran issuing a ‘fatwa’ condoning the killing of the author for committing blasphemy (Allen 2010a; Also see Githens-Mazer et al 2010; Modood 2005; Asad 1990). However, while scholars (Allen 2010a: 7; Modood 2005) have demonstrated how Muslims, particularly from South Asia were ‘largely’ apolitical in their religious views before the 1980s, there are instances of political activism which merits mention in this section (Also see Hussain and Bauguley 2005). As early as ‘1938’ for instance the small number of Muslims living in Britain and others across the colonies protested against the book ‘A short history of the world’, by H.G. Wells (Piscatori 1990). The book portrayed ‘an unflattering portrait of the Prophet’ that resulted in protests ‘in Kenya…Uganda…and London itself,’ while the British Imperialist authority was fearful of riots spreading to the Indian subcontinent, but given the limited scale of distribution of the book, the government was able to prevent any large-scale protests (Piscatori 1990:767-768). The event is important in demonstrating the potential of arousing a Muslim political conscience, particularly when a reverent figure such as the Prophet is attacked or ridiculed. Furthermore, as Addison (2010) observes Muslims in Britain were gradually becoming more publicly religious, with the number of
mosques growing from ‘thirteen’ in ‘1963’ to ‘338’ in ‘1985’ and ‘more than thousand’ in ‘1997’ (Addison 2010:374). These statistics provide an important backdrop in understanding the Muslim identity in Britain, where British Muslims while not politically active, were nonetheless publicly becoming more religiously conscious. However, the first time the ‘host’ society became aware of a Muslim presence in Britain ‘was during the OPEC oil boycott in the early 1970s’ when ‘all ‘Muslims’ became ‘Arabs’, and all ‘Arabs’ were shifty, dangerous people determined to undermine civilization’ (Sardar and Ahmad 2012:2). Despite this awareness of a Muslim presence, the British Muslim became particularly problematic after the Rushdie affair. This event was also important in politicizing the Muslim South Asian identity, as Modood (2005) observes, at the forefront of the anti Rushdie riots in Britain were Muslims of a ‘South Asian’ descent. For the host community, Muslims from the sub continent, particularly Pakistan were placed within the ‘regional’ South Asian identity, where in formal documents whether ‘equal opportunities questionnaires,’ or the ‘census,’ South Asians were grouped together (Panayi 2010:138; Also see Modood and Salt 2013:9). Their respective ethnic and religious identities were often overlooked or conflated within the ‘South Asian’ category. While ethnicity often draws on ‘language, culture, religion, nationality and a shared heritage…’ (Bagguley and Hussain 2005:216) ignoring the dynamics of ethnic and religious aspects of the

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32 The concept of ‘ethnicity’ is fluid in nature, where different characteristics are drawn upon across generations (Bagguley and Hussain 2005; Modood 2005; Also see Medina, 2004; Jacobson 1997; Hall 1996; Joppke 1996). Modood in his discussion on ethnicity describes ‘five dimensions of ethnic difference’ as relevant to ‘ethnic communities’ within Britain, that maybe useful in explaining the non ‘static’ nature of ethnic identity (Modood 2005:21-22). These include ‘cultural distinctiveness’ that draws on ‘norms and practices’ along with ‘religion’ particular to the group in question; ‘disproportionality’ in relation to ‘structural products of opportunities and obstacles’ which may further contribute to essentialist and stereotypical notions and ‘attitudes within…and towards the ‘group”; ‘strategy’ often a consequence of existing ‘circumstances’ that may promote a ‘group consciousness’; ‘creativity’ that implies group association with ‘some innovations’ that are particularly attributed to the group, and sometimes taken ‘up

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Pakistani identity, the ‘early Muslim communities thus became part of the hegemonic collective that was known as the ‘Asian’ community’ (Allen 2010a: 8, Hussain 2008). In homogenizing ‘people who trace their origins either directly to the Indian subcontinent (Indian, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh), or else indirectly through their ancestors who migrated to East and South Africa, Fiji, East and South-East Asia, the Caribbean and elsewhere,’ under the category of ‘South Asian’ was problematic as it failed to take into account the diversity that encompassed South Asia (Sahoo and Maharaj 2007:13). Echoing Shah (1998), such categorization served the objective of assisting the host state to ‘imagine’ and create groups for the practical purpose of ‘managing’ them (1998:51), whereby identity is often not just negotiated internally by a group, but also externally through the space under which it is constructed by the host state. Whether it is legislation or media, different actors are constantly interacting with a particular group to manage it. The ‘Asian’ identity was also part of this struggle between self-definition and state management. However, second and third generation South Asians moved more towards a ‘Muslim’ identity, being unable to completely identify with their ancestral home in South Asia. The Rushdie affair encouraged such a move towards a Muslim identity.

Resistance to racism before the ‘Rushdie affair’ was more so along the ‘coloured’ lens of ‘black power’ and politics, where the ‘South Asian’ community was mostly invisible. ‘Anti-racism in the seventies was only fought and only resisted in the community, in the localities, behind the slogan of a Black politics and the Black experience’ (Hall 2000:151; Also see Gilroy 1987). The problem with such slogans was that it excluded the experiences of Asians, which did not always fall in line with the Black anti-racism

by the mainstream; ‘identity’ whereby ‘membership of a group may carry affective meanings that may motivate or demotivate’ the group as a whole (Modood 2005:22).
movement (Modood 2005). The nature of racism, with Britain becoming ‘multiracial’ also became more complex, as ‘[t]he “No-Coloreds” racism was not unitary: racists always distinguished between the groups they rejected, and while the likelihood that some-one who discriminated against one group also discriminated against other groups probably was high, the culturally constructed grounds of rejection varied depending on the immigrant group’ (Modood 2005:34).

The ‘Rushdie Affair’ problematized the narrative of the British Self as it questioned the identity of the British Muslim, believed to have gone against the ‘liberal values’ of ‘freedom of speech and expression’ (Addison 2010:376). With ‘the Iranian leader, Ayatollah Ruhhola Khomeini’ issuing a ‘fatwa calling for Rushdie’s execution’ for committing blasphemy, and British Muslims protesting against Rushdie, the clash between religion and Western liberalism came to define this incident (ibid: 375-76; Also see Samad 1992). ‘Like the race riots in 1958 and 1981, or Enoch Powell’s speech in 1968, the Rushdie affair was a milestone in the evolution of race relations’ where ‘[b]efore the Rushdie affair, integration had been seen as the adjustment of minorities to dominant society; after the Rushdie affair, it was understood to be a mutual process which would also transform the majority population’ (Cesari 2010a: 167). For the first time, the British public became aware of ‘the presence of minorities’ who ‘not’ only ‘ subscribed…to a national’ and regional ‘identity’ but also to a ‘universal Muslim identity,’ which was reinforced by British Muslims themselves in their ‘public’ demands (Meer and Noorani 2008:203). With a politicized Muslim identity, the question of what it means ‘to be British,’ came to the fore yet again. However, this question is not just limited to religious and ‘coloured’ ethnic minorities that represented one aspect of this
debate. Discussions around Scottish nationalism also testified to the identity conundrum that Britain is confronted with. Labour Party leader Ed Miliband tried to overcome this problem by arguing for a Britain where citizens have ‘more than one identity,’ where ‘home’ includes ‘more than one place’ (Miliband June 2012). Yet incorporating such an inclusive national narrative has continued to be problematic, despite the attempts of the British government to include the notion of multiculturalism in their national identity. However, with the rise of ‘Islamist’ home grown terrorism, the success of such a national narrative has been questioned, with the British Prime Minister David Cameron declaring that ‘multiculturalism’ had failed in Britain (Cameron 2011).

Yet, the problem of multiculturalism in relation to British Muslims has been part of the discussion on identity since the Rushdie affair. The problem has been couched in debates around freedom of expression and freedom of religion, where the lines of demarcation between the two freedoms continue to be projected as ideologically irreconcilable (Also see Parekh 1990; Asad 1990; Jones 1990). However, the problem of the British Muslim cannot be reduced to mere ideology, as economic and educational disadvantage are also factors that have shaped the position of Muslims in Britain, particularly those from South Asia (Hussain 2008; Abbas 2005, 2004; Dale et al 2002). The ‘Muslim communities in the UK are’ both ‘the second largest faith community’ and ‘the most visibly recognizable, with traditional Islamic attire or even just mere aspects of the tradition being easily identifiable across many of Britain’s towns and cities’ (Allen 2010a: 85 also see Peach 2006a). ‘60 percent of all Muslims are under the age of thirty’ (Hussain 2008:42). Out of the Muslim population in England and Wales, South Asians make up ‘68 percent’ of
Muslims, (Peach 2006b:356), with ‘Pakistanis and Bangladeshis’ being the ‘two largest Muslim ethnic groups in Britain’ (Peach 2006b: 354; Change Institute 2009).

The British Pakistanis represented the majority in protests against Salman Rushdie for his book, ‘The Satanic Verses’ and belonged to the Sunni sect of Islam, following the ‘Barelvi’ or ‘Deobandi’ school of thought (Jacobson 2006:27; Modood 1990:150-51, 154). Both schools trace their ‘origins’ in South Asia to the teachings of ‘Shah Wali Ullah’ (Modood 1990). While the ‘Deobandis’ in Britain are ‘apolitical’ exploring ‘in-depth’ their religion, and spreading Islam, the ‘Barelvi’s’ are not as ‘apolitical’ having a strong ‘reverence’ towards the ‘Prophet,’ which exceeds ‘the orthodox’ (Modood 1990:150-151). Sunni Islam as linked to the Indian subcontinent is different from the ‘political Islam’ of the ‘Salafi’ tradition, which has come under media and academic scrutiny for being linked with terrorism and the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks. While ‘Salafism’ will be discussed in the next chapter with reference to security, for the British Pakistani identity it is important to highlight how the version of Islam that was being followed in the Pakistani community was mostly ‘non political’. However, ‘The Satanic Verses’ perceived as an assault on the Prophet of Islam, resulted in a response from the ‘Barelvi’ Pakistani community, the result of their ‘sensitivity’ to the figure ‘of Muhammad (deemed by many Muslims, including fundamentalists, to be excessive) and cultural insecurity…’ rather than ‘Qur’anic fundamentalism’ (Modood 2005:106; also see

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34 Another school of thought that Modood mentions with respect to the Pakistani community is the ‘Jamaat-i-Islami,’ which has ‘political’ aspirations and the support of countries like ‘Saudi Arabia’, but comprises only a minority of followers in Britain (Modood 1990:151).

35 While the response to the ‘Rushdie’ affair grouped all Muslims together as reactionary, without identifying the different schools of thought they belonged to, the response in the Indian subcontinent also varied amongst different Muslim groups. The Tablighi Jamaat for instance in India called for a show of ‘compassion’ towards Salman Rushdie, and ‘dawat (invitation)’ to Islam, in following the example of ‘the

The reaction triggered by this event in both media and policy circles resulted in further politicization of British Muslims, where they constantly had to defend their religious identity, being questioned on what it meant to be a ‘British Muslim’, or a ‘British Pakistani Muslim’, the definition almost having the undertone of questioning nationalistic loyalties against ideological sense of belonging. It further brought into question the parameters of the Race Relations legislation, which after 1983\textsuperscript{36} included ‘Sikh minorities’ into the definition of an identity, protected against ‘discrimination’ by virtue of their ‘ethno-religious’ identity (O’Toole et al 2013:30).

Hence the second and third generation British Pakistani Muslims started identifying more with being Muslim than Pakistani (Modood 2010; Allen 2010a; Hussain and Bagguley 2005). They also started looking more towards Islam outside their cultural prisms, realizing the distinctions between ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ (Jacobson 1997:242). As Parekh noted, “‘[w]hile the parents would have said that they were Muslims, their offspring say that they have a Muslim or Islamic identity...’” adding, “...the difference is deep and striking” (Parekh 2006 as cited in Allen 2010b:16). The expression of such a religious identity, proved problematic within the Western notion of citizenship and belonging.

While ethnic minorities were protected against discrimination under the law, only ‘ethno-
religious’ communities like ‘Sikhs’ and ‘Jews’, were given the same protection, with ‘Muslim heterogeneity’ preventing them from gaining similar protection (O’Toole et al 2013:30). Furthermore, Muslims as a consequence of the Rushdie incident continued to be viewed as a problematic group. As Taylor discussing the Rushdie affair observed ‘[t]he awkwardness arises from the fact that there are substantial numbers of people who are citizens and also belong to the culture that calls into question our philosophical boundaries. The challenge is to deal with their sense of marginalization without compromising our basic political principles’ (Taylor 1994:63).

However, the second and third generation British Muslims were in fact acting within the boundaries of British citizenship through the assertion of their religious identity, which for them was never viewed as antithetical to their Britishness. Events like the publication of ‘Kalim Siddiqui’s The Muslim Manifesto: A Strategy for Survival,’ which aimed to provide guidelines for a united ‘Muslim identity’ in Britain, ‘The Muslim Parliament’ that was established subsequently, though did not survive (Allen 2010b:18), the opposition to the Gulf War in 1991, the ‘race riots’ in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001, and the ongoing opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in the ‘Global War on Terror’, reinforced the position that the differences between Muslims and Britishness were irreconcilable (though the meaning of Britishness was yet to be determined). Yet, what such a narrative around the British Muslim failed to recognize was that ‘Muslim assertiveness’ as ‘triggered and intensified by what’ were ‘seen as attacks on Muslims’ were ‘derived not from Islam or Islamism but from contemporary Western ideas about equality and multiculturalism’ (Modood 2006:46, also see Yaqoob 2007). Hence, the kind of disruptions that erupted prior to the events of 9/11 by Muslims
and Pakistanis in Britain were an expression of British Muslims exercising their rights as British citizens, through peaceful protest, which in certain instances turned violent. These efforts of young British Muslims illustrate how ‘social identities are not simply reactive, formed through taking on dominant categories that circulate within hegemonic discourses and inverting their meaning and significance, but rather are creative, emerging through the fusion and cross-cutting of multiple identities and making new visions possible’ (Birt 2009:216). These ‘new visions’ were being expressed through British Muslim activism in their attempts to define their place in British society.

Ramadan (2010) captures this changing notion of Britishness when he observes, ‘...new kinds of citizens are emerging. They used to be Asians, Africans, Turks, or Arabs, and now they are French, British, Italian, Belgian, Swedish, American, Canadian, Australian, or New Zealander. Their parents used to be isolated and had come to earn a living (probably intending to go home), but now their children are increasingly “integrated” into society and more and more visible in streets, schools, firms, administrations, and on campuses…visible through their color, their dress, and their differences, but they speak the country’s language...’ (Ramadan 2010:25). Ramadan’s observation highlights the dilemma confronting the narrative on British multiculturalism, which is yet to accept the changing meaning of Britishness, and incorporate voices of dissent against mainstream national rhetoric as part and parcel of being British. As Parekh in defining ‘multiculturalism’ notes, ‘[m]ulticulturalism is…a perspective on or a way of viewing human life’ with ‘three’ main ‘insights’: ‘human beings’ are ‘culturally embedded,’ ‘…different cultures represent different systems of meaning and visions of the good life...’ and ‘…every culture is internally plural and reflects a continuing conversation
between its different traditions and strands of thought’ (Parekh 2010:238-239). Culture of both the ‘minority’ group, but also the ‘host’ community is evolutionary, which continues to be redefined as cultures interact internally and externally with each other. As Stuart Hall (1996) highlights, ‘we all speak from a particular place, out of a particular history, out of a particular experience, a particular culture, without being contained by that position’ (Hall 1996:448). The British Muslim identity is placed within a context where it has evolved beyond an apolitical invisible entity, to a visible and active component of modern day Britain. Yet, British Muslims continue to be singled out in the narrative on terrorism and security, which feeds into the nature of discrimination they encounter (as discussed in the next chapter).

Hence in understanding multiculturalism, citizenship and belonging within the context of the British Muslim, Parekh’s observation is further insightful, when he states, ‘[c]itizenship is about status and rights; belonging is about acceptance, feeling welcomed, a sense of identification… One might enjoy all the rights of citizenship but feel that one does not quite belong to the community and is a relative outsider…’ (Parekh 2010:241). Acceptance and recognition of the immigrant is integral to the process of equal citizenship and multiculturalism. ‘[R]ecognition’ operates on both an ‘intimate’ and ‘social plane,’ yet it is the social where ‘identities are formed in open dialogue’ that has proved problematic where a ‘refusal’ of recognition ‘can inflict damage on those who are denied it…The projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent that the image is internalized’ (Taylor 1994:36).

Since the Rushdie affair and an assertion of British Muslim identity by the community, the British government has nonetheless tried to address the concerns of its Muslim
citizens. In particular, reports such as ‘The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain’ also called ‘The Parekh Report’ in 2000 are important in highlighting the Muslim cause, ‘[r]ethinking the national story’ (2000:14) to include the diverse ethnicities and religions that constitute modern-day Britain as well as acknowledging that ‘[w]hen racism uses a religious justification, anti-racism has to adopt distinctive strategies’ (2000:237). Furthermore, legislation such as the 2006 and 2010 Equality Acts’ are important where the need of ‘tackling disproportionately lower incomes and higher rates of unemployment, comparatively lower skills both in education and in vocational trainings, a greater likelihood to reside in deprived housing situations and disproportionately bad health’ were finally acknowledged (O’Toole 2013:33). Yet, Islamophobia as a form of discrimination that needs to be outlawed at all levels still remains to be acknowledged, where particularly in the aftermath of 7/7 the Muslim identity has become further problematic (as discussed in the next chapter).

IV. Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted an understanding of Islamophobia through an overview of immigration and racism in Britain, particularly with reference to the ‘coloured immigrant’ and the South Asian/Pakistani Muslim. The preceding discussion illustrates how identity and belonging is a two way process between both the ‘host’ society that accommodates immigrants, and the ‘immigrant’ who adjusts to the host society, yet retains his/her cultural heritage. However, it further illustrates the level of agency that is often overlooked within the immigrant community, who may assert his/her identity at various points in time, as witnessed in the politicization of a British Muslim identity in reaction to the Rushdie affair. The participants in this research belong to such ‘discourse’
‘communities’ of ‘British’ citizens, with a ‘Pakistani’ heritage, or Overseas ‘Pakistanis’ entering a ‘host’ society that already categorizes them through its historical interaction with Pakistani and South Asian immigrants (Bakhtin 1981). They further belong to the ‘community’ of ‘Muslims,’ sharing a ‘language’ and an ‘identity’ that is viewed as antithetical within the ‘discourse’ of their ‘British’ ‘community.’ However, what emerges is a continued ‘dialectic’ within and across these different ‘communities’ where participants share their interactions with ‘White’ and ‘non-White’ members of various ‘communities,’ interactions that may result in Islamophobic encounters and experiences, or those that may overcome and challenge such ‘discourses’ that exist within ‘communities’ about Muslims and Pakistanis (Bakhtin 1984; 1981). Hence, as both this chapter and the narratives will illustrate, the challenge for a multicultural Britain lies in creating a space to accommodate the self-identity of a minority group, within a wider narrative on Britishness. The struggle for acceptance and accommodation is an on-going one, as highlighted in the next chapter on security and the Muslim identity.
Chapter III

Securitizing the Muslim Subject: Understanding Islamophobia in a post 7/7 Britain

This chapter is the second of a two-part exploration of Islamophobia and racism in Britain, highlighting the ‘securitization’ of the British Muslim identity after September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005. By exploring counter terrorism measures undertaken by the British government after 7/7, the chapter illustrates a problematic narrative around the Muslim subject, where Islamophobia ‘racialises’ and ‘securitizes’ British Muslims. The discussion is further located within higher educational institutions focusing on questions of radicalisation, Islamism(s) and the Muslim student, as well as analyzing the emergence of a radicalised, securitized female Muslim identity. This chapter therefore presents a backdrop to the narrative of Islamophobia and the Muslim radical, particularly within the context of the university. This backdrop is essential in understanding the accounts of participants who are located within these universities, their identities submerged in external historical and contemporary narratives about being ‘British’, ‘Muslim’, and ‘Pakistani’, narratives that influence their encounter with other social beings both within and outside the university.

I. Introduction

Muslims in Britain, as illustrated in the last chapter became problematic as a group particularly after the Rushdie affair in 1988-1989. British Muslims of a Pakistani heritage had predominantly been identified as South Asians where discrimination was more on the grounds of ‘colour’ and ‘culture’, rather than ‘religion’. The evolution from ‘colour’ discrimination for the Muslim South Asian to a ‘racialised’ ‘religious’ discrimination shares a long history, from the Muslim Moors and Arabs of the Crusades, the inferior colonial subject of the British Raj in the Indian subcontinent, the ‘Paki’ of the 1960s onwards, the problematic ‘Arab’ of the OPEC crisis and the disruptive, ‘fundamentalist’ of the Rushdie Affair, caught within Huntington’s famous ‘clash of civilization’ (1996) in midst of the Gulf war and the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s, taking again the form of rioters and trouble-makers with the riots in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford that followed in 2001(Sardar and Ahmad 2012; Sales 2012; Kumar 2012; Lyons 2012; Zebiri 2011; Grube 2011; Allen 2010b; Sayyid 2010; Panayi 2010; Addison 2010; Meer and
Modood 2010a; Fekete 2009; Sanghera and Thapar-Bjorkert 2007; Hussain and Bagguley 2005; Said 2003; Solomos 2003; Ouseley 2001; Cantle 2001; Huntington et al 1996; Modood, 1990). In tracing this narrative of racism and the ‘racialisation’ of Muslims, the events of September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005 were also particularly significant by placing the British Muslim within a security framework. Islamophobia, after 9/11 and 7/7 took on the overtones of a ‘securitizing’ impulse as reinforced in the policies and rhetoric of the British state and media (Croft 2012). Therefore, this chapter in further locating the experiences of British/Pakistani Muslim students explores the contemporary realities outside the university that inform these experiences and ‘discourses’ (Bakhtin 1981) within participant ‘communities’.

The emergence of the homegrown terrorist refocused the security lens inwards, evoking a fear of the Muslim terrorist hiding in the closet (Croft 2012; Kumar 2012; Mouritsen 2012; Esposito and Kalin 2011; Allen 2010a; Birt 2010). While the importance of ensuring homeland security is crucial in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, the security agenda of the British state instead normalized an insecure narrative around the Muslim subject, where ‘securitization’ of Muslims in Britain and the West further resulted in ideological debates on Britishness and belonging. These debates took place in media, in political discussions but also influenced other institutions, such as schools and universities. Muslim and international Muslim students, in universities in particular came under the limelight, on discovery that the terrorists involved in the 9/11 and 7/7 plots had either been university graduates, or enrolled in a British university at some point in their lifetime (Interview with Professor Glees November 30, 2009; House of Commons 2006; Glees and Pope 2005. Also see Song 2012; Jackson 2007:424-25).
Therefore, in continuing to trace the evolution of racism and Islamophobia within Britain, this chapter will explore the implications of the July 7 terrorist attacks and the subsequent counter terrorism policy CONTEST of the British state on Muslims in Britain. It will further explore how security is both understood and practiced in society, as highlighted in the literature on International Relations and Sociology. In presenting an overview of ‘Islamist radicalism’ and extremism, the discussion will shift towards the university, and the Muslim student radical whose presence is also ‘securitized’ and ‘racialised’ within this narrative of insecurity (Croft 2012; Meer and Modood 2010). The role of the media is further highlighted which continues to confine and ‘securitize’ the existence of British Muslims, as well as Muslim students in educational institutions. The discussion will conclude with an exploration of how such a security narrative is important in defining and reinforcing the phenomenon of Islamophobia within British society.

II. Securing the Self: Understanding the ‘home-grown’ threat

‘Security’ as a term carries social and ‘political’ credence, whereby an invocation to security - an act or action in the name of security - is often deemed acceptable for the social conscience (Booth 2007; Lausten and Waever 2000). The urgency that is evoked through inferences to homeland ‘security’ is important, particularly in the aftermath of a major attack (such as the attack on July 7, 2005), where the public out of fear of a similar potential attack is more readily supportive of counter terrorism measures (Nacos et al, 2011; Huddy et al 2007), even when these measures curtail individual rights and freedoms. Booth (2007) captures the fundamental acceptance of such a security narrative when he observes how ‘people understand what security is by knowing how insecurity feels’ (Booth 2007:101). It is precisely the sense of human insecurity in the aftermath of
7/7 in Britain, that resulted in both support for counterterrorism measures that curtailed civil and individual liberties, as well as a retaliation against the enemy, the Muslim community or those who looked Muslim, through acts of discrimination or Islamophobia. Defining security as a concept however is not a straightforward task as it can have different meanings in different contexts, be it individual, familial, community, organizational, national, or international. The Oxford dictionary defines security as ‘the state of being free from danger or threat’ (2013). Yet, what is this ‘danger or threat’, who defines it and, at what point, are all questions crucial in understanding this concept. While security has been explored across disciplines and subjects, ranging from the humanities to social sciences, in locating security within the discussion of a post 9/11 socio-political environment, it is important to understand how this concept is constructed by the state, in particular the British state both internationally, and domestically.

Within International Relations, and the question of state and security, the ‘traditional’ approach ‘assumes that nation-states have one driving goal in their relations with other states – their own survival’ (Steele 2008:2). This definition in particular was credible during the Cold War era of inter-state rivalry, yet the events of 9/11 brought insecurity within the nation-state, especially where the threat was no longer from a tangible external entity, but more internal or ‘home-grown’ through an ideology that transcended material boundaries, recruiting one’s own citizens for a transnational cause. Hence, with the changing nature of insecurity and warfare, the more traditional means of understanding security, are also changing (Tibi, 2007).37 Within Critical Security Studies, the

37 This change in definition started as early as the 1990s with the emergence of a more critical security studies strand, with ‘three different… yet related types of theory’ on security: the ‘Copenhagen School’, ‘the Welsh School’ and ‘the Paris School’ (Croft 2012:75-76). These three schools are particularly
Copenhagen School in particular has dominated discussion on the changing nature of ‘security’. Buzan and Waever’s (1998) notion of ‘security’ is important in exploring the normalization of a security agenda through what they term ‘securitization’ (Croft 2012: 76-77). However, Buzan and Waever’s theory on ‘securitization’ is theoretically limited to an analysis of inter-state relations at the global level (Buzan and Waever 2009).

In overcoming this limitation, Stuart Croft (2012) introduces a ‘Post-Copenhagen’ theory of ‘securitization’ that includes Anthony Giddens notion of ‘ontological security’. In line with the changing nature of insecurities, Croft (2012) illustrates how securitization has moved inwards, beyond just protecting borders. In the case of Britain, securitization includes redefining notions of ‘Britishness’ and ‘citizenship’, a process that was already underway particularly with a politicized British Muslim identity (as discussed in Chapter 2). The securitizing impulse however has influenced both domestic and international policy, where welfare and immigration services have also fallen within the purview of security, where identity and the idea of belonging has been co-opted by a narrative of (in)security (Cesari 2010b; Khan 2010; Noxolo, 2009; Brown 2008a). The following section elaborates on the Post-Copenhagen school that is important in understanding the unconventional nature of the existing security threat (Cesari 2010b).

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38 The Copenhagen School approaches security at the level of the ‘state’ which is the ‘key agent,’ where an invocation to ‘security’ is considered a ‘speech act’ where the term security legitimizes and warrants certain reaction and actions on the part of the state in the ‘name of security’ (Croft 2012: 80-83; Buzan and Waever 1997; 2009).

39 In his discussion of ‘ontological security,’ Anthony Giddens describes the concept in relation to the notion of trust, referring ‘to the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action’ (Giddens 1990: 92). Drawing on the works of ‘Harry Stack Sullivan’, amongst others Giddens shows how this ‘sense of security emerges very early on’ during childhood, which is reinforced in everyday interactions within society (Giddens 1991: 44-45).
a. Securitization

‘Securitization’ involves identifying ‘an existential threat to a valued referent object’ and justifies ‘exceptional measures’ in countering that threat (Buzan and Waever 2009:257). While the threat posed by Al Qa’ida materialized in the tragedies of 9/11 and 7/7, the prevalence of the battle against extremist Islamist terrorist groups on all social and political fronts, from schools and universities, to immigration and welfare testify to the ideological and existential nature of this conflict that moves beyond the physical.40

In Croft’s conception of securitization in post 7/7 Britain, the security threat is created in the form of an Other that is both radically different and ‘inferior’ from the British Self, what he calls both ‘the Radical’ and the ‘Orientalized Other’ (2012:246-247). The definition of this radicalism and extremism continues to be dictated by the state and media. The British state’s counter-terrorism policy illustrates the extent of this otherization and securitization that implicates Muslims across social institutions.

The British government’s Terrorism Act 2000 ‘remains’ the ‘primary anti-terrorism legislation, with amendments made in 2001…2005, and again in 2006…’ where each amendment ‘expanded’ ‘the definition of terrorist offences’ as well as ‘police powers’ (Klausen 2009:404). According to the Terrorism Act 2000 Section 1(1) ‘terrorism’ is defined as ‘the use or threat of action where’ ‘(2) [a]ction… (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person’s life,

40 Croft in developing ‘securitization’ as a ‘process’ illustrates the importance not just of the ‘speech act’ that justifies state actions and policies in the name of homeland security, but also the ‘images, silences and intertextuality,’ which are evoked through the media and everyday ‘common sense’ initiatives around prevention of radicalization, police powers of stop and search, all that are deemed ‘common sense’ for the purpose of securing against an imminent attack (Croft 2012:243-44). Furthermore, Croft’s extension of the Copenhagen school of security also demonstrates how both securitizing agents and audience are spread across society, from religious authority figures to academics and media personalities who reinforce a narrative of the Muslim terrorist against a tolerant and liberal sense of Self, in particular the British self (ibid 246-47).
other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system’ (HM Government 2000). The definition that includes five different clauses,⁴¹ has been criticized for being ‘too wide to satisfy the clarity’ required ‘for the criminal law,’ leaving ‘room for political bias… used to prosecute people active in legitimate social or political movements who are exercising their rights’ (Carlile 2007:21 discussing University of Exeter report “The Rules of the Game”). While Lord Carlile in his independent review of defining terrorism suggests minor amendments to this definition⁴², it nonetheless continues to be the guiding definition for UK counter-terrorism policy. The definition becomes further problematic when linked to Islam or what is defined as Islamism, whereby phrases such as ‘Islamist terrorism’ can create greater confusion and misunderstanding about Muslims and their religion (See Meer 2010; Jackson 2007).

The 2006 Counter Terrorism ‘report announced the government’s strategy, known as Operation Contest, and used four buzzwords… to summarise the approach: PREVENT, PURSUE, PROTECT and PREPARE’, where ‘the core elements of prevention’ included the need to address ‘structural problems’ such as inequality and discrimination, changing ‘the environment’ to deter radicalisation and ‘engaging in the battle of ideas’ (Klausen 41 Further under section 1(b) ‘the use or threat is designed to influence the government [‘or an international governmental organization’] or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious [‘racial’]41 or ideological cause…(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied…(4) (a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom, (b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated, (c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and (d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom,’ and ‘(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation’ (Terrorism Act 2000, as updated on http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/part/1#commentary-c1675655).

Counter terrorism measures were also introduced within immigration under the ‘Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006’ that placed ‘security as its guiding principle, introducing a ‘good character’ test, and lowering the threshold required to deprive rights of abode and citizenship on the basis of national security’ (Brown 2010:173). Further amendments to the Terrorism Act were put forward in 2008 with ‘stronger asset-freezing powers, post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects, additional powers of entry over ‘controlled’ individuals, restrictions on those who have been convicted of terrorism-related offences after they’ve served their criminal sentences, and powers to direct financial institutions to act against terrorism’ (Brown 2010:173 citing HM Government 2009: 67; Also see Ansari 2006). Such policies become problematic since ‘[b]y seeking to protect citizens and society, the relationship between ‘the public’ and ‘the private’ has been redrawn, allowing intervention in all areas of life, including financial affairs and hitherto private spaces in the name of security’ (Brown 2010:173). Infringement of human and civil liberties as a response to the attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 is also witnessed in other countries, such as the US (Love 2009), where a similar form of ‘new terrorism,’ is defined as being ‘global, fluid and dispersed’ (De Goede 2008:157). The US in the 9/11 Commission Report defines terrorism as ‘a tactic used by individuals and organizations to kill and destroy’, but it also clearly states that while ‘Islam is not the enemy,’ a ‘transnational… Islamist terrorism’ is (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004:363). However, despite the report clearly outlining the problem of Al Qa’ida and its affiliates, the rhetoric invoked by using terms such as ‘the war on terror,’ ‘Islamic terrorism’ and the like has resulted in creating further confusion and misunderstandings, where within the media and
political debate, the difference between Islam and various Islamisms, is often overlooked and more generally conflated (See Githens-Mazer 2012; Cole 2011; Jackson 2007; 2005). Hence, ‘[t]hrough a carefully constructed public discourse, officials…created a new social reality where terrorism threatens to destroy everything that ordinary people hold dear – their lives, their democracy, their freedom, their way of life, their civilization’ (Jackson 2005:1-2), evoking yet again the tropes of the ‘Oriental’ and the ‘Radical Other’ (Croft 2012). Further, problematic was legislation such as ‘The Patriot Act’ that ‘lessened the restrictions on surveillance, allowed various personal records to be obtained by authorities, reduced the privacy of attorney-client conversation, and broadened the definition of terrorism to include “material support,” a concept that’ had ‘not been fully defined’ (Cesari 2011:30, Also see Semati 2010).

Legislation in the UK also attempted to confront a ‘security’ threat that was both domestic and international. The reaction by the US and the UK as well as subsequent governments across Europe attempted to negotiate between a highly permeable boundary of security and human rights, where Muslims as a result of their religion continued to be securitized in the public imagination. This is clearly illustrated in the Labour government’s 2009 counter terrorism strategy CONTEST that institutionalized a counter terrorism agenda, particularly through community projects on integration with the aim of engaging with the Muslim community, yet in effect securitizing the nature of such engagement. Projects under the ‘Commission on Integration and Cohesion (COIC)…became quickly entangled in the Prevent strategies…viewed as identifying the wrong problems’ (O’Toole et al 2013:37).

43 Such rhetoric is constantly evoked in the question of Guantanamo Bay where terrorists and other suspects are held and often subject to torture such as ‘water boarding.’ (Gude 16/11/2010; McKeown 2009; Tittemore 2006)
Learning from the mistakes of its predecessors who were seen to alienate the Muslim community despite attempts at working with them, the Conservative government introduced CONTEST 2011 with the aim to counter the threat of Al Qa’ida and its affiliates. Building on the existing counter terrorism approach, the government continued with the four-pronged agenda: ‘Pursue…stop terrorist attacks; Prevent…stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism; Protect…strengthen’ the country’s ‘protection against a terrorist attack; and Prepare…mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack’ (HM Government 2011b:10). The new counter terrorism strategy is also attempting to balance the urgency of security, with the rights and freedoms of its citizens, in particular Muslim citizens, where a conscious effort is underway by the government not to securitize all aspects of its interaction with the Muslim community (HM Government 2011b). Yet despite this realization, immigration services, education and community projects that aim to engage with Muslims nonetheless continue to be tainted by a security agenda. As McGhee notes the Prevent Strategy under the new government is full of ‘contradictions,’ yet ‘[t]he major difference seems to be that the New Prevent agenda will be ‘dedicated to “purer” and by implication “hard-edged”, multi-agency intelligence driven, targeted identification and de-radicalization programmes which are not to be diluted or distracted by wider integration and cohesion projects which, according to the Home Office in this report ‘have much wider social objectives’’ (McGhee 2011:1, also see Awan 2012).

In the spirit of engaging with the Muslim community, the Conservative government’s CONTEST strategy has tried to limit the powers of the Police, particularly their power to Stop and Search. Under the 2011 strategy ‘the maximum period that a terrorist suspect
can be detained before charge or release,’ has been ‘reduced to 14 days’ though there continues to be ‘a contingency mechanism’ whereby ‘this period may be temporarily increased to 28 days in exceptional circumstances subject to Parliament’s prior approval of primary legislation’ (HM Government 2011b:49). These ‘exceptional circumstances’ have not been predefined, dependent on the nature of the terrorist suspect, and the ‘threat’ posed by him or her.

However, community projects involving the police and the Muslim community as a consequence of the Labour government initiatives have had mixed results, at times creating further distrust and a feeling of being under surveillance by the Muslim community. As Klausen observed, for police and community projects to be successful ‘improved relations between the police and the Muslim community are needed to enhance efficiency, prevent radicalism, and mitigate the damage in families and communities resulting from operations and arrests, in particular when the police ‘get it wrong’’ (2009:408). But distrust continues to be created through government programs such as ‘Project Champion’, a ‘£3m project’ that was planning a ‘surveillance’ in Birmingham by installing a ‘network of CCTV and automatic number plate reading (ANPR) cameras,’ under the guise of ensuring security of the residents by monitoring crime and theft, when in fact the ‘project was being run from the West Midlands police counter-terrorism unit with the consent of security officials at the Home Office and MI5’ (Lewis, P 30/09/2010). As noted by Chief Constable Sara Thornton in a review of the project, ‘the consultation phase’ with the community leaders ‘was too little too late, and the lack of transparency about the purpose of the project has resulted in significant community anger and loss of trust’ (Thornton 2010:47). The project was discontinued
after protests, yet damaged the relationship between the police and the local Muslim community (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011:171). For community initiatives to be successful in countering terrorism a level of ‘implicit trust as a mechanism’ is essential ‘for ensuring long-term partnership’ (Spalek 2010: 809). Yet, as Choudhury and Fenwick’s work has demonstrated the relationship between police authorities and the Muslim community can vary, often dependent on both the police officials in charge, and the Muslim individuals. However, there continues to be certain areas of engagement between police officials and the Muslim community, which are problematic. These include the reporting of hate crimes which are often ‘not…taken seriously by the police’ and undermines a Muslim citizen’s ‘trust and confidence in the police and criminal justice process’ (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011:157, also see Spalek et al 2009a, b; Lambert 2008b, Also see Patel and Tyrer 2012).

The example of the relationship between police authorities and the Muslim community illustrates the problematic nature of holding a community suspect that can disrupt the every day experiences of ordinary British citizens who are Muslims. Furthermore, by expecting ‘police officials’ to take the lead in community driven projects that are meant to promote cohesion and security of Muslims, the level of trust in the community aspect of the project becomes further suspect, where the role of the police as securitizing agents often stands out. Such levels of securitization are also witnessed in educational institutions, such as schools and universities. The experiences of students explored in this research are all informed by this wider narrative of insecurity, from the police to government officials and media. The government’s counter terrorism operation known as the ‘Channel Program’ testifies to this narrative within schools. The ‘Channel Program’
is an initiative under the Prevent strand that aims to target schools and interrupt the ‘process of radicalization’ at an early stage, though this program has been criticized for being ‘anti-Islamic’ (Travis, 18/02/2011). Such programs continue to be loosely defined, since the exact nature of ‘radicalisation’, how to gauge whether a student or a young person is vulnerable to extremism is often left at the discretion of local actors. Further problematic is the assumption that there is a ‘radicalisation process’ that can be identified, and can clearly demonstrate how an individual changes from being a normal law-abiding British citizen to a bearded, close-minded violent extremist ready to kill his fellow citizens (Githens-Mazer 2010a; Brown 2010). In attempting to interrupt such a process then, the British state claims to engage with Muslim communities to root out extremists, and, intervene and assist the vulnerable. As a result of such efforts both at the community and domestic level, government engagement with Muslims continues to be coloured by the ‘security’ lens (Croft 2012; Brown 2010). Such a lens feeds into stereotypes of the Muslim extremist, particularly in media representations and reporting, which may influence encounters with Islamophobia and discrimination.

Given how such a narrative of radicalisation also influences the British state’s engagement with Muslim students, particularly in universities, a discussion on Islamophobia, Muslims and universities requires an understanding of ‘radicalisation’. The following section highlights the discussion on radicalisation and the problematic nature of this concept that underscores a preventive risk management strategy where the exact nature of the risk continues to be undefined.
b. Radicalisation

The term ‘radicalisation’ in a post 9/11 context, following the London bombings of 7/7 is encumbered by a complex mesh of politics, religion and culture. Defining radicalisation is a difficult task, since different definitions have been presented, almost all linking radicalisation with some form of extremism in the context of the war against Al Qa’ida. Patel (2007) explores the term within the context of ‘seeking fundamental change in the present political order’ (2007:42). Francois Burgat (2008) discusses different meanings of radicalisation from ‘violent...struggle’, to ‘sectarian radicalisation’ which creates division between communities, denying the very ‘existence’ of another group. Such ‘sectarian radicalisation fuels racist postures,’ resulting in violence against a community during ‘times of peace’ (2008:90). Johnson (2006) describes it as a process that reorients individuals towards a particular path. The idea of radicalisation as a process is also discussed in the works of Stemmann (2006) who describes ‘the radicalization process’ as beginning ‘with the emergence of anti-integration tendencies and the desire to disengage from the host society. It continues with hostility towards the host society, rejection of the principles and institutions of liberal democracy, and the growing acquisition of violent attitudes, all of which make individuals a potential target for recruiters. The final stage of the radicalization process is recruitment...’ (Stemmann 2006:8). The ‘anti-integration’ tendencies is not just the result of the minority’s inability to belong to a society, but also the host community’s inability to accommodate ‘difference’ within its dominant ‘discourse’ on citizenship and belonging (Strabac and Listhaug 2008; Barnes 2006; Wieviorka 2004). Githens-Mazer (2012) problematizes the term describing it as ‘a collectively defined though individually held moral obligation to participate in direct
action, often textually defined,’ yet as he recognizes his ‘definition’ lacks the ‘acknowledgement of its contemporary use as a challenge to the hegemonic status quo’ which needs to be highlighted in any research on ‘radicalization’, as well as the need to recognize ‘varying degrees of process, belief, and commitment’ in relation to ‘radicalization’ where ‘the condition of being radicalized…can be present one minute and absent the next with no guarantee of its return’ (2012:563).

Radicalisation as these definitions suggest is an attempt towards bringing about a change, where it could take the form of a ‘violent struggle’ or an internal struggle, where it could be present at one moment in some individuals and groups, but completely absent in others. Professor Anthony Glees in his interview expressed the opinion that radicalisation as a process aims towards winning ‘thinking and often cultured people’ to ‘extreme ideas’ (November 30, 2009). However, as he observes:

‘Not every extremist is violent and not every violent extremist is a terrorist, but every terrorist has been both a violent extremist, and an extremist and a radical…’

(Interview with Professor Glees, November 30, 2009)

His observation suggests that while experiences of extremism, violence and radicalisation is a common trait amongst terrorists, the experience of radicalisation alone does not translate into extremism, though it may follow that particular trajectory. Furthermore, as Githens-Mazer (2010a) observes there is ‘no inherent causal relationship or necessary correlation between radicalisation and violence’ (2010a: 24), and any attempts at establishing such a relationship would be false and misleading. The question as to why some individuals turn to violence while others do not is not a straightforward one, thus making counter terrorism measures such as Prevent problematic. Research on answering the ‘why’ question, particularly with reference to ‘Islamist extremism’ has yielded
different results. Sageman argues for a ‘scientific approach’ to understanding terrorism, based on ‘all the available data’ which is ‘representative of the terrorist universe’ (Sageman 2008:14). Yet what is ‘representative’ of this ‘terrorist universe,’ who makes that decision and how are problems which again are not easy to resolve. Whichever interpretation of Islam is (ab)used to evoke violence, Rehman (2007) believes that such radicalisation has roots in individual experiences of ‘ostracization, neglect, and alienation from the mainstream’ (Rehman 2007:847). This juxtaposed with generational differences amongst parents and children has led to greater isolation, making young people more vulnerable to radical ideologies (ibid). Roy also calls it a ‘youth movement,’ led by young Muslims who have no roots to the homeland of their fathers. In Roy’s words ‘they are a lost generation’ not a ‘militant vanguard of the Muslim community’ (Roy 2007:55). These young individuals are ‘unmoored from traditional societies and cultures, frustrated by a Western society that does not meet their expectations...their vision of a global umma is both a mirror of and a form of revenge against the globalisation that has made them what they are’ (Roy 2007:55-56). Professor Modood in his interview highlighted the level of frustration that young people experience, which may either lead them towards lawful political activism or push them towards unlawful behaviour.

‘[t]he generational factor...we now have a group of young people who don’t feel that their parents really are on their wavelength and understand them but they don’t feel that the rest of society respects them, and yet they feel some degree of identification with both. Obviously they feel some identification with their families and their family elders, and they can have feelings of respect for their elders, but they also feel that their elders are mistaken in number of ways. They can be mistaken in terms of religion because the elders might have all kinds of superstitious practices.... They may think their parents don’t understand politics. They may think that the older generation did not stand up for themselves in an assertive, militant way. And they certainly can feel that their parents’ views about personal freedom are very out of date. Because they want more personal freedom to go in and out of the house when they want to, meet with whomever they like and perhaps they have a different view of boy/girl
relationships than their parents. So for a whole host of reasons they can feel respect for their parents but not that their parents understand them, or that they can talk to their parents about some of these things that are worrying them. So there is an implicit critique of their parents for whom they may still have love and respect of course. And they feel exactly the same but different, a division, a divide with the rest of society including white young people in their class, in their university and so on whom they feel they share a lot in common with, share books, like similar clothes, like similar music, like similar TV programs and everything like that but they feel these people don’t have this burden of all the problems to do with being a Muslim, whether abroad or in Britain. So they feel alienated as well, and that kind of alienation people have argued make them very susceptible to radicalisation because when you are feeling lost again if someone comes up with a solution they say hey nobody really likes you do they, nobody really understands you do they, but we do, join us we are on your side, and you can be on our side, you can be part of our team. When I say part of our team I mean a sense of belonging to something, a cause but also a group and I think for young people that can be very emotionally satisfying in some cases even emotionally necessary. I think that there is generational alienated feeling which adds in the context of all these other things, which adds to their willingness to join radical causes or radical clusters, cells.’

(Interview with Professor Tariq Modood- December 14, 2009)

Vertigan’s (2007) analysis extends Modood’s reasoning further by positioning radicalisation within local, national and international influences. While alienation and discrimination are local or national factors, atrocities committed against the innocent, in places like Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir become catalysts, giving young individuals a purpose. Hence, ‘for many recruits, the sense of belonging to a group, sharing values, explanations and companionship, is part of the attraction’ (Vertigans 2007:454). O’Duffy also explores the nexus between ‘local grievances’ such as structural unemployment, inequality and government ‘foreign’ policies towards Muslim countries (O’Duffy 2008). The role of ‘alienation,’ feeling disconnected from the community as part of the process of radicalization has also been signalled as one of the many reasons as to why young people turn to extremism, with ‘radicalisation’ reflecting and being ‘a product of increased fragmentation and self-reflexivity, where people look for meaning in their
lives’ (Spalek 2007:193; See also Duffy 2009). While these discussions focus on the radical individual, Wiktorowicz (2004) extends the debate to radical groups. Drawing on ‘social movement theory’, he demonstrates how groups like the ‘Al Muhajiroun’ are organized in a way to ‘attract’ individuals, looking for meaning and a place to ‘belong’ (Wiktorowicz 2004:16). While discrimination and a sense of dislocation play an important role, these factors alone are insufficient for the path from radicalisation to extremism. ‘Group’ philosophy, structure, and the manner by which they engage with individuals are important in drawing young people into their fold (Wiktorowicz 2004:24).

Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler (2006) further use ‘rational choice theory’ to illustrate the ‘incentives’ for potential members to join such a group, which include ‘spiritual’ incentives, though the nature of incentives might differ for different individuals (2006:318-319, Also see Wiktorowicz 2005a).

These different interpretations and explanations for radicalization, suggest one clear fact, the one size fits all approach to radicalization and more importantly how it relates to terrorism is problematic. As Githens-Mazer (2010a:19) observes, ‘[r]adicalisation does not occur in a vacuum – it is a course of action which is impacted on by all many factors which help to determine its shape and form: historical circumstances, the potency of some myths, memories and symbols which underpin identities over others, economic conditions, political frustration, amongst many other insufficient but necessary and insufficient and unnecessary causal factors,’ which ‘…help to set the scene where, when and how radicalisation can occur, and helps to shape the variety of radicalisation itself.’

An Islamist group started by ‘Omar Bakri Mohammad’ who was a member of another Islamist group banned by the British government, ‘Hizb-ut-Tahir’. Al Muhajiroun was considered ‘radical’ because of its ‘support for the use of violence…the use of military coups to es- tablish Islamic states wherever there are Muslims, including Britain…condoned the use of violence against Western military operating in Muslim countries’ (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler 2006:302).
In such a context then, evoking ‘radicalization’ in congruence with Muslims and extremism creates greater confusion, where even peaceful radical behaviour by Muslims is judged within the radical-extremist nexus. This definition becomes particularly problematic when understood in opposition to ‘the moderate.’ (Sedgwick 2010:481-82). Such a definition locates radicalisation on a ‘continuum,’ where both an understanding of the radical and the moderate is compromised, with different groups, depending on their power dynamic, define the terms differently (ibid).

These groups will have different interests and understanding of the radical ideology in question. Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010b) highlight how ‘conventional wisdom’ often dictates an understanding of radicalization for ‘policy makers and the media,’ where radicalization is ‘largely…an asser-tion that a sense of Islamic difference (variously explained in terms of a lack of integration, a lack of secularism, the existential threat posed by Islam to the West, or external Islamic influences from Saudi Arabia and the wider Middle East) among Muslim communities has the dangerous potential to mutate issues of differing identities into support for violent ‘Islamo-fascism’” (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010b:889-890). Githens-Mazer (2012) further illustrates how viewing the concept either as ‘a process’ or as ‘causation’ may be too simplistic where present day understanding has resulted in ‘a conceptual back-formation’ moving away from ‘the 18th and 19th centuries radicalization’ that fundamentally challenged ‘those shibboleths held by religious and political elites’ to ‘how one of us becomes one of them – how an ‘ordinary’ person enters on the path to becoming a terrorist who wants to kill me and you’ (Githens-Mazer 2012:560, also see Githens-Mazer 2010b). Hence, the manner by which radicalisation is explained in media and policy circles, simplifies it in a
desperate attempt to understand modern day terrorism, where individuals despite their varied background and life experiences are clumped together under the category of a radical extremist, where an interpretation of Islam makes Islam itself suspect. Such ‘claims’ towards ‘the causality of certain process or factors’ are logically unsound as similar ‘processes’ can be observed in ‘cases beyond the sample’ of Islamic extremism (Githens-Mazer 2012:564; Sedgwick 2010).

Given this problematic nature of radicalisation and security, it is not surprising to find policies of counter radicalisation, such as Prevent encountering greater challenges and obstacles, especially where the Muslim community as a whole is rendered ‘suspect’. With the British state attempting to ‘counter radicalisation’ in universities, such a narrative instead of supporting Muslim students against extremist ideology, rather encourages a framework of otherization, where Muslims have to constantly prove their legitimacy as British and Muslim students. Thus, as long as the meaning of radical and the radicalisation process is located within a framework of security around the Muslim subject, there is a greater likelihood of a misdiagnosis of the problem of Islamic extremism and terrorism. Policies that aim to disrupt a process that continues to baffle academics and policy makers may in fact contribute to further isolation and disengagement amongst the Muslim community. Further problematic is the understanding of ‘Islamisms’ in relation to radicalisation, as the next section illustrates.

c. Radicalisation and Islam: The Salafis and the radicals, the extremists and the moderates

Discussion on radicalisation and Muslims is incomplete without understanding the link between radicalisation and Islam, as evoked in media, and by government agents.
However, in undertaking this discussion one needs to also heed the warning of Amartya Sen when he writes:

‘Increasing reliance on religion-based classification of the people of the world...tends to make the Western response to global terrorism and conflict peculiarly ham-handed. Respect for “other people” is shown by praising their religious books, rather than by taking note of the many-sided involvements and achievements, in nonreligious as well as religious fields, of different people in a globally interactive world. In confronting what is called “Islamic terrorism,” in the muddled vocabulary of contemporary global politics, the intellectual force of Western policy is aimed quite substantially at trying to define – or redefine – Islam.’

(Sen 2006:12)

The problem with using terms such as ‘Islamic’ or ‘Islamist’ terrorism,’ ‘Political’ or ‘Fundamentalist Islam,’ ‘Global Islamism’ and the more recent ‘Militant Islam’ is one of definition, where often in media and political rhetoric Islam as a religion is equated with certain interpretations limited to a minority of followers. In particular, the overarching stereotype is that of the ‘takfiri jihadist,’ ‘the radicalised’ Muslim who believes ‘that it is a religious and moral obligation to wage jihad against kafir or non-believers…anywhere at any time,’ (Githens-Mazer 2010a:5) which is generalized to any Muslim who appears overtly religious in appearance or practice. The distinctions between believers continue to be overlooked. Githens-Mazer et al (2010) in challenging such generalizations observed how ‘Islamic radicalism can mean “those people who believe that Islam is under threat and that they are sanctioned to defend Islam from that threat (Lim, 2005)”’, where ‘fundamentalism’ is taken ‘to denote religious practice based on literal interpretation of a sacred text… applied to Muslims and Christians (Lewis, 1993)…’ (2010:12). According to Bourbekeur (2007) political Islam, as understood in Europe is a term used more by Western political scientists than the ‘Islamists’ themselves. There is no one form of political Islam, as it varies from the Sufis, the exiled Islamists of Turkey and Egypt, the
Salafis and the Deobandis, amongst other variants. Each group has a particular agenda, with its own definition of political Islam. However, the one group which has become central in the discussion on radicalisation is the Salafi strand.

“Salafi” is used to denote those who follow the example of the companions (salaf) of the Prophet Mohammed,’ seen to command ‘a pure understanding of the faith,’ having learnt ‘about Islam directly from the Prophet…’ (Wiktorowicz 2005b:75, Also see Cesari 2008). According to Esposito (2003:275) it is the ‘name’ of ‘a reform movement’ that was led by ‘Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh at the turn of the twentieth century’, with the aim to restore the ‘Islamic doctrines to’ this ‘pure form’ that adhered ‘to the Quran and Sunnah’ while rejecting ‘later interpretations’ and maintaining ‘the unity of ummah.’ Not all Salafis believe in ‘the use of violence,’ with ‘the jihadi faction’ endorsing violence, while ‘nonviolent Salafis… emphatically reject the use of violence and instead,’ believe in peaceful means for furthering the ‘Salafi’ cause (Wiktorowicz 2005b:75). Amghar’s discussion of Salafism revealed how present-day understanding of the ‘Salafi’ school of thought gained momentum in the 1990s, with three different strands, ‘the revolutionary’ that uses violence; ‘predicative salafism,’ that promotes a philosophy of ‘withdrawal,’ opposing political participation in Western systems, by believing that Muslims are subject to the law of Islam alone; and a third strand that believes in an ideology of political action to promote the idea of an ‘Islamic state and

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45 Amghar drawing from Mervin (2000) notes ‘Salafism was born with the beginning of Muhammad’s apostolate in the 7th century. His teachings brought together men and women, the most famous among whom were the four first Caliphs of Islam …later to become… what Muslim theologians would call the Companions of the Prophet; the sahâba. To these companions were added the successors (tâbi’îne), and then the successors of the successors (tâbi’îna tâbi’îne)… These three groups formed what the theologians were to call “Salaf”, the pious predecessors: three generations that represented the golden age of Islam’ (Amghar 2007:39) He further notes how ‘[t]he Salaf were distinguished by their exemplary piety, and by their military conquests, which were the foundations of a great empire stretching from Spain to India. Theologians and clerics thus established a causal relationship between the faith of the Salaf and their military and political success’ (ibid).

The use of violence for the revolutionary strand is justified on the basis of a continuation of the ‘established practice of fighting injustice that dates back to the Prophet’s rebellion against the Meccan oligarchs,’ they further ‘attempt to emulate and associate themselves with the piety and virtues of past heroes,’ and use past successes ‘to convince themselves and prospective supporters that they enjoy God’s favour and will prevail, irrespective of the odds’ (Ryan 2007: 987-88). Their eventual aim is the establishment of the Caliphate.

Violence in the West is ‘offensive’ in nature, with the aim of coercing Western countries from withdrawing their support of un-Islamic authoritarian ‘Arab’ ‘regimes’, but violence perpetrated by ‘Muslims from Europe in Muslim countries’ is often ‘defensive’ with the aim of protecting communities seen as ‘victims’ of ‘Western’ ‘aggression’ (Amghar 2007:42).

While ‘‘jihad’ has many meanings, ranging from improving oneself in the image of God to taking up armed struggle for Allah,’ ‘jihad’ in the context of present day violence perpetrated by Al Qa’ida and its affiliates refers to ‘violent acts or the threat of violence,’ that has ‘a political purpose’ (Klausen 2009:404, Also see Ansari 2005). The Islamic thinkers that have influenced the philosophy of Al Qa’ida and its leaders, in particular include ‘Ibn Taymiyya’ ‘Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab’ ‘Mawlana Abul A’la Mawdudi’ and ‘Sayyid Qutb’ whose thinking has been expanded ‘in a way that increased the scope of permissible violence’ (Wiktorowicz 2005b:77). ‘Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya’ is ‘the best known medieval Salafi scholar’, whose ‘most important contributions to Salafi thought is his elaboration of the concept of tawhid – the unity of God…divided…into two categories: the unity of lordship and the unity of worship’
(ibid:78). The concept is important as ‘the unity of worship,’ has been interpreted by his followers, resulting in how modern day Salafis, particularly those believing in violence, justify their violent acts against both Muslims and non-Muslims. Mawdudi, in interpreting the notion of ‘the unity of worship,’ introduced his concept of ‘the modern jahiliyya… “the period of ignorance”…where unity of worship was divided ‘between the “party of God” and the “party of Satan,” which included Muslims who adhered to human-made law…’ (ibid). Sayyid Qutb expanding on Mawdudi’s work ‘reinforced the stark distinction between the Party of God and the Party of Satan: all those who do not put faith into action through an Islamic legal system and strictly obey the commands of God are part of the modern jahiliyya and no longer Muslims,’ advocating a form of ‘jihad’ that necessitated ‘force’ for the prevalence of Islam and ending of oppression (ibid:79). Wiktorowicz highlights how ‘Ibn Wahhab’s’ influence was through his work ‘The Ten Voiders [or Nullifiers] of Islam’ which outline different factors that ‘automatically expel someone from’ Islam (ibid:81). While such thinkers influenced the violent philosophy of Al Qa’ida, not all Salafis follow such a violent interpretation, many condemning groups like Al Qa’ida and others disagreeing over the use of violence, particularly the killing of civilians and those that Al Qa’ida and their affiliates consider apostates (Briggs and Birdwell 2009:18 discussing the work of Trevor Stanley).

The discussion on Salafism and the various strands that exist within this school are important in recognizing the problematic nature of simplifying Salafist thought within the security agenda46 (See Lambert 2008a, 2008b; Spalek and Lambert 2008). The same thinking translates into how Muslim student groups and societies are perceived, where

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46 Also see Desai’s (2007) discussion on ‘Global Islamism’ which again simplifies and generalizes ‘Islamism’ as linked to terrorism.
vulnerability of students turning towards extremism is often premised on generalizations about Islam and its various schools of thought. As Spalek and Lambert (2008:266) observe ‘unless this conflation between violent and non-violent groups is challenged it becomes normal to deal with Salafis and Islamists not as ‘communities’ but as ‘subversive groups’ and as ‘associates’ of subversive groups.’ Engagement with such groups continue to be dominated by a security agenda, without realizing the realities of different Islamic groups, also resulting in Islamophobic encounters and further alienation. This is particularly evident in the creation of categories such as ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’, which are promoted by media and political rhetoric. The British government’s attempt at tackling ‘Islamist extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ resulted in a conscientious effort to work with Muslim communities, but only those that they label ‘moderates’ (Also see Birt 2005). This resulted in the creation of external categories, the radicals/extremists and the law-abiding moderates. In universities, such perceptions clearly manifest in how the activities of student Islamic societies are monitored, where ‘moderate’ speakers are welcomed to universities, whereas those deemed ‘extremist’ by security think tanks such as the Centre for Social Cohesion and other government departments are banned. This raises the important question of who is a ‘moderate’ and an ‘extremist’, and who defines them. While Tyrer (2010) would argue that such definitions move beyond binaries where ‘degrees of alterity’ (as discussed in the previous chapter, see pg. 33) determine how definitions vary in relation to what is deemed acceptable at different points in history, a binary conceptualization nonetheless is evoked through an ‘Orientalized’ and ‘Securitized’ rhetoric of ‘Us versus Them.’

47 No where is this more evident than in the rhetoric employed by President George Bush, where he states “You're either with us or against us in the fight against terror.” (CNN 6/11/2001).
An example that illustrates how such constructions may influence individual experiences is the case of journalist Mehdi Hasan who was subject to online abuses from readers after he joined the magazine ‘New Statesman’ and more recently the ‘Huffington Post’. As he observes, ‘…I’ve lost count of the number of websites that try to “out” every Muslim in public life as an extremist or Islamist of some shape or form’ whether it be Conservative party member Sayeeda Warsi, ‘Labour’s Sadiq Khan’ or ‘Labour peer Lord Ahmed’ which makes one wonder ‘if Muslims such as Warsi, Khan, Ahmed and me are all secret extremists, who are the moderates? That, of course, seems to be the implicit, insidious message: there aren’t any’ (Hasan 08 July, 2012). By securitizing the Muslim identity both in the construction of the radical/extremist who follows a Salafist school of thought (without understanding Salafism), as well as the moderate who can be identified in appearance as someone ‘like us’ clean-shaven, wearing western clothes, there still continues to be a degree of suspicion linked to the Muslim identity. The emergence of what is considered an extremist is further blamed on the ‘moderates’, ‘who are held responsible for their failure to stop the ‘extremists’… proof of the general failure of Muslims to adjust to modernity’ (Kundnani 2012:160). The level of Muslim vulnerability towards radicalism that is highlighted in the government’s Prevent agenda testifies to such a suspicion, and fear of the Muslim terrorist in the closet. As Hopkins and Kahani Hopkins (2009) observe ‘…it is the merging of different discourses and the ensuing lack of specificity for differentiating between extremism and moderation which means that all may feel vulnerable to being judged as ‘bad’…Yet, it is not simply that one may be miscategorized as extremist. Accepting the labelling as moderate may also be oppressive if it involved accepting terms of reference that are not one’s own’ (2009:103). This
further limits the power Muslims themselves have in both defining their Muslimness and their right to practice their religion without being labelled an extremist or moderate. Brown’s study on Muslim women and mosques illustrates this limitation where women in practicing a non-moderate version of Islam that separates religion from culture, are able to claim their rights and gain legitimacy. Yet their ‘‘fundamental’’ position on Islam’ is perceived as ‘radical’ and ‘threatening’ by the ‘government’ (Brown 2008:482-83).

The problem of such categorization is its continued reliance on religion in order to provide an explanation for July 7, 2005 and for the actions of a terrorist organization like Al Qa’ida. This problematizes the nexus between religion and politics where ‘a person can have strong religious faith – Islamic or any other – along with tolerant politics,’ but ‘the insistence, if only implicitly, on choiceless singularity of human identity…savagely’ ‘challenges,’ ‘shared humanity,’ with ‘differences… narrowed into one devised system of uniquely powerful categorization’ (Sen 2006:15-17; Also see Nagel and Staeheli 2011). Instead of attempting to strengthen the ‘shared humanity’ amongst different communities irrespective of race or religion, the state’s continued insistence on ‘securitizing’ the Muslim community, by deciding what is an acceptable version of Islam, further creates misunderstandings about Islam, as well as assumes a simplistic system of categories, that may not necessarily reflect the religious or political points of view of the individuals and groups in question. Furthermore, by reducing security concerns to ‘Islamic extremism’, and engaging with Muslim communities on the basis of a counter terrorism narrative, the legitimacy of a non violent yet Islamic narrative continues to be overlooked and undermined, a narrative that could be just as important in providing an alternative to the
small group of violent extremists that exist within Islam, as they do in other religions and ideologies. As Professor Modood notes in his interview,

‘... I would say that what perhaps the radicals are not sufficiently hearing loudly and clearly is from other Muslims saying, hey you are not the solution, you are making things worse or because of you we are all getting a bad name. Because you are contributing to greater fear, conflict, polarization and Islamophobia, You are making everything worse for all of us. We are having to cope with your so-called heroic martyrdom. We are all having to cope with the fallout.’

(Interview with Professor Modood, December 14, 2009)

Such alternative voices are being either overlooked or undermined. As Sen (2006) observes, ‘...in the context of Blair’s frequent invoking of “the moderate and true voice of Islam,” we have to ask whether it is at all possible – or necessary – to define a “true Muslim” in terms of political and social beliefs about confrontation and tolerance, on which different Muslims have historically taken…very different positions. The effect of this religion-centered political approach, and of the institutional policies it has generated…has been to bolster and strengthen the voice of religious authorities while downgrading the importance of nonreligious institutions and movements’ (Sen 2006:77).

Furthermore, categorizations such as ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ may further fall into the performative trap as noted in the American context where Maira (2011) observes ‘the desire to perform “good” Muslim citizenship has altered the identities and social relations within Muslim American communities after 9/11 and created divisiveness, mistrust, and suspicion related to questions of dissent and complicity’ (2011:121). Hence such categories raise the question of legitimacy within the Muslim community with ‘Muslim thinkers, activists and reformers’ avoiding ‘the label of “moderate”’ because of ‘the perception of having sold out on their religion to the west and its suffocating terminology’ (Ramadan 12/02/2010). While the narratives presented in this research
testify to the problematic nature of such categorization, and provide insights into alternative progressive voices within the university by students who are Muslims, the role of the media in perpetuating such stereotypes, needs to be further examined.

d. Media – Truth or fiction, on reporting the ‘Islamist terrorist’ threat

In criticizing the media two weeks after the September 11 attacks, Christopher Allen at a conference described how the media continued to commit Islamophobia by perpetuating an image of the barbaric ‘fanatic’ (Allen 2001). However, media, whether broadcast or print has always had an uneasy relationship with representations of Muslims, as outlined by Edward W. Said, in his book ‘Covering Islam. How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World.’ In a foreword for the revised edition of the same book in 1996, Said explained how media’s representation of Islam in the news was plagued with ‘ignorance’ and ‘hostility’ (Said 1997: xIviii). Massey and Tatla (2012) in exploring media representation of British Muslims after the Bradford riots of 2001, expose how ethnic minority and Muslim populations were held accountable for the violence, where media reports created a ‘new folk devil’ in the form of the ‘Muslim extremist, scapegoated for being criminally inclined and socially problematic because of failure to ‘integrate’’ (Massey and Tatla 2012:161; Also see Werbner 2005a; 2012). Abbas (2011) traces such media portrayals of Muslims after ‘the Rushdie Affair’ in 1988, the ‘Danish cartoon controversy’ in 2006 and the remarks by ‘Jack Straw’ in the same year when he ‘argued’ that ‘the niqab…was a “visible statement of separation and of difference”’ (Abbas 2011:67-68; 70-72). In a post 9/11 climate Halliday (2002) explains how the media’s rhetoric has been instrumental in increasing ‘anti-Muslim’ sentiment, and perpetuating the stereotype of the Muslim radical. This is true for the ‘tabloids’ as
well as the film industry, where films such as ‘The Siege’ (Ramji 2003)\textsuperscript{48} have replaced the old Soviet enemy, with that of the Arab. ‘Trial by media’ is also a phenomenon which Fekete (2009) highlights. Muslim suspects are often represented as guilty in the media, with links to terrorist networks, despite their innocence.\textsuperscript{49}

Dekker and Van der Noll’s research on Islamophobia in the Netherlands utilized ‘intergroup contact theory’\textsuperscript{50} to illustrate how ‘negative attitudes’ towards ‘ethnic outgroups’ are more ‘the result of processing…emotional and informative messages that individuals receive from relevant others,’ which include ‘family, school, church, mass media, peer group, and political leaders’ (Dekker and Van der Noll 2012:113 discussing the works of Laswell 1977, Jennings 2007, Jennings et al. 2009, and Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007 Italics added by me). While their findings could not directly establish a causal relationship between negative attitudes and the media, the findings from this research nonetheless illustrate how the influence of the media is considered an important element for the existence of Islamophobia in British society (Also see Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010a). Furthermore, the Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies’ extensive research in 2008 on media coverage of Islam and British Muslims between 2000 to 2008 further revealed how ‘British Muslims’ were either portrayed as ‘a threat (in relation to terrorism), a problem (in terms of differences in values) or both (Muslim extremism in general)’ (Moore et al 2008:3, Also see Baker and McEnery 2011; 48 Television programs such as ‘24’ by the Fox Network and ‘Homeland’ by Showtime have also sparked controversy over their portrayal of Muslims as terrorists (Doward 30/01/2005; Showtime 2013).

\textsuperscript{49} Amongst the examples Fekete mentions ‘the case against 16 North Africans’ accused of carrying explosive materials, when in fact, they were carrying ‘cologne, olive oil, honey, household ammonia and washing powder’. (Fekete 2009:60). The same could be said of the Muslim students in Manchester who were portrayed as terrorists, despite lack of evidence against them (Laville et al 2009).

\textsuperscript{50} The theory shows how interactions with ‘outgroups’ may reduce the level of ‘negative…attitudes’ towards those groups. Their study demonstrated how greater contact with Muslims who make up the outer group plays a positive role in reducing Islamophobia in society (Dekker and Van der Noll 2012:113; 119-123).
Saeed 2007; Miller 2006). Such reporting in broadcast or print can be understood within Hall’s notion of media and representation, where ‘interpretation’, ‘contexts’, funding, individual and government agendas, are all important aspects in the construction and ‘representations’ of ‘truths’ (See Hall 2010; 2003; 1977). Frost further observes how such ‘representations’ or ‘what is seen to be worthy of ‘news’’ has been selected and reported in forms that represent particular and preferred interpretations of issues,’ (2008:570) that often construct and reinforce ‘different forms of racism within British society that presents itself in more subtle but equally powerful ways’ (2008:574). Whether such reporting is for ratings, competition, or some political agenda, negative reporting on Muslims has increased after 9/11 and 7/7 (Fekete 2009; Frost 2008; Allen 2010a). Such negative reporting influences the day-to-day lives of Muslims, as highlighted in this research. Such ‘misinformation’ reveals ‘a rational process’ in ‘the…demonisation of Muslims’ rather than an ‘irrational fear’ or ‘phobia’ of Islam (Birt 2009:218). However, initiatives such as the Leveson Inquiry are underway to improve the quality and standards of media reporting. The ‘submission to the Leveson Inquiry’ by ENGAGE, an organization that monitors media reports and racism illustrates the realization of the problems posed by a problematic press. ENGAGE requested ‘a more robust system of self-regulation’ by media bodies with the ‘right of third party complainants to challenge misrepresentations, inaccuracies and false reporting’ (ENGAGE 2011:5). While the Leveson Inquiry did not explore the problem of media in relation to Muslims and Islam in Britain, The Islam Channel with its partners has set up

51 Inquiry into the ‘culture, practices and ethics of the press’ by Lord Justice Leveson. The inquiry was concerned with ‘a phone-hacking scandal’ that implicated the press and the police. Yet the inquiry is important in highlighting the problems and limitations of the press, and provides solutions including ‘self-regulation’ providing an overview of codes of ethics required for a free, responsible and impartial British press (See The Leveson Inquiry 2012).
‘The Alternative Leveson’ to investigate ‘The Practice of Reporting Muslim and Islamic Affairs’ (See The Alternative Leveson Inquiry 2012). Hence, such initiatives aim to highlight and provide solutions to such negative portrayals of Muslims, which further encourage Islamophobia. However, before exploring the narratives in this research that highlight how such negative portrayals influence daily lives of Muslim students, an overview of Muslim females within the security agenda and student radicals needs to be explored.

e. The Muslim female: The Victim and the radical

In reviewing the literature on Muslim women in Britain, in particular research on South Asian and Pakistani women related to religion and culture, the narrative continues to fluctuate between the Muslim veiled woman, and progressive second or third generation Muslim females in educational institutions from schools to universities, to the labour force (See Contractor 2012; Mohammad 2010; Meer et al 2010; Haw 2010, 2009; Thiara and Gill 2010; Erel 2009; Khattab 2009; Joppke 2009b; Dwyer and Shah 2009; Bhopal 2009, 2008; Afshar 2008; Thompson 2008; Ahmad 2003, 2001; Dale et al 2002; Dwyer 2000,1999a; Parker-Jenkins et al 1997; Brah 1993) Women are both oppressed by tradition but are also seen as challenging a backward culture, while using religion as a source of empowerment rather than oppression (See Siraj 2011; Williamson and Khiabany 2010; Shirazi and Mishra 2010; Thapar-Bjorkert and Sanghera 2010; Bhimji 2009; Sanghera and Thapar-Bjorkert 2007; Tyrer and Ahmad 2006). Hence, while these narratives often contradict each other, fluctuating between agency and oppression, the one consistent theme is that of change in the lives of young Muslim women who access education and employment, though the scale of this change is debatable (Also see Ahmad
In contextualizing the discussion in this research on Islamophobia and British/Pakistani female students, an overview of the aftermath of 7/7 on Muslim women in Britain is necessary to examine. Following the terrorist attacks of July 7, the visibility of the ‘veiled’ Muslim woman in the public space has increased, making her more ‘vulnerable’ to Islamophobic attacks (Faith Matters 2013a; Townsend 09/03/2013; Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010a; Zebiri 2011; Allen 2010a; Meer and Modood 2010; Tyrer and Ahmad 2006). While most discussion on Muslims as trouble makers in Britain, from the time of the Rushdie Affair to a post 7/7 context focused mostly on men as perpetrators, oppressors, barbaric, unruly, extremists, or vulnerable to extremism, Muslim women, in particular British Pakistani women were mostly viewed as the opposite, the oppressed, the backward, confined to the private sphere (Gottschalk and Greenberg 2011:202-205; Tyrer and Ahmed 2006). This stereotype is clearly illustrated in Werbner’s discussion of ‘the English “scarf affair” …in 1989’ which ‘began when two teenage Muslim girls (the Alwi sisters)’ were suspended for wearing ‘headscarves to school’ (Werbner 2005b:35). While the girls were allowed to wear scarves by the school board eventually, the narrative that permeated media accounts about Muslims varied from the ‘oppressed’ to the ‘fanatic’ (Werbner 2005b:36; also see Werbner 2007). Following a similar trajectory, while for men experiences of discrimination and Islamophobia often involved accusations of terrorism, Muslim women particularly in this research had experiences or encounters that considered them oppressed and backward (Spalek and Lambert 2008; Hopkins 2007:
In discussing women and the narrative on radicalisation, Professor Modood observes,

‘[t]here clearly is a big big gender divide here. I suspect that there are some women that are involved but if you like they are less frontline. They are likely to perhaps know a brother or a husband who is involved rather than be involved themselves, but they maybe quite supportive, I think that’s possible. .... It is difficult to fully explain that except that obviously in many societies, virtually in all societies, but especially Muslims, especially people with South Asian and Middle Eastern background and so on, there is a very strong sense that men are public agents, certainly men do the fighting and also that men stand up for their communities. That the honour of the community is related to male honour. That you for instance fail to stand up for your family, or your community, then shame on you if you’re a man, whereas if you are a woman, well then okay you are not strong enough to stand up. I think there are reasons to do with traditionalist gender roles, and ideas about male honour.’

(Interview with Professor Modood, December 14, 2009)

However, with the emergence of female Muslim extremists, particularly as highlighted in the media, the British Muslim female identity, especially for those who carry Islamic signifiers, in the form of the ‘hijab’ and the ‘niqab’, are juxtaposed between oppressed on the one hand, and a security threat on the other. This threat can be both a direct physical danger of the terrorist under the ‘niqab’, but also a cultural threat believed to be a physical manifestation of a primitive religion that disturbs the liberal fabric of British society. This is clearly witnessed in the case of the ‘niqab’ ban at Imperial College London in 2005. Ironically, the security agenda through the creation of the suspicious Muslim figure behind the ‘niqab’ has further removed agency from young women, many of whom take on the ‘veil’ or the ‘niqab’ of their own free will. While the case of

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52 Samina Malik, the ‘lyrical terrorist’ is an example who became the first Muslim woman ‘convicted under new terrorism legislation after writing poems entitled How To Behead and The Living Martyrs’ (Truscott 06/12/2007). While her ‘sentence was suspended for 18 months,’ her trial and conviction nonetheless reinforced the fear of radicalism amongst Muslims.

53 One student who in her second year removed the niqab because of the ban, and after graduation wore it again, observed, ‘Of course no girl would mind taking her niqab off at security checkpoints if this was the only way, but the reason why the niqab is not easy to be taken off, is literally because it is part of Islamic worship...a choice for the Muslim woman’ (Khaled 2/10/2012).
Imperial College illustrates a private decision it nonetheless reflects the nature of insecurity bred by a narrative around Islam and terrorism.

The problem with the narrative is the difficulty in balancing perceived insecurities with religious rights and freedoms. There is no denying the existence of a security threat, clearly illustrated by Roshonara Choudhry who ‘stabbed a 55 year old MP for East Ham twice in the stomach… “to get revenge for the people of Iraq”’ (BBC News 03/11/2010). Another woman, Shasta Khan was found guilty of ‘engaging in preparation for terrorism’ by helping her husband to plan an attack against the local ‘Jewish community’ (BBC News 19/07/2012). Yet, the problem lies in a response, which tends to demonize all young women who may be overtly religious, yet peaceful. The generalizations about such women, and the ‘niqabi’ and ‘hijabi’ by the media echo Croft’s notion of otherization where the Muslim is both a ‘radical’ and an ‘orientalised’ inferior individual, who either needs to be saved from a repressive culture and religion, or needs to be protected from being radicalized. As Brown (2008) observes ‘these gendered stereotypes have significant implications for the discursive framework in which women’s rights and political activism is envisaged… creating images of vulnerable women who need saving by hyper- masculine heroes intervening in women’s campaigns on their behalf’ (Brown 2008:482; Also see Allen and Guru 2012). Such a saviour complex echoes across society whether it is everyday encounter with the hijab/niqab or media stereotypes of the vulnerable Muslim woman. Being a Pakistani and a Muslim further adds to this vulnerability as incidents of ‘honour killings’, stereotype the entire Pakistani community.
and culture as yet again oppressive and backward\(^5\) (Werbner 2005b; Dwyer 1999b; 2000; Dwyer and Shah 2009).

However, banning the ‘hijab’ or the ‘niqab’ will not ensure security, the assumption again reiterating the moderate/extremist fallacy whereby religious practice is instinctively linked to political radicalism. As Monshipouri (2010:47) observes ‘such restrictions may well provoke a backlash that could foster extremism.’ While the UK government, unlike its European counterpart has not banned Islamic dress in public the narrative that is often evoked around the ‘hijab’ and ‘niqab’ through media nonetheless results in an Islamophobic understanding of Muslim women and agency. ‘Islam today has come to embody a representation of women that some find distasteful or loathsome….The \textit{hijab}, then, can only be perceived as an attack on female dignity once a reconstruction has taken place based on what one knows (or thinks one knows) about Islamic civilizations. Such an interpretation of a system of religious symbols, that fails to take into account the people who chose to display them, constitutes in itself a limitation of an individual’s freedom of conscience’ (Cesari 2010a:164).

Taking ‘account’ of both ‘people who chose’ to wear Islamic symbols, as well as those Muslims who do not, this research provides individual insights into such stereotypes, where responses of participants demonstrate assertiveness and activism that is often overshadowed by generalizations and stereotypes. Through individual narratives the voice of young women, those who are talked about in the literature and within the broader socio-political ‘discourse’ ‘community’ but are seldom provided an opportunity

\(^5\) The murder of ‘Shafiea Ahmed’ by her parents in the name of ‘honour,’ considered too ‘Westernized’ by her Pakistani parents reinforce the image of the oppressed Pakistani/Muslim woman (Carter 03/08/2012). While honour killing is a problem and a crime, such incidents are often generalized, where all Pakistani/Muslim women are viewed as oppressed victims of culture and religion.
to share their own narratives come through, where their ‘discourses’ (Bakhtin 1981) testify to an alternative narrative, one that challenges the stereotype of the ‘oppressed’ and/or ‘securitized’ Muslim woman, ‘discourses’ that as this research illustrates, exists in pockets across universities in England.

f. Universities and the Muslim radical

While the previous section discussed perceptions of British Muslim women as oppressed or backward, particularly those who wear Islamic symbols, such perceptions are also present within the university reinforcing experiences of Islamophobia. However, the university becomes further problematic because of its links to radicalisation and ‘Islamist terrorism’ that came to light on discovering that the young terrorists involved in 9/11 and 7/7 were university graduates, many of whom had met on campus rather than in a shady corner of an unknown place (Hamid 2007; Glees and Pope 2005). As a result, the notion of the stereotypical disgruntled, disenfranchised youth who turns to terrorism was completely shattered. Furthermore, investigation into groups classified as extremists, such as the Hizb ut Tahrir, showed how higher education institutions were targeted as recruiting grounds (The Centre for Social Cohesion 2010). In response to such findings, the UK government further implicated universities and Muslims in its securitization process. Under Prevent 2011 university ‘staff’ and ‘administration are advised to be vigilant about any ‘signs of radicalisation’ for the sheer purpose of ensuring the ‘welfare’ and well-being of their students (HM Government 2011a: 76; Also see Secretary of State for the Home Department 2012). With these ‘signs’ being undefined, Muslim students are further securitized, even within policies on student welfare. While ‘signs’ in isolation might seem insignificant, the lack of definition leaves room for human biases and
prejudices that might be the result of fear, reinforced through media accounts of the Muslim terrorist, the bearded radical or the burqa clad hidden woman. Such securitization therefore fuels Islamophobic perceptions and attitudes towards Muslims, particularly within universities towards Islamic societies and other Muslim student groups.

The case of Rizwaan Sabir illustrates such insecurities. Sabir was a ‘master’s student’ who downloaded the Al Qa’ida training manual from the ‘US Department of Justice’ website, ‘a manual… which could be bought at WH Smith, Waterstones and Amazon as well as the university’s own library’ (Townsend 14/07/2012). He sent it to a ‘friend’ for advice on his research, ‘a friend’ who ‘was well known on campus as a mentor for Muslim students’ (Thornton 2011:423). When ‘a member of staff’ discovered ‘the document’ on Sabir’s computer he was reported to the authorities and arrested along with his friend (Jones 14/09/2011). ‘Sabir and his friend were held and questioned for 6 days because of their possession of the Al Qaeda Training Manual’ (Thornton 2011:423), and were eventually released without charge. In this case, the two actors who could have helped Sabir and his friend became a source of the problem: the ‘university authorities’ who claimed that the student had no right to access such a document, despite his supervisor’s insistence that the document ‘was relevant to his research,’ (Thornton 2011; Jones 14/09/2011), and the police authorities who were later discovered to have ‘fabricated key elements of the case against’ him (Townsend 14/07/2012). While the police authorities later monetarily compensated Sabir and issued an apology ‘for being stopped and searched’ the level of bias against Sabir in this case demonstrates how dominant narratives around the Muslim student radical influences the perceptions of local actors. The role of the police is reminiscent of the problems of racism highlighted by the
‘Stephen Lawrence’ Inquiry (1999) as discussed in the previous chapter, yet in the case of Sabir, the police clearly demonstrated levels of Islamophobia. The same holds true for the university who took on the role of a counter terrorism actor at the expense of an innocent student. His supervisor Rod Thornton was further suspended from his post after he published a piece on the incompetence of the University of Nottingham in the case of Sabir (See BBC News 30/03/2012; 12/05/2011). As Thornton observed, ‘the university’ implemented ‘[t]he ‘better-safe-than-sorry’’ approach by calling the ‘police straightaway’ instead of carrying ‘out some basic checks’ (Thornton 2011:423-24). Hence, ‘[t]he tragedy of this approach was that while the university authorities trumpeted the fact that they were providing a supposed duty of care to the collective, they were not doing so for the individuals involved’ (ibid:424). This ‘safe college’ image in the case of Sabir compromised his rights as a researcher, which has further implications for Muslim researchers in universities (as illustrated in the narratives in this thesis). It further compromises the function of a university, which according to Said provides a ‘Utopian space’ for research on minorities in plural societies (Said 1994:xxix). This space is politically neutral, where individuals can challenge dominant narratives without the fear of being persecuted for their distinct views. However, the danger of creating the university into a *Big Brother* for the state, ‘where social and political issues are actually either imposed or resolved would be to remove the university’s function and turn it into an adjunct to whatever political party is in power’ (Said, 1994:xxix). Hence, while the university is situated in the wider socio-political milieu, it is in a reciprocal process of both shaping and being shaped by dominant social narratives.
The case of the North Western 10, as discussed in Chapter 6, and the 2007 arrest of five British Muslim students from Bradford for downloading ‘and sharing masses of extremist material,’ (Casciani 26/07/2007) further highlights the challenge that universities face to ensure the well being and security of their students, as well as ensure intellectual and academic freedom and inquiry without prejudice, while simultaneously be accountable to the government’s security agenda. With the discovery of more terrorists like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas day attacker who was once a student at UCL and the head of their ‘Islamic society’, universities and their Muslim students are constantly placed within a ‘vulnerable’ group, where universities are called upon to assist with the ‘security’ agenda (Universities UK 2011:2 The Centre for Social Cohesion Press Briefing – 5/01/2010; BBC News 12/10/2011).

Islamic societies (ISocs) in such a context have also come under the limelight, accused of promoting radicalism amongst Muslim students. The Centre for Social Cohesion (CSC) has repeatedly highlighted the extreme nature of such student societies, which had previously been infiltrated by members of Hizb ut-Tahrir for the purpose of recruitment. The CSC also compiled a list of ‘extremist speakers’ circulated to Islamic society members and universities to prevent them from giving talks to Muslim students (CSC 2010). Lord Carlile’s ‘Report to the Home Secretary of Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and Strategy,’ further accused the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) for not doing enough to counter ‘extremism’ on campuses (HM Government 2011c:11), a view reinforced by the Home Affairs Committee Report on ‘Roots of violent radicalisation’ (2012). In exploring the experiences of students in three student Islamic societies Song (2012) observes how generalization about ‘extremism’ amongst Islamic
societies overlooks ‘all the other aspects of ISOC membership within universities, and all
the students who join ISOCs for entirely innocuous, and indeed, laudable, reasons’ (2012:158).

The narratives in this thesis will explore student responses to such accusations, but they
also highlight the possibility of positive Muslim student activism that is often overlooked
within the security lens. Student activism and radicalism within the university is an old
phenomenon. Student movements in Britain historically have varied, given the changing
social and economic environments, from the ‘town and gown’ clash of 1354 at the
University of Oxford\textsuperscript{55} (Halsey and Marks 1968), to the 1960s where student activism
was related to ‘internal university or college issues...than national or international issues’
(Blackstone and Hadley 1971:3). Rootes (1980) in a discussion on student radical
movements explains how ‘student movements are creatures of the societies in which they
occur and as such they evince, in variable measure, all the excellences and deformities of
their circumstances’ (Rootes 1980:473). Present day student activism can similarly vary
from internal demands to more national or international concerns, such as anti-war
protests, anti-austerity protests, or animal rights. This is true in the case of Muslim
students, who organize around issues of a prayer room or access to halal\textsuperscript{56} meat, to the
more international concerns about Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan or Kashmir
(Tyrer and Ahmad 2006; Tyrer 2003; Ahmad 2001).

By simplifying the radical and violent extremist connection amongst Muslim students,
not only is there a danger of implicating Muslim student radicals who are politically

\textsuperscript{55} Clash between the residents of Oxford and the university. Some accounts argue that the clash was the
result of Oxford students who constantly ‘flouted’ the laws, ‘destroyed property’ and ‘harmed’ the citizens,
resulting in an eventual clash, also known as the ‘St Scholastica’s Day Riot’ (Boren 2001:12).

\textsuperscript{56} ‘Literally ‘released’ from prohibition. The Hebrew equivalent \textit{kashar} implies something that is fit, or
suitable.’ (Halliday 2002:13).
active but do not harbour any violent tendencies, but also results in an Islamophobic perception of Muslim students that would breed resentment and promote isolation. As ‘H. A Hellyer, a research fellow at the University of Warwick and deputy convener of a Home Office working group on tackling extremism and radicalisation’ observed, ‘[u]niversities are generally not held accountable for the actions of their graduates; not for IRA sympathisers who graduated from British universities, nor extremists from any background - the British National Party chairman is a University of Cambridge graduate.’ As he warns universities are not ‘security establishments,’ (Newman 7/01/2010), and treating them as such would compromise intellectual and academic freedom.

The government however has become more sensitive to the role of the university in both preserving and promoting academic freedom and intellectual curiosity and their difficult role within the state’s security agenda. According to the Home Affairs Committee report there is acknowledgement that ‘there may be a much less direct link’ ‘between university education and terrorist activity,’ ‘than was thought in the past,’ (2012:13) though it may still be present, therefore ‘the government’ still needs to ‘issue clearer guidance to universities about their expected role in Prevent, following consultation with university and student representative bodies’ (2012:44). The Universities UK report on ‘Freedom of speech on campus: rights and responsibilities in UK universities’ further highlighted the need for university personnel to be involved in ‘the development of relevant policies and associated strategies’ and be involved in the ‘implementation’ process of such ‘policies’ (Universities UK 2011:32). However, in a context where consensus over terms such as radicalisation, Islamism, moderate and extremist are yet to be reached, much more than a clear guidance is required for the university to be part of the security agenda, without
compromising its own neutrality and impartiality. With a fear of the Muslim student radical also reinforced through such an agenda, ‘Islamophobia’ then takes the form of a ‘fear of Muslim political agency’ (Birt 2010:117) particularly in the university, where students who are politically active albeit for Muslim campaigns are viewed with suspicion. The attempt of organizations like the Universities UK, ‘the representative organization for UK’s universities’ to address the problem of intellectual and academic freedom, and the state’s security agenda, is a positive starting point, though the possibility of innocent Muslim students being implicated in the security narrative continues to be a challenge.

Experiences of Islamophobia, whether being falsely accused of terrorism or more day to day encounters continue in universities, though such instances particularly escalated after 9/11 and 7/7. Islamophobic attacks have varied from students being picked on by professors or fellow students for their Islamic views, (Tyrer 2003; Hussain 2007), to physical attacks and altercations. According to a study undertaken by the Office for Public Management (OPM) and Serena Hussain (2009), on experiences of Muslim students in Higher Education and further education institutions in London, ‘eighty four

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57 The report ‘Oversight of security-sensitive research material in UK universities: guidance’ (2012) is important in recommending the need to ‘expand...existing research ethics approval processes,’ that would ensure security-sensitive literature is not misused, and protect young students and academics from being accused of a security breach in their academic work (2012:2). However, while regulations are required problems around what could be a security breach will again need to be addressed, where in the case of Rizwaan Sabir, the document being accessed was in fact widely available to the general public.

58 Further problematic for Overseas Pakistani students is the 2012 changes in student visa requirement that now necessitates a ‘face-to-face’ interview for all students applying to UK universities, to ‘root out’ ‘bogus’ applicants. While this measure is more a consequence of an economic crisis and the need to reduce immigrants, it nonetheless encourages a negative perception about Pakistani students as well the UK for potential Pakistani students, who have to go through extra measures to get a student visa to the UK (See The Huffington Post 13/04/2012; Watt 13/04/2012).

59 In 2009 ‘a mob of 30 white and black youths...surrounded Asian students near City University in central London and attacked them with metal poles, bricks and sticks while shouting racist abuse. Three people – two students and a passerby who tried to intervene – were stabbed’ (Bates 9/11/2009, Also see Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010a:26-32).
percent of Muslim ‘students’ who experienced Islamophobia ‘failed to report it to their institution’ (OPM and Hussain 2009:8). In another study Hussain (2007) highlighted suspicion and mistrust in some institutions, where Muslim students suspected university authorities of spying on Islamic societies.

Other research such as Tyrer’s (2003) work on ‘institutionalized’ Islamophobia in universities also recorded different levels of discrimination within universities faced by Muslim students. Nabi (2011:4) in her doctoral thesis outlines how universities practice a form of ‘racialised governmentality’ against Muslim students that has institutionalized ‘Islamophobia.’ While these studies are important in highlighting the existence of Islamophobia in universities, the insights of individuals who experience Islamophobia, their response to such discrimination and the nature of their resistance to Islamophobic narratives is necessary, in order to gain a more grass roots perspective on Muslims and discrimination.

### III. Conclusion: Race, Security and Islamophobia

The existing literature on security and Muslims in Britain as this chapter highlighted presents a socio-political milieu of fear and insecurity. The government’s counter-terrorism agenda, instead of creating a more secure environment, has further increased a sense of vulnerability for both Muslims and other communities within Britain, where the immediate threat of Al Qa’ida and its affiliates has further transformed into an existential threat, where the place of Muslims in British society is constantly questioned. The result

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60 This study included the creation of ‘an expert panel’ with representatives from the ‘academia, faith communities, further and higher educational institutions, the National Union of Students and wider policy fields’ (OPM and Hussain 2009:10). Review of existing literature and a survey of ‘672’ ‘students’ from across institutions in London were undertaken, along with focus groups and ‘stake holder interview’ (ibid:10-11).
of securitizing universities and Muslims students, schools and immigration, has further isolated the Muslim community despite attempts at working with them. Hence, such a narrative goes back to the repeated claims of a failure of multiculturalism as discussed in the previous chapter, where the existence of a home-grown terrorist threat in the form of a Muslim extremist or radical reveals a problem of over accommodation of different identities and religions that go against ‘British values’ (O’Toole et al 2013). The burqa clad woman, or a Muslim who expresses allegiance to his/her religion before his/her country, despite claiming to be a British Muslim becomes antithetical to what it means to be a modern day British citizen.

Furthermore, tracing the history of racism particularly for the ‘coloured’, Pakistani, South Asian, and Muslim community in Britain from the last chapter, to the present discussion on security and the Muslim subject, reveals how racism for this community has moved from a question of ‘colour’, to one where religion is essentialized, resulting in the ‘racialisation of Muslims’ (Meer and Modood 2010). In exploring the phenomenon of Islamophobia within a post 9/11 and 7/7 environment, this ‘racialisation’ is further meshed with a narrative of ‘securitization’, resulting in Croft’s ‘Orientalized’ and ‘Radicalized’ Other’. Hence, Islamophobia both ‘racialises’ and ‘securitizes’ Muslims in a post 9/11 socio-political milieu. Such an overview of racism and Islamophobia for the British/Pakistani Muslim community is important in contextualizing the narratives of British/Pakistani students in this research, which inform their experiences as located within their multiple ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ (Bakhtin 1981) both within and outside the university, informed by this larger narrative of an ‘Orientalized’ and ‘Securitized’
Muslim, references which are constantly evoked in the discussions of Islamophobia and radicalism as explored in Chapter 5 to 7.
Chapter IV

Methodology

In discussing the methodology of this research, the chapter outlines the narrative framework of inquiry for exploring the experiences of Islamophobia within the diverse ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ of participants. This chapter further describes the narrative categories designed for the purpose of analysis. Discussion of truth, validity and reliability within the method of a narrative inquiry is also undertaken, as well as an exploration of the problematic position of the researcher’s own identity, her insider-outsider dilemma, by highlighting the meaning of self-reflexivity within this research. The rationale of the sampling method is highlighted, and the obstacles encountered in recruiting participants for this research. The chapter further presents profiles of the universities, with particular emphasis on the ‘multi-cultural’ or ‘multi-religious’ character of different universities in the sample, the presence of student societies, as well as their stance on Islamophobia or anti-religious discrimination as highlighted on their websites or in documents that were obtained from university officials.

I. Introduction

In exploring the experiences, encounters, responses and reactions to Islamophobia of British/Pakistani Muslim female participants in this research a narrative method of inquiry is employed, that is located within a Bakhtinian ‘dialogical’ framework (1981; 1986). These narratives take the form of a reflective dialogue that draw on experiences and encounters, including past conversations with individuals in public and private gatherings, as well as reflections on being a British, Muslim and/or Pakistani female student within a ‘securitized’ and ‘otherized’ socio-political milieu (Croft 2012). Given the in-depth nature of the dialogue, a narrative analysis provides the analytical tool ‘to present experience holistically in all its complexity and richness’ (Bell 2002:209). The narrative strategy focuses on a diverse sample of forty students with a British/Pakistani female identity in universities located in the following regions across England: West Yorkshire, North and South West England, North and South East England, West Midlands, and within the vibrant city of London. The British/Pakistani/Muslim student,
the narrator of this research, is located within the wider context of a university, further situated in the socio-political milieu of an on-going war against Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates that places at its centre a Muslim, a British Muslim, and often a Pakistani subject. Thus, an engagement with Islamophobia through individual narrative creates the possibility of a dialogue that reflects on experiences as contextualized within the wider socio-political environment. These experiences are not in isolation, but a result of social interactions within and outside the university.

Before exploring the narrative strategy and the Bakhtinian dialogical framework that informs this research, the chapter begins by locating the sample. A brief overview of each of the universities is presented to provide a context to the immediate environment within which the individual and her narratives are located. The overview therefore highlights the demographic significance of Muslim students and the nature of student support in each university. The profiles also outline any outstanding characteristic of the university that is important in locating the narratives of participants. The chapter then provides the narrative strategy for this research, elaborating on the method of narrative interviews employed for the purpose of conducting research, as well as exploring the rationale for such a strategy and the obstacles associated with narrative research, including the problem of truth claims and validity. Procedures for analysis are further highlighted, followed by a discussion on the significance of this research. The chapter concludes with a self-reflexive discussion about the researcher’s positionality in researching a Pakistani, Muslim female population.
II. University Profile and selection

In exploring a grass roots account of Islamophobia through the experiences and encounters of British Muslim women with a Pakistani heritage and overseas Pakistani women in universities in England, participants were selected through a process of ‘purposive sampling’ and ‘snowballing’ (Creswell 2009:178, Denscombe 2010:37). In order to identify potential participants, sampling began with an overview of the Higher Education Statistical Agency’s (HESA) dataset, which is categorized for a Pakistani domiciled student body, on the basis of institution, gender, level (undergraduate/postgraduate) and principal subject from 2000/01 to 2007/08. This distribution was studied to identify which universities had a high proportion of Pakistani students, and which ones had a low population of Pakistani students. The reason for this distinction was to explore the varied experiences of students across universities. This is based on the premise that institutions with a high population of British/Pakistani students encounter Islamophobia differently, from one with a low population (Interview with Professor Modood, December, 14 2009). The dataset was further supplemented through an overview of existing literature on ethnic student choice and participation in higher education (See Office for Public Management and Hussain 2009; Thompson 2008; Bhopal 2008; Broecke and Hamed 2008; Brooks 2008; Richardson 2008; Bagguley and Hussain 2007; Gittoes and Thompson 2007; Tyrer and Ahmad 2006; Gorard and Smith 2006; Connor et al 2004; Archer 2003; Archer and Leathwood 2003; Dale et al 2002; Gayle et al 2002; Shiner and Modood 2002; Ahmad 2001; Reay 2001; Egerton and Halsey 1993). A profile of the university location was also studied to gain insights into
the population composition of the specific town in question in terms of ethnic and religious diversity.

Prior to contacting universities, a pilot study was designed to test the research strategy. Themes highlighted in the pilot study were further incorporated into the narrative strategy. In particular, the problematic nature of Pakistani student campaigns was identified during the pilot study, subsequent to which questions were included in the narrative study. The pilot study also included interviews with three experts in the field. Professor Tariq Ramadan was selected for his expertise in Islam, in particular European Muslims. Professor Anthony Glees was interviewed because of his interest in security studies, and terrorism. Professor Tariq Modood’s experience with researching racism and multiculturalism was important for developing a narrative strategy around the concept of Islamophobia within the context of British Pakistani Muslims. Questions to guide the narrative around these themes were finalized after assessing the results from the pilot study (See Appendix 1-A).

On identifying the universities the Pakistani and Islamic societies of each university was contacted via telephone and email. Since the initial response was slow, the researcher visited the universities to introduce herself, often attending Islamic Awareness events, including a session on Islamophobia, and a hijab workshop. Participants who were attending these Islamic Awareness events, Head sisters of Islamic societies but also non-members of Islamic societies through the Pakistani societies were contacted. The researcher presented the participant information document (See Appendix 1-C), as well as the research advertisement (See Appendix 1-B) for the purpose of circulating across the student body. Any questions that students had about the study were addressed
directly. The researcher further became involved with the National Pakistani student association’s\(^{61}\) annual conference that invites Pakistani and British Pakistani students from all over England to discuss current affairs in relation to Pakistan. The researcher participated in the 2010 session, while helped organize and preside over a panel in the 2011 session with the aim to both engage with Pakistani students and recruit participants for the research. Both the Islamic Awareness events and the Pakistani student conference were instrumental in finding participants. However, the nature of recruitment did not allow a standard number of participants from each university. Furthermore, through ‘snowballing’ (Denscombe 2010:37) more participants were identified across different universities. For the purpose of ensuring anonymity as guaranteed to the participants, the universities cannot be named. However, to further locate the student within her specific university, this section provides a profile of each educational institution in this sample. The university profile is important to understand the immediate environment within which the student is situated. Since the focus of the research is ‘the individual’ and ‘her experiences’ of a particular phenomenon Islamophobia, the distribution of participants across universities varied, dependent on access and willingness of students to talk to the researcher.

All universities in line with the Equality Act 2010\(^{62}\) have a no tolerance policy towards discrimination, which includes race and religion. This is highlighted on their websites, and also evident in student responses. The responses of university personnel who were interviewed for this research are also included in the university profiles. However, only three university representatives responded to requests for an interview, while others

\(^{61}\) The name of the organization is changed to ensure anonymity.

declined citing lack of time as the main excuse, while forwarding the university’s welfare website in response to interview requests.

**West Yorkshire** The West Yorkshire region has a high percentage of Muslims, with 11 percent of the entire Muslim population in Britain located in this area, according to the 2001 census (Hussain 2008:46, also see Peach 2006a: 650). However, this figure is likely to have increased, with a growth in the population of Muslims in Britain to 2.7 million as illustrated in the 2011 census (Office for National Statistics 2012:1). According to the same census, specific areas within West Yorkshire continue to have a high percentage of Muslims (Office for National Statistics 2012). Within this region, West Yorkshire1 is located in a culturally and religiously diverse neighbourhood. The university itself has a relatively small presence of Muslim and Pakistani students. The Student Union consists of a Welfare Officer who deals with all students and their welfare concerns, along with black and ethnic minority student officer and an international student officer to support and encourage greater participation of students from different backgrounds. The university also provides support in the form of counselling services. These services are aimed at the general student body and cover a wide range of issues from harassment, discrimination to emotional and psychological health. However, as outlined by the participants while services might be available for student support, including Muslim students in the university in general, students remain unsure about whom to contact for reporting a specific form of discrimination like Islamophobia. In meeting the needs of its Muslim students, there is provision of both halal food and prayer rooms. The university has an Islamic society, but encountered problems establishing a Pakistani society, with opposition from British students with a Pakistani heritage. This problem is further
explained in light of the association between this university and ‘Islamist terrorists’ involved in acts of terrorism in the UK. These terrorists (of a Pakistani heritage) were part of the university alumni.

**West Yorkshire** The university is located in a town with a large South Asian community. This is also represented in the student population, consisting of a large Pakistani student body. The university’s welfare provision includes faith advisors for different religious groups, with three in particular allocated for Muslim students, where one advisor is a member of staff. The contact information for these advisors is clearly available on the university’s welfare website. A university Welfare member was also interviewed for this research, who further highlighted the nature of such provisions that provide religious, intellectual, psychological and emotional support. However, the biggest problem for Muslim students, especially women in this university as outlined in the interview related to issues of forced and arranged marriages, as well as problems more directly related to academic underperformance, with no cases of Islamophobia being reported. Information about such welfare provisions, particularly for issues relating to forced marriages were publicized not only on notice boards across the university but also in female toilets. Welfare provisions were further provided by the Student Union through the welfare officer, a part time black and minorities officer, as well as a part time international students officer. The university also provides halal food options and prayer room facilities. The university has a large Islamic society but despite having a large presence of students with a Pakistani heritage, the university does not have a Pakistani society. The number of Overseas Pakistani students is also quite small, which was
evident from the fact that for many, the researcher was the first Pakistani they had met. The university was in the news over arrest of some of its students on charges of terrorism. 

**North West** The North West region is also reported to have a strong Muslim community, with a large Pakistani presence (Office for National Statistics 2012:8; Hussain 2008:46). The region has also been highlighted in the news, with Pakistani students from universities in this region arrested on charges of terrorism. This led to the Justice for North West 10 Campaign, that is discussed in Chapter 6. North West in the sample has a large population of Pakistani students compared to other universities in this region as indicated in the HESA dataset. The university also has a strong Pakistani student society and an Islamic society. In providing support to students against ‘hate crime’ that includes racism and religious discrimination, the Student Union is working together with the local police authorities where crimes can be easily reported through the Union. The Union also provides welfare support through a wellbeing officer, as well as a diversity officer, to guarantee support to all students relating to problems of health, as well as issues around discrimination. The university itself provides counselling services, as well as personal tutors that look after the academic as well as other welfare needs of the students. There is also provision of prayer rooms and halal food. 

**South East England** This university town has a small population of Muslims and Pakistanis, both in the region and within the university. It has an active Islamic society and a Pakistani student society. The university provides a race equality platform to discuss issues relating to race and inequality as well as religious discrimination, with the aim of finding solutions and facilitating both staff and students. The university is also in the process of addressing student concerns regarding prayer facilities, as highlighted by a
survey undertaken by the Equality division, though a temporary prayer facility was provided to students. Halal food can be found in shops around the university campus. The Race and Equality officer for the university was also interviewed, who highlighted the support given to students facing discrimination, in terms of counselling services, but also underlined the disconnect between students and university welfare provisions, which are seldom utilized. The Student Union also has a welfare officer and an international students’ officer along with providing peer support across the university.

**South East England2** Located in the same town as South East England1, this university has a small population of Muslim students. The university provides a platform for multi-faith dialogue, as well as provisions such as prayer rooms and halal food for Muslim students. The student union comprises of an ethnic minorities student officer, as well as an international officer, in addition to a full time ‘Student Experience officer’, with all three positions aimed at assisting students’ diverse welfare needs. The university’s race and welfare officer was interviewed for this research, who like South East England1 mentioned how miscommunication was often the biggest problem facing Muslim students in their relationship with the university.

**South West England1** This area has a small percentage of Muslims. A university town, South West England1 has an Islamic society, but given the small population of Muslim and Pakistani students, it does not have a Pakistani society. However, to cater to the religious needs of its students, the university provides a ‘multifaith chaplaincy’. It also has a prayer room, and halal food is available in their Union store. The university further provides counselling services to students in general. The Student Union also has a welfare officer, who deals with issues relating to both welfare and equality. It further
provides part time officers, especially the International Student officer and a part time widening participation officer, to cater to the diverse needs of students, encouraging greater participation of students from various backgrounds across the student body.

**West Midlands** The West Midlands, in particular the area of Birmingham has a strong presence of Muslims and Pakistanis (Office for National Statistics 2012; Hussain 2008; Peach 2006a). However, West Midlands is located in an area with a small percentage of Muslims, and the university itself has a small population of Muslim and Pakistani students. It is for this reason that the university does not have a Muslim or Pakistani student society. The university is included in this list of profiles because of Tehmina who is a student at West Midlands, but was interviewed for her involvement not only with her student union, but also at the national level, her insights and experiences with Muslim students across the West Midlands area. The university provides a multi-faith prayer room, with a multi-faith chaplain who can direct students to facilities outside the university. There is no provision of halal food within the university campus. The university provides counselling services for the well being of its students. The Student Union welfare support comprises of diversity, representation and international officers, to encourage and support students from all backgrounds.

**North East England** A university town, North East England has a small population of Pakistani and Muslim students. Students are given support through personal and academic tutors, as well as counselling service. It has an Islamic society, but given the small population of Pakistani students there is no Pakistani student society. The university provides a Muslim chaplain, as well as a prayer room. However, the prayer room is located behind a pub, which proved problematic for students, particularly young
women who encountered drunk individuals on their way to prayer. The university does not provide halal food on campus.

**London** According to the 2011 Census, London is the most diverse city with a large presence of Muslims (Office for National Statistics 2012:1). The student sample from universities across London varied, depending on student response and accessibility. The universities themselves had a diverse distribution of Muslim students as the following profiles illustrate:

**London1** This University of London higher educational institution is dedicated to research relating to health and well-being. It has a small population of Muslim and Pakistani students, with no Islamic or Pakistani society. The main source of support for students is their student adviser, as well as a counsellor to provide academic and non-academic welfare support. London1 is affiliated with the University of London Union which provides further student support in the form of the black students officer. As students’ narratives demonstrated, London1 does not have prayer room facilities on campus, nor is there any provision of halal food on campus.

**London2** Also affiliated with the University of London, London2 has a large presence of Pakistani and Muslim students. The Student Union provides support in the form of a welfare and international officer, and has been supportive of the Islamic society. The university also has a vibrant Pakistani society. The university provides a Muslim chaplain as well as counselling services for Muslim students. There are prayer room provisions, and halal options are available for students in their Union store.

**London3** also has a vibrant Muslim and Pakistani student body. While it has an active Pakistani and Islamic student society, the Student Union under the anti racism officer is
quite active in raising awareness about Islamophobia and counter terrorism. The Student Union organized an Islamophobia Awareness Month, as well as a conference on security and student extremism on campuses. The Union also took a stance against Islamophobia and Anti Semitism, and implemented a no tolerance policy on all forms of religious discrimination, including Islamophobia for all student societies. The university provides prayer room facilities, and halal food on campus. Like other universities in the sample it also provides welfare support such as counselling services. While the provision of a prayer room exists, students have recourse to a multifaith chaplain, who directs them to the relevant authority.

**London4** while located in an area with a strong South Asian presence, has a small percentage of Pakistani students compared to the other three London based universities. However the student union has a large network of welfare officers including individuals dealing with multi-culturalism, and international students. London4 has both an Islamic society and a Pakistani society. The university provides welfare provisions, including counselling, with a multifaith chaplain. Students are also provided prayer room facilities, and halal food on campus.

As these university profiles illustrate, the diverse distribution of participants across an equally diverse university setting provides rich narratives of British Pakistani and Pakistani students’ experiences of Islamophobia. The students themselves come from different locations in both England and Pakistan. The Overseas students included Punjabis, Sindhis, Pukhtuns, and Kashmiris. Most of the British Pakistani students were

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63 These ethnicities are particular to certain geographical locations in Pakistan. Punjabis belong to the Pakistan province of Punjab, Sindhis to the province of Sindh, Pukhtuns belong to the Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa in Pakistan, while the Kashmiris traditionally belong to the Azad Jammu and Kashmir region in Pakistan.
often day scholars either living with their family in the same town as the university, or a nearby town. The only exception were three students from the East Midlands who were studying in a university away from home. The Pakistani ethnicity of the British Pakistanis included Kashmiris, Punjabis and Pukhtuns. For a sample that captured ‘degrees of religiosity’, participants who wore the hijab and/or the jilbab and/or the niqab or simply those who did not have any religious signifier were all selected. Unlike Githens-Mazer et al (2010) discussion of ‘degrees of religiosity’ that highlighted individual religious practice, from ‘praying’ and ‘mosque attendance’ to ‘fasting’ during ‘Ramadan’ as well as opinions about ‘Islamic causes’ and ‘the Islamic state,’ this research instead highlights the perception of ‘religiosity’ as linked to Islamic signifiers, which often resulted in Islamophobic altercations (OPM and Hussain 2009; Brown 2008; Tyrer and Ahmed 2006). The discussion therefore drew on the experiences of women who were ‘visibly’ religious because of their clothing, but also those who may not be visibly ‘Muslim,’ to explore how physical appearance may contribute to encounters and experiences of Islamophobia, where women who wore the ‘niqab’ were viewed as highly ‘religious’ as opposed to those without any religious signifiers. The different experiences of participants as a consequence of the religious signifier or lack of, was further instrumental in exploring the relationship between the ethnic identity, the Islamic signifier and Islamophobia.

Furthermore, while currently enrolled students were selected to explore the experiences of Islamophobia, eight alumni of universities were also included for the purpose of evaluating whether similar narratives with respect to universities and Islamophobia.

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64 A hijab is a ‘headscarf’ (Droogsma 2007). A jilbab is ‘a cloak covering most of the body’ (Vakulenko, 2007:720). A niqab covers the face, (Allen 2010a) with only the eyes showing and is often worn with a jilbab.
emerged. These students were asked similar questions to explore the same themes. Individual profile of all participants are provided in Appendix 1-E. These students differed not only in their level of ‘religiosity’, but also in the level of involvement in university activities, with some students heavily involved within their Islamic societies, and/or their Pakistani societies, while others participated more in leftist student societies. Experts and representatives of student groups were also interviewed. These included a representative for the Federation of Students Islamic Societies (FOSIS), a representative for the National Pakistani students’ association, two representatives of their respective Student Unions, a Welfare representative from West Yorkshire, an Equality division representative from South East England, and a university welfare officer from South East England. These interviews were aimed at providing greater context to the problem of Islamophobia as experienced by students, as well as identity and verify trends that emerged across student narratives. These trends and the narrative strategy identified for exploring these trends is discussed in the following section.

III. ‘Dialogics’ and the Narrative Method

‘In making the world a meaningful place, one that is steeped in personal values, the subject actively engages with and alters its lived situation; and, in so doing, continuously transforms itself. This is an ongoing process: the self is continually ‘reauthored’ as its life and circumstances change, and is hence ‘unfinalizable’, always open to further development and transformation. What Bakhtin is striving to outline here is a phenomenology of what he terms ‘practical doing’, one that focuses on our incarnated activities within a lifeworld’ (Gardiner 2000:49-50)

In exploring the experiences and encounters of Islamophobia within the lived realities of participants as communicated to the researcher, the Bakhtinian notion of ‘dialogics’ provides both a theoretical and methodological backdrop in formulating a narrative
method for this research. As Gardiner’s observation highlights, Bakhtin’s ‘phenomenology’ was premised on an individual engagement with his/her surroundings, with other social beings through what he termed ‘dialogics’ (Bakhtin 1981; 1986). For Bakhtin ‘the starting’ point of reality and an exploration of an individual’s existence in the world is ‘communication in which the ‘I’ is the product of a process of self-creation in interaction or dialogue with the ‘other’ in a historically located world’ (Flood 1999:159-160). The ‘other’ is central within a Bakhtinian understanding of human reality, since ‘humans are radically “other” in relation to each other, but it is this relationship that defines human understanding’ (Bernard-Donals 1994:43). Participant narratives also highlight such ‘intersubjectivity’ with individuals (re)presenting accounts of their interactions with other individuals either in public or private, but also their continued dialogue between wider narratives and ‘discourses’ that are beyond the immediate environment of the individual, narratives about the Muslim and Pakistani terrorist, the oppressed Muslim woman behind the veil, or the problematic immigrant that continues to corrupt the liberal landscape of Britain. Hence, in exploring Islamophobia, participants, and their voices, their experiences as communicated to the researcher, through yet another ‘intersubjective dialogue’ becomes central within a Bakhtinian understanding of reality and communication. Furthermore, by focusing on the narrative of participants as the central unit of analysis, the multiple ‘voices’ that inform or make up a participant’s reality can be explored in depth. As Bakhtin observes, ‘the unique speech experience of each individual is shaped and developed in continuous and constant interaction with others’ individual utterances…Our speech, that is, all our utterances…is filled with others’ words, varying degrees of otherness or varying degrees of “our-own-
ness,” varying degrees of awareness and detachment’ (Bakhtin 1986:89). These ‘varying
degrees’ of participants’ relation to ‘the other,’ that inform their experiences are captured
in the narratives presented in this research.

By exploring these narratives of Islamophobia, the research conceptualizes Islamophobia
through the ‘realities’ of participants, but it does not claim to generalize, or speak for the
entire British/Pakistani Muslim female student population, or the entire British/Pakistani
Muslim population in England. These individual points of view attempt to provide a grass
roots account of Islamophobia, where in the wider discussion of Islamophobia as a
phenomenon individuals, especially Muslim women are seldom provided the opportunity
to narrate their experiences. While in the discussion chapters the narratives are given a
prominent space, the problem of the ‘author’ ‘dominating’ the (re)presentation of these
narratives (Bakhtin 1981; 1986) by imposing her own mode of analysis, is one which can
only be overcome if the researcher’s own biases are accounted for, but also if a clear
narrative strategy is developed.

(a) Narratives Inquiry

Narrative inquiry has been selected as a strategy as it allows the individual to tell her
story, the way she perceives it. As Bruner observes, ‘we organize our experience and our
memory of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative-stories, excuses, myths,
reasons for doing and not doing, and so on’ (1991:4). In such a sense, the power to tell
narratives, the selection of events and emotions which are shared through the process of
‘telling,’ gives more control of the narrative to the participant. Thus narrative inquiry is
undertaken on the basis that ‘…people by nature lead storied lives and tell stories of those
lives…narrative researchers describe such lives, collect and tell stories of them, and write narratives of experience’ (Clandinin 2006:45 quoting Connelly & Clandinin, 1990:2). It locates the individual as the focal point of research through which both personal and social themes are highlighted. Chase (2005) identified five lenses for a narrative strategy, central in this project’s research process. These include the following: ‘Narrative is retrospective meaning making,’ it allows the participant to present her ‘point of view,’ and demonstrates the importance of the narrative; ‘Narratives’ are ‘verbal actions’ where the emphasis is on the ‘narrator’s voice(s).’ Such emphasis is important in highlighting the ‘versions of self, reality, and experience that the storyteller produces through the telling’; ‘Stories’ are ‘both enabled and constrained by a range of social resources and circumstances,’ which entails ‘cultural’, ‘historical’ as well as ‘local’ settings which influence the nature of the narrative produced; Narrative is ‘flexible, variable, and shaped in part by interaction with the audience,’ hence different ‘audience’ might yield different kinds of narratives; ‘Researchers’ are also a form of ‘[n]arrators’, who construct and interpret the meaning of the narratives presented to them, within the confines of their ‘discipline’, ‘social resources and circumstances’, catering to a ‘particular audience’ (Chase 2005:656-657).

These five lenses of the narrative strategy interact at different stages of the research process. These lenses also raise issues around the bias of the researcher (discussed in the last section of this chapter), as well as the bias of the participant. However, since the aim of a narrative strategy is to understand the voice of the participant, authenticity of the narrative is based on the earnest telling of the account, the honest expression of emotions and the relaying of experiences and encounters as perceived by the participant. The
authenticity of the narrative itself cannot be objectively determined, since the nature of the story telling is subjective. This subjectivity nonetheless problematizes the notion of ‘truth’ in this research.

The participant in sharing her experiences and encounters draws from her memory of interactions with other social beings in her private or public space. But ‘memory’ as Wall observes ‘is always someone’s memory, just as truth is always someone’s truth…this truth and this memory are not purely individual phenomena: they are actualized only in dialogic interaction. There are no memories that are not lived’ (1990:58). Hence the notion of an objective ‘truth’ is problematic where the narratives of participants highlight a sense of intersubjective experiences and exchanges, that may or may not be objectively accurate, but through a reflective process of communication, (re)present the points of view, the perceptions and opinions of the participants in question. Since the purpose of this research is to explore the individual’s experience as narrated by her, her perception of the phenomenon Islamophobia, it is this interpretation of the participant and how she makes sense of her experience that is important to explore. The notion of an absolute ‘truth’ is further problematic within a Bakhtinian analysis of ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ and ‘dialogics’, where such an assumption would take the form of an imposition or dominance of a single voice, or a single interpretation, often that of the ‘author’ (or the researcher) where the multiple dimensions of experience and narratives are lost in the quest of one ultimate truth (see Bakhtin 1981;1990). Such multiplicity of meaning is further important in exploring the intersubjective nature of participants’ ‘discourse’ ‘communities.’ As Rutland (1990:128) observes, ‘[t]ruth (as value) is not anterior to discourse but is continuously constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed in discursive
interchange.’ There ‘is’ a ‘desire for empowerment among subjects – the need to be a subject, a recognized participant in the collectivity, speaking and acting within and from a specific position or complex of positions relative to other subjects and their positions’ (ibid). Yet, as he further observes, within truth then ‘[d]esire, discourse and power fold over upon one another. But power is not reified in the Bakhtinian scheme (as it tends to be in the Foucautian): it is a matter of ratios of dominance and resistance, of monologic contest and resolution within the encompassing ongoing dialogic process, situated within and between subjects, individual and collective’ (Rutland 1990:128).

With the recognition of multiple ‘truths’ and perspectives the problem of ‘validity’ and ‘reliability’ also needs to be briefly explored. Establishing validity in any sort of qualitative research is not a simple task because of the nature of the research. Creswell defines reliability as ‘consistency’ of results, whereas validity in qualitative research is determined by understanding ‘whether the findings are accurate from the standpoint of the researcher, the participant, or the readers of an account’ (Creswell 2009:190-91 discussing Creswell and Miller, 2000). The standpoint of the participant can only be fully realized if the narrative at point has depth. The depth of each narrative is discussed at length in the next section, while the bias of the researcher is presented in the last section of this chapter. However, what is obvious from the narratives is that while facts pertaining to the direct experience of Islamophobia cannot be verified often as a consequence of the nature of the experience, themes that emerge from these accounts on the other hand can be identified across different groups of narratives. The themes that have emerged in student narratives have also been highlighted in interviews with experts, as well as interviews with student representatives, and university personnel. Hence, while
the exact accuracy of an experience cannot be determined, what can be clearly identified are certain trends that emerge across participant narratives, across their ‘communities’ of ‘discourses,’ further reinforced through expert interview, and by representatives who interact with a larger body of Muslim students. The personal biases of individuals that may impact their narratives can only be kept in check by explicitly making these prejudices part of the narrative. The manner by which such biases were included in the narrative is highlighted in the next section on narrative interviews.

(b) Narrative Interview

With participant accounts located within the intersubjective realities of their ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ (Bakhtin 1981), within the conventions and realities of a wider socio-political narrative, the perspective of the narrator can be successfully communicated when the narrative interview takes the form of a dialogue, which ‘requires investigators to give up some control’ by ‘following participants down their trails...’ (Riessman 2004:709). As Holquist observes, ‘[d]ialogue is a manifest phenomenon’ which ‘for schematic purposes...can be reduced to a minimum of three elements...an utterance, a reply, and a relation between the two,’ with ‘the conviction that what is exchanged has meaning’ (1990:38; Also see Zavala 1990; Loriggio 1990). The dialogue that takes place between the researcher and the participants is similarly framed, where the participants while prompted by the researcher, are provided the space to ‘relate their experiences, bringing in whatever they consider to be relevant. The researcher probes where necessary to guide the interviewee through the research topic(s).’ (Bates 2004:16, discussing Jovchelovitch and Bauer, 2000).
The narrative interview for this research began with informal questions about the participant’s background, her family and her education. Questions around the family were important in building a relationship with the researcher, as these questions often involved a discussion about Pakistan, with the researcher being questioned about her Pakistani background. This also led to a discussion around the meaning of Pakistan as imagined by the narrator, thus creating an atmosphere of mutual understanding. The narrative interview then moved on to questions about the narrator’s university education, her selection of courses, reasons for that selection. In discussing the university experiences questions revolved around extra curricular activities and student societies, in particular the Islamic and Pakistani societies. Depending on the nature of the response, the discussion often moved towards the Muslim identity, as well as other identities and discrimination. The narrator was then directly asked about the concept of Islamophobia and how it was understood. In most situations the narrator would naturally lead on to giving either examples of Islamophobia as experienced by her, or examples of other students, or individuals who had shared their experiences with her. Questions linking the hijab to Islamophobia, the Pakistani identity to Islamophobia as well as student activism and radicalisation were all explored during each narrative. The narrators in their discussion often drew on media and the wider social narrative in providing explanations, and telling their stories. The narratives on average were 80-100 minutes long, however some discussions took up to two hours. Appendix 1-A gives a sample of the questions that were outlined for the narrative interview. These questions acted as a ‘guide’ (Bates 2004:18 quoting Flick 2000:78) for the researcher, as most themes were highlighted through the narratives in the form of a dialogue. While the guide is detailed, it was
nonetheless ‘flexible to accommodate any new aspect’ that emerged ‘from the interviewee’ (ibid). However, the guide ensured that the narratives across the 40 participants addressed similar issues that had been outlined in the research questions.

The biographical details from the narratives were used to create biographical profiles of the participants (See Appendix 1-E). The participants were given pseudonyms to ensure anonymity. The profiles are important in providing information about who each participant is. They elaborate on both the factual information provided by the participant about place of birth, parents occupation, and siblings, but also highlights any insights the participant presented about her own character, and her religious beliefs. These profiles provide a more complete picture of the participant, especially when examined in relation to her narrative as quoted in the findings chapters.

The narratives were mostly audio recorded. However, in two instances the narratives had to be written down by the researcher, as the participant was uncomfortable with being recorded. The researcher took detailed notes during the narrative sessions, and also after the meetings. While the narrative could not possibly be noted down verbatim, a consequence of human fallibility, conversations about the dominant themes of the research were nonetheless noted extensively by the researcher. The narrator was also asked to often repeat herself, as keeping pace with the narrative and writing down everything that was discussed became difficult. While this interrupted the flow of the narrative, it instead gave the narrator an opportunity to further expand her account, and explain her position clearly. For the audio recordings on the other hand, the quality of each recording depended on the location of the meeting.
The location of the narrative interview was not always ideal for a discussion of this nature. However, the primary concern for the researcher was the participant, who was given the responsibility of selecting a location of her liking. This was based on the assumption that the participant would select a place she would feel secure and at ease in to engage in such a discussion. The locations varied from university meeting rooms and common rooms, participants’ homes, cafes, and for some video skype conferences. While the ‘location’ of an ‘interview’ is important in creating an environment ‘conducive’ for the narrator to share her narratives (Elwood and Martin 2000), a video skype conference despite the spatial distance was nonetheless successful, in particular more successful than meetings in cafes. The selection of cafes while comfortable for the participant was problematic with audio recordings. The background noise affected the sound quality of narrative recordings. While transcribing therefore, the Audacity software⁶⁵ had to be used to reduce background noise. However, for participants who out of convenience suggested a skype conference, the skype interviews overcame the noise problem, and also improved the dynamics of the conversation. Skype meetings were mostly held at night, after the participant had returned from the university. The participant was more relaxed in the comfort of her own room, and often was more willing to share her narrative. The longest narrative recorded in this research was 150 minutes long, which was over skype. Such interviews gave more power to the participant with the narrator often moving away from the themes and presenting her points of view on different issues. Hence the problem of the narrative losing focus (Chase 2005) was difficult to control in a skype interview, which was often compensated by the diverse richness of the data.

⁶⁵ Please refer to http://audacity.sourceforge.net/ for more information about the software.
Language was also a factor in the way narratives were collected. Bates (2004) highlights how the ‘…language one uses can either encourage or discourage the flow of conversation’ (2004:17). Language, and the multiple expressions and meanings that it elicits, is also important within a Bakhtinian understanding of ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ (Bakhtin 1981). While English was the primary language, the narrator often used Urdu expressions knowing that the researcher spoke the same language. In two interviews the narrator preferred to use Urdu. Even with the Urdu interviews, the narrators often used English interchangeably. For the purpose of authenticity, and to ensure a stable flow of the conversation, the narratives that are presented in the findings chapters include both the Urdu statements and words, and the English translation of the researcher. The English-Urdu hybrid, particularly with Overseas Pakistani students resulted in an atmosphere in which the narrator was at ease conversing with the researcher.

Fieldwork continued for one year, given the slow nature of participant recruitment at the start of the research, though some interviews with university personnel and student representatives were conducted after this one-year due to a delay in responses. Transcription of data was consistent throughout the fieldwork. Transcripts were detailed to include both the verbal and non-verbal communications. The narrative data was analysed by drawing on different narrative strategies as highlighted in the next section.

(c) Narrative Analysis

The narrative analysis strategy was determined by both the narrative data, and the research questions. A thematic approach was the predominant method used in analysing data. The research questions clearly outline the aims of the research, which were reflected in the interview guide. In exploring the student narratives about Islamophobia within
their various ‘discourse’ ‘communities’, a ‘thematic’ approach proved to be the most insightful in observing meanings within the narratives that drew on ‘discourses’ from across the various participant ‘communities’ while simultaneously invoking the meta-narrative of security and terrorism around the Muslim subject.

The analysis began with the transcribed data. Ten of the transcribed interviews were selected at random and analysed individually to highlight various themes that emerged within the narratives. While the research aimed to identify experiences of Islamophobia, student narrative revealed how Islamophobia and the way it was experienced was not always a simple direct encounter. Students interacting within and outside the university were well versed in the dominant media and political ‘discourse’ (Bakhtin 1981) around the war against ‘Islamist’ terrorism. Hence, invocations to the media and portrayal of Muslims were often made in the narratives. Such portrayals influenced student relationships both at home and in the university, and the way the individuals perceived themselves and their identities. With such issues highlighted in the narratives, the analytical strategy was organized around categories of meanings/definitions, experience, perception, explanation, action, and recommendation. Each of these categories further explored sub-themes that emerged from the narratives.

*Meanings/definition:* Themes relating to the meaning of the term Islamophobia; the reasons given for its existence often around questions of misunderstanding and ignorance; the problem of the moderate/extremist dichotomy; media and its role in creating negative stereotypes; meanings of student activism and radicalism, were all sub-themes that emerged within the narratives.
Experience: Themes around experience related to both direct and indirect encounters with Islamophobia. What happened is what this category aims to highlight within the narrative. Accounts of Islamophobia; where it took place, inside or outside the university; when it happened; what was the reaction of people around; what was the reaction of the narrator; what were the reasons given for the experience were all questions around which the experience of Islamophobia was categorized in the narrative. If the experience is indirect, how did the narrator hear about the story; where did it happen; why did it happen; when did it happen; and how did she respond to it.

Perception: This category refers to the perception of the self in relation to Islamophobia. How being Pakistani/British/Muslim/female is perceived in the narratives. It also highlights perceptions of belonging, family perceptions of being a Muslim, individual struggle with expressing identity, are all included in this category.

Explanation: This category further highlights narratives that explain why the event occurred. Themes around hijab/jilbab/niqab and its relation to Islamophobia; being Pakistani and its relation to Islamophobia; being Pakistani and its relation to student activism, are highlighted on the one hand. Explanation as a category also explores the rationale or justification provided for Islamophobia that consistently emerges in the narratives of the participants.

Action: This category highlights the response within the university to Islamophobia whether experienced directly or indirectly. Reporting or non-reporting of events - reasons given; involvement or non-involvement in student campaigns – reasons given; Use of welfare services at university – reasons given.
Recommendation: The narrators’ suggestion about how to tackle Islamophobia within the university was included in this category. Optimistic/Pessimistic views on challenging Islamophobia; Islamic societies and their role; Welfare officers and their role; University and training; Media and Politics.

To identify trends, each thematic narrative was compared with each other to identify consistencies and variations. The trends that emerged from the narrative were then compared to the narratives of the student representatives and experts, and existing literature on Islamophobia. The narratives of student representatives were also analyzed using the same categorical thematic approach, with the exception that their accounts were often not about themselves but student groups or societies that they had encountered in their work. These trends will be discussed in the findings chapters.

The thematic approach was effective in also exploring the intersubjectivity within and across participant ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ as highlighted in the narratives. The approach designed for this research was influenced by Riessman’s (2008) discussion on thematic analysis, that pays ‘attention’ to “‘what’ is said, rather than “how,” “to whom,” or “for what purposes”” (Riessman 2008:53-54). However, she is critical of thematic analysis for precisely overlooking the how and why questions in the narrative. While there are different ways in answering the how question, structural analysis under Labov is one such popular strategy. A Labovian framework defines narratives as having ‘six common elements: an abstract (summary of the substance of the narrative), orientation (time, place, situation, participants), complicating action (Sequence of events), evaluation (significance and meaning of the action, attitude of narrator), resolution (what finally happened), and coda (returns the perspective to the present) (Riessman 1993:18-19).
Given the structure of the narrative interview, and the research questions that primarily aim to investigate Islamophobia, a structural analysis would not have effectively answered the research questions. With a hybrid of Urdu and English used by the narrators, the traditionally defined Labovian English sentence with ‘clauses’ and a ‘set of elements’ is not as simple to determine (Labov and Waletzky 2003; Riessman 2008; Patterson 2008). Despite these difficulties, the categories defined for the thematic analysis nonetheless take some Labovian structural elements such as ‘orientation’ (as demonstrated through the experience category), ‘evaluation’ (perception and explanation), and ‘resolution’ (action) into account. While themes are identified, the experiences are carefully located in a particular point in time and place.

III. Narrating the Self: A Process of Self-Reflexivity

‘Bakhtin’s great obsession is how to go beyond the recognition of the commonalities, how to continue a conversation without imposing one’s authority on one’s listener, without co-opting or pre-empting his or her reply – how, in a word, to grant a person his or her freedom. There is, for Bakhtin, no better prelude to successful dialogue than the ability to maintain one’s alterity during empathy. “Outsidedness,” in its various designations, as “exotopy” or as “extralocality,” is very much a positive value, and possibly the central sub-topic of Bakhtin’s thought’ (Loriggio 1990:105)

The importance of granting ‘freedom’ to the narrator without co-opting her voice is a dilemma that any research by virtue of being a research project confronts. While the power dynamic in the narrative dialogue is shifted towards the participant, the eventual power of (re)presenting those experiences lies with the writer/researcher. Gayatri Spivak captures this paradox in the observation that ‘the writing of the writer writes agency in a way that might be different from that of” the participant’s narrative (Spivak 1993:179). While such a dilemma can never be completely countered, placing the researcher’s
position in the research process (Flyvbjerg 2006) is important in producing an ‘honest’ account. The researcher however does not occupy the ‘outsidedness’ that Bakhtin may expect for a ‘successful dialogue’ to take place. Instead she is in this instance, both an insider and an outsider to the research process. Her identity as an Overseas Pakistani female places her within the community of her participants. While being a Muslim she might be considered an insider, her way of practicing Islam is different from those of certain participants. These differences and similarities affect the way in which the narrative is told.

This was obvious in the way participants interacted with the researcher. The question ‘Where do you come from in Pakistan?’ asked by the narrator was often the starting point of the conversation for the Overseas Pakistani students. This further became a connecting point. For the British Pakistani who had never been to Pakistan it resulted in stories related to the ‘imagined country’ as presented by parents and grandparents. For the Overseas Pakistani it created an atmosphere of nostalgia, reminiscing about all that was good in Pakistan and all that has gone wrong. Being an insider through the Pakistani identity resulted in a comfortable environment where the narrator could communicate between English and Urdu.

The outsider dilemma worked in a complex manner. As a practicing Muslim who does not wear the hijab, meeting young women who do, resulted on the one hand questions about why as a Muslim the researcher did not wear the hijab. On the other hand, the narrator herself would instinctively point out how being a good human being did not equate to just wearing a hijab with expression like ‘Individuals such as yourself (the researcher) are good people too’. All these instances reflect the nature of the researcher-
narrator relationship, where being at ease the narrator often looked onto the researcher as a friend rather than a stranger. Correspondence between the narrator and the researcher continued after the narrative session, where maintaining a distance with the participant was often difficult.

Bernard-Donals in his discussion of Bakhtin’s ‘dialogism’ argues that “‘dialogism’ is the way in which humans encounter one another and enter into a consummating relationship….while “dialogue” is the cognitive-ethical event that result from this consummation’ (1994:35). The encounter between the researcher and the participant was a complex one, which drew on the ‘insider-outsider’ dynamics of the researcher’s own identity in relation to the participant, and vice-versa. Such a dynamic however, lent a level of authenticity to the ‘dialogic’ that emerged within the narrative interview context.

While the dynamics of the interview resulted in certain responses, or interpretations that are (re)presented by the narrator, the researcher/narrator relationship continued to be constantly negotiated during the dialogue. Narayan dismissing the insider/outsider dilemma insists that,

‘what we must focus our attention on is the quality of relations with the people we seek to represent in our texts: are they viewed as mere fodder for professionally self-serving statements about a generalized Other, or are they accepted as subjects with voices, view and dilemmas – people to whom we are bonded through ties of reciprocity…?’

(Narayan 1993:672, as quoted in Bishop 2005:113)

The participants in this research are ‘subjects with voices,’ though these voices do serve the researcher’s purpose of conducting her research. However, one way of ensuring a balance between the researcher’s points of view, and those of the participants is by acknowledging the researcher’s own biases through the process of ‘reflexivity’ (Hollway and Jefferson 2000:65-68), and the ways in which she dealt with them, to stay as ‘true’ to
the account of the narrator as possible. Religiously, the researcher comes from a position that does not believe that the hijab/niqab/jilbab are religiously sanctioned signifiers. Rather for her these are a cultural phenomenon, particular to a specific time and place. The researcher nonetheless believes that individuals have the right to interpret religion in their own ways. Since both the participants and the society they exist in deem such signifiers as having religious overtones, the researcher despite her personal belief will respect the narrators’ opinions by describing the hijab/niqab/jilbab as religious signifiers in this thesis. Furthermore, in the research process the researcher experienced difficulty in separating her personal ideals as a political, left leaning activist from the role of an objective researcher. This dilemma was often problematized in a situation where the researcher encountered a student who experienced Islamophobia but refused to report it, and instead tried to rationalize it. It was also encountered in cases where students were reluctant to participate in student campaigns, especially for Pakistan. However, such a dilemma instead resulted in a more in-depth discussion, as the researcher would often respond to the participant by asking ‘why’ she chose to stay quiet, or ‘why’ she was reluctant to join a student campaign. These biases were kept in check throughout the research process, so as not to interfere in the narrative. These were further kept in check while analysing the narratives in this DPhil thesis.

The researcher also observed the ‘codes of ethics’ as identified by Christians (2005), including guaranteeing ‘informed consent,’ ensuring an absence of ‘deception’ as well making sure ‘privacy and confidentiality’ was maintained (2005:144-145). In line with the Central University Research Ethic Committee (CUREC) of Oxford the ‘Informed Consent’ document and ‘Participant Information Form’ was given to each participant
who had an opportunity to ask questions (Please refer to Appendix 1-C). The researcher did not face any cases of emotional distress when talking to the participants. After each narrative session she emailed the participants to thank them for their time, as well as to ensure that no distress or discomfort was experienced.

IV. Conclusion

In capturing the experiences and encounters of forty British/Pakistani female Muslim students within universities in England, the narrative strategy as highlighted in the preceding discussion provides the space for the narrator’s voice(s) to be at the centre of analysis. By drawing on a Bakhtinian notion of ‘dialogics’ the research strategy highlights participants ‘continual interaction and interconnectedness, relationality, and the permeability of both symbolic and physical boundaries’ (Gardiner 2000:57).

The narratives located within their various ‘communities’ of ‘discourse’, across different social settings continue to inform and be informed by other social beings, where meaning is not static, but evolves within changing relations and circumstances (see Bernard-Donals 1994).

The method of ‘dialogue’ between the researcher and the participants was also a form of ‘intersubjective’ conversation. The narrative interview became another ‘community’ of ‘discourse’ where individuals would inter-act with the researcher, have a conversation about their experiences relating to the research, but also other experiences that they believed the researcher would have in common with them, as a Pakistani female. Such a connection was instrumental in creating a context that put both the narrator and the researcher at ease, thus resulting in rich and diverse narratives about participants.
The methodology however has its limitations as well. Given the insider status of the researcher, there were assumptions made by participants’ about the familiarity of the researcher with their ethnic and religious background. While the researcher despite such familiarity always asked the participants’ to elaborate for the purpose of the research, the insider-outsider dilemma was never fully resolved. Furthermore, the research advertisement and participant information form specifically asked for British and/or Muslim and Pakistani female students, all the participants who responded identified with either being British Muslim with a Pakistani heritage or Overseas Pakistanis. While this self-identification ensured a rich mixture of British/Pakistanis who came from a diverse Pakistani background, the distribution of participants across each university could not be controlled. Hence, instead of having an even distribution of students across universities, there was an uneven response rate. However, since the purpose of the research was the individual and her experience/encounter/response/reaction to Islamophobia, such variation while acknowledged was not deemed a central problem for the narratives. Rather, the variation provided a rich mixture of participants from across universities in England.

Despite these limitations, the narratives that were recorded provide rich accounts of British Muslim women with a Pakistani heritage and Overseas Pakistanis in universities across England. The discussion of these narratives in Chapters 5-7 are structured in a manner that reflects the intersubjective realities of participants which constantly punctuate each other in different contexts, at one moment in the classroom or exam room, to another in a restaurant or a social gathering, and yet another in the prayer room, or
outside campus. Hence, these experiences and encounters are not in isolation but influenced by the participants’ multiple ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ (Bakhtin 1981).
Chapter V

Narratives of Islamophobia and Pakophobia: Experiences and Perceptions from the Grassroots

In defining Islamophobia, the existing literature draws on theories of racism and sociology, describing Muslims as a ‘racialised’ and ‘securitized’ group, that experiences discrimination as a result of their religious beliefs but also influenced by ethnicity, skin colour, and appearance. This chapter provides a more in-depth exploration of the realities of British/Pakistani female students, their accounts of Islamophobia within their various ‘communities’ of ‘discourse’ in the university and beyond. The chapter further considers the emergence of Pakophobia as highlighted by the participants, and exposes the intersection between ethnicity and religion within Islamophobia. The experiences and observations demonstrate how the meta narrative on security and Islam as propagated by the media and state actors influences student understanding of Islamophobia, as well as their experiences as young Muslims often held suspect because of their association with both a troubled country Pakistan, and a suspicious religion Islam.

I. Introduction

The discussion on Islamophobia in chapters 2 and 3 illustrate how defining the term has proven more difficult, since academics and policy makers continue to negotiate the parameters of what Islamophobia entails. For the purpose of this research the definition that is primarily drawn upon is Islamophobia as a form of ‘racialisation of Muslims,’ (Meer and Modood 2010) particularly in a context of the on-going War against Al Qa’ida and its affiliates where Islamophobia is further situated within a security narrative (Croft 2012). This chapter contributes to this debate through the inclusion of a grass roots perspective by narrating the understanding and experiences of participants in this research. It addresses the first two questions posed in the thesis introduction, a) How is Islamophobia understood? b) How has Islamophobia been experienced? The participant narratives expose how Islamophobia is experienced in every day life both on and off university campuses, how the wider ‘discourse’ on Muslims and terrorism informs their everyday interactions across their various ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ (Bakhtin 1981).
Their understanding of Islamophobia further provides insights into why it exists, often perceived as the result of ignorance and misunderstanding than malice or hatred for Muslims. The second part of the chapter explores the ethnic identity of the participants, locating their Pakistani identity within their experiences of Islamophobia to highlight how ethnicity becomes an important factor in experiencing discrimination, where ethnic and religious identities are often conflated. Some participants have called such a form of discrimination ‘Pakophobia,’ a fear of Pakistanis in a highly securitized socio-political imagination within Britain.

The participants highlight not only the experiences of Islamophobia, but also provide their own insights about the social context where the experience occurred. Hence, the discussion moves beyond a narration of the experience itself, to a more reflective conversation about why it happened. Such an in-depth narrative draws on different ‘discourses’ across participant ‘communities,’ invoking references to the British state’s security agenda, political actors, media and the resulting stereotypes that have emerged about Muslims. In the conversation about the ethnic identity, similar invocations of Pakistan, corruption, the war against Al Qa’ida are repeated, illustrating how individual experiences are punctuated by a meta-narrative that influences their points of view about Islamophobia and often their own identity.

The experiences located within the university may be encountered in different social settings or arenas. These include the formal classroom or exam room, to interactions on campuses amongst fellow students as well as administrators, interactions off campuses in social gatherings, as well as experiences in religious gatherings and events both within and outside prayer rooms. This chapter does not divide these experiences according to
these different social contexts, but rather presents the narratives across social settings to illustrate the pervasive and permeable nature of the (in)security ‘discourse’ that either directly or subtly intersects across the university and social ‘communities’ that participants belong to. Hence, Islamophobia may be experienced in an interaction within the exam room at one point, or on the street at another time. The nature of these experiences is further determined by the social circumstances in which they occur, where the experiences can either be direct or implicit. Therefore, this chapter highlights the intersection between the meta-narrative of the state around the Muslim suspect, and the innocent Muslim Pakistani student who is often held suspect for her religious beliefs or ethnic identity. By focusing on the individual and her existence within her dynamic ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ a grassroots analysis is provided to further the understanding of Islamophobia, both focusing the lens within the university, while simultaneously locating it in a wider context of insecurity and the Muslim subject.

II. Understanding Islamophobia

a. Defining Islamophobia: A Grassroots definition

The narratives of participants across the universities in the sample predominantly echoed three main themes in explaining Islamophobia: ‘a fear of the unknown,’ ignorance, and misunderstanding. Hatred was believed to be confined to a minority group, where most Islamophobes were acting on the basis of misinformation about Islam and its believers. The experiences and understanding of young women who wore the niqab66, the jilbab/hijab67, the hijab, the shalwar kameez68, as well as those without any religious

66 A niqab covers the face, (Allen 2010a) with only the eyes showing and is often worn with a jilbab.
67 A hijab is a ‘headscarf’ (Droogsma 2007). A jilbab is ‘a cloak covering most of the body’ (Vakulenko, 2007:720).
68 ‘…consists of trousers and a tunic’ (ibid, 721).
signifiers all echoed a similar theme. However, ‘degrees of religiosity’ were perceived to be a primary criterion invoking encounters and experiences of Islamophobia. Such religiosity was often confined to religious symbols and clothing. Hafsa who wears the hijab described Islamophobia as,

‘fear of the unknown. It seems to me that phobia does not stem from an actual understanding of what’s going on or the knowledge of what it is but because they don’t know what it is. They take the first thing they see about it, which comes through media and that’s exactly not a very well painted picture, and as a result they are scared of it’.

(Hafsa, North East1, 22, Law Grad, Overseas)

The discrimination however does not always include a physical manifestation of prejudice, but may also take a psychological or emotional form. Debates around Muslims, from the Danish cartoon controversy, to the headscarf debate in countries in Europe are all perceived as part of Islamophobia.

‘Psychological discrimination against Muslims...people having reservations about Muslims...For example the whole French debate about headscarves...stopping Muslims from observing their religious practices. Even though I don’t cover my head and I don’t actually believe that it is part of our religion but I also think that Muslims have the right to make that choice. I would also say Muslims having reservations against other Muslims on the basis of their degree of practice. I would also call that Islamophobia.’

(Salma, North West1, 28, Business Grad, Overseas)

Salma’s observation highlights the importance of the physical marker or religious symbol that makes young men and women more susceptible to discrimination, and further illustrates how the experience of Islamophobia itself is not only confined to non Muslim ignorance but also Muslims themselves contribute to Islamophobic behaviour against each other. The first part of her account relating to identity markers comes through in the narratives of all the participants who highlight how different levels of religiosity as determined by religious symbols like the ‘hijab’, the ‘niqab’, and the ‘jilbab’ make young
women vulnerable at different levels, the ‘niqab’ described as the most susceptible to Islamophobia.

‘I think at that time after 9/11 things that were going on I felt really really sorry for girls who were wearing the hijab, jilbab, the cloak... I could imagine people staring at them, taunting them, making them feel that they had done something wrong. I had heard of people in terms of the workplace suffering, in public transport...Islamophobia is something where people have this negative stereotypes, these images that any Muslim they see choosing to wear their symbol, are proactive or are very outspoken in what they believe are suddenly a bad person, they are a threat, to the society to the world and at any given time they can turn into a terrorist or do something wrong on public transport or kill people. It is more like I get the feeling that when the media portray Islam like that, Muslims are going to take over want to kill everyone...’

(Sabahat, West Yorkshire2, 25, Alumnus, Teacher, British)

Sabahat’s narrative both testifies to the media ‘scare’ around the terrorist in the closet, where any Muslim who visibly practices his/her religion is perceived as a potential threat, as well as exposes Muslim women’s vulnerability to Islamophobia, particularly those who stand out because of their dress. Sabahat experienced such vulnerability herself when she started wearing the hijab a few weeks before her interview. The attitude of people in public, as well as her work colleagues in schools changed drastically, where she was often patronized or ignored. Other participants who also display a religious symbol have constantly highlighted the level of patronization that they experience from people both in the university and outside, where they are often perceived as being unable to speak English. Such patronization is often perceived as a consequence of the stereotype of young Muslims women, as Areesha observes,

‘They refer the word Islamophobia in a bad context saying like we are tied to chains and the other people who are not religious they just want to come and free us. They think us being religious is being tied to chains. And they feel like since we can’t do anything about it they want to come and free us from religion, which is completely the opposite if you think about it. Ask a religious person they would say we are happy where we are, more happy than the place where you are, to be quite honest. Islamophobia, they have got these restrictions from the religion
when they don’t even know what religion is and because of the wrong representation of religion because of hundreds of factors going on in this world they think you are going away from your freedom, when you become more religious.’

(Areesha, West Yorkshire, 20, Social Sciences Undergrad, Overseas)

Areesha’s observation highlights a form of ‘saviour complex’ that is often adopted by the host society in their attempts to rescue Muslim women from the chains and shackles of a primitive religion. However such a perception further removes agency from young women, particularly those in universities who consistently have to prove themselves. Mehreen who wears both the hijab and shalwar kameez struggles continuously to prove to people that she is ‘normal,’

‘People who know me, know that I wear the scarf and I am normal. But people who don’t know me I try to make an effort but it gets tiring to constantly defend and make an effort. People have opinions about you beforehand…people think it’s some mental deficiency, that is why you wear the hijab…I make an effort, I can talk, I have a brain, normal human being. This professor from the math department came and talked to me but I have difficulties sometimes because I can see from people’s eyes, gestures that they don’t treat me equally.’

(Mehreen, South East England, 28, Science Grad, Overseas)

While Mehreen might perceive a difference in attitude that may or may not be present in the case of the professor she encountered, the fact that young students perceive such differences illustrates a greater need to engage with young practicing Muslims, as well as raise awareness about their religion. Such discrimination is further pronounced when students perceive their religion as being specifically singled out in media and by state actors, where other religions like Christianity is more acceptable than Islam within the British context.

‘there are pictures of like the nuns and she is completely covered and then you see the Muslim woman in the hijab, and you know if you saw the hijab, the Muslim woman walking in Britain she would look different, some would say something…but nun she is a pious woman, people get out of her way, give her
respect, role model for society, so dedicated, she sacrifices her life for her Lord. Islam doesn’t teach that you should sacrifice everything but that you should mingle in your society, mingle, still live. I would never think that Muslims who are trying to follow Islam the right way would ever put down anyone. If I were to see that woman I would give her incredible amount of respect...’

(Sabahat, West Yorkshire2, 25, Alumnus, Teacher, British)

Hence, Islamophobia can be psychological and emotional, present in gestures perceived to be the result of ignorance and misunderstanding. However, it may also take a more direct form, as Rukshanda observes,

‘... harassing someone for being Muslim, for their religious beliefs. And also kind of abusing them, including abusive language that your beliefs are wrong. Abusing their religious figures, targeting the Prophet (pbuh)69, targeting the Quran. And also their outlook, for instance in France with respect to the hijab.’

(Rukshanda, London2, 28, Science Grad, Overseas)

The reason for this harassment can vary from sheer ignorance to a belief that young men and women practicing their religion are defying Western democratic values. This defiance is both perceived as a threat and a corruption of the progressive social fabric within Western and British societies. Natasha echoing the previous participants concludes,

‘I guess the concept of Islamophobia when you hear about these things the first thing that comes to your mind is that it means that targeting of individuals based on religion. People being discriminated based on religion. Maybe its stereotyping of individuals and sometimes it is based on specially for women I guess for men people who are really Islamic have beards and women cover their heads and everything, so in that context on the basis of your appearance only, it means that you are not active in a way where you define anything which is part of societal structures and norms and that you get a negative vibe or negativity in terms of actions against you.’

(Natasha, North West1, 34, Business Grad, Overseas)

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69 P.B.U.H means Peace be upon him – included with the name of messengers of God in Islam as a sign of reverence and respect.
Tabussum, the Racism and Equality Advisor at South East1 also highlighted such targeting of individuals based on their appearance. When asked about the first image that came to her mind on hearing the word Islamophobia she responded,

‘There are two things. In my head I have a visualization of women in burkas being shouted at, that’s my visualization, which is very strange. But then when I think of the word without the imagery I think of people not understanding Islam and hating it without any reason.’

(Tabussum, South East1, Racism and Equality Advisor)

If Islamophobia is determined by the degree of religious practice, the stereotype of the backward and oppressed or defiant and victimized young woman is often the result of media and government policies that continuously ‘otherize’ Muslims. Such otherization gives the ‘reason’ that Tabussum alludes to, for discriminating against Muslims. While accepted as the result of ignorance by most, Mehreen refuses to accept misinformation as a reason for the existence of Islamophobia,

‘I think Islamophobia is a misconception and misinterpretation that people have in their minds about Muslims. Ignorance is not an excuse for them…people like to read here, why can’t they read the Quran for themselves.’

(Mehreen, South East England1, 28, Science Grad, Overseas)

A further complexity to Islamophobia, and the way it is experienced is that often Muslims themselves exhibit such signs of mistreatment towards other Muslims, based on their level of religiosity. Fatima70 who wears a shalwar kameez and hijab, expressed her discomfort with young women who are overtly religious in the way they dress, particularly those who wear the niqab,

‘People scared of Islam. Basically that is what it is. Islamophobia I think what my personal view is that people who are very scared of hijabs or beards, the way

70 While Fatima described her reaction to the niqab, I perceived a similar reaction towards her from students around her when I went to interview her. Wearing a lose shalwar kameez and a hijab, Fatima stood out, where students would stare at her clothes or snigger. Fatima, seemingly shy and quiet, just ignored them as we made our way to the discussion room for the interview.
people dress. To be honest I have kind of got a bit like wowwww when you come across people with full on niqabs and black dress. Because I came across a group of women at the train station, 5 or 6 of them and I was like oh no if they dress like that and then these other people looking at them and then they are going to associate me with them....

(Fatima, West Yorkshire1, 21, Undergrad Law, British)

Fatima’s fear of being associated with the conservative niqab clad woman echoes the nature of discrimination that young women often face not only from non-Muslims but also from Muslims themselves. Her association with a ‘niqab’ clad female would evoke stereotypes of backwardness but also insecurity, where she is perceived as a troublemaker for not wanting to fit in. Kiran’s narrative also echoes this stereotype,

‘I think they can encourage it. Some of them really really encourage it. I think it is really stupid as well. People don’t need to be wearing ‘abaya’s (a type of niqab) everywhere. There are other things that cover you, not just abayas and if it is going to make someone look at you and think something of you then why would you want to wear it. But I can understand that everyone has the right to wear what they want but sometimes they should just avoid attracting attention to yourself for the sake of calm and being with other people.

(Kiran, London1, 22, Science Grad, British)

While both Fatima and Kiran hold the woman wearing the ‘niqab’ or ‘abaya’ responsible for standing out in public, women like Hafiza who wear the niqab have opted to stay away from the public domain as much as possible. Hafiza dropped out of her old university because she felt uncomfortable wearing the ‘niqab’ despite attending a university with a strong representation of Asian students. She decided to join the Open University instead where she did not feel as confined in observing her religious practices.

Hafiza, unlike Fatima and Kiran does not understand why both Muslims and non-Muslims have a problem with the niqab, as she believes women like herself are model citizens, and should be supported,
‘I am not going to go against society. It is a symbol of my religion...why are we made to look as women who cause problems. Niqabi women are an asset to the community. We don’t smoke, drink or gamble.’

(Hafiza, London, 25 Alumni, British)

However, despite not drinking, gambling or smoking, women who are overtly religious continue to fall victim to Islamophobia, both from Muslims and non-Muslims. Other participants have also shared their own reactions towards fellow Muslims. Nazia mentions her reaction to a bearded man with a huge backpack on the subway who ‘looked suspicious’, while others have questioned the need to wear a ‘niqab’. The reactions of Muslims themselves testify to the powerful meta-narrative of securitizing Muslims, in particular a certain kind of Muslim, who is held suspect on the basis of his or her degree of religiosity. However, it also highlights the problematic nature of assuming that Muslims practice their religion in the same way, by virtue of being Muslim. Given the level of religiosity amongst a diverse sample of forty students in this research, as well as their personal discomfort with different levels of religiosity, their narratives provide insights into the dynamics of a diverse religious group that is constantly stereotyped in the media and by state actors. Often, this misunderstanding is triggered by what Kiran calls,

‘preconceived notions...people’s attractiveness towards their egos when they want to discriminate against someone.... a lot of it is stupidity because people will not look into things. Arrogance. They do not want to look into someone else’s religion or understand other people’s thoughts or beliefs. There are a lot of barriers.’

(Kiran, London1, 22, Science Grad, British)

Islamophobia then includes the elements of a ‘fear of the unknown’, which far from being an irrational fear entails a level of rationality when contextualized within the wider narrative of Muslims and terrorism. There is a reason behind the existence of
Islamophobia whether it is misunderstanding or ignorance, or whether it is a deliberate act of hatred, often influenced by the meta narrative on terrorism as promoted by the media and highlighted by state actors. With stereotypes of Muslims based on the level of their religiosity as determined by physical markers, Muslims with different ‘degrees of religiosity’ experience Islamophobia differently. The reasons given for such difference in experiences allude to stereotypes that are part of the wider ‘discourse’ ‘community’ (Bakhtin 1981) about the Muslim woman who wears a niqab, a hijab/jilbab, a hijab/shalwar kameez, or one who bears no visible religious symbols. Such stereotypes are so pervasive that they also influence Muslim perceptions about other Muslims. Hence, Fatima and Kiran’s assumption about the problematic niqab clad woman, or Nazia’s suspicion of a ‘bearded man’ with a ‘backpack’ on a subway is rooted in ‘knowledge’ that securitizes certain ‘types’ of Muslims (Bakhtin 1984). While these narratives highlight such perceptions, the next section draws on the experiences of Islamophobia of young students, particularly those who wear the ‘hijab,’ ‘niqab,’ ‘jilbab,’ or the ‘shalwar kameez’, as well as those practicing Muslims who do not have any religious signifiers.

b. Experiencing Islamophobia

‘there was also an incident where I had an exam. Obviously I had the niqab on, and the man, he should have told me that come to the side and lift your niqab up for ID check, but he actually told me there, he just goes lift your niqab up and at that time I got loads of emails from all my fellow students telling me to complain but I really didn't want to cause a fuss about it. I don't know I just didn't want to fuss about it... I just thought that as a minority I was the only person wearing the niqab in that whole exam room and there were about 200 people in the exam room and only one me wearing the niqab and I thought I don't know I might as well instead of drawing attention to myself I just as well do as he says and lift my niqab up and get it over and done with. ... but then again another exam I had this female and she spoke to me in a really patronizing way, like I’m sorry but we really have to you know how they sometimes speak to you in a really slow way like you don't understand English
and that annoyed me more than that man who told me in front of everyone to lift my niqab up. Because I don't know I had a feeling that she assumed I didn't know what she was talking about and she patronized me so I felt worse and was more annoyed about that than the previous incident.'

(Faiza, West Yorkshire2, 22, Undergrad Humanities, British)

The experience of Islamophobia for university students often goes unreported precisely because of young Muslim women like Faiza who do not want to ‘cause a fuss.’ The problem with such under reporting is that universities are unable to cater to the needs of an internationally and religiously diverse student body. Faiza’s university has a large Muslim population, but within that population young women who wear the niqab are in a minority. Such women not only stand out amongst their fellow Muslims, but may experience greater discrimination both outside and within the university, particularly where the staff is not trained to deal with young people who wear the niqab. Islamophobia therefore is not always restricted to experiences outside the formal setting such as classrooms or exam rooms but may directly interrupt a student’s academic experience. The representative of FOSIS also highlighted the problem faced by young women who wear the niqab in universities across England.

‘A few years back Imperial College is an example where they tried to impose a niqab ban. I think they did but it was overturned because we took the case to the NUS and made a big deal about that. Definitely this happens. There are other issues with the niqab there was another case as well where it was a college student who wasn’t allowed to enrol into college if she wore the niqab. They gave all sorts of excuses, that oh because of security reasons you can’t put it on, problems with identification. So she said okay for my ID card I can take a picture without the niqab for you. She was prepared to do that. She said if in class people have trouble understanding me then I won’t wear it in class. So she was prepared to make those concessions just to be accepted and enrolled. But they over ruled it saying no you can’t wear the niqab. They just did not want someone on campus wearing the niqab. That is happening. By the way that is why generally hate crime in particular is widely known to be under reported, it is a battle for us.’ (FOSIS Representative, 2011)
The student who wears the ‘niqab’ is both caught between a narrative of the oppressed woman and a sense of insecurity around Muslims that is continuously fuelled by both media and political actors. While the act of gaining admission and studying at a higher education institution should be encouraged as it allows greater agency, the ‘niqabi’ woman is further isolated because of the stereotype of suspicion that informs her reality both within and outside her university. Nadia who wore the ‘niqab’ to attend classes outside the university, suffered Islamophobia on the streets,

‘like myself I don’t wear the niqab but I have worn it a couple of times because of my classes where it was my teacher, because it was like mixed and stuff she wanted the girls to cover their faces in certain areas. Obviously I wouldn’t take it off in public because it is disrespectful to someone who wears it. That was the only time I have had someone just openly come up to me in (West Yorkshire) and just in my face ... he just started yelling stuff and he was just like oh you want us to be scared of you, I am not scared of you not scared of you and I was like have a nice day. He couldn’t see me smiling...he was English, quite an old man must have been in his 50s. But these people are confused and they want to take it out on someone. Once it was Jews, and then Pakis and now it is Muslims.

(Nadia, West Yorkshire2, 20, Undergrad Law, British)

Nadia’s explanation for this experience draws on the need for the general public to find someone they can physically hold responsible for the events of July 7. The niqabi woman, hidden behind the veil provides the perfect scapegoat, falling victim to a security narrative that ‘securitizes’ her very existence. She is also often subject to slurs such as ‘ninja,’

‘Ninja is that you know cartoon strips, that some kind of monster that has its face covered in those cartoon strip, a cloth around their eyes tied behind their back, like the niqab ... I just ignore them, I feel sorry for them. I just think you don’t even know who I am, what I’m doing, why I’m wearing this. You just feel the need to you know name call.’

(Faiza, West Yorkshire2, 22, Undergrad Humanities, British)
All forty participants agreed that women who wear the niqab face the worse form of Islamophobia. Zubaida, who does not wear any religious signifiers shares her experience,

‘...The ones who definitely keep quiet. Embrace religion a bit more. I have had English people come up to me say they feel scared when a woman comes on a subway with a hijab or burqa. They tell me that they are scared. I think those kind of women get more because of religion, way they are just because of how much they embrace it. Unlike me. I don’t want to use the word Westernized because that would mean I am on their side, when it is not about sides, or like wanting to be white. It is just weird. It is almost like a comment referred to like, you are one of us.’

(Zubaida, London 1, 30, Science Graduate, British)

Such a distinction between religious signifiers also creates divisions within the Muslim group. Categories of the moderate against the radical literally take on physical manifestations of religion, where those who display religious signifiers are often considered more radical or vulnerable to extremism,

‘You are putting an X on yourself, that here I am, I am Muslim. You are putting yourself out there whether you want to or not. I mean that is the whole point, you cover up, you lower your gaze and you hope that people don’t look at you, that is the whole point. It is the whole modesty thing. But in a way people will look at you more, and in that way you are a target. Then if something goes wrong, they look to you like if something is happening in a Muslim country, oh it is your people.’

(Farzana, South West 1, 20, Undergrad Medicine, British)

Identifying a woman who wears the ‘niqab’ or the ‘hijab’ as belonging to ‘that’ group of terrorists, troublemakers, outsiders locates the individual within the meta narrative of ‘security,’ where encounters with Islamophobia are tainted by a lens that perceives all Muslims as homogenous, belonging to the problematic group of ‘Islamist terrorist’ or their sympathizers. While the ‘niqab’ is targeted the most, the ‘hijab’, ‘jilbab’ and the ‘shalwar kameez’ have also attracted unwanted attention. Women who wear the ‘hijab’ often have to tolerate racist slurs such as ‘nappy head’, ‘...Osama bin Laden’s wife,’ and
other more common words like ‘Paki’, discussed later in the chapter. Mehreen has also experienced such Islamophobia, but since she wears both the ‘hijab’ and the ‘shalwar kameez’, she feels that she stands out more.

‘I was walking on the street. Two students follow me. One says to the other guy ‘but she…’ as if to stop the other guy from stopping me. I heard him move to the left so I crossed the street, but as I was doing that he spat at me. It did not reach me. Other people call me a lesbian since I wear the hijab. If such people are in a group I can hear the others trying to stop them as if they think I might react, or there might be a reaction from the Muslim community.’

(Mehreen, South East1, 28, Science Grad, Overseas)

Mehreen also experienced discrimination within the university when applying for a research assistant job, yet did not report it, a problem she believes a lot of young Muslim women who wear any of the religious symbols face, both within the university, as well as outside, when seeking employment. While the problem with her ethnic identity will be explored in the second part of this chapter, the Muslim identity juxtaposed with a Pakistani identity is nonetheless problematic, where she is considered backward both as a result of her religion and her culture. Such perceptions of backwardness, misunderstanding of religious beliefs may also fuel discrimination in other ways within the university, yet they continue to go unreported as highlighted by Tehmina,

‘... Again it can be very indirect, being Islamophobic or being racist can be very indirect. There is the whole debate about anonymous marking. I am a strong believer that anonymous marking should go through. I know cases where people have been not graded or passed because of their faith or just because their name it sounds Muslim, they wear a headscarf or they wear a burka so, yeah I mean there was a lot of debate about it. I mean most of them don’t even know where they can report it in higher education.’

(Tehmina West Midlands1, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British)
While women continue to be more susceptible to discrimination because of their headscarf and levels of religiosity, those women who lack a visible Muslim signifier may still fall victim to Islamophobia.

‘I think it is just as hard if you are not wearing a headscarf. When people see you wearing a headscarf they already have an idea in their head but when you are not wearing one then it really begins, then they really try to psychoanalyze you and it is just as hard.’

(Aisha, London4, 22, Undergrad German, British)

Constantly having to prove that you are Muslim enough without being considered a threat is a struggle which participants without Islamic signifiers highlighted in the research.

Nazia faced a similar problem of having to defend her religion to a fellow student,

‘There is this French girl in my class who is an atheist, I am Pakistani and I am a Muslim and there is another boy who is from Panama and he is a ... practicing Catholic. So we were having dinner together and the guy asked me what kind of food do you eat? I told him I eat anything that is Halal or Kosher. He said explain to me what Kosher is and I said what Jews eat is Kosher. I joked that when Jews ask for Kosher it is fine but when we ask for halal we are ‘fundos’. So this French girl said well you guys are and I said why would you say that. And she said that she could prove to me that all Muslims are terrorists and they are willing to blow themselves up...I said to her you don’t have to prove to me that the whole Muslim world is terrorist and are willing to blow themselves up. You just have to prove to me that I am a terrorist and I can blow myself up...but there is no way in a hundred years that you can prove that because I am a Muslim and I am a normal human being just like you, look at me we are sitting here and talking...I just realized if such a girl who is from Paris, is in a university like this which is so central and has more nationalities than the UN believes this, then we as Muslims need to launch a very big marketing campaign for Islam since because of misrepresentation Islam has become a very bad brand. ...Islam has become the Enron basically, this is how I look at it.’

(Nazia, London3, 28, Social Sciences Grad, Overseas)

Islam’s position as the ‘Enron’ of the civilized world was exacerbated by the events of 9/11 and 7/7. The tragedy triggered a level of suspicion that was directed at all Muslims, where those without any religious signifiers were still vulnerable because of their Muslim names. Tabussum’s insights into this phenomenon are important as the ‘Racism and
Welfare’ advisor at her university, where she liaisons between the university and the students, having launched a multi-faith dialogue project between student societies and representatives.

‘Then 7/7 happened…it has made people very suspicious of Muslims. Maybe for people like you and I, who don’t wear hijabs you wouldn’t really necessarily know we are Muslims, unless you knew a lot about Arabic names, and people would be like yeah yeah they’re cool, but then maybe when they find out that we are Muslims I think they will be suspicious of us. I think that’s the effect it has had on people. Just this thing of distrust, and I think with all the right wing information out there about Islam both from the West and from the East it’s made people really misunderstand the whole religion.’

(Tabussum, South East1, Racism and Equality Advisor)

The level of ‘distrust’ that Tabussum mentioned has been displayed by both the ‘black’ and the ‘white’ community, as Zubaida’s account illustrates,

‘Yeah when the twin towers happened…Had it strongest from the black people in university. Racist comments, how we caused shit, we should leave, take friends back. They were like students, fellow students. A little bit, I was like what? I remember the first reaction I had was like ‘You are calling me a Paki, when you are black. If this is about colour, you are darker than me.’ I would say it. A lot of the environment got scary. Uni, some teachers were a bit more preferential towards other. I didn’t wear the hijab but I had a group of girls I hung around with who wore the hijab, so I guess by association. I never said I was or wasn’t Muslim.’

(Zubaida, London1, 30, Graduate Sciences, British)

Discrimination then moves beyond just the colour of the skin. In the ‘racialisation of religion’, discrimination entails both an essentialist reading of religious symbols that become markers of differentiation, where lack of symbols nonetheless confines individuals to external categories. Looking a certain way or having certain names, are ‘naturally’ associated with a wider ‘securitized’ group of Muslims, where expressions like ‘leave, take friends back’ echo a sense of ‘otherization’ projected towards Muslims.
Young women who do not wear any of the religious symbols are constantly questioned about their religion. As Aisha observes,

‘You know when people look at me and they see I wear jeans I look quite modern and stuff but I pray. They look at me and they say they can’t believe that I pray, you know those kind of anti Islamic comments. It kind of makes them scared because they look at me and think if people like her are religious then imagine how fanatical the others who wear headscarves are... The media is making everybody more stupid or feeding them whatever they want ... Moderate is kind of, almost like degrading in a sense. If someone said to me I am a moderate Muslim, I would be offended. I would be like you don’t know what is in my heart. I’d be like what just because I am not wearing a headscarf. As a Muslim person if someone calls me moderate it is saying to me that you are not practicing your faith properly. Either way you are kind of damned, whether you are an extremist or a moderate, you don’t want to be either really.’

(Aisha, London4, 22, Undergrad German, British)

While young Muslim students in universities struggle to express their identity, external categories of the moderate and the extremist continue to define and further confine the boundaries of that expression and their religious identities. With media and state actors dropping words such as ‘moderate’, ‘extremist’ or ‘radical’, young Muslims in their everyday experiences are limited within such vague terms. As Mehnaz notes,

‘I believe that these terms do exist. There are some Muslims who are more extreme than others. But what is a moderate? Would you call someone who does not stand up for their religious rights moderate, or someone who does as non-moderate. Who decides? The media?...You can be extreme in many cases...these terms are to narrow people down. You have got so many people you can’t narrow it down. I don’t think they are the correct terms. They may explain ideas but who decides what they mean. Does extremist mean someone who will go bomb or someone who is going to stand up for their rights...A person who goes bombs people and calls themselves jihadis. I don’t see them as jihadis but I think of them as stupid idiots who have been brainwashed...I do not believe in stuff like this. If you want to do jihad, do jihad within. For me a person who stands up for their rights might be extremist for some people might not for other. So I won’t define something like that.’

(Mehnaz, West Yorkshire2, 22, Undergrad Law, British)
Mehnaz’s narrative is echoed across participants, all of whom have expressed their dissatisfaction with such terms as used by media and state actors. Almost viewed as a value judgment on the level of one’s own religiosity, moderates and extremists are external categories limiting an individual’s right to practice his or her religion without being judged by an outsider. Their narratives echo journalist Mehdi Hasan’s observation (See pg 91) about how Muslims constantly need to prove they are ‘moderate’ enough, while people are deliberately trying to ‘out’ the secret ‘extremists’ within them (Hasan 08 July, 2012). Furthermore, the participants described both Muslim and non-Muslim students as being judgmental and dismissive. Talking about Muslims being Islamophobic, Zahra observes,

‘...yeah I have come across some of them. You know they want to be ‘moderate’ so they get confused and they’d think that you know what if somebody is practicing, they would think they are extremist. At the same time, they get scared that we are moderate so we don’t get stereotyped

... Interviewer: These are Muslims saying that?
Zahra: Yes these are Muslims. I think they have taken that concept that moderate Muslims are okay. They don’t take things to the extreme. They want to be called moderate so they tend to stay away from people like me.
Interviewer: How does it make you feel?
Zahra: It makes me feel a bit useless. You do feel like you don’t fit in or something. But you know we are human (she laughs)’

(Zahra, West Yorkshire 2, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British)

If the state’s prerogative with the Prevent agenda in universities is to counter extremism often linked to isolation and alienation, then terms like ‘extremism’ and ‘moderate’ are by virtue counter productive. Zahra’s feeling of not fitting in, is similar across students who tend to befriend young people who are more accepting of them and their beliefs, rather than judgmental and dismissive. The ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ dynamic hence creates a further sub division within Muslim student groups, where there is a fear of being
considered less ‘moderate’ or more ‘extremist’ through association. However, as Faiza observes,

‘I don’t believe in any such thing liberal, fundamental Islam, moderate. I think Islam is in each person. And I don’t believe that women who wear hijab or don’t wear it, even the head scarf or niqab as long as they are kind, good mannered, don’t have anger, not ignorant, even those people are true Muslims they don’t have to wear a niqab or anything. Islam is in each person...’

(Faiza, West Yorkshire2, 22, Undergrad Humanities, British)

There is a further assumption that terms such as extremist and moderate have the same meaning for young people across different groups. Yet, the narratives illustrate that such terms have different meanings for different students. For Hafsa,

‘Someone who is a fundamentalist or extremist in Islam is someone who is extreme in their love for God, that is what a Muslim should be, and that is the goal they should strive towards. However, when they use terms like radicalisation in a context that is definitely definitely negative, associated with suicide bombers, they automatically put in the general public including the Muslim population’s head that radicalisation of your religion is really bad. By that they stop you from going into the extreme of your religion, or really looking too much into it, and they make you realize, keh (that) if you are a moderate Muslim, the one who chills and hangs out, has a beard occasionally, you are okay because you are moderate, but the moment you start going too much into your religion be that daari, (beard) hijab, whatever praying a little more, fasting more, then you are in the danger zone. You are in the zone that you can become one of those fundamentalists, you can become an extremist, so it’s one of those very subconscious subtle ways of putting in the people and the masses head that this is not right. So they have confused the two concepts by making you focus on the black sheep, who by the way I believe are not even Muslims ... they want the masses to focus on a negative picture, on what Islamic extremism can be, whereas that is the opposite of what Islamic extremism actually is ... So extremism for me is just a term that they have coined so that people tend to be happy with the moderate Muslim state which is not exactly the ideal...’

(Hafsa, North East1, 22, Law Grad, Overseas)

The experiences and understanding of Islamophobia based on a purely Muslim identity is often determined by the more broader categorization of the radical and moderate in conjunction with ‘degrees of religiosity’ as encouraged by the media. Before
understanding the role of media and the other factors that students have highlighted as contributing to such experiences, another important element that needs to be examined is the ethnic identity. In this sample, the Pakistani ethnic identity stands out, which participants believe play a part in their experiences of Islamophobia, some calling the experience itself ‘Pakophobia.’ The next section highlights what Pakophobia entails, how it is experienced, particularly for the British/Pakistani population, illustrating the intersection of a religious and a problematic ethnic identity within a larger framework of security and discrimination.

III. Pakophobia: The Muslim and the Pakistani in Britain

In the literature on Islamophobia, race and ethnicity are often mentioned as factors that contribute to discrimination, but the extent to which such factors play a role in experiencing Islamophobia is often overlooked. An understanding of Islamophobia is primarily dominated by the religious identity Muslim, described as the primary factor for Islamophobic attacks. The preceding discussion on religiosity and symbolism supports this line of argument, yet in refocusing the lens on Islamophobia, the narratives also suggest that different identities as located within the narrative on security provoke different reactions. The Pakistani identity is problematic in the ‘security’ narrative, highlighted by the emerging political jargon around Afghanistan and Pakistan in relation to terrorism, better known as the ‘Af-Pak’ problem. This socio-political narrative is not simply limited to an uneducated potentially vulnerable Pakistani Muslim stereotype, but recent accounts of Pakistani students arrested on suspicion of terrorism have further made the educated Pakistani suspect.71 The problematizing of the Pakistani student has resulted

71 The campaign Justice for North West 10 highlights how Pakistani students have been implicated as terrorist suspects, discussed in the next chapter
in debates around student visas, which was addressed in the 2011 Prevent Agenda of counter terrorism. With students and universities situated in the wider political agenda of counter terrorism, both stereotypes of the Pakistani and Muslim identities that are evoked in participant conversations and interactions across different private and public arenas, needs to be considered. In a media and information driven society where images of the Pakistani terrorist abound, often the problem of discrimination is not just restricted to Islamophobia but also what students called ‘Pakophobia’. As the Pakistani identity continues to be shrouded in suspicion and trepidation, the experience of Pakophobia moves beyond direct discrimination to include also the internalization of a fear of being perceived in a negative light, one associated with being Pakistani. As Salma observes,

‘Once again, we are Pakistanis, so we have that situation of having different types of stereotypes and negative perceptions associated with us because Pakistan is not popular...I think as a Pakistani Muslim it is quite difficult to sometimes see whether it is a religious resentment or is it a cultural resentment. You never know where the other person might be coming from or might potentially go because both are not seen as the best possible scenarios.’

(Salma, North West1, 28, Business Grad, Overseas)

Hence, Pakistan’s position in the current war, now being fought on Pakistani soil, has had repercussions not only for the country internally, but also for Pakistanis internationally. Politically allies, the United Kingdom and other Western powers are constantly urging Pakistan ‘to do more’ in countering terrorism in the country. This has created a ‘trust deficit’ of sorts between allies that has filtered down through media to the general public. More incidents like the Bin Laden killing in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad has dominated media and state narratives, further fuelling this distrust. In exploring narratives of discrimination for a Muslim/Pakistani population the distinction between
Islamophobia and Pakophobia is more difficult, precisely because ‘both’ identities ‘are not seen as the best possible scenarios.’

a. Defining Pakophobia: The Muslim Pakistani nexus

Pakophobia in Britain needs to be contextualized within the discussion of the British Pakistani Muslim identity. The discussion in the preceding chapters highlights the fluid nature of identity, where it is argued that being British, being Pakistani and being Muslim cannot be artificially dissected. All three aspects of one’s identity are expressed in different situations, either separately or simultaneously. However, the space available for expressing these identities are constantly negotiated not only internally but also externally, often dependent on how the host state ‘imagines’ and creates categories for the practical purposes of ‘managing’ immigrant communities (Shah 1998:51). Farzana’s insights on her British Pakistani Muslim identity highlights the negotiation of this space:

‘Personally I don’t think that I have been like oo I have to prove that I am Muslim and be this way and have to prove that I am British and be this...I am me and I am quite happy being me. But if you have to define me, like you know if I have to fill a form, I am not ticking the White box, now am I? I am ticking British Pakistani or whatever.’

(Farzana, South West1, 20, Undergrad Medicine, British)

However, students like Farzana are nonetheless ‘at home’ in expressing who they are, no matter how different members of the ‘White box’ might perceive them. As Tariq Ramadan observes of the second and third generation British Muslims, in particular those with a Pakistani heritage,

‘I think that even with the young generation of British Muslims, there is a new understanding of who they are, what they should achieve. In the older generation, voices coming from Pakistan, idea that we have something to give, but we will isolate ourselves from the surrounding societies. Now it is no longer the case. The younger generation understands that they are citizens, have a role in society, have something to give. It’s really from isolation to integration to contribution. Isolation was the first step, saying yes we are here but we need to
protect ourselves; Integration was saying yes we are part of the society so we are going to create our schools, we are going to have OUR things, a sort of integration for protection, and now in terms of Contribution young Muslims understand ... that you have to give something, you have to be proactive .... Coming from the scholars they have changed their mind on that, changed their rules, this is something of a silent revolution, intellectual revolution, change your mindset.’

(Interview with Tariq Ramadan December 18, 2009)

Nevertheless, in a post 9/11 socio-political milieu such citizens are often viewed with suspicion and apprehension by the host community. The British Pakistani identity today is placed in the particularities of the war against Al Qa’ida as a result of which there is a constant negotiation on what it means to be a British Muslim, or a British Pakistani Muslim, the definition almost having the undertone of questioning nationalistic loyalties against an ideological sense of belonging.

Both the British Pakistani Muslim and the Pakistani Overseas students’ experiences need to be understood in such a context, where religious and ethnic identities are singled out, finding expression through Islamophobia and Pakophobia. As Rukshanda observes,

‘...especially since 7/7...debates started on madrassas in Pakistan and how these militants were trained in Pakistan and sent abroad to do all these activities. After that they started looking at Pakistan in a very suspicious way.’

(Rukshanda, London2, 28, Science Grad, Overseas)

With Islamophobia understood as a ‘racialised’ phenomenon (Meer and Modood 2010), the ethno-religious aspect of the Pakistani-Muslim identity is also intricately interwoven. This is clearly illustrated through Hafsa’s experience,

‘I was on the train right, and I was on the way back home and a couple of Yorkshire big bulky butch pissed drunk men and they all sort of get on the train and somehow one of the trains weren’t working so none of us could get our seats, and those people who didn’t have seats also had to get on the train. So we were standing in there. I was just like standing in the middle and you know, at that point I didn’t even wear the hijab but I think it’s pretty obvious that I’m a Muslim, they associate Pakistani...as Muslim. And I was speaking to my brother on the phone and I was like ‘itmei aadmi hain and mei beech mei phans gai hoon na’ (there are a lot of men and I am stuck in the middle) because he just dropped me
And he’s like okay try and find a seat and try and you know get away from them. When they heard me speak in Urdu one of them was like ‘oo she’s a Paki isn’t she ooo’ shuru hogai (they started). And then certain of them made a few snide remarks about me being a Muslim, something like ‘You like Muhammad eh’...

(Hafsa, North East1, 22, Law Grad, Overseas)

Given such a juxtaposition of identities Pakophobia is understood as a form of Islamophobia, which is interspersed with both the ethnic (Pakistani) and the religious aspect of the individual. It is not a phenomenon that is different from Islamophobia, but is situated within the same category, where the specific ethnic characteristic of a Pakistani may often be the defining feature of the discrimination experienced, rather than the religious aspect alone. Abida who highlights the term Pakophobia in her narrative clearly illustrates this point,

‘Interviewer: You mentioned Islamophobia and then Pakophobia. What do you think is the link between the two?
Abida: Most Pakistanis are thought to be Muslims.
Interviewer: Being Pakistani, does that make one more vulnerable towards Islamophobia or is it a completely different kind of discrimination.
Abida: It is exactly the same thing...I’ve seen people react differently towards people belonging to as I said other countries who are Muslims...’

(Abida, West Yorkshire1, 21, Undergrad Law, Overseas)

However, for the participants the anti-Pakistani sentiment has been internalized to a greater extent than the anti-Muslim sentiment. The problems Abida encountered from the British Pakistani Muslim community in her efforts to establish a student Pakistani society testifies to this internalization. The university she belongs to has a small population of Muslim and Pakistani students. Creating a Pakistani society yielded resistance from British Pakistani Muslim students:

‘That matter is one big problem, it is called a Pakistani society. People have suggested renaming it the South Asian society. Some kind of name which does not involve Pakistan, they say that it’s not a good idea to have a society like this. I
don’t know the reasoning, probably because I don’t understand it or I don’t want to understand it. But they say oh don’t name it the Pakistani society, we are not too keen about it, it’s not a good country... I think I don’t see it that much in Overseas Pakistanis, I see it more in British Pakistanis... who again hate it because maybe they haven’t been there...they think that Pakistan is extreme, fundamentally run.’

(Abida, West Yorkshire1, 21, Undergrad Law, Overseas)

Abida’s university has an Islamic society, but the same members were willing to join a South Asian society, not one by the name of Pakistan. Hence, the British Pakistani Muslims in her university rather than being indifferent to the Pakistani identity, displayed an active attempt to distance themselves from it. With Pakistan getting negative press in the media, any association with that country was deemed suspicious by the British Pakistani Muslim students. Areesha, who studies at a predominantly Pakistani university in West Yorkshire, echoes similar sentiments:

‘Like the other day the girl was saying, oh I am too scared to go to Pakistan. I said why? Oh it is so dangerous...There are bombs going on, this going on that going on. I said excuse me I just came from Pakistan my family is there, and nobody is at risk. These are British Pakistanis.’

(Areesha, West Yorkshire2, 20, Undergrad Social Sciences, Overseas)

This negative association with Pakistan has resulted in a dissociation with the country for more than half of the British Pakistani Muslims in the research, akin to what Nadia called an ‘inferiority complex’. Nadia, identifies this inferiority complex quite clearly for her British Pakistani Muslim friends,

‘I do think generally across the board Pakistanis do have this inferiority complex and I do feel like all the time you have different narratives. You know there was kind of the black power movement and even though there is still racism on that front there is a sense of like power and like belonging and people are proud to be black and people are proud of their heritage and Afro Caribbean’s and there is a sense of pride. The same for my Arab friends, they are proud of where they are from and other people respect that and they think oh Egypt is so cool, oh Ghana is so cool but when it is Pakistan I think a lot of our parents generation were slightly nationalistic and some of our generation are... but they are a little bit like yeah Pakistan instead of being like oh yeah Pakistan it is such a rich and amazing country which it is on so many
levels, but it hasn’t really been communicated in that way. It is just seen as these really backward people and I don’t think that the way people view Pakistan is how they view any other country in the East.’

(Nadia, West Yorkshire2, 20, Undergrad Law, British)

While the perception of Pakistan as a conflict state fuelling extremism is present both within the British Pakistani Muslim and the non British Pakistani population, the fear of being discriminated against on the basis of one’s Pakistani identity clearly comes through, especially in narratives where women are warned not to disclose their Pakistani identity.

‘When I came here my phupho (aunt) ... in London...said if someone asks you about your nationality, don’t tell them you’re Pakistani. This was kind of really strong. She said you must be thinking that your aunt has become something over here, but you will face racism issues so don’t typify yourself as a Pakistani... And then she explained it to me that after all the things that Pakistanis did people have had problems with being this and they tried to conceal their identity. Loads of people in London that I’ve met they say that being a Pakistani makes life more difficult, makes you less trustworthy...’

(Maryam, South West1, 28, Graduate, Social Sciences, Overseas)

This fear and embarrassment is also translated in the way students interact with each other in classrooms. Abida echoing Nadia’s sentiments on inferiority made similar observations about the Pakistanis in her class,

‘Most of the Pakistani girls don’t talk during lectures...They are too scared of being noticed as a Pakistani. I remember we were doing constitution, there was a terrorism act, and of course everyone knows what terrorism means, especially Pakistanis. So I remember on the day of the lecture our slides are given about a week before... There was no Pakistanis and no Asian British present during that lecture, I was so ashamed of it. I don’t know the reason why because our professor in the beginning mentioned the first organization to invent terrorism was the IRA, the Irish. So it’s the fact that they think we are terrorists is what makes them ashamed of the you know...

Interviewer: Are you saying that Pakistani and British Pakistanis themselves think they are terrorist?

Abida: They themselves think they are part of that group. In TV, on the news when they say that these many people were arrested, some of them were from Pakistan, even if they don’t say it, they sound like Pakistani names. Mohammad Hussain
(changes to a deep Pakistani accent when she takes this name) is not going to be an Arab guy, it sounds Pakistani, so we have got this self loathing quality that we have adopted, which is not a good quality which makes us think we are inferior, because we think now that our own people are blowing up planes and are blowing themselves up. We see that in our own country and we know that there are Pakistanis who are blowing up hundreds of people in political rallies, just because someone has a different view.’

(Abida, West Yorkshire1, 21, Undergrad Law, Overseas)

In order to understand this internalization, British Pakistani Muslim participants in this research were asked about the different aspects of their identities. As the literature on South Asian Diaspora in Britain has highlighted in Chapter 2, (See pgs 54-63) the Muslim identity for second and third generation Pakistanis is more prominent and politicized, where the Pakistani identity is associated more with the parents generation. However, while exceptions to this understanding did emerge in the narratives of some British Muslims with a Pakistani heritage who expressed the importance of their Pakistani identity, others in keeping with the wider literature emphasized their British and Muslim identities. Hence, the nature of responses to the question on identity and being British/Pakistani/Muslim varied, with some young people confidently asserting their Britishness, or their ‘Pakistaniat’ while others were unsure about the extent to which their ‘Pakistaniat’ came through. Faiza, studying at West Yorkshire2 is a case in point,

‘I don’t consider myself as a total British. With the cricket world cup I was supporting Pakistan not England, I don’t know why... The royal wedding that is coming up, I am actually interested in it. I like the British royal family, I appreciate the monarchy. My parents pay taxes, I appreciate being British but I don’t know what it takes to be British. To be white, to be white British could make you completely British.’

(Faiza, West Yorkshire2, 22, Undergrad Humanities, British)

The notion of being white as an indicator of one’s Britishness was an aspect mentioned by several participants across different universities. While Faiza belonged to a West
Yorkshire university which has a large percentage of British Pakistani students, Farzana belonged to a university located in South West England, which had a small Muslim, and an even smaller presence of Pakistani students. Yet, similar sentiments were echoed by her,

‘Well I am British and I do actually think I am British but I will feel stupid saying that to a white person because there has to be a way to differentiate them from me because we are not the same.
Interviewer: What makes you different?
Farzana: Look at me. Helloooooo.’

(Farzana, South West1, 20, Undergrad Medicine, British)

However, only one participant out of the twenty British Pakistani Muslims in this research questioned and refused to accept the dominant notion of whiteness in relation to being British,

‘Since 9/11 the whole identity question has become more focused on Muslims especially with Pakistani background, and Indian. I see myself as British.... This is my own country and you are telling me that I am not part of it because I am not white...my mother was born here, my father was born in Pakistan...for me I am British, I am a British Muslim. I think the Asian bit comes at the end of the equation. But for some people it is different. Being Pakistani is very important to them...for myself as British I don’t need to, and then obviously my faith is important to me, I am Muslim....I don’t think it needs justification....being English is something different....being British does not mean it’s white. If you look at the British flag it’s not like it is made up of one colour...again for different people it is different. I know people who were born here, their parents were born and bred here but they do not see themselves as British at all. And they would argue that you will never be British you never can be. You’re a Pakistani.’

(Tehmina West Midlands1, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British)

The question of whiteness and Britishness is one that has dominated discussion on racism ever since the encounter with the ‘coloured’ population in Britain in the 1950-60s as illustrated in Chapter 2. This issue is also highlighted in the narratives of participants, where Tehmina’s point of view demonstrates the divergent opinions about being ‘British’, ‘Muslim’ and ‘Pakistani’, reflecting a Bakhtinian ‘dialogics’ at play within the
‘discourse communities’ of participants trying to negotiate their point of view and (re)claim their identity (Bakhtin 1981; 1984). After the emergence of homegrown terrorism, the question of being brown and Muslim has greater overtones of insecurity and extremism. Loyalty and a sense of belonging are constantly evoked for Muslims, but particularly those who have a Pakistani heritage. While British Muslim Pakistanis may draw on different aspects of their identity, the experience of discrimination is perceived as invoking both the Muslim and Pakistani identity often together. Hence, the reality around the problematic positioning of Pakistan in the realm of global politics adds yet another dimension to the way in which the Pakistani self of the individual expresses itself. Mehnaz’s observations best illustrates this problem,

‘If someone asks me my ethnicity I would say British, I will not say Pakistani because I am born and bred in the UK... I think being Pakistanis are making us more vulnerable, because we have certain practices that are wrong, culturally yeah acceptable, Islamically not acceptable. I think with those practices we have made ourselves more vulnerable. 7/7 is actually like a fuse of problems, and with that fuse being blown up we have made ourselves more vulnerable... With Pakistanis we keep ourselves to ourselves, we don’t like socializing that much. The Indians have accepted the culture of Britain much more happily than Pakistanis. Indians are okay with marriages outside your communities, Pakistanis we’ve even got caste systems we don’t want to get out of that caste system to get married. So like I think with those ideas and those cultural practices I think that is why many people are looking at Pakistanis and are saying you know what, I am sure they have something going on there. I am sure they are planning something. They don’t know as Pakistanis we can’t keep our mouths shut. That is our problem. If we were terrorists we would be the most horrendous terrorists in the universe. Do you know how much problem we have of keeping our mouth shut?’

(Mehnaz, West Yorkshire2, 22, Undergrad Law, British)

Hence, locating the Pakistani identity within the British Muslim population in this sample proved more complex. While the Muslim identity as highlighted in the existing literature is no doubt highly politicized for the British Muslim with a Pakistani heritage, the assumption that the Pakistani identity is only associated with the first generation is
problematic particularly in a context where the media continues to highlight the negative role of Pakistan in the on-going war against Al Qa’ida and its affiliates. The sample provided a mixture of responses to the question on identity, with the preceding narratives questioning the relevance of the Pakistani identity, whereas others like Kiran confidently asserting different aspects of who she is,

‘I think that I am British, I have some British aspects to me, I am Muslim because I have Muslim aspects, and I am Pakistani I have Pakistani aspects. I think religion, culture and national identity are all different sections you can’t put them in boxes and pair them against each other. They are there in different areas of life. If someone was to ask about being Muslim and Christian at the same time that is different. I can be Pakistani British and Muslim at the same time. I don’t see why people have to argue with that. I find it really easy to be all at once. At the moment I feel like some kind of super woman.’

(Kiran, London1, 22, Science Grad, British)

Kiran’s description illustrates how external categorization of identities can often yield artificial results, where individuals can express different identities simultaneously. Yet, the phenomenon of ‘Pakophobia’ goes beyond a basic expression of ones identity, where student narratives constantly evoke the troubled position of Pakistan both domestically and internationally. Hence, ‘Pakophobia’ can be a two way process, where students are directly discriminated as a consequence of the Muslim-Pakistani juxtaposition, or they may internalize the negative narrative around Pakistan, distancing themselves from the Pakistani identity. While it is likely that the dissociation from Pakistan was a process that started well before 9/11, as events such as the Rushdie affair demonstrate (See pgs 54-63), the 9/11 and 7/7 tragedies however may have provoked an active disengagement from the problematic and often negative Pakistani identity. However, while this complex perception of identity and internalization of a negative Pakistani narrative provides one
aspect, the extent to which students experience direct discrimination as a result of their Pakistani identity is also worth considering.

b. Experiencing Pakophobia

In his discussion on racial insults in Brazil, Guimare describes racial insults as ‘tools of humiliation.’ Often ‘the social and racial position of the insulted is already historically established by means of a long process of prior humiliation and subordination, the very term that designates them as a racial group (‘preto’ or ‘negro’) has already become in itself a pejorative term’ (2003:136). Hence, as Bernard-Donals’ observes ‘regardless of the “interested” or “naïve” uses of language and its history, subjects cannot go outside of that history: it is always already there’ (Bernard-Donals 1994:164). The term ‘Paki’ is one such insult, which is historically situated in the narrative of the South Asian community in Britain. As Singh describes it, the term ‘Paki’ ‘…exists in a system of associative relationships with signs which negatively label other ethnic groups’ (2004:23; Also see Kureshi 2011:6-7). ‘Paki-bashing’ became more prominent ‘in 1969 or 1970’ which according to Pearson signalled the ‘emergence of a ‘moral panic’ when the official and semi-official view of ‘public opinion’, the mass media, the courts, and the police found a new word to describe acts of ‘unprovoked assault’ on people who are said to be racially inferior’ (Pearson, 1976:49-50).

However, with the Muslim identifier gaining prominence the term Paki gradually became associated with not just being South Asian but also Muslim. Faiza’s observation highlights this evolution,

‘If you are white as white can be, and you wear the hijab you are still called Paki. I think that the use of the word Paki has changed over time. Before it was just about being brown skinned being called Paki. Now it’s anyone who covers themselves, wears the hijab can be called Paki.’
For Faiza who wears the niqab, her experience of discrimination is more the result of ignorance about Islam, than her being Pakistani. Yet the permeability of the boundary between anti Pakistani and Islamophobic abuse is evident in the changing nature of the term ‘Paki’. Nadia’s narrative is another case at point. Nadia who wears the ‘hijab’ and ‘jilbab’ ‘looks’ Muslim. However, for her the term ‘Paki’ has taken on Islamophobic connotations as she observes,

‘I think it used to be just anti-Asian. It was used for Pakistani, Indians, Bengali and even people from like Nepal and stuff but now you hear Paki being used and the next word they would use is Osama bin Laden’s wife or Al Qa’ida. So they are making that link themselves.’

(Nadia, West Yorkshire2, 20, Undergrad Law, British)

While Paki was described as one of the terms that was predominantly heard, there were other less familiar terms which students also highlighted, often associated with anti-Pakistani sentiments,

‘Abida: I have had people call me T.W.A. Didn’t understand what that meant at all, It means Third World Assassin. I have started owning that persona now.
Interviewer: What do you mean?
Abida: It means that if you think I am a third world assassin which I am not, you better run and hide because if I find you I am going to smack the a-wax out of you. So yeah, if being a part of Pakistan means being called that then let it be I don’t really care.’

(Abida, West Yorkshire1, 21, Undergrad Law, Overseas)

Racist terms are one form of discrimination that British/Pakistani students experienced. These experiences were often on the streets, or on campuses at night where students encountered drunken individuals. However, there were also indirect experiences of Pakophobia in the university. Mehreen, an Overseas Pakistani student in a predominantly
‘white’ university in South East England, often experienced discrimination because she wore both the hijab and the shalwar kameez.

‘I get teased about my dress in the streets. I wore a shirt for my exam because I thought my shalwar kameez might give a negative impression so I wore a shirt then...I think the scarf is unacceptable to them. I have an Indian colleague, she wears shalwar kameez nothing happens to her.’

(Mehreen, South East1, 28, Science Grad, Overseas)

While for Mehreen her hijab is more problematic, for her exam she nonetheless decided to change her shalwar kameez, taking on a more acceptable western dress. As she explains, the shalwar kameez becomes problematic because of the stereotypes of the Asian woman that exists in the social psyche,

‘Also my shalwar kameez when I wear it. I am sorry to say that Pakistani/Bangladeshi/Indian, especially Pakistani community are labour class, not educated people. They think you are uneducated but I try to overcome this, and people are often happy that I make an effort.’

(Mehreen, South East1, 28, Science Grad, Overseas)

These subtle nuances around discrimination have also come through in other accounts. One case in point is the experience of a Pakistani student with her British Indian professor.

‘Rukshanda: I think because he is British Indian so at times it was a bit difficult. It might be because of a political thing between India and Pakistan. When I came here in 2007 there was a lot of trouble going on back home, like blast and political instability and all these things. He used to point out those problems. At times it became a bit difficult and I started ignoring all these things.

Interviewer: What kind of things?
Rukshanda: Like for example like at the beginning of any meeting he would say yeah I have read the news very terrible things are happening and why are these Taliban doing these things?...

Interviewer: Did it affect your work relationship with him?
Rukshanda: At first a little bit. I was a bit hesitant in going to his office. I felt I didn’t want to go, because he might say something of that sort. So in the corridor or while passing by the labs if I wanted to ask something, I would ask him.’

(Rukshanda, London2, 28, Science Grad, Overseas)
Such narratives reinforce the difficulty in defining the nature of discrimination that British/Pakistani students experience because of the problematic nature of both their religious and ethnic identities. Such complexities may or may not be present with other ethnicities, as the media seemingly has an easier time identifying the Pakistani aspect of a terrorist’s identity, than the Saudi aspect of a person like Osama bin Laden, who as far as media narrative is concerned is identified as being more ‘Arab’, than ‘Saudi’.

‘I think especially now with the whole war on terror. Oh no Pakistan is helping the US, oh no you are helping the Taliban. If you are Muslim you are either Arab or Pakistani. That is what it seems like right now.’

(Shumaila, South West1, 20, Undergrad Medical, British)

The reasons given for such discrimination varies, some blaming the media, while others highlighting a grander agenda of the war against Al Qa’ida. As Amna explains,

‘I think Pakistanis tend to suffer more because the point of Islamophobia is that you justify an unjustified war and that war is being fought in Pakistan. You know I used to take a bus and they used to play this news on the radio, a crappy tabloid. And three to four times every week there would be some lame news about some Ali or Usman Pakistanis who was being tried in some court on some terrorist suspicion, his trial date is moved forward or back. And the reason why they do this is because they want to keep that fear alive that these people are a real threat and every single one of them is plotting against you all the time...normally it is the Pakistanis and it makes sense because the War is being fought in Afghanistan and Pakistan right now so you have to create a real fear amongst the British public that if we are using millions and billions of your tax pounds it’s justified because these people are monsters and we have to combat this threat.’

(Amna, North West1, 28, Graduate Social Sciences, Overseas)

While these accounts of anti-Pakistani sentiments within the university are more indirect in nature, the normalization of this sentiment was more directly demonstrated in Hafsa’s
experience. After the North West 10 incident in April\textsuperscript{72}, she sat for a law exam in June of the same year, and was offended by a case study in their paper,

‘Case study around Rushdie...anyway people are arrested on terrorism act...this is all about how media covers the guilt of the people and they are not supposed to do...they called them ‘terrorists’...okay this is the best part they have never done this before. And the reason why I had issue with it is because they use the word Pakistan...statements like ‘fanatics’ ‘hate preachers’...The issue that I had, yeah...you can talk about all these things...but you cannot name a particular place or region...but the point is that I went and checked back and in every single paper up till that year every single question that was a problem question instead of having a country named, it used to have country A country B, something like this. But in this year, in this paper, after this event, they decided very happily to write Pakistan. I complained that you know we are all sensitive about this issue... (the teacher) could have used this entire situation that is completely fair but why did she call it Pakistan...you cannot say that. This can be a reality but in a paper you can’t do that. You can’t prejudice Pakistani students who take them seriously. You don’t know that we might even have, you know my friend has had an uncle killed by terrorists in Pakistan and she was giving that paper. So you can imagine how upset she was when she came out of the paper. It affected me more, because I hadn’t slept for the past four days...so this was like the last straw kind of thing. I completely literally felt like I was going to fail the paper.... And then I like passed, I got a low grade...I don’t know how and I have a feeling that they on purpose passed me because they didn’t want me to take this up as a proper proper issue’

(Hafsa, North East1, 22, Law Grad, Overseas)

These experiences and perceptions of discrimination have greater implications in our understanding of modern day racism as it exists in British society. These narratives reiterate Baroness Sayeeda Warsi’s claim that ‘Islamophobia has now passed the dinner-table test’ whereby Islamophobic slurs are becoming increasingly more acceptable (Anthony, 23/01/2011). This acceptance is not just translated by the non-Muslim/Pakistani population, but the British/Pakistani participants in this study are more willing to negotiate their space around such perceptions and incidents, rather than

\textsuperscript{72} The incident is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. It concerns a group of 10 Pakistani students who were accused of terrorism, but because of ‘lack’ of ‘evidence’ were found innocent, only to be further detained with the government attempting to deport them (See J4NW10 https://sites.google.com/site/j4nw10/Home Accessed on 09/08/2010; Cobian and Norton-Taylor 18/05/2010).
challenge them directly. Often such incidents of Islamophobia or Pakophobia go unreported because they are either seen as a consequence of ignorance or misunderstanding, or young women instead end up blaming themselves for such experiences. The next section highlights the reasons given for the experience of discrimination, as well as the role of the media that is continuously mentioned by participants, as an important factor that encourages Islamophobia both within university and in society.

IV. Rationalising Islamophobia

‘One very big factor is obviously the media, where what you see on media becomes reality...what they see on media becomes reality for them. I try to tell them that what you see on TV is 6-7 percent of the population. Most of the people are like me. They will pray, they might cover their heads, they may not cover their heads. They are modest people who want to send their children to school and have good jobs, and have a pension fund, and have electricity and water and security...the other reason is that we have just given up, we don’t do much to showcase our culture and our country.’

(Nazia, London3, 28, Social Sciences Grad, Overseas)

The existence of Islamophobia as well as Pakophobia has largely been attributed to the stereotypes presented by the media. All the participants in the research described how the media’s portrayal of Muslim terrorists and Pakistan as a dangerous country that promotes terrorism had resulted in a negative image, that informs their experiences within and outside the university, their interaction with other students and individuals in their private and public arenas. The participants also highlighted how the media’s portrayal often exaggerated and sensationalized the Muslim element of a terrorist,

‘You know the part of linking it. You know if you look at a Christian or other religions a lot of people have done similar kind of things. You know I think when it is a Muslim it becomes a headline which makes things worse. Yes there is this one person doing it but it is not about the religion. You should focus on the individual or group but not society or religion, it is not related to that. If you are
a Christian or from any other religion they would not emphasize that much but it seems like in the media it is all Muslims who do these things.’

(Zahra, West Yorkshire2, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British)

Participants further acknowledged the problem posed by certain individuals who were committing acts of terrorism in the name of Islam. However for most, these individuals did not represent Islam, while others completely dismissed the claim that they were Muslims, as Islam for them did not allow such kind of violence and terror. However, with the power of the media, and the actions of a few evoking the name of Islam in acts of terrorism, some participants believed that it was only a natural consequence for Islamophobia to emerge in society, and in their universities,

‘Whatever is happening is just kind of [umm] I don’t think the media does it on purpose, but things are still happening and unfortunately in most cases Muslims somewhere down the line are involved. That doesn’t mean that other races and other religions aren’t involved but it is an easy target. Easy target that no one at the moment can confidently stand up and question and say you know what you are wrong because pretty much we are wrong being Muslims. There is some level of truth to the media, but then again it is a level it is not all true.’

(Kulsoom, North West1, 22, Undergrad Science, British)

While media was cited as one reason, Muslims themselves were also held responsible for invoking Islamophobia. Nazia believed that ‘we don’t show case our culture and our country’ well, or even the Muslim religion. Other participants also expressed their disapproval at the clothes women wore, which made them stand out.

‘...I think it has to do with where they live. In certain places people are very educated and also the way they conduct themselves. I know people should be free to wear what they like but if they wear shalwar kameez and never try on skirt or jeans then of course they will be labelled these terms because they have come to this country, they should adapt something from this country as well. People should learn how to mix but I think what makes one vulnerable is living in certain areas where people are uneducated. In this area if I were to walk out in shalwar kameez people won’t say anything but if I was in (another place) and I was to walk in shalwar kameez people would label me Paki. But people would also make themselves vulnerable in the way they conduct themselves...’
Another problem highlighted was the isolation and ghettoization amongst the Pakistani community that has alienated itself because of attempts by the first generation immigrants to preserve their culture and identity. Pakistanis themselves are believed to have played a role in such negative experiences, as Sana also observes,

‘Lack of integration. If you are coming to a society you need to integrate with it instead of creating a mini Pakistan or mini India...you must to some extent extend your hand a little...understand their culture and what makes Britain what it is.’

(Sana, London1, 23, Graduate Medical, Overseas)

The reasons provided by students have varied from misunderstanding as provoked by the media, to ignorance about religion to even self-blame. Such arguments also provide insights as to why students often do not report their experiences or encounters with Islamophobia. Fatima who was subject to Islamophobic slurs while waiting outside her college, did not complain or talk to anyone about the incident,

‘Fatima:...just pushed it aside. Didn’t do anything about it... There is no point in me making it bigger. And I thought I haven’t done anything but our fellow Pakistanis have done something to instigate this. That is why they do it, they have a reason. They didn’t just think lets go shout at funny girls. They were instigated by other people. I personally think they have got calls for doing that because people have suffered loss because of some stupid men because of that we have to pay for it now...
Interviewer: Is such behaviour then justified?
Fatima: There is no justification in being racist but I think there is a somewhat understanding that there is a reason they are doing it, they are not just pure racists. They were attacked, they are scared.’

(Fatima, West Yorkshire1, 21, Undergrad Law, British)

A similar rational is provided by Zubaida who believes that

‘... Islamophobia is not helped by people who do actually blow themselves up and do like blowing things up. And I’m like well you need to fix it on both sides. In order to not be called that you shouldn’t do it.’

(Zubaida, London1, 30, Graduate Sciences, British)
The narrators hence constantly try to understand the perspective of the Islamophobe who is viewed as acting out of ignorance and misunderstanding that is promoted by media, which simultaneously becomes a further problem through the actions of Muslims and Pakistanis themselves. While none of the students were guilty of any form of terrorism or radicalization, the fact that they belonged to a group that was stereotyped as being radical, was often perceived as an understandable reason for people to be Islamophobic. With participants having been asked to remove their niqab in an exam room, being patronized, subject to Islamophobic slurs, spat at, or having to constantly defend their religion, none of them in providing an explanation for their experiences ever mentioned direct hatred towards Muslims. Ignorance, misunderstanding and the backward stereotype of the Pakistani or Muslim were defined as the primary reasons for the existence of Islamophobia in an information driven, post 9/11 and 7/7 society. As Faiza observes,

‘...we are a minority, a very small minority and you have to deal with these things, that’s how I see it’

(Faiza, West Yorkshire2, 22, Undergrad Humanities, British)

V. Concluding Discussion

The narratives in this chapter provide insights into the dynamics of everyday life of British/Pakistani Muslim female students in this research, whose interactions, whose ‘realities’ are informed by a wider narrative of insecurity and suspicion about Muslims and Pakistanis. Supporting the existing literature on Islamophobia, the narratives expose how Islamophobia has resulted in the ‘racialisation of Muslims’ (Meer and Modood 2010), yet this racialisation may draw on different characteristics amongst different groups of Muslims, which in this sample were distinguished based on their ethnicity. The emergence of Pakophobia in the narratives indicate the extent to which certain ethnic
identities in conjunction with the Muslim identity may make students further vulnerable to experiences of discrimination. The narratives further illustrate how experiences of Islamophobia and Pakophobia are not just confined to the streets outside the university, but student encounters within the more formal structures of the classrooms, in examinations, in their interaction with their supervisors are also implicitly or directly influenced by a wider narrative around the suspicious Muslim/Pakistani student. Such a wider narrative permeates throughout student interactions even within a social context, where their religious identity, whether explicitly obvious through religious signifiers or not, continues to be a point of reference.

Hence, the participant narratives in further supporting the existing literature on Islamophobia, indicate how ‘degrees of religiosity’ play a role in the experience of Islamophobia for young women. However, while Muslim symbols and dress was found to be an important factor in the vulnerability towards Islamophobia, those practicing Muslims without any religious signifiers also felt discriminated against, albeit a different form of discrimination which as a consequence of stereotypes around moderate and extremist, necessitated a need to prove their Muslimness. Almost echoing Tyrer’s (2010) theory of ‘alterity’ within the ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ categorization, such narratives demonstrate how the extent of what it means to be ‘moderate’ or ‘extremist’ is decided more by the outsider than the Muslim herself. The outsider, in this case the non-Muslim who encounters the Muslim, determines what is ‘Muslim enough’ for someone to be deemed acceptable, and not at risk of being radicalized. Such ‘discourses’ influence the different ‘communities’ that participants belong to, where conversations and interactions with members across and within various ‘discourse’ ‘communities’ (Little et al 2003;
Bakhtin 1981) draw on such meta-narratives about Muslims and Pakistan. These judgments themselves evoke a degree of Islamophobia, removing individual agency from Muslim women. The extent to which differences in the immediate university environment that resulted in similar or varied experiences and encounters of Islamophobia is also worth exploring. The sample consisted of universities with a high and a low percentage of British Muslim Pakistani students. Students in universities with a small percentage of Muslims stood out as a result of their appearance, while those in a large percentage did not complain about discrimination that was directly the result of their dress within the university. This was particularly evident to the researcher, where in universities such as West Yorkshire2 or North West1 students in ‘shalwar kameez’ or ‘hijabs’ and ‘jilbabs’ were visible across campus, whereas in universities such as South East England1, West Midlands1 or West Yorkshire1 students with Islamic and cultural symbols were less visible across campus. However, the one problematic Islamic symbol that stood out across the sample was the ‘niqab’ which participants across universities deemed the most ‘vulnerable’ to Islamophobia. All participants across the sample also found the ‘moderate/extremist’ ‘degrees of alterity’ (Tyrer 2010) problematic, where irrespective of the demographic composition of the university, stereotypes of the moderate and extremist influenced their experiences and encounters with Islamophobia. Differences in encounters and experiences of Pakophobia as a result of university student demographics was not as easy to determine, since encounters of Pakophobia were reported in universities across the sample. However, Overseas Pakistani participants were more direct in highlighting the problem of their Pakistani identity, in relation to discrimination, while British Muslim
participants with a Pakistani heritage, especially those with visible Muslim signifiers were more direct in highlighting the Muslim aspect in the experience of discrimination. Yet, both British/Pakistanis nonetheless underlined the problematic nature of the Pakistani identity within the meta-narrative on security that often conflated Pakistani with a suspicious Muslim identity, hence making both identities doubly problematic.

In short, these narratives further add to the existing conceptual understanding of Islamophobia by demonstrating how in a securitized socio-political landscape a) a problematic ethnic identity such as Pakistani further contributes to experiences and perception of Islamophobia, especially where the ethnic and religious identities are both securitized in the media and state narratives; b) while ‘degrees of religiosity’ make young women more vulnerable to Islamophobia, lack of a religious identifier does not prevent women from experiencing Islamophobia, where the meta narrative on Muslim women is constantly evoked, with Muslims being asked to defend the practice of their religion.

Another important insight provided by the narratives is in the reasoning and rational that is given for the existence of Islamophobia. This part is particularly important in understanding why encounters of Islamophobia often remain under reported. The reasons provided by the participants illustrate how such discrimination is almost justified as a natural human reaction to the events of 9/11 and 7/7, where despite the innocence of the participants, they are still targeted for being Muslim or Pakistani.

However, as the next two chapters illustrate, while the reasons behind such experiences are often understood as a result of misunderstanding or ignorance, there are students within the sample who at an individual and student society level have been trying to challenge Islamophobia in the university, who are attempting to challenge the dominant
‘discourse’ (Bakhtin 1981). The next chapter highlights the challenges faced by Islamic societies and young Muslim and Pakistani student activists who at a group level are often subject to Islamophobia in the university, as a result of being directly implicated in the state’s counter terrorism agenda, with some Islamic societies accused of having links to extremist groups. While the present chapter provided individual accounts of Islamophobia both off and on university campus, the next chapter will relocate these experiences within the university, further exposing the relationship between security and Islamophobia as it plays out on university campuses.
Chapter VI

The Student Radical: From Activism to Radicalisation

The last chapter explored individual narratives of Islamophobia and Pakophobia, highlighting definitions, experiences and reactions to these phenomena. This chapter in developing the narrative further relocates the lens to the university, particularly focusing on student societies and their experiences and encounters with discrimination. In particular, the chapter highlights the student society activities of Islamic societies (ISocs) and their interaction with the meta narrative on radicalisation and the Muslim student. Expanding on the discussion of radical and moderate from the last chapter, participants present their understanding of radicalisation and student activism within the university. In particular, the problematic nature of ISoc activism, especially around the issue of extremist speakers is further examined, to explore how and why Islamic societies felt targeted and further isolated after the tragedies of 9/11 and 7/7. The chapter further engages with the question of student activism exploring Muslim and Pakistani student support of international campaigns related to Palestine, and the more problematic Justice for North West 10 (J4NW10) campaign. The findings provide insights into what students deem political as opposed to humanitarian, where student are more willing to engage with Islamic humanitarian campaigns while avoiding politics, in particular political causes related to a problematic and troubled country like Pakistan.

I. Introduction

The problem of extremism and radicalisation on university campuses has been highlighted in government documents, (Home Affairs Committee 2012; HM Government 2011a;b) by the media particularly in high profile cases such as the underwear bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s association with UCL (Universities UK 2011; BBC News 12/10/2011; The Centre for Social Cohesion Press Briefing 5/01/2010) as well as by academics and think tanks (The Centre for Social Cohesion 2010; Glees and Pope 2005). The problem is presented as one of student vulnerability and alienation, which may be exploited by extremist groups to recruit potential terrorists. Islamic student societies
(ISocs) in particular have come under the limelight, as they are accused of providing a platform for extremist Muslim speakers, who may influence vulnerable young minds. The Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) which is the umbrella organization for ISocs in universities in Britain have specifically been subject to such criticism, accused of not doing enough to counter extremism on campus (HM Government, 2011c:11; Sutton, 13/12/2012). With such media and government focus on ISocs in universities, Islamophobia is a problem that the Islamic societies have constantly encountered within and outside the university. The narratives of ISoc members illustrate the intersection of ‘discourses’ across ‘communities’ (Bakhtin 1981), as their conversations with fellow students, as well as individuals on the street evoke the ‘securitized’ ‘discourse’ of media and political actors that informs the Muslim identity in Britain. ISoc members were asked to share the society’s experiences of Islamophobia in their narratives, highlighting the difficulty Islamic societies faced when confronting such a narrative of insecurity around radicalization and Muslim students. Islamic societies served an important welfare role for Muslims, but were also simultaneously perceived as easy targets for extremist organizations. The first part therefore examines their experiences of Islamophobia, as well as explores how the narrative of radicalization limits their level of student activism as an Islamic society.

The second part of the chapter further engages with the discussion on student activism

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and radicalism by exploring Muslim and Pakistani students involvement with national or international campaigns. This section shows how the Muslim understanding of a political cause as opposed to a humanitarian campaign often dictates the nature of their activism, where Muslim students in their narratives shy away from politics, many calling themselves apolitical, yet the same apolitical students are quite active with humanitarian causes that have political repercussions. For this purpose this section will explore student involvement with the Palestine campaign, Justice for North West 10, and will also examine narratives that highlighted the less common but equally relevant campaign for Dr Aafia Siddiqui.

Through group and individual examples of student activism the chapter demonstrates how media hype around Muslim radicals and terrorists, particularly their association with universities in Britain influences individual student decision, from membership of Islamic societies, to the kind of campaigns students endorse. It further illustrates the more pervasive and subliminal nature of the Islamophobic narrative that pervades media and government policy on Muslim students in universities resulting in a form of self-censorship as Muslims tread with caution lest they are accused of being radicals or terrorists. It therefore addresses both the question of how Islamophobia is experienced, but also how the narrative around radicalization and security influences student experiences.

II. The ISOC: From welfare to radicalism

Islamic societies in universities across the sample pride themselves in providing support to Muslim students, assisting their ‘spiritual,’ ‘religious,’ and other ‘welfare’ needs. While non-Muslim students are also welcomed to ISoc events, the society mainly attracts
Muslim students, especially those who often feel isolated because of their ‘degree of religiosity’. As Sanam observes

‘...for example in terms of drinking or partying or casual sex or things like that I think most Muslims are quite specific about those things ... I feel like too many times, I know that the administration doesn’t organize the fun events for students, but too many times it is easy for the university environment to build up this idea of fun revolving around those things which then sidelines a lot of young Muslims...for people who don’t want that kind of lifestyle what do they do. Then you have ISOC organizing separate events where you just have biscuits and pizzas, soda and I am not saying that is bad but it always has to be a separate event...’

(Sanam, South East1, 26, Social Science Grad, Overseas)

Sanam’s narrative highlights the problems that many Muslim students confront in a predominantly non-Muslim university context. Their inability to participate in the ‘fun events’ in universities often makes them stand out within the student body. The ISoc provides a space for Muslim students who cannot find such a sense of belonging in the widespread activities of the university, where the university itself is limited in its ability to cater to the specific requirements of its Muslim student population. Mehreen who belongs to the same university as Sanam restricted her socializing to the Islamic society as she felt that non ISoc events did not offer much in terms of her religious and cultural needs, where she often could not eat food properly at dinners or departmental BBQs which served mostly non Halal meals, she could not engage in the drinking culture and she stood out because of her appearance. The ISoc however provided a place for her to meet young people who held similar views, where she did not feel like an outsider. It is precisely for this reason that participants joined their various university ISocs, where by providing an avenue for young students to find others from similar religious background the societies served an important welfare function. While such a function is important in supporting Muslim students, it may also result in further isolation particularly with ISocs
that do not encourage cross society events. Unlike Mehreen, Sanam for instance stopped attending ISoc events precisely because they continued to be ‘separate’, without providing an opportunity to meet other students. Given the diversity within the Muslim student body, where based on the level of student religiosity some students prefer a more exclusive society, while others are more inclined to mix with non-Muslim students within an environment that they feel comfortable in, the ISoc can only play a significant welfare role for Muslim students through a partnership with the university. Such support would encourage cross society dialogue and events, creating an environment where students are not merely restricted to their ISocs but where members are encouraged to meet other young people beyond their group.

Participants from other universities also highlighted this important welfare role of ISocs. Nargis who belongs to South West1 discussed the problems she encountered when she first arrived to the UK, unfamiliar with living in a non-Muslim country. Her colleagues at work were friendly but her interaction with them was restricted because of their different lifestyles. As she comments,

‘The colleagues I work with are mostly who I interact with... One is from Mexico and one is from Thailand they are the only two girls in my research group but I really cannot interact with them. Hundreds of issues that they talk, they are quite irrelevant to me. Boyfriends and loads of other things that they talk about I would be like okay, going to the pub- I never go to the pub, talking about sex – I’d be like okay. They live with their boyfriends and I’m like okay. So really can’t make good friends. The only friends I talk to are on skype, the old ones. I am just like okay with people and lots of work’.

(Nargis, South West1, 25, Graduate Sciences, Overseas)

Alluding to Sanam’s observation, Nargis constantly felt she could not communicate with her colleagues, unable to participate in their lifestyle. The ISoc however provided her with a sense of community, though because of work she was not as active as she would
have liked. She felt ‘comfortable’ talking to members of the ISoc who would organize events where she could equally participate. Aliya, a British Muslim with a Pakistani heritage had less trouble making friends, but her closest friend was a Muslim as it was easier for her to be friends with someone from a similar background. While she herself was not as actively involved in the ISoc as her friend, she nonetheless felt the ISoc was important in getting Muslim students together, particularly in a university where they are in a minority. Her own mother as well encouraged her to find her university ISoc and stay on the ‘straight and narrow’ path mixing with the right people. Other students have also highlighted this important role served by their ISoc. However, while ISocs provide an important welfare function for Muslim students, because of the concentration of Muslims within the society, they are also perceived as an ideal recruiting point for Islamist extremist organizations. With academics such as Glees and Pope (2005) highlighting the radicalising role of Islamic societies in the lives of the 7/7 terrorists, with think tanks such as the Centre for Social Cohesion (2010) also issuing constant warnings about the vulnerability of Muslim students, as well as government and media constantly focusing on universities and their ISocs as potential recruiting targets, Islamic societies in the wider narrative are tainted with a reputation for being radical. While the last chapter briefly explored the meaning of ‘radical’ in the discussion of the Muslim ‘moderate’, the term ‘radical’ in a university context particularly for the ISoc is also linked to extremism. Tehmina who is an active member of her Student Union but has also been involved in the national student union, particularly within a welfare capacity highlighted the problem that various ISocs across the country encountered after the tragedy of July 7, 2005.

‘...Well I would go back to 9/11. I mean all of that changed the world... it really put Muslims really on the forefront and not for the right reasons at all. I think that
politics has got everything to do with it... I think 7/7 really changed, really made it difficult for Muslim students, and also more difficult for things like Islamic societies. There was a discussion about whether they should be allowed to have Islamic societies, which is a bit of a contradiction when you have got Christian societies and Jewish societies. I have to say to a lot of these universities, some of who have only got minority of Muslim students but they should still have access to their services and to unions. I think those events national and international events, they all have a say on how we live our daily lives, how women in particular in higher education, Muslim women in particular how they can access it and all.’

(Tehmina West Midlands1, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British)

Tehmina’s narratives points to the importance of having ISocs that provide an avenue for young Muslims to both access and demand services such as prayer room facilities, Halal food on campus and the like. It also however illustrates how political events outside the university have implications for young students who think twice about joining Islamic societies. However, her narrative alludes to an important role of university ISocs, as campaigners for Muslim student rights. With their reputation often under suspect, the role of Muslim campaigners can often be misunderstood, where the danger of being labelled radical for campaigning about Muslim student rights in universities, for supporting international causes such as Palestine, or inviting speakers to raise awareness about Islam can often limit their activities on campuses. While the issue of speakers will be discussed later in the section, the notion of radicalism as opposed to activism needs to be understood in the context of the ISoc. The association between radicalism and universities predates the question of Muslims and 9/11. As Professor Tariq Modood observed,

‘...It was exactly the same when I was a student. I was a student in the early 1970s and Marxist groups and some anarchist groups flourished in universities. They flourished in universities much more than they did in lots of workplaces. So it’s very true that young people have a certain idealism. They want solutions that make certain kind of intellectual sense to them and they tend to be guided by ideas and idealism more than older people because if you like they have less personal
responsibilities. ...And I think that what we are seeing with Muslims in universities, I am talking now about British universities reminds me all the time of when I was a student. You get lots of little groups, each trying to be more radical than the other. Each trying to be more self-righteous, saying how they’ve interpreted in this case the Quran, in the 1970s some Marxist text, better. And that their rivals are sell outs to capitalism and so on, and for young people these things really kind of matter ... for Muslims where there is a real strong feeling of grievance and a sense of ‘I must make up my mind about where I stand, am I for this or against this? Is the Quran a solution and if so who best understands the Quran?’ A lot of people, because they are only interested in doing their studies, pubbing and clubbing and getting their career, aren’t even thinking that such big questions exist. But for a lot of Muslims, they do think that there are these big questions, so they are very open to what we might call ‘preachers’, and I don’t just mean ‘religious preachers’, very open to what we might call ‘political preachers.’ This was exactly as it was in the 60s and 70s with all the kind of student protests and student rebellions then.’

(Interview with Professor Modood, December 14, 2009)

Professor Modood’s observation highlights both the long tradition of radicalism amongst the youth particularly in universities, but also the changing nature of this radicalism amongst Muslim students. Unlike, other students in the university Muslim students as demonstrated in participant narratives have particular needs that are often different from their fellow non-Muslim students. In attempting to define these needs, understand their differences, students are further confronted with questions about their religion. Ironically, the same university also provides an opportunity to engage in debates or have dialogues about these questions and issues. Organizations like FOSIS are important in this respect, as they pride themselves on being progressively radical. As Faisal Hanjra (22/04/2010), the President of FOSIS clearly stated in his article in the Guardian entitled, ‘Student Islamic societies are radical, not extremist.’ This radicalism is what has resulted in ISocs taking on ‘...a role in empowering Muslim students towards a culture of civic and political participation with remarkable results... seen in every level of campaigning from feminist and social issues, to international conflict, human rights, ethical investment and
accessible education’, with ‘a former ISoc president’ ‘elected’ as ‘the first Muslim vice-president of the National Union of Students (NUS)’ (Hanjra 22/04/2010). However, the FOSIS representative interviewed shared her concern about the problematic use of the term ‘radical’, particularly in association with ISocs and Muslim students.

‘I disagree with the term radicalization in general and we have said this before, every student is a radical by all means. I think but because it has become a taboo word to be called a radical. Before it was something to be proud of, radicals are our best activists in history, radicals were people who changed thoughts, changed society through their radicalism. I fundamentally disagree with the term. I think it has been really hijacked by certain individuals. I think when such a depiction is there the term itself is highly problematic. Student activism is radical but the way we use student activism is not even related to radicalism which is seen as behind closed doors their thoughts changing...I was quite active throughout my university, we did all sorts of protests which could be called radical, but to use radicalization here is a problem.’

(FOSIS Representative, 2011)

Hence, in the context of Muslim students then radicalism takes on a connotation of extremism. Kiran describes a radical as something quite different from a student activist or a campaigner.

‘Radical are people who have used the name of Islam and they have committed certain acts under that name, or they have voiced their opinions about certain acts under the name of Islam. They are not from Islam, or within Islam because Islam is not dirty or filthy like they make it. It is not like that. Islam is something beautiful that is meant to make you feel at peace not make you feel filthy’

(Kiran, London1, 22, Science Grad, British)

Aisha also expressed similar sentiments about the problematic use of the word radical, particularly in connection with Islam and extremism.

‘Radical for me would be somebody who is a fanatic, who is not willing to listen to other people’s opinion, who think they have a grasp of religion. Because if you think about it in Islam there is no such thing as radical...you cannot be a little bit of Muslim and a little bit of something else, you are either a Muslim or you are not. The term radical in Islam is the same debate as with the word jihad. People just take it out of context, same with radical... Someone radical for me is just the same as somebody who is mental and goes on a killing spree. People especially
the media always put the word radical and extremism with Islam and Muslim. ... 
It is just stupid’

(Aisha, London4, 22, Undergrad German, British)

The activities of university ISocs are similarly held under suspicion for promoting radicalism through their campaigning. This radicalism unlike Hanjra’s definition is associated with extremism, making the dividing line between ISoc activism and extremism highly permeable within the security lens. It is also for this reason that ISocs have been approached by security agencies, which further increases, their level of insecurity as the FOSIS representative observed,

‘... issues like being approached by the special branch on campus which happened with one Islamic society and we were there to help them through that. I think it happens a lot as in they ask them for a meeting, or want to talk to them but the ISocs really don’t know how to respond, because they don’t want to say no because it is the special branch, it is quite a big deal so they are a bit worried that something might happen if they say no. At the same time they don’t want that association at all so they are torn in between and don’t know how to respond to issues like that.’

(FOSIS Representative, 2011)

Within such a security narrative then ISocs are viewed with suspicion, that is not only confined to media outside, but also young Muslim and non-Muslim students within the university who similarly ‘suspect’ ISocs and their members of having ‘radical’ or ‘extreme’ views. The narrative is further problematic for ISocs who have been associated with students who later turned into ‘terrorists’ or ‘extremists’. West Yorkshire2 in this sample becomes particularly vulnerable because of its association with students who were later accused of extremism. The ISoc’s previous association has tainted its reputation, where current members struggle to prove their innocence not just to society outside, but also often to their own Muslim and non Muslim fellow students. Nadia, the head sister of the ISoc highlights this problem,
‘people are like wow these guys will radicalize the students because the purpose of the Islamic society is to radicalize because this is the whole thing the media played upon. And even if you say this time and time again that there are only a minority of people who do this. If you look at every single case of people who were affiliated with the Islamic society, the people who radicalized them were not part of the Islamic society. And even with us we had a few guys arrested a few years ago, the people who radicalized them were off campus and they had nothing to do with the Islamic society and the Islamic society is trying to you know get rid of them so for us it is difficult because people do build that view.’

(Nadia, West Yorkshire2, 20, Undergrad Law, British)

The ISoc is also part of a university that is suspected of Hizb ut Tahrir sympathizers, a factor highlighted by another participant from the same university. A participant belonging to North West1 in the sample also alluded to this tainted reputation of this particular ISoc. However, Nadia and other members of the Islamic society continue to struggle to prove their innocence. Despite these rumours, the welfare staff member of the university who was interviewed did not mention any such problems with the ISoc but rather highlighted the university’s constant engagement with Muslim students through the Islamic society. However, members still have to defend themselves as Zahra notes,

‘Zahra: People when you tell them you are Muslim and from the Islamic society they think you are trying to convert them. If you invite them to events or talks, they know you are Muslim they will just think you are trying to make them Muslim even though you are just inviting them to a talk. And you are just giving them knowledge about Islam, they don’t have to become Muslim to attend a talk, but for them they think you are trying to make them Muslim.

Interviewer: What kind of an image do people have of the Islamic society?
Zahra: I think they think that they are extremist. Whatever that means for them but that’s what they will label it as.

Interviewer: Why is it misunderstood?
Zahra: I think you know you like, you think that media doesn’t effect but I think to some extent it does. Even though like you consciously do not think that but unconsciously it does. People do watch programs and they take that in, and they think that you know they are up to something. ... I think people find it hard, Muslims find it harder. You can see it in Islamic societies even in this university majority are Muslims, but the majority find it hard to join the Islamic societies. They will think twice about it because of the stereotypes.’

(Zahra, West Yorkshire2, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British)
West Yorkshire2 has also complained about problems between the ISoc and the middle management. They often face problems in booking rooms for their events, where on several occasions the management has double booked a room. In my interview with Nadia a professor also interrupted the interview, as the room had been double booked by the administration. After the interruption Nadia observed how,

‘It happens, one in ten events. I mean I was part of the People and Planet society, Peace society, Amnesty International, Women’s forum, never had a problem. But I think last year I saw it with my eyes because I was the general secretary and I would book the room and the thing is the student union is always fantastic, we have always had a good relationship with them and the room, the woman who books rooms over there is fine, but it is the middle management, the people whose faces we never see, you can’t sit down with them to have a discussion and say okay how can we make it work better, they are the ones who actually have the system, if they change their minds they change their minds. That was typical when this Imam came from Pittsburgh. We had a room booked and it was the top floor of the building, so eight flights of stairs... we went in and there was a lecture going on, and we had to just go to the prayer rooms and just do it in the prayer rooms, which we did then for our final event last year. We told them, but they double booked us with a lecturer, and obviously it is an academic thing we could not tell the lecturer to leave and there was no other room available for his class. So we had no other place to go so we just went to the prayer room and did it there. The student union, bless them, they gave us the sound system so we quickly set up and tried to do it. Last year our final event, we had to do it in the prayer room as well. It was really fantastic, it turned out for the better but again it was an inconvenience for us because you organize an event, you put the fliers there and people go to the room and you are not there.’

(Nadia, West Yorkshire2, 20, Undergrad Law, British)

Nadia believes that the ISoc was deliberately being targeted as the middle management had problems with the Islamic society. She felt it was ‘Islamophobic to a degree’ where ‘the middle management’ had this image of the ISoc and Muslim students as being extreme because of sheer ‘ignorance.’ Such an image is further reinforced by media stereotypes. The emergence of another terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in 2009 who attempted to blow up a plane bound to the US further made the position of university ISocs questionable, as he was a student and the ‘President’ of the UCL ISoc in 2006-07.
His association with the ISOC reignited the debate on Islamic societies and their ability to radicalise young students. This event further isolated the ISocs, especially amongst some Muslim students who previously were indifferent to the existence of university Islamic societies but started actively avoiding it. Parents in particular became worried about their children’s involvement in ISocs. The FOSIS representative highlighted this parental concern,

‘When you hear these stories about Islamic societies as being extreme and they do this and that, especially after the Christmas bomber plot, we did get a sense that some parents and actually I hear this from friends of mine who say my parents don’t want me to get involved in Islamic society you know they don’t want that trouble, you know they are there to study they don’t want to get involved in all the drama. They don’t agree with it but they would rather avoid that happening to their child. Actually it is happening to the most unlikely people and you know innocent individuals doing a bit of research who have been picked up. Political activists…’

(FOSIS Representative, 2011)

With Muslim students, in particular ISoc members coming into the limelight because of the Abdulmutallab incident, parents started discouraging their children from joining such societies. Not only were these parents living in Britain, but even those in Pakistan were constantly asking their children to avoid the ISocs. Hafsa observes this with her mother,

‘My mom told me don’t get involved in the Islamic society...they get after these people only, pehla koi masla hota hai tu inkei peechai aatei hain, yeh who (whenever there is a problem, the first ones they come after are these people, this and that). This is generally a concern that does exist. I don’t really know what the grounds for it are perhaps the whole UCL incident did exacerbate it a bit.’

(Hafsa, North East1, 22, Law Grad, Overseas)

Hence, Abdulmutallab’s association with his university ISoc created greater problems for ISocs in other universities. Unlike before, when parents such as Aliya’s had encouraged their children to join the Islamic society with the hope that they would not stray far from their religious and cultural values, Hafsa’s parents and others like them now actively
discouraged them from joining the society, fearful for their children’s safety. Organizations like FOSIS also faced its share of criticism from government officials, the media and think tanks like the Quilliam Foundation and the Centre for Social Cohesion. Despite such limitations FOSIS and the ISocs in this sample continued to challenge this negative image in their individual capacity by engaging with other student societies. While this level of activism is discussed in detail in the next chapter, the challenges and success of FOSIS is summarized by Ahmed who as a representative of his university’s Student Union witnessed a high level of engagement between FOSIS and other student groups and societies at the national level.

‘The best way to test how Muslim students are progressing in mainstream student politics is sort of to look at the national picture and so FOSIS is a prime example, and I think as long as they are attacked for being an extremist group on campus, even though they represent all Muslim students I think that is going to be very very negative for tackling extremism, if we are to agree that that is a problem. And I think the problems reduce over the past few years. I was a delegate...elected to represent my university at the National student conference. I saw first hand how the different organizations ran their campaigns and got involved in the national picture so the union of Jewish students, FOSIS, Socialist workers party, Labour students ... There the picture is that FOSIS are very very involved and integrated in the national picture. You have members in the executive, they have had members on the actual leadership centre, vice president of the NUS. When you see that happening you realize that there is potential to organize Muslim students in the mainstream of student politics.’

(Ahmed, London3, Student Union Anti Racism Officer)

Despite these efforts, Islamic societies have to constantly struggle against the stereotype of being vulnerable to extremist groups who may target them for the purpose of recruitment. In fighting against such a stereotype, they further have to prove their innocence to students in their own universities, to their own families, and to the society at large. While events outside the university continue to create greater challenges for university ISocs, another issue that continues to be highlighted is that of extremist
speakers. This has been particularly problematic after the Centre for Social Cohesion (CSC) drafted its own list of speakers whom they deemed extremist (2010). The problem with such lists and policies is that often these are drafted without consulting Muslim students or societies, as a consequence of which Muslim groups instead of engaging with think tanks and security agencies are often equally suspicious of them. The participants further suspected organizations like Quilliam (See Dodd 04/08/2010) and CSC for promoting their own limited agendas that had nothing to do with Islam or Muslims. The problematic relationship is best captured in Nadia’s narratives,

‘I think I found the Centre for Social Cohesion, their whole report about universities which was in house researched by 6 people who have never been to these universities, and Quilliam foundation, groups like that who have caused us so many problems. We have had people coming to the student union and not even saying anything but handing over lists to the people who work there with a list of speakers on it, kind of hand written and saying these people are terrorists you cannot use them. And even CSC gave out leaflets to a lot of universities of the list of speakers.’

(Nadia, West Yorkshire2, 20, Undergrad Law, British)

Such lack of engagement with student societies results in resentment and further isolation where young Muslim students and their ISocs feel targeted. Romeena who is part of the University Welfare staff and the Islamic society executive committee at South East2 highlighted how the problem with inviting speakers was more a result of lack of communication between university and the ISocs who were often excluded from the decision making process.

‘I think students here feel like they are being singled out...they invited a speaker, security guards outside, students were checked... it was an alienating experience...no communication between the security, university and Islamic society as to what was going on. Security just appeared. No forewarning, no notice. Nothing Islamic society could do to let students know.’

(Romeena, South East2, University welfare and Islamic society executive, alumnus)
Such a level of distrust further reinforces suspicion of university authorities. This suspicion is particularly problematic when students believe their ISoc is under surveillance. As Hafsa observes,

‘It is very interesting actually I think there were spies in our Islamic society, spies to the level that knew about our activities before even we did. So we were on the exec okay, so the exec committee before they even made a decision to call a speaker, because we had this whole monthly speaker coming, we had this new third year thing that we started, so before we even had that the vice president got an email from one of the LGBT officers or somebody, it was like hey we hear that you intend to call this person and previously he has given a speech on something that was about how Islam is against homosexuality or something like that right. And if he is coming here we want a guarantee that he doesn’t say anything against or something to that effect about Islam. My friend was shocked, he was just like dude we haven’t even as the exec made a decision, we haven’t even sent the email out to the whole Islamic society that anybody who is on the mailing list can figure it out and tell the LGBT officer. How did they find out that this was our intention, no body knew pretty much. I don’t know how they found out. They knew the name, the date he was being called and we didn’t even know. As the exec we didn’t know and they knew. It was just so odd. We were like okay we are so so being monitored. Generally yeah because they knew about everything that was going on.’

(Hafsa, North East1, 22, Law Grad, Overseas)

Ironically, the fear of spies and security agencies is one which is also reinforced by the parents. Nadia faced this problem with ISoc members in her university, and also believes she was being watched by the special division,

‘Even like my parents, you know with the Islamic society and being the head sister and all, a lot of girls that come to me they are like I really want to start practicing but I prayed Fajr’ this morning and my dad came rushing in and he was like what are you doing, you are turning into an extremist. And this happens like my own father this one time when I prayed tahajud, he got so scared he was like this is extreme. You know you don’t have to get up this early and pray you know this is not normal. And if you start doing this, you know the MI5 are going to come and like I’ve had special branch outside my house before, like I don’t even know what they were doing but they quite often do this, sort of keeping an eye but Alhamdulillah I have never had a raid or anything... But Muslim parents, that generation and the intention they came here with, well not all of them but the

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74 Morning prayer. First of the five daily obligatory prayers for Muslims.
75 Prayer said late at night.
majority was economic as well, and they just want to fit in and they just want to make money and that becomes a driving factor and Islam is a barrier. So when a child starts praying, when a child starts saying that maybe we shouldn’t spend money on this stuff that starts becoming a concern. And when society and you know the white media that they have always seen as superior and the Western powers that they have always seen as intellectual are telling them that Islam is dangerous and if you are moderate it is okay then that builds a fear in them and they don’t want their own children to get locked up which is understandable but it is not them who you should be fearing.‘

(Nadia, West Yorkshire2, 20, Undergrad Law, British)

Despite confronting such problems from parents, fellow students, university administration, the government and the media, ISocs are still willing to engage with different actors provided there is a level of mutual engagement, rather than dictation. Ahmed’s ISoc for instance cooperated with its university because the university administration rather than simply preventing them from inviting speakers were willing to have a conversation with the ISoc. Furthermore, organizations like FOSIS also do not ‘shy away from’ the problem of extremist speakers or radicalism, but they are quick to point out the exaggerated nature of the threat,

‘This is happening, obviously we have issues of immigration, fair enough they do exist, and they have been there over the years but particularly 9/11 and 7/7 were defining moments particularly in the UK on issues of terrorism and ‘extreme Muslim Islamic radicalization.’ And what happens is that with that came all the anti terrorist legislation which set the theme and acceptability where it is okay to talk about Muslims in a particular way which would not be acceptable with other communities but because it is well these are the cases that are happening. We have also heard stories about homebred cases of terrorism which is seen as a huge wake up call. On campuses in particular there was this huge case in 2009 with the Christmas day bomber plot, there were a lot of issues around that as well. The ISoc of the UCL received a lot of heat particularly from the media because of the speakers that they bring. Increasingly people have started making a link between the speakers that you are bringing and creating these people even though there are a handful of such people which yes they happen to go to university but there is nothing that indicates or suggests that they were in fact radicalized at university. Yes they were at university but they were also doing other things going here and there…We acknowledge as well that it is something we will look into, we won’t shy away from it. Which is why earlier this year, we had a radical thinking conference between extremes of security and freedom of
expression. Our whole purpose was, look we are not going to shy away from this we want to talk about this as we acknowledge at the moment there is a hugely sensationalized debate going on in the media. It is not even logical any more. The things that you read are ridiculous.’

(FOSIS Representative, 2011)

FOSIS is willing to directly engage with these problems, in partnership with academics, and security experts who want to have a dialogue rather than simply dictate their terms. However, FOSIS and Islamic societies are also faced with criticism for the international campaigns and causes they support. Most of these campaigns are concerned with charity events, others more directly related to the cause of Palestine, while depending on the composition of each ISoc some campaigns have also included support for the Arab Spring. Muslim and Pakistani students who may or may not be part of their university ISocs, and those who may or may not be part of the Pakistani societies at their universities were asked about the kind of campaigns they were either involved with or would be willing to join. In particular the campaign Justice for North West 10 (J4NW10) evoked mix responses. While there were students who were familiar with the campaign and decided to get involved, there were others who avoided it. However, equally there were students who being apolitical had never heard of such campaigns, though their apolitical stance changed on issues relating to Palestine. The next section explores the nature of student campaigning in university campuses, particularly campaigns supported or avoided by Muslim and Pakistani students.

III. The limits of student activism: The humanitarian vs. the political

Muslim student involvement with international campaigns particularly on issues relating to Islam and the Muslim Ummah has generated greater suspicion and apprehension on the part of the government and security analysts. Professor Anthony Glees in his
interview highlighted the problem posed by support for such international campaigns like Palestine.

‘I think there are many reasons and obviously the perception of injustice in the Middle East, and particularly in Palestine, Israel that’s quite clearly a factor and it has been a factor of terrorism for the whole of my adult life. In a sense Al Qa’ida is just a more focused and more clearly organised form of something that I have seen the whole of my adult life. So in that sense it’s not new and there has always been a link between the Israel-Palestine issue and violent Islamist extremism.’

(Interview with Professor Glees November 30, 2009)

While in the interview Professor Glees followed this statement with the observation that such a connection does not always result in a causal relationship between radicalisation and terrorism, his comment nonetheless captures the level of suspicion and mistrust that is attributed to Muslim student campaigning. By generalizing such an assumption Muslim students are further restricted in their activism, afraid that their activities might be misconstrued within the ‘security’ narrative. The example of Palestine used by Professor Glees highlights this misunderstanding, as the participants in this study, all of whom viewed Islam as a religion of peace and denounced violence and extremism, were vocal in their support for Palestine. Even the ones who did not attend any political protest or rally, called themselves apolitical, did not engage in any form of student political events, supported the Palestinian cause. The same students were asked about other student campaigns. While the Palestinian cause provides insights into the nature of ‘Muslim campaigning,’ students were also asked questions about activism related to their Pakistani identity. One campaign in particular was highlighted by one of the participants, Justice for North West 10 (J4NW10).

In April 2009 12 students, 11 of whom were Pakistani were arrested on suspicion of terrorism. They were condemned by the media and politicians, only later to be exonerated.
by the judicial system on grounds of insufficient evidence. Despite, their innocence as proven in a court of law, ‘deportation orders’ were issued against the students who remained in custody. 10 students appealed against the deportation, and the Justice for North West 10 campaign was initiated for the release of these detainees. However, 8 students eventually voluntarily went back to Pakistan while two remained in prison appealing against the deportation. In May 2010 these two students, Abid Naseer and Ahmed Faraz Khan eventually were allowed to stay ‘when a judge ruled that’ while the ‘two Pakistani students posed a serious threat to national security’ they ‘could not be deported because of the risk they would be tortured or killed in their own country’ (Cobian and Norton-Taylor 18/05/2010).

Despite the innocence of the Pakistani students involved, the J4NW10 campaign was primarily initiated and supported by lawyers and leftist parties both off and on campuses. The response of the Pakistani and Muslim student body studying in universities in England was cautious if not completely absent. Amna, who was active in this campaign describes the difficulty she had in getting students involved,

‘The problem is that this issue is so controversial that the last thing a Pakistani student wants to do is get involved in this. I did have some gora friends over there, who were willing to get involved but Pakistani students were staying away from this. Even my own brother, I didn’t tell him anything because if I told him that I was involved in this campaign, and you know he would have this fear that ‘I working here and you involved in such activities and they will think that I am also a terrorist you know’... so I didn’t tell them anything. There is a fear that anyone who is Muslim who gets involved in such activities will be labelled a terrorist and be picked up.’

(Amma, North West1, 28, Graduate Social Sciences, Overseas)

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76 For more information, see https://sites.google.com/site/j4nw10/Home
77 Gora meaning ‘White’.

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The ISoc at her university was approached but they chose to stay away from this campaign. However, the same Muslim students supported the Palestinian cause, either directly or indirectly, but were apprehensive about this campaign. The FOSIS representative highlights the reluctance of Islamic societies and Muslim students in getting involved in political causes, from Palestine to campaigns such as J4NW10.

‘I think there is apathy, there can be. I suppose it depends. In terms of actual campaigning for Palestine there is apathy. My main involvement on campus was around Palestine, I was quite active in that. I felt there was a lot of passive support. You’d tell people and they’d be like yeah go do it. It is different. I think we were raised that way, it is very entrenched. You are raised knowing that Palestine is very close to the heart. Maybe it is coming from the families so maybe there is no fear to do that, so people go along with it a lot more. With this, I think it is a new phenomenon and people don’t know how to deal with it, and because it effects directly your position here, I think the fear of physical harm is a lot closer. It is much easier to support something far away than something that is so close.’

(FOSIS Representative, 2011)

The FOSIS representative mentions ‘apathy’ as a problem, where Muslim students prefer not to directly get involved in political campaigns. The reason for such lack of active involvement yet the existence of passive support was not clear in her mind, as she felt it could vary from indifference to an actual fear of being labelled a radical for getting involved in political campaigns, particularly the kind that was linked to radicalism. Given Professor Glees’s observation at the beginning of this section that sense of fear of association might result in students distancing themselves from student campaigns. Fatima notices this problem with her friends,

‘I know a couple of friends from ... university who protested but I haven’t. Honestly, I think it is because of all this Islamophobia thing. I don’t think I would want to be part of a group that is labelled. The media is there, and they start seeing Muslims protesting, and don’t know. There was once this anti Iraq War protest in London once. There were extremists and they got caught on camera. And there is this danger that if you are present at such protests you would get associated with such groups, I didn’t want any of that.’

(Fatima, West Yorkshire1, 21, Undergrad Law, British)
Such guilt by association, the fear of being ‘picked up’ highlighted by Amna have resulted in a sense of self censorship, where students while passively supporting different campaigns, will not actively get involved. Campaigning for a cause such as J4NW10 is further problematic because of the negative hype that was generated by the media. Students were further unsure about the facts of the case. However, in their discussion of this campaign students also mentioned the problematic nature of political campaigning for Pakistan. Tamana notices this problem,

‘I think Pakistan is… so corrupt. What is the point of you doing something you know what I mean. Whereas Gaza is more to do with children dying and more to do with you know… I think Muslim students watch Al Jazeera. I think Gaza is mentioned more there but Pakistan is not mentioned there...’

(Tamana, West Yorkshire2, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences British)

The corruption that plagues Pakistan, the internal problems with the country for Tamana and others in the sample was what discouraged them from participating in campaigning for Pakistan. Pakistani students also highlighted this apprehension. Tasneem, confessed her reluctance to participate in any form of campaign for these students, primarily out of fear of ‘getting into trouble’,

‘...There are things which are complicated and I could be in a lot of trouble with my parents for doing that because they are worried about me. It is not because they don’t want me to, it’s because they are worried about me. You know they keep saying that when we had a protest the only thing we kept being worried about was that we might say something which might be the next big thing on Pakistani media and you know we might be pointed fingers at for it. So there are things where you just have to play it safe. I don’t know if it sounds logical or right but there are some things which may not be a certain way which could actually get you into a lot of trouble which you were actually not intending or looking for.’

(Tasneem, North West1, 21, Undergrad Social Sciences, Overseas)
While the fear of ‘getting into trouble’ existed for some students, there was the added fear of immigration problems that may result from such active involvement for the Overseas students.

‘Even if people want to take part in such a thing they would refrain from doing it given it will effect their immigration or visas ... I would think I don’t want to screw up my own visa by getting involved in something like this...even if people want to get involved the last thing they would want is to get deported in the middle of your study.’

(Nazia, London3, 28, Social Sciences Grad, Overseas)

Amna who was involved in the campaign also highlighted similar issues with her friends who were afraid their visas might get revoked, or those on government scholarships might lose their funding. However Amna found it more frustrating when the same young students were active for the Palestinian cause,

‘I actually saw that those same people who were very active for Palestine and Gaza were not active for Pakistan which really bothered me. I thought they would be apolitical by nature, but a lot of the Pakistanis did not help me at all with the deportation campaign...for two reasons. First of all, everyone is sympathetic for Gaza, Pakistan has a very bad image...and secondly everyone was supporting Gaza so you don’t feel singled out. It’s Lebanese, Egyptian, Gora, homosexuals, old, young, children...The same people told me that we are not taking any part in any protest for Pakistan because that is a political issue. Gaza for them is a Muslim issue...This is all the Pakistanis.’

(Amna, North West1, 28, Graduate Social Sciences, Overseas)

Reiterating the preceding discussion on Palestine, Amna’s narrative illustrates how Palestine for many was viewed as a more Muslim concern, where human rights of fellow Muslims were being violated. It was also a campaign that did not involve a ‘fear of getting into trouble’ because it was a more widely ‘acceptable’ cause. It was not viewed as something political in nature, where the act of protesting did not translate into political action, but rather a demonstration of solidarity with Muslims whose rights were violated. While Palestine fell in the domain of a more Muslim issue, Pakistan despite being a
majority Muslim country was viewed with suspicion. Zebunnisa, who was a member of her university’s Pakistani society’s executive committee observes this phenomenon amongst Pakistani Muslim students in her university,

‘when you get involved with Pakistani issues, there is a lot of corruption involved, other third party issues involved which turns off people...Palestine there is no such issue. They unite on only one thing we are Muslims, we want our freedom. There is no corruption, no such problem. If you know Palestinians they are very passionate and united people. I think that is why people and Pakistanis it is overall they agree with the agenda of Palestinian people than Pakistan. It stems from the fact that with Pakistani issues it is not just religion...but other things. Unity in Palestinians is what inspires Pakistanis to be a part of that, because we don’t have that, and that is what we look up to with the Palestinians.’

(Zebunnisa, North West1, 21, Undergrad Law, Overseas)

The British/Pakistani students also kept a distance from any politically driven Pakistani campaigns. As the last chapter discussed, this distance could be either a consequence of lack of association with Pakistan as a country for the second or third generation British Pakistanis, or an active dissociation because of the troubled situation in Pakistan. Fatima as a British Pakistani student relates to such a dissociation,

‘British students with Pakistani heritage don’t want to associate with Pakistan anymore. I approached one of my friends about joining the Pakistani society. She said I am not so keen on Pakistan if you know what I mean. I told her but we are trying to portray a positive side of Pakistan but everyone just looks at them all negative and that is what is putting them off.’

(Fatima, West Yorkshire1, 21, Undergrad Law, British)

The representative of the National student association for Pakistani students, an organization comprising of British/Pakistani students and alumni also noticed how its own student association was quick to respond to the Gaza crisis, but was reluctant to get involved with politically sensitive issues pertaining to Pakistan. However, while students were clear in distancing themselves from Pakistan politically where the campaign J4NW10 was viewed more as an issue related to a specific group of Pakistani students,
the case of Dr Aafia Siddiqui a Pakistani neuroscientist who was convicted of terrorism after being extradited to the US (Walsh, D 24/11/2009; AlJazeera 06/08/2008) was perceived differently, especially by the British Pakistani students. Specifically her name came up in three different narratives of British Pakistanis, while the Overseas Pakistani students did not mention her even once. However, her case was discussed as that of a ‘Muslim’ woman who was being persecuted for her Muslimness. Kiran for instance was willing to get involved in campaigns for Dr Siddiqui perceived as a humanitarian cause,

‘Interviewer: Why Aafia Siddiqui?
Kiran: Because I think I am inclined towards humanitarian causes, I can empathize with her as many people do. Any area where human rights are being affected I think it is important.’

(Kiran, London1, 22, Science Grad, British)

Zahra a student at West Yorkshire2 shared similar sentiments. Her ISoc was actively involved in the case of Aafia Siddiqui who despite her Pakistani nationality was perceived as an issue of human rights in relation to Islam, not Pakistan.

‘Because of what happened to her. She is Muslim and on that basis ...if you imagine yourself in that situation. Really how she is being brutalized. She didn’t even do anything. I find it strange that people can characterize, you don’t need evidence. It is like you are Muslim and you don’t need any evidence for it.’

(Zahra, West Yorkshire2, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British)

Hafiza, another British Pakistani who wore the niqab and believed that ‘going to protests’ was ‘against Islamic ethics, modesty or ‘Hayya,’’ nonetheless was active on the internet having started a website on Islam. On this website, she created a separate section on Dr Aafia Siddiqui, under ‘current affairs,’ who was again perceived as a victim of Islamophobia because of her Muslimness. With such conflicting narratives, understanding the nature of British/Pakistani Muslim female student activism becomes more complex, where students’ definition of political causes, as opposed to humanitarian
causes are often unclear. However, what is quite evident in their narratives is that they are willing to participate in campaigning for Muslim causes, as opposed to campaigns related to a particular nationality such as Pakistan. This however may not be true for other nationalities. During the research, ‘the Arab Spring’ i.e. revolutions in the Middle East started gaining momentum. The participants interviewed during this time were well aware of these revolutions and openly supported them. Even those who did not attend a protest still verbalized their support. The universities that were visited for the purpose of this research had banners supporting these revolutions. Yet with Pakistan, the narrative shifted, as Faiza points out,

‘I think no one is willing to get their hands dirty in politics, in a country where politicians are powerful. In Palestine the politicians aren’t powerful. Pakistan might be a developing country but still their politicians are ‘powerful’. I don’t think nobody wants to mess around with people like that.’

(Faiza, West Yorkshire2, 22, Undergrad Humanities, British)

The narratives of these young women suggest an active interest in international affairs, particularly those relating to human rights and Muslims. However, there is a sense of dissociation with politics and Pakistan, one which could either be the result of a more politicized Muslim identity where only campaigns directly linked to Islam are supported either actively or passively, or an actual fear of being associated with a highly problematic country. The second or third generation British Muslim Pakistani provided mixed responses to the question of identity as highlighted in the last chapter, with responses varying between affinity and indifference to Pakistan. However, the identity issue becomes further problematic when overseas Pakistani students are cautious about getting involved in politically sensitive issues relating to their country. Such a sense of caution raises important questions about the perceived freedom to protest without ‘getting
into trouble’, where apathy becomes an insufficient reason particularly where support for Muslim causes like Palestine exists. As Pakistani students are more willing to engage in Muslim causes, as opposed to Pakistani campaigns where the Pakistani identity is seen as more troubled than the Muslim identity, an understanding of Islamophobia and the way it is internalized should consider the relevance of certain politicized ethnic identities. The reason for such lack of involvement could be two-fold. Either the Pakistani identity is not significant enough to warrant a response from students; or there is an actual fear that such involvement might lead to the experience of Pakophobia through the dreaded association of being a Pakistani which is considered more problematic than being a Muslim in the current socio-political climate. The answer to this query can be found in Malika’s response to the problem of student campaigning for Pakistan, which is to convert the issue into one effecting Muslims, rather than ‘just Pakistanis’,

‘I would say that in a situation like that if it wasn’t just Pakistani students but Muslims students of other racial descent, if they got together as well and they protested. It would probably, like these people the government, probably wouldn’t have as much power to you know falsely accuse the students and just deport them back to their home countries. Because if it’s like only Pakistani students they would be like oh they are all to be tied with the same rope. But if it were Muslim students of other descents, they would also care about the image that they are portraying of themselves by like deporting students just because they are Muslims, just deporting them back because they are acting up...but if they were only Pakistani students then it would be more dodgy.’

(Malika, North West1, 22, Undergrad Social Science, Overseas)

The nature of student campaigning hence provides important insights into the perception of Islamophobia in relation to Pakophobia, the perception of what is political and what is defined as humanitarian. As Amna observes,

‘What happens is when you go abroad you are constantly being attacked for being Pakistani, constantly being attacked for being a Pakistani especially with Islamophobia. So what happens is you are more comfortable with identifying yourself as a Muslim than a Pakistani. Most of my cousins have tried to learn
Arabic before they learnt Urdu because they can identify with that Arab culture and that is something they can boast about you know, more comfortable being identified with. Being Pakistani, such a messed up country, everything we do is wrong, the match fixing, Sialkot tragedy so everything Pakistani is embarrassing so they much rather have a different identity. Islam is something which everyone gravitates towards and obviously being Pakistani has always been confused with being Muslim a lot.’

(Amina, North West, 28, Graduate Social Sciences, Overseas)

IV. Concluding Discussion: ISocs and student activism

This chapter in exploring student politics and activism has illustrated how stereotypes of Muslim students and Pakistanis that are part of the socio-political ‘discourse’ outside the university, informs ‘discourses’ of different student ‘communities’ within the university. The narratives further locate the personal arena of the family, within the discussion of insecurity and the Muslim student in relation to ISocs. The ISocs in universities are no longer perceived as just another religious group that serve an important welfare role for Muslim students. Instead, they have to constantly struggle against a tainted image, the result of individuals convicted of terrorism, who in their time as university students were associated with their Islamic societies. ISocs throughout the university sample struggled with this image of the ‘radicalizing ISoc’, but those Islamic societies that were once associated with individuals later convicted of terrorism in particular have to prove their innocence for crimes committed by others. With the stereotype of the troubled, radicalising ISoc pervading the media and security narrative, ISocs constantly feel monitored and further isolated. Such monitoring is also reflected in the constant control over which speakers they are allowed to invite, where a level of vulnerability continues to be associated with Muslim students and their student societies. Ahmed, as a Student

78 Match fixing – Pakistani cricket team implicated in a ‘betting scam’ (See Akwagyiram, 01/11/2011); Sialkot Tragedy – two young boys accused of robbery were tortured by a mob in broad daylight in the Pakistan city of Sialkot in the presence of police officers and hanged. (See BBC News 23/08/2010)
Union representative who was both a part of his university’s ISoc and is actively engaged in raising awareness about Islamophobia (discussed in the next chapter) observes how such a narrative around ISocs and Muslim students is extremely counter productive,

‘For me my personal view is that the only way you tackle extremism is by involving people in a democratic process and allowing them to engage in the mainstream ways of achieving things. When you have far right parties on a national level, if you get them involved in elections they are less likely to espouse radical views. They may still be radical but will not be as bad in terms of something that they will say because they know that by being involved in that process there are certain responsibilities that you take up. When you are not involved in that process at all you have zero responsibilities so for me if you want to tackle extremism on campuses, the government if they are to intervene which is another debate, they have to encourage Muslim students to get involved in their student union, get involved in campus life as opposed to saying no you guys are extremists, you can’t bring any of your speakers because they are all extremists, you can’t really organize on campus because we have kind of created this image of suspicion because you guys are not necessarily fit to be involved with student union politics or anything to do with campus life. So by setting up the narrative in that sense, you sort of immediately prevent any potential extremist who does exist from moving away from those extremist views or tackling them in the first place.’

(Ahmed, London3, Student Union Anti Racism Officer)

However, while all the student representatives in the sample acknowledged that there had been cases of extremism which were reported in the media, such cases had been generalized to the entire ISoc population. They were nonetheless willing to engage with the university in rooting out any potential problem that the university or security agencies believed to exist within the Muslim student population. Yet, the level of engagement continued to be restricted where students were primarily given a list of who not to invite by organizations that they did not deem credible. With such a level of disengagement between the university and student societies, Muslim students often felt targeted.

Despite these feelings and perceptions Muslim students were nonetheless involved either actively or passively in international campaigns around human rights and Islam. The Muslim identity continued to dictate the nature of such campaigning. Yet, the same
attitude did not translate towards their national identity, or heritage, Pakistan. In comparing the responses of British Muslims with a Pakistani heritage and Overseas Pakistanis, the ‘fear of getting into trouble’ for Pakistani causes was more clearly illustrated in Overseas student narratives. However, the one trend that was consistent in British Muslim Pakistanis was the insistence in supporting Muslim humanitarian causes, as opposed to what was deemed as political causes, despite the political repercussions of such humanitarian causes. Hence, students were willing to be part of a Palestinian campaign, or for others ‘Aafia Siddiqui’s’ campaign, perceived as a humanitarian issue, despite her controversial role in the war against Al Qa’ida and its affiliates. However, J4NW10 was considered a political campaign where the deportation of Muslim Pakistani students who were found innocent in the British court of law was not considered a humanitarian issue. While Islam provided an ideological sense of belonging that was pure from any human corruption, Pakistan, particularly anything politically relevant to Pakistan was smeared by corruption and suspicion. The continued negative depiction of the country in the media resulted in a form of self-censorship, where students tried to avoid getting involved in such messy campaigns like J4NW10. These narratives testify to the way Islamophobia can be differentially internalized through a level of self-censorship, where in the case of the troubled Pakistani identity, the fear of experiencing Pakophobia, of being associated with the Pakistani terrorist was enough of a reason to avoid politics and Pakistan. However, the next chapter illustrates how at a small scale students are trying to move beyond Islamophobia, and Pakophobia, how ISocs are encouraging students to politically engage on campus, and how Pakistani societies are attempting to
tackle the image problem, by promoting Pakistani culture, while avoiding Pakistani politics.
Chapter VII

Beyond Islamophobia: Solutions from the Grassroots

The narratives presented in the preceding chapters highlight the experiences and encounters with Islamophobia. This chapter will explore the solutions to the problem of Islamophobia as presented by the participants. In particular, the narratives illustrate how both individuals and student societies are challenging the dominant ‘discourse’ on Muslims and insecurity across their student ‘communities,’ by raising awareness about issues relating to Islamophobia and Islam. Further, the suggestions and actions demonstrate the changing nature of anti-racism efforts on campuses, where Muslim young women are actively challenging the meta-narrative of the Muslim-Pakistani terrorist, through individual dialogue. The chapter also highlights the nature of welfare provisions in universities, their successes and limitations.

I. Introduction

Experiences and encounters with Islamophobia, as the preceding discussion has illustrated can be both direct and indirect, whether through interaction with middle management or staff in universities, or through a sense of self-censorship as a consequence of the grander narrative of terrorism and Islam. Islamic societies have felt monitored or censored under the state’s agenda on security and counter-terrorism in universities. Pakistani students also often feel the need to underplay their Pakistani identity, a consequence of the problematic position of Pakistan in the ongoing War against Al Qa’ida and its affiliates as highlighted by media. However, despite these obstacles participants were given an opportunity to provide their own solutions to the problem of Islamophobia. While there were students who have opted to stay silent on the matter of Islamophobia, they nonetheless have expressed their views on how they think this problem can be tackled either within the university or outside. However, other students are more active in both their individual capacity and as Islamic society (ISoc) and Pakistani society (Paksoc) members in overcoming the problem of ignorance and misunderstanding. This chapter in addressing the fourth research question of the ways in
which the university environment can assist students in challenging Islamophobia, presents such narratives of ‘activism,’ where British/Pakistani students confronted with Islamophobia in their day-to-day lives are moving beyond the problem, and looking towards solutions.

The narratives further illustrate the Bakhtinian ‘dialogics’ at play where as Bakhtin observes, ‘[t]he word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgements and accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others … and all this may crucially shape discourse, may leave a trace in all its semantic layers, may complicate its expression and influence its entire stylistic profile’ (Bakhtin 1981:276).

These words are conveyed within individual and group ‘activism’ in the form of a dialogue in the university or beyond, challenging dominant perceptions, the dominant ‘discourse’ that fellow students, or individuals have about participants and their religion or ethnic identity. While they may not change the meta-narrative on Muslims and terrorism, these pockets of activism are nonetheless important in altering perceptions within groups, as illustrated in the participant narratives. The solutions to the problem of Islamophobia in this chapter are discussed at three levels: the individual, student society, and university, where each section will expand on what is already being done, and what more can be done to counter Islamophobia and Pakophobia as suggested by students. The chapter in analyzing these solutions will also examine written material, from fliers and brochures given out by ISocs, to student society websites, and university websites, to explore how the problem of Islamophobia is presently being tackled within the university. Furthermore, while interviews with university official were limited because of
their non-responsiveness or non-availability, three different welfare and racism personnel in different universities were interviewed. Their responses will also be explored in this chapter. The representatives of the national Pakistani society and FOSIS have also been recorded in addition to the students. The purpose for such a multidimensional analysis is two-fold: examine the level of communication between students and universities in their efforts at countering Islamophobia, and, explore the extent to which Islamic society initiatives as presented in the narratives are communicate to the wider student body, through their published material. Discussing the nature of ISoc events is further important in highlighting both the possibility of activism but also their limitations, especially where controversial speakers are given a platform. Hence, such an exploration provides insights into the successes and limitations of existing counter Islamophobia initiatives in universities, as highlighted by the participants. It further illustrates how young students are active in countering Islamophobia, where instead of being victims of discrimination, they are attempting to challenge the dominant ‘discourse’ on Muslims and Pakistanis. These narratives therefore provide important insights for furthering the agenda of counterterrorism or counter Islamophobia on campuses.

II. The Power of Dialogue: Individuals Changing Perceptions

‘... some times you just don’t want people to have that bitterness. I would rather build a relationship and even if you know the first five times we meet for coffee and they hate being there and they hate talking to me maybe on the sixth time they might say actually I am going to start thinking about this. I am going to stop making certain comments because sometimes if it is done through the system then yeah they can put on their record that this was addressed and such and such was dealt with it but it hasn’t actually been dealt with because like it has to be a long term thing.’

(Nadia, West Yorkshire2, 20, Undergrad Law, British)

The literature on Islamophobia within universities (Nabi 2011; OPM and Hussain 2009; Tyrer and Ahmad 2006) highlights the problems associated with Islamophobia and
racism, but often overlooks student response to such discrimination. The participants in this research challenge the victim narrative of the oppressed Muslim woman, many asserting a level of individual activism through the simple medium of dialogue. While it is crucial to acknowledge that almost half of the women in this sample were engaged in such activism, the others who may not have actively participated in such dialogues nonetheless highlighted the importance of overcoming misunderstanding, even at the individual level. Like Nadia, Farzana also emphasized the importance of dialogue,

‘Talking to people helps a lot and that is something which I think a lot of people struggle with. They don’t think that it is their duty to explain to this girl sitting next to her why she is dressed like this. She has a dialogue with her...She doesn’t have to but if they have a dialogue it would help. While you are at uni, if you could tell your immediate friends why you have to rush off five times a day, if you could tell people you have to pray and this is what Islam stands for little little things like that but people don’t seem to do... We all need to take a little bit of responsibility for doing that because the thing is I can’t stop a negative but I can make a positive...So if we all stop being negative, let them keep talking but we should be a positive role model.’

(Farzana, South West1, 20, Undergrad Medicine, British)

The little things that Farzana highlights may have more significance for individuals who are completely ignorant of what Islam or Muslims stand for, especially those who are influenced by media stereotypes. In his interview, Tariq Modood highlighted the promising ability of young Muslim women to use dialogue to overcome differences,

‘But women seek a more reasonable, calmer, talk based approach, that they want negotiation and dialogue, they are looking for more political solutions rather than violent solutions...I think that’s probably the case in universities that women students who get involved in political awareness, political thinking as they of course do, that they’d be looking for political solutions rather than what they’d regard as kind of macho hothead actions, that you know on the whole men are too prone to violent solutions, especially on things like the honour of Islam, honour of community and all that is mixed up, that they are not susceptible to reason in the way that women perhaps are ... I think women are certainly becoming very politically involved in the sense that thinking about these issues and sometimes joining organisations and so on. I am sure you have heard of the political party RESPECT. Well, young Muslim women took to that in quite a big way...’
The participants in this research are precisely engaged in such a dialogue to challenge Muslim stereotypes and ignorance, especially within the university. Tehmina’s narrative demonstrates the level of ignorance often found within universities as well,

‘I think universities are seen as a bizarre place around with some international students, people from different walks of life, many have not had the opportunity of embracing other people’s culture, some have, some are quite narrow minded and don’t want to. … I know a student who came to see me and didn’t know that you don’t call someone Islamic you call them Muslim. Islamic is something completely different and she said I haven’t met, I don’t know any Islamic people. I said that’s just the terminology. Again it’s little things like that, if they are willing to learn…’

(Tehmina West Midlands1, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British)

However, Tehmina in her narrative also expresses her frustration in having to engage in such a dialogue particularly within the same university context where ‘ignorance’ is not an excuse. Yet, moving beyond the individual Tehmina is instead more active within her Student Union as well as outside the university with various youth programs in her community, becoming politically active to overcome prejudices. While Tehmina belongs to a university which has a small presence of Muslim students, Nazia who is part of a more internationally diverse student group in central London has moved beyond the medium of dialogue, taking active steps to get more involved with her friends and other students in order to overcome such misconceptions.

‘I never thought about reporting it. I think it was after this incident that something in my thought process changed. I am not much of a party person...how many glasses of juice can you have you know...I am not very keen to go out and hang out with a group who drinks because I don’t drink...for me seeing people get drunk is not my definition of fun but I made an effort to hang out more only because they would understand I am a regular person. I am a Muslim, I don’t miss my prayers. I am a practicing Muslim as they call me but at the same time I am a girl just like them who wants to have fun. Who wants to go for a movie, go to the dance floor. I will not drink that is fine but I will sit and make fun of you guys
when you are drunk… I would make more effort to stand up and represent myself as a Muslim, female and Pakistani. People don’t make that effort to change mindsets because it requires a lot of energy, a lot of effort…people I would come across would say I don’t care. It is unfortunate.’

(Nazia, London3, 28, Social Sciences Grad, Overseas)

Nazia who does not wear any Islamic symbols, but dresses in a Western fashion like many other students still feels the need to actively prove that she is a normal, regular human being. The problem for young women with religious signifiers is greater, as the FOSIS representative highlights,

‘Non-Muslim girls as well will feel that hijab is a barrier. So that is where Muslim women need to make people feel that it shouldn’t be a barrier, that we are no different. For me I was quite involved on activism on campus, talking to people, it doesn’t matter if there were Muslims or not but through that interaction people would talk more. I had people tell me that before I met you I wouldn’t have approached a girl with a hijab and I realized actually you are no different, you do talk to people. So you do have these misconceptions, more so with the niqab as well.’

(FOSIS Representative, 2011)

However, while some practice such individual activism, Amna highlights the frustration that many others face,

‘the problem with Muslims is also that they get emotional before engaging with someone. So my flat mate had this problem she would defend Islam for no reason. Like at one point... she was debating with someone that she can’t have vinegar because it has trace amounts of alcohol, so that person was debating with her that why are you so fussy, so instead of engaging with her she became all emotional. ‘You don’t understand my religion, in this country I have to explain myself all the time.’ Of course you have to because for them it’s a foreign religion, a foreign nationality. So at least with the public, you should respond differently, you should engage with them more and at the government level your response should be different, you should be lobbying against the government and their laws. With the public it helps to engage and if they say stupid things like your men get married four times, engage with them. Tell them it’s true and it’s also not true. And the more they interact with Muslim women and Muslim people, the more they realize that these people are not anything less than human, they are just like us’.

(Amna, North West1, 28, Graduate Social Sciences, Overseas)

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79 Amna is referring to the Terrorism Act 2006 (See HM Government 2006).
Amna’s narrative is also important from another perspective. Not only does it highlight the frustration felt by many Muslims who often do not want to engage in a conversation about their beliefs, but it also demonstrates the difference between an Overseas Muslim and a British Muslim. While Amna can dismiss the ignorance of others on the basis of the foreignness of her religion and Pakistani identity, the British Muslim, for whom Britain is her home, where her religion is a part of that home, the excuse of foreignness does not hold true. Hence, there is a greater level of frustration felt in the constant need to explain one’s own Muslim perspective. While such complexities within individual acts of dialogue remain, young people in universities are nonetheless willing to have such debates. Their voice, their experiences, and their success stories need to be highlighted. The need to project such positive images of Muslims in universities is important both for overcoming Islamophobia but also for creating a sense of belonging. Farzana, in her discussion on positive role models, takes the discussion further by suggesting the need to include more members of staff and academics who wear the Islamic signifier,

‘I know you can’t just hire someone for that but stuff like that to see Muslims in a positive role, that is a nice thing...it seems a bit weird but it is a simple thing, you associate certain things with certain things. You see a Muslim person you associate negative things with that, so we need to try and get some positive thinking, educated know what they are talking about is good...people here associate things with things.’

(Farzana, South West1, 20, Undergrad Medicine, British)

While students in their individual capacities are engaged in such dialogues, or are hoping to promote positive role models, student societies like the Islamic society and in some cases the Pakistani societies are also engaged in a level of activism with the hope of challenging misconceptions about Islam.
III. Student Societies: Changing Perspectives

‘Combating Islamophobia comes in many levels. Some of it can be loud campaigning, anti-Islamophobia campaigning, holding conferences and so on... our focus is to talk to Muslim students, empowering them to know their issues, be aware of where they are being wronged, and be aware of reasons to engage. It is only when you engage on campus, run for student positions, have representation there, which means that you are the first to know about any issues, people trust you, come to you first. Kind of normalizing Muslim student presence, that is the term we use, Normalizing Muslim Student Presence. The more normal you seem to people, I know it sounds horrible to say as such but the more as an equal you are seen, you don’t segregate, the more involved and loud you are, you have amazing examples of societies who do this, LSE, Imperial college, so they do events jointly with other societies, which shows people how they actually as Muslims are open, get involved with other people, other issues. Making sure that Muslims get involved in mainstream issues not just Muslim issues, also participating on campus, increasing their representation on campus, working with other individuals interfaith things, also with regards to civil liberties issues and we make sure our services available to Islamic societies...We are also campaigning to make sure issues are made public, so we are working continuously. Alhumdulillah we have a situation that if something happens we have the NUS and other organizations who are there to support Muslim students. We are talking about institutional type of Islamophobia. I think visible Islamophobia it is very hard to combat that, that is really a long process about changing perception.’

(FOSIS Representative, 2011)

FOSIS in outlining its agenda for countering Islamophobia highlights a fundamental aspect of the debate, the normalization of ‘Muslim student presence,’ who stand out because of the rhetoric around extremism and radicalization. The narratives in the preceding section also point to attempts by students to prove their normality, especially young women who display Islamic signifiers. In order to show other students that Muslims are normal human beings belonging to a peaceful religion that promotes integration rather than segregation, ISocs in universities have organized Islamic Awareness Week to help both Muslim and non Muslim students, as well as citizens outside the university to learn more about Islam, ask questions with the hope of overcoming existing prejudices and misunderstandings. However, as the following
discussion demonstrates, while the objective of ISocs is to raise awareness, they continue to be confronted by more problems and limitations.

a. Islamic Student Societies – Limitation and Successes

South West1 in the sample has an active Islamic society. Amongst its various objectives, the society aims to spread awareness about Islam to Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as challenge misrepresentations of Muslims that resulted after the tragic events of 9/11. The website for the ISoc also highlights the need to counter discrimination against Muslim students, often the result of such misunderstanding. For this purpose the university organized a ‘Discover Islam Week’ that started with an event to encourage ‘an interactive interfaith discussion’ with representatives of other religious communities, and included talks on the Bible and Islam, as well as a special talk dedicated to ‘Coexistence Under Islam.’ Fliers of the event were given to all students, both Muslim and non-Muslim. The event was nominated by the Student Union for the university Union awards that recognizes successful student initiatives. However, while the nomination by the Student Union illustrates how the ISoc successfully connected with other societies and groups in the university, one of the speakers that was invited by the ISoc has been black listed by the Centre for Social Cohesion (CSC) in their report ‘Radical Islam on UK Campuses’ (2010). The speaker has been criticized for encouraging greater isolation amongst the Muslim population, yet he was invited to speak at this event. Despite the success of the event that was recognized by the entire Student Union through its nomination, this example illustrates the problematic relationship between the ISoc at this university and organizations such as CSC who are working towards countering extremism on campuses. As the FOSIS representative notes,
‘When we look at examples of Centre for Social Cohesion or Quilliam their reports... they don’t even have any credentials as researchers. They don’t have the academic degree to go with their research. They are just people with an agenda, that is what they are, they would look at news in a way that suits their way of thinking and their agenda.’

(FOSIS Representative, 2011)

The Islamic Awareness week demonstrates the capability of Islamic societies to ‘normalize’ the presence of Muslim students, creating a space for greater interaction amongst student groups. It also demonstrates the limitation of counter extremism initiatives where instead of working in partnership with organizations that aim to root out extremism on campuses, students are often suspicious of the organizations themselves, viewed as being agenda driven and biased. Nadia’s narrative in the last chapter also exposes the level of suspicion and mistrust directed towards the CSC and Quilliam by Muslim students. There is a greater need to engage with ISocs, not just monitor their activities, as the problem of speakers that are deemed extremist by the state or such organizations can only be resolved through mutual understanding rather than continued mistrust.

However, ISocs at universities like West Yorkshire2 who publicized all their Islamic Awareness Week talks on youtube could be an example of how greater transparency may be achieved. Speakers included public intellectuals as well as a famous Muslim poet. Publicizing the event on youtube also led to a greater willingness to interact with a non-Muslim and Muslim audience beyond the university to challenge misconceptions about Islam. They also scheduled a specific event for the audience to ask questions about Islam. The West Yorkshire2 ISoc has also organized awareness events throughout the academic year, including a hijab workshop which invited Muslim and non-Muslim students to discuss the importance of the hijab, and provided a platform for asking questions and
encouraging debate. While the ISoc continues to struggle with its tainted reputation, a result of its association with students who were later accused of extremism (as highlighted in the last chapter) they are nonetheless active in challenging this association through dialogue and student activism. Other universities in the sample also organized similar events. North West1 however created a Discover Islam website, providing a platform for visitors to ask questions about Islam. The websites also consists of a video that showcases students from different nationalities, with different ‘degrees of religiosity’, spreading their message of Islam as a peaceful religion. Such initiatives are important not only in challenging Islamophobia, but also in educating Muslims themselves about their religion. Such an education is needed to counter extremism on campuses as highlighted by Tariq Modood in his interview,

‘I suppose the other thing that can help is the more aware people are of their religious heritage, Muslims are. Because most of the people who are turned on by radicals besides all the other things that I mentioned like standing up for Muslim causes and so on, tend to be unsure about what Islam is, and so if somebody comes up and says to them we can tell you what Islam is, this is what Islam is A, B C, there you go now do it, they are very open to that because they don’t have enough knowledge and understanding of their Islamic heritage.’

(Interview with Professor Modood December 14, 2009)

While the Islamic societies have been active in spreading awareness about Islam, they have also been successful in nurturing a close relationship with their Student Unions. The anti- racism officer Ahmed, in a London3 university launched an ‘Islamophobia Awareness Month’.80

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80 The necessity for launching this event was the result of a disagreement between the atheist society at another university and their ISoc, where the atheist society published the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad ‘to publicize a pub crawl.’ His university’s ‘atheist society’ in solidarity started publishing ‘cartoons of the Prophet and Jesus on their facebook’ website. With complaints from students a motion against Islamophobia was passed on ‘the same day as an anti-Semitism motion’ with the two groups working together with the support of a large student body.
‘on campus organized two main initiatives. First week long exhibition with pictures in terms of headlines from the papers which were demonizing Muslims or portraying Muslims in a negative light. And also like some statistics about how the general British public felt about Muslims in terms of building mosques or Muslim schools or Muslim youth. So we had that exhibition in the Quad which is the hub of the Student Union and a lot of people were looking at that throughout the week. The second initiative was an event, the launch event for the whole month with (academics) and National Union of Students representatives talking about Islamophobia...one talking about academia and Islamophobia...other need to counter Islamophobia ... The atheist society was very welcoming of it...brought everyone together against racism.’

(Ahmed, London3, Student Union Anti Racism Officer)

Ahmed’s example of an ‘Islamophobia Awareness month’ that was meant to precisely raise awareness about the problem of Islamophobia without targeting any particular student society or group, illustrates the success of such university initiatives. The atheist society that had previously published the Danish cartoons also supported Ahmed’s event, which he successfully launched without any opposition from any student. He further plans to continue this event every year.

However, while student societies whether the university ISocs, or Student Unions have the potential to engage in greater dialogue, such engagement is often limited because of their inability to attract a non-Muslim audience. Faiza, for instance acknowledges both the potential of a student Islamic society but also its limited appeal,

‘Islamic society should endeavour to educate people about Islam. It is more focused just towards Muslims, but you know if you want to make the place you know where Islam is accepted, it’s not, people choose to ignore it or pretend it’s not there. I think people need the Islamic society to try and educate non-Muslim people, tell them what Islam is about. You get a lot of things on TV that make it out as though Muslim people hate non Muslims which I think is completely wrong.’

(Faiza, West Yorkshire2, 22, Undergrad Humanities, British)

Rukshanda further raises the problem of limited publicity. Instead she recommends large scale annual events that may attract a greater audience,
'there is not enough publicity, it is always at a really small level. For example when Muslim scholars are invited it is normally Muslims who attend such events. Out of a hundred or one hundred and fifty people only five will be non-Muslim. So we need Muslim students to publicize these events more. Also, it may seem more effective to organize conferences where academics are invited and people tend to participate more, rather than random lectures, since a conference is taken more seriously by students than one lecture every now and then. I think even if we have a conference once a year, it will have a longer term impact.'

(Rukshanda, London2, 28, Science Grad, Overseas)

Kiran in overcoming this lack of attendance, highlights the possibility of making such religious events more ‘fun,’ so non religious and non-Muslim people would be tempted to participate. While such initiatives are underway in some universities they nonetheless continue to be limited, a problem highlighted by Zahra,

‘I think they are trying to raise awareness and I don’t know but then when you do raise awareness you only see it with those people who are open minded and would listen. But people who are more likely to do the discrimination, they wouldn’t listen so I don’t know, I have no idea how it can actually make a difference. Raising awareness I think is the best way but by raising awareness only some people will listen.’

(Zahra, West Yorkshire2, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British)

However, despite these limitations such awareness events have nonetheless influenced student perceptions about the Islamic society. Tasneem’s ISoc for instance has tried to be involved with the university Student Union, again with the aim of ‘normalizing’ their presence.

‘People do think them to be a little extreme. But I think within the last few years especially how the union functions here they have made a special effort to make sure that people don’t get that image and what they have done is started supporting non Muslim students to be candidates, they have stopped just picking people who are just Pakistani, Muslim or Asian, they are going out of their way to support everybody, giving a chance for people to be associated with them and get to know what they are.’

(Tasneem, North West1, 21, Undergrad Social Science, Overseas)
Malika who belongs to the same university as Tasneem demonstrates how her attitude towards the Islamic society changed as a result of their activism.

‘First year got the impression that they were religiously extreme, but when I got to know them, the events they had, got to know about the activities they are involved with, my opinion changed drastically. I realized these people are normal, not out of the world or something like that.’

(Malika, North West1, 22, Undergrad Social Science, Overseas)

Hence such initiatives by Islamic societies provide an alternative to the stereotypes that are prevalent in media accounts of ISocs that inform the immediate ‘discourse communities’ (Bakhtin 1981) of participants. Their activities further testify to an ongoing ‘dialectic’ where Muslim students interrupt the meta-narrative about their ISocs, adding an alternative voice within this narrative (Bakhtin 1986). While Islamic societies continue to raise awareness at the student level, with attempts to branch out and attract a greater audience, initiatives at countering Pakophobia by the Pakistani student societies often face greater limitations.

b. Pakistani Student Societies

Unlike FOSIS, the National Pakistani Students society in Britain does not have a planned course of action for countering anti Pakistani or Islamophobic sentiments. They are more focused towards supporting current students, and improving networks between Pakistani students and alumni abroad. However, the society does hold events to promote a more positive image of Pakistan. As their representative observes,

‘We understand that we are in a privileged position and we understand that that puts us in a particularly responsible position...we ought to be helping and nurturing a nation of people who are committed to progressive democratic Pakistan.’

(National Pakistani Student Representative, 2010)

For this purpose this organization holds an annual conference that brings together students Pakistani, British/Pakistani as well as non Pakistanis to discuss the political,
economic and social issues that continue to plague Pakistan with the aim of providing solutions. These solutions are not limited to the conference, but are sent to local parliamentarians in Pakistan. Such activism is geared towards using the skills and expertise of students abroad to bring change within Pakistan. Given, the more ‘academic’ nature of a ‘conference,’ which has different panels, and a parliamentarian style discussion format, students are less hesitant in attending such events.

At the local university level, Paksochs are also organizing events to encourage such a positive image of the country. Nazia who belongs to the same university as Ahmed has highlighted her Paksoch’s efforts at changing perceptions of students about Pakistan.

‘I will tell you something that happened, on Monday we just launched Pakistan week at (my university), we are showcasing one event...one movie everyday ending with a Strings concert. So Monday morning what we did was that we got this typical Pakistan bus with all the decorations on it, there is one in London. So the Pakistan society team came with the bus into the campus, parked the bus on campus and then a dhol waala came in and there was a big random dhol dhamaat which the Pakistani student did and every single person stepped out of the class to see what was going on and we had put up Pakistani flags and were wearing shalwar kameez and the girls and boys were all dancing on the team. 5 of my own class fellows came up to me and said we so want to go to Pakistan...It was hardly for 10-15 minutes. They parked the bus and the rikshaw and I was like this is what the bus in Pakistan looks like and they were just amazed at me...I think just 15 minutes of that effort made people think about Pakistan differently, so we need to showcase Pakistan differently.’

(Nazia, London3, 28, Social Sciences Grad, Overseas)

Nazia’s example illustrates how at the local level students have the means and are active in countering the grand narrative around the Pakistani extremist. However, while the case of Ahmed and Nazia’s university provides the best example of how in small pockets

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81 A Pakistani music band.
82 Referring to a person who plays the ‘dhol’, a local musical instrument that resembles drums.
83 Dance and music.
young people are trying to raise awareness through student activism, there are nonetheless limitations to these efforts.

One problem in tackling Pakophobia through student societies is that Pakistani societies exist in some universities, not all. In the sample, half of the universities had a Paksoc, with West Yorkshire attempting to establish a Pakistani society as Abida’s narrative illustrated in chapter 5. However, even when Pakistani societies do exist most of them do not engage with political issues related to Pakistan. They are nonetheless active like Nazia in promoting cultural events. Amna who was trying to organize a protest against General Musharraf in 2007 when he imposed emergency in Pakistan, encountered resistance or apathy from Pakistani students.

‘When I spoke to the Pakistani society they told me sister we are not political, we aren’t religious this is just about partying because we want to show that Pakistanis can also have fun. I was like I am totally with you, for the halwa purri parties and the Eid-ul-fitr parties, I totally endorse that I am not against it but this is an issue which is relevant to your country, and you can do something and you have a luxury that you can protest over here when our people cant protest in Pakistan so we should really make use of this opportunity…’

(Amma, North West, 28, Graduate Social Sciences, Overseas)

Hence, whether Pakistani students are apolitical or as illustrated in chapter 6 uneasy about getting involved in political activism concerning Pakistan, the Paksocs like the ISocs are still trying to challenge the negative image of the Muslim and Pakistani. The Paksocs continue to be less political, focusing on promoting a positive cultural image, when and where they can. As Tasneem illustrates,

‘anything that can promote peace, promote a good image of us Muslims and we can get something out of it we are happy to raise our voice for it and stand by it…’

(Tasneem, North West, 21, Undergrad Social Science, Overseas)

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84 Local Breakfast
85 Celebratory event to mark the end of Ramadan, the month of fasting for Muslims
Furthermore, given the link between Islamophobia and Pakophobia, attempts to promote a positive image of Muslims or Pakistanis will be instrumental in countering both levels of discrimination. It is for this reason that such initiatives need to be supported by the universities but also by government agencies that are trying to counter extremism on campuses. Despite the limitations, these initiatives are important in creating a sense of belonging and shared purpose. The next section illustrates how the university staff and services are supporting Muslim students but are limited in their outreach.

IV. Institutionalized Welfare: The University Support System

The narratives thus far have highlighted student experiences and encounters with Islamophobia either within or outside the university. However, what also needs to be addressed is the provision of welfare services to address the grievances of Muslim students, particularly concerning Islamophobia. The myriad of responses to welfare provisions suggest a disconnect between the university provisions and the students, who either are unaware of the services, or are reluctant to access them because of various reasons discussed in this section. Tehmina, both as a member of her university’s Student Union and the national student union has encountered this problem of under reporting,

‘I mean for example I’ve been SU officer now. I’m not saying that I’m a fantastic officer but I am more approachable, more familiar with the students, and the Islamic societies... However I don’t think many of the students, or even lecturers going through Islamophobia would really know where to go with that. I think a lot of the statistics, many people don’t report the incidents but the cases that I hear of, or the students I’ve had conversations with, or the unions I have spoken to, they told me it goes unreported there isn’t directly anyone they can go to. Or if they do make a big song and dance about it they can be seen as extreme or radical’

(Tehmina West Midlands1, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British)
Tehmina’s observation highlights three important points which have also been raised by other participants: the level of approachability for such services; lack of knowledge about these services; and the fear of standing out. Another problem is also the student’s own inhibition at repeating the event, which often requires bureaucratic paperwork, as well as lack of time on the part of the student who just ‘can’t be bothered’ to chase up such complaints. Faiza who encountered Islamophobia did not report it precisely because she wanted to avoid all the ‘fuss’ and did not want to get into the bureaucratic process of making the complaint. Yet Faiza’s university welfare personnel who was interviewed was confident that sufficient welfare procedures were in place for any student who may encounter any form of discrimination. She was at the same time confident that such forms of discrimination did not exist in her university. For her the main welfare concern of female British Muslim Pakistani young women was more related to ‘forced marriage, arranged marriage, family issues, exam stress, general transition issues.’

‘Diane: We have contacts with all the societies...we also arrange meetings with them.
Interviewer: Have the societies ever reported any problems?
Diane: Nothing at all.’

(Diane, West Yorkshire2, University Welfare, 2011)

Both the university policy documents that she shared and the welfare website of the university have a clear policy against any form of discrimination, and has provided faith advisors for Muslim students. Given the large Muslim population of the university, three faith advisors are available, a separate male and female one, as well as an academic member of staff. The contact information for these advisors is clearly provided on the university website. Despite such a strong welfare team there continues to be a communication gap between students and their university’s welfare advisors. The
students are also hesitant about contacting the student Welfare officer. Nadia, the head sister of the ISoc instead is approached by young women with matters concerning discrimination or welfare. While she then communicates to the Welfare officer she nonetheless encourages the complainants to speak to the relevant authority,

‘I think most students don’t even know that is available and don’t even know how approachable these people are. The most approachable person in the whole student union is a Polish guy, the academic affairs officer. Even the black student officer was with us for the prayer rooms and if it wasn’t for him we wouldn’t have the prayer rooms. He got us an hour free for jummah time every Friday. He got us so many things and if ever I have an issue I could go to him... He is Polish. He is fantastic and I would tell so many people to go to him because he will sit down and he will actually make time for you. But people are like how is he going to understand... I’m like this is the mentality you have got to get yourself out of. He can help you...’

(Nadia, West Yorkshire2, 20, Undergrad Law, British)

The problem faced by students and welfare services at West Yorkshire2 are quite similar to problems in other universities. While many students might dismiss their experience of Islamophobia, there are others who clearly do speak to Islamic society members about their experiences. However, unless the ISocs take the matter further, often such experiences remain under reported. The reason for under reporting can also vary depending on the socio-political climate. Tabussum, the Racism and Equality advisor for South East1 in the sample was interviewed at the time of the Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab incident when he tried to blow up a plane headed to the US. His previous affiliation with UCL and their Islamic society was highlighted across the news and media outlets. Tabussum discussed the importance of this incident in her dealings with the university’s ISoc.

‘Tabussum: I think the kind of Islamophobia that we are dealing with is not the kind you see with the BNP, or the English Defence League...What it is, is an

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86 Friday afternoon prayers, normally prayed with a congregation.
institutional attitude towards the perception of the potential threat that Muslim students might be potential terrorists especially after the UCL incident. And I think what happened was because of that UCL incident then I don’t know if you saw the information in UUK, Universities UK set up this task force. Actually members of the Islamic society came forward and said we are really really worried, is the university going to start monitoring us. So we met with them, so it was in a sense Islamophobia from an institutional perspective as opposed to an individual perspective. So what we did was we managed to convene a meeting with the head of student services, myself, head of the equality and diversity unit and talked through some of the issues that were worrying them and from that we managed to assure them but also make sure that their voice was heard, and make sure that we were supporting Muslim students in the right way.

Interviewer: What were the major concerns raised?
Tabussum: About being monitored, about being watched. Yes, there was an article in the (university paper) that one of the police officers, you know the Prevent agenda... has been here talking about ... you know what to look out for, and Muslim students turning into terrorists so they were worried.... But I could see why they were saying it and it was very sort of, the wording in the (university paper), which isn’t the best journalism as we know, was very much like you know you need to be the sniffer-dogs and watch out for your students, you know that was the implications of what they were saying. It was just fear around that, and being treated differently, and being treated as suspects when they haven’t done anything wrong. Which is of course Islamophobia, but an intelligent approach to Islamophobia instead of the Daily Mail, Sun kind of Islamophobia.'

(Tabussum, South East1, Racism and Equality Advisor)

However, the fact that the university was quick to allay the fears of the Islamic society, and was more than supportive in understanding their position reflects how in some universities the welfare staff are trying to engage with Muslim students to support them. Yet the same racism and equality advisor also acknowledged the need to advertise their services more to students, and also the need to further pour resources into encouraging Muslim students to come forward with any complaints about Islamophobia. When students like Mehreen who are part of the same university fail to report their experience of Islamophobia, despite the provision being in place, the Welfare services can only be successful in countering Islamophobia to a limited extent.
Romeena, who is part of her university’s welfare services and is also affiliated with the Islamic society’s executive committee, highlighted a similar problem with the security narrative. In Romeena’s university the chaplain decided to join the Friday (jummah) prayers, without telling Muslims students. This created further mistrust, as Romeena observed,

‘people do things and there is no sense of accountability. Why did the chaplain turn up to Jummah every week. She was a woman to a jummah that was all men…a bit uncomfortable for the men…they need to have dialogue about how to better manage…but people jump into action and no accountability…”

(Romeena, South East2, University welfare and Islamic society executive, alumnus)

However, she also believes that her university is proactive in engaging with Muslim students. She is especially confident that if a Muslim student complains about Islamophobia the university will take action and support the student. The university therefore can be most effective in providing support to the students if the students themselves willingly engage with the university. This is where the ISocs and Paksoecs can be effective mediators between the university welfare and equality personnel and the students. As Tehmina observes,

‘I think the Islamic societies, the Pakistani societies, they have a responsibility, that’s the whole point of it. I know that there is of course the social experience around it, but I really think its more about really being there and being a familiar face, so I think they definitely need training around it, something that I am trying to push here. I have worked in the equality and welfare, but I just want to be able to kind of deal with that kind of situation, and you know what would be the procedure through it so. Again if its like a racial incident people I think are quite quick to report racial incidents, but I feel that when its about Islamophobic remarks, people don’t. They just feel like oh you know you are just making a big deal out of it, or you’re paranoid.’

(Tehmina West Midlands1, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British)

The experiences and encounters by students that have been recorded in the last two chapters further support the notion of paranoia that Tehmina alludes to. Often unsure
about the intentions of the Islamophobe students are quick to dismiss or provide explanations for the acts of discrimination, from ignorance to misunderstanding. In situations where students perceive hostility but never directly experience it, this fear of being paranoid or overly sensitive, or ‘making a big deal’ again prevents young people from coming forward and complaining. In order to bridge that gap between the university and students, the participants were questioned about the possibility of including an Islamophobia officer that was entirely dedicated to providing support against such discrimination. The students predominantly rejected this idea. The FOSIS representative captures the problem with such a position,

‘Interviewer: Do we need an Islamophobia officer within the university?
FOSIS: I would disagree with assigning an Islamophobia officer. You don’t want to create the victim mentality that the whole world is against you. Definitely there are people who are against you but the more we think that the more willing we are to actually engage and make a change, the more you think you are victims the more you segregate yourself...we have officers, welfare or black student officer or anti racism. They are there to help students, whether they are that effective I am not entirely sure. The NUS is trying to give training around Islamophobia for student officers...also a lot of Hindus and Sikhs actually get treated similarly because of the ignorance since they are brown which is really unfortunate, they are also getting the same language and verbal abuse and at times physical abuse as well. There are elements of hostility towards the Muslim community...'”

(FOSIS Representative, 2011)

Faiza further rejected the idea of separate provisions for tackling Islamophobia, as such a separation would possibly create further division within the student body,

‘Interviewer: Do you think there needs to be mechanisms in universities where students can go and complain if they want to? Do you think there are mechanisms such as those right now for Muslim students?
Faiza: I don't think there are and I don't think there should be actually. The more we separate I think the more people would direct hate towards us because you know we are already different and then if we have separate separate jobs it would only worsen things, make things worse. It would peak these attitudes you know what I mean.
Interviewer: What should be done to prevent them?
Faiza: I don't think you can prevent these attitudes, that would only make it
worse. Making things exclusive to Muslims would only worsen their situation. People's attitudes would be I don't know why do they need separate, this separate that separate.’

(Faiza, West Yorkshire2, 22, Undergrad Humanities, British)

Diane, the Welfare staff member at the same university also echoed similar sentiments about greater division. Given that West Yorkshire2 has a large population of Muslim students, predominantly with a Pakistani heritage, the need to have separate officers would not have been a sufficient solution to the problem of such specific discrimination, and would result in what she calls,

‘A different form of racism...taking one race out, which ever race it is and putting additional focus on will have a different impact....it feels to me a process of sort of greater separation rather than greater acceptance or acknowledgment.’

(Diane, West Yorkshire2, University Welfare, 2011)

Participants throughout echoed similar sentiments, though many emphasized the need for greater training of existing officers rather than creating a separate position. They also highlighted how discrimination based on religion was also experienced by other religious groups where Hafsa suggested the possibility of a focus on religious discrimination, if needed. A separate Islamophobia officer however was completely rejected.

The emphasis of the narratives was not so much on lack of facilities but lack of information about these facilities. However, despite the university’s own efforts at spreading awareness about such facilities, unless the Paksoecs and ISocs more actively encourage and support any student who may have experienced discrimination, students on their own are either unwilling to complain or oblivious of university welfare provisions. Fatima similarly is unsure about the nature of welfare provisions within her university, but she has sufficient faith in her Islamic Society to deal with problems of discrimination,
‘Interviewer: Is there someone at the university they can complain to?
Fatima: I don’t think they do. The university staff keeps a distance from the students as far as complaining is concerned so I don’t think they know who to go to.
Interviewer: Should university have someone to deal with Islamophobia?
Fatima: No, not this university. I think in the Islamic society we are all quite approachable. Anyone who has some views or problems, we can take it further to the SU.’

(Fatima, West Yorkshire1, 21, Undergrad Law, British)

While Fatima is unsure about the university support, Ahmed as a member of the Student Union believes his university that has an internationally diverse student population is well equipped to deal with any instances of Islamophobia,

‘Interviewer: Is there university support for anyone who experiences Islamophobia?
Ahmed: Absolutely from my personal conversation with the director at this school...the dean for undergraduate studies, the chaplain, we have people in (my university) who are terrific on Islamophobia. They recognize that it is a problem and they I am sure, this hasn’t been tested yet, but I am sure if there was an Islamophobic incident where a student was attacked for just being a Muslim they would be quite strict in terms of following all procedures that are in place. There is also good support in terms of counselling services.
Interviewer: Do students know about this?
It is not very well publicized I think. It could be better publicized in that sense.’

(Ahmed, London3, Student Union Anti Racism Officer)

Rukshanda clearly illustrates the problem of such lack of awareness about university provisions. Her example provides insights into welfare and Islamophobia related problems that may directly interfere with a student’s academic work.

‘I think the laws in the university are really good. I know one of the postdocs, she is British Pakistani and she was doing her postdoc in one of the groups and she was the only Muslim there. Her boss had an issue with her praying. He would say that you spend this much time when you go pray and would ask her if she makes up for the wasted time in the lab later. Then Ramzan87 came, and of course the fasts in Ramzan were long so her progress went down and her boss was also unhappy about that. But being a British she knew her rights so she went to HR, she complained about that man and she resigned from that job, and found a new

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87 Muslim holy month of fasting
I also know some Pakistanis who had issues with their supervisors and they put up with it for months until someone told them that they had the option of changing supervisors. But of course if students don’t know about these provisions then of course they will continue to suffer.

Interviewer: Do you think other students in your university know who to talk to? Rukshanda: I don’t think so.’

(Rukshanda, London2, 28, Science Grad, Overseas)

Despite these limitations Islamic societies working together with Student Unions and the university are starting to address this problem. Nadia in highlighting this problem also mentions the importance of accountability.

‘I think first of all people need to feel like something is going to be done. I think mostly people feel like nothing will be done whether it is a university... Or if it is you have to go through all these boards. If they made it easier if you didn’t have to go through a million and one boards and sit down directly and speak to someone and have it dealt with there and then people would be more willing to do it. If people were generally more approachable and were part of the student life... I think what is quite good is that they are starting to get psychology students involved’

(Nadia, West Yorkshire2, 20, Undergrad Law, British)

However, Ahmed’s Student Union continues to be a success story in this regard, since for the first time the Student Union is ‘giving out a code of practice’ to student societies and groups that instructs them to take action against ‘any kind of misconduct,’ which includes ‘Islamophobia’. The success of his Student Union might be the result of greater involvement of Muslim students in student politics that resulted in students like Ahmed raising awareness about the problems faced by Muslim students. However, while such initiatives by students are an important starting point, a long term change is only possible if the meta narrative on Muslims and terrorism changes. As Ahmed observes,

‘On the national level I think the narrative has to change so that Muslims aren’t seen as like the fifth pillar in society or people who harbour intentions that are destructive to the rest of society. That kind of narrative which is portrayed now has to change. And that can be changed by engaging in the media, engaging in politics having politicians who are well informed and speak out against
Islamophobia when they see it. I think that process is happening and I am quite optimistic about the future in terms of the national picture. I think campuses are just a subset of that national picture, if the national picture changes I think the campuses will also change. So that is why it is important to not just focus on campuses but also be engaged in the national campaign against Islamophobia as well.’

(Ahmed, London3, Student Union Anti Racism Officer)

V. Concluding Discussion: The Way Forward

The student and university narratives highlighted in this chapter illustrate a way forward in the struggle against Islamophobia, as well as in the state’s counter extremism agenda, that of partnership between students and student societies, university personnel, and government departments that are attempting to prevent extremism on campus. However, while the government in its counter terrorism policy highlights the importance of engagement with Muslim communities, the attitude towards universities is often more paternalistic, where students are afraid of being monitored, and continue to display suspicion towards government and non-government organizations like the CSC that are concerned with security. Furthermore, as the last chapter illustrated organizations like FOSIS has had its share of critics for not working enough to prevent extremism on campuses (Sutton, 13/12/2012; HM Government, 2011c:11). Yet, the grassroots initiatives in this chapter illustrate how students and student societies are active in pockets throughout universities to counter the narrative on Islamophobia, to create a more integrated Muslim identity in campuses through political activism, but are also engaging in dialogue as individuals to change perceptions about Muslims. Such changes demonstrate the capability of young students to engage in a ‘dialectic process’ in order to alter the narrative that informs their experiences, that determines their ‘realities’ (Bakhtin 1981; 1986). Hence the continued ‘discourse’ between students in their various groups
and ‘communities’ is constantly evolving while interacting with the dominant ‘discourse’ of insecurity, and will continue to change as more Muslim and Pakistani students actively engage in a conversation about their religion and their identity. This struggle for participants is on-going, as the FOSIS representative highlights,

’I really believe that the key problem with Islamophobia is about perception, the fear of the unknown and they have particular perception of Muslims, you can’t overcome it until you change that perception. How do we change that perception is by making sure Muslims are doing their part, making sure Muslims are involved in societies, making sure they are not given a reason to say they are not integrating doing this or that. So I think that for me is the key focus in what can be done.’

(FOSIS Representative, 2011)

While such activism continues at different levels across universities, it is nonetheless limited in its outreach. For the ISocs the audience is often predominantly Muslim, while the Paksoc is more focused on promoting cultural events that again are more likely to attract a South Asian audience. The ISocs may face additional problems concerning their speakers, yet they have been successful in finding a more acceptable place within the broader Student Union body, which is an important starting point in ‘normalizing Muslim student presence’ in campuses. Furthermore, the limitations of such initiatives as identified in this chapter were often highlighted by students themselves, who are willing to work towards finding more effective solutions to these limitations. As Tehmina observes,

’I think in terms of the Muslim community itself, I think for too long they have taken the back seat. Because they have taken the back seat and not taken a lead for so long this is what happens. You should never let other people make decisions for you, if it’s regarding you or your community or a group of Muslim students or a Muslim students’ movement you need to take a lead on it and not wait for other people. For too long we have done that and now we have seen what happens when you make the other people who have no clue tick the boxes for too long.’

(Tehmina West Midlands1, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British)
At the level of the university, the Race and Equality officers and the Welfare officers are attempting to engage more with Muslim students and provide support. Yet there continues to be a communication gap between the university and its Muslim students who often do not report their experiences of Islamophobia. The reasons for such underreporting vary from student’s own reluctance to lack of information about welfare provisions in universities. However, university websites across the sample have a clear equality and anti-racism policy which may not directly mention Islamophobia but nonetheless highlights a no-tolerance attitude towards all forms of discrimination whether based on ‘race’ or ‘religion’. Furthermore, student societies are actively trying to work with university staff and personnel to address issues relating to Muslim students. Such positive initiatives illustrate the possibility and ongoing struggle for change by Muslims within the university. FOSIS, the Muslim umbrella organization is an example of that change, as it started as an outsider but through its activism has become an integrated part of the national student union. As the FOSIS representative observes,

‘FOSIS is an old organization but it has only really been in the past 10 years that we have actually taken an active interest in participating with the NUS. It is for this reason that we spoke to the ISocs and say look you need to get involved or your issues won’t be heard. I think the defining moment was when Shimon Perez the president of Israel actually came and was given a platform on NUS to speak to all students. So then at that time FOSIS hadn’t organized anything, and there were only a handful of students. So we decided to be more organized, our support has grown, become more involved with NUS and now the vice President of higher education within the NUS is actually now a Muslim. He is a brilliant example of individuals that actually change perceptions. I know that he is someone who would actually speak to people and change perception... Since then things have changed. They used to be anti hijab, but these have now changed with FOSIS involvement. ... You need to make an active effort. That involvement has changed perceptions.’

(FOSIS Representative, 2011)
Chapter VIII

Conceptualizing Islamophobia: Discussion and Concluding Observations

This chapter discusses the findings in Chapters 5-7 in relation to the literature highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3, with the aim of further developing an understanding of Islamophobia and securitization as experienced and described by the participants. It further explores the implications of this study in the area of racism and Islamophobia, securitization and Muslim student experiences within Higher Educational Institutions. It also highlights the limits of this DPhil thesis as well as identifying potential areas for future research.

1. Introduction

In exploring narratives of Islamophobia the thesis has presented a grassroots account of British Muslim female students with a Pakistani heritage and Overseas Pakistani students in universities in England. Providing snapshots of discrimination that ‘racialises’ and essentializes the Muslim and Pakistani identity(s), these encounters and realities capture the ‘intersubjective’ nature of student experiences, across their public and private realms (Bakhtin 1981; 1986). Forty participants were identified across universities in England located in West Yorkshire, North and South West England, North and South East England, West Midlands, and within the vibrant city of London. Participants were approached through Islamic and Pakistani student societies, and included Muslim women with different ‘degrees of religiosity,’ from those who wore religious and cultural symbols, the ‘niqab’, ‘hijab/jilbab’, ‘shalwar kameez’ and those without such symbols. The universities included both a small and high percentage of Muslims and Pakistanis within the student body.

The thesis began by locating Islamophobia within a backdrop of racism and insecurity in Britain, especially for the ‘coloured’, South Asian, Muslim, Pakistani immigrant. By tracing a brief history of race and racism to the present day reality of securitization, the
discussion illustrated a long and troubled narrative of insecurity around the Muslim and non White identities. This insecurity ranged from the historical encounter with the violent Moors of the Crusades (Sardar and Ahmad 2012; Kumar 2012; Lyons 2012; Zebiri 2011; Allen 2011; Sayyid 2010; Fekete 2009; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008), to the inferior species of colonialism and Imperialism particularly in the Indian sub-continent (Sayyid 2010: Said 2003; Solomos 2003), the disruptive ‘seamen’ of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the backward and primitive workers from the Commonwealth of the 1950s-60s (Grube 2011; Panayi 2010; Julios 2008; Hansen 2000; Solomos 2003; Spencer 1997; Joppke 1996; Layton-Henry 1992), the uncivilized Arabs of the OPEC crisis (Sardar and Ahmad 2012:2), the violent youth of the 1980s to 2001 who caused disruption through rioting, especially the disgruntled Muslims that emerged in 1988-89 (Sales 2012; Addison 2010; Meer and Modood 2010; Meer 2010; Meer and Noorani 2008; Sanghera and Thapar-Bjorkert 2008; Hussain and Bagguley 2005; Ouseley 2001; Cantle 2001), and finally to 9/11 or more directly July 7, 2005 when the threat of the barbaric, violent young Muslim materialized in attacks at the heart of England, killing fellow citizens (Croft 2012; Cesari 2011; Githens-Mazer 2010; Brown 2010; Meer and Modood 2010; Klausen 2009; Glees and Pope 2005). Such a backdrop informs the realities and experiences of participants in this research, within and across their ‘discourse’ ‘communities’. A Bakhtinian understanding of ‘discourse’ places language as the central feature, where ‘all utterances are linked to each other in the great heteroglot dialogue of dialogues constituted by all that has been said and all that will be said in history,’ where meanings as communicated across ‘communities’ are not static but are the result of an on-going ‘intersubjective’ exchange between social beings and their ‘material’
environment (Holquist in Bakhtin 1990:xxxi, Also see Bernard-Donals 1994). Hence a Bakhtinian understanding of reality highlights the ability of individuals to influence their environment, and each other through a ‘dialectic’, where a multiplicity of ‘voices’ and ‘meanings’ are constantly in circulation, communicated across various groups and individuals, yet these voices are also constrained by their evolving ‘material’ circumstances and surroundings (Bakhtin 1986; Bernard-Donals 1994).

The realities that influence the student narratives in this research include the ‘historical,’ that place the British-Muslim-Pakistani-female identity within a narrative of race and racism, further informing a conceptualization of Islamophobia as ‘racialising Muslims’ (Meer and Modood 2010). It also consists of the contemporary ‘security’ realm that ‘securitizes’ the British-Muslim-Pakistani-female identity (Croft 2012). Such wider narratives intersect across participants’ ‘communities’ influencing their experiences and understanding of Islamophobia. The nature of these influences vary, according to the social location of the encounter, from the classroom, exam room, university campus, prayer room, to social gatherings both within and outside the university. However, participants have not been stationary within their ‘communities’ of ‘discourse’ but have acted and reacted back, either through individual or student dialogue. Furthermore, participation in this research, communicating and discussing the experiences of Islamophobia, expressing opinions about radicalisation and security, Islam and student activism which in turn are (re)presented by the researcher are also a part of the participants’ ‘intersubjective’ reality, where participants continue to actively shape the meaning of their lives and experiences (Bakhtin 1984). Such a backdrop is therefore essential in situating the experiences that are narrated in Chapters 5-7, where these
encounters with discrimination, the responses and reactions to Islamophobia does not take place in a vacuum but have been influenced by the realities of Muslims and Pakistanis, of insecurity and Britishness that is part of the social narrative both within and outside the university.

In further situating the participant accounts within the wider discussion of security and Islamophobia in Britain this chapter brings together the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 with the findings in Chapters 5-7, conceptualizing Islamophobia within a securitized context in light of these findings. The chapter begins with an exploration of Islamophobia, incorporating trends identified in participant narratives. The discussion also includes the notion of Pakophobia, its meaning and implications in understanding Islamophobia. It further highlights the gendered nature of the narratives, and the importance of the female perspective in understanding Islamophobia within a ‘securitized’ socio-political milieu. The exploration illustrates how the findings from this research contribute to the existing literature on Islamophobia and racism, particularly concerning the problematic nexus between religion and ethnicity, gender and security. It also highlights the implications of student narratives especially the Islamic and Pakistani student societies for the Prevent and security agenda, outlining the limitations of such an agenda within the university. In exploring the welfare role of the university, the chapter further contributes to existing literature on Islamophobia within the university (Nabi 2011; Tyrer 2003) demonstrating a grass roots perspective regarding welfare services for Muslim and Pakistani students. The chapter concludes the thesis with an overview of the limitations of this research, and the potential areas for future inquiry as highlighted by the doctoral thesis.
II. Understanding Islamophobia: Insecurity at the Grassroots

In conceptualizing Islamophobia this section returns to the beginning of the thesis, by discussing the research questions identified in Chapter 1 in relation to participant narratives. These research question include the following:

a) Amongst British/Pakistani Muslim female students how is Islamophobia understood?

b) How has Islamophobia been experienced?

c) How does the narrative around radicalisation and security influence student experiences?

d) In what ways can the university environment assist students in challenging Islamophobia?

In engaging with the first research question regarding definition, participants have often conflated the meaning of Islamophobia with the reasons for its existence. In defining Islamophobia as discrimination against Muslims and their religion, participants simultaneously have highlighted the *why* factor, how it is the result of ‘misunderstanding’ and ‘ignorance’ about Islam and its believers. Described as a ‘fear of the unknown,’ this unknown is the terrorist hiding in the closet, the ‘vulnerable’ Muslim student who may fall prey to radical and extremist ideas, and unleash violence and terror. The conflation between the *what* and the *why* is important to recognize as it highlights *how* such experiences are rationalised by the participant herself. The narratives suggests a level of ‘rationality’ to the irrational perception of Muslims where all participants except one, accepted the problem of ‘misunderstanding’ and ‘ignorance’ which the Islamophobes fall victim to, where malice and hatred is limited to a handful, with most being misinformed.
about Islam. The level of understanding of the Islamophobe that is provided in the narratives of these participants testify to a more pervasive character of Islamophobia, particularly within a socio-political milieu of security, where Islamophobia is a ‘natural’ consequence of July 7, 2005, a consequence that is understandable though not completely justifiable.

In understanding student definitions of Islamophobia, the second research question relating to experience is also important within this discussion, as narrators move between defining Islamophobia and explaining how they have directly or indirectly experienced and encountered it. Participants’ outward appearance is an important determinant in outlining the nature of the experience of Islamophobia, where ‘degrees of religiosity’ dependent on religious signifiers dictate their experiences within the ‘private’ and ‘public’ space. The ‘degrees of religiosity’ through Islamic signifiers varies from the ‘niqab’ to non-signifiers. The ‘niqab’ is perceived to be the most problematic by all forty participants (See pgs 157-160). The ‘niqab’ becomes a physical manifestation of the ‘irrational fear’ about the Muslim subject and the ‘othered’ status of the Muslim woman who by her very existence interrupts the civilized landscape of a free and liberal British society. Terms like ‘ninja’ used for the ‘niqabi’ therefore echo both a fear and a sense of ‘alieness’. With her face hidden behind a cloth, the Muslim woman is considered a security threat who cannot be seen, but also an amalgamation of all that is wrong with Islam that encourages or rather forces women to hide behind the veil. The ‘hijab’ is similarly problematic, a cultural and religious signifier that also ‘racialises’ the Muslim. Again, it is the Muslim woman who is forced to hide everything but the face behind a piece of cloth. However, by taking on the hijab she further places herself within Tyrer’s
(2010) ‘degrees of alterity’, where unlike the ‘niqabi’ a ‘hijab’ clad female Muslim may still be judged as an acceptable ‘Other’ depending on the nature of her conservative behaviour. Hence, not all ‘hijab’ wearing women are rendered unacceptable though they are not perceived as moderate enough either, the ‘White’ or ‘Westernized’ Muslim being the judge and jury for such a woman. The hijab becomes further problematic when worn with a cultural dress, the shalwar kameez, where the Pakistani association indicates both a primitive culture that condones acts such as ‘honour killings’ (Dwyer and Shah 2009; Werbner 2005b; Dwyer 2000; 1999a), but also reinforce a sense of insecurity with Pakistan’s role in the on-going war against Al Qa’ida and its affiliates. Furthermore, participants who do not carry any Islamic signifiers are also implicated within an Islamophobic view of the ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’, still required to prove their Muslimness to a biased audience. They are either considered not Muslim enough, or because of their religious practices not moderate enough. Hence, the experience of Islamophobia is more complex than a direct encounter with an abusive slur or a physical altercation. Indirect forms of Islamophobia whether a patronizing attitude or comment is internalized by participants, who may avoid similar encounters, encouraging further isolation from the general university population. Such encounters within the sample are more prominent in universities with a small presence of Muslim and Pakistani students, where women with religious and cultural symbols would stand out. In universities with a high percentage of Muslim and Pakistani students, such encounters within the university campus are less frequent, though women with the niqab continue to experience Islamophobia irrespective of the university population demographic. However, another
factor that also becomes problematic within such experiences of Islamophobia is the ethnic factor, Pakistan.

While existing literature on Islamophobia mentions ethnicity and religious observance as factors that result in ‘cultural racism’ (Meer and Modood 2010; Sayyid 2010; Modood 2005), the extent to which a problematic ethnic identity existing within a securitized environment contributes to the experience of Islamophobia is often overlooked. Birt (2009:217) highlights how ‘the common experience of Islamophobia creates a unique community of suffering, which conflates ethnically disparate communities as Muslims and creates an assertive Muslim identity politics.’ However, what is overlooked in understanding Islamophobia predominantly as an attack on Islam or Muslims are other identities which may reinforce the experience of Islamophobia. By focusing on not just Muslims as a homogenous group, but Muslims who are either from Pakistan or have a Pakistani heritage, the Muslim-Pakistani nexus is further highlighted in this thesis. This nexus complicates a clear understanding of how Islamophobia is experienced, where the troubled nature of the Pakistani identity, especially amongst the student population cannot be easily disentangled from their Muslim identity in a post 7/7 milieu. Hence, the term ‘Pakophobia’, a fear of the Pakistani identity is linked to a corrupt, violent country in the public’s imagination, where children like Malala Yousafzai are shot by the Taliban for wanting to go to school (Urquhart 27/03/2013), where second generation British Pakistani women like Shafilea Ahmed are murdered in the name of ‘honour’ by parents or family members (Carter 03/08/2012; The Huffington Post 03/08/2012), and the most wanted man in the war against Al Qa’ida, Osama bin Laden is killed in a covert operation in Pakistan (BBC News 02/05/2011). Such is the image of Pakistan as depicted in the
media, that influences students’ experiences, with participants highlighting encounters with supervisors and fellow students about the troubled nature of their country both within and outside the university, in the exam room, as well as in the class room. Overseas Pakistani students expose their constant struggle at having to defend their Pakistani identity, with many staying clear of anything political in relation to Pakistan. This is clearly illustrated in the discussion on Pakistani student activism, where participants not only avoid a campaign like Justice for North West 10 that concerned a group of Pakistani students believed to have been wrongfully accused of terrorism, but also express their unwillingness to join campaigns relating to a political or security issue concerning Pakistan (see pgs 208-217). However, a similar level of precaution or indifference is absent in the case of Muslim campaigns, such as Palestine, considered a higher and more important cause because of its Muslim and humanitarian implications. This is especially evident in the narrative of British Muslim students, who are more willing to participate in campaigns that are deemed Islamic, or humanitarian as opposed to political, irrespective of the political repercussions of these campaigns. The discussion on the Pakistani identity becomes further problematic for these participants. While Chapter 2 in the discussion on Muslim identity clearly illustrates the politicisation of the religious identity, where an affinity to Pakistan was present in the first generation immigrants, the response of participants however is not as clearly definitive. While British Muslim is a primary identifying factor for the participants, Pakistani is nonetheless part of their heritage. However, this association becomes a problem again in discussion on politics and Pakistan, with students exhibiting an active dissociation from anything political in relation to Pakistan. This is illustrated in narratives that opposed the
creation of a Pakistani student society, but also in the narratives of Overseas Pakistani students who have defended their country to other British Muslims with a Pakistani heritage. Such a form of Pakophobia results in students constantly having to negotiate with or around their problematic ethnic identity. Whereas being Muslim allows students to belong to a more utopian ideal of a Muslim Ummah, the Pakistani identity however is constantly linked to a troubled, insecure country that continues to recur within media and political discussions on terrorism and insecurity. However, with Pakistan being a Muslim majority country, with most immigrants from Pakistan in Britain being Muslims, the association between Pakistan and Muslim is more difficult to separate. This association is clearly illustrated in racial slurs that often combine a derogatory word like ‘Paki’ with Islamophobic expressions, whereby Pakophobia becomes another expression of Islamophobia.

Therefore, in conceptualising Islamophobia, a problematic ethnic identity in juxtaposition with a troubled religious identity, the Pakistani-Muslim in the context of a war against ‘Islamist’ terrorists like Al Qa’ida cannot simply be disentangled. It cannot be ignored either, especially where the Pakistani identity is just as securitized as the Muslim identity. Hence, ethnicity is not simply a factor in conceptualising Islamophobia, but can often play an important role in the experience of Islamophobia itself. With Islamophobia being more than a direct form of racialisation, Pakophobia illustrates how essentializing and securitizing an ethnic and religious identity together may make certain Muslim groups like Pakistani Muslims more vulnerable to Islamophobia. The extent of such vulnerability is beyond the scope of this thesis, as a comparative study can truly evaluate how other
Muslims from the Middle East or Gulf States experience Islamophobia in comparison to Pakistanis or even South Asians.

The problematic location of the religious-ethnic nexus, Muslim-Pakistani further provides insights into the third research question about the meta narrative on security and radicalisation, which influences students self perception of their ethnic-religious identity, but also their encounters with others, within the private and public space. In refocusing the lens towards the university itself, the influence of the narrative of radicalisation and security on student experiences is holistically captured. Universities have been implicated in the security agenda of the British government, on discovery that some of the captured ‘Islamist’ terrorists in the UK had once attended a university in Britain. Individuals such as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas day bomber was an active member of his university’s Islamic society; Roshonara Choudhry who ‘stabbed’ an ‘MP’ as ‘revenge’ for the invasion of ‘Iraq’ was also a student at a British university; not to mention terrorists involved in 9/11 and 7/7 who had either attended a British university or had links to students in universities, with attempts to recruit ‘vulnerable’ young Muslims (BBC News 03/11/2010; Hamid 2007; Glees and Pope 2005; The Centre for Social Cohesion Press Briefing 5/01/2010; BBCNews 12/10/2011). Universities are also important sites for this exploration as research indicates the existence of Islamophobia within higher educational institutions (OPM and Hussain 2009; Tyrer 2003; Nabi 2011), though students’ experiences of Islamophobia have never been explored in depth. With ‘Islamist terrorists’, particularly those affiliated with Al Qa’ida becoming a primary security concern for the UK government, a position reiterated in the counter terrorism policy of 2011, university ‘staff” and ‘administration’ within this policy are being asked
to look out for any ‘signs of radicalisation’ amongst its students to guarantee the
‘welfare’ of the student population (HM Government 2011a: 76). This concern is further
highlighted in the ‘Roots of Violent Radicalisation’ report and the subsequent
government’s response that outlined the appointment of ‘ten regional co-ordinators’ to
work with universities to help strengthen the Prevent agenda (Secretary of State for the
Home Department 2012:8). While police officers continue to be involved in community
building and security efforts with Muslim communities, reports such as ‘Prevent, Police
and Universities’ (2012) have been published to ensure transparent guidelines for police
involvement with universities (Association of Chief Police Officers 2012).

Muslim students within such a security lens are ‘constantly at risk’ of being radicalised,
as they are constantly considered ‘vulnerable.’ While ‘signs’ of vulnerability have yet to
be clearly defined, with disagreement over what constitutes ‘radicalisation,’ or whether a
‘process of radicalisation’ even exists that turns a law abiding Muslim student into a
terrorist, (see pgs 79-85) even the law abiding Muslim moderate is under suspicion, lest
s/he be attracted to the forbidden path towards terrorism. Hence, the language of
vulnerability that is adopted within policies such as Prevent towards Muslim students has
patronizing undertones, where a watchful eye is needed over Muslim students who may
be led astray by radicalising and terrorising forces. Such an attitude is also evident in the
manner by which ISocs are dealt with particularly when religious or political speakers are
invited, where Islamic societies are often told who not to invite, rather than included in
the decision making process. If Muslim students are to be useful in a counter terrorism
agenda that is geared towards preventing terrorism, constantly holding them suspect
rather than working in partnership with them, treating them as ‘children’ who need to be
told what not to do, rather than engaging with them, make such policies counter productive. This is particularly problematic with an agenda that aims to prevent alienation, or ghettoization believed to be a part of that undefined ‘radicalisation process’, but hopes to encourage greater involvement of Muslim students within university life.

With Islamic societies and Muslim students treated as suspects under the security agenda, it is not surprising to find them feeling further isolated, particularly in situations where they are accused of not doing enough to fight against ‘extremism’ in universities (HM Government 2011c:11). ISoc members have to constantly defend themselves not only to outsiders but also to fellow Muslim students and families who are all too familiar with the narrative of insecurity around Islamic societies that is often encouraged by the media. Their accounts reveal a constant struggle to prove their innocence for crimes committed by ex members, or non members who once attended a university and were part of an Islamic society that had no relevance to their ISocs. However, despite these constant struggles ISocs also serve an important welfare function for those students who are members, particularly young women who have trouble adjusting to the ‘pubbing’ and ‘clubbing’ culture of a British university. While a security agenda that aims to ‘prevent’ terrorism is no doubt important for the ‘well being’ of society at large, it becomes problematic once innocent Muslims are held suspect despite their non-violent beliefs, a problem that is clearly highlighted in such ISoc narratives.

However, an important aspect of Islamophobia and insecurity within universities that is often overlooked is the role of Muslim students themselves in perpetuating discrimination, particularly non members of ISocs. Discussions on Islamophobia predominantly focuses on biases and prejudices of non Muslims, but in doing so
undermines the pervasive nature of an Islamophobia and security narrative that in dictating the acceptable/unacceptable Muslim, the extremist/moderate variety creates suspicion within the Muslim community. Furthermore, by homogenizing Muslims as a group where moderate and extremist strands are pitted against each other, where ‘Salafis’ within media and political discussions are simply painted with a single stroke as being extremists, without qualifying such statements (see pgs 86 - 94), suspicion amongst Muslims themselves is encouraged. These problems are further illustrated in the narratives of ISoc members who have to defend their way of practicing Islam to fellow Muslims, who would rather not be associated with ‘such radicals.’ Thus, the burden to prove their innocence continues to be placed on Islamic societies and Muslim students that do not fall within the category of the ‘moderate’.

ISocs have nonetheless taken on this burden actively with the support of FOSIS. By raising awareness about Islam through Islamic Awareness Weeks but also by encouraging student political participation across the student body, ISocs are active in ‘normalising Muslim student presence’ within universities (FOSIS Representative, 2011). The success of such normalization can be illustrated by exploring the problems outlined in Tyrer’s (2003) doctoral research on institutionalized Islamophobia within universities, and Nabi’s (2011) doctoral research findings on Islamophobia in universities. Both theses highlighted the troubled position of Muslim students within universities, especially the relationship between Islamic societies and the local and national student unions. They were often treated with suspicion, with the likes of the ‘National Union of Students’ and the local student body previously resisting Islamic society requests for religious provisions including halal food and prayer rooms (Tyrer 2003). However, the narratives
in this thesis, particularly the efforts outlined by the FOSIS representative, by various ISoc heads and society members illustrate how Muslim students have attempted to both normalize Islamic society presence within the university, but also encourage Muslim student participation in university activities beyond the ISocs. Muslim students have taken on important executive roles within the National Union of Students, and their local student unions. Islamic societies and Muslim students through their activism continue to overcome such opposition, with the NUS and local student unions becoming allies of ISocs in several universities, particularly the ones outlined in this thesis (see pgs 228-234). Nabi’s research was undertaken between 2004-06 and exposed a level of Islamophobic ‘governmentality’ with Muslim students either having a ‘hyper-presence’, ‘absence’ or ‘inclusion’ (2011:239) at different points in their interaction with university personnel and fellow students. This DPhl research however reveals how the continued struggle of student societies like the ISocs and FOSIS have succeeded at the very least in starting a ‘normalizing’ process, that locate Muslim students not only within their Muslim identity but also beyond this single identity. While Islamophobia still continues to be a problem with the need for a ‘normalization of Muslim students’ agenda still encouraged by FOSIS, students continue to be active in confronting Islamophobia through individual and group activism, thus testifying to the multiplicity of ‘meaning’ and ‘dialectics’ at play within the university (Bakhtin 1981; 1984).

Unlike the Islamic societies, Paksocs have not encountered similar problems within the security narrative for two reasons: no active link has been made between terrorists and Pakistani student societies; and they mostly engage in cultural events, claiming to be cultural ambassadors for Pakistan, while staying clear of issues relating to politics and
security. Through such a ‘cultural’ role they are nonetheless important in resisting Islamophobia/ Pakophobia within universities, by presenting a counter narrative to the predominant view of Pakistan as the ‘hub’ of terrorism and insecurity. While Pakistani societies are not as prevalent as Islamic societies in universities, where the ratio and interest of Pakistani students determines the establishment of a Pakistani society, universities with Paksoocs continue to play a positive cultural role, bringing Pakistani and non Pakistani students together. Such accounts, though still limited to a few universities nonetheless illustrate the capability of Paksoocs in encouraging a positive image of Pakistan within the student population, one that can help overcome Pakophobia and Islamophobia.

However, despite such efforts by ISocs and Paksoocs the problem of Islamophobia, particularly the underreporting of Islamophobia continues in universities. In discussing the fourth research question further by considering the ways in which universities provide a space to challenge Islamophobia, this underreporting becomes especially problematic, where the exact scale of Islamophobic encounters is difficult to determine. Universities have a welfare responsibility towards all its students, irrespective of their religious or political beliefs. The ‘securitization’ narrative around universities draws on such a welfare responsibility, where these institutions have to ensure the protection of both student groups: those who maybe ‘vulnerable’ to radicalisation and the greater student body who needs to be protected against such ‘radical’ and ‘extremist’ elements (HM Government 2011a:76). However, as the discussion in this thesis has illustrated, without concisely defining what universities are meant to prevent, what administration and staff are required to look out for, such a role runs the risk of co-opting universities within a Big
Brother narrative. It further risks compromising academic and intellectual liberty in exchange for regulating Muslim student behaviour. The case of Rizwaan Sabir is an example of such a compromise, where a university body over reacted to a Muslim student’s research in the name of ensuring security (Townsend 14/07/2012; Thornton 2011; Jones 14/09/2011). This problem is also constantly invoked in the regulation of speakers who are invited to ISoc events, or incidents concerning staff and administration monitoring Friday sermons, and cases where students highlight a fear of being monitored by university and security officials on campus. While guaranteeing security and preventing terrorism is both important and in the interest of the entire student body, as well as the community at large, a fact that is recognised by participants themselves, the problem lies in how the university and security personnel within the university approach this issue. Again, the problem is one of being told what not to do rather than being included in the decision-making process, which further encourages distrust and resentment.

However, while ISocs and Muslim students have expressed their concern about such a security agenda, they are nonetheless quite confident in their universities’ ability to provide welfare support to counter Islamophobia and discrimination. Yet, despite this confidence students seldom make use of the resources they believe are available for them in the university. According to the three welfare personnel that were interviewed for this research, such services are available for student support. The welfare websites of the universities in the sample also highlight the availability of such services. The reason why these services are not availed, or Islamophobia goes unreported is primarily because of three main reasons (a) there is a disconnect between the university welfare personnel and
the students who while remotely aware of such resources do not know who to contact, how to contact them or where to contact them. Often such lack of information results in students avoiding going through the system, for the sake of not wasting time; (b) while there is a belief that if reported, Islamophobia will not be ignored, there continues to be lack of trust in the results that will be achieved, where students often do not want to ‘create a fuss’, especially where the act might only warrant a warning which will not provide a credible solution to the problem of Islamophobia; (c) the last reason again concerns the nature of the act, where a passing remark, a look or even a comment while remembered and repeated by participants during the research may not warrant a complaint to the university, as in most cases, the act is understood or dismissed as an action that is a result of ignorance or misunderstanding about Islam. However, in cases of such a disconnect the ISocs and the Paksocks can play a positive role in both helping students use the services that are provided by their universities, but also work with universities in order to raise awareness about Islamophobia. Such a role is only possible if such student societies are considered partners in securing the well being of all students, including Muslims, one which can be achieved through mutual trust and respect, rather than constant suspicion and paranoia that is encouraged by a one sided security agenda.

In engaging with the student narratives, that cut across explanations, experiences, responses and reactions to Islamophobia, as located within a broader narrative on security and radicalization that informs student experiences, this research has drawn attention to the multiplicity of ‘voices’ and ‘meanings’ that continue to react and interact within the university and beyond, through an ‘intersubjective’ reality that redefines meanings of being British Muslim and/or Pakistani (Bakhtin 1986:139; Gardiner 2000). Furthermore,
by focusing the lens on the female British/Pakistani Muslim student, the female perspective which is often talked about but seldom engaged with, is given a space where women can reflect on their experiences of Islamophobia, their realities within a ‘securitized’ contemporary context (Croft 2012). In exploring the history of Muslims in Britain (see Chapter 2) discussion about immigration particularly in the 1950s-60s largely focused on young men, especially from Pakistan who came to Britain leaving their families behind. The immigrants from the Commonwealth, (for this research those from South Asia) who entered the Imperialist Centre carried a cultural baggage of inferiority, that was reinforced by their racial inadequacy in the ‘colour’ of their skin, the backwardness of their culture, and the primitiveness of their religion. While the first generation of South Asian immigrants remained largely apolitical, with the British state adopting a policy of assimilation, that soon moved to one of integration, finally to adopt multiculturalism (Meer and Modood 2010; Addison 2010; Modood 2004; Spencer 1997), the second generation immigrants were in constant negotiation and often conflict with the state that physically manifested in racial riots, as well as resistance movements particularly by the ‘black’ community (see Pgs 56-57). However, most of these accounts of the immigrant community focused on men in the public space, whereas women who because of tradition, i.e. culture or religion were talked about in relation to the private space, or their transition from the private to the public space (See Siraj 2011; Williamson and Khiabany 2010; Shirazi and Mishra 2010; Thapar-Bjorkert and Sanghera 2010; Bhimji 2009; Sanghera and Thapar-Bjorkert 2007; Tyrer and Ahmad 2006). The eventual politicization of the Muslim identity during the Rushdie affair of 1988-89, that caused protests again focused on the more outwardly and publicly visible Muslim man. Similar
focus post 9/11 and July 7, 2005 was on men as a direct security threat, and women yet again as oppressed or victimized by their religion. Women as a problem of ‘security’ is restricted to the more ‘extremist’ visible identifiers of the ‘niqab’ as most Muslim women, especially those with religious signifiers are viewed as victims, in need of being saved (see Brown 2011). Hence, the history of Muslims, their ‘otherization’ ‘racialisation’ and ‘securitization’ (Croft 2012; Meer and Modood 2010; Said 1994) primarily focuses on the male immigrant, where women are reduced to a physical embodiment of the quintessential ‘victim’. Research on women continues to focus on structural and traditional obstacles that may hinder their progress, including access to schools and jobs, underperformance, and the more traditional obstacles of religion and culture that restricts their choices and mobility (See Contractor 2012; Mohammad 2010; Meer et al 2010; Haw 2010, 2009; Thiara and Gill 2010; Erel 2009; Khattab 2009; Joppke 2009b; Dwyer and Shah 2009; Bhopal 2009, 2008; Afshar 2008; Thompson 2008; Ahmad 2003, 2001; Dale et al 2002; Dwyer 2000, 1999a; Parker-Jenkins et al 1997; Brah 1993). While such research no doubt is important, the ‘voice’ of the female, her experience as narrated by her, her perception of her own reality, especially a reality that in the contemporary post 7/7 context is informed by a ‘security’ meta-narrative, is seldom heard. This research by focusing on the female British/Muslim/Pakistani within the context of the university addresses this gap.

The narratives illustrate how Islamophobia is experienced by these female participants both within and outside the university, in different social and private settings. While men experience Islamophobia more directly where a ‘devout’ Muslim man, especially one who ‘looks’ religious can be considered a security threat more easily because of the
media narrative about male Muslim terrorists (Spalek and Lambert 2008; Hopkins 2007: 165-166; Tyrer and Ahmed 2006:20), the female narratives in this research illustrate both direct and indirect encounters with Islamophobia. These range from physical altercations to the more nuanced interactions in the form of ‘dinner table’ conversations or social gatherings that invoke the ‘securitized’ rhetoric around the Muslim subject, altercations in the exam room, with administrators, academics, as well as encounters on the street all of which are informed by ‘meanings’ and ‘narratives’ about the Muslim participant that exist beyond her physical being, yet intersubjectively are experienced by her.

III. Research limitations and Potential Fields of Inquiry

The findings of this research as highlighted in the preceding discussion provide a conceptualization of Islamophobia within a securitized socio-political milieu through the narratives of forty British/Pakistani female students in universities in England. The research by being limited to forty narratives, through an in-depth exploration of the ‘intersubjective’ realities of participants, does not provide generalizable findings, yet gives significant insights into the experiences of Islamophobia, particularly amongst a population of young women that is seldom the focus of a narrative on security and discrimination. For the purpose of an in-depth analysis of the ethno-religious factor the research had been limited to one ethnic identity, without comparing across ethnicities. Furthermore, the research does not highlight the division and distinctions between Muslim sects, as the participants in their narratives on Muslim identity did not mention their specific sect, but rather used the more general term ‘Muslim.’ However, such limitation also provides the opportunity for potential research, highlighting areas for the possibility of future inquiry. The following include potential points of inquiry:
The ethnic identity factor: While the importance of an ethnic identity Pakistani in the experience of Islamophobia is outlined in the narratives of participants, such a finding further prompts a necessity to explore how different groups of Muslims experience Islamophobia differently. Would the experience of Islamophobia be different for Muslim students from the Middle East, South Asia, the Gulf States, or the Caucuses in Britain? Such an investigation may not only be limited to educational institutions but can also be located in other social settings. An exploration of this nature would further contribute to an understanding of the ‘racialisation of Muslims’ (Meer and Modood 2010) whose Muslim character is essentialized, but the nature of such essentialism may vary across different groups.

Degrees of Religiosity: The importance of Islamic signifiers has been highlighted by the narratives and in existing literature on the subject of Muslim women and discrimination. However, the significance of a lack of Islamic signifier and its role in the experience of Islamophobia for practicing Muslims as highlighted in this thesis is one which is often overlooked in research on Islamophobia. Such an exploration is important to understand the ‘normalization’ of Islamophobia where Tyrer’s (2010) ‘degrees of alterity’ between moderate and extremist, may further interfere with a ‘moderate’ Muslim’s expression of her religion. Such an analysis could include not just women, but also men who may not bear physical markers of Muslimness, but are nonetheless practicing Muslims.

Muslim Islamophobes: The findings further identified Islamophobic behaviour exhibited by both non-Muslims and Muslims of different degrees of religiosity. Such a finding further necessitates an exploration of Islamophobia that broadens its scope of analysis to include Muslim behaviour towards more overtly religious Muslims. A large-
scale investigation of such a nature would provide insights into how ‘securitization’ (Croft 2012) of the Muslim identity also creates divisions and paranoia within Muslims as a group, particularly in the construction of what qualifies as a moderate and acceptable Muslim, as opposed to an extremist.

**Security and Student activism:** The narratives in identifying problems encountered by Muslim students, in particular ISocs with the state’s security agenda, and their subsequent response through individual and group activism provides an opportunity for further research involving a larger student sample. Such research would provide insights for improving the relationship between the university, security personnel that are working with the university, and Muslim students. Highlighting a progressive student activism that might be present amongst ISocs in other universities, strengthening their initiatives to counter ‘ignorance’ and ‘misunderstanding’ about Islam, supporting individual student initiatives towards dialogue is important, particularly in understanding Muslim student activism that is otherwise understood within the extremist, radical lens.

**Shia-Sunni divide:** While this divide was not a factor highlighted in the narratives in this research, it may be an important analytical tool for the purpose of exploring whether the securitized narrative around Al Qa’ida and its affiliates, a largely Sunni extremist group evoke different responses and narratives from Shia students. It would further be insightful to examine student activism and its association with different Muslim denominators, particularly on issues relating to a troubled country like Iran, which also occupies a securitized position within the media narrative.
IV. Concluding Discussion

The themes highlighted in the preceding discussion illustrate how this thesis has contributed to an understanding of Islamophobia by including a grass roots perspective of women with a British/Muslim and Pakistani identity, as well as Overseas Pakistani students in universities located across England. Accounts of women and discrimination have largely been of an anecdotal nature in existing literature or have focused on much wider issues in universities with Islamophobia mentioned as one of the multiple factors identified (OPM and Hussain 2009; Tyrer and Ahmad 2006). The discussion on Islamophobia in universities within the literature is more focused on governmentality or does not specifically consider the gendered or ethnic component (Nabi 2011; Tyrer 2003) of discrimination and ‘racialisation’. By focusing on women as a group, and Muslim women with a Pakistani heritage particularly within a socio-political context that has securitized universities and the Muslim-Pakistani identity(s), the thesis provides insightful narratives, points of view of young women whose experiences and opinions are seldom explored. It is this richness of opinion, the diversity of experience as located within the particularities of a meta-narrative on Muslims and insecurity in a post 9/11 and 7/7 socio-political milieu that make these narratives exceptionally insightful. The findings identify a diversity of experiences and perceptions that is often homogenized within the literature on Muslim students, on British Muslim students, on Muslim women, and those with a Pakistani heritage. While there are certain trends that are identified through such a diverse group of students, these trends contribute to a conceptual understanding of Islamophobia through the lived realities of the participants.
Thus, according to what is learnt from the participant narratives about their ‘intersubjective’ experiences (Bakhtin 1981; 1984) Islamophobia in ‘racialising’ (Meer and Modood 2010) and ‘securitizing’ (Croft 2012) Muslims is pervasive, functioning not merely as a direct form of discrimination but often operating subliminally, influencing and problematizing Muslim behaviour. For Muslim women in particular their ‘degrees of religiosity’ dictates how Islamophobia is encountered, where visibly practicing and non-visibly practicing women are caught within the moderate/extremist dilemma that may encourage Islamophobia of a more indirect nature. Such expressions of Islamophobia however continue to be located within a security framework that breeds a ‘fear of the unknown’ extremist, who ironically is ‘known’ in the securitized imagination as a uncivilized, backward, Western hating extreme ‘Islamist’. Such suspicion as the narratives have highlighted is not only limited to Muslim men, but also women who become visually disruptive through their ‘niqabs’, ‘hijabs’, ‘jilbabs’ and ‘shalwar kameez’.

The ‘racialising’ and ‘securitizing’ moves beyond gender and religion when confronted with a securitized ethnic identity in the form of the Pakistani. While Islamophobia is predominantly associated with a problematic Muslim identity, in a securitized environment, an equally insecure ethnic identity can further exacerbate encounters with Islamophobia. In the case of the Pakistani identity, Islamophobia takes on the guise of Pakophobia, eliciting a fear of the Pakistani-Muslim terrorist. The sense of insecurity that is evoked by an ethnic identity in conjunction with the Muslim factor, complicates a simplistic understanding of Islamophobia, suggesting that different groups of Muslims
may experience Islamophobia differently, especially those groups associated with another insecure identity.

By focusing on universities as located within the meta-narrative of insecurity and the Muslim student, the thesis further provides British/Pakistani female student insights into the troubled security-university nexus that is currently encouraged by the British government’s Prevent agenda. The insecurity that permeates ISocs and their activities as a result of this agenda on security interrupts Muslim student activities, who are constantly held suspect, considered ‘vulnerable’ to extremist forces. Yet, while existing literature focuses on this insecure position of Islamic student societies within universities (Nabi 2011; Tyrer 2003), what is often overlooked is student responses to such obstacles as highlighted in this thesis. These responses include, ISoc initiatives to ‘normalize Muslim student presence,’ encouraging dialogue and discussion, promoting a positive image of Islam, as well as Pakistani student society cultural initiatives to promote a positive image of Pakistan. Muslim students, British/Pakistani female students are active in pockets across universities, through a ‘dialectic’ that challenges dominant ‘meanings’ of being British, Muslim and Pakistani in a ‘securitized’ post 7/7 Britain.
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Interview (December 14, 2009) *Professor Tariq Modood, Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy, Director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, University of Bristol.*


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Appendix

1- A

The following acted as an interview guide for the research. Questions were often asked in response to the narrative, where the wording of the question changed. The narrative was more of a dialogue, with the participant highlighting most of the issues raised in this guide without the need of the researcher to interrupt her.

1. Tell me about yourself. What are you studying? How old are you? When did your family come to England? Which part of Pakistan are they from? What do they do? Where were you born?
2. What kind of school did you attend? Did you enjoy studying at the school? Do you have any memories, anything you would like to share? Any happy memories, any sad moments during your time at school? What about extracurricular activities in school? What kind?
3. Why did you decide to study (the subject)? Are you enjoying your time at the university? Was it easy for you to make friends? What about students from other cultural, religious backgrounds? Is it easy to be friends with them? Are you part of any societies etc? If Islamic society, what is the society like? How are the members? Ever had any problems getting speakers? Any other issues?
4. If hijabi, When did you start taking the hijab? Why? Ever experienced discrimination? What kind?
5. Recently, there has been a lot of discussion on what some people have called Islamophobia? What do you understand by this term? Are there any three words that come to mind, which for you describe Islamophobia? What is the difference between Islamophobia and racism? Do you think Muslims can be Islamophobic? How? Looking back at your time here, do you think Islamophobia has increased after the 7/7 tragedy in 2005, or was it always the same?
6. Have you ever experienced any kind of discrimination? Why do you think this discrimination took place? (If not) have you ever heard of anyone, or know anyone who has experienced any form of discrimination? (If yes) why do you think this discrimination took place? What did you feel when you experienced such discrimination? What did you do about it? Who did you talk to? Was it helpful to talk to (the person)? Did you talk to anyone at the university? Were talking to them helpful? What did they suggest you do? What kind of relationship do you have with your tutors, supervisors? Can you talk to them about issues such as discrimination etc? Was action taken against the discriminator? (If not), why do you think no action was taken. (If yes), were you satisfied? (If not), what kind of action would you have wanted to be taken against the person? Are there any
societies or groups at the university which have helped you in dealing with this discrimination? What kind of societies/groups are these? How did they help you? Are you still a member of this society?

7. What should be done in your mind to overcome Islamophobia? What can students like us do to fight against Islamophobia? Do you think only women who wear the hijab experience Islamophobia, or other Muslim women who do not wear the hijab also suffer from this phenomenon. If no, why do you think that is?

8. What do you understand by the word ‘Paki’ when it is used? How often have you heard the word Paki. Is it Islamophobic in nature? Why do you think they use it?

9. If British Pakistani, have you met Overseas Pakistani students? Your impressions

If Overseas Pakistanis, have you ever met British Pakistani students? Your impression

10. What do you believe are the major reasons for Islamophobic behavior?

11. Have you heard of the North West 10 incident? If yes, any campaigns organized by your university that you joined? If yes, how was it? If no, why not? Part of any campaigns around Palestine? If yes, why? If no to Manchester 10, then how come you didn’t join that campaign but were a part of the Palestinian campaign.

12. There has also been recent discussion on radicalisation, with media talking about radicalisation, and reports on radical individuals? What do you understand by the term radicalisation? What do you think these reports mean, when they talk about radical groups in universities? Do you think radicalisation is always a negative phenomenon as projected in the media, or is there a thing such as positive radicalisation? (If yes) how would you define positive radicalisation? Have you ever heard of such groups existing in the university? Is there a difference between radicalisation and political activism on campus?

13. What do you think is the difference between moderate/fundamentalism/extremism?

14. Did you hear about the incident of the Christmas day bomber? Did anything change in your university after that incident? Did the university welfare contact you? Did students attitudes towards you change? Have you ever heard of a group called the English Defence League?

15. As a final point, is there anything else you would like to add to the discussion, especially with respect to the on-going debates on Islamophobia, and radicalisation?
Encounters with Islamophobia

British Pakistani women students are invited to share their experiences of Islamophobia

I am a Pakistani student doing a DPhil (PhD) at the University of Oxford. I am interested in exploring the experiences of Pakistani and British Pakistani students in higher education universities, particularly with respect to Islamophobia. Given the dearth of literature on this subject, often plagued by stereotypes rather than actual accounts of young women, my research will aim to talk to young British/Pakistani female students, in order to gain an understanding of their experiences as narrated by them.

This research will give you an opportunity to present your views on Islamophobia. In particular your contributions to the debate on Islamophobia will be integral in redefining this phenomenon. The interviews will be semi-structured with the aim to engage in a dialogue. The dialogue is meant to be open ended, giving you a chance to share your narrative, and express your point of view. You are free to ask any questions related to the research. You do not have to answer any questions that you do not want to and can opt out of the research at any time.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please contact me either at the following mobile number 07916439259 or you can email me at tania.saeed@sant.ox.ac.uk

This study has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee. The transcripts and audio recordings of this interview and the questionnaires will be stored securely and destroyed at the end of the DPhil (PhD) in 4 years. Only my supervisor Dr David Johnson and I will have access to this data. Your anonymity is guaranteed, as the information provided will be strictly confidential, unless you request otherwise.

Thank you for considering to participate in the study.
Participant Information Sheet for Student Groups

The study entitled ‘Encountering Islamophobia: A Case Study of Pakistani women in Higher Education Institutions in England’ is undertaken by Tania Saeed, a doctoral student at the University of Oxford, Department of Education. You may contact Tania at tania.saeed@sant.ox.ac.uk (mobile number: 07916439259) or her supervisor Dr David Johnson at david.johnson@education.ox.ac.uk.

The purpose of the research is to explore the encounters, experiences, and effects of Islamophobia on Pakistani and British Pakistani women in Higher Education institutions in England, and their responses to it.

This research will give you an opportunity to present your views on Islamophobia, as well as the space to discuss yours and your group’s experiences of discrimination. In particular your contributions to the debate on Islamophobia will be integral in redefining this phenomenon. While institutional definitions of Islamophobia inundate existing literature on the subject, the real experiences of individuals’ are often ignored. Often research stereotypes students as helpless victims, or radical individuals, rather than presenting their points of view. Your participation therefore will be invaluable in filling this gap, and overcoming stereotypes and misunderstandings associated with being Muslim, Pakistani and British.

You do not have to answer any questions that you do not wish to and you are free to opt out of the study at any time.

This study has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee. The transcripts and audio recordings of this interview will be stored securely and destroyed at the end of the PhD in 4 years. Only the researcher Tania Saeed and her supervisor Dr David Johnson will have access to this data.

Your anonymity is guaranteed, and the information will be kept confidential.

Thank you for considering to participate in the study.
Consent Form

The study entitled ‘Encountering Islamophobia: A Case Study of Pakistani women in Higher Education Institutions in Britain’ is undertaken by Tania Saeed, a doctoral student at the University of Oxford, Department of Education. You may contact Tania at tania.saeed@sant.ox.ac.uk (mobile number: 07916439259) or her supervisor Dr David Johnson at david.johnson@education.ox.ac.uk.

The purpose of the research is to explore the encounters, experiences, and effects of Islamophobia on Pakistani women in Higher Education institutions in Britain, and their responses to it. It is further aimed at exploring ongoing debates on Islam in Britain and in British Higher Education institutions.

Declaration

I have read the participant information sheet. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research and have received satisfactory answers to questions, and any additional details requested. I am free to withdraw from the study at any time by advising the researcher of this decision. I understand that this project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee. I understand that the information will be kept confidential, and my anonymity will be guaranteed in the research report. I agree to participate in this study and understand how to raise a concern and make a complaint.

Participant Name: ______________________  Researcher Name: Tania Saeed
Signature: ____________________________  Signature: __________________
Date: ________________________________  Date: __________________

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http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201292464012781613.html on 01/03/2013)
Narrator’s Profile

Salma, North West1, 28, Business Grad, Overseas

Salma was born in Lahore, Pakistan. Her mother is a homemaker and her father is a businessman and a landlord. She has two sisters. She went to a single sex missionary school in Lahore, and a single sex private high school. She attended a mixed sex liberal arts university in Lahore, where she studied Social Sciences, with an emphasis on political science and history, and a minor in Economics. She also worked in the university, a requirement of a scholarship she was awarded as an undergraduate. Her work entailed interacting with potential students and their parents, as well as managing other students who worked under her. She was never inclined towards extra curricular activities, as she would rather spend her spare time reading books. She would have liked to pursue creative writing and literature as a career. However, describing herself as a practical person who wants to be financially independent, she chose business school instead for a graduate degree, something ‘she is good at’. She read for a Masters in Business at a university in Coventry, and then worked as a research assistant at a business school in West Yorkshire. She joined another Business school in West Yorkshire to pursue a PhD. She had visited England before on family vacations, and the transition from Pakistan to England was quite easy for her, despite having doubts about being away from her family. She made friends easily, although it was often people who befriended her rather than her approaching other students, as she does not mind being on her own. However, she is more inclined towards being friends with women rather than men, as it takes her more time to trust men. In her PhD, she now has more male friends than females, after having known them for four years. She moved to a big city for her PhD as she felt a PhD degree would have been ‘an isolating’ experience especially in a small campus town, whereas a big city would be more ‘busy’ with more to do. While she goes to clubs and pubs she does not drink alcohol for religious reasons, which she feels limits her friendship with British students, as there is a drinking culture she cannot be a part of. Despite avoiding extra-curricular activities she has been voted as the class representative for both her Masters and PhD degrees. She believes people chose her because she is approachable and she consciously tries not to be ‘judgemental’, ‘like people in Pakistan.’ While a practicing Muslim, she does not wear the hijab.

Zebunnisa, North West1, 21, Undergrad Law, Overseas

Zebunnisa comes from the city of Karachi, Pakistan. Her father works for the government and her mother is a teacher. Her parents sold a piece of property they had inherited from her grandfather to finance her studies. Her father was a bit hesitant about sending her abroad. In school she was both studious and active in her debating club. When she won a local debating competition and was selected to go abroad for another competition she was accompanied by her mother and grandmother. When she won international competitions, her father ‘was over the moon’ and felt confident enough to send her abroad for her studies. Zebunnisa also has an older sister and a younger brother. Her sister got married at a young age, she ‘had a love marriage,’ and she is happy and settled. However, her sister regretted not going abroad for further studies, a factor that further influenced her parents.
decision in letting her go to England. Her brother is still in school but will soon be also applying for undergraduate degrees abroad. Zebunissa chose North West1 because it was located in a town with a strong Muslim population so she felt she would not have any issues with ‘halal food’. She is active in her university’s Pakistani society, and is passionate about portraying a positive image of her country. She wants to be a lawyer and serve Pakistan. In her narrative she also highlighted the problem of Pakistani women being less politically active even in their student Pakistani societies. She believes women need to be more involved in student politics, and tries to encourage others. She also ‘co founded’ a charitable organization based in Pakistan that promotes education for the under privileged. She runs the organization while studying for her undergrad in North West1. She is a practicing Muslim and was not wearing the hijab or a religious signifier.

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Hafiza, London, 25 Alumni, British

Hafiza lives in London. Her father is from Lahore and her mother is from another town in the Punjab. Her father came to England to study. She has five other siblings, two sisters and three brothers. While all her sisters like her wear the ‘niqab’, the youngest is not too ‘strict’ about it. Her mother is unwell. Her father always encouraged the sisters to wear a ‘hijab and shalwar kameez’ and they were allowed to wear ‘long lose skirts’ but never anything tight. Her father also gives the ‘Friday sermons’ at their local mosque. She describes her father as ‘religious but his religion is tainted by culture’, and gives the example of ‘celebrating the Prophet’s birthday’ which for her ‘is a cultural practice, not Islamic.’

She started thinking about religion after a course on ‘philosophy, media and politics’ that she took in her ‘A levels’ which confused her, and made her question God’s existence. She was in an accident, ‘hit by a car’ when she was in college, and describes how she ‘had a strange vision’ and she ‘didn’t feel any pain’ She was just grateful that she had said her morning prayers that day. Having survived, that accident made her even more religious. She wanted to use ‘philosophy to prove that Islam was right.’ That is when she started ‘studying about Islam’ since she ‘did not want to believe what she was told.’

She tried attending a regular university but felt ‘that university life compromises a Muslim woman’s modesty.’ She felt she stood out because of her clothes. It was also the time she started wearing the niqab, which she describes as ‘the hardest thing she did.’ Her father discouraged her since he was afraid that she might be targeted. Since she was still learning about the niqab and did not realize whether it was mandatory in Islam or not, for her father’s sake she only wore it ‘within the university’ since her father was afraid of her ‘travelling’ with the niqab on. Outside the university she would take it off. Soon she dropped out of university and instead joined an online university program since she felt more secure. She wanted to marry a man who would support her decision to wear the niqab, and in her last year at her university she got married and feels more confident wearing the niqab since has ‘the support.’

Hafiza has travelled to Pakistan but she feels that she does not fit in. She also has never been to a protest because she believes ‘going to protest is against Islamic ethics’ and ‘modesty.’ She does however have a website through which she creates awareness about Islam, and has a separate section about the causes and campaigns she endorsed.
Faiza, West Yorkshire, 22, Undergrad Humanities, British

Faiza was born in a predominantly South Asian town in West Yorkshire, where she has lived all her life. Her mother is a homemaker. Her father is a salesperson or so she thinks, since she is not sure about exactly what he does. Both her parents are from a small village in Northern Punjab, Pakistan, and her ethnic background is Pathan. She has 6 sisters, four older and two younger ones. She went to a state-sponsored primary school, and then attended a faith school, which got state patronage while she was a student there. She then attended a Muslim girls college and after 6th form taught at a Muslim girls primary school for one year. She is reading for an undergraduate degree in humanities at West Yorkshire. She is repeating her first year for the second time, as she failed her qualifying exams.

She is not active in extra-curricular, and has described herself as someone who lacks ‘self-confidence’. Her biggest highlight of her school years was ‘getting something that you didn’t think you could do.’ She enjoys watching cricket, though she does not know how to play the game. Her idea of fun is to go to theme parks with her family. She does not go to the cinema to watch films, and while she sometimes spends time with her friends, she does not enjoy it as much as spending time with her family.

She wears a niqab, which she started wearing at the age of 19 when she attended evening classes on Islamic theology. Her mother also wears the niqab. She started wearing the jilbab at age 18, since it was part of her 6th form uniform. She continued with the hijab since school, where it was part of the school uniform.

She has never been on a plane and has never travelled to Pakistan. She imagines Pakistan as a place with ‘open air, close to nature’ having ‘a lot more freedom to do things than you do here,’ since for her England feels ‘quite closed.’

Hafsa, North East, 22, Law Grad, Overseas

Hafsa was born in England but mostly grew up in Karachi, Pakistan. She has a dual British-Pakistani nationality. While growing up in Karachi, she used to visit England during the summer. Her father is a businessman and her mother is a lawyer. She has an elder brother and a younger sister. She studied in a single sex missionary school in Karachi, and attended a mixed sex private high school. She hated her high school experience, as she was not used to boys and ‘that kind of attention.’ She came for her undergraduate degree in law at a North East university in England, after which she continued to pursue law in England. She has always been involved in extra curricular activities throughout her academic life. From sports and student politics in school, to becoming involved with the Islamic society and the student council at her university, she now volunteers for a pro bono legal advice organization in England.

She started wearing the hijab as an undergraduate. She had always wanted to wear one in Pakistan but her parents were not supportive of the idea. Her mother was especially against the idea of her wearing a hijab in England, as she was afraid her daughter might encounter discrimination. When she started wearing it in England, she did not tell her parents for a month. Despite wearing the hijab for three years her father and brother still have a difficult time accepting the hijab. Her mother inspired by her, started wearing the
‘dupatta’ (a piece of cloth in the form of a sash, part of Pakistani traditional dress) in Pakistan.

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**Aliya, South West1, 20, Undergrad Sciences, British**

Aliya was born in a town in the West Midlands, which has a large Pakistani Diaspora. Her mother was born in the same town but her father immigrated from Mirpur in Pakistan. Her father has a hearing disability. She has one younger brother. She is studying in a university in South West England. She is in her second year of undergraduate in audiology. She went to a mixed sex primary and secondary school, and went to a grammar school for 6th form. She visited Pakistan when she was 5. She has been active in extracurricular activities from primary school to her university, involved in the student council, entering writing competitions, as well as playing hockey. She is also a member of her university’s sign language society, and is learning sign language. She also joined the photography club and a pottery club though she feels she is not that ‘good at making pottery’. She has volunteered at a Red Cross shop as well. She is a member of the Islamic society, though not part of the committee, and helps out with society events. She feels that she is an ‘organized person’ which is why she can be involved in extracurricular activities and study at the same time, though her course is not that demanding.

She describes herself as a British Muslim first and a Pakistani last, while her grandparents keep telling her that she is a British Pakistani and then a Muslim. She disagrees, since she has only been to Pakistan once, does not speak the language and her ‘Mirpuri is like that of a 7 year old, it is that bad’. She also does not feel like she is a ‘typical Pakistani girl’, since Pakistani girls are either the typical ones who are into ‘boys, Bollywood films and songs’ or try to ‘be white’. She has never been in either category, and believes that ‘having boyfriends’ is not allowed in Islam. She has had friends from different backgrounds, since she makes friends based on the person not their background. Her sixth form best friend though was of a Pakistani background.

She wears the hijab, but her mother discourages her from wearing it in the beginning. Her mother felt that she should wear the hijab for the right reasons, rather than changing her mind later on and taking it off. Her mother also wears the hijab. She started wearing the hijab whenever she would go out while still in school. However, she would never wear it to school. She and her friends also used to wear it during Ramadan. She realized about the importance of the hijab when she read the Quran in English and has been wearing it ever since.

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**Amna, North West1, 28, Graduate Social Sciences, Overseas**

Amna was born in Lahore, Pakistan. Her father was a doctor who passed away. She has a stepfather who is a businessman. Her mother used to be a beautician but now is a full time homemaker. She has two sisters and three brothers. She went to a single sex missionary school in Lahore, and a single sex private high school. She completed her undergraduate from a liberal arts university in Lahore. She travelled to West Yorkshire to study part-time for a Masters in Social Sciences at West Yorkshire. 1At the time of the interview she had returned to Pakistan after completing her Masters and was working for an NGO related to education. She was involved in sports in school, and became ‘politically aware’ in her undergraduate. As a graduate student at West Yorkshire1, she
was politically involved in the Justice for North Western 10 campaign. She also initiated a political campaign in West Yorkshire against General Musharraf in September 2007, when he declared an emergency in Pakistan. She became politically active in West Yorkshire because she was ‘frustrated’ by the lack of student activism for Pakistan, and felt the need to take initiative. She continued her political activism on returning to Pakistan, attending street protests, and organizing discussion groups on current affairs in Pakistan.

While a practicing Muslim, she does not wear the hijab.

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**Aisha, London4, 22, Undergrad German, British**

Aisha was born in an Asian neighbourhood in Lancashire. Her mother is a community worker, and was the first woman in her community to start teaching in the local mosque. Her father is a pharmacist. She has one sister and one brother. Her father’s side is from England, as her grandparents moved to England from Lahore. Her mother is from Lahore. She went to a predominantly ‘white’ primary school. She then joined a state secondary school, which was really bad so her parents moved her to a private high school. Her school was located in a vastly Asian neighbourhood. In her high school there were not many Pakistanis. She was in a class of 70, out which one four were girls. She soon realized she was ‘different’ from the other girls, when she used to show up wearing ‘long skirts’ in school while the other girls wore short skirts. She also spoke Urdu and Punjabi fluently which the others could not communicate in. She described her ‘mum as the driving force behind her education.’ She is studying German in her undergraduate. She feels both Pakistani and German people find it strange that she is pursuing German. She wanted to be a pilot but her father’s friend advised them against it, as he was a pilot and felt that such a profession was ‘not good’ for a woman especially when she is married. Her father tried to make her do pharmacy but she was not interested. She thought about what she enjoyed and realized it was German so she pursued it in her undergraduate. Her undergraduate has a big Asian population, with a strong Bengali community. She used to be involved in extracurricular growing up. However, since she came to university, she describes herself as an ‘introvert.’ She mostly kept to herself. It was difficult for her because she came from a protective environment, even though her mom encouraged her a lot. Now she has moved to a big city, has to worry about financial issues as well as other problems on her own. She also felt that she did a lot of extracurricular in schools so in university she just wanted to focus towards work. She tried to join student societies but never felt like attending their events. She feels the university is in a ‘very Asian area.’ She does not ‘like the way it looks.’ She also feels there needs to be more interaction amongst students from various backgrounds in the university as students have a tendency to stick with their ‘own people’.

She has became more religious in recent years, though she is not part of any student society, nor does she wear the hijab.

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**Mehreen, South East England1, 28, Science Grad, Overseas**

Mehreen describes herself as a true ‘Lahori.’ She was born in Lahore, Pakistan. Her father used to be an engineer in the army. As a consequence of his job they moved around
Pakistan a lot, when she was growing up. Her father now teaches in a university and her mom also teaches at a government college. She describes herself as coming from a family whose ‘fifth generation’ is in education. Her grandparents were doctors. She has two sisters. She went to an army school growing up. She talks highly of her father. ‘People also believe’ she has ‘a mind like her father’s.’ Her father was supportive of her education. She applied to both the US and Britain but felt that in Britain there were ‘more human rights’ as her friends did not have good experiences at the airports in the US. She is pursuing a PhD in the sciences in a university with a small Muslim and Pakistani population. She describes herself as a ‘very friendly person,’ yet she has had trouble making non-Muslim friends as she feels they don’t talk to her because of her scarf. However, her close circle of friends, while mostly Muslims also include a German who is in her course, and was also her flatmate. She is involved in extracurricular with the Pakistani and Islamic societies.

She wears the hijab and the Pakistani dress, shalwar kameez in her university. She is very proud of her Muslim and Pakistani identity. She started wearing the hijab when she was 9 or 10 years old. At first, inspired by her sister who wore the dupatta (piece of cloth- part of the Pakistani traditional dress), she started wearing the dupatta but soon felt that she should cover her entire head. Despite negative experiences, she confidently asserts her Muslim and Pakistani identity.

(In the interview she asked not to be audio recorded, as she was uncomfortable with being recorded.)

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Nadia, West Yorkshire2, 20, Undergrad Law, British

Nadia was born in Germany and came to Britain before her GCSEs. Her mother is a civil servant and her father runs a shop. Her mother’s family is originally from Lahore, though her mother moved to England. Her father’s family is originally from Kyrgyzstan and then her grandfather moved to Pakistan. Her father eventually moved to Germany. Her mother’s side of the family is ‘mixed because of the area she grew up in’. They include non-Muslims, mainly Afro Caribbean. She has two sisters and lives in a predominantly Pakistani neighbourhood in West Yorkshire. She is reading for an undergraduate in Law at West Yorkshire3. She has always been active in extracurricular, learning martial arts, drumming, and involved in the student council. However, having grown up in Germany and then moved to the UK she has a keen interest in anti fascist student politics, and has been active both in the university as well as in the community, doing youth work and tackling racism. She was also involved with the National student union. She is the head sister of her university’s Islamic society, and was previously the head of the United for Palestine society. She describes her purpose in coming to university was not simply to gain an education but to become involved in student activism. For her this activism means standing up for what you believe in. During her own freshers' week, she organized a stall for Palestine and Anti fascism. However, she has moved away from socialist societies, towards Islamic societies, though it was ‘not an easy transition,’ for her to realize that socialism was not the answer.

She wears the hijab and jilbab. She started wearing the hijab one year after joining her university. She had thought about wearing it, but it was quite a shock for her parents as she used to have dreadlocks before. She considered wearing the hijab after she cut her hair but ‘did not want to do it for the wrong reasons’. However, one day she wore it and
never took it off. She put more thought into the jilbab. She read the Quran, researched it, felt there was a ‘rational thought process’ behind it and realized that she should wear it. She also had supportive friends in her university. Her family however was not supportive initially. They were a bit shocked especially after she wore the jilbab as none of them wear a hijab. Her father has ‘come around’ to the jilbab, though in the beginning they were all ‘against it’ as they felt ‘it was a bit too much.’ She feels that she looks like an ‘adopted child’ whenever she goes out with her family as she is the only one wearing both the hijab and the jilbab.

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Abida, West Yorkshire1, 21, Undergrad Law, Overseas
Abida describes herself as being from all over Pakistan. While her father is from Muzafarahbad, a town in Azad Kashmir and her mother from Quetta in Baluchistan, she has grown up in different cities in Pakistan because of her father’s job in the army. She attended mostly army public schools. She moved to England on her own to study for her A levels when she was 16, and has been in England for five years. She came to England because she did not want to ‘regret missing an opportunity’ of studying abroad. She chose England over the US because she prefers the British education system, believing that the British are ‘more cultured’ and more ‘informed about the world’ than the US. Before pursuing an undergraduate law degree at West Yorkshire2, she took one year to study an international business foundation course.
She has been involved in extracurricular activities since she was in kindergarten. Debating, swimming, heading her school basketball, cricket and netball teams. She was also involved in the English literature society, the school literary society, was the head prefect in school. She felt that there was ‘no group’ that existed without her. In England she did not pay much attention to extra curricular though ‘she did stand in elections for the international student representative in her college’. She is now trying to create a Pakistan society at her university, though she has faced opposition from British Pakistani students.
She does not wear the hijab. In fact, people have a hard time believing she is Muslim. This is because ‘she does not really hang it by the neck.’ People are also often surprised to see her in the Islamic society.
(At the time this student profile was being created, Abida had successfully founded the Pakistan society at her university despite opposition from some British Pakistani students.)

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Farzana, South West1, 20, Undergrad Medicine, British
Farzana was born and lived most of her life in Leicestershire. Her father was born in a place called Sangla Hill in Pakistan but lived most of his life in Lahore. He had a business in Lahore and moved to England much later in his life. Her mother is from Africa, though originally from Pakistan. Her parents are cousins but they ‘had a love marriage’, as she describes it. Farzana has never travelled to Pakistan. She attended ‘normal state schools’ and a single sex madrassa before starting her undergraduate degree in medicine. She is now in her second year.
She has always been involved in extracurricular activities. She used to take karate lessons in junior school, ‘French lessons now and then,’ she was part of the netball team in her secondary school, participated in Christmas productions at school, helped with school
activities such as parents evenings. She has not been as active in her undergraduate. She helps with a charity for the homeless, and is a member of the Islamic society and the marketing society. In her university she has come across students who have never met a Muslim before. For her flatmate she was the first Muslim friend. She often engages in conversations with her to clarify any misconceptions about Muslims. She often gets asked ‘what are you?’ in the Islamic society. People are confused about her identity, since for many she doesn’t look Pakistani.

She used to wear the hijab but stopped wearing it. She felt she was wearing it for the wrong reasons. She started because her friends wore it. However, she soon reached an age where she realized she was not praying five times a day and despite ‘being good’ by not having boyfriends, nor smoking or drinking, neither going to clubs, she still felt that she needed to ‘work on the praying thing.’ Her parents have been supportive of her decision. Her mother does not wear the hijab and ‘has short hair.’

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Kiran, London1, 22, Science Grad, British

Kiran had been married for almost three years at the time of the interview, living in an area South West of central London. Her grandfather worked for the Pakistani government but was based in England. According to Kiran the British government invited his entire family to live in England. Her mom at that time was six years old. Her father, who is also her mom’s cousin, moved from Pakistan, since her parents fell in love, got married and moved to a district in South West London. Her father has severe arthritis and ‘was made redundant’ because of his illness. He has had five hip replacement operations. She looks up to her father who she describes as the ‘bravest man’ she knows, who ‘never complains about his pain ever. Her mother works at a ‘company taking care of training for people.’ Her husband just completed his politics degree and will start work.

Kiran wears the hijab, but started wearing it properly a year before she got married. She had tried wearing it before but at that time she ‘wore it’ for the ‘wrong’ reason, as more of ‘a fashion accessory.’ She felt disgusted with herself for treating it like that, and also feels that she should not have taken it off but explains it as being part of the process. She feels that the hijab keeps away unwanted attention from men. Her mother does not wear the hijab, her elder sister wore it ‘for a year or two’ but then she stopped. Now she only wears it when she goes out with her husband as he wants her to. Her younger sister however wears the hijab. Her mother on first seeing her in a hijab told her that it was her choice but she did not have to wear it as ‘Allah looks at your heart more than anything.’ Her father was pleased though he also told her that he would not mind her not wearing it. However, as a father he does not like it when his daughters wear tight jeans so he was happy to see her in a hijab, as was her husband. While she wears the hijab, it has not stopped her from dressing up which she enjoys doing.

She is quite critical of the new generation in Pakistan. When she went to visit her relatives in Pakistan, wearing the hijab for the first time she felt people treated her differently, assuming that she had changed. She also feels the new generation does not have good role models. ‘There is a lot of materialism and a lot of people…think wrongly of religion…They think that if somebody prays five times a day they are a big aalam (religious authority) or something’, an ‘impression’ she got from her ‘cousins.’ As for the Pakistani female students who come to the UK, ‘a lot of them have gone off the rail. A lot of them are making an effort with their education which is really admirable,’ people like
the researcher as she points out, who ‘will go back to’ her ‘community and become a role model and give back…’

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**Zubaida, London1, 30, Science Graduate, British**

Comes from a town a bit north of Manchester, which she describes as ‘a racist little town.’ Her grandfather was a sea merchant who lived in Egypt but then moved to England, where he met her mom’s grandfather. She sarcastically calls the marriage between her parents as ‘doing business,’ when her maternal grandfather invited her father and paternal grandfather to his place to chose which daughter he wanted in marriage. Her mother who was unaware of this arrangement was initially quite upset, but ‘it worked out in the end.’ Her father was recently made redundant and her mom is a housewife. Her mom comes from a small village in Afghanistan, while she describes her father as being of ‘Mongol-like’ origin from the North of Pakistan and a bit Libyan. She has six sisters and a brother in total, with her being the second oldest. She describes herself as still under her mom’s influence, unlike the ‘younger generation’ in her house, with one sister living away from home with her boyfriend, without her parents knowledge, and another one who lives at home constantly getting drunk in front of the mother. She on the other hand cannot conceive of ever upsetting her mother, a sort of influence which she thinks will last till the age of 60. She also believes that while her mother wants her to be happy, secretly she is hoping that Zubeida would marry one of her cousins. The idea that she would chose someone in her present university would completely ‘destroy’ her mom, something she could never do.

Zubaida went to a ‘racist school’ which was predominantly white where she was continuously bullied. Her high school was also full of bullies. The fact that her mother made her wear a headscarf from a young age, and also stitched clothes for her to wear, as she was not allowed to wear Western clothing like skirts or trousers made the bullying worse. She would be beaten up, called ‘Paki’ and often returned home with bruises. Her father was always busy with work but her mother tried to talk to the teachers. However, the mother could not speak English, and basically taught herself while watching Sesame Street, which is why when she would try to talk to the teachers they would dismiss her by telling her they could not understand what she was saying. The teachers were also often complicit in the bullying, looking the other way or telling Zubeida off for making up stories despite her bruises. She was also once physically assaulted by a teacher in high school. Zubeida in her narrative constantly mentions how she carries this trauma with her, even at the age of 30, where now she reacts if anyone is rude to her, and answers back often with anger. She has also struggled with religion, removing the hijab as a teenager, without her mother knowing since she pretended to wear it but removed it after leaving home so as not to get bullied. She does not wear the hijab now. She also mentioned how she tried her first drink in uni, but because of getting ‘alcohol poisoning’ did not drink for almost ‘two and a half years’ after that incident and felt guilty for lying to her mother.

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**Mehnaz, West Yorkshire2, 22, Undergrad Law, British**

‘Born and bred in Britain.’ She is a third year law student both in a town and a university with a high percentage of Pakistanis. Her father is a taxi driver, born in Pakistan but ‘bred in the UK.’ Her mother is a ‘housewife’ born in Pakistan but only came to the UK after
her marriage. Her family comes from a small village near Lahore, and she describes herself as Punjabi. The last time she visited her village was four years ago (at the time of the interview). She has three brothers, with her being the second child. She mentions how all her brothers are over protective. If someone said anything to her or swore at her ‘they would actually go’ and ‘beat the hell out of them.’ She finds Pakistanis outside of Pakistan, particularly overseas female students really ‘modern.’ She believes that by going abroad they have already ‘taken a step’ forward which is described as something ‘fantastic.’ In further elaborating her observation, she points to the researcher indicating ‘how the only way’ she could tell the researcher was not British was from the accent. She studied in an ‘Asian populated school,’ but her nursery was in an ‘English populated’ locality. Her high school was ‘very very Asian’ with only four ‘English people’ in her class. Sixth form was ‘majority white populated.’ In sixth form she recounts how she removed her hijab once in class because her hair became lose. Since she was sitting at the back of the classroom she thought no one would notice. But on seeing her hair, all her classmates including her teacher were in shock. They were shocked because they thought she was bald, and did not realize she had hair underneath her scarf. However, she doesn’t think she has ‘experienced any form of racism’ because she describes herself as a ‘volatile person,’ and her motto is ‘if you push me I will make sure you fall.’ She believes that it is the attitude of the person that also influences experiences, if anyone messes with her she will ‘mess’ with them. However, the fact that she has grown up in an Asian community is one of the main reasons why she feels she hasn’t encountered Islamophobia. She started ‘wearing the hijab’ at the age of eight because her ‘mom was wearing it ’ and she continued ever since. She did not struggle in taking on the hijab since it felt ‘natural’ to her. Her mother wears the jilbab and has advised her to wear that but for the moment she feels ‘the hijab is more than sufficient.’

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Rukshanda, London2, 28, Science Grad, Overseas

Rukshanda originally comes from the city of Peshawar but her family moved to Lahore. Her father is retired and used to work in Saudi Arabia as a health professional, while her mother is a ‘retired social worker.’ She has one brother who is a businessman. She chose to study in England as opposed to Australia which is the other option she was considering since the universities in England had a higher ranking. When she came to England for her doctoral research she suffered a ‘cultural shock’ since she had never lived away from her family, or had been in a non Muslim country. It took her a while to adjust, which in the beginning was emotionally difficult. She also had trouble in her lab since the research in her British university was quite advanced, compared to Pakistani universities where she was previously based. It therefore took her time to adjust to the new university environment.

While a practicing Muslim she does not wear a hijab or any religious markers. She had problems with her supervisor because of her Pakistani identity, as her supervisor a British citizen of an ‘Indian’ heritage often brought up issues of insecurity and terrorism in Pakistan in their discussions which she found upsetting. She also claimed to be a proud Pakistani and planned on going back after her PhD to help her country.

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Zahra, West Yorkshire2, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British
Zahra is in her second year of undergraduate studies in Sociology. Her parents are from Mirpur in Pakistan. She lives in West Yorkshire with her family. She grew up in an area with a large percentage of Pakistanis and Asians in West Yorkshire, even her school had a large South Asian presence. She did not experience any discrimination in school as she felt everyone was more or less the ‘same.’ She started wearing the hijab in primary school. Her sister does not wear it but her mother wears the hijab. She started wearing the jilbab in Sixth form. At first she was not ‘sure’ if the ‘jilbab’ was an Islamic requirement, but she soon learnt at ‘a madrassa where’ she ‘was studying’ that ‘in Islam it says you should wear it.’ For her a Muslim is someone who recites ‘the Kalima’ making a pledge to God and His Prophet, and someone who practices, i.e. follows the ‘five pillars’ that include praying, fasting, giving ‘Zakat’ or alms, and if possible going for pilgrimage to the Ka’aba in Mecca. She also includes ‘wearing the scarf’ as an act that ‘may be’ part of being a Muslim, as well as following the Quran and Sunnah. However, she is uncertain about the niqab and can understand people who do not like the niqab since ‘you can’t see their face’ and there are problems in communication as a result of that restriction. Zahra visited Pakistan when she was in grade 8. That was also the last time she left her home town.

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Areesha, West Yorkshire2, 20, Social Sciences Undergrad, Overseas

Areesha is an overseas Pakistani student studying at a university in West Yorkshire which has a large presence of ‘British Pakistani’ students. She lives with her relatives and chose this university because she ‘got rejected from universities in Pakistan and’ the ‘others’ she had applied to. She is studying psychology, and feels that her university provides strong academic support. She used to live in Saudi Arabia but moved back to Pakistan and lived mostly in Islamabad. Since she studied in an American high school in Saudi Arabia, she has had no difficulty in making friends from different religious groups and nationalities. However, she did have trouble adjusting to a different lifestyle in Britain.

She wears the hijab and the jilbab. However, in her interview she was quite critical of the British Muslim students with a Pakistani heritage. She felt they were ‘confused,’ ‘living in’ Britain but trying to ‘keep a Pakistani culture.’ She also felt that Pakistan was ‘more modernized’ whereas the people she met ‘have a perception…that in Pakistan no one wears English clothes and no one goes out.’ She feels that since people come ‘from villages…they have mixed their culture and religion with the British lifestyle’ which is why ‘it is quite messed up.’ She also believes that ‘British Pakistani’ women are more restricted, and is further critical of young girls who pretend to be religious in front of their parents, but remove their hijabs the moment they enter the university.

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Fatima, British Pakistani, West Yorkshire2 Age 21, Undergraduate Law

Fatima was born in West Yorkshire where she grew up. Her parents are from Mirpur in Pakistan. She studies in a local primary school, attended an Islamic high school followed by a Catholic college and is now studying Law at West Yorkshire2. In high school she was a head girl and prefect, while mostly she did not participate in extra curricular activities. In university she is active in the Islamic society.

Fatima wears both the ‘shalwar kameez’ and a ‘hijab.’ She stood out in her university campus, which had a small percentage of Pakistani and Muslim students. This was also
obvious when she was taking the researcher to a seminar room for the interview, since other students would stare at her and her clothes, though she would just ignore them and stare elsewhere. Fatima is the ‘first girl’ in her ‘whole generation to actually go as far as university. No other girl in’ her ‘generation has even gone to college. They just did a high school education and are sitting at home,’ either are getting ‘married’ or ‘waiting.’ Since her family is living away from her extended family because of ‘family problems’ she with her mother’s encouragement pursued an education. Her ‘mom thought that’ she ‘was doing pretty well in’ her ‘high school’ and her ‘teachers thought that’ she ‘should go to college as it’ was ‘pointless staying at home in this age so’ she ‘went to college’ and was successful enough to get admission into West Yorkshire1. She looks up to her mother who ‘is the first woman in’ their ‘whole generation to start driving.’ She described the rest of her extended family as living ‘in the stone age,’ with many of them having ‘problems with’ her ‘coming to uni.’ Her father while a bit reluctant in the beginning has also gradually accepted the fact that is studying.

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Nargis, South West1, 25, Graduate Sciences, Overseas

Nargis was born in Dubai and lived there for eighteen years, after which time her family moved back to Pakistan. She did her undergraduate and graduate degrees in Pakistan in ‘a top research university’ in Islamabad. She came as a doctoral candidate to South West1, because of their ‘research’ facilities and financial aid. She had trouble finding friends in the beginning since she had never lived in a non Muslim country before, and could not find someone who understood or shared her culture. However, she felt the Islamic society was useful in helping her settle in.

She is active volunteering in science related projects at the university which she enjoys. She does not wear the hijab though she wore it when she was in Pakistan. Before coming to the UK she decided to remove the hijab out of fear of experiencing discrimination. Her family was also hesitant about her wearing the hijab. She believes her family is really paranoid about Muslim groups in the UK, which is why she did not tell her parents about the Islamic society at first when she started attending their events. Her parents think that the Islamic society is extremist, so was afraid that her parents might think that their daughter is at risk of being radicalised. Even though her mother wears the ‘dupatta’ she would not encourage her daughter to wear the hijab. Her graduate supervisor in Pakistan also warned her about Muslim groups in the UK who may try to recruit her. Her supervisor advised her to stay away from Muslim groups and avoid Islamic events as those are the places where young students are targeted. She believes that such reactions from her loved ones back home further add to the paranoia since she felt the Islamic society in her university was an ordinary student society and people were friendly. She finds her lab mates also supportive, as she prays in an office next to the lab and all her colleagues and her supervisor respect her and often give her the space to pray. She is still considering wearing the hijab, and has asked several of her friends in her university about their experiences, getting a mixed reaction from some who had faced discrimination, and decided to remove it while others have had a good experience. However, the one factor that prevents her from taking on the hijab are the number of questions that she will have to answer from colleagues and other people if she makes that decision, not to mention her family who would be concerned about her safety.

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Rehma, South West1, 29, Graduate Sciences, Overseas

Rehma is originally from the Swat Valley but her family moved to Peshawar. She comes from a traditional ‘Pathan’ family, with seven other siblings, three brothers and four sisters. She is the first girl in her family to go to a university, and to go abroad. Her father, described as a ‘strict’ individual has always been supportive of his children’s education, encouraging both his sons and daughters to pursue higher studies. He was the one who also encouraged her to apply for a PhD program within Pakistan, and when she secured a scholarship was happy to send her abroad. Two of her brothers also supported her ambitions. Her mother however, was a bit hesitant at the idea of her daughter living alone in a foreign country, but she kept quiet and never discouraged her. She also has a fiancé in Pakistan. She got engaged before she came for her PhD. Her fiancé was the son of a family friend who was recommended by her mother, and she agreed. Before the proposal however her relatives had raised their concern about her marriage eligibility on getting a PhD degree.

She describes herself as ‘gharailu’, i.e. more domestic being interested in housework. In Pakistan she would attend university and be busy at home helping her mother, which is why she faced problems when she came to England in getting a bank account and sorting out the official details as she was unfamiliar with the procedure, never having dealt with such ‘official’ business. She never participated in any extra curricular activities in her undergraduate or school, describing herself as always the ‘quiet and unnoticed’ one. While she was interested in sports she never had the confidence to pursue it. In England, since she is getting used to a new system, she does not have the time for extra curricular activities. It is for this reason that she has not join the Islamic society.

She used to wear the niqab in Pakistan, as she felt more comfortable wearing it in Peshawar. However, she decided to only wear the hijab in England, because she felt she would stand out. In Peshawar there is a culture of women wearing the niqab and people are still familiar with each other, whereas in England she felt people would not be able to recognize her and it would cause unnecessary problems. Her decision to remove the niqab was based on the realization that in Islam, veiling is for the purpose of modesty and ‘looking Muslim’ which she believed could still be achieved with the hijab, where her Muslim appearance would also ensure that people know their limits in interacting with her.

Since she was more comfortable with the Urdu language, the interview took place predominantly in Urdu, with some phrases from English included in the conversation.

Shaista, South West1, 27, Graduate Sciences, Overseas

Shaista is in her second year of PhD. She is from Multan in Pakistan. She did her undergraduate from Pakistan. This is her first time in the UK, and she is the first girl in her family to go to a university or even go abroad. She is married. Her husband is in Pakistan where he is doing his PhD. In university, she is mostly busy with her academic work and is not involved in any extra curricular activities though she does interact with the Islamic society as her friends are members. She did not join the Islamic society since she does not have time, and being a ‘disorganized person’ she felt she would not be able to fully participate in the society, which would make her feel guilty for doing something half heartedly.
She describes herself as a quick learner, which is evident from her pronounced British accent, which she picked up when she moved to England. She feels she has the ability of picking up accents without realizing it. She wears the hijab and the jilbab. While her supervisor has always been supportive, she had problems with some of her lab mates and fellow students including a female from Pakistan who were not too supportive of her ‘Muslim’ appearance. However, she believes it was the result of miscommunication, as people often misunderstood her. She also never complained about it to her supervisor. She further believes that she is a positive person, who does not realize when someone is behaving in a negative manner towards her which surprises people.

While the conversation took place in English, towards the end exchange she switched to the Urdu language.

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Sanam, South East England1, 25, Social Science Grad, Overseas
Sanam grew up in Saudi Arabia but her family moved back to Lahore, Pakistan seven years ago. Her father is an academic. Her mother has been unwell. She has a brother and a sister, being the youngest in her family. She studied in an American school in Saudi Arabia, moved to a British school since her parents wanted her to take the GCSE exams, but then returned to her American high school since she realized that she did not want to do A levels. On moving back to Pakistan she went to public university, rather than a private one for the experience of being in the Pakistani system. She was always involved in extra curricular activities from debating, dramatic, sports, especially basketball to becoming the editor of her school magazine. She chose England because of her scholarship, and her university was well known in Pakistan.

She is also active in her English university, attending talks and participating in debating and sports. She also attends ISoc events. While she believes the ISoc is welcoming she does not spend too much time with them as she feels there is ‘a strand’ in the ISoc that expects students to dress a certain way, especially if one gets involved with ISoc events. She used to wear a scarf when she was fifteen or sixteen but only wore it for a few months. All her friends wore the scarf, her elder sister also started wearing it, as did her cousins and she was part of the Islamic society in her school where she felt inadequate for not wearing it. However, she soon realized that she did not like it, and felt like she was ‘two different people.’ Overnight she had to behave in a certain way with her male friends, who had always been close friends, and was different at home. She could not take it and decided to remove the hijab. While some of her friends were not happy with her decision as the ‘hijab’ for them was not a light matter, she nonetheless felt she was being honest in removing it. She did visit the UK with her father when she went through that phase, and while she stayed within a universities, she recounts how she wandered off on her own to explore the countryside and asked an Englishman for directions to a town.

While he gave her directions he warned her not to go there alone as she would be discriminated against because of her scarf. However, ever since she has come to the UK for her graduate degree she has not worn the scarf, or feels the need to wear it.

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Dalia, South East England1, 21, Social Science Undergrad, Overseas
Dalia is from Karachi where she attended a private English medium school. She has one younger brother, who will be applying for his undergraduate degree. She has always been involved in extra curricular activities. At her undergraduate university in England she is
also quite active in student societies, from acting to politics. She describes her family background as ‘liberal’ in terms of religious practice, and she does not wear any religious symbols or signifiers. However, she faced problems settling in because of the drinking culture at her university. In the first week she arrived and attended a student event, she was put off by students getting ‘drunk and hitting on each other,’ which discouraged her from attending any of the other events. She felt a bit scared in the beginning not having any close friends, and did not know how to handle such situations. She also did not fit into the Islamic society described as being too ‘conservative,’ while the Pakistani society for her was also too insular, as they did not encourage students to mingle outside their group. However, gradually she made other friends, especially in her ‘course’, which she describes as ‘multicultural’ and found a place for herself.

In her discussion about the Islamic society she shared the experience of her friend who became an active member of the ISoc. However, her friend started wearing the hijab because everyone in the society wore a hijab and she felt left out. Only later did she realize that she was wearing the hijab for the wrong reasons and stopped. While the ISoc for Dalia is friendly she tends to go to their events during Ramadan when she can eat free food for Iftar (the time when Muslims break their fast). She has met ‘British Pakistanis’ and in her description divides them into two groups, those who are completely assimilated, and those who are still stuck in 1950s Pakistan. Only a small minority for her are in the middle.

Dalia in discussing Islamophobia highlighted discrimination faced by Pakistani students in applying for student visas. She personally knows friends who could not join British universities because of visa issues. She feels students are discriminated against because of their Pakistani identity.

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Tehmina West Midlands1, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences, British

Tehmina was born in a multicultural town in the West Midlands where she grew up. Her father is from Pakistan but her mother was born in Britain. While studying for an undergraduate degree related to youth work, Tehmina has been involved in youth projects within and outside her university. She has been active in community projects relating to young people focusing on integration. She has also received several national and local awards for her activism. It was Tehmina’s youth work inside and beyond her university that was one of the reasons why she was invited to participate in this research. Having been active in the national and regional student organizations, she was familiar with the problem of Islamophobia across universities in her region. She highlighted the issue of non-reporting of Islamophobia by students, and on several occasions intervened on behalf of the students. She is also active as an Equality officer within her university.

Tehmina wears a hijab and has been verbally attacked because of her political views which she believes is a result of the nature of the work she does as a youth activist, having debated with workers from the British National Party. She also started an online radio station and a magazine for young people. She disagrees with terms such as ‘minority’ since she feels she is British and not part of some minority community, a term that ‘was made popular by middle class politicians.’ She also believes that Muslim women and men need to become more involved in mainstream politics where they can change negative perceptions about their community. For her the problems faced by the
British community with a Pakistani heritage is a consequence of a culture, which is confused with religion, and hence misunderstood.

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Sehrish, North West1, 21, Graduate Social Sciences, Overseas
Sehrish is from Sialkot, in the Punjab province of Pakistan. She went to a private English medium school. She came to England to pursue an undergraduate degree, but stayed back for her Masters. Her university has a strong presence of Pakistani students. While she has never been active in extra curricular activities, she is part of her university’s Islamic society. She feels more comfortable with Asian students, and has friends from East Asia but cannot feel the same level of connection with ‘English people.’ She has been to England before on a family vacation. While she herself has not experienced Islamophobia she is familiar with friends who have experienced it in public. She also knows of a family friend who wears the niqab and encountered it on the street, being called a ‘terrorist.’ She believes if she suffered Islamophobia she would go and report it to the Islamic society. She wears a lose duppata with a ‘Western’ clothes.

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Bano, North West1, 22, Graduate Sciences, British
Bano was born in England in a town that has a strong presence of South Asian Muslims. Her father is from Faislabad and her mother is from Sahiwal in Pakistan. Her father had a cloth manufacturing business, but he is retired. Her mother is a housewife. She has three siblings, two brothers and a sister. She is the youngest. Her parents always encouraged their children to excel in school, and have continued to be supportive, letting them study whatever they want to study. Her parents themselves are ‘not educated’ since their families could not afford their education. However, her father’s brothers are doctors, their education was supported financially by her father, when he started working. She speaks Urdu fluently and is also well versed in Punjabi. All her siblings speak Punjabi, but she was the ‘guinea pig’ who was taught Urdu by her parents, instead of Punjabi at home. As a rule, she and her siblings can only speak in Urdu or Punjabi with their parents, but they speak in English amongst themselves.
Bano went to a primary school with a strong Pakistani student community. However, her parents moved and at the age of ten she joined another school where she was the only ‘brown person.’ She struggled at her new school and often came home crying. In explaining her experience, she describes how it was difficult for the ‘all white’ students to have a ‘brown’ person in their midst, since they were not used to seeing someone like that. They used to ask her all sorts of questions about her eating habits, and her culture and religion which at times were asked just to annoy her. However, soon through group projects she managed to make friends. Her high school and college was quite multicultural which also prepared her for her university.
Bano has always been active in extra curricular activities. She learnt how to play the piano and the guitar, she writes poetry and plays badminton. She also teaches ‘bollywood dancing.’ She does charity work and raised funds for Pakistani flood victims. She is a member of the Islamic society and is active in her university’s Pakistan society. She feels a greater affinity to Pakistan, which she illustrated through an anecdote. When she was ten years old, she filled in a form and ticked the Pakistani box in response to a question on identity. This created a problem as her father was contacted to check whether his daughter was of a Pakistani nationality. She was lectured by her father, and was told that
she was Pakistani within the house, but was a British citizen outside. She could not understand since she always felt Pakistani. She also wants to go to Pakistan and contribute since she feels she can be of more use there than in England. While a practicing Muslim, she does not wear the hijab.

MALIKA, NORTH WEST1, 22, UNDERGRAD SOCIAL SCIENCE, OVERSEAS
Malika grew up in Canada and Pakistan. She decided to chose England because she wanted to pursue a law degree which would have taken longer in Canada. She has been active in extra curricular activities such as debating, and activities related to her degree. She was also involved with her college Paksoc in her first year. However, she is not that active with the Islamic society which she felt was ‘extreme’ initially until she interacted with them, and saw ‘their events’, and ‘realized they’ were ‘normal.’ While brought up in Canada, her father was very strict about her speaking in Urdu at home, because he was afraid that she might lose touch with her culture. While she spoke in English outside, at home she always conversed in Urdu, which she believes is the reason why she is in touch with her Pakistani culture. She believes the problems concerning Muslims and Pakistanis in Britain are more related to the ‘media’ that creates a ‘paranoia around Muslim students.’
While a practicing Muslim, she does not wear the hijab.

TASNEEM, NORTH WEST1, 21, UNDERGRAD SOCIAL SCIENCES, OVERSEAS
Tasneem is from Karachi. She chose England as it was closer to home compared to the US and Canada and she already had her brother studying in North West1. Her parents therefore felt ‘more comfortable’ sending her to North West1. She went to a private school in Karachi and has always been active in extra curricular activities. In her university she was involved with her Student Union, and was also active in the Pakistani society. She did not have trouble adjusting because of her brother as well as her friends from Pakistan who also chose North West1.
She is a practicing Muslim who does not wear the hijab. She has worked closely with the Islamic society as a member of the Student Union and believes that the ISoc is misunderstood. She never felt she was treated differently despite not wearing the hijab, and believes that the members are ‘normal’ people. She feels that the problem of Muslims in Britain was exaggerated after the events of 9/11, as Muslims had ‘been around’ before those events, dressed in the same way, while they may have experienced discrimination, they became more visible after the events of 9/11 and 7/7.

NOOR, NORTH WEST1, 19, UNDERGRAD SOCIAL SCIENCES, OVERSEAS
Noor is from Islamabad though she has travelled a lot within and outside Pakistan because of her father’s job, who works for a tobacco company. She chose North West1 because she was rejected from the top universities of her choice in Pakistan, and by the time she had to apply North West1 was one of the few good ones in the UK that was still accepting applications. She felt other countries like the US was too far away from home. She has always been active in extra curricular in her schools from dramatics, debating, to the student council and sports. However, in her undergraduate, she ‘slacked’ and was only involved ‘in a few charities’. She is not involved in the Pakistan society, as she just
never got around to it. However, she is also not involved in the Islamic society, which she describes as ‘too religious for her.’ She relates an anecdote about her first experience with the ISoc. In her first week she went to their stall and was talking ‘to a boy, who was fine with her’ but then a ‘girl’ came up to her and told her that if she ‘had a question she should ask a sister.’ She was a bit taken aback and just said sorry. She does not understand why on their fliers they have separate contact information for men and women, which is why she never joined the ISoc. She has suffered discrimination outside the university in a well-known store in North West when a woman who was friendly admired a necklace she was wearing. On asking her what it was, and being told that it meant ‘Allah’ the name of God in Arabic the woman just walked away without saying anything.

While a practicing Muslim, she does not wear the hijab.

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**Natasha, North West1, 34, Graduate Social Sciences, Overseas**

Natasha is from Pakistan. She mostly grew up in different cities across Pakistan but also lived in the US for over three years where she enrolled in an American high school. The rest of her education was in Pakistan. The reason why she moved a lot across cities was because of her father’s job, who was ‘in the government service’ but is retired now. She has also travelled to the UK off and on, and as a child ‘attended one year of kindergarten’ there. She has always been inclined towards the Social Sciences. She has been involved in sports and dramatics in school, but was not too active in extra curricular in her undergraduate university, which was small and did not offer many facilities in that regard. She is also not involved in extra curricular at her present university because of the demands of her degree.

When she came to the UK for her graduate studies she had problems adjusting more so because she came from a working background and was not used to just studying. She worked in the ‘education sector for a couple of years’ before she came to North West1. She has a closer circle of Muslim friends since she feels that the requirements of her religion do not permit her to ‘fully participate’ in the culture of non-Muslim class fellows. For her ‘friendship is something that you develop when you have commonalities.’ She does not blame the non Muslim students but feels that she herself did not ‘feel comfortable’ with them since she could not join in the drinking culture, so preferred to mingle with people she had more in common with.

While a practicing Muslim, she does not wear the hijab

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**Lyyla, North West1, activist, alumnus British**

Lyyla has been politically active on university campuses locally and nationally being involved in leftists’ organizations, but in particular in campaigns such as ‘Stop the War Coalition,’ and ‘United Against Fascism.’ Her parents are from Pakistan, her father is from a town near Islamabad and her mother is from the Azad Kashmir region. While she graduated from her university some time ago and was not politically active while a student, after graduation and working in different parts of England, she came back to North West where she joined the anti-war movements. She calls herself a ‘radical,’ and believes the problem with Islamophobia is related to the ‘war on terror, media’ and Muslims themselves who ‘refuse to fight back’. In working with Muslim students and ISocs on university campuses she felt that the Islamic societies reinforce the stereotype of
a non-political Muslim, particularly for Muslim women. She shares her own experience, after she started wearing the hijab recently. A male Muslim student, also a leftist, was surprised when she told him she was going to go pray. He explained how he felt there were two kinds of Muslim women who wear the hijab, the ones who do it for religious reasons as found in the ISoc, and people like her who are trying to make a political statement but are not religious. She feels frustrated at the idea that such external judgements and categories exist about Muslim women, though she also feels that Muslim women themselves, reinforce it. For her the Islamic societies in universities provide a ‘safe environment’ for students who are ‘away from home’ where ‘no one pushes their’ boundaries.

Lyyla has also encountered discrimination within national leftist parties, with fellow activist questioning her loyalty to a leftist cause because of her Islamic belief. She is a strong believer in being politically active in the community, and blames the leaders of the Muslim community for not setting an example of activism. She gives the example of an English Defence League (EDL) protest when the Muslim community was asked by the police to stay inside that day, being told that their ‘safety’ could ‘not be guaranteed.’ What upset her the most was the announcement by the local police that if they saw ‘Asian men’ out on the streets that day, they will arrest them on counter terrorism charges, accusing them of creating mischief. The fact that the EDL was allowed to protest whereas Muslim citizens were told to stay inside, which they quietly did, reflect the lack of political will on the part of the community, and the institutional problem that exist within the government, as well as the British leadership. A similar lack of activism is also present with the Muslim student community in universities.

While an active member of leftist groups within and outside the university, she also works for an IT company.

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Nazia, London3, 28, Social Sciences Grad, Overseas

Nazia has grown up all over Pakistan. Since her father was a ‘government servant’ posted across Pakistan, the family moved around with him, though her ‘main schooling’ was in the city of Islamabad. While her father comes from a conservative region in north Punjab, he was always supportive of her education, and encouraged her and her sister to pursue a higher degree. She believes that she is successful because of the support of her parents. She was married but divorced her husband despite ‘social pressures.’ She worked in the banking sector but joined the graduate program at London3 since she wanted to change her career path. She wants to be in academia and is a strong advocate of education for girls. She was the first girl in her family to receive an education because of her father’s support and ‘knows how education can change a girl’s life,’ as it gave her the strength to be where she is today. She wants to contribute in the field of education for this reason.

She is also patriotic about her country, having been involved in Pakistan society events. She believes there is a need to promote a positive image of the country which she has been doing at an individual and group capacity. She feels things are changing for women in her country, which is evident by the number of Pakistani women she has met at her university compared to men. However, she highlighted how this presence of women might also be the result of racism from the immigration and visa services. She has heard accounts of young Pakistani women getting visas and scholarships, while Pakistani men have faced more issues by being denied a student visa. She believes the reason for this is
discrimination and the idea that Pakistani men would be a greater ‘security’ risk, inclined to join terrorist activities, whereas Pakistani women do not pose such a threat.

She is a practicing Muslim, particular about praying, fasting and halal, and does not drink alcohol either. She does not wear the hijab or any Islamic symbols or signifiers.

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Rubab, London1, 29, Science Graduate, Overseas

Rubab is from the city of Karachi. Her father is a retired banker. She has two brothers and a sister. She is married and lives with her husband in England who works as an export sales engineer. She wears the hijab and has experienced Islamophobia from her lab mates. She described one such incident where her lab mate told her how she felt ‘scared’ when Rubab would go pray in a separate room. She believes that she is not a ‘weak person’ nor is she ‘afraid’ but she does not want to create issues in her lab by reporting such remarks. She wants to ‘leave a good impression’ which is why she ignored her colleagues at first, but soon decided to talk to them. While she believes that the talking has helped, it was difficult for her in the beginning.

She started wearing the hijab at the age of 20. No one in her immediate family wore the hijab and her mother was a bit apprehensive when she started wearing it. She was influenced by her cousins and realized that she ‘felt comfortable’ with it. She has worn it since then. She got married while enrolled in her graduate degree. It was an arranged marriage, which she was happy about, though she constantly had to defend her decision to her lab mates who kept asking her if she was being ‘forced’ to marry.

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Zunera, London3, 24, Social Science Alumnus, Overseas

Zunera is from a town near Islamabad. She went to a private school in her town and an undergraduate college in Lahore. She did not have any problems adjusting to her program in England. Her ‘university is very international’ and has a strong and active Islamic society so she never felt any form of discrimination during her time there. She did witness Islamophobia while she was waiting in a tube station, where a man was being shouted at for looking ‘Pakistani’ and ‘Muslim.’ She feels Muslims themselves can also be Islamophobic and gives the example of her sister, who is studying in the US. Her sister was quite ashamed of herself when she looked at a ‘Muslim’ and ‘Pakistani’ looking man with a turban, beard and ‘shalwar kameez’ boarding a train and was afraid that he might be ‘a terrorist.’ In narrating this incident to Zunera her sister explained how she was shocked by her own reaction.

Zunera has participated in one protest against General Musharraf’s self imposed coup in 2007 outside the Pakistani High Commission in London but believes that Pakistani students in general are less inclined to be politically active. The reason for this is the protective environment in which they have grown up, since they do not know anything about political activism, and the maximum they might do is sign petitions.

She does not wear the hijab but is a practicing Muslim. She does not think that wearing the hijab or a religious symbol is the only thing that makes a Muslim stand out. She believes that she dresses conservatively, especially in summer, where people can tell that she is Muslim, since Muslims ‘look a certain way’ despite lack of any prominent religious signifier.

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Sabahat, West Yorkshire2, 25, Alumnus, Teacher, British
Sabahat was born in West Yorkshire where she grew up. Her parents are from Pakistan. She has a big family, three brothers and three sisters, nieces and nephews all of whom live in West Yorkshire. After graduating from West Yorkshire, she joined a teaching degree and taught in primary schools for two and a half years. In her undergrad she only started making friends outside her Pakistani circle in her second year. Throughout her life she had always had close Pakistani friends, but was happy to interact and get to know non Pakistani British students. In her school, they never encouraged students to go beyond their little groups which she felt was the reason why she was never confident enough to become friends with a non South Asian or Pakistani. She also suffered racism in secondary school when ‘white kids used to throw sticks and stones at’ the South Asian kids when they were walking back from school. She never told anyone, not even her parents because she felt it would be too difficult for her parents to handle when they were already struggling with ‘bringing up their children in a Western society’. She did not mention it to any of her ‘teachers’ either which she regrets not doing.

She has also suffered racism in her teaching degree from fellow students. She narrates one incident in which her class fellows who were part of her group came into class, and instead of sitting on her table where there was plenty of space with no other table available went and got a separate table, found chairs at the back and created a separate corner. ‘That moment’ made her feel ‘horrendous.’ She mentions how frustrating the situation was for her, especially knowing that the same people who kept ignoring her existence will become teachers and teach in multicultural schools.

She started wearing the hijab four weeks before the interview and has already noticed a change in people’s behaviour. Her colleagues in school look at her differently, and those who do not know her are often surprised when they hear her speak English. However, she feels that she has the confidence now to answer back to anyone who is Islamophobic or racist towards her.

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Sana, London, 23, Graduate Medical, Overseas

Sana is from Lahore in Pakistan. She comes from an industrial, and feudal background. She attended a private English medium school in Lahore, and was active in extracurricular in school. She further attended a University of London institute for her undergraduate degree and came to London for her graduate program. She chose England because she was familiar with the British system as well as London since her family used to spend their summer vacations in London.

In discussing Pakistanis and Islamophobia, she believes that family background and geographical location of students who come from Pakistan is an important factor in how they interact with people in Britain. In trying to understand the difficulties some of her more religious class fellows have faced in adjusting to a Western context, she believes that if she did not have the kind of exposure she had growing up in a city like Lahore, and instead had come from a less diverse city or village, she would also have a different attitude to Western countries. For her the problem of Islamophobia is two sided, where Muslims need to explain themselves to people who do not know their religion, to prevent discrimination from happening. This need for Muslims to explain themselves is particularly important in today’s environment.

Sana is a practicing Muslim and does not wear the hijab.

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Maqsooda, West Yorkshire2 alumnus, 24, Social Sciences, British

Maqsooda attended West Yorkshire2 for her undergraduate degree. Her father is from Lahore while her mother is half British and half Polish. Her father’s family lives in Pakistan, which she visited quite frequently until the security situation worsened. She went to a private school, and a girl’s public secondary school. She wanted to appear for her A level examinations but was not allowed to take A levels because her school’s headmistress told her she would not get good grades. Instead she ended up attending a sixth form college. She does not know of anyone else who was discouraged from taking their A level exams, but she felt greatly discouraged by that incident. However she liked her undergraduate university, as she was given the space to develop her thinking and express her opinions.

She understands the British Pakistani dilemma that young people face, though she believes it should not be a problem, as identity is something subjective. Some people feel they are British others do not. She does not mind being called either, but she does feel like she ‘identifies’ with her ‘Pakistani background’ more. Her mother being half Polish faced discrimination in England, so she never formed a strong English connection.

She feels that in today’s climate of suspicion and apprehension, people ‘have a responsibility to find out’ about things that they are afraid of rather than accept that fear without question.

She is a practicing Muslim but does not wear the hijab.

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Tamana, West Yorkshire2, 19, Undergrad Social Sciences British

Tamana was born and brought up in West Yorkshire. Her parents are from Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (now known as Khyber Pukhtunkhwa) ‘but her grandmother was Indonesian who reverted to Islam.’ She has three sisters and one brother. She is the youngest. She is also an ‘alima,’ described as someone who ‘is an Islamic scholar’. She graduated from ‘a madrassa’ a year before the interview.

She started wearing the hijab when she was in high school. She ‘used to wear it loosely then’ but now wears it ‘properly’ after her ‘mom explained ‘ the importance of the hijab. Her mother also wears the hijab ‘and a coat’ with it. Her sisters also wear ‘the coat’ and one of them wears the niqab. She felt her family were ‘ignorant’ about ‘Islam’ confusing it ‘with culture’ but gradually ‘her mom’ learnt more about the hijab and started wearing it. She ‘hates the word Paki,’ which she finds offensive. For her it was used against her ‘forefathers’ when they were employed doing work that ‘the English people didn’t want to do. It was a word that was used for people like her grandfather and she hates it, especially when ‘Pakistanis’ use it with each other. She also mentioned an incident with her sister who wears the niqab, who was called ‘a ninja’ on the street, which shocked both of them. She believes the nature of discrimination depends on where Muslims live, as in some areas no one would ever experience Islamophobia whereas in other places one would.

She also does not understand the British Pakistani identity question. When she goes to Pakistan her relatives call her ‘walaity’ meaning ‘foreigner’ and when she is in Britain people question her Britishness. She does not understand this obsession as British history is filled with ‘Roman’ invasions, ‘the Vikings’ and other foreigners that have defined British identity. For her there is no contradiction or dilemma in being British Pakistani and Muslim.
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**Romeena, South East2, University welfare and Islamic society executive, alumnus**

Romeena is an alumnus of South East2. She also works full time at the university with their welfare services and manages the Islamic society. She is also on the board of an organization that is in charge of madrassas in South East England. While she has encountered problems amongst student and staff which was the result of misunderstanding and miscommunication, she believes her university is proactive in protecting the rights and welfare of their Muslim students. Being active in different Islamic organizations, she mentions how she is used to receiving interview requests by researchers working on Muslims in England.

Romeena is a practicing Muslim with a Pakistani heritage. She also wears the hijab.

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**Tabussum, South East1, Racism and Equality Advisor**

Tabussum works with both staff and students in ensuring welfare of university members. Her work concerns a ‘mixture of policy…keeping up with the legislation but also doing project work and responding to students’ needs’. She also ‘facilitates’ a ‘working group’ on race and religion, focusing on ‘multifaith’ dialogue. She is further exploring any impact of university policies on religious groups. She believes that the problem of Islamophobia is primarily because of misunderstanding and miscommunication in universities, which can be overcome by creating greater dialogue within the university, and also encouraging students to step forward when they experience any kind of discrimination.

She is a practicing Muslim of a Pakistani heritage. She does not wear the hijab.

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**Diane, West Yorkshire2, University Welfare, 2011**

Diane is part of the University’s welfare program which is specifically concerned with diversity and widening participation. Her university provides mandatory training to all its staff members regarding equality and diversity. Since her university has a diverse student body, with a ‘large proportion of non white British applicants’ and ‘international students’ she believes they have an ‘ethical requirement to be aware of the ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’ prefixes of their students. Her university has a clearly defined no tolerance policy on discrimination which she thinks is not a problem at West Yorkshire2. For her, the greater problems are to do with ‘family issues,’ ‘forced’ and ‘arranged’ marriages and general academic related stress, which she believes the university is successfully dealing with.

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**Ahmed, London3, Student Union Anti Racism Officer**

Ahmed is the Anti Racism officer of his Student Union. He is active in spreading awareness about Islam through student led conferences on Islamophobia and terrorism. He has worked closely with the Islamic society, and the National student society in his capacity as an officer of his Student Union and believes that Muslim students are making a difference by becoming more politically proactive in student politics within and beyond the university campus.

He is a practicing Muslim.

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**FOSIS Representative, 2011**
The Federation of Students Islamic Society (FOSIS) was established in 1963, ‘the oldest Muslim organization in Britain. It serves over 100,000 Muslim students in higher and further education in England and Ireland and it is the representative, umbrella organization of Islamic societies in these campuses. Work revolves around reporting and representing the interest of Muslim students across the country, whether it is welfare issues or it is political, or training Muslim students in leadership’ (FOSIS representative 2011).

The representative of FOSIS interviewed for this research is part of the National Executive Committee. She is also a practicing Muslim who wears the hijab and jilbab.

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National Pakistani Student Representative, 2010

The National Pakistani Student association (pseudonym) is an organization that aims to build a network between Pakistani students and alumni, as well as encourage greater cooperation between British students with a Pakistani heritage and Overseas Pakistani students in the UK. It further aims to encourage a positive image of Pakistan, for which purpose it organizes an annual Pakistani student conference to discuss the social, economic and political problems in Pakistan with the aim of providing workable solutions. These solutions are sent to the Pakistani parliament.

The representative interviewed for this research is the media spokesperson who is also an Overseas Pakistani student.

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Expert interviews

Professor Tariq Modood

He is the ‘Director of the University Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship’ at the University of Bristol. He is an expert on the ‘politics of racism, racial equality, multiculturalism and secularism’ especially in relation ‘to British Asian Muslims’, as well as identity politics, and structural issues of ‘employment and education’ amongst religious and ethnic minorities in Britain (See http://www.bristol.ac.uk/spais/people/person/14808).

Professor Anthony Glees

He is a ‘Professor of Politics at the University of Buckingham’ and the director of the university’s ‘Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies.’ His interests are in the area of British security, and he has also written about ‘the Stasi’ as well as ‘Islamicism’ and ‘terrorism’ (See http://www.buckingham.ac.uk/directory/professor-anthony-glees/).

Professor Tariq Ramadan

He is a ‘Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies,’ at the Oriental Institute and a ‘Research Fellow’ at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford. His expertise are in the area of ‘[c]ontemporary Islamic issues,’ relating to ‘Muslim majority countries,’ the ‘Middle East’ as well as ‘Europe’ and countries in the West, with a particular emphasis on ‘immigration’ and ‘identity’ problems amongst Muslim communities (See http://www.orinst.ox.ac.uk/staff/iw/tramadan.html).