Claiming the state: the everyday lives of Palestinian refugee youth in East Jerusalem

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by

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Abstract

An understudied yet central aspect of the failure of the Oslo Peace Process is the lived impact of this failure on the lives of young Palestinians who have grown up in its wake. By examining the everyday lives of youth in the Shu'fat refugee camp in East Jerusalem, this thesis explores the changing production and enactment of politics among third generation refugee youth. While the Palestinian political elite continue to strive for a two-state solution that many in reality know is impossible, this study offers an account of the ways that young refugees continue moving forward with their own lives in spite of political stagnation. Drawing on fieldwork conducted over an 18-month period, it explores how and why young refugees begin to make stronger political claims on the Israeli State. Young people in Shu'fat camp hold both refugee documents and permanent residency status, enabling them a partial access to the Israeli State. Planning regimes and discriminatory bureacractic processes in Jerusalem are incrementally excluding the population of Shu'fat camp and its surrounding neighborhoods from the demographic of the city. While the state operates against them, these young refugee, permanent residents are making strategically pragmatic claims on the state. It asks questions of what remains of nationalism for third generation refugees in Palestine, and specifically, what forms Palestinian nationalism takes when Israeli citizenship, however conditional, becomes a viable alternative. By exploring the ways Palestinian refugee youth in East Jerusalem experience, navigate, subvert and ultimately make claims on the Israeli State, this research hopes to further our understanding of youth aspiration and agency in a context of protracted violence and displacement. In so doing, it hopes to contribute to the rich

discussion about the changing content and form of politics in Palestine, painting a nuanced picture of what oppression and freedom look like to third generation refugee youth.

To the bravest people I've ever known

Yaqoot, Tamara, Rana, Najah and Yousef

Islam, Hadeel, Muhanned and Younes

*

To Yamam, until we meet again

*

To Anni and Mike, for everything

Table of Contents

Abstract 2
List of Figures 8
Acknowledgements 9
Acronyms 14
A note on transliteration 15
Prologue 16
Introduction 19
Developing a research question 22
Outline of the thesis 26
Chapter One - Contextualising everyday life in Shu'fat refugee camp 31
Introduction 31
Settler Colonialism in Palestine 32
Palestinian refugees and UNRWA 36
In the wake of the Oslo Accords 42
A matrix of dispossession in East Jerusalem 49
Shu'fat refugee camp 61
Conclusion 69
Chapter Two - Theoretical approaches to the study of refugee youth in East Jerusalem 70
Introduction 70
Characterising the state 71
Instruments of state control 75
A continuum of state violence 79
Approaches to Palestinian forced displacement 85
Conceptualising youth in protracted violence and displacement 90
Morality and strategic pragmatism: a conceptual framework 98
The social condition of settler colonialism 99
The limitations of a resistance framework 101
Strategic pragmatism 108
Conclusion 112
Chapter Three - Politics and positionality: doing ethnographic research in Palestine 114
Introduction 114
Methodological approach 115

Methods of Data Collection among refugee youth 119
Research assistants in ethnography 119
Participant observation 123
Maintaining access to young people and building reciprocal trust 127
Collective research methods 135
Social media 137
Interviewing 139
Power and ethics in contexts of violence 140
Doing ethnography 141
Writing ethnography 147
Limitations of this research 151
Chapter Four - Experiencing the state: societal de-development in Shu'fat refugee camp 154
Introduction 154
Welcome to G-Town 155
Who controls the camp? 163
Structuring everyday life in Shu'fat 171
Expectations of the state 180
Politics is meaningless 185
Conclusion 188
Chapter Five - Navigating the state: mobilising political claims through youth transitions to adulthood 190
Introduction 190
Protecting Permanent Residency Status 191
Navigating systems of education in East Jerusalem 196
Phasing between education and work 206
The politics of love 214
Conclusion 222
Chapter Six - Subverting the state? Shifting moralities during the third intifada 224
Introduction 224
A third intifada 225
Predictive policing and a virtual de-development 231
The meanings of resistance 237
Shifting moralities 245
Conclusion 252
Chapter Seven - Claiming the state: citizenship applications as strategic pragmatism 254
Introduction 254
Refugees acquiring citizenship 255
Act one: claiming access to healthcare 260

Act two: claiming access to social security 265
Act three: claiming access to space 270
Citizenship as strategic pragmatism 273
Conclusion 283
Conclusion 286
Contributions of this research 287
Looking ahead 295
Bibliography 300
Newspaper sources 329
Annex 1. Brief political timeline 331
Annex 2. List of interviews conducted. 334

List of Figures

Figure 1 Road sign at the entrance to a town in Area A of the West Bank 45
Figure 2. Graffiti in Dheisha Refugee Camp, Bethlehem 48
Figure 3. Movement restrictions in Jerusalem. OCHA, October 2015 52
Figure 4. Shu'fat refugee camp in relation to the municipal boundary. OCHA 2017. 59
Figure 5. Demolitions and displacement in East Jerusalem. OCHA 2017b. 60
Figure 6. Shu'fat refugee camp in 1966. UNRWA, Jerusalem Field Office. 62
Figure 7. Shu'fat refugee camp from a hilltop, 1970. UNRWA, Jerusalem Field Office 63
Figure 8. Main road in Shu'fat refugee camp, 1970. UNRWA, Jerusalem Field Office 63
Figure 9. Shu'fat refugee camp expansion, 1972. UNRWA, Jerusalem Field Office 63
Figure 10. Annotated view from a rooftop in Shu'fat refugee camp, 2017 67
Figure 11. Aerial photograph highlighting wall around Shu'fat refugee camp, 2017. 68
Figure 12. Aerial photograph of Shu'fat refugee camp, 2017 68
Figure 13. Traffic queues to leave the camp at the checkpoint 157
Figure 14. Rooftop views, from the centre of the camp 159
Figure 15. The view of a settlement, from the edge of the camp 159
Figure 16. New buildings on the edge of the camp, beside the separation wall 160
Figure 17. Walking home in the camp 162
Figure 18. Shu'fat camp alleyways 169
Figure 19. Mapping youth transitions to adulthood 194
Figure 20. A banner of a recent martyr from the camp 227
Figure 21. Numbers of Palestinians applying for Israeli citizenship. 276

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When I was ten years old, my parents helped me to do my first research project on homelessness in London. They taught me how to do interviews with people who were sleeping rough around Marble Arch, and helped me draft my first letter to the Prime Minister to ask why homeless people didn't have the right to vote. Brought up going to demonstrations in a backpack and learning the words to protest songs in different languages, my parents have taught me to see politics everywhere – and more importantly, to try and model feminist love in its shadow. As scholar-activists in their respective fields, I hold them entirely responsible for my continuing belief that another world is possible, and that we should continue fighting for it. One of the last real conversations I had with my dad was just before I left for fieldwork. He gave me three pieces of advice: to always remember that I would owe my interlocutors everything; to try and stay on time; and to treat everyone as an end, and nobody as a means to an end. I wish more than anything that I could have just one conversation with him now about this thesis, on which he would no doubt have had a lot to say methodologically, theoretically, politically and empirically. In another world, I hope he can read this and be proud. My mum's commitment to changing the world, and to social justice in Palestine long precedes my own. She has breathed all of the ups and downs of this project with me, came to visit me in Palestine and in the camp, invested herself heavily in the projects that became my commitments, and has read every word in this thesis at least twice. I am completely overwhelmed with love and awe for a mum who inspires me, challenges me, and above all encourages me to do good and keep trying, always. Together, my parents have taught me everything I know. Thank you.

Acronyms

AFRC	American Friends Service Committee
DORA	Department of Refugee Affairs (PLO)
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
ILO	International Labor Organsiation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PA	Palestinian Authority
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
UNCCP	United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine
UNCRC	United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency

A note on transliteration

Where no established convention exists for rendering proper terms in English, this thesis follows the standards set by the International Journal of Middle East Studies for transliteration of Arabic words. A bar above a letter (-) is used to indicate a long vowel. The standard convention of a single opening quotation mark is used to denote the *'ayn* (‘). A single closing quotation mark is used to denote the *hamza* (’). *Ta marbuta* is transliterated as “a” or “eh”. The translations in this document are my own, and any fault in the translation lies with me.

Prologue

I would like to begin by introducing you to Yamam Abdulhaq. Yamam and I met one afternoon at a gym in the camp, early in my fieldwork. We spent a few hours talking over a juice that day in a mixture of languages, and quickly became close friends. Yamam was at once hilariously sarcastic and incredibly warm. She was a 24-year-old law graduate, living on the edge of the camp. Her family had mixed ID cardss: her father was from Jerusalem and her mother from the West Bank. They had moved to live in Cyprus after they were married, where her father worked for the PLO. Only after 1996 when the Centre of Life policy was introduced did they decide to move back to Jerusalem. They had extended family in Shu'fat camp, and so decided to return there. Several months before I met her, Yamam was diagnosed with a brain tumor, and she had already undergone a heavy round of chemotherapy at the Augusta Victoria hospital in Jerusalem when we met. While her Facebook page was full of photos of her with her long hair on display, when I met her she always wore hijab in public to cover her now neatly shaved head. Having struggled to find a job that could use her legal training in Jerusalem, she had settled for working as a 'community mediator' for an international NGO trying to implement an environmental project in the camp. Driving her to the hospital for regular appointments and checkups became our way of meeting regularly, and avoided her having to take long, uncomfortable bus journeys to the hospital. Sharing these drives to and from the hospital, and time spent in hospital waiting rooms or in the hospital garden after a period of treatment with Yamam became a deeply moving and motivating factor in this study. She

used to talk of pursuing a PhD herself one day, and her belief in the power of writing to make sure there was an accurate record of what had been. The many times I have felt like giving up, or like it was all too complicated a picture to try and contribute to, it was often thoughts of her that made me keep going.

When she received her diagnosis, Yamam was given a choice of whether or not to receive treatment at the new Oncology department in Bethlehem, or at the Augusta Victoria hospital in Jerusalem. *It's my right to go to Jerusalem for this treatment – I'm not going to take away services from Palestinians in the West Bank when I have the choice to use a hospital in Jerusalem. And besides, it would be very convenient, wouldn't it? For the Israelis, if we just stopped using things because they made it too difficult. As long as I can choose where to go, I'll choose to go here* [to the Augusta Victoria hospital]. This choice meant long waits at checkpoints to get in and out of Jerusalem every time she needed to go to the hospital. When one night she fell unconscious, the checkpoint out of the camp, and the two surrounding checkpoints were closed, meaning that she could not go to the hospital where all of her records were kept. It was quicker to drive to Ramallah than to Bethlehem from their home, but the combination of limited expertise in Ramallah and inability to co-ordinate file sharing meant that the hospital were unable to provide the right combination of treatments in time.

Yamam died because a checkpoint closure meant that she could not get to the right hospital at the right time – although how much longer they could have prolonged her life, we will never know. Amidst the drama and spectacle of violence that everyday lives in Palestine are documented, there are also other kinds of death. Anyone can get a brain tumor. Her story is a stark reminder of the intimate ways that Israeli state control permeates the lives and deaths of the Palestinians subjected to its occupation; but also

that while settler colonialism carves its effect on every aspect of life and death in Palestine, there are always multiple processes, multiple lives being lived in tandem, and we can never really separate those out. As her family and friends continue to say of her, Yamam *was* life. Her narratives, thoughts, sharp wit and complex ideas appear throughout this thesis. In many ways, her personal story as a portrait anticipates much of what follows in these pages.

Introduction

'I have been saying throughout that the Palestinian lives a curious destiny; at no time more than now has this been more painfully true.'

Edward Said (1979: 169)

The breakdown of the Palestinian nationalist project is coming to centre stage in contemporary studies of Palestine (Ganim 2010; Allen 2013; Turner and Shweiki 2014; Allan 2014; Roy 2016 (3rd edition); Haddad 2016; Baconi 2018). Yet remarkably absent from the study of this process has been the way this breakdown plays out among Palestinians. How does an empathy with the aspiration of the nationalist project sit alongside a coercive settler colonial state that forces its subjects to engage in its structures? In particular, how do competing visions for the future play out in the lives of young refugees who sit poised between inheriting a struggle that has preceded them for generations, and a desire to move forward in their own lives in the midst of political stagnation? Based on eighteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in and around the Shu'fat refugee camp of East Jerusalem, this thesis seeks to understand these questions through the perspectives of female and male youth. Offering new ways of understanding these questions, this study is about a changing production and enactment of politics among Palestinian refugee youth in East Jerusalem.

Building on scholarship in the anthropology of violence, conflict and war, which argues that such events should be read as social processes rather than breakdowns of social relations (specifically Vigh 2006a; Lubkemann 2008), my doctoral research focuses on understanding what happens to the everyday decisions of refugee youth as they plan for their futures in a context of extremely protracted violence and displacement. Palestinian youth continue to be framed by media, humanitarian, policy and academic analysis as either violently opposing Israeli occupation or as victims of trauma at the hands of Israeli occupation. Rather than focusing on the sensational components of violence, which have been well studied in the anthropology of conflict (Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Nordstrom 1997; Das et al 2001; Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004) this thesis builds on a body of ethnographic analysis in Palestine that considers everyday lives in extraordinary times (in particular Allen 2008; Kelly 2008; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015; Bishara 2015; Buch-Segal 2016). Comaroff and Comaroff (2005) have succinctly summarized the positionality of youth as a demographic who simultaneously stand for 'the terrors of the present, the errors of the past and the prospect of a future' (p.20). By paying careful attention to the ways youth make choices about moving around their home community; the weight they attribute to political incursions; where to go to school, and when to leave education; how to secure a job; who to marry; where to give birth; how to take care of their loved ones; and what kinds of collective processes to invest in, we can better understand the intimate, social dimensions of protracted violence and displacement. In so doing, this study builds a picture of how incremental, often unintentional, and not necessarily politically driven decisions and actions of youth begin to contribute to broader political change.

Twenty-five years after the Oslo Accords of 1993, structural conditions under Israeli occupation are worse than ever. Illegal Israeli settlements and outposts have

expanded exponentially, severing Palestinian communities from their agricultural lands and from crucial water supplies (OCHA 2017). In East Jerusalem, forced displacement continues to rise, and reunification procedures for families split between the West Bank and Jerusalem have ceased to exist (Buttu 2015). Increases in the arrest and detention of Palestinians without charge in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have risen exponentially in recent years (DCI 2018; B'Tselem 2018). The Palestinian economy has stagnated, and unemployment in Gaza is now among the highest in the world (World Bank 2018). There have been three severe military attacks on Gaza in the decade since the Israeli imposed blockade (UNSCO 2017), where conditions are predicted by the UN to become 'unlivable' by 2020 (UNCTD 2015). Meanwhile, since its establishment under Oslo, the Palestinian Authority (hereafter PA) has built an authoritarian state, with weak systems and services, and a security force that uses discretionary power to violate civilians' rights with impunity (Allen 2013; Human Rights Watch 2018). Twenty-five years after one of the most famous peace processes in history, many Palestinians are left legitimately questioning what there is left to continue the liberation struggle for (Haddad 2016). This is therefore a critical time to analyse how the generation of Palestinian youth who have grown up in the wake of Oslo are positioning themselves towards the future under conditions of severe political constraint.

This thesis argues that we need a more grounded and empirically informed understanding of the changed means and enactment of politics among a refugee community who have for so long been hailed as the centre of the Palestinian struggle for liberation. It complicates dominant accounts of resistance and occupation by highlighting that where there are relative spatial openings in Palestinian political positionalities, these are being marked by crucial shifts among refugee youth. It is through this perspective that the thesis develops a nuanced political argument, positing that rather than falling

into a binary of either complicity or resistance, refugee youth navigate a tightrope between the two. In so doing, it calls for a deeper reflection of what we think of or classify as 'politics' in the case of Palestine and Israel.

The thesis gives a nuanced picture of the specific dynamics in an East Jerusalem refugee camp, contributing to the gap in existing literature on Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugee context more broadly. By asking broader questions about the human condition and marking of new trajectories in contexts of protracted violence and displacement, this thesis hopes to go beyond the context of one refugee camp and to theoretically develop an argument that can carry meaning to other contexts of severely protracted violence. The principal goal of the thesis, however, is to contribute to our understanding of how social transformation is affected by youth during protracted violence and displacement, and how politics becomes re-produced away from mainstream political organization and organizational narratives.

Developing a research question

I first worked in Palestine for an NGO in 2011, delivering creative projects with young people in the city of Nablus and its surrounding refugee camps. It was the year that Palestine was making a bid for statehood and full membership of the UN, although asking many young people today what stands out as an important event in 2011, they recall Mohammad Assaf's triumph in being the first Palestinian to win the music contest Arab Idol. My attempts to develop joint projects between refugee communities and communities in the city formed my first insights into the complexities of class division in Palestine, and the ways that refugee camps were concurrently reified as symbols of the continued struggle and stigmatised for being 'hot beds' of violence. Two years later, I

spent a summer living with a family in the Jenin refugee camp. I undertook a short ethnography for my MA thesis of two cultural centres in the camp. The study addressed the competing constructions of 'Palestinian refugee identity' that each centre promoted among refugee youth through frameworks of 'non-violent resistance', within which I sought to locate the aspirations and agency of refugee youth themselves. Subsequent professional experience in Palestine continued to challenge the narratives of Palestinian solidarity that I had grown up with in the UK. As Amahl Bishara (2017a) has argued, the success of post-Oslo fragmentation of Palestine is such that every community, village, refugee camp, city, or 'Area' (in the post-Oslo division) has their own politics, their own struggles and their own ways of living under the realities of Israeli settler colonial rule. The result is that any argument of an overarching collective solidarity or narrative of a shared future aspiration is inevitably problematic.

Inspired by recent anthropological research in the Middle East, and eager to build on my existing academic and professional experiences in Palestine, I began my doctoral research as an attempt to understand what effects protracted displacement and violence had on the ways refugee youth grew up, and the subjectivities they adopted in a particularly complex environment within the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter oPt): namely, a refugee camp located on the 'West Bank side' of the separation wall in East Jerusalem. The result of my empirical data and analysis has somewhat flipped this question upside down, to understand the ways that a period of transition between youth and adulthood provides a critical moment for youth to assert new ways of being in contexts of protracted displacement and violence. Rather than documenting the way violence and displacement structure their transitions to adulthood, I ended up documenting how young people use this period of change in their lives to change their

immediate circumstances. This thesis therefore sets out to answer the following research question:

> How do youth draw on the possibility of change during their transitions to adulthood to articulate different enactments and productions of political action?

In so doing, this thesis examines why, after three generations, Palestinian refugees who were once at the heart of the resistance struggle are seeking to engage with the settler colonial state system. In order to explain this process, it analyses how refugee youth navigate between respect and empathy for the of the past, and the necessary pragmatism for the future in contexts of continuing violence. This navigation, it suggests, is indicative of a shifting morality among Palestinian refugee youth, in terms of what it means to be 'a good refugee' and struggle for the cause be attributed to this broader change. Further, it considers how the example of East Jerusalem encourages us to re-consider the meanings of citizenship for subjects living under a settler colonial regime. Finally, in the Palestinian context, it opens up questions of what the implications of these changing navigations be for a future Palestinian nationalist project, or Palestinian political economy more broadly.

Shu'fat refugee camp[2] in East Jerusalem was a place that fascinated me for different reasons. The people living in the camp were Palestinian refugees (both registered and unregistered), but also held permanent residency status, giving them the right to live and work in Jerusalem. In early consultations with Palestinian academics, humanitarian and development workers and journalists when I first began fieldwork, Shu'fat camp was always referred to in negative terms, described as a 'dark place', 'no mans land' and 'the most violent and politically charged camp in Palestine'. One senior

[2] Throughout this thesis, I have chosen to refer to the real name of this refugee camp, since due to its unique geography, it would be impossible to disguise it with a pseudonym. However, as discussed in Chapter Three, the names of all interlocutors and research assistants and any identifying characteristics have been changed.

UN staff member described it as 'a place in Palestine that nobody really understands'. Given this introduction, I was puzzled during the initial months of my fieldwork by what seemed to be an apparent 'lack' of political conversation among youth in Shu'fat, which I had understood to be one of the 'most political' camps in Palestine (however problematic that sentiment is). Convinced that my Arabic must be lacking, I took (anonymised) field notes and questions to my Arabic teacher in Ramallah to help analyse some of my conversations in the camp, and to check what nuances I may have missed. My teacher was from a West Bank village, but now lived in a city close to several refugee camps. He was less surprised by what I had to say than I was. In one memorable conversation he asked, *how would you feel if you listened to politicians talking on the radio for twenty years while you struggled to feed your family?* Once I stopped asking about party politics, or looking for 'Politics' (with a capital P) in every conversation, I began to see a fascinating, different phenomenon in the camp, namely that of increased engagement with the Israeli state on pragmatic terms. In the eighteen months I spent in the camp, I did not meet a single young person who spoke of striving for nationalist imperatives. Rather, the narratives of youth in the camp emphasized aspirations conceived in far more personal terms. The accounts offered by the young refugees I worked with not only critiqued the idea of a Palestinian nationalist project but actively sought to distance themselves from it. This study is therefore focused on a specific set of processes currently underway in the somewhat ephemeral context of Shu'fat refugee camp, where Israeli government policy and planning is changing at a rapid rate to the detriment of the stability of its inhabitants. The study does not claim to offer a comprehensive ethnography of either a place, nor of its people, nor does it produce a comprehensive analysis of the entirety of social life in a specific camp. Rather, it is concerned with how subjectivities of refugee youth have taken a gear shift in a different political direction. Indeed, it is precisely the interstitial

processes and indicators of change enacted by this third generation of refugees that make their lives and actions uniquely clarifying and enabling for the anthropological rethinking of the production and enactment of politics.

Outline of the thesis

Chapter One explains the context of Palestinian refugee youth in East Jerusalem. As the Chapter suggests, Shu'fat refugee camp is simultaneously a place where many of the core features of the long and complex political history of Palestine and Israel coalesce; and, a camp which maintains a particularly unique space in this landscape. Rather than seeking to offer a condensed history of Palestine, the Chapter draws out the key components of this struggle as are particularly pertinent to this study. It locates the overall historical framework as one of settler colonialism, addressing the root of the Palestinian refugee context in this light. It continues through a discussion of the Oslo Accords and their failure, as the political landscape under which the young people at the heart of this study have grown up. It then turns specifically to the complexities of East Jerusalem, and in particular the areas of East Jerusalem on the 'West Bank side' of the separation wall, where Shu'fat refugee camp is located. Finally, it gives the readers an introduction to the specific space of the refugee camp itself.

Having located the context of this study, Chapter Two situates this thesis within the relevant academic landscape. This Chapter places the study broadly within political anthropology, and builds a conceptual framework through which to understand the empirical Chapters. The Chapter first uses three bodies of literature to draw ideas from existing theoretical understandings of 'the state', and the actors within the state around whom this study centres. It characterizes the state in question as settler colonial, and

examines the existing literature on Palestinian refugees to establish a basis for understanding protracted forced displacement in this context theoretically. It draws further theoretical tools from the literature on youth and youth transitions to adulthood to explain how moments of change in young people's lives are used to mobilise political claims. Together, these literatures build a theoretical understanding of Palestinian refugee youth in a settler colonial state. The Chapter then develops a conceptual framework through which to understand a changing enactment of politics among these young refugees. Acknowledging the literature that draws on an everyday resistance framework in the Palestinian context, I argue that this framework does not adequately theorise the social processes underway in this study. Instead, I suggest bringing the concepts of morality, strategy and pragmatism into dialogue with one another. In so doing, the Chapter argues that strategic pragmatism, in parallel with a shifting morality of what it means to live 'the right way' as a Palestinian refugee offers a more useful framework through which to understand the empirical Chapters of this thesis.

Before addressing the empirical analysis, Chapter Three turns to the methodological approach I took to understand the everyday lives and decisions of refugee youth in Shu'fat refugee camp. The Chapter offers a discussion of my choice in methodological approach and the ethnographic tools I drew on during 18-months of fieldwork in a refugee camp in East Jerusalem, as well engaging with the ethics of empirical enquiry in violent spaces. The way I came to some level of understanding the experience of violence among my interlocutors in Shu'fat camp was deeply shaped by the violence that affected them, and myself during fieldwork. This Chapter discusses this violence to the extent that it shaped the subsequent analytical and theoretical approaches adopted in this thesis.

The empirical Chapters of this thesis are all framed around the different ways that refugee youth in Shu'fat refugee camp interact with the Israeli State. Chapter Four begins and ends with the attempt of one of my interlocutors to physically leave the space of the camp. The Chapter examines the way the state is 'experienced' through the interplay of different kinds of state control over refugee youth. Building on Roy's (2016[1995]) framing of de-development in economic terms, the Chapter moves towards an understanding of 'societal de-development' in Shu'fat. It argues that the continuum of violence in the camp (building on Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004) has left refugee youth with the conclusion that 'Politics' no longer has any meaning in this space. What young people do to attempt to change this reality forms the basis of the following Chapter.

Chapter Five focuses on what young people do to 'navigate' the state as discussed in the previous Chapter, and specifically how they use the period of transition between youth and adulthood to mobilse new political claims. The Chapter is based around three transition 'processes' in which youth in the camp seek to strengthen their political claim to retaining permanent residency status in East Jerusalem. Structured around the narratives of three refugees and their families, the Chapter examines the question of choice in systems of education; efforts to secure employment; and decisions over marriage and pregnancy though a discussion of the politics of love in Shu'fat camp. Through this Chapter, the concept of strategic pragmatism is gradually built to explain the duality with which refugee youth feel as if they have no choice but to do what they are doing; yet simultaneously choose to engage with Israeli State institutions as a strategic way of strengthening their future political claims.

Having examined the way that youth experience the Israeli state, and seek to navigate state institutions and procedures, Chapter Six takes us back to the contemporary

political context of my fieldwork, which was referred to in the camp (almost unanimously) as a third *intifada.* This Chapter questions the extent to which this *intifada* was seen by youth in the camp as a realistic way of 'subverting' the Israeli state, and brings the strategic pragmatism of Chapter Five into dialogue with ideas of what is expected of young people growing up as refugees. This Chapter extends the argument of societal de-development to consider an additional angle of virtual de-development that has emerged during the third *intifada* as a way of targeting youth specifically. The Chapter considers the ways youth talked about and experienced this *intifada* through the lens of a shifting morality as they not only chose not to 'participate' in it, but challenged it overall as a process for change. It argues that while some of these attitudes mirror responses among young people to earlier periods of occupation related violence, there is something more stark about this kind of response coming from a refugee community.

The final empirical Chapter takes this forward into a discussion of how refugee youth finding ways to 'claim' the state to which they are deemed to pose a significant threat. The Chapter analyses both the praxis and political implications of Palestinian refugee youth applying for Israeli citizenship. It also considers in equal measure the 'acts' of citizenship that my interlocutors engaged in, as they claimed access to state social services, healthcare, and, perhaps most symbolically of all, space. Rather than a tacit 'acceptance' of the Israeli state and desire to attain a political or ideological membership through the acquisition of citizenship, I analyse the reasons why refugee youth in Shu'fat see this as their only meaningful way to secure their own futures. At a time of significant change in strategic geo-political interests and investments in Israeli and Palestine, young refugees are fighting for their futures in ways that have not yet been discussed. This study sets out to contribute theoretical ideas to the experience of displacement in a context of

ongoing settler colonialism, and to answer questions related to the way young people think about their (political) futures, having grown up in the wake of the Oslo Accords.

Chapter One

Contextualising everyday life in Shu'fat refugee camp

Introduction

This chapter locates the changing enactment of politics among refugee youth in East Jerusalem in a political and (recent) historical context. It does not attempt to offer a condensed history of the deeply complex trajectory of settler colonialism in Palestine[3]. Shu'fat refugee camp is a place where many of the core features of any political discussion of Palestine and Israel coalesce: Palestinian refugees; the creation and failure of the PA following the Oslo process; the status of Jerusalem; and the realities of life under military occupation. Yet living in a refugee camp located on the West Bank side of the wall, but with conditional access to Jerusalem, means that the residents of Shu'fat camp maintain a particularly specific space in the political geography of the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). In order to understand the contingencies placed on the everyday lives of refugee youth in the camp, it is crucial first to locate the camp in its broader historical and political context. This chapter explains this political geography in order that we can understand the challenges, choices and decisions taken among refugee youth in the empirical chapters which follow.

[3] For reference, a brief timeline of political events in Palestine and Israel since the signing of the Balfour Declaration by the British government in 1917 is included in Annex 1.

Settler Colonialism in Palestine

Many scholars of Israel and Palestine agree that Zionism, as it exists in the early 21st century, can be interpreted primarily as a settler colonial movement (see for example, Sayegh 1965; Rodinson 1973; Hilal 1976; Said 1979; Kimmerling 1983; Shafir 1989; Salaita 2006; Piterberg 2008; Jabary-Salamanca et al. 2012; Veracini 2013a). Much of the early literature published by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (hereafter PLO) Research Centre in the 1960s and 1970s explicitly framed the Israeli-Palestinian context as a settler colonial one (Jabary-Salamanca et al. 2012: 8), as did the Socialist Organisation of Israel, better known as the Matzpen (Orr, Hanegbi and Machover 1971), as well as a number of revolutionary scholars and activists (Abu Laban and Abu Lughod 1979; Jilal 1976). Examining the nature of Zionist settlement in historic Palestine, the Israeli 'New Historians' (including Morris 1988; Pappé 1992) also began to frame Israel as a colonial-settler society.

While scholarship on violence against Palestinians has often lacked a coherent framework, it has documented a variety of Israeli practices as one off (but related) events. These include, *inter alia,* the annexation of land, confiscation of ID cards and deportation, military occupation, the separation wall, home demolitions, aerial and maritime bombardment, and the siege of Gaza. Settler colonialism provides a coherent frame within which to make sense of these practices which simultaneously disrupt, control and disorientate the Palestinian political arena, while keeping the international community at a distance. Rachel Busbridge (2018) suggests that as an interpretive paradigm settler colonialism:

> ‘holds powerful conceptual and pedagogical implications for reframing understandings of the conflict in Israel-Palestine, which have been typically fragmented and frequently mythologized in the international arena […] It also offers a far more accurate portrayal […] than the picture of Palestinian criminality and Israeli victimhood that has conventionally been painted’ (p.92-93).

The frame of settler colonialism further enables us to understand the context of Palestinian refugee youth not only in relation to the displacement of their families in 1948 but rather in an on-going context of continuing dispossession. The nature of the settler colonial state is theorized in the following Chapter, but is introduced here as the overarching framework through which to make sense of the complex context in which this study is located.

Patrick Wolfe ‘s (1999) account of settler colonialism centers on the premise that the invasion by settler societies is a continually evolving structure, rather than a one-off event. This means that while the overall project of settler colonialism strives for what Wolfe terms a ‘logic of elimination’, it does not simply mean the physical elimination of indigenous populations:

> ‘The logic of elimination not only refers to the summary liquidation of Indigenous people, though it includes that…negatively, it strives for the dissolution of native societies. Positively, it erects a new colonial society on the expropriated land base – as I put it, settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure, not an event’ (Wolfe 2006: 288)

As Wolfe later highlights, this ‘elimination’ does not necessarily take the form of genocide or other forms of mass killing (p.402). Rather, settler colonialism is a slower, more

incremental way of removing indigenous populations from their land. Settler colonial actions are therefore driven by diverse strategies including segregation, incarceration, religious conversion, racial regimes and categorisations, and (to some extent) assimilation (Busbridge 2018: 95).

Zionism has had many trajectories in its time. While there is not space for an extended discussion here, it is important to acknowledge the diverse historical and ideological currents that problematise contemporary Zionist narratives in Israel (Rose 2005). As a political movement however, Zionism has subjected Palestine and Palestinians to violent, structural forms of land appropriation and dispossession, in the pursuit of a new Jewish state (Jabary-Salamanca et al. 2012: 1). Principle among these methods is population transfer (Simons 1988; Akram 2010). The first Zionist Congress held in Basel in 1897, led by Theodor Herzl, developed a major strategy (The Basel Program) to obtain diplomatic support for the creation of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine. This was to take place through explicit plans and implicit policies to transfer Palestinians out of their homeland (see Moore 1974: 4; Khalidi 1988:1). On November 2nd 1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour sent a letter to the British-Zionist leader, Lord Rothschild, promising that 'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people' (as quoted in Tannous 1988: 65). A month after the Balfour Declaration, General Allenby led British troops in a march on Jerusalem, marking the end of Ottoman rule and the start of the British Mandate in Palestine. Simultaneous commitments were made by Great Britain at the end of the First World War to the Zionist movement in support of the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine, and to the Arabs to incorporate Palestine into a regional Arab state (Roy 2007a: 332).

Three decades later, when the British Mandate in Palestine came to an end, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed Resolution 181, known as the Partition Plan, proposing the division of Palestine into a Jewish state (on 56.47% of the land) and an Arab state (on 42.88% of the land). The city of Jerusalem was to become 'internationalised' in the process (Hadawi 1963: 24). The Partition Plan provoked armed uprisings between Zionist and Palestinian militias. The Palestinian resistance was defeated and on the 15th May 1948 David Ben-Gurion declared the establishment of the state of Israel. Known in Arabic as *al-Nakba* (the catastrophe), this partition severed economic, geographical and political links between communities across historic Palestine. It saw the creation of the state of Israel on 78% of historic Palestine by the Zionist Yishuv, a predominately European settler community that immigrated to Palestine between 1882 and 1948 (Masalha 2005: 1).

The events of (and following) 1948 have been referred to under different names and definitions. The eminent Israeli historian Ilan Pappé (2006) used declassified Israeli government archives to argue that what transpired in British Mandate Palestine after March 1948 amounted to a concerted policy of ethnic cleansing. The UN definition of ethnic cleansing serves well to encompass the continuing experience of displacement and dispossession as '…a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious groups from certain geographic areas' (UN Security Council Resolution 780: 1994). The debate over the nature of war crimes committed against Palestinians in 1948

has yet to be politically or morally resolved[4] (al-Hardan 2014:62). What cannot be disputed is that the establishment of the state of Israel resulted in the forcible displacement of more than half of the population of historic Palestine, representing 85% of the total indigenous Palestinian population of the area that became Israel (ibid; Abu-Lughod 1971:159; see also figures cited in *Final Report of the United Nations Survey Mission of the Middle East,* 1949). Some 11 urban quarters were obliterated; 531 villages from territories covering an area of 17,000Km2 were demolished; and the steady destruction of Palestinian cultural, political and social institutions was set in motion (Masalha 1992; Khalidi 1992; Pappé 1999, 2006).

Palestinian refugees and UNRWA

Following a long period of armed violence between Zionist militias (predominantly comprised of Jewish immigrants to British Mandate Palestine) and Palestinians, the *Nakba* in 1948 resulted in the forced displacement of over 750,000 Palestinians from their homes and villages in Mandate Palestine[5]. Believing they would be able to return home within weeks, those who fled during the *Nakba* took up refuge in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Egypt in camps that were set up by the Red Cross. In December 1948, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted Resolution 194 (III),

[4] For instance, the use of the term 'ethnic cleansing' was more recently contested by the genocide scholar Martin Shaw (2010), who argued that as a legal notion, genocide encapsulates a more complex range of processes than total human extermination. Instead of ethnic cleansing, he argues that 'the widespread destruction of Arab society [in 1948] should be considered partly genocidal' (Shaw 2010: 19, cited in al-Hardan 2014: 62).

[5] Figure according to the 1949 Final Report of the UN Survey Mission for the Middle East (UN DocA/AC.25/6). Available via [https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/C2A078FC4065D30285256DF30068D278]. Accessed on 10.09.2018.

paragraph 11 of which set forth a framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee question:

> "Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible" (Paragraph 11, Resolution 194, UNGA).

Resolution 194 (III) further attests that those refugees choosing not to return are entitled to resettlement and to receive compensation for their losses[6]. There are therefore three distinct rights (which could be read as a hierarchy of rights), that Palestinian refugees are entitled to access under international law: return, restitution, and compensation. In sub-paragraph 2 of Resolution 194, the UNGA established a mechanism to facilitate the implementation of these durable solutions for Palestinian refugees, through the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCPP). Regarding the implementation of the complete set of solutions for Palestinian refugees, the UNCCP drew up six major conclusions on the meaning of paragraph 11:

> (1) that the term 'refugees' applies to all persons displaced during the war in Palestine; (2) that refugees have a right to exercise their free choice about

[6] The foundations of this resolution can be traced to a 'Text of Suggestions' (A/863) drafted by the UN Peacekeeper and Mediator for Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte in June of 1948, in which he recommended the UN recognize 'the right of residents of Palestine who, because of conditions created by the conflict there have left their normal places of abode, to return to their homes without restriction and to regain possession of their property'. Four days after Bernadotte's report was forwarded to the UNGA, Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem by the Jewish extremist group LEHI (also called the Stern Gang). For a detailed analysis, see Rempel (2007), 'Resolution 194 (III): a retrospective'. Available via [http://www.badil.org/en/component/k2/item/3-resolution-194-iii-a-retrospective.html] Accessed on 13.09.2018.

> their future; (3) that refugees have a right to return to their homes, and not just their homeland; (4) that refugees wishing to return should give advance assurances of their intention to live in peace. Israel may reserve the right to veto individual cases based on evidence of past action; (5) Israel has an obligation to protect the rights of returnees and Arab host states have an obligation to ensure that refugees are able to make a free choice; and finally (6) refugees should be able to return when stable conditions have been established and that such conditions were created by the 1949 armistice agreements (UNCCP W/45: 1950).

It soon became evident to the relevant UN parties involved that the UNCCP would be unable to fulfill any mandate as a protection agency due to Israel's opposition to any repatriation of Palestinian refugees (Goddard 2009; Feldman 2012; Akram 2014). While the UNCCP was never legally terminated, its operations shrank with the political impasse, and de-funding by the UN. Adding to the denial of international protection offered to Palestinian refugees was a severe gap in implementing the key provisions of other international laws related to the refugee right of return, the right to property restitution and the right to compensation or reparations. For example, provisions within the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (Article 12:4)[7]; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 13:2)[8]; the European Convention on Human Rights

[7] ICCPR 12(4) states: 'No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country'. International convention on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S 171, 205, (16 Dec. 1996)

[8] UDHR 13(2) states: 'Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country'. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. resolution 217A, Art.13, UN GAOR, 3rd Session, 1st Plenary meeting, UN Doc. A/810 (12 Dec, 1948).

(Protocol 4, Article 3:2)[9]; the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 22)[10]; and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Article 12)[11] all grant a habitual resident of a territory the right to return to their precise place of origin, regardless of their nationality of citizenship status, with no distinction made between individual or mass return (see Akram 2010: 12). Israel is party to all the major treaties that establish the right of return (the Fourth Geneva Convention, the ICCPR and the ICERD[12]; OHCHR 2011), but has never meaningfully been held to account to any of them (Akram 2010). As a consequence Palestinian refugees have persistently been denied international protection.

A year after the establishment of the UNCCP, on the 8th December 1949 the UNGA passed Resolution 302 (IV) approving the creation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). At the outset, UNRWA was established as a short-term agency with a three year (renewable) mandate for 'relief and works', applied only to a sub-set of the UNCCP definition of Palestinian refugees who were deemed to be particularly 'in need' (Akram 2014: 229). UNRWA's reduced focus defined Palestinian refugees as:

> 'Persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period of 1st June 1946 – 15th May 1948, and who lost both their home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict' (475-510 8th December 1949).

[9] ECHR 3(2) of Protocol 4 states: 'No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national'. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213.U.N.T.S 221. (4 Nov. 1950).

[10] ACHR 22(5) states: 'No one can be expelled from the territory of the state of which he is a national or be deprived of the right to enter it'. American Convention on Human Rights, 1144, U.N.T.S. 123 (22 Nov. 1969).

[11] ACHPR 12(2) states: 'Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country'. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1520 U.N.T.S 217, Article 12 (1981).

[12] Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; International Convention on Civil and Political Rights; International Convention on the elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

UNRWA's definition of refugee status has always been operational, as opposed to the legal mandate of UNHCR[13] (Feldman 2012). The UNRWA criteria for refugee status were developed in 1948 purely to identify those eligible for UNRWA services. Crucially, and unlike the UNHCR, UNRWA has no mandate for seeking durable solutions for Palestinian refugees. A significant consequence of this operational character has been the ability to call for multiple adjustments of the definitions over the years (ibid.: 388). Mirroring the settler colonialism that framed their displacement, defining Palestinian refugees has been a process rather than a single event, determined along a spectrum rather than fitting a specific criterion (Feldman 2012: 392). The result is that 'the category of a Palestinian refugee has always been an incomplete one' (ibid.). Definitions of the 'Palestinian refugee' were subject to significant discussion throughout the period of the Oslo negotiations. Israel argued for a reduced definition of 'a Palestinian refugee', to include only the first generation who had been forcibly displaced in 1948 or in 1967 (Rempel 2006:9). Palestinians, instead, argued for a more inclusive definition that included the families (children and spouses) of refugees; persons deported from the oPt by Israel; persons abroad at the time of hostilities who were now unable to return; and individuals whose residency rights had been revoked by Israel and no longer had access to their livelihoods (ibid.). This latter definition still made no provisions for those Palestinians who might elsewhere be labelled as internally displaced[14] or

[13] Under UNHCR's mandate, legal protection has been described as 'the core attribute of being a refugee' (Zetter 2007: 167; see also Loescher 2001).

[14] While UNRWA considers all those who lost their homes in 1948 (and their descendants) as refugees, the UNHCR Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement define Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as those who have fled their homes but have not crossed an internationally recognised border. As Palestinians who can be defined as refugees experience secondary displacement in the form of house evictions and demolitions as Israeli settlements continue to expand, some argue that there are Palestinians in the West Bank who can uniquely be considered both refugees and IDPs (Abou Samra and Zeender: 2006). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) argue that it is important to recognise the IDP label to bring visibility to the issue of secondary displacement in the West Bank, suggesting the 'exacerbated vulnerability and exhausted coping mechanisms' of this population (ibid: 26).

stateless[15]. The definition of 'refugee' in the Palestinian context then, does not provide an ecompassing explanation of forced displacement in the oPt. It is however important to understand how and why Palestinian refugees are treated differently to those who fall under the 1951 refugee convention and mandate of UNHCR, so as to better understand the kinds of decisions and trajectories affecting these refugees.

December 2018 will mark 70 years since the UNGA adopted Resolution 194 (III). Over this period the refugee definition has been expanded to include the descendants of Palestinian refugee males, including adopted children, who are also eligible for refugee registration. Today, UNRWA operates 18 refugee camps in the West Bank, 1 in East Jerusalem (Shu'fat refugee camp), 8 in Gaza and a further 32 camps in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Around 5 million Palestinians are registered as refugees and are eligible for UNRWA services. This does not include the vast numbers of refugees who are not registered (an estimated 1.5 million, and their descendants); internally displaced persons who remained in Israel after 1948; or Palestinians displaced by the 1967 six-day war, which led to the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and the illegal annexation[16] of East Jerusalem (Dumper 2008: 195). With a limited refugee definition,

With the IDP label, they argue, rights under international human rights and humanitarian law can be guaranteed. There remains little evidence of the advocacy work of IDMC in this field however, and while the long-held debate over definitions of Palestinian refugees often draws on the IDP label, there is little research or evidence to back up its utility in this context.

[15] Alongside these debates runs the emergence of the statelessness paradigm, of which the Palestinians are an obvious example. Palestinians considered stateless are those who (1) possess a Refugee Travel Document issued by Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq and some other Arab countries; (2) holders of temporary Jordanian passports; and (3) holders of the Palestinian passport issued by the PA which is considered as a travel document, pending the formation of a full Palestinian state (Shiblak 2006).

[16]The international community has never recognised Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem, and the UN Security Council and General Assembly have repeatedly condemned Israel's actions, denouncing the annexation of East Jerusalem as contrary to international law, and in particular to the Fourth Geneva Convention. International resolutions about Jerusalem by the General assembly and Security Council of the United Nations are available via [http:// unispal.un.org]. Accessed on 10.02.2018.

and no legal protection or political mandate, the ability of UNRWA to improve the lives of Palestinian refugees has long been severely limited (Kagen 2009), and never more so than in the light of endemic funding cuts that have fallen on the agency in recent years (Irfan 2018).

In the wake of the Oslo Accords

In order to make sense of some of the empirical Chapters to follow, it is vital to understand the broader political context in which the Shu'fat refugee camp in East Jerusalem is located. The Oslo Accords have failed to realise 'peace' in Palestine and Israel, and yet 'the peace process' remains the principal discursive framework in which the relationship between Palestine and Israel is discussed by the overwhelming majority of political partnerships on both sides, and the global media. The majority of the young people who are the central focus of this study were born in the aftermath of the Oslo Peace Process, and have grown up under the structural conditions ushered in by the Accords. These young people living in Shu'fat refugee camp maintain a conflicted relationship to the West Bank, both in the way they move in and out of different spaces and the way they imagine life under the jurisdiction of the PA. Scholarly accounts of Palestine rarely cross the boundaries and categories set in place by the Israeli occupation, resulting in the presentation of the Palestinian population as 'analytically separate pieces of an impossible puzzle' (Jabary-Salamanca et al 2013:3; see also al-Hardan 2014). As such, small sections of Palestinian geography and people have been studied devoid of their broader context, disguising the larger structures of settler colonialism at work. Crucial to this study, this tendency has been most observed in scholarly accounts of

Palestinian refugee communities. While the confines of this study mean that the focus remains on the specific experiences of refugee youth in East Jerusalem, it is important to locate their trajectories in the broader dynamics of Palestine that intrinsically shape their everyday lives.

In the aftermath of the first *intifada* (uprising)[17], the Oslo peace process was initiated in 1991 in Madrid. Bringing hope among Palestinians and Israelis that some kind of 'resolution' could be achieved, the Oslo agreements proposed a two-state solution, in which a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza would exist alongside an Israeli state[18]. What emerged instead was a "peace process" which, by design 'altered the political, economic and physical landscape of the Palestinian territories in a manner that intensified rather than mitigated Palestinian dispossession, deprivation and oppression' (Roy 2007a: 234). As Rashid Khalidi has highlighted, the toxic combination of weakness in Palestinian negotiating, Israeli leadership who were not concerned by international legitimacy and the 'callous pragmatism' of US policy makers made meaningful negotiations during the Oslo process impossible (1999:239). The first agreement, signed in 1993 saw the creation of an interim authority, the Palestinian National Authority; and the redeployment of Israeli forces in the West Bank and Gaza. Further, it saw the deferral of key political decisions, such as the final status of Jerusalem; the eventual borders of an

[17] The first *intifada* (uprising) began twenty years into Israel's military occupation, in 1987 and lasted until 1993. For reference, see for example Jean-Klein 2003; Collins 2004; Bucaille 2006; Leopardi 2017.

[18] The first Oslo agreement, the Declaration of Principles (DOP) was signed in September 1993 and included the removal of international law as a basis or resolving the conflict in Israel and Palestine; the redeployment of Israeli forces within the West Bank and Gaza; the establishment of the PA; mutual recognition; and the delinking of 'interim' and 'final status' issues that could not be agreed upon during the Madrid talks. The seven final status issues included (1) the status of Jerusalem; (2) the question of Palestinian refugees; (3) Israeli settlements; (4) security arrangements; (5) borders; (6) relations and cooperation with neighbours; and (7) other issues of common interest (for detailed anaylsis of the Oslo process and its failures, see for example Khalidi 1999; Watson 2000; de Jong and Aaronson 2001; Roy 2007a; Finkelstein 2007; Bauck (ed) 2017).

imagined Palestinian state; the establishment of a Palestinian state; and the question of refugee right of return (Al Husseini and Bocco 2009). Secret talks were conducted by the Fatah leadership during the Oslo agreements, when the decision not to include UNGA resolution 194 on the refugee right of return in the Declaration of Principles (DOP) became a basis for the hypothetical negotiation of a final peace agreement with the Israeli Government (Bocco 2009).

The Oslo framework established an interim administration in the occupied Palestinian territories, the PA, and handed over small portions of territory to its management. The PLO's leaders and cadres withdrew from Lebanon following the first agreements, relocating to the West Bank and Gaza where they adopted roles within the various institutions of the PA (Farah 2006). The PA was given limited authority over the civil administration of the majority of Palestinians in the West Bank, but (crucially) not over their land. The second Oslo agreement, signed in 1995, divided the West Bank into three areas, each under varying degrees of Israeli and Palestinian control[19]. Geographically, the West Bank was divided into three administrative areas, which remain today. Area A designates land under civilian rule and security control of the PA, and comprises 17% of the West bank which initially consisted of seven major Palestinian cities. The entrance to Area A is, throughout the West Bank, demarcated by road signs warning Israelis citizens of the risk to their lives if they enter these spaces. Area B constitutes 22% of the West Bank, and designates land under civilian rule of the PA and security control of the state of Israel. Area C is by far the largest of these zones, comprising 61% of the West Bank and designating land within the West Bank under civilian rule and

[19] Territorial division in fact began in 1993 in Gaza, with the grouping of settlements into three blocs combined with a network of bypass roads and military bases on a third of the land of Gaza (see Farah 2006).

security control of the state of Israel. This division meant that Israel gained legal control over a majority of the West Bank (something it had sought since 1967) and precluded any territorial continuum for a future Palestinian state.



Figure 1 Road sign at the entrance to a town in Area A of the West Bank

Today, spaces in Area A are regularly subjected to Israeli military incursions, which the PA are powerless to prevent; Area B has no effective power sharing mechanism, and is generally only subject to Israel control; and the full annexation of Area C by Israeli is being debated in the Israeli Knesset[20]. The Oslo period therefore cemented the existence of

[20] 'Government approves bill that advances West Bank annexation' (26.02.2018), *JPOST* [Available via: https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Government-okays-bill-that-advances-West-Bank-annexation-543619]; 'Israel's creeping annexation of the West Bank continues' (06.03.2018), *Al Jazeera* [Available via: https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Government-okays-bill-that-advances-West-Bank-annexation-543619].

power asymmetries in the Palestinian-Israeli relationship, through the further territorial fragmentation of Palestine and the establishment of an authoritarian governing structure. Indeed, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin permitted Arafat to return from exile and establish this authority not on the grounds that he wanted to see democracy flourish, but rather based on the need to devolve responsibility for controlling Palestinians to an entity that would be entirely dependent on and accountable to Israel (Roy 2007a: 235). In a Fanonian frame, the creation of the PA manufactured a colonised elite in Ramallah, to watch over the Palestinian population on behalf of the Israeli State.

The conditions that were imposed on Palestinians by the Oslo process were intrinsically shaped by Israel's closure policy[21]. Established in early 1991, the policy became a permanent administrative measure in 1993 in response to heightened violence by Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel. This policy sealed off the occupied territories from each other (Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem), from Israel and from external markets, removing any basis for the Palestinian economy in doing so (Roy 2007a: 241-244). It severely restricted Palestinian access to natural resources, movement of people and movement of goods, leading to rising unemployment and limitations on any prospects for sustained economic development. The Paris Protocol on Economic Relations collectively defined a legal framework for Palestinian economic relations with Israel, and economic activity in the oPt. The framework notably included the retention of Israeli military law and accompanying economic restrictions over the oPt; Israel's full control over land, water, labour and capital; and Israel's unchallenged control over all borders of the oPt. These fundamental structures remained in place throughout the peace process, despite the creation of some new economic agreements, such as the use of

[21] For detailed analyses of the Closure Policy see Roy 1995 and 2006; and Turner and Shweiki 2014.

foreign assistance. The peace process launched in the aftermath of Oslo was seen by the international community as one that could (indeed, would) lead to a two-state solution. In reality, it represented 'a process based upon the principle of separation and limited Palestinian autonomy for the Israeli side, while for the Palestinian side it represented the potential of launching a territorial war of position towards the formation of a viable two-state solution' (Hussein 2015: 49).

As noted above, the status of Palestinian refugees, the status of Jerusalem and the borders of a future Palestinian state were all deferred within the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 for 'permanent status negotiations', due to be concluded within a five-year period (Watson 2000). The proposal made by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at the 2000 Camp David Summit[22] included no right of return, other than for a select few thousand refugee families from Lebanon permitted to return to Israel under family reunification laws[23] (Farah 2006). In return, Israel requested the signing of an 'end-of-conflict statement' from Palestinian negotiators that would release Israel from any further responsibilities pertaining to the question of Palestinian refugees (Falk 2007). Among the demands made on Palestinian negotiators at Camp David were approval of the annexation of three large settlement blocks in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (constituting 80% of the settler population at the time); denying Palestinians all control of their borders and over East Jerusalem; and granting full Israeli control on all economic borders and groundwater resources (de Jong and Aronson 2001). When, in 2000, Ariel

[22] It is critical to note that by the time the Camp David summit was held, the settler population had reached 200,000, almost doubling in a decade, along with the accelerated expansion of new settlements on confiscated Palestinian land; the division of the West Bank and Gaza into cantons under varying levels of control had been institutionalised, along with the closure policy; and the movement of Palestinians had been restricted to these designated enclaves, supported by the construction of checkpoints and barricades to further restrict movement (Roy 2007a).

[23] These few thousand refugees were out of a total Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon of 300,000 refugees at the time (see Farah 2006).

Sharon (then the leader of the Likud Party) broke the Status Quo agreement by visiting the Haram al Sharif compound in an attempt to mobilise his own political base, it set off a series of riots which, combined with the outcome of Camp David, led to a second *intifada*[24].

When Arafat returned to the oPt from exile after the Oslo Accords were signed, he addressed a crowd of over 70,000 Palestinian refugees in the Jabalia refugee camp in the north of Gaza (where the first *intifada* had begun in 1987), saying: 'I know many of you here think Oslo is a bad agreement. It is a bad agreement. But it's the best we can get in the worst situation' (Usher 1995: 1).



Figure 2. Graffiti in Dheisha Refugee Camp, Bethlehem

As Arafat's main political advisor at the time, the current president of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, reflected after the signing of the accords, that Oslo 'could lead to a Palestinian state or

[24] The second *intifada* began in 2000 and lasted until 2005. For reference, see Allen 2008; Kelly 2008; Manekin 2012; Frisch 2015; Ashrawi 2015.

a catastrophic liquidation of the Palestinian cause' (Usher 1995: 15). As Karma Nabulsi has argued, the Oslo Accords were responsible for setting up the 'slow emergence of a Palestinian political discourse of a predominantly interest-based nature, which assumes that the two key principles of self-determination and the Right of Return are incompatible' (Nabulsi 2007: 233-234).With a neo-liberal framework at its core (Samara 2000; Khalidi and Samour 2011; Nakhleh 2012; Haddad 2017), many Palestinians hold the Oslo process responsible for the death of a revolutionary spirit (*al-thawra*, or *tha'ir* to describe this spirit as embodied by an individual) in Palestine (Allen 2013:8).

Twenty-five years after one of the most famous handshakes in history between Yassar Arafat and Yitzhak Rabbin, Oslo has brought about the division of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, as well as an entrenched division within each of these sites. By cementing the fragmentation of the geographic, political, historic and demographic landscape of Palestine, it forced the PLO to concede its own demise as a national liberation movement (Farah 2006: 229). The result, in the view of many Palestinians, was that the Oslo Accords were 'a nail in the coffin of Palestinian nationalist politics, a nail made rusty by the murky economic deals in which that process fermented' (Allen 2013: 78). Oslo therefore collapsed both the reality, and subsequently the idea of a Palestinian collective. Youth in Shu'fat refugee camp have grown up in the wake of Oslo with the promise of a future Palestinian state to emerge and its subsequent failure to do so.

A matrix of dispossession in East Jerusalem

Like the West Bank and Gaza, East Jerusalem is occupied territory as understood by international law and the international community. It has concurrently long been claimed

the 'eternal and undivided capital' of Israel[25] (latterly supported under the Trump Administration, since 2018); while Palestinians assert that without East Jerusalem, there can be no viable Palestinian state[26]. Israel's Basic Law on Jerusalem (30th July, 1980) which claimed the capital, was condemned by the UN Security Council, who reaffirmed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force (Buttu 2015: 35)[27]. Since the occupation began in 1967, Israel has been committed to steadily transforming the multi-religious and multi-cultural city of Jerusalem into a Jewish city under the exclusive control and sovereignty of Israel through a variety of bureaucratic and material practices and policies (B'Tselem 1995; Wiezman 2007; Chiodelli 2012; Buttu 2015). According to Oren Yiftachel (1998), the efforts to assert increasing Israeli control over the city since the 1967 annexation has been to affirm its sovereignty and create 'urban facts' that will make any future reversal of this decision impossible. The processes of 'Judaisation' (in particular, the expansion of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem) and 'de-Arabisation' (in particular, through the enforcement of demographic and urban planning policies to minimize the number of Palestinians in the city) have worked in parallel towards this aim.

Nayrouz Abu-Hatoum (forthcoming 2019[28]) has termed these efforts to change the demography of the city as a 'Matrix of Dispossession' as a way of understanding the

[25] Basic Law (1980), Jerusalem, Capital of Israel. Available via [https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm]. Accessed on 20.02.2018.

[26] Status of Jerusalem (available in English), Palestinian National Authority, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available via [http://www.mofa.pna.ps/en/jerusalem/]. Accessed on 20.02.2018.

[27] A great deal of scholarship has documented the complex political history of Jerusalem. For reference, see Dumper 1997, 2002 2013 and 2014; Armstrong 1996; Asali 2002; Benvenisti 1996; Kark 2001; Klein 2001; Ricca 2007.

[28] Paper presented at the European Association for Social Anthropology biannual conference in Stockholm, Sweden 2018, 'We are losing Jerusalem: dispossession of Palestinians in East Jerusalem'; forthcoming publication in, Abu-Hatoum, N. and Procter, C. (eds) 'Shifting populations, permanent instability, suspended stay: contemporary mobilities in Palestine and Israel', *Mobilities (Special Issue, forthcoming 2019).*

socio-political and spatial implications of settler colonialism on East Jerusalem. This matrix is centered on key Israeli state practices that institutionalise the challenge of maintaining a Palestinian presence in Jerusalem. First, and most pertinent to this study is the identification system instigated following the military occupation of 1967, and its subsequent adjuncts including the revocation of residency permits. Second, the matrix involves the state policies and practices that seek to reduce the Palestinian presence in the city, by the separation wall; discriminatory urban development policies; and the demolition of Palestinian homes and businesses. The map in Figure 3 helps to illustrate what these policies and practices look like in reality, by highlighting the number and location of Israeli settlements, the delineation of the 1949 Armistice (green) line, the separation wall and annexed land in between. It also highlights the myriad of movement restrictions that were in place across East Jerusalem when I started fieldwork in 2015[29]. In the following overview I draw out some of the key developments and patterns that contribute to an understanding of this matrix of dispossession, as pertinent to the lives of refugee youth in Shu'fat camp.

As discussed in the Introduction to this study, as well as being Palestinian refugees, the young people in Shu'fat camp also hold Permanent Residency Status of the Israeli state by nature of being from, and living in, Jerusalem. Since the struggle to retain this status forms much of the discussion of this thesis, the nature of this status requires careful historical contextualization. In 1967, known as *al-Naksa* in Arabic (the setback), Israel militarily occupied the West Bank, Gaza and the Syrian Golan.

[29] The map in Figure 3 produced by OCHA is from October 2015, during a heightened period of violence in East Jerusalem. This explains the number of 'new obstacles' alongside the 'pre-existing' obstacles across East Jerusalem. During the course of my fieldwork, until early 2017, many of these movement restrictions remained in place.



Figure 3. Movement restrictions in Jerusalem. OCHA, October 2015

Israel also annexed Jordanian East Jerusalem along with an additional 64 square kilometers of territory from the West Bank, unilaterally claiming this area to be part of an expanded Jerusalem municipality[30]. A census was carried out in the late summer of 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza that excluded East Jerusalem, after which anyone wishing to enter or leave the West Bank and Gaza required the approval of an Israeli military commander[31]. Several months later, in the annexed areas of East Jerusalem, 65,857 Palestinians were recorded by an Israeli registry (HaMoked and B'Tselem 1997). Israeli ID cards were granted only to residents present at the time of the census. Residents of the annexed territory who, for one reason or another, were not there at the time the census was conducted lost their right to an Israeli identity card. In order for them to live in the city, their families had to submit a request for family unification on their behalf (Jeffries 2010). Palestinians who were physically present at the time of the census were registered by the Israeli population registry and were granted Israeli identity cards but, importantly, not Israeli citizenship. In 1988, the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled that this status should be defined as 'Permanent Residency'[32].

Israel applied the same legal status to the residents of East Jerusalem as to immigrants from foreign countries, despite the fact that, rather than immigrating to Jerusalem from another country, indigenous Palestinians had no choice in having Israeli

[30] Following the decision of the British government to turn its Mandate for Palestine over to the United Nations, the first UN Partition Plan was developed in 1947 which proposed the detachment of Jerusalem into an international enclave, or *Corpus Separatum* as envisaged by the General Assembly Resolution 181 (ii). For a detailed analysis on the division of Jerusalem before and after 1948, see Dumper (2014).

[31] The census was used to form a registry of the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza, after which the two areas were declared closed military areas. See order of Area Closure (Gaza Strip and North Sinai), (No. 1), 1967 (issued on 8 June 196); Order Regarding Closed Areas (West Bank Area) (No. 34), 1967 (issued on 8 July 1967).

[32] Based on the recognition of those counted in the 1967 census, residents of East Jerusalem received licenses for permanent residency in accordance with the interpretation of case law of Section 1(b) of the Entry into Israel Law of 1952 (see HCJ 282/88 Awad vs The Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, PD 45(2) 424 (1988).

jurisdiction imposed upon them. As permanent residents, Palestinians were permitted a limited set of formalised rights in Israel and the illegally annexed East Jerusalem, enabling them to work legally in Israel, travel on a *laissez passer*, receive medical insurance, vote in local elections[33], and to receive socio-economic benefits within the Israeli state (Jeffries 2012:210-211). In reality, this limited access to the state was (and remains) somewhat different. For instance, while permanent residents have the legal right to work in Israel, they do not have the right to travel freely across Israeli borders, and require the permission of the Ministry of the Interior to obtain entry/exit visas, which are granted on a discretionary basis[34]. By law, if an individual with permanent residency status leaves Israel and chooses to live outside of East Jerusalem or Israel for a period of seven years, or receives the status of resident or citizen in another country, their residency status would be revoked (Al-Shabaka 2017). An Israeli citizen doing the same would legally retain their citizenship (ibid.; also noted in Jeffries 2012, and in HaMoked and B'Tselem 1997).

Critically for this study, according to the Israeli Citizenship law of 1952 (in particular section 5(a)), East Jerusalemites were entitled to citizenship through naturalization, as long as a number of provisions were met. These included that they must have been in Israel for three out of five years preceding the application; that they intend to live in Israel; that they have some knowledge of Hebrew; and that on approval of the application, the applicant would swear allegiance to the state of Israel. The consensus

[33] Municipal elections in Jerusalem have generally been boycotted by Palestinians on the grounds that the legitimise the occupying power (see for example Badil 2009).

[34] Entry into Israel Law 1952, s5: 'The Minister of the Interior may grant a return visa to a person who, being permitted to reside in Israel permanently (1) wishes to leave Israel with the intention of returning; or (2) is abroad and wishes to return to Israel'.

regarding why East Jerusalemites have not historically pursued this option rests on two points: first, the indeterminacy of the permanency of the Occupation; and second, because accepting Israeli citizenship was generally regarded as legitimizing the illegal acquisition of Palestinian land by Israel, and would ultimately be detrimental to the Palestinian struggle for international recognition (Jeffries 2010: 2009)

In the period between the illegal annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967 and 1995, Palestinians could have their status of Permanent Residency removed if they lived outside Israel (including in the oPt) for a period of seven years (Buttu 2015: 8). In 1995 this was abruptly changed with the introduction of the Centre of Life Policy (see Jefferies 2012). Under this policy, if an individual could not prove on an annual basis that their centre of life (including for example renting property, having an Israeli job contract, paying taxes in Israel) was in Jerusalem, their residency would be revoked (ibid.). The Centre of Life Policy was initially designed to strip Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza of their legal right to access Jerusalem, and between 1995 and the end of 2016, 14,595 Palestinians lost their residency on these grounds (Human Rights Watch 2017). In response, many Palestinians who were Jerusalem ID holders but not resident in the city either moved their place of residence to affordable neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem, or in some cases rented a second property. The implications of this for the changing demographics of Shu'fat refugee camp are discussed later in this Chapter, as well as in detail in Chapter Four.

In 2006, a subsequent policy was introduced to enable punitive revocations of residency to take place on the basis of 'a breach of allegiance' to the Israeli state (Al-Shabaka 2017; Adalah 2018). In 2006, the Israeli Ministry of Interior revoked the permanent residency of three Palestinian elected parliamentarians of the Palestinian

Legislative Council (PLC) on the grounds of their affiliation with Hamas, alongside revoking the residency of the Palestinian Minister for Jerusalem Affairs, Khaled Abu Arafeh[35]. The four men were accused of breaching allegiance to Israel, by nature of their affiliations to the PLC and Hamas (Buttu 2015: 47). Since then, a further 3000 Palestinians have so far lost their residency on the grounds of political activities (Al-Shabaka 2017). As violence in Jerusalem began to build momentum in October 2015, the Israeli security cabinet voted in addition to revoke the permanent residency rights of 'terrorists' without trial, with no criteria for 'who' constituted a terrorist in this context (Human Rights Watch 2017). This enabled the Israeli authorities to revoke residencies without the legal backing of the Supreme Court.

Israeli policies surrounding residency in Jerusalem have been described as based around asserting increasing pressure on Palestinians to leave, in an effort to shape a geographical and demographic reality that precludes any future challenges to Israeli sovereignty (B'Tselem 2017). Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relates to the situation of persons protected under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) who, as a result of conflict, find themselves under the rule of a foreign power. The Article stipulates that these protected persons 'who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory', including the annexation of the whole or part of the occupied territory. Under international law, East Jerusalem is occupied territory and as such the appropriate norms of IHL and Human Rights Law should be applied. Yet since the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Israel has treated

[35] Buttu 2015:47, citing HCJ 7803/06 *Khalid Abu Arafeh, et al. v. Minister of Interior*.

the area as sovereign territory. The consequence of revoking permanent residency status is a deprivation of the right of Palestinians to continue to live in their homes and the risk of being forcibly deported. Revocation of residency deprives them of freedom of movement within the occupied West Bank, which includes East Jerusalem. This policy is, therefore, contradictory to the provisions of Article 49(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention that prohibit the Occupying Power from carrying out any type of forcible transfer of the protected persons.

The second component of the matrix of dispossession in East Jerusalem centres around the role of urban planning policies in the struggle for Jerusalem, which has been well documented by scholars (Yiftachel 1998; Bollens 1998 and 2000; Della Pergola 2001; Auerbach and Sharkansky 2007; Shragai 2011; Chiodelli 2012). The construction of the wall was designed to enable Israel to annex an additional 160 square km of land from the oPt, while physically separating over 80,000 Palestinians from the rest of the city (OCHA 2011)[36]. The eight-meter high concrete wall is one of the most iconic images of Palestine today, forming a 202km barrier around Jerusalem (Ir-Amim 2014). Historians of Jerusalem have argued (Dumper 2014) that the construction of the wall has been the 'single most important change to the city since 1967, particularly for the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem' (p.24). As highlighted by the map in Figure 4, the route of the wall meant that all of the settlements surrounding Jerusalem were located on the 'Israeli' side of the wall, while two main Palestinian neighbourhoods (and their surrounding areas) were cut off from the rest of Jerusalem. The two largest areas are Kafr'

[36] The construction of a wall to separate the occupied West Bank from Israel was first discussed during the premiership of Yitzhak Rabin in the 1990s. It was, however, deemed both too expensive, and too difficult to find a compromise between sticking to the 1949 Armistice lines and providing protection to the illegally constructed Israeli settlement projects throughout the West Bank (Dumper 2014: 23). The proposals were re-examined during the early years of the Second Intifada, and by 2003, construction had begun. For a detailed background on the construction and route of the wall, see Dumper 2015 p. 23-39.

Aqab and Shu'fat refugee camp (including the areas of Ras Khamis, Ras Shihadeh, Dahiyat as Salaam and part of Anata village surrounding the camp)[37]. Combined, the two areas are home to an estimated 140,000 Jerusalemites who as a result of the wall could only access Jerusalem through military checkpoints (B'Tselem 2017). The social, economic and political implications of the separation wall in Jerusalem have been well documented elsewhere (see for example Bimkom 2006 and 2009; Brooks 2007; B'Tselem 2006; Margalit 2006; Habib 2005; al-Barghuti 2004). Less documented is the way that the wall, in conjunction with discriminatory planning in East Jerusalem has led to increasing numbers of Palestinians being forced to move to live behind the wall, and the implications this has had for the refugee camp in particular.

Since 1967, the Israeli state has expropriated more than a third of the land annexed to Jerusalem (2,450 hectares, most of which was privately owned by Palestinians), building 11 neighbourhoods that are earmarked for Jewish inhabitants only, and declaring four areas as national parks where building is prohibited (Jabareen 2017; B'Tselem 2017). In so doing, the Israeli state has destroyed more than 1,600 Palestinian housing units, affecting around 8000 people (OCHA 2017b; see Figure one which illustrates the increase in the number of structures demolished in recent years). The new neighbourhoods built in place of the demolished homes are considered as settlements, in the same way that settlements in the West Bank are treated under international law (OCHA 2017b.). Official documents of the Jerusalem Municipality argue that unauthorised building in Palestinian neighbourhoods is a result of the disregard of Palestinian residents for the law (see Jerusalem Municipality Chapter Four, as cited in

[37] Other localities include Qalandiya village; part of Hizma; Ash Shayah of As Sawahira Ash Sharqiya; Bir Ona; and part of al Walaja in the Bethlehem area. Estimates of the population in these areas range from 55,000 to 120,000 -160,000 residents, although the ratio of East Jerusalem residents to West Bank ID holders is not known. See East Jerusalem Palestinian localities behind the Barrier, OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin, July 2016.

Chiodelli 2012 pg. 102). Scholars and humanitarian agencies have argued instead that this is due to the very limited space on which Palestinians can legally build in the city (Ir Amim 2017 and OCHA 2017b). Only 13% of the land in Jerusalem is 'zoned' for Palestinian construction, and the difficulty of obtaining a building permit makes legal building virtually impossible (Ir Amim 2017)[38]. This forces many Palestinians to build, or live in, buildings that are without permits, living with the threat of demolition.



Figure 4. Shu'fat refugee camp in relation to the municipal boundary. OCHA 2017.

[38] For a detailed discussion on the procedure for Palestinians to obtain planning permits, see Chiodelli 2012.

Jabareen's (2017) analysis of the evolution of Israeli planning policies in East Jerusalem highlights the Jerusalem Municipality has, to date, classified 20,000 Palestinian buildings as 'illegal', and therefore subject to demolition orders. These buildings are home to approximately 80% of the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem (p.18). To cite one example, in the Palestinian neighbourhood of Silwan on the edge of the Old City, only 6 out of 6,000 Palestinian owned buildings possess a 'legal' status in the eyes of the Jerusalem Municipality (ibid.).



Figure 5. Demolitions and displacement in East Jerusalem. OCHA 2017b.

Given the need to prove an address in Jerusalem in order to meet the criteria of the Centre of Life Policy, Palestinian East Jerusalemites are required to find somewhere else to live. Assuming that having one's home or business demolished carries substantial financial implications, families in such a position must find somewhere cheaper to live that is still within the municipal boundaries of the city. The lack of available building permits in East Jerusalem has created increasing pressure on Shu'fat refugee camp and other areas of the Jerusalem municipality which fall behind the wall, which are the only spaces in the city

where building is not highly regulated. In these areas, buildings continue to spring up to accommodate the new rental market. While technically the areas of East Jerusalem behind the wall still fall under the planning policies of the Jerusalem municipality, the area goes largely unchecked, and towering apartment blocks were rapidly built to house the many families needing to relocate in order to maintain their ID with a Jerusalem address (Jabareen 2017; OCHA 2017b). Consequently, this has had a dramatic impact on everyday life in Shu'fat refugee camp and its surrounding areas, which is discussed throughout the empirical Chapters of this thesis.

Shu'fat refugee camp

Unlike other Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza that were established immediately following the *Nakba* of 1948, the Shu'fat camp was not built until 1965. Around 500 Palestinian families who became refugees in 1948 fled first to the old city of Jerusalem. These refugees predominantly came from villages around Jerusalem (Beit Hanina, Silwad, Ras al Amoud, and areas which are now classed as West Jerusalem such as Beitool and Malha), and from the coastal areas of Jaffa, Lydd and Ramleh. The Red Cross initially established temporary accommodation for refugees in buildings that had been abandoned during the *Nakba* in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. This grew into the informal Muasakar camp, which was managed by UNRWA[39]. The conditions of this informal camp were cramped, with its combination of abandoned and semi-destroyed properties and tent structures, but UNRWA were not able to expand the space for

[39] Interview, UNRWA Camp Manager, October 2015. See also 'Shu'fat Refugee Camp, UNRWA'. Available via [https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/west-bank/shufat-camp]. Accessed on 11.10.2015.

refugees in the old city without damaging buildings in the Jewish Quarter. Under pressure from Israel to move the refugees out of the Old City to allow the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter to begin, UNRWA established the Shu'fat refugee camp with the support of the Jordanian Government in 1965. The camp was built next to the village of Shu'fat just north of the Old City in Jerusalem (ibid.)[40].



Figure 6. Shu'fat refugee camp in 1966. UNRWA, Jerusalem Field Office.

[40] As soon as the refugees had been removed, the Israeli government implemented two initial phases of Israeli settlement in the Old City, expropriating any remaining Palestinian properties between the Armenian and Magharib quarters of the city in order to expand the Jewish Quarter, which was promptly populated with Israeli residents. For an in-depth analysis of Israeli settlement in the Old City of Jerusalem, see Dumper, M (1992) 'Israeli settlement in the Old City of Jerusalem', *Journal of Palestine Studies* XX1 no.4 pp.32-53; Dib. G, and Jaber, F. (1970) *Israel's violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A Documented Report* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies); and Khatib, R. (1980) 'The Judaization of Jerusalem and its demographic transformation' in *Jerusalem: The Key to World Peace* (London: Council of Europe).



Figure 8. Main road in Shu'fat refugee camp, 1970. UNRWA, Jerusalem Field Office



Figure 7. Shu'fat refugee camp from a hilltop, 1970. UNRWA, Jerusalem Field Office



Figure 9. Shu'fat refugee camp expansion, 1972. UNRWA, Jerusalem Field Office

According to the narratives of refugees who recalled the move into the camp, roughly 3500 people moved from the old city into the camp in 1966. UNRWA oversaw the construction of 550 breezeblock homes for these refugees, rather than providing them with tents as had been provided to refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, and other UNRWA camps beyond historic Palestine in 1948[41]. Officially, they came with the instruction from UNRWA that upward building was not permitted, maintaining the notion that these camps were temporary. Refugees who recalled moving to the camp at this time remembered these original shelters as being very small, measuring just 3.5 by 4 meters, and comprised of two connected rooms. Extended family groups were clustered together into shelters, resulting in up to twenty or thirty people sharing one bathroom. When the camp was built, UNRWA provided transport for refugees in the Old City to move their belongings from the city into the camp. The camp was set up on the edge of the village of Shu'fat, which was on the outskirts of Jerusalem. As Omar, a 70-year-old refugee in the camp explained:

> 'The UN gave us 15 days, the people in the old city, to prepare ourselves and get out…they did not force us to leave exactly, but they really encouraged us all to go to the camp. The Wakale [UNRWA – literally, the agency] brought cars and took all the furniture belonging to the refugees and said, here is the house, here's the key, this is your new home, assalamualaikum [may peace be upon you] and that's it. '

Unlike the terror which forced families to flee to unknown destinations in 1948 (Masalha 2012), this secondary displacement was a short journey from the Old City. This is not an attempt to minimise the political implications of moving, as refugees, from the Old City to

[41] Interview, UNRWA Camp Manager, October 2015.

the camp. On the contrary, historical analysis has demonstrated that by refusing UNRWA the possibility of extending service provision to refugees in the old city, the Israeli government effectively forced them to find alternative living arrangements for these refugees (Dumper 1997). Yet, having lived as what would now be termed urban refugees for 17 years in the Old City, many refugee families had developed new extended social networks and sources of livelihoods. Much about the rhythms of daily life did not need to change when these refugees were relocated to the camp. Many refugees continued to go to school, work, to pray, to socialise and to engage in the politics of East Jerusalem as a whole. Maintaining these kinds of links to the wider city has meant that, although many refugees live in Shu'fat camp have UNRWA ID documents, they do not necessarily 'define' themselves as refugees. This is a fundamental difference, in my experience and as has been well documented in the literature[42], between Shu'fat and other Palestinian refugee camps in and beyond historic Palestine. In other camps, refugees will often use the politically resonant term of '*mukhayamjiyeh'* (meaning a person of the camp) or '*lajeh mukhayamjiyeh'* (a refugee of the camp) to describe themselves. These terms signify not only a physical location or address, but more importantly denote a foundational identity marker (Achilli 2015:73). By contrast, many refugees in Shu'fat would describe themselves as being Jerusalemites (*min al Quds* or *Maqudsi*) and living in the camp (*wa saken fi'l mukhamyam*).

As explored in the previous section, a combination of policies and practices seeking to alter the demographics of Jerusalem have had a critical impact on the size and demography of Shu'fat camp. Concurrently, Palestinian buildings and properties elsewhere in East Jerusalem have been confiscated or demolished by a combination of

[42] An extended discussion on literature on Palestinian refugee contexts that relates back to this idea takes place in the following Chapter.

legal, security and state-planning institutions, forcing a number of families to relocate to areas like the camp, where rent is cheap and the threat of demolition is lower.

As Chapter Four details, the lack of Israeli State intervention in the communities of East Jerusalem behind the serparation wall has made Shu'fat camp and its surrounding neighbourhoods (along with other areas, primarily Kafr' Aqab beside the Qalandia checkpoint) a prime location for Jerusalemites to move into. The camp today still sits on the original site allocated in 1965 of 0.2 square kilometers, which is now home to a concrete jungle of apartment blocks. The construction of the wall around the camp, which began in 2003 exacerbated this over-population, and the boundaries between the original camp and the surrounding maze of towering apartments in the surrounding areas of Ras Khamis, Ras Shihadeh, Dahiyat as Salaam and part of Anata village can only be deciphered by those who live there. To date, the number of registered refugees in Shu'fat camp is 13,000, with a further 12,000 unregistered refugees thought to be living in the camp[43]. However, the population figure most popularly referenced by those living in the camp, which accounts for the population of the whole area of the camp and these surrounding neighbourhoods is around 80,000. Today, as the annotated photograph in Figure 10 below highlights, from almost every corner of the camp the separation wall is visible, as are the Israeli settlements that surround the camp. The dark grey, eight-meter-high concrete slabs wind around the edge of the camp, punctuated only by watch-towers staffed by IDF soldiers and a large, heavily armed military checkpoint.

[43] Interview, UNRWA Shu'fat Camp Manager, October 2015.



Figure 10. Annotated view from a rooftop in Shu'fat refugee camp, 2017[44]

[44] This annotated photograph refers to the Apartheid wall. The applicability of the term apartheid in Palestine is subject to increasing academic debate. For reference, see Pappé (ed.) 2015b. The photograph is reproduced with permission by Léopold Lambert for The Funambulist (2017). Available via [https://thefunambulist.net/app/uploads/2017/07/Jerusalem-Shufat-Camp-The-Funambulist.jpg]. Accessed on 04/04/2018.



Figure 11. Aerial photograph highlighting wall around Shu'fat refugee camp, 2017.[45]



Figure 12. Aerial photograph of Shu'fat refugee camp, 2017

[45] Edge of green line indicates 1947 Armistice line. Red line indicates separation wall. White line delineates edge of the Jerusalem Municipal boundary. Figure 'C' shows the main entrance to Shu'fat refugee camp. Photograph reproduced with permission by Léopold Lambert for The Funambulist (2017). Available via [https://thefunambulist.net/app/uploads/2017/07/Jerusalem-Shufat-Camp-The-Funambulist.jpg]. Accessed on 04/04/2018. The map highlights the 1949 armistice line (green) and the line of the separation wall (red), against the route originally planned for the separation wall (white).

Conclusion

Being a Jerusalemite but living in the refugee camp succinctly encapsulates the multiplicity of identities felt among refugees in Shu'fat camp. This Chapter has located the overarching narrative of this thesis in a context of settler colonialism, as a frame through which the status of Palestinian refugees, the aftermath of the Oslo accords, and the steady attempt to change the demographics of East Jerusalem can all be understood. The machinery of the settler colonial state as relevant to this study will be elaborated in the theoretical discussion presented in the following Chapter. Having highlighted the particularities of Palestinian refugee status and the role of UNRWA in the oPt, the Chapter has concentrated on more recent political history of the aftermath of the Oslo Accords to illustrate the political environment in which the young people in this study have grown up. Examining the overarching failure of the Accords to lead to the realization of a fully functioning and internationally recognized Palestinian state, the Chapter then focused on the political context in East Jerusalem.

Framing this context as a matrix of dispossession that seeks to fundamentally alter the demographics of the city, the Chapter highlighted two key areas that influence the lives of refugees in this study: the system of identity management; and control over land and space in the city. Explaining that a critical impact of these policies has been the rapid expansion in size of the Shu'fat refugee camp, the final section of the Chapter briefly introduced the camp itself, which is discussed in further detail in Chapter Four. Having examined the political and historical context to this study, the next Chapter turns to the theoretical departures that build a conceptual framework to explain the changing enactment of politics among refugee youth in East Jerusalem.

Chapter Two

Theoretical approaches to the study of refugee youth in East Jerusalem

Introduction

This thesis is broadly located in the anthropology of politics, and considers how marginalized actors (refugees, and refugee youth specifically) find new ways of interacting with a state project that seeks (at best) to oppress them. The point of departure is the interplay of social perspectives, forces and actions, and how these are manifested in the experiences of refugee youth in East Jerusalem. Tracing this process requires theorising three distinct but inter-related aspects of this study, namely the state, the actors, and their actions. This chapter first addresses the complex characterisation of the state, theorising settler colonialism and the multiple forms of violence this kind of state produces. Turning to the actors around whom this study is centred, namely refugee youth, it addresses the extensive existing literature on the Palestinian refugee context to explain how this study builds on this scholarship. Then, locating the study of 'youth' as a gap in this literature, the Chapter conceptualises youth by drawing on the wider literature of the anthropology of childhood and youth. Finally, the Chapter proceeds to build a conceptual framework through which to theorise the actions and choices of refugee youth in this context. This framework puts the concepts of strategy (in particular Vigh 2006a, drawing on de Certeau 1984), pragmatism (Desjarlais 1997; Whyte 2005;

Allan 2014) and morals (Fassin 2015) or moralities (Zigon 2008; 2010) in dialogue with each other, in order to explain theoretically the changing enactment of politics among refugee youth in East Jerusalem.

Characterising the state

The following discussion characterises the Israeli State as settler colonial, examining the systems of administrative and legal order and practice under which Palestinian refugees in East Jerusalem are technically governed. It also introduces the organs of state institutions which should, legally, provide for these young people. The fulfilment of settler colonial statehood rests in this complex duality, enforcing participation in legal, bureaucratic processes, while simultaneously abnegating any responsibility towards those Palestinians with permanent residency living under Israeli State jurisdiction. This section explains how, through this duality, a settler colonial statehood is achieved, forming a critical theoretical understanding to the empirical chapters which follow.

The Weberian conception of 'the modern state' (1964) understands 'it' as a putative monopolist of legitimate force, characterized by a system of administrative and legal order, which 'claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens […], but also to a large extent, over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction' (p.156). This definition, as Jonathan Spencer points out, has 'mysteriously lost its capacity to disturb' (Spencer 2007: 119), and as such has sparked considerable anthropological engagement with the complexity of modern state relationships to other forms of power (Sharma and Gupta 2006). Timothy Mitchell's (1991) framing of the 'state effect', that produces an image of the state as separate from society, has gained significant

currency in anthropological approaches to the state, as have efforts to question the extent to which the state is a social construction (Abrams 1988). However, as Spencer (2007) argues, any approach to the study of the state that conceives of the state as external, or as 'a force to be resisted, with more or less heroism, by the plucky subjects of our field research…is unconvincing, not least because it is based on misplaced confidence that, *a priori*, we 'know' what the state 'is' and what it 'does'' (p. 102). The state, or states, with which Palestinian refugee youth in East Jerusalem engage immediately pose critical questions of 'who' or 'what' the state 'is' from their perspective.

The young refugees around whom this study is based hold permanent residency status, colloquially known as the *Jerusalem ID (Howiyeh al Quds)* which, as explained in the previous chapter gives them a conditional access to the Israeli state. This access is conditional in that permanent residents are required to meet specific conditions and requirements to retain it, and also in the physical sense that a closed military checkpoint immediately blocks their physical access to the rest of the state territory. As described in the previous Chapter, the onus always falls on Palestinians in the camp to access the Israeli state, rather than the other way around, since the Israeli state provides no services in the refugee camp. By nature of being physically located on the 'West Bank side' of the separation wall, these refugees are also sometimes required to engage in services from the Palestinian state[46]. While the PA has no jurisdiction to operate in the camp because it officially falls under the Jerusalem municipality, if checkpoint closures preclude Palestinians from physically accessing the Israeli state, they often have no choice but to instead access Palestinian state services (this is particularly relevant in relation to health

[46] For a comprehensive list of the resolutions, decisions and reports regarding the status of Palestine in the United Nations, see [http://palestineun.org/category/palestine-at-the-un/resolutions-icj-advisory-opinion/]. Accessed on 04.05.2018.

care, for example, as alluded to in the Prologue). Finally, the young people in this study concurrently hold refugee ID documents, and live in a refugee camp, in which UNRWA provides basic services (principally health care and education) since the camp was established. These are services that, for permanent residents, should be provided by the Israeli state but are not. They cannot be legally provided by the Palestinian state, leaving UNRWA attempting to bridge the gap. In order to 'characterise' the state, then, it should be clear that while 'the state' in question in this study is predominantly the Israeli state, refugees in Shu'fat straddle something of a unique position in their access to three 'state-like' bodies, and the different relationships refugees hold with each of them. Locating action in a context of the mechanisms of control asserted by the Israeli state, the lack of functionality of the Palestinian state in this context, and the attempts of UNRWA to bridge some of the gaps produced in this context require in depth analysis. As such, the choices young refugees make between these different options are ethnographically analysed in the empirical Chapters which follow.

The matrix of dispossession and control instigated through a settler colonial state framework, as examined in the previous chapter, presents both the visible and invisible state structures that need to be understood theoretically. Settler colonialism is by no means a new modality for interpreting the behaviors of the Israeli state, and as Rana Barakat (2017) has argued, the body of scholarship that theoretically examines Zionism through a settler colonial framework has grown exponentially since the 1965 publication of Fayez Sayegh's study, *Zionist Colonialism in Palestine.* Others have traced this theoretical framework back still further, (Hilal 1976; Said 1979; Pappé 2015a), suggesting that the settler colonial framework has featured in Marxist and anti-Zionist public and scholarly analysis of the context since the 1920s. Scholars today argue that

settler colonialism is not only the most useful paradigmatic perspective on Israel-Palestine to date (Pappé 2012: 40), but also the most productive (Busbridge 2018: 93), in that it forces any discussion of solutions to be framed around decolonization, rather than conventional models of conflict resolution.

Having sought to disentangle settler colonialism from colonialism theoretically, settler colonial studies has become well established as a field in its own right since the deeply influential work of Patrick Wolfe (1999). In 'Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology' (1999), Wolfe established that settler colonialism should be theorised as an on-going structure in the present, as opposed to a one-off event of the past, which is maintained by the drive for access to territory (p.93; also Wolfe 2006: 388). As Jabary-Salamanca et al (2012) outline in the introduction to a special issue of *The Journal of Settler Colonial Studies* (one of three special issues since the establishment of the journal in 2011 to focus on Israel-Palestine), scholarship on violence against Palestinians has often lacked a coherent framework, and as such has documented a variety of Israeli practices[47] as one-off events. Instead, the framework of settler colonialism links the splintering of Palestinian populations (between the West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza, citizens of Israel, refugees and the diaspora) within a systematic pattern.

Settler colonialism as distinct from other forms colonialism or neo-colonialism has subsequently become the subject of much scholarly debate (see for instance Veracini 2010; Bateman 2011; Mikdashi 2013). Contributing to and building on Wolfe's scholarship, settler colonialism is distinguished from other forms of colonialism in two

[47] By practices, I refer here to *inter alia* restricted access to water and to agricultural lands, repeated home demolitions, theft of land, annexation, confiscation of ID cards, deportation, racist laws, arrest and detention without trial, aerial and maritime bombardment, massacre and invasion, the separation wall, the siege on Gaza and coercion into collaboration.

ways. First, unlike colonial soldiers, traders or government agents, settlers come to stay, permanently occupying and asserting sovereignty over indigenous lands. Since the likelihood of finding a genuinely empty land has historically been rare, settler colonialism is premised on the idea of controlling and dominating indigenous peoples in order to establish a new society to replace the original one (Veracini 2013a: 314). As a process by which colonisers come to stay, rather than to temporarily exploit indigenous labour, settler colonialism is about turning a place and its materialities into something else (Veracini 2013b). This takes us to the second distinguishing feature of settler colonialism, which is that it seeks its own end: in other words, while the goal of colonialism is to perpetuate itself, the aim of settler colonialism is to supersede itself (Veracini 2013a:28). This is done by slowly eliminating indigenous claims to the land, including physically removing them from the land, and asserting narratives and structures that increase claims to settler belonging. This is foundational to both the theoretical debates and empirical discussion in which young people grapple with the implications of their decisions to engage further with the Israeli state which seeks to eliminate their claims to the land.

Instruments of state control

A critical theoretical approach drawn from anthropological engagements with the state is the idea that states assert a great deal of power through the everyday practices of routine and repetitive procedures that go unnoticed (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 11). Indeed, monotony, repetition, and time spent engaged in Israeli state bureaucracies occupy many of the empirical narratives presented in this thesis. Counter to Ferguson's (1994) assertion that such bureaucratic proceduralism suppresses 'the political',

bureaucracy in a settler colonial state enables the exertion of power. As the driving narrative of this research suggests, the invisible routines practiced in order to prove residency and retain their status as permanent residents constitute a great deal of everyday life. This study builds in particular on the work of Palestinian feminist scholar and activist Nadera Shalhoub-Kerkovian (2015a; 2015b; and Shalhoub-Kerkovian and Busbridge 2014) in its effort to use ethnographic analysis to move beyond understanding the processes of state bureaucracy, and towards an understanding of what these structures mean to the everyday lives of Palestinians. Such an analysis, she suggests, can reveal the intimacy of everyday politics, moving beyond an understanding of bureaucracy as merely procedural, recognizing instead 'the obsession of occupiers and of their bureaucracies with the intimate details of who is sleeping with whom, who is marrying whom, who is giving birth and whose children are to be recognised' (2015a: 155). Understanding the micro politics of the settler colonial state is critical in order to understand how the state comes to be experienced, navigated, subverted and, perhaps, ultimately claimed by Palestinian refugee youth.

As an extension of state bureaucracy, a further instrument of the state is conditional access to citizenship. While citizenship has long been investigated in terms of the content and depth of rights and responsibilities between an individual and a state, anthropology has moved debates beyond ideas of liberal citizenship to instead ask questions about what constitutes political membership and subjectivity in a given context (Lazar 2013: 2). Aihwa Ong (1996), for instance, has argued that 'citizenship is a process of self-making, and being-made' (p.737), shifting away from the idea of citizenship as a purely legal status towards a position where citizenship is analysed as a complex bundle of practices constituting political membership (Lazar 2013.12). Isin (2008) takes this

further, criticising the idea that political voice is contingent on the granting of formal citizenship. Instead, he argues that acts of citizenship can be individual or collective; and can be either authored or anonymous. In this iteration of citizenship, what counts is not necessarily the legal status of the individual, but rather the 'act' itself. This allows us to consider not only the duality of whether a state grants citizenship to its subjects or not, but rather the way(s) that citizenship as an idea or aspiration is performed and negotiated, particularly within a refugee population. While formal citizenship applications are underway in the context of this study, the aspiration towards citizenship and the different 'acts' of claiming it are argued in Chapter Seven to carry an equally important significance.

Over the last three decades, critical studies of citizenship such as these have emphasised the social, political, cultural and symbolic practices of making citizens (Isin 2008: 17). Whether debating legal citizenship or acts of citizenship, scholars have drawn attention to the distinctions between full and second-class citizenship (for example, Rosaldo 1994a; Dagnino 2006); formal and substantive citizenship (Sassen 2003; Holston 2008); and full or settler colonial citizenship (Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury 2015), the latter of which is conceptualized as an 'empty' citizenship, and is examined in Chapter Seven. Indeed, many adjectives have come to describe the multiplicity of claims made by different individuals on different states connected to citizenship, including among others cultural citizenship (Rosaldo 1994b), insurgent citizenship (Holston 2008), and precarious citizenship (Sundar 2014). For Renato Rosaldo, cultural citizenship refers to the right to be different (in terms of language, ethnicity, race) with respect to the norms of the dominant national community, without compromising one's right to belong. From this cultural citizenship comes a discussion with his research participants (Latino

immigrants to the USA) around second class citizenship and their struggles for a better-quality citizenship. For James Holston, Brazilians in peripheral settlements of São Paulo from the mid twentieth-century onwards challenged their differential treatment by the state through an insurgent citizenship, claiming their rights through the regularisation of land titles. Nandini Sundar theorises precarious citizenship as emerging from the state effect created by performances of sovereignty during civil war. This body of scholarship has critically addressed how people seek a 'better' citizenship than that which they already have, or who find alternative ways to make 'claims' on the state (Lazar 2013: 11). What has been less explored is how subjects become claimants of citizenship under 'surprising conditions' (ibid), such as, for example, settler colonialism. I suggest that an exploration of refugee youth as claimants of a settler colonial citizenship can add to these debates, by seeking to explain what kinds of 'acts' of citizenship are possible in a settler colonial context, and why Palestinian refugee youth aspire to a citizenship that is perceived to be 'empty'.

According to Spencer (2007), investigation into 'the moral investment that many people make in the idea of being owners, or at least members, of a state of their own' has been limited (p.102.). This resonates with Rana Barakat's (2017) critique of a settler colonial studies analytic in Palestine which, she suggests, has led to 'a Zionist centered reading of the narrative of Palestine' (p.350) which, she argues, produces a reading of Palestinian experience within the narrative of a settler colonial project. A more analytically productive understanding of Palestinian indigeneity would come from reading Palestinians as the makers of Palestinian history, as opposed to the products of a Zionist narrative. In efforts to counter this, and to understand the moral investments and their implications among refugee youth who aspire to some level of state, the empirical

chapters of this thesis build up a picture of what refugee youth *do* in a setter colonial state context, rather than what the state does to them. As such, this context can be particularly enabling for a re-thinking of what citizenship comes to mean for individuals living in a settler colonial context.

A continuum of state violence

'Violence' is not the central subject of this thesis, yet given that different kinds of violence emerge powerfully throughout the lives of the young people in Shu'fat camp, the way violence is theoretically framed in relation to the state project needs discussion. Life in Shu'fat camp ebbs and flows between various forms of violence and calm, where both can be present in the same moment. A moment of calm can suddenly become violent; one kind of violence can inexplicably lead to another kind of violence; and perhaps most critically, violence is experienced as the everyday 'normal'. The theoretical history of what Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (2004) have called a continuum of violence (p.1) includes objective, subjective, structural and everyday forms, and helps to understand the ways that these diverse forms of violence come to constitute normal, everyday life. This resonates with Michael Taussig's definition of 'terror as usual':

> "A state of doubleness of social being in which one moves in bursts between somehow accepting the situation as normal, only to be thrown into a panic or shocked into disorientation by an event, a rumour, a sight, something said or not said – something that even while it requires the normal in order to make its impact destroys it" (1992: 18).

Within Taussig's definition, the duality of being between these two states, is a helpful way of understanding the implications of living between structural and everyday violence in Shu'fat camp. This duality of being is picked up again later in this Chapter through a discussion of the social condition produced by living in violent spaces.

Structural violence refers to the ways that history, politics and economics oppress certain people (Galtung 1969; Farmer 2004). As the grounding of this study in settler colonialism attests, structural violence applied through the 'logic of elimination' has been a determinant of Palestinian lives since the 1948 *Nakba.* To draw on a different terminology, almost two decades ago Israeli anthropologist Jeff Halper (2000) termed this structural violence in the occupied Palestinian territories as a 'matrix of control'. This kind of violence is invisible, in that it is taken for granted as part of the everyday landscape. In the Palestinian context, it manifests through access to land and territory, policed through a permit regime that works alongside visible materialities (the separation wall, roadblocks and checkpoints to name a few) to control the movement of people. Within this regime are countless routines that come to structure daily life for Palestinians, ranging from long term family separations because of different permits and the withdrawal of family reunification procedures; when and where to give birth; to everyday decisions of times of day to travel, and means of transport. As explained in the previous Chapter, for Palestinians with permanent residency, any confrontation with the law could lead to the revocation of legal status. The fear of this possibility emerges powerfully throughout this study as being the absolute forefront of people's concerns. State power through structural violence, then, is still connected to the ability of the state to arrest, detain, maim or kill individuals with a charge of suspicion (or no charge at all); but it is also connected to a what Shalhoub-Kerkovian (2015a) has described as a political

economy of fear (p.10) which simultaneously obscures and perpetuates violence and power inequalities.

Structural state violence emerges in this context not only through the historic, political and economic strategies of oppression pursued by the state, but also in the strategies they *do not* pursue. Chapter Four examines in detail the ways that refugee youth experience their community through a lack of state intervention to address violence in the camp. Drug dealing and consumption, crime and street violence are never policed by the Israeli state in the camp, even though the camp falls within the Jerusalem municipality. There is no regular electricity supply to the camp; the provision of water is inconsistent; the sewage system has not been maintained; roads are in dire need of repair, to the extent that many are impassable by vehicle; and the municipality does not facilitate waste removal in the camp. UNRWA operates to a limited extent to fill some of these gaps (as discussed in the previous Chapter), and community initiatives sometimes compensate in small ways. The point for this discussion is that another significant example of structural violence in Shu'fat camp is not only what the state does, but what it does not do. It is useful here to link the theory of structural violence to Sara Roy's (1987; third edition 2016) concept of 'de-development'.

Framed in economic terms, de-development is defined as 'a process which undermines or weakens the ability of an economy to grow and expand by preventing it from accessing and utilizing critical inputs needed to promote internal growth beyond a specific structural level' (Roy 1987: 56). De-development was originally theorized to explain the political economy of Gaza, but has since emerged as one of the most meaningful and influential concepts to explain the impact of occupation on Palestinian people, where economic and societal potential is '…not only distorted, but denied' (Roy

2007a: 33). In the Forward to a seminal book that tackles the 'invisible colonial grammar' in political economy analyses of Palestine (Turner and Shweiki 2014: 2), Roy argues that, not only has de-development arguably reached its logical conclusion of distorting economic activity in the oPt, but that as a concept, de-development can equally be applied to the Palestinian body politic. Analyses of the relationship between de-development and settler colonialism have largely focused on structures of domination and subordination, with an analytical gap surrounding the exploration of more mundane aspects of power (Shalhoub-Kerkovian and Busbridge 2014: 80). By focusing on micro-dimensions of power, this study brings a deeper insight into what it means to grow up in such contexts. Chapter Four takes this theoretical argument forward to ethnographically analyse the emergence of a 'societal de-development' in the camp, while Chapter Six analyses the expansion of 'de-development' to an online realm through policing of social media. Together, these are used to empirically explain the settler colonial strategy of ruling through dis-rule, allowing spaces of violence to perpetuate themselves. Turning to theories of everyday and ordinary violence offers critical insights to this idea.

In her 1997 article *Peace-Time Crimes,* Nancy Scheper-Hughes wrote that everyday violence could '…encompass the implicit, legitimate, organized and routinised violence of particular socio-political state formations' (p.471). Everyday violence concurrently links to Taussig's 'terror as usual' through public displays of violence, yet in so doing manages to camouflage broader projects of structural violence underway. In this way, everyday violence serves the settler colonial state project exceptionally well. Scheper-Hughes (ibid.) adds that everyday violence produces a social indifference to suffering. On this point, it is helpful to consider the theoretical implications of language used to talk about violence in the camp. Early in my fieldwork, as we were nearing the

end of a long day of workshops in an UNRWA school, my research assistant Reem yawned, saying with her wry, dark humour she hoped the army would not come to the camp that night because she could really do with a good night's sleep. The army did go into the camp that night and a number of men were arrested and detained. The following day, Reem's face was immaculately made up, but still she looked exhausted. Asking how the previous night had been, she replied '*ādi*. In Arabic, *'ādi* means ordinary, usual, nothing new; but it also carries an air of, 'what am I supposed to say' – or, in Arabic, *shu ehna lazem bnsowie* (what are we supposed to do?). '*Ādi* is an answer one could give to questions of *kīfik* (how are you); *shu al akhbar* (what's going on, what's new); or *kif al wada'* (literally how is the situation, meaning how are things here, often used to refer to the broader political situation in a place). It was also a word often used in answer to questions of what happened when the army came to the camp before; or questions about the news of siblings or other family members in prison.

The mundane and the ordinary, as expressed in Reem's response, have long been staples of social anthropology, but were for some time neglected in anthropologies of violence and displacement (Das et al 2001). Das (2007) argues that attempts to regain everyday practices by a 'descent into the ordinary' are crucial to the ways people can live through and beyond violence. Anthropological scholarship on Palestine has built upon this idea, examining not only what becomes ordinary in contexts of structural and everyday violence, but what ordinary means to those living through it. Lori Allen's (2008) study of how violence became normal during the second *Intifada* analysed the political implications of cultural practices in which violence became routinised. Her analysis of the multiple forms of agency entailed through normalized violence led to a theoretical understanding of navigating the occupation by 'getting by': an idea that I expand upon in

the concluding section of this chapter. In a different analysis of everyday life during the second *Intifada*, Tobias Kelly (2006) explained the desire of individuals to pursue ordinary lives in extraordinary circumstances as based first and foremost in obligations to provide for families. Writing on the way extraordinary levels of endurance in the aftermath of violence become 'ordinary' among the wives and mothers of Palestinian martyrs and prisoners, Lotte Buch-Segal (2016) suggests that focusing on the ordinary and everyday creates concurrent feelings of hope and doubt. These works have not only highlighted the importance of attending to the ways that violence is normalized in the Palestinian context, but the way that 'ordinary' becomes a critical analytical lens through which to understand broader social and political change. Indeed, it prompts us to question what the meaning of *'ādi* or the ordinary is in the context of Palestine (Buch-Segal 2016). This thesis builds upon this literature by seeking to understand the kinds of decisions that evolve when so much is taken as ordinary.

Returning to Taussig's 'state of doubleness' as cited at the beginning of this section, I suggest that any such understanding of the ordinary, must remain grounded in the ways that communities read and assess violence in the everyday. Lamia Mognieh (2017) has conceptualized this as 'living-in violence', building on the idea that there is a need to pay greater attention to how violence, however ordinary it has become, is both anticipated and experienced (drawing on Khayyat 2013 and Hermez 2017)[48]. In an article on the struggle of precarity in post-invasion Iraq, Hayder al-Mohammed (2012) similarly attends to the heightened state of alertness produced by the constant anticipation of

[48] Mognieh's argument also questions the growing theoretical and empirical interest in such contexts and what the methodological implications are for capturing the experience of 'living in violence' ethnographically (p.25). These debates are picked up in greater depth in the following Chapter in a discussion of the methodological approach taken for this study.

violence during the pursuit of the ordinary. As Buch-Segal (2016) writes, 'what is most violent about the situation in occupied Palestine is that it continues without end' (p.17). The 'social condition' that is produced by the 'state of doubleness', between what is *'ādi* and the precarious nature of living-in violence, forms the basis of the final section of this Chapter.

This section has drawn theoretically from settler colonial studies to explain the state(s) of control under which refugee youth in Shu'fat live. It has highlighted critical aspects of state machinery that pertain to this thesis, namely state bureaucracies and citizenship to which the empirical data of this study will contribute. Finally, it has drawn from the literature on structural and everyday, or ordinary violence as deeply meaningful to understanding how the settler colonial state project operates in the everyday. Before building a conceptual framework to understand the social condition produced by the characterisation of the state offered here, it is first necessary to locate to 'actors' of this study within two academic landscapes: the literature on Palestinian refugees; and theoretical approaches to the study of youth.

Approaches to Palestinian forced displacement

Palestine as a place, as a struggle and as one of the most enduring 'questions' (Said 1979) of the last 100 years since the Balfour Declaration has been theorised from many angles: indeed, as noted by the Society for Palestinian Anthropology in their inaugural call for papers (2018), almost every facet of Palestinian living and dying has been subject to academic scrutiny. In relation to Palestinian refugees, the distinctions surrounding refugee status have been extensively debated by scholars of history, law and political

sciences (Takkenberg 1998; Akram 2002; al Husseini and Bocco 2009; Kagen 2009; Erekat 2015). These debates have addressed the historically exceptional nature of Palestinian refugee status, focusing in particular on the protection gap facing Palestinian refugees since no Agency is responsible for seeking durable solutions on their behalf[49].

Despite the lack of legal protection offered to refugees, UNRWA has continued to be considered as a historically structural feature in refugee lives, and the relationship between Palestinian refugees and the Agency has been the subject of much ethnographic enquiry (in particular Farah 2009, 2010; Rosenfeld 2010; Gabiam 2012; Feldman 2012, 2015, 2017; Abu Moghli, Bitari and Gabiam 2015). This scholarship has built critical insights into the role refugees ascribe to camp spaces as ways of being and living in a Palestinian context. It contrasts with the popular, instrumentalised use of Giorgio Agamben's (1998) suggestion that refugees become reduced to their 'bare life' living in camps that are set outside the normal judicial order by a single sovereign power[50]. Scholarship on the Palestinian context has instead highlighted the complexity of power struggles between refugees, humanitarian agencies and NGOs, occupying powers, host governments and governments in waiting, who contest and negotiate the camp space (for example see Salih 2013; Ramadan 2013; Allan 2014; Martin 2015; Aburahme 2015; Woronieka-Krzyzanowska 2017; Tuastad 2017; Hajj 2017). These scholars have

[49] The failures of the UNCCP to do so have already been addressed in the previous Chapter.

[50] It should also be noted that some scholars working on Palestinian refugees have been inspired by Giorgio Agamben's (1998) work, using Agamben's analysis to examine the separation of Palestinian refugee camps from the political sphere of sovereignty and citizenship, and their reproduction as biopolitical paradigms of the state of exception (in particular Are and Hanafi eds. 2011). Elsewhere, (Martin 2015) Agamben's theory has been developed towards a new model of 'the camp-scape', in which both camps and informal settlements represent a new 'collective exception', suggesting that Palestinian refugees are not the only members of Lebanese society experiencing 'bare-life'. However, the dominant argument has been that while Agamben's model might work for the analysis of coercive camp spaces (Giaccaria and Minca 2011), the complex realities of protracted displacement require a more nuanced analytical framework (Katz 2015; Woroniecka- Krzyzanowska 2017).

emphasized the multifaceted socioeconomic and political agendas of each of these actors (see also Feldman 2015a and 2015b; Oesch 2017) that highlight the complexity of social conditions in protracted exile. Some scholars have called for the 'de-exceptionalisation' of refugee camps (Sigona 2015), while others have sought to 'de-essentialise exception' as an analytical category, examining materialities (Aburahme 2015) and governance (Woroniecka- Krzyzanowska 2017) through an interrogation of the way exception is produced, negotiated and challenged in Palestinian camp spaces. These studies have also contributed to the growing literature on humanitarian governance which has more broadly illustrated dynamics of legitimacy between humanitarian agencies and the recipients of aid, questioning who humanitarian interventions really intend to 'serve' (Fassin 2007 and 2012; McConnachie 2014; Scott-Smith 2016). The relationship between refugee youth and UNRWA as an institution, or a specific focus on the politics of humanitarian interventions among Palestinian refugees in Shu'fat are not central features of this thesis. The arguments do, however, add to discussions around understanding the ways refugees relate to the agencies that seek to govern them, and in particular to the 'value' that they attribute to the refugee status they are granted (Cole 2018; Bardelli 2018). The value of refugee status in this context comes to light in comparison to the practical 'qualities' that citizenship can offer, particularly in a context where neither of the two are deemed to carry any significant political meaning.

Another major theme in studies of Palestinian refugees, is the way these competing political and socio-economic agendas play out. Building on Rosemary Sayigh's (1979) seminal oral history of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, studies of Palestinian displacement have critically documented the ways that 'the nation' is imagined, produced and recreated in refugee spaces. Palestinian political actors have often referred to

Palestinian refugee camps as crucial reminders of the right of return, and a symbol of refugee refusal of *tawteen* (resettlement). The 'right way' to live as a refugee has been to persist in the struggle for national liberation: or as Feldman writes (2015b), to struggle by persistence. Refugees are seen as an embodiment of *sumūd*, a particularly stoical form of steadfastness that connotes perseverance against all (often violent) odds (ibid.; see also Hart 2002; Bowker 2003; Peteet 2005; Fincham 2012; Larkin 2014). These are ideas that we return to later, and which become integral to the conceptual framework of this thesis. From this perspective, 'people are meant to persist as refugees until the threshold moment of liberation and return. Refugees are charged at once with living in waiting for that moment…with serving as symbols for Palestinian national claims, and with anticipating a future liberation' (Feldman 2015b: 245). The idea that Palestinian nationalism mobilises the practice of *sumūd,* particularly within refugee communities has been foundational to a great deal of research on the Palestinian struggle (see Sayigh 1993 and Buch-Segal 2016 for further discussion).

Working in other refugee contexts, scholars have argued for a deeper interrogation of whose interests are served by the assertion of 'good' refugees, or refugees living 'the right way' (in particular Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014; see also Fassin 2012). As Feldman (2014) argues, the idea that refugees continue to maintain the struggle for liberation and return has dominated Palestinian political thinking about refugees and refugee camps. Some scholars have, however, developed alternative arguments. For instance, Hart notes the reference to younger generations as *jeel al-awdeh* (the generation of return), constructing young people as 'agents of redemption' for the homeland (2002: 38). Through ethnographic research with young refugees however, Hart (2008) suggested that while young people continued to 'perform' nationalism in the

presence of their parents, when left alone they would express that they identified more with being Jordanian than Palestinian. Similarly, Fincham's research among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon suggested that the nation 'must be collectively imagined through the construction of an authentic shared culture and an official national memory' (2012: 50). Precisely because these imaginings become so routinised however, the symbols of this nationalism quickly become banal. Attachment to a land that many have never seen, and believe it unlikely that they will see, for example, is unifying only at the level of rhetoric (ibid.:14). Concentrating specifically on the political cultures surrounding the refugee right of return, Sophie Richter-Devroe (2013) asked different generations of refugees in the West Bank, Jordan and Lebanon what 'return' and place of origin meant to different individuals (between a permanent return to historic Palestine; to a transnational dimension of life; or something else (p.94)). While narratives among the first and second generation of refugees were unified across locations, the articulations of third and fourth generation refugees varied considerably, and suggested a shift was underway among this generation in relation to what they saw as acceptable ways of living and thinking as a Palestinian refugee. Indeed, as Sayigh (2012), Salih (2011) and Richter-Devroe (2012) have suggested, young Palestinians are often those most likely to critique and challenge political elites and political projects, displaying the most imaginative and creative ideas for future political cultures.

The body of literature on the Palestinian refugee context has built a steady picture of Palestinian displacement, with critical contributions to the ways we understand place-making in exile; transmission of identity across generations; moving to analyse what happens across multiple generations of a displaced population, and how challenging it becomes to continually re-produce historic narratives. This has enabled critical

questioning of what 'the political' comes to mean in such contexts, ultimately challenging scholars and other interested parties to seriously consider ways of thinking about empathy and solidarity in relation to Palestine and Palestinian displacement. While it is perhaps not surprising to see the emergence of similar subjectivities among third generation refugees in East Jerusalem as in Lebanon and Jordan, the implications this carries in the oPt are arguably heavier. Indeed, as one PA official told me after an early presentation of some of the empirical work of this thesis, these findings could be 'dangerous' and have 'critical consequences' for 'the struggle'. While in this thesis I theorise the experiences of protracted displacement among young people from a stance of deep solidarity and empathy, it is important to recognise this gap in scholarship. There is therefore a need to explain theoretically the life choices and trajectories of young people who have grown up in refugee camp communities in a post-Oslo era.

Conceptualising youth in protracted violence and displacement

The empirical characterization of youth is addressed throughout this thesis, but it is important to clarify the way that both 'youth' and the process of youth becoming adults are theorised in the empirical Chapters which follow. The term 'youth' is derived in relation to specific social processes, cultural understandings and historical influences. Youth is inherently a time of transition from the generative category of childhood to the life-course phase of adulthood. As a socially constructed identity, it has multiple configurations and should be understood as both a dynamic and contested concept: 'as both social *being* and social *becoming*: as a position in movement' (Vigh 2006a:11). While young people may be ascribed a generational position, they may also seek to move out of it, or within it in different ways (Hart 2008: 11). It is therefore problematic to use the

concept of youth to categorise individuals within a certain age group. Rather, if considered as a social process, youth should rather be understood as 'a negotiation between the social significance of age…and the significance of other social divisions, as well as a struggle for meanings between different social groups of young people and the more powerful definitions and constructions of other groups' (Bloch, Sigona and Zetter 2014: 127; Wyn and White 1997). Emphasising youth as a position of social becoming is critical to the empirical analysis in this thesis, but also pushes back against divergent theoretical understandings of youth in other fields. The study of youth as either 'troublesome', (generally male) individuals who spark and perpetuate violence, or 'troubled' (generally female) individuals who are passive victims of the same has been subject to important critique (Stainton-Rogers and Stainton-Rogers 1992: 182). I seek to build on this unsettling of gendered categorisations of youth throughout this thesis.

These categories have been particularly pervasive in the Palestinian context. Troublesome youth come to the fore in theories that connect youth unemployment to the potential for violent rebellion through youth bulge theory (see Huntington 1996; Collier 2000; Goldstone 2001). Youth bulge theory has become a popular explanation for current political instability in the MENA region and for recruitment to international terrorist networks (Urdal 2004: 1). Gendered assumptions dominate this research, claiming that '…overwhelmingly, the people who join rebellions are young men' (Collier 2000: 94). This has led to the assumption that youth are generally marginalized, and females in particular are consistently victimized through a focus on specific forms of violence discussed in isolation from their social-cultural contexts (including early marriage, female genital circumcision and sexual exploitation) (Boyden et al. 2014: 7). While these ideas were developed around two decades ago, they continue to be popular

among scholarship on youth in the Middle East (for example, Chabaan 2008; Dhillon and Yousef 2009; Assad et al. 2010; Egel and Salehi-Isfahani 2010; Sayre and Kraetsch 2011; Gebel and Heyne 2014). In the Palestinian context, specifically in light of the violence in the oPt since 2015, it has been claimed that 'no factor correlates stronger with political violence than youth bulges' (Tuastad 2017: 164)**.** The concept has also gained significant traction in policy circles in the oPt, and has become a commonly cited basis of humanitarian and development planning for young people (see for example Brookings 2009; UNFPA 2017; ILO 2018). A more nuanced explanation of youth engagement in political violence is therefore critical in the current Palestinian context.

Another body of youth literature, that has dominated approaches to the study of young people in Palestine is rooted in a mental health perspective (for recent examples, see Dubow et al 2009; Al-Krenawi and Graham 2012; Basak 2012; Qouta et al. 2012; Khamis 2013; Vostanis et al. 2013; Veronese et al 2014; Miller-Graff and Cummings 2017; Veronese et al 2017). These examples follow a general trend in the literature relating to youth and violence, conflict or war, using biomedical frameworks as analytical tools to understand the experience of young people. Research in this field carries weight in its applicability to humanitarian and development practice, and is frequently used by NGOs and UN agencies in developing programmatic responses to young people in contexts of violence, conflict or war, while important social and environmental variants and the subtle complexities of these experiences are omitted (see Boyden and de Berry 2004). Through such studies, youth are portrayed as passive victims of adult decision-making, whether adults cause direct harm to young people, or 'coerce' them into combat (for examples of such treatment of youth in conflict affected situations elsewhere, see Ayalon 1983; McHan 1985; Hamilton and Mann 1998; Gupta 2000; Vindevogel et al 2013;

Harendra de Silva 2013). The assumption carried forward is that the traumatic experiences of violence in childhood and youth form a generation of adults for whom taking part in violence becomes normalised (Boyden 1994; West 2004).

By contrast, anthropological scholarship on youth subjectivities, experience and aspired future trajectories, specifically in contexts of divergent forms of violence and displacement, has grown since the formative work of Jo Boyden and Joanna De Berry (2004. For further examples see Christiansen, Utas and Vigh 2006; Panelli et al 2007; Hart 2008; Enria 2018a). The need to understand the lives of young people in relation to the structures, expectations and constraints under which they have grown up has become central to anthropological studies of youth, bringing an inter-generational perspective to the core of analysis (in particular Huijsmans et al 2014; Durham 2017). Chapter Five of this thesis in particular builds on this inter-generational perspective to consider a future-oriented generational dynamic among refugee youth, emphasizing the ways youth make decisions based around attempts to secure better futures for their as-yet unborn children. This has been an under-studied aspect of research with youth around the world, which has tended to prioritise understanding inter-generational relationships between youth and their elders, rather than seeing youth as having a future vision that concerns the way their actions will have meaning for *their* children (Durham 2017).

The ways in which youth are conceptualised within a society invariably impacts on the position they adopt within that society, as well as their aspirations for the future, and the way they negotiate processes of becoming adult (Ansell 2005; Bloch, Sigona and Zetter 2014. The direct Arabic translation of youth, *shabab* is typically used in reference to males in Palestine. *Shabab* can be used in a variety of a contexts and to denote different meanings. Young males regularly refer to themselves as *shabab,* in a way that would

perhaps better translate as 'guys': for example, a young man motioning to a group of friends to get on a bus or leave a café might say, *yallah shabab,* come on guys, let's go. In conversations about the past with older generations of refugees, *Shabab* was often used as an expression of pride, referring to the young men who had fought for the camp during the *intifada* years. Today however, *shabab* had adopted a more negative framing, used to refer to those who caused trouble in the camp. Some young women in the camp would collectively refer to themselves as *shababes*, referring to their groups of female friends and drawing on the English 'babe' as an adjunct to *shabab* (although this would only appears in writing, as was a play on words rather than a construction used to delineate a social group). Groups of young women more typically referred to themselves as *sabaaya,* translated as 'girls', regardless of whether or not they were married. While clearly the intellectual discussion surrounding 'youth' and their portrayal is critical, throughout the remaining Chapters of this thesis I refer to interlocutors interchangeably as youth, young people, and in cases where they self-defined as such, young adults. For instance, if a female interlocutor was married at the age of 15 or 16, and particularly if she already had children, she would consider herself to be an adult. Throughout this thesis, I refer to my interlocutors in the ways that they self-defined, rather than the ways they were defined by other adults.

While many studies of youth have moved away from biological boundaries and definitions, so too have those of adulthood. Rather than being defined around a specific age category (predominantly centered around the legal age of 18 in accordance with the UNCRC[51]), the term 'social adulthood' has frequently been used to indicate that it is a

[51] Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) defines a child as anyone under the age of 18, unless the laws of a particular country set the legal age for adulthood younger. The Guiding

socially defined and recognized status, rather than a biological one (Durham 2017). Theoretical engagement with transitions from childhood to social adulthood have a long academic history (see for example Van Gennep 1909; Piaget 1936; Erickson 1950). Although Erickson's (1950) stage model to psychosocial development has been subject to critique (see for example O'Rand and Kreker 1990), individuals are still considered by life course theorists to move through different stages and roles via different rites of passage or events that hold socially symbolic meaning (Elder 1994). Transitions to adulthood are thus understood to include a combination of biological change and change in social status, roles and responsibilities, such as the completion of school education; moving out of the parental home; transitioning from school to work; developing a meaningful relationship with a life partner (which may include marriage); becoming a parent; and exercising citizenship (Lloyd 2005: 5; World Bank 2006). Adding further depth to these stages, Boyden et al (2014) discuss the transition to adulthood as a time when sexual identity becomes clearer (on queering transitions to adulthood, see also Torkelson 2015; Vembar 2016); institutional contexts change to either further education or employment; and a time when a change in residence may mean migration (p.4).

In childhood and youth studies globally there is an emergent focus on the ways that youth transitions to adulthood are evolving. Although young people may be dispossessed of their political or economic rights, they continue to find ways of gaining responsibility and respect in their communities. Young people are described as 'stuck' either inside the family home unable to afford to leave (Hansen 2005; Brinton 2011) and adding to the financial burden of their families in doing so (Zhang 2013); or 'stuck'

principles of the UNCRC are available via [https://www.unicef.org/crc/files/Guiding_Principles.pdf]. Accessed on 03.03.2018.

outside the family home and unable to build the separate household necessary to be seen as adults (Sommers 2012). Young people have been described as being in a period of 'waithood' as they are still not understood to have attained social adulthood well into their thirties (Honwana 2012; Singerman 2013). More ominous than waithood is Vigh's (2006) terming of this liminality as a state of 'social death'. Elsewhere they are mired with 'timepass', busying themselves with further study or aimless activities as they are unable to secure employment (Jeffrey 2010a). As these scholars look for new ways to explain how young people transition to social adulthood in contexts where social, economic and political structures are changing, some question the continuing utility of the 'transitions' concept altogether (Morrow 2013). In particular, young people growing up in contexts of forced displacement or armed conflict often find that conventional patterns through which these transitions might take place are undermined (Boyden and de Berry 2004; Hart 2008) and elsewhere, young people are required to migrate in order that these transitions might take place (Crivello 2007; Monsutti 2010). Framing the empirical data of this thesis around theories of migration is neither politically correct or appropriate; yet the argument that young people are required to make serious life choices in order for these transitions to take place carries across to this context.

I began fieldwork anticipating that these frameworks would be formative in understanding how refugee youth were adapting transitions to adulthood around a declining Palestinian economy, and in a context of protracted everyday violence where rates of arrest and time spent in prison (particularly among young men) continue to be high. What I found instead was that across genders and class divisions in the camp, youth transitions to adulthood were not 'under threat' as a result of structural circumstances *per se*: youth were not 'trapped', unable to marry or to be seen as adults in their

communities either as a result of limited finances or the violence in their everyday lives. Rather, female and male youth differently drew on their transitions to adulthood as moments of change to engage with the Israeli state. A useful alternative conceptualization for these moments of change can be found in Johnson-Hanks' (2002) notion of 'vital conjunctures' as 'socially structured zones of possibility that emerge around specific periods of potential transformation in a life' (p.870). This 'zone of possibility' might last from several months to several years, and emerge in contexts of particularly oppressive structures as individuals attempt to navigate emerging opportunities for change. A consequence is to place an emphasis on the contingent and anticipated future in a given context, as opposed to universally ordered stages of progression, providing a more malleable framework through which to understand changes as young people become adults. 'Vital conjunctures' is yet to gain significant currency in youth research, but the idea is useful in this thesis as a way of understanding the ability of young people to make strategic changes to their own lives.

As a final note, it is important to highlight the hetero-normativity of such a framing, and acknowledge that this approach could differ significantly among refugees of diverse sexual orientation and gender identity in the camp. None of my interlocutors in Shu'fat indicated that they were of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity, and it is therefore beyond the remit of this research to speak to these complex debates. Critical scholarship has recently started to call for an increased queering of debates on Palestine more broadly (see for example the Introduction by Farsakh et al. to the 2018 special issue of the *Journal for Palestine Studies* on 'Queering Palestine'). While the theoretical framing here remains heteronormative as a result of the empirical data it has drawn from, there is clearly a space to consider how this argument would differ for refugee youth of diverse

sexual orientation and gender identity. Turning now to the final section of this Chapter, I propose a conceptual framework through which the choices made during these moments of change, or vital conjunctures for refugee youth can be explained.

Morality and strategic pragmatism: a conceptual framework

Having considered different ways of theorizing the state that forms the backdrop to this thesis, and the theoretical debates surrounding the study of Palestinian refugees and youth in contexts of violence and displacements, this conceptual framework seeks to theoretically explain what it is that refugee youth, growing up under the settler colonial state and its various productions *do*. First, it locates the actions and decisions of refugee youth in Shu'fat in a 'social condition of setter colonialism', which, I argue is characterised by a sense of existential precarity. Turning to the applicability of a framework of everyday resistance to explain the agency of Palestinians in the oPt, it makes a careful argument around why this approach does not do enough to adequately explain the actions of youth in this context. It introduces the growing literature surrounding morality and moralities in anthropology as a way of acknowledging the political complexity that comes with challenging the notion that the 'right way' to live as a refugee is to continue to struggle for the cause, foregrounding an argument that is further developed in Chapter Six. Finally, it brings together the concepts of strategy and pragmatism, theoretically articulating the relationship between these concepts as the most helpful way of explaining the actions of refugee youth as they navigate the settler colonial state.

The social condition of settler colonialism

In *Culture in Chaos: An anthropology of the social condition of war*, Stephen Lubkemann (2008) theorises the social existence of 'the growing number of people throughout the world who struggle to survive prolonged warfare and displacement' (p.1). Lubkemann considers both the ways people behave in contexts of protracted violence and conflict, and, concurrently, the impact that protracted violence and conflict has on social and cultural processes. Doing anthropology in a setting where social processes are characterised by disruptions and instabilities requires substantial thinking through the meaning of extraordinary events and circumstances that quickly become routine and everyday. As Hoffmann and Lubkemann have observed, in contexts in which '…the certainty of uncertainty has become a fundamental reality in the lives of social actors, the relationship between the unpredictable moment and the predictable one have been normatively inverted. Inasmuch as instability becomes the norm, unpredictability has become unremarkable, and the predictable moment the one marked as exceptional' (2005: 318). This succinctly draws together much of literature already discussed in characterizing the state, as well as the contextual analysis laid out in the previous Chapter. The conceptual framework adopted in this thesis, then, is located in what I term here as a social condition of settler colonialism.

A growing anthropological literature is exploring the centrality of uncertainty in social life (most recently, Cooper and Pratten's edited volume, 2015; see also Kleinman 2006; Das 2007). The theorisation of uncertainty is useful to this framework, particularly with reference to modes of action that uncertainty brings. This 'reflexive action' (Cooper and Pratten: 3), or theory of action in a 'subjunctive mood' (drawing from Wagner-Pacifici

2000) attends to action based on that which is yet to happen: 'a doubting, hoping, provisional, cautious and testing disposition to action' (Whyte 2005: 251). While this mood of action produces useful adverbs, in the uncertainty literature they are generally related to a sense of optimism, turning uncertainty on its head by deriding something positive out of these circumstances. In this sense theorising uncertainty in the lives of refugee youth in Shu'fat does not sit well. It would be wrong to assert that youth in Shu'fat make a straightforward connection between the idea of attaining Israeli citizenship and the idea that this will lead to better life. While they seek out a greater sense of security and stability in doing so, they are well aware of the potential political costs involved. Understanding this social condition as one of precarity is potentially a more useful way forward.

Conceptualising precarity places a focus on uncertainties that exist as inherent and internal to 'the ordinary', rather than as something exceptional. In *Precarious Life*, Judith Butler (2004) argues that the concept urges us to attend to the 'slippages, fraying, and importantly the exposure of life itself' (p.600), and that by embracing precarity we might 'attempt to catch some of the physical, emotional, intellectual and practical work that goes into making life, and also the type(s) of life or lives we want to lead' (p.608). Unlike other terms, such as 'vulnerability', precarity does not indicate an assumed subjugation: rather it encapsulates a potential for change or mobilisation among those who experience it (Waite 2008).

Within the growing conceptual use of precarity in anthropology (for example, Molé 2012; al-Mohammed 2012; Millar 2014; and on material precarity specifically, Mould 2017), Anne Allison's (2013) terming of 'social precarity' (p. 354) is a particularly useful way of addressing the interplay of material, social and existential insecurities in

life. Going a step further, Shahram Khosravi's (2017) ethnography of youth culture and migration in Iran builds the link between precarity and social conditions, emphasising how 'one form of insecurity leads to another form, engendering multiple precarities that undermine and de-securitize one's life condition' (p. 4-5). Based on the discussions of the previous Chapter, the political engineering of a settler colonial state has arguably created a social condition of precarity among Palestinians in both economic and political terms. Considering refugee youth specifically however, their lives are not only precarious because of the structural imposition on the Palestinian economy; or the stagnation of the Palestinian political status quo. Rather, as they challenge what it 'means' to be a refugee in the third or fourth generation, experiencing an ever-encroaching settler colonial rule and with no faith in the Palestinian national leadership, their circumstance can perhaps be characterized as existential precarity. Building on Allison and Khosravi's framings in particular, existential precarity is therefore conceptualized here in an effort to understand the responses of Palestinian refugee youth young people to the historical moment in which they are living.

The limitations of a resistance framework

Within a context of existential precarity, a conceptual framework is required to theoretically explain the emerging actions and subjectivities of refugee youth. The anthropology of politics has only recently re-emerged (Spencer 2007: 28), and predominantly explorations of political ideas in anthropology have centered around studies of power and resistance to it. Building on the earlier work of British cultural theorists including Raymond Williams (1958) and E.P. Thompson (1963), a collection of

studies that developed an anthropological understanding of 'resistance' in the mid 1980s launched with the publication of Jean Comaroff's (1985) *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: the culture and history of a South African people;* James Scott's (1985) *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance,* and Aihwa Ong's (1987) *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Decline: factory women in Malaysia.* Arguably the most influential of these texts was Scott's work on small manifestations of what he theorized as 'everyday resistance' among agricultural laborers in a Malaysian village, and the ways in which they were able to undermine the authority and power of local landowners. Scott's scholarship specifically marked a break away from concerns with overt rebellion, encouraging anthropologists instead to focus on the pursuit of political struggle in places not immediately deemed as 'political'. Everyday resistance as theorised by Scott (see also 1989; 1990) is quiet, disguised or indeed seemingly invisible through different kinds of behavior. Actions such as disloyalty, laziness, passivity, avoidance and gossip are, he argues, examples of everyday resistance which are 'small scale…relatively safe…[promising] vital material gains [and requiring] little or no formal coordination' (Scott 1989: 35). Particularly useful in contexts where an outright rebellion would be too risky, Scott argues that these tactics are equally valid and meaningful ways of opposing domination. It is therefore relevant to ask, in relation to this study, whether the ways and means through which Palestinian refugee youth make different claims on the Israeli state could be explained through a framework of everyday resistance.

Moving to a contemporary Middle Eastern context, Charles Tripp's (2013) *The Power and the People: Paths of resistance in the Middle East* argues that the politics of resistance in the oPt, and the region more broadly, has become 'a way of engaging with, indicting and seeking to change whole systems of power and exclusion' (p.5). In the post-

2011 regional context, an effective way to lay bare Foucault's (1980) conceptualization of the 'capillary' forms of power is to analyse a combination of small, sometimes invisible gestures with major demonstrations and spectacular acts of violence in what Tripp terms the 'capillary forms of resistance' (p.5-6). In the Palestinian context, this has been explored through a mirroring of settler colonial state power, in which, like the settler colonial state, resistance is also conceptualized as a structure, and not as an event (Svirsky 2017). Indeed, many scholars have adopted the mantle of everyday resistance, reading it theoretically into varying actions and materialities in the Palestinian context. Among the broad literature that adopts an everyday resistance approach has been the consideration of ordinary resistance (Laïdi-Hanieh 2008); popular cinema as popular resistance (Loshitzky 2012; Shwaikh and Van Gils 2016); cultural resistance (Rivers 2015); hiking as resistance (Clarno 2015); creative resistance (Patierno 2015); visual resistance (Alloul 2016); theater as resistance (Santos 2018); heritage as resistance (De Cesari 2017); unarmed resistance (Darweish and Rigby 2015); and in the context of joint Palestinian-Israeli activism against the occupation, co-resistance (Gale 2016). While each of these studies finds new subtleties in the use of an everyday resistance framing, they are unified by the assertion that small scale, relatively safe actions that require little coordination (to draw on Scott's definition above) all add up to acts of subversion of the macro-politics of settler colonialism in Palestine.

In light of such a multitude of studies and meanings derived from the term, it is pertinent to refer back to Lila Abu Lughod's work (1990), which refocused attention on the importance of intention and voice in ascribing resistance to actions. Abu Lughod has argued that unless there is a relatively conscious intention to resist, it is not the place of the social scientist to ascribe 'resistance' to an action. Indeed, the institutionalizing of an

everyday resistance approach in anthropology more broadly has provoked scathing accusations of 'power functionalism' (Sahlins 2002), for the way anthropology had begun to elevate the political importance of seeming trivia and reducing a diverse and complex variety of contexts to the workings of 'power'. Saba Mahmood (2005) has also contributed to this debate, emphasising the importance of being attentive to the elisions that any process of translation entails, especially when the language of social science claims a self-transparent universalism, and the language used by 'ordinary people' is understood as a poor approximation of their lived realities (p.15). As Chapter Six in particular will explore, the linguistic, and more holistic meanings of 'resistance', struggles to find resonance with the choices and actions of refugee youth in Shu'fat camp.

Campbell and Heyman's (2007) ethnography of informal Mexican migrant settlements along the US-Mexican border looks for new ways of explaining actions which occur without a conscious awareness of their defiant qualities; or when intention appears long after the event, and serves rather as a justification or explanation than as a point of motivation. Campbell and Heyman conceptualise the term 'slantwise' as a reaction to a perceived distortion of ethnographic material which attempts to locate phenomena such as accidental defiance or avoidance into a resistance framework. Slantwise offers a potential conceptual frame for understanding modes of behaviour that are not overtly political or anti-state, even if they ultimately have political consequences. Actions or behaviours that might be characterised through this modality pertain to feeling the effects of power, while continuing to seek out better living conditions. While these actions may challenge power or authority from time to time, they neither intentionally resist nor capitulate to the power or authority in question. While useful, what this framing lacks is an attention to the *considered* nature of these actions in the context of refugee youth in

Shu'fat. Neither does it account for what Kelly (2010) has described as the feeling of betrayal that remains once the personal costs of engagement in a struggle become heavier to bear than the value accorded to heroic, somewhat unquestioning support for a collective struggle.

Drawing on ethnographic research conducted during the second *intifada*, Kelly (2009) examined why the violent struggle for statehood was no longer the only imaginable future among Palestinians. Indeed, what has emerged through recent ethnographic studies connected to violent resistance is the idea that 'the call for resistance is at best ambiguous in contemporary Palestine' (Buch-Segal 2016). Buch-Segal (2016) questions the limits of endurance within the narrative of *sumūd,* arguing that, 'the important thing here is for anthropology to elucidate that which is eclipsed by the rallying of Palestinian resistance' (p.16). In the introduction to Buch-Segal's ethnography on mourning among the wives of prisoners in Palestine (2016), she reflects on the Palestinian moral discourse that entwines resistance, *sumūd* and suffering, and how this works in conjunction with the ideas of trauma and the temporality of endurance to shape the picture of 'so-called heroic women's endurance and suffering' (p.6). Buch-Segal's (2015) tentative framing of the 'loss of politics' builds on the work of Kelly (2009), Allen (2012) and Achilli (2014) in suggesting that 'while violent death still causes people to mobilise and express anger at the political situation, less grievous forms of loss increasingly fail to register, as they are absorbed into everyday life – not quite normalized, but not worthy of public engagement either' (p. 13). Allen argued in 2008 that, despite all of the resistance debates, there is still no adequate political concept to explain processes that neither constitute submission or confrontation, but still remain critical to political dynamics:

> '…there is something beyond political motives and awareness that inspire the incorporation of order into a quotidian disorder…the necessities of survival and the physical and psychological capacities that people have to learn to adapt themselves in changing circumstances also feed into a kind of agency' (p. 456).

While Allen's argument is a critical starting point for this thesis, the political stakes of the actions of refugee youth applying for Israeli citizenship represent another level to the daily adaptations of individuals living under prolonged violence and occupation, and therefore requires further explanation. Together, this collection of scholarship paints a nuanced picture of a quietly shifting political landscape in Palestine and among Palestinian refugees elsewhere, but one to which application of the everyday resistance literature does not adequately represent. The puzzle separately highlighted by Kelly (2006), Allen (2008), Achilli (2014) and Buch-Segal (2016) of finding a way to explain action not deemed to be political, but which will likely have political implications, therefore remains. An empirical discussion of 'resistance', the ways it is understood and the expectations it carries is picked up in Chapter Six, and takes us towards a complex realm of class debates in the Palestinian context, into which I do not wish to delve too deeply as a political choice, although these debates will be noted as they arise throughout the thesis. Many of the choices, decisions and actions explored in this thesis are subversive towards the Israeli state, and my argument is not that the framing of everyday resistance is completely without meaning here. Rather, it is to say that explaining all Palestinian actions through a lens of resistance, as we have seen has been popular, does not adequately theoretically explain the actions and subjectivities among refugee youth in this context. Debates emerging from the anthropology of morals and moralities can help to bring more nuance to this framework.

Drawing on Monica Heintz's (2013) argument, while there is clearly important nuance to be drawn between the two terms, I consider them in this context to broadly belong to the same field. Rather than attempt to define these terms (which are still being disputed within philosophy) or suggesting we need to verify the extent to which people's actions and judgements correspond to a particular definition, the point here is to use 'morality' as a way of trying to understand what individuals consider to be good or right actions in a given context (Fassin 2012: 6). Jarrett Zigon (2008, 2010) and Didier Fassin (2008) have similarly argued that there has been a tendency in anthropology to equate morality with society or culture, drawing from the Durkheimian origins of the discipline and Durkheim's proposition that moralities differ by social, political and historical contexts. The anthropology of moralities, particularly as delineated by Zigon (2008) has set out to address how we study the ways that people try to act as moral subjects in the world, rather than reading their actions as exclusively strategic, or in the pursuit of self-interest or power (see also Fassin 2013: 249). For Zigon, a key aspect of morality accounts for 'the embodied dispositions that allow for non-consciously acceptable ways of living in the world' (2008: 5). This, Zigon clarifies, is about 'being existentially comfortable in one's world, which is another way of saying living sanely in one's world' (ibid, citing Asad 2003). I will return to this literature throughout the thesis, but particularly in Chapter Six in order to explain the shift away from engagement in not only the praxis but also the ideals of a third *intifada*, building towards the discussion in Chapter Seven on the alternative future pathways that refugee youth seek out. The ideas drawn from this literature help to explain the questioning among refugee youth themselves who consider, throughout these chapters, the actions that are 'expected' of them as Palestinian refugees, in contrast to how they can attempt to build their own futures in a settler colonial state.

With the idea of a shifting morality among refugee youth in mind, explaining their choices and actions as 'strategic pragmatism' is, I suggest a conceptual frame that offers a meaningful theorisation of the empirical discussion which follows.

Strategic pragmatism

I take agency as a point of departure to understand the meaning of strategy, and in particular its relevance to pragmatism in this context. Sherry Ortner's proposal for a 'Sub-Altern' Theory of Practice (1996) merges the idea that habitus is a deeply internalised structure, that can be powerfully controlling; with the assertion that actors are knowing subjects who can reflect on their situation and construct their own critiques and resistance. She argues that subjects are constantly embedded in multiple webs of seemingly opposing power relations: 'whatever 'agency' they seem to 'have' as individuals is in reality something that is always in fact interactively negotiated...as truly and inescapably social beings, they can only work within the many webs of relations that make up their social worlds' (Ortner 2006: 151-152). This links with Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische's (1998) theoretical reconceptualization of agency as a temporally embedded process of social engagement that is informed by the past (by habitual practices); orientated towards the future (with the capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and mediated by the everyday contingencies of the present. Understood in this context, agency can be both individual and collective, entailing the coordination individual actions with collective projects, often as a result of persuasive or coercive forces. What this framing lacks is an understanding of how agency works in constantly changing circumstances, such as the precarious social condition of settler colonialism as discussed above.

Vigh's (2006a) study of young combatants in Guinea-Bissau offers a more nuanced approach by conceptualising people's efforts to live in unstable circumstances as 'navigation' of a 'social terrain'. He uses navigation as a tool to bridge the gap between agency and 'social forces' (p.14) arguing that it conceptually denotes 'the inseparability of act and environment, knowledge and praxis' (ibid), and enables us to understand how actors act in a constantly changing environment (p.171). This idea of an environment in motion distinguishes his work from the Bourdieusian concept of 'the field' (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), defined as 'a network or configuration of objective positions between relations [that are] objectively defined, in their existence and in their determinations, they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions' (ibid.97). In contrast, Vigh suggests that in some contexts, such as that of precarity explored above, there may not be demarcated spaces or rules of behaviour to structure the struggles of everyday life. Examining the multiple layers of unpredictability in the lives of his interlocutors, young men in Guinea-Bissau make Bourdieu and Wacquant's perception of life as a 'structural grid' of potential situations conceptually inadequate (p.164). Rather than trying to fix notions of subject/object, or agency/resistance to the lives of the young people I worked with, explaining the actions as navigations in the face of precarity attempts to provide a fuller description of a world under pressure, and how, in a moment, this pressure can descend on their lives and play itself out through different practices. Reading actions as social navigations builds an understanding of the constant efforts of refugee youth to innovate and improvise in a social condition of settler colonialism (Hoffman and Lubkemann 2005: 318).

Discussion of pragmatism in anthropology is not new. In *Shelter Blues*, an ethnography of homelessness in Boston, Robert Desjarlais (1997) argued for a need to

embrace pragmatist traditions to explore the felt immediacies of people's lives (p.223). In *Refugees of the Revolution*, Diana Allan's (2014) ethnography of the Palestinian refugee camp of Shatilla in Lebanon also argued that the significance of adopting a pragmatist stance is that 'it allows one to understand uncertainty not only as a condition of experience and orientation to the future, but also as a way of being and operating in the world' (p. 28). Attending to contingencies of everyday life as productive conditions, rather than something to be passively endured (ibid. p.27), Allan argues that attention to pragmatism is a way of exploring the centrality of daily struggles in structuring moral life. To focus on pragmatic action, rather than on discourse, Allan suggests that pragmatism 'finds social meaning deriving from critical engagement' (p.28), or drawing on Whyte (1997), from 'belief and intelligent inquiry, rather than knowledge and reasoned recognition of an existing order' (p. 19). This idea circles back to the earlier argument around why a resistance studies framework is not fitting for this context, given that while there is clearly a potentially deep political significance to the actions of refugee youth seeking out further engagement with the Israeli state, this is not necessarily directly apprehended by those concerned. Their priority, rather, is with their immediate experience as inscribed by the realities of life in the camp.

John Dewey's (1929) theory of pragmatism recognizes the embeddedness of actors in their environments. Drawing on Dewey, Michael Jackson (1989, 2005) has argued for the importance of disruption, contradiction and ambivalence in order to understand changing priorities in a community: which are often best revealed when practical matters, such as money, health care, or safety are prioritized over broader readings of nationalism or political ideology. This resonates deeply with the analysis of the empirical Chapters which follow. Susan Reynolds Whyte (1997; 2002) theorized

'situated pragmatism' as a means for understanding how people struggle to respond both practically and ideologically to changing, uncertain, or (we might add) precarious circumstances. Similarly building on Dewey, Whyte's ethnography of a Nyole community in eastern Uganda described that it was 'a search for security rather than a quest for certainty' which underpinned people's actions (1997: 3). As such, she conceptualises pragmatism as being intrinsically influenced by what actors believe to be at stake for them in a given situation. As this Chapter has already argued, the 'logic of elimination' embodied within settler colonialism is at stake for refugee youth in Shu'fat. Engagement with the Israeli state is pragmatic in the sense of it being the only viable way that refugee youth can see to build their own futures without risking being physically removed from their land by having their permanent residency revoked. In Arabic, this pragmatism was epitomized by the repeated use of the phrase *shu ehna lazem bnsowie,* (what else are we supposed to do), which was noted above as almost a synonym for *'ādi*, through which such actions were considered as utterly normal.

However, in a context of settler colonialism, there has to be a political slant on this pragamatism, which I suggest can be framed conceptually as 'strategic'. The distinction drawn between strategy and tactics by Michel de Certeau (1984) is a way of explaining how refugee youth respond to the immediacy of the present while continuing to strive for future projects (see also Vigh 2006a and 2006b; Shalhoub-Kerkovian and Busbridge 2014; Enria 2018a). In this context, tactics constitute an everyday praxis of those required to 'act' in spaces shaped by others, while strategy supposes an ability of the individual to shape their own relations with the world around them. I argue here, that in a context of settler colonialism, where refugee youth live in a social condition shaped by precarity, being pragmatic becomes the most strategic thing to do. As the empirical

chapters of this thesis explain, Palestinian refugee youth pragmatically navigate a precarious, constantly changing terrain, while at the same time building their own strategic aspirations and 'claims' to the Israeli state.

Conclusion

This Chapter set out to build a theoretical understanding of the complex engagement of Palestinian refugee youth with the Israeli state in East Jerusalem. It characterized the 'state' in question as settler colonial, examining some of the key tools used by the state to induce an existential precarity in the lives of refugees. It addressed the variety of scholarship on the Palestinian refugee context, arguing the place for this study in contributing ethnographic understandings of the ways refugee youth are moving outside of their ascribed 'roles' towards a new mode of engagement with the state. Explaining the way that youth and transitions to adulthood are theoretically understood for the purposes of this thesis, it has built a conceptual framework to understand the engagement of Palestinian refugee youth with the settler colonial Israeli state. While there are multiple acts of subversion of the Israeli state at work within this thesis, the complexities of action underway among refugee youth in Shu'fat require an alternative conceptual framing. This Chapter has therefore suggested that bringing together the ideas of strategy and pragmatism offers a more useful conceptual frame. Strategic pragmatism may not be the perfect tool, but it is an attempt to develop a new way of thinking through the complexity of life as a third (or in some cases fourth) generation refugee in East Jerusalem. As Fiona Wright (2018) suggests (drawing on Drabinski's discussion of Levinasian ethics, 2011), 'theory can fail just as practice can…[yet] broken theory may, in fact, be precisely the way to think through and with imperfect lives' (p.20).

Conceptualising the strategic pragmatism of refugee youth is in no way an attempt to deflect critique of the Israeli state structures that create the need for this engagement in the first place; nor of the failures of the PA or nationalist project to provide a viable alternative; nor of the complicity of the UN in failing to secure any lasting change in the 70 years they have served Palestinian refugees. Neither is it at attempt to imply a value judgment on the extent to which actions match up to this definition. Rather, considering the strategic pragmatism of refugee youth, in conjunction with the idea of a shifting sense of morality in terms of what the expectations of being a refugee in Palestine are, helps us to understand the choices that individuals consider to be necessary actions in order to move forward with their lives. Grounded as this theoretical understanding is in long term ethnographic fieldwork, the following Chapter discusses my methodological approach to this study.

Chapter Three

Politics and positionality: doing ethnographic research in Palestine

'...if I did not believe that ethnography could be used as a tool for critical reflection and human liberation, what kind of perverse cynicism would keep me returning again and again to disturb [their] waters?'

Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1995: 418)

Introduction

This chapter addresses the questions of politics and positionality that my methodological choices and praxis during fieldwork entailed, and examines the principal research methods that I used to collect data. Throughout this chapter, I draw on personal fieldwork experiences which had a subsequent bearing on the analytical and theoretical approach that I have adopted in this thesis. Within anthropology, the emphasis on ethnographers' emotional investment in their field sites is informal but implicit, and the total, consuming nature of my fieldwork led to a complex variety of personal and professional challenges. Ethnographers are expected, according to the legacy of literature, to quickly assimilate into our sites of study and equally quickly to attempt to detach ourselves from the communities and friends we have worked among, to gain some analytical distance. Fieldwork therefore constantly demands us to (re)negotiate our positionalities and subjectivities in relation to the spaces we seek to understand. This chapter makes explicit

some of the implications of these personal investments, through a discussion of the politics and positionality of ethnography in Palestine.

Drawing on recent scholarship on the affective dimensions of ethnographic research (Stodalker et al, 2018), this chapter posits that the kaleidoscope of methods that ethnographers draw on is rooted in a feminist attempt at communication and moral, often mutual, understanding. The chapter begins with a discussion of the methodological approach and the compromises when doing ethnography in violent spaces. It continues by discussing the complexities of negotiating and then maintaining access to interlocutors, and the specific methods of data collection used within this ethnographic approach. My understanding of the implications of everyday violence (as conceptualized in the previous Chapter) was significantly shaped by the violence that affected my interlocutors, and myself during fieldwork. This chapter engages with the challenging realities in which the research was conducted, in the hope of creating a space that might be useful to future researchers when considering the real implications of conducting long term research in violent spaces. It concludes by exploring some of the ways that contexts of on-going violence complicate the ethics of empirical enquiry, and a discussion of the limitations of this research.

Methodological approach

Ethnography is concerned with the in-depth study of the actions and accounts of people in their everyday contexts. The practice of this approach is always negotiated, and requires engagement with both personal and positioned activities (Campbell and Lassiter 2015: 5). An ethnographic approach to the study of young people enables the researcher

to account for the different dimensions of their experience and the networks young people engage with as they navigate their social worlds (see Boyden and de Berry eds. 2004). Rather than assuming the events in the life of a young person that will have caused them distress, this approach creates space for young people to articulate these for themselves (Thomson 2008; Abebe 2009). As such, the approach enables the collection of the kind of data that represents young people as they represent themselves, rather than as outside researchers might otherwise perceive them to be (Boyden and Ennew 1997). When conducting research among young people in a refugee camp context, this approach enables us to focus on displacement and on-going violence as a context in which every day life, agency and aspirations are pursued (Hart 2014: 389). Indeed, the field of anthropology has similarly played a fundamental role in the development of the study of forced displacement. Scholars such as Rosemary Sayigh (1979), Peter Loizios (1981) and Barbara Harrell-Bond (1986) inspired generations of future anthropologists to engage in ethnographic research with displaced communities. Developing empirical evidence based upon the accounts and everyday lived experiences of those who are living through experiences of displacement has contributed to shifting the focus towards analysis of subjective understandings, positions and actions.

The post-colonial critique of the discipline of anthropology has largely dismantled the orientalist and colonialist origins of the field and its historically reified forms of categorization (Asad 1973; Said 1978; Marcus 1998; Jameson 1998; Spivak 1999; Chakrabarty 2000; Asch 2015). Although this reflexive turn led to the explicit acknowledgement of power imbalances in research specifically among white researchers working in post-colonial contexts, the idea that fieldwork against-all-odds is a 'rite of passage' remains (The New Ethnographer, 2018). The fundamental principal of

ethnographic research (stemming from Malinowski 1922) is participant observation, through which ethnographers build an intimate rapport in a community and produce the information they gather as contributions to scholarship. The British Royal Anthropological Institute continues to cite Bronisław Malinowski as the key founding example of ethnographic fieldwork: 'Since Malinowski's time, fieldwork – traditionally away from one's own society – has been regarded as an essential and necessary part of the anthropologist's training…[some] anthropologists still consider doing fieldwork in the traditional Malinowskian sense is an essential and distinguishing aspect of anthropological research'[52].

Yet during periods of violence, conflict or war, researchers struggle to create and maintain the practical and ethical conditions that are generally thought of as essential to ethnographic practice. As Jo Boyden (2002) has highlighted, 'the circumstances of conflict are hardly conducive to sound fieldwork and commonly make participant observation, the basic tool of the anthropologist's trade, impossible' (p.238). This research was conducted in a context of regular armed violence, where fears of informers and collaborators with different state regimes meant that individuals rarely trusted their neighbors or extended family members, let alone an outsider. Combined with the everyday experience of military occupation, these contextual factors brought significant limitations to what might historically be considered as 'pure ethnography'. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson have described in their own work the emergence of 'a hierarchy of purity of fieldsites' (1997:13) that can prompt anxiety among ethnographers who are

[52] Royal Anthropological Institute, *'Fieldwork'.* Available via [https://www.discoveranthropology.org.uk/about-anthropology/fieldwork.html]. Accessed on 28/03/2018

forced to adapt the methods that can be used within this methodological approach as a result of the contextual realities in which they work. The challenges to conducting ethnography in such contexts are not only practical, but require the intense personal and emotional engagement of the researcher. Any deep engagement with subjective understandings of and actions require of the ethnographer 'a kind of depth that challenges sensibility' (Marcus 1998: 246), particularly when developing an ethnographic research project in a context with multiple contingencies.

My approach to this study has been deeply inspired by Nancy Scheper-Hughes' discussion of a 'militant anthropology' (1995) that is both politically and ethically engaged. Throughout this chapter, I explore the practical, ethical and personal challenges that arose as a result of my choice of this methodological approach. This research remained grounded in the fundamental principles of ethnography, which guided everything from the ways I engaged with interlocutors and lines of enquiry I pursued, to the way I analysed and ultimately wrote up this thesis. As this chapter will explain, I drew on a range of other methods to practically enable me to gather data among refugee youth. Although a full engagement with participant observation was not possible, I rely here on Boyden's argument, that, 'even with the difficulties, enquiry into human misfortunes like war [or other contexts of on-going violence] is an important precursor to the development of theories of societal transformation, value formation, social and cultural reproduction' (Boyden 2004: 255).

Methods of Data Collection among refugee youth

My fieldwork spanned an 18-month period from August 2015 – January 2017. During this period, I was registered as a Visiting Researcher with Birzeit University and as an Associate Researcher with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). My fieldwork was ethnographic in that it consisted of a long period of time of 'being there'. Ingold (2011) writes that, 'nothing has been more damaging to ethnography than its representation under the guise of the 'ethnographic method'. Of course, ethnography has its methods, but *it* is not a method…' (p.242). The following section details the way I worked with a research assistant throughout my fieldwork; the extent and limitations of participant observation in this research; the use of collective research methods to make up for some of the contingencies of participant observation in this context; my engagement with different kinds of interviewing; and a note on the use of social media in ethnography. The section concludes with an explanation of the ways I analysed these different kinds of data that have been incorporated into an ethnographic approach.

Research assistants in ethnography

As Gupta and Ferguson ask, 'how many of the 'lone anthropologists' doing fieldwork in 'other cultures' have actually worked alone? What does the heavy reliance of so many researchers on 'native' research assistants do to our conceits about the intrinsic virtues of a 'professionally trained observer'?' (1997:23). Research assistants, principal interlocutors or the uncomfortable terming of 'key informants' have long been central to ethnographic research (Middleton and Cons, 2014). Although the fieldwork process is central to the production of ethnography, the reflexive turn in anthropology as a discipline and ethnography as a practice since the 1990s has done little to re-engage with

the fundamental role that these individuals play. Despite their often central role in the research process, their presence has tended to be 'conveniently erased in all the important progressions from fieldwork to published ethnography' (ibid: 282). As a generation of ethnographers who have been trained with *Writing Culture* (Clifford and Marcus 1986) as a foundational text, making the 'secrets' of ethnography plain has been paramount. Yet the uncomfortable relationship with research assistants, marked by their distinct absence in much ethnographic writing, remains evident. 'The Field' is neither where nor what it used to be (Faubion and Marcus 2009), and in ethnographies conducted in dangerous spaces, access and navigation become dependent on new kinds of research relationships (Midleton and Cons 2014: 281).

From my first visit to Shu'fat camp, people I met went out of their way to make sure I was never alone in a public space. My initial visits to the camp were to different community organisations and projects that I had been introduced to via friends of friends. During my early conversations with these organisations about the kind of work I wanted to do, I was told repeatedly that I should not walk around much in the camp, and certainly not alone on the grounds that it was too dangerous to do so. I rather arrogantly brushed this off as something that would fade in time, given my earlier experiences of conducting research in other refugee camps around the West Bank. I agreed with one of these organisations that I could employ a research assistant for six months to accompany me to different research activities, after which point we could decide if this should be extended for the whole year. One of the community centres in the camp had a large pool of volunteers, who were mainly all unemployed university graduates. After meeting with a selection, I offered a job to Reem, a 23-year-old who had struggled to find a job after graduating with a degree in education from a West Bank University. We chatted easily

comparing our University experiences; our friends and families; the kinds of food we liked; the ways we like to spend our spare time. She asked many questions about my research which I struggled at the time to answer, not knowing how to explain my research well in English let alone in Arabic. Like the majority of people who became interlocutors during my fieldwork, Reem had not really heard of anthropology, and 'an interest in young people in the camp and their ideas about the future' was about as far as I was able to explain it. She was interested in doing something that could help her community, and thought this project might be a good way to do so – is what she said, although she also needed the money to pursue her next dream, which was to launch her own education project.

Socially adept, warm, open, publicly non-judgmental and deeply politically reflexive, Reem not only facilitated my ability to gather data in her home community, but she facilitated the encompassing experience of my fieldwork. Streets in Shu'fat camp are not spaces to socialize or spend time, and I found that in general my interlocutors spent as little time moving between places, unless strictly necessary, as possible. The first time I went to Reem's family home, which was on a side of the camp I had not visited before, I walked quite slowly – in part because of the steep hills and slippery road surface that I had not learnt to navigate, but also because I was looking up and around me. She awkwardly asked me if I could hurry up, saying it would be better to be inside. Reem adopted the role of being 'my protector' in the community, as she described it. She accompanied me walking around the camp from place to place; she eased the anxieties of others who were unsure of my presence in the community when I was unable sufficiently to do so myself; and she joined many of the meetings with different interlocutors. When warning gun shots were fired in the air because my presence was misinterpreted, it was

Reem who would take control of the situation and re-establish the meaning of my presence on my behalf. When I experienced violence first-hand, it was Reem who negotiated my safety. In a special issue of *Ethnography (15:3)*, Jason Cons and Towns Middleton write of their engagement with research assistants as 'fixers', to 'get the ethnographer into the action and out of trouble' (2014: 286). My personal interest was less based on being 'in the action', and more on understanding the everyday lives of youth who were surrounded by it. I certainly did not see Reem's role as that of a 'fixer' in the sense of arranging meetings for me or initiating different kinds of contacts. While I was initially concerned that working with a research assistant would mean that interlocutors would speak only with her and not to me, this was almost never the case (although undoubtedly being able to work in Arabic was also crucial to this process). Contrary to my concerns, I found that since Reem was a similar age to many of my interlocutors and had lived a quite similar life, her understanding of the conversations I had with them often helped to add a level of nuance that I would likely not have reached alone. There was certainly no question, six months into fieldwork, that we might stop working together, and Reem worked with me almost everyday for the duration of my fieldwork.

The employer-employee power dynamic cannot be emphasized enough. Reem became my most trusted friend during the time I worked in Shu'fat, and her family adopted me both during my fieldwork and in its aftermath. Their immense warmth, trust, love and kindness made me forget that I had not always had the privilege of feeling a part of their family. Yet even as she became what could otherwise be referred to as a principal interlocutor and friend, she was also an employee. As Middleton and Cons (2014) suggest, the commodification of ethnographic labour proves integral to the researcher participant relationship, and 'with rare exceptions, ethnographers are in the business of

transforming the work of a hired assistant into the cache of intellectual capital...[which] in a Marxian sense, raises troubling concerns about the commensurability of labor, data, money and ethnographic 'truth'' (p.284). In agreeing to work with me, Reem fielded a great deal of personal stigma from other people in the camp, who accused her of working with a collaborator, and challenged her politics on the grounds that she was earning money by working with an outsider. It was certainly not an entirely seamless working relationship. Somewhat inevitably there were people I wanted to get to know in the camp that Reem was unhappy about, and did not want to maintain any association with. This was particularly the case regarding working with male youth who were engaged in drug dealing or drug taking. On these occasions we came to an agreement that she would accompany me to a particular meeting point, but would not stay for the meeting. Perhaps these particular examples are issues that would have been easier to navigate had I worked with a male research assistant, although in reality I did not meet any young men (other than those so heavily involved in drug taking that their ability to work would not have been reliable) who were unemployed or had the time to spend working with me instead. While I paid Reem the same amount she would have earned working full time in an education context (as she had trained to do), she was frank in her acknowledgement to me that since this was only a 'temporary job', and one without a contract, she would leave to take up another job should a longer-term prospect present itself.

Participant observation

Participant observation is made up of a variety of research methods, including informal discussions and conversations with interlocutors in their daily environments. The art of participant observation has been described as being able to observe while participating

in the ways of life of others (Gellner 2012). Others suggest that where ethnography falls down is in believing that as outsiders, participation is ever truly possible, when in reality the context will always be dictated by 'observation' and 'externality' (Rabinow 2007: 79). Indeed, it has been argued (Bloch 1992) that participant observation itself is an oxymoron: that while one can either participate in or observe social worlds, it is impossible to do both simultaneously (p.49). The blurring lines of friendship in efforts to 'observe' makes this extremely challenging. During my own fieldwork for example, the death of an interlocutor who had become a dear friend forced me to sharply confront the extent to which I could ever simultaneously 'participate in' and 'observe' the social lives and worlds of the people I was working among. I continued trying to maintain something of a balance throughout my fieldwork, participating in social events and processes to the extent that I could, while making constant notes and reflections on what I thought I was learning.

The ways that violent, contested spaces compromise ethnography should not be underestimated. Ethnographers are constantly working: observing, note-taking, thinking, planning, being flexible, being friendly and open, rejecting lines of enquiry and considering new ones. This idea of an always open and friendly ethnographer jars somewhat with the experience of daily life in Shu'fat, where one is encouraged to walk quickly and directly from place to place, or ideally take a car which is deemed to be safer, and certainly never to talk to strangers. I had twice before lived and worked in refugee camps in the West Bank, in the cities of Nablus and Jenin. Both of the camps in which I had spent significant time (Balata refugee camp in Nablus, and Jenin refugee camp) were 'known' among Palestinians and the international community alike for being dangerous places that had been bastions of resistance in the first *intifada* and even more so during

the second. Convinced by the experiences of other researchers (see Chapter Two), and my own prior experience of living and working in the West Bank, the realities of violent spaces in Palestine did not make me question the feasibility of this research. While I was well aware of the potential for violence in Palestinian camp communities, my experience of this had been solely that of Israeli occupation-related violence perpetrated against Palestinian refugees. As it turned out, knowledge of the compilation of threats and uncertainties that my friends and interlocutors in the camp faced on a daily basis, combined with my own experiences of violence in the camp were deeply formative for the kinds of questions and lines of enquiry I eventually pursued, as this chapter will later discuss in greater depth.

Living among interlocutors has long been seen as key to ethnographic practice. Yet Reem was one among many to quickly refute my idea of living in the camp during my fieldwork. Not only would I be in danger if I stayed in the camp overnight, she argued, but I would be putting the family and others in the building I stayed at risk too. Particularly during the period of my fieldwork there were military raids of the camp on an almost nightly basis; and when the army were not there, violence was regularly sparked between different individuals or groups in the camp. The fear was that knowledge of my living with a family could make the family suspects of collaboration; and that living on my own in the camp would make me an easy target. On the basis of this advice, I lived in a neighbouring town and travelled to the camp daily by either car or public bus. In the end, this not only gave me a more secure place to sleep and store my belongings, but enabled me the privacy not afforded to residents of the camp, and a space to decompress. I would on occasion stay with one of three families in the camp overnight, but my doing so often provoked palpable anxiety among the families in question, and was only something I did

if there was really no other option. On numerous occasions when I had stayed late in the camp for meetings, social events or having just lost track of time in a family home, my interlocutors or their close family members would insist on accompanying me in my car to the edge of the camp – or if I didn't have a car, driving me themselves, and waiting with me until a shared bus came, or driving me all the way home. More often than I can account for, my interlocutors put my safety above their own, prompting real ethical considerations about the meaning of research in such spaces, which I discuss further towards the end of this chapter.

Having studied Arabic for close to a decade, I was able to conduct most of my research in Arabic, using English when research participants preferred to do so. In total, I built sustained relationships with 55 young people in the camp, aged between 15 and 25 years old. Of these, 28 were female and 27 were male. Many of them were friends with each other, or distant relatives. While a small number of them were young people who engaged in organised NGO or community centre activities in the camp, many of them were not. Indeed, many of the young people with whom I ended up developing the most sustained relationships were those who had never taken part in organized activities outside of school before, which led us to have different kinds of conversations to those that might have taken place with youth in more institutional settings, a point that I discus in more detail below. Of these young people, I came to know six different families well, and interacted occasionally with the parents, husbands or wives of others. This section addresses the complex issues surrounding gaining access to these young people; building their trust; and maintaining their well-being during the research process.

Maintaining access to young people and building reciprocal trust

Bauman (1991) famously wrote that the unknown stranger produced specific iterations of anxiety and suspicion. Complicating this idea, protracted violence commonly undermines the social fabric of communities, 'creating social worlds that are permeated by misunderstanding and mistrust' (Boyden 2004: 241). Oral narratives and conversations form much of the basis of this thesis, and it is therefore critical to reflect on who I spoke to, where these conversations and discussions took place, and how I went about gaining and maintaining access to young people and building their trust in the first place. On one of the first days I spent with Reem in the camp, she warned me: 'The people here don't even want to talk to their neighbours, for sure they won't want to talk to you…and you absolutely must not ask people here about politics – if it's about social things, that's fine, historical things, that's fine, but don't ask them what ID they have, don't ask if they're Fattah or Hamas, don't ask if someone in the family is in prison, don't even ask where they work, because they'll think you are part of the *Mukhabirat* [intelligence, and used in this instance to imply Israeli intelligence]. They won't trust you'. Questions and discussions of politics featured highly throughout my fieldwork, but it took a long time to build the trust of many of my interlocutors to have these conversations.

The possibility that I might be considered a spy accompanied me throughout my fieldwork, as a shadow that follows many anthropologists (Driscoll and Schuster 2017). One result of this was evident in fluctuating access to interlocutors in the camp. As Utas' (2004:209) discussion of 'fluid research fields' has highlighted, research spaces and the people within them change over time, and gaining meaningful access to young people

requires constant reiteration. In addition to my own transient position, entering and exiting the camp on an almost daily basis, political circumstances in the camp changed at very short notice. This had a direct impact on the extent to which young people were able or willing to meet with me. With several of the young people I worked with, for example, there was a period of between several weeks and several months when I could not see them because of other things going on in their lives, or their individually changing political circumstances that subsequently made them question their relationship to me and the research. In part, this is why such a long period of fieldwork in this community was necessary, to account for these ebbs and flows in access to young people and subsequently their participation in the research. Access is therefore conceptualised in the context of this research as a continual and a sustained process, rather than a one-off event.

My initial entry points to the camp were via introductions by friends of friends, to two community centres in the camp. Both provided an initial way of getting to know the camp and its different communities. During the first months I spent in the camp, I busied myself with the task of becoming a familiar face and making myself useful. I found out about a Violin teacher from the prestigious Edward Said Music Conservatoire who had established an outreach programme, teaching violin to young people in the camp. Having studied music for many years, I began joining him for several afternoons a week, when around thirty young people would come to one of the camp community centres for large group music lessons (although this had the unfortunate initial result in my being known in the camp as *al doktora l'al kamanja*, the violin-academic). I took on other roles within these community centre settings in the early months of fieldwork, including writing funding applications for project proposals; facilitating activities at the centres; and

joining social workers from the different centres as they ran programmes and activities in the different schools in the camp. Spending much of the school day in or around the different schools in the camp was helpful not only in terms of meeting more young people but in ensuring my own safety by becoming more of a familiar face in the camp. White NGO staff worked only intermittently in the camp, and my presence often took people by surprise.

Transparency around my personal politics, and the politics of the research was fundamental to young people in Shu'fat. Young people in the camp were rightly wary of the longer-term implications of the research, and what the consequences of their association with the research might be. In particular they were concerned to know whose political interests their thoughts and opinions might serve; there was interest in understanding where the funding for my research came from, and with whom I would be sharing my research findings. As much as they were concerned about this individually, the wider concern was with what other people might think of their association with me and the study. Engagement with any form of local politics also complicated my research, and hindered the extent to which some young people wanted to participate. For example, my attendance at activities and events organized by a particular community leader who openly associated with (and took money from) a political group meant that some older youth in the camp assumed my research was part of that group's political agenda. Several months into my fieldwork, it became clear that any ties to the community centres in the camp would seriously limit the number of people who wanted to talk to me, given the general assumption in the camp that these centres are deeply corrupt. While working through certain camp institutions was necessary in the first instance, I worked hard to dissociate myself

from individuals and their political positions in the aftermath, and attempted as far as possible to engage young people with a wide variety of political perspectives.

This takes us to another critical juncture in understanding access to research participants, namely that of gatekeepers. Establishing a gatekeeper between different worlds was key to establishing access to young people in the camp. Reem often played this role in the research, as a trusted go-between for young people I wanted to work with before they established their own trust in me. When Reem was not able to play this role, for example when I worked with young men that she did not want to be associated with, finding a similar go-between proved crucial to accessing other young people within a similar 'group' or 'network'.

Having started regularly meeting and spending time with around 8 young people via these centres, I began to be introduced to their friends, their cousins, the friends of their cousins, and to meet people in different settings. I often met with female youth at a women's gym tucked away in the basement of a building in the centre of the camp, where young women spent a great deal more time in the adjacent 'juice bar' than working out; in three informal education spaces where young graduates had established additional teaching opportunities for young people who had left school without qualifications; with male youth at a new music studio in the camp which was a place where a number of the male youth I worked with liked to hang out; in cafes; and of course, in people's homes. I also became a taxi driver for much of my fieldwork, often driving people to and from Jerusalem in order to pass more quickly through the checkpoint. The car became an important space for conversation and discussion. Away from view and in the confidence that it was not bugged, many of the most meaningful conversations I had with interlocutors in the camp took place in my car.

My personal belief is that research with young people should be as inclusive as possible, prioritizing the mutual, and reciprocal establishment of trust between the researcher and research participants. It is therefore never sufficient to only establish consent once. Gaining meaningful and on-going consent with young people who have much more on their minds than your research, is a challenge. Drawing on the important work of Virginia Morrow (2009), I defined meaningful consent as ensuring a genuine understanding of the purpose and anticipated consequences of the research, the overall political intention of the research, the funders of the study, the possible benefits and harm to them as interlocutors, how the data would be stored, and through a series of discussions around confidentiality and anonymity. As Chakravarty (2012) has suggested, developing a stability to these delicate relationships is a skill that takes practice. It was constantly re-iterated to the young people I worked with that they did not have to talk to me for the research anymore if they did not want to. On numerous occasions, young people would clarify that a conversation we were having was not for research purposes: *this isn't for al kitab [the book], right? I'm just telling you this as a friend!* Inevitably, everything I heard and understood from these young people has contributed to my understanding of their social worlds and the way I have analysed the data I was able to collect with their consent. However, any instances where I was directly asked not to include things in 'the book', I have not included these thoughts, impressions or conversations.

Resulting from this understanding of consent as an on-going process, as well as the security implications of asking young individuals to sign documents, I did not gain a signed consent form from any research participant (ASA 2011: 5). In fulfillment of my CUREC ethical clearance for this research, when research participants were under the age

of 18, I established 'a trusted other' with each individual: someone (not always a parent or family member) that they trusted me to talk to about the research, and about any concerns I might have about things an individual might say as part of the research process. This was not always possible. For example, one 16-year-old male and one 15-year-old female refused to tell their caregivers that they were meeting with me, and we failed to find a suitable alternative that they could trust. In this instance, working with Reem was of particular importance. As a young woman from the camp, she became an important ally of some of the young people who became significant interlocutors for this research, and adopted a sisterly role to many of the younger interlocutors.

Key to building reciprocal trust was to respect the choices of young people regarding spaces in which to meet, and their preferred format for these meetings. It became clear early in the research that spaces I assumed young people might find 'safe' to talk in were in fact not considered safe at all by them. Meeting young people on their terms, at times convenient to their busy schedules, in spaces of their choosing therefore all formed a crucial part of trust building. Further, I did not record our conversations on a mobile or dictaphone, but rather memorized them and quickly wrote them down to the best of my ability. Particularly for the males and females aged between 15-19 who had been arrested and detained, the presence of a red light on my phone indicating it was recording (as I tried in some of my initial meetings) clearly caused anxiety. Older youth, with whom I had a different kind of rapport by being close to the same age, found recording less problematic. Particularly on occasions when we would talk in the car, they would be happy for me to record our conversations on my phone as we drove. I transcribed these recordings as quickly as possible, stored them on a cloud, and deleted them from my phone.

Stemming from the issues surrounding recording, and perhaps imbued in all of these discussions around building trust, was being asked to keep secrets from their other friends and family members. This clearly raised ethical implications that I addressed in different ways as they emerged. While I found the character of 'a trusted other' useful in mitigating these circumstances, it was clear that a blanket rule for ethical decision making on when to pass on information and when not to was impossible. I attempted to balance questions of when information should be passed on and when it should not on the basis of the likelihood that the individual was at risk, along with what could be done to change the situation. Somewhat linked to this was the murky water of responding to conversations or discussions with a seemingly moral judgement on the kinds of information young people chose to share with me. I was regularly asked for my personal opinion on a wide range of subjects, particularly those connected with what were assumed to be popular opinions among white NGO workers in the camp on subjects such as early marriage, drug taking, engagement in violence or leaving school without a qualification. The young mothers I worked with had become accustomed to being criticized by those outside of their community for their decision to marry and have children before completing school. Many of them had attended events or trainings at community centres in the camp, where they had been asked to speak to younger girls about the difficulties of marriage and pregnancy to encourage them to stay at school. Malak, whose narrative is central to Chapter Five, once met with me after one such meeting in floods of tears, unable to understand why she was being criticised for her decision, and her husband labelled as a predatory male for wanting to get married when she was 16 (he was 19). Clearly this was an example of intrusive and unnecessarily critical interventions that made young mothers feel shamed about their own choices. At

the same time, among older (particularly female) interlocutors, there were examples of conversations and discussions that led to reflections on differences between my life, decisions, options and choices, and theirs. As Georgia Cole (2018) outlines, sometimes posing difficult questions, or not concealing your true opinion on a subject can offer a key moment for building both respect and rapport among interlocutors. It again questions the extent to which ethnographers can or should 'participate' rather than actively observe, and rather than constantly fighting to blend in to become unnoticed, to celebrate the differences and use them to build better respect and rapport.

A final comment on building trust among the young people I worked with related to developing a reciprocal understanding of safety. My own efforts to mitigate risk during my fieldwork were initially based around signing up to the UN Department of Safety and Security text messaging service which would provide tens of updates per day on any 'security incidents' around the West Bank, including army incursions, checkpoint closures, clashes, and house demolitions. Palestinian news sites and Facebook pages, Twitter, and Palestinian traffic apps all contributed to my knowledge of when and how it was safe to move around. In the camp itself, building a network of contacts who I could trust to tell me when it wasn't safe to come into the camp was also key. Many of these were the young people I worked with, and showing them that I trusted them to keep me safe served as a meaningful way to try and shift the inherent power dynamics of my research. This included asking them to share their sources of information with me (again, typically social media feeds), and trusting their judgement on where and when it was safe to meet.

It took a long time to develop meaningful relationships with youth in the camp, as the lengthy discussion above suggests. In the interim, I drew on a range of collective research methods to aid contexts in which there was no obvious entry point to participant observation or discussion with young people. For example, an easy way of initially meeting young people was by running workshops or activities in schools or community centres in the camp (however problematic these affiliations subsequently became). These involved mappings of the camp and spaces beyond the camp; photography using the cameras of smart phones; life story timelines and drawing. Unlike talking, these methods were intrinsically non-linear, and enabled young people to represent emotions, thoughts or share information without needing to prioritise certain elements. As time went on and my relationship with my research participants deepened, it became easier to hold group conversations on certain subjects, and away from institutional environments. In the early stages of fieldwork, however, group discussions that anticipated an instantaneous response from the participants did not seem the appropriate tool to use.

As scholars have highlighted, there are significant limitations to predominantly non-verbal collective methods (for a useful discussion, see Kara 2015). Precisely because they rely primarily on visual rather than textual narratives, they become highly interpretative research methods (Silverman 2001). By nature of being more "open" than language-based strategies, they become much harder to interpret, and there is a significant risk that the researcher will over-interpret what these methods seek to represent (Literat 2013). Ethnographers are not what Myers (1995) has termed 'visual translators', and should not fall into the trap of telling their audiences 'what to see' in an

image, drawing or map. Drawings, maps or photographs are not produced spontaneously, but rather at the request of the researcher. As such, the content of such data can only be understood in the context of its production (and, in some contexts, subsequent circulation) (see Rose 2001:16). Some of these drawings, maps, letters and photographs are referenced throughout the thesis, but they do not significantly contribute to the analysis. Rather, these methodologies were used specifically among younger research participants (principally those aged 15-16) as a way of opening up a space for discussion on a particular topic. As such, where they are included in the thesis, they should be considered as a point of departure for apprehending something of the way young people see and understand their social worlds, rather than as a direct depiction of their perceptions (see Mitchell 2006: 63).

As time went on and relationships with individuals grew, I found it possible on occasion to facilitate group discussions on particular subjects, with the idea of better understanding conflicting opinions on the same topic (following Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). I found the effectiveness of these discussions to be deeply gendered. On only one occasion was I successful in hosting meaningful mixed-gender group discussion, which took place in an informal education centre on the subject of informal education opportunities in the camp. With this one exception, I found it impossible to create mixed gender groups for the purposes of discussion. While groups of female research participants enjoyed meeting together and discussing a range of different topics when time allowed, males were much more reluctant to talk in a group. On the several times that I convened group discussions among males, generally only one or two would take part in a discussion, with the others following their lead by adding only their agreement

or disagreement to a point. I found male youth to be more receptive to individual interactions, or interactions with just one or two close friends or family members.

Social media

As will become evident through the empirical chapters of this thesis, social media plays a significant role in the lives of young Palestinian refugees. All of my research participants had smartphones, to which they were glued for a variety of reasons: social, of course, but more importantly they were a crucial source of security for young people. News of violence was typically first communicated on Facebook, either on the status of a friend or one of the various camp Facebook pages. While there were well founded rumors that these camp Facebook pages were infiltrated by Israeli intelligence, or with collaborators who would post provocatively for the sole purpose of provoking a response that could lead to further surveillance justification, these pages were still a go-to source of information. When it came to personal communications people were more cautious. More common than exchanging phone numbers with research participants in order to maintain contact was to add each other on Facebook (indeed, *'andek face?* – do you have Facebook - was a predictable precursor to almost any conversation). Yet follow up contact that I would initiate on Facebook messenger would almost always be met with a request to switch to Instagram chat, on account of its stronger security settings. Phone calls were rare among young people. Whether this was a reflection of a generational shift similar to that I have experienced among my own younger family members, whose sole communication is through the messenger function of different apps rather than by talking on the phone, or a result of growing up in a context of wiretapping that precludes phone conversations, is difficult to say.

The ethics of social media in research has received little attention in anthropology, perhaps stemming from the prevailing assumption in anthropological methods training that fieldwork will be conducted somewhere remote with limited connectivity. Ethnographers who have recently conducted fieldwork have increasingly turned their attention to the field of radical research methods and the ethics of using different apps to gain access to potential research participants (for a brilliant example on the use of Tinder in ethnography, see Evans 2017). Less discussed is where we draw the ethical boundary with social media and participant observation. Indeed, to my knowledge there are currently no robust guidelines on ethical practices within digital elements of ethnography. A research participant 'friends' you on Facebook and Instagram; at their suggestion, this is the best way for you to be in contact with them; they like the posts you share, and your photos, you like theirs in return; they tag you in comments, events or statuses that they think will be of interest to you; you reciprocate. They post things on Facebook that you bring up in subsequent conversations; you see the kinds of things they 'love' or which make them 'angry' or want to 'cry', using the basic Facebook emoji function. It would be impossible for all of this not to influence the perception you form of this individual, as invariably your own behaviour on social media influences what they think of you (in my case, not being an avid Facebook user, the accusation was usually coming from my research participants about why I had not responded to their posts, or why I had not grasped the series of events in the camp because I had been following it on mainstream media channels rather than through Facebook). While I believe it to be unethical to cite comments from research participants made online, albeit in public spaces (but ones which they did not know would be taken out of context and used for other purposes) clearly my observation of social media behaviours profoundly

influenced the ways I understood my research participants. This has been particularly significant in teasing out the tension that runs throughout this thesis, namely the way young people oscillate between empathy for third *intifada* going on around them while continuing to pursue their own tactical engagements with Israeli state structures.

Interviewing

I used different forms of interviewing with organisations and individuals at different points during fieldwork, which are outlined in Annex 1 (drawing on Mason 1996:42; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 143). In total 86 semi-structured interviews (SSIs) and 5 focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with staff of international organisations and NGOs; community based organisations (CBOs) in the camp; the Palestinian National Authority; the Jerusalem Municipality; and Palestinian academics in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Depending on the context, interviews were mainly conducted in English, with some interviews conducted in Arabic. All of the focus group discussions were conducted in Arabic. Those conducted outside of the camp were recorded, while those conducted inside the camp, in line with the discussions above, were not recorded. Semi-structured interviews offered more in depth and ultimately useful data than the focus group discussions. However, as I found through the collective research methods used to work with youth, in the cases of CBOs in the camp and Youth Organisations outside of the camp, discussion groups held among staff members provided an interesting way to understand the diverse perspectives of staff members in a context where they were all working at the same level, and knew each other well enough to debate their ideas in public (Creswell 2007: 133).

Having worked in the West Bank over several years before starting my doctorate, I had a number of existing contacts within NGOs, UN agencies and among Palestinian academics and policy makers. I maintained these contacts, and built others as I became familiar with other organisations in the area. After moving to Palestine, I mapped out organisations who were either working among refugee youth, or with youth in East Jerusalem. As can be seen in Annex 1, I returned to several of these interviewees more than once to conduct follow up interviews. Semi structured interviews with the UN, NGOs, the PNA and the Jerusalem Municipality were prepared with a topic and set of questions (ibid.: 130), but were generally used to pose questions to respondents to understand their reaction and perspectives to some of my findings. Those conducted among community based organisations (CBOs) in the camp were rather conducted to fill gaps in my understanding, and indeed in these interviews it was crucial not to give anything of my data away, since many of the staff in these CBOs knew the young people I had been working with.

Power and ethics in contexts of violence

As researchers who spend long amounts of time in the places we work, ethical considerations are bound up in our everyday praxis, as we seek to try and reduce the inevitable imbalance of power relations with interlocutors. There has long been an emphasis in refugee studies on promoting a refugee-centered approach to research. This approach concurrently promotes advocacy within refugee communities, and a commitment to research built around principles of ethics, consent, participation and reflexivity in attempts to disrupt the inherent power dynamics of research with displaced

populations (see for example Voutira and Doná 2007). Recently, Georgia Cole (2018) has poignantly highlighted that this literature has lacked the detail needed to turn research centered around such principles and ethical aspirations into practice. (see also Tomkinson 2015). Conducting fieldwork as I have explained above was fraught with ethical challenges, which continued through to the process of analysis and deciding how and what to include in writing up this thesis. While I sought throughout my fieldwork to address the kinds of questions that were most relevant and meaningful to my interlocutors (following Ticktin 2011: 228), ultimately the choice of which of these 'answers' and narratives to include in the empirical Chapters that follow lay with me. The discussion that follows points to some of the pit-falls of participant observation in contexts of violence, and the messy navigation of a constant stream of ethical dilemmas, bringing a realistic approach to our desire for constant reflexivity in the moment of fieldwork (Finlay 2002). It presents my attempts to balance a commitment to producing research that not only serves a witness function but might actually be of some use towards bringing about a lasting political change in the lives of these young refugees, while making every effort to protect the security of those who shared information with me during the course of this research. The final section therefore addresses what has arguably prompted the most challenging ethical choices in all of this, namely decisions over how to write up this research.

Doing ethnography

The privilege I held as a white, British PhD student at an elite institution shaped every aspect of my research. At simultaneously the most basic and most profound level, the fact that I could leave the camp at the end of the day (usually in my own car), and indeed that

I would eventually 'go home' in some way structured my interactions and relationships with research participants in the camp. In many contexts violence is used as a means to establish some level of internal 'order', or to gain status or power over others (Bourgois 2003). And yet however prepared we think we are, studying violence can force us to confront violence in deeply disturbing ways. With no intention of overstating my own experiences of violence in contrast to the lived experiences of all of my interlocutors, I reflect on these experiences here insofar as they pervaded my approach to the data and experience of writing up this thesis. The importance of this discussion is not only to explain the ways I navigated this space while maintaining an ethnographic approach, but to explain the interpretations of my data that followed.

Fieldwork in Palestine is exhausting and draining in different ways. Visits from friends and family during the time I lived in Palestine provided a mirror for me to realise how normalised violence had become in my mind during the time I worked in Shu'fat. On an almost weekly basis, friends and interlocutors in and outside of the camp were arrested and detained without trial; while the homes of other friends were raided and sometimes demolished by military incursions. Sound bombs, gun fire and the explosion of tear gas canisters were the soundtrack to many afternoons and evenings in and around the camp. The amount of time it took to move from place to place on account of roadblocks and checkpoints was extraordinary, and made efforts of planning ahead almost useless. Collectively, this formed the backdrop to everyday life. It became my habit every morning to send around text messages to friends in areas that, (via a combination of the UNDSS text service, Facebook, Twitter and different news sources) I knew had been subject to raids, explosions, shootings or otherwise the night before. I quickly learnt to judge, as my friends in the camp did, what the implications of different circumstances

might be, and when it was safe to move around and when it was best to stay home. These experiences fundamentally shaped the kinds of questions I proceeded to ask of my interlocutors about their lives and the way they thought about their futures. It brought the ideas of perceived uncertainties and insecurities to the centre of my work. Yet however difficult experiences of occupation related violence were, they were accompanied by a clear, shared solidarity among friends, colleagues and research participants. What was much harder to navigate were experiences of violence within the camp conducted by Palestinians in the camp community.

The way I came to think about power structures and relations in the camp was critically altered by my own experience of a very real fear and powerlessness one afternoon in the camp. After a series of incremental, but disparate violent encounters, one afternoon while meeting with Reem and two male interlocutors in the camp, the building we were in was raided by a group of masked gunmen from the camp firing rounds of live bullets. Barricading ourselves into the room we were in, Reem and the two young men insisted on positioning themselves between me and the gunmen, should they break into the room. The episode went on for hours until it was safe to get out of the building and, for me, out of the camp. The immediately protective response of Reem and the young men I was with at the time of the shooting forced some serious confrontations with the confusion over whether my presence had anything to do with the shooting that day, or if it was an unfortunate coincidence. The encounter, some of my interlocutors suggested, made me understand their lives a lot better, and brought me a great deal closer to them ('now you see the *real* camp', was a comment made by the father of one of my interlocutors). In reality, it made me feel that my privilege had never revealed itself so starkly. Returning to the camp a week later, my 'bravery' was praised by many different

people in the camp who had heard about the incident, while all I could concentrate on was the fact that I could choose to leave the situation entirely at any moment.

Luisa Enria (2018b) has brilliantly used the concept of 'fragility' to think through some of these junctures, whereby my personal feeling of fragility enabled an empathy that I could not otherwise have reached; while simultaneously forcing me to confront the injustice made evident precisely by the kind of fragility I felt in that moment which was entirely new to me. Enria (ibid.) urges us to re-position this fragility as a way 'to think reflexively about multi-dimensional power relations, helping us break out of monolithic ways of understanding how identity interacts with power in the field' (Enria 2018[53]). This intersectional reflexivity is by nature, she argues, a political act: because it forces us to reject the segregation of analysis and advocacy by considering how our own vulnerabilities are different from those of our research participants. This relates back as another facet to the point made earlier regarding the celebration of difference from interlocutors, rather than vein attempts to blend in. Since this difference, arguably at a time when it matters most, cannot be erased, it should not be ignored and deserves greater attention as researchers consider their interactions with interlocutors. Indeed, the encounter abruptly forced me to understand the nuance and contradictions of life in the camp at a much deeper level. Beyond shaping the kinds of questions that I asked of my interlocutors, these experiences taught me a great deal about what fear, uncertainty and unpredictability mean in relation to everyday life in the camp. They have also inevitably structured the ways I have analysed my data and framed this thesis.

[53] Enria, L. 2018b. 'Elective Affinities: Fragility and injustice in the field'. Published on *The New Ethnographer.* Available via [https://thenewethnographer.org/2018/04/25/elective-affinities-fragility-and-injustice-in-the-field/]. Last accessed 01/07/2018.

Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius Robben's (1995) edited volume, *Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Culture* remains, in my experience and that of doctoral students at other institutions teaching in English, the text that is most often referred to in pre and post-fieldwork discussions around risk and safety. The volume sought to enable ethnographers working in contexts of violence and socio-political conflict to 'recognize these existential problems, to solve them, and to turn them to their advantage…[to] take away some of the anxieties of doing fieldwork on violence [and] encourage anthropologists to carry out more research projects on this topic' (p.14). In reality, while some of these problems can be mitigated, it is naïve to suggest they can be solved, particularly by a lone PhD researcher. The investigative documentary '9 days in Cairo: the murder of Giulio Regeni' produced by Amnesty International about the kidnapping, brutal torture and murder of a PhD candidate at the hands of the Egyptian Government makes for powerful watching. Giulio was an Arabic speaking PhD student from the University of Cambridge, conducting ethnographic research on informal street vendors in Cairo in 2015. Watching the film with friends and colleagues who had also conducted long-term fieldwork under repressive regimes, we saw many mirrors of our own actions and choices reflected in the film: the way he presented himself and his research; the trust he had in his research participants; the way he navigated contexts that clearly had the potential to become dangerous, but treading a the fine line of risk to collect empirical data that could attempt some level of advocacy. Scholars are increasingly voicing their serious concerns over the state of guidance and professional training for scholars considering research in environments of violence, conflict and war, and producing important work to address this shortfall (see in particular Campbell 2017; and Lake and Cronim-Furman 2018; Stodulka et al 2018; and for researchers working in the

Middle East specifically, see Clark and Cavatorta's 2018 edited volume). These collections aspire to fill a gap that has not sufficiently been filled since *Fieldwork Under Fire*, which remains the most commonly cited reference in methods trainings and discussions. The realities, of course, are that in the more than two decades since its publication, the range of risks, increased surveillance and challenges facing independent researchers conducting ethnographic studies have increased exponentially.

Nancy Scheper Hughes (1993; 1995) has inspired generations of anthropologists to speak out against the injustices they encounter during fieldwork. Our position as ethnographers grants us an immense privilege, and it should be our duty to employ that privilege to continually do what we can to directly confront these injustices. The focus of many pre-fieldwork discussions is on how not to raise expectations of research participants. While this is critical in conducting ethical research, my personal contention is that as researchers with a long-term engagement, connections and friendships in communities we *should* be constantly striving to do what we can, rather than finding ways of absolving ourselves of responsibility. Indeed, to do anything less in the face of gross injustice amounts to condoning it. But as Pamela Nilan (2002) has argued, to what extent is somewhat incoherent data collected in risky and chaotic circumstances really useful? If research in contexts of violence fundamentally raises the moral and ethical bar for researchers, it ultimately begs the uncomfortable question of, is it worth it?

To speak reflexively of doing research in challenging places means to seriously consider the ethics of accepting that one's interlocutors may prioritise your safety over their own, and to interrogate what this means in light of any commitment to ensuring the well-being of your participants during a research process. The UK Association of Social Anthropologists guidelines (2011) highlight the core responsibilities of the researcher to

towards research participants[54]. The guidelines further state that, 'when there is conflict, the interests and rights of those who are studied should come first' (ASA 2011: 3). Similarly, the University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre ethical guidelines (2007) note that it is the principal role of the researcher to 'anticipate and mitigate against possible harm' (p.164), while the ASA). In the case of this study, I failed to do so. While it was never decided upon in the camp that my presence that day had any influence on the shooting, I have grappled ever since with the fact that my research participants put their lives in front of mine.

Writing ethnography

To begin with some practicalities, the issues of data storage and security in Palestine are extensive. Any time I crossed a checkpoint with an electronic device it was put through an electronic scanner, and often taken away. Around two months into my fieldwork, I realized that my phone had been tapped, and although I ended up using three different phones with different sim cards, this remained a constant concern. This meant generally resorting to social media or text messages to communicate with interlocutors and arrange places and times to meet. I have already discussed why recording conversations and oral narratives with interlocutors was often not possible. In these instances (which were many), I would make notes reconstructing the conversation or discussion as soon afterwards as possible which I could later analyse. Of the interviews and conversations

[54] The eight core principles of ethical research, as highlighted by the ASA (2011) guidance are: (1) protecting research participants and honouring trust; (2) anticipating harm; (3) avoiding undue intrusion; (4) negotiating informed consent; (5) rights to confidentiality and anonymity; (6) fair return for assistance; (7) rights of participants to intellectual property; and (8) participants' involvement in research.

that were recorded, I tried to transcribe these as quickly as possible while I was still in Palestine. This both served as a security measure (not wanting to carry around devices that could be taken away by authorities), and enabled me to process some of the information gathered and develop further lines of enquiry. I would often double check my translations of recordings with Reem or with my Arabic teacher, going through anonymized notes or transcripts to ensure I had correctly understood the meaning of phrases used. The remainder of these recordings were translated and transcribed when I returned to Oxford. Again due to security concerns, I de-centralised my fieldnotes throughout my fieldwork, storing them in different notebooks and in different files on my laptop. Concerned by the experiences of other researchers who had notebooks full of data and information removed by Israeli security at Ben Gurion airport when leaving Israel, I shipped my notebooks back to the UK as a security precaution. Once back in Oxford, I began the slow process of organizing these notebooks along with typed notes and transcriptions for analysis. It is impossible to discuss this process without referencing the challenges to this technical aspect of research. In *Field of Screams,* Amy Pollard (2009) analysed some of the difficulties researchers face when trying to write ethnographically about fieldwork that has been saturated with different kinds of trauma. Reading fieldnotes and transcribing interviews that were full of markers of the emotional challenges I dealt with during my fieldwork was an exercise that filled me with dread and anxiety. I will return to this discussion in the Conclusion of the thesis, in relation to some of the methodological implications of this work for the future. It is, however, critical to reflect on this point here, since it ultimately influenced some of my choices over which findings from my fieldwork to examine in depth for the purposes of this thesis.

Discussions of power and ethics emerge perhaps even more starkly through the process of analysing and writing about other peoples' lives in contexts of everyday violence. As well as the myriad of complexities connected to conducting fieldwork in challenging spaces, the issue of how the research is analysed and eventually framed is perhaps the most significant and carries profound implications (Boyden 2004: 245). Writing about Palestine carries particular challenges because of the politically charged and sensitive nature of this context (as has been well documented in Deeb and Winegar: 2016), but also because of the moral responsibilities to which scholars should be held to account (Roy 2007b). It is critical, I believe, to reflect on what the ethics of theorising contexts of protracted violence are, and whose purposes such theorising serves. How do researchers select which accounts or experiences of violence to group together as normalised, everyday experiences, and which others to highlight as particularly clarifying? Who are researchers to determine or delineate the conditions of what makes a situation 'liveable' or 'bearable', or not and organise their data accordingly? What is the added value of reflecting on the possibilities that violence is anything other than destructive, and that navigations of violence are anything other than survival mechanisms? Is there sometimes an intention to deny the destructive capacity of violence? In a context where we study lives that walk a tightrope between living in, and being extracted from, their communities (whether through arrest, kidnapping, deportation or death), it is morally imperative that theoretical debates do not fall into the tropes of social science but remain true to empirical analysis. In seeking to counter tropes of victimhood in the study of violent spaces, there seems to be a tendency to over-ascribe politics or tactical agency in contexts of survival. In so doing, scholars sometimes quickly remove themselves from the empirics of their discussion and focus instead on complex

theoretical interpretations of events. Clearly, the theorising of violence, either as specific events or as a contextual backdrop then raises questions of ethical practice. Throughout this thesis, I have chosen to negotiate these tensions by staying as close as possible to the empirical data and explicit wording used by interlocutors to explain their lives. As I hope the theoretical arguments presented in the previous chapter have made explicit, this thesis has adopted a theoretical framing that stays very close to the data gathered in an effort to ensure that the experiences shared with me by interlocutors are neither sensationalized nor instrumentalised for theoretical purposes.

Through the process of going through my fieldnotes, transcripts and re-constructed conversations, I was able map out an initial set of themes emerging from different kinds of narratives. Having mapped out this initial set of themes, I uploaded my anonymised interview transcripts and notes to a database using NVivo software, coding these initial themes and subsequent sub-themes as they emerged. Of the collective research methods I used, I have found only the timelines to be helpful in the data analysis (although the other methods played a key role in enabling the kinds of conversations that produced valuable data later on). It was by reconstructing timelines of the lives of a core group of my interlocutors (22 of the 55) that the broader political analysis eventually emerged. The four empirical chapters draw principally on a combination of fieldnotes both of daily encounters and particular events; recorded conversations (in quotation marks when verbatim); conversations recorded in note form (italicized, rather than in quotation marks) and interviews. A number of individuals feature prominently throughout the chapters. They have been selected for inclusion in this way when their stories or experiences best sum up those of a number of other individuals; or, to the contrary, provide a stark example of a different experience. To protect their identities, names and

some defining features of their lives have been changed. In two instances, interlocutors requested that I change their gender when writing about them, because they felt that would be the best way for their anonymity to be protected. In the end, their narratives have not been prominently included in the text, although they continue to feature in affirming or challenging the narratives, experiences and perspectives of others.

Limitations of this research

Palestine, in my experience, is a place that constantly raises new questions: of politics, of law, of social interactions, of ethics, of struggle. Aside from the constantly unfolding context, inevitably my positionality and methodological approach bring limitations to this research. I have lived and worked in different parts of Palestine for parts of every year since 2011. I conducted long-term fieldwork for this PhD, and I speak Arabic. Yet knowledge production can only ever be partial, and I am under no illusion that my understanding of life for Palestinians in Palestine can ever be complete.

First, there is the challenge of time to complete a funded PhD. Even with the very generous support of the ESRC, the challenges to doing long term fieldwork alongside the pressures of trying to begin a scholarly career are substantial. One significant limitation to this study is that of the language of literature I have consulted. Although I speak both Arabic and French, with the exception of news sources, I do not consult or reference scholarly literature in Arabic, and draw only briefly on scholarship published in French. I can put this down to the confines of time, but I am well aware that this brings a limitation to this study. Even with my training in Social Anthropology at an institution that has long prioritised the decolonising of academic curricula (SOAS), the majority of the literature

in which I have been trained stems from the global north, and predominantly from white male scholars. I have tried as far as possible to draw on literature (published in English) from scholars in the Middle East throughout this thesis, but it is clearly a limitation that my bibliography does not include academic texts written in Arabic.

The limitations to the practice of ethnography in Shu'fat refugee camp have already been discussed. Of more interest, here, is to return to a point raised by the Norstrom and Robbens (1996) collection in which they urge ethnographers to *use* challenging fieldwork experiences to their advantage. Aside from the extractive tone of this recommendation, I would rather point to the limitations that arise from collecting data based on long term relationships in violent spaces. As much as I have argued for the importance for attention to building access, trust and ultimately rapport with young research participants in contexts of violence, a key part of this is in respecting their silences, and their wishes that certain parts of information are not included in the analysis. Much of what I heard and witnessed in the camp has not been included in these pages. Even in the scope of a doctoral thesis based on ethnographic research, it can be difficult to clearly communicate the nuance and more importantly weight to be attributed to comments, questions or answers. My interlocutors would often say things that could be read as violent or 'extreme'. In many cases, these would be throwaway comments, or parroting a phrase they had heard someone else say. It would be easy to sensationalise this discussion by including these references. Linking to my earlier discussion on the ethics of theorizing contexts of violence, as researchers we have an ethical obligation to our interlocutors to ensure that their words will not be read out of context, used against them or allowed to in any way to be a contribution to wider debates which was never intended.

This brings us to the fundamental limitation of ethnographic and other qualitative research methods, namely the question of interpretation. The words and turns of phrase made in passing through conversations or discussions with the young people I worked with exist within a complex web of individual subjectivities, meaning that my interpretation of their meaning and implication was entirely from my own point of understanding. I attempted to bridge gaps in my knowledge constantly, and would feedback what I thought I had understood from conversations with individuals and groups as much as possible throughout the research process – which in many cases resulted in young people 'correcting themselves', or changing their narrative somewhat when they saw what I had understood from what they said. Before returning to Oxford, I facilitated a series of individual conversations and group meetings with my principal interlocutors whose narratives and experiences had been formative to the ways I understood life in Shu'fat refugee camp, to gauge their responses on what I had understood. During a return trip to Palestine in mid-2018, I again visited almost all of the young people whose narratives feature the most in this thesis. Aside from their bemusement that I still had not finished 'the book', nobody challenged what I planned to include in these pages. To the best of my ability, this research was both designed and conducted with a commitment to inclusive research methods, based on the building of lasting, trusting relationships. Without any false claims of representation, I hope this study does justice to the young refugees who, through the process of this research have taught me more than I can say about meanings of life, struggle, love and hope.

Chapter Four

Experiencing the state: societal de-development in Shu'fat refugee camp

Introduction

This Chapter examines the ways that refugee youth in Shu'fat camp experience the Israeli State in their everyday lives. It argues that the social condition in the camp is one of existential precarity, which forms a critical basis for understanding the actions and choices of youth in the subsequent empirical Chapters of this thesis. It builds on Roy's (1987) conceptualization of de-development, which explains a systematic de-structuring of an economic base to the point that it is no longer able to function (as discussed in Chapter Two). I argue that youth in Shu'fat camp experience the state through a process of *societal* de-development.

The Chapter begins with an analysis of the kind of space Shu'fat refugee camp is. It moves from the physical environment of the camp to its political structures of governance, or rather, the lack thereof. The recollections of the parents of some of my interlocutors reveal a stark contrast between the way the camp is remembered among older generations as a space of community solidarity, and the way that life in the camp it is experienced today. Building on the discussion in Chapter Two, this Chapter focuses on how occupation-related violence is experienced by refugee youth as an inevitability, with the assumption that something will, at some stage, happen to them. It then moves beyond

the discussion of occupation-related violence to consider a different, emerging form of violence in the camp associated with the fear of collaborators with the Israeli State. It locates the role of informers in the camp through the lens of societal de-development. It analyses the ways this societal de-development has structured the social lives of young refugees in the camp, in terms of where they can and cannot spend time; the ways they avoid being caught up in rumours and suspicion; and also considers the ways some refugee youth relate to the 'choice' of working for the Israeli State in this way. Given this structured, societal de-development, the Chapter considers the extent to which refugee youth expect either the international community or the Israeli State in which they hold permanent residency to do anything to change both their material and political realities. Finally, the Chapter argues that a deep political despondency has emerged among refugee youth, who consider 'Political action' (in the sense of Politics with a capital P) to be *al fadi,* or meaningless. This argument returns us to the limitations of a resistance framework as discussed in Chapter Two, and draws out the 'existential' side of precarity as experienced among youth in the camp.

Welcome to G-Town

On a stiflingly hot Wednesday afternoon in July, Tha'er and I were sitting in my car waiting to cross the checkpoint out of the camp. Although the sky was the usual, perfect, bright summer blue, our immediate vicinity was punctuated by hazy remnants of tear gas, mixed with the smoke of burning piles of rubbish at the side of the road and the fumes pumping out of the many cars surrounding us in the traffic pile up. The AC had broken, and with the windows down the air was heavy and made our eyes sting. Tha'er drew long

drags on his cigarette, trying to stay calm. *They're suffocating us here (khanagoona), they've turned this camp into a prison (sawwat elmukhayam sijin)*[55], he said through his exhalations. Dunia, his wife had gone into hospital two days previously, with complications connected to her pregnancy (she was seven months pregnant with their first child at that time). The checkpoint had been closed the day after her admission to hospital, meaning that Tha'er could not go and visit her. Tha'er was in his early twenties, and worked as a security guard at a shopping centre in the camp. We had been drinking a coffee together at the end of his shift when he saw on Facebook that the checkpoint had finally re-opened. Knowing how anxious he was to reach his wife, who had gone to the hospital alone, I offered to drive him there to avoid the usual delays for him travelling across the checkpoint by bus or by foot.

The distance between the refugee camp and the bus station at Damascus Gate outside the Old City of Jerusalem (from where Tha'er would change bus to go up to the hospital on the *Jabal al Zeitoun*, the Mount of Olives) was 2.6 miles. According to Google Maps, it was a ten-minute drive from the area where the camp was located to the bus station. On Google Maps, the refugee camp itself did not exist, although the names of neighbouring illegal Israeli settlements did[56]. Crossing the checkpoint by bus was always an unpredictable journey. After long traffic jams waiting to get there, all passengers would be ordered to get off; to wait in line alone the wall separating the camp from Jerusalem; to proceed one by one to the cluster of three or four IDF soldiers, all heavily armed and standing behind a large concrete block with a bullet proof shield in front of

[55] Throughout the empirical chapters of this thesis, I use italics to quote the words of individuals that were not orally recorded, but which I recorded in note form. Quotations that were recorded *verbatim* are expressed using quotation marks.

[56] For an excellent analysis of how mapping and virtual representations of East Jerusalem legitimise the status quo of segregation and separation, see Cristiano and Distretti 2017.

their upper bodies; to present their ID; to answer questions about what they were doing in Jerusalem; and then, at the discretion of the soldiers, allowed to return on to the bus. If the soldiers found a reason to refuse, the individual would be sent back, or sent into the checkpoint terminal for further questioning; or indeed, arrested without charge on the spot. A problem with one passenger could delay the whole bus. Getting out of the camp, and into the rest of Jerusalem to go to school, to work, to access healthcare or to socialise was never easy. Leaving the camp permanently was even harder.



Figure 13. Traffic queues to leave the camp at the checkpoint

Tha'er was one of many young people in the camp to refer colloquially to the refugee camp as a 'ghetto', using the word in English. A collective of hip-hop artists from the camp described Shu'fat as a ghetto in the early 2000s, adopting the name 'G-Town'

(Ghetto-Town) for their crew[57]. The group popularised the use of the word 'ghetto' to describe the refugee camp, depicting it as a densely populated area that was poorly maintained, with no policing and indiscriminate violence of different kinds dominating much of daily life. As discussed in Chapter One, the Jerusalem municipality provides no services to the Palestinian communities behind the wall, even though all residents of these areas including refugees are required by law to pay municipal taxes.

Although the camp falls within the boundaries of the Jerusalem municipality, until recently UNRWA was the only provider of education in the camp (as will be discussed in depth in Chapter Five), and continues to be the only healthcare provider. Although there was a limited capacity for ante-natal care at the UNRWA health centre, Dunia and many other pregnant young women in the camp preferred to access services at hospitals in Jerusalem (again, a discussion that will be addressed in Chapter Five). More visible, and visceral was the lack of services in the camp to remove waste, manage sewage or maintain roads. On almost every corner of the camp there were tall, mounds of rubbish piled high, which were periodically set alight. Families who could afford AC units in their homes did so, enabling them to keep the windows closed at all times during the summer months to avoid the acrid and toxic fumes from getting into family homes. In reality, unreliable electricity supplies in the camp meant that even those homes with AC units were often unable to use them. UNRWA provide a limited amount of waste removal in the camp

[57] G-Town were producing hip hop during and in the aftermath of the second *intifada.* The members of the group all grew up in Shu'fat refugee camp, and through their music, they positioned themselves as the 'ultimate, authentic, *mukhayyamjī* [camp-dwelling] sub-altern Palestinians' (El Hamamsy and Soliman 2013; for further academic analysis of their music, see Swedenburg 2008). G-Town's music videos, with extensive footage shot in Shu'fat refugee camp are available via [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZuWgm-j1CPE&t=28s]. Accessed on 02/04/2018.

(roughly sixteen tons of the estimated 24 tons of waste produced per day) in the specific boundaries of the original camp, but not the surrounding neighbourhoods.



Figure 14. Rooftop views, from the centre of the camp



Figure 15. The view of a settlement, from the edge of the camp

The result was that all of these surrounding neighbourhoods would bring their rubbish to throw into the camp, a practice which Th'er described as turning the camp into the rubbish dump of the area (*al mukhayam hon, zei al zbale-l'al mintaqah*). My intention here is not to address the materiality of Shu'fat camp in depth, although clearly as other scholars (in particular Abourahme 2014) have argued, human action in refugee spaces is intimately entangled with 'the very stuff of encampment' (ibid.: 216). Rather, the purpose here is to take this as a starting point to understand some of the ways that the Israeli state is experienced by young people in the camp, and in particular how it is experienced through its absence. We will return to Tha'er's journey out of the camp to visit his wife in hospital towards the end of this Chapter.



Figure 16. New buildings on the edge of the camp, beside the separation wall

The camp had not always been considered as 'a ghetto'. On the contrary, among those refugees in the camp who grew up there in the 1970s, the camp was remembered as a spacious place, with beautiful views over the surrounding hilltops, and a strong sense of community. Kiffayah was born in 1975, and had eight children who were all still living in the camp. Comparing the environment her children were growing up in to that of her own childhood, she explained:

> 'There were rarely problems connected to order or safety when I was a child - the camp was a safe place to grow up. The families worked together, UNRWA was in charge, the army were not around so much, and the community was together [*kollna eid wahadeh* - literally meaning we were with one hand]. Since the wall was built, people only come in to the camp to do bad things – to sell drugs or stolen cars'.

The construction of the wall was often described as a defining event that changed everyday life in the camp, not only because of the physical implications it carried, but because of the changing demography in the camp that emerged as a result. This demographic shift had in fact been steadily underway since the introduction of the Centre of Life policy in 1996, which marked the go-ahead for a vast number of unregulated construction projects to cater for the numbers of Jerusalemites needing to prove their place of residence in the city. However, the construction of the wall gave a physical marker of the segregation of communities behind the wall from the rest of the city, and as such the wall had become a by-word for many other elements of social change in the camp. Naila, who was a similar age to Kiffayah, worked in one of the community centres in the camp, and had lived in the camp all of her life. She expressed a particular nostalgia for the camp she had grown up in:

> ‘The camp used to be a good place [*min zamān, al mukhayam kan biijinnen*] but not now. This camp is not a camp anymore. I used to like living here when I was young, because of the community, but there is no community here anymore. There is no security at all, and you can’t trust anybody. I’m terrified every time my children walk in the streets – in the daylight, not just at night’.

Naila’s sentiment that the camp had been a good place in the past was shared by many among her generation, who spoke of their own upbringing in the camp. Indeed, the nostalgia many older generations of refugees held for the camp they had grown up in was almost reminiscent of the way Palestinians elsewhere in the West Bank talked about pre-*Nakba* life in historic Palestine (often described as ‘beautiful’, ‘peaceful’, even ‘spacious’, and ‘a place where we were happy’). By contrast, today the camp was not only an unpleasant environment to live in, but had become a space of fear and anxiety on multiple levels.



Figure 17. Walking home in the camp

Who controls the camp?

Given this popular characterization of the camp as a lawless ghetto, it is pertinent to explore how the camp was, and was not controlled. Since 1996, Popular Committees have technically played a key role in the governance of Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank, operating under the direction of the PLO Department of Refugee Affairs (DORA) (Hanafi 2010)[58]. DORA supported the establishment of Popular Committees in all refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza to adopt a role equivalent to a municipal administration, coordinating between refugees, UNRWA and the PLO to ensure provision of services, to settle conflicts or disputes in the camp, and to deal with external authorities. The Committees are made up of 13 elected members, and are supposed to represent all political factions in the camp[59]. While in some camps in the West Bank (particularly *al-Am'ari* camp on the outskirts of Ramallah) the Popular Committee has developed an important political role, in other camps the Committees are seen by refugees as inefficient and unrepresentative of the refugee population (Hanafi 2010:11). In Shu'fat refugee camp this organisation has limited control, or indeed relevance in the lives of the refugees they purport to serve. From an early stage of my fieldwork when I conducted interviews or held meetings with representatives of the Popular Committee,

[58] The Department of Refugee Affairs was established by the PLO in 1996 to address the concerns of Palestinian refugees wherever they were living, but in practice was only permitted to operate in the oPt. The principle functions of DORA were to support refugees through coordination with relevant departments of the PA; to support official PLO policy and participate in negotiations and meetings on the right of return; and to coordinate and cooperate with UNRWA in the provision of services in Palestinian refugee camps. Details of the Department of Refugee Affairs are available via [http://plord.ps]. Accessed on 16.08.2018.

[59] Since 2003, Hamas has fairly systematically been excluded from participation in Popular Committees (see Hanafi 2010: 10).

my main interlocutors would express surprise. *Why do you want to talk to them? They don't know anything about the camp!* Others believed that those who were elected to the Popular Committee were in fact working as informers, either for the PA or for the Israeli state.

Given this lack of governance, the camp was described by my interlocutors as a lawless space (*bidooon qanoon)* with no system of control or authority (*fish nitham hon fi'l mukhayam, wallah wahad a'ndo sulta*). Kiffayah's daughter Hanin, who was a 19-year-old living in the camp and studying at an Israeli college in Jerusalem was one of many to describe the result of this lawlessness as the 'very normal' experience of divergent forms of violence in the camp:

> *First, there's the army, who come every day to make arrests. Then there's the people in the camp, who keep you awake all night long shooting at each other. Then you hear people shouting and screaming at each other at home, you hear them through the walls. Everything here is unsafe and nobody does anything about it. It's normal to feel unsafe in the camp. All of it, all of this violence in the camp is very normal* (*al 'onf fi'l mukhayam ktir 'ādi).*

As a space in which occupation related violence (in the form of army raids of the camp and the regular arrest and detention of individuals), violence within the community and inter personal violence were all pervasive, the description of the camp as a lawless ghetto was shared by many of my interlocutors[60]. Although the camp falls within the Jerusalem municipality, the Israeli police do not intervene in issues of security, governance or

[60] While interpersonal violence that took place in family homes was often discussed among female and male interlocutors, for the purposes of space I have chosen not to focus on this argument here. For reference to other studies on domestic violence and inter-personal violence under occupation see Krenawi et a. 2007; OHCHR 2017; Sousa et al. 2018; and on refugee communities in Palestine specifically, Lundholm 2016)

control in the camp; and *since* it falls within the Jerusalem municipality, the PA are prohibited from any governance role within the area. This has left UNRWA in a difficult situation. Officially, the agency does not negotiate with Jerusalem municipality on matters related to the camp; yet UNRWA concurrently acknowledge that the municipality is the only authority that could potentially improve the material conditions and security of the camp[61].

Over coffee one morning with Hanin, after a night of IDF house raids and arrests in the camp, I asked her what had happened and how the situation was. *The army came around 11 las night, as usual. They brought some helicopters to shine lights on the camp, so I doubt anybody got much sleep last night. I think they took 11 men last night.* Her voice was tired and somewhat despondent. Although 11 people had been arrested, this was an unremarkable event. Indeed, army raids of the camp to arrest (most often) male youth and young men was something that happened at least weekly in the camp. Early in my fieldwork I began to see an almost inevitability in the way that occupation related violence was discussed among my interlocutors. This translated into the assumption among many male youth in the camp that if they had not already spent some time in prison, their time would come soon. This was one reason why some people continued to go onto the streets in protest when military vehicles entered the camp, regardless of the acknowledged futility of doing so. Omar was Naila's 16-year-old son, and concisely summed up this situation as one of normality: *maybe you'll get arrested for being in the streets, but so what? They'll arrest me for something I didn't do one day anyway.* One evening at home with Naila's family, Omar was pestering his sister to take some selfies

[61] Interview with UNRWA international staff member, Protection Division, Jerusalem Field Office, November 2015.

together on his mobile phone. She was tired, and bored of his game, but humoured him all the same. Omar joked as he smiled at his own camera, *come on, you never know, this could be my last selfie. Maybe tonight I'll be arrested.*

While generally male youth were more likely to be arrested than female youth in the camp, this experience was not completely gendered. Roa'a was 16 when we met, and was one of several female youth to be arrested in quick succession as violence in East Jerusalem began to increase in late 2015. While crossing the checkpoint to go to her school on the other side of the wall one morning, she was arrested and accused of carrying a knife with the intent of stabbing an Israeli soldier:

> *People behind me in the queue took photos and videos, it was clear I didn't have a knife. They kept me in the police station all day, and I was lucky that my father found a lawyer who helped get me released quickly. It's normal here, that you get arrested for doing nothing wrong. Now I always make sure I have someone with me to cross the checkpoint, so I'm not alone if it happens again.*

Rather than leave her school, and limit the likelihood of being arrested again by crossing the checkpoint, Roa'a instead found a way of making herself feel slightly safer or more confident to continue her daily life, with no expectation that the wider situation around her was going to change anytime soon.

Based on fieldwork during the second *intifada,* Lori Allen (2008) conceptualized the experience of living through routine violence drawing on the Arabic phrase of *ta'wwudna* (having become 'used to it'). The ways that Hanin, Omar and Roa'a described their experience of high levels of violence in their daily lives as 'normal' and to be expected resonates with this idea. A decade on from the second *intifada*, young people continue to see their experiences of it as 'normal' and unexceptional. In her rich

ethnography of the Palestinian refugee camp of Shatilla in Beirut, Diana Allan (2014) argued that underlying scholarly portrayals of Palestinian refugees is a complex stereotype that assumes a unified community identity, created under the auspices of historically collective markers and framed in the language of *maqawama* (resistance) and *sumūd* (a particularly stoic form of steadfastness). This narrative, Allan argues, not only fails to take any account for the routine nature of violence in refugee spaces, but is reliant on the basic idea that 'struggle' and action for the 'struggle' are inherited across generations. *Sumūd* was a word used at community events in the camp; and by individuals to journalists who came to the camp to make news reports on unfolding events, particularly during the early months of the third *intifada*. *Sumūd* was a word that was never used by youth in the camp. Assuming it was indicative of a generational divide of some sort, I asked Roa'a about it one day and whether there was a more 'popular' or colloquial version of *sumūd* that was being used by youth that I hadn't picked up on in the camp. She laughed, explaining *it's not about old people and younger people, but we can't talk about being steadfast against the tojjar mukhaderāt (drug dealers). And they're the ones more likely to do damage today*. While there were routinised responses to occupation related violence (such as protesting by throwing stones on the street); an inevitability about what the likely outcome of occupation related violence would be (arrest and detention); and a shared language to talk about the response to it, all of this became the back drop of daily life in the camp. This is not to diminish or dismiss the many ways in which occupation related violence in Shu'fat camp both affects and structures the everyday lives of refugee youth in this space. Within the narratives of my interlocutors in the camp, however, the violence that was taking place between individuals in the camp was a far greater cause of concern.

The short walk between the bus station in the camp and the cluster of UNRWA schools and community centres was less than 200metres, but was always bustling with small groups of men dealing drugs. The most popular drug, known in the camp as "Mr Nice Guy", was a synthetic marijuana[62]. It was fairly cheap to smoke, a bag costing around 30 NIS (roughly £6). Although this was typically the drug that some of my interlocutors would take, needle injections were also commonplace. Several of my male interlocutors took drugs regularly, and I came to loosely know other young men who sold drugs and weapons in the camp as the extended family members of my interlocutors. My focus here, however, is less on the processes of action among these individuals and groups (to the extent that they existed in groups) and more on the way their presence was experienced by other refugee youth. Anthropological attention to vigilante groups in a variety of contexts has argued that although such organisations in their different formations pose a challenge to law or order in a community, they should rather be understood as constitutive of the production of moral orders (Buur and Jenson 2004). The role of such groups as important community protection forces (Pratten and Sen (eds) 2007), and in particular their motivation to improve the protection of their communities through 'everyday policing' (Jenson in Pratten and Sen's 2007 volume) has contributed an important, gendered nuance to the understanding of such organisations and groups. Conducting in-depth research with these groups themselves was beyond my capacity as an individual, female researcher in the camp. Undoubtedly these groups operate through complex networks and structures of their own, which warrant further study. My purpose

[62] Officially the drug was outlawed in Israel in 2013 through the Dangerous Substances Law, but can still be bought from dealers across East Jerusalem and is readily available from dealers who gather on the main high street of the camp, and in particular outside the UNRWA boys' school in the camp. Mr Nice Guy, otherwise known as "Hydro "is a mixture of herbs and other plant materials sprayed with chemical additives. The long-term effect of this drug is still unknown, but it is generally considered dangerous because of the resulting chemical composition..

here is to analyse the implications of growing up in the environment that these groups create, rather than to explain how such groups and individuals operate.



Figure 18. Shu'fat camp alleyways

The *tojjar mukhaderāt* (drug dealers), *tojjar slāh* (weapons dealers) and *haramiyeh* (thieves) were often grouped together, or used interchangeably by youth in the camp to describe the individuals who had turned the camp into a violent space at the intra-community level. While occupation related violence continued to form the 'back drop' to the everyday lives of youth in the camp, it was the precarity surrounding violence in the community that concerned them the most. Among my interlocutors, the *tojjar mukharerāt, tojjar slāh* and *haramiyeh* were accountable to nobody, and controlled the streets of the camp, their presence dictating which streets and parts of the camp were deemed safe enough to walk around in and which areas were not. More importantly, these three interchangeable descriptions for individuals in the camp were all used as a

by-word for *muta'awineen* (collaborators), who were assumed to be working with the Israeli *Mukhaberat* (intelligence). If anyone in the camp had power or authority, according to my interlocutors it was these groups and individuals. Hanin explained the logic behind the connection of these groups and individuals and the assumption that they were working for the Israeli state:

> 'Anywhere else in Jerusalem or Israel, people dealing drugs illegally, or stealing from people's homes or businesses, or especially people selling weapons, they would be arrested and sent to prison. There is no question about it. But here, they never get arrested. They deal drugs in broad daylight, on the streets, outside the schools, and nobody does anything about it. You can forget about the Popular Committee, nobody pays any attention to them. UNRWA? The camp manager is a joke, he never leaves his office. The Israelis know pretty much everything that comes in and out of the checkpoint, so for sure they know that there are drugs and guns here in the camp. They let these people sell or trade drugs and guns, because in exchange they are sharing information. Everybody in the camp knows it. And these people, they have power in the camp because everyone is afraid of them – in fact, everyone is afraid of everyone else, because you never really know how much they know about you or your family, or who they are going to tell. It's why people have very closed social groups here, there is no community in the way that my parents talk about from the past'.

Hanin's analysis summarised the perception of many young people in the camp, as well as their parents. In the light of the lack of any control or authority in the camp commanded by UNRWA or the Popular Committee people were instead subjected to the unpredictable violence of these groups and individuals, who they believed to be

collaborators working for the Israeli state. When referring to these individuals or groups, youth in the camp were explicitly referring only to men[63]. Collaborators hold an important place in the history of the Palestinian nationalist movement (Kelly 2010: 179-184), with connotations related to the behaviour of informing stemming back over a century (see Cohen 2007)[64]. The difference, as I observed it between 2015-2017 was that while the collaboration in question was certainly still with the Israeli state, refugees in Shu'fat were less concerned about the broader perspective of the struggle, and more so with the day to day impact it had on their lives. What was particular to the individuals and groups in question in Shu'fat was their indiscriminate use of violence that surrounded their actions. The only 'explanation' for this kind of violence being allowed to perpetuate, according to the community, was that they were in fact working as collaborators for the Israeli State.

Structuring everyday life in Shu'fat

I began to understand the 'power' or 'control' of these individuals or groups in the camp by observing what they did to structure the possibilities of public and social life in the camp. Ethnographic tools help to understand the complex ways in which precarity shapes the social worlds of youth in Shu'fat. The long-term nature of my fieldwork spanning over

[63] An in depth study of the realities of everyday life from the perspectives of these men, and indeed possibly women who support them in multiple ways was beyond the remit of this study, but would undoubtedly bring important implications to this analysis.

[64] Kelly (2010) has documented the multiplicity of meanings that 'collaborator' has taken on in the context of the Palestinian nationalist movement, including the *samsara* (Palestinian land dealers who sold land to members of the Zionist movement during the British Mandate period in the first half of the twentieth century); the *khawana* (traitors who continued to sell land to the Israeli state after 1948); the *wasit* (middlemen who liased with the Israeli military); and the *jawasis* (spies who worked directly for the Israeli secret service) (p.181).

a year profoundly affected the way I understood the meanings of predictability and unpredictability, or stability and instability among the youth I worked with in the camp. Through this long-view, I saw the conflicting pressures that in one moment made a young refugee entertain one mode of action, and in another adopt a seemingly contradictory perspective. In this way I came to understand some of the indeterminacies of the everyday among my interlocutors. Developing long term relationships during fieldwork enabled me to gain insight into the changing structural conditions that make life increasingly difficult in particular communities. More critically, these relationships revealed the ways that precarious conditions become embedded, and change the ways that people interpret everyday life. Focusing on how young people both perceived and experienced precarity in their lives seems a promising way to understand how they organise their practical, and ideological responses. My analytical focus in the following section is how precarity is experienced by refugee youth, and what the implications of this are for the ways they think about their own futures.

Whereas the response to occupation related violence remained somewhat united (even though changes to this kind of behavior form much of the basis of Chapter Six), the fear and anxiety provoked by this new kind of power at play in the camp led to a different response. Indeed, the possibility of violent encounters in the street structured a vast array of decisions in the everyday lives of young refugees. I quickly became used to avoiding the most direct routes between people's homes, but taking often a much longer way around in order to avoid passing by certain buildings or streets. If we happened to find ourselves in the wrong place at the wrong time, someone would often fire gun shots up into the sky as a warning. Under very few circumstances did my female interlocutors

walk around the camp at night, or even during the day in many cases. Tha'er described this as a changing understanding of 'being safe' in the camp:

> 'My dad, my mum, my big brother, they all told me the same thing when I was younger, don't go here, don't go there alone – it wasn't about being 'safe' when the Israelis came, it was about the people in the camp. I mean, we always knew what to do when the Israelis came, when we were boys we all went to throw stones – less now, because, *ya'ni* [I mean], who wants to go to prison? But talking about being 'safe' from the people in the camp, that was different – the violence in the camp was always different'.

There is a poignant resonance in Tha'er's description of the changing nature of what it means to be 'safe' in the camp with Michael Taussig's definition of 'terror as usual' (1992) as discussed in Chapter Two. Taussig refers to a state of 'doubleness of social being' (p. 18) that quickly shifts from an acknowledgement of a situation as being 'normal' to one of extreme fear and anxiety. This doubleness is almost encapsulated by the concurrent experiences of occupation related violence, which blur into a background of 'the ordinary', and a new layer of precarious violence invoked by these emerging groups in the camp. Among youth in the camp, decisions and choices about where and how to spend time were made in line with the relative proximity of disorder. Micro actions, like travelling to work, or meeting a friend for coffee, become dictated and punctuated by the likelihood of a macro (political) dynamic, producing a constant state of alertness associated with where ones loved ones are. This sets their lives at a juncture of getting through these minute experiences while figuring out how, if at all, to navigate their everyday social behaviours.

Another way that behaviour was structured was based around the constant discussion and sharing of rumours surrounding who might or might not be collaborating with the Israeli state. This had a structuring influence over behaviours in the camp. Participation in an NGO project held in a certain location, attending at a meeting with other individuals in the camp, and the choice of where and when to socialize were rarely, if ever, taken at face value by my interlocutors. In deciding where to meet, what to do, and how to behave, there was often a discussion around how their actions would be read by others, in the camp with the assumption that 'others' might respond dangerously if they did not like or approve of what they saw. Their engagement with me, as an obvious outsider, was one such example, particularly during the initial months of my fieldwork, and I know was a reason why some of the young people I initially came to know decided at a certain point to distance themselves from me, however much I tried to prove myself as trustworthy.

Much of this was to be expected. Having spent years prior to my fieldwork working in different capacities across the West Bank, I understood well that decades of capricious Israeli control had nurtured a widespread expectation of duplicity and suspicion within different Palestinian communities. As Allen (2016) has persuasively argued, 'being forced to live under a wholly non-transparent, seemingly erratic regime of a foreign military power has produced a generalized wariness among Palestinians marked by unique kinds of expectations about access to the truth, and unique assumptions about how the world is being organised' (Allen 2016: 707). As such, male and female youth were constantly scrutinizing their own actions and behaviours in the camp, and questioning how these would be perceived by others. In a discussion about the role of informers in the camp, Omar explained that, *in the camp, everyone says you can tell who the collaborators are,*

because they are the ones that never go to the streets to protest when the army come into the camp. It's the only time you don't see the drug dealers hanging around, when the army are here. Omar, then, had two reasons to continue to go to the streets and throw stones, or other objects, at military vehicles when they entered the camp. The first, as explained above, was out of a sense of inevitability that he would be arrested one day anyway, so there was no particular sense of 'fear' associated with these actions. Perhaps more importantly, however, Omar went to the streets to avoid any misunderstanding among other people in the camp about his own positionality. Rather than defining his actions as acts of subversion or resistance, his reasons for protesting military incursions were rather more pragmatic and strategic.

Omar's understanding of how to recognize informers in the camp was echoed among some parents in the camp. Khadeeja was Roa'a's mother. She was in her mid 50s, but like many women in the camp she looked much older. A perpetual smoker, she worked in catering, cooking up pastries and sweets at home for events held at different community centres. She was constantly worried about Roa'a's whereabouts, and was eager to divorce her husband and move back to the West Bank city of Jericho that her family were from. She had moved to the camp twenty years earlier to get married, in the hope that she would be able to obtain a Jerusalem ID. It had been an unhappy marriage, as the second wife of a man who was well connected in the drug networks in the camp. Knowing now that it was unlikely she would ever receive the Jerusalem ID, she berated her unnecessary life in the camp. She often compared the quality of life in the camp to the quality of life in Jericho, where, even though she would be resigned to life under the PA, at least there was still a strong sense of community:

> 'Nobody here in the camp knows their neighbours. You can't trust anyone here. Everyone just takes care of themselves. The camp is full of bad people, weapons dealers, drug dealers, thieves…the committees are the worst, they are full of informers for Israel. Those people who work for the Israelis, they are generally poor to start off with. You can tell they have become an informer because suddenly their situation changes – suddenly they have money, a car, they move to nicer houses…Informers in the camp, you know who they are, *home ash-har men naar 'ala jabal* [they're easily recognizable[65]], you can tell. When the Israeli army raid the camp, the informers accompany them to the homes they want to destroy. Most of them got into the job as a way of getting out of prison – usually for drug dealing or weapon dealing. In fact, probably 90% of the arms dealers in the camp are actually informers. It's a deal they often make: if you want to avoid prison or reduce your prison time, you can work for the Israelis.'

Khadeeja lived in constant fear that her children might be arrested, and was always very cautious about where we could meet to talk. Having initially met me at work, she kept our meetings to community centre spaces. She made it very clear throughout the time that we met that she did not want me to be seen going into her house because the families living close by might make assumptions about my identity that could put her and her family in danger. Her son was already suspected of being an informer on account of his father's drug dealing, and she did not need more rumors around the camp that her family were hosting collaborators. Whenever violent incidents took place in the camp, accusations of blame were very quickly made. Social lives were observed within families

[65] Khadeeja was here invoking the Arabic expression *ash-har men naar 'ala 'alam*, literally translated as more visible than a flag on fire, exchanging 'flag' for 'mountain' in her usage. Her use of this phrase was to indicate how easy it was to know who was and who was not a collaborator in the camp.

in minute detail, often in order to question whether someone in that family could be working as an informer. As such, youth in the camp were extremely careful about the ways in which their actions and behaviors were perceived.

As Kelly (2010) has argued, suspicion of collaboration, or the potential for collaboration spreads 'not because people do not know what their friends, neighbors, relatives and colleagues are doing, but because they are all too aware of what is possible or even necessary' (p.171). In my experience, the 'frontline work' of being involved in these networks was reserved for young men. While the reactions to the livelihoods of drug dealers differed between young men and women, none of my interlocutors thought that their presence in the camp was particularly exceptional, or something that might change in time. Among female youth in the camp, involvement with male youth who were either known to be collaborators, or who dealt drugs, and were therefore assumed to be collaborators, was avoided at all costs (a dynamic that was particularly structuring in discussions of marriage, as will be addressed in the following Chapter). The young men I knew well did not deal (as far as I knew) but talked more about how they could understand this as a life choice. Some male youth would see this situation not as creating a future opportunity for them, but at least as creating some kind of 'back up'. Hamza was a 20-year-old who I met at a music event at one of the community centers in the camp. He volunteered his time as part of a clown-troupe in the camp, performing at various events, school workshops and children's' parties when his work scheduled allowed. The rest of the time, he worked as a truck driver on road construction projects in the deeply

controversial E1 area of Jerusalem[66]. His brother was several years older than him, and had spent four years in prison on account of throwing stones at Israeli military jeeps. Once he was released from prison, he struggled to find work and ended up dealing through some friends of his from school:

> *I don't think he ever wanted to become a drug dealer, he wasn't looking for power like that, before he went to prison he wanted to do something with his life. But now, he's got money and he's got power, so why not – it isn't easy to find a job after being in prison, there isn't much else he can do. Somehow it makes a good back up option, since now he's dealing he probably won't get arrested anymore. They never arrest the drug dealers.*

Mirroring Hamza's point, two other young men around the same age, Mo'min and Fadi did not deal themselves, but empathized with the trade-off that some of their friends had made:

> *Guys like us, we risk being arrested at any moment. Guys like them have more protection. Ok, it's not the job of your dreams, and I'm not saying they chose it because of this, it isn't like a life goal, to become a drug dealer. I don't think they are seeking to control the camp, that's more something they get as a result of it. But it is still a tradeoff somehow.*

Although the link was not made explicitly between dealing drugs and collaborating with the Israeli state, the implication was that impunity for drugs was granted as a tradeoff for informing on others in the community.

[66] E1 or 'East 1' refers to an Israeli planning policy (Plan No. 420/4) was approved in 1999 developed in the early 1990s to build a new Israeli settlement near the existing settlement of Ma'ale Adumim. Construction in this area would entirely cut off the already narrow corridor of land connecting East Jerusalem to the West Bank.

Living in such an environment was accompanied by a strong sense of stigma and shame among young people who would often do what they could to conceal where they were from. When it was Roa'a's 17th birthday, her mother wanted to organise a party for her at home, to invite her new friends from her school on the other side of the wall in Jerusalem over for a Saturday afternoon (we will return to the reasons structuring Roa'a's choice to attend a municipal school outside of the camp in the following Chapter). Roa'a was unsure of whether to invite her friends to come into the camp for the party:

> *I'm ashamed to tell people at my school that I come from the camp – some of my friends don't even know that I live here, I tell them that I live in Shu'fat village. So until now, I didn't tell them that it's my birthday next week because I know they won't want to come to my party. Probably their parents will forbid them from coming into the camp. It's so dirty here, and full of dangers – everyone is afraid of entering the camp. They wouldn't come if I invited them. And it's better if they don't know that this is where I come from.*

In the end, her party did not go ahead. Roa'as description of her sense of shame can be further linked to the way the young people I knew in Shu'fat would all present themselves outside of the camp. When in the West Bank, Jerusalem, elsewhere in Israel or in transit to any of the above, I observed that all of my interlocutors would, when chatting with strangers, omit the camp from any narrative about themselves, instead saying that they came from Jerusalem. When pressed, they would clarify that they were from Shu'fat the suburb: not Shu'fat the refugee camp. I quickly understood not to mention the camp in public, if I was with my research participants in a cafe, on a bus, shopping or otherwise making small talk with stranger. Further ramifications of this shift form the basis of the

following chapter as young people from the camp use the time between youth and adulthood as a crucial period to try and move out of the camp altogether.

Expectations of the state

With a joint legal status of 'refugees' and 'permanent residents', theoretically youth in Shu'fat could hold two sets of expectations towards authorities who might intervene in the context of lawlessness in the camp. In late 2015, Dunia (Tha'er's wife) was approached by a European NGO to act as a 'community counterpart' for an environmental project in the camp, attempting to change behavior and attitudes around throwing rubbish directly into the streets. She took the role, and on good days at work would talk proudly about the opportunity to try and do something positive for her community. Reflecting on it on a Friday at home however, she sighed, exasperated and described her work as *al fadi,* or meaningless:

> *People will never stop throwing rubbish in the streets; because people will never stop being afraid of sending their kids to walk in the streets; because the bad people will always be in the streets. And in any case, what difference does it make if the rubbish is on the street or in the bin? They [the Jerusalem municipality] are never really going to change what they do here*.

Similarly, other female interlocutors were uninterested and unimpressed by the interventions of NGOs trying to 'improve' the material circumstances in the camp, given that they believed the broader political context was likely only to get worse. NGOs and

UN organisations also attempted to intervene to 'improve' or at least mitigate the exposure of young people to violence in the camp. Activities were hosted almost weekly through UNRWA or different community organisations in the camp, which usually consisted of 'training' activities. Targeting youth and adolescents, these young people were 'trained' in children's rights, women's rights, principles of non-violent communication, and in the dangers of drug abuse. Roa'a had attended a number of these trainings, towards which she always remained skeptical, but rather saw the activities as a way of occupying her time. *I don't expect any real help from them [ma' natwaqa' ishi], they can't do anything to change this situation.* Palpable among all of the young people I knew in the camp was less a sense of frustration with such interventions (or indeed with the international community for allowing the circumstances in the camp to perpetuate) and more an overwhelming sense that the time when such interventions might serve a purpose had long gone. While there is not space in this analysis to address the nature of de-politicsed NGO interventions with refugee youth, it is important to reference in relation to a broader discussion of what young refugees have come to 'expect' in terms of the ability of UNRWA to affect any meaningful change in their community.

This brings us to the expectations that youth in the camp had of their relationship with the Israeli State. In recent research conducted in other communities in East Jerusalem behind the wall (Abu Hutoum forthcoming 2019), the idea that Palestinian communities would call the Israeli police to resolve disputes of law or order has been strongly dismissed, on the grounds that doing so would imply some level of acceptance of the occupation. By contrast, in the camp refugees often referred to their attempts to ask the Israeli police to intervene in violence within the community. This was not said with any shame, or suggestion that this might be a politically controversial thing to do. I

draw here on a lengthy account shared by Tha'er of his efforts to get the Israeli police to come into the camp to deal with a shooting one night, to illustrate this idea:

> 'At 2pm last night, I was at home with Dunia, asleep. Then some shooting started outside. There were two men on the street fighting, and shooting at each other – one of them was dealing, and there was some issue with the other guy. The drug dealer killed the other guy in the end, he was dead by the time they reached the hospital. I called the [Israeli] police to report it – I told them me and my family were in danger because there was a shooting on the street outside our house. They said, 'this situation is out of our control'. Someone else took a video of the shooting on their phone from the window of their house – and they contacted the police and said, I've got evidence of this shooting, so will you now arrest the man who did the crime. But even with the video as evidence, the Israelis wouldn't arrest the murderer. If people were dealing drugs, or selling guns or breaking into people's homes and stealing, and shooting at random in the streets, and starting gun fights every night anywhere else on the other side of the wall, in Jerusalem or somewhere else in Israel, the Israeli police would be there straight away, they would be sorting it out. And can you imagine if this happened to an Israeli? They would demolish the house of the Palestinian murderer immediately, and the murderer would be arrested, or killed, and his brothers would probably be arrested too. But for us – it's exactly what they want. If I want to go out of the camp to go and pray at al-Aqsa, the soldiers will take me aside at the checkpoint, ask me questions, look up my history, things like that. But if I tell them at the checkpoint that I'm going to pick up some hash or a bottle of vodka to bring it back to the camp, they'll just let me go. They want this camp to be a bad place. They want it to

be miserable. They want people to get fucked up on drugs, they want every family to have a gun, like that this camp will implode and we will all kill each other. This is their goal (*hadaf*). From time to time, the army do a raid on the camp and take out a few weapons, so they can say to the media, 'look what a bad place Shu'fat is, all the Palestinians have Kalashnikovs under their beds'. They rough people up a bit, maybe arrest them for a week or something, but they let them go in the end, and you see, they never take all the guns. It's a shit life if you collaborate, I'm not saying you have an easy time. They only want young people to work with them as collaborators, to sell drugs, to sell guns…ideally, all three of those things at the same time. Like that, they have their informers, but they also have these people who don't give a shit about their community, and don't care what happens here so long as they make their money. They [the Israeli authorities] don't want there to be any security here. They want this place to be full of problems, full of murderers, full of families killing each other. They have the power – they could come into the camp and get rid of these kinds of problems. They could clean up this camp if they wanted to, but they don't want to.'

Tha'er's perception of the protection, or immunity offered to drug dealers in the camp stemmed from their simultaneous role as collaborators, working for the Israeli state. This was a widely held assumption in the camp, and the source of fear that prevented many young people from challenging, confronting or intervening when incidents of violence in the camp that had any connection to drug dealers (or their adjuncts) took place. From Tha'er's account, the idea of societal de-development in Shu'fat emerges as a useful conceptual frame. Over time, the ability of refugee-organising bodies has been reduced in the camp, alongside the dismantling of a feeling of community. In a context where nobody

trusts their neighbours, and everybody is anxious not to be mistaken for an informer, individuals have also emerged who act with impunity and have added an additional layer of violence to the camp, on top of the continuing routine of occupation related violence. There was little doubt, both for Tha'er and other interlocutors, that this was a situation that could be easily resolved, but the State had purposefully decided not to. By choosing not to prohibit drug or weapons dealing in the camp, the Israeli State had simultaneously created a new layer of violence in the camp; gained a number of informers on the community; and created a deep sense of precarity in the camp.

The combined effect of a breakdown in community solidarities and the unpredictability of violence brought financial pressures on families who were already very poor, and the precarity of the present was often juxtaposed with a sense of stability in the past. The solidarity on which the camp had previously depended was often discussed by way of comparison with the isolation families felt from their neighbours in the camp today. As Naila explained:

> *…when I was growing up, and even more recently, I'd say up until the end of the second intifada really, if our neighbours didn't have any food, even if we only had some small pieces of bread, my sister and I passed them through the windows to share. Everyone shared everything with each other. Especially during the hard times, like during the intifada. If we didn't have money we could borrow from someone else in the family, or from the neighbours – people could help each other, and even if they couldn't afford to they wanted to, the community was so strong. Today nobody has money, so you cannot ask for help like before – you know that asking someone else for money is just uncomfortable because they can't afford to give it to you. There's no money anymore from the wakale* (UNRWA), *and I keep*

asking at the community centres but they say no, too. The only money now comes from the dammaan eddakhel [Israel social security] but I never know from one month to the next month if that money will arrive or not.

To an extent, life in as a refugee in Shu'fat had invariably always been shaped by economic strain. Yet, while in the past this could be mitigated by extended community networks of economic solidarity, combined with support from UNRWA and community organisations in the camp, this was no longer the case. As Naila alluded to, the extent of financial support from community organisations had dried up, and UNRWA were, in 2016, providing cash assistance to just four households in the camp[67]. Naila could no longer rely on the economic solidarities that had maintained families in the camp in previous generations, and particularly during previous times of struggle. Although the weakening of social cohesion and community solidarities in the camp meant that Naila faced economic challenges, the way she sought to mitigate them carried important political implications as she turned to the Israeli state for support. Her reliance instead on Israeli social security money for economic support was something mirrored in almost all of the families I came to know in Shu'fat, and is a discussion to we will return to in depth in Chapter Seven.

Politics is meaningless

The afternoon drive out of the camp with Tha'er, on the way to see Dunia in hospital that day in July took hours. The sting of tear gas was often in the air in the camp, especially when the 'third *intifada*' was at its height. The burning rubbish on many of the street

[67] Interview, UNRWA Protection Division, Jerusalem, April 2016.

corners, symbolic of both the lack of service provision in the camp and the dense overcrowding of the space, meant that even if there was a regular rubbish collection it probably would not be enough. The frustration of regular checkpoint closures punctuated the daily rhythms of everyone in the camp; but while leaving the camp was difficult, it was also impossible for anyone to avoid going to Jerusalem entirely, whether for work, school, access to health care, or administrative processes. Besides, socializing was generally preferable out of the camp than inside it. As we sat in the traffic, Tha'er was sending updates of photos of the queue of cars to the camp Facebook page that was established to share news about the checkpoint and estimated traffic times, or to share news of closures or military incursions (we will return to a discussion of social media pages in the camp, particularly during the third *intifada* in Chapter Six). The radio in my tired car had broken along with the AC function. Tha'er and other friends in the camp were constantly offering to find me a better car, from among the many stolen cars brought, and sold on in the camp. Instead, our ears were filled with the humdrum mixture of other sound systems in the traffic jam as we waited in line for the checkpoint: Qu'ran FM; Shamstep; news stations in Arabic; news stations in Hebrew. From somewhere Tha'er caught a few lines about a 'day of rage' being called by political factions in response to recent extra-judicial killings that had become common place since the beginning of the third *intifada* eight months earlier. I asked if there would be a demonstration in the camp on Friday, the usual time of protest being after the Friday mid-morning prayers. *I don't know. And who cares? What they're saying, it's just haki fadi [empty words], politics doesn't mean anything here [siyaseh al fadi hon], demonstrating won't change anything.*

Tha'er derived no meaning from the political rhetoric (or empty words) of faction leaders in their calls for demonstration and other forms of protest. Even if they did

demonstrate, he did not believe this action would lead to any meaningful change. As Omar's remarks about his reasons for continuing to go to the streets when the army entered the camp suggested, taking part in this kind of action was not considered a 'Political' act, but rather an act of self-protection from the more pressing concerns in the camp. The description of 'Politics' as *haki fadi* (empty words), *al fadi* (meaningless), or the assertion that there was no politics in the camp (*fish siyaseh hon fi'l mukhayam*) saturated many conversations over the 18-months I spent in the camp. The exhaustion of youth with their everyday surroundings, combined with the rejection of the possibility of a meaningful collective political action poses a challenge to the popular expectations of political activism among Palestinian refugees and Palestinian refugee camps (building on Allan 2014). While dynamics surrounding the futility of public protest were similarly observed during the second *intifada* (Allen 2008; Kelly 2008), a tacit assumption has remained that refugee camp communities in the oPt will continue to demonstrate, because they remain at the heart of the liberation struggle. This was not only observed in political rhetoric during my fieldwork, but also in conversations with Palestinians in other West Bank cities. The fact that I was conducting fieldwork in Shu'fat camp was often met with surprise among other Palestinians ('You're working in Shu'fat camp? They're the serious freedom fighters!' was one memorable remark made by a Palestinian NGO worker in Ramallah). It was perceived to be a deeply violent and politicised space, although the reasons for violence in the camp as outlined above were less understood. Rather, it was assumed to be a space imbued with a political identity and meaning.

Conclusion

This Chapter has empirically contextualized Shu'fat refugee camp as a space in which a process of societal de-development can be traced. Examining the emerging structures of control in this refugee camp as producing a continuum of violence, it turned to some of the implications this has on the structuring of social life among refugee youth. It analysed the ways that youth in the camp relate to or understand the emergence of new forms of control in the camp. The camp is simultaneously characterised by refugee youth as being a 'lawless' space, and one that is controlled by individuals believed to be collaborators, who are ultimately 'protected' at some level by the Israeli state. Caught up in a daily life characterised by existential precarity the expectations refugee youth come to have of the state, or the international community to intervene and improve their material or political circumstances cease to exist. The final section, then, turned to the historically pervasive ideas of resistance to the Israeli state and the reason why refugee youth no longer engage in a discussion of Politics. The analysis of everyday violence (following Scheper-Hughes 1997) throughout this chapter has revealed the micro dimensions of power at play in the camp. Framing this as societal de-development is a way of understanding a settler colonial strategy in the camp to allow this space of violence to perpetuate itself. As such, this Chapter has explored how the state is 'experienced' by refugee youth in Shu'fat.

Locked in on all sides by the separation wall, military checkpoints, and illegal Israeli settlements, Shu'fat refugee camp is variously described by youth who live there as 'a ghetto', 'no-man's land', 'the most dangerous camp in Palestine' and as a place where 'politics doesn't mean anything'. Such sentiments reflect the level of isolation felt among the camp population, as a kind of societal de-development has been orchestrated by the Israeli state to unfold in this space. The material conditions of the camp have been

ignored by the Jerusalem municipality, and have deteriorated to the point that there is no basic service provision, leaving refugees to travel to parts of the city on the other side of the wall to access the state services that they need. While occupation-related violence continues on an almost daily basis, the emergence of violence within the community has contributed to an existential precarity in the camp. In this context, the daily behaviours of youth are structured around trying to stay out of the way of those that they believe to be collaborators working for the Israeli state. The despondency of Tha'er and many of his peers, towards whether they should (or could) engage in collective political action, takes us towards the next Chapter which is framed around youth transitions to adulthood in Shu'fat. This will build the case for understanding the reasons refugee youth seek to increase their engagement with the Israeli state as a strategic pragmatism, so that they might ultimately be able to leave the camp permanently.

Chapter Five

Navigating the state: mobilising political claims through youth transitions to adulthood

Introduction

This Chapter analyses the ways that refugee youth in Shu'fat draw on the period of transition between youth and adulthood as a time to make political claims on the Israeli state. As noted in Chapter Two, this analysis applies Vigh's (2009) conceptualization of social navigation as a way of explaining how youth 'move within a moving environment' (p.419). It further uses social navigation conceptually to examine the dynamic interaction between the context of societal de-development in Shu'fat camp, and the efforts of young refugees to carve out their future trajectories. The starting point for this analysis was the consistency in the narratives of my interlocutors that their main concern, in any conversation about the future, was retaining their permanent residency status and access to Jerusalem. Their means of doing this, initially, was by strengthening their claim that their centre of life was in Jerusalem, in accordance with the 1995 Centre of Life Policy (as discussed in Chapter 1).

By developing timelines retrospectively from the recorded conversations, interviews and notes made with my interlocutors, a series of patterns emerged of strategies to maintain permanent residency status. Decisions surrounding choice of schools, places of employment, who to marry and where to give birth were almost always

explained with qualifiers such as *it's better that way* or, *it makes most sense* or, *I do what I have to do.* Although these actions were not necessarily articulated in direct reference to maintaining their permanent residency status, they all represented key aspects of maintaining their 'centre of life'. The navigations through which refugee youth opt in and out of these social institutions were therefore all based around mobilizing a political claim to retaining permanent residency status in Jerusalem. The Chapter draws in particular on the life stories of three young people which illuminate the kinds of trajectories available to refugee youth in Shu'fat, focusing on gendered decisions around education; employment; and marriage and pregnancy. While the Israeli State does not make it easy for refugee youth to navigate any of these social institutions as they become young adults, I argue that my interlocutors used these periods of change in their lives to engage with the state in a way that is both strategic and pragmatic.

Protecting Permanent Residency Status

As discussed both in Chapter Two and in the previous chapter, youth and social adulthood are not necessarily understood here in terms of biological age categories. However, in the context of East Jerusalem, conditions of legal status are pinned to biological age criteria. In East Jerusalem, young people from the age of 16 must prove their status as eligible to live in the city, independently of their families. Technically this can be readily achieved by attending a school in the city until the age of 18, but as detailed below, there are severe political constraints on Palestinians attending municipal schools. As the chapter examines, this puts the onus on young people to individually navigate ways of proving their status if they are to retain their Permanent Residency. Remaining mindful of the problematic assumptions that accompany rigid age boundaries in discussions of

young people, this chapter is also attentive to the legal constraints specific to the Palestinian context.

The table that follows in Figure 19 presents a snapshot of experience among youth in the camp (based on information gathered from 60 young people) grouped around key moments of change through education, employment and marriage. What is interesting in mapping out these trajectories is that young people here are not following a path that the state has provided in order to best promote the interests of well-being of young people (through which, for example, we might expect to see young males and females staying in education until the age of 18; going on to tertiary education post-18 to gain a specific qualification; finding work; and finding a life partner). Rather, these young people have successfully carved their own 'pattern' of trajectories that have become common practice in the camp, in order to navigate the state institution of proving and maintaining permanent residency status.

Most of my female interlocutors in the camp attended the UNRWA school until they were 16, at which point they transferred into the municipal school system. Those that did so successfully often went on to college, university or training programmes in Jerusalem or elsewhere in Israel. As is explained through Dima's narrative which follows, the longer-term aspiration behind this decision was that it would enable young women to bypass informal sector work, and begin a job with a contract in Jerusalem or elsewhere in Israel in their early twenties. Although this meant attending schools with poor material conditions, and studying an Israeli curriculum, female youth saw this as a strategic way of securing their centre of life in Jerusalem in the future.

Male youth in the camp began moving between education and work from the age of 13, and by the time they were 16 they had left education entirely (this is a process I

term ‘phasing’, and discuss in detail through the narrative of Fadi below). None of the male youth I worked with in the camp completed their school leaving exams, or had any intention of pursuing further study. Fadi was among many of the male youth in the camp who began working in the informal sector from a young age to build the necessary networks and experience. This would enable them to find formal sector jobs when they turned 18 and to be eligible for insurance schemes through a job contract. While they were required to work to support the family income, this was something they took for granted: far more relevant to them, in discussing the reasons why they left school to work around the age of 13 or 14, was their desire to build networks and experience.

When female youth left school before completing their studies in order to get married, it was (in the experiences of those I knew in the camp) because of the opportunity (*forsa*) that the match offered to enable them to move out of the camp and into a family living on the other side of the wall in Jerusalem. In this sense, marriage was viewed as an important strategy for these young women to better protect their residency, because it enabled them to move to another part of the city that was not located behind the separation wall, and therefore was not at risk of being cut off by from municipality in the future. The second preferred option among female youth discussing their marriage preferences was that their desired partner should, at the very least, also hold a Jerusalem ID card (as is discussed through Malak’s narrative which follows). If she became pregnant, she would only consider hospitals in Jerusalem. This was in part because of the

Figure 19. Mapping youth transitions to adulthood [68]

Age	Education	Employment	Marriage	Pregnancy
13-15	Full time; Three school systems	n/a	To someone from outside the camp	n/a
	Phasing	Informal sector	n/a	
16-18	Full time; Municipal school system	Informal sector	To someone with a Jerusalem ID	Ante-natal care and birth in Jerusalem
	n/a	Informal sector	n/a	
19-21	College, Technical or Vocational Training, or University in Jerusalem or elsewhere in Israel	Formal sector	To someone with a Jerusalem ID	Ante-natal care and birth in Jerusalem
	n/a	Formal sector	To someone with a Jerusalem ID	
22-25	n/a	Formal sector	To someone with a Jerusalem ID	Ante-natal care and birth in Jerusalem
	n/a	Formal sector	To someone with a Jerusalem ID	

Female
Male

[68] Formal education here refers to schooling in either UNRWA, Jerusalem Municipality or Awqaf schools in the camp or in neighbouring urban areas of East Jerusalem. 'Phasing' is a process of moving between education and work, as discussed below. Informal sector work is used here to refer to short term work without a contract, which was sometimes in the camp and often in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Formal sector work is used to refer to employment in Israel with a contract.

insurance she was already paying for this medical care, and in part because she would consider this medical care to be superior to that which could be provided (to an extent) either by UNRWA in the camp, or in Palestinian hospitals in neighboring cities. Principally, however, it was to ensure that when her child was born, it would be in Jerusalem, meaning that the baby would be registered in the city and eligible for an ID.

The ways youth in Shu'fat navigate the Israeli state through their transitions to adulthood are not necessarily unique to the refugee population. Indeed, any Palestinian with a Jerusalem ID is faced with the same obligation to prove their Centre of Life in order to retain their Permanent Residency status. However, there are important dimensions of this analysis that hold specific implications for refugees in the camp. The location of the camp behind the wall posed a distinct threat to refugees in the camp who, in almost any conversation of political developments, would debate the likelihood of the camp being excluded from the municipality of Jerusalem and subjected to rule under the PA. Indeed, the threat that the areas of East Jerusalem cut off by the wall would be handed over to PA administration and would become part of the West Bank has been a long running debate in the Israeli Knesset[69]. The emergence of the third *intifada* resulted in a significant upsurge in these debates, along with the implementation of the newest article of the Centre of Life policy, namely that of showing allegiance to the Israeli state, as discussed in Chapter One. The high number of violent incidents stemming from the camp led to multiple house demolitions and deportations among refugee families in the camp in late 2015. The desire to remain in Jerusalem and not to be deported to the West Bank

[69] In particular, a Bill has consistently been discussed in the Knesset as proposed by MK Yoav Kish of the Likud party to bolster the Jewish majority of Jerusalem by incorporating settlerments into the municipal boundary and excluding the areas of East Jersualem located behind the wall. See for detail 'Netanyahu backs expanding jerusalem's jurisdiction to include West Bank Settlements', published in *Ha'aretz* (27.07.2017). Available via [https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-plans-to-add-major-settlements-to-j-lem-1.5435707].

therefore became a thread running through many conversations about the decisions or intentions at major junctures in the lives of my participants. The following three sections provide an empirical explanation of these patterns through the narratives of Dima, Fadi and Malak, three of my interlocuters in the camp. Their narratives were particular examples of the patterns described above, and serve well to contextualise the emergence of this process of trajectories between youth and adulthood in Shu'fat camp.

Navigating systems of education in East Jerusalem

Dima and her siblings were born in Shu'fat refugee camp, as were both of their parents. During the 1948 *Nakba*, her grandparents on both sides were forcibly displaced from the village of Malha, an area of Jerusalem that is now dominated by the enormous Malha Shopping Mall. They fled first to the Old City of Jerusalem, and were relocated by UNRWA to the Shu'fat refugee camp in 1966. Her parents were both born in the camp, and were educated through the UNRWA system until there were around 15 years old. Her father had worked in a settlement for as long as he could remember, while her mother, until she was married, had been a gymnast, travelling all over the West Bank, Israel and Jordan to competitions. She got married when she was 19, and had kept an immaculate house for her family ever since. Their home was a few blocks south of the main road that ran through the camp, and adjacent to the UNRWA girls school in the camp (the boys school was further over to the east side of the camp). Dima's recollections of her childhood in the camp were punctuated by the same rhythms of violence as most of my interlocuters. Born in 1994 as the Oslo Accords were falling into place, she had grown up surrounded by stories of the first *intifada* and of the way the camp had united in its struggle against

the occupation. Schools in the West Bank and East Jerusalem were shut down between 1988 and 1991, and her older siblings and extended family members had subsequently been unable to complete their education effectively[70]. Her father had spent a short time in prison, as had several of her cousins and neighbours. She remembered their collective release, when she was around 4 years old; the care that mothers and wives took take over preparing for the homecoming of their sons and husbands; and the celebrations that would ensue, dominated by long discussions among the men in the family about the experience of detention. The second *intifada* began to unfold when Dima was 6, and she began to witness a steady stream of arrests and deaths among those around her:

> *Mohammed was arrested first [her oldest brother]; then a cousin went missing; another one did an 'amaleyeh [operation] and he died; then they took Ahmad [the third brother, who was 11 when he was arrested]; then our neighbours' son was killed…everything was death.*

The matter of fact way she reeled off the atrocities experienced by her extended family and in their neighbourhood was typical among my interlocuters. Almost every young person I worked with in the camp had a similar history of detention and death of loved ones, which they would explain as ordinarily as if they were reading from a list. Dima had continued going to school during the *intifada*, with the exception of 2003 when a year-long curfew was imposed[71]. She remembered having to keep windows closed during the hot summer months to avoid the tear gas getting into the building during the regular IDF incursions to the camp, but she didn't have any recollections of her education being

[70] After the first *intifada*, Israel passed legislation that made it impossible for students in the occupied Palestinian territories to repeat a school year. The result was cohorts of students who could not read or write, who were forced to attempt to undertake classes at a higher level, and subsequently dropped out of school. For a detailed analysis of this context, see Nuseibeh 2015.

[71] For an in depth analysis of experiences under curfew during the second *intifada*, see Abdulhadi 2004.

particularly disrupted during that time. By the time the second *intifada* drew to a close, the construction of the separation wall around the camp was well underway. At 11 years old she was already acutely aware of the difficulties her family were facing in continuing to access Jerusalem through the now heavily armed checkpoint controlling their movement (although a checkpoint of sorts had always been in place, the apparatus connected to that which was now controlling access across the wall was vastly more intimidating):

> *We used to go into Jerusalem all the time to see friends and to shop, but everything was more stressful [daght] and difficult [sa'eb] with the wall. My mother preferred not to take me with her. So until I changed my school, and started going to school in Jerusalem, actually I didn't really go into the city that much.*

Dima and her siblings all initially attended the UNRWA schools in the camp. There are eight UNRWA schools in Jerusalem[72], which cumulatively serve 3% of the student population of the city, roughly 2,442 students in total (Nuseibeh, p.101, data from 2011[73]). These schools provide primary and elementary education for young refugees up to the age of 16 in East Jerusalem[74]. They were among the poorest schools in Jerusalem, with budgets often subsidised by money made through the school cafeterias, or direct

[72] Four of these schools are located in the central neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem (Silwan, Wadi al Jouz, Soourbaher and Beit Safafa) while the other four are located behind the wall, in Shu'fat refugee camp.

[73] I was unable to secure updated figures on the number of students in these schools, but all eight of these schools currently remain open in Jerusalem.

[74] UNRWA schools throughout the West Bank and Gaza provide education up to Grade 9, after which, in theory, there are arrangements with PA or Awqaf schools for students to continue their education through to the final exams. However, before 2009 there were no other schools in the camp, meaning that students had to cross the checkpoint in order to go to school. In part because of the associated dangers or checkpoints, and the time required to cross them in the morning, but also because Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are not issued the full Jerusalem ID card until the age of 16, UNRWA agreed to add an additional year to the schools in the camp. This ensured that students could wait until they received their full ID card, before having to cross the checkpoint alone each morning to get to school.

donations from teachers or the families of students. In the UNRWA girls' school in Shu'fat, for example, the photocopiers, fax machines and phones were all paid for by teachers at the school. Dima, like all of my other female interlocuters who had attended the UNRWA school, had little that was positive to say about her education, often referring to how dirty the classrooms and playground were, and how many of the school buildings were falling down. This was connected to the second *intifada*, which left parts of buildings shot-out and destroyed, and a constant supply of bullet cases and empty tear gas cannisters in the playground, rather than to UNRWA's negligence. Other recollections of her UNRWA education experience centered around the teaching: *the teachers were always stressed, always shouting. They didn't beat us in the girls' school physically, like they did in the boys school, but they beat us with their words.* While in the West Bank UNRWA staff are paid on average 20% more than PA staff in equivalent jobs, in East Jerusalem this is not the case. The higher cost of living in Jerusalem meant that UNRWA teachers were often forced to work evening shifts to supplement their pay. Of the UNRWA teachers I met in the camp, two worked on supermarket cashier desks, three in a warehouse, and another had an evening job, cleaning offices in West Jerusalem. Working in dire teaching conditions, underpaid and exhausted, the UNRWA staff union regularly called for teacher strikes. Over the course of my fieldwork I recorded 6 periods of teaching strikes ranging from a day to several weeks, meaning that for young people in the camp, the school timetable was both irregular and unreliable.

In 2014, the Al Aqsa fund of the Islamic Development Bank invested $2.5million in renovations to three UNRWA schools in East Jerusalem, including the girls' school in the camp. In interviews and conversations with teachers and Headteachers at both the UNRWA boys' and girls' schools, it was frequently reiterated that the decision to improve

the girls' school but not the boys' school was because girls were more likely to continue their schooling through to the leaving certificates (in line with Table 1). There is no official data either through UNRWA, or indeed across the other education systems in East Jerusalem on the number of young people leaving school prior to taking either the *Towjihi* or *Bagrut* – although as will be discussed later, attempts to classify 'school drop out rates' in East Jerusalem fundamentally disregard the structural and individual constraints and motivations which underlie the decision of a student to move out of the formal education system.

By the time she was 14, Dima was fed up with the UNRWA school. She had always dreamed of becoming a teacher, and knew that she would need a high score on her school leaving certificate to get a place at a training college. She also knew that the education system in East Jerusalem became most difficult to enter at the age of 16, when the majority of UNRWA students would try and secure places at alternative schools to complete their leaving certificates. She had two options to complete her education in the camp, either by accessing the Awqaf[75] or the Jerusalem Municipal system[76]. Awqaf schools are technically supported by the Palestinian Ministry of Education but are

[75] Awqaf schools are run by the Jerusalem Directorate of Education but administered by the PA Ministry of Education. Awqaf schools were established in 1971 by a group of Palestinian teachers in Jerusalem. This was during a period when the Jerusalem Municipality was attempting to force all Palestinian schools to transition to the Israeli school curriculum, instead of using the Jordanian curriculum (during this time, there was no Palestinian curriculum). Led by Hussny Al Ashab, the then Palestinian head of the Jerusalem Directorate of Education, a group of teachers established make-shift schools in people's homes, in order to continue teaching the Jordanian curriculum. Eventually these schools were registered under the Islamic Waqf in Jerusalem (although some still refer to them as the Al Ashab schools). The schools remained under Jordanian administration until the PA took control of the education sector in 1994.

[76] There is a fourth education provider in East Jerusalem through local charitable schools or other private schools. Charitable schools in East Jerusalem are generally run by Christian denominations, and were first established to primarily serve Palestinian Christians. Commercial, profit-making private schools are called Sakhnin schools. Since none of my research participants attended these schools, I will not expand on these schools in greater detail here.

effectively governed by the East Jerusalem department of the Jerusalem Municipality[77]. For the Palestinian Ministry of Education (MoE), Awqaf are considered to be the official providers of education to non-refugees in East Jerusalem (UNRWA remain the official providers of education to Palestinian refugees up to the age of sixteen)[78]. Awqaf teacher salaries and school bills (including the rent of school buildings and associated utility bills) continue to be paid by the PA MoE, but aside from these basics there is no additional funding offered to the Awqaf schools. These schools have always been considered unofficial and illegal by the Israeli MoE[79]. They are routinely denied licenses to expand their buildings or infrastructure, or to build new classrooms, and are instead regularly listed under municipal demolition orders (Nuseibeh 2015: 61)[80]. Since the PA are prohibited from operating in East Jerusalem, the infrastructure of Awqaf schools cannot be altered without Israeli permission, and such permission is regularly denied (Ir-Amim 2016). The result is that many of the available Awqaf schools in East Jerusalem are in such dire need of refurbishment and repair that they are unable accommodate all students applying to enter the system.

An Awqaf school was established in Shu'fat in 2008, after the separation wall had been constructed around the camp. When the towering wall and large, armed military checkpoint was constructed, families in the camp began to withdraw their children from schools in other parts of East Jerusalem. As Dima's mother explained:

[77] This is due to the prohibition of the Palestinian MoE to operate in Jerusalem, since 2001.

[78] The Palestinian MoE neither officially recognises or cooperates with the Jerusalem Municipal Education system.

[79] Private schools that refuse to work with the municipality are also considered to be 'unofficial'.

[80] For an example of the immediacy with which demolition orders are delivered to schools and communities, see NRC 2017, available via [https://www.nrc.no/news/2017/august/israel-demolishes-palestinian-schools-days-before-reopening/]. Accessed 25.11.2017.

> 'A lot of mothers in the camp decided it was far too dangerous to let their children go alone into the city, crossing the checkpoint twice every day - they were just children! We didn't use mobile phones then like we have now, so it was very difficult to know where they were. A lot of families at that time decided it was safer for their children to just stay here in the camp'.

Crossing the checkpoint in the morning took several hours, due to the high volume of traffic, meaning students would leave the house often in the dark around 4.30am, in order to reach school in time for class. More important than the physical exhaustion this induced, many parents and caregivers feared for the lives of their children walking through the checkpoint manned by heavily armed Israeli Defense Force soldiers, operating under the instructions of 'if in doubt, shoot' on a daily basis (Rothbart and Korostelina 2012: 143-145). The Awqaf girls' school in the camp sought to provide an opportunity for students to complete their education without crossing the wall. However, the lack of funding and space for this school meant that it could only accommodate a small number of students and was quickly oversubscribed.

As funding and restrictions on non-municipal schools increased, Dima was required to look for an alternative to complete her education. A third option was for her to enter a school managed by the Jerusalem Education Administration (the Manchi), which is the joint body of the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality and the Israeli Ministry of Education. By law, Israel should ensure free education is made available to all of its citizens and permanent residents between the ages of 5-18, regardless of their religion or ethnicity[81]. The law also forbids discrimination within the education system on the

[81] See the Pupils Rights Law, 2000. Available via [https://knesset.gov.il/review/data/eng/law/kns15_pupilsrights_eng.pdf]. Accessed on 22.05.2018.

grounds of political views, socio-economic status or ethnicity. However, the funding for municipal schools is unfairly distributed between schools in East and West Jerusalem (see Alyan et al. 2012), meaning that there is a shortage of places available for Palestinian students in municipal schools in East Jerusalem[82]. The Supreme Court ruled in 2011 that the classroom shortage in East Jerusalem was a violation of the constitutional right to education for Palestinian children. By 2016, however, the current classroom shortage remained at 2,247 (Ir-Amim 2016), adding up to a need for school places for an estimated 80,000 students (ibid)[83]. Dima's recollection of her municipal school was not much better than the UNRWA school in the camp on a material level. Furthermore, in attending a municipal school, she was required to study an Israeli curriculum.

The Israel-isation of the curriculum taught to Palestinian students in East Jerusalem has long been planned. In April 2011, the Jerusalem Municipality issued an official call to all Palestinian private schools receiving any financial support from the municipality to stop teaching the Palestinian curriculum (produced by the MoE of the PA) and start teaching the modified version of the Palestinian curriculum that was already being taught in the municipal schools. This 'modified version' was censored by the Israeli municipality and printed under the supervision of Israeli authorities. The new curriculum removed the Palestinian flag; any national symbols including maps from all school books; any mention of the PA or the Palestinian state; the works of Palestinian poets and writers,

[82] In a comparative study of educational exclusion between East and West Jerusalem, Nuseibeh (2013) argued that discrimination begins at Kindergarten, where only 3% of Palestinian children gain free places each year (p.82). Across the system, only 50% of the Palestinian students in East Jerusalem are catered for through municipal education services, and many who are have to pay a (small) fee to the schools (Nuseibeh 2013: 79).

[83] The Jerusalem Municipality and the MoE attribute the shortage of classrooms to a lack of "available land" for the construction of schools in East Jerusalem, ignoring the discriminatory planning policies that have been applied by the Israeli authorities in East Jerusalem. According to outline plans, the area zoned for public buildings for Palestinians in East Jerusalem comprises just 2.6 percent of the total land in the area (Ir-Amim 2016).

along with any reference to their works; and the names of Palestinian cities now under Israeli sovereignty, all of which were changed to the Hebrew names. It also ensured that Palestinian national textbooks and civic education texts were removed from the curriculum entirely. Most critically, it listed Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

The Israeli government threatened to withhold recognition of school status, permits for school premises and government funding to schools who were not using the censored curriculum. In 2011 there were intense protests from teachers, parents, and parent-teacher associations, and while the curriculum moved forward, it was not enforced as had been previously threatened. The result is that to date, there are three different curricula in use across the schools in East Jerusalem: the PA curriculum, culminating in the *Tawjihi* exam; the censored PA curriculum (with the same colour of book but with the logo of PA removed, along with historical information, poems and stories by Palestinians writers), also assessed by the *Tawjihi* exam; and the Israeli curriculum, assessed by the *Bagrut* exam (which can be taken in Arabic). In 2016, during my fieldwork, a new push began to enforce the use of the Israeli curriculum in exchange for subsidies to schools who accept it, including the rehabilitation of school buildings and education subsidies for materials. Israeli Education minister Naftali Bennett (who is also the leader of the Settler party, 'Jewish Home') went as far as saying that he planned to 'provide a strong tailwind to any school that chooses the Israeli curriculum. My Policy is clear: I want to aid the process of Israelization'[84].

[84] 'How Israeli is turning Palestinians into Zionists', published on *Aljazeera* (18.02.2016). Available via [http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/israel-turning-palestinians-zionists-160218084338003.html].

The trajectory of female refugee students a generation above Dima in Shu'fat had been to stay in the UNRWA school system until the age of 16, and then move into an Awqaf school to complete the *Towjihi* exam. However, the pressure on youth to add proof to their claims under the Centre of Life Policy meant that attending municipal schools became a desirable option, even if this meant studying under a colonised curriculum. Dima was convinced that her chances of going to an Israeli college or University, and subsequently securing a job in Israel were significantly higher if she completed her education at a municipal school, where she could sit Israeli school leaving exams and study Hebrew. Ultimately, having a job contract in Israel would add further weight to her Centre of Life claim in the future. While some young women chose to study at institutions in the West Bank (usually the Universities of Al Quds, Bethlehem or Birzeit), almost all of those I knew had chosen or planned to study at Israeli colleges or Universities. Dima and her friends would often speak disparagingly of family members or friends who were studying at West Bank institutions, acknowledging that although the fees were less, it would be almost impossible to find a job in Israel with a degree from the West Bank. Many young women in the camp explained that secure, well-paid work opportunities in Israel only came with a certificate from an Israeli institution. While it would be incorrect to assert that this was the perspective of all young, university educated women in the camp, it was evident in the minds of the young women I worked with that the chance of securing work with an Israeli contract post-university or college was indeed more likely among those who had studied in Israel. Engaging in municipal education, in spite of the colonised curriculum it offered, was a critical, strategic step in this trajectory.

Phasing between education and work

The ways that male youth in the camp engaged with education told a different story. Attendance of the UNRWA boys' school had dropped so dramatically in recent years that, during the period of my fieldwork, sections of the school were slowly separated out with new concrete walls, in order for the space to be repurposed for other businesses and organisations. Although official figures were not made available, the head teacher of the UNRWA boys school noted in an interview that in the last five years the number of students had decreased from over 1000 to just 300, and of those 300 many did not attend full time[85]. There is a significant emphasis among humanitarian agencies working with Palestinian refugee youth in East Jerusalem on trying to reduce school 'drop out' rates, which are often used as an indicator of the deepening humanitarian 'crisis' in the city (see for example NRC 2014; OCHA 2017b; UNICEF 2018). The following discussion complicates this idea conceptually, arguing that among male and female youth in Shu'fat, the decision to leave school before attaining a qualification (or before the age of 18) was rather taken as a political necessity in order to maintain their permanent residency status.

Fadi was 20 years old when we met. He was a childhood friend of Omar (who we met in the previous Chapter), since their families lived opposite one another, and they had grown up together. Fadi was still living at home with his mother and three younger siblings, and he was the principal wage earner in the family: his father had died, one brother had moved away, and the other had been in prison in Israel for four years. Alongside his day job, as a driver of small trucks in Israel, he was an aspiring hip-hop

[85] Interview, UNRWA headteacher, March 2016.

artist and worked with other musicians in East Jerusalem producing his work. Inspired by the success of the Shu'fat crew G-Town, with whom he had learnt to write poetry as a child, he was also now running song writing workshops with children in the camp. The children coming to the workshop were usually between around 8 and 12 years old, and were almost all students at the UNRWA school in the camp. I joined him for many of these workshops in the camp, and we would often sit for hours talking about the writing produced by younger children after they had gone. Fadi said many times that he 'saw an old version of himself' in these children (who were mainly boys, but several girls would also attend from time to time). The narratives and political language of these younger children was raw, and presented a much clearer dichotomy of occupation and resistance than any of the narratives of youth in the camp. Fadi commented on this often, reflecting on the difference between the way he saw *al wada'* (the situation) in the camp when he was a child, and how his opinions had changed as he had increasingly engaged with different Israeli institutions throughout his adolescence in efforts to protect his ID and residency status. This idea is developed further in Chapter Six, but I have included it here to help highlight the way that the experience and responsibility that comes with the forced engagement with the Israeli state has a direct impact on the way politics is enacted among refugee youth.

In conversations about his education at the UNRWA school in the camp, Fadi had similar recollections to Dima, regarding the unpleasant school environment, poor quality of teaching and regular physical punishment from teachers. He and his friends had regularly received physical beatings at the UNRWA school, including on one occasion

being hit around the head with a piece of metal pipe[86]. As well as wanting to get away from this school, he had been eager to get out of the camp environment for a change of scene: 'everything is the same here every day, same people, same places…even when I was young, I was so bored'. So aged 13, he enrolled in a municipal school on the other side of the wall in East Jerusalem. It meant early starts every morning to cross the checkpoint, but he dismissed this as unimportant in the narrative – almost everyone he knew was commuting out of the camp for work or school anyway, and for him making the journey to school was neither here nor there ('*ādi, mish mohem*). He was the only student from the refugee camp to attend this particular school, surrounded by students from neighbouring East Jerusalem suburbs on the other side of the wall. He immediately felt excluded, and unwelcome on account of coming from Shu'fat camp:

> "When you're from the refugee camp nobody wants to be your friend, nobody wants to sit next to you, share their lunch with you...They made me feel like I was a real monster. I didn't know if what they said was true, if I was a good guy or a bad guy – I was too young to understand. But after a while you do become this aggressive guy because they're telling you all the time that that's who you are, and so you start to be the tough kid in the school, and that's what happened with me"

By the time he was 14 he decided to stop going to school. He didn't have friends there, and he felt like attending classes was pointless (*al fadi*): 'a lot of the kids my age in the camp were working, my brother was working, everyone was starting to make money. My brothers told me I should start working, and I decided it was better than staying at

[86] It is important to note that during the period of my fieldwork UNRWA were developing new policies and trainings in relation to corporal punishment, in addition to existing reporting mechanisms which were already in place (Interview, UNRWA Child Protection Officer, Jerusalem Field Office, December 2015). For an important critique of child protection in educational settings with specific reference to corporal punishment, see Fay 2017.

school'. Through Fadi's older brother, he found a job working in a car garage in the camp. He was mainly cleaning cars, but was sometimes allowed to help the older *shabab* doing the mechanics and working on the cars. None of the male youth in the camp directly spoke about financial pressures within their families, or suggested that their families insisted that they drop out of school in order to start work[87] . Rather, many indicated the shared responsibility of financial pressures within the family that they had grown up with. When Fadi started work at the garage, he would be paid cash in hand at the end of each week – the equivalent of roughly £2 per day. He gave all this money to his mother, who would offer him a small amount back each week to buy snacks or drinks. Several months into his first job, Fadi arrived at work one day to find that the garage had been raided overnight. Car parts (mainly stolen) were strewed across the street and parts of the garage had been set on fire. He ran back home, and later found out that the IDF had arrested his friends running the garage because they did not have a business permit to operate in the camp. The one lawyer in East Jerusalem who took on cases of youth arrest from the camp had been called, but had been unable to visit the men in detention, and so far a court date had not been set[88]. Both of Fadi's older brothers had already spent time in prison, and so far it was something that Fadi had managed to avoid. He decided that, with these contacts gone, he preferred to go back to school rather than find another job. The way he described his decision was not because he thought that continuing his studies

[87] I initially wondered if they were merely reluctant to talk to me about financial family pressures because of an associated shame or stigma; but in fact, family financial pressures and concerns came up in a variety of other contexts and discussions.

[88] If a Jerusalemite is arrested on the basis of an offense committed in Jerusalem or territories inside the Green Line, they enter the Israeli civilian court system. However, if the alleged offence has any ties to the West Bank (and regular legal practice suggests that very little burden of proof is placed on the prosecution to prove such a connection), military court jurisdiction extends to Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, accompanied by extended interrogation periods and (renewable) detention without trial for six-month periods (see 'In the Shadow of the 2014 Gaza War: Imprisonment of Jerusalem's Children', *Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association*, 2016).

would help him in the long term, but because it was 'something to do' when working seemed too dangerous. He knew that it wouldn't take long for the IDF to associate him with the workers at the garage, and realised that he needed to lie low for a while until this incident had died down.

The second time round at school was a more positive social experience. Some younger boys from the camp had joined the school during his absence, and he quickly found that he had a group of friends. Soon after returning to school, Fadi started taking drugs. At his peak, Fadi smoked three bags a day of Mr Nice Guy, and he needed money to pay for it. Perhaps more important was the understanding that Fadi shared with many other male youth in the camp that, since a completed education was not a solution to finding a job, the possibility of work at an earlier stage would lead to the logical decision to take it:

> 'It's not that I had to work, if I had been really good at school I could have stayed, but I knew there was no point. A *towjihi* certificate doesn't get you a contract! You need *wasta* (nepotism, contacts or connections), and you have to start working on that as soon as you can, otherwise you'll be 18 and working in a useless job'.

After about eight months he left school again and found a new job, this time as a labourer working on a settler road (a road connecting illegal Israeli settlements together and to Israeli cities, that only Israelis can drive on by law) in the West Bank. A friend of one of his brothers was working on the same construction project, and offered to take Fadi with him. Like his first job, this one was also cash in hand. He worked long hours (typically from 5am – 3pm) and the pay was low. The road was completed several months later, and Fadi found another short-term construction job through another young man he met working on the road. Fadi and his friends saw nothing exceptional in the way they would

'phase' in and out of school. As we will see, the importance these young men gave to starting to work at an early age had little to do with the responsibility or social status that earning money brought them, and more to do with the need to gain informal sector work experience and start to build their own employment networks.

There were also various informal education systems available to young refugees both in and out of the camp, specifically targeted at youth who left formal education before completing their leaving certificates (either the *Towjihi* in the Palestinian system, or the *Bagrut* in the Israeli system). Informal education ranged from individual tutoring in the camp, to small community organisations facilitating classes, to municipality-funded education programmes. One example of this was a small group of young women among my research participants in the camp who, during the course of my fieldwork, established a new education centre in the camp in response to boys in their own extended families 'phasing' in and out of education. Many found that they were unable to re-join their schools at the level they had left them, and needed extra tuition to help them catch up. Three women in their early twenties, who had all trained to be teachers at West Bank universities but had been unable to secure work in Jerusalem, saw this as an opportunity to use their skills and develop more teaching experience. Together they founded a small tutoring organisation in the camp, which they designed to enable more young people to see 'phasing' their education as a viable option. They overtly acknowledged the importance of boys and young men starting to work from a young age in order to better secure their residency, and specifically sought to create ways to help them keep their options open. When Fadi and I met, he was also enrolled in an informal education programme in the camp specifically targeting young people who were between education and work. In the afternoon he attended a few hours of classes at an Israeli funded youth

centre on the edge of the camp, staffed with Palestinian psychologists and educators trying to help young people who had dropped out of school to pass the Israeli *Bagrut* exams. The students at these informal education centres were quite transient. Indeed, over the course of my fieldwork, Fadi re-started and then quit this programme twice.

Fadi's jobs without a contract had generally been within the refugee camp, and a number of other male youth similarly held short term jobs in shops, car garages or hair salons in the camp from around the age of 14. Others, like Fadi's friend Omar worked in illegal Israeli settlements and their surrounding areas in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, either in construction or in fruit and vegetable picking and packing. Although both Palestinian and Israeli law set the minimum working age at 15, in reality many start work when they are younger. If a trusted family member or friend could secure work in a settlement, this was seen as preferable by many because of the increased income it secured (the average salary gained from a day of work in the agricultural sector in a settlement is the equivalent of £14; by contrast, male youth working in the camp in garages or shops would rarely earn more than £5 per day). Settlement jobs typically entail the picking, cleaning and packing of fruit and vegetables (mostly tomatoes, asparagus, aubergines, onions and peppers). The working day began at 5.30am, requiring workers to leave home at 4am to allow enough time to pass through the crowded checkpoint out of the camp. Since there was no regulation of working hours in the camp, my interlocutors would often end up working 12-hour days during peak seasons. Omar held a number of different jobs in settlements during the course of my fieldwork, and once summed up the long hours he spent packing vegetables in the summer months, saying, *my mum loves this job for me because it's great for my health – I don't even have time to smoke a cigarette during the day because we get no breaks!* However, no breaks

during the summer months, when the temperature in the Jordan Valley regularly reached over forty degrees Celsius, meant that they often came home with terrible headaches and vomiting from heatstroke.

Other jobs carried out by my interlocutors in the settlement agricultural industry included spraying pesticides on fruit and vegetables (for which no protective clothing was provided), and carrying heavy cans of pesticide spray on their backs. From their accounts it was clear that although much of their working days took place around dangerous machinery, this work largely went unmonitored. As with discussions around the lack of significance attributed to formal education, male youth who had worked in settlements similarly saw nothing exceptional in their experience. The fact that these working conditions were grueling, repetitive and badly paid (although well paid by contrast to jobs in the camp) was evident. What concerned young people most about these kinds of employment, however, was not the exploitative labour, but the precarity of their work, and the lack of any employment contract available to them. Crucially, undocumented workers under the age of 18 receive neither medical insurance or social insurance benefits[89]. Any injury or illness arising from the working environment must be covered by the individual, while time off work risks losing the job. Fadi was one of many young men in the camp who emphasised the importance of building up his 'profile' as a worker, and his connections and reputation among men in the camp who help to him find a job with an Israeli contract after he turned 18, in turn allowing him access to Israeli insurance and benefits systems.

[89] The limitations in access to Israeli benefits among camp residents will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six, which offers an examination of why access to citizenship in the settler colonial state is only ever partial.

In the same way that female youth in the camp sought to find a job contract in Israel as an important way to retain their residency status, male youth also developed strategies to find employment with a contract. For young men, these opportunities arose after they turned 18 and were eligible for a job with an Israeli contract with accompanying access to health insurance and unemployment benefits. These contracts were secured based on the networks built up by young men or by their family members, and young men found that being able to prove a track record of work experience in the informal sector (typically by word of mouth, being known as a 'good worker') was essential. The kinds of job contracts accepted by my male interlocutors included institutional cleaning jobs, truck driving jobs, construction work in both Israel and illegal Israeli settlements. The strategy worked for Fadi, and by the time he turned 18, he had established his own network of contacts and was regularly employed on short-term construction or agricultural jobs in settlements. It was then possible for him, through these contacts, to find a job with a contract in Israel that would provide him with insurance and unemployment benefits. This was the job he was doing when we first met, working in the mornings as a truck driver, starting at 4am every day and finishing by noon. He explained that, without the contacts and networks he had built up working informally when he was younger, he would not have been able to find a highly coveted job with a contract in Israel.

The politics of love

Phasing between education and work was a concept unique to male youth in the camp. Among the female youth I worked with, leaving school on account of earning money was never discussed, but leaving school if a good marriage opportunity arose was quite

common. Across generations in the camp, the shared understanding was that youth became adults at the point that they got married, and until such a time, female youth were subject to the decision making of their fathers, older brothers or uncles. While male youth held more autonomy regarding the ways they were allowed to spend their free time, young men and adults similarly saw marriage as the key to being fully respected by their fathers, and treated as an equal.

Malak and Dima were distant cousins. Several months into my fieldwork, Dima invited me to attend a family party with her to celebrate Malak's pregnancy (she was expecting her second child). The day of the party, we went over to the house early with some snacks to help Malak get ready, although when we arrived everything was clearly well under control. At 18 years old, she was the mother of 16-month old Sa'eed, who perched on her hip as she cleaned up in the kitchen. Malak and Mahmoud were one of many young couples in the camp. They had been married two years earlier, when she was 16 and he was 19. Malak left school when she was 15 to prepare for the wedding. At that time, she was informed by all three education providers (UNRWA, Awqaf and the Municipality) that she would be prohibited from returning to school after she was married. While 'phasing' was not encouraged among male youth it was tolerated by all three education providers to a certain extent. For girls, however, marriage meant exclusion from any opportunities of further formal education.

Having phased between school and work since the age of 14, Mahmoud had saved enough money by the time he was 19 to be available to get married. He had a job as a hospital cleaner in Jerusalem, which came with a contract with the associated insurance and access to social security benefits. Moreover, the prospect of a wedding broke up the

monotonous rhythm of daily life in the camp and gave both Malak and Mahmoud something to be excited about:

> *Everything you see here is dark, everyone is stressed and anxious, you never know what is coming, but you assume always that something bad is coming, and you thank God every day when it passes smoothly. The idea of getting married – it was amazing! It made me so happy, having something else to think about, and everything to plan. It made me feel like I was moving forward with my life*.

Like many young people in Shu'fat, Malak came from a 'mixed' family (*ehna 'eileh makhtalatah*). To be 'mixed' means to have one parent with a West Bank ID and one parent with a Jerusalem ID. In Malak's case, her mother had a Jerusalem ID while her father had a West Bank ID. Palestinians who were not present in East Jerusalem at the time of the 1967 census received West Bank ID cards which are today colloquially as 'the Green ID' (due to the colour of the document holder), but not permanent residency status. West Bank ID holders can apply for permits to enable them to cross checkpoints to enter Jerusalem, but they are granted only under specific circumstances, including work, health appointments, religious tourism or business. The permits last from a day to a year, but overnight stay in Jerusalem is prohibited. When Malak's parents got married, they had made multiple applications to the Israeli Ministry of Interior for family reunification, to enable her father Nasser to obtain a Jerusalem ID. Even now, her mother Kiffayah would make trips to the Ministry every few months to see if there was any progress on the application, involving a trip out of the camp and to the West side of Jerusalem each time.

Malak saw how difficult life had become for her mother, with her father unable to travel to Jerusalem for family events, to accompany his wife or children on hospital visits, or even to travel on the same roads to other parts of the West Bank. Like Dima and Fadi,

Malak had not been inspired by her education at the UNRWA school, remembering only that it was boring, the school was dirty, and that the teachers were angry all the time:

> *There was no reason to stay at school – what was the point? School here is meaningless [al fadi], unless you do well in Towjihi and you have money to study something else after. For me that was impossible. I already knew how to read and write, I can think for myself, so with the choice of getting married or staying at school, I preferred to get married!*

Mahmoud, Malak's husband-to-be came from one of the bigger families in the camp which was something she occasionally made reference to: but most importantly for her, he also held a Jerusalem ID card: *Our life is much easier because he also has the ID. He has good work in Jerusalem, there's no problem with the children, when they're sick we can go to hospital together, we've got the insurance so we can go to any hospital – it's easy.* In reality, Malak and Mahmoud, like many others in the camp who could technically access other hospitals in Jerusalem almost always preferred to use two Palestinian hospitals in East Jerusalem (the experiences of youth in the camp attempting to access health care in West Jerusalem are discussed further in Chapter Seven). Many female youth in the camp would therefore describe the chance to marry a man with a Jerusalem ID as a good opportunity (*a'ndi forsa)*. If such an opportunity presented itself at a slightly younger age therefore, young women would prioritise getting married over completing their education.

While there were many mixed parents among my interlocutors in the camp, the politics of love among youth were dictated by the discriminatory residency laws and the physical restrictions to accessing Jerusalem. Parents with mixed IDs, especially women with Jerusalem IDs who married men with West Bank IDs, were adamant that their children would not do the same. Nadia was in her early-twenties when we met. She was

immediately full of warmth, and we quickly bonded through jokes and discussions about the differences in our personal lives given our similarity in age. She had met her husband Ra'ed in the small, beautiful (UNESCO heritage-listed) village of Battir close to Bethlehem, where her family had extended networks of friends. Ra'ed was a laborer, working with a permit that enabled him to work in settlements (but not in Israel) in the Gush Etzion settlement block. They married in Battir, but immediately moved to live together in the camp and began applying for family reunification. Every year they filed the relevant documentation to the Israeli Ministry of Interior in the hope that Ra'ed might be granted a Jerusalem ID:

> "It's really, really hard to be married to someone with a West Bank ID. If my daughters wanted to marry someone with a West Bank ID, I absolutely will not agree...my friends and me used to talk about the ID issue a lot when we were younger. I knew it would be hard but I didn't realise exactly what life would be like as a mixed couple. When I had the children, at a hospital in Jerusalem, Ra'ed was not allowed to come with me. Only once, with one of the kids I had to have surgery and he was able to come to visit me in hospital, he got a permit for a day – but by the time he reached the hospital, after waiting hours for the checkpoint and everything, he was only with me a short time and then he had to go back again because the visiting time was over. He got a permit for only one day – the rest of the time my mother had to come. This is the Israeli law."

Some of my research participants had been born in a West Bank hospital, and even though one of their parents had a Jerusalem ID, they had been unable to obtain their own ID through family reunification procedures. For many of these people, trying to marry into a Jerusalem ID family was a crucial way of trying to secure this process. Sundos was

a 22 year old recently-qualified social worker working in a children's community centre in the camp. Her father had a Jerusalem ID and her mother had a West Bank ID. Although they had repeatedly applied for family reunification over many years, they had been unable to secure an ID for her mother. She was therefore unable to give birth to her children in a Jerusalem hospital, meaning that they were born with West Bank IDs in Ramallah:

> "Since I'm technically 'from' the West Bank, since that's where I was born, if someone from Jerusalem came and asked me to marry him that would be really important for me, I'm thinking not only about my future but about the life I want for my children …but still, it's hard to find someone to marry with a Jerusalem ID. There are girls from here who planned on getting married outside the checkpoint [to people from outside the camp] and they're still waiting for their permits to come through to enable them to marry. It's really hard to do anything if you don't have the permit."

Women in Shu'fat camp did everything they could to ensure their children would be born within the walls of the city in order to secure their Israeli registration, enabling them to access a Jerusalem ID after the age of 16. There were different approaches to giving birth. In cases of mixed marriage where the male held a Jerusalem ID and the female a West Bank ID, women would describe the practice of *tahreeb* (or smuggling – used to describe the smuggling of goods, or when a West Bank ID holder travels to Jerusalem without a permit), in order to get into Jerusalem and give birth in a hospital there. Regardless of the ID of their parents, only babies born in a hospital registered under the Jerusalem municipality can be registered, meaning they will receive a Jerusalem ID.

As an international researcher with a car that had an Israeli registration plate (enabling me to drive in both the West Bank and Jerusalem), I was often called upon by research participants and friends in the camp to help take family members into Jerusalem. With my car license plate, and more importantly my skin colour, I was able to cross checkpoints without being stopped by Israeli soldiers, who paid little attention to whoever else might be with me in the car. As such, I would often drive pregnant young women in the camp into Jerusalem to meet with midwives who could advise them on which hospital to access to give birth. Many young women spoke of not having been able to access adequate pre-natal care in the camp, because they felt the facilities at the UNRWA health clinic were of low quality, but were unable to travel to Jerusalem without a permit. Further, many mothers explained that while they had been pregnant their movement had been very restricted, because they believed that staying physically still limited the chances of an unplanned, early delivery. Above all, they wanted to avoid being caught off guard, which might mean that they wouldn't have time to reach a Jerusalem hospital before giving birth.

The second approach related to mixed couple cases when the female held a Jerusalem ID and the male a West Bank ID, and required a different strategy to giving birth. Men could apply for a permit to accompany their wives to Jerusalem, but these would typically only be granted for one day at a time, and from 7am-7pm. In studies of pregnancy among East Jerusalemite women, Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015b) and Hammoudeh et al (2017) found cases of women attempting to induce pregnancies in coordination with the permits granted to their husbands, in order to ensure that their husbands could accompany them to the hospital. Growing up surrounded by these dynamics, and often witnessing family members struggling, young people with a

Jerusalem ID would often speak of these challenges. Indeed, when a possible engagement or 'match' was discussed either among young women in friendship groups or within their families, the first question to be asked was usually what ID the individual in question held. As Noor, a 15-year-old who was still attending the UNRWA girls school in the camp explained:

> "Already a lot of people came and asked to marry me, but all of them are from the West Bank. So my mother didn't agree. It's not a good idea for the future. So much would change without my ID. It's really hard if you don't have the Jerusalem ID… I feel free with my ID, when I have my ID I feel like I'm protected. It's not something I could give up just for marriage."

Even in consideration of marriage prospects, at the age of 15 Noor's comment illustrates the way that marriage as a social institution has been instrumentalised among youth in the camp in order to serve the political claim of maintaining Permanent Residency. This chapter has argued that this is also the case with choices around education and work, yet the extension of politics towards decisions of partnership and love take on a deeper and more intimate meaning. Concurrently, the politics of love in Shu'fat reveal how the system of necessity for maintaining Permanent Residency is 'reproducing' itself. As youth in the camp are forced to navigate the parameters of the Centre of Life policy, they simultaneously entrench the fragmentation of historic Palestine by doing so. In some cases, this also emerged in the narratives of female youth when talking about their marriage aspirations. Female youth in Shu'fat would refer to young men from the West Bank as *basiit* (simple) or using the rather more derogatory *mutakallif* (backwards) as a result of having never lived in Jerusalem, implying that even beyond their lack of a Jersualem ID, they would not wish to have a partner who could not navigate the same

kind of systems as them. The re-production of this fragmentation is taken further in Chapter Seven when we examine the aspirations of youth in Shu'fat towards Israeli citizenship.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the ways that refugee youth navigate significant moments in their transitions between youth and adulthood to strengthen their claim to retain their permanent residency status. Female youth opted to join the Israeli funded municipal education system, to better secure their likelihood of attending Israeli colleges or universities. This would subsequently enable them to find a job contract in Israel that would satisfy their centre of life claim. Those who chose to leave school before completing their final exams did so if a good opportunity for marriage to a man with a Jerusalem ID arose. This, again, would help to secure their residency status. Male youth began phasing between school and education in order to gain relevant work experience, so that after they turned 18, they would have the necessary networks to secure a formal sector job. Such a job would come with insurance, a contract, and again, would help them to prove their residency.

It was beyond the scope of this study to develop a historical analysis that charts precisely how this level of engagement has changed over time, but among my interlocutors in the camp community, it was constantly remarked that these behaviours were new among this generation of youth. Chapter One highlighted the increasing conditionalities within the Centre of Life Policy since its introduction in 1996, particularly since the introduction of the breach of allegiance policy in 2006, and the stringent

enactment of this clause that began in the wake of the 2015 third *intifada*. The generation of youth in Shu'fat camp today therefore represent the first generation needing to navigate their transitions to adulthood with political claim making in mind. This does not suggest that refugee youth engagement with Israeli state institutions cultivates a politics of consent or compliance with the settler colonial project. Rather, I argue that young refugees are strategically pragmatic in their engagement with the social institutions of education, work and marriage to make important political claims. The next Chapter returns to the more immediate political context of this study, locating these navigations in the context of the violent political realities of the third *intifada,* and considering the way that these decisions happen in conjunction with a shifting morality among refugee youth.

Chapter Six

Subverting the state? Shifting moralities during the third intifada

Introduction

This Chapter sets the arguments of the previous two Chapters against the contemporary political environment of a third *intifada*. By locating the required engagement with the Israeli State in this context, I argue that a shifting morality is underway among refugee youth in Shu'fat. This reflects the ways that youth consider what it 'means' to be a refugee, and 'how' they are supposed to continue to 'struggle'. The Chapter begins by analysing the third *intifada* from the perspectives of my interlocutors in Shu'fat camp, highlighting the way it was seen as both unpredictable and *al fadi* (meaningless). In so doing, it questions the ability of this *intifada,* from the perspectives of refugee youth, to act as a mechanism to subvert the state. It continues by addressing some of the new technologies of control that were asserted by the Israeli State in response to this *intifada*, and adds to our understanding of de-development. By conceptualizing these practices as a *virtual* de-development, it addresses the ways this impacts on refugee youth. Considering the tangible responses to violence in the camp, the Chapter then begins to build a case for understanding youth subjectivities as a shifting morality, drawing on the narratives of youth who sought to understand their place in this *intifada*. The Chapter concludes by analysing a commemoration event which was held in the camp a year after the start of

this third *intifada.* Through this analysis, the Chapter highlights the changing subjectivities of youth who do not seek to engage in either the praxis or the rhetoric of the *intifada*.

A third intifada

I don't know, but it seems like this intifada is al-fadi (meaningless). Moments earlier, Amal and I had been having lunch at home with some of the other female teachers from the education centre she worked at in the camp, along with two of her friends from university. It was December 2015, and different forms of protest and demonstration were taking place with increasing frequency across the West Bank and East Jerusalem[90]. The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) text messages buzzed in on my phone between 10-15 times a day, much to the amusement of my interlocutors who got their news first from Facebook (which was generally a faster form of information sharing). Upstairs, in the living room usually reserved for guests and visitors, we sat on the floor surrounded by the remains of a big *maqlooba* pot, fruits and sweets. News of another *ameliyeh* (literally an operation, meaning in Arabic an act undertaken in protest of the occupation) beside the Damascus gate in Jerusalem had just pinged in to my mobile, and the young women were busy scrolling on their social media news feeds, looking for more updates. UNDSS never identified the individual(s) involved, but minutes later photos and live videos were rolling on to Facebook, Snapchat and Instagram. A young

[90] The framing of violence around this time as an *intifada* is addressed below. For reference to the violence in late 2015, see for example: 'Mapping the dead in the latest Israeli-Palestinian violence', *Al Jazeera* 13.10.2015 [https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2015/10/mapping-dead-latest-israeli-palestinian-violence-151013142015577.html]; 'Israeli-Palestinian violence spreads over the Gaza border', *BBC News* 09/10/2015 [https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34484765].

Palestinian man had been shot dead by an Israeli soldier, on the grounds that he was approaching another Israeli soldier with a knife. The Palestinian man in question was from the camp.

Is he Mahmoud's brother?

No, no I think it's Hasham's cousin – the one who works at the Pizza shop?

Hammoudeh would know, I'll call him and ask if he knows…

I think he's studying at Abu Dis, I've seen him on the bus in the mornings…

Is he? What was he studying?

No idea…haram…

Oh it's that guy, he was engaged! My mum knows his fiancé's mum, she went to the engagement party a few months ago

Wait, here's a closer picture of him, can you see? You have seen him, for sure, at the pizza place

My sister was at school with his sister

Haram...

Allah ye hamro

It didn't take Amal and her friends long to locate him in the geography of the camp. After spending a few minutes discussing what they collectively knew of his life, family, his connections, his work, his dreams and aspirations, his more tangible future plans, they fell quiet momentarily. Amal's comment about the meaningless nature of this *intifada* seemed to echo what the other women in the room were thinking. This young man, like most young people in the camp, was not known to have been affiliated with a political

group. Was he from a Hamas family? Did that matter? Had he been humiliated by the IDF? Had someone else in his family been killed? Was he suicidal? He had probably been in prison (most young men his age in the camp had been in prison or at least arrested and detained) but he wasn't particularly well known in the camp. Were any of these circumstances more defining than the other?



Figure 20. A banner of a recent martyr from the camp

Their conclusions were that the man in question did not have a political affiliation that they were aware of, and his actions (as was the case with the vast majority of actions taken during this *intifada*) was not the result of any kind of coordination or planning with other people. They struggled to understand how or why 'a good man' (*zalameh mnih*), who was characterised as such on account of holding a job in Israel and being engaged to be married, would choose to end his life in this way[91]. Joining the conversation slightly

[91] By this point in the third *intifada,* it was widely acknowledged among Palestinians in the camp that if an individual was found by an Israeli solider to have a knife, they would be killed for doing so.

later, Amal's mother, Um Mahmoud, was momentarily taken aback by the news, but not particularly shocked. In responding, her comments spoke more to the broader shape of violence underway, that to the specific fact that a man from the camp had died: *this intifada is not like the ones before. Today, you never know who is going to do what, or when.* Having worked out who he was, and speculating for a few minutes on the circumstances of his death, the conversation faded away as quickly as it had begun. When I commented on this to Amal later that day she looked at me blankly. *This could have been anyone – last month it was my cousin. How do you keep feeling sorry for others when it happens to everyone, and you know it could happen to you, again? It's 'ādi ya'ani, we are all in the same situation.* Shrugging her shoulders, the conversation was closed.

The framing of the violence in Palestine and Israel that has been underway since the autumn of 2015 as a third *intifada* continues to be hotly contested among Palestinians, the international community and the media. It has lacked the momentum that characterized both its predecessors, and most crucially it has not been claimed as such by the current PA leadership (although Hamas, who continue to be the ruling party in Gaza have used the terminology of *intifada*[92]). The debate over whether or not the

[92] It is interesting to note that while the international media were quick to frame the events during this period as a third *intifada*, drawing in particular on Hamas claims on a third *intifada* in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Palestinian and Israeli media were more reticent to do so. For a select review of media coverage on the events of 2015-2016 in particular, see for reference: 'Abbas warns of risk of new intifada if Israeli escalations at Al Aqsa continue' *WAFA, Palestinian News Agency* 22.09.2015 [http://english.wafa.ps/page.aspx?id=rSKkmZa27959647881arSKkmZ]; 'Intifada or not, something powerful is going on', *Al Jazeera* 17.10.2015 [https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/palestine-intifada-powerful-151016094419464.html]; 'Is a third intifada on the way or has it already begun?', *The Guardian* 05.10.2015 [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/05/third-palestinian-intifada-on-way-or-already-begun]; 'Intifada: what is it, and what does a third uprising mean for the region', *The Independent* 09/10/2015 [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/what-exactly-is-an-infitada-a6688091.html]; 'Why this is not a third intifada', *Ha'aretz* 17.11.2015 [https://www.haaretz.com/this-is-not-a-third-intifada-1.5330266]; 'Three reasons we are not seeing a third intifada' *Ha'aretz* 13.12.2017 [https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/three-reasons-we-aren-t-seeing-a-third-intifada-1.5628267]. For an example of a page of live updates from October 2015, see *Ha'aretz* [https://www.haaretz.com/four-wounded-in-two-jerusalem-stabbing-attacks-1.5407997].

events of those months constitute an *intifada* was often held among Palestinians working in policy or political circles, and among Palestinian and international journalists. Within the camp, the adoption of the language of *intifada* among youth was unanimous. Some of their parents were skeptical: *you don't remember the second intifada, this is nothing like that, you cannot put this in the same league as an intifada*, Naila remarked to Hanin one afternoon, with the news rolling in the background documenting spectacular scenes of vast pillars of black smoke and young men with their faces wrapped in keffiyehs hurling slingshots. Generally, however, among my interlocutors of different generations in the camp, *intifada* was the word used to describe the current *wada'a* (situation), and it among most of my interlocutors it was agreed that this *intifada* had started in September 2015[93].

The origins of this third *intifada* are another subject of debate in the camp, although a general consensus was that it was the increase in Israeli settlers visiting the Al Aqsa mosque compound, escorted by Israeli police in doing so, that led the events of the months following to unfold. When we were not in the camp, a lot of the time I spent particularly with female youth from the camp was in the Old City of Jerusalem, in trips which almost always included visits to the Al Aqsa compound. Often when we visited, Israeli settlers would be trying to access the site, escorted by Israeli police. Typically, these provocations were carried out under the auspices of the Temple Mount Movement[94] (whose widely publicized goal is to destroy the Al Aqsa Mosque and Dome

[93] Some in the camp claim this *intifada* began in 2014, with the death of a 16 year old Palestinian from the suburb of Shu'fat in East Jerusalem (not the camp), who was kidnapped and subsequently burnt to death in a forest on the outskirts of the city by Israeli settlers. The attack was a retaliation for the kidnapping and death of three teenage settlers in the West Bank a month earlier. Days later, Israel began launching air strikes on the Gaza strip, leading to 'Operation Protective Edge' which lasted until late August, during which time more than 1,400 Palestinian civilians, and 6 Israelis were killed (OCHA 2015). Protests and demonstrations against the attack on Gaza were held across the West Bank and East Jerusalem, but did not gather a particular momentum at this time.

[94] For further reference, see 'Objectives of the Temple Mount Faithful', available via [http://templemountfaithful.org/objectives.php]. Accessed on 15/04/2018.

of the Rock shine and replace them with a Jewish temple), often accompanied by government officials and always by Israeli police (see also IMEU 2015). Having spent time visiting Al Aqsa since I first started working in Palestine in 2011, the increased presence of the *Murabitat*[95] around Al Aqsa was a response to the increased presence of members of the Temple Mount Movement. A pattern of events that we witnessed on multiple occasions while visiting the compound was that as Israelis were escorted by heavily armed police into the compound, the *Murabitat* would gather around them, chanting *Allah o Akbar* (God is great) in a peaceful protest. Women were quickly escorted out of the compound for doing so, and were often arrested in the process. During *Eid al Adha* at the end of September 2015, Israeli soldiers entered the compound, firing stun grenades and rubber coated bullets at worshippers[96]. In response to this particular incursion, crowds of Palestinians started to gather at checkpoints across the West Bank and all over East Jerusalem in protest. As these protests gained momentum, they were followed by a series of individual stabbing or attempted stabbing attacks which were carried out by Palestinians, predominantly against Israeli soldiers or settlers. A pattern of events tended to follow: a Palestinian would attempt a stabbing; often they would be shot dead on the spot in the process; the IDF would then descend on the community that the individual

[95] The translation of this term is complex. *Murabitat* and *Murabitiyyn* are the feminine and masculine plurals of the active participle, based on the third form of the Arabic root *Ra Ba Ta*, meaning to tie, to attach, or to fasten. In this third form, it adopts a specific meaning of 'to be stationed' (as in troops), lined up, or posted in a defensive position, to protect a specific location from attack. The noun of the root is *ribat*, which describes the activities of the *Murabitat and Murabitiyyn*. Those who practice *ribat* are therefore those who defend a specific location from attack. The term is not necessarily specific to the Palestinian context, although it is term used to describe the women who defend Al Aqsa against Israeli settlers and police who try to enter the compound. On the contrary, it has been used by Hizballah in Lebanon to describe soldiers who patrol the border against a possible Israeli incursion; it has also become the name of a new Islamic Maghreb group who act as a merger between al-Qaida and the *al-Mulathameen* brigade (literally, 'the brigade of the masked ones'), who have adopted the name of *al-Murabitun.*

[96] 'Israeli police, Palestinians clash at al Aqsa compoud', *Al Jazeera* 28.09.2015 [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/israeli-police-palestinians-clash-al-aqsa-compound-150927132041035.html].

came from, arresting family members and friends and imposing movement restrictions on the community in question. This was met with protest, and similar protests would gather at key checkpoints around the West Bank (most prominently, the Qalandia checkpoint that separates Jerusalem and the West Bank; and at the Israeli settlement of Beit El, on the outskirts of Ramallah).

What gets lost in the media and policy narratives of a third Palestinian intifada are the continual struggles and efforts of families and individuals to live through constant, heightened levels of political uncertainty and danger that characterized this *intifada*. Returning to Um Mahmoud's framing, this *intifada* was more unpredictable than previous periods of violence, as a result of its seeming lack of coordination or direction. Rather than offering a discussion of the macro-political causes and consequences of this *intifada*, this discussion is rooted in the experiences of youth in the camp who were trying to make sense of events unfolding around them.

Predictive policing and a virtual de-development

As sources of information sharing, Facebook, Instagram and Snapchat were important communication tools during the beginnings of the third *intifada*. My interlocutors were constantly updating each other in the camp about their whereabouts; and as I moved around the camp people would do the same for me, constantly phoning or messaging to check that I had safely arrived at my destination. Ensuring that one had enough credit on a mobile phone was seen as an important safety measure, even if maintaining enough credit to access data on a mobile (to receive information from the camp Facebook page,

or generally from a newsfeed of status updates from the camp) resulted in a significant economic strain on families.

As in many other parts of the world, young people in the camp were often glued to their mobile phones. While I have argued in previous Chapters that this was often in order to be in constant contact with family members or friends, like many of us, youth in Shu'fat were also prone to passing time with aimless scrolling through the feeds of their Facebook and Instagram accounts. The difference between their feeds and mine, however, were the number of *intifada* related posts that would appear. Scrolling through the newsfeeds of my interlocutors produced a constant stream of updates of what was happening all over the West Bank and in East Jerusalem. The camp Facebook page monitored the situation at checkpoints, and during army raids of the camp it became the way information was shared regarding the location of the army. Anyone who 'liked' the page could contribute to the feed, and as such would receive frequent updates posted by other on their Facebook newsfeed. While all of my interlocutors followed this page, none of them posted on it. Indeed, from what I saw online, their use of Facebook was to gain information rather than to endorse, promote or publicly empathise with events taking place around them. Hammoudeh, Amal's 19-year-old brother, explained that one of his friends had recently been arrested on account of a Facebook post:

> *All he did was share a post about a Shaheed [martyr] from the camp and said allah ya hamro [may God bring him peace], that's it, he wasn't saying anything about what he did, just allah ya hamro. You can't even say allah ya hamro about your friends in public anymore.*

Hammoudeh went on to explain that he never posted things online anymore because he did not want it to be used against him. He was working as a laborer on a construction

project south of Jerusalem at the time. It was a job with a contract and an insurance scheme, and from his perspective, posting on Facebook was not worth risking all that he had built. Social media reports that made any reference to the words *Shaheed* (martyr), *Al Quds* (Jerusalem), or the Al Aqsa mosque led to the posters being flagged as potential suspects, using an algorithm-based early warning system known as 'predictive policing' (Fatafta 2016: 16). While arrests were primarily connected directly to the Facebook post of an individual, sentencing was contingent on the traction of the post (for example, based on the number of 'Likes' or 'Shares' it received)(ibid.).

During the early months of the *intifada*, there was a significant increase in the arrest and detention of Palestinians on account of a new charge or phenomenon: posting content on social media channels that constituted 'incitement to violence' (see Adameer 2016). Monitoring of cybersecurity by Hatzav, the Israeli Military Intelligence Unit, was a new addition to their portfolio after the start of the third *intifada*. The Palestinian human rights association Adalah documented 400 cases[97], while the Israeli newspaper Haaretz gave a higher total of 800 Palestinians arrested either by Israel or the PA on account of incitement to violence online between September and December of 2015[98]. The Israeli Minister of Internal Security, Gilad Erdan subsequently argued in a high-profile interview on Israeli national television that 'Facebook today sabotages, it should be known, sabotages the work of the Israeli Police, because when the Israeli Police approach them, and it is regarding a resident of Judea and Samaria, Facebook does not cooperate'[99].

[97] Adalah, 08.03.2017, 'Women Human Rights Defenders Speak Out'. Available via [https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/9060] Accessed on 27.07.2018.

[98] Haaretz, 24.04.2017. 'Arrest of Palestinians for Potential Terror Attacks brings new meaning to Minority Report'. Available via [https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-arrest-of-palestinians-brings-new-meaning-to-minority-report-1.5464664] Accessed on 27.07.2018.

[99] Reuters, 02.06.2016, 'Israeli Minister says Facebook a 'monster', hindering security'. Available via [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-facebook-idUSKCN0ZI0XB] Accessed 20.04.2018.

Facebook responded to this by immediately shutting down the Profiles or Pages of Palestinians that were accused of promoting incitement. This introduced yet another layer of surveillance for youth in the camp to navigate on a daily basis. As a result of these new dynamics, young people in the camp became cautious about what they posted online. While from one perspective this can be seen as a strategic form of self-protection among youth in the camp, Hammoudeh's response to the arrest of his friend suggested that, from his perspective, this *intifada* was not deemed to be worth the risks of engaging in online forms of protest.

In the summer of 2017, the camp Facebook page was taken down by Facebook under the instruction of the COGAT[100]. Other Facebook pages were established in its wake, and my interlocutors continued to use Facebook in other ways for information. Indeed, there had been speculation for some time over who really was commenting on the page and to what ends, and some people agreed it was a good thing the page was no longer available online. What is more interesting, however, is to contrast the closure of a source of information sharing on the grounds of incitement to violence with the kinds of sites that were not shut down. The YouTube channel of the 'Shu'fat Camp Snipers' provides a poignant example. This channel posted tens of videos, songs and commemorations during 2015 and 2016, with graphic images and lyrics, for example:

[100] The head of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), Major General Yoac Mordechai had, in 2016, established a Facebook Page in Arabic called *al-Munnaseq* (The Coordinator) to create a way for the COGAT to communicate directly with Palestinians. As a scroll through the newsfeed of this page suggests, the page initially focused on promoting propaganda against the PA and Hamas. Latterly, the page was used more for communicating information with Palestinians, such as houses or other infrastructures that were scheduled for demolition, or checkpoint closures (although the latter was not regularly updated). The announcement of the closure of the Shu'fat camp Facebook page on the grounds that it was promoting incitement to violence was also posted on *al Munnaseq.* The Facebook page *al Munnaseq* is available via [https://www.facebook.com/COGAT.ARABIC/]. Accessed 10.09/2018..

I'm so proud that I'm from Shu'fat. I will never shake, I'm strong like a mountain; Let all the world see who we are, the people of Shu'fat; Your anger can destroy the enemy; Just read our history and you'll know what our past has been; We are ready to die; We face death with no fear; Holding our weapons we fight and walk towards death; We just have these stones which turn into fire in our hands; (martyrs name), you challenged the Israelis and now you are waiting for paradise; (martyrs name), you faced the Israelis with stones; (martyrs name), you took a gun; (martyrs name), your home misses you; Here in Shu'fat you will find only tigers, who are ready to fight to get their rights[101].

While the camp Facebook page, as a key point of communication in the camp was removed, YouTube channels with videos and lyrics like this content remained online. This builds on the arguments made in Chapter Four that extend the theoretical framing of de-development still further, to an online sphere. At the discretion of the Israeli state, certain kinds of information were allowed to remain online (such as these videos with lyrics intended to inspire a continued uprising); while other kinds of information, such as the camp Facebook page which provided a level of community solidarity through information sharing, was removed on the grounds of incitement to violence. This could be framed as an example of a 'virtual' form of de-development. In a conversation in the aftermath of a different *ameliyeh* carried out by a young teenager in the camp, Dalia, who was in her early twenties and worked in a community centre in the camp evoked a similar idea. The following is taken from a recorded conversation between Dalia and myself:

[101] Youtube page of Shu'fat Camp Snipers, available via [https://www.youtube.com/user/b7bak99/videos]. Accessed on 30.07.2018.

Dalia: The children in the camp are easily influenced. You see it right? They're are always on their phones – or maybe not their personal phones, but the phone of someone in their family. Always selfies, always snapchat – *'ādi*, that's not the problem – the problem is, they see this stuff [referencing the Youtube channel], and they take this message like an instruction, you know? [impersonating someone shouting instructions] 'You're from Shu'fat camp, we are the strongest camp of all the camps, you should fight for the camp'

Caitlin**:** Their parents must know about it though, and talk to them about it to try and explain it in a different way?

Dalia: Sure, my mum for example tells Ahmed [her younger brother] not to watch it if she sees him watching it or talking about it but it's everywhere and she isn't with him all the time. Like, here at the centre, if I see one of the kids with it I tell them not to pay attention to it, but it's still everywhere

Caitlin: Who do you think is producing it in the camp?

Dalia: I don't know, these videos just get posted…but personally, I don't know anyone in the camp who would want to promote this kind of stuff – and the Israelis would know who it was, because it comes up with your name beside it when you post something, right? So, technically they should be arrested for posting things like this – so I think the only ones who get away with it, posting things like this, they must be working for the Israelis.

The details of who was making and promoting these Youtube videos was of less interest to Daila. Rather, her point was that regardless of the charge of 'incitement to violence', this kind of information was allowed to stay online, promoting a narrative of the camp as

a space of resistance in which young people were expected to fight. Many of these videos take lyrics from songs that circulated during the second intifada. For older youth in the camp, who had worked hard for the lives they had thus far secured with their permanent residency status, there was a clear sense of anger that this was being undermined during this third *intifada*.

The meanings of resistance

It is pertinent to spend a moment here on the difference in language and collective aspiration attributed to certain activities among Palestinians who were well educated, who had travelled and often studied outside of Palestine and who, while living under occupation in the West Bank or East Jerusalem, lived in relative comfort; in comparison with the language and collective aspiration attributed to activities by those living in the camp. The Arabic term for resistance [*muqawama*] was often associated with 'the resistance' [*al-muqawama*], with implicitly violent connotations of armed struggle as part of a project of liberation. The meaning of the word in Palestine varies depending on who uses it. Among many Palestinians, particularly those who have engaged in the work of human rights organisations, NGOs, or other (intellectual) spaces where a holistic approach to the struggle is discussed, the term is defined with great nuance that pertains to everyday life.

> 'Resistance is fighting for your rights in any way you can, it's about your whole existence, preserving your humanity when everything here is pushing you not to, when everything around you treats you like you are not a human and yet you

continue to be humane, it empowers you to continue walking through cages to get to school and to work, and to continue with everyday life[102]'.

In the camp, where people live in generally harsher economic and political conditions, the notion of resistance is understood as a holistic ideal, but one that does not really 'empower': 'yes sure, we can say that living our lives is resistance, and in everything I do, I hate the occupation and I want to live freely. But it's just words, it doesn't *mean* anything in reality'[103]. More common still in the camp was the lingering connotation of *muqawama* with *al-muqawama*, to which the overwhelming response, said with deep cynicism was *wēn al-muqawama? Fish hada hon fi'l mukhayam* (where is the resistance? There is nobody from the resistance here in the camp). Writing on the emerging politics of leisure among Palestinian refugees in Beirut, Laleh Khalili (2015) has warned of the tendency in academic literature to adjudicate on the lives of others, 'measuring them against impossibly heroic indices of struggle, exhorting them to grand utopias, demanding an austerity in commitment that we ourselves do not observe' (p.596). Among certain elite groups, there will always be demands made of others to resist, and a charge of failure levied at those who choose an alternative way forward.

Since the upsurge of violence in 2015, the threats and dangers facing youth in the camp, along with their family members, friends and loved ones were innumerable. On almost a daily basis there was the threat of being caught in the cross fire of an extra-judicial killing at the checkpoint or in Jerusalem; there were arbitrary arrests in the camp; there were targeted killings; targeted house demolitions; and there were shootings

[102] *Muqawama* as explained in a conversation with Nur, a 26-year old NGO worker in the West Bank.

[103] *Muqawama* as explained in a conversation with Hadeel, a 25-year old who was from Shu'fat camp and working in one of the camp's community centres.

between gang members and families on the streets. Reading and assessing violence everyday meant that young people in the camp could easily distinguish not only between fireworks and gunshots, but the gunshots of weddings, the gunshots of street fights and the gunshots of soldiers; or between the sounds of the army and the sounds of a drug brawl. All of this required careful navigation of the camp streets and checkpoints, regular communication with friends and family and a constant alertness to one's surroundings. In all the time I spent in the camp around the young people I knew well, I never really saw them relax, even at home. As much as this kind of violence was part of the daily landscape in the camp, friends and family in the camp all worried about each other's safety. My interlocutors would continually call and text, to make sure people had safely arrived at their homes, or other destinations. Many times, they would call each other, or me, to avoid a certain area for a day because of rumors of violence (most typically, avoiding being in the centre of the camp, crossing the checkpoint, or going into Jerusalem). During research in the Iraqi city of Basra, Al-Mohammed (2012) observed a similar obsession with being in touch with friends and loved ones: 'as much as this points to the concern we all held for our friends' well-being, there was always an element of refusal to confront one's own precarious position' (p.604). As discussed in Chapter Four, occupation related violence was often referred to as an '*ādi* (ordinary) backdrop to everyday life in the camp, in contrast to the emerging violence within the camp itself. Intervening in violence instigated by refugees who were perceived to be collaborators was not an option from the perspective of youth in the camp. However, intervening in violence connected to the continuing *intifada* was deemed to be important among these same young people. Indeed, some youth in Shu'fat took an active role in confronting the precarity engendered by the third *intifada* as by seeking to discourage others from participating in violence.

Hanin's husband Mahmoud was 23, and had a cleaning job at one of the schools in the camp. Like Hanin, he had grown up in the camp, as had his parents. He had left school when he was 15 to start working, and by the time her was 19 he had a job as a hospital cleaner in Jerusalem. He was laid off several months before we met, and had found a temporary job, also as a cleaner, at a school in the camp. Although it made their future plans to leave the camp a little less stable, Hanin joked that she was secretly delighted he was working closer to home, because it meant she got to spend more time with him. Crossing the checkpoints in and out of the camp took hours out of every day. It was unusual, therefore, for Mahmoud to be late coming home from work. On a particular afternoon when he had still not returned home several hours after his shift ended, Hanin was anxious. Updating her Whatsapp every few minutes, she swore over the poor-quality cellular data in the camp due to the lack of reception, and ran between the kitchen and rooftop of their home to try and improve the signal. Several hours later, Mahmoud returned home looking exhausted. After Hanin berated him for not being in touch sooner, he explained that he had escorted a boy home from school rather than completing his shift. He had found a boy alone in a classroom, furiously scribbling a note to his parents. In the note, the boy described how, after seeing the murder of a girl at a checkpoint outside of another West Bank city, for attempting to attack an Israeli soldier with a knife, he wanted to continue what she had started and become a *Shaheed* (martyr)[104]:

[104] There is not space within this argument to engage in more of an in-depth discussion over the debates surrounding martyrdom in Palestine. Briefly, while Islam openly condemns suicide as a sin, martyrdom is considered to be the sacrifice of life in the service of Allah, and usually as part of *jihad*, or the struggle for God's cause. The *hadith sharif* (The Prophet's sayings) place suicide and martyrdom in sharp opposition: while a martyr is promised a place in paradise, where all of life's sins will be forgotten, an act of suicide will take someone only to hell. Dabbagh's (2005) sensitive ethnography on suicide in Palestine has helpfully complicated the picture of suicide and martyrdom away from the narratives found in psychological studies of Palestinian adolescents in the aftermath of the first *intifada* and second *intifada* (such as Barber 1997; Moghadam 2003; Brym and Araj 2006; Bader 2012). Further anthropological engagement with the subject of martyrdom can be found in Allen 2009, and Buch-Segal 2016.

He was planning to go to the checkpoint after school – he had a small kitchen knife in his backpack, he must have taken it that morning. I asked him why, and he said it was for al watan (the homeland or the nation). I asked him which watan? This watan that you never see? That does nothing for you? He said we have to fight for al watan, and I told him, why would you fight for something that does not give a shit about you? The watan does not care if you live or die, and dying will not change anything for anyone. So don't even think about defending the watan. Because the watan will never lift a finger to defend you.

Mahmoud had accompanied the boy home to his parents, to make sure he did not go to the checkpoint as he had planned. His own frustration with the idea of struggle on behalf of the *watan* were echoed among many interlocutors who struggled to make sense of why people chose to join the different forms of protest within this *intifada* that (to reference Amal's comment earlier in this Chapter) many considered to be *al fadi,* or meaningless..

Another example of the way youth sought to discourage engagement in the third *intifada* emerged during an army raid of the camp one afternoon. The discussion which follows presents an important juxtaposition to Omar's explanation, in Chapter Four, of his choices to go to the streets protest the presence of Israeli military incursions in the camp. Omar's narrative explained that continuing to go and (generally) throw stones or rocks at Israeli military vehicles when they entered the camp was an important way of demonstrating to others in the camp that he was not a collaborator. His contention that doing so was an important way of protecting himself from others in the camp was not, however, one that was unanimously shared among my interlocutors.

A favourite hangout of many of my research participants was the new Nutella Cafe in the camp. Located on the top floor of the main shopping centre on the edge of the camp,

it was the latest outlet of a chain of cafes to have taken the West Bank by storm. It was the only place of its kind in the camp for young men and women to spend time in a shared public space: the internet cafes were reserved for young men only, not because women and girls were prohibited from entering but because they were widely understood to be drug dens. I would often meet my interlocuters at the café after work, and one particular Thursday I had planned to meet Mo'min (who was then 17) and his friend Mohammed (who was then 19). They usually got back to the camp around 4pm, after long shifts in the neighbouring West Bank settlements. Mohammed was working as a truck driver, and Mo'min as a labourer. We met on the street outside the mall, which was busy with shoppers and children heading home from school, and climbed the broken escalator up to the cafe on the top floor. Under the neon flashing fairy lights that coloured the otherwise plain walls, we sat on plastic chairs at small tables, sipping thick juice shakes and sharing crepes heaving in Nutella. Mo'min questioned Mohammed about his work with envy. As a truck driver he had a certain autonomy in his work, and more importantly, a contract and access to benefits should he be laid off. As a worker under the age of 18, Mo'min worked for cash in hand, coordinated by a man in the camp who was a friend of the family. Mo'min had no proof, but was sure this man coordinating the Palestinian workers on this construction project took a large cut for himself.

A loud crash downstairs interrupted our conversation – the shutters of the mall had slammed shut. Rushing out of the cafe and down the broken escalator, we joined a crowd of other shoppers to see what was going on. Through a pane of glass that the shutter had not reached, we saw IDF tanks rolling down the main street of the camp. A small crowd of young men and boys were on the streets, showering rocks and other objects that were lying around on the street on to the tanks. Some of the children on our

side of the shuttered mall started to cry – others hammered on the shutters wanted to be let out to join the crowds outside. Mohammed and Mo'min joined other young men women in holding them back. *Leave it! It's not worth it [al fadi hek]. You'll only end up in prison. Stay where you are.* They shouted at those who were already in the streets telling them to get inside, and get away from the situation. Mohammed got into an argument with another young man of a similar age who was trying to break the shutters across the door to get out, repeating at the top of his voice that it was *al fadi* to go to the streets, and that doing so would only make things worse. The whole thing was over in a matter of minutes, although it felt like hours. When the coast was clear the shutters of the mall were rolled back up and our eyes were hit by the sting of tear gas that lingered in the air. We said our goodbyes and went home, anticipating that the army would return later for a round of arrests.

Mo'min was among many of my interlocutors who had vivid memories from his childhood of waiting in anticipation for a phone call from his brother from the prison; or travelling hours across town with one of his parents to visit him. His brother had been arrested at the age of fifteen for throwing stones at an Israeli tank during the second intifada. Mo'min was five years old at the time. The Mosqobiyeh prison in which Mo'min's brother had spent so many years had become almost a by-word for a way of spending time, which youth in the camp would say to explain an individual's absence as casually as saying they were at the market. The prison was infamous in Palestine for the experiences of physical and psychological torture inflicted on those who were sent there. Influential scholarship on Palestinian refugees has argued that the experiences of young males being beaten or imprisoned at the hands of the Israeli authorities constitute a form of ritual performance and a rite of passage for young Palestinian men, constructing their resistant

subjectivities (Peteet 1994: 31). The notion of systemic humiliations of young men in Shu'fat galvanizing political consciousness today sits uncomfortably alongside the way that prison and torture are discussed by young men, and to a lesser extent young women, as unremarkable experiences. Indeed, during the period of my fieldwork, 400 East Jerusalemites were imprisoned; an additional 300 Palestinians under the age of 18 were imprisoned; and a further 477 Palestinians were held in administrative detention without charge or trial (Adameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association: June 2018[105]).

From Mo'min's perspective, there was nothing to be gained from time spent in prison: *Going to prison doesn't give you anything. Does it give you a passport? Does it show people you are strong? Does it get you a wife? No* (although the release of prisoners was always greeted with great enthusiasm, usually involving a car parade around the camp and a big party to welcome home the person in question). Certainly, among my interlocutors it was not seen as an experience to be desired, or something that would bring a social or political status. Although, as discussed in Chapter Four, it was seen as something that was probably inevitable among male youth, it was still best an experience that was best avoided for as long as possible. Mo'min and Mohammed were discouraging other (younger) youth in the camp from going to the streets to demonstrate on the grounds that 'it', meaning this kind of struggle, 'wasn't worth it'. This, I suggest is indicative of what I have framed as a gently shifting morality surrounding decisions among refugee youth in the camp to take part in, or at least support the rhetoric of the

[105] For a breakdown of this data, see Adameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, available via [http://www.addameer.org/statistics?field_date_of_statistics_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=07%2F01%2F2015&field_date_of_statistics_value_1%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=07%2F07%2F2017]. Accessed on 10.07.2018.

intifada. The theoretical discussion in Chapter Two has already examined the ideas behind 'the right way' to live as a refugee in the Palestinian context, embodied by the ideas of *sumūd* and 'struggle for the cause'. As the previous Chapters have explored, the belief among youth in the camp that the struggle for liberation might one day be realized had all but ceased to exist. There was rarely reference made to organised resistance struggle among youth in the camp, and the more holistic idea of resistance lacks meaning or resonance in this context of existential precarity. It is therefore pertinent to question the extent to which young refugees are willing to sacrifice their own lives for 'the cause' is changing.

Shifting moralities

Luigi Achilli's (2015) ethnography, conducted among Palestinian refugees in Jordan, found that while refugee youth had grown up with an expectation that they would 'continue the struggle', they were remarkably uninterested in Palestinian nationalist politics. They dismissed the idea that they should dedicate their lives to joining any kind of struggle for Palestine, preferring instead to invest in their individual futures in Jordan. As discussed in Chapter Two, It is perhaps unsurprising that second and third generation refugees who have grown up outside of historic Palestine become more absorbed in the realities and politics of daily life in the countries they live in, rather than the politics of, and associated struggles for the homeland. In the context of a refugee camp within the oPt however, I suggest that we need further tools to understand this change. It is here that the discussion of morals and moralities in Chapter Two comes to the fore, specifically

with reference to the ways refugees consider what it 'means' to be a refugee, in terms of how they 'should' continue to join 'the struggle'. In Jarrett Zigon's (2008) framework for an anthropology of moralities, he argues for a greater emphasis on the key 'moments' of moral breakdown, or 'moments that shake one out of the everydayness of being moral' (Zigon 2008: 133). He later suggests that these 'moments' require a critical reflection of actors to 'consciously reflect upon the appropriate ethical response' (2010:9). Such ruptures, or moments of moral breakdown did not emerge during my fieldwork. The decisions among the young people at the forefront of this study to prioritise their engagement with the Israeli state over joining the *intifada* struggle did not come from a particular moment or rupture, but rather through a series of incremental decisions that built something of an inevitability into what they saw as their available options for the future. This, I suggest, led to an emerging response among youth in this camp not to endorse either the practice or rhetoric of demonstration or protest within this third *intifada* context. It is relevant to also draw here from Mahmoud's (2005) analysis of morality, described as a disposition produced by 'human endeavour, rather than revelatory experience or natural temperament, acquired through the repeated performance of actions that entail a particular virtue or vice' (2005: 137). The analysis which follows turns to a commemoration event held a year after the start of the third *intifada,* to locate these ideas ethnographically the context of Shu'fat.

A year on from the start of this new intifada, a community centre was hosting a commemoration event. As the bus wound its way through the pot-holed streets into the camp on a warm afternoon in September 2016, I noticed there was more bunting on display than usual. Not, however, the colourful bunting that accompanies weddings, engagement parties or exam celebrations. Zig-zagging across the main street at the top of

the camp leading to the community centres, health clinic, mosque and UNRWA schools, this bunting was made up of martyr posters made over the last 12 months of the young men from the camp who had been killed. Fluttering in the breeze against the perfect clear blue sky, each of the posters was interspersed with bunting of the Fattah party flags. A giant poster of all the Shu'fat martyrs (who had been 'claimed' by a political party) had also been rolled out across the front of the youth centre, next to the UNRWA boys school on the main street. It was a commemoration day, marking a year since the death of the first martyr from Shu'fat refugee camp in this third intifada.

We are so proud of our martyrs who have taken their place in this third intifada. We must continue their work until we have our freedom! cried the director of the Women's centre down a microphone. She was standing on a stage in a hall underneath the one of the girls schools in the camp, part of the compound housing several kindergartens, community centres and the school. Wrapped in her kuffiyeh, with her arms around one of the grieving mothers who was crying, she applauded her own statement along with the several hundred women, men and children connected to the families (the children had been given the day off school) and had gathered to attend the event. The hall was packed with plastic chairs loosely arranged in rows, with music blaring from tinny speakers. Posters of all the martyrs from the camp of the past year were nestled into the bright yellow Fattah flags, Palestinian flags and black and white kefiyehs that hung from every available space on the wall.

I sat at the back of the hall with Amal and Dalia. Amal had a few hours to spare before work and we had planned to meet for a tea at her home. Distracted by the bunting coming into the camp, I suggested we met at the centre instead. Dalia had come to the event with her mother to support the family – her cousin' s face was on one of the many

posters stuck to the wall. He was shot dead at the checkpoint at the entrance to the camp ten months ago for trying to attack a soldier with a knife. His death had been a surprise for the family – he was a polite and quiet boy, very studious and had been earning good money in a shop in Jerusalem. He was 19 years old. Dalia had talked a lot in the past about why he did what he did; about the constant humiliation of young men crossing the checkpoint for work; about how often he was made to remove his shirt or trousers in front of the queue of people waiting to cross in order to be searched; about how he would leave the house at 4am in order to make the less than 2km journey to work which started at 7am because that's how long it took to cross the checkpoint; about how many of his friends were in prison; and about how great it was that he had managed to hold on to this job for so long - Israeli employers rarely show much understanding for being late to work because of checkpoint closures. But at the same time, she couldn't understand it.

When a Palestinian in the camp was killed on the grounds of an *ameliyeh*, the individual would be celebrated as a martyr in the camp; but while the public narrative maintained the politics of these events, the conversations in people's homes was radically different. When Dalia's cousin approached a soldier at a checkpoint with a kitchen knife and was shot dead on the spot, posters of his face on the backing of a Hamas flag quickly appeared around the camp. Dalia and her cousins were furious: *he never talked about Hamas in his life, they just claimed him as one of them* [*Hamas etban-nato*]. This takes us back to a key question in the resistance studies literature, namely that of who the label of resistance really serves, particularly if we are only characterising it as such from a scholarly perspective, and not as a self-defined act (Fegan 1986). Pushing this a step further, it could be argued that the label of 'resistance' serves the intentions and concerns of the dominant society more than it does the individuals or collective to whom we

ascribe it. Political factions were, indeed, are, often very quick to 'claim' the affiliation of individuals in the camp who took part in violent attacks during the third intifada. This would often jar with the narratives of other family members, who were convinced that the person in question had never held an affiliation, either formal or informal, with the group. Instead, factions claiming acts of 'resistance' by their 'members' served to strengthen their own political narrative. Yet, such actions were unlikely to be carried out in a planned or organized way. Rather, what we see is individuals sometimes actively taking part in, but often getting caught up in violence deemed to be against the Israeli state; Hamas claiming the act of resistance being undertaken in their name; and the Israeli state tightening its grip on a community on account of their connections to Hamas as a terrorist organisation. While the resistance narrative serves Hamas to assert their authority, it simultaneously serves the Israeli state as an excuse to maintain and strengthen their security apparatus. Meanwhile, the extent to which the individual saw their agency as a resistive one becomes largely lost in the narrative[106].

Back at the community centre, a small cluster of women took to the stage, and Amal pointed out that they were all the mothers of martyrs from the camp who had died this year. As one of these mothers took the microphone and began to sing a PLO song across the crowd, Amal and Dalia kicked back on the last row of seats in the hall. Loudly chewing gum, Amal said, *this whole thing is such a joke. It's all just a parade. It's all Fatah,*

[106] Such claims have been the basis for large scale military attacks, such as the attack on Gaza in 2014. When three teenage Israeli settlers were kidnapped and murdered while hitch-hiking home to their settlement in the West Bank in June 2014, Netanyahu stated that Hamas resistance groups in the West Bank were responsible for the abduction and Hamas would therefore 'pay a heavy price' in Gaza (see 'Israeli jets pound Gaza as Netanyahu blames Hamas for teenagers' deaths', Peter Beaumont, *The Guardian* 01/07/2014 [Available via: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/01/israeli-jets-gaza-netanyahu-hamas-teenagers-deaths]) . Netanyahu produced no evidence for this claim because there was no evidence: on the contrary, it was later proved that the murder had been committed by a lone cell with no prior coordination or support from Hamas. But the launch of the military assault on Gaza that began on the 8th July 2014 was the price paid for the work of this 'resistance' movement.

Fatah Fatah. They've got the flags, they've got the money to throw at things like this, they pretend that they planned this whole thing, but they don't change anything. It's such a waste of time. As Ahmad's mother finished singing, the mic was passed over for someone else to read a poem. A prominent Sheikh in the camp was next to take the stage for a speech, concluding with, 'there will be no tears today, for we have nothing to be sad about, for now our martyrs are walking with Allah. We must continue the fight they fought in our name'.

A dabke group from Jerusalem had been brought in to dance for the ceremony - they danced a 'martyrs choreography', including dancing a funeral, wrapping one of the troupe in a huge keffiyeh and carrying him as if in a funeral parade. Food started to be passed around - each time a young woman appeared having walked down the line with a tray of something, Amal would point out, *that's the sister of this shaheed [martyr], that's the cousin of that shaheed.* Endless trays of food were brought out. *Mana'eesh*, biscuits, chocolates, truffles, breads, juices: each mother of a martyr had made her sons favourite food. The event itself was consistently referred to by the organisers as 'a party for our martyrs'.

Earlier in the morning, we had heard the news of the drive by shooting near the light rail in Jerusalem. After the dancers had finished, a member of the Popular Committee [the camp Committee] took the stage to read the Facebook status of the man who had shot into the crowd waiting at the light rail stop beside the Israeli settlement in Sheikh Jarrah[107] that had been posted several hours before the attack, to applause and cheers

[107] Sheikh Jarrah is a suburb of East Jerusalem. The light rail in Jerusalem connects all of the East Jerusalem settlements with West Jerusalem.

throughout the hall. The mother of one of the camp martyrs grabbed the mic to add that she was proud the work of her son was being continued.

Then the awards ceremony began. I had seen the *Wisaam Sharaf* (medals of honour) before, plaques with the names and dates on them, awarded for lives given in service of the Palestinian cause. If someone walking into the room didn't know better, they would be forgiven for thinking it was any other prize giving, full of applause and cheers from the crowd. As the mothers were adorned with flower garlands, a huge cake for the martyrs was rolled out, with the usual sky-high sparklers, in lieu of candles, ablaze. Amal and Dalia were not cheering. Her arms crossed, Dalia tutted loudly. *These stupid medals…all they say is that your child is a national hero and you must be proud of them. But really, it's rubbish. Medals cannot hide the sadness these women carry in their hearts. Medals mean nothing if your child is gone*. Amal and Dalia were not dismissing the commemoration of martyrs as a whole. On the contrary, they both had a lot of empathy for the families of those who had been killed, and attended the event out of respect. What they berated was the co-option of these commemorations by political factions, and the efforts to suggest that all of this was done with some kind of broader goal in mind: a goal that they felt, to return to Amal's comment at the start of this chapter, was meaningless.

What has been missing from anthropological approaches to the subject of moralities and morals, according to Fassin (2013), is attention to ambiguous moral forms or ethical positions, such as those this Chapter has addressed, and the which the following Chapter takes forward. Fassin (ibid.) suggests that what the moralities literature has lacked is attention to the 'moral sentiments that escape the boundaries between the moral good and evil, and make sense of political issues' (p.249). The contribution of these arguments in this context is not to pass judgement on the actions of refugee youth, neither

is it an attempt to hold them up to a 'standard' of what is either good or right. Rather, it is to argue that throughout the empirical discussion of this thesis, there is a sense that what is seen as a 'good' or 'right' action for the figure of a young Palestinian refugee to take is changing. Concurrently, refugee youth in Shu'fat remained clearly ambivalent about their efforts to engage with the Israeli state. While seeking to build more secure futures for themselves, there was also an acute awareness that even if they were successful in gaining citizenship, that would not necessarily change everything in their lives for the better. These ideas form the foundation of the following Chapter.

Conclusion

Whether or not the events that characterised much of everyday life during my fieldwork come to be remembered or recognised as a third *intifada* will be a subject for future debates. However, based on their own framing of their everyday lives as a period of *intifada,* this Chapter argued that the ways many youth in Shu'fat responded to this context is indicative of a shifting morality. As this Chapter has highlighted, the response to this *intifada* has gone to new lengths of control and constraint over young people's lives, tapping into their online worlds as well as having a physical presence. The emergence of these new, online dynamics had an important effect on structuring everyday lives and subjectivities among youth in the camp. In this context of increasing constraint, refugee youth did not see this *intifada* as a meaningful way of 'subverting' the state. I argued that, perhaps, the ways that youth responded to this demonstrated a shifting morality of what should be the expected responses of young refugees in a time of *intifada*.

In Chapter Four, the structuring of a societal de-development in Shu'fat camp and the subsequent baring this had on the everyday lives of refugee youth was analysed to reveal the extent of a continuum of violence in the camp. Chapter Five examined the ways that youth in the camp use the period of transition between youth and adulthood as a time to make stronger political claims on the Israeli State, as they made life choices based around the need to protect their permanent residency status. This Chapter has drawn on the way the third *intifada* was experienced among my interlocutors to suggest that a shifting morality was changing the parameters of the ways refugees allowed themselves to think about and plan for their futures. This opens up the question, then, of what other directions, or possible futures they could seek out. The following Chapter takes forward the ideas of a shifting morality among refugee youth and a strategic pragmatism in their engagement with the Israeli State, to build an understanding of youth aspirations towards Israeli citizenship.

Chapter Seven

Claiming the state: citizenship applications as strategic pragmatism

Introduction

This final empirical chapter examines the ways that refugee youth in Shu'fat approach political claims of citizenship in Israel. The Chapter first explains the process for applying for Israeli citizenship, as understood by my interlocutors, to provide a context to this discussion. This Chapter uses Isin's (2008) theoretical framing to locate three different 'acts of citizenship' in which refugee youth engage. As Isin has argued, there is equal analytical importance between negotiating a citizenship which one believes is one's entitlement, and the extent to which that citizenship is legally granted. This Chapter seeks to contribute to the lacuna outlined by Isin, in identifying and analysing acts of citizenship that are underway in 'surprising [political] circumstances' (p.17). The chapter draws on three acts of citizenship that refugee youth in Shu'fat engage in. First, it addresses access to healthcare, which is a state service that refugees buy into through health insurance schemes that maintain their centre of life claim. A second 'act' is analysed through the efforts of young women in Shu'fat to claim social security payments in Israel. Finally, a third act of citizenship is explored through the ways in which refugee youth in Shu'fat spend their free time in West Jerusalem. Emerging from these acts of citizenship is the idea, as argued by Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury (2015), that Israeli citizenship for Palestinians is an empty, settler-colonial citizenship. Finally then, the

Chapter seeks to understand why refugee youth continue to make their 'claim' on the Israeli State through applications to citizenship. Drawing from the previous Chapters which have highlighted the strategic ways that refugee youth in Shu'fat position themselves towards the Israeli State, this Chapter argues that even though the citizenship to which they aspire is characterised as 'empty', this positioning is still the most pragmatic thing to do.

Refugees acquiring citizenship

On Sunday and Tuesday afternoons, a group of eight young women met at Sajah's family home in the camp, where they gathered around old copies of Hebrew language textbooks. Sajah was in her early 30s, and was an administrator for a department within the Jerusalem Municipality. She had recently moved back to live with her mother after going through a divorce, and in order to support the rest of her family had started teaching Hebrew in her spare time to women in the camp. Sajah emphasised talking, over reading or writing in the class. The main reason the women (who were aged between 19 and 26) gave for wanting to learn the language was to be able to deal with Israeli administration and bureaucracy with greater ease, but Sajah felt that getting comfortable with the sounds of the language was an essential first step. In a private conversation after class one day, Sajah explained:

> *The sounds of the different letters in Hebrew, these women are very attuned to it – usually it is a sound either that we mock or that we fear. It's something else to produce these sounds yourself, to bring these words from your own mouth.*

Some women in the class thought that studying Hebrew would help them find work in Jerusalem. Others spoke of the importance of being able to interact with Israeli soldiers at checkpoints, or to be able to address them directly if their homes were raided by the IDF, or if their children were arrested. Three of the eight women in the group told me they were studying Hebrew in order to be able to apply for Israeli citizenship.

As discussed in Chapter One, Palestinians who hold permanent residency are permitted, if they meet certain conditions, to receive Israeli citizenship. These conditions include swearing allegiance to the State of Israel, proving they are not citizens of any other country, and demonstrating knowledge of the Hebrew language, even though Arabic is an official language of Israel (Buttu 2015: 13)[108]. Applicants also need to prove that they have been living in Jerusalem for the past three years, and produce electricity, water and municipal tax bills for that period of time, and letters from employers or children's schools confirming their regular attendance. The phenomenon of East Jerusalemites applying for Israeli citizenship is not necessarily new although, according to my interlocutors, it was new among the refugee population in Shu'fat camp. I was initially surprised by the idea that the young women in the group wanted to apply for Israeli citizenship, and immediately thought that this must be something that they tried to keep hidden from others in the camp. *Are you worried about what other people in the camp would think about this*, I tried asking, in different ways on different occasions. Like so many of my questions of 'why' during fieldwork (why do you choose this school if the conditions are so bad? Why you do this job if you find it so degrading? Why do you choose

[108] As protected persons under International Humanitarian Law, the State of Israel cannot force Palestinians to take Israeli citizenship or to naturalize. The State of Israel is already in contravention of International Humanitarian Law by conditioning fundamental rights (such as the right not to be deported or transferred from occupied territory) on swearing allegiance to and accepting citizenship of the occupying power (Buttu 2015: 14).

an Israeli hospital over a Palestinian hospital when you could go to both?), this was another discussion in which most answers revolved around *'ādi, shou ehna lazim bnsowie* (it's normal, what else are we supposed to do). There was a wide acknowledgment among my interlocutors and their families that in a context of very limited options, applying for Israeli citizenship was the most pragmatic way forward. Nobody in the camp would 'judge' them for applying for citizenship, since it was a practice aspired to by many families. According to my interlocutors, the suggestion that their decision to apply for citizenship was controversial came only from Palestinians living in better material circumstances in the West Bank. We will return to this discussion towards the end of the Chapter.

A growing body of literature on protracted encampment has challenged assumptions that delineate the boundaries between citizenship and refugees (Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska 2017). For instance, among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Allan (2014) has argued that the prospect of citizenship poses a threat to refugee rights, rather than a preferred solution. In other contexts, the privilege of refugees to use camp spaces as sites for political action over, for example, the urban poor who have no such space to mobilise have also been highlighted through debates of refugee acquisition of citizenship (Pasquetti 205). In contexts where refugees who become citizens are likely to become 'second class citizens', some scholars have argued that refugee status and refugee camp communities can offer more layers of protection than citizenship can (Sanyal 2012: 641)[109]. A question that puzzled me when first discussing citizenship applications with young women in Sajah's Hebrew class surrounded the implications for their refugee

[109] This has also led to interesting methodological debates (Cole 2018) over the way scholars engage with refugees as different from 'citizens' of a state who may in fact be substantially worse off.

status if they proceeded with citizenship applications. Discussing this with Sajah, Hanin and several other women after a Hebrew lesson one day, the women struggled to understand what I was talking about when I referred to the *Cart al Wakale* (the UNRWA ID card):

What?

What are you talking about?

I'm not sure I have one…

What is it for?

Ohh this thing?

Hanin pulled a tattered, folded small sheet from her wallet. *This is totally separate from a howiyeh (an ID) or getting citizenship, this doesn't do anything*, Hanin explained. The women saw no issue either, either legally or politically, with holding both refugee status and an Israeli passport concurrently. On the contrary, the young women in this group considered that the benefits of gaining citizenship would have much greater practical meaning to their everyday lives than would holding refugee status.

As discussed in Chapter One, the Israeli Citizenship law of 1952 states that East Jerusalemites are able to apply for Israeli citizenship in accordance with a number of conditions. These conditions pertain to having a certain level of Hebrew; the length of time lived in Israel prior to the application; and that the applicant swears an allegiance to the State of Israel in order to be granted citizenship. Historically Palestinians in East Jerusalem have chosen not to apply, on the grounds that it serves as a way of legitimising the acquisition of Palestinian land by the Israeli state, and because it would ultimately reduce the likelihood of a future Palestinian state coming to fruition (Jeffries 2010). We

will return to the discussion of the politics of citizenship applications towards the end of this Chapter, but it is pertinent note at this point what was desirable about citizenship to refugee youth in Shu'fat. Hanin, who was one of the women in Sajah's class, immediately refuted the suggestion that citizenship applications were linked to a desire for political participation:

> *I've never voted in the [municipal] elections, to be honest I don't really know much about the elections, when they happen, what they do, because nobody in my family votes…it's not something we talk about. And so what, even if I voted, the municipality will never change, and the situation in the camp will never change, so what's the point.*

Hanin explained that although she could legally already vote in the municipal elections (although not national elections), this was not something she had done in the past. Beyond the camp in East Jerusalem, although municipal elections have historically been boycotted by Palestinians, a recent poll commissioned by the Hebrew University and conducted by the Palestine Centre for Public Opinion suggested that this was starting to change, with over 60% of polled residents calling on Palestinians to turn out in the next elections[110]. In the camp however, and during the period of my fieldwork, political participation was never discussed as a motivating factor for applying for Israeli citizenship.

While this process of applying for legal citizenship in the State of Israel was being undertaken by many of my interlocutors, none of them had so far been granted citizenship, and as noted above, the process itself can take years. It is pertinent, then, to

[110] The official results of the poll are available from the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research, via [http://pcpsr.org/en/node/733]. Accessed on 15/09/2018.

consider the other kinds of political claims youth already make on the Israeli state on the basis of their Permanent Residency status. Drawing on three different acts of citizenship, the following section explores the context of severe discrimination in which these claims on the state take place, hinting at what Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury (2015) have described as the experience of 'settler colonial citizenship'. The first act is based around Mo'min's attempts to access Israeli healthcare (for which, as Permanent Residents, he and other youth in Shu'fat are obliged to pay insurance), in spite of the severe discrimination he faces in doing so. The second act of citizenship is centred on the practice of claiming *dammaan eddakhel* (social security) from the Israeli state which, referring back to the narratives presented in Chapter Four, was essential to the economic survival of many families in the camp. Finally, a third act of citizenship is explored through a discussion of where some refugee youth in Shu'fat choose to spend their free time. These three acts of citizenship explore some of the different kinds of claims refugee youth make on the state, which are pursued in spite of the deeply discriminatory context they face.

Act one: claiming access to healthcare

Reaching the hospital on the West side of Jerusalem from the centre of the camp took close to two hours by car. Traffic jams are predictable in Jerusalem, especially in the morning, so to arrive in time for the scheduled appointment at 10 we left the camp at 7 to allow enough time. Mo'min had been to the hospital once before, by bus, but he had been very lost. Still, he preferred to try and remember the route the bus had taken rather than follow the directions on my sat-nav. His mother, Hind, was in the back of the car, and was anxious throughout the drive. It was the first time in several months that she had left

the camp, and she did not like being in a part of the city that was unfamiliar. The hospital was on the outskirts of West Jerusalem, 15 kilometers away from the camp, in a suburb of Jerusalem called Ein Karim. Perched on a hill top, it was just beside the village of 'Ayn Karim from which Mo'min's grandparents had fled in 1948. In 1962, French artist Marc Chagall painted a series of stained-glass windows for the synagogue of the hospital, meaning the hospital attracted many tourists and visitors as well as patients in need of care. As we struggled to find the entrance, we saw a group of young Israeli men walking down the road from what looked like the hospital car park. Mo'min jumped out of the car to run over and ask for directions and the group looked physically taken aback. Hind sat bolt upright in the back of the car, muttering under her breath that he should come back to the car immediately, and it was too dangerous to approach a group of Israelis in this way. Mo'min asked for directions in English, and they hesitantly replied, in English that we needed to continue on the same road until we reached the multi-story car park.

Arriving almost an hour ahead of his scheduled appointment, Hind and I found seats in the waiting room while Mo'min went to the reception desk. He spoke to the receptionist in English, providing all the required documents neatly organized in a plastic wallet. He was told to sit down and wait, and that his name would be called at his allocated appointment time. Mo'min and his mother were the only Palestinians in the waiting room. As I spoke with his mother in Arabic, Mo'min immediately interjected in English, speaking only to his mother in Arabic in a hushed voice. His mother was visibly uncomfortable by the whole scene. Mo'min tried to relax, getting up and strolling around the waiting room, trying to read the posters written in Hebrew on the walls. The eyes of other patients followed him closely as he moved around the room, as did the receptionist. Half an hour after his scheduled appointment time he went back to the desk to ask how long the wait

would be, and again he was told to sit down and wait his turn. A Palestinian nurse came through the waiting room, and Mo'min jumped up to ask her what was going on. The nurse looked sympathetic, and promised to try and find out, but disappeared and we did not see her again that day. By mid-day, after three hours of waiting and watching other non-Palestinian patients come and go, Hind was anxious and frustrated. Her back was in pain from the hard, plastic chairs, and she was worried about getting home in time to prepare lunch for the family. She voiced her irritation with Mo'min that he had not just used the UNRWA health clinic like other people would have in the camp. He was eventually seen by a Doctor several hours later, and was told he would need to return again with further paperwork before he could receive any treatment.

When we got back to the camp that afternoon, we left Hind to prepare a very late lunch and headed up to the roof of the building. It was the first time Mo'min had tried to use a hospital beyond the Palestinian hospitals in East Jerusalem and the UNRWA clinic in the camp:

> *I have to pay the Israeli health insurance, so I may as well use it. It's quicker than going through the UNRWA health centre, there are many Israeli health centres around the camp so it's more convenient. And if you go to one of those centres, then they give you an appointment at one of these hospitals.*

There were five Israeli health insurance centres in or around the camp, which could technically be accessed by anyone with a Jerusalem ID card who pays Israeli health insurance. While some of the East Jerusalem hospitals accepted patients under contracts with Israeli insurance providers, often patients paying Israeli insurance would be required to pay an additional fee to access Palestinian hospitals. The way Mo'min presented it was quite straightforward:

Look, I have this ID, so I have to pay for insurance – it's one of the biggest necessities to prove that I'm living here. If you try to go to any Israeli department, asking any question, they will ask for proof of your health insurance. We have to pay if we want to stay here, living in the camp – that's the law they [Israel] made. So, in life, you are entitled to get what you pay for.

He didn't talk about the fact that we were made to wait hours, or the fact that he was treated disrespectfully in the hospital. Mo'min was 20 years old, and was not working at the time of our hospital visit, so having to call in for multiple days of sick leave did not concern him at that time, and he cheerfully asked if I could drive him to the hospital again for his next appointment the following week.

The UNRWA health centre in the camp was refurbished during the period of my fieldwork, although it was often empty inside. Patients tended to be older generations in the camp, for whom travelling across the checkpoint to other Jerusalem hospitals was too exhausting. The doctor at the health centre explained that although he thought the number of people in the camp starting to engage with Israeli health care providers was increasing, levels of discrimination remained the same:

'There is so much discrimination [*tamyiz*] in the hospitals – everywhere in the city, but even in the hospitals! It's well known here. Many people in the camp have experienced this discrimination, but if you talk to Doctors on the other side they will say 'no,no, a patient is a patient, we treat everyone the same…' but that's not true [*mish mazbut hek*]! There are rare occasions when you find an Israeli doctor who will really care about their Palestinian patients, but especially since this *intifada*, if we call it an *intifada* – let's say, since the situation in Jerusalem got worse [*min al wada'a hon fi'l Quds kanat aswad*] the only word for the way they

> deal with us in hospitals is *kariha* [hatred]. Only hatred [*bas kariha*]. In my opinion, generally older people prefer to go to the *Maqqaasid* or *Augusta Victoria* or *St Johns* [Palestinian] hospitals, because you get to deal with people like you – Palestinian doctors and nurses. But it also depends on the services available at the hospital – sometimes it isn't possible'.

The doctor went on to explain that he thought it was logical that young people in the camp were less concerned by the discrimination they dealt with in accessing Israeli health care services, because it was a level of discrimination they experienced in many other aspects of their daily life and education or work in the city. For him, this formed part of a trajectory of Israeli policy which started with enabling access to Israeli health insurance, and ended in the de-funding of Palestinian hospitals:

> 'For certain kinds of treatment – expensive treatment, like cancer care for example, you cannot be treated in a Palestinian hospital if you have a Jerusalem ID. If you pay Israeli health insurance, and you have cancer, you have to go to an Israeli hospital because the treatment is so expensive. Israeli insurance companies don't want to be paying for oncology treatment at a Palestinian hospital. So it puts the hospitals under a lot of political pressure. The funding they have is already limited, and now Israel are trying to shut them down. And they do it, by forcing Palestinians to use Israeli health care. They force us to buy health insurance; then they choose which hospitals we can access and which ones we cannot; and then that means the Palestinian hospitals go out of business. For sure the number of Palestinian hospitals is going to decrease in the coming years. Even running a Palestinian hospital is really difficult in East Jerusalem, because there are so many rules and obstructions to making this a public institution'.

This highlights an important contradiction in narratives within the camp. Mo'min saw it as his right, to access health care that he has paid for (admittedly because the demands of the Centre of Life policy require him to pay for this insurance), in the city that is his home. The doctor, on the other hand, saw the increasing use of Israeli health insurance providers as part of a broader political plan for the city to de-fund the limited remains of Palestinian infrastructure.

Act two: claiming access to social security

Malak also attended Sajah's Hebrew class, and although she was not currently in the process of applying for Israeli citizenship, she talked about it with the other women in the class with ease. Her focus on studying Hebrew was rather connected to her desire to collect social security payments more easily in Jerusalem, since the staff at the *Maktab al Amal* (Employment Office) would only speak to her in Hebrew. Having left school without a qualification to marry Mahmoud when she was 16, she struggled to find a more stable job either in or outside of the camp. Malak was part of a Whatsapp group which, three times a week, would be full of photos and updates from the 90 members who had joined it. The group was coordinated by Doa'a, who worked for one of the only Israeli labour associations engaged in Palestinian worker's rights. The members of the group were all women who had heard of it through friends, or friends of friends, or other women they had met queuing at the Israeli Employment Office, which was open three times a week for Palestinians to collect the *damman eddakhel* (social security payments). As Malak explained, because the office was in West Jerusalem, along with most of the jobs suggested to women accessing the centre, getting between there and the camp was expensive. On the mornings the office was open, photos would roll in on Whatsapp to

show other women what the queues were like. Often, there would be more than 500 people queuing to get in, and since the office closed at mid-day, this was a gauge to help other women plan whether or not to access the centre.

> 'There's only one *Maktab al Amal* [employment office] in East Jerusalem – the Israelis have a separate one somewhere else in the city. The one for the Israelis is always clean, they have fans in the waiting area – I've seen it online - and us, we wait on the streets in the dust. It's so humiliating and degrading [*al wada' moheen wa enhittat elkaraameh*]. If we don't manage to sign in time, then *khalas* [that's it], there's no money'.

Malak and Nadia already knew each other through family connections, but would often travel together to the *Maktab al Amal*, which was part of the Isreali Ministry of Interior. The high number of people waiting to access the office on one of the three days a week that it was open meant that meetings with Israeli officials were generally short, and the women would often leave without a clear idea of what they were supposed to do. The women were required to register at the Office on a weekly basis and show proof that they were actively looking for work. Failure to provide such proof meant their benefits would be withdrawn. This meant that if the Employment Office made suggestions of work, these women were obliged to pursue any offer of work made to them. However, as Nadia explained, the 'jobs' that the *Maktab al Amal* sent them out to find often turned out to be non-existent:

> 'I found the office that the *Maktab al Amal* told me to visit, they told me this office were hiring cleaners and I should go there to ask for a job, it was on the other side of the city so it took a long time to go there – and when I arrived to ask to start a job, they told me they didn't need a cleaner. I explained that the *Maktab al Amal*

had sent me, I showed them the paper that the office gave me, but they looked at me as if I was crazy! It's so humiliating. They are fake jobs! They send us to fake jobs. Once my friend went to a job, to the address they gave her and there was not even a building there. So then we have to go back to the unemployment office again. And all of it takes money – buses or taxis or asking someone to drive you to the office, to these fake jobs, back to the office again, back to another job that won't be a real job… They play with us when they talk to us there, we just go from one humiliating situation to another'.

Having wasted the precious little money she had on getting the bus there, Nadia was required to go back to the *Maktab al Amal* again the following week, and begin the whole process again.

'At the end of it all, they're dishonest with us [*fi ennihayeh, hommeh bileffu wa biduru*], because the reality is there is no work available for Palestinians in this city. The Israeli's think we are weak. They think that if they send us to these fake jobs we won't come back to bother them again at the *Maktab*. But now most of us know the situation, we know they are trying to trick us. They don't want to give us *doam dakhel* because with this, we pay less *arnona* [municipal tax]. If we pay less tax, they have more excuses not to provide services in the areas we live'.

Doa'a was from another part of East Jerusalem, and had been accessing the *Maktab al Amal* herself to receive *dammaan eddakhel* to pay her rent. Initially she reported the discrimination that she felt women at the *Maktab* were experiencing to local NGOs, but none of them offered to do anything to try and change the situation. Instead, using Whatsapp, Doa'a created a community of women from different parts of East Jerusalem who would not necessarily otherwise have been in contact with one another. Creating

this online support group, through a private network, Doa'a simultaneously facilitated a new kind of collective solidarity, while practically helping women to plan their time (deciding when and when not to try and go to the *Maktab*) and establishing a way that women could safely report their negative experiences of the system:

> 'I couldn't believe how many women were there every time I went to the *Maktab*…I had never seen anything like it, it was completely chaotic [*kanat mkhalssah*]. I contacted some NGOs to ask for help - the system was so obviously discriminatory. But there was nobody interested in this issue. Eventually this Israeli association who I had already been in contact with wanted to help, and they gave me a job to try and change the situation. So now, when things happen, like women being sent to fake jobs; machines being broken; verbal abuse at the centre – it all gets documented, people tell me what happened and I'm keeping records of everything. The Whatsapp chat works well, there are always many notifications and updates on the days the office is open. Asking for benefits is so humiliating, I think it is important that these women know they are not alone'.

Doa'a approached an Israeli labour organization, who offered to support these women in deciding if and how to pursue different forms of action and complaints against the *Maktab*. Doa'a started documenting abuses within the system in 2016, and by early 2017 she had received over 8000 cases, which she referred to as state injustices (*thalom*) against Palestinians with Permanent Residency connected to their attempts to access social security benefits. Some of the women involved were happy for their cases to be filed in the Jerusalem judicial system, although many women refused to do so. This, they argued, was on the grounds that they preferred to stay under the radar and not bring any attention to themselves or their families in case it resulted in them losing their permanent

residency status. Doa'a explained that she saw the whole process as one which was designed to pressure these women to a point that they would give up trying to access these services themselves:

> 'Of course, our capacity to change the system is very limited. But at least these women now feel like there is someone to report things to – I think even at this level it helps, to feel like someone is listening, and we try to take things to court when we can. It's all a process. For 280,000 people under the poverty line in East Jerusalem, there is one bureau of employment. If everyone who wanted to come here came, it would collapse. Never mind the racism, never mind that everything is in Hebrew, never mind that there's no work available. And the thing is that, even with all that, women are still compelled to come. The reality is that *their* system, the Israeli system is working. Because when they deter women from accessing benefits for long enough, women cannot pay their rent in the city anymore. One month, maybe two, the landlord will be generous, but if she continues not to pay then she will have no choice but to move her family to live somewhere cheaper. Many, many people are moving into Shu'fat camp for this reason – because it's cheaper to live there. So first they remove everyone into Shu'fat camp – and leave the people in the camp to deal with the consequences of that – and then the next step for Israel will be to say, ok, you live behind the wall, now the area behind the wall is no longer Jerusalem, and *khalas*. These families will lose everything'.

Doa'a lobbied the employment office to install a water machine for those waiting, and to provide some shade for people to wait under to avoid either the sun or rain. A water machine was installed, but she commented that the water that runs through it is not clean or drinkable. The last time we spoke, the requests for shelter for those queuing remained

unanswered. In spite of these new forms of control and attempts to keep them out of work, these young women continue to make claims on the state to which they are legally entitled. Nadia explicitly framed this in juxtaposition to what having citizenship would mean:

> *Just because I'm not an Israeli citizen, I live in this city, and with my [permanent residency] status I know that there are these benefits if I am unemployed. Of course, it is easy for the Israelis to treat me like a dog. And it's better for them if I am not a citizen because they can always threaten me if I try and hold them to account.*

Nadia was in the process of applying for Israeli citizenship at the time, and like other women accessing the centre, she did not want to bring any unnecessary attention to herself or her family name that might jeopardies the process. She continued to go through the routine humiliation of searching for jobs that did not exist, and attempting to claim her social service benefits without filing any formal complaints.

Act three: claiming access to space

It would be wrong to assume that acts of citizenship only emerge through actions directly connected to the state and state services. Indeed, in an article on *The Politics of Pleasure,* Laleh Khalili (2015) encourages greater engagement with the different ways individuals spend their free time and engage in leisure activities, as representative of the politics of the present moment. Male and female youth in Shu'fat camp engaged in diverse leisure activities that took them into West Jerusalem. Such activities are new among this generation, and the parents of different interlocutors occasionally commented that it would have been impossible for them to do the same several years ago.

Usually one afternoon in every two weeks, Dima and her friend Hadeel would meet after work in Jerusalem to spend several hours window-shopping in West Jerusalem. Towards the end of my fieldwork, they had both started new teaching jobs in municipal schools in East Jerusalem, Dima teaching English and Hadeel teaching Maths. Walking up to Jaffa street from the East Jerusalem bus station, they would often be the only *hijabi* women in the shops they went into. Dima invited me to join them for these afternoons, meeting for an extortionately priced ice-cream or a sandwich to break up the walk along the street packed with different clothes shops. Both Dima and Hadeel had completed their own schooling through the municipal system, and enrolled in teaching colleges after their school leaving exams. As the emerging generation of the trajectories analysed in Chapter Five, they were both the first generation of women in their families to be contributing to the family income, and in both cases were earning more money that their older brothers or fathers who held jobs in construction and as drivers respectively. This income was still relatively low, and the young women rarely spent money on these shopping trips. Yet window-shopping offered for them a form of leisure without expenditure. Although we mainly spoke Arabic together in the camp, we spoke English together on these trips. Shop assistants and waiters in cafés often looked visibly more alert when the Dima and Hadeel entered the shop, paying far more attention to their movements than to those of other customers. Jaffa street runs along the top side of one of the most orthodox Jewish communities in West Jerusalem, and the street's shops and cafés are typically populated by Israelis or groups of tourists. On more than one occasion, either Dima or Hadeel were stopped unnecessarily by security guards at the entrance of the shop and physically searched on the grounds that they might be carrying a weapon.

On these afternoons, Dima and Hadeel claimed their access to a part of the city that was unexpected on multiple counts. Shop keepers and café staff did not expect to see women like them in spaces like that, and made their discomfort with the presence of these young women very obvious. Older generations of their families in the camp had not accessed such spaces before, and both their mothers would text them constantly demanding reassurance that everything was ok. After several of these trips, both women stopped telling their mothers where they were going, and instead just said that they were working late. It was also seen as unusual among those Palestinians who chose not to shop in West Jerusalem, on account of the Boycott of Israeli goods and products. In continuing to spend their free afternoons on Jaffa Street, taking their time over coffees or ice creams and wandering in and out of shops, Dima and Hadeel were claiming their access to these spaces.

Khalili (2015) argues that more attention should be paid to these ordinary moments of joy and conviviality in public space, which are political precisely because joy and pleasure are so hard to achieve or sustain in a life of hard times. Going shopping on Jaffa Street is still something that many young people in the camp would consider unthinkable, preferring to spend their free time in Jerusalem in the old city where there are more Palestinians, and it feels safer. Highlighting experiences of leisure is not to suggest that frivolity is a betrayal of politics. Pleasurable practices do not have to be imbued with a resistive politics to be either meaningful, or necessary in the lives of young Palestinian refugees. On the contrary, in the context of deep political tensions in Jerusalem on account of the third *intifada*, observations of the experiences of leisure add to the fragility of this political moment, as discussed in the previous Chapter.

Citizenship as strategic pragmatism

Having examined different acts of citizenship, we can turn more directly to a way of solidifying this relationship to the state, insofar as it reduces the ability of the state to displace these refugees (again) through revocation of their permanent residency status. What emerges from all of these acts of citizenship is the varying levels of discrimination against Palestinian refugee youth who attempt to make claims on the Israeli State. These moments of discrimination rarely get reported by refugee youth, for fear of what might happen to their already precarious Permanent Residency Status. Securing this status, through citizenship applications, is therefore seen as a pragmatic way forward among youth in the camp. In this final section, I point to the different ways in which youth present their decision to apply for Israeli citizenship, or their aspiration towards it. I argue that citizenship applications are seen as the most pragmatic action among refugee youth, and are the culmination of a considered strategy ultimately to enable them to remain living in Jerusalem. I argue that this changing enactment of politics speaks as much to the rejection of the PA by refugee youth, as it does to their increased engagement with the Israeli State.

Returning briefly to the distinctions between colonialism and settler colonialism outlined in Chapter Two, a critical distinction can be made in relation to citizenship (Veracini 2013a: 30). Under colonial conditions citizenship rights would be denied, or at least significantly postponed to disallow native sovereign capacities (at the time of writing, this is the case in the West Bank and Gaza; although recent moves by the Israeli

state to annex Area C of the West Bank[111] could mean that this is about to change). Under settler colonialism however, the significant reduction of the indigenous population means that elements of a settler colonial citizenship are selectively offered:

> '…[as a means to] eradicate residual sovereign impulses…the rhetorical claim that indigenous individuals can participate in the political life of the settler polity are among the most powerful tools available for consolidating settler colonial projects' (Veracini 2013a: 30).

As noted in Chapter one, Palestinian citizens of Israel were granted citizenship in 1948, and legally Palestinians with permanent residency status are entitled to apply for Israeli citizenship. Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury (2015) argue this citizenship to be a specifically 'settler colonial' citizenship. Through historical analysis, they present the ways Palestinians have behaved as citizens of Israel, and the ways that, in critical moments, the state has openly treated them as nothing more than the subjects of a settler colonial project[112] (see also Ram 2009). Although Palestinian citizens of Israel do not necessarily articulate their citizenship in the terms of 'settler colonial citizenship', according to Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury (2015), Palestinians nonetheless perceive

[111] For a select example of coverage of this subject: 'Israel's creeping annexation of the West Bank continues' *Al Jazeera* 06/03/2018 [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/israel-creeping-settlements-continue-expanding-180303201420050.html]; 'How Israeli right wing thinkers envision the annexation of the West Bank', *Ha'aretz* 18/08/2018 [https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-how-israeli-right-wing-thinkers-envision-the-west-bank-s-annexation-1.6387108]; 'UN Expert: Israel moving closer to formal West Bank annexation' *The Jerusalem Post* 02/06/2018 [https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/UN-expert-Israel-moving-closer-to-formal-West-Bank-annexation-561314].

[112] To evidence a contemporary example of this treatment, Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury (2015) draw on the case of the Or Commission that was established after the 2003 killing of Palestinian citizens of Israel during a demonstration during the second intifada: 'They went out *as citizens* to protest the killing of other Palestinians and support the cause of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza…in 2008, after lengthy legal deliberations, the government chose to close the investigation file because of 'lack of evidence'…this decision convinced Palestinians that the state does not view their citizenship as seriously as they do' (p.219). At moments of crisis that are perceived to challenge the state's settler-colonial system, Palestinians are treated as settler-colonial subjects, and not as citizens.

the state of Israel as having taken over their homeland by force in the name of the Jewish people, and see that 'genuine' citizenship status is reserved for Jews only. Particularly in the light of the approval of the Nationality Bill in mid-2018, the citizenship Palestinians in Israel are entitled to in comparison is described as 'empty' (ibid.:215). This raises important questions when considering why refugees seek out this kind of citizenship, even though it is widely believed among Palestinians who hold it to be 'empty'.

As discussed in Chapter Two, scholarship within the anthropology of citizenship has often centered around the aspiration to citizenship as an aspiration to be included in a political community. While this literature highlights some of the subversive or insurgent ways that people in different contexts under different kinds of state find to do so, in the Palestinian context, there is nothing subversive about the way refugees technically go about applying for citizenship. My many efforts to interview staff at the Israeli Ministry of Interior and gain data on the number of Palestinians with permanent residency applying for Israeli citizenship were unsuccessful during my fieldwork. However, according to figures from the Israeli Population and Immigration Ministry cited in a news report[113], 2016 was a 'peak year' for citizenship applications, in which 1,081 families requested citizenship, in contrast to 547 families in 2008 and 704 families in 2003. According to the graph below, the number of Palestinians applying for citizenship has consistently been significantly higher than the number of Palestinians actually granted Israeli citizenship. This resonated with the experiences of those in the camp I knew to be navigating the application process. As they understood it, getting an appointment with the Israeli Ministry of Interior through a lawyer to begin citizenship

[113] 'More East Jerusalem Palestinians seek Israeli Citizenship', *The Times of Israel* 22/03/2017. Available via [https://www.timesofisrael.com/more-east-jerusalem-palestinians-seek-israeli-citizenship/]. Accessed on 05.09.2017.

applications took months, and waiting for the outcome of a decision on an application took three or four years.



Figure 21. Numbers of Palestinians applying for Israeli citizenship. [114]

There are three key elements that differentiate Permanent Residency Status from Citizenship in Israel. With Permanent residency, a subject has the right to vote in local, but not in national elections; she has the right to travel, but with a travel document (a *Laissez Passer*) and not a passport; and crucially, it is a suspended status, in that it can easily be revoked, implicating the subject in forcible transfer from Jerusalem. As permanent residency ID holders, these refugees can already travel on *laissez passer* documents, and as we have seen above, they can also already access state benefits. Rather than considering citizenship in terms of the benefits that joining a political community in Israel would bring, the balance among my interlocuters lay in what they stood to lose if

[114] Source: Israeli Population and Immigration Ministry. Available via More East Jerusalem Palestinians seek Israeli Citizenship', *The Times of Israel* 22/03/2017. Available via [https://www.timesofisrael.com/more-east-jerusalem-palestinians-seek-israeli-citizenship/]. Accessed on 05.09.2017.

they did not pursue the citizenship application. Applying for Israeli citizenship was a long and often expensive process, and one that not all of my interlocutors had actually embarked on. Ali explained his intention to apply for citizenship in terms of the addition to the Centre of Life Policy pertaining to needing to prove allegiance to the Israeli state:

> 'My ID now, this Jerusalem ID, they can take it away at anytime. Today I have it, tomorrow some member of my family or someone I knew at school could do an *ameliyeh* [an operation] and I will get a black mark against my name for being connected to him in some way. It doesn't matter if it's my brother's wife's sister's husband's cousin – *mish mukhem* [it doesn't matter] they [Israeli authorities] can still draw a line back to me. And with this black mark on my name, they can do what they like, we'll be waiting for them to come to the house any day and demolish it, and take away my ID. Like that, they destroy my home and make me illegal [by taking away his ID], so I would have no choice but to go to the West Bank or be arrested [for staying illegally in Jerusalem]'.

Ali and I often met in Ramallah, at his suggestion. He had many friends in Ramallah, and often went there to socialize. With this in mind, I responded to his comments above by asking if it would really be that bad to have to live in the West Bank, given that was where he chose to spend much of his time already. I asked, especially, if it was worth the political implications of taking Israeli citizenship, just to avoid having to live in a place where he chose to spend a great deal of his time already:

> 'What do you mean, is it worth it? Taking citizenship doesn't mean anything political, *wallah wallah ishi siaseh* [absolutely nothing to do with politics]. It's about protecting myself. I know I probably won't even get this citizenship anyway, people wait years for it, and mostly they don't get it. But if I do – it means they

can't make me move, they can't make me leave my home anymore, they can't take citizenship away just like that'.

While Ali had no objection to spending his free time in West Bank cities, his reason for applying for citizenship was in order to 'protect himself' from the risk that his ID could be taken away at any moment. Citizenship, he argued, would be harder to revoke. Also emerging from Ali's narrative was his realist approach to citizenship. He knew that even if he applied for it, he would be unlikely to have it granted. A different perspective on citizenship applications came from Hamza, who directly related the potential loss of his Jerusalem ID to what he perceived to be the negative experience of life under the PA:

'If I lose my Jerusalem ID, it means I have to live under the PA. Have you seen the PA? Nobody gets paid, you're locked inside the West Bank, and Ramallah is the most corrupt city in the world. Fuck the PA. Why would I give up my life for them if there is an alternative?

Caitlin: What is the alternative?

Hamza: Citizenship, applying for the citizenship. There will be people who don't like it *bas shou ehna lazem nsawi* [what are we supposed to do]? Don't tell me any guy in the West Bank wouldn't do the same if he could. The ones in '48 [the Palestinians in Israel] have it so easy. *Hayaathom zei helemi* [their lives are like my dreams]. They don't have the army waking them up at night, they can work where they want, they don't get stopped on the streets in Haifa or Tel Aviv for no reason, they have water and electricity every day, nobody is going to come in the night for no reason and say '*yallah* [let's go], time for you to leave your house'.

Hamza's narrative drew on two different of ideas. The first was around a rejection of the PA and the crony governance of the administration in Ramallah, and its inability to provide reliable services to those living under its rule. Like Ali, Hamza also spent a lot of his free time in Ramallah, and saw the differences between his own life and that of his friends without a Jerusalem ID, in terms of the rate of pay for work, the waiting time and quality of care in hospitals, the lack of social security payments, the poor infrastructure, and the increasing impunity of the PA security services. As a recently published Human Rights Watch report (2018) has documented, the number and nature of arbitrary arrests, detentions and torture of peaceful critics at the hands of the PA since its creation in 1993 produce compelling evidence that this systematic practice may constitute a crime against humanity prosecutable at the International Criminal Court. Life in the precarious environment of the camp, punctuated by occupation related violence and the more prevalent violence among those to be collaborators was not necessarily better. At least, however, it was accompanied by a greater freedom of movement, and access to more reliable services and institutions.

Simultaneously, Hamza's narrative drew on a rather less political construction of what life was like for Palestinian citizens of Israel. Through extended families, friends and networks made at work, many of my interlocutors in the camp knew individuals or families with citizenship living in Israel, and heard regular accounts of the discrimination they experienced in day-to-day settings. These were also well reported in the media and on social media networks. Hamza was well aware of this. He kept an eye on Facebook most of the time, and was, like most of the young people I knew in the camp, always eager to update me on the latest news of the *third intifada*. I challenged him on some of his perceptions regarding life for Palestinians in Tel Aviv or Haifa, and he acknowledged that

he was exaggerating somewhat. He knew for example that Palestinians did still get stopped in the streets in Tel Aviv and Haifa – and even if they didn't, this point was of little relevance to him since he did not have any particular aspiration to move beyond Jerusalem himself, or even the camp necessarily. Rather, the point he was making was that at least with citizenship, he could try and secure one aspect of his life – his legal status.

One of the young women in Sajah's Hebrew class who had made an application, along with her husband, was Shuhood. She had a job as an administrator in an office in Jerusalem. During the period of time that we met, she was waiting to hear if she had an appointment at the ministry to begin her citizenship application. She had been studying Hebrew for several years alongside her college diploma to improve her job prospects. When her neighbour's home in the camp was demolished on account of their sons' involvement in an *ameliyeh* (operation, or act of protest against the occupation), she and her husband began talking about taking the citizenship test. Like Ali, she felt that the likelihood that she could be distantly associated to an *ameliyeh* at some stage was high, and certainly was out of her control. Gaining citizenship seemed the only viable way of trying to ensure that her residency would not be revoked. However, Shuhood brought an additional dimension to this debate through her work at the Municipal school. Her students were all Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, and were studying (as discussed in Chapter Five) under the new curriculum that had been imposed at her school:

> *I can't believe some of the things the children say in class. They're using the new textbooks, these books with nothing of Palestine, and it's like their parents tell them nothing of Palestine….[when we try and talk about Palestine, or the camps, or history] they don't care! They say we don't care, we just live our lives, we can go to*

Jaffa when we want, we can go to Ramallah when we want, it doesn't matter…they have their citizenship so khalas [whatever], it doesn't matter for them. I blame their parents, I can't believe they don't tell them about their own history.

While this did not deter Shuhood from her own citizenship application, it did indicate her trepidation for what the implications of it might be for future generations who grew up with Israeli citizenship unquestioningly.

When some of my interlocutors first started talking about their aspirations towards Israeli citizenship, my assumption was that the topic was likely to provoke some tensions between different groups of young people, and certainly between young people and older generations within their families, particularly those who maintained a stauncher political affiliation. Returning to the earlier discussion of the politics of citizenship applications in the camp, Hiba's decision to apply for citizenship took me by surprise. While she would not necessarily have described herself as being a Hamas supporter, or as coming from a Hamas supporting family, she had attended multiple events organised by Hamas student groups at different Universities in the West Bank and talked about her interest in Hamas often. At the same time, Hiba was also in the process of applying for Israeli citizenship. She laughed at my surprise when she told me one afternoon that she had been queuing at the Interior Ministry for an appointment regarding a citizenship application:

Hamas will not do anything to change the realities here now – I can still think about being 'with' Hamas and do this at the same time – why not? For me, it really doesn't mean anything, applying for citizenship, it's not making a political statement – it's just practical. I know life will be easier if I can get citizenship, so why not try?

For Hiba, first and foremost, applying for citizenship was a way of securing her future life in Jerusalem, in a context where it was easy to have permanent residency revoked, and this revocation would immediately cut off her access to the city and its services. From her perspective, Palestinian political leadership was not, and would likely never be in a position to assert any influence over the precarious daily realities of life in the camp. Without any meaningful leadership, or optimism for what the PA (or in Hiba's case, Hamas) might one day achieve, many of my interlocutors believed that they had to find ways to protect their futures themselves.

Although the narratives are different, Hamza and Hiba both pinpointed the crux of this discussion. Hamza explained the aspiration for citizenship in relation to what the alternative might be: being forced to live under the rule of the PA in the West Bank. Hamza was among many of my interlocutors who rejected the language of politics as a force for change in the camp. He rejected the way the PA continuing promotion of rhetoric around resistance in the camps, while doing nothing tangibly to support the lives or rights of refugees in the camp, had led to a clear disillusionment with the potential for political change. Hiba, on the other hand, explained that while her intellectual politics lay with Hamas, 'Hamas will not do anything to change the realities here now'. This was not necessarily a new realization, that came about as a result of an abrupt shift in the political landscape. Rather, I argue that it was the result of growing up in the wake of a failed peace process and disintegration of the Palestinian nationalist project. This is not to suggest that seeking Israeli citizenship was a way of 'choosing' Israel over the possibility of a Palestinian state. During a discussion with a former Palestinian politician about this research, he asked, 'don't you think this is just the ultimate 'up-yours', as you say in English, to the PA?' While applying for Israeli citizenship does mark a clear shift in the

engagement of refugees in East Jerusalem with the Israeli State, as Hiba and Hamza argue, the choice as they see it is not a political one. Rather, it is the most pragmatic way of ensuring that they will be able to continue living in Jerusalem in the future.

Conclusion

Applications for Israeli citizenship have been underway in East Jerusalem for some time, although not necessarily in the camp community. It was not possible to know how many of these applications were being granted, or at what rate, and none of my interlocutors were granted Israeli citizenship in the duration of my fieldwork. As I have argued however, claiming citizenship is not only a legal process. This Chapter built a discussion of the acts of citizenship in which refugee youth engage, and the reasons surrounding their aspiration towards Israeli citizenship. Framed around claiming different kinds of access to the state, the Chapter drew on the ways refugee youth sought out Israeli health care, social security, and spaces of leisure. This highlighted ways of claiming their access to the Israeli state, albeit in a context of deep discrimination. These levels of discrimination constitute what scholars have argued to be a 'settler colonial citizenship' (Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury 2015). Finally, the Chapter turned to the underlying reasons that refugee youth still aspired to this settler colonial citizenship. I argue that this represents both a rejection of the PA, and a pragmatic prioritizing of strategies that can secure their individual futures.

In the face of stark and routine humiliation of discrimination, refugee youth in Shu'fat continue to make demands on the state resources that they can, such as health care, social security and the possibilities of leisure as ways of affirming their Permanent

Residency Status. In expressing their desire to apply for Israeli citizenship, and embedding themselves in a long application process that many know may prove fruitless, they seek perhaps the most basic claim of citizenship: the right not to be removed. My interlocutors had no desire to engage in Israeli civil or political society, nor to provide fuel for co-existence narratives that many believed were still rooted in a settler colonial framing. Instead, their choices and actions require us to fundamentally engage with the idea of citizenship as a strategic and pragmatic choice, rather than an aspiration towards political agency. Youth in Shu'fat were acutely aware of the way this choice might be read by other Palestinians: as Ali put it, 'some people might not like it'. In my experience of the camp this was not particularly a point of inter-generational conflict. On the contrary, the parents of several interlocutors at different points highlighted the merits of attaining citizenship. Ali was instead pointing to tensions between different kinds of communities who chose to 'resist' in different ways. In an extension of the way middle- and upper-class Palestinians were appalled by the idea of shopping in West Jerusalem, because they boycotted these shops, this idea of citizenship applications rests in the kinds of choices afforded to an individual in a specific set of contexts.

As discussed in Chapter One, planning regimes in Jerusalem are incrementally excluding the population of Shu'fat camp and its surrounding neighborhoods from the demographic of the city. While the state operates against its non-citizens, these same non-citizen, refugee, permanent residents are making strategically pragmatic claims on the state. A strategic pragmatism and individual determination, rather than a revolutionary consciousness, are, I argue the driving factors behind the kinds of political and social change enacted by refugee youth in Shu'fat camp. As such, this concluding empirical chapter presents their changing enactment of politics as a process of adaptation in a

period of protracted political violence. Fundamentally, it demonstrates the capacity of youth to adapt to severely constraining conditions, and to develop emerging practices when required to do so by structural determinants.

Conclusion

A return visit to Shu'fat camp a year after I finished fieldwork was a stark reminder that life goes on, and that academic analysis such as this provide only a snapshot in time. Two of the young people whose narratives have featured prominently in this thesis had been arrested and detained on indefinite sentences in Israel; a family had had their permanent residency status revoked and had left the camp to move in with extended family members in the West Bank; and material conditions in the camp had significantly deteriorated over the winter months. Most of my interlocutors had new jobs; several of them were now married and had left the camp to live elsewhere in Jerusalem; and there were a few new babies to meet. The heightened period of violence of a third *intifada* had died down, but my interlocutors continued to refer to the current *wada'* or state of affairs as one of *intifada.* The Trump Administration had just declared their intention to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and to move the American Embassy to the city. My interlocutors were angry about the decision, but also somewhat despondent about what the broader implications of this might be. Conversation, as always, was much more concerned with the realities of day to day life than of the macro political changes that were likely to have an effect on their futures.

In this Conclusion, I highlight the key theoretical, empirical, methodological and political contributions of this study, and the challenges within each them. It also looks

ahead, to consider where future research could be directed and what policy implications could be drawn from this study. While this work has not been policy oriented in nature or specifically directed at humanitarian agencies or interventions with Palestinian refugees, I believe it would be ethically wrong not to attempt to derive a more practical meaning from some of the findings of this research. These are considered specifically in the light of current changes underway in the Palestinian context.

Contributions of this research

This study set out to explain how refugee youth draw on moments of change in the period of time between youth and adulthood to articulate different enactments of political action. Through my ethnography, I came to understand that refugee youth used these moments of change to strategically engage more with the Israeli State, in order to secure their own political claim to permanent residency status. I therefore sought to explain how youth from Shu'fat camp have reached a point where engaging more with the Israeli State was seen as the only pragmatic thing to do to build any sense of stability for the future. The first empirical Chapter drew on an analysis of everyday life in the camp that was characterised as existential precarity, relating not only to the day-to-day fears of life in a context of protracted violence, but 'existential' because it was no longer clear what the 'purpose' of continuing to live this way was. Not only were individuals in the camp perpetuating street violence, but they had introduced a constant state of fear and mistrust among refugees in the community. Everyone in the camp was constantly worrying that they would have their permanent residency status revoked, and concerns that one's neighbours could be collaborating with the Israeli State, and could escalate such a process

led to a heightened anxiety. The Chapter extended the theoretical argument of economic de-development as a tool of settler colonialism to suggest that the camp has experienced a societal de-development. Through this process, a structured, planned, break-down of community processes and systems has been orchestrated and overseen by the Israeli State. In this context, even serious levels of occupation-related violence (which were heightened during my fieldwork on account of the third *intifada*) somehow became only an anticipated backdrop to everyday life, in which the precarity of violence instigated by those considered to be collaborators with the Israeli State posed a greater threat. By the end of Chapter Four, we were left with the idea that in this space, 'Politics' had ceased to have any real meaning for refugee youth, creating the backdrop for the following Chapter which examined the strategies youth develop to invest their energies in Israeli State systems instead.

Chapter Five drew on three key periods of change for refugee youth as they became young adults, namely choosing systems of education, securing employment, and deciding who, and when, to get married. It explored the ways in which both female and male youth made strategic choices to strengthen their claims in accordance with the Centre of Life Policy, upon which their permanent residency status was based. Throughout the Chapter, they ways refugee youth navigated the requirements they needed to fulfill in order to make this claim were broken down to present a careful strategy, through which they prioritised securing employment in Jerusalem or Israel, or marrying into families that also had Jerusalem ID status. In every decision they took, the emphasis was to make sure that nothing would jeopardise their permanent residency status. While strategic, I argued that these choices were also pragmatic, in that that would help refugee youth to secure a better future, in both economic and material terms.

Chapter Six brought these decisions into the contemporary political moment during which I undertook fieldwork, namely that which was referred to in the camp as a third *intifada.* One might assume that, if ever there was a time in which refugees might doubt the political choices of the previous Chapter, it would be during this political moment, when there was a potential collective sense of 'struggle' to unite around. On the contrary, as this Chapter explained, the young people I worked with in the camp saw the *intifada* as useless, and not one which was worth risking all that they had built. This, I argued was indicative of a shifting morality among refugee youth, in relation to the way they challenged the assumption that, because they were refugees from Shu'fat camp, they would necessarily want to join this struggle. The Chapter examined the frustration of youth with others who did take part, and in particular the ways that the remnants of nationalist factions in the camp attempted to glorify the process. Questioning the extent to which they sought to subvert the state through this process of intifada, the Chapter concluded that while youth retained a certain empathy for the families of those who had lost loved ones, it did not deter them from pursuing their own personal projects of engagement with the Israeli State.

The final empirical Chapter turned to the question of extending this strategic pragmatism towards citizenship applications in Israel. Using a frame of 'acts of citizenship', it analysed ways in which refugee youth already claimed aspects of citizenship to which they were entitled as permanent residents, including healthcare, social services, and spending their time off work in West Jerusalem. The Chapter then turned to the discussion of citizenship applications, to understand the meaning that youth attributed to this process. It argued that refugee youth did not, in any way, see this as a political choice. Rather, it was something pragmatic that would ultimately enable

them to secure their futures in the city they lived in, without the fear that their residency status would be revoked. As such, applying for Israeli citizenship was, for youth in refugee camp, a strategically pragmatic thing to do.

Theoretically, this study has sought to contribute to debates and discussions falling broadly under the anthropology of politics. In particular, it has addressed questions of settler colonial statehood; the ways that youth begin to enact different politics through their transitions to adulthood; how morality might be used as a frame to understand changes in long held political assumptions, and where young people become those who can re-think perceptions of 'the right way' to live or behave as a refugee; and the consideration of strategic pragmatism as a useful tool to think through young people's actions and decisions in a context of protracted displacement and violence. First, this study contributes to the growing body of evidence that locates the Israeli state project as settler colonial, and offers an analysis of some of the complex ways through which the state is working slowly and incrementally to dismantle the subjectivities of those it seeks to control. In particular, Chapter Four built on the idea of de-development to understand the ways that de-development operates at a social level to break communities. Chapter Six built on this further, by illustrating how this de-development operates in a virtual, online sphere to destroy limited collective solidarities where they do still exist. In so doing, the picture this thesis paints is bleak. At a recent conference panel hosted at the European Association of Social Anthropology (2018), I was asked, along with four Palestinian colleagues on the panel, a broad question of what hope we saw for the future of Palestine. Not one of us was able to highlight something 'optimistic' about this future. The settler colonial practices of the Israeli State are ostensibly extending their reach in Palestine; the PA is broken; Israel is emboldened by the current White House

Administration and it is difficult to see that the situation will change other than for the worse. At the same time, the examination of the social condition of settler colonialism in this thesis has sought to highlight a different direction for the future aspirations of Palestinian refugee youth. This study has challenged the way we think about citizenship in a settler colonial context, and what it can come to stand for. Even with its limitations, citizenship can offer refugees a certain kind of security, and as I have argued, within this context, aspiring to citizenship may be the most strategically pragmatic thing to do. It will always be harder to revoke citizenship than permanent residency, and as such, while it is perhaps not ultimately a desired goal in the sense of becoming a member of a political community, it is a critical step for young refugees to take to secure their futures. Practically being able to apply for citizenship requires strategic, incremental steps on the parts of refugee youth, which have been explored and built up throughout this thesis.

A second theoretical contribution of this study has been to the growing scholarship on youth in contexts of protracted violence and displacement. In this thesis, I specifically chose not to focus in too much analytical depth on contexts of violence in the camp. This was a very deliberate choice. Even in framing the third *intifada* in this study, in which it must be acknowledged that much of the violence has stemmed from Shu'fat camp, I seriously question to what ends and for whose purposes one might theorise violence in this context. Instead, I chose to draw out the experiences of a much larger number of young people in the camp who did not engage in the violence of the third *intifada* and did not believe in it as a meaningful political process. Most critically, this study has challenged the idea that when presented with macro-political processes that could hinder their ability to become young adults, youth in this context are instead using these times of change quite strategically to further their individual political claims on a

state. This study has therefore shed light on the ways that, even in a context that I have characterised as existential precarity, youth can produce important social and political change. In the Palestinian context, it has offered important evidence against the idea that Palestinian youth are either coerced into violent action; or traumatized victims of violent action; or indeed that these two taken together have produced 'a lost generation', which continues to be the dominant narrative in humanitarian, policy, and some academic spheres. On the contrary, this study has characterised Palestinian refugee youth as strategically pragmatic in their engagement with the Israeli State. By claiming their permanent residency, acts of citizenship, and legal citizenship from the state, they are in fact moving towards a new kind of future.

This takes us forward to a third contribution that this study tentatively makes to the literature on moralities, and the application of anthropological ways of thinking about morality to the context of Palestinian refugee youth. As I have argued throughout this thesis, but particularly in Chapters Six and Seven, there is a tendency to place an expectation on those in contexts of struggle to continue to fight 'the good fight', and that a shared hope should be enough to sustain action and ambition towards a shared goal. Without necessarily articulating it as such, I think there is a tendency, particularly among scholars and activists working in the Palestinian context to place normative judgements on the ideas of solidarity and comradeship vs. abandonment or desertion to the 'cause', with little or no understanding of what it means to take up any of these things in practice. While developing the empirically grounded theoretical argument for strategic pragmatism, it was important to find a way of explaining the nuance of this approach. Palestinian refugee youth neither see themselves (or their peers) as 'giving up' and surrendering to the Israeli State, nor being co-opted by it. While they retain a certain

empathy with the actions of the third *intifada,* as Chapter Six in particular has illustrated, this empathy lies principally with the families of those left behind. In searching for a way to articulate this theoretically, I kept returning to the idea of what the expectations are on refugee youth in times of struggle in the Palestinian context. These debates build on the growing anthropological literature in the oPt and among Palestinian refugee communities elsewhere that attends to some of the hidden implications of the fracturing of a nationalist movement for people's everyday lives. In light of this fracturing, perhaps ideas around a shifting morality in terms of what the 'right way' to live is, if the 'right way' is no longer centered around the idea of struggle. The idea of a shifting morality also speaks more broadly to emerging debates in refugee studies that consider hierarchies of refugee-ness and the value of refugee status to refugees themselves (Fiddiyan-Qasmiyeh 2014; Cole 2018a; Bardelli 2018). These debates have concentrated on exposing the way international organizations structure such hierarchies through the politics of labelling. This study in contrast offers a starting point to reflect on the ways an 'ideal refugee' is constructed by political elites and upper classes in a protracted context of struggle, where there is an expected pressure on refugees to maintain the praxis of a struggle in their everyday lives.

Exploring the complexities and potential use of shifting morality, in conjunction with strategic pragmatism has been done in an effort to move beyond debates of everyday resistance in Palestine. As a final theoretical contribution this study sought to develop, this was in no way intended to undermine narratives, imaginings or motivations of resistance related activities in Palestine, broadly defined. Rather it is derived from an empirically grounded understanding of the challenges of maintaining the praxis of these narratives among refugee youth. How else could their decision-making and aspirations

be framed? What could offer a more meaningful representation of their personal, daily struggles between a political identity and a search for their futures? If anything, I hope that this suggestion can be read *in solidarity* with a third generation of refugee youth, who having lived in dire socio-economic circumstances and who, surrounded by a crumbling politics are still finding ways to move forward. It is important here also to address the contribution and analytical purchase of strategic pragmatism. Is it too basic to explain the complex processes underway here? Is it too nuanced in this framing to be usefully applicable to other contexts in the oPt, let alone further afield? As used in this thesis, strategic pragmatism is a conceptual term intended to encompass a dimension of conscious thought that I have attempted to capture ethnographically. It seems to be the best way of articulating the bluntness of 'what else am I supposed to do at this point', together with the idea that actually there could be another life beyond the camp. The existential precarity that characterises everyday life in the camp is such that refugee youth want to build their future lives, and lives for their future families in this vein. Who, indeed, could critique them for this desire to do so.

Expanding more explicitly to the context of Palestine and Israel, this thesis offers a vital contribution to understanding the ways that refugee youth perceive their circumstances a quarter of a century after the Oslo Peace Process. Is it, perhaps, inevitable that this point would be reached, when those who were able to secure a better future for themselves through engagement with the Israeli State project would chose to do so? Arguably this is precisely what the settler colonial state project set out to do. The politics behind the findings of this thesis have not been easy to write, and neither are they necessarily easy to hear. Having presented papers from this thesis at a number of conferences in the oPt over the past two years, I have many times been told that my

findings must be wrong; that I must have misunderstood; that my Arabic must have been lacking; and that what I was suggesting would only be detrimental to 'the cause'. While completing this thesis during a Fellowship at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University, with some trepidation I took up the opportunity to discuss my findings with another Research Fellow at the Harvard Middle East Initiative, the former Palestinian Prime Minister Dr Salam Fayyad. He reflected that, for him, this analysis spoke most deeply to the rejection of the authority and the legitimacy of the PA, that a desire for Israeli citizenship, with all the contradictions and complications that this implies comes to the fore in the minds of refugee youth. Indeed, he suggested that it perhaps offers the ultimate evidence that the PA has failed, when those it has built up to be its bravest defenders say that they have had enough. This takes us to what some of the implications are, politically, methodologically and theoretically looking ahead.

Looking ahead

As re-iterated above, twenty-five years after Oslo, this study has shown how a generation who have grown up in the wake of the accords, and might be expected to be one of most politicised refugee populations in the oPt, are actually marking a critical shift towards new ways of engaging with the Israeli state. This study thus contributes to a growing call to acknowledge that a meaningful two state solution is no longer a realistic prospect, as evidenced here by the fact that when given a 'choice' between possible states, refugee youth are choosing to engage further with the Israeli state.

In light of the above, a further implication that emerges from this study is a re-consideration of the ways that international organisations are operating in Shu'fat refugee camp. While humanitarian and development interventions have not been the central focus of this study, what emerged specifically from Chapter Five was the ways that youth are opting in or out of certain institutions (here focused on education, employment and marriage) in order to maximise opportunities to make political claims. By contrast, NGOs and humanitarian agencies working with youth in the camp continue to emphasise the importance of conventions such as the UNCRC, and encourage all young people to stay in school until the age of 18; not to seek employment before the age of 18; and not to get married before the age of 18. As Chapter Five explained, there are careful political reasons why these transitions take place at different times and in different ways. This therefore suggests that a more nuanced approach to humanitarian intervention in the Palestinian context could lead to ways of supporting refugee youth not only in their transitions to adulthood but in a way that makes sense to them politically.

Looking ahead to where this study takes us next, I would like first to point to the methodological implications of this study and thoughts about future research training and practice. Scholars continue to suggest that taking risks is part and parcel of ethnographic methods (Stewart et al: 2009), suggesting that fieldwork has to be somewhat perilous in order to be recounted as something of an adventure (Roth 2018). Associations and departments promote guidelines and basic training, but as Amy Pollard's (2009) seminal study, *Field of Screams* has highlighted, the standard of trainings and applicability of existing guidelines (at least in the UK) are not sufficiently supporting researchers doing ethnography in challenging contexts. Multiple accounts of women's experiences of violence in the field have pointed to the 'extra affective, physical and

intellectual labour required to reassert our legitimacy as researchers' (Berry et al. 2017: 539. See also Winkler and Hank 1995; Behar 1996; Mahmood 2008). The brave collection of articles published in *Sexuality and Danger in the field: starting an uncomfortable conversation* (Clark and Grant eds. 2015) began a critical discussion in British anthropology around the gendered experience of fieldwork, in understanding what could be done to better prepare doctoral students to navigate these realities. Since 2017, #MeTooAnthro has gathered an overwhelming number of testimonies related to the pervasiveness of sexual harassment and violence in fieldwork, but also detailing the silencing of experiences of violence that goes on in institutions when scholars 'return from the field'[115]. This is a reality of long-term fieldwork that, while pervasive among white scholars, and particular white female scholars, is still further exacerbated for women of colour. As succinctly argued by Nayyirah Waheed: 'all the women. in me. are tired' (2014).

Extensive discussion among scholars working ethnographically in challenging contexts have led to the emerging idea of a 'compassionate turn' in anthropology (The New Ethnographer, forthcoming 2019). This 'turn' is one which attempts to balance the wellbeing of the researcher and the interlocutors, making explicit not only the way our fieldwork impacts the places we work, but developing an honesty about the way it impacts the researcher. This is in no way to detract from the importance of conversations around *why* scholars want to study the places and people they do, especially in light of

[115] #MeTooAnthro was launched at the joint Australian Anthropological Society (AAS), Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth (ASA) and Association of Social Anthropologists of Aotearoa/New Zealand (ASAANZ) conference 'Shifting States' in Adelaide, Australia in December 2017. The working group behind #MeTooAnthro is made up of representatives of all three associations. To date, #MeTooAnthro has launched a training manual on dealing with sexual violence and harassment, proposed revisions to ethical guidelines to acknowledge the possibility of sexual violence and harassment in the field and professional settings, and has built a website of testimonies and resources, available via [https://metooanthro.org].

the dark colonial complicities of anthropology as a field. Rather, the idea of the compassionate turn is to ask the increasingly neoliberal capitalist academic market in which we work to treat its researchers with a level of compassion that reflects the realties we engage in, in our attempts to doing meaningful academic work. It hopes to encourage future doctoral students and other early career researchers, their institutions and their funders to seriously consider what it means to do research in a way that is safe for both researchers and those we work with.

Looking ahead empirically and theoretically beyond this study, the decisions of refugee youth to increase their political claims on the state are, as I have argued, not taken lightly. The specific context in which these decisions have been taken should also be kept in mind, and it would be interesting to try and develop the theoretical tools in this thesis to understand the subjectivities of post-Oslo refugee youth elsewhere in the oPt. Refugee youth in the West Bank and Gaza do not have the option of applying for Israeli citizenship, and nor are they likely to do so anytime soon. However, it would be interesting to expand this research to consider the utility of strategic pragmatism, and shifting moralties among refugee youth elsewhere in the oPt as they similarly grapple with a failing nationalist project and ever tighter political, economic and material realities. Another critical area for deeper exploration in Palestine is class dynamics between refugee and non-refugee communities, and the disconnect of expectation held between the two would add to these debates. Expanding this study beyond the Palestinian context, it would be interesting to build more theoretically on the idea of hierarchies of refugee behaviours within other displaced communities. Engaging more deeply in class debates about Palestine is a subject that should be handled with great care, but could offer valuable insights about the

breakdown of collective solidarities that need to be reconfigured and subsequently rebuilt.

The political environment in Palestinian and Israel is constantly changing, and the years in which I have completed this PhD have seen some radical shifts take place. The US Government have officially recognised that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel; Israel has passed a new Nationality Bill; and the US has cut all of its funding to both the PA and to UNRWA, meaning that the dismantling of the agency (or at least of significant parts of it) is likely to follow. Concurrently, in Gaza, the last 6 months has seen the biggest mobilisation of demonstrations on the border to end the siege during the ten-year blockade. These demonstrations have been led by youth, organised largely on social media, and while Hamas have tried to co-opt these demonstrations in different ways, they have largely remained as a grassroots movement. Elsewhere in Gaza, migration out of the coastal enclave is on the rise. What these events have in common is, again, a move away from the nationalist orthodoxies of the past, and youth taking their futures into their own hands with new directions, and new forms of action. This study has sought to argue that attention to the subjectivities of refugee youth can offer critical insights into changing enactments of politics within one of the most publicly debated contexts in the world. Future attention to the fall out of these changed enactments will be critical to understanding the new ways that Palestinians are facing the future.

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Annex 1. Brief political timeline

This timeline offers a very brief outline of political events in Palestine and Israel from the signing of the Balfour declaration by the British government in 1917.

1917	Balfour declaration is signed. Britain promises a 'Jewish National Home' on the land of historic Palestine.
1922	League of Nations approves the British Mandate for Palestine and its purpose of helping establish a Jewish Homeland.
1929	Al-Buraq uprising. The first mass protests against increased Jewish immigration to Palestine.
1935	Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, a Palestinian revolutionary leader is killed by British forces.
1936	Six-month strike in Palestine, protesting Jewish immigration.
1937	Peel commission recommends the partition of Palestine and transfer of Palestinians from land allocated for a Jewish state.
1938	Armed Zionist group, Irgun launches first series of attacks against Palestinians.
1946	Irgun bombs the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing 91 people.
1947	UN adoption of Resolution 181, a partition plan for Palestine. Palestinians reject the resolution.
1948	January: Armed Zionist group, Haganah bombs the Semiramis hotel in Jerusalem.
	February: Zionist forces attack Palestinian villages around Haifa, and begin expulsion of Palestinians.
	April: Stern Gang and Irgun militias massacre of the Palestinian village of Dayyr Yassin, near Jerusalem.
	May: State of Israel is declared, and immediately recognised by the US and the Soviet Union. State of Israel passes the Law of Return, stating that any Jewish person had the right to immigrate to Israel.
	August: Stern Gang assassinates Count Folke Bernadette, UN appointed Mediator for Palestine and Swedish diplomat.
	December: By the end of the year, 750,000 Palestinians had been forcibly displaced in what is refered to today as the *Nakba.* UNGA passes resolution 194, affirming the right of return for Palestinian refugees.
1949	Armistice agreements signed between Israel and neighbouring countries of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Egypt. UN establishes UNRWA agency for Palestinian refugees.
1950	Jordan assumes administrative control of the West Bank.

1956	The Suez crisis.
1960	Israel passes Basic Law as the draft chapters of a future Israeli Constitution.
1964	Palestinian Liberation Organisation is formed in Cairo.
1967	The *Naksa* or the Six Day War. Israel occupies the West Bank, Gaza, Syrian Golan Heights and the Egyptian Sinai. UN Security Council passes resolution 242 calling Israel to withdraw from these occupied territories.
1970	Black September uprising in Jordan. PLO are expelled from Jordan.
1973	October war or Yom Kippur war,
1974	Arab League recognises PLO as the legitimate representative body of the Palestinian people.
1976	Israel confiscated thousands of hectares of land from Palestinian citizens of Israel. 'Land Day' continues to be commemorated every year.
1978	Egypt and Israel sign Camp David Accords.
1982	Israel invades Lebanon.
1987	First *Intifada* begins in the occupied Palestinian territories.
1988	PLO recognises the State of Israel through UN resolutions 242 and 338.
1991	Madrid Peace Conference.
1993	PLO and Israel sign the Declaration of Principles (Oslo I) on interim self-government arrangements.
1994	The Paris Protocol on economic relations between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel is signed by Israel and the PA.
1995	PLO and Israel sign interim agreements granting some autonomy to Palestinians in parts of the West Bank and Gaza (Oslo II). Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin is assassinated by an Israeli university student.
1997	PLO and Israel sign an agreement requiring Israeli forces to partially withdraw from Palestinian city of Hebron in the West Bank.
2000	Camp David II Summit ends in failure. PLO and Israel renew final status negotiations. Second *intifada* in the oPt begins.
2001	Israel assassinates leader of the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Abu Ali Mustafa. PFLP assassinate Israeli far-right Minister for Tourism, Rehavem Ze'evi.
2002	Israel re-occupies Palestinian cities in the West Bank. Israel assassinates military leader of Hamas, Sheikh Salah Shehadeh. Israeli massacre of Jenin refugee camp in the northern West Bank. Israel begins construction of the Separation wall.
2003	Yassar Arafat names Mahmoud Abbas Prime Minister of the PA.
2004	Yassar Arafat dies. Hamas Founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin killed by Israeli airstrike. Head of Hamas, Abdel Aziz al Rantissi killed by Israeli airstrike.

2005	Mahmoud Abbas elected President of the PA. Israel conducts Gaza 'disengagement'.
2006	War breaks out between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hamas wins first election in Gaza.
2007	Hamas takes control in Gaza. Mahmoud Abbas swears in new government of the West Bank. Israeli blockade of Gaza begins.
2008	Israel attacks Gaza in 'Operation Cast Lead'.
2009	Benjamin Netanyahu forms coalition government in Israel. PA issues plan to create a Palestinian State within two years.
2011	Mahmoud Abbas seeks full UN membership for a Palestinian State.
2012	PA seek non-member State status at the UN.
2012	Israel attacks Gaza in 'Operation Pillar of Defence'.
2014	Israel attacks Gaza in 'Operation Protective Edge'.
2015	Violent protests framed by some as a third *intifada* in the occupied Palestinian territories and Israel
2017	President Trump recognises Jerusalem as Israeli capital and orders US Embassy to move to Jerusalem.
2018	Israeli Knesset passes law declaring Israel a Jewish State, with Hebrew as the official language and Jerusalem the capital.

Annex 2. List of interviews conducted.

Organisation	Department	Number of meetings / interviews conducted	Interview type
International organisations / INGOs			
UNRWA (HQ)	Protection field office	3	1 SSI Director 1 SSI with Manager 1 Follow up meeting with Manager
	Child protection	4	4 SSIs with lead staff member
	Camp Services Office	2	1 SSI with CSO 1 follow up meeting with CSO
UNRWA (Field)	Camp manager	2	2 SSIs with Camp Manager
	Health centre	4	2 SSIs with Head of Health Centre 2 SSIs with 2 nurses
	Boys school	3	1 SSI with Headteacher 2 SSIs with other teachers
	Girls school	4	1 SSI with Headteacher 3 SSIs with other teachers
	Social workers (based in girls school and boys school)	7	4 SSIs with girls school Social Worker 3 SSIs with boys school Social Worker
UNICEF	Child Protection	2	2 SSIs Director
NRC	Education	2	2 SSIs Head of Education programming
Save the Children	Field office	1	SSI staff member
	Protection	1	SSI staff member

WHO	Research and Evaluation	2	2 SSIs, Director
Community Based Organisations (not named for anonymity)			
CBO 1: based in the camp, funded by the PA		6	5 SSIs staff members 1 Focus Group Discussion among 8 staff members
CBO 2: based in the camp, funded by the PA		3	1 SSI with Director 2 Focus group discussions among 12 staff members
CBO 3: based in the camp, funded by the PA		3	1 SSI with Director 2 SSIs with staff members
CBO 4: based in the camp, funded by the Islamic Waqf		4	1 SSI with Director 3 SSIs with staff members
CBO 5: based on the edge of the camp, funded by the Jerusalem Municipality		2	2 SSIs with staff members
CBO 6: based on the edge of the camp, funded by the Jersualem Municipality		3	3 SSIs with staff members
CBO 7: based in the camp, privately funded		8	2 Focus group discussions 1 SSI with Director 5 SSIs with staff members
CBO 8: based in the camp, privately funded		7	1 SSI with Director 6 SSIs with staff members
Youth Organisation (YO) 1: based in East Jerusalem (EJ), funded by the Islamic Waqf		2	1 SSI with manager 1 Focus group discussion among 6 staff members
YO 2: based in EJ, funded by the Israeli Ministry of Education		1	SSI with Director
YO 3: based in EJ, funded by international donors		1	Focus group discussion among 8 staff members
YO 4: based in EJ, funded by international donors		2	1 SSI with Director

			1 SSI with staff member
Palestinian National Authority			
Ministry of Social Affairs	Child protection	1	1 SSI
Ministry of Youth and Sports		1	1 SSI
Ministry for Jerusalem Affairs	Education specialist	1	1 SSI
Jerusalem Municipality			
Department of Education Administration		2	1 SSI
Academic institutions			
Birzeit University	Department of International Affairs; Department of Public Health; Department of Sociology	3	3 SSIs
Al Quds University	Department of Social Work; Department of Sociology; Department of Political Science	2	2 SSIs
Bethlehem University	Department of Department of Sociology; Department of Political Science	2	2 SSIs