

SIMON V OF MONTFORT:
THE EXERCISE AND AIMS OF
INDEPENDENT BARONIAL POWER
AT HOME AND ON CRUSADE,
1195-1218

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SHORT ABSTRACT

The career of Simon of Montfort is one of the more remarkable recorded baronial ascents of the High Middle Ages. Despite living at the turn of the thirteenth century, a period frequently characterised by political historians as the triumph of centralised royal bureaucracy over pluralistic feudal anarchy, Simon's rise from French sylvan lord to prince of the Midi was accomplished with little reference to royal power and often in opposition to it. Through the vehicle of the crusade, Simon was able both to escape and participate in the lordship of various kings and popes, often playing competing authorities off each other to his own advantage. Such independence, however, required alternative bases for his own power, which Simon found principally in his personal networks of support among the French aristocracy and the animating programme of reform advocated by the Cistercians and certain Parisian theologians. Followed by his family and friends, driven by the ideal of a Christendom purged from heresy and dedicated to a neogregorian order, and armed with the resources of his French patrimony and the lessons of lordship he had gleaned there and during his brief seisin in England, Simon threw himself into the work of conquering and administering the Midi in the name of Christian orthodoxy. Despite his eventual death and the subsequent collapse of his principality, his years in power clearly demonstrate a commitment to government usually associated by historians with royal regimes. The life of Simon of Montfort, therefore, suggests a corrective to a focus on monarchies as the exclusive engines of medieval government: exceptional though Simon may have been, his career provides a valuable glimpse of both the means and concerns of baronial autonomy at the turn of the thirteenth century.

LONG ABSTRACT

Historians of political development in the High Middle Ages often focus on the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries as the generations in which monarchy finally triumphed over aristocracy to create a monopoly on governing institutions in western Europe. However, it was precisely in this period that Simon of Montfort emerged from his modest forest lordship in France to conquer a principality stretching from the Pyrenees to the Rhône. A remarkable ascendancy in any period, it is perhaps especially so in its contrast with the accepted historiographical narrative. Nonetheless, Simon has been largely overlooked on his own terms, especially by English historiography. Despite the numerous works over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries devoted to the Albigensian Crusade, only a handful of biographies of Simon have been published, none of which are in English. Furthermore, those French works dedicated to his life have been little more than narrative retellings of the Albigensian Crusade from Simon's perspective, with an introductory chapter or two about his family background, participation in the Fourth Crusade, and life in France. French domination of the historiography has also prevented any deep exploration of Simon's English connexions, chiefly his inheritance of the earldom of Leicester in 1206. The substantial inquest regulating this inheritance awaits publication by David Crouch, but at least forty other acts from Simon's life remain unedited, despite increased interest in the Albigensian Crusade and several having been catalogued for over a century.

Though one of the aims of this thesis is to correct the lack of Anglophone attention paid to this seminal figure of the early thirteenth century, a biographical study of Simon has

consequences beyond the man himself. The inheritance of his claims to the Midi by the French Crown after his death means that his documents survive in a volume uncharacteristic of a baron of his station. The dedicated narrative history of his career provided by Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay's *Hystoria albigensis* is likewise the most intimate prose portrait of a comital figure available from the period. Thus Simon's life is perhaps the best recorded of his contemporary peers, offering a rare insight into the priorities and means of a baron's administration of his lands and leadership of a crusade. Moreover, despite the supposed triumph of monarchy during his lifetime, Simon's meteoric career took place largely outside of royal auspices and sought crowned approval for its gains only after the fact. Simon's experience was certainly exceptional, both in itself and in the volume of its narrative and documentary records, but it nevertheless provides a challenge to an uncomplicated or teleological understanding of contemporary politics as effectively national affairs directed by kings.

Rather than spend his life in the train of one particular king, as did his contemporaries William the Marshal or William of Barres, Simon's career, in its various geographical manifestations, saw him in the lordship of three different Crowns: France, England, and Aragon. Though his relations with the first of these were almost entirely amicable—if not always harmonious—he was more often in open conflict with the latter two. As a crusader, Simon was also subject to a fourth lord, the pope, for the major events of his career. But even while executing papal mandates, Simon at times came into conflict with the distant will of Rome. However, none of these lords successfully prevented Simon's ascendancy. Angevin and Barcan influence in the Midi was drastically handicapped by the Albigensian Crusade, in the latter case, definitively. And while popes may have disagreed with some particulars of Simon's prosecution

of the crusade, he remained their best hope for curbing the threat of heresy. One reason for Simon's success in the face of opposition was his ability to exploit the margins of monarchical authority, retreating from his obligations of fidelity to lord in favour of another, thus presenting himself as a legitimate actor while interfering with the designs of a nominal superior.

Such independence, however, required alternative bases for his own power that could not be found in the largely rhetorical refuge offered by a distant overlord. In the absence of support from above, Simon worked to cultivate relationships with his social peers and the lesser French nobility. Notably, however, outside of his immediate family, adherence to his cause more often came from his socially inferior neighbours and those with common spiritual devotions than from his wider kinship network. His extended family, of roughly equivalent social standing to himself, were more interested in following the French king in his campaigns to consolidate royal power than investing deeply in Simon's crusade. However, those with similar ideological concerns or dependent on his success saw in Simon a charismatic and effective leader worthy of their allegiance.

For Simon himself, the crusade was animated by the programme of reform advocated by the Cistercians and certain Parisian theologians. His context was permeated by the reformers, especially in his close connexions with the abbey of Vaux-de-Cernay. Concerns about just war, the liberation of the Holy Land, ecclesiastical liberty, sexual morality, and the purgation of heresy espoused by Cistercians and schoolmen were reflected in Simon's career. He was more than a simple cipher for ecclesiastical priorities: his campaigns and government were ambiguous in their attitude toward mercenaries and complicit in the problem of usury. Nevertheless,

Simon's crusades to both Syria and the Midi demonstrated a remarkable dedication to building a Christian republic according to the vision of the reformers.

But Simon was not always a crusader, and the majority of his career—though not the majority of its records—took place in his ancestral lands in France. Though his time in the shadow of Paris does not offer the same salient examples of baronial independence as his conquest of the Midi, it does provide a crucial glimpse at the ordinary exercise of aristocratic government on a more intimate scale. His forest lordship furnished lessons of administration that would prove relevant to his rule in the Midi, such as the diplomatic projection of authority, the value of seigneurial continuity, the economic benefit of thriving towns, the necessity of an intensively participating chivalric following, and the advantage of wide ecclesiastical patronage. Similarly, Simon's brief seisin and subsequent disseisin of the honor of Leicester demonstrated the fragility of his power when many of these elements were lacking. In addition to abstract lessons of governance, his northern lands also provided the financial backing necessary for at least the initial phases of his crusading career. Thus Simon's lordship in France and England, though not nearly as autonomous as in the Midi, is far from irrelevant to his later manifestations of independence: it rather informs his later government and even made it possible.

That is not to say that Simon's administration of the Midi was simply that of his French fief writ large. Most significantly, his possessions in the south were obtained by conquest rather than inheritance. Moreover, that conquest was ideologically justified by a characterisation of the previous lords as deficient protectors of the Christian republic. As a result, the image and patronage cultivated by Simon in the viscounties of Béziers and Carcassonne made little effort to reflect Trencavel traditions. This negative difference was supplemented by the positive

distinction enshrined in the Statutes of Pamiers, which decisively implemented the reform programme embraced by Simon and neglected by his predecessors. But the Trencavels had been culturally of a piece with their subjects, and the influence of heresy and resistance to neogregorian ideas among the indigenous aristocracy fomented serious resistance to Simon in the first years of the crusade. Simon countered this not only through superior generalship, but by coopting what native lords and burghers he could, conserving the loyalty of his French followers with confiscated fiefs, generally respecting urban autonomy, and lavishing patronage on local bishops and Cistercian houses. Due to the crusading context of his conquests, his implementation of government was dynamic rather than dogmatic, balancing the demands of reform with the practical constraints of a largely hostile populace.

This dynamism, paradoxically, broke down just as the crusade reached its zenith in the acquisition of the county of Toulouse. Though Simon's introduction of French feudal patterns and antiheretical policies still stood in stark contrast to the often ineffectual and tolerant attitude of the Saint-Gilles, the dispossessed family's dynastic eminence offered more incentive to maintain continuity with Egidian iconography and at least cultivate personal ties with traditionally favoured Benedictine abbeys. As in the viscounties, cultivation of local nobles, appointment of French followers to key posts, preservation of urban liberties, and patronage of Cistercians and bishops all undergirded Simon's regime. But even with this broad base of support, Simon was finally undone by the southern resurgence that focussed on the fatal exception to his characteristic urban lenience: Toulouse. His inability to accommodate the consular independence of his ostensible capital allowed it to serve as a rallying point for the

disaffected and dispossessed aristocracy of the region, and it was before the red walls of *Tolosa dolosa* that Simon met his bloody end.

Despite his death and the subsequent collapse of his principality, Simon's years in power clearly demonstrate a commitment to government—represented most clearly by the Statutes of Pamiers—usually associated by historians with royal regimes. The achievements and—more importantly—the aspirations of Simon's career suggest that this may be too narrow. Not only were kings still unable to control their barons at the turn of the thirteenth century, they were not the only lords interested in the creation of effective government. Indeed, Simon's preoccupation with government paradoxically contributed to the collapse of his regime: had he been less interested in implementing his reforms and binding his subjects to intensive participation in his regime, he might not have engendered the resentment that cost him his life. A study of Simon of Montfort, therefore, suggests a corrective to a focus on monarchies as the exclusive engines of medieval government: exceptional though Simon may have been, his career provides a valuable glimpse of both the means and concerns of baronial autonomy at the turn of the thirteenth century.

***Simon V of Montfort: The aims and exercise of independent
baronial power at home and on crusade, 1195-1218***

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
List of Abbreviations

AdC-O	Archives départementales de la Côte-d'Or, Dijon
AdH-G	Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne, Toulouse
AdS-M	Archives départementales de la Seine-Maritime, Rouen
AdY	Archives départementales des Yvelines, Montigny- le-Bretonneux
AN	Archives nationales, Paris
ASV	Archivum secretum vaticanum
BAV	Biblioteca apostolica vaticana
BI	Bibliothèque Inguimbertaine, Carpentras
BmT	Bibliothèque municipale de Toulouse
BnF	Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris
BS-G	Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève, Paris
<i>Canso</i>	William of Tudela and Anonymous, <i>La chanson de la croisade albigeoise</i> , ed. and trans. Eugène Martin-Chabot (Paris, 3 vols., 1957-61).
<i>Carcassonne</i>	<i>Cartulaire et archives des communes de l'ancien diocèse et de l'arrondissement administratif de Carcassonne</i> , ed. Jacques- Alphonse Mahul, (Paris, 5 vols., 1857-1867).
CCC	Corpus Christi College, Oxford
<i>Charter Rolls</i>	<i>Rotuli chartarum in Turri Londinensi asservati</i> , ed. Thomas Duffus Hardy, i (London, 1837).
Clari	Robert of Clari, <i>La conquête de Constantinople</i> , ed. Philippe Lauer (Paris, 1924).
<i>Close Rolls</i>	<i>Rotuli litterarum clausarum in Turri Londinensi asservati</i> , ed. Thomas Duffus Hardy, i (London, 1833).

- Complete Peerage* Cokayne, G.E., *The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom*, eds. Vicary Gibbs, H.A. Doubleday, Howard de Walden, and Geoffrey H. White, revised edition (London, 13 vols., 1910-40).
- Devastatio Constantinopolitana* Andrea, Alfred J., 'The *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, A Special Perspective on the Fourth Crusade: An Analysis, New Edition, and Translation', *Historical Reflections* 19 (1993), pp. 131-8.
- EHR* *The English Historical Review*
- Eracles* 'L'Estoire de Eracles empereur et la conquete de la terre d'outremer', in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: Historiens occidentaux*, ii (Paris, 1859), pp. 1-481.
- Ernoul* *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, ed. Marie-Louis de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871).
- Fine Rolls* *Rotuli de oblatiis et finibus in Turri Londinensi asservati*, ed. Thomas Duffus Hardy (London, 1835).
- Fædera* *Fædera, conventiones, litteræ, et cujuscunque generis acta publica, inter Reges Angliæ et alios quosvis Imperatores, Reges, Pontifices, Principes, vel Communitates*, eds. Thomas Rymer, Adam Clarke, and Frederick Holbrooke, revised edition, i (London, 1816).
- Gallia christiana* de Sainte-Marthe, Denis and Barthélemy Haureau, *Gallia christiana, in provincias ecclesiasticas distributa* (Paris, 16 vols., 1715-1865).
- Gesta Philippi Augusti* William the Breton, 'Gesta Philippi Augusti', in *Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, historiens de Philippe-Auguste*, ed. Henri-François Delaborde, i (Paris, 1882), pp. 168-320.

<i>HGL</i>	<i>Histoire générale de Languedoc</i> , eds. Claude de Vic and Joseph Vaissète, revised edition (Toulouse, 16 vols., 1872-1904).
<i>Hystoria</i>	Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, <i>Hystoria albigensis</i> , eds. Pascal Guébin and Ernest Lyon (Paris, 3 vols., 1926-39).
<i>Layettes</i>	<i>Layettes du Trésor des chartes</i> , ed. Jean-Baptiste Alexandre Teulet, (Paris, 5 vols., 1863-1909).
<i>Llibre dels fets</i>	James I of Aragon, <i>Llibre dels fets del Rei en Jaume</i> , ed. Jordi Bruguera, ii (Barcelona, 1991).
<i>Mémoires de Rambouillet</i>	<i>Mémoires et documents publiés par la société archéologique de Rambouillet</i>
<i>MGHS</i>	<i>Monumenta Germaniae historica: Scriptores</i> , eds. Georg Heinrich Pertz et al. (Hanover, 39 vols., 1826-2009).
<i>Patent Rolls</i>	<i>Rotuli litterarum patentum in Turri Londinensi asservati</i> , ed. Thomas Duffus Hardy, i (London, 1835).
<i>Patrologia latina</i>	<i>Patrologiae cursus completus: series latina</i> , ed. Jacques-Paul Migne (Paris, 221 vols., 1844-65).
<i>Pedro el Católico</i>	<i>Pedro el Católico, Rey de Aragón y Conde de Barcelona (1196-1213): Documentos, Testimonios y Memoria Histórica</i> , ed. Martín Alvira Cabrer (Saragossa, 6 vols., 2010).
<i>Philippid</i>	William the Breton, 'Philippidos', in <i>Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, historiens de Philippe-Auguste</i> , ed. Henri-François Delaborde, ii (Paris, 1885).
<i>Pipe Roll</i> [? ?]	<i>The Great Roll of the Pipe for the</i> [?] <i>Year of the Reign of King</i> [?] (London, 38 vols., 1884-1925; new series 58 vols., 1925-).

PRO	National Archives (Public Record Office), Kew
Puylaurens	William of Puylaurens, <i>Chronique: Chronica</i> , ed. and trans. Jean Duvernoy (Paris, 1976).
<i>RAPA</i>	<i>Recueil des actes de Philippe Auguste</i> , eds. Henri-François Delaborde et al. (Paris, 6 vols., 1916-2005).
<i>Register Innocenz'</i>	<i>Die Register Innocenz' III.</i> , eds. Othmar Hageneder, John C. Moore, and Andrea Sommerlechner (Graz and Vienna, 12 vols., 1964-).
<i>RHGF</i>	<i>Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France</i> , eds. Martin Bouquet and Léopold Delisle, revised edition (Paris, 24 vols., 1738-1904).
Villehardouin	Geoffrey of Villehardouin, <i>La conquête de Constantinople</i> , ed. and trans. Edmond Faral (Paris, 2 vols., 1938).



Map 1: *The World of Simon of Montfort*

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1169-1180: Simon V of Montfort born.

1185-1188: Simon IV of Montfort dies.

1184-1196: Simon V marries Alice of Montmorency.

1196

January: Simon renounces his claims to Pacy, Norman fief of his uncle Robert, 4th earl of Leicester, and stands surety for Robert's release from captivity by King Philip II of France.

August: Simon participates in the siege of Aumale.

May 1197-March 1198: Amalric V born.

April 1198-February 1199: Guy of Montfort born.

March 1199-February 1210: Amicia of Montfort born.

28 November 1199: Simon takes the cross at the tournament of Écry.

May 1201: At Sens, Simon, along with other crusading barons, unsuccessfully solicits Odo III of Burgundy to lead the crusade.

1202

a.May: Simon, along with other barons, judges in the king's favour in an inquest over the rights of the vidame of Châlons to the episcopal regalia.

Summer: Simon assembles with the rest of the crusading host in Venice.

October: Simon and the crusade sail from Venice.

12 November: As crusade lays siege to Zara, Simon and Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay denounce the Venetians and refuse to take part in the assault on the city.

April 1203: As the main host of the crusade resolves to sail for Constantinople, Simon leads his followers to Hungary, thence to Italy and Acre.

1204: Robert, 4th earl of Leicester, dies, and his sister, Amicia, Simon's mother, exchanges his Norman fief of Breteuil for the forest of Yveline with Philip II of France.

September: While most of the crusaders in Acre return home, Simon and Guy of Montfort remain.

1206: Simon returns to France from the Holy Land and confirms his mother's agreement with Philip.

August: Simon travels to England to receive the earldom of Leicester.

13 February 1207: John of England confiscates the earldom.

c.1208: Simon of Montfort born.

February: Simon judges a suit between Matthew of Montmorency and the abbey of Saint-Denis.

September: At Rochefort, at the urging of Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay and Odo of Burgundy, Simon takes the cross against the Albigensians.

1209-1217: Robert of Montfort born.

1209

March-June: Simon fortifies Épernon.

24 June: Simon musters with the other crusaders at Lyon.

22 July: The crusaders sack and burn Béziers.

1 August: The crusaders invest Carcassonne.

3 August: Simon leads an attack on the northern burg, capturing it.

4 August: During the failed attack on the southern suburb, Simon and one of his squires rescue a crusader left in the ditch with a broken leg.

15 August: Raymond-Roger Trencavel surrenders Carcassonne and is taken into captivity.

Late August: Simon is elected captain of the crusade army and succeeds Raymond-Roger as viscount. He then tours the Aude valley and southern Albigeois, before making a abortive march on Cabaret.

Autumn: Simon invades the county of Foix, capturing Mirepoix, Pamiers, and Saverdun. He then conquers the rest of the Albigeois and the Razès.

November-December: Simon meets Peter II of Aragon at Narbonne and rides with him to Montpellier, where he requests recognition as viscount, but is declined. A general uprising in the viscounties leads to the loss of most of his conquests. Simon and Raymond VI of Saint-Gilles betroth their children, Amicia and Raymond.

1210

Early March-April: Alice rejoins Simon at Pézenas, and Simon begins the reconquest of the viscounties, recovering the Aude valley.

May: Simon attacks Foix itself.

June-July: Simon besieges Minerve, burning one hundred and forty heretics after the fall of the town.

August-November: Simon besieges Termes, which falls after a false surrender and an outbreak of dysentery. He then mops up the remaining castles in the Razès.

December: Simon reconquers the viscounty of Albi.

1211

January: Simon meets with Peter at Narbonne, where he begs him once more, successfully, to receive his homage for the viscounties.

27 January: At Mézouls, the crusader and the king betroth their children, Amicia and James; James and Montpellier are placed in Simon's custody.

March: The crusaders march on Cabaret, which capitulates at a distance. Simon then redirects his offensive against Lavaur.

April-May: Petronilla of Montfort born and baptised by Dominic of Osma.

3 May: Lavaur falls. Three to four hundred heretics are burned, the chivalric garrison is hanged or put to the sword, and the lady of the town is thrown down a well and stoned.

May: Simon invades the county of Toulouse, capturing Les Cassés among other towns, where fifty to sixty heretics are burnt. Baldwin of Saint-Gilles joins the crusade.

June: Simon conquers the Tolosan Albigeois before marching on Toulouse.

16-29 June: The first siege of Toulouse. After raising the siege, Simon invades the county of Foix once more.

July-September: Simon receives the submission of Quercy.

September-November: Another general uprising forces Simon to fall back on Castelnaudary, where he is besieged by a coalition of southern counts. As a relief column is attacked by Raymond-Roger of Foix, Simon rides out to support his knights and routs his enemies. He then sets about reconquering the castles he has lost.

1212

January-March: Simon resumes his reconquest before the return of campaigning season, reducing the Tolosan Albigeois.

April-May: Simon recaptures Hautpoul and the Toulousain, before turning toward the Agenais.

June-July: Simon successfully besieges Penne-d'Agenais and receives the submission of Agen.

Early August: Simon takes Biron in the Périgord, hanging its traitorous mercenary lord.

14 August-8 September: Simon besieges Moissac, executing its mercenary garrison upon its capitulation.

September-October: Simon campaigns through the counties of Foix and Comminges.

Late November-1 December: Simon convenes a parliament at Pamiers and publishes his statutes for the government of his conquests.

1213

14-27 January: The Council of Lavaur rejects Peter of Aragon's proposal for the reconciliation of the southern counts under his protection. In defiance, Peter unilaterally creates a protectorate over their lands.

15-17 January: Innocent III reprimands Simon for exceeding his mandate in attacking the vassals of Peter of Aragon and suspends the indulgence for the crusade against heresy.

February: Simon and Peter fail to reach an agreement, and mutually repudiate each other.

March-May: The crusaders harass the vicinity of Toulouse.

21 May: Innocent reprimands Peter for having deceived him over affairs in the Midi.

24 June 1213: Amalric is knighted at Castelnaudary.

July-August: Simon invades Gascony, and the southerners attack Pujol, slaughtering its garrison.

10 September: Peter of Aragon with the southern counts lays siege to Muret. Simon rides from Fanjeaux to relieve the garrison.

12 September: Simon charges the allied army at Muret, killing Peter, routing the southern knights, and slaughtering the Tolosan militia.

November-January: Simon invades Provence, cowing the local nobility.

1214

February: Baldwin of Saint-Gilles is betrayed at Lohme and executed outside Montauban.

March-April: Narbonne welcomes an Arago-Catalan contingent, prompting Simon to attack the city until the intervention of the papal legate, Peter of Benevento. Simon recovers towns in the Agenais which had defected to John of England, before surrendering James I of Aragon to Peter at Capestang.

3 May: Bernard-Aton transfers the viscounties of Nîmes and Agde to Simon.

June: Amalric of Montfort marries Beatrice of Vienne at Carcassonne. Simon continues his campaign in the Agenais.

28 June-18 August: Simon besieges Casseneuil before destroying it.

July: The papal legate, Robert of Courson, awards Simon with his conquests in the Albigeois, Agenais, Rouergue, and Quercy.

August-September: Simon invades Périgord.

October-November: Simon oversees justice in Figeac on behalf of Philip of France before receiving the submission of Henry of Rodez. He then besieges Séverac.

1215

January: The Council of Montpellier elects Simon to succeed to the entire county of Toulouse and other crusader conquests, which Peter of Benevento recommends to Innocent.

30 January: Michael I of Arles enfeoffs Simon with Beaucaire.

2 April: Innocent entrusts Simon with the provisional care of the lands conquered by the crusade, pending a final decision by the upcoming œcumenical council.

April-June: Louis of France crusades in the Midi, confirming Simon's authority in the region. At his command, the walls of Toulouse and Narbonne are dismantled and hostages taken from both cities. Arnold-Amalric of Narbonne objects in vain to Simon's jurisdiction in his archiepiscopal see. Simon occupies Foix.

July: Simon visits the Rhône valley.

August-September: Simon visits the Toulousain and Agenais and even ventures into Gascony.

30 November: The Fourth Lateran Council awards Simon with the county of Toulouse.

14 December: Innocent confirms Simon as the count of Toulouse.

21 December: Innocent orders Foix to be returned to Raymond-Roger.

1216

30 January-4 February: In defiance of Arnold-Amalric, Simon marches on Narbonne to exercise his position as duke of the city and installs himself in the vicecomital palace.

8 March: Simon swears to be a good and faithful lord to the citizens of Toulouse.

April: Simon travels to France, where he pays homage to Philip of France for the county of Toulouse and duchy of Narbonne.

June: The young Raymond of Saint-Gilles enters Beaucaire and besieges the French garrison, drawing the crusaders into a siege.

5 June: Simon, returning from France, arrives to assume command of the countersiege of Beaucaire.

24 August: Simon negotiates an end to the siege, abandoning the town to Raymond but withdrawing his garrison.

September: Simon seizes hostages from Toulouse and imposes a heavy tallage on the city. Subsequent riots lead to a destructive fire before peace is reestablished by Fulk of Toulouse.

6 November: At Tarbes, Simon witnesses the wedding of his son Guy to Petronilla of Bigorre.

November-January: Raymond-Roger fortifies the hill of Montgrénier, leading to the collapse of the peace with Simon.

1217

February-March: Simon reduces Montgrénier.

May: Simon campaigns against rebel castles in the Corbières.

June-September: Simon makes a pilgrimage to Saint-Gilles, which resists him. He then attacks the rhodan towns opposing him, before invading Provence at the behest of the papal legate, Bertrand.

13 September: Raymond VI of Saint-Gilles enters Toulouse, inciting a general revolt against the crusaders.

1 October: Rushing back from Provence, Simon lays siege to Toulouse.

October-July: Second siege of Toulouse.

November: Simon erects a siege camp in Saint-Cyprien, before returning to the right bank of the Garonne.

December-January: Simon takes hostages from Montauban, whose citizens attempt to kill some of his knights.

1218

May: Simon steps up the construction and use of siege engines.

June: Simon once more occupies Saint-Cyprien.

25 June: While defending the siege cat from a sally by the Tolosans, Simon is killed by a stone thrown by a mangonel on the walls.

INTRODUCTION

In late November 1212, as winter crept down the Ariège from the pyrenean foothills into the Aganaguès and brought the campaigning season to an end, a parliament of bishops, barons, knights, and burghers met in the town of Pamiers. Over the course of several days, the assembly drafted a series of laws for the government of the lands bordered by the Pyrenees and the Garonne, Lot, and Hérault rivers. The congregation which drew up this legislation had been summoned by Simon V of Montfort,¹ 5th earl of Leicester, viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne, and—despite its diverse representation—reflected his particular priorities. Simon's Statutes of Pamiers, as they came to be known, provide a key to understanding the opportunities, ambitions, and means of baronial power during the second decade of the thirteenth century, especially as exercised through the crusade.

¹ Simon V of Montfort is often numbered Simon IV in modern historiography due to a long-standing conflation of the crusader's father and grandfather as the same man: Simon III. According to this interpretation, Simon III was married twice, taking Amicia of Leicester as his second wife: P. Belperron, *La croisade contre les Albigeois et l'union du Languedoc à la France* (Paris, 1942), p. 181; J. Girou, *Simon de Montfort: Du catharisme à la conquête* (Paris, 1953), pp. 64-5; J. Ventura Subirats, *Pere el Catòlic i Simó de Montfort* (Barcelona, 1960), p. 102; R.J. Kovarik, 'Simon de Montfort, his Life and Work: A Critical Study and Evaluation Based on the Sources', (Saint Louis University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1964), pp. 84-7; Y. Dossat, 'Simon de Montfort', *Cahiers de Fanjeaux* 4 (1969), p. 282; D. Paladilhe, *Simon de Montfort et le drame cathare* (Paris, 1988), pp. 21-4; M. Alvira Cabrer, *12 de septiembre de 1213: El jueves de Muret* (Barcelona, 2002), p. 603; L.W. Marvin, *The Occitan War: A Military and Political History of the Albigensian Crusade, 1209-1218* (Cambridge, 2008), p. 56. However, the independent identity of Simon IV as husband of Amicia and father of the crusader has been positively established in *Complete Peerage*, vii p. 716n. e.

Simon's rule was that of a foreigner and conqueror. Born in France in the 1170s,² his youth had been marked by a Cistercian education that probably included Latin and a degree of literacy. He was deeply attached to both monastic and lay piety, frequently attending divine offices, making auricular confession, and receiving communion.³ While he played a limited role in the Norman wars of King Philip II of France against King Richard I of England in the 1190s, his devotion led him to take the cross at the turn of the century with the Fourth Crusade. After deserting the main army at Zara in 1203 upon the leadership's decision to sail for Constantinople, he served King Aimeric of Jerusalem in Syria before returning home. Upon returning to France, he found himself heir to his childless uncle, Robert, 4th earl of Leicester. After a brief seisin, King John of England confiscated Simon's moiety of the honor, confining his holdings once

² The year of Simon's birth is unrecorded, but is usually imagined around 1160-1165: Belperron, *Croisade*, p. 183; Z. Oldenbourg, *16 mars 1244: Le bûcher de Montségur* (Paris, 1959), p. 133; Girou, *Simon de Montfort*, p. 66; Ventura Subirats, *Pere i Simó*, p. 105; Kovarik, 'Simon de Montfort', p. 85; Dossat, 'Simon de Montfort', p. 285; W.L. Wakefield, *Heresy, Crusade and Inquisition in Southern France, 1100-1250* (London, 1974), p. 103; J. Sumption, *The Albigensian Crusade* (London, 1978), p. 101; Paladilhe, *Simon de Montfort*, p. 23; C. Woehl, *Volo vincere cum meis vel occumbere cum eisdem: Studien zu Simon von Montfort und seinen nordfranzösischen Gefolgsleuten während des Albigenserkreuzzugs (1209 bis 1218)* (Frankfurt am Main, 2001), p. 96; Alvira Cabrer, *Jueves de Muret*, p. 603; Marvin, *Occitan War*, p. 55; M.G. Pegg, *A Most Holy War: The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom* (Oxford, 2008), p. 88. M. Roquebert, *Simon de Montfort: Bourreau et martyr* (Paris, 2005), pp. 42-3 suggests c.1175 instead, chiefly due to his belief that a man would not be capable of nine years of constant hard campaigning in the Albigensian Crusade from his late forties through fifties. This proof suffers when compared with the long careers of some of Simon's contemporaries, e.g. his stepfather, William II of Barres, or William the Marshal. However, in 1189 the same William of Barres still held the dowry from the first marriage of Simon's widowed mother, Amicia of Leicester, at Winterbourne Stoke (Simon IV is last noted as holding the estate in the account of Michaelmas 1185, and it presumably left his possession on account of his death). William had no right to this dowry, which would pass to Amicia's children by Simon, indicating that in 1189 Simon V was less than twenty-one years of age, still in his minority according to English law: *Pipe Rolls 31 Henry II*, p. 194; *1 Richard I*, p. 178; T.E. James, 'The Age of Majority', *American Journal of Legal History* 4 (1960), p. 26. By 1195-1196, he was able to issue his own acts, append his seal to those of others, stand legal surety for his uncle, and campaign in Normandy, proving that by then he had at least reached fifteen, the age of majority according to French custom: *Recueil de chartes et pièces relatifs au prieuré Notre-Dame des Moulineaux et à la châtelainie de Poigny*, ed. A. Moutié (Paris, 1846), p. 5; G.A. de la Roque, *Histoire généalogique de la maison de Harcourt*, iii (Paris, 1662), p. 126; *Cartulaire normand de Philippe-Auguste, Louis VIII, Saint Louis, et Philippe-le-Hardi*, ed. L. Delisle (Caen, 1852), pp. 278-9; *Philippid*, p. 132; R. Carron, *Enfant et parenté dans la France médiévale, X^e-XIII^e siècles* (Geneva, 1989), p. 107. Simon must therefore have been born sometime between 1169-1180 inclusive, validating Roquebert's guess.

³ *Hystoria*, i p. 293; M. Aurell, *Le chevalier lettré: Savoir et conduite de l'aristocratie aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles* (Paris, 2011), pp. 62-5, 102. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay's account of the divination at Rochefort in 1208 suggests Simon was illiterate, but the request for interpretation from Abbot Guy may simply be a requirement of literary convention: *Hystoria*, i p. 103. Simon's namesake son and grandsons were clearly literate: J.R. Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 94-6.

more to France. A few years later, however, Pope Innocent III's summoning of a crusade against the Albigensian heretics and their protectors in the county of Toulouse provided Simon with an opportunity not only to expand his possessions but also to enact his reforming conception of Christian duty.

It was this Albigensian Crusade which brought Simon and his parliament to Pamiers in November 1212. The crusade had been immediately redirected to the viscounties of Béziers and Carcassonne, which—after the fall of the two capitals in 1209—were awarded to Simon upon his election to replace the now deposed viscount, Raymond-Roger Trencavel. Armed with a papal mandate, a small cadre of loyal French followers, and regular but brief reinforcements of crusaders, Simon's lightning campaigns quickly brought the Trencavel lands under his control and compelled his recognition as viscount by their overlord, King Peter II of Aragon. But royal acceptance was given grudgingly, as Simon continued to wreak havoc in the transpyrenean lands linked to the Crown: he had already invaded the county of Foix and would soon expand the crusade—with the blessing of the papal legates and local episcopate—into the counties of Toulouse and Comminges. After defeating the combined armies of these counts in pitched battle at Castelnaudary in autumn 1211 and systematically reducing fortresses across the Midi, Simon brought most of their territory—save the town of Montauban and Toulouse itself—under his control by the end of 1212. The Statutes were therefore intended to organise his conquests, both for continued military efficiency and renewed orthodox reform.

Events would confirm the independent position he had carved for himself. The surprise victory over the combined might of the southern counts and Peter of Aragon—who had repudiated his French viscount in favour of the embattled native baronage—at Muret on 12

September 1213 left Simon nearly uncontested on the battlefield, and he received the county of Toulouse from the Fourth Lateran Council in December 1215 and from Philip of France in April 1216. But though they granted their authority to Simon's titles, the pope did not possess the ability nor the king the will to intervene effectively in the crusader's conquests, leaving him to rule practically as a prince from the Rhône to the Pyrenees and even beyond the Garonne and Dordogne. His principality did not prove lasting: revolts organised by the dispossessed count of Toulouse, Raymond VI of Saint-Gilles, and his namesake son would first chase Simon from his grip on the Rhône at Beaucaire and finally lead to his death on 25 June 1218 before Toulouse itself, felled by a stone cast from a mangonel on the walls. His eldest son, Amalric V, was unable to hold together the father's conquests, and by 1224 had little choice but to make over to King Louis VIII of France his by now largely theoretical rights in the Midi. The Statutes of Pamiers would eventually be limited to the lands of Simon's French followers who had managed to secure their southern holdings under the royal regime, before their own descendants increasingly sought to exchange the crusader customs for local written law in the fourteenth century.⁴ But the failure of Simon's government to survive is less interesting than the achievements of his lifetime. In an age frequently characterised among modern historians by the bureaucratising, monopolising, and nationalising influences of the monarchies of France, England, and Aragon, Simon of Montfort, a baron of prestigious pedigree but limited real possessions, had risen to create his own principedom in the Midi through the pursuit of the material and spiritual aims of the crusade.

⁴ *HGL*, viii c. 789; P. Timbal, *Un conflit d'annexion au Moyen Age: L'Application de la coutume de Paris au pays d'Albigeois* (Toulouse, 1949).

Such an accomplishment presupposes an intentional cultivation of independent power in the face of royal and ecclesiastical institutions that more and more widely asserted their dominance. However, a study of the practical aspects of Simon's authority has never been attempted. Indeed, Laurence W. Marvin's observation in 2008 that—despite the wealth of books written about the Albigensian Crusade—‘Simon...has been ill served by the quality and quantity of biographical works devoted to him’ remains substantially unchallenged.⁵ Most recently, Michel Roquebert has written an effective popular biography in French, but dwells upon the perceived tension in Simon's dual reputation for violence and sanctity without pressing far beyond the narrative. His attempt to demonstrate the compatibility of the warrior, even the butcher, with the martyr is, however, a great improvement over most previous literature on the subject.⁶ From the Pétainist lionisation by Pierre Belperron to the regionalist condemnation by Jean Girou, Simon of Montfort attracts moral posturing even eight hundred years later, especially in France.⁷ The only scholarly publication dedicated to Simon's life is a 1969 article by Yves Dossat, but this is too brief to give much more than a synopsis. Christine Woehl's German prosopographical treatment in 2001—while admirably aware of the problems of moralising historiography—is likewise only a summary amidst her wider catalogue of Simon's companions.⁸ Anglophone studies are almost nonexistent, and what has been written adds nothing to the French contribution. An unpublished American thesis of 1964 provides an inadequate account of the crusader's career restricted to printed sources before finally

⁵ Marvin, *Occitan War*, p. 54.

⁶ Roquebert, *Simon de Montfort*.

⁷ Belperron, *Croisade; Paladilhe, Simon de Montfort*; Oldenbourg, *Bücher de Montségur*, pp. 133-205; Ventura Subirats, *Pere i Simó*; Girou, *Simon de Montfort*.

⁸ Dossat, ‘Simon de Montfort’, pp. 281-302; Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, pp. 96-108.

succumbing to the same admiration found in the works of Belperron and Dominique Paladilhe. At the other pole, Simon Sebag Montefiore has included Simon of Montfort among the ‘monsters’ of a particularly sensational collection.⁹ In addition to not being especially adventurous in their theses, none of these works—the surveys of Dossat and Woehl excepted—rises above a moral judgement of Simon’s character and its place in historical progress.

In this, they are not far removed from the histories of Simon’s contemporaries. As a result of his geographically diverse and meteoric achievements, Simon appears in the peripheries of a wide array of important narratives around the turn of the thirteenth century. As expected of medieval historical writing, all of these place Simon within a moralistic framework of one sort or another. The royal biographer William the Breton notes his service in the Norman wars—including at least one battle at which he could not have been present—and imagines his victory at Muret as a testament to the hegemony of Capetian power. John of Earley, source for the verse biography of William the Marshal, similarly invents Simon’s impossible participation in a tournament at Lagny in order to incorporate his heroism into his theme.¹⁰ Other more intimate and accurate sources still cast Simon as an exemplar or miscreant. Robert of Clari and the author of the *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, Simon’s fellow crusaders in 1202, may have recorded his departure from Zara briefly and dispassionately as members of the lesser chivalry and clergy on the Fourth Crusade, but others were more heavily invested in his actions. The *Chronique d’Ernoul* and *Estoire d’Eracles* reflect Frankish gratitude for his devotion to Syria in contrast

⁹ Kovarik, ‘Simon de Montfort’; S. Sebag Montefiore, *Monsters: History’s Most Evil Men and Women*, rev. ed. (London, 2009), pp. 77-80.

¹⁰ *Philippid*, pp. 132, 187, 231-43; *L’Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal*, ed. P. Meyer, i (Paris, 1891), p. 163. Simon could have been at most eleven for the tournament at Lagny in 1180, while both he and his brother, Guy, were in Syria during the French siege of Château-Gaillard: *Ernoul*, p. 360; *Eracles*, p. 263; above, p. 14n. 2.

with those who went to Constantinople or quickly returned to France in 1203, while Geoffrey of Villehardouin clearly displays his irritation with Simon and his party ‘qui voloit l’ost depecier’.¹¹ Even as a supporting character, Simon inhabited a clear position of hero or villain.

These characterisations were amplified as he became a leading man in the drama of the Albigensian Crusade. Like William the Breton, those beyond the Midi tended to view Simon’s actions in national terms: official Arago-Catalan chroniclers saw in the victor of Muret a greedy interloper who threatened their hubristic king’s interests north of the Pyrenees, while English historians like Roger of Wendover and the Waverley annalist portray him as a righteous foil to the failings of their own tyrant.¹² Much like their modern counterparts, these historians found in Simon a cipher for their own concerns and priorities and described him accordingly.

However, those who dedicated entire works to recording the struggle against heresy in the Midi provide the most valuable—though still value-laden—assessments of Simon’s career. William of Tudela, a Navarrese clerk and troubadour living in Montauban when the crusaders arrived, probably began composing his Provençal *Canso de la cruzada* in 1211, when he left the city and entered the employ of Baldwin of Saint-Gilles—brother of Raymond VI and from that time an important lieutenant of Simon. As an occasional eyewitness and intimate of other eyewitnesses, William provides a generally accurate account of the first years of the crusade, though at times the demands of his poetic genre result in compression or confusion of the

¹¹ ‘who wished to disperse the host’. Clari, p. 14; *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, p. 133; *Ernoul*, pp. 351, 360; *Eracles*, pp. 255, 263; Villehardouin, i pp. 82, 110-2.

¹² *Gesta comitum Barcinonensium*, eds. L. Barrau Dihigo and J. Massó Torrents (Barcelona, 1925), pp. 18, 53, 140-1; *Crónica de San Juan de la Peña*, ed. A. Ubieto Arteta (Valencia, 1961), pp. 139-42; Roger of Wendover, *Flores historiarum*, ed. H.G. Hewlett, ii (London, 1887), p. 90; ‘Annales de Waverleia’, in *Annales monastici*, ed. H.R. Luard, ii (London, 1865), pp. 266, 278-80.

narrative.¹³ William likely knew Simon through Baldwin's household and the poet portrays the crusader captain sympathetically. Though he pities his fellow southerners on whom judgement falls, William believes Simon to be a righteous harbinger of divine justice to the Midi.¹⁴

Similarly, William of Puylaurens a generation later depicts Simon and his campaigns as God's chastisement of a land that had fallen away from Him. A native of Toulouse, William was born around the turn of the century and completed the first recension of his Latin *Chronica* by 1249. He had witnessed the events of Simon's crusade from the capital in his youth, but his sympathies at the time of his writing—by then a lay notary in the entourage of the bishop of Toulouse and sometime inquisitorial scribe—were clearly with the crusaders. As an intimate of Bishop Fulk, he had a link with Simon's camp, though he almost certainly entered episcopal service after the crusader's death. Even so, his imagining of Simon is complicated in order to drive his moral point. The passage of time and development of events since 1218 gave William the benefit of hindsight, and his analysis of Simon and his downfall allow him to frame his story as one of personal righteousness compromised by the indiscipline and greed of his followers.¹⁵

Nevertheless, both of these southerners found in Simon a character through whom Providence had brought low the wicked practices that had plagued their country at the turn of the century.

This opinion was far from universal, and a unique glimpse of the sentiments in the opposite camp is found in the continuation of the *Canso*. William's song cuts off in the midst of the events leading to the Muret campaign of 1213, perhaps as a result of the execution of his

¹³ *Canso*, i pp. vii-ix, xiii-xiv, 4, 174.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 86, 112, 166.

¹⁵ Puylaurens, pp. 8, 94-6; Y. Dossat, 'La croisade vue par les chroniqueurs', *Cahiers de Fanjeaux* 4 (1969), pp. 234-8, 241.

patron by southern partisans the following year.¹⁶ The unknown poet who resumes the narrative was probably a Tolosan citizen and a dedicated opponent of the crusade. Likely writing around 1228, the anonymous continuator had nevertheless participated in a number of the events he describes, most importantly the Fourth Lateran Council and the sieges of Beaucaire and Toulouse. However, despite the accuracy and insight given to many events, his testimony concerning intimate details of the words and actions of his principal characters are often obviously fictitious. This is especially true of Simon—whom he is unlikely to have ever met—playing the colourful role of the story’s tyrant. Apparently orthodox himself, the troubadour resented the interruption of his native culture by the crusaders and therefore despised Simon and his followers.¹⁷ For the continuator—and, presumably, the southern nobles who patronised him—Simon was a personal archenemy as well as the uncivilised persecutor, not only of heresy, but of their institutions and way of life.

At the other end of the spectrum lies a work written by one of Simon’s intimates, a young Cistercian monk. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay’s *Hystoria albigensis* provides the nearest semblance of a complete life of Simon: later copies and translations of Peter’s work bore the title *Gesta nobilis viri domini Simonis, comitis de Monte Forti*, and it is appropriately hagiographical. Nephew of Abbot Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay—Simon’s close friend and former tutor—and probably in his early twenties during the crusade, Peter was deeply enamoured of this heroic crusader so sympathetic to the ideals of his order.¹⁸ He was familiar with the Montfort family,

¹⁶ *Canso*, i p. 290; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 186-93; Puylaurens, pp. 86-8.

¹⁷ *Canso*, ii pp. x-xiv, xx-xxi. Martin-Chabot overestimates the poet’s potential access to the content of the crusader councils of 1216-1218: *ibid.*, pp. xxi-xxii.

¹⁸ *Hystoria*, i p. 293, iii pp. xlvi-xlvii, xlix-li, lii, lxvi, lxxi-lxxii, lxxx, lxxxiii-lxxxiv, cvi; *idem*, *The History of the Albigensian Crusade*, trans. W.A. and M.D. Sibly (Woodbridge, Suff., 1998), p. xxiv.

and had accompanied Simon and his uncle to Zara in 1202. Most importantly, he was extremely well-informed about Simon's actions in the Midi. Much of what he records he had seen firsthand in trips to the south in 1212, 1214, 1216, and probably afterwards; other reports of the crusader's movements and behaviour were obtained from eyewitnesses. The intimacy of his history provides a uniquely detailed account of the concerns and deeds of a crusading baron in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. An honest—if naïve—source, Peter still serves primarily as an apologist for the crusade.¹⁹ As such, he aims to enumerate Simon's virtuous deeds and justify or mask his questionable actions, forming a model for the reader that mirrors his own infatuation.

But all this preoccupation with moral conclusions in both modern and medieval historiography hinders a deeper exploration of how and why Simon pursued his objectives within a context where other powerful figures pursued similar but often contradictory ends of their own. Of course, authorial intent ought not prevent the historian from discerning deeper implications in relevant texts. Furthermore, Simon's appearances in narratives are supplemented by a substantial survival of documentary evidence, further contributing to the unique depth of information available for his particular career. First catalogued by Auguste Molinier in 1874, a second collection was published by André Rhein in 1910.²⁰ Their work was analysed and augmented by Marc-Antoine Dor in 1992 in a valuable but unpublished dissertation concerning the Montforts in France and Normandy, while Woehl's prosopography of Simon's French followers on the

¹⁹ Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, *Albigensian Crusade*, pp. xxiv-xxv, xxviii-xxix; Dossat, 'Chroniqueurs', p. 224.

²⁰ A. Molinier, *Catalogue des actes de Simon et d'Amauri de Montfort* (Paris, 1874), pp. 54-98; A. Rhein, 'La seigneurie de Montfort en Iveline', *Mémoires de Rambouillet* 21 (1910), pp. 139-94.

Albigensian Crusade amasses an impressive amount of archival evidence.²¹ Correspondence, especially papal, also provides an immediate access to the purposes of the protagonists, and the publication of Innocent's registers—both in the *Patrologia latina* and the edition currently in progress under the direction of Othmar Hageneder—is indispensable to a study of Simon's career.²² However, many documents remain unprinted, especially concerning Simon's acts in the Midi and the correspondence of Pope Honorius III; those that are known have been appended to this volume.²³ It is not that such evidence—mediated as it is through third-party scribes and often drafted after the events it records—represents a pure insight into the intentions of the interested parties, but rather that the particular and general images formed by documents provide many independent testimonies to the workings of the lordship and government of Simon and others.

And others there were, who played an important role in the story of Simon's ascendancy. His lifetime is one traditionally noted by historians for an astonishing growth of centralised royal government and bureaucratic institutions. France, England, and Aragon all developed systems of accounts during the latter half of the twelfth century and worked to achieve political sovereignty and the exclusive exercise of violent power within their realms.²⁴ However, Simon's career challenges a too ready acceptance of their success. Without the backing of any monarchical

²¹ M.-A. Dor, 'Seigneurs en Île-de-France Occidentale et en Haute-Normandie: Contribution à l'histoire des seigneurs de Montfort-l'Amaury, des comtes d'Evreux, et de leur entourage au XII^e siècle et au début du XIII^e siècle', (École des chartes, Diplôme d'archiviste-paléographe dissertation, 1992), pp. 380-476; Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, pp. 123-77.

²² *Patrologia latina*, ccxiv-ccxvii; *Register Innocenz*, i-xii.

²³ Appendix A.

²⁴ J.W. Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal Power in the Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1986); J.E.A. Jolliffe, *Angevin Kingship*, 2nd edn (London, 1963); *Fiscal Accounts of Catalonia under the Early Count-Kings (1151-1213)*, ed. T.N. Bisson, i (Berkeley, 1984), pp. 78-158.

state, the crusader was able to invade and establish personal control over vast territories to which he had no dynastic ties nor even—in the case of the county of Toulouse before 1214—any formal claim. Some monarchies may have become more self-confident over the course of the latter twelfth century, but autonomous barons pursuing their own ends remained an ongoing concern—at least between the Seine and the Pyrenees—through the first quarter of the thirteenth.

Evidently, the concept of lordship still carried more weight than official hierarchy and at least as much as government: the French and the Aragonese kings, if not the English, remained first and foremost lords—albeit the most organised and powerful—in the eyes of their barons. As a result, though Simon might be subject to their lordship, he retained his own potential and actual status as a lord, capable of attracting his own affective following independent of royal purpose.²⁵ The concepts of ‘intensive’ and ‘extensive’ power articulated by Michael Mann offer a useful means of imagining the interaction of these overlapping and competitive lordships.²⁶ While kings could compel intensive participation from Simon the lord, earl, or viscount while personally present or when he was resident in areas susceptible to the operations of their officers, their power over Simon the crusader was at most extensive. Under the cross, Simon passed to the intensive control of the papacy, but Rome was distant and papal legates easily coopted. Furthermore, the tangled web of medieval hierarchy meant that, though theoretical deference was owed up the chain, to whom that deference was given could often be elective. If Simon found himself in conflict with one king, it was always possible to retreat rhetorically under the authority of another. The constraints of geography and resources and the inclusive nature of multiple

²⁵ T.N. Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of European Government* (Princeton, 2009), pp. 6-12, 377-9, 412-5.

²⁶ M. Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, i (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 7-8.

authorities meant that practical enforcement of royal or papal lordship was often a tenuous venture.

A related point is the extent to which Simon contributed to the creation of modern France. Belperron certainly saw in Simon the author of French incorporation of Languedoc, and his judgement was even confirmed by Dossat. This is entirely teleological: very telling is the standard use in French of the verb *réunir* to describe the annexation of provinces to the Capetian demesne.²⁷ But many regionalists on both sides of the Pyrenees similarly hold Simon responsible for the consequent destruction of a mythical culture of which the anonymous *Canso* continuator accused him.²⁸ However, the unified southern culture they imagine never existed before the crusade, when the Midi was a collection of shifting and centrifugal fiefs: it was perhaps born in some fleeting sense out of opposition to the French invasion, but much more out of the Félibrige and the vinters' revolts of 1907. Of course, this is not to argue that France and the Midi did not belong to distinct cultural communities—however heterogenous within themselves—in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: clearly both the French and the southerners saw each other as foreigners.²⁹ But both nationalists and regionalists understand Simon's career with modern developments very much in mind. While the experience of the conquest was surely traumatic for those who lived through it, its lasting impact at a cultural level was minimal. Taxes

²⁷ Belperron, *Croisade*, p. 339; Dossat, 'Simon de Montfort', pp. 300-1; E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (London, 1977), p. 95.

²⁸ *Canso*, iii p. 228; Girou, *Simon de Montfort*, pp. 205-6; Oldenbourg, *Bûcher de Montségur*, p. 169; Ventura Subirats, *Pere i Simó*, pp. 305-7.

²⁹ A.V. Roche, *Provençal Regionalism: A Study of the Movement in the Revue félibréenne, Le feu, and other Reviews of Southern France* (Evanston, Ill., 1954), pp. xiii, 49-58, 120; L.M. Paterson, *The World of the Troubadours: Medieval Occitan Society, c.1100-c.1300* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 3-4, 87-8. For this reason—*pace* *ibid.*, p. 3—this thesis prefers the organic terms 'Midi' and 'Provençal,' however deficient and imprecise, to the modern inventions 'Occitania' and 'Occitan,' which suggest a uniform and anachronistic political and linguistic community; likewise, 'France' refers to the modern Île-de-France and occasionally to a wider northern cultural sphere marked by linguistic commonality.

and levies were now owed to Paris, but local custom remained in force and even reclaimed territories subjected to the Statutes of Pamiers by the Treaty of Meaux. It was not until the late nineteenth century that the majority of the population of Languedoc identified as French, and Provençal dialects remained the language of the region until the Third Republic and even the Great War. While the king of France might have become count of Toulouse just over fifty years after Simon's death, it would await the Directorate and the Empire to begin the absorption of Languedoc into France herself.³⁰

If Simon was not an architect of the French hexagon, the construction of his principality in the Midi must have been a more personal affair. The pattern that emerges from Simon's career is a cultivation of lordship in both its territorial and personal senses, the traditional aim of the rising noble classes over the previous centuries.³¹ In addition to the titular landed patrimonies that he inherited, Simon invested significant moral and material capital in attracting affective devotion from his fellow knights and from religious and episcopal prelates in order to establish himself as a man of authority. Given the competition of royal lordship in northern Europe, he could most effectively develop this independent authority on crusade, away from the centres of crowned power. His second crusade added enormous lands and grand titles to his lordship, thus necessitating the transformation of a household and following into an institutionalised expression of government.

Government, even in the provisional form of a chronically militarised regime, became the preoccupation of Simon's later life. The ideological drive of the Albigensian Crusade was

³⁰ J. Given, *State and Society in Medieval Europe: Gwynedd and Languedoc under Outside Rule* (Ithaca, NY, 1990), pp. 244-51; Timbal, *Conflit d'annexion*, pp. 28-31, 99-104, 108-12; Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, pp. 67-114, 487;.

³¹ Bisson, *Twelfth Century*, pp. 74-8.

predicated on the restoration of proper Christian order. Simon therefore set about to realise the reformed vision in the Midi through the enactment of legislation, creation of administrative offices, and introduction of measures for accountability, however rudimentary. Clearly the replacement of petitionary lordship by institutional government was not the exclusive preserve of kings and the greatest magnates.³² This political architecture suggests an important revision to Thomas N. Bisson's model of 'crisis.' The emergence of government was not impossible in the face of unaccountable sub-royal lords who multiplied violence through their exercise of power: in fact, Simon's administration suggests that the two easily went hand in hand.

However, the crusader regime was more than an attempt to create a temporal order: it encompassed a dream of aligning political aims with the transcendent priorities of the divine. This included a wide range of concerns, but its primary anxieties naturally embraced the repression of heresy. The nature of medieval dualism is a hotly debated historiographical topic, and the recent conversation about the 'invention of heresy' has called into question many traditional assumptions about its form and following in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. A revisionist circle—led in the Anglophone world by R.I. Moore and Mark Gregory Pegg—began with a model of dissidence framed by authority but has since moved to increasingly radical claims that medieval 'heresy' did not exist. Instead, they argue, confessional deviation was an ideological construct built by a rising clerical class; heresy was nothing more than folk Christianity, reluctant to embrace certain reform ideas and in turn misunderstood by reformers

³² Ibid., pp. 295-7.

who viewed it as a survival of Manichæism.³³ This challenge to the orthodox medieval conception of ‘Catharism’ as a unified perversion of the Roman Catholic Church and its hierarchy has provided a much needed corrective. However, though the deconstructionists imagine themselves as torchbearers for textual criticism, their approach has in fact largely obliterated the texts rather than truly analysing them critically, as L.J. Sackville has done.³⁴ In fact, *a priori* dismissal of any accuracy in the descriptions of heresy by orthodox commentators has led Moore and Pegg to ignore significant and independent evidence for the existence of both mitigated and absolute dualism, including the heretics’ own writings.³⁵ Peter Biller has reasserted the presence of dualist beliefs in heretical communities in the Midi and the agency of heretics in expressing them.³⁶ Bernard Hamilton had already convincingly argued for the authenticity of the so-called ‘Charte de Niquinta’ which records the establishment of a heretical hierarchy in the region by Bosnian missionaries in the late twelfth century, while Caterina Bruschi has defended the reliability of inquisitorial testimony concerning traffic between heretical communities in the Midi and Lombardy.³⁷ Though one can no longer assume a pan-

³³ R.I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950-1250*, 2nd edn (Oxford, 2007); idem, *The War on Heresy: Faith and Power in Medieval Europe* (London, 2012); M.G. Pegg, *The Corruption of Angels: The Great Inquisition of 1245-1246* (Princeton, 2001); idem, *Most Holy War*. For similar historiographical trends in French, see M. Zerner, ed., *Inventer l'hérésie?: Discours polémiques et pouvoirs avant l'Inquisition* (Nice, 1998).

³⁴ L.J. Sackville, *Heresy and Heretics in the Thirteenth Century: The Textual Representations* (Woodbridge, Suff., 2011).

³⁵ B. Hamilton, ‘Wisdom from the East: The Reception by the Cathars of Eastern Dualist Texts’, in P. Biller and A. Hudson, eds., *Heresy and Literacy, 1000-1530* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 48-58.

³⁶ P. Biller, ‘Cathars and the Material World’, in P. Clarke and T. Claydon, eds., *God’s Bounty?: The Churches and the Natural World* (Woodbridge, Suff., 2010), pp. 89-110; idem, ‘Review of *The War on Heresy: Faith and Power in Medieval Europe*’, *Reviews in History* 1546, <http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1546>.

³⁷ B. Hamilton, ‘The Cathar Council of Saint-Félix Reconsidered’, *Archivum fratrum Praedicatorum* 48 (1978), pp. 23-53; C. Bruschi, *The Wandering Heretics of Languedoc* (Cambridge, 2009).

European ‘Cathar church,’ it remains difficult to escape the conclusion that a large number of southern communities which interacted with each other truly held dualist beliefs.³⁸

To Simon and many of his contemporaries, those beliefs were not only repugnant but sufficiently offensive to inspire campaigns of intense violence against their adherents; concern for the establishment of orthodox order widened the circle of targets to include the protectors of heretics as well. Unsurprisingly, this has led to modern evaluations of Simon as a sectarian fanatic imbued by the uniquely destructive power of religion: ‘le saint et le bourreau...les deux à la fois’ or, more frankly, a ‘self-righteous, sanctimonious prig’.³⁹ But this is to say little more than that the Europe of the thirteenth century was markedly different from that of the twenty-first. William T. Cavanaugh has convincingly demonstrated that ‘religious’ violence as a species qualitatively different from violence motivated by political or other considerations has little ontological pedigree, especially before the Peace of Westphalia.⁴⁰ The temporal and spiritual spheres, while distinct in many respects, were hopelessly intertwined in the medieval mind; to see the crusader as one driven to war by irrational impulses rather than practical aims is to impose a contrast that he would have found incomprehensible. Simon of Montfort may have

³⁸ For the purposes of this thesis, the dualist communities in the Midi are referred to as ‘Albigensian.’ While the label is accusative rather than nominative and inevitably glosses over the subtextual differences in belief and practice among dualist heretics living between the Pyrenees and the Rhône, it has the merit of contemporary usage and is clearer than the vague and confusing—though often confessional—‘good men/women’ or the abstract and largely anachronistic ‘Cathar’: D. Power, ‘Who Went on the Albigensian Crusade?’, *EHR* 128 (2013), pp. 1070-4; *pace* M.G. Pegg, ‘Albigenses in the Antipodes: An Australian and the Cathars’, *Journal of Religious History* 35 (2011), pp. 583-4. ‘Perfect’ is used to refer to the fullest members of the sect when the term ‘heretic’ alone would be unclear, though it is necessary to remember with Sackville, *Heresy and Heretics*, pp. 201-2 that the title *perfectus* was rarely employed even among contemporary Catholic writers, save Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay.

³⁹ Roquebert, *Simon de Montfort*, pp. 19-20; C. Tyerman, *God’s War: A New History of the Crusades* (London, 2006), p. 593. Cf. Girou, *Simon de Montfort*, pp. 66, 201; Oldenbourg, *Bûcher de Montségur*, pp. 139-40; Ventura Subirats, *Pere i Simó*, pp. 295-6; Pegg, *Most Holy War*, p. 161.

⁴⁰ W.T. Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence* (Oxford, 2009).

been another zealot, but to finish an historical assessment there adds little to one's understanding of him or his contemporaries.

Furthermore, regardless of the official justification for the Albigensian Crusade, the ordinary exercise of power by Simon and his regime—though unremarked upon by the sources—was surely the collection of rents, tolls, and other dues from his subjects. Violence was also a frequent exhibition of power, directed against Christians at least as often as heretics. Some historians have therefore depicted Simon as a freebooter to match his extremism. Echoing William of Puylaurens, they imply a devolution of the Albigensian Crusade under his leadership from lofty spiritual aims to base material gain, but this analysis collapses in the face of evidence of Simon's deep concern for spiritual affairs.⁴¹ This is not to say that Simon had no desire for temporal advantage: even deeply pious people are tempted by worldly riches, and Simon clearly laboured to create an hereditary principality to transmit his accomplishments to his family. But it is improbable that Simon could clearly distinguish between his divine mandate and the recompense brought by its execution, especially in a conflict whose very aim was the confiscation of property from the unworthy and its redistribution to faithful Catholics. Finally, to dismiss Simon as an ecclesiastically licensed pirate is to ignore as much about him as does the judgement of zealotry.

Instead, by approaching Simon on his own terms, examining his context and actions in detail, one can hope to discover the historical imprint of a man, rather than a caricature. Simon inhabited a wide variety of geographical and political circumstances; he therefore offers an insight into how one man might interact with environments from Leicester to Acre, a forest


⁴¹ Puylaurens, p. 98; Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, p. 108; Marvin, *Occitan War*, pp. 305, 309; below, p. 139-40.

lordship to a great comital capital. However, he was also a member of a particular class with whom he shared aspirations and anxieties, and his extraordinary experience of lordship given and received may illuminate wider French baronial priorities and prejudices. Certainly he was not alone among Gallic lords to find political advancement abroad. During Simon's lifetime, marriage brought the crowns of Cyprus and Constantinople to the Lusignans and Courtenays respectively, while John of Brienne personally ruled the kingdom of Jerusalem as royal consort. The division of Romania amongst the errant crusaders after 1204 likewise transformed many French barons into foreign princes.⁴² This commonality must, however, be balanced by a recognition of Simon as an individual, formed by his own surroundings and concerns. Simon's understanding of himself, his class, and his salvation manifested in the exercise of both the authority to which he was born as a nobleman and that which he acquired through the crusade. That authority and the power he hoped to draw from it simultaneously promised and relied upon autonomous action, driving Simon from the French barony of his birthright to the southern principedom of his devotion and ambition.

But even as a prince, Simon was far from sovereign. Therefore, a study of his autonomy must begin with an examination of his role as subject throughout his career. His participation in the lordship cultivated by kings and popes sheds light on both the limitations to Simon's independence and his ability to profit from competing hierarchies. The parameters of action mean little, however, without an object for its exercise. Simon's use of the crusade to exploit or transcend his temporal obligations necessarily exists in a wider context of aspiration, informed


⁴² L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'Île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, i (Paris, 1861), pp. 37-8, 42-8, 120-1; R.L. Wolff, 'The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204-1261', in K.M. Setton, ed., *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd edn, ii (Madison, Wisc., 1969), pp. 192, 212-4; G. Perry, *John of Brienne: King of Jerusalem, Emperor of Constantinople, c. 1175-1237* (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 44-50; J. Longnon, 'The Frankish States in Greece, 1204-1311', in Setton, ed., *History of the Crusades*, pp. 237-8.

both by his general environment among the French aristocracy at the turn of the thirteenth century and his particular interest in the movement for Christian reform represented by the order of Cîteaux and certain theologians of the Paris schools. Only after preparing these contextual grounds can the historian begin constructing the analytical edifice that will illuminate the workings of Simon's administration. Given the geographical and political variety of his lordships, each is best treated separately—though the brevity of his tenure in England places its exploration alongside that of his French patrimony—in order to most clearly reveal the distinct ways in which Simon exercised his autonomy depending on its context. After thus reconstructing the crusader's career, a more interesting character emerges than the hero, the villain, or even the bloody saint. Instead, a contextual focus on the baron in search of independent power with which to shape his world may suggest interesting alternative readings of the period as a whole.



Map 2: France

Map 3: England



Map 4: *The Midi*

I. SUBJECT AND VASSAL

Simon's subjection to kings and popes was a necessary aspect of medieval social theory, whatever the realities of practical power. As a mid-grade baron of 'not quite first-rank'—to use the phrase applied by Guy Perry to the contemporary John of Brienne—Simon could hardly have avoided participating, extensively or intensively, in the lordship of others.¹ How heavily such lordship weighed upon Simon, however, varied according to proximity and investment, and he was often able to escape unwanted intensive commitments through the crusade. This, however, exchanged the domination of a king for the oversight of a pope, who no less than his temporal counterparts attempted to impose his will on the crusader. But Simon's relationship with overlords was not only antagonistic. A distant king or pope could be a refuge, if only rhetorically, granting the crusader the political legitimacy he lacked in the territorial lordship of another while extending the appellate influence of the Crown or Keys at little cost to itself. Furthermore, while bureaucracy was undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the hands of monarchs, its potency can be overstated: on several occasions Simon dictated terms to his superiors, and not only on the battlefield. Even within the recognised hierarchy, Simon possessed substantial latitude for independent action.

¹ Perry, *John of Brienne*, p. 4.

Family history

Simon's ancestors had traditionally enjoyed such autonomy with much less constraint. Though in origin simply castellans and foresters in Yveline, a French royal forest roughly thirty miles west of Paris, his forebears had proved no exception to the temptations of the feudal revolution, converting their offices into territorial patrimonies and warring with their petty neighbours.² Higher station was achieved through a dynastic union with the Norman comital house of Évreux, which brought the county to Amalric III of Montfort in 1119. Straddling the Franco-Norman frontier, the family was frequently in a position of practical parity with the Capets. Amalric jointly founded the town of Montchauvet with King Louis VI, and both men reserved the right to make private war against each other, in which case the neutrality of the townsmen would be guaranteed. Amalric and Louis did go to war in 1128, but Louis VII would still seek the confirmation of Amalric's son, Simon III, for a royal grant in the town in 1164.³ Though Capetian supremacy may have been acknowledged in theory, the Montforts as counts of Évreux could afford to govern themselves.

Their Franco-Norman status meant that they also figured into the contest between king and duke. Both before and after inheriting the county of Évreux, Amalric had successively opposed King Henry I of England and Louis VI, sometimes aligning with the other rival in

² *Les registres de Philippe Auguste*, ed. J.W. Baldwin, i (Paris, 1992), p. 51; *RHGF*, xi p. 275; Bisson, *Twelfth Century*, p. 162.

³ Orderic Vital, *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, ed. and trans. M. Chibnall, vi (Oxford, 1978), pp. 188, 276-8; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 301; D. Power, *The Norman Frontier in the Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries* (Cambridge, 2004), p. 87; Suger of Saint-Denis, 'Vie de Louis le Gros', in *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. A. Lecoy de la Marche (Paris, 1867), pp. 133; *RHGF*, xii p. 77; A. Luchaire, *Études sur les actes de Louis VII* (Paris, 1885), p. 422.

pursuit of his own dynastic interests.⁴ Simon, however, more consistently sided with King Henry II of England.⁵ But with ducal power often distant in England and Anjou and royal power weakened by Angevin ascendancy, the Montfort counts were able to act as independent power-brokers, courting advantage and wreaking havoc on either side of the Eure.

This came to an end in 1181 with the death of Simon, who divided his lands between his sons, Count Amalric III of Évreux and Simon IV of Montfort. For all the independence provided by life on the frontier, it had also exposed the Montforts to frequent confiscations by either duke or king, feeding a perpetual cycle of conflict and oscillating loyalty.⁶ Simon III's sustained attachment to the Plantagenets may have led him to jettison his French lands to the cadet line of the family, freeing his eldest son to spread his wings in the Anglo-Norman sphere. He could not have known that the French conquest of Normandy would bring the county of Évreux to an abrupt end, nor that the extinction of Amalric's patrilineal line within another generation would confine the Montfort patrimonial destiny exclusively to France.

⁴ Orderic Vital, *Ecclesiastical History*, v (1975), p. 218, vi pp. 188, 196-8, 330-2, 344; Suger of Saint-Denis, 'Louis le Gros', pp. 121, 125, 133-4; *RHGF*, xii p. 77.

⁵ *Cartulaire de Notre-Dame de Chartres*, eds. E. de Lépinos and L. Merlet, i (Chartres, 1862), p. 187; Robert of Torigny, 'Chronica', in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, ed. R. Howlett, iv (London, 1889), pp. 206, 247, 257; Roger of Howden, alias Benedict of Peterborough, *Gesta regis Henrici Secundi*, ed. W. Stubbs, i (London, 1867), p. 194; Ralph of Diss, 'Ymagines historiarum', in *Opera historica*, ed. W. Stubbs, i (London, 1876), p. 373.

⁶ Robert of Torigny, 'Chronica', p. 295; Power, *Norman Frontier*, 229-31.

Harmony

Philip II of France

It was thus as lord of Montfort and subject of the French king that Simon V would enter his majority. In the royal registers, Simon was listed among the king's barons rather than counts.⁷ The vestiges of his family's former comital status in the French landscape also began to disappear. In June 1205, Philip, probably declining to continue in a position of equality with Simon in the lordship of Montchauvet, leased his share to Simon's brother-in-law, Bartholomew of Roze, for five years; the king does not seem to have ever taken it back into his own hand. Simon was still abroad on crusade at the time, and no mention is made of the Montforts in the surviving copy of the lease.⁸ The decline of Montfort prestige mirrored an increasingly confident Capetian concept of royal supremacy that precluded Simon's maintenance of his ancestors' lofty privilege.

Naturally, this supremacy most clearly demonstrated itself in the royal preserve of Yveline. As early as 1160, the Montforts' rights in the forest had been sharply reassessed by a royal inquest in the wake of Simon III's support for Henry of England the previous year. The Montforts' rights in the forest were declared inalienable, but pannage—which Simon III had granted to a Chartrain lazaret in 1158—was reserved for the royal herds: the lords of Montfort were strictly limited to a hundredweight of acorns found at Rambouillet or Poigny for their own swine only. Pigs found in the forest should be immediately returned to the king's men.

⁷ *Registres de Philippe*, i p. 329.

⁸ *RAP*, ii p. 475, iii p. 527; Power, *Norman Frontier*, p. 87; below, p. 57n. 54.

Only after the royal pannage could the Montforts introduce anyone else's pigs to Yveline; even then, they were not to profit from such permissions. Similarly, the rights to justice outlined in the inquest underlined the preeminent position of the Crown. Blood crimes committed in the forest and criminals discovered there were to be prosecuted by the lord of Montfort, but if he chose to exact pecuniary penalties from thieves captured in Yveline, the money belonged to the king. If royal archers working in the forest should commit an offence, the Montforts could escort them only as far as the royal castle at Saint-Léger and exact a fine of no more than *5s.p.* Philip would copy this inquest into his first royal register in 1204-1205 in order to add to the collection of written judgements specifying the king's rights throughout his demesne, especially in its valuable forests.⁹ Royal monopoly and seigneurial subordination surely circumscribed the Montforts' autonomy in a forest that they had over generations likely come to assume as their own property for all practical purposes.

Meanwhile, Philip had been cultivating a more dependable class of men to enjoy royal favour. Many of the episcopal prelates and comital magnates who had advised the king since he took the throne had died before or during the expedition to the Holy Land, and in their wake, Philip chose to entrust the practical governance of the kingdom's affairs to younger and less prominent men. Bartholomew of Roze, who likely married Simon's sister Petronilla through royal promotion, was the exemplar of these new administrative and judicial functionaries drawn from the petty nobility. A lack of significant independent lands or wealth made such men dependent on the Crown for their living and advancement, thereby helping to solidify royal

⁹ *Registres de Philippe*, i pp. 38-47, 50-2; *Cartulaire de la léproserie du Grand-Beaulieu*, ed. R. Merlet and M. Jusselin (Chartres, 1909), p. 21; Baldwin, *Government of Philip*, pp. 141-2, 249-52. Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 242-3 convincingly redates this inquest in the context of the peace between Kings Louis VII and Henry II: *Recueil des actes de Henri II*, eds. L. Delisle and É. Berger, i (Paris, 1916), p. 252.

control over the affairs of the kingdom.¹⁰ Despite holding a rump of his family's former estates, Simon remained too grand a figure to be incorporated into the new royal government in this way.

Simon's station generated no evident resentment against royal authority, and the lord of Montfort would remain at least a passively loyal vassal throughout his life. He served in the royal army during the 1196 siege of Aumale, the castle his grandfather had defended for Henry II over twenty years earlier. Little notice has been taken of the significance of Simon's participation in the siege. Richard the Lionheart had just captured the fortress of Nonancourt thanks to the treachery of its castellan, Nicholas of Orphin: Nonancourt lay only a day's march from Houdan, and Nicholas was a knight from the lordship of Montfort.¹¹ While Simon was besieging Aumale, his home was being threatened. Such devotion to royal rather than personal causes might have opened more traditional routes of advancement. Simon's stepfather, William II of Barres, and his brother-in-law, Matthew II of Montmorency, both attained high position at court—though not in administrative capacities—through military service.¹² But aside from William the Breton's reference to Simon's presence at Aumale, there are no authentic records of his participation in the Norman wars. Simon may have fought at Philip's side on other occasions during the 1190s, but he did not make a reputation by doing so.

More frequently, he served in the royal court. In 1201 and 1207, he witnessed the homages of Blanche of Navarre, countess of Champagne, and of Count Walcher of Saint-Pol, respectively, for their fiefs. Before leaving on crusade in 1202, Simon assisted at a judgment in

¹⁰ Baldwin, *Government of Philip*, 104-6, 109-12.

¹¹ *Phillipid*, pp. 129, 132-4; Robert of Torigny, 'Chronica', p. 257; Ralph of Diss, 'Ymagines', p. 373; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 309; Power, *Norman Frontier*, p. 349.

¹² Baldwin, *Government of Philip*, pp. 114, 483n. 24.

the king's favour during an inquest into the rights of the vidame of Châlons to the episcopal regalia. These were unlikely to have been the extent of Simon's appearances at court: he probably witnessed other minor royal acts, and most surviving judgements did not name the adjudicators.¹³ But it is significant that on these recorded occasions, Simon lent his support to the extension of royal power beyond the immediate vicinity of Paris.

In an even earlier instance, Simon had contributed to Capetian ascendancy at his own expense. In January 1196, Simon's maternal uncle, Robert, 4th earl of Leicester, had surrendered his important castle at Pacy to Philip in order to ransom himself from captivity. The king kept Pacy in his own hand, and compelled the childless Robert's living relatives—including his sister, Amicia of Leicester, and nephew—to renounce their own potential claims to the castellany.¹⁴ But Philip also demanded guarantees that Robert, once freed, would not unilaterally attempt to recover his ransom. Three of Robert's French kinsmen—Simon, Roger of Meulan, viscount of Évreux, and Gervase II of Châteauneuf—agreed to stand surety that the earl would not attack the king for his losses. All three guarantors were loyal to the king of France and held their most important lands from him, but Simon was chief among them: a more significant baron than Gervase, he also—unlike Roger—held his estates exclusively within the French realm with no properties in Normandy. Should he default in defending Pacy from his uncle or in bringing him to justice before the king in the event of an attack, he stood to lose everything, as Philip would seize his lands. Philip thus used Simon as an appeal to Robert's honour or sentiment: to place

¹³ *RAPA*, ii pp. 237, 296; A. du Chesne, *Histoire généalogique de la maison de Montmorency et de Laval* (Paris, 1624), preuves, p. 78; Baldwin, *Government of Philip*, pp. 39, 143. The date of the Châlons inquest must be earlier in the year than Delaborde et al. indicate, as Simon was certainly in Venice by the beginning of October 1202, and very likely by a month or two earlier.

¹⁴ *RAPA*, ii pp. 54, 57, 492; *Layettes*, i pp. 184-5; Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, ed. W. Stubbs, iii (London, 1870), p. 278, iv (1871), p. 5; de la Roque, *Harcourt*, iii p. 126; *Cartulaire normand*, p. 278.

such a close relative in jeopardy in order to recoup his personal losses would demand a selfish cold-heartedness out of keeping with Robert's proven character.¹⁵ But the same considerations that made Simon an acceptable guarantor to Philip compensated the risk to himself. As nephew, Simon was much more closely related to Robert than the other two knights, and was the only one of them who stood to inherit upon Robert's death. He was not, however, a clear heir presumptive: the Quincys, for instance, had a competing claim. Aiding his uncle in obtaining his freedom was thus a useful means of solidifying their relationship, despite serving on opposite sides of the Franco-Norman divide. Nevertheless, Simon's surety demonstrates his primary loyalty to the French Crown.

This loyalty yielded its greatest material dividend for the Montforts upon Robert's death in 1204. Though Simon was crusading in the Holy Land when the earl died, his mother Amicia and Philip seized the opportunity presented amidst the collapse of Angevin resistance in Normandy to solidify their respective positions. Amicia transferred Robert's castle of Breteuil with all its appurtenances, as well as all that belonged to Robert and all that Amicia might inherit from him south of the English Channel, to the royal demesne. If her sister in England were to sue for her share of the Norman inheritance, Amicia would reimburse her out of lands she might inherit there. In return, Philip handed over the royal castle of Saint-Léger to Simon's mother as a

¹⁵ *Layettes*, i pp. 185-6; AN, J 394 n^{os} 2, 2 *bis*; Power, *Norman Frontier*, pp. 259-61. Both of Simon's co-guarantors were also tied to him personally by familial relation or affection. Roger of Meulan, as the grandson of Simon's great-grandfather, Amalric III, was his first cousin once removed, while Gervase of Châteauneuf was his second cousin once removed through the Beaumonts: Appendix C. Gervase's father, Hugh III, was likely a familiar of Simon IV, as he witnessed a grant the elder Simon made to Vaux-de-Cernay, an abbey with which Hugh had no other connexions: *Cartulaire de l'abbaye des Vaux-de-Cernay*, eds. L. Merlet and A. Moutié, i (Paris, 1857), p. 72; D. Power, 'L'Aristocratie Plantagenêt face aux conflits capétiens-angevins: L'Exemple du traité de Louviers', in M. Aurell, ed., *Noblesse de l'espace Plantagenêt (1154-1224)* (Poitiers, 2001), p. 134. In the end, Robert did try in vain to regain Pacy in 1198, but as the attempts occurred within the exempted context of 'publica guerra regis Anglie', Simon and his co-guarantors were spared any repercussions: Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, iv p. 60; Power, *Norman Frontier*, pp. 343-4.

perpetual fief, along with Yveline. The lack of mention of *grieria* in the concession of *tota Aquilina* suggests that probably for the first time in their history, the lords of Montfort now held the forest entirely in their own right.¹⁶ The exchange allowed Philip not only to absorb an important Norman honor—including its forest—into his holdings, but it also helped to solidify his control over his new conquest, all at the relatively bargain price of a forest in which royal rights had long been compromised anyway.

It was an ostensible boon for the Montforts as well. They had surrendered a valuable estate, but one in a territory which had been subject to a decade of warfare, and could possibly suffer even more should John of England try to recover what he had lost. Yveline, meanwhile, was no less economically endowed, and was all the more attractive for its familiarity and stability. The limitations of the Montforts' status as royal foresters—though perhaps not painfully burdensome nor rigorously enforced—disappeared. In May 1208, to settle a contest over deforestation rights with the Saint-Georges de Bazainville, Amicia sold a grove to the monks, seeking the confirmation not only of her son but also of the king. In both confirmations, their rights to Yveline are characterised by the fact that '*grieriam in ipso se contendebant habere*'.¹⁷ But rather than reflecting a continued deputy role, the reference to *grieria* likely recalls the Montforts' anterior rights in the forest; likewise, royal confirmation does not imply a sustained active interest in the forest, but simply notes the legality of the Montforts' sale. Such confirmations travelled both ways. In 1209 Philip granted the woods of Cardonnay in the

¹⁶ *Layettes*, i p. 271; *RAPA*, ii pp. 449-50. Roquebert, *Simon de Montfort*, p. 80 claims that Simon was back in France by early 1204 based on the date given in a 1244 *vidimus*; however, the act clearly states that he was '*iter Jherosolimitane peregrinationis aggressurus...in proximo*', meaning it must be from 1202 at the latest: '*Cartulaires de Saint-Thomas d'Épernon et de Notre-Dame de Maintenon*', eds. A. de Dion and A. Moutié, *Memoires de Rambouillet* 4 (1878), pp. 14-5.

¹⁷ 'they claimed to have the forest-wardship over the same'. Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 314, 316-7; BnF, ms. lat. 5441, i p. 259; *RAPA*, iii p. 100.

Norman forest of Longboel to the Cistercian nunnery of Fontaine-Guérard; the lands must have formerly belonged to one of Simon's ancestral honors, whether Évreux or Breteuil, for he confirmed the king's gift from the Midi the following October.¹⁸ The king's direct authority in Yveline was therefore now likely little more than historical. The Montforts continued to hold their lands from the Crown, but consistent fidelity had brought them the reward of demesne rights and a degree of recognised autonomy.

The Leicester inheritance would give Simon another opportunity to display his loyalty. Upon his return from Palestine in 1206, Simon confirmed the exchange of Breteuil for Yveline, probably aware that he was about to receive an even greater benefit in the earldom of Leicester. Given that Philip had instituted a policy of confiscating the Norman lands of those who remained in England, his permission for Simon to cross the Channel to claim his inheritance seems strange. It may have been out of respect for his late uncle: Robert had died while waiting—with the French king's blessing—to see whether John would recover Normandy before doing homage to Philip himself for his Norman possessions. Simon was already Philip's vassal, and the king must have felt some measure of trust in him after the Pacy affair. Still, he was taking few chances. The fact that Simon still styles himself as simply *dominus Montisfortis* in the confirmation of the transfer of Breteuil for Yveline suggests that it was drafted before his journey to England to receive the inheritance.¹⁹ Perhaps fearing that John might try to use Simon's suit to regain a foothold in Normandy, Philip made sure that his hold on Breteuil was secure before allowing the lord of Montfort to become earl of Leicester. If Simon had surrendered his claim to

¹⁸ AdS-M, 80 HP 4; Appendix A, iii.

¹⁹ *Layettes*, i p. 307; F.M. Powicke, *The Loss of Normandy, 1189-1204*, 2nd edn (Manchester, 1960), pp. 283, 294; below, pp. 47-8.

any Norman estates, John could not use them as bargaining chips in the negotiations concerning the inheritance of Robert's English titles and lands. Before undertaking his obligations across the Channel, Simon needed to demonstrate the priority of his status as French subject.

Ten years later, Simon demonstrated this identity once more in drastically changed circumstances. His English inheritance had dissolved, but he had now—after six years' absence from France—been awarded the county of Toulouse by the Fourth Lateran Council. The decision to disinherit the Saint-Gilles had been made without reference to Philip as their proper overlord, a blatant infringement on his rights which the king had feared since the beginning of the Albigensian Crusade.²⁰ But Simon had no intention of severing his ties with the Crown. As soon as weather once more permitted travel, he rode north to pay homage to Philip for his conquests in April 1216.²¹ Despite the conciliar prejudice to his rights, it is hardly surprising that the king embraced his new count. Three years earlier, Raymond of Saint-Gilles and the consuls of Toulouse had implicitly renounced French lordship, exchanging it for that of Peter of Aragon, who had shown a more vested and favourable interest in the outcome of the southern struggle. The transfer of these lands and rights marked a clear rejection of Philip's authority and the bold extension of Aragonese power deep into territories historically belonging to the French kingdom.²² If the king had bristled at papal interference in his kingdom, he was not likely to acquiesce to usurpation by another temporal prince. Simon at least shared political and cultural ties with Philip, and was obviously not likely to commit himself to the Aragonese. But other lords remained easily conceivable. When enfeoffed with Largentière by Bishop Burnon of

²⁰ *HGL*, viii c. 681; *RAPA*, iii p. 83; *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi c. 524.

²¹ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 264-5; *RHGF*, xviii p. 719; *HGL*, viii cc. 684-5.

²² *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi cc. 845-8; *Hystoria*, ii p. 85; below, p. 80.

Viviers in July 1215, Simon had managed to preserve his ultimate fidelity to Philip by exempting himself from personal service in any potential conflict between the bishop and the king; however, he was still bound to provide a garrison for the defence of the town and the castle of Fanjau on the bishop's behalf.²³ But if Philip could trust Simon not to neglect royal rights over his own person, the crusader himself might draw royal vassals into his service. In June 1214, Viscount Raymond III of Turenne had promised to provide Simon with military service in the northern dioceses of the county of Toulouse; if simultaneously called to royal service, Raymond was excused from personal attendance in the crusader's wars but still expected to send his knights and sergeants under the leadership of another noble.²⁴ Simon had scrupulously maintained royal rights in the Midi, but it was still better to bring him once again into the fold of royal lordship rather than leave him to pursue his crusade in competition with the requirements of the kingdom.

This incorporation of Simon as count of Toulouse into the Capetian sphere went beyond the simple act of homage. In October 1214, over a year before his trip to France, Simon rendered justice at Figeac on Philip's behalf, a right that had been delegated to the now-absent count of Toulouse since 1195. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay claims that Simon had received a royal commission to undertake this responsibility and others in the lands he had conquered, and there is no reason to doubt him; after five years of war, the king needed to reestablish civil order under his ægis, and Simon was in the best position to do so. Philip similarly entrusted the crusader with the supervision of the transfer of the diocesan regalia to the see of Lodève in July 1215.²⁵

²³ *HGL*, viii c. 667.

²⁴ Appendix A, xiii.

²⁵ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 210, 230; *HGL*, viii c. 432; *RAPA*, iii p. 548.

Representation of royal interest came with its rewards. After the homage of 1216, Simon returned to the Midi at the head of one hundred and twenty knights, perhaps a contingent from the royal household. One hundred knights on six months service—four and a half times the length of a typical crusade quarantine—with Simon's campaign in Provence in late summer 1217 were certainly sent by the king.²⁶ The crusader had proven not only his loyalty to the Capets, but also their own interest in maintaining his position. The harmonious relationship between Simon and Philip would ultimately enhance both of their lordships and prestige.

John of England

The same could not be said for Simon's interactions with either of his other two overlords, John of England and Peter of Aragon. Nevertheless, the former may have received homage from the new earl of Leicester in 1206. Unfortunately for the historian, the year of Simon's return coincides with the missing charter roll for the eighth year of John's reign; as a result, it is difficult to authoritatively reconstruct the events of his investiture as earl of Leicester. The king seems to have encouraged his suit, issuing a safe conduct for the new *comes Leircestrie* and even forgiving the debt inherited from the late Robert for the farm of Belgrave.²⁷ Though he left no extant acts in England, Simon clearly crossed the Channel to collect his uncle's honor. In 1208, John reimbursed two English knights £11.10s. for Simon's expenses, while the complicated procedures of 1231-1232 surrounding the seisin of his namesake son record that

²⁶ *RHGF*, xviii p. 719; *Hystoria*, ii p. 292.

²⁷ *Pipe Roll 8 John*, pp. 2, 190, 225.

Simon V was personally present in England to receive his inheritance.²⁸ However, while a charter survives granting Saer I of Quincy, husband of Simon's aunt and competitor for the inheritance, his portion of the Beaumont lands, there is no similar charter for Simon. It probably never existed.²⁹ But contemporary records confirm that he did—at least briefly—hold seisin of the moiety of the honor. The Merchants' Guild of Leicester dated several entries of their roll with references to Simon's succession; one reference was recorded in the year that he *recuperavit Leicestriam*, while two others specifically refer to his later disseisin. Even before the judicial partition of Robert's estates, John ordered that Simon be given 100*m.* worth of land from escheated English estates of Norman nobles in August 1206. Royal command had also granted him land in the soke of Waltham during the last quarter of the fiscal year.³⁰ The same year, Simon had given £12 worth of land to a certain Agnes for her marriage to Ralph of Martiwast, a transfer that would be confirmed by the king upon Ralph's payment of a relief of 40*m.* Simon's right to dispose of his lands was not disputed, and the king even forgave 15*m.* of Ralph's relief.³¹ On 10 March 1207, the partition of the Beaumont inheritance was finally adjudged, according to the charter given to Saer, earl of Winchester since the previous September. The entire estate, save the dowers of Robert's mother and widow, was divided between Saer and Simon; the dowers would be similarly apportioned after the deaths of the two women. However, Simon was recognised as the earl and granted the capital messuage of the honor and the ceremonial office of

²⁸ *Pipe Roll 10 John*, p. 171; *Close Rolls of the Reign of Henry III Preserved in the Public Record Office*, i (London, 1902), p. 560, ii (1905), p. 19; L.W. Vernon Harcourt, *His Grace the Steward and the Trial of Peers* (London, 1907), p. 75.

²⁹ Vernon Harcourt, *His Grace the Steward*, pp. 94-5.

³⁰ *Records of the Borough of Leicester*, ed. M. Bateson, i (London, 1899), pp. 19, 20, 32; *Close Rolls*, p. 74; *Pipe Roll 8 John*, p. 107.

³¹ *Pipe Roll 8 John*, p. 9.

royal steward. Furthermore, he was to receive the third penny from the earldom, while Saer was simply compensated with £40 worth of land from Simon's half-share until Saer could receive his portion of the inheritance from Robert's Norman lands.³² By 1207 the recovery of these lands did not look immediately likely, but the allotment of a portion of Simon's inheritance to Saer was in accordance with Amicia's instructions from Philip in the 1204 transfer of Yveline to appease the Montforts' insular relatives using their own English lands.³³ On the face of it, the settlement of the earldom looked to be very much in Simon's favour.

Of course, it was not: by this time, Simon had already been disseised.³⁴ However, King Henry III's administration would recall that Simon returned to France seised of the honor and left a knight in England to manage his affairs. This is corroborated by John's pursuit later in 1207 of a certain Thomas of Astley for the profits from the honor during the period in which Thomas served as Simon's bailiff.³⁵ A largely ignored inquest, surviving in a fourteenth-century copy in the Huntington Library, may shed some light on the period before Simon's departure and disseisin. It is a royal report, based on the sworn testimony of representatives of the earls of Leicester and Winchester and the vill of Leicester, on the value of the honor and the details of its partition. The copy contains many errors, particularly of arithmetic, but remains a uniquely valuable source. It was almost certainly drafted during Simon's personal presence in England,

³² *Fædera*, p. 96; *Pipe Roll 8 John*, p. 225; *Liber feodorum: The Book of Fees, Commonly Called Testa de Nevill*, i (London, 1920), p. 92.

³³ Above, p. 42.

³⁴ *Patent Rolls*, p. 68; *Records of Leicester*, i p. 32.

³⁵ *Close Rolls of Henry*, i p. 560, ii p. 19; *Pipe Roll 9 John*, p. 196.

given its references to his concerns and grievances about the partition.³⁶ Beyond this, it cannot be dated very accurately. At the end of August 1206, John alludes to the division of the Beaumont inheritance as an event yet to happen. But as the honor was impounded by early February, the inquest cannot be later than January 1207. It already assumes that Simon held not only the title of earl—which had been practically recognised since his arrival in England—but also the capital messuage; the lands apportioned to Saer are to be taken out of the honor held by Simon. The 10 March charter therefore could not have been the first draft of the Beaumont partition; some earlier division must have been arranged.³⁷ If it was committed to parchment, it must have been lost with the rest of the charter roll for that year; as its provisions were quickly rendered void by Simon's disseisin, its failure to survive is not surprising.

This earlier agreement, probably arranged in winter 1206-1207, must have given—provisionally or permanently—the principal rights of the honor to Simon. The inquest likely served as a royal fact-finding mission, to see how the division was proceeding in practice in preparation for the final adjudication of the inheritance. Much of it seems to anticipate the 10 March charter: though nothing is said of the third penny or the stewardship, the value of the lands of the honor are divided in half, and Saer is to be compensated for Robert's foreign lands

³⁶ Appendix B. D. Crouch, 'The Battle of the Countesses: The Division of the Earldom of Leicester, March-December 1207', in P. Dalton and D. Luscombe, eds., *Rulership and Rebellion in the Anglo-Norman World, c.1066-c.1216* (Farnham, Surr., 2015), pp. 179-211 researched and edited the Huntington Roll independently of this thesis.

³⁷ *Close Rolls*, p. 74; *Patent Rolls*, p. 68; *Fædera*, p. 96. Crouch, 'Battle of the Countesses', pp. 188-9 believes the inquest to date from December 1207, but it does not account for the reassignment of the eastern suburb of Leicester and other farms to Saer nor the halving of alms owed by the moiety of the honor, both of which had occurred by Michaelmas that year: Appendix B; *Pipe Rolls 11 John*, pp. 24-5; *12 John*, p. 96. Crouch's objection that the inquest makes no mention of John's presence and therefore cannot represent the division referred to in Saer's charter is easily explained by its working nature: the formal division would have taken place later based upon the inquest's findings. References to Simon's moiety in the 10 March charter presumably represent revenues and rights confiscated by John by that time.

with £40 from Simon's moiety.³⁸ Even though Simon was not to benefit significantly from his earldom, it is clear that he had submitted himself—however briefly—to John's kingship.

Peter II of Aragon

Simon's subjection to Peter of Aragon was also abbreviated. Notably, Simon did not immediately petition Peter for recognition as viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne. After watching Simon subdue the local aristocracy over the autumn of 1209, Peter invited the crusader to ride with him from Narbonne. It was only upon reaching Montpellier that Simon asked the king to confirm his position. Having received his crown at the hands of Innocent III himself in 1204, Peter could hardly reject the papal candidate for viscount, but he still hesitated. Unlike Philip, Peter was hardly enthusiastic about integrating this crusading interloper into his developing transpyrenean lordship. The king would hold out until January 1211, when—faced with the death of his old viscount, Raymond-Roger, pressure from the papal legates, Simon's military resilience, and the looming threat of a Moorish campaign in Spain—he finally relented, receiving Simon as his viscount at Narbonne.³⁹ Just as Philip and John had been unable or unwilling to prevent Simon's initial inheritance of Leicester despite the threat his divided loyalties might present their individual and opposed interests, so Peter could not keep the successful crusader at bay indefinitely. Once again, Simon demonstrated the limits of royal power.

³⁸ Appendix B.

³⁹ *Hystoria*, i pp. 124-5, 128, 208; *Register Innocenz'*, vii pp. 407-9; *Canso*, i p. 94; Puylaurens, p. 62; D.J. Smith, *Innocent III and the Crown of Aragon: The Limits of Papal Authority* (Aldershot, Hants, 2004), pp. 91-2.

An examination of the little-studied terms of their agreement reinforce the impression that the balance between the two men may not have reflected a strong lordship arrangement. Not only had Peter needed to garrison the comital castle of Foix with royal troops in order to save it from the crusade, he also provided Simon with letters patent promising to hand the castle over to him should Count Raymond-Roger continue to take up arms against the crusader. All this transpired despite the count's personal refusal to assent to the truce. The king also offered his son, James, in a marriage alliance with Simon's daughter, Amicia.⁴⁰ The girl had already been betrothed to the younger Raymond of Saint-Gilles the previous year, but the agreement seems to have collapsed amid growing friction between the Montforts and the Saint-Gilles. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay characteristically blames the failure of the betrothal on Raymond VI's bad faith, but the withdrawal was much more likely Simon's move: not only were his relations worsening with the count, but the Aragonese alliance offered him and his family much greater benefit. Astonishingly, the two-year-old James was committed to Simon's care, along with the stewardship of Montpellier, until the age of eighteen.⁴¹ Simon now believed he had secured a marriage alliance with royal blood; his daughter would presumably one day be queen of Aragon. This entrenchment of the Montfort family in the region through advantageous political and nuptial ties was designed to further legitimise Simon's rule over his new territories and ensure the permanence of his dynasty in the south. His custody of Montpellier also gave him access to the town's considerable prestige and financial resources; the town consuls had pledged to aid the papal programme in 1209, and Simon's exercise of James' rights there could direct this potential

⁴⁰ *Hystoria*, i pp. 197-9, 209, ii pp. 77-8.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, i pp. 145, 209; *Pedro el Católico*, iii pp. 1174-5; *Canso*, i pp. 144-6; Puylaurens, p. 66.

support to the benefit of the crusade.⁴² In return, Simon's subjection entailed little more than the adherence to a truce with Raymond-Roger of Foix—broken by the count in March 1211—and the provision of around fifty knights for the king's campaign against the Moors that summer.⁴³ The events of January 1211 had not only put an end to the insecurity of Simon's political position, they had confirmed his dominance of Arago-Catalan lands north of the Pyrenees.

Viewed as a simple contract of submission by a vassal to his overlord, it is unclear why Peter should commit himself to such an arrangement. Papal pressure may have required him to recognise Simon, but it did not demand the surrender of his lucrative rights in Montpellier nor of his only legitimate son as a hostage. The notorious independence of the town was something of a nuisance: tapping into its potential wealth had furnished headaches for the king in the past, headaches that were now Simon's problem. Furthermore, Peter's claim to Montpellier derived from his marriage, which he now hoped to annul. Nevertheless, later events would prove he had few scruples about his ultimate authority over the town and even less intention of allowing it to escape his influence.⁴⁴ As for James, the anticipated annulment from his mother, Mary of Montpellier, would render him a bastard. Whatever the king's reasons for handing his son over to Simon, it was not because 'ell fià's tant en él e en la sua amor', as James would remember it in his old age. In 1209, a year after the prince's birth, the king had even named his brother, Count Alfons II of Provence, as his heir. Peter clearly did not intend to allow the Montforts access to the throne through the betrothal. Even custody of the boy may have meant little to Peter: it did not stop him from attacking the crusader in 1213, and negotiations for James' return only began

⁴² *Register Innocenz'*, xii pp. 223-5.

⁴³ *Canso*, i pp. 168-70; *Hystoria*, i pp. 217-8, 255; Puylaurens, pp. 70.

⁴⁴ Smith, *Innocent and Aragon*, pp. 16, 70-4; below, p. 81.

after the king's death.⁴⁵ Despite promising not to violate the grant himself, Peter had also packed a formula of plausible deniability into the betrothal charter, an escape clause should his annulment case bear fruit or other circumstances change: the betrothal of James and custody of Montpellier were entrusted to Simon 'sicut melius possum'.⁴⁶ But if Peter's losses and Simon's gains were not as great as they appeared on the surface, the question remains as to why the king felt it necessary to enrich Simon at all, much less cede him a town and hostage in contravention of customary practice.⁴⁷ Quite simply, Simon had shown himself by 1211 to be a real and enduring threat to royal hegemony, one the king was incapable of destroying at present. As such, the crusader was in a position to dictate the terms of his subordination to royal lordship, even to the extent of standing the agreement on its head by extorting securities from the king himself.

The papacy

If Simon could afford to be so impertinent toward his king for the viscounties, he proved much more subservient toward his spiritual overlord, Innocent III. Simon may have caught his first glimpse of the long reach of papal power in the resolution of the French interdict by Octavian, cardinal-bishop of Ostia, in September 1200. Through his legate, the pope forced Philip to renounce his concubine and reinstate his queen at Saint-Léger in the heart of Yveline.⁴⁸ Simon's opinion of his king's marital problems is unknown, but Innocent's impressive display of

⁴⁵ 'he had such faith in him and in his love'. *Llibre dels fets*, pp. 12, 14; Smith, *Innocent and Aragon*, p. 94.

⁴⁶ *Pedro el Católico*, iii pp. 1174-5.

⁴⁷ Cf. A.J. Kosto, *Hostages in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 81-2.

⁴⁸ Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, iv pp. 137-8.

authority—manifested in the lordship of Montfort—and concern for Christian order may have made an impression on the crusader.

The moral suasion of the papacy had in fact already personally affected Simon in November 1199 when—inspired by the unitive model of crusade and moral reform mediated through papal preachers like Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay and possibly Fulk of Neuilly—he embraced the papal vision of a renewed chivalric expedition that would liberate the Holy Land through the collective virtue of Christendom.⁴⁹ However, the course of the crusade quickly demonstrated that this conception of the expedition was not universal among the barons or even the clergy who took the cross. Faced with a crisis of payment at Venice, the comital leadership of the crusader army accepted the Venetian offer of postponement of their debt in return for cooperation in subduing the pirate city of Zara, despite the clearly stated opposition of the pope, who threatened all those crusaders who attacked Christians with excommunication. Most of the crusaders and even many of the Cistercian abbots acquiesced to the counts' plan, leaving Simon at the head of a minority party that included Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay, bearer of the papal prohibition against attacking the city. Unconvinced by the argument from necessity, Simon, according to the eyewitness Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, responded by insisting, 'Non veni...huc ut destruam christianos.' To argue that this attitude and subsequent departure from the army was 'più papista del Papa' is to misunderstand Innocent's later absolution of the crusaders, whom the pope believed to be truly penitent. In accordance with papal wishes, Simon awaited the resumption of the course towards Egypt, only deserting when the new plan to place Alexius Angelus on the throne of Constantinople threatened to violate the pope's conditional absolution with further

⁴⁹ *Register Innocenz*, i p. 504; below, pp. 129-34.

violence against Christians.⁵⁰ To Simon's mind, unjust and unchristian actions performed in defiance of the pope would not work toward the fulfilment of his crusade vow, but rather unravel the spiritual merit and potential success of the entire enterprise.

It is therefore difficult to explain Simon's dissent from the crusade leadership without strong reference to his ideological formation and reliance on papal authority. The supposition of Monique Zerner-Chardavoine and Hélène Piéchon-Palloc that Simon obstructed affairs at Zara out of resentment for his own eclipse in the crusade leadership has been adopted by several historians of the Fourth Crusade but presents more problems than it explains.⁵¹ Most obviously, had his opposition been an attempt to force the crusade to proceed to Egypt under his leadership, he would have found himself stranded on the Dalmatian coast awaiting a more navigable season with insufficient personal funds or social rank to supplant the Venetians or the counts. However, it may be that Simon and his partisans—like Innocent III—underestimated the desperation of the French which led them ultimately to support the Venetians.⁵² It is also unlikely that Simon was driven primarily by the negative impulse to avoid excommunication. The fear of spiritual penalties must have played its part in his decision to abide by the papal order, but his subsequent actions suggest his conduct was governed by a more positive adherence to the papal will. Simon did not join those fellow deserters like Stephen of Perche or Reynald of Montmirail who had

⁵⁰ Villehardouin, i pp. 82-4, 94-6, 108-12; *Hystoria*, i pp. 107-10; *Register Innocenz'*, vi pp. 159-68, 391-3; *Patrologia latina*, ccxiv cc. cxxxix-cxli; *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, p. 133; G.E.M. Lippiatt, 'Duty and Desertion: Simon of Montfort and the Fourth Crusade', *Leidschrift* 27 (2012), p. 87. *Pace* L. Usseglio, *I marchesi di Monferrato in Italia ed in Oriente durante i secoli XII e XIII*, ii (Turin, 1926), p. 210.

⁵¹ Lippiatt, 'Duty and Desertion', pp. 81-2. *Pace* M. Zerner and H. Piéchon-Palloc, 'La croisade albigeoise, une revanche: Des rapports entre la quatrième croisade et la croisade albigeoise', *Revue historique* 267 (1982), pp. 16-7; D.E. Queller and T.F. Madden, *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople*, 2nd edn (Philadelphia, 1997), p. 74.

⁵² Lippiatt, 'Duty and Desertion', pp. 82-4; A.J. Andrea and I. Motsiff, 'Pope Innocent III and the Diversion of the Fourth Crusade Army to Zara', *Byzantinoslavica* 33 (1972), pp. 14-5.

escaped the papal ban but rushed to Constantinople after Innocent's tacit acceptance of the city's capture in order to carve out their own slice of forfeit Byzantine wealth.⁵³ Furthermore, although Innocent had stipulated two years—later reduced to one—of service from troops subsidised by those hoping to earn the indulgence by proxy, Simon appears to have personally borne his cross for nearly four years.⁵⁴ The surety that they were completely blameless in the eyes of the pope, successor of Saint Peter and author of the crusade, contributed to the self-vindication of Simon and his party in the contested aftermath of the Fourth Crusade.

The importance attached to papal approval can be seen once again in Simon's letter to Innocent announcing his election to the viscounties of Béziers and Carcassonne in autumn 1209. After relating the news of his election and his intention to renew all those local tithes that had fallen into disuse due to heretical influence—more likely those tithes that had never undergone the Gregorian process of restoration that had prevailed in France—Simon proposes to levy an additional annual census of *3d.* from each household in gratitude and recognition of the primacy of the Holy See. Papal correspondence would refer to the continued collection of this census, and it would be enshrined in the Statutes of Pamiers. Moreover, Simon offered the pope a further *1,000m.ty.* in September 1212.⁵⁵ In addition to this financial tribute paid to Rome, Simon's career in the Midi also closely followed the mandate established by Innocent in his 1208 bull *Rem crudelem* to root out heresy by attacking those lords who favoured or protected it.

⁵³ Villehardouin, ii pp. 122-4, 170. However, Simon did receive relics from Constantinople shortly after becoming viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne: CCC, ms. 32, f° 94r°.

⁵⁴ *Register Innocenz'*, i p. 503, ii p. 496. Simon left France in late spring or early summer 1202, and does not reappear in local documentary evidence until April 1206: *Chartes et documents de l'abbaye de Saint-Magloire*, eds. A. Terroine and L. Fossier, i (Paris, 1966), pp. 190-1; Villehardouin, i p. 50; Clari, p. 8; *Layettes*, i p. 307; AN, P 1839, f° 242r°.

⁵⁵ *Register Innocenz'*, xii pp. 239-40; *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi cc. 357, 690, 693, 694; *HGL*, viii c. 627.

Though the attack on the count of Toulouse in summer 1211 found no specific command in papal correspondence or legatine direction, it matched the spirit of both. Simon and Raymond had shared largely amicable relations through early 1210, even briefly betrothing their children, but the count's deteriorating canonical position with the legates led to the resurrection of suspicion about his complicity with the spread of heresy in his lands. He was once again excommunicated in April 1211 and Simon invaded the county shortly thereafter.⁵⁶ The reasons for the outbreak of hostilities were various, but Simon's attitude towards Toulouse thus far had closely matched that of Innocent, if not always that of his legates. Even if the principal motivation behind Simon's earlier amity toward Raymond had been the weakness of his own position, he could at worst be accused of following Innocent's advice to his legates in 1209: 'divisos ab ecclesie unitate divisim capere studeatis,...non statim incipiatis ab ipso [comite], sed eo primitus arte prudentis dissimulationis eluso, ad extirpandos alios hereticos transeatis'.⁵⁷ Such counsel served Simon well in the first year and a half of his crusade.

On certain specific occasions, Simon explicitly subordinated his will to that of the papal legates, even if their direction may not have perfectly reflected Innocent's will. In July 1210, the legates Abbot Arnold-Amalric of Cîteaux and Thedisius of Genoa were present at Minerve as negotiations began for its capitulation to the crusaders. Upon their arrival, Simon immediately submitted the talks to Arnold-Amalric's arbitration. The abbot, hoping that the town might be

⁵⁶ *Register Innocenz'*, xi p. 38; *Canso*, i pp. 94-6, 108, 140-6; *Hystoria*, i pp. 116, 145, 167-9, 195-7, 210-11; *MGHS*, xxiii p. 892; *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi cc. 410-1, 833; *Album de paléographie et de diplomatique: Fac-similés phototypiques de documents relatifs à l'histoire du Midi de la France et en particulier de la ville de Toulouse*, ed. F. Galabert, 2^{ème} fasc. (Toulouse, 1913), XIII^e s., pl. v, n° 2.

⁵⁷ 'strive to capture separately those divided from the unity of the Church...do not begin immediately with him [the count], but first deceiving him with the art of careful dissimulation, cross over to extirpating the other heretics'. *Canso*, i pp. 162-4, 168, 174; *Hystoria*, i pp. 211-2, 216-7, 219-20, 230-1, 237-8; Puylaurens, p. 70; Marvin, *Occitan War*, pp. 96-7, 108; *Register Innocenz'*, xi p. 379.

taken by force and the heretics inside purged by the sack, tried in vain to bring about the collapse of the negotiations. Simon and William of Minerve, the defending lord, agreed to Arnold-Amalric's proposal to separately record their terms, but when they were read out, Simon found William's offer unacceptable and prepared to continue the siege. It may be that Simon had colluded with Arnold-Amalric to bring about the abbot's desired result, but given that he later followed the example of Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay by personally attempting to convince the one hundred and forty perfects within the walls to recant rather than die, it is equally possible that he continued to negotiate in good faith. In the event, William frustrated the abbot's design by capitulating unconditionally, thus sparing Minerve's garrison and population—save the unrepentant perfects, who were nearly all burned in the pyre. Whatever Simon's attitude toward Arnold-Amalric's attempt to force a sack, the intention ran contrary to the spirit of Innocent's wishes for the *negotium pacis et fidei*, which were probably better reflected by the conversion initiatives of Guy and Simon.⁵⁸ Either way, Simon explicitly tied his actions to the papal will as mediated through Innocent's representatives.

Innocent, for his part, was quick to reward this fidelity. In her zeal to depict Innocent as a saintly pope worthy of the epithet 'the Great'—and therefore free from the stain of complicity with the greedy and unscrupulous Simon—Helene Tillmann interprets the letters written by the papal chancery in November 1209 in response to Simon's announcement as evidence that the pope 'wollte sich und seine Nachfolger wohl nicht mit einer feierlichen Garantie zugunsten des landfremden Eroberers belasten.' Such a conclusion, however, reads against the text. In both letters, Innocent heartily congratulates Simon, gladly confirms him and his heirs in their

⁵⁸ *Hystoria*, i pp. 157-61; *Canso*, i p. 116; H. Tillmann, *Papst Innocenz III.* (Bonn, 1954), pp. 202-3.

possession of the conquered territories by the authority of the Apostolic See, and promises to give counsel when required and to lobby for further help for the crusade. There is little scope for Tillmann's imagined tension between Simon's expectations and Innocent's response. Given Simon's attempt to render homage to Peter of Aragon that same month, it is unlikely the crusader objected to the pope's inclusion of the phrase 'principalium dominorum et aliorum etiam, si quibus forte competit, iure salvo' in his confirmation; likewise, context suggests that Innocent's use of the Ovidian proverb 'non minor est virtus quam querere parta tueri' is more likely an exhortation to continued zeal in the purgation of the conquered viscounties than a warning against further aggression. Tillmann correctly notes that Innocent does not mention in either letter the annual payment to the Holy See from the viscounties 'in recognitionem domini Romane ecclesie' proposed by Arnold-Amalric in an earlier independent letter; but neither does the suggestion appear in Simon's letter to the pope. It is difficult to see how Innocent's silence on the matter could be construed as a rejection of Simon's desire to be made a papal 'Lande Lehnsman' when such a request was never made. If this was in fact the meaning behind the *dominium* mentioned in the legates' letter supporting Simon—a questionable assumption given that it is immediately followed by the familiar qualification 'aliorum dominorum in omnibus salvo iure'—it may be that Simon and Innocent alike distrusted the idea of the viscount's temporal vassalage to the Holy See; the proposal better reflects the aspirations of Arnold-Amalric. Innocent did, however, accept the new census proposed by Simon in recognition of the Roman church as 'caput nostrum et fidei catholice...fundamentum'.⁵⁹ In January 1211, Innocent

⁵⁹ *Register Innocenz'*, xii pp. 237-8, 239, 258-61; *Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta*, eds. G. Alberigo et al., 3rd ed. (Bologna, 1973), p. 253. Pace Tillmann, *Innocenz*, pp. 20, 190, 255-7. Arnold-Amalric may have been inspired by the submission of his old sovereign, Peter of Aragon, to the Holy See in 1204: *Register Innocenz'*, vii pp. 408-9. For evidence of Arnold-Amalric's later hierocratic approach to authority and Simon's reaction against it: below, pp. 87-8, 284-6.

would explicitly refer to the crusader as his representative in the region responsible for the collection of the devotional census and expressed his hope that Simon 'sit semper obnoxior' to the Holy See.⁶⁰ The pope appeared very happy to tie his hopes for the restoration of the Catholic faith in the Midi to Simon's ascendent star.

Accordingly, he attempted to rally continued support for the crusade. In his 1209 letter to Rome, Simon had complained that many important castles in the viscounties still held out against him while he was constrained to pay his remaining troops twice standard wages in order to retain their service. He begged Innocent to solicit material aid from the rest of Christendom.⁶¹ Isolated in a foreign land and devoid of feudal ties, Simon relied on the pope to lend him moral and temporal legitimacy from his treasury of pontifical prestige. Innocent therefore immediately wrote to the ecclesiastical and temporal princes in the region, recommending Simon to them and asking for their support of the *negotium pacis et fidei*. One of the recipients of these letters was Peter of Aragon. Although he made no mention of Peter's rights over the viscounties in this letter and continued to confirm Simon's conquests in June 1210 without direct reference to the king, the pope was not insensible to the Arago-Catalan interests. However, whatever intervention he made was in favour of the crusader: it was partly papal pressure exerted later in 1210 that convinced Peter to receive Simon as his viscount.⁶² Innocent had thus given not only spiritual sanction to the crusader's position, but helped to orchestrate his political legitimacy as well.

⁶⁰ *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi c. 357.

⁶¹ *Register Innocenz'*, xii pp. 239-40.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 260-5, 267; *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi c. 743; L. Delisle, *Catalogue des actes de Philippe-Auguste* (Paris, 1856), p. 518.

Even more importantly and immediately, the pope worked to secure the continued support of Simon's French followers. Attempting to counter the shortage of manpower and wage inflation in 1209, Innocent praised the loyalty of the crusaders who remained at Simon's side and urged them to stay in the ranks until heresy had been fully extinguished from the Midi, promising them that it would work toward the continued remission of their sins. He implored them to be 'expensis contenti a proximo Pascha deinceps,' until he could organise further reinforcements.⁶³ The pope here seems to be suggesting a pay freeze effective from the next stipendiary term: with wages almost beyond what Simon could afford at the autumn disbursement—presumably around Michaelmas—Innocent asked the other crusaders not to demand more at the Easter payment (18 April 1210) and to continue serving until the pope can find troops to replace those discontent with the salary. Once again, the pope's moral authority reinforced Simon's tenuous power in the region.

The final manifestation of Innocent's support for Simon came at the Fourth Lateran Council in November 1215. After intense deliberation that ranged the southern episcopate against the local aristocracy, the pope finally adjudged the county of Toulouse to Simon, dispossessing Raymond and reserving only the vague 'residua terra' untouched by the crusade—interpreted by Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay as the march of Provence—for his son. The conservative Innocent was probably truly reluctant to strip the county from the Saint-Gilles, as both the

⁶³ *Register Innocenz'*, xii p. 267.

anonymous continuator of the *Canso* and William the Breton claim.⁶⁴ But Innocent also harboured a real gratitude to and affection for Simon, as expressed the previous April in *Nobilitatem tuam* and other bulls granting Simon the provisional government of the territories he had conquered.⁶⁵ Both he and his successor, Honorius III, accordingly treated Simon as a representative of papal will in the region. Over winter 1215-1216, Innocent would ask both Simon and Guy of Montfort for their help in defending the rights of Adhemar of Noyrac against the usurpation of his brother after the latter had been excommunicated by Bishop William-Peter of Albi.⁶⁶ A year later, the frustration of Honorius' new legate to the region, Bertrand, cardinal-priest of Santi Giovanni e Paolo, led him to ask Simon for assistance against Provençal obstructors of the *negotium pacis et fidei*. Eager to revenge himself for the previous summer's failure to quell the revolt at Beaucaire, Simon gladly crossed the river with the cardinal and compelled the submission of important local nobles.⁶⁷ Despite attempts to deal fairly with the native baronage, the papal administration continued to see their champion in Simon.

When news of the uprising at Toulouse in September 1217 reached Rome, Honorius personally threw his weight fully in support of the crusader. He wrote to Bertrand making clear how much faith he placed in Simon of Montfort 'ad mandatum Apostolicæ Sedis juxta nomen

⁶⁴ *Canso*, ii pp. 42, 56, 58-64, 66-72, 76, 80-2, 86-8; *HGL*, viii cc. 681-2; *Gesta Philippi Augusti*, p. 306; Belperron, *Croisade*, pp. 306-7; Tillmann, *Innocenz*, pp. 198-9. It is, however, unlikely in the extreme that the pope counselled the young Raymond to win back his inheritance, nor did he reserve the Argence for him. Archbishop Michael I of Arles, who entrusted the fief to Simon in January 1215, had been a participant in the Fourth Lateran Council, and the pope would have been well aware of the grant. Indeed, Innocent would order Arnold-Amalric and Simon to provide the wife of Raymond VI, Eleanor of Aragon, with 150*m.* from the revenues of Beaucaire, presumably as compensation for part of her dowry: Appendix A, xxii; R. Foreville, *Latran I, II, III et Latran IV* (Paris, 1965), p. 393; *Vetera monumenta slavorum meridionalium historiam illustrantia*, ed. A. Theiner, i (Rome, 1863), i p. 64.

⁶⁵ *Layettes*, i pp. 413-5.

⁶⁶ *Monumenta slavorum*, p. 69.

⁶⁷ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 284-5n. k, 288n. g, 289-93; *Canso*, ii pp. 258-62, 304.

suum obediens'. Letters were also sent to all of Raymond's supporters, attempting to dissuade them from joining in opposition to Simon. Threats of excommunication were followed by action in November 1218 for the Arago-Catalan barons interfering with the claim of Simon's son, Guy, to the county of Bigorre through his wife, Countess Petronilla.⁶⁸ The growth of the uprising by 1218, however, demonstrated that such negative assistance would not be enough. Honorius therefore published the bull *Populus Israel* throughout Gaul, calling for swift assistance to support Simon against the southerners and offering the crusade indulgence to those knights not already sworn to the Fifth Crusade. The pope also wrote specifically to Philip Augustus, urging him to come personally to Simon's aid or send an army in his stead. Letters were dispatched to Simon's supporters in Narbonne, Valence, Gascony, and Orange, thanking them for their devoted service to the crusader and asking them to continue their aid. Meanwhile, Honorius took an exceptionally conciliatory tone toward Simon himself. In ordering the restoration of the castle of Fanjau—provisionally held by Simon—to the church of Viviers, the pope moved beyond apostolic warnings of consequences for noncompliance; in his letter to the crusader informing him of the correction, he promised to compel the local bishop to swear neither to receive Simon's enemies nor to allow the castle to be used as a base for harm to the *negotium pacis et fidei*.⁶⁹ Honorius' sympathy continued even as Simon's fortunes failed to improve: on 19 July, over three weeks after Simon's death but before the news had reached Rome, Honorius reissued *Populus Israel* to an even wider audience and updated the list of enemies of the Church to include not only the two Saint-Gilles, but also Counts Raymond-Roger of Foix, Bernard IV of Comminges,

⁶⁸ 'Honorii III, pontificis romani epistolæ', in *Medii ævi bibliotheca patristica*, ed. C.A. Horoy, ii (Paris, 1879), cc. 524-5, 559-67, 593-4, iii cc. 56-7.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, ii pp. 567-9, 573-7, 594.

and their sons.⁷⁰ Honorius' desire to see the fight against heresy brought to a successful conclusion had led him to place his hopes fully in Simon, and the papacy stood by the crusader even beyond his death.

Conflict

Philip of France

A focus on the harmonious aspects of Simon's relationships with his superiors naturally tells only part of the story. Ostensible ties of subordination frequently involved competition and occasionally even open violence. Even the lordship of Philip of France was not a straightforward commitment of Simon's actions to royal will. As noted, there is no credible evidence of Simon's participation on Norman battlefields beyond the siege of Aumale in 1196, and he would be absent on separate crusades for the two great victories of Philip's reign: the final conquest of Normandy in 1204 and the battle of Bouvines in 1214. In many ways, this is unsurprising. The French capture of Évreux in 1195, for instance, brought no elevation of Simon's station, as Philip placed the city in the keeping of John of England. Even after Count Amalric IV—Simon's cousin—ceded his possession to Philip in 1200, the king dismembered the county, distributing its appurtenances amongst his household and his own demesne.⁷¹ The possibility of Simon succeeding to the old family county does not seem to have ever been seriously advanced or entertained. Simon's crusading during the final conquest of the duchy in 1202-1204 is therefore

⁷⁰ ASV, ms. Reg. vat. 9, f^o 286r^o-v^o.

⁷¹ *Gesta Philippi Augusti*, p. 196; *Cartulaire normand*, pp. 11, 32, 55; *RAPA*, ii pp. 475, 491-2, iv p. 136; Power, *Norman Frontier*, pp. 210-1, 443-4.

understandable, though Philip may have exacted 15*l.p.* from his lands in recompense for his absence in the royal army.⁷² If the annexation of Normandy did not seem likely to yield territorial gains for anyone except the king, a baron of Simon's rank and pedigree might be excused for finding little interest in it.

This lack of enthusiasm also characterised Philip's attitude toward the Albigensian Crusade, at least in its early stages. The king, suspicious of prejudice to his rights, initially refused to allow the departure of any barons except Duke Odo III of Burgundy and Count Harvey of Nevers with five hundred Burgundian knights. Only when it became apparent that he could not prevent the swell of crusaders did Philip tacitly consent to Simon and other nobles taking the cross.⁷³ When his son, Louis of France, announced his intention to take the cross against the heretics in February 1213, Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay—who was in Paris at the time—records that the king was sad, 'sed causam doloris ejus non est nostrum exponere.' No doubt Philip's ambiguity toward the Albigensian enterprise was reinforced by his dream of invading England, unfeasible in the absence of his son and his following.⁷⁴ But the *Canso* continuator imagines that Philip 'no respon mot ni nulha re no ditz' in 1215 upon hearing of Simon's exploits from Louis upon his return.⁷⁵ No doubt this reflected less the attitude of the king than the poet, who had no way of knowing the royal reaction. But even after Philip's recognition of Simon as count of Toulouse, his support was not unlimited. No response survives from Paris to Honorius'

⁷² N. Brussel, *Nouvel examen de l'usage général des fiefs en France pendant le XI, le XII, le XIII, et le XIV siècle*, ii (Paris, 1727), p. clvi, clxxii.

⁷³ *RAPA*, iii pp. 76, 83; BAV, ms. Ott. lat. 2796, f^o 72v^o.

⁷⁴ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 109-10; A. Cartellieri, *Philipp II. August: König von Frankreich*, iv (Leipzig, 1922), pp. 342-3.

⁷⁵ 'responded not a word nor said anything'. *Canso*, ii p. 36.

1218 pleas for help for the crusader.⁷⁶ The king was certainly disturbed by Simon's death when it happened, as evidenced by Louis' second crusade the following year.⁷⁷ But Philip could not afford to pour blood and treasure without calculation to prop up an unpopular and increasingly insecure vassal indefinitely, even if his rule did increase royal lordship. Simon was an attractive option to the Capets as count of Toulouse because of his close ties to and dependence upon them; paradoxically, however, the king allowed this new comital administration to fail because it could not sustain itself.

John of England

Though finally significant, the distance between king and crusader did not characterise the relationship between Philip and Simon. The latter's interactions with John of England, however, were almost entirely marked by hostility. As noted, Simon's seisin of the earldom of Leicester lasted little longer than his personal presence in England. On 13 February 1207, John published letters patent declaring that all Simon's English lands were to be administered for the king's benefit by Robert of Ropsley, a knight of the royal household, 'quousque habuerimus inde denarios quos idem Comes nobis debet'. Nine days later, according to the roll of the Leicester Merchants' Guild, Simon was formally disseised.⁷⁸ The Huntington inquest had already been put aside. Amicia's dowry at Winterbourne Stoke had been valued at £50, to be divided £30/£20 between the Quincys and the Montforts respectively. The Quincy share was to go, at least in

⁷⁶ Above, p. 64.

⁷⁷ *Hystoria*, ii p. 321; Puylaurens, p. 106.

⁷⁸ *Patent Rolls*, p. 68; *Records of Leicester*, i p. 32; Jolliffe, *Angevin Kingship*, p. 284.

part, toward the £40 balance beyond the moiety of the honor of Leicester. But on 10 February, John ordered the sheriff of Wiltshire to confiscate the Montfort portion and transfer it to Saer; the king claimed that as Saer had only received half of the outstanding balance in the county of Leicester, he should make up the difference with Simon's share in Wiltshire, ignoring the fact that the difference had already been accounted for in the original partition of the manor.⁷⁹ But Saer was still not satisfied and successfully agitated for further farms from Simon's share before the end of the year.⁸⁰ Benefiting the Quincys at the Montforts' expense was at least partly calculated to guarantee the support of the former while the king disseised the latter. Incomes taken from the nephew and given to the uncle were effective means of preventing family ties from uniting against a move which, in the end, brought the most profit to the king himself.

Such guarantees were necessary, as the disseisin stood on very shaky ground. The distraint of a vassal's lands on failure to pay their fine of inheritance, codified in the Statute of Windsor of 1200 or 1201, was a frequent and unpopular tool of John's rule. He would often insist on an extortionate fine, with confiscation as either an incentive to pay or the object of the prohibitive amount.⁸¹ Even if the relief was not inflated, Simon may have refused to pay the proposed rate on account of the fact that he was receiving only half his uncle's lands. John was not troubled either way: the relief—likely never much more than a pretence—had been forgotten by July 1207, when the king stated that he had entrusted Leicestershire and Warwickshire to Robert of Ropsley 'quamdiu nobis placuerit'.⁸² The enjoyment of the honor must have pleased

⁷⁹ Appendix B; *Close Rolls*, p. 77.

⁸⁰ *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 24; *Close Rolls of Henry*, ii p. 19.

⁸¹ *Patent Rolls*, p. 68; Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, iv p. 152; Jolliffe, *Angevin Kingship*, pp. 81-4.

⁸² *Patent Rolls*, p. 74.

John's Exchequer very much: nearly fifty years later, Simon, 6th earl, would complain that his father's lands had been mismanaged while under royal administration, especially in the 'grant destrucion de bois'. In the first two years of the confiscation, Robert of Ropsley milked the honor's estates for £308.11s.9½*d.* in sales of wood—from lands with a dependable gross annual yield of £211.9s.10½*d.* His successor as sheriff, William I of Cantilupe, similarly sold £160.13s.4*d.* worth of wood in his first year, before settling down in 1211 to a more sustainable average of around £60 a year; perhaps the king's officials realised they were running out of trees.⁸³ Of course, other motives than simple cupidity were at work. Most barons holding lands in England and Normandy had already been forced to choose their loyalties to England or France. But the chief purpose after financial profit was probably the effective suppression of the earl of Leicester as a baron and the stewardship as an office. A disseised Simon on the other side of the Channel amounted to one less powerful noble in England that could keep John awake at night. A man who could not trust even William the Marshal was not likely to tolerate a French Montfort in his court and official household.⁸⁴ After encouraging Simon to come to England and take possession of the earldom, John set out to practically erase him, his title, and his office from the English realm.

As it was, Simon would cause John to lose sleep anyway. As baronial resentment of the king grew, the Dunstable annalist—whose priory owned Cadeby in the honor of Leicester—reported in 1212 that John was upset at Nottingham by rumours of a conspiracy to overthrow

⁸³ C. Bémont, *Simon de Montfort, comte de Leicester: Sa vie (120?-1265), son role politique en France et en Angleterre*, 1st edn (Paris, 1884), p. 333; *Pipe Rolls 11 John*, p. 25; *12 John*, p. 96; *13 John*, p. 196; *14 John*, p. 141.

⁸⁴ *Fine Rolls*, pp. 334, 335; L. Fox, 'The Honor and Earldom of Leicester: Origin and Descent, 1066-1399', *EHR* 54 (1939), p. 394; Henry Knighton, *Chronicon*, ed. J.R. Lumby, i (London, 1889), p. 65; Vernon Harcourt, *His Grace the Steward*, pp. 75-6; W.L. Warren, *King John* (London, 1961), pp. 114-5, 184-5.

him and invite Simon to come and rule in his stead.⁸⁵ These were likely nothing more than rumours; the Montforts did not possess even a remote dynastic claim to the English throne and Simon was not an especially familiar figure in England. He had, in fact, only just become viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne and was in the early stages of building his reputation for prowess and piety in the Albigensian Crusade. However, he did have some connexions to disgruntled members of the English baronage: Hugh of Lacy, earl of Ulster, and Walter Langton were both John's subjects who had served alongside Simon on crusade. The first had been wronged in a similar manner to Simon, while the second was the brother of the exiled archbishop of Canterbury. Indeed, unlike the majority of the quarantine crusaders in the Midi, Hugh stayed on from 1210 to become a permanent member of Simon's cadre; Walter likely returned to England or France between his periods of service in the Midi in 1211 and 1218.⁸⁶ In the midst of an excommunication against the king and a papal interdict against his kingdom—both of which were the result of John's refusal to recognise Walter Langton's brother as archbishop of Canterbury—it is not impossible that barons like the Lacys and the Langtons might have advanced the aggrieved and capable commander of the Albigensian Crusade as a potential leader for a proposed revolt. However, if such a plot were ever hatched, Simon seems to have shown no interest in or even knowledge of the venture.

Simon instead interfered with John's interests in the Midi, with disastrous effect. As the king clung to his few remaining continental possessions in the duchy of Aquitaine, he collided

⁸⁵ W. Dugdale and J. Caley, *Monasticon Anglicanum*, rev. ed., vi (London, 1846), p. 240; 'Annales de Dunstaplia', in *Annales monastici*, iii (1866), p. 33 (misdated to 1210: N. Vincent, 'English Liberties, Magna Carta (1215) and the Spanish Connection', in *1212-1214: El trienio que hizo a Europa (Actas de la XXXVIII Semana de Estudios Medievales de Estella. 19 al 23 de julio de 2010)* [Pamplona, 2011], p. 252n. 36).

⁸⁶ Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, pp. 171-4.

once more with the earl he had dispossessed in England. These campaigns had much more to do with the pursuit of heresy and the Anglo-French contest than the Leicester inheritance, but the latter may at least have mitigated Simon's qualms about attacking Plantagenet territory. John had deprived Simon of his rightful inheritance, perhaps allowing Simon to feel justified in occupying lands over which the king had direct or ultimate jurisdiction in order to exterminate heresy.

The conflict between Simon and John was put in train from the moment that the crusade directed its energies against the lands of the count of Toulouse. Despite their violent history in the twelfth century, by 1209 the houses of Plantagenet and Saint-Gilles were closely intertwined. Through his late sister Joan, John was Raymond's brother-in-law and uncle to his son. Joan's dowry of Agen furthered the connexion between the two houses, even after her death.⁸⁷ But the Agenais, as a territory of the count of Toulouse, fell well within the targets sanctioned by the papal legates of the crusade and had a demonstrable heretical population.⁸⁸ To the west, the heretical situation in Angevin Gascony is less clear. Certainly the area was more receptive to the crusade, but it is difficult to claim as boldly as Yves Dossat and others that 'la Garonne sépare le pays cathare des régions réfractaires à hérésie'.⁸⁹ Rather, as Nicholas Vincent points out, 'We know nothing of heresy in the Plantagenet south, because we have few records of its persecution.

⁸⁷ Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, iv pp. 124-5; *Canso*, ii p. 74; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 17-8; N. Vincent, 'England and the Albigensian Crusade', in B.K.U. Weiler and I.W. Rowlands, eds., *England and Europe in the Reign of Henry III (1216-1272)* (Aldershot, Hants, 2002), p. 72.

⁸⁸ C. Taylor, *Heresy in Medieval France: Dualism in Aquitaine and the Agenais, 1000-1249* (Woodbridge, Suff., 2005), pp. 166-7, 170, 175-6, 179-80.

⁸⁹ *Layettes*, i p. 341; *Canso*, i p. 134, 278-80; *Hystoria*, ii p. 55-6, 155; Y. Dossat, 'Catharisme et Gascogne', *Bulletin de la Société archéologique, littéraire et scientifique du Gers* 73 (1972), pp. 167-8; B. Guillemain, 'Le duché d'Aquitaine hors du catharisme', *Cahiers de Fanjeaux* 20 (1985), pp. 63-7; Taylor, *Heresy in France*, pp. 154-61, 164, 185-6.

This is very different from an assumption that no heresy existed.’ Certainly John’s later pledges and orders to eradicate heresy from his lands suggest that it was not unknown.⁹⁰ On the battlefield, the interference in 1211 of certain Gascon lords, Agenais troops, and Angevin mercenary captains—most notably Savaric of Mauléon—in the sieges of Toulouse and Castelnaudary further discouraged harmony between the crusade and the English king.⁹¹ When Simon invaded the Agenais in 1212, he directly infringed upon the king’s rights as suzerain. While at the parliament of Pamiers in November 1212, Simon even participated in an arbitral judgement between the monks and burghers of Condom, thus projecting his authority beyond the Garonne into Gascony. By this time, John had shown himself incapable of retaining his northern continental possessions and, as a confirmed and unrepentant excommunicate, was surrounded by rumours of his own impending papal deposition.⁹² In the eyes of Simon and the bishops, the potential deployment of the army of God across the Garonne was therefore both practical and justified.

Fearing the intentions of his spurned French earl—especially directed as they were against his brother-in-law and nephew—John entered into a secret alliance with Raymond and Peter of Aragon around the time of Simon’s Agenais incursion in September 1212. Though John could not bring his troops to the Continent in time for the Muret campaign, he did welcome the Saint-Gilles as they fled the aftermath of the great defeat and death of their Aragonese patron.⁹³

⁹⁰ Vincent, ‘Albigensian Crusade’, pp. 69-72.

⁹¹ *Canso*, i pp. 152-4, 194, 204-8, 218; *Hystoria*, i pp. 253-4, 263, 270; Taylor, *Heresy in France*, p. 189.

⁹² J. Gardère, *Histoire de la seigneurie de Condom et de l’organisation de la justice dans cette ville* (Condom, 1902), pp. 270-6; C.R. Cheney, ‘The Alleged Deposition of King John’, in R.W. Hunt, W.A. Pantin, R.W. Southern, eds., *Studies in Medieval History Presented to Frederick Maurice Powicke* (Oxford, 1948), pp. 115-6.

⁹³ Vincent, ‘Albigensian Crusade’, pp. 74-5.

By this time, John had reconciled himself to the pope and committed his kingdom into Innocent's hands; he could therefore undertake his continental campaign in security. Though the primary aim of John's landing at La Rochelle in February 1214 was to drive the French from Poitou, his march down the Garonne in April led to the defection of much of the western Agenais. He entered La Réole, where he asserted his intention to defend his Gascon vassals, but did not personally travel any further up the river into crusader-occupied territory. Instead, he sent Geoffrey of Neville, his seneschal for Gascony, east to garrison Marmande. This in turn inspired the important town of Le Mas-d'Agenais to go over to the English. Angevin authority thus reestablished itself along the lower Garonne as far south as Marmande and disrupted Simon's control even further upstream. In June, John's presence in the Périgord again posed a threat to crusader operations. Not only was the king providing refuge to 'plures de hostibus Christi et nostris', Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay writes, but from July through August he was inciting the garrison of Casseneuil—besieged by the crusaders—to resist. Peter—likely along with Simon—believed the king even intended to move against the army himself. However, it is improbable that John intended to attack Simon openly. Even the garrison occupying Marmande raised only Geoffrey of Neville's personal banner over the ramparts, not the ducal standard.⁹⁴ The prodigal son of the papacy—returned and beloved though he was—could not take the field against his loyal brother.

But neither could Simon with his limited forces take on the royal army John had brought to Aquitaine for the purpose of encircling Philip Augustus, even after the arrival of significant crusader reinforcements in early May. Instead, Simon mirrored John's movements. Within a

⁹⁴ *Patent Rolls*, pp. 113-4; 'Itinerary of King John', in *ibid.*, n.p.; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 199-200, 211, 215-6.

week of John's departure from La Réole on 16 April, Simon was besieging Mas-d'Agenais. After three days, he raised the siege for lack of proper equipment. Strengthened by new crusader contingents, including the master siege engineer Archdeacon William of Paris, Simon returned to the area for a more thorough re-conquest in June, destroying castles and fortifications as they were abandoned before him. The only resistance he encountered during his tour was at Marmande, where Geoffrey of Neville and his English sergeants found their position untenable after the inhabitants promptly fled. Simon in turn allowed the garrison to depart unharmed for La Réole.⁹⁵ Thus Simon undid all that John's show of force had achieved. He may have guessed that he and the king were at an impasse; neither could openly engage the other, and as long as they both remained in the field, the Agenais belonged to whomever was most immediate. But this was to Simon's advantage, for John could not remain in Poitou forever and was principally concerned with the developing events that would culminate in the battle of Bouvines, while Simon was in the Midi to stay. This probably encouraged Simon's bravado at the siege of Casseneuil, where he refused to lift the siege while John hovered nearby, even insisting that he would offer battle should the king march on Quercy. The decisive engagement never came, but Simon happily contented himself with the occupation of the southern Périgord after John's withdrawal, further eroding the Angevin sphere of influence.⁹⁶ Given the king's greater Capetian concerns and the complete collapse of his strategy at Bouvines, his demonstration against Simon could never be more than a temporary deterrent, designed to limit crusader expansion in advance of the Fourth Lateran Council.

⁹⁵ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 199-200, 202-4, 209-12.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 216, 222-9.

John fell back on other means of deterrence. 20,000*s.* sterling were handed over to Simon—probably through the offices of the archbishop of Bordeaux—around the same time as the king’s departure for England. Vincent has suggested that this may have been an attempt to appease Simon for the confiscation of the honor of Leicester. More likely, it was protection money, paid to discourage Simon from deeper depredations into Plantagenet territory that the king, reeling from the distant shock of Bouvines, now hoped to leave. The close association of Archbishop William II of Bordeaux with the crusade since 1209, combined with his status as the most important ecclesiastical leader in the remains of the continental Angevin empire, made him an ideal mediator between the king and the crusader. It seems that he advanced Simon the money to effect peace between him and the king, expecting reimbursement from John or the townsmen of La Réole. Whether John ever paid his debts or not, the episode probably provides the grain of truth behind the boast placed in Simon’s mouth much later by the anonymous continuator of the *Canso*: ‘reis d’Anglaterra vol ab mi acordar/E cresser m’a de terra per so que·l lais estar.’⁹⁷ Eager to finish his inconclusive tour of northern Aquitaine and attend to a growing baronial crisis in England, John had quickly settled his frontiers at the least cost to himself. Simon, in constant need of money and eager to consolidate his gains since Muret, was probably happy to accept. In the balance, he likely felt that he had won his staring contest with the king.

John’s strategy to protect his lands from Simon worked, at least for a while. But in June 1215 Simon was once again accepting homage from and re-enfeoffing Gascon lords, including Count Gerard V of Fézensac and Armagnac, without reference to ducal authority. By September,

⁹⁷ ‘the king of England wishes to make peace with me/And increase my lands so that I will leave him be’. *Close Rolls*, p. 171; *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi cc. 834, 839; *Canso*, i pp. 40-2, 134, ii pp. 302-3. *Pace* Vincent, ‘Albigensian Crusade’, p. 77.

he had even crossed the Garonne to receive a submission at Condom. Probably at the same time, he reinforced his control of the Agenais by obtaining the reluctant allegiance of Lectoure and the viscounty of Lomagne, 'salvo tamen dominio domini regis'.⁹⁸ Simon's ability to dictate his own terms apparently decreased the closer he approached the heart of Plantagenet power in Aquitaine at Bordeaux, and he does not seem to have pushed further. Nevertheless, he had once again demonstrated his ability to penetrate the Plantagenet sphere in John's absence.

The king's final opportunity to salvage the situation came at the Lateran Council. Having once more hosted his nephew, Raymond the younger, in England, John sent the young man to Rome, supported by hand-picked English prelates. But the arguments of these churchmen failed to preserve Joan's dowry from the crusade, and the conquered Agenais was committed to Simon.⁹⁹ The sentence faced no appeal from John: rebellion, French invasion, and finally the king's death meant that no more English energy could be spent in favour of the Saint-Gilles.

With the failure of his diplomatic intervention, John lost his practical influence not only over the county of Toulouse, but also over the semi-independent principalities of southern Aquitaine. The Agenais was subsumed into Simon's administration as an ordinary seneschalcy in 1216.¹⁰⁰ That December, Simon brought Count Centulle of Astarac into his entourage, even deputising him to receive the fealty of lords on the crusader's behalf. Finally, lords from the Agenais, along with Gerard of Armagnac, stood surety for the fidelity of Bernard-Jordan of L'Isle-Jourdain to Simon at the siege of Toulouse in December 1217.¹⁰¹ While John struggled to

⁹⁸ *HGL*, viii cc. 686-7; Appendix A, xxviii; *Royal and Other Historical Letters Illustrative of the Reign of Henry III*, ed. W.W. Shirley, i (London, 1862), p. 52.

⁹⁹ 'Annales de Waverleia', p. 280; Puylaurens, p. 92; *Canso*, ii pp. 40, 72-7; *HGL*, viii c. 682.

¹⁰⁰ Below, p. 300.

¹⁰¹ Appendix A, xxxi; *Gallia christiana*, i instr., pp. 185-6; *HGL*, viii cc. 703-4.

hold his throne, the balance of Angevin-Tolosan power underwent a grand reversal as the Agenais and the entire eastern half of Gascony not only paid homage to Simon, but practically functioned as clients of the new count of Toulouse.

Peter of Aragon

Simon would achieve a similar inversion of political weight in relation to the Crown of Aragon, one that would reach a much bloodier and more decisive climax. The source of tension between Simon and Peter of Aragon naturally came from the latter's usurpation of the viscounty from the Trencavels. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay accuses the king of subsequently inciting rebellion against Simon's rule among the indigenous nobility of the viscounties in late 1209.¹⁰² While this is unlikely to be based in fact, it probably represents a suspicion current in the crusader camp. More plausible is the account of the meeting in spring 1210 between Peter and the principal local barons—Raymond of Termes, Peter-Roger of Cabaret, and Aimeric of Montréal—in an attempt to arrange their direct homage to the king, thereby reducing Simon's political authority and isolating his geographical position. However, neither Peter nor the barons were sufficiently committed to the idea, and the conference collapsed.¹⁰³ The king might drag his heels over the viscounties, but—as already shown—there was little he could do in the face of the crusader's papal backing and martial resilience.

¹⁰² *Hystoria*, i p. 125.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-3.

More troubling was Simon's spilling the banks of the crusade with his attacks on the lands dependent on the Crown of Aragon. In autumn 1209, Simon had captured the lower part of the county of Foix as far south as the line Pamiers-Mirepoix-Limoux before Raymond-Roger sued for peace. The truce did not last, and the mountain count would remain Simon's implacable enemy.¹⁰⁴ In October 1212, the crusader invaded southern Gascony, seizing the important crossing of the Garonne at Muret, overrunning the county of Comminges, and ravaging the viscounty of Béarn.¹⁰⁵ Coming even before the consolidation of the Trencavel viscounties, the Fuxan incursion was a clear foray against heresy. Peter had implemented strong measures against heresy in his lands, but these seem to have had little effect north of the Pyrenees.¹⁰⁶ Certainly Raymond-Roger of Foix was the magnate most complicit with heresy in the region. Before the crusade, heretical centres had existed in his county at Mirepoix, Dun, and Lavelanet, while Puivert, Tarascon, and even Foix served as refuges for perfects after Simon's invasion.¹⁰⁷ While Raymond-Roger was probably not personally an heretic, he did attend heretical meetings. Most of the women in his family were dissidents: his wife and sister were ladies perfect.¹⁰⁸ Even the anonymous poet of the *Canso* struggles to extricate him from his heretical company and frankly admits his violence against clerics and crusaders. All this was enough for Simon to deem the count a legitimate target of opportunity within weeks of becoming viscount, especially after

¹⁰⁴ *Canso*, i p. 100; *Hystoria*, i pp. 120-1, 123-4; *HGL*, viii cc. 577-8; *RHGF*, xxiv pp. 554, 578, 584; above, pp. 52-3, 64.

¹⁰⁵ *Canso*, i pp. 278-80; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 52-6.

¹⁰⁶ *Register Innocenz'*, vii p. 408, viii pp. 174-5, 177; *Canso*, i pp. 8-10, 70; Smith, *Innocent and Aragon*, p. 34.

¹⁰⁷ BnF, mss. Doat 22, f^o 229r^o-v^o; Doat 24, f^o 282r^o; *HGL*, vi p. 768, viii cc. 391-2, 451-3, 454-5; *Hystoria*, i pp. 120; É. Griffe, *Le Languedoc cathare de 1190 à 1210* (Paris, 1971), pp. 152-5.

¹⁰⁸ BnF, ms. Doat 24, f^{os} 84r^o-v^o, 209r^o, 241r^o, 244r^o-v^o, 251r^o; *HGL*, viii cc. 1035-6, 1150-1; *Hystoria*, i pp. 43-4, 199-208.

being invited to seize Pamiers by the abbot of Saint-Antonin.¹⁰⁹ Further west in southern Gascony, the state of knowledge about heresy is similar to that in Plantagenet lands: it is impossible to conclude whether it was scarce in reality or simply lacks surviving inquisition records. But the general sympathy or at least acquiescence shown by the Gascon nobility to Simon's invasion suggests that even if some of the barons—like Viscount Gaston of Béarn—were violently anticlerical, most were solidly orthodox. Comminges and Béarn were instead subjected to the crusade because of their leaders' support for the Saint-Gilles in 1211.¹¹⁰ But Simon's justifications for interfering with Peter's vassals meant little to the aggrieved king, who found his new viscount still little disposed to live in harmony with his neighbours.

Simon had also failed to demonstrate sufficient dedication to the wider concerns of the Crown. In late summer 1211, the crusader—hard-pressed by the southern offensive that would end at Castelnaudary—had recalled the detachment under Guy of Lucy sent to aid the king against the Moors. These reinforcements were crucial to Simon's ability to respond to events during the siege; they may well have saved the crusader captain's life. The knights had served in Spain beyond the quarantine customary in feudal military service, and Simon's obligation to Peter had technically been fulfilled. But the king was furious at this loss of manpower, especially as the Calatravan castle of Salvatierra capitulated to the Almohads shortly afterwards. Again, Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay's assertion that the king tried to ambush Guy on his march northward more likely reflects the monk's paranoia coloured by hindsight than actual royal

¹⁰⁹ *Canso*, ii pp. 48-52; *Hystoria*, i pp. 120-1.

¹¹⁰ *Hystoria*, i pp. 240, 253, ii pp. 37, 55-6; pp. 274, 276-8. Cf. Griffe, *1190 à 1210*, pp. 157-9; Y. Dossat, 'Remarques sur un prétendu évêque cathare du val d'Aran en 1167', *Bulletin philologique et historique jusqu'à 1715 du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques* 23 (1957), pp. 346-7; idem, 'Catharisme et Comminges', *Bulletin de la Société archéologique littéraire et scientifique du Gers* 77 (1976), p. 124.

policy.¹¹¹ But Peter of Aragon was bound to be angry at the diversion of any force from the coming Spanish campaign, especially if it were expressly destined for combat against his other vassals.

By the end of 1212, Peter's patience with Simon had expired. Not only had Simon invaded lands dependent on the Crown and privileged his own campaigns over the Moorish threat, his conquest of the county of Toulouse was directed against the Raymonds of Saint-Gilles, both of whom were brothers-in-law to the king.¹¹² Peter therefore entered into the conspiracy of Raymond VI and John of England and lobbied Innocent to cancel the crusade which had gone awry by attacking Peter's lands. Taking matters into his own hands, the king received oaths of obedience on 27 January 1213 from the counts of Toulouse, Foix, and Comminges, the viscount of Béarn, and the consuls of Toulouse and Montauban, thus placing all the enemies of the crusade under his protection.¹¹³ Peter truly began to behave as king north of the Pyrenees, receiving homages from important barons and associating himself with local charters. Meanwhile, Arago-Catalan knights were installed in Toulouse and proceeded to harry surrounding crusader garrisons with great effect.¹¹⁴ Peter had taken the opportunity provided by Simon's contumacy to extend his power across the mountains, confronting the crusade with material royal opposition.

¹¹¹ *Hystoria*, i pp. 254-7, 265-6, 269-70; P. Contamine, *La guerre au moyen âge* (Paris, 1980), pp. 177, 179; Smith, *Innocent and Aragon*, p. 101.

¹¹² *Hystoria*, i pp. 36, 210; Puylaurens, p. 72.

¹¹³ 'Rotulus misæ—anni regni regis Johannis quarti decimi', in *Documents Illustrative of English History in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, ed. H. Cole (London, 1844), pp. 249, 259, 262; *Fædera*, p. 113; Smith, *Innocent and Aragon*, pp. 119-21; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 82, 85; *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi cc. 845-9.

¹¹⁴ Smith, *Innocent and Aragon*, p. 125; M. Alvira Cabrer, L. Macé, and D.J. Smith, 'Le temps de la *Grande Couronne d'Aragon* du roi Pierre le Catholique: À propos de deux documents relatifs à l'abbaye de Poblet', *Annales du Midi* 121 (2009), pp. 16-8 *Hystoria*, ii pp. 106, 120-2, 125-7, 136; *Canso*, ii pp. 4-10; Puylaurens, pp. 76-8.

But while the king had declared a transpyrenean protectorate, he still had actually to protect it by eliminating Simon. On 24 January, witnessed by his entourage and the excommunicate counts, Peter enfeoffed his wife's half-brother, William, and his descendants with the town of Montpellier. Undoubtedly the primary purpose of the act was in preparation for the imminently expected annulment of Peter's marriage: the king wished to be rid of his wife, but did not wish to lose control over her lucrative dowry. But as well as a clear violation of Mary's rights, the enfeoffment was a flagrant abrogation of a key provision of the January 1211 agreement with Simon. By preferring William, Peter had effectively disinherited his son James and stripped Simon of his custodial jurisdiction over the town.¹¹⁵ A few weeks later, on his way back to Spain, Peter summoned Simon to meet him near Narbonne. However, mistrust reigned on both sides, and neither party attended. Several days later, the king served Simon with a letter formally repudiating his homage. The implication was clear: Simon had lost all legal standing in the south and was firmly surrounded by enemies who now had the protection of the Crown of Aragon. Aware of the very real danger he faced, Simon sent his lieutenant, Lambert of Thury, to Roussillon to protest and assure Peter of his obedience and fidelity; the king remained unconvinced. In response, Lambert presented him with a letter prepared by Simon in advance, in which the crusader pointedly avoided reference to Peter as his overlord, repudiated in his turn any service owed to the king, and announced his intention to defend himself should he be attacked. Lambert was imprisoned for his impudence and was only released on the intervention

¹¹⁵ *Pedro el Católico*, iii pp. 1477-9; F. Soldevila, *Els primers temps de Jaume I* (Barcelona, 1968), p. 41; above, p. 52.

of several of his Aragonese acquaintances.¹¹⁶ After what can only be seen as a thoroughly disastrous final round of diplomacy, Simon and Peter were truly at war.

Though the Muret campaign is often seen through the lens of the rise and fall of nations, its immediate aim was in fact intensely personal: the death or capture of Simon of Montfort. Relying on Simon's consistent policy of personally aiding his besieged garrisons, the enormous allied army would await his arrival at the crusaders' forward position at Muret, then trap him and his small cadre where they could be destroyed, captured, or starved into submission. Both in the symbolic sense common to medieval battles and in actual strategic significance, the issue must be decisive. Accordingly, Peter either refused to hear or contemptuously dismissed all the peace delegations sent by the bishops after their arrival with Simon at Muret. Many years later, James I of Aragon famously records that his father was so certain that the trial by combat would be judged in his favour, that he exhausted himself with his mistress on the eve of the battle.¹¹⁷ The king could not have been disappointed by Simon's response. The crusader rode for Muret, similarly convinced of his divine mission and its attendant protection. Peter's belief in his own invincibility after his great victory over the Moors at Las Navas de Tolosa on 16 July 1212 has been noted by Martín Alvira, but Simon seems to have carried a similar belief in his own providential destiny. Despite his weak military position and a series of ill omens, Simon would finally order the temporising bishops out of the way of his knights in order to engage the

¹¹⁶ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 106-9; M. Bloch, *La société féodale*, i (Paris, 1939), p. 351.

¹¹⁷ *Canso*, ii pp. 18-20; G. Duby, *27 juillet 1214: Le dimanche de Bouvines* (Paris, 1973), pp. 146-9; Alvira Cabrer, *Jueves de Muret*, pp. 204-5, 208-9; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 140-1, 164-9, iii pp. 201-2; *Llibre dels fets*, p. 13.

enemy.¹¹⁸ The two men converged on Muret equally convinced of their divine election to the exclusion of the other.

It is therefore hardly surprising that the battle in the plains and marshes before Muret on 12 September 1213 depended more upon moral considerations than relative troop strength or strict tactics. The outnumbered crusaders' bold charge into the heart of the allies' first two corps, followed by the unexpected death of Peter of Aragon in the first shock of contact, rendered the outcome within the first few minutes. In such a short time, the balance between the two forces could hardly have begun to approach equilibrium; the crusaders were likely able to penetrate deeply precisely because their strength was so comparatively small, causing them to be swallowed up by the larger force. If the southerners had fought on, the crusaders would still have faced certain annihilation. But news of the king's death induced a panic among his troops, who had foreseen no end but victory, while the crusaders saw only confirmation of the justice of their cause. The champion of Las Navas de Tolosa was dead; divine judgement had been rendered, and the battle was decided.¹¹⁹ In terms of hard and tangible calculations, the battle of Muret should have led to the end of both Simon and his crusade. But the fact that both Simon and Peter had wagered so much on their belief that the encounter would yield God's verdict in their respective favour meant that, owing to the hazards of combat, the crusader was able not only to survive, but to triumph.

To remove the battle of Muret from the teleological story of the creation of France or the counterfactual dream of a transpyrenean kingdom of Aragon is not to deny its significance. On

¹¹⁸ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 141-3, 149-52; Puylaurens, pp. 80-2; *Llibre dels fets*, p. 14; Alvira Cabrer, *Jueves de Muret*, pp. 154, 246-52.

¹¹⁹ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 153-4; *Canso*, ii p. 28; Puylaurens, pp. 82-4; Duby, *Dimanche de Bouvines*, pp. 152-4; Alvira Cabrer, *Jueves de Muret*, pp. 323-4, 330-3, 352-3.

the contrary, it is an important demonstration of the enduring strength of baronial independence in the face of royal consolidation. For all that Peter may have constructed a *Gran Corona de Aragón* on parchment, Simon's victory proved that royal authority remained fragile: kingdoms were not born simply of a king's will.¹²⁰ After Muret, Arago-Catalan raids continued to range across the Midi, especially before Simon's delivery of the young King James to the papal legate at Narbonne in May 1214. As noted, the Crown of Aragon would support the Raymondine resurgence at Toulouse in 1217-1218.¹²¹ Nevertheless, the Crown's effective power in the region had died with the king. As in Plantagenet Gascony, the pyrenean peripheries were increasingly brought by conquest or cooption under Simon's influence. In 1216, he toured Couserans, dispensing justice in despite of Bernard of Comminges and receiving homage from pyrenean lords such as Teregnous of Castillon and his sons. Further west, he scrambled to have his son Guy wedded to the newly eligible countess of Bigorre, Petronilla, Bernard's daughter and widow of Gaston of Béarn. The wedding took place at Tarbes on 6 November, but required an annulment of her more immediate union with the son of James' regent, who had attempted to preserve Aragonese influence over the county. Though the cheated groom and his Catalo-Bearnese allies would successfully resist the crusader at Lourdes, it earned them little more than excommunication. Petronilla and Guy remained married, granting legitimacy to Simon's claims on southern Gascony until his death in 1218.¹²² The futility of the Crown's attempt to secure

¹²⁰ For the invention of the term *Gran Corona de Aragón* to describe a unifying Arago-Catalan transpyrenean influence and sovereignty, see Alvira Cabrer, *Jueves de Muret*, pp. 166-70.

¹²¹ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 194, 201, 205, 276; *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi c. 959; *Canso*, iii p. 44; *Llibre dels fets*, p. 14; above, p. 64.

¹²² Appendix A, xxxi; *Gallia christiana*, i instr., pp. 185-6; A. Galland, *Du franc-aleu et de l'origine des droits seigneuriaux* (Paris, 1637), pp. 150-3; 'Honorii epistolæ', iii (1879), cc. 56-7; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 279, 294; *Canso*, ii p. 256; Puylaurens, p. 94; Soldevila, *Primers temps*, pp. 91-3, 110.

Bigorre demonstrated the reversed polarity of regional politics. Episcopal backing, political audacity, and the hazards of a chivalric charge had brought the viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne—now also count of Toulouse—to a position where he could draw the very satellites that had previously strengthened Arago-Catalan influence across the Pyrenees into his own orbit.

The papacy

Simon's relationship with Rome also suffered strain as a result of occasionally competing objectives. Of course, it never reached the pitch of Muret: Joseph Stalin's observation about the military strength of the papacy was as true in the thirteenth century as it was in the twentieth.¹²³ But the pope's moral authority carried substantial weight, especially for a pious crusader who owed his position largely to papal favour; indeed, who commanded the divisions at which Stalin would scoff.

Notably, the first sign of fracture between Simon and Innocent III was an offshoot of the growing rift between the crusader and Peter of Aragon. When the king dispatched his embassy to Rome in late 1212, he found a ready audience. Innocent was deeply grateful to Peter, fresh from the great victory at Las Navas de Tolosa, and was anyway increasingly anxious to launch another crusade to Jerusalem free from distractions in Europe.¹²⁴ By January 1213, under the influence of the Catalan ambassadors, Innocent had concluded that Simon was guilty of ingratitude and probable cupidity. He ordered the crusader to submit in all obedience to the king

¹²³ Qtd in W.S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, i (London, 1948), p. 105.

¹²⁴ Smith, *Innocent and Aragon*, pp. 114-5.

as his overlord and restore all those lands he had unjustly confiscated from orthodox barons, while informing Arnold-Amalric that he had cancelled the indulgence for the fight against heresy on account of its successful conclusion and in preparation for the focussing of Christian energies on the recuperation of the Holy Land.¹²⁵ Innocent clearly did not wish to remove Simon from the Midi, but he now believed the crusader had served his purpose and should integrate with Arago-Catalonian interests. Just as papal support had sustained Simon's independence in the Midi, Innocent now hoped that its withdrawal could bring him to heel.

Simon and a united episcopate would manage not only to mollify Innocent's ire, but to redirect it against Peter and the southern barons. But the pope's impulsive response deprived the crusade of knights for an entire campaign season, leaving Simon's army perilously enfeebled while the allied host gathered at Muret.¹²⁶ More consistently, Innocent's desire for justice in the Midi and his policy of intervention in order to achieve it found him expressing impatience with his crusader, even after the Lateran settlement. He ordered Simon to restore the goods he had confiscated from Doat Alaman in 1216 and, postponing a decision on the county of Foix, ordered the occupied comital castle to be turned over to his delegate, Abbot Berengar of Saint-Thibéry. No more is known about the Doat case, but—despite Roquebert's claim that he obstructed the process—Simon seems to have rendered the fortress promptly enough; all subsequent instructions concerning Foix itself seem to take for granted that Berengar is in possession of the castle.¹²⁷ However, Simon leapt at the opportunity to resume his war with Raymond-Roger

¹²⁵ *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi cc. 741-5, 820; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 97, 128-9, 160.

¹²⁶ *Hystoria*, ii p. 134; below, pp. 89-90.

¹²⁷ *Monumenta slavorum*, i p. 66; *HGL*, viii cc. 682-4; P. de Marca, *Histoire de Bearn* (Paris, 1640), pp. 745-6; 'Honorii epistolæ', ii cc. 119, 124. Pace M. Roquebert, *L'Épopée cathare*, iii (Toulouse, 1986), p. 55.

when the count began fortifying nearby Montgrénier in February 1217.¹²⁸ Popes might interfere with Simon's work through bulls or legates, creating real setbacks, but the crusader exercised his own discretion in relation to his enemies.

After 1213, the most significant contest between Simon's discretion and the papal will came in the contest over the duchy of Narbonne. Ironically, the dispute arose not between Simon and an entrenched heretical sympathiser, but with an old friend: Arnold-Amalric, now archbishop of Narbonne. Upon ascending to his see in May 1212, the legate had usurped the title and prerogatives of duke from the Saint-Gilles. Though the duchy was largely honorific, Arnold-Amalric intended to give it force by compelling homage from the viscount of the city, Aimeric III. But after being invested with the provisional care of Raymond VI's possessions by Innocent in April 1215, Simon argued that he ought to hold the duchy himself.¹²⁹ The archbishop's appeal to Rome naturally found a receptive response from his fellow churchman. Once more, Innocent accused Simon of ingratitude, ordering him to leave Arnold-Amalric in peace or face papal correction.¹³⁰ Simon bided his time, but after the award of the county at the Fourth Lateran Council, he asserted his claim more forcefully, even ignoring an excommunication pronounced by the irate archbishop. Arnold-Amalric once more sought relief from Saint Peter through his new successor, Honorius III, in September 1216. The pope, convinced by Arnold-Amalric's characterisation of Simon as 'qui esset, et sit homo meus', sent orders to his legate Bertrand in March 1217 arguing that Simon should indeed be the archbishop's *vassallus* and taking

¹²⁸ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 279-82; *Canso*, ii p. 258.

¹²⁹ G. Besse, *Histoire des ducs, marquis, et comtes de Narbonne, autrement appelez Princes des Goths, Ducs de Septimanie, et Marquis de Gothie* (Paris, 1660), pp. 452, 455, 466-7; *Hystoria*, ii p. 253.

¹³⁰ Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, pp. 454-5.

archiepiscopal property—including Viscount Aimeric—under papal protection.¹³¹ But Honorius seems to have declined to confirm Arnold-Amalric's excommunication of the crusader. When ordering the procedure for settling the contest, Honorius even allowed Simon to present his case before the legate rather than personally in Rome.¹³² The pope might identify with his fellow bishop to Simon's detriment, but he could not completely turn against the one man who prevented a complete collapse of papal designs in the Midi. For both good and ill, Simon wielded his material sword more immediately and more effectively in the Midi than the pope ever could his spiritual one.

The space between lordships

The Church

But Simon's survival in the face of conflict with kings and popes was not due only to his resources and pluck. His participation in a variety of lordships often allowed him to exploit competing authorities. For all that Simon's actions may have imperfectly reflected papal will, the papacy also provided a crucial support for the crusader when confronted with royal opposition. Though Innocent could hardly have been expected to take notice of Simon's disseisin in 1207, the Leicester problem had come to his attention by 1213. As part of John of England's reconciliation to the Church, the pope ordered the king to restore the confiscated earldom; in addition to satisfying the pope's interest in justice and love for Simon, the mandate

¹³¹ Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, pp. 452-9; 'Honorii epistolæ', ii cc. 318-21; ASV, ms. Reg. vat. 9, f^o 85r^o.

¹³² Appendix A, xxxiv, xxxvii; 'Honorii epistolæ', ii cc. 523-4.

may have been an attempt to provide the crusader with a sop that would appease his ambitions in the Midi and thus keep him from clashing with Peter of Aragon.¹³³ John remained unmoved, however, and it was not until 1215 that Leicester was entrusted to Ranulf, 6th earl of Chester and Simon's cousin. This concession was primarily a response to baronial rebellion, but it must also be seen in view of John's preparations for the Fourth Lateran Council, where he hoped to retain papal favour to settle his many conflicts, including that facing his family in Toulouse.¹³⁴ The previous year, John had attempted to immunise his fiefs in the Agenais, Quercy, and the Toulousain from possible incursions by Simon by committing them to papal protection in the person of the English papal legate Robert of Courson, cardinal-priest of San Stefano al Monte Celio. But papal preference—at least as interpreted by Robert—lay with the crusader: by the time the legate reported the offer to the pope in early August, he had already committed these territories—with the exception of Toulouse—to Simon.¹³⁵ Even in competition with a newly-minted papal vassal, the crusader was able to rely on papal sanction for his efforts against heresy in the Midi.

The Church served as an even more important refuge in Simon's contest with Peter of Aragon, a king similarly dependent on the papacy. Of course, spiritual authority did not exclusively reside in Rome. In fact, it was Simon's unanimous support among the reformed southern episcopate that enabled him to reverse Innocent's scandalised opinion of the crusade in 1213. After the bishops' report from the Council of Lavaur in January, the pope believed he had been misled by the Catalan ambassadors: he reprimanded Peter, ordering him to abandon his

¹³³ 'Annales de Waverleia', p. 278.

¹³⁴ *Patent Rolls*, p. 150; Appendix C; Jolliffe, *Angevin Kingship*, pp. 83-4, 328-9; above, p. 76.

¹³⁵ Vincent, 'Albigensian Crusade', pp. 76-7; *HGL*, viii cc. 653-5.

protectorate of the southern counts.¹³⁶ If Innocent did little more to intervene in the conflict between his two crusading heroes, the southern prelacy clearly rallied behind Simon, even accompanying him to the battle of Muret.¹³⁷ This dedicated backing from the bishops and—to a lesser extent—the pope gave Simon crucial legitimacy as he entered a state of open war with his crowned overlord, ending with the king's death at the hands of his knights.

Philip of France

But Simon was not limited to ecclesiastical alternatives to lordship while on crusade. Philip of France, geographically distant but culturally proximate to the crusader, provided Simon with an even more dynamic source of legitimacy in his struggle to implement his will in the Midi. As early as winter 1210-1211, Philip wrote to Innocent urging the pope to arrange a peace between Peter and Simon; as the former finally accepted the latter's homage for the viscounties of Béziers and Carcassonne in late January 1211, it is entirely possible that this reconciliation was brought about by pressure from both pope and king.¹³⁸ Simon, for his part, understood the utility that his first king offered. Despite his submission to Peter, the Statutes of Pamiers in December 1212 contain no mention of the Aragonese king, his rights, or authority: instead, Simon announces his intention 'pacatem et quietam terram habere et retinere ad honorem Dei et sancte Romane ecclesie et domini regis Francorum'.¹³⁹ Finally, when paying homage to Philip in

¹³⁶ *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi cc. 833-9, 843-4, 849-52, 905; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 132-4.

¹³⁷ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 136-7, 151-2, 162-4, 168-9, 175; Puylaurens, p. 80.

¹³⁸ Delisle, *Catalogue de Philippe*, p. 518; *Hystoria*, i p. 208.

¹³⁹ Ventura Subirats, *Pere i Simó*, p. 116; *HGL*, viii c. 626.

1216 for his conquests, Simon included the viscounties of Béziers and Carcassonne, lands that had lain beyond French influence for nearly a century and a half and which had never been tied so directly to the Crown.¹⁴⁰ As relations with his local overlord deteriorated and finally collapsed, the crusader could rhetorically fall back upon the authority of the French king to continue framing his work in a legitimate temporal context.

The brief struggle with John of England in 1214 offered an even more obvious opportunity for reference to French justification. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay claims that Simon conserved the castles and towns recaptured from the English expeditionary force in the Agenais ‘tam sibi quam Francigenis’.¹⁴¹ Thus the defence of lands dependent upon the English king as duke of Aquitaine against the same is placed not in the context of the crusade, the mandate of which required the respect of superior rights, but in that of the disseisin of John’s continental possessions by Philip.¹⁴² As in the conflict with Peter of Aragon, Philip’s largely passive authority accommodated a shifting rationale for Simon’s conquests according to circumstance.

This adaptability even allowed Simon to appeal to royal jurisdiction when papal attitudes proved unsatisfactory. When Louis of France made his crusade in spring 1215, he arrived amidst the dispute between Simon and Arnold-Amalric over the duchy of Narbonne. Over the objections of the archbishop, Louis supported his fellow layman, ordering the destruction of the city’s walls, taking hostages, and compelling Viscount Aimeric’s submission to Simon in retaliation for the citizens’ reception of Arago-Catalan troops in the wake of Muret.¹⁴³ The

¹⁴⁰ *HGL*, viii c. 685; *RHGF*, xviii p. 719.

¹⁴¹ *Hystoria*, ii p. 210.

¹⁴² *Register Innocenz*, xi p. 34; Powicke, *Loss of Normandy*, p. 148.

¹⁴³ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 253-5; Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, pp. 453, 463; *HGL*, viii cc. 659-60.

prince's intervention on Simon's behalf would do more to decide the fate of the duchy than all Arnold-Amalric's appeals to Rome. This principle carried through the Fourth Lateran Council: Philip's confirmation of the conciliar award in 1216 recognised Simon not only as count of Toulouse but also as duke of Narbonne.¹⁴⁴ The investiture benefited both parties: in addition to resolving the contest over the duchy in Simon's favour, it also allowed Philip to assert his right to dispose of his own fiefs independent of papal will. By manoeuvring toward mutual advantage with distant but powerful overlords, Simon had secured his position in the Midi against the opposition of more proximate authorities.

Simon's relationships with his overlords encompassed both cooperation and antagonism to a greater or lesser degree, and in the case of Peter of Aragon, both elements existed simultaneously. Submission to royal or papal lordship was not always detrimental to Simon's freedom of movement. The competing nature of his multiple overlords meant that he could often play one off the other, especially so long as he could find refuge in an authority with which he shared ideological or cultural ties, such as the papacy or the Capetian monarchy. However, the fluidity of Simon's career as vassal also makes clear how little invested he was in the architecture of the state, if he or his contemporaries would even have recognised such a concept. Indeed, rather than contributing to a nascent France, the interactions of the crusader with his superiors highlight the extranational priorities and opportunities available to the contemporary baronage.

¹⁴⁴ *HGL*, viii c. 685.

II. CRUSADERS

As a knight, Simon's primary identification was with the concerns of his class. When studying Simon's impulse to crusade, therefore, one cannot focus on ideological rhetoric or papal incentive to the exclusion of the attitudes held by the contemporary lay aristocracy. The importance of family and geographical networks to crusading has been noted elsewhere, and this brief and specific survey intends to build from rather than retread or compete with these studies.¹ While Simon's relationships with the Cistercians or Innocent III are much more visible due to the survival of Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay's *Hystoria albigensis* or the papal register, his quotidian contexts made his interactions with other knights and nobles at least as significant—if not more so—to his crusading experience as more literate clerical motivators. Relationships with family members, neighbours, and respected members of the higher nobility all informed his decisions both to take the cross and how to behave under its sign.

Family and the Fourth Crusade

Simon was not born into a family characterised by crusading. Preoccupied with their role in the struggle between France and Normandy, no Montfort had ever taken the road to Jerusalem. Simon's nearest relatives to have taken the cross were his maternal grandfather and uncle—the Beaumont earls of Leicester—who accompanied Richard of England and his wife's paternal

¹ J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders, 1095-1131* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 100-5; M. Bull, *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade: The Limousin and Gascony, c.970-c.1130* (Oxford, 1993), pp. 258-81; Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, pp. 122-3; N. Civel, *La fleur de France: Les seigneurs d'Ile-de-France au XII^e siècle* (Turnhout, 2006), pp. 184-6; Power, 'Who Went on the Albigensian Crusade?', pp. 1058-62.

uncle, Matthew I of Marly, who fought with Philip of France. William of Barres also accompanied the French king to Syria, and an adolescent Simon may have been inspired by the stories of the siege of Acre that his stepfather brought back with him in 1191.² But the account of Simon following on the heels of the German expedition to the Holy Land in 1198—an error repeated most recently by Jonathan Phillips—is in fact a confusion of James of Vitry’s report of Simon’s participation in the Fourth Crusade in 1203, garbled by the compilers of the *Magdeburg Centuries*.³ Nevertheless, Simon, his brother, one of his sons, and his nephew would die on crusade or in Outremer; two of his other sons would participate in crusading ventures; and his brother’s descendants would rank among the most important families in the Midi, Outremer, and Cyprus.⁴ However, at the time of Innocent III’s ascension to the pontifical throne, ‘Montfort’ was not one of the names identified with crusading culture.

In fact, Simon seems to have set the precedent for Montfort crusading in 1199 when he, followed by his younger brother Guy, joined the collective adoption of the cross at the famous tournament of Écry which set in motion the Fourth Crusade. Matthew of Marly was also present at the tournament and resolved to return to the Holy Land; both Simon and Matthew would travel to Burgundy the following year to encourage Odo of Burgundy to lead the crusade. The two men shared other social connexions, serving as witnesses to the same acts and supporting local

² Richard of Holy Trinity, ‘Itinerarium regis Ricardi’, in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*, ed. W. Stubbs, i (London, 1864), p. 217; Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, iii pp. 88, 94; Rigord, ‘Gesta Philippi Augusti’, in *Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, historiens de Philippe-Auguste*, ed. H.-F. Delaborde, i (Paris, 1882), pp. 83, 107 106-10, 113, 115-7; Appendix C.

³ *Hystoria*, i p. 110; *Ernoul*, p. 360; *Eracles*, p. 263; James of Vitry, *Histoire orientale: Historia orientalis*, ed. and trans. J. Donnadieu (Turnhout, 2008), p. 466; M. Flacius, et al., *Ecclesiastica historia, secundum singulas centurias*, viii (Basel, 1569), c. 1930; J. Phillips, *The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople* (London, 2004), p. 49.

⁴ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 314-5; *Canso*, iii pp. 206-8; Puylaurens, pp. 102, 104, 126; Rhein, ‘Seigneurie de Montfort’, pp. 81-5; Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort*, pp. 29-30, 106-7; Tyerman, *God’s War*, pp. 726-7.

Cistercian houses.⁵ However, Simon's relationship with his wife's uncle does not seem to have been especially close and likely played little part in Simon's decision to take the cross. The independent authority of Simon over his family group in the Fourth Crusade is confirmed by the actions surrounding the crusade's diversion to Zara and then Constantinople. Simon is listed as chief among those who opposed the attack on Zara by eyewitnesses and other participants in the crusade. Meanwhile, Matthew of Marly had been ill at Venice during the attack on Zara, but was an enthusiastic supporter of the Constantinopolitan adventure which triggered Simon's departure from the army.⁶ The Montfort-Montmorency connexions within the crusade army must therefore have been insufficiently strong to prevent Simon's desertion from the main host. This is not especially surprising; Simon's relation to Matthew was distant and by marriage rather than blood. Furthermore, it had been Matthew who had captured Simon's uncle, Robert of Leicester, in 1194, leading to the earl's renunciation of Pacy two years later for which Simon had stood surety. Although Simon and Robert fought on separate sides of the Norman wars, their family ties were likely stronger than those between Simon and his fellow Frenchman.⁷ While Simon's decision to crusade in 1199 and his behaviour at the crisis around Zara in 1202-1203 were reinforced by the

⁵ Villehardouin, i pp. 4-6, 10, 38-40, 110; Clari, pp. 1-2, 3; *Ernoul*, p. 337; *Eracles*, p. 243; Lippiatt, 'Duty and Desertion', p. 82; *Moulineaux*, p. 7; *RAPA*, ii p. 237; *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 67, 71-2, 76, 130-1, 136-7, 140; *Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Porrois*, ed. A. de Dion (Paris, 1903), pp. 25-30; *Cartulaire de l'abbaye royale de Notre-Dame de Bon-Port*, ed. J. Andrieux (Évreux, 1862), pp. 5-6, 29-30.

⁶ *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, eds. E. Martène and U. Durand, i (Paris, 1717), c. 784; R. Pokorny, 'Zwei unedierte Briefe aus der Frühzeit des lateinischen Kaisereiches von Konstantinopel' *Byzantion* 55 (1985), p. 204; *Hystoria*, i pp. 108-10; *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, p. 133; Villehardouin, i pp. 80, 90, 110-2, 150, 172, 186-8; Clari, p. 14; *Ernoul*, pp. 351-2; *Eracles*, p. 255; Lippiatt, 'Duty and Desertion', pp. 86-7; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon anglicanum*, ed. J. Stevenson (London, 1875), p. 143.

⁷ *Philippid*, p. 117; above, p. 41. Beyond distance or family tensions, another reason for Simon's lack of deference to the elder Montmorency on the Fourth Crusade may have been social inequality. Even if Simon was not himself an earl in 1199-1203, the Montforts were known to be closely related to several comital families in England, and he is listed by both Villehardouin, i p. 6 and Clari, pp. 1-2 with or immediately following the crusader counts. Moreover, perceptions of Simon as a count were already circulating by 1200: below, pp. 164-8.

legacy of his mother's kin and the loyalty of his brother, he acted as a sovereign representative of his family at the start of its two generations of crusading history.

Family and the Albigensian Crusade

A decade and more later, Simon was joined by a number of family relations on the Albigensian Crusade, though his authority over them was predicated more on his formal status as crusader captain than his seniority among the kinship group. His closest knightly relative, Guy—now husband of the important Frankish noblewoman, Hawise of Ibelin—had remained in Outremer after Simon's departure in 1206 and was not in France to follow Simon south along the Rhône in 1209.⁸ However, Walcher of Joigny, Simon's future son-in-law, was with the army, as was Alice of Montmorency's cousin, Bouchard of Marly—son of Matthew, who had died at Constantinople—who remained in Simon's service for three years, despite the differences between Simon and his father on the Fourth Crusade. Bouchard and Simon had shared ecclesiastical interests in France; both were benefactors of the Cistercian nunnery of Porrois, which had been founded by Bouchard's parents. In the Midi, Bouchard endured capture by Peter-Roger of Cabaret, negotiated the surrender of the same castle nearly a year and a half later, and fought at the battle of Castelnaudary in 1211. His service earned him the lordship of Saissac in the Montagne Noire and a place in Simon's court.⁹ Bouchard likely joined the crusade

⁸ *Ernoul*, p. 360; *Eracles*, p. 263; *Hystoria*, i p. 286.

⁹ *Hystoria*, i pp. 83, 126-8, 213, 262-3, 265, 267-70; Villehardouin, i p. 204; *Necrologe de l'abbaye de Notre-Dame de Port-Roïal des Champs*, ed. A. Rivet de la Grange (Amsterdam, 1723), p. 252; *Porrois*, pp. 30, 36-7, 38; *Canso*, i pp. 102-4, 156-60, 210, 216-26; *HGL*, viii cc. 578, 608, 612, 660; AN, J 890, n° 15; Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, pp. 145-7.

independently of his cousin's husband, but his decision to stay in the south and Simon's favour towards him may well have derived from family connexions.

The Montforts

After Simon's election to the leadership the Albigensian Crusade, his family served as a recruiting ground as more of his relations came to the Midi, drawn by piety, ties of kinship, and the promise of confiscated estates. The most important of these was his brother, Guy, who sailed from Outremer with his wife and family in 1211 and joined the crusader for Christmas. Enfeoffed with Rabastens by 1216, he naturally became Simon's right-hand man, providing counsel, witnessing acts, leading separate campaigns on his brother's behalf when reinforcements allowed, and fighting on in the Midi after 1218 until his own death before Varilhes in 1228. In 1215, Guy led the first crusader force to occupy Toulouse and even represented Simon at the Fourth Lateran Council. Their obvious familial affection was reinforced by a shared belief in the crusading cause: after the death of his wife, Hawise, Guy demonstrated their ideological devotion to the struggle against heresy by endowing the priory of Notre-Dame de Prouille with 50*s.mg.* at Rabastens in June 1216.¹⁰ This intimacy meant that Simon could rely on Guy as an unfailing supporter and representative throughout his campaigns in the south.

¹⁰ *Hystoria*, i pp. 285-7, ii pp. 11, 25-7, 28-9, 46, 48-9, 57-8, 120-2, 178, 206, 233, 256-7, 261, 269-72, 295; *Monumenta diplomatica sancti Dominici*, ed. V.J. Koudelka (Rome, 1966), p. 68; *HGL*, vii pp. 124-5, viii pp. 652, 687; L. Ménard, *Histoire civile, ecclésiastique, et littéraire de la ville de Nîmes*, i (Paris, 1744), preuves, p. 54; Appendix A, xxi; *Canso*, i pp. 258, 270, 280, ii pp. 10-2, 74, 120, 186, 286-8, iii pp. 204-6; Puylaurens, pp. 82, 92, 126.

Inevitably, Simon's two eldest sons also played important roles both in his campaigns and his political regime. They probably came south with their mother as boys in 1210.¹¹ The eldest, Amalric, was knighted outside Castelnaudary on 24 June 1213, amidst the build-up to the Muret campaign. The ceremony was one uncharacteristically dominated by the clergy, as Amalric was dubbed during Mass and girded with the chivalric belt by the episcopal brothers Manasses of Orléans and William of Auxerre. As Maurice Keen notes, Gregorian reformers had long hoped that the rite of dubbing might 'symbolise, powerfully, [the] primary obligation of knighthood to the ecclesiastical order and its authority.' But while Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay may have overestimated the novelty of this procedure, he was certainly correct that it was uncommon and contrary to custom. Simon had had to beg the bishop of Orléans at length to administer the belt until he finally consented. The desire for an episcopal dubbing fits neatly with Simon's wider identification with the reform of Christian society and the place of chivalry within it. But it may also reflect an assertion of his independence from temporal jurisdiction; if knighthood was customarily conferred by the prospective knight's lord, Amalric should have been dubbed by Philip of France or Peter of Aragon. Receiving the belt instead at the hands of the bishop further signalled his father's belief that his tenure in the Midi ultimately answered to no other authority than the Church.¹² Amalric's entry into the chivalric class as a man with legal standing, social privileges, and political responsibilities was framed by a projection of Simon's vision not only of his own crusading mission but that of the dynasty he wished to establish in his conquered lands.

¹¹ *HGL*, viii cc. 606, 608; *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i p. 188; *Hystoria*, i p. 146.

¹² *Hystoria*, ii pp. 123-4; M. Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven, 1984), pp. 74-6; A. Luchaire, *La société française au temps de Philippe Auguste* (Paris, 1909), pp. 371-2.

Simon immediately charged his newly commissioned son with independent campaigns like his uncle, though he seems not to have had as much confidence in Amalric's untested ability to handle himself, interfering in the Gascon campaign in 1213 and the siege of Toulouse in 1217. His second son, Guy, was also active on the battlefield during the last years of Simon's life, fighting at Beaucaire and Toulouse and receiving a wound at the latter siege. The two men also served Simon's wider strategic goals through their marriages. In 1214 Amalric wedded Beatrice of Vienne, niece of Simon's friend, Odo of Burgundy, thus creating a strong dynastic alliance with the powerful families to the northeast, whilst Guy's 1216 marriage to Petronilla of Bigorre ensured—at least in theory—Simon's control over his southwestern frontier.¹³ Whether or not Simon's sons ever held the canonical status of crusaders, they were intimately involved in their father's work in the Midi.

The Barres

Outside of his immediate full-blood relations, Simon also found support on the Albigensian Crusade from the Barres, his mother's family by her second marriage. As noted above, William II of Barres, Simon's stepfather, had already taken the cross in 1188 and travelled to the Holy Land with the king. After Simon reached his majority, the two men fought and attended court together.¹⁴ William and his namesake son, Simon's uterine brother, each performed a quarantine as crusaders. The younger William arrived in the Midi in September

¹³ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 124-5, 127, 135-6, 184-5, 206-7, 214-5, 269-70, 279, 299; *Canso*, ii pp. 120, 128, 174, 188, 256, iii pp. 14-6, 18-20, 74-6. That Guy was wounded by his own father-in-law, Bernard of Comminges, as recorded in the continuation of the *Canso*, is not impossible but more likely a poetic invention.

¹⁴ *Philippid*, p. 133; *RAPA*, ii pp. 237, 296; above, p. 94.

1213 in time to reinforce Simon's exceptionally thin forces at the battle of Muret, commanding the charge that killed King Peter of Aragon. His father journeyed southward with a detachment of two hundred pilgrims early in the following year, again providing welcome reinforcements to the crusader army threatened by lingering Arago-Catalan forces concentrated at Narbonne.

William commanded the third corps of the crusading army in an attack on that city, where he drove the enemy back to the gates, shielding his stepson who had been unhorsed in the initial assault.¹⁵ However, neither man remained in the Midi for long; both probably returned to France upon the completion of their quarantine. The Barres were ultimately dedicated to royal service in a way that Simon had chosen not to be; with such divergent priorities, the assistance he and his son could offer to Simon was necessarily limited.

The Montmorencys

On the other hand, Simon's wife Alice of Montmorency gave herself wholeheartedly to the *negotium pacis et fidei*. A woman praised for her ability by both Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay and William of Tudela, Alice first arrived in the Midi in March 1210 and played an active part in her husband's work until his death and beyond. Not only did she lead reinforcements in support of Simon's campaigns in March 1210, July 1212, and May 1218, but on several occasions of crisis she pleaded with crusaders eager to depart at the end of their quarantine to remain with the army of God. She partook in Simon's councils and likely helped determine policy. After becoming countess of Toulouse, she governed the comital city in Simon's absence with a zeal for

¹⁵ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 143-4, 194-6; *Philippid*, pp. 235-6; *Canso*, ii p. 26; Puylaurens, p. 82; 'Annales de Waverleia', p. 279; *MGHS*, xxiii p. 902; *RHGF*, xxiv, p. 611.

Christian reform apparently equal to that of her husband. Moreover, when the city revolted in 1217 she organised the immediate defence of the Château Narbonnais and held out until crusader reinforcements could arrive.¹⁶ It is difficult to imagine a more active medieval female counterpart to Simon of Montfort.

Alice's family did not quite share her dedication. Despite Bouchard of Marly's lordship of Saissac, he had returned to France by late spring 1212. He was almost certainly not in the Midi again until Louis of France's crusade in spring 1215. The anonymous continuator of the *Canso* imagines him at Simon's councils before Toulouse in summer 1218, but Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay only mentions him marching south at Christmas after Simon's death. However, Bouchard does not seem to have forfeited his southern fiefs—as stipulated in the Statutes of Pamiers for extended absences of French barons—and was once more witnessing Simon's acts during his brief visit in 1215.¹⁷ This suggests that his return to Marly had the crusader captain's blessing; for whatever reason—perhaps even familial indulgence—Simon does not seem to have opposed Bouchard's departure and the consequent loss of critical manpower.

Of course, at the time of his return to Marly in 1212, Bouchard had already given more to the *negotium pacis et fidei* than most quarantine participants. Nor was the rest of the Montmorency clan indifferent to Simon's work. A Roger of *Andelis* or *Andelit* mentioned in the *Canso* as being one of the knights who remained at Simon's side in 1209 and who later fought at Beaucaire and Toulouse may have been a vassal of the Montmorencys for the nearby fief of

¹⁶ *Hystoria*, i pp. 111, 146, 185, ii pp. 38, 294-5, 305-6, 319-20; *Canso*, i pp. 120, 260, 266, ii pp. 282-4, 298, iii pp. 82, 104-6; S. ibn Verga, *Sefer Shevet Yehuda*, ed. A. Shohet (Jerusalem, 1947), p. 148; *MGHS*, xxvi p. 282; M. Zerner, 'L'épouse de Simon de Montfort et la croisade albigeoise', in *Femmes-Mariages-Lignages, XII^e-XIV^e siècles* (Brussels, 1992), pp. 451-3, 456-7, 461-2; below, pp. 305-6.

¹⁷ *HGL*, viii cc. 608, 629, 659-60; du Chesne, *Montmorency*, preuves, pp. 397-8; *Porrois*, pp. 40-3, 44-6, 58, 61; *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i p. 185; *RAPA*, iii pp. 377-8, 483; AN, J 890, n° 15; *Canso*, iii pp. 154-8, 172; *Hystoria*, ii p. 320; Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, p. 147.

Andilly.¹⁸ Among the Marlys, Bouchard's mother, Mathilda of Garlande, was present at the fall of Minerve in July 1210, where she convinced three perfected Albigensian women to return to the Church, thereby saving them from execution. Matthew II of Marly, Bouchard's younger brother, was also at Castelnaudary in the autumn of 1211 and tried to muster local assistance for the besieged crusaders. Finally, Matthew II of Montmorency, Alice's brother, also accompanied Louis' pilgrimage of 1215.¹⁹ Simon and his brother-in-law were not strangers: in addition to serving together at the royal court, they cooperated over alienations from Alice's dowry. Matthew had witnessed Simon's government in France, and Simon had even judged a suit between Matthew and the church of Saint-Denis in February 1208.²⁰ But the operative element of Montmorency involvement was clearly its cumulative nature: Bouchard's involvement made the enterprise that much more attractive to his mother and brother. It is also probable that Alice herself played an important role in soliciting support for her husband among her family; Mathilda of Garlande may have joined her on the journey to the Midi in early 1210. Other considerations were also at play, of course. Matthew of Montmorency's involvement in 1215 probably had as much to do with his prince as with his sister. However, Alice no doubt served as an effective Montmorency recruiter, a fact recognised even by the continuator of the *Canso*.²¹ By the end of the summer of 1215, nearly all the knighted members of her family had come to her husband's aid at least once.

¹⁸ *Canso*, i p. 92, ii p. 128, iii p. 76; Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, pp. 143-4.

¹⁹ *Hystoria*, i p. 161, 262, ii pp. 243-4, 319-20; du Chesne, *Montmorency*, preuves, p. 81.

²⁰ *RAPA*, ii p. 237; Appendix A, i; J. Depoin, 'Les comtes de Beaumont-sur-Oise et le prieuré de Conflans-Sainte-Honorine', *Mémoires de la Société historique et archéologique de l'arrondissement de Pontoise et du Vexin* 33 (1915), p. 97; 'Saint-Thomas', p. 16; du Chesne, *Montmorency*, preuves, pp. 77-8.

²¹ *Hystoria*, i p. 146; *HGL*, viii c. 660; *Canso*, iii p. 84; Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, p. 148. Woehl is mistaken in dating Matthew of Montmorency's participation to 1212.

However, the Montmorency-Marly clan, with the natural exception of Alice herself, proved as reluctant as the Barres to commit themselves to a permanent role in the the Midi. Simon's distant relatives, particularly the Marlays, were interested in the crusade and its programme and drawn and inspired by Simon's role therein, but not enough to remain at his side for an indefinite duration. Both Matthew of Montmorency and William of Barres would define their careers by service to Philip Augustus rather than the Church. Thus only Bouchard was rewarded with fiefs confiscated from heretical sympathisers, but even he did not personally administer his southern lands for more than a few years. In fact, in this case Simon's family ties may have worked against him; the crusader's political and martial administration were depleted after Bouchard's departure in 1212, but his affinity may have pushed Simon to overlook his own penal ordinances designed to protect the crusade's military effectiveness, allowing his cousin-in-law to serve as an absentee lord. The crusader and his vision were charismatic, but not enough to draw his wider family out of the orbit of the French king to whose cause and munificence they were so firmly wedded.

The intensity of devotion among Simon's family was clearly correlative with the proximity of blood ties. It was amongst the Montforts, Simon's brother and children, that he found the most enduring support for the crusade in his family. His eldest sons literally earned their spurs on the southern battlefields alongside their father, and his brother would found a cadet dynasty in the region that would outlive its elder branch and survive until the fourteenth century. Whilst Alice was able to bring frequent temporary assistance from her relations, Simon unsurprisingly proved to be the central point which would draw lifelong and even trans-generational commitment to the *negotium pacis et fidei*.

Land grants

Simon's ability to inspire such dedication was by no means limited to his immediate family, however. Particularly on the Albigensian Crusade, he recruited men from a variety of regions, especially France. An important element of obtaining this service was the distribution of confiscated lands formerly belonging to heretics or their defenders. The Third Lateran Council had laid the basis for this policy, the decretists in their *summe* had provided the legal justification, and Innocent in *Rem crudelem* had authorised its application in the Midi. Simon himself was the first to benefit from this clause upon his election to the viscounties of Béziers and Carcassonne in August 1209.²² Many of those crusaders who remained at his side soon received lordships in the former Trencavel lands as well as parts of the county of Foix as they were secured by the crusade. In addition to Bouchard of Marly's lordship of Saissac, Guy I of Lévis received Mirepoix and Lambert of Thury Limoux; the latter was also lord of Puivert by 1213.²³ Such recompense was not only an incentive to attract crusaders to the south, but also a practical necessity for the maintenance of Simon's following far from home.

As more crusaders came south over the following years, a number chose to stay with Simon to see to the ultimate success of the *negotium pacis et fidei* and obtained estates from Simon for their dedication. As he was already castellan of Carcassonne, Philip Gorloin had probably been with the crusade for some time—perhaps even since 1209—when Simon created a

²² *Conciliarum decreta*, pp. 224-5; F.H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1975), p. 114; *Register Innocenz'*, xi p. 34; *Canso*, i pp. 80-8; *Hystoria*, i pp. 99, 101-2; Puylaurens, p. 62.

²³ *Hystoria*, p. 84n. a, 120; *HGL*, viii c. 669; *Canso*, i pp. 90, 94; *Monumenta Dominici*, pp. 45-6; above, p. 96.

lordship for him in the Razès in April 1212.²⁴ By September 1212, a William of Essarts had received the lordship of Villesiscle, while Hugh of Lacy was lord of Castelnaudary and Laurac by May 1213.²⁵ Alan of Roucy had taken the cross in 1211, and remained in Simon's service as lord of Montréal and Bram by June 1214 and of Termes by August of the following year.²⁶ Though it is unclear when Simon so enfeoffed him, Theobald of Nonneville was almost certainly lord of Rieux in the Minervois during the chief crusader's lifetime.²⁷ All of these crusaders seem to have obtained their lordships after several years of campaigning. Some, such as Philip or Theobald, likely rose through the ranks of Simon's household, while others perhaps needed time to prove themselves to Simon before being entrusted with sensitive responsibilities in the heart of his viscounties.

As the crusade expanded into the lands of the neighbouring counts of Toulouse and Foix, distribution of territory became more immediate. After the fall of Lavaur in May 1211, the crusade occupied the abandoned castle of Puylaurens, and Simon handed the stronghold over to Guy of Lucy.²⁸ With the fall of Moissac in September 1212, Simon granted towns up the Garonne as far as Verdun to William of Contres, Baldwin of Saint-Gilles, and Peter of Cisse.²⁹ Enguerrand of Boves and Everard of Villepreux seem to have received lands upon their arrival.

²⁴ *Hystoria*, p. 84n. a; *HGL*, viii c. 608; *Carcassonne*, iii p. 234.

²⁵ *Monumenta Dominici*, pp. 33, 45. William may have been a relative of the better-documented Norman Roger of Essarts, or perhaps another knight altogether from Les Essarts in the lordship of Montfort: below, p. 108.

²⁶ *Hystoria*, i pp. 274-5; *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 51; Puylaurens, p. 110; *HGL*, viii cc. 673-6.

²⁷ *RHGF*, xxiv p. 612.

²⁸ *Hystoria*, i pp. 230, 250-1, ii p. 10. Puylaurens may later have passed to Foucault of Berzy, perhaps after Guy of Lucy returned to Normandy, as there is no mention of Guy in the southern sources after the restoration of Puylaurens in May 1212: Puylaurens, pp. 108n. 1, 110; Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, pp. 159n. 264, 162.

²⁹ *Canso*, i p. 276; *Hystoria*, ii p. 188.

Enguerrand, a fellow dissenter who had abandoned the Fourth Crusade at Zara, fought at Simon's side for several months beginning in the summer of 1212. Within this short time, Simon entrusted him with much of the county of Foix—perhaps as much as had thus far been occupied, save Pamiers and the demesnes of Guy of Lévis and Lambert of Thury. However, Enguerrand does not seem to have remained in the Midi for very long after endowing the Dominican priory at Prouille in December 1212.³⁰ Everard remained with the crusade for much longer, first appearing in the southern sources making donations of confiscated estates and revenues at Prouille in 1213. Two years later, he was lord of Lanta southeast of Toulouse.³¹ Simon's reasons for doling out these lands so quickly may reflect his loss of confidence in native fidelity and a special intimacy with these men. By the time he assumed control of Puylaurens, Guy had been with the crusade for nearly a year. Likewise, Simon had known William, Baldwin, and Peter each for at least a year; William and probably Peter had served him since 1209.³² Personal familiarity probably counted for much with Enguerrand and Everard as well, judging from their swift possession of property in the Carcassès; the former had likely made an impression on Simon at Zara in 1202-1203, and the latter was the brother-in-law of his close friend, Robert Mauvoisin.³³ More importantly, perhaps—given Enguerrand's relatively brief stay in the Midi—Simon had given them lands where his effective control was limited, thus creating an incentive for the continued service of their lords who held the responsibilities and opportunities that came

³⁰ *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, p. 133; Villehardouin, i p. 112; Clari, p. 14; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 26, 51; *Monumenta Dominici*, pp. 38-9.

³¹ É. de Teule, *Annales du prieuré de Notre-Dame de Prouille* (Carcassonne, 1902), p. 48; Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, p. 140.

³² *Hystoria*, i pp. 155, 233-5; *Canso*, i pp. 88-90, 184-6; Puylaurens, p. 72. Peter of Cissey is presumably the same as or a close relative of the Simon of Cissey mentioned by William of Tudela.

³³ *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, p. 133; Villehardouin, i pp. 110-2; Clari, p. 14; AN, KK 1064, f^o 138r^o.

with pacifying them. If this strategy did not work in Enguerrand's case, it is also true that his departure did not cost Simon anything he had firmly gained. These enfeoffments thus benefited both parties and functioned in a more complex manner than simple rewards for service.

Even so, the acquisition of forfeit southern lands by greedy northern nobles has long been a standard explanation of the motivations of crusaders to the Midi, especially among historians of a regionalist persuasion.³⁴ In respect to a number of Simon's followers, Christine Woehl has taken this thesis and married it to the even older explanation of the crusading movement more generally: that these men were younger sons squeezed out of an inheritance in France by primogeniture and therefore searching for new lands to acquire by force. Guy of Lévis offers a particularly salient example. Saddled by the debts of his late father, the family estate was already subject to significant mortgage when it passed to Guy's elder brother, leaving little to the younger sons. Likewise, the brothers Robert, Amalric, and William of Poissy, 'wie so viele jüngere Söhne von Adelsfamilien, sahen sich gezwungen, nach einem zusätzlichen Auskommen Ausschau zu halten. Die Teilnahme am Albigenserkreuzzug bot daher eine willkommene Möglichkeit.'³⁵ According to Woehl, the estates exposed to confiscation by the crusade thus furnished Simon with a useful incentive to attract devoted service from those driven by a general acquisitive spirit or others in need of a landed livelihood.

This theory, however, bears little relation to the evidence. Many of the crusaders who fought with Simon had—as he did—important French estates of their own. Bouchard of Marly,

³⁴ Girou, *Simon de Montfort*, pp. 57-8; Ventura Subirats, *Pere i Simó*, p. 91; Roquebert, *Épopée cathare*, i (1970), pp. 230, 236, 281.

³⁵ AN, LL 1157, pp. 539-40; Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, pp. 125-6, 138-9.

Alan of Roucy, Enguerrand of Boves, and Roard of Donges are prominent examples.³⁶ Despite the financial straits of his family, Guy of Lévis also held fiefs in France before and after campaigning in the south.³⁷ These demesnes may not have been as large as those available in the Midi, but they were more secure and easier to transfer to succeeding generations. Nor had the French conquest of Normandy necessarily put an end to opportunities for expansion. Roger of Essarts and Robert of Poissy, for example, had received confiscated Norman fiefs from Philip Augustus before and during the Albigensian Crusade.³⁸ In fact, not only did Robert—referred to as *dives* in a royal cartulary of enfeoffments—and the other Poissys hold rents and estates in France, there is no evidence that they received any from Simon during their time in the Midi. This did not stop William and Amalric from refusing to surrender a castle they were garrisoning for Simon in 1209 until they were both captured, nor prevent Robert from crusading in autumn 1209 and again in February 1218.³⁹ Of the twenty-four knights listed by Pierre Belperron who formed Simon's 'équipe', only nine possessed southern fiefs; the list does not include Peter of Richebourg, Ferrin of Issy, or Peter of Voisins.⁴⁰ Peter of Richebourg may have only been with

³⁶ *Registres de Philippe*, i pp. 310, 317-9; BnF, ms. nouv. acq. fr. 7356, f^o 417r^o-v^o; *HGL*, viii cc. 581, 608, 609; *Pedro el Católico*, iii p. 1175; *Canso*, i p. 92.

³⁷ *Gallia christiana*, vii instr., pp. 77-8, 79-80; *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 289-90, 310.

³⁸ *RAPA*, ii p. 331, iii pp. 433-4.

³⁹ BnF, ms. ms. nouv. acq. fr. 7356, f^{os} 562r^o-v^o, 701v^o; lat. 13888, f^o 33r^o; AdY, 46H 5, laisse 22; 46H 6, laisse 7; *Abbecourt-en-Pinserais: Recueil des chartes et documents*, ed. J. Depoin (Pontoise, 1913), pp. 29, 37, 42; *Registres de Philippe*, i p. 319; *HGL*, viii cc. 578, 580; *RHGF*, xix p. 677.

⁴⁰ Belperron, *Croisade*, pp. 187-8. Such crusaders were instead compensated by wages: C. Tyerman, 'Paid Crusaders: "Pro honoris vel pecunie"; "stipendiarii contra paganos": Money and Incentives on Crusade', in *The Practices of Crusading: Image and Action from the Eleventh to the Sixteenth Centuries* (Farnham, Surr., 2013), pp. 11-3.

the crusade for around a year,⁴¹ but the latter two knights served at Simon's side for at least four years each and probably more; none received lands in the south.⁴² Even some crusaders who did receive important lordships from Simon, like Bouchard of Marly and Enguerrand of Boves, did not remain constant companions, returning to France for long periods or permanently.⁴³ This is not to say that the opportunity for new lands and titles played no role in the decisions of any crusaders from 1209 to 1218; clearly such compensation was attractive to those with the adventuring spirit or ideological conviction necessary to acquire and hold their gains. Furthermore, the confiscation of heretical lands by orthodox lords who would defend the Faith was the very object of the Albigensian Crusade. But the actual evidence of individual enfeoffments does suggest a picture quite different from that of a greedy northern horde driven from France by overpopulation and primogeniture, intent only on enriching themselves on exposed southern fiefs.

⁴¹ *HGL*, viii cc. 580, 589, 606. The last act should be redated to 12 March 1211, as it explicitly makes use of a Christmas-dating calendar. This date also fits better with Simon's itinerary, as he was at Carcassonne at mid-Lent 1211 and before the walls of Saint-Marcel in March 1212: *Hystoria*, i pp. 211-2, 289-92; *Canso*, i pp. 246-8. Peter of Richebourg had certainly returned to France by March 1215: C. Gautier, 'Histoire de l'abbaye royale de Notre-Dame de Grandchamp', *Mémoires de la Société archéologique d'Eure-et-Loir* 13 (1904), p. 150.

⁴² *HGL*, viii cc. 608, 612, 652, 657, 658, 659-60, 673, 677; E. Lyon, 'Daudé de Prades et la croisade albigeoise', in *Mélanges de linguistique et de littérature offerts à M. Alfred Jeanroy* (Paris, 1928), p. 392; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 304-5; *Canso*, ii p. 238; iii pp. 74, 84, 94, 98, 170, 202. Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, p. 142n. 159 claims that Peter was enfeoffed with La Redorte and Quercorb during Simon's lifetime, but she has misidentified him Peter of Vic, the indigenous lord of Quercorb, who gave La Redorte to Prouille in April 1216: *Monumenta Dominici*, pp. 66-7.

⁴³ Above, pp. 101, 106.

Religious connexions

A more interesting explanation for why men took the cross to fight against heresy may be found in the cartularies of French religious houses. Abbeys and priories, especially Cistercian ones, operated as centres of networks of common eleemosynary policy that bound local lords not only to the monastic community and its ideology but also to each other. The common devotions of the Marlys, Montmorencys, and the Montforts has already been noted. Outside of the family, Simon had confirmed the rights of the abbey of Saint-Magloire de Paris to the castle chapel at Montfort in 1197; Guy of Lévis' father and brother, Philip and Alexander, had become vassals of the abbey the previous year.⁴⁴ The Montforts and the Gorloins shared a close relationship with the priory of Saint-Arnoult in southern Yveline, while both Simon and the Poissys exempted Bonport in Normandy from tolls on the Seine.⁴⁵ But the house most responsible for the circle that formed around Simon during the Albigensian Crusade was naturally the abbey of Vaux-de-Cernay. Simon's family had been benefactors of the Cistercians there for three generations by 1209.⁴⁶ While there is no evidence for grants made by the Lévis before the Albigensian Crusade, their lands marched with the abbatial demesne.⁴⁷ The Poissys and Voisins, however, had links with the abbey that crossed generations and family branches.⁴⁸ In addition to favouring Saint-Arnoult, Philip Gorloin's father, Sevin, not only donated to Vaux-de-Cernay but also stood

⁴⁴ *Saint-Magloire*, i pp. 173, 177.

⁴⁵ *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i p. 68; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 308-9, 311, 313; *Gallia christiana*, viii instr., cc. 524-5; *Bon-Port*, pp. 5, 29-30.

⁴⁶ *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 64-5, 71-2, 140, 168-9, 180.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 289-90, 310.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-2, 100, 103, 139-40, 168, 180.

as witness on the monks' behalf for endowments made by others.⁴⁹ The Cistercians at Vaux-de-Cernay, as proponents of the crusading movements of the early thirteenth century, were essential not only to the mobilisation of the Yvelinois for the Albigensian Crusade in 1208, but also to these crusaders' continued adherence to the project under Simon's command. Once in the south, Guy of Lévis went so far as to insist on admission as a lay brother of the Cistercian abbey of Boulbonne; this was partially in order to retain rights to goods disputed between himself and the community, but it also points to his growing attachment to the order—no doubt encouraged by his friendship with Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay—and a desire to benefit from the white monks' spiritual capital.⁵⁰ While not creating the same binding ties as those of family or service, common religious interests proved important not only to crusade recruiting but also to retention.

Personal loyalty

The greatest contributor to the unity of his followers, however, was almost certainly the personal dynamics of Simon as an inspiring captain. As dedicated as the crusader and his lieutenants may have been to the ideology propagated by reforming elements of the Church, they remained knights—members of a class that had consistently proved resistant to overt clerical domination.⁵¹ Simon was therefore a necessary lay figure who bridged the gap between ecclesiastical ideology and chivalric practice. No doubt many of his cadre, especially those with

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 50, 59, 64.

⁵⁰ *HGL*, viii c. 669.

⁵¹ Luchaire, *Société française*, p. 183-4; R. Kaeuper, *Holy Warriors: The Religious Ideology of Chivalry* (Philadelphia, 2009), pp. 72, 143-66.

ties to Vaux-de-Cernay, were themselves invested in the *negotium pacis et fidei*. Nevertheless, they required a knight like themselves—rather than a monk like Arnold-Amalric or Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay—to lead them on campaign and into battle for the duration.

As a result, Simon's ability to inspire their continued service became essential. For many among the Yvelinois, such devotion was nothing new. Peter of Voisins' father, William, had testified as a knight of Montfort during the 1160 inquest into royal and seigneurial rights in Yveline, suggesting that the family was dependent on the lordship.⁵² Likewise, Philip of Lévis had witnessed an act of Simon in favour of Saint-Magloire in 1197 and attended the royal court with him in 1202, while the Gorloins witnessed three other acts before the Fourth Crusade and may even have accompanied him to Syria.⁵³ The Poissys' vassalage to the Montforts was probably recorded after Simon's death, but it almost certainly predated the formal record in theory or practice; the same is true of Peter of Richebourg and Theobald of Nonneville, who hailed from Les Essarts.⁵⁴ Crispin and Philip of Rochefort and Rotrold of Montfort were probably knights of the Montfort household.⁵⁵ All of these men came from lands within or in close proximity to the lordship of Montfort. Among the Normans, Peter of Ciskey and Roger of Essarts hailed from the Évrecin; the fact that these two Norman knights fought for Simon for nearly four years until their brutal deaths at the fall of Pujol in July 1213 suggests that the Montfort name still carried weight in their old county.⁵⁶ These men were familiar with Simon

⁵² *Registres de Philippe*, i p. 51.

⁵³ *Saint-Magloire*, i p. 177; *RAPA*, ii pp. 296-7; AdY, 13F 7; 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 13, 16.

⁵⁴ Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 381, 386, 392.

⁵⁵ Rhein, *Seigneurie de Montfort*, p. 311; *HGL*, viii cc. 612; *Canso*, i pp. 124, 130.

⁵⁶ *RAPA*, ii pp. 180-1; *Layettes*, i p. 217; *Canso*, i pp. 88, 92, ii pp. 6-10; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 118-9, 125-6; Puylaurens, p. 76; Power, *Norman Frontier*, p. 294; above, p. 36.

and his ancestors as their neighbours and lords, and were content to follow him as such in the Midi, at least for a few years.

But at whichever point it became clear that the army of Christ would be needed in the south permanently, the fidelity of Simon's followers required more than simple traditions of vassalage to ensure their continued participation. The distribution of conquered fiefs and a common ideological purpose were necessary elements of the crusade's cohesion, but likely insufficient in themselves. The animating force behind the devotion that Simon inspired was the loyalty which he showed towards his followers. The clearest demonstration of this principle appeared not in the great hall or on campaign, but in the bedroom. Marital fidelity is a quality notoriously difficult even for spouses to ascertain, but Simon was remarkable for a man of his class and historical period in siring no known bastards, despite his well-documented career. While this in itself hardly constitutes chastity, it coincides with a clear perception among his contemporaries that he was a faithful husband. No doubt this image is to some extent constructed by Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, but it is nevertheless confirmed by other sources and the general pattern of his character as revealed in them; it therefore sheds light at least on the way others understood his attitude toward his obligations.⁵⁷ His public fidelity to Alice was a symptom of his comprehensive belief in fulfilling his vows, whether conjugal, feudal, or crusading.

This loyalty manifested itself time and again on the battlefield. No sooner would Simon hear that one of his castles was besieged than he would race to relieve it, though not always successfully. During the occupation of Muret in autumn 1212, Simon refused to leave the

⁵⁷ Belperron, *Croisade*, p. 185; Roquebert, *Épopée cathare*, i p. 283; Zerner, 'Épouse de Simon', pp. 451, 453-4, 456; *Hystoria*, i pp. 111-2, 146, 257, ii p. 141; *Canso*, ii p. 300.

crusader infantry alone on the other side of the river and exposed to the enemy. Instead, he personally recrossed the river and spent the night with them. At the same place a year later, Simon's reputation for coming to the aid of beleaguered garrisons had preceded him, prompting Peter of Aragon to restrain the southern assault on the town until the crusader's arrival.⁵⁸ The scene at Castelnaudary in 1211 may have been embellished by Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay for effect, but Simon's famous sentiment—'Volo vincere cum meis vel occumbere cum eisdem'—accurately captures the spirit of his campaigns.⁵⁹ Again, the dependable and paternal general is a stock character, but Simon's conformity to the script almost certainly owes a great deal to his actual behaviour. Not only do these anecdotes have a ring of authenticity to them, but such conduct is a necessary element of effective captaincy, particularly when perpetually short of men, funds, and hereditary right. For men in constant peril of their lives, knowledge that their leader will do everything in his power on their behalf has impressive moral impact. There is no need to suppose that the frequently reported cries of 'Montfort!' on the battlefields of the Midi are a simple nod to the expectations of genre or an invention to augment the chief crusader's reputation.⁶⁰ Simon's reputation for fidelity inspired his men; whatever their reasons for taking the cross, the members of Simon's cadre remained with the crusade not only because they believed he could bring them victory, but because they knew he would support them when threatened by defeat.

⁵⁸ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 53-4; *Canso*, ii pp. 18-20.

⁵⁹ 'I wish to conquer with my men or die with them'. *Hystoria*, i p. 268. For other examples of this maxim in action: *ibid.*, i pp. 97, 125-6, 130, 147, 254, 276, 284, ii pp. 127, 142, 198-9, 270, 276-7, 304-5; Puylaurens, pp. 74, 78.

⁶⁰ *Canso*, i pp. 222, 226, 230, iii pp. 96-8, 122, 152, 198, 220, 272, 276; *Hystoria*, i pp. 172, 270-1.

The Zaran company

A particularly demonstrative group of Simon's followers are those who were at his side not only during the fight against heretics in the Midi, but also seven years earlier during the attempt to restore Jerusalem to Christendom. The crisis of this crusade—its contested diversion to Zara and ultimately to Constantinople—presents the earliest example of Simon's independent leadership and further illuminates the analysis of his fellow crusaders presented above.

Recoiling from the decision of the Venetian and crusader leadership to attack Zara in contravention to papal orders on their way down the Adriatic Sea in September 1202, Simon and his good friend Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay led one substantial contingent in protesting and then abstaining from military action against the Christian city. When the Venetians and principal barons decided in winter 1202-1203 to further delay the expedition to Egypt in favour of an expedition to Constantinople, Simon, Guy, and a contingent of French crusaders left the main army. After obtaining safe passage from King Emeric of Hungary, they followed the Roman roads around the Adriatic before finally embarking for Syria from Barletta. Though not the only baron to exhibit qualms about the crusade's developing course, Simon is explicitly mentioned as a dissenter by nearly all the narrative sources of the Fourth Crusade. He was the highest-ranking lord to desert for explicitly ideological reasons and played a role in the council, even physically coming to the defence of Guy as the abbot exhibited the papal prohibition against attacking

Zara.⁶¹ Simon therefore served as a focal point for disaffection and resistance to the prevailing leadership of the crusade.

As a Cistercian abbot, Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay and his relationship with Simon will be more fully discussed in the following chapter. However, he also served as a leader during the Zaran crisis for dissenting crusaders, particularly among the Yvelinois. Besides Guy of Montfort, Geoffrey of Villehardouin names Simon V of Neauphle, Robert IV Mauvoisin, and Drew II of Cressonsacq as departing with Simon of Montfort, along with *maint autre*.⁶² These men also had important ties to Vaux-de-Cernay. Simon of Neauphle's ancestors had in fact founded the abbey, while Robert's wife's family, the lords of Chevreuse, were important benefactors.⁶³ Drew, as the husband of Robert's sister, shared his family connexion, though at a more distant remove. Simon of Montfort and Guy of Chevreuse were also both donors to the priory of Moulineaux in Yveline.⁶⁴ Furthermore, both Simon and Robert would later invest in Saint-Antoine-des-Champs in Paris: the convent would serve as Robert's final resting place and the vocation of Simon's daughter, Petronilla. Though both of these oblations were later than the Fourth Crusade, they may indicate a previous connexion with Fulk of Neuilly, the famous crusade preacher and Saint-Antoine's founder. At the very least, it strongly suggests their shared

⁶¹ *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, p. 133; Villehardouin, i pp. 110-2; *Hystoria*, i pp. 109-10; Clari, p. 14; D.E. Queller, T.K. Compton, and D.A. Campbell, 'The Fourth Crusade: The Neglected Majority', *Speculum* 49 (1974), pp. 448-53; Lippiatt, 'Duty and Desertion', pp. 79-87.

⁶² Villehardouin, i pp. 8, 110-2, ii pp. 104, 162; Clari, p. 3; J. Longnon, *Les compagnons de Villehardouin: Recherches sur les croisés de la quatrième croisade* (Geneva, 1978), p. 86.

⁶³ *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 1-6, 84-5, 140; Zerner and Piéchon-Palloc, 'Croisade albigeoise', pp. 14-6.

⁶⁴ AN, S 4386, f^o 61r^o; *Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Saint-Martin de Pontoise*, ed. J. Depoin (Pontoise, 1895), pp. 259-60; *Moulineaux*, pp. 7, 8-9.

interest in the reform ideology coming from the Cistercians and the schools of Paris.⁶⁵ Whatever Simon and Robert's knowledge of each other before 1202, eleemosynary sources suggest that they grew closer after leaving Zara. While at Acre, the two men—along with Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay—witnessed a donation made to the Templars.⁶⁶ The spiritual concerns about sin and excommunication that played a large part in fomenting opposition to the crusade leadership can thus be connected with a common circle of religious patronage, represented on the field by Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay.

In the temporal sphere, Simon was also a significant presence for those uncomfortable with attacking Zara. Though there is no explicit evidence of contact between Simon and Robert or Drew before the crusade, Robert was descended from the nearby viscounts of Mantes. Between the former county of Évreux, the former Beaumont fief of Pacy, and the Montmorency dowry of Conflans, Mantes was almost surrounded by past or present Montfort influence. Meanwhile, the orbit of Montfort included the lordship of Chevreuse, patrimony of Robert's brother-in-law.⁶⁷ His other brother-in-law, Drew, probably followed Robert rather than Simon from Zara: Cressonsacq is far from Yveline. Neauphle, however, was closer to Montfort both geographically and politically. Not only did the lordships march, but the latter held an informal and limited authority over the former. In 1176, Simon II of Neauphle had been judged by the king's court for the murder of Simon of Maurepas and ordered to surrender his rights in Bazainville to the local church for the welfare of the victim's soul. As these lands lay within his

⁶⁵ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 320, 322; AN, S 4386, f^{os} 60v^o-61r^o, 62r^o; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', p. 178; Zerner, 'Épouse de Simon', pp. 466-9.

⁶⁶ Appendix A, ii.

⁶⁷ *Pontoise*, pp. 259-61; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', p. 383.

lordship, Simon III of Montfort had participated in the judgement and pledged himself to ensure the alms in case any contest should be raised over the settlement in future. Simon IV of Montfort had been one of the witnesses of the judgement. Although the Neaphles were castellans for the counts of Meulan, they had thus been placed under direct responsibility to the king and to the Montforts as royal deputies.⁶⁸ Though it is impossible to say whether they had met personally before the Fourth Crusade, the Montfort name was certainly recognisable to Robert Mauvoisin and Simon of Neauphle.

By the time of the Albigensian Crusade, these relationships had developed even further. Drew of Cressonsacq had likely died on the Fourth Crusade or after his return to France, but Robert and Simon were both early participants in the fight against heresy. Robert was in the initial campaign of August 1209, while Simon appeared in June 1211 along with his brother Geoffrey.⁶⁹ Like many of Simon of Montfort's followers, they held lands in France: Robert was lord of Aulnay and Savigny and had a fief in Champagne at Coulommiers, while Simon of Neauphle held his namesake castellany east of Montfort.⁷⁰ Simon of Montfort enfeoffed neither of them with confiscated southern estates, save some properties around Fanjeaux that he gave to Robert.⁷¹ It is therefore unlikely that either man was seeking landed wealth when he took the cross.

⁶⁸ *Thesaurus anecdotorum*, i cc. 587-8; Zerner and Piéchon-Palloc, 'Croisade albigeoise', p. 14; D. Crouch, *The Beaumont Twins: The Roots and Branches of Power in the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, 1986), p. 20; Civel, *Fleur de France*, pp. 184-5, 249.

⁶⁹ *Register Innocenz'*, xii p. 240; *Hystoria*, i pp. 133, 241-3.

⁷⁰ AN, S 4386, f^{os} 60r^o, 61r^o, 61v^o-62r^o; BnF, ms. lat. 17049, f^o 225r^o; *Documents relatifs au comté de Champagne et de Brie, 1172-1361*, ed. A. Longnon, i (Paris, 1901), p. 128; *Registres de Philippe*, i p. 319.

⁷¹ *Monumenta Dominici*, pp. 31-2.

They do seem, however, to have expanded their interest in the reform ideology embraced by Simon and Guy, particularly as channelled through Vaux-de-Cernay. Simon of Neauphle made several confirmations and a donation of his own in favour of the abbey between the crusades, thus taking up his family's legacy of patronage. Geoffrey also generously endowed the community during the same period.⁷² In Robert's case, the attachment to Vaux-de-Cernay was due not only to his wife's family's interest, but also to Simon of Montfort's influence: in his 1208 donation to the abbey, Robert set aside 20*s.p.* of the alms to be distributed by the monks to the Montfort foundation of Hautes-Bruyères.⁷³ Around the same time, he and Simon both made endowments to Porrois, which was closely associated with Vaux-de-Cernay.⁷⁴ The extent to which Robert embraced the papal-Cistercian programme is clear from his actions on crusade. Whilst on an embassy to Rome for Simon in 1209, he not only placed his goods and loved ones in France under papal protection and ensured his alms at home by four separate papal confirmations; he also petitioned for and obtained the right to a personal chaplain to hear his and his wife's confessions as long as he was with the crusade.⁷⁵ After the fall of Minerve in July 1210, while Mathilda of Garlande sought to save women perfects from the pyre, Robert voiced his concerns to Arnold-Amalric that, having been given the chance to repent, many of the heretics might make false abjurations to save themselves from the flames.⁷⁶ Robert died in November 1214, and while in France in April 1216, Simon granted 5*l.* to Saint-Antoine-des-

⁷² *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 152, 155-7, 158-9, 189. Geoffrey's act antedates 1209, as Guy of Lévis is listed among the witnesses.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-4.

⁷⁴ *Necrologe de Port Roïal*, p. 252; *Porrois*, pp. 39, 75.

⁷⁵ *Hystoria*, i pp. 133; *Register Innocenz'*, xii pp. 265-6, 268-9, 270-2; AN, L 1014, n° 2; *Porrois*, p. 39.

⁷⁶ *Hystoria*, i pp. 158-9.

Champs on behalf of his soul as a final lasting expression of their friendship.⁷⁷ The camaraderie forged between these men on the Fourth Crusade thus continued to manifest itself in their particular religious adherence.

For all the intersections that can be found in eleemosynary records, however, the essence of these lay relationships was naturally found outside of the cloister in the practical workings of the crusade. The Neauphle brothers remained in the Midi for at least six months, far exceeding the typical quarantine of crusade service. During this time, they fought at the first siege of Toulouse and the battle of Castelnaudary, before being caught in an ambush that claimed Geoffrey's life. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay's glowing description of Geoffrey's martyrdom is probably a reflection not only of the family's links to Vaux-de-Cernay but also of the brothers' intimacy with Simon, who commissioned a Dominican chapel at Villar to pray for Geoffrey's soul a year later.⁷⁸ Meanwhile, Robert became one of Simon's closest friends and most important counsellors. Upon assuming the office of viscount, Simon dispatched Robert to Rome to seek papal approval of his title. In his letter to Innocent, Simon describes how essential Robert is to his administration and asks for him to be returned speedily.⁷⁹ Robert rarely commanded troops or distinguished himself on the battlefield; his primary duties were administrative, serving in Simon's court and councils of war. However, in summer 1212, he

⁷⁷ *Obituaires de la province de Sens*, ed. A. Molinier, i (Paris, 1902), p. 963; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', p. 178; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 320-1. Woehl, *Simon und seinen Gefolgsleuten*, p. 156, claims that Robert died in 1216 based on a redistribution of alms to Vaux-de-Cernay and Porrois made by Cecilia of Chevreuse, *uxor Roberti Malevicini*, that year. However, Cecilia also calls herself *soror... Guidonis, domini Cabrosie*, even though her brother had died by August 1210: *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 173-4, 182, 203-4. Robert is only referenced in 1216 in connection with his 1208 donation to the abbey, and dating his death after this is impossible to reconcile with his obituary for 16 November and Simon's benefaction in Paris in April of that year.

⁷⁸ *Hystoria*, i pp. 242-3, 265-6, 279-80; *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 38. Simon of Neauphle was back in France by 1213: *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i p. 190.

⁷⁹ *Register Innocenz*, xii pp. 239-40.

commanded his only siege, efficiently capturing Marmande for Simon during the crusader's Agenais campaign despite a debilitating illness.⁸⁰ As was the case with the other crusaders who joined Simon in the Midi, the Neauphles and Robert were willing to make great sacrifices for their captain because of the personal trust and confidence he was able to inspire in his followers.

At first glance, it may seem strange that the support Simon received from his geographical associates was so much stronger than that provided by his extended family. This tension makes more sense, however, when viewed in light of Simon's rank in the French social hierarchy. Simon's family was composed largely of his peers. All were barons with significant patrimonies in the vicinity of Paris. Some, like the Montmorencys, may have been slightly the Montforts' betters, but the distance was not great. Those among these barons who held offices at court had obtained them by effort rather than inheritance, and the growing confidence of the royal administration was thus an opportunity for their advancement, whether attained through emerging bureaucratic utility or traditional martial prowess. The ideas emerging from the schools and monasteries that so animated Simon and his followers held an appeal for them, but less than that offered by the success of Philip Augustus.

The men who rode at Simon's back, however, often had less access to the rewards promised by the Capetian resurgence. As satellites and dependants of the Montforts, they rarely had distinguished lineages of their own and most never attended court in Paris. Those closer to the Montforts' stature, like Robert Mauvoisin, had by 1209 been personally bound to Simon by the experience of the Fourth Crusade. The others lived in a region dominated by the Montfort family and the local religious houses, especially the Cistercian abbey at Vaux-de-Cernay. These

⁸⁰ *HGL*, viii cc. 589, 601, 606, 608, 638; *Pedro el Católico*, iii p. 1175; *Canso*, i p. 120; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 34-5.

influences exposed them to the neogregorian ideologies that lay behind the reform movements of the early thirteenth century—especially that against heresy. Thus when a crusade was launched to prosecute those very programmes, Simon of Montfort served as personal beacon to ignite their passion for a purer Christendom in which they could play an important role; one with both spiritual and temporal rewards. Simon's social standing, uncompromising values, and demonstrated fidelity inspired the devotion necessary not only to draw these men south, but to retain them in his service.

High baronage

If Simon's success on crusade depended on the support of the petty chivalry around Yveline, it was also affected by the actions of his social betters, members of the old comital and ducal families of France. These magnates could bring enormous resources to bear on crusade, whether in terms of men, money, materiel, or morale. Apart from the more general social advantage that could be gained by their friendship and patronage, Simon had to take into account their concerns when acting in tandem with them under the sign of the cross. After leaving Zara, for instance, Simon found himself attacked in letters sent to the West by Count Hugh of Saint-Pol, a propaganda campaign that may have contributed to Simon's difficulties in finding shipping to Syria.⁸¹ But such magnates were also essential supports during the Albigensian Crusade, providing frequent—if transitory—quarantine contingents to support Simon's campaigns. In fact, Hugh's successor as count of Saint-Pol, Walcher III of Châtillon, would crusade alongside

⁸¹ *Thesaurus anecdotorum*, i c. 786; Pokorny, 'Zwei unedierte Briefe', p. 209; *Hystoria*, i p. 110.

Simon in 1209 and 1215. In neither case did Walcher come at the head of the expedition, but he would nevertheless have been accompanied by a substantial following of his own. He further witnessed the creation of Simon's protectorate over Narbonne, and received from him the jawbone of Saint Vincent to carry back to Laon.⁸² If rebelling against Hugh of Saint-Pol had potentially damaged his reputation in France, Simon's presumed reconciliation with Walter made it possible to capitalise on the family's prestige to further his own political authority in the Midi.

Simon's most important connexion among the high baronage was with Duke Odo of Burgundy. Though their earliest recorded association is at the royal court at Sens in May 1201, Odo had been familiar with Simon's relatives and neighbours since the 1190s. The men had apparently developed sufficient intimacy that Simon found a place in the embassy of nobles that solicited the duke to assume the leadership of the Fourth Crusade at the same court.⁸³ As Simon did not participate in any other aspect of crusade planning, his inclusion in the party was probably owing to a personal affinity with Odo.

The duke, however, turned down the offer, likely due to the priority he placed on his obligations to the king. This is not to say that he was insensible to the aims of the crusade. His father had followed Philip of France to Syria in 1190, and the duchy of Burgundy was the cradle of Cistercianism. Odo continued the family tradition of patronising the white monks, though not as exclusively as had his forebears.⁸⁴ But he obviously felt a deep commitment to his king that overshadowed the call of Jerusalem. Though he would take the cross from Robert of Courson in

⁸² *Canso*, i pp. 154-6, 176, 186, 190, iii p. 158; *Hystoria*, i pp. 73, 82, 176-7, 180, 186-7, 215-6, 237-8, ii p. 243; *HGL*, viii c. 660; A. du Chesne, *Histoire de la maison de Chastillon sur Marne* (Paris, 1621), preuves, p. 36.

⁸³ *Reomaus, seu Historia monasterii sancti Ioannis Reomaensis in tractu Lingonensi*, ed. P. Roverius (Paris, 1637), p. 229; *Layettes*, i p. 198; *RAPA*, ii pp. 235, 237-8; Villehardouin, i pp. 38-40; Lippiatt, 'Duty and Desertion', p. 82.

⁸⁴ Villehardouin, i p. 40; Rigord, 'Gesta Philippi', p. 83; C.B. Bouchard, *Sword, Miter, and Cloister: Nobility and the Church in Burgundy, 980-1198* (Ithaca, NY, 1987), pp. 151-2.

1213 for the Fifth Crusade, he also protested the provisions restricting royal jurisdiction over the property and debts of crusaders. At the turn of the century, the duke was more concerned to support his king than the papal legate, Peter of Capua, cardinal-deacon of Santa Maria in Via Lata, sent to organise not only the crusade but the Franco-Norman peace that would make it possible.⁸⁵ Despite his links to Cîteaux, for Odo the health and security of the French kingdom surpassed concerns for the Holy Land.

Though Odo's mentality may not have changed, by 1208 there had certainly been a reversal of roles between the duke and Simon. Perhaps the Holy Land seemed a distant and draining concern to Odo in light of imminent threats to France, but heresy in the south was a pressing danger; he could not ignore warnings of unchecked error on the margins of Burgundy itself. On his way to the crusader muster at Lyons in 1209, he made a donation to Abbot Arnold-Amalric and Cîteaux, the charter of which clearly aligns his motivations with the Cistercian struggle against heresy.⁸⁶ Nor was the duke's enthusiasm limited to recruiting only his Burgundian subjects. Perhaps remembering Simon's zeal from 1201, Odo sent him a letter by way of Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay—probably on the abbot's return from the order's general chapter in September—requesting that Simon join the duke on crusade. Unlike Odo at Sens, Simon needed little urging when he met with Guy at Rochefort.⁸⁷ But Odo's true importance to Simon's career was the indispensable support he gave the chief crusader whilst in the Midi. After having refused the confiscated Trencavel viscounties himself, Odo supported the election of Simon as

⁸⁵ J.M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213-1221* (Philadelphia, 1986), p. 38; *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi c. 819; *Layettes*, i pp. 197-8, 243, 292-3; *Register Innocenz'*, i pp. 502, 517, vi pp. 95-6.

⁸⁶ Oldenbourg, *Bûcher de Montségur*, p. 15; AdC-O, 11 H 66, f^{os} 3v^o-4r^o.

⁸⁷ *Hystoria*, i pp. 102-3.

leader of the crusade and was instrumental in persuading him to accept the responsibility. The duke also remained after the departure of the count of Nevers and most of the other crusaders, advising the new viscount on the conquest of his territories and supporting the crusade's assertion of force with his own troops. By early September, however, Odo's obligations in Burgundy and at the royal court compelled him too to ride north with his host.⁸⁸ The absence of ducal support led to widespread revolts against Simon and his small band of remaining crusaders that would continue for nearly two years. Odo had requested Simon to join him on crusade and to accept the conquered viscounties, giving him more political and military support than anyone else. But with heresy seemingly defeated, Odo's primary concerns lay elsewhere.

However, the duke's connexion with Simon did not end in September 1209. While Simon adapted to his isolation and found relief for his lack of manpower and resources in the frequent quarantines led by French counts, he was once again looking to the duke for support in the aftermath of Muret. In the late autumn of 1213, the extension of the *negotium pacis et fidei* into the march of Provence brought it across the Rhône and much closer to the duchy of Burgundy. With a decapitated but still writhing movement of resistance threatening Simon's control over the county of Toulouse, the cooperation of Odo was essential to the swift submission and pacification of important local nobles like Adhemar II of Poitiers, count of Valentinois. After Adhemar's capitulation in the face of ducal mobilisation for war, Simon entrusted several castles given by the count as surety to Odo.⁸⁹ This not only allowed the crusader to conserve his forces whilst maintaining the security of his eastern frontier, but also

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 101-2, 113, 115, 116, 118-9.

⁸⁹ Ibid., ii pp. 182-4.

gave Odo an opportunity to exert his influence over his southern neighbours. But the two men had dynastic as well as military strategy in mind. Whilst on campaign together, through the mediation of Arnold-Amalric, they arranged the betrothal of Odo's niece, Beatrice of Vienne, to Simon's eldest son, Amalric.⁹⁰ Simon, now fully in command of the Trencavel viscounties and occupying most of the counties between the Pyrenees and the Rhône, found in his friendship with Odo a means to secure his family permanently and legitimately in the region. Not only was the marriage a social elevation, but it was also a union with a powerful local family. Simon and Odo no longer looked at each other from over the social gap that separated the lord of Montfort from the duke of Burgundy in 1201, and the marriage that united their two families was an attempt to ensure that Simon's descendants could be secure in this higher echelon.

Though inhabiting the peripheries of Simon's crusade experience, magnates such as the Saint-Pols or Odo of Burgundy demonstrate the significant effect that the higher nobility's support or lack thereof could have on crusading operations. Though Simon was not a follower in the strict sense of any of these men, his cooperation with them on crusade eased the strain on his own material resources and political capital, while their absence or opposition was accompanied by a struggle for survival. Simon thus at times had to weigh carefully the value of his principles and independent interests against the necessities of continued service to the cross.

In relation to none of these groups—family members, local knights, or superior magnates—did Simon operate in complete independence, nor could he. Crusading did not happen in isolation, and Simon relied on the men and women at his side in order to achieve the aims for

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 184-5, 206-7; above, p. 99.

which he took the cross, often against unfavourable odds. However, in most cases he served as their inspiration to take the cross and subsequently as their leader on the expedition itself.

Support from his companions was not always continuous; lasting aid was most often provided by the network of dependency and affection centred upon the nobility around Yveline. Perhaps the greatest mark of Simon's social independence was that, while his relatives, peers, and betters largely focussed their energies on the consolidation of French royal power in the north, he remained preoccupied with the accomplishment of crusading programmes for the perfection of Christendom. Even so, he found himself subject to the same constraints of lordship—albeit on a smaller scale—as the kings to whom he nominally owed fealty.

III. MASTERS AND MONKS

The crusades which formed the most active part of Simon's career were both heavily influenced by the neogregorian reform ideologies moving through the Church at the turn of the thirteenth century. Calls for a society of perfected Christian beliefs, morals, and politics that would embrace both lay and clerical roles were growing, especially in France. Chiefly responsible for shaping the vision of this idealised Christendom were the schools of Paris and the order of Cîteaux. John W. Baldwin, Beverly Mayne Kienzle, and Jessalynn Bird have done important work in exploring how these programmes were formed, articulated, and promoted to effect social change.¹ Simon had several points of contact with both the Parisian masters and the Cistercians and was influenced by the priorities they espoused. As the first among his close family and a leader among his peers in taking the cross, his impulse to do so was at least partially formed by the ideas emerging from the cloister and the schoolroom. The orthodox Christian society envisioned by these men became an important aim of Simon's work, taking precedence over even the ambitious and proximate objectives of the Capetian monarchy. This dedication to the realisation of the first half of the Lord's Prayer—*veniat regnum tuum, fiat voluntas tua*—was the defining aspect that set Simon apart from his peers and superiors in France.

¹ J.W. Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and his Circle* (Princeton, 2 vols., 1970); B.M. Kienzle, *Cistercians, Heresy and Crusade in Occitania, 1145-1229: Preaching in the Lord's Vineyard* (York, 2001); J. Bird, 'Heresy, Crusade and Reform in the Circle of Peter the Chanter, c.1187-c.1240', (University of Oxford, D.Phil. thesis, 2001).

The Holy Land

When Pope Innocent III set in motion his drive for a new crusade to recover Jerusalem in 1198, his first choice for the promotion of the venture was the charismatic reform preachers emanating from the scholastic circles of Paris. Chief among these was Fulk of Neuilly—a student of Peter the Chanter, intellectual father of the Parisian practical theologians—who may have been recommended to Innocent by the papal legate Peter of Capua, himself a Parisian master of theology. Thus commissioned, Fulk preached in Paris and throughout France, spreading his message of personal penance and advocating the liberation of Jerusalem.² Despite the assumptions of some historians, it is not certain that Simon ever met Fulk or was directly inspired by him to take the cross in 1199. There is no evidence that Fulk was personally present at the tournament at Écry and nothing otherwise to link the two men before Fulk's death in 1202. Similarly, the Montforts' later attachment to Fulk's foundation at Saint-Antoine-des-Champs should not be overemphasised: by the time the Montforts began endowing the abbey, it had long been converted into a Cistercian nunnery, likely losing an element of the original character imbued by Fulk.³ This is not to suggest that a meeting between the two men was unlikely, nor—

² *Register Innocenz*, i p. 597; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 36-7; M.R. Gutsch, 'A Twelfth-Century Preacher—Fulk of Neuilly', in L.J. Paetow, ed., *The Crusades and Other Historical Essays* (New York, 1928), p. 201; M.L. Colish, 'Scholastic Theology at Paris around 1200', in S.E. Young, ed., *Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities* (Leiden, 2011), p. 31; *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, p. 131; Villehardouin, i pp. 2-4; Clari, p. 1; James of Vitry, *The Historia occidentalis of Jacques de Vitry*, ed. J.F. Hinnebusch (Freibourg, 1972), pp. 94-5, 101; *MGHS*, xxiii pp. 876-7.

³ E.H. McNeal, 'Fulk of Neuilly and the Tournament of Écry', *Speculum* 28 (1953), pp. 371-5; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 320-1, 322; H. Bonnardot, *L'abbaye royale de Saint-Antoine-des-Champs de l'ordre de Cîteaux* (Paris, 1882), pp. 87-8; C. Berman, 'Cistercian Nuns and the Development of the Order: The Abbey at Saint-Antoine-des-Champs outside Paris', in E.R. Elder, ed., *The Joy of Learning and the Love of God* (Kalamazoo, Mich., 1995), pp. 123-4; J.W. Baldwin, *Paris, 1200* (Stanford, 2010), p. 34. Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort*, p. 5 and Civel, *Fleur de France*, p. 264, following Zerner, 'Épouse de Simon', pp. 466-7, take for granted a close relationship between Fulk and the Montforts not attested in the surviving evidence.

failing a personal encounter—that Fulk’s message was not transmitted to Simon by related channels. Yveline lay well within the area blanketed by Fulk and his assistants on their preaching tours, and the Paris schools would have been familiar to Simon from his visits to court. Entering the city by the Saint-Germain gate, he would have passed the eponymous abbey—from which his family held Beynes and half of Montchauvet—where Thomas of Chobham would later deliver many of his surviving sermons. Once within the walls, Simon would have ridden through the Latin Quarter on his way to the royal palace on the Île-de-la-Cité, skirting the church of Saint-Séverin where Fulk gave his first learned sermon at the behest of Peter the Chanter in 1195.⁴ Despite Penny J. Cole’s assertion that ‘we have no record of Fulk’s ever having preached to an aristocratic audience’, all the contemporary sources which describe the recruitment of the crusade baronage mention Fulk’s preaching, strongly suggesting that it did have a significant effect on noble participation in the crusade.⁵ Whether Simon had heard Fulk himself or not, the alignment of their ideas indicates that Simon was likely influenced by his circle.

For instance, a related objective of Fulk’s crusade preaching campaign seems to have been the establishment of peace between England and France. His missions to the courts of Richard and Philip were probably principally intended to facilitate the crusade by redirecting combative energies from Normandy to Outremer.⁶ However, they may also have reflected—

⁴ AN, K 24, n° 13; *Recueil des chartes de l’abbaye de Saint-Germain-des-Prés*, ed. R. Poupardin, (Paris, 1909), p. 308; Thomas of Chobham, *Sermones*, ed. F. Morenzoni (Turnhout, 1993), pp. vii-viii; James of Vitry, *Historia occidentalis*, p. 95; Baldwin, *Paris, 1200*, pp. 14-5.

⁵ *MGHS*, xxiii pp. 117, 877; *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, p. 131; Villehardouin, i pp. 2-10, 46; Clari, pp. 1-4; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon anglicanum*, p. 129; A.J. Andrea, and P.I. Rachlin, ‘Holy War, Holy Relics, Holy Theft: The Anonymous of Soissons’s *De terra Iherosolomitana*: An Analysis, Edition, and Translation’, *Historical Reflections* 18 (1992), p. 159. Pace P.J. Cole, *The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095-1270* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), p. 91.

⁶ *Register Innocenz*, i p. 502; Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, iv p. 76; Gerald of Wales, ‘Speculum ecclesiae’, in *Opera*, ed. J.S. Brewer, iv (London, 1873), p. 54; idem, ‘Itinerarium Kambriæ’, in *ibid.*, ed. J.F. Dimock, vi (1868), p. 44.

from the French perspective—anxieties among the Paris circle about the justice of the war against the Plantagenets. Master Stephen Langton—unsurprisingly for an Englishman—seems to have believed that Philip’s attacks on Plantagenet territory were sinful; he advised knights summoned to royal service for such a purpose to accompany the royal host on campaign, but to abstain from actual fighting. This solution was morally neat, but practically almost impossible. Regardless of what he may have thought about the justice of Philip’s cause, Simon had fought against Richard at Aumale in 1196; to do otherwise was to risk forfeiture. Robert of Courson, one of Peter the Chanter’s closest disciples, provided a convenient alternative in the crusade, thereby avoiding the soul’s contamination in unjust warfare whilst protecting one’s possessions under the sanctions of the Church. Baldwin suggests that Robert’s reference to barons who had recently taken this course on the Fourth Crusade indicates the counts who had allied with Richard in the 1190s; it may equally point to Simon and others who were loyal to Philip but less than enthusiastic about the Norman campaigns.⁷ If Simon—under the influence of Parisian reformers—was concerned about the legitimacy of the king’s Norman policy, the Fourth Crusade—as preached by those same reformers—offered not only an opportunity to avoid such spiritually compromising warfare, but also the chance to atone for it.

The principal evident means by which Simon came into contact with these ideas was through the white monks of Cîteaux. By the end of the twelfth century, anxieties about the restoration of Jerusalem to Christian rule formed a significant part of Cistercian self-identity. The Second Crusade had been called by the Cistercian Pope Eugene III in 1145 and preached by Saint Bernard of Clairvaux the following year. Another abbot of Clairvaux, Henry of Marcy, and

⁷ Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 210-1; above, p. 40.

the Cistercian Archbishop Baldwin of Canterbury, vigorously promoted the Third Crusade; the latter would even die before Acre in 1190. By that year, weekly prayers for the success of the crusade had entered into the order's liturgy, and daily requiems were ordered in all Cistercian houses for the souls of those who died on the expedition.⁸ In November 1198, Innocent III allowed Fulk of Neuilly to recruit Cistercians and other religious to his preaching campaigns, and at the chapter general in September 1201 Fulk commissioned the abbot of Cercanceaux, Adam of Perseigne, and Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay as fellow preachers. Adam was a friend of the Parisian reform circle; Guy had already overseen the collection of the papally mandated taxes on ecclesiastical revenue for the crusade in spring and summer 1200.⁹ Along with two of the three abbots detailed to Fulk, Simon of Loos and Peter of Locedio would accompany the crusaders to Egypt; a fifth, Martin of Pairis, seems to have falsely represented himself as possessing a similar papal mandate to preach and take the cross.¹⁰ The important abbot for Simon of Montfort was, of course, Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay. A friend of the reforming Bishop Stephen of Tournai and perhaps even of Peter the Chanter, Guy supported the ideology of Fulk and the Parisian practical

⁸ Queller and Madden, *Fourth Crusade*, p. 32; J.G. Rowe, 'The Origins of the Second Crusade: Pope Eugenius III, Bernard of Clairvaux and Louis VII of France', in M. Gervers, ed., *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians* (New York, 1992), pp. 84, 87; Cole, *Preaching the Crusades*, pp. 66-78; *Statuta capitulorum generalium ordinis Cisterciensis*, ed. J.-M. Canivez, i (Louvain, 1933), p. 122.

⁹ *Register Innocenz*, i p. 597; E.A.R. Brown, 'The Cistercians in the Latin Empire of Constantinople and Greece', *Traditio* 14 (1958), pp. 70-3; Villehardouin, i p. 46; *Statuta capitulorum*, i p. 270; James of Vitry, *Historia occidentalis*, pp. 102-3; A.J. Andrea, 'Walter, Archdeacon of London, and the "Historia Occidentalis" of Jacques de Vitry', *Church History* 50 (1981), pp. 145-6; idem, 'Adam of Perseigne and the Fourth Crusade', *Cîteaux* 36 (1985), pp. 26-8; *Patrologia latina*, ccxiv cc. cxxxiv-cxxxv.

¹⁰ Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon anglicanum*, pp. 82-3, 129-30; Brown, 'Cistercians in Constantinople', pp. 67-8; Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria Constantinopolitana*, ed. P. Orth (Hildesheim, 1994), pp. 109-10, 116; idem, *The Capture of Constantinople: The Hystoria Constantinopolitana of Gunther of Pairis*, trans. A.J. Andrea (Philadelphia, 1997), pp. 21-6.

theologians.¹¹ His abbey was also among the most important religious houses in Yveline, and its demesne marched with the lordship of Montfort near Vieille-Église. It was probably Simon IV who exempted Cistercian houses from all tolls, customs, and exactions throughout his lands as far as Elleville, and Simon V's exemptions from tolls at Conflans for the abbeys of Ourscamp in 1198 and Bonport in 1202 suggest a wider interest in the order on his part as well.¹² Though Simon had not personally made a donation to Vaux-de-Cernay by the time of the Fourth Crusade, the abbey had been endowed by his grandfather with a house at Épernon and by his father with 10*l.* from the rents from Rochefort. Simon was now responsible for these alms: in 1202, he approved the lease of the Cistercians' house in Épernon to a local woman. Moreover, he had received his education at the abbey, where Guy himself had served as his tutor; the abbot may have been charged with Simon's care during his minority after the death of his father around 1185.¹³ Guy's enthusiasm for and image of the crusade was therefore easily transmitted to Simon.

But direct evidence for this transmission dates from after the critical event: Simon had taken the cross at the end of 1199, but Guy did not receive his papal commission as revenue collector until spring the following year. However, Guy's selection as papal preacher in 1201 suggests that he may have already been involved with Fulk's campaign since 1199.¹⁴ However it

¹¹ Stephen of Tournai, *Lettres*, ed. J. Desilve, rev. ed. (Paris, 1893), pp. 227-8, 244-5. The second letter of Stephen of Tournai probably dates from the same time as the first and likely refers to the same contest with Grandmontine lay brothers; it may be an attempt to spare an exhausted Guy from participation in the Third Crusade. The abbot of Saint-Victor and chanter of Paris mentioned are likely Warren and Peter respectively, given the frequency of their association with Guy and Stephen: Rigord, 'Gesta Philippi', p. 104; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, ii pp. 236-7; below, p. 136n. 22.

¹² Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 306; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', p. 130; *Bon-Port*, pp. 29-30.

¹³ *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 6, 69, 71-2, 99, 140; *Hystoria*, i p. 293; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', p. 150.

¹⁴ Andrea, 'Adam of Perseigne', p. 28.

happened, Simon had almost certainly encountered their programme by the time he attended the tournament at Écry. He was no stranger to the tournament scene: encounters were often held on the western margins of the lordship of Montfort during the tenures of his grandfather and father. At the tournament of Lagny-sur-Marne—across the river from the Montfort fief of Pomponne—Simon IV competed in the following of William of Barres against, among others, Henry the Young King and William the Marshal.¹⁵ However, there is no reliable evidence that Simon V ever hosted a tournament or participated in one himself until the encounter at Écry on 28 November 1199. Even so, given that tournaments were a persistent bugbear of the medieval Church, his attendance at such an event does not on the surface correspond with the image of a man much affected by reform rhetoric.¹⁶ But if the communal cross-taking at Écry is no longer viewed as a spontaneous reaction to the immediate preaching of Fulk of Neuilly, it is perhaps more reasonable to interpret the event as a staged performance, wherein a number of prominent nobles—already convinced to crusade by Fulk or others—set the example which encouraged the mass adoption of the cross by the rest of the participants.¹⁷ As a prominent attendant at the tournament, Simon probably served as one of these exemplars.

On crusade, Simon's identification with Cistercian and Parisian ideology proved decisive in the crises that plagued the army from its arrival in Venice. The decision to go to Zara to recoup the crusaders' debt to the Venetians caused great anxiety amongst those Cistercian abbots who were tasked with accompanying the crusade. Peter of Capua, however, bound four of them

¹⁵ Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, iii pp. 93-4; *Histoire du Maréchal*, i pp. 107, 134, 141, 148-52, 157, 162-3, 167, 180; É. Ledru, 'Épernon: Notice historique', *Mémoires de Rambouillet* 11 (1896), p. 215.

¹⁶ Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 225-6.

¹⁷ Villehardouin, i pp. 4-10; Civel, *Fleur de France*, p. 410; N. Hodgson, 'Honour, Shame and the Fourth Crusade', *Journal of Medieval History* 39 (2013), pp. 227-8.

to remain with the army come what may and to exercise their influence to prevent attacks on Christians; one of these was Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay.¹⁸ Peter of Locedio, meanwhile, did not embark at Venice but almost certainly carried a letter from the pope to the army forbidding any attack on Zara or other Christian lands; Peter did not publish it himself and probably gave it to Guy.¹⁹ The papal prohibition was therefore in the possession of Simon's camp by the time the fleet appeared outside Zara's harbour on 10 November 1202. Ironically for a man who may have taken the cross to avoid an unjust war in France, the course of the crusade now presented Simon with another instance of questionable violence. Again, his response seems to have been dictated by contact with the practical theology espoused by Peter the Chanter's circle: his attendance on Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay's judgement and support of the abbot's public promulgation of his decision follows the *Summa confessorum* of Thomas of Chobham—who forbade any violence against Christians—whilst his subsequent abstention from the assault on Zara perfectly reflects the counsel given by Stephen Langton in his *Questiones*.²⁰ The influence of reform opinion was also apparent several months later in the contest over the diversion to Constantinople. Even Geoffrey of Villehardouin admits that the Cistercians in the army were divided amongst themselves over whether to sail for Byzantium; Simon of Loos was in favour, while Guy and the abbot of Cercanceaux opposed any further distraction from the Holy Land. Simon of Montfort

¹⁸ Villehardouin, i p. 66; *MGHS*, xxiii p. 117; Brown, 'Cistercians in Constantinople', pp. 73-4.

¹⁹ *Patrologia latina*, ccxiv c. cxxxviii-ix; *Hystoria*, i pp. 108-9; Andrea and Motsiff, 'Innocent and Zara', pp. 17-8; Lippiatt, 'Duty and Desertion', p. 79-80.

²⁰ *MGHS*, xxiii p. 117; Villehardouin, i pp. 80-4; *Hystoria*, i pp. 108-9; Clari, p. 14; Thomas of Chobham, *Summa confessorum*, ed. F. Broomfield (Louvain, 1968), pp. 430-2; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, ii p. 148n. 33; R.H. Schmandt, 'The Fourth Crusade and Just-War Theory', *The Catholic Historical Review* 61 (1975), pp. 202-3. Admittedly, Simon and his party failed to follow Thomas' requirement that one oppose attacks on Christians by force. Furthermore, their later actions, though in line with decretal and papal guidance, clearly show that they did not believe that protection from violence extended to those Christians who harboured or defended heretics.

again sided with Guy. Their conception of the crusade, like that of Fulk of Neuilly, was intimately connected to that of moral reform. The success of the crusade relied not on financial considerations but on communal righteousness and divine favour. Rather than forfeit their indulgence in the company of a renegade host which had recently been excommunicated—only a part of which was now reconciled—and which appeared ready to risk excommunication again, they decided to rely on their own means to reach Syria.²¹ After their arrival in Acre, Simon and his party fulfilled their vows, but their limited exploits were overshadowed in the West by news of the capture of Constantinople by their erstwhile companions.²² The conquest of Egypt or recovery of Jerusalem were tasks beyond the ability of Simon and his small party in the Holy Land, but he and Guy could return to France after several years content in the knowledge that they had accomplished their pilgrimage and avoided the stain of excommunication or sinful violence.

²¹ Villehardouin, i pp. 94-100, 108-2; *Ernoul*, p. 351; *Eracles*, p. 255; *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, p. 133; Gutsch, 'Fulk of Neuilly', pp. 189-91; P. Alphandéry, *La chrétienté et l'idée de croisade*, ii (Paris, 1959), pp. 72-3; J. Bird, 'Reform or Crusade? Anti-Usury and Crusade Preaching during the Pontificate of Innocent III', in J.C. Moore, ed., *Pope Innocent III and his World* (Aldershot, Hants, 1999), pp. 165-6, 176-7; *Register Innocenz*, v pp. 315-20, vi pp. 159-68; *Patrologia latina*, ccxiv cc. cxxxix-xl; Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria Constantinopolitana*, pp. 125-6, 128; *MGHS*, xxiii pp. 117-8.

²² *Ernoul*, pp. 351-2, 355-60; *Eracles*, pp. 255, 259-63; B.Z. Kedar, 'The Fourth Crusade's Second Front' in A. Laiou, ed., *Urbs Capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences* (Paris, 2005), pp. 99-101. M. Zerner, 'L'abbé Gui des Vaux-de-Cernay, prédicateur de croisade', *Cahiers de Fanjeaux* 21 (1986), pp. 191-2 claims that Guy was humiliated and ostracised by his order following the Fourth Crusade, but her argument is unconvincing. The letter of Stephen of Tournai which she uses as evidence cannot be dated to 1203; it is nearly impossible for Guy to have returned to France from Dalmatia—let alone Syria—by the time of Stephen's death. If the identification of Warren of Saint-Victor (†1194) and Peter the Chanter (†1197) as Stephen's supporters is correct, it further supports the earlier date: above, p. 133n. 11.

Social morality

For the reformers who framed Simon's ideology, there could be no distinction between exigency and righteousness. The preaching of the crusade was in vain unless accompanied by the promotion of moral renewal, a theme stressed by Pope Gregory VIII after the fall of Jerusalem in 1187.²³ But that movement had in fact preceded the militant call of the Holy Sepulchre: the programme of reform inspired by Pope Gregory VII had enjoyed significant success among the nobility of France over the previous century. The fundamental aim of the Gregorian project—the liberty of the Church—concerned the laity primarily in its control over ecclesiastical foundations. Simon's ancestors had quickly subscribed to the reformers' insistence on this point, and began rapidly emancipating churches and abandoning claims to tithes in the wake of the Council of Clermont in 1095. Such restitution was not only perceived as an act of justice, but as a positive work of spiritual merit that would facilitate the donor's salvation. Of fourteen eleemosynary grants made by the Montforts surviving from before 1150, ten are restitutions of ecclesiastical property or confirmations of the same. By the late twelfth century, however, usurped tithes and churches in the lordship of Montfort had all but disappeared. Though all three men were generous benefactors of the Church, Simon's grandfather issued only four extant acts restoring ecclesiastical goods, while he and his father issued none.²⁴ Given the generally lower survival rate for earlier charters, this apparent decline is significant. Presumably

²³ *Patrologia latina*, ccii cc. 1541-2; Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, iv pp. 167-9; Alphanéry, *Idée de croisade*, ii pp. 58-9; Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, p. 35.

²⁴ *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, eds. G.D. Mansi et al., xx (Florence, 1775), c. 818; M. Bloch and R. Dauvergne, *Les caractères originaux de l'histoire rurale française*, new ed., i (Paris, 1955), p. 85; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 229-31; Civel, *Fleur de France*, pp. 366-7. Civel makes the pre-1150 proportion 11/15, but includes an act of Simon III dated p.1140: Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 299-300.

there were few wrongs left to right; the Montforts had effectively implemented the primary aim of the Gregorian project in their territories.

Simon did not, however, subscribe to the most extreme models of ecclesiastical liberty advocated by the neogregorian reformers. He demonstrated no compunction, for instance, about assigning the disputed tithe from the village of Gole in December 1207 to the priory of Saint-Thomas d'Épernon, a judgement more properly reserved to the bishop of Chartres but clearly retained by Simon in order to benefit a family religious foundation.²⁵ His opinion concerning the claims of temporal justice over clerical criminals likewise conflicted with the extreme position defended by Saint Thomas Becket of Canterbury. During the reconquest of the Carcassès in spring 1210, Simon captured a French clerk who had previously betrayed Montréal to Aimeric, its former lord. Desiring capital punishment as an example of the price of treachery, he compelled Bishop Bernard-Raymond of Carcassonne to defrock the malefactor and return him to Simon immediately, whereupon the crusader had the traitorous former clergyman dragged through the city behind a horse and finally hanged. Such double jeopardy—being condemned in both ecclesiastical and temporal courts for the same crime—flew in the face of the principles of Saint Thomas, held so dear by Peter the Chanter and his followers. Nevertheless, it reflected the current French royal attitude toward the question and had even received sanction the previous year from Innocent III, himself a product of the Parisian reform school.²⁶ Simon also followed prevailing practice—especially in the Midi—by ignoring radical ecclesiastical concerns about episcopal investiture at the hands of the laity: in addition to creating regalian rights, he would

²⁵ 'Saint-Thomas', p. 17.

²⁶ *Hystoria*, i p. 139; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 146-7; *RAPA*, ii pp. 487, 489; *Register Innocenz*, xi p. 409.

receive the fealty of the bishop of Cahors for the county of the same in 1211.²⁷ He was clearly more than a simple creature of the reform movement.

Even so, Simon enjoyed a notable reputation for personal piety, and not just as a crusader. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay's descriptions of Simon's frequent attendance at Mass and many of the monastic hours certainly reinforce his hagiography, but they remain entirely credible. His attachment to holy places and objects manifested itself not only in his pilgrimage to Syria on the Fourth Crusade, but also his later receipt of a consignment of relics from Constantinople, pilgrimage to Rocamadour, and devotion to the Holy Shroud of Cadouin and Saint Vincent's remains at Castres. Decades after his death, he remained so closely associated with chivalric piety that he would be cited with approval by Saint Louis.²⁸ Whilst resolving disputes between laymen and religious houses such as Saint-Thomas or Vaux-de-Cernay, Simon routinely found in favour of the monks, though this impression may owe to the selective preservation of such charters by the interested houses. However, in August 1212, he wrote to his mother from the siege of Penne-d'Agenais, specially exhorting her to defend the interests of the abbey of Breuil-Benoît—a daughter house of Vaux-de-Cernay—in order 'eos in temporabilibus adjuvare qui suos in spiritualibus adjuvant adjutores'.²⁹ This devotion to the Church was already sufficiently esteemed and well-known that the abbey of Saint-Denis accepted him as mediator of her dispute with Matthew of Montmorency in February 1208; Simon was an unusual choice, not only as a

²⁷ *Conciliorum collectio*, xx c. 817; *HGL*, viii cc. 611-2; below, p. 218.

²⁸ *Hystoria*, i pp. 193, 247, 252, 291, ii pp. 123-4, 144-6, 149-50, 312-3; CCC, ms. 32, f° 94r°; *Canso*, i p. 202; Roquebert, *Épopée cathare*, i pp. 430-2; Appendix A, xviii; du Chesne, *Chastillon*, preuves, p. 36; J. Bollandé et al., eds., *Acta sanctorum*, Ianuarii, iii (Paris and Rome, 1866), p. 13; Stephen of Salagnac and Bernard Gui, *De quatuor in quibus deus praedicatorum ordinem insignivit*, ed. T. Kaeppli (Rome, 1949), p. 12; John of Joinville, *Œuvres*, ed. and trans. N. de Wailly (Paris, 1867), p. 34.

²⁹ 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 20-2; *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 186-7; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 161-2, 167-8; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 318-9.

layman himself, but also as brother-in-law to the lay plaintiff, with no personal eleemosynary links to the abbey.³⁰ That the monks would agree to his arbitration suggests a reputation for an at least fair and perhaps even preferential attitude toward the clergy.

Reform extended beyond the dispute over ecclesiastical freedoms to affect lay behaviour. Prostitution was among the chief vices that concerned the Parisian practical theologians. James of Vitry railed against its ubiquity in his *Historia occidentalis* and possibly during his own preaching of the Albigensian Crusade, whilst Robert of Courson—who probably knew Simon best among the Parisian reformers given his legatine tour in the Midi in 1214—devoted sections of his own *Summa* to the problem and implemented practical countermeasures to curb it as papal legate.³¹ Robert's first public sally against the sex trade was likely as one of the preachers delegated by Fulk of Neuilly at the end of the twelfth century. Prostitution was a special concern of Fulk, who devoted much of his sermon content to combatting it.³² However, the great preacher also took practical steps to prevent its necessity. The convent he founded at Saint-Antoine-des-Champs was intended to serve as a haven for redeeming fallen women through the chastity and stability of religious life. Simon's donation to the nunnery in April 1216 was primarily driven by its 1204 transformation into a Cistercian community and status as the resting place of his friend, Robert Mauvoisin. Alice's later commitment of their daughter Petronilla to the care of the nuns in February 1222 with a clear view toward Petronilla's eventual profession in

³⁰ du Chesne, *Montmorency*, preuves, pp. 77-8.

³¹ James of Vitry, *Historia occidentalis*, p. 91; *Hystoria*, i pp. 281-3, ii pp. 7, 202-4, 207-8, 217; *HGL*, viii cc. 653-5; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 133-7; *Conciliorum collectio*, xxii (1778), c. 854; Bird, 'Heresy, Crusade and Reform', pp. 43-4, 46.

³² James of Vitry, *Historia occidentalis*, pp. 99-100; Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, iv p. 76; Rigord, 'Gesta Philippi', pp. 139-40; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon anglicanum*, p. 82; *MGHS*, xvi p. 654; *RHGF*, xviii p. 742; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i p. 37.

the convent—indeed, she likely later became prioress—was likewise an extension of the affinity she shared with her husband for the Cistercians. But despite the gentrification of Saint-Antoine following its adoption of the white mantle of Cîteaux, it is entirely possible that a legacy of the abbey’s original mission had survived: many of the elder nuns, for instance, were probably Fulk’s converts.³³ Simon and Alice seem to have personally held to chaste marital practice, and their public commitment to sexual stability may have extended beyond their own conduct to the campaign against prostitution by supporting religious alternatives that helped women to escape the practice. This carrot was certainly complemented by the stick in December 1212, when Simon implemented in the Statutes of Pamiers the injunction of Robert of Courson’s contemporary *Summa* that public and incorrigible prostitutes be expelled from their towns.³⁴ The chastity observed by Simon and Alice was not only a virtue they cultivated themselves, but one they—presumably with the encouragement of reforming elements of the Church—attempted to impress upon the society around them.

The reformers’ anxiety about the sale of sexual services was mirrored by their concerns about the market of violence. While soldiers’ entitlement to just wages was uncontested, armed bands of Spanish and Flemish mercenaries had by the late twelfth century become infamous in western Europe for wanton violence, rapine, and brigandage. Such companies operated outside of traditional hierarchies of land tenure or sworn service and were therefore difficult to control on campaign and impossible to regulate after the expiry of their contracts. Most crucially for

³³ Dor, ‘Seigneurs de Montfort’, pp. 178, 187; Rhein, ‘Seigneurie de Montfort’, pp. 320-1, 322; Rigord, ‘Gesta Philippi’, p. 140; James of Vitry, *Historia occidentalis*, p. 100; *MGHS*, xx p. 330, xxiii p. 877; Humbert of Romans, *Legendae sancti Dominici*, ed. S. Tugwell (Rome, 2008), p. 609; S. Tugwell, ‘Notes on the Life of St Dominic’, *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 73 (2003), pp. 60-1.

³⁴ *HGL*, viii c. 633; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, ii p. 95n. 141; above, p. 113.

reformers, the lack of stability among these bands meant that—upon the default of their paymasters or conclusion of their employment—they frequently fed themselves by plundering the defenceless peasantry and clergy.³⁵ Both temporal and ecclesiastical authorities had enacted stern legislation to suppress warbands in the latter half of the twelfth century, but with little impact. Such freelance troops regularly fought in imperial, Angevin, Anglo-Norman, and French campaigns, but it was their activities in the Languedoc that attracted the particular attention of the contemporary reform movement. As early as 1179, the archbishop of Narbonne had solemnly excommunicated mercenaries and their employers in accordance with the final canon of the Third Lateran Council and had specifically named the complicit lords in his province, including the count of Toulouse and viscount of Béziers. Two years later during his tour of the Midi, Stephen of Tournai—then abbot of Sainte-Geneviève de Paris—would write of a land laid waste and made perilous by professional soldiery run riot. In 1207, Raymond VI of Toulouse was excommunicated for employing mercenaries, and his reconciliation at Saint-Gilles two years later was conditional on their dismissal from his service and expulsion from his territories. Excommunication also befell the consuls of Toulouse for their use of mercenaries in defence of their city in 1211.³⁶ Simon's own relationship with mercenaries in the south was complicated. Throughout his career, he paid wages to knights in his household, which in its widest sense would have included those crusaders who followed him to Syria and the Midi as well as many of

³⁵ Peter the Chanter, *Summa de sacramentis et animae consiliis*, ed. J.-A. Dugauquier, iii.2 (Louvain, 1963), pp. 370-1; Robert of Courson, *Le traité De usura de Robert de Courçon*, ed. and trans. G. Lefèvre (Lille, 1902), pp. 41-3; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 221-3; H. Géraud, 'Les routiers au douzième siècle', *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 3 (1842), pp. 126-7, 131.

³⁶ Géraud, 'Routiers au douzième siècle', pp. 131-2; idem, 'Mercadier: Les routiers au treizième siècle', *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 3 (1842), pp. 418-22; *Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum historicum, dogmaticorum, moralium, amplissima collectio*, eds. E. Martène and U. Durand, ii (Paris, 1724), cc. 880-1; *Conciliorum decreta*, pp. 224-5; *HGL*, viii cc. 341-2, 619; Stephen of Tournai, *Lettres*, p. 101; *Register Innocenz*, x pp. 120-1, xii pp. 145, 147-8; *Canso*, i p. 14; *Hystoria*, i pp. 38-40.

those who remained with the Albigensian Crusade beyond their quarantine. Others were individually recruited from France specifically for paid service.³⁷ These men, linked to Simon by ties of lordship, were not *ruptarii*, or mercenaries. But in the early years of the crusade, Simon also hired Spanish troops under captains such as Peter the Aragonese and Martin Algai, though there is no evidence for his use of such professionals after the latter demonstrated his unreliability at Castelnaudary in 1211. In fact, when Martin was taken at the fall of Biron the following year, Simon had him dragged behind a horse through the army before hanging him like a common criminal. The mercenary company captured at Moissac a month later fared little better: handed over to the the crusaders by the townsfolk in exchange for a peaceful capitulation, they too were summarily executed.³⁸ It would always have been difficult for Simon to ignore the anti-mercenary component of the *negotium pacis et fidei*, given the Church's long commitment to the Peace of God movement and the reformers' polemics against those who fought for material gain in independent warbands. However, the presence of men like Peter and Martin in the army suggests that the exigencies of campaigning in hostile country with meagre forces led Simon to ignore ecclesiastical proscriptions against employing mercenaries before 1212, an embarrassing fact passed over by Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay with as little comment as possible.³⁹ But when Simon had personally felt the sting of betrayal by hired troops—and as his relationship with Aragon simultaneously deteriorated—practical concerns and emotional prejudices may have reinforced the ideological opposition of his crusade to mercenary companies.

³⁷ Tyerman, 'Paid Crusaders', pp. 12-3, 19; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 181, 270; idem, *Albigensian Crusade*, p. 301.

³⁸ *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 59; *HGL*, viii c. 601; *RHGF*, xxiv p. 562; *Canso*, i pp. 84, 210, 226, 260, 274-6; *Hystoria*, i pp. 115, 263-5, 270, ii pp. 36-7, 49-50.

³⁹ É. Delaruelle, 'Paix de Dieu et croisade dans la chrétienté du XII^e siècle', *Cahiers de Fanjeaux* 4 (1969), pp. 52-61; *Hystoria*, i pp. 115, 263.

However, the greatest social evil condemned by the reformers was one which Simon seems to have ignored completely. Despite the vehement campaigns and voluminous scholastic treatises against usury by men connected with the crusader such as Fulk of Neuilly, Stephen Langton, and Robert of Courson, there is no evidence that Simon ever legislated or took action against money-lenders.⁴⁰ Inasmuch as Christian usurers and Jews were frequently conflated by reform polemics, Alice of Montmorency's imprisonment and extortion of the Tolosan Jewry in 1217 might have been influenced by anti-usury rhetoric, but the details of the episode as reported by a thirteenth-century Hebrew notice suggest that zeal for conversion was the primary motivation.⁴¹ An obvious reason for Simon's silence about usury was his own complicity: the exigencies of the crusade required a constant flow of cash that he could not easily raise except through loot or loans. Though the 1208 bull *Ut contra crudelissimos* promised to absolve crusaders from any interest they might incur through borrowing, to claim such privileges would wreck Simon's credit by denying lenders incentive to advance the money in the first place; funding nine years of campaigning on such a basis was impossible.⁴² Instead, Simon obtained liquidity from merchants like Raymond of Cahors, who served in Simon's court from March 1210 until at least January 1215. Raymond, in turn, was repaid from the profits of Simon's conquests, which presumably exceeded the value of the principal: the banker received 'generaliter omnia jura' over Pézenas and Tourbes and the booty from Lavaur in 1211 as

⁴⁰ Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, iv p. 76; Rigord, 'Gesta Philippi', p. 132; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon anglicanum*, pp. 81-2; *RHGF*, xviii p. 743; *MGHS*, xx pp. 329-30, xxiii p. 876, xxvi p. 258; Robert of Courson, *De usura*; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 296-7, ii pp. 189n. 63, 207-8ns. 57, 59.

⁴¹ *Patrologia latina*, ccxi c. 694, ccxvi c. 1238; Peter the Chanter, *Verbum adbreuiatum*, ed. M. Boutry, i (Turnhout, 2004), p. 325, ii (2012), p. 292; *Register Innocenz*, i p. 503-4, Robert of Courson, *De usura*, pp. 43, 53, 63; *Conciliarum collectio*, xxii c. 786; *Conciliarum decreta*, pp. 265-6; *MGHS*, xxvi p. 258; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 298-9, ii p. 204n. 18; ibn Verga, *Shevet Yehuda*, p. 148; Zerner, 'Épouse de Simon', p. 461.

⁴² *Register Innocenz*, xi p. 243.

recompense for his support.⁴³ Three years later, Raymond's native city resisted the legatine visit of that scourge of usurers, Robert of Courson, by holding the gates against him until the cardinal's men set them alight. The 1,050*l.tn.* demanded by Simon from the citizens in 'satisfaction'—presumably for the offence against the peace of Simon's governance, as the money never went to Robert—not only suggests a hypocritical opportunism on his part, but ironically also makes clear the extent to which the crusader failed to understand or sympathise with the reformers' objections to usury: the money was collected from usurers, whom Robert of Courson and his colleagues insisted did not lawfully possess it in the first place and therefore could not be taxed on what they were obligated to restore to their victims. For similar reasons, the infamous 30,000*m.* tallage which Simon imposed on Toulouse in the autumn of 1216 was another violation of the reformed vision of proper fiscal governance.⁴⁴ However, it may be that Simon's resort to such methods fell within circumstances permitted by the practical theologians of Paris. Robert of Courson at least permitted a prince to take out a loan or impose tallage in extreme need for the defence of the Church, so long as the sum was promptly repaid.⁴⁵ These exceptions may have allowed Robert a clearer conscience in his endorsement of Simon, but it is unlikely that the crusader much troubled himself on the question. After all, even if there is no evidence for usurious loans at Vaux-de-Cernay during Guy's abbacy, they had been common

⁴³ *HGL*, viii cc. 589, 604-8, 611, 612, 657, 658; Gardère, *Seigneurie de Condom*, p. 276; Lyon, 'Daudé de Prades', p. 392; Appendix A, xxi, xxii; *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi cc. 693, 694; *Canso*, i p. 174; Dossat, 'Simon de Montfort', p. 289.

⁴⁴ *RHGF*, xix p. 604; Bird, 'Reform or Crusade?', p. 170; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, ii p. 157n. 95; *Canso*, ii pp. 246, 252; Puylaurens, p. 98. Though a lack of evidence prevents definitive conclusions, the Cahorsin episode may have allowed Simon to cancel his debts to the city's bankers, while avoiding the consequences of damaged credit by simultaneously mulcting them with tallage. However, Raymond of Cahors continued to attend Simon's court for at least seven months after Robert of Courson's arson: Lyon, 'Daudé de Prades', p. 392; Appendix A, xxi, xxii; *HGL*, viii c. 657, 658.

⁴⁵ J. Bird, 'Paris Masters and the Justification of the Albigensian Crusade', *Crusades* 6 (2007), p. 143.

practice amongst the abbeys in the Cistercian heartland of Burgundy for over half a century.⁴⁶

Any admonishments from the white monks against the crusader's involvement with the practice would therefore have rung very hollow. Moreover, Simon remained a layman and a knight: as much as he had allowed reform precepts to permeate his life, liquidity—even at the cost of usury—remained a necessity for chivalric finances. Where the survival of the crusade was concerned Simon refused—perhaps somewhat paradoxically, given his stand at Zara—to allow the perfect to become the enemy of the good.

Heresy

The particular good for which Simon spent nearly a quarter of his life crusading was the elimination of heresy from the Midi. At least in the minds of neogregorian reformers, no distinction existed between external morality and doctrinal assent. Just as usury was the outward manifestation of greed and sloth, so was formal heresy the sign of pride, the arch-sin. The application of similar penalties for heresy, freelance soldiery, and usury by ecclesiastical councils was an acknowledgement of the social dimension to creedal dissent and an appeal to the temporal powers to deal with it accordingly.⁴⁷ Simon's leadership of the Albigensian Crusade was an answer to that call, which had been mediated through his French religious and scholastic connexions.

⁴⁶ C.B. Bouchard, *Holy Entrepreneurs: Cistercians, Knights, and Economic Exchange in Twelfth-Century Burgundy* (Ithaca, NY, 1991), pp. 41-2. The earliest records for Vaux-de-Cernay's acceptance of pawns date from December 1216; admittedly, the collateral for both loans were tithes detained by lay knights, meaning they were unlikely to be perceived as usurious: *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 202-3; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i p. 276.

⁴⁷ *Conciliarum decreta*, pp. 223, 224-5; *Conciliarum collectio*, xxii cc. 786, 850-1; *Hystoria*, i p. 15; Bird, 'Heresy, Crusade and Reform', pp. 271-2.

Heresy was a matter of concern for all circles of clerical life, but popular heresy—and especially dualist creeds such as Albigensianism—elicited special concern from the Cistercians. As with the order's involvement in crusade preaching, Saint Bernard led the way. Before and during his 1145 preaching tour of the Midi, the abbot condemned heresy in the strongest of terms but stopped short of advocating the use of force to suppress it. However, his emphasis on the threat heresy posed to the social order and its apocalyptic ramifications meant that his successors would have difficulty making the same distinction.⁴⁸ When Henry of Marcy also undertook a tour of Languedoc to combat heresy in 1178, he argued that the cooperation of the temporal sword may be necessary for the effective use of the spiritual. He was influential in the passing of the final anti-heretical canon at the Third Lateran Council the following year, which authorised the confiscation of property belonging to heretics and their supporters. In 1181, now a cardinal and papal legate, Henry returned to the Midi at the head of an army that captured Lavaur, belonging to Viscount Roger II of Béziers, whom Henry had branded as a protector of heretics.⁴⁹ Not only had the order of Cîteaux assumed leadership of the Church's struggle against heresy in the Midi, but it had appealed to military might in order to win.

An army led by a papal legate would not appear in the Languedoc again for nearly thirty years. In the meantime, Innocent III from the start of his papacy appointed Cistercians to carry out an extensive preaching campaign in the region in order to stem and reverse the spread of heresy. The monks Rainier and Guy were the first to be sent to the Midi in 1198. Peter of Castelnau and Ralph of Fontfroide followed in 1203, and Abbot Arnold-Amalric of Cîteaux

⁴⁸ Kienzle, *Cistercians, Heresy and Crusade*, pp. 78-104, 107.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 112-34; *Conciliorum decreta*, pp. 224-5. It was on this expedition that Stephen of Tournai observed the desolation wrought by mercenary bands: above, p. 142.

received a commission as chief papal legate in the area the following year. In the spring of 1207, Arnold-Amalric brought twelve other Cistercian abbots to join in the preaching effort. Meanwhile, Bishop Fulk of Toulouse had also been a Cistercian abbot before his election in 1205. In the end, it was the murder of the Peter of Castelnau which triggered the Albigensian Crusade, and when the armed march on the Trencavel viscounties began anew in 1209, it was once more a Cistercian abbot—Arnold-Amalric—at the head of the column.⁵⁰ Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay again played a special part in mediating the order's ideology to Simon. Likely prepared by the anti-heretical literature found in his abbatial library, Guy had personally witnessed the state of affairs in the Midi as one of the twelve Cistercian abbots commissioned by Arnold-Amalric to preach against heresy in 1207, and he returned to Yveline to paint a dire picture of contumacious dissent. His desire for conversion was earnest: he personally—though vainly—besought the heretical population of Minerve to repent after the fall of the town to the crusaders in 1210, and Simon followed his example with similar results. However, the investment in spiritual conversion demonstrated by both men did not preclude the possibility of temporal coercion. Indeed, Guy personally lobbied Simon to take the cross at Rochefort one evening in 1208; though he did not himself join the initial crusade in 1209, he may have recommended Simon V to Arnold-Amalric before its departure, thereby influencing the promotion of the former to viscount.⁵¹ The white monks, Arnold-Amalric and Guy chief among them, were unquestionably the spiritual directors of Simon's crusade.

⁵⁰ *Register Innocenz*, i pp. 135-8, vii pp. 123-5, xi pp. 30-5; *Hystoria*, i pp. 5-6, 23-9, 41-4, 45-7; *Canso*, i pp. 8, 10-22, 34; Jordan of Saxony, 'Libellus de principiis ordinis Praedicatorum', in *Monumenta historica sancti patris nostri Dominici*, ed. M.-H. Laurent (Rome, 1935), p. 35; *MGHS*, xxvi p. 271; Puylaurens, pp. 42-4, 52.

⁵¹ H. Martin, 'Inventaire des biens et des livres de l'abbaye des Vaux-de-Cernay au XII^e siècle', *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de Paris et d'Île-de-France* 13 (1886), pp. 39-42; Zerner, 'Gui des Vaux-de-Cernay', pp. 196, 197; *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 168-9; *Hystoria*, i pp. 27-8, 45-7, 102-3, 159-60, iii p. iii-ivn. 2.

But the Cistercians were not the only clerics committed to the suppression of heresy. In the schools of Paris, Peter the Chanter and his fellow reformers had speculated about the problems of the heretic in society and engaged with academic heretics in their midst. Whilst Peter the Chanter opposed capital punishment in favour of perpetual incarceration, Robert of Courson adopted the bloodier and more practical position. He translated this into action by supporting Simon in 1214, during which campaign he personally convicted seven Waldensians captured at Morlhon and witnessed their execution by the crusaders. In July, Robert further endorsed the crusade by committing to Simon and his heirs all the lands conquered in the dioceses of Albi, Agen, Rodez, and Cahors.⁵² Stephen Langton, now cardinal-priest of San Chrisogono and archbishop of Canterbury, was otherwise occupied by his struggle with King John during the crusade years, but his brother Walter fought twice at Simon's side. James of Vitry, meanwhile, undertook preaching missions in France and Germany promoting the Albigensian Crusade in 1211, 1212, and 1214. His sabbatical year saw the beginning of his *Vita Marie de Oegnies*, written at the instigation of Fulk of Toulouse and at least partially intended as a defence of orthodox lay spirituality.⁵³ Less conspicuous members of the university circle also participated. Clarin, Simon's chaplain and eventual chancellor, is titled *magister* in a witness list of May 1214, which may suggest a connexion with the Paris schools.⁵⁴ More concretely, the capable archdeacon of Paris, William, was associated with Stephen Langton and especially Robert of Courson in diocesan affairs in France. But even before he accompanied the latter

⁵² Caesar of Heisterbach, *Dialogus miraculorum*, ed. J. Strange, i (Cologne, 1851), pp. 304-7; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 105, 188-9, 321-3; *HGL*, viii cc. 653-5; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 202-3, 207-8, 217.

⁵³ *Hystoria*, i p. 247, 281-3, ii pp. 7, 185-6, 202-3; *Canso*, iii pp. 106, 122; James of Vitry, *Vita Marie de Oegnies*, ed. R.B.C. Huygens (Turnhout, 2012), pp. 8, 44-5.

⁵⁴ *HGL*, viii c. 652; below, p. 245.

cardinal on his legatine expedition to the south in April 1214, William had joined James of Vitry in his 1211 preaching campaign and ridden south with the crusaders he signed. However, William's enthusiasm for the anti-heretical effort passed beyond the usual clerical roles. As early as the siege of Termes in 1210, he made a name for himself as a master siege engineer, and he oversaw siege operations for Simon's army again in 1212 at Penne d'Agenais and Moissac.⁵⁵ The influence the Parisian reformers had exercised on Simon's ideology since the 1190s was now coupled with their active participation at the crusader's side in the fight against heresy in the Midi.

The persecution of heresy necessitated consideration of the means by which it would be prosecuted. As wilful error could be hidden to avoid condemnation, a traditional method for establishing the guilt of an accused heretic was the trial by ordeal. Proofs of water, hot iron, or battle, usually blessed by local clergy, were undertaken by the accused, who was then judged by the popular consensus of the crowd of witnesses on the outcome of the ordeal.⁵⁶ The opposition of reformers to such *peregrina iudicia* was part of a wider reforming impulse to combat superstition alongside heresy, taken up especially by James of Vitry and the Cistercians. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, for instance, ridicules southerners throughout his *Hystoria* for their folk beliefs and routinely presents Simon as an exemplar of masculine rationality and orthodoxy in contrast

⁵⁵ *Register Innocenz'*, viii p. 162; *Recueil de chartes et documents de Saint-Martin-des-Champs*, ed. J. Depoin, iii (Paris, 1917), pp. 258-9; Stephen of Bourbon, *Tractatus de diuersis materiis predicabilibus*, eds. J. Berlioz and J.-L. Eichenlaub (Turnhout, 2002), pp. 176-7; AN, J 731, n° 19; M. and C. Dickson, 'Le cardinal Robert de Courson, sa vie', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 9 (1934), pp. 81-2, 136-7, 138-9; *HGL*, viii cc. 601, 625; *Hystoria*, i pp. 178-80, 184, 190-1, 247, 281-3, ii pp. 7, 10-1, 25-7, 30-1, 41, 47, 203-4.

⁵⁶ Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 323-5; P. Brown, 'Society and the Supernatural: A Medieval Change', *Daedalus* 104 (1975), pp. 137-40.

to the effeminate, superstitious, and heterodox local nobility.⁵⁷ For Peter the Chanter, the ordeal was the worst fruit of this evil tree. His indignation at these presumptive and unreliable tests of the divine was echoed by some of his students and finally enshrined in Church teaching by the condemnation of clerical participation in ordeals—and a renewed ban on duels absolutely—by the Fourth Lateran Council.⁵⁸ Before this ecumenical proscription, however, Robert of Courson once again demurred from his master's conclusion. Though Robert opposed ordeals in principle, he allowed their utility in doubtful cases and followed Pope Lucius III's 1184 decretal *Ad abolendam* in his deference to local custom.⁵⁹ Simon's constitutions at Pamiers in 1212 showed slightly less ambivalence. Judicial combat was outlawed, but—in what may have been a concession to his French knights, sure of their prowess and jealous of their privileges—exceptions were allowed for most capital charges: treason, theft, rape, and murder. Guy of Lucy's castellan had already been hanged for refusing to fight a duel before the vicecomital court to exonerate himself for the loss of Puylaurens in 1211. But while this dulled the statute nearly beyond effect, it remains significant in light of the ruling on judgements of another offence carrying the death penalty: heresy. Simon decreed that no one may be judged a heretic or a believer in heresy except on the testimony of a bishop or priest.⁶⁰ This restriction of competent authority in the conviction of heretics effectively rejected the concession made by *Ad*

⁵⁷ A. Forni, 'La « nouvelle prédication » des disciples de Foulques de Neuilly: Intentions, techniques et réactions', in *Faire croire: Modalités de la diffusion et de la réception des messages religieux du XII^e au XV^e siècle* (Rome, 1981), pp. 34-5; *Hystoria*, i pp. 211, 228-9, ii pp. 141-2, 150; Zerner, 'Épouse de Simon', p. 453. It is worth noting, however, that Peter seems to report Simon's own divination of the psalms with approval: *Hystoria*, i p. 103.

⁵⁸ J.W. Baldwin, 'The Intellectual Preparation for the Canon of 1215 against Ordeals', *Speculum* 36 (1961), pp. 613-4; idem, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 326-30; *Conciliorum decreta*, p. 244.

⁵⁹ *Corpus iuris canonici*, ed. E. Friedberg, 2nd edn, ii (Leipzig, 1881), c. 781; *Conciliorum collectio*, xxii cc. 842, 920; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 330-1.

⁶⁰ *HGL*, viii cc. 630, 634; *Hystoria*, i p. 251.

abolendam. Though such due process does not seem to have been consistently exercised during the preceding years of the crusade, after 1212 the discovery of a dissimulating heretic was no longer possible through a trial by ordeal.⁶¹ Instead, he would now be examined by a clerical judge, thus preventing—at least in theory—mob justice and vendetta from polluting the persecution effort.

In addition to the spiritual and theological support from the Cistercians and schoolmen which justified violent and judicial measures in order to suppress heresy, a new approach found encouragement from Simon in his identification with the emerging Dominican order of Friars Preacher. Dominic, subprior of the chapter of Osma, had come to the Languedoc with Bishop Diego and had joined in the preaching campaigns of the Cistercian legates, adopting a mendicant attitude to counter the Albigensian claims to a monopoly on apostolic poverty. After the death of his bishop in 1207, Dominic probably returned to Osma, but was back in the Midi by the summer of 1211 to continue efforts to convert heretics through the double example of life and preaching. After developing a following of repentant former ladies perfect, Diego had founded a convent at Prouille to resettle the women in a stable and orthodox religious life; like the prostitutes of Saint-Antoine, these women had been redeemed from their lives of sin to work for God's kingdom through prayer.⁶² Prouille quickly became the epicentre of Dominic's mendicant mission, which Simon and his followers generously supported. Most important, however, was Simon's grant of

⁶¹ *Canso*, i pp. 164; *Hystoria*, i pp. 228; Puylaurens, p. 70. Cf. Robert of Courson's examination and condemnation of Waldensians in 1214: *Hystoria*, ii p. 208. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay's casuistry concerning superstition is once more evident in his description of the miracle of the repentant heretical disciple at Castres in 1209 who escaped unharmed from the flames to which Simon had condemned him. The event—at which there is no mention of a clerical judgement—differs from an ordeal in little beyond its spontaneity and its fatalistic premise: *ibid.*, i pp. 117-8; Roquebert, *Épopée cathare*, i p. 312.

⁶² *RHGF*, xxiv p. 592; *Hystoria*, i pp. 21-4, 48; Jordan of Saxony, 'Libellus', pp. 36-9; Puylaurens, pp. 46, 54; Tugwell, 'Notes on Dominic', pp. 8-15; *HGL*, viii cc. 611-2; *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 59; above, pp. 140-1.

Casseneuveil—captured in August 1214 and probably awarded at the council of Montpellier the following January—to Dominic and his followers. By giving the fortified village to the preaching community centred on the future saint, Simon demonstrated that his interest in their work extended beyond the cloistered prayers of pious women and rehabilitated heretics: he had now provided Dominic with a material and financial base from which to spread his active and perpetual evangelisation. In December 1217, Simon renewed and extended his protection, ordering his seneschals of Carcassonne and the Agenais to defend Dominic and his concerns as if they were Simon's own.⁶³ The identification was more than formulaic: while Simon attacked the political structures that sheltered heretics, Dominic worked to weaken their popular support by offering a Catholic alternative. Indeed, the work of the two men was so closely joined that Dominic, forewarned in 1217 by a vision of Simon's downfall, dispersed his followers from their nascent house in Toulouse, fearing for the safety of his new order should it lose its great patron. Anxiety about the backlash against the Dominicans that might result from the collapse of the crusading regime in Toulouse was well-founded: the revolt later that year began with a massacre of the French and collaborating population.⁶⁴ The preaching mission, while exercising a spiritual influence on the crusade, had also become dependent upon the security offered by its conquests.

The institutional affinity between the preacher and the crusader also translated into a personal intimacy. Certainly later Dominicans and Montforts alike had reason to emphasise the connexion between the two illustrious men. There is no surviving contemporary evidence of Dominic's presence at the battle of Muret, for instance; his name may have been added to Peter

⁶³ *Hystoria*, ii p. 222, iii pp. 207-8; Jordan of Saxony, 'Libellus', pp. 43-4; Tugwell, 'Notes on Dominic', pp. 89-90; *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 85.

⁶⁴ Jordan of Saxony, 'Libellus', pp. 47-8; *Canso*, ii pp. 276-8; Puylaurens, p. 100.

of Vaux-de-Cernay's account by Bernard Gui in the early fourteenth century in order to obtain for the friars a mythical share in the miraculous victory.⁶⁵ Other details recorded around forty-five years later by Humbert of Romans—such as Dominic's baptism of Simon's daughter Petronilla in spring 1211 or his blessing of the marriage of Amalric of Montfort and Beatrice of Vienne in 1214—were almost certainly provided by Petronilla's elder sister Amicia, who founded the Dominican nunnery at Montargis, and other members of the family who kept up close relations with the friars in France.⁶⁶ But these details—despite their late date and vested interests—do not warrant Luigi Canetti's casual dismissal as 'una patina fortemente leggendaria.' To assume with him and Roquebert that Dominic's preaching and Simon's crusade were at odds is to misunderstand both.⁶⁷ The saint did not hesitate to associate with the authors of the *negotium pacis et fidei*, even administering the diocese of Carcassonne on Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay's behalf while the new bishop was recruiting crusaders in France in 1213.⁶⁸ Documentary evidence further confirms that Dominic was no stranger to Simon's court or campaigns. He was with the army during the first siege of Toulouse in the summer of 1211. He may also have been at Simon's side in the Agenais the following year, prompting Robert Mauvoisin's donation to Prouille and Simon's confirmations.⁶⁹ Humbert likely sums up their relationship best: 'comes Montis Fortis pugnans contra hereticos gladio materiali et beatus

⁶⁵ Bernard Gui, *Scripta de Sancto Dominico*, ed. S. Tugwell (Rome, 1998), pp. 89-91, 112.

⁶⁶ Humbert of Romans, *Legendae*, pp. 322, 609-10; Stephen of Bourbon, *Anecdotes historiques, légendes et apologues*, ed. A. Lecoy de la Marche (Paris, 1877), p. 241.

⁶⁷ L. Canetti, 'Domenico e gli eretici', in G.G. Merlo, ed., *Storia ereticale e antiereticale del Medioevo* (Torre Pellice, 1997), pp. 131-3; Roquebert, *Épopée cathare*, i p. 210. Cf. Bernard Gui, *Scripta*, pp. 170-2.


⁶⁸ Constantine of Orvieto, 'Legenda sancti Dominici', in *Monumenta historica Dominici*, p. 324; Bernard Gui, *Scripta*, p. 90.

⁶⁹ *HGL*, viii cc. 611-2; Gerard of Frachet, *Vitae fratrum ordinis Praedicatorum*, ed. B.M. Reichert (Rome, 1897), pp. 68-9; *Monumenta Dominici*, pp. 31-2.

Dominicus gladio verbi dei'.⁷⁰ Though the moments in which they can be positively placed together are relatively rare, Simon and Dominic were personally linked by a common antipathy towards heresy in the Midi and viewed their very different methods for combatting it as complementary rather than competitive.

The ideology which propelled Simon to conquer the county of Toulouse was closely wedded to the major reform movements animating the Church at the turn of the thirteenth century. Though principally mediated through his contacts with the Paris schools and especially the French Cistercians, Simon's understanding of this reform was sufficiently adaptable to embrace newer approaches—such as that of the Friars Preacher—or even to ignore inconvenient elements of the programme, such as prohibitions against the employment of mercenaries or the toleration of usury. Despite this selectivity, his ideals for a perfected Christendom encompassed the majority of the reformers' aims and provided the foundation of his career. It was the reformers' call to realise the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth—whether in France, Dalmatia, Syria, or the Midi—that captured Simon's sense of both duty and adventure, fuelling his ambition to conquer in the sign of the cross.

⁷⁰ 'the count of Montfort fighting against the heretics with the material sword and Blessed Dominic with the sword of the Word of God'. Humbert of Romans, *Legendae*, p. 609.



Map 5: *The Lordship of Montfort*
 Map 6: *The Earldom of Leicester*

IV. LORD OF MONTFORT AND EARL OF LEICESTER

The titles and lands inherited by Simon, though least central to the crusading element of his career, nevertheless form the foundation of his identity as a baron and reveal his government at its most primitive level. As such, they provide an important point of departure and comparison with his better-known achievements in the Midi. However, Simon also continued to serve as the effective lord at least of Montfort after 1209, and an evolution can be traced through his administration in France as well as in the south. The smaller geographical scale of Montfort and brief possession of Leicester—little studied by historians—show only an embryonic glimpse of what Simon's government would become in time, but the mundane and domestic concerns of these pacific possessions still bear the distinctive mark of Simon's governance. The continuities and contrasts between his lordship exercised over Montfort and—however fleetingly—Leicester



and his conquest of the Midi are necessary for understanding the consistency and dynamism of Simon's career.

Inheritance

After 1185, upon the death of his father, Simon inherited a patrimony centred on the forest of Yveline and the ancient castles of Montfort and Épernon.¹ The frontiers of this lordship would remain substantially unchanged for the rest of his life. The smaller fief of Bréthencourt on the southern edge of Yveline with its dependent castellany of Beynes in the north had been set aside for his younger brother Guy and so passed to the cadet line, while Simon gained the right to the tolls collected where the Oise meets the Seine at Conflans through his marriage to Alice of Montmorency.² From 1204, his family not only held the forest of Yveline in its own right, but also added the castle of Saint-Léger, its provostship, and the fiefs of Bordes and Foillous. Simon's personal authority in these latter places was unclear; the royal enfeoffment had been made to his mother while he was on the Fourth Crusade with no mention of his lordship over these concessions. It may be that he continued to serve as forester for his mother: he alienated this role for Foillous in 1207 and granted only usage rights in Yveline before 1216, while his mother seems to have controlled the dispensation of monetary alms.³ Simon's tenure therefore

¹ *Pipe Rolls 31 Henry II*, p. 194; *34 Henry II*, p. 142; *Registres de Philippe*, i p. 51; *RHGF*, xi p. 275.

² BnF, ms. lat. 5441, ii p. 120; A. de Dion, 'Notice sur Beynes', *Mémoires de Rambouillet* 11 (1896), pp. 23-4; Depoin, 'Conflans-Sainte-Honorine', p. 96.

³ *RAPA*, ii p. 449; *Layettes*, i pp. 271, 307; BnF, mss. fr. 20691, p. 570; Duchesne 22, f^o 344v^o; lat. 10095, f^o 43v^o; fr. 20692, p. 381; *Chartres*, ii (1863), pp. 35-6, iii (1865), p. 173; *Necrologe de Port Roïal*, p. 252; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', p. 556; AN, P 1839, f^{os} 241v^o-242r^o; above, pp. 42-3; below, p. 177.

witnessed the detachment of a minor fief for his brother, but the important augmentation of territory and rights through his mother's exchange of his uncle's Norman fiefs.

The approximate integral limits of the lordship of Montfort under Simon skirted the castellany of Neauphle from Méré north to Marcq, thence west to Montchauvet, and south alongside the county of Dreux through Houdan and Maintenon to Ablis. There the frontier ran east to Rochefort before returning north, circumventing John of Rouvray's fief at Auffargis between Vieille-Église and Les Essarts while marching with the lordships of Lévis and Maurepas and the abbatial lands of Vaux-de-Cernay and Hautes-Bruyères. Within the lordship lay another significant enclave at Poigny held directly from the king by John of Rouvray, and at least part of Les Essarts was similarly exempted for the Garlandes, though this seems to have reverted to Simon by 1216. The Montforts shared their rights over Montchauvet with the king and those over the forest of Sonchamp with the abbey of Fleury. This picture of the lordship's boundaries is necessarily rough and overlooks a number of complications. For one, Simon did not hold the entirety of his lands from the Crown: Beynes and Montchauvet, for example, depended on Saint-Germain-des-Prés.⁴ Moreover, it is often unclear whether villages and castles themselves belonged to the seigneurial demesne or simply certain properties or rights within them. For instance, Simon retained rights to land and revenues in Soligny and Gometz, but almost certainly not their entirety.⁵ Moreover, whether a place was held by or from the Montforts is often difficult to ascertain with clarity. Religious houses, for instance, owned Saint-Arnoult and La

⁴ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 95-7, 308; *RAPA*, ii pp. 106-7; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 179-80; AN, K 24, n° 13; *Gallia christiana*, viii instr., cc. 524-5; *Saint-Germain-des-Prés*, p. 308.

⁵ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 311, 315-6.

Couperie, as well as lands and serfs throughout the lordship.⁶ The *Scriptum feodorum de Monteforti*, the surviving document closest to a systematic record of Montfort influence in the region, was probably compiled under the tenure of Simon's son, Amalric V, and can now be recovered only in extracts or corrupt copies. Followers of the family seem to have concentrated their sub-fiefs around the peripheries of the lordship, and Simon could demand allegiance and service even further afield in Chevreuse or Poissy. However, it is improbable that these external vassals held their patrimonies from the Montforts; more likely, they held some property within the lordship.⁷ Amidst this tangled web of fiefs, enclaves, and exclaves, it is probably more accurate to conceive of medieval political limits not in terms of modern borders but as dynamic spheres of influence determined by remembered custom, recorded rights, and projected power.⁸ The limits given here should therefore be held loosely and interpreted as a general outline for imagining the extent of Montfort authority in France.

Within this lordship lay a network of important castles, reminders of the region's once-strategic location on the Franco-Norman frontier. Saint-Léger held a royal garrison until 1204, but most of the strongholds had been built by the Montfort family over the preceding centuries. Montchauvet, Houdan, Gambais, and Épernon formed a line to the east, reinforced behind by Saint-Léger and Gazeran, while Montfort held the seat of seigneurial power, and Rochefort stood guard over the southwestern corner of Simon's lordship. Dependent castles on the margins of Yveline included Beynes, Septeuil, Civry, Richebourg, la Tour-Neuve, Maintenon, and

⁶ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 302, 308; *Clypeus nascentis Font-ebaldensis ordinis*, ed. J. de la Mainferme, ii (Paris, 1688), p. 328; *Grand-Beaulieu*, p. 68; *Saint-Magloire*, i pp. 105, 197.

⁷ Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 373-8, 380-476; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 97.

⁸ Power, *Norman Frontier*, pp. 3-5.

Bréthencourt.⁹ The refortification of the western defences in the late twelfth century was almost certainly the result of Simon's initiative. After the division of Évreux and Montfort upon his grandfather's death in 1181, the northwestern edge of the lordship once again became a contentious frontier that needed protection. The keep at Houdan provides the only surviving archeological evidence for this period: renovation work there may have begun under Simon IV, but the addition of a spiral staircase clearly dates from the tenure of Simon V. Any further alterations that Simon may have planned, however, were rendered obsolete by the cession of Évreux to the French Crown in 1200, and the project was probably abandoned.¹⁰ In 1209, Simon enclosed the burg of Épernon on the eve of his departure for the Albigensian Crusade. The defensive rationale at first seems unclear: not only was Normandy firmly within Philip's grasp by this time, but Épernon lay on the road to Chartres, far from any organised enemy threat. Instead, the construction of new walls more likely reflects the town's growing economic importance, which Simon was keen to encourage and protect from roving marauders during his absence.¹¹ Even after the decline of Montfort's importance to the Franco-Norman conflict, Simon's castles continued to play an important role in the cultivation of the lordship's welfare.

A noteworthy example of the varied roles that castles played in the lordship of Montfort is found in their relationship to local road networks. Important arteries ran through Yveline

⁹ A. Moutié, 'Saint-Léger-en-Yveline', *Mémoires de Rambouillet* 1 (1873), pp. 97-9; Civel, *Fleur de France*, pp. 26, 28-9, 39-40; J. Harmand, 'Houdan et l'évolution des donjons au XII^e siècle', *Bulletin monumental* 127 (1969), pp. 206-7; Ledru, 'Épernon', pp. 209, 210-1; A. de Dion, 'Le château de Montfort', *Mémoires de Rambouillet* 1, pp. 123-4, 125; C. Chastillon, *Topographie françoise* (Paris, 1655), pls. 13, 27, 28, 119.

¹⁰ Robert of Torigny, 'Chronica', p. 295; *Complete Peerage*, vii pp. 715-6n. h; C. Coulson, 'Fortress Policy in Capetian Tradition and Angevin Practice: Aspects of the Conquest of Normandy by Philip II', in *Anglo-Norman Studies VI*, ed. R.A. Brown (Woodbridge, Suff., 1983), p. 30; Harmand, 'Houdan', p. 207; *RAPA*, ii pp. 180-1; *Layettes*, i p. 217.

¹¹ 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 19-20; below, p. 181.

linking Dreux, Chartres, Paris, and Beauvais. Saint-Léger, as the former centre of royal power in Yveline, formed a node at which four major roads crossing the lordship intersected. Montfort sat more aloof, east of the road to Meulan and south of the route between Paris and Dreux, but Épernon regulated traffic from Chartres toward Poissy or Mantes, and Rochefort watched over that toward Paris.¹² In addition to the obvious strategic value of these locations, their domination of the transportation network through the forest meant that Simon could effectively control and safeguard production and commerce within his lordship.

Simon's brief possession of the earldom of Leicester demonstrates a sharp contrast with his confident and secure tenure in France. The initial partition of the honor, drawn up in December 1206 or January 1207 in the Huntington inquest, is an attempt to bring order out of a confused succession in which both of the claimants continued to contest the arrangements.¹³ This inquest, however, remains the best source for approximating the shape and structure of the earldom's demesne as Simon held it while in England. According to the division, he possessed not only Leicester itself with its eastern suburbs, but also lands at Hinckley, Earl Shilton, Belgrave, Desford, Bagworth, Glenfield, and Whetstone, as well as retaining some of his mother's dowry at Winterbourne Stoke in Wiltshire. Though he judged it insufficient, he held an unknown portion of Leicester Forest, the eaves of which brushed Glenfield, Braunstone, Potters Marston, Kirkby Mallory, and Desford. He was further able to draw service from thirteen sergeants and nearly five knights, as well as a further £1.14s. in commuted payments.¹⁴ From

¹² A. de Dion, 'Les anciens chemins de l'Iveline et du comté de Montfort', *Mémoires de Rambouillet* 1 (1873), p. 228.

¹³ Above, p. 50.

¹⁴ Appendix B; L. Fox, 'The Honor of Leicester: A Study in Descent and Administration', (University of Manchester, M.A. dissertation, 1938), p. 233.

this can be gleaned a vague picture of the complicated partition in the immediate vicinity of Leicester, but it says nothing about the state of the honor further afield in Warwickshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Hertfordshire, and Dorset. In the absence of the lost royal charter roll for 1206-1207, it is impossible to clarify the contemporary disposition further. Some attempt at reconstructing Simon's theoretical rights may be made from studying the honor granted to his son, Simon, 6th earl of Leicester, who owed a total of sixty, one half, and one fifth knight-fees drawn from across England, mainly concentrated in the central midlands and the southwest.¹⁵ However, such an arrangement for the wider honor does not seem to have been finalised by 1207, and Simon, 5th earl, was probably seised only of his demesne in and around the borough itself—along with the remains of his mother's dowry in Wiltshire—before the confiscation.

The limited surviving evidence similarly treats few matters other than revenue. For instance, the state of the comital castles is entirely unknown except for Mountsorrel, which appears to have remained in the king's hand throughout the affair. During his stay, Simon presumably took up residence in the castle at Leicester—which came to him with the capital messuage—but its fortifications may still have been partly ruinous from its slighting in 1175. Other defences of the honor—such as the remains of the castle at Groby—probably remained in Saer's hand.¹⁶ Unlike in Yveline—where he could rest comfortably in the traditional rights and secure castles of his compact lordship—Simon found his footing less than sure in Leicestershire.

An alien competing for an avuncular inheritance against an insular baron under the eye of a

¹⁵ Fox, 'Origin and Descent', pp. 386-8; *Close Rolls*, p. 130; *Close Rolls of Henry III*, iv (1911), p. 491; PRO, E 372/76, m. 2r^o.

¹⁶ *Close Rolls*, p. 25; *Fine Rolls*, p. 268; *Pipe Rolls 22 Henry II*, p. 179; *23 Henry II*, p. 29; *6 John*, p. 229; Ralph of Diss, 'Ymagines', p. 404; L. Fox, *Leicester Castle* (Leicester, 1944), pp. 10-1.

manipulative and paranoid king, he could not even rely on strongholds from which to demonstrate his authority over his putative possessions. Consequently, his absence was all that was needed for their loss and the evaporation of his earldom.

Image

In addition to the projection of authority by appeal to legal right reinforced by men and mortar, baronial power required softer means of promotion, such as the cultivation of a distinctive and advantageous image within the constraints of traditional political formulæ. One of the clearest ways in which Simon did this was through his official seal. Simon's earliest surviving seals—from the 1190s—depict an armoured knight on horseback, blowing a horn whilst riding through a sylvan scene accompanied by two sighthounds.¹⁷ The setting, the horn, and the dogs are a clear reference to the lordship's environment and to the Montforts' role as royal foresters for Yveline. These characteristics remained constant through the turn of the century, but from 1200 the rider on Simon's seals discarded his mail, shield, and helm in favour of a more pacific hunting tunic and bare head. Nicolas Civel believes that this change reflects the impact of Fulk of Neuilly's preaching: the violent aspect of seigneurial identity overshadowed by tenurial right and responsibility, the symbols of social chaos replaced by those

¹⁷ AdY, 15H 1/1; AN, J 216, n° 4; J 394, n° 1.

of order.¹⁸ As neat as this theory may be, it is unlikely. Not only is the link between Simon and Fulk less clear than Civel assumes, but the abandonment of martial pride for an exclusive focus on the veniality of sport hardly fits the character of the preacher's reform, which championed an uncompromising and often violent zeal for holiness.¹⁹

Simon's modification of his seal was far from arbitrary, however. The first appearance of this new pattern in 1200 is indicative, as this is the same year as the treaty of Le Goulet, by which the title to Évreux passed from the hands of Simon's cousin, Count Amalric IV, to Philip of France.²⁰ The French conquest of Évreux may have suggested to Simon a chance to reunite the family holdings divided at his grandfather's death; at the very least it was an opportunity to stress his connexion with the counts of Évreux in order to augment his own prestige in France. The image on the seal adopted by Simon around 1200, therefore, is almost identical to that used on the counterseal of his grandfather, Simon III, count of Évreux and lord of Montfort.²¹ The county of Évreux did not in fact return to the Montforts, and the legend of Simon V's seal prudently makes no claim to it. However, by employing the same seigneurial seal as his grandfather, Simon officially proclaimed that he was of comital stock; what is more, after the departure of Amalric for the earldom of Gloucester in 1200, he was the chief representative of his family remaining on the Continent.²² Even without recovering his ancestral county, Simon

¹⁸ AN, S 2125^A, n° 44; J 219, n° 3; Civel, *Fleur de France*, pp. 262-4.

¹⁹ Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 226-7; above, p. 129.

²⁰ *RAPA*, ii pp. 180-1; *Layettes*, i p. 217; *Cartulaire normand*, p. 11.

²¹ AN, S 1343, n° 2; S 2125^A, n° 44; BnF, ms. lat. 5441, i p. 256; Power, *Norman Frontier*, pp. 443-4.

²² *Complete Peerage*, v p. 692; above, p. 65.

could use French victories in Normandy to enhance his social standing and assert his proud lineage.

There is strong evidence that such intimations of comital parity did in fact lead Simon's contemporaries to view him as a count. Before 1207, Simon avoids any use of the *comes* title, referring to himself in his acts as *dominus Montisfortis* or, occasionally, *de Monteforti*. Although the legend of his grandfather's counterseal may have read COMITIS : MONTE : FORTIS, only the toponym survives in the version adopted by Simon V.²³ In one of his earliest charters—an 1197 confirmation of a grant by Amalric III of Montfort, count of Évreux, to the abbey of Saint-Magloire—this seigneurial style is accompanied by the invocation *Dei gratia*—an appendage increasingly reserved for the Crown and no longer employed by the lower baronage of northern Europe—and Simon's subscription is listed as *domini...comitis*. However, these anomalies result from the scribe's careless transcription from Amalric's original, composed at a time when divine grace was commonly referenced in comital styles.²⁴ He was not the only one confused by Simon's aristocratic rank. In an act of surety for the release of Robert of Leicester in January 1196—probably drafted by a member of the royal chancery for the three guarantors—Simon is styled *comes Montifortis (sic)*; similarly, a monk of Sainte-Honorine de Conflans probably wrote the instrument containing Simon's confirmation of a grant to the priory sometime before 1200 where his seal is described *comitis de Monteforti*. Although the seals for both these acts are the first variant, devoid of connexion with Simon's comital ancestry, Simon's baronial station

²³ de la Roque, *Harcourt*, iii p. 126; *Cartulaire normand*, p. 278; *Saint-Magloire*, i p. 191; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', p. 130; *Grand-Beaulieu*, p. 68; Appendix A, i; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 265, 311, 312, 315; *Cartulaire de Notre-Dame de Josaphat*, ed. C. Métais, i (Chartres, 1911), p. 353; *Bon-Port*, p. 29; *Gallia christiana*, viii instr., c. 524; 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 13-6; *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i p. 140; *Layettes*, i p. 307; BnF, ms. lat. 5441, i pp. 256, 257, 259; AN, J 890, n^{os} 2, 5, 14.

²⁴ AN, S 1153, n^o 9; BnF, ms. Clairambault 1188, f^o 93v^o; BS-G, ms. 701, f^o 21r^o; D. Crouch, *The Image of Aristocracy in Britain, 1000-1300* (London, 1992), pp. 13-4; *Saint-Magloire*, i pp. 104-6.

already seems to have been confused by his contemporaries who saw in him a grander man than his current title and possessions technically allowed.²⁵ The confusion may have been compounded not only by his Evrecin connexions, but also by his possession of Rochefort, which had held a comital dignity in the eleventh century before coming into the Montfort patrimony. This status had faded, and by the turn of the thirteenth century the comital title made only occasional appearance and was never, apparently, employed by Simon himself.²⁶ Interestingly, its only attachment to him occurred in England, where the Merchants' Guild of Leicester recorded him as *comes de Rocheford/Rochefort*; however, the rank was likely still attached to Leicester: these references are to his disseisin, while the entry concerning Simon's investment with the earldom uses *de Rocheford* as a simple toponym, in the same way it continued to be used on occasion for his father.²⁷ The lordship of Montfort could not be transformed into a county by sheer swagger.

Even so, whether from extratextual cultivation or a simple lingering social aura, the perception of Simon as a count persisted, and not only among notarial scribes. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay refers to Simon as *comes Montisfortis* throughout the *Hystoria albigensis*; though by the time of composition Simon did hold a comital title, it was derived from Leicester, not Montfort. But other contemporary narrative authors mistook him for a count even when writing about the period before 1206. For instance, Robert of Clari and the Frankish source for the French histories of Outremer—though notably not Geoffrey of Villehardouin—describe Simon as a

²⁵ AN, J 394, n° 1; AdY, 15H 1/1.

²⁶ *Le cartulaire du prieuré de Notre-Dame de Longpont*, ed. J. Marion (Lyons, 1879), p. 72 (Marion mistakenly identifies this Simon as the son of Guy II of Rochefort, whose male line in fact died with him; it is in fact Simon III of Montfort, using the comital title ambiguously); Orderic Vital, *Ecclesiastical History*, vi p. 156; Robert of Torigny, 'Chronica', p. 295; Rigord, 'Gesta Philippi', p. 83; Porrois, p. 26n. 1; *Complete Peerage*, vii p. 716n. e.

²⁷ *Records of Leicester*, i pp. 19-20, 32; *Histoire du Maréchal*, i p. 163.

cuens during the events of the Fourth Crusade. As both men were writing after 1215—when Simon was not only earl of Leicester but also count of Toulouse—they may be applying the title retrospectively. However, neither makes reference to the Leicester inheritance or the Albigensian Crusade in his work, and from the perspective of Robert and the Frankish sources—men far beyond the periphery of Simon’s circle and probably of lesser sociopolitical rank—the independent crusader probably seemed very much like a *cuens*.²⁸ Without ever formally claiming such status, Simon was able to insinuate it through subtle links to his ancestry and a projection of personal authority.

His actual inheritance of a comital title in 1206 secured him the elevated position to which he had aspired. In 1207, after his return from England, Simon almost invariably uses the formula *comes Leicestrie et dominus Montisfortis*.²⁹ Over the following three years, he reverts to the simple *dominus Montisfortis* in only three surviving ecclesiastical alienations of traditional Montfort lands.³⁰ In February 1208, while arbitrating a conflict between the royal abbey of Saint-Denis and his brother-in-law, Matthew of Montmorency, he is once again styled *Comes Montisfortis*: this may be another confusion by a monastic scribe unfamiliar with Simon, but it may alternatively demonstrate a conscious attempt to stress simultaneously the lay arbiter’s worthiness to judge the case and his French identity.³¹ Despite these aberrations, Simon would utilise the Leicester title throughout the rest of his life, even after his royal enfeoffment with the

²⁸ *Hystoria*, i-ii *passim*; Clari, pp. 1, 14; *Ernoul*, pp. 337, 351, 360; *Eracles*, pp. 243, 255, 263. The flexibility of comital titles for those not in fact possessed of territorial counties is demonstrated—albeit in different circumstances—by Perry, *John of Brienne*, pp. 36-7.

²⁹ Rhein, ‘Seigneurie de Montfort’, p. 316; Depoin, ‘Conflans-Sainte-Honorine’, p. 97; ‘Saint-Thomas’, pp. 17, 18-21; *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i p. 168; Dor, ‘Seigneurs de Montfort’, pp. 161, 164, 167.

³⁰ Rhein, ‘Seigneurie de Montfort’, pp. 315, 317; *Moulineaux*, p. 8.

³¹ du Chesne, *Montmorency*, preuves, pp. 77-8.

county of Toulouse in 1216. His disseisin in 1207 hardly registered in this sense: none of Simon's own documents contain any reference to it and the title appears almost without interruption from that year. There was, however, no corresponding change in his personal seal. Without a need to issue acts in England, a seal bearing reference to the earldom of Leicester hardly merited the expense of a new mould. The cost of the ink used for the longer style, however, was well worth it. The years before 1206 had taught Simon the permeable nature of the rhetorical barrier between lesser baron and count, but the period following 1207 witnessed his determination to cling to the titular advantage once gained; even if it had lost its material force and capital, it retained an eminently useful prestige as a sign of the social station to which he was entitled.

Ecclesiastical patronage

Simon's prestige was also enhanced by his cultivation of connexions with the religious foundations patronised by his forebears. Confirmations and augmentations of alms to traditional recipients underscored the continuity of Simon's authority with that of his predecessors and ensured the support of the ecclesiastical communities in his lands. Of course, genuine piety was also a motivation in Simon's eleemosynary policy, and not only in relation to the local Cistercians. However, his claims to authority relied less on his personal religious preferences and more on his ability to emphasise his uninterrupted links with the perpetual mediators of divine grace that his ancestors had supported.

By the turn of the century, eleemosynary donations most frequently took the form of a share in seigneurial revenue, an exemption from seigneurial impositions, or an enjoyment of seigneurial privilege; material goods such as a house, mill, vineyard, field, or grove were given only occasionally. These were more modest gestures than the foundations and restitutions of older generations, but they also made continued generosity sustainable, as the amount of usable land increased more slowly than the growth of the commercial economy.³² Thus it is important to remember that behind the incomplete record of small gifts made by Simon rests a large body of capital and income alienated by his ancestors that he now bore the responsibility of protecting and maintaining. Simon's eleemosynary policy is thus much larger than what is encompassed by the known gifts made in his own lifetime.

His earliest extant charters, in fact, benefit those houses founded by his forefathers and are principally confirmations of earlier endowments. In 1197, Simon reissued the gift of the priory of Saint-Laurent—within the castle walls of Montfort—along with tithes and other important churches and properties in the northeast of the lordship to the abbey of Saint-Magloire, an endowment originally granted by Simon I in 1072 and confirmed and enlarged by Amalric III in 1124.³³ The following year, he confirmed Amalric's 1105 endowment to the abbey of Coulombs for the priory of Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Houdan, adding fishing rights and a half-interest in nearby mills in order to obtain requiems for Amalric, Simon III, and himself.³⁴ February 1199 saw the confirmation of another donation by Amalric III, along with past alms from Count Guy I of Rochefort, Amalric IV of Montfort, and his grandfather, Simon III, to the

³² Civel, *Fleur de France*, pp. 367-8.

³³ *Saint-Magloire*, i pp. 84, 104-6, 176-7.

³⁴ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 299-300; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 552-3.

lazarhouse of Grand-Beaulieu de Chartres. Payments in kind had been augmented by Simon in 1158 with land, villeins, and money rents, and Simon V now added a further 40s., thereby solidifying his own place in the tradition of Montfort munificence to the lepers.³⁵ Newly married and with two sons to carry on the family legacy, Simon now anchored his authority as an important regional baron through his advertised continuation of patronage for religious houses within his lordship and abroad.

After the tournament at Écry, however, Simon's almsgiving both increased markedly and took on a further aspect. Compared with three surviving confirmations from Simon's five- to fifteen-year tenure before the turn of the century, the two and a half years between Simon's adoption of the cross and his departure saw four confirmations and six new grants. Almost immediately upon his return from Écry, for instance, Simon endowed the Norbertine abbey of Grandchamp founded by his mother with gifts in cash and kind.³⁶ In May 1200, he bestowed an annual rent of 20s. to the abbey of Notre-Dame de Josaphat outside of Chartres, while two years later he granted forest rights to Saint-Laurent.³⁷ Such gifts may at first seem paradoxical, given the enormous expense of crusading. The dispensing of liquid revenues and capital to such foundations deprived Simon of the currency and resources needed to equip and maintain himself and his retinue on the journey. But the concern to emphasise dynastic connexions remained. In

³⁵ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 307; *Grand-Beaulieu*, pp. 68-9. This act is slightly suspect due to its naming Simon's wife *Eva*, but as it is impeccably correct and detailed on all other aspects of Montfort genealogy, this is more likely to be a copyist's error than an indication of forgery: cf. *Complete Peerage*, vii p. 714n. g.

³⁶ Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 134-5; Gautier, 'Histoire de Grandchamp', p. 146; *Obituaires de Sens*, ii (1906), p. 300. Oddly, Simon's donation to Grandchamp notes the assent *filiorum suorum Amaurici et Symonis*, but Simon, the future 6th earl of Leicester, had probably not yet been born, while Guy, who had been born c. April 1198-February 1199, is missing. It might be considered a forgery, except that the original survives and is confirmed sixteen years later.

³⁷ *Josaphat*, i p. 353; *Saint-Magloire*, i p. 191.

1200, Simon and Guy together issued a confirmation of the donation made by Amalric III and confirmed by Simon III of lands and rights to Saint-Martin-des-Champs.³⁸ As he prepared to set off for Venice in April 1202, Simon V turned his attention to the most distinguished of Montfort foundations: Hautes-Bruyères. Founded by Amalric III and his infamous sister Bertrade of Montfort, the Fontevraultine abbey had received her foundress and other Montfort women in her cloister and the bodies of her founder and Simon IV in her chapter house; Simon V would eventually rest alongside them until the abbey's destruction in the French Revolution. His confirmation of all his ancestor's concessions and alms contains no indication of his impending pilgrimage, but is clearly an attempt to safeguard the rights of the centre of Montfort religious influence and to publicise his protection before his departure.³⁹ Meanwhile, Amicia's patronage made an obvious case for supporting Grandchamp, while Simon III had once made a grant of 10s. to Josaphat's priory at Davron, in return for which the abbey marked the anniversary of his death with a requiem. Simon V's contribution in 1200 added his father's anniversary to the monks' calendar, as well as his own and that of his mother after their deaths.⁴⁰ In addition to being a useful policy of spiritual insurance before undertaking a dangerous pilgrimage, the addition of his father to the mortuary roll symbolically completed the link between himself and the abbey, marking out his family as an important source of patronage even beyond the frontiers of their lordship. Benefiting Saint-Laurent likewise ensured continual remembrance and prayers at the very heart of seigneurial power during his absence.

³⁸ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 302-3, 312-3.

³⁹ Orderic Vital, *Ecclesiastical History*, iii (1972), p. 128; Power, *Norman Frontier*, p. 296; BnF, ms. lat. 5480, ii pp. 25-6; *Clypeus Font-ebraldensis*, ii p. 328; *Actes de Henri II*, i p. 347; *Obituaires de Sens*, ii p. 224; AN, P 1839, f^o 241v^o.

⁴⁰ *Josaphat*, ii (1912), p. 260.

Not all of his grants in this period were to foundations with which Simon had known ancestral ties, suggesting that the crusader was also casting his net of spiritual and social investment as widely as possible. For instance, Saint-Paul-lès-Aunois, a priory of Saint-Victor de Paris with no known prior connexions to the Montforts, received usage rights in the forest of Soligny in 1200, while in May 1202, Simon gave Saint-Georges de Bazainville permission to trap eels and operate a mill at *Borrellum* ‘quando in terra Jerosilimitanam profectus sum’, making explicit the link between the concessions and spiritual support for Simon’s crusade.⁴¹ Neither of these houses may have enjoyed a history of endowment at the hands of the Montforts, but that does not mean they were unable to make a beginning on the eve of the crusade.

Foundations with long-standing links to the Montforts were also a source of more material assistance. In 1200, Simon received an unspecified aid from Saint-Arnoult, a priory which had received confirmations of its rights and possessions from both Simon III in 1167 and Simon IV in 1183.⁴² No confirmation issued by Simon V for Saint-Arnoult survives, but in 1202 he did grant one to Saint-Thomas d’Épernon, a priory founded for the abbey of Saint-Martin de Marmoutiers by Amalric I of Montfort in the eleventh century and the resting place of Simon I and his elder sons. In exchange, the prior gave the crusader 40*l.* for his crusade expenses.⁴³ While the rash of eleemosynary grants made by Simon in his preparations for the Fourth Crusade certainly stored up prayers for his safety and salvation, it also confirmed his authority in the

⁴¹ Rhein, ‘Seigneurie de Montfort’, pp. 311-2; Dor, ‘Seigneurs de Montfort’, p. 141.

⁴² Rhein, ‘Seigneurie de Montfort’, pp. 308-9, 311, 313.

⁴³ ‘Saint-Thomas’, pp. 1-3, 13; Orderic Vital, *Ecclesiastical History*, iv (1973), p. 216. At the same time, Simon confirmed the priory’s monopoly over the town market, first granted by Simon III, and undertook to better enforce it: ‘Saint-Thomas’, pp. 14-6.

region, ensured an ecclesiastical interest in the protection of his rights and property during his absence, and helped to raise the funds necessary for the expedition.

The same principle linking Simon to his paternal ancestors through continued alms could also be deployed to strengthen ties with other branches of his family. His role in overseeing alienations and licences from Alice's dowry at Conflans, for instance, drew him closer to the other Montmorencys. Shortly after his marriage in the latter 1190s, he confirmed his portion of a donation from river tolls to Sainte-Honorine de Conflans given by a William *Roschart*. At his wife's request, he further graced the priory in February 1208 with a nearby grove.⁴⁴ In 1200, he confirmed the exemption from portage tolls granted by Matthew of Montmorency to the abbey of La Vallée-Sainte-Marie further up the Oise; Alice reinforced this connexion in 1217, when she gave the abbey an annual 10*l.* from the tolls collected on the first Sunday of Lent. This gift was made for the salvation of her soul and those of her family, including her husband, and given with his consent.⁴⁵ Clearly Alice was the driving force behind Simon's almsgiving at Conflans, but Simon is naturally invoked in each act. Such repeated reference stressed Simon's benevolence toward these houses in his wife's homeland and encouraged them to protect his rights beyond the fringes of his own lordship, where his intrinsic power was relatively weak. Moreover, all of these alienations or confirmations were in favour of local houses, thereby keeping the income from crossing and passage tied to the local environment of Montmorency. This favourable attitude toward Matthew's interest is not surprising, given Alice's control over her dowry, but it may help explain why Simon was asked to serve as arbitrator for his brother-in-law's case

⁴⁴ Depoin, 'Conflans-Saint-Honorine', pp. 96, 97. The latter donation is dated 1207, but was issued at Saint-Denis, probably at the same time as Simon's arbitration of the dispute between the abbey and Matthew of Montmorency.

⁴⁵ Appendix A, i; du Chesne, *Montmorency*, preuves, p. 65.

against the abbey of Saint-Denis in 1208.⁴⁶ Alice may have guided eleemosynary policy concerning Conflans, but Simon's cooperation facilitated harmony not only at home, but also across the Seine.

Across the Channel, however, his ability to determine the destination of his alms was even more limited and—given his brief seisin—of little value to his authority. Upon becoming earl of Leicester, he inherited the tithes and religious commitments undertaken by his predecessors. However, for the one term—Michaelmas 1206—in which he had seisin of his lands, Simon seems not to have paid these alms in full, whether from lack of will or ability: the Exchequer absorbed the difference for the Augustinian canons of Leicester, while the tithes for Saint-Evroul simply disappeared, perhaps due to the loss of Normandy.⁴⁷ Simon had also argued for a reduction of the alms owed by his moiety of the honor in the Huntington inquest, insisting on only between a fourth and a fifth of the original total. Even if Simon was especially mean in his negotiations for altered English almsgiving, he was not entirely without cause. At some point before March 1207, the alms owed from Simon's moiety were halved, suggesting that John also found the division of eleemosynary responsibility unfavourable when he was accountable for it.⁴⁸ Despite the apparent wealth of detailed information offered by the Huntington inquest, the brief seisin it represents was caught between the bequests of previous earls and the royal administration, and therefore sheds little light on Simon's own potential or actual eleemosynary

⁴⁶ du Chesne, *Montmorency*, preuves, pp. 77-8.

⁴⁷ Appendix B; *Pipe Roll 11 John*, pp. 25-6. Préaux, however, continued to collect her alms after the confiscation of the honor.

⁴⁸ Appendix B, ns. 6-12, 14-5, 17-8, 20-2.

choices in England. However, it is clear that Simon had neither the time nor the largesse to sink religious anchors into the earldom, and its loss was therefore made that much easier.

In France, the loss of Leicester was offset by the acquisition of Yveline, which gave Simon new resources that could be used to further entrench his influence in France. Among the first to benefit were, of course, the traditional centres of Montfort religious identity. Before he even set off for England, he once again confirmed the sylvan rights of Hautes-Bruyères, while in December 1208, he allocated the disputed tithes of Gole—perhaps a new plantation in the forest—to Saint-Thomas. While preparing for the Albigensian Crusade, Simon confirmed the rights of Saint-Magloire's churches and granges in Yveline, granting Saint-Laurent de Montfort and Saint-Magloire de Méré generous rights and customs throughout the forest. In the charter, Simon claims that he is simply making explicit the rights granted by his ancestors, but this is not necessarily the case.⁴⁹ Though previous Montforts may well have tacitly or verbally granted such privileges, to do so was technically beyond their competence as foresters. But even if the monks and their serfs had been exercising these rights for generations, Simon was now making them licit and official through his family's new power as lords of Yveline in their own right; his ascent carried with it the important foundations associated with the Montforts, thereby stressing the continuity of his new position while also ensuring these houses' interest in his continued governance and success.

The majority of Simon's beneficiaries after 1206 were not Montfort foundations, but houses with some connexion to his crusading experience. The Cistercians at Vaux-de-Cernay

⁴⁹ AN, P 1839, f^{os} 241v^o-242r^o; 'Saint-Thomas', p. 17; *Saint-Magloire*, i p. 197. The latter act as it survives in two turn-of-the-fourteenth-century cartularies bears the date *mense Julio*, but this can hardly be correct, as Simon was mustering with his fellow crusaders at Lyons by the beginning of the month: BnF, ms. lat. 5413, f^o 150v^o; AN, LL 39, f^o 36v^o; *Hystoria*, i p. 81. If it is genuine—as seems likely—a copyist must have corrupted the date by transforming *Junio* into *Julio*.

most obviously profited from this connexion: in 1208, Simon confirmed the annual grant of 10*l.* made by his father and extended his patronage to the nearby convent of Porrois.⁵⁰ Simon also continued to support the houses that he had patronised in the years before the crusade, whether from growing interest or as an expression of gratitude. Simon encouraged the connexion of Saint-Paul with Soligny by confirming the grant of half a tithe there to the priory in 1207 and may have persuaded his mother, Amicia, in May 1208 to conclude her dispute with the monks of Saint-Georges over their cultivation of the wood at Bazainville. Whatever his role, he consented to the transfer of the grove to the monks' possession.⁵¹ Finally, while Simon did not begin a pattern of patronage toward the the Templars, his exchange in November 1208 of a plot in Épernon for a house in the order's possession is the first surviving evidence of a direct connexion between the Montfort family and the Temple, perhaps initiated by his service as witness of a donation to the order in the Holy Land.⁵² Even after his return from a crusade that had fallen far short of his expectations, his investment in the ideals that had so animated him at the turn of the century remained strong.

When Simon took up the cross once again in September 1208, however, there does not appear to have been a similar increase in patronage. Arbitrations and confirmations were made in favour of Saint-Thomas and Saint-Magloire in 1209, but these acts contain no reference to his impending departure on the Albigensian Crusade.⁵³ They may simply have been attempts to set his house in order before riding south, as both houses had benefited before his previous crusade.

⁵⁰ *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 72, 168-9; *Necrologe de Port Roïal*, p. 252.

⁵¹ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 314, 316-7; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 161-2.

⁵² Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 317; Appendix A, ii.

⁵³ 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 20-2; *Saint-Magloire*, i p. 197.

But while Simon would return only once to his lordship after 1209, his investment in his religious patrimony continued. Much of this was in support of his mother, Amicia, who seems to have directed the distribution of alms in Simon's absence. In 1212, he remotely consented to her grants of 20*l.* annually to Vaux-de-Cernay and forest usage in Yveline to Breuil-Benoît.⁵⁴ In August the following year, on his own initiative but inspired by the devotion of his mother, he granted two pecks of salt from the imposts at Conflans to Grandchamp. Simon's eleemosynary activities during his visit to France in 1216 after her death were largely concerned with her legacy. He renewed his grant and all his mother's donations to Grandchamp, adding substantial alms in cash and kind, prebends from across his lordship, and the entirety of Gambais.⁵⁵ Beyond lavishing gifts on Grandchamp, Simon confirmed Amicia's grant of 20*s.* to Saint-Jean-Baptiste, matched that amount to pay for a lamp in memory of his ancestors, and added his father's name to the priory's obituary list.⁵⁶ He also confirmed her gift of an annual 5*l.* to the cathedral of Chartres, diverting the money from the construction of the church to requiems for her anniversary. Amicia's posthumous influence may also have led him to cede his long-standing dispute with the chapter over commercial customs and tolls owed in his lands.⁵⁷ Amicia's direction of patronage in Montfort during Simon's absence had reinforced the memory of his

⁵⁴ BnF, ms. fr. 20692, p. 381; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 318-9.

⁵⁵ AN, S 4349, n° 2; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 181-3.

⁵⁶ Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 555-6.

⁵⁷ Chartres, ii p. 86; *Spicilegium, sive collectio veterum aliquot scriptorum qui in Galliae bibliothecis delituerunt*, eds. L. d'Achery, É. Baluze, and É. Martène, rev. ed., iii (Paris, 1723), p. 569. During his visit, Simon may also have contributed to the windows above the choir of cathedral depicting himself and Amalric: Y. Delaporte, *Les vitraux de la cathédrale de Chartres* (Chartres, 1926), p. 459; F. Perrot, 'Le vitrail, la croisade et la Champagne: Réflexion sur les fenêtres hautes du chœur à la cathédrale de Chartres', in Y. Bellenger and D. Quérueu, eds., *Les champenois et la croisade* (Paris, 1989), pp. 112-3, 127-8.

authority in the lordship, and his continuation and augmentation of her religious favour after her death further cemented their relationship in the eyes of the local Church.

Beyond his continuation of his mother's patronage, it was the Cistercians who especially benefited from Simon's generosity during the Albigensian Crusade, no doubt because of his close contact with the order while persecuting heresy. In 1212 Simon not only judged in favour of Vaux-de-Cernay in her contest over Poliempont, but gave 20s. annually to her grand-daughter abbey of La Trappe.⁵⁸ His interest in Saint-Antoine in 1216, of course, derived not only from Robert Mauvoisin's tomb but also from its Cistercian affiliation.⁵⁹ Likewise, the appeal of Breuil-Benoît extended beyond its location in the former county of Évreux and his mother's investment; Simon was personally keen to ensure that this daughter-house of Vaux-de-Cernay was brought under the mantle of Montfort patronage and protection in August 1212. Perhaps influenced by his mother's death, he may have made a confirmation or further grant to the abbey during his visit to France in 1216, but his clear commitment to the white monks suggests he needed little urging.⁶⁰ Like any contemporary baron, Simon's eleemosynary policy was largely dictated by the traditions of his family and the maintenance of authority through familiar channels of largesse; however, in the surviving examples of Simon's grants beyond these parameters, it was the connexion with the crusade that exercised the most influence on Simon's personal allocation of alms.

Finance

⁵⁸ *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 186-7, 188.

⁵⁹ Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', p. 178; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 320-1; above, pp. 140-1.

⁶⁰ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 318-9; BnF, ms. Baluze 58, f^o 200v^o.

The distribution of these alms naturally rested on a capacity to produce sufficient goods or revenue. The lordship of Montfort was not a great artisanal or commercial centre; its value lay primarily in sylvan agriculture. Far from being a wilderness, Yveline and its environs were filled with the sounds of the falling axes of woodcutters, the crackling furnaces of colliers, the baying hounds and horns of seigneurial hunters, and the beating staves of swineherds. The frequent alms in the form of hunting or usage rights in the forest, rather than in kind or coin, hint at the prominence of these forms of exploitation. Taxes and customs raised from villeins working in the forest of course provided the Montforts with a level of liquid income, but most of their wealth was rooted in the raw resources of wood, acorns, chestnuts, fruit, honey, wax, venison, and pork.⁶¹ These were valuable goods, but—with the notable exceptions of wood and pannage—not always easy to render in monetary exactions.

This wooded preserve simultaneously prevented the population growth necessary for economic expansion. By the tenure of Simon V, the clearing of the forest had not overtaken traditional means of labor and production, but was certainly underway. No doubt the annual pannage, despite royal regulation, had had its own deforesting effect in Yveline, but it was in Simon's tenure that large sections of the forest were given over to cultivation proper. Little can be discerned of seigneurial clearing: two hundred and sixty-two arpents of woods at Sonchamp were ceded to cultivation in 1216, and Simon's assignment of the tithe from Gole to Saint-

⁶¹ AdY, 64H 1, p. 24; AN, P 1839, f^{os} 241v^o, 242r^o; *Saint-Magloire*, pp. 107, 191, 197; *Longpont*, p. 214; *Registres de Philippe*, i pp. 51-2; *Grand-Beaulieu*, p. 68; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 110-2, 302-3, 307-9, 311-2, 315, 318-9; *Archives de la Maison-Dieu de Châteaudun*, ed. A. de Belfort (Paris, 1881), p. 14; Brussel, *Usage des fiefs*, ii p. clxxvi; *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i p. 190; Gautier, 'Histoire de Grandchamp', p. 146; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', p. 183; Bloch and Dauvergne, *Histoire rurale*, i p. 7.

Thomas in 1208 may have resulted from the creation of a new village.⁶² Clearer evidence of deforestation can be found in licences given more or less grudgingly to Saint-Paul in 1200, Saint-Laurent in 1202, and Saint-Georges in 1208; these were accompanied by the first appearance of alms from the forest rendered in the form of arable crops like wheat and oats. Naturally, the increase in cultivated land also involved a corresponding rise in seigneurial rents, but the population of these clearings with villeins further introduced new tenants subject to Montfort customs.⁶³ Deforestation therefore not only increased revenues, but generated those more easily converted into cash.

Simon needed this money not only for the diverse expenses of his ordinary administration but also in order to live according to the station he believed his ancestry accorded him amidst an increasingly liquid economy.⁶⁴ In addition to seigneurial imposts and the sale of deforestation licences, he possessed rights entitling him to ready sources of such income. Tolls were levied in both salt and coin at Conflans from those navigating or portaging up- and downstream, as well as on travellers using the many roads through the lordship.⁶⁵ Merchants and merchandise moving through Simon's lands were a special source of toll and customs revenue, especially in and around Épernon. Montchauvet had long had protectionist mercantile liberties, and there is evidence of commercial activity elsewhere—rights to a fair at Saint-Arnoult or markets at

⁶² *Registres de Philippe*, i pp. 51-2; Suger of Saint-Denis, 'Libellus alter de consecratione ecclesiae sancti Dionysii', in *Oeuvres*, pp. 221-2; Bloch and Dauvergne, *Histoire rurale*, i pp. 8-10, ii (1956), p. 16; *Recueil des chartes de l'abbaye de Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire*, eds. M. Prou and A. Vidier, ii (Paris, 1912), pp. 222-3; 'Saint-Thomas', p. 17.

⁶³ Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 134, 161, 182; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 311-2; *Saint-Magloire*, i p. 191; *Necrologe de Port Roïal*, p. 252; Bloch and Dauvergne, *Histoire rurale*, ii p. 149.

⁶⁴ Bloch and Dauvergne, *Histoire rurale*, i pp. 85-6, ii p. 149; above, pp. 164-8.

⁶⁵ AN, S 4349, n° 2; S 4373, n° 17; Depoin, 'Conflans-Sainte-Honorine', p. 96; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', p. 130; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 118-9, 308-9.

Elleville—but all these documentary hints are dwarfed by the volume of surviving charters negotiating economic activity in Épernon. Customs were raised on movables going out of the town, and the annual Saint Leodegar's Fair drew vendors who could also be taxed on their wares, though Simon remitted these upon leaving for the Holy Land in 1202. At the same time, Simon began tightening his enforcement of seigneurial licences needed for stalls established in the town's ordinary markets.⁶⁶ As with his clearing of the forest, the encouragement of contact with localities beyond his own wooded frontiers through commercial exchange introduced new sources of income in more desirable forms.

Despite this increase in liquidity, little can be discerned about the details of Simon's revenues due to the lack of surviving seigneurial accounts. Fortunately, two important fiefs belonging to Simon spent time under royal administration and therefore offer glimpses of their productivity. The first, Saint-Léger—with its attendant rights over the forest of Yveline—came into the Montfort family in 1204, but was technically held and administered by Amicia, Simon's mother, until her death in 1215. Even so, the evidence of close cooperation between mother and son suggests that the distinction was probably academic.⁶⁷ Before leaving the king's demesne, the revenues and expenses from its provostship were recorded in the royal account of 1202-1203. These receipts record the gross annual yield from Saint-Léger's farm as 290*l.p.* with an additional 50*l.* earned from the autumn mast, placing it just below the median of over forty royal

⁶⁶ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 118-20, 301, 308-9; 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 3, 14-6; *Saint-Magloire*, p. 105; Ledru, 'Épernon', p. 233. The dating of the regulations for the Épernon fair is given as 1203, likely due to scribal error in copying the *vidimus*.

⁶⁷ Above, pp. 158, 177. Amicia was still alive in 1215, but had died by the time of Simon's visit to France the following spring: *Spicilegium*, iii p. 569; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 320.

provostships: a significant but not fabulously rich fief.⁶⁸ But judging from its ancient retention by the Crown, its control of Yveline, and its exchange for the important Norman honor of Breteuil, it is probably safe to assume that Saint-Léger was among the most wealthy of the Montfort fiefs after 1204. Though such a profitable and militaristic woodcutting campaign was probably neither possible nor sustainable at a seigneurial level, Philip's extraordinary sale of 200*l.* worth of timber from Yveline in 1202-1203 hints at further ways in which Simon could profit from his possession of the forest.⁶⁹ Saint-Léger had not only given Simon a geographically unified lordship, but had financially enhanced its worth as well.

Royal oversight and administration likewise illuminate the value of Simon's lands in England. The Huntington inquest—corrected with reference to the Pipe Rolls—calculates the income of Simon's moiety of the honor of Leicester at £316.12*s.*7½*d.* sterling gross and £237.10½*d.* net. How much of this Simon was able to enjoy is unclear, but he was likely in England and seised of his lands for at least part of the Michaelmas 1206 collections. In addition to the gaps in the later royal account for almsgiving in that term, the sums in the inquest match those received later by the Exchequer, suggesting they were based on actual yields rather than projected estimates.⁷⁰ Later in 1207, after confiscating the earldom, King John expected 80*m.* and a palfrey from Thomas of Astley to be quit of the Crown's demand for the revenues of Simon's lands during his bailliage. Assuming a price of 5*m.* for a palfrey, the sum demanded

⁶⁸ Brussel, *Usage des fiefs*, ii pp. cxlii, clxix, clxxvi, cxciii; F. Lot and R. Fawtier, *Le premier budget de la monarchie française* (Paris, 1932), pp. 142-7. The revenues from Foucherolles and Annemont calculated at the Ascension 1203 were not part of the grant to Amicia in 1204 and have not been included in the calculation. Furthermore, *pace* Lot and Fawtier, the 30*l.* from pannage accounted in the same term almost certainly represents the outstanding sum still owed by the bailiff at Candlemas: *ibid.*, pp. 10-1, 12, 187.

⁶⁹ Brussel, *Usage des fiefs*, ii p. ccii; *RAPA*, ii p. 449; *Layettes*, i p. 271.

⁷⁰ Appendix B; above, pp. 47-8.

from Thomas amounts to nearly three quarters of Simon's termly net revenue.⁷¹ The figure probably represents only the bailiwicks under Thomas' responsibility, rather than the entire moiety's earnings that Michaelmas, so it is unclear if the Crown was demanding all that Simon had received or simply what it thought it could reasonably expect to recuperate. Whichever, it is clear that Simon had been seised—however briefly—of his moiety before its confiscation and had enjoyed a substantial portion of its wealth.

But this remained only a fraction of his potential annual revenue: in fact, Leicester's gross yield was nearly three times that of Saint-Léger. Given that Saint-Léger was only one of five fiefs in the Montfort demesne, it might be expected that—if the provostship was at all representative—the lordship of Montfort was worth at least as much as the moiety of the honor of Leicester.⁷² However, it is important to remember that the only useful surviving figures from Saint-Léger are its gross yields: nothing is known of the expenses and little of the alms attached to the provostship after its passage into Montfort hands. Its expenses after 1204 could not have resembled those incurred when it was simply one property among many to be mulcted in conjunction with the rest of the royal demesne. Moreover, the ordinary revenues drawn from Simon's other provostships are completely obscure; as noted above, Saint-Léger was likely the wealthiest, and not only because of the valuable pannage rights in Yveline. Judging only by the outlay of alienated rents, Simon's lordship hardly seems to have been an economic powerhouse:

⁷¹ *Pipe Roll 9 John*, pp. 192, 194, 195-6, 197.

⁷² Brussel, *Usage des fiefs*, ii pp. cxlii, clxix, cxci; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 380-476. In default of a contemporary exchange rate between pounds sterling and paris, the rate has been calculated by common reference to the pound angevin to reach 1*l.p.*:7*s.*4*d.* sterling: Baldwin, *Government of Philip*, p. xv.

by 1209, it accounted for 29*l*.10*s*.*p*. in alms.⁷³ By way of contrast, the Huntington inquest allots £62.11*s*.9*d*.—roughly 170*l*.13*s*.10½*d*.*p*.—in alms from Simon’s moiety of the honor of Leicester; even after these sums had been reduced under royal administration they still amounted to £48.13*s*.8½*d*., or 132*l*.15*s*.6½*d*.*p*.⁷⁴ His French lands therefore owed between seventeen and twenty-one *per cent* of the amount of monetary alms owed by the earldom of Leicester. Such figures cannot serve as a guide to relative gross production and should generally be treated with caution. The French sums are probably not comprehensive, and anyway only account for alms rendered in or convertible to cash; moreover, nothing can be known about comparative Montfort and Beaumont generosity in previous generations. But the Montfort alms on the eve of the Albigensian Crusade—before such alienations might be offset by gains in the Midi—do suggest a much more modest income than that enjoyed by the great magnates.

There was clearly much more money in the French lordship. As Simon’s conquests in the south added to his capital, further alms were alienated in his patrimony. By 1217, 124*l*.14*s*.11*d*. had appeared in additional alms, surpassing royal eleemosynary expenditure from the moiety of the honor of Leicester.⁷⁵ Like the honor of Leicester before 1204—when its eleemosynary spending power had been augmented by Beaumont possessions in Normandy—the lordship of Montfort after 1209 could afford to free up more of its revenue for religious beneficiaries on account of the revenues from gains made in the south. Before the Albigensian Crusade, the

⁷³ BnF, ms. Duchesne 22, f° 344v^o; AdY, 64H 1, p. 109; *Grand-Beaulieu*, p. 68; Rhein, ‘Seigneurie de Montfort’, pp. 307, 310, 315-6; *Josaphat*, i p. 353, ii p. 260; *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i p. 72; Dor, ‘Seigneurs de Montfort’, pp. 134, 182; *Chartres*, ii pp. 35-6.

⁷⁴ Appendix B; *Pipe Roll 12 John*, p. 96. The sums for the Tourvilles, Robert of Staunton, and Master Gilbert of L’Aigle have been interpreted as money-fiefs and excluded from the calculation.

⁷⁵ BnF, ms. fr. 20692, p. 381; *Pipe Roll 12 John*, p. 96; *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i p. 188; Dor, ‘Seigneurs de Montfort’, pp. 179-80, 182, 555-6; Rhein, ‘Seigneurie de Montfort’, p. 320; du Chesne, *Montmorency*, preuves, p. 65.

lordship had not been short of income, but it was not sufficiently lucrative for the Montforts to spend at a comital level without the substantial security provided by additional lands.

These pre-1209 limitations had also affected Simon's ability to meet the extraordinary expenditures associated with his crusades. Preparations for his first crusade to the Holy Land saw the largest mobilisation of his political and landed capital to find liquidity. In spring 1201 he vifgaged his mother's dowry at Winterbourne Stoke for three years; according to the evaluation in 1207, this should have amounted to an advance of around £150. Saint-Arnoult and Saint-Thomas also subsidised the crusade, though only the latter recorded the amount: 40*l.p.* Though less than the actual total of Simon's war-chest, the known sums liquidated for the crusade amounted to 274*m.5s.4d.c.*, enough to secure passage and one year's provisions for fourteen knights, their horses, twenty-nine servants, and sixty-six men-at-arms, according to the prices and proportions agreed in the treaty of Venice.⁷⁶ This would be sufficient to pay the fare not only of Simon and his brother, but also the Zaran company and nearly all of the knights who witnessed his charters in preparation for the crusade. The Venetian passage price, however, did not cover the equipment of his following, the journey from France to Italy, nor—though Simon could not have foreseen it—the difficult journey from Dalmatia to Syria via Apulia. The sums from Winterbourne Stoke and the monasteries therefore represented only a fraction of his available funds.⁷⁷ Ordinary income was simply insufficient for the continued operation of

⁷⁶ *Charter Rolls*, p. 103; Appendix B; 'Saint-Thomas', p. 13; Queller and Madden, *Fourth Crusade*, p. 11. The rate between pounds paris and marks colon has been calculated by common reference to the pound sterling using the sterling rate from p. 184n. 72 above and the colon rate recorded in 1208 to reach 1*l.p.:7s.4d.c.*: P. Spufford, *Handbook of Medieval Exchange* (London, 1986), pp. 210, 235.

⁷⁷ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 311; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', p. 141; *Saint-Magloire*, i p. 191; *Hystoria*, i p. 110; above, p. 116; below, p. 192.

government and the enormous initial outlay required for the crusade; the necessary funds therefore had to be found through extraordinary measures.

The preparation for the Albigensian Crusade six years later was not accompanied by surviving evidence of a similar conversion of capital to cash. It may be that the religious houses of the lordship—the best sources for the necessary liquidity—had not recovered from the fundraising campaign for the Fourth Crusade. The addition of Saint-Léger to his demesne meant that seigneurial revenues had increased substantially, which may partially explain Simon's apparent financial independence in 1208-1209. Furthermore, his budget was presumably smaller than in 1202: a journey to the Midi for what was likely envisioned in the beginning as an expedition of several months was a much less expensive prospect than a year's travel and service in the Holy Land. Even so, immediate expense was involved, and it is unlikely Simon's ordinary revenue could meet it. The construction of Épernon's walls in 1209, for instance, required a further 40*l.* from Saint-Thomas, assistance from the priory's men in Houdan, and a voluntary offering of money from the men of Épernon.⁷⁸ Funding his crusade contingent at the same time must have required other sources of income. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay may provide a hint as to where Simon made up any shortfall: just as Simon probably helped pay for his neighbours' costs during the Fourth Crusade, the 'magna donans et plura offerens' by Odo of Burgundy in 1208 were probably a means of enrolling Simon in his following by covering at least some of his expenses.⁷⁹ Simon's wealth, then, was hardly on the scale of the great magnates who could outfit enormous companies for crusade out of their own resources. However, by cultivating social

⁷⁸ 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 19-20.

⁷⁹ *Hystoria*, i pp. 102-3.

capital through his ancestral relationships with religious houses and personal friendship with a duke, he was able not only to participate in crusades, but to assert himself as capable of maintaining his own following.

Household and government

For the ordinary purposes of government in his lordship, however, Simon's power was largely unquestioned. In addition to the financial seigneurial rights and customs discussed above, he held monopolies over hunting, fishing, ovens, and mills. Simon's personal control of the latter three essentials imprinted his authority throughout his demesne, while the noise, destruction, and probable terror caused by his hunts likely made him an object of awe to the local peasantry. This authority was reinforced after 1204, when his mother received the entirety of Yveline from the king in her own right. Moreover, knights dependent on the lordship could be reminded of their military obligations and villeins their customary labour.⁸⁰ This control, however, was balanced in the emerging towns of Montchauvet and Épernon by a growing recognition of their status as communities of freemen with economic weight. The men of Montchauvet had enjoyed exemption from tallage, tolls, and forced labour since the time of Amalric III. Both they and the population of Épernon were granted exemption from customs levied on goods moving in and out of their town. When the men of Épernon contributed financially to the fortification of their burg in 1209, Simon provided them with a charter guaranteeing that the aid did not form any sort of precedent that could be used for compulsion in

⁸⁰ Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 380-476; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 121-2; Civel, *Fleur de France*, p. 263; *RAPA*, ii p. 449; *Layettes*, i p. 307.

the future.⁸¹ Whilst far from the sort of communal privileges and liberties he would encounter in the Midi, Simon had already developed some understanding of the varying nature of his power over serfs, burghers, and knights.

If surviving sources are any indication, this intensive power was widely accepted and unchallenged. Only one religious house within his lordship contested his claims to authority. But while the monks of the priory of Saint-Martin-des-Champs may have grumbled about their obligation to provide Simon with a palfrey upon the succession of a new prior or guest-master, they were not able to repeal the fine until after his death.⁸² Simon gave way in two other disputes, but these were both with institutions beyond his frontiers: the contest over Sonchamp with the abbey of Fleury settled in 1202, and the attempt to exact tolls from mercantile serfs of the chapter of Chartres remitted in 1216.⁸³ Finally, in 1208 the monks of Saint-Georges had been clearing the grove at Bazainville without seignorial permission, but this was a contention principally with Amicia; though his mother long complained about the infringement of her rights, evidence of Simon's involvement is limited to an approval of her eventual acquiescence.⁸⁴ With the notable exceptions of Fleury and Chartres, Simon seems to have held his rights in France undisputed.

The same could not, of course, be said for England. His rights in Leicester—though never to the title of earl—were subject to constant competition from before his return from the Fourth Crusade. Not only would the king eventually impound the honor, but Simon quarrelled

⁸¹ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 301; 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 14, 19.

⁸² AN, S 1343, n° 9; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 113.

⁸³ *Gallia christiana*, viii instr., cc. 524-5; *Chartres*, ii p. 86.

⁸⁴ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 314, 316-7; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 161-2.

with his uncle, Saer of Quincy, over their respective rights to the inheritance. Saer had had custody of the honor since 1204, and had therefore been able to impose arrangements that likely prejudiced the attempts at settlement in his favour.⁸⁵ At the Huntington inquest, Simon was able to secure the service of some knights that had been claimed by Saer, but the appended list of complaints makes clear that the new earl still felt he had not received his due portion. Simon insisted that he was owed service and commutations from a number of other fiefs in the honor, that he did not have a sufficient portion of Leicester Forest, that his men living therein ought to have rights to the exclusion of Saer, that Saer had unjustly deprived him of lands and revenues in the honor of Leicester and of service in the honor of Grandmesnil, and that the dower settled by Saer on Lauretta, Robert's widow, was excessive.⁸⁶ It is impossible to evaluate the justice of these claims, but it is clear that Simon lacked the time and support to enforce them. His own advocates in the inquest were men he likely hardly knew, of little to middling significance in the county, and had come to prominence after Robert's death, likely due to the favour of Saer or John. Meanwhile, most of Saer's advocates were his own long-standing retainers; one, William of Harcourt, was a member of one of the most important families in the honor.⁸⁷ Finally, Saer is known to have taken advantage of Simon's disseisin by successfully petitioning the king for a more favourable partition after Simon's return to France.⁸⁸ This wrangling attests not only to the gulf between the interested parties' understandings of a just partition, but also to the fragility of Simon's authority in England.

⁸⁵ *Pipe Roll 6 John*, p. 229; *7 John*, p. 265; *Close Rolls*, pp. 24-5, 29; *Patent Rolls*, p. 58.

⁸⁶ Appendix B.

⁸⁷ Crouch, 'Battle of the Countesses', p. 201n. 41; Fox, 'Descent and Administration', pp. 163, 187, 113-4; below, pp. 194-5.

⁸⁸ *Close Rolls*, p. 77; *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 24; *Close Rolls of Henry III*, ii p. 19.

One source of that fragility was the practical problem of his French identity: his principal link to England was through a mother who had not lived in the kingdom for around thirty years. Though she may have been bilingual, Simon himself almost certainly knew no English, though he could likely easily converse with his Anglo-Norman peers in French.⁸⁹ However, Amicia still proved herself to be a great asset to Simon's authority. Whilst Crouch's assessment that Simon 'appears as little more than a cipher in her machinations' for obtaining the earldom is exaggerated—the claim was after all not pursued until Simon's return from the Holy Land—mother and son nevertheless demonstrated a remarkably active cooperation. Amicia had certainly taken the initiative in securing Montfort rights to Breteuil, which she exchanged with Philip for Saint-Léger and Yveline.⁹⁰ Thereafter, she exercised a largely independent but complementary policy to that of Simon in the rest of the lordship, giving alms to the same foundations and seeking his consent and sometimes ratification for her alienations. This was sensible enough given Simon's status as her heir, but her continued use of the style *domina Montisfortis* further demonstrates her identification with the principality of her son; she appends *et castri Sancti Leodegarii* as a distinct polity to her titles in only one surviving act, in order to assert her rights over the contested grove of Bazainville.⁹¹ While Simon was away on the Albigenian Crusade, Amicia seems to have taken over the administration of the lordship as a whole. In 1212, Simon wrote to her encouraging her care for Breuil-Benoît, and she lent her

⁸⁹ Simon, 6th earl of Leicester, could not speak English when he arrived in England thirty years later, suggesting the language had not been transmitted from his grandmother: *Chronicon de Lanercost*, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1839), p. 77.

⁹⁰ Crouch, 'Battle of the Countesses', p. 190; *Layettes*, i p. 271.

⁹¹ BnF, mss. fr. 20691, p. 570; fr. 20692, p. 381; Duchesne 22, f^o 344v^o; *Chartres*, ii p. 35; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 164, 165-6; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 314, 316-7, 319; Gautier, 'Histoire de Grandchamp', p. 146.

presence in 1215 to the authority of Simon's bailiff in order to settle a dispute between quarrelling courtiers.⁹² Whilst her robust dowager government may have infringed the rights of Alice of Montmorency before her own departure for the Midi in 1210, Amicia was in some ways a stronger regent.⁹³ As both the widow and mother of lords of Montfort, she represented—even as an Anglo-Norman outsider—the tradition of seigneurial administration, simultaneously reminding her subjects of their past and present rulers. Once again, the weight of transcendent family ties helped to ensure the smooth continuity of Montfort authority.

Ties of affinity to Simon's own person were also crucial to this authority. The importance of Simon's friendship with men like Philip of Lévis or Sevin and Philip Gorloin to his crusading efforts has already been discussed, but these relationships played an important part in Simon's ordinary administration in France as well. Judging by their frequency in the witness lists, the Gorloins were probably Montfort retainers; Sevin can be placed at Simon's side as early as 1195. Simon of Gazeran and Hermoin of Bréthencourt were likewise early members of the Montfort household, witnessing five and six surviving acts respectively from 1197-1202. Simon of Gazeran had certainly served Simon IV of Montfort, and may even have been an old veteran of Simon III's administration along with Robert of Ameil and Simon of Hanches, who witnessed one of Simon V's acts on the eve of the Fourth Crusade.⁹⁴ Like Amicia, these knights attested to the continuity of Montfort governance and therefore not only served but legitimised Simon's administration. There is no way of knowing whether they joined Simon on his crusade to the

⁹² Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 318-9, 320.

⁹³ Zerner, 'Épouse de Simon', p. 463.

⁹⁴ *Moulineaux*, p. 5; *Saint-Magloire*, i p. 177; AdY, 13F 7; BnF, ms. lat. 5441, ii p. 120; *Registres de Philippe*, i p. 51; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 310, 311, 312; 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 13, 15, 16; above, pp. 110-2.

Holy Land, but Simon's war-chest was sufficient to include all six of them in his company, along with the most of the other five witnesses to his 'crusade' charters in favour of Saint-Thomas.⁹⁵ But whether they died on the Dalmatian coast, the battlefields of Syria, or in retirement in France, they had nearly all disappeared upon Simon's return in 1206; aside from Philip Gorloin, Drew of Hanches was the only member of Simon's pre-1202 court to resurface in Yveline, guaranteeing a settlement for Simon in 1209.⁹⁶ The Fourth Crusade seems to have served as a watershed for the transition of Simon's inherited government to one of his own composition.

From 1207, Simon's most frequent attendants in France were Warren of Écrosnes and Odo of Hadancourt. Like the members of his pre-crusade household, Warren came from the southern margins of the lordship. But while the origins of nearly all the older knights were grouped around the seigneurial centre at Épernon, Warren's family hailed from the extreme march with the county of Chartres. Odo was from even further afield on the edge of the French Vexin. It may be that these men gravitated to Simon's service in the vacuum left by the death of so many crusaders—including Count Louis of Chartres—at Adrianople in 1205 and the absorption of the duchy of Normandy into the royal domain. Many French knights had risen to fortune and favour in the course of the Fourth Crusade and the conquest of Normandy, but many others must have found themselves stranded by the loss of patronage and conflict that their families had traditionally exploited.⁹⁷ Simon had participated in the final stages of neither conflict, and so remained alive and politically secure enough to offer employment, perhaps even with an enhanced reputation on account of the fulfilment of his crusade vow. From Simon's

⁹⁵ 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 13-5; above, pp. 185-6.

⁹⁶ 'Saint-Thomas', p. 22; above, pp. 104-5.

⁹⁷ 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 17, 21; Villehardouin, ii p. 170; Clari, p. 106; Power, *Norman Frontier*, pp. 108, 447-8.

perspective, these men may have been attractive candidates for his household precisely because they were from outside his lordship, therefore devoid of partisan ties and entirely dependent on Simon—rather than family heritage—for their lands. If this was the case, it mirrors in microcosm the revolution of Philip Augustus’ government as analysed by Baldwin; the substitution of personal for traditional ties of service and dependency may therefore be as much a seigneurial as a royal phenomenon in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century.⁹⁸ Whatever the reasons for their selection, the two men rose quickly in Simon’s administration: Warren was appointed forester for the woods of Foillous, while Odo became Simon’s bailiff for the lordship while the crusader was away in the south.⁹⁹ The latter position is especially notable: as mentioned above, while Amicia likely governed policy and her presence ensured the continuity of Montfort tenure and authority, Odo seems to have exercised routine justice and government under her auspices. Not only had Simon replaced the ancestral machinery of his court, but—driven by his absence on the Albigensian Crusade—he began to formalise its functions with the creation of offices.

Few other details of Simon’s French court survive. The only other lay officer to emerge from the evidence is Warren of Pinthières, castellan of Houdan from at least 1198-1200.¹⁰⁰ There is no evidence of a Montfort chancery operating in France during Simon’s tenure, meaning that he largely relied on the staff of local religious houses for the drafting of his charters and public acts. However, on at least one occasion—the May 1200 grant to the abbey of Josaphat—this role was adopted by Odo, his chaplain, who also witnessed Simon’s regulation of market stalls in

⁹⁸ Above, pp. 39-40.

⁹⁹ BnF, ms. fr. 20691, p. 570; Rhein, ‘Seigneurie de Montfort’, p. 320; *Saint-Benoît*, ii p. 234.

¹⁰⁰ Dor, ‘Seigneurs de Montfort’, pp. 134, 553.

Épernon in 1202.¹⁰¹ However, like the rest of Simon's pre-crusade household, he disappears from the sources after his lord's departure for Syria. Simon's seigneurial household therefore seems of modest size and organisation; reinforced by contemporary methods of ensuring devotion with some delineation of administrative roles, but principally centred on Simon's personal authority, even during his absence on the Albigensian Crusade.

Simon's following in Leicester is more difficult to perceive given his short seisin. His advocates in the Huntington inquest were largely knights who had come to prominence since his predecessor's death. William Picot and Stephen of Segrave had been knights coroner the previous year, and William of Quatremares and Robert of Wyville served on the county court in 1205 and 1207, making them all as likely to be followers of John or Saer as of Simon, while the Kilworths were from a family of minor importance. The dissatisfying conclusion of the inquest in which they represented Simon may be a result of this lack of affinity.¹⁰² But if these men failed to fight for their earl before and after his disseisin, they preserved an attachment to his family. Stephen of Segrave, his son Gilbert, and his grandson Nicholas would be devoted followers of Simon's son; Nicholas and a descendant of Robert of Wyville would be captured at Evesham in 1265.¹⁰³ Thomas of Astley's grandson would prove loyal to the Montfort earls even unto death, and Thomas seems to have personally performed better service than his contemporaries. He had served as Robert's bailiff for Earl Shilton and possibly other bailiwicks,

¹⁰¹ *Josaphat*, i p. 353; 'Saint-Thomas', p. 16.

¹⁰² Crouch, 'Battle of the Countesses', p. 201n. 40; *Curia Regis Rolls*, ed. C.T. Flower, iv (London, 1929), p. 33, v (1931), pp. 18, 39, 69; *The Red Book of the Exchequer*, ed. H. Hall, ii (London 1896), p. 553; Fox, 'Descent and Administration', p. 72; R.V. Turner, *Men Raised from the Dust: Administrative Service and Upward Mobility in Angevin England* (Philadelphia, 1988), p. 122.

¹⁰³ PRO, C 145/28, nos 1-4, 13; Fox, 'Descent and Administration', p. 97; Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort*, pp. 14, 20, 63.

and continued in this office for Simon, collecting revenues for his new lord in the autumn of 1206 and retaining them on Simon's behalf for some time after the royal confiscation of the honor.¹⁰⁴ Another indication of passive loyalties may be found in the attempted mobilisation for King John's Poitevin campaign in 1213: though the response from the English chivalry was disappointing across the country, it is interesting to note that Thomas of Astley substituted his son for his personal service and rendered only a small fraction of the knight-fees that he owed, while Robert of Wyville did not attend the muster at all. William of Quatremares may similarly have declined to render his service.¹⁰⁵ In fact, among the knights recorded in the surviving rolls for the 1213 muster, those from the honor of Leicester were the most likely to plead illness or simply refuse to come. If Vincent is right that English resistance may have stemmed in part from John's plans to assist Peter of Aragon and Raymond of Toulouse against Simon in 1213, this sentiment takes on a particular significance in relation to the response of the Leicestrian knights.¹⁰⁶ Simon may not have been sufficiently popular to entrench himself in his honor in 1207, but six years later his family affinity to the extinct Beaumont earls and heroic orthodoxy compared favourably with the character of the tyrannical and recently excommunicated John.

His lack of enforceable authority in England prevented Simon from exercising any significant administrative functions beyond the collection of revenues during his seisin. In his French lands, however, he was the ordinary arbiter of power within his demesne, and representative of royal authority in the forest of Yveline until 1204; the latter included not only

¹⁰⁴ PRO, C 145/28, n° 4; *Curia Regis Rolls*, iii (1926), p. 45; *Pipe Roll 9 John*, p. 196; Fox, 'Descent and Administration', pp. 50, 133-4, 235-7; Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort*, pp. 61, 74.

¹⁰⁵ N. Vincent, 'A Roll of Knights Summoned to Campaign in 1213', *Historical Research* 66 (1993), pp. 92, 97; *Red Book*, ii pp. 552-3; *Pipe Roll 17 John*, p. 102.

¹⁰⁶ *Pipe Roll 17 John*, pp. 101-3; Vincent, 'Roll of Knights', pp. 96-7; idem, 'Albigensian Crusade', p. 75; above, p. 72.

the regulation of wood-gathering, hunting, and pannage, but also the capture of thieves.¹⁰⁷ In his lordship, Simon had to preserve his seigneurial rights, monopolies, and income, as well as uphold the routine 'public' goods of order and justice. The latter responsibilities entailed the prosecution of criminals, especially those accused of theft, arson, rape, mutilation, murder, and treason: crimes punished by dismemberment or hanging.¹⁰⁸ Occasionally, seigneurial rights to justice were alienated with lands and concessions given to local religious houses. Early lords of Montfort even exempted the priories of Saint-Thomas and Saint-Laurent from all seigneurial justice and recognised the latter's the right to sanctuary.¹⁰⁹ In those cases where Simon and his ancestors had reserved jurisdiction, little evidence survives of its exercise. Some eleemosynary donations include provisions for docking the pay of provosts dilatory in dispensing alms, but graver crimes hardly surface in the records.¹¹⁰ Though the majority of cases handled by Simon and his agents likely involved violations of life or property, only one allows a glimpse of criminal justice at work under Simon's tenure. In 1208, the monks of Épernon had captured a murderer at Maingournois who therefore fell under the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court. However, they lacked a gaol in which to hold the malefactor, and so turned him over to Simon for incarceration, whence he was able to escape. Simon therefore published a statement attempting to exculpate both parties from blame: the monks' inability to render justice did not prejudice their rights, but the escape had happened without Simon's knowledge or—presumably

¹⁰⁷ *Registres de Philippe*, i pp. 51-2

¹⁰⁸ *Saint-Magloire*, p. 105; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 107-8, 301; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 552-3.

¹⁰⁹ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 302-3, 308; 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 3, 14; *Saint-Magloire*, p. 105-6.

¹¹⁰ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 110, 315, 321; *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i p. 169.

—culpability.¹¹¹ Though the episode was technically outside of Simon's jurisdiction, it does provide an interesting insight into the relationship between temporal and ecclesiastical justice in the lordship. The priory was evidently keen to protect its privileged exemption, but could not exercise capital punishment and so rarely dealt with violent crime that it lacked the proper prison facilities. Simon, meanwhile, clearly respected the ancient right conceded by his ancestor and was willing to preserve it even at the cost of actual and potential criminals at large. Though too much should not be made of a single extraordinary case, the Maingournois murderer suggests something not only about the infrequency with which at least Saint-Thomas' monks handled blood crimes, but also of the close cooperation between Simon and his family's oldest religious foundation.

But while evidence of criminal cases is hard to find, civil suits survive disproportionately; in fact, they provide the only records of seigneurial judgements. On the eve of his departure for the Albigensian Crusade, Simon settled a number of conflicts in favour of local priories dependent on Marmoutiers. In one, he served as a petitioned arbiter between a knight and the monks of Léthuvin over rights to the village of Noir Épinay.¹¹² Closer to his own centres of power, Simon ordered the surrender of a meadow that the monks of Saint-Thomas required for a proposed road to their pond. But he needed to supplement coercion with a sale for an aqueduct claimed by one of his knights leading to the same priory's mill at Seincourt, an exchange that further depended on the guarantee of his knights.¹¹³ During his absence, such justice was administered by Odo of Hadancourt in cooperation with Amicia before her death. In order to end

¹¹¹ 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 18-9.

¹¹² Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 167-8.


¹¹³ 'Saint-Thomas', pp. 20-2.

a quarrel between curial familiars in 1215, Odo drafted a peace in conjunction with the plaintiff's brother and a certain Peter Foisnart, the oath to which was then administered by a clerk.¹¹⁴ The salient feature of nearly all these cases is the need for seigneurial justice to find support and accommodation from among its subjects. Knightly claims to contested property needed to be compensated, and their settlement supervised by other knights. Without Simon's personal presence, his bailiff found judgement to be an even more consultative process: the quarrelling retainers may or many not have been knights, but Odo was forced to engage with other third parties in order to reach a solution that could be respected. Though he possessed the highest position in the hierarchy of his lordship, Simon's justice could not be dispensed entirely impartially; though proposed and orchestrated by him, it needed the implicit or explicit consent of his knights in order to stand.

This final observation underscores the intensive requirements for medieval power: just as Simon's sovereigns could not count on his automatic compliance in their projects of state-construction, so Simon relied on the active support—whether voluntary or coerced—of the knights in his lordship if he were to govern effectively. Similarly, he depended on the exchange of alms and prayers with religious networks, who then extended spiritual sanction to his authority. Memory underpinned it all, as appeals to his continuity with his predecessors argued for his right to rule. The convergence of these three elements—chivalric participation, religious cooperation, and traditional image—when underpinned by a sufficient economic base for exploitation, was the measure of Simon's power in France and England. It saw him secure in

¹¹⁴ Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 320.

Yveline, while its absence made it impossible for him to retain Leicester. The contrast provided an important lesson in the priorities of baronial government, one which Simon would adapt with greater and lesser success through the Albigensian Crusade.



Map 7: *The Viscounties of Béziers and Carcassonne*

V. VISCOUNT OF BÉZIERS AND CARCASSONNE

The simultaneous election of Simon of Montfort to the leadership of the Albigensian Crusade and the viscounties of Béziers and Carcassonne presented him with an opportunity to implement a largely independent regime unthinkable under the shadow of intensive royal power in France or England. Not only did his advancement provide scope for his personal ambitions, it also gave him the opportunity to realise his dreams for Christian reform. However, Simon's reference for effective government had been developed through his successes and failures in Montfort and Leicester in circumstances drastically different from those he encountered in the Midi. With little claim to authority beyond ecclesiastical proclamation and martial resourcefulness, Simon now had to develop new methods for cajoling or subduing a subject society in order to secure its reform under his direction.

Conquest

Simon's election brought with it none of the trappings of the traditional authority of inheritance. In theory, he was now lord of a vast territory encompassing the great plain leading from the Hérault river into the Aude valley and the forbidding Montagne Noire looming to the west and north. Less clearly indicated but certainly implied in this mandate were the labyrinthine Corbières to the south of the Aude and the pleasant lowlands descending from the northwestern slopes of the Montagne Noire toward the Tarn. In reality, he found himself in possession of one depopulated city, another largely reduced to a burnt shell, and a tenuous hold

over the stretches of Roman roads linking the two. His first task, then, was to anchor and extend his physical control over the viscounties. He began by occupying the deserted village of Fanjeaux in the immediate vicinity of Carcassonne, whence he could establish a central base for operations throughout the region. The remaining months of 1209 were spent razing fortresses on the Tolosan frontier, occupying and creating a march with the county of Foix, and receiving the submission of strategically and politically important points such as Castres and Albi. By the end of October, his vulnerable corridor along the Aude had expanded to include the Albigeois and Razès. But although his troops had begun to climb the slopes of the Montagne Noire, the fortresses of Cabaret still held out in its further recesses, able to strike at Simon's seat of power in the valley below.¹ This and similar unbowed strongholds would threaten the expansion and consolidation of the Montfort regime for over a year.

In addition to installing garrisons and compelling surrenders, Simon worked to improve his legal position. The deposed Viscount Raymond-Roger presented no practical threat, imprisoned as he was in the castle of Carcassonne. But Simon's claim to the viscounties continued to rest on personal might rather than ancestral right, and other members of the Trencavel family remained at large. After failing to achieve recognition as viscount from Peter of Aragon in November 1209, Simon bought out the interest of Raymond-Roger's widow, Agnes of Montpellier, along with her dower lands of Pézenas and Tourbes. The following summer, Simon compelled the renunciation of any claim to the viscounties by Raymond Trencavel, uncle of the late Raymond-Roger.² Free from potential claims by Agnes or Raymond, Simon's only

¹ *Canso*, i pp. 60, 80, 84, 92-4, 102-4; *Hystoria*, i pp. 91, 99, 112-3, 115-24, 127; Puylaurens, pp. 60-2.

² *Hystoria*, i pp. 124-5; *HGL*, viii cc. 579-82, 609-11.

remaining rival was the younger Raymond, son of Raymond-Roger and Agnes. However, the boy was around three years old in 1210; unable to make an independent claim for eleven more years, he was also unlikely to be promoted by his father's barons, given their general lack of enthusiasm for Trencavel rule.³ Though far from assured in his recognition by the king or the local nobility, Simon had worked quickly to eliminate the potential legal threats presented by the dead viscount's family.

It was, however, the nobles themselves—especially those in the heights of the Montagne Noire and the Corbières—who would most fiercely defy his regime. News of Raymond-Roger's death and Peter of Aragon's refusal to recognise Simon gave them hope of increased autonomy and the expulsion of the French. A general uprising led to the rejection of Simon's authority in Castres and Lombers; Montréal, thirteen miles from Carcassonne, was betrayed by the French clerk Simon had installed there. Armed raids and sieges further cost the crusader control of Alaric and Puisserguier, and although he was able to raze the latter along with several other castles on the edge of the Minervois, winter prevented him from responding further.⁴ The gains of the previous months had evaporated, leaving him in the same precarious position to which he had been elected in August 1209.

Spring meant the return of campaigning, but Simon realised he first needed to secure the support of what noble elements he could. He first obtained the loyalty or at least tacit submission of the Biterrois aristocracy by coopting Stephen of Servian, thereby protecting the Domitian Road that brought crusaders from France and Germany.⁵ Turning south, Simon moved

³ Puylaurens, p. 114; Carron, *Enfant et parenté*, p. 107; below, pp. 235-7.

⁴ *Hystoria*, i pp. 125-6, 129-31, 136-40.

⁵ *Register Innocenz'*, xii p. 236; *HGL*, viii cc. 584-9.

to recover the valley of the Aude and exact justice on those who had violated his trust. After relieving Montlaur in the foothills of the Corbières, he recaptured Bram and Alaric, but Montréal and its environs still held out. However, the failure of the meeting between the rebel barons and Peter of Aragon and Simon's capture of Bellegarde-du-Razès in spring 1210 isolated Montréal, neutralising its threat to Simon's control of the valley.⁶ But the mountain strongholds remained, their bands of knights able to swoop down upon companies of crusaders on the march. Simon therefore resolved to root out the most important of these, beginning with Minerve in June. After clearing the Carcassès and eliminating the threat to the coast from the Montagne Noire, Simon pushed deeper into the southern mountains, investing Termes in September.⁷ The rest of the Corbières castles—save Montségur—fell without much difficulty, solidifying Simon's control over the Razès. He then turned north in December to consolidate his authority in his fourth viscounty, Albi. His previous campaigns ensured that he did not need to even draw his sword: Castres returned to the fold, Lombers was deserted with its stores intact, and he was able to take possession of all the castles south of the Tarn.⁸ By the end of 1210, the conquest was nearly complete.

1211 brought royal recognition from Peter of Aragon and with it regency of the lordship of Montpellier. But the fortifications of Cabaret remained the principal obstacle to Simon's uncontested rule. These nearly inaccessible castles had proved a persistent thorn in the side of the viscounty with raids on Carcassonne and convoys while Simon was away at Termes in the

⁶ *Hystoria*, i pp. 150-4; above, p. 77.

⁷ *Canso*, i pp. 114-8, 132-40; *Hystoria*, i pp. 171, 175-92; Puylaurens, p. 62.

⁸ *Canso*, i p. 140; *Hystoria*, i pp. 122, 193-5; E. Graham-Leigh, *The Southern French Nobility and the Albigensian Crusade* (Woodbridge, Suff., 2005), pp. 140-1.

autumn. But at news of Simon's renewed approach in spring 1211, its lord, Peter-Roger, panicked and sued for peace.⁹ The last remaining stronghold was the town of Lavaur on the Agout. As a frontier town, it was often contested between the county of Toulouse and the viscounty of Albi, the respective lords of which now suffered from a deteriorating relationship. Furthermore, it was known to be flooded with heretical refugees. The campaign intended for Cabaret was therefore redirected at Lavaur, which fell after a little over a month's resistance.¹⁰ The mass executions by rope, sword, stone, and fire that signalled the fall of the town also served as the climax of Simon's conquest of the former Trencavel viscounties in the name of the reform of Christendom.

The denouement, then, was the capitulation of the viscounties of Nîmes and Agde. The last viscount, Bernard-Aton VI, cousin of Raymond-Roger, had entered the cathedral chapter of Agde in 1187, after remitting the viscounty of Nîmes to its overlord, Raymond V of Saint-Gilles, and the viscounty of Agde to its bishop, who already held the preponderance of temporal power in his diocese. However, a succession agreement of 1150 had stipulated that upon default of heirs to Nîmes, the viscounties would devolve to the viscount of Béziers.¹¹ After the victory at Muret, Nîmes had briefly and feebly tried to obstruct Simon's march toward Provence, leading the crusader to implement the 1150 condition of inheritance in order to incorporate the remaining ancient Trencavel holdings into his domain. As Bernard-Aton was already a childless canon, there was no question of dispossessing the former viscount, but the transfer would deprive the

⁹ *Pedro el Católico*, iii pp. 1174-5; *Canso*, i pp. 104, 126-30, 156-62; *Hystoria*, i pp. 171-2, 175-6, 212-4.

¹⁰ *Canso*, i pp. 162-6, 172-4; *Hystoria*, i pp. 214-30; Puylaurens, pp. 66-70.

¹¹ *Gallia christiana*, vi instr., cc. 329-30; A. Castaldo, *L'Église d'Agde (X^e-XIII^e siècle)* (Paris, 1970), pp. 164-7; *HGL*, v c. 1123, viii cc. 380-1; Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, pp. 143-4.

Saint-Gilles of their remaining territory west of the Rhône.¹² No extant documents record Simon's part in the campaign to absorb Nîmes, but records of other parties' reactions survive. On 20 January 1214, Innocent III—presumably on the request of Simon or the local bishops—instructed his legate, Peter of Benevento, cardinal-deacon of Santa Maria in Aquiro, to look into the matter, and on 3 May, Bernard-Aton briefly pretended to be viscount once more. From their retirement, he and his wife ceded the viscounties of Nîmes and Agde to Simon without complaint or reference to the Saint-Gilles. The transfer of the title to Agde was likely simply a measure for security from future irredentist claims: Pope Honorius III would confirm the bishop's rights to the viscounty in 1217.¹³ But even if Simon exercised no real authority in Agde, the viscounty was held by the reliable Bishop Thedisius, while the crusader's acquisition of Nîmes would prove crucial to his efforts to contain the Raymondine resurgence of 1216-1218.

The viscounties, once subdued, gave Simon little trouble after 1211. A handful of isolated fortresses rebelled in the aftermath of the battle of Castelnaudary, but most of the former Trencavel lands remained quiet, unwilling to face the prospect of further sieges at the hands of the invincible and vengeful crusader. In the heights of the Corbières, some remote strongholds like Peyrepertuse would remain unconquered until 1217.¹⁴ But on the whole, the conquests of 1209-1211 were successful. Large numbers of the indigenous aristocracy had fled, and while Simon's regime was unlikely to have been popular among his subjects who remained, he had translated his authority into effective and lasting power over the viscounties.

¹² *Hystoria*, ii pp. 180-1. *Pace* Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, p. 55.

¹³ *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi c. 958; *HGL*, viii cc. 651-3; ASV, ms. Reg. vat. 9, f^o 35r^o.

¹⁴ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 282-3; *HGL*, viii cc. 702-3.

Image

In order to be recognised as viscount, Simon relied not only on the exercise of force but also on diplomatic usage. This initially met with mixed success: acclaimed by the pope, his titles were ignored by the king of Aragon. Nevertheless, relying solely on the authority of the army's election and legatine confirmation, Simon extended his style to include his full range of claims—*comes Lecestrie, dominus Montisfortis, Bitterrensis et Carcassonensis vicecomes*—from his first letter to Innocent III.¹⁵ This formula would be retained, with some alterations, until 1216. Reflecting the progress of the conquest, the spring of 1210 would see the addition of *Albiensis vicecomes* to his style, though a year later Simon downgraded his claims to *dominus Albiensis et Reddensis* for several months; after June 1211, even this was only found in the Statutes of Pamiers. These territories were likely usually left implicit in the more prestigious vicecomital titles on account of episcopal control of Albi, the crusaders' secure hold on the sparsely populated Razès, and Simon's preoccupation with the potential fruits of the invasion of the county of Toulouse.¹⁶ But Simon's status as successor to the Trencavels in Carcassonne and Béziers was insistently repeated. Leicester might carry more prestige and Montfort constitute his patrimony, but they were uncontested titles; even if the lands attached to the former were beyond his practical grasp, the king still admitted the legality of his inheritance to the title. The consistency of his assertion of vicecomital status, however, betrays the underlying insecurity of his entire position in the south: all could be won or lost.

¹⁵ *Register Innocenz'*, xii p. 239.

¹⁶ *HGL*, viii cc. 588, 604, 608, 610, 626, 634; Appendix A, iv. The rendering *Bituricensis et Bajocensis Vicarius* found in Bollandé, *Acta sanctorum*, Ianuarii, iii p. 13 must be due to a faulty transcription.

In this context, Simon's use of divine invocations in his style takes on an added dimension. Most commonly, Simon attributed his rule to *dei prouidencia*,¹⁷ but this sometimes gave place to *divina providencia*,¹⁸ *divina/dei miseratione*,¹⁹ *per divinam gratiam*,²⁰ or *dei permissione*.²¹ Such formulæ were not novel, but were rarely used by northern European barons. The phrase *dei gratia* was especially conflated with royalty, though it still referred occasionally even to viscounts—including the Trencavels—in the Midi: Simon employed it a number of times, most frequently after his victory at Muret.²² But what set him apart both from his peers in France and his predecessors in the south was the regularity of his appeal to the heavens.

The practice of invoking God's providence or grace to support his claims achieved several aims for Simon. It fitted into the pattern already noted whereby Simon's use of diplomatic style could enhance his social standing, underlining the rank to which he believed himself entitled.²³ To rule by the providence, grace, or permission of God was implicitly to govern without reference to mediating temporal powers: whatever political hierarchy existed in theory was ignored by such divine recognition, meaning that Simon either did exercise this autonomy or aspired to do so. It may also have reflected a genuine concern to acknowledge the

¹⁷ Appendix A, iii, vi, viii-x, xii-xiii, xviii, xxi, xxiv-xxvi, xxviii; *HGL*, viii cc. 577, 604, 608, 621, 626, 655, 657, 659, 660, 667, 668; *Layettes*, iv p. 444; *Carcassonne*, iii p. 234, v p. 763; *Monumenta Dominici*, pp. 31-2, 46; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 319; Gardère, *Seigneurie de Condom*, pp. 271, 276; *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 186, 188; Bollandé, *Acta sanctorum*, Ianuarii, iii p. 13; *Recueil des chartes de l'abbaye de la Grasse*, ed. C. Pailhès, ii (Paris, 2000), pp. 117, 121, 126, 350; Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, pp. 463-5.

¹⁸ Lyon, 'Daudé de Prades', p. 391; Appendix A, xv; *Gallia christiana*, vi instr., c. 443.

¹⁹ *HGL*, viii cc. 579, 637, 658.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, c. 588.

²¹ Appendix A, v; *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 37.

²² Crouch, *Aristocracy in Britain*, pp. 13-4; *HGL*, viii cc. 453, 467-8, 470, 473, 484, 487, 489, 599, 653, 655, 665; H. Débax and L. Macé, 'Deux sceaux inédits des Trencavel (1185 et 1202)', *Annales du Midi* 116 (2004), p. 391; Appendix A, iv; *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 45; *La Grasse*, ii p. 116.

²³ Above, pp. 164-8.

divine help he believed he had received in becoming viscount and the source of his authority as crusader captain. Such gratitude migrated easily into a more practical purpose for the style: the public assertion of his divine mandate. If Simon was truly concerned to express his *Non nobis* through his published acts, it was clearly meant to be heard on earth as in heaven. The point seems to have been taken, at least in some circles: in December 1211, a Raymond of Villar dated his grant to Prouille ‘regnante Christo in Carcassonae (*sic*) [in] Bitterensi et Reddensi et in quibusdam partibus Tholosanensibus et Albiensibus’.²⁴ Though constantly hampered by a shortage of manpower and a surplus of enemies, Simon could remind friend and foe with each charter that the Lord fought for him.

It is therefore somewhat surprising to witness no change in Simon’s seal during this period: the legend and device remained the same as in 1200. Perhaps it was simply a matter of practicalities. The Trencavel legend had already been crowded; one bearing Simon’s full style would be difficult to fit in a reasonably-sized mould, and the crusader was likely unwilling to surrender his patrimonial or comital titles.²⁵ Furthermore, Simon—here as elsewhere—seems unconcerned with presenting himself as linked with the succession of the Trencavels themselves. The money minted by Simon at Carcassonne and Béziers provides another example: neither the legends nor designs on the surviving pennies or obol carry on Trencavel motifs beyond the title of COMES and the coining style for the names of the cities. The actual designs were completely overhauled: the cross featured on the obverse of course remained, but mutated its shape. In Béziers, the Barcan cross notably transformed into a cross with *fleurs-de-lys* crowning each

²⁴ *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 24.

²⁵ Débax and Macé, ‘Deux sceaux inédits’, pp. 386-7; AN, AE ii n° 207; J 890, n°s 2, 4, 5, 14, 16.

point; the French flower also appears on the reverse of the obol from Carcassonne, replacing the Trencavel monogram. The pennies biterran instead bear Simon's battle pennant on the reverse, a sharp reminder of his martial authority and Montfort identity.²⁶ Unlike in England and France, the emphasis on continuity is notably absent from Simon's charters and public image in Carcassonne and Béziers; on the contrary, the crusader's zealous regime was a purposeful contrast with the complacent government of the Trencavels. Simon was not carrying on the traditions of his successor, but overturning them in favour of his reforms. Imbued with a divine mandate and protected by Providence, the Montfort rider on his seal need not change his garb, only his quarry: instead of the deer and boar of Yveline's thickets, he now hunted the heretical foxes spoiling the vineyards of the Midi.

Ecclesiastical patronage

Intimately bound up with this conception of Simon's image were, of course, the Cistercians. In recognition of the order's role in the crusade, Cîteaux—in the person of Arnold-Amalric—received houses confiscated from heretics in Carcassonne, Béziers, and Sallèles in

²⁶ F. Poëy d'Avant, *Monnaies féodales de France*, ii (Paris, 1860), p. 285, pl. lxxxv (though he is incorrect about the subjection of Raymond-Roger to the count of Barcelona); M. Crusafont i Sabater, 'Simó de Montfort i la moneda de Carcassona', *Acta numismàtica* 17-8 (1988), pp. 253, 255; idem, 'Simon de Montfort et la monnaie de Carcassonne', *Languedoc numismatique* 43 (1997), pp. 31, 38-9; *De Toulouse à Tripoli: La puissance toulousaine au XII^e siècle (1080-1208)* (Toulouse, 1989), p. 212; M. Bompaire, 'Les comtes de Toulouse et la vie monétaire en Languedoc', in *ibid.*, p. 70; J. Vall-Llosera i Tarrés, 'Simó de Montfort: Diner inèdit de Besiers', *Acta numismàtica* 39 (2009), pp. 80-2; M. Lhermet, 'Simon de Montfort (1165-1218): Découverte d'un second exemplaire du denier de Béziers', *Objets et monnaies non identifiés* 6 (2013), pp. 156-8. Lhermet's attempt to link the cross on the penny biterran with the order of Calatrava is extremely tenuous; although the connexion of the *croix fleurisée* with French royal coinage is indeed anachronistic for this period, over the course of the twelfth century the *fleur-de-lys* had become a symbol especially associated with the Capetian monarchy: A.C. Fox-Davies, *A Complete Guide to Heraldry* (London, 1909), pp. 273-4. It may be that Simon was linking his issue of currency with the French king in a similar way to Raymond-Roger's acknowledgement of Barcan sovereignty.

August 1209 as Simon's first eleemosynary grant.²⁷ Gifts to the Cistercians would then mark each major event of the early years of the crusade in recognition of the white monks' continued guidance and support. As Simon besieged Toulouse for the first time, he added the fortified town of Nissan to the order's possessions. A year and a half later, as he prepared to issue the Statutes of Pamiers, Simon confirmed these donations, exempting them and the Cistercian monks and labourers working there from all exactions and taking them under his special protection.²⁸ After his great victory at Muret, Simon handed over further confiscated property at Berriac to the order, though this time not personally to Arnold-Amalric, who had not been present at the battle; this may also explain the delay between the victory and the grant.²⁹ As his position became more uncertain, however, he found it expedient to renegotiate his patronage. In autumn 1217, as he besieged Toulouse once more, Simon arranged the return of the property he had donated, perhaps hoping to exercise more direct control over the viscounties as his authority in the region began to teeter. This is not to say that he cheated Cîteaux: despite Simon's need for cash to subdue his rebellious capital, he compensated the abbey with 100*m.* from tolls and monopolies at Carcassonne and Béziers.³⁰ The threat of the Raymondine resurgence may have forced Simon to renege on his earlier generosity, but he retained a special devotion to the order.

That devotion also manifested in the relationships he forged relationships with local abbeys. Villelongue received the village of Saint-Martin-le-Vieil in January 1213, and although no record of crusader endowment for his house survives, Abbot Raymond of Villemagne

²⁷ *HGL*, viii cc. 571-2.

²⁸ Appendix A, iv-v.

²⁹ *Carcassonne*, v p. 151; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 143, 163-4, 175.

³⁰ Appendix A, xxxv.

witnessed one of Simon's acts in May and participated in the embassy to King Peter before the battle of Muret.³¹ A month after the battle, the crusader took Fontfroide under his personal protection, granting pasture rights throughout his lands to the abbatial herds and exempting the monks from any sort of toll or exaction; the abbey also received 600*s.mg.* in alms from the tolls of Béziers each Sunday of Lent.³² In addition to their lucrative properties within the principal vicecomital cities, the Cistercians now possessed important fortified towns and wide-ranging freedom of movement and exploitation, making them potentially the most politically influential order in the region.

The nascent community at Prouille was another frequent recipient of Simon's generosity. After the fall of Lavaur in May 1211, Simon formally took the nunnery under his protection, endowing it with nearby confiscated properties. This gift was amplified over a year later during the convocation at Pamiers in December 1212: Simon granted the community more agricultural lands, a confiscated rent, and founded a chapel for the soul of a fallen crusader. Other crusaders followed suit, and Simon issued at least four confirmations for his followers' gifts in the two years following his protection of the monastery.³³ Though the Dominicans were not yet an order, Simon had recognised his spiritual kinship with the foundation at Prouille in their shared intention to purge the Midi of heresy. These noblewomen restored to the Church served as a beacon of orthodoxy in the Carcassès, and Simon endeavoured to support their mission of reform.

³¹ *Gallia christiana*, vi instr., c. 443; *HGL*, viii c. 638; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 143, 163, 175.

³² Appendix A, viii, xl.

³³ de Teule, *Annales de Prouille*, pp. 40, 43, 48; *Monumenta Dominici*, pp. 20-1, 27-8, 31-3, 37-9, 45-6, 47, 50-1, 59, 68, 89-90, 91.

Not all local religious houses enjoyed such close relations with the crusader. Despite the Montforts' use of the knights' houses as hostels when barred from residence in Narbonne in 1212 and Montpellier in 1215, Simon's donation of the village of Montredon to the Templars at the end of August 1215 seems to have been his first and last surviving eleemosynary grant to the military orders. This attitude contrasts sharply with the chivalric monks' popularity among the great indigenous families, and may in fact be a result of the Templars' association with the Trencavels.³⁴ By July 1214, Simon had become embroiled in a dispute with the Benedictines at Lagrasse over possession of a number of fortified towns and villages dependent on the lordship of Termes; it would not be settled until August 1215. The contention may signal a wider disaffection between the local monks and French crusaders, as parallel suits were brought against Guy of Lévis and Alan of Roucy. Resentment must not have run too deep: the abbey served as a source of ready cash for Simon, and even if the crusader had extorted the money from the monks, he compensated them in May 1217 by ceding to the monks his share of the 1215 settlement.³⁵ However, the lack of surviving evidence of alms given to Lagrasse or other Benedictine houses in the area indicates a reversal of Trencavel policy, which favoured the local black monks while largely neglecting the Cistercians. According to the Maurists, Simon worked to prop up the failing community at Montolieu, but this is the only rumour of his patronage of a religious foundation associated with his predecessors. The apparent suspicion of the crusaders may have been justified: even Innocent III believed that the local Church had been consorting

³⁴ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 5-6, 238; *Carcassonne*, v p. 763; D. Selwood, *Knights of the Cloister: Templars and Hospitallers in Central-Southern Occitania, ca. 1100-ca. 1300* (Woodbridge, Suff.: 1999), p. 108.

³⁵ *La Grasse*, ii pp. 109-17, 119-21, 126, 348-50.

with heretical sympathisers and protecting their goods.³⁶ As a result, the attitude of Simon and his followers toward the local religious may have been only slightly more favourable than that toward the indigenous nobility, their traditional patrons.

The secular churches of the viscounties, however, fared better. Castres and its connexion with Saint Vincent of Saragossa seem to have held some spiritual fascination for Simon, for he founded a college of French secular canons—closely associated with Dominic and his followers—to care for the martyr's relics.³⁷ Following the crusade of Louis of France in 1215, the saint's jawbone was sent north with Simon's endorsement. One fragment accompanied Walcher of Saint-Pol, to be deposited with his brother, Bishop Robert of Laon. Robert had himself been a crusader in spring 1212, and was to place the relic in the abbey of Saint-Vincent de Laon where requiems would be sung for Simon and his ancestors. Another was given to Louis himself, who deposited it in Saint-Germain-des-Prés.³⁸ Though in one sense this partly despoiled the church at Castres, it also connected it with important foundations elsewhere in the kingdom, thereby advertising its possession of the saint's body for potential pilgrimage and patronage.

However, the college at Castres remained a French colony; any additional alms that might come from the division of Saint Vincent would only incidentally benefit the indigenous clergy. It is only in Simon's relationships with the bishops that any support from his regime for the southern Church emerges. The local episcopate had enjoyed amicable relations with the Trencavels, forcing Simon and the legates to work to promote the new regime. Bishop Bernard-Raymond of Carcassonne, compromised by his identity as a Roquefort—a family notorious for

³⁶ *Gallia christiana*, vi c. 973; Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, pp. 73, 86-9; *Register Innocenz'*, xii p. 264.

³⁷ Stephen of Salagnac and Bernard Gui, *De quatuor*, pp. 11-2.

³⁸ du Chesne, *Chastillon*, preuves, p. 36; Bolland, *Acta sanctorum*, Ianuarii, iii p. 13.

heresy and violence against the crusade—found himself deposed in 1211. Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay replaced him in 1212, solidifying once more vicecomital-episcopal cooperation in the diocese. However, this grant of a mitre to a Frenchman was unique and apparently free of Simon's interference.³⁹ Vicecomital influence could not be secured only through the fortuitous election of his friend and neighbour to the see. On 20 August 1215, Simon and Alice could be seen at Guy's side, witnessing his distribution of tithes from the cathedral to the parish churches of Carcassonne, a gesture the crusader may have encouraged, judging from his interest in the restitution of tithes in Béziers discussed below. The chapter also benefited: after Simon's death, Alice would confirm his earlier grant of sacristy salt, a stipend for the sacristan himself, and a perpetual sanctuary lamp in the Holy Cross chapel.⁴⁰ A more specific policy of cultivating relations between the castle and the cathedral may be seen in the gift of Villalier. In 1217-1218, Simon granted the village to Guy in a lifetime lease, after which it would be held jointly by the bishop and the chapter of the cathedral of Saint-Nazaire.⁴¹ Though the immediate beneficiary was Guy, the long-term division of the village between the bishop and chapter was a far-sighted means of retaining episcopal loyalty to the Montfort regime: both parties would be indebted to the viscount, meaning the chapter would be inclined to elect favourable candidates and the bishop to govern his diocese in a sympathetic manner. Furthermore, as the source of the grant, Simon and his successors would serve as the natural point for appeal and adjudication in case of

³⁹ Roquebert, *Épopée cathare*, i pp. 148-9; Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, pp. 72, 89; Griffe, *1190 à 1210*, pp. 102-6; *Hystoria*, i pp. 135, 188-9, 292.

⁴⁰ G. de Vic, *Chronicon historicum episcoporum ac rerum memorabilium ecclesiae Carcassonis* (Carcassonne, 1667), pp. 88-9, 90-1.

⁴¹ *Carcassonne*, ii p. 58. According to the witnesses called in the inquest, the grant was made sometime between 1217-1221, but as Simon died in 1218, it must date from the earlier end of their memories and the latter years of Simon's reign.

dispute between the bishop and his canons. The donation therefore served as an effective means of simultaneously enriching his friend and securing a favourable spiritual climate in his political centre of power both for himself and his descendants.

The incumbent Bishop Reynald of Béziers better reconciled himself to the crusader government than Bernard-Raymond, despite his political proximity to Raymond-Roger and the heretical sympathies of his own family, the Montpeyroux. He had tried to convince the Biterrois to give up the heretics among them before the holocaust of 1209 and assisted at Stephen of Servian's submission the following year.⁴² In return for Reynald's support, Simon gave him nearly absolute rights over the castle of Cazouls—confiscated from the heretical Rieussecs—in July 1210. More importantly, over the course of the following year Simon compelled fifteen separate restitutions of diocesan tithes usurped by laymen, proving that his dedication to reform was not exclusively tied to the Cistercians. The Gregorian impulse to return tithes to the Church which had so profoundly affected France had largely passed by the Midi; but unlike the process in the north, where tithes had usually been 'restored' to religious rather than secular foundations over generations, Simon's concentrated campaign worked to see these revenues back in the coffers of the diocese, an injunction that would be applied universally with the Statutes of Pamiers two years later.⁴³ Though consistent with his attachment to reform, the move also served to shore up his authority in the viscounty. Reynald's episcopal city had been torched by the crusaders, and his cathedral of Saint-Nazaire had even collapsed amidst the blaze.⁴⁴ The

⁴² Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, p. 73; *Canso*, i pp. 50-2; *Hystoria*, i pp. 90-1; *HGL*, viii c. 590.

⁴³ *HGL*, viii cc. 599-601, 626; BnF, ms. Doat 62, f^{os} 37r^o-62r^o; *Register Innocenz'*, xii p. 239; Bloch and Dauvergne, *Histoire rurale*, i p. 85; above, pp. 137-8.

⁴⁴ *Canso*, i p. 60.

revenues from Cazouls and the restored tithes would be necessary for the diocese to recover and therefore further ingratiated Simon with the bishop and his chapter. In February 1213, Simon's administration bestowed property confiscated from heretics in and around the city on Peter-Emile, the capitular sacristan. A year later, Simon augmented this gift with rights to confiscated mills along the Orb. As the canon responsible for the vessels, vestments, ornaments, and perhaps even fabric of the cathedral, the sacristan was routinely entrusted with alms for refurbishment, now sorely needed in both structure and sacristy.⁴⁵ Though Simon would not likely have conceived of it in this way, his endowments for the diocese served as—if not moral, then at least material—reparation for the destruction wrought to Béziers in 1209. The church was a necessary part of the city's recovery and one Simon was particularly inclined to support, not only for the good it would do his soul, but for the goodwill it could cultivate with the local clergy and aristocracy. As with the cooption of Stephen of Servian in 1210, the favour lavished on the see of Béziers was likely Simon's attempt to cultivate loyalty and project authority at a distance in the strategically crucial but little-visited viscounty.

Elsewhere, Simon hardly interfered with episcopal affairs. He was familiar with Bishop Arnold of Nîmes, who accompanied him to Muret and Beaucaire: in February 1215, Simon ceded to him the village of Milhau outside the city. However, Arnold remained sufficiently detached from the crusader to be considered as a candidate for the arbitration of the dispute over the duchy of Narbonne and to be entrusted with the restoration of the castle of Foix to Raymond-Roger.⁴⁶ Elsewhere, given the intensive political powers of the bishops of Albi and Agde in their

⁴⁵ Appendix A, vii, x.

⁴⁶ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 143, 162, 175; *Canso*, ii pp. 143-4; Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, p. 465; Ménard, *Histoire de Nîmes*, i preuves, p. 54; *HGL*, viii cc. 658-9, 682-4.

dioceses, the absence of any surviving disputes with Simon comparable to the contest over Narbonne is remarkable. From 1215, the occupant of the see of Agde, the former legate Thedisius of Genoa, probably put Simon at ease, but it is also likely that the lack of heresy in the city of Albi and viscounty of Agde meant the crusader had little reason to involve himself. So long as the bishops were supportive of the crusade and did not allow opposition to emerge in their jurisdictions, their favour was worth more than the direct administration of their traditional prerogatives.

The autonomy of the bishop of Albi had historically been a source of tension with the viscounts. This may have contributed to the close relationship enjoyed by Simon and the bishop, but the crusader—not wishing to be sidelined like his Trencavel predecessors—also developed structural means of exercising his influence over the see. In April 1212, Simon granted the castles of Rouffiac and Marssac to Bishop William-Peter of Albi, but reserved regalian rights over them, meaning that they reverted to his control between the death of a bishop and the consecration of his successor. Should a chapter elect an unacceptable candidate, the holder of the regalia could refuse to return them until a better choice was made. By the early thirteenth century, such practice had largely been reformed in France so that the regalia were automatically conferred after a free election, and there is no evidence that Simon interfered with capitular elections in Albi or elsewhere. William-Peter, for his part, did not seem bothered by the strings attached to the grant: he served in Simon's campaigns north of the Tarn the following month and against Moissac at the end of the summer before taking up the crusader's cause at the council of Lavaur. He also sent civic militias to aid Simon in the sieges of Lavaur, Casseneuil, and

Beaucaire.⁴⁷ But Simon also took steps to win over the canons of Sainte-Cécile: in January 1213, the chapter was promised 20*l.* worth in land, in place of which they would hold the fortified villages of Saint-Georges—where William-Peter already possessed a lifetime lease—and *Marcail* until it was assigned.⁴⁸ As in Carcassonne, the extension of patronage beyond the bishop himself was likely a provision for the future, especially as the arrangement in Saint-Georges mirrored so closely that in Villalier. Though Albi would remain a largely autonomous city under episcopal control—William-Peter would in fact live to see Simon come and go—the crusader had put in place an embryonic system for curbing that independence and subordinating it to his own.

Admittedly, the survival of documents relating to Simon's eleemosynary policy in the crusader viscounties is problematic. The indigenous backlash against his regime followed by years of war may have resulted in the destruction of many records, while the royal successors to the Montfort government had less incentive to copy the instruments of his religious benefactions than those of his political arrangements. However, the gleanings of an eleemosynary policy which remain suggest a novel relationship with the local Church. Traditional patterns of Trencavel patronage in favour of the Benedictines seem to have been abandoned, while renewed support for the Cistercians seems to have benefited Cîteaux as much as her local daughter houses. This trend might seem counterproductive for a viscount who owed his entire position to the grace of the Church, but was balanced by the continued favour of the legates, who began infiltrating the local episcopate themselves. These bishops were already close friends, and

⁴⁷ Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, p. 73; *Gallia christiana*, i instr., pp. 10-1; Baldwin, *Government of Philip*, pp. 65-7; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 13, 47; *HGL*, viii cc. 625, 1507; *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi c. 834; *Layettes*, iv pp. 444-5.

⁴⁸ Appendix A, vi.

Simon made efforts to win over and bind the remnants from the old regime. However, the intensive and extensive investment in the local Church in an attempt to project organic continuity that had characterised his eleemosynary policy in France was notably absent; Simon's patronage in his new viscounties suggested a revolutionary break with their spiritual past. The Trencavels and their benefactions had been orthodox, but lacked the Maccabean and reforming zeal that characterised Simon's piety. His own largesse was therefore planted deep only within those orders intimately connected to the *negotium pacis et fidei* and touched superficially if at all on those foundations with older, native roots.

Finance

In addition to documentary destruction, cultural prejudice, and reforming zeal, a supplementary explanation for the dearth of surviving ecclesiastical bequests may be a strained purse. The circumstances which provided the fortuitous records of royal administration of Simon's holdings in France and England would not exist in the Midi for over ten years after his death, leaving no hope of accounts that might shed light on the crusader's expected income and expenses. Though they certainly dwarfed his holdings in France, it is very difficult to divine the extent or even location of his demesne lands—whether inherited from the Trencavels or confiscated from heretics and their protectors—within the viscounties, much more their worth. Around 1258, a royal inquest determined that *dominus Trenquavellus*—probably referring to Raymond II in 1224—held lands from the king in the seneschalcies of Carcassonne and Béziers valued at 10,000*s.mg.* a year, or roughly 367*l.*10*s.*8½*d.p.* This was almost certainly no more than

a fraction of the wealth of the viscounties before 1224, but while Simon could likely depend on more extensive income than the boy he had disinherited, crop destruction and the flight of peasants and estate officials before advancing armies probably compromised to some degree the productivity of his demesne. Cultivated land—relying on a two-field rotation rather than the three-field system familiar to Simon—also likely yielded less than in northern Europe.

Nevertheless, the lowlands—dominated by wheat and barley, supplemented by wine—were fertile enough. In the mountains either side of the Aude, it was pastoral agriculture which predominated, and transhumance was a crucial part of the economy of the viscounties. In addition to the agricultural revenues drawn from these lands, the rich crags of the Montagne Noire and the Corbières offered veins of silver, lead, copper, and iron.⁴⁹ Cash could be raised from market licences and guidage, protection money paid when travelling on vicecomital roads. The latter had been condemned since the Third Lateran Council and repudiated by the oaths of obedience to the Church compelled throughout the Midi in the wake of the initial campaign of the Albigensian Crusade. Simon would accordingly abolish all tolls and exactions imposed since 1178.⁵⁰ It is therefore unlikely he ever collected guidage, though he clearly did collect some tolls. However, a substantial portion of the vicecomital monopolies and tolls had been widely alienated or eroded by 1209, and ordinary revenue may have been pinched by the time of Simon's

⁴⁹ *RHGF*, xxiv p. 557; E. Le Roy Ladurie, *Les paysans de Languedoc*, 2nd edn, i (Paris, 1966) pp. 54-60, 76-7, 112-4, 118-20; *HGL*, viii c. 610; M.-C. Bailly-Maître, *L'Argent: Du minéral au pouvoir dans la France médiévale* (Paris, 2002), p. 32. No contemporary conversion rate exists for comparing pounds paris to shillings melgorian, so they have been indirectly compared through the rates of the pound paris to tournois from 1221 and the shilling melgorian to pound tournois in 1251, for a rate of 11*p*.:27*s*.2½*d*.*mg*.: Spufford, *Medieval Exchange*, pp. 172, 181.

⁵⁰ H. Débax, *La féodalité languedocienne, XI^e-XII^e siècles: Serments, hommages et fiefs dans le Languedoc des Trencavel* (Toulouse, 2003), pp. 297-9; *Conciliorum decreta*, p. 222; *Register Innocenz'*, xii pp. 145, 149, 151, 162-3, 213, 215, 217-8, 223, 226; *HGL*, viii c. 633.

election even without the abolition of unjust imposts.⁵¹ Confiscated property provided extraordinary income, but Simon often distributed this to the Church or his followers.⁵² After the city's fall and the expulsion of its population in August 1209, the goods of Carcassonne had been set aside for the crusade's use, but the knights appointed to guard it then mislaid or embezzled 5,000*l.* from the treasury.⁵³ The introduction of Parisian custom for inheritance with the Statutes of Pamiers brought with it higher rates of taxation on the mutation of fiefs: a fifth rather than a sixth of the sale price or a year's revenues in relief rather than free succession.⁵⁴ But Simon's nine years in power were unlikely to have seen a sufficient number of mutations for the clause to have had much effect on his finances. Though carrying authority over vast reaches of important territory, the office of viscount was probably not so richly remunerated in reality as Simon might have hoped.

It was certainly not lucrative enough to meet the enormous military expenditure required to keep it. The army with which Simon was left after the departure of Odo of Burgundy was small but expensive. The mercenary troops under Peter the Aragonese, holding less hope of regular enfeoffment, faced with unfavourable odds, annoyed by the anti-mercenary rhetoric of the crusading clergy, and culturally and linguistically affiliated with Simon's enemies, were likely extremely costly.⁵⁵ Even the crusader knights who remained at his side out of loyalty or

⁵¹ Appendix A, xxxv-xxxvi, xl; J. Dovetto, *Cartulaire des Trencavel: Analyse détaillée des 617 actes, 957-1214* (Carcassonne, 1997), p. 151; J. Gordon, 'The Laity and the Catholic Church in Cathar Languedoc', (University of Oxford, D.Phil. thesis, 1992), p. 57; cf. Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, pp. 131-3.

⁵² Appendix A, iv, vi-vii, xi; *HGL*, viii cc. 571-2, 600, 637; *Monumenta Dominici*, pp. 27-8, 31-3, 38; *Carcassonne*, iii p. 234, v p. 151; above, pp. 104-6, 210-2, 216-9.

⁵³ *Hystoria*, i pp. 99, 100; *Carcassonne*, v p. 326; *RHGF*, xxiv p. 613.

⁵⁴ *HGL*, viii cc. 633, 634; Timbal, *Conflit d'annexion*, pp. 91-7.

⁵⁵ *Canso*, i pp. 84, 100; *Hystoria*, i pp. 115, 119; above, pp. 141-2.

zeal needed money in order to maintain themselves and their own households. When Simon complained to the pope in 1209 that he was paying twice the usual rates for military employment, he was not referring exclusively to the Aragonese. In France at the turn of the century, the royal muster judged a man-at-arms to be worth on average 8*d.p.* per day, a crossbowman 1*s.5d.*, a mounted sergeant 3*s.2d.*, and a knight 6*s.* Simon was therefore probably paying around 1*s.9½d.mg.* for each man-at-arms he retained, 3*s.10d.* for crossbowmen, 8*s.7½d.* for mounted sergeants, and 16*s.4d.* for his knights. Continuing the comparison with royal military expenditure, the waggons and teams employed in Simon's baggage train likely cost around 4*s.1d.* each day of his long campaigns. Extraordinarily, the skilled engineers who manned the trebuchet named *Mala Vezina* at the month-long investment of Minerve in the summer of 1210 were paid the incredible salary of 21*l.* per day.⁵⁶ Of course, Simon's regular army—at least of Frenchmen—would have been dwarfed by the royal levy of 1202, which numbered about 2,150 men at any given moment. At around thirty men, the known chivalric crusader cadre possessed only twelve *per cent* of the average strength of French knights on the final Norman campaigns. If this proportion holds for the wider relationship between the armies of Simon in 1209-1210 and Philip in 1202, the former may only have retained around two hundred and fifty men. But the rates cited would require a significant payroll sum to keep even Simon's small force constantly in the saddle. Assuming once more a rough correspondence in composition between the royal and crusader armies, Simon was likely spending about 1,124*s.* a day on ordinary military operations—excluding mercenary troops and siege engineers—in the

⁵⁶ *Register Innocenz*, xii p. 239; Tyerman, 'Paid Crusaders', p. 16; E. Audouin, *Essai sur l'armée royale au temps de Philippe Auguste* (Paris, 1913), pp. 24, 40-50, 56-62, 75-81, 84-92; *Canso*, i p. 114; *Hystoria*, i p. 156; Marvin, *Occitan War*, p. 78n. 36. Mounted crossbowmen made up only 3% of Philip's army in 1202 and were most effective in open warfare; they were therefore unlikely to have seen much service on Simon's mountainous siege campaigns: Audouin, *Armée royale*, pp. 67-73.

first year of the crusade. It is therefore little wonder that he found it necessary to impose a pay freeze in 1210 to combat inflating wages.⁵⁷ Clearly the conquest was not paying for itself.

In addition to martial expenses, other extraordinary costs arose. In order to pay off the surviving Trencavels, Simon agreed to give Agnes of Montpellier 25,000*s.* to buy out her interest in her dower lands, as well as provide her with a stipend of a further 3,000*s.* annually for the rest of her life.⁵⁸ Furthermore, he had promised Innocent an annual census of 3*d.* per household. This regular revenue would be augmented by fines attached to unrepentant excommunication: should a castellan remain without absolution for forty days, he would owe 100*s.*, a knight or burgher 50*s.*, and a peasant 20*s.*⁵⁹ These collections would be drawn from the population rather than Simon's own purse, but they still involved the expense of deploying bailiffs to the countryside, transporting the money to a treasury, and guarding it until it could be delivered to a papal representative. However, Simon's commitment to the undertaking—even if proposed by Arnold-Amalric—remained strong enough for the census to be enshrined in the Statutes of Pamiers, where it was decreed it would be collected annually during Lent.⁶⁰ Such costs paid moral dividends, but did little to alleviate the pressing need for cash to hand.

The crusader required ordinary and stable income. Outside of his demesne lands, the most obvious source for this was in the towns. The crusader viscounties were more densely populated and economically active than the forest of Yveline, and the burgher of Béziers or Albi

⁵⁷ Audoin, *Armée royale*, pp. 40-50, 56-62, 67-73, 75-81, 84-92; *Hystoria*, i p. 119; *Register Innocenz'*, xii p. 267. Again, mounted crossbowmen have been excluded from the calculations of correspondence. The mode of 50 men-at-arms:1 waggon (with any remaining men-at-arms requiring another waggon) from the levy of 1204 has been used to calculate the proportion of waggons: *ibid.*, pp. 24, 123-9.

⁵⁸ *HGL*, viii cc. 579-82.

⁵⁹ *Register Innocenz'*, xii pp. 237-8, 239.

⁶⁰ *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi cc. 357, 690-1, 694; *HGL*, viii c. 627.

was much wealthier than his counterpart in Épernon or Montchauvet. However, as with his agricultural demesne, Simon's access to these potential sources of revenue were limited. Though Béziers retained usable property after its sack, the destruction Simon and his fellow crusaders had wrought in the city meant it could not recover immediately, and the depopulation of Carcassonne, though almost certainly only temporary, must have resulted in serious economic disruption.⁶¹ Even where he could draw money from the towns, Simon often restricted his own authority. Nothing from his regency over Montpellier in 1211-1213 survives, which may suggest he left the town largely to its own devices. The restrictions on arbitrary tallage, abolition of recently instituted tolls, and provision for free justice all removed extraordinary sources of vicecomital income, though mercantile activity remained subject to exactions. In 1216, Simon went even further, granting the citizens of Nîmes total and perpetual exemption from tolls, customs imposts, and other monetary exactions in recognition of their support during the siege of Beaucaire.⁶² Such measures were useful for assuaging the fears and encouraging the fidelity of the burghers, but they also limited Simon's options for drawing immediate funds from a wealthy and exploitable portion of his population.

A similar restraint appears to have been exercised—at least initially—in the striking of coins. Having inherited the vicecomital mines and the mints at Carcassonne and Béziers, Simon carried on the Trencavel practice of issuing currencies, of which three exemplars are known: one obol ugonenc and two pennies biterran. For roughly forty years before Simon's election, these had weighed on average 0.42g and 0.65g respectively; biterran had always been a weak local

⁶¹ *HGL*, viii c. 572; *Canso*, i pp. 60, 80; *Hystoria*, i pp. 91, 99; Puylaurens, pp. 60-2.

⁶² *HGL*, viii cc. 626, 628, 630-1, 633, 694; Ménard, *Histoire de Nîmes*, i preuves, p. 54.

currency, even by comparison with provincial ugonenc, which at least held the advantage of antiquity from Carcassonne's Carolingian mint.⁶³ But despite the weakness of these currencies—especially in the shadow of the regionally-dominant melgorian—it remained in Simon's interest to continue to strike his own coins for local use as a demonstration of his authority. When he appropriated the old mints is unclear, but he did not need to wait—as proposed by Jacques Labrot and Michel Lhermet respectively—for the confirmation of either Muret or Philip Augustus. Popular resentment of his rule mattered little so long as his ordinary subjects were in need of coins for daily business, and after the papal confirmation of his election to the viscounty in 1209, Simon hardly needed royal authorisation to operate a mint that had been functioning without it since the death of Emperor Charles II the Bald.⁶⁴ On the contrary, immediate dissemination of his coins would emphasise simultaneously his regime's permanence and independence.

However, the other great benefit derived from minting—the devaluation of currency for one's own benefit—seems to have been overlooked for a period, if the known exemplars are any guide. With only three surviving specimens, firm conclusions are impossible: however, certain aspects of the small numismatic record in conjunction with wider historical evidence allow tentative proposals. First, while Simon clearly adapted the Trencavel dies, he did not immediately cheapen their metal content, despite his pressing financial problems. At 0.45g, Simon's obol ugonenc was in fact worth a bit more than either exemplar of Roger II or

⁶³ *HGL*, vii p. 407, viii c. 610; Débax, *Féodalité languedocienne*, pp. 294-6; J. Labrot, 'Simon de Montfort a-t-il frappé monnaie?', *Bulletin de la Société française de numismatique* 59 (2004), p. 93; Bompaire, 'Vie monétaire en Languedoc', p. 70; Crusafont i Sabater, 'Monnaie de Carcassonne', pp. 32-3, 38-9.

⁶⁴ Débax, *Féodalité languedocienne*, pp. 301-2; Labrot, 'A-t-il frappé monnaie?', p. 93; Lhermet, 'Découverte d'un second denier', pp. 158-9.

Raymond-Roger Trencavel or even of the mean half-value of their surviving pennies. Simon's pennies biterran are unequal, but the heavier weighs 1g, nearly two-thirds more than the Trencavel equivalent. However, the second—though its 18mm diameter clearly marks it as a penny rather than an obol—weighs only 0.54g, even less than its Trencavel predecessors. As devaluation of currency is a more common practice than enrichment, the latter likely reflects the later minting, indicating a depreciation of nearly half its value.⁶⁵ Again, the period of Simon's rule in which these coins were struck cannot be divined. However, he may have paradoxically needed to provide a robust currency at the very moment when he was most vulnerable militarily, politically, and financially. More valuable coins minted in his name could buy goodwill, especially in the towns, and would certainly reinforce the propagation of his authority through commerce. But after the viscounties had been finally conquered and his political and military reputations secured at Pamiers and Muret respectively, he could afford to spend his moral capital to gain financial relief by drastically weakening his currency. Perhaps the threshold in Simon's monetary policy, then, fell between 1211-1213: after several years of costly strong mintings, he may have allowed value to fall in the lands which served as his base of power in order to afford his expeditions further afield.

The chief benefit to be gained by such a devaluation was in the repayment of loans, a concern which must have been especially pressing for Simon as the years of campaigning dragged on and expenditures mounted. However, his lack of liquidity was unlikely to be relieved so long as he was in the saddle, and so even cheapened currency was unlikely to be dedicated to

⁶⁵ *HGL*, vii p. 407; Crusafont i Sabater, 'Monnaie de Carcassonne', pp. 38-9; Vall-Llosera i Tarrés, 'Diner de Besiers', p. 80; Lhermet, 'Découverte d'un second denier', p. 158. *Ibid.*, p. 160 notes the weight of Vall-Llosera i Tarrés' penny at 0.84g rather than 1g, but without explanation. All Simon's exemplars are minted in billion rather than fine silver, but this is not in itself evidence of devaluation as many—though not all—Trencavel coins were made of the same: Poëy d'Avant, *Monnaies de France*, ii pp. 276-7, 284-5.

debt redemption. Instead, as he had done in England, Simon exchanged capital for cash, especially in the first years of the crusade. The principal of Raymond of Cahors' initial loan is unknown, but the banker was repaid with hereditary rights to the fortified villages of Pézenas and Tourbes—valued at over 25,000*s.*—and the booty from the sack of Lavaur.⁶⁶ Likewise, in May 1213, as open war with Peter of Aragon loomed, Simon sold confiscated property at Aspiran and Péret to Bertrand of Béziers for 100*m.* The victory at Muret, however, did not ease the needs of his treasury. The arbitration between the crusader and Lagrasse in August 1214 resulted in Abbot William paying 10,000*s.*, one hundred pecks of wheat, twenty of grain, and eighty of barley to reimburse Simon's expenses in maintaining and improving the disputed properties. Three years later, Simon's purse remained sufficiently light for him to cede to the abbey the contested serfs and harbergage that had been awarded to him in return for a further 2,000*s.*⁶⁷ The constant and heavy demands of the perpetual crusade against heresy meant that Simon was constantly living beyond his means, requiring him to distribute the gains from his conquest liberally not only among his knights, but also those burghers and prelates who subsidised him.

Debt was not an uncommon experience for a man of Simon's class, but his attachment to a programme of reform independent of higher temporal authority meant that he was not always free to combat the demands of his creditors through usual channels. With the local aristocracy largely alienated or resentful, arbitrary exactions on burghers or immediate devaluation of currency would threaten the goodwill or at least tolerance shown his regime by the local urban classes, leaving his viscounties practically ungovernable by his small cadre of French knights

⁶⁶ *HGL*, viii cc. 579-82, 604-8; *Canso*, i p. 174; Dossat, 'Simon de Montfort', p. 289.

⁶⁷ *HGL*, viii cc. 637-8; *La Grasse*, ii pp. 117, 126;

and southern noble collaborators. Simon therefore adopted the patterns of government displayed by the French kings and counts who established their power against a fractious lesser nobility by alliance with the cities and cathedrals.⁶⁸ By embracing the burghers and bishops of the Midi, Simon might free himself from dependence on an antipathetic and unreliable indigenous aristocracy.

Household and government

These alliances, however, did not provide men in sufficient numbers or of the necessary class for the temporal government of his viscounties. The bishops' handling of spiritual affairs was clearly to Simon's advantage but of limited utility amongst a population corroded by heresy and anticlericalism. Despite the crusader's attempts at winning over the burghers, resentment probably lingered from the destruction of Béziers and depopulation of Carcassonne in 1209. Attempts to raise militias from both cities to relieve the siege of Castelnaudary in autumn 1211 met with little success: the Biterrois characteristically refused outright, and while Carcassonne sent provisions, the five hundred men mustered from the city and its environs deserted before beginning the march.⁶⁹ One of the chief obstacles to urban participation in the crusade was the independence of consular governments. Though not nearly as evolved as those in Toulouse, Montauban, or Narbonne, the civic councils of the capitals had largely emancipated themselves from vicecomital control before the arrival of the crusade. William of Tudela attributes the

⁶⁸ Luchaire, *Société française*, pp. 447-9; Baldwin, *Government of Philip*, pp. 59-70, 72.

⁶⁹ *Canso*, i p. 216; *Hystoria*, i pp. 261-2

Biterrois' refusal to surrender to the crusade in July 1209 at least in part to their wish to avoid 'que lor senhoria fos en outra camgea.' While many of the leading citizens presumably died in the ensuing conflagration, and the even less organised government of Carcassonne must have been severely interrupted a month later by the expulsion of its citizens, hard-won political liberties could not be surrendered so lightly.⁷⁰ There is very little evidence for either the reconstitution or the permanent suppression of civic government as the burghers slowly began to rebuild Béziers and return to Carcassonne. However, Simon was not opposed to consular administration in principle: in July 1216, he confirmed the rights of the consulate of Nîmes in gratitude for the citizens' support during the siege of Beaucaire. Simon's confirmation may have been driven by necessity, but it came in the wake of generous support from the Nîmois, who were therefore unlikely to have had a specific grievance against the crusader.⁷¹ Montpellier also had a strong consulate with which Simon seems not to have interfered while regent. But Nîmes and Montpellier were apparently free from heresy and had never been attacked by the crusade. And a lack of interference did not always translate into goodwill: after the battle of Muret, the citizens of both towns closed their gates to Simon, and the Montepessulans even tried to assassinate him when he entered the town during the ecclesiastical council held there in 1215.⁷² This may have been largely driven by fear of the crusader in the absence of the restraining power of the Crown of Aragon, but the citizens of Béziers and Carcassonne had lost their livelihoods to Simon and his comrades: while they might be persuaded to acquiesce to the new regime, they

⁷⁰ 'that their government should be changed for another'. *Canso*, i pp. 50, 56-60, 80; *Hystoria*, i pp. 91-2, 99; Puylaurens, pp. 60-2.

⁷¹ Ménard, *Histoire de Nîmes*, i preuves, p. 54; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 270, 272, 274, 277; *Canso*, ii p. 100.

⁷² *Hystoria*, ii pp. 180-1, 240-1.

could hardly be expected to demonstrate more intensive support than they ever had for the Trencavels.

Nor could Simon hope for acquiescence from much of the local aristocracy. Some nobles—like the important Stephen of Servian or the petty William Cat—became active members of Simon's court. Stephen was a leading member of the Biterrois nobility and possibly even a rival to Trencavel authority in the region, but had been convicted of heretical sympathies which he abjured with sureties in February 1210. Episcopal acceptance of his abjuration may have been conditional upon Stephen's willingness to pay homage to Simon, who had braved the hostile winter and now looked to begin reconsolidating his hold over those parts of the viscounties that still held out or had reneged on their submissions from the previous autumn. By obtaining Stephen's cooperation, Simon could then rest assured of the loyalty of the Hérault plain. Upon receiving Stephen's homage in March, Simon reenfeoffed him with the lands he had forfeited by his heresy: Stephen was forbidden to receive or defend heretics or to alienate his property without Simon's authorisation and required to amend any wrongdoings or failures within thirty days of notification from Simon, otherwise his lands would once more be subject to forfeiture. His prominence meant that his conversion to the crusading cause—publicly proclaimed and recorded—held great propaganda potential. He had been almost totally absent from the administration of Raymond-Roger, and may have exercised considerable autonomous influence

over the viscounty of Béziers.⁷³ But as an abjured heretical believer, he was indebted to Simon and the crusade leadership for his rehabilitation. Accordingly, Stephen proved a loyal vassal: for all his troubles elsewhere, Simon never had to deal with so much as dissent between the Orb and the Hérault for the rest of his life.

William Cat, from Montréal, also came from an heretical background, though whether he was ever personally a believer is unknown. He was even closer to the Montforts than Stephen: enfeoffed and knighted by Simon, tutor for Amalric, and even godfather to Petronilla. Sicard of Puylaurens and Gerald of Pépieux were also quick to join Simon, who entrusted the latter with the care of several castles in the Minervois. Finally, two Fanjovian knights, the brothers Peter Mir and Peter of Saint-Michel, submitted in early 1211; the former went on to serve faithfully at Simon's side at the 1216 siege of Beaucaire.⁷⁴ A handful of other southern knights and burghers appear several times in the witness lists of vicecomital acts, suggesting that they moved on the fringes of Simon's court: Pons III of Olargues, Imbert of Cabrières, Aimeric Bofat, and Gerald-Martin. But all these men were Biterrois and—like Stephen of Servian—only appear to have witnessed acts in Béziers itself. While this demonstrates Simon's efforts to incorporate important figures from the city and surrounding countryside into his administration in ways that Raymond-Roger had failed to do, it equally suggests his inability to compel service from these

⁷³ *HGL*, viii cc. 584-9; Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, p. 150. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 66-7, where Stephen's heresy is doubted, but on the not entirely convincing grounds of a single episcopal-abbatial arbitration in his favour. The suggestion that Stephen's abjuration was in fact a result of the conflation of heresy with opposition to the crusade is disproved by the fact that he was the first of the southern lords to submit to the crusade, yielding his property on the eve of the sack of Béziers: *Register Innocenz*, xii p. 236. The Stephen of Servian noted in the much later royal inquest as having fought against the count of Montfort was likely his namesake son, who may have rebelled against Amalric of Montfort after Simon's death before being captured and dying in prison: *RHGF*, xxiv pp. 546, 569, 598; *HGL*, viii c. 669.

⁷⁴ *Hystoria*, i pp. 128-9, 212-3, 230, 263-4; Tugwell, 'Notes on Dominic', p. 57; *Canso*, i pp. 102, ii pp. 138, 162, 186.

men beyond their immediate locality.⁷⁵ Simon's power in Béziers therefore appears predominantly extensive: his authority was felt most when he or one of his agents, like Robert Mauvoisin, was personally present, but in their absence the continuing crusade may have been largely ignored—though surely bitterly remembered—by the local lords and civic fathers.

At least the Biterrois did not revolt. William Cat, despite the trust placed in him, betrayed the crusade and attempted to ambush Guy of Lévis as the marshal brought supplies to Simon's besieged forces in Castelnaudary in autumn 1211. William had probably rejoined his heretical family, a prominent namesake member of which had participated in Peter-Roger of Cabaret's assault on the siege train outside Carcassonne in summer 1210.⁷⁶ Sicard of Puylaurens, son and nephew of ladies perfect, took service with Raymond of Toulouse after the fall of Lavaur and—with the help of a population strongly sympathetic to heresy—recaptured his patrimony from Guy of Lucy's garrison amidst the preparations for the Castelnaudary campaign in late summer 1211; he would later fight the crusaders at the second siege of Toulouse in 1218.⁷⁷ For Gerald of Pépieux, it was the murder of his uncle that turned him into an implacable enemy of the crusade and led him to instigate the 1209-1210 winter uprising at Puisserguier. He further fought in the ambush at Montgey and battle of Castelnaudary in 1211 and defended Saint-Marcel and—abortively—Castelsarrasin the following year.⁷⁸ Family concerns may likewise have weighed on the brothers Peter: their mother, Raymonda, had been a lady perfect since 1204.

⁷⁵ *HGL*, viii cc. 313-5, 589, 601, 638, 652, 669; Appendix A, vii; Débax, *Féodalité languedocienne*, pp. 262-3.

⁷⁶ *Hystoria*, i p. 264, 266-7; Puylaurens, p. 74; BnF, ms. Doat 24, f^o 277v^o; *Documents pour servir à l'histoire de l'inquisition dans le Languedoc*, ed. C. Douais, ii (Paris, 1900), pp. 298-9; *Canso*, i p. 126; Tugwell, 'Notes on Dominic', pp. 57-8.

⁷⁷ Griffé, *1190 à 1210*, pp. 94-6; *Canso*, i p. 238, iii p. 120; *Hystoria*, i pp. 230, 250-1.

⁷⁸ *Canso*, i pp. 102, 222, 264; *Hystoria*, i pp. 128-30, 217-8, 289.

Peter Mir once again took up arms against Simon sometime after Beaucaire, and while it is unclear if Peter of Saint-Michel rebelled before or after Simon's death, he was finally imprisoned for his own heresy at Toulouse.⁷⁹ These ties of kinship across confessional lines plagued Simon's relationships with the southern nobility. A remarkable later inquisitorial deposition records a conversation between the crusader and William I of Niort, a knight personally loyal to Simon but also husband, brother, and father of heretics. When pressed by Simon about his failure to govern his family, the southerner pleaded 'quod non vexaret eum super materia ista, asserens quod semper erat in pace extra domum propriam.'⁸⁰ Even those among Simon's new subjects who submitted understandably showed little enthusiasm for attacking their heterodox relations.

Meanwhile, the prominent nobles of the Carcassès, Montagne Noire, and Corbières demonstrated their opposition to the crusade from the beginning. Aimeric of Montréal, a probable heretical believer and son and brother of ladies perfect, abandoned his castle after the fall of Carcassonne; while he later made a brief submission to Simon, he had likely rebelled again before winter 1209, and could thereafter be found resisting the crusaders from Montréal and—after surrendering and revolting once more—at the siege of Lavaur.⁸¹ Peter-Roger of Cabaret, Raymond-Roger's vicar of Carcassonne since 1204 and at least a protector of heretics, had defended the capital from the first crusader assault in August 1209. After his expulsion from the city, he retired to his mountain stronghold, whence he constantly harassed crusader

⁷⁹ *HGL*, viii c. 1150; *RHGF*, xxiv pp. 548, 597.

⁸⁰ *Documents de l'inquisition*, i p. lxii.

⁸¹ Griffé, *1190 à 1210*, pp. 108-111; *Hystoria*, i pp. 138-9, 164, 170, 214; *Canso*, i p. 164; Puylaurens, p. 68.

operations in the Aude valley.⁸² Meanwhile, at the poles of the viscounties, William of Minerve and Raymond of Termes held out against Simon from their isolated fastnesses among the crags.⁸³ After the conquest, Peter-Roger, his kinsman Jordan of Cabaret, William, and Aimeric—albeit the last only momentarily—surrendered to the crusade. Jordan remained faithful to Simon, whom he served at the 1212 siege of Hautpoul, to the enraged shock of his family and countrymen. However, William and Aimeric both soon chose to continue the fight against the crusade, while Peter-Roger eventually fled to Rousillon.⁸⁴ Hostile geography might be occupied, but its inhabitants proved harder to tame.

The reason for this fierce resistance has often been attributed to loyalty to the Trencavel family and outrage at the suspected murder of Raymond-Roger. With the rise of nineteenth-century Occitan regionalism, the unfortunate young viscount increasingly took on the image of a doomed folk hero. According to this interpretation, the popular Raymond-Roger's continued existence could serve as a rallying point for the local nobility to rise up against the crusaders in favour of their natural lord, providing all the more motive for his alleged murder at the crusaders' hands.⁸⁵ But Eliane Graham-Leigh has convincingly argued that the Trencavels did not in fact enjoy significant respect or love from their subjects; their influence over even those nobles most

⁸² *Cartulaire de Béziers: Livre noir*, ed. J.-B. Rouquette (Montpellier, 1918), p. 518; J. Benoist, *Histoire des albigeois et des vaudois ou barbets*, i (Paris, 1691), p. 270; BnF, ms. Doat 23, f° 108r°; *Canso*, i pp. 64, 102, 126-30; *Hystoria*, i pp. 119, 127-8, 150, 171-2; Puylaurens, p. 62. Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, p. 65 does not believe the evidence against Peter-Roger to be convincing, but her counterargument—that Peter-Roger presented the debating heretics to Peter of Aragon in order to elicit their condemnation—stretches the interpretation of *preces* and *audientia* and does not match the fact that heretics were openly consoled—presumably with his consent even if not his attendance—in Cabaret around 1199.

⁸³ *Canso*, i p. 116; *Hystoria*, i pp. 112-3, 156, 173-5; Puylaurens, p. 62.

⁸⁴ *Hystoria*, i pp. 161, 170, 213-4, ii pp. 3-4; *Canso*, ii pp. 164, 176, 190; Puylaurens, p. 68; *RHGF*, xxiv pp. 562, 591, 596, 604.

⁸⁵ J. Girou, *Trencavel et la drame albigeoise* (Paris, 1934); Ventura Subirats, *Pere i Simó*, p. 111; *Canso*, i p. 94; Puylaurens, p. 62.

proximate to their centre of power in Carcassonne was more theoretical than real, a problem compounded for Raymond-Roger by his recent minority. Though well-represented in his own court—largely due to the efforts of his father—the lords from the Montagne Noire who most vigorously opposed the crusade had no tradition of loyalty to or inclusion in Trencavel government; the family's succession to the county of Carcassonne may have been disputed—or at least resented—by the local nobility and the counts of Barcelona into the late twelfth century. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay claims that Raymond of Termes was ready to pick a fight with any of the regional powers, including the king of Aragon. While Peter-Roger of Cabaret and Bertrand of Saissac had been members of the Trencavel regime as vicar and regent respectively, neither did any more to restore the infant Raymond to his vicecomital inheritance than the other local lords who swore in 1191 to uphold the family succession. In fact, the 1210 solicitation of Peter of Aragon by Raymond, Peter-Roger, and Aimeric of Montréal in order to hold their lands directly from the king strongly implies their indifference to the viscount and resentment of any vicecomital claims, just as their balking at royal insistence on castellar rendability illuminates their true objective: practical autonomy. Elsewhere, Trencavel control over the viscounty of Albi had relied on good personal relations with the rural aristocracy, while the city itself was under episcopal administration. The young viscount's authority was especially weak in the viscounty of Béziers: the citizens of the capital had even murdered his grandfather, and the promotion of the mountain lords in the Trencavel court had come at the expense of the Biterrois nobility. Few from the area witnessed Raymond-Roger's charters, and his government excluded the most

important regional family, the Servians.⁸⁶ It is telling that after the fall of Lavaur, no major uprisings against crusader rule occurred in the viscounties. The only fortified villages in the viscounties to throw over their garrisons in the general uprising after the battle of Castelnaudary were Puylaurens, Coustassa, Le Bézu, and Hautpoul; Cabaret sent overtures to the count of Toulouse, but was unwilling or unable to achieve anything without foreign aid. After the battle of Muret, Arago-Catalan bands raiding as far as Béziers induced some of Simon's subjects to defect, but they were forced to submit or flee after the Spanish knights returned to Narbonne.⁸⁷ The great eulogies for the end of the Trencavel line are therefore suspect. The famous sirvente by William Augier supposedly lamenting the viscount's murder could as easily refer to that of Raymond I in 1167 or the death of southern culture more figuratively, and Raymond of Roquefeuil's support for Raymond II at the Fourth Lateran Council, though rousing, was probably isolated and may have been no more than transitory.⁸⁸ The status of Raymond-Roger as a symbol of southern independence and culture would only emerge many generations later in much different political circumstances; amongst his contemporaries, he seems to have been unpopular or ignored.

Acknowledging the lack of support for the deposed Trencavel simply changes the cause of the resistance that Simon faced, not its ferocity. The nobility of the viscounties of Carcassonne and the Razès especially demonstrated a notable cooperation and coordination,

⁸⁶ Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, pp. 122-4, 126-31, 138-43, 147-54, 157-60, 165; *Hystoria*, i pp. 152-3, 174; *Carcassonne*, v p. 283; William of Newburgh, 'Historia rerum anglicarum', in *Chronicles of Stephen, Henry, and Richard*, i (1884), pp. 127-8.

⁸⁷ *Canso*, i p. 238; *Hystoria*, i pp. 259, 276-7, 285, ii pp. 1-2, 9, 185; Puylaurens, pp. 114. Hautpoul had historically enjoyed exceptionally close links to the Trencavel court: Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, pp. 139-40.

⁸⁸ William Augier, 'Quascus plor e planh son dampnatge', in *Anthologie des troubadours: XII^{me}-XIII^{me} siècles*, ed. and trans. A. Jeanroy and J. Boelcke, rev. ed. (Paris, 1974), pp. 235-7; *Canso*, ii pp. 56-8; Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, pp. 30-1, 125-8.

perhaps strengthened by their shared connexions with heresy. Guerrilla unrest and frequent betrayal plagued the first years of the crusade as Simon grappled to find a means of maintaining control of his conquests. A carrot was first extended through the offer to mountain lords of property of reciprocal worth in the lowlands. Their threatening castles could then be filled with French garrisons, whilst granting a form of justice to the former occupants and theoretically retaining their service.⁸⁹ But as Simon found himself less able to trust the indigenous nobility, the stick was applied more liberally. William of Puylaurens ascribes the turn in the crusader's attitude to the treason of William Cat: Simon continued to employ southern knights after 1211, but a marked increase in surviving instruments of homage and enfeoffment may suggest a decline in his confidence in their loyalty. When enfeoffing his retainers, Simon could comfortably frame their service in terms familiar from French practice: Raymond of Cahors, for instance, owed an archer and a mounted host for a day's cavalcade for Pézenas and Tourbes, while Philip Gorloin owed one knight for his lordship of Villarzel.⁹⁰ But amongst the southern knights Simon re-enfeoffed in order to assert his authority, traditional terms of service remained vague. According to the surviving Trencavel cartulary, a standard oath centred on the holding of vicecomital fortifications, engaging the faith of the tenant to keep and defend the castle on behalf of the viscount, but little else specific regarding martial obligations. Service further afield was rarely mentioned. This cartulary was probably available to Simon, and he may have used it as a reference for determining his rights and renewing the fealty of his subjects, but its patchy composition and the flight of many families meant it did not provide a comprehensive record of

⁸⁹ *Hystoria*, i pp. 161, 170, 213-4.

⁹⁰ Puylaurens, p. 74; *HGL*, viii c. 607; *Carcassonne*, iii p. 234.

vicecomital vassals nor details of service beyond castle walls.⁹¹ The multiplicity of castles in the Midi is an oft-remarked observation, and while the Trencavels had long insisted on principles of rendability in their acts, practical control of castles remained elusive. Simon renewed the emphasis on rendability and worked to ameliorate his difficulties of enforcement through active campaigns of slighting, but his limited resources probably allowed many petty nobles to hide passively in their mountain fastnesses. He was able to ensure at least acquiescence on the part of the baronage after 1211 and even managed to extract wider military service from some nobles, but it was clear that his power in the Midi was more extensive than the intensive control he had exercised in France.⁹² As a result, the feudal situation in the viscounties of Béziers and Carcassonne from 1209-1218 appears very confused to the modern historian and was likely not much clearer to contemporary French crusaders. While Simon almost certainly developed some intelligibility of Provençal during his nine years in the south—given its proximity to French—he may never have achieved mastery of it, reinforcing his suspicion toward his subjects. Rostan of Posquières, for example, had sworn to uphold the *negotium pacis et fidei* and taken the cross against heretics in June 1209, but would still be required to make a written declaration of homage to Simon in April 1215.⁹³ Assumptions of service based on verbal agreements had been too often flouted, and the contracts of submission—even if reflecting traditional terms of fealty—were now to be scrupulously recorded and preserved in Latin.

⁹¹ Dovetto, *Cartulaire des Trencavel*; Débax, *Féodalité languedocienne*, pp. 102-3, 105, 127, 198-200; Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, p. 15.

⁹² Sumption, *Albigensian Crusade*, p. 21; Débax, *Féodalité languedocienne*, p. 127; Appendix A, xxvi-xxvii, xxxviii-xxxix; *HGL*, viii cc. 668-9, 702-3; *Carcassonne*, iv p. 306.

⁹³ Paterson, *World of Troubadours*, p. 4; *Register Innocenz*, xii pp. 158-61, 163; Appendix A, xxvi.

Simon's ruthless actions, meanwhile, demonstrate a deep and unrelenting hatred of betrayal. They can also be traced beyond the battle of Castelnaudary to Gerald of Pépieux's attack on Puisserguier in late 1209. After capturing the castle, Gerald botched the execution of the garrison's sergeants and took the two crusader knights to Minerve, where he blinded and mutilated them before exposing them to the elements; only one survived to find his way to Carcassonne. Simon's vengeance was calculated and compound. The fall of Bram in March 1210 caused one hundred men-at-arms to fall into the hands of the crusaders. Simon ordered their eyes put out and noses cut off, except for one man who retained an eye so as to lead the sorry troupe to Cabaret. That the disfigurement of men in the service of Aimeric of Montréal and their dispatch to Cabaret was intended as a gesture for Gerald of Pépieux, last reported at Minerve, reflects Simon's awareness of the mountain aristocracy's concerted action against him.⁹⁴ As a deterrent, the demonstration showed the southerners the lengths to which Simon was prepared to go to maintain his conquest; he would not be content with heaping coals of fire upon his enemies' heads.

Instead, his violent and sometimes cruel reprisals suggest an intense identification with the righteousness of his cause: while not excluding Simon's sense of personal grievance, injuries done to his regime were not perceived as directed solely against his authority, but offended the divine mandate that had placed him at the head of the viscounties. They must therefore be swiftly and severely punished in his capacity as an agent of the Lord and His rectifying charity. Simon's bloody zeal was not reserved for cultural or linguistic aliens: the horror at Bram was accompanied by an intolerance for French malfeasance. The high-ranking knight who had killed

⁹⁴ *Canso*, i p. 102; *Hystoria*, i pp. 130-2, 148.

Gerald's uncle was promptly buried alive, the clerk who had betrayed Montréal to Aimeric in 1209 was defrocked and hanged, and Guy of Lucy's castellan who allowed Sicard to regain Puylaurens in 1211 likewise died at the end of a rope. While Simon could not lay hands on William, Gerald, or Sicard, he exacted his righteous vengeance on the persons of those rebellious lords he could. No exchange of lands and resettlement for Raymond of Termes, who was captured by the crusaders in the early morning hours of 23 November 1210 while fleeing his dysentery-infested castle after reneging on a surrender agreement: the old knight spent his remaining twilight years in the dungeon of a vicecomital tower in Carcassonne. The frequent traitor Aimeric of Montréal and his associates fared even worse. Taken at the fall of Lavaur on 3 May 1211, he was hanged from a gallows outside the town, while around eighty of his fellow knights were put to the sword. His sister Geralda, the widowed lady of Lavaur, was cast down a well and stoned to death.⁹⁵ As a man of honour and executor of divine wrath, Simon resolved to stamp out treachery wherever it raised its head.

The result for Simon's administration was a heavy reliance on French knights. Though—as just noted—they were not immune to indiscretion, treason, or incompetence, their shared origin, language, and cause made them altogether more reliable and committed than the native nobility. While Simon could rarely exercise more than extensive power over indigenous knights, the French crusaders were intensively linked to his regime. The numbers of such men at his disposal fluctuated frequently with the arrival and departure of contingents fulfilling their quarantine in order to gain the indulgence.⁹⁶ But the men alongside whom he had taken the cross

⁹⁵ S.A. Throop, *Crusading as an Act of Vengeance, 1095-1216* (Farnham, Surr., 2011), pp. 150-1, 154-61; *Canso*, i pp. 102, 138, 164-6, 172; *Hystoria*, i pp. 139, 185-9, 191-2, 227-8, 250-1; Puylaurens, p. 70.

⁹⁶ L.W. Marvin, 'Thirty-Nine Days and a Wake-up: The Impact of the Indulgence and Forty Days Service on the Albigensian Crusade, 1209-1218', *The Historian* 65 (2002), p. 91.

were frequently incorporated into his court, especially those who remained at his side after the departure of the duke of Burgundy in 1209 and those who later stayed past their indulgence quarantine. The old vicariate structure of the Trencavel administration seems to have been largely discarded, replaced by a hierarchy more characteristic of the lands north of the Loire. Guy of Lévis was given the title of marshal during the initial invasion of the county of Foix and entrusted with the town of Mirepoix. This lordship was probably intended to serve as a march against Foix to defend the Carcassès. On campaign, Guy's role appears to have been primarily a logistical one: mustering troops and provisions in support of the garrison at Castelnaudary in 1211 and supervising the camp at Muret in 1212. He also served as Simon's second-in-command, representing the crusader captain at parleys and leading independent forces in support of the main army. After the arrival of Guy of Montfort in December 1211, these responsibilities—but not the title—were frequently assigned to Simon's brother, though the two Guys jointly directed a second army against Foix in May 1212; while the marshal thereafter played a less prominent role, he remained a key member of Simon's court.⁹⁷ As the most important officer outside of the Montfort family, Guy continued to hold a universal authority within the army, reflecting the permanent military footing on which Simon's regime was based.

But French knights also filled important local posts. Simon's lieutenant at Carcassonne in March 1211 was his dependable retainer from Yveline, Philip Gorloin, labelled castellan but probably exercising roughly the administrative functions of the traditional Trencavel vicar, though with a French tone and an emphasis on martial responsibilities. As Carcassonne's military role declined, Philip's jurisdiction may have expanded: his title changed to seneschal by

⁹⁷ *HGL*, viii cc. 578, 669, 695, 705; Appendix A, xxii; *La Grasse*, ii pp. 348, 350; *Canso*, i pp. 90, 120, iii pp. 10, 22, 94; *Hystoria*, i pp. 120, 188-9, 261-2, 264, 267-70, 285-6, ii pp. 11, 53-4.

August 1215, reflecting the integration of the viscounties with the administration of the Tolosan principalities under Simon's control and foreshadowing the later royal administration of the conquest. Less important offices were established elsewhere: for example, Peter the Aragonese and a Warren of Ameil successively held Peyriac in Simon's name, and Pons of Beaumont was bailiff of Lagrave in 1211.⁹⁸ At other times, local administrative roles were distributed *ad hoc*. Before Philip was entrusted with the city, William of Contres guarded Carcassonne while the rest of the crusader host set out to besiege Termes. Simon granted him a retinue for the purpose including Crespin of Rochefort and the brothers Guy and Simon the Saxon, but whether this office constituted a formal castellany or not is unclear.⁹⁹ The other vicecomital capital, Béziers, does not seem to have had any permanent governor during much of Simon's reign; perhaps the city was left to the administration of the consuls, the influence of local lords like Stephen of Servian, and the oversight of the bishop during the crusader's absence. Such a policy would be in keeping with recent Trencavel arrangements. In February 1213, however, a glimpse of provisional government can be seen in the hands of Robert Mauvoisin, *vices agens Domini Simonis Comitis montisfortis*. However, Robert simply authorised the alienation of confiscated property, and the role was likely no more than transitory. When Simon reorganised his territories around 1215, he instituted a seneschal of Béziers, whose jurisdiction seems to have extended down the coast to include even Narbonne by 1218.¹⁰⁰ Of course, Simon's court was filled with other French knights, both perpetual and quarantine crusaders, who held fiefs, exercised

⁹⁸ *HGL*, vii pp. 196-7, 200, viii cc. 608; *La Grasse*, ii pp. 117, 121, 350; *RHGF*, xxiv pp. 562, 611; *Canso*, i p. 242; *Hystoria*, i p. 278; Débax, *Féodalité languedocienne*, pp. 41, 309-10; Graham-Leigh, *Southern Nobility*, pp. 136-7; below, p. 300.

⁹⁹ *Canso*, i pp. 120-4.

¹⁰⁰ *HGL*, viii cc. 429-31; Appendix A, vii; AN, J 310, n° 41; *RHGF*, xix p. 677.

occasional government functions, and provided their captain with counsel. One known courtier named Luke may have been from the north; however, his only known service outside of ordinary court attendance is as procurator in the negotiation of a treaty with Raymond-Roger of Foix, which may suggest he was of local origin or at least knew pyrenean Provençal.¹⁰¹ But outside of confiscated property given to his followers with its attendant responsibilities, Simon does not seem to have instituted an overarching French structure of civil government throughout the viscounties. Given the exigencies of the crusade, his authority remained primarily martial and therefore mobile; even after the pacification of the former Trencavel territories, continuing campaigns in the counties of Toulouse and Foix drew his energies abroad and prevented a revolution in administration beyond the erection of seneschalcies.

A similar adaptation of French and local usage in the viscounties can be seen in the drafting of Simon's official documents. Béziers, for instance, in keeping with its pride in consular government, had an established tradition of public notarial service. Though notaries had originally been comital agents, the monopoly for authorising notaries now claimed by the city fathers—in conjunction with the bishop, whose cathedral school likely provided the necessary education—gave the consulate power over what documents might be considered evidence in legal disputes brought before the municipal court, underlining urban independence from vicecomital control. Simon initially made no attempt to circumvent this practice: of the seven surviving acts by his government in and around Béziers from 1210-1214, six were written

¹⁰¹ *Pedro el Católico*, iii p. 1175; *HGL*, viii c. 694; *Canso*, ii pp. 234, 282; de Marca, *Histoire de Béarn*, pp. 745-6; above, pp. 96-114.

by public notaries, all of whose workshops predated the crusade.¹⁰² Simon also employed public notaries while at Montpellier and Nîmes, both of which possessed their own strong traditions of civic liberty. Despite being executed at Carcassonne in the presence of Simon's chancellor, the act creating a crusader protectorate over Narbonne in May 1215 came from the pen of a Narbonese public scribe.¹⁰³ These may have been a concessions to consular independence, but they also ensured that the instruments would be recognised by their communities as legal and binding. Once again, Simon found it prudent to respect urban customs in return for the compliance of the burghers.

In Carcassonne and the countryside, where consular privilege was weaker, scribes were drawn from beneficiaries of eleemosynary grants, religious parties to arbitration, or whatever clerks might be attached to the crusader's retinue at the time. However, a hint of a developing chancery appears in March 1211: at the end of the list of witnesses to Raymond of Cahors' enfeoffment at Carcassonne occurs the name *Clarini capellani domini comitis*, who may also have served as scribe. This priest had been with the crusade since 1209, when he witnessed the sale of Agnes of Montpellier's dower, and may have already been serving as Simon's chaplain.¹⁰⁴ By 1212, the crusaders were already occasionally using southern scribes who dated their acts according to the French Easter calendar, but the first clear evidence for the use of the latter in Simon's presence rather than the traditional native Christmas and 1 April datings is in an act of 3

¹⁰² Débax, *Féodalité languedocienne*, p. 125; Appendix A, vii, x; *Cartulaire de Béziers*, pp. 345, 495, 501; *HGL*, viii cc. 589, 601, 638, 652-3. The only one not to bear a notarial subscription dealt with Cistercian affairs in France: *Vaux-de-Cernay*, i pp. 187.

¹⁰³ *HGL*, viii cc. 581, 660, 695; Ménard, *Histoire de Nîmes*, i preuves, p. 54.

¹⁰⁴ *HGL*, viii cc. 581, 601, 608; *La Grasse*, ii p. 117.

April 1215, *per manum Clarini...comitis cancellarii*.¹⁰⁵ The official adoption of a French calendar was the least impact of the chaplain's promotion. Since February, Master Clarin had been at the head of a chancery drafting documents throughout the viscounties, including Béziers six months later. The chancellor and his staff were largely peripatetic, travelling with Simon on his campaigns and tours and executing instruments along the way. However, chancery operations themselves must have been quite cumbersome, as they are only recorded in notable cities and towns in the viscounties such as Carcassonne, Béziers, and Lavaur or at the siege camp before Toulouse.¹⁰⁶ There may have been little point in antagonising the distant but loyal city of Nîmes by infringing on their notarial independence, but the crusader could not permit his continuing subordination to a documentary monopoly in such a proximate and important capital as Béziers: public acts must be associated with vicecomital power. Simon's own chancery therefore liberated him from dependence upon ecclesiastical bureaucracy or casual scribes while simultaneously restoring to him the reins of legal authority throughout his conquests, especially in the cities.

These reins had been given their firmest pull at Pamiers in December 1212, as Simon took advantage of the pause offered by the near completion of his conquests. The statutes developed there were an attempt to rationalise a complex landscape of competing legislation and jurisdiction—his dominion now encompassed not only the former Trencavel viscounties, but also substantial portions of the counties of Foix, Toulouse, and Comminges—while simultaneously securing the martial stance of his regime and implementing the reform programme that inspired

¹⁰⁵ *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 28; A. Giry, *Manuel de diplomatique*, rev. ed. (Paris, 1925), p. 123; Appendix A, xxvi.

¹⁰⁶ Appendix A, xxvi-xxvii, xxxii-xxxiii; *HGL*, viii cc. 660, 662, 669; *La Grasse*, ii pp. 117, 121, 126, 350; *Carcassonne*, v p. 763.

it. Again, efforts were made to incorporate a range of classes and origins in the governing process: the committee charged with drafting the legislation was composed of Bishops Fulk of Toulouse and Navarre of Couserans, a Templar, an Hospitaller, four French knights, two southern knights, and two southern burghers. But while Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay is clearly proud of the representative nature of this parliament, it was never likely to decide anything contrary to the *negotium pacis et fidei*. The bishops were committed supporters of Simon's policies and the reform programme; while the military orders contributed little to the Albigensian Crusade, they were not about to oppose it; the French crusaders owed their entire livelihoods in the Midi to Simon, in addition to sharing linguistic and cultural similarities with him; and a number of loyal indigenous knights and burghers appear in the sources. Moreover, despite the closer social proximity of knights and burghers in the Midi, class distinctions remained which may well have weakened any solidarity amongst what was already a minority contingent. Finally, the entire document was enacted under the authority of Simon in conjunction with the bishops not only of Toulouse and Couserans, but also Guy of Carcassonne, Arnold IV of Agen, Ralph I of Périgueux, Garsia of Comminges, and Arnold II of Tarbes, meaning that ultimate responsibility for its content lay with the crusader and the local episcopate.¹⁰⁷ The diversity of the parliament may have been more apparent than real.

Simon's mailed hand can clearly be seen throughout the document. The gains of the crusade, while extensive, were not secure so long as the canonical position of the southern counts remained uncertain and refuges in Toulouse, Montauban, Gascony, and Catalonia remained open to them. Simon therefore prepared for a long war, organising his usually small crusader and

¹⁰⁷ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 63-4; *HGL*, viii cc. 625-6.

largely unreliable indigenous forces as best he could into an effective sword that could be wielded against his enemies. One clause explicitly forbids all commerce with Toulouse and other ‘hostes Christi’ on pain of perpetual forfeiture; officers convicted of such crimes would further find themselves ‘in manu et misericordia comitis’, likely a veiled reference to the death penalty. Another outlaws confederations of any sort—excepting merchants’ guilds and pilgrims’ confraternities—on pain of forfeiture if the purpose were against their lord or a graded monetary fine if for any other object. Those who knew of enemies of the crusade in conquered territories who failed to report, pursue, or capture them would similarly suffer perpetual dispossession and surrender of their person to Simon’s mercy.¹⁰⁸ Clearly the experience of the first years of the crusade had filled Simon with suspicion about not only the loyalty but the acquiescence of his subjects.

More positively, efforts were taken to define military service and obligations. Several were applied universally: all barons and knights were required to respond to Simon’s military emergencies—whether to open battle or siege relief—on pain of confiscation of half their movable property, while ordinary summons to fifteen days’ service were to be likewise observed, with the consequence of distraint—graduated according to the delay—for disobedience. Failure to provide the required number of knights incurred the double fee for their service. The memory of frustrated attempts to raise troops to relieve Castelnaudary a year earlier must have burned in Simon’s mind. Earlier campaigns of scrabbling along rocky precipices and through threatening valleys were also reflected in his general policy toward castles: vicecomital rights to rendability

¹⁰⁸ *HGL*, viii cc. 632-3.

are repeated, adulterine construction prohibited.¹⁰⁹ The petty independence of civic militias and mountain lords was to be curbed.

Other statutes apply to the service of French knights as a bloc: they were required to attend ‘quando et ubicumque [comes] habebit guerram contra personam ratione hujus terre acquisite vel acquirende in hac terra’ with the complement of knights stipulated at their enfeoffment. The wording clearly ties the settled crusaders to both defensive and offensive campaigns, but wars hypothetically undertaken by Simon in support of others are explicitly excluded. Unlike the quarantine crusaders or even most levied troops in France, French knights were bound to serve for the duration of a conflict with no temporal limits. Continuing the pattern of distrust towards southerners, Simon’s countrymen were held to supply this service with French knights rather than indigenous ones for twenty years, after which the crusader likely hoped that his position would be sufficiently secure and integrated that geographical origin would be irrelevant. Finally, any French knight returning to France was forbidden to linger beyond the agreed period, though Simon was to allow him a grace period of four months before confiscating his southern lands.¹¹⁰ Southern knights were divided into two classes: former heretical believers and faithful Catholics. The former were bound to the will of Simon and his barons. However, it is hard to imagine more stringent obligations than those imposed on the French knights. Southern knights who had never flirted with heresy, however, preserved their ancient and particular terms of service. Simon once again found himself delicately balancing the needs of his tenuous position with conciliatory policies intended to motivate loyalty. Though

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., cc. 629-30.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., cc. 628-9.

joined to his French followers by close geographical, linguistic, cultural, and spiritual ties, Simon laid heavier obligations upon them precisely because they were so essential to his precarious ability to project martial power. They were of course compensated by the revenues and authority that came with their enfeoffments, and Simon guaranteed them their traditional French customs and justice in his court. But the Statutes also reflected a war that had lasted three years and showed no prospect of an immediate end, binding the French chivalry to an indefinite life in the saddle. Southern knights, meanwhile, were unreliable and so had either to be kept on a short leash if known to have entertained heretical sympathies or placated through respect for their traditional positions if they were consistently orthodox. The latter were therefore able to remain at home aside from emergencies and their annual obligation of several months' service.¹¹¹ Military necessity mandated, paradoxically, stringency toward friends and leniency, if not toward enemies, at least toward acquaintances.

The Statutes also attempted to reinforce Simon's military position through rulings on social obligations. Traditional rents and servitude were reaffirmed, and a failure to pay the former entailed further fines, culminating in sale or redeemable confiscation after three years of noncompliance.¹¹² This ensured not only the gratitude of the chivalric class to whom these revenues were often due, but also provided funds necessary for the continuation of the war effort. More drastically, Simon claimed for ten years the princely right to approve marriages: noblewomen and the widows and heiresses of magnates—while free to marry Frenchmen—were forbidden to marry indigenous men without the crusader's permission. Once again, Simon's

¹¹¹ Ibid., cc. 630, 634.

¹¹² Ibid., cc. 631, 633.

growing distrust of the local aristocracy led him to implement means for ensuring that important fiefs would not fall into the hands of enemies, whether actual or potential.¹¹³ But it was the regulation of inheritance laws that probably had the largest potential impact on southern society. Simon mandated that all his subjects—barons, knights, burghers, and peasants—would observe the laws of inheritance current around Paris. This attempted to husband his military resources in three principal ways. First, eleemosynary bequests would be limited to a fifth of ordinary estates and prohibited in baronies and fortifications in order to combat the loss of profitable and defensible land to mortmain, where it would no longer contribute to the financial or martial needs of the conquest. Second, dowries would fall to the heirs of the deceased woman, rather than to her native family, thereby allowing the consolidation of fiefs over time rather than their dispersal through partition among many claimants. Third, family inheritances would follow the rules of primogeniture—theoretically preserving the integrity of the estate for the eldest son, who could then render concentrated military service from it—rather than partition, which would divide its resources and obligations among many heirs. Within Simon’s own lifetime, exceptions may have been made: the recognition under the walls of Toulouse of Heracles of Montlaur as heir to Rostan of Posquières’ Nîmois fief a month before the crusader’s death may have been a concession to voluntary—though not partible—bequest.¹¹⁴ Simon did not—perhaps could not—see the transgenerational appeal of partible inheritance: confronted with a military struggle of indefinite duration, he believed that only the familiar practice of primogeniture could preserve fiefs that would yield effective service against hostile neighbours and subjects.

¹¹³ Ibid., c. 634. Though on the face of it, this decree appears an attempt to breed the indigenous aristocracy out of existence, it should be recalled that endogamy was not prohibited, simply regulated. Many local knights remained in Simon’s trust and service: e.g. above, pp. 231-3; below, pp. 293-7.

¹¹⁴ *HGL*, viii cc. 628, 633; Appendix A, xxxviii-xxxix.

Reform and heresy

Though they may have been engineered by Simon and strongly reflect both the legal customs of Paris and the crusader's cautious view of his subjects, the Statutes ought not to be considered the example of French colonisation that modern historians often represent them to be. Of the eighteen men involved in the creation of the legislation, only one-third were French. However, fully half were churchmen, and a further five were crusaders. The defining majority was affiliated with the reform movement expressed by the crusade.¹¹⁵ If a consequence of the Statutes was an attempted francisation of the Midi, it followed the principal intention to create an ideal Christian state: the eldest daughter of the Church provided a convenient and familiar model.

If preconceptions about protocolonialism can be set aside, one of the most unexpected elements of Simon's legislation is its liberality. J.R. Maddicott notes the remarkable feature of the programme led by Simon's namesake son in England nearly fifty years later as 'magnates attempting to curtail their own privileges'; the same could be said of the Statutes of Pamiers, though they had neither the wide support nor lasting impact of the Provisions of Oxford. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay can always be counted on to provide the propaganda perspective, but his assessment of the Statutes as 'satis competentes consuetudines, per quas sancte ecclesie, divitibus et pauperibus providebatur' is not without merit.¹¹⁶ Here was government: 'recognition of societal needs and of judicial remedy, persuasion to tenets of collective utility and

¹¹⁵ *HGL*, viii cc. 625-6; *Hystoria*, ii p. 63; cf. Oldenbourg, *Bûcher de Montségur*, p. 164; Ventura Subirats, *Pere i Simó*, p. 184; Roquebert, *Épopée cathare*, i p. 512.

¹¹⁶ Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort*, p. xiv; *Hystoria*, ii p. 63.

management in place of exploitation'.¹¹⁷ Ordinary provisions of the Statutes forbade theft and insisted on standard measures for bakers and innkeepers, reflecting a growing seigneurial mandate to prevent fraud. Insistence was made on the rule of law, outlawing private revenge in favour of seigneurial prosecution except in cases of immediate and proportional defence.¹¹⁸ Most striking perhaps are regulations regarding justice: cases were to be considered and executed for free, including curial provision of an advocate for those too poor to afford one; men were not to be imprisoned in spite of pledges of good conduct; nor were they to be used as sureties for their lord's debt against their will. These provisions—especially those concerning the gratuity of judgements—closely mirror the concerns of Peter the Chanter's circle and their associated reforms.¹¹⁹ Such stipulations may have been proposed by the churchmen, but their codification nevertheless indicates a public willingness by Simon to forgo the exercise of arbitrary privilege at the expense of the vulnerable.

Other clauses show a similar interest in the economic concerns of the ignoble classes and petty chivalry. Despite the confirmation of traditional rents and labour obligations, tallage at least was to be regulated: any lord enfeoffed by Simon was not to exceed the exactions laid down at his enfeoffment, and mechanisms were instituted for both the subjects of crusaders as well as those of native lords to hear complaints and rectify abuses. Poor widows were to be entirely exempt.¹²⁰ Novel tolls were abolished, while pilgrims and knights were completely exempted.

¹¹⁷ Bisson, *Twelfth Century*, p. 18.

¹¹⁸ *HGL*, viii cc. 632, 633; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 265-6.

¹¹⁹ *HGL*, viii cc. 628, 631, 632; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i pp. 191-2.

¹²⁰ *HGL*, viii cc. 626, 630-1, 633.

Simon also confirmed urban usage rights extant for thirty years to woods, water, and pasture.¹²¹ Finally, while customary rents and servitude had been reaffirmed, provision was also made for migration. Any freeman who felt the tallage to which he was subject excessive was allowed to emigrate while retaining possession of his moveable property; serfs, meanwhile, could also leave for another lordship, though relinquishing both their immoveable and moveable goods. The abandoned lord had no legal or financial recourse and was prohibited from taking pledges from his subjects to prevent their departure. While not going so far as to abolish tallage and servitude—as had Amalric III at Montchauvet—for those migrating to or living in towns, Simon's measures did grant some power to burghers and peasants by creating competition within the taxation market: not only could Simon intervene on behalf of subjects oppressed by their lords, but peasants and burghers themselves could better their own positions by threatening to withdraw their service, albeit at the cost of their property.¹²² While a reforming concern for moral lordship clearly contributed to these statutes, they also contained a strong intention to elicit goodwill from the burghers. Roquebert correctly notes that such 'liberal' legislation was not novel in the Midi: Roger II Trencavel had abolished serfdom entirely at Limoux between 1178 and 1193, and the lords of Pexiora had guaranteed their burghers protection from seizure, fraud, and violence in 1194.¹²³ The extent of crusader enforcement of the Statutes is also unknown and was probably uneven: after his enfeoffment with Rieux, Theobald of Nonneville increased the tallage exacted on the town from the 700s. imposed by Simon to 1,000s. When the townsmen

¹²¹ Ibid., cc. 628, 631-2, 633.

¹²² *HGL*, viii c. 631; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 301.

¹²³ Roquebert, *Épopée cathare*, i pp. 507-8; A. Sabarthès, 'Trois chartes de la commune de Limoux', *Bulletin philologique et historique (jusqu'au 1715) du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques* (1921), pp. 215-6; idem, *Les manuscrits consulaires de Limoux* (Paris, 1930), p. 40; J. Ramière de Fortanier, *Chartes de franchises du Lauragais* (Paris, 1939), pp. 534-5.

complained, Theobald's bailiffs closed the gates for four days and forbade the exit of man or beast until the full sum was paid.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, the blanket restraints on arbitrary power enshrined in the Statutes of Pamiers indicate an underlying concern with justice and its universal codification. These principles were likely derived from the reform movement, but also probably intended to reassure and coax support from the influential burgher classes of the region. Happily, here the crusader found his ideals converging with political expediency, though at the expense of the personal profit of himself and—if enforced—his French followers.

The most substantial reform element of the Statutes, however, was directed at that essential support of the crusade, the Church. Accordingly, Simon endeavoured to implement belatedly the Gregorian programme of ecclesiastical liberty in a region that had largely ignored the fulminations that had converted the monarchies and aristocracies of northern Europe. Like the Provisions of Runnymede that would be issued three years later, the first statute was a general protection of the Church's privileges and independence from temporal domination.¹²⁵ This was followed by specific provisions enumerating the details of the Gregorian project as reaffirmed by Innocent III: the payment of first fruits and tithes, exemption of the clergy, religious, and ecclesiastical serfs from tallage and tolls, and the reservation of prosecution of criminal clerks to ecclesiastical courts. The privileges in the Statutes also reinforced Gregorian prohibitions for the clergy: exemptions from tallage and tolls did not apply to those clerks who were married or merchants.¹²⁶ Other clauses addressed problems specific to the local Church. One was the fortification of ecclesiastical property by temporal lords: Simon forbade such

¹²⁴ *RHGF*, xxiv p. 612.

¹²⁵ *HGL*, viii c. 626; J.C. Holt, *Magna Carta*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, 2015), p. 378.

¹²⁶ *Register Innocenz*, x p. 222-3; *HGL*, viii cc. 626, 627, 628.

constructions in future and ordered the demolition of extant works. However, some churches had been fortified at episcopal order, as when the chapter of Béziers obtained a licence for defensive works from Raymond-Roger in 1203; these were to be dismantled or maintained at the bishop's discretion.¹²⁷ The Statutes attempted to combat spiritual indifference and the popularity of heresy by forbidding Sunday markets—a favourite target of reformers—and compelling attendance at Mass and preaching on holy days on pain of fines. The Church's position was also reinforced by the confiscation of heretical houses and their conversion into churches and rectories in villages lacking such provisions for orthodox clergy. Similarly, the papal census of 3*d.* per household was confirmed as an annual Lenten exaction, 'in signum et perpetuam memoriam, quod per [domini pape et sancte ecclesie Romane] auxilium contra hereticos [terra] fuit adquisita et comiti et ejus successoribus concessa in perpetuum et confirmata'.¹²⁸ In the minds of Simon, the bishops, legates, and crusaders, such reminders of error and reforms to correct them would bring the Midi—lagging behind Rome and Paris in the correct relationship between the temporal and spiritual powers—into the light of proper Christian observance, leading to a renewed and robust Catholic Faith.

Neogregorian ideas also found expression in the Statutes. Prostitutes were to be expelled from all towns, presaging the measure promoted by Robert of Courson at the council of Paris the following year. So that they might not exercise power over Christians as they had under the Trencavels, Jews were excluded from public office and judicial testimony, except when testifying against fellow Jews; this measure reinforced the decision of the Third Lateran Council while

¹²⁷ *HGL*, viii c. 626; *Cartulaire de Béziers*, pp. 513-5.

¹²⁸ *HGL*, viii cc. 626-8; Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, i p. 266.

anticipating that of the Fourth. As previously discussed, lip service was paid to the abolition of the ordeal as a means of proof in seigneurial courts, while the reservation of convictions for heresy to episcopal courts more concretely reinforced this principle.¹²⁹ It was naturally the penalties for heresy which received the most concentrated attention among the neogregorian projects. In addition to confiscating heretical houses, Albigensian networks were disrupted by the measure prescribing perpetual confiscation and personal forfeiture for those harbouring or tolerating heretics in their lands.¹³⁰ Confiscation was already the canonical punishment for those who repented from more serious attachments to heresy; in addition, those who had merely been believers were forbidden from future public office or testimony and—if they were knights—held to arbitrary military service, while former perfects were exiled from the town in which they had lived as heretics.¹³¹ Such penalties not only discouraged heretical sympathies and observances, they also prevented the participation of those tainted by them in public life, thus reinforcing orthodoxy's position amidst the population.

Despite his bitter experience at Castelnaudary the previous year, Simon makes no mention of mercenaries in the Statutes; perhaps the precariousness of his military position persuaded him to keep the option open. However, he had clearly developed a reputation for ruthlessness toward mercenaries found in enemy garrisons: as early as November 1210, the company assisting the defence of Termes feared execution should they fall into the crusaders' hands. The next year, Simon burned Auterive after it had been occupied by a warband sent by

¹²⁹ *HGL*, viii cc. 628, 630, 633, 634; *Conciliorum collectio*, xxii c. 854; *Conciliorum decreta*, pp. 224, 266-7; *Cartulaire de Béziers*, pp. 518, 522; above, pp. 151-2.

¹³⁰ *HGL*, viii cc. 627-8.

¹³¹ Russell, *Just War*, p. 114; *Register Innocenz'*, xi p. 34; *HGL*, viii cc. 628, 630.

Raymond-Roger of Foix, and the mercenaries occupying Puylaurens in May 1212 found it politic to accompany Raymond of Toulouse when he retreated from the town rather than face the army of God.¹³² While Simon never hunted such freelance soldiers as a matter of policy, they were included in the anathemas launched against the region, and therefore presented legitimate targets for his violent zeal.

Heretics captured on Simon's campaigns had even more reason to fear. One hundred and forty were burned after the fall of Minerve, while three to four hundred perished outside Lavaur. Despite the later restriction of heretical condemnations to sacerdotal authority, any trial seems to have been impossible for such numbers in such a short period of time; at the former siege, however, the victims were implored—largely in vain—to repent before embracing their fate.¹³³ As for the persecution of perfects beyond these enormous pyres, only the inquisitorial testimony of Berengar of Lavelanet in 1244 provides any clues. Berengar's mother, Alice-Olivera, was a lady perfect captured by Simon's agents outside Lavelanet and taken to Carcassonne around 1214.¹³⁴ The crusaders must therefore have been on the lookout for suspicious persons, but the isolation of this case suggests dispersion and increased discretion on the part of the heretics and the priority of martial requirements among Simon's troops. However, the progress of Simon's campaigns shows an interest in striking heretical centres in the viscounties. In the immediate vicinity of Carcassonne, heresy seems to have been popular at Auriac and Laure, but its adherents—along with the Waldensians at Aigues-Vives—likely fled after the fall of the

¹³² *Canso*, i p. 140; *Hystoria*, i p. 244, ii p. 10.

¹³³ *Hystoria*, i pp. 159-61, 228; *Canso*, i pp. 116, 164, 172; Puylaurens, p. 70.

¹³⁴ BnF, ms. Doat 24, f° 61r°.

capital.¹³⁵ Fanjeaux had been a prominent Albigensian centre before the crusade; though the population fired the town and fled before the arrival of Simon's Aragonese mercenaries, the crusaders occupied it and supported the nunnery below at Prouille to prevent the resurgence of heresy in the area. Nearby Montréal was likely abandoned and captured at the same time, suppressing the heretical community there.¹³⁶ Shortly thereafter, Simon and Odo of Burgundy pushed into the Montagne Noire in an unsuccessful attempt to take Cabaret, a heretical bastion since at least the turn of the century. While the crusaders could not reach Cabaret nor probably the Albigensians deeper in the mountains at Miraval for almost a further two years, the heretical houses at Aragon and Saissac on the lower slopes likely emptied at this time.¹³⁷ Interestingly, no mention is made in the narrative sources of Lasbordes, where a heretical house was established by 1203; Saint-Martin-Lalande, home to a heretical cemetery in 1205; or Laurac, which—along with Fanjeaux and Montségur—accounts for the greatest concentration of pre-crusade heretical activity in the inquisitorial depositions. They may have been deserted around the same time as the Albigensians were chased from Bram in spring 1210; Lasbordes and Saint-Martin were used as a supply route by the crusaders during the siege of Castelnaudary in autumn 1211, and Laurac was a fief belonging to Hugh of Lacy by May 1213.¹³⁸ In addition to those consumed by the holocaust at Minerve in July, the heretics at Peyriac and Azille were probably captured or forced to flee as Simon moved through the Minervois.¹³⁹ It was probably during the subsequent

¹³⁵ BnF, mss. Doat 24, f^{bs} 37r^o-v^o, 37v^o-38r^o, 123r^o-v^o, 124r^o-v^o; Doat 23, f^o 118r^o; Griffe, *1190 à 1210*, pp. 180-1.

¹³⁶ Griffe, *1190 à 1210*, pp. 114-9, 161-5; Roquebert, *Épopée cathare*, i p. 300; *Canso*, i p. 84; *Hystoria*, i pp. 29, 115, 138; Puylaurens, p. 52; above, pp. 152, 212.

¹³⁷ *Hystoria*, i pp. 16, 119, 127; Griffe, *1190 à 1210*, pp. 167-80, 173-6.

¹³⁸ BnF, ms. Doat 24, f^o 208v^o; BmT, ms. 609, f^{bs} 198r^o, 250r^o, 252r^o, 253v^o; Griffe, *1190 à 1210*, pp. 109-13, 121, 127; *Canso*, i pp. 220-2; *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 45.

¹³⁹ *Canso*, i pp. 116-8; *Hystoria*, i pp. 155, 161; *RHGF*, xxiv pp. 562, 596, 611; Griffe, *1190 à 1210*, pp. 181-3.

reconquest of the Albigeois that Simon scattered the heretical communities at Roquefort, Saint-Paul-Cap-de-Joux, and Lautrec. The enormous number of perfects killed at Lavaur therefore likely reflects not only the town's indigenous heretical population, but the displacement caused by Simon's campaigns. Three hundred perfects had swelled the remote castle of Roquefort alone in 1209-1210 and must have fled further west when Simon secured the viscounty of Albi the following winter.¹⁴⁰ Strategic concerns were naturally indispensable for Simon's campaigns, but a strong emphasis seems to have been placed on the reduction of sites notorious for heretical activity.

In general, the conquest correlated with a disappearance of heresy from public life, suggesting that the zeal that animated Simon in taking the cross continued even as the political and martial considerations of the crusade approached the fore. According to the admittedly fractional and fallible memories of inquisitorial deponents, heresy seems to have been seriously compromised in the viscounties during Simon's reign. The royal inquest into claims for the restitution of property in the seneschalcy of Carcassonne counts two hundred and fifty individual nobles who had forfeited their lands during the wars *comitis Montis Fortis*—meaning both Simon and Amalric—from 1209-1224. Aimeric of Montréal and Raymond of Termes are not among them, and over twenty further names can be gleaned from eleemosynary charters. Not all of these dispossessed outlaws were heretical believers: many probably lost their estates as a result of armed opposition for purely political reasons or flight motivated by self-preservation. However, most likely exhibited some degree of sympathy toward their heretical subjects and kinsmen—if only by protecting them from the crusaders—and fifteen of the outlaws listed in the

¹⁴⁰ BnF, mss. Doat 23, f^{bs} 77r^o, 96v^o; Doat 22, f^o 65r^o-v^o; *HGL*, viii c. 1034; Griffe, *1190 à 1210*, pp. 80-3, 92-4, 102-3.

inquest were later condemned for heresy themselves by inquisitorial or royal agents. Despite Joseph R. Strayer's claim to the contrary, Simon does not seem to have 'left the mass of simple Cathar believers alone.'¹⁴¹

This impression is reinforced when the narrative sources are laid alongside the surviving ecclesiastical inquisitorial depositions. Of course, the inquisitors never uncovered the entire structure of heretical activity in the region during the crusade based on the decades-old memories of those they happened to compel to appear before them. The totality of their records is further compromised by how few now remain. However, there is a noticeable gap in the deponents' memories contained in the extant registers for the years after the *adventus cruce signatorum*. At the risk of arguing from silence, it seems that heresy had been largely suppressed in or evicted from the viscounties. The flow of Albigensian refugees naturally reflected military movements: it is therefore not surprising to see the movement of Simon's armies into the lands of the count of Toulouse resulting in a backwash of heretics into the marches of the viscounties. Arnalda of Lamothe, testifying in 1243, recalls that as a little girl she followed an heretical troupe up the Tarn and Agout from Villemur, probably to escape the crusaders' invasion of Quercy in late summer 1211; interestingly, they settled at Lavaur, where the still-scorched earth outside the walls bore a grisly reminder of their fellow perfects' fate. However, even if Simon's attention was focused beyond his frontiers, his viscounties were not safe for heretics, and Arnalda and her companions fled Lavaur after a year for Rabastens.¹⁴² The notable exception was the impregnable fortress of Montségur, defended by Peter-Roger of Mirepoix, which continued to

¹⁴¹ *RHGF*, xxiv pp. 545-614; Appendix A, vii; *HGL*, viii cc. 572, 637; *Monumenta Dominici*, pp. 20, 28, 31-3, 37, 38, 51, 89; above, pp. 234-5. Pace J.R. Strayer, *The Albigensian Crusades* (New York, 1971), p. 75.

¹⁴² BnF, ms. Doat 23, f^{rs} 5v^o-6r^o; *Hystoria*, i pp. 246-7.

serve as a haven for perfects. Though technically within Simon's jurisdiction as viscount, he never attempted to besiege it.¹⁴³ Again, strategic considerations came to the fore: the cost of a long, expensive siege in territory easily threatened by Foix outweighed the marginal benefit of exterminating the isolated perfects, especially when he was faced by so many armed enemies further north.


The strain between strategy and zeal ironically seems to have broken after Simon's investiture with the county of Toulouse. It is only around 1216-1217 that inquisitorial deponents' memories of heresy resume, reinforcing the suggestion that Simon had until then overseen, if not a real resurgence of Catholicism, at least a significant suppression of Albigensianism. But as his legendary mobility was compromised by long sieges on the Rhône and in the Toulousain, perfects began to creep back into the valleys. First the Lauragais, then the Corbières, Montagne Noire, and even Montréal and Fanjeaux recovered their heretical clergy, albeit largely in secret. In 1218, one heretical community even thought it safe to send a letter to Rieux in the Minervois. After Simon's death, Albigensian communities rushed to restore their position before the crusade, ministering in public throughout the viscounties.¹⁴⁴ The fear instilled by Simon's reign had proved largely personal, and did not survive his death, particularly in the context of the failing effort against Toulouse. The crusader's neglect of the viscounties given to him in 1209 resulted first in a spiritual failure rather than a political one, and his fatal obsession with

¹⁴³ Griffe, *1190 à 1210*, pp. 120-1, 130, 152; idem, *Le Languedoc cathare au temps de la croisade (1209-1229)* (Paris, 1973), p. 204; *Canso*, ii pp. 48, 52.

¹⁴⁴ BnF, mss. Doat 22, f^{bs} 76v^o-77r^o, 177r^o-v^o, 179r^o-v^o, 180r^o-v^o, 181r^o-182r^o; Doat 23, f^o 109r^o-v^o, 122r^o-123r^o, 168r^o, 177r^o-v^o, 236v^o; Doat 24, f^{bs} 84v^o-85v^o, 119r^o-v^o, 136r^o-v^o, 138r^o-v^o, 139v^o-140r^o; Griffe, *Temps de la croisade*, pp. 190-1, 205-6; below, pp. 308-9.

Toulouse cost him not only his life but also the achievement of the great reform he had attempted in December 1212.

Simon's new office granted him the opportunity to implement the programme of Christian renewal which—mediated by the Cistercians and the schoolmen—had inspired him to take the cross the previous year. However, he also had to reckon with a more recalcitrant population than he had ever before encountered. He adapted the governing methods learned in France and England, but the cultural gulf presented by his new subjects dulled their effect. Paradoxically, Simon found his power most extensive when he wished to construct his most intensive regime. As a result, he was almost entirely dependent upon the prelates and his fellow crusaders. As he balanced interminable military concerns, the reform movement, and practical conciliatory government, the first found the strongest expression. Still, Simon managed to achieve a sort of peace in the viscounties. It was probably far from what he hoped, but his hold over the old Trencavel lands included a largely stable regime, an effective persecution of heresy, hints at wider reform policies, and a quiescent if resentful population. The coming crisis would test Simon's ability to extend these moderate gains to even wider territorial conquests.



Map 8: The County of Toulouse and Duchy of Narbonne

VI. DUKE OF NARBONNE AND COUNT OF TOULOUSE

Simon's occupation of most of the lands belonging to Raymond VI of Saint-Gilles brought the crusader to the height of his power and effectively transformed him into a regional prince. He now possessed the opportunity to implement reform and crush heresy throughout the entire *Provincia* encompassed in the rhetoric of the Cistercian preachers and Innocent III. However, the new responsibilities and challenges of his position threatened to expose an overreach on his part. The conquest of the Trencavel viscounties had presented a rude welcome to his regime and its zealous priorities, and the invasion of the Egidian patrimony would challenge Simon's responsiveness to the political realities of government in the Midi.

Conquest

Unlike Simon's election in 1209, the *de iure* award of Toulouse in 1215-1216 simply confirmed what the crusader already held *de facto*. Several weeks after the fall of Lavaur on 3 May 1211, Simon—with the encouragement of the papal legates but without a clear mandate from the pope himself—invaded the county of Toulouse. Montgey was razed to the ground in retaliation for the inhabitants' complicity in the ambush of crusaders marching to the siege of Lavaur a month earlier. Attacks on Les Cassés and Montferrand advanced his frontier in the lowlands of the Lauragais, while his crossing of the Tarn the following month brought the submission of Rabastens and the northern part of the diocese of Albi, which had been usurped

from the Trencavels by the Saint-Gilles.¹ The crusader's first moves against Toulouse had done little more than secure an aggressive march and recover the integrity of the viscounty of Albi.

It immediately became clear, however, that Simon was not simply establishing an advantageous defensive position. Within days, the reinforced crusader army had manoeuvred across the Hers and shut up Raymond and his hastily summoned allies within Toulouse itself. Simon may have hoped to capture the capital quickly, as the initial host had done with Béziers and Carcassonne, thereby decapitating the county and allowing the conquest to proceed on his terms. The siege was far from successful, dissolving after two weeks. However, it was a demonstration of strength that impressed the surrounding appanages of the county. Bishop William IV of Cahors and the lords of Quercy considered Raymond to have already been deposed, and Simon accordingly reinvested the bishop with the county of Cahors, which the see held from the count of Toulouse. After raising the siege and launching a brief vengeful campaign against Foix, Simon rode to Quercy himself, where he was received at Cahors as overlord of the region.² Though a close siege of Toulouse had failed, Simon now began a wider encirclement of the city: his frontier with the county now stretched in an arc from Saverdun northeast to Montferrand, north to Lavaur, and northwest through Rabastens to Cahors.

The southern allies' autumn counteroffensive against Castelnaudary ended in an overwhelming tactical victory for Simon, but its strategic result was deeply damaging. Rumours of the crusader's death emboldened the towns in the Lauragais and north of the Tarn to defect back to Raymond; even Saverdun threw over its French garrison during the siege.³ As in spring

¹ *Canso*, i pp. 174-82; *Hystoria*, i pp. 122-3, 231-4, 236-7; Puylaurens, p. 72.

² *Canso*, i pp. 186-202; *Hystoria*, i pp. 238-45, 246-7, 249-50; Puylaurens, p. 72; *HGL*, viii cc. 611-2.

³ *Canso*, i pp. 238-40, 244; *Hystoria*, i pp. 274, 276-8; Puylaurens, p. 74.

1210, Simon found himself retaking castles he had thought secured. After spending winter and spring 1211-1212 laying waste to the county of Foix and reasserting his control over the Razès and Albigeois, Simon was ready by late May to continue his encirclement of Toulouse at the instigation of Bishops Raymond III of Uzès, Fulk of Toulouse, Guy of Carcassone, and Arnold of Agen. From Quercy, he moved into the Agenais, besieging Penne-d'Agenais in June and receiving the submission of Agen itself. After a siege of nearly two months, the northern Agenais was in Simon's hands and the crusader began to close the ring. Moissac fell after another month, and Simon quickly moved up the Garonne as far as Verdun.⁴ Montauban and Toulouse were now the poles of a rump county, though communication between them was disrupted by crusader domination of the river. Finally, in the autumn Simon reestablished pressure from the south by sending Enguerrand of Boves to retake Saverdun while he captured Muret before invading the county of Comminges and viscounty of Couserans to cut off support for Toulouse from the west.⁵ The heart of the county of Toulouse was surrounded, and Simon could prepare for the eventual victory of the *negotium pacis et fidei* with the Statutes of Pamiers.

The Arago-Catalan invasion the following year naturally disrupted this leaguer. The ring had tightened briefly in spring 1213 with the occupation of Pujol, but summer saw the loss of the castle amidst the Tolosan resurgence inspired by Peter's invasion.⁶ After Muret, Simon was able to regain his losses more quickly than in the wake of Castelnaudary, perhaps because of growing war-weariness among the population. However, the crusader made no immediate move against

⁴ *Canso*, i pp. 242-76; *Hystoria*, i pp. 284-5, 287-91, ii pp. 11-35, 39-50.

⁵ *Canso*, i pp. 278-80; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 50-6.

⁶ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 118-9, 125-7; *Canso*, ii pp. 6-10; Puylaurens, pp. 76-8.

Toulouse, preferring to leave its reduction to diplomatic and economic pressure.⁷ Instead, he invaded Raymond's march of Provence to punish transrhodan support for the comital capital. The campaign brought to light how apprehensive other outlying regions had become of Simon's growing power: along with Montpellier and Nîmes, previously neutral Narbonne refused him entry. Over winter 1213-1214, Simon cowed Largentière but quickly approached the negotiating table rather than conduct a military campaign in Provence; unlike in Raymond's other lands, he made no attempt to establish direct administrative control over the march, but induced the local lords to good behaviour by drawing in his old friend Odo of Burgundy.⁸ His ambitions may have been grand, but he as yet saw little profit to be gained from tying himself down so far from home.

By spring 1214, Simon had returned, while Narbonne declared itself for Aragon and welcomed Spanish troops eager to avenge their fallen king on the crusaders. An assault on the city was only interrupted by the arrival of a new legate and a rising in the Agenais.⁹ The reconciliation of Simon's enemies by Peter of Benevento led him to turn his gaze north to the remaining comital satellites through 1214. He reconquered the Agenais and invaded Périgord, extending his operations and authority even into Plantagenet Aquitaine; his rights to these conquests would be confirmed by Robert of Courson in July.¹⁰ Thus emboldened, Simon turned east and entered the Rouergue in the autumn, exercising justice in Figeac and receiving the

⁷ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 176-8; *Canso*, ii p. 34; Puylaurens, pp. 84-6.

⁸ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 179-85.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 185, 194-9.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 197-201, 205, 207-29; *HGL*, viii cc. 653-5.

submission of Capdenac before wrangling homage out of Count Henry of Rodez himself.¹¹ After bringing the entirety of the northern appanages under his authority, Simon once again moved east, receiving Beaucaire on 30 January 1215 and Fanjau and comital rights to Largentière on 4 July.¹² Few of Raymond's possessions west of the Rhône now remained untouched by the crusade.

1215 saw the confirmation of this conquest by both pope and king. In the spring, provisional trust was placed in Simon's hands by Innocent with *Nobilitatem tuam* and by Louis of France in his support for Simon's entry into Toulouse and protectorate over Narbonne.¹³ It was not long before Simon was secure in his family's hereditary rights over what he had conquered: in December the Fourth Lateran Council confirmed him as count of Toulouse, and King Philip of France did the same in April 1216.¹⁴ Though Foix and Comminges lay beyond his reach, Simon had achieved the political ends of the crusade and could now settle down to the government and reform of his new lands.

However, no sooner had Simon reached the summit of Fortune's wheel than he was violently dragged beneath its weight. In June 1216, as Simon returned from France, Beaucaire rebelled against him under the leadership of Raymond the younger of Toulouse and with the support of the great towns of the Rhodan valley. He hurried back to the Midi to oversee an unsuccessful two-month siege.¹⁵ Upon retiring to Toulouse, he found his authority intact

¹¹ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 230-6; Appendix A, xxi; *HGL*, viii cc. 655-8.

¹² Appendix A, xxii; *HGL*, viii cc. 665-7.

¹³ *Layettes*, i pp. 413-6; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 252-7; *Canso*, ii pp. 34-6; *HGL*, viii cc. 659-60.

¹⁴ S. Kuttner and A. García y García, 'A New Eyewitness Account of the Fourth Lateran Council', *Traditio* 20 (1964), p. 125; Richard of San Germano, *Chronica*, ed. C.A. Garufi (Bologna, 1937), p. 73; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 262-5; *Canso*, ii p. 78; Puylaurens, p. 92; *HGL*, viii cc. 681-2, 684-5.

¹⁵ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 266-77; *Canso*, ii pp. 90-198; Puylaurens, pp. 94-6.

elsewhere west of the Rhône, but his power crumbling. Saint-Gilles defected to its former lord in September, and while his summer 1217 campaign to restore the crusader regime in the area cowed the town into submission, it also allowed Raymond VI to slip into Toulouse, instigating the riot that deprived Simon once more of control of the capital. Throughout his nine-month siege before its walls, Simon kept his conquests largely obedient through the fear his reputation inspired. But the effort cost him his life, and after his death on 25 June 1218 the embattled principality he passed on to his son Amalric quickly collapsed.¹⁶ At its height, the crusader's conquests stretched from the Garonne and the Pyrenees to the Rhône. But despite his attempts to usher in a perpetual Catholic reign under Montfort authority, Simon bore the titles of duke of Narbonne and count of Toulouse for barely two years.

Image

Those two years were less than a third of the time that Simon spent in effective control of the majority of the county of Toulouse. Despite his quarrel with Arnold-Amalric over the duchy of Narbonne—which had begun in earnest by spring 1215—and the award of the Fourth Lateran Council, the crusader did not make diplomatic claims to be either duke or count of his conquests until the eve of his departure to seek royal confirmation in France.¹⁷ The following month, his claims to both offices were recognised by Philip Augustus at Pont-de-l'Arche. For the rest of his life, Simon's diplomatic style almost invariably began with *dux Narbone, comes Tholose*, trailing

¹⁶ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 277-8, 283-316; *Canso*, ii pp. 258-309, iii pp. 8-226; Puylaurens, pp. 98-104.

¹⁷ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 253-4; *HGL*, viii cc. 659-60, 681-2; G. de la Faille, *Annales de la ville de Toulouse depuis la réunion de la comté de Toulouse à la Couronne*, i (Toulouse, 1687), preuves, p. 124; Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, pp. 453-4; *Gallia christiana*, vi instr., c. 58.

his other titles behind them.¹⁸ Eager as he may have been to replace Raymond of Saint-Gilles—and he clearly had little compunction about pressing his martial and political advantage in order to bring it about—the crusader never adopted a title he had not been awarded. In this context, it is further significant that—despite forays across the Rhône in 1213 and 1217—he never claimed the march of Provence: not only was it militarily imprudent, it had not been given him by the Lateran Council. The mandate from Cardinal Bertrand may have led Simon into an earnest attempt to add the march to his coronet, but the Tolosan rising interrupted the campaign in its infancy: Simon was never seriously entertained as a potential margrave.¹⁹ His scrupulosity—if such it was—about the use of titles may also help explain the crusader’s enmity for Arnold-Amalric’s usurpation of the duchy of Narbonne in 1212, over three years before Raymond’s formal deposition.²⁰ However, Simon’s restraint also made good political sense. He needed to tread carefully, operating as he was on the edge of the mandate against heresy accepted explicitly by Innocent and implicitly by Philip. That is not of course to say that Simon did not behave as though he were already count of Toulouse. Peter of Berriac, abbatial notary of Lagrasse, recorded Simon as *comes Tolosanus duxque Narbonensis* as early as July 1214—earlier even

¹⁸ *HGL*, viii cc. 684-5, 694, 702, 704; *RHGF*, xix p. 677; Dor, ‘Seigneurs de Montfort’, pp. 179, 181, 184; Rhein, ‘Seigneurie de Montfort’, p. 320; *Chartres*, ii p. 86; Appendix A, xxx-xxxiii, xxxv-xxxvi, xxxviii; Galland, *Franc-aleu*, pp. 151, 153; *Gallia christiana*, i instr., p. 185; *La Grasse*, ii p. 126; Ménard, *Histoire de Nîmes*, i preuves, p. 54; *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 85. Three surviving acts contain a style that fails to lead with *dux Narbone*. The first two are acts in favour of French churches, and so privilege Simon’s status as *dominus Montis-fortis*, while the third relegates the title to the end; but the latter epistle did not come from Simon’s chancery, and the title’s placement perhaps reflects its contested and largely honorary nature: *Spicilegium*, iii p. 569; Dor, ‘Seigneurs de Montfort’, p. 554; *HGL*, viii c. 677. A *vidimus* of a 1207 donation to Prouille purportedly by Simon on 28 March 1213 and using the titles *dux Narbonensis*, *comes Tholen*. has been proved a forgery: V.J. Koudelka, ‘Notes sur le Cartulaire de S. Dominique’, *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 28 (1958), pp. 100-11.

¹⁹ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 179, 289-93, 296; *Canso*, ii pp. 258-62, 300-6; above, p. 63. The transcription of the 19 July 1216 agreement between Simon and the consulate of Nîmes by Molinier adds *marchio Provinciae* to Simon’s style, but the edition by Ménard—a more complete record of this lost document—does not contain this anomaly: Ménard, *Histoire de Nîmes*, i preuves, p. 54; *HGL*, viii c. 688.

²⁰ Below, pp. 284-5.

than *Nobilitatem tuam*—in the preliminaries of the arbitration between the crusader and the abbey. Doubtless Simon cultivated the impression that his ascendance was a foregone conclusion both on and off the battlefield. But the decisions of the suit—also drafted by Peter but published a year later—are notably free of references to either Toulouse or Narbonne.²¹ Perhaps Simon had intervened to correct the scribe's mistake. Around the same time, grants from Fulk of Toulouse to Dominic's community were scrupulously dated 'comite Montis Fortis principatum Tolose tenente' in order to avoid presumption.²² Should he be seen to disregard either papal or royal claims to the supervision of affairs in the Midi by unilaterally and patently adopting the Saint-Gilles' titles, Simon could quickly find himself transformed from the champion of Christendom into a public enemy repudiated by the Roman Church and French Crown.

But if Simon knew he was sailing close to the wind, he continued to find support through appeal to the divine. At his first assumption of the ducal and comital titles—in his vow of good government at Toulouse—the notary used the 'royal' *Dei gratia* formula.²³ Thrilled with the consummation of his crusade, Simon probably wished to project a princely aura over his new subjects, the recalcitrant and resentful citizens of Toulouse. The uncertainty of his position in the south, exposed by the loss of Beaucaire, may have made the pretence ring hollow and forced Simon to climb down. Contact with the Capetians may also have suggested the imprudence of pushing his diplomatic prestige too far. But the overwhelming majority of the crusader's

²¹ *La Grasse*, ii pp. 110, 114, 116-7, 121.

²² *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 58.

²³ de la Faille, *Annales de Toulouse*, i preuves, p. 124; above, p. 208. *Dei gratia* also appeared in his subscription to the marriage contract between his son Guy and Petronilla of Bigorre: Galland, *Franc-aleu*, p. 153.

diplomatic formulæ—and occasionally references made by others—continued to attribute his rule to *Dei prouidentia*.²⁴ It was Providence, not the king, who had made him duke of Narbonne and count of Toulouse.

Although his government's justification by divine intervention was a theme common to his administration of the viscounties, in other respects Simon's management of the comital transition was markedly different. Whilst he had shown little concern for synchronising the public image of his rule as viscount with that of the Trencavels, the crusader now adopted the imagery of the Saint-Gilles. Simon's comital seal from 1216 bears little relation to his previous two patterns. Gone are the horse, the hounds, the forest, and the hunting tunic. Instead, the image is closely patterned on that used by Raymond VI: a bare-headed man wearing a tabard, seated on a throne with a naked sword across his lap. It is not a perfect imitation: the counterseal retains the traditional Montfort lion rampant, and where Raymond placed his claim to the march of Provence in his legend, Simon has substituted the viscounties of Carcassonne and probably Béziers. Most importantly, however, Simon's figure bears the sign of the cross on the right shoulder of his tabard, signifying the source of his office and his continuing crusader status.²⁵ The melding of traditional comital imagery with his own emphasis on violent crusading zeal indicates Simon's conception of his new authority: he and his heirs—though keen to

²⁴ Appendix A, xxx, xxxii, xxxvi, xxxviii; *HGL*, viii cc. 694, 704; Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 179, 181, 184, 554; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 320; *Chartres*, ii p. 86; *La Grasse*, ii p. 126; Ménard, *Histoire de Nîmes*, i preuves, p. 54; *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 85; *RHGF*, xix p. 677. Only a confirmation in favour of Chartres in April 1216 lacks an invocation: *Spicilegium*, iii p. 569.

²⁵ AN, J 890, n° 19; BnF, ms. lat. 5480, f° 489r°; L. Douët d'Arcq, *Collection des sceaux*, i (Paris, 1863), pp. 381-2. In the drawing from ms. lat. 5480, the legendary fragment has been transcribed ...RENIG..., but in comparison with the cast of J 890, n° 19 (made before the exemplar suffered further damage) kept in the archival Service des sceaux (Douët d'Arcq, *Collection*, n° 747), this might be corrected to [BITER]R CARC[ASS].

acknowledge their ecclesiastical mandate through the crusade—were the legitimate and permanent successors of the Saint-Gilles.

Numismatic evidence may reinforce this continuity. An obol tolosan bearing the obverse legend : SIMON COMES exhibits on the reverse an A above a triangular cross patty. This appears to be a fragment of the PAX image familiar to southern currency, coined to signify a commitment to the Peace of God movement. Given its garbled reproduction, however, it is unlikely that Simon or his minters intended this connexion, as ideologically useful as it might have been. Perhaps the image was simply a poor and unintelligent attempt to maintain iconographic continuity with raymondine coinage.²⁶ But it may also be that Simon adapted the PAX which he failed to comprehend in favour of symbols more meaningful to him: the A may have taken on a sense of apocalyptic renewal, while the X metamorphosed into a cross, sign not only of the universal instrument of that renewal but also of the particular crusade that had brought it to pass in the Midi.²⁷ While this interpretation must remain speculative in the absence of other exemplars, such a programme would not be out of keeping with other elements of Simon's iconography.

²⁶ A. Dieudonné, 'Maille de Simon de Montfort avec des considérations sur le monnayage toulousain', *Revue numismatique* 39 (1936), pp. 317-9; T.N. Bisson, 'The Organized Peace in Southern France and Catalonia, ca. 1140-ca. 1233', *American Historical Review* 82 (1977), p. 305; Poëy d'Avant, *Monnaies de France*, ii pp. 247-9, pls. lxxx-lxxxi.

²⁷ Apocalypse xxii. 13; Dieudonné, 'Maille de Simon', p. 319.

Ecclesiastical patronage

The crusader's identification of his mission with the Church manifested itself more clearly elsewhere in his conquest of the county of Toulouse. Once again, the Cistercians were closely linked to Simon's ascendancy. Despite the expenses of the second siege of Toulouse, Simon in November 1217 earmarked 100*l.tn.* collected at Marmande for provisioning the order's annual chapter general.²⁸ But crusader support may have sometimes been to the white monks' detriment, even before 1218. In 1212, the monks of Grandselve complained of the damage done to their property by the counts of Toulouse, Foix, and Comminges and the viscounts of Turenne and Béarn.²⁹ For the most part, however, the Cistercians profited from the conquest. Despite its close connexion with the house of Foix, the abbey of Boulbonne received the bodies of several fallen crusaders in 1211 and welcomed Simon himself on his way to Muret in September 1213. It was here that Simon dedicated his sword upon the altar and entrusted the keeping of his testament. Geography surely played some role in the choice of Boulbonne for that moment, but the abbey's relationship with Simon was not entirely incidental: in May 1217, the crusader granted to it the nearby village of Ampouillac.³⁰ In Périgord, at the northern extreme of the conquest, Simon favoured the abbey of Cadouin, shrine of a Holy Shroud first referred to in Simon's grant of tithes to the abbey in 1214. The same year, Simon made a condition of enfeoffing Viscount Raymond IV of Turenne with property confiscated from Bernard of Cazenac

²⁸ Appendix A, xxxvi.

²⁹ AdH-G, 108H 56, f^{os} 3v^o-4r^o.

³⁰ *Canso*, ii pp. 50-2; *Hystoria*, i p. 280, ii pp. 143, 144-5; Puylaurens, p. 80; Appendix A, xxxii.

that the viscount restore the abbey's rents detained by Bernard.³¹ In March 1216, as Simon prepared to receive royal recognition as count of Toulouse, his seneschal for the Rouergue—in conjunction with the bishop and count of Rodez—exempted the Cistercians and the military orders from all financial levies typically imposed for the maintenance of the Peace of God in the diocese, likely in recognition that these three orders already contributed to the establishment of Christian order through their own charisms.³² As in the crusader viscounties, the spoils of the conquest of the county of Toulouse were shared with the religious advocates of the crusade.

Simon still does not seem to have spread his patronage liberally beyond Cistercian cloisters. He exempted the distant and isolated charterhouse of Val-Sainte-Marie beyond the Rhône from tolls throughout his lands in 1212, but other houses in Raymond's lands seem to have gone without alms from the crusader.³³ However, in September 1216, Simon made a powerful but oft-overlooked donation to the Angevin abbey of Fontevrault. On the surface, the content of the act is unremarkable: Simon promises an annuity of 1,000*s.* angevin to the nuns from the tolls on salt collected at Agen. More significant is its context: the continuation of alms granted by Joan of England, Plantagenet sister and Saint-Gilles wife and mother. Simon thus presents himself not only as the successor of Raymond VI, but also of John of England in the south. The homage given by Raymond to John in 1200 had stipulated, according to Angevin practice, that any children of Raymond by Joan would possess her dowry once they reached their majority.³⁴ By patronising a former centre of Angevin power with resources drawn from the

³¹ Appendix A, xiv, xviii.

³² *Ibid.*, xxix.

³³ BI, ms. 1812, f^o 100r^o.

³⁴ Dor, 'Seigneurs de Montfort', pp. 15-6, 184; Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, iv pp. 124-5; *HGL*, vi p. 190.

younger Raymond's inheritance, Simon demonstrated his legitimacy as the heir to the county of Toulouse and its appurtenances, independent of Plantagenet power.

Though evidence of patronage is scarce, the Benedictine abbeys played a more important political role at the margins of the county of Toulouse than they did in the viscounties. The very abbey from which the counts of Toulouse had taken their name is a particularly salient example: Abbot Pons of Saint-Gilles was a firm supporter of the crusade. He complained on the crusader's behalf at the council of Lavaur, witnessed his enfeoffment with Beaucaire in 1215, and supplied the army during the siege of the same town the following year. When he could no longer hold his abbatial town against the arrival of Raymond the younger that autumn, he abandoned it, taking with him his community and the Blessed Sacrament.³⁵ Elsewhere, abbots could serve as more effective mediators between the crusaders and the local population: Elias I of Sarlat, for instance, offered obedience to Simon on behalf of the inhabitants of La Roque-Gageac in September 1214. Abbot William of Figeac likewise helped negotiate an understanding between Simon and the lords of Capdenac in October, after transferring to the crusader the comital rights over the town held from the abbey. William also enfeoffed Simon with Peyrusse, suggesting that Simon had largely found acceptance as ecclesiastical champion and Raymond's replacement in Périgord and Quercy.³⁶ Though he does not seem to have lavished eleemosynary grants on these houses, Simon forged personal ties with crucial abbots in order to present himself as a preferable political option in contrast with the struggling and unsympathetic count of Toulouse.

³⁵ *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi c. 835; Appendix A, xxii; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 274, 278.

³⁶ Appendix A, xvi, xix-xxi.

The Agenais presents a more complicated picture. After taking Moissac in September 1212, Simon replaced Raymond of Saint-Gilles as co-lord of the town, and restored Abbot Raymond to his traditional sovereignty. He restored the abbey's tithes and exempted the monks from all tolls or harbergage. Based solely on the documents outlining the rights of the abbot and crusader in the town, one might assume that Simon had earned another devoted supporter. But when Raymond of Saint-Gilles returned in April 1214, Raymond of Moissac does not seem to have done anything to stop him.³⁷ In itself this is not surprising: Pons of Saint-Gilles was equally powerless in the face of comital knights and a hostile population. But Raymond may also have grown indifferent to the contest. Though the abbot seems to have participated at the Pamiers parliament, he also wrote to Philip Augustus around the same time, complaining not only of the tyranny of Raymond of Saint-Gilles but also of the destruction wrought by the crusaders, pleading for confirmation of the abbey's ancient royal privileges. The initial destruction referred to may not have been intentional sacking but the incidental damage incurred during a month-long siege prosecuted by missile engines. But whatever ruin was wrought by Simon's troops was compounded by incremental abuses and usurpations perpetrated by his bailiffs. The arrival of Robert of Courson in summer 1214 reinforced Simon's increasingly dominant position, leading Raymond of Moissac to appeal to Abbot William II of Cluny for support. In December, arbitration by Fulk of Toulouse, Thedisius of Genoa, and Abbot Peter of Clairac finally found in favour of Raymond and ordered Simon to indemnify the abbot and return

³⁷ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 49-50, 198; *HGL*, viii cc. 621-5; *Layettes*, v pp. 67-9.

the confiscated revenues.³⁸ Such bullying of a religious house was out of character for Simon, but the crusader knew the inhabitants of the town to be opponents of the crusade and likely took unilateral punitive measures against them, especially after their defection to Raymond of Saint-Gilles. The abbot's protests may have been ignored as obstructive to the crusade effort, calling into question his enthusiasm for the holy work regardless of the justice of his claims.

If the friction with Moissac placed a stain on Simon's reputation with some religious, he continued to enjoy near perfect relations with the episcopate. This presents another contrast with the viscounties, where the Trencavels had enjoyed generally amicable relationships with their bishops before the crusade: resentment towards the Saint-Gilles by the prelates in their lands was exceptionally strong. Raymond had failed to defend the see of Toulouse from its creditors, and the increasing tension between count and bishop culminated in Fulk's departure from the city with his clergy and the Blessed Sacrament shortly before Simon's invasion of the county in summer 1211.³⁹ The complaints laid against Raymond in 1209 included the usurpation of episcopal rights at Cahors, Agen, and Rodez, and the fortification of the latter cathedral. In Provence, he had likewise clashed with the bishops of Vaison and Carpentras.⁴⁰ From the start, therefore, the crusaders frequently encountered episcopates welcome to the change he offered.

For his part, Simon recognised the value to be gained from episcopal support and worked to cultivate it. Dissatisfied prelates were often happy to lend the crusader legitimacy. Arnold of Agen invited Simon into his diocese in May 1212, sanctioning the move into what had been the

³⁸ Gardère, *Seigneurie de Condom*, p. 276; *HGL*, viii cc. 635-6; A. Lagrèze-Fossat, *Études historiques sur Moissac*, i (Paris, 1870), pp. 376-8; *Recueil des chartes de l'abbaye de Cluny*, ed A. Bruel, vi (Paris, 1903), pp. 42-4. Bruel dates the letter to Cluny to early 1215, but it makes more sense in the context of the 1214 preparations for arbitration, especially given the covering letter sent by Peter of Clairac: *ibid.*, pp. 44-5.

³⁹ *Hystoria*, i pp. 220-2; Puylaurens, pp. 44, 68-70.

⁴⁰ *Cartulaire de Maguelone*, eds. J.-B. Rouquette and A. Villemagne, ii (Montpellier, 1913), pp. 58-9, 62.

dowry of Raymond's late wife. The Agenais was a region where heresy was especially strong, and so Arnold's motives need not have been primarily political. But other bishops whose dioceses were on the peripheries of the heretical centres behaved similarly. William of Cahors led the nobility who welcomed Simon into Quercy as early as summer 1211. Bishop Peter III of Rodez seems to have invited Simon into Rouergue in July 1214, submitting the temporalities of his see to the crusader's jurisdiction in September and confirming the confiscations in his diocese the following March.⁴¹ Bolstered by the backing of these bishops who often held as much effective power in their dioceses as the Saint-Gilles, Simon's conquest could present itself as a liberation rather than a naked usurpation.

The most concrete gesture of episcopal favour was the enfeoffment of Simon with ecclesiastical temporalities. These fiefs were Church lands whose defence and administration had once been granted to the counts of Toulouse. Now that Raymond had become a public enemy, many bishops rushed to hand these now vulnerable lands over to the best candidate for stable and orthodox government. In most cases this likely derived from a concern for their ability to defend their possessions amidst an armed conflict. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay claims that Simon was granted the lordship of Agen in June 1212 by its citizens, but by April 1217 it was necessary to clarify amicably the crusader's position in relation to the bishop. Accordingly, an episcopal arbitration decreed that Simon and Arnold of Agen held the city jointly, though Arnold was to possess this temporal power as a fief from Simon.⁴² Though identifying with the bishop by virtue of their common clerical state, the members of the committee believed it necessary to

⁴¹ *Hystoria*, i p. 245, ii pp. 17, 207; Lyon, 'Daudé de Prades', pp. 391-2; Appendix A, xv, xxiii; above, p. 71.

⁴² *Hystoria*, ii p. 21; *Gallia christiana*, ii instr., pp. 431-2.

affirm Simon's technical supremacy in the city in order to preserve it from reconquest by the Saint-Gilles. Similarly, Bishops William of Mende and Peter of Rodez provisionally gave Simon the nearby towns of La Roque Valzergues and Saint-Geniez during the siege of Séverac in November 1214.⁴³ These enfeoffments were most notable on the fringes of the county of Toulouse, where heresy was less of a threat but anarchy no less improbable as Raymond's regime collapsed: by offering an incentive for Simon to extend his authority into their dioceses, the bishops may have hoped to stave off the disintegration of local authority. Thus, in January 1215, Archbishop Michael of Arles entrusted Beaucaire and the Argence—long held from him by the Saint-Gilles—to the crusader, while in July, Bishop Burnon of Viviers provisionally placed the comital castle of Fanjau at Largentière in Simon's hands.⁴⁴ At the extreme eastern march of Simon's holdings, neither of these latter fiefs would remain long in his possession, but along with the towns on the Lot, they demonstrate the mutual advantage the crusade initially brought to Simon and the bishops.

But the transfer of temporalities was a channel which ran in both directions. There is no evidence of a widespread campaign for restoring tithes to the dioceses, as had happened at Béziers. The cathedral chapter of Saint-Trophime d'Arles received a generous donation in July 1215 for the remembrance of Montfort anniversaries—simultaneously advertising Simon's authority beyond his frontiers—but assignments of tithes or rents within the county itself do not seem to have been as common as in France or the viscounties.⁴⁵ More frequently, documentary sources record Simon restoring or augmenting the rights anciently bestowed on the episcopate by

⁴³ *HGL*, viii cc. 657-8.

⁴⁴ Appendix A, xxii; *HGL*, viii cc. 665-7.

⁴⁵ *HGL*, viii cc. 667-8.

the counts of Toulouse. William of Cahors' reinvestment with the county he and his successors had held from the Saint-Gilles is only the first example. Four years later, Simon would further reward him with the demesne fiefs of Pestillac and Cazals.⁴⁶ In July 1214, Peter of Rodez received the villages of Villeneuve and La Bastide-l'Évêque from the crusader in return for one month's annual service from three knights, as well as a share in Séverac after its fall that autumn.⁴⁷ Simon also gave Verfeil to Fulk of Toulouse in June 1218, retaining only the service of one knight-fee, perhaps in the hope that the bishop might rejuvenate the conquered but desolate town.⁴⁸ Raymond IV of Uzès, in recognition of the many offences committed against his diocese by Raymond of Saint-Gilles and his steadfast support for the crusade, obtained in March 1215 many former comital rights throughout his diocese. Most importantly, Simon promises that 'quandocumque terra predicta a domino papa mihi fuerit perpetuo assignata,' he will negotiate a new arrangement with the bishop, allowing him to dispose of the rights in his diocese 'sicut melius et utilius tibi et ecclesie Uticensi et capitulo visum fuerit expedire'.⁴⁹ In this clause lies the chief genius—beyond the desire to realise the Gregorian settlement—of Simon's policy toward the southern episcopate: such grants made it clear to the bishops that so long as the crusader was ascendant, they would rise along with him. Simon's generosity therefore did more than simply assert his succession to the authority of the Saint-Gilles. It

⁴⁶ Ibid., cc. 611-2; Appendix A, xxiv.

⁴⁷ Lyon, 'Daudé de Prades', p. 391; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 234-5.

⁴⁸ *HGL*, viii cc. 653; Puylaurens, pp. 26-8, 102. The manuscript copy reprinted in *HGL* is likely defective, as the date disagrees with William (who was almost certainly looking at the charter firsthand) and the bishop's initial is rendered *R.* rather than *F.*: AN, JJ 19, f^o 182v^o.

⁴⁹ *HGL*, viii cc. 660-2

provided an incentive for the bishops to pressure the pope—from whom a decision on the permanent fate of the county would eventually be required—on the crusader's behalf.

This is not to say that relations between Simon and the southern bishops were always perfectly amicable. After entrusting Fanjau to the crusader, Burnon of Viviers decided that personal possession of the castle would be preferable to Simon's commission; no sentence delivered on the subject by the Lateran Council—as foreseen by Burnon's 1215 grant—survives, and the issue may have been lost amidst the contention over the fate of the Saint-Gilles. But by 1218, Burnon had petitioned the pope for its restitution.⁵⁰ Whether Simon complied is unknown, but Burnon may have feared that the crusader—having lost Beaucaire and now embroiled before Toulouse—might no longer be able to defend the castle from the Raymonds as well as an episcopal garrison might do.

Although Burnon may have rejected the crusader's protection because of a decline in his power, Simon's greatest episcopal challenge was a result of his elevation. While both outsiders to the power structures of the Midi, Simon and Arnold-Amalric had formed an intimate pair, the model union of the temporal and spiritual swords. However, as each became more embedded in the government of the region, they entered a collision course that resulted in the contest over the duchy of Narbonne. Arnold-Amalric's claim in 1212 of the prerogatives and title of *dux Narbone* usurped a privilege held by the counts of Toulouse since the late eleventh century; one the new archbishop hoped to use to secure his control over the city.⁵¹ At this point, Simon took no notice; in 1212, the dukedom had little to do with him. But as Simon's success grew, Arnold-

⁵⁰ *HGL*, viii cc. 665-6; 'Honorii epistolæ', ii c. 576.

⁵¹ Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, pp. 452-3, 466-7; *Gallia christiana*, vi instr. cc. 57-8; *Hystoria*, i p. 293; *HGL*, v c. 743; L. Sigal, 'Contribution à l'histoire de la cathédrale Saint-Just de Narbonne', *Bulletin de la commission archéologique de Narbonne* 15 (1921), p. 46.

Amalric may have grown increasingly uncomfortable as the crusader cleared the field of effective opposition. Once dominant, his uncompromising creation might not look favourably on the ecclesiastical principality the archbishop was building on the coast.

Indeed, in the wake of the 1214 defection of Narbonne to the Aragonese, Simon broke from his tradition of benevolent neglect toward the city. Arnold-Amalric had demonstrated his inability to effectively govern the temporality of his see, and Simon resolved to strip it from him, including his pretentious title. To deter further Narbonese insolence, Simon demolished the city's walls the following year, capitalising on the presence of Louis of France on his spring crusade.⁵² However, Simon went even further, asking the prince to summon Viscount Aimeric to Carcassonne to submit himself and his viscounty to the crusader. While both the crusader and the archbishop would later refer to Aimeric's submission as an oath of homage and fealty, the surviving instrument is less formal; the viscount simply promises nonaggression and places himself and his city under Simon's protection. The relatively loose terms of this act would not, of course, have prevented its later practical interpretation as an admission of political dependence and obligation. After the departure of Louis several weeks later, Simon interfered with other possessions claimed by Arnold-Amalric, destroying the walls of Cabrières and confiscating other fortresses belonging to the see.⁵³ The crusader thus demonstrated to Arnold-Amalric that his pretensions to the duchy were literally indefensible.

Matters hung in suspense until the conclusion of the Fourth Lateran Council. Armed with the confirmation of his family's hereditary right to the county of Toulouse and its appurtenances,

⁵² Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, p. 453; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 194-6, 253-5; above, pp. 91-2.

⁵³ *HGL*, viii cc. 659-60; Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, pp. 453-4, 455, 463, 465-6; *Gallia christiana*, vi instr., c. 58.

Simon reopened hostilities. Arnold-Amalric had already begun the refortification of the city, using the opportunity to solidify his authority over contested sections of the ramparts. He had furthermore invalidated Aimeric's oath to Simon, extracting homage from the viscount once more.⁵⁴ Simon therefore declared his intention to exercise his rights as duke and placed himself and his followers under papal protection. Arnold-Amalric's threats and attempts at negotiation were brushed aside. On 4 February 1216, the archbishop personally tried to prevent the crusader's entry into the city, but was brusquely manhandled out of the way by Simon's men. Recovering his dignity only to see the Montfort lion flying above the vicecomital palace, the archbishop ran to his own residence, where he excommunicated the crusader and laid the churches of the city under interdict. This too Simon ignored: he possessed a papal privilege allowing him to hear divine offices despite such sanctions. He ordered his clergy to carry on their services and ring the bells of the palatial chapel as normal. Meanwhile, the French ran riot through the streets, seizing properties and revenues belonging to the see; two stones were even lobbed through Arnold-Amalric's window.⁵⁵ More emphatically than he had the previous May, Simon demonstrated again that the archbishop was incapable of enforcing his claim to the duchy.

After installing himself in the vicecomital palace, Simon remained in Narbonne through the rest of the month. In a letter to his friend, Bishop Raymond of Uzès, justifying his actions, Simon asked for Raymond's support in subverting the archiepiscopal interdict, effectively turning a suffragan bishop against his primate. But Simon had judged his popularity amongst the episcopate well. Arnold-Amalric had been humiliated—isolated from the majority of his

⁵⁴ BnF, ms. Baluze 374, p. 124; Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, p. 463.

⁵⁵ Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, pp. 456-9; *Monumenta slavorum*, i p. 67.

suffragans and bullied within his own archiepiscopal city—and Simon soon published his own proposal for arbitration by archiepiscopal delegates. Simon’s willingness to comply with hefty terms for default—1,000*m.* paid to the arbitrators, ‘*si idem Archiepiscopus ad eandem se voluerit obligare*’—reveals his confidence in his claim.⁵⁶ The former legate’s determination to refortify Narbonne was deemed an obstruction of the crusader’s governance of his conquered lands: if this did not make Arnold-Amalric guilty of defending heretics, it at least made him culpable for undermining Simon’s ability to suppress them. The new count of Toulouse may have owed his earlier successes to Arnold-Amalric, but the bishops in the province of Narbonne recognised that they owed their own positions in large part to Simon, and so were willing to back him against the increasingly ridiculous claims of their primate.

This solidarity in favour of Simon had been evident since at least January 1213, long before the conflict between Simon and Arnold-Amalric. After Peter of Aragon’s attempt to subvert the council of Lavaur with his own protectorate of the excommunicate counts, the entire episcopate of the Midi joined its voice in protest to Rome. Not only the legates Bishop Hugh of Riez and Thedisius of Genoa, but also three archbishops and fourteen bishops warned the pope against reconciling the enemy counts. Arnold-Amalric, at the time still favourable to Simon, personally begged his fellow Catalan and former king to desist.⁵⁷ Though the united bishops could not stop the king’s invasion the following year, they did restore the pope’s faith in Simon. The crusader’s partnership with the episcopate was rewarded as each party realised their success depended on the other.

⁵⁶ Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, pp. 456-7, 464-5.

⁵⁷ *Patrologia latina*, ccxvii cc. 833-9, 842-4; *Hystoria*, ii p. 66n. 4.

Finance

The moral support Simon cultivated from the episcopate was crucial to his maintenance of authority over his conquests, but was no substitute for material means. As war moved out of the viscounties, leaving their economies more productive and therefore more profitable for his government, the crusader's monetary needs seem to have lessened. Along with increased stability in the former Trencavel lands came the acquisition of new territories as he overran the county of Toulouse. Here there was more scope for agricultural cultivation: though two-field rotation remained universal, the Toulousain, Quercy, and the Agenais were better suited to the plough than the southern highlands. As in the viscounties, agriculture and viticulture predominated, while pasture—though not as critical as in the Pyrenees and the Montagne Noire—played an important part, especially in Quercy and Rouergue. In the latter, the slopes of the Massif Central housed silver mines which fed Simon's mints at Toulouse, Beaucaire, and perhaps Agen. This currency then circulated in the major markets throughout the county, principally in Cahors, Toulouse, Montauban, and Agen, as well as the important port at Narbonne. From the merchants and goods that passed through the county could be extracted tolls and customs dues, which even the Statutes of Pamiers could not have made unprofitable.⁵⁸ Again, there is no way of cataloguing Simon's demesne holdings upon assuming the county's wealth, but in 1258, another French count of Toulouse, Alphonse of Poitiers, assessed his ordinary net income from the seneschalcies carved out of the old county at 28,344*l*.14*s*.8*d*.*tn.*, nearly thirty times the revenue of the moiety of Leicester. Simon likely did not enjoy the entirety of this sum, as his

⁵⁸ P. Wolff, ed., *Histoire du Languedoc* (Toulouse, 1967), p. 149; Appendix A, xxii; *Gallia christiana*, ii instr., p. 431; Bailly-Maître, *Argent*, p. 30; Labrot, 'A-t-il frappé la monnaie?', pp. 94-5, 96; above, p. 221.

tenure was often bitterly contested and production frequently interrupted by endless war.

However, he also profited from the confiscation of fiefs that would have been returned after his death to their former lords under Count Raymond VII of Saint-Gilles, thereby denying them to Alphonse in the future; furthermore, Alphonse's accounts do not include extraordinary income from tolls, customs, and tallage.⁵⁹ If Simon was able to use only a fraction of the revenues available to his successor, he would still command enormous resources.

Of course, these were matched by enormous expenses. Simon's enfeoffment with Peyrusse was conditional upon a rent of 10*m.* in silver to the abbey of Figeac, while Michael of Arles demanded 100*m.mp.* annually for Beaucaire.⁶⁰ Other extraordinary costs arose. For the transfer of towns on the Lot in November 1214, Simon was required to defray the bishops' maintenance with a reimbursement of 9,000*s.mg.* More gratuitously, in autumn 1212 he had sent 1,000*m.ty.* to Rome, probably out of the booty from his conquest of the majority of the county.⁶¹ But such liberality was trifling compared with his military expenditure. Simon could clearly afford a larger regular army and—except in 1213—could count on substantial quarantine contingents whose costs would have been defrayed by other crusading barons. Nevertheless, his tireless campaigning must have taxed his resources and may not have been entirely recouped through spoils and confiscation. Raymond of Cahors remained an active member of Simon's retinue, suggesting that the crusader was still not financially independent.⁶² The unceasing

⁵⁹ E. Boutaric, *Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers: Étude sur la réunion des provinces du Midi et de l'ouest à la Couronne et sur les origines de la centralisation administrative* (Paris, 1870), pp. 275-6; Spufford, *Medieval Exchange*, p. 209.

⁶⁰ Appendix A, xix-xx, xxii.

⁶¹ *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi cc. 693, 694.

⁶² Appendix A, xxii; *HGL*, viii cc. 612, 657, 658; *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi cc. 693, 694.

demands of active campaigning likely imposed a hand-to-mouth existence, with new sources of wealth exhausted as quickly as they became available.

If the spoils of war were not forthcoming, the consequences could be disastrous. After nearly two months unsuccessfully besieging Beaucaire, Simon was nearly ruined and filled with wrath as he retired to Toulouse. Upon regaining the capital, he slammed the citizens with an enormous arbitrary impost of 30,000*m.*, accusing the Tolosans of conspiring behind his back. Moreover, in the aftermath of the rioting and arson that accompanied Simon's return, his troops occupied houses abandoned for fear of the flames, stripping them of foodstuffs and fabric before extorting money for the owners' return. The crusader's suspicions of duplicity may not have been entirely unfounded, but both the *Canso* continuator and William of Puylaurens associate the resentment engendered by this tallage and violence with Simon's eventual loss of his hard-won county.⁶³ Simon had abandoned the urban conciliation that he had selectively implemented in the viscounties: the lesson that all potential sources of material wealth ought not be exploited in order to preserve moral capital was forgotten in the face of his zealous hatred for this *caput heresis*.

However, the Tolosan tallage also inspired the regulation of coinage for the capital's mint: the citizens, anxious to prevent such a large sum from becoming increasingly extortionate, extracted from Simon an oath that the comital finances would henceforth be carried out according to the French monetary ordinances of Philip Augustus.⁶⁴ Though at 0.53g the weight

⁶³ E. Martin-Chabot, 'Mésaventures d'un toulousain « donat » de Saint-Sernin: Glose pour la *Chanson de la Croisade Albigeoise*', in *Mélanges d'histoire du Moyen Âge dédiés à la mémoire de Louis Halphen* (Paris, 1951), p. 505; *Canso*, ii pp. 208-12, 246, 252; Puylaurens, p. 98.

⁶⁴ J. Boizard, *Traité des monoyes et leurs circonstances et dépendances*, rev. ed., ii (Paris, 1711), p. 337. The manuscript to which Boizard refers is lost, and his claim that the sum totaled 3,000*m.* carries less weight than the agreement on 30,000*m.* by the two surviving thirteenth-century sources.

of Simon's surviving obol tolosan is consistent with the contemporary royal exemplars, it is made of billon rather than silver. Occasional earlier Tolosan exemplars are also alloy, but most—and all from France—are silver, suggesting either that it dates from before the accord of 1216 or that Simon tried to cheat his subjects.⁶⁵ In any event, Simon's tyrannical actions threatened the very independence which he exercised through them. The more supreme he became in the Midi, the more cause his subjects might have to appeal to the king for his limitation.

Household and government

Simon's accord over Tolosan coinage was not his only attempt to cultivate a rapport—or at least the appearance of one—with the citizenry. On 8 March 1216, Simon received oaths of obedience from the citizens, before promising himself to be a good lord, preserve their persons and goods, and give redress to their appeals; no mention was made, significantly, of consular privileges or liberties.⁶⁶ The new count seems to have drastically altered the constitution of the consulate, which at the time held the greatest degree of independence and regional authority of any civic government west of the Rhône. The citizens had feared Simon since he first united them against the crusade in June 1211, and Simon for his part likely shared Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay's perception of the city as a cesspool of heretics and outlaws fleeing the righteous sword of his justice. After his failure before Beaucaire and the subsequent abortive revolt in Toulouse itself, mutual distrust and hatred had grown to the point that Simon could not tolerate any

⁶⁵ Dieudonné, 'Maille de Simon', p. 318; idem, *Les monnaies capétiennes ou royales françaises*, i (Paris, 1923), pp. 58, 61; Poëy d'Avant, *Monnaies de France*, ii pp. 247-9.

⁶⁶ de la Faille, *Annales de Toulouse*, i preuves, p. 124; *HGL*, x p. 163.

independent body governing the city. Simon appointed, possibly with help from Fulk, a civic court of his choosing—likely first of three men, expanding to eight by April 1217—to exercise justice, assist the seneschal, and perhaps collect tallage. These men, along with the seneschal, Gervase of Chamigny, also delegated on occasion judges to help them hear cases. Of the eleven recorded courtiers, all had served as consuls in the past, and nine since the first siege of Toulouse; three of the five known extraordinary judges had likewise served previously in the Capitol, and another was the son of a merchant who had been elected three times since 1202. Most of these men were patricians, and Simon probably hoped to lend his new arrangement legitimacy by coopting such respected civic notables into his regime. But no matter how the crusader may have tried to mask it, Simon's court was a far cry from the nearly sovereign coonsulate which Toulouse had formerly enjoyed and the representative nature of its institutions which had grown rather than lessened under the threat of the crusade. Men would later recall that the crusader regime had failed to provide impartial justice in the city: 'jus per alium seu alios non reddebatur, nisi per illos et eorum socios'.⁶⁷ This loss of urban liberty could only stoke the embers of resentment that threatened to burst into the flame of rebellion.

As discussed above, this was not typical of Simon's policy toward cities. The independent urban centres on the Rhône that opposed the crusade may have seen in Simon a threat to their traditional liberties, but more likely they were simply nervous about the possibility of a large and effective unified state so close to their own consular spheres of influence. In fact, Simon's attitude toward Narbonne reflects his traditional tolerance of urban liberty.⁶⁸ There were

⁶⁷ *HGL*, x p. 165; J.H. Mundy, *Liberty and Political Power in Toulouse, 1050-1230* (New York, 1954), pp. 86-7, 151-3; idem, *Society and Government at Toulouse in the Age of the Cathars* (Toronto, 1997), pp. 390-400.

⁶⁸ Dossat, 'Simon de Montfort', pp. 294-6.

notable exceptions. After that city had served as a base for Arago-Catalan troops in the wake of the battle of Muret, he insisted on razing its walls along with those of Toulouse during the crusade of Louis of France in spring 1215. As at Toulouse and Montauban, he also took hostages from the city to ensure the citizens' good faith.⁶⁹ However, Narbonne's ability to receive the Spanish knights in the first place had largely been due to Simon's indulgence toward the city since the beginning of the crusade. He had carefully cultivated a policy of neutrality toward Narbonne. But when Arnold-Amalric failed to prevent the citizens from becoming partisan, and as tensions mounted over the title to the duchy, Simon moved to bring the city into formal submission. However, his policy was not nearly as vindictive as that taken in regard to Toulouse. In the oath which Aimeric swore to Simon in May 1215, he and his subjects are bound to very little: they must not fight or conspire against the crusade, and Aimeric promises to be a *fidelis adjutor* of Simon's regime, while Simon swears to protect Aimeric and the citizens. Simon's confrontation with Arnold-Amalric in the city and exploitation of harbergage in the vicecomital palace the following year demonstrated the crusader's intention to enforce his authority, but the target of this exercise of power was no longer the viscount but the archbishop. By 1218, he had even given permission for the reconstruction of the city walls. With Aimeric pacified and Arnold-Amalric humiliated, he was content to leave Narbonne free from interference, and his strategy was rewarded. The same year, Pope Honorius counted Narbonne as one—and certainly the most proximate—of the few faithful cities to aid Simon during the second siege of

⁶⁹ *Hystoria*, ii p. 301; *Canso*, ii pp. 230, 240-2; Puylaurens, p. 90; Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, p. 453; *Gallia christiana*, vi instr., c. 58.

Toulouse.⁷⁰ If Toulouse dragged Simon into deeper conflict the more he tried to control it, Narbonne—at least from 1215—increased its support the more it was left in peace.

The participation of the Tolosan courtiers or Narbonese citizens in the work of the *negotium pacis et fidei* was far from exceptional. As Simon's star rose, many important southern nobles and burghers rallied to his service. The Quercynois represented by William of Cahors in 1211 were only the first and evidently the most enthusiastic. Bertrand II of Cardaillac, the bishop's nephew, occasionally accompanied Simon on campaign and received the castles of *Darnegal* and *Sinergues* in 1215 for his loyalty.⁷¹ After the capture of Biron in August 1212, Simon entrusted the former mercenary stronghold to a local lord, Arnold of Montaigu, who had served as a guide for the crusaders.⁷² But it was in 1214, after the miracle of Muret, that the number of homages Simon received throughout the lands dependent on Toulouse exploded. Three such instruments survive from Quercy that year, two from the Agenais, and another two from Périgord.⁷³ The following years saw the net spread further, as Gascon lords—many of whom had long been sympathetic to the crusade—sought or were compelled to recognise Simon's lordship. Southern knights were also members of the garrison and the countersiege camp at Beaucaire.⁷⁴ Many such followers had formerly been familiar with Simon's enemies. Raymond of Turenne had been enfeoffed by Peter of Aragon with the castle of Pals in Catalonia during the creation of the Arago-Catalan protectorate of 1213, but this did not stop him from

⁷⁰ *HGL*, viii cc. 659-60; Besse, *Ducs de Narbonne*, pp. 453, 457-9; AN, J 310, n° 41; *RHGF*, xix pp. 677; 'Honorii epistolæ', ii c. 594.

⁷¹ *HGL*, viii c. 657; *Hystoria*, i p. 245; Appendix A, xxv.

⁷² *Canso*, i pp. 254, 260.

⁷³ Appendix A, xi-xiv, xvi-xvii, xxi.

⁷⁴ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 55-6, 127; Appendix A, xxviii; *HGL*, viii cc. 686-7; *Gallia christiana*, i instr., p. 185; *Canso*, ii pp. 110, 170; above, pp. 75-6.

trimming his sails after Muret in order to receive from Simon not only his patrimonial viscounty but also the lands confiscated from his brother-in-law, Bernard of Cazenac, in 1214. While Raymond of Turenne would fall away by the end of Simon's life, Raymond Pelet, lord of Alès, and Bertrand of Gourdon had likewise previously sworn homage to Raymond of Saint-Gilles before switching allegiance to Simon in the last years of the crusader's life; Bertrand had even been fighting against Simon during the second siege of Toulouse. More intensively, the lawyer Guy of Cap-de-Porc, who had served with distinction in Raymond's court and had even been enfeoffed by the count with the town of Balaruc as late as February 1211, had entered Simon's service by the following month. He would remain at the peripheries of the crusader court into 1218.⁷⁵ Whether inspired by the decline of Egidian power in the region or an affective interest in the Montforts, an attraction to the ideals of the crusade or a fear of its means, a substantial following emerged for Simon around the edges of the county of Toulouse. If this stands in sharp contrast with Simon's difficulties in the viscounties, it should also serve to complicate the historiographical picture of a sharp patriotic divide between the French and the southerners.

The continuing attachment of indigenous lords to Simon's cause as the titular core of his new principality fell further and further from his grasp further suggests that his influence rested on more than simply the projection of brute force. During the second siege of Toulouse, Simon received only one new extant act of homage—that of Bertrand of Gourdon—but there is evidence for the fidelity of other southern vassals during Simon's hour of need. As noted above, a group of southern barons stood surety for Bernard-Jordan of L'Isle-Jourdain in December

⁷⁵ *Pedro el Católico*, iii pp. 1492-3; Appendix A, xiii-xiv, xxxiii, xxxviii; *HGL*, viii cc. 608, 704-6; 'Honorii epistolæ', ii cc. 593-4; *Canso*, i p. 142, ii p. 100; C. Taylor, *Heresy, Crusade and Inquisition in Medieval Quercy* (York, 2011), pp. 101, 210-1; *Maguelone*, ii pp. 77-9; Gardère, *Seigneurie de Condom*, p. 276.

1217, and Rostan of Posquières renegotiated his inheritance with Simon's approval before the walls of the capital a month before the crusader's death.⁷⁶ No doubt fear was a powerful component of this fidelity, but that does not necessarily preclude a real commitment to Simon's government.

Furthermore, even after the supposed watershed at Castelnaudary, Simon's attitude toward southern nobles was far from exclusionary. In fact, the two most prominent and most active southerners in Simon's army may suggest something of his early intentions for the government of the county after the projected deposition of Raymond. Baldwin of Saint-Gilles, Raymond's brother, had been born and raised in the court of his uncle, Louis VII of France, and had only come to the Midi in his majority. Distrust and resentment between the brothers led to Baldwin's defection to the crusade during the initial invasion; his common French cultural affinity with Simon may have made the transition easier. Warmly embraced by the crusaders, Baldwin received the fortified towns of Montcuq and Montech for his service.⁷⁷ But Simon's intentions for Baldwin may have been even greater. There is little clear evidence before 1215 that the crusader intended to take the Saint-Gilles' ancient titles for himself. Certainly, he worked to exclude Raymond from territorial and juridical power and to absorb the harried count's former authority. But supplanting the Trencavels was one thing: they were an upstart family of viscounts caught between powerful neighbours and autonomous subjects. The Saint-Gilles were another: their dynasty may have been in decay, but it remained a venerable house that could not lightly be cast aside. When Raymond was eventually deposed—as Simon and his

⁷⁶ Above, pp. 76, 251.

⁷⁷ *Canso*, i pp. 180, 182-6, 276; *Hystoria*, i pp. 233-6, ii pp. 19; Puylaurens, pp. 58, 72.

allies worked to ensure—Baldwin would be a convenient titular replacement, albeit with his freedom of movement severely circumscribed by the fact that Simon held the majority of the former comital rights throughout his lands. If such a client rump county was envisaged, the project was compromised by Baldwin's capture and murder in February 1214.⁷⁸ But Simon still seems to have been hesitant to advance himself as count. Without a Saint-Gilles in reserve, he may have resorted to supporting Raymond's son-in-law, Peter-Bermund of Anduze. The two men knew each other from the Fourth Crusade, and Peter-Bermund had participated in the initial campaign against heresy in 1209; in November 1214, Simon granted him joint lordship over Séverac with Bishop Peter of Rodez.⁷⁹ Peter-Bermund might have been a worthy successor to Baldwin in terms of his affective devotion to Simon, but his claim to the county was not nearly so good. As the husband of Raymond's daughter, Constance, by his second wife, Beatrice of Béziers, Peter-Bermund had no blood tie to the Saint-Gilles. Furthermore, it was rumoured in the crusader camp that Beatrice had become an Albigensian perfect after her divorce from Raymond; if the allegation did not compromise Peter-Bermund's personal reputation, it still coloured his links with the comital family.⁸⁰ However, this did not stop him from petitioning Innocent III for the disinheritance—in his favour—of Raymond the younger as a bastard as early as December 1212. He also took special care to note his close friendship with Simon in his letter to the pope. Three years later, he would travel himself to the Lateran in hopes of pleading his

⁷⁸ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 186-93; Puylaurens, pp. 86-8.

⁷⁹ *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi cc. 754-5; Villehardouin, i p. 46; *Register Innocenz'*, xii pp. 158-61, 163; *Canso*, i p. 36; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 234-5.

⁸⁰ *HGL*, vii p. 24; *Maguelone*, ii p. 59; *Hystoria*, i pp. 35-7; G. Frenken, *Die Exempla des Jacob von Vitry: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Erzählliteratur des Mittelalters* (Munich, 1914), pp. 143-4.

case before the Council, but died whilst in Rome.⁸¹ His eligible friends cleared from the field and his belief in his own candidacy perhaps strengthened by the decision of the council of Montpellier and its confirmation in *Nobilitatem tuam*, Simon cannot have been too reluctant to accept Lateran IV's award of the county in default of other worthy recipients.

The fidelity of Baldwin and Peter-Bermund, though not unique, was uncommon. More frequently, Simon found his effective control over the areas he dominated compromised by defection and betrayal. The very existence of so many binding instruments of homage suggests something of Simon's anxiety about the reliability of southern barons.⁸² The lord and knights of Lolmie who captured Baldwin of Saint-Gilles had previously submitted to Simon, while Ratier of Castelnau, another member of the cabal, had fought in the independent Quercynois campaign of 1209 and was believed friendly to the crusaders. No doubt much of this disaffection was, as Claire Taylor claims, bred by the crusaders' disregard for orthodox native claims to lordship amidst the conquests.⁸³ But resentment of French ascendancy only partly explains the murder of Baldwin, who remained after all a representative of the local comital dynasty. In fact, such internecine warfare had been a feature of southern society for centuries: conflicts between count and barons and even foreign intervention were nothing new, and would continue well into the fourteenth century.⁸⁴ Moreover, Simon retained the loyalty of the Turennes and other Quercynois families, at least in 1214. But what troubled southern nobles was the comprehensive

⁸¹ *Patrologia latina*, ccxvi cc. 754-5; Puylaurens, p. 92; *HGL*, vi p. 396.

⁸² Appendix A, xi-xiv, xvi-xvii, xxi, xxiv-xxv, xxviii, xxx-xxxii, xxxiii; *HGL*, viii cc. 655-7, 659-60, 686-7, 704-6.

⁸³ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 186-7; *Canso*, i p. 40; Taylor, *Heresy in Quercy*, p. 98.

⁸⁴ J. Firnhaber-Baker, *Violence and the State in Languedoc, 1250-1400* (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 35-44, 66-72, 91-8; R. Benjamin, 'A Forty Years War: Toulouse and the Plantagenets, 1156-96', *Historical Research* 61 (1988), pp. 270-81.

nature of Simon's understanding of his mandate, as opposed to the often ineffectual lordship claimed by Raymond. The hierarchical authority he imposed on them through instruments of fealty stood at odds with their more egalitarian aristocratic traditions: indeed, the French concept of vassalage may have appeared to them as humiliating as serfdom.⁸⁵ As a result, disaffection was endemic. During and after the siege of Castelnaudary, Simon lost control of most of the Toulousain and the Tolosan Albigeois, while the inhabitants of Moissac attacked their garrison and invited Raymond to return two years later. During King John's Poitevin campaign around the same time, Le Mas-d'Agenais and Montpézat defected and Marmande even welcomed an English garrison.⁸⁶ Similarly, Peter of Aragon's invasion in summer 1213 led to a general defection in Gascony and elsewhere in expectation of the king's victory. After the risings at Beaucaire and Toulouse, a rebellion was organised at Montauban in winter 1217-1218 but thwarted by Philip of Landreville, Simon's seneschal of the Agenais.⁸⁷ The wide geographical distribution of these flashes of resistance suggest a landscape that was only ever tentatively dominated, despite Simon's efforts; though power lingered even after the armies had moved on, the appearance of another force in the vicinity was enough for local nobles to invite an alternative prince's protection or the townspeople to attempt to overthrow their crusader garrison.

Though no stories comparable to the mutilations of Bram or massacre at Lavaur survive for the conquest of the Tolosan principalities, Simon's vengeance remained swift and often implacable. Reconquest was frequently accompanied by the razing of fortifications. This was especially the case in the summer campaign of 1214 through Quercy, when special attention was

⁸⁵ Paterson, *World of Troubadours*, pp. 35, 68-71.

⁸⁶ *Hystoria*, i pp. 276-8, ii pp. 198-200, 209, 211.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, ii pp. 136, 138, 301-4.

paid to ruining the possessions of those complicit in the capture and murder of Baldwin of Saint-Gilles: a detachment under Guy of Montfort ravaged the lands of Ratier of Castelnau and others, razing their castles to their foundations. As Simon's campaigns dragged on, slighting became more and more frequent, applied even to castles that had never been in rebellion but were simply taken as the crusade marched toward the frontiers of the comital lands.⁸⁸ The lesson of the vicecomital conquest and the uprisings after Castelnaudary had taught Simon the danger of leaving fortifications in his rear. It was no longer enough to forbid future adulterine constructions; the works of past fragmentations of authority must be undone. As in the viscounties, reprisals and policy had become impossible to distinguish.

But the greatest vengeance was saved for the heart of the county. Toulouse, centre of resistance for four years, found an exception to Simon's usual permissive attitude toward cities after he took possession of the Château Narbonnais. Supported by Louis, he ordered the walls pulled down in 1215. After the crusader's failure before Beaucaire the following year, he set about despoiling moveable and destroying immovable—especially fortified—property within Toulouse, even firing part of the city. In Montauban—which had likewise remained unconquered until 1215—flames also followed the attempt on Philip of Landreville's life as the victorious French knights sacked the town in revenge.⁸⁹ The conciliation given to Narbonne was never extended toward the refuges of heresy that had stood against the crusade for so long.

As in the viscounties, such violent measures, borne from frustration and distrust, only engendered more resentment. As a result, despite wider cooperation from local notables, the

⁸⁸ Ibid., i p. 275, ii pp. 9, 11-2, 19, 27, 38, 57, 117, 206, 208-10, 222, 223-4, 226-7, 228-9.

⁸⁹ Ibid., ii pp. 254, 257, 278, 304; *Canso*, ii pp. 36, 208-18; Puylaurens, p. 98.

bulk of Simon's government remained French. Though he distributed confiscated fiefs to his followers of all origins, Simon seems to have entrusted the offices of his developing governmental institutions almost exclusively to Frenchmen. Little is known of the lower levels of this administration: the subscription of a Bertrand the bailiff to an act of 1214 confirms the existence of a substratum of officials tasked with tax-collecting, almsgiving, and perhaps the enforcement of the Statutes of Pamiers and other decrees, but reveals little else. Likewise, Peter-Martin's appointment as judge for Castelnaudary by Simon in 1216 indicates that southerners were not excluded from participation in ordinary justice, but illuminates no more than a flash of integrated administration.⁹⁰ Aside from Guy of Lévis—who continued in his role as marshal—the only clearly identifiable officers of Simon's regime are the seneschals, knights tasked with the oversight of particular districts of the principality. Their first mention in Simon's documents is in July 1215, when the office clearly existed in Beaucaire. Simon had likely simply assumed the old seneschalcies established by the Saint-Gilles throughout their territory, though he probably added around the same time districts based on at least Carcassonne and Béziers in the viscounties. Beaucaire was entrusted to Lambert of Thury, while William of Beynes became seneschal of Rodez, Philip of Landreville of Agen, and Gervase of Chamigny of Toulouse. The exact nature of these roles is never explicated, but they seem to have served as general comital representatives, receiving homages, defending interests, overseeing alms, dispensing justice, garrisoning castles, and projecting power.⁹¹ That such roles should be exclusively performed by Frenchmen may not be surprising in the wake of numerous betrayals by indigenous lords and the

⁹⁰ *HGL*, viii cc. 621, 658; *La Grasse*, ii p. 123; *RHGF*, xix pp. 677-8.

⁹¹ *HGL*, viii cc. 668, 677, 701-2, 705; *Canso*, ii pp. 110, 184, 282; Appendix A, xxix; *Monumenta Dominici*, p. 85; *Hystoria*, ii p. 302; R. Limouzin-Lamothe, *La commune de Toulouse et les sources de son histoire (1120-1249): Étude historique et critique suivie de l'édition du Cartulaire du Consulat* (Toulouse, 1932), p. 448; above, pp. 242-3.

death of Simon's trusted lieutenant Baldwin of Saint-Gilles, but it did little to anchor his government in the intensive cooperation of his subjects.

Not enough is known of Simon's chancery to draw a similar conclusion for his bureaucracy. Though one of his clerks, Aton, may have been southern, the chancellor, Clarin, and his successor as Simon's chaplain, William, were both probably French. Originating in November 1214, the comital chancery enjoyed a selective monopoly over the drafting of acts concerning Simon's affairs outside of Toulouse itself.⁹² But after 7 May 1217, Clarin seems to have been frequently in France, raising support for his master: a certain William, *notarius domini comiti*, assumed his functions. Though this may have been Simon's chaplain working up the ranks, it was more likely William Vital, public notary of Toulouse, who drafted two acts in the city for the crusaders after 1215. Simon was again reviving comital authority over public acts as he had in the viscounties.⁹³ But by incorporating a public notary of Toulouse into his own chancery, Simon had subsumed rather than skirted the civic notarial tradition. The dating clauses of notarised acts were now *regnante Simone comite Tolose* rather than *Raimundo*, a change likely more easily imposed through comital domination of the notariate.⁹⁴ With the notary once more functioning as an officer of the count rather than the consulate, Simon had legally tied the citizens to his lordship and emphasised his authority not only over the county but also over his erstwhile autonomous capital.

⁹² Lyon, 'Daudé de Prades', p. 392; Ménard, *Histoire de Nismes*, preuves, i p. 54; *HGL*, viii cc. 658, 659, 668, 687; Appendix A, xxxv-xxxvi.

⁹³ *Canso*, iii p. 82; de la Faille, *Annales de Toulouse*, i preuves, p. 124; *La Grasse*, ii p. 126; Appendix A, xxxii-xxxiii, xxxv, xxxviii; *HGL*, viii cc. 702, 706; Mundy, *Liberty and Power*, pp. 115-6; above, pp. 245-6.

⁹⁴ Mundy, *Liberty and Power*, p. 210; *Monumenta Dominici*, pp. 69-71; *HGL*, x p. 163.

Reform and heresy

The absorption of the Tolosan notary also signalled continuity, a theme that Simon was keen to stress as count. Paradoxically, that continuity could also be found in a number of the clauses of the Statutes of Pamiers. The expulsion of prostitutes from the towns had already found codification in Toulouse by the Capitol in 1201, and the prohibition of arbitrary arrest reiterated consular legislation protecting citizens since 1152.⁹⁵ Whether or not Simon was aware of southern precedent for these aspects of his legislation, they may have eased the impact of his reform programme.

But the rupture brought by other aspects of Simon's reform could not be disguised. His lack of interest in the fight against usury has already been noted, and it is therefore unsurprising that it found no expression at Pamiers. But an anti-usury campaign had been promoted with some success by Bishop Fulk in Toulouse before his departure from the city in 1211. Had this programme been revived by Simon's government or even permitted to continue under episcopal ægis, the crusader might have been able to exploit the tensions that had divided the capital for and against the crusade before his first siege. Instead, Simon's courts frequently worked to restore the investments of creditors, probably to ensure his own access to ready cash, whether through loans or tallage. These judgements may also have been partly intended to settle interminable debts hobbling the city's patricians, but they flew in the face of reform rhetoric and can hardly have been preferred by the burdened older families to cancellation and prosecution of

⁹⁵ *HGL*, viii cc. 472, 633; Limouzin-Lamothe, *Commune de Toulouse*, p. 269.

their persecutors in the burg.⁹⁶ Usurers were not natural allies of the crusader regime, especially if they were Jews, and Simon's insistence on the repayment of loans alienated an entire class of potential supporters.

Other civic traditions were positively abolished by the Statutes of Pamiers. The Tolosan law of reprisal—recorded in the same statute of 1152 and allowing a private citizen, failing to obtain redress through comital channels, to take a foreign hostage or property in distraint of a grievance—blatantly contradicted the statute against detaining one for the debt of another, not to mention the reservation of justice to the count.⁹⁷ Such reforms may have been intended to establish justice, but they also dismantled generations of urban privilege, further alienating an already resentful population.

But it was not only in the capital that reform was enforced. Simon's statute liberating the migration of free peasants and serfs had much wider application than the narrow enticements offered by the Tolosan Capitol.⁹⁸ While civic legislation and privilege allows for clearer comparison with the Statutes than the often unrecorded customs and practices of the countryside, glimpses emerge of the same concerns exhibited on campaign. Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay tells of the crusaders' discovery at the abbey of Sarlat of one hundred and fifty peasants mutilated by Bernard of Cazenac and his wife, Alice of Turenne, in September 1214. Though Peter's outrage at the sight certainly carries a rhetorical effect, he almost certainly obtained the story from an eyewitness, and it is not necessary to disbelieve him. Interestingly, he does not include his usual

⁹⁶ *Canso*, i pp. 110-2; Puylaurens, pp. 64-6, 68-70; Mundy, *Liberty and Power*, pp. 87-8; idem, *Society and Government*, pp. 197, 207-8; Bird, 'Heresy, Crusade and Reform', pp. 276-7.

⁹⁷ Limouzin-Lamothe, *Commune de Toulouse*, pp. 269-70, 310; Mundy, *Liberty and Power*, p. 129; *HGL*, viii c. 632.

⁹⁸ *HGL*, viii c. 631; Mundy, *Society and Government*, pp. 73-4.

gratuitous accusation of heresy; their cruelty was sufficient indictment of their character. The Cazenacs were also charged with the despoliation of churches and general persecution of the poor; after their flight before the crusaders, Simon transferred their confiscated lands to Alice's brother, Raymond of Turenne, on the understanding that he would restore the damages his sister and brother-in-law had inflicted on the local church.⁹⁹ The dispossession of the Cazenacs, in addition to being a punitive action against political enemies, was—in Peter's account and confirmed by Raymond's charter—also conceived as a defence of the Church and the poor.

The crusade also targeted the specific enemies of the *negotium pacis et fidei* as it moved through the county. The mercenary company at Montferrand in spring 1211 may have been spared during the capitulation of Baldwin of Saint-Gilles, but the fear of execution at the hands of the crusaders was already present. If the four-hundred-strong mercenary garrison of Penne-d'Agenais was allowed to go free in July 1212, it was only due to a negotiated capitulation from fear of their fate should they be captured and the weakness of Simon's military position as a crusader quarantine prepared to expire.¹⁰⁰ Simon's invasion of Périgord in late summer 1214 was justified as an intentional harrying of warbands, while Robert of Courson had already made a special note of Simon's reputation for hunting down mercenaries throughout the lands he had conquered.¹⁰¹ The 1212 campaign against Biron—where the traitor of Castelnaudary, Martin Algai, had established an independent stronghold—was primarily an operation of vengeance, but William of Tudela records that Simon had received complaints from throughout Périgord and as far as Saintonge of the mercenary captain's depredations; Martin was readily handed over to the

⁹⁹ *Hystoria*, ii pp. 224-6; Appendix A, xiv.

¹⁰⁰ *Canso*, i pp. 176, 180; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 20, 32-3.

¹⁰¹ *Hystoria*, ii p. 223; *HGL*, viii c. 654.

crusaders by his own subjects.¹⁰² Simon took his most substantial recorded action against mercenaries a few months later, at the fall of Moissac. The town had been maintained by a warband in the employment of Raymond of Saint-Gilles, and Simon made its surrender conditional on the delivery of the mercenaries into his power. The crusaders then set upon the three hundred captives, putting them all to the sword.¹⁰³ This represents perhaps the most obvious development of the reform programme from its implementation in the viscounties: after the betrayal at Castelnaudary, ecclesiastical rhetoric against mercenaries seems to have translated into action.

However, the net of enemies to Christendom identified by the reformers also encompassed another group that had previously enjoyed widespread tolerance in the Midi. The exclusion of Jews from public life first applied in the Statutes of Pamiers went even further with the Montforts' possession of the county. The Jewry of Narbonne were so alarmed by the destruction of their city's walls in 1215 that they sent their own petition to the pope to beg for reconstruction. An episode at Toulouse two years later suggests that the fears of the Narbonese Jews were not entirely unfounded. Interestingly, it was not Simon, but Alice of Montmorency who began the active persecution of the capital's Jewry. While Simon was invading Provence in late summer 1217, the new countess rounded up the Tolosan Jews and allegedly threatened them with conversion or death. Ibn Verga's late retelling of the incident is steeped in the imagery of traditional persecutions from the time of Emperor Hadrian, but likely contains a kernel of truth. The children were forcibly baptised, while fifty-seven men converted; the rest were imprisoned

¹⁰² *Canso*, i pp. 258-60; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 36-7.

¹⁰³ *Canso*, i pp. 274-6; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 40, 44, 49-50.

and perhaps sentenced to death, but the revolt of the city brought other priorities to the fore. Upon Simon's return, accompanied by Cardinal Bertrand, the crusader ordered the Jews set at liberty and even restored their confiscated property. However, the children, as Christians, were not returned to their families, and Bertrand ordered the distinctive badges advocated at the Fourth Lateran Council imposed upon the recusants.¹⁰⁴ The effectiveness of such a scheme amidst the chaos of the second siege of Toulouse is questionable, but demonstrates that Simon, supported by the legate, was still determined to isolate the Jews within his Christian republic. However, they remained under his protection, much as they were considered royal property by the French court: in addition to Simon's refusal to convert his Jewry at sword-point, at least one case heard by his judges concerned a boy accused of stealing bread from the Jewish hospice in Toulouse.¹⁰⁵ Rather than imagine a tension between justice and reform in the apparent paradox of Simon's Jewish policy—such as it was—it may be more accurate to see his attitude as one protecting his self-defined comital prerogatives. Jews fell under his will, and trifling with them was to interfere with his sovereignty; meanwhile, as zealous as he was for a reformed Christian polity, he was unwilling to go further than the Church in forcing conversion.

Heretics, however, remained subject to the same eager and deadly persecution they had faced in the viscounties, whence many had fled. The county of Toulouse had a rich indigenous heretical population as well: the legatine brief of 1209 and later inquisitorial depositions depict a landscape where heretical activity before the crusade was concentrated in the southeastern

¹⁰⁴ ibn Verga, *Shevet Yehuda*, pp. 147, 148; *Hystoria*, ii pp. 287-97; Zerner, 'Épouse de Simon', p. 461; *Conciliorum decreta*, p. 266. The notice inserted by ibn Verga's son names Béziers as the city whose Jews feared the destruction of their walls, but in all other details the story follows the events at Narbonne. I am very grateful to J. Weinberg for translating the passages from ibn Verga and elucidating their context within the tradition of Jewish persecution literature.

¹⁰⁵ R. Chazan, *Medieval Jewry in Northern France: A Political and Social History* (Baltimore, 1973), pp. 66-7; *HGL*, x p. 166.

Toulousain and the Tolosan Albigeois—unsurprisingly the same regions that were first to defect during the Castelnaudary campaign. These were also along precisely the route that Simon’s army took during the invasion of the county in 1211—rather than the more obvious approach to the city along the Aquitanian Road—suggesting that a zeal for the eradication of heresy weighed at least as heavily with the crusader as strategic considerations and political ambition.¹⁰⁶ Even so, only the taking of Les Cassés yielded a significant number of heretics: between fifty and one hundred perfects who, refusing to repent, were dragged from the castle and burnt.¹⁰⁷ This isolated incident presents a much smaller scale than the great bonfires before Minerve and Lavaur. Most likely, the traditional heretical communities had been thoroughly disrupted by the end of 1211, the surviving perfects having fled to Lombardy, Montségur, or Montauban and Toulouse. The latter two had in fact been swelled by refugees since 1209, and the concentration of heretics within their walls can only have increased as the war progressed.¹⁰⁸ Toulouse had of course been one of Simon’s first targets in the county, but the crusader never directly assaulted Montauban, likely giving the heretics hiding there a chance to flee once more before he was awarded possession. Perhaps the difficulties of the first siege of Toulouse had alerted Simon to the practical impossibility of capturing large urban centres with his available resources, leading him to direct his energies to other conquests.

These campaigns in the peripheries were no less directed against hotbeds of heresy.

Though evidence for northern Quercy is nonexistent and the eastern part of the county seems to

¹⁰⁶ *Maguelone*, ii pp. 59-60; BnF, mss. Doat 22, f^{bs} 30r^o-v^o, 65r^o, 72v^o-73r^o, 75r^o; Doat 23, 70v^o-71r^o, 76r^o, 86v^o, 116r^o, 346r^o-v^o; Doat 24, f^{bs} 20r^o-v^o, 37v^o, 123v^o; BmT, ms. 609, f^{bs} 11r^o-v^o, 20r^o, 22v^o, 29v^o, 30r^o, 66r^o, 120r^o, 143v^o-144r^o, 184r^o-v^o, 243r^o, 250r^o-v^o; above, pp. 265-6.

¹⁰⁷ *Canso*, i p. 200; *Hystoria*, i pp. 232-3.

¹⁰⁸ BnF, ms. Doat 23, f^{bs} 2v^o-3v^o; BmT, ms. 609, f^o 115v^o; Griffe, *Temps de la croisade*, pp. 160-3, 167.

have been solidly orthodox, it is clear that Villemur hosted a thriving heretical community before the arrival of the crusaders, and perfects were also seen at Castelsarrasin.¹⁰⁹ The Agenais held several heretical centres, which would presumably only have swelled with fugitives from the former Trencavel viscounties and conquered portions of the counties of Toulouse and Foix.¹¹⁰ As detailed evidence of heresy in the Rouergue, Périgord, or Provence does not survive, it is impossible to discern the impact of such considerations on Simon's campaigns in these areas. But it remains telling that Simon's first campaigns in the county targeted the areas most affected by the propagation of heresy: a genuine zeal for the eradication of heresy sat comfortably alongside the material strategic interests of Simon's campaigns. It is even possible that Simon himself was incapable of distinguishing the 'ideological' demands of the *negotium pacis et fidei* from its 'political' concerns: God's work was the permanent destruction of heresy, and this required the crusader's assumption of the property and rights of those found unworthy to govern in the emerging republic reformed for the good of Christendom.

However, this dream of divinely sanctioned grandeur came crashing down with the failures surrounding the end of Simon's life. As the fruitless second siege of Toulouse absorbed his attention, heretics could once again be found in Castelsarrasin; after his death, they crept back into Quercy, the Toulousain, and even Narbonne.¹¹¹ Built together, his ideological vision collapsed with the political edifice he had constructed to support it. By mid-century, the legacy of the crusader's fight against heresy was the furtive existence eked out by perfects darting

¹⁰⁹ BnF, mss. Doat 22, f^o 34r^o-v^o; Doat 23, f^{os} 3v^o-5v^o; Taylor, *Heresy in Quercy*, pp. 211-2. The assertion by *ibid.*, p. 88 that the rest of upper Quercy was free of heresy, while entirely possible, argues largely from silence.

¹¹⁰ Taylor, *Heresy in France*, pp. 231-3.

¹¹¹ BnF, mss. Doat 22, 15r^o-v^o, 16v^o, 17v^o, 20v^o, 22r^o, 23v^o, 24r^o, 44v^o; Doat 23, f^{os} 260v^o-262r^o, 301r^o; Doat 24, f^o 64r^o, 66v^o; BmT, ms. 609, f^o 17r^o; Griffé, *Temps de la croisade*, pp. 168, 175-6, 178.

through woods and shadows, whilst confessional adherence to or at least sympathy towards heresy remained widespread.¹¹² Simon's dream of a purified Midi would not be realised through the sporadic violence of his ragtag military campaigns, but by the evangelical example of reformed clergy and the unrelenting pressure of inquisitorial bureaucracy, protected by the immense resources of the Crown.

Simon's failure as count of Toulouse was a result of his eponymous capital. Specifically, it was caused by his inflexibility, suspicion, and even hatred towards the city that symbolised for him the cancerous core of a hostile country that he nonetheless desired to possess and cure. In many ways, Simon's relationship with the inhabitants of the county was the most cooperative of his lordships outside of France. He enjoyed enthusiastic and nearly universal support from the episcopate, courted a diverse selection of religious foundations, retained the fidelity of important cities amidst adverse circumstances, and commanded intensive participation from magnates, barons, and burghers. But Toulouse—a fiercely independent commune that had recently emancipated itself from the comital yoke—would resent any attempt by Simon to establish his dominance over the capital in order to purge it of heresy. Convinced of the bad faith of the citizenry, Simon imposed exceptionally heavy demands and made few and half-hearted concessions. This intransigence led to the city erecting itself as a competing *mons fortis*, against which Simon would finally meet his own fate.

¹¹² Pegg, *Corruption of Angels*, pp. 121-4.

CONCLUSION

It was not that Simon had failed to adopt lessons of governance learned in his diverse experiences of lordship. The consultative approach to the subject aristocracy that proved so effective in his patrimony was implemented with some success in the Midi, but predominantly collapsed in the face of irreconcilable objectives and differing understandings of feudal obligations. The appropriation of traditional means of lordship, so notably lacking in Leicester, was attempted in Toulouse. A respect for urban development and autonomy was allowed to mature when it came into contact with the southern tradition of consular independence, except in the crucial case of *Tolosa dolosa*. Any shortcomings were partially compensated by the vigorous cultivation of episcopal and Cistercian support. However, the exchange of practical compromise for strict adherence to the ecclesiastical reform programme proved the undoing of Simon's crusade. The characterisation of the Albigensian Crusade as a conflict that began with high ideals of eradicating support for heresy and subsequently devolved under Simon's leadership into a simple land grab is clearly insufficient. In fact, had Simon shown himself more interested in the retention of personal power, regardless of the consequences for the *negotium pacis et fidei*, he might have been able to found a lasting dynasty. He would have still presented a more sympathetic alternative than the Trencavels or Saint-Gilles to the local episcopate, and had shown himself to be not only pragmatic in matters of necessity—such as the employment of mercenaries or usurers—but adaptable to the circumstances of alien communities, like Béziers, Nîmes, and Narbonne. A similar flexibility shown to lords who harboured heretics or the proud Tolosans might have allowed him to retain at least the extensive acquiescence of his subjects.

But Simon had taken the cross in 1199 and in 1208 in order to reform the Christian order where he perceived it to be weakest. In both cases, he pursued his divine mandate without allowance for the secular concerns of others; in both cases, he failed to achieve lasting results. There is therefore, for all his brutality, something tragic about Simon's exercise of lordship: a man possessed of great talents for enlisting the aid of his fellows and directing them to victory, he finally employed them to tilt at windmills on the walls of Toulouse.

But in his quest for a comital principality beyond the station of his birth, Simon was hardly a relic, nor was his use of the crusade as a vehicle exceptional: the pursuit of power, especially in foreign lands, was one enthusiastically undertaken by contemporaries. However, the Lusignans, Courtenays, and Briennes benefited from invitations, however partisan, to assume authority: a potential title became available before being offered and accepted.¹ While this roughly parallels Simon's temporary acquisition—through blood rather than marriage—of Leicester, other expansions to his titular authority moved through quite different channels. In the viscounties of Carcassonne and Béziers, Simon was elected to the head of the politico-military entity which had taken by force the centres of vicecomital authority, but the crusader did not become count of Toulouse until he already held all the territory pertaining to the title. Thus violence, justified by canon law rather than feudal practice, formed the cornerstone of Simon's authority.

In many ways, this places Simon in a long tradition of southern warfare. Conflict between king, duke, count, viscount, and castellan in any number of permutations had been a feature of aristocratic life in the Midi for centuries, despite the influence of the Peace of God.

¹ P.W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 23-5; Wolff, 'Latin Empire', p. 212; Perry, *John of Brienne*, pp. 44-6, 150-2.

Power relied on proximity and political will. But Simon's authority was also qualitatively different from that which had previously characterised the region. The distance between French and southern understandings of lordship led to resentment and evasion on the part of Simon's subjects and frustration and vengeance from the crusader. The consequent cycle of rebellion and retaliation would ultimately lead to the collapse of Simon's principality and the loss of his life.

Nevertheless, Simon's power—however bloodily established and maintained—clearly translated into government, setting him apart from the common adventurer as a subject of interest. He was deeply invested in the ideological—if not always the legal—underpinnings of his rise to power, and strove to implement the reform they represented. His means of doing so was to create a structure of office and accountability that mirrors in microcosm and for very different purposes the emerging governments of the kingdoms surrounding him.

Heretofore, historians have looked to such royal institutions for the origins of European government while largely ignoring—except in the case of the English Barons' Wars—aristocratic influences. There are good reasons for this: monarchies uniquely possessed the resources for extensive organisation on a national scale and would be the enduring repositories of power from the Middle Ages until the nineteenth century; moreover, the overwhelming preponderance of surviving sources for medieval governance reside in royal archives. Barons, with their autonomous and uncontrollable appetites for personal exploitation, have usually been seen—outside of England—as opponents of administrative progress. Simon's remarkable career may provide a corrective. Though not an uncomplicated story of baronial success—he failed to retain Leicester, for instance, and the battle of Muret might well have ended differently—it hints at a

deeper diffusion of governing principles at the turn of the thirteenth century that included the nobility, and not only the greatest comital magnates.

By turning to the aristocracy to observe the transformation of lordships of private power into lordships of public government, historians may be better able to free themselves from a teleological focus on the progress of modern states. Barons may have been routinely violent in their autonomy, but that does not mean they were insensible to concepts of public order. Moreover, the crusade as a channel for extranational baronial concerns suggests that the emergence of government at the turn of the thirteenth century may encompass conscious prescriptive ideals beyond the descriptive efficiency of systems of account. This development is one that remains insufficiently explored, and the intersection of lords—from castellans to kings—and the neogregorian reform embodied by Innocent III may contribute to a more complex understanding of high medieval political history.² Perhaps, touched by the temporal concerns of the schools and the Cistercians, kings and nobles alike strove for the creation of a public order in a variety of different theatres.

Simon himself appears at first an unlikely candidate for herald of responsible government, and it would be a mistake to read his career in the same manner as Whig historians treated that of his son. He was a violent man from a violent class in a violent age. Moreover, he was little interested in the construction of the centralised state, if he or his contemporaries could even think in such terms. However, like his son, he was driven by ambition and piety to dream of a different republic animated by ideal principles. But a programme such as that entailed in the

² Given, *State and Society*, pp. 261-2; T.N. Bisson, 'Author's Response', in T. Riches, 'Review of *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of European Government*', *Reviews in History* 754, <http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/754>.

Statutes of Pamiers could only thrive outside of the intensive influence of royal administrations, concentrated as their energies were on wars amongst themselves. It also presumed a society judged by the reformers to be desperately in need of their medicine. The Midi in the early thirteenth century perfectly fitted both requirements, and Simon set about carving out a principality for himself and his family in which they could rule as temporal agents of divine correction. The brief existence of such a republic makes it no less interesting to the history of political development. Nor should Simon's feet of clay obscure the metals discernible higher up. His jealous cultivation of a grudge and his callous brutality mark him as a corruptible man imbued with the power and prejudice of his time and class. Indeed, the very ideals for which he stood may be judged offensive to modern minds. But rather than lead to a dismissal of his remarkable career as simply that of an especially capable or greedy zealot, his employment of those ideals in the creation of an autonomous lordship paints an intriguing portrait not only of his own understanding of power and its aims, but—given his esteemed reputation—that of many of his contemporaries. The career of Simon of Montfort reveals a baronial pursuit of independent government exceptional in the detail of its documentation, but perhaps not so irrelevant to the exercise and experience of power at the turn of the thirteenth century.

APPENDIX A: UNPUBLISHED ACTS

I. *Simon of Montfort confirms the exemption from tolls at Conflans granted by Matthew of Montmorency to the monks of the abbey of Notre-Dame du Val.*

(1200)

A. AN, L 944, n° 42: parchment, 8.75cm x 17.55cm, attachment for missing seal.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 56; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 144.

Nouerint uniuersi presentem paginam inspecturi, quod Ego Simon de monte forti pro remedio Anime mee et parentum meorum de assensu A. uxoris mee ratam habeo libertatem quam matheus de montemorenciaci contulit monachis in loco qui uocatur uallis beate marie domino famulantibus, uidelicet quod licebit eis in perpetuum ferre, et ducere res proprias libere, et quiete per transuersum meum de Cofflens. Eandem etiam libertatem predictis monachis Concedo in Omni terra et quam modo possideo; et quam domino largiente possessurus sum. Et ut hoc firmum et inconcussum permanent, Autentici mei munimine decreui corroborari. Actum Anno Gracie, Millesimo ducentismo.

II. *Hugh and Odo of Ausona grant the census from their land around Saucei to the Knights of the Temple of Solomon.*

(Acre?, c.1203-1206¹)

A. AN, S 5150^A, n° 16: parchment, 16.7cm x 8.4cm, left mandola seal (4.7cm x 3.3cm) in green wax of seated abbot with the legend ✠ SIGILL·ABBATIS SARNAIL, blank counter-seal, attached with red silk thread, remains of red silk queue for missing right seal.

Notum sit tam presentibus quam futuris. quod Ego Hugo de Ausona et Odo filius meus pro salute nostra et nostrorum antecessorum et uxoris mee domine Gile. donauimus et concessimus domui Militie Templi in helemosinam censuam illius terre nostre que esset proprior et uicinior molendinis eorum de Saucei. Et ut ista donatio semper firma foret et stabilis Abbas de uallis et dominus Rotbertus malus uicinus ad preces nostras sigillorum suorum impressione presentem paginam munierunt. Huius doni etiam testes sunt. Abbas Sacre Celle. et dominus Symon de monte forti. et dominus Gerardus de Forniuas. Hoc donum fuit factum in presentia fratris Willelmi de chartres. et fratris Rotberti de Chamuile qui tunc erat preceptor domus Templi Accon.

III. *Simon of Montfort confirms a royal grant of tillage land in the forest of Longboël to the abbey of Notre-Dame de Fontaine-Guérard.*

(Termes, 12 October 1210)

A. AdS-M, 80 HP 4: parchment, 11.8cm x 4.7cm, seal (destroyed) in brown wax attached with double parchment queue.

Ind.: Power, 'Who Went on the Albigensian Crusade?', p. 1063n. 62.

¹ Though the charter bears no date or location, the presence of William of Chartres and Robert of Camville clearly indicates the donation was made in Syria in the first years of the thirteenth century: P.-V. Clavierie, *L'Ordre du Temple en Terre Sainte et à Chypre au XIII^e siècle*, ii (Nicosia, 2005), pp. 328, 338.

Symon Comes Licestrie Dominus montisfortis et dei prouidencia Bitterensis et Karcassonensis vicecomes vniuersis presentes litteras inspecturis. Salutem. vniuersitatj uestre notum facimus. nos Caritatis intuitu dare et concedere sanctis monialibus de Fonte Giraldj terram ad opus unius Caruce in nemore quod vocatur Luncboel. libere et quiete in perpetuum possidendem. sicut Philippus illustris rex francorum predictam terram concesserat possidendam. monialibus predictis Quod ut ratum habeatur et inconcussum permaneat sigilli nostri munimine fecimus roborarj Datum in obsidione Termarum. Anno domini m^o. cc^o. x^o. Quarto Idus Octobris.

IV. *Simon of Montfort grants Nissan to the abbey of Notre-Dame de Cîteaux and Abbot Arnold-Amalric.*

(Siege of Toulouse, 22 June 1211)

B. AN, JJ 30^A, f^o 19r^o: 13th c.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 67; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 164-5.

In nomine patris et filij et spiritus sancti Amen. Ego Symon Comes Leicestrie dominus montis fortis et dei gracia Biterrensis et Carcassonensis vicecomes et dominus albiensis et Redensis. Notum facio uniuersis tam presentibus quam futuris quod Ego pro remedio anime mee et antecessorum meorum dedi et concessi deo et ecclesie Cisterciensi in manu domini arnaudi eiusdem loci abbatis apostolice sedis legati in puram et perpetuam elemosinam Castrum quod uocatur Anicianum prope Biterrim cum omni territorio suo et omnibus pertinentiis suis tam in terris cultis et incultis quam in aquis pascuis, nemoribus et omnibus bonis seu prouentibus ad idem castrum quomodolibet pertinentibus ad omnem uoluntatem abbatis qui pro tempore fuerit et fratrum dicti monasterij cum libertate plenissima imperpetuum faciendam. Et ut hoc Ratum et stabile imperpetuum perseueret presentem cartam huius mee donationis feci sigilli mei munimine roborari. Actum in obsidione tholose anno domini m^o. cc^o. vndecimo x^o kalends Julij.

V. *Simon of Montfort confirms his grants of property confiscated from Emile of Rieussec and of Nissan to the abbey of Notre-Dame de Cîteaux.*

(Pamiers, 29 November 1212)

B. AN, JJ 30^A, f^o 19v^o.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 71; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 169.

In nomine patris et filij et spiritus sancti. Ego Symon Comes Leycestrie dominus montis fortis dei permissione bitteris et Carcasone vicecomes pro remedio anime mee et parentum meorum gratis ac bona fide cum hac presenti carta inperpetuum ualitura dono et irreuocabiliter concedo ut domus bitteris que fuit quondam amelij de riuo sicco heretici, et omnia ad ipsam domum pertinencia et castrum Aniciani cum omnibus pertinentiis suis et domus Carcasone que fuit quondam bernardi de lerida cum omnibus pertinentiis suis et omnia que a nobis monasterio Cisterciensi et fratribus ibidem deo seruientibus donata sunt et concessa in munitate gaudeant et plenissima libertate et omnes fratres et omnes homines in predictis locis habitantes et res ipsorum semper sub nostra sint protectione et ab omni exactione tolta, questa, leuda, fodagio liberi sint et immunes in tota terra nostra et nullus de baiulis nostris uel hominibus eisdem inferre audeat aliquam molestiam uel grauamen. ad maiorem huius confirmationem rei presentem cartam

sigilli nostri munimine fecimus roborari. actum fuit hoc in villa apamie. anno domini m^o cc^o xij^o in vigilia Sancti Andree.

VI. *Simon of Montfort gives the fortified villages of Saint-Georges and Marvail to the cathedral chapter of Sainte-Cécile d'Albi.*

(Lavaur, 24 January 1213)

B. BnF, ms. Doat 105, f^{os} 185r^o-186r^o: 17th c.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 74; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 172-3.

Symeon Comes Leycestræ Dominus Montisfortis Dei prouidentia Biterris, et Carcassonæ vicecomes, vniuersis præsentis Literas inspecturis, Salutem in domino Vniuersitati vestræ Notum facimus, quod nos pro salute animæ nostræ, et successorum nostrorum damus et concedimus Capitulo Sanctæ Ceciliæ Sedis Albiensis, et Canonicis ibidem deo servientibus, viginti libratas terræ annuatim in mera Eleemosina inperpetuum libere possidendas, pro quibus eisdem tenendum concedimus quicquid habemus in Castris Sancti Georgij, et de Marvail cum pertinentiis eorundem, eo tamen Salvo quod Guillelmus Petri Episcopus Albiensis habet in vita sua, in Castro Sancti Georgij prædicti vero Canonici honores prædictorum Castrorum possidebunt, quousque eis assignemus vel hæredes nostri prædictas viginti libratas terræ loco alio competenti, quæ cum eis fuerant assignantæ, id quod eis dedimus in Castris iamdictis, ad nos, et ad hæredes nostros plenius reuertetur, ipsi autem Capitulum, et Canonici nobis, et hæredibus nostris dicta Castra reddent, quotiens fuerint requisiti, et nos eis reddemus eo modo munita, quo ea receperimus ab eisdem. quod vt ratum sit præsentis Literas sigilli nostri munimine Confirmamus. Actum Vauri Anno dominij millesimo ducentesimo duodecimo Nono Kalendas februarij.

VII. *Robert Mauvoisin, as deputy of Simon of Montfort, grants property confiscated from heretics to Peter-Emile, sacristan of Béziers.*

(February 1213)

B. BnF, ms. Doat 153, f^{os} 55r^o-56v^o: 17th c.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 77 (dated 1214).

In nomine Domini. Anno natiuitatis eiusdem millesimo ducentesimo decimo tertio Regnante Rege Philippo, mense februarij. Ego Rotbertus malus vicinus vices agens Dominj Simonis Comitis montisfortis, Vicecomitis Bitterrensis, et Carcassensis per ipsum Comitem, et per omnes suos ex mandato eiusdem Comitis bona fide, et sine dolo cum hac carta dono, concedo, et trado nunc et inperpetuum titulo perfectæ donationis sine vlla Domini Comitis suorumque retentione tibi Petro Amelio, et tuis, et cui vel quibus tu vel tui donaveritis, dimiseritis, aut cum consilio seniorum subscripti honoris vendideritis, vel pignori subposueritis exceptis sanctis et militibus, scilicet totum illum ortum cum arboribus, et cum omni jure suo qui fuit Johannis de Bosco ciuis quondam Bitterris, qui est de hæresj condempnatus, et totum illum mansum qui fuit Petri de Sancto Martino, qui est in campo nouo extra portale sanctæ mariæ magdalenæ, qui affrontat ex altano in carreria de Campo nouo, ex meridie in alia Carreria qui itur ad puteum, ex circio in alia carreria quæ descendit de Campo nouo ad portale, ex *Aquil.* in manso qui fuit de Cochaluin; Ortus vero affrant ex in meridie in flumine orbi, ex circio in orto qui fuit Petri Sicardj Suloris, ex

aquil. in carreria, ex altano in paxeria de Bannolis, et promitto tibi quod totum prædictum honorem cum omnj jure suo, et omnibus suis pertinenciis, et cum omnj valentia, et bonitate quam nunc habet, vel in antea habuerit, facient Dominus Comes, et sui, te et tuos semper habere, et tenere bene et quiete, et ab omnj persona aliquid ibj petente, vel demandante illum vobis semper deffendent, et de hoc toto ex parte eiusdem Comititis recipio te, et tuos in Dej fide et nostra, et causa maioris firmitatis hanc cartam impressione sigilli mej confirmo; vos vero dabit de prædicto honore seniorj illud vsaticum, quod inde darj consuetum est huius rej sunt testes Poncius helemosinarius sancti Nazarij, Dominus Guillelmus de bel deport, Aimericus Botatus, Guiraudus martinj, Poncius Ermenguadj, Raimundus de furno Et Bernardus Martini publicus Bitterris notarius, in cuius operatorio Radulphus de florentiaco hæc scripsit. Ego idem Bernardus Martinj subscribo.

VIII. *Simon of Montfort takes the abbey of Sainte-Marie de Fontfroide under his protection, grants it pasture rights throughout his lands, and exempts it from all tolls and exactions.*

(Crusader encampment near Roquefort, 17 October 1213)

B. BnF, ms. Doat 59, f^{os} 329v^o-330v^o: 17th c.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 76; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 175.

Simon Comes et Leycestriae Dei prouidentia Biterris, et Carcassonæ Vicecomes humiliter præsentis literas inspecturis salutem in domino vniuersitati vestræ notum facimus, quod nos Abbatem, Monachos, et fratres Fontisfrigidi, et omnes res, et possessiones eorum vbicumque fuerint in potestate nostra hominum et amicorum nostrorum cepimus in nostro guidagio, et protectione, et securitate nostra inhibentes omnibus ne dictis Abbati, Monachis, et fratribus, rebus, vel possessionibus eorundem inferre præsumant iniuriam vel grauamen, quod si quis faceret nos non relinquerimus impunitum, præcipimus, et omnibus baiulis, militibus, et omnibus nostris quod res prædictæ domus deffendant, et custodiant sicut nostra propria, nec sustineant in aliquo molestari volumus et concedimus quod p^{er} pecora predictæ domus per totam terram nostram in pascuis publicis pascua habeant libere, et quiete; ita quod ab ipsis pro pastura p^{er} pecorum publicis pascuis aliqua pecunia, siue aliquod præmium nullathenus exhigatur ipsis, et concedimus, quod omnes res ipsorum ad proprios vsus suos pertinentes qualescumque fuerint per totam terram, et potestatem nostrum tam per terram, quam per quam secure et libere reducantur, nec ab eis aliquod pedagium, vel exactio aliqua exhigatur; Elemosinas autem quæ ab ipsis fient de terra nostra concedimus eis, et ipsas possideant, saluo tamen seruicio et quolibet iure nostro, quod vt ratum sit præsentis literas sigilli nostri munimine confirmamus. Actum in exercitu domini Nycolajruprefortis² Anno domini millesimo ducentesimo decimo tertio in vigilia Sancti Luchæ Evangelistæ.

IX. *Simon of Montfort promises lands worth 500l. to Adam Cheverel and assigns him money-rents until they are granted.*

(Valence, 4 December 1213)

B. BnF, ms. lat. 9996, f^o 84r^o: 13th c.

² Molinier proposes 'in colle rupisfortis' as a better reading of the lost original; Roquefort-les-Cascades offers the best candidate matching Simon's itinerary.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 77; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 176.

Simon comes Leicestrie dominus montis fortis dei prouidentia Bitterensis Karcassonensis vicecomes vniuersis presentes litteras inspecturis salutem in domino Vniuersitati uestre notum facimus quod nos damus adam cheverel et heredibus suis de legitima uxore progenitis quingentas libratas terre. Nos ei assignabimus loco et tempore competendo partum autem quosque predictas quingentas libratas terre eidem assignauerimus dabimus ei singulis Annis Quingentas libras de denariis nostris scilicet ad purificationem beate marie C libras ad Pascha C libras ad festum sancti Johannis Babbiste C libras ad festum sancti Remegij C libras ad Nativitate domini C libras et propter hec ipse fecit nobis et heredibus nostris pro se et heredibus suis homagium ligium et ipse et heredes sui tenentur nobis et heredibus nostris seruire seruitio unius militis secum quociens illos curabimus ad nostra negotia facienda. Quod ut Ratum sit presentes litteras sigilli nostri munimine confirmamus. Datum valentie Anno domini m^o CC^o xiiij^o die mercurij Ante festum beati Nycholai.

X. *Vidimus of Simon of Montfort's gift of confiscated mills to Peter-Emile, sacristan of Béziers.*
(Béziers, February 1214/18 January 1239)

B. BnF, ms. Doat 62, f^{os} 73r^o-74r^o: 17th c.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 83.

Nouerint omnes præsentem paginam inspecturj, quod Ego Simon Dominus Montisfortis, Comes Leicestriæ Dej prouidentia Vicecomes Bitterensis et Carcassonensis per me et per omnes hæredes, ac successores meos dono, concedo, et trado in perpetuum tibj Petro Amelio sacristæ Bitterensis Ecclesiæ, et tuis ad omnes voluntates tuas plenarie faciendas in vita vel in morte totum illud Claperium molendinorum cum omnj jure suo et omnibus suis pertinentiis, quod fuit Bermundj de Riwo torto super flumen orbj ad Bannolas, et totam illam partem cum omnj jure suo, quam Stephanus de Portalj et Poncius Aymericus ciues quondam Bitterenses habebant, vel habere debebant in molendinis de Rego, et in eorum pertinentiis, quæ Scilicet pars, et prædictum Claperium sunt ad me reuersa per escaducham ex præscriptione Bitterris similiter dono, et trado tibj, et tuis totum illum honorem quam³ habeo per Escaducham hominum Bitterris, vel alium de in toto terminio villæ nouæ requini infra ipsum Castrum et extra, et promito tibj quod totum jamdictum honorem, cum omnibus suis pertinentiis, et cum hædificiis, quæ ibj facietis, et cum omni valentia et bonitate quam nunc habet, vel in antea habuerit faciam te et tuos semper habere et possidere et legalis defensor vobis ero. Acta fuerunt hæc apud Bitterrim anno Natiuitatis Christi millesimo ducentesimo decimo quarto, mense februarij. hoc est transcriptum quod Petrus grandis vice Bernardj Escotj publicj Bitterris notarij ab autenticis et originalibus Litteris sigillo Dominj simonis quondam Comitiss Montisfortis et Leicestriæ corroboratis transtulit, nihil augens vel minuens, Anno ab incarnatione Dominj millesimo ducentesimo tricesimo nono, decimo quinto Kalendas februarij præsentibus et legentibus Berenguario Peirerio clerico, Johanne Provincialj Raimundo de Solario, Bernardo Radulfo, et præscripto Bernardo Escoto notario, Ego idem Bernardus Escotj subscribo.

³ *Later emended quem.*

XI. *Pons Amanieu swears fealty to Simon of Montfort for Saint-Livrade and the lands of William Amanieu.*

(Penne-d'Agenais, 13 April 1214)

C. AN, JJ 30^A, f^o 11v^o.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 77.

Ego Poncius Amenii. Notum facio vniuersis presentes litteras inspecturis quod feci hominagium ligium contra omnes homines domino Symoni Comiti leycestrie domino montisfortis et vicecomiti biterensi et Karcassonensi de tota terra mea et de hoc quod habebat ipse apud Sanctam liberatam et de tota terra Guillelmi Amenii que ipsi erat escaduta quam michi dedit et propter hoc debeo ei seruire et heredibus suis eo seruitio quod debeo de propria terra mea et de illo quod predictus Guillelmus Amenii debebat de terra sua. predicto autem domino Comiti et heredibus suis ero semper bonus homo legitimus et fidelis ita quod si aliquid contra ipsum uel heredes suos aliquo tempore quod absit fecero. si per iudicium Curie sue agenensis illud uoluerem emendare tenebor vbique pro proditore ac omnia mea tam terra quam aliud erunt sibi incursa. Quod ut ratum sit presentes litteras sigilli mei munimine confirmaui. actum apud Pennam in Agenensi anno domini m^o cc^o. xiiij^o die dominica post octabas pasche

XII. *Deodat Baras swears fealty to Simon of Montfort and agrees to destroy his fortifications at Béduer and Lissac should he be so ordered.*

(Crusader encampment near Montcuq, 12 June 1214)

B. AN, JJ 30^A, f^o 11r^o-v^o.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 78.

Vniuersis presentes litteras inspecturis. Ego Deodatus baras salutem in domino. Noueritis me prestitum sacramento euuangeliiis tactis corporaliter sacrosanctis bona fide pepigisse domino meo S. Comiti leycestrie domino montisfortis dei prouidentia biterensi et Carcassonensi vicecomiti et semper ero ipsi et suis in omnibus legitimus et fidelis et ero eidem contra omnes viuentes in auxilium et iuuamen Concedo eciam ei sub predicto sacramento quod forciis meas necnon villas et castra ad voluntatem suam et arbitrium dirui faciat cum de forciis aliorum baronum terre Caturcensis dirui faciet. Ita tamen quod castrum de beduer, et forcia de liseac cum integritate murorum michi debent integra remanere. Si vero in aliquo predictorum deficerem et omnia non tenerem plenare et integre prelibata me esse obligatum erga dominum Comitem iamdictum in decem mille solidis margolensibus profiteor et penam incurrere pecunie nominate, propter hoc quod in non tenendo supradicta me esse scirem transgressorem prestiti sacramenti. Et ad maiorem securitatem totam terram meam ubicumque sit uolo pro predicta pecunia obligari. Omnia ista supradicta feci et teneri pepigi a me bona fide ut beniuolenciam domini Comitis possem acquirere et omnes rancores quas erga me habebat usque ad hanc diem pro retroactis michi benignitatem condonaret quod quidem gratia sui impetram sicut in litteris quas de ipso habeo super hec et super aliis continetur. Quod ut ratum sit presentem cartam sigilli mei munimine confirmaui. Actum in exercitu domini iuxta moncuc. Anno domini m^o cc^o. xiiij^o. pridie Idus Junij.

XIII. *Viscount Raymond IV of Turenne pays homage to Simon of Montfort, promising service in the dioceses of Cahors, Rodez, and Agen for his lifetime.*

(Siege of Casseneuil, 29-30 June 1214⁴)

C. AN, JJ 30^A, f^o 13r^o-v^o.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 78.

Vniuersis has litteras inspecturis R. vicecomes turensis, salutem. Vniuersitati uestre, Notum facimus quod nos tenemur in fidelitate et homagio legitimo, Nobili viro domino S. Comiti leycestrie domino montisfortis dei prouidentia biterris et Karcassone vicecomiti per hominagium quod ei fecimus et tenemur de seruire Simoni et heredibus suis personaliter quamdiu vixerimus, nos decimis militum armatorum et cum decem seruientibus armatis annuatim per vnum mensem quociens ab ipso citati fuerimus ad sua uel suorum negocia facienda infra dyoceses Caturcensis, Rutinensis, Agennensis saluo iure in omnibus domini Regis Francie. Si vero nos infirmari contingeret uel essemus negociis domini Regis Francie occupati aliquem nobilem cum militibus et seruientibus dictis, possemus mittere loco nostri dictus vero dominus Comes tenetur custodire manutenere et defendere ab omnibus inimicis fidei et suis atque nostris nos et totam terram nostram cum hominibus et rebus eorundem saluo tamen negotio fidei ihesu xpi et fide qua tenetur domino Regi Francie et aliis dominis suis in omnibus conseruata. Quod ut ratum sit presentes litteras sigilli nostri munimine duximus confirmandas. Datum in obsidione cassinolij. anno domini millesimo ducentesimo xiiij^o. Mense Junio.

XIV. *Raymond of Turenne pays homage to Simon of Montfort for the possessions of Bernard of Cazenac and Alice of Turenne.*

(Domme, September 1214)

C. AN, JJ 30^A, f^o 6r^o-v^o.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 79.

R. vicecomes turrensis has litteras inspecturis salutem in domino. Nouerit vniuersitas vestra quod cum b. de casnac et heliz uxor eius propter grauia et enormia delicta que aduersus deum et sanctam matrem ecclesiam et dominum nostrum S. Comitem de monteforti in pluribus commiserant omnia bona tam mobilia quam immobilia de iure amisissent et ad ipsum dominum Comitem de mandato sedis apostolice deuenissent. tandem ad instanciam supplicationis nostre, idem Comes omnia bona predictorum b. et he. nobis donauit liberaliter et concessit. propter quod nos sepedicto Comiti homagium et fidelitatem fecimus manuales seruicium sibi propter hoc secundum quod inter nos et ipsum conuenerit fideliter impensuri promittentes quod ad cogitationem et arbitrium venerabilium patrum R. domini petragori Episcopi, et C. abbatis cadinij omnibus de sepredictis b. et he. conquerentibus singulis annis pro ratione reddituum curabimus satisfacere competenter promissimus eciam quod sepredictum b. de casnac reddemus domino Comiti de cetero fidelem et per omnia pariturum, quod si idem b. facere recusauerit et in consueta uoluerit contumacia permanere; nos eum qui inimicum nostrum de omni potestate nostra eiciemus et eum bona fide expugnabimus et castrum dallac et omnia alia que quondam fuere predictorum b. et he. pro uoluntate domini Comitis modis omnibus destruemus. pro hiis

⁴ *Hystoria albigensis*, ii p. 214.

autem fideliter et firmiter obseruandis, nos et omnia nostra sepedicto Comiti obligauimus.
Datum apud domam Anno incarnati uerbi M^o. cc^o. xiiij^o. Mense septembri.

XV. *Bishop Peter III of Rodez promises to submit to Simon's judgement all contentions over the temporal possessions and rights of his see.*

(Rodez, 11 September 1214)

C. BAV, ms. Ott. lat. 2537, f^o 96v^o: 13th c.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 79.

Nobili ac magnifico uiro karissimo et speciali amico domino S. dei gratia comiti lycestrie domino montis fortis diuina prouidencia Biterris et Carcassone vicecomiti P. eadem gratia episcopus et capitulum Ruthenense cum sincera dilectione salutem et prosperus ad vota successus presencium testimonio litterarum vobis promittimus quod si aliqua tenemus vel possidemus aut in posterium forsitam possidebimus domino concedente que ad vos pertineant vobis aut vestris siue alii etiam cuilibet conquerenti in manu vestra exhibebimus super illis iusticie complementum. Datum Ruthene anno domini m^o cc^o xiiij^o iii idus septembri.

XVI. *Abbot Elias I of Saint-Sacerdos de Sarlat, representing the knights and men of La Roque-Gageac, promises that they will be faithful and obedient subjects of Simon of Montfort.*

(Domme, 12 September 1214)

B. AN, JJ 30^A, f^o 13r^o.

Ind.: *Gallia christiana*, ii c. 1509; Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 79.

Helyas sarlatensis ecclesie Abbas totusque eiusdem loci conuentus vniuersis presentes litteras inspecturis, salutem in domino. Noueritis nos illustri viro S. Comiti de monteforti pro militibus et hominibus rupis de gaiac promisisse quod predicto Comiti et suis a predictis hominibus nullum omnino malum proueniet in futurum, sed semper ipsi Comiti et suis erunt legitimi et fideles sicut eciam corporaliter iurauerunt propter quod firmiter obseruandum, nos et nostra predicto Comiti confitemur teneri. Quod ut ratum permaneat presentes litteras sigilli nostri munimine duximus confirmandas. Datum apud domam, anno domini m^o cc^o. xiiij^o. pridie Idus septembri

XVII. *Raymond of Montaut pays homage to Simon of Montfort for his lands in the Agenais.*

(Penne-d'Agenais, September 1214)

A. AN, J 890, n^o 12: parchment, 7.2cm x 13.7cm, seal (6.4 cm diameter) in brown wax of a mailed knight with half-helm, triangular shield (bearing two triangular bars down the top quarter), and drawn sword riding a barded horse to dexter, with damaged legend SIGILLVM • R • DE MO..., counter-seal of triangular shield bearing five triangular bars down top quarter, with damaged legend ...LVM • R...MONTAV... attached with double parchment queue

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 79.

Ego Remondus de Montealto Notum fatio omnibus tam presentibus quam futuris me illustri uiro Symoni Comiti de Monteforti, de hijs que habeo in Agenensi diocese et in partibus bainensibus homagium ligium fecisse: et firmiter promisisse quod eidem Comiti ero decetero legitimus et fidelis, et propter hoc predicto Comiti tale seruitium teneor facere; quale debent alij barones

agenenses, et pro hijs omnibus firmiter obseruandis; dedi bec de caumont fideiussorem. In cuius rei testimonium presentes litteras feci sigilli mei Munimine Roborari. Actum apud pennam in agenensi, Anno Dominj M^o. cc^o. xiiij^o. Mense Septembri.

XVIII. *Simon of Montfort gives the fisheries of Castelnaud to the abbey of Notre-Dame de Cadouin out of respect for the Holy Shroud.*
(Cahors, 1214)

B. BnF, ms. Périgord 37, ff 70r^o-v^o: 18th c.

C. BnF, ms. Périgord 12, ff 275r^o-v^o: 18th c.

Simon Comes Licestræ,⁵ dominus montisfortis dei providentia bitterrensis⁶ et Karcassonensis vicecomes omnibus has litteras inspecturis salutem et iis dare fidem ad omnium noticiam⁷ volumus pervenire quod, ob remedium animæ nostræ et A.⁸ karissimæ⁹ uxoris nostræ¹⁰ et pro salute bonæ memoriæ Wilelmi archidiaconi parisiensis, et omnium parentum nostrorum donamus [et concedimus in perpetuum]¹¹ elemosinam deo et Beatæ mariæ, et fratr[ibus Cadunii decimas] piscariæ nostræ de Castronovo, et omnium aliarum [piscariarum] quas habemus vel unquam habituri sumus in ep[iscopatu petragoerensi] sane quia volumus quod in Ecclesia prædictorum fratrum, Coram precioso sudario domini nostri Jesu Christi, quod ibi honorifice Continetur, lumen indeficiens amodo perseveret, Eidem Ecclesiæ viginti¹² libras petragoenses monete¹³ in piscariis nostris de Castronovo donamus singulis annis perpetuo percipiendas. itaque¹⁴ de illa pecunia semper die ac nocte Coram supradicto¹⁵ Sancto Sudario ardeat cereus unus Cum autem ostendetur¹⁶ duo cerei accendantur. præcipimus¹⁷ etiam quod si prædicta¹⁸ piscaria detur ad

⁵ Lectorsensis C.

⁶ Biterrensis B.

⁷ notitiam B.

⁸ Lacking in C.

⁹ carissime B.

¹⁰ Lacking in C.

¹¹ Material in brackets suppld by BnF, ms. Périgord 37, ff 72r^o (1219 confirmation by Amalric of Montfort).

¹² xx B.

¹³ Lacking in B.

¹⁴ itaque que B.

¹⁵ ...radicto C.

¹⁶ ostend... C.

¹⁷ precipimus C.

¹⁸ præd... C.

firmam nichil firmarius ibi percipere¹⁹ permittat nisi prius de dictis viginti quinque libris satisfaciatur²⁰ Ecclesiæ supradictæ si verò²¹ ad firmam data non fuerit, volumus²² quod de primis proventibus dictæ piscariæ dicta pecunia persolvatur itaque que²³ quod si Balivus noster vel quisquis prædictum Castrum pro nobis tenuerit hoc facere detrectaverit singulis hebdomadis penam quinque solidorum Eidem Ecclesiæ dabit donec ad plenum fuerit satisfactum Si autem de prædictis viginti quinque libris aliquid residuum fuerit in Candelis ad usum fratrum infirmorum expendatur²⁴ verum si aliquo casu fortuito prædicta piscaria ad illas viginti quinque libras habendas non sufficerit volumus et præcipimus quod de redditibus²⁵ nostris de Castro novo modis omnibus persolvatur. et etiam sub pena prædicta præcipimus etiam et quisque piscator a nobis aut a nostris in prædictis piscariis fuerit institutus totius piscationis decimas sub fide sacramenti fideliter persolvere prædictis fratribus tenetur datum Caturci per manum rainaldi decani sancti aniani aureliani anno incarnati verbi M CC quarto decimo Testi presentibus amalrico filio meo feremo et lamberto et sociis nostris, et multis aliis

XIX. *Abbot William of Saint-Saveur de Figeac enfeoffs Simon of Montfort with Peyrusse and its appurtenances for an annual rent of 10m. and concedes to him the former rights of the count of Toulouse in Capdenac and Lentillac, which are held in fief from the abbey.*
(Cahors, October 1214)

C. AN, JJ 30^A, f° 24^{ro}.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 80; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 178.

W. ecclesie Figiacensis minister humilis totusque eiusdem ecclesie Conuentus. Vniuersis presentibus et futuris, salutem in domino. Nouerit vniuersitas vestra quod inter nos ex vna parte et S. Comitem Nobilem virum ex alia super castro perucie talis compositio intercessit quod ipse et heredes sui castrum perucie cum omnibus pertinentiis suis a nobis et ecclesia Figiacensi tenebunt libere et quiete nobis et ecclesie persoluendo decem Marchas argenti de redditibus ipsius castri singulis annis in festo Sancti Michaelis. Concessimus eciam ipsi Comiti montisfortis et suis heredibus quicquid Comes tholosanus de iure habebat in caddenac, et Dentelac, et aliis locis de feodo predictæ ecclesie et quicquid iuste poterit acquirere in feodo sepepredictæ ecclesie. Ita quod iura illa a nobis et ecclesia teneat et super eisdem juri stet coram nobis. Tenetur eciam jdem Comes nos et nostra in jure nostro tueri et legitime defensare. Nos autem iura ipsius Comitis tanquam hominis nostri conseruare tenemur et legitime defensare

¹⁹ perc...ere C.

²⁰ sa...aciat C.

²¹ uero C.

²² volu...s C.

²³ *Lacking in B.*

²⁴ Capendatur C.

²⁵ reditibus C.

contra omnes. Quod ut firmum et stabile persueret presentes litteras sigilli nostri munimine fecimus roborari. Actum apud Caturcium anno gratie, m^o. cc^o. xiiij. Mense octobri

XX.

Reissue of the previous act at Figeac.

(Figeac, October 1214)

- A. AN, J 890, n^o 13: parchment, 20cm x 19.1cm, mandola seal (4.6cm x 4cm at most undamaged points) in green wax with standing abbot wearing mitre, alb, and chasuble, and holding a crozier in his right hand and a church in his left, with damaged and partly illegible legend ...GILLVM...GIACENSIS..., round counter-seal with bust of Christ holding Gospel and giving benediction with three cross-arms behind him and the legend ✠ SIGNVM SCI SALVATORIS, attached with knotted double queue in fine red and white silk cinctured at the ends with dark threads to make four ends, *cyrographum*: :CYROGRAPHUM:
Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 80.

In nomine sancte et indiuidue trinitatis, Amen. Nos Willelmus ecclesie Figiacensis minister humilis totusque eiusdem ecclesie conuentus notum facimus vniuersis presentibus pariter et futuris, quod inter nos ex una parte, et nobilem uirum Symonem Comitem de Monteforti ex alia, super castro perucie talis compositio intercessit, quod idem Comes et heredes sui castrum Perucie cum omnibus suis pertinentijs, a nobis et ecclesia figiacensi tenebunt libere et quiete, nobis decem Marchas argenti de redditibus ipsius castri in festo sancti Michaelis annis singulis persoluendo. Concessimus etiam dicto Comiti et heredibus suis, quicquid Comes tholosanus de iure habebat in Cadenac et dentilac et alijs locis de feodo ecclesie figiacensis et quicquid juste acquirere poterit in feodo ecclesie sepedicte idem Comes de Monteforti, uel heredes sui. Ita quod iura illa a nobis et ecclesia nostra teneant et super eisdem juri stent coram nobis. Tenentur autem predictus Comes et heredes sui, nos et nostra in iure nostro tueri, et legitime defensare. Nos uero jura sua in predictis locis cum omnibus pertinentijs suis, tenemur ipsi et heredi suo tanquam hominj nostro conseruare, et legitime defendere contra omnes. Quod ut ratum et stabile in perpetuum perseueret presens cyrographum scribi, et sigilli nostri munimine fecimus roborarij. Actum figiaci, Anno gratie, Millesimo Ducentesimo quartodecimo, Mense octobrj.

XXI. *Simon of Montfort receives the allegiance of the lords of Capdenac and promises to respect their rights.*

(Figeac, October 1214)

- A. AN, J 890, n^o 14: parchment, 17.45cm x 39.5cm, with five seals (left to right): (1) mandola (7.1cm x 4.5cm) in brown wax of a standing bishop wearing mitre, alb, and chasuble, holding a crozier in his left hand and making a sign of benediction with his right, with the legend ✠ S(hook of crozier)IGILLVM : GVILLELMI : MIMATENSIS : EPISCOPI, round counter-seal with the bust of bishop wearing mitre, alb, and chasuble, holding a crozier in his left hand and making a sign of benediction with his right, S over his right shoulder P^l over his left, (2) mandola (6.3cm x 4.25cm) in brown wax of standing bishop wearing mitre, alb, and chasuble, holding a crozier in his left hand and making a sign of benediction with his right, with the legend SIGILLM : WILLMI(bishop's feet)CATVRCENSIS : EP, round counter-seal of a patty cross with a fleur-de-lys in each quarter, with the legend ✠ BENEDCS DNS DS MS, (3) damaged round seal (4.8cm diameter at most undamaged point, but likely little more than half the real diameter) in brown wax, showing lower half of rider in tunic on a saddled horse (horse's head effaced) riding to dexter, with a hound below the horse, with the damaged legend ...IS • DE • MON(horse's forelegs)T..., round counter-seal with the lower three quarters of a shield bearing a double-queued lion rampant to sinister (lion's head is missing), smaller illegible oval device imprinted below, (4) mandola (6.4cm x 4.4cm at most undamaged points) in brown wax, broken in two, of a standing bishop wearing mitre (middle of the figure is missing) and holding a crozier in his left hand (right hand is missing), with damaged legend SIGILLV...RV(bishop's feet)THENE..., round counter-seal showing the lower half of a bust of the Virgin Mary holding the Christ Child (their heads are missing), with

damaged legend ...VE M..., (5) mandola (5.5cm x 4.1cm) in light-brown wax with standing abbot wearing mitre, alb, and chasuble, and holding a crozier in his right hand and a church in his left, with legend ✠ SIGILLVM • WILLI • FIGIACENSIS • ABBATIS, round counter-seal with bust of Christ holding Gospel and giving benediction with three cross-arms behind him and the legend ✠ SIGNVM SCI SALVATORIS; all attached with double parchment queues, *cyrographum*: CYROGRAPHUM
Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 80; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 178.

Notum sit omnibus hanc scripturam cernentibus quod S. comes leycestrie dominus montis fortis dei prouidencia biterencis et carchassonensis uicecomes conuenit cum dominis de capdenac in hunc modum, Videlicet quod ipsi iurauerunt ei castrum de capdenac et reddiderunt tanquam domino suo, et promiserunt ei fidelitatem, promittentes etiam quod iddem castrum eidem comitj et irati et placati tradant quocienscumque ab ipso fuerint requisiti. Et debent predicto comitj dare procuracionem eo presente semel in anno. Et dominus comes promisit eis quod non diminuat eos nec iura ipsorum, nec uim eis in aliquo inferat, nec ab aliquo fieri permittat. Promisit etiam eis quod in predicto castro de capdenac nec in mandamento ipsius castri non faciat nouam forciam uel forcias, nec ab aliquo fieri permittat sine uoluntate eorum. Promisit etiam eis quod non eiciat eos de dominio suo sine uoluntate eorum, et quod eos tanquam fideles suos semper in libertate conseruabit. Et hoc totum dominus comes se seruaturum promisit dominis de capdenac quamdiu ipsi parati essent stare iurj in curia sua. Si uero aliquis dominorum de capdenac nollet respondere de iure in curia dominj comitis dominus comes sine dampno et grauamine parcium aliorum dominorum posset habere regressum in bonis illius, ita quod alij dominj nec partes eorum teneantur. Remisit etiam eis quicquid ab ipsius dominis aliqua occasione exigere poterat usque ad hanc diem. Et ut hec promissio maiorem obtineat firmitatem de mandato et uoluntate domini comitis nos Vgo de lassi et petrus de uarzis tactis sacrosanctis euuangelijs in Animam ipsius comitis iuramus quod dominus comes contra predictam pactionem non ueniet sed omnia supradicta dominis de capdenac eorumque heredibus inperpetuum fideliter obseruabit. Actum hoc Anno ab incarnatione dominj M^o. cc^o. xiiii^o. regnante Philippo rege mense octobri apud figiacum in presencia Guillelmi mimatensis episcopi, et Guillelmi caturcensis episcopi, et petri ruthenensis episcopi, et Guillelmi figiacensis abbatis qui omnes sigilla sua presenti carte apposuerunt. Interfuerant etiam alij, Guido de monte forti, et Amalricus filius comitis, Aimericus decanus, Guido cellararius, Guido bodis, Philippus presbyter, titbaldus de nouuila, Amalricus de montarzi, Raymundus de caorts, benedictus iohannis, Gaucelmus de uarso Stephanus bels, deodatus bec, durantus de lentiliac, Radulfus de fam iorj, et plures alij.

XXII. *Archbishop Michael of Arles enfeofs Simon of Montfort with Beaucaire.*
(30 January 1215, Beaucaire)

A. AN, J 890, n° 7: parchment, attachment for three seals on double silk queues, all missing, *cyrographum*: ABCDEFGHJKLMNQRSTVX

A bis. BnF, ms. lat. 9236, n° 3: parchment, 27.6cm x 32.1cm, attachments for three seals on double silk queues, all missing, *cyrographum*: ABCDEFGHJKLMNQRSTVX

b. P. de Caseneuve, *Le Franc-alieu de la province de Languedoc, établi et défendu*, 2nd edn, (Toulouse, 1645), pp. 315-8.

c. *Gallia christiana*, i instr., pp. 100-1.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, pp. 82-3; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 180.

In nomine domini nostri ihesu xpi Amen. Anno incarnationis eiusdem, M^o. cc^o. xiiii^o. iii.²⁶ kalends februarii. Notum sit omnibus presentem paginam inspecturis, quod nos Michael dei gratia Arelatensis Archiepiscopus consilio R.²⁷ Prepositi, Magistri²⁸ B. Decani, B. Sacriste, P. precentoris, et totius Capituli Arelatensis ecclesie, uobis Symoni Comiti montisfortis, et heredibus uestris tradimus et concedimus in feudum castrum belliquadri, cum tota sennoria sua, cum tota argentia et omnibus iuribus suis et pertinentijs, de quibus hec duximus propriis nominibus exprimenda: Castrum de furcis, Adanum, uillam sancti Petri de campo publico, et castrum de ionquerijs, munitionem de redorta, castrum sancti Romani, et de aculia, pedagia, siue in aqua siue in terra, lesdas, quintale, cordam, furnos, sextairale, iurisdictionem, iusticias, firmancias, trezenos medios trezenos, laudimia, monetam, paludes pascua, terras cultas et incultas, portus Rodani, et Gardonis, et omnia alia iura ubicumque sint que ad memorata castra pertinere noscuntur, quantumcumque Arelatensis diocesis extenditur, a castro furcarum et supra usque clausonam et a roca gaudoni usque ad petronos. Concedimus etiam uobis ius omne si²⁹ quod in Auinionensi, Vticensi, et Nemausensi diocesibus, uel alibi idem castrum habuisse dignoscitur, exceptis decimis et dominicaturis omnibus antiquis, quas nos et ecclesia Arelatensis infra dictos terminos habere dignoscitur, et excepto pedagio de pilis belliquadri, quod antecessores nostri Archiepiscopi Arelatenses et nos ipsi consueuimus percipere tempore comitum aliorum, et exceptis petitionibus etiam et querimonijs si quas aduersus aliquas personas Archiepiscopus et capitulum ante captionem castri belliquadri habebant de iure infra terminos antedictos. Pro dicto autem feudo uos et heredes uestri nobis et successoribus nostris homagium ligium facietis, et iurabitis fidelitatem, personas nostras et canonicorum Arelatensium uitam et membra fideliter custodire, res omnes et iura ad nos et capitulum seu ecclesiam Arelatensem pertinentes, contra omnem hominem defendetis et manutenebitis bona fide. Baiulus etiam quem apud belliquadrum uel furcas constituetis pro tempore; eandem nobis et ecclesie Arelatensi excepto homagio fidelitatem iurabit, et quod iura nostra nobis et fratribus nostris canonicis integra et libera³⁰ pro posse suo conseruabit et ab alijs faciat conseruari³¹. Item, nobis Archiepiscopo et successoribus nostris³² pro censu c. marchas boni et legalis argenti ad pondus uille montispessulani in festo beati Michaelis apud Arelatem per uos uel nuncios uestros sine difficultate aliqua dabitis aut dari facietis fideliter annuatim. Item, quando cudetur moneta uestra³³ in hiis partibus, dabitis unum denarium nobis in libra, uidelicet³⁴ de moneta noua que

²⁶ *Lacking in b.*

²⁷ *Reuerendi b.*

²⁸ *majoris c.*

²⁹ *uobis Vicecomiti si b.*

³⁰ *et libera lacking in c.*

³¹ *et...conseruari lacking in c.*

³² *Lacking in c.*

³³ *nostra c.*

³⁴ *vel c.*

cucurrerit in castro belliquadri ubicumque cudatur, et nos per potestatem nostram et iurisdictionem³⁵ pro posse nostro eandem currere faciemus. Item, confitemur nos recepisse a uobis pro acapito M. cccc. marchas boni et legalis³⁶ argenti ad pondus uille montispessulani, mille scilicet³⁷ pro comparandis possessionibus ad usum mense nostre, et quadrigentas pro debitis expensarum ipsorum castrorum, de qua pecunia confitemur similiter nobis satisfactum esse ad plenum, abrenuntiantes exceptioni non numerate pecunie.³⁸ Item non licebit uobis uel heredibus uestris ullo unquam in tempore prefatum feudum uendere,³⁹ donare, comutare, obligare, diuidere, diminuere, alienare,⁴⁰ uel alio modo in aliquem siue in aliquas personas⁴¹ transferre, nisi in heredem qui pro temporibus⁴² in uniuersum uobis succedet. Item, neque nos neque canonici Arelatensis ecclesie dabimus aliquid pro lesda uel pedagio in uendendo uel traducendo per aquam uel per terram res nostras proprias, uel alienas ad usum nostrum emendo. Et quando⁴³ fuerit ibi portus curie uel comunis: similiter nichil dabimus ex transuerso. Item, si quis aliquam peciam terre uel uinee pro remedio anime sue nobis uel arelatensi capitulo uel ecclesie uoluerit conferre, liceat ei sine uestra contradictione uendere uel donare. Similiter liceat nobis libere emere uineas et alias possessiones, cartones⁴⁴ uel tascas ad usum mense nostre uel canonicorum infra terminos supradictos, saluo iure quod in uenditore habere debetis. Item, homines belliquadri et castri furcarum, et omnes alios⁴⁵ quicumque per se aut per alios agriculturam exercebunt in argentia, ad decimas bladi, uini, ferri,⁴⁶ nutrimentorum, et quorumlibet terre fructuum, nobis et ecclesie Arelatensi cum integritate soluendas cogetis.⁴⁷ Et nos M. dei gratia Arelatensis Archiepiscopus per nos et successores nostros promittimus uobis et heredibus uestris, quod bona fide uos et uestros adiuuabimus et pro posse nostro predictum feudum et iura uestra⁴⁸ rationabiliter defendemus. Et nos Symon Comes montisfortis, prefata

³⁵ juris dictum *c.*

³⁶ boni...legalis *lacking in c.*

³⁷ ad...scilicet *lacking in c.*

³⁸ et...pecunie *replaced by &c. in c.*

³⁹ *Lacking in c.*

⁴⁰ obligare...alienare *lacking in c.*

⁴¹ siue...personas *lacking in c.*

⁴² pro temporibus *lacking in c.*

⁴³ quum *b.*

⁴⁴ Cartonis *b.*

⁴⁵ alij *b.*

⁴⁶ *Lacking in b.*

⁴⁷ Et quando...cogetis *replaced by &c. in c.*

⁴⁸ nostra *c.*

castra belliquadri et furcarum cum omnibus territorijs suis et districtu, a uobis domino M.⁴⁹ Arelatensi Archiepiscopo prout superius est expressum, per nos et heredes nostros in feudum recipimus, homagium ligium et fidelitatem uobis et successoribus uestris quandocumque⁵⁰ mutabitur dominus siue in feudo siue in ecclesia Arelatensi, sine difficultate qualibet faciemus. Et tunc in recognitione dominij recipiemus uos infra castrum belliquadri, et reddemus uobis claues ipsius castri, et leuabitis signum uestrum in turribus eiusdem castri, et tunc uobis et socijs uestris et equitaturis faciemus procurationem honestam, et ipsa die uel in crastino restituētis nobis. Item, pro censu uobis et successoribus uestris ut dictum est superius, in perpetuum singulis annis soluendo, uniuersa nostra habita et habenda, et specialiter pedagium et omnes redditus belliquadri et argentie obligamus, ita quod si non solueremus uel non faciemus⁵¹ persolui predictum censum ad diem statutam: liceat uobis et successoribus uestris accipere tantum de pedagio et alijs redditibus, quod exinde usque ad summam c. marcharum sit uobis plenius satisfactum. Item omnia alia pacta tam de censu quam de alijs que superius exprimuntur, bona fide et sine malo ingenio in perpetuum obseruabimus, et obseruari pro posse nostro a baiulis nostris faciemus sic nos deus adiuuet et hec sancta dei euangelia.⁵² Item, nos M. Arelatensis Archiepiscopus et Capitulum,⁵³ et nos similiter Symon Comes fomontis (*sic*) fortis⁵⁴, supradictum contractum facimus saluo in omnibus mandato et auctoritate domini pape ac uenerabilis patris⁵⁵ nostri domini P. dei gratia sancte Marie in aquiro Diaconi Cardinalis, Apostolice sedis legati. Acta sunt⁵⁶ hec in castro belliquadri. In presentia domini G. Auinioni episcopi, P. abbatis sancti egidij, et E.⁵⁷ Decani sancti Egidij, Magistri Tedisij, bernardi comde,⁵⁸ M. de caunis, S. bernardi, R. bouet, P. de sancto Jacobo, bertrandi de senacio, R. de miramari, R. bonaldi, hugonis aldemerij, Amalrici, et R. fulconis iuuenis, Canonorum Arelatensium, Raimundi dagel,⁵⁹ et P. marini sacerdotum, hugonis fulconis, Magistri bertrandi de furcis, Hugonis laurentij, R. laurentij,⁶⁰ bertrandi laurentij, B. ferreoli, hugonis petri, R. de moreze, R. de rocamaura, Gui. de azillano, E.⁶¹ de rocamaura, B. malisanguinis, bertrandi de rosso, R.

⁴⁹ meo *c.*

⁵⁰ quotiescumque *b*, quantumcumque *c.*

⁵¹ faceremus *b.*

⁵² Et tunc...euangelia *replaced by &c. in c.*

⁵³ et Capitulum, *lacking in c.*

⁵⁴ Comes montisfortis *A bis.*

⁵⁵ *Lacking in c.*

⁵⁶ sicut *b.*

⁵⁷ G. *b.*

⁵⁸ Bernardi comde *lacking in b.*

⁵⁹ Arelatensium. Baidagel *b.*

⁶⁰ R. laurentij *lacking in b.*

⁶¹ G. *b.*

isnardi, Lau. de codaleco, bertrandi de remolinis, bertrandi rauani, R. de conchis, R. de caturcio, Baudace et Iohannis fratris ipsius, P. arlenci, Andree de furcis, G. de luzis marescalci, Teobaldi de nonaulla, Lamberti de limos⁶², Philippi goleen, et B. de nemauso. Ad hec nos supradicti M. Archiepiscopus et Capitulum Arelatense, et nos Symon Comes montis fortis ad perpetuam huius rei memoriam, presentem paginam precepimus sigillorum nostrorum munimine roborari.⁶³

XXIII. *Bishop Peter of Rodez announces the confiscation by Simon of Montfort of goods from mercenaries and heretical sympathisers.*

(March 1215⁶⁴)

B. AN, JJ 13, f^o 39r^o: 13th c.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 89 (dated 1216).

Vniuersis ad quos presens scriptum peruenerit P. dei permissione Ruthinensis ecclesie minister humilis salutem in Domino. vniuersitati uestre presentibus fieri uolumus manifestum quod sicut constitit nobis veraciter, hereditates et bona omnia P. Grossi, Giraudi de Cadel, Nuiberti Bernardi, Guillemis de cornus, Bernardi de cornus, Nisadi de cornus, Naiaq, Remondi Bemegutis, Remondi, et Hugonis de Castronovo, venerunt in commissum domino S. comiti de montisfortis (*sic*) pro eo quod ipsi erant ruptarii et inmundi Sancte ecclesie et quibus ex eis (*sic*) heretici quidam receptam (*sic*) et defensores, hereticorum et hac de causa ipse comes bona, et hereditates eorum apud naiacum et in aliis locis, auctoritate Romane ecclesie ~~occupauit~~ occupauit. Datum Anno domini M^o. cc^o. xv. Marcij.

XXIV. *Bishop William IV of Cahors pays homage to Simon of Montfort for the fortified village of Pestillac.*

(Lavaur, 1 April 1215⁶⁵)

C. AN, JJ 30^A, f^o 11r^o.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 90 (dated 1216).

Nouerint vniuersi presentes litteras inspecturi quod nos Guillelmus dei gratia Caturcensis Episcopus recepimus a vobis domino Symone Comite leycestrie domino montisfortis dei prouidentia biterrensi et karcassonensi vicecomite in feodum Castrum de pestillaco cum omnibus suis pertinenciis et honore et totam terram que fuit bona fuxensium ubicumque eam habebant uel habere debebant preter castri de Casellis et honorem eiusdem castri. hanc autem donacionem fecistis nobis et successoribus nostris Episcopis Caturcensibus, et propter hoc fecimus vobis homagium et fidelitatem et tenemur uobis seruicio vnus militis cum a uobis fuerimus requisiti. Forciam Autem dicti Castri de pestillaco quociens requisieritis tenemur vobis reddere uobis iratis

⁶² Lunos *b*.

⁶³ P. abbatis...roborari. *replaced by &c. in c.*

⁶⁴ Given the context and dating of the following three acts, this should likely be dated to the same year: below, n. 65.

⁶⁵ This act and the two following must date from 1215 rather than 1216, using a 1 April calendar, because Simon was back in France by the first week of April 1216 (Easter falling on 10 April) to confirm his mother's alms to the cathedral of Chartres: *Spicilegium*, iii p. 569.

uel pactatis et vos eam nobis restituetis ita munitam sicut recipietis a nobis. Ad idem uero homagium fidelitatem et seruicium faciendum successores nostri Episcopi Caturcenses uobis et heredibus uestris inperpetuum tenebuntur. Quod ut robur obtineat perpetue firmitatis presentem Cartam sigilli nostri munimine fecimus roborari. Actum apud Vaurum, anno domini M^o. cc^o. xv^o. Kalends Aprilis.

XXV. *Bertrand II of Cardaillac pays homage to Simon of Montfort for the castles of Darnegal and Sinergues.*

(Lavaur, 1 April 1215)

C. AN, JJ 30^A, f^{bs} 11v^o-12r^o.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 90 (dated 1216).

In nomine domini ihesu xpi amen. anno incarnationis eiusdem M^o. cc^o. xv^o. Kalends Aprilis. Notum sit vniuersis presentes litteras inspecturis, quod ego b. de cardellac recipio in feodum et homagium pro me et heredibus meis a vobis domino Symone Comite leycestrie domino montisfortis dei prouidencia bitterris et Carcassone vicecomite et heredibus vestris Castrum de darnegol et forciam de sinergues cum pertinenciis suis, et exinde feci vobis et heredibus vestris homagium ligium contra omnes homines et predicta Castrum et forciam teneor uobis reddere iratis uel paccatis uel heredibus vestris quociens a vobis uel ab ipsis fuero requisitus, et vos restituetis michi eodem modo munita quo tradam vobis. Quod ut ratum sit presentes litteras sigilli mei munimine confirmaui. Actum apud Vaurum anno et die quo supra per manum Clarini Cancellarii Comitis antedicti.

XXVI. *Rostan of Posquières pays homage to Simon of Montfort for the castle of Posquières.*

(Lavaur, 3 April 1215)

C. AN, JJ 30^A, f^o 11r^o.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 90 (dated 1216).

In nomine domini nostri ihesu xpi amen anno incarnationis eiusdem M^o cc^o. xv^o. iiij. Nonas aprilis. Nouerint vniuersi presentes litteras inspecturi quod ego Rostannus de posqueriis pro me et heredibus meis recipio in feodum et homagium a uobis domino Symone Comite leycestrie domino montisfortis dei prouidencia bitterris et Carcassone vicecomite et heredibus uestris Castrum de posqueriis in neuhausensi dyocese cum omnibus pertinenciis suis et exinde feci uobis homagium ligium contra omnes homines, promittens firmiter bona fide et astringens me debito homagii supradicti quod de predicto Castro ego et heredes mei quociens a vobis uel heredibus uestris fuerimus requisiti. faciemus guerram vel pacem contra omnes homines, similiter eciam promitto vobis quod ero vobis et heredibus uestris legitimus et fidelis et seruabo vitam et membra uobis et heredibus vestris pro toto posse meo. predictum autem Castrum de posqueriis quociens vos uel heredes vestri a me uel heredibus meis requisieritis ego vel heredes mei vobis trademus illud et vos illud reddetis nobis eo modo munitum quo recipietis a nobis. et ad hec omnia fideliter obseruanda ego astringam me et heredes meos debito fidelitatis et homagij supradicti. Quod ut robur obtineat perpetue firmitatis presentem cartam sigilli mei munimine roborauimus. Actum apud Vaurum anno et die quo supra, per manum Clarini predicti Comitis Cancellarij

XXVII. *Elias Rudel acknowledges that he holds Montlédier from Simon of Montfort and must render it to him upon demand.*

(Toulouse, 6 June 1215)

C. AN, JJ 30^A, f^o 12r^o.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 85.

Ego helyas ridelli, Notum facio vniuersis presentes litteras inspecturis quod Castrum de monte lederio quod dominus Comes de monteforti michi ad custodiendum committit teneor reddere uel ipsius nuncio speciales litteras suas super hoc deferente quandocumque ab eodem Comite uel uiua uoce uel litteris fuero requisitus et ad hoc faciendum me obligo et astringo ita quod tota terra mea eidem Comiti absolute caderet in commissum si ad requisicionem suam eidem uel suo nuncio sicut superius est expressum non redderem dictum Castrum. Quod ut ratum sit presentes litteras feci sigilli mei munimine confirmari. actum Tholose, anno domini M^o cc^o xv^o viij^o Jdus Junij.

XXVIII. *Aton of Montaut pays homage to Simon of Montfort for his possession of Gramont.*

(Condom, 25 September 1215)

C. AN, JJ 30^A, f^o 12r^o-v^o.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, pp. 87-8.

In nomine sancte et indiuidue Trinitatis Amen. Anno incarnationis dominice M^o cc^o xv^o. vij. Kalends octobri. Nouerint vniuersi presentes litteras inspecturi, quod Ego Not de monte alto non coactus sed libera et spontanea voluntate mea recipio pro me et heredibus meis a uobis domino Symone Comite leycestrie domino montis fortis dei prouidentia biterris et Karcassone vicecomite pro uobis et heredibus uestris Castrum de acrimonte cum omnibus pertinentiis suis tenendis possidendis a vobis et heredibus vestris pro tali seruicio quod ex predicto castro et honore ipsi debetur. promitto eciam uobis et heredibus vestris pro me et heredibus meis quod nos pro uobis de dicto castro guerram contra quemlibet hominem faciemus, et quod nos irati uel paccati predictum castrum ita munitum sicut uos uel nuntius vester litteras vestras deferens inueneritis uobis reddemus sine contradicione qualibet pacifice et quiete tanquam boni vassalli et fideles et vos uel heredes uestri tanquam boni domini et legales debetis michi et heredibus meis eque bene munitum cum vobis placuerit reddere dictum castrum propter hoc facio vobis et domino A. primogenito vestro homagium ligium contra omnes homines et heredes mei post me uobis et heredibus vestris hoc idem bona fide facere tenebuntur et hec omnia et singula fide interposita promisi tenere firmiter et seruare. et nos Symon Comes leycestrie damus et concedimus tibi Not de monte alto et heredibus tuis in feodum castrum dictum de acrimonte cum omnibus pertinentiis suis a nobis et heredibus nostris tibi et heredibus tuis possidendum imperpetuum et tenendum sicut superius est expressum, et promittimus quod tibi et heredibus tuis tanquam boni domini et legales promissa omnia conseruare et quod dictum castrum per nos uel per alios nullatenus diruemus nisi heredes tui faciant per quod dictum castrum diruatur de iure. ad quorumdam supradictorum maiorem stabilitatem duo instrumenta per alphabetum diuisa inde fieri fecimus et sigillorum nostrorum muniminibus confirmari. Actum apud Condomum Anno et die quo supra.

XXIX. *Vidimus of the agreement between Bishop Peter of Rodez, Count Henry of Rodez, and William of Beynes to exempt the Cistercians, Templars, and Hospitallers from the payment of peace maintenance.*

(Rodez, 11 March 1216/27 February 1370)

B. BnF, ms. Doat 17, f^{os} 47r^o-49r^o: 17th c.

Vniuersis Baiulis, Castellanis, Notarijs, Seruiantibus, Comissarijs~~æ~~, refformatoribus, arrendatoribus, seu receptoribus comuniis pacis, cæterisque alijs Justitiarijs, et non Justitiarijs quibus hæc præsentis litteræ peruenerint, et eorum cuilibet, vel locatenensibus eorumdem. Arnaldus de Landorra miles Dominus Castrij de Volomedio Vicecomes de Cadartio, et Senescallus Ruthenensis Domini nostrj franciæ Regis salutem, et præsentibus dare fidem. notum facimus, nos uidisse tenuisse, palpasse, ac de verbo ad verbum coram nobis per legj fecisse quasdam patentes, et apertas litteras in pargameno scriptas a Reuerendo Patre in Christo Domino P. Dei Gratia Ruthenensi Episcopo, et ab Egregio principe Domino A. Comite Ruthenensi, et a Nobili, et potenti viro Domino V. de Bena Senescallo Domini Comitum Montisfortis eorumque sigillis impendenti cæra Alba, vt prima earum facie apparebat, sigillatas non viciatas, nec cancellatas, non abolitas, nec in aliqua sui parte suspectas, sedieet prorsus omni vitio, et suspicionem carentes. quarum tenor talis est.

Sit notum quod nos P. Dei Gratia Ruthenensis Episcopus, et A. Comes Ruthenæ, et V. de Bena Senescallus Domini Comitum Montisfortis communicato in inuicem Consilio paci et tranquillitatj religiosorum virorum Cisterciensium, templariorum et ospitalariorum, ac monialium Anon. paterna sollicitudine prouidentes firmiter, et inconcusse decernimus, et statuimus, vt nunquam in Ruthenensi Diocesi familia eorum conpensum, siue comune per soluere cogantur. excepto quod pastores eorum mercennarij habent de animalibus suis tantum persoluere præter triginta oues, et quinque vacas, de quibus non dabunt conpensum, cum earum custodia transierit in rationem mercedis ex pacto. præterea de animalibus partiariis non dabunt pro parte sua conpensum sedieet pro parte, quæ contingit extraneos, persoluetur. homines autem sui donatj, qui habitum religiosum non deportauerit, ipsj per soluent. Actum anno Domini millesimo ducentesimo decimo quinto, mense Martio pænes Ruthenam. quod vt robur perpetuæ firmitatis obtineat præsentem paginam sigillis nostris comunire curamus. Datum Ruthenæ in Vigilia Gregorij Papæ. In quorum visionis, lectionis, palpationis, et diligentes inspectionis testimonum Nos Senescallus prædictus ad maiorem firmitatem habendam sigillum Regium authenticum prædictæ nostræ Senescalliæ Ruthenensis huic præsentis vidimus, seu transcripto apponi fecimus inpendenti, nec non et per Notarios Regios infrascriptos tabellionari. Actum, et datum Ruthenæ, die penultim a mensis Martij, Anno Domini millesimo trecentesimo septuagesimo ~~Indietus~~ Datum est supra Testibus præsentibus nobilibus viris Ratone de Landorra, Raimundo de Caslutio discreto viro Magistro Johanne Vayssa procuratore Regio Senescalla Ruthenensj, Raimundo Amanej Saluæ terræ, et pluribus alijs ad præmissa præsentibus. Et me Petro Girgols Notario Regio, qui in præmissis præsens fui, et signum meum hic apposui, quod est tale

P—H—*

Et ego Robbertus Larrerij Notarius Regius facta prius collatione cum originali litterarum præinsertarum vna cum Magistro Petro Girgols Notario Regio subscripto hic me suscriptj, et signum meum quo vtor in præmissis publicis Instrumentis hic apposui quod est tale

E>— Ie —*

Nos vero Arnaldus de Landorra miles, et Senescallus prædictus prædictæ Ruthenensis Senescalliæ huic præsentī vidimus, seu transcripto sigillum authenticum prædictæ nostræ Senescalliæ apponj fecimus in pendenti Actum, et datum vt supra seum

XXX. *Simon of Montfort enfeoffs Niger of Redorte with 200l.mg. worth of land at Redorte, Tors, Trausse, and Palairac.*

(Siege of Beaucaire, 24 July 1216)

B. BnF, ms. lat. 9996, f^o 4v^o.

b. *Carcassonne*, iv p. 306.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 92; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', p. 190.

Symon dei prouidentia Dux narbone, Comes tholose et leycestrie, vicecomes biterri et carcassone et dominus montis fortis vniuersis presentibus pariter et futuris.⁶⁶ Salutem in domino. Noueritis quod nos damus et concedimus dilecto et fideli nostro Nigro de Redorta et heredibus suis de legitima uxore sua progenitis ducentas Libras⁶⁷ terre ad marg. ipsi et heredibus suis de nobis et heredibus nostris quiete et pacifice possidendas in perpetuum pro seruicio corporis sui et seruicio heredum suorum quocienscumque ipse et heredes sui a nobis et heredibus nostris fuerint Requisiti. Et propter hoc dictus niger homagium ligium nobis fecit et heredes sui nobis et heredibus nostris hoc idem facere tenebuntur. Sciendum tamen est quod terram⁶⁸ quam tenet a nobis videlicet Redorta, Tors, traucan, paleiac, cum omnibus pertinentiis et dominiis eorumdem⁶⁹ primo debet jn ducentarum librarum numero computari et nos deffectum illarum ducentarum librarum alio loco eidem assignabimus competentī. Quod ut ratum sit presentes Litteras sigilli nostri munimine confirmamus. Actum in obsidione Belliquadri Anno ab incarnatione domini m^o. cc^o. sextodecimo Nono Kalends Augusti.

XXXI. *Count Centulle of Astarac, on behalf of Simon of Montfort, receives the homage of Teregnous of Castellon and his sons, Roger and Raymond.*

(Road near Espèche, 23 December 1216)

B. AN, JJ 30^A, f^o 11v^o.

Vniuersis xpi fidelibus ad quod presens scriptum pervenerit, Centullus Comes de esteraco salutem in domino. Nouerit vniuersitas uestra quod Tegnous de castellione et filij eius Rogerius et Remundus, fecerunt in presencia mea homigium ligium contra omnes homines domino Symoni duci narbone Comiti Tholose et leycestrie duci et Karcassone vicecomiti et domino

⁶⁶ Comes...futuris *replaced by* etc... *b.*

⁶⁷ libratas *b.*

⁶⁸ terræ *b.*

⁶⁹ earumdem *b.*

montisfortis. et ego erga ipsum ducem me fideiussorem posui pro eisdem quod ipsi erunt dicto duci et heredibus suis homines legitimi et fideles. dictus vero dux supradicti Tengnoi recipit homagium sub tali forma quod si ipse addiscere poterit quod idem T. idem aliis homagium fecerit uel uerbo uel opere steterit contra fidem michi prosit ei homagium iteratum. Tamen filij ipsius ab ipso duce et heredibus suis suam hereditatem tenebunt quamdiu ipsi duci et heredibus suis erunt legitimi et fideles, et ut hec firmitus habeatur ego ad petitionem dictorum patris et filiorum quam sigilla non habebant presentem cartam sigilli mei munimine confirmaui. Actum in uia iuxta Castrum de espet anno domini M^o. cc^o. xvi^o. die veneris ante Natale domini.

XXXII. *Simon of Montfort grants the village of Ampouillac to the abbey of Notre-Dame de Boulbonne.*

(Carcassonne, May 1217)

B. BnF, ms. Doat 83, f^o 362r^o-v^o: 17th c.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 94; Rhein, 'Seigneurie de Montfort', pp. 192-3.

B.

In nomine Domini nostri Jesu Christi. Notum sit omnibus hominibus quod Ego S. Dei prouintia Dux Narbonæ, Comes Tholosæ et Leyncestriæ Dominus Montisfortis vicecomes Biterris et Carcassonæ, et Albiensis pro amore Dei et salute animæ nostræ et parentum nostrorum Donamus, et concedimus perpetua donatione per nos, et per omnes nostros hæredes in perpetuum Domino Deo, et beatæ mariæ Bolbonæ, et tibi R. abbati eiusdem loci, et vobis fratribus eiusdem loci præsentibus et futuris omnia iura nostra, quæ habemus uel habere debemus in villa de Ampuliaco cum omnibus pertinentijs suis saluo iure in omnibus alieno, et ut ratum sit præsentem cartam sigilli nostri munime duximus confirmandam. actum Carcassonæ anno Domini millesimo ducentesimo decimo septimo. mense maij per manum Guillelmj notarij nostri absente cancellario.

XXXIII. *Raymond Pelet, lord of Alès, swears fealty and homage to Simon of Montfort for his lands.*

(Before the gate of Saint-Sernin, Toulouse, 14 July 1217)

A. AN, J 890, n^o 20: parchment, 14.75cm x 16.9cm, detached seal (7.1cm diameter) in brown wax of a bearded and bare-headed rider with a shield in his left-hand and an unsheathed sword in his right on a saddled horse riding to dexter, with the slightly damaged legend ✠ SGILLVM RAIMVNDI P...LETI : COMITIS, with a reverse of a mailed knight with an iron cap riding a barded horse to dexter and holding a shield in his left hand and a bannered lance in his right, with the damaged legend ✠ SIG...M : RAIMVNDI PILETI : COMITIS, formerly appended with silk queue, *cyrographum*: ABC DEF GHJ KLM NOP

Ind.: G. de Catel, *Mémoires de l'histoire du Languedoc* (Toulouse, 1633), p. 341; Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 95.

Jn nomine domini nostri, Amen. Anno incarnationis eiusdem M^o. cc^o. xvij^o. pridie idus Julij. Nouerint uniuersi presentes litteras inspecturj quod Ego Raimundus peleti dominus Alestj pro me, et heredibus meis recipio in feodum, et homagium ligium a uobis domino Symone Duce Narbone et Comite Tholose, Bitterrensi et Carcassonensi vicecomite, et domino Montisfortis, et heredibus uestris stare meum Alesti, et omnia que habeo in villa Alesti intus uel extra in toto eius mandamento, excepto Castro de Rossono, et eius tenemento, et Castro de petra mala, et eius tenemento, que teneo ad feodum de domino Episcopo Vticensi, et excepto Castro de Sandrad,

quod teneo de Sandracensi abbate. Recipio etiam a uobis in feodum, et homagium ligium: Castrum de Boucoirano, Castrum de Curtis, Castrum Sancti Stephani, Castrum nouum, partem Castri de acrifolio, Partem castrj de Grabiaco, Totum castrum de Monteclaro, totum castrum de Monte Joj, Partem castrj de Fonleto, Partem Castri de Calcadiz, Partem castri de Malbosc, Partem Castrj de turre, et de Cerueria, Partem castri de Conillera, et quicquid amplius habeo, uel deinceps aliquo modo acquirere potero. Quot propter hec omnia cum homagio uobis fidelitatem iurauj, et promisi quod ego et heredes mej, uobis et heredibus uestris erimus legitimj et fideles, et de omnibus supradictis faciemus guerram, uel pacem, contra omnes homines cum a uobis uel heredibus uestris fuerimus requisitj. Promitto etiam uobis et heredibus uestris, pro me et heredibus meis, quod ego et heredes mej uobis seruabimus uitam et membra pro toto posse nostro, et pro uobis faciemus guerram uel pacem contra quamlibet homines, et nisi faciemus et uos haberetis guerram in frontaria nostra, nos omnia castra, et munitiones nostras in illa frontaria pro guerra facienda uobis, et heredibus uestris irati et paccatj reddemus ita munita sicut eadem inuenitis, et uos guerra uestra finita illa reddetis nobis eodem modo munita, quo eadem recipietis a nobis. Et ad hec omnia et singula fideliter obseruanda ego astringo me, et heredes meos debito fidelitatis et homagij supradicti. Ceterum ad mutationem domini debetis uos, et heredes uestri leuare uexillum uestrum in turri mea de Alesto, et signum, seu edictum uestrum facere ibi clamare, et uos promisistis michi bona fide, quod me uel feudum meum, quod de uobis teneo de manu uestra non eicietis, uel alicuj debitis, nisi domino Amalrico primogenito uestro, uel domino Guidoni, filio uestro Comitj Bigorum, uel domino Guidoni de monteforti, fratri uestro, uel heredibus uestris masculinis, quibus Ego et heredes mej ita tenebimur sicut uobis sine aliqua diminutione omnium predictorum. Et ad maiorem predictorum omnium firmitatem duo instrumenta per alphabetum diuisa, uos domine Comes et Ego exinde fecimus fierj, que nostris Sigillis fecimus communirj. Actum Anno et die quibus supra, in exercitu domini iuxta portum sancti Saturninj, per manum Guillelmi notarij uestrj uestro absente Cancellario.

XXXIV. *Pope Honorius III instructs Bertrand, cardinal-priest of Santi Giovanni e Paolo, to summon Archbishop Arnold-Amalric of Narbonne, Bishop Walter of Elne, and Simon of Montfort to Rome settle their differences in his presence.*

(Lateran Palace, 21 October 1217)

B. ASV, ms. Reg. vat. 9, f^o 165v^o: 13th c.

Ind.: P. Pressutti, ed., *Regesta Honorii papae III*, i (Rome, 1888), p. 142.

[B. tituli sanctorum Johannis et Paulj presbytero Cardinali apostolice sedis legato.]

Licet questiones suborte inter venerabiles fratres nostros Narbonensem Archiepiscopum et Episcopum Elenensem ac Nobilem uirum S. Comitem Montis fortis per te commodius ut arbitramur potuerint iudicio uel concordia terminari. quare tunc pro hiis est ad sedem apostolicam prouocatum. eisdem per nostras dedimus litteras in mandatis ut ipsi Archiepiscopus et Episcopus personaliter Comes uero per procuratores ydoneos infra uiginti dies post susceptionem litterarum ipsarum iter arripiant ad nostram presentiam ueniendi et sine fraude prosequantur arreptum. Ne autem inficiari possint nostrum ad ipsos peruenisse mandatum. discretionem tuam per apostolica scripta mandamus quam id ipsum eisdem cures iniungere uice nostra. Datum laterani xii. kalends Nouembri. Anno Secundo.

XXXV. *Abbot Conrad I of Cîteaux returns the grants made earlier by Simon to his abbey in exchange for 100m. in expectation of lands of equivalent value.*

(Siege of Toulouse, 3 November 1217)

A. AdC-O, 11 H 156: parchment, with three parchment queues for missing seals, *cyrographum*: ABC DEF GHI KLM.

In nomine dominj, Amen. Anno incarnationis eiusdem M^o. cc^o. xvij^o. iij^o. Nonas Nouembris. Nos Corraudus dei greatia Cisterciensis Abbas, uobis domino Symonj Duci Narbone, Comiti Tolose, ac vicecomiti Bitterrensi, pro nobis, et pro toto Conuentu Cisterciensi, restituimus integre ac perfecte at sint melius, firmitus possumus, reddimus uobis totum illud quod uos titulo mere elemosine donaueratis Domuj Cisterciensi in Bitteris, et Carcassone ciuitatibus, ac Narbonensi, Bitterrensi, et Carcassonensi Diocesibus; scilicet castrum Nicianj, et Domum que fuit Amelij de Riuosicco, infra Bitterim, cum pertinentijs suis, et Domum que fuit Bernardi de ylerda infra Carcassonam, cum pertinentijs suis. Cedimus etiam, soluimus, et transferimus in uos, imperpetuum totum jus et dominium quod habebamus in castro et Domibus supradictis, ita quod nullo unquam tempore, nos uel alius abbas, seu ipse conuentus in eis possimus a uobis, uel ab heredibus uestris aliquid requirere occasione donj predictarum possessionum quod Domuj Cisterciensi fecistis. Instrumenta etiam que super hoc confecta suerunt uobis reddimus in instanti. Et ego Symon dux Narbone, Comes Tolose, ac vicecomes Bitteris, uobis domine Corraude Abbas, et pro uos conuentuj, et Domuj Cisterciensi, propter restitutionem, et redditionem istam, et etiam titulo pure elemosine, pro salute anime nostre, ac progenitorum nostrorum de assensu et uoluntate A. Comitisse uxoris nostre, A. primogeniti nostri, Guidonis filij nostri Comitis Bigorre, et aliorum heredum nostrorum, donamus uobis in annuis redditibus centum marcas argenti, quarum quinquaginta uobis assignauimus percipiendas singulis annis in pedagiis et salinis ciuitatis nostre Carcassone et alias quinquaginta, in pedagiis, et aslinis similiter ciuitatis nostre Bitteris, ita uidet quod nuncius uester cum litteris uestris patentibus missus a uobis predictas centum marcas, in dictis ciuitatibus recipiet sicut prouenient, ab octabis pasche, in Antea testimonio bauilorum nostrorum qousque receperit eas plene. Has itaque centum marcas habebitis, et tenebitis annuatim, quosque nos assignerimus uobis centum marcatis terre in loco alio competenti, etiam tote ille centum marce, ad nos et heredes nostros plenarie reuertentur. Quod ut robur optineat perpetue firmitatis, duo instrumenta per alphabetum diuisa fecimus inde fieri, et sigillis uestro, nostro, et A. primogeniti nostri eadem sigillari, quorum unum uobis tradidimus, et alterum penes nos reseruamus. Actum in obsidione Tolose Anno et die quibus supra, per manum Clarinj Cancellarij nostri, Et Guillermj Notarij nostri.

XXXVI. *Simon of Montfort grants an annual 100l.tn. to Conrad of Cîteaux for the provisioning of the annual chapter general.*

(Siege of Toulouse, 3 November 1217)

A. AdC-O, 11 H 156: parchment, with slots for three parchment queues, two of which survive, for missing seals. Ind.: *Canso*, iii p. 235n. 4.

In nomine Domini, Amen. Anno Incarnationis Eiusdem M^o. cc^o. xvij^o. iij^o. Nonas Nouembris. Nos Symon dei prouidencia Dux Narbone, Comes Tholose, ac Vicecomes Bitteris, Vobis Domine

Corraude abbas Cistercii, et Conuentuj Cistercii, uoluntate et assensu A. vxoris nostre, A. primogenitj nostri, et G. filij nostri Comitiss Bigorre, donamus et concedimus in perpetua et pura elemosina Centum Libras Turonensi monete, singulis annis percipiendas in pedagiis et salinis ville nostre qui dicitur Mirmanda in Dyocesi Agenensi, ut ex eisdem pro salute nostra, progenitorum nostrorum, A. vxoris nostre et heredum nostrorum, capitulo generali fiant expense in uictualibus singulis annis quinta die. Predictas autem C. Libras in dicta villa nuncius noster cum litteris nostris patentibus missus a nobis percipiet ab Octabis pasche singulis annis in antea testimonio Baiulj nostri existentis ibidem quousque receperit eas plene. Quod ut ratum sit, presentem Cartam fecimus sigilli nostri et predicti A. primogeniti nostri munimine confirmari. Actum Jn Obsidione Tholose, anno et die Qvo SupRa. PeR manum CLarinj Cancellarij nostRj.

XXXVII. *Pope Honorius grants Simon of Montfort permission to present his case personally before the legate rather than by advocates in Rome.*

(Lateran Palace, 7 November 1217)

B. ASV, ms. Reg. vat. 9, f^o 172v^o.

Ind.: Pressutti, *Regesta Honorii*, i p. 147.

nobili uiro S. Comiti Montisfortis⁷⁰

Ex parte tua fuit nobis humiliter supplicatum, ut cum nonnulli emuli tui per litteras apostolicas te faciant ad loca diuersa citari, ad que sine graui periculo nec ire potes nec procuratores idoneos destinare. quatinus in te quasi ob contumaciam excommunicationis sententiam faciant promulgari. super hoc tibi paterna prouidere sollicitudine dignemur. Cum igitur dubium non existat quod tua uirtus atque deuotio multos tibi peperit inimicos, nos uolentes eorum obuiare malitie in articulo prenotato. presentium tibi auctoritate concedimus, ut quamdiu coram apostolice sedis legato in illis partibus existente paratus fueris de te conquerentibus exhibere iustitie complementum. non tenearis cuiquam sub alio respondere nisi forsan per litteras que a sede apostolica de certa scientia emanantes, plenam de presenti concessione facerent intentionem. Siquam uero sententiam in te uel terram tuam contra eiusdem concessionis munimine contigerit promulgari. eam decernimus non seruandam. Nulli ergo et cetera usque nostre concessionis et constitutionis infringetur, uel ei et cetera usque contraire. Siquis autem et cetera usque incursum. Datum laterani vii. Idus Nouembri. Anno Secundo.

XXXVIII. *Rostan of Posquières disposes of his succession by Heracles of Montlaur under the supervision of Simon of Montfort.*

(Siege of Toulouse, 3 February 1218)

C. AN, JJ 30^A, f^o 8r^o.

b. É. Baluze, *Histoire généalogique de la maison d'Auvergne*, ii (Paris, 1708), p. 86.

Ind.: Molinier, *Catalogue des Montfort*, p. 96.

In nomine domini nostri ihesu xpti amen anno incarnationis eiusdem M^o. cc^o. xvij^o. iij^o. Nonas februarii. Nouerint vniuersi presentes pariter et futuri quod ego Rostannus de posqueriis fateor et cognosco vos dominum meum ligium dominum Symonem dei prouidencia ducem Narbonensem

⁷⁰ *In margin.*

Comitem tholose ac vicecomitem biterris gratia et amore Erachi⁷¹ de montelauro generi mei et meo reddidisse michi castrum de posqueriis et aliam⁷² terram nostram totam vnde bona fide promitto uobis et heredibus uestris sicut homo uester ligius et fidelis quod⁷³ pro posse meo legitimo omnia mandata uestra faciam, nec per me nec per meos prodicionem aliquam vobis uel vestris faciam nec sustinebo pro legitimo posse meo publice uel priuatim quod aliquis offendat vos uel uestros uel terram uestram si deus me adiuuet et hec sancta dei euuangelia. Immo vos et vestros de castro posqueriarum et de margaritis et de omni terra mea quam a vobis teneo pro toto posse meo bona fide contra omnes homines fideliter iurabo⁷⁴, nec contra vos uel vestros faciam prodicionem et castrum de posqueriis et de margaretis et omnes alias municiones meas iratus et paccatus vobis et heredibus vestris iratis et paccatis ego et heredes mei quocienscumque et quandocumque illa castra et municiones a me uel heredibus meis requisieritis trademus incontinenti omni occasione et excusacione remotis ita munita uel munitas sicut ea uel eas imenietis et vos tanquem bonus dominus et heredes uestri michi et heredibus meis ea eque munita restituetis cum vestre placuerit voluntati. Si autem contra predicta omnia uel aliquod predictorum quod deus auertat uenirem omne ius quod in castris predictis et in omni terra mea quam teneo a vobis habeo uel habere debeo uobis uel vestris sine aliqua reclamacione decidat in commissum et in omni curia pro proditore habear, nec me aliqua ratione de prodicione valeam excusare nec posse Rendere alicui nisi tamquam proditor et insanus et heredes mei similiter obligerentur si contra predicta uel aliquod predictorum contingeret ipsos venire,⁷⁵ et ego Eraclius de monte lauro vobis et heredibus vestris domino Symoni dei prouidencia duci narbone Comiti tholose ac vicecomiti biterris domino meo homagio⁷⁶ obligo me et totam terram meam quam a vobis teneo pro dicto Rostando scilicet quod ipse erit vobis et vestris legitimus et fidelis et heredes sui post ipsum et quod in nullo predictorum vos uel uestros uel terram uestram per se uel per alios offenderit publice uel priuatim, nec contra vos uel vestros facient prodicionem et quod omnes pactiones suprascriptas uobis et vestris bona fide tenebunt dictus Rostannus et heredes sui et si forte contra predicta omnia uel aliquod predictorum venirent ego me et totam terram meam quam a vobis teneo et castrum de posqueriis et de margaretis et omnem aliam terram ipsius Rostandi que mea est post decessum suum que castra et terram totam de vobis recipio in feodum et homagium ligium pro me et heredibus meis vobis obligo ad omnem voluntatem uestram plenare faciendam. Quod ut robur obtineat perpetue firmitatis et ut predicta omnia et singula firmiter et fideliter obseruentur dictus Rostannus et ego presens instrumentum sigillis nostris fecimus communiri.⁷⁷ actum est hoc in obsidione tholose anno et die quibus supra, presentibus et testibus domino Guidone de Capite porco, theobaldo de noua uilla, lamberto de limoso,

⁷¹ ERACLII *b.*

⁷² etiam *b.*

⁷³ & quod *b.*

⁷⁴ iuvabo *b.*

⁷⁵ et castrum...venire *lacking in b.*

⁷⁶ ligio *b.*

⁷⁷ Quod ut...communiri *lacking in b.*

Eurardo de uilla peror, Guillelmo notario predicti Comitis domni nostri et militis aliis bonis viris, et eciam fratre Guillelmo de ailiaco milicie templi in prouincia et in partibus tholose preceptore, Durado mota, et bernardo de pignan⁷⁸ in presencia venerabilium patrum domini⁷⁹ B. dei gratia tituli⁸⁰ sanctorum Johannis et pauli prebyteris⁸¹ Cardinalis apostolice sedis legati, G agathensis et Lodouensis Episcoporum et multorum aliorum

XXXIX. *Heracles of Montlaur acknowledges that he holds his inheritance of Posquières from Simon of Montfort.*

(Siege of Toulouse, 3 February 1218)

B. BnF, ms. Duchesne 49, f^o 353r^o: 17th c.

In nomine Domini amen. Anno incarnationis eiusdem MCCXVII. III. Nonas Februarii. Ego Eraclius de Montelauro fateor me recipisse castrum Posquieriarum à vobis domine SIMON Comes Tholose custodiendum nomine nostro. Ita quòd illud custodiam et tenebo pro vobis, quousque Rostandus de Posquierijs socis meus suo sigillari fecerit Cartam compositionis, quae facta est inter vos et ipsum. De qua compositione tenenda firmiter et seruanda ego tenere fidejussor, sicut in instrumento praedicto plenius continetur. Datum in obsidione Tolosae anno et die quibus suprà.

XL. *King Louis IX of France orders his seneschal of Carcassonne, John of Cranis, to maintain the rights and alms granted to the abbey of Fontfroide by Simon and Amalric of Montfort.*

(Notre-Dame-la-Royale near Pontoise, July 1247)

B. BnF, ms. Doat 153, f^o 309r^o.

Ludouicus Dei gratia francorum Rex dilecto et fideli suo J. de Cranis Senescallo Carcassonæ vniversis que Seneschallis ibidem pro tempore substituendis salutem. Mandamus uobis quatinus Abbatiam beatæ Mariæ de fontefrigido Cisterciensis ordinis tenere permittans, et pacifice possidere pascua in Montanis Minerbæ ex totius Minerbesij quæ bonæ memoriæ Amalricus Comes Montisfortis franciæ constabularius eidem Abbatiae contulit intuitu pietatis, prout in eiusdem Amalrici patentibus litteris plenius continentur, vobis quoque mandamus ut triginta libras Melgorienses quas bonæ memoriæ Symon quondam Comes Montisfortis pater dicti Amalrici conuentus eiusdem loci propitantijs Sex dierum dominicarum Quadregesimæ usque ad Pascha similiter contulit capiendas, in pedagogiis diocesis Bitterrensis sicut etiam in litteris eiusdem Symonis vidimus contineri, eidem Abbatiae reddi faciatis ei haberi. Tantum super hijs facientes quod fratres dicti loci a partibus tam remoris suam ad nos non cogantur querimoniam reportare. Actum apud Abbatiam Monialium beatæ Mariæ Regalis juxta Pontisaram Anno Domini millesimo ducentesimo quadregesimo septimo mense Julio.

⁷⁸ Eurardo...pignan *replaced by &c. in b.*

⁷⁹ *Lacking in b.*

⁸⁰ dei...tituli *lacking in b.*

⁸¹ Presbyteri *b.*

APPENDIX B: HUNTINGTON ROLL

A. Huntington Library, ms. HAM, box 58B(1), r^o: 13th c.

b. Crouch, 'Battle of the Countesses', pp. 192-200.

Cal.: *Report on the Manuscripts of the Late Reginald Rawdon Hastings, Esq., of the Manor House, Ashby-de-la-Zouche*, i (London, 1928), pp. 334-42.

[Mem. 1]

Inquisicio facta de valore legitimo per sacramenta militum et legalium hominum coram Willelmo de Wattona, Henrico archidiacono Staffordiensi, Gilberto filio Remfredi, Eustathio Ffaconberge, Waltero Maltheri illuc missis per dominum Regem.

Electi ex parte Comitis Leycestrie: Willelmus Pigot, Stephanus de Segraue, Ricardus de Kenelingworth', Willelmus de Quatermere, Willelmus de Kenelingworth', Robertus de Wyuilla.

Electi ex parte Comitis Wyntonie: Willelmus de Aubenny, de Trumpentone (*sic*), Willelmus Harecourt, Willelmus de Knapwill', Willelmus Trenchefoyll', Ricardus de Brakkele.

Electi villa Leycestrie: Ricardus de Wyteby, Rogerus Boun, Simon Alecat, Griffyn Cok, Willelmus filius Erdrici, Robertus filius Ricardi, Rogerus Gonekes, Reginaldus iuxta murum, Rogerus filius Willelmi, Henricus Fferrator, Geruasius Russell', Galfridus filius Nicholai, Willelmus filius Pagani, Walterius Pykenot.

De prima prefectura Leycestrie per annum cxvij li. x d.¹

De firma pontum Leycestrie per annum iiij li.

De valore molendinorum Leycestrie per annum xxxvj li. xij s. iiij d.

De firma furnorum tam extra portas quam infra xxij li. xij s. iiij d.²

De valore quatuor carucatarum terre in dominico per annum cum prato x li.

De redditu assise extra portam orientalem per annum xj li. ii s. ij d. ob.³ exceptis cxij s. x d. assignatis abbati Leycestrie. Et exceptis xx s. assignatis Willelmo de Langetone.

De redditu noui feoffamenti in Leycestria per annum xvij s. vij d. ob.⁴

De redditu gallinarum assise extra portam australem iiij s. ij d.

De redditu trium librarum piperis per annum in Leycestria xvij d.

¹ The king would collect £117.15d. in 1207: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 24.

² These revenues were reassigned to the Quincys between 2 February and 6 December 1207: *ibid*; *Close Rolls of Henry III*, ii p. 19.

³ £8.5s.9½d. of this sum were reassigned to the Quincys between 2 February and 6 December 1207: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, pp. 24-5; *Close Rolls of Henry III*, ii p. 19.

⁴ This is obviously an estimate. However, the king collected 16s.8d. in 1207 and his sheriffs seem to have assumed this as a fixed income in their subsequent accounts: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 25, *12 John*, p. 96; *13 John*, p. 196; *14 John*, p. 141.

Summa cc li. lxiiij s. v d.⁵ preter denarios assignatos abbati Leycestrie inde Elemosinis confortitis.

[Mem. 2]

Canonicis Leycestrie in pretoria Leycestrie per annum vj li.⁶ per cartam Roberti Comitis primi
Eisdem canonicis de terra Radulfi Lutelchild' in Leycestria per annum ij s. per cartam

Roberti Comitis ~~primi~~ vltimi

Eisdem canonicis de mesuagio Simonis clerico in Leycestria per annum x s.⁷ per cartam
Comitis Roberti ~~primi~~ vltimi

Honialibus (*sic*) de Pratellis per annum recipiendos ad scaccarium comitis x li. iij s. iij d.⁸ per
cartam Roberti vltimi

Infirmis fratribus sancti Lazari in pretorio Leycestrie per annum x s.⁹ per cartam Roberti secundi

Eisdem ffratribus de firma poncium Leycestrie per annum vj s. viij d.¹⁰ per cartam

Comitisse Petronille et per confirmationem predicti Comitis secundi

⁵ Corrected to £202.13s. using the sums provided; allowing for the value of the prefecture reported in the Pipe Roll would yield instead £202.13s.5d. The latter is likely the correct figure, accounted for by the scribe's omission of a v in the prefecture pence sum and addition of an x in the total shillings.

⁶ In 1209, the king accounted for these alms in full for Pentecost 1206 (21 May) and Candlemas 1207, presumably as the honor had not been definitely divided until 10 March 1207 and was still under the king's jurisdiction for those two terms. For the five terms from Pentecost 1207 (10 June) to Michaelmas 1208 inclusive, the king owed £6 from the moiety he had confiscated from Simon. It is unlikely the accounts calculated £1.4s. to be collected each term during this period; more probably the final division of the estates had not been fully effected by Pentecost 1207, meaning that the prefecture of Leicester was still entirely in the king's hand at that time, leading him to assume responsibility for the full £2 for that term and £1 each subsequent term. If so, this also helps explain the reference to £1 owed from Simon's moiety for Michaelmas 1206. If Simon had been seised of the honor in summer or autumn 1206, he may have been responsible for distributing the prefecture's alms in their entirety until the division. Michaelmas 1206 was the only term for which Simon would have been responsible for the prefecture, but it seems he only managed to pay half of the alms due to the canons, leaving the remainder to the king's account: *Fædera*, p. 96; *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 25. From 1210, Simon's moiety in the king's hand owed only half these alms annually: *Pipe Roll 12 John*, p. 96.

⁷ The scribe is likely mistaken here and has provided an s' instead of a d'. In 1209, the Exchequer calculated an outstanding sum of 27½d. owed to the canons from Pentecost 1206 to Michaelmas 1208 inclusive, a period of eight terms: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 25. This corresponds much more closely with an annual sum of 10d., though still imperfectly given the difficulties of calculating termly payments with an obol as the smallest unit of account. For 1210, however, Simon's moiety owed 1s.4d. from the house of Simon the clerk: *Pipe Roll 12 John*, p. 96.

⁸ The king accounted for only 10m. of these alms for the Pentecost 1206 and Candlemas 1207 terms, meaning that they were short roughly 2s.3d. As the sum given does not divide neatly into three, the Exchequer may have rendered the alms in marks for ease of accounting. Simon presumably paid the alms for the Michaelmas 1206 term, but it is impossible to tell if this was simply by a further 5m. or if he made up the difference with £3.10s.½d.: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 26. After March 1207, Simon's moiety owed half these alms annually: *Pipe Roll 12 John*, p. 96.

⁹ The king accounted for these alms in full for the Pentecost 1206 and Candlemas 1207 terms in 1209, and Simon presumably had already paid the remaining 3s.4d. at Michaelmas 1206. After March 1207, Simon's moiety owed half these alms: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 26; *12 John*, p. 96.

¹⁰ The king accounted for 4s.5d. of these alms for Pentecost 1206 and Candlemas 1207, suggesting that Simon had already paid the remaining 2s.3d. at Michaelmas 1206. After March 1207, Simon's moiety owed half these alms annually: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 26; *12 John*, p. 96.

Leprosis ffratribus Leycestrie in pretorio Leycestrie per annum ix li. xviiij s. iiij d.¹¹ per cartam Roberti primi

Eisdem fratribus de exitu foreste per annum vij s. iij d.¹² per cartam eiusdem Comitis Hospitali Leycestrie per annum de exitu quolibet mense xiiij parua quarteria bladi per cartam Roberti secundi. Et per confirmationem Roberti Comitis vltimi per annum xvj li. xviiij s. scilicet partem cuiuslibet quarterium ij s.¹³

Clericis sancte Marie de Castello per annum xx s.¹⁴ recipiendos ad scaccarium Comitis per cartam Roberti Comitis primi

Ffratribus sancte Marie de Vluerscroft per annum xiiij s. iiij d.¹⁵ de decimis Seldarum Leycestrie per cartam

Monachis de sancto Ebrulpho per cartam Roberti Comitis primi per annum lxxiiij s. iiij d. de decimis molendinorum de Leycestria¹⁶ secundum quod molendina appreciantur ad lv marcas sicut superius notatur

Roberto clerico de decima ffurnorum extra portam Leycestrie habenda in vita sua per cartam Roberti Comitis ~~primi~~ vltimi et Gunfredo Capellano de decima ffurnorum infra portas Leycestrie per monachos sancti Ebrulphi per cartam Roberti primi. Et est Summa decimarum

¹¹ For Pentecost 1206 and Candlemas 1207 to Candlemas 1209 inclusive (Michaelmas 1206 presumably having been excluded as Simon's responsibility) the king accounted for £13.4s. of these alms, roughly 5d. short of half the total for eight equitable terms using the sum given. It is possible that at Michaelmas the alms were slightly more substantial than at the other two terms; if £1.13s.6d. were given annually at Michaelmas and £1.12s.10d. were given at Pentecost and Candlemas, this would yield the total for the eight terms accounted for in the Pipe Roll. In 1210, Simon's moiety owed £4.19s.3d. of these alms annually, or half the sum given here and a penny: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 26; *12 John*, p. 96.

¹² For Pentecost 1206 and Candlemas 1207 to Candlemas 1209 inclusive the king accounted for 17s.8d. of these alms, 1s.8d. short of the total for eight equitable terms using the sum given. It is possible that at Michaelmas the alms were more substantial than the other two terms; if 4s.1d. were given at Michaelmas and 1s.7d. were given at Pentecost and Candlemas, this would yield the total for the eight terms accounted for in the Pipe Roll. This is a large difference between terms, but may perhaps be explained by the greater autumnal demand for wood for fuel and repairs in preparation for winter. In 1210, Simon's moiety owed only 3s.6d. of these alms annually, 1½d. short of half the sum given here: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 26; *12 John*, p. 96.

¹³ This should read 2s.2d. a quarter. These alms were rendered in kind and therefore do not appear in the Pipe Rolls.

¹⁴ For unknown reasons, these alms were accounted double to the king for the Pentecost 1206 and Candlemas 1207 terms. Simon presumably paid them at Michaelmas 1206, but whether he gave the castle clergy 1 or 2m. for the term is unclear. After March 1207, Simon's moiety owed half of these alms annually: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, pp. 25-6; *12 John*, p. 96.

¹⁵ The king accounted for these alms in full for the Pentecost 1206 and Candlemas 1207 terms in 1209, and Simon presumably had already paid the remaining 4s.5½d. at Michaelmas 1206. After March 1207, Simon's moiety owed half of these alms annually: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 26; *12 John*, p. 96.

¹⁶ These alms do not appear to have been distributed under royal administration and may have been transferred to the Quincys, if they were still being rendered after the loss of Normandy.

furnorum tam extra portas quam infra portas xlv s. iiij d.¹⁷ secundum quod omnes furni positi sunt ad firmam xxxiiij marcarum.

Simoni de Turuill' et Ernaldo fratri suo per annum x li.¹⁸ in feodo in prefectura Leycestrie per cartam Comitis Roberti secundi.

Roberto de Stauntone in eadem prefectura per annum xl s. per cartam Roberti Comitis vltimi.¹⁹

Priori de Warra de decima prefecture per annum x li.²⁰ per cartam Roberti primi
Ffratribus hospitalibus de Estbrugge de Cantuaria per annum xiiij s. iiij d.²¹ in predicta prefectura per cartam Comitis Roberti secundi.

Magistro Gilberto de Aquila in eadem prefectura c s.²² per cartam Roberti Comitis vltimi habendos in vita sua.

Et Summa lxxix li. xj s. ix d.²³ Quibus subtractis de predictis cc li. lxiiij s. v d. remanent ad locandum in valore Leycestrie c li. xj s. viij d.²⁴

Terra assignata Comiti Wyntonie contra valorem Leycestrie per sacramentum predictorum Juratorum

Iurata dicunt quod de (*sic*) Brakele posita fuit ad firmam tempore Comitis Roberti et adhuc valet per annum xxxviiij li. exceptis viuariis et auxiliis et columbariis sed per defaltam totius instaurati per commune consilium apreciata ad xxxv li. sed inde debunt subtrahi Elemosinas. Et sciendum quod infra predictum valorem computatus exitus cuiusdam graue.

¹⁷ The king accounted for £1.10s.2d. of these alms for the Pentecost 1206 and Candlemas 1207 terms in 1209, or roughly an obol short of the value given. Simon had presumably already paid the remaining 15s.1½d. at Michaelmas 1206. From Pentecost 1207 to Candlemas 1209 inclusive, Simon's moiety owed 13s. of these alms, or about 14% annually. In 1210, however, the confiscated moiety owed half of these alms annually: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 26; *12 John*, p. 96.

¹⁸ Simon's moiety only ever accounted for half this sum annually while in the king's hand: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 26; *12 John*, p. 96.

¹⁹ This grant does not seem to have been paid by the royal administration. Robert of Stanton may have died, or responsibility for his maintenance may have been transferred to the Quincys.

²⁰ While the moiety was in the king's hand, the Exchequer accounted these tithes at £11.17s. annually, applying this value in 1209 even to the Pentecost 1206 and Candlemas 1207 terms. In addition to this, the Exchequer accounted for £2.8s.10½d. to the priory for Pentecost 1206 and Candlemas 1207 from the tithes of the mills. After March 1207, this value was halved to £1.16s.8d. annually, suggesting these tithes were claimed by the priory after this inquest was conducted but before Simon's disseisin or the partition of the honor: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 26; *12 John*, p. 96.

²¹ The king accounted for these alms in full for the Pentecost 1206 and Candlemas 1207 terms in 1209, and Simon presumably had already paid the remaining 4s.5½d. at Michaelmas 1206. After March 1207, Simon's moiety owed half these alms: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 26; *12 John*, p. 96.

²² The king accounted for these alms in full for the Pentecost 1206 and Candlemas 1207 terms in 1209, and Simon presumably had already paid the remaining £1.13s.4d. at Michaelmas 1206. After March 1207, Simon's moiety owed half these alms: *Pipe Roll 11 John*, p. 26; *12 John*, p. 96.

²³ This total is only correct if the substitution, recommended in n. 7, is made of 10d. for 10s.

²⁴ Using the sums given, this should read £123.11s.8d.; the scribe has accidentally missed out *xxij* from the pounds sum. Using the total corrected with reference to the Pipe Rolls in n. 5, it would yield £123.1s.8d.

Item dicunt quod si Halso instauratus esset de xxxv vaccis et de ouibus et de xl porcis tunc valeret per annum xxxviiij li.

Item dicunt quod si Groby instauratus esset de xx vaccis et vno tauro et xx ouibus et vno verro tunc valeret per annum xiiij li. viij s. iiij d. quia molendinum quod valuit per annum tempore Comitis Roberti iiij li. non valet modo nisi iiij marcas quia non habet sectam Leycestrie sicut habere solebat. Sed tamen per commune consilium extenditur (*sic*) ad xiiij li. ac si instauratus esset set inde debunt subtrahi Elemosinaria.

Item dicunt quod Schepe valet xix li. per annum vij s. iij d. cum quoddam prato pertinente ad dictum manerium quod valet per annum xl s. Sed inde debent subtrahi elemosinaria.

Item dicunt quod Swythelond' tempore Comitis Roberti vltimi valuit per annum lxij s. vij d. sed modo non valet plusquam xxxij s. vij d. quia Willelmus Ffalconarius recuperavit seisinam totius terre de dominico per assisam post mortem Roberti Comitis vltimi.

Item dicunt quod Merkenfeld' valuit tempore Comitis Robert vltimi et modo valet per annum lx s.

Item dicunt quod Whitewyk' valuit tempore Comitis Roberti ultimi et modo valet per annum xxx s. preter viuarium.

Item dicunt quod Roteby valuit et modo valet per annum iiij li. xvij s. extra viuarium et vno par calcario deaurato de terra Petri de Sancto Edwardo.

Item dicunt quod Ansty valuit tempore Comitis Roberti et adhuc valet per annum lxvij s.

Item dicunt quod Waltone valet per annum xxiiij s. sed inde debent subtrahi elemosinaria.

Item dicunt quod in Leitone sunt xx s. de redditu Galfridi de Craunford' et de Philippo de Wasteney v s. per annum.

Summa tocius xxiiij li. xxiiij d.²⁵

Monialibus de Godestouwe in Brackeley xiiij s. iiij d. Hospitali de Brackeley vj s. per annum Canonicis de Leycestria de decima eiusdem ville lxxvj s. per annum, scilicet de xxxviiij li. sicut posita fuit ad firmam Comite Roberto.

Eisdem canonicis de decima xij li. et iiij s. de redditu assisa in Halso xxiiij s. iiij d. per annum.

Eisdem canonicis de decima veteris firme de Shepesheued', scilicet de xvij li. vij s. preter pratum viij d. per annum. Eisdem canonicis de decima xxiiij s. de Whattone per annum ij s. iiij d.

Monachis de sancto Ebrulpho de decima iiij li. de valore molendini de Groby per annum viij d.

Summa tocius viij li.²⁶ Quibus subtractis de predictis cxxiiij li. et xxiiij d. remanent cxxiiij li. vii s. iij d.²⁷

Allocantur Comiti Wyntonie in terra assignata ei contra valorem Leycestrie quibus subtractis de cxxiiij li. x s. viij d. de valore Leycestrie cum Elemosinis constitutis in Leycestria remanent ad locandum Comiti Wyntonie contra valorem Leycestrie viij li. xiiij s. v d. ex quibus subtractis iiij

²⁵ Corrected to £125.2s.10d.

²⁶ Corrected to £5.18s.4d.

²⁷ Using the figures given, this should total £115.23d. Using the corrected subtotals from above, it should amount to £119.4s.6d.

li. xv s. viij d. de superplusagio Elemosine quas Comes Leycestrie reddidit in Hynkeley et de villa Willelmi de Seneuilla vltra xxij s. de Elemosinis quas Comes Wyntonie reddidit de Wyngestone et de molendinis de Thurmodostone remanent ad locandum Comiti Wyntonie lxxvij s. ix d. ex quibus medietatem, scilicet xxxvij s. x d. ob.

Allocantur eidem Comiti Wyntonie in parte sua de terra forinceca que non sunt computata contra valorem Leycestrie vt habeat partem suam integram et de altera medietate allocata eidem Comiti Wyntonie xxij s. iiij d. in superplusagio valoris viuarii que idem Comes habet in parte sua contra Leycestriam vltra valorem viuarii que Comes Leycestrie habet in parte sua. Et adhuc remanent ad locandum Comiti Wyntonie xv s. vj d. ob. ex quibus ix s. ij d. allocantur eidem Comiti Wyntonie in superplusagio quam habet in xl li. terre vltra medietatem Comitis Leycestrie. Et preterea vj s. iiij s.²⁸ ob. allocantur eidem Comiti Wyntonie recipiendos de xvj s.²⁹ redditus quos Comes Leycestrie habet ex parte sua in villa Wyntonie et est valor terrarum assignatarum Comiti Wyntonie per partes superius notatas exceptis Elemosinis in predictis terris constitutis cxxij li. x s. viij d.

Terre assignate Comiti Wyntonie pro xl li. vltra medietatem Comitis Leycestrie de terris forinceca que non sunt computate contra valorem Leycestrie, scilicet in Wynteburnestok' xx li. In Westam cxix s. vij d. In Clenfeld' c s. ij d. In Belgrave ix li. x s. v d. Et habent de superplusagio vltra xl li. ix s.³⁰ ij d. que allocantur Comiti Wyntonie defalta terrarum suarum que ei assignantur.

Terre assignate Comiti Leycestrie in terra fforinceca

In Hynkele cum Wyca xxvij li. xvj s. ij d. ob. In Shelton' xvj li. ii s. iiij d. ob. In Belgrauie ix li. ix s. v d. In Derseford xij li. ij s. v d. In Bagworth xvj li. In Clenfeld' c s. ij d. In Wethstan cxix s. que appreciantur xxvj li.

Summa iiij^{xx} xij li. x s. iij d. ob.³¹

Contra hec remanent Comiti Wyntonie Thurmodestone per xv li. vij s. viij d. Wykyngestone pro xl li. Seueby per viij li. ij s. j d. ob. In manerio Wynteburnestoke x li. quod appreciantur l li. In Westan xx li.

[Mem. 3]

In Westan xx li. v d.

Preterea residuum de Wynteburnestoke, scilicet xl li. diuiditur ita quod xx li. remanent Comiti Leycestrie et Comiti Wyntonie ita quod ipse habet inde xxx li. cum predictis x li.

Milites assignati Comiti Leycestri vnde contencio fuit inter ipsum et Comitem Wyntonie

²⁸ This clearly ought to read *d*.

²⁹ There are then 9s.7½*d*. remaining to Simon from the vill of Winchester. The king does not seem to have collected these rents.

³⁰ Corrected to 10s.

³¹ Corrected to £93.9s.7*d*.

Radulfus de Martiuall' j militem. Hamon' de Hoiot j quarterium. Willelmus de Belgraus (*sic*) v partem j militis. Michael Bugetel j quarterium. Jacobus et Robertus de Westane j quarterium in Porcbrigge de maritagio Comitisse Gloucestrie. j militem in Penitone de maritagio eiusdem. j militem in Stratford' in Wyltesire de maritagio Margerie de Toney. j militem medietatis de maritagio Alicie Basset in Wattone de xxiiij virgatis terre vnde adhuc nullum facit seruitium. In seruitio Willelmi de Seneuilla xx s. In Wupwynburne in seruitio Willelmi Cooc xiiij s. In Wyntonia medietatem redditus assise de feodo Leycestrie aduocacione ecclesiarum in Wyntonie de eodem feodo.

Servientes assignati Comiti Leycestrie

Johannes de Netherhauene, Robertus de Carl't, Willelmus Ffalconarius de Thurkelestone Austurcarius, et Wilbertus Aceps³² in Thorp', Iuo de Leur', Robertus filius Willelmi de Brumsthorpe, Rogerus de Pokyngtone, Radulfus de Curtone in Glenefeld', Willelmus de Belgrae, Robertus de Scultone, Richardus Cocus de Hynkele, Thomas Pynzoun, Willelmus Lardarius in Leycestria.

Milites assignati Comiti Wyntonie

Willelmus de Ayua j militem. Willelmus Pycot i quarterium. Ricardus filius Waruni j quarterium. Hugo de Gundeuilla ij milites in Pympre de maritagio Comitisse Gloucestrie, de maritagio matris Rogeri de Toney in Stratford' j militem, de maritagio Willelmi Luppelli in Munsteron et in Clecumbe ij milites et dimidium. In Gleton quarta pars j militis quam Prior de Cristecherch' tenet medietatem servienterie de maritagio Alicie Basset.

Contra milites Comitis Rogeri (*sic*) assignantur Comiti Wyntonie ij milites et j quarterium, scilicet de Comite Sari j militem, de Ricardo Basset j militem, de Briano de Insula dimidium militem, de Michaeulo Rogerell' ij partes j militis. Contra milites Willelmi de Casmnes assignantur Comiti Wyntonie ij partes militis de paruis feodis de Moretonia, scilicet de de Willelmo Turuilla i militem in Hamndenar', in Greton', Canterbrugge, et Betton' j militem, medietatem j militis de Radulfo de Merlyng' et alteram medietatem Comiti Leycestrie.

Demande et calumpnie quas Comes Leycestrie habet versus Comitem Wyntonie Item petit elemosinas sibi allocari quas eum reddere oportet secundum tenorem cartarum antecessorum suorum, scilicet leprosis de sancto Leonardo Leycestrie de redditu de Hynkeley per annum lx s. Item leprosis predictis vij s. de decima fforeste. Item monialibus de (*sic*)

Item ecclesie beate Marie de castello ij s. x d. de terra que fuit Littelchild'. Item fratribus de sancto Lazaro de per annum de eodem scaccario x s. Et preterea dimidium vadimonium de redditu prenominato. Item hospitali sancti Thome de Estburgge de Cantuaria per annum j marcam. Item monialibus de Wroxhale per annum x s. Item Priori de Hynkele per annum de decima sote de Hynkele iiij li. xij s. Item

³² Corrected to *auceps*.

hospitali sancti Johannis Baptiste de Leycestria quolibet mense per annum xiiij quarteria bladi secundum minorem mensuram

Item Robertus Clericus habet de decima furnorum extra portam orientalem de Leycestria quousque modo affirmantur in tota vita sua. Item Comes Leycestrie petit partem suam de octo viuariis et de Chacea de Wysele. Item petit iiij pueros scilicet duas filias Hugonis de Cla et heredem Willelmi de Traunsre et heredem Radulfi de Sapeyk. Item petit rationabilem partem suam de fforesta. Item queritur quod homines sui manentes in fforesta scilicet homines de Dirsford' et Bagworth', Clenfeld' et Thurkelestone possunt habere communem pasturam et alia aysiamenta ad eos pertinentia sicut habere solent in fforesta et in bosco vnde Comes Wyntonie nichil debet habere nisi venacionem. Item idem Comes queritur quod Comes Wyntonie vendidit et omnino destruxit quoddam alnetum de Hynghahg' et non partem et ad liberam haiam de Hynghahg' que pertinet ad partem dicti Comitis Leycestrie. Item quetiur de Laura qui fuit Roberti plus habet in dotem quam habere debet per liberacionem Comitis Wyntonie. Item idem petit cxix s. vij d. in West assignati fuerunt in parte sua et Comes Wyntonie ei deforciauit. Item partem suam de seruicio Nicholai de Wyel in Chacia de Vunburheg'. Item petit medietatem xxviiij s. de Willelmo Coco in Hupp Turnbull. Item petit partem suam de seruicio Trebeti in Netherhauene et partem suam de seruicio Willelmi Trenchefoill' in eadem villa. Idem petit medietatem de molendino quod predictus Willelmus tenet in predicta villa. Idem petit partem suam de seruicio heredum Moruni in Whattone et de seruicio xxiiij virgatarum terre datarum ei in maritagio in eadem villa. Idem petit partem suam de seruicio Ade de Shepesheued' de seruicio Ricardi filii Nicholai et Walteri Walensis et Rogeri Camerarii et Gilberti filii Edwyni. Idem petit partem suam de seruicio Willelmi Fframerii et Roberti de Bellestone et Walteri filii Ade de Ansty et Bertandi et Thurstani de Thurmodestone et Rogeri Godberdi et Thome filii Ricardi Ffraunceys. Idem petit partem suam de seruicio Roberti Gormondi et Walerami de vna vncea serice et de seruicio Sweyn de j libra piperis et partem suam de seruicio Summentari de Grobypiperis. Et de seruicio Haraldi de Spenc' in eadem villa. Et de seruicio Ivonis Hurell' de iij virgatis terre in et de medietate terre quam Petrus de sancto Edwardo tenet in Rotby. Et de seruicio Camerarii in Wyky de seruicio Willelmi Sheueby scilicet de vna libra cere. Idem petit domos quod fuerunt Episcopi Lincolniensis in sub[urbio] quas Comes Wyntonie dedit Archidiacono Wellensi. Idem petit operacionem terre militum in honore de Grentemelnio que Comes Wyntonie ei deforciauit scilicet de parte sua ad reparandum viuarium et Stagnum de Leycestria sicut facere solebat.

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