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Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results.

Abstract:

We analyze the incentives to disclose intermediate research results. We find that despite the help that disclosure can give to a rival, the leading innovator sometimes chooses to disclose. Disclosure signals commitment to the research project, which may induce a rival to exit. With weak product market competition, the leader discloses intermediate results that are sufficiently promising, while secrecy may be employed for very good results. As spillovers from disclosure increase, the leader be...

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Publisher:
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2004-12-01
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:a04d79ef-9d51-46ba-be1b-70475bf3bf5a
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:13492
Deposit date:
2011-12-16

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