ARISTOTLE ON THOUGHT AND ACTION

Thesis submitted for the degree of D. Phil. by

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Corpus Christi,
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Without whom not: to whom for

This thesis is drawn from a larger piece of work on Aristotle's philosophy of mind.

Such as it is it would not have emerged had it not been for the help, encouragement and prodding received on the way.

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Finally, and not least (ton eschaton amphotera) my thanks to Dr Rosalind Hursthouse, an INUS condition for the thesis for whom the I and U are mealy-mouthed.
The immediate object is a determinate resolution of Aristotle's position in *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.3. over the Socratic problem and in particular the possibility of last-ditch akrasia. My approach seeks interpretational constraints and illumination from considering the argument as a structured whole. Moreover, the passage is a point on which larger issues in Aristotle's philosophies of mind, action, and morals converge: the elucidation offered attempts both to frame and throw light on these.

Chapter One makes preliminary moves on several fronts. Firstly it looks briefly at Aristotle's position over last-ditch akrasia in *De Anima* and *Eudemian Ethics*. Then it outlines the problems of *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.3. and classifies previous lines of solution. Thirdly an intuitive picture is given of Aristotle's method and basic stance. Finally some contrasts are drawn between Aristotle's and modern approaches to akrasia.

Chapters Two to Five discuss the four Sections of *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.3.'s argument.

Chapters Two and Three take Section 1 and 2 together and consider two major problems of interpretation. Chapter Two asks whether these Sections concern akrasia at all, and, if so, how. I argue that their concern is direct, general (i.e. not confined to some akratic species), and inclusive (i.e. embracing non-akratic phenomena). Chapter Three asks about the interpretation of "exercising knowledge". Firstly the results of Chapter Two are defended; an aporetic discussion of this difficult issue then follows.

Chapter Four examines Section 3. After analysing its structure, it distinguishes three principal issues. I argue firstly that Section 3, like 1 and 2, concerns akrasia directly, generally and inclusively; secondly that the knowledge that the akratic is temporally unable to use (that is 'tied') is his (universal) knowledge of what is worthwhile; thirdly that this failure involves a cognitive failure (I suggest a distortion of the agent's situational appreciation) - and not, as some scholars have recently urged, merely a motivational failure.

Chapter Five, perforce selective, tackles firstly various problems of Section 4's argumentative structure, and then the interpretation of 1147a26-31 (the 'normal case'). Finally 1147a31-5 (the 'akratic case') is examined and a case argued for its offering two syllogisms but only one practical syllogism.
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Main Abbreviations

(Page references are to the first usage.)

APS (cf. RPS) : practical syllogism of appetite (p.32)
AS (cf. ES; RS) : appetitive system (p.60)
BKM : the true belief instead of knowledge manoeuvre (p.13)
(C) : the assumption that the conclusion of the practical syllogism is identical with the action (p.130)
(Con) (cf. (U);(En)) : contemplate (theorein) (p.158)
CooPS : Cooper's(1975) view of the practical syllogism (p.34)
DC (cf. PC) : deliberative conclusion (p.135)
DGI : the claim re some section that it concerns akrasia directly, generally and inclusively (p.116)
(E) : the assumption that failing to exercise the minor premiss is at least failing to know it in the sense of knowing the particular circumstances required for acting intentionally (p.129)
(En) (cf. (Con); (U)) : activate knowledge (energein) (p.164)
EPS (cf. APS; RPS) : practical syllogism of emotion
ES (cf. AS; RS) : emotional system (p.60)
FP : final proposition (teleutaia protasis)
generally7.3. : applying to all types of akrasia at issue in NE.7.3. (p.110)
generally7.1-10. : applying to all types of akrasia at issue in NE.7.1-10. (p.110)
GPS : practical syllogism of reason (=RPS)
(H) : Having but not using (p.158)
(HL) (cf. (HS)) : Habitus ligatus (p.22)
(HS) (cf. (HL)) : Habitus solutus (p.22)
IA (cf. WA) : Impulsive akrasia (propeteia) (p.19)
1MS (cf. 1SA) : Premiss (1) on the merely subdivisional interpretation (p.90)
1PS (cf. I2PS; S2PS): Only one practical syllogism (p.261)
1SA (cf. 1MS) : Premiss (1) on the strictly additional interpretation (p.90)
I2PS (cf. 1PS; S2PS): Two practical syllogisms with independent minor premisses (p.260)
MaP (cf. MiP) : Major premiss (p.157)
MiP : Minor premiss (p.157)
MP (cf. PMP; TMP) : Minor premiss approach to/interpretation of akrasia (p.126)
N (cf. W) : narrow (HS) usage of 'having but not using knowledge' (p.91)
FC (cf. DC) : practical conclusion (p.135)
FK (cf. TeK; TK) : practical knowledge (p.30)
PMP (cf. MP; TMP) : a partial minor premiss interpretation (p.126)
PR (cf. TR) : practical reason (p.30)
PS (cf. S) : practical syllogism (p.32)
RPS (cf. APS) : practical syllogism of reason (p.32)
RS (cf. AS; ES) : rational system (p.61)
S (cf. PS) : Syllogism
S2PS (cf. I2PS) : Two practical syllogism with shared minor premiss (p.260)
TeK (cf. FK; TK) : technical knowledge (p.38)
TK (cf. FK; TeK) : theoretical knowledge (p.30)
TMP (cf. MP; PMP) : a total minor premiss interpretation (p.126)
TR (cf. PR) : theoretical reason (p.30)
U (cf. (Con); (En)) : use (chresthai) (p.158)

V1A/B
V2A/B
V3

: View 1, etc. (pp.86-7)

W (cf. N) : wide (both HS and HL) usage of 'having but not using knowledge' (p.91)

WA (cf. IA) : weak akrasia (astheneia) (p.19)
**Method of Reference**

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Our present aim is straightforwardly to establish as determinately as is possible \(^1\) what position the Aristotle of NE.7.3. holds over the Socratic problem of the possibility of akrasia - the problem as Aristotle puts it:

peri...tou eidota kai me, kai pos eidota endechetai akrateuesthai,....

about whether for a person knowing or not, and in what manner knowing it is possible for them to act akratically....

(7.3.1147b17-18)

Much has been written on this, although of uneven quality. Philosophical Wagnerianism predominates, with grand themes, axe-grinding, anvil-bashing off-stage, and too little sophistication at the textual footlights.\(^2\)

The intricacy - and ultimately the philosophical interest - of the topic lies in the sheer number of factors involved, of independently tricky sub-issues, and the possible permutations of their resolutions. Elucidation of these has its own philosophic and exegetic importance, practically regardless of the truth (and generality) of
such solution(s) as Aristotle offers us.

I am of course interested in arguing for a particular (set of) interpretation(s) of Aristotle's position and for its philosophical contribution to modern discussion; but I am equally concerned to elucidate the range of issues needed to be taken into account and the methodological difficulties of establishing criteria for correctly persuasive arguments in the area. The latter is difficult. The literature is choc-a-bloc with theses that may well be right, but the arguments for which fail adequately to register and fend off competing interpretational possibilities.

1.1.2. Aristotle and Last-Ditch akrasia

Our question of Aristotle's position over the Socratic problem has a more particular and acute form: "In making room for akrasia, does Aristotle allow for the possibility of last-ditch akrasia?"

Informally last-ditch cases are those where the agent acts freely, intentionally, for a reason, in a way contrary to his best judgement - to what he judges it would be best for him to do now, given his values - even though he is aware of this and thinks it is open to him to act in accordance with his best judgement. More illuminatingly, these are cases where the fault, or irrationality, at issue does not lie in the agent's reasoning, is not an intellectual fault either of content or mode. The agent
knowingly simply does what he is aware is not in his best interest. The irrationality lies simply in his action.\textsuperscript{5} Are such cases really possible?\textsuperscript{6} We have contrary intuitions here.

On the one hand, the question seems bizarre. Such cases are not merely possible but everyday. 'I know it's best for me to get up now; but I'm going to stay here. Are you telling me I don't know what I'm doing? But I do; and what's more I'm just as convinced as ever that it would be better for me to get up; I'm quite aware of all the circumstances (I'm awake, not half asleep); and no-one and nothing is compelling me. I'm a grown up, I can act irrationally if I want.'

But why doesn't the agent then get up? 'He can't just loll there in brazen akrasia; he is an affront to us, and we demand an explanation.' And so our other intuitions creep out. There must either be some aspect of compulsion, some sense in which he is temporarily unable to get up ('he is suffering from incipient aboulia'); or else he isn't really committed to getting up - it's just a value he's playing with, being hypocritical about ('after all if he really valued it, he'd get up, wouldn't he?'); or although it is a value at the present he doesn't really understand that it would be best for him to get up. For if he did he would get up. So there must be some intellectual fault,\textsuperscript{7} some deviancy in content or mode.

Controversy rages not only over the possibility of such last-ditch cases, but over whether Aristotle's
NE.7.3. account allows for them.

But perhaps a wider consideration of Aristotle's views will offer illumination, at least by way of constraint.

(A) Akrasia and the De Anima

In De Anima 3.9. Aristotle turns to the question of what part of the soul sets animals in spatial motion (432a15-22; b7-8; 13-14). There is a long argument (3.9.432b14-3.10.433b1), to the eventual conclusion that the capacity (dunamis) in question is desire (orexis) (433a31-bl). In the first part of this argument (432bl4-433a8) Aristotle argues that the relevant capacity is not (1) the nutritive capacity (432b14-19); nor (2) the perceptual capacity (432b19-26). He then advances considerations for supposing that it is neither the intellectual capacity(-ies) alone nor the desiderative alone. The passage runs:

But nor yet is it the logistikon part and the so-called nous that produces movement. For on the one hand the theoretical intellect contemplates nothing practicable, and does not say anything about the objects of 'flight' and of 'pursuit', while movement belongs to one who is either fleeing or pursuing something. But nor on the other hand when (the rational part) does contemplate some such thing, does it thereby order one to flee or to pursue: e.g. often it thinks of something fearful or pleasant, but does not order one to be afraid, but the heart is moved, and if something pleasant, some other part. Further even when the intellect (nous) does issue orders and thought (dianoia) is saying to flee something or to pursue one is (sc. sometimes) not set in motion, but one acts according to appetite (epithumia), e.g. the akratic. And in general we see that the person who has medical
knowledge is not thereby curing, as though there is some other thing that is in charge (kurios) of acting according to the knowledge, but not the knowledge itself.

But nor yet is it desire that is in charge (kuria) of this type of: i.e. spatial movement: for the enkratics while they desire, i.e. are having appetites, do not do those things for which they have the desire, but follow the intellect (nous). (432b26-433a9)

Here Aristotle uses the figures of the akratic and encratic to argue that apparently neither intellect alone nor desire alone is the capacity in question. From this he goes on to draw the apparent (mid-argument) conclusion:

But these two things appear at least to do the setting in motion - either desire or intellect, if one were to posit phantasia as a kind of thought (noesis): for many follow their phantasiai in violation of their knowledge, and in other animals there is not thought (noesis) nor calculation, but there is phantasia. (433a9-12)

It is the comment, not the 'conclusion', that concerns us. Given the way they are described, and what has just preceded, I take it that "the many" who follow their phantasiai in violation of their knowledge include akratics. (Cf. also 433a25-6; and I would also cite the controversial passage at 3.11.434a5-15 in support.)

Moreover that akratics are describable as people who follow phantasiai in violation of knowledge is supported by NE.7.7.1150b27-8.

Now from 3.9. (quoted above) we might conclude that Aristotle is there countenancing last-ditch cases,
for the agent appears to possess a best judgement - to have commitment, no ignorance, and no compulsion - and simply fails to act appropriately.

However two factors militate against this conclusion.

(a) First the passage, 433al-3, is closely comparable to NE.7.3.1147a33. And if the case there is determined not to be a case of last-ditch akrasia (because, say, of the use of "legein" 1147a34 indicating mere enunciation with deficient understanding), this will recoil on the evidential power of the present passage. Nor again can capital be made out of the fact that intellect in 433al-2 is described as "actually issuing commands" ("epitattontos"). For it does so in akrasia dia thumon (NE.7.6.1149a25-32), but the agent doesn't 'stay around' to listen to his reason's "epitagma".

(b) Secondly, if Aristotle holds that akratics follow phantasias in violation of their knowledge, then the following passage from De An.3.3. implies that Aristotle doesn't accept last-ditch akrasia but regards akratics as suffering from cognitive clouding:

And on account of their \(\phi\)phantasiai remaining and being similar to (their?) perceptions, animals do many things according to them \(\phi\)sc. phantasias, some because they don't have intellect (nous), e.g. the beasts, others because their intellect is veiled (epikaluptesthai)\(^8\) at times by passion (pathos) or by diseases or by sleep, e.g. human beings. (3.3.429a4-8)
While the range of "pathos" is potentially disputable I can see no argument against its including emotions and appetites here - and moreover these remarks have an obvious affinity with those of NE.7.3.1147all-18.

So De An.3.3.'s "veiling" joins NE.7.3.'s "temporary ignorance" (1147b6ff) as militating against Aristotle's acceptance of last-ditch akrasia.

However, on the other side, the generality of this second argument may be brought into question. Every move in this argument can be granted, with the proviso that we do not have to suppose that every type of akratic is included among such phantasiai-followers. There may be other types, and among these, might be cases of last-ditch akrasia. And more strongly, it can be urged, we have some grounds for supposing that not every type of akratic is in fact a phantasia-follower:

(i) NE.7.3.1147bl talks of someone being brought to act akratically "by an argument and a belief" - no mention of phantasia here (except in connection with beasts who can't be akratic (1147b5)).

(ii) A closer look at NE.7.7.1150b25-8 reveals that the clause "on account of their being apt to follow the phantasia" is applied either to impulsive akratics generally or to a certain type of impulsive akratic and could be held to have application only to such types, and to be inapplicable to cases of weak akrasia (cf. MM.2.6.1203b5);

(iii) While NE.7.6.1149a32 allows phantasia a role (and cf. perception in a35), "logos" (a32, 35) is equally allowed to
play that role in the generation of the akratic act.

While there may be replies to these countermoves, they suffice to indicate that the De An. is not going to provide us with knock-down arguments. However we can minimally conclude that:
(i) De An.3.9. can not be taken to provide us with clear examples of last-ditch akrasia as might at first appear;
(ii) that the apparently close connection between De An.3.3.'s remarks on "veiling" and NE.7.3.1147all-18 appears to confirm that Aristotle would regard some types of akratic as cognitively clouded, and if not all types, then we have to be shown these types. It creates, I suggest, some presumption that Aristotle would regard all akratics this way, unless we are shown to the contrary.

(B) Akrasia and the Eudemian Ethics

In the supposedly early seventh book, Aristotle remarks at one point:

But the good man neither upbraids himself at the time (hama), as the akratic does, nor yet his later self his earlier self, as does the remorseful (/regretful) man, nor yet his earlier self his later, as the liar does.... (7.6.1240b22ff)

The sort of case Aristotle seems to be alluding to here is that of Plato's Leontius. The compresence of such self-assessing attitudes appears to speak strongly in favour of the possibility of last-ditch akrasia and of Aristotle's countenancing it here. If the agent really feels himself compelled, then he shouldn't be representing
himself to himself as a currently suitable object for censure; and if he isn't aware of what he is doing (Ø-ing against his best judgement), then he loses the object for current assessment and censure. So at first glance the phenomenology of this sort of case suggests we can represent ourselves to ourselves as engaged in last-ditch akrasia.

It may be countered that phenomenology doesn't underwrite truth: it can seem to us that last-ditch akrasia is possible without its being so.

Obviously one agrees with that, in the sense that one can make mistakes in one's self-assessment, not feel oneself compelled when in fact one is (e.g. a hypnotism case) etc., etc. What the argumentative counter required, of course, was the possibility that our phenomenology might be entirely wrong: that not only might it be that none of us are in fact engaged in last-ditch akrasia when it appears to us that we are, but also we couldn't ever be right about this ('for last-ditch akrasia is not possible').

The argumentative grounding of any such large (global and modal) "error theory" attack on the phenomenology is suspect. A game that one thought one knew how roughly to play, whose moves one could essay, is radically altered, by pressing that kind of invitation to 'go global' characteristic of one type of sceptical strategy. We are surreptitiously encouraged to stand outside ourselves to learn how far the world and our conceptual scheme may mismatch; but lured out of ourselves, so to speak, it is
no longer obvious that we have anywhere to stand from which to launch such attacks or understand such lessons.\textsuperscript{11}

However there are other kinds of countermove to the phenomenological argument. One would challenge the description of the phenomenology, claiming that a more careful dissection would reveal that we never really envisaged ourselves as engaged in last-ditch akrasia.\textsuperscript{12} Another would try and push the self-assessment aspect itself into the akrasia; would argue that it was part of a wider self-deceptive scenario, and claim e.g. that one doesn't really understand the self-assessing criticism any more than the best judgement one is violating.

If these moves fail (as I suspect they would), then this phenomenological argument may go through (certainly these cases have not received the attention they deserve).

But even if Aristotle is committed to last-ditch akrasia here, it could hardly be regarded as an authoritative commitment. It seems an isolated remark in an early work; moreover it is noticeable that the 'official' treatment of NE.7.3. neglects these "Leontinian" cases, a neglect that appears more in line with a rejection of the last-ditch case.

However more seriously it has been claimed\textsuperscript{13} that in a much more central and extended part of the EE Aristotle explicitly countenances last-ditch akrasia - EE.2.6-8. And this certainly appears so from such passages as this:
Moreover both pleasure and pain are present in both of them. The man acting continently suffers pain in that he is even now acting in violation of his appetite, and gets enjoyment from the expectation that he will benefit in the future or from the fact that he is even now benefiting from being healthy; while the incontinent man gets enjoyment from getting what he has an appetite for when he acts incontinently, but suffers pain from an expectation, as he thinks that he will fare ill. (1224b15-21, Woods, adapted)

and more generally from the absence of any talk of 'ignorance' in the relevant passages together with an argument to the effect that neither akratic nor encratic can strictly speaking be considered as acting under compulsion (1224a30-1225a2).  

But in these very respects it differs from the NE.7.3. account, where however it is interpreted overall, Aristotle is obviously much concerned with differences in cognitive state and in 'ignorance', and not at all with compulsion. So, one should not, I think, expect the possibility of much leverage from the one passage to the other.

This wider consideration does not afford a great deal in the way of help. It may be that the De An. denies last-ditch akrasia, while the EE admits it. If so, then Aristotle - considered as a system of texts - will be inconsistent. Could he be expected then to go one way rather than the other in the NE? If there are some points of contact with the De An., that would perhaps favour a rejection of last-ditch akrasia. Alternatively, if Kenny is right, then NE.7.3. is part of the EE. But then, as
Pears points out,\textsuperscript{15} if 7.3. independently assessed doesn't allow for last-ditch cases, then Aristotle would be guilty of a more glaring inconsistency.

1.1.3.

I turn now (Section 2) to outlining and imposing some order on the range of problems one faces in attempting to tease out a determinate position from NE.7.3. In Section 3 of this Chapter I start laying some foundations, by indicating interpretative positions to which we can plausibly commit ourselves early on in the game. And finally in Section 4 I step from the face of the picture to examine some contrasts between Aristotle's approach to \textit{akrasia} and some modern ones.
SECTION 2

SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS IN 7.3.1146b24-FIN

1.2.1. Problems of argumentative structure

Our first set of problems concerns the structure of the argument (1146b24-fin). We face basically two kinds of problems internal to each section and problems concerning their relations - 'intrasectional' and 'intersectional' problems. While difficult they don't demand Cook Wilson's dramatic response.¹

I start by expounding the divisions and subdivisions of my 'sections',² to highlight some intrasectional problems.

Sec.0. criticizes the 'true-belief-for-knowledge' manoeuvre (BKM) as a response to the Socratic problem: this distinction is 'irrelevant'. Sec.1. proceeds by contrast ("alla" b31) to introduce a distinction that is 'relevant'. Sec.2., 3., and 4., build on this response by introducing further points. Sec.1-4. are clearly demarcated by the introductory "further"s ("eti": 1146b35; 1147a10, a24).

Sec.1-4. constitute the building blocks of Aristotle's argument. However a special problem arises over Sec.4. - 'the 4c puzzle'. Each preceding section (1, 2, 3) is clearly terminated by the "further" initiating its successor. But where does the scope of the final "further" (a24) end? Does it encompass Sec.4c?³ Or does it end with Sec.4a (or 4b), while the remainder is really a
'Section 5', summing up results of some or all preceding sections? If the former, the relations of Sec.4a, b, and c are intrasectional problems; if the latter (also) intersectional ones.

Other clearly intrasectional problems occur both in Sec.4. and in Secs.2. and 3.

So, for instance, in Sec.4a a question surrounds the logical structure of 1147a35-b5: is the second consequence (b3-5) itself a consequence of the first (a35-b3), or parallel to it? Again, however we resolve 'the 4c puzzle', Sec.4b's place in the argument appears obscure. Again, there is a problem internal to Sec.4c - the "Ramsauer problem": do we read simply "tauten" at 1147b10 (with Bywater, Apelt, Gauthier-Jolif) or "tauten de" (with Ramsauer, Susemihl, Burnet and Rackham)? And how does this affect our understanding of the point of Sec.4c?

Sec.3. falls into two parts (3a and 3b), each with its own conclusion. This structural division is usually ignored, to the detriment of many interpretations.

Sec.2. divides in three, whose relations are extremely cryptic:

(i) **Sec.2b's relation to 2a.** Does 2b simply elaborate on 2a's point in greater detail? Or does it add an altogether further point (see (ii))?  
(ii) **Sec.2c's relation to 2a and 2b.** What does "according to these manners" (a8) refer to? Just to the "two manners" of 2a (1147a1)? Or also to further 'manners' introduced in 2b?
1.2.2. Turning to the intersectional puzzles, the literature is particularly preoccupied with two - the '4-1' and 'Phusikos' puzzles.

The '4-1 puzzle'

'Do the main sections (1-4) constitute four separate solutions (to the same problem) or a single solution "developed in four successive stages" (Ross, Aristotle, p.222)?'

Scholars divide. However the terms of this contrast in the literature are unhelpfully imprecise - merely gesturing towards different strategies of interpretation. (We might for instance tighten the latter option by re-construing it on the model of a 'progressive bisection': Sec.1. carves off a large area within which akrasia and much else is located; each succeeding section 'bisects' its predecessor's area, thus progressively isolating the figure of the akratic. The former option would by contrast deny any such dependence.)

The 'Phusikos puzzle'

'Is "phusikos" (Sec.4a 1147a24) pivotal in the argumentative structure? - opposing Sec.1-3. (or Sec.3. alone) to Sec.4.; and if so, what is this opposition?'

Some scholars simply ignore 'phusikos' or construe it lightly as marking mere progression to considerations 'closer to the facts'. But many consider it pivotal.

Among the latter, the typical, although not universal, interpretation opposes 'phusikos' to 'logikos', and takes the latter to characterise the concern or method
of Sec.1-3.

Yet even here there is radical disagreement over what this contrast imports:

(I) some consider it a contrast of methodological approach to the same problem. These in turn subdivide into

   (IA) those who play down Sec.1-3. as offering 'merely dialectical' (logikos), even merely ad hominem, solutions, and think Sec.4. contains Aristotle's "real lusis"; 9

   (IB) those who, conversely, see in Sec.1-3. Aristotle's proper 'philosophical' (logikos) solution (or solutions), while Sec.4. is merely a sop,

   to satisfy those unfortunate persons who cannot distinguish philosophy from psychology. (Robinson) 10

(II) Others take the contrast not to be one (merely) of methodological approach - to the same problem, but indicative of a change of problem: different methods different problems. 11 Thus Santas argues:

What is Aristotle doing in these three passages \( \text{i.e.} \text{Sec.1-3}, \)? Is Aristotle giving three independent solutions, and in the passage of our example \( \text{i.e.} \text{Sec.4}, \) a fourth one yet, or is the last one the only "real" solution? Endless disputes have arisen about this. The right answer it seems to me, turns on a point of logic. We need to distinguish the Socratic question, "How is it possible for one to act contrary to his knowledge (of what is best)?" from a different question: "How can we explain an actual case of incontinence?" In the three passages we have cited that occur immediately before the passage of our example, Aristotle is answering the first question, not the second; even if he
thought he was answering the second question - which is very unlikely since examples in these passages are not examples of conflicting motivations - he did not in fact answer the second question. ((1969), pp.181-2) 12

This view would gain further support if in 1147a24-5,

Further also in the following way phusikos someone might carefully examine the cause.

the examination of the "aitia" is peculiar to a phusikos approach. (By contrast those favouring (I) will take this sentence to imply that Sec.1-3. also have been examining akrasia's 'aitia', albeit not 'phusikos' but 'logikos'.)

Within (II)'s contrast of possibility with explanation, there is some variation.

One line 13 simply sees Sec.1-3. concerned with akrasia's possibility, Sec.4. with its explanation, in this prefiguring the discussions of e.g. Davidson, Wiggins, Charles. 14

One problem is that 'the' possibility/explanation distinction lacks clarity. 15 Another is that, if Aristotle's major concern is taken to be akrasia's possibility (as 1147b18f "endechetai" may suggest), then the above line threatens the relevance of Sec.4a. (shades of Robinson).

Santas' view appears less straightforward. He stresses that Sec.1-3. concern the possibility, not of akrasia, but of 'acting contrary to one's knowledge (of what is best)' (cf. "...examples in these passages are not examples of conflicting motivations..."). Apparently
viewing Aristotle's primary aim as the explanation of akrasia, he sees Sec.1-3. as merely preparatory for Sec.4.'s "complete explanation" (p.182):

In the first three Sec.1-3. Aristotle explores the various things that can "go wrong" with the knowledge provided by practical reason, and hence, in our terms, the various things that can go wrong with the practical reason-wish motivation. And in the fourth passage Sec.4. he provides in addition the conflicting opinion-desire motivation to explain the action of the incontinent man. (p.182)

This view is controversial in its construal of Sec.1-3.'s examples; and it is particularly hard to square with Sec.3.'s explicit concern with akrasia. Moreover if Sec.1-3. are not in some measure concerned with the possibility of akrasia, their relevance appears undermined.

1.2.3. Further questions

Obviously questions arise about the ways responses to the '4-1' and 'Phusikos' puzzles interlock.

But more interestingly, if 'phusikos' is accorded a pivotal role contrasting Sec.1-3. with Sec.4., we clearly hit a '3-1 puzzle' over the argumentative structure of Sec.1-3.: are they three separate solutions (albeit all 'logikos')? Or a single solution 'developed in successive stages'? Or are Sec.1. and 2. merely preparatory to some solution in Sec.3.? etc. Two specific questions here are:

(a) Is Sec.3.'s "other manner" of knowing entirely
19. additional to those of Sec.1. and 2., or a subdivision in Sec.1.'s?
(b) Do "the manners of having knowledge just spoken of" (1147a10-11) include Sec.2.'s 'manners'? And either way what is Sec.2.'s role? - for Sec.3. evidently picks up on Sec.1. while Sec.2.'s contribution seems ignored, at least until Sec.4.

1.2.4. Types of akrasia at issue in 7.3.

We can now introduce a further problematic factor, intimately connected with these structural problems. In NE.7.3-10. Aristotle makes several distinctions between types of akrasia (e.g. distinctions between types over their objects, between 'normal' and pathological types, and between 'weak' and 'impetuous' forms). The question then arises of which types are under consideration in 7.3. (or whether the discussion moves at an altogether more abstract level). This issue's importance is in part that of the generality of Aristotle's 7.3. solutions.

Secondary literature concentrates particularly on 7.3. and weak (WA) and impulsive akrasia (IA).

Some scholars consider that only (WA) is at issue in 7.3.17

Others think these different types are under discussion in different sections.18

Stewart illustrates this latter position in a way
that reveals its close connection with the structural problems.

He holds these three theses:

(1) in Sec.3. it is:

the propetes akrasia, or propeteia of EN.vii.7.8. \(<\text{that}>\) is the form of akrasia which the writer has in view

while Sec.4a:

takes up the other kind of akrasia distinguished in E.N.vii.7.8., viz. astheneia. (Vol.II.p.146)

(2) Sec.1-4a present four separate considerations against Socrates' view (Vol.II.p.146);

(3) phusikos is opposed to logikos, and the contrast is between an explanation that is "remote and abstract" (viz.logikos) and one that offers:

the proximate cause or oikeios logos, which an examination of the concrete nature (phusis) of the phenomenon will make known. (Vol.II.p.156)

Two structural questions immediately arise.

(Q1): if Sec.3. concerns (IA) and Sec.4a. concerns (WA), what do Sec.1. and Sec.2. concern?

(Q2): can one consistently hold theses (1) and (3)?

(Q2)'s problem is that, if logikos remarks offer "remote and abstract" explanations (i.e. (3)), how can Sec.3. be taken to concern a (different) kind of akrasia of equal specificity with that in Sec.4a (as (1) requires)?

Stewart fails to notice, let alone respond to,
this tension. Over (Q1), his position is fairly tortuous.

If I have correctly decoded it, his preferred position is to claim that:

(i) Sec.1. and 2. are directly concerned to explain akrasia;
(ii) they consider akrasia generally - i.e. at least both (WA) and (IA);
(iii) Sec.3.'s 'tied' manner of having but not using knowledge is a third species of 'having knowledge', distinct from the two species of having knowledge in Sec.1. and 2.

Together with thesis (1), these form an inconsistent set. For, by (1), (IA) is under discussion in Sec.3.; by (1) and (iii), (IA) cannot be under discussion in Sec.1. and 2.; and this contradicts (ii).

Later I argue that there are good grounds both for denying (iii) and (1). Another, albeit extreme, resolution would retract (1), and so a fortiori (ii).

More moderately one could initially retract simply (ii), and take Sec.1. and 2. to concern some different specific type(s) of akrasia to that discussed in Sec.3.

Again, one could (rightly) deny (iii) and claim instead that (iii*) the sense of 'having but not using knowledge' in Sec.1. and 2. is rather a 'genus' (that of potential knowledge); and Sec.3. introduces a 'specific' distinction within this 'generic' notion, between 'free having' and 'tied having'.

Stewart indeed toys with this last manoeuvre,
but merely as a possible, not a necessary concession (p.154; cf. p.153).

Now both his 'preferred' and his 'concessionary' positions commit Stewart to committing Aristotle to the existence of what I term 'Habitus Solutus' (HS) types of akrasia (in contradistinction to Habitus Ligatus (HL) types); in fact they commit him to the stronger thesis that (WA) is a (HS) type (from which the preceding claim follows by existential generalisation).

(iii), or (iii*), equally suffice to ground the claim that some type(s) of akrasia involves the 'tied having' of Sec.3. (1) identifies this type as propeteia (IA), as against other types (especially (WA)). (i) and (ii) entail that Sec.1. and 2. concern certain types of akrasia other than (IA) - whether or not they also concern (IA) (the difference between (iii) and (iii*)). And these other types - which presumably include weakness (ii) - are either immediately describable as (HS) cases (if (iii) holds); or else are so describable by the subtraction of the (IA)(HL) cases from the generic notion of potential knowledge (if (iii*) holds).

But so what?

The Puzzle of Habitus Solutus Akrasia

That Aristotle countenances types of (HS) akrasia is not as unproblematic as might initially appear. Here are two worries - inconsistency and explanation.

(a) Inconsistency
In Sec.4b Aristotle talks about the (temporary) agnoia of 'the akratic' and how he becomes again a 'knower'; and, (in the manner of Sec.3.), he compares the akratic's condition to a man asleep or drunk - i.e. in a 'tied' condition.

But there is no apparent reason to suppose he is here talking only of a specific type of akratic, and that this is the impulsive, as Stewart would need to suppose. Stewart signally fails to deliver the goods here. For he holds that in the immediately preceding lines (Sec.4a) Aristotle has been discussing only (WA), but then doesn't say anything about how Sec.4b fits in to the line of argument on this view of the structure (see e.g. pp.160-1). (By contrast Kenny, in a not dissimilar position, sees he must claim that Sec.4b is textually misplaced.)

Moreover by "the akratic" Sec.4b (1147b6-7) Aristotle very arguably does intend both (WA) and (IA). First he talks of "the" rather than "an" akratic; then the context suggests - and most scholars agree - that (WA) is under consideration (at least inclusively) in the sections either side (viz.Sec.4a, 4c). Thirdly at 7.10.1152al4ff Aristotle again talks of "the akratic" (1152a9), again compares his cognitive condition to a man asleep or drunk (a14-15) - and all this prior to distinguishing within "the" akratic the two figures of the weak and the impulsive (a18-19; cf.a27ff).

That then is evidence that Aristotle regards
both (WA) and (IA) as (HL) forms of akrasia. If Aristotle is understood as countenancing (HS) akrasia in Sec.1. and 2., then either he is inconsistent, or possibly (though implausibly) it is a type different from both (WA) and (IA).

(b) Explanation

But there is anyway something odd in the notion of (HS) akrasia.

(HS) contrasts with (HL) over ability conditions. If one is in a (HS) vis-a-vis (some) knowledge, one is (in some sense) free to exercise it at that time. If one is in (HL), one is temporarily unable to exercise it - for as long as the condition which 'ties' one's ability lasts.

Evidently a full account here requires interpretations both of what constitutes 'exercising knowledge' and of the (HS)/(HL) distinction.

But even prior to such an account one can see a potential threat in the notion of (HS) akrasia. For such akratics would, unlike their (HL) confrères, be in some (to be explicated) sense free to exercise their knowledge - yet 'simply' fail to do so. Can we then explain why they didn't exercise this knowledge in any way that preserves their action as akratic? Would Aristotle think that in (HS) akrasia there is enough room to explain why such persons act akratically rather than not?

These are testing questions. However it may
also be wondered whether ultimately much will hang on resolving them. For, on the one hand, even if Aristotle does commit himself to (HS) akrasia, this doesn't appear to make (e.g.) the attribution to him of 'last-ditch' cases\textsuperscript{26} any easier (for in (HS) just as much as in (HL) the agent is failing to 'exercise' his knowledge). And, on the other, even if all Aristotelian akrasia is (HL), this needn't rule out the attribution of 'last-ditch' cases, given suitable interpretations of 'exercising knowledge' and of the 'ignorance' (agnoia) characterising (HL); (so, for instance, where knowledge is 'practical', 'exercising' it may necessitate acting on it, and temporary 'practical ignorance' be viewed as affecting not intellectual apprehension but motivational efficacy).

\textbf{1.2.5. Problems of the 'Manners of Judging Correctly/Having Knowledge'}

These last remarks lead naturally to the problems of interpreting the various distinctions that Aristotle draws in the 'manners' ("tropoi") of correct judgement and 'having knowledge'.

These distinctions are central. As evidenced e.g. by the way he poses the Socratic problem (7.2.1145b2lf; 7.3.1146b8-9) and concludes his discussion of it (7.3.1147b17-19), Aristotle holds it is by exploiting distinctions within the 'manner' ("pos"/"tropos") in which
the akratic agent can be said to judge correctly that the Socratic problem will be resolved.

Aristotle's discussion has negative and positive stages.

The Negative Stage

If Aristotelian akrasia is possible at all, there must be some manner(s) or other in which the akratic (unlike the akolastic) can be said to judge correctly: this is at least a necessary condition for akrasia's possibility.

One kind of distinction among 'manners' of 'judging correctly' is, Aristotle allows, between the differing (correct) states of 'knowledge', 'true belief' and 'practical wisdom'. And some attempt had been made to resolve the Socratic problem by exploiting this sort of distinction:

But there are some who concede certain of Socrates' contentions but not others; that nothing is stronger than knowledge they admit, but not that no one acts contrary to what has seemed to him the better course, and therefore they say that the incontinent man has not knowledge when he is mastered by his pleasures, but opinion. (7.2.1145b31-5; trans. Ross)

Aristotle first in the aporetic chapter, 7.2., points out that this solution is not unproblematic, and faces a prima facie objection (7.2.1145b36-46a4); and subsequently (7.3., Sec.0.) argues against it on other grounds. But if Aristotle rejects the relevance of this
distinction among 'manners' of judging correctly (cf.7.3. 1146b25 "ouden diapherei"), others, he thinks, are.

The Positive Stage

The 'manner' distinctions Aristotle does think relevant are drawn initially not within the genus of 'judging correctly' but within the species of 'knowing'; however they apply equally to 'true belief'. This is unsurprising given his rejection of the knowledge/true belief manoeuvre (BKM) above; and in Sec.4. Aristotle himself employs belief terminology (1147a25, cf.26, bl, 3, 9). (Practical wisdom is another matter.) The prominence of knowledge terminology in Sec.1-4. is presumably due in part to knowledge cases appearing harder (which (BKM) exploits) and Aristotle's consequent desire to show his solution accounts also for these.

The distinctions constituting his positive contribution are in Sec.1-3.

In Sec.1. he distinguishes two 'manners' of "x knows...", whose truth-conditions are respectively:

1) "x knows₁..." is true iff x has-knowledge-but-is-not-using/contemplating-it;
2) "x knows₂..." is true iff x (has-knowledge-and-) is using/contemplating it.

In Sec.2a he distinguishes two 'manners' of proposition, universal and particular. In 2b he adds a further distinction within the universal term.

In Sec.3. he distinguishes within a wide notion
of having-but-not-using knowledge between (HS) and (HL). These distinctions raise severe problems. Some we have already mentioned (in 1.2.1.; 1.2.3.). But these intrasectional and intersectional issues can to some extent be resolved independently of commitment to particular interpretations of the distinctions involved.

What then are these problems of interpretation? Two principle ones are:
(Q1) What constitutes the use/exercise/contemplation of knowledge, and what is it merely to have but not use (etc.) it?
(Q2) What is the difference between (HS) and (HL)?

The problems of interpreting the basic distinction in Sec.1. comprise a series of interlocking issues. Broadly, the basic distinction is yet another instance of Aristotle's concern with, and sensitivity to, differences between dunamis and energeia (potentiality and actuality). As we shall see (Chapter 3), he makes similar distinctions with 'to perceive' (and indeed offers this parallel in De An.2.5.).

What emerges then is a distinction between actually 'using one's knowledge' and not 'using' it but being in some sense(s) able to 'use' it.

This kind of ability is possession-ability and not acquisition-ability. And possession-ability is - so I shall argue - an undifferentiated one, embracing
both (HS) and (HL).

That said, there are two tasks: first and foremost to provide an account of what the activity - "using knowledge" (etc.) - consists in; and secondly to consider whether the conditions for possession-ability are as straightforward as often assumed (given Aristotle's further distinction between capacity (dunamis) and state (hexis)).

The difficulties of the first task appear if we ask what items are the objects and what the content of 'use'. Various interpretations are on offer.

1) The atomistic disposition/occurrence - or Date - model

This takes both object and content to be items of knowledge and the same items.

Thus 'using' possessed knowledge that p (e.g. that Hastings was fought in 1066) is interpreted as having p actually (and assertorically) in mind, running through one's consciousness.

2) The application disposition/occurrence model

This takes object and content to be (standardly) items of knowledge but different items.

Thus 'using' possessed knowledge that p (e.g. all animals are mortal) consists in "the recognition of more particular instances as falling under it", in "applying it to a more particular case" so as to realise that q (e.g. all men are mortal).

Without some modification, clearly no item of
singular knowledge can be 'used'.

Whether acting itself is allowed to count as a content of 'use' or not discriminates different versions of (2). The former will presumably be favoured by those who strongly contrast practical (PK) and theoretical knowledge (TK).

This latter contrast leads to a third interpretation.

(3) The functional-realisation model

To 'use' possessed knowledge is to realise the function or purpose of the kind of knowledge in question.

There are Simple and Refined versions.

The Simple version simply contrasts practical (PR) with theoretical reason (TR). The end of the latter is truth, of the former, action; so to 'use' knowledge where that knowledge is practical is to act on it (realise it in action).

The Refined version accepts this strong contrast between PR and TR but registers that 'use' occurs more fine-grainedly. Accordingly it also distinguishes different sub-functions among items of knowledge in line with their roles in the practical syllogism: e.g.

What is the difference, then, between a piece of knowledge being merely present, and being actually operative? In the case of practical knowledge, an item is operative if it thrusts towards action. What this metaphorical expression means will differ from case to case, according to the nature of the individual items in question. A practical generalisation, a
universal premise, will be operative when consequences are drawn from it that are more particular and therefore closer to practical implementation.... A particular premise will be operative when it leads to a practical conclusion being drawn.... A practical conclusion, in its turn, is operative when it is actually acted upon (Kenny(1979), p.161)

On both versions it would be possible to identify the practical conclusion with the action. 38

How are we to decide between these three models? Are they the only models? Neither question appears to have an obvious answer.

Sec. 2. emerges as a hopeful source of constraints on interpretations. For prima facie it envisages:
(a) universal propositions being 'used' without (apparently) particular ones being 'used';
(b) where consequently 'use' is also in principle applicable to particular (kata meros) propositions;
(c) and where the latter include singular propositions.

This "fine-grainedness" of 'use' militates against the Simple version of (3); (c) against the cited version of (2) - (c) licensing, (2) abrogating, the intelligibility of 'use' applied to singular propositions. (However the claim that (a) is incompatible with (2) relies on an equivocation over 'use'.) 39

But this still leaves a wide field, and room for further epicycles of modifications.
1.2.6. Problems in Practical Reasoning

Finally a host of problems surround Aristotle's conception of practical reasoning (PR), the contrast(s) he sees between this and theoretical reasoning (TR), and the role played by 'the' practical syllogism (PS).

The following are among the more prominent:

To take the PS first. What does this non-Aristotelian term of art refer to? Each scholar is initially free to define PS as they like, and hence 'rival' views of 'the' PS need not be rivals at all. However more sensibly we start by defining PS by example (for us from NE.7.3.), and this gives some cutting edge to rival views.

Then in connection with the PS in 7.3. several problems of detailed interpretation emerge, in particular: (a) what is "the final proposition" of Sec.4c 1147b9? Is it as some hold the minor premiss of the good practical syllogism (RPS) - i.e. that of reason as against appetite's practical syllogism (APS)? Or is it its conclusion? Is it the same as the "mia" sc. proposition/ belief of Sec.4a 1147a26? (b) are we to understand another "universal" ("katholou") after "he de" in 4a 1147a32 or not?

(a) closely connects with the question of the relation between the conclusion of the PS and the action: is it identity? or sufficiency? And if the latter is it plain sufficiency or sufficiency given certain conditions C? And if the latter (given the implausibility of plain sufficiency) do the conditions C include the absence of
certain internal psychological conditions such as countervailing appetitive desires or not?

(b) involves the problem of whether there are two PSs at 1147a31ff or only one.\textsuperscript{41} If there are two, we face the question, posed clearly by Ackrill,\textsuperscript{42} of whether the model supposes the minor premiss of the two PSs to be shared or different; and if different, what the minor premiss of the RPS here is. Mutual constraints operate here between (a) and (b): e.g. if you take the final proposition to be the minor premiss, and a two-PS view with shared minor premiss, you wipe out the intentionality of the akratic act.

A further connected problem arises over the specification of the first universal - "forbidding to taste" (1147a32): is this "don't taste the sweet" (cf. 1147a29); or "the pleasant" (cf. 1147a32-3); or "the G" (where G ≠ the sweet and G ≠ the pleasant)?

This in turn leads to a further cycle of issues about the nature of the example and the psychological role of the two universal propositions. Does the first represent some commitment to temperance (in contrast to an akolastic one at 1147a29)? Does the second express any kind of evaluative commitment - or is it some merely 'factual' belief? If the latter - a mere "inventory item" (Bogen(1982), p.116) - what sort of a fact is it? It looks a pretty odd sort (is it really comparable to "such and such food is dry" (1147a6-7) as Kenny urged?).\textsuperscript{43}

Stepping back further we uncover more general puzzles about the role and range of the PS.
Considering the role, an immediate question is:
(i) is the PS a step within Aristotelian PR or not?

On the one side Cooper$^{44}$ argues that Aristotelian PR is practical deliberation which terminates in a judgement about a specific kind of action (this is the major premiss of a PS and is identified as a decision, a prohairesis). The PS itself lies 'outside' PR and fills in the explanatory gap that thus opens between the termination of PR and actual action. (Label this view (CooPS).)

On the other side, many consider the PS as within PR. As such it is a step of practical reasoning. The question of the PS's conclusion then becomes crucial. If it is identical with the action, then PR takes us through to action, the final step still being one of practical reason; if on the other hand the PS's conclusion is differentiated from the action, a gap opens between the final stage of reason and the action, as on CooPS, only now it is between a final singular best judgement and the action, between the PS and the action; and the question arises of how to treat it.$^{45}$

To talk of a "practical syllogism" is to employ a term drawn from reasoning; and if Aristotle does not himself use "PS", his (paradigmatic) examples employ other terms and notions drawn from reasoning - "proposition", "conclusion", and, some claim, the notion of logical necessity. Is this talk literal or metaphorical?

On the first of the two lines distinguished
above, the rational trappings of the PS are metaphorical or analogical. According to Cooper and Nussbaum, Aristotle sees theoretical reasoning as providing a model for action-explanation - which thereby:

(a) illuminates the differences and connections between the various kinds of psychological state we naturally appeal to in giving an adequate action-explanation (Cooper, pp.54-5; Nussbaum, pp.174, 201, 185, 187);

(b) seeks to explicate the necessity with which actions follow on these psychological states by analogy with the logical necessity of the conclusion, given the premisses, in theoretical reason (Cooper, p.55; Nussbaum, pp.175, 175-84, 186, 187-9).

Cooper and Nussbaum differ over their location of the PS. Cooper 'locates' it between the final step of reason and the action - between the achievement of a (general) resolution (a prohairesis, the result of PR) and its application or realisation at a particular time in particular circumstances - or, in the case of non-deliberated actions (whether human or bestial) between a (decisive/dominant) desire and the action (p.54). In other words the PS is a model for explaining how desire (whether the outcome of PR or not) combines with perceptual information (or imagination or nous(p.54)) to yield action. For Nussbaum, by contrast, the psychological states adverted to by the PS:

sometimes...are conscious, and the explanation
corresponds to the agent's actual deliberation (p. 174)

Aristotle's theory of the PS is not to be hived off "from his general account of deliberation":

The syllogism is to provide a schema for answering a very general question about the conditions for action, which could be posed at various stages of the deliberative process. (p. 185 n. 34)

(see also pp. 190-2, p. 192 n. 44).

Within other different lines, the rational trappings are taken as entirely literal. Aristotle is talking about a different form of reasoning from "ordinary reasoning" - practical reasoning (cf. e.g. Anscombe (1957), § 33).

One tradition emphasises the psychological attitudes, the other their content. A third option sees in this distinction a mode of reconciliation:

In one sense a piece of reasoning is a psychological process. In another sense, a piece of reasoning is an abstract structure consisting of certain sentences.... In the first sense, my reasoning to the conclusion that it will rain is a process involving certain beliefs of mine. In the second sense it is an argument consisting of the sentential (propositional) contents or expressions of these beliefs. (Bratman (1979), p. 155)

Turning now to the question of the PS's range.

On the one side it may be held that Aristotle sees in the PS an explanatory model for all intentional action, including the non-deliberated actions of beasts
and humans. (Nussbaum for instance upholds this wide range for PS.)

On the other it may be claimed that given that beasts do not make universal judgements (e.g. NE.7.3.1147b5; De An.3.3; 3.10) the PS has nothing to do with bestial action; and is confined perhaps to prohairetic action.

The bogey of terminology again raises its head here. If we introduce the notion of PS by example (as was initially suggested), then differences can emerge straightaway over the range taken as appropriate: in particular is the following to be included or not?

"I should drink" says appetite; "this here is drinkable" said perception, or phantasia or nous; he straightway drinks. (DMA 7.701a32-3)

(This is a schema said explicitly to be applicable to animals: 701a34.) It is not obvious that inclusion/exclusion here will produce rival accounts of 'the' PS rather than accounts of different topics. (In favour of exclusion note the possible implication of 701a28: "hosa me logisamenoi prattomen"; and also De An.3.11.; etc.)

1.2.7. Problems in Practical Knowledge: The 'Wiggins Problem'; Articulated v. non-articulated/-able skills and knowledges

As is well known Aristotle's prime model of theoretical knowledge (TK), or of a science, is
universalistic and deductive. Within a given science, universals belong to other universals either immediately or mediately: if immediately one cannot demonstrate (apodeixis) that one belongs to the other but must employ other modes of elucidation (delosis); if mediately one can so demonstrate, through a middle term (which itself belongs immediately to one of these universals, and to which the other immediately belongs; or if the connections here are mediate, then there is a further middle term...). Knowing these universal inter-relations constitute knowing the science. Individuals can only be known insofar as they are perceived to instance these epistemological patterns or configurations (or 'abstractions').

But practical knowledge (PK) doesn't seem to conform to this model of knowledge very well. Nor does Aristotle think so. Nor is this peculiar to (PK). Aristotle is very interested in a schism that appears in the productive or technical skills (TeKs) between those that are assimilable to (TK) in that their universals have been formulated and laid out - these (TeKs) have been, I shall say, articulated (cf. diarthrosis); and on the other hand those (TeKs) where it is the case that either:

(a) their universals have not yet been articulated; or
(b) their universals have not yet been articulated, and are not likely to be by human beings, although we may make some progress; or
(c) there is a limit to which their universals can be articulated; this limit is set by the essential nature of
their subject-matter - the universalistic connections are there (we may already know them), but they hold only "for the most part" - and require ad loc. supplementation; or (d) their 'universals' have not yet been articulated nor do we think they can be; there are not universals there to be articulated; such 'universals' as there are are simply rule of thumb generalizations, aide-memoires, educational 'lies', etc. etc.; or (n) ....

To maintain (a) or (b) re some area of knowledge is to maintain a de facto particularism;⁴⁸ to maintain (d) is to maintain an essential particularism (i.e. the diametrically opposite conception to the universalistic one above); (c), which of these four positions is perhaps closest to Aristotle's, is a position of 'universalistic short-fall, requiring particularist supplementation' (a notion requiring further interpretation!). Skills that are articulated are e.g. grammar; skills that are not are e.g. medicine, money-making, navigation.⁴⁹ Within the latter, which I shall label simply the non-articulated, where Aristotle stands over (a)-(n) involves discussion of the role(s) of the "for the most part" (hos epi to polu) modifier and of "indeterminateness/-acy" (adioriston) (NE.3.3.1112b8-9) - and this we must set outside our brief. However we can note the following three Aristotelian differences between articulated and non-articulated (TeKs):

(F1): The more articulated a (TeK) is, the more
"teachable" it is - "didaskalikoteros"; for (a) articulation articulates explanations (the middle terms), and acquiring these 'jointings of the epistemological framework' is what (strictly) 'learning' (manthanein) is; so one can only 'learn' subjects insofar as they are articulated, i.e. insofar as they are 'teachable'. (b) Not all skills are 'teachable'; but some non-teachable ones are nevertheless transferable by other modes, e.g. "ethismos" and "askesis". Initially what underpins this contrast is whether a skill is acquirable via the spoken word, or whether it requires actually engaging in the desired activity/producing, albeit in a "trainee" sense: building\textsuperscript{T}, or playing-the-flute\textsuperscript{T}. This is the difference between "clean" and "dirty-hand" transfer. Aristotle's view of 'teaching' and 'learning' make (a) and (b) aspects of the same point.

(F2): The non-articulated (TeKs) are ones where we can be (more) in doubt about how things will turn out; and which consequently generate both room and need for deliberation on our part. In the articulated there is no room for such doubts, and so not for deliberation either (NE.3.3.1112b1ff).

(F3): A consequence of (F2) is that in non-articulated skills there is room for a further type of error than those common to both articulated and non-articulated - viz. mistakes in deliberation:

This might lead someone to be puzzled about why doctors deliberate about things that fall under
the science they possess, but scribes ("grammatikoi") do not. The reason is that error occurs in two ways: for either we err in calculating or with respect to perception when actually doing the thing - and while in medicine it is possible to err in both ways, in the scribe's skill it is possible only with respect to perception and action - and if they were to enquire about that, they'll go on for ever. (EE.2.10.1226a33-b2, Woods adapted)

Aristotle holds that (F1)-(F3) applies also to (FK), which falls on the side of non-articulated skills. With this background, I turn to what I label the Wiggins problem. Briefly it is this. The more one plays up Aristotle's talk of the role of perception (in an extended sense) in (FK) - the more one moves a notion of situational appreciation into the centre of the picture - the less room there appears to be for deliberation to play the large role Aristotle accords it. Moreover (F3) above suggests that the role of perception, common to articulated, non-deliberation-involving skills and to non-articulated ones, is concerned simply with the application of a body of knowledge; and that it is the role of deliberation to make up the short-fall in articulation in non-articulated skills. Now it may be that there is a genuine tension here in Aristotle, between trying to make (FK) as much like a proper knowledge as is possible, on the one hand, while on the other being forced to continually rely on the figure of the man-of-experience (cf. NE.10.9.) and to extend the role played by perception. There is at least a
prima facie problem of elucidating the interrelations between perception and deliberation.\textsuperscript{57}

This has a particular application to NE.7.3. over the questions of how wide a role perception (and the minor premiss with which it is associated) plays, how and in what ways are the practical syllogisms over-simplistic, how far any of it applies to men merely of experience without universal (PK). Perception seems in 7.3. to have a simple, mere 'applicability' role; but perhaps this is just the function of the example. If we had taken as an example a syllogism whose major premiss was:

\begin{align*}
\text{(MaP)} & \quad \text{"all men should be courageous"}, \\
\text{(MiP)} & \quad \text{"j-ing now is what is the courageous thing for me to do in the present situation"},
\end{align*}

would reveal a colossal reliance placed on the agent's sensitivity to the situation and the relevant factors in it.
SECTION 3

THE INTUITIVE PICTURE OF 7.3.

1.3.1. The issues of interpretation in 7.3. are so numerous, their interconnections so labyrinthine, that an interpreter needs to offer some intuitive picture of how he construes Aristotle's treatment of the topic; to give in broad outline what he takes to be plausible starting-points in the development of a full interpretation.

1.3.2. The Implication of the Methodology

Aristotle's discussion of akrasia in NE.7.1-10. is the classic instance of a favoured tripartite methodology: 1 (i) the collection of common opinions (endoxa or legomena or phainomena);
(ii) the generation of puzzles (aporiai) on their basis;
(iii) the resolution (lusis) of those puzzles. 2

One assumption underlying and justifying this strategy is the conviction that most, if not all, endoxa are likely to encapsulate some true point - though not all of the truth, only a part; and though confusedly ("sugkechumenos") and not clearly ("saphos"). 3 The investigator must not let that element of the truth get thrown out in the excitement of some Archimedean eclairsissement. And this is difficult. When one collects
the endoxa, there will be some each of which sound true but which together seem inconsistent: these form one's puzzles. The task then is to show, if possible, how to resolve them: the prime tool is the deployment of distinctions and qualifications to disambiguate the endoxa in question in such a way as to reveal them, thus reformulated, as consistent. That is, inconsistency here is, in the first instance, taken as a sign of lack of clarity in the formulation of whatever truth lies at the core of the endoxon; only if disambiguation fails, does inconsistency then proclaim the falsity of an endoxon - and the investigator can only be sure that there is no lurking core of truth that he has failed to disintricate if he can explain why anyone found the endoxon attractive to maintain in the first place.  

Given this methodology in 7.1-10., we expect an attempt on Aristotle's part to disentangle and preserve both some truth in the Socratic premiss from which Socrates concluded the impossibility of akrasia, and equally some truth in the commonplace view that treats akrasia as not only possible but of everyday occurrence. Or, failing that, we expect an explanation of why one (or both) of these 'false' views might appear true.

The expectation is fulfilled. And in the more satisfactory way. For Aristotle does not find himself forced to explain the total falsity of either the Socratic premiss or the common view. Instead he offers some
resolution: there is some truth in the Socratic premiss (7.3.1147b13ff), while nevertheless akrasia is possible.

If this is correct, then the methodology generates an interpretational constraint. Any successful interpretation of Aristotle's position must be consistent with the truth Aristotle attaches to the Socratic premiss. Minimally we may say that this involves attributing "agnoia" of some sort - some failing of knowledge about what it is best for one to do - to an, or the, akratic.

But is this a hopelessly weak constraint?

At the simple level we can distinguish Feeble and Muscular versions of the constraint. 'An akratic'.

On the Feeble version, it would suffice to satisfy the constraint if one's interpretation made Aristotle's acknowledgement of the truth in the Socratic premiss consistent with its application to only some, and not all, types of Aristotelian akratic. On this line, Aristotle would be free then, even within the confines of his 'resolutionary' strategy, to admit any other types of non-Socratic akrasias. So the restraint seems to vanish from the constraint. 'The akratic'.

On the Muscular version, by contrast, satisfying the constraint requires interpreting Aristotle as acknowledging that every type of (Aristotelian) akratic illustrates the truth in the Socratic premiss. And this
looks more like a substantial constraint. For then anyone who, like Kenny (1966), wants to maintain that Aristotle
countenances types of akrasia:

in which the agent has actual knowledge \(S_c\) at
the time of the wrongness of the particular
\(I.e.\) individual act that he does (p.163;
\cf.pp.183-4)

will be under considerable pressure to explain how Aristotle
can consider the truth in the Socratic premiss to be
satisfied in such a type of akrasia.

The obvious, and perhaps the only, way of cashing
out this contrast between Feeble and Muscular versions at
the textual level is in terms of the 4c puzzle. Aristotle's
explicit acknowledgement of the truth in the Socratic
premiss occurs in Sec.4c.\(^{10}\) Now, as we saw in \(1.2.1.\), 4c
might be regarded parochially as merely a part of Sec.4.
or else as a summing up of the course of the whole
argument (a "Sec.5."). From that perspective on the text
from which it would make sense to contrast Feeble and
Muscular perspectives, obviously a summing-up view of 4c
favours the Muscular version while a parochial view
favours the Feeble version.
The Feeble version shows Hidden Muscle

However if our contrast between Feeble and
Muscular versions is cashed out at the textual level as above, then even the Feeble version begins to exercise
substantial interpretational constraint. For if 4c is viewed parochially, then at least the type of akrasia at
issue in Sec. 4. must meet the truth in the Socratic premiss. But surely any really viable exploitation of the feebleness of the Feeble version depends on locating Aristotle's commitment to a type of non-Socratic akrasia precisely within Sec. 4. So at the ground level of textual interpretation, the Feeble version closes up on the Muscular version in the interpretational constraint it generates.

I conclude then that, at the simple level, the methodology supplies a substantial methodological constraint.

There is, however, a further sophisticated dimension to this whole issue. For it is possible to concede that the condition of 'agnoia' must be met by all types of (Aristotelian) akrasia, but then to question whether the constraint of meeting this condition is as substantial as initially appears.

This initial appearance of substantiality consists in one's taking 'agnoia' to indicate the presence of some intellectual fault, some 'clouding' (or whatever) in the cognitive condition of the akratic. (This would mean that Aristotle did not, here, recognise the possibility of 'last-ditch' akrasia.)

But need 'agnoia' so be taken? The sophisticated suggestion is that it need not. This suggestion invites us to distinguish sharply between practical reason (PR) and theoretical reason (TR): they have different ends, so
different conditions for what counts as success - and so also for what counts as failure. The end of PR is action, of TR understanding. Now while a 'failure of knowledge' in TR will be a purely intellectual failure (a failure of cognition, of understanding), this need not be the case with PR; the analogous failure here will be one not of understanding but of efficacy. The 'failure of knowledge' ('agnoia') where the knowledge in question is practical knowledge may consist in its failure to lead to action - a failure in the motivational condition of the agent - which is quite compatible with an intellectually unclouded appreciation of the good conclusion. The akratic agent may - so this suggestion runs - clearly understand that it would be best for him to do a, unless of course by "understand" is meant some sort of 'practical understanding', a condition for having which is that one acts appropriately (if one does anything intentionally, etc.). The akratic agent ex hypothesi doesn't have that; but this doesn't imply that his failure with respect to practical knowledge is a cognitive one; rather it is (/may be) a failure peculiar to practical, as against theoretical, understanding - viz. a failure to be motivationally so adjusted or attuned to his knowledge that he act appropriately (if he acts intentionally, etc.).

The availability of this suggestion means that we cannot be satisfied with a simple deployment of the methodological constraint.
However it is two-edged. For if we can show that 'agnoia' as used by Aristotle always indicates cognitive failure, then we could hope thereby not only to reinstate the "simple" level of constraint but also to use that point as a lever against those who wish to see in Aristotle's discussion a contrast between PR and TR of the kind implicit in the above suggestion.

One point consideration of the methodology does enforce on us is the need to know what Aristotle makes of the initial positions - the commonplace and the Socratic - between which he strives for a 'lusis'. To this we now turn.

1.3.3. The commonplace view

What does Aristotle take the commonplace view to be? The answer is simple: he takes it to be given by the 'phainomena' (/'legomena') he cites in 7.1.1145b8-20.

When at 7.2.1145b27-8 Aristotle says that the Socratic "logos" is clearly at odds with "the phainomena", the reference is presumably to those just listed, all of which presuppose akrasia occurs. However phainomenon 3 provides a particularly prominent point of clash:

And the akrates knowing that <what he does is> bad acts through pathos, while the enkrate knowing that his appetites are bad does not follow <them> through his reason. (7.1.1145b12-14)

But what view of akrasia is implicit in this? Kenny((1966)
p.164) appears to, and Charles((1984)p.118; cf. p.110) definitely does, construe this as a description of 'last-ditch' akrasia, where the agent knows full well at the time that he should not do the action he does. If so, then 'last-ditch' akrasia is itself one phainomenon. But then there is not much room for a "lusis" between this and the Socratic premiss; and, arguably, in the resolution he actually gives, Aristotle does not allow (for) such cases. Of course Aristotle can then be interpreted as eventually rejecting this commonplace view so construed. But equally one questions the construal. Why not take this phainomenon to be just as potentially ambiguous, as unclearly expressed, as the Socratic thesis over the 'manner' of knowledge at issue? Viewed this way, it is easier to see how Aristotle might think the inconsistency between the commonplace view and the Socratic thesis resolvable in the way he exploits.

1.3.4. Aristotle and the Socratic position

The first puzzle Aristotle poses in the aporetic chapter 7.2. (at 1145b21-1146a9) is:

In-what-manner of judging correctly is it that someone (nevertheless) acts akratically?

'Judging' ("hupolambanein") occurs here generically and
covers all 'species' of judgment: the 'knowledge' (episteme), 'true belief' (doxa), 'practical wisdom' (phronesis) and their opposites (De An.3.3.427b24-6; b9-11). 'Correctly' ('orthos': cf. De An.3.3.427b9-11) confines our interest to the former three.

The 'manner' question is very wide. Aristotle here pursues the puzzle by exploring one type of 'manner' distinction in judgement - viz. between the above 'species': he discusses the difficulties of answering the question in terms of:

(a) knowledge (1145b22-31);
(b) (true) belief (1145b31-1146a4);
(c) practical wisdom (1146a4-9).

By contrast his own solution in 7.3. exploits a different 'manner' distinction.

The drive behind this question is that the akratic identity as a separate figure on the 'ethical' scene (7.1.1145a16-17; 35-b2) depends at least on distinguishing him:

(i) from the good, or phronimos, in that he fails to do the good thing, on account of appetites, and
(ii) from the bad, by characterising some manner in which, unlike the bad but like the good, he 'judges correctly'.

Aristotle's aim here is to show that this latter task, while requisite, is not unproblematic.

It is a mistake simply to identify this puzzle with the 'Socratic problem' of the possibility of akrasia.
Of course they are closely connected: but the Socratic problem is a special instance of this general problem arising when it is envisaged that the answer to the original question might be 'none', (rather than a piecemeal 'well, not this way, but that way').

One could of course view the whole discussion 1145b21-1146a9 as cumulatively raising the Socratic problem: 'for if there are problems in answering the question in terms of knowledge, & belief, & phronesis, then the question gets a total negation, and the figure of the akratic disappears.' However Aristotle himself doesn't explicitly point this moral; rather his aversion to the Socratic problem is embedded in his discussion of the first of the three alternatives, (a).

This passage (1145b22ff) merits careful scrutiny.

An interpretative paraphrase of b22-27 runs:

Now (4) as for a person knowing, certain people deny that it is possible <for him to act akratically>; for (3) it is odd that if knowledge is in someone - as Socrates thought - something else controls and drags knowledge around like a slave.

For Socrates himself quite generally (holos) fought against the thesis26 on the grounds (2) that akrasia doesn't occur: for (1) no-one making a judgement acts in violation of what is best except on account of ignorance.27

This interpretation emphasises the distinction between "those" ("tines") who find a particular problem with the answer "knowledge" - a position which doesn't rule out an answer in terms of some other judgemental state - and
Socrates' advocacy of a general negative answer. This interpretation gives point to the occurrence of "holos" (b25); to the fact that (2) features as grounds (hos) and not merely as a conclusion; to the occurrence of the general 'judging' (b26) in place of the specific 'knowing' (of b22).

In Aristotle's view, then, Socrates' basic position is (1) - the premiss of rational explanation - from which (2) allegedly follows. (4)'s derivation from (3) seems to be a special instance (re knowledge) of (2)'s derivation from (1). 29

The passage proceeds to comment on the Socratic view:

Now this thesis (viz. (1)) is at odds with the phainomena plainly, and it is necessary to enquire concerning the pathos, if "on account of ignorance" what is the manner of the ignorance that occurs. 31 For that the person who acts akratically thinks at least that he should not Ø before he has got into the pathos, is manifest. (1145b27-31)

Aristotle apparently makes two points here: first that the Socratic premiss conflicts with the phainomena; secondly that there is a lacuna in the Socratic position. This latter point needs spelling out. As I construe it, Aristotle argues:

(i) on the Socratic premiss (1) the person once in the pathos - i.e. the person ex hypothesi misdescribed as acting akratically - does what he judges to be best, say, Øs;
(ii) but such people before they get into the pathos manifestly at least think - even if they don't actually know - that it is best not to Ø; this is a "manifest" fact ("phaneron");

(iii) so such an agent is not like someone who was ignorant of what was best to start with; they have become ignorant of what they (at least) thought was best for them.

(iv) But how can this ignorance occur and/or what does it consist in (e.g. must we suppose they have undergone a complete radical change of their basic values, etc.)? An explanatory gap is revealed in the Socratic position over the agent's ex hypothesi change of mind; and we are puzzled about how it could be filled.

Aristotle then proceeds to argue that problems of equal gravity arise over attempts to answer the original question in terms of belief as against knowledge; or in terms of phronesis.

Aporia results. There are serious difficulties with each of the positive answers canvassed (and no obvious neglected one); and the totally negative answer of the Socratic position seems equally problematic, its premiss being at odds with the phainomena, and explanatorily deficient.

1.3.5. Aristotle's own solution

Aristotle's own solution to the question in
chapter 3 (cf."pos eidotes" 1146b9; 1147bl8) exploits a
different dimension of manner.

The aporia whose resolution he aims to provide is
constituted by the conjunction of the following three
claims:

(C1): The Socratic premiss (1);
(C2): The Socratic premiss (1) entails the Socratic
conclusion (2) - that akrasia is non-existent/impossible;
(C3): Akrasia occurs (and so is possible); and therefore
there must be some sense in which the akratic judges
correctly (for that is a necessary condition for the
akratic figure).

One resolution is to employ the 'Belief-Manoeuvre':
i.e. to confine the truth of the Socratic premiss to those
cases where 'hupolepsis' = 'episteme' - thus allowing
akrasia to be impossible under some conditions, but to
deny its truth for (at least some) cases where 'hupolepsis'
= 'doxa', and so allowing cases of akrasia to occur (and
specifying the sense in which the akratic judges correctly).
This does achieve something that looks like a resolution of
the aporia - allowing us to disentangle and preserve some
element of truth in each of the aporetic claims.

Aristotle rejects this manoeuvre. But
Aristotle's strategy, while different, nevertheless like
the former, exploits ambiguities in the Socratic premiss
to achieve a resolution.

In Sec.1. and 2. Aristotle is, I think, best
viewed as exposing two ambiguities in the Socratic premiss, construed in its "knowledge" form:

no-one who knows what is best for them to do acts intentionally in violation of this knowledge.

These two ambiguities are ones that now strike us as quite obvious - and Aristotle apparently expects his reader to grasp them easily enough:

(A) First that 'knowing' has a dispositional and an occurrent usage. (I use these terms to delineate the general distinction, and not as a specific interpretation of what using, or 'being occurrent' with knowledge amounts to here.) Someone can have knowledge and fail to bring it to bear; we don't find anything "odd" in someone's acting in violation of knowledge they have in this sense (though there is need for an explanation of why someone who has relevant knowledge fails on some occasion to bring it to bear).

(B) Secondly there is an ambiguity in "what is best for one to do": this could be universal knowledge or else singular knowledge of what it is best for one to do here and now. There is nothing "odd" in someone's acting in violation of universal knowledge.

It is intuitively plausible to view Aristotle as homing in on two such obvious areas of ambiguity in the Socratic premiss. That the Socratic premiss is the focus of Aristotle's interest in Sec.1. and 2. is I think both obvious and further confirmed by the occurrences of "odd"
and "amazing" (1146b35; 1147a9-10). For on the Socratic premiss it was "odd" if anything were to overcome knowledge (1145b23); Aristotle's disambiguations of the premiss reveal those readings on which it would, and those on which it would not, be "odd".

So Sec.1. and 2. point to a resolution of the aporia which is going to allow us to preserve some truth in each claim.

There is a further point however.

The focus of Aristotle's remarks in Sec.1. and 2. is primarily on undermining the argumentation from Socratic premiss to Socratic conclusion rather than on maintaining the actual falsity of the latter. In other words, Aristotle's initial thrust is delivered to the validity of the Socratic inference; it disambiguates the Socratic premiss and thereby shows that there are some possibilities of 'acting in violation of one's knowledge of what is best'. A revamped argument for the Socratic conclusion would now require a further premiss:

(EP): 'these possibilities do not include cases of akrasia'. But Aristotle thinks they do (and it is to that extent that cases of akrasia are directly under discussion in Sec.1. and 2.); however it is only in Sec.3. that Aristotle moves to deliver the coup de grace by explicitly arguing that (some or all) cases of akrasia do indeed fall within the set of above possibilities - and so the Socratic conclusion is false: (EP) is not available for its salvation. This job
is precisely part of Sec.3.'s role in the argumentative structure of the chapter.

1.3.6. 4-1 and Phusikos puzzles

The intuitive picture we are outlining suggests a resolution of the 4-1 and Phusikos puzzles along the following lines.

All four sections deal directly with akrasia; but they are neither separate solutions on the same level nor simply stages in one overall solution. Rather the same problem is turned over at different levels of specificity. The first two stages expose ambiguities in the Socratic premiss, establishing certain possibilities of 'acting in violation of one's knowledge'; Sec.3. aims to persuade us that akrasia (along with other phenomena) is included in those possibilities. Sec.4. homes in specifically on akrasia, as against any other phenomena, showing us in detail how it is supposed to occur (this sort of explaining 'how' is required in the end to make good the claim of possibility: 'showing specifically that something is possible' comes down to 'explaining how it occurs').

Obviously this is not the whole story. The role and content of Sec.2. is really much less clear than the above supposes; again, the relation between Sec.3. and 4. may not conform so neatly to this picture.

Nonetheless it seems a plausible picture to
start from. And albeit impressionistic, it presents a prima facie case against both:

(i) views that hold Sec.1. and 2. not to concern akrasia directly at all; and

(ii) views that hold that some sections are concerned with one type of akrasia, others with another — in particular views that oppose Sec.2. to 3., and 3. to 4. on these issues. (Different types may of course be distinguished within any given major section on our view.)

These are substantial commitments, and incompatible with many interpretations of 7.3.
SECTION 4

SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ARISTOTLE'S AND MODERN APPROACHES

1.4.1.

"Akrasia" means lack of control, strength or power. It is misleading to translate it "weakness of the will". Aristotle does not employ any term that cries out to be translated as "will"; moreover, while Aristotle does employ the notion of "weakness" in this connection (viz. (WA)), it is only as one species of akrasia, and Aristotle does not explicitly specify what it is a weakness of.

What is akrasia a lack of control over? It is:

(AK): lack/loss of control on the part of Reason over the agent's actions (/character/course of life).

This conception takes Reason as the 'rational action-initiating system', but as not the only action-initiating system in the agent. Reason can lose out to the other system(s) (e.g. the Appetitive (AS) or the Emotional (ES)). And then the agent does not do what he has judged best to do (or not because he has so judged). This immediately is opposed to Davidson's(1970) position that all intentional action is action on an unconditional best judgement (UncoBJ). Indeed this position not only:

(i) denies that all intentional action flows out through the unique psychological state of an UncoBJ;

but also:

(ii) can, and typically does, deny that there is any unique
psychological state through which all intentional action flows (not even Intention).

It is such losing out on the part of Reason that constitutes the agent's 'irrationality' - although as we shall see this takes various forms.

The rational system (RS) may typically be held to have these two features:

(F1): it has its own natural goals\(^6\) (goals essential to characterising the type of system the RS is, in an unperverted state);

(F2): it is in a sense the (human) agent's true/real self; Reason stands at the apex of hierarchical orderings of the soul-capacities, and in marking off what is peculiar to man over other animals earns its right to constitute the human agent's 'real self'.\(^7\)

So if the RS fails or ceases to command the human vessel, the agent suffers from "akrasia" - lack of control over his true self.

We have here one perspective from which we can lose sight of the distinction between the akratic proper and the akolastic or, more generally, the wicked.\(^8\) For in wickedness - if this is taken to involve the agent's having a false view of what is worthwhile in life - the agent is also representable as having lost control over his own true self.\(^9\) The agent fails to apprehend or appreciate the natural goals of the RS and sets up false values in their stead. From what source does he get these false values?
What inhibits the emergence of the RS's natural goals? Both Plato and Aristotle apparently claim that the answer lies in interference from outside the RS by another system, especially the AS, which can provide the agent with other goals he can come to value (or value excessively) and which can pervert the RS to its own ends.\textsuperscript{10} Arguably neither pays sufficient heed to the possibility of 'internal perversion' of the RS.\textsuperscript{11} Here in part lie the explanations for:

(a) the relative poverty of their treatments of wickedness as against virtue;\textsuperscript{12}

(b) the prominence of the figure of the akolastic as the central example of wickedness;

(c) the persisting failure to disentangle and adequately discuss the difference between two apparently possible akolastics:

(1) the 'short-term' sybaritic hedonist\textsuperscript{13} whose modus vivendi expresses implicit adherence to the principle, (SH): always pursue the present pleasure,\textsuperscript{14} and who is in effect driven through his life by the succession of his appetites;

(2) the 'long-term' sybaritic hedonist whose principle, (LH): maximize the intake of (sensory) pleasure over a life-time, requires the development of quasi-virtues (e.g. quasi-temperance), qua executive dispositions enabling the agent to resist the pressures and attractions of the moment in favour of his overall goal, and which allow us to view him
as in control of his life rather than hounded through it.

Aristotle tends to follow Plato's adherence simply to akolastic (1). This is in some tension with the role he accords prohairesis (preferential choice); and highlights his failure to seriously explore the possibility of anti-phronesis (and anti-nous). One of the important issues here is the relation of phronesis to integrity, and the question of whether the wicked can have integrity.

1.4.2. Aristotle's basic isolation of the akratic

NE 7.1. distinguishes six main figures in Aristotle's moral landscape:
(1) the man of heroic or divine excellence;
(2) the man of human excellence - the phronimos;
(3) the enhratic;
(4) the akratic;
(5) the man of human vice;
(6) the brutish man. (7.1.1145al5ff)

There are four basic contrasts Aristotle makes between these.
(A) Figures (1)-(3) are good, deserving of praise or even above it (figure (1)); the characters of figures (4)-(6) are to be avoided, censurable or even below it (figure (6)).

Characters (1) and (6) are outside the boundaries of normal human assessment (on (6) see 7.5.1149al). In particular Aristotle claims that brutishness is "a quite different genus from vice" (7.1.1145a27), but that akrasia, while not
the same state (hexis) as wickedness, should not be judged as "a different genus" from it (1145b1-2). Henceforth we ignore (1) and (6).

(B) Figures (2)-(4) have the correct conception of what is worthwhile in life (of eudaimonia); (5) has a false conception.

(C) On the other hand, figures (2), (3) and (5) are alike in that they act "kata prohairesin" or "prohairoumenoi" - on their preferential choice; i.e. they act to realise their conception of eudaimonia. (4) by contrast acts in violation of his preferential choice - acts "kata pathos", according to some onset of emotion (7.3.1146b22-4; 7.4.1148a4-11; 16-17; 7.8.1151a5ff; 3.2.1111bl3ff; cf. 5.9.1136b6ff "para ten boulesin"). In other words he fails to act so as to realise his (correct) conception of eudaimonia.

(D) Finally, figures (3) and (4) contrast with (2) and (5). The latter pair we can call 'integrated' or 'resolved' characters. These are people whose whole being, in their emotions and actions, revolves around realising or living out their conception of what it is to flourish. They both think they have the right idea about what life is all about, and they live totally in the light of that conception without feeling any temptations to alternatives. The former pair are, by contrast, 'unintegrated' characters: they have desires, interests or inclinations that have not been melted into an integrated commitment to a certain sort of life.
(the truly eudaimon one), but which remain recalcitrant.
Both feel impulses to deviate from what they accept is the
best pattern for living; the encratic overcomes these
wayward temptations; the akratic succumbs.

All this is standard Aristotelian fare. With
this in the background we now consider some more interesting
characteristics of Aristotelian akrasia.

1.4.3. Aristotle's further characterization of akrasia
At several points Aristotle's claims are at odds
with modern orthodoxies - and, more interestingly, at odds
with some of the best modern thinking on the topic. He is
also in several respects at odds with some of the best modern
interpretations of his position - or so I shall argue.

Two of the best modern thoughts in the structure
of the topic are ones I associate respectively with
Davidson and Peacocke:
(M1): akrasia is not essentially a moral problem, but an
entirely general problem in the philosophy of action. The
irrationality in question is not per se attached to moral
content. It's 'simply' the irrationality of deciding that
something (whatever) is best for you to do, and then failing
to do it when you could, etc. Inspired by Ockham's razor
call this Davidson's toothbrush (DT).
(M2): perhaps the most perennially tempting move to
accommodate akrasia is the introduction of some radical
distinction between types of desire: e.g. appetites and (rational) wishes; first- and second-order desires; reason-producing (r-p) and reason-following (r-f) desires, etc. etc. Now while Davidson points to the potential dangers in such dual, or n-tuple, desire models of dividing the subject, Peacocke lets that ride but presses the possibility of akrasia within subdivisions of desire: e.g., admit Schiffer's distinction between r-p and r-f desires, there still surely remains the possibility of akrasia among r-f desires. (Peacocke's thought here seems a particularly acute and refined application of the blanket Davidsonian (M1).)

Now both (M1) and (M2) offer much philosophical illumination. Yet - and here are our first further Aristotelian characteristics - Aristotle rejects both. (C1): He shares with his tradition a moral setting for akrasia. Scholars sometimes play this down, arguing that Aristotle's account is potentially generalizable, that it can be extended to satisfy the breadth required by (M1). But Aristotle seems already aware of such generalizability; yet sees some point in resisting it. Is this mere stipulation or does the Davidsonian (M1) actually miss out on some point that Aristotle, clinging to tradition, preserves?

(C2): Over (M2) Aristotle moves against both Davidson and Peacocke.

Against Davidson he maintains the intelligibility
of hierarchical layering and interaction of human desiderative systems within a single agent (this connects with his rejection of Davidson's thesis that all intentional action flows out through an unconditional best judgement: cf. 1.4.1. above).

As regards Peacocke's strictures, Aristotle, as I interpret him, agrees (at least in part) with the thesis that cases of akrasia emerge again within desiderative-subdivisions. Peacocke sees in this the failure of 'distinct-types-of-desire' theorists to provide an account of the akratic's irrationality that covers all relevant cases. But this is only damaging on the assumption that there is a general account of the akratic's irrationality to be had. And this Aristotle rejects. On the contrary he thinks we are faced with essentially distinct akratic phenomena (which may nevertheless be "focally" related); and suitably to this can provide a disjunctive (or n-junctive) account. In other words Aristotle holds there are different types of akratic irrationality at issue; and this allows him to maintain that distinctions between types of desire are essential to accounting fully for one type of it, while agreeing with Peacocke's above thesis about intratypical akrasias. Behind this disagreement lies a further one over the nature of "intention" and "intentional action".

We turn now to some further closely connected characteristics. Modern discussions of akrasia appear
primarily interested in the possibility of akratic action more than in the akratic state of character. Aristotle by contrast is at least as interested in the state. This comes out in several ways.

(C3): The akratic-encratic contrast

Wiggins raises the following difficulty for McDowell's interpretation of Aristotle:29

For Aristotle there really is some important way in which the incontinent man's cognitive conception of a situation may be expected to differ from a temperate man's conception. ...But this is only half of what is needed. It is important to see that McDowell can be right about the interpretation of Aristotle on temperance, and right about what temptation or fear is at that ideal limit of temperance, and yet a difficulty can still arise that McDowell does not acknowledge. For the difficulty we are now concerned with relates not to the difference between temperance and continence but to the difference between continence and incontinence as these occur in ordinary adult people who fall short of the ideal, and to the distinction that Aristotle is obliged to postulate between the continent man's and the incontinent man's knowledge and perception of a situation. These two men are neither of them temperate. In a sense, then, they are very much the same sort of men, and susceptible at least to the same sorts of excess. (Indeed, on different occasions one and the same man may do the continent or the incontinent thing.) How then can it be maintained, even in the face of all the phenomenological findings, that the continent and incontinent man see things differently?

This doesn't, I think, speak explicitly to what someone might find most problematic about McDowell's account (viz. the sheer opacity of the 'clouding' metaphor).

McDowell could reply: (i) that his distinction is one of
degree in 'clouding/blurring the focus', and it makes no
difference that one and the same man might act continently
or incontinently on different occasions (without, presumably,
a radical alteration in his character) - it's just that he
had the noble more in focus one day than the next\textsuperscript{30} (i.e.
a direct claim against Wiggins' "phenomenological findings",
in effect accusing Wiggins of an invalid slide from imputing
a phenomenology to a type of character to a phenomenology
associated with an occasion).

(ii) secondly by denying that the akratic and
encratic "are very much the same sort of men";(that they are
does not follow - except in an irrelevant and trivial sense
- from neither of them being temperate, as Wiggins implies).
It certainly appears that Aristotle denies that his
encratic and akratic are the same sort of men. To suppose
that they obviously are smacks of a modern concentration on
action over character - and perhaps even of some combined
thesis to the effect that:
(i) we need to maintain that the akratic action is free and
not compulsive;
(ii) showing an action to be done freely involves maintaining
that the same psychological conditions might have been
present without leading to the same action - so the same
person over the same issues can act akratically one day,
encratically the next.\textsuperscript{31}

I think Aristotle (roughly) accepts the
"phainomenon" that runs:
the same man is encratic and apt to stick by his reasoning, and akratic and apt to abandon his reasoning (7.1.1145b10-12)

(i.e. if the "-ikos" endings indicate not dispositions ("apt to") but simply abilities ("can"s), these different abilities will nevertheless be functions of different sorts of character).

And I take it that from the Aristotelian angle, doing an encratic action is not sufficient for being encratic (acting encratically), nor an akratic action sufficient for being an akratic (acting akratically).

In fact Aristotle goes further and characterises encratic and akratic as straddling "the many":

Concerning the pleasures and pains and appetites and aversions that come through touch and taste, about which both akolasia and temperance were earlier defined as concerned, it is possible (a) to be so disposed as to be defeated even by those which the many master /can master/; and (b) to be so disposed as to master even those by which the many are defeated. Of these <character-dispositions>, vis-a-vis pleasures, the one (a') is the akratic, the other (b') the enkratic; vis-a-vis pains, the one (a'') is the softie, the other (b'') the endurer.

The state of the majority is in between, although they incline more to the worse states /viz. akrasia and softness/ (7.7.1150a9-16)

So the encratic and akratic are very different people for Aristotle: the one is a good state, the other a bad state. What is bad about the akratic is not (simply) the irrationality, but that the appetites given in to are bad (or worthless: e.g. 7.4.1148a2-3; 7.9.1152a1ff), and it
is not asking more than a minimum of a human being not to give in to them (most people can resist them).

But doesn't Aristotle here say that most of us are like Wiggins' person? No. His point is simply one of thresholds of resistance to sensory pleasures (of a certain delimited sort). Some (the temperate) don't suffer, or can 'silence', such appetites; others stand out in their ability to resist while suffering, others equally in their inability; while most of us have characters that fall between the latter two - the distance between 'our' threshold and that of the akratic being shorter than that between 'our' threshold and the encratic's.

McDowell could then defend his position this way qua interpretation of Aristotle. But whether Wiggins would still command the battlefield of truth is a further question. (C4): One-off akrasia; Atypicality of akrasia

Concentrating on action rather than character, it can seem there is no problem about cases of one-off akrasia. I decide it's best to get up, but stay in bed, this one time in a life-time of early rising.

Moreover it can seem not merely that one-off akrasia is possible, but that it must, so to speak, be the rule. The akratic agent has a/the-right conception of what is worthwhile; and surely it is a criterion of having a conception of the worthwhile (a value-pattern) that it is (a) character-based, (b) evidenced in much of the structure and construction of one's life and its daily course; otherwise observers will rightly rumble hypocrisy and
self-deception. So akratic actions must be the exception—not character-expressive, but, on the contrary, "out of character". So **akrasia** is not a character-trait, but a parasitical phenomenon afflicting those with (good) character.

Aristotle, by contrast, severely constrains the first of these thoughts, and rejects the second— or so I shall maintain.

**(C5): Akrasia and Enkrateia as essentially transitional states**

A further modern tendency⁴⁶—closely connected to, although not obviously consistent with the above thought of akrasia's essential atypicality—is to hold, either per se or at least as an interpretation of Aristotle, that insofar as akrasia and enkrateia can be viewed as states, they are necessarily or essentially **unstable** (not "bebaios kai ametakinotos" (NE.2.4.1105a33)), diatheseis rather than hēxeis,⁴⁷ and, moreover, unstable because essentially **transitional**. That is, the akratic must either be in the process of 'going up' towards enkrateia (if the occasions on which he resists are on the increase), or else be 'going down' to akolasia, to the acceptance of a different conception of what is worthwhile (if the occasions on which he yields are on the increase); and correspondingly the enkratic is either 'going up' to temperance or 'down' to akrasia.

This is effectually to hold that the 'thresholds'
of akrasia and enkrateia can have no fixity: a tendency is always being either reinforced or diminished.

Now it may be that there is a sense in which Aristotle thinks enkrateia and akrasia comparatively unstable - by comparison at least with the integrative, or 'mutually reinforcing' states of the phronimos; but if in this sense they are comparatively unstable, is Aristotle's akolastos any better off (cf. 1.4.1.)? But perhaps Aristotle slips up here by not pressing hard enough the possibilities of 'quasi-integration' and mutual reinforcement of various states within non-optimal life-styles.38

However in any case let us grant that akrasia and enkrateia do have some comparative instability (grounded in Contrast (D) of 1.4.2.): after all the akratic is able and/or inclined to feel regret - and thereby fulfils a necessary condition for being curable, unlike the akolastic (7.7.1150a21-2). What nevertheless we should resist (both as regards the truth and the interpretation of Aristotle) is that any such "instability" is to be simply and generally explained in terms of these states being necessarily or essentially transitional.

It seems quite plain to me that akratic and enkratic thresholds can be constant, and that there is no good reason to suppose Aristotle denied this. The claim that in enkrateia and akrasia a tendency is always being either reinforced or diminished is itself either trivial or false (as so put): for either it is "by definition" true of
all "tendencies" as such, so says nothing interesting about enkrateia and akrasia against temperance and akolasia; or else it is simply prejudice, which I see no grounds for accepting. (If I have a weakness for Fs, I may have that degree of weakness for Fs for a life-time.)

(C6): Last-ditch akrasia; self-deception

Modern discussion has been particularly interested in the questions of:

(1) the possibility of last ditch-akrasia;
(2) the taxonomy of akratic breakdowns, in a very wide sense of "akratic", including strategies of self-deception.

Aristotle's stance over the first of these is a matter of notorious controversy. Perhaps the current orthodoxy is to suppose that Aristotle does allow for it. I do not. But I do not think that answering this question one way or the other is vital to Aristotle's principal concerns in discussing akrasia. One of these concerns is (as with much of the NE) with the 'Socratic paradoxes'; he is out to show that akrasia is possible, and to explain why we should not allow ourselves to be pushed by the Socratic argument into denying its possibility. But so far as this aim goes, all he has to establish is the possibility of some phenomenon meeting the akratic description; he could leave it open whether a particular form of it is possible.

Over the second question, Aristotle's taxonomy is rather different. While we could perhaps accommodate
cases of self-deception to his descriptions, Aristotle shows no interest in this: his central case is not an action on a (deviantly arrived at) best judgement; akrasia does not escape the agent's notice (7.8.1150b36) (whereas there is no need for self-deception to be realised). On the other hand he is interested to site akrasia and enkrateia within a larger family whose other members are softness and endurance: what underpins this division is the importance Aristotle attaches to the distinction between succumbing to a (sensory) pleasure and failing to resist a (sensory) pain.

1.4.4. (C5) again; Are Akrasia/Enkrateia essentially transitional states?

I think this orthodoxy neither true nor held by Aristotle. On the contrary someone once in an akratic state can stay in it the rest of their lives - just as someone can suffer for life the intermittent attacks of epilepsy (cf. 7.8.1150b32ff).

The orthodoxy obviously strives after something. Intuitively one might argue that if someone is persistently akratic, their professions whether to themselves or others that such actions are 'atypical', i.e. not expressive of their characters, come to sound 'hollow'. 'Whether they know it or not, their values really have changed' - we perhaps say.
Charles (1984) simply starts by assuming (p. 155) that:

(i) we have to explain why the akrates' action is "atypical" of him; and that
(ii) this atypicality precludes the possibility of permanent akrasia.

He later argues that the impossibility of permanent akrasia is explained by Aristotle's theory of 'goal formation and goal destruction':

Aristotle's account of the formation of goals ... also explains why akrasia cannot occur permanently; for if someone were regularly akratic, he would lose his perception of his valued goals. Unlike the Belief-based theory, it offers an empirical account of the rarity of akrasia,... for all depend on the interconnexion and mutual coherence (or lack of it) of the agent's desires. By contrast, if the agent's valuational perception was independent in origin of his motivational states it would remain empirically unexplained why akrasia was a rarity.... (pp.186-7; cf. p.183)

Charles apparently takes as brute that akrasia must be "a rarity", "atypical" of the akratic agent, and "cannot occur permanently" nor "regularly". He sees it as an advantage of his account of Aristotle as a Moderate Desire-Based theorist that the way Aristotle is then interpreted as dealing with the formation of goals explains the above fact.

But what is this alleged fact? The talk of "rarity" and "regularity" suggest that akratic acts must be statistically infrequent on the part of the akrates; the
talk of "atypicality" suggests the act must be "out of character"; that it "cannot occur permanently" suggests it is essentially transitional:

> the akrates' state cannot endure for long without collapsing into self-indulgence; his condition cannot become permanent without changing his perception of his goals. This is why akrasia is an atypical occurrence for an agent. (p.183)

These notions are not sufficiently critical. Charles does not make clear what the statistical frequency ranges over. But if akrasia's being "a rarity" implies, as seems likely, that **on the whole** the 'akratic' resists temptations, i.e. acts enkratically, then Charles has followed Wiggins into making the akratic and encratic the same sort of person, and this, I have argued, won't do as an interpretation of Aristotle. Further, if, as Aristotle claims, akrasia is a hexis, it will thereby support a sense in which the akratic agent acts typically - will underwrite the assertion of "oh that's typical of them". Knowing your weaknesses I can set out to tempt you from your diet; knowing your weaknesses you can protect yourself by declining my dinner-invitation. Of course we can say there is a sense in which the akratic act must be atypical, 'out of character' - in that e.g. it does not express the values you identify with. But that sense of 'out of character' does not mean that you cannot have weaknesses and susceptibilities as character-traits: I may have weaknesses for Terry's All Gold or Miss X which may lead me to act
against my better judgement any time, many times, regularly, during my life, knowledge of which enables friends and enemies to manipulate or shield me. Increasing self-knowledge may lead one to attempt some "integration of one's motivational states with one's picture of well-being" (Charles, p.186); but even so the type of integration need not simply be that envisaged by Charles - the elimination of these wayward inclinations. One can try to integrate one's failings into the ordered pattern of one's life, by learning to live and cope with them - by trying to arrange one's life so as to minimise their potential for disruption: 'Given that I'm going to do what I judge it's better that I don't do, I'd better do it in the next town, not my home town; now while they're away, rather than then....', etc.

I find Charles' position here difficult to argue against except by suggesting such counter-example stories, largely because I find it so undermotivated. It seems plausible to maintain that the akratic state is a route by which people can become akolastic; but why suppose the akratic must be going down it (or up, as the case may be)?

I offer the following diagnosis. It can seem that with (Aristotelian) akrasia we face the problem of a "Double Appeal to Character". On the one hand the akrates has the correct conception of what is worthwhile - has the right goals. To explain both how he has acquired this and what conditions there are on having such a conception (cf. the conditions on making a best judgement), we need, on
the Aristotelian picture, to appeal to the agent's character; and his having the correct conception seems to presuppose he is properly emotionally adjusted. On the other hand, the akratic fails (on occasions) to realise this conception; if this failure is regular - a character-trait - we will be making a second appeal to the akratic's character: but this time we will be seeking to explain his persistent akratic acts by reference to a failure to have his emotions properly adjusted in his character. But this is now inconsistent with the first appeal to character. We can resolve this by claiming that the akratic's failures cannot be regular - cannot be a matter of a character-trait. Alternatively if they become frequent, then his character has changed, and he no longer has the correct conception (but is akolastic).

What is wrong with this picture au fond is that it assumes too simple a connection between developing a correct conception of eudaimonia and being properly emotionally adjusted. To tease this out in detail (which would also be to render more transparent McDowell's "clouding") is beyond our present confines.

1.4.5. (C4) again: One-off akrasia and the atypicality of akrasia

In arguing (in 1.4.4.) that Aristotle does not accept that akrasia and enkrateia are necessarily
transitional, I have underpinned a sense in which they can be permanent states of the agent and so a sense in which individual akratic (and encratic) actions may be 'typical' of the agent. This is not to say that there isn't another sense in which akrasia is atypical of the agent: whole aspects of character, casts of mind, can be out of synch, unintegrated into the person viewed in the round.

But what of one-off akrasia?

There are two sides to this - the underpinning of the presence of a best judgement and of the akratic nature of the violation.

I am tempted to think that there is a conceptual centrality in the case where we suppose the agent to have a maturely worked out evaluative scheme, and has a persisting weakness of character (sustaining counterfactuals). For if the agent is young, and has not a settled character, this tends to undermine the appropriate sense of best judgement (and we are more willing to think that what has gone on is self-deception, or a change of mind, or 'schizophrenic akrasia' - playing at being different persons with different values); although even here we should presumably require a concept of juvenile akrasia. On the other hand, if our mature agent has not been tempted by Fs before, and isn't again, unless he can tell us some suitable story, our confidence in the freedom and intentionality of his lapse from rational grace appears sapped.

The import of the other more serious contrasts
should emerge in the subsequent discussion of the text, to which I now turn.
2.0.

There are considerable difficulties of detailed interpretation especially in connection with Sec. 2. But these aside, there are two major issues of interpretation. The first is whether these sections directly concern akrasia at all, and, if so, whether their concern is quite general or limited to some specific type of akrasia in contra-distinction to a different specific type discussed, say, in Sec. 3.

The second is how to interpret Aristotle's distinction, or distinctions, between the mere having of knowledge and its exercise.

These issues are major because stances here can largely determine the overall view of akrasia an interpreter ascribes the Aristotle of 7.3. Indeed the second issue is the avenue through which Aristotle himself chooses to approach his resolution of the Socratic problem (cf. Chapter 1.2.5.). Again both issues are closely interwoven with similar problems of interpretation in Sec. 3.

In this Chapter I consider the first issue.

I start by offering a basic translation of these
sections.

**Basic Translation: Sec.1-2. 1146b31-1147a10**

**Section 1**

But since we speak of knowing in two ways (for the person who has but is not using their knowledge and the person who is using it are said to know), the fact of whether it is a person who has but is not contemplating or a person who is contemplating, who does what they should not will make a difference; for the latter seems strange, but not if not contemplating.

**Section 2**

2a Further since there are two 'manners' (tropoi) of propositions, as for a person having both nothing prevents them acting in violation of their knowledge, provided that they are using the universal proposition but not the particular; for the particulars are what is done.

2b And also the universal makes a difference: for the one universal is set over the person himself, the other over the issue. E.g. that dry things are advantageous to every human being, and that I am a human being, or that such-and-such is dry; but whether this is a such-and-such, either he doesn't have or does not exercise.

2c And so with respect to these 'manners' (tropoi) it will make such an incredible difference that it seems that for a person to know in this manner (houto) there is nothing absurd in their acting in violation of their knowledge, while in another manner(s) amazing.
2.1. First Major Problem: Argumentative Structure

"In what sense are Sec.1. and Sec.2. about akrasia?"

Our initial question is just one part of the problem of elucidating the overall argumentative structure of 7.3. But it provides a good starting point: for in developing a sufficiently sophisticated framework to cope with it, we come across many of the issues we must face in the Chapter as a whole.

After a precautionary remark (2.2.), I embark on a preliminary investigation of our question, assembling and developing many points aired in secondary literature (2.3-8.). On the basis of this I then articulate a framework of distinct questions and issues in terms of which we can break down and deal with our original question (2.9.), and consider some loose ends left in that framework (2.10.). Armed with these results, I turn (2.11.) to the resolution of this first issue; I begin (2.12.) by offering an outline of a general argument for my favoured interpretation, relying on many points already argued for; I then proceed to devote some separate consideration to Sec.1. (2.13.) and then to Sec.2. (2.14-fin). In connection with the latter I am particularly concerned to defuse certain 'simple' lines of objection which, if successful, would sink my favoured interpretation.
2.2. An Assumption and a Constraint

Our initial question presupposes these sections are "about" akrasia in some sense; and, it may be objected, even this is controversial.

That is fair. It is presupposed. But it is a very weak assumption, as the intentionally vague choice of "about" suggests. All that is ruled out are claims\textsuperscript{13} that Sec.1. and 2. are textually so misplaced that there is no need to account contextually for their presence in a chapter on the 'Socratic' problem in akrasia. My assumption then is simply that their present textual location be accepted; and that constrains us to elucidate some sense in which these sections are "about" Socrates' problem with akrasia. The weakness of this assumption of relevance is evidenced by its not excluding Kenny's (1966) view\textsuperscript{14} that these two sections are not offering solutions to akrasia but rather explaining one, non-akratic, sense "in which a man can eidos ha me dei prattein". For within this view one can still justify the presence of these sections:\textsuperscript{15} e.g. in terms of Aristotle's clearing away potential confusions to provide a clearer perspective on the akratic himself.

2.3. Preliminary Investigation (2.3.-2.8.)

(PI): The first noticeable fact about Sec.1. and Sec.2. - one that struck Rassow and Kenny forcibly\textsuperscript{16}
- is that in neither section is any explicit mention made either of *akrasia* and its cognates or of *pathos* (e.g. epithumia) and its role in *akrasia*.

The conclusion of each section is similar: that while there is some manner (or manners) of knowing in which it "seems" (dokei: 1146b35; 1147a9) "odd"\(^{17}\) (deinon 1146b35; thaumaston 1147a9-10) not to do what one knows (sc. is best for one to do), there are nevertheless other manners in which it does not so seem.

Nothing is explicitly said about whether these latter manners are, or include, cases of akratic agents, or whether they definitely do not but rather exclude them.

Consequently there are at least the following three possible views:

(V1) the latter manners of knowing simply are (are to be identified as) cases of *akrasia*;

(V2) they include cases of *akrasia* along with other non-akratic phenomena;

(V3) they do not include, but exclude, any cases of *akrasia*.

In more detail:

(V1) View 1 is the view that the schematic cases introduced by the latter manners of knowing in these sections are ones in which only cases of *akrasia* are thought by Aristotle to be accommodatable.

There are then two important variations within this view. These are:

(V1A): while the schematic cases introduced here are ones
to which only cases of **akrasia** are accommodatable (i.e. V1), there are other types of (normal, Aristotelian)\textsuperscript{18} akrasia which are not accommodatable to these schemata, and so not under consideration here;

(V1B): while the schematic cases introduced here are ones to which only cases of **akrasia** are accommodatable, they are also (jointly)\textsuperscript{19} ones to which all (normal) types of Aristotelian **akrasia** are accommodatable.

(V2) View 2 is that these sections include cases of **akrasia**: that is, they offer schemata at a sufficiently high level of generality that not only are cases of **akrasia** accommodatable to them but so are\textsuperscript{20} certain types of non-akratic phenomena.

As with View 1, there are two varieties:

(V2A): allows that there are types of Aristotelian **akrasia** not captured by the inclusive schemata of these sections;

(V2B): claims that these inclusive schemata capture all types of (normal) Aristotelian **akrasia**.

(V3) View 3 is the claim that these sections do not offer us schemata to which Aristotle supposes that any types of **akrasia** are accommodatable. In line with our initial assumption (2.2.) it is incumbent on any advocate of (V3) to advance some rationale for the present context of these sections.
2.4.

(P2): Secondly, there are various features about Sec.3. which prima facie have implications for how our question should be answered.

Aristotle begins Sec.3. by saying:

Further, having knowledge belongs to human beings in another manner - "allon tropon" - than those just spoken of. (1147a10-11)

"allon tropon" introduces a further sense of having knowledge: put this as the thesis that:

1. Sec.3. introduces us to a new sense of having knowledge quite different from those considered in Sec.1. and Sec.2.

Secondly it is in connection with this new sense of having knowledge that akratics are explicitly mentioned for the first time since Sec.0. 1146b25 - see (P1) above. This - the first mention point - suffices to establish the relatively non-controversial\(^{21}\) thesis that:

2. at least some types of (normal, Aristotelian) akrasia are at issue in Sec.3.: in these the akratic agent is describable as 'having knowledge' in this new sense.

However it can also be taken as naturally implying the stronger (controversial) thesis:

3. all types of (normal, Aristotelian) akrasia are at issue here in Sec.3.: in all the akratic agent is describable as 'having knowledge' in this new sense.

This stronger thesis is further supported by
the **definite article** point, viz. that a definite article precedes the occurrence of "akrateis" (akratics) at 1147a18 (cf.a23-4). Talk of "the akratics" naturally suggests talk of them as a general class, as against talk of a specific type(s) (where one would expect "akrateis tines"). And such talk of akratics as a general **class** parallels the illustrative use of such **classes** of people as "those mad, asleep, drunk, or in passions" at 1147a13-14 (cf.14ff), the **wholesale class** point.

**Prima facie**, acceptance of (1) and (3) together constitute a decisive case in favour of (V3). For, if by (1) the new sense of having knowledge is quite different from those at issue in the preceding sections, and it is by (3) the sense characteristic of all types of (normal, Aristotelian) akrasia, then akrasia cannot have been directly under discussion in those preceding sections.23

Are (1) and (3) acceptable?

These issues have not previously been formulated with sufficient precision. Certainly many scholars, including holders of (V3),24 have implicitly denied (3) and hence the alleged natural import of the "first mention" and "definite article" points. (The denial of (3) is implicit in any view that takes Sec.3. to be about a **particular** kind of akrasia.)25

As will emerge,26 I think (3) difficult to deny. But if (3) is accepted, must one then embrace (V3)? This now turns on (1); and on closer inspection this reveals
construals with very different implications.

It is indisputable, I take it, that Aristotle represents himself in Sec.3. as introducing a new manner of having knowledge in addition to those of Sec.1. and 2. But this new manner that is "other than those previously spoken of" could have its novelty conceived of as either 'strictly additional' (SA) or else as 'merely subdivisional' (MS). In other words on the (SA) reading (the reading required if (1) is to support (V3)) (1) becomes the claim:

ISA: Sec.3. introduces a new sense of knowing such that, if someone at t knows (that p) in this sense, then it is not the case that at t they know (that p) in any of the other senses of knowing distinguished in Sec.1. and 2.: i.e. this new sense is exclusive of those senses - with the corollary that those senses cannot be exhaustive distinctions.

On the (MS) reading (1) becomes the very different claim:

IMS: Sec.3. introduces a new sense of knowing such that, if someone at t knows (that p) in this sense, then it is the case that at t they know (that p) in one of the other senses of knowing distinguished in Sec.1. and 2.: i.e. this new sense is included in one of those senses - with the corollary that those senses may provide an exhaustive distinction.

This difference in fact depends on the interpretation to be given that manner of knowing which is "having but not
using knowledge" as that occurs in Sec.1. and 2. This emerges clearly at the textual level.

In Sec.1. Aristotle distinguishes between "having knowledge but not using it" and "having knowledge and using it".

In Sec.3.1147a11-12 he draws a distinction within a notion of "having knowledge and not using it". Call this usage of the phrase the wide usage (W). Then this passage makes a distinction within this wide usage (W):

\[
\text{to echein men, me chresthai de (W)}
\]

\[
\text{diaphora}
\]

between

\[
\text{to echein pos kai me echein'
}\]

\[
= \text{habitus ligatus (HL)
}\]

\[
\text{tied having}
\]

and

\[
\text{to echein haplos, kai me chresthai' (N)}
\]

\[
= \text{habitus solutus (HS)
}\]

\[
\text{free having}
\]

Aristotle does not explicitly employ the narrow usage (N) of the phrase "having but not using knowledge" in Sec.3., but its logical place is easily extrapolated from the context.

Our question is then whether the earlier occurrence of the phrase "having but not using knowledge" in Sec.1. (and 2.) is the wide (W) or the narrow (N) usage.

If it is (N), then the new sense of knowing introduced in Sec.3. is 'strictly additional'; and (ISA)
and (3) constitute a decisive case for (V3).\(^{29}\)

If it is \(W\), then the new sense of knowing of Sec.3. is merely a subdivision of \(W\); and then (IMS) and (3) constitute a decisive case against (V3). Indeed they also constitute cases against (V1A), (V1B), and (V2A), and in favour of (V2B) alone. For (3) claims that Sec.3. concerns all types of (normal Aristotelian) akrasia and that they are all of the Habitus Ligatus type (i.e. all akratic agents have knowledge in the new manner introduced in Sec.3.); and (IMS) states that this new manner of having knowledge (HL) is merely one subdivision (Habitus Solutus being the other) of the wide usage (W) at issue in Sec.1. (and 2.). So Sec.1. (and 2.) must, on the principle of a whole containing its parts, be concerned with all types of akrasia (i.e. view 'B's as against view 'A's); and it must concern all those types inclusively with other non-akratic phenomena (i.e. 'V2' as against 'V1') - for it also covers Habitus Solutus phenomena (by (IMS)) and these phenomena cannot be types of akrasia (by (3)).

So, we can conclude that:

(i) \((\text{ISA}) \& (3) \rightarrow (V3)\)

(ii) \((\text{IMS}) \& (3) \rightarrow (V2B)\).

The two options open to someone who denies (3), viz.:

(iii) \((\text{ISA}) \& \neg (3)\)

(iv) \((\text{IMS}) \& \neg (3)\)

are more complex; their importance lies particularly in
revealing what is required to block them.

In discussing them I interpret "-(3)" as the claim of internal negation that Sec.3. is concerned with not all akrasia, i.e. that it discusses only some specific type (cf. notes 21 and 22 above).

Option (iii): (1SA) & -(3)

This option claims that:

(Cl): Sec.3. concerns a specific type of akrasia which is not directly at issue in Sec.1. and Sec.2.

The positions consistent with this are:

(V3): for this claims that Sec.1-2. are not directly about akrasia at all;

(V1A) and (V2A): both these claim that Sec.1-2. do directly concern akrasia, but also that there are (/may be) other types of (normal Aristotelian) akrasia not covered by the schemata of these sections: on this option, Sec.3. provides such a further type.

We shall note that to hold (V1A) or (V2A) within the perspective of Option (iii) commits one to the existence of Habitus Solutus akrasia (see Chapter 1.2.4.): for Habitus Ligatus akrasia is confined to Sec.3. and Sec.1-2. are concerned directly with akrasia, but with a different type from Sec.3.

Positions inconsistent with this option are:

(V1B) and (V2B): both these are committed to Sec.1-2. offering schemata that cover all types of (normal, Aristotelian) akrasia.
Option (iv): (IMS) & -(3)

This option claims that:

(C2): Sec.3. concerns a specific type of akrasia which must be directly treated (somewhere) in Sec.1-2., and which Sec.3. singles out to say more about.

The only position obviously inconsistent with this is (V3).

To be consistent with this option:

(V1A) and (V1B) would be committed, as always, to viewing Sec.1. and 2. as countenancing Habitus Solutus akrasia: 'as always' because:

(i) whether (IMS) or (ISA) is adopted, Sec.1. and 2. will be concerned at least with (HS) phenomena;

and:

(ii) these two views, (V1A) and (V1B) claim precisely that all the phenomena at issue in Sec.1. and 2. are akratic.

More interestingly to be compatible with this option, (V2B) would also have to view Sec.1-2. as countenancing (HS) as well as (HL) akrasia. For, on (IMS), Sec.1-2. include both (HS) and (HL) phenomena; (V2B) claims that the schemata of Sec.1-2. capture all types of (normal, Aristotelian) akrasia; suppose then that all these types were on the (HL) side - other non-akratic phenomena filling out the (HS) side; then Sec.3. would concern akrasia generally (at least from the perspective of 7.3.) and not selectively, contrary to Option (iv)'s commitment to -(3).
(V2A) by contrast would not, within Option (iv), be forced to make this commitment to (HS) akrasia. For on (V2A) it would be possible to claim e.g. that Sec.1-2. deal simply with (HL) akrasia while all the (HS) phenomena are non-akratic - and that perhaps the purpose of Sec.3. is to further the argument by actually separating out this specific type of akrasia from the irrelevant mass of non-akratic (HS) phenomena.

But doesn't this mean that Sec.3. then concerns akrasia generally and not selectively? No, unlike (V2B), (V2A) can avoid this result, provided it claims there is another specific kind of akrasia considered in 7.3. which is neither (HL) nor (HS). So, for instance, it might be argued (à la Kenny(1966)) that Sec.4a deals precisely with such a type of akrasia.

To sum up. This discussion of Options (i)-(iv) and the five Views yields the following significant result. If we can establish three points:

(a) that (V3) is implausible;
(b) that Aristotle is unlikely to countenance (HS) akrasia (cf. Chapter 1.2.4.);
(c) that Aristotle does not (in 7.3.) countenance a type of akrasia that is neither (HS) nor (HL) (remember Kenny (1966) had to advocate transposing Sec.4b);

then, of our Views and Options, every Option would be blocked bar (ii) (i.e. (1MS) & (3)) - and Option (ii) permits only a single View - (V2B).
Moreover the above three points do not look absurdly difficult to defend.

So - rather surprisingly - we could end up with a strong case for a determinate view of the argumentative structure of this part of 7.3.  

2.5.  

(P3): thirdly, there are the implications of the immediate context.  

As mentioned under (P1), Rassow argues that Sec.1. and Sec.2.:

do not refer to akrasia, and the words "delon oun hoti homoios schein lektein tous akrateis toutois" show that the state of the akrates is first discussed in §§7, 8.

This view was criticized by Cook Wilson, followed by Stewart, on the grounds that the sentences 1146b33-5 and 1147a8-10: mean that the distinctions made remove the apparent paradox (compare 'deinon', 'atopon', 'thaumaston') that the akrates acts against his knowledge: for this is the paradox which is before the writer, as is evident both from §1 and §3.

The point about the context of Sec.1. and 2. can be put another way. In Sec.0.1. and 2. (i.e.1146b24-1147a10) Aristotle's driving concern is apparently with the question of what factors do not and what do "reveal a difference or
distinction" (diapherein) relevant to the Socratic thesis
("pros ton logon" 1146b25-6).\textsuperscript{34} We can represent the line of argument as follows:

'Faced with the Socratic thesis:
(i) it makes \textbf{no difference} to it if one supposes that it is true belief rather than knowledge in violation of which people act akratically (Sec.0. 1146b24-31);
(ii) but it will \textbf{make a difference} in which of the two ways we understand 'know' (Sec.1. 1146b31-35);
(iii) and with respect to these manners it will make \textbf{a fantastic difference} (Sec.2. 1146b35-1147a10).\textsuperscript{35}

If this is the structure, then we must take Aristotle to be struggling with the Socratic problem over akrasia in Sec.1. and 2.

But is this as strong as it sounds? Need it be anything more than a re-affirmation of our original assumption (2.2.) that these two sections are 'about' the Socratic problem in some sense? Two manoeuvres are open to any supporter of (V3). On the one hand they can try and attenuate the sense in which the distinctions introduced in Sec.1. and 2. are 'of relevance' to the Socratic problem; on the other they can suggest that the focus of 'the' Socratic problem is a focus not on the thesis that akrasia is impossible, but on the thesis that it is impossible to act in violation of what one knows is best for one to do, so that countering this may involve one in showing the possibility of other non-akratic phenomena which could
fall under that description and which need to be distinguished from cases of akrasia proper.

While the second is perhaps more plausible than the first, neither are convincing so far as the present point about the immediate context is concerned. Given that Sec.0. concerns akrasia directly (1146b25; cf.b28), and given the structure involving "to differ" (diaphorein) outlined above, opting for a (V3) view is perverse - unless one has very strong motivations from interpretative commitments at other points in the argument.

2.6.

(P4): fourthly the Magna Moralia offers a potentially helpful parallel.

Stewart, after citing Cook Wilson's criticisms adds a further argument against Rassow and in favour of viewing Sec.1. and 2. as dealing directly with akrasia:

It may be added that the writer of M.M.11.6. 1201b11sq. applies remarks parallel to those in §§5 and 6 I.e.Sec.1. and 2. explicitly to the akrates.

The parallels that Stewart is offering us here are between Sec.1. and MM.1201b10-23, and between Sec.2. and MM.1201b23-39 (or even beyond). The first MM passage introduces a distinction between two manners of 'knowing' and applies it explicitly to the akrates (MM.1201b14-16); the second introduces and exploits a distinction between
two kinds of proposition, universal ("katholou") and particular ("epi merous"); and likewise applies the results explicitly to the akrates (MM.1201b33ff).

However these parallels may seem of dubious value. Firstly, there is a limit to the effectiveness of parallels from other works of the same author (he may have changed his mind, etc.). Secondly, the uncertain status of the MM detracts even more from the effectiveness of these particular parallels. And thirdly, while there are the similarities Stewart points to, there are also considerable differences. So, for instance, the MM seems ignorant, at least in explicit terms, of the further manner of 'having knowledge' introduced in Sec.3.; and, while MM.1201b14-16 does explicitly locate akratics among those who have but are not using their knowledge, the passage immediately goes on (b18) to compare the akratic's condition with people asleep, in the manner of Sec.3. Since it is differences in the possible relations of Sec.3. to Sec.1. and 2. that help get our problems going, this blurring of such issues in the MM arguably debars it as a source of illumination.

I do not think that these qualms are by themselves sufficient to smother Stewart's point. If one thought one had independent grounds for viewing Sec.1. and 2. as not directly applying to akrasia, one would indeed appeal to them to disembarrass oneself of the MM. But in the absence of such grounds, the MM parallels show that at
least there is nothing outrageously odd to Greek ears in applying these two distinctions directly to cases of akrasia.

So, as a point considered in isolation, the MM discussion gives some support for (V1) and (V2) against (V3), and in fact for (V2) over (V1). \(^{41}\)

2.7.

(P5): fifthly, the occurrence of "hode phusikos" at the beginning of Sec.4. may bear on our question. \(^{42}\)

The interpretation of "phusikos" is controversial. \(^{43}\)

However it may seem plausible to accept the following theses:

(i) "phusikos" occurs here in contrast to (an implicit) "logikos"; \(^{44}\)

(ii) all three preceding sections (Sec.1., 2., 3.) are "logikos" in their approach (and not, say, just Sec.3.);

(iii) the Aristotelian contrast between "logikos" and "phusikos" is one of looking at the same topic from different levels or perspectives.

(iii) is intentionally vague in order to be acceptable to scholars who, accepting (i) and (ii), explicate the contrast here in NE.7.3. variously (and in many cases obscurely) as (e.g.):

(a) between ad hominem remarks and the giving of one's own opinion;

(b) between dialectical considerations and considerations
peculiar to the relevant science (here psychology);
(c) between considerations set at a distance (or higher level of generality) and considerations close or peculiar to the specific topic in hand;
(d) between philosophical considerations addressed to the possibility of akrasia and psychological ones addressed to its explanation;
(e) between the formal analysis of the language in which we express what there is and 'physical' or functional analysis of what there is itself. ⁴⁵

My point is that acceptance of (i)-(iii) constrains one to view all four sections as concerned directly with the same topic (even if it is being approached from different perspectives and with somewhat different questions in mind): akrasia. ⁴⁶ We haven't shown it impossible to accept (i)-(iii) while maintaining (V3); but such a combination has no obvious attraction, and it is not surprising that Kenny (1966) holding (V3) rejects all three. ⁴⁷

2.8.

(P1)-(P5) are not intended as a complete list of factors. There are (e.g.) further questions about cross-referencing between the sections (cf. (P2)).

A look at a central instance of this concludes our preliminary investigation.
(P6): The possible connections between Sec.2b, Sec.3. and Sec.4c.

In Sec.2b Aristotle introduces two cases:

**Case A** where the agent "does not have" the knowledge of "whether this is a such-and-such";

**Case B** where the agent "does not exercise" that knowledge.

In Sec.4c Aristotle distinguishes between:

**Case 1** where the akratic does not have "the final proposition" "being in the pathos"; and

**Case 2** where the akratic has "the final proposition" but in such a manner that the having it is not to know it but to merely-say it, as the drunk does Empedocles' works.

That much is non-controversial. (The use of "case" here is neutral - two "cases" need not indicate two types of akrasia but may be different descriptions of one and the same type.)

And though often ignored, it should be non-controversial to distinguish in Sec.3. between:

**Case i** where the akratic is temporarily tied with respect to his knowledge (Sec.3a); and

**Case ii** where the akratic is tied with respect to his knowledge and also says ('merely-says') the appropriate things.

We have already noted two very different views of Sec.3.:

the **Specific view** of Sec.3. as concerned with only some type(s) of akrasia among those discussed in 7.3.; and
the General view of Sec.3. as concerned with all types of akrasia discussed in 7.3.

Now Sec.4c is often viewed as a summing-up section; and this encourages the idea that Case 1 and 2 pick up on earlier passages, and the question then arises of the details of this back-referencing.

This has obvious bearing on our concern. For any view that Case A and/or Case B are picked up in Sec.4c will have the consequence that Sec.2b is directly concerned with akrasia (and if 2b then surely 2a; and if Sec.2. then surely Sec.1.): this rules out (V3). Equally any view holding that Case A and Case B are not picked up in 4c will favour (V3), against all the other views.

Among those who do accept some back-referencing from the Cases of 4c to those of 2b a variety of strategies is apparent - different strategies favouring different non-(V3) options.

A common strategy starts by taking Case 2 to pick up Sec.3.'s Case ii. This is then combined with all, or some suitable selection, of the following:

(i) a Specific View of Sec.3.;
(ii) a failure to distinguish Case i from Case ii in Sec.3.
(iii) Case 1 and Case 2 are not different descriptions of the same type of akrasia; they characterise specifically different kinds of akrasia;

to yield a commitment to the claim that: Case 1 picks up a specific type of akrasia not at issue in
Sec.3.
Add to this the further thesis that:
(iv) Sec.4a is not picked up by Case 1 (e.g. because it is concerned with the same specific type as Sec.3.).

One is then committed to locating the reference of Case 1 somewhere prior to Sec.3. - and Sec.2. (especially 2b) is the obvious choice.

The details of this strategy subsequently depend on whether "the final proposition" of Sec.4c is understood as the conclusion of the 'good' syllogism (RPS) or as its minor premiss.\(^{55}\)

If the conclusion, then Case 1 is a kind of akrasia where one \textit{fails to have} the (RPS)'s \textit{conclusion} \(^{56}\) "being in the pathos" (1147b11). Sec.2b explains this as due to a proximate\(^{57}\) failure either (Case A) to have (=acquire) or (Case B) to exercise the requisite (RPS) minor premiss. On this line both Case A and Case B are held to provide scenarios for Case 1 - which is consequently viewed as referring back to \textit{both} of them.

If the minor premiss, then Case 1 is a kind of akrasia where one \textit{fails to have} the (RPS)'s \textit{minor premiss}. But then Case 1 can pick up only Sec.2b's Case A. This is obviously awkward. For Case B is now not picked up at all in the summing-up; yet it is usually regarded as more important than Case A 'and as being the case discussed in Sec.2a.\(^{58}\)

This awkwardness might be adduced in favour of
the "conclusion" reading. However one can seek to eliminate it by re-examining Sec.4c's notion of "not having the final proposition". The awkward omission of Case B stems from interpreting the failure to have the (RPS)'s minor premiss as a failure to acquire it. So perhaps we can re-interpret it as a failure to have it (HS). If so, then either:

(a) Case 1 implies we have the minor premiss (HL). Here Case 1 can pick up only Case B, and Case A is left out - again awkward, but not so awkward as the converse.

Or:

(b) Case 1's failure of (HS) having leaves its explanation open. It may be because the minor premiss is tied (HL), or because it simply has not even been acquired. Here Case 1 can pick up both Case A and B, as on the "conclusion" reading.

But this re-interpretation is not plausible in the context of this general strategy.

**Argument 1**

It requires that we give the "not having" of Sec.2b's Case A and of Sec.4c's Case 1 entirely different interpretations: the former in terms of a failure to acquire, the latter in terms of some failure(s) to have (HS).

**Argument 2**

According to this general strategy, Sec.2b and Sec.3. concern different specific types of akrasia. In fact this strategy is committed to Option (iii) (cf.2.4.) - i.e. (ISA) & -(3). And this Option, while consistent with (V3), (V1A), and (V2A), in the context of the present strategy
arguably favours (V2A). 59

Now, on Option (iii), Sec.2., if concerned with akrasia, cannot concern (HL) akrasia (cf.2.4.). But the suggested re-interpretation precisely construes Case B as an (HL) case. So it's blocked.

So someone adopting this strategy must either take the "conclusion" reading or weather the awkwardness of supposing Case 1 to pick up Case A alone. And this latter is extremely implausible.

There are severe problems facing this strategy in any case (e.g. over its commitments to a Specific View of Sec.3. and to the existence of (HS) akrasia).

However if this strategy favours the specific (A) views (especially (V2A)), there are others that favour the general views, (V1B) and (V2B). Without going into these here, let us merely note what has been taken as a fatal objection to them. Any view that holds that Sec.2b concerns akrasia generally (so far as 7.3. is concerned) thereby attributes to Aristotle some strong "minor premiss" resolution to the Socratic problem. If this is hopelessly inadequate charity requires we look for another interpretation before condemning Aristotle. (This must await discussion.)

Enough has been said to indicate the trickiness of the relations between our three sets of Cases.

Addendum: The 'Phusikos Barrier'

If the three theses put forward about 'phusikos'
in (P5) are accepted, then Sec.4a is approaching the same issue but on a different 'level' from the preceding three sections. If again Sec.4c is viewed as summing-up, then we are looking for earlier occurrences of Case 1 and Case 2. Case 1 and Case 2 clearly concern akrasia on the same 'level'.

I suggest that accepting the above theses makes the occurrence of 'phusikos' into a barrier for back-referencing in the following sense: if Case 1 and Case 2 are viewed as picking up sections either side of 'phusikos', then the two cases won't be on the same level. To avoid this, the back-references of Case 1 and Case 2 must both fail on one side of 'phusikos' or the other.

2.9. A framework of distinct questions

Our original question - "In what sense are Sec.1-2 about akrasia?" - can now be broken down explicitly into three separate ones. In fact we have already employed them; for it is precisely they that articulate the distinctions between the five different Views we initially envisaged in (P1).

The first question distinguishes (V1) and (V2) from (V3) by asking: (V1)/(V2) or (V3):

Q1: Is this section itself concerned with akrasia directly, or only preparatorily - preparatorily to some further section which is directly about akrasia? i.e. does it
actually present schemata which accommodate akrasia?

The second distinguishes (V1) from (V2):

(V1) or (V2):

Q2: Given that this section concerns akrasia directly, is it about akrasia exclusively or inclusively? i.e. does it accommodate akratic phenomena alone, or also other non-akratic phenomena?

The third distinguishes (A)S from (B)s:

(V1A) or (V1B); (V2A) or (V2B):

Q3: Given that this section concerns akrasia directly, is it about akrasia generally or selectively? i.e. does it encompass all varieties that Aristotle recognises as types of akrasia, or does it deal with only one, or some, among these?

Both Q2 and Q3 have application only where Q1 receives the answer 'directly about akrasia'; the distinctions they introduce are logically independent.61

2.10. Loose ends

Q1 and Q2 are straightforward. Q3 calls for some comments.

Firstly, as mentioned earlier,62 some sections (notably Sec.2., and possibly Sec.3.) may be interpreted as delineating distinct types of akrasia within one and the same section. There would then be various ways of taking Q3. The simplest is to take it aggregatively over a
single section as a whole.

Secondly, and more seriously, there are different ways of interpreting the scope of "all varieties". If some section is about akrasia generally, then it offers schemata to which 'all varieties of Aristotelian akrasia' are accommodatable: but are 'all varieties' all those with which he is concerned in 7.1-10, or merely all those at issue in 7.3?

This is a potential source of confusion. Two interpreters may agree that in some section of 7.3, Aristotle is discussing akrasia 'generally', but intend different things by this. One may relativise the claim simply to 7.3., and be claiming that this section is not concerned with some specific type in contradistinction to another section's concern with another type. Here the question of generality and specificity is internal to 7.3.; claiming that some section is general is thus compatible with a belief that 7.3. as a whole only concerns a specific type of akrasia (say, weakness) in contradistinction to other specific types found elsewhere in 7.1-10. The other interpreter may make the larger claim, relativised to 7.1-10: he would be claiming that some section of 7.3. was dealing with all the types (or more weakly, all the normal types) distinguished in later chapters. Here the question of generality and specificity is both internal and external to 7.3.

We can distinguish these readings by subscripting
them 'generally 7.3.' and 'generally 7.1-10.' when it is important to do so. I take the focus of our present discussion to be on the former. So to establish that some section is general 7.3. will leave open the further substantial questions of which varieties of akrasia are at issue in 7.3. and of the relation between them and those distinguished in subsequent chapters.

These two further questions are closely connected and call for two comments.

Over the second question, of the relation between the akratic varieties of 7.3. and 7.4-10., we run into a problem that exemplifies a danger inherent in that type of Aristotelian methodology of which 7.1-10. is the classic instance.

7.1. presents six sets of endoxa, from which, in 7.2., six aporiai are generated. The sixth endoxon claims:

Further people are called lackers-of-control (akrateis) also of anger and of honour and of financial gain. (1145bl9-20)

The aporia generated from this runs:

Further if akrasia, and enkrateia, occurs with respect to everything, who is "the akratic" without qualification (haplos)? For no-one has all the akrasias, yet we do affirm certain people to be <"akratics"> without qualification. (1146b2-5)

This puzzle Aristotle resolves in chapter 4. But before this he addresses (in chapter 3) the Socratic problem, and apparently offers a typical Aristotelian "lusis",
preserving truths on both sides. Socrates' main point comes out as right (1147b13ff), and yet there are, compatibly with that, cases of akrasia.

But what relation does this have to the ensuing puzzle of chapter 4? What sort of akrasia has chapter 3 established the possibility of?

One suggestion would be:
(a) that chapter 3 establishes the possibility simply of akrasia haplos (which turns out to be akrasia di'epithumian); the reader is then left to extend this solution to all other types of akrasia to which his attention may be directed.

Another suggestion is:
(b) that chapter 3 establishes the possibility of some abstract or neutral kind of akrasia - akrasiaₙ, prior to any decision about what objects akrasia can occur about (i.e. what values 'n' can take).

It may be that Aristotle is not sufficiently alive to the potential obscurities generated by the seriatim treatment of logically-interlocking aporiai. And even supposing there is some rationale to the order in which Aristotle chooses to discuss the various aporiai, this is not made very explicit.

There may simply be no determinate answer to our question. However, in favour of (b) it may be urged that Socrates' original thesis is neutral over what objects are at issue; and that the opening sentence of 7.4.:

As to whether there is a kind of akratic who is so without qualification or whether all akratics
suggests that the akrasia 7.3. has just shown to be possible is not akrasia haplos, but akrasia that is neutral so far as concerns 7.4.'s question.

But (a) also has considerations in its favour. 'Akrasia' actually occurs haplos (i.e. without added qualification) in 7.3.; 7.3.1146b18-20 gives us a preview of the identity of the haplos akratic; and 1147a31ff concentrates on precisely such a central case (involving appetite). This is perhaps the stronger case.

Regarding our first question of the kinds or varieties of akrasia at issue in 7.3., we need to consider the notion of 'variety of akrasia' more explicitly; up to now the reader has been relied on to supply appropriate interpretations. There are perhaps three main dimensions to this notion for Aristotle: distinctions between akrasia haplos and akrasia pos, between weakness and impulsiveness, between varieties of different 'stage of breakdown'.

(D1) The distinction between akrasia haplos and akrasia pos is one between akrasia without qualification and akrasia with an added qualification; (this has its place in Aristotle's philosophical approach to ordinary language and the development of theses about focal meaning). Aristotle holds that:
(i) certain people are said to be "akratic", without any additional specification of, say, the object over which they lose control of themselves; 68

(ii) that people spoken of as "akratic" unqualifiedly cannot be understood to be people akratic about everything; for there are no such people; so that:

(iii) people who are akratic unqualifiedly (haplos) are ones who are akratic over a specific object; people who are akratic over a different object, must have that object specified (i.e. are akratic pos) in being described as akratic; otherwise they would be being wrongly described.

We can label this a distinction between central akrasia (akrasia δι' epithumian) and extended akrasia.

(D2) In 7.7.1150b19-28 (cf.7.10.1152a18-19; 27-9) Aristotle distinguishes within "akrasia" between weakness (WA) and impulsiveness (IA):

For some (=the weak) having deliberated do not stick by what they have deliberated on account of the pathos, while others (=the impulsive) on account of not having deliberated are led by the pathos;....

How does this distinction relate to (D1)? It could be that (i) (WA) and (IA) are simply and solely types within akrasia haplos; or (ii) that they are distributed differently between akrasia haplos and akrasia pos - in particular (e.g.) (WA) to akrasia haplos/δι' epithumian and (IA) to (especially)
akrasia dia thumon. Perhaps the most plausible claim is (iii) that, while this distinction is explicitly applied only to akrasia haplos, there seems no reason why the reader should not be intended to apply it appropriately to extended akrasia.

(D3) Within at least some of the different akratic varieties mentioned in (D1) and (D2), there are varieties of 'stage of breakdown'. So, for example, on many interpretations, 7.3.1147b9ff distinguishes two significantly different places or stages, at which practical reasoning can break down in akrasia. (This is in part the notion of a schema for akrasia deployed in §§3-8.) There are, in turn, questions about the relations of this distinction to the two previous ones. So, for instance, various views have been taken over the question of whether, and if so in what way, the (D2) distinction between (WA) and (IA) is implicitly present, or prefigured, in 7.3. Obviously that distinction is closely involved with one about stage of breakdown; some scholars would identify them, and would argue that e.g. the two types of case in 1147b9ff are to be viewed as exemplifying (IA) and (WA) respectively; others consider 7.3. to be concerned solely with (WA), and so cannot adopt that interpretation of 1147b9ff. 71

There is, at least initially, considerable room for manoeuvre. However the following is a plausible provisional stance:
(i) 7.3. primarily concerns akrasia haplos rather than akrasia;

(ii) talk of 'ho akrates' in 7.3. covers both (WA) and (IA) (and so 7.3. is not confined solely to (WA)). For in 7.10.1152a9-19, especially 17-19, Aristotle passes various comments about 'ho akrates' in such a way that demonstrates that he envisages himself as referring both to (WA) and (IA).72

(iii) whether (WA) and (IA) are to be aligned with the various stages of breakdown introduced in 7.3. is a further question, and not one to be simply presupposed.

2.11. Resolution of the First Major Issue (2.12-fin)

This framework of distinctions and associated terminology provides us with an adequate articulation of the issues. And, I argue, we can supply a reasoned resolution.

Lest it seem that all this is making heavy weather of what must surely be a side-issue, we must remember that a result here can have significance far beyond the local confines of these two sections; in fact as we shall see it can provide a basis for ruling against a great number of interpretations of Aristotle's overall position.

In the sections that follow I argue for the correctness of (V2B) - that in Sec.1. and 2. Aristotle is
considering akrasia _directly, generally and inclusively:_ call this the DGI claim for Sec.1. and 2.

First I outline a general argument, picking up the remarks at the end of (P2) (see 2.4.). Then I go on to consider Sec.1. and Sec.2. separately and in greater detail. Of particular importance is the discussion, in connection with Sec.2., of certain 'simple' objections which purport to show that Sec.2. cannot concern akrasia DGI. For here we begin to see the implications of (V2B) for the overall interpretation.

2.12. Outline of a General Argument

We have already touched on most of the elements in this; what follows can be regarded as having a partly summarising function.

The argument has two stages:

1. arguments for Option (ii) - i.e. for the two premisses (1MS) and (3) - vis-a-vis Sec.1. and 2.;
2. arguments that Option (ii) entails (V2B).

The second stage I take to be less controversial (even those who don't agree that Option (ii) holds can agree with this); and I have already given the argument for it (2.4.).

It is the first stage that requires most argument. There are two ways of supporting it.

Positive arguments for accepting (1MS) and (3)
I offer some considerations in favour of (1MS) over (1SA) in the next section, 2.13. As for (3), I have already pointed to one favouring consideration - the 'definite article point' (2.4.p.89); and provide a fuller treatment in Chapter 4.

**Negative arguments** against the acceptability of any of the rival Options.

I refined this down (2.4.p.95) to the need to establish three points, on which I will briefly comment.

(i) That (V3) is implausible

Given the concern of the chapter, the assumption of relevance (2.2.) ensures that one will, if at all possible, take Sec.1. and 2. to be directly concerned with akrasia. So the onus of proof is on the advocate of (V3) to show that this is not possible. Various arguments have indeed been adduced that purport to secure this: these are the 'simple objections' we discuss in connection with Sec.2. below (2.14.ff), and show not to hold water.

(ii) That Aristotle doesn't countenance (HS) akrasia

The two arguments here are those discussed in Chapter 1.2.4. - the matters of consistency and explanation.

(iii) That Aristotle doesn't countenance some non-(HS) and non-(HL) form of akrasia in 7.3.

One way of trying to cash out the idea that Aristotle in 7.3. countenances a form of akrasia in which the agent's state of knowledge is neither (HS) nor (HL) is
to claim that the type of akratic at issue in Sec.4a is one who is actually using his knowledge: for he arrives at the good conclusion (1147a34). ('Using' knowledge on this line obviously is taken not to involve acting on it.)

To this claim may be added a further one about Sec.1. and 2.: 'Sec.1. and 2. look as though Aristotle is agreeing that it would be odd ('deinon' 1146b35; 'thaumaston' 1147a9-10) for the agent who is using his knowledge (etc.) to do some intentional action in violation of this knowledge. But this is misleading; Aristotle in fact precisely allows such cases, as is seen in the above interpretation of Sec.4a. And a closer look alerts us to the fact that Aristotle need not be interpreted as expressing his agreement - witness the occurrences of "dokein" at 1146b35 and 1147a9.'

To concentrate on the first and major of these claims. It won't do for several reasons:
(a) Sec.4b seems connected with 4a and clearly implies a (HL) on the part of the akratic agent;
(b) Sec.4c implies the same at least so far as concerns Case 2 (1147b11-12 with its back-reference to Sec.3.) - and Case 1 hardly suits the bill;
(c) Sec.4a itself in its employment of "legein" at 1147a34 - as against perhaps phanai - clearly also implies (HL) (cf.1147a18, 23, bl2).

That then is the guts of the 'general' argument. It has one slightly exposed flank. We have not explored
how it fares against some position that tries to drive a wedge between Sec.1. and 2. by conceding that Sec.1. and
3. connect in the mode suggested by Option (ii) but in some way cuts out Sec.2. (e.g. by claiming that the reference of "the manners just discussed" in 1147a10-11 refers exclusively to Sec.1.). As I see it, such a move threatens the integrity of the text, and my entire policy is to see how far we can get by assuming its integrity - the assumption with which we must surely start.

2.13. Consideration of Sec.1.

Taking the issue of directness first, the following argument purports to show 'decisively' that Sec.1. concerns akrasia directly:

(A) Background assumption: the principle of relevance means we must at least try to locate the akratic here;

(1) Ex hypothesi the akratic is at least a person who:
   (a) has knowledge in some sense or other - call this unanalysed sense 'having knowledge';
   (b) does some action (intentionally) while having-knowledge
        (he does not lose his knowledge in a way such that he would have to re-learn);

(2) Principle (P):

Of people who meet conditions (a) and (b), it must be the case that when acting they are:

(\(\alpha\)) either using their knowledge
(β) or else merely having-but-not-using it.

(3) Therefore, since the akratic is among people who meet (a) and (b), he must at least be included in either (α) or (β), and so directly under discussion. 77

The important step here is (P) which claims in effect that the distinction between 'using' and 'having-but-not-using' knowledge is exhaustive of the domain of knowers: i.e. that having-knowledge decomposes in the first instance into just these two exclusive and exhaustive senses. But, as we have seen, 78 it is possible to deny (P), by claiming that Sec.3. introduces a further sense ('allon tropon' 1147al0) of 'knowing' that is strictly additional to "those just discussed" (a10-11); combining this with the fact that the akratic features in connection with this further sense (1147a17-18), yields an argument for akrasia's not being directly discussed in Sec.1.

How serious is this challenge?

At the 'textual' level two considerations might be adduced to support the 'strictly additional' (SA) - as against the 'merely subdivisional' (MS) - construal of Sec.3.'s new manner of knowing. First the phrase "in another manner than those just discussed" (a10-11) by itself naturally suggests the (SA) construal. Secondly, on the (SA) construal of Sec.3., the manner of 'having-but-not-using' at issue in Sec.1. has to be the narrow (N) usage 79 - viz. the pure, unqualified ('haplos'), manner of Habitus Solutus. That this is the manner at issue in Sec.1. may
seem corroborated simply by the fact that the manner of 'having-but-not-using' in Sec.1. is indeed referred to as such, i.e. without any qualification.

Neither consideration weighs. Even granting that the 'conversational implication' of 1147a10-11 by itself favours the (SA) reading, this is immediately cancelled by the following explanatory ("gar") sentence (all-12) which makes abundantly clear that the new manner is a subdivision within ("en" all) a previously distinguished one. Moreover, (and non-controversially), "having-but-not-using" occurs unqualifiedly at all-12 in the wide (W) usage, and this undercuts the second consideration. There now seems no reason not to suppose the usage in Sec.1. the same wide one; and every reason to do so, since Sec.3. obviously appeals to some previous acquisition on the reader's part of an (undifferentiated) notion of 'having-but-not-using' within which Aristotle now proceeds to draw a distinction. 80

There are other more theoretical objections, which we consider in connection with Sec.2. But, with the proviso that we can defuse them, we can conclude here that the 'decisive' argument goes through.

Granted that Sec.1. concerns akrasia directly, we now face the two further questions of inclusivity and generality.

That Sec.1. concerns akrasia generally flows straight from the 'decisive' argument. For that argument hinged on the exhaustiveness of the distinction between
'using' and 'having-but-not-using' knowledge: i.e. on there being no place to locate any type of Aristotelian akratic outside the scope of that distinction. So all types of (normal) Aristotelian akrasia fall within its purview. Moreover given the decisive argument we can also argue for the inclusivity of Sec.1.'s concern with akrasia - in two ways.

First, and most simply, if Sec.3. in its concern with (HL) akrasia itself concerns akrasia inclusively, i.e. with other non-akratic phenomena, then so will Sec.1. simply because it covers Sec.3. (on the (MS) reading).

Secondly, if it is accepted that Sec.3. concerns all types of normal Aristotelian akrasia (i.e. they are all (HL) phenomena), then Sec.1. in covering also (HS) phenomena, will cover non-akratic phenomena, and so be treating akrasia inclusively.

The inclusivity of Sec.1.'s concern is independently corroborated by EE.2.9.1225b11ff:

But since knowing and understanding is of two kinds, one having and the other using knowledge, the man who has knowledge but does not use it could in a way rightly be said to have acted in ignorance, but in another way not; for example if he failed to use his knowledge because of negligence. (trans. Woods)

Here 'having-but-not-using' knowledge clearly includes the non-akratic phenomenon of failing to act according to one's knowledge "di'ameleian". With the proviso that some further objections are met, we may conclude that Sec.1. concerns akrasia DGI.
2.14. **Consideration of Sec. 2.**

In contrast to Sec. 1., Sec. 2. is extremely problematic, both internally and in its relations to other sections (cf. Chapter 1.2.1.).

Our aim is to argue the DGI claim for Sec. 2., and in particular to defuse certain 'simple' objections to it. Our treatment is perforce provisional to some extent. For a full discussion must also take Sec. 4. into account. But we cannot face all problems at once, but must inch forward by explicating the mutual constraints of varying solutions to various problems and by spotting loci of leverage.

I start by offering an argument from context (2.15.); then try and bring out the broader import of the DGI claim for Sec. 2. (2.16.). This provides the background against which I then formulate the 'simple' objections (2.17.) and attempt to defuse them (2.18.-fin).

2.15. **An Argument from Context**

If

1/ Sec. 1. concerns akrasia DGI (as argued in 2.13.)
and
2/ Sec. 3. also does so,

then, given further that
3/ Sec. 2. contains no explicit or obvious indication to the contrary,
we can surely conclude that
4/ the surrounding context provides strong evidence that
Sec.2.'s concern with akrasia is likewise DGI. 86

It is helpful to comment on the three DGI aspects separately.

(i) **Directness**

It is hardly controversial 87 that Sec.3. concerns akrasia directly; if it is also granted that Sec.1. does, then it is well nigh impossible to make out a plausible rationale for supposing Sec.2. retreats to a merely preparatory concern (especially given no explicit indication of such a shift in perspective). So a rejection of Sec.2.'s directness must go hand in hand with a rejection of Sec.1.'s, i.e. with premiss 1/ above.

(ii) **Inclusivity**

If it is once granted that Sec.2. concerns akrasia directly, then it is reasonable to regard it as inclusive, both because of the surrounding sections 88 and because it is in fact easy to fit non-akratic phenomena to Sec.2.'s schemata. Moreover I see no theoretical interest in rejecting the conditional claim that 'if Sec.2. concerns akrasia directly, then it does so inclusively'.

(iii) **Generality**

Someone out to deny Sec.2.'s directness would, I suggested above, focus on rejecting premiss 1/. By contrast, someone who accepts its directness but rejects its generality will reject premiss 2/. They will allow that
Sec. 3. concerns akrasia directly (and perhaps inclusively), but not generally: it concerns only specific type(s) of akrasia. This then makes room for the claim that Sec. 2. is similarly only concerned with some specific (but different) type(s) of akrasia.

The philosophically important issues are those of directness and generality (cf. 2.16.).

2.16. The Importance of the claim that Sec. 2. concerns akrasia DGI

The DGI claim for Sec. 2. has important repercussions for Aristotle’s position over akrasia in the chapter as a whole. Its importance lies in two theses, respectively concerning directness and generality.

(I) If Sec. 1. and Sec. 2. concern akrasia directly, then Aristotle recognises as forms of akrasia cases where the agent:
(a) does not contemplate/use knowledge that he has (Sec. 1.);
(b) does not use the particular proposition that he has, although he is, or may be, using the universal one (Sec. 2a);
(c) either (i) does not even have knowledge of some relevant particular proposition; or (ii) does not exercise (his knowledge of) it (Sec. 2b).

(II) If Sec. 1. and Sec. 2. concern akrasia generally then Aristotle recognises the form or forms of akrasia countenanced in (I) as constituting the only forms: all types
(or all normal types) of akrasia are supposedly accommodatable to those schemata.

If (I) is accepted and so Sec. 2.'s concern is direct, then it presents us with schemata that locate the (proximate) cause of at least some akratic failures in some failure or other over the (or part of the) minor proposition, (see (I)(b) and (c)). I call this a 'Minor Premiss' (MP) approach to akrasia. (Within this usage an (MP) approach does not presuppose a specific interpretation of the nature of the failing; it is merely 'locational', and leaves open a wide variety of (MP) interpretations.)

Granted (I), the question of generality becomes acute. If (II) is accepted, then Aristotle is advocating an (MP) approach for all types of akrasia: i.e. a 'Total Minor Premiss' (TMP) approach. If (II) is denied, then in Sec. 2. he is advocating an (MP) approach only for certain selective types of akrasia: i.e. a 'Partial Minor Premiss' (RMP) approach.

The idea that Aristotle advocates any minor premiss approach to akrasia is objectionable to many scholars. It forms a central issue in interpretational controversies, particularly over Sec. 4.; but it arises equally for Sec. 2., and we must consider the objections brought against it.

The standard of argument in the literature is not generally high at this point. I point to three 'dangers' that are not always successfully negotiated.

First is the danger of conflating an (MP) approach
with a particular (MP) interpretation - i.e. a failure to appreciate the potential range of (MP) interpretations. So, for instance, a particular (MP) interpretation will depend on some specific view of what it is "to exercise" (knowledge of) some minor proposition. If a particular (MP) interpretation is objectionable, this need not be taken to imply that the (MP) approach is totally wrong, but that the interpretation of 'exercise' is.

Second is the danger of not distinguishing two different targets:

(i) the 'original target' - Sec.2.'s directness. Here the objections target on the viability of any (MP) approach at all, and seek to show that no type of Aristotelian akrasia is accommodatable to Sec.2.'s schemata.

(ii) the 'modified target' - Sec.2.'s generality. Here the objections accept that some types of Aristotelian akrasia are accommodatable to Sec.2. and thus susceptible to some (MP) interpretation; but they seek to show that there is at least one type, Y, that cannot be (Y is usually taken to be (WA) - and will be in what follows). In other words Sec.2. is not to be viewed as advocating a (TMP) approach.

The third and final danger is also a matter of targeting. An objector must make clear whether his target is Aristotle or an interpretation of Aristotle. And of equal importance with clarity here is rationale - we need to know why we should take one focus rather than the other.
2.17. The Simple Objections

I discuss three objections - those concerning (i) the akratic struggle, (ii) the intentionality and (iii) the censurability of the akratic act and agent. All are thought to render an (MP) approach to akrasia inconsistent with philosophical commonsense and/or with Aristotle's views elsewhere - and so to condemn either certain interpretations of Aristotle or himself to philosophical darkness.

Objection 1: The akratic struggle

'In Sec.2. the agent either fails to have or fails to exercise a relevant minor premiss. Therefore he must fail to draw, and so be aware of, the conclusion that would have resulted. But how can this be true of the akratic? For elsewhere Aristotle portrays akrasia as involving an active struggle between reason and passion - and it is a pre-condition of the existence of such a struggle that the akratic has reached and appreciates the conclusion of the good syllogism (RPS).'

Objection 2: The intentionality of the akratic act and agent

'Given the agent of Sec.2. either fails to have or fails to exercise some relevant minor premiss, then, on the NE.3.1. doctrine, he can't be acting intentionally under a description involving the content of that minor premiss. And how can this be true of the akratic? If Sec.2. does embrace the akratic, then we have the following dilemma:'
either the akratic acts unintentionally, thus preserving harmony with the doctrine of NE.3.; but this is (a) absurd; (b) inconsistent with Aristotle's explicit pronouncements both in Book 7 and elsewhere,\textsuperscript{90} or the akratic of Sec.2. although ignorant of the relevant minor premiss, nevertheless does intentionally do the akratic act; but then this flouts (a) the doctrine of NE.3. and (b) philosophical commonsense. If neither horn seems tenable, shouldn't we deny the antecedent and suppose that Sec.2. does not embrace the akratic?

Objection 3: The censurability of akratic act and agent

'If the ex hypothesi akratic of Sec.2. acts unintentionally, then on the NE.3.1. doctrine that \( \phi \)-ing intentionally is a necessary condition for being censured for \( \phi \)-ing this akratic is not censurable. But in NE.Bk.7. and elsewhere Aristotle denies that the akratic (at least of the central case) is censurable - that akrasia is "among things to be censured" ("ton psekton" 7.4.1148b6).'

These objections contain a farrago of confusions. They also rely for their effectiveness on certain presuppositions the most important of which concern 'energein' and the 'conclusion' of the practical syllogism. (E) Both objection 1 and 2 as presented assume that failing to exercise the minor proposition is at least failing to know it in that sense of knowing the particular circumstances required in NE.3.1. for acting intentionally - which it would be orthodox to think of in terms of
'being aware that...', or 'having consciously in mind that ...

This is significant since other construals of 'exercise' appear to immediately undercut these objections, and, until demonstrated to the contrary, are available on the philosophical market.

(C) Some of the forcefulness of the objections may stem from assuming that in 7.3. Aristotle is supposing that the conclusion is identical with the action. If so, and if, as objection 1 claims, Aristotle is elsewhere committed to the thesis that the (or an) akratic reaches the conclusion, yet after a struggle fails to act appropriately, then he seems straightforwardly inconsistent. Equally vis-a-vis objection 2, it may be supposed that had the akratic been aware of the good minor premiss he would inevitably have drawn the conclusion, i.e. acted; and so Aristotle's view of the practical conclusion forces him to deny that the akratic is aware of the good minor premiss - but this lands him in inconsistency with his account of intentional action.

Three comments.

If these objections went through, the inconsistency attributed to Aristotle seems so blatant as to throw doubt on the assumption about the practical conclusion.

In fact both arguments as they stand rely on further assumptions. Objection 1 assumes a single sense of "conclusion", whereas there may be room to distinguish
the conclusion of deliberation from the conclusion of the practical syllogism (as understood above). Objection 2 assumes that someone aware both of their values and the relevant circumstances obtaining in the situation will always put them together so as to draw the conclusion, whereas there seems room for failure here.

While (C) may give the objections a certain bite, as presented they make no explicit commitment to it. Yet (C) can be viewed as providing an explanation of the source of the alleged inconsistencies: without it Aristotle's view (on this line) would be not merely inconsistent with claims elsewhere but internally bizarre.

2.18. Objection 1: The akratic struggle

Kenny (1966) writes:

Cook Wilson and others have argued that these passages (viz. Sec. 1. and Sec. 2.) cannot be by Aristotle because Argument 1 inconsistent with his general picture of incontinence as a conflict between reason and desire. Here there is no conflict since the judgement of reason is not actual. (p.173)

Kenny accepted the force of this argument, but instead of concluding with Cook Wilson that the passages were not Aristotelian concluded that they did not directly concern akrasia.92

As an argument against the directness of Sec. 2.'s concern with akrasia, it is very unconvincing.
An obvious countermove is to point out that while Aristotle countenances type(s) of akrasia where there is a conflict between reason and passion of a sort which apparently requires the agent’s appreciation of the conclusion of the good syllogism, he clearly also countenances type(s) where this conclusion is precisely not reached prior to the action. Most obvious is (IA) - where the agents:

\[\text{dia to me bouleusasthai agontai hupo\'tou pathous (7.7.1150b21-2);}\]

and:

\[\text{ouk anamenousi ton logon (7.7.1150b27-8).}\]

Again, in akrasia dia thumou - whether or not this is viewed as a special instance of (IA) - anger (or the angry agent) is described as listening to part of the argument of the good syllogism, but instead of hanging around to hear its conclusion, rushes off:

\[\text{ouk epitagma d'akousas (7.6.1149a31);}\]

(and "as it were" (1149a33) draws its own conclusion).

So for all the original argument establishes, Sec.2. could directly concern such specific types of akrasia. 93

The availability of this countermove suggests that objection 1 might fare better deployed, not against Sec.2.'s directness, but against its generality. 'Either
Aristotle's account is radically inconsistent or there are some types of akrasia (e.g. (WA)) that are at issue in Sec.2. A

However before considering how objection 1 fares against the 'modified target' let us note a way of buttressing the argument as directed against its 'original target'.

The objector could add the premiss:

\[(G): \text{Sec.2. either concerns akrasia generally or else does not} \text{ directly concern it at all.}\]

By "generally" here the objector need have no more in mind than 'generally_7.3.'; but the view he has of 'generally_7.3.' must be such as to at least include weak akrasia. So, for instance, he could claim that:

(i) Generally_7.3. = generally_7.3. (WA): i.e. claim with Rowe and Sorabji that the only type of akrasia at issue in 7.3. is weakness; or else:

(ii) Generally_7.3. = generally_7.3. (WA) & (IA): i.e. the claim that both and only weakness and impulsiveness are at issue in 7.3.

Now the addition of (G), so understood, validates an inference from:

\[(P): \text{Weak akrasia cannot be accommodated to the schemata of Sec.2. (at least not without gross inconsistency)}\]

- which is what the above envisaged countermove allows the original unsupplemented argument to secure - to Kenny's desired conclusion:

\[(K): \text{Sec.2. does not directly concern akrasia at all.}\]

Naturally the viability of this move depends on providing some persuasive justification for (G) (understood
as the argument requires it be). But of course since I'm arguing for the DGI claim re Sec.2. (and want to accept that weakness is dealt with in 7.3.), I'm not merely sympathetic but committed to (G).

Am I now sunk by this supplemented argument?

It all turns on whether the original argument does at least succeed in securing (P) - and of course that is precisely the question of how the original argument fares against the 'modified target'.

So the question whether (WA) can be accommodated to the schemata of Sec.2. emerges as our central issue. If not, we must abandon the DGI claim; if yes, then the main parts of the DGI claim are established - and we are effectively committed to attributing a (TMP) approach to Aristotle (and most - but not actually all\textsuperscript{97} - interpretations of this entail that Aristotle discountenances the possibility of last-ditch akrasia).

Now there is a strong case for supposing that Sec.2. cannot accommodate weakness. Couched in terms of objection 1, Aristotle is seen as committed to these two theses:

(T1): In the schemata of Sec.2. the conclusion of the good syllogism is not reached: for some requisite minor premiss is either missing or not exercised. So the failure occurs at a stage prior to the conclusion.

(T2): Aristotle acknowledges (both in Book 7 and elsewhere) at least one type of akrasia that exhibits the classic
struggle between reason and passion - for the almost
defining characteristic of this type is that the good
conclusion is reached: Aristotle describes weak
akratics as those:

who having deliberated do not stick by what
they have deliberated on account of passion
(7.8.1150b19f)\(^98\)

These two theses apparently commit Aristotle to (P).

Two lines of response are available.

First we can make a 'Cooper-style Move' \(^99\) and
draw some distinction between the (or a) deliberative
conclusion (DC) and the practical conclusion (PC); we can
then claim that it is in violation of the former, not the
latter, that the weak akratic weakly acts.

An example will flesh this out.

After deliberation at \(t_1\) the weak akratic reaches
the deliberative conclusion:

\[\text{(DC): It's best that I } \emptyset \text{ at } t_2.\]

For this decision to be practically effective, or realised
in action, the agent would have to acquire or exercise the
belief (part of the minor proposition, (MiP)):

\[\text{(MiP): Now is } t_2\]

in order to reach the practical conclusion:

\[\text{(PC): It's best that I } \emptyset \text{ now.}\]

The present suggestion is that the weak akratic
fails to stick by his deliberated resolution (DC), and acts
in violation of it, because passion stops him acquiring or
exercising a (MiP) requisite for reaching the (PC) (which we may suppose is either identical to the action (so Cooper) or else sufficient for it).

(The gap that this suggestion creates and exploits has obvious similarities with Davidson's distinction between all things considered judgements and unconditional best judgements.)

But there is another line of response. The argument for (P) claims in effect that failure with respect to the minor proposition rules out the possibility of the akratic struggle which must occur in cases of weak akrasia, on the grounds that failure has occurred at a stage prior to the agent's drawing the good conclusion.

But there is an ambiguity here. Both the objection and the first line of response understand this 'priority' in a strongly temporal way. They ignore the possibility of giving it a merely 'locational' reading. The second response exploits this. On this reading Aristotle allows that of course weak akratics get to their conclusions; and then explains how they fail to act on them when the crunch comes by claiming that passion attacks their situational appreciation, rendering it ineffective in one way or another.

This possibility suffices to show that one cannot simply infer (P) from the claim that Aristotle's conception of weak akrasia involves a struggle between reason and
passion of a sort requiring the agent's appreciation of the good conclusion. For Sec. 2. does not rule out such appreciation. There can be as much struggle as you like - all that Aristotle would be claiming in Sec. 2. is that reason's defeat eventually consists in some failure of situational appreciation. What we are given is an explanation of the (proximate) means by which passion achieves its victory.

This second line of response requires initially that one deny the Identity thesis that the conclusion \( = \) the action (i.e. (C)).

Now such a denial is by no means implausible. But it does bring into the limelight a puzzle that the adoption of (C) laid to rest. Given the locational perspective of our second response, why should Aristotle suppose that passion always attacks the minor proposition? Why suppose this to be the only weak point in reason's armour? Why shouldn't Aristotle acknowledge cases where the weak point is the conclusion - mightn't passion (a) attack one's ability to go on seeing or drawing the conclusion; or (b) attack the mode of one's apprehension of it (whether one conceives this as some cognitive occlusion or as some motivational inefficacy peculiar to practical knowledge) while all the while leaving the integrity of one's appreciation of the minor proposition untouched?

The rejection of (C) appears to open up these
possibilities - and creates a legitimate demand for an explanation of an Aristotelian failure to do so (the apparent consequence of the DGI claim for Sec.2.).

Moreover this demand will become acute if the "final proposition" of Sec.4c is taken to refer to the good conclusion. For then Sec.4c would apparently be canvassing precisely such cases as (a) and/or (b) above - and thus threaten the generality of Sec.2.

Anyone maintaining DGI for Sec.2. - and so interpreting Aristotle as advocating a (TMP) approach to akrasia - must meet the basic demand here; the acute form may be avoided if the "final proposition" refers to good syllogism's minor proposition - but I think it can be met even in the acute form.

The acute form can be met by the claim that the failure either (Case 1) to have the conclusion or (Case 2) to grasp it non-deviantly must itself be understood in terms of some temporary failure to (acquire or to) exercise the (or part of the) minor proposition: i.e. knowledge of the conclusion rises and falls with that of the minor proposition.

Of course this lays one open once again to the original demand for an explanation of why it should be so.

To some extent I must here take out a promissory note on this demand. However I offer some pointers.

Obviously one variable is (E) - the interpretation of what it is to use knowledge and exercise the minor proposition.
I suggested that the simple objectors assume a 'being aware' interpretation (2.17.). But if instead exercising the minor proposition consisted in bringing it to bear on one's values (major proposition) so as to draw and non-deviantly appreciate the conclusion, neither (a) nor (b) are possible except insofar as they involve some failure of 'exercise' of the minor proposition. We pursue this further in Chapter 3.

2.19. Objection 2 and Objection 3

(1)

Kenny continued the passage quoted at 2.18.init. by giving a second argument of "Cook Wilson and others":

〈Argument 2〉 Moreover, according to book III, someone who is ignorant of the particular circumstances of his action acts unwillingly and is to be pitied; whereas the incontinent man acts willingly and is to be blamed. ((1966), p.173)

This argument comprises our second and third objections, and could be laid out as follows.

'According to NE.7.: 

C1: the akratic acts intentionally;

C2: the akratic is a suitable object of censure;

C3: the (ex hypothesi) akratic of 7.3.Sec.2b is ignorant (whether through lack of or failure to exercise knowledge) of some relevant particular aspect of the situation.

According to NE.3.:
C4: (x) (x is ignorant of a particular aspect of the situation → x acts unintentionally);

C5: (x) (x acts unintentionally → x is not a suitable object of censure but of 'pardon', and sometimes of pity).

C1-5 yield two inconsistencies:

(A) The 'acts intentionally' objection (2)

C3 and C4 entail that the akratic acts unintentionally. This contradicts C1.

(B) The 'object of censure' objection (3)

C3 and C4 entail that the akratic acts unintentionally. This derived conclusion and C5 entail that the akratic is not a suitable object of censure. This contradicts C2.'

Kenny's response (as we noted) was to admit the validity of these arguments and to claim that Sec.1-2. don't directly concern akrasia: i.e. to reject premiss C3. (Of the two most singly disruptive premisses, C3 and C4, C3 can seem the obvious one to eliminate and C4 an important truth.)

(2)

A Brief epicycle

Before preferring the above response, Kenny offers, and himself objects to, another "possible answer":

〈Possible answer 1〉 The first is to point out that according to the doctrine of Book III ignorance is not always excusable, but only ignorance for which the agent is not to blame (1113b24).

〈Objection to this〉 However, the ignorance which Aristotle considers blameworthy always appears to be ignorance concerning the major
premise: ignorance of what one should do, or ignorance of what is in the laws (1110b27-
1111a1; 1113b34). Ignorance of the minor premise is held to excuse and so if incontinence consisted in ignorance of the minor premise it would be excusable. ((1966), p.173)

Neither answer nor objection are satisfying.

The answer apparently neglects Kenny's Argument 1 (cf. 2.18. above); and is not sufficiently detailed in its response to Argument 2. It is directed to allowing that the akratic is censurable (C2), although he is ignorant of some facet of the situation (C3), by denying that NE.3. maintains the consequent of C4 and C5, viz.:

C6: (x) (x is ignorant of a particular aspect of the situation → x is not a suitable object of censure, etc.). And this involves therefore denying one or other or both of C4 and C5 (vis-a-vis NE.3.). But if only C5 is denied, we are still left with Inconsistency (A); while if C4 is denied - in the sense that it is maintained instead that NE.3. allows that one can be ignorant of a particular facet and be acting intentionally (hekousios) - then indeed both inconsistencies (A) and (B) go, but is there any plausibility in denying that NE.3. maintains C4? 104

Denying C5 re NE.3. has some plausibility owing to the possibility of exploiting differences between "akousion" ('unintentional') in a narrow sense and "ouk hekousion" ('non-intentional'). 105 But this difference is irrelevant to the denial of C4 as a solution to the inconsistencies: for the akratic acts "hekon" ('intentionally') and yet is
ignorant (C3), and so the denier of C4 would have equally to deny that NE.3. holds:

\[ C_4^* : (x) (x \text{ is ignorant of a particular aspect } \rightarrow (x \text{ acts unintentionally}_N \text{ v. } x \text{ acts non-intentionally})). \]

That then is what is initially wrong with this answer: either it is an incomplete response to the inconsistencies or it has to rely on a totally implausible claim. Kenny's objection that according to NE.3. if one is ignorant and censurable, then the ignorance in question is of the major premiss and not of a particular aspect, would, if correct ensure that this answer did not even succeed as a partial response. But (a) whether he is correct or not is irrelevant to the question of the overall adequacy of this answer; (b) and whether he is correct is open to doubt - and turns on what cases Aristotle is envisaging in NE.3.1.1110b24-27 (and its relation to NE.5.8.1136a5-9). 106

(3)

I am now going to set objection 3, on censurability, to one side. It is simply parasitic on objection 2, (perhaps together with some dubious assumptions about the relation between the intentionality of action and censurability). The interesting question about akrasia and censurability - the question about what it is that Aristotle holds is censurable in akrasia - we hold in reserve.

(4)

Inconsistency (A)

Concentrating then on inconsistency (A).
C4 is ambiguous. As stated, it is ludicrous. No sublunary creature is plausibly viewed as knowing, or being aware of, every particular aspect of the occasions in which they act – even if there were such a thing to know.\(^{107}\)

So, on C4, there will be no sublunary intentional action.

C4 should then be understood as trying to say something different:

\[ C4': (x) \text{ (x is ignorant of a particular aspect of the situation} \implies x \text{ acts unintentionally with respect to that aspect);} \]

together with what is naturally interpreted as its contra-positive:

\[ CC4': (x) \text{ (x acts intentionally with respect to some aspect in the situation} \implies x \text{ is not ignorant of that particular aspect).} \]

Now this is more like it. Admittedly some doubts cling even to this formulation. For example,

(a) as regards its truth: here are the worries created by Davidson's carbon copies:\(^{108}\) if I don't know that I am making ten carbon copies, then by C4' I'm not doing so intentionally even though I succeed;

(b) as regards its straightforward attribution to Aristotle: here it has sometimes been claimed\(^{109}\) that Aristotle in NE.3.1-5. commits "a fallacy of the misplaced adverb", and accepts in some form or other a principle to the effect:

(MisAd): "I get drunk intentionally at t, everything I do
under the influence of drink at $t+1$ I thereby do intentionally".\textsuperscript{110}

If so, Aristotle would be committed apparently either to claiming that drink did not ever lead to ignorance,\textsuperscript{111} or to denying CC4'.

However we need not pursue these worries here, and can rest with C4' and CC4'.

But with C4 interpreted as C4', C3 and C4' no longer entail that the akratic acts unintentionally. What C3 and C4' entail is that the akratic acts unintentionally with respect to that aspect of which he is ignorant; and this is quite consistent with C1's claim that the akratic acts intentionally, provided that the aspect of which he is (by C3 and C4') ignorant is not one of which what he does intentionally (by C1) requires that he be aware - i.e. provided that the minor proposition in question is not "shared";\textsuperscript{112} a provision necessary:

\begin{quote}
if it is impossible for the same man to do the same thing voluntarily and involuntarily /intentionally and unintentionally/ at the same time in respect of the same /aspect of the situation/,.... (EE.2.7.1223b25ff: Woods)\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

(5)

Against this 'simple' objection we can then oppose a simple conclusion.

Unless the simple objection 2 is supplemented by an argument showing that the minor premiss in Sec.2b must, if akrasia were to be at issue there, be shared, it offers
no block at all to assimilating cases of akrasia to Sec.2b (and Sec.1-2. generally) - both of impetuous and weak kinds. (So, for example, it may be suggested that Sec.2b's case of 'not having' the minor premiss instances (IA), while the failure to exercise it at the crunch instances (WA) (cf. the locational interpretation of energein in 2.18.).)

So so far as this goes, there is as yet no block to our DGI claim for Sec.2.

However this is by no means the end of the affair. We have already pointed out (in 2.14.) that a full discussion will need to take Sec.4. into account. We have taken out something of a promissory note in 2.18. (over the possibility of a 'locational' interpretation). And as regards the present section, there are further epicycles of sophisticated objections, such as Charles' (pp.126-7) which, employing different interpretations of "to exercise" strive to suggest that Sec.2. can only plausibly be seen as concerned with certain specific types of akratic case, and not with akrasia generally. These I discuss in the next Chapter.
3.1.1.

If one major interpretative issue raised by Sec.1-2. is over how, if at all, these sections are about akrasia, a second concerns the interpretation of the basic contrast(s) they draw in the "manners" (tropoi) of "knowing" (2.0.).

This issue is obviously not confined to these two sections. It is closely involved in the interpretation of Sec.3. - and particularly clearly so on the correct (IMS) interpretation of Sec.3.'s relation to Sec.1-2.; and will, one way or another, be relevant to the interpretation of Sec.4. and Aristotle's overall position on the Socratic problem. It is an issue of central importance, in particular because - as we have suggested (1.2.5.; 1.3.5.) - Aristotle sees the resolution of the Socratic problem as lying (wholly or partly) in the exploitation of these distinctions. But it is important not merely in the elucidation of Aristotle's position, but also in the
assessment of its success. Ross, for instance, sees in Aristotle's commitment to this strategy the source of the inadequacy of Aristotle's theory as a general solution:

The upshot of this solution [Here Ross means Sec.1-4. 's] is to vindicate up to a certain point Socrates' view that one cannot act against knowledge. When you do the wrong thing you do not at the moment know it to be the wrong thing. Now it need not be doubted that the situation here described may exist. But at best this explanation will account for only one of the two forms of incontinence which Aristotle later distinguishes - for impetuosity as opposed to weakness. It says nothing of a moral struggle; the minor premise of the moral syllogism (and with it the conclusion 'I ought not to do this') has never been present, or it has already been suppressed by appetite. And the account which explains how the wrong act can be done in the absence of this knowledge cannot explain how the knowledge has come to be absent.... We must suppose that interest in his favourite distinctions of potential and actual, of major and minor premise, has betrayed him into a formal theory which is inadequate to his own real view of the problem .... [etc.] (1923/49), p.224)

On the other hand, more recently Charles (1984) and Dahl (1984) have argued that there is no such inadequacy in Aristotle's account, that in effect Aristotle does countenance last-ditch akrasia in 7.3., but they precisely employ different interpretations of these epistemic distinctions.

Again this second issue interlocks to some extent with our first issue. In Chapter 2 I argued for the DGI claim re Sec.1-2., in the face of certain "simple" objections. However more sophisticated positions abound, which constitute objections especially to the generality (G)
claim and the (TMP) approach consequent on it.

This first section of Chapter 3 takes up where Chapter 2 left off, and considers some more sophisticated objections to the DGI claim re Sec.2., which are directed not against the directness of Sec.2.'s concern with akrasia, but against the generality of its concern, and which are based on exploiting different interpretations of what it is to "use" or "exercise" knowledge.

Naturally the extremely difficult question of the correct interpretation of these latter notions is ultimately in the offing. And while a fully satisfactory treatment of these issues lies outside the scope of this thesis, I shall pursue at least some aspects later. However the present section aims, in a largely ad hominem fashion, to articulate and then fend off what I have termed the 'sophisticated' assaults on the DGI claim re Sec.2. and the (TMP) approach consequent upon it.

3.1.2.

Let us begin by returning to the stage of the simple objection 2 - the "acts intentionally" objection - prior to its simple defusing by the "simple conclusion".

One way of responding to the objection was the line taken by Kenny (1966) who denied that the agent in Sec.2b (and also in Sec.1. and 2. generally) is, or included the akratic, and so claimed that these sections did not directly concern akrasia.
A second and very different line of response lies in the possibility of defusing the objection by re-interpreting the crucial notion of "not exercising the/a minor premiss" in Sec.2b in such a way that it allows the agent to be aware of the particular circumstance - "tode toionde" - in the sense required by NE.3.1. if the action is to be intentional with respect to that aspect.

The 'simple conclusion' of Chapter 2 had, like the simple objection 2, accepted interpretation (E). Consequently, while it had, contra objection 2, shown the possibility of akratic cases, these were limited to what Charles calls cases of unintentional akratic action: i.e. cases where:
(i) the agent intentionally performs an action, (ii) where that action also falls under a description that is relevant to the agent's commitments in such a way that the agent would have judged it best not to perform it; but (iii) where the agent is temporarily unaware of the action's falling under this relevant description.

By contrast the strategy suggested above would countenance cases of akrasia where:
(a) the agent was contemporaneously aware of the (RPS)'s minor premiss, i.e. that the action fell under a description that was in fact relevant to his basic commitments, where this premiss was not shared with the (APS); and also cases where:
(b) the minor premiss in question was shared between (RPS) and (APS) - and so the agent could not have been unaware of
it on pain of there being no intentional action at all on
his part (in the relevant sphere): i.e. cases where it is
precisely the aspect of the action that attracts the agent
that also for him constitutes a better reason for avoiding
it (given his values).\(^3\)

A possible way of putting flesh on this
sophisticated strategy is by exploiting a suggestion of
Joachim's. Joachim(1951) suggests that the failure to
"exercise whether this is such-and-such" is failure to
"put the minor premise together with the major" - a failure
to "suntheorein" (contemplate together) the two
propositions (in the terminology of Pr.An.B.21.67a37, a
text to which Joachim makes central appeal).

'But Joachim's suggestion can't possibly be right,
because in Sec.2a Aristotle talks of the possibility of
exercising, or using, a major premiss without exercising
any minor premiss.'\(^4\)

It is not really clear that this objection hits
at Joachim four square since his position seems fuzzy over
the generality of interpretation to be accorded "use/
exercise" as applied to (MaP)s and (MiP)s (let alone the
consistency of his position: i.e. does "suntheorein" imply
the possibility of contemplating each of the two premisses
separately). However we may set this aside; for Joachim
has a direct reply to the objection in that he denies its
premiss\(^5\) - according to him (p.224 ad 1147al-2) the major
premiss has "a double bearing", and so the case at issue
in Sec.2a must be one where:
one may fully realise the major in half its bearing...and yet fail to realise it in that particular aspect of its bearing which is vital for the action in question. (p.224)

i.e. in Sec.2a the exercise of the (MaP) is held to involve the exercise of one of the two (MiP)s. On this reading Sec.2b turns out to repeat Sec.2a in more detail.  

There is no argument here either for Sec.2b's relation to 2a or for the posited interpretation of Sec.2a. It seems simply stipulated as the sense that the passages must bear if the interpretative line Joachim is advocating is to be correct. Just what line this is, as I have said, is not entirely perspicuous, but is perhaps:

(i) exercise (1147a7) = use
(ii) to use a (MaP)/(MiP) = to bring it into "vital connection" with a (MiP)/(MaP), i.e. see their relevance to each other, i.e. see what follows from them.

It remains a puzzle to me what Joachim wishes to make of the "e ouk echei" case of 1147a7 (i.e. Case A) (I fail to extrapolate a view from p.225.).

Now at the ad hominem level, Joachim is not an immediate threat to my advocacy of DGI, since so far as I can tell, his interpretation takes Sec.2. to concern akrasia not merely directly but also generally.

However Charles(1984) has recently resuscitated Joachim's view within a strategy that sees Sec.2. as concerning one specific type of akratic who:

does not reach (or possess) the good conclusion because he fails to activate (or possibly
possess) the minor premiss. (p.127)

by contrast with Sec.3. (and Sec.4a) which concerns a
different type of akratic (the weak) who:

arrives at the conclusion but possesses it
only in an 'off-colour' way (p.127)

I attack this view of Sec.3.'s specificity of concern with
akrasia on independent grounds in Chapter 4. Here I take
issue with his view of Sec.2b's concern as equally
specific.

Charles' position re Sec.2b is presented thus:

Failure to exercise the minor premiss
may be diagnosed (in the light of 67a35ff) as
failure to survey together major and minor
premises with reference to the particular
case before him. Thus in a non-practical case
a man may know 'All mules are sterile' and
'This is a mule', but not conclude 'This is
sterile'. Rather he may believe 'This mule
is in foal' because he does not put his
knowledge that this is a mule into operation
to draw the relevant conclusion. His failure
to exercise the minor premiss is a failure to
use (suntheorein, 67a37, b5-10) the major and
minor premisses he possesses to draw the
relevant conclusion. If so, in the practical
case, the akrates will know the relevant
major and minor premisses but fail to draw
the good conclusion because he does not
activate the minor premiss. (pp.126-7)

Charles' position is, in the immediate, explanatory
inadequate. Why should the failure to draw the good
conclusion lie in the non-activation of the minor premiss
rather than the non-activation of the major? (On his view
of activation, why should Aristotle say what he does?)
One riposte would be this. 'Well it's because the major premiss is already being activated, in the case at issue in Sec.2b, in connection with other minor premisses.' Against this we could claim it is not an adequate reply, since one could still regard the major as correlatively non-activated vis-a-vis this minor premiss. But let that pass. Charles would still be in deep trouble over Sec.2a, for:

(1) he treats Sec.2a's talk of "use" as equivalent to Sec.2b's "exercise" (cf. pp.124, 126), like Joachim;
(2) he regards Sec.2a as differing from Sec.2b (unlike Joachim: see above): Sec.2a concerns a simple case - a syllogism "with only two premisses" unlike Sec.2b's more complex case with more than two premisses. (p.126, n.22);
(3) but then in 2a the major premiss is activated (used) but the other premiss, the minor, is not;
(4) so one can exercise a major premiss without exercising any minor;
(5) but this appears inconsistent with (1) (contrast Joachim who evaded this difficulty by rejecting (2), and thus (3)).

If we are in some quandary then about how Charles is to treat "exercise" as applied to the (MaP) alone, there is an equal worry at the other end over the conclusion. For his second type of akratic possesses this only in an 'off-colour way'; one assumes then that the non-akratic has knowledge of this conclusion non-deviantly - i.e. in such a way as to "exercise" it. Doubtless a suitable sense can be provided; but the problem for Charles
is to find a principled way of accounting for the different interpretations it appears he will be required to give "exercise" according to context.

Charles' interpretation then is marred at this point by a failure to take this issue of having/use/exercise (etc.) sufficiently seriously (Sec.1. is referred to only once and not really discussed; and likewise Sec.2a doesn't receive the attention it requires). Indeed the general argumentative relations between Sec.1., 2., and 3. are not specified with adequate clarity.

But more importantly for present purposes, Charles seems to present us with no pressing case for supposing that Sec.2b concerns only a specific (non-(WA)) type of akasrnia. For we could accept the analysis he offers above, but claim instead that:

(a) weak cases can be accommodated as well (and that if Charles thinks not, that is because he has assumed a temporal over a locational reading: cf. Chapter 2.18.); that in the case of (WA) the agent has previously reached the good conclusion but under the assault of his appetite, he is led to discontinue his activation of the minor premiss, his awareness of some feature of the situation as relevant to his basic goals.

Equally we could claim:

(b) that the onset of non-activation of the minor premiss meant that the agent now failed to draw (go on drawing) the good conclusion non-deviantly; but that this was nevertheless
compatible with his continuing to 'draw' it *deviantly* (i.e. fulfilling Charles' characterisation of the weak akratic).

Indeed we can claim both (a) and (b): that in some cases of weakness the agent temporarily ceases to reach the good conclusion at all, and in others continues to do so only deviantly ('merely saying'); and that these two subforms could be allocated to Sec.3a and 3b respectively — but we must await Chapter 4 for criticism of Charles from this direction.
SECTION 2
AN ELEMENTARY INVESTIGATION OF THE EPISTEMIC DISTINCTIONS
OF SEC.1-2.

3.2.1. Despite the constraint of simplicity (see below), investigation of these distinctions can quickly lead one to suppose they require a thesis all to themselves. At any rate what follows are some provisional moves whose inadequacy will be transparent.

First, as we shall see, it is one thing to outline the logic of the interrelations between the distinctions Aristotle introduces (at least in Sec.1. and 3.), another to interpret the fundamental notion on which this logical framework pivots - that of "using knowledge" (chresthai tei epistemei) or "contemplating" (theorein). The former proves relatively easy; the latter, as is already evident from Chapter 1.2.5. and Chapter 3.1.1-2. above, presents considerable problems.

However vis-a-vis this latter task there are some constraints on interpretation:
(1) Simplicity. Aristotle appears to take it as obvious (or else as irrelevant) what precisely constitutes the activity of "exercising/using knowledge", for he doesn't evince the need to provide much in the way of explanation;
(2) Socratic context. The interpretation adopted must make Aristotle's distinctions intelligible as an (attempted)
response to the Socratic problem (compare, for instance, the suggestions about the exposure of ambiguities in the Socratic premiss, Chapter 1.3.5.).

Unfortunately neither of these constraints are substantial. The first is vague, and is open to manipulation from presupposition-relativity (i.e. different interpreters can claim that Aristotle presupposes different things as obvious, e.g. a strong contrast between theoretical and practical knowledge). The second simply leaves open an enormous range of interpretations.

More promising is the further constraint:

(3) Sec.2a's use of (MaP). From the case that Aristotle describes in Sec.2a, it appears that, as Milo puts it:

our account must allow us to explain how a person can exercise his knowledge of the universal premise without at the same time exercising his knowledge of the singular premise. ((1966), p.84)

But, as we have just seen over Joachim's response (3.1.2.), not even this is fool-proof. At best it creates an (albeit strong) prima facie case: but it is open to controversy on the part of those who argue that "using knowledge" must mean so-and-so and thus at least a (MiP) must also be being exercised in Sec.2a (Joachim) although not both, or at least a more particular, though not a singular, (MiP) must be being exercised (Kenny).1

Whatever their intuitive aid, there is not then much immediate 'neutral' help from these constraints. Let
us turn to consider first the terminology in which Aristotle presents his epistemic distinctions.

3.2.2. The variety of terminology

Aristotle employs a variety of terminology to express, and in connection with, the distinctions he is after. The three principle sets of contrasting terms are:

1. **echein v. chresthai**: Have (H) v. Use (U)
   
   Aristotle initially (Sec.1.1146b31-3) opposes "having but not using knowledge" to "using knowledge" - a contrast which recurs in Sec.2. (1147a2) and Sec.3. (1147a12).

2. **echein v. theorein**: Have (H) v. Contemplate (Con)
   
   This distinction is immediately recast (Sec.1.1146b33-5) as a contrast between "having but not contemplating" and "contemplating".

3. **echein v. energein**: Have (H) v. Exercise (En)
   
   A third contrast occurs in Sec.2b (1147a7) where Aristotle apparently presents us with an alternative between "not having" and "not exercising" sc. knowledge, presumably, "whether this is a such-and-such". This contrast seems to reappear at Sec.4a 1147a33, although with a proposition(s) and not a human being as the subject of "exercise" and in an intransitive usage.

Besides these three contrasts there are others:

4. **(HS) v. (HL)**
   
   Sec.3., as we have seen, introduces a further
distinction within a wide sense of "having but not using knowledge" \(W\),\(^5\) between what we have labelled "tied having" and "free having", or Habitus Ligatus (HL) and Habitus Solutus (HS), notions which in their turn require interpretation.

(5) 1147b10-12

Aristotle here employs the locution "does not have" (b10-11): (taking "not having the final proposition" to imply "not having knowledge of the final proposition") we can ask whether this occurrence of "not having":

(i) = not having in any sense;\(^6\) or

(ii) = not having in the wide sense (W) (presumably here with the implication "and so a fortiori not using it" either); or

(iii) = not having it (HS) (i.e. allowing possible (HL) possession).

Similar ambiguities afflict "not to know" in b11-12.

(6) eneinai; pareinai

Aristotle employs these two verbs at 1147a32 and 1147b16. How do they stand in relation to the distinctions of (1)-(3)? In particular does the first imply mere (H) as against (U)/(Con)/(En) ((U*) for short)?\(^7\) and the second imply conversely (U*)?\(^8\)

3.2.3. Initial clarification of the basic contrast

Is there any point to the variant terminology
of (1)-(3), or is Kenny right that:

with these three pairs of expressions Aristotle is making a single contrast ((1966), p.168)

It is difficult to see much at issue in this terminological variation (although see further 3.2.4.). The basic contrast at issue introduced in Sec.1. is a straightforward distinction between potentiality and act (cf. Chapter 1.2.5.; 1.3.5.). By the simple way he introduces it, Aristotle takes it to be fairly obvious and readily intelligible. And we find apparently the same distinction introduced in a comparably simple fashion in EE.2.9.1225b11ff; MM.2.6.1201b10ff (cf. also Top.5.2.130a19ff). Like many verbs, "to know" according to Aristotle can be used in two ways - either to refer to actually knowing (to actually \( \phi \)-ing) or to a possessed ability to actually know (possessed ability to actually \( \phi \)). This duality of sense attaches not only to verbs but to their cognates and correlative terms: thus e.g. "object-of-knowledge" and "ignorance" will have a comparable duality. Aristotle is particularly interested in this duality of sense in connection with "to know" and also with "to perceive" and in "to be alive" (\( \zeta \enom )": he draws an explicit parallel between "knowledge" and "perception" in this respect (De An.2.5.passim, esp. 417b16ff); and so clear does Aristotle regard the distinction in the case of knowledge, that he employs it as an illustration for the general distinction between first and second actuality in his
general account (koinos logos) of the soul (De An.2.1. 412a21-6; cf. a9ff).

His references elsewhere to the distinction in the case of "knowledge" evince a variation of terminology comparable to that of the present passage$^{14}$ which reinforces the claim that nothing much hangs on it.

From these passages we can extrapolate the following basic picture with which Aristotle works:

**Basic picture**

```
Acquisition ability (AcqH) ————^ Trainee exercise (Ex^T)
(= 1st potentiality)

Possession ability (H) ————^ Full exercise (Ex)
(= 2nd potentiality = 1st actuality)

(H)-tied (HL)          H-free (HS)
```

The logical articulation of this picture is provided largely by varying ability conditions. Thus if we consider the full exercise Ø-ing (e.g. contemplating), then:

1. (H) is the possessed ability to ¡Ø; that is (approximately) the person is able to ¡Ø:
   (i) whenever they wish if nothing external (ti ton exothen) prevents them: e.g. De An.2.5.417a27-8);$^{15}$
   (ii) they are able to do it "through themselves", i.e. not at another's prompting/directive (De An.3.4.429b5-9; cf. NE.2.4.1105a21-6).

2. More fine-grainedly we may distinguish within (H) between occasions when the person is actually able to
realise their ability to \( \emptyset \), and other occasions when that ability has been temporarily constrained, so that they are temporarily unable to exercise an ability they nevertheless have.

3. Again, some abilities\(^{16}\) we are not born with but must acquire; but at least then we have the ability to acquire the ability.

However if this basic picture clears up the logic of the distinctions Aristotle introduces in Sec.1. and Sec.3., it still leaves us with considerable problems of interpretation:

(1) this picture doesn't tell us what actually constitutes the activity in question - in our case contemplating - nor to what extent it also leaves opaque what grounds the possession ability (H);

(2) equally it sheds no light on what Aristotle is principally after in Sec.2.: is it, as Kenny(1966) suggests, "merely an expansion" of Sec.1.:

First, we are told that you can have knowledge in general without applying it to the particular case. Then we are told in detail how this happens (p.172)

(3)thirdly it leaves out of account the distinction Aristotle makes between abilities (dunameis) and states (hexeis).\(^{17}\)

It is (1) and (2) that concern us here.
3.2.4. Another look at the terminological variation

We may grant that in connection with our three sets of contrasts (1)-(3) there is one basic contrast at issue. But why the variation? For merely grammatical reasons? But grammatical differences are capable of shouldering philosophic weight; even if there is only one principal contrast, nevertheless the terminological variation could point up significantly different aspects of it.

More research is required here, but I suggest that possibly there is something at issue in the terminological variation, along the following lines.

(1) Aristotle in Sec.1. employs "chresthai" (U) with the indirect grammatical object "knowledge", where I think it is very likely that the knowledge thus used is the object, but not the content, or result, of the using (the content or result of the using could be the acting or the derivation of some more particular epistemic item or instantiation of the knowledge used - depending on further interpretation). Given that Sec.2a involves us in an isomorphic usage re the minor premiss, we must suppose some general recognitional capacity to be at issue.

(2) Aristotle employs "theorein" (Con) here without any obvious grammatical object; in fact I take the (philosophical) object of (Con) to be content that results when knowledge is used (U). If this were right, then I think Aristotle would be accepting at least:

(Con1): that the contemplated conclusion resulting from
the use of one's knowledge about what is best for human beings is not identical with one's acting appropriately (nor the drawing of this conclusion) although it would be odd if, "contemplating" this, one did not then act appropriately. For (a) I find it difficult to construe the "oddity" of 1146b35 as downright logical impossibility;22 (b) I don't think it is easy to construe one's acting either as the content of (Con) or as identical with (Con) itself.23

(Con2): What (in the sense of content) someone "contemplates" is some propositional item more specific or more particular than the propositional item knowledge of which he has and whose "use" results in this derived content of "contemplation".

(Con2) says no more than the original characterisation, but it may further be that Aristotle accepted (Con2) in the special version:

(Con3): What the person "contemplates" is always something of the most specific form, i.e. an individual qua falling under an ultimate atomic universal of the body of knowledge in question (e.g. "knowing of Socrates that he is a man").24

(Con2) includes (Con3) read without the "always"; but with the "always" (Con3) will be inconsistent with (Con2) (assuming plausible construals). Which - if we pursue this general line - we should accord Aristotle is not easy to resolve.

(3) Aristotle's employment in Sec.2b of "energein" (En) is
puzzling within the present perspective precisely because it isn't immediately obvious whether to assimilate it to (U) or to (Con) above, whether in the locution "(En)p" "...p" is the object or the content of "(En)...". If the object then we understand Sec.2b's Case B as a failure to use some general recognitional knowledge ("oikeia episteme") so as to realise that "this is a such-and-such." If the content then it will be a failure "to contemplate" the content (or else a failure to Ø the content, if we suppose the (En) operation not to be, or not merely to be (Con): e.g. a failure to (Con)p in its relation to a (MaP) also being (Con)'d, a failure to "suntheorein" (SunCon)). (Different interpretations of (En) can be seen as exploiting these different lines.)

Heinaman(1981) claims that:

To have actual knowledge is to contemplate something one knows, and Aristotle sometimes employs the terms 'to use' (chresthai) and 'to contemplate' (theorein) interchangeably with 'to actualize' (energein) (De An.412a9-11, 21-6; Ph.247b7-9, 255b4; Meta.1050a22-4, 30, 35-6; EN.1146b31-5; EE.1219a16-17; MM.1208a33-b2). (p.65)

Now insofar as this is just Kenny's claim that these terms can be delineating one basic contrast, we are not disputing it, nor therefore that phrases employing these different terms can be used equivalently.²⁵ But Heinaman's claim is too simple. For example in EE.1219a16-17 "use" (chresis) occurs as a wide term for (roughly) second actuality, "contemplation" an example of this.²⁶
"theoria" indeed in these contexts seems confined to the second actuality of knowing. Admittedly it is nonetheless true that "theoria" is a "using" (a chresis). But there is a locution employing "use" of apparently equal specificity with "contemplate", viz. "to use one's knowledge" (tei epistemei chresthai); and we may allow that these can be used interchangeably. But then we are back with the question of what this "knowledge" used is: is it merely the object of use or both object and content?

3.2.5. Aristotle's two epistemic distinctions

The basic distinction we have considered so far is one between potential and actual knowledge. But, stepping back to look at Aristotle more generally, he appears to offer us two distinctions between potential and actual knowledge: 27 we would be inclined to say that one concerned the propositional attitude (disposition v. occurrence), the other exploited logical relations between items of knowledge, although Aristotle does not put it this way. 28

(D1) Actual and potential knowledge/knowing

This is the distinction we have been discussing. "S has knowledge" can be used in two senses:

(i) S has actual knowledge = S is actually knowing... = (Con)p.

(ii) S has potential knowledge = S has the possessed
Two things are still open here: first as we have seen, the question of what constitutes the activity of actually knowing or "contemplating"; secondly whether or not there is any limitation on the possible objects, on the range of substitutions for "p".

Obviously these aspects interlock. If (Con) is interpreted in terms of contemplating or being aware of, then there wouldn't seem to be a sensible limitation on the possible objects.

(D2) Actual_2 and potential_2 knowledge

Take the statements:
(S1) all triangles have internal angles whose sum equals two right angles (abbreviate to "have 2RA");
(S2) all isosceles triangles have 2RA;
(S3) this (triangle) has 2RA.

Now both (S2) and (S3) can be viewed as instances of the truth of (S1); both the singular term ("this (triangle)") and the lower universal ("isosceles") can be viewed as falling under the higher universal "triangle".

This logical relation underwrites a sense in which someone who knows (S1) can be said to know (S2) and (S3) potentially - even though he doesn't know that: (S2') isosceles triangles exist;
(S3') this triangle exists;
or that:
(S2'') such-and-such figures are isosceles;
So then, we judge first of all that (it is characteristic of) the wise man (sophos) to know everything so far as possible, while not having particular (/individual) knowledge of them, ....

...and knowing everything necessarily belongs to him who especially has universal knowledge (ten katholou epistemen); for this man knows in a manner (pos) everything that falls under (panta ta hupokeimenai) (Meta.A.2.982a8-10, 21-3)30

It would, Aristotle says, be misleading to say that someone unqualifiedly (haplos) knows (S2) and (S3) simply in virtue of their knowing (S1), because he may not know (S2'/S2'') or (S3'/S3''), and not knowing these surely supports a sense in which he does not actually know (S2) and (S3). Rather, Aristotle suggests, we should say this person knows (S2) and (S3) with some qualification (pos) - i.e. "universally" (Post.An.A.1.71a24-29; cf. b5-8)31 or "potentially" (Post.An.A.24.86a24-5; 26).32 Whereas someone who (only) knows (S2)/(S3):

in no manner (oudamos) knows the universal (S1) neither potentially nor actually (oute dunamei onte energeia) (Post.An.A.24.86a28-9)

In the other case the person has actual knowledge of (S1) but can be said to know (S2)/(S3) only potentially. What are the conditions on having actual knowledge that p, or if this expression is felt to be misleading, on knowing unqualifiedly (haplos) that p as against knowing it universally/potentially? Is it perhaps simply having...
potential knowledge (D1) and (D2) above would enable Aristotle to expose the two ambiguities in the Socratic premiss that I suggested was part of the content of Sec.1. and 2. But while we find the first distinction deployed in Sec.1. it is not obvious that the second is to the fore in Sec.2., where we seem to have a refined redeployment of the first alongside a distinction between universal and "kata meros" propositions (/knowledges).  

We face here the question of the cross-fertilisation of (D1) and (D2). Here, for example, would be a simple model:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object of Knowledge</th>
<th>Manner of Cognitive Attitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potentially</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universally</td>
<td>having but not using i.e. (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(universal propositions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actually</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individuals</td>
<td>using knowledge (U),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(singular propositions)</td>
<td>contemplating (Con)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This simple model takes a strong version of (D2) and uses it to delimit the possible objects of (D1). If (Con) and (U) are then interpreted on the Date model, our simple model implies that one couldn't contemplate ('be thinking' of) universal propositions nor have but not be using singular propositions (e.g. date of Hastings); the apparent absurdity of this suggests that at the very least (U) and (Con) then be given some different interpretation. However one should not move too swiftly here: it begins to look more
plausible to attribute this model to Aristotle if e.g.: it is confined to those sciences dealing with perceptible objects ("hai epistemai hai ton aistheton" De An.2.5. 417b26-7),\textsuperscript{35} as a perusal of De An.2.5.417b19-28 indicates. Or else perhaps Aristotle holds it quite generally because of other commitments in the philosophy of mind; e.g. if the role played by "individuality" or "singularity" adverts to the presence of a \textit{phantasma} which is (part of) what is "contemplated" or actually thought (noein).\textsuperscript{36} Again, Aristotle should perhaps also be credited with a delimited view of singular terms (and propositions involving them), at least where these are aistheta (aistheta being paradigm individuals for Aristotle).\textsuperscript{37}

The above is too heady a concoction to distill here but speaks for caution. Other models beside our simple one are possible. If we label that the "Simple Hybrid" model, then there is a "Complex Hybrid" model which enlarges the Object of Knowledge/Actually box with particular propositions regarded as universals of more delimited scope relative to those in the Object of Knowledge/Potentially box. This takes a weaker version of (D2) (one that gives a role to propositions both of the (S2) and the (S3) type), but like the Simple Hybrid model cross-fertilizes (D2) with (D1) in such a way that it blocks the range of possible objects allocated to the manners of cognitive attitude. And if this is not to appear arbitrary (at least initially), some interpretation of (\textit{u})/(\textit{Con}) must be provided other than the "actually having in mind" view (i.e. the "Date" model).\textsuperscript{38}
The obvious choice is an "application" model, as in Kenny (1966).

By contrast, what I shall term a "non-Hybrid" model maintains that the two distinctions operate sufficiently independently that in particular (D2) puts no limit on the possible objects of the manners of cognitive attitude - one can have but not use knowledge of individuals and contemplate (propositions involving) universals, where in both cases it is the same knowledge (say, p) that is at issue, whether it is merely had but not used or is used/contemplated. In other words, the non-Hybrid model ideally suits the "Date" model interpretation of the activity of exercising knowledge/(Con). If this were correct then the relevance of (D2) to Sec.2. would recede.

So much then for models of the interaction of (D1) and (D2) and their implications for the interpretation of (U)/(Con). One might now hope against the backdrop of this larger canvas, to get a more powerful argumentative fix on the interpretation of our own passage, by providing general grounds for the attribution to Aristotle of a Hybrid or non-Hybrid model of the relation between (D1) and (D2).

3.2.6. Heinaman's argument for a non-Hybrid model

Heinaman (1981) claims over (D1) that:
It is evident from Aristotle's statements concerning actual and potential knowledge that universals can be objects of both. I may know a universal without contemplating it although I am able to do so whenever I want. And in that case I have potential knowledge of the universal. And when I contemplate it I have actual knowledge of the universal. ....

The distinction between actual and potential knowledge also applies to knowledge of individuals. (p.66)

The defence of a full non-Hybrid model has two parts:

(1) to show that universals can be objects of both potential and actual knowledge;

(2) and similarly for individuals.

Heinaman's argument for (1) itself has two parts - positive and negative ones.

In positive defence of (1) he refers us to De An.2.5.:

So in De Anima Aristotle says (417b22-4): 'But knowledge is of universals, and these are somehow in the soul. So that one can think of them whenever one wishes.' The object of 'think' (noesai) is a universal where 'to think' clearly amounts to 'to contemplate' (theorein) (417b19) and we have already seen that 'to contemplate' is equivalent to 'to have actual knowledge' (energein). (p.66, my emphasis)

But this surely will not impress his opponent: for the crucial words "of them" (stressed above) are not in the text. The opponent can therefore interpret "noesai" as "theorein" but take Aristotle's point here to be this: 'because the universals are in a sense (pos, and perhaps this indeed = potentially) in the soul, the person is able
to use this (indeterminate/indefinite) universal knowledge to produce a determinate (singular/more particular) content for actual thought whenever he likes; the universals are unlike external particulars, always on hand to be applied. Cf. further De Mem.1.449b30ff; De An.3.7.431b ff, 17ff; 8.21-28; 3.4.430a3ff - even 3.5."

However Heinaman also produces some negative evidence that:

To have actual knowledge of a universal in this way is not 'to apply knowledge to a particular instance' (Kenny 1966). (p.66)

His evidence is two passages: Pr.An.B.21.67a33-7 and NE. 7.3.1146b35-1147a3.

However the point he extracts from the second is simply that which we have seen at best creates a prima facie case (cf. 3.2.1. above) and has been precisely challenged by opponents such as Joachim and Kenny. Moreover, given that it is the focus of controversy on which we are trying to get some independent leverage, we must for the moment set it aside.

What then of Pr.An.B.21.67a33-7?

...in the Prior Analytics B 21 Aristotle tries to explain how one can know that all Bs are A, and yet fail to recognise that C - an individual B - is A. And in the course of giving his solution Aristotle points out (67a33-7):

Nothing prevents a man who knows both that A belongs to the whole of B, and that B again belongs to C, thinking that A does not belong to C, e.g. knowing that every mule is sterile and that this is a mule, and thinking that this animal is with foal;
for he does not know that A belongs to C unless he contemplates the two propositions together (cf. APo.78a5-6).

One can contemplate either of the two premises of a syllogism, but if one does not contemplate them together, one will not draw the conclusion and so may err on a particular occasion. Now we have no reason to believe that Aristotle presupposes that when, in such a case, 'All Bs are A' is contemplated but not applied to C because 'C is B' is not contemplated together with it, there is some other B to which it is applied. So the universal can be contemplated, one can have actual knowledge of the universal, without applying it to a particular case. (p.66)

There are several lines of response his opponent might try at this point:

(a) to remain unimpressed by the claim of "no reason to believe", and play in effect the same card as in the NE. 7.3. passage - viz. to counterclaim that there must be a partial (cf. Joachim) or more particular (cf. Kenny) application going on.

Or else:

(b) to challenge the inference, crucial to Heinaman's use of the passage, from "a failure to contemplate together" to the possibility of "contemplating either of the two premisses" separately. "Contemplating-together", it might be claimed, is a unitary operation of holding two premisses together so as to see what follows from them, and has no implication for what "contemplating" a single premiss might be.

Neither of these moves strike one as very plausible. But I think there are further responses:

(c) One can allow Heinaman the inference he needs, and go
back to attacking his equation of "use", "exercise" and "contemplation" (cf. 3.2.4. above). We may allow that there is a wide sense of (Con) such that universals and individuals (etc.) can be its objects, and which is roughly interpreted as "have (assertorically) in mind" (or some such); but there are also occasions where what we contemplate is the result of our having used (U) some (other), more universal knowledge. In other words we may distinguish sharply between (Con) and (U); and then argue that Aristotle's principal interest in Sec.1-2. lies in the "having-but-not-using and using" contrast - his use of theorein in Sec.1. just emphasising how odd it would be to have actually running non-deviantly and assertorically through one's mind the result of the use (i.e. application) of one's knowledge of one's values, and yet fail to act. Moreover (c) might be combined with an attacking move:

(d) Heinaman's appeal to lines extracted from the difficult B.21 is an invitation to pressurise him with a choice of different lines from the same chapter. Thus:

A/ Heinaman, like Kenny, tends to treat (U), (Con), and (En) as, at least in knowledge contexts, much of a muchness, all concerned with the same basic contrast. But Aristotle in B.21 distinguishes "knowledge with respect to actuality" sharply from universal knowledge (and "peculiar knowledge"): the passage quoted by Heinaman continues:

Consequently clearly also (?) if he knows the one but does not know the other, he will be
'deceived' (/taken in); which thing the universal knowledges (hai katholou epistemai) have in relation to the particular knowledges (hai kata meros epistemai).41 For we know (ismen) none of the objects-of-perception occurring outside perception, not even if we happen to have perceived <them>, except in the sense/manner of by the universal (/universally) and by having (echein) the peculiar knowledge (ten oikeian epistemen), but not in the sense/manner of by exercising (toi energein). For "to know" is said in three senses/manners, either in the manner by the (tei) universal <knowledge> or in the manner by the (tei) peculiar <knowledge> or in the manner by the (toi) exercising; consequently also having been deceived occurs in as many manners. Nothing then prevents one both knowing (eidenai) and being deceived about the same thing (except not in a contrary manner (enantios)). This is what occurs also in the man who knows the proposition according to each (kath'hekateran...ten protasin) but has not inquired in detail previously. For judging the mule to be with foal he does not have the knowledge with respect to exercise (ten kata to energein epistemen), nor yet in turn on account of this judgement of his being a deception contrary to his knowledge; for the deception contrary to the (tei) universal knowledge is a syllogism. (67a37-b11)

Whatever the difficulties of this passage - not a few - it seems at least clear that knowing "hos toi energein" (in the manner of by exercising) is quite distinct from knowing "in the manner by universal knowledge". So even if (Con) is compatible with the latter, it seems (En) is not.

B/ What in fact is "contemplating a universal premise"?
Is it equivalent to:

By the (tei) universal <knowledge> we contemplate the in part things,... (67a27)

But this might take us back to (D2) - the manner in which we have knowledge of things that fall under universals
when we do not have peculiar knowledge of them (67a27-8). But are we now sure we understand (Con) in this context?

Turning now to Heinaman's brief defence of claim (2) of the non-Hybrid model, he argues here that:

In the NE 7.3., the distinction (1146b31-3) is applied equally to universal premises and premises dealing with individuals. And in the EE (1225b11-12) it is applied solely to the knowledge of particulars. (p.66)

Whether the EE passage is so obviously confined to mere particulars as Heinaman assumes I think doubtful. But let us agree roughly with Heinaman's statement. The question is, what distinction it is at issue. And in connection at least with the NE passage on which Heinaman's claim is presumably primarily based (viz. Sec.2a), an opponent may argue thus:

'It is significant that Aristotle here talks in terms of the use of the universal and the kata meros proposition (or episteme): for the kata meros is not a singular proposition but equivalent to the Pr.An.B.21's "oikeia episteme", peculiar knowledge - i.e. general recognitional knowledge, and of course this will be required to be applied (used) in order to result in actual recognition of actual individuals/particulars just as much as the man's universal knowledge of his values.'

3.2.7. Conclusion

My provisional conclusions from this discussion
are that:
(1) we have got some way with formulating a more general issue whose resolution would (arguably) provide us with a principled means for achieving a decision on the worries of our passage;
(2) that we haven't as yet come up with that resolution; and in particular Heinaman's defence of one line on it is not likely to convince his opponents;
(3) that both sides of this dispute are similarly over-inclined to run (U), (En) and (Con) together, without considering the possibility of a distinction within these, which allows some justice to be done to both sides.

However ultimately we come back again to that crucially difficult passage in NE.7.3., viz. Sec.2a, where Aristotle at first glance appears to be discussing a case where a (MaP) is used without any (MiP) being used.

Considerations of simplicity militate against the views of Joachim and Kenny (and against some other complex suggestions).

On the other hand if we do construe (U) on the Date model we face the problem of the apparent implausibility of the case in hand (assuming Sec.2a to treat akrasia inclusively); for - to adopt a point of Rowe's from another context - why should the akratic be having a major premiss like "mustn't commit adultery" running assertorically through his mind if he is not aware that that is what he is presently committing? It seems mere coincidence. Could this slim possibility be what
Aristotle is pointing to?

The passage remains intractable. No help is forthcoming from MM.2.6. which avoids any mention of such a case of using or exercising universal knowledge but not particular knowledge.

However as I argued in Section 1 of the present Chapter, its solution does not lie on our direct path, and noting an area of vulnerability here on our flank we may proceed.
CHAPTER FOUR

PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY ON SEC.3.1147a10-24

4.0.

This important section has not usually received sufficient care - over questions of its argumentative structure, over points of interpretative detail, and over its import for Aristotle's overall position.

In this Chapter, I offer a basic translation (4.1.) and expound its basic bipartite structure (4.2.) together with a couple of points of interpretative detail (4.3.). I then formulate and outline what I see as the three major issues or areas of interpretation in this section (4.4-5.). I proceed to discuss these in turn, (4.6-11.), (4.12.), and (4.13.), and summarise the main results in (4.14.).
4.1. Basic Translation

Section 3a

Further 'having knowledge' belongs to human beings in another manner from the ones just mentioned; for within the 'having but not using' <sc. of the preceding passage> we see the state\(^1\) exhibits a difference, so that also there is 'having in a qualified way and not having' <sc. knowledge> - for example the human being who is sleeping or in a fit of madness or intoxicated. But surely\(^2\) in just such a manner are those indeed temporarily disposed\(^3\) who are in the pathe;\(^4\) for fits of anger and of sexual appetite and certain of such things\(^5\) manifestly change the state also of the body,\(^6\) and in some induce even fits of madness. Clearly therefore one should speak of the akratics as being in a similar state\(^7\) to these.\(^8\)

Section 3b

As for <their> uttering\(^9\) the arguments\(^10\) that spring from knowledge, that is no sign: for indeed those who are in these pathe\(^11\) utter demonstrative proofs and verses of Empedocles,\(^12\) and those who have learnt something for the first time articulate\(^13\) the arguments but do not yet understand them; for they must become part of their nature \(\square\) be assimilated\(^7\) and this requires time: so that just in the manner of those who are reciting,\(^14\) in such a manner one must judge also those acting akratically to utter.

4.2. Basic structure

There are more difficulties of detail in the argumentation than first meet the eye. However the basic structure, although often ignored or glossed over, appears
relatively uncontroversial. The section falls into two parts:

3a: 1147a10-18;
3b: 1147a18-24.

Both parts culminate in conclusions ("delon oun hoti" a17; "hoste" a22) in which we are urged to view akратics ("tous akrateis" a18; "tous akrateuomenous" a23-4) in the light of certain other psychological phenomena. In 3a we are told that one should speak of akратics as in a similar state to "these"; in 3b that one should judge that those akратics who utter (sc. "the arguments from knowledge") at the time of their akратic action are speaking merely in the manner "kathaper tous hupokrinomenous" (see 4.3. below).

3a provides the main thesis of the whole section. It first characterises a certain kind of cognitive state: of people in this state we want to say both that they have the knowledge at issue - they will not have to re-learn it later - and yet that they do not have the knowledge - for they do not have it in the sense of being at the moment free or able to 'use' it i.e. (HS). It is then argued that akратics should be viewed as in such a cognitive state.

In 3b Aristotle turns to defuse some implicit objection to that thesis, of the following sort:

'But we find (some) akратics saying the arguments from knowledge while acting akратically; their saying this surely is a "semeion" that their cognitive state
is not that alleged in 3a, that they are not "tied" with respect to their ability to use their knowledge.'

Aristotle counters apparently by offering us, as hopefully persuasive parallels, cases where we do not - he suggests - view appropriate enunciation as evidence for the relevant knowledge (or understanding) thereby being exercised or displayed (1147a19-20), or even possessed (1147a21-2), by the enunciator.

If this view of the structure is correct, two theses emerge clearly:

(T1): first akratics are temporarily in a 'tied' state with respect to their knowledge - a state of 'having in a qualified way and not having' knowledge - while doing the akratic action.

(T2): second, cases where akratics utter (at the time) 'the arguments from knowledge' are no evidence against (T1).

4.3. Two points of detail

There are two questions in particular involving the range of examples at issue, one in Sec.3a, the other in 3b.

Who precisely are the "these" (a18) to which the akratics are in the same, or similar, state? Opinions differ.19 However there is not much of substantial philosophical import here: the upshot must be that the
akratics are in a (HL) cognitive state.

More interesting is the question of who "tous hupokrinomenous" (a23-4) are. All scholars I have consulted unquestioningly assume a specific reference to actors. There is then a question of whether Aristotle thinks that this example is interestingly different from the others of 3b - for indeed it is different, and some scholars have made something of this. However if the reference is specifically to actors, then the argumentative flow is strained: for on this construal of "hupokrinomenous", a further specific example would be confusingly introduced into a conclusion that is overtly being drawn on the basis of what precedes ("hoste" a22).

Consideration of Bonitz and LSJ suggests that this construal is not de rigueur (especially so given the verb rather than the noun "hupokrites"). It would, I suggest, be possible to take the reference not to be specifically to actors, but rather more generally to 'people reciting' and to suppose that Aristotle is here simply generalizing over the range of cases he has already mentioned in 3b - which would precisely suit the nature of (a23-4) as a consequence drawn from what precedes.

This makes the argument so much neater that I prefer it; at the very least, I think it can no longer be unhesitatingly assumed that Aristotle does exploit the - admittedly intriguing and thought-provoking - parallel
with actors.

4.4. The major issues of interpretation

Three major issues in the interpretation of Sec.3. are these:

(1) in what sense is Sec.3. 'about' akrasia? How does it fare over the three issues of directness, inclusivity and generality? Can we maintain a DGI claim for Sec.3.? The important and controversial issue here is primarily that of generality.

(2) does Sec.3. indicate what knowledge it is that is 'tied' in akrasia (or in the particular kind at issue here)?

(3) what is it for whatever knowledge it is that is in question to be 'tied'? And, in particular, is Aristotle here operating with distinct conceptions of theoretical (TR) and practical reason (PR) and then exploiting analogies between them?

4.5. Further comments on these major issues

Over (1) it is relatively uncontroversial that Sec.3. concerns akrasia directly. It also appears to do so inclusively with other non-akratic phenomena - but this is not of great philosophical moment. It is the question of generality that is central as we saw in our discussion of (P2) (Chapter 2.4.); and, as we also saw,
the presence of the definite article at 1147a18 - 'the akratics' - together with the section's concern with wholesale classes of figures, create a natural presupposition in favour of generality over selectivity (relative to 7.3.). Such, however, has not seemed the case to all scholars. Kenny (1966) argued that Aristotle here treated of a specific type of akrasia - 'pathological akrasia' - in contrast to the 'normal' type at issue in Sec.4a. In our terminology this is effectively not merely an attack on Sec.3.'s generality but its directness. However this position is fairly easy to demolish. By contrast, Charles presents a more sophisticated opposition: he has held and still appears to do so (1984), that in Sec.3. and 4a Aristotle is directly considering that specific type of akrasia later characterised as 'weak' akrasia, where (arguably) the akratic reaches but only deviantly holds the good conclusion, in contradistinction to Sec.2. where Charles thinks a different specific type of akratic (the later 'impulsive') is under consideration (here the good conclusion is not even reached). In 4.6. I attack both Kenny and Charles in detail.

The issue in (2) is initially whether Sec.3. carries any implication at all for what knowledge is 'tied'. It may seem that it doesn't - that Aristotle is interested merely in a new distinction within the 'possession-conditions' of knowledge, and not in the objects of those states.
Alternatively - and such is the view of many scholars - it has some such implication, the question then being what precisely that implication is. And here again views divide. The options (many of which have been canvassed) are these: the akratic's 'tied' knowledge is:
(a) the good practical syllogism's (GPS) universal premiss;
(b) the GPS's minor premiss (or part thereof);
(c) the GPS's conclusion;
(d) the whole GPS;
(e) some part of the GPS, varying from case to case depending on the type of akrasia (this could range over (a)-(d) or be restricted to a favoured subset).²³

The interpretation accorded 'tied' - issue (3) - can have a tremendous effect on the overall position accorded Aristotle (whether or not Sec.3.'s concern is taken to be general): in particular it can affect the question of whether Aristotle countenances last-ditch akrasia. For instance, Charles (and Dahl) think there is room here for constructing analogies between theoretical and practical reason. He supposes it to be the conclusion that is tied (see issue (2) above); and he has then suggested that at least some of the other psychological phenomena to which the akratic is here compared are cases of theoretical (TR) and not practical reason (PR). While in these (TR) cases a failure ('being tied') vis-a-vis the conclusion would indeed be an intellectual failure of understanding, the analogous failing in the case of (PR)
would be a failure to act on the conclusion, a failure to hold or accept it appropriately (one holds it only "deviantly") - a failure of desire and not of intellect, and so one peculiar to the particular nature of (PR). This strategy allows Charles to claim that the - or rather this - akratic's failure is compatible with a totally unclouded intellectual appreciation of the good conclusion at the time of the akratic action: his failure is emotional, not intellectual - a failure to integrate his motivational states with his evaluative ones (cf. Chapter 1.3.2.).

If Charles is not convincing - and I am not persuaded - nevertheless he raises problems that must be faced at several levels: is his a plausible, even a possible, reading of the text? Does it embody a correct understanding of the contrasts Aristotle draws between (TR) and (PR)? What implications does it have for the general characterisation of Aristotle's theory of action-explanation?

4.6. First major issue: the DGI claim for Sec.3.

There is not much question but that Sec.3. concerns (normal Aristotelian) akrasia directly.24 Equally the concern appears to be inclusive. For akrasia is illuminated precisely by being subsumed under other non-akratic phenomena.25

The question remains whether its concern is general - in the sense, in the first instance, of general7.3.1.
As already seen (cf. Chapters 1.2.4. and 2.4.) there is a strong case for an affirmative answer. To recapitulate summarily:

(a) internal to Sec.3. is the 'definite article' point — that the definite article precedes talk of akratics at 1147a18 (cf. a23-4); this is further backed up by the 'wholesale class point' (see Chapter 2.4.);

(b) external to Sec.3. but internal to 7.3. is the fact that Sec.4b also discusses 'the akratic', and does so in a manner unavoidably connected with Sec.3. 26 (see Chapter 1.2.4.);

(c) external to 7.3. is that at 7.10.1152a14ff, yet again Aristotle talks of "the" akratic (a9), comparing him to the person asleep or drunk in the mode of Sec.3., and all this prior to referring to the distinction within this figure of 'the akratic' between the weak and impulsive (1152a18-19; 27ff) (see Chapter 1.2.4.).

This last point can be used to support a claim that Sec.3.'s concern is not merely general7.3. but also general7.3-10. (see 4.10.).

If the DGI claim for Sec.3. is then accepted, its most important consequence is that all types of (normal Aristotelian) akrasia at issue in 7.3., and (probably) in 7.1-10., are (HL) and not (HS). This — the (HL) claim for akrasia — while important itself requires interpretation.

It is, I claim, a constraint on any interpretation that seeks to deny the generality7.3. that it account for
(a)-(c). This constraint is not in fact met by either of the scholars whose attempts to deny the generality of Sec.3.'s concern we now turn to criticise.

4.7. Two attempts at denying the generality of Sec.3.

Both Kenny (1966) and more recently Charles (1984) have argued in favour of interpretations that involve the denial of the generality of Sec.3.'s concern - and hence the rejection of (HL) claim for akrasia (i.e. they are committed to Aristotle's acknowledging types of e.g. (HS) akrasia).

There are at least two bases from which one might be led to favour the specificity of Sec.3.:

(B1) First if one's view of the relation of Sec.3. to the sections preceding it combines a (ISA) reading (Chapter 2.4.) of the 'other manner of knowledge' together with an acceptance that akrasia has been under discussion in the preceding sections.

(B2) As already noted, in Sec.4c 1147b10-12 Aristotle can be interpreted as distinguishing strongly between two specific types of akrasia - as exemplified in Case 1 and Case 2. If so, and if Sec.4c is viewed as a summing-up section, then it is reasonable to suppose that these two different cases have each had some separate discussion previously; and it is then tempting to suppose Sec.3. is concerned to expound one or the other of these specific
types.

4.8. Kenny's (1966) denial of the generality

Kenny (1966) argues that Aristotle offers two different solutions to akrasia in NE.7.3., the first in Sec.3., the second in Sec.4a; he also claims that these two different accounts are alluded to by Case 1 and Case 2 of Sec.4c. 28

Kenny's view of the first solution is this:

Aristotle's first solution of the problem of akrasia is to suggest that in the incontinent the hexis of the moral principles is a habitus ligatus, ....

In the paraphrase I have just given, I take it that hoi logoi hoi apo tes epistemes uttered by the incontinent are the universal premisses of practical syllogisms, and not the fragmentary minors....

<An advantage of this solution> 29

This solution explains why it is no use simply to talk to the incontinent. You can't talk people out of madness or drunkenness either.

<Objections to this solution>

But there are two difficulties.

<Difficulty 1>

The first is that the solution seems to be inconsistent with what Aristotle says elsewhere;

<Difficulty 2>

the second, that it seems inadequate to the phainomena.

<Exposition of these difficulties>

If the universal premise is obscured by something other than the evil desire, then there is no conflict between reason and passion as described in 1102b14-25. If, on the other hand, it is obscured by the desire itself, then it is hard to see how Aristotle could go on in 1147b16 to say that the kurios episteme was not dragged about by passion and so Socrates was right after all.
Moreover, if incontinence is like madness, it is hard to see how it is voluntary and blameworthy. If it is like drunkenness to be sure, then it can be blamed: a drunk can be punished because it was in his power not to get drunk (1113b32); so perhaps an incontinent man can be punished because a truly virtuous man would not have evil desires. On the other hand, a continent man has evil desires; and again, it is odd that Aristotle should have compared incontinence indifferently to drunkenness and madness, when the two are different in the crucial matter of voluntariness.

Some cases of people doing what they say is wrong are no doubt cases where they are acting under the influence of a bodily disturbance to madness near allied. But this is hardly the normal case of incontinence: indeed it does not seem to be a genuine case of incontinence at all. To such people the appropriate reaction would appear to be not punishment but treatment: .... But this makes 1147a10-25 quite inadequate as a solution to the philosophical problem.

If he did, he had second thoughts about it which are incorporated in the quite different solution of lines 25f.

But it is possible that lines 10-25 are meant merely as an account of one type of case which might be thought to fall under the rubric of akrasia: the case of the pathological inability to conform to one's moral professions. In that case, the problem of incontinence proper is not attacked until line 25. This interpretation would accord well with Aristotle's insistence in Bk.III that action out of desire is not necessarily a case of psychological compulsion (1109b9, 1111a24). ((1966), pp.174-6; my additions)

Kenny's conclusion then is that either Sec.3. is meant as a solution to all akrasia, in which case it runs into insuperable difficulties and must be regarded as a 'first-off' position about which Aristotle had "second
thoughts"; or it is a solution merely to a specific type of akrasia, 'pathological akrasia', and so can appear alongside Aristotle's solution to "incontinence proper" in Sec.4a.

It is not clear whether Kenny comes down in favour of one or other of these. But later in discussing Sec.4b and 4c he whimsically drifts from one to the other (p.183). Thus he appeals to Alternative 1 in claiming that Sec.4b is not in its correct textual position:

If the later explanation (i.e. Sec.4a) represents Aristotle's second thoughts, it seems that it has been placed by his editor not quite in the right place: the sentence quoted (i.e. Sec.4b) should precede it and not follow it.

But his view of Sec.4c involves him opting for his second alternative - for it finds room for both solutions side by side:

The next sentence (pepei d'he teleutaia protasis, 1147b9ff) comes well after both accounts, provided only that we take teleutaia protasis to mean not the last premiss, but the conclusion. ...There are two cases of akrasia: one - described in 47a10-24 - where the conclusion is not drawn (ouk echei); the other where it is drawn verbally but has no more effect on action than the babblings of the drunkard (houtos echei hos ouk en to echein epistasthai).

Kenny here aligns Case 1 with Sec.3. and Case 2 with Sec.4a. On Alternative 1, Case 2 would have to be viewed as a corrective description ('second thoughts') of Case 1. Clearly this is not what Kenny has in mind. Therefore
either he is here committing himself to Alternative 2; or he is inconsistently introducing some third alternative according to which Sec.3. is dealing with a normal type of akrasia but one distinct from that considered in Sec.4a.

Charity suggests that we see Kenny as committed to Alternative 2, and we suitably emend his comment over Sec.4b.

Now, while Alternative 1 as advanced naturally presupposes the generality of Sec.3.'s concern with akrasia, Alternative 2 denies it: Sec.3. is concerned only with a specific type of akrasia – and that an abnormal one.

There are however conclusive objections to Kenny's (1966) treatment of Sec.3. Kenny himself has abandoned it in (1979) under the influence of Rowe's criticisms. His new position appears to view Sec.3.'s concern as general; but the (1979) position is much less tangible in its structure.

Rowe's criticisms are bound up with the development of his own - questionable - position. It is simpler to advance objections independently, merely noting where they coincide.

**Objection 1**

On either Alternative 1 or 2 Sec.4b appears out of place: Aristotle would be muddling either different total solutions or solutions to different specific types of akrasia. Kenny, rightly realising this (p.183), proposes transposing 4b to Sec.3.

But this is not on.
At the grammatical level he gives no details where exactly to re-locate it. Nor does he even mention the tear such a transposition rends in the grammatical texture: as it is, Sec.4c relies on Sec.4b to supply the subject (viz. "ho akrates" 1147b6-7) for "ouch echei" (1147b10).

Moreover arguments are available securing Sec.4b in its present position in the argumentative flow, in both directions.

Kenny at least attempts to meet this problem of Sec.4b (see constraint (b) in 4.6. above). But he entirely fails to see he must account for 7.10.1152al4ff (constraint (c) of 4.6.). It cannot be only 'pathological akrasia' at issue there; he would have to opt for Alternative 1 - a recurrence of earlier 'first thoughts' on Aristotle's part. He would then have to change his view of 4c (see above), e.g. opting for Case 2 being a corrective re-description of Case 1.

Objection 2

Kenny's interpretation of Sec.4c 1147b9-12

back-references:
Case 1 to Sec.3. (and 4b transposed);
Case 2 to Sec.4a.

This equally is not on.

It is surely impossible not to take the "legein" and "ho oinomenos ta Empedokeleous" of Case 2 as alluding at least to Sec.3b.
The above alignment also infringes the 'phusikos barrier' (see 2.8.). However Kenny suggests a different (independently implausible) interpretation of 'phusikos' on which he faces no such 'barrier':

If 1147a10-24 deals with pathological, and 1147a24-b5 with normal incontinence, may not to view incontinence phusikos (line 24) be to look at its natural cause - epithumia - as opposed to its para phusin causes - the alloioseis biaioi of the near-insane? (p.176, n.18)

But:
(i) first, the interpretation requires defence (no parallels are offered);
(ii) second, Sec.4c then picks up both pathological and normal akrasia, and their unremarked juxtaposition in Case 1 and 2 is curious.

Objection 3

If I understand Kenny aright, his view is that, construed as an account of normal akrasia, Sec.3. is in the first place inconsistent with other passages; and secondly that, even discounting that, it would still be an "inadequate solution to the philosophical problem"; but that both these difficulties disappear on the supposition that it concerns pathological akrasia.

This is best viewed as an attack on the directness of Sec.3.'s concern with (normal) akrasia, and hence a fortiori its generality, rather than on its generality per se; for his worries focus more on whether
Sec. 3. can adequately account for any akrasia, rather than all.

(D1) The charge of inconsistency

This forms a dilemma, each horn allegedly resulting in inconsistency:

Either (i) the universal premiss is obscured by something other than the "evil desire".

But this supposition is inconsistent with the NE. 1. 13. view of akrasia as involving a conflict between reason and passion;

Or (ii) the universal premiss is obscured by the passion ("evil desire").

But then this supposition is inconsistent with Sec. 4c 1147b16 where kurios episteme (identified as the universal premiss of the good syllogism) is said not to be dragged around by pathos (identified as the "evil desire").

This dilemma is defusible by questioning various assumptions on which it is based.

Kenny assumes first that:

(K1) the knowledge 'tied' (identifiable, in his view, with "hoi logoi hoi apo tes epistemes") is the good syllogism's universal premiss. 34

But this is controversial: if, as Rowe and Charles 35 suppose, the knowledge 'tied' is the good syllogism's conclusion Kenny's dilemma disappears.

Again, in the second horn, Kenny assumes that:

(K2) a universal proposition being "obscured" (i.e. 'tied') by passion would count as its being 'dragged around
by passion' in Sec.4c's sense.

But this subsumption of 'being tied by passion'
under 'being dragged around by passion' is questionable.

1147bl6f runs:

It is not in the presence of what seems to
be knowledge proper that the pathos arises
- nor is it this (sc. knowledge) that is
dragged around on account of the pathos
- but in the presence of perceptual
knowledge.

A full account requires interpretations of 'tied', 'being
present', 'being dragged around'. It will suffice here
merely to indicate how (K2) could be challenged. First it
can be suggested that knowledge proper isn't 'present'
precisely because it has been 'tied'.36 Second, if 'being
dragged around' is equivalent (roughly) to e.g. 'being
rendered ineffective', it can be suggested that knowledge
proper isn't 'dragged around by pathos' either because for
this knowledge to be dragged around it would have to be
'present' (which it isn't e.g. because it has been
'tied'); or because it simply isn't the sort of knowledge
that it makes sense to talk of 'being dragged around' (it
is not universal knowledge that does the 'setting in
motion':37 cf. De An.3.11.434a19-21) - and this would still
be compatible with the possibility that such knowledge
could be 'tied', on certain interpretations of 'tied'.
Specifically it seems compatible with Kenny's talk of the
universal proposition's being "obscured", which suggests
a cognitive failure of understanding.
A word of warning. Kenny does not make clear the relation between the view he is committed to on what a Habitus Ligatus is (viz. 'a temporary inability to exercise knowledge, caused by an internal state' (p.174), into which one then plugs his view of what it is to exercise knowledge) and this talk of the "obscuring" of the universal premiss by passion. In my discussion of (K1) and (K2) I have supposed that Kenny takes 'obscured' to be equivalent to 'rendered tied' - which may be a further mistake of his.\textsuperscript{38} If in fact he regards it as a distinct failure, then 'tied' can be replaced by 'obscured' in the above discussion with little effect. There is a serious inadequacy in his account here.

(D2) The charge of inadequacy to the phainomena

The phainomena apparently at issue are that "...incontinence...is voluntary and blameworthy" (p.175).

As I interpret him, Kenny finds three problems:

(i) the comparison with madness threatens the voluntariness and (hence?)\textsuperscript{39} the blameworthiness of akrasia;

(ii) the comparison with drunkenness is innocent in that respect, but what this comparison indicates as the focus of (voluntariness and) blame in akrasia is the presence of evil desires. But the encratic also has these desires (it is the respect in which both he and the akratic differ from the fully virtuous person): yet he is not blameworthy but praiseworthy.

(iii) that Aristotle should indifferently conjoin these
comparisons of madness and drunkenness is itself peculiar since they differ "in the crucial matter of voluntariness". These 'problems' strike me as extremely confused. (We may put to one side the point that Kenny apparently runs together the state of akrasia and the akratic act.)

(a) Let us note first, and mildly, that if we allow that the comparison with drunkenness is innocent in the matter of voluntariness and blameworthiness, because "it was in his power not to get drunk", the analogous remark holds of some cases of 'madness' (cf. 7.3.1147a17 and especially 3.5.1114a14ff). And if there are cases where it does not hold, there are equally cases where it doesn't hold in drunkenness (not merely alcoholism, but cases of mickey finns, of accidentally and innocently drinking a punch that turns out not to be so mild,....). The wedge that Kenny wants to drive between madness and drunkenness (points (i) and (iii)) isn't there.

(b) Several questions emerge over (ii).

Most obviously, the drunk "can be punished" not simply "because it was in his power not to get drunk". Kenny doesn't make clear whether he is considering the case of someone being blamed for being a drunkard (a state of life) of for having got drunk/got drunk and Ø'd. If the latter then we run into the problems of the intentionality of what someone does while drunk; and there is no longer a straight parallel merely with the presence of 'evil desires' on the part of the akratic. The former seems out of place
However the whole direction of Kenny's argument at this point is misconceived. He has failed to consider the point of the comparisons with the mad, drunk, and asleep (the last of whom Kenny oddly ignores in (i)-(iii) above). The aim of such comparisons is not total match, but selective illumination. With some justice it can be said that the matters of voluntariness and blameworthiness, so far from being "crucial" here, are irrelevant. The target for illumination is a certain manner of cognitive disposition: there is no suggestion that the question of whether or not one has voluntarily become so disposed is at issue.

Kenny's (1966) view of Sec.3. is untenable.

4.9. Charles' (1984) denial of Sec.3.'s generality

Charles makes out a more plausible case for viewing Sec.3. as concerned just with one type of Aristotelian akratic in contrast to a different type also considered in chapter 3 - i.e. a case for denying Sec.3.'s generality.

One type of Aristotelian akrates introduced in this passage [Sec. Sec.2b 1147a5-10] does not reach (or possess) the good conclusion because he fails to activate (or possibly possess) the minor premiss. His non-possession of the conclusion (1147b9-11) is explained by non-activation (or non-possession) of the minor premiss (1147a5-10). In the case on which Aristotle concentrates, akrasia occurs when no
good conclusion results from major and minor premisses (1147a26-27), because the minor premiss is not active (contrast 1147a33). Such a case (which is used after 1147a24) is characterisable in terms of Section A as a failure of valuational reasoning. ....

There is, however, a second type of akrates, who arrives at the conclusion but possesses it only in an 'off-colour' way (1147b11-12). That is, he has the conclusion in such a way as 'not to know it but only to say it'. His state is clarified by some of Aristotle's examples in 1147a11-24:....

The second type of akrasia...is not apparently a failure of valuational reasoning, but rather failure to grasp the good conclusion he draws appropriately (i.e. so as to act on it). This case will be that of the weak akrates (1150b19-21; see 1152a18ff), if the latter is characterised correctly as one who fails to grasp the conclusion fully.

Hence both types of akrasia in 1147b10ff occur in the presence of the minor premiss and final term, but in different ways: one akrates does not reach the good conclusion (1147a1-10; 25-7; 33; b10) because he does not put together his premisses and arrive at a conclusion; the other does reach the conclusion but possesses it in an 'off-colour way' (1147a34; 17-24). Hence both failures relate in their different ways to the conclusion (1147b10), as is required if the akrates is to be able to act intentionally akratically. (Chp.3.B., pp.127-8)

Unlike Kenny(1966), Charles' interpretation takes (Sec.1. and) Sec.2. to concern akrasia directly. Moreover he takes it to concern a specific type of akrasia (the 'non-weak') in contradistinction with Sec.3.'s concern with a different specific type (the 'weak'). This strongly suggests he takes a (ISA) reading of "allon tropon" and the relation of Sec.1. and 2. to Sec.3.

Like Kenny(1966), he takes teleutaia protasis to be the good syllogism's conclusion. And again like Kenny he sees Case 1 and Case 2 (Sec.4c 1147b9ff) as referring
to earlier separate discussions of two different types of akrasia. Here he offers the more plausible alignment of:

Case 1 - Sec.2.
Case 2 - Sec.3.; Sec.4a.

And he takes the 'tied' knowledge in Sec.3. to be (at least in the case of akrasia), the good conclusion.

This is an altogether more attractive position than Kenny's.

Nevertheless I think it faces insuperable objections.

At the very least it is not adequately argued for: so far as I can see, Charles fails to address any of the points (a)-(c) (see 4.6.).

(a):

Certainly there is no attempt to address (a). And this failure is compounded by the distorted view he takes of Sec.3.'s point and structure. For he sees Sec.3. as entirely concerned with that 'type' of akrasia characterised by Sec.4c's Case 2 - that is of the akratic who arrives at the teleutaia protasis (= the good conclusion, for Charles) but not in such a way as to know it, merely to say it.

There is, however, a second type of akrates, who arrives at the conclusion but possesses it only in an 'off-colour' way (1147b11-12). That is, he has the conclusion in such a way as 'not to know it but only to say it'. His state is clarified by some of Aristotle's examples in 1147a11-24 (i.e. Sec.3,7):

(1) people asleep, or drunk or mad;
(2) those 'in passion' repeating proofs and poems of Empedocles;
(3) students who have first learnt something and 'put together' arguments, but lack knowledge of the subject...
(4) actors.
In this sense (or senses) one akrates possesses the conclusion in a 'deviant way' either because he undergoes an intellectual failure of one of these types or because he undergoes an analogous failure of practical knowledge (see Chapter 4, Section A). His failure, like all akratic failures, results from the impact of passion (al4-18), but it allows him, unlike other akrates, to say what is best (a23-4). (p.127)

He approaches Sec.3. from the perspective of Sec.4c's Case 2, and runs all the examples together as illustrative of that state. But this is to submerge totally what I claim is the basic structure of Sec.3. (see 4.2.). The examples split into two sets illustrating different points: the first illustrating a temporary inability to 'use' knowledge; the second that appropriate enunciation is no evidence of 'use'. Charles is led to see Sec.3b as the whole point of Sec.3.: he virtually equates the 'tiedness' of knowledge with the 'off-colour having of the conclusion'. But Sec.3a appears to concern akratics whose knowledge is 'tied' in the sense that they don't arrive at the good conclusion; and Sec.3b deals with an objection (to the effect that surely some akratics do arrive at the conclusion as evidenced in appropriate enunciation, and so don't have knowledge tied). 42

(b):

Charles doesn't explicitly consider the role of Sec.4b in the argumentative structure.
Sec. 4b talks of "the akratic" and compares his cognitive state to the person drunk or asleep, in the manner of Sec. 3a. Moreover Sec. 4b's reference to "the akratic" (1147b6-7) apparently supplies the subject to Sec. 4c 1147b9-12 - i.e. the akrates of 4b is the subject of both Case 1 and Case 2. These points, especially the last, support the following thesis:

(A) the reference to the akrates in 4b is general, and the akrates both of Case 1 and Case 2 is in that state of agnoia at issue in Sec. 4b.

Charles cannot accept (A).

He holds that:

(1) Case 1 picks up a specific type of akrasia at issue in Sec. 2b;
(2) Sec. 2b concerns a different specific type of akrasia to Sec. 3.

Given that Sec. 2b precedes Sec. 3.'s introduction of the notion of (HL), I take (2) to commit Charles to an implausible (ISA) reading of the relation between Sec. 2. and Sec. 3., and specifically to the claim that:

(3) Sec. 2b's type of akrasia is an (HS) form.

Moreover it is virtually incontestable that:

(4) Sec. 4b's agnoia either consists in or is produced by the (HL) of Sec. 3a (the comparison is with the person asleep or drunk of Sec. 3a, not directly with people in those states enunciating).

Acceptance of (1)-(4) entails rejection of (A). For the (HS) akratic of Sec. 2b would not have the (HL)-
Charles can of course reject (A). He could claim that "the akratic" of Sec.4b refers only to his second type: that not merely must Sec.4a be understood as delineating only this second type but so must Sec.4b. Indeed this is what I think he does - from the two references to this passage in chapters 4 and 5.43

But this rejection of (A) requires defence.

First we are owed some account of the factors which I claim make (A) the natural reading.

Secondly Charles is committed to having Aristotle countenance a form of (HS) akrasia. But this is controversial from the point of view of explanatory considerations44 and presupposes a certain (restricted) interpretation of what 'being in a tied state' consists in. We require some account of both points. In connection with the latter obviously it would be possible to claim that passion has two different techniques for winning - first by outstripping reason (in impulsive akrasia), and second by suppressing or tying reason (in weak akrasia); and that only the latter is (HL) akrasia. But this needs to be advocated and discussed.

(c):

It is an oddity that on Charles' view every explicit occurrence of 'the akratic' in Sec.1-4. (1147a8, 24, b4, 6) refers only to his second type of akratic and not the first - an oddity that is somewhat suspect. But
the occurrence of "the akratic" at 7.10.1152al4ff is really
damaging. For there Aristotle again compares the akratic's
cognitive state to the person asleep or drunk, in the
manner of Sec.3a and 4b. In all consistency Charles must
then suppose the reference to be simply to his second type
of akratic (the 'weak'). But Aristotle then goes on
(1152al8ff) to draw the distinction between the weak and
impulsive within the akratic he has just been talking about.

Charles makes no attempt to cope with this point,
nor do I see how he can.

So Charles fails to meet our interpretative
constraint (4.6. above) of accounting for (a)-(c).

There are also some further difficulties and
awkwardnesses in his account.

First Charles aligns Case 1 with Sec.2b. But
it is expecting a lot of the reader to refer Case 1 all the
way back to Sec.2b without any help.45

More seriously Charles appears simply to assume
without argument a temporal as against a locational reading
of Case 1 (see Chapter 2.18.), whereas on the latter cases
of weakness can be accommodated to Case 1.

Again in his suggested alignment Charles breaks
the 'Phusikos barrier' (see Chapter 2.8.). This is acute
for him since, unlike Kenny(1966), he espouses an
interpretation of 'phusikos' on which the 'barrier' arises
((1984), Chp.3, p.126, n.27).
4.10. Generality\textsubscript{7.3} v. Generality\textsubscript{7.1-10} in Sec.3.

I conclude from 4.8-9 that neither Kenny (1966) nor Charles (1984) succeed in showing that Sec.3. concerns akrasia specifically\textsubscript{7.3} and not generally\textsubscript{7.3}.

If Sec.3. concerns akrasia generally\textsubscript{7.3}, the question then arises whether it does so also generally\textsubscript{7.1-10}.

The importance of this lies in the possibility of accepting the former and denying the latter on the grounds that in 7.3. Aristotle deals throughout with only one specific type of akrasia (and so each section that deals directly with akrasia will also meet the conditions for dealing with it generally\textsubscript{7.3}). Now this view has been explicitly maintained by Rowe (and more recently Sorabji). He claims that 7.3. concerns only WA, and that IA is only introduced later (7.7.). Obviously on this view it's going to be very much not the case that Sec.4c's Case 1 refers to IA and Case 2 to WA! Rather, as Rowe claims:

> Aristotle is not here referring to two separate cases at all, but is merely giving two alternative descriptions of the state of mind of the...incontinent man. He is in fact simply picking up what he said at a10ff., where the continent man and the drunk were described as 'both having knowledge in a way, and not having it'. ((1971), p.118)

I shall now argue against this claim that 7.3. concerns akrasia only generally\textsubscript{7.3} and not generally\textsubscript{7.1-10}.

Any such claim both faces the following question and must disembarrass itself of the following piece of negative evidence.
The question

If the claim is correct, are we then to suppose Aristotle intends his reader to apply the results of 7.3., developed in connection with a single specific form of akrasia, to the later form(s), and if so how far? If the answer is 'no', then why don't we face a problem over the possibility of this later form(s) comparable to that Aristotle considers in 7.3.? If the answer is 'yes', then what is at issue in claiming that 7.3. concerns only one specific form (e.g. WA) and not another (e.g. IA) - if all the results are transferable; but if they are only transferable to a degree, then what degree is this?

My point is not that these can't be answered, but simply that anyone taking this line must face up to them. (Neither of our advocates of this line formulates or addresses this question.)

Negative evidence

In 7.10.1152al4ff Aristotle appears, in talking of "the akratic", to be talking of the figure generally, and compares his cognitive condition to the sleeper's or drunk's. Both aspects (definite article and comparison) occur in the connected passages in 7.3. - Sec.3. and Sec.4b. Moreover in 7.10. the distinction between WA and IA occurs within this general comparison of akratic with sleeper and drunk. We have mentioned all this before, but it all also speaks against the particular version of the present claim that would see 7.3. concern only WA and make IA a later addition. And it is a constraint which any such view must
guard against.

That said, I turn to argue specifically against Rowe's position (although I would hope some criticisms would speak more widely against attempts to adopt this line of approach to the text).

Contra Rowe

By way of a couple of preliminary shots, I remark that:

(i) he doesn't notice or accommodate the negative evidence of 7.10.;

(ii) he follows Kenny (1966) in supposing that Sec. 1. and 2. do not directly concern akrasia at all (i.e. a (V3)) ((1971), p.116); consequently he holds (ISA) over the relation between Sec. 1. and 2. to Sec. 3. If I am right, this is all false, and Rowe would face the question of whether, given that akrasia is to be accommodated to Sec. 1. and 2., he would still want to claim that IA cannot (or should not) be seen as at issue.

Now a more direct critique.

AntiR-1. He claims that Case 1 and Case 2 are "merely...two alternative descriptions" of the single case at issue in 7.3. - WA. This does not sit well with the presence of "e...e..." (either...or) at 1147b10-11 between Case 1 and Case 2. "Merely...alternative descriptions" sounds far too weak. It would be more plausible from his point of view to claim perhaps that this was a distinction between two subtypes of WA.

AntiR-2. He claims that by these alternative descriptions,
Aristotle:

is in fact simply picking up what he said at alOff where the incontinent and the drunk were described as 'both having knowledge in a way, and not having it'. ((1971), p.118 again)

What does he intend by this? I am not sure, but it seems that he is suggesting a matching up of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sec.4c Pair</th>
<th>Sec.3a Pair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(R) Case 1</td>
<td>with &quot;me echein&quot; (Sec.3.1147a13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 2</td>
<td>with &quot;echein pos&quot; (Sec.3.1147a13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

each vertical pair being alternative descriptions of the same case, each horizontal pair representing the same description of one alternand, and all four apparently describing the same case.

Now (R) au fond seems no more tenable than 2=1, and for a similar reason, that Case 1 and Case 2 are disjunctive (e...e...) descriptions of different cases (albeit conceivably subtypes of WA (cf. AntiR-1.)), while "echein pos" and "me echein" appear as conjunctive (kai... kai...: 1147a1-13) aspects delineating a single type of cognitive state (viz. (HL)). Charity then demands we read (R) as ambiguous - "2" as a variant sign for 1, or vice-versa:

(RI): we hold the "Sec.3. pair" steady as delineating the single (HL) type of cognitive state, and suppose Rowe is reducing Case 1 and Case 2 to a corresponding unity (viz. alternative descriptions of one and the same case).

This is indeed what I take Rowe to hold. But
this - an admittedly neat idea - is open to the objections of AntiR-1, and of:

**AntiR-3.** Case 2 refers specifically to "having as only **saying**" (1147b11-12), but this picks up only Sec.3b, and not Sec.3a, where Rowe's "Sec.3a pair" occur.

But one can evade AntiR-3 by shifting to the other limb of (R)'s ambiguity:

(RII): we hold the "Sec.4c pair" steady as delineating two different cases (or, from Rowe's viewpoint, different subtypes of WA) and suppose Rowe to be expanding "me echein" and "echein pos" to a corresponding duality, by linking "me echein" to the rest of Sec.3a and "echein pos" to the "merely saying cases" of Sec.3b.

But this is still open to the objection that it would be guilty of distributing the conjunction ("kai... kai..."); and consequences would be, **AntiR-4**, that the rest of Sec.3a (viz. 1147a14-18) would be illustrating simply "me echein", and that, **AntiR-5**, the illustrative role of the asleep, mad and drunk (1147a13-14 "hoion"), would be incomprehensible.

So neither (R), (RI), (RII) seem to me tenable.

Moving on from this aspect of Rowe's position, we turn to his positive account of the argumentative relations between Sec.3. and 4. He rightly criticised Kenny's (1966) account of these sections as dealing with two different types of akrasia - the "pathological" and the "normal". His own view is:

(i) "that a10-24 and a24ff are dealing, not with two cases,
but with one" (p.119);\(^{50}\)

(ii) that these two passages are "not describing two different types of akrasia, but two possible stages in a single case". They are concerned with different \textit{temporal stages} of a single type of akrasia (viz. WA):

\begin{quote}
al0-24...deals with the moment when the akrates is in media re. a24ff...deals with the conflict itself, which takes place before the akrates lapses into unconsciousness. (p.119, my emphases)
\end{quote}

This is one of the least plausible offerings in the interpretational souk, and I shall be brief.

\textbf{AntiR-6.} There is no explicit textual support for seeing this sort of division or relation between Sec.3. and Sec.4., nor does Rowe allude to any; moreover such explicit indications as there are – viz. "phusikos" – (a) he entirely ignores and (b) cannot be warped to his support in any obvious way.

\textbf{AntiR-7.} What Rowe claims just isn't true of the content of these sections. Putting to one side the fact he doesn't inform us how to articulate the various parts of Sec.4., it doesn't seem to be true that Sec.4a deals with the moment before the conflict is resolved: e.g. I take the "legei" of 1147a34 to be a "legein" in the 'tradition' of Sec.3b in contrast to the effective "phanai" of 1147a27-28.\(^{51}\)

But enough.
4.11. A new suggested alignment

I conclude therefore that Sec.3. concerns akrasia generally7.1-10., or at least generally7.1-10., WA & IA' And so our DGI claim for Sec.3. goes through in a substantial version. This constitutes our fuller defence of the important premiss (3).52

I now offer a new suggestion for the back-referencing of Case 1 and Case 2:

Case 1 - Sec.3a (Case i)53
Case 2 - Sec.3b (Case ii).

To expand on this. I shall assume that "the final proposition" is the conclusion.54

If one's knowledge is 'tied' temporarily (Sec.3a init.) then in the basic case one simply won't have the conclusion (Case i - Case 1); the most that can happen if one's knowledge is tied, is (the fancy case) that one can verbally enunciate the appropriate argument and its conclusion, although this won't constitute knowing the conclusion (for the knowledge from which it is derived is tied) (Case ii - Case 2). In other words if one's knowledge is temporarily tied (by the pathos), then either one doesn't have the conclusion or at best has it in a sense which doesn't constitute knowing it but mere verbalization55 of it.

There is a sense here in which there is only one case at issue - the basic case of having one's knowledge tied; for the fancy case is just the basic case plus some
verbalisation (Case 2 stands to Case 1 as Case ii to Case i).

**Implication for the structure of the 7.3. argument**

This suggests the emergence of the following picture of the overall structure of the argument:

1. Sec.1-2. establish ambiguities in the Socratic argument, and thereby create conceptual areas within which akrasia could be located;
2. Sec.3. divides up this area more finely in developing an argument that akrasia is indeed to be located there. What emerges as central is the notion of knowledge being tied. If one speaks the argument (including the conclusion), this isn't to be taken to show that the knowledge is not tied;
3. akrasia is not alone in involving the 'tying' of knowledge (indeed Sec.3. precisely employs this point to get us to view akrasia as comparable to certain other phenomena in this respect). So we still need to know something more about akrasia specifically (phusikos) as against these other phenomena (Sec.4.). There is a peculiar (idios) account of how akrasia arises (Sec.4a): (the fact that Aristotle gives us a case with the fancy trimmings of verbalisation (1147a34) is neither here nor there): but there is no peculiar account of the dispersal of the akratic condition (Sec.4b). And so we can now resolve our original question (Sec.4c) (what points Sec.4c actually makes depends in part on our resolution of the "Ramsauer problem").
Implication of the alignment for WA and IA

How do Case 1 and Case 2 now stand vis-a-vis the later distinction between WA and IA? The connection is rather looser than many have thought. We should consider Case 1 and Case 2 separately.

Case 1 (and Case i):

(A1): If "not having the conclusion while/because being in the pathos" (1147bl0-11) is interpreted "temporally" as implying both (a) that the agent is not now reaching the conclusion and (b) has not done so prior to the akratic action, then only IA is accommodatable to this case.

(B1): But if the case is interpreted "locationally" as claiming simply that here the agent is not at the present having the conclusion - not even in a merely verbal way - then it is left entirely open whether the agent had or had not non-deviantly reached and appreciated the conclusion prior to the onset of the akratic pathos. Consequently cases both of IA and WA could be accommodated.

Case 2 (and Case ii):

(A2): If "having the conclusion in such a manner as that having it was not to know it but to merely-say it..." (1147bl11-12) is taken to imply that the conclusion had been non-deviantly reached and appreciated before the onset of akratic pathos, then clearly only WA is accommodatable to this case.

(B2): But if the verbalising of the argument, including the conclusion, at the time of the akratic action,
either does not count as deliberation or can take place simply at the time of and not prior to, the akratic pathos, then apparently cases of IA as well as WA can be accommodated. (And isn't this intuitively plausible? Can't someone on a diet see a box of chocolates, grab one impulsively, murmuring "ooh I know it's naughty...": saying such a thing at the time needn't be regarded as a criterion between WA and IA.59)

I see no immediate reason to opt for Al and A2 over B1 and B2 (although I would expect some to allow B1 but not B2).

4.12. Second major issue: what knowledge is 'tied' in akrasia?

At this point I want to draw out a further implication - one that our resolution of the first issue and its suggested 'new alignment' (4.11.) have for the resolution of our second major issue - whether we can glean from Sec.3. an answer to what knowledge is 'tied' (i.e. subjected to (HL)) in akrasia.

It seems to me that scholars have confused, or not distinguished carefully enough, the two questions: Q1: what knowledge is it with respect to which the akratic is said to be (HL) disposed in Sec.3a?
and:
Q2: what are "hoi logoi hoi apo tes epistemes" in the case of the akratic in Sec.3b? What is it these akratics
"legein"?

Of course the answers might be the same, but there is no a priori reason to suppose they must be. I argue that they are different.

Consideration of Q2

To begin with Q2. Kenny (1966) suggested that the "logoi" are "not the fragmentary minors illustrated at 1147a7" but "are the universal premisses of practical syllogisms" (p.175). Over this latter positive suggestion, he was rightly taken to task by Rowe ((1971), p.118) who suggested that the akratic could "equally well babble the conclusion". Of course the "logoi" must include the verbal conclusion of the RPS. Setting aside the philosophical pointlessness of supposing otherwise, we can argue textually: if the "final proposition" FP is the conclusion then we have a statement in 1147b11-12 that this is merely said and the same reference to reciting Empedocles; and in any case, whatever line is taken over the FP, we have an explicit example of the conclusion being merely said at 1147a34. However some scholars (e.g. Rowe, Charles) appear to think the "logoi" in the case of akrasia will be simply the conclusion: 'for isn't it this alone that is mentioned as being merely said in 4a and 4c?' But I see no reason to suppose that it is only the conclusion at issue: to come out solely with "so it's best not to Ø" (either to oneself or others) isn't what the implicit objector of 3b surely had in mind as an objection to the thesis of 3a. For this saying of the conclusion is only apparent evidence that the
akratic is free to bring his knowledge to bear in the context of the whole RPS on which the conclusion's "so" depends. I therefore take the "logoi" to be a whole piece of reasoning including the conclusion.

I would perhaps think differently (and in line with Rowe/Charles) if the knowledge 'tied' in 3a were just the akratic's knowledge of the conclusion. But if it is not, then I take the above answer to Q2 to be confirmed.

Consideration of Q1

Turning now to this question, Q1, if the 'alignment' and interpretation I outlined in 4.11. is correct, it has as a consequence that the knowledge that is 'tied' in 3a cannot be knowledge of the conclusion. For if when one's knowledge becomes 'tied' one can no longer reach (or go on reaching) the good conclusion, or cannot do so in any more than a merely verbal sense, transparently the knowledge that is 'tied' is not knowledge of the conclusion; rather it is knowledge whose being 'tied' explains the failure to hold the conclusion in anything more than a 'merely verbal' sense, if at all.

Given then that it is not knowledge of the conclusion per se that is the knowledge 'tied' in Sec.3a, what is this knowledge?

We now have left the options:

(1/) the universal proposition (major premiss);
(2/) the/a particular proposition (minor premiss);
(3/) Sec.3a leaves this indeterminate.

Something can be said for (3/). In Sec.1.
Aristotle introduces a distinction in knowing but does not at the same time show interest in its application within a framework where different kinds of proposition are distinguished - that he leaves for Sec.2. Sec.3. may seem to resemble Sec.1. in this respect. It introduces a further distinction in knowing but without any explicit reference to its application to different kinds of proposition; (perhaps Sec.4. supplies this comparably to Sec.2.'s relation to Sec.1.). Indeed, it can be claimed, the very point of Sec.3a is simply the introduction and characterisation of a certain kind of cognitive state, and not the delimitation of the possible objects to which anyone in such a state could be so disposed.

There seems something right about this as a matter of emphasis; but in the context it is hardly satisfying. For if correct, and if this question is clarified later, we will be able to read back the answer into Sec.3. in its application to the akratic: all that results from (3/) is that we shouldn't expect to answer our question simply on the basis of Sec.3a. If correct, but the question is not answered later, then we seem landed with a genuine indeterminacy over Aristotle's views - but this is our last resort.

In favour of (1/) could be claimed the fact that we are dealing with distinctions about having knowledge, (episteme: 1147a2; a10), and this standardly is confined to universal propositions. But this won't do, because it is not until 1147b13 that Aristotle makes some such point,
and in the preceding line (bll-12) he had, by implication, pointed to the possibility of "knowing" (epistatasthai) the FP - which, whether minor premiss or conclusion, is not the universal major. Moreover, as Kenny points out, Aristotle claims that it is not "knowledge proper" (i.e. universal) that is dragged about by passion (1147b15-17).

And doesn't the same passage favour (2/)? for it says that perceptual knowledge is dragged around by passion. Moreover De Somn.2.455b3ff makes clear that sleep affects the capacity to perceive and this 'surely' suggests that it will be perceptual knowledge that is affected: and isn't this confirmed by what Aristotle says about dreams, that dreams are an affection of the perceptual faculty, not of the intellective (De Insomn.1.459a8ff); that in dreams we aren't perceiving (at least not "haplos", De Insomn.1.459a10f), but we can have (true) thoughts (De Insomn.1.458b22ff; 3.462a28-29)? And what again of De Insomn.2.460b1ff and all the examples there of the way passions etc. affect perception?

But perhaps we should look again at the possibility of (4/) the conclusion....

Much in the above comments on (1/) and particularly (2/) is extremely confused. I shall now straighten it out.

Straightening out the question

It is perhaps helpful to rephrase the general question "What knowledge is 'tied'?" as the question "Concerning what knowledge is it that someone is put in a condition such that they are temporally unable to use it?"
Aristotle's answer in the case of the akratic is "the knowledge of his values; i.e. his universal premisses on the model we are considering". So at least I argue.

We need to distinguish strongly (as Kenny failed to do) between:

(I) the (HL) state, which is a state in which one is rendered temporarily unable to exercise some capacity/ability; and:

(II) deviant or distorted or deceived exercise of some capacity.

De Somn.2.455b3ff does indeed provide an excellent illustration of (I):

It is clear from many things that sleep does not consist in the senses not functioning (argein, = ouk energēin) and in not using (chresthai) them, nor yet in not being able (me dunasthai) to perceive. For such indeed happens in fainting fits; for fainting is an inability (adunamia) of the senses. And some forms of derangement (so Hett. eknoiai) are also of this sort. Again those who have the veins in their neck pressed become incapable of perceiving (anaisthētōi). But sleep is whenever the inability to use (he adunamia tes chreoseos) the senses is neither in any chance sense-organ nor on account of a chance cause, but, as has just been said (455a26-b2), in the first organ by which one perceives everything; for whenever this is unable (adunatesai) to perceive, it is necessary that one is unable to perceive with any of the sense-organs; but whenever a particular one of these latter is unable to perceive there is no necessity for the former also to be. (Hett, adapted)

The sleeper is rendered temporarily unable to exercise his perceptual capacities (at least haplos): he is in a 'tied'
state re perception.

By contrast one of the De Insomn. passages referred to illustrates not (I) but (II) 's 'distorted exercise':

With regard to our initial enquiry, let one thing be laid down, which is clear from what has been said, that even when the external object of perception has departed, the aisthembata remain as objects of perception; and in addition to this, (let it be laid down) that we are easily deceived about our perceptions when we are in emotional states (en tois pathesin), some when in one, others in others; for example the coward when he's afraid, the amorous (erotikos) when in love - with the result that from a slight similarity it seems for the one that he is seeing the enemy, for the other his loved one; and the greater their emotional state (empathesteros) the more it is things appear to them from a smaller degree of similarity.

In the same manner both in fits of anger and in every onset of appetite, all become easily deceivable (euapatetoi), and all the more so the more they are in the pathe. ....(etc.) (2.460b1ff)

Here the exercise of people's capacity for perceptual or situational appreciation has been distorted by their emotions and desires. But these conditions have not rendered them temporarily unable to perceive.

(I) doesn't imply that the ability itself is affected (e.g. sleep does not affect one's ability to perceive (e.g. see) well, accurately, etc.); all that is affected is one's ability to bring this ability to bear or to activate it. Whereas in (II) the exercise of an ability is being interfered with (e.g. one sees not well or not accurately, etc.).
Now in akrasia, the akratic's pathos (e.g. appetite) puts him in a state such that:

(a) he is temporarily unable to bring his values (value-knowledge) to bear; but (regarding this value-knowledge as an ability V) this value ability V is not itself affected\(^{70}\) (the basic values the agent holds not being supposed to change); all that is affected is his ability B to bring the ability V to bear, to activate it;

(b) but this ability B to bring ability V to bear is affected - that is, its exercise is distorted. And this ability B is the agent's perceptual or situational appreciation: i.e. the capacity to notice, register, and attend to such features in the situation as are relevant to the realization of one's (valued) goals.\(^{71}\) So the akratic's exercise of his perceptual appreciation is coloured or distorted by his pathos,\(^{72}\) in such a way that renders him temporarily unable to realise his basic values in action.

We can compare here De An.3.11.434a16-21, and the position of the 'pure theorist'.\(^{73}\)

The De An. passage claims that it is either the case that the minor premiss of situational appreciation (18-19) and not the universal major premiss that does the setting in motion, or if both, then nevertheless the universal "is more the at rest one". Why? I take it Aristotle's point is that universal knowledge just sticks there; it doesn't by itself lead to any action; it relies totally on the agent's capacity to notice that conditions hold suitable for its application or realisation. Without
that, its potential stays dormant, unrealised. This is why a 'pure theorist' would be incapable of action that expressed his knowledge; and why the agent without knowledge, but merely with experience (refined situational appreciation) can be "praktikoteros" than a theoretician.74

I conclude then in favour of (1/) - that the knowledge 'tied' in Sec.3a (that the agent is temporarily unable to 'use') is, in the akratic's case, his knowledge of what is best (or, as Aristotle would say, his knowledge of what really is worthwhile in life). And why this is so is that the 'releasing mechanism' for such knowledge - viz. perceptual or situational appreciation - is being exercised deviantly, distortedly, or colouredly.75

This is not to answer the questions of (1) how in the case of practical knowledge 'thinness' and 'richness' are distributed between the knowledge in the major premiss and situational appreciation in the minor;76 nor (2) how in detail the distortion of situational appreciation occurs; nor (3) in particular whether this failing on the part of the akratic agent's is on the intellectual side or simply on the motivational. Questions (1) and (2) I will say something about in Chapter 5; to question (3) I now turn.

4.13. Third major issue: the interpretation of 'tied' and the contrast of theoretical (TK) and practical knowledge (PK)

It may seem that our new alignment and its
interpretation has yet another implication - this time for how our third major issue can be answered.

So, for instance, Charles (1984), as outlined in Chapter 4.5., holds that:

(i) Sec.3. introduces a range of different examples where people are in a 'tied' state with regard to conclusions (which cases are ones of theoretical knowledge);

(ii) these afford parallels for the weak akratic (alone of akratics) who is likewise 'tied' simply with respect to his knowledge of the conclusion;

(iii) that what constitutes being in a 'tied' state re the conclusion differs according to whether the knowledge at issue is theoretical or (as in the case of akrasia) practical knowledge. If theoretical, then being-tied-re/merely saying the conclusion involves an intellectual failure of understanding; but if practical, the failure could be one peculiar to practical knowledge, i.e. a failure to act on the conclusion; and then being-tied-re/merely saying the practical conclusion could simply be a failure of motivation and as such compatible with the agent's entirely unclouded intellectual grasp on it.

Now we have already argued against his view of the relation of Sec.3. to Sec.4. - that instead both IA and WA are at issue in Sec.3.; and against the view that it is the conclusion that is 'tied'. And, if these arguments are on the right lines, it might seem then that his stance on the third issue collapses as a consequence. But such a response would be merely ad hominem and fail to address the difference
in the level of problems here. For Charles, I suggest, could step back from his own detailed suggestions about the argumentative structure of the text, and strive to accommodate our results within his favoured stance on our third issue (viz. the centrality of the contrast between PK and TK).

Such a re-furbished neo-Charlesian position might claim instead:

(Ni): Sec.3a tells us that all akratics are 'tied' with respect to their knowledge (where this is their universal premisses), and compares their condition to e.g. people who are asleep, mad or intoxicated;

(Nii): these illustrative examples however are of people who are 'tied' with respect to theoretical universal knowledge, and thus offer mere analogies for the akratic cases where practical universal knowledge is 'tied'. What counts as such practical knowledge being 'tied' is that the agent is temporarily unable to use it in such a manner as to derive (or arrive at) a practically effective (/non-deviantly held) practical conclusion. Either he fails to arrive at the conclusion in any way (perhaps identifiable with IA) or else he 'deviantly uses' his universal practical knowledge so as to arrive at a merely deviantly held (merely said) practical conclusion. The deviancy of this does - or can (in at least some cases) - consist simply in the conclusion's not having practical efficacy (this property not being transferred to it from the practical universal basis because the agent is 'tied' re that basis);
however this motivational failure is quite consistent with the agent's intellectually unclouded appreciation of it. The fault lies with the agent's motivational states which he has failed to integrate sufficiently with his evaluational understanding; just as in the theoretical example of the first learners (Sec.3b) their analogous intellectual failing is to integrate what they are learning into the body of knowledge they already possess.78

Such a position seems actually to be that advocated by Dahl(1984), Chp.11.: for he shares the same intuitions with Charles over the PK-TK divide, the analogousness of the Sec.3. examples, etc.; but he had allowed Sec.3. to cover the whole range of akratics and remains cagey about what knowledge is 'tied'.79

Now whether this kind of strong divide between PK and TK is (a) attributable to Aristotle and (b) philosophically sound, are large issues. I hope to pursue aspects of them further in Chapter 5; here I shall rest content with trying, at a quite close textual level, to create a prima facie case against its attribution to Aristotle here, and to suggest that Charles and Dahl have to make all the running.

The "refurbished" position holds the following: (1): while the 'tying' of universal knowledge can be given a unitary characterisation, as "the temporary inability to use the knowledge in question/realise the purpose of this knowledge", it cries out for a disjunctive account which
cashes out the purposes in question, in terms of 'the' PK-TK contrast (e.g. leading to the contemplation of individual truths in the one case; leading to a practically effective conclusion, and hence under usual circumstances, to action, in the other).

(2): Likewise the mere saying (of Case 2 - Case ii), now distinguished from the 'typing' question, nevertheless also requires a dual treatment, depending on whether PK or TK is at issue. If TK is, then "merely saying" connotes failure of intellectual understanding; if PK is, then "merely saying" just connotes failure of action ("Action not words!") and not of understanding.

Now,

(1'): while there is controversially some contrast or other between PK and TK in Sec.4a 1147a26-8, there is no explicit reference to this in Sec.3., and certainly no hint in Sec.3a (where it should occur).

In fact it would, I think, be more plausible for our theorists (neither of whom are strong on the divide between Sec.3a and 3b) to claim that all the examples at issue in Sec.3a were ones involving PK.

However, whatever the upshot here, they face also:

(2'): over the "mere saying" of Sec.3b and Sec.4c's Case 2 they must maintain its disjunctive connotations in face of the textual remarks:

(i) ...consequently just as (kathaper) the people reciting, in such a manner (houtos) one should judge also those acting akratically to merely-say (legein). (1147a22-4)
(ii) ...or have it (sc. the FP) in such a manner (houtos) as to have it is not to know (epistasthai) but to merely-say (legein) it just as (hosper) the drunk man (merely says) Empedocles' stuff. (1147b11-12)

I don't think it is possible to square our theorists' need for disjunctive connotations of "merely say" with these passages. (And they can't and don't claim that all these "merely saying" cases are after all cases of PK.)

I conclude then that "merely say" does imply a cognitive failing, some lack of understanding.

4.14. Conclusions

The main results of this Chapter are arguments for the following conclusions:

(1) that Sec.3. concerns akrasia DGI, where the generality is more than merely generality^7.3. and at least generality7.1-10. WA & IA;

(2) that the knowledge with respect to which the akratic is put in a condition such that he is temporarily unable to use it is his knowledge of his values (of what is worthwhile in life) - i.e. his universal premisses (on the model in 7.3.);

(3) that we have prima facie strong textual grounds against supposing that, in cases where practical as against theoretical knowledge (sic) is concerned, "merely saying" the conclusion can be understood in terms simply of a motivational failure of practical efficacy compatible with
unchoked intellectual apprehension on the part of the agent. On the contrary some intellectual failing or 'clouding' is suggested (where this "intellectual" does not suppose the kind of PK-TK contrast demanded by the opposed view).
CHAPTER FIVE

PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY ON SEC. 4.

5.0.

Sec. 4. is a Pandora's box of problems, both of detailed exegesis and of wider philosophical issues. Our discussion will perforce be selective.

In Section 1 I concentrate on some of the more detailed problems; while in Section 2 I turn to pursue more major issues. I offer first a basic translation with some comments in the notes.

Basic translation

Section 4a

Further, also in the following naturalistic manner someone might detailedly look into the cause. For the one proposition/belief is a universal belief, while the other concern with the particulars, of which perception is thereby authoritative. And whenever one proposition/belief results from them, it is necessary vis-a-vis this that has been concluded that there on the one hand the soul assert it, while in the productive propositions on the other does it straightway: for example, if one should taste every sweet thing, and this here is sweet (as some single individual among the particulars), it is necessary for the man that is able and not being hindered at the same time this also actually to do. Whenever then the universal proposition on the one hand is in forbidding to taste, and the proposition on the other is in him saying that every sweet thing is pleasant, and this here is sweet and this latter is active and an appetite happens to be in the agent, the one then merely says to flee this while the appetite leads.
able. Consequently it results that one acts akratically by reasoning in a sense and a belief, but not opposed in itself but accidentally - for it is the appetite that is opposed but not the belief - to the correct account; consequently also on account of this beasts are not akratic because they do not have universal judgement but phantasia and memory of particulars.

Section 4b

And how the ignorance is dissolved and the akratic becomes once again a knower, there is the same account also concerning the intoxicated and the sleeper and not one that is peculiar to this affection, - (an account) which one should hear from the physiologists.

Section 4c

Bywater (OCT) version

And since the final proposition is both a belief of an object-of-perception and authoritative over the actions, this either (the akratic) does not have being in the pathos or has in the manner such that the having does not amount to knowing but to merely-saying, just like the intoxicated the things of Empedocles. And because of the fact that the last term is not (a) universal nor yet is thought to be an object-of-knowledge in a similar manner to the universal (term), what Socrates was seeking even/actually seems to result:

Ramsauer version

And since the final proposition is both a belief of an object-of-perception and authoritative over the actions, and (sc.since) this either (the akratic) does not have being in the pathos or has in the manner such that the having does not amount to knowing but to merely-saying, just like the intoxicated the things of Empedocles, and because of the fact that the last term is not (a) universal nor yet is thought to be an object-of-knowledge in a similar manner to the universal (term), what Socrates was seeking even/actually seems to result:

for it is not in the presence of what is thought to be strictly knowledge that the pathos occurs - nor yet is this "dragged around" because of the pathos - but in the presence of perceptual
SECTION 1

DETAILED PROBLEMS

5.1.1. Problems of the basic structure

There are four connected problems: the 'Phusikos puzzle', the '4b problem' of how 4b connects with the sections either side, the '4c puzzle' and finally the 'Ramsauer problem'.

The Phusikos puzzle

I have already indicated the general line I adopt. In the absence of any viable alternative we should accept:

(i) "phusikōs" occurs in contrast with an (implicit) "logikōs";
(ii) all three preceding sections, 1-3., have been "logikōs" in their approach.

If so, then Aristotle is deploying here a contrast he makes explicitly elsewhere between "considering a matter logikos, or dialektikos", and "considering a matter phusikos". But we still need to interpret this distinction.

The following characterisation would, I suggest, be moderately non-controversial and adequate for present purposes:

(iii) (a) To discuss something phuskos is to discuss it in terms of, or with reference to, its "peculiar first principles" (oikeiai archai);
(b) conversely "logikos" imports notions of generality and distance from the specific subject matter.
To discuss something logikos is to discuss it in terms of principles or distinctions that have wider application than to the specific issue on hand.\textsuperscript{30}

Such a distinction is just what suits our analysis of the relations between Sec.1-3. and Sec.4a. For if the theses of Chapters 2 to 4 are correct, Sec.1-3. concern akrasia DGI - and in particular inclusively along with other non-akratic phenomena. Sec.4a by contrast manifestly concerns akrasia exclusively. Again, this distinction suits well the claims that Sec.1-3. consider akrasia generally and that so does Sec.4. (including Sec.4a: for if Sec.4a's phusikos discussion turned out to apply only to a specific type of akrasia, then it would have homed in too far, and, giving an account of the nature of a sub-species of the phenomenon at issue rather than the phenomenon itself, be guilty of over-specificity.) In line with this we have already argued (Chapter 4.11.) that while in Sec.4a Aristotle takes an example of the basic case with verbal frills as his explanandum, this does not differ from the basic case in such a way as to make it into a different type of akrasia (in some suitably strong sense of "type"). (There is a sense here in which Rowe's intuition that only one case is at issue is correct, though not in the way or sense he supposed.)

If this interpretation of phusikos is correct, then, combined with our earlier results,\textsuperscript{31} the overall articulation of the four building-block sections of
Aristotle's argument turns out as:

(1) Sec.1-2. reveal ambiguities in the Socratic premiss that indicate conceptual room for akrasia;
(2) Sec.3. argues that akrasia, together with other phenomena, actually occupies that room;
(3) Sec.4a homes in on akrasia by itself, and explains how it specifically occurs (/is possible).

This allows us to contrast Sec.1-3. with 4a in terms of the inclusivity and exclusivity of their treatment of akrasia. We do not need to denigrate one approach in favour of the other, nor suppose they address quite different questions. Instead the approaches are complementary and focussed on the same issue.

The 4b problem

In the further clarification of phusikos it is helpful to invoke the difference between an idios/oikeios logos (a peculiar/specific account) and a koinos logos (a common/shared account). To approach some phenomenon phusikos is to approach it with a view to giving an account that is peculiar (idios) to it, distinctive of it as against any other phenomenon. By contrast to approach it logikos involves viewing it in the light of (e.g.) conceptual or logical distinctions that have more universal application.

It is tempting to describe Sec.1-3. as offering us something of a koinos logos of akrasia: an account(s) that shows how akrasia is possible inclusively with certain other phenomena. And Sec.4a offers us the idios logos.
This latter claim is confirmed by Sec. 4b:

But as to how the ignorance is dissolved and the akrates becomes again a knower, there is the same account also concerning the man drunk and asleep and not one peculiar to this pathos.

This implies that Sec. 4a has provided an account which is peculiar (idios) to "this pathos": i.e. that there is a logos peculiar (idios) to akrasia over how it arises (Sec. 4a), but there just is not one peculiar to the dispersal of the akratic's condition.

But if so, this contrast between Sec. 4a and 4b suffices to justify 4b's place in the argument, and so largely resolves the '4b problem'. The thread of the argument goes:

4a: "Here is an account of how specifically (it is possible for) a man comes to act akratically...."

4b: "But as for an explanation of how the akratic recovers his knowledge, well there isn't anything specific to akrasia about that...(and anyway it involves considerations of a kind which are not à propos for us to go into)."

I take these solutions to be mutually reinforcing.

If I am correct about the relation holding between Sec. 4a and 4b it inevitably implies that the akratic of Sec. 4a suffers from the agnoia mentioned in 1147b6. But this was already suggested by the use of "legein" (merely-say) at 1147a34 instead of "phanai" (to affirm: cf. 1147a27-8). It is in fact part of Aristotle's
NE.7.3. position.

The 4c puzzle

Now this solution to the Phusikos puzzle and the 4b problem also illuminates the 4c puzzle. For if phusikos intimates the investigative quest for a specific account, this is over by 4a fin: for 4a contrasts with 4b's point about the lack of such an account for recovery from akrasia. This suggests that 4c will be free to draw some more general conclusion.

However I think we can do better than this rather vague statement. Looking afresh at 1147a31-b17 suggests the following structure:

(1) a31-5: the phusikos account of the aitia of akrasia;
(2) a35-b3: Consequence 1 (hoste) (cf. what results 'sumbainei' from the account);
(3) b3-5: Consequence 2 (hoste);
(4) b6-9: an additional remark (de) which is virtually an aside (we could indeed bracket it), but whose point in the context is as elucidated above;
(5) b9-17: a third larger consequence of the position.

Here Aristotle draws on other material that has emerged in the discussion (b10-12) and on wider philosophical points (b13-14), in order to draw out the import (what results: sumbainein b15) of his account for the resolution (lusis) of the problem which is the chapter's central concern - Socrates' problem.

However Sec.4c is not as simple as this suggests.
The Ramsauer problem

Precisely what point(s) is Aristotle out to make in Sec. 4c?

Unfortunately the argumentative structure is problematic. Should we accept Ramsauer's "and" at 1147b10 and so make the three clauses b9-14 into a conjunctive protasis for the apodosis of b14-15; or should we accept Bywater's OCT which makes b9-10 the protasis for an apodosis at b10-12, and b13-14 a separate protasis for a further apodosis at b14-15? That is the grammatical question. Argumentatively there are three basic positions (label b9-10, (1); b10-12, (2); b13-14, (3); b14-15, (4); b15-17, (5)):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ramsauer</th>
<th>OCT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Premise: (1) &amp; (2) &amp; (3)</td>
<td>Premise: (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion: (4)</td>
<td>Conclusion: (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premise: (3)</td>
<td>Premise: (2) &amp; (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion: (4)</td>
<td>Conclusion: (4)</td>
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Explanation of (4): (5)

Position I and III are close (indeed if one allows that on the Ramsauer reading premisses (1) and (2) could stand in an argumentative relation to each other, one can regard I and III as equivalent). Anyone opting for II must ask themselves about the relation of (2) and (3): are they totally independent, or is Aristotle relying on the reader to supply an argumentative relation between them?
Interpretatively the importance of the issue hangs on whether the prime focus of the whole section is on (4) - as on I in a one-stage argument, and on III in a two-stage argument - or whether one takes it to make two separate points (2) and (4), as on a straightforward version of II. And, given the possibility of III, this important issue still arises for those who reject Ramsauer's emendation.

If one takes Aristotle to be making two separate points here, then one must explain both:

(a) why he makes (1) grounds for (2); and
(b) what the point of making this remark here is.

(a) I find something of a puzzle. Certainly if non-deviantly having (= exercising?) the FP (however understood) suffices for appropriate rational action, then the akratic ex hypothesi cannot be non-deviantly holding it. But this seems an odd explanatory direction for Aristotle to go in at this point. Particularly so if, (b), the point of the remark is supposed to be largely a summarising one, over different types of akrasia he has discussed in Sec. 2b-4. But our investigations do not support such a gathering together of disparate treatments; rather Case 1 and Case 2 here seem to be simply alluding to the basic and 'verbal frill' cases of Sec.3. Of course Aristotle could be re-stating his basic position; but then why the "since..." clause?

As evident in the discussion of the 4c puzzle
above, my intuitions favour taking 4c's focus to be simply on (4). Aristotle has shown us the possibility of akrasia logikos and now phusikos. It is time explicitly to size up the results with reference to the Socratic thesis that caused the trouble: to supply explicitly the lusis to this aporia.

However this requires a fuller discussion of 4c.

5.1.2. The structure of 1147a25-35; (TK) v. (FK); and necessity

(1) Sec.4a divides up roughly as follows:

(1) a24-5: aim;
(2) a25-31: background theory of action generation/explanation in the normal case; \^35
(3) a31-5: analysis of akrasia against this background;
(4) a35-b3: consequence 1;
(5) b3-5: consequence 2.

Our interest here focuses on a25-35, and in particular on a25-31 (the key a31-5 passage we consider among the larger issues in Section 2 below). However a25-31 is important for our understanding of the subsequent passage and of the general theory Aristotle is here working with. Various problems have arisen, over whether Aristotle is contrasting theoretical with practical reason at a27-8, and if so, what contrast he is exploiting; over whether he
is in fact concerned here with practical reason rather than 'technical', or strictly productive reason; over the role he is according "necessity" (a27, 30).

The simple articulation of a25-35 strikes me as:
(i) a25-6: a general background thesis contrasting two sorts of belief/proposition - one about universals, the other about particulars where perception is in charge (cf. De An.3.11.434a16ff);
(ii) a26-31: Whenever 1. Aristotle here describes what happens in a normal case when one belief/proposition results from a pair of propositions of the sorts in (i) - especially when the content of those propositions is practical. In a26-8 he gives a formal description, and then a29-31 follows it up with an illustration ("hoion") of the practical case, which fills out the formal description and prepares us for the akratic case to come.
(iii) a31ff: Whenever 2. Aristotle now takes these results and analyses what happens in akrasia against the backdrop of the preceding 'normal' case.

(2)
The supplementational reading
Whenever one belief/proposition results from (is drawn from) two propositions, one of the universal form and one of the particular form of a25-6, there is a necessity that in that case (entha) the soul affirm (phanai) what has been concluded (= Condition 1), and should the propositions happen to be practical the soul must do what has been
What is the overt relation of Condition 1 - the Affirmation Condition - and Condition 2 - the Action Condition? Are they just analogical - in the one case (entha), where the propositions are theoretical (indeed is "entha" the corrupted relic of "en tais theoretikais"?), Condition 1 must be met, while in the other case, of practical (or productive) reason, Condition 2 must be met instead? I.e. does Condition 1 stand to theoretical reason as Condition 2 stands to practical (or productive) reason? However, many of those who take this line offer no account of what they take the point of Aristotle's drawing such an analogy to be; and where some account is offered it is as likely as not to be critical of Aristotle as trying to press the (TK)-(FK) analogy too far or to offer a plainly false account (as we shall see over "necessity").

Besides this analogical reading of the relations between Conditions 1 and 2 there is another, and I hold preferable, reading - the supplementational. This interprets the passage thus:

'Whenever one belief/proposition results, the soul must in that eventuality (entha men) on the one hand affirm this conclusion (= Condition 1), and in the subset of cases where the propositions are practical on the other (de) the soul must (also) do the conclusion (= meet Condition 2 as well as Condition 1).'

In other words, in all cases where "one results"
the soul must at least meet Condition 1, and if the propositions are in fact practical it must meet Condition 2 as well.

So for example the zoologist who knows that all mules are sterile and that this is a mule must, if he puts these together so that "this (mule) here is sterile" results, affirm (cf. believe) this conclusion. The grammarian - or literate person - who knows that all signs of form "a" are tokens of a, and who perceives of this mark, a, that it is an "a", must, if he puts these together so that "this (a) here is an a" results, affirm this conclusion. Likewise the person who knows that it is best (given his values) that presents receive thank-you letters, and that this is a present, must, if he puts these together so that "it is best (given my values) that this receives a thank-you letter" results, affirm this conclusion; but he must also set about writing this thank-you letter. 40

(3) (TK)-(PK) and necessity

If this supplementational account is correct, it solves the worries that some scholars have felt over whether or not Aristotle is here exploiting a strong contrast between TR and PR, and if not, what he is then doing. Equally it undermines accounts that do presuppose there is some such strong contrast.

Within this latter group, a principal point that has been seen as the focus of Aristotle's exploitation of
a (TK)-(FK) parallel here is an attempt to use logical validity to illuminate the necessity with which an action must follow from certain other psychological states.41

However to see any such point at least in the present text is based on a straightforward misreading. The "necessity" mentioned (a27) is not the above logical necessity. The necessity in 'both' cases is psychological: if the conclusion is drawn the soul must in any case affirm it, and if practical in content must (also) act it.42

(4)
The Parallel; Relations between Conditions 1 and 2 and the Supplementational reading

On a natural reading of the supplementational interpretation of the overt relations between Conditions 1 and 2, the consequence is simply an action requirement on practical belief content. In other words, in cases where beliefs via their content have import for actions, the failure of the agent to conform his action to his beliefs is prima facie (i.e. defeasible) evidence against his occurrently holding that belief. This is simply a feature of the content. If someone says that touching daffodils is dangerous to health, then to find them sprawling in a bed of February Gold counts as evidence either that they have changed their mind or that they didn't sincerely hold that belief or that they aren't occurrently holding it (they have, say, temporarily forgotten it under the pressure of some urgent need to sprawl in yellow) or that they can't
recognise (February Golds as) daffodils or that they believe there is at the time a greater danger in not so doing, or...(N). The question of the range of defeasibility manoeuvres over this action-requirement is of paramount importance (as will soon become obvious).

Part of the evidence I would produce in support of this supplementational interpretation, apart from its being the natural interpretation of the text, and apart from difficulties facing other interpretations, comes from Aristotle's 'parallel' exploitation of these Conditions in the subsequent passage that deals with akrasia.

The akratic cannot ex hypothesi fulfil Condition 2. And as I interpret him, Aristotle also claims that the akratic does not meet Condition 1 either: for his akratic does not affirm (phanai) the conclusion "flee this" but "merely-says" (legein) it. This "merely-says" is a definite failure to meet Condition 1.

If these two claims are right - that of the supplementational model and of the akratic's "legein" failure to meet even Condition 1 - then the crucial question becomes that of what Aristotle takes to be the covert or internal relation between Conditions 1 and 2.

To uphold the possibility of last-ditch akrasia seems straightforwardly to maintain the possibility of satisfying Condition 1 without 2 in the case of occurrent beliefs whose content the agent accepts he should act on. In other words, a last-ditch case in central akrasia would
be constituted by an agent acting on an appetite in violation of a best judgement - where that judgement:
(a) was rendered inoperant in directing the agent's activity/i.e. failed Condition 2;
(b) yet was nevertheless still occurrently believed by the agent (i.e. met Condition 1);
(c) yet the appetite was not compulsive (nor...).
What last-ditchers maintain in effect is that a countervailing appetite can count as a defeasible condition in list (N) above, and can do so in such a way as to allow us still to credit the agent/an unclouded occurrent appreciation of his best judgement, and the freedom to conform his actions to his protestations - where this means the absence of compulsions. The notion of compulsion here is not simple; but it is the explication of the conditions on unclouded occurrent appreciation that are the most difficult of all.

Aristotle then, in rejecting Condition 1 along with Condition 2, appears to reject last-ditch akrasia. And I think he does. (But even so there is still a question about why Condition 1 should fail when Condition 2 does in akrasia: more anon.)

(5)
Charles' Manoeuvre in defence of Last-Ditch Akrasia here

However an attempt has been made (by Charles and by Dahl) to claim that the "merely-saying" attitude to a proposition indicates different sorts of failure depending
on whether the proposition is theoretical or practical: if it is theoretical, then it is a failure of understanding, where the relevant sort of understanding is purely cognitive; but if the proposition is practical, then the failure of understanding is a failure peculiar to practical understanding or (PK) - a motivational failure to act, a failure of motivational and evaluational integration, compatible with unclouded intellectual appreciation of the content.

Charles provides a clear statement of this line in connection with our present passage when he says:

In this reading of 1147a20-35 (and b9-12) the akrates need undergo no intellectual failure. When he is described as saying the conclusion (a34, b11-12), this is to be contrasted with his knowing practically what to do, and not with his asserting the conclusion (1147a27-8). As such, he fulfils one of the disjuncts specified in 1139a25-6 as his reasoning is correct, and he asserts its conclusion, but since his desires are not correct... he lacks practical knowledge. (p.167, n.3; my emphasis) 47

"Διηγόμενον" (legein) is, for Charles, compatible, in the case where what is "said" is practical knowledge, with the akrates "knowing intellectually full well that x is the better course and his realising that he has strong reasons against y" (p.167):

the akrates may know intellectually that what he is doing is wrong while acting intentionally. This failure of knowledge is a failure of practical rather than theoretical knowledge; it is the akrates' preferential desire that is flawed, because of the presence of an opposed sensual desire, and so he does not want appropriately to do what he judges best. (p.167; cf. p.191)
(6)

Response to Charles

In connection with the first passage quoted above, I find myself in disagreement with three more or less specific points and considerably worried over a more general one. The three specific points are these:

(a) His "reading of 1147a20-35 (and b9-12)", which is expounded particularly on pages 166-7. The upshot is his interpretation of the first learners' failure and the suggestion that the akratic's failure is only analogous to this in such a way that the sort of failure of integration undergone by the akratic (value judgements with motivational states) is compatible, as the first learners' failure of integration is not, with full intellectual knowledge (of what is best to do now given his values, and of all his reasons against φ-ing). 48

(b) that the akratic's saying (legein) the conclusion (a34) is not to be contrasted with asserting (phanai) the conclusion. 49

(c) that the akratic satisfies one but not the other "disjunct" of NE.6.2.1139a25-6.

My disagreements are these:

(a') I have already urged that the text allows no plausible room for such analogical manoeuvres (cf. Chapter 4.13.). Aristotle appeals to a range of cases (or if I am right, two cases: cf. 4.3.) simply to persuade us of the delimited point that appropriate enunciation (to others or self) is
no adequate evidence for supposing that knowledge is being thereby expressed. The akratic who says the right things (the things that encapsulate his knowledge/values) is 'merely-saying' them, and is cognitively distanced from them.

(b') Against (b) I have claimed that a25-31 and its relation to a31-5 is, on the contrary, best viewed as committed precisely to making this contrast between the normal person's and agent's affirming the conclusion and the akratic's merely-saying it. This is supported by (a')s point about Aristotle's use of "legein".

(c') NE.6.2.1139a21-6 runs:

And there is what in thought is affirmation and denial, this in desire (orexis) is pursuit and flight; consequently since excellence of character is a state involving preferential choice, and preferential choice is a desire out of deliberation, it is necessary on account of these reasons on the one hand for both the reasoning (logos) to be true and the desire to be correct if the preferential choice is to be good, and for it to be the same things that the one (the reasoning) affirms (phanai) and that the other (desire) pursues.

There will not be any preferential choice - let alone a good one - if it is not the case that what reason affirms as good the agent also desires to pursue. This does not logically imply what Charles takes it to: namely that there can be cases where a person's reason affirms that such and such is best to do and yet he does not desire to pursue it at the same time. At best this is a 'conversational implication'.

Here is a passage that cancels that implication:
Whenever the soul affirms or denies good or bad, it flees or pursues. (De An. 3.7.431a15-16)

Naturally it is not satisfying to sling passages around like this where what is demanded is a fuller treatment. My point is primarily that the Greek does not explicitly say what Charles here apparently claims. Whether it is to be interpreted as implying it is a matter for further argument.

Charles sees this same possibility of the akratic's fulfilling only one of two (separable) conditions on being practically wise: viz. fulfilling:

Condition 1: affirms the conclusion that the phronimos affirms; but not fulfilling:
Condition 2: acting on the affirmed conclusion - as promulgated in another - equally controversial - passage, 7.10.1152a8-15. Thus he says:

(i) In NE/EE VII 2 practical knowledge is a candidate for the relevant type of knowledge (loc. cit.) overruled in the case of akrasia (1145b22-26). Aristotle rejects this possibility by saying that a man could not be practically wise and akratic. If practical knowledge is intellectual knowledge plus acting on it (1152a8-10), the akrates could fail to have practical knowledge precisely because he fails to act on his (uncloaked) intellectual knowledge that doing x is best. (p.161, n.1; my emphases)

(ii) The account so far is neutral as to which version of Moderate Desire-based theory is advanced in VII 3, as it has not analysed the akrates' failure to 'know' the good conclusion which he says but does not act on. Does this failure indicate one of intellect (e.g. insincerity, clouded judgement, failure to see
a consequence) or one of desire which is compatible with the akrates' knowing full well (intellectually) that what he is doing is wrong? Elsewhere (1152a8-9, 13-14) Aristotle notes that:

A man is practically wise not only by knowing but by acting; but the akrates does not act...for although he is near to the practically wise in reasoning, he differs in preferential desire.

Here, the failure of the akrates consists in his not properly desiring to do what he judges as best (1151a6-7); for if he did, he would do it (1048a10-13). If so, his failure is one of practical knowledge which arises because he does not desire to do the good action decisively. (pp.164-5; my emphases)

Thus he sees in this passage, as in that of NE.6.2., the possibility of the affirmation Condition 1 and the desiderative/decisively-desiderative/action Condition 2 coming apart and the first being satisfied without the second. Against this I argue as follows.

Charles' Index locorum references are not accurate on this passage and its surrounds, but so far as I can see he nowhere makes any actual reference to the lines 1152a14-15 which follow on from the passage he quotes in (ii) above:

- so nor yet as the knowing, i.e. contemplating, but as the man sleeping or intoxicated.

We have come across his failure to discuss these lines before - they constituted our constraint (c) in Chapter 4 (see Chapter 4.6, and 4.9.). Their presence prima facie undermines his present point that this passage shows that
the akratic may meet the affirmation/knowledge condition: for isn't Aristotle precisely denying this here? Well I think he is. But perhaps Charles would reply as follows:

"What we have to understand here is that the sense in which the akratic is said to be not actually knowing, not 'contemplating', refers to practical knowledge - and this is compatible with his intellectually knowing the conclusion full well; the comparisons with the man asleep and drunk are merely analogies in the case of theoretical, as against practical, knowledge."

If he were to do so, (a) I hope to have already indicated that he has not given us sufficient reason to follow him; (b) it would be too implausible to be possible in the context - for the following reason. The passage, 1152a8-15, is arguing that the practically wise and the akratic are not the same person. The skeletal structure of its argument is this:

Further a person is phronimos not only (I) by knowing, but also (II) by being praktikos. But the akratic is (II) not praktikos, ..., so nor yet (I) as the knowing, i.e. contemplating person, but as the person asleep or intoxicated.

It is clear that Charles takes "knowing" (a8) as "intellectually knowing" (this is especially evident in quotation (i) above;) to take "knowing" as Charlesian "practical knowing" would be so dramatic a shift as to border on inconsistency and invalidate what appears to be the obvious thrust of the argument.
But if Charles does not offer such a reply, then I do not see what other reply he has to the original *prima facie* point. 53

These doubts and attacks on Charles' interpretation of NE.6.2. and 7.10. in conjunction with his view on our current 7.3. passage are in fact not merely local skirmishes. They are part and parcel of a strategy to effect a general écroulement of his attribution to Aristotle of a (particular version of) Moderate Desire-based theory, and ultimately of the general analysis of desire he wishes to attribute to Aristotle. However it is not to my purpose to press this here. I conclude these remarks on Charles with a more general worry.

We remarked earlier that one of the greatest difficulties in this area was producing a principled account of the conditions on a belief (of practical content) being occurrently and uncloudedly held. Now Charles, in the passages quoted and in many others, appeals to a notion of "(intellectually) knowing full well" - it is precisely this notion that he needs in order to formulate the possibility of the kind of split he envisages between *Condition 1* (the Affirmation Condition) and *2* (the Action Condition). He wishes to allow that an akratic may "intellectually know" it is best for him to $\emptyset$ etc., while $\not\rightarrow$-ing instead due simply to a failure in his motivational structure.

Obviously then this notion of "intellectually knowing full well" must be handled with some care. Let us
start by separating the following two positions:

**Position 1**: the conditions for occurrently intellectually knowing full well that p can be met without what is known/affirmed having occurrently any motivational force (even where p is practical in content);

**Position 2**: the conditions for occurrently intellectually knowing full well that p can be met without what is known/affirmed having occurrently **decisive** motivational force or upshot.

Now **position 1** is decompositional\(^54\) in essence. On it, someone who has (FK) is viewed as having to satisfy two separable conditions - a cognitive condition involving their arriving at and affirming a true best judgement about what to do, and a motivational condition which leads them to accept that judgement in such a way as to want to act on it (in fact, to want most of all to act on it). The adherent of this position needn't be committed to its being a mere accident that the above two conditions are ever co-satisfied. But he is limited in the kind of explanation he can provide. For on this position the conditions are separately satisfiable - at least\(^55\) to the extent that someone who, like the akratic, lacks (FK), may satisfy the cognitive condition but not the motivational condition: and this in the strong sense that they may have no occurrent desire at all to do what they affirm is best for them.

Against this (strongly noncognitivist) position
the rival non-decompositional account holds that it is part and parcel of fully cognitively apprehending items that, where appropriate, they exercise a certain motivational efficacy with the agent: e.g. it is part of (a condition on) uncloudedly apprehending that "this bus is likely to run me over" or "this bus is dangerous" that its realisation moves one to get out of the way (unless...). The akratic on this account must then surely have at least some desire to act on his affirmed best judgement (supposing him to meet the cognitive condition of unclouded understanding).

Position 2 would, unlike the strongly noncognitivist position 1, be able to accommodate the above anti-noncognitivist thought. If the adherent of position 2 did so, then in connection with weak akrasia his claim would be that the akratic:

(a) in satisfying the cognitive/affirmation condition vis-a-vis his best judgement, must thereby be occurrently motivated in some degree to perform the action; but
(b) that his failure to perform the action is a failure to satisfy the motivational condition now viewed as a failure to desire decisively to do it. Further, unlike position 1, the adherent of position 2 who accommodates the anti-noncognitivist thought may be enabled to offer a more convincing account of the co-satisfaction of the two conditions in the practically wise.

What, in turn, will an anti-noncognitivist make of position 2? Setting aside worries about "decisiveness", 
obviously he won't reject it wholesale. He may nevertheless claim that there are certain kinds of item for which position 2 is false; one might, for instance, interpret McDowell's view that uncloudedly understanding moral requirements involves their silencing other considerations as just such a claim. Now whatever one thinks of that example, the most obvious candidate of all for an item for which position 2 is false - for which the conditions on uncloudedly intellectually knowing it do involve its exercising decisive motivational force - is a best judgement (whether of an unconditional or an all-things-considered form). It is part of the notion of a best judgement in the required sense that one (possibly intentionally) forms it in order to act on it - as a means of deciding what to do. Its content is thus rather special; and it can seem that uncloudedly apprehending it precisely involves its exercising not merely some motivational efficacy with the agent, but a decisive motivational efficacy: that that is what apprehending it as a best judgement involves (cf. what is involved in understanding "best to do" in the judgement's content).

My more general worries about Charles' account are these:

(i) Does he make clear in his talk of "intellectually knowing full well" whether he has position 1 or position 2 in mind? (And if so, does he remain consistent?)
(ii) If he adopts position 2 it will not take him as easily as perhaps he supposes to his conclusion that Aristotle allows the akratic full intellectual understanding of the good conclusion. In fact, it should, I hope, have become apparent that, at least in connection with the passages we have considered, all the evidence is that Aristotle rejected position 2 for the good conclusion: that the failure of \textbf{Condition 2} (whether or not construed in terms of decisiveness) in the akratic scenario entails the failure of \textbf{Condition 1}, viz.:

'No appropriate best action because of akratic interference of appetite (etc.) \rightarrow no contemporaneous unclouded affirmation of the good conclusion.'

(iii) Is position 2 a half-hearted attempt to accommodate the thoughts that drive the anti-noncognitivist? It certainly does not do enough to resolve the peculiar strains that appear when the item of knowledge in question is a best judgement.
5.2.1. 1147a31ff and the "Practical Syllogism"

What noun, or noun phrase, is to be understood after "he de" in 1147a32?¹

Two main options have been canvassed. The first (A) - the more traditional view - supplies another "katholou (sc. protasis/doxa)"; "he de" then contrasts with the preceding "he men katholou" of 1147a31-2. The second (B) understands "hetera (sc. protasis/doxa)", as in 1147a25, thus taking the "men" and "de" here (a31-32) as there to introduce a contrast between major and minor propositions.²

This difference in grammatical interpretation emerges at the philosophical level in the question:
(Q1): Are there two practical syllogisms or only one at issue in a31ff?

Both sides to this controversy share the assumption that if (A) we understand a second "katholou", the text presents us with two PSs, while if (B) the contrast adverts to that of 1147a25 "he de" here introduces a minor premiss.

We need to flesh out these various interpretations.

(A): Those who understand "katholou" and so view the passage as involving two practical syllogisms take the major proposition of one - the practical syllogism of reason (RPS) - to be the content of the katholou protasis described in
a31 as "kolouosa geuesthai"; and the major proposition of the second - the practical syllogism of appetite (APS) - to be "pan gluku hedu" (a32-3).

Holders of this view then divide, depending on the position they take over the inter-dependent questions of the precise content of the RFS's major proposition and of whether the minor proposition "touti de gluku" is shared by both the RPS and APS or peculiar to the APS. At its simplest the contrast here turns on whether or not the description under which the RFS instructs one to avoid something is taken to be the same as that under which it is found 'pleasant' in the APS. ³

Call these two interpretations the Sharing 2 Practical Syllogism Interpretation (S2PS) ⁴ and the Independent 2 Practical Syllogism Interpretation (I2PS). ⁵

One might hold the S2PS: either because one held that the content of the major proposition of the RFS was along the lines of:

"one should not taste anything sweet"
- perhaps on the grounds of being the most obvious way to cash it out in the light of a29ff - in which case "touti de gluku" is determined as a relevant minor premiss for the RFS; or because one held that "touti de gluku" must be a minor premiss relevant to the major of the RPS - on the grounds, for instance, that no other minor premiss is explicitly mentioned - and so once again the content of that major proposition is determined as being along the
"one should not taste anything sweet",
i.e. as having a content such that "touti de gluku" is relevant to it; or some complementary version of both approaches.

On the I2PS the minor "touti de gluku" is peculiar to the APS; if so, neither the unmentioned minor premiss of the RPS nor its mentioned but incompletely characterised major ("kolouosa geuesthai") can advert to sweetness (at least not as the unqualifiedly relevant feature): the major says "nothing that is x should be tasted" and the minor "this is x", where whatever x is, it is not 'sweet' (on pain of reduction to S2PS). A typical reason for advocating I2PS over S2PS would be a belief that "he teleuataia protasis" of 1147b9 refers to the minor premiss (of the RPS); for if the minor premiss is common to both the RPS and the APS, and the akratic "either doesn't have it in his passion or only deviantly has it in a way that doesn't count as knowing", then on a straightforward reading the akratic can't be acting intentionally, (hekousios).

(B): If we understand "hetera protasis" with "he de", then we get a position we may label the **Practical Syllogism Interpretation** (1PS).

This view, advocated by Kenny(1966), endorsed by Rowe(1971), p.118, and recently re-affirmed by Kenny(1979, p.159; p.159, n.2), claims that:
we have here not two conflicting syllogisms, but a single syllogism which has two premisses: the universal premiss which forbids tasting, and a composite minor premiss which says "everything sweet is pleasant and this is sweet". ((1966), p.180)

According to this, there is only one syllogism; we have just been told the content of the (composite) minor premiss; what then is the content of the corresponding major premiss (the one "koluousa guesthai")?

if we are right in taking "everything sweet is pleasant, and this is sweet" as the particular premiss, then the universal premiss must be something like "taste nothing pleasant". ((1966), p.181)

5.2.2. Kenny on the RPS's major proposition

At this point, I digress to consider Kenny's arguments for this view of the RPS's major proposition (5.2.2.); and then a difficulty about the shared premisses of the S2PS (5.2.3.) - and pick up the main thread of my argument in 5.2.4.

Kenny has two arguments for construing the content of the RPS's major proposition as concerning the avoidance of tasting things qua pleasant.

The first, evident in the passage just quoted, is simply that, given the content of a (MiP) and its relevance to a (MaP) one can deductively reconstruct the content (or partial content) of that (MaP).
The difficulty for Kenny is that the (MiP) relevant to the (MaP) "Taste nothing pleasant" is:

"This is pleasant".

But this is not, but is only entailed by, what Kenny claims is the (composite) (MiP), viz.:

"Everything sweet is pleasant and this is sweet". 7

Still, if Kenny is right about the composite nature of the (MiP), this is a difficulty perhaps we must live with. Alternatively we may chalk it up against this interpretation of the (MiP).

Kenny's second argument 8 is independent of his view on the composite nature of the (MiP): it premisses:
(i) the akratic's major premiss must be characteristic of the temperate man, for the akratic shares his principles;
(ii) the temperate man is concerned with things qua pleasant.

One can agree with these premisses; indeed one should perhaps do so, (i) being strongly supported by e.g. 7.10.1152a17, 20ff and (ii), modified to a concern with things qua productive of certain physical pleasures, by e.g. 7.5.1149a21ff, cf. 7.4.1147b23ff. 9 Nevertheless one may resist the conclusion that:
(iii) therefore the (MaP) here is:

"Don't taste (physically) pleasant things (at all/to excess)".

For if the (MaP) in question here is viewed as an outcome of deliberation, there seems no reason why it should not be
a great deal more specific than (iii)'s version.

In support of (iii) appeal may be made to 1146b22-3\(^{10}\) where "thinking one should always pursue the present pleasure" is plausibly taken as expressing the akolastic's basic commitment (or view of what constitutes the worthwhile life); and again to (possibly) minor premiss announcements by "logos or perception" to the effect that "〈this is〉 pleasant" at 7.6.1149a35.

Against this are firstly the nature of the preceding example which Aristotle offers at 1147a29-31, whose (MaP) is "one should taste everything sweet", and which, in consistency with Kenny's premisses (i) and (ii) should presumably be regarded as a more specific (MaP) of the akolastic's.\(^{11}\) Now our example a31ff has one same (MiP) (this is sweet), and a (MaP) concerning tasting: the most natural supposition is to understand "sweet" also in our (MaP). Kenny of course must resist this. He does so by claiming that the example at issue in a29-31 is merely a technical syllogism (unlike a31ff), on the grounds that "en tais poietikais" (a28) marks "the usual contrast between poiesis and praxis" ((1979), pp.157-8; esp. n.2, p.157).

This reply fails:\(^{12}\)
(a) It doesn't address the points of similarity in the examples (nor exhibit a proper grip on the structure of the passage);
(b) its positive suggestion is totally implausible.

Aristotle often doesn't use poiein/prattein, etc.,
distinctively; if he intended to employ this distinction here he would have had to indicate so explicitly; at the very least he would have had to employ "poein" at a28 and a31 and not "prattein" (cf. e.g. 6.4.1140al3-14; 6.5.1140b19 for such care). The phrase here is likely to be equivalent to "en tais praktikais" (NE.6.11.1143b2); any lingering doubt should be dispelled by DMA.7.701a22-5,13 or EE.2.11.1227b28ff (with the comparable NE.7.8.1151al5ff).

Secondly the (MaP) in question does not have the general form "don't pursue..." but the specific form "don't taste...". Now the temperate man is concerned with physical pleasures other than (certain of) those of taste. So, even on Kenny's view, the (MaP) here is not the most general characterisation of the principles shared by temperate and akratic. So why shouldn't the (MaP) be even more specific?

Kenny's failure to ward off the pressure of the preceding example is serious for him and threatens to rebound. For if his first (unlike the second) argument is valid, a rejection of the conclusion can be used to argue against (the premiss of) his interpretation of the (composite) (MiP).

5.2.3. Shared minor premisses

The possibility of shared minor premiss cases seems accepted as unproblematic.14 These are just cases
where it is under the same description that something is viewed e.g. both as (physically) pleasant\(^{15}\) and as bad. Thus in Ackrill's representation:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{X-things are bad} & \quad \text{X-things are pleasant} \\
\text{This is an X-thing} \\
\text{This is bad} & \quad \text{This is pleasant}.^{16}
\end{align*}
\]

But further consideration reveals it as not so straightforward; the question arises of whether it ultimately reduces to the independent (I2PS) case. This turns in part on the role accorded perception.

Consider first:

**Case A:**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Chocolates are bad} & \quad \text{Chocolates are pleasant} \\
\text{This is a chocolate} \\
\text{This is bad} & \quad \text{This is pleasant}
\end{align*}
\]

Here objects are picked out both as bad and pleasant under the shared description of being a chocolate. But their being a chocolate is presumably accidental to their being bad or pleasant.

We come now to:

**Case B:**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Sweet things are bad} & \quad \text{Sweet things are pleasant} \\
\text{This is sweet} \\
\text{This is bad} & \quad \text{This is pleasant}
\end{align*}
\]

Here the identifying property is not that of being an object of a certain sort but of having a certain quality; and what
the agent is called upon to recognise if either (MaP) is to be realised is not an object but a quality. But if this picks out a range of bad and pleasant things does it do so under the property which gives the grounds under a 'constitutive' or intrinsically relevant description? - e.g. it may be that sweet things are bad for healthy human beings because they have the property \( \emptyset \), and this property may belong to a wider range than 'the sweet' (the \( \emptyset \) property may be contingently or necessarily connected with that of sweetness).

Now let us suppose it is qua sweet that things are physically pleasant (to taste); but that it is qua \( \emptyset \) that they are bad (in that they are fattening/rot one's teeth, or whatever. The case based on this - Case C - will not be a S2PS one but a I2PS one. There will no longer be a shared minor premiss.

Our question is whether all cases are ultimately like this, or whether there can be cases where the minor premiss is essentially shared. This latter seems to me difficult to envisage in the case of central akrasia (where reason is surely to be viewed as opposing an appetite for certain physical pleasures on different grounds, e.g. ones that look to future effects).\(^{17}\) That there is a general a priori conceptual truth lurking here, I think probable, but that need not concern us at present.

However one type of counter-example should be pointed out to be set aside: these cases might initially be
represented:

**Case D:**

(i) = **Case B**

(ii) Adultery is to be avoided  Adultery is pleasant

This is adultery

This is to be avoided  This is pleasant

However what is really intended is that D(i) should represent the ascetic, who actually holds on the RPS side:

"physical pleasure (in sweet things) is bad"

and that D(ii) represents the agent tempted by the jaded sensualism on the APS side of:

"the wickedness of its being adultery is spicily pleasant".

And when this is brought out, they cease to be counter­examples.18

Now if what we have said so far is correct, then in central akrasia, there will for the knowledgeable person be different minor premisses at issue; it will only be for the person of mere experience that the minor premisses are the same - he happens to have noticed that people who eat sweets lose their teeth sooner than others; he has no conception of what the relevant property is, nor whether it is co-extensive with "sweet" or not, but he suspects that there is such a property. So here a S2PS view emerges as a function of ignorance. And if it is then claimed either/both that the agent at issue in 7.3. is a knowledgeable not a merely experienced one, or/and that the experienced agent
is not to be represented as acting on a practical syllogism (for these explain the whys, which the experienced do not ex hypothesi possess), then S2PS would not be at issue in 7.3.

However a pragmatic qualification now emerges, which brings in the role of perception (source of the minor premiss). It may be that the relevant property is not easily perceptible - and so even the knowledgeable person will have to make do in everyday life by making use of symptomatic properties that are more easily recognised - and shared minor premisses might occur this way.

Having pointed to this area of complexity, we must return to our main theme.

5.2.4. Practical Syllogisms and syllogisms

In 5.2.1. we saw that philosophical controversy centred round the question:
(Q1): Are there one or two practical syllogisms here?
and that both sides to this controversy assumed that if we understood "katholou" after "he de", then we have two
practical syllogisms.

I want to challenge this assumption by taking as my initial question not (Q1) but:
(Q2): Are there one or two syllogisms at issue here?

The answer to this question, unlike the first, is quite straightforward. There are two syllogisms, two
'bits' of reasoning, at issue.

One syllogism (I) has as its major proposition a universal proposition, which, whatever its precise form, is characterised as "forbidding one to taste", and a conclusion "flee this". This must then have some minor premiss or other, in form a singular proposition.

The second syllogism (II) has a universal proposition "everything sweet is pleasant" as its major premiss and a singular proposition "this is sweet" as its minor premiss. The conclusion, "this is pleasant", is not explicitly introduced, but that we are indeed to suppose it drawn in the context is hardly controversial, and is supported by the following considerations:

(i) most orthodox interpretations of the phrase "haute de energei" 1147a33;

(ii) the occurrence of the proposition "hoti hedu" in the description of akrasia di'epithumian in 7.6.1149a34f; 23

(iii) the fact that Aristotle considers the pleasant the formal object of epithumia; if the two premisses in syllogism II are not put together and the conclusion drawn, then the akratic, while he may have 'bad appetites' - actually or dispositionally - will not in fact be misled by them into an akratic act; for the appetite will not be focussed onto a particular situation or object, it will not be 'engaged' in such a way as to 'lead' to action.

In fact all three interpretations distinguished in 5.2.1. are plausibly viewed as committed to these two
syllogisms. All can be represented as variant instantiations of the following abstract schema:

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{Syllogism I} & \text{Syllogism II} \\
(MaP) \text{Don't taste anything } x & (MaP) \text{Everything sweet is pleasant} \\
(MiP) \text{This is } x & (MiP) \text{This is sweet} \\
(C) \text{Don't taste this} & (C) \text{This is pleasant}
\end{array}
\]

On the S2PS, \(x = \text{sweet}\); and so we get cases of shared minor premisses.

On Kenny's I1PS view, \(x = \text{pleasant}\) (and so the conclusion of syllogism II provides the minor premiss of syllogism I).

On the I2PS interpretation, \(x = y\) where \(y = \) anything you like except for \text{sweet} or \text{pleasant}.\textsuperscript{24} This yields cases of non-shared minor premisses.

As we have seen, there are difficulties in Kenny's understanding "hetera protasis" after "he de" in 1147a32. But the advantage of the approach canvassed above is to divorce, at least partially, the grammatical question of what to understand after "he de" from the philosophical question of how many practical syllogisms are at issue here. For even if we understand "katholou", and allow that II has to be a syllogism, we need not thereby commit ourselves to its being a practical syllogism.

In short we are able to bring the important question into sharp focus. That is this:

(Q3): Given that syllogism I is (or would be if it went through) a practical syllogism, is syllogism II also a
272.

practical syllogism?

5.2.5. The characterisation of PS'

That there are two syllogisms, SI and SII, in a31ff I take as established. In this subsection and the following (5.2.6.), I argue that there is a useful sense of "practical syllogism" according to which only the first syllogism, SI, is (potentially) a PS. (Some of the points that emerge here are pursued further in the subsequent subsections.)

We need first to characterise the notion of PS that we are going to employ. For, as pointed out in Chapter 1.2.6., "practical syllogism" is not a technical piece of Aristotelian terminology; the freedom of definition thus engendered brings the danger of merely terminological disputes. There are however two constraints on this freedom. First, the definition espoused must be interpretatively useful; second it must be secured by appeal to a range of Aristotelian examples or texts, and have some rationale for its selection.

The notion of PS I am interested in - call it PS' - has the following features:

(F1): It takes the element of "syllogism" seriously and literally.

The PS' is literally a step in reasoning - not a mere metaphorical model or analogue for the interaction of
psychological states; this of course does not stop it literally involving the interaction of psychological states. For the PS' is, or is the last stage in, a psychological process of reasoning or deliberating about what is best for the agent to do. So, while the content of the beliefs in the major and minor and concluding propositions will (be taken by the agent to) have certain 'validating' argumentative relations, the beliefs in the (MaP) and (MiP) can be viewed from the psychological angle as interacting so as to produce a new belief. The minor premiss in the PS' is not itself the product of reasoning or deliberated about; rather it is a belief(s) about what conditions obtain in the situation - and over this perception (whether richly or thinly conceived) will be the authoritative source of what one believes is going on around one. But of course this does nothing to prevent that belief appearing in one's reasoning.

However there is a further question over how seriously we should take the talk of "syllogising". Given that it is literal, what actually is it literal about - does it refer to Aristotle's syllogistic or more generally to processes of reasoning broadly conceived? Although I think the former to be the case, we can leave this question open with respect to (Fl).

In his talk of "syllogising" then Aristotle is on this view centering on explicit, probably deductive, reasoning to a best judgement. 'But surely this is
implausibly over-intellectualist - particularly if the explicit deliberation is deductive? However perhaps Aristotle leaves room for himself to meet such charges - in terms e.g. of:

(i) standing-order models;

(ii) habitual/conscious v. self-conscious 'deliberation';

(iii) deliberation itself not exactly being deductive, but rather an imaginative intellectual search for a series of middle terms (to bring the starting point back to what is here and now in one's power to do) within a deductive framework;

(iv) offering an ideal model to which either our ignorant or our dulled, complacent, everyday selves fall far short: ("you get by by not thinking about it, don't you?"). But this question too we can leave undecided.

However one consequence of taking literally the idea that the PS is a syllogism is that it won't be (non-metaphorically) attributable to animals who lack reason. (F2): The range of examples to be taken as paradigmatic are those where the (MaP) is characterised as a universal belief (doxa) or judgement (hupolepsis) and the (MiP) as concerned with individual particulars (thereby making perception the source of such a belief): thus e.g.:

(1) NE.7.3.1147a25-6; cf. al-3, 4-6;

(2) De An.3.11.434al6ff;

(3) De Mot.An.7.701al3-16; 26-8;

(4) cf. NE.6.7.1141b12-23; 6.8.1142a20-3; 6.11.1143b2ff;

It remains non-committal about the status of:
(i) De Mot.An.7.701a16-22;
(ii) Meta.Z.7.1032b6ff; 18ff.

In so far as (i) is like (ii) a model of deliberative reasoning, only undertakeable by creatures with reason, our position will favour viewing these as PS', but this will be in part dependent on how one answers the questions left open under (P1). In so far as (i) is unparalleled and its position in De Mot.An.7. textually obscure, whatever further perspective can be recovered from it will be viewed as 'eccentric'.

However as regards De Mot.An.7.701a31-3:

"I must drink" the appetite says; "this here is drink" perception said or phantasia or intellect; straightway he drinks.

it takes a stronger line and rejects this as a PS'.

We are virtually alone in rejecting this as a PS, and to that extent our PS' parts company forthwith with much Aristotelian scholarship. But our rejection is not unprincipled. Thus this example differs from PS' in that:
(i) its 'major premiss' is neither a belief (doxa) nor universal-involving;
(ii) that is just as well since, if it were, reason-less animals wouldn't be able to entertain it (by Aristotelian lights) - and yet it is supposed precisely to be a schema
that encompasses the explanation of beasts' actions:

That is why also/indeed all the things we do without having calculated, we do quickly. For whenever one is active with perception in relation to that-for-the-sake-of-which <sc. a goal> or with phantasie or with intellect (nous), that which one desires one straightway does. For in the place of questioning or thinking (noesis) the activity of desire occurs. "I must drink" says appetite.... Well then it is in this manner that animals (ta zoia) have an impulse (hormosi) to moving themselves and acting, the last (eschate) cause of movement being the desire, while this occurs either through perception or through phantasie and noesis. (701a28-36)

(iii) I think that this schema is intended to cover actions which are done "without having calculated" - and so e.g. sudden actions on the part of human beings and actions done by creatures that can't calculate. Whether a subset of the cases covered here would also count as PS' cases is perhaps trickier: consideration (i) counts straightforwardly against it; however if "calculation" is reserved only for those cases concerned with working out the best action in the narrow 'prohairetic' sense of praxis, then could not cases involving the calculation of "cleverness" be involved here? I think not, because of (i). Cases of (IA) regarded as cases of acting on phantasiai clearly could be accommodated; and perhaps some scenarios of (WA) - but not obviously those involving thoughts about universals (as for instance SII will qua being literally a syllogism).

In De Mot.An.7.701a22-5 Aristotle distinguishes two types of "practical/productive proposition":
That the action is the conclusion is clear; and the productive propositions are through two forms, both through the good and through the possible.

In the passages we have taken as paradigmatic he emphasises the contrast between universal and particular.

Nussbaum and Wiggins emphasize the first of these contrasts over the second - and this encourages an entirely general view of the PS as a psychological explanatory model for all intentional action (including beasts') - for all intentional action has an end (a 'good') and has perhaps to be seen as possible. By contrast I claim there is a definite set of examples in which Aristotle's primary focus is on the first - whether or not it includes or is a subset of the second.

(F3): A PS' results in a conclusion whose canonical propositional expression is as a belief about what it is best to do (now) (i.e. a singular best value-judgement).

The PS' is the culmination of a piece of practical reasoning (in an unloaded sense) and deliberation undertaken by the agent with the intention of coming to a best judgement with the intention of deciding or choosing to act on it. The agent draws on his practical knowledge and understanding and experience and again on his appreciation of the current situation in order to arrive at a judgement that recommends some action to him - a singular best value-judgement. (He would draw on the same resources if he was engaged in giving advice to another.)
An Aristotelian model of the various stages here runs:

1. Practical deliberation
2. Situational appreciation

yielding:

3. Belief (doxa) = singular best value-judgement
   ("Therefore it is best that I Ø this here now")

standing in R₁ to:

4. Preferential choice:³⁹ (cf. decision; formation of intention)
   "So I'll Ø this here now" or rather,
   "So I'll (opt to) Ø this now rather than Ø that now for end Τ"

standing in R₂ to:

5. Action
   I Ø this here now.

Aristotle characterises R₂ as efficient causation (NE.6.2.1139a31-2) (an element of mental causation which presumably, provided we remain, contra Cooper, at the explicit level, would be acceptable to a Wittgenstinian). The nature of R₁ is trickier. NE.6.2.1139a32-3 presents "desire and reasoning-for-the-sake-of-something" together as (presumably) the efficient causes of preferential choosing, (4). But will this be so through (3) as the proximate cause? In the course of arguing that preferential choice is not identical with a certain kind of belief - plausibly regarded as (including) singular best judgements - Aristotle remarks:

But whether a belief precedes the preferential choice or accompanies it, is not of account: for we are not considering that, but whether
it is identical with a certain belief.
(NE.3.2.1112all-13)

He here leaves open the question of whether the relation between (4) and - perhaps - (3) is (at least in part) one of temporal priority or accompaniment. That it is the former and also a relation of efficient causality is suggested e.g. by EE.2.10.'s characterisation of choice as "from deliberative belief" (ek doxes bouleutikes, 1226b9) - i.e. from a belief that is itself the outcome of deliberation\(^4\) which belief I take to be (3); the same point is also apparent in NE.3.3.1113a2-12 (especially 4-5, 10-12). As such this can be accommodated to the much wider schema of action generation in DMA.8.702a15-19.

On this (1)-(5) model the PS''s conclusion, (3), will be neither identical with the preferential choice, (4), nor (since (4) is not identical with (5)) identical with (5).

Further questions abound. And although I append some further remarks, considerable room for manoeuvre exists compatibly with accepting (F3) (as indeed it does over the acceptance of the above (1)-(5) model).

What status does the "so" have in (4)? Is it an argumentative one, encouraging us to regard the step from (3) to (4) as one of reasoning? I see no obvious reason to suppose Aristotle held so. At bottom we are back with the question of the relation between Condition 1 (the Affirmation condition) and Condition 2 (the Action/Desire
condition) (cf. 5.1.2. above). The object of choice once reached needs both to be affirmed and desideratively accepted. Aristotle I have claimed holds the following internalist picture of their relations. No-one can affirm (phanai) (3) without thereby giving rise under normal conditions to some desire to implement it in action. In fact I have suggested that Aristotle accepts the stronger version that affirming (3) must give rise, in the normal course of events (i.e. is sufficient under conditions C for), to a preferential choice (cf. a formed intention) to implement (3), which, in the normal course of events, must give rise to (the attempt to) implementing (5). Both connections between (3) and (4), and (4) and (5), may be broken by "external" interfering factors - say, a thunderbolt - without abrogating the success of the preceding stages. But - according to the view I attribute to Aristotle - the interference of an internal psychological opponent such as the akratic's unintegrated appetite lies outside the range of such conditions; and thus from the agent's failure to do what he (in some sense) knows is best for him, it transpires by two steps of MTT that he failed actually to preferentially choose the action, and that he failed to affirm at the time the concluding best judgement - which, if he has at all at the time, he has only "in the sense that is not to know it, but to merely-say it" - indicative of a failure of understanding. Moreover - so I claim - Aristotle maintains yet a third step of MTT. For if one
has the practical knowledge and the situational awareness required for its application or realisation in connection with present circumstances, this (I claim) he views as, in normal circumstances (under conditions C) sufficient for reaching and non-deviantly affirming the good conclusion; the akratic's failure to do so (while C obtain) is due to some temporary distortion wrought by the presence of (e.g.) appetite in the agent's situational appreciation which renders him temporarily unable to use (or bring to bear) his practical knowledge. It is here then at stage (2) that Aristotle finds the locus of appetite's attack on the agent's rationality.

What effect does this view have on the interpretation of FP?

Perhaps one of its advantages is that it leaves this open.

If FP is taken as the conclusion, then the reason why the akratic either fails at the time to have it at all or else merely 'mouths' it will be due to a temporary distortion of his situational appreciation which prevents his bringing his values to bear.

If FP is taken as the RPS's (MiP), then Aristotle must be talking of non-shared (MiP) cases; here the effect of the akratic pathos will be either temporarily to block the agent's appreciation of one aspect of the situation or to render his apprehension of it deviant (clouded).

I have favoured the first of these; and further
problems await the second which a full interpretation of Sec. 4c would bring out (e.g. does 1147b15-17 imply that the RPS's (MiP) is present during akrasia?).

(F4): The conclusion of a PS is an evaluational judgement; there is some point to Aristotle's maintaining that it is the deliverance of slow deliberation and calculation. For coming to a best judgement in human life is difficult not simply because executive means are difficult to work out - which they might be even though one's goals were simple - but because of the richness of interests to be integrated (cf. Chapter 1 Section 4 note 17).

Values and evaluation I take to be essentially comparative notions. It is not enough for a creature to have values that it have intentional goals. It must be capable of their rational comparison - or, more weakly, of raising the issue of their comparative worth. Success is not written into this project: but equally success is not ruled out.

We can remain neutral here over the issue of:

(A): a valuational 'theory of types': the question of whether there are certain values a condition on whose possession is that they silence/have some total higher type of ranking than certain other types of value (and if so whether any sense can be made of the possibility of confrontation between different value levels): e.g. the overridingness condition sometimes associated with the moral values.
(B): _valuational tragedy_: the question of whether there is any reason to expect there to be some factor, if only one could discover it, for rationally coming down on one side rather than the other in cases of deep value-conflict, where there is no plausibility in resiling to a position of indifference between alternatives; or whether there is any reason to expect there not to be, and thus to suppose valuational tragedy to be ineluctably meshed into the fabric of our world.

For Aristotle evaluation is a distinct mode of problem-solving available to rational creatures - a trial by reason - in contrast to what is in effect a biological mode of problem solving embodied in non-rational creatures - trial by appetitive strength. A similar distinction can be made over matters 'purely cognitive' (I would claim it was the same distinction). For Aristotle, coming to an evaluative best judgement is the attempt to come to a reasoned preference for one thing over others with a view to the realisation, executive or constitutive, of some end - which ultimately in every case is the end of "flourishing" (cf. e.g. NE.6.5.1140a25ff). This involves the attempt to "measure by one" ("henimetrein") - and whatever the exact meaning of this, it involves calculation, and is open only to such creatures as have deliberative or calculative imagination.

What emerges from these characterising features of FSI is that it is concerned simply with rational action
- in the sense of action open only to creatures with reason; moreover it looks strongly as though it concerns only reasoning to actions in the delimited sense of praxis as prohairetic action, although at present an important doubt surrounds clever action e.g. by the akratic: action that involves deliberation and so is only open to rational creatures, but does not issue in prohairetic action.

5.2.6. Is SII a PS'?

From 5.2.4. SII emerged as a distinct syllogism. We can now return to the question, (Q3), of whether it is also a PS, in the sense elucidated in 5.2.5., viz. PS'.

This turns on the more specific questions of the role accorded the universal proposition "everything sweet is pleasant" (1147a32-3) and so also on that of the conclusion "this is pleasant".

Initially SII looks a promising candidate for being a PS'. It is a syllogism (cf. (F1)); has a (MaP) that is a universal belief and a (MiP) that concerns individual particulars (cf. (F2)). Indeed if 1147a35-b3 is interpreted so that "belief" (doxa: bl, 3) is the concluding belief, "this is pleasant", and the "reasoning" (logos: bl) is the SII syllogising, then perhaps Aristotle's subsequent claim (b3-5) that beasts aren't akratic rests as much on the fact that their appetitive actions don't issue from a
syllogism like SII as on their incapacity for formulating the RPS. Thirdly "pleasantness" is surely a desirability characteristic — something's being pleasant gives the agent a reason to pursue it; so isn't the conclusion evaluative and action-recommending (cf. (F3))? If doubts begin to creep in here about its not being a best judgement and so not fully meeting conditions on the conclusion of a PS', doesn't this add up to a case for revising the criteria for PS'; isn't the rationale for the original criteria undermined?

I argue that it is not a PS'. This will still leave a question about what the role or status of SII's (MaP) actually is: but I think this is as, but no more, puzzling than the role accorded "reasoning" (logos) in 7.6. 1149a32ff where:

(a) For while reason (logos) or phantasia have revealed that <there is> insult or slight, <anger> as it were having syllogised that it is necessary (dei) to fight against such a thing, then straightway flares up;...

(b) but appetite, if reason (logos) or perception have only said that <it is> pleasant, rushes off to enjoy it.45

My arguments are these.

First, if "the belief" (1147b1, 3) is the SII's conclusion "this is pleasant", then this is said not to be in itself opposed to the correct account (i.e. the account which yields the conclusion "flee this" with the correct explanatory backing), but only incidentally. This is
quite in order since the presence of the (bad) appetite was incidental ("tucheí...enousa" 1147a33-4) to the realisation that "this is pleasant"; if the agent had not suffered from bad appetites, this belief would not have been opposed even incidentally to the correct account. It is just that appetite, being present, pricks up its ears at the information that this here is pleasant and drags the agent off to enjoy it. It is the appetite that is essentially opposed to the correct account (and the preferential choice that sponsors: cf. NE.3.2.1111b13-16). It follows that Aristotle views this belief as having no recommendative power within it; whether it plays a role in leading to akratic action depends on the contingent presence of an appetite. The "horme" is in the appetite not in the SII reasoning.

Secondly the akratic agent is not persuaded that he should pursue this present pleasure; but the conclusion of a PS' represents exactly this - the rational persuasion of the agent that such-and-such is in his best interests. But more importantly the conclusion should be understood as the claim: "this here is physically pleasant". And this makes it very clear that so far as that belief is concerned, it tells us nothing about how the agent values the physically pleasant. It could be something he valued totally (cf. the akolastic), or up to a point in certain contexts; or not at all, it was a matter of indifference; or else was something he positively disvalued - something's
being physically pleasant gives him a reason to avoid it.

What really is going on here? In essence the claim is that one can (and in fact as a rational agent, must) take up an evaluative attitude to (/come to some valuation about) something's being physically pleasant in a way one doesn't to something believed to fall under the description of being the best thing for the agent to do: there is no room in the latter for the question "but do I care about that?" in the way there is as regards the former.

'Yet physical pain and pleasure are surely not ordinarily a matter of indifference. Don't we normally regard something's being physically pleasant as something it is natural to pursue, and physical pain as something natural to avoid? Isn't what has been said above perhaps better represented in terms of taking up second-order evaluative attitudes to first-order ones?'

There is some truth in this. The practically wise indeed recognise that (certain) physical pleasures are (in certain contexts) a human good, something to be valued as an ingredient in the flourishing life, and physical pains likewise (in certain contexts) a human evil. But nevertheless "this is physically pleasant" is not, I argue, an evaluative judgement - or if called so, is so only metaphorically in that the biological system can be viewed as 'evaluating', and physical pains and pleasures as its 'directives' to the agent. Here we should glance briefly at Aristotle's philosophy of mind.
5.2.7. The background of Aristotle's philosophy of mind

Against the background of his hierarchical view of the capacities in virtue of which organisms are alive, we can articulate what for convenience we may label Aristotle's Double Theory - double in that it divides beasts from humans and, within the human, the bestial system from the distinctively human (or rational) system.

Roughly, Aristotle can be viewed as claiming that (setting aside plants) faculty-equipment is doled out by nature in two different packages:
(i) beasts get a set of 'survival' equipment;
(ii) humans get a better deal - a 'holiday package': their equipment enables them not merely to survive - to 'have time' - but to have a good time, to enjoy a life that is worthwhile.

Beasts have a set of dunameis which (given certain contextual conditions, such as stability of climate, availability of nutriment, etc.) are sufficient to enable them to survive individually and as a species with a modicum of success. We may term these a 'survival package' of dunameis: they comprise the 'basic' or 'lower' equipment.

One might view this as the possession of a very simple computer, quite proficient at the operations it can perform but limited in their number. More importantly, I want to say that this offers a non-comparative (cf. non-inferential) perspective on life. An animal sees that there is wet over there; has an appetite to the effect
(perhaps) that drinking now is good. And these (provided it can move) are sufficient to set it in action (whether this turns out successfully or not). It does not 'debate' whether there really is wet, or water, over there - whether it has sufficient evidence - nor whether drinking now really is good or better than not drinking.

Man (and any other rational creature) has further capacities - the rational or intellectual faculties, which comprise the issue of 'higher equipment'. Any creature that added these abilities to its hand would find itself with, so to speak, a 'holiday package' of faculties, which enabled it not merely to survive from moment to moment but to plan, pursue and enjoy a life that it considered worthwhile.

One might view this as the possession of a super-fast Japanese computer with lots of operations. More seriously we may say that this offers a comparative perspective on life. We can question whether we are seeing water over there, whether the sun is really the foot across it looks to be; whether it would be better not to drink now.

Now given the doctrine of the hierarchy of the faculties man has (or is) both systems; and prima facie his possession of the lower equipment allows him to discriminate and act as an animal, while his possession of the higher allows him modes of cognition and action that are distinctively human. The problem that then poses itself within such a framework is how these two systems connect.
For instance, in terms of our analogy with the 'simple' and Japanese computer, one might ask: does or can the latter entirely supersede the former? Or is the former still essential to do some basic operations and processing of data? Do they amalgamate in an entirely harmonious fashion, or retain a certain independence? If there is enough overlap for there to be differences can the latter always override the former?

Aristotle's answer(s) to these questions underlies his views on how we 'learn' to become good, on what is going on when we are doing something good, on the contribution of *phronesis* to *phusike arete*; and how and in what direction we become bad; on what happens in *akrasia* and why *akrasia di'epithumian* provides the central case of *akrasia*, and what happens by contrast in the cases of 'extended-akrasia'. And while providing the route that Aristotle takes into these topics, it equally helps explain some of the (at least) apparent weaknesses in his account (e.g. certain difficulties over his treatment of *kakia*).

This distinction between the bestial and the human systems allows us to distinguish appetites from evaluations. The former are responses of the bestial system to physical pleasures and pains\textsuperscript{49} - are so to speak the goods and bads within this system\textsuperscript{50} - whereas evaluations are concerned with comparative goods and bads.

Human beings have both systems as we have said; and they are relatively insulated from each other, in the
sense that the 'evaluative' commitments of either (viz. biological 'evaluations' that emerge as appetites of a certain strength, and rational evaluations emerging in best judgements) do not/cannot register directly - have no direct representation - in the 'evaluating' forum of the other.

A clear and relatively uncomplicated example is provided by urination.

Before a long journey one may decide it best to urinate without any 'felt appetite' to do so. Nor does (/need) one's decision create any.

Equally a felt physical demand is viewed not so much as itself giving one a reason to urinate as reason to do something about it (e.g. suppress it/relieve it): an object to reason about. Indeed the rational agent does not feel himself the subject of such an appetite, but rather the object - something is inflicted on him.

If the agent is not to fall apart in our hands - into two systems shut up in one body - something has to be said about their relations.

A proper consideration here, involving the full range of the emotions as well as the basic appetites would be very intricate. We will stick, artificially, with the appetites.

Aristotle invokes a hierarchy condition: the higher system in some sense includes the lower - in that within limits it can control it and is perceptive of its
demands. Now we can say that what appears as a 'quasi-evaluative' commitment on the primitive level will register merely as a fact - though a peculiarly pertinent, even irritating one - about the appetitive condition of the primitive system at the higher more sophisticated level. The lower level commitment does not register directly at the higher level in this sense: that what the agent reasons about is the presence of the want e.g. to urinate: the agent considers this want so to speak from outside - as something that is potentially disruptive of other activities, as something over which he has only limited control, etc. It is something whose satisfaction he can attach a positive value to as part of a worthwhile human life, but need not.

But what is important here is that the lower system's commitment does not register even as a prima facie reason in the agent's deliberative forum: certainly it is an occurrence which registers on the rational agent and which he knows he will have to do something about - its occurrence gives him a prima facie reason to 'do' something about it - but not in any particular direction.

It is an important consequence of the above that Aristotle does not see all intentional action as flowing out into the world from one 'source', and why he holds this appears as unsurprising when set against the background of his philosophy of mind. He thus rejects the Davidsonian claim that all intentional action is action on a best judgement - and is in good company here. However Davidson
would perhaps argue that the underpinning of Aristotle's rejection is suspect: for it credits dumb beasts with intentional actions and appetites etc. (although not beliefs), but no language-less creature should be so credited. However even if this is accepted, it only carves off Aristotle's treatment of beasts, and would leave his hierarchical picture for humans defensible (the presence of the higher conceptualizing system allows the lower non-conceptual system to be accessed to the subject in such a way that intentional actions could be viewed as flowing from the lower system (cf. e.g. Evans, Varieties of Reference, pp.226-7). 53

5.2.8. Conclusions

There remain several obvious lacunas in our treatment of the troublesome Sec.4.; nor are the implications of such results as we have achieved drawn out for their illumination of such larger issues as Aristotle's views on action-explanation generally, the analysis of desire, moral development, the kind of achievement distinctive of practical wisdom. To that extent our account remains provisional and the riches of our results potential rather than actual. But in work of this kind everything rests on a solid interpretation of the texts; without this, however philosophically interesting a view, it remains puzzling why it was thought worth pegging to Aristotle's mast. This is
not to advocate some millenialist 'final interpretation' of Aristotle; there is always room for reasoned disagreement. But equally we should not rest satisfied with a complacent indeterminacy.

Some progress has, I trust, been made in these Chapters in the elucidation of this extremely intricate Aristotelian passage and of others and of their interconnections. If I were to pick one thing out as the mark of the type of account I have tried to develop it would be the principled attempt to look at the NE.7.3. passage as a whole, and to determine its argumentative structure. For from this rather mundane, almost mechanical, consideration, theses and interpretative constraints can be generated in a quite natural way; and this approach has been surprisingly neglected, perhaps because it did not offer obviously accessible philosophical pickings. Our results have been both negative and positive, both of detailed exegesis and of wider implication for Aristotle's contribution to the topic.

Negatively, I have argued against a wide range of interpretations on a large number of points; and while obviously my debts to other scholars are immense, I have tried to keep a stricter tab on the arguments on either side of controversies. In particular, as regards negative results, I hope to have undermined the recent stimulating approach of the 'Practical Reason theorists', Charles and Dahl, who - whatever their other differences - both
interpret Aristotle as committed to a strong contrast between practical and theoretical reason, and then as exploiting analogies between these - or between failures with respect to these - in such a way as to allow for last-ditch akrasia in 7.3.: cases where the fault is simply one of motivation, not intellect. I find their position philosophically suspect, and have tried to argue that the text will not sustain it.

On the positive side, some attempt has been made to consider views evinced in the De Anima and Eudemian Ethics. The problems NE.7.3. poses and various solutions proposed to meet them have had some degree of order imposed on them. I have also attempted to bring to the fore more of the contrasts that Aristotle's overall position on akrasia and enkrateia has with modern approaches. Then, as mentioned above, a more principled account of the argumentative structure between the various sections of the passage has been developed. Within this we have pursued such other issues as seemed immediately relevant: this has led us to inquire further e.g. into the interpretation of the notion of "exercising knowledge", into the differences between the experienced man and the knower, and into interpretatively useful conceptions of the "practical syllogism". Not all these enquiries have met with much success. But they have not been shied away from; where relevant their importance and potential effect has been acknowledged, and their discussion hopefully advanced, in
an appropriately aporetic spirit.

As for our original central question of Aristotle's position over the Socratic problem of the possibility of akrasia and then in particular of last-ditch akrasia, my conclusions are that in NE.7.3. Aristotle does not countenance the possibility of the latter, and that this is a consequence of his location of the akratic's failure to bring his (proper universal) knowledge (of [his] values) to bear in the 'releasing mechanism' for such knowledge (and no-one who remembers Pr.An.B.21's mule should be tempted to presuppose such failures distinctively 'practical' as against 'theoretical'): the 'releasing mechanism' is perceptual knowledge, or situational appreciation etc. In the account I offered I suggested that the failure here was viewed by Aristotle not as the inhibition of the exercise of this ability,\(^5\) but as some distortion of its exercise: one may 'recognise' something (red traffic lights) but it fails to mean what, given one's values, it should: this is a failure to recognise it - for it is a failure to recognise it as relevant to one's values.

Now, if this suggestion were (partially) correct a series of further questions presses upon us. Firstly, if this discountenancing of last-ditch akrasia clashes with the EE.2.7-8. what account are we to give of it? In particular is it possible that in NE.7.3. Aristotle is not advancing his own considered account but offering a minimal ad hominem response to the Socratic challenge, securing the
figure of the akratic that he wants for his moral theory and prepared for such delimited purposes to ditch the last-ditch akratic to buy off Socrates cheaply? No; I don't find there is room for seeing that degree of merely ad hominem response here. So either the inconsistency must be admitted or the EE reinterpreted (and after all one may be somewhat suspicious of the depth of the EE's concern with the phenomenon; for it seems to be exploiting the possibilities of psychological conflict for ulterior ends - in order, in the manner of Rep.IV., to separate out different psychological states). Secondly we face questions over the range of the perceptual abilities involved in the 'releasing mechanism'; is it 'thin', is it 'rich', or does it change from one to the other? It certainly seems that these abilities are not only 'releasing mechanisms' for the application of universal knowledge once possessed but also the source for such in the first place (cf. e.g. NE.6.11.1143b4-5; Post.An.B.19.100a6-b5), whether individually or socially or both. Is it, as I suggested earlier, that with experience these perceptual abilities become richer until universals (and explanatory patterns) are distilled from them, at which point experience gives way to knowledge and skill, and the perceptual abilities thin back into playing a merely 'releasing role'. These questions about the basic model arise even before we ask how well it fits morality and practical wisdom: did Aristotle at some point think the universals of a practical analogue-skill would distill
out (cf. NE.6.7-8.), and then come to wonder whether practical/political wisdom would/could develop beyond the experience stage (e.g. perhaps NE.10.9.)? Thirdly what larger philosophical implications would this type of rejection of last-ditch akrasia have for the relation between volition and cognition? Aristotle presumably emerges as some kind of anti-noncognitivist (cf. Chapter 5.1.2.) - but how more exactly are we to characterise his position?

So we end, as we began, with questions - but our new ones are richer.
How likely is it that we will be able to pin down the Aristotle of NE.7.3. to a position of sufficient determinacy? Both David Pears and David Charles have, in varying degrees, been pessimistic about the prospects. In this thesis I put to the test my suspicion that that pessimism is unwarranted.

This must be greatly qualified in the light of the recent appearance of Charles (1984) and Dahl (1984). Prior to this, one of the best pieces of work available was Kenny (1966), which if wrong on many issues (as I shall argue), at least mentioned them.


Cf. Pears (1984), p.107 (the phrase 'last-ditch akrasia' is borrowed from Pears).

Or in a failure to integrate his motivational states with his evaluational states.

Can one know (long) in advance that one will act akratically, in a last-ditch way? Such cases might be called 'super last-ditch' ones.

Of course the bogeys of triviality and ambiguity are abroad in such talk of "real understanding" and even with "intellectual fault" (e.g. if you take a strong conception of practical reasoning, if such reasoning fails to be practically effective, though leaving the agent cognitively
unclouded, is this "an intellectual" fault? etc.

8 For Aristotelian usage of this verb see De Sens. 2.437a26 and Hist.An.2.11.503a35, both of eyelids (or skin) covering the eye.

9 By the EE I mean simply its five non-common books. Here I take no position over the original location of the common books, nor of the precedence of NE and EE.


11 Is this itself a global scepticism about scepticisms?

12 So, for instance, it might be argued that the self-assessor will feel as though he is being 'compelled' (might Aristotle indeed be suggesting such a phenomenology in EE.2.8.1224b15-28?). Where then is the locus for censure? Recourse might be had again to an error theory: the self-assessor rejects the phenomenology of compulsion as false, thus clearing the way for his self-censure.


14 EE.2.7-8. merit a more extended discussion. Of particular importance is the question of how tightly they are to be interpreted. In the first place the figures of enkratic and akratic are drawn on not for their own sake, but to make argumentative points (cf. the De An.3.9. passage quoted earlier). Again, is it essential to the argument that the akratic's pain for the future is simultaneous with the present's gratification? etc.

Notes: Chapter 1 Section 2

1 Cook Wilson (1879); for a summary see Stewart, Vol. II, pp. 141-2.

2 See Figure 1.


4 So Ross (1925/80), (1923/49), pp. 222-4; Rassow (Forsch.), pp. 127-9; Stewart, Vol. II, p. 146, p. 161; and probably Burnet (implied by notes and paragraphing of text).

5 Kenny (1966) argued that 4b was misplaced from Sec. 3. This suggestion he retracted (1979), p. 162, n. 1. The problem of its connections with the passages either side remains pressing.

6 (a) 4 solutions: Rassow (Forsch.), pp. 127-9; Stewart, Vol. II, p. 146; Robinson (1969), p. 141; Walsh, Chp. 5.

(b) One solution, 4 stages: Ross (1923/49), p. 222; Gauthier-Jolif, Vol. 2, p. 605: "... ou plutôt de quatre étapes vers une solution definitive".

(Investigation of Aristotle's usage of 'eti' might, one suspects, favour (a): but the contrast between (a) and (b) is too imprecise.)


8 Kenny (1966), p. 176, n. 18, exceptionally, suggests
that:

(i) the contrast is between "phusikos" and "para phusin";
(ii) Sec.4. is contrasted only with Sec.3.

(It would be possible to combine (ii) with a view of the contrast as being between "phusikos" and "logikos", though I know of no-one who does.)

9 Burnet, p.301.


11 & 12 Admittedly the scholars mentioned here don't explicitly hang their views on the presence of "phusikos". However the effect of their positions is to make "phusikos" pivotal in the way suggested.

13 Such a line is intimated in Burnyeat(1980), p.85; and also perhaps in Ritchie(1897), p.539; Milo(1966), p.98; and Robinson (it is easy to slide from (I) to (II)).


15 Doubtless one can make something of this distinction, but it has no magic clarity. (After all, doesn't showing that akrasia is possible involve showing how it is possible, and vice-versa? However there is not room to expatiate on this here.)

16 (1) Different object: 7.1.1145b19-20; 7.2.1146b2-5; 7.3.1146b9ff; 18ff; 7.4.; 7.5.1149a21-4; 7.6.
(2) 'Human/normal' v. pathological: 7.5. (cf. 7.1.1145a30-4; 7.6.1149b27ff); 7.7.1150b13-16.
(3) 'Natural' v. 'Habitable': 7.5.1148b15-18, 27, 29-34; 1149a7, 9; 7.10.1152a29.

(4) 'Weak' v. 'impetuous': 7.7.1150b19-29 (cf. 7.8.1151a1-5); 7.10.1152a18-19; 27-9.


18 (a) Both (WA) and (IA) at issue in Sec.4c: Dahl (1984), p.207; Kenny (1979), p.164; (n.b. Charles (1984), pp.127-8 sees two types of akrasia here, one of which is (WA), but the other is not (IA)).

(b) Sec.3-(IA); Sec.4a-(WA): Stewart, Vol.II, p.146; Rassow (Forsch.), pp.127-9.

(c) Sec.2-(IA); Sec.4a-(WA): Kenny (1979), p.161. Cf. (1) Charles (1984), pp.127-8 who apparently holds the following:

(1) Sec.2b's case of 'not having the minor premiss' may be illustrative of (IA) (p.127);

(2) This case probably doesn't exist, but is a textual error (pp.125-6);

(3) Sec.3. and Sec.4a consider the weak akratic (pp.127-8);

(4) Sec.3. and 4a consider a different type of akrates from Sec.2. (p.127).

Therefore apparently Sec.2. concerns cases of akrasia that are non-(WA) and, given (2), non-(IA).

Criticisms of earlier versions of Charles seem to have resulted in retreat to vagueness here.

(ii) Dahl (1984) holds:

D(1) Sec.2b's case of 'not having the minor' illustrates
(IA), and the case of 'not exercising it' illustrates (WA) (p.207);

D(2) Sec.2. aims at providing an explanation of (IA) (p.203; p.204);

D(3) Sec.3. concerns both (IA) and (WA) (contrast Charles) (p.210).

I have not found an explicit commitment over Sec.4a. There is an unresolved tension between D(1) and D(2).

19 See e.g. the fudging remarks towards the end of his note ad. §9a24, p.156.

On this tension see further "The Phusikos Barrier", addendum to Chapter 2.8., below.

20 ad. §7(a10), Vol.II, pp.151-5.

21 Cf. Vol.II, ad. §7, p.151; ad. §6, pp.147, 148-9, etc.

22 Witness his talk of "the" rather than "an" akratic: e.g. Vol.II, pp.147; pp.148-9; (cf. p.151).


24 'Free having' = Habitus solutus = (HS); 'Tied having' = Habitus ligatus = (HL). I use these terms initially as labels for discernible positions in Sec.3. and do not presuppose on a particular interpretation.


(i) on the distinction Aristotle draws between episteme and doxa see note 24 Chapter 1 Section 3.

(ii) Compare here De An.3.3.427b8-11; 24-6; An Post. A.33. 89al.

(iii) Aristotle considers the 'belief instead of knowledge' manoeuvre both in 7.2. and 7.3., and produces different arguments. Readers may be tempted to see different theses at issue in that 7.2. (see n.28) concerns "doxa" (1145b33; 35; 36) while 7.3. is limited to "doxa alethes" (1146b24).

They would be wrong.

The occurrence of "doxa" in 7.2. occurs within a discussion of 'correct judgement' (1145b21): and the 'correct' state of belief is 'true belief' (cf. De An.3.3. 427b8-11; 24-6). 7.3. has no such context, and so Aristotle must explicitly add "true" (1146b24).

The puzzle Aristotle voices here starts from the assumption that (BKM) exploits the thought that:

(A) belief is not so strong a judgement as knowledge.

Against this backdrop Aristotle points out that:

But it may be objected that if it is belief and not knowledge - i.e. the judgement that is opposing the pleasures is not strong but mild, just as among those who are in doubt, - then sympathetic understanding (/pardon) attaches to one's not sticking among them (one's beliefs) in the face of strong appetitive desires; but sympathetic understanding is not accorded to wickedness, nor yet to any of the other censurable things. (1145b36-46a4; mildly interpretative)
(1) *suggnome* would then attach to akrasia;

(2) but *suggnome* doesn't attach to wickedness nor any of the other censurable things.

One way of cashing out the force of this puzzle is by making explicit that:

(3) akrasia is a censurable thing (cf. 7.1.1145b10). The (BKM) is then seen to lead to the puzzling paradox that both *suggnome* and censure belong to one and the same thing (akrasia).

In 7.3.1146b24-31 Aristotle directly attacks (A) - the (BKM)'s motivating assumption, asserting instead that:

(B) some among those who believe are not in doubt, but think they know precisely.

and:

some have no less conviction in what they believe, than others do in what they know.

Aristotle apparently takes (B) to be self-evident (he adverts to Heraclitus as providing an example: for which see Woods (1982), p.136). (B) is enough to scotch (BKM) as presented; however Aristotle doesn't seem to make explicit that the "some" in (B) include cases of people who then act akratically - which leaves open the possibility of a revised (BKM):

(A') belief is not always so strong a judgement as knowledge, and is weak in cases of akrasia.

This would require a revised (B) to meet it:

(B') some among those who believe and then act akratically in violation of their belief, are not in doubt but think they know precisely.
Holders of (BKM) might with some justice complain that (B') has not the self-evidence of (B), and that their position is now being treated cavalierly. However Aristotle's focus in 7.3.Sec.0. is on asserting that belief doesn't relevantly differ from knowledge within the context of a strategy designed to show akrasia possible (not merely in cases where people think they know, but) even in cases where they do know. And this does support (B') against (A').

29 On the question of whether the phronimos can be akratic (7.1.1145b17-19) see both 7.2.1146a4-9 and 7.10.1152a6-15 (or beyond).

30 i.e. what actually are their different ability conditions? A full answer will depend on first answering Q1's question about the interpretation of 'using' knowledge.

31 Cf. e.g. De An.2.5. (and further Chapter 3). An acquisition-ability is a "first potentiality", a possession ability is a "second potentiality" (= a first actuality).

32 Cf. e.g. NE.5.1.1129allff. (Cf. Hardie(1968), p.274.) See further 1.2.6.

33 Hardie(1968), p.274:

the sense in which the geometer knows the theorem of Pythagoras when he is not thinking about geometry and the sense in which he can be said to know it only when he is actively engaged in proving it to himself or someone else. ...When he speaks of 'use' he means not the application of knowledge in practice but the exercise of dispositional knowledge in actual thinking.
the distinction between having knowledge and exercising one's knowledge amount to a distinction between potential knowledge and actual knowledge. To have knowledge of something is to be potentially capable of knowing it (p.91)

Kenny (1966), pp.169-171; p.182. Joachim (1951), pp.222-9, also appears to hold a version of this model. But I find his position somewhat obscure. He holds:
(1) actual knowing (knowing as theoria) = "actually realizing its meaning"; "realize its bearings" (p.224)
(2) using knowledge of the minor premiss = 'bringing it into relation with knowledge of the major, and so drawing the conclusion' (p.223); cf. "using your knowledge of the minor - i.e....realising the application of the major to this particular case:...bringing your information that this is sweet into connexion with your knowledge that sweet things produce gout" (p.224), etc.

What does (1) mean?
(a) take some major universal premiss, to 'realise its meaning' is to realise its application to the present situation (supposing it applies) - i.e. consists in 'realising' the (full) conclusion.
(b) what of minor premisses? What is it to 'realise their meaning'? It is to realise:

His knowledge of the minor may remain a mere
latent knowledge, not the vivid realisation here and now of this as a case of the general principle (p.223)

(i.e. presumably also the conclusion)

It is possible to know the major and the minor premisses, and yet not draw the right conclusion - i.e. to act against your knowledge. For your knowledge may be the mere having them in your mind, not the actual realizing their truth in your present thinking. (p.224)

Although Joachim doesn't speak of 'using knowledge of the major premiss', I take this to be accidental, and that he would accept:

(i) using knowledge of the MiP = bringing it into relation with knowledge of the major so as to draw the conclusion;
(ii) using knowledge of the MaP = bringing it into relation with knowledge of the minor, so as to draw the conclusion.

It may be objected immediately that in Sec.2. Aristotle countenances cases of using MaP without using MiP. Joachim denies this. The cases are ones where MaP is only partially realised, some MiP is used, some not:

Aristotle shows how owing to the peculiarity of the practical syllogism - owing to the double bearing of its premisses (viz. to agent and to matter) - one may fully realise the major in half its bearing (so to say) and yet fail to realise it in that particular respect of its bearing which is vital for the action in question. (p.224; cf. p.223)

Charles(1984) follows Joachim (pp.126-7) over MiP, although he does not make clear what 'using' the major premiss consists in: over in particular what happens in the case
in Sec.2a. He remarks:

He then separates in effect two types of premiss, major and minor, and says there is nothing to prevent a man possessing both but acting against his knowledge, provided that he exercises the major premiss but only possesses the minor (1147a1-4). (p.125)

Now this is what Aristotle says; and it implies - contra Joachim - that there are cases of using MaP but not (any relevant) MiPs. But if so, then Charles owes us an account of what using knowledge of a major premiss is - since it cannot be the Joachim line I suggest above.

35 Kenny(1966) glances at this point in n.11, p.173. If I have construed his rather cryptic remark correctly, he is suggesting that we should understand Sec.2b's case of failing to exercise (use) "whether this is a such-and-such" as a failure to apply some general recognitional knowledge (e.g. of chickens) to the particular occasion so as to realise "this is a chicken".

On this interpretation, the general recognitional knowledge is the object of use; "whether this is a such-and-such" is merely the content of exercise/use of that general knowledge. Although this is some extension of the original position, Kenny is still maintaining that singular knowledge cannot be the object of use. (Much more needs to be said: e.g. what of the recognitional knowledge of individual objects?)

36 E.g. Meta.a.1.993b20-1; De Caelo Γ.7.306a16-17;
cf. NE.6.2.1139a26ff; De An.3.10.433a14-15.

37 Tentatively I take Dahl's position to be this, (1984), Chp.11. I have not found an adequate exposition of what he thinks counts as using the major premiss without the minor (Sec.2a) (e.g. pp.203-4 doesn't provide it).

38 This depends on whether the interpreter allows "use" to apply to the conclusion or not.

39 See further Chapter 3 on Kenny(1966).

40 Final Proposition: e.g.
(1) = minor premiss of the good syllogism: Wiggins(1978), in Rorty ed. (1980), p.249; Robinson (1954/69);
(2) = conclusion: Kenny(1966); Santas(1969); Charles(1984); Bogen(1982), pp.123-4;
(3) = variable from case to case: Kenny(1979).

41 Traditionally there are taken to be two; Kenny(1966) argues for there being only one (cf. Rowe(1971); Kenny(1979), p.159 n.2). I shall argue that there must be two syllogisms, although there is reason to call only one of them a 'practical syllogism'.


44 Cf. Cooper (1975), Part I.

45 Cf. Nussbaum's (1978) remark:

It is also suggested (although very unclearly) that the syllogism as such must have a propositional conclusion before the initiation of action, after which the agent "does what has been concluded". But if the conclusion itself
is a proposition, an affirmation of a decision, we wonder whether we must not invoke some further factor to explain why action follows the conclusion. (pp.2-3-4)

46 A further condition on having knowledge might be that one could apply it in the instance. On the other hand, Aristotle may allow the possibility of a 'pure theorist' who lacks recognitional knowledge required to instance his universal knowledge while nevertheless having universal knowledge. (Alternatively if he rejects that possibility, it might simply be because of contingent constraints on the way human beings learn.)

47 Aristotle calls skills and sciences "akribeis". This might prima facie imply either that they have been articulated or else that their subject-matter allows of articulation to a high degree (as in (c) below).


49 Cf. e.g. NE.3.3.1112bl-9.

50 Aristotle may hold of skills that either:
(I) all are transferable (i.e. capable of intentionally being passed from a master to an apprentice); and maintain a dichotomy (whether of kind or degree is a further subtlety) between the 'teachable' and the 'trainable' (using these as tokens for the two strategies of 'didaxis' and 'ethismos' - I leave the exact interpretation of these notions open); or
(II) not all are transferable (or the milder non-modal thesis, 'transferred'); and maintain (e.g.) a trichotomy
between skills that are (a) 'taught'; (b) inculcated by training; (c) innate (sumphuton).

Does he ever envisage that some skill may involve subskills, or aspects, some of which are cleanly transferable, others 'dirty-hands' transferable, and which rest on a degree of 'natural skill' (phusike technē to parallel phusike arete)?

(F2): need for deliberation cf. NE.3.2.; 6.5.1140a25ff; 6.7.1141b8-14, etc.
This should be translated:

Further error is either about the universal in deliberation or about the particular....

and not as Ross:

Further error in deliberation may be either about the universal or about the particular....

which makes both types of error errors in deliberation.
This is false: (a) it isn't what the text says; (b) the particulars (ta kath'hekasta) are not the objects of deliberation but of perception (NE.3.3.1112-1113a2) - if you started deliberating about them you'd "go on forever" (NE.3.3.1113a2; EE.2.10.1226b2); (c) errors about particulars occur in articulated skills where there is no deliberation (see (F2) and the quoted EE.2.10. passage).
Once this is realized, it gives a 'crazy' angle to Cooper's (1975) argument over this passage (pp. 28-9) - for the objection he sees he must make to it stems from the mistranslation.

52 Cf. Wiggins (1975). I agree with many of his strictures against mere technical, deductive, rule case models of deliberation.

53 Cf. e.g. NE.6.8.1142a23-30 (cf. 6.7.1141b14-23); 2.9.1109b20ff; 4.5.1126b2ff; 6.11.1143b2ff.


55 Cf. De An. 3.11.434a16-21. I take it that the reason why the minor proposition/belief is said to do the setting in motion rather than the major, is that having knowledge per se won't lead you to do anything - it needs the agent to realise that conditions obtain where it has application (cf. Aristotle's explanations on why the man of experience can be just as, if not more, praktikoteros than a theorist - especially than 'a pure theorist' cf. note 46 above: e.g. Meta.A.1.981a12ff, b5-6).

56 Something of this tension perhaps breaks out in the contrast Aristotle (tries to) draws between poetry and history in the Poetics.

57 One important question here is what model of deliberation is adopted.
Notes: Chapter 1 Section 3

1 Cf. also Phys.IV.4.210b32-211a11; Meta.B.1.995a27ff; De Caelo 1.10.279b5.

2 See further Owen(1961); Nussbaum(1982).

3 Cf. EE.1.6.1216b26-35 (see ad loc. Woods(1982), p.63, on the richer implications of the confusion-clarity contrast and the connection with the road up from things intelligible-to-us to things intelligible-in-themselves. A fuller discussion would encompass the notions of paideia and akribeia).

There are intriguing methodological resonances between various pronouncements by Aristotle in connection with this 'doxastic' method and various methodological principles that have emerged in theories of Radical Translation and Radical Interpretation, in particular the Principles of Charity and Humanity. To these we might add some principle of Intellectual Deference in the face of cultures (or people) hypothesized to be intellectually more advanced than one's own (of course having good reason to believe that others know better than you in the direct way at issue here obviously requires some shared basis) (cf. Putman's linguistic division of labour).

Aristotle focussing on belief (and perception) bids us (on different occasions) in effect to:

(1) maximise the ascription of true belief (cf. 7.1.1145b4-6);
(2) to ignore the views of the mad and insane and childish (EE.1.3.1214b29ff); and where we attribute false beliefs,
it is a constraint on a true theory to explain why reasonable human beings should have found the view plausible (7.14.1154a22-25);

(3) pay particular attention to the opinions of the wise (cf. EE.1.3.1215a2, Rackham; "of the good", Woods(1982), p.200: "the good" would constitute a suitable to-be-deferred-to class just as much the wise).

(Again, on the one hand, Aristotle has to be faced with the question:
(a) how does a non-phronimos recognise a phronimos?
Cf.:
(b) the 'Hesiod problem': how does Hesiod's second best man who knows he doesn't know recognise one who does?
(c) the 'Pupil's problem': how does a pupil who wants to learn about subject X select a teacher who knows about X?

See EE.1.5.1217alff for a glimmer of Aristotle's response.

On the other hand, questions can be raised about who we intellectually defer to.)


6 By this I intend the claim that "no-one making a judgement acts in violation of what is best, except through ignorance" (NE.7.2.1145b26-7).

7 Even if such truth as it has is only accidentally arrived at, as Charles would have it ((1984), p.124): he
detects a pointed irony in Aristotle's use of "sumbainein" (1147b15).

8 Of course this is not yet to say what sort of akratic cases he allows as possible (cf. 1.3.3.).

9 For without that, I don't see what truth could be allowed the Socratic premiss. (However this leaves the notion of agnoia open to very different interpretations.)

10 Although the "deinon" and "thaumaston" cases of Sec.1. and 2. seem also to point to Aristotle's acceptance of some truth in the Socratic premiss.

11 This dimension is exploited particularly by Charles (1984), pp.164-8; cf. pp.127-8; and by Dahl (1984), p.188 (and Chp.11 passim, e.g. p.210).

12 For 'clouding' cf. McDowell (1978), pp.28-9. Wiggins complains (1978-9), Sec.IV, that McDowell's interpretation of Aristotle's thoughts fails to acknowledge the difficulty of distinguishing akratic and encratic. For a criticism of Wiggins, see 1.4.3.

13 Cf. 1.2.6., note 36 Chapter 1 Section 2.

14 Neither Charles nor Dahl, that I can see, explicitly examine Aristotle's use of "agnoia" to see whether it can plausibly cover simply motivational or practical failure compatibly with unclouded intellectual apprehension, as their views require. (Dahl's aversion to 1147b6-9 on pp.212-13 turns out not to address this problem.)

15 Irwin (1982), pp.265-6, offers some suggestive
remarks about the role of the phainomena (fixing the topic in hand).

16 What is "this logos" (1145b27)? The Socratic argument? The Socratic conclusion? The Socratic premiss? I favour the latter albeit tentatively: (a) "houtos" (b27) tends to refer to what immediately precedes; (b) "ei di'agnoian" (b29) quotes the Socratic premiss (b27).

17 It also conflicts with the phainomenon that akrasia is psekton (1145b10), and, in its own way, opposes those who would distinguish akratic and akolastic (1145b17).


19 Owen(1961), p.86:

So Socrates' claim conflicts not with the facts but with what would commonly be said on the subject, and Aristotle does not undertake to save everything that is commonly said.


20 Dahl(1984) appears to gesture towards this possibility, pp.142-3. In favour of this latter interpretation is perhaps the methodology. In favour of the 'traditional' interpretation is Plato, Protagoras 352b (a work presumably in Aristotle's mind - cf. 1145b24); also perhaps MM.2.6.1200b25ff).

21 That this is a unit is evident both from its internal rationale ("pos": episteme; doxa; phronesis) and from the "eti"s that mark out the different puzzles (1146a9,
16, 21, 31, b2).

22 An old interpretation (Cook Wilson; Ross) ran: "How does someone while judging correctly act akratically?" I take this reading to be grammatically wrong; and such philosophical issues as were based on it now dead (cf. Hardie AET, pp. 266-8). The 'pos' asks a manner or a 'qualification' question, which is for Aristotle closely connected with other 'manner/qualification' terminology: e.g. 'haplos'; 'houtos'; tropos.

23 'Judgement' is my more or less token translation of 'hupolepsis' and cognates. 'Hupolepsis' and cognates appear on occasion to have a specific usage (e.g. NE. 6.3.1139b17, unless the succeeding "kai" = i.e.); but clearly not here.

24 'And their opposites': so De An. 3.3.427b10-11; 26.

The 'opposite' of "true belief" (427b10) and of "belief" (b25) is obviously false belief.

The 'opposites' of 'episteme' and 'phronesis' are not nearly so obvious. If episteme's opposite is agnoia, is this a mere lack of episteme? Or something more positively contrasting - false belief? But if the latter, then episteme and true belief apparently share opposites. Or is Aristotle relying on the implicit presence of some further criteria - e.g. that agnoia is false beliefs about demonstrative truths, etc.?

Again is phronesis' opposite - aphrosune - mere lack of phronesis, or more positively some notion of
'anti-phronesis' (see 1.4.1.)?

25 Cf. 1.2.5.; 1.3.5.

26 What is "the thesis" (1145b25)? This depends initially on how we interpret "pros".

On the traditional assumption that it means "against", perhaps the most plausible candidate is the thesis that "it is possible for one who knows to act akratically" (i.e. the negation of (4)). So Stewart, p.127; Rackham (Loeb), p.378 n.b.

If so, and if (2) is supposed to give grounds for Socrates' opposition, it presumably does so a fortiori. It is not possible for one who knows to act akratically, because it is not possible for anyone to act akratically.

Alternatively "pros" might mean "in favour of". If so, presumably the thesis is (3). And then (2) would explain the oddity of knowledge being dragged around - it would be odd because there is no akrasia ((2) is then explained by (1)).

27 Ross mistranslates by offering "against what he judges best" instead of "what is best". People don't act through ignorance against what they judge best.

This formulation of the Socratic premiss appears to leave open the possibility of intentional action not on a best judgement although presumably not when there is also a best judgement (so e.g. perhaps sudden action). In other words it leaves unclear whether Socrates takes it that all action is action on a best judgement. (Xen.Mem.iii.9.§4-5
doesn't make this clear either.) Contrast Plato, Protagoras.

28 Rackham (Loeb, p. 379) translates as though (2) was the consequence of its preceding clause.

29 One might think that the 'knowledge' case was not merely a special instance, but made a contribution of its own - that there is something peculiarly dominating, irresistible, about knowledge. This is the thought that the (BKM) exploits.

There is some sloppiness here about modalities. (4) appears to say akrasia is impossible; "deinon" in (3) presumably also points to the (same) modality (though nothing is said about the kind of impossibility at issue). By contrast (2) and (1) are apparently unmodalized.

30 See note 16 above.

31 Presumably this indirect question could be asking either for a causal explanation of how the ignorance comes about, or what its nature is (it being unlike ab initio ignorance). Perhaps there is not really much at issue between these.

32 (a) note the "ge" (1145b30); (b) I take the "ouk oietai" strongly as implying an internal negation ('thinks that not...'); (c) "phaneron": I take Aristotle's point to be that Socrates could not plausibly deny this fact.

33 See note 31 above.

34 Cf. 1.2.6. (and note 28 Chapter 1 Section 2).

35 Admittedly more is going on in Sec.2. than simply (B).
"Arguing" may seem rather strong for Sec.3., whose style is perhaps nearer assertion or invitation. (See further Chapter 4.)

Or "how it could occur" if one doesn't want to commit oneself to the actual occurrence of the phenomenon. (This indicates my distrust of Santas' distinction: 1.2.2.)
Notes: Chapter 1 Section 4

1 Cf. Rep.4.430e6-431b2 on enkrateia and "kreitto hautou" (though here there is a simple opposition between this and akolasia (431b1-2)). See also Pears(1984), pp.15; 17.

I am uncertain whether the alpha-privative indicates simply "lack", as Pears claims; or whether it (can) indicates "loss", with the implication that the agent was previously in control of himself. Alternatively one might want to bring in a reference to ability here: a lack/loss of ability to keep fully in control of oneself.

2 I here (independently) agree with Pears(1984), pp.17; 23. Among those apparently misled are Wiggins(1978), Sec. III (etc.). (Cf. too Milo(1966), p.67 n.1.)

3 On the concept of "will" in antiquity see Dilhe(1983); Kahn(unpublished). (More generally, cf. Kenny(1975), Chp.2.)


4 Could feelings/emotions be added to this list? One might try describing the encratic as an emotional akratic. But there are obviously many more complexities in the triangle of best judgement, action and feeling/emotion than we can uncover here.

5 & 6 The conception of the rational system (RS)
initiating action is obviously contrastable with Humean, or neo-Humean, conceptions of practical reasoning. (See variously Irwin(1975); Watson(1975), especially Sec.I; Dahl(1984); McDowell(1978).)

While the literature tends to contrast different conceptions of practical reason, the Reason in the RS covers both contemplative and executive aspects, both theoretical and practical reason (however these are distinguished).

Plato in the Rep., by making 'the Good' the highest object of contemplative knowledge, creates a perspective within which TR and PR don't split (or do so as theoretical v. applied).

In NE.1.7.1098a3 I take "praktike tis <zoe>" to include theoria:
(a) there is a wide use of praxis on which theoria is a praxis;
(b) the link between 1098a4-5 and 1.13.1103al-7;
(c) the (more complex) link between 1098a17-18; 1.8.1099a29-31; 7.13.1153b10-12; 10.5.1176a26-7; and 10.7.'s thesis.

7 Cf. 9.4.1166al5-16; 22-3. Obviously there are dangers within such hierarchical views (e.g. they fail to respond sufficiently to the differences that reason can, so to speak, work on the lower system. I pursue this elsewhere.).

8 Another perspective from which the akrates/akolastos distinction appears to vanish are the Socratic paradoxes. But this is open to varying interpretations (depending on
whether Socrates is viewed as arguing for the incoherence of certain concepts, or for revisionary accounts of them). Thus we have at least these possibilities:
(i) the difference disappears because neither character is possible;
(ii) the difference disappears because while a revisionary account of akolasia is possible (as someone who has false beliefs about the good, and so is ignorant of the good and to be pitied), the figure of the akratic is incoherent.

However I am tempted to suppose that Aristotle argues that:
(iii) all Socrates is entitled to are revisionary accounts of both figures, according to which the first is a continual ignorant, the second an epileptic or intermittent ignorant; and so (a) a revisionary version of the distinction can be made out, and (b) consequently Socrates owes us an account of the S-akratic's intermittent ignorance.

(See 1.3.4-fin.)
9 Cf. e.g. Rep.4.431a7-b2 (cf. note 1).

10 Both by blocking access to/development of Reason's own natural goals, and by commandeering and redirecting some of the RS's abilities (e.g. calculative ones) to its own satisfaction (cf. Rep.; Aristotle on deinotes).

11 Mightn't the (RS) have its own 'naturally perverted' goals, so to speak, rather than rely for its perversions on external interference? Even stupidity is a much neglected
One notices again and again the centrality given to the akolastic. The tendency is to treat all forms of money-making and power simply as executive means to procuring more food, drink and sex (see e.g. Phaedo 68c1-3; NE.1.5.1096a 5-7; etc., etc.). To this extent at least the tripartition of the soul in the Republic is a real advance over the Phaedo (cf. also Rep.8-9). But where are the misers, the megalomaniacs, the collectors, the amoralist indifferenters, the cynics, the nihilists...? At times one feels in the presence of some Ur-Freudianism, where, the intellect apart, the loci of satisfaction reduce to oral and genital - with a curious neglect of the anal (there is a marked lack of reference to urinary and defecatory 'appetites' in Plato and Aristotle). Perhaps this is a false impression on my part; but there is a real need for more serious work on wickedness, ancient and modern.

Gosling and Taylor(1982) nicely underpin the basic distinction they draw between "sybaritic" and "enlightened" hedonism in terms of two contrasts: (i) the range of types of pleasure at issue - simply, the merely physical v. the not merely physical (the latter being ambiguous); (ii) temporal attitude (cf. is one 'present' or 'life-time' orientated?). Most unfortunately they fail to formulate and exploit the different hedonisms even these simple contrasts generate. You can in fact get quite far into Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of wickedness just equipped with
the four types of hedonism generated by those two contrasts.

14 E.g. NE.7.3.1146b22-23.

15 Cf. Gosling and Taylor, pp.320-1. But I realise this topic requires more disentangling than the present suggestive remarks. (Cf. Aristotle's construal of the wicked man in NE.9.)

16 I am indebted to David Pears' lectures in the 1970s for this releasing concept. One can extend it throughout Aristotle's main cognitive notions - 'anti-empeiria', 'anti-nous', etc. - as a way of raising the question of whether Aristotle has simply availed himself of a realism whose underpinnings he has not secured against anti-realist worries. Anti-phronesis is of particularly acute interest since Aristotle virtually commits himself to it in his characterisation of the akolastic as a prohairetic character.

17 Cf. G. Taylor(1981). In correspondence I have argued against her claim that the wicked can have integrity, partly on the grounds that:

(i) integrity at least involves an integrating function;
(ii) that integrity involves a richness in such integration (e.g. some 'person' (sic) with only one interest in life doesn't have integrity...); i.e. a necessary condition on having integrity is being able to integrate a sufficiently wide range of interests into a stable pattern of life;
(iii) that de facto at least we have no conception of a person with such a rich range, that nevertheless excludes any purchase on the 'moral'; 'people with integrity have to
buy into care or kindness somewhere' could sloganise the claim.

(i) is intended as a point of common agreement; (ii) as the focal point of disagreement; (iii) as a minimal commitment, merely de facto, not as giving the releasing reason - for I want ultimately to argue that it's not merely contingent that only the moral have integrity.

But even if this is wrong, it is still important to bring into friction Aristotle's conception of phronesis and the uses he wants it to play, and the concern with the concept of integrity that has been shown by Williams(1973) and G. Taylor and the various uses that is to play. E.g. 'Is integrity an excellence?'

This is potentially a particularly illuminating lacuna, given that the two concepts in play appear differently rooted, and so the 'cross-fertilization' (sic) could yield real dividends in illumination.

18 However he is also prepared on occasion to contrast them in terms of genus (7.8.1150b35-6).

19 Although as we have seen (1.4.1.) there is some doubt about how integrated Aristotle thinks the wicked man's false conception can be.

20 Construing "emotion" broadly.

21 Questions are asked about how 'ideal' these figures are, especially that of the phronimos, or man of full virtue, cf. e.g. McDowell(1978), p.28; Wiggins(1978/9), Sec.IV.
Obviously the phronimos is 'the' ideal figure within the scale of human assessment. I take it that Aristotle does not think phronesis ideal beyond the reach of attainment; that there are phronimoi, although they are not very common. (After all there is a still further 'ideal' figure - in the 'godlike' man.)


23 Ibid., pp.32ff, esp.35-6.

24 Peacocke (1979/1985?), pp.lff, esp.2a note**.


26 I have in mind here both: (a) the sophistic puzzles that aphrosune combined with akrasia is excellence (or every bit as good as phronesisis, or correct thought plus enkrateia): for
(i) 'foolishness judges things that are in fact good to be bad and not to be done';
(ii) while akrasia leads the foolish person to do the opposite of what they judge;
(iii) ergo they will do what is good. (7.2.1146a21-31);
and:
(b) the questions whether enkrateia makes one likely to stick by every belief, akrasia to abandon every belief - in which case there will be bad enkrateias and good akrasias (as the case of Neoptolemus in Sophocles' Philoctetes) (7.2.1146a16-21; 7.9.1151a29-b22).
27 I have in mind the akrasia pos cases of 7.4. and 7.6. (I may be overinterpreting here - and stray into giving a neo-Aristotelian account.) The idea is that Aristotle takes as the central case akrasia di'epithumian, action on an appetite (of the AS) in violation of a best judgement of the RS, whereas in these pos cases what goes wrong occurs within the RS. (It is not immediately obvious what Aristotle takes to go wrong in these cases of 7.4. - is it e.g. simply temporary self-deceptive over-valuation of some good? (a kind of 'supermarket madness').)

It may be objected that Aristotle appears to think akratic pos actions in 7.4. are also actions on appetites (1148a22; 27). However Aristotle appears to employ epithumia with two different ranges:
(a) any desire for something qua pleasant is ergo characterisable as an epithumia;
(b) a use where restrictions are put on the kind of pleasantness at issue - basically qua physically pleasant (and these may be further restricted to the physical pleasures which are the subject-matter of akolasia and temperance).

The sense in 'akrasia di'epithumian' is clearly (b). (The appetites of 7.4. above can be attributed to the RS.)

Vis-a-vis 7.6. note the very different type of judgement on which one acts in akrasia dia thumon to that of akrasia di'epithumian (1149a32-b3).
For the notion of a disjunctive account see Hinton (1973), e.g. pp.38ff; Snowdon (1980), pp.184ff. The suggestion is that Aristotle regards the theoretical perspective from which all this range of cases is characterized as though it were a unitary phenomenon as plain wrong. There are essentially different phenomena within it (cf. hallucinating is essentially different from seeing; there is not some common nexus from which 'seeing' is differentiated out by the application of further, typically causal, conditions). Of course there may still be illuminating similarities, intricate kinds of conceptual dependency (here would fit in one's favoured account of Aristotle's views on focality).


The passage quoted from Wiggins continues:

(Unless the claim is ex post facto and the supposed difference is not even represented to be a subjective difference.)

But presumably McDowell would/could claim that the different degrees of clouding suffered by enkratic and akkratic is a subjective difference. The dispute then seems to be over what the phenomenological facts are.

For the falsity of (ii) cf. Hume Treatise II.III.2 (Nidditch, p.408); 1st Enquiry Sec.VIII Pt.I, P.94 n.1.

For perhaps a more plausible diagnosis of a misleading thought here, see 1.4.4. below on the problem of
I find a prima facie oddity in Wiggins' position in that he grants that continence is a state of character (Rorty ed. (1980), p. 243). I don't know whether he views this as contrasting with incontinence (as may be suggested by pp. 252-3), or whether he is happy to view incontinence also as a state of character. But either way the fact that continence is a different state of character from incontinence would per se offer an initial McDowellian purchase on the thought that continent and incontinent have different cognitive conceptions of the situation.

Wiggins seems to view the akratic as, so to speak, an encratic who occasionally fails (cf. p. 253). Insofar as he does so, and for the reasons he gives (pp. 252-3), I think he falls for the problem of the Double Appeal to Character.

32 Cf. e.g. NE.5.9.1137a4-26; NE.2.1.-4.; cf. Top.4.5.126a30ff. I am aware that the application to the akratic may be resisted on the grounds that:
(i) acting θ-ly = acting from character;
(ii) acting from character = acting kata prohairesin;
(iii) the akratic acts para prohairesin.

I wish nevertheless to maintain that akrasia can be a character-disposition; and would reject (ii) as too simple a thesis.

33 Cf. NE.2.8.1109a12ff; 2.9.1109b1ff.

34 Cf. 1150b1ff, esp. 12ff; 7.8.1151a3-5; 7.10.1152a25-7. (7.9.1151b23ff applies the doctrine of the Mean to the
figures of the akratic and en克拉tic, introducing a third figure whose character ("toioutos holos" 1151b23) is:

to enjoy bodily things less than he should, and not sticking by the logos/his reason.

35 E.g. 7.1.1145b8ff; 7.4.1148b2-6; 7.8.1151a27-28; 7.9.1151b28ff.

36 This has been maintained by David Pears (in lectures). It is much in the air - as evidenced by Charles (1984) who assumes it as brute fact (see 1.4.4. below).

37 Cf. Cat.8.8b26-9a13; NE.7.3.1147a14 "dianthtentai". However I see no reason to suppose that akrasia can't become a hexis - "poluchroniotera kai duskinettotera" (Cat.9a5) than a diathesis. Cf. e.g. 7.10.1152a27-33.

38 Cf. note 17 above.


What is unacceptable is the view that he/Sc. Aristotle firmly and consistently placed it well beyond the bounds of possibility.
Notes: Chapter 2

1 I follow the traditional translation of "theorein" as "contemplate". What "theorein" consists in is a question for Chapter 3.

Do we supply "ten epistemen" with "to echonta men me theorounta de"? Certainly we must understand it with "echonta"; but I have found no example in Bonitz of the locution "theorein ten epistemen" - Aristotle apparently preferring to use "theorein" by itself as the energeia to which the (simple) sunamis is "to echein ten epistemen": cf. Bonitz 328a54ff.

2 The grammar of this sentence is confused. The point at issue must be that in my quasi-translation.

3 "Manners": again a largely token translation. The "tropoi" at 1147a8 are cashed out by the adverbs of manner "houto...allos" (a9). But does that "tropoi" pick up the occurrence at al?

4 "para": in violation of (cf. "para nomon"), rather than "against" as Ross et al. (For an explicit parallel with "nomos" cf. 7.10.1152a20ff.)

5 The "men" at al is picked up not by a "de" but by "mentoi". There is some oddity here. Why isn't a case of merely having both and not using either type of proposition mentioned? What on earth does using a universal proposition without using the particular consist in? We come back to
such questions in Chapter 3.

6 I take it that "protasis" (and not episteme) is to be understood here (as with "amphoteras").

7 The phrase Aristotle opposes to "he katholou <protasis>" is "he kata meros <protasis>".

In Pr.An.A.1.24a17ff (cf. A.2.25a4ff) Aristotle distinguishes three sorts of protasis "katholou", "en merei" and "adioristos". "\(\text{en merei}\)" seems clearly equivalent to "kata meros" (cf. e.g. 24a20; 25a10-11, etc.), and the "indeterminate" is here dropped.

In De An.3.11.434a16ff Aristotle contrasts "he men katholou hupolepsis kai logos" with "he de tou kath' hekaston" (cf. NE.7.3.1147b4-5; 1147a25-6).

It is plausible to suppose that hai kata meros protaseis are particular propositions (in the sense of Pr.An.A.1.), a subset of which, hai tou kath' hekaston protaseis, are singular propositions. However the latter are dependent on sense-perception (cf. NE.7.3.1147a26; cf. 6.3.1139b21f; etc.), and some worry might be felt about whether they can be 'had but not used' in the same sense as other kata meros protaseis not so dependent.

Kenny claims, on the basis of Post.An.A.24.86a22ff, that:

the protasis kata meros can in fact be a universal proposition, provided only that its subject is of lesser extension than the universal which is the subject of the katholou. ((1966), p.171)
However that chapter is concerned to oppose katholou and kata meros demonstration (apodeixis); and I don't see that anything immediately follows from that about universal and particular propositions.

(It is also worth wondering whether Aristotle could here be referring to the conclusion, rather than the minor premiss.)

8 "prakta gar ta kath'hekasta"


10 "issue": pragma.

11 autos: Rassow's emendation. The MSS tradition is confused here. In support of Rassow, Stewart (Vol.2, p.151) points to the "autos d'anthropos" of De Mot.An.7.701al3. On the other hand the medical example in the MM passage parallel to the NE has "houtos" (MM.II.6.1201b28, 29). For the import of this for the question of whether this is a technical or ethical syllogism, see note 59 below.

12 "either": as Charles notes (1984), p.126) MSS KbMb omit the first "e". Whether he is right to adopt this and then to treat the remaining "e" as rectificatory is discussed later.

13 I do not know that anyone has actually made such a claim.

14 Kenny(1966), p.173. He has since modified his view: see below, note 16.
Kenny (1966), p.173, however doesn't offer any explicit explanation of why Aristotle should bother to discuss this 'non-akratic' sense here. The suggestion I offer is one found in Fairbrother (1897), pp.364-5. He regards Sec.1-3. as all concerned with various forms of "pseudo-incontinence" and hence "all irrelevant to the real question at issue". However he explains their presence:

> But the statement of them has cleared the ground. We know now exactly what has to be explained and can proceed to the real root (phusikos) of the matter.


Kenny has adopted a more cautious stance in (1979). While he still claims that Sec.2. "is not explicitly discussing akrasia" (p.161, n.1), nevertheless "the passage 1147a4-10" "hints" at one of the two principal kinds of breakdown in practical reasoning in cases of incontinence. (The passage only "hints" because he thinks this passage actually" concerns a technical syllogism" (p.161, n.1).) "Hinting" is very opaque; but perhaps he has moved towards what I call an inclusive view.

"odd". There are two problems here.

The first concerns the nature of the 'oddity' in
question. For example:

(a) It could be one of straightforward logical impossibility. It will be so if 'using one's knowledge' is identical with one's acting appropriately: for how could one use one's knowledge = act appropriately and yet fail to act appropriately?

(b) Alternatively it could be one of conceptual strain in some supposedly acceptable psychological explanatory theory. Aristotle might hold that using one's knowledge = coming to the conclusion (= reaching (e.g.) an unconditional best judgement) and that that is sufficient for one's then acting appropriately. (Failure to so act would entail by contraposition a failure to reach (or more broadly, to be appropriately related to) the conclusion.) For how could one have more reason to do other than what one judge's specifically best to do?

On this latter line, Aristotle would apparently be agreeing with a model of intentional action explanation embedded in, or extrapolable from, the Socratic view, but exposing the difference between universal and singular best judgements (cf. 1.3.5.). The model would hardly involve the plainly idiotic sufficiency thesis of the preceding paragraph: rather the 'Boring Sufficiency thesis':

(BS): Coming to a conclusion about what it is best, singularly, for one to do is sufficient for one's acting appropriately, if one acts (or refrains) intentionally at all.

This acknowledges the relevance of certain external and
internal intentional-action blocking conditions - lightning and heart attacks may strike between conclusion and action. As it stands it is both incomplete and inadequate: (we need to know more about the relations between reaching the conclusion - cf. deciding - and the action, and it fails to accommodate the possibility of change of mind about what is (singularly) best to do (either before or during the action) - and also of certain other types of 'rendering irrelevant' (if one's conception of what is involved in a change of mind is too deliberative)). Nevertheless it preserves the main element in the 'Socratic' model of intentional action explanation, viz. that one always does what at the time one believes one has most reason to do, if one does (or refrains) anything intentionally.

I say that Aristotle would "apparently" be agreeing with this model because the presence of "dokei" at 1146b35 and 1147a9 introduces uncertainty about how far Aristotle himself is committed to (every element in) the picture he presents.

(The 'Interesting Sufficiency' thesis (IS), by contrast, does not preserve the above 'Socratic' model: for it allows in its blocking conditions elements (e.g. appetites) capable of leading to intentional action which thereby is not viewed as necessarily flowing from a best judgement.)

18 There are obvious ambiguities in questions of the form "Is Sec.x. - or indeed chapter 3 as a whole - about
all types of akrasia, or only about certain select types?": (i) is "all" being used to include pathological as well as normal types? (cf. 7.5.; 7.7.); (ii) is the question relativised to types of akrasia recognised by Aristotle, or ones recognised by some modern discussion? (e.g. Aristotle may not deal with 'all' akrasia, because he does not allow for Pears-ian "last-ditch" akrasia).

For simplicity, I confine myself to normal and Aristotelian types of akrasia (though there is no need to commit oneself to what types precisely these are).

19 I gloss over the question of distribution here. Obviously there are different models. Someone could advocate (V1B) - or (V2B) - because they held e.g.: (a) each schema of Sec.1. and 2. accommodates all types of akrasia (so 1147a7 would be offering not exclusive schemata but two descriptions of the same one); or: (b) the schemata of Sec.1. and Sec.2. do so between them (each is necessary); or: (c) Sec.1. accommodates all types; and so does Sec.2. (but Sec.2. offers several different schemata of greater detail than the single all-embracing version of Sec.1.).

We can afford to ignore these complications.

20 I assume that the types of akratic and non-akratic phenomena that may be at issue are actual ones, and not merely possible ones. (There are difficult and interesting questions here, but they are not àpropos.)
I know only two attempts to controvert (2), neither in the least convincing.

Fairbrother (1897) views Sec.1-3. as dealing with "the three commonest forms of...pseudo-incontinence" - with:

...ways of 'sinning against knowledge' in a sense (pos) which do not amount to Incontinence, though they look like it at first sight and are readily confused with it. (p.365)

His paraphrase of Sec.3. (p.365) fails to acknowledge the explicit mention of akratics (1147a18; 24): (presumably he thinks the section is really about non-akratics who are compared with but differentiated from, akratics: that is simply not viable).

Kenny (1966) (pp.174-6) admittedly allows that Sec.3. does concern akrasia, but claims it is best viewed as concerned, not with normal, but with pathological forms of akrasia.

This was criticised by Rowe (1971) (Appendix, p.119), and has since been implicitly retracted by Kenny (1979) (pp.162ff). For further discussion of this and Rowe's criticisms, see Chapter 4 below.

Against my claim about the natural implication of the presence of the definite article with "akrateis" at 1147a18, it may be objected that:

(i) the definite article also occurs, with "akrateuomenoi" at 1147a23;  
(ii) and that there "hoi akrateuomenoi" are, on my own admission, merely a subset of akratics - viz. those who
also verbalise appropriately;

(iii) so that the presence of "the" with "akrateis" earlier need not imply that Aristotle takes himself to be talking about all akratics.

I remain unmoved.

On the one hand I am tempted to claim that in the later passage as well as the earlier Aristotle is talking of all akratics - that we should understand the sense of 1147a23f as:

so in the same way we should judge that <all> those who act akratically speak <should it so happen that they do speak>.

On the other I should appeal to the occurrences of "ho akrates" at Sec.4b 1147b6-7 and 7.10.1152a9-19 for further evidence: see my comments earlier, 1.2.4. and Chapter 3 below.

A word of warning. What I say in the text per se hardly commits me to any particular view of the relevant domain of "all". It could be e.g.:

(a) all the types of akrasia Aristotle recognises in 7.3.-7.10;
(b) same as (a), but excluding pathological types;
(c) only "akrasia haplos" (i.e. di'epithumian), but all types of that (i.e. both weakness and impulsiveness), etc. See further note 18 above; Chapter 2.10. below.

Perhaps the only view it excludes would be:

(d) all the types of akrasia that Aristotle is concerned with simply in this section as against other sections.
But I don't think this is a possible implication, without explicit verbal pointing.

23 While acceptance of (1SA) and (3) are sufficient for (V3), they are not necessary; as I go on to point out not all advocates of (3) accept them both (e.g. Kenny(1966) rejects (3)).


25 For a qualification that allows acceptance of (3) together with there being a sense in which Sec.3. does indeed concern only a particular kind of akrasia, see 2.10. below; and cf. note 22 above.

26 See further Chapter 4.

27 The precise reference of "the manners just discussed" (1147a10-11) is problematic.

28 Also in Sec.2.

29 Kenny(1966), advocating a (V3), must adopt the (1SA) interpretation. He does not see this clearly: in the following passage he first apparently commits himself to a (1MS) reading, and then immediately afterwards to a (1SA) one:

Aristotle...begins /sc. in Sec.3.7 by drawing a distinction between two kinds of hexis within the class of hexeis which he has already distinguished /sc. in Sec.1. and 2. from energelai. Besides the possessing-but-not-exercising mentioned above, there is another sort of possessing-and-not-exercising, the state of those asleep or mad or drunk. ((1966), p.174; my additions and emphases)
See further Chapter 2.12.ff below.


The sentences "dioisei...ei me theoron" (1146b33ff); and "kata te de...thaumaston" (1147a8ff).

For "logos" perhaps cf. 7.2.1145b27 (and perhaps better Phys.A.2.185b12, "ou pros ton logon").

The verb *diaphorein* occurs six times between 1146b24 and 1147a12: viz. 1146b25, 29, 33, 1147a4, 8, 12.

Despite the apparent difference of (or in some cases uncertainty about) their grammatical constructions, it is tempting to suppose all these occurrences connected, as part of a theme concerned with introducing distinctions that have relevance for the Socratic problem (it is surely not that "there is no difference between knowledge and belief" (1146b29), but that in the light of the preceding remark (b27-8), there is no difference between them that is helpful for resolving the Socratic problem).

However my outline of the argumentative thread here relies only on connecting b25, 33, and a8.


Does MM.II.6 §17 introduce a new (or summing up) point as the paragraphing of Armstrong's Loeb suggests? Or is it part of the preceding point?

The structure isn't obvious. While §§15-16 (1201b23-39) apparently concentrate on giving a more
abstract model of how akrasia is possible ("endechetai" 1201b35) (in terms of two premisses of the syllogism), §17 appears to turn to inform us about its psychological causation - indicating that "pathos" can have the same effect on cognitive states as intoxication. (It might be suggested that §17 parallels Sec.3. or even Sec.3. and 4b; but there's nothing very helpful in that.)

38 (a) an early work of Aristotle; (b) a later Peripatetic compilation; (c) student's notes from a lecture course; etc. See e.g. Cooper (1973), pp.327-49.

39 The MM doesn't articulate the further distinction in cognitive state that Sec.3. introduces. (The MM uses the figures of the person asleep and the drunk to make different points: see 1201bl4-22; 1202alff. Admittedly the latter may point towards Sec.3. (cf. note 37 above), but no explicit terminology is introduced.)

There are also other differences. §§15-16 lack anything paralleling Sec.2b (the difference in universal terms); moreover §§15-16 seek to allow for the possibility of akrasia in terms of a case where the agent has the universal knowledge, but does not have particular knowledge (especially 1201b38-9), rather than a failure to exercise it (in the illustration the man lacks knowledge of "whether this man is in a fever", 1201b33). (Admittedly the precise sense of "echein" at issue is not made explicit.)

40 Cf. (P2) in Chapter 2.4. above.

41 That it supports (V2) over (V1) is due to the fact
that in both the parallel MM sections, akrasia is illuminated by non-akratic cases - people asleep in the first part, and the technical medical syllogism in the second.

42 Cf. Chapter 1.2.2. (the '3-1 Puzzle'); Chapter 2.8.

Addendum.

43 Cf. Chapter 5.

44 "logikos" isn't explicitly mentioned. But the occurrences of "legomen" (1146b31) and perhaps "lekteon" (1147a18) are suggestive; ("dokein" at 1146b35 and 1147a9 could also be relevant - but this depends somewhat on the view taken of the phusikos-logikos contrast).

45 (a)-(e) are not all mutually exclusive.

(e): Randall(1960), pp.59-61; Walsh, p.100 n.

46 Doubts however can be - and have been - raised as to whether all four sections consider the same problem with akrasia: see 1.2.2. above (the '3-1 Puzzle'). But what does not seem immediately plausible if one accepts the presence of the logikos-phusikos distinction as vaguely construed in the text is to suppose that any of the sections treat akrasia only in some mildly preparatory way.
My point here is, I think, in agreement with the thrust of Sorabji's remark at the end of footnote 3, pp. 275-6:

and the present passage Sec.4. is introduced not as offering an alternative explanation, but as describing the same thing from a more physical point of view (1147a24). (1980), p.276)

Rowe significantly fails even to acknowledge the presence of "phusikos" in the text: see:
(a) his adoption of Allan's paraphrase, p.117;
(b) the remark (p.119), "At a24, he continues merely with an 'eti'" (my emphasis).

48 In Sec.2. knowledge of the kata meros protasis isn't explicitly referred to as episteme (unless we should understand "episteme" and not "protasis" at 1147a3: cf. the ease with which MM.II.6.1201b24-39 moves between protasis and episteme). Later he apparently refers to it as "aisthetike <episteme>" (1147b17). (Cf. also epistasthai (1147b11-12).)

49 "epistasthai" (1147b11-12): Aristotle does not specify what sense of this is at issue here: it could be apparently either (a) to have knowledge (HS); or (b) to be exercising knowledge. The latter is perhaps easier, except that one would expect Aristotle to use "theorein"; however I suppose "epistasthai" in its 'most proper usage' (kurios) would be equivalent to "theorein" (cf. De A.2.5.417a29).
The notion of "case" is here sufficiently neutral for us to represent positions of Rowe and Charles in its terms:

(a) Rowe argues that Case 1 and Case 2 are not "two separate cases" but "merely...two alternative descriptions of the state of mind of the...incontinent" (p.118); and that Aristotle "is in fact simply picking up what he said at a10ff..." (p.118) - i.e. picking up Sec.3. (Rowe does not, so far as I can see, acknowledge that Sec.3. falls into two parts; and so not the possibility of aligning Case 1 with Case (i) and Case 2 with Case (ii).)

(b) Charles argues that Case A and Case B may not be different cases, but that (omitting with some MSS the first "e") we may view Case B as a rectificatory clarification of Case A ((1984), Chp.3., pp.125-6).

On the various possible 'dimensions' of 'type', see further Chapter 2.10. below.

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On the various possible 'dimensions' of 'type', see further Chapter 2.10. below.

51 On the question of what precisely "hoi logoi hoi apo tes epistemes" are, see Chapter 4.

52 Cf. (P2) in Chapter 2.4. above.

53 Of course a different construction may be placed on Sec.4c's place in the argumentative structure: cf. the "4c puzzle" in Chapter 1.2.1. above.

54 So for instance Charles(1984), pp.127-8 (although as we shall see he is not clear on the structure of Sec.3.). Case 2 seems obviously to pick up on Sec.3.
because of the comparison in b12 with the drunk spouting Empedocles, recalling 1147a20.

It can seem also to pick up on Sec.4a. For if Case 2 is interpreted as one where the agent is 'merely saying' the conclusion of the good syllogism, then isn't precisely this exemplified by 4a 1147a34: "..., he men oun legei pheugein touto"? - (the use of legein here, perhaps as against phanai (cf. 1147a27) being loaded).

Kenny (in (1979), p.164) attempts to carve out a middle road between these options. 'Eleutaia protasis', he argues,

In fact...means 'last proposition' and what it refers to differs from case to case: it refers to the point at which the reasoning of the incontinent man breaks down. In some cases this is a premiss; in other cases it is a conclusion; in each case it is the proposition whose absence, or whose ineffectiveness, is the cause of the incontinence.

I ignore this complication here.

There is an ambiguity in the notion of "failing to have the conclusion" that sometimes goes unnoticed. It may connote a failure to reach the conclusion; but it need not - it could connote a case of having reached the conclusion, but then failing to have it (solutus) at the moment of its needed operancy. We return to this. One reason this ambiguity sometimes passes unmarked is that the latter possibility requires one to reject the view that the conclusion = the action.
57 I call this cognitive failure the proximate cause in order to stress that the further cause (in these cases of akrasia) is the onset of a bad or unintegrated appetite which itself brings about the cognitive failure. This further cause presumably differentiates cases of akrasia from other non-akratic phenomena which are similar in point of proximate cause, but have a different causal story behind that. (Proximate cause may not be the right term: perhaps "enabling condition".)

58 On the relation of Sec.2b to 2a cf. Chapter 1.2.1.

59 For one can argue that:
(a) it is de facto possible to accommodate non-akratic examples to the schemata of Sec.2.;
(b) the actual example in Sec.2b (1147a5-7) seems to be a non-akratic example taken from medicine. Kenny ((1979), p. 161, n.l) calls it a "technical syllogism"; and that it is not itself an example of practical/ethical reasoning, apt for distortion by akratic pathos can be supported by appealing to other occurrences of medical illustrations (e.g. NE.6.7.1141b18-21), and in particular to the 'parallel' passage at MM.II.6.1201b28ff.

However closer consideration of this second point renders it suspect. It can be questioned whether the example in Sec.2b really is a technical one and not an ethical one - or perhaps rather whether "technical" is opposed to "ethical" in the exclusive way required by the argument.
Admittedly the parallel passage in MM.II.6. offers a clearly technical, non-akratic example (the NE.6.7. example also arguably plays a merely illustrative role for practical reasoning).

If we accept MSf's reading "houtos" the point would probably be clinched. But if we accept the OCT (with Rassow's "autos"), then there is a contrast with the MM passage (with its "houtos", MM.II.6.1201b28, 29), in that our example is then self-addressed. And this, it may be suggested, provides basis for questioning whether the example is purely technical.

We can press this further.

I take it that the respect in which dry food is advantageous to every human being is their health.

Now health (and perhaps also medicine) plays a somewhat ambivalent role in Aristotle: in fact it has two roles – an external 'illustrative' one, and an internal constitutive one.

On the one hand, Aristotle avails himself on occasion of the Platonic analogy:

medicine: aimed at good state of body (= health)  
politike: aimed at good state of soul (= flourishing)  
(e.g. NE.1.13.1102a18-23). He also sees in medicine (as too in navigation) a peculiarly appropriate model for practical reasoning and the role of deliberation in that (e.g. 1112b1-11; 11-16).

On the other hand, health – or rather healthy
activities - are partly constitutive and/or executive of human flourishing (e.g. 1140a25-28). Health is (at least part of) the goal of temperance:

The temperate man occupies a middle position with regard to these objects. For he neither enjoys the things that the self-indulgent man enjoys most - but rather dislikes them - nor in general the things that he should not...; but the things that, being pleasant, make for health or for good physical condition, he will desire moderately and as he should, and also other pleasant things if they are not hindrances to these ends, or contrary to what is noble, or beyond his means. (3.11.1119a11-18, Ross)

In which camp does the present example fall? Might it not rather fall in the second?

The principal defect opposing temperance is akolasia; and the central cases of akrasia are those involving the same objects as akolasia (7.4.1148a4-11; 1148b9-14; 7.5.1149a16-20). So why shouldn't our present example be one of practical ('ethical') reasoning, about the subject matter of especial concern to temperance (viz. health), which is what is under attack in central cases of akrasia?

(Indeed many commonplace cases of akrasia occur here: while one sets great value on one's health, one smokes or eats too much despite one's knowledge of the medical dangers.)

If this is right, then being a piece of practical reasoning doesn't exclude its also being, or involving, technical reasoning. Much of one's deliberation about what
is temperate will appeal to medical facts, theories and explanations. Of course there are matters of degree possible here; but Kenny I think does not make good his case for viewing the syllogism here as a 'technical' one as against a practical/'ethical' one.

(The question of practical reasoning's connection with skills requires further discussion: cf. NE.6.2.1139a35ff.)

However, even if the example in the text is not, or is not so clearly, a merely 'technical' one, but an ethical one, it does not follow that the one kind of breakdown it suffers will thereby be an akratic one. De facto, as the example is set out, we can accommodate other non-akratic cases to it (e.g. culpable negligence through tiredness, drunkenness, etc.).

60 Cf. Chapter 1.2.2.

(a) One could of course introduce variants of Q2 and Q3 applicable where Q1 gets only the 'preparatory' answer (vis-a-vis what sort of treatment of akrasia it was preparatory for, etc.).

(b) This framework of questions and views has been developed specifically in connection with Sec.1. and 2.; but it can obviously be abstracted from this and applied to other sections.

62 Cf. note 19 above (especially (c)).

63 Cf. note 18 above.

64 Cf. 7.4.1148a4-11; 7.5.1149a21-4; 7.6.1149a24ff; etc.
(a) Granting - as we should initially - that Aristotle is responsible for the ordering of the topics. (b) Perhaps the opening of 7.3. represents some such explicit plan.

It is also noticeable that in this somewhat odd passage at the beginning of 7.3. (viz. 1146b8-24) Aristotle particularly singles out and brings together these two issues of the Socratic problem and the object-range of akrasia.

The distinction is initially literal. Akrasia haplos is the occurrence of "akrasia" without any further qualifying words added, whereas akrasia pos has specifications added: cf. prostithenai (e.g. 7.4.1147b33; 1148a10, b6-7, b13, etc.).

Besides the contrast between akrasia haplos and pos Aristotle also uses (as apparently roughly equivalent):

(i) haplos v. kata meros: e.g. 7.4.1147b20-l;
(ii) haplos v. di' kath' homoioteta: e.g. 7.4.1147b34-5; 1148b6, 13; 7.5.1149a3;
(iii) haplos v. kata metaphoran: e.g. 7.5.1149a23
(iv) haplos v. kata prosthesin: e.g. 7.5.1149a17; 7.4.1148a 10-11.

What sort of additional specifications are possible? The principle specification is in terms of the various objects about which one may be akratic (lack-control): the "peri", or object, specification.

So, for instance, the central case is the one
where the relevant objects needn't be explicitly specified and are the same objects as are of concern to the akolastos - "ta anagkaia ton polounton hedonen" (7.4.1147b24; 25ff). Extended cases of a normal type are "peri" such things as "nike", "time", "ploutos" (in themselves takeable but admitting of excess: 1147b24ff; b30f; 33-4; 1148a25-6; 7.1.1145b19-20): on "thumos", see below. Extended cases of a pathological type are "peri" things that are not pleasant by nature (7.5.1148b15-17).

Besides the "peri" specification there is also a "dia" (/ek), or causal story, specification. Thus the central case can be characterised as akrasia di' epithumian (7.6.1149b23; cf. 1149a25). Various species of the pathological are distinguished more finely by their causal stories than their object (cf. 7.5.1148b17-18; 7.6.1149b29-30).

One would have expected to find "thumos" in the "dia" and not the "peri" specification. But this does not occur (cf. 1145b19-20; 1147b34; 1149b19; 24-5). And Aristotle seems also happy to move from one construction to the other in the case of epithumia (7.6.1149b24; 25-6).


70 In fact, as we see later, there is a hidden ambiguity in the notion of "a stage of breakdown". It may be (A) an explicitly temporal model or (B) a purely locational one. See 2.18. below.

72 Cf. Chapter 1.2.4.

73 The argument need only concern certain necessary conditions for being akratic, not sufficient ones (so (b) below does not go as far as claiming that the akratic's action must be in violation of his knowledge - though this is true).

74 The knowledge to be understood is obviously practical knowledge of what it is best for one to do - but there is precisely no commitment here as to whether it is universal or singular.

I follow Aristotle in talking in terms of 'knowledge'. Given his remarks in Sec.0. and the later occurrences of doxa and hupolepsis in Sec.4. we could have formulated this equally in terms of 'belief'. It should not however be assumed from this that Aristotle then sees that akrasia is not a special problem in moral philosophy but in philosophy of action generally (cf. Davidson(1970) in (1980), p.30 and n.14). He doesn't (see Chapter 1.4. above).

75 Cf. "to epistasthai" at 1146b31; "to echein ten epistemen" at 1147a10.

76 I do not mean this to imply that there are ways in which knowledge that is 'practical' (cf. knowledge of values) can be lost so that it has to be re-learnt. I think of course there are, but the question needs delicate handling (e.g. the sort of (re-)learning at issue is not 'intellectual-
clean-transfer' learning but "mathesis tis" (e.g. NE.1.8. 1099b19; 1.10.1100b12-17; 6.5.1140b28-30; and Ryle(1958) in (1971); etc.).

77 For there is no other place to locate him. Of course the passage is naturally read as suggesting we include the akratic under (β) not (α).

78 Cf. Chapter 2.4. (P2).

79 On the narrow (N) and wide (W) usages see Chapter 2.4.

80 The general picture of the manners of knowing that emerges from Sec.1. and Sec.3. is the following two-stage one:

Stage 1
- 'Using knowledge'
- 'Having-but-not-using k' (W)

Stage 2
- 'Having-but-not-using k' (N)
- 'Having-in-a-way-and-not-having'
  - "haplos"
  - "pos" (1147al2-13)

81 This argument for generality does not specify how the generality is achieved (e.g. it may be because all the cases are ones of Habitus Ligatus, or because some are of that type and others of Habitus Solutus; it even allows that
some could be - despite appearances - of the 'Using' type).

82 And given the comparisons drawn in Sec.3. between akratics and certain non-akratic phenomena, this seems very plausible. However, it may be that these other cases do not involve any question of acting (see further Chapter 4).

83 I.e. if we accept premiss (3) in Option (ii): see Chapter 2.4.

84 Whether the case is one where the negligent man intentionally does some action, which he would not have done had he not been negligent (ceteris paribus) - or whether at least Aristotle thinks it is - would require further discussion, not à propos our present use of this passage.

85 As argued in Chapter 4.

86 This argument from context is further strengthened (at least in some aspects) on certain interpretations of the contrast "phusikos" in Sec.4. introduces. Thus, if opposed to "logikos", this may suggest the three preceding sections concern the same topic - akrasia - directly (cf. (P5) at Chapter 2.7.); and if the point of the contrast is (partly) one of distance from the specific phenomenon, this is at least congenial to generality and inclusivity.

87 See note 21 above for two unconvincing rejections.

88 Assuming Sec.3.'s inclusivity - cf. note 82 above.

89 For references see e.g. Stewart on Cook Wilson, Vol.2, pp.142-3; Wiggins(1978) in Rorty(1980), p.249.
Cf. e.g. 7.10.1152a15; EE.2.8.

Cf. further Chapter 3.

Cook Wilson modified his position on the 'non-Aristotelian' issue in the (1912) Postscript to (1879).

Such is the position that Kenny has more recently advocated (1979), p.161. Cf. further Chapter 1.2., note 18.

On this terminology see Chapter 2.10.

Cf. Chapter 1.2. note 17 for references.

Or more abstractedly "generally W.A & N", for whatever favoured extra type the interpreter sees at issue.

See further Chapter 3.

Where "ekstatikos" and "emmenetikos" do not appear alone, Aristotle employs a variety of descriptions for what the akratic 'departs from' and the encratic 'sticks by':

1. logismos: 1145b11, 12;
2. logos: 7.8.1151a1 (cf. 21); 7.9.1151a29, 31, 32, 34; b24, 26.
3. doxa: 7.2.1146a16, 18; 7.9.1151b3, 4 (cf. 5); cf. tois doxasin: 7.9.1151b17.
4. hois epeisthe: 7.2.1146a20.
5. hois an bouleusetai: 7.8.1150b20; 7.10.1152a19.

Cf. Cooper(1975), Part I.

Cf. Cooper(1975). This seems to be the upshot of his view, although see in detail: p.26; p.48, n.61; p.25,
n.26; pp.56-7.


102 However even this requirement could be modified if the interpreter availed himself also of the 'Cooper' move and distinguished two 'conclusions'.


104 I am here trading in an ad hominem fashion on the supposition that C4 is not the ludicrous thesis it strictly speaking is as expressed. See below.

105 I.e. C5 can be seen as composing two theses:
\[ C_5^N (x) \quad (x \text{ acts unintentionally}^N \rightarrow x \text{ is not a suitable object of censure etc.}) \]
and,
\[ C_5^* (x) \quad (x \text{ acts non-intentionally} \rightarrow x \text{ is not a suitable object of censure etc.}); \]
and so if $C_5^*$ be rejected, then so will the undiscriminating conjunctive $C_5$.

106 Cf. also EE.2.9.: does its second paragraph (1225b8-16) offer us cases where an agent acts agnoon, and agnoon of particular facts (of the sort at issue in its first paragraph, 1225a38-b8), and is also censurable? If so, this would be a very helpful parallel.

However the thrust of EE.2.9. I find very difficult to disentangle on this point. Woods (1982) (ad loc., p.147) seems to advert to our NE.3.1. passage in the search for a
reverse illumination of the EE passage, thus:

However, although this is a plausible reading of the phrase 'through ignorance' it hardly fits the way in which the terminology is used at EN.III.1110b24f., where the contrast between acting through ignorance and acting in ignorance seems to be a contrast between knowledge of particular facts and knowledge of general principles. (my emphasis)

And of course this is our question about the NE passage - whether indeed it does so "seem" as Woods suggests.

107 Worries here include both those over the notion of a complete description of infinities, and over the identity conditions of 'situation' and/or 'occasion' i.e. of that of which it is being supposed that there might be a complete, albeit infinite, description.


109 D. Pears in lectures. For a different account see Charles(1984), Appendix 2.

110 Obviously the demarcation of "everything" here is problematic (indeed part of the problem).

111 In the sense of ignorance of particulars, rather than temporary value-blindness (supposing this distinction can be made good).

112 I use "shared" as a technical term: a particular item of knowledge is shared if awareness of it features both in the promoting and the blocking scenarios of an action.
Aristotle is here obviously alluding to and/or employing the principle enunciated at Pl.Rep.436b8-cl:

delon hoti tauton tanantia poein e paschein kata tauton ge kai pros tauton ouk etelesei hama, hoste an pou heuriskomen en autois tauta gignomena, eisometha hoti ou tauton en alla pleio.

One would hope that work on the difficult "kata tauton" phrase here (e.g. Stalley(1975)) might illuminate "kata to auto tou pragmatos" in EE, and vice-versa.

These chapters of the EE I find reminiscent of Platonic (Republic IV) argumentative technique.
Notes: Chapter 3 Section 1

1 Cf. Chapter 2.17.


3 In fact I have doubts about the possibility, or at least the normalcy of such shared (MiP) cases.

4 Cf. e.g. the objector in Kenny (1966), p. 170 ("But if we do this,...").

5 As does Kenny (1966), although along a slightly different line. Whereas Joachim takes the (MaP) to be exercised in only half its bearing, Kenny allows the whole (MaP) to be used provided at least one part of it fails to get as far as an action-specific, or 'actionable' level (cf. pp. 170ff).

6 Cf. Joachim, p. 224:

(b) Owing to the double reference in the premisses of the practical syllogism, it is quite possible fully to know the major - to realize it in its application, or with its minor - in one sense, and yet not to see its application (i.e. to know it only dunamei, potentially) in another sense. The akrates may know, for example, 'Sweet food is bad for men and therefore for me, for I am a man', and yet he may fail to realize that this food, which he knows is sweet, is (qua sweet) bad for him.

7 Although I am unclear what sort of generality Joachim would be espousing (e.g. would he think like Rowe and Sorabji that only (WA) is at issue throughout 7.3.? etc.).
8 N.b. Charles takes the "final proposition" (FP) to be the "conclusion" of the RPS.
Notes: Chapter 3 Section 2

1 Kenny's worry ((1966), p.170) seems to involve a fallacy. If "exercise" is interpreted as "apply to a particular instance", then there is no need for one to exercise a (MiP) at the same time as exercising a (MaP), although of course one must be aware of the (MiP).

2 Cf. also 7.10.1152a20-24.

3 Cf. also 7.10.1152a14-15.

4 Charles (1984), pp.125-6, encourages us to:
(i) adopt the MSS readings of K^b and M^b and so excise the first "e" in 1147a7;
(ii) to interpret the remaining "e" as having a rectificatory sense, and so to leave us simply with Case B.

These are two separate steps. One could accept (i) without accepting (ii) (at least I suppose that alternative "e" does occur singly).

I have argued elsewhere that Charles' reasons do not sufficiently motivate us to accept (ii).

5 Cf. Chapter 2.4.

6 I.e. not "having knowledge" in the wide 1147a10 sense of the phrase which includes also "using knowledge".

7 Cf. also 1147a34 of the appetite; 7.2.1145b23. This latter occurrence is probably an intentional echo of a Socratic formulation (cf. Pl.Protag.352b5-6 "enouses... epistemes") - in which case I take the occurrence here
(1147a32) to be precisely pointed against Socrates. More generally see Meta. Δ.23.1023a23-5.

8 Cf. e.g. De An.3.3.428b27f in connection with perception. (I do not see reason to accept Stewart's suggested emendation "periginetai", Vol.2, pp.163-4.)

9 Does this apply to all verbs? Is there any more principled characterisation of this fact?


Aristotle is sensitive to haphazard gaps in grammar and vocabulary, that yawn in the face of commitments to conceptual frameworks, and not afraid to fill them. As with the doctrine of the mean, so here he takes considerable trouble of the same kind to set out the grammatical framework for verbs of activity (especially perception) and change (in a way that sometimes suggests a tightening up of natural ambiguities in the Greek), and likewise notes gaps in the language (e.g. De An.3.2.426a8-15).

So for instance his fully expanded grammatical framework for "vision" etc. looks something like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential object</th>
<th>Actual object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to horaton</td>
<td>to horomenon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aistheton</td>
<td>aisthanomenon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cf. also e.g.:</td>
<td>to kinoumenon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kineton</td>
<td>kinema</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See below for right-hand continuation

Actual seeing    Potential seeing

| horama          | horasis       |
| aisthema        | aisthanomenos |
| kinema          | kinon         |
|                 | opsis         |
|                 | aisthesis     |
|                 | to kinetikon  |

etc.
11 See also e.g. De An.3.4.429b5ff; Meta.Δ. 7.1017a 35ff; 6.1048a30ff; cf. b10ff; 8.1050a23-b2; Phys.7.3. 247b3ff; 8.4.255a30-b11; 13-256a3; EE.2.1.1219a13ff (cf. a24ff; b1ff).

12 Cf. De An.2.5.417a9ff; 3.2.426a23ff; 3.3.428a6ff; De Sens.4.441b19ff; De Insomn.1.458b4ff; Top.1.15.106b13ff; 5.2.129b33ff.

13 Cf. Meta.Θ.8.1050a35-b1; and De An.2.1.

14 For example:
(i) 'having but not using' v. 'using': EE.2.9.1225b11ff.
(ii) 'having' v. 'using': EE.2.9.1225b11ff; Top.5.2.130a19ff.
(iii) 'having knowledge' v. 'being active with knowledge' (energein tei epistemei): MM.2.6.1201b1Off; cf. Phys.8.4. 255a34.
(iv) 'knowing/knowledge' v. 'contemplating/contemplation': De An.2.1.412a21-6; a9ff; 2.5.417b18-19; cf. Phys.8.4. 255a30ff.
(v) 'being able to contemplate' v. 'contemplate': De An.2.5. 417a27-9; cf. Meta.Θ.6.1048a30ff.
(vi) 'being able to use knowledge' v. 'using knowledge': Meta.Δ.7.1017a35ff.

15 Cf. (a) other passages mentioning ta ektos/exothen: Meta.Θ.5.1048a16-17, 19-20; 7.1049a7, a13ff; Pol.4.1. 1288b23-4; (b) other passages not specifically mentioning "ta ektos": Phys.8.4.255b4, 23 (cf. 7, 10-11, 20, 24, 256a2); cf. 2.8.199a10-11; b18, 26; Meta.Δ.5.1015a26ff; DMA.7.701a16;
Two questions arise. First whether the absence of an elephant counts as an external hindrance on one's ability to see an elephant (cf. De An.2.5.417b19-28). Secondly, and more importantly for our purposes, are the questions whether the hindrance factors referred to in Sec.4a 1147a30-31 include such psychological factors as opposing appetites etc.: i.e. whether:

(i) it includes factors other than "ta ektos"; or:
(ii) whether such factors could fall under the "ta ektos" range.

(ii) is unlikely given that appetite is an internal starting point (e.g. NE.3.1.1110a15f; 1111b2; 7.3.1147a35). We are left with question (i). Over this the first point to note is that even if we think it plausible that "me koluomenon" looks only to the absence of external hindrances, it will still be possible to argue that the other clause "ton dunamenon" points to the absence of internal psychological hindrances (cf. esp. Meta.0.5. 1048a11-24).

So the 'basic picture' doesn't apply in all its details to all relevant abilities (e.g. not to perception: De An.2.5.417b16-18; NE.2.1.1103a18ff; 26-32).

I also note here that "trainee exercise" (Ex) covers different sorts of training: e.g. both:
(a) what I call 'clean-transfer' skills and knowledges (transferable by didaxis): cf. NE.2.1.1103a15-17; 7.3.
1147a21-2; Meta. 8.1050a12-3;
(b) and 'dirty hands transfer': NE.2.1.1103a31ff.

17 Cf. e.g. NE.2.1.1103a26ff; 2.5.1105b19ff; 5.1.
1129allff (cf. 5.8.1137a4-26).

18 This view of (U) is perhaps supported by 7.10.
1152a20ff, where the akratic is described as "having good
laws but not making any use of them" and the wicked as
"using the laws but using bad laws"; this naturally suggests
an application model.

19 This raises the question whether Aristotle
distinguishes:
(i) species-general recognitional knowledge (e.g. ability
to recognise something as a horse);
(ii) individual-general recognitional knowledge (e.g. ability
to recognise Socrates).

I take it he acknowledges (i). Over (ii) see
perhaps De Mem.1.450b27ff. (With both (i) and (ii) we come
up against the problem of Aristotle's views on "incidental
perception".)

20 While one must understand "epistemen" with "echonta"
in 1146b33, it seems to me unlikely that we should also
do this with "theorounta" (from a comparison with other
occurrences); n.b. I view "ha me dei <sc. prattein>" (b34)
as the object of "prattein" (not of "theorounta" (b34)).

21 This could be understood as providing a necessary
and sufficient condition for (Con) p, or else just a
sufficient condition; the latter would allow one to (Con) p when p was not derived from the use (application) of some other knowledge q (and so allow p to be a proposition involving the "primary terms" of a science: cf. NE.6.8. 1142a25ff; 6.11.1143a35ff, etc.; that these are possible objects of (Con) is suggested by De An.3.8.432a8-14). Cf. further Chapter 3.2.6. below.

(In what follows I tend to talk in terms of a propositional model of the object of knowledge (ordinary use of 'object' here); but that is for convenience, and not consistently pursued.)

22 Cf. Chapter 2 note 17 on the details. If it were the downright logical impossibility, I feel that Aristotle would have indicated it more strongly.

23 Cf. Bonitz, pp.328b6-9; and cf. e.g. DMA.8.702a15-16 (pace Nussbaum's note, p.358, which leaves me unconvinced). (More generally cf. Charles(1984), pp.90ff.)

24 There is a problem when we turn to the case of actions, over whether Aristotle refers to actions as individuals prior to their occurrence: cf. Charles(1984), Appendix 3, p.264. This need not worry us here.

Those favouring (Con3) would have their eyes on De An.2.5.417a29; Meta.M.10.1087a20-21.

25 Although not perhaps in all contexts (cf. note 21 above).

26 EE.2.1.1219a16ff:
...; but in some cases the employment (chresis) is the function, in the way that, for example, seeing is the function of sight, and speculation (theoria) the function of mathematical science. (Woods (1982), p.13)

Cf. also Phys.7.3.247b7ff for a similarly wide usage of both "chresis" and "energeia" (and their verbs).

27 Cf. also Heinaman (1981).

28 Unless Meta.M.10.1087a15: "he gar episteme, hosper kai to epistasthai, ditton...", is taken as making precisely this point! But it doesn't seem that episteme is being used for episteton here.

29 It seems often assumed in these contexts that Aristotle intends the existential versions (S2') and (S3'), as is suggested by Pr.An.B.21.67a12-13 and a15 (cf. e.g. Heinaman (1981), p.66; Tredennick (Loeb) trans. Pr.An.ad loc.). However even if that is so there (and that is not clear), it is not always so: cf. Pr.An.B.21.67b8-9, a36; Post.An. A.24.86a27 for cases in line with (S2'') and (S3'''). These latter make easier cases for false beliefs (although one may also wonder how much difference Aristotle envisaged between these (..') and (..'') locutions.)

30 Cf. Pr.An.B.21.66b31-3; 67a6-21, etc.; Post.An. 5.74a25ff; A.24.86a11-12; and passages below in the text.

31 Cf. Barnes' discussion (1975), pp.94-5, for criticism of Aristotle, especially of his application of (D2) to the solution of the Meno paradox (so too Ryle (1976), Appendix
p. 9).

32 Post. An. A. 24.86a24-5 says "we know pos and have potentially the subordinate proposition" where the "pos" may be alluding to "universally" (as the manner qualification); however in a26 the "pos" is cashed out as "dunamei" (cf. also 28-9).

33 This is possibly suggested by the "echon" of Post. An. A. 24.86a27; (or, knowing either actually or potentially perhaps suffices for knowing actually).

Heinaman suggests that:

Presumably one has actual knowledge that C is A when, on the basis of the knowledge that all Bs are A, one recognises that C is A. (p. 67; cf. p. 70)

This rules out the possibility (e.g.) of actually knowing (S2) without knowing (S1).

The potential/actual terminology is perhaps not very helpful, and we might do better to stick with "knowing p without qualification" and "knowing p universally/potentially" (in virtue of knowing q).

Can one know (S2) without qualification without knowing (S1)? The strong conditions of knowledge-without-qualification in Post. An. A. 2. (cf. A. 5.74a33ff) suggest perhaps not and that Heinaman is right.

But I don't know whether things are so straightforward. For instance, would possession of (S2) count as potential knowledge of:

(S4) this (isosceles) triangle has 2RA?
34 It is however clearly deployed in MM.2.6. (in the passage comparable to Sec.2. viz. 1201b24ff): see especially 1201b27 "hupo tauten" and 30-1.

35 I leave aside the interesting question of what these epistemai are.

36 Cf. De An.3.8.432a3-10; De An.3.7.431alff, 431b2-19; De Mem.1.449b30-450a14: in this latter I suspect close and potentially illuminating ties with Meta.M.10.1087a10-25 in particular over the point of definiteness (cf. 450a3-7).

37 Cf. e.g. Meta.A.1.981bl0-11: see e.g. Pr.An.B.21.67a39-b3; Meta.Z.15.1040a2ff; 10.1036a5ff (cf. Top.5.3.131b21ff).

38 Cf. Chapter 1.2.5.

39 Cf. Meta.M.10.1087a10-25:

That knowledge is universal in its entirety, so that it is necessary also for the principles of things to be universal and not separate substances, poses the greatest puzzle of those mentioned, but nevertheless there is a manner/sense in which the statement is true and there is a manner in which it is not true. For knowledge (episteme), just as also knowing (to epistasthai), is twofold, of which one is "potentially" the other "actually". Now potentiality as matter being universal and indefinite is of the universal and indefinite, while the actuality (energeia) being definite is also of a definite, being a this something (tode ti) is of a this something; but it is incidentally that sight sees the universal colour, because this colour which it sees is (a) colour, and what the grammarian contemplates, this alpha is (an) alpha; since if it is necessary for the principles to be universal, it is necessary also for the things from them to be universal, just as in demonstrations; and if this, there will not be anything separate nor yet a substance. But clearly
there is a sense/manner in which knowledge is universal, and there is a manner in which it is not.

40 "oikeia episteme": species-general recognitional knowledge? (Cf. note 19 above.)

41 "And this is just the relation of universal to particular knowledge" (Tredennick Loeb).
Notes: Chapter 4

1 "ten hexin" (1147al2). It is unclear whether this is (a) colloquial, simply being the noun corresponding to 'echein' (1147all) - so Grant, Vol.2, p.205; (b) a technical/semi-technical Aristotelian usage meaning "state"; (c) how far Aristotle distinguishes between (a) and (b).

2 "alla men...ge". Denniston (The Greek Particles, 2nd ed.) records this particular phrase under 'determinative Υτ':

Determinative Υτ is most commonly found after connecting particles. Whether these express disjunction, opposition, progression, or inference, Υτ serves to define more sharply the new idea introduced: 'this, and nothing else.' (p.119)

(He compares: Dem.i.23.; Plato, Crat.386D; 412B.) Ackrill then well translates: "Now this is exactly the condition..." (1981), p.147.

3 "temporarily disposed": Aristotle's use of "diatithenai" is probably pointed. But see Chapter 1.4. note 37.

4 "pathesin": I take the reference to be to 'emotions' of the sort outlined in a15f (cf. e.g. De An.1.1.403a16; NE.2.5.1105b21f; Rhet.2.1.1378a21-2 for this delimited use of pathos). However this could be challenged (see further note 11 below).

5 "enia ton toisouton": usually taken simply as "other
such passions" - so Ross; Ackrill((1981), p.147); Thomson (Penguin). Could it mean "certain of such things", i.e. certain instances of the aforementioned "fits of anger and sexual appetite" and such things? (Compare "thumous enious" EE.2.8.1225a21.)

Gauthier-Jolif refer us to Plato, Timaeus 86B-87B. More apposite are De Mot.An.701b29 (Burnet); De An.1.1. 403a16-25; our Sec.4b. See further De An.3.9.432b31-433a1; DMA.11.703b5-8 for physiologically predominant aspects; and EE.2.8.1225a20ff for wider psychological ones.

"homoios echein"

(a) Is this a colloquial phrase, meaning "be in a similar condition" (cf. 2.4.1105a33 "houtos echein"; 5.9.1137a8, 23 "hodi echon", etc.)? Or are we to understand "epistemen" - i.e. "have knowledge in a manner similar to..."? (A similar doubt occurs over the occurrence of "houtos echei" in Sec.4c1147b11.)

The upshot is the same.

(b) Is "similar" (homoios) to be understood as implying sameness or difference?

I take the former. Dahl by contrast unquestioningly assumes the latter, taking it to support his view that the examples of Sec.3. are merely theoretical analogues for the practical knowledge case of akrasia: (1984), p.275, n.40.

However even if "homoios" is read as implying a degree of difference, it needn't of course be Dahl's degree of difference; and I hardly think it a point that "confirms"
his interpretation.

8 "these": see Chapter 4.3. and note 19 below.

9 "legein": 'to merely say' - this contrasts with Aristotle's use of "phanai" or "kataphanai" (to seriously assert).

(a) See e.g. 1147a34; b12; 6.8.1142a19-20.
(b) Is Aristotle's point essentially 'third personal' or 'overt' - we observe other people acting akratically who actually utter...? I take it that it is third personal here because of the way the (implicit) objection is set up. But I don't think it is essentially so: Aristotle could have appealed to our experiences of 'merely saying to ourselves' (cf. 1147a34; and perhaps b11-12).

(I understand the subject of "legein" in a18 to be "the akratics" of the preceding sentence, rather than a generalized reference to "those in the kind of 'tied' cognitive state of Sec.3a").

10 "hoi logoi hoi apo tes epistemes". What are the "logoi": "arguments"?, "statements"?, "accounts"?, "utterances" (to parallel legein)?

(i) "the language that flows from knowledge", Ross;
(ii) "the language of knowledge", Rackham;
(iii) "knowledgeable things", Ackrill(1981), p.147;
(iv) "language that implies knowledge", Thomson(Penguin).

See further major issue (2) in Chapter 4.4.; and its discussion Chapter 4.12.; below.

11 "pathesi toutois": what are these pathe? (Cf. note
4 above.) Apparently the reference is not simply to the emotions as, arguably at 1147a15, but at least includes the "pathe" (in a more extended sense) of sleep, intoxication and madness (cf. also 1147b8); for one inevitably takes the later more precise reference to "the drunk uttering the <verses> of Empedocles" (Sec. 4c 1147b12) to be picking up the present passage. It is also plausible to suppose the reference of "those in these pathe" to be the same as "these people" of 1147a18. If the reference there is only to the person asleep, mad or drunk, then plausibly the pathe here (a19-20) would even exclude the 'emotions'. However the reference of "toutois" (a18) is itself problematic (cf. note 19 below).

12 (a) I take "uttering demonstrations and verses of Empedocles" to be two separate things, and the demonstrations not to be Empedocles' (so Burnet, p.301).

(b) The reference to "merely uttering the verses of Empedocles" here and in Sec. 4c sounds like a well-known allusion. If it hadn't been for the later drunk reciting them, one might wonder whether Aristotle's reference hadn't been originally to the On Nature frg.110:

>If you press them [these teachings] firmly in a shrewd mind, and contemplate them in a well-disposed mood, making this your undisturbed exercise, then all these teachings will surely remain with you so long as you live, and you will acquire besides from them much further knowledge; for these teachings grow of themselves to be part of the individual character, according to the natural disposition of each recipient. (frg.110; Hussey p.71; my emphasis)
13 "suneirein" has two aspects.

First is that (pace Ross's translation, "string together", which smacks of confused articulation) the first learners can reproduce the outward form (of the argument) correctly, long before we credit them with an understanding of its substance (cf. NE.a.8.1142al9-20). (So too Burnyeat in Rorty ed. (1980), p.89f; Charles (1984), p.127, n.25.)

Secondly although the verb can be used in contexts of connecting thoughts, it is especially slanted towards public verbalisation (cf. LSJ). Presumably Aristotle has in mind the parrot recitation of the classroom.

14 "tous hupokrinomenous": see Chapter 4.3. below.


The question of the argumentative structure of this section is ignored by many: e.g. Burnet, pp.300-1; Stewart, Vol.2, pp.139ff; Walsh (1963), p.101; Charles (1984); Dahl (1984).

This has resulted in some scholars failing to discuss the two sets of Aristotle's examples and taking them all to be illustrating one and the same thing: so Walsh (1963), p.101; Bogen (1982), p.121; Charles (1984), p.127; Dahl (1984), pp.207-8.

16 "lekteon" (a18); "hupolepteon" (a23). What are the force of these gerundives? Are they recommendative
"should"s or argumentative "must"s?

This is to raise the question of what kind of argument Aristotle is engaging in here.

17 The argument of Sec.3a consists of four stages:
(1) the characterisation of a cognitive condition (illustrated by appeal to the asleep, mad and drunk); (a10-14);
(2) a claim that if anybody is in this condition it is certainly those in passions (n.2); (a14-15);
(3) a lemma for (2); (a15-17);
(4) the conclusion that we should speak of akratics as in this cognitive condition.

I take (4) to follow from (2) by the principle of inclusion: akratics are a subset of "those in passions".

18 There is (at least) this difference between the first learners and the-in-pathe-reciters of proofs, etc., that while the former do not as yet even have knowledge of what they recite, the latter may, although their present recitation is not evidence of it. However this difference is irrelevant, if both are simply meant to illustrate the point that appropriate enunciation is no "semeion" of knowledge (cf. note 13 above).

A clearer grasp on the concept of "semeion" would also be helpful here. For if e.g. Aristotle's point is that appropriate enunciation is "no guarantee" of actualised knowledge, it sounds more plausible than if the claim is that it is "no evidence" (Thomson(Penguin)). I think it is probably correct to take it in the former way (cf. Rackham:
"no proof"; Ross: "proves nothing"). In An.Pr.B.27.70a3ff Aristotle contrasts semeion with eikos (a likelihood) as being a protasis apodeiktike as against a protasis endoxos.

There are four initial possibilities:

1. It picks up the "eniois" of al7, i.e. those in whom appetites etc. induce "maniai". (So Gauthier and Jolif (p.608); Ramsauer (p.440).)

2. It picks up "hoi ge en tois pathesin ontes" (al4-15).

3. It picks up both the man asleep, mad or drunk (al3-14) and "hoi ge en tois pathesin ontes".

4. It picks up simply the man asleep, mad or drunk (al3-14).

(1) is surely the least plausible. (a) It forges an irrelevantly tight connection between akrasia and mania (where Aristotle equally employs parallels with sleep and drunkenness (1147b7; 1152a15)); (b) it distorts the argumentative flow, if al5-17 is only a lemma for the thesis in al4-15 (cf. note 17 above).

In favour of (4) may be cited the points that (i) "hoi en tois pathesin toutois" (al9-20) must presumably include drunkenness (in view of 1147b12); (ii) the references to the similarity with drunkenness and sleep in Sec.4b.

On the other hand the way I construed the argument in note 17 above favours (2).

If forced to make a determinate choice, I would opt for (2).

hupokrinethai certainly can mean "recite", "declaim" (cf. "sounding off") which is what I suggest we precisely need to pick up the preceding examples of public verbalizing - uttering proofs and verses, rote parrotting of learnt lessons in class. (See e.g. Rhet.Γ.12.1413b23.)

Had Aristotle used the noun hupokrites, I would concede to the traditional interpretation. However I think his choice of the participle from the verb lends some support to my alternative suggestion.

We had characterised a section as being "directly" about akrasia if it was dealing with normal Aristotelian akrasia. However this is of no moment.

It should not be assumed that the questions:
Q1: what knowledge is 'tied'?
Q2: what are the "logoi hoi apo tes epistemes"?
are asking the same question or going to get the same answer.


Those, like Dahl and Charles, who take the purport of Sec.3.'s examples to be to offer theoretical analogues for practical, akratic, cases, could agree with inclusivity: 'the same distinction in 3a will simply have different, albeit analogous, manifestations depending on whether it is applied to non-akratic phenomena as in the theoretical cases or to cases of practical knowledge' (etc.).

More accurately, with Sec.3a.

Kenny (1966) appears to regard it as a fact that "it is no use simply to talk to the incontinent" (p.175, his emphasis). If this were not so, then Kenny thinks that:

in order to convert him (sc. the akratic) from his misconduct, it would be sufficient to point out that, as he knows, he ought not to be acting as he does. (p.169)

and claims:

this is surely amphisbetei tois phainomenois enargos. The incontinent man does not fornicate inadvertently. (p.169)

It is because he regards the above as a fact that it is at least a point in a solution's favour that it can offer an explanation of why this fact obtains.

This is nowhere like philosophically delicate enough, and one can object both to his 'fact' and to his claim of the way in which an (HL) solution to akrasia would explain its holding.

Without ascending to the required delicacy myself, I just remark against the 'fact' that:

(1) if someone was impetuously about to sleep with someone else's spouse (not knowing that what was about to be committed was adultery), it might well be sufficient to merely mention this fact in order "to convert" the akratic from misconduct (or else to change the type of akrasia from IA to WA);
(2) how would you stop someone from an act of weak akrasia?
Obviously one can try and stop the weak by "having a serious talk" with them (just as perhaps they can strengthen themselves in advance; cf. 7.7.1150b22f); equally someone of whom the weak stand in awe may make the most passing remark, yet halt them in their tracks ('governess syndrome') - although admittedly this calls on other factors besides "simply" talking.

Akrasia as a hexis may be cured (e.g. 7.10.1152a27); and there is no reason to suppose that talking may not play a part in the cure.

(A fuller discussion would consider aporia 5 (7.2.1146a31ff) and such passages as 7.8.1151a14 ("eumetapeistos"), 7.10.1152a27ff; and generally the concepts of persuasion and "kolasis" in this context.)

30 This is at least the natural way to take Kenny's first suggestion.

31 Kenny(1979), Chp.14, especially pp.162-3 (and p.163 n.1). All reference to "pathological akrasia" is silently excised.

32 Kenny's present (1979) view of the argumentative structure seems unarticulated (cf. Chapter 2 note 16).
(i) He fails to elucidate what role Sec.3. is now supposed to play in the argument;
(ii) he follows Rowe(1971) in totally ignoring the presence of "phusikos" (1147a24).

33 (As Kenny(1979), n.1 p.163, accepts.)
Rowe's(1971) argument for this, is essentially
that (a) if b6-9 (Sec.4b) is transposed then so must b9-12 be; and (b) if b9-12 must be, so then must also b13-17 (p.119).

His ground for the (a) claim is a version of the 'back-referencing' one (see Objection 2 below): i.e. b9-12 must be taken as referring back to Sec.3. (p.118).

34 Cf. note 23 above.

35 Rowe(1971), p.119; Charles(1984), pp.127, 128. See further Chapter 4.12. (Dahl by contrast, pp.209-10, takes the knowledge 'tied' to vary according to case.)

36 The agent has been placed in a condition where he is temporarily unable to bring this knowledge to bear. So this knowledge is not fully present in his appreciation of the situation and what he is doing. See further 4.12.

37 And so it is not universal knowledge that is capable of being 'rendered ineffective' in the appropriate way.

38 I mean of consistency on his part.

39 If Kenny supposed (as he appeared to do (1966), p.173 (cf. Chapter 2.19.)) that in NE.3. Aristotle held:

(x) (x acts intentionally ↔ x is a suitable object of censure)

(obviously in an appropriately wide sense of "suitable object").

40 I originally criticised an earlier version of Charles' account. The version in the book (1984) has
shifted slightly (it is not so forthright on some points) - but not, I argue, sufficiently.

41 Here Charles has hedged a bit (cf. note 38 above). As pointed out in Chapter 1.2, note 18, Charles apparently (1984), pp.127-8 aligns:

Sec.3. - Charles' "second type" of akratic = WA
Sec.2. - Charles' "first type" (sub-type I: non-possessor (sub-type II: non-exerciser

On p.127 he suggests IA would illustrate sub-type I. (On p.126 he indicates a preference for an interpretation of the text removing this sub-type.) Over sub-type II he appears somewhat silent.

42 See further 4.12.


44 Cf. Chapter 1.2.4.

45 Charles would doubtless reply that his first type of akratic had not been entirely absent from the scene ever since Sec.2b:

one akrates does not reach the good conclusion (1147al-10, 25-7, a33, b10). (p.128)

But these in-between references, viz. 25-7, a33 - are, even if correct, too slight to constitute an adequate help to the reader. Are they even correct? Charles is I think here developing an old (Pearsian?) point that:

(i) "whenever one results from them" (a25-7) can be read
as pointing to occasions where "one" does not so result, but where it should have, i.e. as referring to his first type of akratic (it is not obvious that it must be read with this implication).

Charles would then:

(ii) be suggesting that the same oblique reference by implication can be seen in (a33), presumably in "haute energei" - for this would then obliquely point to occasions where "haute" didn't "energei". But whether an oblique reference here will be to situations appropriate for his first type of akrasia depends initially on the reference of "haute" (a considerable problem in its own right); however, conceivably, investigation might reveal that every interpretation yields the required oblique reference.

But whether correct or not, their slightness is now evident.

46 Cf. Chapter 2.10.

47 For references, see Chapter 1.2. note 17.

In what follows I concentrate on Rowe because he develops this line of approach to the text more fully than Sorabji.

In fairness it should be remembered that Rowe develops this view only in an appendix and Sorabji asserts it merely in a footnote.

48 Indeed in 7.10. as a whole. (It would be helpful to go through 7.4-10. examining Aristotle's references to "the akratic" with the question in mind of whether he
intends only a delimited type - not merely central akrasia as against extended, but WA as against IA. There is something plausible in the notion that Aristotle usually, here and elsewhere in the NE/EE, has his eye principally on WA.)

49 Cf. 4.8. and the reference to Rowe in note 32.

50 On pp.117 and 119 Rowe uses the locution "a24ff". How much of Sec.4. does he intend us to see in "ff"? It seems he intends the whole of Sec.4. - both from the argumentation on p.119 and the apparent acceptance of Kenny's division of 1147a10-24 and 1147a24-b19 as presenting two different solutions (pp.116-7), despite the fact he refers to "a24-b5" as containing a separate solution on p.118.

51 Cf. also "agei" (1147a34) may indicate appetite's success; likewise "enei" (1147a31) may indicate the non-operancy of the RPS's major premiss.

52 Cf. Chapter 2.4.; 2.12.

53 For the terminology, cf. Chapter 2.8.

54 The alignment can still be maintained on the assumption that the "final proposition" (FP) is the RPS's minor premiss, although there will clearly be some differences.

55 But see further major issue 3 (4.13.), on the question of whether this 'not knowing but merely saying' is compatible with unclouded intellectual apprehension.
Aristotle's characterisation of WA incorporates not merely the feature of having reached the conclusion, but having done so in advance of the onset of the akratic pathos (cf. e.g. the past tenses "bouleusamenoi", "ebouleusanto", "dia to me bouleusasthai", 7.7.1150b20-1; and the implication of the lines 7.7.1150b22-25). This leaves open the question of how one then describes someone who comes out with all the right sounds but only when already gripped by the akratic pathos. They had not come to a clear decision before the pathos, which they can now be accused of failing to stick by.

Perhaps Aristotle does not say enough for us to determine which way he would jump on this issue (cf. note 55 above).

Someone might conceivably think that conclusions were indicated, on the ground that "apo" should be understood in much the same way as "ex auton" in a26-27.

I take this to be obviously wrong (Stewart refers neatly to Meta.K.3.1061a3f).

This is intended as an argumentative "so", not one of psychological derivation.

One may also have an independent worry here about
Charles-type commitments to seeing the conclusion as what is 'tied'. Can such interpreters provide a convincing account of "use" or "exercise"? (For if the conclusion can be 'tied', then ergo it is the sort of item that can be used.) Of course some suitable answer can be forged - but can it be provided in a principled way, that takes into account that universal premisses and minor premisses can also be 'used' (Sec.2.), and if there are differences in the 'use' of these items account for these not simply to be ad hoc?

In fact our rejection of the conclusion as an object of tied knowledge raises a further question:
Q3: Why would Aristotle suppose that the akratic wasn't (/couldn't be) disposed (HL) simply with respect to the RPS's conclusion?

The answer to this is obvious if the conclusion is identical with his acting appropriately; but if it is not identical, then there is a lacuna here in our account so far.

(1966), p.175 (for doubts about this cf. e.g. 4.8. above).

Setting aside the possibility that the final proposition actually is the minor premiss.

Cf. Chapter 4.8., Objection 3 (Dl) 'The charge of inconsistency'.

Cf. also De Somn.3.458a28ff:

kai ti estin ho hupnos, hoti tou protou aistheteriou katalepsis pros to me dunasthai
energein, ....

68 Cf. Pears on "motivated misperception" (1982).

69 It may be objected that our distinction between (I) and (II) is artificial in that 'surely (II) can be represented as a special case of (I): i.e. as a temporary inability to Ø well, or correctly, or whatever'.

My feeling is that this misses the point; but this requires further clarification.

70 Or rather it is not simplistically affected. Obviously room has to be allowed here for the following two aspects:

(1) in the long run the 'value-ability' may be affected either because (a) akrasia is an essentially transitional state, and some value commitment will always thereby be being reinforced or weakened; or (b) because even if that is wrong - as argued in Chapter 1.4.4. - nevertheless one's value ability still may be altered and restructured by persistent akrasia.

(2) Equally with the possibility of value restructuring, we need to allow for the processes of value formation - for the delicate ways in which one's growing situational appreciation builds up and forms one's values and goals in the first place: cf. 6.11.1143b4-5 (and variously e.g. 1.4.1095b4-8; 2.1.1103b22-5, etc.; 7.8.1151a15-19; 6.8.1142a19; 6.5.1140b12-20).

71 I intend to include here under "registering" the
notion of "registering as relevant to one's goals, etc.". For, to use an example from another context (Pr. An. B. 21.), it is not enough to register that "this is a mule", one must register this as relevant to one's universal knowledge about mules (e.g. that they are sterile). And one can fail here - the failure being to "contemplate together" (suneilkein Pr. An. B. 21. 67a37) a particular and a universal proposition. More could usefully be said here.

72 It is "aisthetike episteme" that is dragged about ("perielketai" 1147bl6), if any knowledge is dragged about. It is not totally clear that 1147bl5-17 should be read, as it so often is, with the implication that perceptual knowledge is "dragged about" in Aristotle's view.

73 Cf. Chapter 1.2.7. note 46. We can usefully distinguish the three Aristotelian figures of:

(1) the pure theoretician: who knows the universals, the whys of his subject, but who lacks the recognitional or particular knowledge which would enable him to apply this knowledge to the particular case, so as to act on it (e.g. someone who knows what one should do about appendicitis and why, but who cannot recognise a case of it). (Whether a pure pure theoretician is possible is another question.)

(2) the experienced practitioner: who knows (some of) the facts (the hoti's) of his subject, but not their whys. Still what he knows suffices for him to act successfully for himself and give good advice to others.

(3) the theoretical practitioner: who combines the
theoretical knowledge of the first with the experience of the second: he knows the whys and can recognise the thats of his subject. Unlike the former he will be able to act or give advice in the particular case; unlike the latter he can give a knowledge-encapsulating explanation of why he acts or recommends in the way he does.

(Cf. Meta.A.1.; NE.6.7.)


75 Or whatever. Obviously we still have to accommodate the differences between Case 1/Case i v. Case 2/Case ii: is it e.g. that in the former situational appreciation is simply not attending at all to the relevant features, while in the latter it is so only deviantly, etc.?

76 By this I mean: do we have -
(a) a sophisticatedly complex - "rich" - major premiss with a very simple - "thin" - perceptual minor premiss; or
(b) vice-versa, a "thin" major (e.g. all men should be courageous) and a "rich" minor (e.g. "fending off the dervishes for another five minutes and then beating the hell out of here is what the courageous thing to do is in this situation")? N.b. in (b) room must be found for deliberation as well as perception.

Is what it is to develop or to "articulate" a science, or body of knowledge, to move from one of these to the other: (b) being the initial building up of the requisite experience, (a) resulting from (b) when experience has settled and given rise to the requisite universals?
(Cf. Meta.A.1.981al-7; Post.An.B.19.100a6ff.) But even so subjects seem to differ in the status of their universals, or the degree to which they can settle.


(ii) He seems (pp.209-10) to let it vary from case to case (cf. note 35 above).

80 Nor indeed even earlier in the chapter. Moreover Aristotle seems happy to oppose episteme to phronesis but not to treat episteme as confined to things whose first principles are invariant (see 7.2. aporia 1).


82 This is not necessarily as absurd as it sounds. Obviously in the cases of the mad and the drunk they could be thought to be doing something while their knowledge was tied. Equally in the case of sleep Aristotle is aware both of (i) somnambulistic action and, of course, of (ii) 'dream-action' (cf. Pl.Rep.571c9ff).

Nevertheless there is no indication whatsoever that any such cases are at issue. Aristotle is drawing on such conditions simply to make a delimited point about a kind of cognitive condition (in line with such passages as the geometer of De Gen.An.2.1.735a9-11; also Phys.7.3.
247bl3ff; and less obviously De An. 3. 3. 429a4ff; in De An.

2.5. Aristotle is more concerned with the larger distinctions, but he glances at these more fine-grained ones in the aside 417all "and even if he happens to be asleep").
Notes: Chapter 5:5.0. and Section 1

1 A token translation for phusikos. See further 5.1.

2 epiblepein. Bonitz (269b31ff) lists twenty occurrences. It seems to be a variant on the more usual "phusikos episkopein". The "epi-" prefix with these verbs carries overtones of detailed specific examination; this would reinforce what I take to be the point of "phusikos".

3 "he men katholou doxa" (a25f).

Commentators tend to rest content with assertive paraphrase here.

Two ways of construing the lines at least have been canvassed:

(I): The universal premise is an opinion, while the other is concerned with particulars,....
(Thomson(Penguin))

(II): The one opinion is universal, the other is concerned with the particular facts,....
(Ross)

(I) is advocated by Burnet (p.302) and Gauthier-Jolif (p.610). It requires us to supply "protasis" (cf. 1147a2-3) with "he katholou" (cf. also Hintikka, quoted by Kenny(1979), p.122).

(I) is surely absurd. It apparently posits a contrast between a premiss that is a doxa and a premiss that concerns particulars over which perception is authoritative. But there is no contrast here, and anyway propositions other than the universal major are also opinions (cf. 1147b1, 3, 9).
The contrast must be between a concern with universals and particulars as on (II) (cf. e.g. De An.3.11.434a16ff; cf. also NE.6.7.) (so e.g. Allan(1955); Cooper (1975), p.48; Kenny(1966), pp.176-7).

However (II) is an interpretative translation.

The Greek runs:

(II^X): The one is a universal opinion, the other....
(so rightly Kenny(1979), p.122)

What do we understand now with "he men"?


Does it matter?

Only to this extent: whatever is supplied here must likewise be understood with "mia" at a26, and if this were protasis we would have an example of protasis used of the conclusion to support the interpretation of FP as referring to the conclusion.

In favour of doxa it may be claimed:

(a) it is grammatically easy to supply the subject - from the complement;
(b) a parallel problem arises in De An.3.11.434a16ff where it certainly looks as though we are to understand doxa (cf. 19-20);
(c) if the subject had been "he katholou" that would perhaps have encouraged the understanding of "protasis" (cf. e.g. Post.An.A.24.86a22ff, esp. 29-30; 1147a2-3); but
with the break coming with "he men" the issue is more open.

In favour of protasis:
(a) In De An.3.11.434a17 the second clause runs "he de tou kath'hekastou"; but in our passage we have "he d'hetera...". And isn't this a technical Aristotelian term for the second, or minor, premiss (cf. Burnet, p.280)?

However, so far as I have yet discovered, this is not so obvious. At Pr.An.A.24.41b28 the phrase appears merely to refer to one or other premiss (so Ross (1949), p.374). And apart from that the only text I have yet come up with (cf. Bonitz 651b26f) is NE.6.11.1143b3. However this may be thought sufficient.

(b) "Proposition" is surely to be understood with "in the productive" (1147a28) (cf. DMA.7.701a23f). (Grant, however, suggests "epistemai": Vol.2, p.206.)

On balance I tentatively favour doxa.

4 he hetera: allegedly a technical term for the minor premiss. (See note 3.) Cf. 6.11.1143b3.

5 ede. I take its point to be that once we've arrived at the level of particulars we are thereby in perception's realm: cf. e.g. NE.3.3.1112b34-1113a2; 2.9.1109b22-3; 6.8.1142a20-30; (NE.6.7.1141b14-16; 3.1.1110b6-7). Further cf. Meta.A.1.981b11, A.2.982a24-6; Z.10.1036a2-8 (with interesting twist); Post.An.A.2.72al-5 (cf. Meta.A.2.).

6 authoritative: kurios. Cf. 1147b10; cf. Meta.0.5.1048a12 "kurios". We could do with a clearer view of the logic of this term. It seems to allude to the 'proper'/
specific role of something (cf. as applied to language, the 'strict' sense: e.g. 1147b15).

7 mia. Feminine: whatever noun is understood with "he men..." (a25) and "he d'hetera..." (a25) must be similarly supplied with this. See note 3 above.

8 phanai.

(i) I take it as equivalent to "kataphanai" (a common Aristotelian usage) and not as opposed to kataphanai/apophanai in a quasi-technical usage (for which cf. De An. 3.7.431a8-9; Meta.9.10.1051b24-5).

(ii) So far as I have researched, phanai/kataphanai is always used by Aristotle of serious psychological assertoric commitment and is never used in the way he exploits "legein" (to indicate verbal froth without inner understanding etc.).

9 I take "to sumperanthen" to be the object of prattein as well (rather than consider prattein intransitive here). Cf. also Cooper(1975), p.48, n.61; Nussbaum(1978), p.204, n.50.

10 kai. Some play has been made with this as a further indication that conclusion and action here are separate (e.g. Nussbaum(1978), p.204, n.50; cf. Charles(1984) trans., p.129).

However "kai" can apparently be used rather as "actually" (cf. perhaps 1147b14). Indeed this is how Ackrill(1981), p.147, translates the present passage.

So I don't think it cuts much ice.
koluousa (1147a32). Is this the same or a different usage from koluomenon in the preceding line?

Generally speaking, I take it there are these two usages of koluein:

(K1) used of hindering, preventing factors, as at e.g. De An.2.5.417a28 and used synonymously with empodizein by Aristotle;

(K2) a Platonic usage where it characterises the negative commands of Reason (= orders not to...) as against keleuein which gives the positive commands (cf. Pl.Rep.439c).

In connection with K2 we may remark:

(i) appetites (or least the appetitive system) do not order at all; their mot juste is agein (to lead/draw);
(ii) their content can in a sense be said to be all positive; with the consequence they are never "opposed" (enantios) to each other (NE.3.2.1111b16; cf. Pl.Rep.439);
(iii) Reason however may oppose appetites - but then Reason must appear in its negating/forbidding guise (e.g. De An.3.10.433b5-10) (n.b. the 'opposition' of Reason to the appetitive system when and if guilty of "anaisthesia" would be quite different).

Now Aristotle certainly uses this keleuein (cf. De An.3.9.432b31; 3.10.433b8: his own quasi-technical term is epitattein); but I haven't yet noted a clear case of K2.

Do we have one here - or is it K1? Do we translate:

(Kl'): "...the universal <proposition> is in the agent preventing him from tasting..."; or:
(K2'): "...the universal proposition is in the agent ordering him not to taste..."?

(Obviously K1' would have to be a conative usage.)

Given the subject, the most natural line is to follow e.g. Ackrill(1981), p.147 and opt for K2.

However there is a possible line of resistance.

In 7.2.1146a13-14 Aristotle says:

for if the appetites are good, the state koluousa one from/not to follow them would be bad

Which use do we have here? It could be K2: a state that is disposed to issue negative commands; but it could equally well be K1. And it might then be suggested that even if we do have to understand protasis in 1147a32 it is going proxy for a state (cf. enei), and we could after all opt for K1.

However the parallelism with what precedes and its examples (esp. 1147a29), and the need for some more direct opposition to appetite seem to confirm K2.

(This question is separate from that of the range of factors at issue in the first koluomenon a31: i.e. is it confined to external factors or does it cover disruptive desires etc. Cf. e.g. Allan(1955), p.333; Hardie(1968), p.282, on the one hand; e.g. Santas(1969), p.177; Charles (1984), p.129 on the other for opposing positions on this latter issue. And see further Chapter 3 Section 2 note 15.)

12 The question here is the scope of "hoti" (a32). Does it end at "hedu" (a33) or extend beyond it?
It is tempting to break it at "hedu" (e.g. Ackrill (1981), p.147, who translates as though there were a further "hoti" a33).

But some verb must be supplied with "he de" in a32, capable of sponsoring the "hoti" clause. Yet if the scope of "hoti" is now stopped at "hedu", we have an awkward combination of oratio obliqua and oratio recta ("touti de gluku").

13 haute a33. What is the reference? There are two options:
(a) simply to "this is sweet"; (so e.g. Joachim (1951), p.228, n.1; Wiggins (1978) in Rorty ed. (1980), p.249);
(b) to "he de" in a32 (whatever that is supposed to cover cf. note 12 above) (so e.g. Grant, Vol.2, p.205; Stewart, Vol.2, pp.158-9; Gauthier-Jolif, p.613).

In favour of (b) is the feminine "haute" which more easily picks up the explicit "he de"; whereas on (a) we must supply the thought that "this is sweet" is a "protasis".

14 he men a34. What noun do we supply? Some scholars supply protasis or doxa from a31-2 (e.g. Ackrill (1981), p.147). Another candidate has been "soul" (with an eye to 1147a28) (e.g. Charles (1984), p.130).

Neither offer an immediately convincing contrast with "appetite" (a34). The comparable passage in De An.3.9. 433alff employs "dianoia"; and possibly this has dropped out here ("oun" a34 could be its remains: how convincing a
construction is "hotan...oun..."?). But considerations of the parallelism with 1147a25-31 (see further Part 1 Issue B) support "soul" over "proposition".

15 **legein.** Cf. 1147a18, 20, 23, b12.

16 **agei** a34: the mot juste for the modus operandi of appetite's leading to action (appetites can draw the agent straight into (intentional) action without 'passing through' a separate psychological state of intention: see later). Cf. e.g. EE.2.8.1224b1, 2; Pl.Rep.439b4, dl.

17 Cf. e.g. Ackrill(1981), p.147, for this way of reading this sentence. The other way ("for appetite can move each of the parts of the body") is absurd.

The upshot is that appetite is an *arche* of intentional action (cf. NE.3.1.1110a15f).

And the consequence of this is that Aristotle holds that actions flow out into world from different kinds of psychological state: i.e. a denial of the role Davidson accords unconditional best judgements (1970) (cf. Aristotle's denial of what Charles has labelled the Uniqueness thesis).

18 **luetai** b6. Cf. esp. De Somn.1.454a32; De Insomn. 3.462a17.

19 **teleutaia protasis** (1147b9). "Final proposition": the phrase is not employed elsewhere by Aristotle (that I can see). The classic question is whether this refers to the last (MiP) of the RFS or to its conclusion.
One might wonder about what teleutaios means here: obviously it could mean that proposition which is last in some ordering of propositions. But could it also mean the 'proposition concerned with the last term'? I doubt it.

In favour of the conclusion cf. Meta.Z.7.1032b15-17.

20 en toi pathei on bll. "Being in the pathos": the participle here might be simply temporal ("while") or else causal ("since/because"). However either way there is no textual need to read this as implying that before the onset of "the pathos" the akratic here had not reached the final proposition (FP) (i.e. to assume what I termed the "temporal" over the "locational" reading: cf. Chapter 2.18.).

21 ho eschatos horos: the last term. Aristotle uses this as an expression for the third term of the three involved in Aristotelian syllogistic (as against "the first" and "the middle"): e.g. Pr.An.4.25b32f; 26a3, 6, 10.

It will occur both in the minor premiss and in the conclusion of a syllogism.

22 ho ezetei al4. What is this? I take it to mean roughly "what Socrates was seeking to get established": and Aristotle seems to be referring to the Socratic premiss (1145b26-7) or to a corollary that "nothing is stronger than knowledge". Grant (Vol.2, p.208) takes it the opposite way: it "must mean 'the questionings' or doubts of Socrates, i.e. as to the possibility of acting against knowledge", and refers to NE.1.4.1095a32.
23 eoike al4. What does this word imply? That there is, we now see, a sense in which something resembling/close to Socrates' original aim turns out to be the case?

24 The sentence need not imply that "perceptual knowledge" is dragged around - as is so often assumed it does.

25 For these problems cf. Chapter 1.2.1. and 1.2.2.

26 See especially Chapter 1.3.6.; 2.7. (F5).

27 (i)-(ii) are orthodox: e.g. Burnet (pp.301-2); Gauthier-Jolif (p.609); Joachim (p.226); Ramsauer (p.441); Ackrill (1973), p.258, cf. p.31; Hardie (1968), pp.280-1 (endorsing Burnet and Joachim); Robinson (1954/69), p.150.

28 Cf. e.g. Phys.3.5.204b4; De Gen.et Corr.1.2.316a10; Bonitz 432b5-11, 835b15-22. Cf. also esp. De Gen.An.2.8. 747b28-30.

29 Several commentators equate "logikos" with "dialektikos" (and also "analutikos"): e.g. Gauthier-Jolif, p.609; Burnet, pp.301-2; Joachim, p.226; Barnes (1975), p.165; LeBlond (1939), p.205, n.4 (referring to Bonitz 432a9; Burnet above; and Post.An.2.8.93a15).

But this should not be simply assumed (cf. Charlton (1970), pp.x-xi).

30 Compare with (iii), the following remarks on phusikos and logikos.

(a) Phusikos:

(1) Gauthier-Jolif (p.609):
Phusikos - à partir des principes propres de sa nature. ...La démonstration physique... tend à la précision en même temps qu'à la propriété, en recourant à l'observation des faits, en demeurant au contact de la réalité observée et en l'expliquant par ses principes propres.

(2) Burnet (pp.301-2):

To consider a thing phusikos is to consider it in the light of its oikeiai archai, i.e. of phusikai protaseis (Top.105b21), in the present case, of course, from a psychological point of view.

(3) Joachim (p.226):

Hitherto, Aristotle has attacked the problem logically.... Now he gives a 'scientific' solution, i.e. one based on grounds appropriate to the phenomena to be explained. The phenomena belong to the subject matter of phusike (natural science), for phusike is the science concerned with man's body and soul.... Here, therefore, phusikos is contrasted with logikos as 'scientifically' with 'logically' or 'dialectically', because phusike is the science in question.

(4) Hardie (p.280):

The treatment of a topic is 'physical', at least if the topic falls within physics, when it is in terms of principles proper and peculiar to the topic treated.

(5) Stewart (Vol.2, p.156):

Hitherto the enquiry has been conducted logikos rather than phusikos - the remote and abstract explanation afforded by the great Aristotelian distinction of dunamis and energeia has been adduced rather than the proximate cause or oikeios logos, which an examination of the concrete nature (physis) of the phenomenon will make known.
(Cf. rather differently C. Williams (1982), pp.65-6.)

(b) Logikos

(1) Gauthier-Jolif, quoting Robin (p.609):

\textit{Logikos} désigne souvent une façon abstraite et non réelle d’envisager les choses, en considérant dans leurs essences, non leur unité vraie, mais les généralités qu’elles enveloppent, suivant une méthode, non pas démonstrative, mais dialectique.

(2) Hardie ((1968), p.280):

The examination of a question is 'logical' if it makes use of principles or distinctions which, like the distinction between potential and actual, have application to many different subjects.

(3) Charlton ((1970), introduction p.x):

He (sc. Aristotle) uses the word 'logical' (\textit{logikos}) with a variety of nuances, but by a 'logical' argument he usually understands one proceeding from considerations which are not proper to the things being discussed.

(4) Barnes ((1975)), p.165):

The term "general", logikos, is often used by Aristotle to designate an argument not employing notions or principles proper to any given science (thus it is more or less synonymous with \textit{dialektikos}): "But perhaps a general demonstration would seem more persuasive than what has been said - I call it general for this reason, that the more universal it is, the further it is from the appropriate principles". (GA B 8,747b27-30).

(Cf. also Hamelin, \textit{Le système d’Aristote}, p.100; Rodier ed., De An., Vol.II, p.26: both quoted by LeBlond (1937), p.204, n.1.)
There is however need for further investigation, particularly over the relation of "phusikos" to "phusike" (natural science). A potential ambiguity lurks in "phusikos" (as in "scientifically" or "in the way a natural scientist would" (Ackrill's (1973) emended translation of Ross, p.134) between:

(a) approaching a topic actually qua a natural scientist;
(b) approaching a topic in the specific way a natural scientist approaches his topics.

The literature isn't altogether clear about this. But let me note that if "phusikos" is taken as conveying simply an approach to a subject in terms of its oikeiai archai, then there is no longer a direct connection with natural science per se. For there are disciplines outside "phusike" which have their own oikeiai archai (cf. De Gen. An.2.8.748a7-16; De An.1.1.402a21-2).

I see no particular need to take phusikos as adverting to (a) rather than (b) above (so too LeBlond (1937), p.207). It seems certainly not to be to "the phusiologoi" of Sec.4b. Whether it is in fact to the Aristotelian phusikos as he contrasts with the dialektikos in De An.1.1. (403a27-b16) may be the case, but I am unconvinced that we need anything so specific.

31 Cf. Chapter 1.3.6.; Chapter 4.11.
32 Cf. the different interpretations outlined in Chapter 1.2.2.
33 Cf. De An.2.1.412a5-6 (cf. 1.1.402b5ff), b4, 10;
But if Sec.4b's place is now intelligibly secured, the question of its connection or lack of connection with Sec.4c remains (looked at another way this is part of the 4c puzzle):

(i) There is a grammatical connection in that 4b supplies the subject of 1147b10 (echei) - viz. "the akratic" - on the OCT reading of the text. (On the Ramsauer reading, the reader has to supply "the akratic" at b10 for himself from the context.)

(ii) See further in the discussion of the 4c puzzle.

Is what Aristotle says here - in its application to action - intended as a _general_ model for action explanation, covering all actions? No. Had he characterised the premisses/beliefs in terms of one being about the good, the other about the possible, as at DMA.7.701a23-5, someone could have tried maintaining this (although I would not myself have agreed). However since the relevant contrast is drawn, here as in De An.3.11., between a universal and a kath'hekasta premiss, it will not explain actions not viewable as involving universal beliefs: in particular:

(a) it will not explain action by beasts who have no universals, no beliefs, and cannot deliberate (e.g. 7.3. 1147b3-5; De An.3.11. passim; De An.3.3.428a20-4; De Mem. 2.453a4-14; Meta.A.1. esp.980b25-8);

(b) and presumably not (certain kinds of) sudden actions on the part of humans (and maybe not actions when "nous" is
occluded: cf. De An. 3.3.429a4ff).

But it is not easy to characterise the range it will explain. Certainly prohairetic actions, but what else (akratic actions involving the exercise of deinotes?)?


37 So perhaps Wiggins(1978) in Rorty ed. (1980). He first remarks of Aristotle's practical syllogisms that:

Aristotle calls such patterns of reasoning 'syllogisms'... because of an analogy that interests him between deductively concluding or asserting and coming to a practical conclusion or acting. (p.248)

That is not to say what the point of analogy is. However later (p.251), Wiggins appears to be criticizing Aristotle's commitment to the analogy as excessive (still however without actually explaining what he thinks Aristotle takes the point of the analogy to be).


38 E.g. Cooper(1975), p.55 and n.70.

39 The earliest version I know of this approach to the text is Kenny(1966), p.177 (cf. (1979), p.157, n.2). Unfortunately he fails both times to offer a plausible positive account in turn. In (1979), p.157, n.2., he criticises his own (1966) account; for criticism of his equally "fanciful" (1979) version, see Chapter 5.2.2.

The strongest support for the analogical reading
comes through pressing hard here for a close parallel with DMA.7.701a7-16.

I am resistant to that degree of pressure. However in any case I intend the supplementational reading to leave open initially the further question of the internal relations between Condition 1 and Condition 2 in the practical subset: i.e. the agent's öffent (Condition 2) may simply be in an 'accompanying' relation with his affirmation of his best judgement (cf. e.g. NE.3.2.1112all-12 "parakolouthei"; and cf. Anscombe(1957/63), §33, pp.60-1).

This is over-simple in various ways (we haven't built in any temporal considerations, nor adverted to defeasibility conditions, etc.).


That the necessity is one of psychological state (if that may include acting) and not concerned with logical validity is evident in e.g. Milo(1966), p.99; Wiggins(1978) in Rorty ed. (1980), p.248; Bogen(1982), pp.113-4.

Particularly if "to sumperanthen" is taken to be the direct object also of "prattein" as the Greek word order suggests. A non-supplementational interpretation must either reject this natural implication of the word-order, or have to find the passage rather awkward (as Nussbaum has
the courage to do (1978), pp.203-4).


45 Cf. note 39 above.

46 Cf. Chapter 4.13.

47 Cf. further n.30, p.130.

48 They [sc. akratics] - like the young students - have failed to make certain beliefs their own; but the nature of their failure, although analogous, is not identical. The young students have failed to integrate their newly acquired beliefs with their experience (or their other beliefs); the akrates fail to integrate their value judgments with their motivational states (1095a8-11). (Charles (1984), p.167)

49 There is a grammatical slip or an error in Charles' note 3, p.167. The "his" of "his asserting the conclusion (1147a27-8)", refers to the akrates; and should not do so.

50 I use "pursue" and "flee" as token translations for Aristotle's "diokein" and "pheugein": about which it may be asked:
(i) are they simply pursuit- and flight-desires or actual bodily movements? (I think pretty obviously the first);
(ii) are they simply desires or decisive desires of the system (as I think Charles supposes)? The answer is not obvious to me.
(On the notion of 'decisive desire' cf. e.g. Charles (1984), pp.86-7.)

51 In a paper, "De An. 3.7.431a8-17 and the perception of value", I discuss the interpretation of this difficult
Passage and criticize accounts by Charles and Engberg-Pedersen.

52 Charles discusses the passage further, pp.188ff.

53 The passage, 1152a8-15, as I have said, is difficult, in particular the lines a10-14:

- but nothing prevents the clever man from being akratic: (1) that is why indeed some people are thought sometimes to be phronimoi and yet akratic, (2) on account of the fact that cleverness differs from practical wisdom in the way we said in our first discussions (3) and while in respect of reasoning (logos) they are close, in respect of preferential choice they differ -

Now, assuming the integrity of this text, it is not clear whether (3) is within the scope of (2) and so its subjects are "cleverness" and "phronesis"; or whether (2) is an aside, and so the subjects of (3) are the "some people" of (1): i.e.:

...(1) that is why indeed some people are thought sometimes to be phronimoi but akratic ...and (3) to be close with respect to their reasoning but to differ with respect to their preferential choice.

I don't think that makes much sense. But accepting the OCT text those seem our two options - and neither is compatible with the translation Charles offers in (ii). However given that our second reading is only dubiously intelligible, while the first is oblique and only dubiously, if at all, true, it seems reasonable to posit either some grammatical laxity or an emendation, and understand the
passage in line with Charles' translation. (An emendation would unfortunately require more than merely repunctuating the OCT — with the dash before "kai kata men" (a13) instead of before "oude de" (a14).) But understood as Charles translates, the passage still offers him no help: for the point he sees in it is still undercut by the line that follows.

My interest in this grammatical question lies in what clause the "so" of "oude de" is drawing on: is it "ou praktikos" (a9) as in the OCT, or the "kata men... prohairesin" clause as on an emendation?


55 As I have here framed the cognitive condition, the wicked would fail to satisfy this, while satisfying the motivational condition (construed as wanting, most, to act on their best judgement). If one drops the reference to truth from the cognitive condition, then they satisfy it.

56 This "unless..." is incompletable. The point lies in the need for some special story or other to be told if it is claimed that S has such unclouded appreciation and yet doesn't see it as a reason to get out of the way (cf. Foot (1958-9)).

57 Charles certainly is very conscious of the need to explain why the two conditions get to be satisfied together: it is not pure chance that there are phronimoi (cf. e.g. (1984), p.155; pp.188ff; and pp.181ff).
It is a major question whether the role Charles gives to trained desires in the development both of correct valuational and motivational structures and responses makes the account he offers of the non-accidental co-satisfaction of the two conditions one suited to an adherent of position 1 or of position 2. (We have already met another worrying consequence of the account he offers, viz. the atypicality of akrasia, pp.182-3: see Chapter 1.4.4.)

58 It is not within my brief to discuss whether this move is true or false, or if true only so trivially, etc.

59 Of course the direction of explanation may be the reverse.

60 In particular a likely worry if Charles advocates position 2 will be whether under his talk of the akratic's failure to integrate his motivations with his evaluations we will be left, in akrasia, with two desires slogging it out backstage - where which desire 'wins' (the good one springing from best judgement or the bad unintegrated appetite) will be decided by non-cognitive features of the desires over which the agent has no immediate control.
Notes: Chapter 5 Section 2

1 I stress "noun, or noun phrase" because there is also a question over what verb or verb phrase to understand as governing the "hoti" (cf. a similar question arises at 1147a5-7).

2 Cf. also De An.3.11.434a16-17, 17-18 (so Kenny (1966), p.179).

However it is problematic what degree of contrast can be elicited from the "men" (a31) and "de" (a32) given the whole run of "de" connectives in this clause (four occurrences in a31-2).


(Exponents of this interpretation sometimes characterise the major and minor premisses in terms of "x" or "Ø" and don't explicitly say that "sweet" is not a possible substitution.)

6 This qualification is necessary because e.g. sweetness could presumably feature as an element among others. So
for instance:

(a) Walsh (1963), p.106, considers the possibility of an example with the universal premiss:

"All tasting of an excessive number of sweets is forbidden",

where the relevant full minor premiss would be:

"That amounts to an excessive number of sweets".

(b) Aquinas suggests (comment. ad loc.) that the universal forbidding to taste is:

nullum dulce est gustandum extra horam


Here the relevant full minor would run:

"This is a sweet between meals".


One can see here a budding unclarity in the distinction between shared and non-shared (/independent) minor premiss views. Consider the Aquinas example above. If the minor premiss there is considered a unit it will be quite different from the APS's minor premiss "this is sweet". But if the RPS's minor premiss can be regarded as a conjunction of separate items - such as "this is a sweet, and now is between mealtimes" then it will be possible for the APS's minor premiss to be shared by the RPS which then perhaps goes on to conjoin it with other features, thus building up a context for it which gives it the proper resonance it should have for the agent.
Kenny may think he evades this difficulty because of his interpretation of "use/exercise" as "apply to the particular case". This does not work, as I have argued at length in a separate paper, "Kenny's interpretation of energeian". (Cf. also Chapter 3 Section 2 note 1.)

For this argument see (1979), p.159. (For a more complex version, viz. the premiss of the akratic "is presumably the contradictory of the premiss of the intemperate man's", see (1966), p.181.)

One should not be complacent about these remarks however. It is one thing to say that the temperate and the licentious are concerned about "the same things" at one level; another at another. In fact this is really rather difficult, and one may wonder whether Aristotle always saw his way clearly here. But presumably the basic picture is that both temperate and licentious are:

(a) concerned with the same things in the sense of a 'neutral range of object/passion' which any triad in the doctrine of the mean will share. In their case the passions in question are certain physical appetites and pleasures. This may ground one sense in which both could be said to be concerned with certain things "qua pleasant";

(b) but at another level the nature and purpose of their concern can be represented as quite different - the temperate being concerned with these pleasant things qua conducive and damaging to his physical health, the licentious qua things
one can come to value as the only things worthwhile in life.


12 Kenny also regards the earlier example in Sec.2b 1147a5ff as another 'technical' syllogism: for doubts about this cf. Chapter 2 note 59.

13 It is just possible that the phrases are not equivalent, but that "poietikai" is wider, covering strictly productive and strictly practical, while "praktikai" is confined simply to the latter. I doubt if this has real import in our contexts.

14 In themselves that is - for of course they come to seem very problematic if combined with the view that the FP is the PRS's (MiP).

15 physically pleasant. "hedu" presumably connotes this in central akrasia. "Appetite" (epithumia) appears to have at least these two Aristotelian usages:

(i) it is a desire whose formal object is anything qua pleasant (e.g. NE.3.1.1111a30-1; 3.12.1119b15ff; 7.4. 1148a22ff);

(ii) it is a set of appetites for certain physical pleasures shared with beasts.

Charles, p.264).

17 Cf. e.g. De An.3.10.433b7-8.

18 For obviously the relevant minor premises for such attitudinal propensities turn not simply on the situational awareness of "this is sweet"/"this is adultery" but also on the detection of an attraction and a condemnation. (Such 'second-order' complications could perhaps be compared with Williams' (1976) remarks on deviant relations to the virtues.)

19 I.e. Aristotle's "empeiros" (cf. e.g. Meta.A.1., etc.).

20 Cf. NE.6.11.1143b11-14 (n.b. "anapodeitois").

21 At this point I still leave it open whether the syllogisms are intended literally or metaphorically. Either way there are two of them. I close this option in 5.2.5.

22 Robinson's (1954/69) suggestion that:

The word legei is vague enough to mean no more than that the right universal premiss tends to forbid the act, and would forbid it if joined to its own particular premiss in actuality. (p.145)

if read naturally, seems to me absurd; but perhaps it is an unhappy formulation.

23 Qua the result of logos rather than perception of the two options 1149a35 gives us.

24 "Anything you like" would be an exaggeration if the
example is taken strictly of the akratic who shares the temperate man's values.

25 Potentially - simply because the RFS is not non-deviantly present.

26 At least not typically (NE.7.3.1147a25-6). However perhaps NE.3.3.1112b34ff doesn't rule out deliberation on some occasions; and 7.6.1149a32 and 35 might be construed as minor premisses produced by 'logos' (alternatively the logos in question might be such a piece of reasoning as SII).

27 Cf. Chapter 4 note 76.

28 Although it does introduce a new way in which one's reasoning can come unstuck; for one may make a perceptual mistake and the belief in the perceptual minor premiss then be false (cf. NE.6.8.1142a20-2; cf. Chapter 1.2.7.). Compare perhaps Post.An.A.16.79b23ff, esp. 26-9.


30 After all presumably syllogistic is Aristotle's model of reasoning (within which framework he distinguishes between demonstrative and dialectic propositions, etc.). (However a fuller study would consider his views on induction.)

31 'For this would rule out the man of experience being at issue: cf. NE.6.11.1143b11-14.' However I think Aristotle accepts this (cf. e.g. 6.7.1141b14-23).
Admittedly Aristotle distinguishes "goodness of deliberation" from "goodness at conjecture" (eustochia) and "acumen" (agchinoia): NE.6.9.1142b2-6. For the latter is a type of the former (1142b6; Post.An.A.34.89b10), and is as such a kind of ability to hit on the middle term "in a time not allowing for enquiry/reflection" (en askeptoi chronoi 89b10: either LSJ and Barnes misunderstand the point of "askeptos" or the writer of NE.6.9.1142b2-6 did, see esp. 2-4).

However I consider it revealing that these are concepts Aristotle considers worth distinguishing from euboulia, and does not contrast them over the point of a search for a middle term, but over the manner involved.

I argued against Charles in a class some years ago that not all intentional action in Aristotle is best viewed as involving practical syllogisms. Although he has since changed his mind (e.g. (1984), p.96), De Mot.An.7. 701a32-3 still appears to be regarded as a practical syllogism by him (witness Appendix 3, p.262) (though perhaps this is doubtfully consistent with what he says, p.96).

This dogma is challenged in Hursthouse (1974), on "pointless actions" in unpublished D.Phil. thesis.

At least I take it to be most illuminating to consider a singular best judgement the canonical form: for this see:

(1) **Singular best judgements:**
EE.2.7.1223b8; 2.10.1226b15-16; NE.9.4.1166b11.

Cf. (a) in terms of sumpheron: 7.3.1147a6; (b) in terms of a good: DMA.701a28; NE.9.4.1166b9.

However Aristotle does represent PS conclusions in other ways:

(2) In terms of commands by reason:
NE.7.3.1147a34; De An.3.9.433a2; cf. 432b30-1; De Mot.An. 11.703b7-8.

The mots justes here are "epitattein" and "keleuein": cf. Chapter 5 Section 1 note 11.

(3) In terms of "dei" (whether this is taken as some rational "should" or as a (practical) necessity):
Cf. the phrase "ha dei prattein": e.g. 3.1.1110b28-9; 5.8.1136b8-9; 7.3.1146b22-3; 7.6.1149a33-4; 6.9.1142b23, clearly Conclusion; 6.10.1143a8-9 (the goal of phronesis);
etc. etc. Meta.Z.7.1032b19 (cf. 7. for connection with anagke); De An.3.11.434a18 (in (MaP)); Rhet.1.9.1357b37ff. But what about:

(4) In terms of the gerundive "-eon"?
(a) The PS' conclusion can be represented by this locution: De Mot.An.701a13; 14; 16; 19 twice; 20 ("and the conclusion 'I must make a cloak' is an action" (cf. e.g. Kenny(1975), p.97 for the ambiguity)); 8.702a16.

(b) However I would maintain, on the evidence so far, that the gerundive ending has much wider connotations than those of (1)-(3); thus for instance:
(i) appetite can be represented gerundively in its demands
(De Mot. An. 7. 701a32);

(ii) EE.2.10.1226b23ff allows that:

an opinion about whether something should be
done or not may well be present to many people
though not through reasoning (logismos).

It is not clear what this EE passage actually
covers: whether it allows that there may be strongly
irrational beliefs (in a sense not countenanced by De An.
3.3.428a19-24); or whether it is concerned with the
beliefs of the experienced who do not know the
explanation (cf. NE.6.11.1143b11-14, n.b. doxais (13)).

36 I.e. reasoning about practical matters.

37 And on others' advice: cf. NE.3.3.1112b10-11.

38 Although naturally the giving of that advice, being
an action of his own, would also be set in the framework of
his own practical reasoning about what, given his values,
it would be best to tell this other.

In fact more generally the parallel between
deliberation and advisory or collaborative deliberation
(sumbouleusis) is potentially illuminating and has been
rather neglected.

39 This is not susceptible of assessment as true or
false: EE.2.10.1226a4; cf. NE.3.2.1111b33-34 (although less
clearly because of the "mallon").

40 For this interpretation of "bouleutike" cf. EE.2.10.
1226b19-21.
For the central point compare also EE.2.10. 1226a4-6.

41 Cf. NE.6.2.1139a22-6.

42 The distortion may, I suggest, include a failure to appreciate the relevance of the (MiP) to the agent's universal knowledge - as when perhaps a drunk drives through "those pretty red traffic lights".

43 I ignore certain fanciful possibilities here.

44 E.g. perhaps a weak commensurability thesis of the U3 form (cf. Wiggins (1978), Sec.VI).

45 The lines that follow, viz. 1149b1-3, might be thought to create more of a difficulty. This is because in these lines "logos" is appealed to in two different respects:

(1) first in the way brought out in the quotations;
(2) but secondly in 1149b1-3 where it clearly picks up the 'reasoning' in "as it were having syllogised" (1149a33):

Consequently while anger follows reason (logos) in a sense (pos), appetite does not. (etc.)

I am assuming that the "hypo logou" of 7.3.1147bl is similar to (1) here and unlike (2).

46 Contra Charles (1984), p.131, who takes "This is pleasant" to "commend a course of action".

47 The clever man poses an immediate problem here: cf. 5.2.8.
48 Obviously what is said here and below will not apply straightforwardly to the emotions as against the basic appetites, and so not to extended akrasia: cf. 5.2.8.

49 I leave these notions of physical pain and pleasure unanalysed here.

50 Cf. De An.3.7.431a10-11.

51 Cf. e.g. De An.3.11.434a14-15.

52 There is also a varying sensitivity to the 'dictates' of reason on the part of the lower system (and a range of different metaphors of training, hearing, harmonising, as is to be expected given differences between emotions, and between emotions and appetites).

53 We should note two points that require further elucidation in Aristotle's picture as so far drawn (1) extended akrasia. Extended akrasia has not been examined. This seems to differ from central akrasia in that the "goods" at issue there are ones not merely that the agent values (presumably the satisfaction of appetites may also be valued) but exercise their lure in that very aspect that the agent values them - and he is temporarily led to over-value them. Whereas in central akrasia the lure straightforwardly provokes the basic appetites of the lower, AS, system, bypassing the agent's evaluational system. It might be claimed of course that the goods of extended akrasia are lures provoking emotions - the ES system - such as anger and ambition, also bypassing the agent's
evaluational system. However these emotions are essentially more cognitive - their situational roots are more cognitively exposed; and they are intricately bound up with the agent's development of his value-scheme, his view of what is worthwhile in life, to start with (cf. our earlier problems with the "Double Appeal to Character"). A careful examination is needed to tease these elements out.

(2) cleverness (deinotes). Cleverness poses something of a problem for the account so far developed (see also below). For cannot the clever akratic be represented as an agent who comes to a best judgement of a sort (he may deliberate both about the constitutive and the executive means of an akratic project)? "Given that irrationally I am taking this as my present goal, it is best for me to...". And couldn't such deliberation be viewed as leading to the formation of a prohairesis (cf. an intention) of a sort (an opting for a over b for goal T)? Aristotle appears to reject this, and some account is required of the presuppositions behind this rejection.

54 Unless perhaps the "ouk echei" case (Case A) of Sec.2b is a case of inhibition of exercise, while Case B is the case of distortion.
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