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Thesis

Electoral competition and the dynamics of public debt

Subtitle:
context-conditional political budget cycles
Abstract:

Why and under what conditions do governments borrow before elections? This thesis aims to shed light on this question by exploring governments' incentives that give rise to political budget cycles, i.e. fluctuations in the budget balance during election times, under different political, institutional, and economic contexts. The argument will be developed in three stages. First, the thesis will explain why politicians may choose to use debt strategically to win elections and discuss and evalua...

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Social Sciences Division - Politics and International Relations

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Role:
Supervisor
Role:
Supervisor
Publication date:
2010
Type of award:
DPhil
Level of award:
Doctoral
Awarding institution:
Oxford University, UK
URN:
uuid:9fa80792-826c-4fc6-b3e9-f120986b4472
Local pid:
ora:4459

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