Journal article

Auctions versus Negotiations.

Abstract:: Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder? The authors show, under reasonable assumptions, that the auction is always preferable when bidders' signals are independent. For affiliated signals, the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller's choice of negotiating mechanism. The result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition. The paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory.

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APA Style

Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. (1996). Auctions versus Negotiations. American Economic Review, 86.

MLA Style

Bulow, J., and P. Klemperer. “Auctions versus Negotiations.” American Economic Review, vol. 86, 1996.

Chicago Style

Bulow, J, and P Klemperer. 1996. “Auctions versus Negotiations.” American Economic Review 86.
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Authors

+ Bulow, J More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Klemperer, P More by this author

Role:: Author

Journal:: American Economic Review More from this journal
Volume:: 86
Publication date:: 1996-01-01
ISSN:: 0002-8282

Language:: English
UUID:: uuid:9f021e77-70e1-4025-8f4d-7987b4735607
Local pid:: oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:10287
Deposit date:: 2011-08-16

Terms of use

Copyright date:: 1996

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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