Journal article icon

Journal article

Auctions versus Negotiations.

Abstract:

Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder? The authors show, under reasonable assumptions, that the auction is always preferable when bidders' signals are independent. For affiliated signals, the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller's choice of negotiating mechanism. The result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competit...

Expand abstract

Actions


Authors


Jeremy Bulow More by this author
Paul Klemperer More by this author
Journal:
American Economic Review
Volume:
86
Publication date:
1996
URN:
uuid:9f021e77-70e1-4025-8f4d-7987b4735607
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:10287
Language:
English

Terms of use


Metrics



If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP