THE WHITE RUSSIAN ARMY IN EXILE, 1920-1941

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

ABSTRACT (1)
D.PHIL THESIS , PAUL ROBINSON, ST. ANTONY'S COLLEGE, HILARY 1999
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In November 1920, 100,000 troops of the White Russian Army of General Wrangel were evacuated from the Crimea. These men constituted the most cohesive group in the inter-war Russian emigration, and represented the grass roots of émigré society. In exile, after the troops dispersed, they maintained the army's organisation through their veterans' association, the Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soiuz (ROVS), whose history is the main focus of this thesis. ROVS was the largest of all Russian émigré organisations. In some countries one third of all Russian exiles were ROVS members. They continued to regard themselves as soldiers, and sought to renew the struggle against the Soviets despite immense pressures: foreign countries were unsympathetic to the needs of Russian refugees; most émigrés lived in poverty; and émigré society was under continual attack from the Soviet secret services.

This study shows how these pressures induced in Russian émigrés feelings of isolation and paranoia which helped to fragment the Russian emigration in the 1930s and which produced numerous public scandals and splits. Yet ROVS survived because it gave substantial support to its members. Its leaders found work for thousands of troops in the early 1920s, and later continued to provide humanitarian aid. ROVS viewed itself as an "order of knights", a concept which boosted the self-worth of members who had few other sources of moral support, and which reflected the prevailing values of White officers. These values, this thesis proposes, were primarily spiritual, the most important being honour. The Whites' beliefs brought them into conflict with émigré monarchist organisations, but they succeeded in resisting the monarchists and restraining their influence on the emigration. Meanwhile, ROVS members promoted youth organisations, and helped to support Russian culture abroad. Through these activities, Russian military émigrés made a more positive contribution to the Russian emigration than has hitherto been acknowledged.

ABSTRACT (2)
D.PHIL THESIS, PAUL ROBINSON, ST. ANTONY'S COLLEGE, HILARY 1999
THE WHITE RUSSIAN ARMY IN EXILE, 1920-1941

In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and Civil War, about 800,000 Russians fled into exile. About one quarter of these were veterans of the various White armies which had fought against the Bolsheviks. In recent years, interest in the history of the inter-war Russian emigration has expanded rapidly, but most studies of the emigration have focused on the intellectual and cultural élites of émigré society, and have ignored the largest mass of émigrés - these military men. The primary purpose of this thesis is to fill this large gap in the history of the Russian emigration by studying the fate in exile of the 100,000 troops of the Russian Army of General Wrangel, who were evacuated from the Crimea in November 1920. Wrangel sought to maintain his army's existence, and when his troops eventually dispersed in search of work they preserved the organisation of the army through a veterans' organisation, the Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soiuz (ROVS), which was founded by Wrangel in 1924. ROVS was the largest of all Russian émigré organisations. In some countries one in three of all Russian exiles were ROVS members. Even in countries where the proportion was lower, about one in ten exiles were members. Because of its large membership, ROVS represented much of the grass roots of émigré society, and its history reveals much about the history of the wider emigration. As a secondary purpose, the thesis uses the history of the Russian military émigration to examine the nature of the anti-Bolshevik White movement, and to draw conclusions about the beliefs and ideology of the White officer corps.

Russian military émigrés continued to regard themselves as soldiers even after long years of civilian life in exile. They sought to continue the struggle against the Soviet regime in Russia, and to preserve the values and culture of the Russian officer corps. They did so in spite of immense external pressures: foreign countries, who had sufficient problems of their

own, were unsympathetic to their needs; most émigrés lived in poverty; and émigré society was under continual attack from the Soviet secret services. Given these circumstances, some commentators have interpreted the behaviour of Russian émigrés as proof that they lived in a fantasy world which only hindered their adaptation to the new circumstances of their lives. This thesis seeks to show that, on the contrary, their behaviour was a result of the external environment in which they found themselves, which gave them no choice but to look to each other for support, and also the result of a genuine belief that the values they held dear were worth preserving.

After being evacuated from the Crimea by sea, Wrangel's army travelled to Constantinople. Under the protection of the French army, the troops were placed in refugee camps at Gallipoli and on the island of Lemnos. Conditions in these camps were extremely harsh, and the French decided to disband the Russian Army, exerting considerable pressure on its men to accept repatriation to Soviet Russia. On Lemnos the morale of the troops disintegrated and many accepted repatriation. At Gallipoli, however, the troops rallied around their leaders and claimed to have experienced a moral resurrection. This came to be known as the 'Gallipoli miracle', a myth which was to sustain many of the veterans thereafter. The lesson of Gallipoli, they maintained, was that Russians could only survive in exile by banding together and by preserving their military organisation. In addition, their experiences at Gallipoli led them to despise the French and western values in general, and so to look back to Russia as the embodiment of all that was valuable.

Gallipoli and Lemnos taught military émigrés the lesson that they were alone in a hostile world. This sense of isolation, which later developed into an extreme paranoia, was a central feature of the Russian émigré psychology. For the men of Wrangel's army it was reinforced by the political struggles which surrounded the army in 1921. Wrangel and his

men viewed themselves as the most valuable core of the Russian emigration, and felt that the rest of émigré society should rally around the army and Wrangel's leadership. However, émigré intellectual and political leaders instead abandoned the army. Meanwhile, a lack of funds meant that the army had to cede precedence in many matters to the humanitarian organisation Zemgor, which was viewed as a hostile organisation determined to undermine the army.

From Lemnos and Gallipoli, the remnants of Wrangel's army were moved to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. In Yugoslavia the leadership of the Russian Army was able to find work for all its men in such a way as to preserve the structure of the army. Wherever possible, men of the same unit were put to work on the same projects, and in the case of the Kuban Cossack Division the men stayed together in this way right up until the Second World War. The army also gave valuable humanitarian aid to its soldiers, providing money for the sick, students and the unemployed. Similarly in Czechoslovakia, Russian military organisations provided considerable financial and moral support to the several thousand Russian soldiers who came to study in Czechoslovak universities.

In Bulgaria, however, the political situation was deeply unstable and the government, under pressure from the Bulgarian Communist Party, decided to repress the Russian Army. Many senior Russian officers were arrested, funds held by the Russian Army were seized, and the rights of Russians were severely restricted. In these circumstances, the army and its leadership were the only protectors that many émigrés had, and so most remained fiercely loyal to it, although some deserted in despair and returned to Russia. Meanwhile, financial problems meant that Wrangel was no longer able to keep the army together, and its men were forced to disperse in search of work. The only work available in Bulgaria was hard physical labour, and Russian officers were thrown down from their lofty status as officers to the lowest

rungs on the economic and social ladder. To help their men survive this transition, for several years units of the Russian Army preserved a small cadre to keep the troops of the unit in contact with one another and kept a unit base to which troops could return in periods of unemployment. Mutual help funds were set up in every unit to provide aid to the sick and unemployed. In this way the structure of the army survived the dispersion of the troops, while valuable aid was given to them.

By 1924 a worsening employment situation in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was inducing many members of the Russian Army to move west in search of work. Rather than resist this movement, Wrangel decided to support it. It has been claimed that the leadership of the Russian Army played a negative role in the lives of Russian émigrés, resisting all their efforts to disperse in search of work and keeping them in poverty, in the hope that frustrated refugees would be a source of strength against the Soviets. This interpretation is not supported by the facts in this thesis. On the contrary, Wrangel's representative in France, General Shatilov, found work for several thousand Russians in France and Belgium, and through his efforts a system of Russian 'work groups' was established in those countries, which preserved the links between the men of the army and was believed to have helped them to gain benefits from their employers.

The dispersion of the army made it necessary for it to take on a new structure. As a result, in September 1924 Wrangel announced the formation of ROVS. This united in one body the dispersed units of the Russian Army and the many other Russian veterans' associations which had sprung up throughout Europe. ROVS's purpose was two-fold: practical and moral. On the practical side, ROVS provided material aid to those of its members in need, and the associations within ROVS acted as social centres where Russians could meet and where Russian cultural activities could be promoted. On the moral side,

ROVS viewed itself as a religious-military order, preserving the highest moral and spritual values among its members in order to resurrect Russia through their example and to restore these values to Russia after the fall of communism. To this end, ROVS members were meant to use their time in exile to study and to improve themselves, and ROVS held regular lectures and training courses which members were meant to atttend. In fact, ROVS's image as a knightly order bore little relation to reality, but the notion did help to boost the self-worth of soldiers who had few other forms of moral support.

It has sometimes been maintained that White officers were overwhelmingly monarchist in their political convictions, and adjectives such as 'reactionary' are often used to describe them. However, this thesis argues that monarchism was never the prime belief of White officers. In the early 1920s, monarchists sought to persuade military organisations in exile to adopt monarchist slogans, but they were resisted by Wrangel, who banned members of military organisations from joining political groups. Wrangel's opposition deprived monarchist political organisations of their largest body of potential supporters - military émigrés - and the monarchist cause was dealt a fatal blow. Wrangel believed in the idea of 'non-predetermination', which maintained that the future form of government in Russia should be determined by the Russian people, not predetermined by émigrés. It has been claimed that non-predetermination was a façade behind which White officers hid their true reactionary beliefs, but the insistence of many of them on sticking to the principle even in exile belies this idea.

ROVS believed that one of its main tasks was to continue the struggle against the Soviets. As full scale armed conflict was no longer possible, the emphasis was put on a campaign of underground subversion and terrorism. In the mid-1920s this campaign was led by one of Wrangel's senior commanders, General Kutepov. Kutepov sent various agents into

the Soviet Union, but fell prey to a Soviet provocation known as 'The Trust', as a result of which his underground organisation was destroyed by the Soviet secret services. Subsequently Kutepov sent various terrorist groups into Soviet Russia, but almost all were intercepted and nothing was achieved. The actions of the Trust became public knowledge in 1927 and convinced many émigrés that Soviet provocateurs were everywhere among them, a conviction that bred a severe paranoia. In 1930 Kutepov was abducted by Soviet agents. This resulted in a series of mutual accusations among émigrés, and promoted mutual suspiciousness. The interplay of the Soviet secret services and the émigré underground thus had an important effect on the overall émigré psychology.

By the early 1930s it had become clear that the Russian emigration needed rejuvenating. For this purpose, ROVS put considerable effort into promoting new organisations of émigré youth. Particular attention was given to providing military training to young émigrés, and to encouraging scouting, sports and gymnastics groups. Significant aid was given to the Natsional'nyi Soiuz Novogo Pokoleniia (NSNP), which in later years, under the title NTS, would become one of the most influential Russian émigré organisations. Through its contacts with such groups, ROVS played a vital role in revitalising the Russian emigration and made a positive contribution to the preservation of Russian culture in exile.

The longer Russians were in exile, the more the ideologies of the past came into question. As part of this process, in the 1930s everything that ROVS stood for, including non-predetermination, came under scrutiny. A real effort was made to determine the ideological nature of the White movement and to produce a positive political programme. This effort was to end in failure. The majority of White officers insisted on sticking to their cherished apoliticism and to the idea of non-predetermination. This thesis suggests that one of the reasons for this failure was that material political, economic, and social ideas of the sort

which make up political programmes were not what mattered most to White officers. Instead they were primarily concerned with promoting spiritual values such as honour and religion. Since these values, which emerged out of the Whites' experiences in the Russian Civil War, remained remarkably constant, this revelation helps to create a better understanding of the nature of the White movement and its conflict with the Bolsheviks.

During the mid-1930s deep divisions began to develop among ROVS members. These were symptomatic of a broader crisis suffered by the Russian emigration as a whole. This crisis was caused by years of poverty and failed hopes, a situation made worse by the Great Depression. In addition, the rise to power of the Nazis in Germany and developments within the Soviet Union fundamentally altered the environment in which émigrés found themselves. Émigrés responded to these changes in different ways. Some became increasingly impatient to renew the struggle against the Soviets, a philosophy known as 'activism', which had strong support among younger ROVS members. Others, however, believed that Stalin's Russia was developing into a strong nationalist state, and began to rethink their opposition to the Soviet regime. The believers in activism agitated within ROVS to persuade its leadership to undertake more active underground struggle against the Soviets. Their actions resulted in a number of public splits, which left the organisation severely damaged. At the same time, a debate broke out between those who supported the idea of aiding a foreign country which invaded the Soviet Union ('defeatists'), and those who believed that the Soviets should be supported in their attempts to defeat any foreign invader of Russian territory ('defencists'). ROVS played a central role in this debate, being the most prominent supporter of defeatism. The arguments that it put forward persuaded many émigrés that collaboration with a foreign invader was justifiable, and so opened the door for the eventual collaboration by many of them with Germany in World War Two.

Throughout the 1930s, the Soviet secret services continued their work to undermine the Russian emigration. This thesis reveals how Soviet agents within ROVS played an important role in aggravating the divisions in émigré society, and the debilitating effect that their activities had on émigrés' mutual relations. The culmination of these activities was the abduction in 1937 of the then head of ROVS, General Miller. This act led to another round of mutual recriminations and accusations, after which émigrés' paranoia reached extreme proportions.

Yet despite all these problems, ROVS stayed together throughout the inter-war period, its members remained loyal to their basic values, they continued to regard themselves as soldiers, and they remained committed to renewing the struggle against the Soviets. In the light of the problems they faced, this was remarkable. This thesis argues that ROVS survived, and its members behaved in this way, because the organisation served a genuine purpose, made a positive contribution to émigré life, and helped many thousands of its members both morally and materially.

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GLOSSARY OF NAMES OF ORGANISATIONS, INDIVIDUALS & CONCEPTS

Note: Transliterations follow a standard format except in cases where an alternative transliteration is already in general use - thus, 'Wrangel' not 'Vrangel", 'von Lampe' not 'fon Lampe'.

ORGANISATIONS

Belaia Ideia (White Idea) - Political organisation of White youth.

FSR (Fond Spaseniia Rodiny) - Fund for the Salvation of the Motherland. Raised money for underground operations inside the USSR.

Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo (Gallipoli Friendly Society) - Student society of former Gallipoli veterans in Czechoslovakia.

GPU - Soviet Secret Service (Originally Cheka, later NKVD).

Legitimists - Supporters of the Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich.

Mladorossy (Young Russians) - Political organisation. Supporters of Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich. Slogan - 'Tsar and Soviets'.

Russkii Natsional'nyi Komitet (Russian National Committee) - Liberal political organisation set up in 1921 with aim of uniting the emigration.

NSNP, later NTSNP (Natsional'nyi (Trudovoi) Soiuz Novogo Pokoleniia) - National (Labour) Union of the New Generation. Political organisation of émigré youth. Closely associated with ROVS.

Obshchestvo Gallipoliitsev (Society of Gallipolians) - Society of Russian veterans who were at Gallipoli in 1920 and 1921.

ROVS (Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soiuz) - Russian General Military Union. Federation of Russian military organisations. Founded September 1924.

Sokols (Falcons) - Gymnastics youth movement.

SROUV (Soiuz Russkikh Ofitserov Uchastnikov Voiny) - Society of Russian Officer War Veterans, based in Paris.

SUVV (Soiuz Uchastnikov Velikoi Voiny) - Society of Great War Veterans (societies with this name existed in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia).

Zemgor - Émigré humanitarian organisation, controlled by liberal and socialist intellectuals.

INDIVIDUALS

Abramov, Lieutenant General F. F. - Commander of the Don Cossack Corps. Head of ROVS's 3rd Department 1924-1944. President of ROVS, 1937-1938.

Arkhangel'skii, Lieutenant General A. P. - Head of personnel department of Russian Army, 1920-1922. President of ROVS, 1938-1953.

Barbovich, Lieutenant General I. G. - Commander of Cavalry Division. Head of ROVS's 4th Department, 1933-1941.

Bazarevich, Colonel V. I. - Russian Military Representative in Yugoslavia, 1922-1941.

Burtsev, V. L. - Journalist, Editor of 'Obshchee Delo'. Member of National Committee.

Denikin, General A. I. - Former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia.

Dieterichs, General M. K. - Head of ROVS's Far Eastern Department.

Dragomirov, General-of-Cavalry A. M. - Head of the Society of Officers of the General Staff. In charge of ROVS's secret operations, 1930-1935.

Ekk, General-of-Cavalry E. V. - Head of ROVS's 4th Department, 1924-1933.

Foss, Captain K. A. - Secretary of ROVS's 3rd Department.

Golovin, Major General N. N. - Military historian and theoretician. Head of the Higher Military Courses in Paris and Belgrade.

Gulevich, General A. A. - Head of SROUV in Paris, 1921-1924.

Il'in, Professor I. A. - Political and religious philosopher.

Il'in, S. N. - Political adviser to General Wrangel, 1920-1925.

Kharzhevskii, Major General V. G. - Head of Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, 1923-1932. Assistant to General Dragomirov in secret work of ROVS, 1930-1935.

Khol'msen, Lieutenant General I. A. - Russian military representative in Germany, 1920-1922, and in France, 1922-1924. Head of ROVS's 1st Department, 1924-1930. ROVS treasurer, 1930-1935.

Kirill Vladimirovich, Grand Duke - Pretender to the Russian throne.

Komorovskii, Rotmeister A. - Secretary of ROVS's 4th Department.

Kussonskii, Lieutenant General P. A. - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Army, 1920-1926. Assistant to General Miller, 1930-1937.

Kutepov, General-of-Infantry A. P. - Commander of 1st Army Corps, 1920-1922. In charge of secret operations in Russia, 1924-1928. President of ROVS, 1928-1930.

Lampe, Major General A. A. von - Russian military representative in Hungary, 1920-1922, and in Germany, 1922-1924. Head of ROVS's 2nd Department, 1924-1941.

Larionov, Captain V. A. - White terrorist.

Levitskii, V. M. - Writer and propagandist.

Lukomskii, Lieutenant General A. S. - Senior advisor to Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and General Miller.

Makhrov, Lieutenant General P. S. - Former Chief of Staff to Generals Denikin and Wrangel. Russian military representative in Poland, 1920-1925. Prominent 'defencist'.

Matsylev, Colonel S. A. - Commander of Paris detachment of the Alekseevskii Infantry Regiment. Secretary of ROVS's 1st Department, 1937-1940.

Miliukov, P. N. - Liberal politician. Editor of newspaper 'Poslednie Novosti'.

Miller, Lieutenant General E. K. - Commander of White forces in far north of Russia during the Civil War. Chief of Staff of the Russian Army, 1922-1924. Seconded to staff of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 1924-1928. President of ROVS, 1930-1937.

Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke - Uncle of Tsar Nicholas II. Former Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Russian Army. Supreme Commander of the Russian Army and of ROVS, 1924-1929.

Orekhov, Captain V. V. - Editor of journal 'Chasovoi'.

Peshnia, Major General M. A. - Commander of the Markovskii Infantry Regiment.

Pronin, Colonel V. M. - Editor of newspaper 'Russkii Golos'.

Rep'ev, Lieutenant General M. I. - President of Society of Gallipolians, 1924-1933.

Shatilov, General-of-Cavalry P. N. - Chief of Staff of the Russian Army, 1920-1922. Head of ROVS's 1st Department, 1930-1934.

Skoblin, Major General N. V. - Commander of the Kornilov Shock Regiment. Soviet agent.

Steifon, Major General B. A. - Commandant of Gallipoli, 1920-1921.

Stogov, Major General N. N. - Head of military chancellery of ROVS's central directorate, 1930-1934.

Struve, P. B. - Political philosopher. Foreign minister under Wrangel, 1920.

Trubetskoi, Prince S. E. - Head of political chancellery of General Kutepov, 1924-1930. Head of Information Department of FSR, 1930-1937.

Tsurikov, N. A. - Writer and propagandist.

Turkul, Major General A. V. - Commander of Drozdovskii Infantry Regiment.

Vitkovskii, Lieutenant General V. K. - Deputy Commander of 1st Army Corps, 1920-1922. Commander of 1st Army Corps, 1922-1937. Head of ROVS's 1st Department, 1937-1941.

Wrangel, Lieutenant General P. N. - Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, 1920-1928.

Zaitsov, Colonel A. A. - Assistant to General Kutepov, 1926-1930. Teacher on Higher Military Courses of General Golovin.

Zinkevich, Major General M. M. - Commander of Alekseevskii Infantry Regiment, 1922-1941.

CONCEPTS

Defeatism (Пораженчество) - A belief that émigrés should help a foreign country which invaded the Soviet Union to defeat the Soviets.

Defencism (Оборончество) - A belief that Russian territory should be defended against any foreign invader, even if this meant abandoning the struggle against the Soviet regime.

Non-predetermination (Непредрешенство) - The idea that the future form of state government should not be predetermined by émigrés, but should be left to the Russian

people to decide.

Statehood (Государственность) - A belief in a strong state and the primacy of state interests.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS OF PRIMARY SOURCES

BAR	-	Bakhmeteff Archive, Columbia University.
BAR, ROVS	-	Bakhmeteff Archive, ROVS Collection.
COC	-	Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes, Paris: Archive of the Corps d'Occupation de Constantinople.
ENA	-	Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes, Paris: Archive of the État-Major National des Armées.
GARF	-	Gosudarstvennyi Archiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow.
HIA	-	Hoover Institution Archives.
HIA, WA	-	Hoover Institution Archives, P. N. Wrangel Archive.

Notes:

1. Citations from the Wrangel Archive are given in the form: HIA, WA, Box/File/Sheet.
2. Citations from collections at GARF are given in the form: GARF, fond/opis/delo/list.
3. Other collections have not been catalogued in as much detail. In these cases only the box number, and where possible the folder title, are provided.

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

In a grave near Paris lies Second Lieutenant Georgii Ivanovich Kononovich of the Alekseevskii Infantry Regiment, a unit of the White Russian Volunteer Army. His tombstone is marked, "Мир праху воину Георгию, 1900-1983". Kononovich is not alone. The Russian cemetery at Ste. Geneviève-des-Bois, in which he lies, contains scores of graves of Russian soldiers, marked with their ranks and regimental badges, just as in the war cemeteries which dot Europe. But these soldiers died of old age, not in battle. The Alekseevskii Regiment ceased to exist as a recognisably military unit some time in 1922 or 1923. The largest monument in the cemetery is that to the Society of Gallipolians, an organisation of White veterans who were at Gallipoli - in 1921. Georgii Kononovich had been a civilian for sixty years when he was buried with his regimental comrades and with his military rank inscribed on his tombstone.

These graves testify to what is perhaps a unique phenomenon - the existence of a stateless 'army' in exile - and also to the stubborn insistence of thousands of Russian military émigrés who left Russia in the aftermath of the Russian Civil War on maintaining their identities as military men, even after decades of life in exile. As one such veteran wrote in 1939, "Офицер-эмигрант прежде всего - офицер, и таковым он остается, несмотря на все невзгоды беженской жизни".[1]

This phenomenon invites study, in the first place to discover why Russian military émigrés behaved in such a stubborn fashion, second to explain how they were able to

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[1] Signal, no. 55, 15 May 1939, p. 1.

maintain their illusions for so long, and third to understand what they were hoping to achieve. In examining these questions this thesis also seeks to shed light on the general history of the inter-war Russian emigration, and on the nature of the White movement itself.

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The exact number of refugees who left Russia in the aftermath of the Russian revolution and civil war is not known. Estimates vary from 700,000 to approximately two million, but the most accurate figures suggest a total of about 800,000.[2] Of these about one-quarter were veterans of the various White armies which had fought against the Bolsheviks in the civil war. They were predominantly young, single and male. Yet to date, despite the fact that these veterans made up the largest single group among émigrés, and despite growing interest among historians in the Russian emigration, there exists no detailed study of that military component of the emigration. This thesis seeks to fill that gap. It starts in November 1920 when the Russian Army of General Wrangel left the Crimea, and concludes in June 1941 when the Germans invaded the USSR, beginning a new epoch of émigré history. The study focuses on Wrangel's Russian Army and the Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soiuz (ROVS), a federation of Russian veterans' organisations founded by Wrangel in 1924. Together these organisations played a leading role in the life of military émigrés.

This study has two distinct purposes. On one hand, it aims to provide a better understanding of the White movement, the nature of which is a matter of some debate.[3] The

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[2] Sir John Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem: Report of a Survey (London, 1939), p. 82; W. Chapin Huntington, The Homesick Million: Russia-out-of-Russia (Boston, 1933), p. 18; A summary of various estimates is to be found in Marc Raeff, Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-1939 (New York, 1990), pp. 202-203.

[3] For a discussion of the various views of the nature of the White movement, see V. N. Samus, S. V. Ustinkin & P. S. Matsur, Beloe Dvizhenie i otechestvennyi ofitserskii korpus v

civil war lasted only three years, during which time the strains of battle meant that White soldiers had little opportunity to sit down and express their beliefs and thoughts. The twenty years of emigration, which form the timeframe of this study, provided them with much greater opportunity to do so. An examination of what White soldiers did and said in the inter-war period can be used to look back and create a better understanding of the White movement, and its strengths and weaknesses during the civil war as well. Such a study of the character of the White movement is a matter of concern not just to historians but to contemporary Russia. For, as the chief foreign correspondent of the newspaper 'Izvestia', Konstantin Eggert, recently noted - "The civil war in Russia is still being fought in the hearts and minds of a country trying to come to grips with its past".[4]

The second purpose of this study is to fill a wide gap in the history of the Russian emigration as a whole. The far-ranging activities of Russian military émigrés had an important impact on the wider emigration. They contributed significantly to the process by which émigrés adapted to their new lives in exile, since military organisations and the leadership of the Russian Army were major providers of humanitarian aid to refugees. They influenced the generation split which emerged among émigrés in the 1930s, serving in some way to bridge the gap between the generations, helping the development of émigré youth organisations, and acting as a conduit through which Russian culture was passed on to the younger generation. They also influenced the debate among émigrés with regard to the pros and cons of collaborating with a foreign power which might invade the USSR, so laying the

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gody grazhdanskoi voiny v Rossii (Nizhni Novgorod, 1995).

[4] Konstantin Eggert, 'From Old Russia to New, or Whites Finally Beat Reds', International Herald Tribune, 31 Jul 1998, p. 6.

groundwork for the eventual collaboration by some émigrés with Nazi Germany during World War Two. Finally, since military men made up much of the rank and file of the emigration, their history also helps paint a picture of the ordinary lives and fates of the mass of the émigré population.

The prevailing attitudes among émigrés which emerge from this study are a tremendous sense of isolation and an ever growing paranoia. This mood was encapsulated in a statement by one officer in 1934, in which he noted that, "14 лет нас травили со всех сторон, обливали грязью, возводили на нас чудовищные обвинения, поносили и позорили".[5] This siege mentality was fairly typical. The evolution of this mode of thought was the result of various forces which acted on Russian émigrés, which forced them and their society to change over time. Four particularly important forces are identified in this study. The first of these was a hostile international environment. From the moment that émigrés arrived in exile they found themselves at the mercy of foreign powers, who were generally disinclined to help exiles or the anti-Soviet cause. Wrangel's army experienced political and physical repression at the hands of both the French and Bulgarian governments (see chapters 2, 3 & 4) from whom it had initially expected support. In the mid-1920s, the international environment became somewhat less hostile for Russian military émigrés, but from the early 1930s after the Great Depression and the rise to power of the Nazis in Germany, the situation again deteriorated. Some émigrés, in response to the hostility they encountered, fell into despair and abandoned the White cause to which they had originally been committed. Others came to realise that only by sticking together could they survive in a hostile environment.

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[5] GARF, 5881/1/255 (V. N. Varnek, 'Golos Armii').

This environment thus simultaneously split émigrés apart and drove them together. Some also came to despise the Western world, which they felt had betrayed them, and in response they looked back to Russia as the embodiment of the highest spiritual and cultural ideals.

The second force acting on émigrés was economic need, especially the need for employment. This forced émigrés to disperse far and wide in search of work, although such work as they found was normally poorly paid. Émigrés' financial positions became even worse during the Great Depression, when European nations practised open discrimination against refugees. A French law passed in 1932 fixed maximum percentages of aliens who could be employed in any industry. These limits applied even to enterprises run by refugees, so that a Russian choir, for instance, could legally employ only 10% Russians.[6] As a result, the economic conditions in which most émigrés lived were very poor. One described the main characteristic of the emigration as "social degradation and poverty".[7] Financial want had the same contradictory effect as the hostile international environment. Gruelling physical labour or unemployment reduced military officers to the status of proletarians, wearied their souls, sapped their energy and undermined their old identities. On the other hand, the very same hardship made the retention of their identities and their links with their old comrades all the more valuable, as in their degraded lives these links gave them their only sense of self-worth. The existence of military organisations in exile also enabled émigrés to practise mutual support, and so provided much needed humanitarian aid.

The third force acting on the emigration was the activities of the Soviet regime.

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[6] John A. Hutchins, The Wrangel Refugees: a study of Baron Peter N. Wrangel's defeated White Russian forces, both military and civilian, in exile, (University of Louisville, MA Thesis, 1972), p. 140.

[7] B. N. Aleksandrovskii, Iz perezhitogo v chuzhykh kraiakh, (Moscow, 1969), p. 161.

Émigrés paid close attention to developments within Soviet Russia, and in reaction to these developments their attitudes towards the Soviets gradually altered. Some, especially military émigrés, remained irreconcilably opposed to the Soviet regime, but others gradually came to terms with it. This created divisions within the emigration which grew wider and wider as time progressed. In the meantime, the Russian emigration was the subject of considerable attention from the Soviet secret services, which regarded military émigrés, especially ROVS, as their main target, and which expended considerable efforts on disrupting the emigration.[8] The activities of the Soviet secret services generated an ever-increasing fear of Soviet agents, which as time went on made émigrés more and more suspicious of one another.

The paranoia of the emigration can also be seen to have been in part a result of the fourth force acting on the emigration - its own internal political struggles. Wrangel's battles with both the émigré left and the émigré right (see chapters 3 & 7 respectively) created an atmosphere in which military émigrés felt that they were continuously under attack even within their own society. At the same time these struggles forced émigrés to reassess what they believed in, although what is remarkable about ROVS members is the way in which they stayed true to many of the fundamental principles of the White movement throughout the inter-war years (see chapter 10).

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The White Army in Historical Writing

The core of the military emigration was the Russian Army of General Wrangel, which was evacuated from the Crimea in November 1920. Wrangel's army was the direct successor

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[8] Christopher Andrew & Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (London, 1990), p. 115.

of the Volunteer Army formed by Generals Alekseev and Kornilov at the end of 1917 to fight against the Bolsheviks, and of the Cossack armies which had fought alongside the Volunteers. Before Wrangel took control, these troops had been commanded by General A. I. Denikin under the title 'Armed Forces of Southern Russia' (AFSR). In March 1920 Wrangel succeeded Denikin as Commander-in-Chief and as head-of-state in the territories occupied by his army. Under Wrangel the AFSR was renamed 'The Russian Army'.

The Russian Army was dominated by two groups - Cossacks, and officers of the former Imperial Russian Army. Of the 100,000 troops who were evacuated out of the Crimea with Wrangel, about 50,000 were Cossacks and 25,000 were officers. By contrast there were only 20,000 peasant soldiers among the evacuees.[9] Throughout the Russian Civil War relations between the Cossacks and the Volunteer officers were never stable. The Cossacks zealously guarded their independence and only reluctantly accepted the Volunteers' leadership. Whereas officers often fought the Bolsheviks for ideological motives, Cossacks fought primarily for their land and their farms. As a result they did not like to fight beyond the boundaries of their home region, and when defeat and exile separated them from their native land their will to continue the struggle diminished markedly. In addition they were hard to discipline, and viewed the politics of the officer class with suspicion.[10]

These tendencies were to affect the fate of Wrangel's army in exile. Many Cossacks soon lost heart and accepted repatriation to the USSR. In addition the Cossack political leadership was to quarrel and split with Wrangel in 1921, after which he was able to retain control of only a segment of the Cossack troops. Some Cossacks such as the Kuban Cossack

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[9] Hutchins, The Wrangel Refugees, p. 8.

[10] Peter Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1919-1920 (Berkeley, 1977), pp. 110-137.

Division remained loyal to Wrangel and later to ROVS, but essentially in the capacity of quiet followers rather than as leaders and activists.

It was the officers of the Russian Army rather than Cossacks or the rank and file who were to take the initiative in preserving the army in exile and who were to play the leading role in its subsequent activities. These officers came from a wide variety of social backgrounds.[11] Even before the First World War a shortage of officers had meant that the army had commissioned many children of poorer families, and it became something of a ladder for social mobility. This process was accelerated by the World War, in which casualties among officers were enormous and many men of moderate social origins were commissioned to replace those who had been killed. As a result, in spite of mistaken claims by some modern historians that the White officer corps represented the landowning class,[12] it in fact represented no single particular social or economic group and fought for no particular economic interest. Instead Russian officers are best viewed as having been primarily members of a separate military caste, with its distinct set of military values. Most Imperial Russian officers spent nearly their entire lives in a military environment, having been educated from a tender age at cadet corps and military schools (there were a few exceptions, such as Wrangel, who had been trained as a mining engineer). These officers knew little of the world outside the army, which for them was everything. As a result many of them came

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[11] For information on the social background of Imperial and White Russian officers, see Alan K. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the Soldiers' Revolt (March-April 1917) (Princeton, 1980), p. 22; & Samus, Ustinkin & Matsur, Beloe Dvizhenie, pp. 12-19.

[12] Orlando Figes, A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924 (London, 1996), p. 564. James D. White, The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921: a Short History (London, 1994), p. 218.

to identify the Army with Russia - "The Army is Russia" was a common refrain among White officers (see pp. 137-138). Their reaction against the revolution was thus not so much a rebellion against the destruction of the old economic, social and political order, as against the destruction of the Army. As the liberal politician, N. N. L'vov, put it, "Белое движение есть прежде всего военный поход, борьба за армию".[13]

The younger officers commissioned in the First World War formed a distinct group from the pre-war Imperial officers. The latter had a much better sense of the need for discipline and self-restraint, and a more powerful sense of themselves as military persons. The former, however, had a more zealous and idealistic sense of purpose, which sometimes led them to believe that the high ideals of their movement justified the most unscrupulous behaviour, a mode of thought sometimes referred to as 'Volunteerism' ('Добровольчество'). Volunteerism became associated with the atrocities committed by White troops and the corruption behind their front lines, and so came to imply a shocking lack of discipline. Some officers reached high rank at an early age in the Civil War (Major Generals Turkul, Skoblin, Manstein and Kharzhevskii were all in their twenties). These men had little feeling for the need for restraint in the pursuit of their cause, and tended to value action over everything else.

Both the older and younger generation of officers were deeply influenced by the events of the Civil War. They came to feel that they alone had stood up to the Bolsheviks, and that they had lost not because of their own failings but because they had been betrayed and abandoned by everyone else: by the Russian masses, who had stood to one side; by the intelligentsia, who had proved that they were incapable of anything other than talk; and by

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[13] N. N. L'vov, Beloe Dvizhenie (Belgrade, 1924), p. 7.

their French and British allies, who had provided only desultory assistance, which in some cases was counterproductive. This induced in White officers a powerful sense of self-righteousness, a feeling that they constituted some sort of moral élite, but also a sense of being alone in the world, and of being surrounded by enemies. They were therefore prone to believe in conspiracy theories, with the result that anti-semitism and a belief in the existence of Masonic plots were prevalent among White officers.[14]

Historians have generally not given Russian officers a good press. Imperial Russian army officers are regarded as having had an indifferent attitude towards the performance of their duties, and to have been prone to heavy drinking, duelling and corruption.[15] Generally viewed as "profoundly conservative", even "blindly reactionary"[16], officers were educated in a system which emphasised traditional military virtues, such as patriotism, honour, duty and service.[17] Officers in particular had a highly developed sense of personal and corporate honour, enforced by a system of Courts of Honour for Officers. In 1894 the Russian government had even legalised duelling, and Courts of Honour were known to force unwilling junior officers to issue challenges to those who were deemed to have insulted their regiment.[18] Their education entirely avoided political matters, with the result that they tended

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[14] For a long discussion of Russian émigrés' obsession with Jewish-Masonic plots, see M. Nazarov, Missiia russkoi emigratsii (Stavropol, 1992), pp. 64-128.

[15] John Bushnell, 'The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881-1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiencies', American Historical Review, Vol. 86, No. 4, 1981, pp. 753-780.

[16] Kenez, Civil War, p. 64.

[17] Richard Luckett, The White Generals (London, 1971), p. 14; Dmitri Lehovich, White against Red: the Life of General Anton Denikin (New York, 1973), p. 298.

[18] For one such example, see A. I. Denikin, The Career of a Tsarist Officer: Memoirs 1872-1916 (Minneapolis, 1975), p. 52.

to display "political ineptitude" and "naivety", which left them ill-prepared for the tasks they faced in a time of civil war.[19] First and foremost professional soldiers, they regarded themselves as above politics and despised politicians. They have also been denounced as "anti-intellectual".[20]

The White defeat in the Civil War is often blamed on the political and administrative failures of the White generals. Denikin and his counterpart in Siberia, Admiral Kolchak, allowed corruption and ill-discipline to run rife among their troops, and displayed an inability to check abuses by their troops against the civilian population. Furthermore, as military men, they tended to view their struggle with the Bolsheviks as being purely military and when pressed on political matters would insist that these would have to be postponed until a Constituent Assembly could be called. This policy became known as 'non-predetermination' ('непредрешенство'), and it is argued by many historians that this refusal to tackle political issues meant that the Whites were unable to win support from the Russian population as a whole, and that this fatally undermined their military effort.[21]

Some historians consider that non-predetermination was a hypocritical policy, being merely a pretext to put off reactionary reforms until officers felt strong enough to impose them.[22] It is maintained that although White officers considered themselves to be above

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[19] Oliver Ray, 'The Imperial Russian Army Officer', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 76, No. 4, Dec 1961, pp. 584 & 590; Peter Kenez, 'The Ideology of the White Movement', Soviet Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, Jan 1980, p. 67.

[20] Kenez, The Ideology of the White Movement, pp. 58-61.

[21] For instance, Orlando Figes, A Peoples' Tragedy, pp. 587-588.

[22] Kenez, The Ideology of the White Movement, p. 74; Jonathan Smele, Civil War in Siberia: the anti-Bolshevik Government of Admiral Kolchak, 1918-1920 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 185.

parties, in reality they belonged, as Geoffrey Swain insists, to the "reactionary right".[23] Peter Kenez describes the White officers as being essentially restorationist in belief, and the Army as a "reactionary phenomenon".[24] Such explanations leave little room for any positive aspects to the White officers or their ideology. There are few dissenting voices among Western historians except for those who have written on Wrangel's regime in the Crimea in 1920. Before being defeated, Wrangel undertook land reform and restored a degree of law and order in the lands that he controlled. His regime, Nikolai Ross and D. W. Treadgold have pointed out, illustrated that White government was not necessarily reactionary in practice.[25] But these are isolated voices. It has been left to post-Soviet Russian historians to produce a positive reappraisal of the White movement. Indeed, there is a danger that some modern Russians, in a reaction to 70 years of communism, may seek to idealise the Whites.[26] One example is a well-researched but uncritical book on General Wrangel's life in exile by V. D. Bortnevskii, published in 1996.[27] A defence of the White movement has also been brought out in English by a young Russian historian, Ilya Somin.[28]

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[23] Geoffrey Swain, The Origins of the Russian Civil War (London, 1996), p. 246.

[24] Kenez, Civil War, pp. 64 & 82.

[25] D. W. Treadgold, 'The Ideology of the White Movement: Wrangel's "Leftist Policy in Rightist Hands" ', Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. 4, 1957, pp. 481-498; & Nikolai Ross, Vrangel' v Krymu (Frankfurt, 1982).

[26] Vladimir N. Brovkin, Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War: Political Parties and Social Movements in Russia, 1918-1922 (Princeton, 1994), p. 4.

[27] V. D. Bortnevskii, Zagadki smerti Generala Vrangelia: Neizvestnye materialy po istorii russkoi emigratsii 1920-kh godov (St. Petersburg, 1996).

[28] Ilya Somin, The Stillborn Crusade: The Tragic Failure of Western Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1918-1920 (New Brunswick, 1996).

One recent work by a Russian historian which strikes a more reasoned view is an article by Leonid Heretz published in 1997. Heretz notes that White officers were not motivated by materialistic concerns, but by spiritual notions such as duty, honour and religion - "The Whites perceived the world and their struggle in religious categories, and it is in the context of religion that their mentality can best be explained".[29] Heretz's views find endorsement in the writings of émigré officers, cited in this thesis. The picture which emerges of the White officer corps from its time in exile somewhat contradicts that painted by most historians. Efforts to apply political labels, such as "reactionary", "monarchist", even "fascist", to White officers, appear incorrect. While some individuals fitted these labels, this study reveals that the White movement was never wedded to any particular political, social or economic structures, since its members for the most part did not think in such terms. Their world view was primarily that of military men, and as such it was not materialistic or political in nature, but concerned itself, as Heretz notes, with spiritual values such as religion, honour, duty, self-sacrifice and patriotism. Their aims turn out to have been as much moral as political and military. Although most officers were monarchists, their leaders spent much of their time in exile fighting émigré monarchist groups and seeking to distance themselves from what they considered reactionary opinions. Russian military organisations occupied the centre rather than the extremes of émigré politics and had a moderating impact on them, restraining extremist tendencies, and attempting in vain to unite émigrés around the moderate centre. Most White officers were certainly not liberals or democrats, but likewise most did not envisage a restoration of the pre-revolutionary order.

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[29] Leonid Heretz, 'The Psychology of the White Movement', in V. N. Brovkin (ed), The Bolsheviks in Russian Society: The Revolution and Civil Wars (New Haven, 1997), pp. 105-122.

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The Wider Russian Emigration in Historical Writing

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, interest in the inter-war Russian emigration has expanded enormously, especially among Russian historians. The last six years have seen a veritable explosion in publications by Russians devoted to the theme of the emigration.[30] Russians have come to recognise that it is part of the history of Russia as a whole, and are looking to it for ideas and inspiration. As one writer recently put it, "нет истории эмиграции, а есть история нашего Отечества",[31] while another states that contemporary Russian historians have a "moral duty" to resurrect their spiritual link with those Russians who were obliged to flee abroad.[32] Indeed there is a danger, as André Liebich has pointed out, that the emigration will become "the object of an uncritical cult". "Hijacked by new political imperatives", Liebich notes, "the emigration may now be requisitioned to serve as an instrument of historical legitimation".[33] Placing on record an accurate and fair representation of the views and activities of Russian émigrés is therefore a matter of importance not merely to historians but to contemporary Russian thought in general.

The history of the Russian emigration attracts attention for many reasons. One of these is that it contributes to a general understanding of the phenomenon of emigration and

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[30] For a historiographical study of writings on the Russian emigration, see A. Kvakin, 'Rossiia poznaet russkoe zarubezh'e', Novyi Zhurnal, no. 211, 1998, pp. 155-172.

[31] V. I. Kosik, 'Russkaia Iugoslaviia: Fragmenty istorii', Slavianovedenie, No. 4, 1992, p. 32.

[32] E. I. Pivovar, Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Turtsii, iuzhno-vostochnoi i tsentral'noi Evrope (Gottingen, 1994), p. 3.

[33] André Liebich, From the Other Shore: Russian Social Democracy after 1921 (Cambridge, Mass, 1997), p. 328.

refugee life, and the processes by which émigrés adapt to life abroad. As Iu. A. Poliakov has noted, it is desirable to carry out "изучения проблем российского зарубежья как части глобальной проблемы миграций в современном мире".[34] Of more interest to most Russian historians, however, are the political and philosophical ideas of émigrés, which were forbidden fruit in the Soviet Union, and to which they look for ideas for contemporary Russia.[35] Modern Russian research thus continues a trend established by Western historians which focuses on the intellectual and cultural élites of the emigration, leaving the history of the mass of the emigration still undescribed.

Until the collapse of Soviet rule, the history of the Russian emigration had been left almost entirely to Western historians. The only major exception was a book published in 1981 by L. K. Shkarenkov, 'Agoniia Beloi Emigratsii', which sought to show that émigrés' efforts to challenge the Soviet Union, either physically or ideologically, were futile. Shkarenkov maintained that throughout the inter-war period the emigration gradually came to terms with new political realities and came to accept the Soviet regime.[36] This was a theme echoed in the memoirs of various former émigrés who returned to the USSR after the Second World War, such as Dmitrii Meisner and Boris Aleksandrovskii, who describe how they gradually became disillusioned with the emigration and came to accept Soviet rule.[37]

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[34] Iu. A. Poliakov, 'Rossiiskoe Zarubezh'e: problemy istorii', in Problemy izucheniia istorii russkogo zarubezh'ia: Sbornik statei (Moscow, 1993), p. 9.

[35] V. M. Selinskaia, 'Problema "Rossiiskoe Zarubezh'e XX veka", ee izuchenie i prepodavanie na istoricheskom fakultete MGU', in Problemy izucheniia, pp. 64-77.

[36] L. K. Shkarenkov, Agoniia beloi emigratsii (Moscow, 1981).

[37] Dmitrii Meisner, Mirazhi i deistvitel'nost' (Moscow, 1966); B. N. Aleksandrovskii, Iz perezhitogo v chuzhykh kraiakh (Moscow, 1969).

Western writers have been rather more sympathetic towards émigrés, although not exclusively so. In general the emigration did not attract much interest from historians until the 1980s, because with the Soviet Union seeming permanent and immovable, émigrés appeared to be the losers of history, and few were interested in discussing alternatives to communism which had failed and so seemed irrelevant. It has taken the fall of communism to shake such attitudes. Until the 1980s almost the only subject in émigré history to attract significant interest among historians was the underground struggles of military émigrés against the Soviet regime, especially an infamous Soviet provocation known as 'The Trust', the story of which offered useful Cold War lessons about the methods of the Soviet secret services.[38]

The first major Western work on Russian émigré life was Robert C. Williams' study of Russian exiles in Germany, published in 1971.[39] After a large gap this has been followed by Robert H. Johnston's study of Russian émigrés in Paris,[40] Marc Raeff's general study of the culture of the Russian emigration, 'Russia Abroad',[41] as well as various articles and books on

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[38] For instance, Geoffrey Bailey, The Conspirators (London, 1961); Paul Blackstock, The Secret World to World War Two (Chicago, 1969); Marina Grey, Le Général meurt à minuit: l'enlèvement des Généraux Koutiepov et Miller (Paris, 1981); B. Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia pautina (Silver Spring, 1979).

[39] Robert C. Williams, Culture in Exile: Russian Émigrés in Germany, 1881-1941 (Ithaca, 1971).

[40] Robert H. Johnston, New Mecca, New Babylon - Paris and the Russian Exiles, 1920-1945 (Kingston & Montreal, 1988).

[41] Marc Raeff, Russia Abroad: a Cultural History of the Russian Emigration (New York, 1990).

aspects of Russian émigré thought.[42] Two collections of articles on European émigré centres have also been published in German in the past five years, edited by Karl Schlögel.[43]

Émigrés tended to regard their exile as having two purposes - continued struggle against the Soviets, and preserving Russian culture, which was believed to exist only in exile. It is on this second task that most historians have chosen to focus, a choice in part justified by the vibrant cultural life of the emigration and its undoubted achievements, and in part by the availability of sources. Most historians have tended to be somewhat dismissive towards those émigrés who stood outside the cultural élites, regarding their efforts to continue the struggle against the Soviets as futile, and the fractious internal politics of the emigration as of little interest. "The story of the political life of the Russian emigration in Germany", wrote Robert Williams, "is largely one of despair and ultimate defeat; the story of its cultural life is one of intellectual ferment and literary productivity".[44] Even more categorically, Marc Raeff states that the politics of the emigration are not worth studying, being of only "limited and passing interest". He is also dismissive of those on the émigré right (in other words, most émigrés), stating that only liberal and socialist writers had anything of interest to say, a statement which ignores the contribution of right-wing thinkers such as Petr Struve and Ivan Il'in.[45] In fact,

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[42] For instance, Nicholas Hayes, 'Kazem-Bek and the Young Russians' revolution', Slavic Review, 1980, no. 39(2), pp. 255-268; André Liebich, op cit; & Hilda Hardeman, Coming to Terms with the Soviet Regime: the 'Changing Signposts' Movement among Russian Émigrés in the early 1920s (DeKalb, 1994).

[43] Karl Schlögel (ed), Der grosse Exodus: die russische Emigration und ihre Zentren (Munich, 1994); & Russische Emigration in Deutschland 1918 bis 1941: Leben im europäischen Bürgerkrieg (Berlin, 1995).

[44] Williams, op cit, p. 290.

[45] Raeff, op cit, p. 10.

historians in general tend to regard the mass of military émigrés as incorrigible reactionaries who contributed little to émigré life.

The problem with saying that the mission of the Russian emigration was to preserve Russian culture in exile, and therefore focusing on the intellectual and cultural élites, is that to do so assumes that the preservation of culture was purely a concern of these élites. Yet military émigrés were also deeply concerned with preserving Russian culture in exile, although to them it meant something rather different to what it meant to liberal intellectuals. To Russian officers, culture was associated not only with literature and other High Culture, but also with Russian traditions and history, such as service to the state, honour, duty, the traditions of the regiment, preserving the memory of Russian military victories, and so on, traditions which to liberal intellectuals were almost universally anathema. For many officers, culture could not be maintained without struggle against the Soviets, whereas to intellectuals preserving culture was an alternative to struggle. In addition, the subject of the Russian emigration's efforts to preserve Russian culture cannot be divorced from the emigration's politics. Control of humanitarian aid, for instance, was a political battleground, as it was through such aid that different groups sought to influence émigrés' political views. The liberal and socialist dominated émigré humanitarian organisation Zemgor was widely suspected by émigré officers of favouring left-wing cultural institutions at the expense of those of the army, indeed of actively promoting the dissolution of the army and its institutions (see pp. 61-67). As it was through such institutions that Russian culture was passed on to the next generation, the political struggles for control of these institutions determined which version of Russian culture would be preserved.

A fairly similar picture of émigré life emerges from most works on the emigration. In

the manner of émigrés from many other nations, Russians in exile tended to stick together and form a closer community with fellow Russian exiles than with the natives of the countries in which they lived. They formed their own society, which is often described as 'Russia Abroad'. With the possible exceptions of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, Russian émigrés felt welcome nowhere. Faced with hostility and discrimination from their host nations, Russians showed little or no interest in the local culture, preferring to remain within the confines of 'Russia Abroad'. This led to a sort of double life, in which Russians would work in the local community during the day and then after work return to their fellow Russians to socialise.

Paul Tabori has described this as a "psychosis" called " 'bacillus emigraticus', the virus of nostalgia and homesickness that is so powerful that it turns the exile almost into a fellow traveller".[46] Both Western and Russian historians describe Russian émigrés as living in what Robert Williams calls a "world of fantasy".[47] A Russian historian, for instance, has noted that the longer émigrés lived in exile, the more they led a life "оторванной от реальности", pursuing futile politics and taking courses of education they would never use.[48] The pictures painted by John Stephan in his study of Russian émigré fascism reinforce the image of men living in a dream world. His description of Anastasii Vonsiatskii, founder of his own one-man Russian fascist party in the United States, collecting a herd of snapping turtles and painting swastikas on their shells in order to create his own 'panzer battalion', hardly induces

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[46] Paul Tabori, The Anatomy of Exile: a Semantic and Historical Study (London, 1972), p. 33.

[47] Williams, op cit, p. 290.

[48] O. A. Polivanov, 'Psikhologiia russkoi emigratsii', in Iz istorii rossiiskoi emigratsii: sbornik nauchnykh statei (St. Petersburg, 1992), p. 23.

one to take émigrés seriously. The subtitle of Stephan's book, 'Tragedy and Farce in Exile', sums up this view of the Russian emigration succinctly.[49]

The language used when talking of this fantasy life is generally that of disease, as if émigrés suffered from some sort of psychological illness. Émigrés themselves also used such language. The émigré newspaper, 'Russkii Golos', for instance, wrote that "Русское общество продолжается и в эмиграции изживать ту ужазную болезнь, которой сонровождалась русская революция. Болезнь это заключается в том, что люди отрываются от действительности и начинают существовать ... в области чистой фантазии".[50]

Military émigrés have been particularly criticised for their refusal to accept their fate. They were especially stubborn in resisting assimilation, continued to believe in the need to struggle against the Soviet Union, and ran numerous military training courses to prepare themselves for the day, which never came, when they could again fight the Soviets. It is maintained by some authors that the insistence of émigré military leaders on maintaining military organisations in exile hampered the adaptation of soldiers and officers to life in exile, hindering them from finding employment and above all accepting the reality of their fate, instead keeping them in perpetual limbo with promises of a return to Russia which never happened.[51]

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[49] John Stephan, The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925-1945 (London, 1978), p 224.

[50] Russkii Golos, no. 25, 27 Sep 1931, p. 4.

[51] For instance, T. F. Johnson, International Tramps: From Chaos to World Peace (London, 1938), pp. 285-291; & V. F. Ershov, 'Adaptatsiia rossiiskoi voennoi emigratsii v stranakh razmeshcheniia v 1920-e gody', in Iu. A. Poliakov, G. Ia. Tarle, & V. N. Shamshurov

Together such views create an image of an emigration at the top of which stood a flowering élite, and underneath which lay a mass of reactionary fantasists. A 1990 Russian history of the emigration thus contrasted the futile activities of military émigrés with the achievements of that "лучшая часть эмиграции" - the intelligentsia.[52] It may be doubted whether this dismissal of the majority of émigrés is either fair or accurate. Their actions and beliefs make sense if one recognises that most of them fervently believed that their exile would not last forever and that sooner or later the Soviet regime would fall and they would return home. This belief persisted throughout the inter-war period, and was one of the defining features of the Russian emigration. Of course, this may be interpreted as yet more evidence of the emigration's divorce from reality, since the Soviet regime did not fall rapidly and most émigrés never did return home. The former Russian ambassador to France, V. A. Maklakov, certainly thought so. In a letter to a French journalist in 1934 he stated that he did not share the "illusions" that the Soviet regime would fall, and that it was necessary to remain irreconcilably opposed to communism. But, he continued, it would not be fair to disillusion émigrés, as in their impoverished lives they needed hope, and this was all they had.[53] This view, that émigrés' continued belief in their return home was a sign of their loss of touch with reality, or just a straw they clung to as they had nothing else, is rather unfair, and does not help one understand what émigrés really thought and felt. Of course, with hindsight, we know that Soviet power did not fall in the 1920s and 1930s, but at the time it seemed very

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(eds), Istoriia Rossiiskogo Zarubezh'ia: problemy adaptatsii migrantov v XIX-XX vekakh (Moscow, 1996), p. 91.

[52] V. V. Kostikov, Ne budem proklinat' izgnan'e ... puti i sud'by russkoi emigratsii (Moscow, 1990), p. 21.

[53] Chasovoi, no. 135/136, Oct 1934, p. 25.

possible, even probable, that it would. In the first twenty-five years of its existence the Soviet Union lurched from crisis to crisis (the Kronstadt revolt, peasant uprisings, internal party struggles, collectivisation, the terror famine, the Great Terror, the German invasion). All of these crises were well reported in the émigré press, and it was quite reasonable to expect that one or other of them might bring about the regime's fall. What may seem to modern observers as living in a "world of fantasy" did not seem so unrealistic at the time.

Russian émigrés were not economic refugees who had gone abroad to seek a better life, but were political exiles. One might expect economic refugees to try to put down roots in their new homes, learn the language, educate their children in a new culture, and so on. Political exiles, on the other hand, are unwilling emigrants. They desire to go home, but cannot because of their hostility to the political regime there. It is absurd to tell them to assimilate to the culture of their new homes, or to give up their hostility to the regime of their native country, since to do so would negate the entire reason for their exile. As the newspaper 'Russkii Golos' put it in an article entitled "Эмигранты или переселенцы?": "акт эмиграции является выражением некоторой идеи, отвергающей существующий порядок и совершается во имя определенных принципов".[54] "Мы в добровольном изгнании", wrote one veteran in 1955, "Но долгие годы нашего вынужденного пребывания на чужбипе - не сделали из нас 'беженцев' ... Мы остались до сегоднящнего дня непримиримыми политическими эмигрантами и наша борьба с мировой красной опасностью - продолжается".[55] It would be better,

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[54] Russkii Golos, no. 34, 29 Nov 1931, p. 4.

[55] Gallipoli-Lemnos-Chataldzha-Bizerta: Iubileinyi al'manakh izdannyi k 35-i letiiu prebyvaniia v Gallipoli Russkoi Armii, 1920-1955, p. 2.

therefore, to view Russians' refusal to assimilate in the context of their political beliefs and their continued irreconcilability towards the Soviet regime, rather than in terms of psychological illness. In this context, since their exile was politically based, the belief of many that continuation of the struggle was a necessary precondition of their retention of Russian culture, makes sense.

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Sources

The primary sources available to the historian wishing to study Russian émigré military organisations are vast. The largest single source used in this study is the archive of the Central Directorate of ROVS and the ROVS 1st Department, which is held in the Bakhmeteff Archive at Columbia University. Consisting of 177 boxes and over 70,000 items, this collection, despite being open for general use, is a hitherto unused source on the history of the Russian emigration. It contains the correspondence of ROVS leaders dating from 1920 to 1940, circulars and orders, reports, and information bulletins, as well as much routine paperwork dealing with the activities of ROVS in France, petitions for help to ROVS from émigrés and other such materials. The Bakhmeteff Archive also contains several smaller collections containing similar materials, such as those of A. I. Denikin, A. P. Kutepov, and A. P. Bogaevskii. Large collections of materials can also be found at the Hoover Institution. Prime amongst these is the P. N. Wrangel Archive, about half of which relates to Wrangel's activities after the evacuation of the Crimea in November 1920. This part of the Wrangel Archive has previously been little used, V. D. Bortnevskii's book on Wrangel being the only work to make significant use of it. The main contents of the Wrangel archive are Wrangel's correspondence with other émigré military, political and social leaders, though it also

contains numerous reports on the composition, morale, work and disposition of the Russian Army in exile, as well as orders and circulars issued by Wrangel. Similar materials covering slightly different aspects of the same subject are to be found in the collections of A. A. von Lampe, E. K. Miller, V. I. Bazarevich, A. P. Arkhangel'skii, P. A. Kussonskii and others. In Moscow the State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF) contain numerous "fondy" with relevant materials, such as the archives of Generals von Lampe and Abramov, of the Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soiuz (a smaller collection than that at Columbia University), and of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo. GARF also holds numerous diaries and memoirs. Finally, the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes, France, possesses several boxes of materials relating to the relations between the Russian Army and the French army occupying Constantinople after the evacuation of the Crimea. These provide an interesting perspective on events in Constantinople, since unlike the other archives which only express the views of the Russian participants, the French archives give the views of another side as well.

There is quite a considerable overlap between these archives, with the same materials appearing in many of them. Together they provide the researcher with a very detailed insight into the thinking of the leaders of the Russian Army and ROVS. These leaders corresponded profusely and were generally fairly open with one another, although only in the cases of Generals Wrangel and Shatilov could they be said to have been friends. It is noticeable that their private correspondence differs little in tone from their public statements, suggesting that the latter should be taken as being a fair representation of their views. This is an important discovery, since both the Russian political right and the political left believed that the pronouncements by White officers that they were above politics and were not interested in

restoring the old regime were mere pretence and hid secret aims which they were afraid to state openly. Such suspicions turn out not to have been correct. The White officers seem to have been a remarkably straightforward group, who generally meant what they said.

One weakness of the archives as sources is that they consist predominantly of the writings of senior officers. There are comparatively few documents in them written by junior officers or by the rank and file. It is therefore hard to be certain to what degree the views of the White leadership reflected the views of their subordinates. To a small degree this problem can be overcome, since the leadership collected regular reports on its subordinate groups. Units of the Russian Army in exile also produced regular information bulletins to enable members to keep in contact with one another, and these provide an insight into the conditions of life for many of the rank and file military émigrés, as well as expressions of their viewpoints on various political and military matters. Memoirs and diaries, such as those held at GARF, also help overcome this problem. Most such materials, however, come from units of one part of the Russian Army - the First Army Corps. Cossack units, which represented about half of the army, produced relatively few such documents, as they tended to be less well-educated than the men of the First Army Corps, and because they tended to live closer together in exile and so had less need to stay in touch by written means. In general the Cossacks are therefore under-represented in this study.[56]

An additional source of information on the views of Russian émigré officers is pamphlets produced by ROVS propagandists in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly I. A. Il'in, N. A. Tsurikov, and V. M. Levitskii. Officers also helped run various newspapers and

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[56] A very large archive of the Don Cossack Corps is held at GARF (fond 6711), but it consists largely of official, bureaucratic documentation.

journals, which carried articles detailing events from émigré life, political commentary and ideological debates. The most prominent of these were the military journals 'Russkii Voennyi Vestnik' and 'Chasovoi', the Belgrade weekly newspaper 'Russkii Golos', and the bi-monthly newspaper of the Society of Gallipolians, 'Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev'.

Histories, official and semi-official, were also produced in the 1920s. These include official histories of the First Army Corps at Gallipoli, and of the Don Cossack Corps from 1920 to 1925,[57] as well as the works of V. Kh. Davatz, 'Russkaia Armiia na Chuzhbine' (jointly authored with N. N. L'vov) and 'Gody' (for this thesis the German translation 'Fünf Sturmjahre' has been used).[58] Some memoirs were published in the Soviet Union by White soldiers who subsequently returned to the USSR, and these provide an alternative if sometimes tendentious perspective, the works of B. N. Aleksandrovskii, Dmitrii Meisner and I. M. Kalinin being examples.[59]

The greatest difficulty facing researchers of the Russian Army in exile is the immense volume of materials. For this thesis it has not been possible to examine all the relevant documentation, and by necessity a fair degree of selectivity has had to be used, based on the apparent relevance of materials to the central themes of the thesis. Subsequent researchers reviewing the same collections will be able to find considerable additional material to justify their efforts.

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[57] Kazaki v Chataldzhe i na Lemnose v 1920/1921 gg (Belgrade, 1924); Kazaki za granitsei, 1921-1925 gg (Belgrade, 1925); Russkie v Gallipoli: Sbornik statei (Berlin, 1923).

[58] V. Kh. Davatz & N. N. L'vov, Russkaia Armiia na chuzbine (Belgrade, 1923). V. Kh. Davatz, Fünf Sturmjahre mit General Wrangel (Berlin, 1927).

[59] B. N. Aleksandrovskii, Iz perezhitogo v chuzhykh kraiakh (Moscow, 1969); Dmitrii Meisner, Mirazhi i deistvitel'nost' (Moscow, 1966). I. M. Kalinin, Pod znamenem Vrangelia: Zametki byvshego prokurora (Leningrad, 1925).

CHAPTER 2 - THE MAKING OF A MYTH: THE RUSSIAN ARMY AT CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE GALLIPOLI MIRACLE, 1920-1921

"The myth is a drama which begins as a historical event and takes on its special character as a way of orienting people to reality", writes the psychiatrist Rollo May. "The myth carries the values of the society; by the myth the individual finds his sense of identity".[1] Russian émigrés whose whole world had been shattered were particularly in need of myths to sustain them in their years in exile, and through a study of their myths one can gain an understanding of the values of their society and their sense of identity. In the case of many soldiers of the Russian Army of General Wrangel, the myth that would sustain them was that of the so-called 'Gallipoli Miracle', according to which the men of the Russian Army interned at Gallipoli after their evacuation from the Crimea in 1920 underwent a spiritual and moral resurrection, renewed their determination to carry on the struggle against the Bolsheviks to the end, and united around their leaders as a cohesive, disciplined mass. Great efforts were put into propagating this legend, which gave military émigrés a sense of their own worth, as members of a supposed moral élite, and gave a purpose to their existence in exile, through the reassertion of the need for struggle against the Bolsheviks. For this reason events at Gallipoli in 1920 and 1921 were to be a crucial formative experience for the Russian emigration.

An important aspect of the Gallipoli legend was the conflict that arose in 1921 between the men of the Russian Army and the French forces which were then occupying Constantinople, and which had offered the Russians shelter. The French tried to disband the Russian Army, using every means at their disposal short of

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[1] Rollo May, The Cry for Myth (New York, 1991), p. 26.

outright force. These efforts were strongly resisted by the Russians, who at first had regarded the French as allies but soon came to look on them as enemies. Their conflict with the French led many of the Russians to despise their former allies, to reject the values of the West in general, as represented by France, and to look back to Russia as the repository of all that was valuable. At Gallipoli, it was maintained, the French were rebuffed because the Russians held together and united behind their leaders, and so the message was sent out that in future Russian émigrés should follow the example of Gallipoli, and to defend their interests should stick together in the face of the hostile outside world. Thus at the earliest stage of their exile the Russian refugees decisively turned their backs on the world into which they had come, and turned their gaze towards home, a stance which they would never alter thereafter.

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In March 1920 General Wrangel assumed command of the White forces opposing the Bolsheviks in Southern Russia, and also assumed the role of head of state of the territory occupied by his troops. By that time the army controlled only the area of the Crimea, where it managed to hold out for six months before being driven out by the Red Army in November 1920. Wrangel's defeated troops evaded capture by embarking on the ships of the Russian fleet at the ports of the Crimea from where they were taken to Constantinople. Between 13 and 16 November 1920, 126 ships carried 149,000 people, 105,000 of them military personnel, out of the Crimea.[2] By the time they reached Constantinople these men were thoroughly demoralised. The voyage itself, which took several days, was for most an appalling experience, with

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[2] COC, 20 N 1156. (Rapport d'ensemble sur les réfugiés russes; Exode Wrangel)

thousands of men crammed into barely sea-worthy vessels with scarcely any food or water.[3] Military discipline had almost entirely broken down. There was little to distinguish the army from a disorganised mass of refugees. The troops' belief in their cause was shattered - "За редким исключением никто воевать не хочет", wrote Captain G. A. Orlov in his diary, "все усталы, измотались, потрясены, пе верят в успех при обычных у нас постановках".[4] In Constantinople the army came under the protection of the French, whose troops had occupied the city and surrounding area after the defeat of the Turks in World War One. The French had previously supported Wrangel's government in the Crimea, but they now decided that with the defeat of Wrangel the White cause was finally lost, and that Wrangel's army should be disbanded, as it was a potentially destabilising force. There were fears that the Russians might get involved in the Greek-Turkish war being fought at that time, which made the task of disbanding the army even more urgent.[5]

In these circumstances it seemed most improbable that the army could survive. However, despite the catastrophic nature of his defeat, Wrangel was determined to keep the army together and to continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks. He believed that internal or external factors would soon undermine the Soviet

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[3] For descriptions of the voyage to Constantinople, see: GARF, 5881/1/154 (M.P., 'Gallipoli 1920-1921', Memoirs); GARF 5881/1/724/15-16 (P. Ivlin, 'Dnevnik russkogo izgnannika'); Boris Aleksandrovskii, Iz perezhitogo, p. 17; G. Rakovsky, Konets Belykh: Ot Dnepra do Bosfora (Prague, 1921), pp. 200-201; I.M. Kalinin, Pod znamenem, pp. 214-216; Georges Oudard & Dmitri Novik, Les Chevaliers Mendiants (Paris, 1928), pp. 179-235.

[4] BAR, G.A. Orlov Collection (Diary of G. A. Orlov, p. 349).

[5] General Jean Bernachot, Les Armées Françaises en Orient après l'armistice de 1918 (Paris, 1972), pp. 70-71.

government so as to make a new armed campaign against it possible. In addition, Wrangel and many around him came to associate the army with the very existence of the Russian state. As such the army had to be preserved.[6]

Lieutenant-General Baron Petr Nikolaevich Wrangel was a dashing but arrogant cavalry officer, with immense personal charisma and fighting skill, as well as undoubted administrative and political talent. He was a firm believer in traditional military virtues, above all discipline and honour, and was decisive and quick thinking. Wrangel punished transgressions brutally, but nonetheless earned his troops' respect by his obvious care for their well-being. Immensely self-confident, he had a reputation for overbearing vanity which made him many enemies. But his authority among his own troops was extraordinarily large, in part because, unlike many other senior officers, he had a genuine rapport with the men under his command and knew how to communicate with them.

Wrangel's most important subordinates were his Chief of Staff, General-of-Cavalry Pavel Nikolaevich Shatilov, and the commander of his First Army Corps, General-of-Infantry Alexandr Pavlovich Kutepov. Shatilov was a highly intelligent man, who had qualified top of his class at the Russian General Staff Academy, but he was hated by many other officers because of an unfortunate disposition towards intrigue. Kutepov lacked the intelligence of either Wrangel or Shatilov, but possessed remarkable stubbornness and self-discipline, being something of a military automaton. Kutepov was brutal but fair, and like Wrangel stressed the need for military forces to maintain the highest possible standards of discipline and moral

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[6] Russkie v Gallipoli: Sbornik statei (Berlin, 1923), p. 241.

behaviour. During the Civil War both Wrangel and Kutepov had acquired a reputation as fierce opponents of the ill-discipline which pervaded many White armies, and had used their powers to prevent pogroms and hang looters.[7] The emphasis both men placed on the value of discipline, and on moral values in general, was to be decisive in the course of the events which unfolded in 1920 and 1921.

The fighting in the Crimea had inflicted heavy casualties on the army. On arrival at Constantinople, one of Wrangel's first acts was to disband many rear and staff institutions which were no longer required. The army was left with three corps: the Don Cossack Corps, 23,000 men under General Abramov; the Kuban Cossack Corps, 12,000 men under General Fostikov; and the First Army Corps (which contained all the non-Cossack troops of the army), 29,000 strong under Kutepov. Of these, the First Army Corps was the most cohesive, in part because it contained a disproportionate number of officers. In addition to the three corps, several military schools came with the army into exile. The disbandment of the rear and staff institutions left many officers without employment, as a result of which Wrangel issued an order releasing from the service all inessential personnel, in particular senior officers without posts and those not in the top categories of medical fitness.[8] This immediately reduced the army substantially in size.

The reorganised army was distributed among various camps. 20,000 men were sent to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia), which had

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[7] General P.N. Wrangel, The Memoirs of General Wrangel (London, 1930), pp. 168-169 & 239. Jean Delage, Koutepoff - La Carrière Militaire, L'Exil, L'Enlèvement (Paris, 1930), pp. 19 & 41. Kutepov: Sbornik statei (Paris, 1934), p. 15.

[8] COC, C 20 N 1154 (Order, General Wrangel, no. 3817, 21 December 1920)

agreed to accept a limited number of refugees. The rest of the troops were sent to three locations - the First Army Corps to Gallipoli; the Don Cossack Corps to various camps in the region of Chatalga, north west of Constantinople; and the Kuban Cossack Corps to the island of Lemnos.[9] Wrangel reached agreement with the local French commanders that the Russian fleet would be handed over to the French as security for the expense of providing aid to the army.[10] The fleet subsequently sailed to the Tunisian port of Bizerta, where it remained manned by skeleton Russian crews until 1924.

Conditions in the army's camps were very harsh. This was especially true of the Chilingir camp near Chatalga, where cholera was rife and there was little shelter.[11] At Gallipoli the troops were initially placed in an muddy, empty field with no shelter apart from a few old tents. Some soldiers slept for two weeks under the open sky, and it rained every day.[12] Rations were provided by the French, but were barely enough to sustain life. Charitable organisations, the most important of which was the American Red Cross, provided tents and medical aid, as well as supplementary rations for those most in need.[13] Initially, to better their conditions the troops sold anything they could lay their hands on, and there were many desertions. Cossacks tore down telegraph

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[9] Bernachot, Les Armées Françaises, p. 74.

[10] A. Ushakov, 'Gallipoli: Die Weisse Armee in den Lagern', in Karl Schlögel (ed), Der Grosse Exodus: Die Russische Emigration und ihre Zentren, 1917 bis 1941 (Munich, 1994), p. 23.

[11] Kazaki v Chataldzhe, pp. 18-28. Kalinin, Pod znamenem, pp. 223-226.

[12] GARF, 5881/1/724/18 (P. Ivlin, 'Dnevnik').

[13] Hutchins, The Wrangel Refugees, pp. 46-64. Russkie v Gallipoli, pp. 343-353.

poles for firewood, and robbed local Greek inhabitants.[14] Wrangel and Kutepov believed that only the harshest discipline could restore order and put the troops in a position where they could work together to improve their conditions. Thus on 1 December 1920 Wrangel issued an order stating that the three corps were immediately to set up courts-martial. In addition Courts of Honour were set up, to uphold the moral rectitude and sense of honour of the officer corps. During the civil war White armies had been notorious for their ill-discipline and corruption, but exile now made many realise that their own ill-disciplined behaviour had contributed to their defeat.[15] Commanders therefore began to demand the highest standards of discipline, and even began to define their army as a morally superior élite, the guardian of all that was best in the old Russia. As Wrangel put it in his order of 1 December 1920 establishing Courts of Honour, "русский офицер всегда был рыцарем".[16] In this respect the army began to redefine itself while it was at Constantinople.

The enforcement of discipline was harshest in the First Army Corps at Gallipoli. Kutepov told his troops: "Будет дисциплина - будет и Армия: будет Армия - будет и Россия".[17] He noted that the civil war had had a terrible effect on the morals of many officers, and was determined to rectify the situation.[18] He

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[14] COC, C 20 N 1156 (Télégram, Broussaud to COC, no. 1441, 26 November 1920; & Letter, Director Général Poste, Télégraphes et Téléphones, 28 December 1920).

[15] See for instance, Pereklichka, no. 93, July 1959, p. 8.

[16] HIA, WA, 99/6/2 (Order, Gen. Wrangel, no. 3776, 1 Dec 1920).

[17] V.Kh. Davatz & N.N. L'vov, Russkaia Armiia na chuzhbine (Belgrade, 1923), p. 84.

demanded that officers and soldiers be arrested for the slightest infraction of discipline - offences such as failing to salute or being improperly dressed were likely to lead the offender to spend 3 days in the guardroom. Kutepov put special emphasis on the external forms of discipline, such as dress and saluting, believing that they set the tone for other behaviour and for the troops' self-image.[19] This discipline was regarded by many of Kutepov's troops as petty and pointless, and utterly inappropriate given the circumstances. The General himself was feared and hated.[20] However, little by little his measures had the desired effect. Orders were obeyed, work carried out, appearance improved, theft and insubordination reduced. The emphasis on external form and discipline continually reminded troops that they were soldiers, not refugees, that as such they had responsibilities, and that they had a home and were not individuals cast adrift. This had a consequent effect on morale. Discipline meant that the troops could be organised for work, and hard work was a noted element of life at Gallipoli. Troops were put to work constructing shelters, bakeries and disinfection chambers. Sanitary commissions ensured that waste was disposed of, and the camp kept clean. Water supplies were improved by digging wells and repairing the local water pipes and reservoirs.[21] As a result of all this, not merely were the troops kept

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[18] BAR, ROVS, Box 1, Folder 'A.P. Kutepov, Gallipoli' (Report, Kutepov to Wrangel, no. 0877, 12 Oct 1921).

[19] Russkie v Gallipoli, p. 138; Davatz & L'vov, Russkaia Armiia na chuzhbine, p. 78.

[20] GARF, 5881/1/154 (M.P., 'Gallipoli, 1920-1921', Memoirs); GARF 5881/2/261/23 & 37 (A. Boltunov, 'Povest' o tom, kak ya zhil, chto videl, chto dumal i chto chustvoval v Gallipoli'); GARF, 5881/2/612/13,14 & 54 (V. Sukhanev, 'Gallipoli'); BAR, G. A. Orlov Collection, (Diary of G. A. Orlov, p. 355).

[21] Russkie v Gallipoli, pp. 106-114.

busy, but the conditions of their life improved, and so did their morale. Nevertheless, life at Gallipoli remained terribly harsh, especially because the rations provided by the French were kept to the bare minimum required to sustain life. One veteran noted that all day the soldiers thought of little but how to get food.[22] "Я откровенно могу сказать", wrote G. A. Orlov in his diary, "что ежедневно педоедаю и голодаю".[23] Yet, to some degree, the harshness of the conditions served to cement the troops together, as they began to regard Gallipoli as an ordeal shared and overcome.

By spring 1921, there had been a definite improvement in the morale of the First Army Corps. General Charpy, commander of the French Occupation Corps in Constantinople, acknowledged this, saying "les résultats obtenus sont réels".[24] No such improvement was visible among the troops of the two Cossack Corps, however. This was in part due to the nature of the Cossack troops, who were always hard to control. Thus, the terrible conditions at Chatalga were in part due to the fact that the Cossacks refused to use the latrines even when ordered to do so.[25] However, the low morale of the Cossacks was also due to a failure of leadership by their commanders, who failed to enforce the kind of stern discipline demanded by Kutepov, or to keep their troops busy. Rather than maintain discipline, some officers were among the first to desert.[26] The French commandant on Lemnos, General Broussaud, criticised the

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[22] V. Dushkin, Zabytye (Paris, 1983), p. 105.

[23] BAR, G. A. Orlov Collection (Diary of G. A. Orlov, p. 386).

[24] COC, C 20 N 1154 (Letter, Charpy to War Minister, 15 Feb 1921).

[25] Kazaki v Chataldzhe, p. 22.

[26] GARF, 5881/2/273 (V. Bunin, 'Begstvo iz lageria Chataldzhi').

Cossack command as "faible à tous points de vue",[27] an opinion shared even by some Cossack officers.[28] Wrangel himself blamed Cossack officers for the poor morale of their troops, complaining that officers were too distant from their men, and had taken all the best accommodation for themselves. To rectify this problem Wrangel ordered subalterns to share their troops' accommodation.[29] This sort of attention to detail and concern for the ordinary soldier made Wrangel immensely popular among his men.

Meanwhile, relations between the French and the Russians had broken down irretrievably. In January 1921, Charpy ordered the Don Cossack Corps to move from its camps around Chatalga to Lemnos. This infuriated Wrangel as the order was made without consulting him, and thus was a clear attack on his prerogatives. By this point, moreover, the Cossacks were in a state of mutiny. Rumours abounded that conditions on Lemnos were even worse than those at Chatalga, and on the night of 12/13th January troops of the Kaledin Regiment revolted, and shots were exchanged between the French and Russians, wounding two Frenchmen. Two Cossack squadrons, including their officers, fled their camp and deserted. The next day, order was restored, and the Cossacks eventually moved to Lemnos, but Franco-Russian relations never recovered.[30]

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[27] COC, C 20 N 1154 (Letter, Broussaud to Gen Cdt COC, 150/5, 30 Dec 1920).

[28] Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia 20-kh - 40-kh godov: Dokumenty i materialy, Vol 1 (Moscow, 1998), Book 2, pp. 525-529.

[29] ENA, C 7 N 2210, Dossier 2 (Order No. 61, Gen. Wrangel, 21 February 1921).

[30] COC, C 20 N 1156 (Letter from the Russian Liaison Officer to the Commandant of French troops at Hadim-Kuey, 15 January 1921).

In mid-December 1920 the French government decided to enforce its policy that the Russian Army should be disbanded, and General Charpy was entrusted with putting this policy into effect. This inevitably led to clashes with the Russian commanders, who were determined to keep their army in being. The method of dispersing the Russian Army preferred by the French was to repatriate the troops of the Army to Soviet Russia. To encourage them to accept repatriation it was decided to stop feeding them, and on 8th January 1921 Charpy received a letter from Paris announcing that he should cease distributing rations on 1st February, an order he denounced as "un geste déplorable, inhumain, et impolitique", but which he nevertheless passed on to the Russians (eventually he was able to persuade Paris to cancel the order).[31] Another way the French sought to reduce the number of Russians in the camps was by recruiting them into the Foreign Legion. This met considerable resistance from the Russian High Command, which did all it could to restrain its men from volunteering.[32] As a result, the French were not able to persuade as many to sign up as they had hoped, and between November 1920 and April 1922 only 2,437 Russians joined the Foreign Legion.[33] The efforts to persuade the soldiers to accept repatriation to the Soviet Union were more successful. The French government ordered Charpy to prepare a boat to repatriate volunteers, regardless of whether

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[31] ENA, C 7 N 2210, Dossier 1 (Letter, Charpy to War Minister, 3109/3, 22 January 1921).

[32] HIA, WA, 138/9/53 & 91 (Orders, Gen. Abramov, no. 9, 9 Dec 1920, & no. 25, 20 Dec 1920).

[33] Bernachot, Les Armées Françaises, p. 128.

agreement was reached with the Soviet Union to guarantee their safety or not.[34] In addition, Charpy was informed that the Brazilian government had agreed to take 10,000 refugees, and efforts were now made to find volunteers to go to Brazil.[35] As a result, Charpy arranged for ships to take volunteers back to Russia, and the first repatriations to the Soviet Union took place on 16th February 1921, when 3,285 volunteers left by ship for Novorossiisk.[36] Nearly all of these were Cossacks, whose morale had by now been so undermined by the conditions of life in the camps that their fear of the Soviets was outweighed by their desire to escape from Lemnos.

In March 1921 the French government decided that the issue of disbanding the Russian Army should be immediately and finally settled. On 11 March 1921, the government sent a telegram to Constantinople in which it announced that France would be ceasing all provisioning of the Russians, and that the Russians must choose at once between three options: returning to Russia, resettlement in Brazil, or finding work to maintain themselves.[37] The last was clearly impossible, and Brazil was immensely unpopular with the Russians, since they were only offered work as plantation labourers. The choice was therefore really one of starvation or repatriation.

This ultimatum was a decisive moment. It created a wave of indignation against the French, which developed into a general contempt of everything associated with Western Europe, and correspondingly an elevation of everything Russian. The

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[34] COC, C 20 N 1154 (Telegram, Briand to Charpy, 3250/3, 4 February 1921).

[35] COC, C 20 N 1154 (Letter, Chef du Service de Santé to Charpy).

[36] COC, C 20 N 1154 (Letter, Charpy to Pellé, 3339/3, 17 February 1921).

[37] COC, C 20 N 1154 (Telegram, Briand to Charpy, 11 March 1921).

Russians had regarded the French as their allies, and so now regarded the French behaviour as betrayal. "Все единодушно ругают французев", wrote one officer in his diary.[38] "Сейчас уже видна у нас", wrote another, "перемена и настроений и вкусов и отношений к Европе ... уже нет подобострастия, нет восторженного преклонения перед ней. Русский растет в собственных глазах и уже перерос в себе Европейца". Europhilia, he continued, had been replaced by Russophilia - "Европа вообще и Франция в частности потеряли авторитет идейно-передовых стран в глазах мыслящей России".[39] In light of the later hostility shown by Russian émigrés in general towards the West and Western ideas, this development was to be of profound importance.

The actual implementation of the ultimatum varied in the different camps. At Gallipoli, the French seem to have contented themselves with advertising the choices on posters, but on Lemnos the French commandant, General Broussaud, pursued his orders with zeal and enthusiasm. Broussaud deliberately sought to keep conditions on Lemnos hard in order to provide an incentive for the Cossacks to accept repatriation. He objected strongly to the efforts of the representative of the American Red Cross, Captain Macnab, to improve living conditions, rejecting his offer of a tuberculosis sanitorium, and accusing him of providing a military school with "a completely unnecessary tent".[40] To prevent Cossack officers from persuading their troops not to

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[38] GARF, 5881/2/612/71-73 (V. Sakhanev, 'Gallipoli').

[39] GARF, 5881/2/261/102 & 119 (A. Boltunov, Memoirs).

[40] COC, C 20 N 1154 (Letter, Broussaud to Charpy, 193/5, 5 April 1921). In an equally insensitive statement, the French senior medical officer at Gallipoli doubted that the Russians in the tuberculosis sanitorium there were ill, and accused them of using it solely to enjoy "a rest by the seaside"! - COC, C 7 N 2210 (Report,

leave, he sent out his own officers to put the Cossacks on the spot and get volunteers, the officers telling the troops that no other country was willing to take them and that their safety was guaranteed. While this was going on, a gunboat patrolled the coast in sight of the camp.[41] As a result 6,135 troops volunteered to return to Russia, and left on ships on the 29th of March and 2nd of April 1921.[42] 3, 435 also volunteered to go to Brazil. However, repatriations ceased thereafter, as the Soviet government refused to take more, though in June and July 1921 over 3,000 went to Baku after an offer to work in the oil industry there.[43] Thereafter, the only option provided to those Russians seeking to leave the camps was to go to Greece. From May 1921 onwards, the Greeks allowed individual Russians to enter their country, but those who did so went entirely at their own risk with no guarantees of work. To entice Cossacks to leave Lemnos and enter Greece, the French offered new boots to any who agreed to go, while at the same time deliberately withholding the boots from those in the camps, even though many had no decent footwear.[44] Such ethically questionable tactics by the French did not endear them to the Russian command. Approximately 2,500 Cossacks took up the offer to go to Greece, but it was later reported that many had difficulty finding work, and that about 90% of them had contracted malaria. By 1922

Maj. Butin, 12 Jul 1921).

[41] Rakovskii, Konets Belykh, p. 264. Kazaki v Chataldzhe, pp. 97-101.

[42] The fate of the repatriees is described in Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia, Book 1, pp. 352/353.

[43] Bernachot, Les Armées Françaises, p. 131.

[44] HIA, WA, 139/11/1095 & 1449 (Order, Col. Sitnikov, no. 1449, 31 May 1921; & Letter, Abramov to Maj. Brenne, no. 1531, 18 Aug 1921).

their situation was described as 'tragic', and many subsequently fled from Greece to Yugoslavia, where they were allowed to rejoin their units.[45]

Nearly all those who volunteered to go to Brazil and Greece, or to be repatriated, were Cossacks. It is noticeable that very few among them were members of the First Army Corps. This is a testament to the higher morale and discipline of that corps. The morale of the First Army Corps was boosted by a wide variety of cultural activities which were developed from the spring of 1921 onwards. Kutepov encouraged the formation of cultural societies, artists' groups, and lecture courses on subjects such as literature, mathematics, history and geography. The First Army Corps contained a high percentage of well-educated people, and such activities proved far more popular there than among the Cossacks. At Gallipoli churches were built, a football league set up, and theatres built in camp and in town.[46] In this way some began to feel that the Gallipoli camp represented a 'Russia in miniature', that there was among the troops a revival of interest in Russian culture and traditions. "Я в России", exclaimed one officer on arriving at Gallipoli from Lemnos, "С потерей Крыма казалось ... что она умерла ... но я, приехав в Галлиполи, на самом деле очутился именно в России!".[47] It was claimed that, in exile, deprived of their homeland, the troops came to realise how important that homeland was to them, and tried therefore to get in contact with it in the only way possible - through culture.[48]

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[45] Kazaki za granitsei, 1921-1925 gg. (Belgrade, 1925), p. 23.

[46] Russkie v Gallipoli, pp. 235-330.

[47] GARF, 5881/2/261/7 (A. Boltunov, Memoirs).

[48] Russkie v Gallipoli, p 434. GARF, 5881/2/612/177 (V. Sakhanev, 'Gallipoli').

As a result of these activities, the improved discipline, and the conflicts with the French authorities, many of the troops at Gallipoli now began to rally around their commanders. The harsh discipline no longer seemed so irksome, and many began to realise its importance. As one officer, A. Boltunov, wrote in his diary on 26 September 1921, Kutepov's severity had been justified by its results - "галлиполийцы же сами про себя говорят: <<так и надо>>".[49] General Kutepov, previously feared and hated, was by the summer of 1921 deeply respected by many of his men. "Все офицеры на стороне генерала Кутепова", wrote G. A. Orlov on 10 September 1921, who just a few months earlier had commented that "Все в один голос ругают Кутепова".[50] The Corps commander was especially admired by the younger officers and cadets, among whom he acquired a moral influence which he was to retain for the rest of his life.

Although the French commandant at Gallipoli, Colonel Thomassen, was not as tactless as General Broussaud on Lemnos, Franco-Russian relations were no better at Gallipoli than elsewhere. Kutepov infuriated the French by confirming the execution of a Russian officer accused of spying for the French,[51] and also by insisting on the right of one of his officers to challenge a French officer to a duel for

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[49] GARF, 5881/2/261/118 (A. Boltunov, Memoirs); For similar views, see GARF, 5881/1/724/19 (P. Ivlin, 'Dnevnik'); GARF, 5881/2/612/126 (V. Sakhanev, 'Gallipoli'); I. Opishnia, 'Gallipoliiskii Kutep-Pasha', Vozrozhdenie, 1956, no. 49, p. 134.

[50] BAR, G. A. Orlov Collection (Diary of G. A. Orlov, pp. 355 & 439).

[51] COC, C 20 N 1156 (Rapport).

supposedly insulting his wife.[52] Wrangel considered that the French had betrayed the Russians, and therefore felt that they were without honour. He made this plain at a reception at the British embassy in Constantinople, at which he ostentatiously refused to shake Charpy's hand, and told the senior British officer present, General Harrington - "General, it is indeed painful for me to abuse your kind hospitality by refusing to greet this gentleman, but he knows exactly the reason for my behaviour, and he must know that I am ready to offer him satisfaction wherever and whenever he wishes".[53] Such gestures satisfied honour, but were hardly diplomatic. It was behaviour like this that led Charpy to complain bitterly of Wrangel's "opposition manifeste et arrogante".[54] This episode also reveals why the White officers had so few friends outside their own narrow circle. Their notion of honour meant that they tended to be diplomatically inept.

In the middle of May 1921, the French offered to transport 1000 troops as individuals to Bulgaria, after an offer by the Bulgarian government to take that many refugees. Despite the improvements of life at Gallipoli, conditions there remained sufficiently harsh that volunteers to go to Bulgaria were easily found. As a result, Kutepov decided that the time had come to clear his Corps of the weak-willed and to reinforce his authority. He therefore issued an order giving all troops three days to decide whether they wished to leave the army. All those who wished to leave could

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[52] HIA, WA, 139/11/1411-1415 (Letters, Thomassen to Kutepov, no. 1669, 8 Aug 1921, & Kutepov to Thomassen, no. 7777, 11 Aug 1921).

[53] Alexis Wrangel, General Wrangel: Russia's White Crusader. (London, 1990), p. 226.

[54] COC, C 20 N 1154 (Report, 'Sur l'attitude de Général Wrangel').

do so at the end of the three days, but those who chose to stay would be obliged to accept military discipline thereafter and any future attempts to leave would be treated as desertion.[55] As a result of the order some 2,000 men left the First Army Corps, but the great majority chose to remain. This was regarded as a ringing endorsement of the army's leadership, and as a step to rebuilding the army on the basis on the strongest-willed and most morally sound elements.[56]

By summer 1921 relations between the Russians and the French had been reduced to the level of mutual loathing. When the Russians had first arrived at Constantinople they had handed over most of their weapons to the French, but several thousand rifles and machine-guns had been kept. The Russians had resisted all efforts by the French to make them hand over these weapons. As a result the French did not feel able to carry out their threat to stop feeding the Russians, because the latter made it clear that if they were not fed they would not hesitate to take violent action to ensure their survival. To this end, Kutepov's staff drew up plans to march on Constantinople and seize the city, and the First Army Corps carried out ostentatious military training and night alarms to convince the French of their seriousness.[57] These activities had the desired effect. Plans drawn up by the French in May 1921 to seize the Russians' weapons by force were abandoned in the knowledge that such an endeavour would meet armed resistance, and the threat to end the distribution of food

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[55] HIA, WA, 138/10/1052 (Order no. 323, Gen. Kutepov, 23 May 1921).

[56] Davatz & L'vov, Russkaia Armiia na chuzhbine, p. 87.

[57] V. K. Vitkovskii, 'Konstantinopol'skii Pokhod', Rossiia, nos 4766 & 4767, Dec 1951. ENA, C 7 N 2210, Dossier 3 (Report of 3-ieme bureau, HQ COC, 17 May 1921), HIA, WA, 138/9/724 (Report, Gen. Kutepov, no. 0410, 19 Apr 1921).

was never repeated. The Russians drew the conclusion that they had been saved by their unity and cohesion, and that such cohesion could protect them in situations where others did not have their best interests at heart. This was to be an important element of the Gallipoli legend.

In spite of this limited success in resisting French efforts to disband the Army, initial hopes of renewing an armed campaign against the Soviets had been shattered, as it was clear that nobody was willing to help the Army launch such a campaign. Wrangel was forced to accept that it might not be possible to preserve the army as an army, and that he should consider methods of dissolving the army, but in such a way as to keep some structure intact in order that it could be re-formed should a suitable opportunity to use it arise. To achieve this, it was necessary to move the Army out of the camps near Constantinople and find it a new home where its members could support themselves by work. In March 1921, therefore, Wrangel sent General Shatilov to Belgrade to ask the Yugoslav government to accept troops of the Russian Army into its country. Shatilov met the Yugoslav Prime Minister and the Prince Regent, Alexander, who agreed to allow Russian troops into Yugoslavia with their command structure intact, and to provide employment for several thousand in the Yugoslav border service, on condition that money was received to help pay for their support.[58] After further talks, Wrangel's military representative in Belgrade, General Pototskii, persuaded the Yugoslavs to take an additional 4,000 men to carry out road-

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[58] HIA, WA, 139/10/656 (Letter, Shatilov to Minister of War of Yugoslavia, no. 1229, Apr 1921), & 682 (Telegram, Shatilov to Chertkov, no. 2001/8, 17 Apr 1921).

building projects.[59] Together, under these agreements, the Yugoslavs accepted 5,000 Russians into their border service, 6-7,000 to work on road building projects, and an additional 8,000 to be supported for six months by funds provided by the Russians.[60] After the necessary funds were found (see p. 62), the first Russian contingents were able to move to Yugoslavia in May 1921. An additional agreement was later reached to provide work for another 4,000 men from the Technical Regiment at Gallipoli to carry out railway construction work, provided that the cost of the move of the troops to Yugoslavia was paid for by the Russians.[61] As a result of all these agreements, some 25,000 men of the Russian Army found new homes in Yugoslavia.

Negotiations with Bulgaria were also successful. In June 1921 after talks between Shatilov and the Bulgarian government, the Bulgarians agreed to accept a first group of 2,000 men of the Russian Army. The Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Army, Colonel Topaldzhikov, agreed that the troops entering Bulgaria should preserve their military organisation and command structure. All troops were permitted to wear uniform, and unit commanders to carry firearms.[62] The Army's High Command was thereby able to ensure that the dispersal of elements of the Army to Bulgaria would be done in such a way as to ensure its continued survival. A detachment of 2,000 men under General Gusel'shchikov moved to Bulgaria on the

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[59] HIA, WA, 139/10/801 (Telegram, Pototskii to Shatilov, 26 Apr 1921).

[60] HIA, WA, 139/10/913 (Circular, Gen. Wrangel, no. 6352, 10 May 1921).

[61] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 11, File 44 (Letter, Pototskii to Miller, 22 Sep 1921).

[62] HIA, WA, 139/11/1128-1137 (Letter, Viazmitinov to Topaldzhikov, no. 362, 7 Jun 1921) & 1161-1166 (Letter, Topaldzhikov to Viazmitinov, no. 768, 15 Jun 1921).

basis of this agreement.

Negotiations with the Bulgarian government continued after this, and several more agreements were reached in the summer of 1921 to accept additional detachments of troops. Under an agreement of July 1921, Bulgaria stated that it was willing to accept a further 7,000 men under the same terms as the detachment of General Gusel'shchikov on condition that $300,000 was provided to pay for their upkeep.[63] After this money was found (see p. 62) a treaty was signed in August 1921 with regard to the transfer of troops to Bulgaria.[64] A further agreement to allow even more Russians into Bulgaria was reached in November 1921. As a result of these agreements, some 19,000 men of the Russian Army found homes in Bulgaria. Negotiations with the Czech government also resulted in places for 1,000 Cossacks being found there. The troops of the Russian Army left their camps at Gallipoli and Lemnos for these locations in various groups between August and December 1921 (See table at Annex 1), and by mid-December the only troops remaining in the area of Constantinople was a detachment of 2,000 men at Gallipoli. A new life for the men of the Russian Army began.

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By December 1921 only about 45,000 men remained in the Army out of the 100,000 who had left the Crimea. Nevertheless, a core of the army had been maintained. This was a development of profound importance for the inter-war

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[63] HIA, WA, 139/11/1245-1246 (Telegram, Viazmitinov to Miller & Shatilov, no. 462, 1 Jul 1921).

[64] BAR, ROVS, Box 166, Folder 'Bulgaria 1922' (Addition to Treaty, 18 Aug 1922).

Russian emigration as a whole. But perhaps more important than the Army's physical survival was the myth that developed around events at Gallipoli. At Gallipoli, many felt that the army had been not merely physically preserved, but more importantly, morally resurrected. The First Army Corps had come off the boats utterly defeated. A year later it left Gallipoli numerically weaker, but in the eyes of many who were there, spiritually stronger. Many veterans would later write of Gallipoli as something almost miraculous. As the representative of a Russian émigré charity at Gallipoli, Sergei Resnichenko, wrote in a report to his centre in Paris: "В Галлиполи совершилось русское национальное чудо".[65] This theme of the 'Gallipoli Miracle' is echoed in scores of memoirs, articles and letters by Gallipoli veterans. According to one such writer "Галлиполи - колыбель возрождения русского духа",[66] a theme echoed by the First Army Corps' official history, which stated that at Gallipoli the troops underwent "громадное духовное перерождение".[67] At Gallipoli, supposedly, the troops not merely bonded close together, but also regained their faith in their eventual victory and in the need for continued struggle.[68] Gallipoli came to encapsulate the spirit of 'irreconcilability' - the concept that no matter what happened and no matter how much time elapsed, émigrés should not compromise with the Soviet regime and should continue the struggle against it.

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[65] Kutepov: Sbornik statei , p. 278.

[66] Letter by P. Skarzhinskii, Gallipoli, no.1, 1923, p.3.

[67] Russkie v Gallipoli, p. 272.

[68] BAR, ROVS, Box 88 (Manuscipt, V. Larionov, 'Dobrovol'cheskaia Belaia Ideia v izgnanii'); B.N. Sergeevskii 'Gallipoli', Vestnik Pervophokhodnika, no. 37/38, Oct/Nov 1964, p. 22.

Within a few years Gallipoli had acquired a legendary status. Histories, memoirs, poems, even a play,[69] were written about it. This mythology was promoted by the Society of Gallipolians ('Obshchestvo Gallipoliitsev') established by General Kutepov just before he departed Gallipoli in November 1921. The Society kept the veterans of the First Army Corps in touch with one another as they dispersed across Europe, and sought to maintain the 'Gallipoli spirit' among them.

Gallipoli was doubly important because it was there that the army began to redefine its role and ideology. On arrival there the army's leaders still hoped to use it again as a fighting force to renew the struggle against the Bolsheviks. During 1921 they began to realise that this was not possible in the short term, and began to view the army as a cadre around which a future Russian army could be built. As such it would have to be made out of the best personnel, thoroughly trained and disciplined, and it would have to exemplify all that was best about Russian military traditions. As the official history of the First Army Corps concluded:

> Наш корпус являет собой то ядро крепко не количеством, а качеством, вокруг которого объединится вся распыленная по миру русская масса. Мы восстановим честь русского имени, мы и здесь создадим культурные ценности, мы, не покладая рук, будем работать над собой, будем учиться и учить.[70]

This philosophy, with its emphasis on self-improvement, was based on a belief that the catastrophe of the revolution and defeat in the civil war was due to a spiritual failure by the army and the Russian people as a whole. The army was now expected to reforge its spiritual values, especially those of discipline, honour, and

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[69] A. Rennikov, Gallipoli (Sofia, 1925).

[70] Russkie v Gallipoli, p 449.

study. The army thus began to redefine itself as a moral élite, an "order of knights" ("орден рыцарей"), a "knightly order of monks" ("рыцарский орден монахов"),[71] bearing moral values and the traditions of Russia along with its arms. This view of themselves as an order of knights was to be a vital part of the self-image of the White military émigrés for years thereafter, and its origins lie in Gallipoli. It is for this reason that many military émigrés would feel that it was at Gallipoli that the military emigration and its ideology was created,[72] that "Галлиполи ... превращалось в идею".[73]

As with all myths it is of course necessary to treat the claims made about Gallipoli with some circumspection. It is hard to penetrate the official Gallipoli mythology, as spread through publications printed by the First Army Corps and the Society of Gallipolians, to find the views of the rank and file. Certainly, the supposed moral resurrection of the First Army Corps was not as absolute as some claimed. Kutepov would not have been obliged to issue his order of 23rd May 1921, giving his troops three days to decide whether they wished to stay in the army, if all had been well in regard to the Corps' morale. Some 21% of the First Army Corps left its ranks during the year at Gallipoli,[74] and it is probable that many of those who stayed did so primarily because the alternatives were so unattractive, rather than because they were totally dedicated to the cause. In addition, the Gallipoli 'miracle' excludes the

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[71] Kutepov: Sbornik statei, p. 137.

[72] Dushkin, Zabytye, p. 118.

[73] Kutepov: Sbornik statei, p. 261.

[74] Russkie v Gallipoli, p. 430.

Cossacks, among whom no such moral rebirth took place, and whose morale on Lemnos sank lower and lower as time went on. An alternative perspective of events is given in a report to Paris written by General Charpy who believed that most of Wrangel's troops would have gladly left the army had they not been forcibly prevented from so doing.[75] Memoirs of veterans who later returned to the Soviet Union also provide an alternative view of what happened in the year in Turkey. Dmitrii Meisner, for instance, specifically denied that any form of moral resurrection took place at Gallipoli,[76] and Boris Aleksandrovskii, a military doctor at Gallipoli, noted in his memoirs the prevalence of suicide there.[77] Nevertheless both Aleksandrovskii and I.M. Kalinin, another officer who returned to Soviet Russia, confirmed that many troops at Gallipoli did rally around General Kutepov, and that it was there that the ideology of the White military in exile was formed.[78] Diaries written by soldiers at Gallipoli also testify to the renewal of their spirit while there - "Сильная духом, крепко любящая свою родину, Русская Армия уже целый год держится", wrote P. Ivlin in his diary, "День за днем духом рос русский солдат здесь в Галлиполи".[79] A balanced assessment would be that during 1921 the army divided into two - one group which fell into despair and deserted the army, and a second

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[75] COC, C 20 N 1156 (Rapport).

[76] Meisner, Mirazhi i deistvitel'nost', p. 108.

[77] Aleksandrovskii, Iz perezhitogo, p. 37.

[78] Ibid, pp. 31-32. Kalinin, Pod znamenem, p. 291.

[79] GARF, 5881/1/724/4 (P.Ivlin, 'Dnevnik'); See also GARF, 5881/2/261/71 & 95 (A. Boltunov, Memoirs), & GARF, 5881/2/612/87 & 177 (V. Sakhanev, 'Gallipoli). For a completely different point of view see GARF, 5881/1/154 (M.P., 'Gallipoli').

group which stayed with the army and rallied ever closer together. The official version of the Gallipoli miracle is echoed in numerous memoirs by officers who served there, printed in émigré journals over a period of several decades. Whether or not Gallipoli really was the special experience that was claimed, many certainly came to believe that it was. In a sense the mythology made it real. To many of them Gallipoli was the most vital experience of their lives, a terrible ordeal shared and overcome together in which they took immense pride. "Не умерла еще наша белая Русская Армия", wrote one officer to another from Bulgaria in 1923, "Не убили ее еще козни врагов, лишения тела и страдания души в тех тысячах русских людей, что прибыли сюда из сурового, но бесконечно дорогого нам всем Галлиполи".[80]

The Gallipoli mythology would sustain many veterans throughout their long years of exile. It determined their own self-image, and shaped much of their future behaviour. The physical survival of the Army also ensured that its members were not cast adrift on their own in a hostile outside world. As one veteran wrote:

> Если бы не было генерала Кутепова, то не было бы и поражвшего порядком русского Галлиполи, не осталось бы Русской Армии, а были бы только бездомных беженцев и, следовательно, судьба всей русской эмиграции была бы совсем другая.[81]

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[80] HIA, Miller Collection, Box 16, File 22 (Letter, unknown officer to Davatz, 15 Apr 1923).

[81] V. Kravchenko, Drozdovtsy ot Iass do Gallipoli (Munich, 1975), p. 340.

ANNEX 1 TO
CHAPTER 2

Table showing the principal evacuations of refugees from Constantinople from November 1920 to the end of 1921[1]

Dates	Numbers Evacuated	Destination
1920		
22 November	2,000	Yugoslavia
23 November	5,306	Yugoslavia
25 November	2,470	Bulgaria
30 November	1,200	Bulgaria
3 December	3,800	Yugoslavia
8 December	742	Greece
10 December	5,585	Bizerte, Tunisia
11 December	4,100	Yugoslavia
12 December	4,100	Yugoslavia
15 December	1,800	Rumania
1921		
16 February	3,300	Russia
16 February	500	Greece
29 March	3,595	Russia
2 April	2,700	Russia
26 April	3,435	Brazil
13 May	2,132	Baku
27 May	2,121	Bulgaria
28 May	3,220	Yugoslavia
2 June	2,194	Yugoslavia
18 June	3,106	Baku
18 June	1,600	Greece
13 July	1,110	Bulgaria
13 July	521	Greece
13 July	226	Baku
2 August	929	Yugoslavia
10 August	996	Yugoslavia
26 August	2,038	Yugoslavia
28 August	3,365	Bulgaria
4 September	2,400	Bulgaria
17 September	1,339	Bulgaria

[1] Adapted from a similar table in Bernachot, L'Armée Française, p. 131.

17 September	101	Baku
17 September	20	Greece
14 November	992	Czechoslovakia
27 November	1,653	Bulgaria
29 November	3,447	Bulgaria
1 December	1,680	Bulgaria
5 December	1,180	Yugoslavia
17 December	2,520	Bulgaria
28 December	45	Czechoslovakia

CHAPTER 3 - POLITICAL STRUGGLES FOR CONTROL OF THE RUSSIAN EMIGRATION: CONSTANTINOPLE, 1920-1921

Events at Gallipoli and Lemnos made the soldiers of the Russian Army feel abandoned and alone in a hostile world. This sense of isolation was a key point in the mentality of Russian émigrés thereafter. It was reinforced by other events in 1921, in particular the political struggles which took place between the leaders of the Army and the leaders of émigré 'society'. These struggles had a profound influence both on the psychology of military émigrés and on the humanitarian and cultural institutions which came to dominate émigré life. They created divisions that left the emigration rudderless and divided, and created an atmosphere of bitterness among many members of the Army, who came to feel that they had been abandoned by other émigré groups. As a result of these political conflicts, the largest mass of émigrés - military men - became in effect disenfranchised in the running of the wider émigré cultural and humanitarian institutions, and in the capacity of representing émigré interests to foreign powers. There was nothing inevitable about this process. The leaders of the Russian Army had every desire to organise and control matters such as humanitarian aid, and if they were unable to do so, had definite preferences as to which alternative groups should or should not take over that role. But their wishes were to be, in their eyes, arbitrarily trodden on, and their rightful role usurped by the liberal émigré intelligentsia, with the assistance of foreign governments, especially that of France.

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The evacuation of the Crimea caused many Russian émigrés to make a complete reappraisal of their attitudes towards the Bolshevik regime in Russia and to

the idea of armed struggle against it. The introduction in 1921 of the Soviets' New Economic Policy (NEP) gave additional impetus to this process of reappraisal, as it seemed to suggest that the Soviet regime was abandoning some of the precepts of communist dogma. To many émigrés the idea of armed struggle was now completely discredited and it was felt that new methods must be adopted. This was most strikingly personified in the 'Smena Vekh' movement, which emerged in 1921. This urged that émigrés come to terms with the Bolshevik government and work with it to help it evolve in a more positive direction.[1] Another example was the 'New Tactics' unveiled by Pavel Miliukov, the editor of the most widely read émigré newspaper, 'Poslednie Novosti'. Miliukov decided that the cause of the Whites' defeat lay in their failure to adopt a political programme which could attract broad support among the Russian populace. Émigrés, he argued, should adopt popular policies on social and economic issues in alliance with the forces of the left, in particular the Socialist-Revolutionary (SR) party, and should abandon support for Wrangel's army.[2]

Miliukov's 'new tactics' did not win great support among émigrés, but they were symptomatic of a change of attitude towards the army which made it immensely difficult for it to win support among the emigration as a whole. Many émigré leaders felt that their priority must now be providing humanitarian care for their fellow exiles. This meant that they were unwilling to use the scarce financial resources available to

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[1] For a history of the Smena Vekh movement, see Hilda Hardeman, Coming to terms with the Soviet regime: the 'Changing Signposts' movement among Russian Émigrés in the early 1920s (Dekalb, 1994).

[2] For similar views expressed by the former head of the Provisional Government, Prince G. E. L'vov, see Orlando Figes, A Peoples' Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924 (London, 1996), p. 682.

the emigration to maintain the army's continued existence. Even more decisively, the French government was not willing to let Wrangel dispose of the assets of the former Russian state, even though previously in the Crimea it had recognised him as head of state. Struggle for control of these resources between Wrangel and other émigré leaders was to play a key role in determining the future of the army and indeed of the wider emigration.

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At the centre of the divisions which arose between the Army and the leaders of émigré 'society' was a difference in opinion on the merits of 'statehood' ('государственность') and 'public opinion' ('общественность'). The officers of the Russian Army believed in 'statehood' and often referred to themselves as 'state-minded people' ('государственно-мыслящие люди'). This implied a belief in a strong state, and also in the primacy of state interests. The Russian intelligentsia, by contrast, tended to despise the state, regarding it as reactionary and incompetent. They felt that the state should surrender its responsibilities to what they called 'society', in other words themselves. In the context of exile, this meant that officers of the Russian Army, noting that the Army was the sole remaining institution of state, and that Wrangel was the last recognised head of state, believed that the Army must be preserved in order to preserve the state, and that the Army was the natural leader of émigré society, to which 'society' should defer. By contrast, émigré intellectuals felt that Wrangel and the Army should defer to 'society'.[3]

In exile the 'State' was represented by Wrangel himself, as head of state; by the

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[3] For instance, HIA, WA, 141/16/ 97-100 (Letter, Wrangel to Burtsev, no. 100, 20 Apr 1921).

government he brought with him out of the Crimea; and by the Army. Cossacks also brought their own state institutions into exile with them, at the head of which stood the Atamans (Cossack chieftains) of the Don, Kuban and Terek Cossack Hosts, each of whom had beneath him a small 'government'. The other major state institutions in exile were the Russian embassies. In 1921 the Soviet regime was not internationally recognised, and Russian ambassadors were still those appointed by the Provisional Government. Some, especially the ambassador to the USA, Boris Bakhmeteff, were in possession of large sums of official money, estimated at several million dollars. Crucially, however, because the ambassadors had been appointed by the Provisional Government rather than by Wrangel, they felt under no special obligation to obey him.

In early 1921 'society' was represented by a plethora of groups of varying political orientations, and by numerous émigré social and humanitarian organisations. Émigré charities included the Russian Red Cross, which accompanied the Russian Army, and the Zemstvo and Town Relief Committee, known as Zemgor, which had operated in Russia before the Bolshevik seizure of power and was closely associated with liberal and socialist political groups. Indeed part of the problem in providing humanitarian aid to the members of the Russian Army after the evacuation of the Crimea was that there were too many organisations providing relief (foreign organisations such as the American Red Cross were also involved), and no centralised control or coordination.[4] The need for such centralised control was widely

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[4] For a list of organisations involved in providing aid to refugees, see Hutchins, Wrangel Refugees, p. 45.

recognised, but the representatives of the Army and 'society' could not agree as to who should exercise it. As a result the provision of aid became highly politicised.

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After their arrival at Constantinople, Wrangel sent his Prime-Minister, Krivoshein, his Foreign Minister, Struve, and his Finance Minister, Bernatskii, to Paris to plead the army's case with the French government, and to obtain control of funds which were owned by the former Russian state and which were held in foreign banks and property abroad.[5] But Wrangel's ministers were unable to carry out this task. In January 1921 Wrangel's official military representative in Paris, Lieutenant General E. K. Miller, told Wrangel that he was unable to carry out negotiations with the French government about the Russian Army, as the French would not recognise that the Army existed. The French Prime Minister, Briand, wrote to the head of Zemgor, Prince G. E. L'vov, that he could not accept the claims of Wrangel's representatives to administer the assets of the former Russian state. Humanitarian aid for Russian refugees, wrote Briand, should be concentrated in the hands of Zemgor.[6] Briand wished to disband the Russian Army and so did not want Wrangel to get control of Russian state property which he could use to support the Army. His decision had far-reaching consequences.

Meanwhile, the Cossack Atamans soon came into conflict with Wrangel. Political agitation by left-wing politicians among the Cossacks made the Atamans feel that they needed to make concessions to the left in order to preserve their own

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[5] Obshchee Delo, 30 Nov 1920, no. 138, p. 1.

[6] HIA, WA, 139/9/248 (Letter, Briand to L'vov, 29 Jan 1921).

leadership position. In December 1920 radical Cossack politicians sought to compete with the authority of the Atamans by creating a 'Soiuz Vozrozhdeniia Kazachestva', which contained former members of the Cossack governments, cooperatives and political activists. The Union blamed the White generals for the defeat of the Cossacks and called for the struggle against Bolshevism to come to an end.[7] Under pressure from groups such as this, the Atamans on 14 January 1921 took a first step towards asserting their independence from Wrangel by forming a 'United Council of the Don, Terek and Kuban'. The Atamans agreed to act together in all political, economic and external matters, and called for a Russia based on "democratic and federal principles".[8] As V. Kh. Davatz pointed out, this declaration undermined Wrangel's ability to present himself to foreign governments as the sole legitimate representative of Russian state power.[9]

Wrangel's position was not helped by his own decision to disband the government which he had previously headed. His decision was based partly on financial reckonings and partly on a recognition of political realities. Wrangel simply had no means of supporting the government, besides which most of its departments now had nothing to do, as there was no longer any territory to administer.[10] Wrangel regarded the government as merely an administrative apparatus, whose disbandment

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[7] G. Rakovskii, Konets Belykh (Prague, 1921), p. 230.

[8] HIA, WA, 114/21/15-28 (Agreement of 1/14 Jan 1921).

[9] Davatz, Fünf Sturmjahre, p. 25.

[10] N. Savich, 'Konstantinopol'skii Period', Grani, April-June 1989, No. 152, pp. 215-216. Also, Richard Pipes, Struve: Liberal on the Right, 1905-1944 (Cambridge, Mass, 1980), p. 295.

did not affect his own status. But in practice, his decision made it impossible for him to argue against the view of the French that he was no longer head of state as he had no government or land.

On 2 February 1921, the senior Russian ambassadors, M. Girs, V. Maklakov and B. Bakhmeteff met in Paris and together agreed to form a Conference of Ambassadors. The Conference decided that as Wrangel had dissolved his government, their conference constituted the only remaining legal state authority. As such it would take on itself responsibility for the distribution of all state property. The conference also determined that the distribution of aid to refugees should be concentrated in the hands of a single organisation, and that the organisation should be Zemgor.[11]

Although Zemgor maintained that it was apolitical, the army High Command regarded Zemgor as a political organisation hostile to the army, as many of its members were connected with left-wing political groups. The transfer of control of state funds to Zemgor was seen as an attack on the army by the political left, and as part of the general campaign of liberal politicians such as Miliukov to destroy the army in exile. However, it is clear that the real cause of the ambassadors' decision was pressure applied by the French government. Girs told Wrangel that the passing of control of aid into the hands of Zemgor was necessary, as it was the only solution which would permit the matter to stay in Russian hands. Without it, he wrote, the French would insist on taking control of aid into their own hands, leaving the

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[11] Davatz & L'vov, Russkaia Armiia na chuzhbine, p. 48. Davatz, Fünf Sturmjahre, pp. 22-23; E. I. Pivovar, Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Turtsii, iugo-vostochnoi i tsentral'noi Evrope 20-kh godov (Göttingen, 1994), p. 54.

Russians dependent on their goodwill.[12]

The decision of the ambassadors left the Russian Army financially dependent on their generosity. This caused considerable difficulties for Wrangel's representatives when undertaking negotiations with foreign powers to allow the transfer of Russian troops onto their territory. Both the Yugoslav and the Bulgarian governments demanded that money be provided to them in order to ensure that elements of the Russian Army entering their territory did not become a burden on the state (see pp. 45 & 46).[13] As the Army did not have sufficient funds, the transfer of troops to those nations was held up, until eventually Wrangel's representatives persuaded the Ambassadors' Conference to pay the required sums ($400,000 to Yugoslavia, and $300,000 to Bulgaria), after which the transfers went ahead. Furthermore the army's shortage of money meant that it was obliged to hand over much of the care of its own sick and wounded to Zemgor, as well as control over the civilian schools which had accompanied the army into exile. In this way the army's power and influence gradually diminished. Military men were eased out of positions of influence in émigré humanitarian, cultural and educational institutions, and their places taken by liberal intellectuals who were in many cases alien to the military culture. This made it very difficult for military émigrés to instil their own version of Russian culture and values into émigré youth. For instance, in the mid-1920's when the Army leadership sought to persuade émigré institutions to organise sporting

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[12] HIA, WA, 148/36/104-109 (Letter, Girs to Wrangel, no. 100, 10 Feb 1921).

[13] HIA, WA, 139/10/682 (Letter, Shatilov to Chertkov, no. 2001/8, 17 Apr 1921), & 139/11/1245-1246 (Telegram, Viazmitinov to Miller & Shatilov, no. 462, 1 Jul 1921).

activities for youth, believing that sport instilled a sense of teamwork and discipline, it encountered opposition from the liberal émigrés who ran many of the Russian schools. This was true even in émigré communities such as those in Bulgaria where the great majority of émigrés were former soldiers, but where the Russian schools were run by Zemgor. A librarian at the Zemgor-controlled Russian school in Varna, for instance, complained in 1927 that it would be very difficult to introduce organised sports at the school because the Zemgor officials had a great fear of even a hint of something that reminded them of the military.[14] The decision of the Russian ambassadors to back Zemgor rather than Wrangel thus had important long term consequences for the Russian emigration.

The history of the Russian Army's relations with Zemgor is one of mutual hostility and suspicion. In early 1921 the Russian military representative in Japan, General Podtiagin, handed over a sum of about one million francs held by him to ambassador Girs, who in turn gave it to Prince L'vov on the understanding that it would be used to improve the material and sanitary conditions of troops of the Russian Army. Thereafter the money seems to have disappeared, and the High Command was convinced that Zemgor had not used it for the specified purpose.[15] Whether or not it was, the fact that the Army believed it was not created an impression that 'society' was exploiting its control of émigré financial resources to undermine the Army.

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[14] GARF, 5826/1/193/44 (Letter, A. Kurbatov to Gen. Gulevich, 1 Sep 1927).

[15] HIA, WA, 148/36/291 (Letter, Chertkov to Khripunov, no. p/127, 26 Apr 1921); BAR, ROVS, Box 166 (Letters, Balabanov to Guchkov, and Zeeler to Miller).

In part these suspicions were well-based. Left-wing politicians used the cover of Zemgor to spread their influence among émigrés and reduce that of the military High Command. For instance, in Prague in June 1921 Zemgor set up its own registration department and announced that old documents issued by Russian diplomatic and military officials were no longer valid. The Russian military representative in Prague, General Leont'ev, noted that left-wing parties had long wished to destroy Russian diplomatic and military agencies, and being unable to do it under their own flag were using the guise of Zemgor to achieve the same ends.[16]

The exodus of hundreds of thousands of Russians from their country in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and Civil War put a great strain on the resources of the international community, which was obliged to give these refugees aid and which was ill-equipped to cope. The evacuation of Wrangel's army prompted Western leaders to consider the creation of a permanent international apparatus to manage the provision of aid to refugees. To this end, in June 1921 the League of Nations carried out discussions aimed at creating a central organisation charged with dealing with the Russian refugee problem. Miliukov and Prince L'vov went to Geneva to lobby the League on behalf of Zemgor and to undermine the claims of the Army leadership to a role in dealing with refugee issues. A. I. Guchkov, one-time war minister of the Provisional Government and a trusted confidant of General Wrangel, went to Geneva to plead the Army's case.[17] Wrangel hoped that the Army High

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[16] HIA, Miller Archive, Box 15, File 25 (Letter, Leont'ev to Miller, no. 90, 15 Jun 1921).

[17] HIA, WA, 148/36/466-476 (Letter, Guchkov to Wrangel, 30 Jun 1921).

Command could play a leading role in providing humanitarian aid to its own members, and if that was not possible felt that the Russian Red Cross (which was sympathetic to the Army and its needs) would be the best organisation to control humanitarian aid.[18] In the end the League of Nations created a High Commission for Refugees led by the Norwegian explorer, Fridtjof Nansen. Nansen was sympathetic to the Soviet regime, and believed that the best solution to the refugee problem was the repatriation of refugees to Soviet Russia. As such, his appointment was a great blow to the Russian Army and reinforced its belief that its views were being ignored and trampled on. In 1923 Nansen signed an agreement with the Soviet government to permit refugees to be repatriated to Russia. Zemgor earned the wrath of the Army High Command by issuing a declaration welcoming this agreement and supporting the principle of repatriation.[19]

The control exercised by groups outside the army over humanitarian aid put the army's members at the mercy of people who were often hostile to their organisation's purpose. This was less pronounced in Yugoslavia where the government provided aid through its own agency, the 'Derzhavnaia Kommissia'. There the government agreed that the Russian military representative and also Wrangel's government plenipotentiary, S. N. Paleolog, should participate in the distribution of aid funds.[20] However even in Yugoslavia problems arose. The

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[18] HIA, WA, 148/36/499-501 (Letter, Wrangel to S. N. Il'in, no. 157/s, 12 Jul 1921).

[19] HIA, WA, 149/39/535-538 (Circular, S. N. Il'in, no's k/2075-2084, 16 Mar 1923); & Sheets 539-540 (Letter, Astrov to Lodyzhenskii, no. 833, 4 May 1923).

[20] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 5, File 19 (Letter, Paleolog to Shlikevich, 23 Jun 1921).

Russian secretary of the Derzhavnaia Kommissia, Pletnev, regarded the Russian Army with hostility. Various educational institutions had followed the Russian Army into exile and then into Yugoslavia (childrens' schools, Cadet Corps and Military Schools), and Pletnev sought to remove these from military control.[21] Only the Cadet Corps were to survive, and these experienced regular difficulties with liberal education officials on the Derzhavnaia Kommissia over the next two decades (see p. 104).

Similar problems were to confront the Army in other countries in future years. In Bulgaria part of the sum provided by the Ambassadors' Conference for the use of Wrangel's troops would later be spent on repatriating Cossacks, and the Russian diplomatic representative in Bulgaria would refuse to let military representatives join in discussions as to how the money should be spent, even though it was destined for their men (see chapter 4). Zemgor remained the main problem as far as the Army was concerned. In Czechoslovakia, a Zemgor-inspired Cossack congress launched bitter attacks against General Wrangel, with the result that some Cossacks walked out in protest. This created considerable difficulties for them, as Czech law required them to belong to a legally registered organisation, and these were all financially dependent on Zemgor.[22] In Yugoslavia in 1925, the representative of Zemgor, Colonel Makhin, was accused of carrying out propaganda for the SR party under the cover of Zemgor's charitable work. Under pressure from Wrangel's staff, the Yugoslav government

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[21] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 5, File 20 (Letter, Paleolog to Shlikevich, no. 264/s, 9 Aug 21).

[22] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 10, File 40 (Letter, Makhrov to Miller, no. 181, 16 Jun 1924).

withdrew its support for Makhin's activities.[23] Zemgor's claims to be an apolitical humanitarian organisation were never believed by many in the Russian Army.

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Assailed by the left-wing press, under pressure from the Cossack Atamans, and undermined by the ambassadors, Wrangel began to feel the need for support from 'society'. However, few representatives of liberal 'society' were willing to accept Wrangel's leadership and most felt that the White Armies' defeat was due to the fact that the White officers had divorced themselves from 'society' and followed reactionary policies. It followed, they claimed, that in order to survive, the Army would now have to embrace 'society', giving it a more prominent role in decision-making, and replacing the Army's 'reactionary' political advisors with men of more liberal convictions.[24]

In the early period of their exile, there existed a considerable desire among Russian émigrés to forge some sort of émigré political union to overcome the divisions which had so damaged the anti-Bolshevik forces in the past. Wrangel sought to create such an émigré political union around a body created by himself - the Russian Council. He felt that this union should be subordinate to him and that members of 'society' should join the Russian Council, rather than seek to take a leading role for themselves. This idea was not, however, acceptable to many outside the Army. In a competing effort to unite the emigration around monarchist slogans, a

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[23] HIA, WA, 146/31/557 & 560 (Letters, Wrangel to Kondzerovskii, 6 Aug 1925, & Bazarevich to Kussonskii, no. 1811, 18 Aug 1925).

[24] See, for instance, HIA, WA, 148/36/28 (Letter, Burtsev to Wrangel, Dec 1920).

large congress was held at Reichenhall in Germany in June 1921, which elected a permanent executive, the VMS (Vysshii Monarkhicheskii Soiuz), which was dedicated to promoting the monarchist cause. During the same month a group of liberal politicians in Paris launched yet another unity scheme and formed a Russian National Committee, which aimed to unite all the various groups of the emigration into one body. It failed however to do so, as both the left (SRs and Miliukov) and the right (the VMS) refused to cooperate with it. The Committee therefore became merely another political organisation representing few people other than itself, although it could be seen as occupying the broad centre of émigré politics. Of all the groups in émigré political 'society' the National Committee would be the closest to the Russian Army. This of itself belies the idea that the Army was inherently 'reactionary', since it was in the émigré centre that the Army was to find its strongest support.

The first steps towards creating the Russian Council were taken at a conference held in Constantinople on 29 January 1921, which considered how to create a new anti-Bolshevik political front and an organisation to lead it. Wrangel told the conference that to survive the army needed a declaration of support from émigré society. However, there was disagreement as to how the new political organisation should be structured. Wrangel wanted merely an advisory council, with final authority resting in his own hands, whereas others wanted the representatives on the council to have the decisive voice. Historians have often criticised the White generals for not having understood the political nature of the Civil War. Yet the generals' experiences in the war merely reinforced their belief that politicians were capable only of talk and incapable of action, and that they should not share power

with them.[25] As Wrangel stated:

> Хотят разделить со мной власть. Я за власть не цепляюсь. Но, пройдя через горнило бедствий, потоки крови, через Временное Нравительство, комитеты, всякие 'особые совещания', придя к единоличной власти, без которой не возможно вести борьбу - хотят теперь снова повторить тяжелые ошибки прошлого. Я не могу отнестись легкомысленно к этому факту. Передать армию в руки каких-то комитетов я не имею нравственного права перед этой армией и на это я никогда не пойду.[26]

The idea of the Russian Council ran into immediate difficulties. Representatives of the National Committee and of similar groups in Constantinople attacked the entire concept of such a council. Any organisation uniting the Russian emigration, they claimed, should be organised by 'society' and not be subordinate to the Army. Only an 'independent' council could achieve unity and protect the Army and its interests.[27] The National Committee therefore refused to join Wrangel's new body, depriving him of the participation of his closest supporters.

Nevertheless Wrangel pressed ahead with his plans to create the Russian Council. The negotiations for its formation were full of difficulties. Most problematic were the discussions held with the United Council of the Don, Kuban and Terek, for the Cossacks were determined to make the Commander-in-Chief responsible to the Council, a demand which Wrangel was unwilling to countenance.[28]

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[25] BAR, Russkii Natsional'nyi Komitet Collection, Box 5 (Letter, Wrangel to Burtsev, 25 Jan 1921).

[26] Rakovskii, Konets Belykh, p. 249.

[27] HIA, WA, 141/16/35-37 (Letter, Bureau of Temporary Russian Committee of National Union, 31 Mar 1921); & Sheets 15-16 (Letter, Political United Committee to Wrangel, 9 Mar 1921).

[28] HIA, WA, 114/14/34-36 (Letter, United Council of Don, Kuban and Terek to Wrangel, no. 1081/k, 9 Mar 1921); & Sheet 37 (Letter, United Council of Don, Kuban and Terek to Wrangel, no. 1102/k, 12 Mar 1921).

Despite these problems the project went ahead, and on 12 March 1921, a declaration was issued establishing the Russian Council.

According to the proclamation of General Wrangel, the Council was based on the principle of the succession of power, exercised by himself as Commander-in-Chief, in conjunction with social organisations.[29] The statute of the council established that it would consist in part of delegates elected by émigré social organisations and in part of appointees of the Commander-in-Chief. Authority and power was to remain firmly in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, who would have a veto.[30] The council's purpose was to mobilise émigré society in support of the army, rather than to be a truly representative institution.

The Council was, however, crippled from its inception. The biggest blow to it was the refusal of the United Council of the Don, Kuban and Terek to participate, as their demands for the Commander-in-Chief to be responsible to the Council had not been met. Ataman Bogaevskii wrote to Wrangel to say that experience had shown that individual dictatorship was no solution, and he appealed to Wrangel to seek to rebuild the struggle on new principles.[31] Wrangel regarded the actions of the Cossack Atamans as completely unforgivable, a return to the sort of 'atamanshchina' which had cost the Whites so dearly in the Civil War. From this moment on he would regard the United Cossack Council as anathema, and refuse to have any official relations with it

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[29] COC, C 20 N 1154 (Proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, 12 Mar 1921).

[30] COC, C 20 N 1154 (Statute of the Russian Council, 12 Mar 1921).

[31] BAR, Bogaevskii Collection, Box 1 (Letter, Bogaevskii to Wrangel, no. 1113/k, 14 Mar 21).

or the Atamans. This was typical of Wrangel. Desperately protective of his own authority, he was incapable of forgiving those who broke with him, which greatly complicated efforts to promote émigré unity in future years.

As a result of the Atamans' decision a final split between the High Command and the Cossack political leadership became inevitable. In practice this rupture had little effect, as the military units of the Cossacks remained under Wrangel's command, and their military leaders continued to obey Wrangel's instructions. Many of the rank and file of the Cossack units also continued to look to Wrangel as their leader.[32] Nevertheless, the split with the Cossack Atamans undoubtedly weakened Wrangel's position. His ability to speak as a political leader on behalf of all his men was fatally undermined.

Wrangel himself remained in Constantinople until March 1922, when he finally moved to Belgrade. Prior to that, in autumn 1921, the Staff of the Russian Army and the members of the Russian Council moved to Yugoslavia. Wrangel continued to hope that, with some changes, the Council might serve as the focus of a broad émigré political union.[33] In January 1922, in order to increase the breadth of the Council's base, Wrangel added to the Council delegates from the Church and émigré social organisations in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. However, the conservative nature of émigrés in those countries meant that the new members to be chosen by these organisations were likely to be primarily of a right-wing political persuasion.

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[32] For instance, HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 5, File 20 (Report from town of Vranje, July 1921).

[33] HIA, WA, 148/37/372-373 (Letter, Wrangel to Savich, no. 404/s, 12 Dec 1921).

This worried Wrangel who was determined to escape the charge of being 'reactionary', and who feared that the monarchist right would try to use the Council to further its own party interests. He therefore asked the head of the National Committee, A. Kartashev, to try to persuade Parisian circles to participate in the Council. Without their participation, he noted, the Council could acquire an undesirably narrow right-wing complexion.[34] In connection with this request, the National Committee proposed enlarging the Council and altering its structure to give more power to representatives of 'society' rather than the Commander-in-Chief, and several members of the National Committee visited Wrangel in Belgrade in March 1922 to talk with him about this. However, Wrangel insisted that political organisations could not be represented on the Council, and that he had to retain a veto. This was necessary, he said, in case the council acquired a monarchist tint and started passing monarchist resolutions. Only a veto could prevent the Council becoming the weapon of any political party which was in a majority.[35]

Wrangel's insistence on retaining control over the Council was unacceptable to the representatives of 'society', who therefore broke off negotiations. The union of émigré industrialists, 'Torgprom', for instance, refused to accept Wrangel's leading role. Having lost faith in the armed struggle against the Bolsheviks, they had begun instead to hope that the Red Army might overthrow the regime, in which case the name of Wrangel could only be a hindrance to reaching agreement with Red

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[34] BAR, Russkii Natsional'nyi Komitet Collection, Box 5 (Letter, Wrangel to Kartashev, no. k/580, 12 Jan 1922).

[35] HIA, WA, 141/16/268-271 (Letter, S. N. Il'in to Danilov, no. k/635, 30 Mar 1922).

generals.[36] The reason for the Council's failure, wrote A. I. Guchkov, was that it was regarded by émigré 'society' in France as being too right-wing.[37] In vain Wrangel pointed out that it was precisely for that reason that he had asked Kartashev to persuade the National Committee to join. In the light of the refusal of those on the political left and centre to join the Council, its abolition was now the only possibility.[38]

As predicted by Wrangel, the new inductions to the Council brought in new members of right-wing, monarchist persuasions. Wrangel therefore decided to dissolve the Council, which held its last meeting on 22 September 1922. The abolition of the Council greatly angered its monarchist members who regarded it as a direct attack on the émigré right by the Commander-in-Chief.[39] Certainly it shows that émigré 'society' was wrong to regard Wrangel and the Army he led as a reactionary force. Wrangel showed a genuine desire to reach out to the left and centre of émigré politics and to form a broad-based union. There was really very little to separate the Army from groups such as the National Committee. The creation of a broad political union was quite feasible. What wrecked it was the personal ambitions of each side, neither of which was willing to let the other be in control. In this sense Wrangel did not always help his own cause. He had a pronounced inclination towards absolutes, demanding total subordination of others to him or nothing at all. (Of

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[36] HIA, WA, 149/38/219-222 (Letter, Guchkov to Wrangel, 7 Apr 1922).

[37] HIA, WA, 149/38/32-236 (Letter, Guchkov to Wrangel, 12 Apr 1922).

[38] HIA, WA, 149/38/237-245 (Letter, Wrangel to Guchkov, 23 Apr 1922).

[39] HIA, WA, 140/13/708-733 ('Zhurnal Zasedaniia Russkogo Soveta', no. 107, 20 Sep 1922).

course, the National Committee was equally guilty in this regard).

Despite the failure of Wrangel's attempt at establishing an émigré political union under his own authority, his efforts did have a lasting impact on the emigration. Like all future efforts to create an émigré union, they left the Russian émigrés even more disunited than before and left a legacy of distrust and mutual suspicion. This was not entirely necessary, in that those who resisted Wrangel's claims to leadership of the emigration were not all hostile to either Wrangel himself or the army, but were forced by the political circumstances in Paris to abandon their former master. This was certainly true in the ambassadors' case, even if not in that of Miliukov. However, by refusing to recognise this and interpreting their actions as deliberate attacks on his own person, Wrangel helped created a climate in which the army felt itself assailed not merely by outside powers but also by its fellow émigrés. Coming on top of the efforts made by the French to disband the Army, this established the sense of paranoia and isolation that would mark the military emigration for years to come.

CHAPTER 4 - THE WHITE ARMY IN BULGARIA, 1921-1923

When agreement was reached with the Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments for the transfer of the Russian Army to those countries, the Army felt that it had at last found a safe haven. In Bulgaria this was to prove to have been an error of judgement. The Army was sucked into Bulgarian internal politics and subjected to a campaign of repression by the Bulgarian government, a campaign in which the Bolshevik secret services played a significant role. The only previous historical work to have described these events was produced by Bulgarian communist historians with the aim of proving that Wrangel had conspired to overthrow the Bulgarian government, and had been prevented from doing so by the heroic efforts of Bulgarian communists.[1] In fact, as will be shown below, Wrangel categorically rejected overthrowing the government, and his army was to find itself entirely at the mercy of events, rather than being an active participant. The experiences in Bulgaria reinforced the impression gained at Constantinople that exile was to be harsh and hostile, that the army was to have no friends, and that its members would have to stick together to survive. However, as at Constantinople, the army survived the crisis it experienced, albeit in a radically new form. It was forced to adapt rapidly, but succeeded in doing so, and in the process provided valuable aid to its members, enabling them to withstand the transition from military to civilian life.

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Those of Wrangel's troops who entered Bulgaria in 1921 were spread

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[1] G. I. Cherniavskii & D. Daskalov, Borbata na BKP protiv Vrangelistkaia Zagovor (Sofia, 1964).

throughout the country in about 40 locations, where they were housed in barracks vacated by the Bulgarian army, which after the First World War had been reduced to a few thousand men, and so no longer had use for the barracks in question. Under the terms of the treaty reached between the Bulgarian government and Wrangel's representatives in August 1921, the Bulgarian government agreed to accept not just individual refugees but organised military units, maintaining full military organisation with their command staff, and under the authority of the Russian Commander-in-Chief. Troops were allowed to wear uniform, and commanders, but not their men, retained the right to carry personal weapons.[2] On arrival in Bulgaria, the Russians were asked to surrender their weapons, but not wishing to do so entirely, they handed over only a token quantity to satisfy the local authorities, and kept the rest.[3] Most units managed to bring some weapons with them into Bulgaria, and many paraded openly with them in Bulgarian towns.

The responses of the troops and leaders of the two Russian corps in Bulgaria to their new circumstances were somewhat different. Encouraged by the commander of the Don Cossack Corps, General Abramov, Cossack troops soon started to look for work, using their barracks as bases to which they could return at night or in periods of unemployment.[4] By May 1922 about 70% of Cossacks were working outside their

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[2] Cherniavskii & Daskalov, Borbata, p. 27; Also BAR, ROVS, Box 166, Folder 'Bulgaria 1922' (Addition to Treaty, 18 Aug 1922).

[3] HIA, WA, 145/28/251-252 (Letter, Vitkovskii to Kutepov, no. 5063/g, 6 Sep 1921).

[4] Kazaki za granitsei, 1921-1925 gg. (Belgrade, 1925), p. 3.

units.[5] In contrast to the Cossack leadership, General Kutepov strongly disapproved in principle of allowing his soldiers to get work, and the men of the First Army Corps themselves were not keen to do so. Rather than working, the men of the corps devoted their time and energy to barrack life.[6] Meanwhile, despite grave financial difficulties which meant that cadets lived in very straightened circumstances, several Russian military schools which had been brought to Bulgaria continued to function, training and commissioning officer cadets of the Russian Army.[7]

The political situation in Bulgaria in 1921 and 1922 was deeply unstable. The dominant political force was the governing peasant-based Agrarian Party of Prime Minister Stamboulisky. The main opposition came from the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) and a right-wing bloc of 'bourgeois' parties. Both the BKP and the right bloc were prepared to use any means to overthrow the government. From the beginning of 1922 the BKP began an active campaign of propaganda and agitation against the Russian Army. Socialist newspapers published stories that the Russian Army was a counter-revolutionary force of landowners who were preparing to drag Bulgaria into war against Soviet Russia, that it was a 'state within a state', and that it was preparing a coup.[8] Communist meetings were held in towns throughout

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[5] BAR, Kutepov Collection, Box 3, Folder 'Bulgaria 1922' (S. V. Resnichenko, Obsledovanie polozheniia chastei Russkoi Armii v Bolgarii, May 1922; and S. V. Resnichenko, Russkie v Bolgarii, pp. 6 & 30-33).

[6] Ibid.

[7] For a description of life at the Sergievskii Artillery School in Bulgaria, see M. Karateev, Belogvardeitsy na Balkanakh (Buenos Aires, 1977), pp. 67-97.

[8] BAR, ROVS, Box 166, Folder 'Russian Army (1)' (Report, Col. Iasevich, June 1922).

Bulgaria to protest against the presence of the Russian Army, and questions on the issue were raised in the Bulgarian parliament. Attempts were made to provoke the Russians into violent action, which in some cases had the desired effect. Russian officers and soldiers did not always behave with restraint. In the town of Svishchov, a group of armed Russians exchanged shots with the Bulgarian police after a fight between a Bulgarian officer and a Russian officer.[9] Such incidents helped turn elements of the Bulgarian population against the Russians. This change in the mood of the Bulgarians was facilitated by a sometimes rather arrogant attitude displayed by Russian officers, who, as a result of the liberation of Bulgaria by the Russian Army in 1877, felt that they, as officers of the modern Russian Army, automatically deserved to be treated as liberators. Boris Aleksandrovskii noted that the Russians often offended Bulgarian national sensibilities by making it clear that they looked down on their 'younger brothers'.[10] The nationalistic Bulgarians did not always appreciate the flying of Russian flags over barracks, the mounting of armed guards, or the public parades of armed Russian troops. BKP propaganda thus fell on increasingly fertile ground.

In response to the anti-Russian campaign of the BKP, the Bulgarian government decided that it needed to show the public that it was taking action on the issue. On 23 March 1922 it passed a resolution stating that the Russians were to be fully disarmed, and that efforts were to be made to find work for the troops. It also announced that it would open talks with the Soviet government about repatriating

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[9] HIA. WA, 142/19/2 (Memo, Gendarmerie department of Ministry of War, no. 106, 11 Feb 1922).

[10] Aleksandrovskii, Iz perezhitogo, pp. 41-44.

troops to Russia.[11] Bulgarian Army commanders were instructed to round up all Russian weapons, except those held by the military schools.[12] This order was not, however, zealously enforced. The Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Army, Colonel Topaldzhikov, explained to Shatilov that the order had a purely declarative character, designed to appease public opinion, and that the government had no intention of putting it fully into effect. He and Shatilov agreed that only a token number of weapons would be handed over to give the impression that something was being done.[13] Thus the Sergievskii Artillery School in Trnovo 'disarmed' by handing over 30 of its 300 rifles and 2 of its 15 machine-guns and hiding the rest.[14] This appears to have been the standard procedure elsewhere as well.

Despite this, the situation in Bulgaria continued to become more and more tense, as the BKP organised another round of anti-Russian public meetings. The mounting tension forced the Russians to consider what their response would be if the situation got any worse. On 6 April 1922, Wrangel instructed Kutepov and Abramov that if the situation became unbearable they were to seize stores of Bulgarian armaments and march out of Bulgaria into Yugoslavia.[15] Kutepov, however, wanted

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[11] HIA, WA, 142/19/43 (Resolution of Supreme Administrative Council, 23 Mar 1922).

[12] HIA, WA, 142/19/38-39 (Circular, Col. Topaldzhikov, no. 72, 21 Mar 1922).

[13] HIA, WA, 141/19/77-78 (Telegram, Shatilov to Wrangel, no. 180, 31 Mar 1922).

[14] Karateev, Belogvardeitsy, pp. 70-71.

[15] HIA, WA, 142/19/95-96 (Letter, Wrangel to Shatilov, no. 00934, 6 Apr 1922).

more dynamic action. On 2 April 1922 he met with his senior commanders to discuss the crisis. The meeting calculated that, if it needed to, the First Army Corps could easily arm itself from Bulgarian stores, which were generally only partially guarded, and could quickly seize control of the main railways and threaten Sofia. In the event that the situation became unbearable, Kutepov argued, the Russian Army should reach agreement with the non-socialist political parties in Bulgaria, overthrow Stamboulisky, and install them in power.[16]

This plan was categorically rejected by Shatilov. In the event of an armed conflict breaking out between the various factions in Bulgaria, the Army, he wrote, must observe strict neutrality in order not to earn the hostility of the Bulgarian people and worsen the Army's position.[17] Shatilov therefore told Kutepov and Abramov that they must not interfere in Bulgarian internal affairs - "никакое предъявление нам каких бы то ни было требований со стороны болгар, не может вызвать с нашей стороны принятия активных мер к проведению того или другого нашего желания".[18] Wrangel agreed with Shatilov. He reemphasised that the Army must observe "unconditional neutrality" in Bulgarian internal affairs. Armed struggle within Bulgaria was rejected "in principle".[19]

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[16] HIA, WA, 142/19/98-99 (Letter, Kutepov to Shatilov, no. 0588, 12 Apr 1922).

[17] HIA, WA, 142/19/127-130 (Letter, Shatilov to Miller, no. 249, 25 Apr 1922).

[18] HIA, WA, 142/19/132-139 (Telegram, Shatilov to Miller, no. 256, 29 Apr 1922).

[19] HIA, WA, 142/19/140 (Letter, Wrangel to Shatilov, no. 01070, 30 Apr 1922).

At the beginning of May the Bulgarian government decided to finally clamp down on the Russian Army. The method chosen was forgery and provocation, and the pretext for the repressions against the Russian Army was a search which was conducted on 4 May 1922 of the room of Colonel Samokhvalov, a member of Wrangel's security staff. The Bulgarian police arrested Samokhvalov and declared that incriminating documents had been found in his room proving that the Russian Army had been planning a coup. These documents supposedly included an order by Wrangel, signed by both him and Shatilov in Dubrovnik on 9th April 1922, which told units "to be ready to rise up at the first sign". However, as Shatilov pointed out, neither he nor Wrangel had ever been to Dubrovnik. The document was a forgery.[20]

Behind these provocations lay the hand not just of the Bulgarian government but also of Bolshevik agents. A letter written by the head of the Soviet secret service, the GPU, reveals that the Bulgarian interior ministry was under the control of the GPU's agents.[21] A Russian provocateur named Komissarov who worked for the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior was believed to have prepared the forgeries with the knowledge of the Minister of the Interior, Daskalov.[22] Meanwhile Bolshevik agents were actively working to destroy the army from within. A Soviet agent named Shcheglov, for instance, offered General Vitkovskii a post as a corps commander in

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[20] BAR, ROVS, Box 166, Folder 'Russian Army (1)' (Report, Col. Iasevich, Jun 1922).

[21] Russkaia Voennaia Emigratsiia, Book 1, p. 377 (Letter, Yagoda to Kalinin, no. 5734, 29 Sep 1922).

[22] HIA, WA, 142/21/108-185 (Report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 20 Oct 1923).

the Red Army if he would announce his support for the Soviet regime.[23]

Whatever the source of the forged documents, Stamboulisky now had a pretext to act. On 10th May 1922, Kutepov's apartment in Veliko Trnovo was searched, and various officers were arrested. On the next day, Topaldzhikov telephoned Kutepov and invited him to Sofia to discuss the developing crisis. Kutepov suspected that he might be arrested if he went to Sofia, and asked Topaldzhikov to give his word of honour as an officer that he would be allowed to return to his troops after the interview. Topaldzhikov gave his word, but when Kutepov arrived at his office he was nonetheless arrested. Kutepov's response is revealing, as it shows the old-fashioned importance which he, like many other Russian officers, attached to the concept of honour. On being informed of his arrest, he turned to Topaldzhikov and asked simply "А где же ваше офицерское слово?".[24] To Kutepov a word of honour really meant something.

At the same time, many other senior Russian officers throughout Bulgaria were also arrested, and along with Kutepov they were expelled from the country. Also, on 11th May the Bulgarian Council of Ministers took the following decisions: to take control of all funds brought to Bulgaria for the support of the Russian refugees (some 14 million levs still remained of this); to disperse those Russians living in barracks into groups of 10 to 50 men; to distribute these groups around the country into towns and villages, where they would be put to work; and to help those who

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[23] BAR, ROVS, Box 166, Folder 'Bulgaria 1922' (Memo, Gen. Vitkovskii, 16 Sep 1922).

[24] Kutepov: Sbornik statei (Paris, 1934), p. 143. This story is repeated in numerous contemporary documents, suggesting that the incident is real.

wished to return to Russia. All Russians were henceforth forbidden to travel by rail, and all were obliged to register with the local police. Various barracks were surrounded by Bulgarian troops who searched the barracks for weapons.[25]

These actions brought a sharp riposte from Wrangel. In a typically intemperate telegram of complaint to Stamboulisky, Wrangel wrote: "Преследуемые клеветой и злобой Русские воины могут быть вынуждены сомкнуть ряды вокруг своих знамен. Встает вновь жуткий призрак братоубийства - Бог свидетель, что не мы вызываем его".[26] To Wrangel this had now become a matter of honour. As he told General Ronzhin:

> Вам надлежит прежде всего помнить, что как бы неблагоприятны не были условия, мы прежде всего должны поставить себе целью оберечь до конца достоинство русского знамени. Мы дошли до крайних предел уступчивости, дальнейшие уступки уже затрагивают честь Армии - они не смогут удовлетворить болгар, поставивших себе целью окончательно уничтожить наши войска и лишь облегчать им достижение своей цели, будучи истолкованы как признак нашей слабости .[27]

To try to defuse the situation, Wrangel decided to send General Miller to Sofia. Miller was a good choice for this task. He had served as a military attaché in various countries and possessed a tact and diplomatic skill most White generals entirely lacked. Miller arrived in Bulgaria in the middle of June 1922 and visited Prime Minister Stamboulisky to persuade him to countermand his order. He was told

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[25] Cherniavskii & Daskalov, Borbata, pp. 163-166.

[26] HIA, WA, 101/6/246 (Telegram, Wrangel to Stamboulisky, 16 May 1922).

[27] HIA, WA, 142/19/196 (Letter, Wrangel to Ronzhin, no. 001803, 18 May 1922). For similar comments see also, HIA, WA, 142/19/192-193 (Directive, Wrangel to Vitkovskii, no. 00180, 18 May 1922) & 142/19/195 (Order, Gen. Wrangel, no. 001802, 18 May 1922).

that the Bulgarian government had no complaint against the behaviour of the Russian Army, but had been obliged to act against it in order to remove a pretext for attacks against the government by the BKP.[28] In order to remove this pretext, Miller proposed that the Russian military contingents in Bulgaria be reorganised into workers' artels (see below, page 89). The titles of 'Corps', 'Division' and so on would be abolished, and efforts would be made to find the troops work. Small directorates would be formed in each region of the country to travel around the artels and report on their needs. Those unable to work would continue to be housed in barracks. In part this was merely a cosmetic change, but it also reflected a need for the army to find a new structure which would enable it to stay together as its members dispersed to find work. But, Miller pointed out, it was a change that some troops would strongly object to. In order to persuade the troops to accept these changes, all repressive measures against the troops would have to be stopped.[29] These arguments seem to have convinced the Bulgarian government, and Stamboulisky ordered local authorities not to dissolve units in barracks by force or try to disperse them to local villages, but instead merely to assist the soldiers in finding work.[30] The planned dissolution of the army therefore never took place in the manner originally envisioned. A few units were still forcibly expelled from their barracks, but in most cases units were able to keep their barracks as bases, while the men went out to

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[28] HIA, WA, 142/20/45-47 ('Beseda s Generalom Millerom', June 1922).

[29] HIA, WA, 142/20/48-53 (Letter, Miller to Daskalov, 16 Jun 1922).

[30] HIA, WA, 142/20/22 (Telegram, Miller to Abramov, no. 1699, 22 Jun 1922).

work.[31]

Harassment of the Russians continued, however. Throughout June and July there were more searches of barracks for weapons by the Bulgarian army. On July 3rd, for instance, the Kornilov Military School was surrounded and searched, and the commandant, three officers and three cadets arrested. At the Sergievskii Artillery School, a cadet was killed and 6 more wounded when a Bulgarian patrol opened fire on a group of cadets. In August the school was then forcibly transhipped to Nova Zagora from its previous location in Veliko Trnovo, but once in its new location it was allowed to continue to function.[32] The effect of all this harassment was to disarm most of the Russian contingents, and to seriously demoralise many of the troops, but the basic structure of the army survived.

The army now faced an even bigger threat, namely bankruptcy. Those funds which Wrangel had been able to preserve for his own use after the evacuation of the Crimea were exhausted, and the Bulgarian government had confiscated what remained of the funds given by the Ambassadors' Conference for the maintenance of Russian troops in Bulgaria. In these circumstances it was vital that the men find work, although the men of the First Army Corps remained reluctant to do so. In May 1922 Shatilov praised the command of the Don Cossack Corps, which put pressure on its subordinate commanders to obtain work for their men, and contrasted this with the behaviour of the Kornilov Regiment, in which neither men nor commanders showed

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[31] BAR, Kutepov Collection, Box 3, Folder 'Bulgaria 1922' ('Russkie v Bolgarii').

[32] Karateev, Belogvardeitsy, pp. 72-77.

any willingness to find work.[33] Miller was therefore instructed by Wrangel that one of the aims of his trip to Bulgaria should be to obtain work for the army's troops, preferrably in large groups, so that they could finance their own existence.[34] In Trnovo on 17th June Miller told officers of the First Army Corps that they must put up with what was happening, that the army's money was exhausted and that the corps would have to be at work by 1st September. This declaration was met with shock by the men of the First Army Corps. Senior commanders told Miller that he misunderstood the mood of the men, and that capitulation was not possible. General Vitkovskii, who had replaced Kutepov as corps commander, issued an order telling units to take all measures to put the largest possible number of men to work,[35] but he also felt obliged to check Miller's instructions himself. He sent a loyal officer to Wrangel's headquarters in Yugoslavia to seek the Commander-in-Chief's decision.[36] This resulted in an order issued by Wrangel on 4th July 1922, which stated:

> Наша казнь истощена - мы стоим перед суровой необходимостью собственным трудом снискать средства к жизни. В Сербии части наши уже обеспечены работой. Пусть каждый, кто в силах, становится на работу. Он облегчит помощь другим. Не теряете связи с родными частями. Заменив винтовку лопатой и шашку топором, Вы останетесь членами родной полковой семьи и Русскими воинами,

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[33] HIA, WA, 142/19/150-152 (Telegram, Shatilov to Miller, no. 292, 9 May 1922).

[34] HIA, WA, 142/20/27-30 (Circular, Gen. Wrangel, Nos 886-908, 12 Jun 1922).

[35] HIA, WA, 142/20/93 (Order, Gen. Vitkovskii, 18 Jun 1922).

[36] BAR, Kutepov Collection, Box 3, Folder 'Bulgaria 1922' ('Russkie v Bolgarii').

орлами Русской Армии.[37]

This, more certainly than the actions of Stamboulisky, sealed the fate of the Army. Throughout summer and autumn 1922 its troops gradually left their barracks in search of work. Most found some, but the only work most Russians could hope to find was physical labour. The largest single concentration of workers was at the Pernik coal mines, where around 1,500 Russians worked. Conditions there were described as "fully satisfactory", due to the lack of flooding or coal dust in the mines. Men there worked an 8 hour day and were fed and accommodated by the mine.[38] A few Cossack units were able to obtain work in large groups,[39] but most soldiers were not able to find such steady labour, and had to settle for individual jobs which were short-term and seasonal, as well as badly paid and very physically demanding. M. Karateev, for instance, after being commissioned from the Sergievskii Artillery School, had a succession of jobs in a coal mine, house building, in an orchestra, at a gypsum quarry and brick making.[40] V. Dushkin sang in a choir before moving to work at the Black Sea coal mine, but stayed there only three weeks, and eventually found work again at a salt mine.[41] Volunteer Ivanov tried and failed to get a job road-building, and eventually got employment brick-making. He then became an

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[37] BAR, Kutepov Collection, Box 3, Folder 'Bulgaria 1922' (Order no. 271, Gen. Wrangel, 4 Jul 1922).

[38] HIA, 145/28/455-458 ('Usloviia postanovki russkikh rabochikh na rabote na dobyche uglia v derzhavnykh shakhtakh "Pernik" ').

[39] Kazaki za granitsei, p. 6.

[40] Karateev, Belogvardeitsy, pp. 107-162.

[41] Dushkin, Zabytye, pp. 125-127.

Englishman's manservant, before falling ill, after which he worked first as an icon-peddler, and later as a railway worker loading and unloading rail wagons. When that job also expired, he got work in a sugar factory.[42] These were fairly typical examples of the fates of the officers and men of the First Army Corps and the military schools. Such men were thrust from their vaunted status as military officers down to the lowest social levels, and occupied the bottom rung of the economic ladder. The Cossacks on the whole did not suffer quite so badly, as many of them settled down to a life in agriculture, but their lives were still far from easy.

The main emotions of Russian officers in their new circumstances were, according to one veteran, humiliation and shame. Nevertheless many retained their faith in the cause, and in a perverse Dostoyevskian way found purpose in their sufferings. The intense sufferings of the Russian officer, wrote F. Anikin in 1923, would lead to resurrection and through this to the salvation of the Russian people as a whole, - "мои унижения имеют свой смысл ... в священном огне моей любви к Родине и вере и надежде на хорошое светлое будущее".[43] The Russian officer's image of himself as a member of a moral élite was thus only reinforced by his sufferings.

Maintaining any form of military organisation in the army's new circumstances represented a major challenge. Nevertheless this was done. In every major unit a small cadre and command staff was preserved, while the mass of the

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[42] Volunteer Ivanov, 'Po sledam pamiati', Vestnik Pervopokhodnika, Nos 42-48.

[43] GARF, 5881/1/213 (F. Anikin, 'Ofitser na rabote', Yambol, Bulgaria, Jan 1923).

soldiers and officers left to find work. This cadre had the responsibility of maintaining links among the dispersed troops, and of providing aid and shelter to those unit members unable to find work or too ill to work. In locations where many Russians worked together, so-called 'work groups' were established, each with a senior officer in charge. Where units had been allowed to keep their barracks, these barracks were kept going as refuges where troops could return in the intervals between jobs. This was especially important in the winter of 1922/3 when much of the seasonal work which had kept men going in the summer and autumn came to an end, although it did sometimes have the unintended side-effect of inducing men to live off the welfare of their unit rather than seek work. Many men of the First Army Corps remained very reluctant to work at all.[44]

The new structure adopted by the Army ressembled that of the Russian 'zemliachestvo'. Prior to the revolution, most Russian industrial workers were peasants who maintained close contacts with their villages. Workers from the same village would bind together into a 'zemliachestvo' to obtain employment and living quarters, and through this would continue to consider themselves members of the village.[45] In the case of the Russian Army the military unit was substituted for the village, but the principle was the same. Where large numbers of Russians were concentrated together, as at Pernik, they adopted another Russian form - the 'artel'. This was a form of cooperative society, in which workers pooled their wages to pay for communal services such as accommodation, cooking and cleaning. In this

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[44] HIA, WA, 145/28/488-496 (Minutes of commission of Stroitel'naia Kontora, no 121, 25 Feb 1923).

[45] Figes, People's Tragedy, p. 110.

fashion, some members of a work group would not work in the mine or factory, but be employed by the artel to cook or wash. The methods by which the Russian Army adapted to its new circumstances thus followed Russian traditions.

Meanwhile the relative lull in the campaign against the Russian Army came to an end in September 1922. By this time Stamboulisky feared a right-wing coup against his government, and decided to further destroy the Russian Army, which he regarded as a potential ally of the Bulgarian right. A search of the rooms of one senior Russian officer, General Ronzhin, 'revealed' more documents, planted by the Bulgarians themselves, purporting to show that Wrangel was plotting with the opposition parties in Bulgaria to mount a coup. Weapons were also 'found' at the Russian embassy.[46] These 'discoveries' gave the government a pretext for renewed repressions and an opportunity to whip up public anger against the Russians, as a result of which 17 unit commanders were expelled from the country. However, by this time the new army structure was sufficiently in place to withstand these blows and the army's organisation survived. This was in part because the government's assaults on the army were once again rather patchy, with many units still being allowed to keep their barracks and with the military schools continuing to train officer cadets unmolested. Nevertheless, the situation remained tense for the Russians. They could never know when further attacks might take place or whether the government might not decide to destroy their organisation entirely.

Meanwhile, a new threat had emerged in the form of the 'Soiuz Vozvrashcheniia na Rodinu', ('Sovnarod') . This organisation was formed in May

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[46] For the Russian version of these events, see HIA, WA, 88/3/208-216 ('Svodka Informatsionnykh Svedenii', no. 9, 15 Sep 1922).

1922 and had as its aim the encouragement and organisation of repatriations to the Soviet Union. Stamboulisky's government gave Sovnarod its direct support. It held meetings in towns where Russian troops were located and persuaded them to sign up to return home. The harshness of conditions of life in Bulgaria and the demoralisation brought about by the government's campaigns against the army gave Sovnarod some success, especially among Cossacks. By September 1922 Sovnarod had registered 65 local groups with 5,300 members. The organisation's work was aided by agents of the GPU, who agitated among members of the Russian Army to persuade them to accept repatriation, largely by using the ideas of 'Smena Vekh' to play on soldiers' sense of patriotism and convince them that they should return home to help rebuild Russia.[47]

In autumn 1922 an agreement was reached between the Soviet government and the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, F. Nansen, in which the Soviets confirmed a general amnesty for the rank and file of the White armies (officers had to receive personal amnesties). As a result, in October 1922, Nansen issued a declaration on repatriation from Bulgaria.[48] Between May and October 1922, 3,887 Russians had already returned in unorganised groups to the Soviet Union, and Sovnarod now organised more repatriations, as a result of which 3,751 returned home between October 1922 and May 1923.[49] Few of these were officers or members of the

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[47] Russkaia Voennaia Emigratsiia, Book 2, pp. 263-266 & 591.

[48] Cherniavskii & Daskalov, Borbata, pp. 222-227.

[49] D. Daskalov, 'Sofia: die russischen Flüchtlinge in Bulgarien', in Karl Schlögel (ed), Die Grosse Exodus, pp. 74-75.

First Army Corps. The great majority of those who were repatriated were Cossacks.

In June 1923, the government of Stamboulisky was overthrown in a coup. The White Russian forces took no part in the coup and observed strict neutrality.[50] In some locations the Bulgarian Army offered arms to the Russians for their self-defence in case of counter-attacks by supporters of the government, but these offers were refused.[51] As a result of the coup the restrictions which had been placed on the Russian Army by Stamboulisky's regime were rescinded. In addition, the funds which had been confiscated in May 1922 were returned to Russian control. However, it turned out that Stamboulisky's government had spent a large portion of the money on repatriating Russians. Furthermore, the Russian diplomatic representative in Bulgaria, Serafim, who received control of the funds from the government, would not allow representatives of the army to participate in meetings to discuss the distribution of aid to refugees, even though this money had been specifically assigned to aid members of the army. As Miller explained to Girs, thousands of members of the army, who had expected this money to be spent on their needs, were deeply offended by this treatment.[52] It highlighted, in their eyes, the manner in which émigré 'society' ignored the wishes and needs of the army.

The parlous financial state of the army required the process of dispersal in

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[50] HIA, WA, 142/21/32 & 38 (Letters, Ronzhin to Wrangel, 26 Jun 1923; & Wrangel to Tyrkova-Williams, no. k/2239, 25 Jun 1923).

[51] HIA, WA, 142/21/39-43 (Col. A. Zaitsov, 'Svodka po perevorote na mestakh').

[52] HIA, Miller Archive, Box 10, File 19 (Letters, Miller to Girs, Jan & Feb 1924; & Stavitskii to Miller, 18 Mar 1924); Box 11, File 4 (Letter, Stavitskii to Miller, 29 Jun 1923); File 5 (Letter, Miller to Girs, 25 Jun 1923); & File 8 (Letter, Stavitskii to Miller, 6 Sep 1923).

seek of work to continue. Efforts were continued to concentrate soldiers from the same units at the same places of work in order to maintain as much cohesion as possible. At places where large numbers of soldiers were working together, the Russians were housed in separate barrack blocks from the Bulgarian workers, and divided up by units, each with their own senior. At Pernik, for instance, men were accommodated according to their units, each battalion occupying its own barrack. Nearby, the Kornilov regiment rented a house for its regimental headquarters, and those unable to work were accommodated there.[53] The pretence that military units still existed was thus maintained. The military schools commissioned their last classes of cadets in June 1923, after which the schools closed but kept their barracks for several more years as bases for their ex-cadets.

By the middle of 1924, the Gallipoli group in Bulgaria (as the First Army Corps had been renamed) was divided into 60 work groups of between 15 and 1,500 men, each with its own senior, and the Don group was similarly organised. The country was divided up into 11 regions, each with its own regional commander. The largest group was at Pernik (1,394 men), and of approximately 10,000 members of the Gallipoli group, there remained without work only 192 officers and soldiers of the regimental cadres, 335 invalids and 43 unemployed.[54] Each regiment still retained a cadre, paid for from Wrangel's budget, of 5 to 6 men, and a barrack or building in which the unemployed could find shelter. Troops were expected to contribute 15 levs

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[53] Col. Riabinskii, 'Pernik', Iubileinaia Pamiatka: Kornilovtsy, 1917-1967, p. 136.

[54] BAR, ROVS, Box 166, Folder 'Russian Army, 1923-1924' (Svodka o zhizni chastei gallipoliiskoi gruppy v Bolgarii, Aug 1923-Aug 1924).

monthly from their salaries to keep the regimental organisation intact, and to help those in need. General Wrangel ordered the creation in every unit of a reserve capital to provide aid to the sick and unemployed.[55] Life was necessarily hard. Physical labour remained the norm, and conditions were often very poor. Returning to Bulgaria for an inspection of troops of the Gallipoli Group in December 1923, Kutepov noted that only 10% of soldiers were well set up. He commented that he met toughened officers with battle experience who cried when describing their situation in Bulgaria. At the Plakhovtsy mines, for instance, the workers' barracks were dirty, there were no toilets and only one tap. The mines were poorly fortified. Those working in sugar factories had to endure foul smells and terrible heat. Despite this, officers' faith in the Army and in General Wrangel remained high.[56] The worst conditions were possibly at the Black Sea coal mine, where it was reported that 100% of the Russians had malaria and that the work was in perpetual dirt and water.[57] However, despite the pressures for dissolution that such harsh conditions produced, the army's organisation and cohesion remained remarkably intact.

The fall of Stamboulisky did not entirely remove the threat to the army. The BKP remained active and was preparing an attempt to seize power. On 23 September 1923 a communist uprising began. Wrangel instructed his commanders not to interfere in the internal affairs of Bulgaria, but did permit self-defence in the event of

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[55] General E. K. Miller, Armiia, (Belgrade, 1924), pp. 6-9.

[56] HIA, WA, 145/28 (Report, Kutepov to Wrangel, no. 01255, 12 Dec 1923).

[57] Vestnik Pravleniia Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 2, 31 Jan 1924, p. 10.

attacks by communists.[58] In general the White troops stayed out of the conflict except where self-defence required participation. In the north-west of the country, where the situation was particularly bad, several hundred troops of the Markovskii regiment were brought together under General Peshnia, and played an important role in clearing the area of communists.[59] This was the last time that units of the Russian Army were to fight together as an organised body. With the defeat of the communist uprising, the threat to the army was removed. Henceforth the army's new organisation would be able to continue unmolested.

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The events in Bulgaria had two contradictory effects. In some they created a sense of despair, which resulted in their decision to leave the army, and, in the case of many Cossacks, to return home. In others, however, it had the opposite effect. Without friends and support in the outside world they turned in on themselves and clung ever closer together. To those who stayed with the army, it offered a source of hope and purpose in a world which otherwise lacked any, and it offered a memory of status and a hope of renewed status for those who had sunk to the lowest rungs of society and descended to darkest poverty. Given the hostility of the surrounding environment, the Army and its High Command were their only defences against the outside world. Many therefore remained fiercely loyal to it, and especially to General

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[58] BAR, Bogaevskii Collection, Box 1, Folder 'Catalogued correspondence, Wrangel to Bogaevskii' (Letter, Wrangel to Bogaevskii, no. 03816, 26 Sep 1923).

[59] HIA, WA, 142/21/54-99 ('Svodki ob obstanovke v mestakh raspolozheniia russkikh garnizonov i rabochikh partii', 26, 28 & 29 Sep 1923, 1, 11, 17 & 20 Oct 1923). Also, Davatz, Fünf Sturmjahre, pp. 202-205.

Wrangel, who was seen as their main protector. As one officer wrote from Pernik to a friend in Belgrade in 1923:

> Боже Вас упаси подумать, что ... мы забываем о нем, нашем вожде и защитнике, ... о том, чье имя для нас свято навсегда, кто наш кумир ... Мы готовы броситься за нашим любимым вождем-кумиром в огонь и в воду, не спрашивая куда и зачем ведет, ... мы его обожаем, мы ему бесконечно верим.[60]

The conditions in which the soldiers of the Russian Army had to work were very tough. The army offered support at a time and place when material support was unavailable from other sources. The retention of army barracks and unit cadres gave soldiers a home to which they could return when out of work or sick. These things greatly facilitated the transferral of the troops to a working life, and eased what would in any event have been a painful transition. It has sometimes been claimed that the insistence by the army on maintaining its existence hindered the adaptation of military émigrés to the realities of life in exile.[61] Yet the evidence from Bulgaria suggests that this was not so. In the case of the men of the First Army Corps, who were so reluctant to abandon their military way of life, it was only the insistence of General Wrangel that they do so that enabled a smooth and relatively successful transition to a new form of existence. The army's leaders and structures helped its soldiers adapt.

The pressure applied to the army in Bulgaria, both from the government and from financial difficulties, was such that the army's continued existence was not

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[60] HIA, Miller Collection, Box 16, File 22 (Letter, unknown at Pernik to V. Kh. Davatz, 25 Apr 1923).

[61] See for instance, V. F. Ershov, 'Adaptatsiia rossiiskoi voennoi emigratsii v stranakh razmeshcheniia v 1920-e gody', in Iu. A. Poliakov & V. N. Shamshurov (eds), Istoriia rossiiskogo zarubezh'ia: problemy adaptatsii migrantov v XIX-XX vekakh (Moscow, 1996), p. 91.

foreordained. The most likely result of this pressure would have been a total dissolution of all military structures and the dispersion of the soldiers. Such a dispersion would have rendered much more difficult the creation of any form of émigré society in Bulgaria, and it was prevented only by the actions of the Army High Command, which took timely measures to ensure the survival of some sort of military organisation. In this way the very existence of what is known as 'Russia Abroad' can be shown to have depended in part on the determination of the High Command to create such a society abroad, and to get its troops to stick together as Russians.

CHAPTER 5 - PUTTING THE ARMY TO WORK, 1921 - 1926

Bulgaria was not the only country in which the High Command of the Russian Army provided valuable aid to its troops to enable them to find work and adapt to their new circumstances. Substantial aid was provided in both Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Despite this, some contemporaries believed (as do some historians) that far from aiding their troops, the Army's High Command played a thoroughly negative role, standing in the way of those who were trying to help the Russian refugees, and keeping alive futile hopes of a return to Russia. Thomas Frank Johnson, for instance, who worked in the 1920s for the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees, wrote of Russian émigré leaders, with the army's leadership particularly in mind, that they deliberately sabotaged the process of repatriating refugees, in order that the refugees would remain "exactly where their leaders wanted them - at the mercy of their exploitation".[1] Similarly, Sir John Hope Simpson commented negatively on Wrangel's objections "to every effort to give the soldiers freedom to disperse",[2] while a study of the papers of the American Red Cross concluded that "many White Russian leaders did not want the problems of Russian refugees to be solved, since frustrated refugees were a source of their anticipated strength for overthrowing the communist regime".[3] Yet such negative conclusions are not shared by all. V. Kh. Davatz and N. N. L'vov felt that the preservation of the army's organisation eased the transition of its members to civilian life, saying that

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[1] T. F. Johnson, International Tramps: From Chaos to World Peace (London, 1938), pp. 285-381.

[2] Sir John Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem: Report of a Survey (London, 1939), p. 71.

[3] Hutchins, Wrangel Refugees, p. 177.

"Если бы вся эта масса ... была сразу брошена на европейский рынок труда, она погубила бы себя в борьбе за существование".[4] In the same vein, a Russian historian recently wrote that "Документы воинских организаций убедительно показывают, что воинским чинам, объединенным в группы, союзы и.т.п., было легче преодолевать житейские трудности, нежели отдельным лицам".[5]

This chapter examines the role of the Russian Army's command in providing humanitarian aid to its troops, and in so doing endorses the last comment cited above. It emerges that through the efforts of the command, in particular of General Shatilov, work was found for thousands of Russians. Direct humanitarian aid was also provided to many of those for whom work could not be found or who were struck down by illness, and hundreds of students were also helped to gain further education, so giving them an opportunity to rise out of the general émigré poverty. This contribution to the life of many thousands of military émigrés deserves recognition.

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Czechoslovakia

While the Russian Army was still in Turkey, an offer was made by the Czechoslovak government to receive 100 soldiers as part of the 'Action Russe', a scheme under which the government subsidised the education in Czechoslovakia of Russian refugees. As a result 100 men of the First Army Corps left Gallipoli for

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[4] Davatz & Lvov, Russkaia Armiia, p. 96. For similar comments, see Alexis Wrangel, General Wrangel, p. 239.

[5] A. L. Raikhtsaum, 'Dokumental'nye materialy RZIA po istorii adaptatsii rossiiskoi emigratsii', in Poliakov, Tarle & Shamshurov (eds), Istoriia rossiiskogo zarubezh'ia, p. 42.

Czechoslovakia on 26th October 1921 to attend Czechoslovak universities.[6] More former army officers came to Czechoslovakia to study after the army went to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in late 1921, and by December 1923 there were 3,245 Russian students in Czechoslovakia.[7] Many of these were officers who entered the country from Bulgaria as individuals, often illegally, once the Russian Army in Bulgaria began to disperse.[8]

Most Russian students carried out studies in technical subjects, such as agriculture and engineering, and were accommodated in Russian student barracks, which were dreadfully overcrowded. Some had to sleep on benches or in cupboards.[9] As late as 1926 students were sleeping two to a bed in some locations.[10] On graduating from their institutes, some found work in Czechoslovakia, but many Russians had great difficulty in obtaining work matching their qualifications, and left the country.

From the beginning efforts were made to preserve some form of organisation among officers and soldiers of the Russian Army in Czechoslovakia. The first group of Gallipoliitsy which arrived in November 1921 formed a 'group of student-

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[6] For a description of the departure of this group, see the diary of one student, Captain G. A. Orlov, in BAR, G. A. Orlov Collection, Box 1.

[7] Hutchins, Wrangel Refugees, p. 161.

[8] For a description of how such officers entered Czechoslovakia see V. V. Almendinger, Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo v Brno: pamiatnaia zapiska o zhizni Gallipoliitsev v Brno, 1923-1945 (Huntington Park, California, 1968), pp. 11-17, 84 & 88.

[9] Ibid, p. 17.

[10] HIA, Vooruzhennye Sily Iuzhnoi Rossii Ssudnoe Otdelenie, Box 3, File 13 ('Informatsionnyi Listok 1-go Armeiskogo Korpusa, no. 7, 31 Mar 1926).

Gallipoliitsy' under the most senior officer among them, Lt. Col. Prokofiev, through whom contacts were maintained with the Russian Army. Later, veterans of the Russian Army established various other student organisations, such as the Society of Russian Students at Příbram, which in 1927 joined ROVS.[11] A larger group was the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, founded in 1923, which by 1924 had 150 members in Brno alone (out of a total of 600 Russian students in Brno),[12] and which in the 1930s had about 600 members throughout Czechslovakia.[13]

The greatest problem facing Russian students in Czechoslovakia was money. Some students received stipends from the Czech government, but others received nothing at all. The primary purpose of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo (in addition to maintaining links among Russian veterans) was to provide aid to those members who could not afford their education. Using money obtained from membership fees and charity events such as balls, the organisation guaranteed a dinner for all in need by giving out dinner coupons valid at Russian student hostels. It also provided stipends to cover petty expenses, and helped pay students' matriculation fees.[14] In the 1930s, when most of its members had already graduated, the organisation provided stipends to young Russians who came from Bulgaria to study in Czechoslovakia.[15]

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[11] HIA, Chasovoi Collection, (S"ezd Gallipoliitsev Chekhoslovakii 4-5 Iiunia 1933 goda v Prage').

[12] Vestnik Pravleniia Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 6, 1 Jun 1926, p. 9.

[13] GARF, 5759/1/55/7 ('Gallipoliiskaia gruppa v Chekhoslovakii', 12 Jun 1932).

[14] HIA, Vooruzhennye Sily Iuzhnoi Rossii Ssudnoe Otdelenie, Box 3, File 13 ('Informatsionnyi Listok 1-go Armeiskogo Korpusa, no. 7, 31 Mar 1926).

[15] BAR, ROVS, Box 7, Folder 'Correspondence, Czech Group, 1930-1931' (Letter, Kharzhevskii to Vitkovskii, 13 Dec 1930).

The Society of Russian Students at Příbram provided stipends to between 14 and 20 students a year throughout the 1920s and 1930s.[16] In this way, the army, and later ROVS, made a continuing commitment to the education of their members.

This was true in other countries as well as Czechoslovakia. In Belgrade, for instance, the Commander-in-Chief provided money and free dinners to the Gallipoli-Students organisation, which by 1924 had some 200 members.[17] Wrangel provided funds to repair a building in Belgrade which was then used as a student hostel, housing over 100 students, and feeding up to 350 a day.[18] Since obtaining a university degree was one of the very few ways in which Russian exiles could escape from the penury of émigré existence, the army and ROVS provided an invaluable source of help for hundreds of their members, and helped greatly to alleviate their lives in exile. In Czechoslovakia, therefore, many members felt that the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo fulfilled a useful purpose. The organisation's archive contains many letters from members thanking it for the support it gave them while they were studying at Czechoslovak universities. As one member wrote, "Помощь мне была оказана не только материальная, но и моральная, т.к. я почувствовал, что я не одинок, и что организация сильна".[19] Similarly, Colonel V. V. Almendinger commented that:

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[16] HIA, Chasovoi Collection, (S"ezd Gallipoliitsev Chekhoslovakii 4-5 Iiunia 1933 goda v Prage').

[17] Vestnik Pravleniia Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 5, 27 Apr 1924, pp. 3-5.

[18] HIA, WA, 108/9/158-159 (Memo, Gen. Kussonskii, no. 02625, 10 Feb 1923).

[19] GARF, 5759/1/64/284 (Letter, D. Stetsenko to the directorate of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, 18 Feb 1936).

> Пребывание в Землячестве заменяло галлиполийцам не только состояние в военной части, но, до некоторой степени, Родину и даже семью. Это было то, что еще осталось и многие этим дорожили и отдавали много сил и времени Землячеству. Землячество помогало по мере сил вновь прибывшим и уже одним этим выполняло долг поддержки не только материальной, но и моральной. Вновь прибывший "неиждивенец" попал к своим и не чувствовал себя отчужденным и заброшенным. У каждого создавалось уверенность в скором достижении возможности учиться в условиях хотя бы и более чем скромных.[20]

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Yugoslavia

Those who went to Czechoslovakia were far outnumbered by the many thousands who moved to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria at the end of 1921. During negotiations in 1921, the Yugoslav government was persuaded to employ members of the same military unit on the same project, so ensuring that units were kept together. As a result, the Cavalry Division of the First Army Corps, the Life Guards Don Battalion, and the Kuban Guards Regiment (in all some 5,000 men) joined the Yugoslav border service. The Kuban Division was sent en masse to Vranje in Serbia where it carried out road and railway construction in the areas of Vranje and Niš, and the Technical Regiment of the First Army Corps built railways.

In general, Yugoslavia was the most hospitable and generous of all European nations towards the Russians. The Yugoslav government provided the Russian émigrés with large sums of money out of its annual state budget, which were distributed by a body known as the 'Derzhavnaia Kommissiia'. This gave aid to the sick and unemployed, helped provide retraining and find employment, and funded Russian schools. Among the latter were the 3 Cadet Corps which had accompanied

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[20] Almendinger, Galllipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, p. 77.

the Russian Army into exile (the Russian Cadet Corps, the Don Cossack Alexander III Cadet Corps, and the Crimean Cadet Corps).[21] Until 1923, graduates of the Corps were sent on to the Russian military schools in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to be trained and commissioned as officers, but these schools finally closed in that year. Thereafter many from the Cadet Corps went on to attend university in Yugoslavia and in Belgium. Graduates of the Cadet Corps were also accepted into the Yugoslav military academy in Belgrade, and many followed this route and joined the Yugoslav army.[22]

The Cadet Corps aimed to provide a full education for boys, but with the addition of the traditional Russian military values which had been taught in Cadet schools in Imperial Russia. This brought the Corps into some conflict with the liberals who ran the education department of the Derzhavnaia Kommissia, who wished to focus more on providing an education likely to help young émigrés find useful employment or further education.[23] For this reason, in late 1924 a number of reforms were undertaken by the commission to dilute the military nature of the schools, which made those connected with the Corps feel that the Derzhavnaia Kommissia was deliberately aiming to undermine them.[24]

Although the Army and later ROVS had no official connection with the Cadet Corps, they continued to show a keen interest in them. With time, falling attendance

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[21] Vl. Maevskii, Russkie v Iugoslavii: vzaimootnosheniia Rossii i Serbii (Tom 2) (New York, 1966), pp. 14-17.

[22] Kadetskie Korpusa za rubezhom, 1920-1945 (New York, 1970).

[23] BAR, ROVS, Box 85, Folder 'Russkii Kadetskii Korpus' (Letter, B. Oreshkov to the directors of the Don, Russian and Crimean Cadet Corps, 27 Mar 1924).

[24] BAR, ROVS, Box 85, Folder 'Russkii Kadetskii Korpus' (Letter, Prikhodnii to Kutepov, 14 Nov 1928).

rolls and lack of funds forced two of the Corps to close - the Crimean Corps in 1929 and the Don Corps in 1933. When the Russian Cadet Corps was then threatened with closure in 1936, General Miller personally intervened to help it, by writing directly to Prince Paul of Yugoslavia. This had the desired effect, and the school was saved.[25] The Russian Cadet Corps continued in existence until 1945, when it fled the advancing Red Army and was closed. Through their support of the Corps, the army and ROVS made a small contribution to the maintenance of Russian culture abroad, the education of a new generation of Russians as Russians, and the preservation of the traditions of the Imperial Russian Army.

In addition to the funds given by the Derzhavnaia Kommissia, the Yugoslav government also aided many Russian émigrés by providing direct employment in its army and civil service. The Military-Topographical section of the Russian Army, for instance, which consisted of about 100 officers, was employed by the Yugoslav army, and these helped train a new generation of Yugoslav military topographers.[26] Service in the Yugoslav armed forces was particularly open to those with technical skills which the Yugoslavs lacked, such as engineers, artillery officers and pilots.[27] In addition, about 500 former Cadets of the three Russian Cadet Corps were

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[25] BAR, ROVS, Box 85, Folder 'Russkii Kadetskii Korpus' (Letter, Miller to Col. V. A. Rozanov, 27 Feb 1936).

[26] Maevskii, Russkie v Iugoslavii, pp. 57-61. Also, General Professor I. S. Svishchov, 'Pochemu ia ne popal v Gallipoli', Gallipoli-Lemnos-Chataldzha-Bizerta: iubilenyi al'manakh-pamiatnik (Hollywood, 1950), p. 39.

[27] HIA, WA, 145/29/768-780 ('Kratkie svedeniia o sluzhbe i deiatel'nosti russkikh voennykh kontingentov i ofitserskikh obshchestv v korolevstve SKhS', 14 Feb 1924).

commissioned into the Yugoslav army during the 1920s and 1930s.[28]

The 5,000 men who worked in the Yugoslav border service served in their own units under their own officers, but the conditions of service were very hard. A report of May 1922 noted that inflation had cut into wages and that troops were rarely able to buy meat. Their families lived in poverty, there was a shortage of medicine, and morale was falling.[29] In November 1922 the border guards service was turned into a new 'finance-control' department and the number of Russians offered employment in the new service was reduced to 1,700. This meant that 3,300 Russians lost their jobs. From spring 1923 about 2,000 jobs were provided for the men of the Cavalry Divison building a road from Kraljevo to Raška (a project which was partially subsidised by General Wrangel until January 1925), and some others were provided with jobs railway-building in Slovenia.[30] In 1924 some 4,000 Russian troops were employed in road-building projects on the Kraljevo-Raška road and at other locations.[31]

Efforts were made where possible to obtain work contracts for entire units in order to keep them together. The Life Guards Don and Ataman battalions were especially successful in this regard. On being released from the border service they were employed as forestry workers near Gorniak. Conditions there were very hard.

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[28] V. A. Tesemnikov, 'Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Iugoslavii', Voprosy Istorii, No. 10, 1988, p. 130.

[29] HIA, WA, 145/29/449-453 (Report, Maj. Gen. Kreiter, 1 May 1922). See also Russkaia Voennaia Emigratsiia, Book 2, pp. 586-589 (Report, Gen. Globachev, 11 Feb 1922).

[30] HIA, WA, 145/29/643-645 (Memo, Gen. Kussonskii, 'Gallipoliitsy v Iugoslavii', no. 02825, 15 Mar 1923); & Davatz, Fünf Sturmjahre, pp. 170-173.

[31] Gen. E. K. Miller, Armiia (Belgrade, 1924), p. 9.

Salaries were hardly sufficient to pay for food, the workers' barracks were in poor condition and the weather was continually rainy or snowy. Extra funds had to be provided by the Commander-in-Chief to help the troops survive.[32] In June 1923 they moved out of Gorniak and found work railway-building in much better conditions.[33]

The men of the Kuban Division who were road-building in the area of Vranje remained there until 1925. The group constructing a railway near Niš was later provided with various other large scale contracts railway-building and mining. The Kuban Guards Regiment (which had previously worked in the border service) eventually found employment at the Belishte lumber works of a Baron Gutman, where they were joined by the Life Guard Kuban and Terek Companies who had previously worked at another of Gutman's enterprises, a sugar factory at Beli Manastir. These contracts kept the Kuban troops closely together, and by 1927 they were still all working as units of company and battalion size.[34] Indeed, the Life Guard Kuban and Terek Companies worked at Belishte right up until the Second World War, and all that time lived in unit barracks with their command structure intact.[35] Other elements of the Kuban Division also stayed together throughout the 1930s. In 1933, for instance, elements of the Division began work filling in dikes on the Danube under the personal command of the Divisional commander, General

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[32] Kazaki za granitsei, pp. 17-18.

[33] Ibid, p. 18; & HIA, WA, 145/29/671-673 (Report, Col. Iasevich, 'Kazaki v Serbii', 10 Sep 1923).

[34] Kazaki za granitsei, p. 14; HIA, WA, 145/29/671-673 (Report, Col. Iasevich, 10 Sep 1923); HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 1 (Report, Zborovskii to Wrangel, no. 91, 25 Feb 1927).

[35] Chasovoi, no. 178, 15 Nov 1936, pp. 3-6.

Zborovskii.[36] Of all the units of the Russian Army, the Kuban Division stayed together the longest. It was sufficiently cohesive for 600 of its members to meet and parade in full uniform, with regimental flags flying, at a memorial held for the assassinated King Alexander of Yugoslavia at his grave at Oplenats in June 1935.[37]

The Kuban Division excepted, by late 1924 the opportunities for large-scale organised work were coming to an end. The finance control department reduced the numbers of Russians working for it from 1,700 to 800, and in January 1925 Wrangel ceased his subsidy for the Kraljevo-Raška road project, after which only members of the Kuban Division were left road and rail-building as organised units. Elements of the Cavalry Division were able to find work at the State tobacco monopoly, but more and more units were obliged to disperse so that their members could find individual employment.[38] Furthermore, many troops were by now exhausted from the hard physical labour of the past few years. Visiting Kuban Cossacks roadbuilding near Vranje in June 1924, Wrangel noted that "от тяжелой работы, однофазия и дикости места, люди усталы и того духовного подъема, который я видел в прошлом году, теперь не было".[39] Morale was better in other locations Wrangel visited, but nevertheless it had become evident by this stage that the old system of the troops working en masse on construction projects or as border guards was coming to an end.

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[36] Russkii Golos, no. 117, 2 Jul 1933, p. 3.

[37] Russkii Golos, no. 219, 16 Jun 1935, p. 2.

[38] HIA, WA, 146/31/582-584 (Letter, Wrangel to Lukomskii, no. 1956/s, 7 Sep 1925).

[39] BAR, ROVS, Box 171, Folder 'Sovet ob"edinennykh ofitserskikh obshchestv (1924)' (Order no. 29, Gen. Wrangel, 12 Jun 1924).

Providing aid to the troops throughout this period was expensive, and by early 1922 the Commander-in-Chief's exchequer was empty. However, a means was found of avoiding financial disaster, which was to liquidate the assets of the Petrograd Credit Institution. These consisted of money and valuables left as deposits on loans and mortgages. The institution had moved its assets south to the Caucasus for safekeeping when the German army approached Petrograd in 1917. There, during the Civil War, they were captured by troops of Denikin's army, and subsequently evacuated to Yugoslavia. In 1922 it was decided to liquidate those deposits on which the time-limit for repayment of the loan had expired. This raised 41.5 million dinars, which was spent on the upkeep of the army, providing personal loans to those in need, training and education, medical care, help to the unemployed and so on.[40] In Sofia, for instance, the army rented hostels to provide cheap accommodation for those in need.[41] The Don Corps built bathhouses, hostels, libraries and dining rooms for its men.[42] The army was to survive on these funds for the next three years, and in using them was to provide considerable humanitarian support.

Additional aid for the troops was provided by Wrangel's wife, Baroness Olga, who made several fund-raising trips to America which raised $12,000. These funds were used to support three sanitoria for the troops, two in Bulgaria (at Trnovo and Kniazhevo, with 25 and 20 beds respectively) and one in Yugoslavia (at Vranska

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[40] Davatz, Fünf Sturmjahre, pp. 108-115; HIA, WA, 146/32/159-178 (Report, Miller to Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, Apr 1926); 146/31/672-686 ('Istoricheskaia kratkaia spravka ob izmenenii formy bytiia Armii i finansovoi storone ee obespechenii', Oct 1925); & 149/39/541-544 (A. F. Shelest, 'Operatsiia s ssudnoi kaznoi', from 'Poslednie Novosti', 18 May 1923).

[41] Ershov, Adaptatsiia, p. 86.

[42] Raikhtsaum, Dokumental'nye materialy RZIA, p. 41.

Bania, with 50 beds). Baroness Olga's fund also provided aid to students who were unable to work.[43] Aware that his own money could not last forever, the Commander-in-Chief ordered the formation in every unit of a reserve capital fund, and provided an initial deposit for each such fund. Troops in each unit were to pay a monthly contribution to the fund in proportion to their wages. To ensure that such deposits were not used to support the staff, they would remain the personal property of the depositor, but would be paid out only in the event of sickness or unemployment.[44] In effect this was a form of insurance, designed to put units on an independent financial basis for long-term mutual support. Through the combination of all these activities, the army without doubt provided substantial support to its men in the early 1920s, and helped ease the extremely tough circumstances in which the troops found themselves.

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Western Europe

In late 1923 the funds gained from the liquidation of the Petrograd Credit Institution began to run out, and in early 1924 severe cuts in expenditure were ordered by Wrangel. In these circumstances it became necessary to consider moving men out of the Balkans to Western Europe, where they might be better able to earn a decent living. By mid-1923 a spontaneous movement had already started among troops of the Russian Army, who began to leave Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on their own accord and head west to France and Belgium in search of work. Wrangel's military representative in Paris, General Khol'msen, noted that between 1 January and 1 April

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[43] Vestnik Gallipoliitsev: Trekhletie Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 11, Nov 1924, pp. 80-81; Also, Alexis Wrangel, General Wrangel, pp. 236-237.

[44] P. N. Wrangel, The Memoirs of General Wrangel, p. 344. Also, E. K. Miller, Armiia, p. 9.

1923, about 200 Russian officers arrived in the city from Bulgaria and Constantinople. Almost all were without money and civilian clothing. Khol'msen opened a shelter for them in St. Cloud where they could be housed for several days on arrival, and provided them with a small sum of money, some free meals and letters of recommendation to factories to help them find work.[45]

Rather than impeding this spontaneous movement Wrangel decided to support it, but to do so in such a way as to keep some control over the general process. On 24 March 1924 Wrangel asked General Shatilov, who was then in France, to start finding work for men of the Russian Army in France as a matter of urgency.[46] Four days later he informed commanders that it was appearing likely that the army's exile might be prolonged, but that:

> Нам отнюдь не следует опасаться дальнейшего неизбежного рассредоточения Армии, отъезда отдельных лиц и групп, к работе в самые отдаленные государства. Физическое разряжение Армии не страшно.[47]

Commanders were therefore ordered not to hinder troops who wished to leave for other countries, and indeed even to help them.

Wrangel's order was a recognition that since troops were already deciding on their own to move to the West, it was unlikely that the High Command could stop them, and attempting to do so would only undermine its authority. Wrangel was determined, however, that the transfer of men to the West in search of work should be

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[45] HIA, WA, 96/24/469-470 (Letter, Khol'msen to Miller, no. 2006, 4 Apr 1923).

[46] HIA, WA, 144/27/1368-1370 (Letter, Wrangel to Shatilov, no. 831, 24 Mar 1924).

[47] BAR, ROVS, Box 171, Folder 'Sovet ob"edinennykh ofitserskikh obshchestv (1924)' (Circular, no. 04469, 28 Mar 1924).

done in a systematic way. In an order of 15 May 1924, he stated that the principle of the transfer of troops from the Balkans had been agreed, but that this had to be done in such a way as to preserve the links between units. For this reason, the transfer of troops was to be undertaken in a planned manner, and unit commanders were forbidden to make agreements on their own with entrepreneurs, employers or middle-men.[48] The system that Wrangel envisioned was for employment in France to be given to groups of men from the same units, so enabling the units' integrity to be retained as much as possible. His concept was that his representatives in France would find factories willing to offer a fixed number of jobs, and that he and his staff would then assign troops to those jobs.[49] The reality was to prove far more difficult.

There was one initial success in this regard. In May 1924 the commander of the Life Guards Don Battalion, Major General I. N. Opritz, reached agreement with the managers of the mines at Decazeville in France to accept 200 Russian workers. As a result the Life Guards and elements of the Don Technical Regiment were sent to Decazeville in August 1924. After arriving, Opritz declared that the battalion's structure had been preserved, and that conditions and wages were much superior to those in the Balkans.[50] After visiting the Life Guards in January 1925, Shatilov noted they had their own officers' mess, a dining room for the Cossacks, a library, church

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[48] BAR, ROVS, Box 171, Folder 'Resettlement of Refugees (1)' (Order no. 24, Gen. Wrangel, 15 May 1924).

[49] BAR, ROVS, Box 1, Folder 'Bogaevskii A.P. to Shatilov P. N.' (Letter, Bogaevskii to Shatilov, no. 681, 4 Jun 1924).

[50] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 10, File 40 (Report, Opritz to Kussonskii, no. 301, 30 Aug 1924); Also, Kazaki za granitsei, p. 18.

and museum. Their cohesion, he commented, was exceptional.[51] Later the Life Guards left Decazeville and went en masse to work for the French State Railways, for whom most continued to work throughout the inter-war period.

Already, before Wrangel laid out his plans, some transfers of troops to France had been undertaken by a commercial company, 'Tekhnopomoshch', which was run by the former Russian military representative in Belgrade, General Pototskii. Tekhnopomoshch found work for Russians in France and provided loans to those Russians accepting the job offers, to enable them to pay for their journey to France. It then arranged with the employers to repay the loan by subtracting the necessary amounts from the arriving workers' pay.[52] Shatilov, whom Wrangel had placed in charge of the operation of transferring men to the West, initially hoped to provide work for Army members in the same manner as Tekhnopomoshch, but he was forced to abandon this plan. On 26th June 1924 he held a meeting with Monsieur Lebel of the French Department of Foreign Labour. Political considerations made it undesirable for the business of moving men to France to be seen to be connected with the Russian Army, so Shatilov attended the meeting in the guise of the representative of a Russian company in Belgrade named Tekhprom (not to be confused with Tekhnopomoshch). Lebel told Shatilov that his ministry regarded very negatively any attempts by Russians to contact employers directly, as had been done by Pototskii. If such attempts were made in the future, his ministry, whose permission was required,

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[51] HIA, WA, 146/30/129-130 (Letter, Shatilov to Wrangel, no. 247, 28 Jan 1925).

[52] BAR, ROVS, Box 37, Folder 'Resettlement of Refugees (1)' (Letter, Shatilov to Kussonskii, 20 May 1924); & Box 13, Folder 'Court of Honour, Khimich v. Mel'nitskii' (Report, Shatilov to Khol'msen, no. 2415, Sep 1925).

would refuse visas for the workers who had been promised employment. Lebel suggested an alternative scheme for bringing Russians to work in France. He would give permission for 450 Russians to come in groups of 50. They would be sent to Toul in Eastern France, where they would be held in a distribution centre and would only at that point be given offers of work, on the basis of 3 month contracts. After completion of the initial contract they would get a permanent residence permit. The workers would have to pay for the costs of their journeys to France.[53] Lebel reacted very negatively to Shatilov's suggestion that employers repay Tekhprom the credits issued by it to pay for the workers' journeys, as he wanted no contact at all between Tekhprom and the employers.[54] Tekhprom was also to be forbidden from interfering in the relations of the workers and their employers, for which reason it was not to be allowed to contact the workers once they had arrived in France.[55] Despite these restrictions, Shatilov agreed to Lebel's scheme, since in reality he had little choice and it at least gave permission for an initial group of 450 men. To try and defray the costs of the journeys to France, he asked Generals Ronzhin and Kussonskii in Yugoslavia to try to arrange free travel for workers leaving the country on Yugoslav railways.[56] Shatilov also reached agreement with the Swiss railways for free transit through

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[53] BAR, ROVS, Box 37, Folder 'Resettlement (3)' (Letter, Shatilov to Abramov and others, no. 478, 27 Jun 1924).

[54] BAR, ROVS, Box 37, Folder 'Resettlement (3)' (Letter, Shatilov to Kussonskii, no. 482, 27 Jun 1924).

[55] BAR, ROVS, Box 13, Folder 'Court of Honour, Khimich v. Mel'nitskii' (Report, Shatilov to Khol'msen, no. 2415, Sep 1925).

[56] BAR, ROVS, Box 37, Folder 'Resettlement (3)' (Letter, Shatilov to Abramov and others, no. 478, 27 Jun 1924).

Switzerland for workers coming to France from Bulgaria.[57]

Shatilov's agreement with Lebel suffered from one great weakness, which was that there was no clear means of paying for the workers' journeys to France. The army was obliged to tell those who wished to take up opportunities in France that they must pay their own way. This greatly complicated the attempt to move whole units as blocks, as it was never the case that everyone in a unit could afford such a journey. To alleviate the problem in part, General Abramov in Bulgaria, from where the 450 were to be taken, handed over to Tekhnopomoshch the actual process of organising the transfer.[58] This ensured that the men would be able to travel, but had the great disadvantage that many of them were saddled with large debts on their arrival in France. This was to cause much dissatisfaction later.

In addition to the negotiations undertaken with Lebel to allow industrial workers to enter France, Shatilov also undertook talks concerning the immigration of agricultural workers. Unfortunately the conditions for agricultural workers were particularly poor, and the French government demanded that such workers be given twelve month contracts, which was considered unacceptable. Both Wrangel and Ataman Bogaevskii felt that the conditions for agricultural workers amounted to 'white slavery'.[59] Wrangel therefore issued an order forbidding members of the Russian Army from accepting agricultural work in France. The vacancies offered by

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[57] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 10, File 40 (Letter, Polunin to Abramov, no. 607, 18 Jul 1924).

[58] BAR, ROVS, Box 37, Folder 'Resettlement (6)' (Letter, Abramov to Shatilov, no. 886, 16 Jul 1924).

[59] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 10, File 40 (Letter, Kussonskii to Shatilov, no. 137/s, 21 Jun 1924). GARF, 6460/1/1/26 (Letter, Bogaevskii to Abramov, no. 811, 23 Jul 1924).

the French were instead advertised among those military émigrés who had left the ranks of the army.[60] Very few responded, however, because the required 12 month contract was deemed unacceptable by most. In these circumstances it is unlikely that Wrangel's prohibition had much impact on the transfer of troops to France, since few were willing to accept the terms offered anyway.

The first group out of the 450 men agreed to between Shatilov and Lebel arrived in France on 16 August 1924. On 22 August the French Ministry of Labour agreed, in addition to the original 450, to allow the French consulate in Sofia to issue 50 visas a month for Russians to work in France.[61] Those sent under the original agreement and under the new scheme went first to Toul, and from there on to their assigned places of work. Shatilov's main task now was to try to establish contact with these men and re-establish some form of military organisation among the arriving groups. In this he was restrained by the prohibition on contacts between Tekhprom and Russian workers. To achieve the desired aim, a senior was appointed in every group due to enter France, who was given the task of contacting Shatilov once the men of his group had reached their place of work. There the men were to form 'work parties', under the authority of the senior officer and with their own mutual support funds. However, on arrival at Toul most groups were split up into smaller groups, and the majority of the seniors of the work parties failed to report to Shatilov as required. It therefore fell to Shatilov himself to track these men down. Having found a group of Russian workers (whether they had arrived in France by this method or any

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[60] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 10, File 40 (Letter, Kussonskii to Ekk and Abramov, no. 489/s, 11 Aug 1924).

[61] BAR, ROVS, Box 38, Folder 'Resettlement, 1924 (8)' (Letter, Shatilov to Kussonskii, no. 833, 22 Aug 1924).

other) Shatilov would check the background of the senior officer, and if approved, appoint him group commander, giving him a copy of the instructions for the formation of work groups in France and Belgium. According to Shatilov, group seniors were invariably extremely happy when contact with the army was reestablished:

> По прибытии во Франции эти лица ... чувствовали себя оторванными от всех и вся, видели вокруг себя типичную рабочую среду, типичную рабочую жизнь с ее беспросветностью и отсутствием перспектив в личной жизни. Установление связи со мной, осведомление о существовании воинской организации, возможность обратиться за поддержкой и советом в нужную минуту - все это заметно подбодрило наших воинских чинов и устанавливалась между мной и ими - живая связь.[62]

Lebel's prohibition on contacts between Shatilov and the arriving workers meant that Shatilov had to keep his contacts with the workers secret from the French and so could not pass on their complaints. These complaints were numerous. Lebel had promised three month contracts, but on arrival in France most Russians found themselves on 6 month contracts, and sometimes even longer. Russians were obliged to complete these contracts if they wished to obtain permanent residence in France, and therefore until the contracts were completed they were in effect in a form of bonded labour and unable to escape if conditions were harsh. Their desire for shorter contracts was highly understandable. The first group of 50 workers who arrived at Toul refused to take up the employment offered when they learned that their contracts were to be longer than promised, and only agreed to go when they were reduced to

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[62] BAR, ROVS, Box 17, Folder 'Wrangel Headquarters (7)' (Report, Shatilov to Wrangel, no. 212, 24 Jan 1925).

three months.[63]

The main complaints by Russians were over repayments to Tekhnopomoshch from those who had used that method of entering the country, as in many cases these were much larger than the Russians had been led to expect. But the Russians, being unable to turn to their own leaders, who were forbidden from representing them, were powerless to do anything about it. Coming to France, hoping to find a better life after the hardships of the Balkans, many felt deeply disillusioned almost immediately, and very soon came to realise their inferior legal and social position in France.

Despite these problems, Shatilov's efforts were not without results. Under his arrangements with Lebel, twelve groups, totalling 622 men, plus 100 family members, left Bulgaria for France between 2 August and 15 November 1924. An additional 200 were transferred in the same period from Yugoslavia in a separate agreement between Shatilov and the French Ministry of Labour, and 100 were moved from Poland and Danzig. Thus, by the end of November 1924, Shatilov had moved over 1,000 people to France.[64] Shatilov had also succeeded in establishing contact with numerous other groups of Russians in France, so that by January 1925 he was able to report the existence of 73 work parties of the Russian Army in France, with a total of 3,750 members.[65]

In October 1924 the French government finally extended diplomatic

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[63] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 10, File 40 (Letter, Shatilov to Abramov, no. 681, 2 Aug 1924). See also GARF, 6460/1/1/23-26 (Letters, Bogaevskii to Abramov, 23 Jul & 22 Aug 1924).

[64] BAR, ROVS, Box 38, Folder 'Resettlement, 1924 (10)' (Letter, Polunin to Maklakov, 24 Nov 1924).

[65] BAR, ROVS, Box 17, Folder 'Wrangel Headquarters (7)' (Report, Shatilov to Wrangel, no. 212, 24 Jan 1925).

recognition to the Soviet regime. Having done so, France wished to reduce its official contacts with members of the Russian Army, and it was probably no coincidence that on 8 November 1924 Lebel ordered a temporary halt in the issuing of 50 visas a month, citing a worsening employment situation in France.[66] In April 1925 this halt was made permanent, and Shatilov's arrangement with Lebel was brought to an end. Wrangel nevertheless wished the transfer of troops out of the Balkans to continue, so Shatilov was now obliged to consider new methods. This task was complicated by the fact that the High Commission for Refugees, now renamed 'The Refugee Unit of the International Bureau of Labour' had decided that the transfers of refugees needed to be properly coordinated, by it. The Bureau reached agreement with the French government to take over responsibility for the transfer of Russian labourers to France.[67] This new development caused concern in the army as it was felt that the International Bureau would not be willing to send army personnel to the west in groups, but would seek to mix them up with the general refugee mass.

To get around these new complications, Shatilov returned to his original idea of negotiating directly with French employers, who would then have to obtain the necessary visas from the Ministry of Labour without suggesting that representatives of the Russian Army had been in contact with them. Such negotiations had some success. In May 1925, for instance, a group of 250 set off from Bulgaria to go to

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[66] BAR, ROVS, Box 38, Folder 'Resettlement, 1924 (11)' (Letter, Lebel to Shatilov, 8 Nov 1924).

[67] BAR, ROVS, Box 38, Folder 'Resettlement, 1925 (1)' (Letter, Kussonskii to Shatilov, no. 833/p, 30 Mar 1925).

Knutange.[68] Shatilov also proposed another scheme. Under this plan, those working in France were to press their employers to accept more Russians, and to ask the Ministry of Labour for the necessary certificates. Names of members of their units back in the Balkans were to be provided.[69] This scheme resulted in the production of various offers of work throughout the rest of 1925,[70] but there was often a long delay between people signing up to go to France and the work certificates being received. By the time the certificates arrived many were either unwilling to leave, no longer had the necessary money (workers still had to pay the full costs of their journey), or had disappeared.[71] Depite these problems, transfers of men into France continued into 1928. In March 1926, for instance, Shatilov was able to persuade the director of the mines at Decazeville to provide an extra 70 jobs for Russians from Bulgaria, and permission for these was received from the Ministry of Labour.[72]

Offers of work were also provided for several hundred Russians in Belgium. Negotiations with Belgian employers on behalf of the Russians were undertaken by Madame Sh. G. Frichero, the wife of a Russian industrialist with large holdings in Western Europe. In July 1924 she was able to obtain work for 50 soldiers at the

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[68] BAR, ROVS, Box 38, Folder 'Resettlement, 1925 (1)' (Letter, Abramov to Shatilov & Kussonskii, no. 519, 9 May 1925).

[69] BAR, ROVS, Box 38. Folder 'Resettlement, 1924 (12)' (Letter, Shatilov to Abramov, 25 May 1925).

[70] Numerous offers of work and lists of workers sent to France are held in BAR, ROVS, Box 38, Folder 'Resettlement, 1925 (2)'.

[71] For instance, BAR, ROVS, Box 39, Folder 'Resettlement, 1925 (4)' (Letter, Société Générale des Chaux et Ciments to Shatilov, 19 Oct 1925; & Letter, Abramov to Shatilov, no. 439, 30 Oct 1925).

[72] BAR, ROVS, Box 39, Folder 'Resettlement, 1926 (1)' (Letter, Shatilov to Abramov, no. 461, 5 Mar 1926).

factory 'Armand Blaton',[73] and a year later obtained offers for 500 Russians to come from Bulgaria to work in mines and quarries in Belgium on 12-month contracts. It proved very difficult to fill these places, because the Russians disliked the idea of 12-month contracts, and many, after years in Bulgarian mines, were simply unwilling to accept work as miners again. As a result only 11 volunteers came forward to take the 100 places offered at Belgian quarries.[74] Eventually more agreed to go to Belgium and also to Luxembourg, and various groups travelled there from Bulgaria in 1928.[75] A group of the Markovskii artillery battalion which left Bulgaria to work at the Winterslag mines in Belgium in 1926 commented of their new life that "В общем ничего этого в Болгарии мы не видели. Чувствуем себя здесь несравненно лучше". The group formed an artel, pooled its wages, and with them rented a house where they all lived and paid for a cook and two servants.[76]

In total, from 1923 onwards some 9,000 Russians arrived in France and Belgium, most of them members of the Russian Army.[77] Perhaps a third to a quarter of these were found employment through the efforts of General Shatilov. The Army and its representatives also helped find employment for Russian soldiers coming from Poland. In summer 1924, for instance, General Miller sent 3,000 francs to Poland to

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[73] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 10, File 40 (Letter, Frichero to Wrangel, 11 Jul 1924).

[74] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 10, File 40 (Report, Col. Alatyrtsev to Vitkovskii, no. 90, 22 Sep 25).

[75] GARF, 5826/1/101/13-18 (Reports, Gen. Abramov, Jul-Oct 1928).

[76] Russkii Voennyi Vestnik, no. 45, 13 Jun 1926, p. 1.

[77] Hutchins, Wrangel Refugees, p. 135.

enable troops there to pay for their journeys to France. [78] By April 1925, there were 50 work groups of the Russian Army in France and Belgium, each with its own senior appointed by Shatilov, with a total of 4,041 members.[79] In this way the army's involvement in the transfers proved something of a success.

Many of those Russians who arrived in France continued to live and work together for years. In 1930, for instance, 40 Gallipoliitsy working in a factory in Cannes still shared a workers' barracks, had their own mutual help fund and had set up their own orchestra.[80] This sort of lifestyle became less common as time went on, but it was not unusual. A group from the Life Guards Don Cossack Battalion, who worked as porters at the Gare du Nord in Paris, continued to share accommodation and march together to work as a unit right up until the Second World War.[81] This phenomenon was not spontaneous, but was largely a deliberate creation. The leadership of the Russian Army went to very considerable lengths to find work for its men, and to do so in such a way so as to keep them together. Without the army's involvement, many thousand of these immigrants to France (and equally their colleagues in Yugoslavia) would have been dispersed, with little or no connection between them. The army ensured that as much as possible they worked and lived together, and thus helped create part of the phenomenon of 'Russia Abroad'.

The army's involvement did not cease the moment refugees arrived in France

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[78] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 10, File 40 ('Polozhenie nashikh voennykh kontingentov v Pol'she', Gen. Makhrov, 26 Sep 1924).

[79] BAR, ROVS, Box 133, Folder 'Lists' ('Spisok russkikh armeiskikh rabochikh grupp na territorii Frantsii i Bel'gii', 1 Apr 1925).

[80] Chasovoi, no. 46, p. 29.

[81] Philip Longworth, The Cossacks (London, 1969), p. 316.

or Belgium. Once their initial 3 or 6 month work contracts were over, many Russians left to look for alternative, better paid, employment. To do this they often required letters of recommendation, or proof of their previous military service. These they had to obtain from the offices of ROVS, which possessed the necessary records. Military personnel who had arrived in France by other routes also turned to ROVS for such services. Thus in 1925, ROVS's department in France provided recommendations to 5,800 men in the Paris region and 860 in the provinces; it provided 310 men with rail fares to their place of work; subsidies of 11,937 francs were given to the especially needy; 1,875 free dinners were issued; 8,569 nights of beds provided free of charge; 100 men were given hospital assistance; appeals were made to the French authorities for visas on behalf of 340 people; and official information from the archives was given to 380 men to present to the French authorities.[82] The system of work groups established by the High Command, although designed primarily as a means of retaining some form of military structure, had the side effect of helping Russians improve the conditions of their work. Shatilov noted that group commanders felt that the organisation and discipline of work groups made a positive impression on French employers. Requests from group commanders were often agreed to, where the same requests from individuals would have been rejected. Enterprise managers were also willing to give money for group purposes, in one instance giving money to build a library and in another case providing money for a church. The clear advantages of being in such a group, Shatilov noted, helped keep the men together.[83] In this way,

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[82] BAR, Bernatskii Collection, Folder 'Settlement of White Army Veterans, 1921-1925' ('Pamiatnaia zapiska', no date or signature).

[83] BAR, ROVS, Box 17, Folder 'Wrangel Headquarters (7)' (Report, Shatilov to Wrangel, no. 212, 24 Jan 1925).

the maintenance of the army's structure helped the men rather than hindered them.

Finally, it should be noted that the international situation in the inter-war period did not encourage assimilation. European countries had great problems of their own and were concerned primarily with helping their own nationals, as a result of which many countries openly discriminated against foreigners. In 1926, for instance, General Opritz noted that the French government had temporarily banned foreigners from obtaining work in the Renault factory, and that as a result of protests by the French syndicate of taxi drivers, Russians were having great difficulty in acquiring driving permits.[84] In such circumstances, it was hardly surprising that Russians looked to each other for support, and so the continued existence of the Russian Army and later ROVS was a great help to many. The aid which the Army provided was an important factor in persuading many to keep their links with it throughout their long years of exile.

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[84] GARF, 6460/1/10/7-10 (Letter, Opritz to Abramov, 11 Jun 1926).

CHAPTER 6 - THE RUSSKII OBSHCHE-VOINSKII SOIUZ (ROVS) - AN ORDER OF WHITE KNIGHTS

By late 1924, the Russian Army had been so dispersed that it was necessary for it formally to take on a new structure. This resulted in the formation of the Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soiuz (ROVS). ROVS was almost certainly the largest of all Russian émigré organisations during the inter-war period, but despite its central position in émigré society, histories of the Russian emigration give little idea of what it did on a day-to-day basis, what its members thought its real purpose was, and how and why it survived. Its purpose evolved over time, taking on moral as well as practical tasks. ROVS imagined itself as a religious-military order, devoted to self-perfection, and preserving the highest moral values among its members in order to resurrect Russia through its moral example. In reality ROVS's members did not live up to these grandiose aims in the least, but the aims cannot be dismissed as mere rhetoric, because they shaped much of the way in which military émigrés behaved and they determined their self-image. The emphasis on moral matters gave ROVS a role which allowed it to survive long after the possibility of renewing the civil war had evaporated, and gave its members a sense of their own self-worth which sustained them in what were otherwise difficult lives. In addition, ROVS acted as a provider of humanitarian aid and a supporter of Russian culture abroad, and in these roles contributed significantly to émigré life.

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Wrangel's army was not the only White army to have been driven out of Russia in late 1920. Remnants of several White formations had been interned in Poland, for instance. Wrangel hoped to unite all the White forces in exile to create

one large military organisation under his command. As a first step, in December 1920 the army of General Bulak-Balakhovich and the former 3rd Army in Poland recognised Wrangel as their supreme commander.[1] In May 1921, survivors of the Kronstadt uprising also asked to be included in the ranks of the Russian Army.[2] In the case of those interned in Poland, Wrangel provided what financial aid he could, giving the 1st Division of Bulak-Balakhovich's army, for instance, a grant of 1,135,000 Polish marks in autumn 1921.[3] With the help of Wrangel's military representative in Poland, General Makhrov, the troops interned there were reformed into artels and money was provided to help them create workshops to earn a living.[4] Subsequently many moved to France with the help of General Shatilov.

Elsewhere, exiled Russian veterans had already begun spontaneously to form their own military associations. These included regimental associations, military study groups, and societies of Great War veterans. In Paris, for instance, one of the largest of these, the Soiuz Russkikh Ofitserov Uchastnikov Voiny, SROUV, was formed in Paris in January 1921.[5] This process was encouraged by General Wrangel.

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[1] HIA, WA. 148/36/19-20 (Declaration of representatives of the Armed Forces of the Northern and Western fronts, 14 Dec 1920).

[2] HIA, WA, 148/36/446-448 & 808 (Letter, Petrichenko to Wrangel, May 1921, & Petition to Wrangel from participants of the Kronstadt revolt, 25 May 1921).

[3] HIA, WA, 145/28/296 (Letter, Commander of the 1st Infantry Division 'Smert", Tukhol Camp, 19 Oct 1921).

[4] HIA, WA, 50/21/112-115 (Letter, Makhrov to Miller, 13 Feb 1923); 145/29/741-743 (Letter, Makhrov to Kussonskii, no. 825, 23 Oct 1923); HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 12, File 48 ('Polozhenie voennykh kontingentov v Pol'she v dekabre 1923 g', Gen. Makhrov).

[5] BAR, ROVS, Box 164, Folder 'Organisation of ROVS, 1921-1922'.

Although he hoped to preserve the Russian Army as an army, he was by January 1921 already aware that this might not be possible, and had therefore begun to think of alternative forms of existence. He ordered that in every country former military personnel should be organised into unions and societies, and that his military agents and representatives were to take responsibility for ensuring that this happened.[6] Following on from this, on 2 April 1921, Wrangel's staff issued a set of 'normal regulations' for military organisations. These laid out a form of regulation which should be followed by all military organisations, and envisioned for the first time a general union of unions, with organisations in each country sending delegates to a 'general union', each of which would in turn send delegates to form a 'main union'.[7] The idea of a federation of unions, which eventually found form in the shape of ROVS, had therefore been established as early as April 1921.

In order to set in motion his plan for a general union of unions, on 5 July 1921 Wrangel ordered his military agent in Turkey to unite all military organisations in that country into a general union, and to keep an eye on all the organisations to ensure that they did not get involved in politics or in speculation.[8] The military agent succeeded in forming a 'Council of Unions and Societies of former Russian soldiers in

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[6] BAR, ROVS, Box 161, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1921-1923' (Letter, Shatilov to Miller, 8 Jan 1921).

[7] BAR, ROVS, Box 164, Folder 'Organisation of ROVS, 1921-1922 (2)' (Gen. Wrangel, 'Normal'nyi Ustav russkikh voinov, nakhodiashchikhsia v ...', 2 Apr 1921).

[8] BAR, ROVS, Box 164, Folder 'Organisation of ROVS, 1921-1922' (Letter, Shatilov to Chertkov, no. 7046, 5 Jul 1921).

Turkey', which brought together 8 military organisations comprising 2,430 members.[9] In December 1921, a similar 'Council of United Officers' Organisations in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes' was created. To encourage this process of uniting the émigré soldiers into one organisation, Wrangel provided small sums of money to those military associations which recognised his authority, money which many depended on. In May 1924, for instance, Wrangel's representative in Germany, General von Lampe, noted that the funds provided by Wrangel were the main source of income for the Russian officers' union in Berlin.[10] In September 1923 the process of uniting the émigré military was brought further forward when Wrangel issued his Order no. 82. This brought all military associations into the ranks of the Army, and stated that associations which refused to join the army, and so be subject to recall to the colours at any time, were to be deprived of financial support.[11] By this stage, as the units of the army dispersed in search of work, and the units themselves took on new forms similar to those of the military associations, the distinction between military units and associations began to fade. Wrangel therefore decided to create a new structure to hold the dispersed elements of the military together, and in September 1924 announced the formation of the Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soiuz (ROVS).

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[9] Pivovar, Russkaia Emigratsiia, pp. 65-67.

[10] HIA, von Lampe Collection, Box 2 ('Svodka no. 1 o polozhenii ofitserskikh soiuzov', 15 May 1924); Also Box 4 (Letter, von Lampe to Kussonskii, no. 1164, 20 Sep 1925); See also HIA. Kussonskii Collection, Box 12, File 48 (Letter, Miller to Khol'msen, no. 858/a, 14 Mar 1924).

[11] BAR, ROVS, Box 161, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1923-1924' (Order, no. 82, Gen. Wrangel, 8 Sep 1923). For further information on Order no. 82, see Chapter 7, pp. 168-173.

The founding documents of ROVS were General Wrangel's order no. 35 of 1 September 1924, and the 'Temporary Statute of the Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soiuz', issued on the same day.[12] These created a military union to include all military units of the Russian Army and all military associations who wished to join the complement of the Army. Such organisations, on entering ROVS, were to preserve their name and independence in internal matters. To control the organisation, 6 departments were created, each with its own head and staff, on a territorial basis: the 1st Department (under General Khol'msen until 1930, when he was replaced by Shatilov) covered France, Italy, Holland, North Africa and the Middle East (Egypt, Syria, Morocco etc.), and consisted of a general mix of Great War and Civil War veterans; the 2nd Department (General von Lampe) - Germany - consisting mainly of Civil War veterans who had fought in the Armies of Bermondt, Miller and Bulak-Balakhovich; the 3rd Department (General Abramov) - Bulgaria - consisting mainly of veterans of Wrangel's Russian Army; the 4th Department (General Ekk until 1933, after which General Barbovich) - Yugoslavia - also consisting mainly of veterans of Wrangel's army; and the 5th Department (General Gartman) - Belgium - containing a variety of veterans. A 6th Department was created in 1930 to cover Czechoslovakia, and a Far Eastern Department (Manchuria, under General Dieterichs) was set up in 1928, consisting of men who had fled from Siberia after the defeat of Admiral Kolchak. In addition, as ROVS members dispersed ever further around the world, sub-departments subordinate directly to the ROVS president were eventually created in

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[12] BAR, ROVS, Box 161, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1923-1924' (Order no. 35, Gen. Wrangel, 1 Sep 1924, & 'Vremennoe Polozhenie o Russkom Obshche-Voinskom Soiuze', 1 Sep 1924).

the USA (New York and Santa Monica), Canada, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Finland.[13] These sub-departments were very small, however, and the bulk of ROVS's members lived in the areas of the 1st, 3rd and 4th Departments. ROVS did not exist in some countries such as Poland and Rumania, which bordered the Soviet Union and did not wish to incur Soviet displeasure, and which therefore banned Russian military organisations. From 1929 a central directorate in Paris ran ROVS as a whole.

ROVS's structure made it a federation of military organisations, rather than a centrally controlled, tightly organised body. Members did not join ROVS directly, except in rare circumstances where they lived in isolated areas where no military organisation existed. Instead they were a member either of a unit of the Russian Army or of a military association, and through that of ROVS. This had the disadvantage of creating multiple and overlapping commands. The military units of the Russian Army were retained, and through them the idea that the army still existed was retained also. Commanders were appointed and dismissed, personnel transferred from unit to unit by special order, and so on. Until 1926 each unit retained a small cadre financed by the Headquarters of the Russian Army, but after 1 January 1926 the members of these cadres were obliged to seek work, and henceforth unit commanders themselves had to maintain links with the men of their unit in their spare time after work. But these units were not the only organisations within ROVS, nor was their chain of command the only one. An officer might be a member of a regiment of the Russian Army with its chain of command, but he might also be a member of one or

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[13] BAR, ROVS, Box 164 ('Organisation of ROVS'); & Armiia i Flot (Paris, 1938).

more military associations, such as the Society of Gallipolians or the Society of General Staff Officers, which had their own separate chain of command. All of the groups to which he belonged were issuing instructions, providing help and advice, and expecting membership fees. General Abramov noted, for instance, that Gallipoliitsy were expected to pay fees to both their unit and the Society of Gallipolians, which few could afford.[14] The overlapping commands led to bitter disputes between commanders. Generals Abramov and Vitkovskii, for instance, quarrelled over who should issue instructions to Gallipoliitsy in Bulgaria - Abramov as head of the 3rd Department, or Vitkovskii as Commander of the First Army Corps.[15] These difficulties were exacerbated by the geographic dispersion of ROVS members, which made communications between members very slow and inefficient. General Miller, who became head of ROVS in 1930, would often complain that orders and information issued by the Central Directorate were not passed on to the lower ranks.[16] In other cases, orders were simply ignored. General Zinkevich, the Commander of the Alekseevskii Regiment, who lived in Bulgaria, noted that he and Abramov regularly suppressed orders from the centre, as they considered that orders issued in Paris were often inappropriate in Bulgaria.[17] While this habit may have been understandable, it did not help create a strong, unified organisation.

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[14] HIA, WA, 147/33/315-316 (Letter, Abramov to Wrangel, 26 Jul 1927).

[15] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 1 (Letters, Vitkovskii to Wrangel and Arkhangel'skii, and Abramov to Wrangel, July & August 1927).

[16] For instance, BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Miller, E. K. to Tsurikov, N. A.' (Letter, Miller to Tsurikov, no. 1166, 7 Jul 1935).

[17] BAR, ROVS, Box 6, Folder ' Correspondence, Zinkevich to Matsylev, 1937-1940' (Letter, Zinkevich to Matsylev, 7 Apr 1937).

As information was not centralised, ROVS never knew exactly how many members it had. Until 1930 there was not even a universal ROVS membership card.[18] The only available document in the ROVS archive on the subject is a list put together in November 1925, according to which, at that time, ROVS had 35,214 members, 19,226 of which were in military units and 15,988 in military associations. The largest department was the 1st, which had 13,853 members, followed by the 4th Department with 10, 955, and the 3rd with 9,281.[19] However, as the person preparing the list pointed out, these figures were at best a rough estimate. After 1930, ROVS's membership fell, especially in France. In 1936, Miller estimated ROVS's membership in France at 6,000,[20] a fall of over 50% since 1925. This decline was not as severe elsewhere. Membership held up much better in the Balkans (taking into account a large drop in the mid-1920s caused by the movement of veterans from the Balkans to France). Correspondents from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the mid-1930s often noted that the situation there was much better than it was further west.

With 35,000 members ROVS was almost certainly the largest organisation in the Russian emigration, although the figure represented a failure of Wrangel's attempts to unite the military emigration into one body. ROVS did not even contain a majority of those who had left the Crimea with the Russian Army in 1920. However,

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[18] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1920, II Otdel to Central Office' (Order, no. 5, Gen. Stogov, 18 Apr 1930).

[19] BAR, ROVS, Box 164, Folder 'Project to form Russian Army abroad (3)' ('Spisok ofitserskikh obshchestv i soiuzov, voinskikh chastei i organisatsii, vkhodiashchikh v ROVS, 1 Nov 1925).

[20] BAR, ROVS, Box 1, Folder 'Maklakov V. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to Maklakov, 27 May 1936).

the importance of ROVS varied from country to country. Its 6,000 members in France in the 1930s constituted only a small percentage of the approximately 100,000 émigrés in that country. In Czechoslovakia in the late 1930s, there were about 800 ROVS members out of an émigré community of 7,000 people, but in Bulgaria in 1933 ROVS was reported to have 4,500 members out of a total émigré community of 15,000 Russians.[21] This meant that one in three émigrés in Bulgaria were ROVS members. The same was probably true in Yugoslavia. ROVS was thus by far the dominant Russian organisation in those two countries.

ROVS's failure to attract all veterans into its ranks did not unduly bother its leaders, who continually stated that quality was more important than quantity. The real problem, however, was that ROVS's members often lacked commitment, not so much because they had ceased to believe in the cause, but because they had little energy or money to devote to it. The correspondence of senior officers, and the pages of military journals, are full of complaints about the non-payment of membership dues. In 1926, Abramov estimated that only 40-50% of members paid their dues.[22] Initially, non-payment was grounds for expulsion, but as von Lampe pointed out, the numbers not paying were too great to make expulsion a practical option.[23] As a result, in 1927 Wrangel ordered that those who were genuinely unable to pay should not be expelled for failing to do so. Expulsion was to be reserved solely for those who

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[21] Chasovoi, no. 110/111, Oct 1933, p. 33.

[22] HIA, 147/33/36-37 (Letter, Abramov to Wrangel, 30 Nov 1926).

[23] HIA, von Lampe Collection, Box 4 (Letter, von Lampe to Kussonskii, no. 1164, 20 Sep 1925).

showed no desire to maintain links with their comrades.[24]

Non-payment of dues became a particularly severe problem during the Great Depression, when the economic problems which many émigrés experienced made it more and more difficult for them to afford their membership fees. In 1934 General Zborovskii, commander of the Kuban Cossack Division, stated firmly that collection of any dues from his Cossacks was impossible.[25] The same year, the head of the Paris branch of the Alekseevskii regiment, Colonel Matsylev, noted that in some units in France the payment of fees had ceased entirely.[26] Such units survived primarily on the proceeds of charitable balls, dinners and the like, but their activities were curtailed by the resulting shortage of funds.

ROVS was able to survive the non-payment of dues because it was financed from above rather than from below. Members' subscription fees went solely to the unit or military organisation of which they were a member, and were used entirely for the needs of that unit, primarily for aid to the sick and unemployed. Subscriptions were also used to publish unit information bulletins, which printed orders from ROVS commanders and detailed information from the lives of members in different areas, and which were then circulated among members. The difficulties in collecting fees harmed the work of the component parts of ROVS, and undermined the organisation as a whole, but they did not affect the working of the departments or the central

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[24] HIA, WA, 147/34/468-471 (Circular, Gen. Wrangel, 25 Sep 1927).

[25] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 2 (Report, Zborovskii to Miller, no. 131, 13 Sep 1934).

[26] BAR, ROVS, Box 86, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Matsylev (1934-1936)' (Letter, Matsylev to Zinkevich, 13 Sep 1934).

directorate. These were funded centrally, first with money held by General Wrangel, and after 1928 with several million francs provided to ROVS in that year by General Podtiagin, the former Russian military agent in Japan.[27] These funds were thereafter used to finance the salaries and expenses of the small staffs of the ROVS central directorate and the various departments (the department heads received stipends to cover their expenses, but also worked on their own to supplement their incomes).

Members' lack of commitment went beyond not paying their membership fees. Many seem to have been purely nominal members, who rarely if ever turned up at meetings of their unit or organisation. Attendance was especially poor for the military training courses which ROVS members were expected to attend (see pp. 209-214), and at the lectures ROVS organised. In August 1933, for instance, only 8 of ROVS's 70 members in Grenoble bothered to attend a propaganda lecture given by the organisation's professional agitator in France, V. M. Levitskii.[28] The problem was, as one general noted as early as 1925, that members engaged in hard physical labour had no energy to do anything after work but sleep.[29] Colonel Levashov, commanding the units of the First Army Corps in Belgium and Luxembourg, noted in 1927: "К сожалению на ряду с проявленной большинством товарищеской спайкой было заметно и пассивные отношения к делу, а порой и уклонепие от исполнения своих обязанностей в отношении нашей организацей".[30] Similarly Kutepov

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[27] For information on the origins of this money, see BAR, ROVS, Box 1, Folder 'Kutepov A. P. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Kutepov to Miller, 30 Aug 1928).

[28] Informatsionnyi Vestnik Grenobl'skoi Gruppy ROVS, no. 45, Aug 1933.

[29] HIA, WA, 146/31/508-516 (Report, Artifeksov to Wrangel, 1 Aug 1925).

[30] BAR, V. D. Merzheevskii Collection, (Order no. 1, Col. Levashov, 1927).

commented in 1928 that "К сожалению, нельзя не указать на некоторые недостатки - невыдержанности в долгих усилиях и нетерпения. У нас нет упорства и настойчивости".[31] Noting in 1933 that of 1,200 Gallipoliitsy in the Paris region only 96 had actually joined the Paris detachment of the Society of Gallipolians, the society's directorate commented that "нельзя не отметить все увеличивающееся безраличие, апатию, разрозненность и в сильной степени ослабление сплоченности и единства".[32]

This gloomy picture was not, of course, universally applicable. Some units and military organisations were well led and managed to keep their members committed. The Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo was the best example. A much higher proportion of Gallipoliitsy in Czechoslovakia were members of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo than were members of the Society of Gallipolians in any other location.[33] Furthermore, they were fully committed members. Even though ROVS had only 800 members in Czechoslovakia, they contributed more money in absolute terms to the fund ROVS had set up to finance its underground anti-Soviet activities, the 'Fond Spaseniia Rodiny' (FSR), than did ROVS members in any other country. ROVS members in France, despite their larger numbers and that country's relative

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[31] GARF, 5853/1/35/15811 (Order, Gen. Kutepov, 14 Jul 1928).

[32] BAR, ROVS, Box 6, Folder 'Correspondence, 1 Armeiskii Korpus, 1931-1933' ('Obrashchenie Pravleniia Otdela Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev vo Frantsii', Feb 1933).

[33] BAR, ROVS, Box 7, Folder 'Correspondence, Czech Group, 1930-1931' (Letter, Kharzhevskii to Vitkovskii, 13 Dec 1930).

wealth, contributed less than members in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.[34] But the level of commitment shown by the Gallipoliitsy in Czechoslovakia seems to have been the exception rather than the rule.

ROVS leaders liked to speak of their "firm cohesion" ("твердая спайка"), and thought of their military discipline as the greatest strength of their organisation. The reality was somewhat different. Many did indeed retain a sense of themselves as military officers, even after twenty years of exile, but as time went on this became harder and harder to do. Cohesion and discipline became more and more a matter of rhetoric and less and less a reality. Underlying all this was an inevitable process by which the mentalities of many ROVS members were gradually civilianised, so that by 1937 General Kussonskii was forced to admit that "офицеров осталось очень мало, а все прочие 'господа' даже мало зависимо от их чина и прежнего воспитания, рода войск и части, никоим образом не могут почитаться офицерами в том смысле, в каком мы привыкли его понимать".[35] ROVS's purpose was to fight this tendency.

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Given its weaknesses, it is remarkable that ROVS held together. It was able to do so in large part because its purpose evolved over time to suit changing circumstances. When the Russian Army first arrived in exile, its leaders viewed it as a cadre around which a new army could be formed to renew the armed struggle

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[34] BAR, ROVS, Box 84, Folder 'Russian Youth Organisations, 1929-1932' ('Informatsionnyi List Alekseevskogo Pekhotnogo Polka', no. 4, 11 Apr 1933).

[35] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1937, III Otdel to Central Office' (Letter, Kussonskii to Abramov, 28 Jul 1937).

against Bolshevism. The concept of 'preservation of cadres' emerged as the leadership's main task. As General Lukomskii noted, "отрицать возможность такой обстановки, при которой русское зарубежное воинство сыграет роль при восстановлении национальной России нельзя. А это обязывает сохранить РОВС и кадры русского зарубежного воинства".[36] As time passed, though some still hoped to use the army again as an army, this possibility became less and less likely. One active ROVS member commented in 1932 that from about 1926 onwards nobody any longer expected the Russian Army to be reformed and to renew the civil war in the old form.[37] The army now came to be seen less as the cadre of a new army to fight the Bolsheviks than as the cadre of the new army which would be established once the communist regime had fallen as a result of its own internal problems, when it was expected that the Red Army would fall apart.[38] As Kutepov said in 1929, military organisations must be preserved "до момента возрождения своей Родины, чтобы помочь ей создать прежнюю могучую и славную Армию".[39] The preservation of the army was something of an end in itself. The Army was seen as embodying all that was best about Russia, or as N. N. L'vov put it, "Армия - это Россия",[40] a sentiment

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[36] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 2 ('Bor'ba s bol'shevikami', Gen. Lukomskii, 27 Oct 1932).

[37] HIA, Chasovoi Archive, Box 1 (Letter, Orekhov to Miller, 15 May 1932).

[38] See for instance, HIA, WA, 146/31/672-678 ('Istoricheskaia kratkaia spravka ob izmenenii formy bytiia Armii', Oct 1925); HIA, VSIuR, Ssudnoe Otdelenie, Box 3, File 13 ('Informatsionnyi Bulletin, no. 18, Soiuz Russkikh Ofitserov v Bolgarii', 25 Dec 1925); & Russkii Golos, no. 389, 18 Sep 1938, p. 1.

[39] Chasovoi, no. 7/8, Apr 1929, p. 3.

[40] Ross, Vrangel' v Krymu, p. 295.

echoed by many others. "Была жива Армия - была и Россия, убили Армию - погубили Россию", wrote Captain V. N. Varnek, a ROVS member in Grenoble.[41] Many of ROVS's activities served no greater purpose than keeping the 'army' in existence. As part of this, units held regular dinners, celebrated regimental anniversaries, held commemorative church services, and met for drinks, at which they could see old friends, talk about past experiences, and keep the memory of their unit and its traditions alive - in short carried out the sort of activities associated with veterans' groups in other countries, such as the Royal British Legion. These activities gave ROVS the image of a backward-looking organisation, interested only in the past, but for many ROVS members this social function was always the way in which ROVS impinged most upon their lives.

ROVS was meant to be more than just a veterans' association, however, and it needed to find some deeper reason for its existence. The Temporary Statute of 1924 therefore laid out the following aims for ROVS:

> Русский Обще-Воинский Союз образуется с целью объединить русских воинов, рассредоточенных в разных странах, укрепить духовную связь между ними и сохранить их как носителей лучших традиций и заветов старой Армии. Задача РОВС заключается в поддержании среди членов его воинского рыцарского духа, укреплении начал воинской дисциплины и военной этики ... а также в содействии по оказанию материальной и моральной помощи своим членам.[42]

This in effect split ROVS's aims and activities into two - moral and practical. The latter, which focused on mutual support and humanitarian aid, was an essential

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[41] GARF, 5881/1/255 (V. N. Varnek, 'Golos Armii').

[42] BAR, ROVS, Box 161, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1923-1924' ('Vremennoe Polozhenie o Russkom Obshche-Voinskom Soiuze', 1 Sep 1924).

prerequisite for the former. For if ROVS could not help its members, those members would see no point in supporting the organisation. Humanitarian aid was never more than a secondary purpose, but it did shape much of what ROVS did in practice.

The aid which ROVS provided to its members can be divided into two types - that provided locally by units and military organisations, and that provided centrally from ROVS itself via the department heads. The former was based upon the system of mutual help funds which Wrangel had ordered to be established in the early 1920s. These survived throughout the inter-war period. Unit and organisational funds were kept going through members' dues and through an endless round of charity dinners and balls. Such balls were held by most units once a year with varying success. The Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo often raised substantial sums from its annual ball. In January 1933, for instance, its ball was attended by 1,500 people, including many Czech luminaries, and raised 50,000 crowns.[43] This money was divided between the FSR and the Zemliachestvo's mutual help fund. Those organisations which were successful in collecting fees and holding charitable events could often give quite substantial support to their members. An example was the Union of Cavalry and Horse Artillery in France, which had 186 members. In 1935 the union expended 30,175 francs on support to its members, including 9,220 francs on keeping the sick in sanatoria, 2,703 francs on rest homes, and 3,600 francs on support of the unemployed.[44] In Belgrade the Society of Russian Officers set up a credit cooperative

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[43] BAR, ROVS, Box 16, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Miller' (Letter, Zinkevich to Miller, 24 Jan 1933).

[44] BAR, ROVS, Box 7, Folder 'Ob"edinenie konnitsy i konnoi artilerii (6)' (Report, Gen. Chekotovskii, 1935).

and a job centre.[45] The Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo was particularly active in providing support to its members. Using its funds a restaurant was set up in Prague which provided employment to several members. A car was purchased which enabled two more members to earn their livings as taxi drivers. The organisation also set up a hostel in collaboration with the Union of Russian Engineers for unemployed and homeless Russians in Prague.[46] Humanitarian care became particularly important in the 1930s, which were times of particular hardship for ROVS members, and examples such as these show why many chose to stick together and stay with their military organisations.

Military organisations also served as important social centres for their men. Many set up messes where cheap food could be purchased, rooms were available for meetings, and reading rooms and libraries were provided. The Gallipoli Mess in Paris and the Officers' Mess in Belgrade were especially important social centres, and their facilities were used by many organisations both inside and outside of ROVS.[47] Many military organisations held meetings at their messes with lecturers speaking on a variety of political and cultural themes. In 1926, for instance, General Miller began a series of lectures in Paris, entitled 'Lectures on Russia', copies of which were

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[45] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1930, IV Otdel to Central Office' (Declaration by Gen. Ekk, no date given, probably 1929).

[46] Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 18, 1 Jan 1935, p. 11.

[47] Details of all the meetings held at the Gallipoli mess in Paris can be found in L. A. Mnukhin (ed), L'Emigration Russe, Chronique de la Vie Scientifique, Culturelle et Sociale en France, Vols 1-4 (Paris, 1995 & 1997). For information on the Officers' Mess in Belgrade, see Russkii Golos, no's 117, 121, 129 & 223, & BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1930, IV Otdel to Central Office' (Letter, Bazarevich to Stogov, 3 Nov 1930).

distributed around Europe to be read in other countries. Designed to reinforce in the older generation, and nurture in the younger generation, a sense of the glories of Imperial Russia, these covered such subjects as the church, Russian culture, external politics in Russian history, and economic development.[48] Later, in December 1926 the Gallipoli Mess in Paris held lectures on such diverse themes as Turgenev, the Orthodox Church in the 15th and 16th Centuries, Dostoevsky, and The Time of Troubles.[49] In larger émigré centres, literary and artistic evenings were arranged, and musicians and singers often found employment at the numerous balls held by military organisations. Well known writers such as N. Teffi, A. Kuprin and B. Zaitsov were sponsored at literary evenings held by the Society of Gallipolians in Paris.[50] The Society's branch in Belgrade published a collection of poems by Ivan Savin, who had served in the Russian Army in the Crimea and was the favourite poet of the younger generation of White veterans, but who died prematurely in 1927.[51] Historians commenting on the maintenance of Russian high culture in exile seem to assume that this was entirely the outcome of the work of émigré intellectuals and artists. But without a wider community supporting them these intellectuals would not have been able to carry on their work. By providing such support, ROVS and its component organisations played a vital role in the maintenance of Russian culture.

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[48] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder '1928-1930, III Otdel to Central Office' (Letter, Miller to A. Ermolov, 15 Mar 1928); & Mnukhin, L'Emigration Russe, vol. 1, p. 267.

[49] Mnukhin, L'Emigration Russe, Vol. 1, pp. 292-294.

[50] Mnukhin, L'Emigration Russe, Vol. 1, pp. 242 & 421.

[51] Ivan Savin, Ladonka: Kniga Liriki (Belgrade, 1926). Savin's poems have now been published in Russia under the title Moi Belyi Vitiaz (Moscow, 1998).

Humanitarian aid was provided not only by members' own units and organisations but also from the centre. Much of the day-to-day work of ROVS's departmental and central directorates was taken up in dealing with requests for assistance from military émigrés. Colonel Matsylev, who served as secretary of the ROVS 1st Department in the late 1930s, reported that the department received as many as 70 to 80 visitors a day.[52] The files of the ROVS central offices are full of requests to ROVS for money, for aid in getting visas, for recommendations for work, for certificates proving military service, and so on. ROVS also handled dozens of inquiries from émigrés trying to find lost relatives or friends, or trying to determine whether somebody they had met was really who he said he was. ROVS was often able to help with providing information or aid in getting visas, but requests for money were normally rejected. Some groups within ROVS did, however, receive direct financial assistance from the centre. In November 1930, for instance, the Kuban Cossack Division in Yugoslavia was given a loan of 5,000 francs by General Miller, which was supplemented by a further loan of 17,000 dinars in May 1932.[53] In Paris, ROVS arranged for a lawyer to provide free legal advice for members who were unable to afford it themselves,[54] and it paid for the establishment of a bed at a hospital near Paris to be used exclusively, and free of charge, by ROVS members needing

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[52] BAR, ROVS, Box 86, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Matsylev, 1934-1936' (Letter, Matsylev to Zinkevich, 15 May 1936).

[53] BAR, ROVS, Box 65, Folder 'Correspondence, 1935, IV Otdel to Central Office' (Letter, Miller to Zborovskii, 7 May 1935).

[54] BAR, ROVS, Box 4, Folder 'Central Office (6)' (Announcement - 'Besplatnaia iuridicheskaia pomoshch' chinam ROVSa').

surgery.[55] In Bulgaria in 1930, the ROVS 3rd Department paid half the cost of surgery for 27 members (the other half being paid for by the men and their units) and found places for 75 of its members in the sanatoria of Baroness Olga Wrangel.[56] The 3rd Department also paid for a bed for the exclusive use of one of its members in the hospital of the Russian Red Cross in Sofia.[57] In addition, General Shatilov was able to obtain grants from the League of Nations to boost the mutual help capitals of the military organisations in the 1st Department.[58]

In order to safeguard its members' interests, ROVS took an active role in the wider activity of humanitarian aid to the Russian emigration in general. In the mid-1930s, many émigrés became attracted by the idea of moving to South America, in particular Paraguay, which offered positions in its army to Russian officers. By February 1934, 40 Russian officers were serving in the Paraguayan army in the Chaco war against Bolivia, and more were thinking of joining them both as officers in the Paraguayan army and as civilian settlers.[59] General Miller joined an émigré

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[55] BAR, ROVS, Box 4, Folder 'Central Office (6)' ('Polozhenie o koike ROVS v gospitale Villejuif).

[56] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller (2)' ('Informatsionnye Svedeniia 3-ogo Otdela ROVSa', 5 Sep 1931).

[57] BAR, ROVS, Box 7, Folder 'Correspondence, 1932, III Otdel to Central Office' (Letter, Abramov to Miller, no. 176, 1 Jul 1932).

[58] BAR, ROVS, Box 6, Folder '1 Armeiskii Korpus, 1931-1933' (Letter, Shatilov to Fok, no. 3283, 19 Dec 1933).

[59] Russkii Golos, no. 150, 18 Feb 1934, p. 2. Chasovoi, nos 135/6, 143, 174 & 176, Oct 1934 - Oct 1936. M. Karateev, Po sledam konkvistadorov: Istoriia gruppy russkikh kolonistov v tropicheskikh lesakh Paragvaia (Buenos Aires, 1972). B. F. Martynov, Paragvaiskii Miklukho-Maklai: Povest' o generale Beliaeve (Moscow, 1993).

committee set up to investigate the economic and legal conditions there and to provide advice to émigrés, and General Stogov travelled to Paraguay to see the situation first hand. Pamphlets produced by the committee were distributed throughout Europe.[60] ROVS members were also active in the Russian Labourers' Christian Movement (RTKhD), a mutual aid society for Russian workers founded in 1931, and based on Christian principles. In Yugoslavia, the movement was set up with the aid of the ROVS 4th Department, and soon expanded rapidly, with several thousand members in Yugoslavia alone.[61] ROVS members were particularly attracted by the religious element associated with the RTKhD, which sought not only to provide material aid to members but also to develop them spiritually and bring up their children with Christian morals.[62]

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Despite all these efforts, the humanitarian and social aspects of ROVS's life were never the main purpose of its existence. ROVS's main tasks came to be seen as moral and political, to act as a moral élite at the core of the emigration, preserving Russian culture and continuing the ethos of irreconcilable hatred of the Soviet regime. To preserve its moral force it had to remain military in essence, to prevent its

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[60] Russkii Golos, no. 230, 1 Sep 1925, p. 4; BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to Tsurikov, no. 1166, 7 Jul 1935); Box 62, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, II Otdel to Central Office' (Letters, von Lampe to Stogov, no. 102, 3 Mar 1934, & Stogov to von Lampe, no. 129, 8 Mar 1934); & Box 134, Folder 'Minutes' (Minutes of general meeting of commanders and representatives of ROVS 1st Department, Paris, 8 Nov 1935).

[61] Russkii Golos, nos 96, 123, 178 & 320; Chasovoi, no. 77, 1 Apr 1932, p. 30.

[62] Informatsionnyi Vestnik Grenobl'skoi Gruppy ROVS, no. 41, Feb 1933. Chasovoi, no. 188, 5 Apr 1937, pp. 15/16.

members becoming proletarianised by their everyday lives, and to preserve in them the high values of a Russian officer. As General Miller told a dinner of members of the Kornilov regiment in 1935, "Занятие у Вас, с позволения сказать, <<пролетарские>>, а понятия у Вас должны сохраниться офицерские:- понятия о чести, долге, благородстве". Under the mask of a social organisation, ROVS members were to remain an army, bound by the demands of discipline. Subordinates were to obey orders precisely, leaders not allow errors to pass without comment - "Мы должны оставаться ТОЛЬКО ВОЕННЫМ, борясь с окружающими нас соблазнами и соблазнителями".[63]

ROVS saw itself as the preserver of the history and traditions of the Imperial Russian Army, guarding these in exile so that they could be taken back into post-communist Russia in order to fill the moral vacuum which it was believed would exist after the fall of the Soviets. In this vacuum it was felt that a small group of cohesive, morally forceful people could have a decisive impact.[64] As General Zinkevich told Colonel Matsylev in 1935, "берегите наш полк, он нужен для России. Быть может он не надобится, как боевая организованная единица, но он нужен как собрание людей одинаково мыслящих, стоявщих на совершенно правильной пути ". After the collapse of communism there would be a void, Zinkevich predicted, a negative attitude to anything creative, but "Мы ... сможем дать и идеи и практические указания по устройству жизни в России. Ценность этого

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[63] BAR, ROVS, Box 89, Folder 'Manuscripts, Miller, E. K.' (Speech to Kornilov Regiment, 1 Sep 1935).

[64] GARF, 5796/1/7/99 (Letter, Orlov to the President of the Regional Directorate of the Society of Gallipolians in Czechoslovakia, no. 554, 22 Jun 1938).

огромна".[65] A report by the army's deputy Chief of Staff in 1922 noted that in the event that the army could not be used in its true purpose as a fighting force, it should still be preserved in exile - "сохранить и жизнь и моральный облик тех, кто входил и входит в состав армии, для того, чтобы передать будущей России тот драгоценный идейный материал, который большевики пытаются всеми силами распылить и уничтожить".[66]

To the leaders of ROVS there was no distinction between the task of preserving Russian culture and that of fighting Bolshevism. They were inextricably linked, because the struggle between Red and White always had been, in their view, primarily a cultural and spiritual one. The revolution, explained the philosopher I. A. Il'in, who was closely associated with ROVS, was "a spiritual illness" ("духовная болезнь"), and the White struggle had nothing to do with political programmes, but was "прежде всего вопрос религии, духа и патриотизма".[67] Wrangel himself summed up the moral purpose of the White Army, both in the Civil War and in exile, in a note in which he emphasised that the White cause was primarily about saving Russia's honour:

> Белое движение ... показало, что не весь русский народ безропотно покорился красным палачам. Не будь "белой" борьбы, в истории России прследние смутные годы остались бы несмываемым позорным пятном. ... Армия должна объединить все зарубежное русское воинство, сплотить его и сохранить для будущей России. России потребуются не только технические знания, не только боевой опыт, но и горячий жертвенный порыв и горячая любовь к отечеству - те чувства, которые несет в себе

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[65] BAR, ROVS, Box 86 (Letter, Zinkevich to Matsylev, 17 Nov 1935).

[66] HIA, WA, 50/27/35-49 (Report, Deputy Chief of Staff, November 1922).

[67] Il'in, Rodina i My, (Belgrade, 1926), pp. 13 & 15.

Армия.[68]

Their belief in honour made ROVS's leaders regard their organisation as a sort of religious-military order, a concept which first emerged at Gallipoli (see p. 50). In 1922 an officer of the Kornilov Regiment suggested in the regimental magazine that Russian society and the army in particular could not continue in its old ways. What was needed, said the author, was the creation within the army of a "knightly order" which would aim for self- perfection and act as a moral force to regenerate the entire army.[69] This idea was repeated by I. A. Il'in, who wrote to Wrangel that:

> В армии, руководимой Вами, мне всего дороже ее живое вдохновение, уже превратившееся в волевой характер. Это вдохновение, в корне своем религиозно; этот характер, в строении своем, рыцарственен. История человечества обогатилась новым орденом; Россия рухнула потому, что такого ордена у нее не было; без такого ордена Россия не возродится ... Идея этого ордена должна быть осознана, выговорена, раскрыта во всей ее государственно-патриотической силе .[70]

In a pamphlet written for the Society of Gallipolians, Il'in told its members that their purpose must be to generate the necessary love of country, as they could only return home once they had achieved this - "Мы оторваны от родной земли именно для того, чтобы найти в себе самих родной дух ... И родная земля вернется нам только тогда, когда огонь этого духа загорится и в нас, и в оставших там братьях наших".[71] In his book 'On the resistance to evil by force', he noted that physical force could only succeed if backed by a positive moral purpose. It was

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[68] BAR, ROVS, Box 161, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1923-1924' ('Pamiatnaia Zapiska' attached to Letter, Wrangel to Kutepov, no. 1473/s, 18 Jan 1924).

[69] Kornilovets, no. 2, pp. 6-10.

[70] HIA, WA, 149/39/496 (Letter, I. A. Il'in to Wrangel, 5 Apr 1923).

[71] Il'in, Rodina i My, p. 3.

necessary to fight the underlying moral cause of the evil one was fighting, as well as fighting it physically, physical force never being anything other than a "secondary and subordinate means" in the struggle.[72] Il'in therefore argued that the moral struggle had to preceed the physical one.

ROVS's self-image as an order of knights implied a number of moral and practical tasks in order for its members to reach the high ideals demanded by Il'in, Kutepov and others. In the practical sense, they were to strive for self-perfection. This gave much of what ROVS did a very earnest character. As the book 'Russkie v Gallipoli' said, "мы, не покладая рук, будем работать над собой, будем учиться и учить.".[73] For this purpose, ROVS set up military training courses, which officers were expected to attend to renew their military knowledge (see pp. 209-214). Officers were also expected to study world affairs and political theory. As one of ROVS's propagandists, N. A. Tsurikov, noted, ROVS was not meant to be a purely professional or social organisation, but to be actively involved in anti-Bolshevik activity, which required its members to be politically educated.[74] Captain Varnek commented that "от наших небольших усилий, небольшой работы над самим собой зависит наша общая сила".[75] Meetings of units were thus devoted to lectures discussing current events inside the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the world (the dry nature of such meetings did not encourage attendance!). To educate its men and to

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[72] Il'in, O Soprotivlenie Zlu Siloiu (Berlin, 1925), p. 112.

[73] Russkie v Gallipoli, p. 449. For similar sentiments, see Russkii Golos, no. 412, 26 Feb 1939, p. 2.

[74] N. A. Tsurikov, Zadachi Russkogo Obshche-Voinskogo Soiuza i Natsional'no-Obshchestvennaia Rabota, (Publication details unknown).

[75] Informatsionnyi Vestnik Grenobl'skoi Gruppy ROVS, no. 40, Jan 1933.

ensure that they stayed loyal to its philosophy, ROVS carried out active propaganda and agitation among them. Subsidies were given to the military journal 'Chasovoi' (until 1933, when they were ceased) and to the 'Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev'. Speakers and publicists were provided with stipends to travel around units and lecture to them on political and other matters, and were paid to issue occasional pamphlets. Education in all senses was strongly encouraged. If ROVS members could not serve their country again as army officers, they were expected to at least acquire the knowledge to serve in some other capacity. As Miller told a banquet of First Campaign Veterans, "Наш долг каждого использовать свое пребывание за-границей для того, чтобы набраться знаний, умения, опыта в самых разнообразных областях ... ибо в России мы найдем пустыню в этом отношении".[76]

On the moral side, the self-perfection expected of ROVS members implied self-discipline, and adoption of a code of honour. This code was enforced by the system of Courts of Honour, which in 1923 Wrangel extended to include the military associations.[77] ROVS's leaders considered the system of Courts of Honour to be of prime importance, and devoted a great deal of time and energy to them. General von Lampe, for instance, commented that "Я лично придаю судам чести

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[76] BAR, ROVS, Box 89, Folder 'Manuscripts, Miller, E. K.' (Speech, Gen. Miller, 15 Nov 1931).

[77] BAR, ROVS, Box 161, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1921-1923' ('Polozhenie o Russkikh Ofitserskikh Sudakh Chesti', 7 Apr 1923; & Order no. 37, Gen. Wrangel, 7 Apr 1923).

исключительное значение и считаю их основой существования РОВС".[78] The courts examined all actions committed by officers which might be deemed dishonourable, and settled disputes over matters of honour between members. Hundreds of such cases were heard in the inter-war years, most of which were remarkably trivial. The courts provided the ROVS leadership with its only means of sanction to enforce discipline, but it was not a very strong one, as courts had very few sentencing options. They could issue a reprimand, reduce an officer in rank, or expel him from ROVS. None of these had great meaning in the circumstances of exile, though in the tight-knit world of émigré life a condemnation by a Court of Honour could be a severe blow to an émigré's social status.

The concept of honour played a central role in the minds of émigré army officers. However, for most Russian officers, it was not so much their own personal honour that they were concerned with as the collective honour and prestige of the Russian Army, the Russian officer corps, and Russia itself. Russia's honour, they believed, had been stained by the Bolsheviks' signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and through the barbarities of Bolshevik rule. Russia had been shamed, and it was the task of the Whites to restore its reputation. This implied that ROVS members must remain irreconcilably opposed to the Bolshevik regime in order to prove to foreigners and to future generations of Russians that not all Russians were Bolsheviks, and that there were positive aspects to Russia's past. As Denikin put it, if nobody had resisted

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[78] GARF, 5853/1/35/15714 (Letter, von Lampe to Kutepov, no. 565, 26 Aug 1928).

the Bolsheviks, the Russian people "would not have been a people but dung".[79] Russia had been shamed, said I. A. Il'in. What would Russians say to their children, he asked, if nobody resisted the Bolsheviks? That they were slaves? What would Russia's history be but a story of self-destruction and self-degradation?[80] It was incumbent on ROVS to continue the struggle in exile to save Russia's honour, and to maintain among Russians the moral and religious principles which were being destroyed inside Russia. As N. A. Tsurikov wrote:

> Для победы нам прежде всего надо сохранить в неприкосновенной чистоте наше Белое Знамя - Знамя Корнилова-Врангеля. Это Знамя Чести, без которого все тлен и мираж.[81]

In all this ROVS's main purpose, therefore, was moral - to protect and support the spirit of its men, in particular the spirit of honour, duty, discipline and self-sacrifice, and through this save the honour of Russia. I. A. Il'in summed it up by saying:

> Белая Армия станет творческой основой, ферментом, цементом русской национальной Армии - и в недрах ее она сделается орденом чести, служения и верности. И этот орден возродит не только русскую армию, но и русскую гражданственность - на основах верности, служения и чести. Но для этого мы, белые, должны прежде всего соблюсти свой дух и самих себя ... Мы должны соблюсти, во-первых, дух чести, ибо Россия погибла от бесчестия, и возродится только через честь[82]

Wrangel fully agreed with Il'in's emphasis on honour. As he said in his New Year's greeting for 1923 - "В черном труде, русские офицеры, солдаты и казаки,

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[79] Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War (Boston, 1987), p. 21.

[80] I.A. Il'in, 'Gosudarstvennyi smysl' beloi armii', speech delivered in Nov 1923, copy held at HIA, WA, 140/40/208-229.

[81] Pervopokhodnik, no. 3, Feb 1938, p. 2.

[82] Il'in, Rodina i My, pp. 3-4.

отстаивают честь России. В этом смысл их борьбы".[83]

Of course, in reality, many, if not most, ROVS members failed to live up to the high standards expected of them. The strains of émigré life meant that most did not have the time or energy to devote themselves to study and self-perfection, and examples of poor moral behaviour were common. The Soviet secret services had no difficulty in finding ROVS members willing to serve them. Ill-discipline, disobedience, even mutiny were not unusual among ROVS members. Examples of crude, 'un-officerlike' behaviour were common.[84] For instance, the secretary of the Society of Officers of the General Staff in France, Colonel Arkhangel'skii, absconded with the society's funds.[85] But the discrepancies between the rhetoric and the reality did not make the rhetoric any less genuine. ROVS's leaders may not have been able to promote high morals among all its members, or to persuade them all to study and improve themselves, but that remained their purpose nonetheless, and it shaped much of what they did.

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Organisationally, ROVS was chaotic. Its members all too often were less than fully committed. Control over them was weak. Still, the organisation was not without purpose. In some cases it succeeded in giving important humanitarian aid. In

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[83] Bortnevskii, Zagadka, p. 113.

[84] For a typical complaint about the rude behaviour of fellow officers, see GARF, 5759/1/64/230-231 (Letter, I. Lupenko to the directorate of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, 5 Feb 1934).

[85] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Miller, E. K. to Shatilov, P. N.' (Letter, Miller to Shatilov, no. 758, 10 Oct 1933).

all cases it offered membership of what purported to be a moral élite. The spirits of Russian émigrés had little support. The conditions of their lives were often brutal and of a sort which was likely to undermine their spirits and morals. In this situation ROVS gave, if nothing else, much required spiritual support. The Russian officer turned miner, waiter or taxi driver, through membership of this 'knightly order' could once again feel himself to be something above the ordinary. As V. Kh. Davatz wrote, when the Russian officer was tired he could find a place of rest in the military milieu, where a high spiritual level and military traditions were preserved - "Вот почему воинская среда есть не только школа, но и убежище, как какая-то духовная санитория ... будем-же по-прежнему сохранять нашу связь: она помогает жить".[86] This, perhaps more than anything else, explains why ROVS, despite all its inherent weaknesses and obvious divisions, survived for so long and why Russian officers clung so stubbornly to their military identities.

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[86] Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 18, 1 Jan 1935, p. 4.

CHAPTER 7 - MONARCHISM, NON-PREDETERMINATION, AND THE ELUSIVE STRUGGLE FOR ÉMIGRÉ UNITY, 1921-1928

Wrangel's failure to unite the Russian emigration around himself and the Russian Council in the years 1921 and 1922 did not eliminate the goal of creating a broad émigré political union. It was felt that if émigrés could present a common face to the outside world, political and financial support from foreigners might be forthcoming. Efforts to form an émigré political union therefore continued in the years 1921 to 1926. These efforts to were to fail entirely, but in the process they created a climate of despair and desperation among some émigrés, causing them to lose faith in their leaders and hope of ever achieving anything in exile. Others decided that new, more violent methods of action were now required if émigrés were to make their mark. Émigrés were thus forced to reassess what they believed and modify their methods of action. It would be wrong, therefore, to regard the Russian emigration as having been politically static.

At the same time, political activities directed at forging an émigré union brought the leadership of the Russian Army into conflict with émigré monarchist groups. The monarchist movement had considerable support among émigrés in the early 1920s, and sought to subordinate the Army to its cause. These efforts were stopped by Wrangel's Order No. 82, which, as will be seen, dealt a severe blow to the monarchist movement. The struggle between the Army leadership and the monarchists revealed the depths to which the philosophy of non-predetermination was embedded in the psyche of White officers. While most émigré officers believed deeply in the idea of monarchy, they were not committed to its restoration in practice. Wrangel's resistance against the monarchists also prevented the emigration from

remaining stuck in a backward-looking ideology and made possible the development of new ideas among Russian émigrés. For this reason his struggles with the monarchists were of great importance for the wider emigration.

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The first major impetus to the émigré monarchist movement was provided by the Reichenhall Congress of 1921, which resulted in the formation of the VMS, led by N. E. Markov II (see pp. 67 & 68). In November 1921, the VMS persuaded a council of the Russian Orthodox Church abroad to adopt a resolution stating that God wanted a Romanov restoration.[1] The VMS then started trying to persuade Russian military organisations to adopt the slogan of the former Imperial Russian Army - "For Faith, Tsar and Fatherland" ("За Веру, Царя, и Отечество"). As has been noted by many historians, the great majority of Russian military exiles were monarchist by conviction.[2] This was true even of younger officers. Captain A. Grammatchikov, for instance, who was a former student member of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo who had moved to Yugoslavia to obtain work, commented in 1928 that he was taking Yugoslav citizenship "потому, что это подданство дает мне возможность иметь своего короля".[3] Émigré officers might have been expected to support the activities of the VMS in large numbers, thereby giving the monarchist movement an

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[1] Davatz, Fünf Sturmjahre, pp. 43-45.

[2] For instance, Marc Raeff, Russia Abroad, p. 14; Richard Wraga, 'Russian Émigré Politics after Thirty Years' Exile', in George Fisher (ed), Russian Émigré Politics (New York, 1951), p. 41; & Marina Gorboff, La Russie Fantôme: L'Emigration Russe de 1920 à 1950 (Lausanne, 1995), p. 129.

[3] GARF, 5759/1/64/56-57 (Letter, Grammatchikov to Directorate of Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, 24 Aug 1928).

unassailable position in émigré politics.

The efforts of the VMS to persuade military organisations to adopt monarchist slogans soon confronted a major obstacle, namely the opposition of General Wrangel. The cause of monarchism, he felt, had been hijacked by the most reactionary elements, and to adopt it would be to associate himself with those elements.[4] Whereas once the ideas of monarchy and motherland were interchangeable, wrote Wrangel, now the idea of monarchy had become the property of one political party. It could only be adopted by the Army if it once again became the general property of the Russian people. The idea of motherland should be the principle, Wrangel noted, behind which the army and émigré society should unite.[5] Wrangel wrote to A. V. Kartashev about the men of his Army:

> Это не остатки старой армии, - это кадры новой ... она, эта новая армия, стало действительно Армией Национальной. Встарь русские воины шли "за веру, Царя и Отечество" и прежде всего за Царя. Теперь их идеал выше, они борятся прежде всего за Отечество .[6]

Here Wrangel was making a significant point. In the past service to Tsar and country had been synonymous, but a growing professionalisation of the Army prior to the First World War had begun a process in which, according to William Fuller, "the army became an end in itself, the preservation of the army a goal more important than the survival of the Romanov dynasty or the Empire ... the primary value of the

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[4] HIA, WA, 148/37/294-301 & 330 (Letters, N. S. L'vov to Ivan Pavlovich; & Wrangel to Gen. Nikol'skii, no. 463/s, 9 Jan 1922).

[5] BAR, Russkii Natsional'nyi Komitet Collection, Box 5 (Letter, Wrangel to P. N. Girs, no. k/585, 16 Jan 1922); HIA, WA, 148/37/387-389 (Letter, Wrangel to Krasnov, no k/585, 16 Jan 1922).

[6] BAR, Russkii Natsional'nyi Komitet Collection, Box 5 (Letter, Wrangel to Kartashev, 26 Nov 1921).

professional soldier was the army, not the regime".[7] This helps explain the determination of many officers to preserve the army in exile. To them, the army was the most valuable thing of all. The White officers held a more modern concept of nation than the older, essentially personal, vision centred on the Tsar, which saw Russia as the Tsar's personal patrimony. Monarchy, wrote Wrangel, must be based on the support of the people, but monarchist politicians continued to think that monarchy was based on its supposed holy origins, and not on the people. They promoted monarchism primarily because they wanted to regain their former power and privileges.[8]

Wrangel's hostility to the VMS and the monarchist movement was based on the theory of non-predetermination (see Chapter 1, p. 11). In part non-predetermination was a tactical necessity prompted by the perpetual fear that the army would split if it adopted a clear political position. "РОВС есть организация военная и аполитичная", wrote von Lampe in 1928, "Всякое внесение в РОВС политической борьбы в том или ином виде - РОВС разложит и уничтожит".[9] The dangers of getting involved in émigré politics and of taking sides in any of the disputes which bedevilled the emigration were clearly shown in the case of the Church. The Russian Orthodox Church abroad split into two factions in the early 1920s. Though nominally caused by church matters, the split followed political lines,

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[7] William C. Fuller Jr, Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881-1914 (Princeton, 1985), p. 261.

[8] HIA, WA, 149/38/104-105 & 146-149 (Letters, Wrangel to Chebyshev, no. k/5, 11 Mar 1922, & Wrangel to Guchkov, Mar 1922).

[9] GARF, 5853/1/35/15714 (Letter, von Lampe to Kutepov, no. 565, 26 Aug 1928).

with more right-wing groups following the Church Synod in Sremski Karlovac under Metropolitan Antonii, and more liberal groups following Metropolitan Evlogii. Wrangel himself sympathised with Metropolitan Antonii, but his closest colleague, General Shatilov, was a fervent supporter of Evlogii. After the Church authorities inside Soviet Russia issued a demand that émigré priests give a written declaration of support for the Soviet regime, the Synod issued an epistle denouncing this demand, and Wrangel sent copies of the epistle to his senior officers asking them to distribute it among the rank and file of the Army. Shatilov refused flatly to do so, as he felt that Wrangel's order was an endorsement of the Synod's authority, and he complained that Wrangel had invited a priest subordinate to Antonii to attend him as his personal priest. Nearly all émigrés in France, he said, supported Evlogii, and if Wrangel continued to associate himself with Antonii he would find himself alone.[10] Shatilov's warning was echoed by von Lampe, who wrote that "принятие Главным Командованием в церковных вопросах той или другой стороны неминуемо повлекло бы за собой полное наше разложение".[11] If it was to avoid splits, it made sense for the Army to stay out of politics. In the instance of the Church, therefore, Wrangel eventually issued an order stating that "Религиозные убеждения являются делом совести каждого и никто из начальствующих лиц не должен

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[10] HIA, WA, 151/44/760-768 (Circular, Gen. Wrangel, no. 1758, 9 Nov 1927, & Letters, Shatilov to Khol'msen, Wrangel to Khol'msen, Shatilov to Wrangel, & Wrangel to Shatilov, Nov 1927); Also, HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 4 (Letters, Shatilov to Arkhangel'skii, 4 Mar 1928, & Arkhangel'skii to Shatilov, 9 Mar 1928).

[11] GARF, 5853/1/35/15646-15647 (Letter, von Lampe to Father Vassilii, 10 Jul 1928).

допускать какого либо влияния в этом отношении на подчиненных им лиц".[12]

Another consideration in Wrangel's support for non-predetermination was that he did not wish to seem overly reactionary in the eyes of foreign powers whose help and support he still hoped to win. In 1922, for instance, he noted that associating the army with monarchism would be likely to lead to more repressions against the army in Bulgaria.[13] All this suggests that the policy of non-predetermination was fundamentally based on tactical needs rather than principle. Indeed many in ROVS did regard it in precisely these terms. General Miller wrote in 1930 that, although he was personally a monarchist, adopting monarchism as a policy was impossible because it would split ROVS:

> Крепость же и сила РОВС покоилась до сих пор на отсутствии в нем партийности и политиканства ... Далее, Белая Армия в настоящей коньюнктуре может стать активной лишь при содействии и помощи иностранных держав. Большинство из них ... истолковывает исторический вековой уклад России или превратно, или считает его политически опасным. Все это ... заставляет РОВС, пока она находится за рубежом, оставаться на своем старом пути - непредрешенства.[14]

Non-predetermination was "a tactical means of union" ("тактическое средство объединения"), stated a ROVS newspaper in the Far East.[15] Similar views

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[12] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 2 (Circular, Gen. Wrangel, no. 36, 16 Feb 1928).

[13] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 11, File 45 (Letter, Wrangel to Markov and others, no. k/1183, 30 Aug 1922); & HIA, WA, 143/22/164-171 (Letter, S. N. Il'in to V. Bobrinskii, Sep 1922).

[14] BAR, ROVS, Box 13, Folder 'Correspondence, E. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to El'shin, 26 Aug 1930); See also BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1933. IV Otdel to Central Office (1)' (Letter, Miller to Barbovich, no. 421, 1 Jun 1933).

[15] Na Strazhe Rodiny, 1934, p.2.

were expressed by one of ROVS's propagandists, N. A. Tsurikov, in a pamphlet dedicated to the subject of non-predetermination.[16] But it would be wrong to interpret this to mean that the policy was a hypocritical one behind which the true monarchist, reactionary nature of the White Army was deliberately hidden. For it was a tactic based also on strong principle. As General Wrangel wrote:

> Хотелось бы, чтобы творимые противниками Армии легенды о ее реакционности, ее бонапартизме были бы рассеяны ... Политическое credo Армии ясно ... Армия ведет борьбу не за монархию, не за республику, а за отечество. Она не пойдет за теми, кто захочет навязать России, помимо воли народа, тот или иной государственный правопорядок, но станет на страже того порядка, который будет установлен действительно свободным изъявлением народной воли. ... Все прошлое России говорит за то, что она, рано или поздно, вернется к монархическому строю, но, не дай Бог, если строй этот будет навязан силой штыков, или белым террором. В том же случае если в России установится волей народа республиканская форма правления, каждый честный монархист должен будет с этим примириться и быть вернейшим слугой своей Родины.[17]

Wrangel's views were shared by many others. Ataman Bogaevskii commented to Abramov that he was not a republican, but that the past could not be restored - "Многие, как и мы с Вами, искренно сожалел о невозвратном прошлом, но, что делать: жизнь творит новые пути".[18] "Мы почти все монархисты", stated Captain Varnek, "но своим лозунгом считаем не 'За Царя', а 'За Родину' ".[19] A general

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[16] N. A. Tsurikov, Nepredreshenstvo i zadacha osvoboditel'noi bor'by (Paris, 1932), p. 8.

[17] BAR, Russkii Natsional'nyi Komitet Collection, Box 5, Folder 'Corespondence, Wrangel to Kartashev' (Letter, Wrangel to Kartashev, no. k/580, 12 Jan 1921).

[18] GARF, 6460/1/1/13 (Letter, Bogaevskii to Abramov, no. 244, 28 Jan 1924).

[19] GARF, 5881/1/255 (V. N. Varnek, 'Golos Armii').

meeting of the Society of Russian Veterans in San Francisco resolved that "Монархисты в потерянном прошлом, монархисты в конечном будущем, но убежденные непредрешенцы на долгом пути освобождения России - таковы были, есть и будут наши основные положения".[20]

Wrangel's comments about monarchy not being restored on the point of bayonets is reflected in the writings of I. A. Il'in, whose views Wrangel valued highly. Il'in was both an enthusiastic monarchist and a believer in non-predetermination. Monarchy, he believed, was a superior form of government to republicanism, but it was not always appropriate because the forms of the state must reflect peoples' legal consciousness.[21] If there was no mood for monarchy, Il'in went on to say, it would be pointless to create a monarchy, as it would simply be destroyed.

This attitude, which was shared by many other White officers, distinguished such officers from the monarchist politicians. Whereas the latter took the view that the Tsar was sovereign, Il'in and Wrangel were admitting that the people were sovereign. This did not mean that Wrangel believed that the issue of the form of government should be decided by a popular vote or a Constituent Assembly. He spoke often of a 'spontaneous' expression of the people's will. As his political advisor, S. N. Il'in, explained, the image Wrangel had in mind was that of Napoleon's return to France from Elba. Then, the spontaneous welcome the Emperor received

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[20] Vestnik obshchestva russkikh veteranov velikoi voiny, no. 154/155, Mar/Apr 1939, p. 2.

[21] Letter, Wrangel to Il'in, 4 Oct 1924, printed in Bortnevskii, I. A. Il'in i P.N. Vrangel', p. 230.

legitimised his rule.[22] Should the Romanov dynasty return to Russia and receive a similar welcome, then that would be sufficient to justify the restoration of a monarchy. If however, the monarchist standard was raised in Russia and the people did not respond, then it would be clear that Russia was not ripe for monarchy. This attitude did not make Wrangel a democrat. He and most officers despised democracy. Nevertheless he and his followers ultimately recognised the sovereignty of the people, however it was expressed.

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Another reason for avoiding associating the army with the monarchist cause was political. Aware that his own efforts to unite émigrés politically around his Russian Council were failing, Wrangel still wished to achieve a broad political union including both the monarchist right and the liberal elements of émigré 'society'. Adopting monarchist slogans would make any such union impossible, as Parisian 'society' made it clear that it would refuse to participate in any union associated with 'reactionary' monarchist politics.

In early 1922 two different schemes of émigré union were circulating. The first, put forward by the National Committee, envisioned the formation of a bloc of émigré social organisations and representatives of the Army, and talks were begun with other social and political groups in Paris to this end. The second scheme centred around Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the uncle of the last Tsar. Between 1914 and 1915 Nikolai Nikolaevich had been Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, and many old soldiers respected him greatly. Nikolai Nikolaevich was one of two

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[22] HIA, WA, 143/22/164-171 (Letter, S. N. Il'in to V. Bobrinskii, Sep 1922).

potential Romanov pretenders to the Russian throne. The other was Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich, who in terms of lineage had the best claim to the throne, but who was exceedingly unpopular among the mass of émigrés because in February 1917 he had publicly endorsed the revolution which overthrew Nicholas II. Nikolai Nikolaevich was far more popular, and it was to him that most monarchists looked for a potential leader of their cause. By early 1922 many monarchist organisations were proposing that émigré society unite politically by accepting the leadership of Nikolai Nikolaevich, who could also be acceptable to republicans as he did not claim the throne for himself, and publicly supported the concept of non-predetermination. Nikolai Nikolaevich's leadership was, however, rejected by Wrangel, who wrote that any union led by him would inevitably turn into a monarchist organisation and would be perceived as such by others.[23]

Wrangel preferred the scheme of the National Committee but, unfortunately for him, the National Committee enjoyed little support and its scheme soon collapsed.[24] Meanwhile, pressure on Nikolai Nikolaevich to accept the leadership of the process of uniting the emigration continued to mount, although the Grand Duke himself did not want to take on this role. A new impetus was given to the movement promoting Nikolai Nikolaevich in July 1922 when Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich declared himself to be the rightful heir to the Russian throne (his supporters acquired

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[23] HIA, WA, 143/23/8-12 (Letter, Wrangel to Lukomskii, no. k/699, 6 Apr 1922).

[24] V. G. Bortnevskii, 'General P. N. Vrangel' i bor'ba za rukovodstvo russkoi emigratsii v 1920-kh gg', in Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian Emigration between the World Wars in Czechoslovakia, Vol. 2 (Prague, 1995), p. 579.

the title 'legitimists' because of the supposed legal basis of Kirill Vladimirovich's claim). The personal antipathy most émigré monarchists felt towards Kirill Vladimirovich now made them even more determined that Nikolai Nikolaevich should step forward to lead their cause. The latter's name had a great reputation among many émigrés, who, being aware of their desperate position, now clung to his name as their last hope. Reports in 1923 from the Drozdovskii regiment in Sevlievo in Bulgaria, for instance, noted that "Ожидают объединения эмиграции вокруг Великого Князя Николая Николаевича", while from Orkhanje it was written that "С надеждами следят за всей работой, происходящей в Париже вокруг Великого Князя Николая Николаевича".[25]

As support for Nikolai Nikolaevich increased, the monarchist movement as a whole gained momentum. All that stopped many émigré officers from joining monarchist groups was the opposition of General Wrangel. Aware of this, monarchist groups such as the VMS sought to undermine his influence and to bring members of the Russian Army into their own orbit, even if this meant destroying the Army in the process. [26] In this way monarchist organisations and Wrangel came into direct conflict and a battle for control of émigré military organisations began. It was not easy for Wrangel to maintain his line. Many of his senior officers supported the idea of Nikolai Nikolaevich declaring himself leader of the Russian emigration, and a

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[25] BAR, ROVS, Box 166, Folder 'Russian Army, 1923-1924' ('Svodka o zhizni chastei gallipoliiskoi gruppy v Bolgarii za avgust mesiats 1923 goda').

[26] See for instance, HIA, WA, 149/38/179 (Letter, Khol'msen to Wrangel, no. 30/s, 22 Mar 1922); HIA, WA, 149/38/440-444 (Letter, von Lampe to Miller, no. 10/l, 12 Jun 1922).

conference of senior officers held in November 1922 resolved that only Nikolai Nikolaevich had sufficient authority to unite the emigration.[27] Wrangel, by contrast, was convinced that Nikolai Nikolaevich would fail and had no faith in him as a person. But he did not wish to be seen to be hindering what many considered to be the emigration's one and only hope.[28] Being aware of Nikolai Nikolaevich's support within the Army, on 7 May 1923 he told Shatilov that he had reconsidered his opposition to him. If Nikolai Nikolaevich's leadership would help the Army, he continued, he would willingly hand over his leadership of the Army to him.[29] As a result, on 12 May 1923 Wrangel sent a telegram to Nikolai Nikolaevich announcing his willingness to subordinate himself and the Russian Army to him. This was a remarkable step on Wrangel's behalf. He is very often criticised for having been vain and ambitious and for being primarily concerned with self-promotion. But in this he undertook a remarkable act of self-effacement. Wrangel hoped that his declaration of support for Nikolai Nikolaevich would force the Grand Duke to come out into the open and declare his leadership of the emigration. Nikolai Nikolaevich, who was known to support non-predetermination, could then use his authority to make monarchists cease their agitation to get military organisations to adopt the monarchist cause. In this way, the divisions created by monarchists within the army would be brought to an end. But events did not turn out this way. Nikolai Nikolaevich seems

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[27] HIA, WA, 143/22/228-229 (Minute of meeting of senior commanders, 22 Nov 1922).

[28] HIA, WA, 149/39/531-534 (Letter, S. N. Il'in to Gen. Danilov, no. k/2074, 16 May 1923).

[29] HIA, WA, 143/23/182-183 (Letter, Wrangel to I. P Aleksinskii, no. 1242/s, 7 May 1922).

to have been suffering from a crisis of indecision. On the one hand he told Shatilov and Kutepov that he intended to start work, and began to meet representatives of émigré 'society'. On the other hand, he was still unwilling to make a public declaration of his leadership. The political situation which emerged in mid-1923 was therefore one of total confusion, as it was not clear exactly what Nikolai Nikolaevich intended.

This confusion was exploited by monarchists who continued to pressure military organisations to adopt monarchist slogans, with some success. During 1923 various military unions adopted monarchist slogans. Particularly prone to monarchist tendencies were unions of Guards Regiments and societies of officers of Great War Veterans (i.e. officers who had fought in the First World War, but not in the Civil War). By contrast the monarchist movement made little headway among units of the Russian Army itself. In Paris, the president of the Union of Great War Veterans (SROUV - see p. 126), General A. A. Gulevich, was particularly active in promoting the monarchist cause. The SROUV adopted the slogan 'For Faith, etc.' and Gulevich decided to set up branches of the society in other countries, so forming an alternative military structure outside that of the Russian Army and independent of Wrangel's leadership.[30] In Belgrade this resulted in the formation of the Soiuz Uchastnikov Velikoi Voiny (SUVV) led by General Bolotov, which also adopted the slogan 'For Faith, etc.'.[31] Members of the SUVV were reported to have told one of the senior

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[30] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1923-1924 (1)' (Letter, Miller to Wrangel, 21 Oct 1923).

[31] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1923-1924 (1)' (Letter, Arkhangel'skii to Bolotov, August 1923).

officers of the Russian Army, General A. M. Dragomirov, that their organisation's purpose was to destroy the power of Wrangel.[32] Wrangel's representative in Germany, General von Lampe, noted that the VMS was actively trying to undermine Wrangel's authority among military émigrés in Germany with encouragement from General Gulevich.[33]

Frightened that Nikolai Nikolaevich's indecision was creating a situation in which the Russian Army and military organisations were being dragged bit by bit into the monarchist camp, Wrangel decided that the time had come to act. In so doing he displayed his powers of leadership and ability to grasp a situation and take control of it. The form of Wrangel's response was Order no. 82, issued on 8 September 1923. This was to prove one of the most important acts in the history of the politics of the Russian emigration. It determined the behaviour of much of the military emigration for the next 20 years and significantly limited the influence that the more extreme elements of the emigration were to have.

Order no. 82 stipulated that: the leadership and union of all military organisations in every country was to be carried out by Wrangel's own military representatives; all officers who did not consider themselves to be part of the army were to resign; members were forbidden to engage in political activity or to join political organisations, and those who continued to do so would be expelled from the

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[32] HIA, WA, 144/25/925-929 (Letter, Wrangel to Shatilov, no. 1409/s, 5 Oct 1923).

[33] BAR, ROVS, Box 162 (Letter, von Lampe to Shatilov, no. 5014, 2 Sep 1923).

army; and military unions were forbidden to discuss political matters.[34]

The response to this order was mixed. Most of the rank and file of the Russian Army accepted it without complaint, and even welcomed it. The prevailing mood of the rank and file, especially its younger elements, was summed up in a letter written by members of the Circle of Russian Youth in Helsinki, several of whom had served in the Russian Army under Wrangel. They wrote:

> Мы монархисты не за страх, а за совесть ... И тем не менее мы, ... хотели бы остаться вне влияния отдельных монархических группировок ... Мы уверены, что реставрация всего дореволюционного, да еще отягощенная местью, ничего кроме новых потоков крови и нового бунта не принесет.[35]

Despite this, Order no. 82 drew howls of protest from some quarters, especially from monarchist members of unions of Great War veterans, and also from many of the more senior generals of the Russian Army who began to pressure Wrangel to reverse his decision, which had been taken by him alone.[36] The contrast between the reaction of the Great War veterans and the rank and file of the Russian Army showed the degree to which the White officers had become differentiated from those officers of the Imperial Army who had not fought in the Civil War. Both groups were monarchists, but to the Whites monarchism was a less important emotion

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[34] BAR, ROVS, Box 161, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1923-1924' (Order no. 82, Gen. Wrangel, 8 Sep 1923).

[35] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 12, File 47 (Letter, Bergman, Savolainen and Larionov to A.N. Fen, 8 Sep 1923).

[36] See for instance, GARF, 6460/1/6/16 (Letter, Kutepov to Abramov, 25 May 1924); HIA, WA, 144/25/918-924 (Letter, Shatilov to Wrangel, no. 394, 30 Sep 1923); HIA, WA, 144/25/944-951 (Letter, Miller to Wrangel, 8 Oct 1923); & HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 12, File 47 (Letter, von Lampe to Miller, no. 261/l, 1 Nov 1923).

than patriotism.

What angered the Order's opponents was the ban on participation in political organisations. As very few officers had ever been likely to join parties of the left, Order no. 82 was clearly designed with monarchist political groups in mind, and aimed at breaking the influence of those groups over the military emigration. Since military émigrés constituted the most promising pool of potential recruits for the monarchists, Order no. 82 was a terrible blow to their hopes.

The biggest protests against the order came from the Great War veterans in Paris and Belgrade. On 1 October 1923 Miller noted that it would not be possible to keep them on the army's side without compromise.[37] General Gulevich was continuing to put forward plans to expand his own organisation in other countries, and in Belgrade the Great War veterans held a general meeting on 30 September 1923 at which they reaffirmed their support for the slogan 'For Faith, etc.'.[38] Aware of the resistance his order was meeting, Wrangel met representatives of officers' organisations in Yugoslavia between 9 and 11 October 1923 to discuss its implementation. He explained his views in clear terms:

> Русская Армия это все русское воинство, оставшееся верным русскому знамени, Русская Армия - это все, что и не Совдепия - это Россия. И пока не умерла Армия - она - эта Россия, жива. ... Мы, старые офицеры, служившие при Русском Императорем ... не может не быть монархистами ... но мы не можем допустить, чтобы, прикрываясь словами "Вера, Царь, Отечество", офицеров вовлекали в политическую

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[37] BAR, ROVS, Box 4, Folder 'Central Office (2)' (Letter, Miller to Wrangel, 1 Oct 1923).

[38] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1923-1924 (1)' (Letter, Pravlenie Soiuza Russkikh Ofitserov-uchastnikov Velikoi Voiny v Korolevstve S.Kh.S, to Gen. Wrangel, 7 Oct 1923).

борьбу.[39]

However, Wrangel's plans were greeted with great reservations by many senior officers present. The prevailing view was that the Commander-in-Chief must compromise, and that he was wrong to seek conflict with the monarchist right. Many officers asked for the order to be altered. General Orlov, for instance, stated that the order could result in the collapse of the monarchist cause. He felt that officers were divided between a sense of duty to obey the order, and a sense of honour not to abandon their colleagues, 80% of whom were monarchists. He asked Wrangel to change the order so that officers could preserve their honour. Similar ideas were expressed by many others.[40] Wrangel refused to reconsider his decision, but the opposition that he encountered made clear the extent of monarchist sentiment among military émigrés at this time. It seems likely that if Wrangel had openly adopted the monarchist cause on behalf of the Russian Army, he would have found considerable support among émigré officers, and it might have been possible to form a large-scale émigré political union on the basis of a monarchist platform. This would have ensured the political triumph of monarchism among émigrés. As it was, the pressure from monarchists was sufficient to force Wrangel to backtrack slightly. Writing to Miller in March 1924, Wrangel told him that in enforcing Order no. 82, the local situation was to be taken into consideration. In certain locations, individuals were to be allowed in special circumstances to join political organisations in order to

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[39] BAR, ROVS, Box 161, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1921-1923' (Speech of Gen. Wrangel to representatives of officers' unions in Yugoslavia, 10 Oct 1923).

[40] BAR, ROVS, Box 161, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1923-1924' (Minutes of commission of representatives of officers' organisations, 11 Oct 1923).

influence discussions concerning the Army.[41] This was to be the way in which the order would be enforced from that moment on.

This concession may have been brought about by the continued resistance to the order from the SROUV in Paris. At a general meeting of the union on 20th January 1924 calls were heard to set up officers' unions supporting the slogan 'For Faith, etc.' in other locations, and some officers directly criticised General Wrangel himself. General Nechvolodov, for instance, complained that Wrangel was living well in Yugoslavia while his men toiled in Bulgarian coal mines. On hearing this comment, General Miller left the meeting in protest, followed by about half those present. The divisive potential of monarchist politics was clearly revealed.[42]

Despite all this, Order no. 82 achieved its desired effect. Even the SROUV eventually accepted it, and General Gulevich was replaced as the union's president by another officer less associated with the monarchist cause. In the end Wrangel's authority was sufficiently large among most army officers for his order to be obeyed. Henceforth, except for a few individuals who received special permission, members of the Russian Army and officers' organisations remained outside émigré political bodies. Order no. 82 shattered the hopes of the monarchist movement for a broad based émigré union, including émigré military organisations, based on the monarchist principle. The Order was one of the most decisive acts of the political history of the Russian emigration. Prior to it there was a clear and strong impetus towards an open

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[41] BAR, ROVS, Box 171, Folder 'Sovet ob"edinennykh ofitserskikh obshchestv, 1924' (Letter, Wrangel to Miller, no. 1486/s, 12 Mar 1924).

[42] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1923-1924 (1)' ('Obshchee Sobranie Soiuza Russkikh Ofitserov Uchastnikov Voiny', 20 Jan 1924).

declaration of support for monarchism which attracted many among the military émigrés. Order no. 82 stopped this movement in its tracks. Émigré monarchism did not die out, but its strength as an organised political force was greatly weakened. In resisting the monarchist right, Wrangel prevented the emigration from becoming stuck in a backward-looking ideology and allowed it to adapt to new times and to evolve. The later development of new ideas among émigrés became possible, the more extreme elements of the emigration were restrained, and the emigration was pulled towards the political centre.

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By mid-1924 Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich had begun practical work as leader of the nationalist Russian emigration. He established a staff at his home at Choigny, near Paris, which took over efforts to establish an émigré union conference, sought financial and political support from foreigners, and tried to start up underground operations inside the USSR. But until November 1924 Nikolai Nikolaevich still refused to make an open declaration of his leadership. What finally prompted him to act was the actions of Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich. In April 1924 Kirill Vladimirovich formed his own military organisation - The Corps of Officers of the Imperial Army and Fleet - as a parallel to those organisations already existing under Wrangel's command, and with the aim of attracting members from them. Few officers were willing to join the new Corps, but its creation helped further undermine the morale and cohesion of émigré officers.[43] On 31 August 1924, Kirill

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[43] See for instance, BAR, ROVS, Box 166, Folder 'Memoranda, 1921-1924' (Letter, Vitkovskii to Abramov, 3734/a, 15 Jun 1924).

Vladimirovich then threw the emigration into disarray by declaring himself Emperor of Russia, demanding recognition of his position from military organisations. Most refused to give it, and the prevailing mood among the rank and file, according to a despatch from Bulgaria, was one of bewilderment.[44] Nevertheless, such was the extent to which monarchist emotions had been raised, and such was the desire for a leader who could claim legitimate authority, that some officers did respond positively to Kirill Vladimirovich's declaration. The naval officers' society, 'Morskoi Kaiut Kompaniia', recognised Kirill Vladimirovich as Emperor,[45] and the commander of the Guards Cavalry Regiment, Colonel Apukhtin, was expelled from the Russian Army by Wrangel after sending a telegram of support from his regiment to Kirill Vladimirovich.[46]

Kirill Vladimirovich's declaration forced Nikolai Nikolaevich to step forward to counter his influence, and as a result on 16 November 1924 he announced that he would assume command of the army in exile, exercising his powers through Wrangel as Commander-in-Chief. This was exactly what Wrangel had been hoping for. Those military organisations, such as the SROUV, which had refused to recognise Wrangel's authority but who did recognise that of Nikolai Nikolaevich, were now brought into ROVS and under the sway of Order no. 82. This, Wrangel hoped, would put an end to monarchist intriguing within the ranks of émigré military organisations.

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[44] Vestnik Gallipoliitsev, no. 11, Nov 1924, p. 143.

[45] BAR, ROVS, Box 134, Folder 'Memoranda, 1921-1924' ('Pamiatnaia Zapiska', no date or signature).

[46] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1923-1924 (1)' (Order no. 46, Gen. Wrangel, 13 Oct 1924).

But he was to be disappointed. Attacks on Wrangel in the émigré press by the leader of the VMS, N. E. Markov II, continued, and Shatilov suspected that these had been sanctioned by Nikolai Nikolaevich himself.[47] Nikolai Nikolaevich also provided subsidies to monarchist organisations in Yugoslavia.[48] Responsibility for military organisations in the Far East and North America was taken from Wrangel by the Grand Duke and given to General Lukomskii.[49] Relations between Wrangel and Nikolai Nikolaevich rapidly deteriorated, the former being convinced that the latter did not value the Russian Army and was happy to see it disappear.

Around the middle of 1925 the focus of Wrangel's correspondence changed. Complaints about the activities of monarchists, which once dominated almost to the exclusion of everything else, now tapered off. It would appear that, despite Wrangel's complaints about Nikolai Nikolaevich's encouragement of monarchist groups, Order no. 82 had achieved its aim, and the activities of such groups had lessened. A new subject now came to dominate Wrangel's correspondence - money. When Nikolai Nikolaevich had assumed control of the Army, Wrangel had handed over to him all the money at his disposal. This put the remaining cadres of the Army, as well as the staff of ROVS, at the mercy of the Grand Duke's generosity. Nikolai Nikolaevich had additional priorities to maintaining the army's cadres, as he wished to fund political work and underground activities inside the USSR. His own money-raising

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[47] HIA, WA, 146/30/401-402 (Letter, Shatilov to Wrangel, no. 1415, 4 Jun 1925).

[48] HIA, WA, 146/31/754-757 (Letter. Wrangel to Miller, no. 1997/s, 1 Dec 1925).

[49] HIA, WA, 146/31/450-451 (Letter, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich to Wrangel, no. 10/l, 26 Jun 1925).

schemes had little success,[50] and he was short of cash. Nikolai Nikolaevich therefore announced that expenditures on the remaining cadres of the Russian Army would be cut on 1 April 1925. In response Wrangel was obliged to order these cadres to seek work. All remaining cadre members were instructed to have found work by 1 January 1926.[51] All that now remained of the Russian Army was Wrangel's headquarters at Sremski Karlovac, which was in turn disbanded on 1 August 1926. With this the final remnant of the Russian Army ceased to exist. From now on, although many would refer to the Army as if it still existed, ROVS had fully taken its place.

With the closing of the Army staff, Wrangel's own role in the life of the émigré military was greatly downgraded. In December 1926 he moved from Yugoslavia to Belgium in order to be closer to his family. Wrangel was a somewhat petulant character, who if he could not have things his own way preferred to have nothing to do with them at all. Von Lampe commented in October 1927 that Wrangel appeared to have lost his will, and lacked energy.[52] To a large degree he now withdrew from public life.

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In the meantime those around Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich were making the grandest attempt yet to forge an émigré political union. The idea arose of

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[50] For the example of Nikolai Nikolaevich's failed financial negotiations with the American MacCormick family, see HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 2 (Report entitled 'Bor'ba s bol'shevizmom', Lukomskii to Miller, 27 Oct 1932).

[51] BAR, ROVS, Box 3, Folder 'Wrangel' (Circular, Gen. Wrangel, no. 1648, 7 Aug 1925), & Box 4, Folder 'Central Office (2)' (Letter, Wrangel to Lukomskii, no. 1937/s, 12 Aug 1925).

[52] GARF, 5853/1/31/23 (Diary of von Lampe).

summoning a Congress elected by Russian émigrés throughout Europe which could agree on a common political platform and endorse Nikolai Nikolaevich as leader. It was felt that if its delegates were elected by the entire emigration, the congress would give Nikolai Nikolaevich's leadership legitimacy and allow him to speak and act on behalf of all émigrés, both within the emigration and in front of foreigners. It was hoped that the Congress would elect a single 'centre of will' in the form of a permanent executive committee, which would direct the struggle against Bolshevism.[53] Preparations for the Congress (known as the 'Zarubezhnyi S"ezd') were carried on throughout 1925, and it finally met in Paris in April 1926. Delegates were chosen not by a direct election in which all émigrés voted, but indirectly through elections in émigré political and social organisations, who were invited to send delegates. A very broad part of the emigration did participate in these elections, but the indirect electoral procedure of itself reduced the congress's legitimacy. The émigré political left refused to attend, Miliukov claiming that the electoral procedure revealed that the Congress was merely a mask which monarchists were using to give themselves legitimacy[54] (although in reality, given the mood of the emigration at this time, a more direct form of representation might have helped the monarchists). The Legitimists also refused to attend. In addition, ROVS was forbidden to send delegates due to the requirement that it stay above politics. Military personnel were allowed to attend, but only in the capacity of representatives of non-military organisations, and they were prohibited from speaking in such a way as to identify themselves as military

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[53] Pipes, Struve, p. 380.

[54] P.N. Miliukov, Emigratsiia na pereput'e (Paris, 1926), pp. 14-18.

persons.[55] With the absence of these groups, it became very difficult for the Congress to claim that it could unite the emigration.

In the end the Congress passed resolutions recognising the independence of Poland, Finland, the Baltic States, Georgia and Armenia, and rejecting any restoration of land or property seized during the revolution. In this way it hoped to send a positive message to the Soviet people with regard to the political and social aims of the anti-Soviet struggle. But the main task of the Congress was to create a permanent body to represent the emigration and lead the anti-Soviet struggle in its name. Agreement could not be reached on what form of standing body to create. The right wanted a body with full powers, subordinate to Nikolai Nikolaevich, whereas the centre and left felt that such a body lacked the right to act as if it possessed democratic legitimacy, and felt that it should have no authority over émigré social and political organisations. They saw Nikolai Nikolaevich only as a figurehead. But the final vote on the creation of the permanent body caused only confusion. A majority voted in favour of creating an authoritative council, but the rules of the Congress required a two-thirds majority, and the majority fell just short. The question remained unresolved. Two competing unity councils were then set up - the centrist Russian Central Union and the more right-wing Patriotic Union. Rather than uniting the emigration, the Congress resulted only in the creation of two more political bodies, neither of which enjoyed any authority.

The failure of the Congress was largely the fault of Nikolai Nikolaevich himself. It was called specifically to endorse his leadership, but he not only failed to

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[55] BAR, ROVS, Box 4, Folder 'Central Office (2)' (Letter, Khol'msen to President of the Society of the General Staff in France, 23 Jul 1925).

attend, but also did not make a clear public statement of where he stood on the key questions to be debated. Many delegates arrived at the Congress keen to vote in whatever way Nikolai Nikolaevich wanted them to, but they had difficulty finding out what this was. Many asked Nikolai Nikolaevich's official representative at the Congress, General Lukomskii, but even he did not know his master's wishes. He told many delegates to vote in favour of creating an authoritative council, only to find out later that Nikolai Nikolaevich was opposed to the idea.[56]

Richard Pipes praises Nikolai Nikolaevich for showing "considerable political acumen" and "an ability to come to terms with liberal forces" despite his innate conservatism.[57] But the reality was that he was weak and indecisive. As the liberal politician, N. N. L'vov, noted, "в деловом отношении, в области организации и денежных расчетов великий князь, как беспомощное дитя, неумеющее ступить и боящееся каждого шага, чтобы не упасть".[58] Personally unambitious, he was reluctant to become involved, and did so only due to the pressure exerted on him by others. When he finally did get involved he preferred to stay on the sidelines rather than speak out in public. He provided no sense of direction to those who followed him, and his leadership achieved nothing positive. It was perhaps one of the tragedies of the Russian emigration that the only man whom most émigrés were willing to follow was by nature not suited to the task of leading them.

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[56] HIA, WA, 151/42/102-103 (Letter, Shatilov to Wrangel, 16 Apr 1926).

[57] Pipes, Struve, p. 368-369.

[58] HIA, WA, 150/41/66-67 (Letter, L'vov to Wrangel,1925).

On 25 April 1928 General Wrangel unexpectedly died, almost certainly of intensive tuberculosis. The sudden nature of his illness (which lasted only a month), and his relative youth (he was only 49), have ever since led to speculation that he was poisoned,[59] but there is no direct evidence for this, and the idea of poisoning was categorically rejected by those closest to him at the time.[60] Initially he was buried in Belgium, but a year later his body was moved to Yugoslavia to be reinterred in the Russian Church in Belgrade. To mark this event, an enormous demonstration was organised.

In October 1929, Wrangel's body was brought to Yugoslavia by train. After several stops en route, it reached Belgrade railway station on 5 October, where it was guarded overnight by a platoon of the Kornilov Artillery Battalion. The next day a huge procession accompanied the coffin from the railway station to its final resting place at the Russian church in Belgrade. The Yugoslav Army provided two companies of infantry, an artillery battalion and a gun carriage for the coffin. Companies of Cossack troops in full uniform and with sabres joined the procession, as did a platoon of the Kornilov Shock Regiment and various other troops of the Russian Army. Russian pilots flew planes overhead. Russian youth organisations, representatives of the Yugoslav, Hungarian and Italian governments, Russian émigré social organisations, and the general public brought up the rear. Lieutenant General Baron Petr Nikolaevich Wrangel, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, was

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[59] Most recently, Bortnevskii, Zagadka, p. 86.

[60] Bolezn', smert' i pogrebenie Glavnokomanduiushchego Russkoi Armii general-leitenanta barona Petra Nikolaevicha Vrangelia v Briussele (Brussels, 1928), pp. 7 & 8. Although see also GARF, 5853/1/25/30 (Diary of von Lampe).

buried in a manner befitting a head of state.[61]

No other émigré leader received a send-off of even remotely comparable magnitude, but then no other émigré enjoyed the love and devotion of so many. Wrangel was a divisive character, who had a knack of alienating those around him, but he retained the admiration and love of the rank and file of the Russian Army, thousands of whom directly experienced the benefits of his efforts to improve their welfare in the early 1920s, and were grateful. Whatever his personal faults, he was a great leader, who provided direction and purpose, and instilled a sense of hope in those who served under him. When he died, their hopes were shattered.

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The failure to create a political union around the person of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, coming on top of earlier failures to establish émigré unity, created a lasting disinclination among émigré military leaders to go down the same path again. From this point on they would eschew attempts to unify all émigré elements, though smaller efforts to create closer links with like-minded groups for specific aims would be continued.

Russian émigrés were in an impossible position. To achieve anything politically, they needed to put forward a common face and have one leadership which could represent them all. This was especially true if they were to obtain help from foreign powers. But as General Miller noted in 1930, every attempt to establish unity merely created more disunity. Achieving a broad union on the basis of a general ideological programme was impossible, and attempts to do so only poisoned the

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[61] Perenesenie prakha Generala Vrangelia v Belgrad, 6 Oktiabria 1929 g. (Belgrade, 1929).

atmosphere even more.[62]

In such circumstances, the most sensible thing seemed to be to do nothing. ROVS's answer to this problem can be found in a letter Miller wrote to G. N. Kutepov in 1933. In this he commented that:

> Не слова, как бы ни красноречивы они ни были, а только действительное руководство какой-то деятельностью, ... по сколько она приведет к явственным и ощущимым всей эмиграцией успешным результатам во борьбе с советской власти, может побудить "глав" отдельных групп под стихийным напором низов объединиться. ... Во имя Общего Блага сбить всю эмиграцию в едино вообще никогда и ничем невозможно, ибо это самое "Общее Благо" разные группы эмиграции представляют себе разно. ... Поэтому переход к действиям против большевиков (всяким - террористическим, партизанским, революционно-заговорщецким или революционно-повстанческим) является неприменным условием, основанием всякого единения активных организаций.[63]

In other words, efforts to unite the emigration on political grounds should be abandoned. What was needed was direct action against the Soviets, and if such action could be shown to succeed, the emigration would unite around those carrying it out. Von Lampe commented that "мне кажется, что совершенно надо откинуть вопрос об "объединении" - единой фронте и пр., надо просто стараться найти дело и тогда к нему все придут и сами".[64] In this way, the growing calls for 'activism' (in other words, direct terrorist action against the Soviets) which emerged at the end of the 1920s can be seen to have been a direct result of the failure to unite the emigration in the years 1921 to 1926. The latter year thus marked a fundamental turning point in

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[62] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, C. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to Lt. Gen. Chekmarev, 13 Jun 1930).

[63] BAR, ROVS, Box 13, Folder 'Correspondence, K. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to G. N. Kutepov, no. 584, 13 Aug 1933).

[64] GARF, 5853/1/31/100 (Diary of von Lampe, 22-31 Dec 1927).

the strategy of the army in exile. Furthermore, Miller's letter shows that to some extent 'activism' had a purpose beyond merely striking back at the Soviet Union. An individual terrorist act might not shake the Soviet Union to its foundations, but by showing that something was being done, it offered a prospect of achieving the elusive goal of émigré union, and so showed a way out of a seemingly hopeless situation.

CHAPTER 8 - PROVOCATION AND ABDUCTION: NOTES FROM THE UNDERGROUND, 1923-1930

Events and developments inside Soviet Russia remained the focus of emigres' thoughts throughout the inter-war period. For its part, the Soviet regime paid close attention to the activities of émigrés, especially of ROVS, which it regarded as a serious potential threat, due to ROVS's determination to continue the anti-Soviet struggle. In stressing in 1930 the need for direct action against the Soviet Union, General Miller was calling upon a well-established tradition, for such activity had already been going on for several years. Few people participated in the underground struggle against Soviet power, but their actions reverberated widely among the Russian emigration as a whole. This was especially true of the activities of General Kutepov, who would become involved in two scandals which shook the emigration in the years 1927 to 1930 - the notorious Soviet provocation known as 'The Trust',[1] and his own abduction by Soviet agents in January 1930. These scandals revealed how the underground war émigrés were seeking to wage against the Soviets was being countered by an even more effective war waged against the emigration by the Soviet secret service (GPU). The GPU was to have considerable success in disrupting émigré activities, bringing dissent into émigré ranks, and convincing émigrés of the error of their ways. In this way it was to have an immense influence on the development of the Russian emigration, sowing mutual distrust and paranoia in émigrés' minds.

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[1] Numerous books and articles have been written about the Trust. Most notable are: S. L. Voitsekhovskii, Trest: Vospominaniia i Dokumenty (London, Ontario, 1974); B. Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia Pautina (Silver Spring, 1979), G. Bailey, The Conspirators (New York, 1960); & P. Blackstock, The Secret Road to World War Two (Chicago, 1969).

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The evacuation of the Crimea did not mark the end of the struggle between Red and White. The Soviets' campaign against the Russian Army in exile began as soon as the Army arrived in Constantinople, where the Soviet secret services were soon at work recruiting agents among disaffected officers.[2] The Soviets were believed also to have played an important role in the provocations and forgeries which so damaged the Russian Army in Bulgaria in 1922 (see chapter 3). As a result of these activities, Russian émigrés rapidly developed a feeling that they were surrounded by Soviet provocateurs. Members of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, for instance, were already by 1923 accusing one another of being Soviet agents,[3] and similar behaviour was common among other groups of émigrés. This mutual distrust had a debilitating effect on émigré society, and in the ensuing years the continued activities of the Soviets multiplied this effect many times over.

Just as the Soviets did not interpret the evacuation of the Crimea as the end of their war against the Whites, so the leaders of the Russian Army did not believe that their defeat marked the end of the anti-Bolshevik struggle. The staff of the Russian Army attempted to carry out underground actions inside Russia from the very beginning of the Army's exile. Unsuccessful efforts were made during 1921, for instance, to raise a new revolt in the Don region.[4] Wrangel told his military

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[2] Russkaia Voennaia Emigratsiia, Book 2, pp. 263-266 ('Agenturnye svedeniia poluchennye inostrannym otdelom GPU ob organisatsii polkovnika Anisimova).

[3] GARF, 5759/61/11 (Declaration, V. I. Kudriumov to Directorate of Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, 23 Jun 1923). See also, GARF, 5759/61/41/42 (Declaration, A. I. Grammatchikov to Directorate of Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, 26 Jun 1926).

representatives in various countries in 1922 to try to establish contacts with leading members of the Red Army with the aim of convincing them of the positive nature of the Russian Army's aims.[5] Wrangel's military representative in Berlin, General Khol'msen, created in 1922 a newspaper, 'Russkaia Pravda', which was distributed inside Russia across the Polish and Baltic borders and through Soviet sailors calling at German ports.[6] In 1924, funding for 'Russkaia Pravda' was ceased by the staff of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, after which it was rescued by a former regimental colleague of General Wrangel, Prince Leikhtenbergskii, who ran a publishing house in Berlin. A group of 'friends' of the newspaper was established, known as the 'Bratstvo Russkoi Pravdy' (BRP), which raised money to keep it going throughout the inter-war period. 'Russkaia Pravda' claimed to be in contact with a large number of anti-Soviet groups inside the Soviet Union (especially Belorussia) whom it claimed were controlled by the BRP's 'Verkhovnyi Krug', and it published fantastic stories of their partisan activities. An edition of autumn 1927, for instance, wrote of the destruction of a government supply depot in Borisov, the beating off of a Red cavalry

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[4] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence,1937. III Otdel to Central Office' (Letter, Kussonskii to Abramov, 17 Apr 1937).

[5] HIA, WA, 145/29 (Letters, Kussonskii to von Lampe, no. 1616, 27 Jul 1922, & von Lampe to Kussonskii, no. 34/l, 3 Aug 1922); 143/22/71-72 (Letter, L. Artifeksov to Wrangel, 25 Aug 1922); HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 11, File 44 (Letter, Kussonskii to Khol'msen, no. 1617, 24 Jul 1922).

[6] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 11, File 45 (Letter, Khol'msen to Kussonskii, no. 53/2835, 7 Sep 1922), & File 46 (Letter, Khol'msen to Miller, no. 422, 1 Feb 1923). Also, Box 12, File 48 ('Svodka vypisok iz rasshifrovannykh donesenii, poluchennykh v techenie 1923 goda po voprosu ob obstoiatel'stvakh, soprovozhdaiushchikh rasprostranenie zhurnala "Pravda", 31 Dec 1923).

detachment, and the shooting down of a Soviet warplane.[7]

The claims of 'Russkaia Pravda' were treated with great caution by ROVS leaders, many of whom felt that they were products of the fertile imagination of the newspaper's editor, S. A. Sokolov, and that the BRP was based entirely on bluff. There were suspicions that the BRP was either a Soviet provocation or a genuinely anti-Soviet organisation heavily penetrated by Soviet agents.[8] As a result, ROVS came to regard the BRP as a hostile organisation, especially as its fund-raising activities competed with those of ROVS. ROVS members were forbidden from participating in its activities.[9]

The BRP was not the only group dedicated to continued struggle against the Soviets, for the desire among members of the Russian Army and of ROVS to continue the fight was widespread. Wrangel noted that the 'preservation of cadres' could not be an end in itself, and only made sense if these cadres were used in some way against the Bolsheviks.[10] The Circle of Russian Youth in Helsinki, which consisted of former junior officers, noted in 1923:

> Главная и единственная пока задача национально мыслящих русских людей как в России, так и в эмиграции ... это беспощадная

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[7] 'Russkaia Pravda', Sep/Oct 1927, pp. 14-15 (Copy held in HIA, VSIuR, Ssudnoe Otdelenie, Box 3, File 13).

[8] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 1 (Letter, von Lampe to Arkhangel'skii, no. 794, 13 Sep 1927). HIA, WA, 147/34/505-507 (Letter, Shatilov to Wrangel, 11 Nov 1927), 151/44/417-420 (Circular, Gen. Wrangel, 7 Nov 1927), & 147/33/390-391 (Letter, Wrangel to Shatilov, 23 Aug 1927).

[9] BAR, ROVS, Box 4 (Letter, Abramov to Stogov, 29 May 1931), & HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 2 (Circular, Gen. Shatilov, no. 452, 27 Feb 1933).

[10] HIA, WA, 146/31/770-772 (Letter, Wrangel to Shatilov, no. 2004/s, 6 Dec 1925); & 150/41/325-327 (Letter, Wrangel to Trepov, 15 Dec 1925).

> идеологическая и физическая борьба с большевиками, борьба во что бы то ни стало, борьба всех, в ком бьется сердце русское, борьба до последней капли крови.[11]

By contrast, some other émigrés, such as Miliukov, were vehemently opposed to the idea of continued struggle. Instead they placed their hopes on the Soviet regime 'evolving'. Continued anti-Soviet struggle would, it was feared, merely fuel a backlash inside Soviet Russia and so hamper the process of evolution. For the members of the Russian Army, however, Miliukov's strategy seemed self-defeating. In the eyes of the White officer corps, the Soviet regime was based entirely on force, and by force it had to be overthrown. As General Shatilov wrote in 1923, the idea that the Soviet regime could evolve was baseless - "Вот почему единственным верным путем к освобождению России от власти 3-го интернационала должно считаться насильственное ее свержение".[12]

If the Soviet regime was not going to evolve, it followed that it was the responsibility of émigrés to do all they could to promote its violent overthrow. As Kutepov wrote in an article in 1927, "Большевицкая власть сама собой не исчезнет и с ней необходима упорная борьба".[13] A document written in 1927 noted that it would be wrong to sit back and wait for the Soviet regime to evolve and fall, because in the intervening years untold harm would have been done to Russia. With every year of communist rule, religion was undermined, Russia's historic

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[11] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 12, File 47 (Letter, Bergman and others, to A. Fen, 8 Sep 1923).

[12] BAR, ROVS, Box 165, Folder 'Project to overthrow Soviet government' (Gen. Shatilov, 'Zapiska o rabote po podgotovke, rukovodstvu i osushchestvleniiu sverzhenii vlasti v Rossii', 31 Jul 1923).

[13] Vestnik Gallipoliitsev v Bolgarii, no's 5/7. Sep-Nov 1927, p. 1.

traditions were destroyed, and tensions between the nationalities of the country increased, making it harder and harder to keep them together. Thus concluded the author, "время не ждет - надо действовать".[14] Otherwise, irreparable damage would have been done by the time communism actually fell.

The arguments for continued struggle were moral as well as practical. In 1925, I. A. Il'in caused a stir in the circles of émigré intellectuals with the publication of his book 'On resistance to evil by force'. Written as a rebuttal of Leo Tolstoy's doctrine of non-resistance to evil, Il'in's book had the practical purpose of providing a philosophical underpinning to the idea of 'irreconcilability', and to the need for continued struggle against the Bolsheviks. Il'in argued that struggle against evil was necessary for the good of one's soul. If one ceased to resist evil, even internally, then in self-justification one would begin to convince oneself that maybe the evil was not so bad after all. The less one resisted evil the more one was prone to having one's character undermined by it. If resistance required the use of force, the fighter should not hesitate to take this sin upon himself - "физическое пересечение и понуждение могут быть прямой религиозной и патриотической обязанностью человека".[15] With Il'in's book, White terrorists found their moral and religious justification.

Agreement having been reached that the fight should continue, and practical and moral justifications having been found, the problem remained of how in practice to pursue this struggle. By 1923, many were becoming aware that the prospects of a

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[14] BAR, Kutepov Collection, Box 3, Folder 'Grand Prince Nikolai Nikolaevich' (Unsigned document entitled 'Za nas li Vremia?', Paris, 18 Feb 1927).

[15] Il'in, O Soprotivlenii, pp. 13-14, & 171.

new foreign intervention in Russia, and therefore also the prospects for a renewed military campaign by the Russian Army, were fast disappearing. It was necessary, at the same time as the army moved to new forms of existence, to contemplate new forms of struggle. In this light, the decision was made that the emphasis should be moved away from concepts of a remobilization of the army's cadres and large-scale armed intervention, towards revolutionary methods. This implied conspiracy, propaganda and subversion, terrorism and sabotage within the Soviet Union. This had first been suggested by Wrangel's staff as early as January 1921,[16] and by 1923 was recognised as necessary by Wrangel himself. As he wrote in a circular of 18 July 1923, the prospects of foreign intervention had faded and so:

> Нам следует перейти к революционной работе, поддерживая те национальные силы, которые дремлют, но рано или поздно выявлятся внутри пока задушенной России. ... Объединить все национальные силы и средства, связать их с национальными силами в России - вот стоящие перед нами задачи. ... С государственной точки зрения, большая часть сил и средств отныне должны быть направлены внутр России.[17]

Responsibility for running underground operations inside the Soviet Union was given to General Kutepov. In December 1923 Wrangel handed over control for underground activities to Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, and in March 1924 Kutepov was summoned to France by the Grand Duke to take over the command of this secret work. His operations were funded through the 'Fond Spaseniia Rodiny' (FSR), which raised its money from individual contributions. Committees were set

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[16] HIA, WA, 113/27/20-31 (Report, Head of Information Department of Russian Army, no. 26, Jan 1921).

[17] BAR, ROVS, Box 3, Folder 'Wrangel' (Circular, Gen. Wrangel, no. 03728, 18 Jul 1923).

up in émigré communities to organise the fund raising, and wherever possible, civilian leaders were found to run the committees. Most contributions came, however, from the ranks of ROVS members.

By piecing together various statements Kutepov made over the next few years, an outline of his strategy emerges. A popular conception around this time was that the mass of the Russian populace was fiercely opposed to the Bolshevik regime but too cowed by years of repression to act on its own. What was needed was for émigrés to make a visible strike against the regime which would inspire those inside Russia to rise up against their oppressors. A commonly expressed belief was that "нужен толчок извне".[18] As Wrangel's former advisor, N. E. Savich put it, "как ни плохо теперь там, нового ждать нельзя без толчка извне. Страна не способна сама по себе сбросить иго ".[19] Kutepov, however, felt that if the regime was to be overthrown it had to be done by forces inside Russia.[20] This meant that his first step must be to establish contacts with anti-Bolshevik movements within Russia. The emigration's role would then be to support and encourage these groups, maintain contacts with them, and show them that they were not alone. As Kutepov wrote, "Наш долг помогать внутренним национальным силам России всеми имеющимися у нас средствами".[21] Particular importance was given to the task of

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[18] BAR, ROVS, Box 165, Folder 'Project to overthrow Soviet government' (Report, Gen. Monkevits, 6 Jul 1923).

[19] HIA, WA, 150/41/102-104 (Letters, Savich to Wrangel, & Wrangel to Savich, 14 & 25 Apr 1925).

[20] For a discussion of Kutepov's rationale, see HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 2 ('Bor'ba s bol'shevikami', Gen. Lukomskii, 27 Oct 1932).

[21] Vestnik Gallipoliitsev v Bolgarii, no's 5/7. Sep-Nov 1927, p. 1.

establishing contacts with the Red Army, as it was realised that the support of the Red Army for any uprising would be vital. It was no longer envisioned that the Russian Army would fight against the Red Army, but that they would become allies in a common struggle, and eventually merge to form a new national army. As Kutepov later said, " Мы верим и знаем, что когда армия, ныне называемая красной, сбросит с себя иго III интернационала, она сольется с нами в единую русскую армию".[22]

Kutepov's strategy was quite modest. It did not involve at this stage embarking on large scale terrorist operations, incitement of uprisings, or the like. Insufficient funds were available for any grand plans, and it was recognised that the groundwork had first to be laid. The emphasis was to be on espionage, maintaining links with the homeland, penetrating the Red Army, and establishing contact with anti-Bolshevik forces inside the USSR. For this, it would first be necessary to establish safely inside the Soviet Union a number of long-term agents. Unfortunately for Kutepov, this strategy was to lead him right into the trap prepared by the 'Trust'.

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The Trust was the codename given to a fictional underground anti-Soviet organisation which was in fact fully run and operated by the Soviet secret services. It was one of a number of similar provocations organised by the GPU in the early 1920s. The modus operandi of such provocations invariably followed the same lines. Émigrés would be contacted by a Soviet citizen, abroad on business, who would purport to be a member of a large, well organised underground movement inside the

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[22] Chasovoi, no. 5/6, p. 4.

Soviet Union. The émigrés would be asked to establish contacts with their movement, send their agents to meet them inside Russia, and give them financial support. The purpose of the whole exercise was to channel the activities of would-be émigré plotters into directions where they could be observed and controlled by the Soviet secret services. At the required moment, the whole émigré underground could then be destroyed, its agents arrested and shot.[23]

The Trust began its operations in November 1921 when a man calling himself Aleksandr Iakushev made contact with Russian émigrés in Estonia and claimed to be a member of a widespread underground organisation inside Russia, codenamed 'The Trust'. The Trust claimed to have many cells throughout Russia, and to have important contacts within both the Red Army and the Cheka. Iakushev claimed that its leaders were the well-known ex-Tsarist generals Zaionchkovskii and Potapov, both of whom had acquired important positions in the Red Army. On 7 August 1923 a meeting was arranged in Berlin between Iakushev and various senior army officers and civilian advisers representing Wrangel, in order to evaluate Iakushev's claims. Having listened to him, only one of those present thought that Iakushev was a provocateur. The others chose to believe him.[24] Iakushev then travelled onto Paris, where he met Miller,[25] and through him Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich.[26] Wrangel,

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[23] For the case of Boris Savinkov, see Christopher Andrew & Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (London, 1991), pp. 68-70.

[24] BAR, ROVS, Kutepov Collection, Box 3, Folder 'Trest' (Letter, Lukomskii to Wrangel, 2 Aug 1927).

[25] BAR, ROVS, Box 165, Folder 'Project to overthrow Soviet government' (Letter, von Lampe to Miller, no. 6695, 17 Sep 1923).

[26] Voitsekhovskii, Trest, p. 152. Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia Pautina, pp. 52-57.

however, was not convinced by the reports given to him. After meeting General Potapov in Yugoslavia in late 1923 he became convinced that the Trust was a provocation, and ordered his staff and all organs subordinate to him to break all contacts with it.[27] Wrangel also warned Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Kutepov of his suspicions, but his warnings were to no avail.[28] On a visit to Paris, Potapov convinced many that the Trust was genuine, and the Grand Duke's staff decided to establish permanent contact with it.

To test the worth of the Trust, Kutepov arranged for two agents to be sent to Moscow. These were a former White officer, Georgii Radkovich, and his wife, Mariia Zakharchenko-Shul'tz, who had also fought in the Civil War on the White side. In late 1923, they crossed into Russia, made their way to Moscow, and there established contact with the Trust, which provided them with accommodation and work in a market. They were allowed to continue living in Moscow to create the impression that the Trust was genuine. It has been claimed that Kutepov and his agents knew from the start that the Trust was a provocation, and simply used it in order to get the agents safely in and out of Russia.[29] But even a cursory review of Shul'tz's letters to Kutepov reveals that she was totally taken in by the Trust. One report, for instance, mentioned that the Trust had opened cells in 11 new towns, and

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[27] Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia Pautina, pp. 59-60.

[28] HIA, WA, 144/27/1793-1794 (Letter, Wrangel to Miller, no. 1645/s, 31 Oct 1924); 150/41/73-74 & 77-78 (Letters, Fedorov to Wrangel, 11 Feb 1925, & Wrangel to Girs, no. 1728/s, 12 Mar 1925); & 151/44/356-357 (Letter, Chebyshev to Wrangel, 11 Mar 1925).

[29] Blackstock, Secret Road, p. 46. Also, N. Vinogradov, 'Pravda o svidanii bol'shevitskogo agenta Iakusheva-Fedorova s Velikim Kniazem Nikolaem Nikolaevichem', Vozrozhdenie, no. 48, Dec 1955, pp. 109-118.

conveyed a request to provide the Trust with $5,000.[30] In another she wrote that their 'friends' "работают правда свыше всяких сил. Я поражалась их трудоспособности".[31] Kutepov was warned from many quarters about the nature of the Trust. General Denikin, for instance, to whom he often turned for advice, warned him that it must be a provocation,[32] but despite this, Kutepov retained complete faith in it.[33]

There were many reasons for the absolute faith Kutepov had in the Trust. Wishful thinking undoubtedly had much to do with it. Another reason was that Shul'tz and Radkovich were allowed to live unmolested in Moscow for several years, and to send back a continual flow of intelligence. Between the end of 1923 and early 1927 the two agents made various trips out of the country to meet Kutepov, and the ease with which they crossed and recrossed the border only reinforced their faith in the Trust. Kutepov and his colleagues were also blinkered by their sense of honour. It was one thing to understand in principle that many men were provocateurs, it was another to question the honour of the specific person who stood in front of you. Lieutenant M. A. Kritskii, who later worked for Kutepov, noted that when the general lived in Yugoslavia he was often visited by soldiers asking for help. He was aware

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[30] BAR, Kutepov Collection, Box 3, Folder 'Trest' (Report, Shul'tz to Kutepov, no date given).

[31] BAR, Kutepov Collection, Box 3, Folder 'Trest' (Report, Shul'tz to Kutepov, 15 Mar 1925).

[32] BAR, Denikin Collection, Box 26 (Manuscript by General Denikin, entitled 'Kutepov').

[33] See, for instance, Kutepov's letters to N. N. Bunakov on the subject - BAR, ROVS, Box 9 (Letters, no. 13, 10 Jul 1926, & no. 16, 31 Jul 1926).

that many were deceiving him, but was nonetheless always surprised to find this out. For, as Kritskii said, "чувство подозрительности к людям у А.П. [Кутепова] было скорее теоретическое. Ему трудно было представить себе, что именно этот человек, который сейчас находится с ним в общении, способен на обман. Неспособный сам на ложь, А.П. даже как бы стыдился подозревать во лжи другого человека".[34] S. L. Voitsekhovskii, who worked for Kutepov's secret organisation, handling correspondence between him and the Trust, felt that in his own case it was also honour which blinded him to the Trust - "Мы были молоды и воспитаны в традициях той России, для которой военный мундир был порукой чести. Мы не могли представить себе Зайончковского или Потапова презренным орудием чекистов".[35]

The line peddled by the Trust was that it was a large and growing organisation, with an ever increasing number of members in important positions of authority. Rather than spending its resources on premature subversion and terrorism, it claimed to be preserving its forces to be in a position to make one big bid for power. This gave the Soviets a useful pretext to restrain Kutepov and his agents from trying to carry out subversion, sabotage or terrorism themselves. By 1926, however, Kutepov and his agents were becoming impatient with the lack of activity this implied, and had began to consider carrying out terrorist actions. In March 1927, Kutepov met Shul'tz, Iakushev and Potapov in the town of Terijoki in Finland to discuss strategy, and it became clear from the meeting that it would be increasingly

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[34] Kutepov: Sbornik statei, p. 146.

[35] Voitsekhovskii, Trest, p. 10.

difficult to dissuade Kutepov from the use of terror.[36] In these circumstances the Trust had outlived its purpose, which was to restrain Kutepov from such activities and to channel his actions into directions deemed harmless by the GPU. In addition, the Trust was coming under suspicion around this time from the Polish intelligence services. Supposedly, a set of Soviet mobilisation plans sold by the Trust to the Poles were seen by the Polish president, Marshal Pilsudski, who announced that he was sure that they were forgeries.[37] The Soviets therefore decided to liquidate the Trust.

Shul'tz and Radkovich had initially made contact with the Trust through a man named Eduard Opperput, who unknown to them was a Soviet agent. In April 1927, Opperput suddenly revealed to Shul'tz that he was working for the Soviets and that the Trust was a provocation. He had, he said, repented of his ways, and wished the truth to be known. Fearing arrest, Shul'tz and Kutepov's other agents (three more had arrived in Moscow in 1926) fled the country. Opperput, under instructions to keep an eye on Kutepov's organisation, went with them. Having arrived in Finland, Opperput made a statement to the press, revealing all about the Trust. This was a terrible blow to those who believed in the need for underground actions against the Soviet regime, as the pointlessness and futility of such actions were now revealed. Furthermore, the public revelations about the Trust shone bright light on the activities of Soviet provocateurs. The journal 'Illiustrirovannaia Rossiia' ran a sensational article by Vladimir Burtsev revealing many of the most intimate details of Kutepov's involvement with the Trust. This sparked a series of similar revelations about other

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[36] Voitsekhovskii, Trest, p. 98.

[37] Richard Vraga, 'Trest', Vozrozhdenie, no. 7, Jan-Feb 1950, pp. 132-133.

underground groups. For instance in 1928 a set of polemical articles appeared in the émigré press purporting to reveal all about the BRP, and claiming that the organisation was a Soviet provocation.[38] Émigrés already believed that they were surrounded by enemies. Now their worst fears were proven to be true. There were provocateurs everywhere after all! The newspaper 'Novaia Rossiia' expressed the mood well:

> Г.П.У. стремится разложить самого страшного для коммунистов врага - русскую эмиграцию. Идет сплошная вакханалия за границей: провокации за провокацией, подкуп, измена, "тресты", покушения и.т.д. ... В спину эмиграции уже занесен нож русского чекиста.[39]

From now on the emigration's sense of paranoia would grow ever deeper. It became increasingly difficult to trust anybody else, and when things went wrong the failures were invariably to be laid at the door of Soviet provocateurs. Mutual accusations of being Soviet agents began to fly back and forth with ever increasing regularity.[40] This not only made any form of communal action more difficult, it also made a rational analysis of errors impossible. Opperput's public revelations about the Trust thus had a devastating and debilitating effect on the whole Russian emigration.

Kutepov himself came under tremendous pressure to surrender the leadership of the underground struggle to someone else. In order to restore his reputation, he therefore decided now to move immediately to a new strategy - terror - in the hope

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[38] GARF, 5853/1/35/15835-15847 (newspaper clippings from the von Lampe diary).

[39] GARF, 5853/1/35/15844 (clipping from the von Lampe diary).

[40] For a typical example see GARF, 5759/1/61/126 ('Prigovor treteiskogo suda po delu polkovnika Toma-Papsha i kapitana Orlova, 21 Jun 1929).

that a few prominent terrorist acts organised abroad would inspire those inside the USSR to follow suit.[41] Opperput was given a chance to prove that his repentance was real, and sent back into Russia with Shul'tz and a third agent, Peters, armed with explosives to blow up a GPU hostel in Moscow. A second team of three men, led by a captain in the Markovskii Artillery Battalion, Viktor Larionov, was sent on a similar mission to Leningrad. Unsurprisingly, Opperput's mission was intercepted by the GPU (probably betrayed by Opperput himself). Pursued across the country, Shul'tz and Peters were eventually killed in a shootout near Smolensk.[42] Larionov's group had more success. Reaching Leningrad undetected, they threw several bombs into a minor meeting at the Leningrad Party Club and escaped unscathed back over the border into Finland.[43]

Encouraged by this success, Kutepov sent two more groups, each of two men, over the Finnish-Soviet border in August 1927, and a third group of three men crossed into Russia from Latvia. Unfortunately, the first group was confronted by a forester who tried to detain them. Having killed him in order to escape, they were pursued by Soviet soldiers and killed in a shootout near Petrozavodsk. The alarm having been raised, the second group of two was captured, as were the three coming in from Latvia. The 5 survivors were then put on public trial by the Soviets.[44] These

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[41] Voitsekhovskii, Trest, p. 115.

[42] Voitsekhovskii, Trest, pp. 12-13.

[43] The whole operation is described in Larionov's own book, Boevaia vylaska v SSSR (Paris, 1931).

[44] Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia Pautina, pp. 119-120. N. Kichkasov, Belogvardeiskii terror protiv SSSR (Moscow, 1928).

disasters caused Kutepov to halt his terrorist campaign for a year. Then in July 1928 Radkovich and one other were sent to Moscow. Radkovich threw a bomb into the pass office of the Lubianka, and in the ensuing pursuit both he and his colleague were killed.[45] Kutepov's so-called 'Fighting Organisation' was wiped out with hardly anything to show for it.

The failure of Kutepov's terrorist campaign was in part due to a lack of resources, and in part to bad luck, but mainly to the immense difficulty of operating within the Soviet Union. But Kutepov's absolute failure did not mean that his efforts were without wider consequences both in the international arena and for the Russian emigration. Paul Blackstock claims that Kutepov's terror offensive contributed to the war scare which emerged between Britain and the USSR in 1927, and that it was also used by Stalin to justify a counter-terror against his political opponents inside the Soviet Union.[46] When the five captured members of Kutepov's organisation were put on public trial every effort was made by the Soviet prosecutors to link them to British intelligence, which, it was claimed, had entirely directed Kutepov's work.[47] This contributed to the general war psychosis which gripped the USSR at this time. Kutepov's activities can only have served to increase the Soviets' sense of security paranoia, justifying their beliefs that the White Guards were still plotting against them, although, given the degree to which this sense of paranoia was already developed, it is probable that these activities had little impact. The effect of

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[45] Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia Pautina, pp. 125-126.

[46] Blackstock, Secret Road, pp. 159-169.

[47] Kichkasov, op cit, pp. 4-6 & 30.

Kutepov's operations was greater on the Russian emigration than it was on the wider world. They pushed the emigration in two opposing directions. Some émigrés, examining Kutepov's failure, decided to turn their backs once and for all on 'active struggle' against the Soviets, concluding that nothing could be done. To others, though, Kutepov was an inspiration. However much he had failed, he had shown the way ahead. This interpretation was particularly popular among the Gallipoliitsy and the younger generation of Russian émigrés. Indeed, B. Prianishnikov, himself later to be an advocate of 'activism', remarked that émigré youth "worshipped" Kutepov.[48] On top of his example at Gallipoli, his leadership of the continuing underground struggle came to symbolise the very essence of 'irreconcilability'. His example tore the emigration into two - half abandoning the struggle for ever, and half endorsing it even more keenly.

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On 29 April 1928, the day after Wrangel's death, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich appointed Kutepov head of ROVS.[49] Less than a year later, Kutepov found himself elevated yet again. For on 5 January 1929, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich died. While ill at the end of 1928 the Grand Duke had temporarily transferred all his powers and authority to Kutepov, who therefore now issued an order formally taking over Nikolai Nikolaevich's duties on a permanent basis.[50] With

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[48] Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia Pautina, p. 35

[49] BAR, ROVS, Box 134, Folder 'Orders, 1928' (Order no. 3, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 29 Apr 1928).

[50] BAR, ROVS, Box 134, Folder 'Orders, 1929' (Order no. 1, Gen. Kutepov, 6 Jan 1929).

this he became undisputed leader of the military emigration. The Grand Duke's staff were now subsumed into ROVS, and absorbed into the central directorate which Kutepov created in Paris.

Some senior officers were sceptical about Kutepov's ability to fulfil his new role. He was considered to be unintelligent, discredited by his involvement with the Trust and politically too far to the right.[51] In fact, Kutepov was to prove an excellent choice. He enjoyed immense personal authority among the Gallipoliitsy, but as a former commanding officer of the Preobrazhenskii Guards Regiment, was also acceptable to most of the more conservative minded officers who made up the membership of the military associations. He therefore united all the various tendencies within ROVS. In addition, despite his reputation for harsh discipline and reactionary beliefs, he was to display a surprising flexibility and ability to reach out to the more liberal parts of the Russian emigration. It appeared that years of exile had taught him a political tact that he had previously entirely lacked. General Denikin commented that, as ROVS President, Kutepov showed surprising diplomatic ability, finding a way of speaking in different tongues to both the left and right of émigré society. He carefully kept out of the arguments dividing the Orthodox Church abroad, visiting churches under the jurisdiction of both Evlogii and Antonii. He also made determined efforts to attract Jews into the anti-Bolshevik struggle, and to rid the White armies of their anti-semitic image.[52] One prominent liberal Jewish émigré, G.

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[51] GARF, 5853/1/35/15648-15656 (Diary of von Lampe).

[52] BAR, Denikin Collection, Box 26 (Manuscript by Denikin entitled 'Kutepov').

Sliuzberg, would later praise Kutepov as one of the few White leaders to have actively prevented pogroms in the Civil War, and to have accepted that a future Russia must be for all Russians, including the Jews, whom he understood could play an important role in a renewed Russia.[53]

From the point of view of the Soviet government, Kutepov was an especially dangerous enemy, as his immense stubbornness gave him an utterly inflexible determination to continue the struggle against the Soviets with all the means at his disposal. The Soviets must have known that Kutepov would never stop. They therefore decided to eliminate him.

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On the morning of 26 January 1930, Kutepov disappeared. Later, a witness reported seeing a man of his description being bundled into a car and driven away at high speed.[54] It turned out that Kutepov had been abducted by agents of the GPU, who planned to take him back to Moscow, interrogate him and then kill him. Two versions exist of his ultimate fate. According to the first version, Kutepov suffered an adverse reaction to the chloroform used to subdue him and died while still in France.[55] According to the second version, he was smuggled onto a boat in Marseilles, but died while en route to the USSR.[56] Whichever version is true, Kutepov does not seem to

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[53] Kutepov: Sbornik Statei, pp. 364-366. See also p. 315 for a speech by Kutepov to the 'Soiuz Russkikh Evreev-Patriotov', 8 Dec 1928.

[54] Grey, Le Général meurt, pp. 12-15.

[55] Ibid, pp. 112-120. This version is supported by Pavel and Anatolii Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: the Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness, a Soviet Spymaster (Boston, 1994), p. 91.

[56] Leonid Mlechin, Set' - Moskva - OGPU - Parizh (Moscow, 1991), pp. 26-27.

have reached the Soviet Union alive.

From the point of view of ROVS and the broader Russian emigration, the impact of the kidnapping was devastating. In the first place, ROVS lost a leader who enjoyed great authority. There was no suitable replacement, and Kutepov had named no successor. On the day after his disappearance a group of senior generals and civilians close to ROVS met to discuss the succession, and endorsed General Miller as the new president of ROVS. Miller had many qualities, but he lacked the authority of either Wrangel or Kutepov, and also lacked their strength of will. He was to prove incapable of providing the same leadership as his predecessors.

Kutepov's abduction renewed the split in the emigration with regard to the viability of active struggle against the Soviets. It was clear that he had been kidnapped because of his commitment to underground work. To those opposed to 'activism', his abduction was proof of the folly of such behaviour. But to many others, Kutepov's abduction was instead proof that ROVS was on the right track. Thus Nikita Struve has noted that the episode increased the sense of self-importance of the more militant veterans. For surely, it was argued, the Soviets would not have abducted Kutepov unless ROVS was a real threat.[57] The title of a contemporary pamphlet summed up this feeling precisely, asking "Почему похищен Кутепов а не Милюков?" - the obvious and implied answer to which was that Miliukov was not a threat to the Soviets, whereas Kutepov was.[58] Despite the obvious failures of his underground work, Kutepov's activities now acquired in some circles a truly

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[57] Nikita Struve, Soixante-dix Ans d'Emigration Russe (Paris, 1996), p. 44.

[58] Pochemu pokhishchen Kutepov a ne Miliukov? (Paris, 1930).

inspirational quality. His death completed a process begun after the Crimean evacuation, and accelerated by the revelations about the Trust, in which the Russian emigration split into those promoting renewed struggle and those opposed to it. It solidified the opposing attitudes and ensured that the rift between them would be final.

An even worse impact was caused by the mutual recriminations which followed Kutepov's disappearance. Accusations of involvement began to fly in all directions. Vladimir Burtsev took upon himself the task of researching the case, and concluded that there must have been a Soviet spy in Kutepov's closest entourage. Burtsev claimed that his 'sources' had told him that the general was betrayed by "several people close to him", though he refused to name names.[59] Suspicion in particular fell on one of Kutepov's assistants, Colonel A. A. Zaitsov. Burtsev did not actively accuse Zaitsov of involvement, but issued a statement saying that he could not ignore the accusations being made, which from Zaitsov's point of view was little better. Bitter recriminations flew back and forth for three years, until in 1933 Burtsev was finally forced to apologise.[60]

The witch-hunt atmosphere launched by Burtsev would have been bad enough on its own, but it now spread even wider. The newspaper 'Vozrozhdenie' accused two émigré generals, D'iakonov and Karganov, of working for the Bolsheviks. The two

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[59] BAR, ROVS, Box 1, Folder 'Burtsev, V. L. to Miller, E. K.' (Letters, Miller to Burtsev, 25 & 30 Jul 1930; & Burtsev to Miller, 28 Jul 1930).

[60] BAR, ROVS, Box 1, Folder 'Burtsev, V. L. to Miller, E. K.' (Letters, Burtsev to Zaitsov and Zaitsov to Burtsev, 23 May 1933).

sued the newspaper in the French courts and won, but the mud stuck.[61] A Captain Zavadskii-Krasnopol'skii, who had liaised with the French police on Kutepov's behalf, also came under suspicion. A final accusation which was made, once again by Burtsev, was against General Steifon, formerly camp commandant at Gallipoli. Burtsev claimed that Steifon and Zaitsov helped run counter-intelligence operations in Bulgaria and played a double game with Soviet provocateurs, in a manner which exceeded the permissible limits. Steifon vehemently rejected these claims in correspondence to Miller, and sued Burtsev for libel.[62] The accusations against Steifon were indicative of the all-round suspicion created by Kutepov's death. Even more than before, it now became commonplace to blame all problems on Soviet provocation, and to accuse anyone with whom one had a disagreement of being a Soviet agent.

The emigration, though separated from its homeland, was not ignored by it. The Soviets had a profound fear of all opponents, and actively pursued the goal of breaking up émigré society, fostering divisions, removing opponents, creating suspicion and paranoia, and undermining faith in active struggle. In this they were phenomenally successful. Once the interplay of the Soviet regime's external operations with the underground activities of the émigrés themselves is recognised, it becomes much easier to understand why émigrés behaved and thought as they did.

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[61] Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia Pautina, p. 152.

[62] BAR, ROVS, Box 15, Folder 'Correspondence, S. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Steifon to Miller, 23 Feb 1931). For more recent accusations concerning Steifon, see V. M. Zernov, 'K pokhishcheniu Gen. Kutepova', Novyi Zhurnal, no. 138, 1980, pp. 129-135; B. Prianishnikov, 'A. Kutepov i B. Steifon', Novyi Zhurnal, no. 139, 1980, pp. 267-269; & Grey, Le Général meurt, p. 114.

CHAPTER 9 - FATHERS AND SONS: ROVS AND THE NEW GENERATION

During the 1930s ROVS became actively involved with émigré youth groups. At first it hoped to persuade young émigrés to join ROVS, but when few responded, it instead chose to focus on pulling youth groups into its general orbit, providing instructors, money and ideological support. The involvement of ROVS members in youth groups often introduced an unwelcome element of intrigue into their activities, but through its support of youth, ROVS gave an injection of life into the Russian emigration at a time when such a boost was badly needed. It helped the process of preserving Russian culture in exile and gave an outlet to the energies of the more active young émigrés.

From the late 1920s, a sharp generational divide emerged in the Russian emigration. Younger émigrés (this included the younger veterans of the White Armies) rebelled against the values and institutions of their fathers. Some assimilated into their host cultures; others blamed the older generation for their exile and the victory of Bolshevism and sought to find their own methods of political and military struggle against the Bolsheviks, abandoning the parties and organisations set up by their parents, and forming organisations of their own. Examples were: the Young Russians (Mladorossy) who under the slogan 'Tsar and Soviets' promoted an odd mixture of legitimism, nationalism and socialism;[1] the NSNP (Natsional'nyi Soiuz Novogo Pokoleniia), and the 'Post-Revolutionary' Groups, so-called because they consisted of people who had not held positions of authority prior to the revolution. Among such youth there was a tendency towards extremism and militancy, based upon a rejection of what was seen as the passivity of the older generation of exiles. This was expressed in an article in 'Belyi Arkhiv' in 1928:

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[1] Nicholas Hayes, 'Kazem-Bek and the Young Russians' Revolution', Slavic Review, Vol. 39, no. 2, Jun 1980, pp. 255-268.

> Молодежь ... желает отныне дело борьбы взять в свои руки, вести его наиболее активными путями и, в своем лице, создать действительную силу - силу действия ... старое поколение совершило ряд величайших ошибок и глубочайших преступлений.[2]

Only the new generation, said the author, was capable of pulling Russia out of the abyss into which its parents had driven it.

This split between the generations accelerated the process of dissolution of the Russian emigration, but in a contradictory way it also put new life into the emigration, promoting new and energetic leaders, and renewing the desire to fight against Bolshevism and to retain Russian culture. At the centre of this process stood ROVS. On the one hand, it represented the old generation of failed leaders. On the other hand, many of its members were young and these young men would play a leading role in the political activism of the new generation. ROVS straddled the generation gap, and made great efforts to try and influence youth and pull them into its orbit.

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Preventing their children from being assimilated into host cultures was a concern for most émigrés, and a matter which was considered a priority by many émigré social, cultural and educational institutions. ROVS leaders in particular considered it vital to preserve the spirit of patriotism, struggle, irreconcilability, and self-sacrifice in youth, so that even if they refused to join ROVS, they would wish to carry on the struggle on their own. As General Miller said in a speech in Bulgaria in 1930:

> Борьба не заключается только в том, чтобы сражаться с орудием в руках, но и в том, чтобы сохранить свой национальный и моральный облик, закалить в себе чувство жертвенности и беззаветной преданности Родине. ... Мы за рубежом должны создать базу для будущего возрождения России - упорным трудом,

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[2] Vladimir Igorev, 'Novaia Sila', Belyi Arkhiv, vol 2/3 (Paris, 1928), pp. 253-254.

может быть, тяжелыми лишениями поддержать молодые силы эмиграции.[3]

In 1926 Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich told Wrangel of his desire to fill the ranks of regimental unions with young men, in order to instill a spirit of duty and honour into émigré youth. Wrangel therefore issued an order allowing regiments and military organisations to begin including in their ranks young men who had not fought in either the Great War or the Civil War.[4] However, few organisations did anything as a result of this order, and there was in any case little response among youth. Noting that many young émigrés were interested in sport, in 1926 the staff of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich decided to organise sporting clubs attached to military organisations. A great deal of effort was put into this, but with limited results.[5] In Paris a gymnastics school was set up under General Fok, and a youth circle attached to the SROUV was created, but elsewhere little was achieved. In 1929 Kutepov noted that very little had been done by military organisations to organise activities with youth. He reminded them of the need to put this matter onto firmer principles, giving special attention to practical activites rather than merely giving lectures,[6] but his reminder brought little change.

By 1930 ROVS's members had aged ten years since the evacuation of the Crimea, and so rejuvenating the organisation now became a high priority. In March 1931, Miller issued a 'Statute on the Military Preparation of ROVS Members'. This established four categories of military training courses designed to update the military knowledge of existing ROVS

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[3] General Miller v Bolgarii (Sofia, 1930), p. 6.

[4] BAR, ROVS, Box 134 , Folder 'Orders, 1926' (Order no. 42, Gen. Wrangel, 12 Dec 1926).

[5] GARF, 5826/1/192, 193 & 194 (Committee on the physical development of Russian youth).

[6] BAR, ROVS, Box 84, Folder 'Russian Youth Organisations, 1929-1932' (Circular, Gen. Kutepov, no. 750, 25 Sep 1929).

members, and to provide a basic military education for those outside of ROVS who wished to join. These courses covered topics such as weaponry, tactics, military history and topography, communications, the Red Army and the contemporary USSR, and in some cases included field training, map reading, and sports, as well as a two week camp.[7] With the establishment of all these courses, ROVS finally began to put into practice its talk about study and self-perfection, as well as its talk about attracting new members.

Great hopes were initially placed in these courses, but the response among both ROVS members and émigré youth was disappointing, and the courses were attended by only a handful of men. For instance, in France in 1932 only 20 men attended courses set up to train NCOs.[8] In Belgrade, courses established for would-be officers attracted an average of only 10 men a year throughout the 1930s.[9] In France, the Officers' School for the Development of Military Knowledge, designed to upgrade the military skills of junior officers, was such a failure that in 1935 it was closed down. It had proved almost impossible to get officers to participate, some preferring to resign from ROVS than to do so.[10]

Only in a few locations did ROVS's training schemes have any sort of success. In Yugoslavia in 1932, 80 NCOs of the Kuban Cossack Division completed a two year NCO's course. Photographs in 'Chasovoi' showed Cossack NCOs in full military uniform carrying

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[7] BAR, ROVS, Box 134, Folder 'Orders, 1931' ('Polozhenie o voennoi podgotovke chinov ROVSoiuza', March 1931).

[8] Chasovoi, no. 78, 15 Apr 1932, p. 28. BAR, ROVS, Box 134, Folder 'Orders, 1932' ('Informatsionnyi Bulletin, Voennaia Kantselariia ROVSa, 1 Feb & 15 Apr 1932).

[9] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1932. IV Otdel to Central Office (2)' (Order no. 14, Gen. Barbovich, 14 Dec 1934; Report, Col. Dreiling, 28 Mar 1932; & Report, Lt. Gen. Stremukhov, 26 Mar 1932); & Box 65, Folder 'Correspondence, 1936, IV Otdel to Central Office' (Letter, Barbovich to Miller, 5 Mar 1936).

[10] For instance, BAR, ROVS, Box 134, Folder 'Orders, 1931' ('Prikaz Kornilovskomu Artilleriiskomu Divisionu', no. 16, 12 Sep 1931).

out military training in the classroom and in the field, an unusual sight for 1932.[11] The numbers involved in the courses run by the Kuban Division were large considering its size (about 800 men), but those participating were not youths, but soldiers who had already served in the Civil War. The only places where ROVS's training courses were able to attract any number of new recruits were Bulgaria and Belgium. In 1937 in Sofia, the ROVS 3rd Department set up the 'General Kutepov Company of the Young Relief', which had 160 members, and met three times a week to conduct military training, which included field training in spring and autumn.[12] In Belgium a 'Russian Shooting Squad' ('Russkaia Strel'kovaia Druzhina') was formed in 1930.[13] Aware that overt military training would not be permitted by the local authorities, ROVS leaders in Belgium decided to resort to subterfuge by creating what was nominally a sports shooting team, but which in practice was a military training organisation.[14] Branches were set up in Brussels, Louvain and Liège. By September 1932 the Shooting Squad had 165 members, aged between 20 and 30, as well as 24 command staff and 5 teachers.[15] By January 1934, 212 members had passed through its ranks.[16] This was a fair quantity given the relatively small size of the Russian colony in

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[11] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder, 'Correspondence, 1932, IV Otdel to Central Office (1)' (Letter, Zborovskii to Stogov, 20 Jul 1932); & Chasovoi, no. 90, 15 Oct 1932, p. 2.

[12] V. N. Butkov, 'Russkaia Natsional'naia Molodezh' v Bolgarii', Nashi Vesti, no. 421, 1990, p. 20.

[13] Chasovoi, no. 31, 15 May 1930, p. 17, & no. 34, 30 Jun 1930, p. 2.

[14] BAR, ROVS, Box 134, Folder 'Orders, 1930' ('Informatsionnyi List Oblastnogo Otdela O-va Gallipoliitsev i chastei 1-go Armeiskogo Korpusa v Bel'gii', 22 Apr 1930).

[15] BAR, ROVS, Box 134, Folder 'Orders, 1932' ('Informatsionnyi Biulleten, Voennaia Kantseliariia ROVSa', 1 Sep 1932).

[16] BAR, ROVS, Box 66, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, V Otdel to Central Office' ('Otchet no. 4 o Russkoi Strelkovoi Druzhine za 1933 god').

Belgium.

The most successful training course was the Higher Military Technical Course, run by General N. N. Golovin, one of Russia's foremost military scholars. Two branches of the course were run, one in Paris, beginning in 1927, and one in Belgrade, beginning in 1931. The courses in effect constituted a general staff academy in exile. Attended by middle-ranking officers, they offered a broad in-depth military education, and completion of the courses gave the graduate the right to join the General Staff. Lecture subjects included tactics, airpower, chemical warfare, military history, military organisation, logistics, the work of the general staff, and the economic bases of modern warfare.[17] Between 1927 and 1940, over 400 attended the Higher Military Courses in Paris, and 200 those in Belgrade.[18] The high attendance at the courses, and the quality of their contents, made them the one undoubted success of ROVS's training programme. Their success was helped by the high reputation of Golovin himself, who not only wrote many books, but also lectured at military academies in France, the U.K., and the U.S.A.[19]

Other organisations within ROVS, and outside of it, also held lectures on military themes for their members. The 'Sporting Circle of ROVS' in Paris, for instance, held flying lectures giving would-be pilots the necessary theoretical knowledge to pass their pilots' examinations (practical training had to be done at French aerodromes at great personal

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[17] Details of many of the lectures are to be found in Mnukhin (ed), L'Emigration Russe.

[18] A. Trembovel'skii, 'Zarubezhnye vysshie voenno-nauchnye kursy Professora Generala Golovina', Pervopokhodnik, no. 11, Mar 1973, pp. 42-44; Also, Vl. Maevskii, Russkie v Iugoslavii, pp. 115-118.

[19] I. V. Obraztsov, 'N. N. Golovin i vysshaia voennaia shkola russkogo zarubezhiia', in E. P. Chelyshev & D. M. Shakhovskoi (eds), Kul'turnoe nasledie rossiiskoi emigratsii, 1917-1940, Vol. 1, (Moscow 1994), p. 373. For information on the thought of Golovin and other Russian military writers in exile, see in the same book an article by I. V. Domnin, 'Voennaia Kul'tura Russkogo Zarubezh'ia'.

expense).[20] Organisations such as the Society of Officer-Artillerists and the Union of Technical Forces held lectures to discuss topics of interest to their own military speciality. The Officers' Technical Courses of ROVS in Paris, attended by 20-40 officers at a time, taught subjects such as mathematics, mechanics, thermodynamics and chemistry.[21] The Society of Enthusiasts of Military Knowledge had branches in many locations and published its own journal in Belgrade during the 1920s. Other important military publications were 'Chasovoi', which was closely associated with ROVS through its editor, V. V. Orekhov, and 'Russkii Invalid', the paper of the Society of Russian War Invalids, which was not part of ROVS. Together, these societies and publications meant that in the area of military thought there was an active culture among Russian émigrés.

Despite the success of Golovin's Higher Courses, ROVS's training programme was a failure. Few serving officers participated, and even fewer members of the younger émigré generation joined ROVS. There were many reasons for this failure. In part it was due to a lack of willing, qualified teachers of high quality. There were also considerable political difficulties which could not always be overcome. Von Lampe commented in 1931 that Soviet diplomatic representatives closely followed émigré military training activities and complained vociferously to the local authorities if any were undertaken. In Berlin the head of the proposed officers' courses warned that if military training were to be openly conducted there, the officers' union might be closed by the authorities.[22] The political situation worsened after

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[20] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1932. IV Otdel to Central Office (2)' (Letter, Stogov to Bazarevich, no. 623, 27 Oct 1932).

[21] Chasovoi, no. 34, 30 Jun 1930, p. 23; no. 73, 1 Feb 1932, p. 18; & no. 97, 1 Feb 1933, p. 23.

[22] BAR, ROVS, Box 62, Folder 'Coresondence, 1931. II Otdel to Central Office (2)' (Report, von Lampe to Miller, no. 657, 29 Oct 1931).

the rise to power of the Nazis, which brought the prospect of war closer and made many nations seek alliances with the USSR. In Latvia in 1934, the head of the 'Riga Group for the Maintenance of Military Knowledge', Lt. Col. Zenov, was put on trial for leading an illegal organisation.[23] In France, the government asked 'Chasovoi' not to print any more stories about military training activities in that country, as every time such a story appeared the government had to put up with a barrage of complaints from the Soviet embassy. In 1935, in the aftermath of the signing of the Franco-Soviet Pact, the French Foreign Ministry, under pressure from the Soviets, attempted to ban Golovin's Higher Military Technical Courses, and Miller was only able to prevent this from happening with great difficulty.[24]

But though political difficulties may have contributed to ROVS's problems, the chief reasons for the failure of ROVS to attract youth to participate in its courses and join the organisation are rather more complex. The essential problem was that there was very little incentive for young men to join ROVS. Even if they did complete a course, there was nothing for them to do within the organisation thereafter. Attending yet more lectures, or appearing at dinners and balls where older men recalled old times was hardly a prospect that would attract young men, especially the more dynamic ones ROVS was after. These wanted to be doing things, and to be playing a role of their own. ROVS did not offer them that opportunity.[25]

Many suggestions were made as to how to rectify the reluctance of young émigrés to

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[23] BAR, ROVS, Box 62, Folder 'Corresondence, 1934. II Otdel to Central Office' (Report, von Lampe to Miller, no. 113, 11 Mar 1934).

[24] BAR, ROVS, Box 6, Folder '1 Armeiskii Korpus, 1934-1936' ('Protokol sobraniia starshikh nachal'nikov 1 otdela ROVSoiuza Parizhskogo raiona, imevshego mesto 26 Avgusta 1936).

[25] For a discussion of the reasons why young émigrés failed to join ROVS, see Chasovoi, no. 58, 30 Jun 1931, p. 18, & no. 77, 1 Apr 1932, pp. 20-29.

join ROVS, including an entire report on the subject written by General Barbovich in 1932,[26] but General Dragomirov noted that even if all Barbovich's suggestions were implemented, émigré youth would still not join ROVS, for the simple reason that they wanted their own independent organisations. As they could never be anything other than junior members of ROVS they would never wish to join.[27] Colonel Bazarevich cast doubt on the whole idea of attracting youth into ROVS. It was his view that it was less important to get young people to join ROVS than to attract them generally into the Russian nationalist orbit.[28] This was an idea developed by General Abramov, who noted that the 'healthy elements' of émigré youth were joining their own organisations such as the sokols (see pp. 216-217) and the circles of national youth (which later became the NSNP - see pp. 219-224). Rather than attracting these youths into ROVS he proposed that ROVS concentrate on helping these other organisations. Military training could be included in the programmes of groups such as the sokols and scouts, which youth would join more readily than ROVS, and as such organisations did not have their own military instructors, ROVS should provide them. ROVS should also give continual material support to the sokols and the circles of national youth.[29] This different direction of activity, based on supporting and promoting other youth groups rather than attracting youth into ROVS, was the one which ROVS adopted from about 1932 onwards.

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[26] BAR, ROVS, Box 84, Folder 'Russian Youth Organisations, 1929-1932' (Letter, Barbovich to Miller, including report of commission examining the subject of youth, no. 93/s, 27 Feb 1932).

[27] BAR, ROVS, Box 84, Folder 'Russian Youth Organisations, 1929-1932' (Notes of Gen. Dragomirov & Gen. Lukomskii on report of Gen. Barbovich).

[28] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1932, IV Otdel to Central Office' (Letter, Bazarevich to Miller, no. 386, 19 Sep 1932).

[29] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1932, IV Otdel to Central Office' (Letter, Abramov to Stogov, no. 172, 28 Jun 1932).

The task of maintaining tight links with youth organisations now acquired new urgency and vigour. In particular ROVS leaders tried to promote, and get actively involved in, the 'Sokol' movement. The sokols were a gymnastics club, originally created in Czechoslovakia, which practised both individual gymnastics and mass gymnastic displays. The latter were often given a patriotic flavour. As well as gymnastics, meetings of sokols were devoted to singing patriotic songs and holding parades with national flags. The purpose of the Russian sokols was described as the physical and spiritual development of Russians, and the struggle with denationalisation.[30] Members of the Russian Army were involved in the sokols from the early days of their exile. In 1923, General Fok took 300 sokols from Yugoslavia to attend the 'All Slavic Sokol Rally' in Prague.[31] In 1929, Kutepov, who had visited sokol organisations in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, issued a circular praising the movement and calling on senior commanders to support links with it.[32] Similar calls to ROVS members to support the sokols were issued by Generals Miller, Khodorovich, and Abramov.[33] As a result many ROVS officers did take up positions running sokol organisations. In Bulgaria, for instance, the sokol organisation was headed by General Abramov and subsidised by the ROVS 3rd department.[34] In 1932 Miller formed a committee to provide material and moral support to enable Russian sokols to attend the All-Slavic Sokol

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[30] Russkii Golos, no. 320, 23 May 1937.

[31] HIA, Kussonskii Collection, Box 7, File 28 (Report, V.Kh. Davatz, June 1923; & Letter, Abramov to Davatz, no. 1571, 21 Jun 1923).

[32] BAR, ROVS, Box 84, Folder 'Russian Youth Organisations, 1929-1932' (Circular, Gen. Kutepov, no. 382, 20 Apr 1929).

[33] Chasovoi, no. 34, 30 Jun 1930, p. 3, & no. 75, 1 Mar 1932, p. 27; & HIA, VSIuR, Ssudnoe Otdelenie, Box 3, File 13 (Circular, Gen. Abramov, no. 315, 29 Jun 1927).

[34] GARF, 5826/1/193/71 (Letter, Abramov to Gulevich, no. 707, 28 Nov 1927).

Rally in Czechoslovakia.[35] ROVS activists involved with the sokols tried to give the groups an even more patriotic flavour and to add an element of military training to their activities. This created problems with liberal elements who wished to avoid any form of political or military colouring in the organisation. Military involvement in the sokols was far greater in Yugoslavia than in Czechoslovakia, where the movement had its headquarters, with the result that activities had a much greater patriotic ideological flavour in the former country than in the latter. In Yugoslavia the sokols were gradually turned into a military training organisation.[36] In 1930 sokol leaders in Yugoslavia proposed moving the organisation's headquarters there from Czechoslovakia, a plan which was supported by ROVS officers involved in the movement. At a meeting of the sokol committee in Prague the Gallipoliitsy present voted to support the move to Yugoslavia, but others voted against, saying that in Belgrade the sokols would be militarised.[37] As a result the sokol movement split into two, with two rival organisations being created, one based in Belgrade and the other in Prague.

ROVS was also actively involved with the various scouting organisations set up by Russian émigrés. Of these, perhaps the most popular with ROVS was the NORR ('Natsional'naia Organizatsiia Russkikh Razvedchikov'[38]). The NORR was run on the basis of hierarchy and discipline, and its activities had a distinctly military nature. In Bulgaria, where

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[35] BAR, Russkii Natsional'nyi Komitet Collection, Box 2, Folder 'Correspondence, Miller to Kartashev' (Letter, Miller to Kartashev, 11 Feb 1932).

[36] Photographs showing sokols in Yugoslavia carrying out military training in the 1930s are on display at the Museum of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in Moscow.

[37] BAR, ROVS, Box 16, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Miller' (Letter, Zinkevich to Miller, 20 Dec 1930).

[38] A 'Razvedchik' is a military scout or reconnaissance soldier, and is also the word for a secret intelligence operative. The use of this word rather than the more common word for boy scout - 'skaut' - implied a militarised version of boy scouting.

the NORR had some 600 members in the later 1930s, many of its instructors were provided by ROVS, and it had groups engaged in gliding, skiing, chemical warfare training, shooting, and riding. Under the supervision of the ROVS 3rd Department, it ran summer camps training recruits for underground military activities, studying subjects such as minefield crossing, grenade throwing and night navigation.[39] ROVS was also involved in less militaristic groups. For instance, in the south of France, ROVS took a scout group of 30 boys and 15 girls under its protection, and found 4,000 francs to run the group's annual camp.[40] But ROVS's interventions were not always of a positive character. As with the sokols, so with scouting organisations, the involvement of ROVS could drag the organisations into political intrigue and bitter inter-party disputes. Not all ROVS members were willing to cooperate in a positive spirit with members of other organisations involved with youth groups. V. A. Temnomerov, Commissioner General in France of the NORS ('Natsional'naia Organizatsiia Russkikh Skautov') complained to Miller in 1936 that Gallipoliitsy in France were obstructing the work of the group because some of the parents and one of the instructors of the organisation were members of the Mladorossy Party.[41] Such behaviour was not untypical of the Gallipoliitsy, who had a tendency to obstruct any work they could not control themselves. On the whole, though, the positive impetus ROVS gave to youth groups outweighed the negative consequences of the politicking of some of its members.

ROVS's involvement with youth also included political groups, several new political organisations run by émigré youth having emerged in the late 1920s. Of these, the least

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[39] Butkov, Russkaia natsional'naia molodezh', p. 20.

[40] BAR, ROVS, Box 102, Folder 'Attestations, 1932 (1)' (Letter, Shatilov to Gen. Aprelev, 20 Jul 1932).

[41] BAR, ROVS, Box 16, Folder 'Correspondence, T. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, V. A. Temnomerov to Miller, 6 May 1936).

favoured by ROVS were the Mladorossy, whose strange mix of legitimism and Soviet nationalism was regarded with great suspicion. Some ROVS members, such as Orekhov, proposed establishing good relations with the Mladorossy, in order to gain some influence over them, but this advice was rejected.[42] It was believed that the Mladorossy were under the influence of the GPU,[43] and also that their ideology played insufficient attention to religion.[44] As a result they were in general regarded as a hostile force.

In France, General Shatilov, who from 1930 to 1934 was head of the ROVS 1st Department, took a very active role in promoting and supporting youth groups which were nationalistic in flavour and close to ROVS in ideology. One group he encouraged was 'Belaia Ideia', established in 1933. Inspired by the exploit in Leningrad of Viktor Larionov (see p. 199), who was one of its founding members, Belaia Ideia was made up of students, who discussed political matters and sought to train themselves to carry out underground action against the USSR. More significant than Belaia Ideia was the NSNP, which was probably the most important of the new émigré youth organisations to arise in the 1930s. In World War Two, the NSNP (by then known as the NTSNP, and often referred to simply as the NTS) played an important role in the collaborationist movement of General Vlasov, and it would continue to play an active political role after the war. Its origins are therefore of wider significance.[45] In the 1930s ROVS and the NSNP were to develop particularly close

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[42] GARF, 5853/1/54/165-169 (Letter, Orekhov to von Lampe, 16 Jul 1933). BAR, ROVS, Box 4 (Letter, Miller to von Lampe, 20 Jun 1930).

[43] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Miller to Abramov' (Letter, Miller to Abramov, 20 Aug 1933).

[44] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions (1930s)' ('Informatsionnaia Svodka', no. 3, Annex 5).

[45] See Catherine Andreyev, Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement: Soviet Realities and Émigré Theories (Cambridge, 1987).

relations, which then collapsed in 1936 and 1937, producing one of the major public splits and scandals of the history of the Russian emigration (see pp. 299-304 & 310-311).

The NSNP had its origins in youth circles which sprung up in the early 1920s among young émigré army officers. Perhaps the largest group was among officers of the Russian Army at Pernik, where in 1925 a 'Circle of Russian National Youth' was already thriving.[46] These groups studied political, military and world affairs, organised debates, and published journals. They sought to analyse the reasons for the White defeat in the Civil War, and to come up with possible future strategies. At first this did not extend to creating political programmes, and so they did not count as political organisations under Order No. 82. Their early membership was largely made up of young army officers and cadets, especially in Bulgaria and France, though less so in Yugoslavia where most members were not ex-soldiers (though many of their leaders were). This meant that the NSNP (which grew out of these groups) had a tight link with the Russian Army and ROVS from the very beginning. With time these youth circles became more political in character. Feeling that the White struggle had failed because it had lacked a positive ideology and popular support, youth groups began to consider creating such an ideology. Furthermore, many young men blamed their seniors for the defeat of the White cause, and wanted to create their own organisation based entirely on youth. For these reasons, in 1928 the numerous youth groups throughout Europe united to form one new political organisation, known as the Union of Russian National Youth, which after a conference in 1930 changed its name to the NSNP. Its president was a Don Cossack veteran of the Russian Army, V. M. Baidalakov.[47]

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[46] Vestnik Glavnogo Pravleniia Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 8/9/10, Aug/Sep/Oct 1925, p. 11.

[47] B. Prianishnikov, Novopokolentsy (Silver Spring, 1986), pp. 5-7.

The ideology of the NSNP was close in spirit to that of ROVS. The organisation supported non-predetermination, believing that there were more important questions to settle than that of whether Russia should be a monarchy or republic. It believed in a 'solidarist' state, and rejected political parties, emphasising that the state must rule above all parties and classes in the name of the national interest. In all this, there was no difference between ROVS and the NSNP. The latter's philosophy was based on 'idealism, nationalism and activism' - stressing, in turn, the spiritual over the material dimension of life, the nation as the framework for a creative society, and continual direct action against the Soviet Union.[48] Where the NSNP differed from ROVS was in its stress on the need for ideological as well as military struggle against the Soviets.

By 1932, as ROVS faced up to its failure to attract youth into its own ranks, a desire to use the NSNP and to bring it firmly into ROVS's orbit, so as to steer it in the right direction, was becoming more and more pronounced.[49] In April 1932, Baidalakov wrote to Miller to praise a speech he had given in Paris and to explain what the NSNP was doing. Its purpose, he explained, was to continue the political struggle by creating a corps of political agitators, to do which it was first necessary to equip them with a clear set of political ideals. Miller gave Baidalakov his approval, and the stage for closer relations was set.[50]

By mid-1933 the impetus for establishing some form of official cooperation was gathering momentum, in particular in the area of underground struggle against the Soviets. In March 1933, Abramov wrote to Miller to say that ROVS's own efforts in that direction had

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[48] Andreyev, Vlasov, pp. 185-187.

[49] For instance, BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller E. K.' (Letter, Tsurikov to Miller, 30 Nov 1931).

[50] BAR, ROVS, Box 84, Folder 'Russian Youth Organisations, 1929-1932' (Letters, Baidalakov to Miller, no. 68, 10 Apr 1932; & Miller to Baidalakov, 20 Apr 1932).

achieved little, while youth were finding their own way in such matters independent of ROVS. The time had come for ROVS to let youth take the lead.[51] This cause was taken up with special enthusiasm by Shatilov. In September 1932 he sponsored a congress of nationalist-minded youth organisations in Paris, and he was keen to promote a new active-minded, nationalistic, political force in the Russian emigration. ROVS already provided support to the NSNP through use of its buildings, where NSNP meetings were generally held. But NSNP leaders wanted more assistance, and in particular wanted an exception to be made to Order No. 82 for their organisation, so that ROVS members could join it. Shatilov agreed that it was worth making a concession in the NSNP's case, and on 24 June 1933 issued a circular allowing ROVS members to join the NSNP. This instruction was then duplicated in other departments. It was not meant to give blanket permission for any ROVS member to join the NSNP, and ROVS members who joined the NSNP were meant to continue to abide by ROVS's internal discipline and not to participate in any activities which ROVS might not approve of.[52] Nevertheless a green light was given for the first time to a large number of ROVS members to join a political organisation, and many took advantage of it.

On 22 September 1933, after he and Miller had met one of the leaders of the NSNP, M. A. Georgievskii, and promised him their support, Shatilov issued another circular, which ordered that wherever there were groups of ROVS but not of the NSNP, the former were to help set up new detachments of the latter. In such locations the local ROVS commander was

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[51] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller' (Letter, Abramov to Miller, 31 Mar 1933).

[52] BAR, ROVS, Box 65, Folder 'Correspondence, 1933. V Otdel to Central Office' (Letter, Stogov to Gartman, 23 Oct 1933).

to appoint a person who was to be in charge of setting up and organising a detachment of the NSNP.[53] This instruction was confirmed by a meeting of senior ROVS commanders in October 1933,[54] and it resulted in a spectacular growth in the activity of the NSNP in France. According to B. Prianishnikov, who was himself a leading NSNP member in France at this time, groups of the NSNP sprung up "like mushrooms" after Shatilov's circular.[55] Georgievskii would later write to Shatilov that "Если бы не Ваша помощь, то во Франции вообще не было бы Союза".[56]

ROVS's support for the NSNP was financial as well as organisational. The NSNP wished to carry out 'active work' against the Soviets, and asked ROVS for financial assistance. In response, General Abramov suggested giving it a grant of 10,000 francs.[57] General Zinkevich endorsed the idea of using the NSNP to carry out 'active work', writing to Miller:

> Совершенно необходимо использовать прекрасный материал союза нац. молодежи ... Мое мнение, что на них надо сделать главную ставку ... Революцию всегда делала молодежь ... Сейчас они льнут к нам, если их не использовать, мы лишимся притока свежей крови ... Необходимо им дать работу и именно в Россию, иначе от нас уйдут к другим.[58]

As a result, Miller agreed in June 1933 to give the NSNP 10,000 francs out of the

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[53] BAR, Denikin Collection, Box 27 (Circular, Gen. Shatilov, no. 2717, 22 Sep 1933).

[54] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions, (1930s)' (Report arising from conference of senior commanders, Oct 1933).

[55] Prianishnikov, Novopokolentsy, p. 20.

[56] Russkii Golos, no. 345, 14 Nov 1937, p. 3.

[57] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller' (Abramov to Miller, 10 May 1933).

[58] BAR, ROVS, Box 16, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Miller' (Letter, Zinkevich to Miller, 15 May 1933).

FSR.[59] It was also agreed that the fund raising activities of the NSNP and the FSR should be coordinated to avoid competition between the two.[60] The NSNP now became ROVS's great hope, and support for it a top priority. As Abramov wrote to Miller, "Благоприятное отношение и всяческое содействие развитию и укреплению Союза Нац. Молодежи, должно быть основной линией РОВС'а ".[61]

The close links established with the NSNP did not meet the approval of all. Some bemoaned the fact that Order no. 82 had been broken, and feared that ROVS would be dragged into political fights.[62] These fears were to be justified. Within a few short years, the ROVS leadership was to regret permitting its members to join the NSNP in such large numbers, for these members found themselves subject to a dual authority and ROVS did not always prove to be the prime loyalty. In 1937 an open split was to develop between the two organisations, resulting in one of the most bitter scandals of the emigration's history (see pp. 299-304 & 310-311). In the long term it was the NSNP which would profit more from the arrangement than ROVS.

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One of the causes of the later split between ROVS and the NSNP was a shady underground group operating within both organisations, known as the 'Inner Line'. The Inner

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[59] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder, 'Correspondence, Barbovich to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Barbovich, no. 460, 19 Jun 1933).

[60] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder, 'Correspondence, Barbovich to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Barbovich, no. 470, 21 Jun 1933).

[61] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller' (Letter, Abramov to Miller, 27 Jun 1933).

[62] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions (1930s)' (Unsigned document entitled 'Order no. 82'), & Box 2 , Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Tsurikov to Miller, no. 594, 15 Aug 1933).

Line represented a more sinister aspect of ROVS's efforts to promote and control émigré youth organisations. Its activities were to be the source of much scandal and left a deep impression on the minds of some émigrés. It came to be seen by some as an all-pervading conspiracy with roots spreading deep into all parts of émigré life, eating away at them like a cancer - "язва на теле русской эмиграции", as one writer described it.[63] The truth was somewhat more prosaic than this hyperbole suggests, but the way in which émigrés reacted to the Inner Line tells one much about the atmosphere of the times.

The Inner Line was a secret organisation of nationalist youth which was established in Bulgaria in the late 1920s. According to General Abramov, cells had been set up in the provinces of Bulgaria, unaware of each other's existence, and controlled from the centre by the secretary of the ROVS 3rd Department, Captain K. A. Foss. Their purpose was to spread ideas into the mass of the emigration by means of personal example and by participation in émigré debates.[64] Though Abramov did not specify it, what this actually meant was that they were to penetrate émigré social and political organisations and seek to gain control of them from within. By 1930 this strategy had already had significant success in Bulgaria. Members of the Inner Line were commanding a large variety of émigré groups in Bulgaria. Foss himself was apparently head of the Bulgarian branch of the BRP, and other members headed the Bulgarian NSNP, the local branch of the left-wing party 'Krestianskaia Rossiia', and the 'League of Aubert'[65], among others.[66]

[63] N. Svitkov, Vnutrenniaia Liniia (iazva na tele russkoi emigratsii) (Sao Paolo, 1964).

[64] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller' (Letter, Abramov to Miller, 21 Mar 1931).

[65] 'The League for Struggle with the 3rd International' was otherwise known as the 'League of Aubert' after its founder, an anti-Soviet French lawyer (see A. E. Senn, Assassination in Switzerland: the Murder of Vlatsav Vorovsky (Madison, 1981)). With branches in many European countries, the League carried out anti-Soviet agitation among the local population.

In 1929 and 1930 various members of the Inner Line moved to France, and began to create cells of the organisation there, supervised by a Captain N. D. Zakrzhevskii under the overall command of Shatilov. Zakrzhevskii began to recruit rapidly for the Inner Line, which in the years 1930 to 1933 expanded greatly. From the little he had been told about the organisation by Shatilov and Abramov, Miller gave his approval to the Inner Line's activities.[67] Much of Zakrzhevskii's time was taken up with counter-intelligence tasks, collecting information on émigré organisations such as the BRP and the Mladorossy, and reporting to Shatilov on the mood among ROVS members.[68]

The Inner Line was a logical extension of the concept of a knightly order acting as a moral centre in the midst of the Russian emigration. However, as befitted an organisation which viewed itself as something of a special 'order', the Inner Line began to take on a life of its own outside of ROVS, and it began to work secretly from Miller with the aim of getting all the strings of power into its own hands. In particular it sought to gain control from within of both ROVS and the NSNP. In 1933 Zakrzhevskii wrote to R. P. Ronchevskii in Lyons, who was a member of both the NSNP and the Inner Line, that:

> Мы должны быть везде незримыми руководителями, незримыми стержнями, толкающими работу обеих организаций [ROVS and the NSNP] к победе ... оба аппарата, и РОВС и НСНП, должны быть насыщены нашими людьми до такой степени, чтобы все это в конечном счете сливалось бы.[69]

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[66] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1937, III Otdel to Central Office' (Circular, 'Ispolnitel'noe Biuro Soveta NTSNP, no. 205, 9 Mar 1936).

[67] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Abramov, no. 260, 2 Apr 1931).

[68] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Abramov, no. 216, 17 Mar 1933).

[69] Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia Pautina, p. 178.

In another letter, he wrote likewise, "Мы стоим над РОВС и над НСНП".[70] This statement, once it became known to the NSNP's leaders, caused great alarm, convincing them that the Inner Line was trying to take over their organisation from within.

According to Boris Prianishnikov, the climax of the Inner Line's efforts was a Congress of National Groups held in Paris at the Gallipoli Mess from 31 March to 3 April 1934. This congress was organised by Shatilov, and groups invited included the NSNP, NORR, Cossack groups and 'Belaia Ideia'. Its stated purpose was to reach agreement among active anti-communist groups about their future activity and to find common points of view.[71] According to Prianishnikov, however, its purpose was more sinister - to establish the control of the Inner Line over those groups attending, by means of the creation of a permanent committee to unite and coordinate their activity. Many of those attending the congress were Inner Line members, and their plan was, Prianishnikov claims, to elect one of their number, V. M. Levitskii (ROVS's propaganda chief in France), to the presidency of the permanent body, and to get all attending groups to agree to subordinate themselves to it. This would then subordinate all nationalist émigré youth groups to representatives of the Inner Line. To prevent this the NSNP representatives acted to prevent Levitskii's election, and Viktor Larionov was elected instead, thus supposedly foiling the Inner Line's plans.[72] In any event, the permanent committee, like all previous such unity committees, proved to be stillborn and never achieved any real control over the organisations it claimed to represent.

It may be that the congress of national groups was not the sinister plot of the Inner Line that Prianishnikov believed it to be. What mattered was that many in the NSNP

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[70] Ibid, p. 178.

[71] Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 11, 15 May 1933, pp. 1-4.

[72] Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia Pautina, pp. 208-210.

believed that it was, and their fear and dislike of the Inner Line began to grow ever stronger, until eventually it led to a direct split with ROVS (see pp. 299-304 & 310-311). Whatever its real purpose, the congress of national groups represented the high point of ROVS's involvement in the politics of the new generation. ROVS had given birth to many of the new groupings of the Russian emigration, and had nurtured them through their early years. Now those groups were ready to break free of ROVS and find their own way.

CHAPTER 10 - THE 'WHITE IDEA': THE SEARCH FOR AN IDEOLOGY, 1930-1936

By 1930, many émigrés had become frustrated with their old methods of struggle, which appeared to have got them nowhere, and many began to search for new ones. As part of this process, a search for a positive ideology was undertaken, and everything ROVS stood for came under review, in particular the guiding concepts of apoliticism and non-predetermination. Some officers began to demand that ROVS increase the intensity of what was termed its 'political work'. The beliefs of émigré officers came increasingly under attack from new political philosophies such as Eurasianism and fascism, and also from old ideas such as legitimism. In the face of this, ROVS members were forced to examine what they believed in, and what it meant. Some succeeded in doing so, but others stubbornly refused to, and in the end non-predetermination continued to hold sway. At the end of this process, the 'White Idea' remained as elusive as ever before, which in itself reveals the extent to which the ideas of apoliticism and non-predetermination were embedded in the psyche of White officers. Nevertheless, the very process of searching for a new ideology, however unsuccessfully, revealed much about what ROVS members believed and showed the essentially spiritual nature of their philosophy.

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From the late 1920s, many groups within ROVS, having become convinced that continued struggle was not possible without a positive ideology, began to question non-predetermination. Leading the charge were the legitimists. Non-predetermination was "criminal", wrote the legitimist General Akatov, "идею политического маразма и разложеня борьбы, удачно скрывающую республиканские тенденции".[1] The newspaper

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[1] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1931, IV Otdel' (Open letter, Akatov to Miller, no date).

'Russkii Voennyi Vestnik', which was the official organ of the Council of United Officers' Organisations in Yugoslavia, printed several articles in 1927 calling for the adoption of a positive political programme. "Никакая организация, никакая успешная борьба невозможны", wrote S. L. Voitsekhovskii in one such article, "без созидательной идеологии". Later he added that: "нужна программа ... отсутствие такой программы погубило белое движение".[2] In pursuit of a positive programme, the editor of 'Russkii Voennyi Vestnik', Lieutenant N. Rklitskii, began to espouse the philosophy of Eurasianism in the newspaper, with the result that in 1927 Wrangel ordered military organisations to cease all contacts with it, considering its political tone unacceptable for a military publication.[3] Subsequently the newspaper was renamed 'Tsarskii Vestnik' and regularly printed articles attacking ROVS and non-predetermination, while propagating the legitimist cause.

Monarchists were not the only ones questioning non-predetermination. Among the Gallipoliitsy there was an ever increasing feeling that ROVS needed some positive political slogans to win support. Viktor Larionov in a speech in November 1934 put this succinctly, saying "идеи в современной войне, столь-же сильны, как и пушки".[4] A year earlier V. V. Orekhov, the editor of 'Chasovoi', had written to General Stogov, head of ROVS's central military chancellery: "Потускела наша идеология ... Непредрешение формы правления - абсолютно необходимо, непредрешение же первого периода после падения

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[2] Russkii Voennyi Vestnik, no. 101, 17 Jul 1927, p. 3, & no. 107, 28 Aug 1927, p. 1.

[3] HIA, WA, 147/34/415-420, 429, 434-435, & 444-446 (Letters, Wrangel to Ekk, 6 & 7 Sep 1927, & 31 Oct 1927; & Paleolog to Wrangel, 5 & 7 Oct 1927); BAR, ROVS, Box 17, Folder 'Wrangel Headquarters (13)' (Circular, Gen. Arkhangel'skii, 30 Sep 1927).

[4] BAR, ROVS, Box 88 (Manuscript, V. Larionov, 'Dobrovol'cheskaia Belaia Ideia v Izgnanii').

большевиков становится уже абсурдом".[5] In this way, some White officers were coming around to the view expressed by Miliukov in his New Tactics that physical struggle with the Soviets must be replaced by ideological struggle.

As part of this change in direction, the Gallipoliitsy began to demand that ROVS intensify its political work. Such work had always been undertaken by ROVS, and involved anti-Soviet agitation among foreigners and among other émigrés, as well as agitation among ROVS members to reinforce in them the existing ideological principles of ROVS - 'non-predetermination', 'irreconcilability', and military values such as duty, honour, discipline and sacrifice. New ideological movements such as the Smena Vekh, the Eurasians, the Mladorossy and the Post-revolutionaries, were throughout the 1920s and 1930s gradually undermining many of these principles among émigrés, some of whom were being attracted by ideas that the Soviet Union might evolve, that it had become a defender of Russian national interests, and that continued struggle against it was pointless. 'Political work' implied fighting these tendencies, through speeches at meetings, pamphlets, newspapers and so on.

Most ROVS members, however, remained stubbornly unwilling to countenance the idea of abandoning their cherished apoliticism, even to the limited degree implied by taking up 'political work'. The impermissibility of politics in the army was clear to every officer, wrote a G. Genkel', in 'Russkii Golos' in 1938.[6] Franco was not winning in Spain, wrote a Captain A. A. Semeniuk in the same year, because his army was more politically educated than his opponents - "Победу решают храбрость и стойкость пехоты и техника".[7]

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[5] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1924-1929' (Letter, Orekhov to Stogov, 12 September 1933).

[6] Russkii Golos, no. 381, 24 Jul 1938, pp. 2-4.

[7] Ibid, no. 382, 7 Aug 1938, p. 3.

Nevertheless, as time went on, the ideological attacks on ROVS by other émigré groups did create an increasing demand for ideas which members could use to defend themselves against these attacks. Thus General Zinkevich insisted that ROVS must engage in political work and give its members ideological weapons to defend themselves, while not in so doing creating a 'political programme'.[8] Squaring that particular circle ultimately proved impossible, but demands for something of the sort had become very strong by the beginning of the 1930s.

During the 1920s ROVS had not had any permanent propaganda or political apparatus. This gap began to be filled in late 1931 when Miller started paying monthly stipends to A. A. Brauner in Bulgaria and N. A. Tsurikov in Czechoslovakia to enable them to increase the work they were doing as propagandists for ROVS. Brauner and Tsurikov travelled around their respective countries meeting groups of ROVS members, giving lectures, and acting as conduits for information and ideas from the centre to the periphery and back again. A similar role was carried out by V. M. Levitskii in France and I. A. Il'in in Germany. What ROVS lacked was a printed organ of its own. The establishment of an official ROVS newspaper was mooted while Kutepov was president, but nothing ever came of the idea.[9] The nearest ROVS had to official publications were 'Russkii Voennyi Vestnik' (until 1927), and the 'Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev'. The latter began publication in 1933, was published once a month in Sofia, and had a circulation of about 1,850 copies, which were distributed throughout Europe.[10] The paper contained details of events in the

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[8] BAR, ROVS, Box 86, Folder 'Zinkevich to Matsylev, 1937-1940' (Letter, Zinkevich to Matsylev, 7 April 1937).

[9] BAR, ROVS, Box 17, Folder 'Wrangel Headquarters (14)' (Letters, Kondzerovskii to Khol'msen, 26 June 1928; & Khol'msen to Kondzerovskii, no. 1430/a, 6 September 1930).

[10] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, III Otdel' ('Svedenie o rasprostranenii Vestnika Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev').

lives of groups of ROVS members and articles on political and military matters. These articles examined political events in Europe, the Far East and the Soviet Union, and debated issues such as the tasks of ROVS members, their attitude to ideologies such as fascism, their slogans, and so forth. The ROVS central directorate subsidised the newspaper to the tune of 300 francs a month.[11]

The other publication closely associated with ROVS was 'Chasovoi', but complications with its editor, Orekhov, meant that this journal could never be relied upon to relay ROVS policy accurately. 'Chasovoi' was founded at the beginning of 1929 with financial help from the eccentric White veteran Anastasii Vonsiatskii, who had married an American millionairess. In 1931, however, Vonsiatskii stopped providing money to 'Chasovoi' and his place was taken by ROVS. Problems arose because Orekhov, even though he was a ROVS member and was receiving a subsidy from Miller, insisted on absolute editorial independence.[12] Relations between ROVS leaders and Orekhov declined rapidly, and in 1934 Miller cut off his subsidy to 'Chasovoi'.[13] The journal's opinions could never be seen as being representative of ROVS's official line.

A more reliable newspaper from ROVS's point of view was 'Russkii Golos', published in Belgrade twice a month. This was founded in 1931 by two ROVS members, General Potavtsev and Colonel Pronin, with the specific aim of promoting the ideology of ROVS.[14]

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[11] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, III Otdel' (Letter, Zinkevich to Abramov, 14 June 1934).

[12] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Chasovoi to Miller' (Letter, Orekhov to Miller, 14 December 1933).

[13] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, IV Otdel (2)' (Letter, Kussonskii to Barbovich, 13 November 1934).

[14] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1931, IV Otdel (3)' (Letters, Barbovich to Miller, 9 January 1931; Potavtsev to Miller, 15 June 1931; & Pronin to Miller, 11 April 1931).

Its editor, Pronin, was subsequently to prove far more obedient to the ROVS hierarchy than Orekhov, but even he earned an occasional rebuke from Miller for not following the political line that Miller would have wanted.[15] ROVS was never fully able to overcome its failure to set up an organ of its own, which would have been able to issue a clear political line to all its members.

Another area of ROVS's political activity was that of anti-Soviet propaganda. Miller joined an émigré committee to lobby foreign governments against Soviet economic politics. Fighting the Soviets on the economic front was especially important, he wrote, because it would create the conditions for the collapse of the Soviet regime.[16] As another aspect of this work, information bulletins about events in the USSR produced by the FSR were distributed among foreign journalists, politicians and military leaders.

ROVS was therefore always engaged in some forms of political and propaganda work, but by the early 1930s many members increasingly felt that such activities had to be intensified. As Tsurikov noted in 1933, one of ROVS's problems was that, while being very sensitive to attacks on them in the press, ROVS members were not used to reacting to these by argument and did not know how to do so. As a result they got excited and irritated, and this sapped morale. It was necessary to provide members with better ideological preparation so as to be able to respond confidently to such attacks.[17] But not all were in favour of even limited ideological and political work. There was a fear among senior, more conservative

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[15] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1931, IV Otdel (3)' (Letters, Stogov to Pronin, no. 1000, 14 December 1931; & no. 127, 19 February 1932).

[16] BAR, ROVS, Box 1, Folder 'A. I. Guchkov to E. K. Miller' (Letter, Miller to Guchkov, no. 737, 5 October 1931).

[17] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Tsurikov to Miller, 21 August 1933).

officers that this could easily drag ROVS on to the road of becoming a political party. To many senior officers, ideology had no place in an army, the basis of which should be discipline, and discipline alone. In 1934 General Gartman wrote:

> Сейчас идет перемена психологии на штатский лад в силу обстановки и давать волю Цуриковым, Левитским и пр. - не след. Вспомните Галлиполи и действия Кутепова. Он тогда понял, что только дисциплина сохранит спайку, а сейчас мы переживаем моральное Галлиполи и все что может быть штатского в наших взаимоотношениях, мы должы извергать.[18]

This was fairly typical of the response of the older generation of senior officers to the crisis facing the emigration in the early 1930s. While those who had served in the army for a shorter time were gradually being civilianised and demanding a review of the ways of the past, the senior generation clung ever more determinedly to the military values they had been brought up in, especially discipline. The result was an ever increasing divide between the mentalities of leaders and led.

In August 1933 Tsurikov wrote to Miller to suggest that ROVS create its own ideological organisation.[19] Tsurikov stated that the basic aim of the new organisation should be to systematise the work already being done, by creating a centre with control over representatives in the localities. It would be necessary for the new organisation to adopt an 'above-party' position. It would not seek to turn ROVS into a political party, just to provide members with 'weapons' of ideas to oppose their enemies.[20] This idea did not meet universal approval. S. E. Trubetskoi, one of the workers in the ROVS central directorate, wrote to

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[18] BAR, ROVS, Box 66, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, V Otdel' (Letter, Gartman to Kussonskii, no. 283, 21 September 1934).

[19] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Tsurikov to Miller, 21 Aug 1933).

[20] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Tsurikov to Miller, 12 November 1933).

Tsurikov opposing the idea. He feared that it could drag ROVS into 'politicization'. He did not dispute the need to give political instruction to members, he wrote, but

> Мне кажется, что в положении РОВС тут лучше недохватить, чем перехватить, т.к. в случае уклона в сторону "политической организации", РОВС ... начнет усиленно терять своих членов, рискующих отпасть от него по чисто политическим мотивам. РОВС не является и не должен быть политической организацей.[21]

Trubetskoi was not alone in opposing the idea. Many of Miller's senior advisers were also against it on principle. Generals Dragomirov, Lukomskii, Vitkovskii and Stogov all spoke out in opposition.[22] Senior officers' hostility to the idea of mixing politics and the army ran deep. But Generals Shatilov and Abramov, who headed the ROVS 1st and 3rd Departments, were in favour of creating the new organisation, and Miller felt that as heads of two of the three most important departments their views should have preference.[23] He therefore decided to give the idea his support. ROVS member were semi-educated, he wrote, and not used to abstract ideas - "Жаждут не предрешения, а более рельефных лозунгов, которые им понятнее самим и которые им легче отстаивать - проще, конкретнее. И эти лозунги в области социальной и экономической, т.е. специфически анти-коммунистические, нужно им дать".[24]

To create the new organisation, one representative was nominated from each department. These met in Paris in March 1934 to discuss the formation of the proposed new

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[21] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Trubetskoi to Tsurikov, 18 November 1933).

[22] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, IV Otdel (1)' (Letter, Stogov to Barbovich, 23 January 1934).

[23] BAR, ROVS, Box 66, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, V Otdel' (Letter, Miller to Arkhangel'skii, 1 May 1934).

[24] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to Tsurikov, no. 788, 14 December 1933).

Information Bureau ('Osvedomitel'noe Biuro' - OBRO). They agreed that OBRO's main subjects of study would be the situation in the USSR and the international world, and its tasks would be to establish among ROVS members unity of outlook towards other émigré groups, to unify the work of the various groups within ROVS's sphere of influence, and to instruct the most active members in questions of agitation.[25] A 'ROVS Credo' was produced by A. A. Brauner and given to the conference for discussion. Miller sent the credo onto his senior advisers and department heads, and stated that once their opinions were heard it would be deemed to be the obligatory ideology for ROVS and not open for further discussion.[26]

The 'ROVS Credo' is of interest as the only attempt made by ROVS members to produce a systematic political ideology. Despite Miller's statement that it would be made an obligatory ideology for ROVS, nothing much seems to have come of it and it did not receive wide circulation. But the ideas in the credo appear in different forms in various military publications, such as the 'Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev', and are a fair reflection of the opinions found in the correspondence and speeches of many senior ROVS officers.

The future power in Russia, the credo stated, would be established not for vengeance but to rebuild Russian power and economic life. It would be above classes and parties, a 'state national power' -"Форма власти будет установлена самим народом. В переходном периоде власть должа быть ДИКТАТОРИАЛЬНОЙ, опирающейся на здоровые элементы страны". This dictatorship would have to prepare for a transfer of power on the basis of a constitution chosen by the people. Village, town and oblast soviets would be

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[25] BAR, ROVS, Box 134, Folder 'Miscellaneous' (Resolutions of conference from 25 to 30 March 1934, presided by N. A. Tsurikov, with participation of Prince S. E. Trubetskoi, Capt. Brauner, Rotmeister Komorovskii, and V. M. Levitskii).

[26] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to Tsurikov, no. 131, 13 March 1934).

temporarily retained. Courts would be independent "в согласии с народным правосознанем". There would be freedom of conscience, word and assembly. Nationalised industries would be retained by the state, but there would be gradual measures to privatise these. The government would defend labour, and would pass legislation guaranteeing freedom for labour, fair wages, and accommodation. Land restoration was rejected. Petty landowning was seen as the ideal. The Army would accept anybody willing to defend national Russia, no matter whom they had previously served.[27] The problem with this credo as a political ideology was its lack of specifics. No explanation was given as to what these ideas would mean in practice. After 14 years of exile, White officers had still not given much thought to the practical meaning of their beliefs.

Meanwhile, OBRO got off to a bad start. At their conference in March 1934, its members had agreed on a centralised structure which would allow them to communicate directly with one another, and accept instructions from their own centre, independently of the ROVS departments. However, ROVS's department heads objected to this, as they suspected that this was a deliberate ploy to take authority away from them and to concentrate it in the hands of a self-appointed group of junior officers and civilian advisers.[28] Miller therefore insisted that OBRO not work as an independent organisation but through department heads.[29] This effectively meant that OBRO did not really exist, and that all that remained was a loose group of agitators. The organisation never got off the ground, and the effort to create a

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[27] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions (1930s)' (Kredo ROVSa).

[28] BAR, ROVS, Box 66, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, V Otdel' (Letters, Gartman to Kussonskii, no. 283, 21 September 1934; & Kussonskii to Gartman, 25 September 1934).

[29] BAR, ROVS, Box 66, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, V Otdel' (Letter, Miller to Arkhangel'skii, 1 May 1934). GARF, 5853/1/54/23005-23020 (Letters, Shatilov to von Lampe, 2 Jan & 10 Apr 1934, & Shatilov to Abramov, 11 Apr 1934).

centralised body to produce a more systematic ideology was thus stillborn.

Undaunted by this failure, Miller instructed Tsurikov that he wanted articles to be produced explaining ROVS's slogans.[30] As a result of this, a number of articles and pamphlets were written and published by Tsurikov and Levitskii, but Miller was not happy with the results. He felt that the slogans and ideas being promoted by them were too vague. It was not enough to limit matters to ten or twelve phrases, Miller wrote. Every thought must be explained to show what it meant in practical life. ROVS had to avoid merely repeating negative comments, such as 'We do not want the Bolsheviks', which justified the common complaint that ROVS did not know what it wanted. Commenting on Tsurikov's leaflet 'What we are fighting for' he stated that the ideas contained in it must be expanded. It was not enough to say 'all land to the peasants'. One must show what this meant.[31] This was as close as any ROVS leader ever came to demanding a positive political programme. But opposition to the idea of a positive ideology was strong. Tsurikov himself refused to give Miller the detailed explanations of his slogans that were being demanded. He claimed that he was not qualified to do so, but the truth may have been that he was too much an adherent of non-predetermination to go down a route that risked ending in the creation of a political programme. When a group of Gallipoliitsy approached Miller in 1935 and demanded that ROVS undertake more political work (see p. 277) they met great resistance. In response to their demands, General Dragomirov stressed that ROVS was a military organisation - "такое военное сообщество может существовать только тогда, когда оно стоит вне политики

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[30] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to Tsurikov, no. 181, 23 April 1934).

[31] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E.K' (Letter, Miller to Tsurikov, no. 685, 21 December 1934).

и вне борьбы политических партий". The basis of such a society must be "единство действия, дружная сплоченность, самопожертвование всех, во имя общего дела, основанная на безусловном и безговорочном подчинении членов РОВСа всем распоряжениям и указаниями его главы".[32] Dragomirov's views were shared by many of the rank and file of ROVS. Captain Dobrokhotov, a member of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, noted in a letter to another officer in 1929 that:

> Нежелание членов полка ... порывать связь с своей частью и выходить из ее рядов основывается на твердой уверенности, что ни какая-либо политическая доктрина, или программа той или иной политической партии не принесут никакой пользы для дела освобождения и возрождения России, а лишь организация людей твердых, решительных, ставящих преданность Родине прежде всего и выше всего.[33]

This attitude was shared even by some of those who had been calling for ROVS to intensify its political work. General Kharzhevskii, for instance, who was representative of the more militant Gallipoliitsy (see p. 268), urged caution. Given the differences of opinion within ROVS, he noted that it might be entirely impossible to reach agreement on a ROVS ideology. The process of working out such an ideology should therefore proceed slowly, he said.[34]

In the face of such resistance the process of creating a positive ideology ground to a halt. A final effort was made in 1935, when an Instructors' Centre was set up under General Turkul, with orders to work out tactics and slogans for the White movement.[35] But its work

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[32] BAR, ROVS, Box 164, Folder 'Proekt reorganizatsii tsentral'noi upravleniia ROVS'a' (Opinion of General-of-Cavalry Dragomirov).

[33] GARF, 5759/1/55/311 (Letter, Dobrokhotov to Cornet Kandiba, 31 Jul 1929).

[34] GARF, 5796/1/13/25 (Letter, Kharzhevskii to Podgornyi, 15 Nov 1933).

[35] BAR, ROVS, Box 133, Folder 'Instructions' (Instruktorskii Tsentr 1-otdela ROVSa v Parizhe).

was always hindered by the need to avoid producing what might be a party programme. The Instructors' Centre was no more successful than OBRO before it, and Miller's efforts to produce a clearer set of ideological principles and slogans failed almost entirely. ROVS never did develop a systematic ideology even after 20 years of exile.

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This failure calls into question whether there was ever any ideological basis to the White Movement, beyond a shared irreconcilable hatred of Bolshevism and a belief in the need for armed struggle. One belief which many felt was a core of the 'White Idea' was nationalism, but as the 1930s developed, Great Russian nationalism began to be adopted also by Stalin's regime, and so lost its force as an inspiration for the anti-Soviet struggle. Furthermore, divisions emerged among émigrés as to what the essence of the nation was. To some such as General Denikin, Russia was always a territorial concept. Territory for him had an almost mystical significance, and loss of territory was seen as a violation of Russia's spirit.[36] But to many other officers, a nation was not a territorial but a spiritual idea, bound up in culture, history and self-awareness. Less important than territory was preserving Russian culture.[37] These theoretical differences had practical consequences, and helped divide Russian émigrés into opposing camps as the prospects of a German or Japanese conflict with the Soviet Union increased during the 1930s. Émigrés like Denikin who defined Russia in territorial terms became 'defencists' ('оборонцы'), believing that Russian territory must be defended even if this meant helping the Soviet regime to resist an invader. By contrast, those

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[36] William G. Rosenberg, A. I. Denikin and the Anti-Bolshevik Movement in South Russia (Amherst, 1961), p. 42.

[37] For instance, Signal, no. 15, 15 Sep 1937, p. 2; & Russkii Golos, no. 53, 10 Apr 1932, p. 1.

who emphasised the cultural aspect of Russian nationhood became 'defeatists' ('пораженцы'), claiming that an invader of the Soviet Union should be supported, even if the invader had to be compensated with territorial gains, because an invasion could lead to the fall of the Soviet regime and so save Russian culture.[38] Denikin's views were, wrote Tsurikov, "территориальный фетишизм", and ignored the prime task of national strategy, "сохранение живой силы своей нации".[39] The Soviets, it was argued, were destroying Russian culture, and if they stayed in power much longer, Russia as such would no longer exist.[40] General Golovin commented that an invader of the Soviet Union should be supported: "Некоторые утверждают, что основная трагедия в том, что отпадает от России часть русской земли. Главная трагедия не в этом, а в том, что под большевицкой властью может умереть вся русская культура, душа России".[41] This debate revealed how nationalism, which previously had been one of the main emotions binding White officers together, by the mid-1930s was no longer a unifying force.

Two main ideological tendencies can be observed among ROVS members. The first was predominant among more senior officers who had served in the pre-war Imperial Russian Army, and may loosely be described as a traditional conservatism, resting on conservative beliefs in the family, religion and law and order, while being willing to accept gradual change in order to preserve what was valued most. Miller himself fell into this category. In October

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[38] The terms 'defencist' and 'defeatist' had originally been coined to describe the sides in a similar argument which took place among Russian socialists during World War One.

[39] N. A. Tsurikov, Sovetskoe Pravitel'stvo, Inostrantsy, Voina i Pozitsiia Emigratsii (Sofia, 1936), pp. 10 & 13.

[40] GARF, 5759/1/55/23-24 (Letter, Dobrokhotov to Orekhov, 7 Mar 1934); & Russkii Golos, no. 149, 11 Feb 1934, p. 2.

[41] Russkii Golos, no. 54, 17 Apr 1932, p. 3.

1934 he produced a leaflet entitled 'Почему мы непримиримы'. In this he stated:

> Я не могу примириться с существующим положением в России потому, что в доме моих родителей с детских лет я был воспитан, как верующий христианин, в правилах уважения к человеческой личности ... Православная Вера, родина, семья - вот те три устоя, на которых русский народ строил свою жизнь, свое государство. И им советская власть, олицетворенная коммунистами, объявила беспощадную войну.[42]

Such thinking looked back on the Imperial era as a positive one, but at the same time men like Miller recognised that the past could not be restored. While one could call them conservative it would be wrong to call them reactionary. Actual reactionaries, who believed in a restoration of the old order, mainly stood outside ROVS, and were concentrated in Yugoslavia, where in the 1930s the legitimist movement made determined efforts to try to force ROVS to abandon its policy of non-predetermination and declare its support for Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich. A secret memo circulated among the ROVS hierarchy in 1931 claimed that in June of that year legitimist leaders had met in Paris and planned a strategy of attack against ROVS, at the centre of which was a plan to form legitimist cells inside ROVS.[43] As part of this campaign, the newspaper 'Tsarskii Vestnik' ran numerous articles attacking ROVS and its leaders, and efforts were made to win influence within the Belgrade-based Union of Great War Veterans (SUVV). The leader of the SUVV, General Romanko-Romanovskii, obliged, and allowed legitimist officers and members of the Mladorossy party to join the union, in direct contravention to Order no. 82.[44] This angered Miller, who was determined to resist pulling ROVS into the monarchist camp, and he ordered General

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[42] BAR, ROVS, Box 15, Folder 'Correspondence, Shatilov to Miller' (Leaflet, Gen. Miller, 30 October 1934, 'Pochemu my neprimirimy').

[43] GARF, 5853/1/47/10-14 (Untitled document, marked secret, 1931).

[44] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1933, IV Otdel' (Letters, Barbovich to Miller, 21 Jan 1933, & Miller to Barbovich, no. 481, 1 Jun 1933).

Barbovich, head of the ROVS 4th Department, to force legitimists out of the SUVV. Despite this, the activities of the legitimists had some success, and there was something of a monarchist revival among officers in the mid and late 1930s. The head of ROVS 5th Department, General Gartman, for instance, noted in 1935 that the emigration's problems stemmed from the lack of a legitimate leader, and he therefore urged Miller to recognise Kirill Vladimirovich as Emperor: "Обстановка изменилась и следует взять новый курс - законный - или мириться с неизбежным распылением".[45]

Gartman's advice was rejected by Miller, but it was symptomatic of the way in which many were challenging non-predetermination and demanding new methods. One of the main problems which the legitimist cause faced was the personal unpopularity of Kirill Vladimirovich. This problem came to an end in 1938 when Kirill Vladimirovich died. Great hopes were then placed on his son, Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich, who, it was hoped, might play a role similar to that previously played by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. On 16 December 1938 he was received at the Gallipoli mess in Paris by an official delegation from military organisations in France,[46] and Miller's successor as head of ROVS, General Arkhangel'skii, declared that ROVS would support a union around Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich. Arkhangel'skii emphasised that recognition of him as the rightful ruler of Russia, and subordinating ROVS to him, were out of the question,[47] but even this mild step towards the monarchist cause proved to be too much for some ROVS members. The Society of

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[45] BAR, ROVS, Box 164, Folder 'Proekt reorganizatsii' (Letter, Gartman to Miller, no. 213, 4 Jun 1935).

[46] BAR, ROVS, Box 81, Folder 'Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich' ('Predstavleniie voinskikh organisatsii E.I.V. Velikomu Kniazu Vladimiru Kirillovichu').

[47] GARF, 5853/1/66/137142 (Letter, Gen. Arkhangel'skii, 6 Jan 1939; & Circular, Gen. Arkhangel'skii, no. 11, 10 Jan 1939).

Russian Great War Veterans in San Francisco left ROVS in protest, saying that the close relations established with Vladimir Kirillovich breached the principle of non-predetermination.[48] Monarchism was thus no more able to unite ROVS members in the late 1930s than in the early 1920s. Despite the calls for its renunciation, non-predetermination retained a powerful hold over émigré officers.

The second tendency among ROVS members shared much in common with the conservative tendency discussed above, but was more forward looking, marking a clearer break with the past. It had many similarities to the various movements of the inter-war European extreme right, though it could not rightly be described as fascist. This tendency was most marked among the younger members of ROVS, and its basis was essentially corporatist. During the 1930s, some officers began to move somewhat to the left on social issues, realising that their future Russian government had to win popular support, and they also began to look to the models of Italian and German fascism for inspiration. Thus an article in the military newspaper, 'Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev', in 1934, entitled "Наше отношение к фашизму", stated that one of the attractive points of fascist theory was "Широкий арбитраж государства между работодателем и рабочим".[49] Similarly, in an 'Information Bulletin of the Alekseevskii Regiment', issued in November 1934, the regiment's commander, General Zinkevich, stated his interest in the recent social and economic experiments carried out by Mussolini, Roosevelt and Hitler.[50] An article in 'Vestnik

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[48] Vestnik Obshchestva Russkikh Veteranov Velikoi Voiny, no. 154/155, Mar/Apr 1935, pp. 1-2.

[49] Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 10, 15 April 1934, p. 6.

[50] Major-General Zinkevich, 'Informatsionnyi List Alekseevtsev', no. 190, 8 November 1934, Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 17, 15 November 1934, p.15.

Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev' stated that especially valuable aspects of fascism were its "чувство долга, спайка, и дисциплина", and also praised fascism's belief in: a strong national state, above classes and parties; the arbitration of the state between workers and employers; planning and state control over private industry; and "национальный эгоизм" in foreign policy.[51] Fascist corporatism appealed to White officers' dislike of class and party conflict, offering a means of providing national unity and class cooperation. As General Turkul wrote:

> Солидарность всех классов во имя нации - идея Муссолини. Честь и слава ему, преодолевшему распад нации. Фашизм и нацизм ... становятся мировым явлением. Они единственная реальная угроза коммунизму ... Идея фашизма находит созвучный отклик в российских душах.[52]

Both tendencies within ROVS shared a certain distaste for democracy. White Army officers tended to associate democracy with the chaos of the rule of the Provisional Government in 1917. They sensed that democracy led to government by self-interested people and groups, who governed in their own interest and not those of the population as a whole. Furthermore they believed that only a dictatorship could restore law and order in Russia, and their natural inclination was towards one-man rule, whether it be monarchical or presidential.[53] As military men, they were inherently inclined to believe in hierarchical systems, a belief strengthened by their adherence to the concept of honour - honour systems being traditionally associated with hierarchical societies. Their scepticism towards democracy was reinforced during the 1930s by the seeming collapse of the democratic order

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[51] Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 10, 15 Apr 1934, p. 6.

[52] Signal, no. 2, 6 Mar 1937, p. 1.

[53] A. A. von Lampe (ed), Glavnokomanduiushchii Russkoi Armii General Baron P. N. Vrangel' k desiatiletiiu ego konchiny, (Berlin, 1938), p 160. Kutepov: Sbornik statei, pp 197 & 311. I. A. Il'in, Osnovy, p 39. Rakovskii, Konets Belykh, p 249.

in Europe, which suggested that democracy was a thing of the past. Thus the 'ROVS Credo' emphasised that the transitional power in Russia must be dictatorial.

From 1932 onwards, the example of Nazi Germany, and its successful repression of the German communist party, seemed to offer an example of how communism could be defeated. As an article in 'Russkii Golos' put it, fascism had saved Italy and Germany from communism, but democratic Europe had done nothing - "Если бы не Хитлер и не Муссолини, то врядь ли Европа не была бы коммунистической".[54] As well as these practical considerations, the actual ideology of fascism was attractive to White officers, especially the ideology's spiritual side - namely fascism's "dynamism",[55] its nationalism, and its ability to instill a sense of self-sacrifice into its people. General Dragomirov noted that the era of rationalism was coming to an end, and that a new heroic epoch, a "New World", associated with fascism, was arriving.[56] He suggested that ROVS members study fascism's spiritual basis, and its cult of service of the state.[57]

To many, fascism was merely an extension of the White struggle. The world, it was believed, was being divided into two camps - those of nationalism (White) and internationalism (Red). "Мы не можем не признавать" wrote General Shatilov, "что эти новые течения являются продолжением и развитием нашей Белой борьбы".[58] The

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[54] Russkii Golos, no. 363, p. 2.

[55] Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 13, 15 Jul 1934, p. 7.

[56] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, IV Otdel (1)' (Outline of speech to be delivered by Gen. Dragomirov, 25 Nov 1934, Belgrade).

[57] BAR, ROVS, Box 164, Folder 'Proekt reorganizatsii' ('Mnenie Generala-ot-Kavalerii Dragomirova').

[58] HIA, Nicolaevskii Collection, Box 752, File 18 ('Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soiuz i ego zadachi', Gen. Shatilov, 3 Jan 1934).

enthusiasm for fascism spread even to men as conservative-minded as General Miller. In 1937 he issued an order instructing ROVS members to undertake study of fascism, "потому, что мы, чины Русского Обще-Воинского Союза", he wrote, "являемся как бы естественными, идейными фашистами".[59]

Support for fascism among the Whites was strongest in Germany and Bulgaria. Photographs of ROVS's Kutepov Company in Sofia show its members making fascist salutes.[60] But even in Bulgaria and Germany, ROVS leaders were very reluctant to be seen to be promoting fascism. Both von Lampe and Abramov refused to distribute Miller's order to ROVS members to study fascism. General Zinkevich praised the spiritual element of fascism, as well as its nationalism, belief in a strong state, and corporatism, but at the same time attacked it for its racism, 'vozhdism' and étatism. After Stalin, he wrote, the last thing the Russian people would want was another 'vozhd" (the Russian equivalent of 'Führer' or 'Duce'). The generally accepted line seems to have been that fascism had some good aspects, but that it should not be slavishly copied. V. M. Levitskii, while saying that there were lessons to learn from fascism, questioned its principle of 'vozhdism', and noted that "рабское подражение помочь не может. Нам нужна творческая, живая, РУССКАЯ мысль."[61]

One aspect of Nazi thought that attracted some Russian émigrés was its anti-semitism. We consider Hitler "своим попутчиком в деле освобождения нашей Родины от иудейских захватчиков", wrote one officer in 1938.[62] The anti-semitic pogroms committed by White forces in Southern Russia during the Russian Civil War have led Peter Kenez to

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[59] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 2 (Circular, Gen. Miller, no. 10, 2 Jan 1937).

[60] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 5 (Photograph album - 'Rota Generala Kutepova').

[61] V. M. Levitskii, Chto nam delat'?. (Paris, 1938), pp. 8/9.

[62] Signal, no. 43, 15 Nov 1938, p. 2.

claim that anti-semitism was an "obsession" among White officers, and that it formed the core of their ideology.[63] But Kenez's claim does not stand up to close scrutiny. Undoubtedly many White officers were anti-semitic, some even obsessively so. One officer wrote to another from Pernik in 1923, for instance, that anti-semitism there had reached such proportions that it could no longer be resisted.[64] Yet, despite this, anti-semitism hardly registers at all in either the public writings or the private correspondence of ROVS members. Though anti-semitic comments do sometimes appear, they are very rare. Only in the 1930s, after the Nazis' rise to power, did anti-semitism reappear noticeably among the writings and statements of ROVS members. 'Russkii Golos', for instance, ran a number of anti-semitic articles and praised Nazi anti-Jewish laws.[65]

ROVS's leaders were in general keen to avoid antagonising Jews. Wrangel stated clearly that he was not hostile to Jews, and did not support anti-Jewish measures. "There are Jews who brought Russia immeasurable harm ... There are Jews that Russia can be proud of", he stated.[66] General Kutepov won praise from some émigré Jewish leaders for his efforts at improving relations between ROVS and émigré Jews.[67] In his turn, Miller wrote to von Lampe that the Nazis' coming to power was a positive development, but:

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[63] Peter Kenez, 'The Ideology of the White Movement', Soviet Studies, vol. 32, no. 1, January 1980, p. 78; & Peter Kenez, 'Pogroms and White Ideology in the Russian Civil War', in John D. Klier & Shlomo Lambroza (eds), Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern History. (Cambridge, 1992), p. 311.

[64] HIA, Miller Collection, Box 16, Folder 22 (Letter, unknown to V. Kh. Davatz).

[65] For instance, Russkii Golos, no. 111, 21 May 33, pp. 1 & 2.

[66] HIA, WA, Box 152, sheets 179-230 (Replies by Gen. Wrangel to questions in the trial of Bernstein v. Ford).

[67] Untitled article by G. Sliuzberg, in Kutepov: Sbornik Statei, pp. 364-366. Also, BAR, Denikin Collection, Box 26 (Manuscript entitled 'Kutepov', by Gen. Denikin).

> На всем блестящем фоне картины есть только одно облачко которое может разгореться тучу с громом и молнией и бурей и поэтому было как будто и неосторожно и даже очень создавать его - это выявленный острый антисемитизм: желая от души успеха антикоммунистическому действию Хитлера, я поэтому очень сожалею, что он вызвал на бой эту громадную силу и создал себе могущественного врага в мировом масштабе, который сможет парализовать все его усилия в борьбе с коммунизмом ... Не из семитофильства, а по причинам целесообразности я сожалею об этом.[68]

Even many of those who were deeply anti-semitic realised that it would not be suitable to act on these sentiments. 'Chasovoi' therefore printed an article in 1934, criticising talk that pogroms might follow the fall of the Soviet regime:

> Неужели вы хотели омрачить свободу в первые же, зоревые дни ее становления?! Побойтесь Бога! Как можно на крови бедных, гонимых, бесприютных людей устанавливать свободу? Вы запятнаете ее светлое появление, опозорите борьбу с коммунистической несчистью и принесете огромный ущерб русскому делу. Русская свобода должна быть добыта чистыми средствами. ... Мы же, русские солдаты, почтим светлую память евреев Доры Каплан и Леонида Канегиссера и пусть найдутся русские люди, чтобы повторить их незабвенные подвиги.[69]

In fact, many of the more virulently anti-semitic émigrés regarded ROVS as soft on the Jewish question. Von Lampe, himself an anti-semite, lamented that he was being accused of 'judophilia' by other émigrés in Germany.[70] General Zinkevich, also anti-semitic, was attacked by the journalist Ivan Solonevich, who stated that "Костлявая и пронырливая рука Вечного Жида чувствуется за спиной ген. Зинкевича".[71] Although the influence of anti-semitism was strong, it does not appear to have been the major reason why many in ROVS

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[68] BAR, ROVS, Box 14, Folder 'Correspondence, von Lampe to Miller' (Letter, Miller to von Lampe, no. 269, 25 Mar 1933).

[69] Chasovoi, no. 116/117, 1 Jan 1934, pp. 34/35. Kaplan had attempted to assassinate Lenin, and Kanegisser had murdered a leading Chekist, Uritskii.

[70] BAR, ROVS, Box 62, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, II Otdel' (Letter, von Lampe to Kussonskii, no. 446, 24 Sep 1934).

[71] Cited in Boris Solonevich, Ne mogu molchat': 'Nasha Gazeta', emigratsiia, ROVS, i I. L. Solonevich. (Paris, 1939), p. 36.

found fascism attractive.

The rise of the Nazis to power caused an explosion in the number of Russian émigré fascist organisations, as Russians sought to jump onto the fascist bandwagon. This was especially true in Germany where a Russian Nazi movement, ROND, was formed. Despite Miller's enthusiasm for fascism, he was hostile towards ROND, and ROVS members were forbidden to join it under the provisions of Order No. 82. This was because Miller regarded ROND as a German puppet organisation.[72] "Наша берлинская эмиграция с ума сходит", he wrote to his son in April 1933, "и собирается записываться в партию Нази. Сплошная истерика и потеря всякого чувства не только меры, но и собственного достоинства".[73] ROVS leaders were determined to resist the pull of members into fascist organisations, and in this they had some success. Von Lampe noted that in Germany it was only ROVS's existence which prevented émigrés in that country from joining fascist organisations in large numbers.[74] As with Wrangel's resistance against the monarchist movement during the 1920s, ROVS served to restrain the political extremes in the Russian emigration and to pull it towards the political centre.

ROVS and its members were certainly not democrats and favoured a 'dictatorial' government, but their view of the state was not totalitarian. Indeed, I. A. Il'in specifically remarked that the state "не может и не должно регулировать все. Государство тоталитарное - безбожно".[75] Zinkevich remarked that after Stalin Russians would not want

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[72] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Barbovich to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Barbovich, no. 361, 5 Aug 1933).

[73] BAR, ROVS, Box 10, Folder 'Miller, Family Correspondence' (Letter, Gen. Miller to N. Miller, no. 313, 13 Apr 1933).

[74] GARF, 5853/1/62/274 (Letter, von Lampe to Abramov, no. 310, 28 Oct 1937).

[75] Il'in, Osnovy, p 143.

another government which would seek to interfere in every aspect of their lives.[76] Moreover, the Whites appear to have been concerned with creating a law-based state, so that even the dictator would be subject to the law. This stress on legality was in part a reaction to what many White officers recognised as their own lawlessness during the Civil War.[77] Wrangel spoke of the need for legality, and the NSNP's programme stated that all should be equal before the law,[78] a prerequisite mentioned also by Il'in. Il'in made it clear that dictatorial government did not have any inherent superiority to other forms per se, but that the form of government had to fit the level of development of the national legal consciousness. "Il'in is equally clear", Philip Grier has noted, "that such a 'dictatorship' would be justified in the long run only by its success in raising the moral, legal and religious consciousness of the population to such a level that a state based upon the rule of law would become possible".[79] This was an idea which found its way into the 'ROVS Credo'.

The combination of a preference for dictatorial government and a belief in the rule of law did not make it easy for the Whites to produce a systematic ideology, as the two ideas were not easily compatible. But there is a more important reason why ROVS failed to systematise its political philosophy, which is that political and practical ideas were not really what mattered most to its members. An admirer of the White movement wrote recently that:

> Это было идеалистическое и героическое движение, боровшееся за самое бытие, честь и возрождение России, за ее религиозные, культурные и исторические ценности и за торжество в России свободы, права и право-порядка. ... В ряду духовных ценностей, вдохновлявших белых,

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[76] Major-General Zinkevich, 'Informatsionnyi List Alekseevtsev', no. 194, Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 38, 24 August 1936, p. 7.

[77] See for instance, Pereklichka, no. 93, July 1959, p. 8.

[78] Andreyev, Vlasov, p. 184.

[79] Grier, The Complex Legacy of Ivan Il'in, p. 173.

совершенное особое место занимало понятие чести.[80]

This is a somewhat one-sided view, but it makes an important point, which is that the White struggle in the Civil War was not really about political ideas, but about cultural values, in particular those cherished by the Russian officer corps such as honour, duty and service. Bolshevism was repugnant not for its social or economic policies, but because it was the antithesis of these values.

Russian émigrés as a whole experienced something of a spiritual crisis, and felt a need for an enhanced spiritual life. As Marc Raeff has noted, there was "a revival of spirituality and religious concerns" among émigrés.[81] A prevailing idea was laid down in the religious journal 'Put", which noted that "The political task is for émigrés secondary and subject to the spiritual task".[82] This fitted in exactly with the thinking of those who regarded ROVS as a religious-military order, preserving and supporting the highest moral and cultural values. Many felt that the underlying causes of the problems both of Russia itself and the Russian emigration were spiritual. Miller for instance, in a statement of his New Year's wishes for 1932 wrote:

> Корень всего зла, взрастившего такой пышный и ядовитый цветок, как коммунизм, и дающего ягодки в виде экономического и политического кризиса, лежит в крайнем понижении мировой морали. Близорукий эгоизм, жажда личной наживы любым путем - вот единственный возбудитель и смысл современного человека ... Мое первое желание - чтобы люди не только осознали это зло, но и нашли в себе волю к борьбе с ним, к борьбе за правду и честность.[83]

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[80] N. P. Poltoratskii, '"Za Rossiiu i Svobodu". Ideino-politicheskaia platforma belogo dvizheniia', in Russkoe Proshloe, Book 1, 1991, p. 304.

[81] Raeff, Russia Abroad, p. 104.

[82] Quoted in Huntington, The Homesick Million, pp. 153-154.

[83] BAR, ROVS, Box 4, Folder 'Central Office (12)' ('Mysli - Pozhelaniia Generala Millera k nastupaiushchemu 1932 godu').

As he later wrote to General Krasnov - "Вы совершенно правы, характеризуя настоящее время не только тяжелым, но и "подлым". К сожалению, весь мир охвачен одной и той же болезнью - полной потери морали".[84]

This spiritual emphasis did not mean that White officers were ascetics who disliked material wealth, merely that they believed that political programmes, with their emphasis on economic, political and social change, were not a solution to mankind's problems, as they tackled only the material superstructure. The substructure of peoples' mentalities was considered more important. If mankind's morals were first improved, its material situation would improve also. Responding to the 'ROVS Credo', Barbovich stated that he wanted less emphasis in ROVS's slogans on the material side of life, and more on the spiritual, writing - "Этих обещаний - морального порядка - слишком мало в лозунгах, подчеркивающих только блага материальные. Надо больше ставить на то, что является нашей отличительной чертой и что неизменно по своей сущности".[85] To General Dragomirov these unchanging values were faith, irreconcilability, belief in Russia's eternal national principles, self-sacrifice and discipline, - "Офицер вкусивший политического яда не способен больше ни на дисциплину, ни на скромное ... исполнение своего служебного долга".[86]

To a certain extent the spiritual emphasis of White officers was religious in nature. As Wrangel noted, "спасение России от большевистского ига должно начаться с

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[84] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, IV Otdel (1)' (Letter, Miller to Krasnov, 25 November 1933).

[85] Cited in BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to Tsurikov, no. 133, 17 March 1934).

[86] Russkii Golos, no. 425, 28 May 1939, p. 3.

религиозного ее возрождения".[87] Miller said in a speech in 1934:

> Мир постепенно делится на два лагеря: в одном оказывается безбожные, отрицающие всякое духовное начало ... в другом - те, кто не хочет стать рабами Зла, кто готов бороться за право иметь семью, Родину, Веру.[88]

The White movement was a moral, religious one, wrote I. A. Il'in - "Белизна определялась с самого начала и будет определяться до самого конца - чистотой движущего мотива и религиозным напряжением патриотической воли. Где этого нет, там нет и белого".[89] An article in 'Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev' noted that "Служение Христу ... вот устремление всех истинно национальных усилий. Это идейное содержание русской государственности".[90] This was contrasted with communism in a later article - "Большевицкая программа, внутренний смысл их коммунизма - устроение жизни без Бога. Истинное существо советской власти - борьба с Богом за власть над миром".[91] A meeting of representatives of the Society of Gallipolians held in Bulgaria in June 1937 discussed the need for slogans and programmes, and noted that it was the idea of 'service to the motherland', not any social programme, or the ideas of corporatism or solidarism, which had led to the success of Hitler and Mussolini. The meeting resolved:

> Мы утверждаем, обязаны и должны утверждать, первенствующее значение духовного начала в жизни человека ... начала Божественного. Отсюда признание нами великого значения религии ... сыгравшей главенствующую

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[87] HIA, WA, 150/41/26 (Letter, Wrangel to N. D. Zhevakhov, no. k/3588, 8 Jan 1925).

[88] BAR, ROVS, Box 89, Folder 'Miscellaneous Manuscripts' (Speech to the Kornilov Regiment, 9 September 1934).

[89] Vestnik Gallipoliitsev, no. 11, November 1924, p. 10.

[90] Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 27, 15 September 1935, p. 2.

[91] Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 28, 15 October 1935, p. 5.

роль в деле нац. осознания и объединения русского народа.[92]

But religion was not the only part of this philosophy. It also stressed the superiority of the spiritual over the material in general terms. Many officers explicitly rejected rationalism, which, claimed Dragomirov, led inevitably to communism.[93] An article 'On Slogans' noted that efforts to forge a compromise between socialism and capitalism would fail, as they were both based on materialism:

> Лучше уж мы заложим в фундамент будущей России принципы вечные, как то Бог, Родина, Нация, Правда, а цементом будут нам тоже понятия вечные и святые, как: честь, достоинство, благородство ... В одном нет сомнения - Белую Идею нельзя втиснуть в рамки узкого материализма.[94]

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The efforts of many in ROVS to establish in more definite terms their political beliefs ultimately ended in failure. Even after 20 years in exile they were still unable to say in concrete terms what it would mean if they ever were to take power. This is of itself a remarkable fact. It shows how strongly the idea of non-predetermination was held, not merely in the sense of not predetermining the question of monarchy or republic, but in its wider form of not predetermining social and economic questions in general. It shows how wrong were those on both left and right who imagined that non-predetermination was a mask for some hidden political ideology. Yet many White officers were very ideologically driven. If they failed to produce a concrete programme, it was ultimately because political, social and economic issues were not what mattered to them. Their concerns were primarily moral and spiritual. Theirs was a movement which put its main emphasis not on social or political

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[92] Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 49, 21 July 1937, p. 25.

[93] Russkii Golos, no. 191, 2 Dec 1934, p. 3.

[94] Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 40, 15 October 1936, p. 3.

programmes but on the spirit of struggle and activism and on maintaining and fostering the spiritual values it held dear, in particular religion and the values of professional military men - honour, discipline, service, duty and sacrifice. Since these values emerged from the Whites' experiences in the Civil War, and remained remarkably consistent, this reveals something fundamental about the nature of the Civil War as well. From the point of view of the Whites, the battle between Red and White turns out to have been a clash of cultures and values, not of economic or social interests or of competing concepts of material progress.

CHAPTER 11 - CRISIS, SCANDAL AND DIVISION IN THE RUSSIAN EMIGRATION, 1930-1938

During the 1930s the divisions within Russian émigré society grew ever deeper and more bitter. As part of this process, ROVS was to experience a series of crises and scandals which left it damaged but intact. Personal animosities and ambitions played a role in many of the splits which weakened émigré society in this period, but these personal disputes might not have been so serious had those involved in them not been able to excite others to join in. They were able to do so because years of economic deprivation and failed hopes had created a general climate of disillusionment and a desire for change, and because the international environment during the 1930s changed for the worse as far as the emigration was concerned. The Great Depression, the rise of fascism, the division of Europe into competing blocs, and the resulting threat of war, all had a significant impact on the psychology of émigrés, and accentuated the divisions among them. The changing environment brought to the fore two ideological debates, which were to play a particularly divisive role. These were the debate over the philosophy of 'activism' ('активизм'), and the argument between the defencists and the defeatists (see pp. 241 & 242 for definitions of these terms). The supporters of activism and defeatism believed that their philosophies offered émigrés a way out of their seemingly hopeless situation, but in reality they only made the situation worse.

In part the divisions among émigrés were a result of the developing situation inside the Soviet Union. From 1929 onwards, the Soviet regime lurched from crisis to crisis, especially during the struggle against the peasantry in the years 1929-1933. The terrible situation inside the Soviet Union was well known to those émigrés who cared to pay attention, as matters such as the famine in the Ukraine were well reported in the émigré

press.[1] This created in some a sense that an opportunity had at last come to topple the communist regime. Fear that this opportunity would be lost promoted an impatient desire to take up immediate 'direct action' against the Bolsheviks (a desire which defined the philosophy of activism). Other émigrés, however, observed the increasing conservatism and nationalism of Stalin's regime, in which revolutionary values appeared to be jettisoned for more traditional ones, and interpreted this as a sign that the communist regime was evolving in a favourable direction. They therefore turned from being enemies of the regime into passive, and in some cases even active, supporters of it.

Outside the Soviet Union the most crucial development was the Nazi rise to power in Germany. From 1933 war was recognised as a probability rather than a possibility by many émigrés. The question arose of how émigrés should respond to a war between the USSR and a foreign power, especially a power which had designs on Russian territory. Furthermore, in response to the Nazi threat some European countries such as France and Czechoslovakia began to seek alliances with the Soviet Union, which now emerged from its previous diplomatic isolation. In the early 1930s the few countries which had held out against recognising the Soviet regime, such as the United States, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, finally caved in and gave recognition. This had a terrible effect on émigrés' morale as it undermined their hopes of finding allies against the Soviets. In addition, it became harder and harder for anti-Soviet organisations to continue their work unmolested. A Bulgarian-Soviet agreement signed in 1934, for instance, stated that neither side would support on its territories organisations engaged in active political struggle against the other country.[2] Similar clauses

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[1] See for instance an article entitled 'Golod v Rossii', in Russkii Golos, no. 82, 30 Oct 1932.

[2] Russkii Golos, no. 175, 12 Aug 1934, p. 2.

were inserted in treaties signed with other countries such as France, and were clearly designed by the Soviets to restrict the activities of groups such as ROVS. Meanwhile in Germany, ROVS found itself under continuous threat of being closed down by the Nazi authorities who suspected it of being a pro-French organisation. As the world split into two opposing blocs, émigrés were being obliged to bend in different ways in different countries in order to remain unmolested by the local authorities. This made it very difficult for them to retain their unity.

Another factor undermining the emigration was the simple passage of time. By the mid-1930s émigrés were ageing, and many of their more charismatic leaders, such as Wrangel and Kutepov, were dead. Years of exile had also undermined émigrés' morale. Continual disappointments sapped faith in the cause, while poverty and deprivation ate at men's nerves and undermined their patience and sense of proportion. It required only a small spark to set off major quarrels. The sapping of morale was further accentuated by the Great Depression which had a catastrophic effect on the lives of émigrés. Many lost their jobs, especially because some European nations, seeking to protect their own citizens from the effects of the depression, passed discriminatory laws restricting the labour rights of refugees. Particularly badly hit were Russians in Bulgaria.[3] A typical report of the situation was sent from Bulgaria in February 1930:

> С 3 февраля фабрики в Сливене, по переезде рабочих на 3 дневную работу в неделю уменьшивают поденную плату на 20 процентов в день ... что ставит нас - Русских - в очень тяжелые положения ... В случае не улучшения положения закроют фабрики. Мы обречены на голодную смерть, ибо нет тех необходимых запасов про "черный день".[4]

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[3] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller (2)' ('Informatsionnye Svedeniia 3-ogo Otdela ROVSa', 5 September 1931).

[4] BAR, ROVS, Box 4, Folder 'Central Office (7)' (Report, Voennyi Chinovnik Poltoratskii to Stogov, 1 February 1930).

In 1931 the situation worsened as the Bulgarian government brought in legislation restricting the rights of non-Bulgarian citizens to hold employment. In March 1932, for instance, the Bulgarian Ministry of Labour asked a factory in Plachkovski for a list of its workers. On discovering that 50 Russians were working there, it ordered 10 dismissed immediately and gave the remainder until June to leave.[5] Similarly in April 1932, government labour inspectors visiting a sugar factory in Gorno-Orekhovitsa demanded that 11 Russian workers be dismissed. The eleven applied for Bulgarian citizenship as the only means of keeping their jobs.[6] By 1935 only one in three Russians in Bulgaria was working full time.[7]

The situation was not much better in other countries. In Luxembourg, where the Gallipoliitsy shared a hostel, conditions were described as "terrible".[8] Between 1930 and 1937 the numbers of Russians employed at the Renault factory at Billancourt in France fell from 8,000 to 300 as a result of laws discriminating against immigrants.[9] As Colonel Matsylev noted in 1934:

> У нас здесь положение тоже ухудшается с каждым месяцем. Безработица с наступлением осени сразу значительно увеличалась. В ноябре месяце на заводах Рено и Ситроен произошли очень болшьие сокращения рабочих, в первую голову иностранцев и русских, так что многие из наших лишились

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[5] BAR, ROVS, Box 6, Folder '1 Armeiskii Korpus, 1930-1933' ('Informatsionnyi List Alekseevskogo Pekhotnogo Polka', 16 August 1932).

[6] BAR, ROVS, Box 6, Folder '1 Armeiskii Korpus, 1930-1933' ('Informatsionnyi List Alekseevskogo Pekhotnogo Polka', no. 4, 25 April 1932).

[7] Hutchins, Wrangel Refugees, p. 129.

[8] Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 12, 15 June 1934, p. 22.

[9] Hutchins, Wrangel Refugees, p. 140.

работы.[10]

In Czechoslovakia an unemployed member of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo commented that when applying for the jobs, "часто слышал ответ, что Вы иностранец, почему не идете в Россию?".[11]

Another problem ROVS faced was leadership. Miller was a man of many positive qualities, but he also had certain weaknesses which made him unable to cope with the emerging crisis. A Guards cavalry officer, he had served much of his career as a military attaché, in Brussels, the Hague and Rome, and his diplomatic experience made him well suited to many of the tasks required of a leader in exile. Miller believed in the cause and stayed at his post, despite his own failing health, because of a genuine sense of duty, which was recognised by those around him.[12] Miller's weakness was that he was terribly indecisive. Whereas Wrangel perpetually sought confrontation and brushed his opponents aside, Miller always sought compromise. As Wrangel noted, he was afraid of clear, definite decisions.[13] By attempting to bring people together he all too often succeeded only in dragging out their quarrels until finally they erupted into something dramatic. In the worsening situation ROVS faced in the 1930s it desperately needed decisive leadership, but this was to be noticeable only by its complete absence.

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[10] BAR, ROVS, Box 86, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Matsylev, 1934-1936' (Letter, Matsylev to Zinkevich, 9 November 1934).

[11] GARF, 5759/1/64 (Letter, D. Stetsenko to the directorate of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, 2 Oct 1937).

[12] HIA, WA, 146/32/51-52 (Letter, Wrangel to Shatilov, 1 Feb 1926), & 144/26/1166-1171 (Letter, Shatilov to Wrangel, 30 Dec 1923). BAR, ROVS, Box 65, Folder 'Correspondence, 1936, IV Otdel (2)' (Letter, Barbovich to Miller, 23 Nov 1936).

[13] HIA, WA, 144/26/1196-1199 (Letter, Wrangel to Shatilov, no. 1464/s, 18 Jan 1924). For similar comments by Shatilov, see GARF, 5853/1/54/23005-23009 & 23020 (Letters, Shatilov to von Lampe, 10 Apr 1934, & Shatilov to Abramov, 11 Apr 1934).

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Activism

By the early 1930s the external environment had turned the Russian emigration into tinder which only required a small spark to burst into flames. This spark was provided by the ideology of 'activism', which was to prove one of the most divisive influences on the military emigration in the second decade of its exile. Activism emphasised the carrying out of direct action inside the Soviet Union, be it terrorist activity, conspiratorial work on the lines of setting up revolutionary cells, or propaganda and subversion. To many this was the main purpose of the Russian emigration's existence. Activism valued action over philosophy, deed over word. I. A. Il'in noted in 1924 that White officers should not become involved in politics because, if they did so, they would cease to be 'White'. "Белый - человек воли и поступка", he wrote, not of word.[14] Action acquired a moral meaning all of its own. As General Turkul said, "Армия - это действие, это движение и борьба, а не замкнутая стоянка".[15] Few of the proponents of activism ever thought much about what they were acting for. Action itself was the purpose.

ROVS did endeavour to carry out 'active work' against the Soviets in the 1930s, but such work was highly expensive, and without foreign backers ROVS's sources of finance were limited, being restricted to the FSR and the reserves of the High Command. Contributions to the FSR fell dramatically in the early 1930s, partly as a result of the Great Depression's impact on émigrés' salaries, and partly as a result of increasing scepticism about

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[14] Vestnik Gallipoliitsev: Trekhletie Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev (1921-1924), no. 11, November 1924, p. 11.

[15] Ivan Lukash, Goloe Pole (Kniga o Gallipoli), 1922 g. (Sofia, 1922), p. 47.

the effectiveness of the work undertaken with the fund's money.[16] In such circumstances achieving anything was very difficult. Making the task even more problematic were the persistent activities of Soviet agents. The paranoia of Russian émigrés was not without some justification. The Soviet secret services continued to put a great effort into infiltrating émigré organisations, and of all these ROVS was the prime target. Two Soviet agents in particular caused immense damage to ROVS. One of these was Sergei Tretiakov, a former industrialist and minister in Kolchak's government. Once wealthy, by 1930 Tretiakov had fallen on hard times, and he agreed to spy for the Soviets in return for money. Unfortunately for ROVS, Tretiakov was their landlord, owning the building in Paris where the ROVS Central Directorate had its offices. In January 1934, Tretiakov, who lived in the apartment above the ROVS office, installed a microphone there, and from then on eavesdropped regularly on the conversations below.[17] The second agent was the commanding officer of the Kornilov Shock Regiment, Major General Nikolai Skoblin. Having risen rapidly through the ranks in the Civil War, Skoblin was only 26 at the time of the evacuation of the Crimea. He was, however, completely under the thumb of his wife, the popular singer Nadezhda Plevitskaia, to the extent that he was mockingly known as 'General Plevitskii'. Plevitskaia had expensive tastes and missed the fame and fortune she had enjoyed in Russia. After being approached by a Soviet agent in September 1930, Plevitskaia prevailed on her husband to agree to work for the Soviets in return for money.[18] He was given the task of sabotaging the secret work of ROVS, and was to prove even more disruptive than Tretiakov.

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[16] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Correspondence, Miller to Shatilov' (Letter, Miller to Shatilov, 11 November 1932).

[17] Leonid Mlechin, 'A Minister in Emigration', in New Times, no. 19, 1990, pp. 40-43.

[18] Leonid Mikhailov, 'General daet soglasie', in Nedelia, no. 48, p. 11. This account is based on documents released from the KGB archives.

After Kutepov's death ROVS's secret activities were put under the command of General A. M. Dragomirov, though he delegated most of the work to the head of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, Major General V. G. Kharzhevskii. As a result of the lack of success experienced by Kutepov's terrorist campaign, it was decided that the main emphasis of such work should be intelligence gathering and organisational work (that is, creating conspiratorial cells inside the USSR).[19] This created some dissatisfaction, because the proponents of 'activism' wanted not only intelligence gathering, but also headline-grabbing terrorist actions. As no such actions were being planned, their anger and impatience with ROVS's leaders increased.

ROVS's intelligence gathering efforts were in any case a complete failure. Kharzhevskii endeavoured to send men into Russia through Rumania, using a Colonel Zheltkovskii as his agent. Two members of the NSNP were sent into Russia in this way in November 1933. Messages were received from them for a while, but then ceased. In summer 1934 another group was sent from Rumania, but was captured by the Soviets who had been warned in advance of the plan by Tretiakov.[20] The failure of the Rumanian line of operations led to a search for an alternative, and efforts were made to send agents into the USSR via Finland.[21] However, Miller had chosen Skoblin as his go-between with the Finns, and when

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[19] BAR, ROVS, Box 134, Folder 'Memoranda, 1930-1933' (Memo, 'Sovershenno Sekretno', no date given), & HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection (Zapiska no. 103, Gen. Miller, 28 Nov 1936).

[20] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1937, III Otdel' (Circular, Ispolnitel'noe Biuro Soveta NTSNP, no 205, 9 March 1936); Box 65, Folder 'Correspondence, 1936, IV Otdel' (Letter, Barbovich to Miller, 12 March 1936); & Leonid Mlechin, Set' Moskva - OGPU - Parizh (Moscow, 1991), pp. 162-163.

[21] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Dobrovol'skii to Miller' (Letters, Dobrovol'skii to Miller, 25 May 1933, & Miller to Dobrovol'skii, no. 492, 5 July 1933, & no. 613, 27 August 1933).

in June 1934 three agents crossed the Finnish border, the Soviets were waiting for them, as Skoblin had betrayed the operation. They managed to escape back over the border, but their mission was aborted.[22] In summer 1936 the Finns, suspecting that ROVS was infiltrated by the Soviets, informed ROVS that they would not cooperate with it any longer, nor allow it to carry out underground activities from Finnish soil.[23] With this ROVS's last serious efforts to penetrate the USSR came to an end.

The complete failure of ROVS's 'direct action' against the Soviets caused dissatisfaction with ROVS's leadership to mount among many of its members. In May 1932, V. V. Orekhov sent a report to Miller in which he commented that the lack of successful 'active work' was the prime cause of falling morale among ROVS members.[24] Orekhov noted the "страшное разногласие между возглавителеями строевого офицерства и органом, ведающим самой главной и основой задачи РОВС - борьбой". He was obliged to tell the truth, he continued, and "правда эта УЖАСНА". As editor of 'Chasovoi' he said that he received many letters from ROVS members complaining that active struggle had ceased. Members simply did not believe assertions that it was continuing, as there was no proof that this was the case. Collections for the FSR were laughed at, and it was felt that the funds went towards putting food into the mouths of the staff. As a result members were leaving ROVS - "Мы медленно но верно идем к вымиранию".[25]

How deep such feelings went, it is hard to tell. It would appear that in fact 'activism',

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[22] Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia Pautina, pp. 231-232.

[23] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Miller, E. K. to Trubetskoi, S. E.' (Letter, Miller to Trubetskoi, 3 August 1936).

[24] HIA, Chasovoi Archive, Box 1 (Letter, Orekhov to Miller, 15 May 1932).

[25] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions, 1924-1929' (Letter, Orekhov to Stogov, 12 Sep 1933).

and dissatisfaction with the lack of it, was almost exclusively a characteristic of the younger generation of ROVS members, especially the Gallipoliitsy. There was little evidence of it among other groups in ROVS, such as Cossacks and Great War veterans. Rotmeister Komorovskii, secretary of the ROVS 4th Department, felt that to some degree activism was a pretext used by troublemakers.[26] In Bulgaria in 1937, the Chief of Staff of the Don Corps, Colonel Iasevich, attacked the activists and 'Ultra-Gallipoliitsy', but noted happily that they were a small minority.[27] They were, however, a noisy and prominent minority. There were enough of them to cause serious trouble. At a meeting with General Miller the ROVS department heads reported that members were losing faith in the route taken by ROVS, that more and more voices were being heard to say that no active work was being undertaken, and that ROVS had no successes to show, whereas the Soviets did.[28] General Barbovich noted that the feelings of unhappiness with the absence of "real work" "охватили значительную часть офицерства".[29]

The ideology of activism contributed to a bitter dispute which erupted among ROVS members in Czechoslovakia in 1932. At the centre of this dispute were Kharzhevskii, who was the head of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, and General-of-Infantry N. A. Khodorovich, who commanded the ROVS 6th Department. These two men represented two entirely different strands of ROVS's membership. Born in 1857, Khodorovich was one of the

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[26] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, III Otdel' (Letter, Komorovskii to Zinkevich, no. 209/2, 21 June 1934).

[27] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1937, III Otdel' (Letter, Iasevich to Kussonskii, 8 September 1937).

[28] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions, (1930s)' (Report of meeting of commanders of 1st, 3rd & 4th Departments with the President of ROVS).

[29] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Barbovich to Miller' (Letter, Barbovich to Miller, no. 82/s, 5 June 1933).

most senior members of the old Imperial Army, having served in the First World War as commander of the Kiev Military District.[30] Kharzhevskii was 35 years younger than Khodorovich. He had joined the army as a reserve NCO in 1914, and within 6 years had risen to the rank of major general, aged only 28.[31] Khodorovich and Kharzhevskii thus represented different generations and different modes of thinking.

Until the late 1920s the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo was the only Russian military organisation in Czechoslovakia. Kharzhevskii obtained from the commander of the First Army Corps, General Vitkovskii, an order obliging all members of the Corps in Czechoslovakia to join the Zemliachestvo. But in the late 1920s a new military organisation was set up - the SUVV (Soiuz Uchastnikov Velikoi Voiny). When this joined ROVS, it became necessary for the first time to set up a ROVS department in Czechoslovakia, to stand over both the SUVV and the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo. In 1930 therefore, the ROVS 6th Department, under Khodorovich, was formed. Kharzhevskii now found that his place as the undisputed head of the military emigration in the country had been undermined. Furthermore, as the SUVV now existed, the order that all members of the First Army Corps join the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo could no longer be justified. Under instruction from Miller, on 9 December 1930 Vitkovskii revoked the order.[32] This greatly angered Kharzhevskii, who felt that the Zemliachestvo's position was threatened, and that the SUVV was a hostile organisation. Relations between the SUVV and the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo had never been good. The Gallipoliitsy complained that the SUVV had

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[30] N. Rutych, Biograficheskii spravochnik vysshikh chinov Dobrovol'cheskoi armii i Vooruzhennykh Sil Iuzhnoi Rossii (Moscow, 1997), p. 255.

[31] Ibid, pp. 253-254.

[32] BAR, ROVS, Box 6, Folder '1 Armeiskii Korpus, 1930-1933' (Letter, Vitkovskii to Kharzhevskii, no. 56, 9 December 1930).

accepted members who had been expelled from the Zemliachestvo, while the SUVV complained that the Gallipoliitsy refused to participate in joint projects such as the creation of a joint officers' mess. Khodorovich was accused of taking the side of the SUVV in these disputes, and of interfering in the internal affairs of both organisations.[33] In protest Kharzhevskii asked to be relieved of his post.

Miller refused Kharzhevskii's request, but did nothing to resolve the tensions in Czechoslavakia, which simmered on from 1930 to 1932. In the meantime a deliberate campaign to discredit Khodorovich had begun among the Gallipoliitsy. He was attacked for not understanding the Gallipoli spirit and for being opposed to activism. Khodorovich had opposed putting all the proceeds of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo's annual ball into the FSR, and insisted that half be put aside to help the unemployed. This proved, the Gallipoliitsy maintained, that he was a mortal enemy of activism, whereas they felt that "в поддержании духа активности весь смысл Белой идеи и галлиполийской психологии".[34]

The spark required to produce a major crisis was provided in October 1931, when the French newspaper 'Humanité' revealed that Kharzhevskii was involved in underground operations against the Soviet Union. In Miller's eyes the revelation of Kharzhevskii's activities meant that he could no longer continue as head of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo. It was vital that there be no official link between ROVS and underground anti-Soviet activity, for if there was such an official link, ROVS might find itself subject to police repressions in

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[33] GARF, 5797/1/5/1-8 ('Pokazanie General Bigaeva', 21 Jul 1932). BAR, ROVS, Box 6, Folder '1 Armeiskii Korpus, 1930-1933' (Letters, Kharzhevskii to Vitkovskii, no. 293, 6 May 1931, & Khodorovich to Stogov, 29 May 1931).

[34] BAR, ROVS, Box 12. Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Abramov, no. 527, 11 August 1932).

many countries.[35] Kharzhevskii, however, did not see it this way. He wished to keep his position as head of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo. On 24 March 1932 he finally sent in a letter of resignation, but made it clear that he was doing so under duress.[36] Matters now came to a head.

Kharzhevskii was very popular among the Zemliachestvo's members. His resignation was greeted by them with dismay.[37] On 28 March, a group of Gallipoliitsy met in Prague to discuss Kharzhevskii's resignation. The meeting sent a letter of protest to Vitkovskii, stating that Kharzhevskii's departure was a capitulation to the Bolshevik press, that he was irreplaceable, and that the leadership of the 6th Department was "лишенный какого-либо пафоса борьбы".[38] Despite this protest, on 1 May 1932 Miller issued an order relieving Kharzhevskii of the command of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, which was to be temporarily subordinated to Khodorovich until such time as a successor was appointed.[39] The response of the Gallipoliitsy was dramatic. On 22 May 1932 the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo in Brno voted to refuse to subordinate itself to Khodorovich, and stated that it would take orders only from the Main Directorate of the Society of Gallipolians. Other branches of the Zemliachestvo followed suit. This was mutiny. The Gallipoliitsy claimed

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[35] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Miller, E. K. to Vitkovskii, V. K.' (Letter, Miller to Vitkovskii, 5 April 1932).

[36] BAR, ROVS, Box 7, Folder 'Correspondence, Czech Group, 1932' (Letter, Kharzhevskii to Miller, 24 March 1932).

[37] GARF, 5759/1/24/2 (Letter, Lt. Vasnetsov to Gen. Vitkovskii, 22 Mar 1932).

[38] BAR, ROVS, Box 7 (Report, Lt. Col. Grigor'ev to Vitkovskii, 30 March 1930). GARF, 5759/1/24/3-4 ('Protokol soveshchaniia raionnykh nachal'nikov grupp i rukovoditelei Gallipoliiskogo Zemliachestva', 28 Mar 1932).

[39] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder '1 Armeiskii Korpus to 1 Otdel, 1931-1932' (Order, Gen. Vitkovskii, no. 5, 1 May 1932).

that the cause of their action was ideological differences with Khodorovich on the issue of activism, which made subordination to him impossible. As one officer commented: "Руководство ген. Ходоровича нашими организациями и наше ему подчинение символизируется с отказом от продолжения нашей Белой жертвенной Борьбы.".[40]

Miller sent Generals Arkhangel'skii and Zinkevich to Prague, respectively to report on the situation and to take temporary command there. Based on Arkhangel'skii's report, Miller determined that Kharzhevskii was to blame for the mutiny.[41] But Zinkevich, himself a Gallipoli veteran, took Kharzhevskii's side, and reported that the cause of the problem was Khodorovich's unpopularity. Miller therefore reluctantly agreed to relieve Khodorovich of his post, but also refused to restore Kharzhevskii. A sort of compromise was reached under which both participants in the dispute lost their jobs. The ROVS 6th Department was disbanded and turned into a sub-department of the 1st Department, under a naval officer in Brno, Captain Podgornyi. An instruction issuing a severe reprimand to the members of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo was published.[42] Order was restored.

The responses to this crisis reveal much about the mentality of Russian émigrés at this point. The universal opinion seemed to be, without any evidence, that Bolshevik provocateurs lay behind the whole incident. Miller himself said as much in a number of

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[40] GARF, 5759/1/24/17-18 ('Protokol soveshchaniia v Brno', 22 May 1932). BAR, ROVS, Box 7, Folder 'Czech Group, 1932', (Letters, Col. Almendinger to Vitkovskii, 8 June 1932; & Lt. Shchukin to Vitkovskii, 9 June 1932).

[41] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Abramov, no. 410, 17 June 1932).

[42] BAR, ROVS, Box 6, Folder '1 Armeiskii Korpus, 1930-1933' (Order to 1st Army Corps, Gen. Vitkovskii, no. 8, 23 August 1932).

letters.[43] A member of the SUVV directorate in Prague reported to General Arkhangel'skii that Captain Lupenko, a close colleague of Kharzhevskii's, had been spreading rumours discrediting Khodorovich and was acting as an unconscious weapon of agents of the GPU. Captain G. A. Orlov, who later became head of Gallipoli Zemliachestvo's Prague detachment, was named as the most likely such agent.[44] This, said Zinkevich, was pure fantasy,[45] but it is indicative of the paranoid mind-set of émigrés at this point in time. Such attitudes made it very difficult to come to sensible conclusions as to what had gone wrong and what should be done.

Within two years crisis again broke out in Czechoslovakia. Visiting Berlin in March 1934, the head of the Prague branch of the SUVV, Colonel Tilli, made a speech to a Russian fascist group. News of this reached the Czech left-wing press, which began to attack ROVS for being in league with Nazi Germany. A short while later, Tilli gave a speech in Prague about the Far East problem in which he openly took the side of the Japanese, despite instructions from Captain Podgornyi to remain neutral. Tilli's speech was reported in 'Poslednie Novosti' and by the Czech press, which resulted in threats to close down Russian military organisations in Czechoslovakia. As a result Tilli was reprimanded by Podgornyi, and also by Kharzhevskii, who although no longer holding any official position was still the

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[43] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Abramov, no. 419, 20 June 1932). For similar sentiments see, Box 12, Folder 'A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to K. D. Asepeva) & Box 16, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Zinkevich, no. 570, 1 August 1932).

[44] BAR, ROVS, Box 16, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Miller' (Report, Volunteer Khrennikov to Arkhangel'skii, 15 July 1932).

[45] BAR, ROVS, Box 16, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Miller' (Letter, Zinkevich to Miller, 6 September 1932).

unofficial leader of the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo.[46] Tilli responded by complaining that Kharzhevskii had reported him to the Czech police as a fascist, and in an official letter called Kharzhevskii a scoundrel and slanderer.[47] Tilli had the support of many SUVV members, who resented the manner in which the Gallipoliitsy regarded themselves as an 'elect', and expected everyone to obey their leader, Kharzhevskii.[48] Tilli was also egged on by several officers who had been expelled from the Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, and wanted revenge on Kharzhevskii. One of these, 2nd Lieutenant Skalon, pulled a gun on a leading Zemliachestvo member, G. A. Orlov. In June 1934 Tilli then accused another Zemliachestvo member, Captain Gepner, of being a Bolshevik agent. As a result of this, the head of the SUVV in Czechoslovakia, Colonel Bigaev, decided to get rid of Tilli, and asked him to resign. Tilli refused to do so, however, and instead issued an order stating that the SUVV in Prague would no longer accept the authority of Podgornyi and Bigaev.[49] The directorate of the SUVV's Prague detachment passed a resolution in support of him, and asked him to remain in his post.[50]

At this point the ubiquitous accusations of Bolshevik provocation cropped up. Documents were passed to Podgornyi showing that in Constantinople in 1922 Tilli had been in contact with a well-known Soviet agent, Anisimov. Confronted by this evidence, Tilli did

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[46] BAR, ROVS, Box 67, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, VI Otdel' (Report, Podgornyi to Erdeli, no. 294, 7 September 1934).

[47] BAR, ROVS, Box 67, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, VI Otdel' (Letter, Khodorovich to Miller, 18 June 1934).

[48] HIA, Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 648, File 2 (Anonymous letter to 'Poslednie Novosti', entitled 'Krisis ROVSa: pis'mo iz Praga').

[49] Ibid.

[50] BAR, ROVS, Box 67, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, VI Otdel' (Resolution of Directorate of SUVV in Prague, 24 August 1934).

not deny it. But he stated that he had been acting on the instructions of General Globachev, one of Wrangel's security chiefs.[51] Whatever the truth,[52] the mud stuck, and for Podgornyi it was proof that Tilli had been acting in a deliberate manner with the intent of discrediting ROVS. He recommended that the SUVV in Prague, which at the time had 160 members, be expelled from ROVS.[53] As a first step, Miller expelled Tilli and all those who had signed the resolution supporting him, on the grounds that Tilli had deliberately organised a mass breach of subordination.[54] But Tilli refused to submit. He organised a general meeting of the SUVV in Prague, attended by 51 members, which passed a resolution stating that it would leave ROVS.[55] Miller confirmed this by expelling the detachment from ROVS, and then setting up an alternative union, the 'Russkii Voinskii Soiuz' (Russian Military Union).[56] By the end of the year over half the SUVV's members had left to join the new organisation, and so rejoin ROVS, which thus emerged from the split relatively intact. ROVS's reputation was damaged, but it proved fairly resilient in surviving the crisis. The incident revealed the degree to which years of exile had so strained everyone's nerves that personal disputes soon blew out of control, and also revealed once again the debilitating effect of émigrés' fear of Soviet agents

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[51] BAR, ROVS, Box 67, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, VI Otdel' ('Pokazanie Generala-ot-Infanterii N. N. Shillinga', 3 September 1934).

[52] GPU reports mentioning Tilli as one of Anisimov's agents can be found in Russkaia Voennaia Emigratsiia, Book 2, pp. 215, 325, & 327.

[53] BAR, ROVS, Box 67, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, VI Otdel' (Report, Podgornyi to Erdeli, no. 294, 7 September 1934).

[54] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, IV Otdel (1)' (Order, No. 29, Gen. Miller, 15 September 1934).

[55] BAR, ROVS, Box 67, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, VI Otdel' ('Informatsiia Russkogo Soiuza Uchastnikov Velikoi Voiny v Prage', no. 2/7, 11 Oct 1934).

[56] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, IV Otdel (1)' (Orders, Gen. Miller, No. 30, 7 Nov 1934; & No. 33, 24 Nov 1934).

on their mutual relations.

Czechoslovakia was not the only country in which divisions developed. In 1936 General Kussonskii complained that even in Australia, where ROVS had only 40 members, spread out over thousands of miles, splits had somehow emerged! The only exception was Bulgaria.[57] Activism produced particularly severe divisions among ROVS members in France. In this a prime role was played by Skoblin. Aware that the spirit of activism was making ROVS members dissatisfied with their leaders, Skoblin became a forthright promoter of the need for 'direct action', and sought to instill its spirit into those around him. He knew that this would create desires that could not be fulfilled, and would therefore bring dissent into ROVS's ranks. Rather than do too much of this himself, and thereby rouse people's suspicions, he chose instead to act through an unwitting agent, the commander of the Drozdovskii Infantry Regiment, Major General Anton Turkul. Like Skoblin and Kharzhevskii, Turkul was very young for his rank, having been only 27 in November 1920. An impatient, immensely arrogant firebrand, Turkul brought disruption with him wherever he went, but he was very popular with the troops of his regiment. He was the very epitome of the spirit of activism and volunteerism, rarely thinking beyond the idea of action to anything else, and not overly particular in his morals. Wrangel and his staff had to restrain him several times in the early 1920s for his excessive zeal.[58]

Skoblin goaded Turkul on, aware that if anyone could disrupt ROVS's ranks, it was he. He told Turkul that Miller was speaking privately against him, and told Miller of

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[57] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1936, II Otdel' (Letter, Kussonskii to von Lampe, 21 Mar 1936).

[58] HIA, WA, 142/19/274 (Letter, Ronzhin to Vitkovskii, 27 May 1922), 152/48/18-19 (Order no. 163, Gen.Wrangel, 27 Apr 1921); & HIA Kussonskii Collection, Box 5, File 18 (Report, Maj. Gen. Ostrovskii, no. 30, 14 Aug 1922).

criticisms made about him by Turkul.[59] Skoblin's problem was that Turkul lived in Bulgaria, and to have the maximum impact he needed to be in Paris at ROVS's centre. He therefore decided to bring Turkul to Paris, and the Soviets arranged to get Turkul a job at a garage in Paris (Turkul did not know how his employment was provided, and was unaware that he was being used by the Soviets). In November 1931 Turkul left Bulgaria and moved to France. Abramov warned Miller that his arrival would mean trouble,[60] and indeed he soon lived up to expectations.

In May 1932, together with Generals Skoblin, Peshnia and Fok, Turkul wrote to Miller demanding a renewal of active work inside the USSR.[61] He also began to demand changes to bring younger faces to the front and to get rid of older officers opposed to the spirit of activism. With Skoblin he started to intrigue to get rid of the head of the Society of Gallipolians in France, General Rep'ev.[62] These episodes convinced Miller that Turkul was being manipulated by Bolshevik provocateurs,[63] but he felt unable to dismiss him because of his popularity and the scandal and possible split that any dismissal of him would cause.

Over the next two years Turkul continued to whip up dissatisfaction among the Gallipoliitsy in France, complaining of the lack of 'action'. Skoblin stood by and let him do the damage. All went as Skoblin planned. As the years passed and ROVS's secret work still

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[59] Signal, no. 16, 1 Oct 1937, p. 1.

[60] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Abramov, 13 August 1932).

[61] Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia Pautina, p. 227.

[62] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Abramov, 1 September 1932).

[63] BAR, ROVS, Box 15, Folder 'Correspondence, Shatilov to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Shatilov, no. 511, 7 August 1932).

had no success to show, dissatisfaction grew ever stronger. By 1934 a sense of crisis had began to pervade ROVS. "Мы переживаем критический момент, грозный период упадка морали и духа", wrote one officer in March 1934.[64] Miller was sick and took a sabbatical that spring, which led to intense speculation that he would retire, and produced some very public intriguing for his succession. Adding to these problems were mounting financial difficulties. By the beginning of 1935 much of the money which Kutepov had received from General Podtiagin in Japan (see p. 135) had been spent. As a result, at the beginning of 1935 various large cuts in the ROVS budget were announced. It was the announcement of these cuts that, among other things, sparked the so-called 'revolt of the marshals'.

On 23 February 1935, General Vitkovskii appeared at Miller's office and informed him that 14 unit commanders of the First Army Corps were waiting outside and wished to see him. Miller let them in, whereupon they expressed a series of complaints about ROVS's failures, and demanded that ROVS be reorganised in order to revitalise it. In particular they demanded that ROVS intensify its political and underground work.[65] This was the so-called 'revolt'. The demands were formulated in a general way without any specific proposals, so Miller sent them away to come up with something more concrete. It was agreed that a commission, chaired by General Rep'ev, would be formed to discuss the proposals the group produced.[66] Unfortunately for the ROVS leadership, which hoped to keep news of the revolt

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[64] GARF, 5759/1/55/23-24 (Letter, Dobrokhotov to Orekhov, 7 Mar 1934).

[65] For a description of the 'revolt' by one of its participants, see BAR, ROVS, Box 86, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Matsylev, 1934-1936' (Letter, Matsylev to Zinkevich, 27 Feb 1935).

[66] BAR, ROVS, Box 164, Folder 'Proekt reorganizatsii' (Circular, Kussonskii to heads of departments, no. 145, 15 March 1935).

quiet, one of those present leaked details of what had happened to 'Poslednie Novosti', which gleefully seized on this evidence of dissent in ROVS's ranks. News of the divisions at the top of ROVS now spread to the entire Russian emigration.

The representatives of the First Army Corps on Rep'ev's commission suggested creating a 'Special Directorate' which would have full responsibility for active struggle, political affairs, propaganda and information, and finance, and which would be elected either by the commission itself or by the membership of the units of the Russian Army.[67] As some who read the proposal noted, this was a thinly disguised grab for power by the members of the First Army Corps. The areas of responsibility assigned to the 'Special Directorate' were the most important of ROVS's activities, and it was proposed that they now be run by the directorate, not by the ROVS president, who would thereby be emasculated. As a result the proposals were rejected by almost every senior officer in ROVS to whom they were sent for comments.[68] Nearly every respondent criticised the idea of taking key areas of responsibility away from the ROVS president and giving them to a committee. The very idea of a committee reminded them of 1917. As Abramov wrote - "Всякий коллектив - вносит собой безответственность".[69]

There was particular anger that a small group of officers of the First Army Corps had taken it upon themselves to speak in the name of the entire membership of ROVS. The

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[67] BAR, ROVS, Box 164, Folder 'Proekt reorganizatsii' (Proekt reorganizatsii tsentral'nogo upravleniia ROVSa - final version).

[68] BAR, ROVS, Box 164, Folder 'Proekt reorganizatsii' (Letters, Abramov to Miller, 16 May 1935, & Dragomirov to Miller, 10 June 1935; Report, Gen Barbovich, 24 May 1935; Opinion of General-of-Cavalry Dragomirov; Opinion of General Rep'ev).

[69] BAR, ROVS, Box 164, Folder 'Proekt reorganizatsii' (Letter, Abramov to Miller, no. 62, 18 May 1935).

"praetorian methods" of the First Army Corps were unacceptable, wrote von Lampe.[70] Many commented that the basic assumption of those putting forward the plan, namely that the morale of ROVS members had collapsed, was false. It might be true in Paris, but not elsewhere. In Yugoslavia, said Barbovich, the authority of the ROVS president remained high, among ROVS members, other émigrés and with the Yugoslav government. Miller's appeal to Prince Regent Paul had saved the Cadet Corps (see p. 105), and shown the respect the Yugoslavs had towards him.[71] In Bulgaria, wrote Dragomirov, the atmosphere was quite unlike that in Paris - "здесь крепче, здесь веруют, что авторитет главы РОВС должен быть сохранен во что-бы то ни стало".[72] Even Colonel Matsylev, who had participated in the revolt, came to regret his involvement, and was obliged to admit that the mood in Paris was not representative. He wrote to Zinkevich:

> Вы совершенно правы, что Париж это гнездо откуда идут всякие сплетни, интриги и пр.. Как в провинции так и в других странах несомненно настроение более здоровое и Париж не может диктовать своей точки зрения.[73]

Backed by these comments, Miller was able to reject the proposals put forward by Rep'ev's commission. Reform of ROVS was indefinitely shelved.

Unhappy that the 'revolt of the marshals' had produced no results, Turkul now decided that the time had come to abandon non-predetermination. By adopting fascist-style slogans he hoped to gain financial and practical assistance from the rising powers of Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan. In July 1936, therefore, he set up a new military-political organisation, called the 'Russian National Union of War Veterans' ('Russkii Natsional'nyi Soiuz Uchastnikov

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[70] BAR, ROVS, Box 164 (Report, Gen. von Lampe, no. 187, 12 May 1935).

[71] BAR, ROVS, Box 164 (Report, Gen. Barbovich, 24 May 1935).

[72] BAR, ROVS, Box 164 (Letter, Dragomirov to Miller, 10 June 1935).

[73] BAR, ROVS, Box 86 (Letter, Matsylev to Zinkevich, 8 March 1935).

Voiny'). At the organisation's opening meeting Turkul made a speech sharply critical of the leadership of ROVS, and several days later an account of this speech was published in the newspaper 'Vozrozhdenie'.[74] Miller had not been forewarned of this meeting, or of the plan to create a new organisation, and he summoned Turkul to explain what he was doing. He told him that he could not remain commander of the Drozdovskii regiment and be in charge of a political organisation, as a result of which Turkul handed in his resignation from ROVS. Therefore on 28 July 1936, Miller issued an order dismissing Turkul from ROVS at his own request, and sent out an explanatory circular to ROVS commanders, explaining this decision. In his circular he noted that if a senior ROVS commander was to lead a political organisation with an alignment of the sort envisioned by Turkul, ROVS itself would face the risk of repression from the French authorities. It had to be made clear that any such political organisation was not officially linked to ROVS.[75]

Miller had told Turkul to hand over the command of the Drozdovskii regiment to one of his subordinates. But Turkul now declared that he would not do so, and that he still considered himself to be regimental commander. The response of the detachments was mixed. In France and Belgium resolutions were passed supporting Turkul. In Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria Turkul's instructions were ignored. In Yugoslavia the regiment was divided.[76] In fact, since moving to France Turkul had had little contact with the men of

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[74] BAR, ROVS, Box 6, Folder '1 Armeiskii Korpus, 1934-1936' (Minutes of meeting of senior commanders of the Paris branch of the 1st Department of ROVS, 16 August 1936).

[75] Ibid.

[76] BAR, ROVS, Box 65, Folder 'Correspondence, 1936, IV Otdel' (Letter, Barbovich to Kussonskii, 11 November 1936); Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1936, III Otdel' (Letter, Kussonskii to Abramov, 12 August 1936); Box 6, Folder '1 Armeiskii Korpus, 1934-1936' (Letter from unknown in Wiltz to Vitkovskii, 31 August 1936); Box 86, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Matsylev' (Letter, Zinkevich to Matsylev, 19 May 1938).

his regiment outside of France, and so his declaration had no practical significance. Except in France and Belgium a split was avoided. ROVS proved to be very robust in its ability to survive divisions in its ranks such as those caused by Turkul and by Tilli. Turkul's new organisation put out a newspaper 'Signal', and he managed to find financial support from a mysterious source, possibly the Germans or the Japanese. But his organisation had little success. Few joined and it was felt by many that the main loser in the whole incident was Turkul himself, as his reputation fell substantially.[77]

This incident highlighted the damaging role played by the philosophy of activism. Activism was meant to strengthen and revitalise the Russian emigration, to give it success in the one area that mattered most for many émigrés - the struggle against the Soviets. Success in this area would then help unite émigrés and enable them to overcome their petty squabbles. But it had the opposite effect to that intended. Instead of uniting the emigration, it created even greater dissent, and split it into even smaller pieces. The activists' dissatisfaction was perfectly understandable, given the failure of ROVS's underground operations, but in their impatient demands for 'action' they never stopped to consider what the practical possibilities were, whether their plans had any chance of succeeding, or what sort of preparation was required to make them work. In screaming for 'direct action' they ignored the very real problems ROVS faced in trying to carry out such action. The proponents of activism played straight into the hands of Soviet provocateurs, such as Skoblin, who egged them on, knowing the disruption they would cause. All in all, the 'activists' would have done well to head a warning issued by Wrangel in 1927:

Необходимо предостерегать от "болтай-активизма" другой части печати,

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[77] BAR, ROVS, Box 86, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Matsylev' (Letters, Matsylev to Zinkevich, 22 October 1936; & Zinkevich to Matsylev, 25 March 1937).

призывающей к "активной борьбе", "к действенности" без ясных и тому определенных возможностей. Такие призывы, напрасно возбуждая горячие головы, имеют последствием неизбежное разочарование, толкают доверчивых в объятия провокаторов.[78]

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Defencism and Defeatism

Equally disruptive as 'activism' was the argument between the defencists and the defeatists. In this debate ROVS took the line of 'defeatism', and came under attack from the proponents of 'defencism', the most prominent of whom were Miliukov and Generals Denikin and Makhrov. The two generals had considerable prestige among military émigrés, being respectively a former Commander-in-Chief and a Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief. They approached the question of defencism from slightly different angles. Denikin continued to oppose the Soviet regime, but believed in the sanctity of Russian territory and the need to defend it. He called on Russians first to overthrow the Soviets, and then to resist any invader. Makhrov, by contrast, was taken in by the increasing nationalism and conservatism of Stalin's regime, and had become an active supporter of it. Miliukov occupied a position somewhere between the two men, and he used his newspaper 'Poslednie Novosti' to print any scurrilous news or rumour about ROVS, with the aim of discrediting it and the policies it stood for, especially the policy of defeatism. It was no coincidence that the news of the 'revolt of the marshals' was published by 'Poslednie Novosti', which gladly leapt on all such signs of divisions within ROVS and sought to stir them up further.

The argument over defencism and defeatism first became serious in the late 1920s when Japanese involvement in China led to the possibility of a Japanese-Soviet clash over the

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[78] BAR, ROVS, Box 17, Folder 'Wrangel Headquarters (13)' (Circular, Gen. Wrangel, no. 1883, 9 December 1927).

Chinese Eastern Railway which ran through Kharbin, where there was a large Russian émigré population. By late 1931 there was considerable interest among Russian émigrés in the burgeoning conflict between Japan and China, and in the possibility of the Japanese creating a buffer zone in the Soviet Far East. This was an idea which stretched back to the Russian Civil War when Japanese troops had controlled much of Eastern Siberia. Speculation about it revived in the early 1930s. The idea was that the Japanese would seize some territory in the Soviet Far East and create a Russian state as a buffer between themselves and the Soviets. This idea won the support of the ROVS leadership. A buffer state, noted the head of ROVS's military chancellery, General Stogov, would be "буферного для японцев, а для нас просто русской территории, освобожденной от большевиков".[79] Support for the buffer zone concept seems to have been fairly widespread among the rank and file of ROVS, especially in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Colonel Iasevich of the Don Cossack Corps, noted that the crux of the issue was whether Soviet or Japanese power was better. Most Russians in Bulgaria, he concluded, thought that Japanese power was preferrable.[80]

The debate over a buffer-zone created a sharp reaction among defencists, such as Denikin and Makhrov. In April 1932 Denikin made a speech criticising those who were putting their hopes in the Japanese. Surrenders of territory to foreign powers, he said, could perhaps lead to the fall of Soviet power, "Но что сталось бы тогда с Россией?! Отрезаной от морей и житниц, окруженной враждебным образованиями, отброшенной вспять на пять столетии? ... И так, в случае вторжения иностранной державы в пределы России,

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[79] BAR, ROVS, Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1931, IV Otdel (3)' (Letters, Stogov to Pronin, no. 1000, 14 Dec 31; & no. 127, 19 Feb 32).

[80] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder, 'Correspondence, 1932, III Otdel' (Letter, Iasevich to Kussonskii, 4 Mar 32).

с целью захвата русской территории, участие наше на ее стороне недопустимо".[81] Denikin had never been popular among ROVS members, most of whom were aware of the terrible relations which had existed between Denikin and Wrangel. Now, however, some ROVS members who shared his views on defencism began to promote his name as a possible replacement for Miller as president of ROVS (although Denikin was not actually a ROVS member). One of those who did so was a General Mel'nitskii. In 1930 a petty squabble broke out in Lyons between Mel'nitskii and another ROVS member, General Khimich, in which the former accused the latter of appropriating money collected for the FSR. General Shatilov, who was head of the ROVS 1st Department, took Khimich's side in the dispute, as a result of which Mel'nitskii turned his anger against Shatilov.[82] Mel'nitskii wrote to Stogov accusing Shatilov of profiting from the transfer of troops to France from Bulgaria in 1924 and 1925. Shatilov had, he said, taken for himself the money troops had been obliged to pay from their salaries to repay Tekhnopomoshch.[83] As no real evidence was offered to prove that this was the case, no further action was taken.

In late 1932 Mel'nitskii established contact with Makhrov, who in April 1932 had written a couple of articles supporting the concept of 'defencism' for the newspapers 'Mladorusskaia Iskra' and 'Poslednie Novosti'. As both of these were regarded as hostile by ROVS, Makhrov had been expelled from the Society of General Staff Officers, of which he was a member, and therefore from ROVS.[84] Makhrov was also in contact with a disgruntled

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[81] A.I. Denikin, Russkii Vopros na Dal'nem Vostoke. (Paris, 1932).

[82] BAR, ROVS, Box 81, Folder 'French government's efforts to expel Shatilov and Abramov' (Letter, Stogov to Shatilov, no. 26, 8 January 1931).

[83] BAR, ROVS, Box 81, Folder 'French government's efforts' (Letter, Mel'nitskii to Stogov, no. 7, 16 February 1931).

[84] BAR, Denikin Collection, Box 26 (Open Letter, Makhrov to Dragomirov, May 1932).

member of the Society of First Campaign Participants (the 'Pervopokhodniki'), General Nevodovskii, who had for some time been trying to create a new military union loyal to Denikin.[85] Meanwhile, talk of a split between Miller and Denikin was given prominence in 'Poslednie Novosti'. In November 1932 Nevodovskii announced the formation of a new 'Union of Volunteers' ('Soiuz Dobrovol'tsev'), which was designed to replicate ROVS and win members from it. When pressed by Miller, Denikin denied that he supported Nevodovskii, but also refused to condemn him or the new union.[86] Encouraged by Denikin's failure to condemn him, in December 1932 Nevodovskii gave a talk to an intellectual circle, the 'Chas Dosuga' (Hour of Leisure), criticising "certain leaders" of ROVS, and maintaining that Wrangel had deliberately abandoned the Crimea. Miller ordered that Nevodovskii be put before a court of honour,[87] and banned ROVS members from joining the new Union of Volunteers.[88] Nevodovskii was unable to get his new union off the ground, and the project folded.

Meanwhile Makhrov and Mel'nitskii had decided to strike back at ROVS through attacks on Shatilov. A new military newspaper hostile to ROVS, 'Edinyi Front', had been set up by a Lieutenant A. N. Pavlov. In September 1932, Pavlov had written to Miller accusing Shatilov of negotiating with Trotsky in 1920 for the surrender of the Crimea, accusations he

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[85] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Abramov, no. 867, 23 November 1931).

[86] BAR, ROVS, Box 85, Folder 'Soiuz Dobrovol'tsev' (Letter, Denikin to Miller, 9 November 1932).

[87] BAR, ROVS, Box 85, Folder 'Soiuz Dobrovol'tsev' (Letter, 18/21 January 1933, Miller to Shatilov).

[88] BAR. ROVS, Box 85, Folder 'Soiuz Dobrovol'tsev' (Letter, Miller to Shatilov, no. 392, 29 April 1933).

repeated in 'Edinyi Front' in March 1933.[89] On 24 June 1933, 'Edinyi Front' then published articles by Makhrov and Mel'nitskii insulting both Shatilov and ROVS.[90]

In response Shatilov challenged Mel'nitskii to a duel.[91] Mel'nitskii accepted the challenge. As duels were illegal in France, it was agreed between the two sides' seconds that the duel should take place on 9 July 1933 in Monte Carlo, where duelling was legal. At the same time, Vitkovskii issued a similar challenge to Makhrov, who refused to accept it. Anxious to avoid the scandal of a duel, Miller ordered a court of honour to examine the affair. In a breach with tradition it offered Mel'nitskii a way out. If he apologised in public, he would not have to fight the duel. Mel'nitskii accepted, and on 11 July 1933 a letter from him appeared in 'Vozrozhdenie' apologising to Shatilov. The duel never took place, but the entire episode was publicly recorded in the émigré press, doing no good to ROVS's public image.

Within a couple of months of the aborted duel, ROVS members were again engaged in a bitter polemic in the press around the person of Shatilov. General Govorov, head of the French detachment of the Union of Pervopokhodniki, had written a letter to 'Poslednie Novosti' which Shatilov had deemed unacceptable. He asked Govorov to resign. Govorov refused. Relations between the Pervopokhodniki and the rest of ROVS had been tense even in the 1920s, as many of the former were supporters of Denikin.[92] Relations were now further undermined by a scurrilous leaflet produced by some Gallipoliitsy attacking Denikin, which

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[89] Edinyi Front, no. 8, 16 Mar 1933.

[90] Edinyi Front, no. 9, 24 Jun 1933, pp. 2 & 4.

[91] This incident is recreated from the file of the court of honour which examined the affair, in BAR, ROVS, Box 81. This file contains original documents such as written challenges to duels, letters exchanged by the seconds, and the proceedings of the court of honour.

[92] For an example of a dispute involving the Pervopokhodniki and Denikin in 1928, see HIA, WA, 147/34/711-713 (Letter, Shatilov to Wrangel, 7 Mar 1928).

Miller believed must have had Shatilov's silent approval.[93] On 1 October 1933, a general meeting of the Pervopokhodniki in Paris passed a resolution saying that the replacement of Govorov was not possible, and that if he was replaced they would leave ROVS.[94] A copy of the resolution was sent to Denikin, who was their honorary chairman. Govorov wrote a mutinous letter to 'Poslednie Novosti', and Miller immediately expelled him from ROVS. Some of the Pervopokhodniki followed him and left ROVS of their own accord. Miller had to call a general meeting of the rump to elect a new directorate.[95] Then, on 26 October 1933 'Poslednie Novosti' published a letter from Nevodovskii. This accused Shatilov of illegally wearing the order of St. George 3rd Degree and of never having been properly promoted to the rank of major general. 'Poslednie Novosti' then refused to print a reply by Miller explaining how Shatilov had won his award and rank.[96] A long polemic followed in 'Poslednie Novosti' and 'Vozrozhdenie', as a series of writers sent in letters stating their opinion on whether Shatilov did or did not legally have his rank and award. Among the letter-writers was Denikin, who came down firmly against Shatilov.

The debate between the defencists and defeatists was given new importance by the rise to power of the Nazis in 1933, which made a future Soviet-German conflict much more likely. Hitler's plans to invade Russia and enslave or annihilate its population had been laid out in 'Mein Kampf' and were well known to Russian émigrés. Determining whether Hitler

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[93] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Abramov to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Abramov, 9 August 1933).

[94] HIA, Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 752, File 18 ('Vsem uchastnikam 1-go Kubanskogo pokhoda', 24 Feb 1934).

[95] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to Tsurikov, no. 715, 23 October 1933).

[96] BAR, ROVS, Box 164, Folder 'Polemic between Generals Nevodovskii & Shatilov' (Letter, Miller to Iu. F. Semenov, editor of 'Vozrozhdenie', 14 November 1933).

seriously intended to implement these plans was a crucial matter for émigrés, since, if he was, collaboration with him was clearly out of the question. ROVS members were not unaware of Hitler's plans for Russia, and they did cause Miller and other ROVS leaders to treat Germany with caution. Thus in August 1933 Miller told General Dobrovol'skii that Hitler was primarily interested in displacing the population of Western Russia to create German living space, and that he was "прежде всего немец и о спасении России от большевиков совсем не думает - это ему безразлично. Поэтому вопрос о переговорах с ним ... совсем не прост и не определенен по существу".[97] However, although Hitler's plans instilled some degree of caution in ROVS leaders, they did not actually believe that Hitler would implement them. General Lukomskii, for instance, commented of Hitler's words in Mein Kampf that, "полагаю, что это только страшные слова, а действительность будет для России приемлема и не страшна".[98] This was not just wishful thinking. It seemed incredible that any invader of Russia would be foolish enough not to exploit anti-Soviet sentiments among the Russian population and would instead deliberately antagonise the Russian people. It would surely be in the interests of any invader to support the Russian people in fighting against the Soviet regime. As von Lampe wrote to Miller, "Немцы слишком практичны, чтобы не использовать это обстоятельство".[99]

Others took the view that the threatening tone of Nazi pronouncements about Russia's fate did not negate the need for collaborating with them, but on the contrary made it even more important that Russians do so, as this was the only way Nazi plans could be ameliorated

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[97] BAR, ROVS, Box 12, Folder 'Correspondence, Dobrovol'skii to Miller' (Letter, Miller to Dobrovol'skii, no. 613, 27 Aug 1933).

[98] HIA, Lukomskii Collection, Box 1 (Letter, Lukomskii to Arkhangel'skii, 2 Feb 1939).

[99] BAR, ROVS, Box 14, Folder 'Correspondence, von Lampe to Miller' (Letter, von Lampe to Miller, no. 61, 15 Jan 1933).

in Russia's interests. The worse the invaders, the more important independent activity by Russians became, wrote N. A. Tsurikov.[100] This idea was opposed by Miliukov, Denikin and Makhrov. In a speech on 22 December 1933, Miliukov praised Soviet foreign policy for protecting Russia's interests by seeking to create an anti-fascist bloc. He then drew a further lesson from this - if the Soviet Union was defending Russian interests, weakening the Soviet Union would be dangerous for Russia. Active struggle against the Soviet regime by the emigration should therefore cease.[101] Denikin, by contrast, had little faith in the Soviet government's ability to defend Russia. The Red Army could only defend Russia, he argued, if it first overthrew the Soviets. Denikin therefore urged a policy of simultaneously resisting both the Soviets and any invader of Russia.[102]

Denikin repeated his views on many occasions throughout 1934. In December of that year, for instance, he made a trip to Czechoslovakia, where he made two speeches outlining his views to émigrés. His activities earned him the hostility of the many ROVS members who were keen to keep the option of collaboration open. General Kharzhevskii, for instance, noted that Denikin's position was contradictory, as it was not possible to fight both the Soviets and an invader at the same time.[103] In response to the speeches of Miliukov and Denikin, Miller issued a circular outlining ROVS's position on the issue of collaboration. It was wrong to say that the Soviet government was defending Russia, Miller argued, as the regime was concerned primarily not with the economic and cultural flourishing of Russia, but with world revolution, regarding Russia as merely a launching ground for that revolution. It

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[100] Tsurikov, Sovetskoe Pravitel'stvo, p. 15.

[101] Chasovoi, no. 118/119, 15 Jan 1934, p. 10.

[102] Chasovoi, no. 120, 1 Feb 1934, p. 6.

[103] GARF, 5796/1/13/69 (Letter, Kharzhevskii to Podgornyi, 10 Jan 1935).

was true that the moment in which the communist regime fell would pose a risk, as it could be exploited by foreign powers, "но это только "риск" а продление коммунистической власти не только "рискует" быть опасным, но неминуемо губит Россию уже и сейчас. Во-вторых "риск" расчленения России будет только возростать с каждым лишним годом существования антинациональной коммунистической власти". The same was true of the danger of separatism. 'Defencists' argued that any invader of Russia would exploit separatist aspirations among the minority nations in the Soviet Union and offer them independence in return for their support. But, argued Miller, in retrospect correctly, "никто и ничто не работает так на пользу "сепаратистов", как именно коммунистическая власть". The longer the communists were in power, the greater the risk of separatism. The Soviets, he concluded, were Russia's main enemy, and their overthrow should be the prime task.[104]

ROVS's propagandists now went to work, attacking the position of the 'defencists'. V. M. Levitskii commented on Denikin's statement that émigrés could only support an invader who came to liberate Russia. The problem, Levitskii noted, was that Denikin did not say where such an invader could be found. He therefore left émigrés with no plan of action. Denikin obviously did not understand that there was no hope of help from democratic Europe.[105] S. L. Voitsekhovskii called on émigrés to focus on the prime enemy - the Soviets. Foreigners were a secondary enemy, who could be dealt with once the Soviets had been overthrown.[106]

ROVS's support for collaboration with Nazi Germany did not go unnoticed by the

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[104] Russkii Golos, no. 147, 28 Jan 1934, p. 2.

[105] Russkii Golos, no. 147, 28 Jan 1934, p. 5.

[106] Chasovoi, no. 118/119, 15 Jan 1934, p. 6.

French authorities. Shatilov had survived the various scandals which had surrounded his name, but his position was now dealt a fatal blow by the French. On 15 June 1934, Shatilov and General Abramov, who was in Paris deputising for Miller while he was on sabbatical, were summoned to the French Foreign Ministry, where they were served with verbal orders to leave the country. The reason given was that they were considered responsible for the new pro-German line which had been adopted by ROVS.[107] Miller had to rush back to Paris from his rest cure to plead the cases of Abramov and Shatilov before the French Foreign Ministry. Once again his diplomatic skills prevailed and the expulsion orders were revoked, but Shatilov had now had enough. The next week he resigned his position as head of the ROVS 1st Department, and was replaced by General Erdeli. The episode reveals the degree to which ROVS was in a highly delicate political position. In France it was accused of being pro-German, but in Germany it was suspected of being pro-French because its central directorate was located in Paris. The head of the 2nd Department, General von Lampe, noted that the Germans were unable to understand that Denikin, who often made anti-Nazi statements, was not connected with ROVS.[108] In August 1933 von Lampe was arrested by the Nazis on suspicion of being a French spy, and he spent several months in prison before being released. ROVS's chief ideologue, I. A. Il'in, was also arrested in the same month. Later released, in April 1934 he was dismissed by the Nazis from his job as a professor at the Russian Institute in Berlin. Hounded for his refusal to teach anti-semitism, in 1938 he left Germany and moved to Switzerland.[109] ROVS was being forced to bend its policies to fit the political

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[107] BAR, ROVS, Box 81, Folder 'French government's efforts' (Letter, Shatilov to French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 June 1934).

[108] BAR, ROVS, Box 62, Folder 'Correspondence, 1934, II Otdel' (Letter, von Lampe to Miller, no. 1071, 6 Mar 1934).

[109] Grier, The Complex Legacy of Ivan Il'in, p. 165.

demands of its hosts, but as these hosts divided into hostile camps it became increasingly difficult to pull off the juggling act of satisfying the authorities in every country.

Although ROVS supported defeatism, it did not endorse unconditional collaboration with any country which invaded the USSR, regardless of that country's intentions. A question and answer pack sent to ROVS leaders to enable them to answer questions on political matters stated that ROVS's reaction to an invasion of the USSR would depend on the concrete form that the invasion took. One directed against the Soviet regime would be supported, but one directed against Russian interests would not.[110] A meeting of ROVS departmental heads decided that ROVS could only work with powers that declared in advance that their struggle was directed against Soviet power, not against the Russian people or to seize Russian land.[111] ROVS's objection to the arguments of the defencists was that they ruled out collaboration in all circumstances.

ROVS leaders repeatedly made it clear that their organisation must maintain its independence. In the event that they did collaborate with an invader, Russians were not to join the invader's army, but to form their own independent military units, acting as allies of the invader and not as subordinates.[112] Miller objected to those who uncritically degraded themselves in an effort to win help from others, and therefore condemned the head of ROVS in Kharbin, General Verzhbitskii, for making an excessively fawning speech praising

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[110] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions (1930s)' ('Otvety na voprosy').

[111] BAR, ROVS, Box 162, Folder 'Officers' Unions, (1930s)' (Report of meeting of commanders of 1st, 3rd & 4th departments with the ROVS president).

[112] GARF, 5826/1/94 ('Vypiska iz instruktsii general Kutepova', 23 Apr 1929). HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 2 (Circular, Gen. Miller, no. 416, 27 Apr 1931).

Japan.[113]

ROVS's policy was in effect one of 'positive engagement'. It was recognised that émigrés could have no influence on the decision of a foreign power to invade or not to invade the Soviet Union. All they could do was join in and try to extract as many advantages as possible from the situation.[114] The emigration could not start or prevent war, wrote Tsurikov, but by engaging in talks with foreign powers could help turn an external war against the USSR into a war to overthrow the Soviet regime.[115] Miller's strategy was to seek contacts with Japan and Germany, and by means of negotiations with them find common interests, convincing them that a Soviet government was not in their interests, that supporting émigré struggles against the Soviets would help them in their own fight, that émigré activities would best be carried out by independent national organisations, and that it was in their economic interests for post-Soviet Russia to be a strong power which would provide markets for their products.[116] As a result contacts were made with both Japanese and German governmental representatives. Von Lampe, for instance, met the Nazi minister Rosenberg, who asked him to present a proposal for a joint plan of action.[117] The problem for ROVS, however, was that neither the Japanese nor the Germans were interested in having allies who were independent

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[113] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 2 (Circular, Gen. Kussonskii, no. 285, 29 May 1934).

[114] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Tsurikov to Miller, 13 Apr 1932); Box 64, Folder 'Correspondence, 1931, IV Otdel (3)' (Letter, Stogov to Pronin, no. 1000, 14 Dec 1931); & Box 134, Folder 'Orders, 1932' (Letter, Miller to Shatilov, no. 276, 15 Apr 1932).

[115] Tsurikov, Sovetskoe Pravitel'stvo, p. 12.

[116] BAR, ROVS, Box 15, Folder 'P. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to S. A. Poklevskii-Kozell, no. 9, 3 Jan 1933).

[117] GARF, 5853/1/54/22940-22943 (Letter, von Lampe to Miller, no. 1, 26 Oct 1933).

of them, only in puppets willing to carry out their every command. Von Lampe's talks with Rosenberg and other Nazis soon came to an end with no positive results,[118] and after the Japanese occupied Manchuria ROVS leaders soon realised that the Japanese, as Kussonskii put it, "ценят только тех, кто их лижет мягкое место".[119] As a result, when the Japanese in Manchuria asked the head of ROVS in Kharbin, General Verzhbitskii, to lead Russian collaboration with them, he refused. In his place the role of Japanese puppet went to Konstantin Rodzaevskii, head of the Russian Fascist Party in Kharbin.[120]

By 1936 the argument between 'defencists' and 'defeatists' had become increasingly divisive. The 'defencists' were especially strong in France, where a Union of Defencists was formed, along with a Union for Return to the Motherland. The Union of Defencists, one of whose most prominent members was Makhrov, took the most extreme position - that one should not merely desist from supporting an invader of the Soviet Union, and cease active struggle against the USSR in peacetime, but that one should actively support the Soviets. Makhrov praised the new Soviet constitution of 1936 as a sign that Soviet power was evolving towards democracy. Denikin's slogan of 'defend Russia, but overthrow the Soviets' was unsatisfactory, he said. The experience of 1917 had shown that if the government was overthrown in wartime, chaos and anarchy would ensue and defence would become impossible.[121]

Concerned at the spread of defencist ideas, in 1936 ROVS issued two pamphlets

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[118] GARF, 5853/1/54/22989 (Letter, von Lampe to Miller, 1 Mar 1934).

[119] BAR, ROVS, Box 66, Folder 'Correspondence, 1935, V Otdel' (Letter, Kussonskii to M. N. Polzikov, 28 Feb 1935).

[120] Stephan, Russian Fascists, pp. 68-73.

[121] P. S. Makhrov, Chto Nam Delat'?. (Paris, 1938), pp. 23-27.

attacking defencism - one by N. A. Tsurikov, the other by V. M. Levitskii. The latter argued that defencists were over-concerned with the loss of territory, and should be more concerned with the Russian people. A true patriot, he wrote, could not be in favour of defending a regime which had enslaved and impoverished its people, as had the Soviets. The only true defencist was one who defended his people by liberating them from Soviet rule. According to Tsurikov, the Soviets' repressive rule was indirectly encouraging separatist tendencies among the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union. Defencists argued that the fall of Soviet power could lead to the break-up of the Russian empire, but it actually was the repressive nature of Soviet power which was creating this possibility. As Tsurikov noted, if the nations of the Russian empire decided that it was impossible to have freedom within Russia, then they would seek freedom from Russia.[122]

The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War at the end of 1936 provided those who believed in active struggle against communism with an opportunity to put their ideas into practice. The struggle of the nationalist forces of General Franco was seen by many ROVS members as a continuation of their own White struggle. Victory for the republicans would be a triumph for international communism, whereas a victory for Franco would be a blow against the 3rd International.[123] Some therefore felt that it was incumbent upon ROVS to organise the movement of Russian volunteers to Spain to fight in Franco's army. This, it was felt, could revitalise ROVS, by proving that it was actively engaged in struggle against communism. It could also lead, if Russian volunteers were allowed to serve together, to the

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[122] N. A Tsurikov, Sovetskoe Pravitel'stvo; & V. M. Levitskii, Plany razlozheniia emigratsii (ot 'Trestov do Kommissii Oborontsev'). (Paris, 1936).

[123] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 2 (Circular, Gen. Kussonskii, no. 680, 15 Aug 36).

recreation of Russian military units, albeit under the Spanish banner. Prime among those pushing this line was Shatilov, who hoped to use the issue to restore his reputation. Miller himself was sceptical, but under pressure from Shatilov he agreed to approach Franco. Contact was made with the Spanish through their diplomatic mission in Rome, and agreement reached that a ROVS delegation could travel to Spain to speak to the Nationalist High Command. The delegation, consisting of Shatilov and two others, travelled to Spain via Italy in December 1936. As a result of their talks with the Nationalist High Command, Franco's forces agreed to accept Russian volunteers, but, crucially, refused to pay the travel expenses of such volunteers. If sufficient came, they would be formed into a Russian unit in the Spanish Foreign Legion.[124] As a result, at the beginning of February 1937, Miller issued an order calling for volunteers. This decision was opposed by Denikin. The former Commander-in-Chief was generally not invited to the anniversary celebrations regularly held by ROVS, but in September 1937 Skoblin invited him to attend the 20th anniversary celebrations of the Kornilov regiment, certainly with the aim of disrupting ROVS by providing a platform for Denikin's unpopular views. Denikin fulfilled Skoblin's expectations and used the occasion to accuse ROVS leaders of "trading in others' blood".[125]

As it happened, few ROVS members volunteered to go to Spain. There appears to have been very little enthusiasm for the cause among the ROVS rank and file, many of whom were now past fighting age and in any case only wished to risk their lives in a fight for Russia. General Abramov noted in February 1937 that there had been no declarations from ROVS members in Bulgaria expressing a desire to go to Spain. Even among those who

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[124] BAR, Merzheevskii Collection ('Gibel' Generala Millera'); & HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection (Circular, Gen. Kussonskii, no. 845, 25 Dec 1936).

[125] GARF, 5853/1/62/22-23 (Letter, Kussonskii to Abramov, 20 Sep 1937).

might have considered it, the cost of the journey was beyond most ROVS members, especially those living in the Balkans. As a result, Miller's order of February 1937 elicited only 2 volunteers in the whole of Yugoslavia.[126] More might have been found had travel expenses been paid for. General Zborovskii noted that no members of his Kuban Division could afford the journey, but if it was paid for, he would order all the officers to go. He was sure that they would obey, and many of the rank and file Cossacks would follow.[127] The Spanish Civil War did, therefore, offer an opportunity to ROVS, but the failure to get Franco to give financial support to Russian volunteers ruined this one chance to reform Russian units.

In the end only 32 volunteers were sent, all from France. Four groups of eight men were smuggled across the French-Spanish border by Captain P. Sablin, who was placed in charge of the operation by Miller. Sablin worked closely with Skoblin, and it is possible that the latter sabotaged the crossings by betraying the route to the French police. The fifth group was apprehended by the police, and thereafter activity had to cease.[128]

ROVS's efforts to reach agreement with the German authorities were no more successful than their attempts to become involved in Spain. The general attitude of the Nazi leadership towards ROVS was hostile. In 1938 the Germans forced von Lampe to reform the Russian military organisations in Germany into a new organisation independent of ROVS. The ROVS 2nd department was dissolved and a new 'Ob"edinenie Russkikh Voinskikh

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[126] BAR, ROVS, Box 65, Folder 'Correspondence, 1937, IV Otdel (1)' (Letter, Barbovich to Kussonskii, 22 Feb 1937).

[127] BAR, ROVS, Box 65, Folder 'Correspondence, 1937, IV Otdel (2)' (Letter, Zborovskii to Kussonskii, 24 Feb 1937).

[128] BAR, Merzheevskii Collection ('Gibel' Generala Millera').

Soiuzov' (ORVS) was formed in its place.[129] It became clear that however willing émigrés were to collaborate with the Germans, the reverse was not the case. This did not mean, however, that the debate between the defencists and the defeatists was without results. Many émigrés were convinced by the arguments of the defeatists, with the result that large numbers of them later collaborated willingly with the Germans during World War Two.

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The difficulties ROVS experienced in the 1930s were not unique to it. They were shared by many other émigré organisations, and merely reflected the wider crisis being experienced by the Russian emigration as a whole. Sadly for those leading ROVS and other émigré organisations, there was really very little they could do to bring the worsening situation under control. The external pressures were too great. The result was a fragmentation of Russian society abroad. What is perhaps remarkable is that ROVS held together at all. Its ability to survive these crises indicates that its members must have felt that the organisation served a real purpose, however dissatisfied they were with the way in which that purpose was being carried out.

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[129] BAR, ROVS, Box 164 (List of organisations in ROVS, 1939).

CHAPTER 12 - PROVOCATION AND ABDUCTION AGAIN: THE DEATH OF GENERAL MILLER AND THE APPROACH OF WAR, 1934-1941

In the final years of the 1930s émigré society began to fragment rapidly. One symptom of this was a mounting sense of paranoia among émigrés. Already out of control, this now reached extreme proportions. ROVS was perhaps more affected by this process than any other émigré group. As the 1930s wore on more and more problems were added to those ROVS already faced. In particular its relations with its closest political ally, the NSNP, fell apart as a result of arguments over the activities of the secret organisation known as the Inner Line (see pp. 224-228). Within ROVS severe differences of opinion arose between leaders in France and leaders in Bulgaria regarding the Inner Line and two dissident journalists, the brothers Boris and Ivan Solonevich. These arguments made it clear that by 1936 ROVS members in Bulgaria and France were no longer thinking along the same lines. Years of separation had driven them apart and created an entirely different set of attitudes in each country. Meanwhile ROVS was coming under increasing attack from the Soviet secret services (by now known as the NKVD). In this regard a particularly damaging event was the abduction of General Miller by Soviet agents in September 1937. This was to prove even more traumatic than the kidnapping of Kutepov seven years earlier, leading to a similar series of mutual denunciations, and heightening the mutual suspiciousness of émigrés, but in an even more extreme form.

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At the centre of many of the disputes which racked ROVS in the late 1930s was the Inner Line, which leaders of the NSNP (now known as the NTSNP) were convinced was continuing its efforts to infiltrate their organisation and take over its leadership. In December 1935, a dispute broke out regarding a Captain Voitekhovich who was a member of both

ROVS and the NTSNP. Voitekhovich was also a member of the Inner Line and was known to have reported on the NTSNP's activities to it. As a result he was under investigation by the NTSNP hierarchy and they refused to let him attend their congress in Paris, spreading rumours that he was a traitor. This angered members of ROVS, who considered that their organisation had been insulted by the accusations against one of its members.[1] Miller felt that the NTSNP had some justification for their actions, but they had acted insensitively and had ignored ROVS.[2] At any rate, ROVS-NTSNP relations began to become seriously strained.

On the night of 4/5 December 1935, three members of the Society of Gallipolians in Belgrade, Dr. Linitskii, Captain Shklarev and Mr. Drakin, were arrested by the Yugoslav police in connection with a break-in at the house of the president of the NTSNP, Baidalakov. With them was arrested the secretary of the ROVS 4th Department, Rotmeister Komorovskii. All were charged with being Soviet agents.[3] The Yugoslav police disovered that Linitskii had a list of 14 names, supposedly given to him by Komorovskii, of people who had entered the USSR with ROVS's help. It was clear that even if Komorovskii was not a Soviet agent, he was certainly guilty of carelessness in his choice of colleagues and of handing information over to people who did not justify the trust he had placed in them. NTSNP leaders claimed that they had warned ROVS of Linitskii and his colleagues, and that Komorovskii's actions proved that he must also have been in the pay of the Soviets. Indeed they now became convinced that the entire Inner Line was a Soviet provocation. They therefore decided to expose it, and in so doing they created a decisive split between ROVS and the NTSNP.

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[1] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1935, III Otdel' (Letter, Kussonskii to Abramov, 30 December 1935).

[2] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to Tsurikov, no. 159, 13 March 1936).

[3] Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 31, 30 January 1936, p. 1.

Miller set up a commission of inquiry under a prominent Russian émigré in Belgrade, Senator Tregubov, to investigate the events in Belgrade. The NTSNP Executive Bureau sent Tregubov a long report, in which they laid the blame for what had happened on the Inner Line, and accused numerous prominent ROVS members of being Soviet agents. It was claimed that the Inner Line had tried to poison two leading NTSNP members, M. A. Georgievskii and V. D. Poremskii, and that it was plotting against the leadership of both ROVS and the NTSNP. It was also claimed that General Kharzhevskii was a Soviet agent, as was Colonel Zheltkovskii, whom Kharzhevskii had used for his secret work in the Soviet Union (see p. 265).[4] The report contained much accurate information about the efforts of the Inner Line to infiltrate and take over the NTSNP, but in making broader accusations against respected ROVS members it went too far. The failure of ROVS's underground work was not due to the treachery of Kharzhevskii or Zheltkovskii, but to that of Skoblin and Tretiakov. The NTSNP were firing at the wrong targets, and in so doing they greatly antagonised ROVS members and made it harder for the more correct elements of their accusations to be treated seriously. They were also almost certainly wrong in regarding the Inner Line as a gigantic Soviet provocation. It is clear from the correspondence between Skoblin and his Soviet handlers that Captain Foss, the supposed head of the Inner Line, was regarded as a dangerous enemy by the Soviets.[5] However, the NTSNP was being swept along on a growing wave of paranoia, and lashed out at targets on all sides, unable to hit the right ones due to the lack of reliable information.

As relations between ROVS and the NTSNP deteriorated, some blamed one of the

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[4] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1937, III Otdel' (Circular, Isponiteln'oe Biuro Sovet NTSNP, no. 205, 9 March 1936).

[5] Mlechin, Set'-Moskva-OGPU-Parizh, pp. 120 & 165.

NTSNP's leaders, M. A. Georgievskii, for the emerging crisis.[6] Miller complained that Georgievskii wanted to pull all of ROVS's most active members into his organisation and had focused on recruiting from ROVS rather than undertaking the more difficult work of attracting younger people. In their behaviour towards Voitekhovich, NTSNP leaders had shown an 'insulting' attitude towards ROVS. Their accusations against Komorovskii were not justified. As for the Inner Line, Miller admitted that "она стояло не 'внутри РОВС' и мнила себя стоящей над РОВС-ом и над НСНП. Почему от меня все это тоже скрывалось", but he also believed that it was far smaller and less important than its accusers were claiming. The NTSNP, wrote Miller, was behaving as if it were not a friendly organisation.[7]

Miller was by now regretting his decision to allow dual membership of ROVS and the NTSNP, and in April 1936 he issued a circular, which stated that in future, although he would still give permission to join the NTSNP, he would do so only in exceptional circumstances and as a general rule would not do so.[8] From Belgrade, Barbovich wrote to Miller to complain that since the Komorovskii incident leaders of the NTSNP were taking an "impermissible" attitude towards ROVS, attempting to weaken it by spreading tendentious facts and untrustworthy rumours, and criticising ROVS's help to them.[9] "Действительно, изо дня в день работать становится все труднее ", Barbovich commented, "наши враги делаются все смелее и наглее; разного рода политиканы и лже-патриоты, направляемые опытной рукой большевиков ведут непрекращающуюся интригу против

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[6] For instance, GARF, 5853/1/62/248 (Letter, Orekhov to von Lampe, 18 Oct 1937).

[7] BAR, ROVS, Box 2, Folder 'Tsurikov, N. A. to Miller, E. K.' (Letter, Miller to Tsurikov, no. 159, 13 March 1936).

[8] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 2 (Circular, Gen. Miller, 9 Apr 1936).

[9] BAR, ROVS, Box 65, Folder 'Correspondence, 1936, IV Otdel (1)' (Letter, Barbovich to Miller, 3 April 1936).

РОВС".[10]

The NTSNP continued to insist that Komorovskii was a Soviet agent and that ROVS was under the sway of a Bolshevik provocation, namely the Inner Line. In part this was a genuine belief, in part it may also have been a convenient pretext for some NTSNP leaders such as Georgievskii to assert their organisation's independence and break free of ROVS. Within ROVS itself the Komorovskii incident and the accusations about the Inner Line produced a difference of opinion between Sofia and Paris. Abramov praised those involved in the Inner Line,[11] whereas, Miller's assistant, General Kussonskii, disagreed. The Inner Line's pretensions to be above ROVS were intolerable, he wrote - "во Франции внутренняя линия принесла ТОЛЬКО вред".[12] Abramov defended his position. He could not understand, he said, why the ROVS central directorate was letting the NTSNP dictate to ROVS - "Для меня ясно, что НСНП хочет руками же самого РОВС внести в его среду еще большую смуту и разложение, чтобы окончательно занять его место". It was clear, wrote Abramov, that Paris and Sofia had fundamentally different conceptions of the direction that ROVS's work must take.[13]

In December 1936, Linitskii, Shklarev and Drakin were convicted by the Yugoslav courts of spying for the Soviets, but Komorovskii was acquitted. In March 1937 Tregubov's report was finally produced. It concluded that Komorovskii was not a Soviet agent, but that

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[10] BAR, ROVS, Box 65, Folder 'Correspondence, 1936, IV Otdel (1)' (Letter, Barbovich to Miller, 21 April 1936).

[11] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1936, III Otdel' (Letter, Abramov to Kussonskii, 8 March 1936).

[12] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1936, III Otdel' (Letter, Kussonskii to Abramov, 22 March 1936).

[13] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1936, III Otdel' (Letter, Abramov to Kussonskii, 26 March 1936).

he should not be allowed to work any more in ROVS. He was guilty at the very least of gross negligence.[14] ROVS members in Bulgaria believed that Komorovskii's two acquittals proved that he was the victim of a Soviet provocation, and rushed to his defence. The 'Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev' wrote that Komorovskii was the deliberate target of a provocation led by Linitskii who had sought to compromise him by planting incriminating documents in his house.[15] But the NTSNP remained convinced of Komorovskii's guilt. The defence of him mounted by ROVS members in Bulgaria just proved in their eyes that the ROVS 3rd Department was under the control of the Soviets. NTSNP meetings continued to pursue Komorovskii, which angered his supporters in ROVS. In Belgium Colonel Levashov complained in April 1937 that the local NTSNP group was deliberately trying to drive a wedge between the leadership of ROVS and its rank and file. One must doubt, he continued, whether the NTSNP was still a friendly organisation.[16]

Meanwhile, in Bulgaria another dispute broke out between the ROVS 3rd Department and the émigré journalists Boris and Ivan Solonevich, who had escaped from the Soviet Union in August 1934. The unlikely nature of such an escape was sufficient to raise some peoples' suspicions that the Soloneviches were Soviet provocateurs, but the deeply anti-Soviet nature of their writing persuaded most that they were genuine dissidents, and they very rapidly gained a considerable influence in émigré circles. At first ROVS's relations with the brothers Solonevich were very good. With the help of Miller and Foss they were brought to Bulgaria from Finland, to where they had fled from the USSR, and given the editorship of the

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[14] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 2 (Circular, Gen. Kussonskii, no. 101, 25 Mar 1937).

[15] Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev, no. 47, 20 May 1937, pp. 12-13.

[16] BAR, ROVS, V. D. Merzheevskii Collection (Order No. 2, 28 April 1937, in 'Kniga Prikazov: Oblastnoi Otdel O-va Gallipoliitsev v Bel'gii').

newspaper 'Golos Truda'. Subsequently in the middle of 1936 they set up their own newspaper 'Golos Rossii'.[17] At first 'Golos Rossii' took a very positive line towards ROVS, but the Soloneviches were firm supporters of activism and began to publish articles in which they chronicled the divisions within ROVS between the younger 'activists' and the older generation, classifying these two as 'Staff-Captains' and 'Generals'. Although they maintained that they were simply reporting the facts of existing divisions, many felt that they were implying support for the former and criticising the ROVS leadership by implication. Suspicions that they were Soviet provocateurs began to deepen.

In June 1937 the 'Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev' suddenly began a bitter polemic against the Solonevich brothers. Responding to questions about how they managed to fund 'Golos Rossii', the Soloneviches had claimed that this was done from profits made from lecture tours they carried out around Europe, and that ROVS's department in Bulgaria could confirm this. The 3rd department's leading officers, Generals Abramov and Zinkevich, were angered by this, as it linked them too closely with the brothers, and because it was in any case not true that they could confirm the source of their funds. A reply was planned for 'Vestnik Obshchestva Gallipoliitsev' but withdrawn when the Soloneviches offered to apologise. However, the Soloneviches then suddenly published an article in their newspaper complaining about the attitude of Zinkevich. Abramov demanded an apology, but the proposed apology Ivan Solonevich showed him was deemed insufficient.[18]

Zinkevich now wrote to Miller to say that he was convinced that Boris Solonevich

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[17] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1936, III Otdel' (Letter, Abramov to Kussonskii, 19 May 1936); Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia Pautina, pp. 336-337.

[18] BAR, ROVS ,Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1937, III Otdel' (Letter, Boris and Ivan Solonevich to Miller, 11 June 1937; & Letter, Abramov to Miller, 12 June 1937).

was a Soviet agent. He had been told this by General Dobrovol'skii in Finland, who had been told by the Finnish police. The German police apparently also shared the same opinion. Zinkevich claimed to have incontrovertible proof at his disposal.[19] Zinkevich later admitted that he did not actually have such proof in his hands, but he remained convinced that the Soloneviches were provocateurs.[20] Other ROVS leaders were sceptical about his accusations,[21] and Miller ordered Zinkevich to desist from further polemics against the brothers.[22] This induced a sense of despair in Abramov. He was bemused that Miller would not take his and Zinkevich's side in this dispute. "Почему", he wrote, "у Вас доверия к братьям больше чем к нам?".[23]

It was, in any case, already too late to order Zinkevich to desist. A congress of the Society of Gallipolians in Sofia passed a resolution condemning the Soloneviches and recommended to all their members that contacts with them cease.[24] Meanwhile Ivan Solonevich declared open war on ROVS, publishing for instance a pamphlet in 1938 in which he wrote that ROVS was in terminal decline and heading for collapse.[25] In 1938 he left

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[19] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1937, III Otdel' (Letter, Zinkevich to Miller, 1 Jun 1937).

[20] GARF, 5853/1/62/31-32 (Letter, Zinkevich to von Lampe, 15 Aug 1937).

[21] For instance, GARF, 5853/1/62/28-29 (Letter, von Lampe to Zinkevich, 8 & 11 Jul 1937).

[22] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1937, III Otdel' (Letter, Miller to Zinkevich, 8 Jun 1937).

[23] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1937, III Otdel' (Letter, Abramov to Miller, 12 Jun 1937).

[24] GARF, 5853/1/62/33 ('My i "Golos Rossii" brat'ev Solonevich').

[25] Ivan Solonevich, K sudu ofitserskoi chesti, k sudu russkoi sovesti i russkogo uma (August 1938), pp. 4-5.

Bulgaria and moved to Berlin where he set up a fascist-orientated newspaper, 'Nasha Gazeta', which printed abusive articles attacking ROVS leaders and praising Turkul - "Абрамов - трус", he wrote, "Архангельский - вывеска, Витковский - болван, Зинкевич - идиот, Фосс - чекист".[26] In response, the newspaper 'Russkii Golos' openly accused Ivan Solonevich of being a Soviet provocateur.[27] Any attempt at reasoned argument had now ceased. Émigré disputes had descended into the realm of simple name calling.

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By the end of 1936 Skoblin's star was on the wane. Under instructions from Moscow to keep Turkul in ROVS where he could cause maximum damage, Skoblin had tried to bring him back into the fold after his dismissal in August 1936, and had thereby antagonised many of ROVS's senior officers. By November 1936, Kussonskii was noting that Skoblin had fallen into 'extreme opportunism', and commented that "Я просто пока не понимаю, куда и с какой целью клонит этот маршал".[28] Rumours began to circulate that Skoblin was living beyond his means, and one member of his regiment told Kussonskii that his income could not be sufficient for what he was spending. Kussonskii did not suspect treachery, though Colonel Matsylev commented in July 1937 that even Miller, who had previously trusted Skoblin fully, had begun to doubt him.[29] Matsylev, like Kussonskii, wondered what Skoblin was up to - "Надеюсь", he wrote, "что в ближайшее время раскроется для всех некрасивая роль,

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[26] Cited in Boris Solonevich, Ne mogu molchat': 'Nasha Gazeta', Emigratsiia, ROVS, i I. L. Solonevich (Paris, 1939), p. 21. See also B. Bel'skii, Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soiuz (ROVS) i I. L. Solonevich (Tallin, 1938).

[27] Russkii Golos, no. 382, 7 Aug 1938, p. 3, & no. 385, 21 Aug 1938, p. 4.

[28] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1936, III Otdel' (Letters, Kussonskii to Abramov, 3 November 1936 & 24 November 1936).

[29] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1937, III Otdel' (Letter, Kussonskii to Abramov, 17 March 1937).

которую играет Скоблин во всех начинаниях"[30]. Matsylev's wish was to be fulfilled, but in far more tragic circumstances than he could ever have imagined.

On 22 September 1937, General Miller left his office to go to a secret meeting and never returned. Before leaving he handed Kussonskii an envelope and ordered him to open it in the event that he failed to return. That evening, after Miller failed to reappear, Kussonskii opened the envelope and found a note from Miller explaining that he was going to meet Skoblin, but that he suspected it might be a trap. Kussonskii summoned Skoblin to the ROVS headquarters, where he denied having met Miller. It was suggested that they go to the police, but while the backs of Kussonskii and his colleagues were turned Skoblin slipped away and disappeared. Later that night he knocked on the door of a friend and asked to borrow some money. After that he was never seen again.

Miller had been abducted by the Soviets. Skoblin had lured him to a meeting where he was drugged and kidnapped. He was then put on a boat to the Soviet Union, and eventually shot in Moscow.[31] It is not clear exactly why Miller was abducted. ROVS by 1937 was not the force it had been in 1930, and Miller lacked Kutepov's charisma as a leader. An often cited theory concerns Skoblin's involvement in the so-called 'Tukhachevskii affair'. In 1937 Stalin arrested and executed many of his leading generals, including the famous Marshal Tukhachevskii. It later emerged that the Nazis had forged documents purporting to show that Tukhachevskii had been engaged in negotiations with them, and they arranged for these documents to reach Stalin. It is alleged that the idea to forge these documents had been given to the head of the Gestapo, Heydrich, by Skoblin, under the instructions of Stalin who

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[30] BAR, ROVS, Box 86, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Matsylev, 1937-1940' (Letter, Matsylev to Zinkevich, 24 February 1937).

[31] Mlechin, Set' - Moskva - OGPU - Parizh, p. 191.

was looking for a pretext to act against Tukhachevskii. Skoblin met Heydrich and informed him that Tukhachevskii was plotting against Stalin, so prompting Heydrich to act. The theory goes that Miller knew of Skoblin's involvement in this affair, and so had to be disposed of in order to prevent him revealing to the outside world that Stalin had been involved in framing his own marshal.[32] This whole episode is, however, so unsubstantiated that it cannot be given credence as the real reason for Miller's abduction. A more likely explanation is that it was part of a general cleaning out of the stables being undertaken by Stalin as war approached. It was known that ROVS hoped to win the support of either Japan or Germany, and in the event of war with either of those powers the Soviets may have feared that the White army would finally be given its chance to re-form with foreign backing. ROVS may not have been a serious threat to the Soviets, but Stalin's paranoia was even more well developed than that of the émigrés, and even a tiny threat was a threat too much.

More than Miller's abduction, it was Skoblin's treachery that stunned émigrés, and it had a terrible effect on émigrés' mutual relations, provoking a round of mutual accusations and recriminations. Skoblin's guilt soon became firmly established after the French police searched his house, and found a large collection of incriminating documents. As a result of these documents, Skoblin's wife, Nadezhda Plevitskaia, was arrested and charged with complicity in the kidnapping of General Miller. At the end of her trial, Plevitskaia was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years hard labour in prison, but the result did not satisfy everybody. One of Skoblin's assistants, Captain Petr Savin, was convinced that Skoblin was innocent and that Shatilov, whom he hated, was the real murderer of Miller. He gave

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[32] W. G. Krivitskii, I was Stalin's agent (Cambridge, 1992 - first published 1939), pp. 221-222. This theory is supported by Geoffrey Bailey, The Conspirators, pp. 261-263; by Paul Blackstock, The Secret Road, pp. 289-291; and by Marina Grey, Le Général meurt, p. 210. See also Igor Lukes, Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler (Oxford, 1996), pp. 91-112.

testimony alleging this at the trial of Plevitskaia, and subsequently published a pamphlet hinting that Shatilov was a Soviet agent.[33] Though false, these allegations were believed by some and fatally discredited Shatilov, while damaging ROVS in the process. In the meantime, Vladimir Burtsev again waded into the scene, and accused Savin of being an agent of the NKVD.[34]

The most damaging allegations were to come from the NTSNP. They were convinced that the Inner Line lay behind Miller's disappearance, and decided that the time had come to expose it in public. On 9 October 1937, NTSNP members Ronchevskii and Prianishnikov gave a public lecture in which they repeated for the first time in public all the allegations that they had previously made in private regarding the Inner Line. ROVS leaders were infuriated. The NTSNP was carrying out a deliberate campaign against ROVS, Zinkevich claimed, in order to destroy its influence and tear youth away from it.[35]

The effect of the revelations about the Inner Line were electric. Articles were run on the subject in 'Poslednie Novosti' and 'Vozrozhdenie'. It was assumed by many that the NTSNP were correct and that the Inner Line was a Soviet conspiracy, and so ROVS was publicly portrayed as an organisation riddled by provocateurs. Angered at the way in which their organisation was being portrayed by the NTSNP, ROVS leaders now moved to formalise their rift with it.[36] ROVS department heads ordered members to choose between

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[33] Petr Savin, Gibel' Generala Millera: Rabota GPU, 'Vozhdei' i 'Druzei' po razvalu ROVS (Paris, 1939).

[34] V. L. Burtsev, Bol'shevitskie Gangstery v Parizhe: pokhishchenie generala Millera i generala Kutepova (Paris, 1939), pp. 29-33.

[35] BAR, ROVS, Box 86, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Matsylev, 1937-1940' (Letter, Zinkevich to Matsylev, 10 November 1937).

[36] BAR, V. D. Merzheevskii Collection (Copy of circular, no. 1597, 18 December 1937).

the two organisations. Dual membership was forbidden, and some ROVS members were subsequently expelled from ROVS for refusing to leave the NTSNP.[37] In August 1938 an effort was made to repair relations between the two organisations, and a meeting of leading figures on both sides took place in Paris. But this was only partially successful.[38] The rift had gone too far to be healed.

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The abduction of Miller was not the last of the scandals to hit ROVS in the 1930s. In October 1938 Nikolai Abramov, the son of General Abramov, was arrested by the Bulgarian police, charged with being a Soviet agent, and expelled from the country.[39] With this coming on top of all the other scandals, ROVS's reputation as an organisation which was fatally penetrated by the Soviets was now firmly entrenched in peoples' minds. The credibility of ROVS as an effective anti-Soviet organisation had been destroyed.

There were also problems with the succession to Miller. His designated deputy and successor was General Abramov, but Abramov had never wanted the post of president of ROVS, and he asked General Dragomirov to take over the position instead. Dragomirov refused, so Abramov reluctantly took over Miller's post. This caused a big outcry in the Bulgarian press, which feared retaliation from the Soviets if the leading émigré anti-Soviet organisation had its headquarters in their country. The Bulgarian government asked Abramov to leave the country. Unwilling to do this, he now asked General Gulevich to take the post.

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[37] GARF, 5853/1/62/350-351 (Minutes of meeting of Council of United Officers' Organisations, 12 Nov 1937). BAR, ROVS, Box 6, Folder '1 Armeiskii Korpus, 1938' (Report, Col. Levashov to Vitkovskii, no. 20, 27 February 1938, & Circular, Gen. Zinkevich to departmental presidents of Gallipoli Society, no. 2397, 25 December 1937). BAR, V. D. Merzheevskii Collection (Copy of circular, no. 1597, 18 December 1937).

[38] BAR, ROVS, Box 63 (Letter, I. Ia. Savich to Viktor Mikhailovich, 6 September 1938).

[39] Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia Pautina, pp. 333-334.

This was a deeply unpopular decision among ROVS members, many of whom remembered Gulevich's struggles with Wrangel in the early 1920s (see p. 167),[40] and so Abramov withdrew the invitation, and again appealed to Dragomirov to accept the leadership. This time Dragomirov accepted, but only on condition that he could move the Central Directorate of ROVS to Yugoslavia. For three months negotiations with the Yugoslav government dragged on until eventually on 18 March 1938 Belgrade gave a negative response. The scandals of the past few years meant that few countries wanted to be associated with ROVS any longer, added to which the clear approach of war was making governments cautious about antagonising the Soviet Union. Abramov had to find an alternative successor.[41] He settled on General Arkhangel'skii, the former director of personnel of the Russian Army, who lived in Belgium. Political considerations helped this decision. Von Lampe warned Abramov that if the ROVS Central Directorate remained in France, ROVS would be closed down in Germany.[42] Belgium, meanwhile, was willing to tolerate ROVS's presence whereas other nations were not. Arkhangel'skii accepted the post and on 25 March 1938 Abramov appointed him to replace him as president of ROVS.[43] During the Civil War Arkhangel'skii had run an underground anti-Bolshevik group within the Red Army, while himself serving as the Red Army's director of personnel. Eventually he escaped to the Crimea, where he again occupied the post of director of personnel, but this time in Wrangel's Russian Army. Like

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[40] GARF, 5853/1/62/37 (Letter, Zinkevich to von Lampe, 6 Dec 1937).

[41] BAR, Denikin Collection, Box 26 (Circular, Lt. Gen. Abramov, no. 96, 20 March 1938); & HIA, Lukomskii Collection, Box 1 (Letter, Dragomirov to Lukomskii, 11 Jan 1938); Also, Russkii Golos, no. 347, 28 Nov 1937, p. 3.

[42] GARF, 5853/1/62/226-230 (Report, von Lampe, no. 340, 12 Oct 1937). HIA, Chasovoi Collection, Box 1 (Letter, von Lampe to Orekhov, no. 363, 26 Oct 1937).

[43] BAR, Denikin Collection, Box 26 (Order, Lt. Gen. Abramov, no. 8, 24 March 1938).

Miller he was a 'desk' officer and lacked the charisma of Wrangel or Kutepov, but he had the advantage of not being disliked by any of the diverse groups within ROVS.

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The story of ROVS in the late 1930s is one of an organisation struck low by all-encompassing paranoia, which made it impossible for anyone to trust anyone else, and made everyone assume the worst motives in other people. The NTSNP saw a grand conspiracy in the Inner Line, which was in truth merely a misplaced, ill-conceived intrigue by a few individuals. ROVS in turn saw in the actions of the NTSNP a deliberate attack against it. In Bulgaria Zinkevich became convinced that the Solonevich brothers were spies, while to others, Zinkevich and the whole 3rd Department were in the hands of the Bolsheviks. In such an atmosphere mutual cooperation became impossible. This was symptomatic of how the emigration was splitting further apart into tiny groups throwing insults and accusations against one another. Saner heads calling for calm were shouted down.

Arriving on top of this tumult of suspiciousness, the abduction of General Miller was a catastrophe for the Russian emigration. The trial of Plevitskaia revealed what many people had suspected all along - that Bolshevik agents were placed in the highest echelons of émigré organisations. But all felt that there must be more to Miller's death than just the work of Skoblin and Plevitskaia. The mutual accusations mounted, and paranoia, already over-developed, steamed out of control. ROVS's reputation was destroyed once and for all, and although the organisation survived, after 1937 it would never again be a credible force. Even those who had once called for ROVS to take an active role in émigré politics and adopt a clear political position abandoned their demands for activism. V. V. Orekhov, for instance, who had been one of the main protagonists in the 'revolt of the marshals', had decided by

1938 that ROVS must abandon politics and become a purely professional organisation.[44] Similarly, in 1939 General Dragomirov commented that ROVS should cease all efforts to unite émigrés and adopt a purely defensive position.[45] As World War Two approached, ROVS had effectively given up on the struggle and turned in on itself.

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Their own efforts to fight the Soviets having failed entirely, by 1939 Russian émigrés had only one remaining hope, namely that the Soviet Union would find itself embroiled in an external war, and that defeat in this war would destroy the Soviet regime. In this regard, the Soviet invasion of Finland in late 1939 offered an unexpected opportunity. Arkhangel'skii considered the resulting war an ideal opportunity to reopen armed struggle against the Soviets, and on 16 December 1939 he sent a letter to the Finnish national leader, Marshal Mannerheim, offering the help of ROVS in the Finns' struggle against the Soviets.[46] Mannerheim was a former Imperial Russian Army officer, who had served with both Generals Arkhangel'skii and Abramov, and was still in contact with both.[47] However, despite his sympathies for the White cause, he turned down Arkhangel'skii's offer.[48] The Finns wished to portray their war as one of a small nation struggling against Russian imperialism,

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[44] HIA, Chasovoi Collection, Box 1 (Memo, Orekhov, 1 Jul 1938, & Letter, Orekhov to Abramov, 8 Nov 1938).

[45] Russkii Golos, no. 425, 28 May 1939, p. 5.

[46] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 1 (Letter, Arkhangel'skii to one of the generals of ROVS, 17 Jan 1940).

[47] BAR, ROVS, Box 63, Folder 'Correspondence, 1937, III Otdel' (Letter, Abramov to Kussonskii, 29 Jun 1937). In this correspondence, Abramov discusses a letter he had recently received from Mannerheim.

[48] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 1 (Letter, Mannerheim to Arkhangel'skii, 30 Dec 1939); & HIA, Chasovoi Collection, Box 3 (Letter, Lt. Gen. O. Enkel to Orekhov, 24 Jan 1940).

and not as one of Red versus White, and therefore the involvement of White Russians was not desired.

In February 1940 as the war dragged on and Finland's position became more precarious, Mannerheim changed his mind. Stalin's former secretary, Boris Bazhanov, who had defected to the West some years previously, was given permission by the Finns to recruit a 'Russian National Army' from among Soviet prisoners of war, to be used behind the Soviet front lines. He soon succeeded in recruiting 450 volunteers. These were not willing to serve under Soviet officers, so Arkhangel'skii put ROVS's Finnish sub-department at Bazhanov's disposal, and ROVS officers were put in charge of the detachments of Soviet prisoners. In early March 1940, the first detachment went into battle, working behind the Soviet front, inciting Soviet soldiers to desert, and within a short time had encouraged 300 men to do so. However, on 14th March 1940, the war came to an end, and the 'Russian National Army' was disbanded. ROVS's involvement in the Finnish War had come too late to make any difference.[49]

On 22nd June 1941 the German army invaded the Soviet Union. The attack seems to have surprised nobody except the Soviet High Command. In Berlin, von Lampe was aware that the invasion was imminent, and on 21st May 1941 he sent a letter to the commander-in-chief of the German armed forces, Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch. Stating his belief that Germany's conflict with communism would end in war against the USSR, von Lampe commented that he was sure such a war would be fought not against the Russian people, but against communism. He therefore ended by offering the services of both himself and all

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[49] Boris Bazhanov, Vospominaniia byvshego sekretaria Stalina. (France, 1980), pp. 295-300. HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 1 (Memo, Gen. Arkhangel'skii, 30 Mar 1940).

those under him to the German High Command.[50]

Arkhangel'skii agreed with von Lampe that the Germans would fight against communism, not against the Russian people. In June 1940, he noted that a strong Russia was in Germany's interests, as Germany would desire external markets, and this required peaceful, strong, prosperous neighbours.[51] As it was, the Germans refused von Lampe's offer, and after the invasion von Lampe was told by the German War Ministry that Russians would not be used by the German armed forces. The Nazis were interested in destroying Russia, not in promoting Russian nationalist organisations. Rejected by the Germans, on 17th August 1941 von Lampe issued an order to members of military organisations giving them all the right to choose for themselves whether to support Germany or not.[52] Later the Germans changed their minds and did start recruiting Russians, but they refused to allow Russians to play an independent role, and so ROVS was denied the opportunity to play any part in the momentous events of the Second World War. Émigrés' hopes of a victorious return home to a free Russia were dealt a final blow. Meanwhile, the Nazi invasion of Russia led to the exodus of a new wave of Russian émigrés, and a new era was ushered in.

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[50] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 2 (Letter, von Lampe to von Brauchitsch, no. 392, 21 May 1941).

[51] HIA, Arkhangel'skii Collection, Box 4 (Letter, Arkhangel'skii to Biskupskii, 28 Jun 1940).

[52] Almendinger, Gallipoliiskoe Zemliachestvo, p. 56.

CHAPTER 13 - CONCLUSION

Reading the correspondence of Russian military émigrés one sometimes gets the impression that they felt themselves to be completely alone in a world gone mad. The sense of isolation which military émigrés developed in exile was not without justification. The truth was that foreign countries were unsympathetic to their needs, the White officer corps was despised by many of its fellow Russian exiles, and the Soviet secret services did do all they could to disrupt émigré society. As a result, émigré officers felt alone and misunderstood. General von Lampe noted towards the end of his life that, "Одиноки мы, несмотря на ту или иную меру гостеприимства, которое оказали нам приютившие нас страны. В лучшем случае нас не понимают".[1] But it was not merely foreigners who misunderstood the Whites. Many fellow émigrés insisted on viewing them as reactionaries despite all the efforts of Wrangel and other ROVS leaders to prove the opposite. In reality, their world view was primarily spiritual, not materialistic, which means that a White victory in practical terms of economic and social policy could have meant almost anything. This has not hitherto been fully appreciated, partly perhaps because to date there has been no serious study of the Russian military emigration. Mark von Hagen has noted that the historical interpretation portraying the Whites as monarchists and reactionaries has its roots in the self-vindicating views expressed by liberal Russian émigré intellectuals, such as Miliukov.[2] Because the focus of studies of the emigration has been on such intellectuals, and because of the lack of detailed information about the lives and views of military émigrés, historians have to a certain extent accepted this interpretation at face value. Similarly, the view that military

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[1] A. A. von Lampe, Puti Vernykh, (Paris, 1960), p. 250.

[2] Mark von Hagen, Preface to Anna Procyk, Russian Nationalism and Ukraine: The Nationality Policy of the Volunteer Army during the Civil War (Edmonton, 1995), p. x.

émigrés lived lives "cut off from reality" (see Chapter 1) can be seen to have resulted in part from a lack of knowledge of the details of the history of the Russian Army in exile. It has been a prime purpose of this thesis to fill this gap in historical knowledge and so rectify the historical picture.

Russian military exiles for the most part suffered terribly from economic deprivation, and lacked legal and civil rights in many of the countries in which they lived, a situation which only got worse as time went on. Meanwhile, the failure of ROVS's underground work made people realise that the struggle was not continuing in any meaningful way, and dashed hopes for a quick return home. As the situation of military émigrés deteriorated, and as the international environment changed for the worse, many of the precepts which they held dear came under attack, and the organisations which held them together began to split apart. In these circumstances the survival of these organisations, the retention of any form of military identity, and the preservation of their values and beliefs, was very problematic. But what is remarkable is that these organisations, in the form of ROVS, did survive; military identities were retained; and the essential beliefs of ROVS members, such as non-predetermination, were preserved. Those émigré officers who made up the ranks of ROVS proved extraordinarily resilient in defending what they believed, and their organisation proved remarkably robust. This was especially true outside the confines of Paris, where most of the scandals and intrigues were concentrated. While others came to terms with the Soviet regime, ROVS kept the flame of 'irreconcilability' burning and did its best to pass the torch on to the younger generation of émigrés. It is true that many ROVS members lacked commitment, that ROVS itself was organisationally chaotic, and that in France in particular its membership declined severely over time. Yet even in Paris as late as 1936, Colonel Matsylev was able to persuade 80 members of the Alekseevskii regiment to meet together

once a month, demanding written explanations from those unable to attend. Members were instructed to research and report on military and political developments in the USSR, and appear to have fulfilled their tasks and not questioned Matsylev's right to give them orders 16 years after the civil war ended.[3] Among these members was probably Georgii Kononovich (see chapter 1, page 1). Despite all the pressures, all the crises, and all the scandals, such men remained loyal to the Russian Army, to their regiment, and to their identities as soldiers thoughout their years in exile.

The determination with which military émigrés clung to their beliefs, their identities, and their organisations, can in retrospect be seen not to have been the result of some sort of mental disease such as Paul Tabori's "bacillus emigraticus", but instead to have resulted from a genuine conviction that these beliefs were right, and from the advantages which émigrés gained from these organisations. The Army's High Command protected its men at Gallipoli and in Bulgaria, when the Army came under attack from foreign governments determined to disperse its men and if possible repatriate them to the Soviet Union. The same High Command found employment for many thousands of its troops in Yugoslavia, and helped thousands of others to move to France and Belgium to find work there. Later, ROVS and its component parts provided much needed humanitarian aid to its members. But the support that émigré military organisations gave their men was not merely material. It was also moral and spiritual. ROVS's image of itself as an 'order of knights' may have borne no relation to reality, but it gave émigré officers a sense of their own worth at a time when they had been reduced to the bottom of the social ladder and had to endure terrible physical hardship. The Russian Army in exile thus serve a genuine purpose, made a positive contribution to émigré

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[3] BAR, ROVS, Box 86, Folder 'Correspondence, Zinkevich to Matsylev, 1934-1936' (Letters, Matsylev to Zinkevich, 16 Jul & 8 Sep 1935, & 24 Mar 1936).

life, and helped many thousands of its members both morally and materially.

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