


STUDIES ON THE 5th AND 6th ESSAYS OF
PROCLUS' COMMENTARY ON THE REPUBLIC

by

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ABSTRACT

Introduction: After a brief statement that Proclus' 5th and 6th essays deal with Plato's discussions of poetry in the Republic, some remarks are made about the continuing interest and relevance of Platonic and Neoplatonic attitudes to art, the background to Proclus' work and the problems of studying Neoplatonic commentaries. The contents of the thesis are summarised and related to these remarks and some important recent bibliography is mentioned.

Chapter 1. The Form of the Essays and their Scholastic Context:

The chapter opens with a discussion of C. Gallavotti's view that Proclus' Commentary on the Republic is a heterogeneous collection of essays and that the 5th and 6th essays differ in their nature and purpose. This view is essentially accepted and the two essays are then examined separately as regards their form and their scholastic context. The 5th essay is related to the "genre" of problems in the exposition of a philosophical authority exemplified by the Πλάτωνικὰ ζητήματα of Plutarch and some of the Quaestiones of Alexander of Aphrodisias. It goes together with eleven of the other essays in the collection to form an introductory course on the Republic for students in the Platonic school. The 6th essay is similarly related to this "genre" of philosophical problems and also to the tradition of exposition of problems in Homer. It is shown to be the written up version of a lecture delivered to the Platonic school on Plato's birthday. After dealing with the question why Proclus wrote no continuous commentary on the

Republic, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the dating of the two essays.

Chapter 2. The Text of Homer and the Text of Plato: Proclus' quotations from Homer and Plato are analysed in order to discover whether his text of these authors differed from ours. Our knowledge of the history of the text of Homer suggests that Proclus' Homer was essentially the vulgate text. This is borne out by the detailed examination of his quotations. Problems and variants are found principally in those quotations which also occur in Plato and examination of Proclus' Plato quotations reveals that his text of Plato differed significantly from ours and agrees with no one branch of the medieval tradition. This is fitted in with the general conclusions drawn by modern scholars about the Neoplatonic text of Plato.

Chapter 3. Proclus' debt to Syrianus: This chapter is divided into five sections. In section (i) the problem of the relationship between the ideas of Proclus and those of Syrianus is set out and some views of it are discussed. Proclus' references to Syrianus in the 6th essay are examined and it is shown that Syrianus did not write anything of precisely the same format as Proclus' essay. Section (ii) analyses the four interpretations of Homer which Proclus refers explicitly to Syrianus: the Theomachy, Agamemnon's dream, the union of Zeus and Hera on Mount Ida and the unseemly behaviour of Achilles. In section (iii) conclusions are drawn from these analyses: Syrianus developed allegory of Homer in terms of transcendent metaphysical entities and Proclus was largely taking this over, adding some

refinements and adaptations. Some more of Proclus' interpretations of Homer are attributed to Syrianus on the basis of these conclusions. Section (iv) deals with Proclus' debt to Syrianus in the interpretation of Plato. More passages of the 6th essay are analysed: pp. 155.25-156.9; 166.12-167.9; 168.3-169.24 (with 117.27-122.20); 169.25-170.26; and 173.4-177.3. The conclusion is drawn that Proclus is again following and adapting Syrianus, who in this sphere was closely following earlier interpretation. In section (v) it is argued that the theory of three types of poetry, developed at the end of the 6th essay, is Proclus' own. Syrianus had distinguished between two types, inspired and uninspired, and Proclus splits inspired poetry in two to create a new classification of inspired, didactic and mimetic.

Chapter 4. Proclus' interpretation of Plato: The 5th and 6th essays are examined separately to see what kind of problems Proclus deals with in interpreting Plato and how he resolves them. Much of the 5th essay is analysed in detail and it is shown how Proclus' interpretation there is related to the criticisms of Plato made by Aristotle and his followers, and to the rhetorical concepts and terminology of Proclus' own time. Proclus' attitude to irony in Plato and his belief in the unity of Plato's thought are also discussed. The 6th essay is then examined, particularly Book II (pp. 154-205). As in the 5th essay, Proclus expounds Plato by means of his own words in other contexts, displays knowledge of rhetoric and literary criticism and takes up earlier criticism of Plato. His view that Plato and Homer agree is discussed and related to the belief in one

authoritative tradition which is expressed by different writers in different ways. Finally Proclus' interpretations in the 6th essay of the Cratylus and the Ion are discussed. Throughout the chapter Proclus' interpretation is evaluated and some comparisons are drawn with modern interpretations of Plato.

Chapter 5. Allegory, Symbols and Mysteries: This chapter examines the terms Proclus uses for allegory. Most of them are taken from mystery religion and from theurgy. The traditional use of mystery-language in Greek philosophy is surveyed and it is argued that in Proclus the mystery metaphor forms a meaningful part of an organised philosophical terminology. Some discussion of Proclus' attitude to theurgy, including the problem of the relationship in later Neoplatonism between theurgy and the Plotinian ideal of intellectual contemplation, reinforces the point that Proclus is revitalising the traditional mystery-language. At the end of the chapter further aspects of Proclus' use of mystery-language are briefly considered: the distinction between inspired and educational myths and their respective audiences; the danger of misunderstanding both myths and mysteries; the part played in both by the demons; and the application of mystery-language to the interpretation of individual passages of Homer.

Chapter 6. The Theory of Three Types of Poetry: An account of pp. 177.7-199.28 of the 6th essay is followed by discussion of the passages where Proclus gives Homeric examples of his three types of poetry and claims that Homer knew his poetic theory. Proclus' use of Homer here is related to the tradition of Homeric

interpretation. The three concepts of inspired, didactic and mimetic poetry are then considered individually. Proclus' interest in inspired poetry itself rather than the psychological state of its creator and his definition of inspired poetry in terms of its content are contrasted with other views of inspiration, ancient as well as modern. A discussion of the relationship in Neoplatonic thought between poetic and prophetic inspiration leads to an examination of Proclus' different uses of the concept of inspiration and the view which he shares with Hermias that inspiration is a kind of mystical cognition, though at a lower level than full mystical union. This view is made possible by Proclus' theory of mysticism, in which divine assistance plays a more important role than in Plotinian mysticism. Proclus' didactic poetry is distinguished from the modern concept of didactic poetry as a genre, its subject-matter is discussed and it is contrasted with some eighteenth century views of didactic poetry. Proclus' mimetic poetry is shown to be based on Republic X and subdivided into eikastic and phantastic on the basis of Sophist 235d ff. His interpretations of the Sophist passage and of Laws II 667c ff. are discussed. The final part of the chapter considers the theory of three types of poetry as a whole. It is developed out of Plato and clearly differs from theories of genre. Like Neoplatonic metaphysics, it forms a hierarchy of value. The theory's relationship to the distinction between inspired and educational myths is discussed and the validity of Proclus' interpretation of Republic X is considered. The thesis concludes with an examination of Proclus' important distinction between symbolism

and direct imitation in poetry and some remarks on the value of Proclus' three types of poetry as a literary theory.

Appendix I contains a brief summary of the contents of the Commentary on the Republic and a more detailed summary of the 5th and 6th essays.

Appendix II relates Proclus' interpretation of the judgement of Paris, on pp. 108.3-109.7, to earlier interpretation of the legend.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND GREEK NAMES

In the main I have followed the Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek Lexicon in abbreviating the authors and titles of Greek works, and L'Année Philologique in abbreviating the titles of periodicals. For patristic works not given in LSJ I have used the abbreviations of Lampe's Patristic Lexicon and for Latin works those of Lewis and Short's Latin Dictionary. The abbreviations I have used for the titles of Neoplatonic texts will be found in Section A of the Bibliography. I have diverged from LSJ in using Rep. and Tim. for Plato's Republic and Timaeus, instead of R. and Ti. For the works of Philo I have followed the abbreviations used in the new French edition being produced by the Editions du Cerf. For Plutarch I have used De aud. poetis for the De audiendis poetis (Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat); De Is. et Os. for the De Iside et Osiride; and Quaest. conv. for the Quaestiones conviviales. I have used RE for Pauly-Wissowa's Realencyclopädie. I have also referred to a number of modern works in abbreviated form (usually the author's name). Full details of such works will be found in Section B of the Bibliography.

I have tried to use the most common spelling for Greek proper names. This means that I use the Latin spelling for most, but not for all. Thus I write the god of fire as Hephaestus but the father of Zeus as Kronos.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have contributed in many ways to the progress of this thesis. I should like in particular to thank my supervisor, Mr. D.A. Russell. He originally suggested the topic and has provided constant help and encouragement. I should also like to thank Mr. C.W. Macleod, who supervised me for one term, and all those who helped me during the three months I spent in Paris with a Derby Scholarship, particularly M. Pierre Hadot and Father H.D. Saffrey.

INTRODUCTION

The two essays with which this thesis deals are concerned with Republic II, III and X, that is, with the sections of the Republic in which Plato discusses poetry and banishes it from his ideal state on the grounds that it is educationally harmful. The 5th essay considers ten problems which arise in interpreting Plato's words, for example, the problem of how Plato's hostility to poetry in the Republic is to be reconciled with the admiration which he expresses for it in the Laws. The 6th essay tries to reconcile Plato and Homer by defending the passages of Homer which Plato had attacked in Republic II and III. Proclus defends these passages against Plato by interpreting them as allegories of Neoplatonist metaphysics. At the end of the 6th essay Proclus develops a theory that poetry falls into three types, inspired, didactic and imitative.

In modern Western Europe it is common to assume the autonomy of art and to regard Plato's attitude in the Republic as authoritarian and uncomprehending. Art is deemed to exist in an area of its own, with its own values and standards which are not to be subordinated to ethical or political demands. Yet the issues which Plato raised about art are far from settled. In our own time Marxist criticism believes, with Plato, that art should serve the state. The Socialist realism of Russia in the 1930's demanded from the artist very much what Plato demanded, as we can see from the way The Times obituary of Shostakovich described the unfavourable reception of his opera, Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk: "Socialist realism ... asks a composer not for an

interpretation of things as they are ...but for a use of music for moral and social ends. As the excitement of its performance abated the authorities ... could find nothing in the work to uplift the public consciousness and openly teach the good life ..."¹ Proclus shares Plato's belief that art has an essentially moral and didactic purpose, but his practice of allegorical interpretation opens the way to a claim that inspired poetry, which for Proclus includes much of Homer and in particular Homer's myths about the gods, can teach in a way of its own, provided the audience are suitably trained to understand it. Proclus stresses other aspects of Plato's views on art, such as the belief in poetic inspiration expressed in the Phaedrus and (more equivocally) in the Ion, and claims that Plato himself held the views which he, Plato's interpreter and successor, was putting forward some 800 years later.

While Plato's insistence on the moral purpose of art raised issues which are still vigorous in Eastern Europe, if less so in the West, Plato's metaphysics has had a striking influence on European art and literature of many periods, from Dante and Botticelli to Shelley and W.B. Yeats. Neoplatonism played a vital part in the transmission of this influence and many creative artists have seen Plato's philosophy through Neoplatonic eyes.² What the Neoplatonists themselves thought

1 The Times, 11th August, 1975.

2 On the influence of Platonism on both the theory and practice of art, cf. E. Cassirer, Eidos und Eidolon. Das Problem des Schönen und der Kunst in Platons Dialogen (Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg, 1922-3, I Teil), pp. 3-4, and E.H. Gombrich, "Icones Symbolicae", in Symbolic Images. Studies in the Art of the Renaissance (London, 1972), pp. 123 ff. (amplified version of a study which appeared in JWI 11 (1948), pp. 163-92).

about art and literature is therefore a particularly interesting part of Neoplatonist philosophy. Later, post-Iamblichean Neoplatonism has been little studied, even in comparison to the amount of work that has been devoted to the first and greatest Neoplatonist, Plotinus; consequently Neoplatonist aesthetics is usually thought of as meaning only Plotinus' aesthetics. Proclus, however, develops areas of aesthetic theory that are treated only sketchily, or not at all, by Plotinus. In such passages as Ennead I.6 or V.8.1 Plotinus deals with the visual arts, painting and sculpture, but he has little or nothing to say on literature. Moreover, although Plotinus interpreted myths allegorically when it suited him,³ he does not present us with systematic allegory of poetic myths, or a coherent theory of allegory, as Proclus does. The last two chapters of my thesis deal with the aesthetic theories of the 6th essay. In Chapter 5 I discuss Proclus' theory of allegory by means of examining his use of language taken from the mysteries and from theurgy as a terminology for allegory, while Chapter 6 is concerned with his theory of three types of poetry.

Proclus has often been described as the last great pagan philosopher and many traditions of Greek culture flow together in his work. The name, "Neoplatonism", applied to the Platonism of the 3rd to 6th centuries A.D., is misleading if it suggests a unitary movement deriving in a straight line

³ See, e.g., III.5. On Plotinus' interpretation of myths, cf. J. Pépin, Mythe et Allégorie (Paris, 1958), pp. 190-209 (revised version of an article, "Plotin et les mythes" in RPhL 53 (1955), pp. 5 ff.).

from the philosophy of Plotinus. Not only may different schools and movements be detected within Neoplatonism,⁴ but the Neoplatonic philosophers drew on thought before Plotinus, and on other areas of ancient culture besides philosophy. Perhaps the best illustration of this is Proclus' own Hymns. They are the hymns of a Platonic philosopher, addressed to the gods of traditional Greek religion as they were fitted in to the Neoplatonic metaphysical system. Yet they are written in the traditional language and metre of Greek hymns, and they were transmitted to us along with the Homeric Hymns, the Hymns of Callimachus, and the Orphic Hymns. Throughout the thesis, and particularly in Chapters 3 and 4, we shall see how Proclus' interpretation of Homer draws on a wide area of the ancient critical tradition, both allegorical and non-allegorical, and how even his interpretation of Plato draws on earlier literary and rhetorical interpretation, not just on past philosophical discussion. In Chapter 1 I argue that the form of Proclus' essays is to be related to an established "genre" of ancient philosophical scholarship, the exposition of problems in a philosophical text.

One reason why later Neoplatonism has been so little studied is the form in which thinkers of that period presented their work. Most of what survives is rambling, discursive commentary on the philosophical authorities, Plato and Aristotle, and there are peculiar difficulties in the way of studying ideas

4 See the classic article by K. Praechter, "Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus", Genethliakon Carl Robert (Berlin, 1910), pp. 104-56; reprinted in Praechter's Kleine Schriften, ed. H. Dörrie (Hildesheim-New York, 1973), pp. 165-216.

in such a form. Connections of thought can be hard to follow and passages taken out of context can easily be misunderstood. With Proclus we do have the great advantage that the dry bones of his philosophical system are laid out in the Elements of Theology, but to make them live one must study the system as it is used in his exegesis of Plato. The rambling commentary form means that there is much repetition of ideas in different works of the same author and in different authors of the same school. What Proclus is saying can often be illuminated by parallels drawn from his own work, or from that of his predecessors, contemporaries and successors. In drawing such parallels it is always important to take account of the context from which a passage comes: often the passage of Plato (or Aristotle) which is being interpreted colours both thought and expression, and the ideas, while repeated, have been tailored to fit the particular context. So, for example, in Chapter 1 I compare Proclus' distinction between inspired and uninspired poetry at In Tim. 64.13-65.3 with the similar distinction in the 5th essay. There are certain differences between the two passages, which are to be explained by the fact that the one is closely related to the Timaeus, the other to the Republic; yet the basic distinction is the same in both and is, I argue, significantly different from the distinction of three types of poetry in the 6th essay.⁵

The Neoplatonists are developing Plato. Although the ways in which they do so may seem misguided to our different

⁵ See pp. 19-21 below.

point of view, many Neoplatonic ideas cannot be properly understood unless they are first traced to their Platonic origins. In dealing with a particular passage from a late Neoplatonic commentary therefore, one must take account of the passage being discussed, and of other Platonic passages which may lie behind the ideas being used, as well as of Neoplatonic thought on the topic in question. This is the method I have tried to follow and I hope that in particular the conclusions of Chapter 1, on the scholastic context of Proclus' work, and of Chapter 4, on Proclus' interpretation of Plato, could usefully be applied to the wider study of Neoplatonic commentaries.

Apart from their interest for aesthetic theory, the 5th and 6th essays of the Commentary on the Republic are a good place to begin the serious study of Neoplatonic commentary. Beside the bulk of a work like the Commentary on the Timaeus, these two essays are short and their content easily accessible. Many of the problems I have mentioned are present in them on a small scale. The different chapters of my thesis cover different aspects of Proclus' activity as teacher, scholar and thinker, from the point of view of the two essays. Chapter 1 deals with questions which are an essential preliminary to any discussion of Proclus' ideas: to understand Proclus' theories of allegory and of poetry one must first understand how they are set out for the purpose of defending Homer against Plato, and the way in which the defence is conducted is affected both by the original lecture-form of the essay and by the traditional scholarly methods of expounding problems in a

philosophical or literary text. In Chapter 2 I examine Proclus' text of Homer and of Plato as presented in the quotations in the two essays and find that while his Homer differed little from ours, there were significant differences in his text of Plato. These are not so great that they substantially affect Proclus' interpretation of individual Platonic doctrines but there are, as we shall see, a couple of cases where Proclus' interpretation may be affected by his text.⁶ On the larger scale, Proclus' general view of Plato's teachings was affected by his acceptance of such works as Alcibiades II and the Second Letter as genuine. The conclusions of this chapter are also of some interest for the history of the text of Plato. In Chapter 3 I make use of the surviving work of Syrianus, of Hermias' commentary on the Phaedrus, and of references to Syrianus' views in other Neoplatonic texts, to elucidate Proclus' intellectual relationship to Syrianus. We thus become better able to perceive just how much Proclus owed to his revered teacher and in what ways Proclus himself was developing and systematising earlier thought. In Chapter 4, on Proclus' interpretation of Plato, we again see how he built on the ideas of his predecessors, and what assumptions and principles lie behind his interpretation. With Chapters 5 and 6, on Proclus' use of mystery-language as a terminology for allegory, and on the theory of three types of poetry, we come to the independent theories which evolve

6 See pp. 77-9 and p. 100 below.

from Proclus' exegesis. The thesis thus moves from study of Proclus' activity as a teacher, lecturing on particular texts, through investigation of how he used the ideas of his predecessors, particularly those of Syrianus, and of his method of interpretation, to consideration of the aesthetic theories to be found in the essays.

Proclus' teacher, Syrianus, and his contemporary and fellow-student, Hermias, have received hardly any discussion or attention and I hope that Chapter 3, together with the discussions of Hermias at a number of other points, will provide a beginning for study of these two figures and their work. Syrianus was considered a most important thinker by his successors in the Platonic school, yet we know very little of him. Hermias is not so interesting in himself but his commentary on the Phaedrus, largely a report of Syrianus' lectures on the dialogue, contains much interesting material for the study of later Neoplatonism.

In the course of the thesis many passages of the 5th and 6th essays are discussed and commented on. Although this thesis is not a running commentary on the text, it is intended to be useful to anyone wishing to understand the essays and for that purpose I have provided an index of passages discussed.

In many ways this is an exciting time to be studying later Neoplatonism, since there is a revival of interest in this period of thought, and valuable new work is being done. My work would hardly have been possible without a number of new editions of Neoplatonic texts. Dodds' Elements of Theology of 1933, issued in a second edition in 1963, is now being joined

by a new edition of Proclus' Platonic Theology by Saffrey and Westerink in the French Budé series. Volumes I and II of this edition have appeared and I regret only that reference must still be made to Portus' original printed edition of 1618 for the rest of the work. The first volume of Dillon's edition of the fragments of Iamblichus has also recently appeared, shortly after the publication of the thesis of B.D. Larsen, Jamblique de Chalcis, exégète et philosophe, which covers some of the same ground as well as dealing with the works of Iamblichus which survive intact and stressing the importance of Iamblichus' exegetical activity. Iamblichus is a figure of great significance for the later development of Neoplatonism and his philosophical work is as yet hardly understood or appreciated. When more of Dillon's edition has appeared we should be in a much better position to understand this puzzling mixture of wonder-working magician and respected philosopher. The philosophers who followed Proclus, Damascius and Olympiodorus, are gradually being re-edited and new editions of their works too have been very useful to me.⁷ Among recent secondary works, R.T. Wallis's book, Neoplatonism, deserves special mention. It appeared in 1972, not long before I began my research, and has guided and assisted me at every stage.

My thesis was nearly complete when J.A. Coulter's book, The Literary Microcosm. Theories of Interpretation of the Later Neoplatonists, appeared. Coulter's work to some extent

⁷ Full details of these, and of the other works mentioned, will be found in the bibliography.

complements my own, since he is concerned to present Neoplatonist ideas on literary theory so as to make them easily accessible to non-classicists, rather than with the historical development of these ideas or the details of Neoplatonic thought. Dealing with a range of Neoplatonic texts instead of concentrating on one, he focusses on slightly different problems from those which have concerned me. I have included in my footnotes some comments on his work and discussion of places where it overlaps with my own.

Finally I must mention the recent French translation of the Commentary on the Republic by Festugière. This translation, with its notes, is a great help to the modern reader trying to find the way through the discursive maze of Proclus' work. The aim of my thesis is to provide more such help, by illuminating the background and context of the 5th and 6th essays, and so to contribute to the understanding of later Neoplatonist thought, especially in the field of aesthetics.

CHAPTER ONE

THE FORM OF THE ESSAYS AND THEIR SCHOLASTIC CONTEXT

Any reader opening Proclus' Commentary on the Republic will immediately be struck by the fact that it is not a commentary at all, in the strict sense of the word, but a series of essays. C. Gallavotti has argued in two articles¹ that the commentary is not even a connected series of essays but a heterogeneous collection written by Proclus at different times and put together by a pupil of Proclus or by someone still later. In Gallavotti's view the first five essays, the seventh and eighth, the tenth, eleventh and twelfth, the fourteenth and the fifteenth all belong together and in his second article he suggests that together they form an Isagoge, an Introduction to the Republic. The remaining four essays, the sixth on Homer and Plato, the ninth on the views of Theodorus of Asine, the thirteenth, *Μέλιος δὲ τὸν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ λόγον τὸν Μουσῶν*, the sixteenth on the myth of Er (which does take the form of a line-by-line commentary), and the final *Ἐπίσκεψις* of Aristotle's objections to Plato in the second book of the Politics are all quite distinct units of different kinds.²

1 "Eterogeneità e cronologia dei commenti di Proclo alla Repubblica", RFIC 57 (1929), pp. 208-19 and "Intorno ai commenti di Proclo alla Repubblica", BPEC N.S. 19 (1971), pp. 41-54.

2 See Appendix I for a brief summary of the contents of the whole Commentary, and a more detailed summary of the 5th and 6th essays.

If Gallavotti is right, the two essays with which I am concerned, the 5th and 6th, although they deal with the same part of the Republic and therefore with the same group of philosophical topics, should be considered quite separately; we should not be surprised to find that they differ in form and should take this as a sign that they differ in nature and purpose and even, according to Gallavotti, in date. It is therefore of some importance to examine Gallavotti's arguments, as they apply to the 5th and 6th essays, in greater detail and to consider whether his conclusions are to be accepted, as a preliminary to discussing the form and the scholastic context of these two essays. Apart from his arguments on chronology, which I shall deal with later when I come to consider the question of the date (or dates) of the Commentary on the Republic, Gallavotti uses three main arguments to separate the 6th essay from the others in the collection. First he argues that although the 5th and 6th essays deal with the same part of the Republic they differ in their treatment of it and their point of view and that the 6th essay is more polemical in tone than the 5th and than the others in the collection. Secondly he points out that the MSS repeat the name of the author before the 6th essay and again before the 7th, "as if to re-affirm the authorship of the work which is taken up again after a long parenthesis". Finally he claims that the lack of cross-reference between I 119.2, in the 6th essay, and II 105.23 ff., in the essay on the myth of Er, when both these passages deal with the views on myth of the Epicurean Colotes, shows that these two essays are quite distinct. This

last argument would not in itself be conclusive if there were no other grounds for treating the essays as distinct; if there were a cross-reference the manner of it might show us whether Proclus was referring to a distinct work or to an earlier part of the same work but the fact that there is no cross-reference is at best only a straw in the wind. The second argument does have some weight since the name of the author is not repeated before every essay in the collection, but it could show simply that an early copyist shared Gallavotti's belief in the heterogeneity of the collection and was trying to indicate this. The first argument, that the 5th and 6th essays differ in treatment and point of view, is by far the strongest and Gallavotti could have brought this out by a more detailed discussion of the content of the two essays. Such a discussion does in fact support his argument.

First of all Proclus' view of allegory in the two essays may be compared. Both the theory and the practice of allegorical interpretation play a large part in the 6th essay while in the 5th allegory is mentioned only in the first and the eighth of the ten problems there discussed, namely at 44.3 ff. and at 65.19-25. In the first of these passages Proclus is explaining why Plato banishes poetry from his ideal state. The first reason for the banishment is that poets produce inaccurate representations of reality (ἀνομοίως μιμούμενοι τὰ πράγματα, περὶ ὧν ποιοῦνται τοὺς λόγους 44.3-4) and this inaccuracy takes two forms, ignoble descriptions of heroes on the one hand and the use of improper words about the gods on the other (44.6-20). The improper expressions used

of the gods are called *παρὰ πετάσματα* "veils" (44.14).

This is a standard term in Greek thought about allegory

for a myth requiring allegorical interpretation. So too at

44.19-20 Proclus speaks of τὸ πρόχρημα τῆς μυθοποιΐας

While Plato's objection, according to Proclus, to poetic

descriptions of heroes is that they are just false or fictional

(ψεύδεται), his objection to poetic descriptions of gods is

that οὐ καλῶς ψεύδεται,³ they are ugly falsehoods

or fictions. Poetry about the gods is bound to be fictional,

that is, in Proclus' terms, allegorical. This follows from the

Neoplatonist view that since the gods are transcendent any

human account of them, whether poetical or philosophical, is

bound to be inaccurate. Plato's demand is that these necessary

fictions should be beautiful and fitting and should use descriptive

terms taken from the good in human life, not the bad. The point

is very clear at 45.3-4: (poets) ὅπου δὲ ψεύδεσθαι δεῖον

μη' καλῶς ψεύδεσθαι.⁴ Proclus gives the same interpretation

of Plato at 65.19-25 where, in considering what the best poet

would be like according to Plato, he says that such a poet

would make his poetry about the gods conform to the theological

τύπων laid down by Plato in Republic II and discussed by

Proclus in his 4th essay, i.e. that the gods are good, impassive and unchanging.

In these passages Proclus is envisaging poetic myths about

3 In 44.24 οὐ must be supplied:- See Kroll's Addenda, Vol. II, p. 472 and cf. Festugière's note.

4 Cf. also the résumé at 47.14-9 where τὸ συμπᾶν τῆς μυθώδους . . . ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν refers to poetry about the gods.

the gods as requiring allegory (since they are inevitably $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\eta$ and the allegorical interpreter can get a little nearer the transcendent truth) but is placing restrictions on the kind of poetic myths that are admitted in the first place (the $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\eta$ have to be $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\alpha}$). Is this inconsistent with the position of the 6th essay where Proclus is concerned to allegorise just those myths in Homer which Plato attacked as not $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\alpha}$? The difference between the two positions can be explained when we remember that in the 5th essay Proclus is concerned to expound Plato; the view that he puts forward there is a tenable interpretation of Plato's words in Rep. II. In the 6th essay Proclus' express purpose, as laid down at the beginning of it, is the reconciliation of Homer and Plato. Homer therefore plays a part in the 6th essay which he does not play in the 5th and the format of the 6th essay allows Proclus to develop his own views and those of earlier commentators on Homer as well as to expound and interpret Plato. The theory of allegory is made more sophisticated by the introduction of the idea that myths can symbolise transcendent reality by using terms directly opposed to it to describe it (77.12-28)⁵ and by the use of the argument that the myths are literally true of the demons (77.29-78.14 and passim later).⁶ Both these sophistications go far beyond the scope of the 5th essay. Proclus can be acquitted of the charge of self-contradiction on this point but the manner of

5 Cf. further below, pp. 399-407.

6 Cf. below, pp. 149-50; 192-4; and 331-3.

his acquittal brings out clearly that there are differences of nature and purpose between the two essays. The difference of attitude to allegory in them thus supports Gallavotti's general argument that the two essays are distinct and do not form two closely related links in a continuous chain of discussions.

It is worth pointing out that Proclus' view of poetry concerning heroes in the 5th essay - that Plato's objection to it is straightforwardly that it *ψευδεται* (see especially 44.26-45.1) - is absolutely consistent with his treatment of the Homeric heroes in the 6th essay and indeed helps to explain why he solves problems about them by means other than allegory on the whole and never dissolves the heroes themselves into metaphysical entities as he does the gods. Poetry about heroes is not inherently allegorical as poetry about the gods is. Similarly Proclus' rather surprising hostility to tragedy is equally clear in both essays and in both is linked with Plato's hostility to it. (See 49.13-51.25 in the 5th essay and 195.21-196.13; 196.24-198.24; 201.16-202.6; and 202.25-205.13 in the 6th).⁷ Both these facts reinforce my point that we are dealing here not with self-contradiction but with a difference of attitude between the two essays of the kind that Gallavotti describes only in very general terms.

A much more disturbing difference appears if we compare the classification of types of *μουσική* in 56.20-60.13, the

7 On Proclus' attitude to tragedy, cf. below pp. 250-1.

fifth problem of the 5th essay, with the classification of types of ποιητική at 177 ff. in the latter part of the 6th essay. Proclus distinguishes four types of μουσική in the first passage, basing what he says in part on the types of life listed in Phaedrus 248d. The highest type is philosophy. Second is possession by the Muses which moves souls to ἐνθεος ποιητική. In this type μουσικόν and ποιητικόν are the same thing and such poetry teaches by the exhibition of noble examples from the past which the young are to imitate. Then there is the φιλόκαλος who is reminded of eternal harmony by the sound of sensible harmony and finally there is παιδευτική μουσική which knows which rhythms and harmonies (i.e. musical modes) will best mould the soul. In 60.6-13 Proclus distinguishes poetry from μουσική in general and says that it goes either under inspired μουσική or under uninspired but not under τῆς ἀναγκασμένης, the μουσική of the φιλόκαλος. This means that poetry belongs under either the second or the fourth of the types of μουσική mentioned. The types of μουσική do not seem to be mentioned in a hierarchical order for although the first, philosophy, is the highest and subsumes all the rest, the third, that of the φιλόκαλος, is superior to the second and the fourth. (Cf. 59.19-20: ἄν ὁ τοῦτο μουσικός πρὶ φιλοσόφῳ εὐβότοιχος and 60.9-10). The concept of poetry here is very much that of Plato in the Republic: it is directly mimetic and the inspired poetry mentioned under the second type of μουσική is of the kind which Plato in the Republic is prepared to admit, that is, poetry which presents good examples

for the young to imitate.

In the second passage, at 177 ff., there is a three-fold classification of types of poetry into inspired, didactic and mimetic, the last being further subdivided into eikastic poetry, which aims at accurate representation, and the even lower phantastic poetry, which represents things only as they appear, not as they really are, and aims at $\psi\upsilon\chi\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\acute{\iota}\alpha$. How is this classification to be reconciled with the classification into two types of poetry at 56.20 ff.? The mimetic poetry of the later passage may be taken to be the same as the uninspired poetry which comes under $\pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\upsilon\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ $\mu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ in the first passage. At 190.20 ff. Proclus does actually refer to $\pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\upsilon\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ $\mu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$, after quoting Laws II 667 ff. on $\mu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$, and classifies eikastic poetry under it. Moreover, moulding the soul by the use of the right rhythms and modes may be considered a type of $\psi\upsilon\chi\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\acute{\iota}\alpha$, though in the later account of mimetic poetry Proclus seems to be following Plato in Rep. X in thinking only of its power to harm and to be neglecting the educational possibilities of mimetic poetry of the right kind. The real difficulty lies in trying to reconcile the concept of inspired poetry in the two passages. It is not just that the inspired poetry of 57.23-58.27 sounds much more like the didactic poetry of the later discussion (cf. especially 58.3-24 on the educational function of this inspired poetry with the account of didactic poetry at 179.3-15); it is that Proclus uses exactly the same term, $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ $\pi\omicron\iota\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$, in the later passage for a quite different concept. The $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ $\pi\omicron\iota\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ of the second passage has direct access

to philosophical truths which it expresses in allegorical mythological terms while that of the first passage relates the deeds of heroes who were once in this world rather than myths about the transcendent gods, and teaches not by revelation hidden in allegory but straightforwardly by example. Moreover Proclus uses the same passage of the Phaedrus, 245a, in each case to illustrate his point and give it Platonic authority (see 57.25 ff. and 180.11 ff.). The words in that passage of Plato which describe the poet's educational function, τὸ μὲν τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κομμοῦσαν τοὺς ἐπιχρυσμένους παιδεύειν, are interpreted in two quite different ways at 58.2 ff. and at 181.30 ff.

Here we have not just an apparent inconsistency which may be explained by the difference of purpose between the 5th and the 6th essay but a significant change of view which is best explained in terms of a different time of composition of the two essays and a development in Proclus' views about poetry. The fact that his view of allegory in the 6th essay is more complex and sophisticated than in the 5th, even though not in direct contradiction to the view there, would accord well with this.

Gallavotti refers to a passage from the Commentary on the Timaeus in order to support his view that the 6th essay of the In Remp. is more mature in thought and later in composition than the In Tim. At In Tim. 64.13-65.3, in the context of commenting on Plato's remarks about poets at Timaeus 19de, Proclus makes a distinction between ἐνθεὺς and τεχνικὴ ποιητικὴ. The first comes from the gods; the second

is due to human τέχνη and is not good enough to praise the inhabitants of the ideal state described in the Republic and recapitulated in the Timaeus. The two types of poetry here may be aligned with the two types of the 5th essay which belong to inspired and uninspired μουσική respectively, provided due allowance is made for the fact that the one passage is closely related to Plato's Republic, the other to his Timaeus. The same distinction as in the In Tim., between ἐνθεος and τεχνική ποιητική, using the same terminology, may be found in Hermias' commentary on Phaedrus 245a (97.29 ff.), the passage of which Proclus gives differing interpretations in the 5th and in the 6th essay (cf. also Hermias 146.28 ff.). Hermias' commentary on the Phaedrus largely consists of Hermias' notes from Syrianus' lectures on that dialogue.⁸ We can therefore expect to find in it some of the same ideas as in Proclus, taken over from Syrianus, but not those ideas which are Proclus' own. A similar distinction is also made in Proclus' 16th essay, at In Remp. II 316.6 ff., between inspired and human μουσική. In the In Tim. passage Proclus makes use of the concept of ὕψος, which makes no appearance in the discussion of poetry in the In Remp., and the passage arises out of a consideration of the views of Longinus, Origen and Porphyry about Timaeus 19de. Although he introduces the passage under discussion with δοκᾷ οὖν μοι it seems plausible to consider, in view of the

8 See K. Praechter's RE article on Hermias (1912) and Bielmeyer. Bielmeyer suggests that Hermias' work also contains material drawn from the commentary of Iamblichus but the suggestion is regarded with some scepticism by Westerink (Anon. Prol., p. x, note 6), Gelzer (p. 22, note 48) and Larsen (p. 362).

Hermias parallel, that the distinction between *ἐνθους* and *τεχνικὴ ποιητικὴ* was known to Proclus from Syrianus and that *δοκεῖ οὖν μοι* merely expresses his selection of a view from among those of his predecessors. (The use of the concept of *ὑψος* does tempt one to speculation about Longinus even though the *περὶ ὑψους* we have is now commonly agreed not to be by him.)⁹ While this distinction between *ἐνθους* and *τεχνικὴ ποιητικὴ* appears to be the one which Proclus has in mind in the 5th essay, and in the 16th, the view of the 6th essay is much more complex. It seems that Proclus had developed his views between writing the 5th essay and writing the 6th.¹⁰

On the classification of types of poetry, and to some extent on allegory, there is a real difference of view between the two essays and a development in the thought from the one to the other, of the kind claimed by Gallavotti. Whether Gallavotti is right or not in all his conclusions about the date of the different parts of the *In Remp.* and the cohesion into an "Isagoge to the Republic" of the twelve essays which seem to go together, he clearly is right that the 5th and 6th essays must be considered as distinct units, composed at different times, with different purposes, and for different types of occasion. In what follows I shall therefore consider them quite separately as regards their form and their scholastic context.

9 But cf. G. Luck, "Die Schrift vom Erhabenen und ihr Verfasser", *Arctos* N.S. V (1967), pp. 97-113. Luck argues that the *περὶ ὑψους* is by the 3rd century Longinus. This passage of the *In Tim.* could be added to Luck's evidence. Proclus makes use of *ὑψος* as a literary concept again at *In Parm.* 646. 21-647.24.

10 See further below pp. 221-34 and Chapter 6, pp. 336 ff.

The 5th essay considers ten different problems which arise in connection with Plato's discussion of poetry in Rep. II. Two of them, the third and the seventh problems, are concerned to reconcile what Plato says there with what he says in other dialogues; the first and the fourth are concerned to resolve apparent contradictions within the Republic itself; the second discusses the conflict between Plato's rejection of tragedy and comedy and the Aristotelian doctrine of catharsis; and the remaining five problems expound what Plato says and fill in what he does not say but (in Proclus' view) would or might have said. The ten problems are initially set out at 42.1-43.25. They are then discussed in order and in each case the problem is restated before it is discussed, the progress of the argument is clearly marked and the answer that has been given is often summed up at the end of the discussion of the individual problem. It can be seen from the way I have characterised the ten problems that they are all closely linked to the exposition of Plato. Although this is not line-by-line commentary, it is commentary in a wider sense of the term as comment on problems that arise in the course of studying a particular text. When one thinks of commentary in the ancient world, or on classical texts in the modern world, one thinks of line-by-line commentary, whether on literary texts or on philosophical writings. In fact however, just as today, the study of texts could also take the form of the selection and discussion of specific problems. Gudeman's RE article on Λύσεις¹¹ discusses just this type of activity. The

11 (1927). Cf. also H. Dörrie, Porphyrrios' Symmikta Zetemata, in Zetemata 20 (Munich, 1959), pp. 1-4.

Λύσις is the answer to a scholarly question, the explanation of a difficulty, or the solution of a problem. The problem itself can be called πρόβλημα, ζήτημα or ἀπορία. A large part of Gudeman's article is concerned with the collections of Προβλήματα or Ζητήματα Ὀμηρικά, discussions of both philological and moral difficulties in Homer, to which I shall return when I come to discuss the form of the 6th essay. After a brief mention of Προβλήματα concerned with other authors such as the Περὶ ποιητικῶν ζητημάτων ᾧ Λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ of Diogenes of Tarsus, mentioned in Diogenes Laertius VI.81, and the Quaestiones in Genesim and in Exodum of Philo, Gudeman passes to the collections of independent Προβλήματα or Ζητήματα which range from the philosophical and scientific Προβλήματα of philosophers such as Aristotle and Theophrastus, to the less serious collections of problems discussed at symposia such as Plutarch's Quaestiones Conviviales or Athenaeus' Deipnosophistae. Proclus' 5th essay falls into a particular group of this large and heterogeneous class of writings, a group not properly distinguished by Gudeman who simply makes a broad classification into Προβλήματα linked to a particular author and independent Προβλήματα but then includes a work like Plutarch's Πλατωνικὰ ζήτῃματα under the latter. The group in question is that of Προβλήματα linked to a particular philosophical author and concerned with philosophical exposition rather than with the solution of philological or moral difficulties. (The latter is the only kind of discussion Gudeman

seems to have in mind for his first class of Προβλήματα .) Good examples of the kind of philosophical discussion I am talking about are provided by Plutarch's Πλατωνικὰ ζητήματα and by some of the Quaestiones of Alexander of Aphrodisias which deal with specific problems in the exposition of Aristotle.¹²

Plutarch's ten Πλατωνικὰ ζητήματα (the same number of problems as we find not only in Proclus' 5th essay but, by explicit design, in most of the books of Plutarch's Quaestiones Conviviales, and also in Proclus' own De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam) may be found in Volume VI.1 of Drexler's revised Teubner text of the Moralia.¹³ They discuss a variety of individual problems taken from different dialogues of Plato, often giving more than one solution without taking a final view as to the right answer. A typical example is the third one where Plutarch summarises the account of the Divided Line in the Republic and then poses the problem: τί οὖν διανοηθεῖς ὅς ἔστι τὰ τμήματα τὸ πᾶν ἔτεμε; καὶ πότερον τῶν τμημάτων τὸ νοητὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητὸν, μᾶλλον ἔστιν; αὐτὸς γὰρ οὐ δεδήλωκε . With the demand that what Plato has left unsaid should be filled in we may compare the fifth, the ninth and the tenth of the problems in Proclus' 5th essay. Plutarch

12 Cf. also Porphyry, Plot. 15:- Euboulos wrote to Plotinus from Athens and sent him εὐχαρίσματα ὑπὲρ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ζητημάτων . See further Koch, pp. 13-8; Nock's Sallustius, Prolegomena, p. cxiv, esp. note 28; Larsen, pp. 155 and 175-6 (with reference to the De myst. of Iamblichus.)

13 (Leipzig, 1959). For a brief discussion of the Πλατωνικὰ ζητήματα see R.M. Jones, The Platonism of Plutarch (Menasha, 1916), pp. 104-6.

introduces the answer with $\Delta\acute{o}\xi\epsilon\iota\ \delta'\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\upsilon$,
 adding a string of further points with a succession of $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota$ s.
 Then he states the opposite view: $\Pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \delta\epsilon\ \tau\acute{o}\upsilon\ \nu\alpha\lambda\eta\acute{o}\upsilon\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\tau\epsilon$
 $\pi\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu$, supports it with passages from other dialogues and
 the addition of further points with $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \mu\acute{\eta}\nu$, $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\varsigma$,
 $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\ \mu\acute{\eta}\nu$ but comes to no final conclusion. Of particular
 interest is the eighth problem, $\Pi\acute{\omega}\varsigma\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$
 $\delta\ \tau\acute{\iota}\mu\alpha\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\iota\varsigma\ \tau\epsilon\ \gamma\acute{\eta}\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \beta\epsilon\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu\eta\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$
 $\acute{\omicron}\beta\alpha\ \acute{\omicron}\rho\gamma\alpha\upsilon\alpha\ \chi\rho\acute{o}\nu\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\eta}\nu\alpha\iota$. It has a more
 complicated structure than the others, being in two parts.
 In the first part Plutarch does give a verdict as to which
 solution he prefers and he deploys and refers to the opinions
 of a variety of other philosophers and, on the same level, the
 views of Pindar and Euripides.

The Quaestiones of Alexander as they have come down to
 us are a very miscellaneous collection. In the introduction to
 his edition¹⁴ Bruns divides them up into four groups. These
 are: independent problems, distinct from the commentary and
 like the Προβλήματα of Aristotle and Theophrastus;
 $\acute{\epsilon}\xi\eta\gamma\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ of which five were originally part of a complete
 commentary but the rest are separate discussions of particular
 problems in Aristotle; summaries and paraphrases of Aristotelian
 passages; and fragments. In practice it is difficult to
 separate the third group from the second. A problem like III.6,
 for example, on the section of the De anima in which Aristotle
 demonstrates that there are only five senses, is placed by Bruns

14 Supplementum Aristotelicum II (Berlin, 1892).

in his second group but could be considered a paraphrase and placed in the third group. In any case I am concerned with the second group, in which there are a number of clearcut examples. A good instance of the type is II.25 (p. 76.16 ff. in Bruns). It is headed Ἀλλης λέξεως ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς Ἀριστοτέλους ἐξηγήσεις. Alexander begins by quoting the relevant portion of the De anima and then poses the question what a particular phrase in it means: Πρὸς τί "τοῦ ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στασεως ἐν αὐτῇ;" He expounds the problem a bit further and then introduces the solution with ἡ. Another interesting example is I.11, of which there are two different versions (p. 21.14 ff. in Bruns). After the heading Πῶς εἴρηται ἐν τῷ α' περὶ ψυχῆς. τὸ γὰρ ζῶον τὸ καθόλου ἢ τὰ αὐδέν ἐστὶν ἢ ὑπερὸν, it begins: Ἐξηγήσεται πῶς εἴρηται... Alexander refers in it to his own commentary on the De anima, thus making it clear that this is a separate ἐξηγήσεις of a particular problem written after the overall commentary and distinct from it.

Proclus' 5th essay falls into this genre of problems in the exposition of a philosophical authority, although it differs from the examples I have given in that it is confined to a particular portion of a particular work. A formal analysis of the essay brings out clearly its relationship to such works as those of Plutarch and Alexander. I have already mentioned the way in which the problems to be discussed are set out and the progress of the argument clearly marked. Gudeman in his RE article picks out a number of formulae regular in the exposition

of a πρόβλημα and its λύσις and others may be found in the manner in which Plutarch introduces his Πλατωνικά ζητήματα. Thus Gudeman's πῶς to introduce the problem is found in Proclus' first statement of his third problem, at 42.16, again in the second statement of it at 51.27 and in the second statement of the fourth problem at 54.3, while in Plutarch problems 6, 7 and 8 all begin with πῶς : πῶς ποτ' ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ λέγεται . . . ; πῶς ποτέ φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων; πῶς λέγει τὰς ψυχὰς ὁ Τίμαιος . . . Similarly Alexander begins I.11, quoted above, Ἐζητήτω πῶς εἴρηται . . . Another of Plutarch's standard opening formulae, this one not noted by Gudeman, is τί δήποτε which introduces his first, second and fourth problems. So in Proclus τί δήποτε is used when the second and fourth problems are first stated, at 42.10 and 42.22, while in Alexander I.16 we find the similar ἡπόρησε τί ποτ'

Plutarch's most frequent way of introducing his solutions is with πότερον . . . ἢ because, as I said, he frequently gives alternative solutions and does not decide between them. In Alexander there is no regular formula for introducing the solution; at II.25 it is introduced with ἦ while at III.3 there is a more tentative μή ποτ' οὖν (p. 81.29 in Bruns). In Proclus we find διαλύομεν at 49.20 and λέγομεν οὖν at 57.8 which is like the λέγουσι δὲ, φασὶν οὖν ὅτι, λέκτέον, etc. noted by Gudeman. The most common sign in Proclus that we have moved from exposition of the problem to the solution is just the particle μὲν οὖν . So at 61.2 τοὺς μὲν οὖν ῥυθμούς ; 65.19 χρή μὲν οὖν etc. (Cf. also 63.21-2

ἐν δὲ οὖν τούτων).

Proclus frequently expounds Plato by means of his own words in other contexts. He refers to the Timaeus at 45.7 ff., to the Laws at 46.5 ff., and to the Politicus and then the Laches and the Minos at 61.5 ff. where he is concerned to amplify what is said about harmony and rhythm in the Republic and turns to other works of Plato for help.¹⁵ This is a schoolroom discussion of problems for an audience of serious students who all know their Plato texts and are concerned to understand them better. The marking out of the steps of the argument, the frequent summaries and repetitions (e.g. 46.1-7; 47.14-9; 51.20-5; 53.26-54.2, etc.) are also a part of this scholastic context. The Neoplatonic commentaries were originally given as lectures in the Platonic schools and some of those which we have, such as that of Olympiodorus on the Gorgias, are actually ἀπὸ φωνῆς, written up from notes taken by a student.

Proclus seems to have written up his own lectures; this is implied by Marinus Ch. 22, ἐν τε ταῖς συνηθείαις δυνάμεις ἅμα καὶ βαρύνει ἐπεξεργαζόμενος ἕκαστα καὶ ἐν συγγραμμάτων ἅπαντα καταβαλλόμενος, if one takes ἅπαντα as referring to all that Proclus went into (ἐπεξεργαζόμενος) in his lectures. It is also indicated by the fact that his commentaries are not called ἀπὸ φωνῆς in the MSS and are on the whole free from the kind of student's errors which beset some of the later commentaries.¹⁶

15 See further below, pp. 237-42 and 269-70.

16 Cf. Westerink's introduction to the Anon. Prol., p. x, note 4 and p. xxxix on errors of this kind in the Anon. Prol.

The 5th essay then is a subsequent written version of a schoolroom discussion of ten problems arising from Rep. II. It is a fairly elementary discussion, concerned largely to expound Plato. The repetitions and summaries make it easier for the beginner to follow. There is some reference to the views of other philosophers, notably Aristotle in the second problem and the $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ of 65.3 who consider Plato a bad judge of poetry, but on the whole discussion of other interpretations is excluded for the sake of simplicity. A momentary comparison with the Commentary on the Timaeus will make clear that this was not always Proclus' method. Indeed if we compare 65.3, which is actually concerned with Timaeus 21c, with the discussion of the same problem in the In Tim. at 90.16 ff., we can see the difference. The In Tim. tells us who these $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ are and goes into their views in greater detail because it is a more detailed and less elementary work. Towards the end of the 5th essay, in the ninth and tenth problems, we do get something of Proclus' independent views but on the whole these are much more subordinated to the exposition of Plato than they are in the 6th essay. The 5th essay shows us Proclus in his role as teacher of philosophy rather than in the complementary one of original philosopher.

Gallavotti believes that the 5th essay goes together with eleven of the others in our collection and in his 1971 article¹⁷ he argues that together they all form an "Isagoge to the Republic", the introduction which the 1st essay explicitly

17 See note 1 above.

announces. Gallavotti does seem to be right to group these twelve essays together (i.e. 1-5; 7; 8; 10-12; 14 and 15) as all concerned with elementary exposition of the Republic and he is certainly justified in giving them the name "Isagoge" as the proper term for an elementary course, like Albinus' Isagoge to Platonic philosophy as a whole, or Porphyry's Isagoge to the Categories of Aristotle.¹⁸ The only point on which I would take issue with him is his assertion that the succeeding essays do themselves form the seventh of the points to be discussed listed in the first essay (see 6.1 ff. and especially 6.24 ff. for the seventh point τὴν δὲ ὅλου τοῦ συγγράμματος διήκουσαν τῶν δογματικῶν ἐκτελεστικῶν). The difficulty is that the end of the first essay is missing, along with the whole of the second, and the portion we have only gets as far as the third of the seven points. It seems out of proportion for Proclus to have considered his first six points relatively briefly (though in what we have the first is discussed at more than twice as much length as the second) and then to have spent eleven distinct essays on the seventh point. I would rather envisage the first essay as including some treatment of the seventh point, with the emphasis on how the different parts of the Republic form an organic whole, in the terms of the Phaedrus referred to at 6.26, and in relation to the ἑκόντες of the dialogue considered under the first point. Proclus would then make a new beginning and turn explicitly to the exposition of particular points in the different

18 On the form of the Isagoge cf. also Nock's Sallustius, p. cxv.

books of the dialogue. The most illuminating parallels for an elementary course on the Republic of this kind do not come from the ancient world at all. Consider, for example, a work familiar to most students of the Republic at modern British universities, Cross and Woosley's Plato's Republic. A Philosophical Commentary.¹⁹ It is called a commentary though it is in fact an exposition of particular problems; it is explicitly intended as an elementary book for students and the stages of the argument in each chapter are accordingly set out very clearly; reference in the text to the views of other philosophers and to other interpretations is kept to a simple and limited level; however the modern work differs from that of Proclus in that there is little or no reference to other works of Plato. Cross and Woosley do not deal with exactly the same problems as Proclus for their interests are not the same. Although both they and Proclus begin by considering first the argument with Polemarchus and then that with Thrasymachus (dealt with in Proclus' second and third essays and in Cross and Woosley's first two chapters) the paths then diverge: Proclus gives greater attention to theology, Cross and Woosley to political philosophy. We may also compare Nettleship's Lectures on the Republic.²⁰ Like many of the Neoplatonic commentaries but unlike those of Proclus this work has been compiled from student's notes.²¹ The introductory chapter reminds one of Proclus' 1st essay in considering

19 (London, 1964).

20 (London, 1901).

21 See G.R. Benson's prefatory notice.

the true subject of the dialogue, its form as a dialogue, its logical method and its main divisions. The succeeding chapters give a sympathetic exposition of the problems of the different books, interspersed with comment and explanation, and with some reference to other works of Plato.

Gallavotti then is substantially right that the 5th essay forms part of an introductory course on the Republic. Its internal division into ten problems relates it to the genre of problems in the exposition of a philosophical authority exemplified by Plutarch's Πλατωνικὰ Σητήματα and some of Alexander's Quaestiones. Proclus is using the technique and approach of that scholarly genre within the wider framework of a standard type of introductory course for students.

The 6th essay, unlike the 5th, is an independent unit, not linked to any of the other essays of the In Remp., and we have already seen that it is more complex and sophisticated in its thought and probably later in composition than the 5th essay. Like the 5th essay it belongs to the genre of problems in the exposition of a philosophical authority and the parallels of Plutarch and Alexander are as relevant to it as they are to the 5th essay. However, in the 6th essay Proclus is trying to reconcile Homer and Plato and we also have to take into account the tradition of Ὀμηρικὰ προβλήματα, of exposition of problems in Homeric poetry. When Proclus refers his readers or hearers to the work of Syrianus for more details on the theomachy, at 95.26-31, it is to Syrianus' λόγος of Ὀμηρικὰ προβλήματα, that is, to a work devoted to problems in Homer.

There was a long tradition of such collections of Ὀμηρικὰ προβλήματα and indeed it seems to have been the form which much ancient comment on Homer took (cf. the first part of Gudeman's RE article). Ch. 25 of Aristotle's Poetics is περὶ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων and sets out the different kinds of problems and solutions. Aristotle did also write an Ἀπορήματα (Προβλήματα) Ὀμηρικὰ of which we have fragments given by other authors.²² The Quaestiones Homericae of Heraclitus belong essentially to this genre, as their title shows, and Porphyry's Ὀμηρικὰ Σητήματα was an important collection of interpretations drawn on both by the scholia to our Homer MSS and probably by Syrianus and Proclus.²³ The relationship of the 6th essay to this tradition is clear not only from the reference I quoted to Syrianus' work but also from Proclus' references to earlier, pre-Neoplatonic interpreters of Homer at 115.14, 131.5 ff., and 150.11. Yet the 6th essay is not itself a collection of Ὀμηρικὰ προβλήματα but a discussion of Plato: Proclus deals only with those passages to which Plato raised objections in Rep. II and III, his avowed aim is the reconciliation of Homer and Plato, and much of the second book of the essay is taken up with the discussion of Plato's general views about poetry and the development of Proclus' own theory of poetry, although the discussion is brought back to Homer at the end. Proclus is combining Ὀμηρικὰ and Πλατωνικὰ Σητήματα. The latter come to the fore in the second book of

22 Fragments 142-179 in Rose's edition (Leipzig, 1886).

23 Cf. the Prolegomena to Schrader, esp. pp. 408 ff., and cf. below, pp. 156-7 and 185.

the essay where, for example, a special section, 173.4-177.3, is devoted to explaining Plato's apparent devaluation of Homer in favour of Stesichorus in the Phaedrus.

Just as in the 5th essay, here too a formal analysis brings out clearly the relationship of Proclus' work to these two genres of scholarship. When Proclus states the aims of his essay on p. 71 he gives as the first of these, τὰς τοῦ Σωκράτους ἀπορίας διαλύειν (71.8). At 129.6-7 he passes from the discussion of why the gods are said to laugh to the next difficulty raised by Plato with the words: ἐπεξῆς δὲ ἔστιν τῆς τοιούτης προβλήματι διασκεψάσθαι τοὺς περὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης λόγους. Similarly at 132.14 he introduces the question of the union of Zeus and Hera with the words: ἐκδέχεται δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπορία μείζων while at 146.8-9 there is another similar introductory formula: ἐπόμενον ἂν εἴη καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπεξῆς ἀνεγείραι τῶν ἀπορημάτων. One may compare some of Gudeman's examples of introductory formulae to Ὀμηρικὰ προβλήματα such as ἀπορίαν παρέχειν and πρόβλημα ποιεῖν. Blunt questions of the type found in the 5th essay and in Plutarch's Πλατωνικὰ ζητήματα are less common in the 6th essay but 126.18-9 τίς οὖν ὁ τῶν θεῶν γέλως καὶ πὶ δήποτε Ἡφαίστου κινουμένου . . . ἐκείνα γελῶσιν; fits the now familiar pattern. As in the 5th essay μὲν οὖν is frequently used to introduce the λύσις (e.g. 106.18, 112.13, 141.4, 146.17) and there are also more extensive formulae like πρὸς δὲ τὰς τελευταίας ἀπαντήσεις λεγέσθαι (96.16); λεγέσθαι μὲν οὖν καὶ οἷς εὐλόγουν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν ἀπαντᾶν (115.13); λεγόμεν τίνυν καὶ

πρὸς ταύτας τὰς ἐπισημῆσεις (124.1). (Cf. also 113.20, 119.2, 130.1 ff., 131.5). These are like the λέγομεν οὖν of 57.8 in the 5th essay and the variations on λέγουσι δέ, φαδὶν οὖν ὅτι, εἴποι ἄν τις πρὸς ταῦτα listed by Gudeman. Proclus uses a similar formula at 173.26 when dealing with a problem in Plato, not Homer: Ἀλλ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα λεκτέον.

The use of Plato's own words in other contexts to elucidate obscurities or, more commonly, to provide a parallel and give authority to the point being made is found again here, as in the 5th essay. So at 108.9-17, for example, the Phaedrus is used to elucidate the Platonic doctrine of a choice of lives. In general the problems in the 6th essay are dealt with in a less mechanical way than those in the 5th. The structure of the argument is still clear but the moves from one point to another are not so obviously marked. This more sophisticated style is a concomitant of the more complex thought of the 6th essay. It is a less elementary piece of work altogether but the reasons for this lie not, as Gallavotti thinks, simply in its probably later date but rather in the fact that it is different in purpose and intended for a different kind of occasion. The part of the 6th essay where the structure is most clearly marked is in the sections at 177 ff. The three types of poetry are first introduced at 178.6 ff., then described in greater detail and shown to be recognised by Plato at 180.3 ff., that section is recapitulated at 191.25-192.3 and then in a further section at 192.6 ff. we are shown how all the types of poetry may be found in Homer. There is thus a certain amount of repetition here as well as clear

marking of the argument. It is just in this part of the essay that both are most necessary for here Proclus is developing complex ideas which are in part his own and it is important that these new ideas should be presented in such a way that the reader cannot fail to grasp them.²⁴ Similarly in the difficult opening sections of the essay, 71.21 ff. and 87.1 ff., we find Proclus concerned to summarise what he has said before moving on to a fresh point (e.g. 76.8-17; 78.14-79.26; 92.28-93.24). Proclus writes as one who is used to the techniques of lecturing and teaching and aware of the necessity of presenting ideas, particularly abstract ideas, in more than one way in order to get them across. The techniques are more obvious in the 5th essay because that is directed at a less advanced audience.

At whom in fact is the 6th essay directed and what is the occasion of its delivery, if it is a lecture, or production, if it is a written work? The essay opens, at 69.23 ff., with the words "Εναγχος ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Πλάτωνος γενεαίσις διαλεγόμενοι παρέστη διακέψασθαι . παρέστη means, "it occurred to me", and the words ἡμῖν... διαλεγόμενοι would naturally imply that Proclus is speaking of himself as giving a lecture. This is the way they are taken by Festugière and he refers to Philostr. VS I 24.1 for διὰ λαοῦ meaning a public lecture; one might also compare LSJ's reference to Philostr. VS II 21.3. Gallavotti, however, appears to take the phrase in the sense of "when we had a discussion", referring ἡμῖν to

24 On Proclus' originality here, see below, pp. 221-34.

Proclus and Syrianus together and not taking it as an editorial "we" for Proclus alone. He takes 69.23 and 71.3 together to imply that it was Syrianus who held the discussion and speaks of "dispute".²⁵ This must, I think, be wrong. Gallavotti has misunderstood διαλεγόμενος and it is quite illegitimate to take 69.23 and 71.3 together when more than a page of text lies between them. The opening sentence could mean either that while Proclus was giving the lecture he had the idea of discussing Plato's attitude to Homer, or that the lecture did itself deal with that topic. Only in the latter case would the 6th essay be, as is usually assumed, a written-up lecture. The usual assumption seems to me to be justified. In the course of the essay the reader/hearer is addressed not only in the second person singular used in Greek either in written work addressed to a reader or in a speech addressed to a number of people, but also in the second person plural which must imply a live audience (e.g. ὁμᾶς and ὁμῶν in 71.22 and 25; βούλεσθε 144.21 and 164.13; Σκοπεῖτε δέ, εἰ βούλεσθε 198.25). In particular the whole passage at 71.21 ff. sounds like the words of a lecturer. But the essay is too long in its present form to have been a single lecture. In writing up the thought could be developed further and there would be more scope for extensive quotation from Plato of the kind found in the second book of the essay.

25 See note 1 on p. 217 of his 1929 article (op. cit. above, note 1). Similarly, Gallavotti, *L'estetica greca...*, p. 11. Cf. also Immisch, p. 269; he thinks that a lecture or διατριβή by Syrianus is what is referred to. Coulter, pp. 112-13 follows Festugière.

The lecture is presented as taking place on Plato's birthday. We know from Porphyry, Plot. 2 and 15 that the birthdays of Plato and Socrates were regularly celebrated by the Platonists and in 15 we hear of Porphyry reading out a poem as part of the celebrations. Similarly in a fragment of Porphyry's Φιλόλογος ἑκπρόσβη in Eusebius Pr. 2.3 467d (Vol. II, p. 12.1 ff. Gifford) we find mention of a banquet accompanied by philosophical discussion on Plato's birthday and the first part of Plutarch's Quaest. conv. VIII, which deals with questions about Plato, is said to take place on Plato's birthday (see the preface to the book, 717a, and the opening of the first "quaestio", 717b). Marinus Ch. 23 mentions Proclus' own celebration of the Πλάτων γενή and the Συμπόσιον.²⁶ Similar anniversary banquets were held in the school of Epicurus.²⁷ The possibility should not be excluded that this setting is fictional. This is clearly the case with the Plato's birthday discussion of Plutarch Quaest. conv. VIII and we may also compare the Renaissance commentary on the Symposium by Marsilio Ficino. The most recent editor of that work, R. Marcel,²⁸ argues that a real banquet celebrating Plato's birthday did take place in the year 1468 but then goes on to say not that the debate recounted by Ficino really took

26 Cf. also Anon. Prol. 6.16-8. Westerink translates ἡ πόλις there as "the city of Athens", but it is more likely to mean "the Athenian philosophers". (The Anon. Prol. is itself a product of the Alexandrian school:- cf. Westerink, p. x).

27 See A.J. Festugière, Epicure et ses dieux (2nd edn., Paris, 1968), pp. 31 ff. and P. Boyancé, Le culte des Muses chez les philosophes grecs (Paris, 1936), pp. 323 ff.

28 In the introduction to his edition (Paris, 1956).

place but that the celebration gave Ficino a pretext for presenting his commentary in the form of a fictional debate. However, the evidence I have mentioned does support the view that the 6th essay really did originate in a special lecture, as does the fact that most Neoplatonic writing originated in oral teaching.

There is yet a further point of doubt regarding the origin of the essay. Gallavotti, as I have mentioned, takes the mistaken view that the birthday lecture was in fact a discussion in which Syrianus took part. Proclus states a number of times that what he says derives from Syrianus and the difficulty lies in determining just how (a) the initial lecture and (b) the essay we have are related to lectures or written work by Syrianus. Gallavotti is aware of this problem and his error lies in oversimplifying the solution. It is important to recognise that Proclus' references to Syrianus are not all to one work of his or to one occasion on which he told Proclus his views on Homer and Plato. On the one hand we have the reference of 95.26-31 to a written work by him, his Λόγος τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν Προβλημάτων and in 133.5ff. a reference to a special monograph on Zeus and Hera; on the other 71.2 ff. refers to a lecture by Syrianus on the κεννυῖα τῶν δογματικῶν of Homer and Plato.²⁹ It is this latter reference which Gallavotti wrongly equates with the birthday lecture of 69.23. So far we have (i) a lecture by Syrianus; (ii) a subsequent

29 Notice ἡκούσμεν, but the word may not be as significant as it looks at first sight. Julian (Or. V.162c) can speak of "hearing" Xenarchus who lived in the time of Augustus. Cf. Dillon, Introduction, p. 10, note 4.

lecture by Proclus on Plato's birthday; (iii) the final written up and expanded version of that lecture. The references to Syrianus' written work could have been added in (iii) but might equally well have been part of (ii). There still remains the reference to Syrianus of 71.21 ff., in which Proclus disclaims originality for what he is going to say; the credit, or otherwise, for it must go to Plato and Syrianus. All Proclus claims he is going to do is repeat the ideas of Syrianus: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸν λέγοντα περιέχει πάντα ἀκριβῶς ὅτιν εἰς δύναμιν τὰ τότε ῥηθέντα διαμνημονεύει καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὕστερον ἡμῶς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν διαβασσομένων ἐπεκιδέσκειν ἐκεῖνος ἡξίωκεν. If we were to take this passage as belonging to stage (iii), the writing up, and refer τότε to the recent birthday lecture of 69.23 we would seem forced to take Gallavotti's view that Syrianus played some part in that. However we need not do this. The last lecture mentioned has been Syrianus' lecture in 71.3; it is to that that τότε refers; Proclus is going to report what was said then and in private discussions afterwards between himself and Syrianus and this passage may be taken as belonging to stage (ii), the original lecture by Proclus. The use of the plural ὅτιν confirms that this is correct. So in fact we need to allow for four stages in the development of the essay:

- 1) lecture by Syrianus (71.3)
- 2) subsequent discussions between Proclus and Syrianus (71.26-7)
- 3) a lecture by Proclus on Plato's birthday (69.23)
- 4) the writing up of that lecture into the essay we have.

We shall see in Chapter 3 that these four stages of development have to be taken into account in considering how much of the essay derives from Syrianus. The fact that there is more than one type of reference to Syrianus shows in itself that the view that is often taken, that Proclus is doing little more than transcribing Syrianus, is too simple to be correct.³⁰

The celebration on Plato's birthday in which the 6th essay originated, or rather in which it originated as far as Proclus himself is concerned, would be a celebration within the Platonic school, just as the celebration of Epicurus' birthday described by Festugière³¹ was an event within the Epicurean school. A number of features of the 6th essay make clear that, no less than the 5th, it is intended for an audience of students of Plato within the school although it differs from the 5th in not being directed specifically at elementary students. When Proclus cites passages of Plato he does so in a way which suggests his audience are all expected to be familiar with Plato: e.g. τῶν ἐν Τιμαίῳ γεγραμμένων ἀναμνησθῶμεν (164.13 ff.) τὸ δὲ φανταστικὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ γεγραμμένων κατανοήσωμεν (190.26-7). (Cf. also 169.25-6, 157.16-7, etc.). At 131.29-31 Proclus says that the words of Odysseus in Od. 9.6-10 agree τοῖς ἡμετέροις δόγμασιν, meaning, "with Platonic doctrines". The very term δόγματα shows that we are in the context of a philosophical school with fixed doctrines; that these are just called "ours" shows

30 Pp. 120 ff. below.

31 See reference in note 27 above.

that we are among members of, or at least sympathisers with, the school and that all of the audience are presumed to take certain points of view for granted. In the same way Socrates at 149.22 is called *ὁ παρ' ἡμῶν Σωκράτης*.

The most striking passage in this respect comes at the very end of the essay, at 205.21 ff. After another reference to Syrianus - the whole essay is dedicated to the memory of his

βουλευόμενα, a vague term which can cover lectures, discussions, and individual "tutorials" - Proclus says that his words are

to be *ἔργα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς*. As Festugière points out in his translation, this is a topos. He cites parallels in

Stob. Hermet. fr. XI.4, in his own note on that passage, and in Porph. Marc. 14-5, especially p. 284.16 ff. Nauck. He

might have added Epictetus I 29.30 *π' οὖν; λέγειν δὲ*

τῶτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς; and 64 (at the end of a

διατριβή) *π' οὖν; κηρύσσειν δὲ τῶτα πρὸς πάντας*.

The parallel from the Hermetica is interesting for Festugière himself has shown³² that the Hermetica belong to a scholastic

context, of instruction given by a master to one or several

pupils. Similarly the Διατριβαί of Epictetus are Arrian's

reports of the philosophical discussions which Epictetus conducted in his school at Nicopolis.³³ Festugière suggests in his

note on Proclus that the topos is merely used here to give

solemnity to the conclusion but I think there is a little more

to it than that. It does show us that here we have a work for

32 In La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, Vol. II (Paris, 1949), Ch. 2.

33 Cf. I. Bruns, De schola Epicteti (Kiel, 1897).

the school, not for an outside audience, and in Proclus' insistence that the Homeric myths he defends could be harmful if not understood aright we may find the reason why the work is unsuitable for any chance reader. In the conditions of the 5th century A.D., where the Platonic Academy continued to teach pagan philosophy while the outside world was largely Christian, there might be particular point in stressing that allegories in terms of Neoplatonist metaphysics were for the ears of the school only.³⁴

Presumably the audience at the special lecture on Plato's birthday would be all the members of the school who wished to come, from the wisest and most learned to the newest and least experienced. As often happens with such lectures Proclus pitches the argument at quite a high level. He goes beyond the simple exposition of Plato to develop his ideas with some complexity and although he continues to mark the progress of the argument clearly the whole process is less mechanical than in the 5th essay. The students who were attending the elementary course on the Republic of which the 5th essay forms a part must, one imagines, have found themselves in unexpectedly deep water when they came along to the master's special lecture on Plato's birthday. These remarks apply equally to the written up version of the lecture which we have, for I think we are justified in assuming that while Proclus may have added things

34 I owe this last point to Prof. E.R. Dodds. It is supported by the fact that *ἐκ νεότητος* is one of the "code-phrases" which Proclus uses to refer to the Christians:- see H.D. Saffrey, "Allusions antichrétiennes chez Proclus: le diadoque platonicien", RSPH 59 (1975), pp. 553-63, and cf. the allusion to the Christians in the 6th essay, at 74.8.

when he came to "publish" the lecture, or rather to prepare it for circulation in written form, and while in lecturing he might repeat points or digress, as lecturers do, nevertheless the essential characteristics of the work which distinguish it from a simpler production like the 5th essay remain the same in the written version as they were in the original lecture.

I have considered the form of the 5th and 6th essays in themselves and in relation to the rest of the Commentary on the Republic. Two questions remain to be answered which concern the relation of the Commentary on the Republic to Proclus' work as a whole. One is the question why, in dealing with the Republic, Proclus should have written an introductory course dealing with specific problems, and special monographs on particular topics in it, like the 6th essay, but no continuous commentary. The other is the question of the date of the work: can we say anything about its date or about the date of different parts of it in relation to Proclus' other works?

The answer to the first of these two questions is, I think, that we have no continuous commentary on the Republic by Proclus because the Republic was not one of the dialogues read in the regular Platonic school course as laid down by Iamblichus.³⁵ That order may be found in Ch. 26 of the Anon. Procl. The difficulties and confusions of the passage are discussed by Westerink on p. xxxvii of the introduction to his

³⁵ This answer was suggested to me by Prof. T. Gelzer. Cf. also Saffrey and Westerink's introduction to the PT, Vol. I, pp. lv-vii.

edition of the Anon. Prol. However one resolves these, it is quite clear that the Republic, together with the Laws, did not form a compulsory part of the course but was an optional extra. The compulsory dialogues listed in the Anon. Prol. are Alcibiades I, Gorgias, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Phaedrus, Symposium, Philebus, Timaeus and Parmenides. Westerink argues that the missing two required to make up the number of twelve mentioned are Sophist and Politicus, which would follow the Theaetetus. Proclus' full line-by-line commentaries were all on works within the compulsory list: those on Alcibiades I, Cratylus, Timaeus and Parmenides survive, at least in part, and we know that he also wrote on Phaedo, Theaetetus, Phaedrus and Philebus.³⁶ He wrote a commentary on the Sophist too, a fact which fits Westerink's argument.³⁷ The Republic does figure in the short list of dialogues that the student should read in Ch. 5 of Albinus' Isagoge and it is clear that it remained popular although excluded by Iamblichus from the compulsory canon and kept out of that canon by Proclus. (This seems the only reasonable interpretation of the statement at the beginning of Anon. Prol. 26 that Proclus *ἐκφάσκει* the Republic) It appears in Henry's list of the dialogues most quoted by Plotinus.³⁸ It therefore makes excellent sense and accords well with what

36 See R. Beutler's RE article "Proklos" (1957) for the evidence for these works.

37 His commentary on the Gorgias may have been only on the myth and if so would be like the commentary on the myth of Er which forms the 16th essay of the In Remp., while his commentary on the speech of Diotima in the Symposium falls into the same class of commentary on a portion of a text.

38 Cf. Wallis, p. 19.

we know about the dialogues read in the Platonic school, both as part of the compulsory canon and as popular optional extras, that Proclus should have treated specific problems in the Republic and even given an introductory course on it but should not have composed a detailed commentary on the whole work.³⁹

The whole question of the dating of Proclus' commentaries is made very difficult by the nature of these works. As we have seen they were originally delivered as lectures and only later put into written form. A special lecture like the 6th essay will only have been given once but a lecture like the 5th essay which formed part of a course could have been given year after year. This makes any attempt to date Proclus' commentaries on the basis of cross-references between them, such as that of Freudenthal,⁴⁰ virtually impossible. Freudenthal argued that the In Tim. which we know from Marinus Ch. 31 to have been written when Proclus was 28, i.e. in 439/40, was later than the In Remp., but Praechter has shown⁴¹ that Freudenthal's treatment of these references is inadequate. Praechter himself points out that each of the two works refers to the other but argues that the nature of the references suggests that actual publication of the In Tim. preceded that of the In Remp. Whereas at In Remp. II 335.20 we find ἐν τοῖς ἑς τοῦ Τίμαιον ἐκδοσέμενοις the references in the In Tim. to

39 On the canon of dialogues, cf. A.J. Festugière, "L'ordre de lecture des dialogues de Platon aux Ve/VI^e siècles", MH 26 (1969), pp. 281-96, reprinted in Festugière's Etudes de philosophie grecque (Paris, 1971), pp. 535-50; also Larsen, pp. 332-40.

40 "Zu Proklus und dem jüngeren Olympiodor", Hermes XVI (1881), pp. 214 ff.

41 In his review of Diehl's edition of the In Tim. in GGA 167 (1905), pp. 531-2.

study of the Republic can all be taken as references to oral interpretation. (He mentions particularly In Tim. III 66.16 ὡς ἐμύθομεν ἐν Πολιτεῖα the form of which points, he says, on the analogy of other Proclus quotations, to oral teaching.)

Both Freudenthal and Praechter assume that the In Remp. is a unified work. If we take account of its heterogeneous nature, then all Praechter has shown is that the 16th essay, on the myth of Er, in which ἐν ταῖς εἰς τὸν Τίμαριον ἐκδοδόμενοις occurs, is later than the In Tim. and that some at least of Proclus' oral interpretation of the Republic preceded the In Tim. In the 5th and 6th essays the only references to other works of Proclus are two instances of the vague ἐν ἄλλοις at 126.20 and 128.18-9. Kroll's index to the In Remp., under "Proclus", shows that it is in fact in the 16th essay that Proclus makes the largest number of references to his other works. This tells us about the nature of that essay, that it is detailed and closely-documented scholarly commentary, like the In Tim. rather than about its date. In all the twelve essays which form the Isagoge to the Republic the only cross-reference, apart from cases of the vague ἐν ἄλλοις, is to Proclus' commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles at 40.21. Marinus Ch. 26 tells us that it was not until after Syrianus' death that Proclus made any extensive study of the works of Porphyry and Iamblichus on the Chaldaean Oracles and of "the accompanying writings of the Chaldaeans" although he was "brought up with" (ἐν τρεφόμενος) the Oracles themselves. This suggests that Proclus did not write

his own commentary on the Oracles until after Syrianus' death. 40.21 does refer explicitly to a written commentary - ἐν τοῖς αἰς τὸ λόγια γεγραμμένοις - and so allows us to conclude that the final version of the 4th essay and of the Isagoge of which it forms a part was not composed until after that commentary. The lack of other cross-references is due to the elementary nature of the Isagoge. Just as Proclus keeps reference in it to other thinkers than Plato to a minimum, so also he does not include detailed cross-references to his own works. Nor does he do so in the 6th essay, for a lecture on a special occasion is not the place for such references.

We have now at least a date before which the Isagoge could not have been completed in its present form. Can we also date it relatively to the 6th essay? Gallavotti in his 1929 article⁴² tries to date all the essays of the In Remp. relatively to one another on grounds of style and treatment of subject, but he fails completely to take into account the fact that such differences are due to a difference of genre rather than a difference of date. The fact that the 5th essay is simpler in its approach than the 6th does not necessarily prove that Proclus was younger and less experienced when he wrote it but rather that it was written for a younger and less experienced audience. Indeed it could be argued that greater skill and experience on the teacher's part are required to present something simply; it is often the youngest scholars

42 Op. cit. above, note 1. Coulter, p. 41, note 11, unthinkingly accepts Gallavotti's suggested chronology.

who write most obscurely. However, as I have argued on pp. 13-21 above, it is in fact possible to show that the thought of the 6th essay is a sophistication of the thought of the 5th and in particular that the classification of types of poetry of 177 ff. is a development of the classification implied in the fifth problem of the 5th essay which we can see from the In Tim. and Hermias to have been taken over by Proclus from Syrianus. So we can conclude that the 6th essay is later than the 5th, although not on Gallavotti's grounds.

Gallavotti also argues that Syrianus had only just died when the 6th essay was written down, that Marinus' Life suggests that Syrianus died soon after Proclus had completed the In Tim. and so that the 6th essay must have been composed soon after 440. It should be said in passing that no conclusions can in fact be drawn from Marinus' Life about the date of Syrianus' death relative to the completion of the In Tim. As we shall see, it is more probable that Syrianus died before the In Tim. was completed. But the premise from which this argument of Gallavotti's begins is in any case invalid. His reason for thinking that Syrianus' death occurred only a short time before the essay was written is his mistaken belief that the recent lecture on Plato's birthday of 69.23 was a discussion in which Syrianus took part (cf. pp. 36-7 above). This, as I have shown, is wrong. As Gallavotti sees, the closing words of the essay τῶντα . . . μνημὴν ἀεχρῆσθαι τῆς τοῦ καλῶς πεποιθὸς ἡμῶν βούουσις suggest that Syrianus is now dead but there is no clue as to how long he has been dead. We may even suppose that the birthday lecture, which in my view was given

by Proclus alone, was in Syrianus' honour as well as Plato's. So we can date the 6th essay after the 5th, on the grounds that it shows a development in at least one aspect of the thought, and the 5th essay, as part of the Isagoge, after the composition of Proclus' commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles. The 6th essay is more or less explicitly said to be written after the death of Syrianus, while what Marinus tells us about Proclus' study of the Chaldaean Oracles allows us to place the 5th essay too after that time.

I implied above that In Tim. 64.13-65.3 was written before the 6th essay. Saffrey and Westerink have argued convincingly that Syrianus died about 437, not long before the composition of the In Tim., a time which is one of our few fixed dates for the chronology of Proclus' works.⁴³ We may therefore suppose a relative chronology of Syrianus' death, In Tim., Commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles, Isagoge to the Republic, including the 5th essay, and 6th essay. Saffrey and Westerink argue, from their suggested date of 437 for Syrianus' death, and from Marinus' statement (in Ch. 26) that Proclus spent five years on his commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles, that it was started straight after Syrianus' death and completed in 442.⁴⁴ 442 would certainly be the earliest possible date for its completion and a later date could be right. Marinus' words do not definitely imply that Proclus threw himself into the study of the Chaldaean Oracles as soon

43 PT, Vol. I, Introduction, pp. xv-xvii.

44 Ibid., p. xx.

as Syrianus died. We can thus date both the Isagoge to the Republic, and the 6th essay, some time after 442, but it is important to remember that when we are dealing with lectures which, like the In Tim. or the Isagoge to the Republic, may have been given over and over again, it is not at all clear what "date of composition" means, whether the date of the first delivery of the lecture-course, or the date of its publication in written form, or the date after which no further alterations were made to the written text. The 6th essay was a special lecture, given once and then written up, and we are relatively fortunate in being able to distinguish the stages of its composition and to date it relatively to the 5th essay on grounds of content even if we cannot put a finger on the exact year in which it was written.⁴⁵

This examination of the form and the scholastic context of the 5th and 6th essays has, I hope, shown the importance of a proper understanding of these matters before approaching not only questions like that of date but also questions concerning the thought of the essays and of all similar works. If we do not understand the way in which the ideas are being put forward, we are likely to misunderstand and misjudge the ideas themselves.

45 In general, on the problems of dating Proclus' works, cf. the section in Beutler's RE article.

CHAPTER TWO

THE TEXT OF HOMER AND THE TEXT OF PLATO

We saw in the last chapter how Proclus' 5th and 6th essays were to be related to his activity of teaching and lecturing in the Academy. Before turning to the sources and methods of his interpretation of Homer and Plato, I propose in this chapter to examine what Proclus' text of these authors was like. Were the Homer and the Plato he interpreted different from the Homer and the Plato we know today?

The Alexandrian critics of the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C. stabilised the number of lines in the text of Homer and from that period we find that the scholia distinguish between a vulgate text and the readings of Alexandrian scholars like Aristarchus and Zenodotus. The enormous number of medieval MSS of Homer reflect this situation. They present essentially the vulgate text, but with many variants, most of which are unimportant. T.W. Allen grouped the medieval MSS of the Iliad into 24 families, but the tradition is so mixed and the correspondences between manuscripts so complicated that the history of the text cannot be reconstructed from Allen's groupings.¹ For the Odyssey the situation is less complicated because of the smaller number of manuscripts, but essentially the same.

¹ See the text of the Iliad by T.W. Allen (Oxford, 1931). Vol. I, Prolegomena, gives his classification of the MSS. The classification is briefly described and criticised by P. Mazon, Introduction à l'Illiade (Paris, 1942), pp. 7-8.

We cannot postulate a single archetype for the medieval MSS of Homer. Thus Mazon² postulates a number of uncial manuscripts between the 6th and 9th centuries A.D. from which transcription into minuscule was made. We might therefore expect that Proclus, in the 5th century A.D., would have a text of Homer which was essentially the vulgate text but included some variants. His Homer in fact would be very like ours.³ I shall examine Proclus' quotations from Homer in the 5th and 6th essays in detail in order to see whether this expectation is fulfilled.⁴

Many of Proclus' Homer quotations are passages attacked by Plato in Rep. II and III and the quotations may be divided into two main groups, those which we might assume derive directly from the Homeric text, since they are not quoted by Plato, and those which are quoted in a Plato passage under discussion and may therefore derive either from that passage or directly from Homer. Whether following Plato or introducing quotations which are not in Plato, Proclus never quotes Homer by the division into books but refers only to episodes or to context or, where the context is unimportant, simply introduces a quotation with no indication of where it comes in the poems. The division of the Iliad and Odyssey into 24 books each is

2 Op. cit., p. 13.

3 Wilamowitz in "Die Hymnen des Proklos und Synesios", SPAW 1907, p. 274, note 1, points out that in Hymn VII, 1.38 Proclus' ^{ἐπὶ χόρῳ} suggests that he may have read the variant ^{ἐπὶ χόρῳ} in Od. 5.83, while his use of ^{ἐπὶ χόρῳ} in Hymn II, 1.6 implies that like Gregory of Nazianzen he read this corruption of ^{ἐπὶ χόρῳ} in his text of Homer.

4 Unless otherwise stated, my information on MSS of the Iliad comes from Allen's text of 1931, and on MSS of the Odyssey from Allen's OCT, 2nd edn. of 1917. I have adopted Allen's symbols for the different MSS and families of MSS.

usually ascribed to the Alexandrian scholars and is found in papyri from the 1st century B.C. onwards.⁵ Despite this ancient authors never refer to Homer by book.

Proclus freely uses quotations from passages of Homer not mentioned by Plato in order to support his arguments, just as he quotes other passages of Plato, or the Chaldaean Oracles, or even, on one occasion, Callimachus (125.29-30). There are two such "supporting" quotations on p. 93, one on pp. 99-100, another two on p. 102, and so on. Proclus also uses passages of Homer which are morally commendable to back up the defence of those which might be condemned as reprehensible. This appears clearly in, for example, the use of Od. 6.46 at 87.20 where Homer's own testimony to the bliss of the gods is set against his talk of their taking part in battles.⁶

There are no textual problems in fifteen of these direct quotations from Homer which are quite unrelated to Plato. A further two cases, the phrase $\Delta\iota\acute{o}\varsigma \epsilon\upsilon\delta\acute{o}\nu$ from Il. 20.13 at 115.19 and the word $\nu\eta\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho$ in 201.11-2, are so short that they hardly qualify as quotations. In all these cases Proclus' text agrees with the vast mainstream of the tradition. In a further two quotations Kroll has emended the Proclus MS to agree with the known text of Homer, and has been right to do

5 See R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship (Oxford, 1968), pp. 115-6.

6 Proclus also introduces some allusions of his own to Homer. These are noted by Festugière in his translation. On 113.29-30, Festugière notes that Hermes is compared to a $\lambda\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\alpha$ in Od. 5.51. The transformation of Athene into Mentor is familiar from Od. 2.401 and 4.653-6. Festugière adds in his note, "Apollon faucon ne m'est pas connu." In fact Apollo is compared to an $\alpha\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ in Il. 15.237-8 (cf. the quotation of those lines in Aelian NA X. 14).

so.⁷ In 93.19-21 the Proclus MS reads *εἰς ἀρίμους* in the quotation of Il. 2.783. Kroll has restored the correct punctuation *ἐν Ἀρίμοις*. Likewise in the quotation of Il. 2.599 at 195.1 the Proclus MS reads *καὶ τε* *χολωδόμενα πηρὸν θέσαν* which Kroll has emended to the Homeric *κὶ δὲ χολωδόμενα . . . καὶ τε* is not found as a variant in this line anywhere else and cannot be right in the context.⁸ A similar case is the quotation of Il. 1.262 and 267 at 58.21-2. There m³, the corrector of the Proclus MS, has made the necessary emendations, as Kroll notes in his app. crit.

In six of his direct quotations Proclus agrees with the vulgate in not adopting the reading of an Alexandrian scholar. In Od. 6.46, quoted at 87.20, Proclus reads *τῇ* not Rhianus' *τῇ*. In Il. 1.122, quoted at 144.25, he reads *διλοκτεχνῶντα τε* not the *διλοκτεχνέβτα τε* of Aristophanes of Byzantium. In Il. 21.122-3, quoted at 152.5-6, Proclus reads *καὶ 60* and *ὑπελῆς*, not the variants *ῆ 60* and *ὑπελῆν*; these variants, recorded in the scholia, are attributed to Aristarchus in the OCT of Monro and Allen.⁹ In Od. 1.337-8, quoted at 194.15-6, Proclus reads *οἶδ' αὖ* with the vulgate, not Zenodotus' *ῆδ' αὖ*. (*Ἀριστάρχος δὲ ἐν συγχεραίνε τῇ γραφῇ*, say the scholia.)

7 My information on readings in the (Laurentian) MS of Proclus comes from Kroll's app. crit. I have inspected the Laurentian MS very briefly and concluded that Kroll's reading of it is quite reliable. I have also made some use of the Corpus MS which is a copy of the Laurentian.

8 On the use of *καὶ τε* in Homer cf. P. Chantraine, Grammaire Homérique, Vol. II (Paris, 1953), p. 343.

9 (3rd edn., Oxford, 1920). Monro and Allen are presumably following Ludwig and taking *οὐκ ἐν τῇ ὑπελῆν* *ἔπειτα* in the scholia to A as an indication that both variants derive from Aristarchus:- cf. Labarbe, p. 187.

More interestingly, in his text of Il. 1.423-4 at 166.28-30 Proclus has the $\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}$ of our vulgate and not the $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}$ of Aristarchus, Antimachus, Aristophanes and three of the pre-Alexandrian city editions, but of only three medieval MSS. Here quite an important part of the ancient tradition presents the variant but Proclus goes along with that part of it from which the medieval tradition derived. Another interesting case is his text of Il. 1.167-8, quoted at 145.1-2. Here the medieval tradition has either $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\eta\nu \kappa\epsilon \kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\omega$ or $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\eta\nu \kappa\epsilon\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\omega$. Aristarchus and Herodian read $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota} \kappa\epsilon \kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\omega$ which is written in above the line in A. The scholia from A make the point of the variant clear: it avoids both the reduplicated $\kappa\epsilon\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\omega$ and the use of both $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ and $\kappa\epsilon$ in $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\eta\nu \kappa\epsilon \kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\omega$. Thus Allen prints the better reading deriving from Aristarchus. Proclus does avoid the howler of both $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ and $\kappa\epsilon$ together but agrees with that part of the medieval tradition which reads $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\eta\nu \kappa\epsilon\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\omega$. These last two cases show that what became the medieval vulgate was pretty well established in Proclus' time and that some of the more frequent or better variants of the ancient tradition had already been lost sight of in the texts in general use. A similar case is Od. 3.267-8, quoted at 194.22-4. There k Pal. T U¹ read $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho \delta\acute{\alpha}\rho$ which Allen adopts in his text because it makes better sense in the context. Proclus, with the majority of the tradition, has the inferior reading $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$.

However, Proclus does not always agree with the vulgate. There are a number of cases where his text presents a variant. Six of these are quite unimportant. In Il. 14.203-4, quoted

at 93.16-7, Proclus reads $\kappa\alpha\theta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon$ where our Homer reads $\kappa\alpha\theta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon$. $\kappa\alpha\theta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon$, though a possible Homeric form¹⁰ would not scan here. $\kappa\alpha\theta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon$ would be iotacism for $\kappa\alpha\theta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon$.¹¹ It is difficult to know what an editor of Proclus should do here. $\kappa\alpha\theta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon$ cannot be right, but should one print $\kappa\alpha\theta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon$ on the assumption that that was what Proclus' text of Homer read, or the unspoiled $\kappa\alpha\theta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon$? In either case no conclusions of importance can be drawn about Proclus' text of Homer. At 130.29-131.3 Proclus quotes Il. 9.116-8 (splitting the quotation in the middle of line 116 and inserting $\kappa\alpha\iota$.) Kroll's accentuation of $\kappa\eta\rho\iota$ in line 117, following the accentuation which has been added in the Laurentian MS of the In Remp.,¹² is odd. With the necessary meaning, "heart", the accentuation should be $\kappa\eta\rho\iota$, but this of course is evidence of an error in the manuscript of Proclus which has been perpetuated by Kroll¹³ and not of anything in Proclus' text of Homer. At 145.25-6 Proclus quotes Il. 9.524 and 526. Line 525 is not necessary for the sense and is therefore deliberately omitted. (There is no need to suppose it was not in Proclus' text of Homer.) In line 526 Kroll, following the Proclus MS, punctuates $\tau'\epsilon\pi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\nu\tau\omicron$ where Allen punctuates $\tau\epsilon \pi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\nu\tau\omicron$. Both augmented and unaugmented forms of verbs are found in Homer and how to punctuate cases like this is a

10 Cf. LSJ and their example, Il. 19.280.

11 Cf. Mazon, op. cit. (note 1 above), p. 129.

12 See Kroll's preface, p. vi.

13 I have checked the reading in the Corpus MS, since the Laurentian was not easily available, and confirmed that $\kappa\eta\rho\iota$ is not due to an independent error of Kroll's.

for καὶ ἔχει.¹⁴ The fact that Proclus twice quotes the line with the reading $\Theta\alpha\lambda\acute{\iota}\eta$ confirms that this is a genuine variant, not a slip, and it looks as if the 17 medieval MSS which read $\Theta\alpha\lambda\acute{\iota}\eta$ are following an ancient variant known to Dio Chrysostom as well as to Proclus.¹⁵

At 141.14-5 Proclus quotes Il. 18.401. He reads $\gamma\upsilon\alpha\pi\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ for $\gamma\upsilon\alpha\mu\pi\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ as do 6 medieval MSS, including the Townleyanus. The same line is quoted by Syrianus, In Met. 83.3, where the MS reads $\gamma\upsilon\alpha\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ which Kroll has emended to $\gamma\upsilon\alpha\pi\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$. We shall see in Chapter 3 that Proclus' interpretation of the line derives from Syrianus.¹⁶ Either Proclus and Syrianus both read $\gamma\upsilon\alpha\pi\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ in their text of Homer (they may well both have used the same copy) or Proclus is not quoting directly from Homer after all here, but is copying the quotation from Syrianus. In either case, we again have an ancient variant which persists in part of the medieval tradition.

The same phenomenon occurs in the quotation of Il. 18.175-9, quoted at 150.23-151.1. There Proclus reads $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\gamma\epsilon\iota$ at the end of line 176 as do 42 medieval MSS. The others read $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\gamma\epsilon$. A is among those which read $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\gamma\epsilon\iota$ and the scholia note: $\acute{\epsilon}\nu \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega \acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\gamma\epsilon\iota$. $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\gamma\epsilon\iota$ is also the reading of a Syriac palimpsest which contains fragments of the Iliad written in the 6th century A.D.¹⁷ This is near

14 Cf. J.F. Kindstrand, Homer in der zweiten Sophistik (Uppsala, 1973), p. 42. Kindstrand provides a useful collection and analysis of the Homeric quotations in Dio, Maximus of Tyre and Aelius Aristides.

15 In 172.15 Kroll has supplied $\Theta\epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$ at the end of 1.602. This is right:- cf. Proclus' reference to the line at 172.25.

16 P.173 below.

17 See W. Cureton, Fragments of the Iliad of Homer from a Syriac Palimpsest (London, 1851) and Catalogue of Ancient Manuscripts in the British Museum Part I, Greek (London, 1881), pp.6-7. Allen, followed by Mazon, classifies the MS as a papyrus (no.9 in his list) but this is not strictly correct.

to Proclus in date and it is exciting to find that the palimpsest has the same variant as Proclus here. Unfortunately Il. 18.401 is not among the lines preserved in the palimpsest and so we cannot know whether it read $\gamma\upsilon\alpha\pi\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ or $\gamma\upsilon\alpha\mu\pi\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ there. The scholion in A, which may go back to Didymus, bears witness that both $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\gamma\epsilon\iota$ and $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\gamma\epsilon\nu$ were read in antiquity.

There is another variant of this kind in the quotation of Il. 23.219 and 221 at 152.20-1. (Line 220 is deliberately omitted and its sense given by the preceding $\epsilon\mu\sigma\pi\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\epsilon\iota\nu$). In line 219 Proclus reads $\epsilon\lambda\acute{\omega}\nu$ for the vulgate $\epsilon\chi\omega\nu$. $\epsilon\lambda\acute{\omega}\nu$ is the reading of 38 medieval MSS, including A. $\epsilon\chi\omega\nu$ is a varia lectio in A and the reading of the rest of the tradition. 22 of the MSS which read $\epsilon\lambda\acute{\omega}\nu$ are MSS which read $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\gamma\epsilon\iota$ and although the only ancient testimony here is Proclus (as far as I know) this may be considered a further case of an ancient variant which recurs in part of the medieval tradition.

Besides these four cases of a known variant which is found in Proclus, there are two cases of variants found only in his text, to my knowledge. At 58.18-9 Proclus quotes Od. 1.298-9, beginning $\sigma\upsilon\chi$ $\delta\rho\acute{\alpha}\alpha\varsigma$ not, as the MSS of Homer do, $\hat{\eta}$ $\sigma\upsilon\kappa$ $\acute{\alpha}\iota\epsilon\iota\varsigma$. Allen notes Proclus' variant and compares Od. 17.545, a line which does begin $\sigma\upsilon\chi$ $\delta\rho\acute{\alpha}\alpha\varsigma$. This variant is most easily explained as due to quoting from memory. The remaining variant occurs at 147.17-8 where Proclus quotes Il. 21.600-1.¹⁸ In line 601 where our texts read $\pi\rho\acute{o}\theta\epsilon$ $\mu\delta\acute{\omega}\nu$

18 In line 600 Proclus agrees with the vulgate and Aristarchus in reading $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ not the inferior $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ ρ' found in some MSS.

Proclus reads $\pi\rho\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\prime\ \acute{\alpha}\chi\iota\lambda\eta\omicron\varsigma$ and there the quotation stops. The line in our texts of Homer continues $\delta\ \delta'\epsilon\pi\epsilon\delta\delta\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \pi\omicron\delta\delta\iota\ \delta\iota\omega\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu$. This would be impossible with the five syllables of $\pi\rho\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\prime\ \acute{\alpha}\chi\iota\lambda\eta\omicron\varsigma$ instead of the four of $\pi\rho\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\ \pi\omicron\delta\delta\iota\nu$, but with $\pi\rho\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\prime\ \acute{\alpha}\chi\iota\lambda\eta\omicron\varsigma$ the line could be completed with, e.g., $\delta\ \delta'\epsilon\delta\delta\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \pi\omicron\delta\delta\iota\ \delta\iota\omega\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu$. $\pi\rho\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\prime\ \acute{\alpha}\chi\iota\lambda\eta\omicron\varsigma$ also involves taking line 600 as going rather oddly with $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\gamma\upsilon\omicron\pi\iota$ instead of as a pronoun referring to Achilles which it must be if we read $\pi\rho\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\ \pi\omicron\delta\delta\iota\nu$. One answer to the problem might be that Proclus is deliberately changing the text. It is hard to see why he should feel any need to make such a change. This whole section of his work is about Achilles and we do not need his name inserted in the Homeric verses to know that they apply to him. It is possible that Proclus' text of Homer did actually read $\pi\rho\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\prime\ \acute{\alpha}\chi\iota\lambda\eta\omicron\varsigma$. We might suppose that the change was made by someone who did not properly understand the $\omega\pi\eta$ of line 600. Alternatively Proclus is again quoting from memory. This is certainly the easiest, and probably the best, explanation of both these variants which are not found elsewhere.

Sometimes Proclus quotes a passage of Homer to which Plato only alludes. Plato in Rep. II and III rejects a large number of passages in a short space and Proclus gives a detailed defence of each one. So it is no surprise that he should expand allusions by Plato into full quotations. For example, when introducing the discussion of the dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon in Iliad 2 (115.4 ff.) Proclus closely echoes Plato's

phraseology at Rep. II 383a7-8 but at 117.9-10 in the course of his argument Proclus actually quotes Il. 2.10, a line which is never quoted by Plato. So too at 113.14-5, in his interpretation of Proteus, Proclus quotes Od. 4.417-8, while at the beginning of the whole section (109.11 ff.) he has exactly followed Plato in quoting Od. 17.485-6 but mentioning Proteus and Thetis by name without quotation. (Cf. Rep. II 381d.)

In some of the cases of this kind Proclus' text of Homer presents no problems, or agrees with the vulgate against an Alexandrian variant. So his text of Il. 2.10, quoted at 117.9-10, and of Il. 4.93, quoted at 104.14, present no problems, while in Il. 4.88, quoted at 103.29, Proclus' text agrees with the vulgate *ἐν τῷ ἐφείπετο* against Zenodotus' *ἐφίπε δὲ τὸνδε*.

At Rep. II 379e5 Plato attacks *θεῶν ἔρις τε καὶ κριῖς διὰ Δέιπτος*. This has been variously interpreted by commentators as referring (a) to the beginning of Il. 20, (b) to the Judgement of Paris and (c) to Il. 20 with *ἔρις* and to the Judgement of Paris with *κριῖς*. Proclus discusses both myths (pp. 106-9), either taking Plato according to view (c) or, as his use of both terms *ἔρις* and *κριῖς* at both 106.15-6 and 108.5-6 makes likely, trying to cover all three possible views of Plato. W.R. Hardie¹⁹ thought Plato was referring to the Judgement of Paris only and made the whole phrase an allusion to the Cypria but there is no need to

19 CR 4 (1890), p. 182.

suppose that Proclus has the Cypria in mind here, for the Judgement of Paris is briefly mentioned in Homer in Il. 24.29-30. In his discussion of the *ἔρις* at the beginning of Il. 20, Proclus quotes 1.25 and 1.4. In 1.25 Kroll has corrected *δ' ἔρ' ἦγεθ'* of the Proclus MS to *δ' ἔρ' ἦγεθ'*, no doubt rightly. In the text of line 4 Proclus reads *Θέμειτα* with the vulgate, not the *Θέμιτα* of some MSS, or the *Θέμειτ' ἐκέλευσε* of Ps-Plu. Vita Homeri 119. Similarly in 169.11 Proclus picks up Plato's reference to the River Ocean at Phaedo 112e6 ff. by quoting Od. 11.158. His text of that line agrees with the vulgate in reading *πρῶτα* not the *πρῶτον* of P3, U8, Strabo XV.1.25 or Porph. ad Il. 192.32, nor the *πρῶτος* of R6, and *τὸν*, not the *ὄν* of p.

At 113.14-5 Proclus quotes Od. 4.417-8 and here he presents the variant *ἐν γαίῃ* at the end of line 417 for the *ἐν γαίαν* of the medieval tradition.

Two of the cases where Proclus expands an allusion by Plato into a quotation are rather more complex. In 132.29-30 Proclus quotes Il. 14.315-6 and goes on to quote 11.295-6 at 133.2-3. Plato at Rep. III 390c alludes to both couplets and quotes the second half of line 296. Labarbe²⁰ points out that Plato confuses lines 295-6 with Zeus' speech in lines 317-27: he attributes both 295-6 and 315-6 to Zeus with the words *Δί᾽ . . . λέγοντα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμπροσθεν ἔχεται ὡς οὐδ' ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον . . .* etc. when in fact 295-6 in Homer are part of the narrative. Proclus expands the allusion into two

20 Pp. 344-8.

full quotations but continues the mistake. He ingeniously puts 315-6 in direct speech and 295-6 in indirect so that he can quote Homer's 3rd person ἐπιγέσθην, without upsetting the syntax of his sentence. One would naturally suppose that Proclus is quoting Homer directly here. If so, when he looked at the text of Homer, he would surely notice Plato's error, but he has let it go unremarked. Indeed he has managed to continue it. The other possibility is that Proclus' Plato did include the lines of Homer either in the text or, perhaps more likely, as a note in the margin. We shall meet more problems like this as we go on and the second hypothesis here is, I think, at least worth considering seriously. If it is correct we are not in fact dealing with a direct quotation from Homer. Plato's τὸ πρῶτον is picked up by Proclus' τὴν πρώτην (why the feminine? with ἡμέραν understood?) and it is reasonable, despite what Labarbe says to the contrary, to take them both as confirming Aristarchus' reading πρῶτον περ in line 295 for the πρῶτον of most of the MSS of Homer. φίλους λήθοντε ποκῆς, the only words actually quoted by Plato, are picked up again by Proclus at 139.21 as a separate detail requiring defence.²¹

The influence of Plato is still stronger on the second complex case, Od. 10.513-4, quoted at 169.14-5 with reference to the account of the rivers of the underworld at Phaedo 113.²² The MS of Proclus presents:

ἐνθα μὲν εἶς Ἀχέρων τε Πυριφλεγέθων τε ῥέουσι
Κυκλωπὸς θ' ὅς δὲ Στυγὸς ὕδατος ἔσται ἀπόρριψ

21 Cf. below, pp. 179-80.

22 Cf. above on Od. 11.158, at 169.11.

which Kroll originally emended to the vulgate:

ἔνθα μὲν εἰς Ἀχέροντα Πυριφλεγέθων τε ῥέουσι
Κωκυτός θ' ὅς δ' ἢ Στυγὸς ὑδάτος ἔσθ' ἐπὶ πύλαις

However he changed his mind, as he records in his Addenda

(In Remp. II, p. 472) and decided that the MS text should be

kept. Festugière in his translation agrees with this second

thought of Kroll's. The text given in the MS of Proclus

is also found in Plutarch, Quest. conv. VIII 734a. Buecheler

maintained²³ that Plutarch there was deliberately adapting

Homer because it suited his context and modern editors accordingly

punctuate ἔνθα μὲν εἰς Ἀχέρων τε Πυριφλεγέθων τε
ῥέουσι and translate, "There flow in Acheron and Pyriphlegethon"

instead of, "There goes Acheron, and Pyriphlegethon and Cocytus

... flow" as the punctuation given by Kroll requires. Kroll

in his Addenda compares the Plutarch passage and says that

Buecheler is wrong, presumably believing that both Proclus

and Plutarch had a text of Homer which read ἔνθα μὲν

εἰς Ἀχέρων τε Why should any text of Homer read this?

We find the answer when we turn to the Phaedo. With the vulgate

text of Homer, Pyriphlegethon and Cocytus are flowing into

Acheron; Plato is explicit that the three rivers are quite

distinct and do not flow into one another (see especially

Phaedo 113b2). Now with the text presented by Proclus, and

perhaps Plutarch, Plato's picture corresponds to Homer's and

does not conflict with it. We might conclude that Plato's

Homer read ἔνθα μὲν εἰς Ἀχέρων τε , that Plutarch

knew this variant and was influenced by it, and that the variant

23 RhM N.F. LIV (1899), p. 3.

persisted down to the time of Proclus. Unless we wish like Proclus to show the perfect agreement of the poet and the philosopher it is more plausible to conclude that Plato is deliberately changing the traditional rivers for his own myth. Plato's version gives a neat geometrical arrangement of the rivers and he makes similar use of Homeric material for his own purposes in the myth in the Gorgias (523 ff.). What is plausible is that one of the many authors before Proclus who wished to reconcile Plato and Homer emended Homer to fit the Platonic account. Was this emendation in an actual text of Homer or in a commentary on the Phaedo in the form of "Plato here alludes to ..." and then the emended quotation? The Platoscholia and the Neoplatonic commentaries on the Phaedo²⁴ show no trace of such a comment but this is not conclusive as the scholia are extremely scanty and the Neoplatonic commentators are interested in the doctrines involved rather than in the details of the text and in tracing allusions. Since Proclus is so closely following the Phaedo here it would, if it were not for Plutarch, solve the problem very nicely to think of a comment on the Phaedo, of the kind imagined, perhaps written in the margin of his text. Plutarch is not talking about anything to do with Plato or the Phaedo at Quaest. conv. VIII 734a, and his point requires the form of the line as Duecheler punctuated it. But Plutarch knew his Plato well and

24 Commentary A in Norvin's edition is the work of Olympiodorus. Westerink, in his edition of Damascius' Lectures on the Philebus, Introduction, pp. xv-xx, has argued that Phaedo commentaries B, C and D are three sets of student's notes from the lectures of Damascius.

he might be remembering the line in the form *ἐνθα μὲν εἶπε*
Ἀχέων τε . . . from the context of a comment on the
Phaedo and then deliberately altering it further to make his
own point. The alternative to this hypothesis is to say
that the coincidence in Proclus' and Plutarch's text of the
line is no more than a coincidence. In either case it seems
likely that Proclus' variant derives from a comment on the
Phaedo and that here we would definitely be wrong to assume
that Proclus' quotation derives directly from Homer simply
because it does not occur in Plato.

I turn now to the passages of Homer which are also
quoted by Plato. Proclus defends the passages attacked by
Plato and does so in the order in which they occur in Plato
but he does not take up absolutely all Plato's specific
references to actual poetry. For obvious reasons he makes no
reference to the lines cited with approval by Plato at Rep.
III 389e5 ff. and 390d4; these lines need no defence for
Plato himself will admit them to the ideal state. What Proclus
might have done but has not is make use of Plato's approval
of these lines to show that the philosopher does not in fact
reject Homer entirely. When Proclus comes to argue generally
against Plato's rejection of poetry and to demonstrate Plato's
admiration for Homer at pp. 154 ff., he has moved away from
the detailed consideration of Rep. II and III to a more general
approach. He has the denigration of Homer in Phaedrus 243a and
Rep. X in mind, rather than Rep. II and III, and so he does not
pick on Plato's approval of these specific passages of Homer.
Similarly Proclus does not need to defend Od. 17.383-4 which

are quoted in passing but not actually attacked, at Rep. III 389d.

Two much more interesting cases of omission by Proclus are his omission of the three quotations at Rep. II 379d5 ff. and his omission of Od. 12.342 quoted by Plato at Rep. III 390b5. The third quotation in the group at Rep. II 379d5 ff. does not exactly correspond to anything in Homer.²⁵ As we shall see, Proclus omits passages mentioned by Plato which are not by the theologoi (to use Proclus' term), Homer and Hesiod, but that cannot be the reason for the omission here since the other quotations involved are Homeric. In both the cases under consideration Plato gives an extra quotation or quotations to back up a point that has already been illustrated with one longer and more telling quotation. Is Proclus just omitting the extra quotations of 379d5 ff. because they add nothing to the point at issue? He does seem to refer to them at 98.22 ff. and this may well be the right explanation for these three quotations. What of Od. 12.342? Is it too omitted because it makes no fresh point? In other places where Plato gives a whole series of quotations, at Rep. III 386c5 ff., for example, Proclus takes care to provide an answer for every one. This could be because he considers every one to be making a slightly different point, just as he deals with the quotation at 389e13 and that at 390a10 ff. under the same section on pp. 129-132 as each exhibiting a different kind of lack of sôphrosyne. The omitted quotation at 390b5 on the other hand

25 Cf. Labarbe's discussion on pp. 282-3.

is relevant to the same kind of sôphrosyne, ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ἰδίων ἐγκράτειας (129.10-1), as that immediately before it. It is clear here that two distinct points are already being made in Plato. It is nothing like so clear that that is the case in the series of quotations about the soul after death at 386c5 ff. The quotation of Od. 12.342 (and indeed the three quotations at 379d5 ff.) could be omitted from the text of Plato without injury to the sense. The point I have just been making, that the quotation serves only to provide further illustration, makes that clear. If we were to find that Proclus' text of Plato differed considerably from ours, it might be worth entertaining the hypothesis, in view of Proclus' usual scrupulosity in defending Homer at every possible weak point, that Od. 12.342 at least is omitted by Proclus because it did not figure in his text of Plato.

Plato several times attacks passages from tragedy in addition to those from Homer, e.g. at Rep. II 380a, 381d8 and 383b. Proclus does not bother to defend these.

At Rep. II 378a ff. Plato attacks the myths of Ouranos and Kronos related by Hesiod. Homer refers to the story that Zeus threw Kronos into Tartarus, e.g. at Il. 14.203-4, but the castration of Ouranos does not appear in Homer at all. Proclus classes Hesiod with Homer and Orpheus as an inspired poet (e.g. at 72.1 ff.) and in any case in defending myths he could hardly avoid such notorious examples of divine immorality which had already been allegorically interpreted not only by non-Neoplatonist writers but by Plotinus himself (in V.8.13). Proclus deals

with these myths, along with the story of the fall of Hephaestus mentioned by Plato at Rep. II 378d2 and found in Il. 1.585-94 (and in a different version at Il. 18.395-7), in his general justification of the allegorical method on p.82, before he gets down to the detailed defence of individual passages. At Rep. II 378d2 Plato also mentions "Ἥρας δεσμὸς ὑπὸ δέος", alluding to a non-Homeric and non-Hesiodic legend. Proclus, concerned only to defend Homer and Hesiod, and of those two mainly Homer, makes no mention of this rather obscure legend. One MS of Eusebius' PE, the oldest we have, dating from the 10th century, reads ὑπὸ Δίος for ὑπὸ δέος.²⁶ This would make the reference to Il. 15.18 ff. Had Proclus read ὑπὸ Δίος in his Plato he could hardly have failed to defend this myth which was one of those regularly allegorised.²⁷ We may therefore conclude that he read ὑπὸ δέος. However, when speaking of Kronos Proclus uses the phrase Κρονίου δεσμὸς while Plato's phrase is quite different: τῷ Κρόνου . . . πᾶσι ὑπὸ τοῦ δέος. There is nothing surprising in Proclus' use of δεσμὸς (cf., e.g., Orphic Hymn 13.4 and Plotinus V.8.13) but since he is conflating Rep. II 378a and 378d by including the fall of Hephaestus here we may perhaps suppose that the omitted reference to "Ἥρας δεσμὸς ὑπὸ δέος" influenced him in turning τῷ Κρόνου . . . πᾶσι as Κρονίου δεσμὸς . ὑπὸ δέος (or ὑπὸ τοῦ δέος) occurs

26 According to Jowett and Campbell's edition of the Republic (Oxford, 1894), Vol. III, p. 99 this reading is also mentioned by the Suda and Photius.

27 Cf. Buffière, pp. 115 ff.; also p. 20, p. 119.

in both Plato's phrases and this could encourage such a conflation.

Proclus omits the non-Homeric line quoted and criticised by Plato at Rep. III. 390e2. The Suda records that some thought the line came from Hesiod²⁸ but its provenance is otherwise unknown. We might have expected Proclus to discuss the line if he had thought of it as Hesiodic. Presumably he had no better idea where it comes from than we have.

In general Proclus concerns himself only with defending the myths attacked by Plato which are mentioned in Homer and Hesiod. He is not concerned to rescue the few other myths or passages of poetry which Plato criticises.

Proclus' quotations from Homer which are also given by Plato may be divided into four groups: (1) cases where Plato, Proclus and our vulgate text of Homer all agree on the text.

(2) cases where Proclus follows Plato in differing from our vulgate text.

(3) cases where Plato agrees with our vulgate but Proclus does not.

(4) cases where Plato differs from our vulgate but Proclus does not.

Group (1), cases where no problems arise for the text of Homer, contains 7 quotations. These are:

Od. 17.485-6 quoted by Plato at Rep. II 381d and by Proclus at 109.17-8. Plato suppresses the opening *καί τε* which links the verse in Homer to the preceding one while

28 II 135.12 Adler. Cf. Hesiod frag. 361 Merkelbach and West (among "Fragmenta dubia").

Proclus simply quotes the lines in full.

Il. 22.414-5 quoted by Plato at Rep. III 388b6-7 and by Proclus at 123.7-8. Proclus follows Plato and fits the quotation into the structure of his sentence by putting the participles into the accusative. Plato also picks up Homer's main verb ἐλπίσκει with a participle earlier in his own sentence but Proclus omits this.

Il. 18.54 quoted by Plato at Rep. III 388c1 and by Proclus at 123.15. Proclus indicates the context more precisely than Plato does.

Il. 1.599-600 quoted by Plato at Rep. III 389a5-6 and by Proclus at 126.14-6. It is worth noting here that both Plato and Proclus have the πολυβούτᾱ of our tradition of Homer, not the variant πολυβούβᾱτᾱ which is recorded in the scholia and can be traced to Aristarchus.²⁹

Il. 1.225 quoted by Plato at Rep. III 389e13 and by Proclus, omitting the end of the line, at 129.16.

Il. 22.15 quoted by Plato at Rep. III 391a6, and by Proclus at 146.13. Plato goes on to quote line 20 also. There is a variant δολώτατε for ὀλωτάτε attested by the scholia and Eustathius but Plato and Proclus both agree with the vulgate in presenting the known word ὀλωτάτε and not the otherwise unknown δολώτατε.

The remaining quotation in this group comes not from the Republic but from the Phaedo passage discussed by Proclus on p. 169.³⁰ At Phaedo 112a2 Plato quotes Il. 8.14. The line is

²⁹ See Labarbe, pp. 186-7.

³⁰ Cf. above pp. 64-7.

picked up and quoted by Proclus at 169.7-8. The MS of Proclus presents $\tau\eta\delta\epsilon$ for $\tau\eta\lambda\epsilon$ but Kroll is surely right to emend this as a corruption in the text of Proclus. $\tau\eta\delta\epsilon$ would make no sense in the context in Homer and unless we found the reading $\tau\eta\delta\epsilon$ in other ancient authors who are following Plato, it would be much more plausible to suppose that this elimination of the epic $\tau\eta\lambda\epsilon$ has occurred in the course of the transmission of the text of Proclus than that it existed already as a corruption in Proclus' text of the Phaedo.

The one quotation which falls into group (2) presents something of a puzzle. At 96.14-5 Proclus quotes Il. 24.527-8 about the two jars on the threshold of Zeus. The lines are quoted by Plato at Rep. II 379d. Plato's version of line 528 is $\kappa\eta\rho\omega\nu \epsilon\mu\pi\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha, \delta \mu\epsilon\nu \epsilon\beta\theta\lambda\omega\nu \alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\rho \delta \delta\epsilon\lambda\omega\nu$ beside our Homer's $\delta\omega\rho\omega\nu \epsilon\iota\alpha \delta\acute{\iota}\delta\omega\mu\iota, \kappa\alpha\kappa\omega\nu, \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma \delta'\epsilon\lambda\omega\nu$. Plato's text is unambiguous that there are two jars, one of each kind, while Homer's text could be taken as referring to two jars or to three, one of good and two of bad. In Homer line 527 begins $\delta\omicron\sigma\alpha\iota \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \tau\epsilon \pi\acute{\iota}\theta\omicron\upsilon$ while Plato ATDM and Eusebius have $\delta\omicron\sigma\alpha\iota \pi\acute{\iota}\theta\omicron\upsilon$ and Plato F $\delta\omicron\sigma\alpha\iota \tau\epsilon \pi\acute{\iota}\theta\omicron\upsilon$. Labarbe³¹ decides for the reading $\delta\omicron\sigma\alpha\iota \pi\acute{\iota}\theta\omicron\upsilon$ since $\tau\epsilon$ has no meaning without $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ and the preliminary $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ included in the hexameter by Burnet's OCT is simply there to introduce the quotation, as elsewhere when Plato quotes. In Labarbe's view the quotation proper in Plato

31 Pp. 275 ff.

only begins at $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\kappa\alpha\iota\alpha\tau\alpha\iota$. Proclus presents us with Plato's version of line 528 but with a complete line 527 including the $\gamma\alpha\rho\tau\epsilon$ omitted by Plato. We find the same version of the lines in Plutarch: at De aud. poetis 24a-b he quotes the lines just as Proclus does, with a full line 527 and Plato's line 528.³² The lines are also alluded to at Moralia 600c where the words $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\kappa\alpha\iota\alpha\tau\alpha\iota$ make it clear that Plutarch is half-quoting Plato's version, and at Moralia 369c and 473b where there is no evidence for which text of line 528 is involved, though at least at 369c it is clear that Plutarch envisages two jars and not three. Labarbe, worried by the fact that in the De aud. poetis Plutarch quotes line 527 in full, argues that the nature of that work obliged Plutarch to have recourse directly to the Homeric poems, since he discusses passages of Homer not considered by Plato in the Republic, and that there is no influence of the Republic in the passage at Mor. 600c, from the De exilio. He therefore postulates recensions of the Iliad existing between the 4th century B.C. and the 2nd century A.D. with the version of line 528 attested by Plato. The noting of that variant in a recent hand in Il.P15, a 13th century manuscript, would derive from such a recension. Labarbe does not consider Proclus. What are we to say when we find the variant attested in Proclus, in a work which is explicitly following the Republic? (Porphyry, at De antro nymphaeum 29, using the lines in a quite different

32 Labarbe also mentions the quotation of the Homeric version at Consolatio ad Apollonium 105c but the Cons. ad Apoll. is not by Plutarch:- see Ziegler's RE article, Plutarchos (1951), III 4 r.

context from Plato, Proclus or Plutarch, quotes the standard version, not the variant.) Are we to suppose, in view of Proclus' full version of line 527, that Labarbe's postulated recension was still circulating three centuries after Plutarch? When we look a little more closely at the Plutarch passages we see that not only the De aud. poetis, where the subject matter is obviously related to that of Rep. II and III, but also Mor. 600c, 369c and 473b do show the influence of the Republic. In 600c we find $\tau\alpha\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$ used of Zeus, in 369c $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}$ $\delta\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\nu$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\theta\omega\nu$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\tau\alpha\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ and in 473b mention of $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\delta\upsilon\sigma\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ $\tau\alpha\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$, all echoing Rep. II 379e $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\delta'$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\tau\alpha\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ $\eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$ δ $\text{Ze}\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\tau\epsilon$ $\kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\tau\epsilon$ $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\tau\upsilon\kappa\tau\alpha$. If we conclude that both Plutarch and Proclus are following Plato and that the variant in Il. P15 derives from Plato or a writer following him, the only difficulty is Plutarch's and Proclus' inclusion of $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ $\tau\epsilon$. For Proclus the inclusion of a linking particle omitted by Plato finds a parallel in his quotation of Od. 17.485-6 at 109.17-8.³³ but whereas there, since no variant of the text of Homer is involved, one could easily imagine Proclus sitting with a text of Homer at one elbow and a text of Plato at the other and turning up and copying out the relevant lines of Homer, it is not so easy to see what he is doing here. Is he turning up the passage in Homer, copying line 527 and then deliberately going back to Plato for line 528 with never a qualm at the textual disagreement between his two greatest authorities? If we have

33 Cf. pp. 71-2 above.

this improbable picture for Proclus we must also have it for Plutarch. The alternative is to suppose that Plutarch and Proclus were operating with a different text of Plato which quoted the lines in full. Perhaps Proclus' text of Plato also quoted Od. 17.485-6 in full though there is no need to suppose this, since Proclus does quote Homer directly in many places where he is putting in quotations not found in Plato. We are still left with a postulated recension in the 4th century B.C. from which Plato is quoting (Plato would have no interest in making this adaptation himself since if anything it whitewashes Homer by removing the ambiguity as to the number of jars³⁴) but we do not need to suppose that this recension continued through the Alexandrian period of critical activity and right on until the 5th century A.D., then to disappear without trace from the direct tradition apart from a note in one manuscript. We shall see that the text of Proclus' Plato quotations provides a good deal of evidence that he had a different text of Plato from ours and we may remember that this hypothesis also provided a plausible solution to the question why Proclus does not discuss Cd. 12.342, although it is quoted by Plato at Rep. III 390b5. The fact that Plato F has $\delta\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\epsilon\ \mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha$ provides some support for the idea that at some stage the text of Plato quoted line 527 in full. If, as Labarbe points out, $\tau\epsilon$ has no meaning without $\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma$ it is reasonable to think that Plato F

34 G. Lohse, "Untersuchungen über Homerzitate bei Platon", Helikon 4 (1964), pp. 10-8, argues, against Labarbe, that Plato deliberately adapted l.528 to remove the ambiguity, but I find his argument unconvincing.

derives from a text with $\gamma\alpha\rho\ \tau\epsilon$ and that $\gamma\alpha\rho$ has dropped out. So we find that this problem leads to conclusions not about Proclus' text of Homer but about his text of Plato.

In group (3), the cases where Plato agrees with our vulgate but Proclus does not, there is again just one example and again it is quite a complicated one to disentangle. At Rep. III 390a10-b2 Plato partly adapts and partly quotes Od. 9.5-11. Proclus at 129.21-6 quotes lines 6-9 in full. Plato's quotation apparently begins in the middle of line 8 but he presents us with $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\ \pi\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\alpha\ \omega\delta\epsilon$ for Homer's $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\ \pi\lambda\eta\theta\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\iota$ before going on to quote lines 9-10 in the Homeric version. Labarbe³⁵ decides that Plato's line 8 is not a textual variant of Homer but a deliberate adaptation by Plato and that the quotation proper is only of lines 9 and 10. This conveniently gets rid of any problem about Plato's text of Homer here, but when we turn to Proclus we find two distinct problems: first, that Proclus, for all that he is following Plato closely, quotes a longer passage than Plato does and second, that in Proclus' line 10 there is the variant $\pi\rho\alpha\chi\epsilon\eta\delta\epsilon$ for Homer's and Plato's $\phi\alpha\rho\epsilon\eta\delta\epsilon$. We have seen that Proclus does often quote where Plato merely alludes and his quoting more fully here looks at first sight like another instance of the same thing. He makes use of the euphrosyne and the music in lines 6-7 in his defence of the passage at 131.2-132.7 and it is amusing to compare Labarbe's speculations as to the reason why Plato omits any reference to these lines: "C'est qu'ils évoquent la gaieté du festin et les ré citations de l'aède, ils

35 Pp. 292-3.

ne contenaient donc rien qui péchât directement contre les principes de tempérance édictés par Socrate". This prompts the thought that Proclus is deliberately twisting the evidence in his own favour here but in fact the whole passage, or a portion including lines 6-9, is quoted as raising a similar problem in, e.g., Heraclitus' All. Ch. 79, Ps-Plu. Vita Homeri 150 and Athenaeus XII 513b, so that if Proclus is deliberately diverging from Plato here he is simply following the tradition of discussion of such problems in including lines 6-7.³⁶ Alternatively Proclus differs from our Plato not because he is deliberately extending the quotation but because his text of Plato includes the whole passage.

Proclus' variant $\pi\rho\chi\acute{\epsilon}\eta\epsilon\iota$ in line 10 is also found at Maximus of Tyre I.3 and Maximus' paraphrase $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\nu \delta\iota\alpha\chi\epsilon\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$ at XXII.1 implies that he had $\pi\rho\chi\acute{\epsilon}\eta\epsilon\iota$ in mind there too.³⁷ Athenaeus XII 513b offers $\pi\rho\epsilon\chi\eta\epsilon\iota$ which could be a corruption of the more difficult $\pi\rho\chi\acute{\epsilon}\eta\epsilon\iota$. So Athenaeus, Maximus and Proclus all bear witness to the existence of the variant $\pi\rho\chi\acute{\epsilon}\eta\epsilon\iota$. Are we to say that the variant had crept into Proclus' text of Plato along with the full quotation of the passage or are we to say the variant was in his text of Homer and he is deliberately extending the quotation here and so copying out Homer rather than Plato? It seems reasonable to take the two differences together rather than supposing, eg., that Proclus

36 Cf. E. Kaiser, "Odyssee-Szenen als Topoi", MJ 21 (1964), pp. 213 ff. It is clear from Kaiser's discussion that Plato's attack is one of the foundations of this tradition.

37 Cf. also XXII.2 $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\nu \chi\epsilon\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu \mu\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\omicron}\nu$.

is deliberately extending the quotation but following a variant $\pi\rho\omicron\chi\acute{\epsilon}\eta\iota$ in his text of Plato. 131.30 ff. suggest that Proclus had a different text of Plato. Proclus explicitly says there that the omission of euphrosyne and $\tau\eta\nu\ \delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \epsilon\nu\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu\ \mu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\kappa\eta\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\iota\delta\acute{\epsilon}\iota\alpha\nu$, i.e. of lines 6 and 7, would make the lines blameworthy. He could hardly say this if his Plato had in fact omitted them. (Though he might say it if he knew both a text of Plato with lines 6 and 7, and one without them.)

Finally group (4), cases where Plato differs from our text of Homer but Proclus does not, again contains one example. In Rep. III 388c2-d1 Plato quotes Il. 22.168-9 and Il. 16.433-4 and attacks them because Zeus is represented in these passages as susceptible to grief for Hector and Sarpedon respectively. Proclus does not repeat the quotations in full but alludes to them both at 123.17-20 and speaks of Zeus saying $\acute{\upsilon}\mu\omicron\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{\omega}\nu$ in both cases. In fact Zeus in Homer says $\acute{\upsilon}\mu\omicron\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{\omega}\nu$ only in Il. 16; in Il. 22 he says $\acute{\omega}\ \mu\acute{\omicron}\tau\tau\omicron\iota$. We need not suppose that Proclus' Homer read $\acute{\upsilon}\mu\omicron\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{\omega}\nu$ in Il. 22, only that Proclus is making a slip. However Plato has $\acute{\upsilon}\mu\omicron\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{\omega}\nu$ in neither case. In the Il. 16 quotation he has instead the variant $\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{\omega}\nu$ also found at Athenagoras, leg. 21³⁸. Labarbe argues that Athenagoras is not just following Plato in the passage in question and that he provides additional evidence

38 Cf. Labarbe, pp. 183-6. $\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{\omega}\nu$ in Athenagoras is in fact an emendation for the unmetrical $\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\alpha}\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega\nu$ of the Arethas codex from which all our other MSS of Athenagoras derive.

for the existence of a recension of the Iliad with the variant

αἰ αἰ which Labarbe suggests was introduced under the

influence of Attic tragedy where the expression is common.

Labarbe's picture of Athenagoras going directly to Homer

for his quotations is wrong. He seems rather to be using a

collection of traditional material for his attack on pagan

myths and such a collection would be likely to be based on

Plato, with further passages added. In the same chapter Athenagoras

quotes the fragment of Aeschylus attacked by Plato in Rep. II

383b, as does Plutarch at De aud. poetis 16e. The De aud. poetis

is related to Rep. II and III even though it discusses other passages

of poetry besides those attacked by Plato and the same is true

of this part of Athenagoras' work.³⁹ We may therefore consider

the variant αἰ αἰ ἐγὼν as confined to the text of Plato.

There is no particular reason to adopt the suggestion of Howes,

rejected by Labarbe, that αἰ αἰ was introduced by a Platonic

scribe. (Such a scribe would have to be early enough to allow

for the indirect transmission of the variant to Athenagoras.)

Labarbe himself thinks that αἰ αἰ was a variant in the text

of Homer in the time of Plato while G. Lohse⁴⁰ argues that αἰ αἰ

was never a variant in the text of Homer at any time but was

deliberately introduced by Plato himself for variety of style.

It could also be due to lapse of memory on Plato's part. Which-

ever of these suggestions is right, Labarbe is wrong to think

that the variant persisted in texts of Homer past the Alexandrian

39 See Athenagoras, Legatio and De resurrectione, edited by W.R. Schoedel (Oxford, 1972), Introduction, pp. xix ff. and J. Geffcken, Zwei griechische apologeten (Leipzig and Berlin, 1907), pp. 202 ff.

40 Helikon 5 (1965), pp. 282-4.

period.

In any case $\alpha\iota' \alpha\iota'$ is not found in Proclus and again we have the same question: was Proclus looking up Homer and reading $\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\rho \acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{\omega}\nu$ or had his text of Plato been corrected to bring it into line with the vulgate text of Homer? Maximus of Tyre quotes Il. 16.433 twice, at V.5 and XVIII.5. In both those passages he also quotes Il. 18.54 (also quoted by both Plato and Proclus) and the context of the latter passage is a brief résumé of the attack on Homer in Rep. II and III. In both passages Maximus reads $\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\rho \acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{\omega}\nu$. This supports the idea that the text of Plato used by both Proclus and Maximus read $\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\rho \acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{\omega}\nu$. There is a third alternative, that Proclus is being careless not just in saying the same expression is used in both cases but in carrying on with $\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\rho \acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{\omega}\nu$ under the influence of Il. 18.54 quoted immediately above where Homer, Plato and Proclus all agree in making Thetis say $\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\rho \acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{\omega}$. This third answer may be the right one, but when we consider the uncertainty which has arisen over Proclus' text of Plato in more than one of the problems so far considered, and take the evidence of Maximus into account, it is well worth bearing in mind the second answer, that Proclus' Plato read $\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\rho \acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{\omega}\nu$ in the Il. 16 quotation.

In the case just considered Proclus does preserve a little bit of a quotation but there are other places where what is quotation in Plato becomes only allusion or adaptation in Proclus and these throw a little further light on Proclus' text of Plato and/or Homer. At Rep. III 388a5-b3 Plato partly quotes and partly adapts Il. 24.10-2 and 18.23-4. The two passages are conflated by Plato. Proclus at 123.9-12 adapts them

further, abbreviating them and fitting them into the structure of his prose sentence. He changes the order in which Achilles tosses and turns from Homer's and Plato's ἄλλοτ' ἐπὶ πλευρῶς κατακείμενον, ἄλλοτε δ' αἶψα ὑπὸ πον, ἄλλοτε δὲ πρηνῇ to ὑπὸ πον . . . πρηνῇ . . . ἐπὶ πλευρῶς and in abbreviating the passage passes over the problematic τότε δ' ὁρῶν ἀναστάντα πλεῖζοντ' in Plato to ἀλύειν . Taking Proclus' change of order and the problems of πλεῖζοντ'⁴¹ together we perhaps have some slender evidence that there was already confusion in the text of Plato here in Proclus' time. It is a measure of how closely Proclus is following Plato that he makes the same conflation as Plato here of two passages of the Iliad. It is just because Proclus keeps so close to Plato that I am inclined to think that where a passage of Homer is differently quoted by Proclus and Plato, Proclus must have had a different text of Plato rather than be going directly to Homer.

On p. 118 Proclus adapts the whole series of quotations given by Plato at Rep. III 386c ff. The third of the series is from Il. 23.103-4. In line 103 the majority of Homer MSS read τῷς as does Plato T; Plato AF and 27 MSS of the Iliad read τῷ.⁴² Labarbe discusses the two readings and also the unimportant variant τῶν.⁴³ He points out that with τῷς (or τῶν) and the traditional punctuation, no sign after δόμοντιν

41 Discussed by Labarbe, pp. 283-91.

42 Cf. also the echo of this line in Prop. IV.7.1, "Sunt aliquid Manes".

43 Pp. 169-73.

but a comma after εἶδωλον, the sense is "There is a soul and a shade, even in the halls of Hades, but reason is not there at all" or, with τλ, "A soul and a shade are something, even in the halls of Hades, but reason is not there at all." Both these ways of taking the lines give an odd construction to εἶδωλον which Homer characteristically uses of disembodied life in Hades. Labarbe therefore reads τλ but punctuates at the end of line 103 and takes ἔβη in the sense of "exists" so that the meaning is, "There is something even in the halls of Hades: the soul and a shade." Labarbe notes that the Plato MSS, unlike those of Homer, give ἔβη with the paroxytone accent that the sense requires. Proclus' adaptation of this quotation is τὸ εἶδωλον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ νῦν φερόμενα which only equals line 104. This suggests that Proclus took the two lines separately, i.e. that his Plato read τλ and, if it punctuated the lines at all, did so in Labarbe's way. Proclus thus supports Labarbe's argument here.⁴⁴

Proclus switches round the last two quotations, from Il. 23.100-1 and Od. 24.6-9 taking the latter first as ἡ πρὸς τὰς νοκτερίδας . . . ἀπεκκαβία and then the former as ὁ καπνὸς καὶ ὁ τρεπός. We could suppose that his Plato gave the quotations

44 Lohse, Helikon 4 (1964), pp. 19-21, argues that τλ makes better sense in Homer and that Plato would have no interest in changing τλ to τλ. He rejects Labarbe's whole concept of a Platonic text of Homer which differed from the vulgate and therefore argues that τλ must be the right reading in Plato also. Lohse would have to say that Proclus' text of Plato was corrupt here, like the medieval MSS which offer τλ. Although Labarbe's arguments are not always satisfactory in individual cases, Lohse's total rejection of his basic assumptions seems to me unjustified.

in a different order but do not need to. The occurrence of $\tau\epsilon\tau\rho\iota\gamma\acute{o}\alpha\lambda\iota$ in both passages serves to explain how Proclus in adapting has conflated the two into the whole phrase $\eta\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \tau\alpha\varsigma\ \nu\upsilon\kappa\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\delta\alpha\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\lambda\alpha\chi\acute{o}\iota\alpha,\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\ \kappa\alpha\pi\nu\acute{o}\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\ \tau\rho\iota\beta\acute{\mu}\acute{o}\varsigma\ .$

It appears clearly from this discussion of Proclus' quotations from Homer that the real puzzles arise with those quotations which are also found in Plato. This is not just because there are three main factors involved instead of two. The difficulties are not in deciding what Proclus read in Homer, which seems to have differed only a little from what we read, but in deciding what he read in Plato. The situation is further complicated by the tradition of discussion of Plato's Homeric quotations and allusions which has to be taken into account in a number of cases. We have seen that Labarbe makes mistakes because he underestimates the extent and variety of this tradition.

Proclus' Homer was very like our medieval vulgate text. It preserved some ancient variants only attested in part of our medieval tradition but went along with the vulgate in largely ignoring the variants of the Alexandrian scholars. For a better idea of Proclus' text of Plato we must look at what is known about the Neoplatonic text of Plato, and at Proclus' actual quotations from Plato.

There has been no thorough collation of the medieval MSS of Plato comparable to Allen's collation of the MSS of Homer although modern critical editions of a number of dialogues have now

been produced,⁴⁵ and an index to the Plato MSS has been published by the Plato Microfilm Project of the Yale University Library.⁴⁶ The Neoplatonic text of Plato has been most recently discussed by A. Carlini.⁴⁷ He suggests that the different Platonic schools of Pergamum, Athens and Alexandria each had an official text of Plato, to which variants from other texts might be added. He stresses the importance of Porphyry in the diffusion of the text of Plato, just as in establishing the text of Plotinus. Carlini's suggestion that the Athenian school would have an official text of Plato may or may not be right. What is interesting, and has often been pointed out, is that Proclus several times mentions different readings in different texts of Plato. So at In Remp. II 218.1 ff. he distinguishes between the order of the spheres of Rep. 616e given by ἡ μὲν προτέρα καὶ ἀρχαιότερα and the different order of ἡ δὲ δευτέρα καὶ νεώτερα, κρατούσα δὲ ἐν τοῖς κεκωλυμένοις ἀντίγραφοις. Proclus' "older" order is unknown to the medieval tradition which offers that of the κεκωλυμένα ἀντίγραφα. At In Tim. II 308.25 ff. Proclus distinguishes between the reading of οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι οἱ κεκολλημένοι and the current reading. Carlini⁴⁸ gives some further examples

45 E.R. Dodds' Gorgias (Oxford, 1959); R.S. Bluck's Meno (Cambridge, 1961); A. Carlini's Alc. I, Alc. II, Hipparchus and Rivals (Turin, 1964); and C. Moreschini's Parmenides and Phaedrus (Rome, 1966). I have used these editions, the Budé edition, and the OCT for information on the MSS of Plato. My references to Plato use the line-numbers of the OCT.

46 (New Haven and London, 1968). On recent work on the text of Plato, cf. J. Irigoin, "Rapports sur les conférences", Annuaire de l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes IV^e section 1971-2, pp. 182 ff.

47 Fedone, Ch. 5, pp. 91-119. Cf. also Alline, pp. 146 ff.

48 Fedone, p. 103.

of the many passages where Proclus mentions more than one reading. In cases of this kind Proclus discusses the meaning given by the different readings but does not engage in textual criticism. He also comments on problems of punctuation, where these affect the interpretation of the text (e.g. In Tim. 31.1 ff. and In Alc. 129.10-11) Saffrey and Westerink⁴⁹ have drawn attention to the restoration of Hadrian's library in Athens at the beginning of the 5th century, and suggested that at the same time the Academy acquired a library with new copies of its authors. They would connect Proclus' knowledge of "new" readings with this.

There are no certain cases in the 5th and 6th essays where Proclus shows knowledge of more than one reading but I suggested above⁵⁰ that his treatment of Od. 9.5-11 might imply that he knew both a text of Plato which included lines 6-7 and one which did not. His desire to cover all possible interpretations of *Θεὸν ἐπὶ τε καὶ ὑπὲρ διὰ Θεμίστος* at Rep. II 379e⁵¹ is like his desire to explain both readings where he knows of a textual variant.⁵²

Most of the Neoplatonic commentaries are line-by-line commentaries with lemmata. There is a special problem in such commentaries concerning the relationship between the text of the lemmata and that of the commentary. For Proclus, this problem

49 PT, Vol. I, Introduction, p. xlviii.

50 Pp. 77-9.

51 See p. 62 above.

52 Cf. Carlini's point, Fedone, p. 107, that Proclus' knowledge of variants in the text of Plato might come in part from earlier commentators.

has been considered by Diehl in relation to the In Tim., by Carlini in relation to the In Alc., and by Moreschini in relation to the In Parm.⁵³ Carlini and Moreschini have concluded that the lemmata in the In Alc. and the In Parm. respectively do not go back to Proclus but have been filled out from medieval MSS of Plato. For the In Tim. however, Diehl has shown that the full form of the lemmata does derive from Proclus himself. Diehl discusses the contradictions between the text of the lemmata and that of the commentary and argues that Proclus' text of the In Tim. differed from that of the whole medieval tradition.⁵⁴ Carlini⁵⁵ points out that the In Crat. does not present the same problem - it is a collection of notes and lacks lemmata - and he remarks that the In Remp. has not yet been studied in this way.⁵⁶ In fact only the 16th essay of the In Remp. presents a continuous commentary with lemmata.⁵⁷ The question of what we can learn from essays

53 E. Diehl, "Der Timaios-text des Proklos", RhM N.F. LVIII (1903), pp. 246 ff.; A. Carlini, "I lemmi del Commento di Proclo al Alcibiade I e il codice W di Platone", SCO 10 (1961), pp. 179 ff.; C. Moreschini, "I lemmi del Commento di Proclo al Parmenide in rapporto alla tradizione manoscritta di Platone", ASNP Ser.2, 33 (1964), pp. 251 ff. Cf. Carlini, Fedone, pp. 104-5.

54 Cf. also K. Praechter's review of Diehl's edition of the In Tim., GGA 167 (1905), pp. 518 ff.

55 Fedone, p. 105.

56 The dissertation by A. Schaeffer, Quaestiones Platonicae (Strasburg, 1898) collects variants for a number of dialogues from part of the In Remp., and also from the In Tim., In Alc. and In Euc. as well as from Alexander of Aphrodisias, Iamblichus, Syrianus, Simplicius and Olympiodorus (and Priscian). Schaeffer does not tackle the problem of lemmata, and only had available to him Schoell's edition of the In Remp. which did not include the first part of the work, contained in the Laurentian MS.

57 Cf. above, p.11, and below, Appendix I, pp. 410-11.

like the 5th and 6th about Proclus' text of Plato presents itself in a rather different form. The discursive format of the essays allows ample scope for quite extended quotations from dialogues other than the Republic and whereas Diehl could draw conclusions from a large body of evidence about Proclus' text of one particular dialogue, the Timaeus, a study of the Plato quotations in the 5th and 6th essays allows us to construct a fairly general picture of Proclus' text of a number of dialogues although the amount of evidence for each of the individual dialogues quoted is very small. Proclus edits and adapts his quotations and he sometimes paraphrases rather than quoting directly. It can be difficult to decide in a particular case whether Proclus is quoting a variant text of Plato, adapting the text we know, or paraphrasing. Problems of this kind, which we shall see exemplified in the detailed discussion which follows, do not arise when a text can be reconstructed with the help of lemmata, as Proclus' text of the Timaeus can be. There are also the problems which arise in any study of the indirect tradition of a text. In some cases it may be the text of the author who quotes that is causing a difficulty, not the text of the author quoted. We have already seen some instances of this in the study of Proclus' Homer quotations and the same difficulties arise with some of his Plato quotations.

When we consider what dialogues Proclus alludes to or quotes from we can see that the Platonic corpus for him contained a larger number of genuine works than it does for us. In the 5th and 6th essays Proclus quotes from Apology, Alcibiades II, Gorgias, Ion, Laws, Minos, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic of course, Sophist,

Symposium and Timaeus, and also alludes to but does not quote Alcibiades I, Cratylus, Critias, Laches, Philebus, Politicus and Letter II.⁵⁸ Proclus thus accepts as genuinely by Plato not only Alcibiades I and the Second Letter but also, in contrast to all modern opinion, Alcibiades II and Minos. The Minos, although rejected by modern scholars, was not suspected as spurious in antiquity; Alcibiades II on the other hand was regarded by some as the work of Xenophon, according to Athenaeus XI 506c.⁵⁹ Proclus did not simply accept uncritically all that he found in the Platonic corpus: we know from In Remp. II 134.5 that he did reject the Epinomis as spurious. (Cf. also Anon. Prol. 26.5).

A number of the dialogues had alternative titles in antiquity from those known to us, but Proclus always cites the dialogues he mentions by the titles familiar to us from the medieval tradition of the text. Similarly in the three places

58 At 83.12 ff. Neither Kroll nor Festugière has correctly placed this allusion. Kroll suggests Rep. V 452a. Festugière points out that this cannot be right and suggests Th. 172c4 ff. He also adduces a couple of parallels from the Hermetica (Stob. Hermet. fr. XI.4 Vol. III, p. 57 Festugière and Asclepius 25, p. 329.5 ff. Nock and Festugière). In fact Proclus here is alluding to Letter II 314a. καταχέλαστότερα there is picked up by Proclus' καταχέλαστα : cf. καταχέλαστος and "risui" in Festugière's Hermetic parallels, and also Men. Rh., Spengel, Rhetores Graeci III. 337.28, concerning φυσικὰ ὕμνα which are not to be divulged to the multitude. I suspect that the Second Letter has influenced all these passages, even if indirectly. This letter, which may be a Neopythagorean forgery, was accepted as genuine in antiquity and much used and interpreted by both Middle and Neoplatonists:- see Saffrey and Westerink, PT Vol. II, Introduction, § 2, pp. xx-lix, "Les exégèses de la Lettre II". The statement in Anon. Prol. 26.8 that Proclus ἐκβέλλει the Letters cannot mean that he regarded them as spurious, any more than the Rep. and the Laws which he also ἐκβέλλει. The word implies only exclusion from the compulsory canon of Platonic works:- cf. above, p.45.

59 Cf. Alline, p. 37 and note 5 there. Also Düring, Herodotus, p. 75.

where he cites the Republic by book (69.11-12, 117.28 and 177.9) he does so by the division into books known to us and not by the alternative ancient division. At 185.9 he cites the Laws by book and there too his division into books is the one we know, but for the Laws, unlike the Republic, only one division was ever used. The evidence for the 5th and 6th essays thus supports the view which emerges from Alline that the dialogues were known to Proclus under the same titles and according to much the same classification as that in which they passed into the medieval tradition.⁶⁰

When we come to consider the actual text of the quotations, however, we find that Proclus diverges very frequently, to a greater or a lesser extent, from the medieval tradition. In only 9 of 43 quotations, or near-quotations, which I shall consider, are there no textual problems of any significance. One of these, Rep. III 398e1, quoted at 54.7, is only a phrase: $\epsilon\upsilon\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \mu\epsilon\nu\epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$. In another six Proclus agrees with most of our MSS in having what must be the right reading on grounds of sense, etc. as against a variant in one medieval MS. At 184.14-7 he quotes Ion 533e, reading $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ with TF as against W's $\kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{\alpha}$ and $\mu\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\tau\tau\omicron\iota$ with TWf against F Stob. $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \lambda\omicron\epsilon\tau\tau\acute{\alpha}$. In both these readings the text offered by Proclus and the MSS which agree together is clearly superior but it is interesting to see that first W and then F is at fault; it is not possible to make simple assumptions that one

60 Cf. for example Alline, pp. 125-6 on Proclus' agreement with Stobaeus, Theodoret and the medieval tradition in using the title 'Ερμιαί' as opposed to Thrasyllus' 'Αντιρρηναι' .

MS is more likely than another to have all the right readings.

At 156.10-11 Proclus quotes Minos 319d and here he agrees with F in reading $\nu\epsilon\kappa\upsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ as against A's $\nu\epsilon\kappa\upsilon\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$. The standard term $\nu\epsilon\kappa\upsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ must be right and Proclus' reading presents no problems and is of little significance.

At 65.28-9 Proclus quotes Phaedo 61b with the $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omicron\upsilon$ of most MSS as against Y's $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota$. The MS text here reads $\tau\omicron\nu\ \pi\omicron\iota\eta\tau\eta\nu\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\upsilon,\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\pi\epsilon\rho\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\omicron\iota\eta\tau\eta\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota,\ \pi\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \mu\acute{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \alpha\lambda\lambda'\ \epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ while Proclus begins his quotation at $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\pi\epsilon\rho\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omicron\upsilon$ and so inserts $\chi\rho\acute{\iota}$ to give a main verb which will fit in to the run of his sentence. There is no need to suppose that $\chi\rho\acute{\iota}$ is a variant in the text of Plato. Proclus often edits quotations in this way, as we shall see from many of the quotations examined. Editing is particularly common, as might be expected, in the opening of a quotation and such cases must be clearly distinguished from those in which we have grounds for thinking that a real Platonic variant is involved. (Of course it may sometimes be difficult to decide in an individual case whether deliberate alteration or a Platonic variant is the reason why Proclus' text reads as it does.)

At 155.19-20 Proclus quotes Phaedo 95a after a summary of the preceding part of the dialogue. He omits the MS $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\iota\kappa\epsilon\nu$ after $\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\tau\epsilon\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$, adds $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\eta\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ after $\pi\omicron\iota\eta\tau\eta$ and omits $\alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omicron\iota$ before $\eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu\ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$. On the other hand he has $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\mu\epsilon\nu$ with the MSS as against Stobaeus' $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\mu\epsilon\nu$ and $\alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$ with most MSS against T's grammatically incorrect $\alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$. The omission

of ὡς ἔθηκεν and addition of ταύτῃ λέγοντες can plausibly be seen as deliberate alterations by Proclus to make the sense clearer for his purposes while the omission of αὐτὰ is presumably just a slip on his part or on that of his copyist.

The remaining two cases of this type are both in quotations from Republic X. At 201.27-30 Proclus quotes Rep. X 605a and agrees with the majority of medieval MSS in reading ἀχανακτηκόν as against F's incorrectly formed ἀχανακτικόν.⁶¹ The other differences in Proclus' text of this passage, the omission of δηλον ὅτι after ὁ δὲ μνηστὴρ ποιητῆς and of τε καὶ ἡ βολὴ αὐτοῦ ταύτῃ ἔρεσκεν πέπηγεν after πέφυκε, and the substitution of τὸ λογικόν for τὸ ταῦτον may be accounted deliberate alterations by Proclus; he omits phrases in Plato which are not necessary for the point he is using the quotation to make, and substitutes τὸ λογικόν in order to make the sense clear despite the removal of the passage from its context. At 69.10-2 Proclus quotes Rep. X 617b. Here in common with Plutarch and Theodoret Proclus agrees with A's εἷνα τόνον as against F's εἰς τόνον, a reading which is clearly inferior in sense. We also have another case of deliberate alteration in Proclus' plural ἰσῆας to agree with his own Σερῆνας instead of Plato's singular ἰσῆα (Plato has the singular because of the form of his sentence, not because he has only one Siren turning all the spheres; the difference between Proclus and

61 E. Chambry's Budé attributes the reading ἀχανακτικόν to Proclus. This is a mistake, at least in so far as the quotation in the 6th essay is concerned.

Plato here is purely in the form of expression, not in the doctrine.) But there is one other difference in this quotation of a kind we shall find again, a difference in the order of words. Proclus has $\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu \phi\omega\nu\eta\nu$ for the $\phi\omega\nu\eta\nu \mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$ of our Plato tradition. In this particular instance the difference seems insignificant for the quotation is so short that it could easily be from memory and errors of this kind are precisely those which are liable to occur in quoting prose from memory. They are also common in copying and this one could have arisen either when Proclus copied Plato's text, or when scribes copied Proclus' text. However we shall find that slight differences in word order are common in Proclus' quotations. It might be worth looking on the difference here as yet another variant which is after all of some significance in bearing witness that Proclus had a different text of Plato from that of the medieval tradition.

There are a further two quotations where Proclus' variation from Plato may be put down to deliberate alteration. At 186.13-4 Proclus quotes Alc. II 147b. After introducing the quotation with $\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu \tau\omicron \tau\eta\varsigma \pi\omicron\iota\eta\tau\iota\kappa\eta\varsigma \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$ he goes on $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\omicron\epsilon\alpha \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu \delta\acute{\upsilon}\mu\pi\alpha\delta\alpha \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\nu\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\acute{\iota}\delta\eta\varsigma \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota} \sigma\acute{\upsilon} \tau\omicron \pi\rho\omicron\beta\omicron\upsilon\chi\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\nu\delta\rho\omicron\varsigma \gamma\upsilon\omega\rho\acute{\iota}\zeta\alpha\iota$. Carlini's text of Alc. II reads $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu \tau\epsilon \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \delta\acute{\upsilon}\omicron\epsilon\alpha \pi\omicron\iota\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta} \eta \delta\acute{\upsilon}\mu\pi\alpha\delta\alpha \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\nu\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\acute{\iota}\delta\eta\varsigma$. etc. We do not have to assume that Proclus has deliberately changed the opening of the quotation to simplify his own sentence but if we give his text of Plato the benefit of the doubt, so to speak, in cases like this until strong evidence of real variants appears, that evidence will be all the

more convincing when it does appear and cannot be denied on grounds of deliberate alteration. Variants may also be due to corruptions in the text of Proclus, as we can see from Phaedrus 246e, quoted at 166.15-6, where the Laurentian MS of Proclus reads *κεκοσμημένην* which does not make sense and was rightly corrected to Plato's *κεκοσμημένη* in the Corpus MS and so in the editio princeps of Proclus' commentary in 1534 which followed that MS.⁶² Proclus introduces this quotation with *οὕτω γάρ*, a deliberate change from Plato's *ὡς δέ*. He frequently uses *γάρ* in this way to introduce the quotation of a sentence which in the original has a different opening particle to connect it to what precedes in the original context.⁶³

For six of the dialogues quoted by Proclus in the 5th and 6th essays we have only one quotation and in these cases it is only possible to note the variants in his text and to use them in building up a general picture of his text of Plato; there is not enough evidence to say much about the text of the particular dialogues in question. I have already dealt with one of these quotations, from the Minos. At 157.8-11 Proclus quotes Apology 41a. Here he omits the MSS *καὶ Μουσείου* before *καὶ Ἡρόδω*, an omission he had no reason to make deliberately and which we must therefore attribute either to his text of Plato, or to his reproduction of it, or to

62 Cf. Kroll's preface, p. v. Kroll attributes *κεκοσμημένη* only to the editio princeps because, quite reasonably, he disregarded the Corpus MS:- see p. vii of his preface.

63 Cf. J.D. Denniston, Greek Particles (2nd edn. Oxford, 1954), pp. 58 ff. on explanatory *γάρ*. *γάρ* to introduce quotations may be considered a type of explanatory *γάρ*.

corruption in the text of Proclus. He also omits the second $\lambda\nu$ which the MSS give after $\delta\epsilon\lambda\chi\iota\tau\omicron$; again either Proclus' text of Plato, or his reproduction of it, or a corruption in the text of Proclus could be responsible. Proclus agrees with TY in reading $\epsilon\theta\epsilon\lambda\omega$ while BW read $\theta\epsilon\lambda\omega$.

At 156.30-157.1 Proclus quotes Gorgias 523a and here by contrast he has something which the MSS omit, the $\tau\epsilon$ in $\delta' \tau\epsilon \lambda\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma$. It could be claimed that a short quotation like this is probably from memory but this is unlikely in the context where Proclus is carefully assembling examples of Plato's usual respect for Homer from a number of different dialogues. The quotation from Rep. X at 69.10-2 which it seemed plausible to regard as a quotation from memory is made in a very different kind of context: Proclus uses it as a felicitous way of expressing a thought which he could have put in his own words. Here on the other hand reporting Plato's words is essential to the argument and quotation from memory is much less likely.

It is in the same context as these quotations from the Apology and the Gorgias that Proclus quotes Symposium 209d, at 157.20-3. This is an interesting case because here we have a papyrus fragment, P.Oxy 843, dating probably from the beginning of the 3rd century A.D., in addition to the medieval MSS. What we find is that Proclus does not agree completely with either in his text of the quotation. Thus Proclus has $\kappa\alpha\iota \text{'Η} \epsilon\lambda\omicron\delta\omicron\nu$ with the MSS against the papyrus' $\kappa\alpha\iota \epsilon\gamma\gamma\epsilon \text{'Η} \epsilon\lambda\omicron\delta\omicron\nu$ but $\delta\delta\alpha \epsilon\kappa\gamma\omicron\nu\alpha \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\lambda\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu$ where both the MSS and the

papyrus read οἷα ἔκχοντα ἑαυτῶν καταλείπουσιν.
 (Pap. ἔκχοντα).⁶⁴ Moreover Proclus has καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
 ἔχθρους ποιητὰς for the MSS and the papyrus' καὶ τοὺς
 ἄλλους ποιητὰς τοὺς ἔχθρους .

At 189.5-22 Proclus quotes Sophist 235d. He begins differently from our MSS with δύο γάρ . . . φαίνομαι for ἔγωγε μοι καὶ νῦν φαίνομαι δύο and jumps from μιμητικῆς in 235d1 to μίαν μὲν in 235d6. In four cases Proclus agrees with the majority of the MSS against inferior variants in W, reading εἶδη for W's ἴδη , ὁρῶν for W's ὁρῶ , καὶ πλάττει καὶ βάθει for W's different order καὶ βάθει καὶ πλάττει and πᾶν μὲν οὖν with TY and Stobaeus for W's δοκεῖ μοι πᾶν μὲν οὖν (B omits the reply altogether). However Proclus agrees with YWt and Stobaeus in reading ἐκάστοις as against BT ἐκάστῳις and with the majority of the MSS in reading ἐναπερχόμενοι as against Y's ἀπερχόμενοι . Where most of the MSS read τὰς δοξεύμας and W² and Stobaei A read τὰς δοξάμας , Proclus has just δοξεύμας . It is quite clear here that no one medieval MS, or family of MSS, corresponds directly to Proclus' text. What appears on a small scale here in this one quotation could be confirmed on the large scale by making an overall list of the places where Proclus agrees with different branches of the medieval tradition. The different beginning to the Sophist quotation

64 L. Robin's Budé refers also to a reading by Methodius, οἷα καταλείπειν ἑαυτῶν ἔκχοντα (cf. Carlini, Fedone, p. 82) but Methodius' sentence is a paraphrase rather than a quotation and should not be taken as evidence for the text of Plato:- see Meth., symp. 7 IV.159 (ed. H. Musurillo, Paris, 1963).

and the jump are deliberate alterations of the type we have already met with while the cases of agreement with the majority of the MSS four times against W and once against Y are like the examples considered earlier which were clear cases of corruption in just one medieval MS. We are still left with two variants. The omission of $\tau\alpha\varsigma$ before $\delta\omicron\varsigma\epsilon\upsilon\beta\alpha\varsigma$ is very likely due to corruption in the text of Proclus, or to an error by Proclus in copying Plato (the quotation is too long to be from memory) although it could reflect such an omission in Proclus' text of Plato. On the more significant variant, $\epsilon\kappa\lambda\epsilon\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$ versus $\epsilon\kappa\lambda\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\varsigma$, the assembled witnesses are pretty evenly divided.

At 61.29-62.4 Proclus paraphrases Laches 188d. Although a paraphrase this passage deserves to be included when we are considering Proclus' text of Plato, because in 62.2 Proclus' text reads $\epsilon\pi\gamma\alpha\gamma\alpha\gamma\alpha\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma$, thus agreeing with the reading of BT. Burnet's OCT and Croiset's Budé both follow T² in printing $\epsilon\pi\gamma\alpha\gamma\alpha\gamma\alpha\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\alpha$. Festugière wants to read $\pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma$ in Proclus too and translates "des instruments frivoles". This gives a better sense to the Proclus passage and I think Festugière is right here and that we should attribute $\pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma$ to corruption in the text of Proclus.

There are two quotations from Alc. II, one of which I have already discussed.⁶⁵ The second quotation, Alc. II 142e quoted by Proclus at 187.26-188.8, is of considerable interest. We

65 Pp.93-4 above.

have more evidence that Proclus' text of Plato cannot be placed in a direct relationship with any of the medieval MSS, for although he begins *κινδυνεύει γὰρ* as in B against the *κινδυνεύει γὰρ* of TY, Proclus then reads *ἀρόνυός τις* with BT against *ἀρόνυός η* in Y. We also find that Proclus omits *μοι* after *δοκεῖ* and *ὡπῶν* after *ἐπὶ τῶν* against all the Plato MSS. There would be no point in the deliberate omission of either of these by Proclus and it seems unnecessary to explain the omissions away as errors by Proclus or corruptions in the text of Proclus: the number of variants which would have to be so explained is becoming increasingly large. A significant variant which cannot be so explained away occurs in the couplet of poetry which follows. Proclus ends the first line with *ἀνεύκτοις* with TY as against B's *ἀνεύκτ'* but then his second line *τὰ δὲ λυγρὰ καὶ εὐχεμένων ἀπέρυκε* is importantly different from the *τὰ δὲ δεινὰ καὶ εὐχεμένοις ἀπαλέγειν* of all the Plato MSS. The lines recur at AP X.108 where the text is the same as in Proclus except that the second line ends *ἀπερύκοις* not *ἀπέρυκε*. They are also found in the 5th century A.D. *Χρησμοὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν Θεῶν* published in Buresch's book, Klarios,⁶⁶ where the text is as in the AP but is introduced with the words "Ὁν ὁ Πλάτων οὕτως εὐχεσθαι διδύκεται". It is possible that this "oracle" derives from Proclus, for Buresch dates the original of the collection to the period 474-491 A.D., but if so it does at least confirm, since it is so nearly contemporary,

66 (Leipzig, 1889). See no. 40 on p. 107 there.

that the Proclus MS has not been corrected from the AP or anything of that kind. If the oracle does not come from Proclus, it may still come from a Platonist source of some kind, rather than directly from Plato.⁶⁷ The couplet also recurs in the anthology of the 5th century A.D. grammarian Orion⁶⁸ introduced, interestingly, by ἐκ τῶν Πυθαγορικών, beginning Ζεὺ Κρονίδῃ⁶⁹ and with Proclus' second line except for the ending εὐχόμενος ἀπερόκοις (for ἀπερόκοις cf. the AP text) Carlini⁷⁰ argues that Plato's τὰ δὲ δεινὰ καὶ εὐχόμενος ἀπὸ λέξεϊν is a paraphrase, while Proclus and the rest have preserved the actual line of verse. Accordingly Carlini prints τὰ δὲ δεινὰ... etc. as prose in his text of Alc. II. He does mention⁷¹ that ἀπὸ λέξεϊν is a poetical word, and admits the possibility that two versions of the lines existed in antiquity. This, not his preferred explanation, must be the right answer. It would be strange for the author of Alc. II to produce a prose paraphrase of the line which still made a complete hexameter. Was Proclus' variant introduced by him, as Carlini thinks, or did it stand already in his text of Plato? The problem is exactly parallel to the problems that arose with some of Proclus' Homer quotations which also occur in Plato and I would argue

67 A couple of the other oracles in the collection are explicitly said to come from Porphyry. Cf. Lewy, pp. 16 ff. and E.R. Dodds, "New Light on the Chaldaean Oracles", HTR 54 (1961), pp. 263-73.

68 Printed in Meineke's Stobaeus, IV 257, no. 17.

69 Proclus' Ζεὺ βρομίδῃ is guaranteed by his exposition:- see 188.18.

70 In "Studi sul testo della quarta tetralogia Platonica", SIFC N.S. XXXIV (1963), pp. 185 ff.

71 Ibid., p. 186, note 5.

here, as I did there, that Proclus' text of Plato had a different text of the lines of verse from ours. I can see no reason why Proclus should have deliberately altered Plato's version.

For Proclus' text of the Phaedo, as well as the two quotations which I have already discussed⁷² there is an allusion at 85.6 to Phaedo 108a, from which it is clear that Proclus read $\tau\rho\acute{o}\delta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ there, as did Olympiodorus, while all the Plato MSS, and Stobaeus, present the inferior reading $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\delta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$.⁷³ It appears from In Remp. II.132 ff. that Proclus aligned the $\tau\rho\acute{o}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ of the Phaedo with the $\tau\rho\acute{o}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ of Gorgias 524a2.⁷⁴ The Neoplatonists' close knowledge of Plato may be the reason why their text has preserved the right reading here, while Stobaeus and the medieval tradition lost it.

Proclus has two quotations from the Timaeus, and also an allusion which provides evidence for his text of Plato. With the Timaeus we have a "control" of a rather special kind in the form of Proclus' text in his In Tim. He quotes Tim. 28a at In Remp. 109.27-110.4. The passage occurs in the In Tim. at 264.4-9 and the subsequent commentary. Here we have conclusive proof if any were needed, that Proclus can deliberately edit the opening of a quotation to fit it in to his text and in particular that he tends to change the opening particle to $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$. The lemma at In Tim. 264.4-9 begins $\acute{\omicron}\tau\omicron\upsilon \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \acute{\alpha}\nu$ with AP as against $\acute{\omicron}\tau\omicron\upsilon \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \acute{\omicron}\nu \acute{\alpha}\nu$ of FWY and Stobaeus' $\acute{\omicron}\tau\alpha\nu \acute{\omicron}\nu$. The In Remp. quotation begins $\acute{\omicron}\tau\omicron\upsilon \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \acute{\alpha}\nu$,

72 Pp. 91-2 above.

73 Cf. Carlini, Fedone, p. 107 and p. 111, note 56.

74 On Proclus' interpretation of Plato's eschatology, cf. pp. 209-12 below.

that is, with the same text as the In Tim. lemma except for the particle, which has been deliberately altered. Similarly the In Remp. quotation agrees with the In Tim. lemma and Stobaeus in reading τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀπεργάζεται while Plato F and Vatic. 228 read τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, Plato AP read δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, and Y reads δύναμιν alone. The In Remp. quotation also agrees with the In Tim. lemma, Stobaeus and most Plato MSS in reading γεννητῷ against AP γεννητῇ. The omission of τούτῳ πνευ προεχρήμενος παρὰ δόξαν in the In Remp. quotation may be classed as another deliberate omission. Unfortunately we cannot simply conclude that the In Remp. quotation and the In Tim. lemma present the same text for there are two more variants to note. The In Remp. reads εἰς τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχον while the In Tim. lemma presents πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταύτα ἔχον in most MSS but κατ' αὐτὰ in MP; moreover this is one of the cases where commentary and lemma diverge in the In Tim.:- at 271.29 in the body of the commentary we find πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταύτα ἔχον with Plato F. (The other Plato MSS agree with the πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταύτα ἔχον of the lemma) The In Remp. therefore stands alone with its εἰς for πρὸς. Similarly the In Remp. text is the only one with οὗ δ' αὖν εἰς γεγονός while the In Tim. lemma reads οὗ δ' αὖν εἰς γεγονός with Plato E, W has οὗ δ' αὖν εἰς ὁ γεγονός and APY 1812 have οὗ δ' αὖν εἰς τὸ γεγονός.⁷⁵ Are we to say that Proclus in the In Remp. is quoting from memory or that he used one text of Plato when writing the In Remp. and

75 Cf. Diehl, op. cit. above (note 58), p. 249.

another when writing the In Tim.? We have seen in Chapter 1 how difficult it is to date these commentaries which were originally lectures.⁷⁶ We saw too that the In Tim. and the In Remp. refer to each other and that it is no easy task to establish their relative date on the basis of cross-references. I did argue that the 5th and 6th essays were written after the In Tim. but that is not the right way to solve this problem about the text of Plato. There is some confusion in the tradition in each of the problem readings but in each case the text of the In Remp. stands completely alone and diverges only slightly from the In Tim. lemma. The quotation is quite long to be a quotation from memory, but Proclus must have known the Timaeus very well and in the context, where the quotation is adduced simply for purposes of illustration, quotation from memory is likely. The best solution of this particular problem would therefore be that Proclus is quoting from memory in the In Remp. and that is why his text of this passage of the Timaeus, although it mainly agrees with the In Tim. lemma, does present some otherwise unknown variants. The agreement with the In Tim. lemma supports Diehl's view that the unabbreviated lemmata in the In Tim. are original.

At 166.6-8 Proclus quotes Timaeus 41c-d. His text runs
 μιμούμενοι . . . τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν περὶ τὴν ὑπετέραν
 γένεσιν ζῶν ἀπερχόμενοι καὶ γεννᾶτε . He is
 jumping from μιμούμενοι τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν περὶ τὴν ὑπετέραν γένεσιν
 in 41c5-6 to ἀπερχόμενοι ζῶν καὶ γεννᾶτε in 41d2, and reversing
 the MSS order of ζῶν and ἀπερχόμενοι . Kroll prints

76 Pp. 46 ff. above.

Proclus' sentence as a quotation but one might feel inclined to call it a paraphrase and discount it as evidence for the text of the Timaeus. However, when we turn to our "control" in the In Tim. we find that Proclus' is quoting what he read in his text of the Timaeus. The lemma at In Tim. III 238.27-8 begins $\zeta\omega\alpha \ \alpha\pi\epsilon\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\sigma\theta\epsilon \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ \gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon$ with the same order of words as the In Remp. The commentary which follows implies the same order of words (see 238.31-2 and 239.4). It is then right to regard 166.6-8 as a quotation, with a deliberate jump in the middle of the kind we have already seen in the quotation from Sophist 235d. Both in the In Remp. and in the In Tim. (in the lemma at III 229.6-7) Proclus reads $\delta\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\nu$ with most of the medieval MSS against Y's $\delta\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$.

At 64.27-65.15 Proclus alludes to Timaeus 21c. He quotes the adjective which Plato there applies to Solon as a poet. The Laurentian MS of Proclus reads $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\theta\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ which the Corpus MS, followed by the editio princeps, corrected to $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\theta\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ to bring it into line with the text of Plato.⁷⁷ Proclus reads $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\theta\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ again in the In Tim., in the commentary, at 91.21 and 93.7.⁷⁸ It looks from the In Tim. as though both Iamblichus and the Neoplatonist Origen read $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\theta\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$. This is also the reading of Plato W, while the other MSS offer $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\theta\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$. $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\theta\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$

77 Cf. note 62 above.

78 Cf. Gallavotti, L'estetica greca..., p. 33, note 1.

should therefore be left in the In Remp.

We come now to the dialogues from which Proclus quotes rather more frequently: the Phaedrus and the Ion, the Laws and the Republic itself. The quotations from the Phaedrus and the Ion are all from a specific part of each dialogue so that it is almost possible to reconstruct Proclus' text of a continuous passage of each by putting the quotations together. The frequent quotations and allusions from the Laws come from widely scattered passages. The majority of the direct quotations from the Republic are from Rep. X and the situation is rather like that with the Ion and the Phaedrus.

To turn first to the Phaedrus:- I have already dealt with one of the Phaedrus quotations on p. 94 above. For a Neoplatonic text of the Phaedrus we can to some extent compare the commentary of Hermias, but Hermias does not provide us with a text of all the passages quoted by Proclus since he gives only abbreviated lemmata to introduce sections of his commentary; sometimes his text of a passage can be gleaned from a quotation in the body of his commentary or from what his commentary appears to presuppose in the text. The following are the four Phaedrus quotations in Proclus apart from the one already discussed, and the variants in them:

(1) Phaedrus 242d, quoted at 176.17-21

Proclus MS $\delta\upsilon\nu\eta\delta\theta\eta\mu\alpha\iota$ emended by Kroll, I think unjustifiably in view of the other variants in Proclus' text of Plato, to agree with the Plato MSS $\eta\delta\theta\eta\mu\alpha\iota$.

Proclus $\delta\upsilon\ \pi\acute{\iota}\ \alpha\upsilon\ \epsilon\eta\ \delta\epsilon\upsilon\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$: most Plato MSS
 $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\varsigma\ .\ .\ \delta\epsilon\upsilon\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma$: B $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\varsigma$ P. Oxy 2102 $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\varsigma$.

Hermias has no text of this passage in either lemmata or commentary.

(2) Phaedrus 243a, quoted at 173.11-17

Deliberate change by Proclus of opening ἐὼν δὲ to ἐὼν γὰρ

Proclus ἥθετο : MSS ἥθετο

Proclus and MSS ἑλένης : Oxy.² τῆς ἑλένης

Proclus and MSS κατηγορίαν : Oxy. κατηγορίαν but some confusion generally about the two words which are close in sense and easily confused in writing: at 173.22 the Proclus MS has been corrected from κατηγορήσει to κατηγορήσει and at Phaedrus 243b5 MSS and Oxy.² have κατηγορίαν but Oxy. has κατηγορίαν. Hermias uses κατηγορήσαντα in his commentary on this passage at 75.24-5 but one MS of Hermias has κατηγορήσαντα.

(3) Phaedrus 245a, quoted at 57.25-9 (and alluded to at 56.25, 70.28, 140.16 ff., 180.11)

Deliberate change by Proclus of opening ὅς δ' ἔν to ὅς γὰρ ἔν

Proclus Μουσῶν μανίας : Plato MSS μανίας Μουσῶν

Hermias (98.26): μανίας πῶν Μουσῶν. Hermias inserts πῶν because he is adapting the quotation for comment as he goes along.

Proclus ποιητικῆς θύρας : Plato MSS, P.Oxy.1017, Hermias, Aristides, Stobaeus ποιητικῆς θύρας (cf. Seneca, Trang.

17.10 "poeticas fores"). In the allusion to this passage at 140.17 Proclus has ποιητικῆς θύρας. It is possible that Proclus knows of two different readings but more likely, since he makes no comment to that effect, that either 57.26 or 140.17 is corrupt. I suspect that 57.26 has been influenced by the discussion of ποιητικῆς in the context. It is theoretically possible that Proclus himself is quoting wrongly (perhaps from memory) but he would know Phaedrus 245a so well that I think this is rather a case of corruption in the text of Proclus. The apparent variant ποιητικῆς is unknown to the rest of the ancient tradition as well as to the medieval MSS.

Deliberate omission by Proclus of *πεισθεὶς εἰς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐδόμενος*.

Proclus καὶ [ἡ ss. m³] αὐτὸς ἀτελής ἐστὶ ποιητὴς καὶ ἡ ποιήεις αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ . . . : Plato MSS ἀτελής αὐτὸς τε καὶ ἡ ποιήεις ὑπὸ . . . : Hermias (adapting) ἀτελής αὐτὸς τε ἐστὶ τοῦτο οἶόμενος καὶ ἡ ποιήεις αὐτοῦ

Proclus, Stob. ἡ τοῦ δωδρενοῦντος : TW ἡ : B γ

(4) Phaedrus 250d, quoted at 175.8-11

Proclus begins τὸ τῇδε κάλλος διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης τῶν αἰσθητέων κατελήφμεν while Plato begins περὶ δὲ κάλλους δεῦρο τ' ἐλθόντες κατελήφμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθητέως τῶν ἡμετέρων but it is

difficult to tell where adaptation stops and quotation begins and so not really possible to conclude that Proclus has a different text of Plato.

Proclus, Plato MSS (and Plutarch) ὁξυτάτη : Hermias in commentary at 179.20 ὁξυτέρη emended to ὁξυτάτη by Couvreur.

Proclus αἰσθητέων ἔρχεται (ἀρχεται corrected to ἔρχεται in the MSS): Plato MSS ἔρχεται αἰσθητέων

Once again we find some deliberate changes and adaptations of Plato by Proclus and some real variants, including differences of word order. It also appears possible that Hermias and Proclus were not using quite the same text.

Of the six quotations from the *Ion* five follow each other in quick succession on pp. 183-4 and together form a synopsis of and commentary on *Ion* 533-4 on the inspired poet and the transmission of his inspiration to others.⁷⁹ The sixth is

79 Cf. below, pp. 301-5.

from Ion 530b, quoted at 158.6-11, where the Plato MSS read

ἄρα δὲ ἀναγκαῖον but Proclus has ἄρα δὲ καὶ
ἀναγκαῖον . I have already dealt with one of the

five consecutive quotations, that of 533e, quoted at 184.14-7,
on pp.90-1 above. The remaining four, and the variants in
them, are as follows:

(1) Ion 533d, quoted at 183.1-3

Proclus, Plato WF τέχνη : T τέχνη

(2) Ion 533d-e, quoted at 183.14-20

Proclus οὐ μόνον δὲ . . . αὐτοὺς ἔχει πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τοὺς
βιδηροὺς δακτυλίους ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῖς ὁλοκὴν πῶν
ὁμοίων ἐντέθειν, ὥστε ἄλλους ἔχειν δακτυλίους· καὶ
πολλάκις . . . ὁρμαλὸς δακτυλίων ἢ βιδηρίων ἐξ ἀλλήλων
ἡρπῆται· πᾶσι δὲ ἄρα τούτοις ἀπ' ἐκείνης τῆς
λίθου ἢ δύναμιν ἐξήρπῆται

Plato's text as printed in the OCT οὐ μόνον αὐτοὺς τοὺς
δακτυλίους ἔχει τοὺς βιδηροὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ἐντέθειν τοῖς
δακτυλίοις ὥστ' αὐτὸ δύνασθαι τούτων τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ ἢ
λίθος, ἄλλους ἔχειν δακτυλίους, ὥστ' ἐνίοτε ὁρμαλὸς
μακρὸς πᾶν βιδηρίων καὶ δακτυλίων ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἡρπῆται·
πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς λίθου ἢ δύναμιν ἀνῆρπῆται.

As the differences between the two texts are so great I have
underlined the parts which are the same in an attempt to make
the nature and extent of the differences stand out more
clearly.

The MSS text is not without variants:

TW Stob. δύνασθαι	:	F αὐτὸ δύνασθαι	
TW βιδηρίων	:	F Stob βιδηρίων	(cf. Proclus)
TWF (and Proclus) ἡρπῆται	:	Stob. εἴρεται	

The Proclus text of the whole passage differs considerably.

Festugière remarks that ὁλοκὴν is difficult to construe and

says tentatively, "Proclus lisait-il un autre texte?", without making any mention of the other variants in the passage. There is in fact no difficulty with ὁλκόν if we take it as an adjective agreeing with δύνανται. It is so used as an adjective by Plato in Rep. VII 521d3 and 527b9. LSJ say that ὁλκός is an adjective of three terminations, but this is wrong. It has in fact only two:- cf. Philo, Spec. I 105 ὁλκοὶ ... δύνανται and Legat. 268 ὁλκός δύνανται. We may then translate not, as Festugière does, "elle met en eux une force d'attraction qui produit des effets semblables" but, "it puts into them the power of attracting similar things". Should we regard Proclus' text of the passage as paraphrase rather than quotation? Certainly some of the differences may be due to deliberate adaptation. Proclus' καὶ πολλάκις for the MSS ὥστε ἐνίοτε and the omission of μακρὸς πᾶν could be easily accounted for in this way. Yet overall the passage is close enough to the MSS text to be considered at least a partial quotation.

Proclus' ὁλκόν πᾶν ὁμοίων is doing duty for (αὖ F only) δύνανται πᾶν τῶν τούτων ποιεῖν ὅπερ ἡ λείψ of the Plato MSS and Stobaeus. Is Proclus deliberately abbreviating? Or did his text of Plato present him with this more elegant phrase? The MSS text is clumsy and could be a gloss. We have seen that ὁλκός as an adjective is Platonic but this does not help us for Proclus naturally uses Platonic vocabulary himself. (Cf. the use of ὁλκός by Philo, whose language is similarly influenced by Plato). The lesser variants such as ἐκείνης τῆς λείψ for

ἐξ and ἐξήρηται for ἀνήρηται are certainly worth regarding as genuine variants of the kind we have already met with in the other quotations.

The Ion lacks a full critical edition. Proclus' quotation of this passage should certainly be taken into account if such an edition is ever produced. An editor would need to judge very carefully what was a genuine variant in the text of Plato and what was Proclus' adaptation. I would myself like to include ὁλκὸν πᾶν ὁμοίων among the genuine variants but would exclude καὶ πολλὰς and perhaps the omission of μακρὸς πᾶν as adaptation.

(3) Ion 533e, quoted at 183.24-6

Proclus TF Stob. ἐνθέους μὲν : W omits μὲν

Proclus αὐτοῦς (αὐτῆς as a correction in the Proclus MS):

F. Stob. αὐτῆ : TW αὐτῇ

(4) Ion 534b, quoted at 184.18-20 and 21-5

Proclus TWf ἐνθέους τε : F Stob. ἐνθέους

In lines 20-1 Proclus deliberately jumps from ἑκδρωῖν (534b5) to ἔτε (b7) and indicates that he is doing so by inserting καὶ τέλος . The omission of οὖν after ἔτε is probably deliberate and a corollary of skipping part of the text.

Proclus TW καὶ πολλὰ : F τε καὶ πολλὰ

Proclus ἑκάστος οἷός τε ἔστι : Plato MSS οἷός τε ἑκάστος

Proclus WF καλῶς : T καλός

It appears from these quotations that Proclus' text of the Ion did have some important variants from that of our medieval tradition. As in the other quotations we find deliberate

alteration by Proclus, avoidance of some of the more obvious and unintelligent medieval corruptions, and a failure to agree exclusively with any one branch of the medieval tradition. It is also worth noting that Stobaeus more than once presents variants from both Proclus and the MSS which are clearly inferior and which I have not bothered to record above. The contrast between Stobaeus' rather corrupt text of the quotations and that of Proclus is instructive. Stobaeus derives his quotations from a variety of sources, some directly from Plato but others from earlier anthologies. In the latter case the text would be open to progressive corruption. (Of course the text of Stobaeus himself could also be corrupt.) Proclus is more likely to be going directly to Plato and, for the Ion at least, his quotations present a better text.⁸⁰

As well as a number of allusions there are five actual quotations from the Laws. The variants in them are as follows:

(1) Laws I 624a, quoted at 156.16-20

Proclus $\delta\mu\omega\nu$: AO $\delta\mu\omega\nu$

Proclus $\delta\iota' \epsilon\nu\lambda\tau\omega\nu \epsilon\tau\omega\varsigma \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma \dots \beta\omicron\nu\nu\epsilon\nu\beta\iota\alpha\nu$: AO $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma \dots$
 $\beta\omicron\nu\nu\epsilon\nu\beta\iota\alpha\nu \delta\iota' \epsilon\nu\lambda\tau\omega\nu \epsilon\tau\omega\varsigma$

(2) Laws I 630a, quoted at 187.10-21

Proclus AO $\delta\gamma$: Eusebius $\delta\epsilon$

Proclus $\gamma\epsilon\nu\epsilon\theta\omega\epsilon$: others $\gamma\iota\gamma\nu\epsilon\theta\omega\epsilon$

Proclus, Eus. $\acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\iota$: AO $\acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\nu$

Proclus and Eus. IO $\epsilon\lambda\theta\omega\theta\omega\epsilon$: AO and Eus. II $\epsilon\lambda\theta\omega\theta\omega\epsilon$

The sense is such that these two variants entail each other.

⁸⁰ On the Plato quotations in Stobaeus, see Carlini, Fedone, pp. 122-5.

Proclus and Eus. IO. αὐτῆς μόνον ἀνδρείας omitted by AO and Eus. N. Ficino supplemented the words in his translation of Plato from Proclus or Eusebius.⁸¹

Proclus γάρ : others μὲν γάρ

(3) Laws II 667c-d; 668a; 668b, quoted at 190.7-20

Proclus deliberately jumps from 667d6 to 668a6 and again in line 16 to 668b9; he also deliberately omits the responses of the other partner in the dialogue which make no difference to the thought expressed. His introduction of the quotation with οὕτως πῶς φησὶν is a signal that he is going to proceed in this way rather than, as one might at first think, an indication that he is paraphrasing, not quoting.

Proclus AO ἐξερχάζονται : AO⁴ ἐξερχάζονται

Proclus δικαιώτατον ἐν ἡμῖν : AO δικαιώτατον ἐν ἑῷ

Proclus τὴν δὲ ὁρμότητα : AO τὴν δὲ γε ὁρμότητα

Proclus περὶ μουσικῆς : AO περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς

Modern Plato texts such as the Budé and the OCT punctuate with ; after ἑκατέκλι in 667c-d not, as Proclus does, after τί δέ (cf. Festugière ad loc.)

(4) Laws III 682a, quoted at 156.6-9 and 185.11-3

The same passage is used at Hermias 88.17-9.⁸²

At 156.6-9 Proclus omits ἐν θεοῖς τεκνόν. This is presumably just a slip either on Proclus' part or on that of his copyist since he has the word at 185.11 and the sense is difficult without it. The fact that this omission must be a slip reminds us of the possibility that other omissions, where we have no second instance of a quotation to provide a check, may be slips too.

⁸¹ See Alline, p. 303, note 1.

⁸² Cf. E. des Places, "La tradition indirecte des lois de Platon (Livres I-VI)", Mélanges J. Saunier (Lyons, 1944), p. 33.

Proclus AO $\delta\mu\nu\omega\delta\epsilon\upsilon\nu$: Hermias $\chi\rho\gamma\epsilon\mu\omega\delta\epsilon\upsilon\nu$

Proclus $\gamma\epsilon\gamma\omicron\nu\acute{o}\tau\alpha\nu$: AO $\gamma\iota\gamma\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\upsilon\nu$. Hermias omits a participle entirely.

Proclus AO $\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma\iota$ καὶ $\mu\omicron\upsilon\delta\alpha\upsilon\varsigma$: Hermias $\mu\omicron\upsilon\delta\alpha\upsilon\varsigma$ καὶ $\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma\iota$

The variants in Hermias' text are striking, particularly $\chi\rho\gamma\epsilon\mu\omega\delta\epsilon\upsilon\nu$. The sense in Hermias requires that reading since he is using the passage to illustrate that Plato recognises the interdependence of $\mu\omicron\upsilon\delta\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ $\mu\alpha\nu\iota\alpha$ and $\mu\alpha\nu\eta\kappa\acute{\eta}$ $\mu\alpha\nu\iota\alpha$. Is Hermias deliberately recalling the Platonic passage but not actually quoting it? Couvreur does not print the passage as a quotation, which suggests that this was his view. On the other hand we have already seen that Proclus and Hermias did not exactly agree in their text of the Phaedrus. One might be tempted here to invoke Carlini's idea that each of the Platonic schools had its own official text of Plato⁸³ and to think of an Alexandrian text which differed from the Athenian one. However Hermias' work is largely a report of Syrianus' lectures in Athens which he and Proclus both attended.⁸⁴ Did he write his own commentary, based on Syrianus, later in Alexandria using a different text of Plato? That idea will not solve the problem here, for if, as is likely, this portion of the commentary derives from Syrianus, then Syrianus must have used $\chi\rho\gamma\epsilon\mu\omega\delta\epsilon\upsilon\nu$ in his argument here too. Are we then dealing with more than one text of Plato in Athens?

83 Cf. above, p. 85.

84 Cf. above, p. 20 and note 8.

For this Laws passage the best solution is to see Hermias/Syrianus' use of it as deliberate echo, but not quotation.

Χρησμεύουσιν and the others are not genuine variants in Plato. With the Phaedrus we could be dealing with two different texts, although the variants noted are hardly great enough to justify this view. Even if Proclus and Hermias were using different texts of the Phaedrus there is no need to think of these as one in Athens, one in Alexandria. We should expect signs of confusion in Hermias if he heard lectures on one text of Plato in Athens from Syrianus and then wrote his notes up later in Alexandria using a different text. All the comparison of Proclus and Hermias gives us is possible additional evidence that the Athenian Neoplatonists knew of more than one text of Plato.

(5) Laws V 728c, quoted at 102.29-103.2

Proclus AO Stob. $\pi\alpha\theta\eta$: A^2 $\pi\alpha\theta\epsilon\iota$ (cf supra η)

Proclus ὅ τε τυχεύωνν καὶ ὁ μὴ τυχεύωνν : others ὅ τε τυχεύωνν καὶ μὴ τυχεύωνν

In general in the Laws quotations Proclus never agrees with either A or O against the other but there are places where he disagrees with the two of them together; sometimes this disagreement is shared by Eusebius and sometimes not. In at least one case, that of $\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\varsigma$ μόνον ἀνδρείας in (2), where the disagreement is shared by Eusebius, the ancient authors have preserved a phrase omitted by our Plato MSS.

Although the 5th and 6th essays are so much concerned with Rep. II and III there are only three direct quotations

in the essays from those two books. Usually when Proclus wants to refer to a specific passage, in order, for example, to discuss a particular charge that Socrates makes against Homer, he gives a close paraphrase of what Plato says, without actually quoting. The majority of the Republic quotations to be considered come from Book X. Proclus quotes at length from the part of Rep. X on poetry in his discussion of it in the second book of the 6th essay.

I have already dealt on p. 90 with the brief tag $\epsilon\upsilon\lambda\eta\gamma\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$ from Rep. III. Of the two quotations from Rep. II one, that of 378a at 80.13-6, tells us only that Proclus, like most of our Plato MSS, read $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$ where F reads $\alpha\lambda\lambda'$ $\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron$. The second, the quotation of Rep. II 378d at 79.29-80.4 and again of the first colon of the passage at 186.15-6 is more complicated. The different text of p. 186 δ νέος οὐκ ἐστὶ δυνατόν κρίνειν ὅτι τ' ἐστὶν δρόναια καὶ ὅτι μή must be an adaptation since the longer quotation on p. 79 presents us with a text of these words which agrees with most of our MSS. Thus on p. 79 Proclus has $\sigma\iota\omicron\varsigma$ τε with most MSS against the $\sigma\iota\omicron\varsigma$ of F and Stobaei L and ὅτι μή (also on p. 186) with the Plato MSS against Eus. ὅτι μή and Stobaei L μή. Proclus however has 'ὅτι' (corrected in the MS from ὅτι) while the Plato MSS have $\alpha\lambda\lambda'$ and Stob. L has no relative pronoun at all. Proclus agrees with the MSS $\pi\rho\omega\tau\alpha$ against Stob.'s $\pi\rho\omega\tau\omicron\nu$ and with the $\kappa\alpha\lambda\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$ of most MSS, including a marginal correction in F, against the $\mu\alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$ of F and Stob. L. Once again Proclus has a markedly better text than Stobaeus. On the whole he agrees with the

better readings of the MSS but he does present one independent variant.

The pattern of variants and deliberate changes with which we are now familiar is repeated in the nine quotations from Rep. X not yet discussed. (Two were discussed on pp. 92-3 above)

(1) Rep. X 595a, quoted at 196.25-197.3

Deliberate omission of .. λέγω, τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη after ποιήσεως
Proclus A²M παρὰ δεκτέον : AFD παρὰ δεκτέα

(2) Rep. X 595b, quoted at 197.4-7

Proclus MS ἡμᾶς rightly emended by Kroll to ὑμᾶς
(ἡμᾶς makes no sense.)

Proclus and Plato MSS ἐρῆσθαι : Eus. ἐρῆσθαι

Proclus τραγῳδίας : others τῆς τραγῳδίας

Proclus and Eus. πάντας : Plato MSS ἐπάντας

These three variants again indicate that Proclus' text is independent both from other branches of the ancient tradition - in this case Eusebius - and from the medieval MSS.

(3) Rep. X 595c, quoted at 204.23-6

Proclus deliberately alters the opening ἔθηκε μὲν γάρ
"Ὁμηρος to ἔθηκεν γάρ, φησί, "Ὁμηρος
Proclus πάντων : Plato MSS ἐπάντων

Proclus τῶν τραγικῶν διδάσκαλος καὶ... : Plato MSS
τῶν τραγικῶν πρῶτος διδάσκαλος τε καὶ ...

(4) Rep. X 597e3-4 and 6-8, quoted at 197.27-198.2; 6-7
are also quoted at 204.26-8

Proclus (both on p. 197 and on p. 204) *τραχυδίονος* :
 Plato MSS *τραχυδονος*

Proclus (both places) *τρίτος* : Plato MSS *τρίτος* πς

Proclus p. 204 *ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως* : Plato MSS and
 Proclus p. 198 *ἀπὸ βασιλέως* . Proclus is unlikely to
 be dealing with two different texts of this passage in the
 same part of the essay without any comment; either *τοῦ* stood
 in his text and has been mistakenly omitted by a copyist
 (or by Proclus himself when copying Plato) on p. 198, or
 he had *ἀπὸ βασιλέως* and a copyist has added *τοῦ* on
 p. 204 under the influence of *τῆς ἀληθείας* . I am inclined
 to think that here, as in number (4) of the Laws quotations,
 we are dealing with a copyist's error of omission and
 that Proclus did have the variant *ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως* in
 his Plato but obviously the case is a weak one and could be
 argued either way. What is unlikely in either context is
 quotation from memory since in both cases several quotations
 are being carefully made from one part of the Republic
 text.

Proclus p. 198 *οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες* : Plato MSS *πάντες*
οἱ ἄλλοι . The quotation on p. 204 stops before these
 words.

(5) Rep. X 598a, quoted at 191.4-18

Proclus MS *κλίνῃς ἄν* rightly emended by Kroll to agree
 with Plato MSS *κλίνῃ ἐάν* . *κλίνῃς ἄν* does not
 give very good sense and it is easy to see how the corruption
 has occurred.

Proclus and most MSS *θεῶν* : F *θεῶν*

Proclus *καταντηκρὺς ἄν τε* : Plato MSS *καταντηκρὺ ἦ*

Proclus *αὐτῇ αὐτῇ* : Plato MSS *αὐτῇ ἐαυτῇ*

Proclus MS *διαδέρεα* : Plato MSS *ἦ διαδέρεα* .
 < ἦ > rightly added in Proclus by Kroll.

Proclus *ἡραδική* : Plato MSS *ἦ ἡραδική*

(6) Rep. X 598b, quoted at 198.4-5

Proclus ἔργα : Plato MSS ἔργα μου . Very likely accidental omission in Proclus.

(7) Rep. X 598d ff., quoted at 203.12-26

Proclus μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκεπτεόν : Plato MSS μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν ἐκεπτεόν

Proclus μέλλου : Plato MSS μέλλει

Proclus εἰ παρὶν : Plato MSS παρὶν

(8) Rep. X 602a, quoted at 191.30-192.3 and at 198.6-7

Proclus (in both places) ὀρθοδοξάζει : Plato MSS ὀρθὸν δοξάζει

LSJ gives no entry for ὀρθοδοξάζω but does give ὀρθο-δοξατικός which is used by Proclus at In Alc. 76.8-9, and at In Remp. II 88.5 & 19-20. Cf. also the entries for ὀρθοδοξέω and ὀρθοδοξία .

(9) Rep. X 607a, quoted at 204.16-8

Deliberate change of opening εἰ δέ to εἰ γάρ

Proclus παραδέξαι Μένονα : Plato MSS Μένονα παραδέξαι

The resulting split between adjective and noun in Proclus' text is a trick of style of which he himself is fond: see, e.g., 69.25-6, 200.3-4, 205.8. This suggests that Proclus, or possibly his copyist, has unconsciously changed the order of words in the quotation.

It is interesting to see that Proclus' variants in these Rep. X quotations are mainly independent ones not found in any of our medieval MSS.

This detailed examination of Proclus' Plato quotations proves conclusively that Proclus did have a significantly different text from ours of quite a number of the Platonic dialogues. It is true that we have to take into account deliberate alterations of the text to fit it into his own context, corruption in our text of Proclus, including omissions, which can only be detected for certain in the cases where we have more than one instance of a given quotation, and also errors by Proclus himself, whether in copying a quotation (in which case we cannot tell whether Proclus himself or the copyist of his work is responsible) or due to quoting from memory. Even if we thus explain away insignificant variants such as differences in word order, some striking variants remain and their existence suggests that some of the insignificant variants too may be real variants in Proclus' text of Plato. The whole body of variants constitutes a very strong collection of evidence.

We have seen that the study of Proclus' Homer quotations similarly suggested that while his text of Homer differed little from ours, there were significant differences in his text of Plato. My findings agree with the view of Proclus' text of Plato presented by Alline, Diehl and Carlini in showing that no one branch of the medieval tradition derives directly from Proclus' text. This is a corollary of the main point that Proclus' text of Plato differed from the one we know, for what we know is the text of the medieval tradition. Moreover Proclus' text differs from those of Eusebius and Stobaeus, being

noticeably better than the latter. This too agrees with the view presented by Alline and Carlini that the ancient tradition does not offer us a unified vulgate text (unlike the post-Alexandrian tradition of Homer). We have seen that Proclus himself knew more than one text and that it would be a mistake to regard his occasional textual disagreement with Hermias as evidence for the idea that each of the Platonic schools had its own official text. We can also see from the quotations examined that Proclus' text on the whole is free from the more ignorant medieval corruptions. This is what one would expect: Proclus knew both Plato and classical Greek better than did the medieval scribes.

CHAPTER THREE

PROCLUS' DEBT TO SYRIANUS

(1) The problem:

Throughout his work Proclus speaks of his teacher, Syrianus, with the greatest respect and he frequently quotes Syrianus' authority for the ideas he is putting forward. At the beginning of the Platonic Theology (I.1, pp. 6.16-7.17 Saffrey-Westerink) he praises Syrianus in the most striking terms as *ὁ μετὰ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς πλάνων καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἡγεμὴν* and *ἡγεμὸν τῶν τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς τελευτῶν καὶ εἰς ἄκρον ἡκον διανοητικῶς*. Likewise Marinus' Life shows us how close was the relationship between Proclus and his teacher: Proclus was buried in the same grave as Syrianus on Mount Lycabettus (Ch. 36); Proclus began his writings on Plato at the instigation of Plutarch of Athens and of Syrianus, Plutarch's successor as head of the Academy and as Proclus' teacher (Chs. 12 and 13). A number of Proclus' writings were on topics already treated by Syrianus and some of them were simply additional notes to existing commentaries by Syrianus. In chapter 27 Marinus tells the story of how Proclus was warned in a dream not to write a full commentary of his own on the Orphic writings. Marinus, his pupil, persuaded him to write notes on the margins of the existing commentary by Syrianus and Iamblichus. If Proclus had composed an independent commentary no doubt it would have included the views of Iamblichus and Syrianus along with Proclus' own further

comments and criticisms.

Syrianus is not particularly important for the 5th essay. We shall see in Chapter 4¹ that much of Proclus' interpretation of Plato there builds on traditional discussion of the dialogues, going back at least to Hellenistic times and even to Aristotle. We have no certain evidence for a commentary on the Republic by Syrianus and we do not know whether he discussed the Republic with his pupils, or what form such exegesis took.² The distinction between inspired and uninspired poetry which Proclus makes in the fifth problem of the 5th essay (56.20-60.13) recurs in Hermias and we can therefore say that Syrianus used it,³ but there is no reason to think that it originated with him. Both Proclus and Hermias/Syrianus are trying to resolve the contradiction between Phaedrus 245a, the famous passage on poetic inspiration, and 248e, where poetry is relegated to the sixth place in the series of lives. To make some such distinction between two types of poetry is a fairly obvious way to do this.⁴ Proclus will no doubt have taken account of anything his teacher had to say on the problems he considers in the 5th essay but the evidence we have suggests that Syrianus made no significant contribution to them.

The 6th essay presents us with a very different situation.

1 Pp.245-57 below.

2 See further below, pp. 132-3.

3 See above, p. 20, and note 8.

4 Cf. the modern interpretations by Vicaire, pp. 53-4, and R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge, 1952), p. 84, discussed below, pp. 263-5.

There Proclus refers to Syrianus both at the beginning and at the end and in the course of the essay he several times refers to Syrianus' interpretation of Homer and says that he is following it. On the whole scholars have taken Proclus at his word here and have assumed that he is largely repeating Syrianus, without examining in detail either the nature of his references to Syrianus or the interpretations which he explicitly attributes to his teacher. No attempt has been made to see whether Proclus is contributing anything of his own in this essay, in particular whether the theory of three types of poetry which he develops at the end of the essay derives from Syrianus just as much as the specific allegories which Proclus explicitly attributes to him.

The general problem of the relationship between the ideas of Proclus and those of Syrianus is made particularly difficult by the fact that so little has survived of Syrianus' writings independently of his distinguished pupil's work. Besides the commentary on the Phaedrus compiled by his pupil Hermias, only two works by Syrianus himself are still extant, a commentary on books $\beta, \Gamma, \text{M} \vee \text{N}$ of Aristotle's Metaphysics and a rhetorical work, a commentary on Hermogenes' περὶ ῥητορικῆς and περὶ ἱστορικῆς.⁵ We can learn quite a lot about Syrianus' metaphysical views from his commentary on the Metaphysics, but only a little about his views on Homeric poetry and allegory. Since the work is a commentary, the topics it covers are limited

5 Edited by H. Rabe (Leipzig, 1892. 1893).

by the topics covered by Aristotle in the books of the Metaphysics in question. For example, quite a long section of Praechter's RE article on Syrianus⁶ is devoted to his theory of numbers. We know what Syrianus thought about numbers because Metaphysics M and N are concerned with numbers and criticise the Platonist theory of ideal numbers. One might well despair of finding anything at all in a commentary on the Metaphysics that would illuminate the commentator's views on Homer. However, Proclus and Syrianus allegorised Homer in metaphysical and theological terms and sought to show the harmony between poetry, religion and philosophy. As a result myths, including Homeric myths, do make tantalisingly brief appearances in Syrianus' commentary. At In Met. 182.26-8 Syrianus expresses his attitude to the poetry of the theologoi, that is, the ancient poets who wrote about the gods, particularly Homer and Hesiod: οὐτ' οὖν οἱ ἀρίστοι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀφίστανται τῶν θεολόγων οὐθ' οἱ θεολόγοι τὰ δεύτερα δυνατότερα καὶ ἀμείνως τῶν ἀρχηγικωτέρων φαίνει εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μία ἡ παρὰ πᾶσιν ὡσεὶ ἀλήθεια. (Syrianus here denies that the theologoi say ontologically inferior entities, τὰ δεύτερα, are more powerful than superior ones because he is answering Aristotle, Metaph. 1091b4.)

Praechter's RE article gives some account of Syrianus' life and provides a survey of his works and doctrines. Praechter explicitly omits Syrianus' interpretation of myths and allegory of Homer from his account. Dodds, in the introduction to his

6 (1932).

edition of Proclus' Elements of Theology,⁷ has discussed the relationship of Proclus' metaphysics to those of Syrianus and concluded that "most of the theories commonly regarded as characteristic of Proclus were in fact anticipated, at least in part, by his master". On the other hand Zeller, in his history of Greek philosophy,⁸ inclined to believe that Proclus developed and systematised Syrianus' metaphysical doctrines, and he drew attention to the places in the In Tim. where Proclus, always with the greatest of respect, expands or corrects his teacher.⁹ One point made by both Zeller and Praechter is, as we shall see, important also for Syrianus' interpretation of Homer: Syrianus aimed constantly at a metaphysical exegesis of the Platonic dialogues, he was always anxious to interpret them θεολογικώτερον.¹⁰

Later Neoplatonist philosophers were aware of the particularly close relationship between Proclus' ideas and those of Syrianus and in several places the two writers are grouped together as effectively indistinguishable. Thus Olympiodorus, at In Phd. 52.18 ff., accuses Proclus of taking over Syrianus' ideas without proper acknowledgement: καὶ τοῦτο δείκνυσθαι ὁ Πρόκλος ὅτι ὁ Συριανός· συντάττει γὰρ αὐτὰ τῆς οἰκείας ὑπομνήματιν, λέγων δὲ τὰ Συριανοῦ, μὴ γράφειν εἰς αὐτὰ ὡς τοῦ διδασκάλου γράψαντος. This seems a curious accusation when we reflect on how often Proclus

7 Pp. xxiii-xxv.

8 Die Philosophie der Griechen (5th edn., Leipzig, 1923). See esp. III 2, p. 833.

9 Ibid., p. 819, note 2.

10 See Praechter's references to Syrianus, In Met. 183.15 ff. and 81.11, and Proclus, In Parm. 1061.28 and 618.8 ff.

does cite Syrianus' authority but in fact there are places where other evidence, such as that of Syrianus' commentary on the Metaphysics, shows an idea to be Syrianus' even when Proclus fails to acknowledge it as such. So, for example, the principle that generic characters in the effect proceed from a higher source than the specific, expounded in ET propositions 71 and 72, is also found at Syrianus, In Met. 29.4 ff.¹¹ Whether Proclus cites previous authors by name rather depends on the nature of the work he is writing¹² and his lost commentary on the Phaedo, to which Olympiodorus is referring here, may not have been as exhaustive as the In Tim. in its citation and attribution of earlier views. Similarly at 53.24-5 and 58.21 ff. Olympiodorus refers a view to ὁ Πρόκλος ἢτοι ὁ Συριανός . A writer closer to Proclus and Syrianus in both time and place, Damascius, who was head of the Athenian school at the time of its closure by Justinian in 529, presents us with a more complex picture. In his Lectures on the Philebus there are a number of different types of reference to Proclus and Syrianus. At 5.1-2 we find τοὺς περὶ τὸν Συριανόν καὶ τὸν Πρόκλον and at 33.5 οἱ διλόβοι refers to Proclus and Syrianus together. Here Damascius, like Olympiodorus, makes no distinction between the two thinkers. But at 244 Syrianus is referred to on his own, and at 253-5 we find a passage in which Proclus' views are given as supplementing those of Syrianus.

11 For further examples from the ET, cf. Dodds' introduction, p. xxiv.

12 Cf. above, p. 29 and pp. 47-8.

Both the ancient evidence and the modern discussions suggest that Proclus was very largely taking over Syrianus' ideas but that he did supplement, develop and criticise them. Opinions differ as to the degree to which he did so. I hope that a detailed examination of Proclus' use of Syrianus in the 6th essay will help to illuminate this general problem.

The few scholars who have previously discussed the 6th essay have tended to take a simple and uncritical view of the relationship between Proclus and Syrianus in it. Gallavotti, for example, considers that the whole essay is based on Syrianus and mistakenly thinks that the lecture on Plato's birthday referred to at 69.23 ff. was a discussion in which Syrianus played a leading part.¹³ So too W. Schmid, in his review of Gallavotti's L'estetica greca nell' ultimo suo cultore,¹⁴ declares that the whole section of the In Remp. concerned with poetry is "nicht geistiges Eigentum des Proklos sondern des Syrianos". Friedl does at least provide arguments for his similarly sweeping view in Die Homerinterpretation des Neuplatonikers Proklos that Syrianus was Proclus' principal source for his interpretations of Homer. He is aware that Proclus in the essay refers both to written works by Syrianus and to his master's oral teaching but assumes that these both covered the same ground and argues that Syrianus' Λύσεις τῶν Ὁμηρικῶν προβλημάτων to which Proclus refers at 95.30-1, dealt only

13 See above, pp. 36 ff. Gallavotti maintains this view both in L'estetica greca .. and in his two articles in RFIC 57 (1929), pp. 208-19 and in BPEC N.S. 19 (1971), pp. 41-54, respectively.

14 Gnomon 7 (1931), pp. 251-6.

with the passages of Homer attacked by Plato and was Proclus' source. He rightly points out that Proclus may be following Syrianus even where he does not mention his name (cf. the remark of Olympiodorus quoted above which is also quoted by Friedl), and considers that all the interpretations of a specifically Neoplatonic nature derive from Syrianus.¹⁵

All these scholars list Proclus' references to Syrianus in the 6th essay without examining what sort of work by Syrianus Proclus is referring to in each case. Friedl, as I have mentioned, shows some awareness of the diverse nature of these references but tries to make them all refer either to a Λύβητος τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν προβλημάτων which, unlike any other known collection of Ὀμηρικὰ προβλήματα, dealt only with the passages of Homer attacked by Plato, or to oral teaching which covered precisely the same ground. In fact these references are more diverse in their nature than Friedl admits. As I argued in Chapter 1, the opening pages of the 6th essay (pp. 69-71) suggest four stages in the development of the essay: a lecture by Syrianus (71.3); subsequent discussions by Proclus and Syrianus (71.26-7); a lecture by Proclus on Plato's birthday (69.23); and the writing up of that lecture into the essay we have.¹⁶ Already here we have reference to two different types of oral teaching by Syrianus: a lecture on the κοινὴν τῶν ὁμηρικῶν of Homer and Plato and his later further discussion of the topic with Proclus. At 71.22 ff.

15 Friedl, pp. 59-65.

16 P.40 above.

Proclus disclaims responsibility for what he is going to say: all the credit is due to Plato and Syrianus and he is simply going to repeat what he learned from the latter's lecture and private discussion. Striking though it is, this disclaimer should not, I think, be taken too seriously as evidence that Proclus says nothing of his own in the whole essay. It is rather reminiscent of the prefaces to modern scholarly works by polite authors who, after making acknowledgements to their teachers and advisers, say, "Anything good in this book is due to them; the faults that remain are my own."

When he comes to give detailed interpretations of the passages of Homer attacked by Plato, Proclus refers explicitly to Syrianus on four different occasions. At 95.26-31, after a lengthy exposition of the Theomachy, Proclus says that further details may be found in Syrianus' Λύσεις τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν προβλημάτων. Syrianus, it seems, wrote a work like Aristotle's Ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικὰ, Heraclitus' Quaestiones Homericae and Porphyry's Ὀμηρικὰ ζητήματα. No doubt he treated the problems from a Neoplatonic point of view but there is no reason to suppose, as Friedl does, that his interest in harmonising Plato and Homer led him to confine his discussion to the passages of Homer attacked by Plato. Rather he will surely have considered all the passages which had been attacked on philosophical and religious grounds over the centuries of ancient Homer interpretation, including those attacked by Plato. It is only to be expected that he should have given detailed consideration to the Theomachy, the locus classicus for allegorical

interpretation of Homer from Theagenes of Rhegium in the 6th century B.C. onwards.¹⁷

At 115.27 ff., in the discussion of Agamemnon's dream in Il. 2, Proclus introduces Syrianus' interpretation of the dream with the words προσκέειθαι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ καθηγεμόνος ἡμῶν ἐμβολή . (ὁ καθηγεμὼν ἡμῶν or ὁ ἡμέτερος καθηγεμὼν are standard phrases by which Proclus refers to Syrianus. He uses them more often than he uses his teacher's actual name.¹⁸) There is no indication here whether Syrianus treated this topic in his Λύσεις , in his lecture and discussions, or in all three.

At 133.5 ff. Proclus refers to a different kind of work by Syrianus, a special monograph on the union of Zeus and Hera on Mount Ida.¹⁹ There is no reason against supposing that this monograph was distinct from the Λύσεις . One may compare Proclus' own smaller works such as his little treatises, De providentia et fato and De malorum subsistentia, which survive in the medieval Latin translation of William of Moerbeke. For a closer parallel, a monograph on a particular passage of Homer, we need look no further than Porphyry's De antro nymphaeum.

At 153.2 ff. Proclus again directs his reader or hearer to the work of Syrianus for further information on the funeral rites Achilles gave Patroclus. At 152.7 ff. he had indicated

17 See esp. Schol. B to Il. 20.67.

18 On the term καθηγεμὼν , cf. Koch, p. 50.

19 For this meaning of προηγούμενην πραγματείαν , cf. D.A. Russell in his edition of the περὶ ὕψους (Oxford, 1964), p. 193. Both of the meanings of προηγούμενην suggested by Festugière, "qui montre la voie" and "qui précède le mien", are wrong here.

that the interpretation he was about to give was that of Syrianus. Now he breaks off his résumé of Syrianus with the words: καὶ ὅλως πολλὰ τῆς ὑπονοίας ταύτης λάβει τις ἂν τεκμηρία τοῖς τοῦ καθηγεμόνος ἡμῶν ἐντυχῶν. The phrase τοῖς τοῦ καθηγεμόνος ἡμῶν ἐντυχῶν, "by reading the works of our teacher" makes it clear that the reference is to written work by Syrianus. The passage 152.7-153.3 provides us with evidence that Syrianus dealt, in writing, with passages of Homer not actually attacked by Plato. What Plato had censured in the funeral rites of Patroclus was simply the sacrifice of the 12 Trojan captives on Patroclus' pyre (see Rep. III 391b6 τὰς τῶν ζυγρηθέντων δολοχὰς εἰς τὴν πυρᾶν and cf. the way Proclus takes up the problem at In Remp. 150.6-7) The interpretation which Proclus ascribes to Syrianus is an interpretation of the funeral rites as a whole;²⁰ indeed it is precisely the allegory of the captives in accordance with Syrianus' overall view which Proclus introduces at 153.3 ff. with a modest οὐκ ἂν ἀπὸ τρόπου τις λέγοι... that suggests it is his own.²¹ It seems reasonable to suppose that Syrianus gave this interpretation of the funeral rites in his Λύσεις τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν προβλημάτων; he did not fit in the detail of the captives because he was not dealing specifically with Plato.

Finally at 205.21 ff. Proclus dedicates the whole essay

20 For further discussion of the interpretation, see below, pp. 185 ff.

21 Cf. Friedl, p. 62. For the formula, cf. Aristid. Quint. II.17, p. 88.19-20 Winnington-Ingram.

to the memory of his teacher's ἐκτενέστερον. This does not in itself indicate the extent to which the essay is dependent on Syrianus. It merely implies that the whole enterprise of reconciling Homer and Plato is one that would meet with his approval and be an acceptable tribute to him.

It does not seem likely that Syrianus wrote anything of precisely the format of Proclus' 6th essay, for if he had done so surely Proclus would have referred to it rather than to the Λύσεις τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν προσληπτῶν etc. Perhaps the lecture on the κοινωνία τῶν δογμάτων of Homer and Plato came nearest to Proclus' own lecture/essay in form. At the very least then Proclus is making an intelligent compilation of Syrianus' views on Homer from four different sources: his own records or recollection of the lecture and of the later private discussion respectively, Syrianus' Λύσεις and Syrianus' monograph on Zeus and Hera. According to the Suda Syrianus did write a commentary on the Republic as well as a commentary on Homer in seven books and a περὶ τῶν περὶ Ὀμήρου θεῶν. The notices of Syrianus' and Proclus' writings in the Suda are in some confusion. Several of the titles are the same and the words ἐς τὰ Πρόκλου appear in the entry for Syrianus before one of these duplicate titles, the περὶ τῶν περὶ Ὀμήρου θεῶν. The notices have been discussed by Prächter.²² He excludes ἐς τὰ Πρόκλου from the text of the Suda. In Byzantine Greek this phrase means the

22 In "Das Schriftenverzeichnis des Neuplatonikers Syrianos bei Suidas", Byz 4 26 (1926), pp. 253-264; reprinted in his Kleine Schriften, ed. H. Dörrie (Hildesheim-New York, 1973), pp. 222-33. Cf. also his RE article on Syrianus.

same as ἐν τοῖς Προκλου , "already mentioned among the works of Proclus", and will have been an observant reader's marginal note which has crept into the text. The problem of the duplicate titles remains. Praechter argues²³ that the master and the pupil cannot both have written a whole series of works with the same titles and on that assumption presents a scholarly case for the view that the list has been transferred from Syrianus to Proclus. Praechter is wrong to assume that Proclus and Syrianus cannot both have written works with the same titles, as is shown by the evidence of Marinus concerning the way Proclus' commentaries were created²⁴ and by the nature of ancient school tradition in general. However he does present a good case for at least giving the Suda list a hearing as evidence for Syrianus' works (or for some of them. The list is only a partial one and does not include, for example, Syrianus' surviving commentary on Hermogenes.)

Praechter also discusses what other evidence there is for each of the works mentioned in the list. The only possible testimonia to a commentary on Plato's Republic by Syrianus are two references in Proclus' collection of essays, In Remp. II 64.6 ff. and II 318.3 ff. Neither of these is an explicit reference to a commentary on the Republic by Syrianus, and neither is very convincing in itself. The case for a Republic commentary by Syrianus really rests on Praechter's arguments that the whole list of writings in the Suda has been transferred

23 Pp. 259 ff. of his Byz 4 article.

24 Cf. p.120 above.

from Syrianus to Proclus and not vice versa. The textual problems of the Suda entry are so complex that I feel we are hardly justified in attributing a work to Syrianus on the strength of that entry alone. In any case, whether Syrianus wrote a commentary on the Republic or not, it is to other works by his teacher that Proclus refers in the 6th essay. We cannot say for certain whether Syrianus wrote a commentary on the Republic. What we can say, I think, is that he did not deal at length with Plato's attack on Homer within the pages of such a commentary.

What of Syrianus' reported commentary on Homer and his περὶ τῶν περὶ Ὀμήρου θεῶν ? Are these to be identified with the Λόγος τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν προσληπτῶν and the monograph on Zeus and Hera respectively? The commentary could well be the same as the Λόγος but the περὶ τῶν περὶ Ὀμήρου θεῶν sounds like a work of wider scope than the monograph on Zeus and Hera.

However we judge the Suda evidence, it makes little difference to the picture which has emerged from Proclus' own references to Syrianus in the 6th essay: he is using his teacher's writings and lectures on Homer and selecting from them in order to produce an essay on Homer in relation to Plato's Republic.

It is noticeable that in three of the four places where Proclus refers a specific interpretation to Syrianus the interpretation involves Neoplatonist metaphysics. On two of those occasions it is an allegory in terms of metaphysics. The fourth time, at 152.7 ff., the interpretation concerns the intimately related topic of theurgic rites. Friedl argues from

this that all Proclus' interpretations of a specifically Neoplatonic nature derive from Syrianus. There are good grounds for thinking that systematic allegory of Homer in terms of transcendent metaphysical entities was first developed by Syrianus. Writers like Philo and Origen occasionally allegorise Biblical persons and events in terms of metaphysics; Porphyry's De antro nympharum uses Neoplatonist concepts in its interpretation of the grotto in Od. 13. and refers to a full-scale allegory of the Odyssey by Numenius in terms of the journey of the soul; but nowhere before Proclus and Syrianus is there detailed and systematic application of the Homeric myths to the sphere of transcendent metaphysics. Saying that Odysseus represents the human soul in search of escape from the material world is rather different from saying that Zeus and Hera represent the monad and the dyad, two abstract philosophical concepts utterly removed from the world of sense-perception. In Neoplatonist terms, the former is an allegory on the level of Soul, the third and lowest of the Plotinian hypostases, while the latter operates on the level of the supreme First Hypostasis.²⁵ Of course we cannot be sure that this metaphysical type of allegory was developed by Syrianus rather than by some little known philosopher between himself and Porphyry. One would very much like to know more about how Iamblichus interpreted Homer, for it was his lead that Proclus and Syrianus

25 For a good example of an allegory on the level of Soul, see the exegesis of Hector and Andromache in Il. 6 given by the heroine of Charles Kingsley's novel, Hypatia (London, 1875), Ch. VIII, pp. 98 ff. (As far as I know, this allegory is Kingsley's own invention).

followed in their exegesis of Plato.

We do have two clues which point in different directions for the development of allegorical interpretation between Porphyry and Syrianus. On the one hand, Iamblichus De myst. IV 11 and 12 does not use metaphysical allegory to interpret divine love-affairs. His interpretation here may be contrasted with that adopted by Syrianus for the union of Zeus and Hera.²⁶ On the other, Sallustius De diis et mundo ch. 4 mentions the *Θεολογικός* as a type of myth, the others being *ψυχικός*, *ὁρμητικός* (and *μικτός*). Theological myths, according to Sallustius, are οἱ ... τῶν εὐδαίμωνων αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν θεωροῦντες. It is not altogether clear whether Sallustius is classifying types of myth, or only types of interpretation, for he offers as an example a theological interpretation of the myth of Kronos swallowing his children - ἐπειδὴ νοερός ὁ θεός, πᾶς δὲ νόος εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιτρέφει, τὴν εὐδαίμονα ὁ μῦθος ἀντίκειται τοῦ θεοῦ - and then proceeds to add physical and psychological interpretations of that same myth.

The example given by Sallustius confirms that *Θεολογικός* interpretation of myths is what I am calling metaphysical allegory. Nock picks out this use of *Θεολογικός* as peculiar to Sallustius.²⁷ Rather, it is peculiar to Neoplatonic thought about myths and perhaps only after the time of Iamblichus. Sallustius shows that already, a little before the time of

26 Cf. further below, pp. 162 ff.

27 In his edition, p. cxx, note 16.

Syrianus, the metaphysical type of interpretation was being applied in Neoplatonist circles to some of the most important, and most scandalous, Greek myths. Yet Syrianus' reputation for interpreting Plato *θεολογικῶς* does support the idea that his interpretation of Homer too was distinctively *θεολογικῶς* than that of earlier Neoplatonic interpreters.²⁸ I am not claiming that there were no metaphysical allegories of Greek myths before those of Syrianus. What I do wish to claim for Syrianus is an important extension of this type of allegory, to cover a large number of myths and interpret them with greater complexity than before.

(ii) The interpretation of Homer: some detailed analyses

When Proclus refers an interpretation to Syrianus does this mean that his entire discussion of the passage in question derives from Syrianus? Does he ever supplement or criticise his teacher's work here, as he occasionally does in the In Tim. and as Damascius reports him to have done when discussing the Philebus?²⁹ An analysis of the four interpretations which Proclus refers explicitly, in whole or in part, to Syrianus will help us to answer these questions and produce some guidelines for determining how much of the rest of Proclus' interpretation of Homer is to be attributed to Syrianus.

(a) The Theomachy, pp. 87-95³⁰

As we have seen, at the end of his discussion of the

28 Later, Olympiodorus in his Life of Plato (Ch. 6) claims that both Plato and Homer can be interpreted *δογματικῶς καὶ ῥητορικῶς καὶ θεολογικῶς*.

29 Cf. p. 125 above.

30 With this section, cf. Friedl, pp. 83-5 and Buffière, pp. 101-5 and 549-53.

Theomachy Proclus directs his readers or hearers to Syrianus'

Λύσεις τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν προβλημάτων for more information. In fact Proclus has already discussed the problem at unusual length and with some complexity. In his usual way he begins by setting out the problem, at 87.1-28: if in reality there is no division among the gods and, as Homer himself bears witness, they live in eternal peace and calm, how can the poet be correct in saying that they fight and engage in war with one another? 87.25-8 gives a brief indication of the kind of answer Proclus is going to provide: this mythical fighting is to be interpreted in terms of the providence of the gods and the nature of the objects of their providence. As the subject is so complex Proclus develops the philosophical doctrines in terms of which he will interpret not only the Theomachy of Il. 20 but all mythical theomachies, before proceeding to apply those doctrines in actual interpretation. There are, says Proclus, two different ways of thinking about the nature of the ultimate metaphysical reality, with which in his view the traditional gods of Greek religion are to be identified. (He speaks of two different τρόποι, 87.29 and 89.10). The first view, expounded at 87.29-89.9, is that there are opposing forces in the order of things, proceeding from the original opposition of πέραι and ἐντερπεία. These forces are responsible for procession and reversion, division and re-unification. It is because of these opposing forces that all the ontologically inferior entities, the δεύτερα, including all the things in the world we know through sense-perception, are both limited, finite, definite and unlimited, infinite in potentiality, indefinite,

both like the higher entities and unlike them, both equal and unequal, etc. These forces are responsible for the fact that on the one hand creation proceeds right down to the lowest members of the chain of being and yet on the other every thing strives to revert upwards to the cause that has created it. This theory explains the contradictions of the sensible world, which so worried Plato, in a very Platonic way: for each side of the contradiction there is a distinct transcendent cause.

The second view (89.10-89.24) appears superficially to contradict the first: now Proclus says that the gods are essentially united and division is only to be found among the objects of their providence and among the lowest types of gods who are closest to material things, i.e. the demons. There is not really a contradiction here but an interesting awareness on Proclus' part that talking about $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\sigma\tau\epsilon\phi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha$, $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ and $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\tau\eta\varsigma$ and the rest, as independent entities is ultimately misleading. One of the things that makes later Neoplatonist metaphysics so difficult for us to understand is its excessive philosophical realism: any quality of any thing is regarded as having an independently existing metaphysical cause. Yet Proclus does also show himself aware that such realism means the elevation of what are only aspects of the intelligible world into entities and sometimes, as here, he denies that his own hair-splitting distinctions are valid at the very highest level of reality. At 110 ff. a similar dual viewpoint lies behind Proclus' two different metaphysical explanations of changes of shape on the part of the gods and at 107.25 ff. there is a similar case which is simpler and more

easily comprehensible. In that passage Proclus appears to shift from talking about two types of divine activity to talking about two orders of gods. Proclus is aware that in one sense these two orders of gods are nothing more than two types of divine activity and in a further sense, the highest, all divine activity is one. Proclus' two orders of gods are like the two messengers of the White King in Alice Through the Looking-glass: the White King says, "I must have two, you know, to come and go. One to come and one to go." The reason he thinks there must be two is that he knows that messengers both come and go; one universal, one Platonic Form, one messenger, or, in Proclus' terms, one god is needed for each of the two activities. But if the White King, like Proclus, were occasionally aware of his own excessive realism, he would understand that coming and going can also be looked on as two activities, or even as two potential activities of One all-powerful and all-embracing messenger. It is easier to see what is happening in the simple case of 107.25 ff., but the explanation of Proclus' two tropoi for interpreting theomachies is essentially the same. This point about Proclus' awareness of his own excessive realism should not be taken too far; it is only at the highest level of metaphysics that he is willing to "telescope" entities in this way. Proclus' divine henads, the entities within the First Hypostasis, are in part a development of the earlier idea of divine powers.³¹ Already in Plotinus, in the description

31 Cf. A.J. Festugière, La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste III (Paris, 1953), pp. 158 ff. and P. Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (Paris, 1968), pp. 239 ff.

of the intelligible world in V.8.9, we find a number of gods all bound up in the god of the intelligible world. (V.8.9.14 ff.) Similarly Proclus speaks of the henads mingling with one another at, e.g., In Parm. 1048.11 ff.³² So here on p. 89 of the 6th essay Proclus denies division at the highest level of divinity but allows it to reappear at the lower level upon which the demons exist.

An ancillary motive for describing two ways of interpreting division among the gods appears when Proclus proceeds to apply these doctrines to actual myths, for he deals with two types of theomachy, first those in which the war is confined to the gods themselves (his examples are the fight between Zeus and the Giants and the Orphic myth of the fight between the Titans and Dionysus) and secondly those in which the gods join in wars between men, as they do in the Homeric Theomachy in Il. 20. The first type of myth is to be interpreted in accordance with the first tropos, the view that there are opposing forces in the order of things (89.25-90.13); the second type in accordance with the second tropos, for it is only the demons who descend into the material world and concern themselves closely with the wars of men (90.13-92.27). Proclus then recapitulates the two types of interpretation and seeks to demonstrate that Homer, the supreme poet, is aware of both ways of thinking about metaphysics, for he refers to the struggles of Zeus against the Titans as well as recounting the Theomachy

32 Dodds in his ET, pp. 257 ff. and pp. 278-9 underplays this aspect of the henads and correspondingly overemphasises the "static" nature of Proclus' metaphysics.

of Il. 20. Homer is thus as subtle as any Neoplatonist philosopher in his understanding of metaphysical reality. Proclus expands on how well Homer brings out the closeness of the demons to the material world and yet also their relationship to the gods whose names they bear and finishes his exposition with a detailed explanation of what the oppositions between the different gods who fight each other in Il. 20, signify. (92.28-95.26) There follows the reference to Syrianus.

Are we to suppose that the whole of Proclus' interpretation of mythical theomachies derives from Syrianus? Since it is an interpretation in terms of metaphysical doctrines the way to find out is to investigate whether Syrianus subscribed to these doctrines. If he did, then even if we have little or no independent evidence for his use of them in the interpretation of myths, it will be likely, in view of Proclus' reference to him, that the interpretation in question is in fact his.

It so happens that the doctrine of $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\acute{\alpha}$ which forms the basis of Proclus' first tropos of interpretation is particularly associated with Syrianus. $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\acute{\alpha}$ are derived from Plato's Philebus 23c ff. where the Pythagorean $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\circ\nu$ are introduced as the fundamental principles of things. However it was only the later Neoplatonic school who made extensive use of this particular passage of Plato and claimed that each of their many orders of reality represented an appropriate combination of Limit and Infinity.³³ In particular

³³ See Wallis, pp. 148-9; Dodds, ET, pp. 246 ff.; Beutler's RE article, "Proklos", col. 222-3; and J. Trouillard, L'un et l'âme selon Proclus (Paris, 1972), Ch. II, pp. 69 ff.

we find $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$ in Syrianus' commentary on the Metaphysics identified with the monad and the indefinite dyad and used to counter Aristotle's criticism that the theory of Forms is self-contradictory in that it makes number prior to the (indefinite) dyad. Syrianus distinguishes between on the one hand the $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\mu\omicron\nu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ and the $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\delta\upsilon\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ which are Forms and belong to the intelligible world, and on the other the $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\gamma\eta\kappa\acute{\eta}$ $\mu\omicron\nu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ and $\delta\upsilon\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ which are above the intelligible world and are in fact identical with $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$. (See Syr. In Met. 112.14-113.24. Cf. also In Met. 10.2 ff., 165.33 ff. and 64.1).³⁴ The two principles reappear frequently in Proclus.³⁵

It is not only the general doctrine of $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$ which can be paralleled in Syrianus but many details of Proclus' exposition of it at 87.29-89.9. Thus at 88.3-4 Proclus calls $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ the $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\tau\omicron\iota\omicron\delta\omicron\varsigma$ $\mu\omicron\nu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$. $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ is identified with the monad at Syr. In Met. 112.14 ff. and In Met. 10.2 ff. (cf. Proclus In Tim. 176.6 ff.) while at In Met. 165.33 ff. Syrianus says $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ is concerned with $\tau\eta\nu\ \tau\omega\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\iota$ $\beta\upsilon\gamma\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\nu$... $\beta\upsilon\beta\tau\omicron\chi\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$ (cf. 88.12 in our passage of the 6th essay and PT, p. 133 Portus).

At 88.5 $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$ is called $\gamma\epsilon\nu\eta\gamma\eta\kappa\acute{\eta}$ because it is concerned with procreation and creation (cf. $\acute{\alpha}\mu\omicron\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\upsilon\eta\gamma\iota\varsigma$ at 88.16 and $\gamma\epsilon\nu\eta\gamma\eta\kappa\acute{\eta}$ again at 88.17). So Syrianus at In

34 The doctrine of $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$ may go right back to Iamblichus:- cf. Wallis's reference to Damascius, Pr. I 101.11 ff. and 103.6 ff. Ruelle and Dillon, Introduction, pp.31-2.

35 See ET, props. 89-92; PT III, pp. 131 ff. Portus; In Parm. 1119 ff.; In Tim. 176 ff. Rosàn, pp. 126 ff., provides an English summary of the passages in ET, PT and In Parm.

Met. 112.35 ff. says the ἀρχηγικὴ δύς (i.e. ἀπερία) διεγείρει τε πάντα καὶ κινεῖ πρὸς ἀπεχέννησιν τῶν δευτέρων (cf. also Proclus In Tim. 176.6 ff. and PT, p. 133 Portus, and see Dodds's note on ET props. 151-9, p. 278).

88.6-7 describes what the things created by ἀπερία receive from it: τὴν ἀνέκλειπτον δύναμιν καὶ τὴν πλήθους καὶ προόδου οἰκτικὴν ἀπείαν . This comes very close in phraseology, and so in the details of the ideas involved, to Syrianus In Met. 112.35 ff.: δύς μὲν ἡ ἀρχηγικὴ γονίμου δυνάμεως καὶ προόδου καὶ πλήθους καὶ πολλοπλοκισμοῦ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐξηγῆται. (power, multitude and procession are likewise associated with ἀπερία at Proclus In Parm. 1119 ff., In Tim. 384 ff., and PT III, pp.131ff. Portus).

At 88.22 ff. Proclus gives examples of the lower-level oppositions which derive from πέρας and ἀπερία . These oppositions among the θεῖα γένη (88.9-10), that is, among the divine henads,³⁶ derive from ἀπερία in that without ἀπερία they could not exist (we would not be able to distinguish between, e.g., sameness and difference at all, if it were not for ἀπερία) yet in each case one side of the antithesis is related to πέρας the other to ἀπερία (e.g. sameness to πέρας , difference to ἀπερία).³⁷ Each of the four oppositions mentioned by Proclus has its roots in Plato but appears in Syrianus in the

³⁶ For this name for the divine henads, see ET prop. 132 and Dodds' note on p. 270.

³⁷ Cf. Festugière's note in his translation here.

same context as here, in relation to $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\acute{\alpha}$. All four of them, $\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\varsigma$ / $\kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\delta\iota\varsigma$, $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ / $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$, $\delta\mu\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ / $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\mu\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$, $\iota\delta\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ / $\acute{\alpha}\nu\iota\delta\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ are found together at Syrianus In Met. 5.9 ff. where Syrianus himself refers to Plato's Sophist 254d ff. where $\acute{\omicron}\nu$, $\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\varsigma$, $\kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\delta\iota\varsigma$, $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu$ and $\theta\acute{\iota}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ are the basic $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$, and to Plato's Parmenides 129d, 136b and 142b ff. (the second hypothesis); in the second hypothesis in particular we find all four oppositions, $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ / $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\acute{\alpha}$, and others besides. $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ / $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ appear again in Syrianus at In Met. 113.14 ff. in the long passage on $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\acute{\alpha}$. The oppositions do of course appear elsewhere in Proclus. Particularly interesting is In Parm. 743 ff. (on Parmenides 129). 776.23 ff. there shows that the oppositions in the 6th essay are listed in a descending order: each is particularly relevant at a particular level of reality, $\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\varsigma$ / $\kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\delta\iota\varsigma$ are concerned with the $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha$ $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$, $\delta\mu\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\mu\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ with the $\delta\epsilon\upsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha$ according to the In Parm.³⁸

At 88.29 Proclus speaks of $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\acute{\alpha}$ as the $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ $\delta\upsilon\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ just as he has earlier called $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ the $\mu\omicron\nu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ (88.3-4). Similarly Syrianus at In Met. 112.14 ff. speaks of $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\omicron\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\omicron\varsigma$ $\delta\upsilon\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$, $\delta\upsilon\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$... $\acute{\eta}$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\gamma\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ and $\acute{\eta}$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ $\mu\omicron\nu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$, at In Met. 5.9 ff. he uses the term $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\omicron\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\omicron\varsigma$ $\delta\upsilon\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ and at In Met. 10.2 ff. he says monad and dyad are the Pythagorean names for $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\acute{\alpha}$. Syrianus' own terminology in the In

38 For the different levels of reality at which these oppositions appear, cf. Rosàn, p. 154 ($\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ / $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ and $\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\varsigma$ / $\kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\delta\iota\varsigma$), p. 165 ($\delta\mu\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ / $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\mu\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$) and p. 187 ($\iota\delta\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ / $\acute{\alpha}\nu\iota\delta\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$).

Met. is directly based on Aristotle's terms $\mu\omicron\nu\lambda\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\phi\iota\tau\omicron\varsigma$ $\delta\omicron\lambda\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ in the Metaphysics which in their turn are based on the terminology of the Platonists of the Old Academy, if not that of Plato himself.³⁹ Proclus too uses the term $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\phi\iota\tau\omicron\varsigma$ $\delta\omicron\lambda\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ at In Tim. 176.6 ff., and in the recapitulation of his first tropos of interpreting theomachies, at 92.28 ff.

The whole passage at 87.29-89.9 is very reminiscent of Syrianus, in the details as well as in the overall doctrine expressed. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that, like Proclus here, Syrianus in his Λόγος extended the problem of the Theomachy in Il. 20 to deal with mythical theomachies in general and that he expounded an interpretation of one type of theomachy in terms very similar to those used by Proclus here, if not identical with them.

The application of this interpretation at 89.25-90.13 may also be attributed to Syrianus. The examples Proclus gives of myths to be so interpreted provide further support for this attribution for he mentions not only the story of Zeus's fight with the Giants but also that of Dionysus' fight with the Titans. The latter was an Orphic myth and many of the references to it are in Neoplatonist authors, for the Neoplatonists sought to reconcile Orphic tradition as they knew it with Homer, Plato and the Chaldaean Oracles.⁴⁰ Proclus groups

39 See W.D. Ross's Commentary on the Metaphysics (Oxford, 1924), Introduction to Vol. I, pp. lvii ff. and Vol. II, pp. 434-5; cf. also W. Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism (Eng. trans. Cambridge, Mass., 1972), p. 21, notes 27 and 28.

40 For this myth and discussion of the ancient references to it, see I.M. Linforth, The Arts of Orpheus (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1941), Ch. V, pp. 307 ff. and J. Pépin, "Plotin et le miroir de Dionysos", RIPh 24 (1970), pp. 304-20. Proclus refers to the myth again later in the 6th essay, at 174.30 ff.

the Titanomachy and the Gigantomachy together in a similar way at In Tim. 38.28; 79.27; 168.15 ff. and 172.15 ff. At 90.7-13 Proclus aligns the Titans and Giants with ἀπειρία, multiplicity and fragmentation, Zeus and Dionysus with πέρας, unity and wholeness. In the same way Hermias 55.19 ff. associates Dionysus with reversion calling him: ὁ τῆς παλινγενεσίας αἰῶνος θεός... ὁ καὶ δεύτερον ποιῶν τὰ τε ἔνυχα εἶδη καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γένεσιν θύραζε προϊέναι παρασκευάζων. The Hermias passage provides us with evidence that Syrianus interpreted Dionysus in the way in which Proclus interprets him in the 6th essay.

This Dionysus myth presents a particularly interesting case for we have enough evidence for earlier allegories of it to make it likely that Syrianus was the first to interpret it in this "transcendent" way and also to show how such an interpretation grew out of earlier ones. Linforth lists the earlier allegories in The Arts of Orpheus, pp. 316 ff.⁴¹ Flutarch at De E apud Delphos 9.388e, uses a Stoic cosmological allegory of the myth as about διακόσμῃς and ἐκπόρῃς. Macrobius Somn. Scip. 1.12.11 says Dionysus represents the νοῦς ὁλοκός and in a similar way Mythographi Vaticani III.12.5 calls Dionysus the "anima mundi". (Cf. also Proclus In Tim. II 139-147). Linforth reconstructs a Neoplatonist allegory in which Dionysus is the soul of the universe, the Titans are

41 See also pp. 229 ff. and for a more extensive list, including passing allusions as well as developed allegories, pp. 306-12 of Pépin's article.

the evil principle of division, and the heart of Dionysus, saved by Athene, is the undivided mind. This allegory uses Neoplatonist concepts but it does not transpose them into the sphere of transcendent metaphysics as does the Proclus-Syrianus allegory in the 6th essay. The allegory found in Macrobius, Myth. Vat., and Proclus In Tim. stays at the levels of Soul and Mind, the third and second of the Plotinian hypostases; in our passage here Syrianus and Proclus elevate the allegory to take it inside the First Hypostasis, relating it to the oppositions among the divine henads. The earlier Neoplatonist allegory is itself building on the Stoic allegory which already makes the myth concerned with the nature of the universe but remains on a materialist level. Further interesting light is shed on the different Neoplatonist allegories of the myth by Alexander of Lycopolis, a 3rd century Neoplatonist who wrote against the Manichees. pp. 8-9 of his Πρὸς τὰς τοῦ Μανιχαίου

δόξας ⁴² refer to a Manichaean allegory of the myth, and a companion one of the Gigantomachy: οἱ δὲ ἐν ταύταις χαριέστερον καὶ ἑλληνικῶν οὐκ ἄπειρα λόγων ἀναμνησέουσιν ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῶν εἰκόνων, ἐκ μὲν τῶν τελετῶν τὸν κατατεμνόμενον Διόνυσον τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιδημίζοντες ὑπὸ τῶν Τιτάνων, καθάπερ λέγουσιν αὐτοὶ τὴν θείαν δύναμιν μερίζεσθαι εἰς τὴν ὕλην. ἐκ δὲ τῶν ποιήσεων τῆς γιγαντομαχίας, ὅτι μὴδὲ αὐτοὶ ἡγνόησαν τὴν τῆς ὕλης κατὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀνταρσίαν.

42 Ed. A. Brinkmann (Leipzig, 1895).

The Manichees used these myths to support their own doctrines of creation. Alexander himself prefers an allegory in human terms, that the Titans and the Giants represent the mortal element in the body (see p. 37.21 ff. of his work). Alexander perhaps avoids a metaphysical allegory here precisely because his opponents, the Manichees, indulged in one. Syrianus and Proclus, on the other hand, felt free to produce a metaphysical allegory that is noticeably *θεολογικώτερον* than that recorded in Macrobius and Myth. Vat. The earlier allegory could still be applied at the lower levels of creation, as it is by Proclus in the In Tim.⁴³

So there are good grounds for attributing Proclus' first tropos of interpreting theomachies, and its application, particularly to the myth of Dionysus and the Titans, to Syrianus. What of the second tropos? As presented by Proclus the two views are complementary: he applies them to different types of myth and it is only the second that applies to the Theomachy of Il. 20. To apply the first view to that Theomachy would be to attribute an improper concern with material things to the highest gods. It is therefore likely a priori that the second view too comes from Syrianus. A closer examination shows that here Syrianus will have been less original than in his exposition of the first view, for this second view is much more

43 For further discussion of Proclus' and Syrianus' interpretation of Dionysus, with additional references, see Gelzer, pp. 21-6. He does not distinguish between the interpretation of Dionysus at the levels of Soul and Mind, and the *θεολογικώτερον* interpretation, but the distinction could profitably be applied to the passages he discusses.

traditional in its nature.

I connected Proclus' willingness to "telescope" the divine henads together, and his belief that they mingled, yet were separate, with traditional ideas about the attributes of God and with the unified plurality of gods in Plotinus V.8.9.14 ff. If this is right, then it is highly likely that Syrianus too would have been prepared to say that there is a sense in which the highest gods are one and inseparable, as Proclus says at 89.10-7.

89.17-24 introduce the demons and it is with reference to them that the Theomachy of Il. 20 is interpreted at 93.24 ff. Already in the Old Academy Xenocrates had used the demons in the interpretation of myth and cult; in this way anything shocking could be referred to the demons bearing the same name as a particular god and the gods themselves remained unaffected and morally pure.⁴⁴ The same use is made of the demons in Plutarch De Is. et Os. and De defectu Oraculorum.⁴⁵ At Proclus In Tim. 76.30 ff. we find that the Neoplatonist Origen, a contemporary of Plotinus, interpreted the war in the Timaeus between the Athenians and the inhabitants of Atlantis as a war of demons. There is a hint that Syrianus, like Proclus, divided demons into *ἀγγελον, δαιμονες* and *ἵπνες* in his listing *ἐν ταῖς ἀγγελικαῖς καὶ δαιμονιαῖς καὶ ἱπνικαῖς τῶν ἐβίωσιν* at In Met. 26.7-8.⁴⁶ Moreover In Met. 132.30 ff. shows that Syrianus,

44 See R. Heinze, Xenocrates (Leipzig, 1892), Ch. 2, pp. 78 ff.

45 See G. Soury, La démonologie de Plutarque (Paris, 1942), Ch. V, pp. 66 ff.

46 For this division of demons into three classes in Proclus, see Dodds, ET, pp. 294 ff.; In Alc. 30.19 ff.; and In Crat. p. 75.9 ff. Cf. also In Crat. 118, p. 69.

like Proclus, took the view that myths about changes of shape by the gods were about the demons: οὐ μὲν γὰρ θεολόγοι μεταβολὰς ποιῶσι τῶν βασιλευῶν, κ' ἂν τὰ μυθώδη πλάσματα τοῦτο προφάνειν δοκῇ. τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων ἂν μενουμένων ἐν ἡθεσὶ τῆς εἰκείας οὕτως τὰς δευτέρας ὑφίστασθαι λέγουσιν. This makes it likely that what Proclus says at 111.16 ff. about changes of shape by the gods derives from Syrianus, and shows that Syrianus, like Xenocrates, Plutarch, the Neoplatonist Origen and no doubt many others interpreted myths in general in terms of the demons.

Proclus' interpretation of the Homeric Theomachy in terms of the demons, which we are, I think, justified in considering as also Syrianus' interpretation, has a distinctly Neoplatonist flavour. At 94.13 ff. he links the eleven gods of the Theomachy with the eleven gods who follow Zeus at Phaedrus 246e. In the same way Hermias at pp. 137 ff. links that passage of the Phaedrus with several other passages of Homer, though not in fact with the Theomachy. The later Neoplatonists provide constant illustrations of their belief in the agreement of Homer and Plato. So too the number symbolism at 94.16 ff. is Neoplatonist, though not exclusively so.⁴⁷

The detailed interpretation of the oppositions between the different gods who are paired in combat in Homer provides another example of the Neoplatonist transposition of earlier

47 For Syrianus' belief in number symbolism, see In Met. 130.24 ff. and 190.25 ff.

allegory, to set beside the Dionysus myth. The oppositions have already been examined from this point of view by Buffière.⁴⁸ The traditional allegorical interpretation of the Theomachy, as found in Schol. B to Il. 20.67, in Heraclitus All. 52-8 and in Eustathius on Il. 20.67 ff.⁴⁹ interpreted these oppositions in either physical or moral terms. Proclus (and Syrianus) interpret them in related metaphysical terms. Thus in Proclus the opposition between Poseidon and Apollo represents the apparent opposition between the sublunary $\delta\alpha\iota\mu\acute{\alpha}\nu$. In the traditional exegesis Poseidon is the sea, Apollo the sun which draws up water from it. Buffière, following Friedl, points out that at PT VI.10, p. 368 Portus, Poseidon is $\epsilon\delta\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma \epsilon\chi\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \epsilon\upsilon\beta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\epsilon\varsigma$ and concerned with souls in the world of becoming, while at In Remp. 68.15 ff. Apollo is said to reign over the visible world and to model it on the image of the invisible. We may recall the Sun which is the source of light to the visible world and the image of the Good in Plato's Republic and indeed Apollo's connection with the Sun in Proclus appears clearly in his first Hymn, addressed to the Sun, and in PT VI.12, pp. 375-81 Portus.⁵⁰ So here Proclus makes the battle one between the demons which preside over sea and sun, preserving the time-honoured associations of Poseidon and Apollo with these elements and yet keeping his transcendent gods free from concern with them.

48 Pp. 551 ff.

49 Vol. IV, p. 143.28 ff. Stallbaum.

50 Cf. Rosàn, pp. 169-70 and the parallels on pp. 53-4 of Vogt's edition of the Hymns.

According to Proclus the opposition between Hera and Artemis is one between two types of soul, rational and irrational, separated from the body and not so separated, supernatural and natural (or rather between the demons that preside over these two groups of souls.) At In Crat. 170, pp. 93-4, Proclus links together Hera's connection with the air and her connection with souls, saying that air is a symbol of the soul. This suggests that Buffière is right to link Proclus' exegesis of the opposition between Artemis and Hera with the traditional exegesis of Artemis, the moon, passing through Hera, the air. Buffière further claims that the Platonists and Pythagoreans thought the air was full of disembodied souls while the moon presided over the growth of vegetation and animals but he fails to show that Proclus held precisely this belief. It remains unclear how the details of Proclus' exegesis here are to be connected with the traditional one.

The next pair, Athene and Ares, are clearer. In Proclus they represent providence in accordance with reason (i.e. providence in the normal sense of the word) as opposed to providence in accordance with necessity (i.e. fate).⁵¹ The traditional interpretation of Athene and Ares was in moral terms, of *δρῶν τις* opposed to *ἀδρῶν τις*. The connection of *δρῶν τις* with reason, *νοῦς*, is obvious while *ἀδρῶν τις* could easily slide into the blind, brute force which Buffière

51 For Proclus' distinction between these two types of providence, cf. De prov. et fato, Chs. III-V, pp. 119 ff. Cf. also Sallustius, De diis et mundo, Ch. 9.

calls characteristic of Ares, and that into necessity, ἀνάγκη .
 As with Apollo and Poseidon, the traditional associations
 of the god in Greek religion are as important here as the
 simple allegory of Homer to which those associations gave rise.
 The words of Plato are never very far from Proclus' mind:
 νόος and ἀνάγκη come from the Timaeus (47e ff.)

Hermes and Leto, for Proclus, represent the opposition
 between two different types of power in the soul, the γυναικεία
 and the ζῳτικαί . Buffière aligns Proclus' association
 of Hermes and knowledge with the traditional association of
 Hermes and λόγος . For Leto, however, we must look else-
 where than the Homeric allegory preserved in the scholia.
 There Leto is λήθη , forgetfulness. This has nothing to do
 with life, but a parallel passage of Proclus, In Tim. 79, which
 presents the same oppositions as here in the 6th essay in
 slightly different terms, gives us the clue to the connection
 between Leto and ζῳτικαί κινήσεις in the soul. There she
 is said to be responsible for τῆς διὰ τῶν ζῳτικῶν λείας
 καὶ ἐκουσίου καὶ ἐθελήμονος ἀναγκῆς . The etymological
 connection of Leto with λείας is given in Plato's
Cratylus 406a. There too we see why Proclus uses ἐθελήμων
 of her, for Plato uses that word and connects Leto with λῶ ,
 "to be willing".⁵² Is Proclus, or rather Syrianus, taking his
 allegory of Leto straight from Plato and deliberately disregarding

⁵² For Proclus' view of Leto, cf. his commentary on this
 passage of Plato, In Crat. 103 ff.

the traditional equation $\Lambda\eta\tau\acute{\omega} / \lambda\eta\theta\eta$ in Homeric interpretation, or were there other interpretations of Homer now lost to us in which the etymologies from $\lambda\epsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ and $\lambda\acute{\omega}$ were used? It is impossible to tell, but the latter seems likely.

The last opposition, between Hephaestus and Xanthus, is straightforward. As one might expect, it was traditionally allegorised as the opposition between fire and water. Proclus refers it not to elements but to forces within the body and makes it the opposition of the hot and dry to the cold and wet. Aphrodite, not mentioned in the allegory in the scholia, is said to harmonise all these oppositions, a role appropriate to her traditional nature as a god and to the Neoplatonist view of the world. Aphrodite is the right goddess to produce $\phi\iota\lambda\iota\alpha$ and, from a Neoplatonist point of view, since all is really one, the oppositions must somehow be brought together in a harmonious synthesis.

The passage of the In Tim. to which I referred above comes in the context of the interpretation of the Atlantis story in the Timaeus. It is interesting to notice there that at 77.24 ff. Proclus, after mentioning other interpretations of the war between Athens and Atlantis, refers his own metaphysical interpretation to Iamblichus and Syrianus and talks about the division in all things in terms which are like those used in the 6th essay, at 89.25 ff. It seems very likely that Syrianus had treated the two wars, that in Plato and that in Homer, in the same terms, just as Proclus does. What could be more congenial to writers eager to prove the $\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\nu\omega\iota\alpha$ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ $\epsilon\omicron\phi\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota$ of Plato and Homer? And just as Proclus deals with the same

points here in his 6th essay on the Republic, and in his commentary on the Timaeus, so Syrianus is likely to have dealt with the same points both in his Λόγος τῆς Ὀργάνης Προβλημάτων and in his commentary on the Timaeus.⁵³

In the case of the Theomachy then, we have good reasons of a number of different kinds for taking Proclus' reference to Syrianus at 95.26-31 to mean that the whole of Proclus' interpretation comes from Syrianus' Λόγος. The interpretation in terms of πέραι and ἀπερία, etc. is likely to have originated with Syrianus, given the use he made of the πέραι and ἀπερία doctrine and his bent for transcendent metaphysical exegesis. The interpretation in terms of demons, and the detailed allegory of the combats between pairs of gods, is essentially traditional and pre-Neoplatonic but it has been taken over by Syrianus (if not by some earlier Neoplatonic interpreter of Homer) and re-worked in a distinctively Neoplatonic manner. The two interpretations complement each other to form a whole which Proclus has derived from Syrianus.

(b) Agamemnon's dream, pp. 115-7⁵⁴

On p. 115 Proclus takes up the last of the passages of Homer attacked by Plato in Republic II, the deceitful dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon at the opening of Iliad 2.⁵⁵ At 115.4-13

⁵³ Dillon, pp. 269-70, argues that Proclus at In Tim. 77.24 ff. is quoting Syrianus, rather than Iamblichus, directly. Dillon's comments on the nature of Iamblichus' and Syrianus' interpretation should be noted. He speaks of their "making the conflict much more general than any of those criticised" and of Iamblichus "trumping Porphyry by moving the reference of the Platonic text to a more exalted level."

⁵⁴ With this section, cf. Friedl, pp. 90-1 and Buffière, pp. 554-5.

⁵⁵ ὁπλοισιν at 115.4 must refer to the fact that this is the last passage in Rep. II. Festugière's note in his translation here is misleading.

he sets out the problem as presented by Plato in Rep. II 383a7-8: if the gods are without falsehood, how can Zeus send a deceitful dream?

Proclus begins his solution at 115.13-26, by giving the answer of οὐ πολλὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν, that the fault lay not in Zeus but in Agamemnon who misunderstood the dream's "παρὰ πάντας" and attacked in the absence of Achilles. This interpretation involves taking παρὰ πάντας as a number of later writers did, in the sense of "with all the army" and not in its proper sense of "with all speed." (cf. LSJ) At 115.26 ff. Proclus adds to this the view of Syrianus: the traditional solution is unsatisfactory for it fails to take account of the providence of Zeus and his overall design that the Greeks should be punished for their behaviour to Achilles; it is better to say that Zeus does deceive Agamemnon, for his eventual good. There is a further move in the argument at 116.24 ff. The way this is expressed suggests that Proclus is now giving his own view and trying to reconcile the traditional solution with the solution of Syrianus: εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν, πετέσθαι μὲν ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τῷ μετέχοντι, γινέσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ βούλησιν... Proclus argues that the falsehood arises in Agamemnon because of his nature; this happens in accordance with divine will, and for Agamemnon's own good, but the falsehood does not actually come from the gods.

The solution of this aporia thus falls into three parts. Is Proclus taking over the first part, the traditional solution, from Syrianus? Friedl argues that in all the cases where Proclus

cites earlier, non-Neoplatonic exegetes of Homer he derives his knowledge of these exegetes from Syrianus who, in turn, depends on the Ὀμυρική Σημείωσις of Porphyry.⁵⁶ This first solution is indeed to be found among the scholia attributed to Porphyry.⁵⁷ and Syrianus' own view, as given by Proclus, builds on a criticism of the traditional solution. It is reasonable to suppose, given the cumulative nature of ancient commentary, that in his Λύσεις he first gave the traditional view, derived, either directly or indirectly, from Porphyry, and then added his own criticisms and improvements. Neoplatonist terminology creeps into Proclus' presentation of the traditional solution: τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τῇ φαιδραδία τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἔχεν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

The difficulty which Syrianus, as a faithful Platonist, found with this solution was that it ignored the all-pervading providence of the gods (προνοῶν 116.1). The Neoplatonists believed firmly that divine providence could be reconciled with divine transcendence and were much concerned with such problems as the relationship of providence to fate.⁵⁸ So Syrianus affirms

56 Friedl, pp. 59-65. Cf. Schrader, pp. 408 ff.:— Schrader refers οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν at 115.14 to Neoplatonist interpreters of Homer between Porphyry and Proclus, but this seems unnecessary.

57 See Schol. B, p. 87B-9 Dindorf and cf. p. 87.25-6; also in Schrader, pp. 23-4. cf. too Macrobius, Somn. Scip. 1.7.4 ff. and the comments of K. Mras in "Macrobius' Kommentar zu Ciceros Somnium", SPAW 1933, p. 251. Mras argues that Porphyry's Ὀμυρική Σημείωσις is Macrobius' source.

58 Cf. above, pp. 152-3, on the Athene/Ares opposition. See Dodds, ET, pp. 263-5, and also p. 271; Wallis, pp. 149-50 and 157, also index s.v. "Providence". Proclus treats the problems of providence most extensively in his Tria opuscula. In the 6th essay the problem of divine goodness and providence appears also at 96.1-100.17, on the two jars on the threshold of Zeus, and 100.21-106.10, on the breaking of the truce by Pandarus at Athene's instigation.

his belief in the goodness of the gods at, e.g., In Met. 184.1 ff., while at In Tim. 373.22 ff. Proclus attributes to Syrianus two ideas, first that what seems evil to us is not evil in the overall plan known to the gods and secondly that unmixed evil should logically be even lower than not-being and so no unmixed evil can exist.⁵⁹ Syrianus' solution of the problem of Agamemnon's dream must be set against the background of the abiding Neoplatonic belief in the goodness and providence of the gods, to which Syrianus subscribed with the rest. His solution is that goodness is superior to truth and so one may say that Zeus deceives Agamemnon for his own good.

With Syrianus' view about the relationship of goodness and truth we may compare the 4th essay of the In Remp., at 37.15-22. There, in an essay on the three θεολογικὰ ῥήματα of the Republic, Proclus poses the problem of false oracles: *ἡμῶν οὐχὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν πρὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὄντος διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οἱ θεοὶ καὶ ψεύδονται ποτε καὶ ἀπατημένοι τοὺς ἀναξίους τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτόθεν τυχεῖν.* (οὐχὶ goes with the main verb.) Just as Proclus denies that Zeus deceives Agamemnon, so in his discussion of the problem of false oracles at 40.5-41.2 he denies that the gods give false oracles and argues that falsehood arises because of the unworthiness of the instruments.

59 Neither of these ideas is original to Syrianus. For the first, cf. Iamblichus, De myst. IV.8, and for the second Plotinus I.8.3.1-5 with the comments of F.P. Hager, "Die Materie und das Böse im antiken Platonismus", MH 19 (1962), pp. 73-103.

Proclus deals with the question of false oracles again in the same way in PT I.21, pp. 97-9 Saffrey-Westerink.⁶⁰

On p. 98 of the PT Proclus expounds the special and ineffable nature of divine truth and emphasises the unity of divine

knowledge (cf. In Remp. 116.8 ἐν μὲν τῆς θεᾶς συνέζευκται

ἀλλήλοις) while on p. 99 he says that falsehood arises ἀπὸ τῶν δεχομένων ἢ τῶν ἐργαζομένων ἢ τῶν τόπων ἢ τῶν καρπῶν .

Like Syrianus Proclus places goodness above truth in the hierarchy of value but just as he is not prepared to say that the gods give false oracles for a good purpose, so he is not prepared to say with Syrianus that Zeus sends a deceitful dream to Agamemnon for a good purpose. (One wonders what Syrianus' views on false oracles were.)

Proclus justifies Syrianus' view by an appeal to the doctrine that real falsehood lies in matter (116.8 ff.).

Acting ἐνύλως , "in matter", as Zeus presumably does when he sends the dream to Agamemnon is therefore inevitably acting

διὰ τοῦ ψευδοῦς . There is a slide here from a logical

sense of ψευδής ("false" as opposed to "true") to a

metaphysical sense (the perception of matter by the senses

involves illusion and so matter is dismissed by a Platonist as

"false" in the sense of unreal). This is a very Platonic slide,

for Plato thought that only propositions about the intelligible

60 Friedl, pp. 90-1, rightly adduces this passage as a parallel for In Remp. 115-7. The parallel between the 4th essay and PT I.18-21 is set out by Saffrey and Westerink on pp. 150-1 of their edition, in note 2 to p. 80.

world could be known as true, but it is interesting to notice that at In Met. 172.5 ff. Syrianus shows himself aware of the difference between these two senses of $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\acute{\eta}\varsigma$. He is discussing Aristotle's criticism of the Platonists of the Old Academy at Metaph. 1089a20, and in particular their identification of matter with $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\omicron\varsigma$ and he says at 172.20 ff. $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \omega\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\pi\theta\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu\ \psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\grave{\eta}\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\nu\ \grave{\eta}\ \psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\grave{\eta}\ \delta\acute{o}\xi\epsilon\nu\ \tau\eta\nu\ \alpha\epsilon\delta\omicron\mu\phi\omega\nu\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\iota\nu,\ \epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\ \psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\omicron\varsigma\ \grave{\eta}\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\mu\ \pi\alpha\rho'\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\tau\omicron.$

Yet here in the 6th essay Proclus presents the parallel between the false dream and $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\omicron\varsigma$ in matter as also deriving from Syrianus. It could be that the parallel is Proclus' own expansion of Syrianus' doctrine, but it could also be that Syrianus, while aware of the difference between the two senses of $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\acute{\eta}\varsigma$, nevertheless thought the two senses were sufficiently closely related for the parallel to be justified.

In any case, at 116.24 ff. Proclus passes to his own modification of Syrianus' view. He does not reject the traditional solution as utterly as Syrianus did. Rather he attempts to harmonise that with Syrianus' own view, and uses Syrianus' view to help him set the traditional solution within a Neoplatonic framework of ideas. To explain how falsehood arises in Agamemnon according to the will of the gods but not by their agency he makes use of his rather casuistical doctrine of evil as a $\pi\alpha\rho\upsilon\pi\acute{o}\beta\eta\tau\alpha\ \epsilon\iota\varsigma$, a "parallel existence". Proclus expounds his view of the nature of evil in the De malorum subsistentia and in particular in ch. 18 of that work.⁶¹ According

61 Cf. also Dec. dub. 30 and see Wallis, p. 157.

to the doctrine of *παρυστόβιας* evil is rather like the harmful side-effects of a beneficent drug: it has no special cause distinct from the cause of good. Moreover, unlike the side-effects of a drug, it arises not because of the nature of the cause but because of the nature of the object affected.

So at 117.3-6 Proclus aligns the *παρυστόβιας* of falsehood with the material and divided nature of the world of becoming:

καὶ γὰρ ὅλως τοῦ Θεοῦ παρούσης ἐνύλης
 γίνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον, καὶ ἀμερίβτης ἐνεργούσης
 μερίβτης ἀποτελεῖται, καὶ νοερῆς βημαίνοντος
 ἐν τῇ δεχομένῃ τὸ ψεύδος παρυστόβιαται.

The doctrine of *παρυστόβιας* allows Proclus to have it both ways: falsehood comes about by the will of the gods without being directly caused by them and there is a sense in which the falsehood is located in Agamemnon since it would not arise if he were not part of the unworthy material world. *παρυστόβιας* seems to be a Porphyrian word.⁶² Porphyry does not use it in quite Proclus' sense (see Porph. Sententiae 58.25 Lamberz) but Syrianus uses the verb *παρυστόβιαται* in precisely Proclus' way at In Met. 107.9 and 185.21. The doctrine clearly was used by Syrianus as by Proclus but it was Proclus who applied it to the particular problem of Agamemnon's dream. Likewise Proclus uses it at In Remp. 40.25 to explain false oracles.

Proclus' discussion of Agamemnon's dream is of particular

62 See Festugière's note in his translation of the In Tim., Vol. II (Paris, 1967), p. 236, note 3 and W. Theiler, Porphyrios und Augustin (Halle, 1933), p. 14.

interest for his relationship to Syrianus, for in the three parts into which his solution falls we can see how Syrianus' view was related to earlier views and how Proclus' own view is related to both. Syrianus differs sharply from the earlier, non-Neoplatonist view and gives a solution in terms of Neoplatonic doctrine. Proclus returns to the earlier view and lifts it into the Neoplatonist sphere, reconciling it with that of Syrianus as he does so. As in so much Neoplatonist exegesis, Proclus' concern here is to synthesise existing non-philosophical tradition and philosophical doctrine. He is also concerned to preserve the *τύπος* of the truth of the gods and feels that Syrianus has not done so quite well enough. So he slightly corrects the view of his teacher but along familiar Neoplatonist lines. He is developing and refining existing thought rather than breaking out in any new directions.

It is worth noting that nowhere in the solution of this problem does allegory appear. Transcendent metaphysical allegory of the distinctive kind practised by Syrianus is appropriate only to actions among the gods (e.g. wars among the gods or the union of Zeus and Hera) not to the actions of men, or the dealings of the gods with men.

(c) Zeus and Hera on Mount Ida, pp. 132-40⁶³

The deception of Zeus by Hera and their union on Mount Ida, at Il. 14.153-351, is one of the longest and most vividly presented

⁶³ With this section, cf. Friedl, p. 64, pp. 96-8 and p. 100; Buffière, pp. 112-3 (physical allegories of the myth), pp. 329-30 (moral lessons drawn from the myth, without allegory), pp. 544-8 (Proclus' interpretation of the myth).

divine scenes in Homer. It was also particularly shocking to later thought since it attributed carnal desires and weaknesses to the highest gods. It is accordingly censured by Plato at Rep. III 390bc. The defenders of Homer expended much effort on this episode, just as they did on the Theomachy, and Buffière's collection of interpretations illustrates the different types of defence, not all of them allegorical, which were put forward.

Proclus deals with the episode because it had been attacked in the Republic but in view of its long and varied history of interpretation, it is no surprise to find that here he had a special monograph by Syrianus to draw on.⁶⁴

After the initial exposition of the problem at 132.13-133.4, in which, as usual, he follows Plato closely, Proclus makes reference to Syrianus' monograph and declares that he is going to select from it what is appropriate to his purpose and to present this as briefly as possible (133.7-10). He describes Syrianus' interpretation of the myth as inspired and penetrating: *ἐνθεαγονικώτατα τῇ ἀπόρρητον αὐτοῦ θεωρίαν ἐξέδηκεν*. This terminology is more than general compliment; in my opinion it has particular reference to the transcendent metaphysical nature of Syrianus' interpretation.⁶⁵ Like the Theomachy, the union of Zeus and Hera offered ample scope for such interpretation and Friedl is right to describe

64 Cf. above, p.129 and note 19.

65 For *ἐνθεαζεν* and *ἐνθεαγονικός* used of a transcendent metaphysical allegory, cf. the allegory of Aphrodite at In Crat. 183, pp. 109.22-111.20.

it as a clear example of Syrianus' Homer interpretation as a whole.⁶⁶

Just as Proclus began his treatment of the Theomachy with a general exposition of the metaphysics on which his interpretation was then based, so here at 133.19-134.7 he explains the significance of mythical divine marriages and procreation in general before proceeding to detailed interpretation of the episode under discussion. Once again Proclus explains how everything proceeds ultimately from the One and secondarily from the two complementary principles of $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\varsigma$. The One produces the many things in the world by a process of division but all these things strive to be re-united with the One, to return to their cause. This is the Neoplatonist cycle of $\pi\rho\omicron\delta\omicron\varsigma$ and $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\gamma\rho\omicron\delta\iota\varsigma$, procession and reversion. Proclus explains that divine marriages and procreation symbolise this eternal metaphysical process. The gods' production of other gods, their children, is a symbol of procession in the intelligible world, of the division which produces the many intelligible entities of the Neoplatonist universe. Sexual unions among the gods symbolise the reversion of lower gods, lower metaphysical entities, to higher ones. As the cycle of procession and reversion is constantly in operation, reversion (sexual union) is mythically presented as preceding procession (procreation), even though we usually think of the two halves of the cycle in the reverse order of procession and then reversion. There can be no procession

⁶⁶ Friedl, p. 96.

without reversion any more than there can be reversion without procession, for both are going on all the time; there is no temporal priority in the intelligible world.

At 134.8 Proclus passes to the significance of the particular divine union under discussion, that of Zeus and Hera. Zeus and Hera correspond at the lower level, of gods who are directly involved in the creation of the world (ἐν τῇ δημιουργίᾳ τοῦ παντός 134.10-11) to the couples Ouranos and Ge, Kronos and Rhea at the higher levels.⁶⁷ Zeus corresponds to the monad, to πέρας, Hera to the dyad, to ἀπειρία. Their union is the return of the lower power, Hera, to the higher power, Zeus. Hera, as associated with ἀπειρία, is responsible for the procession and multiplication of lower orders of being, Zeus for their reversion and unification. At 135.4-135.17 Proclus explains that the myth distinguishes between two types of union of Zeus and Hera, i.e. the union on Mount Ida in the open, which Zeus is eager for in Il. 14, and the union in their chamber, which Hera, in the Homeric scene, would prefer. These two types of union symbolise the two effects of the metaphysical union of Zeus and Hera. When it takes place on the mountain, χωρίῳ τοῦ παντός καὶ τῶν ἐγκοσμίων ὑποδοχῶν ἐξηρημένῃ (135.5-6) Zeus is the dominant partner and the effect is the superior one of reversion; when it takes place in their chamber τῇν καταδεδεγμέναν καὶ ἐγκόμιον (135.8) Hera predominates and the effect is of inferior value, procession. However, says Proclus, the myths

67 For a brief and clear tabulation of the different orders of gods in Proclus' system, see Saffrey and Westerink's PT, Vol. I, Introduction, pp. lxx-lxxvii.

present as divided what is really one: in reality both types of union are eternally taking place at the same time, i.e. the powers responsible for procreation and reversion respectively are eternally conjoined and eternally producing both effects at once. It is practically impossible to explain the concepts of procreation and reversion otherwise than in temporal terms but Proclus is insistent that for the proper understanding of this perpetual cycle it is necessary to abstract the temporal element which analysis, whether logical or mythical, introduces.

With the explanation, at 135.17-136.14, of why Zeus falls asleep (and thus, in Homer, fails in his vigilance over the battle before Troy) Proclus moves to the interpretation of the details of the Homeric scene in accordance with his overall view of it. When Zeus is awake the emphasis is on his providence towards the world, when he is asleep his transcendence is being stressed. In reality he is both provident and transcendent at the same time but the myth divides the two aspects of his nature.

At 136.15-137.2 Proclus interprets the location of the union, etymologising Mount Ida as the place of Ideas, and explaining again, this time more clearly and concretely, the distinction between the mountain and the *Ὀλύμπιος* made by Hephaestus.

There follows an interpretation of all the details of Hera's adornment. She makes herself look like the mother of the gods, Rhea, who is superior to her in the divine hierarchy, because she is going to revert to what is above her. Zeus himself in this union is imitating his superior, Kronos, by

retiring above the cosmos (on the mountain-top) and becoming transcendent (falling asleep) and so Hera, to be fit for such a union, must become like Rhea (137.2-17). Proclus explains why she combs her hair (137.17-24), the meaning of her girdle and its tassels (137.24-30), of her earrings and her shoes (137.30-138.3) and of the ambrosia and oil with which she anoints herself (138.3-15).

After a recapitulation of the idea that Hera in this episode becomes like Rhea and Zeus like Kronos (138.15-31) Proclus explains the significance of the magic belt which Hera borrows from Aphrodite (138.31-139.19) and finally interprets a detail which had been particularly criticised by Plato, the fact that Zeus says he now has an even greater desire for Hera than when they first slept together *φίλους ἀγαπῶντε τοκῆας* (139.20-140.6).

At 140.6-140.19 Proclus concludes his discussion of the episode, saying it is to be understood *κατὰ τὸν θεολογικὸν τρόπον* and *κατὰ τὴν ἀπόρρητον θεωρίαν*. *κατὰ τὸν θεολογικὸν τρόπον* reminds us of Sallustius' use of the term *θεολογικός* and of Syrianus' reputation for *θεολογικώτερον* interpretation of Plato.⁶⁸ At 140.13 ff. Proclus relates what he has been saying to Plato's Republic and makes use of a distinction between educational and inspired myths:⁶⁹ certainly this episode is not for the young but that

⁶⁸ See above, p.124 and pp. 135-6.

⁶⁹ On this distinction, see further below, pp. 327-30.

is because it is inspired poetry and requires to be understood allegorically. If Proclus is following an independent monograph by Syrianus, these final lines relating the interpretation to the Republic and employing the concept of inspired poetry must be Proclus' own. There is no reason to doubt, however, that the actual allegorical interpretation of the scene comes from Syrianus. Some detailed comment on the interpretation will both confirm this and, I hope, help to explain its more difficult parts.

As we saw in my discussion of the Theomachy it was particularly Syrianus who gave $\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\alpha\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\alpha$ an important place in the later Neoplatonist metaphysical scheme, and they appear here in the interpretation of the union of Zeus and Hera in exactly the same terms as they did in the Theomachy.

At 134.8 ff. Proclus identifies Zeus with the demiurgic monad (see esp. 134.20-21). Similarly Syrianus, at In Met. 140.10 ff., identifies Zeus with the $\nu\omicron\epsilon\rho\alpha$ (intellectual) $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\eta\mu\iota\upsilon\rho\gamma\iota\kappa\eta\ \mu\omicron\nu\alpha\delta\varsigma$ as opposed to the higher $\nu\omicron\gamma\eta$ (intelligible) $\mu\omicron\nu\alpha\delta\varsigma$. In Proclus' system there is a Zeus among the intellectual gods, one among the hypercosmic gods, and one among the hypercosmic/encosmic gods.⁷⁰ In this passage of the In Met. Syrianus seems to be thinking of the intellectual Zeus while the allegory in the 6th essay refers to the lower hypercosmic/encosmic Zeus who is united with Hera. In any case, at all three levels, Proclus' Zeus is demiurgic and we see from

⁷⁰ See the tabulation by Saffrey and Westerink, referred to above, note 67.

In Met. 140.10 ff. that Syrianus' Zeus too was demiurgic.⁷¹

As for Hera, her place in Proclus' scheme is clearly expressed in PT VI.22, p. 403.43-7 Portus, in a passage on the life-giving triad among the hypercosmic/encosmic gods: ἡ δὲ "Ἥρα τὴν μεσότητα συνέχευε (i.e. comes in the middle of the triad, between Demeter and Artemis) τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπογεννητικὴν προικεμένην.⁷² In this passage Hera's connection with production is clear and we may compare the way Proclus characterises her in the allegory in the 6th essay as γόνυμος and γεννητική as well as the use of similar terms to describe the dyad, discussed above (pp.142-3).

To support his view that Zeus is both awake and asleep, both provident and transcendent, at the same time, Proclus, or should one say Syrianus, cites a fragment of the Chaldaean Oracles at 135.31-136.1 (Frag. 8 des Places). At In Met. 89.15 ff. Syrianus refers to the same fragment and interprets it in the same way as here: the fragment's αἰσθητικὴ δὲ ἐπέλγει κόσμους represents the δημιουργικὴ αἰσθητικὴ. Hadot in Porphyre et Victorinus⁷³ seems to take this phrase as meaning "a perception which creates the sensible world" but it could just as well be "the perception of the demiurge". The two meanings come to the same thing, for it is by his perception when awake

71 For Iamblichus' identification of Zeus with the demiurge, cf. Hermias 136.17 ff. and see Dillon, Introduction, pp. 48-9, for the suggestion that "the systematic formulation of the theory of different manifestations of the same god at successive levels of reality is to be attributed to Syrianus rather than to Iamblichus".

72 Cf. Rosàn, p. 172.

73 (Paris, 1968), p. 201, notes 1 and 2.

that Zeus, the demiurge, both creates the sensible world

and cares for it. We may also compare PT, p. 260.3-6 Portus:

ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ μέγιστος Ζεὺς διττὴν ἔχει τὴν
ἐνέργειαν ὣν μὲν τὰ νοητὰ κατέχων, τῇ δὲ δημιουργικῇ
ποιᾷ τὰ αἰσθητὰ διακοσμοῦν.⁷⁴

The etymology of Mount Ida as the place of Ideas at 136.15 ff. is discussed by Friedl, along with Proclus' other occasional etymologies of this type, on pp. 102-3. He adduces an interesting parallel in Hermias 77.16 ff.⁷⁵ In that passage Hermias expounds an allegory of the whole Trojan War, making use of etymologies and interpreting the persons and places involved in terms of Neoplatonist philosophy. So Troy is the region of matter, called Ἰλιον from ἰλὺς, "mud", and ὕλη, "matter"; the Trojans are the forms in matter and irrational souls and so are called ἰθαγενεῖς (because linked to γένεσις ?); the Greeks are rational souls who come from the intelligible world, Greece, and are called ἐπηλυδοί because they come to ὕλη, "matter". As for Helen, she is intelligible beauty and her name is expanded to ἐλενόη, ἡ ἐφελκομένη εἰς αὐτὴν τὸν νοῦν. Iamblichus had linked ὕλη and ἰλὺς at De myst. VII.2 and the etymologising of Helen is as old as Aeschylus' Agamemnon where at 689-90 she is ἐλένας, ἑλενόρος, ἐλέ- / πτολις but in this extended allegory in

74 A parallel allegory of God's sleeping and waking in Psalm 44.23 may be found in Ps-Dionysius the Areopagite, Ep. 9.6 (Migne III, p. 1113):- see Koch, pp. 250-1 and cf. pp. 79-80.

75 Cf. Buffière, pp. 410-3 and, on the etymologies in the Hermias passage, Bielmeyer, p. 84. On Proclus' allusion to this same allegory later in the 6th essay, at 175.15 ff., cf. below, pp. 215 ff.

terms of Neoplatonic concepts we may well see the hand of Syrianus. Indeed might not this allegory of the Trojan War as a whole have figured in Syrianus' Λύγκες τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν προφητειῶν ? Admittedly the allegory is on the levels of Mind and Soul, rather than on the level of the First Hypostasis, but then the fighting Greeks and Trojans are not gods and metaphysical allegory is appropriate only to actions among the gods.⁷⁶ There is no reason to think that Syrianus developed only metaphysical allegories, and it is still tempting to attribute this lower level allegory to him. The etymologies in it bear a close resemblance to the etymology of Mount Ida as the place of Ideas:- all alike are based on a facile equation of vocabulary that would be obscure to later readers of Homer, proper names or unusual Homeric words, with Neoplatonic philosophical terms which sound similar.

At 136.23-6 Proclus refers in passing to the effect of the love of the greater for the lesser: by loving Hera Zeus helps her to revert to her cause, and draws her up towards his own superior nature. Platonist love is usually thought of as the love of the lesser who aspires to be like the greater but in his commentary on the 1st Alcibiades Proclus distinguishes two types of love, that of the superior for the inferior, as illustrated by Socrates' love for Alcibiades (In Alc. 45.4) or the mythical love of Zeus for Kore and Aphrodite (In Alc. 55.10 ff.), and that of the inferior for the superior. The

⁷⁶ Cf. above, p.162.

point is particularly clear as applied to gods at In Alc.

56.1: καὶ θεοὶ τῶν θεῶν ἐρῶσιν, οἱ πρεσβύτεροι τῶν καταδεετέρων, ἀλλὰ προνοητικῶς, καὶ οἱ καταδεετέροι τῶν ὑπετέρων, ἀλλ' ἐπιστρεπτικῶς. Rather confusingly, ἐπιστρεπτικῶς there is used of the love of the inferior for the superior to which it reverts, while at In Remp. 136.24 ἐπιστρεπτικοί describes the love of the superior for the inferior which causes reversion.⁷⁷ So too at Hermias

88.28 ff. Orpheus' love for Musaeus is described as that of the superior which extends divine goods to the inferior and perfects it. The same idea is to be found in Sallustius' De diis et mundo, ch. 4, p. 3.8 ff. (the love of the Great Mother for Attis). The Hermias parallel confirms that this doctrine of the love of superiors for inferiors was held by Syrianus, and Sallustius shows us that it was already current in the Platonic school in the period between Iamblichus and Syrianus.

Proclus explains at 136.30-137.2 that the chamber wrought by Hephaestus, to which Hera proposes that she and Zeus retire, signifies the ordering of the universe and the sensible world, for Hephaestus is the demiurge of that world. He refers back to his earlier exposition of Hephaestus at 126.19 ff., where he discusses the problem of why the gods laugh at Hephaestus. This reference to another part of the 6th essay must of course be Proclus' own addition, but it suggests that the interpretation of Hephaestus at 126.19 ff.

77 Cf. In Alc. 53.1-10 where ἐπιστρεπτικός is used in the same way as in the 6th essay, and see also Rosàn, p. 206, and Wallis, p. 154.

is likewise taken from Syrianus, or at least that Proclus and Syrianus held exactly the same view of this god.

Proclus' view of Hephaestus is most fully set out at In Tim. 142.14 ff. There Hephaestus' mythical attributes are interpreted in terms of the god's role in Proclus' system as demiurge of the sensible world. The same view is expressed more briefly at PT VI, p. 403.20-2 Portus, and at In Tim. II 27.16 ff. where Proclus mentions both the laughter of the gods and Hephaestus' role in the story of Ares and Aphrodite, treated in the 6th essay at p. 141 ff. There too Hephaestus is demiurge of the sensible world. The details given about Hephaestus on p. 141 find an illuminating parallel in Syrianus' In Met., at 83.1-11. There, like Proclus at In Remp. 141.14-15, Syrianus cites Il. 18.401, and he adds the first half of line 402:

πόπας τε γυναικας θ' ἑλικας κάλυκας τε καὶ ὄρμους
ἐν σπηϊ γλαφυρῇ . Proclus simply

says that Hephaestus models the forms beneath the moon, and then quotes the line of Homer. Syrianus adds the extra half-line and gives a more detailed exposition of how he understood the

Homeric passage: καὶ ταῦτα (i.e. the jewellery made by Hephaestus) ἔστι τὰ τριτὰ εἶδη, ἃ εἰ

πυθαγόρειον τῶν εἰσθητῶν ἀχρηίστα εἶδη ὄντα
εἶναι, τελευταίας εἰκόνας ὄντα τῶν ἀχρηίστων εἰδῶν...

The jewels made by the Homeric Hephaestus are the Forms as they appear in matter, the form, with a small 'f', which gives matter shape and meaning; the hollow cave in which Hephaestus fashions them will have been associated by Syrianus and Proclus with the Cave of Plato's Republic, the sensible world beneath the

moon.

This interesting passage of Syrianus confirms that Proclus' view of Hephaestus is taken over from his teacher, illuminates In Remp. 141.8 ff. and entitles us, I think, to attribute to Syrianus at least Proclus' interpretation of Hephaestus' role in the Ares-Aphrodite story and probably his allegory of the whole of that story.⁷⁸

At 137.2 ff. Proclus proceeds to allegorise all the details of Hera's adornment. It was customary for allegorical interpreters of the episode to give particular attention to these details, as we can see from Heraclitus' All. ch. 39 where the details are interpreted in terms of the coming of spring, and from Eustathius who interprets them in accordance with a moral allegory of Zeus as the mind of the wise man and Hera as the air.⁷⁹ More interesting for the interpretation of Proclus and Syrianus is the physical allegory of Hera's adornment which is mentioned by Plutarch at De aud. poetis 19f.: τὸν δὲ τῆς Ἑρᾶς καλλωπισμὸν ἐπὶ τὸν Δία καὶ τὰς περὶ τοῦ κεστῶτος γοητείας ἄερος πνέειν κ' ὁρᾶν εἶναι βούλοντα τῇ πυρώδει πηδύζοντος. The key-word here is κ' ὁρᾶν, for it picks up κ' ὁρᾶν used of Hera at Il. 14.171. It is that κ' ὁρᾶν which has led the physical allegorists mentioned by Plutarch (probably Stoics) to see Hera's adornment as the purification of the air before it is united with the higher element of fire, and it

78 Cf. also Hermias 149.18 ff. for the same view of Hephaestus.

79 Vol. III, p. 207,43 ff. Stallbaum.

is easy to see how Syrianus has transposed this physical allegory into a metaphysical one in which Hera, the lower metaphysical entity, just as she is the lower element in the physical allegory, must purify herself before she is united with the higher entity, Zeus.

Hera in Homer claims that she is going to visit Oceanus and Tethys who brought her up, *δεξάμενοι Πείης* (Il. 14.200 ff.; cf. 301 ff.) It was perhaps this which gave the impetus to Syrianus' view that Hera not only purifies herself but actually makes herself as like Rhea as possible.⁸⁰

As evidence that Hera combs her hair to make it look like the hair of Rhea, Proclus quotes a fragment of the Chaldaean Oracles (no. 55 des Places). Lewy⁸¹ refers this fragment to Hecate, an important goddess in the magical system of the Chaldaean Oracles. Hecate was quite commonly identified with Rhea as the mother of the gods and we can see from Hymn VI that Proclus made this identification.⁸²

The interpretation of Hera's girdle at 137.24-30 seems to be based on another etymology, for Proclus is connecting *ζώνη* both with the metaphysical term *ζωόντης* with which, since the latter is itself a metaphor, there is indeed a link, and also with the unrelated *ζωογόνοιο*.⁸³

At 138.3-15 Proclus interprets the ambrosia and oil with

80 For the place of Rhea in Proclus' theological scheme see, as well as Saffrey and Westerink's table in the introduction to PT Vol. I (cf. note 67 above), PT V.11, pp. 265-8 Portus and Rosàn, p. 154.

81 P. 90.

82 Cf. Vogt's note in his edition of the Hymns.

83 For *ζωόντης* see Festugière's note in his translation here and his parallel in Damascius, Pr. 96, I 241.24f.-242.14f. Ruelle.

which Hera anoints herself. They symbolise the pure and undefiled nature of the gods. In particular ambrosia stands for the divine power of raising above all impurity, and oil for the gods' power of giving strength. (Here again there is a pattern of procession and reversion, for the way the two symbols are interpreted makes it clear that oil is associated with procession, ambrosia with reversion).

Syrianus mentions ambrosia at In Met. 41.30 ff., replying to Aristotle's disparaging reference to ambrosia in myths at Metaph. 1000a9. There Syrianus associates ambrosia, and nectar too, with the fact that the gods are separated from the impurities of the material world. This interpretation of ambrosia was obvious enough:- it is clear in Greek myth that the gods' special food, ambrosia and nectar, is connected with their special powers, and in particular with their immortality. What is more interesting is the correspondence in terminology between this passage of the In Met. and the passage on ambrosia in Proclus' In Remp. In the In Met., as in the In Remp., $\alpha\kappa\alpha\theta\alpha\rho\epsilon\iota\alpha$ is used of the material world (In Remp. 138.9; In Met. 42.2) and in both the food of the gods is associated with their quality of being $\alpha\mu\epsilon\lambda\eta\kappa\tau\omicron\varsigma$ "impassive" (In Remp. 138.6, with reference to both ambrosia and oil; In Met. 42.3, with reference to nectar).

Proclus observes at 138.11 ff. that oil is particularly connected with the Curetes. The point of this remark is that the Curetes in myth were associated with Rhea, and in the whole section from 137.17-138.15 Proclus is trying to demonstrate the view he expounds both before and after that section that

Hera adorns herself in order to become like Rhea. It is clear from PT V.35, pp. 322-4 Portus, that Proclus followed mythical tradition in linking the Curetes with Rhea and placed them in his theological system accordingly. In that passage the Curetes are said to be τῆς ἁγνότητος προσεστῆτες καθαρότητος τῶν θεῶν just as in the In Remp. they are associated with oil, one of the symbols of divine undefiled purity. Similarly at PT V 3, pp. 253.37 ff. Portus they are described as τρίκλα τὴν ἁμειλικτὸν καὶ ἁγνύον τῶν νοερῶν θεῶν (cf. also In Tim. III 310.25-8).⁸⁴

Proclus constantly refers to the Orphic poems as an authority, in the same way as he refers to the Chaldaean Oracles, and on p. 138 he refers to two Orphic fragments, fr. 186 and fr. 148 Kern. We saw above (pp. 145-8) that Proclus and Syrianus, like other Neoplatonists, were interested in the Orphic myth of Dionysus, and it is clear from the account of Proclus' education by Syrianus in Marinus' Life (esp. chs. 26 and 27) that Proclus took over his attitude to Orpheus from Syrianus. According to the Suda Syrianus wrote an Εἰς τὴν Ὀρφέως θεολογίαν and a Συμφωνία Ὀρφέως Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος. Proclus, at In Tim. 315.1f, refers to his teacher's Ὀρφικῇ συνουσίᾳ and Syrianus himself in the In Met. constantly quotes and refers to Orphic doctrines about numbers and cosmogony. Hermias likewise adduces Orpheus in the course of his commentary on the Phaedrus and numbers him among

84 On the Curetes in Proclus, cf. J. Foerner, De Curetibus et Corybantibus (Diss, Halle, 1913), pp. 372 ff. and Rosán, pp. 155-6.

the *θεολόγος* (Hermias, 148.18 ff.; cf. 122.19 ff.) At 154.21 ff. Hermias records for us a question he asked about the interpretation of the Phaedrus and Syrianus' reply.

Both question and answer are set within the framework of Orphic theology.

At 138.31-139.19 Proclus relates Hera's use of Aphrodite's magic belt to the fact that Hera is making herself like Rhea.

There is an allusion to this same *κεστός* at Hermias 31.28-

32.1: *τῆς μὲν Ἡρᾶς μέμνηται ὡς γεννητικῆς καὶ κοσμητικῆς τοῦ κόσμου τῆς δημιουργίας· διὸ καὶ τὸν κέστον παρὰ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης λαμβάνει.*

The allusion here is so brief that it is not easy to grasp the point. Aphrodite, in the late Neoplatonist theology, is the goddess of beauty.⁸⁵ Hermias is saying that the magic belt which Hera borrows from Aphrodite helps her to produce beauty in the world of creation. In our passage of the 6th essay Proclus is saying something different: that the magic belt helps Hera to return to the beauty of the superior goddess, Rhea. Is it possible for both these interpretations to derive from Syrianus? The answer is "yes", for they are not conflicting but complementary. The clue lies in Proclus' allusion to a higher Aphrodite who bestows beauty on the intelligible world, at In Remp. 139.2-5. The two Aphrodites go back to Plato's Symposium but they become an Aphrodite of the intelligible world and an Aphrodite of the sensible world at Plotinus III.5.2.14 ff. and we find the

85 See esp. In Remp. 141 ff. and cf. PT VI.22, p. 404.3-7 Portus.

same view of two Aphrodites, or two aspects of Aphrodite, in Proclus Hymn II, especially 11.4-6.⁸⁶ When Hera is reverting to the higher gods and being united with Zeus, she is helped by the Aphrodite who gives beauty to the intelligible world, or, as we would put it, by the aspect of Aphrodite which gives beauty to the intelligible world. The *κεστός* accordingly helps Hera to beautify herself for her reversion. On the other hand, when Hera is in her more usual role of producing the lower world (as in the Hermias passage) she is helped by the Aphrodite who gives beauty to the sensible world and the *κεστός* helps Hera to beautify the things which she produces.

It would have been quite in order for Syrianus, in his monograph, to have expounded both meanings of the *κεστός*. Proclus here takes only the higher one because in order to defend the episode on Mount Ida against Plato's attack he wants to give as lofty an interpretation of it as possible.

If I am right, Hermias here enables us to see an instance of Proclus selecting from Syrianus as he says he will do at 133.7 ff.: ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅσον πρὸς τὴν παρούσαν πρόθεσιν ἐστὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ γεγραμμένων σύμφωνον παραλαβόντες...

His concern at 139.13 ff. to show that what he is saying is in accordance with the common view of Hera in cult is typical of the later Neoplatonists' desire to harmonise their theology with traditional Greek religion.

The final detail interpreted by Proclus is why Zeus says he loves Hera now more than ever before, even than the first

86 Cf. Vogt's note ad loc.

occasion on which they slept together without their parents' knowledge. Proclus must deal with this point because it had been particularly attacked by Plato (see Rep. III 390c). The point is interpreted in accordance with the physical allegory of Zeus as ether and Hera as air by Eustathius.⁸⁷ In this rather confused passage Eustathius draws a parallel between the $\lambda\eta\theta\eta$ of $\delta\iota\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon$ $\pi\omicron\kappa\eta\alpha\varsigma$ and the philosophical notion of $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$, "potentiality", as opposed to $\epsilon\nu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\epsilon\alpha$, "activity". He says that the original secret union of Zeus and Hera is a potential union of ether and air before the elements are in fact placed in order with ether above and air below (whereupon the union ceases to be secret). It may be that Eustathius preserves for us here the interpretation of $\delta\iota\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon$ $\pi\omicron\kappa\eta\alpha\varsigma$ in the physical allegory of the story but if so Proclus' interpretation is not a straightforward transposition of that allegory. Proclus says that the union on Mount Ida is better than the original secret one because in the second union Zeus and Hera revert to their causes (i.e. they become like Kronos and Rhea respectively) whereas in the earlier one they were only withdrawing into themselves, while remaining on their own level of being.

Hermias 41.14-20 interprets the original secret union in exactly the same way as Proclus here: $\kappa\alpha\iota \dots \epsilon\gamma\mu\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota \pi\alpha\rho\alpha$
 $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\theta\epsilon\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\iota\varsigma$ $\tau\omicron$ $\epsilon\lambda\alpha\theta\epsilon$ $\tau\omicron$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$ $\tau\eta\nu$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$
 $\iota\delta\iota\delta\omicron\tau\eta\tau\alpha$ $\epsilon\nu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\mu\eta$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$ $\tau\eta\nu$ $\pi\eta\nu$
 $\upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\kappa\epsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\nu$ $\alpha\acute{\iota}\tau\eta\alpha\nu$ $\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\pi\iota\nu\omicron\upsilon\alpha\nu$ - $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ $\gamma\alpha\rho$ $\delta\eta\lambda\omicron\iota$

87 Vol. III, p. 227.46 ff. Stallbaum.

καὶ τὸ μίγνυσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς
 φίλους ἡθόντε τοκῆας
 τὸ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἐσωτῶν οὐσίαν καὶ
 ἰδιόματα ἐνεργεῖν μὴ ἀνατεινομένους ἐπὶ τὰ
 αἴτια αὐτῶν μηδὲ ἐκείθεν συνειμένους.

This parallel confirms that Proclus has indeed derived his interpretation of this detail from Syrianus.

Just as he had emphasised that Zeus is really both provident and transcendent at the same time, even though the myth describes him as sometimes awake and sometimes asleep, so here, at 139.30 ff. Proclus points out that both types of union of Zeus and Hera, that in which they revert to their causes and that in which they withdraw into themselves, are going on all the time. The myths divide what is really one.

This motif goes back to Plotinus. (See especially III.5.9.24-6

δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους, ὥστε τοῦτο ἔσονται, καὶ
 μερίζειν χρόνοις 2 λέγουσι, καὶ διαρρεῖν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων
 πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων ὁμοῦ μὲν ὄντα, τὰ δὲ ἢ
 συνάμει διεσπῆτα. μερίζειν is used by Proclus at 140.1;

cf. also IV 3.9.14-20 where Plotinus uses χωρίζειν just
 as Proclus does at 140.6) It recurs in Sallustius, De diis et

mundo, p. 8.14 ff.: ταῦτα δὲ (i.e. mythical stories)

ἔγένετο μὲν οὐδέποτε, ἔστι δὲ αἱ, καὶ ὁ μὲν
 νοῦς ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾷ, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὰ μὲν

πρῶτα, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα λέγει. This attractive idea

must be related, in the Neoplatonists, to their general view
 of the relationship between the One and the many: the unity
 of the divine world becomes multiplicity and division in the

sensible world. The belief that the myths told in the sensible world represent as divided what is really one in the divine world is an aspect of this overall view, and Syrianus will undoubtedly have subscribed to it, and very likely gave expression to it in the course of his allegorical interpretations, just as Proclus does.

A number of parallels in Syrianus and Hermias have confirmed that Proclus was indeed following Syrianus closely in interpreting the union of Zeus and Hera on Mount Ida. In the case of the $\kappa\epsilon\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$ a parallel in Hermias has enabled us to see how Proclus selected from Syrianus. It seems that, as with the Theomachy, Syrianus himself treated the episode at greater length than Proclus does and perhaps, if the example of the $\kappa\epsilon\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$ is anything to go by, discussed varying interpretations of some points. Again as with the Theomachy we have enough information from other sources to see that Syrianus was transposing a detailed physical allegory of Zeus and Hera as ether and air into an equally detailed metaphysical one, of Zeus and Hera as the demiurgic monad and the life-giving dyad. There is some evidence that Syrianus was the first to do this and that earlier Neoplatonists had not taken such pains to harmonise poetry with their metaphysics and theology. At De myst. IV 11 and 12 Iamblichus answers Porphyry's objection to the attribution of $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\mu\alpha$ $\acute{\alpha}\phi\rho\omicron\delta\iota\acute{\epsilon}\iota\alpha$ to the gods. He does not say that such $\acute{\alpha}\phi\rho\omicron\delta\iota\acute{\epsilon}\iota\alpha$ symbolise metaphysical processes. He simply answers that if they are contrary to human law and custom ($\nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\iota$) they may be in accordance with some higher cause of laws; or they are connected

with the harmony in the cosmos and happen $\pi\rho\alpha\nu\acute{o}\mu\eta\varsigma$ because the parts of the cosmos are not perfectly mixed together; or those who tell the stories have misunderstood them through their own weakness. The seeds of Syrianus' type of explanation perhaps lie in Iamblichus' first answer but they are certainly not developed and Iamblichus offers three answers of quite different types without deciding between them.

At In Crat. 92.26-93.22 Proclus offers an interpretation of the union of Zeus and Hera in general, though not specifically of the Homeric episode on Mount Ida. This interpretation differs from that of the 6th essay in equating Zeus with $\nu\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$, and the source of lower minds, Hera with $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ and the source of lower souls. It is not incompatible with the interpretation of the 6th essay but operates on a lower level in the Neoplatonic hierarchy of reality. Proclus quotes Iliad 14 twice in the course of the passage and it is quite likely that this interpretation too comes from Syrianus' monograph. It does not appear in the 6th essay because Proclus there is selecting the loftiest interpretation in order to answer Plato. The interpretation of Zeus and Hera as mind and soul recalls the allegory of Dionysus as the soul of the universe which I discussed on pp. 145-8 above. It is of the same type as Numenius' interpretation of the Odyssey in terms of the journey of the soul. It may be that Syrianus took this interpretation over from earlier allegorists, but only a late Neoplatonist with a highly intricate metaphysico-theological system could have interpreted the union of Zeus and Hera in the manner of Proclus' 6th essay. The development of that system is not usually assigned to anyone earlier than

Iamblichus and it is probable that the details were worked out by thinkers between Iamblichus and Syrianus, and by Syrianus himself.⁸⁸ We have seen reason to think that Iamblichus did not interpret mythical divine unions in terms of his metaphysical system. The available evidence suggests strongly that Syrianus' originality as an allegorist lay in transposing physical allegory into allegory in terms of late Neoplatonist metaphysics. The most important practitioners of physical allegory were the Stoics. Just as, in philosophy proper, the Neoplatonists built on a number of Stoic ideas but transformed them to make them part of a very different cosmology and ontology, so in allegory, Syrianus built on and transformed the Stoic interpretations of myths about the gods.

(d) The behaviour of Achilles, pp. 150-3⁸⁹

At the end of the first book of the 6th essay Proclus deals with two actions of Achilles in the Iliad which had been criticised by Plato as unseemly and unheroic. The first is Achilles' dragging Hector round the walls of Troy. Proclus replies to this charge, at 150.11-151.23, first that dragging the corpses of enemies was an old Thessalian custom, and secondly that Achilles maltreated Hector's body as vengeance for the way Hector had threatened to treat Patroclus' body. He points out that Achilles does treat Hector's body well afterwards.

⁸⁸ Cf. the section of Saffrey and Westerink's introduction to the PT, Vol. I, on the development of the exegesis of Plato's Parmenides, pp. lxxv-lxxxix, esp. p. lxxxvii-lxxxviii.

⁸⁹ With this section, cf. Friedl, pp. 61-2, p. 93, p. 101; Buffière, pp. 483-5.

Both these answers are to be found in a scholion attributed to Porphyry.⁹⁰ It seems reasonable to suppose, as Friedl does, that here, as in the case of Agamemnon's dream, Proclus has taken over the old interpretation from Syrianus who had himself taken it, directly or indirectly, from Porphyry (though this need not imply that Proclus had no independent access to Porphyry's work.)

Similarly when Proclus comes to deal with the second problem of this section, the captives sacrificed by Achilles on Patroclus' pyre, he first of all gives a literal solution (*κατὰ τὸ δαυόμενον* 151.25), pointing out that Achilles kills the captives to give honour to Patroclus and arguing that it is no worse than other Homeric ways of killing one's enemies! (151.24-152.6) I have not been able to find any other instances of precisely this literal answer to the problem. Schol. B on Il. 23.173 provides the answer that Homer himself expresses an adverse judgement of Achilles at line 176: Proclus never has recourse to this type of solution because it would involve admitting that Homer represents evil, even if the poet himself subsequently criticises what he has portrayed.⁹¹

The allegorical interpretation of 152.7-153.3 is firmly attributed to Syrianus and, as I have argued,⁹² the fact that

90 Schol. B on Il. 24.15; cf. also Schol. B on Il. 22.397 where there is a reference to the lines of Callimachus quoted by Proclus at 150.14-5. Cf. also Schrader, pp. 267-8.

91 But cf. 201.9 ff. where Proclus does say that Homer passes judgement on the actions he depicts. One of the lines in which occurs the phrase quoted by Proclus, *τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἔειπεν ἑὸν*, is Il. 4.104. This is one of the instances of Homer passing a judgement given by Plutarch at De aud. poetis 19d (cf. also 32b). 201.9 ff. shows that Proclus is not ignorant of this strand in the tradition of Homeric interpretation.

92 Pp.129-30 above.

it is an interpretation of the whole of Patroclus' funeral rites gives us grounds for thinking that the Λύσεις τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν προβλημάτων did not deal only with the passages of Homer attacked by Plato. Proclus' allegory of the captives at 153.3-10 is presented as his own addition. Whence, then, has he derived the literal solution of the problem of these same captives at 151.24-152.6? If Syrianus did not deal with this detail, Proclus' literal explanation must either be his own or derive from an earlier comment now lost to us. There is no means of knowing which it is, though the latter is more likely.

The allegory of Patroclus' funeral rites is introduced at 152.7 ff. in a tone of modest apology - εἰ δὲ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπορρητότερον ὑπὸ τοῦ καθηγουμένου ἡμῶν τεθεωρημένων καὶ τούτοις ποιήσασθαι μνήμην. . . . As in the case of Zeus and Hera ἀπορρητόν is used to characterise Syrianus' mode of interpretation. This time, however, we are dealing with the actions of human beings, not of gods, and the interpretation is in terms not of metaphysics but of theurgic rites.

The interpretation is discussed by Lewy, pp. 184-5 and p. 207. He is interested in what information it can provide on the theurgic rite of ἀθανάτισμός, "immortalisation", but he provides some useful commentary. Syrianus interprets all Achilles' actions and the objects he uses as theurgic. As such they have a symbolic value, in a strong, magical sense of "symbolic". The cup from which Achilles pours his libation, for example, is a magical symbol, not just a literary one, of the

πηγή τῶν ψυχῶν of Plato's Timaeus 41d ff. (In Remp.
 152.20 ff.) The Homeric account represents (μιμῶται 152.10)
 an actual theurgic rite, in which actions and objects are them-
 selves symbolic. Achilles' cup stands for the cup used by
 the theurgist which in turn symbolises the πηγή τῶν ψυχῶν .
 In Proclus' presentation of the allegory these two levels of
 representation, the literary and the magical, have been telescoped
 together and he passes directly from the description of Achilles
 to the significance of the rites which the description represents.
 Hence the difficulty of Lewy's attempt to extract from our
 passage information on the theurgic rite, the missing inter-
 mediate stage. It is not two levels of symbolism that are
 involved but one of imitative representation (what Achilles
 does imitates theurgic ἀπαθανάτωσις) and one of symbolism
 (the actions of the theurgist are themselves symbolic rather
 than imitative.)

At 152.13 ff. Proclus interprets Achilles' call to the
 winds as a magical invocation by which τὸ φαινόμενον ὄχημα
 is to obtain its proper care and τὸ κύριον θεώτερον to
 be purified. Festugière in his translation takes τὸ φαινόμενον
 ὄχημα as referring to the physical body of Patroclus and
 τὸ κύριον θεώτερον to the astral body of his soul. Lewy
 however,⁹³ takes it that the two terms refer to the two astral
 bodies of the soul in which Proclus and Syrianus believed. Dodds
 deals with this doctrine in his ET, p. 320, where he explains

93 P. 185, note 33.

that the lower ὄχημα was the vehicle of the irrational soul. It was composed of the four elements and survived bodily death but was eventually purged away. The higher ὄχημα was immaterial and imperishable. In one of the passages referred to by Dodds, In Tim. III 236.31 ff., Proclus refers this doctrine of two ὀχήματα to Syrianus. Since ὄχημα is used at 152.14 of the lower "body" and since the doctrine can be ascribed to Syrianus as much as to Proclus, I think Lewy is correct here and that the reference is to two astral bodies. The lower one is described as φαινόμενον and affected by the ἐμφανὴς κίνησις of the winds because it was of material composition. Presumably the theurgist would claim actually to see it rising from the dead body as a mist or something of the kind. The higher one, on the other hand, is θεώτερον, its purification is invisible, and it is able to rise up to its heavenly home through the regions of air, moon and sun by which it originally descended, of course carrying the soul with it.⁹⁴

However, the most natural way to take τὸ φαινόμενον further down the page, at 152.25, is as referring to Patroclus' physical body rather than specifically to the lower astral body of his soul. The relevant distinction in the context is that between body and soul not, as earlier, between two ὀχήματα

94 On the doctrine of the two ὀχήματα, cf. also Dillon, pp. 371-7 (commentary on fr. 81 of Iamblichus' In Tim.), esp. pp. 373-5: the doctrine was peculiar to Proclus and Syrianus and was not shared by Iamblichus. On the ὄχημα in general, see, as well as Dodds' appendix to his ET, pp. 313-21, R.C. Kissling, "The ὄχημα-πνεῦμα of the Neoplatonists and the De insomniis of Synesius of Cyrene", AJP 43 (1922), pp. 318-30.

of the soul. Thus I would translate, "The rites performed by Achilles concerned his friend's soul and not only his visible part, his body", rather than, "The rites performed by Achilles concerned his friend's soul and not only the visible part of that."

Proclus interprets the twelve sacrificed captives in accordance with this general allegory. He interprets them as the twelve companions appropriate to a "leader-like" soul (*ἡγεμονικός*) such as Achilles recognises the soul of Patroclus to be. The twelve companions come originally from Plato's Phaedrus 246e where twelve gods follow Zeus in procession - or rather, eleven follow him and the twelfth, Hestia, stays behind. Buffière compares the passage of Philolaus cited by Proclus at In Euc. 174.12 ff. Friedlein. There Zeus is said to be associated with the number 12 and reference is made to this same passage of the Phaedrus. Proclus is passing directly from the Homeric mention of twelve captives to the metaphysical significance of twelve companions, with no intermediate step of the theurgic rite. (There was not necessarily anything in theurgic *ἀπαθανάτωσης* which corresponded to this particular detail.) This is a further sign that we are right to regard this portion of the interpretation as Proclus' own addition.⁹⁵

As with the allegories in terms of Neoplatonic metaphysics,

95 Festugière has a useful note in his translation here about *ἡγεμών* and the number 12 but says, oddly, "Patrocle représente l'*ἡγεμονικόν* de l'âme, c'est-à-dire la raison ou le *νοῦς*." Thus he translates 153.7, "parce qu'Achille savait ce qui commande en l'âme". It makes better sense to take *ἡγεμονικόν* as an adjective, and *ἐν τῇ* as referring to Patroclus' particular soul, and to translate, "since Achilles recognised its qualities of leadership". Cf. Buffière, p. 484, who understands the phrase in this second way.

the interpretation of Patroclus' funeral rites in terms of theurgic rites, which themselves symbolise metaphysics, could only have been thought of by a late Neoplatonist and we would, I think, be justified in seeing this type of interpretation too as developed by Syrianus or even as his original creation.

(iii) Proclus' debt to Syrianus in the interpretation of Homer: conclusions

What conclusions can we draw from the analysis of these four interpretations about Syrianus' allegory of Homer and about Proclus' attitude to it?

The two interpretations which deal with actions by the gods, the Theomachy and the union of Zeus and Hera, both transpose earlier physical allegories into the realm of Neoplatonist transcendent metaphysics and we have seen good reason to think that this type of allegory was developed by Syrianus and that Syrianus interpreted Homer θεολογικώτερον just as much as he did Plato. The Stoics had made use of etymologies in their physical allegories and we can see from the examples of Mount Ida and the allegory of the Trojan War given by Hermias that Syrianus likewise made a limited use of etymologies for his metaphysical allegory. He had a good Platonic precedent for this in the Cratylus which the Neoplatonists took very seriously.

The interpretation of Agamemnon's dream is not an allegory at all but here too we see Syrianus concerned to make Homer

agree with Neoplatonist doctrine and dissatisfied with the traditional explanation because it conflicts with the Neoplatonist belief in divine providence.

The interpretation of Achilles' funeral rites for Patroclus introduces another distinctive kind of exegesis, interpretation in terms of theurgic rites. Behind it lies a metaphysical allegory of those rites which is parallel to Syrianus' metaphysical allegories of Homer and of Plato.

Proclus has taken over all these interpretations from Syrianus and with them elements of traditional interpretation which had already been included in Syrianus such as the interpretation of the Theomachy in terms of the demons or the traditional exegesis of the problem of Agamemnon's dream. He is by his own admission deliberately compressing and selecting, and in the Zeus and Hera episode parallel passages in Hermias and in Proclus' own In Crat. enable us to see a little of this process at work. In one case, that of the behaviour of Achilles, selection of the appropriate points from Syrianus has to become instead an original addition along the same lines. In the case of Agamemnon's dream Proclus does actually emend Syrianus in order to harmonise his teacher's view with the traditional one and in order to preserve the dogma of the Republic that the gods never deceive. Proclus is doing a little bit more than taking over Syrianus' interpretation of Homer uncritically. He is adapting it in order to relate it to Republic II and III and is making it his own in the sense that he not only accepts much of it without criticism but is also prepared on occasion to develop and criticise it in the light of

the overall Neoplatonic system. Any developments are within the same system and along the same lines and Proclus thought of himself as revealing and expounding a pre-existing truth rather than using philosophy to discover some new truth which no-one had known before. Proclus was not concerned about making an original contribution to the advancement of knowledge but only about further elucidating knowledge which had always existed for those with sufficient understanding. Therefore he was quite happy to adopt much of Syrianus' interpretation of Homer. Historians of philosophy are interested in distinguishing individual contributions to thought and from this point of view it must be admitted that in his interpretation of particular Homeric passages Proclus is adapting and developing Syrianus rather than striking out in any new directions of his own. He makes no contributions in this area which are comparable with his teacher's development of metaphysical allegory.

These conclusions have been drawn from the analysis of the four interpretations where Proclus explicitly mentions Syrianus. What can we deduce from them, or from other evidence, about the remaining interpretations? How many of those can we attribute to Syrianus and can we say anything further about Proclus' treatment of the material he derived from his teacher?

We have already seen reason to attribute certain passages to Syrianus on the basis of parallels between parts of Proclus' In Remp. and Syrianus' In Met. The first of these is the interpretation of why the gods appear to change their shape, at In Remp. 109-114. In Met. 182.30 ff., which I quoted above

when discussing the Theomachy (p. 150), shows that Syrianus was concerned with the problem of mythical changes of shape on the part of the gods and interpreted these in terms of the

demons: οὐ μὲν οἱ θεολόγοι μεταβολὰς ποιῶσι τῶν βασιλειῶν, κ' ἂν τὰ μυθώδη πλάσματα τοῦτο προφάνειν δοκῇ. τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων ἔτι μενούντων ἐν ἡθεὶ τῆς οἰκείας οὕτως τὰς δευτέρας ὁφείτωσθαι λέγουσιν.

Proclus' third solution to the problem, at 113.20-114.29, is a development of this idea. There he distinguishes between different types of divine appearance. (To interpret changes of shape by the gods in terms of demons was of course not original to Syrianus. The same explanation is used, for example, by Maximus of Tyre VIII.8) Proclus' first two explanations, that the apparent change is not in the gods but comes from the nature of those who perceive them (111.16-112.12) and that the gods contain all different powers within themselves but we can only grasp one at a time (112.13-113.19) are more specifically Neoplatonist. The application of the second explanation to Proteus, Eidothea and the seals in Od. 4.351 ff. makes use of the distinctions between a νοῦς ἀγγελικός (Proteus) a ψυχὴ δαίμωνια (Eidothea) and ψυχὰ λογικὰ (the seals), which only existed in the post-Iamblichean metaphysical system. This particular detail therefore must derive from Syrianus or at least from someone not much before him. Here, as before, we can see how the allegory of Proclus and Syrianus transposes earlier allegories. In physical allegory Proteus was primitive matter which potentially contains all its different

forms.⁹⁶ In Proclus he is a νοῦς ἀγγελικός, ἔχων τε καὶ περιέχων ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ εἶδη πάντα τῶν γεννητῶν (112.28-9)

Buffière discusses an interpretation in Sext. Emp. Adv. math.

IX (Adv. dogm. III) 5 in which Proteus is the original cause

of things and it is Eidothea who is matter ἡν.. ὡς εἶδη τροπομένην

σὺβίαν. Here we have perhaps a halfway stage to the Neoplatonist transposition of Proteus into one of the many metaphysical causes of things rather than matter which is affected by a cause.

The layout of this section in Proclus is parallel to the layout of his section on the Theomachy. Just as there there were two tropoi of interpretation, one transcendently metaphysical, the other, in terms of the demons, more traditional, and each tropos was applied to a different type of mythical theomachy, so here there are three tropoi of interpretation (the word τρόπος is used at 112.13), the first two more specifically Neoplatonist, the third again in terms of the demons, and each is applied to a different type of change - the first to Od. 17.485 ff., the second to Proteus, etc., and the third to a whole collection of appearances of gods in the Homeric poems. Moreover, while Od. 17.485 ff. and Proteus both come from Plato's Republic, the passages of Homer dealt with under the third tropos of interpretation had not been attacked by Plato. Is Proclus influenced in his introduction of them by the fact that Syrianus had dealt with all these passages in his Λύσεις ?

96 See Buffière, pp. 179 ff.

The parallel with In Met. 182.30 ff., the similarity in layout to the Theomachy passage which is explicitly derived from Syrianus, and the introduction of passages of Homer other than those attacked in the Republic all suggest that we have here another section which Proclus has derived from Syrianus.

In analysing Proclus' treatment of Zeus and Hera on Mount Ida I was led to discuss the place of Hephaestus in Proclus' theological scheme and to introduce the parallel at Syrianus In Met. 83.1-11.⁹⁷ We saw that Syrianus, like Proclus, gives Hephaestus the role of demiurge of the sensible world and interprets Il. 18.401-2 in the same way as Proclus does on p. 141. Indeed Syrianus' interpretation of these lines helped to explain the interpretation by Proclus. On pp. 141-3 Proclus is dealing with a second scandalous Homeric union, the union of Ares and Aphrodite recounted in Od. 8.266-369. Like the Theomachy and the union of Zeus and Hera, this episode too is interpreted in terms of Neoplatonist metaphysics: Ares presides over division in the cosmos as a whole, Hephaestus is the demiurge who adorns the sensible world. Both need beauty, Aphrodite, but Ares' use of her is at a lower metaphysical level than Hephaestus', so his union with her is adultery while Hephaestus' union with her is marriage. The δεσμοί with which Hephaestus binds the pair of lovers are the τεχνικαὶ λόγοι with which he unites the discordant and harmonious elements of the sensible world. Here again we can see how the

97 Cf. above, pp. 173-4.

Neoplatonist metaphysical allegory transposes the physical one, according to which Aphrodite and Ares were the Empedoclean Love and Strife.⁹⁸ From physical principles of love and strife they have become the metaphysical principles of love and beauty on the one hand and division on the other.⁹⁹ It is interesting to note that just as there existed an allegory of Zeus and Hera at a lower level of metaphysics, as mind and soul¹⁰⁰ so an allegory of the union of Ares and Aphrodite as that of soul and body is reported by Aristides Quintilian in the 3rd or 4th century A.D.¹⁰¹

Once again, then, we have a familiar pattern: there already exists a physical allegory of the story and one at the lower levels of metaphysics; then in Proclus we find a transcendent metaphysical allegory that is peculiarly Neoplatonist. The similarity of this pattern to the development of the exegesis of the Theomachy and of the Zeus-Hera episode, combined with the parallel at In Met. 83.1-11, allows us to attribute to Syrianus the interpretation of the union of Ares and Aphrodite used by Proclus.

At 136.30-137.2 Proclus had referred back to 126.19 ff. for his view of Hephaestus. Pp. 126-8 deal with the laughter

98 Cf. Buffière, pp. 168 ff. and p. 548.

99 For Ares and Aphrodite in the late Neoplatonist theology, cf. the table in Saffrey and Westerink's PT, Vol. I (see note 67 above), and see PT VI.22, p. 403.4-6 Portus (Ares); VI.18, p. 395.44 (Ares is connected with τὸ διαπενκόν as Aphrodite with τὸ ἐρωτικόν); In Remp. 139.2-5 and Hermias 233.2 ff. (Aphrodite's connection with καλλος); Hermias 189.12 ff. (Ares' connection with διαπενκίς). Cf. also Proclus' two Hymns to Aphrodite, II and V.

100 Cf. above, p. 183.

101 Aristid. Quint. II.17, pp. 88.9-89.4 Winnington-Ingram. Cf. Buffière, pp. 464-6.

of the gods in Il. 1.599 ff. and are closely related to the preceding section, 122-6, or rather to the latter half of that section, 124.23 ff., in which Proclus explains why Homer attributes mourning to the gods. In accordance with Orphic doctrines Proclus explains both tears and laughter as symbols of the gods' productive providence. He builds the Orphic ideas into his own system by making the gods' tears providence for particular things and their laughter providence for the whole. (See 125.6-19 and 127.29-128.4) Proclus interprets divine tears in the same way at In Tim. 114.1 ff. (the mourning of Helios for Phaethon) and the laughter of Apollo, Hermes and the rest at Ares and Aphrodite in a similar way at In Tim. II 27.16 ff. We have already seen that Hephaestus played the same theological role in Syrianus as he does in Proclus and the hint this gives that pp. 126-8 derive from Syrianus is confirmed by Hermias 260.22 ff. Hermias there interprets Il.

1.599-600 in the same way as Proclus. On Socrates' use of

παῖδι at Phaedrus 276b5 Hermias comments: "Ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐγκοσμίου δημιουργίας τῆς θεοῦ ἔχει τὸ παῖγνιον αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸν πάντα κόσμον, ὡς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς φησὶ

ἄβυσσος δ' ἄρ' ἐνὶ ᾧ γέλως μακάρεσσιν
ὡς ἴδον ἠδ' αἶσαν
(τούτέστιν, ὡς ἴδον τὰ δημιουργήματα, ἡδ' ἀνέβησαν καὶ ἐγέλασαν)...

Like Proclus, Hermias is relating the Homer passage to the statement of Timaeus 42d that creation and providence are a παῖδι for the gods, (see Proclus In Remp. 127.4 ff.) and

if both Proclus and Hermias do this, that is a sign that Syrianus did it. The two sections in Proclus on why the gods mourn and why they laugh are so closely related that if we attribute the latter to Syrianus we must also attribute the former to him.¹⁰²

The earlier portion of the section at pp. 122-6 deals with mourning by the heroes in Homer. Proclus does not interpret this allegorically¹⁰³ but appeals instead to the difference between Homeric heroes and philosophers: unlike philosophers, or Plato's Guardians, the heroes are closely involved with practical life and so it is understandable, and excusable, that their passions should be strong and that they should mourn the loss of their friends. This is the same type of argument as Proclus uses at pp. 120-1, when dealing with the problem of why the heroes are reluctant to die and why Homer paints a gloomy picture of their life after death. Plato had reproved both heroic and divine mourning at Rep. III 388 and that is why Proclus deals with both in the same section. It is only his interpretation of the latter, divine mourning, that can be securely attributed to Syrianus. It is impossible to tell whether his treatment of the former comes from Syrianus or not. It might well do so, but there is nothing distinctively "Syrianic" about it, and it is worth noting that it is the Republic, not Homer, which has determined the organisation of this section.

There are then a further three and a half sections in

102 Ps-Dionysius the Areopagite interprets the rejoicing of the angels at Luke 15.10 in a parallel way:- see q.h. 15.9 and Koch, pp. 253-4.

103 Cf. the 5th essay, esp. 44.26-45.1, and see above, pp. 13-6.

Proclus which we can attribute to Syrianus, for a variety of reasons. In all of these cases I am presuming that Proclus took over Syrianus' views without criticism, though he may have developed them: we do not have enough evidence to say whether he did so. There is also one passage where we can perhaps catch an echo of Proclus refusing to follow Syrianus' interpretation. This is in the section at pp. 146-9 where Proclus deals with Plato's charge at Rep. III 391 that Homer attributes disrespect for the gods to his heroes. Plato had attacked three passages of Homer, of which the first was Achilles' cry to Apollo at Il. 22.15:

ἔβλαψάς μ' ἐκέρχε, θεῶν ἐλπίσσετε πάντων.

Proclus makes three points in answer to this: first he uses other passages in Homer as evidence for Achilles' piety (146.17-147.6), then he argues that in Il. 22.15 Achilles is addressing only the lowest demon in Apollo's chain who is Hector's personal guardian (147.6-148.13) and thirdly he draws attention to the fact that Achilles is later punished by Apollo (148.13-19).

Before leaving the passage Proclus compares Achilles' behaviour to the ritual *λειτουργία* of the demons in the mysteries (148.19-24). He does not want to press the parallel which he introduces simply as an addition with *καίτοι με οὐ λέγει*... The comparison suggests an interpretation of Achilles as a *μυστήρ* but Proclus does not develop any such view, preferring other types of explanation. Such an interpretation of Achilles as a *μυστήρ* would be like the interpretation of Patroclus' funeral rites as an *ἐπιθεωρητικὸς* which is explicitly attributed to Syrianus and which I discussed

in section (ii) (d). Similarly in the passage on Achilles' piety there is a trace of an interpretation of Achilles' sacrifice to Apollo in terms of late Neoplatonist sacrificial practice and theory. At 147.2-6 Proclus does his best to bring the two types of practice into line. The fact that Achilles in Il. 16.225 ff. cleans his libation-cup, sacrifices to Zeus alone, and stands *ἐν μέσῳ ἔρκεα* are all signs not only of his piety but also of his knowledge of religious symbols, *τῆς γυνάσεως τῶν οἰκείων τοῖς τηρωμένοις συνθημάτων*. I should like to see behind this, and the reference to mysteries at 148.19-24, a treatment of Achilles by Syrianus in which Achilles' sacrifice was interpreted as a theurgic rite and his apparent blasphemy of Apollo aligned with *λειτουργία* in the mysteries. Proclus preserves traces of that treatment but he is unwilling to adopt it.

As so little of Syrianus survives it is never possible to say that a particular interpretation by Proclus must be his own and not Syrianus'. There are no extant cases of interpretation by Syrianus of passages of Homer which are differently interpreted by Proclus, only the rather close parallels I have picked out. For the remaining interpretations we are left with the strong probability that much of what Proclus is saying derives from Syrianus. However, if I am right that Proclus is adapting a work of Syrianus on Homer rather than a work of Syrianus on Plato, then those sections in Proclus whose organisation depends on the Republic will owe at least their layout to Proclus himself. I have already mentioned the case of pp. 122-6, the mourning Homer attributes to both gods and

heroes. Other such cases are 117-22, on the myths about Hades; 129-32, on the passages in Homer which discourage *ἐὐδποσύνη* ; and 143-6 on the passages in which Homer seems to attribute greed for money to his heroes.

Two cases of a related type are the interpretation of the two jars on the threshold of Zeus, at 96-100, and that of the strife to which Zeus rouses the gods, at 106-7. In the latter case a desire to cover both possible interpretations of Plato's phrase in Rep. II 379e5 *θεῶν ἐπὶ τε καὶ κριθείν* has led Proclus to discuss the opening of Il. 20 while in the former he quotes Il. 24.527-8 in a variant version which derives from the text of Plato.¹⁰⁴ The opening of Il. 20 is not discussed in the pre-Neoplatonic tradition of Homeric interpretation known to us through the scholia, Heraclitus' Quaestiones Homericae, etc. The problem would particularly concern Platonist interpreters, since Plato had attacked the passage, and Proclus' solution, aligning Zeus' speech to the gods in Homer with the speech of the demiurge in the Timaeus, is characteristically Neoplatonist. The passage is treated in the same way at In Crat. 49.14 ff. While it comes in here because of Plato's attack in the Republic, it could well have been interpreted by Syrianus in his Λύσεις in just the same way. It would have been fit matter too for Syrianus' lecture on the *κοινὴν τῶν σοφιστῶν* of Homer and Plato.

Proclus interprets the two jars on the threshold of Zeus,

104 See above, pp. 62-3 and 73-7.

in accordance with Neoplatonic doctrine, as the two *εὐπορικὰ* of things in the world. These *εὐπορικὰ* are not of good and bad but only of good and less good. At In Crat. 51.26 ff. Proclus interprets the two jars in the same way, aligning them with the *ταύροτης* and *ἑτερότης* of Parmenides 146a. The interpretation in Porphyry, De antro nympharum 29 (p. 79.12 ff. Nauck) is similar. There the two jars are one of a number of examples that nature begins from *ἑτερότης*. Proclus at least would say that without *ἑτερότης*, difference, the distinction between the two *εὐπορικὰ*, and indeed between *ταύροτης* and *ἑτερότης*, could never get going at all. Now Porphyry quotes Il. 24.528 in the standard text, yet contains the seeds of Proclus' interpretation. This suggests that Proclus could be deriving his interpretation from Syrianus' Λύσεις even while following Plato for his text of the Homeric lines. We are not entitled to draw any conclusions about Syrianus' text of the lines which might, or might not, have been influenced by the Platonic variant.

About half of Proclus' interpretations of Homeric passages clearly derive from Syrianus. In a number of these, when we relate the interpretations given by Proclus to the tradition of Homeric interpretation we can see that Syrianus' distinctive contribution was the development of transcendent metaphysical allegory. In a few cases we can see Proclus developing or even correcting Syrianus; at 148.19 ff. there is perhaps an indication that he is mentioning a Syrianic interpretation but preferring not to use it. What Proclus is doing is fitting Syrianus' comments on Homer, from a variety of sources, into a framework of his own.

(iv) Proclus' debt to Syrianus in the interpretation of Plato, especially in 154.14-177.3

The whole aim of the 6th essay is to demonstrate the agreement of Homer and Plato. It is to this ultimate end that Proclus' allegories of Homer are directed. In his introduction to the essay, at 71.3 ff., Proclus mentions Syrianus' lecture on the *κοινωνία τῶν σοφιστῶν* of Homer and Plato¹⁰⁵ and in the second book of the essay he takes up this theme *ἐπεὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ* (154.16). Here, instead of discussing the passages of Homer attacked in Rep. II and III, he demonstrates from a number of dialogues how Plato admires Homer (154.14-159.6), points out that certain elements in the Platonic dialogues are open to the same kind of attack as Plato himself levels against Homer (159.10-163.9), and shows, again from a number of different dialogues, that Plato emulates Homer in both style and subject-matter (163.13-172.20). None of this, it will be noted, relates specifically to the Republic but rather to the general thesis that Plato and Homer are essentially in agreement. This general thesis is picked up again in the closing sentences of the essay, at 205.13-21. As we shall see in Chapter 4,¹⁰⁶ there is an extensive historical background, going back well beyond the Neoplatonists, for this theme of the agreement of Plato and Homer. It could be used both to attack Plato and to defend him. Proclus of course is defending him and I think it very likely

105 Cf. above, pp. 127 ff.

106 Pp. 280 ff. below.

that for the sections of his work I have picked out (i.e. 154.14-172.20) his immediate source is Syrianus' lecture on the κοινὴν τῶν δογμάτων of Homer and Plato, as he recollected it and as Syrianus later discussed it with him (cf. 71.24-7).

Proclus' interpretation of Plato is not exclusively philosophical. Although his main concern is with Plato's ideas he does also pass literary judgements on Plato's work and shows himself well acquainted with the terminology of rhetoric and literary criticism.¹⁰⁷ One of the sections in which this literary approach to Plato is most evident is 163.13-172.30, one of those which I have just been arguing is closely related to Syrianus' lecture on the κοινὴν τῶν δογμάτων. This should not surprise us when we recall Syrianus' own knowledge of and interest in rhetoric, as evidenced by his commentary on Hermogenes. Walsdorff, pp. 101-2, points out a passage at Hermias 10.14 ff. where Hermias, drawing closely on Syrianus, replies to the charge that Plato's style in the Phaedrus is too poetical. Plato uses the style appropriate to the context, says Syrianus/Hermias. This answer not only makes use of the originally rhetorical concept of τὸ πρέπον¹⁰⁸ but also uses standard rhetorical terms to describe the different styles Plato used in the Phaedrus. Thus the χαρακτήρ of the speech of Lysias is said to be λεπτός καὶ ῥηχρός. Syrianus/Hermias makes further use of literary and rhetorical concepts at 61.27 ff. and 206.17 ff. This literary approach

107 See further below, pp. 271 ff.

108 Walsdorff stresses the extensive use which the later Neoplatonists made of this concept in their exegesis of Plato.

to Plato had a long history, principally among rhetoricians and literary critics rather than philosophers. By Late Antiquity, when rhetoric had an assured place in education and a highly educated person would be familiar with its technical terminology, the rhetoricians' comments on Plato became absorbed into the all-containing framework of Neoplatonist exegesis. Although so lofty a metaphysician as Syrianus might well disdain *πολιτιστικὴν τῆς Λέξεως*, as Proclus does in his own Timaeus commentary,¹⁰⁹ we can see that Syrianus did sometimes make literary and rhetorical comments on Plato and that Proclus is not diverging from his teacher in doing so too.

In a number of places we can trace Proclus' use and interpretation of Plato passages quite closely to Syrianus and an examination of these details brings out how Proclus was drawing on Syrianus just as much in his interpretation of Plato as in his allegories of Homer.

(a) 155.25-156.9

At 155.25-156.9 Proclus cites Plato's admiration for Homer in the Laws as an example of the honour in which Plato held the poet. He begins with a vague general statement that Plato calls Homer *θεότατος* in the Laws and then more specifically mentions the opening of Book III where passages of Homer are cited as descriptions of the early history of human society. Finally he quotes Laws III 682a which praises such descriptions as hitting on historical truth thanks to divine inspiration. It

109 See, e.g., In Tim. 87.6 ff. where Iamblichus is cited as a precedent for this attitude, and cf. also In Remp. 164.8-9.

is not in fact true that Plato calls Homer θεώτατον in the Laws. Kroll and Festugière suggest that Proclus is confusing Ion 530b10 where Homer is described as θεώτατος with Laws I 629b9 where θεώτατος is used of Tyrtaeus. There is a similar general reference to Plato's calling poets θείους and θεωτάτους at Syrianus In Met. 42.23 ff. There Syrianus answers Aristotle's disparagement of τὰ μυθικῶς ἐοδιζόμενα at Metaph. 1000a14. ἐν ταῦτα Πλάτωνος περὶ αὐτῶν ἡκούσαμεν λέγοντος, he says reprovingly, ἀλλὰ δοκιμάζοντος αὐτοῖς ἐν ταῖς περὶ θεῶν ἐπεσθαί λόγους, καίπερ ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν ὡς συγγέμελαν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ θεῖον περιττότεραν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ὅθεν καὶ θείους καὶ θεωτάτους αὐτοὺς εἶπε προαγορεύειν. The fact that Plato does sometimes call poets, including Homer, θείους or θεωτάτους was obviously very present to the minds of both Syrianus and Proclus. Syrianus would certainly mention it in his lecture on the κοινὴν τῶν δογματῶν and that would be all the more reason for Proclus to take it up here. Perhaps we can even explain his mistaken reference to the Laws by the fact that he was working from notes of Syrianus' lecture in which a reference to Laws III occurred immediately after a reference to Plato's use of θεώτατος and did not bother to check whether the more general reference was also to the Laws.

(b) 166.12-167.9

Since the 6th essay is concerned with poetry, Proclus

naturally devotes some discussion to the relevant sections of the Phaedrus. This affords a valuable opportunity to trace Proclus' debt to Syrianus, using Hermias' commentary on the Phaedrus as evidence of how Syrianus interpreted this dialogue. 166.12-167.9 deals with the Phaedrus and we have a parallel passage in Hermias. As an allegory of a Homeric passage, Il. 1.423-4, is also involved, we have evidence from earlier allegory which enables us to pinpoint Syrianus' distinctive contribution here. The passage of the Phaedrus in question is 246e ff. where Socrates, in poetical style, describes the procession of the gods to an intellectual feast beyond the confines of our world. Plato says the gods go *πρὸς δαῖτα καὶ ἐνὶ θείῃν*. There can be little doubt that his language here does indeed derive from Il. 1.423-4:

Ζεὺς γὰρ ἐς Ωκεανὸν μετ' ἄμβροτας Αἰθιοπῆας
 χθρὺς ἔβη μετὰ δαῖτα, θεοὶ δ' ἅμα πάντες ἔπονται

Proclus however claims further that the thought, not just the language, is the same and to support this interprets the Homeric lines as describing the return of Zeus to his own intelligible cause. The Ethiopians are οἱ τῷ θείῳ φωνῇ καταβυπόμενοι and Ocean flows from the νοητὴ πηγή and fills the demiurgic mind (i.e. Zeus) and the gods connected with it. Proclus understands the mythical passage of the Phaedrus in a corresponding Neoplatonic way.

Hermias discusses at length the different interpretations of this passage of the Phaedrus and the different Zeuses to whom it could be applied. At 138.6 ff. he says that Il. 1.423 concerns the Zeus who is one of the twelve gods, i.e. the Zeus

of this Phaedrus passage and the Ethiopians stand for τὸ
 ἀφανές πᾶν καὶ νοητόν. "Ὁν δὲ πάντα οὖτος ὁ Ζεὺς
 ἀνάγει ἐπὶ τὸ νοητόν, he continues, ὥδε συνῶδ' αὖ
 τούτῳ καὶ Πλάτῳ λέγει. τῇ δ' ἔπεται ἑρμῶν
 θεῶν τε καὶ ἀσπερόνων. (Phaedrus 246e6; cf. Proclus 166.15-6)

This is essentially the same interpretation of Il. 1.423-4
 as we find in Proclus for the νοητόν (Hermias) could
 be described as θεῶν φησὶ καταλαμβάνεον (Proclus).
 The allegory is of the metaphysical type which was developed
 by Syrianus. There is a physical allegory of the Homer passage
 in Eustathius.¹¹⁰ There Zeus is the sun and Ocean the waters
 in the inhabited world which lie near the Ethiopians. More
 interestingly, this allegory recurs in Macrobius, Sat. 1.23.
 He gives Cornificius as his source for the equation of Zeus
 with the sun and explains that the idea is that the sun is
 nourished by moisture, citing Posidonius and Cleanthes as
 authorities for this scientific fact. Very likely they too
 alluded to the lines of Homer. The gods who follow Zeus in
 Homer are explained as the stars. Then Macrobius quotes
Phaedrus 246e4-247a1, wrongly ascribing the passage to the
Timaeus and saying, "intellectum nostrum in eandem sententiam
 ducunt etiam de Timaeo Platonis haec verba". He proceeds to
 expound a physical allegory of the Plato passage in which Zeus
 is the sun and the accompanying gods are the stars. This
 Macrobius passage suggests, as we might expect, that the physical

110 Vol. I, p. 105.43 ff. Stallbaum.

allegory of Il. 1.423-4 is Stoic in origin. His parallel allegory of the Phaedrus passage is among those mentioned by Hermias at 136.10 ff. Hermias prefers the interpretation of Zeus as the demiurge which he ascribes to Iamblichus and it is an elaborated form of this which he aligns with the Iliad passage, in 138.6 ff. This passage of Hermias has recently been discussed by Dillon.¹¹¹ He seems unaware of the Macrobius parallel but says of the physical allegory of Phaedrus 246e as recorded by Hermias: "This still sounds like a Middle Platonist interpretation, perhaps Numenian. Hermias considers this to be getting warmer, but still erroneously confining itself to the universe. Iamblichus seems to be the first to raise the exegesis to a supra-cosmic level", and later, "Hermias accepts this (i.e. Iamblichus' view) in essence, but with an elaboration or two, no doubt derived from Syrianus" (the underlining is mine). The resulting picture is just what we might have expected: physical allegory of Homer and physical allegory of Plato already existing side by side in pre-Iamblichean Platonism, metaphysical allegory of Plato developed by Iamblichus, and then accompanying metaphysical allegory of Homer developed by Syrianus. Proclus and Hermias are both following Syrianus here. It seems likely that Syrianus would have expounded the same allegory in his lectures on the Phaedrus, his lecture on the κοινὴν τῶν σοφῶν and perhaps in his ἑρμηνείαν πρὸς Ἀγλαῶν too.

(c) 168.3-169.24 (and 117.27-122.20)

In 117.7-122.20 Proclus not only discusses the Homeric

¹¹¹ Dillon, p. 251.

passages on Hades of which Socrates disapproves in Rep. III, but also defends Plato's own eschatological myths. Interpretations of the traditional mythical eschatology varied widely in antiquity. As one might expect, philosophers often interpreted it allegorically. The Pythagoreans, for example, interpreted the torments of Hades in a moral sense as the torments of the passions in this life.¹¹² The later Neoplatonists, however, avoid this kind of interpretation. Their beliefs about the destiny of the soul are influenced by Plato's eschatological myths and they are insistent that these are to be taken literally.¹¹³ Julian, for example, takes the Homeric Tartarus literally at Ep. 89, p. 139.15 ff. Bidez-Cumont (see especially 140.12 ff.) So Proclus at 121.23 ff. insists that the judgement-places in Hades of which both Homer and Plato tell us, are to be taken literally.¹¹⁴ On pp.200-1 above I noted that the section at 117-22 owes its layout to the Republic and therefore is probably not taken straight from Syrianus in that form. The theme that Plato and Homer agree is made explicit in it and this suggests that the source is the lecture on the *κένωσις αὐτῶν* *τοῦ σώματος*, perhaps that same part of it which Proclus takes up again at 168.3-169.24 on the nekuiai of Homer and Plato. If so, Proclus would be adapting some of the lecture for his own purposes in 117-22. It is interesting that in the anonymous

112 See F. Cumont, Lux perpetua (Paris, 1949) and Buffière, pp. 489 ff. For the Pythagorean view in particular, see F. Cumont, "Lucrèce et le symbolisme pythagoricien des enfers", R Ph N.S. 44 (1920), pp. 229-40.

113 Cf. Cumont, Lux perpetua, pp. 215 ff and 375 ff. Smith, pp. 71 ff., argues that Porphyry too, and even Plotinus, took the traditional eschatology seriously. I am not sure that Smith proves his case for Plotinus but he may be right about Porphyry.

114 Cf. also In Tim. III 235.11 ff.

Platonic commentary D to the Phaedo¹¹⁵ we find recorded an opinion of Syrianus about the detailed interpretation of the myth in the Phaedo. At p. 241.25 ff., on Phaedo 113e, we read: *πῶς οὐδέποτε ἐξίαιεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Τάρταρου αἱ ἀνιάτα βεβιωκυῖαι; ἢ πολιτικῶς ἐψεύεται, ἵνα εὐλαβῶνται αἱ ψυχαὶ τὰ ἀνήκεστα τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. ἢ πρὸς μίαν περίοδον τὸ οὐδέποτε. Συριανὸς αὖτις ἢ ἐμβολή.* (i.e. the latter view.) It looks from this as if Syrianus too took Plato's eschatological myths very seriously and more or less literally.

In the later discussion of Plato's nekuiai at 168.3 to 169.24, Proclus deals less with Homer and more with Plato. Proclus himself wrote a commentary on the myth in the Gorgias¹¹⁶ and the 16th essay of the In Remp. deals at length with the myth of Er. We can see from Olympiodorus' commentary on the Gorgias that certain exegetical points about Plato's nekuiai became standard in the Platonic school. At 241.11-28 Olympiodorus divides the subject-matter of Plato's three nekuiai in the same way as Proclus does at 168.11-23. The Phaedo concentrates on the geography of the underworld, the Republic on the fate of souls there, and the Gorgias on the judges of Hades. (Cf. also In Remp. II 128.12-23) Does this point go right back to Syrianus? There is little means of knowing. Olympiodorus is probably following Proclus. At 241.15 ff. he takes the rivers of the Phaedo literally and at

115 Attributed by Westerink to Damascius:- see above, Chapter 2, note 24.

116 He refers to it at In Remp. II 139.19 and 178.6:- cf. above Chapter 1, notes 36 and 37.

241.18-9 mentions καὶ ἔτι καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν in connection with the Phaedo. By contrast, in his commentary on Aristotle's Meteorologica, p. 146 Stüve (on Mete. 355b32 ff.) he mentions the possibility of interpreting the Phaedo myth ἡθικῶς or φυσικῶς ; the latter comes to something like the Pythagorean view (Tartarus = the material world), the former, despite the adverb ἡθικῶς , sounds fairly literal. Unlike Olympiodorus, Proclus sticks firmly to the same literal interpretation of Plato's eschatology all the time. It must be admitted that the evidence for Syrianus' views on this is extremely slight but it does look as if he and Proclus held the same view and we may reasonably assume, in the light of our overall picture of Proclus' debt to Syrianus, that in his lecture on the κοινὴν τῶν δογμάτων Syrianus put Plato's eschatology together with Homer's and maintained that both should be interpreted literally.

(d) 169.25-170.26

In 169.25-170.26 Proclus argues that the linguistic theories of Plato's Cratylus are based on Homer. Such evidence as we have for the tradition of interpretation of the Cratylus would support the view that Syrianus' interpretation of that dialogue was the same as Proclus'. Proclus claims that Plato divides ὀνόματα into two groups, divine ὀνόματα given for reasons unknown to us and human ὀνόματα given for reasons we can discover. He cites Crat. 391d ff., where Plato refers to Homer's division of ὀνόματα into divine and human, as evidence that Plato is following Homer in this. Proclus takes the Cratylus absolutely seriously, as did the other Neoplatonists:

Plotinus, for example, makes serious use of a number of the Cratylus' etymologies. Daniélou has argued¹¹⁷ that Eunomius' belief in the divine origin of language, which we know from Gregory of Nyssa's polemic against it in Book II of his Contra Eunomium, was based on a Neoplatonic interpretation of the Cratylus and so informs us about the interpretation of that dialogue in the Athenian school of the 4th century A.D. Eunomius' theory that language originated in a gift of God is strikingly different from earlier Greek theories that language arose either from a natural human need or by arbitrary convention or from some combination of these two. It could be supported by taking the mythical *ῥητοδότης* of the Cratylus literally, just as a belief in the creation of the world could be supported by taking the demiurge of the Timaeus literally. It is true that Proclus in his commentary on the Cratylus expresses a belief in the divine origin of language (see, e.g., In Crat. 51-2, p. 20.10 ff.) and supports this with an appeal to the mystic *ἐνὸς μυστα* mentioned in the Chaldaean Oracles. The parallel between Proclus and Eunomius is not as close as Daniélou claims and there would be an important difference in that Eunomius, as a Christian, believed in creation in time and therefore presumably in the origin of language at a point in time, whereas Proclus believed in the eternity of the world and for him the creation of the world by the demiurge was something which was happening constantly; similarly his view would be that the lawgiver of the Cratylus is continually bestowing language upon men, not that he did so at some fixed time in the past. Still, the parallel is worth

117 In "Eunome l'arien et l'exégèse néoplatonicienne du Cratyle", REG 69 (1956), pp. 412-32.

noting and Daniélou rightly points to Iamblichus De myst. VII.4, on the divine origin of divine names. Iamblichus says there that divine names are ἄγνῳστα just as Proclus does at In Crat. 71, p. 31.5-7 and in our passage of the 6th essay, at 170.3. Iamblichus and the Chaldaean Oracles would be enough, even without Eunomius, as evidence that Proclus' theory of divine ὀνόματα is standard late Neoplatonism. A Platonist would naturally base such a theory on Cratylus

391d: Ἑρμογενῆς. καὶ π' λέγει, ὡς Σώκρατες,
 "Ὅμηρος περὶ ὀνομάτων καὶ πού;
 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πολλὰ χῶ. μέγιστα δὲ καὶ κάλλιστα
 ἐν αἷς διορίζει ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἅ τε οἱ ἄνθρωποι
 ὀνόματα καλοῦσι καὶ οἱ θεοί. ἢ οὐκ εἶδεν
 αὐτὸν μέγα π καὶ θαυμάσιον λέγειν ἐν ταῖς
 περὶ ὀνομάτων ὁρθότητος. δῆλον γάρ τίς ὅτι
 οἱ γὰρ θεοὶ αὐτὰ καλοῦσιν πρὸς ὁρθότητα
 ἅπερ ἔστι φύσει ὀνόματα.

So too Hermias, in 187.22 ff., gives an etymology of Ἑρως from εἶναι ῥεῖν like Plato in Cratylus 420a, and goes

on to say: Διάφορα δὲ ἔστι τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν
 θεῶν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αἱ οὐδαίαι αὐτῶν ὡς πρὸς
 τοὺς ἄνθρώπους διάφορα εἶναι. Τούτο δὲ καὶ
 "Ὅμηρος ἐποίησεν εἰπών·

Χαλκίδα κυκλήσκουσι θεοὶ, ἄνδρες δὲ κύμινδιν
 καὶ πάλιν

ὃν Βριάρεων καλέουσι θεοί

Briareus is not one of Plato's examples but χαλκίς and
 κύμινδιν certainly is. It seems fairly clear that the

interpretation of the Cratylus which Proclus puts forward at 169.25-170.26 comes from Syrianus, but it also looks as if he in turn had received it from earlier interpreters. We do not know whether Iamblichus based his views on language on the Cratylus, or only on the Chaldaean Oracles. Gregory accuses Eunomius of deriving his view from the Cratylus and we do seem here to have some tangential testimony to 4th century Neoplatonic interpretation. Our ignorance of the Athenian school in the 4th century prevents us from going much further. The details of the development are lost. All we can say is that the views of Proclus are probably those of Syrianus too.

(e) 173.4-177.3

At 173.4-177.3 Proclus deals with another passage of the Phaedrus, 243a, where Socrates introduces his own "palinode" on Eros with an allusion to the original Palinode of Stesichorus in which Stesichorus recanted the evil he had said of Helen and was accordingly cured of his blindness; Homer, who did not perceive his error, remained blind. This passage presents Proclus with a problem since it implies that Plato thought Stesichorus a better poet than Homer. Proclus believes that Homer is the supreme poet and that Plato thought so too. He therefore has to interpret the Phaedrus passage in such a way that Homer's reputation remains untouched. To do so, he makes a distinction between the types of poetry written by Stesichorus and Homer respectively. Stesichorus told the story of Helen as if it were something that had really happened and his blindness was a real punishment for this. Homer, on the other hand, perceived

the symbolic meaning of the story, and his blindness, like that of Demodocus in the Odyssey, is a symbolic indication of his superior powers of understanding. Homer can only be said to have erred in the sense that by describing intelligible realities in material terms he may have misled readers into concentrating on the material level of his poetry and forgetting about the higher level. In 175.12-176.8 Proclus explains the symbolic meaning of the story of the Trojan War: Helen stands for the beauty of the material world, the ten years of the war for the sojourn of souls within it. He thus arrives at the desired conclusion, that Homer is better than Stesichorus, at the cost of interpreting Stesichorus' blindness in one way and Homer's in another.

Bielmeier deals briefly with this passage of Proclus in Die neuplatonische Phaidrosinterpretation, pp. 46-7.¹¹⁸ He says it is clearly dependent on Syrianus and points to the parallel passage of Hermias which he discusses on pp. 65-6. Dependent on Syrianus certainly, but how closely? When we compare Proclus and Hermias in detail some interesting differences emerge. Hermias 75.26 ff. offers two alternative interpretations of Phaedrus 243a. According to the first there is an ascending order of Homer, Stesichorus and Socrates. Plato is not attacking the persons of Homer and Stesichorus but demonstrating three types of life. Homer represents the person who considers only sensible beauty (Helen at Troy); Stesichorus the person who recognises his error and is led from sensible

118 Cf. also Buffière, pp. 30-1 and 410-13.

beauty to intelligible beauty; Socrates the person who is aware of both types of beauty from the beginning. At 76.21 ff. Hermias presents a second interpretation which puts the three characters in the reverse order: Homer comes highest because he remained blind and therefore in perpetual contemplation of intelligible beauty; Stesichorus ceased to be blind and turned away from intelligible to sensible beauty; Socrates is not yet blind (!) because we have not yet reached the point in the dialogue where he utters inspired praise of divine Eros. Hermias notes that the advantage of this interpretation is that it gives a high place to Homer: *καὶ ὅπως ὅτι σύμφωνος μὲν αὖτις ἡ ἐξηγήσις τῇ παναρχῇ Σωκράτει ἐξυμνοῦντι τοὺς θεολόγους καὶ τοὺς ἐνθέους ποιητὰς καὶ Ὅμηρον, βουλομένη δὲ αὐτῆς ἔπεσθαι*. Nevertheless he prefers the first interpretation since it is more appropriate to what is said in the dialogue. He then expounds an allegory of the Trojan War in which Helen stands for intelligible beauty and her *ἑδωλόν* for sensible beauty. At 78.5 ff. he aligns the ten years of the war with the period of a thousand or ten thousand years which souls spend in the material world according to Plato.¹¹⁹ This allegory in Hermias is presumably intended to accompany his preferred interpretation of Homer and Stesichorus. Thus the Trojan War is about the struggle of souls in this world; Homer mistakenly sticks to that; Stesichorus in composing his palinode turned away from that and recognised that the real Helen, real beauty, lay elsewhere. On Hermias' rejected

¹¹⁹ On this allegory and its use of etymologies, cf. pp. 170-1 above.

interpretation the Trojan War would have to be about the intelligible world; Homer would be describing that, while Stesichorus in his palinode would be turning away to describe the material world. Proclus presents us with a version which draws on both these interpretations but is not precisely either of them. According to him the Trojan War appears to be a historical story and Stesichorus understands it as such; Homer can perceive its real, symbolic significance, that it is about the struggle of souls in this world, not about Helen and Greeks and Trojans. The views of Hermias and Proclus as we have them are incompatible. They cannot both be the view of Syrianus. We know that Hermias' commentary on the Phaedrus is very largely his notes from Syrianus' lectures and it is generally agreed that he was far less of an independent thinker than Proclus, his fellow-pupil. Moreover we have already seen that Proclus does sometimes develop Syrianus' ideas or make a deliberate selection from them. Can we make sense of the contradictions between Hermias and Proclus here if we suppose that Hermias represents the view of Syrianus and that Proclus is adapting that? I think we can. Proclus is discussing only one passage of the Phaedrus, not the whole dialogue. Therefore he need not concern himself, as Hermias does, with the significance of Socrates in 243a. But why does he not simply adopt Hermias' rejected interpretation which, as Hermias/Syrianus explicitly points out, preserves Homer's reputation? The difficulty about that is that it requires a second, unexplained allegory of the Trojan War. There would have to be first the literal level, then the level comprehended by Stesichorus when no longer blind, on which the war is

about sensible beauty and souls, and then the level comprehended by Homer and by Stesichorus when blind, on which the war is about intelligible beauty and - what? This gives us two levels of allegory and it is not clear how the Greeks and Trojans would be explained on the second level. Proclus simplifies the interpretation of the war so that we have simply the literal level, which is all Stesichorus could ever understand, and one allegorical level, understood by Homer. To have two allegorical levels does give room for both Helen and her εἶδωλον but it leaves us in a muddle as to why Stesichorus was blinded in the first place. (Although Proclus here keeps Helen as αἶσθητόν καὶ ἄλλος only, at 153.26 ff. the Helen seized by Theseus and Pirithous is ἀφάνες καὶ ἄλλος. For a Neoplatonist sensible beauty is the image projected by intelligible beauty into the material world, so that in a sense the two beauties are one and the same.)

Whereas Hermias gives Thamyris as an example of a poet whose blindness meant the opening of his eyes to intelligible beauty, Proclus gives Demodocus. This is in accordance with the use Proclus makes of Demodocus and Thamyris respectively a little later in the 6th essay, at 193.16-195.12 where Demodocus is the Homeric composer of Proclus' inspired poetry while Thamyris composes phantastic poetry, the lowest of Proclus' types.¹²⁰ Did Proclus change the example here to fit the rest of his essay?

120 See further below, pp. 344 ff.

Hermias 75.2 ff. gives three different legendary reasons for Homer's blindness, of which the last is that it was a punishment for speaking ill of Helen. It is this last story which Proclus picks out for a mention at 175.12 ff. He takes it to indicate that Homer saw beyond the literal level of Helen's story.

The parallel between the ten years of the Trojan War and the Platonic period which souls spend in the material world is the same in both Proclus and Hermias. Clearly this point, like the whole allegory of the Trojan War, was expounded by Syrianus.

176.13 ff. finds no parallel in Hermias. There Proclus tries to explain why, on his interpretation, Socrates should say that Homer errs. We may reasonably look on this as an answer to an objection. It could be such an objection which led Hermias/Syrianus to prefer the other interpretation of Phaedrus 243a as *προσδυστέρη καὶ οἰκευτέρη... τοῖς ἐνταῦθα ῥήτορις*. Or perhaps the objection was made to Proclus himself, or occurred to him, between giving the original lecture on which the 6th essay is based, and writing up the essay.

If my reconstruction is correct we can here see Proclus adapting Syrianus' work and selecting from it, just as he does, for example, when dealing with Agamemnon's dream.

I have been examining passages of Platonic interpretation in the 6th essay where we can in some measure trace the nature and extent of Proclus' debt to Syrianus. The results of the investigation are very like those obtained by studying Proclus' allegories of Homer. In the main lines of his interpretation

Proclus is following Syrianus who in his turn was following earlier tradition. This is true of the arguments that Plato and Homer agree, and of the literary and rhetorical approach to Plato which Proclus occasionally employs. Much of the time Proclus is taking over Syrianus' views unchanged (e.g. in 166.12-167.5). Sometimes we can see how he has adapted Syrianus for his own purposes: 173.4-177.3 is an interesting case of this. It is hard to judge how far Syrianus himself was making original contributions in these various aspects of Platonic exegesis. The one passage, among those I have considered, where we do find distinct innovation by Syrianus, 166.12-167.9, once again involves metaphysical allegory of Homer. It looks as if Syrianus' contribution in this sphere was more remarkable than in the other aspects of his work on which Proclus is building in the 6th essay.

(v) Does the theory of three types of poetry derive from Syrianus?

At the end of the essay, at 177.7 ff., Proclus develops a theory of three types of poetry, inspired, didactic and mimetic. I have argued in Chapter 1 that the concept of inspired poetry which he expounds here is significantly different from the concept of inspired poetry employed in the 5th problem of the 5th essay.¹²¹ This argument turns principally on the fact that Proclus interprets Phaedrus 245a differently at 180.10-182.20 from the way he interprets it in the 5th essay. Some of Proclus' interpretation of the Phaedrus passage may

121 Pp.16-9 above.

be closely paralleled in Hermias. The two pupils of Syrianus interpret $\acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu$ καὶ ἄβατον ψυχῇν in the same way (cf. 181.2-17 in Proclus with Hermias 98.4-6). Proclus explains how ἐγείρουσα refers to the effort of the soul to return to its cause, ἐκβακχεύουσα to the movement of that cause in perfecting those who are inspired (181.17-29). Hermias explains ἐγείρουσα in much the same way, although he does not set up Proclus' division between the soul and its cause and on ἐκβακχεύουσα he digresses to explain why a Dionysiac term is used (Hermias 98.6 ff.). I mentioned in Chapter 1 the unusual way in which Proclus expounds $\mu\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$ τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα at 181.30-182.9. The poet is not, as one might think, relating the deeds of admirable heroes but is making human affairs appear in a more perfect and shining light by (allegorically) describing divine things. Poetry which conveys a mystic vision is educational too, but not in the obvious way. Proclus remarks at 182.6-9 that παιδεία for children and παιδεία for properly brought up adults are not the same thing. In the 5th essay Proclus had interpreted $\mu\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$ τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα in the more obvious way and this is how Hermias also understands it.

We can see from Hermias that the interpretation of Phaedrus 245a in the 5th essay derives from Syrianus. This interpretation follows the Phaedrus closely in making a simple bipartite distinction between inspired and uninspired poetry. In the 6th essay this bipartite classification has become tripartite, and a concept of didactic poetry has been introduced which takes over the functions of inspired poetry in the 5th essay. Its

products are ζῆλῳ τῆς εὐφροσύνης, νευθεσίας καὶ
 συμβουλῶν ἀρίστων παύρη (179.10-1. Cf. παιδῶν
 τοὺς ζῆλῳ τῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιτηδεύματι 58.9-10, of
 inspired poetry). The theory of three types of poetry is
 developed in order to interpret Republic X - Proclus argues
 that Plato's attack there is directed only against the lower
 of the two kinds of mimetic poetry, leaving the rest untouched -
 and if I am right that Syrianus did not write anything of
 precisely the format of Proclus' 6th essay, dealing with Homer
 in relation to the Republic,¹²² there would be good a priori
 grounds for supposing that the three types of poetry are Proclus'
 own. What Proclus has done is to divide Syrianus' concept of
 inspired poetry in two. Syrianus had developed transcendent
 metaphysical allegory and his own concept of inspired poetry
 would have to contain both poetry susceptible of such allegory
 (now a much larger category than before) and straightforwardly
 instructive poetry such as that of Theognis. The very importance
 which Syrianus attached to transcendent metaphysical allegory
 and the poetry that had to be so interpreted would create the
 need for a new classification of poetry which distinguished
 between poetry that had to be interpreted as metaphysical
 allegory and straightforwardly instructive poetry. Admittedly
 such a step could easily have been taken by Syrianus himself
 but the evidence we have for Syrianus' classification of types
 of poetry suggests that it was not. It would be quite characteristic
 for Proclus to make this further move, thus at one and the same

122 See pp. 131-3 above.

time systematising his teacher's thought and developing something new.

We shall see in Chapter 6 that the concept of didactic poetry is in some ways the odd one out. Both mimetic and inspired poetry are thought of as representational; mimetic is directly representational, inspired poetry represents by means of symbols. Didactic poetry does not belong to this representational scheme.¹²³ The fact that didactic poetry is a new concept, not yet clearly worked out, might help to explain this oddity.

An attempt to trace the sources of the ideas used by Proclus in 177.7 ff. supports my claim that it was Proclus who set up three types of poetry rather than two, while showing us how closely Proclus' thought is connected with Syrianus'.

Proclus begins his exposition of three types of poetry by setting out three types of life to which the types of poetry correspond. The three types of life, in turn, correspond to three different elements in the human soul. Plato's views on poetry in Rep. X are linked to the philosophical psychology of Rep. IV. One of his arguments against poetry is that it appeals only to the lowest of his three parts of the soul, the ἐπιθυμητικόν. Proclus likewise associates his theory of poetry with a division of the soul into parts, though it should be noted that his division is not the same as Plato's.¹²⁴ Proclus' three

123 Cf. below, pp. 374-5.

124 Gallavotti, L'estetica greca..., p. 46, wrongly assumes that it is the same, as does Immisch, p. 270. The Neoplatonists made little use of the Platonic division of the soul:- see Wallis, p. 28 and pp. 74-5.

parts of the soul, in 177.15-178.5, are the ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ , the organ by which mystical union is achieved, νοῦς (the highest part of the soul according to Plato, but second here), and the irrational part. Each part has its own type of cognition by which it is distinguished: mystical and supra-rational cognition for the ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ , intelligence for νοῦς , imagination and sense-perception for the lowest part. The idea that the human soul is capable of an awareness higher than that of intelligence, of a mystical union with an ultimate supra-intellectual reality is of course distinctively Neoplatonist. In Plotinus this union is achieved by means of our νοῦς ; sometimes, admittedly, Plotinus talks as if there is a special element within νοῦς by which we attain mystical union (see, for example, VI.9.3.26-7 or V.5.8.22; cf. VI.7.35.19-24) but it is only after Plotinus that the idea develops of a special faculty in the soul which is distinct from νοῦς , and is the peculiar organ of mystical union. In Proclus this special faculty receives a number of different names. It is ἡ ἀκρότης (or τὸ ἀκρότατον) τῇ ψυχῇ (or τοῦ νοῦ), τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τὸ πρῶτον τῇ ψυχῇ, ἡ πῶν ἡμετέρων ἐνεργειῶν ἡ ἀκροτάτη, ἡ ἐνὲς ἡ ἐν ἑκάστη. Often, borrowing the term from the Chaldaean Oracles, Proclus calls it τὸ ἕνδος τοῦ νοῦ (or τῇ ψυχῇ).¹²⁵

The most convenient name for this special faculty of the soul

125 Sometimes Proclus makes a further distinction between "the flower of the mind" and "the flower of the soul". The distinction is not relevant to the 6th essay and I shall not go into it here.

is "the one in the soul" (τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ). This both makes clear its nature - it corresponds in the soul to the One in the universe, and it is because of its existence that the soul can be united with the One - and recalls the name by which it became important in medieval mysticism, the "unum in nobis".¹²⁶ Accordingly I shall use the term, "the one in the soul", for this faculty throughout. The doctrine of the "one in the soul" in Proclus has been discussed by Beierwaltes in the article referred to in note 126 and similarly in his book, Proklos, Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik,¹²⁷ pp. 367-82, and by L.H. Grondijs in L'âme, le nous et les hénades dans la théologie de Proclus.¹²⁸ Its history has been partially discussed by J.M. Rist.¹²⁹ Rist argues, following Hadot, that the doctrine may already be seen developing in Porphyry. Certainly Iamblichus, in De myst. I.15, p. 46 Parthey, speaks of τὸ... θεῖον ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ νοερόν καὶ ἐν , which is awakened by prayer. The doctrine of the "one in the soul" seems to be present here in some form, though the fact that Iamblichus can call his ἐν ἡμῖν... ἐν , νοερόν suggests that it is not yet conceived as a precise faculty distinct from νοῦς in the way that it is in Proclus.¹³⁰

126 See W. Beierwaltes, "Der Begriff des 'unum in nobis' bei Proklos", Miscellanea Mediaevalia 2 (Cologne, 1963), pp. 255-66.

127 (Frankfurt, 1965).

128 Proceedings of the Royal Netherlands Academy N.S. 23.2 (Amsterdam, 1960). Cf. also Wallis, p. 153, and Koch, pp. 153 ff.

129 In "Mysticism and Transcendence in Later Neoplatonism", Hermes 92 (1964), pp. 213-25.

130 Cf. Dillon, Appendix A, esp. pp. 410 ff., arguing that Proclus In Tim. 211.24 ff., where the "one in the soul" comes in, is "broadly Iamblichean". Julian, Or. VII 217d mentions νοῦν καὶ ἐν δὲ τῇ κρείττονι ἡμῖν ἐπάρχει τοῦ νοῦ, ὡς τοῦ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν μοῖραις τῆς οὐρανίας...

The way Proclus links the "one in the soul" with poetic inspiration is very striking. To say that inspired poetry corresponds to the faculty above νοῦς is to make very high claims for it indeed, in Neoplatonist terms; it is to imply that poetic inspiration is a kind of mystical experience. Iamblichus says little or nothing of poetic inspiration but he does have views on prophetic inspiration (ἐνθουσιασμός) which he develops in De myst. III.4-8 (cf. also III.25). He makes no mention there of the "one in the soul".

The important missing link between Iamblichus and Proclus is Syrianus and we have evidence that he did connect the "one in the soul" with enthousiasmos, just as Proclus does, in a very interesting passage of Hermias which, so far as I can tell, has been completely passed over by those who have written on the "one in the soul".¹³¹

In 84.18 ff., in connection with the four maniai of the Phaedrus, Hermias sets out very clearly what are the different types of enthousiasmos. The questions he is concerned with are these (84.21 ff.): ποῖον μέρος ἐστὶν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐνθουσιῶν, καὶ ὁ πᾶν μέρος ἐνθουσιᾷ, καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἐνθουσιασμός ἐκ θεῶν, καὶ ἐν ποίῳ μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς οὗτος ἐγγίνεται ἢ ἄλλῃ πρὸς κρείττονι ψυχῆς. He divides the rational soul into two parts, διάνοια and δόξα; διάνοια is further subdivided into νοῦς and διάνοια proper.

Distinct from the rational soul, and higher than it, comes a further element (84.27 ff.): Ἄλλο δὲ ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τούτου ὃ ἐστὶν ἀκρότατον τῆς πάσης ψυχῆς καὶ ἐνικνύτατον, ὃ πᾶσι τὰ ἀγαθὰ θέλει καὶ ἄν' ἑαυτὸ

¹³¹ It is discussed by Gelzer, pp. 21-6 and 34-5, but he is not directly concerned with the "one in the soul".

ἐπιδίδωκε τῆς θεοῦ, καὶ ὅπερ ἂν ἐκεῖνον
βούλωνται τοῦτο ἔτοιμον ἐμπεσεῖν. ὁ καὶ
ἐν λέγεται τῆς ψυχῆς [ὁ] καὶ ἑνδοαίμα φέρει
τοῦ ὑπερουδίου ἐνός, πᾶσαν ἐνίσχον τὴν
ψυχὴν.¹³²

In the division of the soul in the 6th essay Proclus
uses νοῦς to cover both νοῦς and διάνοια,¹³³ while the
faculties of the third part of the soul are φαντασία and αἰσθησις
(see 178.4).¹³⁴

According to Hermias each part of the soul has its own
enthousiasmos. Enthousiasmos properly so called, however,
is that of the highest part, of the "one in the soul" (85.14 ff.):
"Ὁ οὖν πρῶτος καὶ κυρίως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐκ θεῶν
ἐνθουσιασμός κατὰ τὸ ἐν γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς,
ὃ ἔστιν ὑπὲρ τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ
νοῦν . (cf. 86.3-5 and 87.19-20). Like Iamblichus

Hermias insists that true enthousiasmos comes from the gods.
He rejects the suggestion that it is to be attributed to
physical or physiological causes (86.11-15). But unlike
Iamblichus, Hermias links enthousiasmos with the "one in the
soul" and, because of the Phaedrus context, he is talking about

132 Cf. also the division of the soul at Proclus, De prov. et fato Ch. 8, 27-32, where there are five types of "cognitio" on which the top two are νοῦς and that of the "one in the soul", and In Parm. 1071.9-1072.18 where the "one in the soul" is the faculty of enthousiasmos by which the One is approached.

133 Similarly Hermias uses διάνοια to cover both as well as distinguishing διάνοια proper. Neither νοῦς nor διάνοια is completely unambiguous; both can be used for reasoning in general, though when a distinction is made between them νοῦς becomes intuitive reasoning and διάνοια discursive.

134 Below the level of διάνοια Hermias has a rather different list of elements in the soul. In 85.19 ff. we find δόξα, then φαντασία, then θυμός and ἐμπερία. On δόξα and φαντασία in Proclus, see H.J. Blumenthal, "Plutarch's Exposition of the De anima and the Psychology of Proclus", Entretiens Hardt XXI (Vandoeuvres-Geneva, 1975), pp. 123-47, esp. pp. 136 ff.

poetic, as well as prophetic inspiration.

Hermias - and that means Syrianus also - therefore shares Proclus' view that the faculty of poetic inspiration is the "one in the soul". Yet as we have seen the inspired poetry which that faculty produces is differently conceived by Hermias/Syrianus and by Proclus in the 6th essay. This example shows us just how careful we have to be in trying to disentangle Proclus' ideas from those of Syrianus and how closely the two are bound up together. Proclus' striking concept of inspiration comes from Syrianus but it is he himself, not Syrianus, who has developed the concept of inspired poetry in such a way as to fit in both with the lofty nature of inspiration and with the interpretative practice of his master.

In 178.26-179.3 Proclus links inspired poetry with *συμμετρία*. He connects *μανική μανία* with truth, *έρωτική μανία* with beauty and divine poetry with symmetry. The triad *ἀλήθεια, κάλλος, συμμετρία* comes from Philebus 64-5 (esp. 65a).¹³⁵ Proclus here is correlating the four maniai of the Phaedrus with the "three monads" of the Philebus. Proclus wrote a monograph on the three monads, which he mentions at In Remp. 295.18-28 and at PT, pp. 150.50-151.35 Portus. In the latter passage he says that their correct order

¹³⁵ Gallavotti, L'estetica greca..., p. 51, suggests that Aristotelian ideas of catharsis lie behind Proclus' connection of poetry with symmetry. This is clearly wrong. The Philebus passage, ignored by Gallavotti, provides a much better explanation, which is quite sufficient in itself without any such vague reference to Aristotle.

is ἀλήθεια, κάλλος, συμμετρία and that in his monograph he aligned truth with the philosopher, beauty with the lover, and symmetry with the μουσικός. He continues: καὶ ὡς ἔχουσιν οἱ βίαι τὰς ἐκείναις, οὕτως ἔχοντα καὶ τὰ ταῦτα πρὸς ἀλλήλα. This suggests that in his monograph Proclus drew up a correlation between the three monads and the types of life listed in Phaedrus 248 (the philosopher, the lover and the μουσικός all come from that list). Similar correlations are made in Damascius' Lectures on the Philebus 241-4; Damascius 236, which Westerink thinks comes from Proclus, places the three in the order ἀλήθεια, κάλλος, συμμετρία and 238, also giving Proclus' view, is about the relation of the monads to the One which is called μέτρον in Laws IV 716c. This last point should be noted, for Proclus alludes to the θεῖον μέτρον of the Laws at In Remp. 178.25, saying that poetic madness is determined¹³⁶ in accordance with it, just before he links poetic madness with the symmetry of the Philebus.¹³⁷ It is hardly surprising that the later Neoplatonists should have been interested in the three monads when we recall their use of the principles of πέραις and ἀπειρία, which are to be found in the same part of the Philebus. The way Proclus correlates the monads with other

136 ἀπορίσεται. Cf. ἀπορίσει in Damascius 238.

137 On the three monads, see further Westerink's Introduction to Damascius' Lectures, p. xxi. Cf. also Dillon, frag. 7 of Iamblichus' In Philebum (= frag. 193 Larsen) and the discussion of it on pp. 262-3.

elements of Plato's doctrines from other dialogues is typical of Neoplatonist systematisation. The link between ἐρωτική μανία and beauty is obvious, while Proclus presumably links μαντική μανία with truth because the inspired prophet speaks the truth. In In Tim. III 66.13-22 he links the monads with different gods, beauty with Aphrodite, truth with the Sun, and symmetry with Hermes (cf. also III 69.10-14). The Sun is Apollo, god of prophecy.¹³⁸ The connection of ποιητική μανία with symmetry may be simply because poetry uses rhythm and metre. Proclus, following Plato in the Republic, stresses the need for poetry to use the appropriate sort of rhythm and metre.

Syrianus too makes use of the three monads. We find a reference to ἀρχαί which are ἐν προθέσει τῶν ἀρχαίων (the phrase comes from Philebus 65a) at In Met. 7.18-21 and Hermias 134.14-24 expounds the doctrine of the Philebus. Hermias speaks not of συμμετρία but of μέτρον and immediately makes clear why he is doing so by referring to Laws IV 716c where God is the μέτρον. That same correlation, between the Philebus and Laws IV 716c, is made, as we have just seen, by Proclus in Damascius' Lectures 238, and here in the 6th essay. However, Hermias makes no mention of the three monads when he discusses the maniai of Phaedrus 244-5. It looks therefore as though Proclus is following Syrianus in linking symmetry in the Philebus with the divine measure in the Laws but producing a further development

¹³⁸ On Apollo's connection with truth, cf. Lewy, p. 49, note 158.

of his own in correlating the maniai of the Phaedrus with the three monads and hence linking inspired poetry with symmetry (and so also with the divine measure of the Laws.) This would fit well with Proclus' known interest in the three monads on the one hand, and on the other with my hypothesis that he developed the concept of inspired poetry in ways not thought of by Syrianus.

In 180.10-186.21 Proclus adduces Platonic authority for his concept of inspired poetry. As well as the Phaedrus, on which his concept has been built to begin with, and the Ion, an obvious choice, he refers to Laws III 682a and Timaeus 40d. The Timaeus passage (taken by modern commentators, no doubt rightly, as ironical, but not so by Proclus) refers to mythical theogonies and would therefore be particularly appropriate to Proclus' own concept of inspired poetry which utters allegorical myths about the gods. Yet it should be noted that Syrianus' vague allusion to Laws III 682a, at In Met. 42.23 ff., is also an allusion to Timaeus 40d.¹³⁹ His words there, *καίπερ ἄνευ τε εὐκότων καὶ ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν, ὡς συγγένησαν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ θεῖον περιττοτέραν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους* echo the Timaeus. This leads me to think that Proclus is following Syrianus in his choice of passages to support the claim that Plato approved of inspired poetry, even though he does not mean by inspired poetry quite what Syrianus meant. The remaining passages used by Proclus

139 Cf. p. 206 above.

in this way, Alc. II 147b and Rep. II 378d are, like the others, obvious passages to choose but they are not in fact quoted by Hermias or Syrianus.

Proclus develops his concepts of didactic and mimetic poetry in the same way as he does that of inspired poetry, finding Platonic references to back them up. He subdivides mimetic poetry into eikastic and phantastic, and eikastic poetry sounds much the same as the uninspired poetry of the 5th essay, i.e. Syrianus' uninspired poetry.¹⁴⁰ There is no trace in Syrianus, Hermias, or the 5th essay, of the division of mimetic poetry into eikastic and phantastic; this development too is likely to be Proclus' own.

My only remaining argument that the theory of three types of poetry in its developed form is Proclus' own is an argument from silence: I cannot find the concept of didactic poetry, and treatment of the Plato passages with which Proclus accompanies it, in Syrianus or in other, earlier Neoplatonists. Similarly the Plato passages by means of which Proclus develops his concept of mimetic poetry are not discussed by his predecessors. The same goes for the passages of Homer cited by Proclus as examples of his three types in 192.6 ff., and for Proclus' attribution of the different types of poetry to different poets mentioned in Homer (193.16 ff.)¹⁴¹ Arguments from silence

140 Cf. above, pp.18-9.

141 We shall see in Chapter 6 (pp.339 ff. below) that Proclus' examples of different types of poetry in Homer may be related to the pre-Neoplatonic tradition of interpretation of Homer, but that is a different matter. The tradition helps to explain why Proclus uses the examples he does but it is only Proclus who builds them into a systematic classification of types of poetry.

are notoriously weak but in this case, since we have found so many examples of ideas from the 6th essay in Syrianus and Hermias, and since the argument supports conclusions reached on other grounds, even silence may be allowed to be of some significance.

I conclude therefore that the theory of three types of poetry is Proclus' own. From Syrianus' simple division of poetry into inspired and uninspired, Proclus evolves a threefold division into inspired, didactic and mimetic (uninspired). He has split Syrianus' inspired poetry in two to create a new concept of didactic. He has also developed the concept of uninspired poetry, associating it with the mimetic poetry of Republic X and further subdividing it into eikastic and phantastic. We can see here how a new Neoplatonic doctrine is created. Proclus systematises and develops the preceding doctrine; he draws out its implications in the way that seemed to be demanded by Syrianus' own development of metaphysical allegory. A development in the practice of poetic interpretation by Syrianus thus led to a development in poetic theory by Proclus. Syrianus is undoubtedly the most important source for the 6th essay and we can trace much of Proclus' debt to him in detail. However, not only the layout of the essay but also certain developments within it are Proclus' own. The theory of three types of poetry is the most significant and interesting of these.

CHAPTER FOUR

PROCLUS' INTERPRETATION OF PLATO

The Neoplatonists saw themselves as interpreters and expositors rather than original philosophers. Even Plotinus looked on his philosophical activity in this light.¹ Proclus' surviving works range from the systematic metaphysical treatise which is the Elements of Theology to such detailed line-by-line commentaries as the Commentary on the Timaeus. The essays which form the Commentary on the Republic are all concerned with exposition of that dialogue and in this chapter I propose to examine certain aspects of Proclus' interpretation of Plato as exemplified in the 5th and 6th essays. What kind of problems does Proclus deal with? Does he have typical ways of resolving them? I shall also show how Proclus was building on a tradition of Platonic interpretation, going right back to Aristotle in some cases, and shall try to evaluate his interpretation. In view of my conclusions about the differing nature and purpose of the 5th and 6th essays, I shall deal with each essay separately although we shall find that many of the answers to our questions are the same in both cases.

The fifth essay

In Chapter 1 I discussed the type of problem dealt with in

¹ See, e.g., V.1.8.

the 5th essay and showed how the essay was a collection of ten problems in the exposition of a philosophical author, like the Quaestiones Platonicae of Plutarch or some of the Quaestiones of Alexander of Aphrodisias.² Some of the problems are concerned simply to expound what Plato said. So the 8th problem, for example (65.16-67.9) examines what sort of poetry the best poet writes according to Plato. The 9th and 10th problems take exposition rather further, for in them Proclus asks what Plato would have said in answer to questions which he does not in fact consider. The 9th problem (67.10-68.2) seeks Plato's answer to a standard type of question in ancient philosophy: what is the τέλος of poetry? One recalls the opening words of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (1094a1-2): $\piρῶτα \quad τέχνη$
 $\kappaαὶ \quad \piρῶτα \quad μέθοδος, \deltaμοίως \deltaὲ \quad \piρῶξις \quad τε \quad \kappaαὶ \quad \piροαίρεσις$
 $\acute{\alpha}γαθου \quad πρὸς \quad ἐφίεσθαι \quad δοκεῖ.$ In the same way the ancients assumed that poetry must be aiming at some end and disputed what that end was. The 10th problem (68.3-69.19) raises a typical Neoplatonic question - who is the cosmic poet on whom the earthly poet can model himself? - and tries to find Plato's answer to it. The Neoplatonists assumed that for everything in the material world there was a transcendent cause which was also a model, a $\piαρὰδειγμα$, and so it made perfectly good sense to Proclus to ask what was the model for any particular material thing, however odd the question may seem to us. The 6th problem (60.14-63.15) tries to make clear a question which Plato in the Republic leaves unclear, what

2 Pp. 22-8 above.

musical modes and rhythms are educationally useful.

Apart from the exposition of Plato, Proclus' other main concern in the essay is to resolve contradictions in Plato. The Neoplatonists believed that Plato's thought was a unified whole. They never resolve contradictions between dialogues by arguing for chronological development in Plato's thought as some modern interpreters do. In general they never solve problems of this kind by relating passages closely to their context in a particular dialogue rather than to Plato's thought as a whole. Plato was authoritative and authorities must always be saying one and the same thing, whatever the appearances to the contrary. So Proclus deals not only with contradictions within the Republic itself, as in the 4th problem (54.3-56.19) on why Socrates says he knows nothing about musical modes and then claims knowledge about rhythm derived from Damon, but also with contradictions between different dialogues, as in the 3rd problem (51.26-54.2) where he raises the question why Socrates in the Symposium says that tragedy and comedy belong to the same branch of knowledge but in the Republic denies that the same poet can write both or the same actor act both. In the 2nd problem, Proclus deals with the contradiction between Plato's rejection of tragedy and comedy and the Aristotelian belief in catharsis (49.13-51.25). The catharsis doctrine itself is an answer to Plato and so we may relate Proclus' interest in this problem to his general concern to answer attacks on Plato, as well as to the Neoplatonists' desire to reconcile Plato and Aristotle. I shall return to both these points later.

I mentioned in Chapter 1 Proclus' frequent exposition of

Plato by means of his own words in other contexts.³ This method of exposition is naturally practised by an interpreter who believes in the unity of Plato's thought. It is not of course peculiar to the ancient world but is standard scholarly practice at all times. The Neoplatonists' application of it to Plato reminds us of the ancient principle "Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου βαλάνιζεν."⁴ Clement of Alexandria and Origen apply a similar principle to the interpretation of the Bible.⁵ Proclus explicitly states the principle as applied to Plato in PT I.2, p. 10.1-4 Saffrey-Westerink: τῶν μὲν ἐν ἀνίμωδι κεμένωνν ἀλλοχόθεν τὴν βαλάνιζαν ἀνευρίσκοντες οὐκ ἐξ ἑλλοτρίων ὑποθέεειν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γνησιωτάτων τοῦ Πλάτωνος συγγραμμάτων.⁶ In this matter the Neoplatonists were typical of their time, applying to philosophical interpretation a principle which was standard in literary and religious exegesis.

There is a certain danger in lifting passages arbitrarily from their context, particularly with an author like Plato whose tone shifts according to the different dramatic characters

3 P. 28 above.

4 This principle is usually associated with Aristarchus but R. Pfeiffer in his History of Classical Scholarship (Oxford, 1968), pp. 225 ff., points out that while the principle does indeed describe Aristarchus' practice of using Homer himself to illuminate Homeric linguistic usage, it is first formulated by Porphyry in his Quaestiones Homericae (see Schrader, p. 297.16).

5 For Clement, see Strom. VII.16.96 (GCS III, p. 68) and Quis dives salvetur 4.2 (GCS III, p. 162). Origen's phrase is πνευματικὰ πνευματικῶς συγκρίνων, Cels. VII.11 (GCS II, p. 163) or, in Latin, "spiritualibus spiritalia comparantes", Hom. in Jos. 15.3 (GCS VII, p. 383), Hom. in Num. 16.9 (GCS VII, p. 153). Cf. H. de Lubac, Histoire et Esprit (Paris, 1950), pp. 308-15 and R.P.C. Hanson, Allegory and Event (London, 1959), pp. 180-2.

6 Cf. also Saffrey and Westerink's note ad loc., p. 132.

and situations of his dialogues. It is often difficult to decide how seriously a passage should be taken, how much allowance should be made for irony and just how we should interpret passages which are clearly ironical in some degree. Proclus takes seriously very many things in Plato which we would consider ironical. So the 1st problem of the essay (43.26-49.12), how Plato can honour poetry as divine and yet banish it, arises because Proclus takes Rep. III 398a, in which the poet is anointed with myrrh and crowned but sent away from the ideal state, absolutely seriously. Jowett and Campbell, and Adam,⁷ dismiss 398a as ironical. So it is, with its exaggerated description of the honours paid to the poet. Yet behind the irony there does lie Plato's genuine feeling for poetry and the contradiction which worries Proclus here is not wholly artificial. Plato's views about poetry as a whole are contradictory. This is a genuine problem of interpretation to which Proclus returns in the 5th problem, where he is dealing principally with the Phaedrus, and in the more extended treatment of the 6th essay. The irony in Rep. 398a was perceived by some ancient critics: Dio Chrysostom, 53.5, says that Plato's instructions for the treatment of poets here are delivered *μὴ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ*. Proclus was aware of earlier, pre-Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato and in particular of the interpretation of certain passages as ironical. So at In Tim. 62.22 ff. he discusses differing interpretations of Socrates' declaration

7 In their respective editions of the Republic: Jowett and Campbell (Oxford, 1894), Vol. III, p. 128; J. Adam (Cambridge, 1902), Vol. I, p. 154.

in Tim. 19cd that he cannot utter encomia of the ideal state.

Some, he reports, say that Socrates is being ironical and pretending that he cannot do what he really can do. But

Proclus is unwilling to admit the famous Socratic irony here:

ἀλλ' ἡ γε ἀρμυρία Σωκράτους εἰς ἑοδικὰς ἐρίχνετο
καὶ νέους, οὐχ οὕτως ἑμφορῶν καὶ ἐπεστημόνων ἄνδρας

Similarly at In Alc. 230.14-5, on Alc. I 109d, Proclus admits

irony somewhat reluctantly: τὸ δὲ 'ἵνα λῶπῃ δαιμονίην
προξενήσῃς ἐμε' μὴ μόνον ἀρμυρίαν νοήσωμεν
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλήθειαν .⁸

He seems to fear that to admit irony in Plato will detract from the dignity of the master's work. The great difficulty with Plato is to judge the tone of the irony; how often should we say, as Proclus does on Alc. I 109d or as I wish to on Rep. 398a, that Plato is saying something he really means behind the ironical way he expresses himself? To avoid the error of not taking Plato's irony seriously enough Proclus falls into the opposite mistake of taking Plato far too seriously. It must be admitted that in doing so he blinds himself to an essential element in Plato.

In this 1st problem we have a good example of how Proclus uses Plato to expound Plato. At 45.6 ff. he turns to Tim. 19de for the reason why poets describe heroes ignobly and gods improperly: as imitators the poets can only imitate what they have grown up amongst. Then at 46.6 Laws II 668d supplies him with the phrase he wants to describe correct poetic mimesis,

8 Cf. also In Remp. 60.27 where Proclus recognises Socrates' tendency to irony. Julian, Or. VII 237b-c, denies that Tim. 40d is ironical:- cf. above, p. 232.

τὸ εἶ μετα τῆς ὀρθότητος . The reader has the
 impression that Proclus is so deeply imbued with the language
 and thought of Plato that these parallels spring naturally
 to his mind. Much as it differs from Plato, Neoplatonism is
 an edifice built with Platonic bricks. Proclus' work, like
 Plotinus', is full of verbal reminiscences of Plato. The
 closing words of the 6th essay, for example, τὰτα, ἡ φίλος
 ἐταῖρος, μνήμη κεχαρίσθαι τῆς τοῦ καθ'ἑαυτοῦ
 ἡμῶν βουνοβίας (205.21-2) echo Phaedrus 250c7: τὰτα μὲν
 οὖν μνήμη κεχαρίσθαι . Similarly, Neoplatonic thought is
 a development from Plato and to understand a Neoplatonic doctrine
 properly we need to appreciate both how it goes beyond Plato and
 what are the Platonic foundations on which it is based. This
 general phenomenon is exemplified on a small scale in the
 use of such passages as Tim. 19de in the 1st problem. In 45.6-10
 Proclus paraphrases the passage of the Timaeus. Then he applies
 the point to the matter in hand. Tim. 19de can be taken either
 as meaning that imitation in word (by poets) and in deed (by
 men of action) is affected by the would-be imitators' environment,
 or as meaning that imitation by poets of both words and deeds
 is so affected. Proclus' words at 45.10 ff. make clear that
 he understands the passage in the latter way for he says that
 poets can neither describe the deeds of heroes fittingly nor
 make them speak in character. This tallies with his interpretation
 of the same passage at In Tim. 65.9 ff. where he makes some
 acute observations on how difficult it is to make fictional
 figures speak in character. The Timaeus passage lies behind
 all the rest of p. 45 of the In Remp. In 46.1-7 Proclus

recapitulates the points he has been making. He takes the example of a painter trying to paint Achilles, because he is picking up Rep. II 377e1-3: "Ὅταν εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς [λούειαν] τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων οἷός ἐστιν ὥστερ' ἑρμῆος μηδὲν εἰκότα ἑρμῆος οἷς ἂν ὅμοια βουληθῇ γράψαι and, as I have already noted, he finds a phrase from the Laws to express correct poetic mimesis. We find the same kind of "building with Platonic bricks" at the beginning of the 3rd problem where the unusual word κατακερματισμένην (52.3) picks up κατακερματισθεῖσα in Rep. III 395b4 and makes us realise how closely Proclus is paraphrasing the Republic as he sets out the problem at issue.⁹

I have said that much of the 5th essay is exposition of Plato and I have given some examples of how Platonic language and ideas are always at the basis of Proclus' thought. Yet that thought is far from being an exact reproduction of Plato. I have already mentioned the 10th problem where Proclus tries to get an answer from Plato to a question Plato would never have asked, the question which god is the cosmic poet. The Neoplatonic assumption that everything in the material world has a transcendent cause and model is an extension and systematisation of Plato's theory of Forms. It is significant too that one can imagine Plato talking about the cosmic poet in a myth although not in philosophical dialectic, for the Neoplatonists

9 Cf. also the 5th problem where the classification of lives in Phaedrus 248de lies behind Proclus' classification of types of μουσική - see above, p.17.

took Plato's myths more seriously and more literally than we do. Once again the 1st problem provides us with a good test case if we wish to consider how accurate Proclus is in his exposition of Plato and in what ways he departs from him. At 47.2 ff. Proclus makes it clear that he is only condemning poetry of a particular type, not all poetry. This is quite faithful to Plato's position in Rep. II and III, which is under discussion at this point. Although one tends to speak loosely of "Plato's attack on poetry", it is true that in Rep. II and III he is attacking only certain types of poetry, and in 398a8 ff. says he is willing to admit the *ἀσχηρότερον καὶ ἁγρότερον ποιήν* into his state. (Cf. Proclus' *Μετὰ δὲ... τὴν ἀσχηροτάτην* 47.6-7) So too at 47.26 ff. Proclus argues that the banished poetry could have uses in states other than the ideal. This again is, I think, true to Plato, for this is precisely why Plato takes a more lenient view of poetry in the Laws than in the Republic: the Republic confessedly describes an ideal, while the Laws describes a state less perfect but (in Plato's view) more practicable. Within this argument, however, at 48.1 ff., Proclus introduces an idea important to him but alien to Plato. Rep. 398a, taken absolutely seriously and at face value, leads him to say that Plato gives poetry a place *ἐν μέβρις ἱερῶν* and then to introduce an analogy with symbolic utterances in theurgic rites. Proclus' belief in theurgy plays an important part in his philosophy, and in Chapter 5 I shall examine his use of language taken from theurgy and from the mysteries as a terminology for allegory. Even here we can see how Proclus, by alluding to Rep. 398a, seeks to

found on Plato an aspect of his philosophy which came to him from another source. In reality this is a significant departure from Plato. Interesting too is Proclus' analogy of poetry with technai in 48.26 ff.: poetry is not allowed in the best state just as technai, though sacred to some deity, are not to be practised by the Guardians. A more charitable view of technai is implied here than Plato ever took. The reason seems to lie in the fact that the different technai were traditionally sacred to different deities, metal-work to Hephaestus, weaving to Athene, etc. The Neoplatonists wished to preserve traditional Greek religion and incorporate it into their scheme of things; Plato, on the other hand, in a different historical situation, combated many traditional religious attitudes, insisting, for example, on the goodness of the gods against traditional ideas of divine envy. So we find that in this 1st problem Proclus expounds Plato with considerable accuracy but his belief in theurgy leads him to foist on Plato views he did not hold and his adherence to traditional religious ideas makes him introduce an analogy with technai in a spirit alien to Plato.

In the 7th and 8th problems Proclus further expounds Plato's views on the faults of poets and on what kind of poetry Plato would approve, in an essentially faithful and accurate manner. Similarly his view in the 9th problem, based on Laws II 667c, that Plato thinks the τέλος of poetry is τὸ πολιτικόν εὖ & οὖν is a reasonable extension of Plato's view in Rep. II and III where Plato is considering how poetry can best serve the state and condemning it if it does not do so satisfactorily. On the whole Proclus is not to be despised as an expositor of

Plato's meaning and the recognition that he brings certain preconceptions about theurgy and about traditional Greek religion to his understanding of his authoritative text should put us on the alert for preconceptions which we in our turn may be foisting on Plato.

I have mentioned that Proclus was aware of pre-Neoplatonic interpretations of Plato and that he was concerned to answer attacks on his authority. The 2nd problem exemplifies these features of Proclus' interpretation particularly clearly. There in 49.13-51.25 Proclus examines whether Plato's views on tragedy and comedy are shown to be false by the Aristotelian doctrine of catharsis. This passage of Proclus has attracted considerable interest and has been treated as supplementary evidence for Aristotelian catharsis of which we have such a brief account in Poetics 1449b28 and Politics VIII 1341b32 ff. It was Bernays who first drew attention to the Proclus passage in this connection¹⁰ and it has been discussed again by Rostagni.¹¹ Gallavotti takes up Rostagni's views in L'estetica greca nell'ultimo suo cultore and in his article, "Intorno ai commenti di Proclo alla Repubblica".¹² These scholars disagree among themselves as to whether Proclus' source is the lost second book of the Poetics (Bernays) or Aristotle's dialogue περί ποιητικῆς.

10 J. Bernays, Zwei Abhandlungen über die Aristotelische Theorie des Drama (Berlin, 1880).

11 A. Rostagni, "Aristotele e l'Aristotelismo nella storia dell'estetica antica", SIFC N.S. II (1922), pp. 22 ff., reprinted in Scritti Minori I (Turin, 1955), pp. 99 ff. and "Il dialogo Aristotelico περί ποιητικῆς", RFIC 54 (1926), pp. 453 ff., reprinted in Scritti Minori I, pp. 276 ff.

12 BPEC N.S. 19 (1971), pp. 41-54.

(Rostagni and Gallavotti). All three are convinced that Proclus must be basing the statement in 49.17 ff., that Aristotle attacked Plato's views on tragedy and comedy, on something more explicit than either of the Aristotle passages on catharsis which we have. This is quite likely, but not, I think, absolutely necessary. 50.17-9 of Proclus, on the need for the statesman to understand catharsis, sound like an allusion to our Politics passage. Convinced as they are that Proclus has an Aristotelian source which we lack, Bernays and Rostagni delightedly make use of him as evidence for Aristotle and use his words to support their respective interpretations of Aristotle's famous but obscure doctrine. This is a somewhat unwise proceeding. We have only to think what a Plato reconstructed from the Neoplatonists would be like to realise its dangers. Thus Bernays claimed that the terms $\alpha\phi\omicron\sigma\iota\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ and $\alpha\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ used by Proclus (see, e.g., 50.8 and 50.18 respectively) were actually Aristotelian words while Rostagni, although not going as far as this, stresses the moral and religious aspect of catharsis which is implied by the term $\alpha\phi\omicron\sigma\iota\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ and wants to ascribe that idea to Aristotle, if not the word itself. It may well be true that $\alpha\lambda\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ in Aristotle has religious as well as medical implications¹³ but all that Proclus' use of a term like $\alpha\phi\omicron\sigma\iota\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ informs us about is the Neoplatonist concept of catharsis for which, as we shall see, there is some further evidence in Iamblichus. Gallavotti rightly points out that Proclus does not altogether accept the Aristotelian view:

13 Cf. on this J. Croissant, Aristote et les mystères (Liège, 1932).

how could he when that view is an attack on Plato? What he does is to reconcile Plato and Aristotle by admitting the value of purifying the passions but denying that tragedy and comedy perform this valuable function. Like Plato, Proclus believes that tragedy and comedy arouse an unhealthy excess of emotion. Gallavotti devotes a whole section of his monograph¹⁴ to the Aristotelian elements which he finds in the 5th essay. Similarly Rostagni¹⁵ alludes briefly to Proclus' use elsewhere in the In Remp. of Aristotelian philosophical distinctions. Neither scholar properly relates Proclus' reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle here to the general Neoplatonic attitude to Aristotle. This is briefly and clearly treated by Wallis, pp. 23-5 and (for the Athenian school in particular) pp. 143-4.¹⁶ Platonists varied in how much of Aristotle they accepted and how far they sought to reconcile Plato and Aristotle but they took a lively interest in the latter's work. We have only to think of the commentaries which the Neoplatonists wrote on Aristotle and of Proclus' own early Aristotelian studies, not only in Alexandria but also with Plutarch and Syrianus in Athens. The final work in the collection which constitutes our In Remp. is an examination of Aristotle's objections to the Republic in Politics II and we know that Proclus wrote a similar work dealing with Aristotle's

14 L'estetica greca..., pp. 25 ff.

15 In "Aristotele e l'aristotelismo.." (op. cit. above, note 11), SIFC, p. 26 - Scritti Minori, pp. 103-4.

16 Cf. also Larsen, Ch. V, esp. pp. 220-3 and 318-20.

objections to the Timaeus.¹⁷ Many Aristotelian concepts, distinctions and philosophical terms are part of the very fabric of Neoplatonism. Thus Plotinus' account of the second Hypostasis, νοῦς, builds on Aristotle's account of νοῦς in De anima III.5¹⁸ and Aristotelian terms like ὕλη had passed into the general philosophical vocabulary. Philosophy after Aristotle could never be the same as it had been before him. Later thinkers could not ignore concepts he had explored, distinctions he had made and terminology he had introduced - nor is there any reason why they should have wished to do so. More particularly, later Platonists could not ignore Aristotle's criticisms of Plato. It was only natural that they should attempt to answer them. Proclus' attempt in the 2nd problem to reconcile Aristotelian catharsis with the Platonic condemnation of tragedy and comedy should be seen in the light of all this. Here Proclus is doing in the sphere of aesthetics what he and other Neoplatonists were doing more extensively in metaphysics. In this connection it is interesting to note that Hermias (and that implies Syrianus too) shows a familiarity with Aristotle's Poetics for in 98.18 ff. Hermias mentions as different literary genres: ἐποποιίαν καὶ ῥαψωδοποιίαν καὶ τὰλλα εἴδη τῆς ποιήσεως, ἣ καὶ [ὡς] Ἀριστοτέλης διαφέρει ἐν τῷ Περὶ ποιητικῆς (cf. Poetics 1447a13 ff.

17 He refers to it at e.g., In Tim. II 278.27 ff. For further evidence for the work, see Beutler's RE article, "Proklos", col. 193.

18 Cf. on this Wallis, pp. 52-3 and, in detail, P. Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness (The Hague, 1963) Section II.

although there is no mention there of iambic poetry.)¹⁹

Bernays, in his discussion of our Proclus passage, also drew attention to a passage of Iamblichus' De myst. I.11, p.

39.14-40.8: δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθημάτων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντα μὲν εἰσέρχονται καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἐφ' ὅσοντες· εἰς ἐνέργειαν δὲ βραχεῖς καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ συμμέτρου προαχόμεναι χείρουν μετρίως καὶ ἀποπληροῦνται, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποκαθαρόμεναι παθεῖν καὶ οὐ πρὸς βίαν ἀποπαύονται. Διὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τε κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦντες ἴσταμεν τὰ οἰκτιρὰ πάθη καὶ μετρίωτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν, ἐν τε τῇς ἱερῇ θεάματι πῶς καὶ ἀκούεσθαι τῶν εἰσχυρῶν ἀπολύομεθα τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ἀπ' αὐτῶν συμπτουσύνης βλάβης.

The passage is part of a justification of theurgy and in it we find the same idea as in Proclus that moderate enjoyment of passions brings relief and so is a good thing. Unlike Proclus (but like Aristotle) Iamblichus thinks that this moderate, commendable enjoyment is experienced by the spectators of tragedy and comedy. The same effect is produced, according to him, by seeing and hearing εἰσχυρὰ in theurgic rites. Bernays points out that Iamblichus refers to the example of dramatic poetry as something well known to Porphyry, the opponent whose attack on theurgy he is answering, and to all

19 Cf. also Hermias 241.21-3 on pity and fear as the passions of tragedy, a passage which implies knowledge of the Poetics.

his readers. Clearly the doctrine of catharsis, like other Aristotelian doctrines in other spheres of philosophy, was well known to the Neoplatonists and, taking Iamblichus and Proclus together, we can see that they associated Aristotelian catharsis with the ritual purifications of mystery religion. Iamblichus is willing to use the Aristotelian concept to justify an aspect of theurgic practice while Proclus speaks not of *καθάρσις* at all but of *ἀφαιΐσις*, using a term with exclusively religious connotations. Whatever Aristotle really meant when he talked about catharsis, in Iamblichus and Proclus we find a concept of catharsis which has a typical late Neoplatonic religious colouring. It is important to realise how Proclus' view differs from Iamblichus'. Both see catharsis as curbing excess of passion and producing a desirable mean (the mean between excess and defect is of course another Aristotelian concept) but whereas Iamblichus is prepared to apply the concept to tragedy and comedy, Proclus is more faithful to Plato and refuses to do so.

Despite his admiration for Homer, Proclus displays a totally Platonic hostility to the drama. So at the end of the 6th essay he condemns both tragedy and comedy as pure mimesis aiming only at *ψοχάγησις* (198.9-11) and agrees with Plato in rep. & that they are directed at the *παθητικόν* in the soul (201.16-7. Cf. also 195.21-196.13 and 202.25-205.13). One wonders how much Greek tragedy and comedy Proclus knew. Such theatrical performances as he might have seen were probably in a sensationalist style which would do nothing

to raise his opinion.²⁰ Julian, in Misopogon 351d, records how his tutor bade him read Homer rather than going with his contemporaries to theatrical shows, but this probably refers to gladiatorial shows or mimes rather than classic tragedy and comedy. I suspect that Proclus' condemnation of the theatre is principally due to the influence of Plato. Despite his literary interests and activities, he shows no sign of independent thought about the drama.

The 6th problem presents another example of Proclus' answering an Aristotelian attack on Plato. In this problem (60.14-63.15) Proclus seeks to answer the question of what musical modes and rhythms Plato approves, trying to elucidate the obscurities of Rep.III 398c-400. He complains that Socrates leaves us "thirsting to hear" his opinion on this subject (60.22) and does his best to assuage this thirst. He treats Plato's preferences in rhythm first, for these are relatively straightforward. Then at 61.19 he comes to Plato's preferences among *ἁρμονίαι* which we should translate here as "musical modes" rather than "harmonies". Proclus considers the views of earlier critics on this question. Some say that Plato admits both the Phrygian and the Dorian mode as educational. These interpreters then disagree among themselves as to whether the Phrygian is the peaceful mode of Rep. 399b2 ff. and the Dorian the warlike (399a5 ff.), or vice versa. Proclus' own view is

20 On theatrical performances in Late Antiquity, cf. M. Bieber, History of the Greek and Roman Theater (2nd edn. Princeton, 1961), Ch. XV, esp. pp. 250 ff. on the Eastern Empire.

that Plato admits only the Dorian mode as suitable for education and considers the Phrygian mode appropriate to sacred rites. Typically he supports this by an appeal to two other passages of Plato, Laches 188d where the Dorian mode is commended as the only Hellenic one, and Minos 318b where the aulos music of Marsyas and Olympus the Phrygian is described as moving those who are "in need of the gods". (We must remember that Proclus accepted the Minos as genuine.²¹) Proclus is falsifying Plato here, for there is no mention in the Republic of the Phrygian mode's association with orgiastic rites. It was generally so associated in antiquity, at least after the time of Plato, and Plato's admission of the Phrygian mode in Rep. 399ab has therefore worried both ancient and modern commentators.²² When we look at Aristotle's discussion of the Republic passage in Politics VIII 1342a28-b17 we can see that Proclus' reason for interpreting Plato as he does is not simply a general ancient belief that the Phrygian mode was orgiastic. Aristotle criticises Socrates in the Republic for accepting the Phrygian mode while rejecting the aulos among musical instruments:

ἄμειν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ καὶ παθητικὰ . Dorian, on the other hand, is quite acceptable, ἑταίριον δὲ οὐδὲν καὶ μέγιστα ἡθὺς ἔχοντες ἀνδρείου. It is a mean among modes and as such particularly suitable for education, for producing the desirable ethical

21 Cf. above, p. 89.

22 Some of the modern views of the problem are discussed by W.D. Anderson, Ethos and Education in Greek Music (Harvard, 1966), pp. 107 ff. (cf. pp. 72 ff. and p. 129). For ancient comment, in addition to the passages discussed in the text, cf. Aristid. Quint. I.9, pp. 18.5-19.10 Winnington-Ingram.

mean.²³ Proclus is trying to answer this Aristotelian criticism and he does so by reconciling Plato and Aristotle. The view he takes of the Dorian mode is not just that of Plato in the Laches but of Aristotle, as we can see from 62.20-7 where he describes both the dactylic rhythm and the Dorian mode as equally proportioned and says that such equality is fitted to the virtues of the irrational soul since it removes excess and defect. This is the Aristotelian doctrine of the ethical mean as expounded in the Nicomachean Ethics and alluded to in our Politics passage.²⁴ Proclus associates the Phrygian mode with orgiastic rites, just as Aristotle does, but claims that Plato accepts it for use in these rites only, not for education. The Neoplatonist practice of theurgic rites helps Proclus here, for it means he does not condemn a musical mode which could be used in such rites. In fact his attitude is parallel to his attitude to myths and mythological poetry. He agrees with Plato that certain kinds of myth are not suitable for education but he is prepared to admit them for other purposes which he conceives as analogous to the purposes of theurgy and mysteries in general.²⁵ Proclus agrees with both Plato and Aristotle

23 For what is meant by calling Dorian a mean among modes see R.P. Winnington-Ingram's translation of In Remp. 62.20-4, and accompanying note, in Festugière's translation of the In Remp., Vol. I, p. 79 and cf. his article, "Music", in the OCD, esp. section 6 on the Aristoxenian theory, with explanatory diagrams.

24 The dactylic rhythm is equally proportioned because the arsis (-) takes as long as the thesis (UU):- cf. P. Lasserre, Plutarque, De la musique (Olten and Lausanne, 1954), p. 67.

25 On this analogy, see further below, Chapter 5. That Proclus here is reconciling Plato and Aristotle was perceived by A. Boeckh, "De metris Pindari" in his edition of Pindar, Vol. I (Leipzig, 1811), p. 239.

in condemning the aulos at 63.5 ff., on the good Platonian grounds of the instrument's ποικιλία. At In Alc. 197.9 ff. he condemns its use in education but says it is useful in the mysteries. He therefore takes the same view of the aulos among instruments as of the Phrygian among modes, escaping the charge of inconsistency which Aristotle levels against Plato. The same view of the aulos is mentioned by Iamblichus in De myst. III 9. He gives the music of Olympus as an example of music thought to produce enthousiasmos. Iamblichus rejects the idea that music can produce enthousiasmos, in accordance with his pattern of argument throughout De myst. III where he constantly denies that human explanations of supernatural phenomena are valid.²⁶ However it looks from Proclus as if the view which Iamblichus rejects was normally admitted by the Neoplatonists. The allusion to Olympus recalls Proclus' allusion to him in 62.7, in connection with the Minos. Olympus is also mentioned by Plato at Smp. 215c3 and, more interestingly, by Aristotle at Pol. 1340a8 ff. where his music is given as an example of music which can make one a certain sort of person. The particular effect of Olympus' music is to produce enthousiasmos. It looks as if Aristotle too had the Minos passage in mind.

If we put the 6th problem of the 5th essay together with In Alc. 197.9 ff. we end up with a neat scheme of Proclus' musical theory:

26 Cf., for example, III.1 where he insists that divination can come only from the gods and rejects all physiological explanations of it. At VI 111 Iamblichus credits Pythagoras with the unequivocal rejection of the aulos.

<u>Stirring</u> (hieratic, or, in the case of rhythm, military)		<u>Educational</u>
<u>Rhythm:</u>	Ionian	Heroic dactyl
<u>Mode:</u>	Phrygian	Dorian
<u>Instrument:</u>	<u>aulos</u>	Lyre

Characteristically, this Procline scheme is more systematised than what we find in Plato. Proclus devises it by taking account of Aristotle's criticisms of Plato and his belief in theurgy helps him to synthesise Plato's and Aristotle's views. Iamblichus De myst. III.9 shows us that the Aristotelian view that music could produce enthousiasmos was well-known to the Neoplatonists. Iamblichus rejects it but Proclus incorporates it into his system.

The 4th problem (54.3-56.19) provides us with yet another example of Proclus' concern to answer earlier attacks on Plato. This time the attack in question was originally made not by Aristotle but by his pupil, Aristoxenus. The 4th problem is a rather factitious one. It seems hardly worth raising the question why Socrates says he knows nothing about musical modes and then claims knowledge about rhythm derived from Damon. Proclus resolves this apparent contradiction by explaining that Socrates does have the general knowledge of music suitable to a statesman; what he lacks, and has no need of, is the detailed technical knowledge of the *μενδικός*. This answer suggests that Proclus felt obliged to deal with the question because of Aristoxenus' charge that Plato was a musical ignoramus. We hear of the charge, and find an answer to it, in chapter 17

of the De musica attributed to Plutarch. It seems that Aristoxenus, in the second book of his Μουσικά, alleged that Plato did not know that the Lydian and the Ionian modes which he rejected could also be useful in the state. Ps.-Plutarch declares that Plato had learnt **about** music from Dracon the Athenian and Megillus of Acragas and knew quite well what he was talking about. In chapter 22 he takes up the charge again and there adduces passages from the Timaeus as evidence for Plato's knowledge of harmony. This unphilosophical kind of criticism of Plato persisted through later ages²⁷ and I suspect that Aristoxenus' charge of ignorance was taken up and transformed into an allegation that Plato depicts Socrates in a contradictory way as sometimes ignorant of music and sometimes not. Proclus' discussion of this problem, as of the others in the essay, should not be seen in a historical vacuum. If we realise that Proclus is trying to answer traditional criticisms of Plato we can better understand why he asks some of the questions that he does, or why he asks them in a particular way.

Similarly the question raised at the end of the 7th problem (64.27-65.15) about Plato's merits as a critic of poetry, was a traditional matter of debate at least from Hellenistic times. Proclus in 65.3 simply alludes to his opponents as πνέες but In Tim. 90.16 ff. identifies Plato's critics here as Callimachus and Duris and mentions Longinus among his defenders.²⁸

27 See Düring, Herodicus.

28 Cf. above p. 29.

Gallavotti²⁹ argues that this particular attack on Plato originated with Praxiphanes whose dialogue περὶ ποιητικῆς presented the conflict between Plato and Isocrates. (cf. Diogenes Laertius III.8) The same view is taken by Düring, while Rostagni with less plausibility traces the criticism right back to Aristotle.³⁰ However that may be, Proclus' own testimony in the In Tim. shows us that Tim. 21c was already being discussed in Hellenistic times and was taken up again by Longinus in the 3rd century A.D.

The 3rd problem (51.26-54.2) deals with the contradiction between Symposium 223d and Republic III 395a: does Plato think, or does he not, that the same poet can write both tragedy and comedy? Proclus explains first of all that the descent of the soul is responsible for the impossibility, in practice, of the same poet writing in both genres (52.6-53.8). He then explains that the writing of poetry requires two things, γνῶσις technical knowledge, and ζωή, experience of life. What Socrates is talking about in the Symposium is technical knowledge, and that is the same for both tragedy and comedy. But since poets are imitators and they can only imitate what they have experienced, the experience of life needed for writing tragedy and comedy respectively is different and this is what Socrates is talking about in the Republic. Proclus founds his claim that the Symposium passage concerns technical skill on the use

29 L'estetica greca..., pp. 31-2.

30 Düring, Herodicus, p. 146. A. Rostagni, "Il dialogo Aristotelico περὶ ποιητικῆς" (ctd.) RFIC 55 (1927), pp. 165 ff. and Scritti Minori I (Turin, 1955), pp. 314 ff.

of ἐμπειρία in it (see 53.18-9). γυναικεία and ζῷον are Neoplatonic philosophical terms, but at the end of the problem, in 53.26-54.2, Proclus expresses the distinction in less technical language as one between τέχνη and ἥθος.

Gallavotti³¹ assimilates Proclus' distinction between τέχνη and ἥθος to the familiar distinction between "ars" and "ingenium", draws attention to the Aristotelian roots of this latter distinction, and claims that here we have another Aristotelian element in Proclus. When Proclus at 53.14 says that ζῷον is necessary for τὴν τῶν ἡθῶν μέμνησιν he is talking about the creation of tragic and comic characters in drama, but when he later substitutes ἥθος for ζῷον he is referring to the poet's (moral) character. To create tragic ἥθος one needs a particular ἥθος, to create comic ἥθος one needs another, different ἥθος. The two senses of ἥθος involved here are the same as the two senses of the English word, "character", in the sentence, "A writer must be of good character if he is to create good characters". Proclus' ἥθος is not the same as the usual "ingenium", for that is simply a natural talent for writing; ἥθος has moral connotations which are absent from "ingenium". The Aristotelian antithesis in, e.g., Poetics 1451a24, is between τέχνη and φύσις. Proclus cannot have this antithesis in mind here, but he might be thinking of another passage of the Poetics, 1448b24 ff., where

31 L'estetica greca..., pp. 30-1.

Aristotle associates the character of writers with the kind of work they write. The correspondence between a poet's internal ἦθος and the ἦθος he creates externally in his work is of course an old one:- Aristophanes makes amusing use of the idea that poets must be like their own creations in personality.³² In Proclus' view a man has his ἦθος by nature, depending on how his soul has fallen; τέχνη he can learn. So the ζωή (= ἦθος) of p. 53 is the same as the ζωή of 52.20, in the account of the fall of the soul.

In 53.10-3 Proclus explains what he means by γνῶσις in this context:³³ τέχνην τοῦ πῶς ἐκατέραν μεταχειρίσσειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν διασκευαστέον καὶ πῶς τεταγμένον καὶ ὁμοίον προσώπων, ὃ δὲ καὶ λέγειν ἐθέλοντες οἱ περὶ αὐτῶν γράλλοντες. The final relative clause, which I have underlined, shows that Proclus was familiar with handbooks of rhetoric and poetics. The parts of a work, their disposition, and the kind of characters are precisely the sort of topics with which ancient rhetoricians dealt. It is not surprising that Proclus, as a learned and scholarly commentator on Plato, should be familiar with earlier criticism of the Republic but one would not necessarily expect in a philosophical commentator the familiarity which he constantly displays with the theory and terminology of rhetoric.

So, for example, Proclus uses a rhetorical concept in the 7th problem where he is expounding the faults of poets according to Plato. In 64.19-26 he schematises what should

32 E.g., Ach. 393 ff.; Th. 63 ff., esp. 146 ff.

33 For γνῶσις in this sense of "technical knowledge", see also 54.6 and, in the 6th essay, 147.5.

be the case and is not: *ἔννοια* should fit *πράγματα*, the facts; *λόγος* should fit *ἔννοια*, *ἁρμονία* should fit *λόγος*, and *ῥυθμοί* should fit *ἁρμονία*. Plato certainly complains of inappropriate *λόγος*, *ἁρμονία* and *ῥυθμοί* but where does *ἔννοια* come from? It makes no appearance in the preceding exposition of Plato but comes in here as a useful mean term, indicating "thought", between the facts and the words in which poets describe them. *ἔννοια* in the sense of "thought" as opposed to diction is a rhetorical term (cf. LSJ *ἔννοια* III) and is used in this sense by Hermogenes. We find it used in Syrianus' commentary on Hermogenes in a way which recalls Proclus' use here. At I 2.16 ff. Kabe, Syrianus defines *ἰδέα* : *ἰδέα δὲ ἐστὶ ποίησις λόγου τῆς ὑποκειμένης ἁρμόδιος προβώπεις τε καὶ πράγματι κατὰ τε ἔννοιαν καὶ λέξιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην τῆς ἁρμονίας διαπλοκὴν*. Proclus is looking at Plato within the terms of the rhetorical distinction between *ἔννοια* and *λέξις* and systematises the Republic accordingly. We find the same scheme of *ἔννοια*, *λέξις*, *ἁρμονία* and *ῥυθμός*, each building on the other, in Aristides Quintilian, II 7, p. 65.22 ff. Winnington-Ingram. This suggests not only that the rhetorical doctrine was widespread but that it had already been conflated with Plato before Proclus, for Aristides Quintilian is also something of a Platonist.

We find rhetorical terminology again in the 8th problem. There Proclus enquires what the best poet would be like according to Plato, dividing the subject into subject-matter

and style, *πραγματικῶς* and *λεκτικῶς* (65.18-9).

These are rhetorical terms (cf. LSJ *πραγματικός* III and *λεκτικός* II.2) and the distinction between them is set out for us by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in Comp. I, p. 4.6 ff.

Usener-Radermacher: διττῆς γὰρ οὐδὲς ἀσκήσεως περὶ πάντας ὡς εἰπεῖν τοὺς λόγους, τῆς περὶ τὰ νοήματα καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἐν ᾗ μὲν τοῦ πραγματικοῦ τόπου μᾶλλον ἐφάπτεσθαι δόξαεν ὧν, ἢ δὲ τοῦ λεκτικοῦ . . .

Plato in Rep. III had divided literary style into three types, narrative, mimetic and mixed. The only kind he really approves is narrative, *διήγησις*. Proclus faithfully reports this at 66.19 ff. but he uses *ἀφηγηματικός*, not Plato's word, *διήγησις*, or the related adjective, *διηγηματικός*. The reason for the change is that *ἀφηγηματικός* was the term used in the rhetoric of Proclus' time. (Cf. Hermogenes, De ideis 1.10, p. 276.11-2 Rabe and Syrianus In Hermog. I, p. 75.25 Rabe) Proclus' acquaintance with rhetorical terminology and distinctions has affected the way he expounds and interprets Plato.

Marinus (Ch. 8) tells us of Proclus' early rhetorical studies in Alexandria but we would be wrong to say with Gallavotti³⁴ that the rhetorical elements in the 5th essay and elsewhere in the Isagoge of which it forms a part, show it to be a youthful work. Proclus had contact in Athens with the rhetor Nicolaus of Myra³⁵ and, as we shall see, he had

³⁴ In his article in RFIC 57 (1929), pp. 208-19.

³⁵ See J. Felten's introduction to his Teubner text of Nicolaus (Leipzig, 1913), pp. xxi ff.

not forgotten his knowledge of rhetoric when he came to write the 6th essay. We saw in Chapter 3³⁶ that Proclus' master, Syrianus, was also interested in rhetoric. The quarrel between rhetoric and philosophy was long over by this time and rhetoric an accepted part of education. Iamblichus wrote a work περὶ κρῖτους ἀρίστου λόγου³⁷ and Damascius taught rhetoric for nine years.³⁸ Ancient judgements of Plato's work from a literary point of view have been collected by Walsdorff in his book, Die antiken Urteile über Platons Stil. Chapter IV.9 of his work (pp. 91 ff.) deals with Neoplatonic literary judgements of Plato and we can see from the material Walsdorff assembles that the Neoplatonists did not neglect this aspect of Plato's work. Commenting on individual dialogues as the later Neoplatonists did, rather than just dealing with particular problems of interpretation as in Plotinus' Enneads, would encourage a literary approach and the celebrated principle that each dialogue must have one and only one ἑκότης, formulated by Iamblichus, is a literary principle arising from consideration of the dialogues as artistic wholes, not just of the ideas expressed in them. The principle could be based on Phaedrus 264c where a work of art is compared with a living animal and a corresponding type of unity demanded

36 Pp.204-5 above.

37 See Syrian. In Hermog. I.9.10 ff. Rabe. Cf. Dillon, p. 25 and Larsen, pp. 216-7. Larsen is wrong to say that Iamblichus' work on rhetoric is evidence of his connections with the Aristotelian tradition; he fails to take into account how widespread the knowledge of rhetoric had become by Iamblichus' time.

38 See Damascius, Vitae Isidori reliquiae, ed. C. Lintzen (Hildesheim, 1967), p. 319.10 (cf. p. 274.10-5 and p. 275.2) and L.G. Westerink, "Damascius, commentateur de Platon" in the CNRS volume, Le néoplatonisme (Paris, 1971), pp. 253-60. Notice Westerink's comment, "Les contacts de l'école d'Athènes avec les études littéraires ont été nombreux et étroits..."

of it.³⁹ Although the later Neoplatonists' interest in Plato remains primarily philosophical we should be on the alert for ways in which their interpretation is modified by their rhetorical knowledge or affected by a literary approach.

In discussing the 6th problem I mentioned that Plato's condemnation of the Phrygian mode has worried modern commentators as well as ancient. We have seen that in some other problems, such as the 4th and the 10th, Proclus raises questions which a modern commentator would not consider but this should not lead us to condemn all the difficulties he examines as unreal. The difficulty dealt with in the 6th problem, while real, is of a rather technical nature and of little interest to most modern critics since we have only a limited knowledge of Greek music. In both the 5th and the 3rd problems, however, Proclus discusses contradictions in Plato which are still of interest today. The 5th problem (56.20-60.13) is primarily concerned with the contradiction between the praise of the inspired poet at Phaedrus 245a and the relegation of the imitative poet to the sixth life at Phaedrus 248e. Proclus' answer to the problem is to distinguish between two different types of poetry, assigning each to a different $\mu\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\iota\kappa\eta$, and so deny that the two Phaedrus passages are both talking about the same thing. Essentially the same answer is given by modern critics such as Hackforth and Vicaire⁴⁰ who, like Proclus, are sympathetically

39 On the connections of the $\epsilon\epsilon\varsigma$ $\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\sigma\alpha\iota$ principle with Phaedrus 264c, see Bielmeyer, p. 23. Cf. Coulter, Ch. 3, pp. 73-94.

40 R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge, 1952), p. 84 and Vicaire, pp. 50-6. Cf. above, p. 121 and note 4 there.

inclined to both Plato and poetry. It seems indeed the only satisfactory answer. 245a cannot, in its context, be dismissed as ironical. Vicaire thinks that Plato would place the inspired poet in the very first life, under the *μουσικός* of 248d3. Proclus sets up his own list of four types of *μουσική*, thus diverging from the letter of the Phaedrus where the *μουσικός* is mentioned only once but remaining more faithful to the spirit of Plato as a whole: he realises that only philosophy can be the highest kind of Platonic *μουσική*⁴¹ and admits inspired poetry merely to the second place.

One might resolve the contradiction between the two Phaedrus passages by saying that they refer to two different types of poetry and yet refuse to abstract that distinction between types of poetry from its context in a myth. Plato is always firm that the poet does not have rational knowledge. It is appropriate that he should allow himself to express admiration for the good poet in a myth, in a part of his work which is not reasoning or dialectic. It is difficult to know how far we should take an idea expressed in a myth in one dialogue as something Plato believed all the time. Proclus is not troubled by any doubts of this kind, as we can see from the very opening of the 5th problem where he puts the description of the inspired poet in Laws IV 719c together with Phaedrus 245a. In the 6th essay he proposes a similar type of solution for the contradictory views about poetry expressed by Plato in his work as a whole. There, in claiming to found the theory

41 Cf., as Kroll does, Phaedo 61a3-4 with Proclus 57.8-9.

of three types of poetry on Platonic authority, Proclus collects a number of passages from Plato's work in which differing views of poetry are expressed. Is Proclus quite wrong to try and force some kind of consistency on Plato in this matter? He is at least not alone, for there have been many other such attempts. Plato's views are contradictory and yet there seems to be a pattern to the contradictions. We can find both the attitudes expressed within a few pages of the Phaedrus elsewhere in Plato's work: poetic inspiration is acknowledged, though it is hard to define the tone of the acknowledgement, in the Ion and, more unequivocally, in the Laws; poetic imitation is condemned in the Republic, for both moral and metaphysical reasons. Proclus may not be right to treat the problem of Phaedrus 245a and 248e in relation to Plato's thought as a whole rather than to the particular dialogue but his solution is at least a sensible one as applied to that dialogue and his intimate knowledge of Plato preserves him from such errors as rating the inspired poet too highly.

The question considered in the 3rd problem (51.26-54.2), the contradiction between Smp. 223d and Rep. 395a, is likewise one that continues to trouble commentators, and to interest anyone concerned with Plato's views of literary creation. Here again, one could solve the problem simply by relating each passage closely to the dialogue in question. The Symposium passage would then just be an example of the sort of thing discussed at intellectual Athenian dinner-parties, while the Republic passage is clearly related to the "one man, one job" principle which Plato expounds as the basis for his society.

However, many modern interpreters, like Proclus, have tried to reconcile the two passages and like Proclus have fastened on the use of ἐμπειρία in the Symposium passage. A frequent modern view is that the "knowledge" required to write tragedy and comedy is theoretical knowledge of a very high order. When the artist has the highest kind of Platonic philosophical knowledge he will have sufficient understanding to do what no Greek dramatist did, create both tragedy and comedy. Thus W.C. Greene in "Plato's View of Poetry"⁴² refers the knowledge required of the perfect artist to "the contemplation of .. pure beauty" described by Diotima earlier in the Symposium while Bury in his commentary on the Symposium says, "the scientific poet must be master of the art of poetry in its universal, generic aspect".⁴³ A similar view is taken by Adam in his commentary on the Republic and by Vicaire in Platon, critique littéraire.⁴⁴ Proclus' version of this modern interpretation would be that in the Symposium Socrates is talking about dramatic composition by the undivided soul, but that is not the view he takes. For Proclus the composition of drama, being essentially mimetic, can only be an activity of the human, divided soul. Proclus cannot say that the comprehensive poet must have a general knowledge of human nature, etc. because he only makes the logical distinction between general and specific as part of a metaphysical hierarchy of value; general knowledge

42 HSPh 29 (1918), p. 31, note 6.

43 The Symposium of Plato, ed. R.G. Bury (2nd edn., Cambridge, 1932), p. 171.

44 Adam (op. cit., above, note 7), Vol. I, p. 148; Vicaire, p. 256.

means knowledge of the Forms and only a soul which had risen above the composition of dramatic poetry could have such knowledge. Proclus therefore takes ἐν' ἑστέρῳ in a much narrower sense than do the modern interpreters, relating it to the detailed knowledge of poetic technique which can be learnt from a handbook.⁴⁵ In doing so he is being truer to Plato than the moderns. Plato did not believe the poet could ever have philosophical ἐπιστήμη even if he was inspired. Proclus thinks the poet, through his inspiration, can perceive the intelligible world in a different way from that in which it is perceived by discursive reason. I doubt if Plato went as far as this but Proclus is surely right that, whatever the poet does according to Plato, he can never have the same kind of knowledge as the philosopher who exercises reason. Proclus avoids reading this into ἐν' ἑστέρῳ but his knowledge of rhetoric leads him to read that into the word instead. It is probably a mistake to place so much stress on ἐν' ἑστέρῳ and it is hard to know whether we should be taking the Symposium passage seriously at all. It is tempting to do so because the opinion expressed sounds interesting and somewhat unusual in ancient thought about drama; yet the attempt to take the passage seriously runs into difficulties. A comparison of Proclus' interpretation with the modern ones here brings out more sharply the points being made by both sides and helps us to evaluate them both as interpretations of Plato.

The 5th essay is exposition and interpretation rather

45 Cf. pp. 257-9 above.

than independent philosophy. I tried to show in my analysis of the 1st problem how Proclus builds his interpretation out of Plato's own words and yet does introduce some alien ideas. To understand Proclus' interpretation we need to see it in the light of earlier criticism of Plato, particularly by Aristotle and his followers, and of the rhetorical concepts and terminology of Proclus' own time. Proclus is not to be despised as an interpreter of Plato. Although we have to make allowance for many Neoplatonist assumptions and ideas, in some cases Proclus displays a better understanding of Plato's way of thinking than more recent commentators. But the principal interest of Proclus' interpretation for us is what it reveals about his own thought. When we study the questions he asks and the answers he gives, relating them to the background of preceding and contemporary ideas in both philosophy and rhetoric, we can see how salient features of his thought are exemplified in practice and so we become better able to describe those features. We shall find that some of the characteristics of Proclus' interpretation which I have picked out in the 5th essay are further illustrated in the more developed and complex 6th essay.

The sixth essay

The sixth essay as we have it is divided into two books of which the first is more concerned with Homer (pp. 69-154), the second more concerned with Plato (pp. 154-205). Accordingly there is more detailed discussion of individual Plato passages in the second book and I shall be dealing mainly with that book

here. Most of the book is interpretation of Plato rather than simple exposition, although in the final section, at 200.4-24, Proclus tries straightforwardly to answer Plato's questions at Rep.X 599c ff. Socrates there demands instances of people and cities educated by Homer, and Proclus, after pleading lack of historical records as an excuse for the scarcity of early examples, attempts to satisfy the demand by referring to the stories of cities which had made use of Homer in settling disputes.⁴⁶

We saw in connection with the 5th essay how Proclus expounds Plato by means of his own words in other contexts and how often a Plato passage lies behind what he is saying and provides a basis for it. The same thing happens in the 6th essay. Reference is constantly being made to other works of Plato. So, for example, Laches 188d, the passage used in the 6th problem of the 5th essay,⁴⁷ is used again at 84.19 ff. where Proclus explicitly relates the distinction he is making between educational and inspired myths to that between the Dorian and the Phrygian mode. The conclusion he came to in the 6th problem is here being used as an established fact about Plato's meaning. At 85.1 ff. Proclus illustrates his concept of inspired, symbolic myths by reference to Plato's Phaedo 62b, 69c and 108a, anxious as always to find Platonic authority for his views. At 98.13, in the discussion of Il. 24.527-8

46 For these stories, see Hdt. VII.161 (cf. V.94); Arist. Rh. I.15, 1375b28 ff.; Strabo IX.1.10; Plu. Sol. ch. 10 (cf. D.L. I.2.48); Quint. V.11.40; Schol. B on Il. 2.558. It is clear from this list that there are several possible sources for Proclus' knowledge of such stories.

47 Cf.p.252 above.

(the two jars on the threshold of Zeus) he alludes to Laws IV 716a. Proclus is expounding the Neoplatonic doctrine of divine providence and how it is related to divine justice and the Laws provides him with a phrase to characterise justice. As one reads through the essay similar references and allusions to Plato constantly recur.

Of some Platonic allusions Proclus seems particularly fond. At 102.29 ff. he quotes Laws 728c in the course of explaining that Pandarus breaks the truce in the Iliad not because the gods make him wicked but because the gods, for his own good, activate his latent tendency to wickedness. The Plato passage distinguishes between *δίκη* and *πρωβία*. Proclus explains that Pandarus merely suffers *πρωβία* in being induced to break the truce and this then makes him ready to submit to *δίκη*. Thus the gods are absolved from the charge that they are unjust in punishing a man for something they have themselves caused him to do. Proclus draws an analogy with opening up wounds to make them easier to cure. He uses the same passage of the Laws and the same medical analogy with the *ἀναστόμωσις* of wounds in In Tim. 380.8 ff.; the analogy with *ἀναστόμωσις* recurs again at In Alc. 119.9 ff. while at In Remp. II 184.19 ff. the Laws passage is referred to again for the distinction between *δίκη* and *πρωβία* and Proclus declares that *ἡ πρωβία τρόπος τῆς ἰσχυρῆς ἐστίν*. The Laws passage and the analogy with *ἀναστόμωσις* are not used in this way by other Neoplatonists. It looks as if Proclus had a personal preference for the passage and the medical

parallel.⁴⁸

Similarly Proclus makes repeated use in the 6th essay of Laws I-II on the usefulness of drunkenness in education. The discussion in the Laws provides a good Platonic example of something which can be useful when taken in moderation but is an evil if taken to excess. Proclus uses it in this way at 75.28 ff., at 161.20 ff. (where Kroll makes the reference more specifically to Laws II 672a ff.) and at 195.24 ff. (referred by Kroll to II 673e). The same example is used in the same way by Aristides Quintilian at II.6, p. 59.23 ff. Winnington-Ingram, and in the context of how to conduct a symposium by Macrobius at Sat. 2.8.4 ff. It is tempting to call the example a commonplace, though the references are hardly numerous enough to justify the name. In any case, Proclus obviously had it particularly present to his mind when he was composing the 6th essay.⁴⁹

As in the 5th essay Proclus displays knowledge of rhetoric and literary criticism. He is familiar with the story that Plato wrote tragedies in his youth (see 205.4 ff.)⁵⁰ and we can see him making use of earlier, literary judgements of Plato

48 The medical parallel follows in the tradition of Plato's analogies between moral and physical health:— see, e.g., Grg. 478 ff. and note that Proclus' *ἐμευλον* at 103.10 is the word used by Plato in Grg. 480b2 and 518e4. The Laws passage is also referred to by Plutarch, De sera numinis vindicta 9 (553f). This work of Plutarch was used by Proclus in the 8th and 9th problems of his Dec. dub.

49 For passages of the Laws popular in antiquity, cf. E. des Places, "La tradition indirecte des Lois de Platon (Livres I-VI)", Mélanges J. Saunier (Lyons, 1944), pp. 27-40.

50 Cf. D.L. III.5; Apuleius, De Platone et eius dogmate I.2; Olymp. Vita Platonis 3; etc.

for his own purposes. A whole stream of ancient literary judgements on Plato were originally formulated as attacks by rhetoricians who were glad to use any weapon against the philosopher who had pilloried rhetoric.⁵¹ Proclus takes some of these up and uses them in Plato's favour in his reconciliation of Plato and Homer. At 110.10 ff. he enunciates the principle that we should not accept what is said by Socrates' opponents in Plato's dialogues as Plato's own views and uses this to justify a similar principle with regard to Homer. He takes up the same point in a different way at 159.24 ff., where he raises the question why Plato introduces evil characters like Thrasymachus and Callicles into his dialogues. Is not Plato as guilty of immoral mimesis as Homer? Rather than making this a reason for rejecting both writers Proclus makes it a reason for accepting both. In both the mimetic element is unfitting to the ideal state, though it might be admitted as a good of a lower order.⁵² The mimetic nature of Plato's own work had often been noted before Proclus, mainly with hostile intent. Aristotle in Poetics 1447a28-b11 groups *Συμπαντικὸν λόγον* in general with the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus. Rostagni thinks that Aristotle himself attacked Plato for being mimetic.⁵³

51 See Walsdorff, Ch. I, pp. 9 ff.; also S. Weinstock, "Die platonische Homerkritik und ihre Nachwirkung", Philologus 82, N.F. 36 (1926), pp. 121 ff.

52 Cf. also 199.4 ff. where Proclus lays down the principle that a writer should be judged by what is best in his work and 205.13-23 where Plato and Homer are joined by the demiurge who is not to be blamed for evil in the world.

53 See "Il dialogo Aristotelico .." (op. cit. above, note 11) RFIC 1926, pp. 443 ff. - Scritti Minori I, pp. 265 ff.

This is speculation but we do find the judgement of the Poetics interpreted in a hostile sense in Athenaeus XI 505b where Plato is accused of being mimetic even though he expels Homer for just that fault, and is further attacked for not inventing the dialogue genre himself.⁵⁴ In the same way Aelius Aristides, when defending rhetoric against Plato, makes use of the argument that Plato himself employs rhetoric⁵⁵ and attacks Plato for writing tragedy and comedy in his dialogues although he condemns those genres, for imitating sophists and sycophants, for being dithyrambic, and for making pleasure the aim of his work.⁵⁶

Not all ancient critics who draw attention to Plato's skill in mimesis do so in order to attack Plato. Theon in his Progymnasmata⁵⁷ gives Homer, Plato, the other Socratic dialogues and Menander as examples of good character-drawing, in a quite neutral tone. Similarly Dionysius of Halicarnassus De imitatione VI.4.430 (p. 210.16-7 Usener-Radermacher) says Plato's skill in depicting characters is worthy of imitation⁵⁸ and Hermogenes De ideis 388.8-15 Rabe points out that Plato's dialogues are mimetic, without attacking Plato on this account (cf. also 406.7-15 comparing Plato and Xenophon in this respect). Diogenes

54 This passage comes in the part of Athenaeus' work attributed by Düring to Herodicus:- see Herodicus, p. 25.

55 Or. 45 Dindorf, Vol. II, p. 4.19 and 86.6 ff. Cf. Cicero, De oratore I 47 where Plato is admired for this.

56 Or. 46 Dindorf, Vol. II, p. 381.12 ff.; 381.23 ff.; 382.13 ff.; 383.14 ff. On these passages, cf. Walsdorff, pp. 88-91.

57 Spengel, Rhetores Graeci II 68.21 ff.

58 Cf. Quint. 5.7.28.

Laertius, III 48 ff. discusses the dialogue-form and Plato's artistic use of it and in 52 Diogenes Laertius, like Proclus in 110.10 ff., points out how Thrasymachus, Callicles, Polus, etc. are introduced as having false ideas and attacked accordingly, while Plato gives his own views through the mouths of Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian Stranger (in the Laws) and the Eleatic Stranger (in the Sophist).

The way was thus open for Platonists to take up this point about Plato without considering it a fault in their idol.

Maximus of Tyre treats it in very much the same way as Proclus.

In XXVI.5 (p. 315.4 ff. Hobein), after noting Homer's portrayal

of contrasting characters he says: "Ἄρα σοὶ εὐδοκεῖ

αὐτὸ τοῦτο, εἰ καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης τοὺς μὲν βασιλικούς
καὶ ἐξόχους ἄνδρας ἀγανὲς λόγους χειρίζων καὶ
ἀποδεχόμενος, Τίμαιόν τινα, ἢ Παρμενίδην, ἢ ἄλλον
βασιλικὸν ξένον. "ὅν δ' αὖ δῆμον τ' ἄνδρα ἴδωι,

βούντα τ' ἐδούρει" (II. 2.198) τοῦτον ἐλαύνων τῷ λόγῳ

Θρασύμαχόν τινα, ἢ Πῶλον, ἢ Καλλίκλεα, ἢ τινα
ἄλλον λυβητῆρα καὶ ἐπέβολον; The question why

Plato introduces πρόσωπα into his dialogues is raised again

by Olympiodorus in his commentary on the Gorgias. The answer

he gives is that these would be inappropriate in a Platonic

ideal state; but as we do not live in such a state characters

are introduced, and the bad ones are censured while the good

are praised (1.12 ff.) The same question is treated in a

slightly different way at Anon. Prolog. 14.9-23, where the answer

given is that the evil characters in Plato, unlike those in drama,

change and learn better ways under the influence of the good

characters.⁵⁹ These later discussions by Olympiodorus and in the Anon. Prol. sound very like Proclus 110.10 ff. and 159.24 ff. and probably owe a good deal to Proclus. Maximus of Tyre shows us that Proclus was following Platonist tradition in turning to the advantage of both Plato and Homer the point that Plato's own work is mimetic and presents characters.

In 163.13-172.30 Proclus argues that Plato is a ζῆλωτής of Homer. He emulates Homer in both style and subject-matter; therefore, according to Proclus, he cannot really disapprove of all Homer's work. The concept of ζῆλος, "emulation", comes from rhetoric. The term μίμῃς is often used in this sense too. So in περὶ ὕψους 13.2 ff. μίμῃς τε καὶ ζῆλος are coupled together and imitation of earlier writers expounded as a means to ὕψος.⁶⁰ Proclus wisely avoids using μίμῃς in this sense since it would be liable to confusion with the philosophical sense of μίμῃς used by Plato in the Republic. He always uses ζῆλος and its derivatives for the rhetorical concept, influenced perhaps by Plato's use of ζῆλος in Ion 530b to which he refers at 163.15. This kind of imitation is an ambivalent concept: even in ancient times it could be considered a literary vice, plagiarism, rather than a literary virtue. So περὶ ὕψους 13.4 is anxious to distinguish laudable imitation from κλοπή, "plagiarism".⁶¹ Athenaeus, apparently following Herodicus,

59 Cf. Westerink's introduction, p. xxxv, and his parallel in Ascl. In Metaph. 138.7-9.

60 Cf. D.A. Russell's notes in his edition (Oxford, 1964), pp. 112-3.

61 Cf. Russell's note on this passage.

accuses Plato of plagiarism in taking the doctrine of the immortality of the soul from Homer.⁶² Similarly Heraclitus All. ch. 4 criticises Plato and exalts Homer by saying that Plato got his ideas from Homer. The Christian apologist Justin makes a similar point against Plato at coh. Gr. 24, 25 (Migne VI, pp. 284-5).⁶³

The claim that Plato derives his ideas from Homer is made without anti-Platonic implications in Ps.-Plutarch, Vita Homeri 122 ff., especially 128. Ps.-Plutarch desires to exalt Homer by tracing the doctrines of all philosophical schools back to him. He is in no way attacking the doctrines so traced.

These judgements all concern Plato's subject-matter but one of our fragments of the famous critic Longinus declares that Plato was first and best at transferring Homeric ἔγκωρ into prose.⁶⁴ Longinus, like Proclus, is looking on Plato's imitation of Homer as a virtue.

It is significant that Proclus should have been preceded by Longinus in considering Plato's imitation of Homer to be a virtue, for it is Longinus who is frequently cited in the In Tim. for his literary judgements of Plato. Proclus considers his comments worth noting even though he always turns to philosophical discussion as the real business of his commentary. Here in the 6th essay Proclus is not just praising Plato for

62 Ath. XI 507e. Cf. Düring, Herodicus, p. 36.

63 On these passages, cf. Weinstock (op. cit. above note 51), pp. 145 ff. and Düring, Herodicus, pp. 159 ff.

64 Spengel, Rhetores Graeci I 214, fr. 9. Cf. Walsdorff, p. 95.

his choice of model but taking that choice as testimony that Plato approves of Homer and so making the discussion of ζῆλος relevant to the topic of his essay.

Proclus divides Plato's emulation of Homer into style and subject-matter. This distinction is in accordance with rhetoric⁶⁵ but it is also reminiscent of the practice in the later Neoplatonic commentaries of Olympiodorus of dividing the discussion of each lemma into λέξις and θεωρία. λέξις and θεωρία are the terms Proclus uses here at 164.8 ff. He also uses them in the In Tim. at, for example, 227.8 ff. and 303.26 ff. although he never divides his comment as rigidly as does Olympiodorus.⁶⁶ In fact the division into λέξις and θεωρία is one of the features which the later Neoplatonists have taken over from rhetoric for use in philosophical commentary.

Proclus praises Plato's ἐνέργεια as equal to Homer's (163.22-3). This is another rhetorical concept.⁶⁷ In Proclus here ἐνέργεια is the result of successful μίμησις (in the Rep. X sense of μίμησις .) Such μίμησις moves our δυνάμις, our imagination (163.27-8) so that we have a clear mental picture (δυνάμις again) of what is being imitated (164.5-7). Proclus is using δυνάμις in two, related senses, first of the faculty of the soul which we would call

65 Cf. pp. 260-1 above, on the distinction between πραγματικὰ and λεκτικὰ in the 8th problem of the 5th essay.

66 See A.J. Festugière, "Modes de composition des commentaires de Proclus", MH 20 (1963), pp. 77-100, reprinted in Festugière's Etudes de philosophie grecque (Paris, 1971), pp. 551-74.

67 See περὶ ὕψους 15.1-2 and Russell's note on p. 121 of his edition (op. cit. above, note 60).

imagination, and secondly of the images which that faculty produces. $\delta\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ is connected with $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\alpha$ by Quintilian 6.2.29, "quas $\delta\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ Graeci vocant, nos sane visiones appellemus, per quas imagines rerum absentium ita repraesentantur animo ut eas cernere oculis ac praesentes habere videamur", and by $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ $\acute{\upsilon}\psi\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma$ 15.1-2. They are both using the term in the sense of "imagery", the imaginary pictures which the artist actually writes into his work. This is different again although related to Proclus' second sense of the word. Proclus' first sense of $\delta\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ is the usual philosophical sense, as defined by Aristotle in the De anima and common in Neoplatonism. Philosophers do also use the word in Proclus' second sense (see LSJ $\delta\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ 1.a) Proclus is using $\delta\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ in two senses which are both philosophical and are distinct from the rhetorical sense we find in $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ $\acute{\upsilon}\psi\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma$ and Quintilian; yet he combines it with the exclusively rhetorical concept of $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\alpha$ just as $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ $\acute{\upsilon}\psi\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma$ and Quintilian combine rhetorical $\delta\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ with $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\alpha$.

In 164.8 ff. Proclus turns away from $\mu\omicron\lambda\upsilon\pi\rho\alpha\chi\mu\omicron\varsigma\acute{\omicron}\nu\eta$ $\eta\varsigma$ $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\xi\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ but after dealing with Plato's derivation of subject-matter from Homer he returns to a literary topic at 170.27 ff. What he examines now is a different kind of literary question, not Plato's style, $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\xi\iota\varsigma$, but the structure of his work, $\sigma\acute{\iota}\kappa\omicron\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$. $\sigma\acute{\iota}\kappa\omicron\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$ too is a rhetorical concept. It was included under the $\pi\rho\alpha\chi\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\varsigma$ of rhetoric, along with invention, $\epsilon\upsilon\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$. That is why Proclus deals

with it here rather than earlier in the section.⁶⁸

In 171.10 ff. Proclus sums up the points he has made.

171.15-7 might have been written by a rhetorical, not a

philosophical critic: καὶ γὰρ ἡ τῆς μιμήσεως ἐνάρχεια
καὶ ἡ ποικιλία τῶν ἡθῶν καὶ ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων
ἥρα καὶ ἡ τῆς οἰκονομίας τέχνη καὶ ἡ τῶν ὀχημάτων
ἐξαιλαγῇ τῆς ὁμηρικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδέας μετέ.⁶⁹ ἥρα in the
sense of "beauty of style" and ἰδέα meaning "style" are

terms Proclus has not been using earlier but they are standard
in rhetoric.⁷⁰ With ἡ ποικιλία τῶν ἡθῶν Proclus notes

Plato's skill in characterisation to which he has already drawn
attention for more specific reasons in 110.10 ff. and 159.24 ff.

As we saw, Plato's gift for creating characters was often
noted in antiquity and often turned against him rather than
in his favour. Proclus expresses general admiration for it
at In Crat. 14, p. 5.17 where he calls Plato μιμητικώτατος because
he makes Cratylus and Hermogenes respectively speak in appropriate
styles.

Although Proclus considers πολυπραγμοσύνη τῆς λέξεως
less important than philosophical discussion of Plato it is
clear from these passages of the 6th essay that he was fully

68 Cf. Russell on περὶ ὕψους 1.4. For the claim that an
admired author imitates Homer's οἰκονομία, cf. Marcellinus'
Life of Thucydides 35, where this claim is made for Thucydides.
(In 37 Thucydides is also said to imitate Homer's style.)

69 Cf. esp. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Dem. 5 and 6 on the good
and bad styles of Plato.

70 See LSJ ἥρα BII.2b and ἰδέα 4b where the examples quoted
Πλάτωνικῃ ἰδέα and Δημοσθενικῃ ἰδέα are exactly
parallel to ὁμηρικῃ ἰδέα here and are drawn from
Syrianus' commentary on Hermogenes.

aware of the literary qualities of Plato's work and sensitive to them. Too often critics of Plato can appreciate him either as philosophy or as literature but not as both. Proclus manages both. It is true that some of his literary comment, such as the parallel with Homeric *ἰκονοποιία*, strikes us as rather forced but his appreciation of Plato's skill in creating dramatic characters, for example, is something we can agree with. In fact the case is just the same as with his philosophical comment: some of it still has interest and validity while other aspects of it are alien to our way of thinking and of largely historical interest.

In discussing Proclus' use of the concept of *ζῆλος* in 163.13-172.30 I showed how the claim that Plato derives his ideas from Homer was made by a variety of writers for various different reasons. The idea that Plato is deliberately imitating Homer is a form of the more general view that Plato and Homer are in agreement. This latter view is basic to the 6th essay. It is expressed in the introduction, 69.23-71.17. It lies behind all the allegory of Homer in terms of Neoplatonist metaphysics in the first book of the essay and is more explicitly developed in the second book where Proclus draws a number of detailed parallels between passages of Plato and passages of Homer.⁷¹

These arguments that Plato and Homer agree may be seen as part of the general tendency in the early centuries of the Christian era to believe that there was one authoritative

71 Cf. above Chapter 3, (iv), esp. p. 203.

tradition of truth and wisdom expressed by all the great writers of the past. So Plutarch in the De Is. et Os. argues that Oriental wisdom agrees with Plato while the claim that Plato derived his ideas from Moses was a theme of both Jewish and Christian apologetic.⁷² One thinks of Numenius' celebrated characterisation of Plato as Μωυσεῖς Ἀττικίζων (apud Clem. Al. Strom. I.150.4 - GCS II, p. 93) Galen wrote a work on the agreement of Plato and Hippocrates⁷³ and according to the Suda Syrianus and Proclus each wrote a Συμφωνία Ὁμήρου Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος περὶ τὰ λόγια.⁷⁴ In the words of A.H. Armstrong, it was a matter of "taking tradition by the scruff of the neck and shaking it till it makes sense".⁷⁵ This well describes Proclus' procedure in interpreting Homer to make him agree with the Neoplatonists' Plato!

We saw earlier how the claim that Plato derives from Homer was made into a charge of plagiarism by Herodicus, Heraclitus and Justin and used to exalt Homer as the supreme authority in Ps.-Plutarch, Vita Homeri. According to the Suda the grammaticus Telephus of Pergamum, in the 2nd century A.D., wrote a work περὶ τῆς Ὁμήρου καὶ Πλάτωνος συμφωνίας.

72 See H. Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (Oxford, 1966), pp. 13 ff.; for the opposite view in Celsus that Moses was dependent on the Greek philosophers, pp.22 ff.

73 De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (ed. Müller, Leipzig, 1874). For some discussion of it, see P. de Lacy, "Galen's Platonism", AJP 93 (1972), pp. 27-39.

74 On the Suda lists of Syrianus' and Proclus' works, cf. above, pp. 131-2.

75 In his lecture, Pagan and Christian Traditionalism in the First Three Centuries A.D., given to the Seventh International Patristics Congress, 1975 (not yet published).

In claiming that Plato and Homer agree Proclus is making use of a well-established theme in a way which accords with his belief in one and only one authoritative tradition.

Although the first book of the 6th essay is primarily concerned with Homer Proclus never allows his reader to forget that Homer and Plato are saying the same thing. 81.21-8, at the end of Proclus' exposition of his theory of inspired, symbolic myths, looks forward to the development in the second book of the view that Socrates in the Republic really agrees with Homer and is only rejecting him for education, not altogether (notice 81.27-8 Ἀλλὰ τῶτα μὲν μικρὸν ὕστερον .) 101.21-102.19 argue that Plato and Homer agree on the justice of the gods in punishment. At 101.11-3 Proclus has declared his desire to give an explanation of why the gods cause Pandarus to break the truce τῇ τε δούρῃ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῇ Πλάτωνος ὑδηγήσει τὴν Ὀμήρου διδασκαλίαν συναρμόζοντες and in 101.21 he takes this up again:- ὅτι δὲ σικεῖα τῶτα τῇ Πλάτωνος ἔστι διανοητικῶς δεκνύμεν This is indeed "taking Homer by the scruff of the neck and shaking him till he makes sense". In 104.15 ff. Proclus compares the choice put before Pandarus with the choice of lives described in the Republic. It is quite plain, apparently, that Homer is saying the same thing as Plato: μόνον οὐχὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶτα βούντος, ἔκ καὶ ὁ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης.... At 107.20 ff. Proclus draws an explicit parallel between the opening of Il. 20, as he interprets it, and Tim. 41a. In 126.19-127.11 Proclus draws a parallel between his interpretation of the Homeric description of Hephaestus and certain features

of the Platonic creation of the world in Tim. 34a and 42d. He draws the same parallel at In Tim. II 98.6 ff. (on Tim. 34a). In 149.20 ff., he uses an example from Plato as part of the defence of Achilles' action in cutting off for Patroclus the lock of hair he had dedicated to the River Spercheius: Socrates in Alc. II 151a accepts the garland which Alcibiades had originally destined for the god. (Proclus accepted Alc. II as genuinely by Plato.⁷⁶) The basic argument here is that anything in Plato must, self-evidently, be right. If Homer can be shown to be recounting a parallel story, then Homer too is safe from attack.⁷⁷

In the second book of the essay Proclus takes up in earnest the theme that Plato and Homer agree (see 154.16-9). We have already seen how two of the themes Proclus uses here, that Plato is as mimetic as Homer, and that he copies Homer, were traditional and often used in polemic against Plato. The argument that Plato honours Homer, developed by Proclus in 154.14-159.6, also belongs to the patterns of anti-Platonic polemic. Proclus is concerned to resolve the contradiction in Plato's attitude to Homer (see 70.3-7 where the contradiction is explicitly set out) and, because he wants to regard Homer as an authority too, he draws attention to the passages where Plato praises Homer and tries to mitigate the severity of the sentence pronounced in the

76 Cf. above, p. 89.

77 Cf. also 85.1 ff., mentioned above, p. 269; 98.26-100.17, discussed in Chapter 3, pp. 201-2; 108.3-109.7, discussed in Appendix II; and 117-22 discussed in Chapter 3, pp. 209-11.

Republic. A parallel contradiction in Plato's differing attitudes to rhetoric is exploited in the more obvious, anti-Platonic sense by Aelius Aristides. In his defence of rhetoric⁷⁸ he argues that Plato really honours rhetoric and, just as Proclus here produces Platonic quotations to prove his point, so Aelius Aristides quotes passages from the Politicus, the Apology and even the Gorgias. He positively glories in drawing attention to the contradiction he finds in Plato. It is generally agreed that Aelius Aristides is merely reiterating traditional material in his attacks on Plato.⁷⁹ The patterns of argument which he uses help us to see that Proclus too is using traditional themes but exploiting them for his own purposes. Proclus makes these themes favourable to Plato and by implication replies to attacks which had used them in the opposite sense.

Proclus cites a selection of passages in which Plato expresses admiration for Homer: Phaedo 94d ff. (especially 95a); Laws III 676a ff. (especially 682a); Minos 319d and 320d; Laws I 624a; Gorgias 523a and 526c; Apology 41a; Symposium 209d; and Ion 530b. We might dismiss some of these as ironical. How serious is Socrates' desire that what he is saying should agree with Homer, in Phaedo 95a? Or does he really mean the praise of Ion's calling and of his favourite poet in

78 Or. 45 Dindorf, Vol. II, pp. 148-50.

79 See, for example, the remarks of A. Boulanger, Aelius Aristide (Paris, 1923), pp. 227 ff. Cf. Quintilian's more sympathetic comments on Plato's attitude to rhetoric and the Gorgias in 2.15.24-31.

Ion 530b, to be taken at face-value? Proclus is always reluctant to admit irony in Plato and of course it would not suit his argument to allow a suspicion of it here.⁸⁰ In citing Laws I 624a he is seizing on one of the introductory remarks in the dialogue. Post-Iamblichean interpretation of Plato carefully interpreted every word, including the openings of the dialogues, in accordance with the *ἐκκρίσις* of each dialogue, but I hardly think Plato intended us to take the Athenian's passing reference to Homer at the opening of the Laws so solemnly. We can see how Proclus' attitude is over-serious if we contrast his interpretation of these passages with that of a modern critic like Vicaire in Platon, critique littéraire. Vicaire is anxious to make out that Plato is sympathetic to poetry and he collects Plato passages with a painstaking care fully equal to Proclus'. Yet of these passages which Proclus cites, Vicaire takes only Smp. 209d as expressing unqualified admiration. Phaedo 94d ff. and Laws III 682a he admits may be ironic though he includes them among "approbations et éloges" of Homer by Plato. The same goes for Apology 41a, while the Minos of course he regards as spurious. Vicaire thinks Plato's attitude to poetry in the Ion as a whole is ambiguous, and classifies Laws I 624a and the Gorgias passages neutrally as "utilisations des mythes homériques".⁸¹

80 Cf. pp. 239-40 above.

81 Vicaire, p. 37 (Smp. 209d); pp. 86-7 (Phd. 94d ff.); pp. 93-5 (Laws III 682a); p. 17 and p. 36 (Ap. 41a); p. 203, note 2 (Minos - cf. p. 247, note 3); pp. 33-5 (Ion); pp. 99-100 (Laws I 624a); pp. 96-7 (Grg. 523a and 526c).

Although Proclus' attitude to these passages is over-serious, it is true that Plato's attitude to Homer is somewhat ambivalent. We cannot discount Smp. 209d and even in Phaedo 95a and Laws III 682a, some genuine respect for Homer may lie behind the irony. Although Plato condemns the practice of using Homer as a kind of Bible in which all wisdom could be found, he does sometimes seem to follow the practice himself. This is what happens in Phaedo 94d ff. where he makes use of Odysseus' address to his *κρηδὴν* in Od. 20.17-3. Plato is not however appealing to Homer here as a sacrosanct authority in the way that a Neoplatonist would appeal to him. He is using Homer to illustrate his argument and appealing to him where a modern philosopher might appeal to the way we ordinarily use language without necessarily thinking that our ordinary usage is sacrosanct and immune to revision. The passages where Plato appeals to Homer do show something about his attitude to Homer but Proclus is mistaken about what it is that they show. He is foisting his own attitude to traditional authority on Plato, whose treatment of tradition was very different.

Proclus assumes a Neoplatonic meaning for some of the passages which he cites. He assumes that the reference to Homer with which Plato opens the myth in the Gorgias (523a) is to be understood in terms of Neoplatonic metaphysics: Zeus, Poseidon and Pluto are the three demiurgic monads among whom the procession of the gods from the One is divided (156.26-157.2). We saw the same principle operating in Proclus' allegories of Homer and his citation of supposedly parallel

passages of Plato. Proclus assumes that Plato and Homer agree in expressing Neoplatonic metaphysics. He may have been influenced in choosing Minos 319-20 and Laws I 624a among his examples by the way Plotinus interpreted Minos. In VI.9.7.23 ff. Plotinus refers to the Homeric description of Minos as Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριότης (Od. 19.179) and takes this as indicating that Minos spent his time in contemplation, returning, as he does in Homer every nine years, to share the fruits of his contemplation with his fellows. Plotinus seems to have in mind Plato's references to the Homeric description of Minos in the Minos and the Laws.⁸² I suspect that Proclus interpreted Minos in this Plotinian way and was therefore the more ready to cite Plato's references to him.

In arguing that Plato admires Homer, or that Plato's own work is mimetic, Proclus is, as I have said, taking up charges of self-contradiction which had been traditionally levelled against Plato. Proclus' belief in a hierarchical scheme of different levels of reality is a great help to him in resolving contradictions in Plato. So he argues that the mimetic elements in both Plato and Homer are acceptable in states other than the ideal⁸³ and in 161.30-163.9 he develops the theme of the purity and unity of the ideal state and of the corresponding ideal education. To it apply all the qualities which come highest in the Neoplatonist

82 Cf. Henry and Schwyzer's reference to these Plato passages in their text of Plotinus. Also Buffière, p. 535, note 57, and J. Pépin, Mythe et Allégorie (Paris, 1958), p. 207.

83 The same point is made in the 5th essay:- cf. p. 243 above.

scheme: τὴν ἑνότητα, τὴν ἀπλότητα, τὴν ἀδιόρατον, τὴν ἀσώφρονα (162.8) Mimesis, on the other hand, is fitted only to the lower levels of reality which are apparent, not real, multiple, not uniform, and divided, not undivided (162.23-6). The terms used here are all terms of Neoplatonist metaphysics. This is the same move as Proclus makes when he distinguishes between educational and inspired myths which are suitable for different audiences (different types of soul)⁸⁴ or when he divides poetry into three types. The three types of poetry are described in descending order of value but none is completely useless (nothing in the Neoplatonist world is unmitigatedly evil). Each is appropriate at its own level.⁸⁵ Contradictions are thus solved by assigning the contradictory elements to different levels of reality. Since the different levels make up one universe, the contradictory elements are being fitted into one overall system. Proclus used his metaphysical system as an interpretative tool and we should not forget that Neoplatonist metaphysics was developed into an elaborate system by philosophers who were developing comprehensive exegesis of Plato at the same time.

In 164.8-172.30 Proclus gives a number of cases where Plato allegedly derives his ideas from Homer. So he argues that Plato's account of the creation of the world in the Timaeus agrees with that implied by Homer (164.8-165.12), that Zeus'

84 See further below, pp. 327-8.

85 Cf. below, pp. 385, 392 and 395.

speeches to the gods in the Iliad accord with Tim. 41a (165.13-166.11), that Plato's description of the gods going to their intellectual feast of contemplation in Phaedrus 246e ff. is based on Il. 1.423-4 (166.12-167.9), that Homer's description of the gods as good and omnipotent agrees with the views of Plato in the Laws (167.10-168.2), that the nekuiai of Homer and Plato present the same true picture (168.3-169.24), that the linguistic theories of the Cratylus are based on Homer (169.25-170.26) and that Plato's philosophical psychology, particularly in Alc. I 129 ff., is in accordance with Od. 11.601 ff. and 90 ff. (171.22-172.30). A couple of these topics have already been treated by Proclus earlier in the essay: the opening of Il. 20 and Tim. 41a in 106.14-107.30, and the nekuiai of Homer and Plato in 117.27-122.20. Od. 11.601 ff. also came into the earlier section at 117-22. As earlier, so here much of the agreement which Proclus finds between his two authorities depends on his interpretation of them, particularly of Homer. For example, he interprets Phaedrus 246e ff. and Il. 1.423-4 as both describing the return of Neoplatonic metaphysical gods to their causes.

Proclus' treatment of these passages of Plato is in accordance not only with his interpretation of them elsewhere but also with the traditional interpretation of them. His interpretation of Tim. 41a is repeated again at In Tim. III 199 ff. where he again cites the opening of Il. 20 and again claims that Plato and Homer agree about Zeus' speeches to the gods.⁸⁶ I have argued in Chapter 3 (iv) that all this section

⁸⁶ See esp. In Tim. III 200.27 ff.

derives from Syrianus' lecture on the *κοινωνία τῶν σοφιστῶν* of Plato and Homer and traced some of the development of the interpretation of Phaedrus 246e ff., of Plato's nekuiai, and of the Cratylus.⁸⁷ In the case of the Phaedrus in particular we can see from Macrobius Sat. 1.23 that 246e ff. was already being put together with Il. 1.423-4 and interpreted as a physical allegory, before Iamblichus and Syrianus developed the allegorical interpretation of Plato and Homer respectively and carried both into the sphere of transcendent metaphysics.

Similarly the parallel Proclus draws between Alc. I 129 ff. and Od. 11.601-4 and 90 ff. was already well-established before his time. The different interpretations of Od. 11.601-4 have been collected and discussed by Pépin.⁸⁸ He argues that the interpretations in Plutarch De facie in orbe lunae 30.944f-945a, Ps.-Plutarch, Vita Homeri 123, Lucian D. Mort. 11 (16), Plotinus I.1.12, IV.3.27 ff., VI.4.16 and Proclus In Remp. 120.12-8 and 172.6-30, form a continuous tradition of interpretation, despite the differences between them, and that Alc. I is implicitly or explicitly behind them all. He suggests that the origins of this exegesis of Homer lie in post-Platonic Pythagoreanism, or in the Old Academy, or specifically in Xenocrates. It is interesting to find that once again we are driven back to the 4th century B.C., for many Neoplatonic doctrines seem to have their roots in the teaching of the Old

87 Pp. 203 ff. above.

88 J. Pépin, "Héraclès et son reflet dans le néoplatonisme", in the CNRS volume, Le néoplatonisme (Paris, 1971), pp. 167-92.

Academy. The 4th century B.C. also appears to have been the formative period for the tradition of anti-Platonic polemic to which I have been relating many of the questions discussed by Proclus. In 172.6-30 Proclus is equating Heracles' εἶδωλον with his body and Heracles αὐτός with the ψυχὴ νοερά which according to Proclus is indicated by αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό in Alc. I 130d. Ps.-Plu. Vita Homeri 123 draws attention to the use of the masculine participle ἔχων of Tiresias' soul in Od. 11.91, despite the feminine ψυχῇ in the previous line and says the usage shows that the soul was Tiresias the man, the essential Tiresias. Pépin points out how this interpretation of the grammatical anomaly lies behind Proclus' brief mention of Od. 11.90-1 in 172.28-30.⁸⁹

Pépin argues that the interpretation in In Remp. 120.12-8 is different from that in the later passage. In 120.22 ff. Proclus distinguishes εἶδωλον, ψυχῇ and νοῦς : ψυχῇ uses εἶδωλον and νοῦς is superior to both. 122.26 ff. suggest that the εἶδωλον is distinct from the body. Pépin thinks this passage is the interpretation of Od. 11.601-4 and that Proclus is now finding four parts of man implied by that Homer passage, where he later finds three. This is a mistake on Pépin's part. 120.22 ff. is an interpretation not of the lines about Heracles but of Il. 23.103-4, attacked in Rep. III 386d and paraphrased by Proclus in 118.8, τὸ εἶδωλον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ νοῦ φερόμενα. Proclus cites the

⁸⁹ Cf. also Buffière, p. 404. Buffière discusses some of the interpretations of Od. 11.601-4 on pp. 404-9 but without mentioning their relationship to Alc. I.

example of Heracles in 120.12-8 for a different purpose, the defence of Il. 22.362-3 and Od. 11.489-91 which had also been attacked by Plato. He explains that different types of soul behave differently when separated from the body and that Achilles $\pi\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\nu\ \delta\chi\omega\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}\nu$, by contrast with the deified Heracles, would naturally regret leaving the body. Proclus is here building on Plotinus I.1.12, where Od. 11.601-4 is taken as indicating the dual nature of the soul - part of it remains in the intelligible world while the rest, the $\epsilon'\delta\omega\lambda\omicron\nu$, falls into the material world. Heracles in Plotinus is an example of practical virtue: $\pi\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}\nu\ \epsilon'\chi\omega\nu$ (I.1.12.35 ff.) Proclus is not copying Plotinus here (he did not hold the Plotinian doctrine that part of each soul never falls at all) but making use of him. In Proclus Achilles becomes the example of practical virtue, Heracles of something higher. It may be that Alc. I 129 ff. lies behind Proclus' use of $\chi\rho\eta\sigma\theta\epsilon\iota$ in 120.25 (cf. 171.22 ff.) and that if pressed Proclus would have difficulty in making his interpretation of $\epsilon'\delta\omega\lambda\omicron\nu$ in Il. 23.103-4, at 120.22 ff., consistent with his interpretation of $\epsilon'\delta\omega\lambda\omicron\nu$ in Od. 11.601-4 in 172.6-30, but 120.12-8 is not directly inconsistent with 172.6-30 because they are not both using the same lines of Homer in the same way. Both are related to the tradition of interpretation traced by Pépin, but a careful comparison between them brings out that Proclus was using that tradition as it suited him in different contexts. In one case he uses it to contrast Achilles and Heracles, with the effect of reversing what Plotinus had made of Heracles, while in the other he uses the

link with Plato which was present in the tradition and makes the passage an example of the agreement of Plato and Homer.

The parallel between certain Homeric descriptions of the gods and Plato's Laws, which Proclus draws in 167.10-168.2 later became traditional. It recurs, for instance, in Olympiodorus In Grg., p. 65.20-4 and Ammonius In Porph. 3.9-15 Busse.⁹⁰ Proclus again affirms divine providence and refers to the Laws in Dec. Dub. I, p.3 where the "adamantinis sermonibus" of the Latin translation is the same phrase as the *ἀδαμαντίνους λόγους* of In Remp. 167.16, taken from Gorgias 509a1. In PT I.15, pp. 71.14-74.16 Saffrey-Westerink Proclus bases on Laws X 901d2-e3 an analysis of divine providence in terms of knowledge, power and will, though without reference to Homer. We do not find precisely this analysis, or the parallel with Homer, before Proclus. The systematisation involved suggests it could be Proclus' own, or he might be taking up a suggestion of Syrianus. In any case we have here a striking example of the pervasiveness of Proclus' influence on later Platonist commentators.

Of the seven examples which Proclus gives where Plato allegedly derives from Homer, four come from mythical parts of Plato's work (the two Timaeus examples, Phaedrus 246e ff., and the nekuiai). This is significant for it is in his myths that Plato draws upon the poets for the form in which he presents

90 For further references in Elias and David, see Saffrey and Westerink's note in their PT, Vol. I, p. 148 (note 1 for p. 71). Surprisingly, they omit to mention this In Remp. passage.

his ideas. The Neoplatonists take Plato's myths as seriously as they take all other myths, if not more so. The allegorical interpretation of Plato's myths makes possible the claim that their content as well as their form comes from Homer, for Homer too is interpreted in the same way. Proclus builds on genuine linguistic parallels between Plato's myths and Homer such as $\delta\alpha\iota\tau\alpha$ in Phaedrus 247a6 which does echo Homer's $\delta\alpha\iota\tau\alpha$ in Il. 1.424.⁹¹ 172.21 ff. is illuminating in this respect. There Proclus claims firmly that the parallel between Alc. I 129 ff. and Od. 11.601-4 is linguistic but also

more than that: ἀνυθὲν <ἄρα> ἀπὸ τῆς Ὀμηρικῆς
ὁδηγήσεως ἤρπηται τὰ περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῷ
Πλάτῳ δοκοῦντα, μηδὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποχομένῃ
τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν. τὸ γὰρ "αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό" πόθεν
ἀλλαχόθεν ἐν δῖβουμεν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ "αὐτὸς δὲ
μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν" ἔχει τὴν ἀφορμὴν, καὶ
τὸ τὴν ὁματικὴν φύσιν εἰδωλὸν τῆς ἀληθινῆς
οὐσίας ἀποκαλεῖν πῶς οὐχὶ παντὶ δήλον ἐκείθεν
μετενηνεγμένον; In this case even the linguistic parallel

is forced - I doubt if Plato had to go to Homer to learn one of the uses of αὐτός, let alone a possible meaning of εἰδωλόν - but the possibility of drawing it allows Proclus to go on and find a parallel in subject-matter too.

Proclus assumes that drawing on poetic myth means drawing on Homer. In fact Plato had more than just Homer to give him ideas. The cosmology of the Timaeus should be related to what

91 Cf. above, p. 207.

we know of earlier philosophical or quasi-philosophical cosmologies rather than directly to epic poetry, while Plato's mythical accounts of the soul and its afterlife are usually thought to contain Orphic and/or Pythagorean ideas. Thus Dodds in his note on Gorgias 523a1-524a7 expresses the view that the references to Homer in the eschatological myth of the Gorgias are "introduced ... to give an air of orthodoxy to a not wholly orthodox narrative".⁹² If that was Plato's intention here he has succeeded only too well in making Proclus believe that his narrative conforms to traditional Greek eschatology!

References to Homer by Plato himself are indeed the other main point on which Proclus builds. His treatment of the Cratylus in 169.25-170.26 depends on Plato's own use of Homer in Cra. 391-2 while for the eschatology in the Phaedo he is using a version of Od. 11.513-4 which has been emended to make its account of the four rivers of the underworld agree with Plato's use of them.⁹³

We would speak of Plato's use of Homeric language and motifs in his myths, or of his use of references to Homer in, for example, Cra. 391-2. Proclus' attitude to these Platonic allusions is fundamentally different from ours. He thinks not in terms of writers each giving an individual twist to existing material, but of their expressing one, unchanging truth. Since the truth does not change all its exponents agree with one

92 E.R. Dodds' edition of the Gorgias (Oxford, 1959), p. 373.

93 Cf. above, pp. 64-7.

another. Tradition for Proclus is not something which writers and thinkers can manipulate but something fixed and stable which different writers and thinkers can only express in different ways. This is not at all the modern concept of a literary or philosophical tradition. It is much closer to the religious notion of an eternal truth which may be re-interpreted in successive ages but remains essentially the same. The practice of allegorical interpretation goes hand-in-hand with this "religious" concept of tradition for it is by means of such interpretation that different writers - Plato and Homer in this case - are made to agree with each other.

In 169.25-170.26 Proclus gives a brief résumé of the Cratylus as he understood it.⁹⁴ According to him Plato divides ὀνόματα into two, those unknown to us which apply to things by nature, οὐκ ἐκ , and those known to us which apply by convention, ἐκ ἐκ . He equates the former with the divine names alluded to in Homer, the latter with the names which Homer says are those of men. The latter are subdivided into those used by sensible people, such as νομοθέται , and those used by more foolish people. The division into divine and human ὀνόματα is based on Cra. 391-2 and the references to Homer there, while the further subdivision of human ὀνόματα comes from 392c ff. and its reference to the two names by which Hector's son was known to men and women respectively, Astyanax and Scamandrius. The views Proclus expresses here are essentially the same as those he develops at greater length in his commentary

94 For the relationship of Proclus' interpretation to earlier Neoplatonic interpretation of the Cratylus, see above, pp. 212-5.

on the Cratylus and that work can help us to understand this page of the 6th essay.⁹⁵ Proclus sets out the *δύεα*/*θέεα* contrast at In Crat. 10, p. 4: Cratylus thinks *ὀνόματα* are *δύεα*, Hermogenes that they are *θέεα*, while Socrates takes an intermediate view that some are *δύεα* and some *θέεα*. This is the view which Proclus attributes to Plato in the 6th essay. The names of eternal things are more *δύεα*, those of perishable things more *θέεα*. Proclus gives Homer's *μυρία* as an example of *τὰ μόνιμῳς ἐν θεοῖς ἰδρυμένα* and his *πανέα* as an example of *τὰ ἐν ψυχῇς* (cf. Cra. 392a). Homer's divine and human names have been accommodated to the Neoplatonic metaphysical system, just as they are in the 6th essay. In In Crat. 51, p. 20.10 ff. Proclus divides *ὀνόματα* into three types: those which come from the gods, those which come from demons and angels and have been taught to men, and those which arise from divided (i.e. human) souls. This corresponds to the division of *ὀνόματα* into three types at In Remp. 170.21 ff. In In Crat. 70, p. 29.15 ff. Proclus draws attention to the fact that Plato turns to Homer in Cra. 391-2, even though he banishes him from his ideal state and in 71 he elaborates the different types of divine *ὀνόματα* in great detail. He claims that these divine *ὀνόματα* are what Socrates is talking about in Cra. 391-2 and just as In Remp. 170.11 says divine *ὀνόματα* are *εὐπρεπέστερά τε καὶ εὐδυνότερα* so In Crat. 34.15-6 tells us *τὰ μὲν θεόκητα ὀνόματα καὶ λεῖά εἰσι καὶ εὐχά καὶ ὀλιγοσύνταβώτερα*

95 On the In Crat., cf. Koch, pp. 227-30.

ἡπερ τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώποις . The subdivision of human ὀνόματα at In Remp. 170.13-6 is the same as that at In Crat. 35.13-5: οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀνθρώπων πάντων πρὸς θεῶν συγκρίνει ὀνοματοθεσίαν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἡρρενυμένων καὶ σοφῶν καὶ τοῖς πατρικοῖς αἰήσις ἀναλογούντων . Divine ὀνόματα are ἄρρητα καὶ ἀγνώστα (In Crat. 31.5 ff.) just as in the In Remp. (170.3).

Proclus also uses the Cratylus at In Remp. 140.8-11 where he refers to the etymology of Hera in 404b as supporting his own interpretation of Hera. He makes the same point, and the same link with the Homeric Hera, at In Crat. 169, pp. 92-3. Once again Neoplatonic metaphysical interpretation is used to make Plato and Homer agree.⁹⁶

Plotinus uses etymologies from the Cratylus in a similar way. Like him, Proclus takes the dialogue absolutely seriously, with never a suspicion of irony. He takes the reference to Homer as a genuine expression of respect for his authority. Read seriously, the Cratylus is splendidly Neoplatonic, but it should not be read altogether seriously. There is plenty of irony in the etymologies. On the other hand I am not at all sure that we should dismiss most of the dialogue as no more than a satire on the linguistic theories of contemporary sophists. There is a core of real Platonic views on language somewhere in it, even if that core is rather difficult to find and define.

Richard Robinson has argued in a very interesting article⁹⁷

⁹⁶ On the interpretation of Hera in the In Crat., cf. above, p. 183.

⁹⁷ "The Theory of Names in Plato's Cratylus", RIPh 9 (1955), pp. 221-36.

that Plato in the Cratylus is not in fact opposing language $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ to language $\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ as later theorists did. All the speakers in the dialogue assume that the origin of language is in convention; the argument is not about that but about whether the conventionally given names are in some way naturally appropriate; the view to which the "nature-theory" (as Robinson calls it) is opposed is never clearly defined. It seems to me that Robinson is right and therefore that Proclus is mistaken in reading the $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma / \theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ opposition back into the dialogue. He has read it in the light of later Greek attitudes to language and been misled by them.

However Proclus does not make another common mistake of interpretation to which Robinson draws attention. He does not think that the dialogue is about the origin of language. At In Remp. 169.29-170.2 he simply says it is concerned to expound $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\nu\ .\ .\ \eta\acute{\nu}\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\nu\ .\ .\ .\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\rho\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu$ and in In Crat. 1, p. 1 he says the $\delta\iota\omicron\mu\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ of the dialogue is to show $\eta\acute{\nu}\ .\ .\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\omega}\nu\ \chi\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\chi\epsilon\alpha\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \eta\acute{\nu}\ \acute{\alpha}\phi\omicron\mu\omicron\sigma\omega\tau\eta\kappa\acute{\eta}\nu\ \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\nu$. This aim is to be achieved by discussing the topic $\eta\acute{\nu}\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\nu\ \acute{\rho}\rho\acute{\omicron}\tau\eta\tau\alpha$ which is what Plato himself gives as the topic of the dialogue in its opening paragraphs. Robinson points out how the mistake arises from taking the mythical lawgiver as a serious historical figure and in general mistaking logical for historical analysis. Proclus takes the lawgiver seriously, but he does not treat him as a historical figure, any more than he treats the demiurge of the Timaeus as one. He draws the analogy between the two at In Crat. 51, p. 19.24 ff. Proclus does not interpret the

Timaeus as about the creation of the world in time, nor the Cratylus as about the origin of language. Instead he interprets both as concerned with the eternally existing order of metaphysics. He does not take logical for historical analysis but he thinks that logical analysis is analysis not just of the way we talk or think but of what really exists. Logic for him is indissolubly bound up with metaphysics, as indeed it was for Plato too, and he interprets the Cratylus in accordance with his own metaphysical system, classifying $\acute{\omicron}\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ into categories which parallel his categories of gods and demons.

Festugière, in his translation of the In Remp., points out that Proclus' division of $\acute{\omicron}\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ into three types in 170.21 ff. is not in the Cratylus although Proclus claims it is. We have seen that the same division is found in the In Crat. Proclus could be thinking not only of Cra. 391-2 but also of the $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha \acute{\omicron}\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ of Cra. 422 ff. These are the basic elements into which other $\acute{\omicron}\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ can be analysed and are not really at all like Proclus' divine $\acute{\omicron}\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ but Proclus, believing in his own theory, might well have seen a reference to it here. (Unfortunately the In Crat. as we have it does not extend to the later part of the dialogue, otherwise it could have told us how Proclus interpreted 422 ff.)

The whole 6th essay can be seen as an attempt to solve a contradiction in Plato, that of Plato's differing attitudes to poetry. Most of the essay is concerned with Plato and Homer and with interpreting these two authorities in such a way that they agree with one another. Towards the end of the essay, in the latter half of the second book, Proclus grapples

with Plato's statements on poetry as such and develops his theory of three types of poetry. He argues that the theory is to be found in both Plato and Homer and solves the contradiction in Plato by making different Platonic opinions fit different types of poetry. I shall discuss the theory of three types of poetry, both in itself and as an interpretation of Plato, in Chapter 6, but I want here to consider the way Proclus interprets the Ion as expressing the highest of his three types, inspired poetry. The Ion and the myth of the Phaedrus are the loci classici for Plato's views on poetic inspiration. In Chapter 3 I have shown how Proclus interprets Phaedrus 245a to make it express his inspired poetry.⁹⁸ He follows his interpretation of Phaedrus 245a with a close paraphrase and partial quotation of Ion 530-535 (182.21-185.7). Proclus' other references to the Ion in the 6th essay are to the praise of Homer in 530b, at 158.3-11,⁹⁹ another brief reference to the same passage at 163.15, and a reference to Ion 533e as evidence that Plato, like Proclus, really thinks Homeric poetry perfects *νόσος* rather than appealing to the *παθητικόν* in the soul (201.20-3). In all these passages Proclus treats the Ion seriously as evidence for Plato's favourable opinion of at least some poetry.

One way of resolving the contradiction in Plato's views of poetry is to take the Ion as ironical and without serious intent, or even to reject it as spurious. This course presents

98 Pp. 221-2 above.

99 Cf. pp. 284-6 above.

the interpreter with a Plato totally hostile to poetry and to inspiration. Such an excessively rationalist Plato would not be acceptable to Proclus, nor would it, I think, be a correct picture. If one takes the Ion seriously it is natural to align it with Phaedrus 245a, as Proclus does, and one then has to tackle the same problem as confronts Proclus. There are various middle positions, such as that of W.C. Greene.¹⁰⁰ He thinks that in the Ion Plato is accepting the traditional belief in poetic inspiration but, at the early period to which the dialogue belongs, is not yet clear about how this inspiration is related to real knowledge; Ion the rhapsode is being mocked but not the poet. We are faced with what is by now a familiar problem: given that there is irony in the Ion, as I think there is, how should we take it? How much serious philosophy lies behind the irony? Plato clearly distinguishes poetic inspiration from $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta$ and he is making his usual point that the poet does not have knowledge, even if, for whatever reason, the point is not being made in quite the usual form. Plato's irony bears more heavily on Ion the rhapsode than on poetry itself. He speaks warmly of poetic inspiration very much as he does in the Phaedrus. Yet Ion is the voice of the poet, the lowest link in the chain that hangs down from the Muse. It will not do to say that Ion is being ridiculed but the poet is not. The rhapsode and the poet stand or fall together. If we take the Ion together with the Phaedrus we must conclude that Plato is according poetic inspiration a certain worth in the right

100 In "Plato's View of Poetry", HSPH 29 (1918), pp. 1 ff.

place (the praise of inspired poetry in the Phaedrus comes in the myth.) But if the interpreters of poetry claim too much for it, as Ion does, then Plato will turn the full force of his irony upon them. Proclus' way of taking the praise of poetry in the Ion is perfectly tenable, though his failure to admit irony leads him, as usual, to treat it all rather too solemnly.

The other, related problem of interpretation commonly raised in connection with the Ion is its subject. Is it about rhapsodes, or about poetry, or about both? Modern critics disagree on this point. On the view I have just advocated, the dialogue is about both poetic inspiration and the interpreters of poetry, i.e. about both poetry and rhapsodes. Proclus, who is not commenting on the dialogue as a whole but only using it in the course of another argument, does not commit himself. It is interesting to note that the Renaissance Neoplatonist Marsilio Ficino thought the subject of the dialogue was poetic inspiration and subtitled his Latin translation of it, "De poetico furore". In the preface to his translation he expounds his concept of "poeticus furor" and equates that of the Ion with that of Phaedrus 245a.¹⁰¹ Ficino's concept of poetic inspiration sounds very like Proclus' - he thinks poetry comes from the gods, not from "ars" or "fortuna" - and it could well be that Proclus' use of the Ion here led Ficino to his belief that the dialogue was "de poetico furore".

101 P. 59r ff. of the Venice edition of 1491. Cf. Chs. XIII and XIV of his commentary on the Symposium and R. Marcel's introduction to his edition of that work (Paris, 1956), p.101.

There is little trace of any ancient interpretation of the Ion before Proclus. Athenaeus XI 506a gives the dialogue as an example of Plato abusing everybody and says that in it Plato κακολογᾷ πάντας τοὺς ποιητάς but this accusation, which may be traced back to Herodicus,¹⁰² hardly qualifies as interpretation. Much more interesting is Plotinus V.3.14.8 ff. Plotinus there compares our relationship to the One to the relationship of the inspired to what inspires them: Ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθουσιῶντες καὶ κάτοχοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τοσούτων καὶν εἰδέν, ὅτι ἔχουσι μᾶλλον ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶν μὴ εἰδέναι ὅτι, ἐξ ὧν δὲ κεκίνηνται καὶ λέγουσιν, ἐκ τούτων ἀβυθύνειν πῶς τοῦ κινήσαντος λαμβάνουσιν ἑτέρων ὄντων τοῦ κινήσαντος, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς κινδυνεύομεν ἔχειν πρὸς ἐκείνο (the One) ...

Henry and Schwyzer think the comparison alludes to Ion 533e where good poets are described as ἐνθεοὶ . . . καὶ κατεχόμενοι. Proclus' allusion to the same passage of the Ion in 201.20-3 places the inspiration of the poet very high among kinds of cognition.¹⁰³ It may well be that Proclus was encouraged to take the Ion as he does by Plotinus' allusion to it. Moreover, in the account of the magnetic chain of Muse-poet-rhapsode-audience he would see the later Neoplatonic doctrine of σειρά linking the different levels of reality. That he did take it in this way is clear from 184.2 ff. The σειρά finds its authority in the golden chain of Homer,

102 Cf. Düring, Herodicus, p. 32.

103 Cf. below, pp. 351 ff.

Il. 8.19-20¹⁰⁴ but the Ion could provide it with Platonic authority too.¹⁰⁵ Plotinus' use of the Ion and the doctrine of *εἶρσι* would thus combine to encourage Proclus in taking the Ion seriously and giving it an important place in the exposition of his theory of inspired poetry.

In the final section of the essay, 202.9-205.23, Proclus displays a striking historical awareness. He points out that Plato attacked poetry so severely in the Republic because of the excessive honour paid to it at the time. This is rather unexpected. Usually Proclus' "divine Plato" sounds like a being removed from any historical situation. Yet perhaps after all we should not make too much of Proclus' historical awareness here. Plato's position vis-à-vis the sophists and contemporary methods of education can easily enough be inferred from the Republic and even more from, for example, the Gorgias. Proclus prefers to draw inferences of this kind rather than ascribe *πᾶσι* to Plato (see 202.12-4): he considers an explanation in terms of external historical circumstances better than one in terms of internal psychological conflict.

Despite the differences in scope and purpose between the 5th and 6th essays Proclus' method of interpreting Plato is fundamentally the same in both. In both he is concerned to

104 Cf. P. Lévêque, Aurea catena Homeri (Paris, 1959), esp. pp. 61 ff.

105 J. Simon, Histoire de l'école d'Alexandrie (Paris, 1848), Vol. I, pp. 137-9, connects the magnetic chain of the Ion with the later Platonist belief in divine inspiration and the conviction that poetry, religion and philosophy could all be reconciled with one another, but more recent expositors of Neoplatonism seem to have missed this point.

expound Plato, to find authority in him for Neoplatonic doctrines, and to show that his work presents a consistent unity. In the 6th essay he attempts to make Homer part of the same unity, while in the 5th we can see him reconciling Aristotle and Plato in a similar concern to make all authorities agree. Platonic vocabulary and ideas are constantly behind Proclus' words, yet he is building something of his own, despite his conviction that all he is doing is interpret pre-existing truth. In three important respects his interpretation of Plato differs from ours: he has a "religious" concept of tradition and therefore looks at Plato's use of earlier philosophy or poetry in quite a different way; he very seldom admits irony in Plato; and he never interprets passages only in relation to their context, rather than to Plato's thought as a whole. Along with the last point goes his lack of any idea of chronological development in Plato's thought.

To understand Proclus' interpretation we need to understand how it is related to earlier interpretation of Plato and in particular to anti-Platonic polemic, to which he is often implicitly replying. We need too to appreciate how Neoplatonic philosophy and contemporary rhetoric affect his reading of Plato. He treats Plato's works as literature as well as philosophy and his knowledge of rhetoric helps him here.

Comparison of modern interpretations with Proclus has helped to bring out some of his basic attitudes to Plato, and to philosophy in general. In the remaining two chapters of my thesis I shall turn from Proclus' interpretation of his authorities to the theories about allegory and about poetry which he develops in the course of his exegesis.

CHAPTER FIVE

ALLEGORY, SYMBOLS AND MYSTERIES

At Rep. II 378d Plato refers, disparagingly, to the allegorical interpretation of myths. The word he uses is *ὑπόνοια*, "under-sense" or "hidden meaning". It is only later, in Hellenistic times, that *ἀλλήγορία* "saying something else" and the verb, *ἀλλήγορεῖν*, come to be used. Plutarch, for example, comments on the change in terminology at De aud. poetis 19e-f. Proclus does not use *ἀλλήγορία* and apart from his two quotations of the Plato passage which uses *ὑπόνοια* (79.29 ff. and 186.15 ff.) he uses the Platonic term in the 5th and 6th essays only at 131.7 and 153.2. He also uses *ἀνιβάεσθαι*, "to speak in riddles" (82.18, 83.3, 89.6, 93.23, 124.30. Cf. 118.18 where he speaks of *ἀνιψυατα* in Plato.) This is a very common term in ancient allegorical commentary used, for example, by Plutarch, Philo and Origen.¹

All the other terms which Proclus uses for allegory are taken from mystery-religion and from theurgy. The most frequent

¹ Cf. Buffière, Ch. III, pp. 45 ff. on these terms for allegory. For *ἀνιβάεσθαι* see, e.g., Plu. De Is. et Os. 366c and d; Philo, Opif. 154, Prob. 2; Origen, princ. IV.2.5 (12) (GCS V, p. 314. 11), Jo. II.5 (4) (GCS IV, p. 59.24) and see H. Crouzel, Origène et la 'connaissance mystique' (Toulouse, 1961), pp. 228-9. Cf. also O. Casel, De philosophorum graecorum silentio mystico, RGVV XVI.2 (1919) index s.v. *ἀνιβάεσθαι*. In rhetoric there is a distinction between the figures *ἀνιψυατα* and *ἀλλήγορία*: *ἀνιψυατα* are obscure both in language and in underlying meaning. See, e.g., Tryphon in Spengel, Rhetores Graeci III, p. 193.

term he uses is *σύμβολον* together with the related adjective and adverb. (See, e.g., 73.12, 83.9, 125.5 for *σύμβολον* and 131.6 for the related *συμβολικώτερον*). For Proclus *σύμβολον* has a special significance since it is a term used in theurgy. The theurgist operates with visible and tangible *σύμβολα*, stones, animals and plants which do not merely stand for invisible and intangible things but are thought to be inherently connected with them. The fragment of Proclus' work, On the Hieratic Art² tells us how certain plants and animals belong in this way to the sun and others to the moon. It is because the *σύμβολα* are inherently connected with the invisible and intangible realities they symbolise that action upon them can affect the other things in the cosmos of which they are symbols. The other term which has exactly the same sense in theurgy as *σύμβολον* is *σύνθημα* and this too Proclus uses of allegory, though less commonly (e.g. 147.6 and 138.5-6). We find a clear statement of what *σύνθημα* means to Proclus at In Remp. II 242.24-6: *σύνθημα γάρ τὰ ἐμφανῆ τῶν ἀφανῶν ἔστιν δυναμέων, τῶν ἀπορρώπων τὰ ἐν μορφαῖς ὁρώμενα διαστρέψαι.*

Proclus regularly uses *ἀπόρρητον* for the hidden meaning which he finds in myths: e.g. at 152.7-8 he speaks of

2 Published by J. Bidez in Catalogue des manuscrits alchimiques grecs, fasc. 6 (Brussels, 1928). It has been translated by A. Brémond in "Notes et documents sur la religion néoplatonicienne", Rec SR XXIII (1933), pp. 102-6 and, with some lines omitted, by A.J. Festugière in La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, Vol. I (3rd edn., Paris, 1950), pp. 134-6. For a commentary see H. Corbin in Eranos-Jb 24 (1955), pp. 199-205 and 263-7.

τῶν ἀπορρητότερον ὑπὸ τοῦ καθυγεμόνος ἡμῶν τεθεωρημένων.
ἀπόρρητον is a term commonly applied to the secrets

of the mysteries. An inscription from Eleusis of the 2nd century A.D. refers to τὰ τε ἀπόρρητα τῆς κατὰ τὰ μυστήρια τελετῆς.³ Proclus also uses the word μυστικός (e.g. 73.2, 78.22, 89,26, etc.) The parallel between understanding allegory and understanding mystery-rites runs right through Proclus' theoretical justification of allegory on pp. 71-86. It is explicitly developed in such passages as 75.5-16 and 78.14-79.4, and made use of in particular cases of actual allegorisation at 110.21-111.16 and 125.2-6. Already in the 5th essay Proclus compares the poetry of false imitation, which has a place in some states though not in Plato's ideal Republic, with τὰ συμβολικῶς λεγόμενα which do play a role in mystery-rites in preparing the audience to receive the divine (48.1-13).⁴

This mystery-language which Proclus uses as a model for the theory of allegorical poetry has two distinct origins, first in the traditional use of mystery-language in Greek philosophy, and secondly in theurgy.

The use of mystery-language in Greek philosophy is a vast topic, which I cannot hope to cover here other than selectively.⁵

3 SIG 873.9. Cf. also, e.g., Eur. Rhes. 943.

4 Cf. above, pp. 243-4.

5 For further details and references see E. Wind, Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance (revised Peregrine edn., London, 1967), Introduction, esp. pp. 1-6; G. Anrich, Das antike Mysterienwesen in seinem Einfluss auf das Christentum (Göttingen, 1894), pp. 60 ff.; Koch, Part II, Ch. 3, pp. 92 ff. and Ch. 5, pp. 198 ff. Cf. also P. Boyancé, Le culte des Muses chez les philosophes grecs (Paris, 1936) and J. Pépin, "Merikôteron-Epoptikôteron (Proclus In Tim. I 204. 24-7): Deux attitudes exégétiques dans le néoplatonisme", Mélanges Puech (Paris, 1975), pp. 323-30.

Already in Aristophanes' Clouds 143 and 254 ff. the knowledge available in Socrates' ἀπονητήριον is described as μυστήριον and Strepsiades has to go through mock rites of initiation before he can be admitted as a student.⁶ Aristophanes here is cashing out a metaphor in concrete terms for comic effect, as he so often does. Even today mystery-language survives when we speak of being "initiated into the mysteries" of, for example, Cordon Bleu cookery. In modern English the phrase is a dead metaphor, lacking in any associations with existing religious practice. Between Aristophanes and the modern dead metaphor lies a long and complicated history, in the course of which the metaphor is used to make different points and with different degrees of vitality.

Plato's metaphorical use of mystery-language is of central importance to the later development of mystery-language in philosophy and would, of course, be particularly significant for a Neoplatonist like Proclus. At Symposium 209e and 210e, for example, Diotima describes the philosopher's progression, from love of physical beauty to love of spiritual beauty to perception of the Form of Beauty itself, in terms of initiation into the mysteries.⁷ In the same way a fragment of Chrysippus (SVF II.17) tells us that ἀνομιαν, the highest of the three Stoic types of philosophy, includes theology διὸ καὶ τελετὰς ἡγορεύουσιν τὰς τοῦτον παρὰ δόξεις. The metaphor which was vivid and striking in Plato has become something of a cliché in

6 Cf. the notes in K.J. Dover's edition of the Clouds (Oxford, 1968) on lines 143 and 254.

7 Cf. Phaedrus 250b ff. and Phaedo 69c.

Chrysippus. In his Life of Alexander Ch. VII Plutarch records

that Aristotle taught Alexander οὐ μόνον τὸν ἠθικὸν καὶ
πολιτικὸν παραλαβὴν λόγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν
ἀπόρητων καὶ βαθυτέρων διδασκαλίων, ὥς οἱ ἄνδρες
ἰδίως ἀκροατικῶς καὶ ἐποπτικῶς προβαλλόμενοι οὐκ ἐξέδεον
εἰς πολλοὺς μεταχέειν. The "esoteric" Aristotelian doctrines

which Alexander was taught are here described in terms of
mysteries (notice ἐποπτικῶς .) The passage which follows
makes it clear that the doctrines in question are Aristotle's
Metaphysics⁸ and Plutarch comments on their difficulty and
the need of philosophical training to understand them. The
mystery-language here has often been taken seriously and
along with other testimony to the division between "exoteric"
and "esoteric" works of Aristotle has contributed to the legend
of "secret doctrines" in the ancient philosophers. Mystery-
language was already taken in this way by Clement of Alexandria
(see Strom. V.9.58.3 ff. - GCS II, p. 365). I. Düring and
G. Boas⁹ have shown that these "secret doctrines" are only
a legend, without basis in fact. In other words, the mystery-
language in this Plutarch passage too is metaphorical. Theon
of Smyrna presents us with a detailed parallel between philosophy
and mysteries in his Expositio rerum mathematicarum (pp. 14.18 ff.
Hiller). He not only calls philosophy μυστικὴν . . . ἀληθεύς

8 I follow J.R. Hamilton in his commentary (Oxford, 1969), p. 20
in accepting the MSS μετα τὰ φυσικά in VII.9 and not adopting
Xylander's emendation περὶ τὰ φυσικά as Ziegler does in
his Teubner text.

9 I. Düring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition
(Göteborg, 1957), pp. 426 ff. G. Boas, "Ancient Testimony to
Secret Doctrines", PhR 62 (1953), pp. 79-92.

τελεμῆς καὶ τῶν ὄντων ὡς ἀληθῆς μυστικῶν παράδοξιν
 but also distinguishes degrees of philosophy in accordance
 with five stages of initiation into the mysteries. Theon
 explicitly relates his use of this parallel to Plato's
 metaphor. The mystery metaphor is similarly used for philosophy
 in Iamblichus' Vita Pythagorica Ch. 17 and the "esoteric"
 doctrines of the Pythagorean school are there described
 as reached only in the final stage of initiation. Proclus
 himself develops the idea that Plato's doctrine is a *μυστικὴν*
περὶ τῶν θεῶν and an *ἐκπαιδεία* at the opening of
 the Platonic Theology (I.1) and in his Commentary on the
Timaeus he uses *ἐκπόνητον* of esoteric philosophical doctrines.¹⁰
 Is such mystery-language commonplace and without much meaning,
 as it is in Chrysippus, or did Iamblichus and Proclus really
 think of progress in philosophy as a kind of progress in
 mysteries? We shall be better able to answer this difficult
 question when we have seen some further aspects of Proclus'
 use of mystery-language.

In the 5th and 6th essays the language of the mysteries
 is applied to allegory of Homer, not, as at the opening of
 the Platonic Theology, to pure philosophy. The idea that the
 hidden meaning of poetry is parallel to a mystery can be found
 in Heraclitus' All. 53, 64 and 76, in a work which is
 allegorical commentary, not technical philosophy. The parallel

10 See, e.g., In Tim. 20.29-21.2. Cf. also PT III 20,
 p. 163.17-26 Portus and IV.16, p. 216.12-3; p. 217.44-
 218.11; Marinus Chs. 13 and 22; etc.

between allegorical interpretation and what happened in the mysteries would be facilitated by the need to allegorise actual mystery-rites such as those of Eleusis and so make them morally and intellectually acceptable.¹¹

In Philo the two types of usage come together, apparently for the first time, and we find mystery-language used in a context of both metaphysics and allegory together. When Philo introduces an allegorical interpretation with mystery-language, as at Cher. 27 or Abr. 122, an allegory in terms of transcendent metaphysical or theological entities is involved and the Biblical story is interpreted in terms of God and his powers and not, as is more common in Philo, in terms of moral abstractions such as virtue or happiness or the lover of wisdom.

The difficulty of understanding the allegorical meaning of a work made the mystery metaphor peculiarly apt for allegory. Initiation into the mysteries was thought of as something which required purification and special spiritual preparation, just as the understanding of allegory was something which required special intellectual preparation and training. The other side of this is the exclusivity of both allegory and mystery-rites. Mysteries were revealed only to initiates and Proclus makes it clear that his allegories are similarly exclusive and that only those with proper training can understand the Homeric myths aright. Thus at 74.19 he speaks of τοῖς δεινομένοις

11 On ancient interpretations of mystery-rites, cf. F. Cumont, Lux perpetua (Paris, 1949), Ch. V, pp. 235 ff.

παρὰ πειρὰ μυστικῶν using, as often, the standard idea of the literal meaning as a "veil" for the allegorical meaning, and at 74.20-4 he explains that the literal meaning of myths functions as a kind of protective barrier. This barrier keeps off the profane from the sacred truths of the allegorical meaning and Proclus uses mystery terminology to describe how it works (βεβήλους, μυστηριακῶς). The profane in this context are particularly the young who lack philosophical wisdom and experience and are therefore more impressionable and open to corruption.

As applied to allegory the mystery-metaphor is more than just a cliché. Like Philo, Proclus takes up the mystery parallel from allegorical interpretation on the one side and, under the influence of the philosophical usage of the parallel on the other side, puts it to use to talk about one particular kind of allegory. We have seen in Chapter 3¹² that Proclus takes over from Syrianus a distinctive type of allegory, allegory in terms of transcendent metaphysical entities. If the ἀπόρρητα of philosophy are metaphysics then it makes excellent sense to call a metaphysical allegorical meaning ἀπόρρητον.

The point becomes clear when we look at Proclus' use of the word μυστικός both in connection with allegory and elsewhere. At 73.16-8 Proclus compares Homer's myths with Plato's:

ὥστερ αὐτὸς ὁ Πλάτων πολλὰ χῆ δ' αὖτε τῶν ἐκόντων
τὰ θεῶν μυστικῶς ἀναδιείκεν. One might think

12 Esp. pp.133-6 and 190 ff. above.

μυστικός is used there because the reference is to Plato's
 myths: so it is but it is also used because it is the
 appropriate word where knowledge of τὰ θεῖα is concerned.
 Similarly at 89.26 the myths of the poets about battles
 among the gods are called εἰ μυστικὰ τῶν θεολόγων
 δῆμα, at 171.12 there is mention of the μυστικὰ διανοήματα
 in Homeric poetry and at 174.19-20 we find the phrase
 τοῖς δὲ νοεροῖς περὶ θεῶν καὶ μυστικῶς διανοήμασιν.
 Thought, mysteries and the gods all go together and the
 implications are not only that μυστικὴ νόσις is the
 highest kind of cognition but also that this kind of
 cognition can be attained and expressed by means of myths.
 The usage of mystery-language in other works of Proclus confirms
 that this is his view. At PT V.3, p. 254.1 ff. Portus, Proclus
 again discusses the myths which Plato excludes from his ideal
 state and expresses the same views as we find in the 6th essay.
 He refers to τὴν ἀπόρρητον αὐτῶν εἰδήθειαν and calls
 them μυστικῶν ἐπινοημάτων ἐνδεικτικὰ. At In Crat. p.
 51.8-13 the knowledge that Zeus is demiurge, father of every-
 thing and unparticipated nous is called τὴν περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ
 τούτου μυστικὴν εἰδήθειαν and at In Tim. III.12.28-9
 the doctrines of Plato's Parmenides, which deals with meta-
 physics, are called ἡ τοῦ Παρμενίδου μυστικὴ παράδοσις.

Proclus' belief that mystical experience is the highest
 kind of cognition means that ἀπόρρητος and μυστικός are
 not just conventional labels for metaphysics and metaphysical
 allegory but do have a specific meaning. Expressions taken
 originally from the mysteries have now become technical terms

in a precise philosophical system. Thus what begins as a meaningful metaphor in Plato, becomes a dead metaphor in Chrysippus, but revives in association with allegory takes its place in Proclus as part of an organised philosophical terminology. We shall see in Chapter 6 that Proclus describes poetic inspiration in terms of mystical experience and that this too can be brought into a precise relation with late Neoplatonic epistemology.¹³

To say that language taken originally from the mysteries becomes technical philosophical terminology in Proclus might suggest that the metaphor has lost all its original force, especially when we consider how extensively it had been used in Greek philosophy. This is not the case. We have already seen that the metaphor was less likely to lose its meaning once it became associated with allegory and I have mentioned the Neoplatonic belief that mystical experience was the highest kind of cognition. For the later Neoplatonists this belief in mystical experience was associated with a belief in theurgy and it is to this second source of Proclus' mystery-language that we must now turn.

The later Neoplatonists have acquired a bad name for practising theurgy and have often been accused of debasing the rationalism of Plotinus by substituting magic for intellectual contemplation as a means of achieving union with the divine. Thus Edgar Wind, in his discussion of mystery-language in antiquity,¹⁴ distinguishes three senses of the term "mysteries":

13 Pp. 351 ff below.

14 See note 5 above.

ritual, figurative and magical. Of these the ritual sense refers to such ancient mystery-rites as those of Eleusis, the figurative is the metaphorical sense which I have been discussing, used by Plato and others, and the magical is the sense used by the later Neoplatonists for their practice of theurgy. Wind's view implies on the one hand that Proclus and the rest thought of theurgic rites as mystery-rites and so gave their mystery-language a real content, and on the other that theurgy was no more than vulgar magic. I would argue that the practice of theurgy did give mystery-language a new significance but that Proclus never loses sight of the traditional use of such language in philosophy. Whatever the more sensational, magical aspects of theurgy, it is wrong to condemn a rigorous thinker like Proclus as a "solemn trifler".¹⁵

The Neoplatonic evidence for theurgic practices has been surveyed and discussed by Dodds¹⁶ while Boyancé has argued¹⁷

15 The phrase is Wind's - op. cit., p. 6. A similar problem arises in the study of Renaissance Neoplatonism and there Wind argues that the Renaissance antiquaries regarded the figurative sense of "mysteries" as basic and held differing attitudes to the actual practice of magic. On the link between magic and the theory of symbolism in the Renaissance, cf. E.H. Gombrich, "Icones Symbolicae" in Symbolic Images. Studies in the Art of the Renaissance (London, 1972), pp. 170-8 (amplified version of a study which appeared in JWI 11 (1948), pp. 163 ff.)

16 In The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), Appendix II, "Theurgy", pp. 283 ff. The essay is reprinted from JRS 37 (1947), pp. 55-69. Cf. also The Ancient Concept of Progress (Oxford, 1973), "Supernormal Phenomena in Classical Antiquity", pp. 200 ff. for a comparison of theurgy with modern spiritualism.

17 "Théurgie et téléstique néoplatoniciennes", RHR 147 (1955), pp. 189-209.

that the Neoplatonic term *τελεστική* covers more than just the magical practices of theurgy and has older origins. He suggests that Neoplatonic "telestic" had its roots in the mysteries of Eleusis and in Orphic rites, not just in the Chaldaean Oracles and the theurgy practised by their authors.

It may well be that several streams flowed together to constitute the magical rites practised by Proclus: Marinus (Ch. 19) records that he practised the rites of all pagan religions. All the same I do not think Boyancé is right to imply that the Eleusinian mysteries influenced Proclus directly. Such influence is rather filtered through the traditional philosophical attitudes to mysteries. The Chaldaean Oracles themselves present a strange mixture of Platonic and magical ideas and the search for the precise origins of Neoplatonic ritual practice is a difficult and rather unsatisfactory undertaking. It seems best to rest with Dodds' broad definition of theurgy as we find it in the Neoplatonists: "magic applied to a religious purpose and resting on a supposed revelation of a religious character."¹⁸

I am dealing here not so much with Proclus' practice of theurgy as with his theoretical attitude to it and his use of terminology deriving from it. The words *σύμβολον* and *ἐνθύμημα* which, as we have seen, Proclus uses of myths which require to be interpreted allegorically, can be traced clearly

¹⁸ The Greeks and the Irrational (op. cit. above, note 16), p. 291.

to the Chaldaean Oracles.¹⁹ Fragment 108 in des Places' edition of the Chaldaean Oracles reads

Σύμβολα γὰρ πατρικὸς νόος ἔδπειρεν κατὰ κόσμον
ὅς τὰ νοητὰ νοεῖ· καὶ καλήν ἄφραστον καλεῖται.²⁰

In fragment 109 σύνθημα is used in the same sense as σύμβολον in 108. The two terms recur in Iamblichus, for example in De myst. II.11.96.19 and 97.5, and IV.2.184.5 and 12.²¹ Fragment V of Proclus' Eclogae de philosophia chaldaica²² states that every soul is composed of νοεραὶ λόγοι and θεῖα σύμβολα. The former come from the intellectual Forms, the latter come from the divine henads and make union with the divine possible. In this fragment Proclus uses σύμβολον and σύνθημα interchangeably and explicitly connects σύνθημα with the Chaldaean Oracles (τὰ λόγια).

Theurgy, like other similar types of magic, makes use of the old idea of cosmic sympathy in a systematically organised way: specific σύμβολα or σύνθηματα have a sympathy with specific other things in the cosmos. This kind of systematisation was precisely what Proclus achieved in his metaphysics and physics. Everything in both the natural and the intelligible world was organised and classified both as belonging to a particular level of being and as belonging

19 Of course the history of both words, particularly of σύμβολον goes much further back, but it is the Chaldaean Oracles which are important for Proclus' usage. On the history of σύμβολον, cf. Coulter, Ch. 2, Appendix I, pp. 60-8. Coulter fails to realise the importance for Proclus of the use of σύμβολον in theurgy and the Chaldaean Oracles.

20 Cf. des Places' notes and Lewy, p. 191, with notes 55-6. The reference to Lewy, notes 255-6, in des Places is an error.

21 Cf. des Places' introduction to his Orac. Chald., pp. 28-9.

22 Ed. A. Jahn (Halle, 1891).

to a particular $\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}$ or $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$, i.e. inherently related to other members of the same $\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}$ on other levels of being, just as one link in a chain is related to the others. Thinking of it diagrammatically, we may say that the world was conceived as organised into both horizontal and vertical lines. The heliotrope, on the low level of plant life, is a $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\mu\beta\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$ of the sun which is in the same $\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}$, the same "vertical line", but on a higher level of being, a higher "horizontal" line. The sun in turn is a $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\mu\beta\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$ of higher realities in the same $\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}$ such as the god Apollo, and ultimately, as in Plato Rep. VI, of the transcendent Good which is the Neoplatonic One. The belief that such "vertical line" relationships hold between the natural world and the intelligible world is equally essential both to theurgy and to Proclus' metaphysics. To put it another way, it was because he believed in a particular kind of metaphysical system that Proclus could believe in and practise theurgy. To say that A is a $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\mu\beta\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$ of B is not just to say that magical operations on A will produce effects on B, but is also to say something about the relative places of A and B in the structure of the universe. $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\mu\beta\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$ is a much more precise and meaningful term for Proclus than the English word "symbol" is for us.²³

Mystery-language as traditionally used in Greek philosophy refers not to mystery-rites but, however weakly and metaphorically, to experience. When Diotima calls the final stage in the progress

23 Cf. Dodds, ET, pp. 222-3, note on prop. 39, for Proclus' use of $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\mu\beta\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$ in general.

to vision of the Form of Beauty τὸ . . . τέλος καὶ ἐποπτικὸν
 (Smp. 209e) she means not that Socrates will go through any
 actual rites but that he will experience a marvellous vision
 like that experienced by the initiate who had gone through
 the final rites in the mysteries. The comparison of philosophy
 with mystery-rites is always fundamentally a comparison
 between the experience of the philosopher and the experience
 of the initiate. I do not mean that such a comparison
 always implies that the end of philosophy is mystical
 experience. Even in Plato the point is rather that the
 philosopher's knowledge, attained by dialectic, is worth
 more than any knowledge gained in the mysteries. The later
 Neoplatonists, however, believed both in the possibility
 of mystical experience and in the efficacy of the actual
 rites of theurgy. For them the end of philosophy was mystical
 experience and they took the mystery-language used by Plato
 and others quite seriously. Did Proclus refer all such
 language to the rites of theurgy, believing that only through
 those rites could mystical experience be attained? This
 leads to the difficult question whether the later Neoplatonists
 did entirely abandon the Plotinian ideal of intellectual
 contemplation or continued to believe both in that ideal
 and in theurgy as alternative ways of reaching the divine.
 Proclus' attitude to theurgy is not like Plato's attitude
 to the mysteries. I do not doubt that he believed in
 the efficacy of theurgy and Marinus tells stories of his

activities as a magician.²⁴ Yet at the same time Proclus does not seem to regard theurgy as the only means of attaining union with the gods, and the One. Recently Andrew Smith has discussed the apparent contradiction between PT I.25, p. 113.4 ff. Saffrey-Westerink, where theurgy is called *κρείττων ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπων σωτηρίας καὶ ἐμάνης* and In Crat. 32.28 ff. and 65.25f. where theurgy is said not to operate beyond the level of the *νοητὸν θεόν*.²⁵ Smith argues that Proclus, and Iamblichus, divided theurgy into a higher branch, concerned with uniting the individual soul to the divine, and a lower branch, concerned with the material world, but that ritual was not absent from the higher branch. He rejects the distinction made, for example, by Rosàn²⁶ between a higher, "contemplative" theurgy in which ritual played no part and a lower, purely ritual theurgy. Certainly it is clear that while theurgy could be used, like vulgar magic, to bring about effects in the material world, Proclus, and Iamblichus, attached such importance to it because it could promote the union of the individual soul with the divine. Smith does not really solve the problem of just how theurgic ritual and intellectual contemplation were related

24 Marinus, Chs. 28 and 29. On the problem of reconciling what appears to us as vulgar superstition and magic with Proclus' philosophical acumen, cf. the interesting articles by A.J. Festugière, "Proclus et la religion traditionnelle", Mélanges Piganiol 3 (Paris, 1966), pp. 1581-90 and "Contemplation philosophique et art théurgique chez Proclus" in Studi di storia religiosa della tarda antichità (Messina, 1968), pp. 7-18. Both are reprinted in Festugière's Études de philosophie grecque (Paris, 1971), pp. 575-84 and 585-96.

25 Smith, Ch. 8 "Theurgy in Proclus", pp. 111-21.

26 Rosàn, pp. 212 ff.

in promoting this union.²⁷

There are some signs of disagreement among the Neoplatonists themselves on this point. The pupils of Iamblichus' pupil Aedesius differed in their attitudes to theurgy. According to Eunapius VS VII.2 (p. 43.5 ff. Giangrande) Eusebius of Myndus disapproved of it, while Chrysanthius and Maximus made striking and "theatrical" use of it: the youthful Julian was more attracted by the magic of Chrysanthius and Maximus than by the solemn warnings of Eusebius.²⁸ Hermias 86.22 ff. records the opinion of *τινές* that *τελεστική* was effective only in the area beneath the moon. Presumably following Syrianus Hermias himself rejects this view. Moreover at Hermias 92.6 ff. we find that Proclus asked Syrianus a question about the relationship of *τελεστική μανία* to *μαντική* and *έρωτική μανία*. It is clear from Hermias' discussion that Syrianus and his pupils understood the *τελεστική μανία* of the Phaedrus to refer to theurgy, and Proclus was apparently puzzled that Plato placed it below *μαντική* and *έρωτική μανία* despite the importance which the Platonists of the 5th century A.D. gave to it. Hermias' report of Syrianus' answer is not easy to follow, but it seems that Syrianus maintained the primacy of *τελεστική* only *ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου βίῳ πράγματι* and not *ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτῇ* (92.13-5). It is tempting to suppose that if Proclus was already concerned about this problem

27 Cf. also Wallis, p. 153 and note 3 there.

28 Cf. The Greeks and the Irrational (op. cit. above, note 16), p. 288.

when he and Hermias heard Syrianus lecture on the Phaedrus, then his own views may have changed and developed in the course of time. This might explain some of the contradictions in what he says about theurgy in different works. Clearly further systematic research is needed on this problem. In my view Proclus did believe both in intellectual contemplation of a Plotinian type and in the rites of theurgy as ways of achieving mystical experience. We do not at present know enough about his views, or those of other late Neoplatonists, to say precisely how these two ways were related in his thought. What we can say is that the belief on which theurgy depends, that *σύμβολα* of an intelligible world are to be found in the material world, provides Proclus with an important theoretical model. It appears from Ecl. de phil. chald. Frag. V that he thinks of the "one in the soul" as a *σύμβολον* of the transcendent One and that it is because of this *σύμβολον*-relationship that any mystical union, including that achieved by Plotinian intellectual contemplation, is possible. Perhaps Proclus came to re-interpret the Plotinian way of achieving mystical union in terms of the theory behind theurgy, and that is why it can look as though he subordinated it to ritual theurgy.²⁹

In the In Crat. the theurgic practice of putting *σύμβολα* on statues to make them like the gods and so able to receive the presence of the gods is compared to the giving of names to things in such a way that the name is like the thing named.

29 Cf. C. Zintzen, "Mystik und Magie in der Neuplatonischen Philosophie", RhM N.F. 108 (1965), pp. 71-100, esp. pp. 93 ff. On the "one in the soul" and Proclus' theory of mysticism see further above, pp. 224-9 and below, pp. 364 ff.

(In Crat.p.19.12-9; cf.p.25.1-7) In general in the In Crat. Proclus takes the view that words are *σύμβολα* of things. There is a link here with his theory of allegory for the idea that there is an essential connection between the name or, more generally, the word, and the thing which it signifies is only one particular form of the idea that there is an essential connection between symbol and thing symbolised. An allegorist who believes that there is one particular deeper meaning, and one only, which the literal meaning of a work stands for, believes in such an essential connection. If there were no such connection between symbol and thing symbolised there could be several possible interpretations of a work and no one interpretation would have an exclusive claim to be correct. Proclus is making such a claim to be authoritative in his interpretations and when he admits the possibility of more than one meaning it is only because the different meanings are different ways of looking at the same thing or reflections of the same truth on different levels of being.

In the In Tim. the statues used in *τελεγονική* which contain both visible and hidden *σύμβολα* of the gods are compared to the sensible world which contains both visible and hidden *σύμβολα* of the intelligible world (273.10-8) and the *τελεγονής* who adorns the statues is compared to the demiurge of the world (III.6.8-15; cf. I.330.1-331.5) In the Neoplatonist view these statues, as a part of the world, reflect the nature of the whole; that is why the comparison makes sense.

When Proclus calls myths *σύμβολα* he is associating his theory of allegory with his theory of language, with the

theory behind theurgy, and with the basic principles of his metaphysics. He is also infusing new life into the traditional mystery-language by associating it with a ritual which he practised and in which he believed. At the same time the mystery metaphor finds its place in an organised philosophical terminology since mystical experience, whether attained by ritual theurgy or by intellectual contemplation, has a precise place in his epistemology as the highest of a series of kinds of cognition.

We can now return to the question raised on p.312 whether Iamblichus and Proclus really thought of progress in philosophy as a kind of progress in mysteries. The argument I have been pursuing leads me to answer that they did. When Iamblichus describes progress in philosophy as progressive initiation in the mysteries in Vita Pythagorica Ch. 17 he is following the traditional usage of such language, although his belief in theurgy would give it a special meaning for him. In the De myst., as we have seen, he uses the language of theurgy and the Chaldaean Oracles.

The two types of language, from the two sources of philosophical tradition and theurgy respectively, have already come together in Julian. This suggests that they did so in Iamblichus from whom Julian derived much of his philosophy. In Or. V.172d Julian describes the doctrine of the Chaldaean Oracles as ἄρρητος μυστηρίου. In Or. VII.215c ff. he divides philosophy into branches, of which the highest is τὸ θεολογικόν and goes on to say that μυθογραφία is appropriate only for a very limited area of philosophy, τοῦ θεολογικοῦ τῇ τελεστικῇ καὶ

μυστικῶ . Although τελεστικός is a term associated with
 mystery and magic from Plato onwards, it would have special
 significance for Julian as related to the Neoplatonic
 "telestic" art of animating statues. In the passage which
 follows Julian develops the mystery parallel: διὰ γὰρ
 ἣ φύσις κρύπτεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀποκρυπνόμενον τῆς τῶν
 θεῶν οὐσίας οὐκ ἀνέχεται γυμναῖς εἰς ἀκαθάρτους ἀκοῆς
 ῥίπτεσθαι ῥήμασιν. φύσις κρύπτεσθαι διὰ is a
 saying attributed to the philosopher Heraclitus and
 common in this kind of context³⁰ and ἀκαθάρτους refers to
 the purification necessary before initiation into mysteries of
 any kind. Later in the same speech, (235a ff.), Julian
 describes his own education in philosophy in terms of initiation
 into the mysteries. It is this education which, he claims,
 has made him adopt the right attitude to myths and poetry.
 All the elements of Proclus' use of mystery-language are present
 here although not systematically organised or developed in
 detail.

In Or. VII Julian distinguishes between inspired and
 educational myths. (See, e.g., VII.223a) Proclus uses a similar
 distinction in the 6th essay in order to reconcile Homer and
 Plato. The distinction is clearly set out at 76.24 ff.:

διαρετέον εἶναι τὰς τῶν μύθων προαγρέσεις καὶ χωρὶς
 ἀφοριστέον τοὺς τε παιδευτικούς λεγόμενους καὶ τοὺς
 ἐνθεαστικωτέρους καὶ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν ἀποβλέποντας
 μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀκουόντων ἑξίν . A distinction between
 types of audience follows. Educational myths are suited to

30 Cf. Proclus In Remp. II 107.6-7.

the young, inspired myths to those capable of understanding metaphysics. (cf. 80.4-13 and 81.12 ff. where the different effects of the two types are set out: educational myths produce ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, inspired myths produce τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεὸν συνᾶσθαι.) In 84.12 ff. there is a similar distinction between inspired and educational ἀρμονία which is correlated with the two types of μυθολογία in 84.24-6. The distinction between the two types of myths is made again at 140.6-19, where Phaedrus 245a has clearly influenced the thought and phraseology of lines 16-9. Plato in Rep. II and III is concerned with the education of the young and with what sort of literature is suitable for them. Proclus is always ready to admit that Homer, writing inspired myths which require to be allegorically interpreted in terms of metaphysics, is not suitable school reading.

In the Neoplatonist universe the structure of the whole is mirrored in every part and man in particular reflects, as a microcosm, the structure of the macrocosm. Accordingly Proclus describes the man who is fit to understand inspired myths as subduing the childish and youthful element in his own soul, τὸ παιδαριώδες τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ νεαρὸς πρῆπτός, at 80.23-81.10. The distinction between two types of audience has here become a distinction between different parts of the soul. Inspired myths are suitable for the rational part of the soul and for nous, not for the irrational part and for phantasia. This links up with the belief that inspired myths are really about metaphysical entities:- the highest part of

the soul is needed to understand them properly.³¹

The distinction between different types of audience is again taken into the individual soul, in a more detailed way, in a passage in the 16th essay, near the beginning of Proclus' commentary on the myth of Er, at In Remp. II 107.14-109.3.

There Proclus explains that the reason why we take pleasure in myths is that we have not only rational nous in our souls but also irrational phantasia. He does not just say that phantasia takes pleasure in the literal story while nous appreciates the deeper meaning but declares at 107.23-6 that the relationship of literal meaning to hidden meaning is just like that of phantasia to nous: the one covers over and obscures the other. The extent to which everything reflects everything else in the Neoplatonist universe can be quite bewildering! Proclus goes on to say that it is important that our phantasia which, as we recall from the passage in the 6th essay, is the childish part of our soul, should be presented with clean and appropriate literal meanings and he refers to Plato's condemnation of myths as bad for $\alpha\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$ $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ though he makes no mention here of the theory of inspired myths. He makes a detailed comparison between the effects of myths and the effects of the mysteries (which, he rather confusingly adds, do themselves make use of myths): even among the initiated there are different levels of comprehension. The different tropoi of interpreting such myths as

31 Cf. also Proclus' correlation between three parts of the soul, three types of life and three types of poetry at 177 ff. See above, pp. 224-5 and below, p. 392.

the Theomachy in the 6th essay would, I think, be considered appropriate to different levels of comprehension in this way.³² By speaking of phantasia as the childish part of the soul Proclus takes the exclusivity of inspired myths inside the human individual and thereby links it with the originally Platonic idea that only the highest and most rational part of the soul can apprehend the deepest truths of philosophy. Just as the uninitiated are shut out from the mysteries so phantasia is shut out from understanding the allegorical meaning of myths. In the passage from the 16th essay Proclus makes further use of his psychology to provide rather a good explanation of why human beings take pleasure in myths.³³

Both myths and mysteries can be misunderstood and taken in the wrong way by the ignorant and uninitiated. It is of course for this reason that the young are to be excluded: it is not just that they will not understand the myths but that there is positive danger in the mistaken ideas which, in their ignorance, they will receive from them. This element of the parallel between myths and mysteries is explicitly worked out by Proclus at 75.5-25 and 76.8-17, in order to make the point that such misunderstanding is the fault of the audience, not of the myths or mysteries themselves. These passages introduce two further parallels. In the first there is a parallel with the creation of the world: the providential organisation of the

32 Cf. above, pp. 136-41.

33 Cf. Olymp. In Grg. 46.3, p. 237.14 ff. and 6, p. 239.12 ff. In general this whole section of Olympiodorus may be compared with Proclus' theoretical justification of allegory.

world is not responsible for the way in which some people abuse the things in the world any more than the myths or the mysteries are responsible for the way in which people misunderstand them. In the second passage the new parallel is with the abuse of alcohol: just as it does not follow that alcohol is bad because some people misuse it, so it does not follow that myths, or mysteries, are bad because some people misunderstand them. The parallel with the creation of the world, which recurs at the very end of the essay, at 205.13-21, is important. For Proclus these comparisons are not just literary similes which find or create convenient similarities to illustrate the point at issue. The points of comparison are really there all the time and the nature of Homeric poetry really does reflect the nature of the world (and vice versa) just as the division of the thinking part of the soul into irrational phantasia and rational nous really does parallel exactly the distinction between the impressionable young and the mature and reflective old. We can see how seriously Proclus took such a comparison from In Alc. 10.13-4 where he develops a parallel between the elements in a Platonic dialogue and the elements in the cosmos.³⁴ Similar comments apply to the parallel with alcohol which Proclus has picked up from Plato's Laws.³⁵

Another way in which mystery-language is appropriate for Proclus' allegory becomes clear at 77.29-79.4. Here we are told

34 Cf. also Anon. Prol. 15.2-13, 16 and 17, with Westerink's introduction, p. xxxv. On the parallel between the demiurge and the creative artist, see Coulter, p. 30, note 23 and pp. 95 ff.

35 See above, p. 271.

that what the myths say is true of the lowest members of the divine chains, the demons, and Proclus compares the way in which mystery-rites take account of the demons as well as of the higher gods. The idea that one has to propitiate the demons to make sure they do not hinder the operations which are being carried out is common in ancient magic. In the fragment On the Hieratic Art Proclus mentions an occasion when a solar demon with the face of a lion was said to have appeared. When a cock, another solar creature traditionally opposed to the lion, was displayed, the demon vanished.³⁶ Proclus might have some such apotropaic ritual in mind here but his reference to laughter and lamenting at prescribed times (78.15-6) suggests rather that he is putting a Neoplatonic interpretation on some of the ritual acts performed in mystery cults. He connects these with a distinctive feature of his metaphysical system, the idea that every god is represented at every level of being; at the lower levels these representatives are demons. The same idea lies behind one of his standard types of allegorical explanation, that the myth under discussion is literally true of the demons who, as representatives of the gods mentioned in the myth, bear their names. The principle involved is set out by Proclus at 79.2-4: *καὶ οὖν διὰ τῶν μύθων ἕκαστος δαμόνιος μὲν ἔσθιν κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον θεός τε καὶ τὴν ἀπόρρητον θεολογίαν.* Proclus has thus absorbed into his system the old idea that apparently unworthy myths may be excused on the grounds that they are about the demons who are intermediate between gods and

³⁶ CMAG 6, 150.15 ff. (cf. note 2 above). Cf. The Greeks and the Irrational (op. cit. above, note 16), p. 291 and note 65.

men rather than about the gods themselves.³⁷

I have been mainly discussing Proclus' use of the mystery comparison in his theoretical justification of allegory. He does also make some use of it in the detailed discussions of individual Homeric passages. At 110.21-111.16 Proclus points out that in ascribing changes of shape to the gods Homer is doing just what the mysteries do, and he quotes a passage from the Chaldaean Oracles to prove his point. The explanations which follow apply both to Homer and to the mysteries. Here we have an illustration of how both poetry and mysteries make use of similar mythical conceptions. This kind of similarity in detail is a corollary of the general similarity between poetry and mysteries which Proclus makes use of in his theoretical justification. In the same way at 125.2-6 Proclus points out that there are *ὁρῶν* in the mysteries which symbolise divine providence, just as there are *ὁρῶν* by the gods in Homer. Because of the parallel in this point of detail Proclus can take over the explanation of the one type of *ὁρῶν* for the explanation of the other. I have already dealt in Chapter 3 with the allegorical interpretation of the rites performed by Achilles at Patroclus' bier as the theurgic rites of *ἐπιδαμνατικὸς μῆνις*, in 152.7 ff., and with the suggested interpretation of Achilles as a *μύθης*, as a way of defending his impious rudeness to Apollo, in 148.19-24.³⁸ These interpretations which, as we have seen, derive from Syrianus, are perhaps the most extreme examples of detailed

37 Cf. above, pp.149-50 and 192-4.

38 Pp.185-90 and 199-200 above.

application of the parallel between myths and mysteries.

The mysteries in question are specific theurgic rites.

A number of the different aspects of Proclus' use of mystery-language can be seen together in the Commentary on the 1st Alcibiades. There progress in the mysteries is compared to philosophical progress towards self-knowledge (In Alc. 9.2 ff., 19.1-7 and 142.1-9), the demons which can distract the theurgist are compared to base lovers who distract the true "lover" in the sense of Plato's Symposium and to sophists who distract the true philosopher (39-40) and the way in which mysteries turn men to the divine is compared with the way in which philosophical arguments and discussions turn men to the philosophic life (61.10-62.2). A passage like 9.2 ff. could be related simply to the traditional use of mystery-language in philosophy but in 39-40 Proclus obviously has theurgy and the Chaldaean Oracles particularly in mind. The reference to the distracting appearance of demons reminds us of the passage from On the Hieratic Art to which I referred earlier (p. 332 above) and Proclus actually quotes the Chaldaean Oracles in this context.

Proclus saw the traditional mystery language of Greek philosophy with the eyes of one who believed in the practice of theurgy and in the possibility of mystical experience. The metaphor therefore had a precise meaning for him and he used it in a variety of ways. In Proclus' thought everything really does reflect everything else. Like a modern structuralist he finds the same underlying pattern in the mysteries, in theurgy, in philosophy, in language, in myth, and in the world as a whole. The principles behind the use of *εὐρεσολα* in theurgy

are also the principles behind Proclus' interpretation of poetic myths and so he can transfer language from the one sphere into the other and use mystery-language to provide a terminology for allegory.

CHAPTER SIX

THE THEORY OF THREE TYPES OF POETRY

Plato deals with poetry in two different parts of the Republic, in Books II and III and again in Book X. Much of Proclus' 6th essay is concerned with Rep. II and III and with the attack on Homer which Plato makes there. Towards the end of the essay he turns to Rep. X. The attack in Rep. X is couched in more general terms than that in Rep. II and III: Plato turns from the moral effect of poetry and the discussion of specific passages to the metaphysical status of poetic imitation. Accordingly Proclus in dealing with Rep. X turns from detailed allegorical interpretation to a general theory of poetry. Like Plato he is concerned with poetry's metaphysical status. To answer Plato on his own terms he must show that at least some poetry is better than "third from reality". In the sections of the 6th essay from 177.7 to 196.13 Proclus expounds his theory that poetry falls into three types. At 196.18-199.28 he uses the theory to answer Rep. X.¹

Proclus first expounds the theory in the abstract (177.7-179.32); then he shows how it is recognised by Plato, fitting a number of passages of Plato on poetry into his scheme (180.3-192.3), and then shows how Homer exemplifies all types of poetry and claims that in his description of different

¹ On the three types of poetry cf. Buffière, pp. 27 ff., closely following Friedl, pp. 56-9; Gallavotti, L'estetica greca..., pp. 44-54; S. Koster, Antike Epistheorien (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 111-4; Coulter, pp. 107 ff.

poets Homer shows himself aware of the theoretical classification (192.6-196.13). This is a slightly deceptive procedure, since Proclus' three types are, as we shall see, evolved from a reading of Plato in the first place. It is, however, typical of the way Neoplatonic doctrines are developed: they begin from a particular way of reading Plato, and hence the Neoplatonists' own claim to be no more than interpreters of Plato, but they can then be presented as independent doctrines in such a way that the modern reader sees the differences from Plato and regards Neoplatonism as an independent philosophical system.

The first of Proclus' three types is inspired poetry. The main Platonic authority for this is Phaedrus 245a, and the Ion. Proclus describes inspired poetry as corresponding to the highest of three types of life, that in which the "one in the soul" is united with the gods. Inspired poetry conveys truths about the divine world in allegorical form. It can be dangerous if not properly interpreted but to those who understand it, it is instructive in the highest possible way. Most of Homer falls into this class, including all the myths about the gods which Proclus has interpreted allegorically in the earlier part of the essay.

Next comes didactic poetry. It presents either facts about the physical world or ethical precepts. In either case it tells the reader what is true and morally commendable in a straightforward way, without allegory. The poetry of Theognis, and perhaps of the Presocratic philosophers, would come into this class. This type of poetry corresponds to the second of the three types of life described in 177.15-178.5,

that in which nous predominates.

The third type of poetry, mimetic, is further divided into eikastic and phantastic. This is poetry as conceived of by Plato in Rep. X, merely a representation of the sensible world and as such deceptive. Proclus bases its subdivision on the discussion of mimesis in the Sophist (235d ff.)

Eikastic poetry represents things in the sensible world as they in fact are. The Homeric example is the passages where Homer represents the heroes fighting or holding counsel or speaking in accordance with their different types of character (192.7-193.4) - in other words representations which may not fit the conduct of the philosopher but are at least accurate and not too discreditable. Phantastic poetry is lower. It represents things as they appear to us, aiming not even at accuracy of representation but only at effect on the emotions. The Homeric example, a rather curious one, is the description of sunrise in Od. 3.1-2. The sun does not really rise out of a lake, but Homer describes it as doing so because that is how it appears to us. This third type of poetry corresponds to the third type of life which is ruled by the irrational part of the soul and its cognitive faculties, sense-perception and imagination.

Proclus' answer to Rep. X, or rather his way of reconciling it with Plato's other statements on poetry, is that Rep. X is directed only against the lower division of mimetic poetry. Inspired poetry, while admittedly unsuitable for the education of the young, is otherwise left unscathed, as is didactic.

Proclus regards Homer with almost as much reverence as he

regards Plato and it is quite characteristic that he should produce examples of all types of poetry from Homer and even claim that Homer knew his poetic theory. As the best poet Homer is not just the supreme example of the best type of poetry, inspired poetry, but contains all the others in some degree. This is in accordance with the Neoplatonist principle, "Everything in everything but according to its nature":- every type of poetry is in Homer although the best type predominates. Proclus' use of Homer here, and the examples of Homeric poetry he picks on, can be related to the long tradition of Homeric interpretation and I want to examine this before going on to discuss the individual types of poetry, and the theory as a whole, in more detail.

After a general statement of how each type of poetry is to be found in Homer (192.6-21) Proclus comes to specific examples. I have mentioned that his use of Od. 3.1-2 as an example of phantastic poetry seems rather curious. It seems odd because Proclus has stressed how emotionally harmful such poetry is and it is a little hard to see,

Ἡ ἥλιος δ' ἀνόρουσε, λίπνιν περικαλλέα λίμνην
 οὐρανὸν εἰς πολύχαλκον...

as aiming at ψυχαγωγία, especially when we are told that the lines are phantastic not, for example, because they are beautiful and make one think about how the words are well chosen and arranged, but because they say what is not true, that the sun rises from a lake.² Proclus is thoroughly Platonic

2 For an ancient criticism of the style of Od. 3.1, with its educational effect in mind, see Aristid. Quint. II.9, p. 68.14 ff. Winnington-Ingram.

here in his simple-minded view of the relation of mimetic poetry to truth (although we shall see later on that on the relation of inspired poetry to truth he is less naive).

φανταστική μίμησις in Sph. 235d-236c is described as imitation which produces illusions of perception. In 235e5-236a2 the Eleatic Stranger refers it to painters and sculptors who change the proportions of objects: if they reproduced the proportions exactly, the upper parts of the objects, distant from the observer, would appear too small and the lower parts, near the observer, too large. This account would lead Proclus to look for an example of poetry presenting an illusion of perception and when we look at other ancient interpretations of the passage of Homer we can see that Proclus was not the first to notice its factual incorrectness. Schol. B on Il.

8.45 reads: οὐκ ἀληθῆ δὲ δηλοῦ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ ἡλίου, ἀλλὰ φαντασίαν δίδωσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Νηκεῶν ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὴν δύειν ἔλθιν. I have underlined φαντασίαν

because if Proclus knew this scholion its use of the word might well encourage him to take the lines as an example of

φανταστική μίμησις.³ Ps.-Plutarch, Vita Homeri 104, cites the lines among those which show Homer's wisdom about the

3 The scholion takes λίμνη as "the Ocean" while Proclus follows the alternative interpretation and takes it as "lake". Festugière in the note in his translation here rightly points out the different possibilities for λίμνη but suggests, despite his own translation, "un certain lac", that Proclus' διὰ τὴν ἀποστάσιν (192.26) means he takes it as "the Ocean". Proclus puts in διὰ τὴν ἀποστάσιν because he is trying to make his example parallel to the examples of painting and sculpture in the Sophist - note διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δ' ἐγγύθεν ὁρᾶσθαι there.

sun. The writer of the Vita, it seems, succumbed to belief in appearances and was taken in by *φανταστικὴ μίμησις*.⁴

The scholion I have noted is not among those attributed to Porphyry. If, as I am arguing, Proclus' interpretation implies that he knew the scholion, then we have here an indication that Proclus' knowledge of earlier Homeric interpretation was not limited to Syrianus' use of Porphyry.⁵

Proclus classifies Homer's descriptions of the heroes as eikastic poetry. Earlier in the essay, when interpreting passages about the heroes, he does not resort to allegorical explanation, and in the 5th essay he explains that what Plato objects to in Homer's poetry about the heroes is *ἀνόμοτος μίμησις* (see 44.6 ff.)⁶ Proclus would say that Homer's *μίμησις* is in fact *ᾠμος* when one takes into account that the heroes are practical men, not philosophers. (Cf., e.g., 145.27-146.5, esp. *ἀλλὰ τῶτα μὲν τῆς ἡρωϊκῆς πρέποντα χρένοισι καὶ τῆς ἐθεσίου... τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἡφίσταται παρ' Ὀμήρῳ μίμησιν*) Similarly Proclus' examples of didactic poetry in Homer refer back to his own earlier discussions of Homeric passages. I would follow Festugière here in referring *τῆς διαφόρου ὑποστάσεως τῶν μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς* (193.4-5) to 155.1 ff., on Homer's knowledge of the nature of the soul and

4 On ancient interpretations of the lines, cf. also Buffière, pp. 215-6.

5 Cf. above, pp. 156-7 and 185. Friedl fails to note this passage among those where Proclus is using earlier interpretations of Homer.

6 Cf. above, pp. 13-6, 162 and 198.

its distinction from the body, and τὴν ἐξελλαχὴν τοῦ εἰδώλου πρὸς τὴν χρωμένην ψυχὴν (193.5-6) to 172.9 ff., on the Homeric Heracles and the relation of his εἰδώλον to his soul. 193.6-7 τὴν τάξιν τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ στοιχείων γῆς, ὕδατος, ἀέρος, αἰθέρος, οὐρανοῦ also have a specific reference, this time not to a passage of Homer discussed by Proclus himself but to passages discussed by earlier interpreters of Homer. Ps.-Plu., Vita Homeri 94-5, praises Homer for his knowledge about the elements, just as Proclus does here. The Vita cites Il. 8.23 ff. as proof that Homer knows earth comes at the bottom, Il. 14.287-8 as proof that air comes above earth and ether above that; Il. 17.424-5 and 1.497 as proof that οὐρανός comes above ether; and finally says that Homer calls Olympus ὄλον λαμπρόν because he knows it is purer than air and furthest from earth and its exhalations.⁷ We can see from this that it was usual to find the doctrines of physical science and cosmology in Homer. Much of Ps.-Plu., Vita Homeri is concerned to show that Homer has knowledge about all sorts of things and it was common Greek practice to take verses of Homer out of context, more or less seriously, to illustrate factual knowledge or give it authority. Indeed this practice may go some way to excuse Proclus, and Plato, for thinking of some poetry as misleading simply because it says what is not in fact true. The practice of treating Homer as a repository of all knowledge is important for Proclus in a number of different ways: we have seen how it leads him to

7 Cf. the expanded version of this passage at Stob. I.22.2 Wachsmuth, and Buffière, p. 106.

pick as an example of phantastic poetry a case where Homer is not a reliable informant of the facts; it explains how Proclus can find didactic poetry in Homer at all; and it also explains why Proclus should want to claim that Homer knows his own theory of poetry. Homer had been claimed as a rhetorician and a philosopher: Ps.-Plutarch claims both these types of knowledge for him, and Proclus himself claims throughout the essay that Homer knows Platonic philosophy.⁸ Now Proclus claims him as a poetic theorist too.

It is at first sight surprising to find Proclus listing five elements here, earth, water, air, ether and heaven. It is all very well for the philosophically eclectic Ps.-Plutarch to distinguish between ether and heaven but one would expect Proclus, as a Platonist, to have four elements, not the Aristotelian five. In fact Proclus' view on the number and nature of the elements is another example of an attempt to reconcile Plato and Aristotle.⁹ The details of it are to be found in a fragment of his Ἐπίκενσις τῶν πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνα Τίμαιον ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους ἀντερρημένων, in Philoponus De aeternitate mundi, p. 482.21 ff. Rabe. According to Philoponus Proclus claimed that the fifth element was not different in nature from the other four, as Aristotle had maintained, but was the purest part of them. Philoponus objects that this is not consistent with Plato's view in the Timaeus

8 Cf. above, pp. 280 ff., esp. pp. 288 ff.

9 Cf. above, pp. 245 ff.

that the heavens are composed of all four elements. A similar view to Proclus' was taken by Plotinus who maintains in II. 1 that the heavens are made of pure fire.¹⁰ Proclus can thus list five elements when thinking in terms of cosmology even though in terms of physics he would reduce those five to the Platonic four.

Proclus' examples of inspired poetry in Homer likewise refer back to his own earlier interpretations. τῆς δημιουργικῆς... καὶ τῆς εἰς τρία διανομῆς τῶν ὁλῶν (193.10-11) refers to 156.26 ff., on the Gorgias' use of Il. 15.187 ff., and to 164.26 ff., on Homer's views on the creation of the world.¹¹ τῶν Ἡφαίστου δεσμῶν (193.12) alludes to Proclus' interpretation of the binding of Ares and Aphrodite by Hephaestus at 141-3, and τῆς πατρικῆς τοῦ Διὸς ἐνὶ βέλει πρὸς τὴν χόνυον θεότητα τῆς Ἥρας... (193.12-4) to his exposition of the meaning of the scene on Mount Ida in 132-40.

To illustrate how his poetic theory applies to Homer Proclus uses both examples drawn from the tradition of Homeric interpretation and examples from his own interpretations earlier in the essay. We can see in the latter how careful he is to preserve the consistency of his thought and how, in the application of eikastic poetry to the heroes, for example, his poetic theory is already implicit in the preceding sections of the essay and even, in part, in the 5th essay.

Proclus goes on to assign each of his types of poetry to

10 Cf. Wallis, p. 24.

11 Here again I follow Festugière.

a poet mentioned in Homer, claiming that Homer is aware of his classification of poetry: *δοκεῖ γάρ μοι κατὰ τὰ πρόθεον εἰρημένα τῆς ποιήσεως γένη διαλεῖν τοὺς παρ' ὧν μῆμ' ἱξικμένους μουσικούς* (194.7-9). Demodocus represents inspired poetry; Phemius, didactic; the bard whom Agamemnon left with Clytemnestra, eikastic; and Thamyris, phantastic. All these poets are traditional examples of Homeric poets, Demodocus being of course the best known. So Ps.-Plutarch, De musica 3, mentions Thamyris, Demodocus and Phemius; Pausanias I.2.3.10 gives Demodocus and the bard left with Clytemnestra as examples of poets who lived at the courts of kings; Athenaeus I 14 b-d discusses the bard left with Clytemnestra, Demodocus and Phemius; Lucian, De domo 18, lists Demodocus, Phemius and Thamyris together with Amphion and Orpheus; and Plato, Ion 533b, groups Thamyris, Orpheus and Phemius together.¹²

It is hardly surprising that Proclus should take Demodocus, the singer at the court of Phaeacia, as the Homeric inspired poet. It is Demodocus who sings of Ares and Aphrodite, one of the examples of inspired poetry which Proclus has just given. Proclus quotes the phrase from Cd. 8.499 *ἄρμυθεὶς θεῷ ἤρχετο* (*ἄρχετο* in Homer) as evidence that Homer explicitly says Demodocus is inspired. There are two possible interpretations of this phrase. One may translate either, "he began, inspired by the god" or, making the phrase refer to the conventional prelude invoking a god, "he began, starting from the god". On the latter interpretation it is possible to take *θεῷ* either

12 Cf. also Ovid, Ibis 270 and Cicero, Brutus 18.71.

with ὀρμηθεῖς or with ἄρχετο, to give the same meaning; on the former θεῶ must go with ὀρμηθεῖς. Schol. T on the line takes θεῶ with ὀρμηθεῖς and gives both interpretations; Schol. P and HQ, less happily, take θεῶ with ἄρχετο but still give both interpretations. Proclus is choosing the interpretation which suits his argument and taking the phrase to mean, "he began, inspired by the god" (cf. also 194.11).¹³

Proclus goes on to quote the praise of Demodocus in Od. 8.488-90 and then says that Demodocus in some sense represents Homer himself; like Homer he is blind, according to Od. 8.64. Proclus would no doubt interpret the blindness of Demodocus in the same way as he interprets Homer's blindness in 173.4-177.3. The inspired poet is blind because he turns his mental vision away from the sensible to the intelligible world. The identification of the blind Homer with the blind Demodocus was already common in the tradition of Homeric interpretation. It is attributed to τινές by Schol. EV on Od. 8.63 and Schol. E also says: οὐκ οὖν, ὡς "Ὅμηρε, Μοῦσας ὡς αὐτὸν ἡ Μοῦσα ἐδίδηκεν, ὅτι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν μὲν ἐστέρηκεν, ζωιδίην δὲ ζῆνι τούτου ἐχαρίσατο, ὥστερ δῆτα καὶ θεὸς ὕπερρον (cf. Proclus 193.19-20 ἡ Μοῦσα αὐτὸν ἐδίδηκεν ἢ ὁ μυστήτης θεός). This scholion is among those attributed

13 R. Harriot, Poetry and Criticism before Plato (London, 1969), p. 42 suggests that Plato's phrase in Ion 534c, ἡ Μοῦσα αὐτὸν (the poet) ὤρμηκεν reflects Homer and an interpretation of ὀρμηθεῖς θεῶ as "inspired by the god". Whether this is true or not, it could well be that Plato's use of ὤρμηκεν here encouraged Proclus in his interpretation of ὀρμηθεῖς θεῶ.

to Porphyry¹⁴ and Proclus could have known it either directly from Porphyry or through Syrianus. Similarly Maximus of Tyre XXXVIII.1c says that Od. 8.63-4 really refer to Homer's own blindness and in XXVI.1b Maximus adapts Od. 8.487-8 to praise Homer himself instead of Demodocus. Proclus is drawing on the traditional view of Demodocus in order to insert Demodocus into his own classification.

For his Homeric didactic poet Proclus picks on the next best known Homeric poet, Phemius. Homer's use of $\alpha\iota\delta\alpha\varsigma$ in Od. 1.337 provides the motive for making Phemius a poet at the level of nous.¹⁵ The inclusion of Phemius in Plato's list of poets at Ion 533b¹⁶ might also have influenced Proclus. I have argued in Chapter 3 (v) that Proclus' concept of didactic poetry is his own creation, produced by splitting Syrianus' concept of inspired poetry in two.¹⁷ It would accord with this that while there is, as we have seen, good precedent for treating Demodocus as an inspired poet, there is no tradition of treating Phemius as a didactic poet. Indeed the subject-matter of the two poets' songs as described by Homer sounds very much the same. Both sing the deeds of gods and men, the one in Phaeacia, the other in Ithaca. Both in fact are very like Homer himself.

Of the two types of mimetic poetry, eikastic is the better

14 See H. Schrader, Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad Odysseam pertinentium reliquiae (Leipzig, 1890), p. 72.

15 Cf. Festugière's note in his translation here.

16 Cf. above, p. 345.

17 Pp.221-34 above.

and for his eikastic poet Proclus selects the bard whom Agamemnon left with Clytemnestra, according to Od. 3.267 ff. Homer, exalting his own profession, implies that the bard had a good influence on Clytemnestra; only when he had been taken to a desolate island and abandoned there did Aegisthus succeed in winning over Clytemnestra to adultery. The Homeric account led later writers to stress this bard's sôphrosyne. So Strabo I.2.3 cites him as proof that Homer τὸν ἀνδρὸς σωφρονιστῆς ἔργῳ . Similarly Athenaeus I 14b says that the bard gave Clytemnestra a desire for virtue, by recounting the deeds of virtuous women, and distracted her mind from base thoughts. The scholia too stress the bard's virtue and invent a whole family history for him. No one before Proclus seems to have regarded this bard as a mimetic poet. The tradition has caused Proclus to place him third, rather than fourth, in the list of Homeric poets, attributing ὁρῶν δόξα to him and making him sing τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης μέλη and παύειν καὶ ἡδύ (194.19-20 and 26). The rest is Proclus' invention.

Thamyris (or Thamyras as the name is sometimes written) is more interesting. Proclus takes him as the type of the phantastic poet and says that his punishment by the Muses (recounted in Il. 2.594 ff.) was for concentrating too much on the sensible world and pleasing the masses. As usual Proclus is anxious to point out that the gods are really impassive and in 195.7 ff. he slips in an interpretation of the anger of the Muses as meaning Thamyris' unsuitability¹⁸ to receive

18 ἀνεπιτηδεύτης is a Neoplatonist technical term:- see Dodds, ET pp. 222-3 and pp. 344-5 and cf. E. des Places, "La religion de Jamblique", Entretiens Hardt XXI (Vandoeuvres-Geneva, 1975), pp. 92-4.

their gift of poetry.¹⁹ Unlike the other poets I have been discussing, Thamyras was not just mentioned in the Homeric poems and thereafter with reference to those poems. There is an extensive independent mythological tradition, details of which may be found in V. Gebhard's RE article on Thamyras, or in Höfer's similar article in Roscher's Lexicon of Mythology. What would be important for Proclus are Plato's references to Thamyras in Ion 533b, Laws VIII 829e, and Rep. X 620a7. Plato always couples Thamyras with Orpheus and seems to regard him as a good poet. Similarly Hermias 76.27 ff. interprets Thamyras' punishment as a blindness which opened his eyes to intelligible beauty.²⁰ Proclus, however, always regards Thamyras as a bad poet (i.e. morally bad; for Proclus, as for Plato, moral and aesthetic evaluation are inseparable). In the 16th essay, on the myth of Er, he comments on Rep. X 620a7. After stating that Thamyras and Orpheus are mentioned by Plato as types - Er saw not the soul of Thamyras but a soul like that of Thamyras (In Remp. II 313.23 ff.) - Proclus goes on to say that Thamyras was punished by the Muses for φιλοτιμία, referring no doubt to the fact that Thamyras had the audacity to engage in a contest with the Muses. In II 316.6 ff Proclus divides ποικίλη into two, inspired and human.²¹ Orpheus is the type of the inspired poet, Thamyras of the human. Inspired poetry does not here receive the high place accorded

19 Cf. Proclus' interpretation of the mourning and laughter of the gods in 122.25-128.23, discussed above, pp. 196-8.

20 Cf. above, p. 219.

21 Cf. above, p. 20.

to it in the 6th essay. Both inspired and human poetry, says Proclus, lead the soul to irrationality. Only philosophy can save it. (In the myth Er sees both the soul of Orpheus and that of Thamyris choosing birds for their next incarnation). The 16th essay differs from the 6th in its view of inspired poetry but in both essays Thamyris represents an inferior type of poetry.

Proclus was no doubt led to his view of Thamyris by the fact that the Homeric story describes Thamyris as audacious, and punished accordingly. There are two possible interpretations of the Homeric lines which record the nature of his punishment, Il. 2.599-600. *πηρός* in 599 has been taken as meaning simply "maimed", i.e. "deprived of song". Schol. A on the line records this as the view of *οἱ νεώτεροι* and it is preferred by, for instance, Leaf and Monro among modern commentators. Alternatively, *πηρός* has been taken to mean "blind". This would make the Homeric story agree with the version found in, for example, Hesiod fr. 65 Merkelbach and West: ...*Ἡρίοδος "Δωπῆν ἐν πεδίῳ" φέρεκε λυγρὸν τετυφλῆσθαι*. Similarly Euripides Rhesus 919-25 recounts the version in which Thamyris was blinded. As I mentioned above Hermias too follows the blindness version. Proclus however does not say that Thamyris was blinded. In fact he does not commit himself to either interpretation, but the way he describes Thamyris' punishment implies that he understands *πηρός* simply as "maimed". Picking up Il. 2.595 *παῶν* *ἀειδῆς* he says, *Θάμυρις ... ὃν δὲ Μοῦσαι λέγονται παῶν ἦς ἑδῆς* (194.29-30) and then quotes Il. 2.599. He

nowhere uses the word $\tau\upsilon\phi\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma$.²² It would not suit Proclus to make Thamyris' punishment blindness, for poetic blindness, as with Demodocus, and Homer himself, is a sign of inspiration.²³ Moreover Proclus' interpretation keeps close to Homer's text and, given his proven knowledge of earlier Homeric interpretation, we may well see him making a conscious decision between two existing possible interpretations here.

Proclus' classification of Homeric poets in accordance with his theory of three types of poetry is an example of his constant desire to draw up corresponding schemata of all kinds. It also, as I have mentioned, belongs to the practice of regarding Homer as a fount of knowledge of every kind. Once again we can see how Proclus is drawing on the earlier tradition of Homeric interpretation and building it into his own scheme of things.

I shall turn now to a more detailed consideration of the three concepts of inspired, didactic and mimetic poetry respectively, before further discussing the theory of three types of poetry as a whole.

Inspired poetry

Proclus expounds his concept of inspired poetry in the

22 Festugière is therefore wrong to translate $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$ as "aveugle" here.

23 Cf. the difficulties Proclus runs into in 173.4-177.3, where he has to explain Stesichorus' blindness as a physical punishment but Homer's as symbolic of inspiration:- see above, pp. 215 ff.

abstract at 178.10-179.3. It corresponds to the highest type of life, described in 177.15-23, in which the "one in the soul" is united with the gods. Inspired poetry is described as producing a kind of mystical union: ἐνδρύνουσα τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τῶν ὁντων, κατὰ τινὰ τε ἔνωσιν ἄρρητον εἰς αὐτὸν ἔχουσα τῷ παρῶντι τὸ παρῶμενον (178.12-4). At 178.24 ff. the Platonic foundations of the

concept appear. Proclus speaks of a *μανία* - . . . βωδρυσμένης κρείττω . The oxymoron comes from Phaedrus 244d²⁴

and the account of ποιητικὴ *μανία* in the Phaedrus is the starting point of Proclus' concept. When he comes to give Platonic authority for it, in 180.10-186.21, his primary authority is the Phaedrus (closely followed by the Ion) and he expounds Phaedrus 245a at considerable length.²⁵ He goes on to link the ποιητικὴ *μανία* of the Phaedrus with the divine measure of Laws IV 716c and with symmetry, one of the "three monads", truth, beauty and symmetry, at Philebus 64-5.²⁶

Is Proclus thinking of inspired poetry from the point of view of the writer or from the point of view of the reader? When he describes how such poetry unites the soul with the gods, one might think he is talking about its effect on the reader. On the other hand, the *mania* of the Phaedrus is that of the poet himself. The answer is that Proclus has both in

24 Cf. also Smp. 218b.

25 The notion of a *μανία* βωδρυσμένη has a considerable history between Plato and Proclus. Some of it is traced in H. Lewy, Sobria Ebrietas, ΛNTW 9 (1929), pp. 51 ff. The intervening history of the phrase might well influence Proclus but there can be no doubt that he is getting it directly from Plato.

26 Cf. above, pp. 229-32.

mind. The inspired poet has a supra-rational cognition which enables him to perceive metaphysical truths and enshrine them in his verse. The reader of such poetry who understands it in the proper allegorical way will himself be assisted to a similar supra-rational cognition by his reading. Following Plato in Rep. X, Proclus focusses his theory on the metaphysical status of poetry itself, rather than on the poet or on his readers or audience. He is, however, interested in the effect of poetry on the audience, again following Plato, and although his types of poetry are primarily distinguished by the nature of their subject-matter, the effect on the audience affords a secondary means of distinction. He is much less interested in the nature of poetic creation or in the psychology of the poetic process. Most modern writers on inspiration, still under the influence of the Romantic interest in the personality of the poet, are interested primarily in the process of poetic creation. So for example John Press's book, The Fire and the Fountain,²⁷ deals with details like the peculiar nature of the poet and the circumstances favourable to composition. Similarly R.E.M. Harding in An Anatomy of Inspiration²⁸ collects a mass of material about how artists of all kinds actually produce their work. Proclus has no such interest in the individual writer. In describing inspiration in the terms of Neoplatonist mysticism, he describes it in terms of a psychological experience; nevertheless his primary interest lies in the inspired work

27 (Oxford, 1955).

28 (Cambridge, 1940).

produced, just as in the case of mystical experience he is more interested in the union achieved and the knowledge gained thereby than in the personal psychology of the mystic.²⁹

A modern example of an attempt to pick out the characteristics of inspired poetry is provided by C.M. Bowra's Rede lecture, Inspiration and Poetry.³⁰ After dealing with the process of inspiration, Bowra comes to the qualities of inspired poetry.³¹ He describes these as an unusual degree of power and as the qualities which show a poet's gifts in their most personal manifestation, saying that inspiration enables a poet to make the most of his technique. Bowra seems to be thinking here of the formal qualities of poetry. He would, I think, claim that inspired poetry could be written on any subject. Similarly, in the ancient world, the celebrated fragment of Democritus in which he affirms a belief in poetic inspiration implies that inspiration gives poetry beauty of form rather than a specific subject-matter: ποιητὴς δὲ ἕκαστα μὲν ἐν χάφῃ μετ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἑρῶ πνεύματος, καλὰ κάρτα ἔσπν. . . (Frag. B 18 Diels-Kranz). Proclus, by contrast, delimits inspired poetry by its content. This initially surprising view seems less startling if we reflect that we often value more highly works

29 Similarly, Origen's theory of inspiration concentrates on the inspired work, rather than the psychology of the writer:- see H. de Lubac, Histoire et Esprit (Paris, 1950), pp. 299-300 and cf., with him, Cels. 7.10 and 7.11 (GCS II, pp. 161-3). The similarity between Origen and Proclus here is at least partly due to their common Platonist orientation. Coulter's remark that Proclus devoted theoretical attention "to the mind of the literary artist himself" (p. 106) is misleading.

30 (Cambridge, 1951). Reprinted as the first essay in the book of the same title (London, 1955).

31 Pp. 27 ff. of the 1951 lecture; pp. 19 ff. of the 1955 edn.

of literature which, in their own way, express universal truths: this can be seen as an evaluation in terms of content. The trouble with Proclus' view is that it makes the content required too specific. He does not simply demand that poetry express universal truths to qualify as inspired, a demand which would be justifiable even if not universally accepted; he demands that inspired poetry express Neoplatonist metaphysics in allegorical myths.

N.K. Chadwick in Poetry and Prophecy³² notes that in primitive communities inspiration is associated with subject-matter and relates to revealed knowledge. Among her primitive communities she includes a number of ancient ones. On her evidence the knowledge revealed to the inspired poet or prophet is largely of past, present or future events. This association of inspiration with knowledge forms a part of the early Greek idea of poetic inspiration. Homer invokes the Muses at the beginning of the Catalogue of Ships (Il. 2.484 ff.), calling upon them for factual information about the Greek host before Troy. Plato, however, stresses the poet's lack of knowledge and sharply distinguishes inspiration from the knowledge of the philosopher.³³ The Neoplatonic belief in a kind of cognition

32 (Cambridge, 1942), p. 41.

33 P.A. Singleton in her Cambridge PhD. thesis, Inspiration and Poetic Genius, with special reference to Ancient Greece from Homer to Plato, places great stress on the link between inspiration and knowledge in Greece before the 5th century B.C. and argues that it was Plato who dissociated inspiration from knowledge. Cf. further Od. 8.487 ff.; Hes. Th. 27-8 and 36-9; Pi. Pae. 6.51 ff. I should like to thank Mrs. Singleton for allowing me to read her thesis. As far as I know it has still be to finally passed by the examiners.

above and beyond that of the rational intelligence allowed Proclus to put inspiration and knowledge back together, while transposing the knowledge involved from that of events in the material world, whether past, passing or to come, to knowledge of metaphysics and theology.³⁴ As is well known, the Neoplatonists believed in the possibility of mystical experience and Plotinus himself, according to Porphyry, actually experienced mystical union four times.³⁵ In the later Neoplatonic school, whatever became of the experience, the theory that it was possible was firmly established and the belief developed of a special faculty, the "one in the soul", by means of which mystical union was achieved.³⁶ In mystical experience the philosopher, according to the theory, attained knowledge like that of the philosopher in Plato's Republic who sees the Form of the Good (Rep. VI 505 ff.). We should not properly speak of "knowledge", for such awareness is thought of as distinct from anything we know as discursive or intuitive knowledge; we are reduced to using the neutral term "cognition". This cognition is of metaphysics at its highest level. Proclus' inspired poet perceives the truth about the gods. The distinguishing mark of the inspired poet in Plato is that he lacks knowledge. Yet in the Phaedrus, Proclus' cardinal text on inspiration, Plato speaks of the inspired poet in terms of high praise. Neoplatonic epistemology made it possible for Proclus to answer

34 Cf. also In Crat., p. 44.21 ff. where inspired poets know the true names of things.

35 See Porph., Plot. 23.14-8.

36 On the development of this belief, see above, pp. 224-7.

Plato on his own terms and to conceive of an inspired poet whose distinguishing mark is that he goes beyond knowledge. This inspired poet has knowledge (cognition) of a new and special kind. The original knowledge of the inspired poet has been transposed into a peculiarly Neoplatonic philosophical knowledge.

Analogies are frequently drawn between poetic and prophetic inspiration. M.K. Chadwick, as the title of her book indicates, groups together the poet and the prophet in primitive societies for the purposes of anthropological study. The Romantic poets saw themselves as prophets speaking to society. When we turn to the ancient world and another writer who, like Proclus, practised allegorical interpretation of an authoritative text, we find that Philo's theory of inspiration is a theory of prophetic inspiration. For Philo, dealing with the Bible, poetic inspiration is subsumed under prophetic. Wolfson³⁷ argues that Philo fused the four maniai of Plato's Phaedrus with a concept of prophecy derived from the Old Testament. He cites some interesting cases³⁸ where the Bible describes poets as prophets (Miriam in Exodus 15.20-1; David in II Samuel 23.2) and argues that Philo uses the term "prophet" to cover all four of Plato's maniai as well as in a narrow sense which corresponds to the Greek notion of a prophet (see esp. Vita Mosis II 188-91). For the Neoplatonists also, there is a close connection between poetic and prophetic inspiration,

37 H.A. Wolfson, Philo (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), Vol. II, pp. 14 ff.

38 Op. cit., p. 13.

stemming of course from the Phaedrus. Here in Proclus we are dealing with poetic inspiration alone but Hermias' account of enthousiasmos in 84.18 ff. deals with both poetic and prophetic madness. Hermias distinguishes the four maniai from one another (89.1 ff.) - each has a distinct role to play in the return of the soul to its primal unfallen state - but also insists on their interdependence (88.10 ff. and 90.5-8). For the later Neoplatonists the First Hypostasis, the One, is no longer simple as it was for Plotinus. The First Hypostasis also contains the divine henads which link the One to the many and are identified with the gods of traditional Greek religion in their highest form.³⁹ The higher realms of Neoplatonist metaphysics were progressively expanded from Iamblichus onwards⁴⁰ and this allowed a corresponding expansion of the possible ways of supra-rational cognition, of being united with the First Hypostasis. Hermias describes each of the maniai of the Phaedrus as a different way of achieving such union and he ranks them in order (88.8-10). When they are so ranked $\muουικη$ $\muανια$ comes at the bottom, then follows $\tauελεστηκη$ $\muανια$, then $\muαντικη$ and finally $ερωτικη$. Proclus would subscribe to this ordering too: it is significant that although he describes the inspired poet as achieving mystical union with the gods, he never says this union is with the One. There are grades of mystical cognition and the inspired poet, while he gets a considerable way inside the First Hypostasis,

39 See Dodds, ET, pp. 257 ff.

40 Cf. above, pp. 183-4, and the ref. in note 88 there to Saffrey and Westerink's introduction to their PT, Vol. I, pp. lxxv ff., esp. pp. lxxxvii-lxxxviii.

does not get as far as the philosopher inspired with ἐρωτική
 μανία . Although Proclus gives inspired poetry so
 high a place he would ultimately agree with Plato in ranking
 philosophy even higher. However, immediately after ranking
 the maniai in order, Hermias points out their interdependence.
 As often, especially in relation to the First Hypostasis,
 Neoplatonist distinctions are collapsible in a bewildering
 way: in one sense each mania is a distinct way of achieving
 supra-rational cognition of distinct elements in the First
 Hypostasis, yet in another the maniai are all the same and all
 lead to contact with a unified First Hypostasis. (Cf. Hermias
 90.5-8, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ δίδοντα ἦν ἡτα καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ
 ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἔστι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἱ δόξεις
 μετέχουσι καὶ κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὸ
 ὑποδεχόμενον ὃ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς πᾶσας
 ἐπιτηδεύσας ἔχει τὰς δόξεις). Poetic and
 prophetic inspiration are thus closely linked in later Neo-
 platonism. Both are varieties of mystical experience,
 prophetic inspiration being a more lofty variety than
 poetic.⁴¹

In his work as a whole Proclus uses the concept of
 inspiration in three main ways. First he describes parts of
 Plato as inspired. In PT I 4, pp. 17 ff. Saffrey-Westerink,
 he divides Plato's method of expounding theology into
 four: sometimes Plato unfolds the truth about the divine
 world in an inspired manner (ἐνθεατικῶς), sometimes in

41 Cf. above, pp. 227-9 , on prophetic inspiration in
 Iamblichus and on enthousiasmos in general in Hermias.

a dialectical manner; sometimes he uses symbols, sometimes he uses *εἰκόνες*.⁴² It is clear from the examples Proclus goes on to give that these are four different methods of exposition. The inspired method is used in the Phaedrus, the dialectical in the Sophist and the Parmenides, the symbolic in the Gorgias, the Symposium and the Protagoras, and the method through *εἰκόνες* in the Timaeus and the Politics. The symbolic and the inspired method do not coincide as we might have expected. A similar list of four methods is to be found at In Parm. 646.21-647.24.⁴³ There appears to be an inconsistency here with the view of the 6th essay that inspired poetry and symbolic poetry are the same thing. A possible way out is to distinguish between philosophical and poetic exposition: in the terms of Hermias which I have just been discussing, Plato operates at the level of (philosophical) *ἐρωτικὴ μανία* (remember that the example given in the PT is Socrates' "inspired" speech in the Phaedrus) and at that level inspired discourse is more direct than symbolic discourse and distinct from it; the inspired poet, even including Homer, operates at the lower level of *μουσικὴ μανία* and at this level inspired and symbolic discourse are the same. Although the In Parm. passage mentions poetry as well as philosophy, it too is primarily concerned with the different styles of philosophical exposition and it could be argued that

42 On the difference between symbols and *εἰκόνες*, see further below, pp. 399 ff.

43 Cf. Saffrey and Westerink's note on the PT passage, pp. 136-7 of their edn.

Proclus only distinguishes between symbolic and inspired poetry there because of the distinction between symbolic and inspired philosophy. Even if this is not right and we have simply to admit inconsistency on Proclus' part, it is important to distinguish the inspiration of the philosopher, of Plato, from the inspiration of the poet.

A second distinct type of inspiration is that of the exegete. Proclus is too modest to describe himself as an inspired exegete but at In Remp. 133.6-7 he describes Syrianus' interpretation of Zeus and Hera on Mount Ida as "very inspired" (ἐνθουσιαστικώτατα).⁴⁴ The devoted Marinus looks on Proclus himself as an inspired exegete. In Ch. 22 of his Life he describes Proclus' exegesis of theology in these terms:

ἐξηγούμενός τε πάντα ἐνθουσιαστικώτερον καὶ εἰς συμφωνίαν ἔχων.⁴⁵ In Ch. 23 Marinus tells us it was even more impressive to hear Proclus lecture than to read his writings: οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ θείας ἐμπνοίας ἐφάνετο διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰ τῶν ν.φ.ἀδελφῶν ὄντως εἰκότα ῥήματα προφέρει τοῦ θεωροῦντος ἐκείνου στόματος· μαρμαρυγῆς γὰρ πινος ἐδόκε τὰ ὅμματα αὐτοῦ πληροῦσθαι καὶ τὸ ἄλλο πρόσωπον ἐλλάμψεως θείας μετείχεν (I have underlined the words which

44 Cf. above, p. 163.

45 Rosàn, p. 25, translates ἐνθουσιαστικώτερον, "in a very enthusiastic manner". This is much too weak. The word does not so much describe Proclus' manner as he expounded as commend the quality of his exposition.

make it clear that Marinus is describing Proclus as actually inspired while lecturing).⁴⁶ A similar concept of the inspired exegete may be found in Philo. In Cher. 27, for example, Philo introduces his preferred allegory of the Cherubim with a claim that his interpretation is inspired: ἤκουσα δέ ποτε καὶ βουδαιότερου λόγου παρὰ ψυχῆς ἐμῆς ἐπιθυμίας πλὴν πολλὰ θεωρητέον καὶ περὶ ὧν οὐκ εἶδε μαντεύεσθαι .⁴⁷

Even when one makes allowance for literary convention here,⁴⁸ there is, I think, a genuine belief on Philo's part that the right interpretation is a divinely inspired one. The exegete derives his inspiration from reading the work. So too Origen, in Philocalia I 6 (from princ. IV.1), gives this sensation of inspiration felt by the reader as a proof that the Bible is inspired: δ δὲ μετ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ προβολῆς ἐντυγχάνων τῆς προφητικῆς λόγου, παθὼν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀναγιγνώσκον ἔχον ἐνθουσιασμόν, δι' ὧν πᾶσαι περιβήσεται οὐκ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι συγγραμματα (Cf. philoc. I.1).

I mentioned earlier that Proclus thinks of the reader of inspired poetry as assisted to similar inspiration himself by his reading.⁴⁹ The inspiration of the reader and that of

46 Cf. also Ch. 33. Rosàn, p. 26, translates βωδρονούντος as "discreet". This is again too weak. I suspect that the concept of μανία βώδρων lies behind it. One might translate, "... words ... poured forth from his mouth; yet he was sane."

47 See also the famous description of the experience of inspiration at Migr. 34 ff.

48 Literary convention also plays a part in Marinus' description:- cf. Porph., Plot. 13.5-8.

49 P.353 above.

the exegete may be taken together, for the exegete begins as a reader, but they should be distinguished from the inspiration of the poet. To put it in the terms of Plato's Ion, the inspiration of Ion the exegete is not the same as the inspiration of Homer the poet. Both derive ultimately from the same source but Ion's inspiration is at a lower level than Homer's.

The inspiration of the poet as we find it in the 6th essay comes in between that of the philosopher and that of the exegete. Lower than the former, it is nevertheless higher than the latter. For Proclus Homer is the inspired poet par excellence. Marinus Ch. 27 describes the Orphic poetry as inspired. It would be interesting to know whether Proclus thought of his own Hymns as inspired poetry. The only reference in them to inspiration is a plea for it, in the Hymn to the Muses: $\nu\omicron\epsilon\phi\omicron\varsigma \mu\epsilon \epsilon\omicron\phi\acute{\eta}\nu \beta\alpha\chi\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\alpha\tau\epsilon \mu\acute{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\iota\varsigma$ (III.10) $\nu\omicron\epsilon\phi\omicron\varsigma \mu\acute{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\iota\varsigma$ indicates that what Proclus is asking for here is the ability to write the kind of poetry which he thought Homer wrote. Proclus is no Philo to describe his own inspiration in philosophical interpretation. He is no Hesiod or Callimachus to describe a personal encounter with the Muses or Apollo. His Hymns concentrate on the gods to whom they are addressed, invoking them, listing their attributes, asking for their gifts, but saying little of the worshipping poet who writes them. Reading Proclus' attractive Hymns we may well feel that the Muses granted him his prayer, but he has left us no record of whether he himself felt that they did.

The inspiration that we are dealing with in the 6th essay is poetic inspiration, distinct from the inspiration of the philosopher on the one side and that of the exegete on the other. According to Hermias it is also distinct from prophetic inspiration. All these types of inspiration are related; all, even that of the exegete, are conceived of as different grades of mystical experience and to define Proclus' concept of inspiration more precisely we need to understand the distinguishing characteristics of his theory of mysticism. I speak of a "theory of mysticism" because I would agree with J.M. Rist that, "where Plotinus is a mystic, Proclus seems to know only a theory of mysticism".⁵⁰ Not even Marinus ever suggests that Proclus actually experienced the Plotinian ecstasy, but he did believe in its possibility. I have just been suggesting that Proclus did experience inspiration. Given the Neoplatonic belief in divine inspiration, it is not, I think, simply conventional tribute when Marinus speaks of his teacher as an inspired exegete. Marinus used that form of words because he really thought that Proclus could not have lectured and written as he did without assistance from an external divine source. The experience known as "inspiration" is, after all, common enough amongst writers of all kinds, in varying degrees of intensity. In its simplest form it is a feeling that what one is writing no longer proceeds

50 "Mysticism and Transcendence in Later Neoplatonism", Hermes 92 (1964), p. 220. Cf. also Dodds' distinction between "mystical theorists" and "practising mystics" in Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety (Cambridge, 1965), p. 70.

from the conscious mind; words come unbidden and new ideas suddenly present themselves. This feeling may be explained in different ways and the source of inspiration may be thought of either as some inner faculty of the mind (the unconscious, for example) or, as commonly in the ancient world, as something external. Thus pagan ancient writers attributed their inspiration to the Muses or the gods, while the Christians attributed theirs to the Holy Spirit. Within the context of Neoplatonic theology and metaphysics inspiration would naturally be attributed to an external source in the divine world and if Proclus, when writing his Hymns, felt an apt word suddenly come to him, he would consider that the Muses had put it into his mind. Inspiration may be a relatively common experience but mystical ecstasy is extremely rare. Proclus' view is that inspiration is an experience of the same order as mystical ecstasy, not that it is precisely the same experience. This is the point of the distinction between grades of mystical cognition which we find in Hermias. In Neoplatonic terms, what I am suggesting is that Proclus never experienced the ἐρωτική μανία of the philosopher which he ascribes to Plato (the ecstasy felt and described by Plotinus would be this mania) nor yet μαντική μανία, experienced no doubt, in Proclus' view, by the writers of the Chaldaean Oracles. What he did perhaps experience was μυστική μανία and the μανία of the exegete, an inspiration comparable to Ion's. The term "mystical experience" properly refers only to the highest of these maniai and of that Proclus has only a theory.

There is another reason too for my use of the phrase

"theory of mysticism". Although I have digressed into the question whether Proclus actually experienced inspiration, I am discussing primarily his ideas, not his experiences. The passage of the 6th essay with which I am dealing is an abstract exposition of the nature of inspired poetry, not an account of how it feels to be writing such poetry or in any other way achieving contact with a supra-rational world.

Writers on mysticism may be divided into those who believe that the experience of the great mystics was qualitatively different from all other human experience and those who regard the difference as one of degree, treating the experience of Plotinus, St. John of the Cross or St. Teresa as an experience of the same essential kind as that of the poet who feels inspiration or even of the ordinary person who experiences a momentary "vision" of some sort. R.C. Zaehner in Mysticism Sacred and Profane⁵¹ is an example of the former group, William James in The Varieties of Religious Experience⁵² of the latter. Marghanita Laski also belongs to the latter group. In her book, Ecstasy,⁵³ she assimilates a large number of experiences of ordinary people to celebrated accounts of "ecstatic" experience in religion and literature. Proclus (and Hermias) would go into the latter group here, but whereas Marghanita Laski is inclined to be agnostic about the source of all these experiences and William James, while believing

51 (Oxford, 1957).

52 (London, 1902).

53 (London, 1961).

in their supernatural origin, gives no precise or exclusive shape to his belief, Proclus is certain that they all alike come from the gods. Zaehner, as a believing Christian, wants to distinguish experiences in which he believes that contact is really made with divinity from all others; Marghanita Laski, on the other hand, does not find disturbing the thought that if mystical union is an experience of the same essential kind as, e.g., poetic inspiration and poetic inspiration has its source in the human mind, then the source of mystical union will also have to be located there. Proclus too is happy to attribute poetic inspiration and mystical union to the same source but in his case the source of both is external, for both come from the gods. The modern writers on mysticism whom I have mentioned are also grappling with the problem of whether to admit experiences induced by drugs into the range of mystical or ecstatic experiences. This is in fact the starting point of Zaehner's book and experiences induced by mescaline are the first group he rejects as qualitatively different from those of true mystics. William James is inclined to include among his series of mystical experiences, "the consciousness produced by intoxicants and anaesthetics, especially by alcohol".⁵⁴ Marghanita Laski argues that the experiences of mescaline-takers are of a different nature from the wide range of experiences she calls "ecstatic".⁵⁵

54 Op. cit., p. 387.

55 Op. cit., Ch. XXIV, pp. 263 ff.

Proclus does not face this problem. Perhaps, however, since the operations of theurgy can, in his view, induce an experience of supra-rational cognition, he would, if pressed, maintain consistency and agree with William James that experiences induced by drugs or alcohol are of the same order as those of inspiration or mystical union. In the ancient world, after all, alcohol was connected with the experience of Dionysiac ecstasy.

Plotinian mysticism is distinguished by the fact that, for Plotinus, to quote Dodds, "mystical union is not a substitute for intellectual effort but its crown and goal".⁵⁶

The philosopher ascends towards the One by an intellectual process. All is dependent on his own efforts. Only at the very highest point of the ascent does divine revelation come into the picture. Only when this highest point has been reached does Plotinus use the language of possession and

filling, as he does, for example, in VI.9.11.13-5: Ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
ἐπικραθεὶς ἡ ἐνθεοσύνη ἡδονῇ ἐν ἑργῷ καὶ
κατακραθεὶς χερένηται ὑπέρβει.⁵⁷

In later Neoplatonism there is a certain modification of this picture. With the entry of the traditional gods into the First Hypostasis as the divine henads there is, so to speak, more help from above. The gods, or their lower emanations, can come to the assistance of the one who seeks union with them. This is where theurgy can come in, for it summons the gods. As often, the later Neoplatonists

56 Pagan and Christian.. (op. cit. above, note 50), p. 87.

57 Cf. J.M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967), p. 223.

are developing an existing element in Plotinus' thought. Plotinus does, occasionally, speak in terms which suggest divine aid for the aspiring mystic and Augustine thought he found the Christian doctrine of grace in Neoplatonism.⁵⁸ In Proclus' account of how inspired poetry brings about union with the gods, at 178.10-24, both the gods and the soul play a part and union is achieved through their co-operation:- see, for example, 178.12-6, *κατὰ πῦνά τε ἐνὸς ἑνὸς ἔργον εἰς αὐτὸν ἔχουσα τῷ πληροῦν τὸ πληρούμενον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὁλῶς καὶ ἀναδῶς ὑποστρωνύουσα πρὸς τὴν ἔλλαμψιν, τὸ δὲ προκαλούμεν πρὸς τὴν μετέδοσιν τοῦ δωτός.*

Poetry plays a similar role to theurgy in assisting the effort of the individual and summoning the gods. (Cf. the use of the quotation from the Chaldaean oracles in lines 17-8.)

It is this modification of the Plotinian theory of mysticism to allow for greater assistance from the gods which makes possible Proclus' view that poetic inspiration and mystical ecstasy are experiences of the same order. When poetic inspiration is ascribed to an external source, that source may be conceived as taking complete possession of the inspired writer, who acts simply as the mouthpiece of another. There is a classic statement of this idea in Philo, Her. 264:

58 See Civ. Dei X 29, and cf. R. Arnou, Le désir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin (2nd revised edn., Rome, 1967), pp. 224-9, for the contrasting passages of Plotinus on this point.

ὅταν μὲν γὰρ αὖτις τὸ θεῖον ἐπιδέμῃ, δύεται
τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, ὅταν δ' ἐκείνο δύηται, τοῦτ' ἀνίσχει
καὶ ἀκτέλλει. . . ἐξοικίζεται μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν
ὁ νοῦς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πνεύματος
ἑδίδιν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μετανάστασιν
αὐτοῦ πάλιν ἐξοικίζεται.⁵⁵ Alternatively

the inspired poet may be thought of as retaining his own faculties and will, and co-operating with the source which inspires him. This is the view taken by Origen. So in Homily on Ezekiel VI.1 (GCS VIII, p. 376) he maintains, "neque enim, ut quidam suspicantur, mente exidebant prophetae, et ex necessitate spiritus loquebantur".⁶⁰ This view is surprising in Origen, since he also holds that God Himself, rather than inspired individuals, is the author of the Bible. Proclus, who holds that Homer's poetry is produced by an inspired poet, not directly by the gods, is more consistent in similarly adhering to this latter view that the inspired poet is not totally possessed by the divinity which inspires him.

In The Greeks and the Irrational⁶¹ Dodds argues that Plato in the Phaedrus conceived of poetic inspiration as total possession, as the former of the two concepts I have outlined above, and in Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety.⁶²

⁵⁵ Cf. Wolfson (op. cit. above, note 37), II, p. 29.

⁶⁰ Cf. also Jo. I 22 (GCS IV, p. 27), and princ. III.3.4 (GCS V, pp. 260-1). See R.P.C. Hanson, Allegory and Event (London, 1959), pp. 194 f.; also de Lubac (op. cit. above, note 29), pp. 299-300.

⁶¹ (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), pp. 68-81 and pp. 217-9.

⁶² (Op. cit. above, note 50), pp. 70-2; cf. also pp. 76-9.

discussing the mysticism of Plotinus, he distinguishes firmly between possession and mystical union. When we come to Proclus, inspiration is not conceived of as total possession, and mystical union involves divine assistance as well as human effort. Thus it becomes possible to classify inspiration and mystical union as experiences of the same order; in both, personal effort and divine assistance co-operate. This means that Proclus treats Plato's account of divine madness in the Phaedrus as describing the same experience as that of the soul which perceives the Forms in the Phaedrus and the Symposium. But the soul which perceives the Forms is indeed, according to Plato, experiencing ἐρωτική μανία . To equate ἐρωτική μανία with mystical union and in effect ascribe mystical experience to Plato is, I think, going too far. Proclus would do this, but would be wrong to do so. On the other hand we may wonder whether Dodds is not also going too far in equating ποικηλή μανία with possession. Dodds' discussion implies that Plato thought of ἐρωτική μανία as significantly different from the other three.⁶³ Yet in Phaedrus 249d2 Plato describes the man who experiences it as ἐνθεοῦ ὄζων . Should we translate this "inspired"? Or even "possessed"? Even if we reject the equation of ἐρωτική μανία with mystical union, the Neoplatonic interpretation of the maniai of the Phaedrus, as we find it in Ieremias, is

63 This view is explicitly taken by W.J. Verdenius, "Der Begriff der Mania in Platons Phaidros", AGPh 44 (1962), pp. 132-50.

beginning to look rather plausible. Plato does conceive of all four maniai as experiences of the same order, differing in degree but not in kind, and this is how Hermias and, I am suggesting, Proclus interpreted them. All four come somewhere between the two poles of possession and mystical union. Proclus would equate the highest of them with mystical union but we should remember here that Proclus' concept of mystical union is not quite the Plotinian one. In any case when we consider Proclus' concepts in isolation from the interpretation of Plato we can see that it is because he thinks of mystical union as a co-operation between god and man, and of inspiration in the same terms, that he can treat the two experiences as of the same kind though different in degree.⁶⁴

Mystical union is typically a transient experience. If poetic inspiration is an experience of the same order, it would follow that the inspired poet is not inspired all the time. This is indeed Proclus' view, for he admits that not all parts of Homer's work are inspired.

Proclus' treatment of inspired poetry focusses on the poetry itself, rather than its creator and his psychological

64 On how far the gods help man to achieve mystical union, in Plot., Porph. and Iamb., see Smith, Ch. 7, pp. 100-110. My point that inspiration and mystical union, instead of being opposed to one another, can be thought of as experiences of the same order, is also made by H. Corbin, "Sympathie et Théopathie", Eranos-Jb 24 (1955), pp. 199-301 - see esp. pp. 201-5. Corbin applies the idea to Sufism but it is interesting that his starting-point is Proclus' fragment On the Hieratic Art.

state. He defines inspired poetry in terms of its content and demands that that content be the expression of metaphysical and theological truth in the allegorical form of myths. He considers inspiration a type of supra-rational cognition, of the same order as mystical experience, although at a lower level than true mystical union. The importance attached by the Neoplatonists to this type of cognition allows Proclus to bring back the old association between poetry and knowledge in a different form; the knowledge now becomes supra-rational cognition, and its object is transposed to become the eternal truths and entities of metaphysics. Proclus' theory of mysticism involves the belief that there are grades of mystical cognition. The ecstasy of the mystic is the highest of these grades and differs in degree rather than in kind from lower grades such as prophetic inspiration, poetic inspiration and the inspiration of the exegete. In mystical union and poetic inspiration alike both personal effort and divine assistance are involved: inspiration is not thought of as total possession, nor is mystical union possible without the help of the gods. Proclus' concept of poetic inspiration is thus closely connected not only with other types of inspiration such as that of the prophet or that of the exegete but with Neoplatonic epistemology and metaphysics as a whole. The basis of it is the *πονητικὴ μανία* of the Phaedrus and the best aid to understanding Proclus' concept of inspiration is Hermias' discussion of the four maniai of the Phaedrus even though, as we saw in Chapter 3 (v), Hermias differs from Proclus with

regard to the actual content of inspired poetry.⁶⁵ Inspired poetry is clearly the one of his three types in which Proclus is most interested; this is the concept which provides him with the means of answering Plato, this is the poetry whose allegorical meaning he spends most of the 6th essay expounding. Proclus' aesthetics are an integral part of his philosophy as a whole and his concept of inspired poetry has to be seen in relation to that philosophy in order to be understood.

Didactic poetry

In Chapter 3 (v) I argued that the concept of didactic poetry in the 6th essay is Proclus' own creation:⁶⁶ Proclus has turned the simple division into inspired and uninspired poetry into a threefold classification by splitting inspired poetry into inspired and didactic. While inspired poetry deals exclusively with myths which require allegorical interpretation in terms of metaphysics, didactic poetry expounds the lower ranges of metaphysics, physics and ethics in a straightforward way, without allegory. (See the list of

subject-matter in 186.22 ff.: πολλὰ μὲν περὶ τῆς
ἀσώματου φύσεως νοήματα ... πολλὰ δὲ περὶ
τῆς σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως εἰκότα ... τὴν
καλλίστην καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν πρέπουσαν συμπερίαν
καὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν πρὸς ταύτην διὰθεσιν

Cf. also 192.12 ff.) I mentioned in Chapter 3 that didactic

⁶⁵ See above, pp.221 ff.

⁶⁶ See above, pp. 221 ff.; also p. 347.

poetry is something of an oddity beside the other two types, inspired and mimetic poetry. They are both thought of as some kind of representation: mimetic poetry represents its subject matter directly, by imitation, and inspired poetry represents it indirectly, by using symbols. But didactic poetry does not represent at all. It simply tells the reader or audience of its subject-matter, retailing facts of philosophy or natural science, or else delivering ethical precepts.

It is useful to distinguish between the belief that poetry in general has a didactic value and the classification of a specific type of poetry as didactic. Proclus believes that all poetry has an educational value for some audience even though inspired poetry is not suited to an audience of the young and uninitiated; in this sense he thinks of all poetry as didactic. He distinguishes one specific type of poetry as didactic by its manner of presenting its material. Didactic poetry is poetry which teaches directly, without the use of representation of any kind. This distinction is really more important than the distinction in terms of subject-matter.

When we speak of didactic poetry we are usually thinking in terms of a classification by genres. Proclus' three types of poetry are not genres: to make this clear, it suffices to point out that Homer, supreme representative of the genre of epic, contains all three types.⁶⁷ Our concept of didactic poetry dates from the eighteenth century. In fact the concept,

67 Cf. Koster (op. cit. above, note 1), p. 113.

though not the term, may be found a little earlier, in Addison's Essay on the Georgics, first published anonymously in Dryden's translation of Virgil, in 1697. Addison distinguishes georgic poetry from pastoral on the one side and heroic on the other, thinking of course of Virgil's Eclogues, Georgics and Aeneid respectively. The Georgics, he says, "fall under that class of poetry which consists in giving plain and direct instructions to the reader; whether they be moral duties, as those of Theognis or Pythagoras; or philosophical speculations, as those of Aratus and Lucretius; or rules of practice, as those of Hesiod and Virgil." Joseph Trapp, the first Professor of Poetry at Oxford, makes explicit reference to Addison's essay when he comes to discuss didactic poetry in his Praelectiones poeticae.⁶⁸ He includes didactic among the genres and deals with it in his 15th lecture, "De poemate didactico; seu praeceptivo" (Vol. II, pp. 90 ff.) Trapp picks out Addison as the first to discuss didactic as a separate genre. Addison is referred to in the same way by Thomas Tickell in his lecture, "De poesi didactica", given at Oxford in 1711.⁶⁹ Both Trapp and Tickell distinguish various types of didactic poetry and give examples ancient and modern. Tickell opens by making the distinction between the didactic value of poetry in general and didactic poetry as a specific

68 (Oxford, 1711, 1715 and 1719).

69 Published in an English translation by J.L. Austin in R.E. Tickell, Thomas Tickell and the eighteenth century poets (London, 1931), pp. 198-209; cf. pp. 21-30 on Tickell's lectures at Oxford.

type: "Although the whole of Poetry has set out to improve no less than to delight ... yet every one of you is aware that that sort of poetry, which is termed Didactic, is quite distinct, wherein the Poet avows himself Master, lays down Rules after his own fashion, and assumes the Role of Teacher." The growth of our modern concept of didactic poetry is linked to the eighteenth century popularity of Virgil's Georgics. The Abbé du Bos in his Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture takes the Georgics as his primary example of the "genre Dogmatique".⁷⁰ Later in the century Joseph Warton's Reflections on Didactic Poetry were published in the translation of Virgil by him and Christopher Pitt.⁷¹

By the eighteenth century the classification of genres had ceased to be purely on formal grounds. Of Trapp's genres, some, such as lyric, are defined by style, while others, such as pastoral and didactic, are defined by subject-matter. In antiquity genres were classified simply on formal grounds and what we would call didactic poetry came under $\epsilon\mu\eta$. We shall find that the eighteenth century writers on didactic do present some interesting points of comparison with Proclus

70 See Vol. I, sections 8 and 9. The Abbé du Bos' work was first published in 1719. His assumption that there is a "genre Dogmatique" suggests that the concept we find in Addison has European origins but I have been unable to trace these. Didactic is not among the genres listed by Boileau in his Art poétique.

71 (London, 1753). For Warton's Reflections, see Vol. I, pp. 393-440. On the fashion for didactic poetry in 18th century England, see D.L. Durling, Georgic Tradition in English Poetry (New York, 1935). Ch. 1, esp. pp. 21 ff., deals with theories of didactic poetry.

but we must not forget that didactic is not a genre for Proclus as it is for them.

Although "didactic" is the most convenient term for Proclus' second type of poetry we should note that he does not in fact call it διδακτική himself. He has no one term to describe it. In 186.22-3 he calls it ἐπισημόναι τῶν ὄντων καὶ κατὰ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν ἐνεργούσαν (cf. 188.24-5) and in 193.5 he uses διδάσκων of Homer as a didactic poet. It was common enough in ancient thought about poetry to distinguish, within the genre of ἔπη, between the work of writers like Empedocles and that of poets like Homer. Often the former is rejected as not really poetry. This is the view of Aristotle in Poetics 1447b13 ff.: οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἔστιν Ὀμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον, διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιόλογον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητὴν. A similar view is expressed by Plutarch in De aud. poetis 16c: τὰ δ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἔπη καὶ Παρμενίδου καὶ Θηριακὰ Νικάνδρου καὶ γυνωμολογία Θεόφριδος λόγοι εἰσι κυχράμενα παρὰ ποιητικῆς ὥσπερ ὄχημα τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸν ὄγκον, ἵνα τὸ πεζὸν διαδύωσιν. Different types of subject-matter for epic are distinguished in, for example, Manilius' prooemium to Book II of his work and in the prooemium to Oppian's Cynegetica.⁷² Both Manilius and Oppian are writing didactic epic and so reject heroic and mythological subject-matter. If we think not in terms of the modern genre-

72 Cf. Koster (op. cit. above, note 1), p. 135 and p. 155.

classification but in terms of this ancient tradition of didactic as a subdivision of the genre of epic, it comes as less of a surprise that Proclus should think of didactic poetry as an element in epic and assign it a special subject-matter.

Unlike Aristotle, who places the essence of poetry in *μῦσις* (as he understands that term), and Plutarch, who thinks poetry is essentially *ψευδής* (false/fictional), Proclus is quite willing to accept didactic as poetry; in fact he gives it a high place.

Proclus gives no examples other than Homer of didactic poetry on metaphysics or physics. Festugière, in his translation, suggests that the poetry of the Presocratic philosophers would be counted as dealing with the second of these types of subject-matter. This would fit in with Aristotle's reference to Empedocles and Plutarch's to Empedocles and Parmenides. On the other hand, at In Parm. 665.17 ff. Proclus, after quoting some lines of Parmenides, delivers a judgement on them like those of Aristotle and Plutarch: ὥστε μᾶλλον πρὸς εἶναι δοκεῖν ἢ ποιητικὸν <τὸν> λόγον .⁷³ Proclus here, however, may well be judging the specific passages of Parmenides which he quotes, rather than Parmenides' work as a whole. He might still be willing to include other passages of Parmenides under his second type of poetry. His examples of didactic poetry in Homer are passages where Homer displays knowledge of the nature of the soul and of cosmology.⁷⁴

⁷³ Cf. Parmenides A18 Diels-Kranz and Koster (op. cit. above, note 1), p. 12.

⁷⁴ Cf. above, pp. 341-3.

For the poetry of ethical instruction Proclus turns to Plato and follows Laws I 630a in commending Theognis and, to a lesser extent, Tyrtaeus. His other example is the anonymous lines on prayer cited by Plato in Alc. II 142e. Theognis provides a clear example of what Proclus understands by poetry of this sort and the treatment of Theognis in Laws I 630a may well be seen as the Platonic starting-point for his concept of didactic, just as Phaedrus 245a is the starting-point for his concept of inspired poetry. But with the introduction of Theognis, and of Tyrtaeus, who both wrote in elegiacs, it becomes clear that Proclus' didactic is not simply a subdivision of epic.⁷⁵ His classification is neither into genres, nor into the subdivisions of a recognised genre.

As for the lines on prayer in Alc. II 142e, Proclus fastens on them in particular because of Socrates' description of the anonymous poet as *φρόνιμος*. This becomes clear in 188.12 ff. where Proclus explains that the epithet is used because didactic poetry, such as this, belongs to *ἐπιστήμη*, the cognitive faculty of nous with which didactic poetry was associated in 177.7 ff.⁷⁶

75 Cf. the Plutarch passage quoted above. Although Plutarch follows Aristotle in the rejection of Empedocles, he must be talking about poetry in general, rather than *ἐπη* in particular, for he includes Theognis among the rejected prosaic verse.

76 Festugière is quite wrong to say in his note here, "Il ne faut pas trop urger sur cette opposition *ὁρᾷ δόξαν ἐπιστήμη* ." He points to 188.25 ff., *ἡ γὰρ τῆς μέλει ἐξείν τῆς ὁρᾶς ἰδορίαν δυναμένη δόξαν αὐτῇ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τέλει ἐπιστήμην ὑφείσθηκεν*, but the point there is that he who has *ἐπιστήμη*, or the poetry of *ἐπιστήμη*, can lay down *ὁρᾷ δόξαν* for others. The opposition between *ἐπιστήμη* and *ὁρᾷ δόξαν* looks back, as I have indicated, to the earlier correlation between the three types of poetry and three faculties in the soul.

Addison gives three types of subject-matter for didactic poetry: "moral duties", "philosophical speculations" and "rules of practice".⁷⁷ Trapp (p. 92) has four: "ad mores", "ad philosophiam naturalem", "ad vitae humanae negotia et oblectamenta", "ad ipsam denique poesin, sive artem poeticam". Tickell (p. 200) gives a different four: morals, philosophy, arts, "and a fourth kind compounded out of these". In all these cases the first two correspond exactly to Proclus' subject-matter of didactic. Although the eighteenth century writers give modern examples, classical poetry provides them with their primary instances and determines their classification of themes. Addison's third type of subject-matter, "rules of practice", is the most important for him because of Virgil, who wrote on a subject of this kind. It is essentially this third subject of Addison's which becomes the third and fourth types of didactic for Trapp and Tickell respectively. (Tickell's instances of his compound type are Hesiod and Virgil). The Greek representative of Addison's third type of subject-matter is Hesiod, but this is the Hesiod of the Works and Days, the "Ascraeum carmen" which Virgil claimed to be reproducing in Latin. For Proclus Hesiod ranks as a theologos, a writer of inspired poetry, because Proclus' Hesiod is the writer of the Theogony. The eighteenth century interest in the Georgics leads the eighteenth century writers on didactic to concentrate on didactic poetry with subject-

77 Cf. above, p.376.

matter like Virgil's. Proclus, writing with different interests and purposes, concentrates on the didactic poetry mentioned by Plato.

Neither Addison nor Tickell cares much for moral didactic. "Precepts of morality," says Addison, "... are so abstracted from ideas of sense, that they seldom give us an opportunity for those beautiful descriptions and images which are the spirit and life of poetry." Tickell (p. 201) expresses himself in very similar terms: "... precepts are so devoid of all ornament that they make poetry dull and unattractive. The images that occur to the expounder of moral precepts have their origin in the Intellect alone, while Genius is delighted with what thrills the senses powerfully and vividly." The very reasons for Addison's and Tickell's low estimate of such poetry are the reasons why Proclus - and Plato - are willing to praise Theognis. What could make a Platonist happier than poetry which does not appeal to the senses, whose images "have their origin in the Intellect alone"?

Proclus' didactic poetry is more than simply a subdivision of epic, for it includes Theognis and Tyrtaeus. It is not the same as the modern genre of didactic poetry, for it includes some of Homer, and Proclus' three types of poetry are not genres. Although Proclus gives it a distinct subject-matter, what significantly differentiates it from inspired and mimetic poetry is that it is not representational in any way, either direct or indirect. Altogether Proclus' concept of didactic poetry is something of an oddity: it does not quite fit any of the boxes into which one is tempted to put it.

Mimetic poetry

The last of Proclus' three types of poetry, mimetic, is subdivided into eikastic poetry which aims at accurate imitation of things as they are, and phantastic poetry which aims only at imitation of things as they appear to most people. The end of the latter is ψυχολογία, its efforts are directed towards the παθητικόν in the soul, and it presents only a shadow-show (εικαστική), not true knowledge. The abstract exposition of mimetic poetry and its two divisions, in 179.15-32, is based upon two of the Platonic texts which Proclus cites as authorities for it in the later section at 188.28-191.25, Republic X and Sophist 235d. The terms εικαστική and φανταστική come from the Sophist passage, where two types of μυθητική are discussed, while 179.22-3 recalls the way in which the power of poetry is envisaged in the Republic. In particular the term εικαστική (179.25-6) echoes Rep. X 602d and the conception of a poetry which is addressed to the παθητικόν in the soul likewise comes from Rep. X. ψυχολογία too is a term found in Plato: in Phaedrus 261a Plato describes rhetoric as ψυχολογία πρὸς δὲ λόγων (cf. also 271c). It became common in later theory. Strabo, for example, in I.2.3 denies that poetry aims at ψυχολογία. He holds with the Stoics that poetry is educational, and argues against Eratosthenes who considered its end to be ψυχολογία. Proclus, typically, is setting up a scheme which allows him to have it both ways: bad poetry aims at ψυχολογία while worthwhile poetry is

essentially educational. (Proclus would, I think, hold that even phantastic poetry could be used for the education of the lowest part of the soul, but this is not its primary purpose. Cf. In Remp. II 107.21-108.16 on the appeal of myths to the imagination.) Just as Proclus' inspired poetry had its starting point in Phaedrus 245a, and didactic poetry had its Platonic basis in Laws I 630a, so mimetic poetry is developed out of Rep. X and Sph. 235d.

In fact, in elucidating what he means by mimetic poetry Proclus faithfully expounds the Platonic concept of poetry as mimesis. Proclus' mimetic poetry presents few difficulties just because it is a concept with which we are familiar from Plato. Two points of interest arise from the section in which Proclus gives the Platonic authority for mimetic poetry, 188.28-191.25. To take the less important one first, Proclus uses his division into eikastic and phantastic to reconcile Rep.X with the more favourable view of poetic mimesis taken in Laws II 667c ff. He takes the latter passage as concerned with eikastic poetry and derives from it τὴν ὁρθότητα τοῦ μιμήματος, accuracy of representation, as the aim of eikastic. Rep. X he sees as dealing only with phantastic poetry. This shows us how Proclus is going to use his classification of types of poetry to answer Rep. X in 196.18 ff. The attempt to resolve a contradiction in Plato by referring contradictory passages to different elements in a Neoplatonic classificatory scheme is typical of Proclus' method of interpretation.⁷⁸ It

⁷⁸ Cf. above, pp. 287-8.

is true that Plato in Rep. X is being as hard on poetry as he can, and there are some grounds for taking his words there as referring only to some poetry, not as a condemnation of all poetry.⁷⁹ Moreover it is natural to put Laws II 667c ff. together with Sph. 235d. The use of the term ἐκτενική invites one to do so.⁸⁰

The second point of interest in this discussion of mimetic is precisely Proclus' interpretation of the Sophist passage. Proclus' use of this passage implies that both the types of μυητική discussed in it are pretty bad. The only merit of ἐκτενική is that it is not quite as corrupt as φανταστική. ἐκτενική ποιητική meets only with modified approval. It is definitely less valuable than either inspired or didactic poetry. There is a common modern interpretation of this Sophist passage according to which ἐκτενική μυητική is given a much higher value than this. Vicaire, for example, calls it "savante" and connects it with the poetry approved in Phaedrus 245a.⁸¹ Against this some more discerning modern interpreters have taken a similar view to Proclus', that the contrast between ἐκτενική and φανταστική is between bad and worse, rather than between good and bad. So E. Panofsky in Idea. A Concept in Art Theory takes this view and, interestingly, associates the φανταστική μίμησης of the Sophist with Rep.

79 See further below, pp. 395-6.

80 Cf. Vicaire, p. 233. He takes the Laws passage as making the same point as the Sph. one, but with less precision.

81 Vicaire, pp. 230-1. Cf. also G.M.A. Grube, Plato's Thought (London, 1935), pp. 194-5 and 203-4.

X 602a.⁸² The same view is implied in E. Cassirer, Eidos und Eidolon. Das Problem des Schönen und der Kunst in Platons Dialogen.⁸³ Likewise Richard Robinson in Plato's Earlier Dialectic⁸⁴ rejects the suggestion that Plato approves of εἰκαστική. I am myself convinced that this latter view, that neither εἰκαστική nor φανταστική is really approved by Plato, is correct. The other interpretation neglects the context in the Sophist from which it is clear that all μυμητική is bad. μυμητική of any kind deals in images, εἰδωλα, and even faithful images are rejected by Plato on principle. Proclus here shows himself more alive to the spirit of Plato's philosophy than are some of his modern interpreters.

The distinction in the Sophist is made with reference to painting. Proclus transfers it to poetry and we have seen earlier⁸⁵ that this leads him into difficulties when he gives an example of phantastic poetry. But the transfer itself is justified. Plato is using painting to illustrate the activity of the sophist, who deceives people with words not with trompe l'oeil pictures, and it is clear from Rep. X that he considers poets to be as much μυμηταί as painters. Proclus' mistake is rather in not making the transfer thoroughly enough. The concept of φανταστική μίμηση would need further modification before it could be usefully applied to poetry.

82 (Eng. trans. New York 1968), p. 5. Cf. Proclus' quotation of Rep. X 602a at 191.31-192.1. Panofsky, interested in the visual arts rather than in literature, makes no mention of Proclus here among ancient and Renaissance interpreters of the passage.

83 Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg, 1922-3, I Teil, pp. 1-27.

84 (2nd edn. Oxford, 1953), pp. 219-20.

85 Pp.339-41 above.

One might wonder why mimetic poetry is subdivided at all. The Platonic authorities Proclus cites for it show that he has a twofold motive; on the one hand he wishes to take account of the distinction in the Sophist, while on the other he wishes to resolve the contradiction between Laws II and Rep. X. Why then, it might be asked, does he not go further and make it clear that he has four types of poetry rather than three? Proclus is not just giving in to a fondness for triadic arrangement here,⁸⁶ though no doubt that weighs with him. Eikastic and phantastic are closely connected. As the Sophist passage itself shows, they are two forms of the same thing. They differ, it is true, in the ends to which they are directed, but they deal with the same subject-matter and represent it in the same way, by imitation. As we have seen, Proclus distinguishes his types of poetry by their subject-matter, and by the manner of representation. The effect of a particular type of poetry on its audience is only a secondary criterion.

This discussion of each of the three types of poetry individually has clarified some aspects of the general theory. I now return to further examination of the theory taken as a whole.

It should now be clear what I meant when I said at the beginning of this chapter that Proclus' three types of poetry are evolved from a reading of Plato in the first place. Each

86 On Proclus' tendency to arrange things in threes, cf. the good remarks of Rosàn, pp. 97-3.

one is based on a passage of Plato and developed from there. We have here a small, and therefore easily comprehensible, example of a general tendency in Neoplatonism. Neoplatonic doctrines evolve from the exegesis of Plato and we can see in the discursive commentaries on Plato which the later Neoplatonists composed how exegesis becomes independent philosophy. In his important article, The Parmenides and the Neoplatonic One⁸⁷ Dodds argued that the basis of Neoplatonic metaphysics came from the interpretation of Plato's Parmenides. By studying earlier interpretation of the Parmenides he showed that the interpretation precedes, and causes, the doctrine, not vice versa. The essentials of this view are now generally accepted. Saffrey and Westerink in the introduction to Vol. I of their edition of the Platonic Theology present the development of Neoplatonic theology as going hand-in-hand with the development of exegesis of the Parmenides.⁸⁸ Similarly Philip Merlan in Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness⁸⁹ expresses the view that, "the philosophical insight which Plotinus expresses by his doctrine of the three principal realities he has acquired by trying to synthesize texts." Dodds, Saffrey and Westerink, and Merlan are all dealing with Neoplatonic metaphysics, but the point they make could be made in the same way with reference to Neoplatonic aesthetics. What

87 CQ 22 (1928), pp. 129-42.

88 See note 40 above.

89 (The Hague, 1963), § 38, p. 77.

we have seen to be true of the theory of three types of poetry in this respect is true of Proclus' philosophy as a whole. Merlan goes on to describe Plotinus' philosophical insight as "derivative rather than original". This is being rather too harsh. Admittedly the link between exegesis and independent philosophy is peculiarly close in Neoplatonism but much philosophical insight is at least assisted, if not actually produced, by the examination of previous writers. Very few minds are capable of philosophical speculation in a void. One of the interesting things about Neoplatonism in general, and Proclus' theory of poetry in particular, is that it presents us with an extreme case of a process which is common in philosophical thought. Proclus is an academic philosopher whose independent speculations arise out of teaching and interpreting philosophical texts, and in seeing how his doctrines are related to his exegesis we may be helped to a better understanding of how much philosophy develops.

We have seen that Proclus' types of poetry are not genres and that they are defined in terms of subject-matter whereas ancient genres were largely defined in terms of form. The Neoplatonists were familiar with the usual classification into genres, as we can see from Hermias 98.18 ff.: ἐπιγονικάν καὶ ὑπεργονικάν καὶ τὰλλα εἶδη τῆς ποιήσεως.⁹⁰ The term Hermias uses for genres is εἶδη. εἶδος is the word Proclus uses in the introduction to his commentaries for the

90 Cf. above, p. 248.

literary form of a Platonic dialogue. In the 1st essay of the Commentary on the Republic (In Remp. 14.15 ff.) Proclus takes Plato's classification in Rep. III of three styles, narrative, dramatic and mixed, treats it as a classification of εἶδη λέξεως and assigns the Republic itself to the mixed εἶδος. Then (15.19 ff.) he describes the dialogue as mixed according to a second classification of εἶδη into ὑψηλῆς, σημῆς and μικτῆς. This latter, philosophical classification is found also in Albinus, Isagoge 3 and Diogenes Laertius III 49. Plato's own three εἶδη are mentioned by Diogenes Laertius III 50 as an alternative way of grouping the dialogues but he treats it with some disdain, calling the use of it πραγματικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ διανοητικόν.⁹¹ Proclus uses the Platonic classification only here in his extant commentaries, surely because he is dealing with the dialogue in which the classification is introduced. This division of literary styles into narrative, dramatic and mixed is sometimes called a classification into genres, of a more fundamental kind than the familiar classification into tragedy, comedy, epic, lyric, etc.⁹² These fundamental styles, kinds or genres are

91 Cf. also Flu. Quaest. conv. VII 711c and Anon. in Thet. col. 3, line 37 ff.

92 Cf. R. Wellek and A. Warren, Theory of Literature (London, 1949), Ch. XVII; they relate Plato's classification to a classification into three fundamental literary kinds, drama, epic and lyric. Similarly Northrop Frye in The Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, 1957), pp. 246 ff., uses the term "genres" for three fundamental kinds, drama, epic and lyric, and suggests that the basis of generic distinctions in literature is "the radical of presentation", i.e. whether the words are acted, spoken or sung. This classification is more like Plato's in Rep. III than like the common use of the term "genre".

ἑῶν in Proclus' terminology. His three types of poetry are to be distinguished from them as much as from genres in the common sense, Hermias' literary ἑῶν. With his usual rigour Proclus avoids using the term εἶδος of his three types of poetry. In 180.3 and 195.13 he calls them γένη while in 192.6 ff. he uses the term ἕξις, but most of the time he simply uses feminine singular articles and participles implying an unexpressed noun ποιητική. So he speaks of ἡ ἐνθεαδική (e.g. 179.3) ἡ ἐπιδημίων τῶν ὄντων (186.22:-cf. p. 378 above on Proclus' lack of a precise term for didactic poetry) and ἡ μιμητική (e.g. 188.28). Perhaps we should be calling the theory a theory of three poetries. As this sounds a little quaint in English it seems best to keep to the neutral "three types of poetry".

I have stressed several times that Proclus' primary criteria for distinguishing the three types are subject-matter, in terms of which the distinction is explicitly made, and the manner of representation, an implicit criterion which plays a particularly important part in the distinction of didactic poetry. The effect on the audience is a secondary means of distinction. We saw that eikastic and phantastic, which deal with the same subject-matter, are distinguished by the effect at which they aim. Effect on the audience also becomes important in such passages as 201.14 ff. To Plato's charge that the imitative poet directs his efforts towards the emotions, towards the παθητικόν in the soul, Proclus replies that drama affects that lowly part of us but the higher poetry of Homer affects our nous or τοῦ νοῦ θεώτερον, i.e. the "one in

the soul".

Proclus' metaphysical system presents a hierarchy of value, not just a factual ordering of reality. The One, at the highest point of the system, is supremely real and supremely good. As one proceeds downward through the Neoplatonist universe both reality and value decrease: Mind is not as real, or as good, as the One; Soul not as real, or as good, as Mind; and so forth. The system of three types of poetry is explicitly correlated with different elements in the human soul which represent the different hypostases within it so that the series $\epsilon\upsilon\ \eta\varsigma\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma \rightarrow \nu\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma \rightarrow \alpha\epsilon\beta\theta\eta\varsigma$
 $\rightarrow \phi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\delta\iota\alpha$ is a hierarchy parallel to the overall hierarchy of Neoplatonist metaphysics. The three types of poetry themselves form such a hierarchy, that is, the classification is evaluative as well as factual. In other words inspired poetry is not just different from didactic or mimetic but is also better than either of them.

Aesthetic judgements are judgements of value, and attempts at aesthetic classification, however factual they may claim to be, often carry evaluative implications. So, for example, when R.G. Collingwood in The Principles of Art⁹³ distinguishes between amusement art, magical art, and art proper, he does so in order to claim that art proper is better, more valuable than the two types of pseudo-art. Even when we say of something in the ordinary way, "That's not art", we are usually implying an adverse judgement, not just making a factual statement.⁹⁴

93 (Oxford, 1938).

94 I owe this example to a lecture by Mr. A.M. Quinton.

When Proclus' whole metaphysical system presents a hierarchy of value, it is no surprise that his classification of types of poetry should be evaluative too, but I would argue that such evaluative ordering is particularly comprehensible when dealing with poetry, or art of any kind. One of the oddities of Platonist metaphysics for us is the way fact and value are inseparably bound up together. We may find it easier to understand if we start from an area like aesthetics where for us too fact and value are closely intertwined.

Since the theory of three types of poetry is evaluative, Proclus can use it to make value-judgements. So in 195.22 ff. he assigns tragedy to phantastic poetry and thus passes adverse judgement on it. This is not really any different from the Platonic condemnation of tragedy, but by saying that tragedy is phantastic poetry Proclus gives the judgement a deceptive ring of factual objectivity. The value-judgement in question is of course moral as much as, or more than, aesthetic. Like Plato, Proclus makes no distinction between moral and aesthetic value: good poetry is poetry which is good for us. We can see more clearly now why Proclus could not consider the metaphysical status of poetry without also taking some account of the effect on the audience. What poetry is, whether it is good as poetry, and whether it is good for us, the audience, are not separate questions for Proclus any more than they were for Plato.

We saw in Chapter 5 that Proclus makes a distinction between two types of myths, inspired and educational.⁹⁵ How

⁹⁵ See above, pp. 327-30.

does this distinction fit in with the distinction of three types of poetry? In 182.4-13, in the discussion of the three types of poetry, the earlier distinction between two audiences, young and initiated, the audiences for educational and inspired myths respectively, is picked up. It is clear here that inspired poetry uses inspired myths, and Proclus explains that such poetry is educational in a special way. The link between educational myths and the lower types of poetry is less clear. A passage at 86.19 ff. implies two kinds of educational myth, for myths which are not inspired are divided into: τῆς τε εἰς τὴν φύσιν βλέπουσας καὶ τὰς φυσικὰς δυνάμεις ἀφειργνευσούσας, καὶ τῆς τὰ ἥθη τῶν ψυχῶν παιδεύειν προσημασμένης . This form of expression recalls the subject-matter of didactic poetry. Mimetic poetry, which imitates the world around us, would presumably not use myths at all. So educational myths must come within the province of didactic poetry. The difficulty about this is that didactic did not sound as if it used myths at all. Once again didactic is the odd one out, the one which does not quite fit into the scheme. If we suppose that some of a poet like Parmenides would count as didactic perhaps the mythical parts of his work would be educational myths suitable for use in didactic poetry. But this may be forcing too much coherence on Proclus. The real answer is that he is more interested in inspired poetry and inspired myths, and so the relationship between those two is clearly worked out. His concept of educational myths is little more than a foil to that of inspired myths and he has not worked out in full how educational myths stand to his lesser types of

poetry.⁹⁶

The theory of three types of poetry is developed for the purpose of answering Plato's attack on poetry in Rep. X and in 196.18 ff. Proclus proceeds to use it in the interpretation of Plato. He argues that the strictures of Rep. X apply only to mimetic poetry, indeed only to the lower kind of that, phantastic poetry (which was, we recall, defined with the help of Rep. X!). Plato is thinking primarily of tragedy and only attacking Homer because of his influence on tragedy.

Proclus' view is not without justification here. The strongest point in his argument is Plato's phrase at 595a:

τὸ μιμητικὴν παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅλην μίμησιν. How much poetry is mimetic? Only drama and unimportant parts of Homer, according to Proclus. In 607a Plato says he will accept only hymns to the gods and encomia of good men into his ideal state. It is true that the frequent description of Rep. X as an attack on art is misleading. It is not an attack on absolutely all art, or rather, on absolutely all poetry. (The real subject under discussion is poetry, or, one might say, literature. The

96 Coulter, p. 109, takes it that educational myths belong to didactic poetry. He is thus led to think that Proclus in the 6th essay considers Plato as a writer to be on the same level as didactic poets who compose such myths. This cannot be right. Proclus may consider some of Plato's myths educational rather than inspired but he never says, and never would say, that, to quote Coulter, "Plato as writer was, at best, only the equal of the middle rank of poets." One of the reasons for Coulter's confusion here is the fact that Proclus is unclear about how educational myths are related to the lower types of poetry.

visual arts are introduced only by way of illustration of the meaning of mimesis.) Yet there is no denying that it is an attack on most poetry. Proclus grossly exaggerates the amount of poetry admitted. Plato's own phrase, ὅτι μιμητική, his own admission of poetry into the ideal state, has left the way open for a defence like that made by Proclus.⁹⁷

Similarly Proclus is right to point out that Homer is being attacked because of his influence on the tragic poets (see, e.g., Rep. X 598d7-8 τὴν τε τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὀμηρον) but he neglects such passages as Rep. X 600e3 ff. where Homer is included among the poetic μιμηταί. If pressed, Proclus would presumably say that in such a passage Plato was thinking only of the mimetic parts of Homer's work. In 199.14-28 Proclus argues that even when Homer is mimetic that is not his main aim.⁹⁸

Plato uses μίμησις in Rep. X in a rather different sense from that in which he uses the term in Rep. II and III.⁹⁹ In the earlier books μίμησις is the impersonation of the actor,

97 Cf. Immisch, p. 271 and Coulter, p. 46.

98 Festugière mistranslates διὰ τὸ ψεῦδος αὐτὸν περὶ λαβὴν τῶν μιμημάτων (199.21-2) as "parce qu'il n'avait reçu qu'une médiocre expérience des choses à imiter," taking both ψεῦδος and μίμημα in an odd sense. It means rather, "because he has experience only of copies".

99 This is a much discussed problem. See, for example, W.C. Greene, "Plato's View of Poetry", HSPH 29 (1918), pp. 1-75; J. Tate, "'Imitation' in Plato's Republic", CQ 22 (1928), pp. 16-23 and "Plato and 'Imitation'", CQ 26 (1932), pp. 160-9; W.J. Verdenius, Mimesis: Plato's Doctrine of Artistic Imitation and its Meaning to Us (Leiden, 1949) - the first part of this monograph, the part on Plato, is reprinted in Plato II, ed. G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), pp. 259-73; R.G. Collingwood, "Plato's Philosophy of Art", Mind 34 (1925), pp. 154-72 and The Principles of Art (Oxford, 1938), pp. 46 ff.

while in Rep. X *μίμῃσις* is imitation and the poet, as well as the actor, is an imitator. The mimesis of the actor can be fitted in to the concept of mimesis in Rep. X if we think of the actor's activity as not unlike that of Ion the rhapsode in the Ion. (The description of Ion reciting in 535b makes him sound rather like an actor who identifies with the character he is playing.) Ion is reproducing the inspiration of the poet in a diluted form, and the actor, I suggest, is imitating at an even lower level than the poet, reproducing by imitation a work which is itself an imitation. If the poet is third from reality, the actor would be fourth from reality. This attempt to amalgamate the two senses of mimesis does not resolve all the problems of the contradiction between Rep. II and III on the one hand and Rep. X on the other, for the narrative, non-mimetic poetry admitted in Rep. II and III will still be rejected as mimetic in Rep. X. It does however suggest that there is point in regarding the mimesis of Rep. X as the primary sense of mimesis for Plato, since mimesis in Rep. II and III can be thus subordinated to it. The Rep. X sense of mimesis is the only sense with which Proclus deals, for a number of related reasons. When discussing Rep. X, it is natural to think of mimesis in the sense expounded there. Moreover this "metaphysical" sense of mimesis is the sense which is important for Plato's philosophy, in which the sensible world is conceived as an imitation of the eternal Forms. Correspondingly it is even more important for Neoplatonist metaphysics, in which there is a whole series of levels of reality, each one imitating the one above. It is mimesis in the Rep. X sense,

not the Rep. II and III sense, which has been enormously influential in later thinking about art. The starting point for the doctrine of art as imitation is Rep. X, whatever its subsequent modifications.

One of the most celebrated modifications of the doctrine of art as imitation is the Plotinian one, that the artist imitates not the sensible world but the Forms (see V.8.1 and I.6). Plotinus speaks primarily in terms of the visual arts, painting and sculpture. It was left for Proclus to apply this idea to literature. His inspired poetry represents the divine world not directly, by imitation, but indirectly, by symbolism.

Before going further into Proclus' distinction between symbolism and direct imitation I should like to point out that Proclus is again here closer to Plato than are some of his modern interpreters. He does not try to claim, as Tate does, that Plato has a good sense of direct imitation. Nor does he introduce, as Verdenius does, the idea that the artist can imitate correctly, though at two removes, by imitating the elements in the sensible world which do themselves imitate the Forms.¹⁰⁰ By *μίμησις* Proclus means what Plato means in Rep. X, direct, slavish, reprehensible imitation of sensible particulars. *μίμησις* could never be a way of representing the divine world of Forms and Neoplatonist metaphysical entities. Instead of suggesting that it could be, Proclus follows along

¹⁰⁰ See Tate and Verdenius, op. cit. Verdenius' idea is already suggested in Plot. V.8.1.32-4.

the path that Plotinus had indicated¹⁰¹ and introduces a new concept of symbolic representation. Such a concept is not present in Rep. X, nor elsewhere in Plato. At this point Proclus leaves Plato behind him and develops one of the most interesting and important ideas of the 6th essay.

In 198.13-9 Proclus distinguishes clearly between the symbolic representation employed by inspired poetry and the direct mimesis of Rep. X: καὶ πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἡ διὰ συμβόλων τὰ θεῶν ἀφερμηνεύουσα μιμητικὴ προβαλεῖται; τὰ γὰρ σύμβολα τούτων, ὧν ἔστι σύμβολα, μῆματα οὐκ ἔστιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἂν ποτε μῆματα γένοιτο, τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ δειχρὸν, καὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν τὸ παρὰ φύσιν. ἡ δὲ συμβολικὴ θεωρία καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐναντιωτικῶν τῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνδείκνυται φύσιν. Symbolism can represent things even by their opposites. So we have seen Proclus in his allegorical interpretations of Homeric myths arguing that the gods do not change or deceive although the myths say that they do. Proclus' practice of allegory shows us how this theory works

101 I do not mean to imply that the idea originated with Plotinus. It is found already in Cicero, Orator 2.8-3.10 and in Seneca Ep. 65.7-10. W. Theiler, Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus (Berlin, 1930), pp. 15 ff. has argued that it goes back to Antiochus of Ascalon. Cf. Coulter, pp. 98-100, and Panofsky, Idea (op. cit. note 82 above), pp. 11-32. Plotinus would, however, be the significant predecessor for Proclus. Proclus applies the idea to sculpture in the traditional way, using the traditional example of Phidias' Zeus, at In Tim. 265.18 ff.

in practice.¹⁰²

The distinction between symbolism and mimesis belongs to a distinction found elsewhere in Proclus between three modes of representation in all, symbolism, ἀναλογία and mimesis. Proclus seldom mentions all three modes of representation together and this makes the distinction between them difficult.

Nevertheless I hope to show that he does distinguish three different modes. 86.15-8 speaks of symbolism and of analogia:

ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς ποιούταις φαντασίαις κατὰ
τοὺς μυθοπλαστάς ἄλλα ἐξ ἄλλων ἐνδείκνυται,
καὶ οὐ τὰ μὲν εἰκόνες, τὰ δὲ παράδειγμα,
ὅσα διὰ τούτων δημαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν σύμβολα,
τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀναλογίας ἔχει τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα

συμπέθειαν. This passage is easy to misunderstand because the two sets of μὲν and δέ are naturally taken at first sight as exactly parallel so that an opposition between εἰκόνες and παράδειγμα corresponds to one between σύμβολα and ἐξ ἀναλογίας. This is how Festugière takes the passage.¹⁰³ But,

102 The later distinction between allegory and symbolism is not relevant to Proclus. One is inclined to call his interpretation allegorical because it sets up a detailed one-to-one correspondence between the myth and its subject-matter, and his theory a theory of symbolism because he uses the word σύμβολον but this modern terminology implies a distinction which he does not make. Coulter, pp. 39-60, is wrong to claim that Proclus' distinction between εἰκόνες and σύμβολον is the same as the modern distinction between allegory and symbol. He says (p. 51), "symbolic mimesis ... possessed the capacity to suggest to the reader the whole structure of reality in all the complexity which the Neoplatonists believed it to possess." This is not what Proclus means by symbolic mimesis. Coulter fails to take account both of how Proclus interprets Homeric mythical σύμβολα in practice and of the significance of σύμβολον as a theurgic term.

103 Coulter, p. 51, follows him and so conflates symbolism and analogia.

as we shall see, *εἰκὼν* and *παράδειγμα*, "copy" and "model", are correlative terms and analogia is precisely the mode of representation which uses *εἰκόνας* and *παράδειγματα*. *ἄλλα ἐξ ἄλλων ἐνδείκνυσθαι* refers both to analogia and to symbolism, for in both these modes one thing is shown through another, but in analogia like is shown through like while in symbolism opposite may be shown through opposite (cf. 198.13-9). I would therefore translate, rather freely: "For in all such fictions imagined by the writers of myths one type of entity is shown by another type; it is not a matter of showing ^{models} ~~copies~~ through ^{copies} ~~models~~ in all these cases; sometimes symbols are used while at other times the sympathy between the two types of entity is expressed by analogy."

The correlative terms *εἰκὼν* and *παράδειγμα* are already present in Plato.¹⁰⁴ Plato's attitude to images, like his attitude to the sensible world which contains images of the Forms, is ambivalent. The sensible world is condemned because it consists of images; yet Forms can be known only through sensible particulars and in a dialogue such as the Timaeus the world of sense is regarded as good precisely because it imitates the Forms. Images in general may either be condemned because they are not the original, they are deceptive - this is Plato's more common attitude - or they may be approved because they resemble the original and can lead us to it.¹⁰⁵

104 See, e.g., the discussion of *παράδειγμα* in Plt. 277-9. Cf. R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (op. cit. above, note 84), pp. 209 ff.

105 The tensions in Plato's concept of an image are brought out in Cassirer, Eidos und Eidolon ... (op. cit. above p. 386 and note 83). Cf. also R.S. McKeon, "Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity", in Critics and Criticism ed. R.S. Crane (Chicago, 1952), pp. 147-59, reprinted with minor alterations from Modern Philology 34 (1936), pp. 1-16.

In Neoplatonism the two attitudes to images separate out and Iamblichus makes extensive use of the *εἰκὼν / παρὰδειγμα* relationship. *εἰκόνες* are good images, for they lead the mind up to the *παρὰδείγματα* which they represent. Iamblichus took the view that the Platonic dialogues each had one and only one *ἑκόνος* and so interpreted some portions of a dialogue as showing through *εἰκόνες* on one level what the dialogue as a whole was concerned with on another level. So, for example, physical parts of a metaphysical dialogue would be interpreted as describing those aspects of the physical world which copied the aspects of the metaphysical world dealt with in the rest of the dialogue. This method of interpretation is bound up with the picture of different orders of reality, each of which copies the one above.¹⁰⁶ Proclus uses the term analogia of this *εἰκὼν / παρὰδειγμα* relationship.¹⁰⁷ Analogia in Proclus has been discussed by Stephen Gersh¹⁰⁸

who illustrates what Proclus means by analogia from his mathematics. Mathematical figures for Proclus are *εἰκόνες* of higher realities. Gersh cites, for example, In Euc. 22.2-6 Friedlein: *ὅσα γὰρ τῆς ἀτελέως συσθέρματα καὶ ἀνάγνη φαίνεται τῆς περὶ τῶν θεῶν ἀληθείας εἰς διάγνῃσιν, τῶτα οἱ τῆς μαθηματικῆς λόγῳ ποτὶ καὶ καταφανῇ καὶ ἀνέλεγκτα διὰ τῶν εἰκόνων*

106 On *εἰκὼν* and *παρὰδειγμα* in Iamblichus, see K. Praechter, "Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus", Genethliakon Carl Robert (Berlin, 1910), pp. 131-4, reprinted in Praechter's Kleine Schriften ed. H. Dörrie (Hildesheim-New York, 1973), pp. 191-4.

107 Cf. J. Pépin, "Merikôteron-Epoptikôteron: Proclus In Tim. I 204.24-27. Deux attitudes exégétiques dans le néoplatonisme", Mélanges Puech (Paris, 1975), p. 324.

108 In ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ ἈΚΙΝΗΤΟΣ A study of spiritual motion in the philosophy of Proclus (Leiden, 1973), pp. 83-90.

ἀποφαινέσθαι . Analogia then is a matter of representing something on a higher level of reality by something on a lower level which is like it. This is to be distinguished from symbolism where there is no resemblance between symbol and object symbolised. The distinction between the two is made clear by W. Beierwaltes in Proklos. Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik:¹⁰⁹ "Das mythisch-mystische σύμβολον verdeckt den Sinn dessen, worauf es verweist, mehr als dass es ihn erhellt. Deshalb bedarf es der Auslegung durch den kundigen Mythologen oder Mystagogen. Εἰκὼν dagegen ist zu verstehen als ἀναλογία , als Weg zum Urbild, zur Sinngestalt der Idee, die von sich aus nicht 'unsagbar' ist, sondern durch das Bild ins Wort gefasst wird."¹¹⁰ As we saw in Chapter 5¹¹¹ σύνθημα means the same as σύμβολον in Proclus and at In Remp. 84.26 ff. he distinguishes between εἰκόνες and σύνθηματα :
καὶ ἡ μὲν δι' εἰκόνων μέθοδος τοῖς γυνόσκουσιν
φιλοσοφῶσιν προσήκει, ἡ δὲ δι' ἀποργήτων σύνθημάτων
τῆς θείας οὐσίας ἐνδεξις τοῖς τῆς μυστικώτερης
ἡγεμόσιν τελεσουργίας . . .

Proclus does not always preserve this distinction between analogia and symbolism. At 77.13 ff., for example, he can say ἡ φύσις . . . ἃ μὲν ἀμέριστα μεριεστῶς

109 (Frankfurt, 1965), p. 171, note 23.

110 Cf. PT I 4, esp. p. 17.21 ff. Saffrey-Westerink, with their note on p. 136; In Tim. 30.11-8; In Tim. 7.26 ff. See also Friedl, pp. 86-7. There is the same distinction in Is.-Dionysius the Areopagite:- see Koch, pp. 202 ff. and Ps.-Dion. c.h. 2.1-3.

111 Is. 308 and 318-9 above.

ἀπεικονίζεταί. He is talking there about any kind of representation of a higher reality by a lower and chooses to neglect the distinction between symbolism and analogia for the purposes of his argument. In 76.20-4 Proclus describes the μίμησις as using εἰκόνες which should be like their παράδειγματα. Here he is talking about representation in general again (with Rep. II and III rather than Rep. X in mind) and allows himself to call the user of analogia a μίμησις. Similarly in 154.4 ff., a passage which Gallavotti¹¹² claims is inconsistent with the distinction between symbolism and mimesis in 198.13-9, Proclus uses μίμησις in the general sense of representation of any kind. He characterises Homeric poetry as follows: τῆς τε θεῶν πανταχού καὶ τῆς κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν γενέσιν καὶ ταῖς ἡρώεσσιν ὡαῖς τὸ πρέπον ἀποδούσης κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπορρητότερον ἐνδεξαμένης, τὰ δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν εὖν νῦν καὶ ἐπιδήμια περὶ τούτων ἡμῶν διδασκάλους. . . . He is not saying here that all

Homeric poetry is mimetic, in the narrow sense of mimesis distinguished in 198.13-9. He says that Homer's representation as a whole, whether of gods, demons or heroes, is in accordance with τὸ πρέπον (and so would be approved by the canons of Rep. II and III). The second half of the sentence implies the later distinction between inspired and didactic poetry:

Homer expounds some things ἀπορρητότερον, that is, in the symbolism of inspired poetry and others εὖν νῦν καὶ

112 L'estetica greca.. pp. 53-4.

ἐπισημῆς, that is, in didactic poetry.

Despite the conflation of analogia and mimesis in such a passage as 76.20-4, the two are not the same in Proclus' thought. Mimesis uses images in the bad sense, the prevailing Platonic sense. An image in this sense is an εἰδωλον, never an εἰκὼν in Proclus. (Cf. 70.26 where εἰδωλα is used of the images of reality with which the poet of Rep. X consorts, or 160.15 where εἰδωλα are lowly and associated with φαντασία.) At In Crat. 56, p. 24.17-25.7 Proclus distinguishes analogia from the relationship of ἰδέα to εἰδωλον. Symbolic representation is also mentioned in that passage although the distinction between symbolism and analogia is largely ignored in order to distinguish sharply between analogia and the ἰδέα/εἰδωλον relationship. There are then three modes of representation: symbolism which uses σύμβολα (συμβήματα); analogia which uses εἰκόνες; and mimesis which uses εἰδωλα. Inspired poetry uses symbolism, mimetic poetry uses mimesis; analogia would, I suppose, be employed by didactic poetry but here there is a now familiar problem in that didactic is not presented by Proclus as using any mode of representation at all. Although analogia is important elsewhere in Proclus, it is the other two modes, symbolism and mimesis, which matter at the end of the 6th essay, for mimesis is clearly expounded in Rep. X and Proclus is concerned to distinguish symbolism from it.

As applied to literature and art this notion of symbolism is of the highest interest. Most ancient thought about art conceives of it as representational: art is a mirror, reflecting

either objects or actions in the world of perceptible reality. Proclus' concept of symbolism, taken over from the religious context of theurgy, belongs to this framework, yet succeeds in breaking out of it: art becomes a magic mirror which reflects the truth about the world in terms of its own. The notion of art as a mirror works well enough for some kinds of art but there are others for which it is quite inadequate. It is easy to see what an Impressionist painting of a landscape represents and satisfactory to think of such a painting as primarily concerned to imitate the appearance of that landscape under a certain light. But what does a Surrealist painting by an artist like Salvador Dali represent? Such a painting is not primarily concerned to imitate anything at all and the notion of symbolism can be of some help in understanding and appreciating it. Similarly in literature, a realistic novel is easily thought of as an imitation of life but we are likely to misinterpret both literature and life if we take all the novels of a Henry James or an Iris Murdoch as straightforward imitation. To judge art by its success in direct imitation would not only exclude many existing works of art but would ignore one of the most important things that art can do. The symbol can express what is not otherwise expressible and some aspects of human experience are better expressed by symbolism than by direct imitation. All this, of course, goes far beyond Proclus but the possibilities of it are there in his concept of symbolism which he uses to account for literature not easily explained as imitation (i.e. the Homeric myths) and to express the inexpressible (i.e. the highest realms of

theology and metaphysics.)¹¹³

The theory of three types of poetry is developed in order to interpret Plato and we have seen that Proclus' consequent interpretation, while in some respects close to Plato in spirit, distorts Plato's view of poetry and exaggerates the amount of poetry of which Plato would approve. Proclus' interest in inspired poetry, and the symbolic myths which it uses, goes beyond this immediate purpose of the interpretation of Rep. X. Inspired poetry reveals the world of transcendent metaphysics so much elaborated in later Neoplatonism and its myths are interpreted by Proclus earlier in the essay in the same way as he interpreted his other authoritative texts, the works of Plato, the Chaldaean Oracles and the Orphic writings. When we try to evaluate the theory of three types of poetry as a theory in literary criticism, we must first ask whether it can be detached from the metaphysical system to which it is so closely linked: if it cannot be, and the metaphysical system is unacceptable, then the poetic theory will be invalidated a fortiori. The same problem arises with regard to Plato's theory in Rep. X. That is often considered in isolation from

113 On the novelty and importance of this notion of symbolism, cf. P. Dronke, Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism (Leiden, 1974), p. 27 f. He finds a similar notion in the medieval Platonist, William of Conches, and claims William's originality. Dronke points out that William was influenced by Ps.-Dionysius. It looks as though William is doing again what Proclus had already done, transferring the notion of symbolism from religion to aesthetics.

Platonic metaphysics, but the most telling criticisms of it are criticisms of Plato's metaphysics as a whole. If we detach Proclus' poetic theory from his metaphysics it is much weakened. We are left with mimetic poetry which imitates the world around us, didactic poetry which tells us truths of ethics, science and philosophy directly, and inspired poetry which perceives and conveys some kind of ultimate truth. Without the backing of Neoplatonist metaphysics we cannot pin down what sort of truth inspired poetry conveys, or even, perhaps, what philosophical truths didactic poetry will tell us. The concept of inspired poetry is left looking rather empty. Yet the difficulty with Proclus' inspired poetry in practice is precisely that he makes its meaning too specific. To say that myths symbolically express truth is attractive; to say that Zeus and Hera on Mount Ida are the monad and the dyad sounds nonsensical to modern ears.¹¹⁴ The problem Proclus is grappling with is the problem of how literature expresses truth even though that truth cannot be spelled out in indicative statements. The distinction between symbolism and mimesis is an important theoretical contribution to the understanding of this problem but Proclus' critical practice is disappointing, for his allegorical interpretation means spelling out what he thinks Homer means in excessively precise terms. Proclus resolves the quarrel between literature and philosophy by making literature a means of expounding philosophy and philosophy for him is a precise and rigid system. If we refuse any solution

114 Cf. above, p. 355.

of this kind, as I would want to do, the claim that literature somehow expresses truth is left looking rather empty and unsatisfactory in theoretical terms. Perhaps in the end we have to be content with that, and rather than subordinating works of literature to the meaning we find in them, as Proclus does, we have to remember that critical exposition is secondary to the work expounded. In the end we must leave Homer to speak for himself.

APPENDIX I

THE CONTENTS OF THE COMMENTARY ON THE REPUBLIC

As no English translation of the Commentary on the Republic exists, or commentary on it, it may be helpful to give here for reference a summary of its contents.

The commentary consists of sixteen essays, and an additional discussion of Aristotle's objections to Plato in the second book of the Politics, and fills two volumes of Teubner text. I argue in Chapter 1 that the first five essays, the seventh and eighth, the tenth, eleventh and twelfth, the fourteenth and fifteenth all belong together and probably formed a course of introductory lectures on the Republic. Their subjects and their places in the Teubner text are as follows:

1. Introduction. Discussion of the *ἑκτονός* of the dialogue, of its nature and subject-matter. (Incomplete at the end) Vol. I, p. 5.
2. On Socrates' reply to Polemarchus' definition of justice. (Missing).
3. On the argument with Thrasymachus. (Incomplete at the beginning) Vol. I, p. 20.
4. On the nature of the gods as defined in Rep. II. Vol. I, p. 27.
5. On poetry, its kinds, and Plato's judgement of the best harmony and rhythm. Vol. I, p. 42.
7. On the three parts of the soul in Rep. IV. Vol. I, p. 206.

8. On the equality of men and women in Rep. V. Vol. I, p. 236.

10. On the distinction between the philosopher and the lover of opinion in Rep. V. Vol. I, p. 258.

11. On the nature of the Good in the Republic. Vol. I, p. 269.

12. On the cave in Rep. VII. Vol. I, p. 287.

14. On the arguments to show that the just man is happier than the unjust. Vol. II, p. 81.

15. On the division of subject-matter in Rep. X. Vol. II, p. 85.

The remaining essays are all distinct units, on the following subjects:

6. On Plato's attack on Homer and poetry in the Republic. Vol. I, p. 69.

9. On Theodorus of Asine's discussion of the equality of men and women as put forward by Socrates. Vol. I, p. 251.

13. *Μέλῳ* on the speech of the Muses in the Republic. Vol. II, p. 5. (On the untranslatable *μῆλῳ* - "selected discussion"? - see Proclus' own explanation, II 5.4 ff.)

16. Commentary on the Myth of Er. Vol. II, p. 96.

Both the 1st essay and the beginning of the 16th are of some interest for the understanding of the 5th and 6th. The contents of the 5th and 6th essays are as follows:

- 5th essay. 42.1-43.5: Introduction, setting out the ten problems to be discussed.
- 43.26-49.12: First problem. Why does Plato honour poetry as divine and yet banish it?
- 49.13-51.25: Second problem. Why does Plato especially reject tragedy and comedy even though they are useful in purifying the emotions?
- 51.26-54.2: Third problem. Why does Plato say in the Symposium that tragedy and comedy belong to the same branch of knowledge, but in the Republic will not let the same poet write both, or the same actor act both?
- 54.3-56.19: Fourth problem. Why does Socrates say he knows nothing about musical modes and then claim knowledge about rhythm derived from Damon?
- 56.20-60.13: Fifth problem. What is real *μουσική* ? What is the relation between poetry and *μουσική* ?
- 60.14-63.15: Sixth problem. What kind of harmonies and rhythms does Plato consider educationally useful?
- 63.16-65.15: Seventh problem. What are the faults of poets in Plato's eyes and why does he say in the Laws that the Muses never err? Plato as a critic of poetry.
- 65.16-67.9: Eighth problem. What sort of poetry does Plato think the best poet writes?
- 67.10-68.2: Ninth problem. What is the end of true poetry?

68.3-69.19: Tenth problem. Who is the universal poet on whom the earthly poet can model himself?

6th essay Book I

69.23-71.17: Introduction.

71.21-86.23: Theoretical justification of allegory.

87.1-95.31: Interpretation of the Theomachy.

96.1-100.17: Interpretation of lines which seem to make the gods responsible for evils. (The two jars on the threshold of Zeus.)

100.21-106.10: Interpretation of Pandarus' breaking the truce.

106.14-107.30: Interpretation of the strife to which Zeus rouses the gods.

108.3-109.7: Interpretation of the judgement of Paris.

109.11-114.29: Interpretation of changes of shape by the gods.

115.4-117.21: Interpretation of Agamemnon's dream.

117.27-122.20: Defence of both Homer's and Plato's myths about Hades.

122.25-126.4: Why Homer attributes mourning to gods and heroes.

126.8-128.23: Why the gods laugh; in particular why they laugh at Hephaestus.

129.4-132.7: Defence of passages of Homer which seem to make light of sôphrosyne.

132.13-140.23: Interpretation of the union of Zeus and Hera.

141.4-143.16: Interpretation of the story of Ares and Aphrodite.

143.21-146.5: Answer to Socrates' charge that Homer attributes greed for money to his heroes.

146.8-149.28: Answer to the charge that Homer attributes disrespect for the gods to his heroes.

150.1-153.20: Answer to the charge that the Homeric heroes have no respect for life.

153.21-154.10: Interpretation of Theseus and Pirithous' descent to Hades. Conclusion of Book I of the essay.

Book II

154.14-159.6: Plato honours Homer.

159.10-163.9: Why Plato in the Republic condemns Homer as unsuitable for the young.

163.13-172.30: Plato emulates Homer in both style and subject-matter.

173.4-177.3: Answer to what Plato says about Homer in the Phaedrus.

177.7-179.32: Three types of life, three parts of the soul and three corresponding types of poetry.

180.3-192.3: The three types of poetry are recognised by Plato.

192.6-196.13: Homeric poetry includes all three types.

196.18-199.28: Why Socrates rejects Homeric poetry in Rep. X and what part of it he rejects.

200.4-202.6: Answer to the charge that Homer is not educational, nor useful politically.

202.9-205.23: Why Plato attacked Homer as he did.

APPENDIX II

THE JUDGEMENT OF PARIS (108.3-109.7)

In Chapter 3, (ii) and (iii), I analysed a number of Proclus' interpretations of Homeric myths and related them to earlier interpretation, particularly that of Syrianus. We have no evidence for Syrianus' interpretation of the Judgement of Paris, but the interpretation which Proclus gives of this legend at 108.3-109.7 may be related to the earlier history of its interpretation.

Proclus interprets the story as about a choice of lives. He refers to the passages of the Phaedrus (252e ff. and 265b) where different types of life and the four different maniai are associated with different gods. In Phaedrus 265b Aphrodite is associated with ἐρωτική μανία, while Hera is associated with the βασιλικὸς βίος in 253b. According to Proclus, Paris represents a soul choosing a type of life, and in giving the golden apple to Aphrodite, he is choosing the ἐρωτικὸς βίος and τὸ τῶν φαινομένων καὶ ἁλός. Since Platonist ἔρως can be the force that draws the soul up to the intelligible world (as in the Symposium) Proclus has to make it clear that the Aphrodite chosen by Paris is the ἐρωτικὸς βίος in the vulgar sense. Paris is not ὄντως ἐρωτικὸς νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν προτιθέμενος (108.23); if he were, he would have chosen Athene rather than Aphrodite. In order not to discredit the goddess Aphrodite Proclus suggests at the end that the beauty of the material world which Paris

pursues is really the province of Ἀφροδίτα καὶ δαίμονες rather than of Aphrodite herself.

A number of interpretations of the Judgement of Paris are listed in Roscher's Lexicon of Mythology.¹ Türk, the author of the Roscher article, points out that there is constant confusion in versions of the legend as to whether Paris was judging the goddesses' beauty or choosing between the gifts they offered him. Thus Euripides Troades 924-31 implies that Paris was choosing Helen, the bribe offered by Aphrodite, rather than judging Aphrodite to be the most beautiful of the three goddesses. If we keep this in mind, it is easy to see how the myth could be interpreted as a choice of lives. It was so interpreted by Chrysippus, according to the scholiast on Eur. Andromache 277:² Χρύσιππος δὲ ἐν Ἡθικῶν τ' λογισάμενον τὸν Πάριον τίνας δὲ μᾶλλον ἀντέχεσθαι, πολεμικῆς ἀσκήσεως ἢ ἐρωτικῆς ἢ βασιλικῆς, νεύει [αὐτὸν] μᾶλλον εἰς τὰ ἐρωτικὰ καὶ οὕτως τὸν τῆς κρ'έσεως μῦθον συντεθεῖναι. This interpretation fits in with what the goddesses offer Paris in the Troades passage, for there Athene offers military glory, Hera offers dominion over Europe and Asia, and Aphrodite offers the pleasures of love with Helen. The gifts promised by each goddess are appropriate to her traditional role in Greek mythology.

1 Vol. III.1 (Leipzig, 1897-1902), pp. 1586 ff. s.v. 'Paris'.

2 Scholia in Euripidem, ed. E. Schwartz. Vol. II (Berlin, 1891), p. 274.

For a Neoplatonist allegory of the myth before Proclus we may turn to Sallustius. In De diis et mundo Ch. 4 Sallustius gives the myth as an example of his "mixed" type.³ In his allegory the golden apple represents the world and Paris is ἡ κατ' αἰσθητικὴν ζῶσα ψυχὴ. Such a soul sees only beauty among the different *δυνάμεις* in the world and so Paris gives the apple to Aphrodite.

Proclus' interpretation may be related to Chrysippus' on the one hand and Sallustius' on the other. Like Chrysippus, he treats the myth as about a choice of lives, but he puts the choice in Neoplatonist terms and associates it with Plato's mythical choice of lives in the Phaedrus. He links Athene with wisdom rather than war, since Athene for him was primarily the goddess of philosophy.⁴ Like Sallustius, he makes Paris a soul given over to the sensible world and its beauty.

We saw in Chapter 3⁵ that in 175.12-176.8 Proclus allegorises Helen as sensible beauty. This fits in with his interpretation of Paris' choice here. In his allegory of this legend Proclus is developing existing interpretation in a way consistent with his allegory of other aspects of the Trojan War story. The tradition of interpretation helps us to understand why he has certain difficulties to explain away. In accordance with tradition, and indeed with the basic legend,

3 On Sallustius' classification of myths, see Nock's Prolegomena, pp. xlv ff. and esp. p. xlix for the "mixed" type, and cf. above, p. 135.

4 See Marinus Chs. 6, 9 and 15 and Proclus Hymn VII, esp. line 34 where Proclus asks Athene for *σοφίην καὶ ἐπιστήμην*, meaning true Platonist *ἐπιστήμη* :- cf. Vogt's parallels ad loc. See also Rosàn, index s.v. 'Athena' and cf. above, pp. 152-3.

5 Pp. 215-20 above.

he makes Paris choose the life of love, but he then has to distinguish such love from true Platonist *ἔρως* and to excuse the goddess Aphrodite from involvement in the grossness of the material world.

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Dec. dub. - De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam.

De prov. et fato - De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis ad Theodorum mechanicum.

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