
Abstract

Against a backdrop of acute global terrorist actions and international counter-terrorist initiatives, and newly marked involvement of UK universities in counter-terrorism with the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015), this article reviews a wide multidisciplinary literature to provide a structural analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research in UK universities over a 20 year timeframe (1997-2017), identifying three phases in terrorism and counter-terrorism legislative and related policy contexts: temporary; permanent; normative permanence.

These three periods correlate with a vast expansion of academic terrorism research which is multidisciplinary, rapidly diversifying and expanding in direct correlation to the intensification of terrorist action. Mindful of a complex context of intensified global terrorism the article identifies shifting patterns in the aims and manifest impacts of terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research in UK universities. The article concludes by proposing a working analytic-structural framework for framing the disciplinary-epistemological, institutional and operational impacts on UK higher education of terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research, including a critical and little explored relationship between universities and security and intelligence agencies.

Introduction

In light of the Counter Terrorist and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015), security is now legislatively integral to UK higher education. With the CTSA bringing significant legal responsibilities and obligations to public authorities through the multi-agency Prevent Strategy, terrorism and the countering of terrorism are part of UK university policy (RG 2015; UUK 2016; also UUK 2011; 2012; 2013; 2016). Long before the CTSA, however, university research had focused on the phenomenon of terrorism (Whittaker 2000). New security environments have nevertheless not only impacted on UK higher education policy in intensified ways but impacted too on university research agendas. There are few academic disciplines that do not engage with terrorism. That is, terrorism itself has had epistemological and disciplinary impacts. Against this backdrop, this review attempts to articulate and provide some structural-analytical shape, to help identify patterns of impact in policy and research
agendas in terrorism and counter-terrorism in order further to understand the specific role of
UK universities in a complex geopolitical and higher education issue.

If Western Europe is less adversely affected in terms of deaths and casualties than other
parts of the world (GTI 2016), counter-terrorism measures in Western Europe and in the UK
in particular are now deeply integrated into all aspects of EU domestic and foreign policy
agenda (EAS 2016). It has been defined as part of an emergent ‘risk society’, ever alert to the
real and imagined threats which present fissures of insecurity to peace, stability and well-
being (Beck 1992; Furedi, 2004; 2006; 2016; also Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand 2013).
Yet as high profile attacks continue to raise a genuine sense of unpredictable risk, the sense
of actual, perceived and imagined threat from home-grown and international terrorism in the
UK and the continent of Europe, as in the US, has intensified. For the UK, impacts on public
policy have been pervasive, and few public bodies not laden with additional responsibilities
to contribute to counter-terrorist policy at individual and institutional levels (CTSA 2015).
The academic and administrative life of the UK’s universities is no exception, and in ways
unparalleled with previous responses to terrorism. As Durodié states, ‘a generation ago, there
was never any parallel system of prevention through education implemented, or even
assumed’ (Durodié 2016: 2). It ‘seems more likely that the impetus for the linkage between
security and education is more recent and has come from elsewhere’ (Durodié 2016: 23).
Recent global reviews of the literature suggest in this context a dual or ambivalent role for
schools and universities in the link between security and education: on the one hand,
education is a major source of inspiration for violent extremist ideology and the terrorism
which may emanate from it; on the other, education is widely seen as a critical factor in
countering violent extremism (Ghosh, Manuel, Chan, Dilimulati and Babaei 2016).

For some, extremist campus activity have made universities themselves a source of threat,
justifying Prevent and related counter-terrorist measures as a necessary and proportionate
securitising of UK higher education (Glees 2015; Glees and Pope 2005). Following the
Copenhagen School, others have determined the widening of security agendas to all aspects
of civil and public life as part of a wider pattern of global securitization (Author, 2015; 2017;
Albert and Buzan, 2011; Buzan et al. 1997; Buzan and Hansen 2009; Dunn Cavelty and

Other accounts provide significant challenges to the interpretive frame of securitization
theory (Pupavac, 2010). Durodié (2016) provides a Foucauldian reminder of the power of
institutions themselves to control populations (Foucault 1970; 1972; 1977; 2009; 2010) and
of the Weberian ‘iron cage’ of bureaucratic systems, show educational systems to be far from
neutral actors (cf. Bourdieu 1986). Durodié’s ‘dialectical approach’ inverts accepted presumptions ‘of assumed power relations’ to highlight ‘the possibility that the contemporary culture of education might in its turn influence how security is conceptualised and applied by those in authority’ (Durodié 2016: 23). By this interpretation, universities are neither neutral nor passive but lead actors in securitisation, willing partners in the monitoring and surveillance that comes with operational relations with the security networks of State power (see also Durodié 2007; 2013a; 2013b; Durodié and Ng 2008).

It is such multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary features which intertwine terrorist research and counter-terrorism policy (Breen-Smyth, Gunning, Jackson, Kassimeris and Robinson 2008; also Gunning 2007; Jackson, Breen Smyth and Gunning 2009; Jackson 2016; Stump and Dixit 2012). Mindful, then, of an intensified global counter-terrorism policy culture and a closely interrelated and expansive international terrorism research literature (Schmid 2011), this review examines a narrow but important element of a complex interface of education and security to ask: What are the aims and manifest impacts of terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research in UK universities?

Methods and Sources
Focused as it is on impacts to terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research to UK universities, it is difficult to separate the UK from the global context. Along with a comprehensive amount of empirical terrorism casualty data worldwide (GTI 2016), the literature on terrorism and counter-terrorism is diverse, is growing and is within the Academy arguably uniquely multi-disciplinary. With published peer-review material across in excess of one hundred journals (Tinnes 2013), a plethora of general, popular or trade literature (Sinai 2012), and an inundation of media reporting and social media exchanges (Sommers 2015), terrorism and counter-terrorism research is also located in a multitudinous range of burgeoning sites, including research centres, institutes as well as governmental, inter-governmental and independent policy-related think-tanks (Freedman 2010). The resulting is an often perplexing range of terrorist/counter-terrorist narratives and counter-narratives (Croft and Moore 2010; Glazzard 2017). This complexity is compounded by shifting legislative contexts in different national and geopolitical regions and set against changing terrorist and counter-terrorist political and other agendas. No single article-length review could realistically cover the disciplinary range in terms of either specialist commentary required or in terms of depth of treatment. For this reason this literature review is qualified by the terms ‘analytic-structural’ by which is meant that the aim of this article is to present some
conceptual-theoretical harnessing for what one theorist has called ‘an unruly field’, itself requiring ‘disciplining’ (Stampnitzky 2011), including in its remit terrorism research centres and institutes within and think-tanks at the edges of the Academy and or the heart of Government and its security and intelligence agencies.

Freedman’s (2010) ‘Terrorism Research Centres’ thus ably demonstrates a global and unambiguously multidisciplinary proliferation of terrorism and counter-terrorism research. It includes in the UK context, Europe’s longest established centre for such research, founded in 1994 by Paul Wilkinson and Bruce Hoffman, now known as the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), incorporating the Rand Corporation-St Andrew’s terrorism database. It also includes the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) – describing itself as ‘the first global centre for knowledge and leadership addressing the issues of radicalisation and political violence’ – and showing a shift in definitional terms to a specific *lingua franca* of contemporary preoccupation. A number of other UK research centres have been created since, including at the University of East London, and the Centre for Conflict, Security and Terrorism (CST) at the University of Nottingham. There are terrorism-focused research units within a number of government advisory bodies, perhaps most prominently the Whitehall-based Royal United Services Institute or RUSI. Other prominent Think Tank exemplars would include – though not all with a primary terrorism and counter-terrorism focus – the Centre for Social Justice; Chatham House; Demos; Institute for Strategic Dialogue; International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation; Policy Exchange; and Quilliam.

The number of academic journals dedicated to terrorism is also growing, with Tinnes (2013) identifying 150 journals, around 25 of which on her list are explicitly concerned with terrorism to the extent that they have ‘terrorism’ or derivatives of terrorism in their titles. The remainder of the journals on the list include a difficult to categorise list of multidisciplinary subject areas. Tinnes’ (2013) open and subscription categorisation does little to help frame the epistemological reach but it is obvious that terrorism and counter-terrorism research breaches disciplinary boundaries and norms.

Following an established method of evaluating citations in criminology (Farrington, and Iratzoqui 2014) and occupational medicine (Gehanno, Takahashi, Darmoni, and Weber 2007), Silke and Schmidt-Petersen’s (2017) meta-analysis of terrorism *articles* (as opposed to journals) identifies the ‘100 most cited articles in Terrorism Studies’. Their search determined which peer-review articles were most cited ‘on subjects related to terrorism and counter-terrorism’. Silke and Schmidt-Petersen conclude:
The most cited articles were published across sixty-two journals, which reflected the interdisciplinary nature of terrorism studies. Compared to other articles, the most cited articles were more likely to be the result of collaborative research and were also more likely to provide new data. Sixty-three of the top 100 articles have been published since 2001 (Silke and Schmidt-Petersen 2017: 692). Their discussion provides some further analysis of methods, contexts and future prospects for terrorism and counter-terrorism. They note that the prominence of many of the most cited articles are characterised by ‘rigorous methodologies’ and can, they hypothesise, be attributed to the production of ‘important new data’. The ‘high level of collaborative papers among the most cited’ is, they suggest, a ‘reflection that greater resources were available to allow more ambitious data collection and analysis.’ In looking to the future, they perceive ‘a strong perception’ that the ‘dominance of post-9/11 research papers will only deepen’ (Silke and Schmidt-Petersen 2017: 700).

Sinai (2012) identifies and provides summary analysis of 150 authoritative reference sources on terrorism and counter-terrorism”. The counter-terrorist intent behind the list he makes plain: ‘To gain an analytical understanding of the origins, magnitude, and evolution of the terrorist threats around the world and how to counteract them, the academic and public policy communities have produced a plethora of books on terrorism ...’ (Sinai 2012). The list is divided into seventeen subdivisions: (i) encyclopedias and reference resources; (ii) textbooks and general histories; (iii) using the social, behavioural, and economic sciences to study terrorism; (iv) journalistic case studies; (v) case studies of terrorist groups; (vi) root causes of terrorism; (vii) radicalization and recruitment into terrorism; (viii) funding terrorism; (ix) suicide terrorism; (x) international law and terrorism; (xi) terrorism on the internet; (xii) terrorism and WMD; (xiii) counterterrorism; (xiv) intelligence in counterterrorism; (xv) de-radicalization and disengagement from terrorism; (xvi) peace negotiations with terrorists, and (xvii) how terrorist conflicts end. The first section on the list at least for the non-specialist contains sufficient authoritative overviews of international terrorism and counter-terrorism research, including encyclopedias and reference resources Ciment (2011), Mickolus and Simmons (2011), Schmid (2011), Martin (2011), and Rich and Duyvesteyn (2012). Sinai’s (2012) list includes numerous popular/ mass market as well as more specialist academic and scholarly texts and shows an insatiable appetite for terrorism across publishing.

In addition to such already extant reviews, this review used key word searches for the following terms: ‘terrorism’ and ‘counter-terrorism’ and ‘universities’, with ‘terrorism counter-terrorism policy and research’. It also searched for the institutional sites of terrorism
and counter-terrorism related research located in the UK, and found particularly large conglomerations of international collaboration in which it was near impossible to extricate specific UK components. Largely due to the pivotal nature of 9/11 in the geopolitics of terrorism and counter-terrorism all UK research is then inevitably international in nature.

Definitions and Debates
Terrorism is here a legally and academically defined but nevertheless highly contested concept (Schmid 2011). In international legal context, the UN now lists terrorism as one of it thematic areas of transnational threat drug trafficking; piracy, trafficking in person and transnational organized crime (UN 2017). Terrorism is described as continuing ‘to pose a major threat to international peace and security and undermines the core values of the United Nations’ and in addition ‘to the devastating human cost of terrorism, in terms of lives lost or permanently altered, terrorist acts aim to destabilize governments and undermine economic and social development’. In response the international community through the UN has developed ‘a common universal legal framework against terrorism’ which, together with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions comprises principally of ‘the 19 universal legal instruments against terrorism’ (UN 2017).

The United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) is guided by Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), ‘to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to prevent terrorist acts both within their borders and across regions’ and was ‘established in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States’. The 2006 Secretary-General Report Uniting against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 8 September 2006, the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy consists of four pillars’: pillar I addressing the conditions conducive to terrorism; pillar II preventing and combatting terrorism; pillar III building States’ capacity and strengthening the role of the United Nations; pillar IV ensuring human rights and the rule of law (UN 2006; 2017). The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force implement CTC workload through expert assessments across UN Member States.

In academic terms, the current state of international terrorism research evidences near limitless disciplinary incursions and epistemological breaches across traditional subject boundaries. That is, there is barely an academic discipline within the academy which is not in some direct or peripheral way impacted by terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research. In epistemological range and sheer quantity of research outputs across so many

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disciplines, there is arguably no other field of enquiry which has seen such cross-disciplinary proliferation in so little time and from so precisely defined a date in time: 9/11.

Since then moves towards international legal definition have resulted in firmer and more defined forms of legislation, though not without controversy. Schmidt suggests more progress has been made in the academic definition of terrorism than the legal definition. The academic consensus, such as it is, is detailed in Schmid’s (2011) *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (Schmid 2011: 39 – 98). The *Handbook* also contains some further 260 definitions (Easson and Schmid, 2011: 99-200). Schmid’s (2011a) *Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism* connects terrorism ‘on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties’. As a tactic terrorism ‘is employed in three main contexts: (i) illegal state repression, (ii) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and (iii) as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state- and non-state actors’ (Schmid, 2011, 86-87).

Despite claims of consensus terrorism ambivalence between notions of legality and illegality, state of peace and conditions of war, and the political legitimacy – or ultimate justification – of acts of terror by state and non-state actors (Ganor 2004). Thus legitimate defence of threatened interests can make terrorist acts a matter of contention. This divide on legitimacy has led to fissures in academic and political debate. In plain language, one side in any conflict regards their terrorist actions as legitimate, justified (say ideologically or theologically or both ideologically and theologically) while the other regards such actions as an abomination, in post-9/11 contexts an abomination worthy of massing the military might of the world’s most powerful nations and their allies in a war on such terror. Official US and UK reports on the military interventions prompted by terrorism or its perceived threat present forensic statements of fault but ultimately maintain this justification, as in the 9/11 Commission Report or Britain’s inquiry into the Iraq War, what came to be known as the Chilcot Inquiry (2016). High profile academics continue to maintain however that the war on terror is state terrorism (Chomsky 2003; 2006; 2007; cf. George 1991).

Indeed, such considerations of moral certitude and ambiguity have fuelled debate around critical terrorism studies (Gunning 2007; Jackson, Gunning and Breen Smyth 2007; Jackson, Breen Smyth and Gunning 2009; Jackson 2016; Stump and Dixit 2012). Distancing
themselves from the post-9/11 ‘moral certitude’ of many State actors, Jackson et al. (2007) argue for ‘a continuous critical reflexivity about the aims, means and outcomes of terrorism research, particularly as it intersects with state counter-terrorism, accompanied by an enduring concern with questions of politics and ethics’. For them, this ‘also entails an enduringly critical stance towards projects of state counter-terrorism, particularly as they affect human and societal security’ (Jackson, Gunning and Breen Smyth 2007: 21). Precisely because this stance also involves a critical distance from state security and intelligence services, vociferous opposition to critical terrorism has come from within security studies (for example Heath-Kelly 2010).

Tensions and disputes such as these remain deeply engrained in legal and academic, policy and research contexts. These can be accentuated in multi-nation state collaborations such as the European Union (Argomaniz, Bures and Kaunert 2014; Bakker 2014). Thus, in European context, Security Council Resolution 2322 (2016) was aimed at strengthening international judicial cooperation through Member States. These measures represent a shared practical operational and strategic approach to counter-terrorism but are entirely dependent upon Member States’ cooperation in a context where national and regional counter-terrorism provisions vary according to the national legal systems.

Terror attacks within Europe have prompted a strengthening of state security through the European Agenda on Security (EAS 2016) in which terrorism is one of three such threats, with organised crime and cybercrime. The extent to which UK collaboration will be vouchsafed post-Brexit is a matter for review. Irrespective of this, there remains an abiding UK, European and wider international tension in enhanced security measures which are implied by the deepening global focus on terrorism and counter-terrorism, in particular perceived concerns over the limitations of rights and freedoms in the light of such security. In the context of Europe Amnesty International’s Report Dangerously disproportionate: The ever-expanding national security state in Europe (AI 2017) describes a situation in which is recognised the need to protect from ‘wanton violence’ as ‘obvious and urgent’, recognising ‘the right to life, enabling people to live freely, to move freely, to think freely’ as ‘essential tasks for any government’ but ‘are not tasks that should, or can, be achieved by riding roughshod over the very rights that governments are purporting to uphold’ (AI 2017: 1).

Geo-Political Contexts and Historical Limits

Here UK Government policy in Northern Ireland has meant a decades’ long and intense modern history of terrorism and counter-terrorism legislation. The critical pieces of
legislation since the 1970s were the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts and Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts. The first of these was the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Temporary Provisions) 1974 enacted after the Birmingham pub bombings, and includes many statutory powers of arrest, detention and investigation which legacy remains today. Between 1978 and 1984, reviews of these temporary pieces of anti-terrorism law were carried out by the then relatively low profile role of Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Reviewers in this period included Lord Shackleton, Earl Jellicoe and Sir George Baker. The Jellicoe Report of 1983 remarked that the annual renewal debates had not received the Parliamentary time they merited. In respect of this an annual review was instituted. The Independent Reviewer’s function would be to look at the use made of the statutory powers relating to terrorism, and to consider, for example, whether any change in the pattern of their use needed to be drawn to the attention of Parliament. The Independent Reviewer was to have access to all relevant papers, including sensitive security information. Between 1984 and 2001, annual reports were produced by Sir Cyril Phillips, Viscount Colville and JJ Rowe QC. In 1995 the government asked the Rt. Hon. the Lord Lloyd of Berwick PC to review and make recommendations for future UK counter-terrorist legislation. The resultant 1996 Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism concluded that even with an eventual peace in Northern Ireland there would be a continued need for permanent anti-terrorist legislation. Recommendations relating to intercept evidence, arrest and detention, stop and search, port powers, terrorist finance, sanctions and sentencing were made into law with the Terrorism Act 2000.

A mere few hours before the attacks on the Twin Towers, 11 September 2001, Lord Carlile of Berriew CBE QC accepted an appointment as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Post-9/11 the profile of the role was further and markedly enhanced, becoming itself part of the statutory basis of counter-terrorism legislation with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015, remaining so today. Between 2011 and 2017 David Anderson QC as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation oversaw and responded to the considerable widening of counter-terrorist powers (for example to public authorities such as universities) affected by the CTSA 2015. In 2017 Max Hill QC was appointed Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Anderson (2014) provides a nuanced historical account of a history in which he played a critical role (Anderson 2014).

This UK-specific or national geopolitics has now become part of a new international geopolitical context. While terrorism has always had a transnational dimension – funding, recruitment, ideologies which transgress national boundaries (Moore 2017) – the period
under analysis thus mirrors a shift from largely national to international terrorism concerns. This wider historical and geopolitical context is a critical backdrop to terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research in UK universities 1997-2017.

In this period there are, if arguably, three definable periods: (I) 1997-2001 (pre-9/11); (II) 2001-2015 (post-9/11 and pre-CTSA 2015); (III) 2015-the present (post-CTSA 2015). The first period represents the last years of a much longer period (dating from the 1970s) of temporary terrorism legislation and a shift to permanent terrorism legislation in the UK; the second period represents the post-9/11 consolidation of permanent counter-terrorism legislation; the third represents a period of normative permanence, or a widening and deepening or embedding of terrorism and counter-terrorism legislative political-societal impacts, including public authorities, notably educational, and of particular present significance universities and other higher education and research-oriented institutions.

(I) 1997-2001 (pre-9/11): Temporary to Permanent

The first period represents, as stated, the last years of a longer stage (dating from the 1970s) of temporary terrorism legislation and marks a shift in these latter years to permanent terrorism legislation within the UK. Fisher (2011) here has important insights into how public consciousness of terror threat was a marked element of this major transition, from the temporary counter-terrorism measures of the 1970s to the state of permanency marked by the Terrorism Act 2000. The Terrorism Act 2000 Terrorism uses ‘terrorism’ to mean ‘the use or threat of action where’ ‘the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and … the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. The types of actions which this entails is defined as involving ‘serious violence against a person’, ‘serious damage to property’, endangering ‘a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action’, ‘creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public’ or ‘is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system’. Fisher points out, too, the idiosyncrasies of this state: ‘the Labour party who had voted against temporary counterterrorism laws for over a decade was newly back in power, and historical context pointed to an inconclusiveness around how effective such laws actually were in reducing insecurity’ (cf. English 2016). She argues that ‘a key element helping explain this transition from temporary to permanent counterterrorism law lies in how particular threat and referent identities were constructed in official British discourse’. Here, she argues, ‘official British discourses from the late 1960s to the present’ are marked by processes of identity construction ‘essential to introducing and justifying the
Terrorism Act 2000’ where the ‘deployment of particular threat and referent labels established in discourse before events such as 9/11 or 7/7, such as “international” terrorism, helped enable the shift from counterterrorism law from temporary emergency response to permanent policy practice (Fisher 2011).

(II) 2001-2015 (post-9/11 and pre-CTSA 2015): Consolidation

If the years following illustrate a consistent pattern in the literature which identifies the importance of narrative and counter-narrative in relation to past, perceived, or expected terrorist threat (Bamberg and Andrews 2004; Casebeer and Russell 2005; Croft and Moore 2010; Ferguson 2016; Glazzard 2017; Halverson, Corman and Goodall 2011; Schmid 2014), 9/11 remains a defining landmark in such terrorism and counter-terrorism narrative. Crelinsten (2014), for example, argues that there is, in security terms, ‘September 12 thinking’ and ‘September 10 thinking’. The former ‘privileges a war model of counterterrorism, while the latter approach is assumed by the former to privilege a criminal justice model of counterterrorism’ blurring between internal and external security, international and domestic jurisdictions, and state and non-state actors (Crelinsten 2014: 1; cf. Crelinsten 2009; 1978).

For the UK, if the first period represents a critical still pre-9/11 shift from temporary terrorism legislation to permanent terrorism legislation, the second represents a post-9/11 consolidation of permanent counter-terrorism legislation. This is primarily evidenced by the Terrorism Act 2006 brought into law after the London bombings of 7 July 2005. It is this period which sees the beginnings of a perceived political need to integrate or embed counter-terrorism operations more widely in public policy, and for educators, this would mean schools, and to some extent universities (UUK 2011; 2012; 2013). On arriving to power in 2010 one of the earliest statements of the Conservative-Liberal Coalition Government was to begin to frame counter-terrorism in terms of a wider approach to security policy through more ingrained structural means: ‘Ensuring the security of our national infrastructure is one of the main Protect priorities as set out in the UK’s National Security Strategy and the UK Counter Terrorism Strategy CONTEST.’

A range of bodies subsequently emerged to consolidate such an integrated approach. The national network of Counter Terrorism Security Advisers and National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) thus provide advice to organisations in the public and private sectors to reduce their vulnerability to attack. For schools and universities the most familiar element of this was Prevent, as one of the four elements of CONTEST, the government’s
counter-terrorism strategy, aiming ‘to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism’ (UKG 2010).

(III) 2015-the present (post- CTSA 2015): Normative Permanence

If the first two periods are marked by shifts from temporary to permanency and subsequent consolidation of terrorism and counter-terrorism legislation, the third represents a normative permanence. Normative permanence here is intended to mean a widening and deepening or embedding of terrorism and counter-terrorism legislative, political-societal impacts, including public authorities, notably educational, and of particular present significance, universities and other higher education and research-oriented institutions. The CTSA 2015 is in this regard unlike other forms of such legislation.

In the UK the CTSA 2015 consolidated measures outlined since Prevent. Part 5, ‘Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism’ outlines (section 26) the ‘General duty on specified authorities’ (including universities):

... certain bodies (“specified authorities” listed in Schedule 6 to the Act), in the exercise of their functions, to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” ... The Act states that the authorities subject the provisions must have regard to this guidance when carrying out the duty ... In fulfilling the duty in section 26 of the Act, we expect all specified authorities to participate fully in work to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. (CTSA, 2015: 5).

Subsequent sections (31 Freedom of expression in universities; 32 ‘Monitoring of performance: further and higher education bodies’ (UKG 2015) detail specific responsibilities. With the CTSA 2015 UK universities have effectively been thrown into the complexities of responsibility for incorporating counter terrorist policy The CTSA formally integrated (what is essentially) a counter terrorism policy for UK universities not as only a matter of campus security but one of statutory duty impacting all aspects of university governance, teaching and research (UUK 2016).

The 1997-2017 timeframe shows the UK then as a central actor both in debates over the causes of terroristic action and as a major player in counter-terrorism in terms of its legislative lead (Hewitt 2007). The UK is also important in demonstrating a State actor implementing terrorism and counter-terrorism legislation which so directly impacts (UK) universities. Thus in terms of their legal responsibilities UK universities are now part of a wider counter-terrorism effort. This involves institutional collaboration in new and more intense ways with security and intelligence as well as law enforcement agencies (Durodié 2015; Glees 2015; Author 2015). Such developments are a result of deep transformations in terrorism and counter-terrorism policy. Terrorism and counter-terrorism research has seen a
veritable revolution. Indeed there seems no epistemological limit to the disciplinary lenses through which terrorism and counter-terrorism is researched, deeply impacting universities in terms of how they accommodate terrorism and counter-terrorism studies and research within departments or as specific units or centres, which in turn impact upon the nature, breadth and depth of what constitutes knowledge of terrorism and counter-terrorism from different disciplinary or epistemological perspectives. If terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research in UK Universities (1997-2017) mirrors, then, the global multi-disciplinary expansion of terrorism research, a distinctive geo-political context has impacted UK universities in policy and research in the period 1997-2017.

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Policy and Research in UK Universities (1997-2017)

Beyond the self-defined or delineated field of terrorism studies itself, itself the political sciences (including international relations, security and intelligence studies) broadly conceived which have led the way in defining the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism research. This is evidenced from the large number of centres for teaching and research which have emerged from the political sciences (Freedman 2010). A major impact of this work has been in those UK higher education which train practitioners in a range of professions, a non-exhaustive list of 10 primary categories includes: (I) education, including teacher training (for example, Author 2015; Arthur 2015; Davies 2016; Durodié 2016; Glees 2015; O’Donnell, 2017; O’Toole, Meer, Nilsson DeHanias, Jones and Modood 2016; Richardson 2015; Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks and De Winter 2015; Thomas 2016); (II) medicine and related health professionals, especially that related to ‘terror medicine’ (for example, Cole, Wagner, Scott, Connell, Cooper, Kennedy, Natal and Lamba 2014; Herman 2015; Shapira, Hammond and Cole 2008); (III) the law and legal practice (for example, Staniford 2013; Walker 2011; 2014) (IV) social care and social work (for example, Guru 2010; 2012; Sweifach, Heft LaPorte and Linzer 2010); (V) psychology, psychotherapy and psychiatry (for example, Foa, Cahill, Boscario, Hobfoll, Lahad, McNally and Solomon 2005; Galea,, Ahern, Resnick, Kilpatrick, Bucuvalas, Gold and Vlahov 2002; Silke 2003; Much of this work represents a strong integration between policy and professionalism. That is, investigating the implications of terrorism and counter-terrorism policy on the professions. Where universities are centres of such professional education and training such research, often framed as ‘evidence-based’ and practically oriented, will be integrated into professional training (Ferguson 2016; in general terms, see Thomas and Pring 2004).
The question of security sensitive research is broad and pressing inter-governmental concern (NATO 2012), with a burgeoning list of publications which includes (VI) engineering and structural engineering (for example, Bugliarello 2008; and the definitive, Gambetta and Hertog 2016); (VII) biochemistry and microbiology (for example, McPherson and Pincus 2011); (VIII) biomedical and life sciences (Atlas 2006); (IX) physical and nuclear sciences (Cravens 2002; Hymans 2010; Potter and Hansell 2013; Sagan 1998); (X) business, commerce, economics, and development studies (Anderton 2014; Burns and Kattelman 2017; Piazza 2014). UUK (2013) provides some summary consideration of the ethical and practical implications for universities hosting such research, predominantly focusing on the physical and life sciences. The United States perspective, operationally largely in the hands of the FBI, is more comprehensive (FBI (2011; FBI 2015a). Security sensitive research will tend to have highly complex ethical considerations, including the problematic questions surrounding secret research, including academic integrity, transparency, and the consequent reliability of truth claims or claims to knowledge and even researcher and or public safety (Author 2017; Dolnik 2013; Oman and Phythian 2013).

Due to the close correlation between policy and research, any separation here into empirical, applied or theoretical terrorism and counter-terrorism in UK universities is bound to be artificial. Even if on the surface empirical and applied forms of work are ostensibly valued by policy agencies as part of a wider trend towards ‘evidence-based’ or ‘research-informed’ or ‘what works’ approach to policy, theoretical research may not only draw upon empirical or applied evidence, but is often itself the stimulus for empirical and applied research, through testing of hypotheses, theories, and seeking proof of concept (Silke and Schmidt-Petersen 2017; Slavin, 2008; see also Gurr 1988; Merari 1991; Silke 2001). There are however under the three-phases defined above notable shifts in UK and global terrorism research in applications to counter-terrorism policy.

1997-2001 (pre-9/11): Temporary to Permanent

The already noted the exponential growth of university-based centres for terrorism and counter-terrorism research (Freedman 2010) is but a part then of a wider impact on a new disciplinary diversity of engagements with terrorism and counter-terrorism. This history of terrorism centres provides itself an indication of the broadening of disciplinary concerns with terrorism and counter-terrorism across the Academy. Thus the earliest of UK terrorism research centres, founded in 1994, is now the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) ‘dedicated to the study of the causes, dynamics, characteristics and consequences of terrorism and related forms of political violence’. Committed to
‘rigorous, evidence-based, scholarly analysis that is policy-relevant but independent’, CSTPV is Europe's oldest for the study of terrorism. Though thriving from pre-9/11 through post-9/11 and post-CTSA 2015 contexts, Centre’s research focus was always international, its’ critical distancing from policy a noted characteristic of research on terrorism from this period, in the UK and internationally (again, Whittaker 2000; also Schmid and Jongman 1968).

The niche focus evidenced by CSTPV marks a period before the extraordinary proliferation of terrorism studies across disciplines (Silke and Schmidt-Petersen 2017; Sinai 2012; Tinnes 2013). The aims of terrorism research in this period can thus be defined as critical understanding of terrorism not engagement with counter-terrorism policy. However, there has been, in the West at least, the longstanding charge even pre-9/11, that terrorism studies researchers tended to provide accounts sympathetic to the western contexts in which they were employed (Herman and O’Sullivan; again, George 1991; also Burnett and Whyte 2005), a charged reiterated throughout much of critical terrorism studies (Jackson, Gunning and Breen Smyth 2007), that traditionally, ‘terrorism studies has long been criticised for its overly prescriptive focus, which is a reflection of its theoretical and institutional origins in orthodox security studies and counter-insurgency studies’ (Jackson, Gunning and Breen Smyth 2007: 7). Indeed, it is a mark of the latter, that such engagement would compromise academic standards of integrity, noting that any such engagement would then, as now, be covert and regarded as professionally questionable (on a case of covert counter-insurgency, see Wakin 2008).

2001-2015 (post-9/11 and pre-CTSA 2015): Consolidation

The shift towards more counter-terrorist policy engagement for research became evident in the post-9/11 period, accentuated in the UK by the bombings in London on 7 July 2005 (or 7/7). It was a period of consolidation in terms of policy but there were also strong signs of contestation.

Three exemplars are suggested here of large scale international scholarly groupings which formed in this period of consolidation which engage in terrorism research and interconnect UK terrorism researchers with global counter-terrorist policy agendas: the Society for Terrorism Research (STR); the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI); and (if less explicitly) the International Association for Intelligence Education; All three cases are to differing degrees related to terrorism research in academic contexts. The International Association for Intelligence Education demonstrates especially strongly how research and security agendas in the Academy have become increasingly enmeshed.
The Society for Terrorism Research was founded 2006 in response to a perceived lack of ‘integrated and multidisciplinary organization dedicated to the area of terrorism and political violence research’. Its formation announced at an American Psychological Association symposium on terrorism from psychological perspectives resulted in the launch of the STR journal *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* (STR 2017). This marked the beginning of a global and multidisciplinary membership which incorporates but is not limited to ‘a wide range of social science disciplines’, notably ‘political science, psychology, sociology, criminology, anthropology, economics, journalism, and law’ (STR 2017).

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI, as of 2017) represents a collaborative effort of 16 research institutions and in excess of 120 individual scholars from over 30 countries, and by its own reckoning ‘constitutes one of the largest research consortia in the field of Terrorism Studies’. Making plain its counter-terrorist credentials through interdisciplinary collaboration, the TRI mission is ‘to enhance security through collaborative research’. Like the STR, these international scholarly and terrorist research credentials are global and multidisciplinary.

The IAFIE plays a significant role in highlighting the operational connectedness between universities and the security and intelligence agencies; see for example its Board of Directors and International Advisory Board (IAFIE 2017). Thus the aims, goals and purposes of the International Association for Intelligence Education are: ‘to serve as the association for advancing research, knowledge and professional development in intelligence education’. Within that remit to provide ‘a forum for the communication and exchange of ideas and information for those interested in and concerned with intelligence education’; ‘advance the intelligence profession by setting standards, building resources, and sharing knowledge in intelligence studies’; ‘foster relationships and cultivate cooperation between intelligence professionals in academia, Private sector, and governments’; ‘develop, disseminate, and promote theory, curriculum, methodologies, techniques, and best practices for pure and applied intelligence’; and ‘act as a liaison with other professional organizations and centers of excellence’ (IAFIE 2014; 2017). Its own bibliographies are significant resources for security and intelligence studies as well as terrorism and counter-terrorism research. The number of international academic centres, including those in the UK, thereby focusing on terrorism and counter-terrorism via the front of security and intelligence studies is wide, deep, and now deeply integrating within universities (Freedman 2010).

In terms of the correlating of the terrorism research and counter-terrorism policy, a significant form of UK-specific consolidation was the formation of the RadicalisationResearch hub, which makes explicit the link to terrorism research and counter-
terrorist policy: “Radicalisation” has often seemed the key to understanding, and preventing, modern terrorism. This site gathers high-quality academic research on radicalisation and makes it easily accessible for policymakers, journalists and anyone else whose work deals with this area’ (RadicalisationResearch.org, 2017). Its ‘host organisations’ include major arts and humanities and social science Research Councils – the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC); the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and related AHRC/ESRC security programmes (Global Uncertainties: Ideologies, decision-making and uncertainty; RCUK Global Uncertainties Programme – now the Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research – and the AHRC/ESRC Religion and Society Programme. Associated Academic Centres are: the Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation Processes; the Center for Terrorism & Security Studies; the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence; the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation; INFORM – The Information Network on Religious Movements; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism; Security Lancaster; and the Society for Terrorism Research.

In the UK, Think Tanks often too have a role for advisory and policy purposes, undertaking and publishing research on terrorism and counter-terrorism, often with direct or indirect links to the UK security and intelligence agencies. RadicalisationResearch lists the following in relation to shared interests in terrorism and counter-terrorism (radicalisation) research: the Centre for Social Justice; Chatham House; Demos; Institute for Strategic Dialogue; International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation; Policy Exchange; and Quilliam. All of this groups in the mid-(post-9/11 and pre-CTSA 2015) period begin to adopt strategies for enhanced impact on counter-terrorism policy ensuring, for reasons no less of public and other forms of private research funding (a powerful academic incentive) to prove usefulness in wider political, counter-terrorist efforts.

Despite any critical terrorism pleas, this period also marks the time when UK and the majority of international centres for terrorism and counter-terrorism research began to make enhanced play of applied usefulness and impact for their research. Applied terrorism and counter-terrorism research is in this case also the obvious remit of the law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies. It is the application of empirical findings to operational settings that further emphasises the interconnected between the Academy and security/intelligence agencies. In the UK such knowledge applications are coordinated through the Joint Terrorist Analysis Centre (JTAC). Established in June 2003 the JTAC is located within
the Thames House London Headquarters of MI5. JTAC’s role is the analysis and assessment of ‘all intelligence relating to international terrorism, at home and overseas’.

An integral part of the UK’s National Intelligence Community (principally MI5, the Secret Intelligence Service SIS or MI6 and Government Communications Headquarters or GCHQ, with Defence Intelligence), the JTAC sets UK terrorist threat levels issues public warnings of such threats and operates across Government departments. It also produces in-depth reporting and analysis of specific terrorist ‘trends, terrorist networks and capabilities’. Coordinating operational expertise across Government departments, police and armed forces, the National Crime Agency and Border Force, the JTAC works closely with MI5’s International Counter-Terrorism section to manage ‘investigations into terrorist activity in the UK’ (MI5, 2017).

As a part of the UK’s National Intelligence Community the work of JTAC is overseen by the Joint Intelligence Committee, in relation to which a National Security Advisor heads the Secretariat for the National Security Council (NSC), processing intelligence through the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) in order for the Government to make tactical, strategic and policy decisions in relation to national defence security as well as in relation to foreign affairs (Aldrich 2011; Aldrich 2015; Aldrich and Cormac 2016; Aldrich, Cormac and Goodman 2014). To ensure transparency, with due caveats for the necessary secrecy of much intelligence work, the parliamentary oversight body which incorporate oversight of related work in terrorism and counter-terrorism is the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation examines, assesses and reports on the legislation implications of and impacts from the operational implementation of counter-terrorism and related security actions in wider societal and political context.

Although Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), particularly terrorism and counter-terrorism centre-sourced research, is critical much operational intelligence gathering is covert or secret, as MI5 publicly acknowledge: ‘…publicly available information is helpful for background purposes, usually the best way to find out about the threat that some organisations and individuals pose is to obtain secret intelligence about their activities’ (MI5, 2017). Such secret techniques of intelligence gathering need however to be in line with respective legislation governing the UK security and intelligence services, including the Security Service Act 1989, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (ISA), the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), and associated Codes of practice (MI5, 2017).

This post-9/11 period also marked a time of intense collective contestation, and a justification from critical terrorism studies for a distancing from state authority and its
operational security and intelligence agents. In their classic statement of the critical terrorism studies agenda, Jackson et al thus declare that a

... serious challenge for the field pertains to the ‘embedded’ or ‘organic’ nature of many terrorism experts and scholars; that is, the extent to which terrorism scholars are directly linked to state institutions and sources of power in ways that make it difficult to distinguish between the state and academic spheres. A good illustration of this dynamic, and its contribution to the development of what has sometimes been called ‘the terrorism industry’, is the influence of the RAND Corporation, a non-profit research foundation founded by United States Air Force with strong ties to the American military and political establishments. The main consequence of such links is that together with certain state, military, think tank and public intellectuals, the leading terrorism studies scholars now constitute an influential ‘epistemic community’ – a network of ‘specialists with a common world view about cause and effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise, and common political values about the type of policies to which they should be applied’… (Jackson, Gunning and Breen Smyth 2007: 8).

From a Gramscian perspective, ‘core terrorism studies scholars function as “organic intellectuals” intimately connected – institutionally, financially, politically and ideologically – with a state hegemonic project’ (Jackson, Gunning and Breen Smyth 2007: 8). Jackson et al. are right to suggest ‘such a situation has serious implications for the integrity and independence of research on terrorism’. Thus a nascent but deep, historical relationship between universities and security and intelligence agencies has given rise to the causes for consternation highlighted by many others at the time too in higher education because of an implicit connectedness to what military strategists call the ‘kill chain’. In a hard-hitting, well-informed if polemical article for Aljazeera – ‘Scholars and spies: A disastrous combination’ – Mark LeVine makes an impassioned plea for the academic community ‘to create a clear firewall between itself and the military and intelligence communities’. LeVine highlights United States (US) Government security and intelligence collaborations with academics in the field of combat ‘in order to help advance military and strategic objectives’. Correctly determining such collaborations as raising manifold ethical issues for academics he acknowledges that at least here there is no pretense that such operations are other than what they are: the direct military application and use of scientific and other forms of knowledge to advance military and strategic field objectives.

While there remain questions of professional academic involvement in military command and control structures, LeVine rightly highlights a more problematic, more nuanced and less determinable set of ethical problems surrounding academic involvement in security and intelligence contexts, notably when academics use their scholarly and research personae as cover for the covert, secret, clandestine collection of knowledge:
…at least such scholars, directly embedded with the military in the field, do not … pretend to be independent and outside military control. But to have scholars literally spying on the people they're studying, and in a way that puts their findings directly into the ‘kill chain’ and thus can lead to the deaths of these subjects without any internationally accepted legal standard or judicial review, is in fact deplorable (LeVine, 2012).

Given the breadth of intelligence gathering, the emphasis on all-source as well as open-source intelligence evidenced in the Snowden and Assange leaks, it is however not merely the active organisational collaboration that terrorism researchers need be mindful of the unintended consequences of their knowledge-generation (Lowenthal and Clark 2015).

Broader public concerns – doubt over what Jackson et al. called that post-9/11 moral certitude – emerged with the Snowden and Assange revelations. These leaks of information and operational procedures used by security and intelligence agencies worldwide which seemed to show that these agencies were not interested only in conventionally defined enemies but everyone (Harding, 2014; Leigh and Harding 2011). It has not dented the enthusiasm for university collaborations with security and intelligence agencies however. Though UK universities’ ethics committees have barely even begun to come to terms with the ethical implications of research in which such security and intelligence agencies collaborations may be part of an overt or covert backdrop to research (Dolnik 2013; Goldman 2009; 2011; Hoffman 2006; Omand and Phytkian 2013). Given this secrecy, one of the critical difficulties in terrorism and counter-terrorism research in UK universities certainly – and an issue applicable internationally – is discovering operationally detailed knowledge. It is for this reason – a lack of open and progressive collaboration in general terms between universities and security and intelligence agencies –that Sageman (2014) described the ‘stagnation’ in terrorism research, provoking some no little degree of ire amongst other academic researchers (Horgan and Stern 2013; Schmid, 2014; Taylor 2014; McCauley and Moskalenko 2014; cf. Schuurman and Eijkman 2013).

2015-the present (post- CTSA 2015): Normative Permanence

The period of normative permanence marks a major shift in policy-research integration, towards a much more active operational engagement in counter-terrorist policy. The divisions between investigation of the field and operational activity in the field often become ethically and methodologically blurred. For example, when it comes to data collection, or information about terrorist activity, lines are often intentionally or unintentionally crossed between an increasingly difficult to distinguish set of markers between security and intelligence ethics and the ethics pertaining to university contexts, or research ethics (Dolnik
It is one of the reasons Sageman (2014) has called for greater clarity but also collaboration between the field of academic terrorism research and those in the field of security and intelligence dealing operationally with counter-terrorism. And, as noted, this is why the critical terrorism studies project regards the relationship as so problematic.

Interconnectivity between UK universities and security/intelligence agencies is made explicit in terrorism/counter-terrorism research is the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) which describes itself as ‘a national hub for understanding, countering and mitigating security threats’, bringing together ‘the UK’s foremost expertise in understanding the psychological and social drivers of the threat, the skills and technologies that enable its effective investigation, and the protective security measures that help counter the threat in the first place’, through ‘significant stakeholder and international researcher engagement, and with a clear plan for sustained and long-term growth’. It main publication is the CREST Security Review, intended as ‘a gateway to the very best knowledge and expertise’ which ‘translate academic jargon to “so what” answers. CREST has a specific and particular interest in behavioural and social science and is concerned with the application of evidence-based research in these fields applied to ‘everyday scenarios’ with a mission ‘to equip its audience with knowledge about the latest research that seeks to understand, mitigate and counter security threats’ (CREST, 2017).

CREST Core Programmes all maintain an emphasis on empirical and evidence-based research to inform security policy, which here incorporates but extends beyond terrorism and counter-terrorism: Actors and Narratives; Ideas, Beliefs and Values in Social Context; Understanding and Countering Online Behaviour; Eliciting Information; Protective Security and Risk Assessment. CREST also has a rolling programme of commissioned projects many of which include a terrorism and counter-terrorism focus: in 2016 – How Does Isis’ Online Propaganda Demonstrate Mechanisms of Radicalisation?; Why do people adopt conspiracy theories, how are they communicated, and what are their risks?; Learning and unlearning terrorism in Northern Ireland; Terrorist Decision Making Regarding Security and Risk; Investigating Sikh radicalisation in Britain; Reporting violent extremist activity and involvement in foreign conflict; in 2017 – The Internal brakes on violent escalation CREST 2017). Output for the core and commissioned programmes are heavily focused on empirically-based, theoretically-informed findings with publication often in-house through the Crest Security Review (CSR).
The collaborations between universities, research and policy organisations, and the security and intelligence agencies here are often not demonstrable and even if discernible are discreet, even covert. Thus, in the case CREST its links to the Radicalisation Research hub underpin both networks by an organisational (institutional-operational) connectedness to the UK Security Services. University-security-intelligence agency relations have been the subject of theoretical framing elsewhere but only through a disparate literature. Current-day terrorism and counter-terrorism preoccupations in policy and research have made this interconnectivity more apparent – and has been defined as part of a process of ‘university securitization’, or, ‘the counter-terrorist campus’ (Author 2017a; also 2015; 2017a; 2018).

In the period we are calling normative permanence pre-9/11 and post-9/11 impacts on UK higher education have been significant in terms of university policy (UUK, 2011; 2012; 2013) and such has only intensified post-CTSA-2015 (UUK 2016). Since the CTSA was made law, senior administrators in UK universities have effectively been thrown into the complexities of responsibility for incorporating counter terrorist policy into their institutions, including the reporting of terrorist and extremist activity. It is, however, not only policymakers at a senior level in UK universities who have responsibilities under the Act. The CTSA formally integrated (what is essentially) a counter terrorism policy for UK universities not as only a matter of campus security but one of statutory duty impacting all aspects of university policy – governance, teaching and research (UUK 2016).

Discussion
The primary aim of terrorism and counter-terrorism policy in UK universities, we may conclude, and as legislatively defined, is to prevent terrorist acts and to prevent people being drawn into violent and non-violent extremism and or becoming engaged in terrorism, explicitly through what is known as Prevent (Thomas 2016; for which programmes there are wide international parallels (Ghosh et al. 2016). It is a legally defined objective which has direct implications for universities in a manner of previously unknown impact for UK institutions of higher education. The aim is defined most clearly in the CTSA 2015. There are parallel international developments, notably across Europe – the European Agenda for Security (EAS 2016) – in and the United States, notably through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS 2017) – which similarly impact public authorities, including universities (Author 2015; 2017).

The aims of terrorism and counter-terrorism research in UK universities are more disparate and difficult to determine with precision because of the diversity of disciplines now engaged
in such research explicitly or tangentially. In other words, the aims and purposes of terrorism and counter-terrorism research is determined in large measure by respective disciplinary and epistemological frameworks. Across such disciplinary and epistemological frameworks the aims and purposes tend to be less defined in counter-terrorist terms, as contributions, that is, to counter-terrorist security policy, though in social, psychological and especially behavioural sciences these research contributions can often defined in counter-terrorist security policy terms. In centres or units dedicated to terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research the aims and purposes of such units and centres is predominantly defined in terms of knowledge and understanding of terrorism but generally framed in counter-terrorist terms, as a contribution to counter-terrorist security policy (for a prominent example, see Abrahms 2005; 2006; 2010; 2013; Abrahms and Lula 2012). Thus in centres for research in terrorism and counter-terrorism there is an explicit or tacit avowed aim to contribute to countering as much as understanding terrorist efforts (Freedman 2010; Sheehan 2012; Silke and Schmidt-Petersen 2017; Sinai 2012; Tines 2013).

Across many European nations, but to a lesser extent in the UK, where such developments involve security agency collaborations with universities, these engagements raise deep-rooted ethical qualms arising from an historical memory of political repression from Fascism and Nazism, and the secret agencies which upheld autocratic and dictatorial power. Many Eastern European governments have too enduring suspicions about any secret organs of the State, marked by a post-Cold War period of realignment for Europe in terms of post-Soviet security governance (Webber, Croft, Howorth, Tariff and Krahmann, 2003). Europe’s universities have already initiated widespread and now deeply integrated programmes of collaborative (university-security-intelligence agency) security-/threat-related research which incorporates but is not limited to terrorism and counter-terrorism (Croft et. al 2010). Here, reviews of university research in the European security research, and UK research council funded work of a similar nature tend to underplay the ethical aspects of security research, including terrorism/ counter-terrorism, which involves direct and or indirect collaboration with security and intelligence agencies (Technopolis 2015; Tilley, Bouhana, and Braithwaite, 2014). From the perspective of European security and intelligence agencies, these tend also for operational reasons to underplay the role of universities in European intelligence cultures (Agrell, 2012; de Graff and Nyce 2016).

We may conclude there are three interrelated dimensions of impact on the Academy: disciplinary-epistemological, institutional, and operational. These three interrelated
dimensions of impact are the primary structural-analytic findings, from the review of an extensive cross-disciplinary literature with no claims to be exhaustive.

The disciplinary-epistemological category is the determinant feature of knowledge creation and dissemination – whether empirical, applied, or theoretical – across and between disciplines (inter- and multi-) resulting in collaborations concerned with or directed towards terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research in UK universities. This has meant a flourishing of not only terrorism and counter-terrorism research in UK universities but a widespread incorporation of terrorism and counter-terrorism in higher education, teaching almost invariably connected research (Freedman, 2010; Sheehan 2012; Silke and Schmidt-Petersen 2017; Sinai, 2012; Tines 2013).

The institutional is the determinant element of all terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research in two ways that relate to definable changes and impacts: (i) at the institutional level, in this case universities, the physical and personnel environment, its effective securitization through the incorporation of counter-terrorism legislation into higher education policy, what in security terms has been defined as a nascent ‘counter-terrorist campus’ (UUK 2011; 2012; 2013; 2016; Author 2015; 2017); and (ii) this institutional-legislative impact has had an indirect physical and personnel impact in disciplinary-epistemological terms in that knowledge creation and dissemination – empirical, applied, theoretical – requires a home. We can note that UK universities as institutions have provided disciplinary-epistemological homes for terrorism and counter-terrorism research with cognate expansions in teaching courses or programmes (again, Freedman, 2010; Sheehan 2012; Silke and Schmidt-Petersen 2017; Sinai, 2012; Tines 2013).

The operational category is the least explored and most contested impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research in UK universities. In essence the operational is concerned with those legal authorities who ensure counter-terrorism policy is effective. That is, the operational dimension of terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research involves an institutional and to some degree disciplinary-epistemological level of collaboration, partnership or other forms of engagement with not only UK agencies such as the police and in governmental terms the Home Office, but also the security and intelligence agencies and their delegated authorities and agents. The extent to which centres of research, study and teaching collaborate with or have connections to the security and intelligence studies is not known in any systematic way but is part of a wider historic and contemporary relationship between universities and the security and intelligence agencies (Author, 2015; 2017; 2018;
Dylan and Alexander 2012; Glees 2015; also, for a mixture of contemporary and historical analysis, Sinclair1986; Winks 1987; Witanek 1989; Zwerling 2011).

This disciplinary-epistemological, institutional, and operational interface provides a working structural-analytic framework for understanding terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research in UK universities, 1997-2017. As this review shows, terrorism and counter-terrorism literature incorporates many strands and sub-fields, including extremism and radicalisation, and such a conflation is represented too in recent UK legislation (CTSA 2015) as one intersection of the global interface of security and education (Author 2015; 2017; Ghosh et al. 2016; Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks and De Winter 2015). Here the review shows too that terrorism and counter-terrorism have themselves become closely entangled in research and policy terms. For example, there is little terrorism research undertaken in UK universities that does not appear to have counter-terrorism policy objectives. These objectives are societal and political in the broadest senses, often corresponding to the UK research councils (and thus Government) stress on funding research which demonstrate impact. Such research also fits within European Union counter-terrorism goals as part of wider political strategies. There is no claim here about any lack of academic integrity in research identified but the close correspondence between research objectives and political strategy must be noted from the outset. It highlights a seemingly ever intensifying correlation between counter-terrorist policy and terrorism research.

The correspondence, however, determines even if it does entirely explain a close correlation between terrorism research and counter-terrorism policy in UK universities. It is a correlation which has become intensified through noted pieces of recent legislation (CTSA 2015). This marks a culmination of a correspondence which had not been so readily evident in the pre-9/11 period. One may speculate on the reasons why the globalisation of essentially Islamist terrorism has provoked this correlation. While terrorism studies had already emerged in the pre-9/11 period it was not in other words so closely correlated to countering terrorism. One example may serve as an illustration: Whittaker’s (2000) Terrorism Reader contains 12 national terrorism case studies (Lebanon, Libya, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Argentina, Spain, Algeria, Peru, Colombia, Germany, Italy, South Africa). While variation motivations are ascribed to terroristic action (rational psychological, cultural motivations), terrorist behaviour is analysed through such disciplinary lenses, but without ever being imbued with a counter-ideological, counter-narrative or preventative justification.

This review shows how disciplinary-epistemological aims have institutional impacts. Namely, that is, universities cater for and accommodate, are responsive to such
developments. As such *disciplinary*-*epistemological-*institutional* impacts are apparent so are, if less determinedly, *operational* aspects of terrorism and counter-terrorism research and policy. This aspect of the review has proved much more difficult fully to evidence. But it is important, and will require further work to elucidate. Thus Sageman (2014) highlights a supposed lack of collaboration between terrorism and counter-terrorism researchers and the security and intelligence agencies directly responsible with law enforcement to enacting policies of counter-terrorist protection. One of the important if tentative conclusions of this review is to show a nascent relationship between universities as institutions, and the disciplines they house, with the security and intelligence agencies. This conclusion is tentative due in part to the often covert modus operandi of the security and intelligence agencies themselves. It also raises many ethically challenging questions precisely because of an inherent lack of transparency, dependent as such agencies ultimately are upon their secrecy. That is, if the strategic counter terrorism objectives of the security and intelligence agencies are clear, the operational means of achieving these objectives often is not. Thus we are in a position when commissioned research clearly has financial support via or originates from security and intelligence sources but we cannot know – because of the covert, secret nature of such organisations – how any knowledge garnered will be used (CREST 2017). If the evidence base for this operational relationship is limited, there is sufficient evidence to show that it exists. Here, an historic and contemporary interaction between universities and the security and intelligence agencies have been delineated along three intersecting lines: the covert, the overt, and the overt-covert (Author, 2015; 2016; 2017). This is without doubt the most marked if least obvious operational impact on UK higher education as part of a much wider and increasingly coordinated international linkage between universities and respective national security and intelligence agencies (again, Author, 2015; 2017; 2018; Glees 2015; and Sinclair 1986; Winks 1987; Witanek 1989; Zwerling 2011).

The operational elements are most ethically and even morally challenging for academic and the sorts of concerns – freedom of expression, academic freedom, freedom from surveillance, basic academic integrity and so forth – reflected in policy documents from UUK (again, UUK 2011; 2012; 2013; 2016). The institutional and operational qualms that university engagement with security and intelligence agencies brings is also deeply disciplinary and epistemological. Historically this has centred on the infiltration of academic disciplines with access to difficult to reach territories and their populations in subjects as anthropology. A famous or notorious case was the Vietnam era story of academic engagement in counter-insurgency as detailed Eric Wakin’s (2008) *Anthropology Goes to War* (see also Price 2004;
and Author 2015). The research ethics aspect of this applies to all subjects and has been very little documented or analysed. The most prominent UK case to reach international academy prominence was the so-called Boston College case in which American researchers interviewed former Northern Ireland Republican and Loyalist who had engaged in political violence under the promise of anonymity. When British security agencies wanted data and thus to breach promised anonymity they sought the aide of the FBI to gain access. The case and the wider ethical issues raised especially for the social sciences is treated at some length by Palys and Lowman’s (2012) ‘Defending Research Confidentiality “To the Extent the Law Allows:” Lessons From the Boston College Subpoenas’.

The ethical and related matters raised here are germane to Marc Sageman’s (2013; 2014) noted intervention on the ‘stagnation in terrorism research’, where the lack of real progress in the field is marked by a ‘fateful decision to bifurcate academic and government research on terrorism resulted in the stagnation of the field’ (Sageman 2014). As Sageman states:

> Terrorism research is now mostly and secretly conducted within governments, specifically within the IC [Intelligence Community], which has not shared much information about terrorist plots with the academic community. One might reasonably ask whether the intelligence community has developed insights into the turn to political violence of which the academic community is unaware (Sageman 2014)

Sageman argues the divide between academic terrorist researchers and security and intelligence operatives highlights a reciprocal need for shared knowledge, methods and purposes, ‘To draw my point to its extreme,’ he argues, ‘we have a system of terrorism research in which intelligence analysts know everything but understand nothing, while academics understand everything but know nothing’ (Sageman 2014: 576). Sageman’s intervention brought a respectful if heated series of responses, most of which contested his central claims regarding stagnation in the field (Horgan and Stern 2013; Schmid, 2014; Taylor 2014; McCauley and Moskalenko 2014). The ‘solution,’ Sageman writes, ‘is obvious: we need more productive interactions between the two communities’. Evidence from the Academy and security and intelligence community would seem to show that this is precisely the current trajectory of travel, a journey along collaborative vectors which have current and likely to be continuing disciplinary-epistemological, institutional and operational impacts on UK universities.

Conclusion

The manifest impacts on UK higher education of terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research can then be summarised through our disciplinary-epistemological, institutional and
operational prism. On (1) the disciplinary-epistemological, we note the vast proliferation of terrorism and counter-terrorism across UK universities in terms of teaching as well as research. In the US context, Ivan Sascha Sheehan’s (2012) mapping of terrorism courses in 106 U.S. based universities and colleges found ‘the institutional presence of a highly cited terrorism scholar, a security studies program and terrorism research center are significantly associated with more terrorism courses’. In the UK the proliferation of research centres and courses has likewise resulted in major disciplinary as well as epistemological developments. On (2), the institutional, the evidence in consideration of the number of publications related to terrorism and counter-terrorism from the representative body for universities, Universities UK, for example in publications such Freedom of speech on campus (UUK 2011) Oversight of security-sensitive research material in UK universities (UUK 2012) and External speakers in higher education institutions (UUK 2013). On (3), the operational, the implementation of the CTSA 2015 has enhanced awareness of a longstanding relationship between universities and the security and intelligence agencies. For representative bodies like UUK this longstanding relationship has been highlighted by UK university engagements with counter-terrorism (UUK 2016).

The CTSA’s longer term effects on higher education policy and research, we may but surmise, is likely to continue to impact UK universities in ways which further embed terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research in disciplinary-epistemological, institutional, and operational ways. Not least amongst these impacts is the proliferation of multi-disciplinary research within and beyond specific centres, institutions or units specifically dedicated to research in terrorism and counter-terrorism, and cognate areas such as security and intelligence studies. The shift from temporary to permanent terrorism and counter-terrorism legislation is mirrored, if only incidentally, in the sense of a normative permanency to the disciplinary-epistemological, institutional, operational changes of terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research in UK universities.

In sum, terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research in UK universities is integrally related to this international context of intensified global terrorism which is mirrored in a global proliferation of terrorism and counter-terrorism increasingly networked research across disciplines and fields. As the review shows, there is a marked, conscious and concerted effort within this UK context to address the disciplinary and epistemological issues which have been a prominent part of terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research internationally. Institutionally, the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 has not only intensified the policy framework for and justification of such research but brought to bear a
wider range of higher education policy considerations in relation to counter-terrorism within UK universities at an institutional level. Operationally, this has necessitated new, often imprecisely defined, even covert relationships between universities and the security and intelligence agencies.

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