University of Oxford

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN UNITED STATES - COLOMBIAN RELATIONS,
DURING THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS, 1970-1998

by

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Somerville College
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This thesis is dedicated to my families across the globe, the Guáquetas, Nauruhns and Tafts, and to my husband, Carlo. This work is the beginning of our journey together.
This thesis addresses almost three decades of U.S.-Colombian relations and asks two main questions. Why did relations remain friendly for so long given the many problems associated with drugs, and the notion that drugs and drug trafficking constituted a security problem? And what changed in 1995 so as to alter the course of friendship?

It argues that U.S. and Colombian preferences over illegal drug control policy have not always been at odds, and disagreements have not precluded cooperation and joint action on drug control matters over a significant period of time. Nor can power asymmetry, a constant feature in the relationship, account for change. A successful account of both friendship and antagonism can be given only by spelling out the ideational and normative components that have contributed to define the character of the relationship and to determine the attitudes and behaviour towards each other. These components refer to the understandings of the drug problem, ideas on what constitutes mutually acceptable political and economic behaviour and their underlying norms, and the images that relevant policy-makers have of each country. This thesis also underscores the need to take stock of the cumulative process by which Colombia and the United States embraced and expanded drug prohibition.
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<th>Abbr.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANIF</td>
<td>Asociación Nacional de Industria y Finanzas</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Anti-Narcotics Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATPA</td>
<td>Andean Trade Preference Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASP</td>
<td>Country Analysis Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICAD</td>
<td>Comisión Inter Americana del Control y Abuso de Drogas (Inter American Commission for Drug Abuse)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAS</td>
<td>Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DECTI</td>
<td>División Especial de Cooperación Técnica Internacional</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNP</td>
<td>Departamento Nacional de Planeación</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>Ejército de Liberación Nacional</td>
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<td>EPL</td>
<td>Ejército Popular de Liberación</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</td>
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<td>FARPA</td>
<td>Foreign Assistance Related Programs Authorizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
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<td>FRUS</td>
<td>Foreign Relations of the United States</td>
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<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area of the Americas</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>U.S. General Accounting Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTIAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCSR</td>
<td>International Narcotics Control Strategy Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCP</td>
<td>International Narcotics Control Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>INL</td>
<td>Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INM</td>
<td>Bureau for International Narcotics Matters (former INL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT</td>
<td>International Narcotic Trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSRP</td>
<td>Justice Sector Reform Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAIA</td>
<td>Latin American Integration Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLAT</td>
<td>Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (used in footnotes as short for their annual reports to the Colombian congress)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Memorias de la Procuraduría</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>Northern American Free Trade Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDCR</td>
<td>National Drug Control Report</td>
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<td>NDSC</td>
<td>National Drug Control Strategy</td>
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<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSDD</td>
<td>National Security Defense Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>Office for National Drug Control Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPDAT</td>
<td>Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPIC</td>
<td>Overseas Private Investment Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEC</td>
<td>Programa Especial de Cooperación</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLANTE</td>
<td>Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public Papers of the President</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPOL</td>
<td>Anti-narcotics police air wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Committee on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDCP</td>
<td>United Nations Drug Control Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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What we have tried to do, though, is to establish standards under which we are prepared to cooperate and support Colombia in many other ways.

It is up to the Colombian people, obviously, to decide how they want to be ruled, but it is up to us and the rest of the international community to decide how we are going to deal with those kinds of individuals [referring to President Samper].


Traditionally, the Republic has never been divided over international problems and I refuse to admit that there are now differences of opinion on the kind of relation we should have with the United States. The only possible division is the one posed by Honourable Representative Garcia: whether we should ask them for more or ask them for less.

Julio César Turbay Ayala, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Colombian Congress in 1959.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis looks at continuity and change in U.S.-Colombian relations from 1970 to 1998, starting with President Richard Nixon's invitation to Colombia to join the war against drugs. It takes the issue of illegal drugs, more exactly the interaction between the governments of Colombia and the United States in their attempt to control the illegal drug industry, as the main point of entry into the relationship. This choice is inevitable. After all, the so called 'illegal drug problem' has been in the bilateral agenda for thirty years and has dominated relations since 1989. Moreover, the unprecedented diplomatic conflict of 1995-1998, in which the United States insistently sought to ...
'isolate' and 'debilitate' President Ernesto Samper, developed around the issue of drugs and narco-corruption. Following the allegations on drug money financing Samper's 1994 presidential campaign, the United States called Colombia's friendship into question for the first time since the traumatic quarrel over Panama in the early twentieth century. The United States deemed Colombia uncooperative in the war against drugs and ordered targeted sanctions against dozens of individuals and firms suspected of connections with drug dealers. In 1996 and 1997 the United States decertified Colombia completely and suspended aid funds for the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) facilities and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) guarantees. American official documents branded Colombia as a 'threat to democracy' and, therefore, to the security of the United States and the hemisphere.

From 1995 to 1998, the United States became heavily involved in Colombian domestic politics as it pressed for an impeachment trial against the drug-tainted Samper. Subsequently, U.S. officials became entangled with local political and bureaucratic struggles affecting the internal political landscape and, above all, the legitimacy of the Colombian state. After that, the issue of drugs has continued to play a pivotal role in the bilateral relationship and the United States has increased its physical and political presence in Colombia. In 1998, breaking with the historical precedent, the United States surfaced as a major actor in President Andrés Pastrana's Plan Colombia and his attempt to demobilise the guerrilla groups Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the right-wing paramilitary forces gathered under the umbrella of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The U.S. rationale was that the three illegal armed groups financed their activities through the drug trade and that United States continued in its quest to
fight drugs. The United States dramatically increased aid in 1998 to fund counternarcotic-counterinsurgency operations targeting rebel groups whenever there is 'credible evidence' of their involvement in the illegal drug industry. This stands in stark contrast to the history of U.S.-Colombian relations, for the United States maintained a prudent engagement and distance from Colombian domestic politics from 1903 until the mid-1990s—something it had conspicuously failed to do elsewhere in the region, especially in Central America and the Caribbean.

This thesis does not assess the efficacy of drug control public policy. The plethora of drug policy studies has already established that prohibition has had, at best, only a limited impact in reducing the size of the drug trade and in preventing its consequences. At worst, prohibition only serves to make the business more lucrative. Instead, this thesis investigates the politics of drugs within U.S.-Colombian relations. It looks at the relationship in historical perspective, and lays particular weight on the ideational and normative dimensions of the U.S.-Colombian relationship. As explained in Chapter 1, such an approach gives new meanings to old information, pulls out previously neglected data and questions myths about the links between drugs and interstate conflict. This also contrasts with the existing literature which stresses power asymmetry and material variables. This thesis does not intend to be a single-case study that seeks to prove or disprove a given theory in International Relations. Rather, it is a theoretically guided account of U.S.-Colombian relations and addresses more than one audience: Colombia-specialists, drug control experts, scholars analysing the forces that shape U.S.-Latin American relations, International Relations academics discussing the role of ideas and practitioners. In general, this work aims to contribute to a better understanding and wiser management of U.S.-Colombian relations.
Except for the first chapter, the thesis follows a chronological order. It is divided into four parts and contains ten chapters. Part I lays out the analytical and historical contexts. Chapter 1 introduces the research agenda and unpacks the argument. It shows how an ideational approach fares better compared to traditional power-systemic and materialist approaches at accounting for the timing and nature of the changes in U.S.-Colombian relations, and especially for the move to conflict on 1995. Chapter 2 traces the history of the relationship from 1900 up to 1970. Part II examines early drug control cooperation, from 1970 when illegal drugs were formally put on the bilateral agenda to 1989. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 show the process by which Colombia and the United States join in drug control actions and Colombia slowly embraces drug prohibition. They demonstrate that the relationship encountered minimal friction on the count of disagreements related to drug policy. This challenges traditional analyses on drug-related inter-state conflict. The chapters proceed to set the drug issue into the broader context of U.S.-Colombian relations in order to weigh the relative political importance of drugs throughout the period.

Part III looks at the years of deep institutionalisation of drug control cooperation that begin with the launching of the U.S. Andean Strategy and the emergence of a renewed bilateral alliance in the war against in 1989 during the Bush (1989-1992) and Barco presidencies (1986-1990). The main objective is to show how friendship persisted despite the increase of Colombia's share in world coca production, despite the post Cold War shift towards understanding drugs as a security threat to democracy, and despite Colombia's faulty material performance in eradicating drug trafficking. Chapter 5 tells the story and analyses the content of the new comprehensive anti-drug agenda. It also examines how prohibition ideas and foreign drug policy become tightly embedded in the U.S. political and administrative institutions thereby increasing the
potential leverage of specific official in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Chapter 6 explains why, despite the perceived costs for Colombia, the Gaviria administration (1990-1994) decided to carry on with the drug prohibition agenda. It analyses Colombia's anti-drug collaborative activities with the United States and the enhancement of prohibition at the national level. Chapter 7 introduces the shift in U.S. expectations on Colombia's behaviour. It argues that the failure to deliver efficient results in the war against drugs should have triggered a major diplomatic conflict especially after the reforms to U.S. drug policy during the Clinton administration (1993-2000). Despite this, to officials of the Bush and Clinton administrations Gaviria remained a trustworthy ally in matters of drugs, democracy and economic liberalisation.

Part IV deals with the emergence and manifestations of the diplomatic conflict between Colombia and the United States. Chapter 8 describes how, according to U.S. policy makers, the drug-tainted Ernesto Samper administration (1994-1998) failed to conform to the new standards of democratic behaviour and to the new benchmarks in the war against drugs. Chapter 9 explains why Colombia and the United States remained locked in conflict between 1995 and 1998, and shows how the basic implicit norms guiding the relationship were ignored or transformed. Finally, the concluding chapter draws together the factors that have determined change and continuity in the character of U.S.-Colombian relations and reflects on the nature of U.S.-Colombian relations.
PART I: ANALYTICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTS

Part I provides the analytical and historical backgrounds in order to examine change and continuity in the U.S.-Colombian relationship. The analytical chapter reviews the literature on international drug politics and unpacks the main arguments of this thesis. The historical one gives an overview of U.S.-Colombian relations from the nineteenth century up to 1970, before Colombia officially joins the so-called war against drugs.
Chapter 1

THE QUESTION OF ILLEGAL DRUG CONTROL AND U.S.-COLOMBIAN RELATIONS

This thesis examines how nearly three decades of the war against drugs (1970-1998) changed the U.S.-Colombian relationship and seeks to answer two main puzzles: Why did relations remain friendly for so long given the many problems associated with drugs, and the notion that drugs and drug trafficking constituted a security problem? And what changed in 1995 so as to alter the course of friendship?

The first section of this chapter assesses the traditional general explanations of drug politics in the Western Hemisphere. These explanations have influenced the main works on U.S.-Colombian relations and we would expect them to account for the dynamics of such a critical case as the Colombian one. It also examines the literature specifically about U.S.-Colombian drug politics and identifies its main shortcomings. The second section unpacks the main arguments of the thesis and the reasoning behind them. It is claimed here that U.S. and Colombian preferences over illegal drug control policy have not been always at odds, and that disagreements have not precluded cooperation and joint action on drug control matters over a significant period of time. Nor can power asymmetry, a constant feature in the relationship, account for change. A successful account of both friendship and antagonism is done only by spelling out the ideational and normative components that have contributed to define the character of the relationship and to determine the attitudes and behaviour towards each other. These components refer to the understandings of the drug problem, ideas on what constitutes mutually acceptable political and economic behaviour and their underlying
norms, and the mutual perceptions or the images that relevant policy-makers have of each country. This thesis also underscores the need to take stock of the cumulative process by which Colombia and the United States embraced and expanded drug prohibition. The third section describes the main sources consulted for this investigation.

1. Studies on Illegal Drugs and Explanations of Inter-State Drug-Related Conflict

In the 1980s academic writing on the history and politics of drug trafficking and international drug control measures proliferated. At present there is a generous quantity of studies often rich in description and that touch upon a wide range of relevant questions. There are, for instance, several studies of the political economy of illegal drugs, describing the size of drug trafficking and the declarations of drug policies in specific countries and regions. There are also histories of drug prohibition, some of which look at the formal international regime that has emerged under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), the Organization of American States (OAS) and other regional organisations. More recently, given that drug money finances warring parties, drug trafficking has been engulfed by studies on transnational organised crime and works on post Cold War intra-state conflicts. Usually two types of audiences engage with studies on illegal drug policies and politics, the issue-specialists and the area-specialists (those who study a particular geographical region where drugs are just

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1 The demand from policy-making circles, mainly based in Washington, boosted the volume of general and technical policy analyses on drug issues. Agencies within the UN system, like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) also played an important role. In the latter part of the 1980s political analyses appeared. Useful bibliographic compilations are Lamond Tullis, in collaboration with the UN Research Institute for Social Development, *Handbook of Research on the Illegal Drug Traffic* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991) and Bruce M. Bagley (ed.), *Drug Trafficking Research in the Americas. An Annotated Bibliography* (Miami: University of Miami, North-South Center, 1996).
but one aspect of a broader political or economic system). Despite the volume of works, there are a number of recurrent problems: The collection of data is incomplete, measurements are only approximations, criteria for successful policies vary, and ideological biases have influenced the academic readings of events and data.

Latin America is the most studied geographical area, because cannabis, coca leaf and poppy grow there and because it is closest to U.S. foreign drug policy. Although mainstream International Relations (IR) has not embraced the topic, a small number of specialists frequently analysing U.S.-Latin American relations have looked at the demands for states' coordinated responses to the drug trade, and have engaged with the classical international cooperation literature, as illustrated below. The *Journal of Inter-American and World Affairs*, for example, served as a first arena to discuss United States, Latin American countries and illegal drugs. Now nearly every study on U.S.-Latin American relations includes sections on illegal drugs.

Nearly all studies on drug policies and politics in the Western Hemisphere share two tendencies. The first one is the predominance of a *materialist* bias in descriptions of the drug problem and in explanations of drug-related international conflict in the Western Hemisphere. Alongside this, drug politics is often understood simply in terms of the coercive imposition by the United States of a prohibition regime onto its smaller and weaker neighbours in Latin America. The following sections develop these points in greater detail. The second tendency is the existence of general pessimism and a relentless focus on conflict. This, in turn, reflects the frequent drug-related diplomatic tensions between the United States and the Latin American countries and the resilience of the drug trade to the panoply of control measures. Even Liberals, who initially produced an optimistic forecast for post Cold War U.S.-Latin American relations based on the continent's ideological convergence around democracy and neo-liberal

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economic reforms, held pessimistic views on drugs and conflict. Open borders seemed to exacerbate problems such as the illegal drug trade, and most believed that drug policy interests continued to be at odds anyway.³

In general, observers have been swift to conclude that the international and regional counter-drug regimes are hollow and argue that cooperation has been simply non-existent, or at best, imperfect or inefficient.⁴ According to most accounts states that do not cooperate with each other necessarily clash, by default. And Latin American states that allegedly do not cooperate with the United States defected from prohibition. However, what is in fact striking throughout the 1980s and the 1990s is the coexistence between the frequency of regional diplomatic tensions and the creation and institutionalisation of drug control cooperation, especially between Colombia and the United States. What is most remarkable about the history of U.S.-Colombian relations is not the existence of disagreements or routine quarrels over the illegal drug industry, but rather the absence of major diplomatic conflict, at least until 1995.

**The Concept of Cooperation as Applied to Drug Control in the Western Hemisphere**

Before looking at the cooperation between Colombia and the United States we need to look at how cooperation has been understood. Here it becomes clear that the neglect of cooperation is often based on conceptual biases and methodological shortcomings. Scholars analysing the case of U.S.-Latin American efforts to deal with the drug issue

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³ A representative study showing the dualism between optimistic forecasts for the region and pessimism about drug politics is Abraham F. Lowenthal and Gregory F. Treverton, *Latin America in a New World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

have often borrowed mainstream IR definitions of cooperation only to conclude that cooperative interaction has been absent. The actual expansion and institutionalisation of the drug prohibition machinery, along with its norms and organisational rules, have been downplayed within this 'lack of cooperation' literature. Celia Toro, for example, an acute observer of the Mexican case, has remained true to conceptual purism adopting Robert O. Keohane's definition of cooperation in order to discard from her analysis actions that do not specifically illustrate a formal coordination process by which demands were mutually adjusted.\(^5\) Keohane says that cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the preference of others through a process of coordination.\(^6\) Again, using Keohane's definition, David R. Mares argues that because cooperation implies a simultaneous compromise by both parties, the fact that an inter-American drug policy exists does not mean that cooperation is present. For him, cooperation requires the explicit linking of policies on supply and demand in order to satisfy the alleged preferences of both sides.\(^7\) Juan G. Tokatlian and Bruce M. Bagley have adopted Krasner's theory on regimes in order to argue that it is too ambitious to call U.S.-Latin American initiatives a regime given its illegitimate character (due to U.S. unilateralism), lack of credibility (due to the supply-side policy bias imposed by the United States), and the unequal distribution of costs.\(^8\) Actions of Latin American countries on drug control have not been regarded as pure 'cooperation' but as the outcome of hegemonic domination and therefore not eligible to be labelled as

5 Toro herself criticised what she labels a 'traditional' notion of cooperation based on the capacity to reduce drug flow. However, she seemed to be criticising more the political abuse of the term cooperation, as opposed to analytically revising the concept, see Celia Toro, 'El control del narcotráfico, podremos cooperar?' in Blanca Torres (coord.), Interdependencia. Un enfoque útil para el análisis de las relaciones México-Estados Unidos? (México: El Colegio de México, 1990), pp. 236-52.


8 Tokatlian and Salah, 'Los efectos del prohibicionismo', pp. 8-9.
cooperation, but rather a case of sheer forced compliance. Finally, the ambiguity in the goals of drug cooperation and in the evaluation of successes has turned policies into an easy target for academic criticism and subsequent neglect.

There is an important problem when applying standard definitions of cooperation to U.S.-Latin American relations. The theorisation on political cooperation advanced within IR approaches has been tailored for the industrialised countries of the West. Keohane's and Nye's 'complex interdependence', often too enthusiastically embraced by analysts of U.S.-Latin American relations, was meant to explain relations among industrialised countries rather than Latin America, as they recently acknowledged. Consequently, interaction within a historical structure of great power asymmetry in a sphere of influence falls beyond the scope of dominant definitions.

Hence the main problems in studying the case of drug control cooperation in U.S.-Latin American relations stems from a conceptual difficulty, namely, identifying which precise actions are considered 'cooperation'. Writings on drug politics, for example, have little discussion and consensus as to the type of actions that need to be observed in order to determine the existence or lack of cooperation. Some look at declared policies by states, others at the distribution of costs (often with a poor

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11 For a critique of mainstream IR theories in the analysis of Latin America see Andrew Hurrell, 'United States and Latin America', pp. 167-71. A similar discussion from Latin American scholarship can be found in Carlos Escudé, Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997). A rather mild Colombian critique can be found in Rodrigo Pardo and Juan G. Tokatlian, Política exterior colombiana: de la subordinación a la autonomía? (Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes, TME, 1988).

12 Even scholars not dealing with power asymmetry have identified shortcomings in the dominant IR concepts of cooperation; Milner, for instance, concludes that the common definition of cooperation that emerged in IR theory 'does not alleviate the empirical difficulties
construction of indicators), and others look at policy implementation and the outcome on the ground. This is particularly the case of those who argue that the resilience of drug trafficking is the ultimate sign of absent or failed cooperation. In sum, little effort has been given to explaining harmony, alliance, drug-related cooperative actions or the process by which drug prohibition has been sustained and enhanced in the region, flaws notwithstanding. Having discussed some of the difficulties surrounding the concept of cooperation, this chapter turns now to existing explanations.

**Power and System-Level Interpretations**

System level explanations, either global-systemic or regional-systemic, have long been well represented in the studies on drug-related conflict between United States and Latin America and in those works that refer to U.S.-Colombian relations. From this perspective, conflict is about U.S. will, need or habit in exercising coercive power over Latin America -- in other words simple power asymmetry. In addition, the post Cold War systemic reordering is cited as the main cause for drug-related inter-state conflict from the early 1990s. The former Soviet Union was no longer there to check or deter the exercise of American power. Besides, with the absence of communism, the United States no longer had a reason for strategic restraint in holding allies accountable on the drug issue, whereas in the past the United States could not risk undermining its anti-communist alliances in the Western Hemisphere because of drug-related problems. Juan G. Tokatlian, for example, holds that U.S.-Colombian relations became increasingly conflictual in 1990s due to a perverse combination of the decline in U.S. *global hegemony*, given the re-emergence of Europe and Japan as powerful international actors, and the rise in *regional hegemony*, given the implosion of the former Soviet Union. The former pushed the United States to increase coercive in using the concept'. Helen Milner, 'International Theories of Cooperation among Nations.
policies in the region, while the latter gave it enough freedom to exercise coercion at a lower cost in Latin America. Thus, for Tokatlian, from 1990 onwards the United States began to behave according to 'its own desires and based on individual needs with the purpose of maximum self-realisation --more a sign of arrogance and clumsiness than of firm and fertile leadership'.

It is clearly the case that drug-related frictions between the United States and Latin American countries increased significantly in the 1990s. From 1995 to 1998, Colombia and the United States experienced an unprecedented diplomatic crisis marked by the United States' decision to grant Colombia a national conditional waiver during the drug certification process of March 1995 as opposed to certifying its full cooperation in the war against drugs. The relationship changed from a pattern characterised by positive and friendly association and the observance of core norms regarding the management of the relationship to one of severe conflict and increased U.S. intervention in Colombian domestic affairs. For sceptical academics, this was the long awaited outcome; but for policy-makers at the Colombian end, who had been accustomed to the friendly management of the relationship, the outbreak, depth and duration of conflict came as a painful surprise.

Strengths and Weaknesses', *World Politics*, 44/3 (1992), p. 469

13 See Juan G. Tokatlian, *Drogas, dilemas y dogmas. Estados Unidos y la narcocriminalidad organizada en Colombia* (Bogotá: TME-CEI, 1995), chapter 3, especially p. 22. Traditionally inclined towards neo-realism, Tokatlian began to modify his own views after 1995 to include domestic and ideational factors due to his exposure to critical security studies. He nevertheless continues to view the United States as a utility-maximising and coercive hegemon. Most of the few academic studies on Colombian international relations as well as U.S.-Colombian relations and the drug issue that appeared before 1995 were written by Tokatlian. The diplomatic crisis of 1995-1998, however, prompted new writing in Colombia and in the United States. These works refer mostly to Samper and decertification and are discussed in chapters 8 and 9. Other important works by Tokatlian are 'National Security and Drugs: Their Impact on U.S.-Colombian Relations', *Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs* 30/1 (1988); and Balgey (comps.) *Economia y politica del narcotrafico* (Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes, CEI, CERC, 1990); and *En el limite: la (torpe) norteamericanizacion de la guerra contra las drogas* (Bogotá, Colombia: CERC, Grupo Editorial Norma, 1997). A balanced critique of Tokatlian's arguments on U.S.-Colombian relations in the 1990s can be found in Germán Palacio, *Globalizaciones, estado y narcotrafico* (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional, UNIJUS, Instituto para el Desarrollo de la Democracia Luis Carlos Galán, 1998), ch. 3.
The absence of the Soviet Union or regional power asymmetry can hardly account for this trend. In the first place, there are several instances of serious drug-related diplomatic conflicts within the region before the end of the Cold War, which indicate that neither the Cold War system nor Soviet power were an infallible impediment to such conflicts. Cases include Mexico in 1969 and 1985, Bolivia in 1980 and 1986-88, and outside the hemisphere, Turkey in 1971. While anti-communism certainly shaped U.S.-Latin American relations, the history of the region shows that the former Soviet Union had a much more limited effect in curtailing the exercise of U.S. power in the region than commonly thought. For example, the Soviet Union did not deter U.S. military interventions in Guatemala in 1954, Dominican Republic in 1965 and Grenada in 1983, or covert intervention in Chile in 1973. Given the record, it is also unlikely that the invasion of Panama in 1989, at least in part related to the drug issue, would have been avoided had the Cold War system still been in place. Even U.S.-Cuban relations, known to be the clearest example of Cold War dynamics, have been shown to have a tempo of their own rather than simply following the systemic rhythm. Thus, the extent to which the Soviet Union has directly affected U.S.-Colombian relations is highly debatable. This is not to say that regional hegemony or that the international context is unimportant. They matter but in ways different to purely neo-realist views that stress power asymmetry.  

Second, for all the reconfiguring of the distribution of power after the Cold War, there has been always substantial asymmetry of material power between Colombia and the United States. Thus, material power asymmetry, a constant feature, cannot in itself account for the periods of harmony and the subsequent shift to conflict. Answering this question is beyond the neo-realist reach, since it requires looking at domestic and

\[\text{Works on spheres of influence, for instance, have referred to their special internal features, which allude to factors other than material power, see Paul Keal, Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance (London: MacMillan, 1983) and Jan Triska (ed), Dominant Powers and Subordinate States. The United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern}\]
ideational aspects in order to answer why, when and how Latin American countries and the United States transformed a given situation into diplomatic or military hostility.

State Interests and Drug Policy Preferences

Explanations of drug-related inter-state conflict have been also concerned with state-level variables and occasionally incorporate domestic societal factors. Some authors have spoken of clashing national security interests and others of divergent drug policy preferences based on the type of participation of each country in the illegal drug industry. Divergent interests and preferences lead to a lack of cooperation over drug control and, eventually, to political conflict. The core interest-based faultline stands between Latin America, which is primarily defined as a producing- and trafficking-region, in other words, the supply side; and the United States, which has the lion's share of regional drug consumption, the demand side. In this view, each side has a different 'drug problem'. The United States seeks to manage its consumption-violence problem at the lower cost possible and by making the trade illegal, while Latin America does not have a serious consumption dilemma and therefore questions the benefits of prohibition measures that require the implementation of unpopular policies in their territories, instead tending towards legalisation and regulation. Adding to the controversy and generating great strife is the fact that United States (unlike Great Britain or Germany) expects to cut its demand by fighting supply beyond its borders, a goal that reflects both U.S. self-attributed prerogatives and the very nature of U.S-Latin American power dynamics. 'Going to the source' necessarily brings centre-stage expectations as to the actions of Latin American states and pushes the United States

Europe (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986). It is important to note that United States and Latin America remain the tightest sphere of influence in post-Cold War world.
towards greater involvement in their domestic affairs than they would ultimately prefer to see.¹⁵

These analyses get some of the broad issues right. But they miss many others and fail to identify important differences among the various Latin American countries. For instance Mares's game-theoretical model explaining U.S.-Latin American non-cooperation on the drugs issue suggests that Latin Americans prefer demand-side policies because they make the United States focus on its own territory. Yet, as we shall see for the case of Colombia, Latin American countries have at times encouraged U.S. supply side policies because they bring aid and other assistance.¹⁶

If this interest-based reasoning were correct, Colombia and the United States should have suffered a major rift in their relationship at anytime since the 1970s. Colombia should have advocated drug legalisation as the less costly way of handling the effects of drug production and trafficking over its social, economic and political systems. Or, as a second-best option, Colombia should have opted for policies that were less costly than eradicating illegal crops or extraditing Colombian drug dealers, and that maintained a minimal level of U.S. influence over its drug policies so as to preserve its much desired autonomy. From the U.S. perspective, Americans should have applied sanctions against Colombia for failing to eliminate, or at least contain, the size of illegal drug supply and the ensuing effects over the political and economic systems of the region.

Instead, as we shall see, Colombia and the United States have frequently worked together to establish and develop prohibition in Colombia, and, despite important


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differences, they succeeded in institutionalising a significant level of bilateral drug control programs. Furthermore, Colombia and the United States retained essentially friendly relations for twenty-five years (from 1970 to 1995) at a time when illegal drugs were a salient and often controversial issue in the bilateral agenda and over the period when the illegal drug industry expanded to the extent of eroding the basic foundations of Colombia's institutions.

Untangling the debate over national interests and drug control is not an easy task. The so-called drug policy 'interests' arguments have been formulated in a conceptually inconsistent manner. Within these interests there are not only specific preferences regarding drug control strategies and tactics, but also general national interests (e.g. sovereignty, autonomy), non-drug interests (e.g. economic well being, trade preferences, electoral politics, bureaucratic interests), and historical prejudices. The following lines in the prologue of a well-known Colombian study on illegal drugs, Narcotráfico en Colombia published in 1991 provide a clear example:

This approach [prohibitionism], oriented to weaken narcotics demand in the United States, has focused on repressive action on the supply side, and has placed the greater burden of the war against drugs in Colombia. In this way, what is more convenient for the United States has prevailed, along with the definition of its own priorities. On the other hand, United States' repression policy does not channel significant cooperation resources for producer countries [...]. The relationship between the two countries is not of allies that unite their strength to confront a common problem. It is more the relationship between a strong country that demands sacrifices from the smaller one, without any compensation. Evidence of this is United States' attitude towards Colombia on trade issues, which is of total disinterest or open opposition.17

That the drug policy interests debate has not been sufficiently unpacked, particularly in the case of U.S.-Colombian drug politics, has led to fruitless debates about the 'true'

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16 Mares, 'The Logic of Inter-American Cooperation on Drugs'.
17 Arrieta, et al. Narcotráfico en Colombia, p. 19. This prologue was written by Arturo Infante, former Proctor of the Universidad de los Andes [author's translation].
drug policy interests and has distorted both policy formulation and academic endeavours.

The demand-supply debate turned in political and academic circles into a dispute as to whom to blame and also created a false idea about actual drug policy preferences. For instance, this formulation has spread the idea that Latin Americans are all anti-prohibitionists. And yet, this conventional assumption is called into question by, for example, Colombia's engagement in bilateral drug control efforts in the early 1970s, when Colombia agreed to collaborate in Nixon's war against drugs. A neo-realist would be inclined to argue that Colombia's behaviour was a case of coerced compliance or of domination whereby the United States used strong-arm tactics on its weaker neighbour. However, despite Nixon's hard talk and Public Laws 92-352 and 92-246 (early versions of certification), there was no threat of sanctions or invasion to Colombia in order to force it into adopting prohibition. Nor was there any substantial linked economic reward, either in terms of aid or of trade benefits. Colombia's acquiescence in preserving and implementing drug prohibition cannot be explained by narrow interest-based accounts or by the naked use of power. Instead, it is necessary to look at the prohibition precedents in Colombia's formal legal system and societal norms, and at the historical path of cooperation with the United States.

Another false idea induced by the simplistic demand-supply language is that Latin American countries dislike supply-side policies and would rather have soft demand-side polices. In fact, criticising United States' leadership and the arrogance with which it implements prohibition abroad is different from rejecting punitive law enforcement and different, too, from Latin Americans wanting the United States to withdraw drug control aid altogether. Colombia has usually welcomed U.S. law enforcement aid in the form of training and equipment for its anti-narcotics police and has constantly asked for increases in the budget allocated to their programmes—which, by definition, are supply-side policies. In 1989 and 1990, for instance, the Colombian President
Virgilio Barco actively campaigned to have international donors, including the United States, finance the 1990 Special Cooperation Programme. The programme attracted multiple donations worth $320 million for eradication, justice reform, law enforcement activities and other projects to mitigate the economic impact of illegal drugs and prohibition.\textsuperscript{18}

In addition, it has become increasingly clear that drug policy preferences are not static. They have been reshaped through time owing to several phenomena. One is the size and manifestations of drug trafficking. In the case of Colombia, the rise of drug-related violence in the 1980s led to a domestic consensus on viewing drugs as a matter of national security. In addition, the preferences assigned to either consumer or producer countries have become increasingly blurred by the vertical integration of the illegal drug industry so that all steps of the chain occur within single countries.\textsuperscript{19}

Besides, international institutions, such as the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), have altered drug policy preferences by endorsing certain lines of actions and introducing financial incentives. And the way in which the 'drug problem' is framed has played a major role in shifting the policy focus. Currently, for example, it is clear that U.S. interest lies not only in reducing consumption, but fighting organised crime, which - they believe - puts Latin American democracy in jeopardy via corruption and terrorism.

In sum, most analyses have failed to open the black-box of the state, which allows for a closer consideration of sub-state actors and their own matrix of interests and preferences regarding drug policies and their implementation. In the end we can see that not all drug policy preferences have been at odds and not all opposing interests have caused major conflicts. In addition, existing studies have failed to explain why

\textsuperscript{18} Centro de Estudios Internacionales, Universidad de los Andes, 'Evaluación del Programa Especial de Cooperación, PEC', Bogotá, 1995.

certain topics are problematised and politicised at any given time, since neither power asymmetry nor interests at loggerheads lead inevitably to conflict.

**The Ideational Basis of Drug Policy and the 'Securitisation' Argument**

The drug issue could be understood and treated as a public health or as a policing issue. Instead, it has been widely viewed as constituting mainly a security problem. President Richard Nixon officially inaugurated this trend in 1970 when he claimed that 'keeping dangerous drugs out of the United States [was] just as important as keeping armed enemy forces from landing in the United States'. Later on, in 1986, Ronald Reagan did the same by labelling drugs a national security threat and declaring a war against drugs. Many have criticised this 'securitisation' of the drug phenomenon, since it automatically raises the political stature of the topic and arouses national sensibility.

In addition, Donald J. Mabry notes that the 'war metaphor preconditioned people to think in terms of a military solution'. This is why Tokatlian has suggested that U.S. 'securitisation' has caused conflicts between the United States and Latin American states. By this he means the 'militarisation' of U.S. foreign drug policy, which to him necessarily involves interventionist U.S. military deployment in the continent, such as in Panama in December 1989 to abduct General Manuel Antonio Noriega on illicit trafficking charges.

It has also been suggested that this is exclusively an American way of perceiving drugs, that it has been capriciously imposed on Latin American countries, and that this

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imposition alone has triggered clashes between the United States and Latin America. A case in point is Bolivia, whose native population has long coexisted with coca leaf under the premises of its religious, cultural and medicinal values, and then turned to militarise interdiction. However, unlike Bolivia, Colombia does not have a strong native ancient attachment to coca leaf. Moreover, as Colombian drug-trafficking mafias gained considerable power, turned violent, and waged a war against the state, judges, police and journalists, many supported Colombia's own 'securitisation' of the drug problem that has gathered pace since 1986. Conceiving drug trafficking a security problem was a crucial factor behind Colombia's continuous adhesion to the war against drugs.

Furthermore, the 'militarisation' of drug operations did not represent a threat to Colombian authorities. The participation of U.S. and Colombian military in drug control operations remained limited in comparison to other countries and Colombia's own police and military forces often welcomed military counternarcotics aid when it occurred. Thus, 'securitisation' alone, the process associated in the literature with the use of military assets and military language in drug policy, does not capture substantive changes of U.S. drug policy in the mid 1990s. Nor does it explain the timing of the U.S.-Colombian crisis.

**The Material Basis of the Colombian Drug Problem**

If neither power asymmetry, nor interests at loggerheads, nor the 'militarisation' explain conflict on their own, then the material basis and changing character of the drug trade may account for conflict. The type of illegal activities involved in drug trafficking certainly represents very important challenges to law enforcement inside

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23 Tokatlian, *Drogas, dilemas y dogmas* and 'Seguridad y drogas: una cruzada militar prohibicionista' in Francisco Leal and Juan G. Tokatlian (comps.), *Orden mundial y seguridad. Nuevos desafíos para Colombia y América Latina* (Bogotá: TME, IEPRI and SID, 1994).
and across borders. And in more extreme cases, such as in Colombia, drug trafficking, bribery and violence can threaten state institutions and destabilise governments. Following this reasoning, conditions inside Colombia, even prior to 1990, had the potential to upset relations with the United States. From being a small marihuana producer in the 1960s, Colombia diversified to coca leaf in the 1980s and to poppy in 1992. While in 1979 Colombia exported between 24 and 31 tons of cocaine to the United States, in 1989, the volume increased to 64 tons, while cultivation was at 52,900 hectares. In 1996 cultivation was again on the rise and 300 tons were exported.25 Especially in the period after 1988, as shown in chapter 4, conditions in Colombia would have merited a U.S. reappraisal of Colombia's drug problem, as well as a revision of Colombians' capacity and willingness to deal with drug trafficking. In 1988-1992, drug traffickers' political leverage was at its peak. Drug mafias assassinated presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán, terrorised public opinion with a wave of bombings, and successfully infiltrated the National Constituent Assembly in order to oppose extradition --the legal procedure most feared by drug traffickers. Drug money had come to finance another type of violence, too. The size and military capability of guerrilla groups, in particular the FARC, as well as of various paramilitaries had dramatically increased thanks to their revenues from the illegal drug industry. This renewed strength had translated into a higher number of attacks against the state authorities and the civilian population.26 By the end of the Barco administration (1986-1990) and the beginning of Gaviria's presidency (1990-1994)

Colombia was 'al filo del caos' (on the brink of chaos), as in the title of the study by Camacho, Leal and Zamosc on Colombian politics.27

However, the deteriorated domestic situation in Colombia in 1988-1991, the scandals of narco-corruption in 1990-1994, and the steady increase of illegal crops did not jeopardise the U.S.-Colombian relationship. U.S. policy-makers had reasonably good information on Colombia's increasing participation in the drug industry, since the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) spent much of their time measuring the size of illegal drug production around the world. Washington officials could have concluded that Colombian efforts against drugs were too weak or had failed. Yet, evaluations during this period never referred to Colombia's poor performance. Instead, reports lauded Colombia's participation in the war against drugs. The numbers of seizures and eradicated areas were deemed to provide sufficient proof for U.S. policy-makers of Colombia's progress and commitment.

To conclude, two main puzzles in the U.S.-Colombian relationship remain, namely why did relations remain friendly for so long given Colombia's participation in the drug trade and the notion that drugs and drug trafficking constituted a security problem? And what changed in 1995 so as to alter the course of friendship?

2. Unpacking the Argument

This section spells out the main arguments of the thesis and expands on the reasoning behind these puzzles. It considers ideational elements that have been absent from previous accounts of drug politics and U.S.-Colombian relations, and recognises formerly neglected Colombian and U.S. endeavours, jointly and separately, to fight

27 Alvaro Camacho, Francisco Leal, and León Zamosc, Al filo del caos: crisis política en Colombia de los ochenta (Bogotá: IEPRI, TME, 1990). See also an insider's account by former security advisor to Barco Rafael Pardo Rueda, De primera mano. Colombia 1986-1994: entre conflictos y esperanzas (Bogotá: CERIC, Norma, 1996), pp. 45, 63-4, 87, 211. There is a
drug trafficking in Colombia. The ideational elements referred to here include the understandings of the drug problem, ideas on what constitutes mutually acceptable political and economic behaviour and their underlying norms, and the mutual perceptions or the images that relevant policy-makers have of each country.  

According to their own standards and understandings, Colombia and the United States engaged in cooperative activities to curb the illegal drug industry and created a significant anti-drug machinery in the period from 1970 to 1995. As illustrated in Chapters 3 to 8, drug control cooperation included Colombia's public endorsement of prohibition through the participation in international summits; political and financial backing to drug control initiatives; the development of laws; and joint planning and operational implementation with the United States. The United States cooperated with assistance in the form of training, equipment and money; and at times, like in the initiatives lunched by Bush in 1989 and 1990, with preferential trade agreements, the promotion of foreign investment and the facilitation of loans. Coordination, joint actions and U.S. provision of assistance required treaties, memoranda of understanding and informal agreements subscribed at the level of the state or sub-state institutions, which is why cooperation included an important diplomatic dimension. All this was consensus in Colombian academia that the end of the 1980s were one of the most critical periods in its history.

28 The role of ideas as determinant in political behaviour has been revived as part of the dialogue between neo-utilitarian approaches (neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism) and the wide range of trends grouped under the constructivist banner. For both weak and strong constructivists, ideas may complement mainstream rationalist and material-based accounts by adding an indispensable segment of the explanatory causal chain or even by replacing the logic of the utility-maximising state. Wendt, for example argues that ideas are a constitutive element of interests, Alexander Wendt, Social Theory in International Politics, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chapter 3. Here I refer to ideas in a general way; to norms as the collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity, as used in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996); and to images as a perceptual patterns that serve to organise or simplify incoming information as suggested in Martha L. Cottam, Images and Intervention. U.S. Policies in Latin American (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994). Other main works from which my analysis draws include Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Jutta E. Weldes, Constructing National Interests. The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
backed by shared prohibition ideas increasingly embedded in each others' political and administrative institutions.

Over time, the successful construction of institutions furthering bilateral efforts to control illegal drugs contributed to change critical dimensions of the U.S.-Colombian relationship and thus contained the 'germs' for conflict in four ways.

First, drugs became a permanent topic of the bilateral agenda. Relevant to this study is how illegal drugs have been understood and positioned in the bilateral agenda, and the extent to which they have influenced other topics of the relationship. In the early 1970s, for example, drugs earned a permanent place in the political bilateral agenda after President Richard Nixon requested Colombia's help in the war against drugs. However, fighting drugs was still low in the political priorities of both countries if compared to issues such as trade, regional integration, the return of the Panama Canal and anti-Communism. Over the 1980s, drugs gained salience. In part, this was a response to the steady growth of drug consumption in the United States and drug trafficking in Colombia. But the increasing emphasis in Colombia and the United States on viewing drugs as a security problem was equally relevant. Thus, in the 1980s the drug issue was as important as debt management, anti-Communism and bringing peace to Central America. In the 1990s the drug issue became the most prominent topic and the articulating rationale for all other issues. Colombians spoke of a 'narcotisation' of bilateral relations.

Second, the institutionalisation of prohibition in the United States and the institutionalisation of bilateral drug control cooperation led to a different configuration of sub-state actors engaged in the political management of the bilateral relationship. As explained in chapters 7 and 8, this created a specific political and bureaucratic opportunity structure that placed actors involved drug-policy agencies in positions where they could exercise greater leverage over the relationship. This is true for both countries. However, given the asymmetry of the relationship, the changes inside the
U.S. administrative apparatus had a larger impact on the relationship than the changes on the Colombian side. This included the creation and increasing power of INL in the Department of State, of the Select Committee on Narcotics Drugs in the House of Representatives and of the Office for Narcotics Control Policy in the White House, as well as the mainstreaming of anti-drugs across governmental agencies. In the United States, these actors were able to lead the policy-making process towards Colombia.

Third, driven by the prohibition agenda of both countries, the U.S. got more enmeshed into Colombian domestic affairs. From 1920 to 1995 the norm of prudent and limited engagement, further reinforced by the practice of never airing disagreements in the media, was hardly ever broken. However, the nature of drug control practices pushed U.S. actors into Colombian domestic politics via law enforcement, judicial reform and eradication and interdiction activities. Not only was this a fundamental departure from what the historical pattern in the relationship had been, but it also increased the potential for friction.

These three elements constituted essential shifts. Notwithstanding, relations remained harmonious. The United States had deemed Colombia cooperative in the past and continued to perceive that Colombia was a committed partner in war against drugs. Partly, U.S. policy-makers' perception was related to their notions of Colombia being, in relative regional terms, a functioning democracy that followed the main premises of Western political and economic ideas. That U.S. policy-makers held this image over seven decades is important, since images help individuals to process incoming information regarding their political environment and can, therefore, become an important basis for evaluating, understanding and categorising behaviour.\(^\text{29}\)

The exact content of U.S. drug policy, its meaning in international politics and perceptions on Colombia underwent a mutation in 1994. The direction of this shift was influenced by the new ideas about democracy and security that were, in turn, embedded in the broader emerging post Cold War normative context with its emphasis on the Western values of liberalisation and democracy.

The legitimate governance standards expected from states changed and this affected both U.S. foreign policy and foreign drug policy. The avalanche of democracy rhetoric permeated discourse, identity, interests, institutions, and policy goals; indeed, U.S. security came to be defined in terms of democracy.\(^{30}\) Informed by this democracy-security framework, American officials thus identified new sources of threats to democracy, such as terrorism and transnational crime and, very critically, came to view drugs in this light. New understandings served as a conceptual framework for policymakers to alter anti-narcotic policies, goals and strategies, to alter the way they interpreted events, and to alter expectations on others' behaviour.

Given the degree to which Colombia and the United States were closely tied together by their commitments and cooperation in the war against drugs, these changes immediately affected the terms of the relationship. The United States acted as a filter through which certain systemic processes reached Colombia, and the bilateral relationship became a window through which Colombia connected to broader systemic processes given United States' double role as world power and regional hegemon. Therefore, the fourth way in which the institutionalisation of bilateral drug control operated to allow change in the relationship, in this case the move from friendship to

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conflict, was by acting as a conduit for new norms, since as one author contends, 'ideas do not float freely'.

Within the new democratic normative context and according to the U.S. law on drug policy, corruption offences were conceived to be serious, not only because they constituted a crime, but because they disrupted democracy. Hence, the drug money that entered President Samper's presidential campaign in June 1994 constituted a grave fault, a defection of the war against drugs and a threat to democracy. Consequently, the United States decided to downgrade Colombia from its status of cooperative ally by granting it a national conditional waiver in 1995. The succession of démarches given to Colombia from 1995 onwards reflected these new expectations. For instance, they insisted on judicial reform, anti-corruption legislation and holding public officials accountable on drug-corruption charges. Drug policies had come to transcend narrow narcotics-related matters to touch upon more profound aspects of democratic institution-building.

It is the combination of these factors that explains the outbreak of the diplomatic crisis. The diplomatic conflict between Colombia and the United States lasted three years, from March 1995 to March 1998. However, the following factors, as illustrated in chapter 9, also helped to hamper any rapid solution to the diplomatic conflict. First, there were the particular ideas and interests of individual U.S. policy-makers. After the Samper drug-related scandal of June 1994, and given the new standards for political legitimacy, Colombia came to resemble the stereotypical Latin American client state: the corrupt, unruly country, a pariah taken over by the Cali drug mafia and narco-guerrillas. Thus, after 1995, U.S. policy-makers were able to discount Colombia's achievements arguing that meaningful anti-drug cooperation could not occur in such

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countries. Cooperation was interpreted through the filter of another image and another normative context. Moreover, according to the new terms of the relationship, U.S. interference was justified. To say that Colombia's image changed is not to deny its acute domestic crisis, and the degree to which drug traffickers had penetrated political circles. The issue is not Colombia per se, but United States' acknowledgement of Colombia's situation and its treatment as a threat.

Second, there was the domestic political crisis in Colombia and the consequent weakening of the Colombian state, as well as Samper's rallying of anti-Americanism as a way of rebutting U.S. opposition and maintaining legitimacy. This ideational setting and the intertwining of the diplomatic conflict and the Colombian political crisis contributed significantly to determining the length and intensity of the clashes between Colombia and the United States.

3. Sources

This thesis is based on an extensive review and analysis of Colombian and U.S. primary and secondary resources. In Colombia, the in-house files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were consulted for the 1990s as well as the yearly Ministerial memoirs submitted to the Colombian Congress. The small library of the Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes contained several key documents and publications, among them bulletins by the Colombian National Police. Gaps on interdiction activities were filled with the database of the Colombian Anti-Narcotics Police.

There are numerous articles and book chapters on U.S.-Colombian relations and the drugs issue for the period between 1978 and 1990. This study builds on this secondary literature, especially on the works by Juan G. Tokatlian, but adds new information and provides different interpretations to the interaction between Colombia and the United States. The controversial Samper scandal was amply recorded in the media, in Colombian journalistic books and in memoirs of Colombian officials, with the only
setback that the international dimensions constituted only secondary subjects of inquiry.

Selected U.S. archival material (Record Group 59) available at the U.S. National Archives in Maryland as well as the volumes on the *Foreign Relations of the United States* were consulted for the historical chapter. The main U.S. documents consulted for the years 1970 onwards include hearings and committee reports of the U.S. Congress, which not only contain information on the actual drug control programmes but transcribe the views of mid-level U.S. policy-makers key to U.S. policy towards Colombia; the International Narcotics Strategy Reports by the U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; the yearly volumes on U.S. Legislation on Foreign Relations; and the detailed reports of the General Accounting Office, the body in charge of investigating and overseeing the U.S. Executive branch. The Department of State Bulletin, and the Public Papers of the President contained speeches, media briefings and records of visits of the U.S. presidents as well as mid-level officials. Other sources were the reports produced by the Congressional Research Service of the U.S. Library of Congress.

Open-ended interviews to Colombian and U.S. government officials were conducted in Bogotá and Washington from 1998 to 2002. Interviews were important to corroborate data and events, and above all, to learn about the ways in which policy-makers interpreted U.S.-Colombian relations. Secondary and primary resources were complemented by Colombian and U.S. press.

More broadly, this theoretically guided account of the history of U.S.-Colombian relations brings together three types of specialised literature. First, this thesis draws on the debate in IR on the role of ideas and norms in international politics. Second, it

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32 The volumes U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office) [hereinafter *FRUS*] covering the 1960s excluded primary documents on Colombia. Therefore, I went back to the U.S. National Archives and reviewed Record Group 59, State Department, Central Files, Political Affairs and Relations with Colombia, for the period 1963 to 1972.
looks at the studies on U.S.-Latin American relations, and on U.S. relations with Bolivia, Mexico and Peru, which also deal with the politics of the 'drug problem'. Although this thesis does not engage in formal comparisons, this literature has provided both theoretical and historical backgrounds in order to identify the particular characteristics of Colombia's relation to the United States. Third, this thesis looks at studies in the political economy of drugs, and international drug politics in general.
Chapter 2

FOUNDATIONS OF THE U.S.-COLOMBIAN RELATIONSHIP, 1800s-1970

Any attempt to trace change and continuity must take stock of history. No study on U.S.-Colombian drug politics makes reference to the legacies of the past, as if drug politics had emerged in a vacuum.\(^1\) It should not be forgotten, however, that more than one hundred-fifty years of contact, dialogue, disagreement and above all cooperation had been underway before the first bilateral counternarcotic agreement was signed. In part, the precedent of friendship influenced Colombia's choice to join the war against drugs. Previous practices also explain the forms of drug control cooperation in its beginnings. Eventually, with time, drug cooperation re-affirmed but also modified some of the main norms and practices of the bilateral relationship.

This historical chapter focuses on three crucial themes of the U.S.-Colombian relationship since the nineteenth century up to 1970: the progressive construction of a stable and solid friendship; the establishment of practices that were mutually regarded as cooperative actions; and the emergence of both tacit and explicit norms on mutually expected behaviour. The first section deals with the period of independence and the traumatising secession of Panama in 1903. The second section examines Colombia's relations with the United States during the two world wars and the period of U.S. 

\(^1\) Only two books provide a full history of U.S.-Colombian relations from the eighteenth century until the 1980s and 1990s; these are Stephen Randall, *Colombia and the United States: Hegemony and Interdependence* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992) and Robert W. Drexler, *Colombia and the United States. Narcotics Traffic and a Failed Foreign Policy* (North Carolina: McFarland & Company Inc., 1998). Given their reliance on declassified material, accounts of the 1960s onwards tend to be weak. Randall stops his narrative just when drugs begin to dominate the agenda, and Drexler, who does tackle questions on drugs, fails to
gunboat diplomacy in Latin America. Sections three and four cover the political and economic aspects of the relation during the Cold War. The concluding paragraphs reflect on the nature and main features of U.S.-Colombian relations that emerged throughout the twentieth century before drugs became part of the agenda.

1. An Ambiguous Start and the Meaning of Panama's Secession

The battles of independence in the nineteenth century brought a common interest to Nueva Granada (Colombia's predecessor) and the United States, namely, to keep Europe's monarchs at arms length. Colombians, therefore, initially welcomed the U.S. Monroe Doctrine, first proclaimed in 1823. Simon Bolivar expected a Pan-American alliance, and more concretely, Colombians thought it would finally deliver the much longed-for U.S. military support, to be used this time against the Spanish Reconquista. But Colombians were mistaken. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, Americans just wanted to obtain assurances regarding trade, protect slavery and, above all, avoid unnecessary international ties and entanglements. Thus, an alliance and military assistance were not forthcoming.

The United States' views on the advantages of some sort of hemispheric association changed as the century drew to a close, and in 1889-1890 it was U.S. Secretary of State James G. Blaine who took the lead in calling the First Conference of American States in Washington. The United States' economy had rapidly expanded, gaining an advantage vis à vis Latin America's nascent nations, and it was now competing at the same level as the European powers. By 1830 the United States had already become the sixth industrial power of the developed world, and by 1860 its share of world manufacturing output was larger than that of Germany and Russia, almost equal to that

draw any analytical connection between history and drug politics. In general, twentieth-century history of U.S.-Colombian relations remains a fertile ground for research.

of France but less than that of Great Britain. By 1880 the United States had surpassed that of France, and by 1890, that of Great Britain, producing 23.6% of the world's manufacture while Great Britain produced only 18.5%. In contrast, from 1850 to 1870, Colombia's economy had become the least developed of the major Latin American countries.

Despite its material capability, the United States set limits to its territorial expansion. Racial and cultural prejudices against non-Anglo-Saxon neighbours, isolationism, and the competition of European states contributed to quell expansionist ambitions at the time when the incorporation of Caribbean islands was open for discussion in the 1870s and 1880s. But the United States' apparent restraint was hardly a barrier to the growth of its political, economic and ideological influence. Diplomatic chargés were assigned throughout the region with the mission to hunt for new trade and investment opportunities. Also, the United States made it its affair to monitor how smaller neighbours dealt with their colonial transitions, as weakened states mired in civil war would surely be an easy pray for Europeans. Private debts, terms of trade, independence revolutions, and the fates of Cuba, Haiti and Puerto Rico constituted some of the main concerns in U.S.-Colombian relations of the time.

By the mid 1800s, the United States was already competing with British economic superiority in Colombia through communication and transportation enterprises such as the Steam Navigation Company of New York, the Panama Railroad Company and the Central and South American Telegraph Company, among others. In particular, the possibility of developing a shorter and faster route to the Pacific across the province of Panama intrigued Americans, as well as the French and the British. Colombians

5 Schoultz, *Beneath the United States*, chapters 4 and 5, especially p. 78.
understood Panama's value and were eager for foreign investment there, but they only partially controlled the area, were suspicious of larger countries' intentions, and were uncertain about the appropriate criteria for granting investment concessions. The result was a clumsy and dangerous game of playing Americans and Europeans off against each other, which eventually led to the traumatic secession of Panama from Colombia in 1903.  

When Colombia failed to bind Britain and France in a multilateral agreement that would ensure Colombia's sovereignty over the unruly province in return for a concession to develop and utilise a canal in the zone, Colombia's leader, Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera, turned to the United States. The 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino treaty, interpreted by Colombians as a diplomatic victory, removed commercial duties and granted the United States the right to open and free transit by any existing or future mode of communication. Most importantly it committed the United States to 'guarantee... the rights of sovereignty and property which Nueva Granada' (Colombia) possessed over the territory. For Americans, this meant restricting European presence, but not its own. Far from the Colombian political and administrative centre, host to a dissatisfied population and herds of troublemaking travellers, the province of Panama had become a locus of instability. U.S. troops entered Panama in 1852, 1856, 1865, 1869, 1873 and 1885 only for transit or to maintain order, sometimes called by the Colombian authorities and sometimes on their own initiative. The United States' upper hand enabled it to ignore the formal clauses of the Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty that required consultation with the Colombian central government whenever U.S. troops entered the territory. In this way, U.S. 'protection' soon elicited discomfort in Bogotá. It was a true dilemma for Colombians. The Colombian central government had done

7 The secession of Panama is the single most widely studied episode in U.S.-Colombian relations. For substantive primary and secondary sources see E. Taylor Parks, *Colombia and the United States, 1765-1934* (Durham, NC: The Seeman Printery, 1935).
little on its own to ensure stability, relying instead on the United States. On the other hand, it feared the growing power of the United States and was unable to force the United States to either interpret or alter the treaty in such a way that Americans would feel compelled to consult with Bogotá. The situation worsened after the Herrán-Hay Treaty of January 1903. This treaty transferred the French concession to the United States for 100 years. The United States was to pay $10 million in cash and a $250,000 monthly rent for the ten kilometre-wide strip, where it could land troops to ensure security of both land and operations while at the same time guaranteeing Colombian sovereignty.\(^9\) Subsequently, however, the United States attributed to itself the right to restrain Colombian passage and use of the land. In November 1903 the U.S. Navy prevented Colombian troops from entering Panama to suppress the insurrection that followed the Colombian Thousand Days civil war of 1899-1902. The United States helped rebels to form the new state of Panama and assured for itself the century-long American control over the Canal zone. Theodore Roosevelt justified 'taking Panama' on the grounds that the United States had a 'mandate from civilization' to build the canal for 'the benefit of the entire world'.\(^10\)

The United States' presence in Panama in the nineteenth century, the dealings of the Panama Canal, and especially the United States' part in aiding the separation of Panama in 1903 had a tremendous impact in defining the terms of the bilateral relation. Colombia would lose territory to Brazil in 1904-1905, to Peru in 1932, and to Ecuador in 1942, yet Panama remained the most traumatic loss. Nearly fifty years after the secession a U.S. official document reported that there was 'still some resentment over the part the United States played in [Panama]'\.\(^11\) Ninety years later, the drug decertification was portrayed as an act of intervention equal to the U.S. military

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8 Ibid, pp. 201-9. Later on, historians would helplessly speculate on Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera's motivations behind an agreement of the sort in the face of U.S. expansionist trend and the Mexican experience.
10 Drexler, *Colombia and the United States*, p. 47.
presence in Panama in 1903. The U.S. 'taking' of Panama led to a number of consequences.

First, it contributed to the development of the concept and practice of 'limited sovereignty'. The United States came to perceive it had the right and duty to cross Colombia's physical and political boundaries. For Colombians it set a precedent of relying on a foreign actor to help them exercise authority inside their territory, but at the same time developed an obsession about guarding their sovereignty and autonomy when it came to the United States. Along with Colombia's traditional legalistic attitudes, these events also drove the country to develop a strong attachment to international legal norms, intended as tools to restrain greater powers, but they also evolved into a feature reinforcing the country's self-perception and image as Western law-abiding state. 12

Second, the 'taking' of Panama was a clear expression of the magnitude of U.S. power, and it sealed a sense of inevitable hierarchy. This sense was based on United States' material capability, but also on the way in which the U.S. viewed Colombia and its role vis-à-vis Colombia, as well as Colombia's perceptions and expectations of the United States. Colombians held dual perceptions of the United States; on the one hand an opportunistic and arrogant giant whose preaching contradicted its actions; on the other, an example to be emulated and a provider of assistance. In 1848, for instance, Manuel Ancízar, who had been expelled from the United States for plotting to free Cuba from Spanish domain, insisted on forging a 'special friendship' with the United States so as not lose the 'invaluable treasures of experience and perfectly democratic civilisation' offered by it. 13 And in 1883 president Rafael Núñez referred to the 'astonishing example of prosperity' whose economic protectionist rules were worth

11 FRUS, 1950, 2, p. 818.
12 This feature can be traced to the first official guide to Colombian foreign policy, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Actuar en el mundo: la política exterior colombiana frente al siglo XXI, (Bogotá: Publicaciones Cultural, 1993).
13 Díaz, Colombia-Estados Unidos, p. 332.
reproducing in Colombia. But views were not as positive after Panama. In 1914, the liberal politician Eduardo Santos, who later became an unconditional ally of the United States in the Second World War wrote:

The Yankee danger has been the nightmare of many Latin Americans in the past years, the tragic spectrum that has disrupted their dreams of future glory and which constitutes for their leaders the greatest problems ... the danger existed and it still exists [despite the Urrutia-Thompson Treaty]. The imperialism that is so fierce for the weak nations of Latin America is not the one we see explicit in official acts and arrogant parades of armoured battleships, but the one produced by its gigantic commercial and industrial development.

Views on U.S. grandeur were also reinforced by American self-perceptions. Already in 1895, Secretary of State Richard Olney, claimed:

today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and this fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? ... Its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all powers.

In the meantime, North Americans formed disparaging ideas about Colombians, and Latin Americans in general, at this early stage. Latin America was paternalistically portrayed as the disobedient child and as the tropical inhumane territory inhabited by a mixed inferior society, expressed in the worst racist terms. In 1904 Theodore Roosevelt said about Colombians:

To the worst characteristics of the seventeenth Century Spain, and of Spain at its worst under Phillip II, Colombia has added a squalid savagery of its own, and has combined with exquisite nicety the worst forms of despotism and of anarchy, of violence and fatuous weakness, of dismal ignorance, cruelty, treachery, greed and utter vanity. I cannot feel much respect for such a country.

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14 Quoted in Ibid, p. 279.
16 FRUS, 1895, 1, pp. 542-76.
17 U.S. policy-makers' ideas since the nineteenth century of Latin American inferiority is the main theme in Schoultz, Beneath the United States.
18 Quoted in Schoultz, Beneath the United States, p. 164.
Americans thought that their Latin neighbours were incapable of self-governance and self-defence, that they had a special appetite for violent actions and revolutions, and that they were corrupt, backward, and inferior. Negative perceptions were stored in a pool of ideas always available in those cases when things went wrong. But grim perceptions about Colombia, either on its own but mostly by regional default, were soon displaced --not replaced-- by positive ones in the twentieth century.

2. A New Beginning and the World War Alliances

With the end of the Spanish-American War of 1895 the United States began to strengthen its influence over the region. It approached Latin American countries in its distinctive fashion, taking upon itself the guidance of smaller states towards the path of democracy and good governance. In Woodrow Wilson's words, the United States was to 'teach the South American Republics to elect good men!' Noble goals, however, did not extinguish military interventionism when politically feasible and morally justifiable. In fact, such incursions became the rule in the Greater Caribbean. Gunboat diplomacy ruled U.S.-Latin American relations up to 1934, and from 1903 to 1930 the United States intervened in Nicaragua, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Mexico more than thirty times. U.S.-Colombian relations, however, followed an entirely different and less antagonistic pattern. As illustrated below, the United States exercised a prudent engagement and limited interference in Colombian affairs. Most importantly, U.S. policy makers did not use military threats to alter Colombia’s strategic choices.

The First World War helped to transform relations by pushing towards a settlement over Panama that included a reparations treaty to compensate Colombia. In war time, Wilson was able to convince Congress that ratifying the reparations treaty, and hence

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maintaining good relations with Colombia, was important. '[W]e need now and it is possible shall need very much more in the immediate future all the friends we can attach to us in Central America, where so many of our most critical interests centre.'

Wilson cautioned that not signing a treaty with Colombia would heighten pro-German sentiments in the country. Other factors were mentioned, such as Colombia's closeness to the treasured canal, its deep-water ports, the production of platinum for vessels, and its potential to provide other essential raw materials.

The last Congress under Wilson in 1921 finally ratified the 1914 Urrutia-Thompson treaty, and Colombia welcomed the $800 million of foreign currency which was pumped into the economy during the 1920s—the 'Dance of the Millions'.

Whether Colombia merited such attention during the First World War is debatable. In military terms, Colombia could do little to defend Panama in case of a German attack. The United States would have had to defend the Canal on its own. However, another U.S. strategic interest was to prevent Germany from using Latin American soil to launch an attack on the United States. In this sense, Colombia represented little danger when compared to other Latin American neighbours. Kaiser Wilhelm II devoted most of his attention to Mexico, the potential 'Belgium of the Pacific', where almost half of the $27 million spent in German espionage in the Western Hemisphere was allocated. And unlike Mexico with its claims to its former northern territories, now incorporated in the United States, Colombia was not in the game of seeking Europe's favour to regain Panama. In general, pro-German sentiments in Colombia paled in comparison to those in Argentina, Chile and even Venezuela. In fact, Colombians did not question the need to repel Germany, since it identified with the 'noble' motives of the allies during the war, believing the conflict being fought in

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20 Randall, *Colombia and the United States*, p. 100.
21 Colombia was the second world producer in platinum. Ibid, pp. 101, 104.
Europe was one between 'autocracy and democracies, between liberty and the spirit of conquest'.

Colombia on its own was not determinant, but the United States believed that loyalty and cooperation from the Latin American region as a whole, was pivotal. Thus they insisted on a hemispheric alliance; Colombia and sixteen other Latin American nations broke off relations with Germany. In Colombia, Americans insistently preached against the German menace. The Telefunken wireless stations in Cartagena and in San Andrés were closed down and local authorities followed U.S. and British black lists that urged expelling, incarcerating or isolating German nationals.

Colombia's alignment with Washington, despite lingering distrust and rancour due to Panama, was closely related to changes in its self-perception. Throughout the 1910s and the 1920s, Colombia experienced changes in social thought, as well as economic and political development. As Celis describes it, 'Colombia wanted to be like the developed countries, wanted to get inserted in civilisation once and for all'. It was eager to become part of a 'higher civilisation'. This mindset, *cosmopolitalismo*, drew Colombia closer to the United States, and resentments over Panama were set aside to allow the emergence of new thinking: Marco Fidel's *respice polum*, which referred to the positive emulation of the U.S. prosperity and the perception of the hegemon as a legitimate world authority. These were the roots of what in the future Colombian policy-makers would refer to as 'pragmatism', as opposed to ideologically-charged approaches. Pragmatism gave them a credible justification to become closer to the United States without shame or guilt of betraying Latin American solidarity, and without being seen as subservient to U.S. interests.

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22 Ibid, p. 102.
23 This turn in attitude towards the United States is comparable to Argentine's shift in the 1990s under Carlos Saúl Menem, the Argentine case was analysed by Carlos Escudé, Argentina and the Politics of Identity, paper presented at the University of Oxford, 1998.
Good relations between the U.S. and Colombia continued into the inter-war years, when U.S. Dollar Diplomacy and the rise of isolationism crystallised into Herbert Hoover's and Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbour Diplomacy. At the time, Latin America was influenced by socialist and fascist ideas, as the countries of the continent sought their own national identities. The result was the continuation of clashes in U.S.-Latin American relations. The expansion of U.S. capital collided with Latin Americans' quest to consolidate a national economic basis which entailed the nationalisation of oil, minerals, transportation and raw material enterprises, as well as independent management of their economic affairs at large.

In 1924, 44% of U.S. foreign investment was in Latin America. In 1928, there were 199 oil companies in Latin America alone, with the largest investments in Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. In Colombia, investments in oil reached $30 million in the early 1920s and by the end of the decade the figure rose to $124 million, including major investments by Tropical Oil and Gulf Oil. Americans also invested in other sectors: the United Fruit Company, through the Magdalena Fruit Company, had become the largest single agricultural employer in Colombia. By 1931 economic relations had grown enough to merit the first Colombian-American Chamber of commerce. There was no consensus in Colombia's policy circles on the desired economic and financial role of the United States. Indecision and opposition, however, did not translate into a defined policy nor did it stop U.S. investment and trade, since it was perceived that it injected dynamism to Colombian economy. Colombia's coffee and banana exports to the United States, for instance, represented more than 80% of all exports.

Enhanced economic exchange potentially posed a political risk, namely greater American involvement in Colombian domestic affairs. In the Caribbean, U.S.

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protection of American citizen's investments had led to the frequent landing of the Marines. Yet, differences between Colombian and the United States never reached such an extreme. As was the case with most Latin American countries, Colombia nationalised its subsoil resources and passed legislation to control foreign investments. However such controls did not appear to represent a great danger for American companies operating in Colombia. Such acts were relatively moderate compared to the regional trend led by Mexico, which the U.S. believed had fallen prey of 'socialist' tendencies after the revolution.\textsuperscript{25} Inevitably, some disputes emerged, for example when Colombia revoked the Barco oil concession in 1926. Instead of Marines, however, Americans sent their legal experts to find a solution. In 1929, H. Foster Bain, former director of the U.S. Department of Mines and J.W. Steel of the U.S. Geological Survey participated in the drafting of Colombia's new oil legislation. The Barco concession question was finally settled in 1930, when a private law firm helped President Enrique Olaya's team draft another oil law that satisfied all parties.\textsuperscript{26} The way in which differences regarding oil investments were managed became a common \textit{modus operandi}, often replicated in other issue-areas. Technical advice on legislation became a subtle way of shaping outcomes, justified on the grounds of mutual benefits brought by 'objective' expertise. This did not compare to intrusive actions elsewhere, such as the Platt Amendment in Cuba.

Problems with the United Fruit Company had a greater impact. The company, which operated in several locations of the Caribbean, became a symbol of U.S. hegemony because of its monopoly over banana exports, its economic weight compared to the host's gross domestic product, and its controversial relations with labour. In early December 1928, more than 10,000 Colombian workers went on strike.

\textsuperscript{25} Schoultz, \textit{Beneath the United States}, pp. 115-6.

\textsuperscript{26} Bushnell claims that Olaya's Liberal administration brought the relationship to a state of cooperation and trust never experienced before his administration, David Bushnell, \textit{Eduardo Santos y la politica del Buen Vencino} (Bogotá: El Áncora Editores, 1984), p. 13. For Matters on oil legislation during Olaya and López Pumarejo see pp. 14-5.
Colombian leaders and U.S. officials agreed to blame the strikes on a Communist plot seeking to infiltrate unions and encourage social turmoil. Following the standard procedure in the region, the U.S. vice-consul in Barranquilla requested naval assistance to put down the strike, but the Department of State in Washington refused considering it an over-reaction. Instead, the Colombian central government sent national forces to crush demonstrations in what became the shameful *masacre de las bananeras*.

The potential for clashes on trade and investment issues seemed to increase in the 1930s with the administration of Alfonso López Pumarejo in Colombia. López was among those who argued that Colombia had made a mistake in granting large concessions to foreign interests; predictably, the United States looked at him with great caution. But even López did not alter economic policy in any decisive way and never matched the extreme measures of Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico. During the Tropical Oil strikes of 1935-1938, for example, López agreed with the United States on the need to minimise communist influence on labour unions. It was the strikers who articulated strong anti-American and anti-imperialist sentiments.

Colombia was ambivalent about the role of U.S. capital, and the idea that the United States took economic advantage of Colombian resources was gaining popularity by the 1930s, echoing the complaints in the rest of Latin America. This added to the mounting discontent over U.S. military and political interventionism throughout the 1910s and 1920s. But under the new post-war international system, Latin America could appeal to international legal and moral norms to condemn, and eventually prevent, U.S. interventionism. The inter-American conferences became the arena to promote the principle of non-intervention in the region after heated debates between the United States and the rest of the region. Here, Colombia under the leadership of

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27 U.S. economic penetration in Latin America also helped to carve a limited idea and practice of sovereignty. Economic policies were influenced either by U.S. private enterprises or government.

Alberto Lleras Camargo played an important role. Yet, Colombia's balancing diplomacy in inter-American conferences hardly resembled, say, Argentine acid criticism, which mattered not only in itself, but due to Argentina's size and influence in Southern cone geopolitics.29

In regional perspective, Colombia received much less attention from the United States than its neighbours to the north and south. Unlike the larger countries, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, Colombia did not aspire to the position of a regional power. Friction was therefore reduced. Also, Americans had not developed a protectorate-like relationship with Colombia as in Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic or Cuba. Subtle penetration took place through economic contact and U.S. technical advice, which could often have great impact. In the 1930s, for example, when Colombia went through severe financial difficulties, Princeton economist Edwin Kemmerer and his team travelled to Colombia to provide financial recommendations; the end result of which was the creation of the country's financial institutions, among them the Banco de la República. This enabled a special friendship to flourish, which gained Colombia certain preferences but certainly did not fulfil all its expectations, especially in financial terms.

As the 1930s drew to a close, U.S.-Latin American quarrels seemed to wane while the situation in Europe worsened. Once again, Washington became wary of Germany's desire to extend its domain into the Americas, and a similar procedure to that of the First World War followed except this time the United States and Latin American countries were drawn even closer together. As Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Miller put it, 'the war time period was characterised by intense wooing of Latin

A formal military alliance was sealed, the outcome of which was U.S. hegemonic consolidation in the continent.

Roosevelt feared Hitler's intentions and ability to overthrow Latin American governments. The appeal of Fascism in places like Argentina, and rumours that German submarines would operate from a Brazilian island or off the Caribbean coast, increased concerns. There were also some reports claiming that Nazism was winning followers in Colombia and that a secret German submarine was at striking distance from the Panama Canal. But once more, Colombia was willing to cooperate. Eduardo Santos, the Liberal president elected in 1938, was a declared anti-fascist and accepted the duty of guarding the canal. When the war broke out, he claimed that 'the security of the Panama Canal is indispensable to the welfare of Colombia and all South America... no one will be permitted to menace the security of the Canal from the Colombian soil'. Colombia broke off relations with Japan and the Axis but only in December 1941 after the Pearl Harbour attack. The delay stemmed from partisan disputes. Santos's Conservative opponent, Laureano Gómez, sympathised with fascist ideas but feared getting Colombia entangled in a foreign war. He then voiced his claims framed in a strong anti-American discourse, which resonated with public opinion. It was one of the few occasions in which Colombia's policy towards the United States became the subject of a bitter and public partisan quarrel.

However, once Colombia's schooner Ruby was sunk in November 1943, the Colombian Senate was ready to declare war against Germany and Japan 'in defence of the country's dignity and of the democratic system'. The war declaration prevailed with 33 votes against 13. Colombia's declaration was received by Secretary of State Cordell Hull with 'admiration and gratification'; he described it as a declaration 'which

30 FRUS, 1950, 2, p. 624.
33 Bushnell, Eduardo Santos, especially pp. 50, 128-31.
exemplifies the historic determination of the Colombian people to maintain the principals of freedom and justice.35 The wartime spirit justified closer cooperation, envisaging the expansion of Colombia's and United States' special rights and responsibilities.

The United States encouraged Colombia to repel both German ideological influence and its participation in strategic enterprises, like transportation and communications. Black lists, drafted by American and British intelligence, were again in vogue. Also, on the grounds of war emergency, the United States expected either its share or total control of certain enterprises with often uncertain trade-offs for the smaller partners. It is difficult to establish whether real concerns for Germany's expansion were behind such militancy and paranoia or whether other regional foreign policy motives, such as the maintenance of dominion in the Caribbean, or even commercial interests, determined U.S. policy. Nevertheless, Colombia, unlike the Southern Cone countries, went along with U.S. requests believing in the cause of democracy. A difficult test was the remarkable case of the Colombian national airline SCADTA, which had been originally formed with German capital and pilots and which Americans ended up controlling by buying 60% of its shares.36

Military cooperation emerged from the Second World War alliance. After the 1938 Lima conference failed to produce binding provisions for a regional military alliance, Roosevelt took on smaller projects such as providing technical advice in the purchase of arms from the United States.37 U.S. vessels and aircraft, on occasion, stopped for symbolic visits in Colombia during their journeys as part of the new military diplomacy. In 1938, a U.S. Air Force bomber flew into Bogotá for Eduardo Santos's inauguration as president, and in 1939, Navy Cruisers visited Cartagena. Finally, after

34 FRUS, 1943, p. 11. (Bushnell speaks of a vessel named Resolute sunk in June 1942).
36 Bushnell, Eduardo Santos, pp. 29-36.
37 Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 176.
Pearl Harbour, at the summits of Havana and Rio de Janeiro, the region agreed to forge a hemispheric alliance and the United States formally committed itself to defend the territorial integrity of Colombia and the other countries of Latin America from European attack. In return, Colombia granted overflight rights to U.S. aircraft in 1941. In 1942, the United States replaced the old British Naval mission in Bogotá with an American one and signed a Lend-Lease Agreement with the Santos administration. There was no automatic or quantitatively significant transfer of weapons, yet the U.S. and Colombian militaries began developing a certain camaraderie. After the schooner was sunk, Santos secretly granted permission to the U.S. military to use Colombian territory for its forces, and in 1945 the Alberto Lleras administration offered Americans bases in Cartagena and Bahia Málaga. However, U.S. Ambassador Wiley turned down the offer, stating that Colombian bases would be of no strategic value.

As the Second World War ended, the United States set out to construct world and regional institutions that bound states, in multilateral arrangements, to specific rules and legal norms of international politics. Colombia collaborated closely with the United States for several reasons. Colombia had long adhered to certain underpinning principles, namely self-determination and state sovereignty. It had decided to participate in international institutions as a regular foreign policy practice because such participation signalled its belonging to the international community. Also, the same motives that drove the United States to seek and value Colombia's cooperation in forming the United Nations and the Organization of American States, prompted Colombia to set forth formal norms to shape their interaction. Colombia expected the

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38 Bushnell, *Eduardo Santos*, p. 70.
39 Later on, camaraderie would be seen as counterproductive in the 1999 evaluations of U.S. defence policy towards Colombia because it sent signals of leniency and tolerance with human rights violations, interview with Phillip McLean, September 1999.
40 *FRUS*, 1945, p. 859-60.
United States to apply in the Western Hemisphere the self-determination and respect for state sovereignty that it argued for in European fora.

The United States praised Colombia's role in the negotiations at San Francisco, Dumbarton Oaks and Rio; it valued Colombia's 'constructive proposals' during its membership in the UN Security Council and through its diplomatic facilitation on the Berlin and Palestine questions. The United States observed, with an attitude of respect, Colombia's 'excellent record of participation' in the new multilateral diplomacy.\(^{41}\) Colombians too, were proud of their participation in the formation of the international system through Presidents Alfonso López Pumarejo and Alberto Lleras Camargo. Moreover, the UN system opened the doors for Colombia to acquire new political value in international politics through General Assembly votes and the non-permanent seats of Security Council, to which it would eventually have access.\(^{42}\) The United States took attentive notice and developed a system to trace the vote coincidence of other countries, ranking as cooperative those who voted with the United States. Here, Colombia set another precedent of friendship and alliance.

Moreover, perceived alliance also stemmed from developing ideas about Colombia's political and social structure. Already by the 1930s and 1940s, there was the notion that Colombia was uniquely stable and democratic for regional standards. David Bushnell argues that in the pre-Violencia years Colombia 'was widely and inaccurately admired as one of Latin America's model democracies, there were Colombians who liked to think of their nation as a moral power'.\(^{43}\)

Almost half a century after Panama, Colombia had become a predictable and reliable partner through its reiterated actions of cooperation, its abidance to

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\(^{41}\) *FRUS*, 1950, 2, p. 828.

\(^{42}\) From 1945 until the mid-1960s, when the number of members of the United Nations was still small, Latin America was the most important voting bloc with 21 countries out of 78 total members in 1959 and 112 total members in 1965.

international law and adherence to Western principles. On the other hand, the United States had established itself as a political model, a military provider, the largest economic partner and a source of technical expertise. From the United States, Colombia came to expect political recognition and financial support to pay for the operational costs of its performance as an ally in world affairs; from Colombia the United States expected political commitment through open statements and token actions. Neither country completely satisfied each others' expectations. Most striking, however, was the fact that friendship and alliance were hardly, if ever, questioned on grounds of incomplete delivering. 44

3. The Neglect Syndrome, Democracy and the Cold War Alliance

After the Second World War, Latin American economic development and democratisation gained special importance in the context of U.S.-Latin American relations and world politics. To some extent, this had to do with the lessons that Americans and Europeans drew from the war: that the 1930s' economic recession led to uncooperative behaviour among states and that totalitarian regimes were prone to war. At the same time, the post-war economic structure began to highlight the gap between the poor, underdeveloped nations and the rich, industrialised ones. In this North-South divide, Latin America fell in a grey category. Politically, it became a significant international player at the UN and the newly created OAS, but most of the continent had fallen behind economically.

44 From the Second World War alliance, other Latin American countries benefited more than Colombia in material terms Brazil, for example, received 70% of all Lend Lease to Latin America. Leslie Bethell, 'From the Second World War to the Cold War: 1944-1954' in Abraham F. Lowenthal (ed.) Exporting Democracy. The United States and Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 48-9. Colombia's value in strictly military strategic terms was limited. The NSC56/2 says: 'In World War II the United States was required to divert ...130,000 men with their equipment...the Latin American countries, with only one major exception [Brazil], were unable to make any contribution to Western Hemisphere Defence.' National Security Council Series in FRUS, 1950, 2, p. 628.
Latin Americans expected their own Marshall Plan. Instead, at the 1948 Ninth Conference of American States in Bogotá, Americans told them that political problems in Greece, Turkey, and other Marshall Plan recipients in Europe differed radically from those in Latin America. They were instead offered private investment and the Point Four Programme. U.S. officials, however, were not blind to Latin American feelings. 'There is a tendency to measure the extent of our interest in their welfare according to the extent to which we advance public funds for economic development', stated a restricted memorandum. Yet policy-makers in Washington interpreted their allies' claims as mere nostalgia for war-time camaraderie, and so responded with diplomatic actions in the 'psychological field', defined in Department of State memorandum as hyperbolic speeches, diplomatic receptions, and visits. George Kennan explained that these symbolic gestures were in fact important and thus suggested the 'coordinated exploitation' of the 'multiplicity of relationships' with Latin Americans to 'guarantee that influence can continue to be brought to bear on the Latin American countries' even if no Latin American Marshall Plan was devised. The Colombian government would have preferred material assistance, but valued the diplomatic overtures. It appreciated the Lauchlin Currie Mission and was delighted with the choice of Bogotá as a site for the Ninth Conference of American States. Nevertheless, the idea that the United States never provided a Marshall Plan endured the passage of time.

Democracy increased its value as a desirable principle and a key to future peace. For a brief period, before the dominance of radical cold warriors and their containment policy, the United States seemed to focus on regional democracy. The United States thus monitored political events in Latin America closely, often trying to tilt the balance in favour of those who U.S. officials believed were safe, moderate democratic

45 FRUS, 1950, 2, p. 594.
candidates. The use of Marines had become obsolete by then, and the U.S. relied instead on diplomatic persuasion, ideological propaganda and covert operations to do this. U.S. 'neutrality', however, remained an important policy; at least in the case of U.S.-Colombian relations. Such 'neutrality' was not difficult to maintain since Colombia had remained democratic. More important, according to U.S. officials, was the durability of an acceptable and viable 'centre' at a time when Latin American neighbours shifted into either left- or right-wing dictatorships.

By 1947, however, partisan rivalry in Colombia had turned into a violent collision leading to the Bogotazo revolt (April 1948), the years of La Violencia (1947-1958) and the only twentieth century Colombian military dictatorship, under General Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957). Despite critical interpretations among U.S. officials of Colombia's situation in the 1940s, U.S. officials continued to refer to Colombia as 'one of the most democratic and orderly nations of the hemisphere', an 'excellent and effective' wartime ally, and a 'most helpful' player at the United Nations. U.S. officials reckoned, that 'despite the uprisings of April 9, 1948, brief riots and misfired plots in 1944 and 1945, and civil disturbances in 1949...the traditional respect for law and order should enable the country to overcome' anything. Moreover, they believed that Colombia's democracy 'facilitated cordial relations and has brought us together on ideological grounds'.

'Neutrality', on the other hand, did not mean complete dissociation and at times the United States got entangled in difficult situations because of its carelessness. Based on the war-time military agreements of 1942, the United States began supplying Colombia with a range of weapons and military assets ostensibly to repel the potential attack of a foreign enemy. The politicised Colombian security forces employed this

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47 See George Kennan's report in ibid, p. 618.
materiel, as well as the B-25 bombers and the P-47 fighters provided in 1947 after the ratification of the Rio Treaty and also intended for use against external enemies, in their war against members of the Liberal party.\textsuperscript{50} Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the radical Liberal campaigning on an anti-oligarchy platform, accused Mariano Ospina's Conservative government and the United States of plotting a conspiracy to illegally arm the Colombian National Police with U.S. weapons. Realising the problem it had caused, the United States belatedly questioned the end-use of its military equipment and denied Ospina's requests for arms at least three times (in 1948, in February 1949 and in May 1949).\textsuperscript{51}

U.S. concerns over the situation in Colombia grew in November 1949 with the election of the extreme Conservative, Laureano Gómez, to the presidency. U.S. officials saw Gómez as 'a leader whose friendship for the United States and whose devotion for democratic ideas are suspect' and considered the possibility of 'serious civil strife'. Nevertheless, they continued to opt for 'neutrality'. A confidential document stated:

Our policy in the present situation is to steer a careful neutral course, striving on the one hand to avoid giving substance to Liberal accusations that the United States is arming the present administration to set up a dictatorship of a minority party in Colombia, and on the other hand pursuing our traditional policy of cooperating with the constituted government of the country and abstaining from intervention in domestic political affairs.\textsuperscript{52}

In 1950, Gómez closed down the Congress. Washington's reaction was 'to persuade the Colombian government to relax its present restrictions on democratic institutions and urge it to avoid drifting into a dictatorship of the right'.\textsuperscript{53} In part, U.S. policymakers discarded a harsher scolding because, based on their interpretations of Colombia's political record, they believed that Conservatives would collaborate with

\textsuperscript{49} FRUS, 1950, 2, p. 817.
\textsuperscript{50} Drexler, Colombia and the United States, pp. 56-8.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, pp. 63-4
\textsuperscript{52} FRUS, 1950, 2, pp. 818 and 820.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, p. 823.
the United States. In addition, Cold War calculations had already begun creeping into U.S. officials' minds and the Department of State appeared willing to sacrifice some quality on democracy as long as the new government was willing to fend off external communist attacks. Moreover, the 1949 Mutual Defence Act, the May 1950 NSC Document 56/2 titled United States Policy Towards Inter-American Military Collaboration, and Truman's military standardisation programme called for the continued transfer of materiel and training to Colombia, despite the potential 'wrong use' of weapons for domestic political purposes.

Two years later, as political infighting escalated, a military junta overthrew Gómez's regime, and in 1953 General Rojas installed himself as leader of an authoritarian regime to put an end to the violent strife among politicians. John Moors Cabot, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs said the United States could 'extend a positive welcome' given that Rojas appeared 'to have the support of the majority of the Conservative party and to be viewed benevolently by the Liberal party', and that Rojas would 'return Colombia to the democratic paths'.

Overall, U.S. policy towards the Rojas dictatorship was ambivalent. At times it appeared willing to keep some distance because Rojas lacked democracy credentials, but other times, the United States collaborated with Rojas. After the 1947 Rio Treaty, for example, a bilateral Military Assistance Agreement was signed in 1952. On that basis Rojas requested weapons, among them napalm bombs, only to receive hesitant responses from Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Thomas Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, disliked the idea, fearing they would be used against domestic opponents. Thus Washington refused to authorise the licence. In 1953, however, the United States assisted in the creation of the first military intelligence units in Colombia on the grounds they were important to fight

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54 Ibid, p. 817.
55 Drexler, Colombia and the United States, p. 72.
Communism. In 1955, counterinsurgency instruction at the Valle de los Lanceros base began, and in 1956 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles met with Rojas in Colombia. U.S. collaboration with Rojas only reflected that Colombia had slowly gone from being an anti-fascist ally to an anti-communist ally, and that Colombia and the United States continued to share political views.

One significant token of Colombia's anti-communist commitment was participating in the Korean war. Once more, as in the two world wars Colombia was strategically insignificant. Nevertheless, Washington assessed Colombia's contribution to the war using other criteria. When Colombia refused to pay the bill sent by the Department of Defence in July 1951 for the use of U.S. assets and ammunitions in Korea, and threatened to withdraw its battalions, the United States caved in to Bogotá's wish not to pay. The Department of State believed that Colombia's withdrawal would have a 'damaging effect upon the concept of collective security through the United Nations'.

As George Kennan suggested, Latin America's importance in the Cold War was not a matter of bases, nor was it 'a problem of defence of the Panama Canal', nor 'a question of the possible mobilisation of Latin American military strength against the United States'. Rather, it was 'the extent to which the attitudes of the Latin American peoples may influence the general political trend in the international community'.

The Violencia years and the short-lived Rojas dictatorship had not shaken U.S. confidence in Colombia's inclination towards democracy nor altered the friendly course of relations. Throughout, Washington policy-maker and ambassadors in Bogotá interfered little in Colombian affairs, and occasionally reminded Colombian officials about their preference for democratic procedures. This behaviour contrasted with

56 Ibid, p. 74.
58 Drexler, Colombia and the United States, p. 70
59 FRUS, 1950, 2, p. 598.
60 Blurr coincides with the idea of limited U.S. intervention in Colombia in regional comparative perspective, Blurr, Our Troubled Hemisphere, p. 146.
U.S. overt and frequent involvement in the domestic affairs of other Latin American countries, even the larger Southern Cone nations, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Colombia's reputation as the oldest and most stable democracy of the region would hold for several decades.

4. Allies Again: Development and Counterinsurgency

In the immediate aftermath of the Bogotazo, both countries claimed that Communism had inspired the revolt. Later on, the ultimately admitted the uprising had more to do with deep-rooted socio-economic problems. 61 In 1958 President Alberto Lleras wrote to Eisenhower:

The uncertain economic situation and a prolonged and almost hopeless state of underdevelopment are creating disillusionment, confusion, and discouragement among the people of Latin America, with the inevitable consequence of political instability and grave social unrest which are constantly militating against the effectiveness of the democratic system. 62

This, however, did not erase their fear of Communism becoming popular, and as the 1950s drew to a close Washington and Latin American leaders agreed that economic improvement was necessary both in itself and to keep Communists from penetrating the continent. The idea that economic development was possible and worth financing was strengthened in U.S. policy-making circles with Walt Rostow's modernisation theory, which envisaged underdeveloped countries reaching a 'take-off stage' after which they were to continue growing, eventually 'graduating' out of poverty and into the upper echelons of the world economy. 63 Fidel Castro's turn to the Soviet Union in 1961 finally mobilised policy-makers in Washington to design a comprehensive assistance package for Latin America, and Kennedy formally launched the Alliance for Progress.

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62 Quoted in Randall, Colombia and the United States, p. 216. Lleras also requested further military assistance.
63 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle, pp. 142-54.
From the beginning, U.S. policy-makers thought Colombia would make a 'key testing ground' for the Alliance.\textsuperscript{64} Working with dictators was possible but democracies were still preferable if they preserved stability. The Rojas dictatorship had ended and the Colombian political elite had crafted the Frente Nacional to peacefully alternate power between Conservatives and Liberals for sixteen consecutive years. Although the arrangement fell short of modern, free political contest, it nevertheless conformed to the practice of regular elections, it was packaged with the right democratic discourse, and it promised stability. Colombia was a democracy as far as the United States was concerned.\textsuperscript{65} Moreover, as revealed in a confidential document, U.S. policy-makers calculated that assistance to Colombia would 'result in the development that is desired' and that its economic thinking was 'in line' with U.S. aims.\textsuperscript{66} Finally, Colombia would provide an 'important impetus for the Alliance for Progress --a much needed demonstration effect important to the United States in its policy and efforts in the entire hemisphere'.\textsuperscript{67}

The U.S. Agency for International Development began providing soft loans and different kinds of technical cooperation. Missions of Ivy League economists visited Colombia again, collaborating on the creation of the National Planning Department in 1958. Colombia accepted massive international lending to finance social and economic development and to overcome budgetary problems, including balance of payment deficits. From 1962 to 1976, Colombia received a grand total of $1327 million (an average of $88.47 million per year, excluding military assistance), which represented

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Country Analysis Strategy Paper} [hereinafter \textit{CASP}] FY 1970, April 1968, Central Policy Files POL COL-US 1613 Box, 1992. RG 59. National Archives. In 1968 the Department of State designed \textit{CASPs}, which drew strategic information on foreign countries provided mainly by U.S. embassies, with the purpose to rationalise U.S. foreign political and defence policies.\textsuperscript{65} At the time of its creation, U.S. policy makers saw the Frente Nacional as a positive arrangement that would eventually develop into deeper democratisation. Later on, academics produced more critical appraisals pointing at its exclusionary character. In the late 1990s, some U.S. experts on Colombia have come to revisit Frente, pointing at its lessons in creating a vernacular and collective solution to violence, interviews with former Ambassador Paul Viron Vaky and Philip McLean.\textsuperscript{66} \textit{CASP} FY 1970.
13% of all economic aid going to Latin America in that period. Of that total, $5.6 million went to drug control as of 1970.

In retrospect, it has been argued that the Alliance for Progress 'lost its way'. Assessing the impact of the $22.3 billion dollars spent on projects and the subsequent implementation of policies was, and continues to be, an onerous task. In 1969, U.S. Comptroller General reported that U.S. officials had been negligent in evaluating Latin America's projects, hence their limited success. Other disappointed U.S. advocates of development blamed the failure of reforms in Latin American countries and their elites' vested interests. But in the 1960s, U.S. policy makers in the Executive branch were pleased with Colombia's economic performance. U.S. Congress members, however, were less generous and spoke of a 'dreadful collapse'. Barring these disagreements in Washington, the developments of the 1960s were important in forming positive notions in U.S. policy circles on Colombia's economic prospects; although the idea that Colombia enjoyed an outstanding 'economic stability' crystallised after its survival to the recession of the 1980s.

Another key concern of the Alliance for Progress was counterinsurgency. Washington's concept of security was beginning to shift away from the idea that vital threats were posed only by external enemies in the form of conventional wars. In 1959, the Draper Committee Report, which reviewed military assistance, changed the requirements and specifications for the use of military equipment, and said fighting

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67 Ibid.
71 Randall, *Colombia and the United States*, p. 240
Communism from within constituted a legitimate use.\textsuperscript{72} This shift eliminated the Morse Amendment to the Mutual Security Act which forbade military aid for internal use.\textsuperscript{73} Moreover military education abroad began to promote U.S. values. Colombia received such training, although Americans often preferred that Colombia purchase its own equipment.

Counterinsurgency was compatible with Colombia's own military needs, since 70\% of the Colombian Armed Forces were now having to fight Communist guerrilla groups, such as FARC, ELN, and the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL). The United States mainly sold or donated helicopters and provided training, although as in the Second World War and the early Cold War, it failed to provide all the equipment Colombia requested.\textsuperscript{74} On other hand, it is possible that there was greater U.S. involvement. The Colombian media reported at the time that U.S. troops had actually fought in the 1964 Marquetalia operation.\textsuperscript{75} Secretary of Defence Dean Rusk and Colombian Generals Ruiz and Reveiz said, however, that the existing Military Assistance Program (MAP) concentrated on in-country \textit{training} only.\textsuperscript{76} As regards Cuba and insurgency, Colombia too feared Cuban influence on its guerrillas, and in December 1961, it broke off relations with the island. Cuba became a recurrent topic in the U.S.-Colombian agenda.

Washington's actual concern about the level of threat posed by the Colombian guerrillas as well as its participation in counterinsurgency appear to be low if one takes into account several aspects such as U.S. views about Communism being a menace; the close way in which U.S. observed unions, political movements, politicians and

\textsuperscript{72} President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, \textit{Composite Report} (Washington D.C.: GPO, August 17, 1959).
\textsuperscript{73} Randall, \textit{Colombia and the United States}, p. 218
\textsuperscript{74} Telegrams from Henry Dearborn, Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá to Secretary of State, 14, 23 and 27 May 1964, POL 23 COL XR DEF 19-2 US-COL. Central Policy Files 1964-1966 Box 2049.
\textsuperscript{75} U.S. Embassy Telegram to Department of Defence, POL 23-3 COL XR DEF 19-2 US. Central Policy Files 1964-1966 Box 2049.
foreign media in Latin America; and other extreme reactions to perceived Communist
threats as in Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973. In balance, U.S. officials thought
guerrillas posed a moderate threat. For instance, the 1968 country assessment stated:

Historically the guerrilla threat in Colombia has been primarily a rural one,
affecting the most backward rural areas. Under the present conditions, the
insurgents cannot overthrow the existing constitutional government and
confront the United States with a hostile power to the South.

The trend was 'expected to continue'. Even Lleras's renewal of relations with the
Soviet Union --part of his universalismo-- did not constitute a source of strategic
concern for U.S. officials. The U.S. Embassy in Bogotá correctly believed that Soviets
would 'concentrate in building a peaceful and cooperative image in Colombia and
therefore are not likely to furnish direct support to guerrilla activities'. As for Cuba,
initial panic about its possible activism had waned and by 1968; its influence was
considered to be 'minimal'.

It is true that by 1967-1968 the Colombian military had trimmed away guerrilla
forces and influence, but the victories were only partial and temporary. Nevertheless,
Colombian officials claimed guerrillas were just a disturbing, though not disrupting,
force always distant from Bogotá. In fact, Colombian civilian and military officials had
shaped U.S. views. With hindsight, it is possible to argue that Colombian leaders failed
to accurately measure guerrillas' potential to inflict damage through the progressive
spread and escalation of violence resulting in the erosion of order and stability.

76 Ibid. And Telegram to the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, 21 May 964, POL 23 COL XR DEF 19-
2 US. Central Policy Files 1964-1966 Box 2049.
77 CASP FY 1970.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 According to one Colombian military journal FARC had 410 troops and ELN 80 in 1965,
whereas in 1968, FARC had 700, ELN 150, and EPL 80. However, there is a consensus in the
Colombian history literature, that guerrilla forces diminished in the end of the 1960s and
increased again since the mid 1970s, see Gonzalo Morales, 'El incremento de la subversión en
Colombia', Revista de la Fuerzas Armadas, 123 (1987), p. 180. There is no systematic analysis
on Soviet influence in Colombia, but it is very unlikely that Colombian guerrillas received any
substantial material aid from the former USSR given their perceptions on Colombia's lack of
potential for revolution. In this respect, Colombia differs from Central America and Cuba. For
Colombian military continued to fight the guerrillas without ever defeating them, and U.S. officials rated Colombia's performance as satisfactory (until 1997). Surprisingly, in the decades after Marquetalia, no one in Washington thought total defeat was required as a proof of Cold War cooperation. It seemed enough that Colombia had survived the 1950s and the 1960s without a reproduction of the Cuban experience. The presence of guerrillas throughout the Cold War environment, despite their apparent lack of threatening capability, justified the continuity of military relations and the presence of a permanent U.S. mission, the Mil-Group, with an office inside the Colombian Ministry of Defence.

The atmosphere of cooperation in U.S.-Latin American relations brought by the Alliance for Progress faded as the 1960s drew to a close. According to Latin Americans, the Alliance for Progress had not delivered the expected economic developments, nor had it brought about a benevolent U.S. policy. The good neighbour commitments were broken when the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic in 1965. In the mean time, Latin American and Third World solidarity increased, raising criticism against what they saw as an exploitative North led by the United States. The Carlos Lleras government, during its last years, demonstrated an apprehension with U.S. behaviour in the region.81

Lleras acquired a reputation for regional leadership and rallied Latin American solidarity. This raised some concerns in the Department of State:

These [problems] mainly involve Colombia as leading member of Latin American nations and concern the relationship between underdeveloped countries and the United States. This poses problems for Colombia, which enjoys good relations with the United States, yet cannot afford to abandon positions of Latin American solidarity.82

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81 At first, Colombia condemned the invasion of the Dominican Republic. However, officials were less critical in private. Bogotá later approved the OAS multilateral operations, while public opinion and academia remained opposed, Bushnell, 'Colombia', p. 414.

Indeed, Lleras enjoyed wide prestige in Latin America and had the power to mobilise diplomatic cooperation to counter Washington. However, Lleras's political stature actually improved Colombia's relations with the United States. The idea that Colombia 'traditionally' supported the United States in foreign policy matters held in the Department of State, despite rising nationalism in Colombia the late 1960s and early 1970s, which usually involved criticism against U.S. policies towards the region. But for the United States, Colombia's nationalism ranked as simply 'normal' compared to other Latin American countries. Colombia, in fact, continued to adhere to the basic tenets of capitalism: in 1968 the Colombian government finally decided to request to join in on GATT, and criticised protectionism and populism. Most importantly, Colombia remained a democracy amidst the second wave of dictatorships in Latin America. Therefore, in 1968, U.S. relations with Colombia were described as such: 'In the purely political sphere our leverage is much more limited and derives more from tradition and a general mutuality of interests and points of view' [emphasis added].

To conclude, over the course of the past century, coming off of the trauma of Panama's secession in 1903, Bogotá and Washington developed shared understandings on the nature of their relationship based on mutually accepted and expected identities. The reality of the power asymmetry was inescapable, and the U.S. still cast Colombia as part of its 'inferior' backyard. Yet friendly relations had been constructed, to a great extent, on the basis of a tradition of affinity. Colombia's democratic tradition; the political elite's explicit intellectual and political identification with Western values; political and macroeconomic stability in relative regional terms; and its foreign policy behaviour, which obeyed international legal norms and was in line with the United

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82 Document 2924, POL 2 COL Box 1613 1988.
83 CASP FY 1970.
84 Carlos Lleras supported Eisenhower in the U2-spy plane crisis and in its relations with the Soviet Union, especially the events with Khrushev at the Paris Summit and regarding Cuba, CASP FY 1970.
States, were aspects of Colombia's identity that generated such affinity among Colombian and U.S. policy makers in charge of managing the relationship. Thus, despite being a small country in material terms, Colombia became a meaningful ally, and after five decades of positive engagement the U.S.-Colombian friendship was solid, stable and resistant to disagreements. The frequency and intensity of friction between the United States and the other Latin American countries also helped to make this friendship special.

Certain tacit norms emerged within the framework of friendship. The United States refrained from using military force against Colombia as it had done in the Caribbean and Central America and avoided excessive meddling in Colombian domestic affairs. Coercion in the form of economic sanctions was also ruled out. The bilateral relations were based on 'soft' instruments and a growing myriad of links through which technical advice was provided. U.S. officials characterised the relations in this manner:

'In Colombia] we are able to influence policy and measures to some degree through suasion, and Military Materiel and Advisory Assistance, and our Policy Safety Program. On the international seen, traditional diplomacy is likely to be sufficient in most cases and in most issues'.

The two countries also resorted to discrete diplomacy to solve any differences. This was facilitated by the small number of officials in Colombia and the United States involved in managing relations. The United States valued Colombia's cooperation not for its material results, but for its symbolic meaning in furthering U.S. credibility and legitimacy in international politics. This lack of interest in material results was reflected in the leniency and paternalism with which the U.S. rewarded the alliance. This had key repercussions, however. Colombia was held to low efficacy standards, as token actions, policies with imperfect impact, and diplomacy usually sufficed to prove Colombia's commitment. U.S. material assistance was usually less than expected, but

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85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
Colombia came to accept this without challenging the friendship. For Colombia, United States' recognition became crucial to its foreign and internal legitimacy. Colombia also came to expect consultation on regional affairs, while the United States monitored UN and OAS voting patterns and expected coinciding votes. In general, cooperation was a rather flexible concept loosely attached to a general convergence on vague ideas of democracy and liberal economy. As illustrated in the next chapter, the friendship and feeling of affinity led Colombia to join the U.S. in the war against drugs when Nixon asked for its cooperation in 1971.
PART II: EARLY DRUG CONTROL COOPERATION, 1970-1989

The history of U.S.-Colombian relations and the war against drugs can be divided into four phases. Part II deals with the first two. Chapter 3 focuses on the first phase of bilateral cooperation. It begins with the general agreement signed in 1971 in which Colombia responded affirmatively to United States' call to other countries to condemn the use and traffic of narcotics. This phase is mainly about the rise of diplomatic awareness on the drug issue and the undertaking of occasional anti-drug actions.

Chapter 4 deals with the second phase. A new generation of agreements which establish more concrete tools to fight drugs arrived in 1980 with the Extradition Treaty, the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, and the technical cooperation treaty that creates the U.S.-funded anti-narcotics unit in the Colombian National Police. National prohibition legislation in the United States and Colombia developed at a steady pace throughout the 1980s, and the demands of implementing prohibition increased. At the same time, illicit traffic in Colombia became violent and degenerated into incidents of narco-corruption and narco-terrorism, as traffickers sought to escape law enforcement, especially extradition to the United States. Both countries renewed their efforts to combat what they increasingly perceived to be a security problem.
Chapter 3

INTRODUCING DRUG CONTROL COOPERATION, 1970-1981

Richard Nixon included illegal drugs in his 1970 speech to the United Nations General Assembly alongside with high profile Cold War matters such as East-West relations and nuclear weapons. A drug abuse epidemic was sweeping across the United States. At the same time, Colombia was turning into the home of quality export marihuana and a distribution hub for cocaine entering the United States. Contrary to common views claiming that the different nature of U.S. and Colombian 'drug problems' would necessarily ensue in irreconcilable positions, Colombia and the United States found enough common ground to work together against drug consumption and drug trafficking. The underlying assumption was that drug abuse and trafficking constituted deviant behaviours that challenged core values of their societies.

In this first phase of cooperation, Colombia discarded the option of legalising cannabis, developed basic legislation that criminalised consumption and traffic, and exercised relatively incipient law enforcement. In return, the United States pledged to provide funding and training. Colombia also agreed to work with the United States by collaborating with DEA agents and agreeing to occasional joint diplomatic declarations. At large, drugs fared low in the bilateral agenda and the domestic politics of each country, yet cooperation signalled each others' commitment to a long-standing friendship.

The first section of this chapter examines the origins of drug control cooperation starting with United States' initiatives to recruit international allies in a war against
drugs. It then analyses Colombia's incentives to join prohibition and describes what early drug control cooperation was about. The second section uncovers the actual topics of agreements and differences on drug policy matters, and reflects on the factors that led to a favourable assessment of cooperation on both sides of the drug control partnership. The third section weighs the relative importance of drugs in the relationship by looking at other political and economic themes that were relevant in maintaining friendship.

1. Recruiting Colombia to Fight the War Against Drugs

By 1970 there were 500,000 heroin users in the United States, ten times the figure in 1960, and in 1971, 24 million Americans over the age of 11 had used marihuana at least once.2 This prompted Nixon to take personal interest in the rise of U.S. drug consumption, which he believed was one of the major forces behind urban crime and social upheaval in his country. Hence, amidst a sense of national emergency, the U.S. president called out for a war against drugs. Traffickers had to 'be hunted to the end of the earth', and 'keeping dangerous drugs out of the United States [was] just as important as keeping armed enemy forces from landing in the United States', he said.3

In the past, much of the United States' international drug battle had been fought in the UN diplomatic arena. But now, the United States was seeking to assign a greater anti-drug role to its bureaucracy, invigorate international prohibition, launch its own anti-drug programmes abroad, and directly persuade foreign states to do the same in their own territories. The additional fiscal, bureaucratic and diplomatic burdens were acceptable as long as Americans could influence the path towards a drug free world and as long as other countries did their part. Nixon believed recruiting international allies was the obvious and easiest way to solve the problem. He told Congress in 1971

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that '[a]lthough the severity of the problem varies widely from country to country -- and is currently worse in the United States than in many countries', international anti-drug cooperation was needed, 'for the production and manufacture of narcotics and dangerous drugs is immeasurably easier to control than their illegal passage across national frontiers'. For Americans, 'going to the source' had been, since the beginning, strategically indispensable and politically feasible. Despite the fact that most of the heroine in the United States was coming from Asia, Latin America immediately encountered this new form of U.S. involvement as well as higher demands on their state apparatus. This was the result of both their share of the cannabis and coca market, and the nature of their relationship to the United States.

A steady expansion of the U.S. drug prohibition bureaucracy began. Nixon appointed a Special Consultant to the President for Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, created a Special Action Office in the Executive Office and a Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State. The Nixon administration likewise increased the Federal budget for law enforcement and abuse prevention from $82 million in 1969 to $785 million in 1974. In 1968, an agency merger had created the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), and its immediate successor, the Drug Enforcement Agency, emerged in 1973 after the new anti-drug impetus.

As regards the foreign dimensions of the new U.S. drug policy, Nixon summoned in 1971 U.S. Ambassadors from Turkey, France, Mexico, Luxembourg, Thailand, Vietnam and the UN to discuss feasible anti-drug actions abroad. In the following

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5 'Going to the source' was later reinforced with the penetration of military thinking into anti-drug strategies.
years, he formally instructed the Chiefs of Mission to convince leaders of countries where drug production and trafficking occurred to 'commit their governments to attacking the narcotics problem with urgency and determination', and promised cooperating governments the 'wholehearted support and assistance' of the United States.\(^9\) New bilateral narcotics control programs were set in motion and aid was provided. By 1976, 228 of 2,117 DEA agents were permanently stationed overseas, and throughout the decade the agency trained up to 2,000 foreign officers.\(^10\) DEA officers were divided into two regional sections; one covered Latin America and the other the rest of the world. Nixon also requested the CIA to engage in drug operations.\(^11\)

In 1972, there were anti-drug agreements with 50 countries, including Colombia. The focus of U.S. concern, however, were drug smuggling via Cuba, the 'French connection', the Italian-American mafia, opiates from the Golden Triangle, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both in regulatory circles of the UN and among U.S. diplomats, Colombia was not associated with coca and marihuana to the same extent as its Latin American neighbours, and had comparatively speaking negligible problems of production and consumption.\(^12\) Thus, in the early days of bilateral cooperation, Colombia was free from the stigma of other drug-countries, and was able to benefit from its relatively positive reputation for a long time.\(^13\) The Colombian cannabis cultivation and export boom began in 1977, several years after signing the 1971 counter-drug agreement with the United States.

\(^10\) Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders, p. 140
\(^11\) PPP, Nixon, 1972, pp. 874-5.
\(^12\) Augusto Pérez Gómez, Sustancias psicoactivas: historia del consumo en Colombia (Bogotá: Editorial Presencia, 1994) p. 81-2
\(^13\) For a Latin American regional comparison before see Walker III, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere. For an appraisal of the priority topics in Vienna and the United States at the time see William B. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. An International History (London: Routledge, 2000), chapters 6 to 8.
In part, Colombia agreed to join the U.S. 'war' because it was familiar with prohibition. Colombia contradicts the widespread idea that all Latin American countries had benign notions of natural-based drugs and disapproved of prohibition and punitive enforcement, and that they were forced into the anti-drug regime under U.S. pressure exclusively. Moreover, studies critical of U.S. drug policy tend to depict Americans' approach to drug consumption as a unique sociological feature, almost an aberration, based on Puritanism and the market culture. However, most of Colombian society, and certainly the central ruling elite, had strong sentiments against the use of drugs. Social censure in Colombia was so deep that when cases of drug use arose in the 1960s and 1970s, experts on drug abuse underwent great pains to produce full statistics because families were ashamed to report use or seek professional rehabilitation. Unlike in Bolivia and Peru, the majority of Colombians had no perception of having ancient cultural ties to coca. National regulation had begun in 1920, and slowly evolved towards tighter controls, similar to the experience of many other countries. By 1947, Colombia had completely outlawed the cultivation of coca leaf, though actual enforcement was rather weak.

Furthermore, Colombia had participated in the 1936 Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs set up first by the ECOSOC in 1946, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. It was a party to the 1972 Protocol Amendment to the Single Convention and reported yearly to the UN on its control activities. Given the minimal level of drug abuse and production in

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14 The dominance of U.S. views is argued in del Olmo, *Prohibir o domesticar*.
16 Pérez, *Sustancias psicoactivas*.
17 Law 11 of 1920, Regulated import, provision and purchase of drugs, targeting opium and cocaine mainly. Law 118 of 1928 defines type of substances and regulates trade; speaks about improper use of drugs. The Código Penal of 1936, Articles 270 and 271 introduced detention against production and traffic.
Chapter 3, Introducing Cooperation

Colombia before 1975, Colombia's regular and deferential presence at the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotic Control Board meetings can only be explained by its condemnation of drugs and, most importantly, by the underlying tenets informing its foreign policy. As has been argued in Chapter 2, participation in international fora reinforced Colombia's identity as a Western country and abiding member of the international community. Finally, the concept of law enforcement cooperation was not new, although anti-drug training was an innovation. International programmes of the DEA, for instance, absorbed some of USAID's Office of Public Safety (OPS) functions. This was a programme of the Alliance for Progress which had been banned in the United States after allegations that trained native forces were violating human rights.

Early U.S. anti-drug assistance to Colombia consisted of training agents, donating vehicles, funding occasional operations, setting up a retribution system of informants and, at times, operating jointly in drug cases. To be sure, and following the established practice of government-to-government aid, Washington subtly tied assistance to the creation of new drug policy instruments. Colombia's interaction and commitments with the United States and the latest UN normative breakthroughs, were galvanising its drug control laws. For instance, complying with one of the requirements of the first 1971 umbrella agreement, the Misael Pastrana administration created in 1973 a policy planning committee, the Consejo Nacional de Estupefacientes (CNE). CNE was to advise the government on policies against cultivation, trafficking and consumption, and became an important decision-making arena in specific instances. In 1974, Colombia also developed the Estatuto Nacional de Estupefacientes, the first comprehensive anti-drug legislation.

The 1971 treaty brought small donations from USAID. Yet, this first disbursement led Colombian agencies to request additional aid, resulting in a general reinforcement

18 Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders, p. 120.
of prohibition. For example, in 1973, the Colombian intelligence agency, Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS), asked for communications systems, vessels and training. The United States responded with $6 million in what became the first counternarcotics aid package as such, mostly spent during López's administration (1974-1978).\(^{19}\) Later on, in 1975, the López and Ford governments signed another mutual assistance pact which provided the Procuraduría General de la Nación two planes and three helicopters to be shared with the National Police.

Among the responsibilities of DEA agents travelling to Colombia were gathering evidence to apprehend traffickers, training agents in drug recognition skills, and disseminating prohibition propaganda to increase the awareness among Colombians of problems created by drug abuse. U.S. Intelligence and Customs agents also participated. They organised, for instance, the very first 'international narcotics seminar' at the Colombian police academy Escuela de Cadetes de la Policía General Santander. These sessions had the spillover effect Americans desired. After the Escuela seminar, and with U.S. advise, the Colombian customs created its own narcotics bureau and the delegate Procuraduría for judicial police adopted anti-narcotics functions. The first Colombian-managed course trained six lieutenants, among them José Leonardo Gallego Castrillón, who became a prominent figure in Colombia's counter-drug efforts in the 1990s.\(^{20}\) In all, from 1973 to 1977, 600 Colombian law enforcement officials were trained, and by 1975 there were DEA permanent offices in Bogotá and Cali.\(^{21}\)

The DEA also cooperated with Colombian military forces in operations. The 1978-1979 Operación Fulminante (OF), which has been wrongly depicted in Colombian academia as an instance of cleavage in the relation and the beginning of U.S.-imposed

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\(^{20}\) *Historia de la Policía Antinarcóticos*, manuscript provided by the Anti-Narcotics Police in 1999.

\(^{21}\) Nadelmann, *Cops Across Borders*, Appendix B.
militarisation of drug control, is an example of such collaboration.\textsuperscript{22} OF was a well-structured, temporary (180 days) operation jointly planned by Colombian authorities and the charismatic U.S. Ambassador Diego Asencio, and did not involve U.S. troops, as the term 'militarisation' often suggests.\textsuperscript{23} The operation assigned the Colombian Armed Forces temporary functions of surveillance, eradication and law enforcement in La Guajira, a large department on the Atlantic coast. The assignment was intended to complement the duties of the Judicial Police and DAS in a geographical division of labour: while the Judicial Police concentrated in the inner territory, cities, airports, and roads, the maritime ports and jungle areas were left to the military.\textsuperscript{24} The United States provided $1.302 million pesos for vehicles, replacement parts, other equipment, and fuel, and Colombia's contributed with $120,000 pesos in troops and equipment. OF started in November 1978 and ended, according to plans, in March 1979. The initial two-month phase had 10,000 Colombian troops dismantling trafficking routes to forcing marihuana to remain in its hiding place. Subsequently, troops traced down the marihuana. This phase also included eradicating 7,000 hectares of marihuana in the Sierra Nevada mountains.\textsuperscript{25} Next, there was a three-month period to verify that drug trafficking and cultivation did not spring up again. All along, DEA contributed with intelligence to trace international routes to Miami. The DEA concentrated on maritime interdiction and distribution networks in Florida.

Some argue that the main motive behind President Turbay's enthusiastic approval of the operation was to placate the United States, as the so-called 'Peter Bourne Memorandum' that was discussed in American prime-time television claimed Turbay had links with the drug mafia. While proving a point to Americans was surely

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\textsuperscript{22} Tokatlian, \textit{Drogas, dilemas y dogmas}, pp. 37-9.

\textsuperscript{23} Proyecto de Acuerdo entre la Embajada de los EEUU de América y una Agencia del Gobierno de Colombia sobre la Campaña de Interdiction de Narcóticos, República de Colombia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, \textit{Memorias del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores} [hereinafter \textit{MRE}], Bogotá, 1978-1979, 2, p. 553-6.

beneficial, Turbay was keen to use the armed forces for social control, especially in the Sierra Nevada, where guerrillas had influence.

Like other operations, OF results on the ground were partial. Many small traffickers were expunged from business and a good number of hectares eradicated, but smuggling in the region continued and marihuana plantations started moving to Los Llanos Orientales—this relocation is known as the 'balloon effect'. However, both Colombian and U.S. officials rated the experience as a success because they had worked well together. On the other hand, government officials in Colombia quickly learned that involving military personnel in drug control exposed them to corruption. Thus, when the U.S. military asked the Colombian military to include not just the Second Brigade (used in La Guajira) but the Seventh Brigade for drug control operations in the Llanos Orientales, both the Colombian military and civilian authorities turned down the request.26 The Department of State assented, and they decided, instead, to create a police unit from scratch, one it could train and monitor closely.27

The Prohibition of Narcotics Campaign agreement signed in 1980 between the Colombian Ministry of Defence and the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá created such unit. It was attached to the police, and virtually replaced the former anti-drugs force within the Procuraduría.28 The United States provided Colombia the unprecedented sum of $13,225,000 for helicopters, boats, radar equipment, transport vehicles and fuel exclusively to be used for interdiction and for training. That same year, for three months the DEA trained the new Colombian Anti-Narcotics Police (ANP) officers.29 By December 1980, satellite anti-narcotics companies were installed in Santa Martha,

27 Interview with Luis Moreno, U.S. Embassy Narcotics Affairs Section, Bogotá, September 1997.
Riohacha and Maicao, endowed with 300 men in total. In 1981, the ANP had its new base in Bogotá constructed with U.S. funds. Also, men were sent to Turbo, Cartagena, Ipiales, Popayán, Villavicencio, San José del Guaviare and Leticia. In 1982, ANP itself had given 24 anti-narcotics courses with DEA collaboration. That same year, the United States gave ANP its first aircraft, a Twin-Otter. Unlike the Mexican experience, where its anti-narcotics force developed nationalistic and antagonist feelings towards U.S. agents, ANP was grateful for the assistance and many of its members believed its association with the U.S. bolstered its image and prestige in Colombian bureaucratic circles. Soon, the ANP and the DEA developed a strong link built upon loyalty, camaraderie and, of course, financial dependence. Fifteen years later, this unit was the strongest and most active anti-narcotics agency in Colombia upholding ties with the United States despite the tensions on the higher diplomatic spheres.

In 1979 and 1980, the United States and Colombia signed further agreements, the Extradition Treaty and the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLATs). The Extradition treaty in particular would elicit sporadic academic, political and diplomatic controversy over the years, not to mention the violent rejection by drug traffickers, because it was often seen as an U.S.-imposed surrender of sovereignty. However, at the time, and in the small domestic and international circles of legal experts and drug policy officials, the treaties were seen as routine initiatives, since it was not Colombia's first extradition treaty that included extraditing its own nationals. In 1979, Procurador Guillermo González Charry, for example, said in UN meetings that the...
Extradition and MLAT agreements between the United States and Colombia were an example for international community to follow.\textsuperscript{33}

2. Agreements and Disagreements Over Drug Control Policy

From 1976 to 1980 there was a serious debate between Bogotá and Washington on the question of legalisation.\textsuperscript{34} The issue was being actively debated in the United States, yet the catalyst event igniting the discussion between experts and policy-makers of both countries was a seminar held in Bogotá and sponsored by the Asociación Nacional de Industria y Finanzas (ANIF), an influential think-tank dealing with economic policies in Colombia. ANIF and Colombian economists in the technocracy had taken special interest in studying Colombia's informal economy and, eventually, their research agenda included contraband and the illegal drug trade. ANIF produced the first systematic study of the economic dimensions of cannabis in Colombia, and the report argued that the economic and social costs of marihuana prohibition, as well as the costs of the ensuing corruption of public officials, were too high. Legalisation would abolish such costs and bring tax revenues. In addition, ANIF argued that drugs were a foreign problem which Colombia did not have to resolve.\textsuperscript{35} A parade of Bogotá- and Washington-based U.S. officials and experts attended the ANIF seminar, including Ambassador Asencio; Edwin Corr, the Deputy Secretary for the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, which had been inaugurated by Carter in 1979 and was to become the single most important agency in U.S. foreign drug policy; Lee I. Dogoloff, the Executive director of the Strategy Council on Drug Abuse; and Democrat Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal. The United States had opted to engage the pro-legalisation discussants.

\textsuperscript{33} MP, 1978-180, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{34} With a pro-legalisation and regulation bias, the debate is well-illustrated in Arrieta et al, Narcotráfico, p. 302-7.
U.S. officials, however, did not have to struggle against the Colombian government, since they were reassured by the Turbay government that ANIF's position opposed the official line.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, in 1979, Turbay had stopped a bill introducing legalisation. Yet evident behind the tenure of discussions was simply a lack of consensus in Colombia on the question of prohibition and the soundness of legalisation, although the balance remained always in favour of prohibition. The debate on legalisation in Colombia, and between Colombia and the United States faded and drug prohibition expanded. Legalisation even became anathema to most policy-makers in both countries.

Although the United States and Colombia agreed on the need to condemn drug abuse and production, officials periodically engaged in squabbles over the sources, causes, consequences and remedies to the drug problem. Who was responsible for what, was at the core of discussions, and there was much finger-pointing. For example, in words of González at the 1979 Geneva conference,

\begin{quote}
...it was the pressure of great external consumption --managed, directed and exploited by international mafias-- which took advantage of our precarious economic conditions and turned its eyes to Colombia... starting by financing the impressive costs, the start up and expansion of crops, and simultaneously the international traffic of the weed, along with its natural sequel: administrative and popular corruption, violence and other connected crimes.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

González insistently complained at Geneva conferences of the 'bad information' spreading around that made Colombia appear responsible for 'creating or maintaining an attractive situation for the vast and dangerous world of narcotics consumption and traffic'.\textsuperscript{38} Minister of Foreign Affairs Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, for instance, asserted at a UN General Assembly in 1976 that international mafias used the U.S. territory in order to traffic and export their corruption into Colombia.\textsuperscript{39}

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, p. 16.
\item\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, p. 6-7.
\item\textsuperscript{38} Informe del Procurador General de la Nación al Congreso de Estupefacientes Reunido en Ginebra en Febrero de 1979.
\item\textsuperscript{39} \textit{MRE}, 1974-1976, p. 96.
\end{footnotes}
Discussions were attached to deep-rooted identity issues, established routines, but also short-term interests. On one hand, drug trafficking had created bad propaganda for Colombia, and officials were adamant to redeem the tarnished image of their country. On the other hand, they sought to extract additional aid funds. Asking for aid was an established routine legitimised by a shared meaning of cooperation constructed throughout their history; in their view, the United States had usually funded alliances during the Second World War, the Korean War, and the Cold War and was expected to continue doing so. At the ANIF conference Procurador González, for instance, complained about the delays of U.S. assistance and added:

In several occasions I have seen myself compelled to emphasise the need to increase technical and economic cooperation by the United States, not only because it is compulsory given the nature of its circumstances, but because they [the Americans] are obliged to contribute to the fight. 40

Adding to this idea was the well-entrenched perception that richer nations owed poorer ones. Such claims were at the heart of the blaming game. Yet more cooperation, not less, was the general preferred option on both sides. In March 1979 the U.S. Congress Subcommittee on Hemispheric Relations finally approved an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act authorising $16 million in anti-drug aid for fiscal year 1980. 41

The actual configuration of drug policy and its implementation led to further discussions and disagreements on what constituted the optimal strategies and tactics to pursue one same goal. Previous studies on U.S.-Colombian relations have argued that Colombian officials traditionally preferred economic aid for counternarcotics, which included a wide range of measures like subsidies for crop substitution, packages to alleviate trade balance deficits, and trade preferences. In addition, these studies have

stressed U.S. refusal of Colombia's requests. They argue that domestic interests in the United States prevented substantial economic aid and that government officials tended to choose military quick-fixes anyway. Indeed, in the 1970s, Colombian officials explored crop substitution but calculated it was only possible with massive U.S. aid, and since the United States was not willing to channel large amounts to rural development, they simply discarded the option. This however, did not mean that collaboration was absent or that the main tenets of drug control differed. Colombia's request for economic aid was not intended to replace other aspects of drug policy, such as interdiction and law enforcement, and the lack of U.S. funding for rural development did not halt cooperation in other areas or hinder good relations.

A source of mutual recriminations was related to the idea of targeting the proceeds of drug trafficking. On this point, both countries agreed: money had to be stopped. Except, they accused each other of not doing enough. In his inaugural address Turbay criticised the United States for not passing legislation to block the financial flows from American traffickers and consumers to Colombian traffickers. In the meantime, Americans attacked the ventanilla siniestra, a dollar-collection service set up by the Colombian Central Bank in 1974 to facilitate the exchange of foreign currency for trade purposes but which was eventually misused, allowing the penetration of black market money into the financial system. In both countries, banks and other financial institutions fought against possible restrictions to their operations and applying stringent anti-money laundering measures turned into a politically meaningful action only in the 1990s. Colombia developed adequate legislation in 1995.

The use of herbicides for eradication emerged as another contentious topic. U.S. drug policy officials in the Department of State and the DEA expected Colombia to

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follow Mexico in the use of the herbicide paraquat. Thus, in 1979, Colombia set up a scientific commission to test paraquat but concluded that the chemical was both hazardous and fallible. Above all, the commission believed that spraying would only force growers to move their crops elsewhere, and that peasants and rural workers would be driven into the arms of guerrilla groups if their crops were destroyed (president Alberto Fujimori's argument for Peru in the 1990s). Turbay declined the use of paraquat, and U.S. officials could do little to insist, for the U.S. Percy Amendment prevented the United States from selling the herbicide abroad anyway. The amendment was later abolished in 1981 and, as illustrated in chapter 4, Belisario Betancur's administration reconsidered the use of herbicides.44

In general, Colombian and U.S. differences have been documented in the drug politics literature, but this literature has failed to examine their actual potential to spark diplomatic conflict. Consultations and debates over the use of Colombian military personnel, developing money laundering legislation, spraying paraquat, tending to addicts, and the level of U.S. assistance were part of the daily management of drug policy, and possible disagreements over these issues never evolved into major diplomatic quarrels. More often than not, Colombian officials looked up to the U.S. bureaucrats and experts to inform their own policy developments, since they lacked well-articulated strategies and technical knowledge. Furthermore, as illustrated below cooperation continued on the basis that Colombia's performance was satisfactory.

Drug control measures increased since the signing of the 1971 anti-drug treaty with the United States, however, there were no signs of improvement in Colombia. On the contrary, the drug trade grew in the 1970s. The DEA National Narcotics Intelligence

Consumers Committee reports showed that Colombia supplied 52% of the marihuana entering the United States in 1977, and that this figure peaked at 79% in 1981. By price, Colombian marihuana exports had come to exceed the total of legal exports. Adding to that, small smuggling of cocaine had turned into bulk transportation with cargoes over 100 kilos. In 1981, more than 60% of all cocaine entering the United States was refined in Colombia, and 2,500 hectares of coca crops were discovered in the South East of the country. Coca had become highly profitable and rural labour was migrating towards the departments of Vaupés and Guaviare. For example, the population in Mitú, the tiny capital of Vaupés, rose from 1,500 in 1979 to 3,000 in 1981. DEA agents began reporting that official corruption, judicial intimidation, and lack of resources often hindered the capture of drug traffickers. To complicate matters further, there were signs that guerrillas profiteered from the drugs business.

At the same time, the drug problem was increasing on the U.S. front; from 1979 to 1984 consumption in the United States and Europe increased at 18.5% per year. Yet, there was no talk of a lost battle against drugs and Colombia gained considerable prestige as an efficient and committed fighter.

Colombia boasted about its own success. Procurador González said that results were 'intrinsically encouraging', and interdiction outcomes placed 'Colombia, according to international acknowledgements and comparative studies, as the leader of intense efforts in the fight against drugs'. U.S. opinions were split. For instance, on December 1978, Carter sent a letter to Turbay congratulating him for *Operación* in Colombia and the U.S. Senate to implement a programme combining spraying and crop substitution, U.S. Senate, *INT*, p. 82-91.

46 Peter Lupsha, 'El tráfico de drogas: México y Colombia, una perspectiva comparada', in Tokatlian and Bagley (comp.), *Economía y política*, pp. 235-64.
47 Pérez, *Sustancias psicoactivas*, p. 80
48 U.S. Senate, *INT*, p. 116,158.
49 Ibid, p. 185.
Fulminante and offering additional aid. The House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control was less content with OF arguing it had targeted mainly small producers.\textsuperscript{52} But U.S. Attorney General William French Smith thought it was the 'most fortunate' effort in marihuana interdiction ever. From 1976 to 1982, representatives Clarence D. Long and C. W. Bill Young from the House Appropriations Committee continuously gave INM in the Department of State a hard time about its Colombia (and Latin America) programmes, but never launched a real campaign to cut resources.\textsuperscript{53} To counter them, Representative Rosenthal was usually supportive. He had been in Colombia and was 'impressed by the degree of sincerity and effort of the Government of Colombia to deal with the problem'.\textsuperscript{54} The DEA had a positive appraisal of its cooperation with Colombian agents; William G. Fink from the Office of Intelligence of the DEA said that sharing intelligence with Colombians had led to several successful operations, and DEA chief Peter Bensinger, considered to be a hawk on drug policy, was convinced of Colombia's commitment, especially under the leadership of Turbay and Procurador González.\textsuperscript{55}

Some episodes, like the rumours of high-level corruption in Colombia, recorded in the Bourne Memorandum somewhat clouded the environment, however. Peter Bourne and the first Assistant Secretary of State for Narcotic Matters, Mathea Falco, Carter's point advisors on drug issues, and the First Lady, approached President López on the issue, but the Colombian leader quickly dismissed their claims.\textsuperscript{56} Turbay, López's successor, was also implicated in the memorandum and later on, during the

\textsuperscript{51} MP, 1978-1980, p. 3-5.  
\textsuperscript{53} U.S. House and Senate, \textit{Foreign Assistance Related Programs Authorizations [hereinafter FARPA]}, 1976-1982. This congressional document is published annually in the format of hearings and reports and follows U.S. fiscal years.  
\textsuperscript{54} U.S. House and Senate, \textit{FARPA}, 1979, p. 132.  
\textsuperscript{56} Premo, 'Colombia: Cool Friendship', p. 105
congressional elections of 1980, a U.S. Embassy official said he believed 10% of the
Congressmen had been elected with drug money. Yet most remarkable of the Bourne
episode and rumours of drug corruption was U.S. official's modus operandi in handling
the situation. The enthusiastic Bourne had been allowed to voice his reservations; it set
useful pressure that could guarantee further commitment. But U.S. Embassy and
Department of State diplomats soon stopped Bourne before his complaints unravelled
into a crisis. The Embassy hastily communicated to Colombia that the memorandum
was not part of the official policy, and INM continued to report to Congress on
Colombia's 'serious' commitment and 'successful' operations.

However, possible doubts on Colombia's commitment to prohibition did not trigger
the application of these early versions of certification. In 1971, Nixon announced the
United States was prepared to use coercive diplomacy in cases where cooperation was
lacking, and the instruments for pressure had been introduced in the legislation, Public
Laws 92-352 and 92-246. The United States indeed exercised pressure in the form
public shaming and aid cuts against non-cooperative countries, like Bolivia, Mexico
and Turkey. In Bolivia, for instance diplomatic relations were left at the chargé level
for 16 months starting in 1980 and all INM activities were suspended in the wake of
the 17 July 1980 take-over by a military junta involved in drug trafficking, led by Luis
García Meza.

U.S. officials' perceptions of Colombia's performance in the war against drugs were
related to several factors. The statistics of actions in terms of seized drugs, aircrafts,
chemicals, and arrests, gave the impression that Colombian law enforcement officials
were active. For instance, Colombia's 1982 report to the UN Commission on Narcotic

57 Arrieta et al, Narcotráfico, p. 313.
58 U.S. House, FARPA, FY 1980, p. 266. Twenty years later the Bogotá Embassy was unable
to outmanoeuvre INM and its allegations against Samper's corruption, which led to the 1995-
1997 crisis, as analysed in chapters 8 and 9.
59 Musto, The American Disease, p, 250.
60 PPP, Nixon, 1972, pp. 874-5.
Drugs, which it also circulated to U.S. officials, gave an excellent impression. Drugs seized included: 18,531,017 bushes of coca leaf, 651,458 kilograms of cocaine, 8,509,261 plants of cannabis and 5,196,362 doses of sedatives and tranquillisers, and the number of seizures made by the National Police rose from 448 in 1981 to 1,051 in 1982. Legal developments, new anti-drug units and the implementation of programs also signalled commitment.

In the United States, most insufficiencies in Colombia's drug control were explained by the still nascent stage of the programmes, or in the worst case, by the 'unique' nature of the Colombian challenge (being source of three drugs), which 'naturally' made law enforcement difficult. Also, soul-searching led American policy-makers to justify both the lack of overall success among drug war allies as a consequence of their own 'period of great ambivalence', as Senator Cohen called it, referring to the years of marihuana decriminalisation in the United States. That the 'drug problem', as serious as it was, still ranked relatively low in the overall security agenda of both the United States and Colombia also helped. The drug trade was not seen as a major structural impediment to the overriding U.S. foreign policy goal, namely containing Communism, which shaped the way in which other topics were conceived.

However, the most crucial factors preventing conflict lie at the base of friendly relations. This base encompassed encrusted perceptions of mutual convergence on broad and ideas of democracy and capitalism. In terms of drugs, Colombia could be 'the most visible drug country in South America' by 1981, as Staff Counsel from the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Howard L. Shapiro remarked. Yet, after all, it was a 'functioning democracy with two parties, with an independent legislative', and 'like any other democracy [it] goes into periodic electoral periods', as U.S. Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt reminded senators scrutinising drug programmes in a

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1981 hearing. The testing ground for affinity was on issues that still remained unconnected to drugs. Later on, drugs would be linked, in a substantive way, to major political and economic topics, which eventually changed the concepts of bilateral cooperation.

Aiming at setting drugs into perspective, the following section looks further into the bilateral relationship uncovering the dynamic by which established perceptions of political cooperation were able to remain unchallenged.

3. Maintaining the Foundations of Good Relations

In the early 1970s, drug prohibition received a strong political boost with long-lasting effects. However, in relative political terms, the first ripples were still faint. Illegal drugs had become a permanent point of the bilateral agenda and there were occasional memorable flashes of the drug issue into high politics, but in essence, drugs were merely a social evil and not determinant in political diplomatic terms --at least for U.S.-Colombian relations. Judgements over Colombia's value as an ally in world politics were not based on drug control performance and mutual perceived identities remained stable, actually nurtured by ongoing collaboration across the board.

The main issues that dominated much of U.S.-Latin American relations throughout the 1970s were underdevelopment, U.S. limited investment, and trade restrictions. Latin American leaders' hopes to attain substantive economic development through the Alliance for Progress had unquestionably vanished. And with the U.S.-Soviet détente in the background, awareness of a world divided into North-South, as opposed to East-West, increased. The potential for permanent relegation to an inferior 'international class' raised the level of anxiety among the Latin American have-nots. But there was another side to the coin. Latin America's political confidence was boosted by United

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62 U.S. Senate, INCP, p. 34; U.S. Senate, INT, p.117.
63 U.S. Senate, INT, pp. 119, 185.
States' tarnished prestige affected after the mistakes in Vietnam and the 1973 oil shock. There was light at the end of tunnel, a good opportunity to increase Latin America's bargaining power. But the outcome was, again, tension in the hemisphere.

Most Latin American countries opted for a four-tier response to both underdevelopment and U.S. power. First, they tried to alter the world market structure through multilateral negotiations at the international level with the 1974 pact for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Second, they diversified their international political and economic relations. Third, they engaged in regional and sub-regional integration agreements that excluded the United States. In particular, the Nixon and Ford governments, advised by Henry Kissinger, feared the political and psychological effects of an anti-American block. Finally, Latin Americans opted for economic nationalism with strong anti-American overtones. Expropriations, which had already began in the late 1960s, continued in the 1970s touching a highly sensitive chord of public and private U.S. interests.

The U.S.-Colombian bilateral relationship unravelled within this atmosphere. Colombians went from cheering the plans for Alliance for Progress projects in the late 1950s, and becoming its showcase in the 1960s, to bitterly resenting its failure in the 1970s. On 11 October 1972, Carlos Sanz de Santamaría, the Colombian presiding over the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress, resigned, and with it the Alliance was officially buried for Colombians.64 The hemisphere's economic problems were mostly attributed to U.S. unwillingness to cooperate, and Colombians longed for the Roosevelt and Kennedy days of 'hope' and 'dialogue' --the 'Belle Epoque'-- and kept on wishing for their very own Marshall Plan.65

Complaints stemmed from the economic and psychological dependency on the United States, but also from Colombia's new Third World identity. The Liberal

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64 MRE, 1972-1973, p. 5.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Liévano claimed that the wealth of industrialised countries was possible due to a 'skewed international economic order put in place by power and force whereby the goods of the tropical zones had less value than the goods of the North'. In every single speech to the UN General Assembly and the OAS General Assembly from 1970 to 1982 diplomats depicted the grievances of less developed peoples; bitterly denounced the economic order upheld by industrialised countries; and demanded from them, especially the United States, concrete actions, such as lowering tariffs for commodities (raw materials) and manufactures, making soft loans available, augmenting the level of aid, allowing for higher raw material prices, transferring technology, and increasing foreign investment under favourable bargains for the host economies.

Not only Colombian rhetoric, but concrete policies dubbed the antagonist mood of its neighbours and other less developed countries. Colombia participated actively in the NIEO proposals emanating from UN Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In the early 1970s it applied to join the Non-Aligned Movement, entering as full member later on in 1983, and also formed part of the G-77. Sub-regional integration was highly promoted, especially under López. Colombia led the formation of the Andean Pact, which became operational in 1970; made part of the new Sistema Económico Latinoamericano since 1975; and continued supporting the 1961 Latin America Free Trade Agreement and its re-vamped version the Latin American Integration Association, in place since 1980. International relations were further 'universalised' under the banners of Minister Vázquez's 'ideological pluralism' in 1970-1976 and President López's 'Respice Similia' in 1974-1978, both of which advocated Third World cooperation.

67 For a review of Colombia and regional integration see Leonardo Carvajal, Integración, pragmatismo y utopia en América Latina (Bogotá: TM, CEI and Universidad Externado de Colombia, 1993).
Amidst this atmosphere, López and his Minister of Finance Rodrigo Botero decided to phase out USAID soft loans alleviating balance of payment deficits. Peace Corps also left. At first López argued that coffee revenues enabled Colombia to dispense with USAID loans, which were originally intended to be transitory. Later, in 1985, López revealed deeper concerns about USAID:

The fragile memory of Colombians forget how in other times, officials from AID had a seat in the Ministry of Finance and inspired policies of our government to the extreme that, being foreigners, they represented Colombia in international fora and assisted ministers in parliamentary debates.

The retirement of USAID from Colombia was portrayed as an heroic act of dignity and independence.

But once more --to the dismay of some and joy of others-- Washington and the U.S. Embassy did not perceive Colombia's policies during the uninspiring Pastrana administration (1970-1074), the charismatic López years (1974-1978) and Turbay's pragmatic regime (1978-1982) as a serious challenge. Washington saw the phasing out of USAID as a routine procedure since Alliance for Progress loans were being halted elsewhere in Latin America. Besides, the last USAID projects were actually negotiated in 1976; pipeline money --US$ 39 million-- remained until 1979; and USAID continued to be involved in anti-narcotics programmes as a contractor agency at least until 1978. For his part, López, the leader most likely to stage confrontations with the United States in this period due to his social-democrat bent and closeness to Europe, announced that Colombia would 'avoid radical behaviour' towards the United States.

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68 Fernando Cepeda and Rodrigo Pardo, 'La política exterior colombiana', in Nueva Historia de Colombia, 3, pp. 60-1.
69 Ibid.
70 Interview with Ambassador Vyron Peter Vacky, Washington D.C., September 1999.
72 Presidencia, Documentos-discursos, 8, p. 35-7.
Colombia welcomed the 1974 Tariff Act with open arms, and at the fourth UNCTAD meeting (1975-1976), López joined Brazil, Chile and Argentina in collective support for Henry Kissinger's plan of stabilising raw material prices through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Colombia continued to request joining in on GATT and left aside the NIEO proposals, which had gone too far left for its interests. Rather, Colombia wanted to improve its terms for trade and attract further capital, not to embrace socialism out of principle. Thus, for instance, in 1971, Vásquez was assuring Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs William Rogers that the Andean Pact would not exclude U.S. investment.

Colombia posed little threat in terms of converting itself into a xenophobic regional leader. Plus, regional integration, whether in liberal terms (a tool for trade) or in its realist version (balancing power), turned out to be wishful thinking. The Andean Pact had crumbled almost upon inception with Chile's withdrawal and excessive concessions made to Bolivia and Ecuador. Most importantly, though supportive of sub-regional integration, Colombian officials envisaged regional management only with the United States. In the OAS, for example, Colombia was less than enthusiastic about Peru's proposal to make of the organisation a purely Latin American one. 73

As for economic nationalism, Colombia was far from radical and never expropriated American assets. While Pastrana lectured Rogers on the right of periphery countries to develop he also assured him Colombia was not going to turn into Salvador Allende's Chile. 74 Political and legal guarantees to American investment were key taking into account the region's record. Peru's left wing military junta expropriated the International Petroleum Company (subsidiary of the Standard Oil of New Jersey) in 1969. In October 1969 Bolivia nationalised the holdings of Gulf Oil Company. In 1971 Ecuador seized 100 California tuna boats. Peru and Mexico applied

74 Ibid, p. 182.
Chapter 3, Introducing Cooperation

the 200-mile sea limit to the United States creating problems for U.S. vessels. From 1970 to 1973, Chile expropriated the copper mines and Venezuela nationalised the oil industry in 1976. In Colombia, however, only communists, represented by 1% of the electorate in 1975, and guerrillas, actually demanded full economic re-orientation with both socialist and nationalist tones.\(^75\)

If avoiding radical behaviour was true for economic issues it also applied to other regional politics. The Panama Canal treaties constituted the single most awesome foreign policy challenge and López dealt aptly with the affair.\(^76\) The treaties began as a major source of discomfort to Bogotá, for the Department of State failed to communicate and consult Colombia early enough on its intentions to negotiate. New treaties impinged directly on Colombia's interests; if the United States turned control to Panama, Colombia was in danger of losing its usage rights of the Canal as stipulated in the 1914 Urrutia-Thompson treaty. By 1974, little progress had been made, and once in power, López altered Colombia's strategy.\(^77\) He understood that negotiating with the Department of State disregarded Panamanian pride and nationalism, and thus approached Panama using the good offices of Venezuela and Costa Rica, and on 29 July 1975, Omar Torrijos announced that Colombia could retain its rights on the Canal after it came back to Panamanian administration. Once the Colombian issue was solved, López then turned to mediate between the United States and Panama. López became an advocate of the Panamanian cause, couched as a Latin American one, but also a U.S. friend on the issue.\(^78\) After his meeting with López on 6 September 1977, Carter remarked:

So far, as I know, the relations between the United States and Colombia are excellent. It means a lot to us in this country to have the people of Colombia supporting the Panama Canal Treaty that has been evolved

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\(^{75}\) Bushnell, 'Colombia', p. 410.

\(^{76}\) See also MRE, 1974-1976, p. 17-20; and MRE, 1977-1978, p. 15-20.


\(^{78}\) Presidencia, Documentos-discursos, 19, p. 23-8; MRE, 1972-1973, pp. 35-41; Interview with Vacky.
between the United States and Panama. And I think it is very accurate to say that President López has been very helpful during the negotiations themselves.\textsuperscript{79}

The United States assured Colombia the maintenance of its special rights in the Canal, as long as its presence in Panama continued.

The approach to Cuba is also an interesting test case to examine the degree of bilateral convergence on regional foreign policy issues and U.S. perceptions of Colombia's alliance. During his administration, Pastrana timidly called for a revision of the 1964 sanctions to Cuba on the grounds of ideological pluralism. López, evoking Latin American solidarity, pushed the issue further; he became an advocate of Cuba's re-integration into the hemispheric community, and reinstated diplomatic relations with the island in March 1975. In reality, Colombia's policy towards the island was based on a combination of political principles, the pursuit for regional leadership, but also strategic concerns, and it was the security aspect that Americans sympathised with. Kissinger welcomed López's prudent strategy to prevent Cuba from exporting its Marxist revolution to Colombia, which contrasted with Mexico's active cooperation with Castro.\textsuperscript{80}

Later on Turbay formulated a Caribbean policy explicitly aligned with American interests. Since 1979, many in Washington saw the urgency to isolate Cuba believing it would turn away from Africa and focus on Latin America.\textsuperscript{81} Amidst the increase of guerrilla activity in Colombia, Turbay was also keen to avoid a direct flow of funds, troops and weapons from Cuba. Colombia was willing to sign a special military agreement with the United States to cooperate in both counterinsurgency and anti-drug operations through the construction of an American military base in the island of San Andrés. The deal failed after exploratory contacts were leaked to the press, but Colombia joined the United States in the Group of Nassau, which soon became

\textsuperscript{79}PPP, Carter, 1977, 2, p. 1537-8.
Reagan's Caribbean Base Initiative.\textsuperscript{82} It also officially suspended relations with Cuba in 1979 when Castro's regime was linked to the Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19) massive assault plan from Southern Colombia. Colombia's initiatives were praised in the usual generous diplomatic fashion during Vice President George Bush's visit to Bogotá in 1981, in which he said: 'Many talk about the need for peace: Not as many contribute to achieving it. Colombia does. Colombia's participating in an areas that is critical to all mankind'.\textsuperscript{83} On the whole, Colombia was able to balance harmoniously its desire for regional leadership, its Latin American identity, and its quest for recognition as a Western cosmopolitan state resulting in on going friendship with the United States.\textsuperscript{84} In the 1970s, Colombia had slowly earned the right to mature dissent on foreign policy issues as long as basic tenets of the U.S.-Colombian friendship were maintained.

Finally, Colombia's democratic status gained special salience given the regional political context. By 1978 there were dictatorships in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. Military authority had heavily permeated civilian rule in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico and Nicaragua, and only Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela held on to electoral systems.\textsuperscript{85} It is true that U.S. administrations at times chose to turn a blind eye to non-democratic regimes in Latin America or even welcome dictators if they proved functional to other interests (such as stability or the protection of private property); it is also true that U.S. officials leaned towards narrow conceptions of democracy, that is holding elections. However, the status of democracy on Latin

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{DOS Bulletin} 80/ 2040.

\textsuperscript{82} Bruce M. Bagley and Juan G. Tokatlian, 'La política exterior de Colombia durante la década de los 80: Los límites de un poder regional', in Heraldo Muñoz and Carlos Portales (eds.), \textit{Las políticas exteriores de América Latina y el Caribe: continuidad en la crisis} (Buenos Aires: GEL, 1987), pp. 77-209.

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{DOS Bulletin} 82/2058.

\textsuperscript{84} An exception was the Latin American resentment against Turbay's failure to condemn Reagan and Britain during the Argentine-British Malvinas conflict.
American countries mattered for U.S. officials. They generally regretted the failure of democracy and overtly reminded Latin American neighbours of U.S. preference for democracy.

In 1977, in what seemed to be an improvement of U.S. foreign policy and its commitment to further democracy, both the Executive and Congress began to monitor the state of human rights in the hemisphere, and those who failed to show acceptable behaviour were punished through the withdrawal of economic and military aid. Prepared by the Political Section at the Embassy in Bogotá, yearly reports began describing Colombia's general political and economic situation, and in particular the human rights violations. These included, for instance, Turbay's state of siege; decrees 1923 of 6 September 1978 and 1244 of 4 October 1978 restricting sea and air traffic on security grounds; incidents of tortures during the crackdown on guerrillas; restrictions on demonstrations; military trials against the M-19, the rise of right-wing paramilitarism; and even the beginnings of the 'dirty war' between military, ex-guerrillas, guerrillas and paramilitaries. Reports were fairly accurate in terms of data, but failed to provide any meaning to events and did not make the state responsible for killings. Hence, reports failed to convey the idea that the political environment in Colombia could be deteriorating. For U.S. officials, Colombia continued to be an 'open society' amiable to unrestricted debate on human rights, and a 'strong, functioning multiparty democracy'. Besides, democracies were not expected to violate human rights, and Colombia's record seemed relatively reasonable in contrast to its neighbours. Turbay's law enforcement excesses did not compare to General Humberto Castello Branco's Operação Limpueza, which rounded up 50,000 persons in

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87 Besides, reports appeared to justify the toughened hand of the state given the rise of guerrilla incursions.
few months, or to Pinochet's repression which included the execution of nearly 3,000 persons.  

To the factors that may explain why the violation of human rights were not a Washington concern may be added Colombia's international discourse in favour of human rights protection; its adherence to regional and world conventions (in 1978 Colombia and Costa Rica were the first ones to sign the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights); the lack of advocacy NGOs pressing the topic specifically in Washington; and the focus on systematic human rights violations by authoritarian regimes. Colombian officials' own emphasis of what they believed was Colombian 'exceptionalism' regarding democracy and human rights was evident international fora. For example, at the UN Vázquez advertised the Frente Nacional as a clear example of democracy amidst a 'convoluted and confused world shaken by protests and revolution'. He also underscored the positive implications for international order: Colombia's 'traditional' and 'outstanding denial' to use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states. U.S. officials legitimised Colombia's image by indulging in equally generous rhetoric. In 1977, for instance, Carter said Colombia was 'committed to the purest form of democracy', and was a 'very fine example for the rest of the world to follow'. Colombia was, therefore, entitled to discuss side-by-side with the United States, about regional politics.

To conclude, the first phase of drug control cooperation (1970-1981) had elements of change and continuity. Colombia held on to its reputation and to friendly relations with the United States. Colombia became internationally known for drug trafficking,

88 CRHRP, 1979, p. 279 and CRHRP, 1983, p. 508
89 Schoultz argues that Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, modern authoritarianism, came to symbolise violation of human rights in Latin America in Washington policy-making circles., Schoultz, Human Rights.
90 In general, Keck and Sikkink make a similar argument to explain why Mexico's poor human rights record became an issue only as late as the 1990s, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in International Policy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 110-16.
91 MRE, pp. 31-4.
as media in the United States reported mostly on mafia stories. Colombian leaders and the ruling elite were extremely conscious about the bad press, and jealously guarded their traditional image of good behaviour. Assuring the external world that Colombia was a reliable member of the international community was pursued by public overtures in favour prohibition, as well as institutional changes inside Colombia, even if largely ineffective.

There were, however, important precedents that set the tone for the next phase, and consequently, for future changes in crucial dimensions of the relationship. First, drugs became a permanent item in the agenda, and the door was open for drugs to gain relevance. In a 1981 hearing of the U.S. Senate, Congressman Sam Nunn asked Ambassador Boyatt: 'is it also going to be a key factor that Colombia is going to have to know that we consider [drugs] to be a centerpiece or the centerpiece in our bilateral relations?' The answer was the centerpiece. Second, cooperation initiated and was expected to continue its course. Third and last, particular ideas underlying U.S. drug policy became entrenched in political institutions. In that same hearing Ambassador Boyatt said:

I think that every person that comes up here is going to agree with the proposition that the closer you get to the source, the cheaper and the more effective your operation. And the source is overseas. That is where the plants are. That is where the chemicals are. Therefore that is where our resources should be concentrated.

Nunn suggested transferring the DEA to Colombia, as if it were a routine bureaucratic reform. The next chapter will focus on the progressive expansion of prohibition and cooperation.

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93 U.S. Senate, *INT*, p. 190.
Chapter 4

BUSINESS AS USUAL, 1981-1989

This chapter deals with the second phase of bilateral drug control cooperation, in which drug control cooperation slowly expanded. Colombia was lauded for its efforts despite the imminent growth of illegal cultivation and drug trafficking, the spread of drug-related violence and the emergence of narco-guerrillas amidst the Second Cold War. Drug cooperation was assessed in the usual flexible manner and guided by perceptions of political affinity. Changes in the overall pattern of U.S.-Colombian relations were still minor, and the only meaningful political development was that illegal drugs were permanently stamped onto the bilateral agenda.

The first section attests to the dynamic nature of the understandings of the drug problem and examines how policy makers in Colombia progressively began to think of the drug problem, specifically drug trafficking, as a security threat. It argues that the security ideational framework underpinned the continuation of U.S.-Colombian cooperation in the war against drugs, despite some of the potential short and long-term costs for Colombia of implementing certain drug control measures, such as extradition. The second section turns to the United States to look at the evolution of the U.S. drug certification procedures in the 1980s. This was a process fuelled by the progressive securitisation of the drug problem, bureaucratic procedures ingrained in the U.S. public administration system and Congressional-Executive inter-branch politics. This thesis points to the constitutive function of certification in that it defines the essence of cooperation and who cooperating and defecting actors are. For more than twenty years
the drug certification procedure contributed to legitimising Colombia as a suitable partner in the war against drugs irrespective of its failure to curb the growth of the illegal drug industry. Finally, the third section describes how, in practice, the U.S. perceived and evaluated Colombia's cooperation in the war against drugs. It examines how drug politics and the rise of narco-guerrillas were played out amidst the Second Cold War and in the context of other political and economic issues in the U.S.-Colombian agenda, such as the Central American wars, the Latin American debt crisis, and Western hemisphere democratisation and economic liberalisation.

1. Articulating Colombian Drug Policies and Cooperative Initiatives with the United States

During the 1980s, political and academic debates in Colombia and the United States on the drug problem tackled three main questions. Whether the demand or supply of drugs stimulated the growth of the industry; how drug trafficking constituted a threat and to whom; and which type of policy and combination of strategies best addressed the problem. Discussions interwove policy makers' world views, ideas of national self, interests in domestic politics and bureaucratic concerns, the ingrained practices of anti-drug and foreign policy agencies, as well as the understandings of the threats posed by the drug trade. In the end, despite doubts and questions, prohibition in Colombia and cooperation with the United States were furthered. The main factors behind this were Colombia's struggle to maintain its Western identity, the desire to interact in global markets, the understanding that drugs posed a security threat and specific domestic political needs of the time. This section looks at the way in which interests and perceptions enabled certain practices of drug cooperation in the 1980s.
Police, Eradication, Herbicides and Early Military Collaboration

The administration of Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) and Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) inherited the Colombian Anti-Narcotics Police (ANP) unit from the Turbay-Carter agreements and continued to foster its work. ANP became 'the focus of U.S. assistance' and the linchpin of bilateral drug cooperation. The United States had 'a great deal of confidence' in ANP and many agents believed it was the cleanest in Latin America. By 1984, ANP had 11 companies of 100 men each and 11 intelligence units for which the U.S. provided everything, from fuel to gear, except for salaries and personnel costs. U.S. and Colombian authorities hand-picked another 54 agents to form an anti-narcotics unit within the F-2, the investigative branch of the former Procuraduría. In addition, the U.S. was helping to improve six police bases with aircraft capacity.

Once counternarcotic forces engaged in aerial spraying in operation zones marked by guerrilla hostility, U.S. and Colombian policy makers realised they needed additional protection in the form of armoured vehicles and improved intelligence capabilities based on time-sensitive aerial photo reconnaissance. Counternarcotics raids in the jungle also required cargo planes that could transport an entire police or military company. Further materiel was also justified by Colombia's role as a hub for regional collaborative initiatives. In 1985, for example, police forces from Colombia and Ecuador patrolled together along the Putumayo river in interdiction exercises. And in 1987 the ANP cooperated with authorities in Caracas, Lima and Quito using a U.S-funded regional communications network.

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2 Ibid.
5 U.S. House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Drug Control, Latin American Study Missions Concerning International Narcotics Problems, 3-19 August 1985, p. 22.
DEA personnel and activity in Colombia increased. The ceiling for in-country DEA agents was raised to 16 in 1985, and other Embassy personnel devoted time to illegal drugs topics.\(^7\) There were joint operations with the U.S. Coast Guard, such as the 1982 Operación Tiburón in the Caribbean, where Colombia authorised U.S. Coast Guard cutters to seize and, when necessary, use disabling fire against Colombian trafficking boats headed towards the United States.\(^8\) There was also an operation against a complex of six coca-processing laboratories in Guaviare nicknamed Tranquilandia. The hit against Tranquilandia was a typical law enforcement cooperative operation. The operation involved 42 ANP officers backed by the Colombian Special Operations Group, satellite capabilities of the U.S. National Security Agency, and DEA agents travelling directly to the location or providing intelligence support from Bogotá.\(^9\)

Eradicating illegal crops became one of ANP's main tasks. In spite of the high security risks and costs of operating in FARC-controlled areas, U.S. drug policy officials insisted eradication was the least costly and most efficient of all strategies because it was implemented 'closest to the source'.\(^10\) U.S. Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt found other advantages to eradication: 'You cannot bribe a plant. Plants cannot move. They are not mobile'.\(^11\) The Colombian government worried about spraying in guerrilla territory, especially amidst peace negotiations and periods of truce, and sporadically ANP's operations were temporarily interrupted. But ANP never lost its focus and embraced the development of improved eradication operations along U.S. recommendations. Minister of Justice Enrique Parejo and especially ANP were key in advocating in Colombian policy-making circles the need to switch from manual to

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\(^10\) INCSR, 1985, p. 8
herbicidal methods against marijuana. With ANP, U.S. policy-makers had not only founded an institution with compatible interests, but had opened an alternate access to the Colombian drug policy decision-making processes. The CNE approved testing on marijuana in December 1983, manual spraying began in May 1984 and by the end of that year 3,400 hectares had been eradicated using that method.

In 1987, ANP was reformed and upgraded within the Colombian National Police structure. It now had a tactical branch, an investigative and intelligence branch, and was provided with an official air-wing. The introduction of aerial spraying prompted the creation of the ANP air-wing—the fastest growing element of Colombia's anti-narcotics program. In 1988 it had 255 men, 14 fixed-winged and 21 rotary-wing aircraft, a central base in Bogotá and three advanced bases in key narcotics areas.

According to some U.S. officials, the war against drugs had entered a new phase after glyphosate, the herbicide for aerial spraying, had been put in use. The logistic and tactical demands inherent to eradication and interdiction activities led the Colombian government to welcoming U.S. military assistance and considering the selective participation of Colombian military in counternarcotic operations. The military had adequate materiel and skills to perform many of the jobs, such as blowing up clandestine airstrips or patrolling the high seas.

Of equal importance to this trend in U.S.-Colombian collaboration was the progressive shift in Colombian and U.S. understandings of the drug problem in terms of a security problem, which underpinned their policy options. In part, the shift began occurring once political attention focused on drug mafias and the ways they affected everyday functions of foreign governments and by extension the United States, mainly

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12 Parejo was a staunch advocate of prohibition and punitive measures but believed the United States conveniently focused on source eradication while ignoring demand suppression. For Parejo's role see Gugliotta and Leen, *Kings of Cocaine*, p. 177 and U.S. House, *Latin American Study*, pp. 20-2.
14 *INCSR*, 1987, p. 95.
through the exported drugs. '[T]his isn't a question any longer of drug addicts and cocaine users. This is a question of our national security,' cautioned Democratic Representative Charles Rangel, one of the U.S. leaders in the formulation of drug policy.\textsuperscript{16} Following the same spirit, Barco characterised drug trafficking in his inaugural address of 1986 as 'one of the gravest crimes against humanity' and pledged to save 'civilisation of its perverse effects'.\textsuperscript{17}

Colombia's perception of drug trafficking as a security threat stemmed largely from domestic circumstances which increased the receptivity of U.S. ideas and policies heading in the same direction.\textsuperscript{18} Increasingly during the 1980s, Colombian traffickers resorted to violent methods to protect the drug industry and persuade government officials to block extradition to the United States and agree to negotiate an amnesty for drug traffickers. Members of the Medellín cartel assassinated government officials, judges and journalists. Colombians were shocked by the deaths of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla on 30 April 1984; the magistrate of the Supreme Court of Justice Hernando Baquero Borda on 31 July 1986; the director of the daily \textit{El Espectador} Luis Guillermo Cano on 17 December 1986; and other public figures. Drug mafia-funded paramilitary groups unleashed a wave of massacres in rural villages of the Magdalena Medio. These were intended to target guerrilla members because of their involvement in the kidnappings of wealthy drug traffickers. Drug traffickers had also fostered 'training schools' that taught an entire generation of hit-men (sicarios) readily available for hire. They ordered bomb attacks that terrorised Bogotá, Cali and Medellín for most of the 1980s and until 1992.

\textsuperscript{16} U.S. House, Select Committee on Narcotic Drugs and Drug Control, \textit{Colombian Drug Trafficking and Control}, 6 May 1987, p. 4.
In addition to narco-violence, Colombia faced other domestic security challenges, such as insurgency and high levels of urban criminality. Betancur unsuccessfully pursued peace negotiations with the various guerrilla groups, which continued to fund their activities with taxes charged to coca growing peasants and drug laboratories operating in guerrilla-controlled zones. Subsequently, in 1986, the Barco administration inherited the unresolved insurgency problem as well as the growing drug-related violence.

Thus, the Betancur and Barco governments began allowing selective and temporary U.S. and Colombian military participation in drug control activities. For instance, based on special powers granted by martial law provisions Betancur authorised military courts to try drug offenders. Betancur also allowed U.S. interdiction operations Hat Trick I and II to blockade the Colombian coast using U.S. naval vessels. Often, the Colombian Armed Forces accepted the counternarcotics function as a way to receive military assistance; for example the Colombian Minister of Defence General Miguel Vega Uribe did not hesitate to request the lease or transfer of military aircraft and helicopters during the U.S. Select Committee’s visit to Bogotá in 1985. Barco granted special powers to the military by which their reports constituted judicial proofs and authorised the Judicial Police to intercept communications in anti-drug operations.

The Colombian experience with military assistance differed from trends in other countries in two ways. First, Colombia did not see such visible and controversial deployments of U.S. troops as the 6-month Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia in 1986

22 U.S. House, Narcotics Interdiction, p. 69; Presidencia de la República, Informe al Congreso. Tomo V (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1990), p. 64
or the intrusive Operation Snow Cap launched in 1987. Second, there were no major diplomatic fallouts related to the participation of U.S. or Colombian military forces, as in Bolivia and Peru. Clashes between Colombian and U.S. diplomats were related to assigning command responsibilities to U.S. officers in joint operations that involved American military assets, and granting U.S. authorities a blanket authorisation to enter territorial waters without a case-by-case notification.

In the end, narco-violence was progressively altering the mindset of the Colombian public and policy makers, and triggered a consensus over the security nature of threats posed by drug trafficking as well as the need to address them. However, Colombians disagreed on the best way to fight illicit traffic and narco-violence, wondering whether to fight drug cartels with draconian measures, including special mandates to security forces and extradition, or to negotiate a retirement.

Extradition and Its Alternatives

In an attempt to surmount initial legal difficulties for the ratification of the 1979 Treaty of Extradition, U.S. Embassy officials used informal contacts inside the Colombian Ministry of Justice to influence the system from within. Acquiescent, the Ministry liaised with the Supreme Court of Justice. Legal obstacles were cleared, and the Colombian Congress ratified extradition in 1981. But against U.S. expectations,

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24 Interview with Clemencia Forero, Viceminister for the Americas, Bogotá May 1999. U.S. and Colombian rationales and preferences on the use of military personnel for drug control activities under the Andean Strategy are discussed in detail in chapter 5.

25 Despite condemnation of drug mafias by the state and many sectors of the public, the Cali cartel in particular was able to penetrate government and political parties through bribery and coercion. Also, money bought them access to clubs and legal businesses where they networked.

Colombian authorities hesitantly and irregularly enforced the treaty during the following decade.

Extradition has often been singled out in the literature of U.S.-Colombian relations as the single most controversial issue. Indeed, what should have been a routine legal tool to facilitate the prosecution of criminals would become in time a political fixation of U.S. policy makers, a security dilemma for Colombia, and an indicator of Colombia's political (un)willingness in the war against drugs, as illustrated in the following chapters. Yet, early difficulties were managed with tolerance.

Betancur's ideas about the United States' role in the world, Colombia's identity, and its position vis à vis the United States informed his drug policy choices. He advocated social change, the cause of underdeveloped nations, and non-alignment in international politics.²⁷ Thus in 1983, the Colombian leader vetoed (Resolutions 217 and 226 of November 1983) a Supreme Court ruling in favour of the United States' first two extradition requests on the grounds they ran counter to a fair expression of autonomy and dignified national identity.²⁸ But the government's official position on extradition was not set. Several high-ranking officials in the Colombian Executive and Judicial branches had reservations on extradition, and no solid consensus existed. Evidence of ambivalence came about when Minister of Justice Lara pushed in favour of the measure and announced in September 1983 that the government was reconsidering extradition. Unfortunately, Lara's support for the measure proved costly for him and he was assassinated on 30 April 1984 by the Medellín group. Subsequent public dismay pushed Betancur towards reinstating extradition, which he could afford to do without appearing to betray his nationalist ideals, and in May 1984 Betancur sanctioned the

²⁷ For a critical account of Betancur's thought and policies see Alfredo Vásquez Carrizosa, *Betancur y la crisis nacional* (Bogotá: Ediciones Aurora, 1986), pp. 81-112. Betancur also had political domestic interests in rejecting extradition, for the wording of the treaty could have resulted in the extradition of guerrillas with whom he attempted peace negotiations, see U.S. House, *Latin American Study*, p 19.
extradition of Carlos Lehder. Nine other traffickers were sent to the United States in 1984 and 1985.

Once the treaty was being implemented, the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs Augusto Ramírez and the Ambassador in Washington Rodrigo Lloreda dealt with derived difficulties, such as the legal, political and public treatment of Colombian prisoners. These were politically significant issues for Colombians and had an impact on the opportunities for further cooperation with the United States, because televised images of Colombian prisoners in the United States exacerbated Colombian nationalism and, by default, anti-Americanism, thereby reducing public support for the war against drugs.

Voices against extradition increased, supported by those whose lives were threatened by the mafia, others who genuinely questioned its virtues in curbing trafficking, but also by corrupt public officials serving as emissaries for drug traffickers. The Supreme Court, whose members had persistently received threats, proceeded in December 1986 to declare the treaty void based on technicalities. In 25 June 1987 they overruled Barco's Executive law that sought to bypass their December vote. By then, the U.S. Congress was progressively clinging onto extradition and sought to pressure other countries to enforce it by introducing explicit legislation in to their foreign assistance law (see drug certification below). One of their incentives was political: imprisoned kingpins displayed in the U.S. media accrued political assets. On the other hand, kingpin Ochoa's frequent and successful evasion of prosecution and prison in Colombia, as well as the scandal related to the death of DEA agent Enrique Camarena in Mexico, exaggerated the place of extradition in Western Hemisphere

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29 Cepeda, 'La lucha por la autonomía', p. 214.

30 Matthiesen speaks of 'nationalist' and 'internationalist' forces regarding extradition, Matthiesen, *El arte político de conciliar*, p. 164.
drug diplomacy. Effectively, Congress's move was turning extradition into an indicator of political willingness to fight the war against drugs.

Meanwhile, ambivalence in Colombia continued, although Barco was stubbornly inclined to cooperate with extradition. Fernando Cepeda, Minister of Communications and close advisor to Barco, was instrumental in the bilateral attempt to surmount the legal obstacles to extradition. Cepeda, believed extradition was valuable both to drug control and to the maintenance of good U.S.-Colombian relations. He also believed it increased the possibility of future gains in terms of drug-related aid or good favour on other non-drug issues. Thus, Cepeda arranged in 1987 for attorneys from the legal division of the Department of State and advisors from the Department of Justice to work for six months with selected Colombian experts to find a way to implement extradition. Finally, on 16 August 1989, Barco's cabinet re-enacted extradition. The next day the Medellin mafia assassinated presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán.

This type of cooperation helped maintain Barco's credibility as a drug warrior in the eyes of Americans, especially at a time when negotiating a retirement of the main drug lords appeared to be an option. The secret 1983 'Panama talks' authorised by Betancur had first explored the possibility of taking up the trafficker's offer to quit their enterprise, turn over processing labs and repatriate their assets if extradition was abolished and they were given 'reasonable' sentences. But the government had not been forthcoming due to a lack of consensus among politicians. Drug traffickers kept insisting on further negotiations, and from early 1988 until September 1989, the Secretary of the Presidency Germán Montoya met at least 10 times with former Minister of Finance Joaquín Vallejo, who was acting as an emissary transmitting the

31 INCSR, 1988, p. 88.
32 U.S. House, Colombian Drug Trafficking, p. 9. Fernando Cepeda mentioned he suspected of infiltrated mafia elements in the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is why he aimed to maintain the cooperation exercise within a restricted circle, interview, Bogotá, May 1999.
proposals of drug traffickers.\textsuperscript{33} Circumstances had turned precarious. This time, traffickers had began a terrorist campaign kidnapping Colombian officials and their relatives, killing prominent politicians and launching bomb attacks in order to press the Barco government into accepting an amnesty. Instead, the Barco administration stepped up the fight against the cartels, in particular Pablo Escobar and his associates.

While reiterating that negotiations were unacceptable, U.S. policy makers were understanding of the complexity of the situation and trusted Barco's resolve.\textsuperscript{34} Also, Colombia had advances to show in the development of punitive prohibition. The Estatuto Nacional de Estupefacientes (Law 31 of January 1986), a comprehensive framework for modern anti-narcotic legislation, provided sentences for up to 12 years for narcotics smuggling, one to three years for consumption, and from two to five years for chemical precursors trafficking. The Estatuto also contained legislation on the forfeiture of assets.\textsuperscript{35} Reforms to the Penal Code (Decrees 50-55) in 1987 established the Technical Police Bureau and the Forensic Institute, key bureaus in drug law enforcement. Also, decrees 1631 of 1987 and 181 of 1988 created special courts to process drug-related criminals. In 1988, threats and murders committed by drug traffickers were legally classified as terrorism.\textsuperscript{36} And, for the first time ever, Colombia introduced a plea bargain method advised by a group of U.S. officials, among them Deputy Counsel Minister Philip McLean and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South America Robert Gelbard, who believed Colombia could adapt elements from the U.S. plea bargain process and the Italian method using faceless judges.

\textsuperscript{33} Jorge Orlando Melo and Jaime Bermudez, 'La lucha contra el narcotráfico: exitos y limitaciones', in Malcolm Deas and Carlos Ossa, \textit{El gobierno Barco: política, economía y desarrollo social en Colombia: 1986-1990} (Bogotá: Fedesarrollo: Fondo Cultural Cafetero, 1994), p. 120. For an insider's version of the difficulties Montoya faced with the kidnapping of relatives see Rafael Pardo Rueda, \textit{De primera mano}, p. 197-207, esp. 198.

\textsuperscript{34} Interview with Philip McLean, Deputy Council Minister in the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá in 1988-1990, Washington D.C. August 1999.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{INCSR}, 1987, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{INCSR}, 1989, p. 72.
In the end, difficulties with extradition and rumours of amnesty during the Betancur and Barco governments did not provoke unmanageable diplomatic fallouts, and the need to find alternatives to extradition opened a new and highly fertile area of cooperation in justice sector reform, as illustrated in chapter 6.

**International Diplomacy**

Colombia's own diplomatic initiatives in international organisations also worked to shape and expand U.S.-Colombian bilateral action. This trend is illustrated by the events surrounding the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the cornerstone of contemporary prohibition.

The 1980s witnessed a new thrust in the construction of an international drug prohibition regime that paved the way to the 1988 Vienna Convention. On 11 August 1984, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela signed the Quito Declaration, which declared drug trafficking a crime against humanity. In October that same year, the New York Declaration Against Traffic and Use of Illegal Drugs, signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, requested the UN's Economic and Social Council to elaborate a Convention project against illegal drugs and drug trafficking. The 'Quito spirit' held together long enough to produce UN Resolution 39/141 of 14 December, which formally requested the General Assembly to prepare an international convention.\(^{37}\) In the 1984 UN General Assembly, Latin American and U.S. joint efforts led to the 'first-ever' speech on narcotics by a Secretary General. Besides, at the regional level, the OAS held the 1986 Inter-American Specialized Conference on Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, which gave birth to the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD).\(^ {38}\)

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Latin America, and Colombia in particular, were especially active in this trend, one of the reasons being the potential stakes given the high level of cocaine and marijuana production in the region. On Colombia's part, there was a genuine concern about the effects of drug trafficking as well as a more pragmatic drive to shape in their favour the distribution of gains and responsibilities of an international anti-prohibition regime. As debates on drug policy progressed to more concrete dimensions of its actual implementation on the ground, Colombia formed clearer views on a few relevant drug policy questions. To begin with, the Barco government articulated Colombia's understanding of drug cooperation into a more or less coherent political discourse set in concrete wording. The groundwork had been laid by López's and Betancur's constant reference to U.S. consumption being the key to 'the drug problem'. Then Barco and his closest collaborators on the topic, such as Cepeda, Parejo, Minister of Foreign Affairs Julio Londoño, and presidential advisor Gabriel Silva refined the argument and Colombia's position. They argued that U.S. efforts were scant when it came specifically to monitoring and penalising the production of precursor chemicals, the exporting of U.S. guns used by drug traffickers, and the laundering of drug profits. The United States had to 'take responsibility', they said, for its own participation in the chain that made up the illegal drug industry, which also included consumption. In addition, as much as the United States had domestic political and financial constraints to implementing draconian measures in these areas, it should acknowledge that Colombia too incurred costs in the war against drugs. Furthermore, Colombia called upon the United States, and other major consumer countries as well, to assist with crop substitution, local economic development programs, and trade preferences. Everyone was to be 'co-responsible'.
Barco used every opportunity at the UN and OAS assemblies, and also during official visits to stress these particular points.\textsuperscript{39} For instance, in the 1986 UN General Assembly, Barco asked consumer countries for the implementation of programs to penalise and discourage the consumption and trade of drugs.\textsuperscript{40} In 1987 he lectured foreign diplomats on the need to stop allowing financial institutions and banks within their territory to serve as a refuge to 'money stained with blood'.\textsuperscript{41} In 1988 Londoño included gun control within broader and more pressing global disarmament discussions, arguing that the international arms trade weakened Colombia's democracy because it provided narco-terrorists with weapons.\textsuperscript{42}

All these issues came to make part of the preparation and negotiation of the Vienna Convention. Meanwhile, for the convention, U.S. officials wanted mandatory and detailed provisions on eradication and extradition, the presence of U.S. law enforcement agents on foreign soil, but also a flexible approach on demand reduction. Above all, 'U.S. negotiators [were] unanimously opposed to what they would deem "politicization" of the Convention by the inclusion of references to social questions or to issues such as shared responsibility of the consumer nations to fund economic development in conjunction with drug eradication programs. U.S. negotiations would oppose in the same category references to special treatment for the problems of transit states who argue that they need special help because they are the victims of chance geographical location'.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{41} Presidencia, \textit{Informe al Congreso}, 5, p. 133.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid, p. 137.
The final text of the Convention combined the concerns on both sides, yet only one Article, number 14, addressed the elimination of illicit demand. Above all, he Convention locked Colombia and the United States into specific cooperation procedures at the operational level and included Article 10 on financial support to transit countries. Colombian negotiators were generally pleased with the results of the convention, believing they had set important precedents regarding U.S. responsibility. On the other hand, U.S. negotiators perceived they had been successful at blocking the ' politicization' of the Convention. In the end, there had been more coinciding interests than what had been expected before the Vienna meeting.


Developments in the United States pushed towards the further development of prohibition and cooperation in Colombia. In the 1980s U.S. drug policy came under heavy criticism from Republicans and Democrats in Congress. Members from the House Select Committee on Narcotic Drugs and Abuse as well as other committees held hearings, sent off study missions around the world, published numerous reports, and ordered meticulous General Accounting Office assessments of U.S. foreign drug policy. Members attributed the limited results of drug war allies to several factors: the belated and insufficient response of the Department of State, the alleged lack of White House leadership, the absence of high level diplomacy, and the use of quiet diplomacy. 'When last do you remember the President of the United States talking about them [drugs] with the same condemnation as he talks about a Fidel Castro?', asked Representative Rangel. Moreover, investigations leading to the U.S. Senate Kerry

Chapter 4, Business as Usual

Report on Central America and the Iran-Contra affair uncovered shameful links between the Department of Justice, U.S. security forces, the CIA and drug trafficking, which blatantly undermined the credibility of U.S. drug policy. At the same time, the DEA and the rest of the law enforcement community had joined congressional prodding to vindicate the torture and assassination of DEA agent Camarena.

Inter-bureaucratic politics between Congress and the Executive-branch became a crucial force behind the expansion of the prohibition machinery and prompted the progressive development of concrete tools to measure drug policy performance. Over-enthusiastic members of Congress introduced legislation to monitor the Executive-branch and had the tendency to expand foreign drug policy programs, and the Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics Matters (INM), directly responsible for the implementation of drug policy, welcomed to some extent the politics of pressure because it prioritised their own topic within the foreign policy realm and thereby guaranteed an institutional budget and their continuation within the bureaucracy. In reality, no governmental agency in Washington disputed the need to step up prohibition and international action. Congress, however, still had to exercise oversight and crafted mechanisms of evaluation. These gained particular technical, institutional and, eventually, political relevance. Here the General Accounting Office's (Congress' investigative arm) in situ monitoring and methodical reports proved highly functional in advancing prohibition within the U.S. bureaucracy and beyond U.S. borders.

Furthermore, the oversight of U.S. agencies inevitably turned into a microscopic scrutiny of foreign countries, among them Colombia. In 1987, for example, the General Accounting Office (GAO) stated: 'We observed that U.S. monitoring of Colombian marijuana controls tended to be informal and infrequent. We believe that oversight of this program could be enhanced if U.S. officials more closely monitored the operation.' In the same report, GAO further warned the administration about the lack of INM or in-country Narcotic Agency Units evaluations of projects and few end-use controls of US-provided equipment. 49

At first, performance indicators were a loose assessment of drug production and trafficking conditions in Colombia and the world. Later, indicators began labelling foreign countries and defining the very essence of drug control cooperation, this was the drug certification process. The Nixon administration had set a precedent with P.L. 92-226, which added an International Narcotics Control chapter to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1971. It authorised the U.S. President to suspend economic and military assistance as well as Foreign Military Sales to any country if it 'failed to take adequate steps' to stop the production and trafficking of illegal drugs and to prevent their flow into the United States. Legislation was refined and expanded almost every year. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 required the U.S. President to submit to the Speaker of the House and to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 'a complete and detailed semi-annual report' on the status of drug control agreements with other countries, expenditures made, and equipment provided. In 1981, P.L. 97-113 added another presidential report 'on the status of the United States policy to establish and encourage an international strategy to prevent the illicit production of and to interdict and intercept trafficking in narcotics'. 50

In 1983 the Foreign Assistance Act introduced 'maximum achievable reduction' goals for foreign countries, which meant that INM had to calculate the hectares a foreign country was able to destroy and determine the country's performance according to the expected rate.\textsuperscript{51} Later, to comply with the recommendations of the 1984 and 1985 Congressional reports, the Executive branch created a subcommittee on drug production constituted by INM, the DEA and the CIA in charge of designing more scientific estimates on cultivated areas and potential drug yield according to the type of plant and climatic conditions of each country.\textsuperscript{52} At this point INM had acquired new responsibilities such as negotiating, implementing, monitoring and terminating narcotics control agreements. The drug control strategy of the time set eradication as a top priority and explicitly left interdiction as a secondary task. Of utmost strategic relevance in the 1980s were diplomatic initiatives, which sought 'an upgrading of the foreign policy priority assigned to narcotics and to improve the international environment for operations'.\textsuperscript{53}

The Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (P.L. 98-164) was the immediate precursor of the Anti-Abuse Act of 1986 and introduced important monitoring practices that were later refined in 1986.\textsuperscript{54} The Act required Executive reports to identify direct and indirect illegal drug source countries. Already, this approach set a distinction between those countries who were put on the list, whether producing or transiting, and those who were not in the U.S. policy radar. It also coined the category 'major illicit producing country', referring to those producing five metric tons or more of opium during one fiscal year or 500 metric tons of coca or marijuana. Following the same spirit, the Act asked for a description of the exact 'methodology' used to determine the maximum achievable reduction of illicit crops

\textsuperscript{51} Section 481 (d) (f) (3) of the Foreign Assistance Act as amended in 1983.
\textsuperscript{52} \textsl{INCSR}, 1985.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} U.S. Senate and U.S. House, \textsl{Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1984}, 1, p. 90-8.
expected from a country. Monitoring whether foreign countries had introduced anti-drug legislation and taken law enforcement measures constituted an innovation in terms of strategy. Reducing illegal crops continued to be the priority, except now countries were also expected to adapt their laws and institutions to prosecute drug traffickers. Finally, the Act spelled out more clearly how uncooperative countries were to be punished. For example, the United States was instructed to vote against loans in the World Bank, the International Development Association, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian Bank.

In April 1986 Reagan gave a new boost to Nixon's drug war rhetoric with Presidential Directive 221. At the same time, Congress was gaining greater leverage over the Executive branch on drug policy issues. This resulted in the 1986 Anti-Abuse Act (P.L. 99-570), which marked a new phase of congressional involvement in foreign drug policy and set into motion the modern certification process.\(^\text{55}\) Reports now included a full 'discussion of the extent to which such country has cooperated with the United States narcotics control efforts.' The 'major drug transit country' category was introduced. Extradition, prosecution of traffickers, and the willingness of foreign countries to pass anti-money laundering legislation and engage in mutual legal assistance treaties became particular indicators of drug control cooperation.\(^\text{56}\) Concrete evidence included seizures, arrests, prosecutions, and the enactment of prohibition laws.\(^\text{57}\) Formal strategic emphasis remained on eradication; however, enforcement cooperation received equal weight.\(^\text{58}\) Moreover, the 1986 Act formalised aid conditionality, and using detailed language set mandatory and discretionary sanctions against uncooperative countries. The U.S. could withhold 50% of aid to a given


\(^{56}\text{U.S. Senate and U.S. House, Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1986, 1, p. 120-1.}\)

\(^{57}\text{INCSR, 1987.}\)
country, vote against its loan requests in multilateral banks, and impose trade sanctions including duties, loss of tariff benefits, and suspension of air service.

Measuring drug cooperation was turning into a complex technical endeavour as well as a political instrument. There were several effects. The process made U.S. policy accountable from within, it expanded the scope of drug cooperation programmes, and it provided U.S. officials with greater leverage over countries with drug trafficking problems. At the same time, this trend introduced more opportunities for friction in U.S. bilateral relations, especially with countries which were relatively unimportant in overall U.S. foreign affairs and where illegal drugs were produced. These countries could be bullied with sanctions. Under the particular bureaucratic, legal and ideational parameters unfolding in the United States in the 1980s, political relationships with other countries could be reduced to a checklist of numbers of eradicated hectares, interdicted vessels, and extradited kingpins. The concept of international political cooperation, defined from the U.S. side, was devoid of all its traditional political components only to be replaced therein with a very specific set of practices in one single issue-area. Department of State officials had come to notice this phenomenon, and although they duly supported drug prohibition, U.S. officials regretted their decreasing capacity for diplomatic manoeuvring. 'This is not like setting a U.S. sugar quota or deciding how much acreage in Iowa can be planted in corn', warned INM chief Anne Wrobleski in one of her usual heated debates with Congressmen. Wrobleski struggled to explain how futile it was to concentrate on micro-criteria to determine cooperation. But Senators such as Alfonse D'Amato, Joseph Biden and Dennis DeConcini wanted to 'rock some boats internationally' even

59 CRS, Combating International Drug Cartels: Issues for U.S. Policy. Report for the Caucus on International Narcotics Control of the United States Senate, 1987, p.13-20. esp. 16. For a good example of the challenges to diplomacy see CRS, Narcotics-Related Foreign Sanctions:
if it meant upsetting allies. Latin American countries, which for many reasons had become the main focus of U.S. drug policy, resented the 'narcotisation' of diplomatic relations with the United States. Potential aid cuts and economic sanctions were among the greatest concerns.

Latin American countries received much U.S. attention in this process, and their annual coca leaf and marijuana output was just one reason behind U.S. policy. In reality, Latin America was a more accessible target. The U.S. had a well established institutional and financial architecture in place in the region much greater in size and spirit than its presence elsewhere. Furthermore, Latin American countries 'cared', as opposed to Syria or Myanmar. They condemned illegal drugs, they worried about sanctions, they wanted aid, and they loathed labelling. They were vulnerable. In the early 1980s, the U.S. Congress mortified Brazil by threatening to restrict its sugar quota if it failed to sign an anti-drug agreement. The U.S. withheld aid worth $7.5 million from Bolivia in 1985 until specific anti-drug laws were effectively enacted. The Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-190) set limitations on U.S. assistance to Jamaica, Peru and Bolivia. Funds to Bolivia resumed for fiscal year 1987, but again in October 1987 the Department of State reconsidered Bolivia's performance and decided to withhold $1.5 billion. That year the Senate disapproved the Executive's certification of the Bahamas, Mexico and Panama. Again in 1988 resolutions were introduced to decertify the Bahamas, Bolivia, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru. None passed in full through Congress though, except the bill against Mexico,

60 CRS, Combating International Drug, p. 19.
61 Reforms included declaring most of coca production illegal and designing a national eradication plan, see CRS, Narcotics-Related Foreign Sanctions, pp. 19-21.
64 Final reversal of the Executive's verdict was not forced in the end, see CRS, International Narcotics Control and Foreign Assistance, p. 10.
which only the Senate approved.\(^{65}\) Mexico and the Camarena case had generated profound dismay, and as a consequence U.S.-Mexican relations suffered greatly from 1985 to 1988.\(^{66}\) Panama was decertified twice, in 1988 and 1989. The Reagan administration finally rescinded CBI and Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) provisions for Panama --the overture to the December 1989 Panama invasion.

Despite the pressure on Latin America, the pariah category had been invariably left to traditional communist and Muslim 'enemies' in international affairs, such as Afghanistan, Iran, Myanmar, and Syria. All throughout, Colombia was conspicuously absent from Department of State hostility and Congressional pontificating.

3. The Praxis of Evaluation: Maintaining the Foundations of Good Relations in a Complex Scenario

Notwithstanding the steady expansion of cooperation, bilateral initiatives encountered obstacles related to the implementation of anti-drug measures. Furthermore, despite decades of good relations, the foreign political environment of the 1980s was difficult, for topics such as the Central American war and the Latin American debt generated important frictions between Colombia and the United States. Yet exceptionally difficult episodes in the war against drugs, such as the open refusal to apply extradition and the failure to prosecute drug traffickers, did not trigger decertification or other radical diplomatic retaliations initiated by either Congress or the Executive branch, one exception being the 1988 'mini-embargo'. Moreover, U.S. assessments of Colombia's degree of commitment in the war against drugs, from the lower levels of the Department of State bureaucracy including the Colombia desk up to mid-levels with the Bureau for Inter-American-Affairs and INM, and from Ambassadors to some


friendly Congressmen, were usually favourable and at times commendatory of the undertakings of the Betancur and Barco administrations. There is a combination of factors at different levels that may explain why U.S. officials were inclined either to perceive Colombia's contribution to the war against drugs favourably, to accept the mediocre implementation of drug control, or to leave important defections unpunished.

**Assessing the Betancur Administration**

After their 1983 trip to Bogotá, some members of the Select Committee on Narcotics concluded that Betancur 'lacked the commitment to attack' drug trafficking. Congressmen were irritated by his initial refusal to use extradition, the allegations of drug money funding Betancur's presidential campaign and the potential demise of prohibition as the result of unofficial talks with drug traffickers. Betancur's nationalist pitch to his discourse on foreign policy added to U.S. concerns. Yet, while dissatisfaction with Mexico's commitment on similar grounds led to repeated actions in Congress aimed at decertification and severing diplomatic ties, there was no such response towards Colombia. By the end of Betancur's term, officials in INM and Congressmen involved in drug policy had come to believe in Betancur's will to enforce prohibition. In particular, Betancur's willingness to experiment with herbicides was seen as 'landmark' in drug control and the record of seizures was often portrayed as 'stunning'.

As regards extradition, INM, led by Anne Wrobleski, openly acknowledged that the measure on its own did not eliminate drug trafficking and therefore it constituted only a secondary goal. And, on the other hand, the Select Committee, which had been critical on extradition, was willing to be lenient with Colombia because it understood

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70 *INCSR*, 1985, pp. 61-71. Other secondary goals at the time included improving the judicial system, implementing the MLAT and strengthening the Penal Code of Procedures.
the unpopularity of the measure. "It would be preferable over the long term for the Government of Colombia, with U.S. support to develop the ability to prosecute major drug traffickers in Colombian courts," their report argued.\(^71\) As regards potential narco-corruption guiding Betancur's positions, Ambassador Boyatt maintained Colombia did not suffer from systematic corruption, that it was 'sui generis', an exception in Latin America if compared to Mexico, Bolivia and to some extent Peru.\(^72\)

Moreover, Congressional explanations of the shortcomings of the war against drugs in the 1980s often targeted Washington agencies. The United States in its narcotic control assistance to the Government of Colombia must develop an orderly, comprehensive approach to identify with that Government what is needed to be jointly accomplished and how to go about doing it. This has been lacking... and to date the drug problem has gotten progressively worse,' stated the Select Committee Report.\(^73\)

The Executive branch itself believed the war was just beginning and that a certain degree of patience or tolerance was needed before demanding greater results. U.S. officials referred with enthusiasm to an emergent 'alliance' in Latin America, 'where national leaders have given new, stronger voice to demands for more effective narcotics control programs'. U.S. officials had won what they perceived was the most necessary battle in the war against drugs, namely convincing other governments of the need to exterminate illegal drugs.\(^74\)

On the other hand, assessments of drug control cooperation were still attached to old ideas of broader political affinity that had been driving the relationship for several decades. On this count, doubts over the alliance in the struggle against Communism, commercial trade issues could have worked to upset joint activities in drug control through a spillover of diplomatic clashes or because of their actual connections to drug


\(^{73}\) U.S. House, *Latin American Study*, p. 27.
issues. Also, questions on either anti-Communism or commerce could have severed relations between the Reagan and Betancur administrations on their own merit.

In the early stage of the Central American imbroglio, Colombia and the United States joined forces. From 1977 to 1982 both countries sought to improve the human rights record in El Salvador and encourage the ascension of a democratic regime. In Nicaragua, their aim was to facilitate the resignation of Somoza and cooperate with an incoming regime hoping to avoid a radical dictatorship, whether right or left-wing. In Central America soon turned into an arena for dissent and competition, however. U.S. officials of the new Reagan team began interpreting events in Central America differently and claimed guerrillas in El Salvador were the result of external Communist intervention. This was the beginning of the U.S.-funded *Contras* and a decade-long war.

Betancur had another perspective on Central America. To begin with, he believed that coinciding with U.S. foreign policies was, in itself, conceding autonomy. Conversely, opposing the United States meant the country was autonomous. This perverse way of defining autonomy solely in terms of the United States distorted the making of Colombian foreign policy. Betancur was keen to achieve what he called a 'respectable and independent' position in world policy and avoid being considered 'a satellite of another country'. In the meantime, U.S. policy makers, who tended to expect alignment on all matters, began to fear Colombia would 'strike out on an independent foreign policy' [authors' emphasis]. The reasoning on both sides was a

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74 Ibid, pp. 5, 9.
75 In 1978 President Turbay sent a letter to the UN condemning Somoza's human rights record and later recommended Somoza's resignation. However, in July 1979 Colombia refused to support Carter's plan of an OAS verification force intended to oversee Nicaragua's transition to democracy. Other cooperative efforts included joining the United States in the January 1982 Tegucigalpa Declaration, condemning the Mexican-French 1982 declaration, sending electoral observers to El Salvador and joining the Nassau group in March 1982, Pardo and Tokatlian, *Política exterior colombiana*, pp. 169-70, 176-8.
quintessential reflection of U.S. relations with smaller countries in Latin America, which in the case of Colombia had coexisted with association and cooperation.

Betancur formally joined the Non-Aligned Movement, rejected Cuba’s isolation in the OAS, and joined Mexico, Panama and Venezuela in the Contadora group to seek a peaceful solution to the Central American wars.\textsuperscript{77} Their 1983 Objectives Document and the 1985 Contadora Act referred to international law and principles including sovereignty, self-determination and non-aggression. They also called for democracy and pluralism, and demanded the removal of all foreign presence in the area.\textsuperscript{78} Colombia’s participation in the Contadora peace initiative from January 1983 to 1987, has been emphatically and proudly recorded in Colombian literature as a 'hard battle against the United States', a period of diplomatic 'hostility', and a unique episode of Colombian 'autonomy' and 'diplomatic prestige.'\textsuperscript{79}

U.S. officials at the Department of State were irritated with Contadora and wanted Central American policy to go their way. 'Why were a bunch of small countries with no economic or military capability, with nothing at stake, making our foreign policy difficult?', wondered Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliot Abrams years later.\textsuperscript{80} In regional perspective, Contadora was a nuisance, but Colombia was hardly a threat to the United States. Colombia’s diplomatic rhetoric paled in comparison to the arms and money transfers from Cubans, Libyans, Mexicans and

\textsuperscript{77} Silva argues that Betancur’s actions failed to match his anti-American rhetoric, Gabriel Silva Luján, \textit{Política exterior, continuidad o ruptura?} (Bogotá: Cerec, CEI-Uniandes, 1985), p. 51.


\textsuperscript{79} See for example Apolinar Díaz, \textit{Contadora: desafío al imperio} (Bogotá, 1985); Silva, \textit{Política exterior}; Carlos Martínez; 'Política internacional, viraje o continuismo?' \textit{Economía Colombiana}, 155 (1984): 81-7; Pardo and Tokatlian, \textit{Política exterior colombiana}; Vásquez, \textit{Betancur y la crisis}. I also include within the Colombian literature Bruce M. Bagley and Juan G. Tokatlian, "La política exterior de Colombia durante la década de los 80: Los límites de un poder regional' in Heraldo Muñoz and Carlos Portales (eds.) \textit{Las políticas exteriores de América Latina y el Caribe: continuidad en la crisis. Anuario de políticas exteriores latinoamericanas}, 1986 (Buenos Aires: GEL, 1987). The core Colombian literature on Betancur’s foreign policy was written in the 1980s while the Contadora initiative was still
Soviets to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador. They were more upset with Mexico, who they believed was 'misleading' U.S. allies in Latin America and Western Europe and 'had to be stopped'. Moreover, CIA and the National Security Council officials were also concerned about Mexico, which they viewed as a large and close neighbour that could turn Communist.

Instead of waging an all-out political war against Colombia, as Vázquez tells, the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy opted for diplomatic engagement to influence Colombia's views if need be. American officials met continuously with Betancur, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador in Washington Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo, and his successor Jorge Ramírez Ocampo, to discuss Contadora. Colombians would usually let U.S. officials know of their frequent visits to other Contadora countries, and Lloreda and Ramírez had no difficulties in revealing internal Contadora disagreements, which in effect reassured Americans officials of Contadora's weakness. Moreover, Colombia was sure to signal its disregard for Communism.

Betancur's participation in Contadora had two additional purposes apart from promoting peace in Central America and gaining diplomatic prestige, namely, to avoid Central America's collaboration with Colombia's Marxist insurgency and to conduct operating and no subsequent reassessment has been made so far. Analyses in general have failed to unpack the meanings and goals of autonomy.

LeoGrande argues that Contadora diplomacy was less of a challenge to U.S. interests than Mexico's unilateral negotiation attempts, for the United States could use alternative methods to influence Contadora without bearing full political responsibility for the absence of negotiations. Whereas dealing with Mexico without overt clashes was impossible, William M. LeoGrande, 'Roll-back or Containment? The United States, Nicaragua and the Search for Peace in Central America' in Bagley (ed.), Contadora and the Diplomacy of Peace, pp. 83-112, especially 91.


Vásquez suggests that Operations Ahuas Tara and Pino Alto in 1983 were in response to the creation of Contadora and that Operation Ahuas Tara II was a response to the Cancún Declaration, Vásquez, Betancur y la crisis, pp. 205 and 212.

internal peace negotiations without U.S. interference or veto. Colombia's challenge was truly dramatic. In 1982, Betancur had launched an ambitious peace process with five left-wing guerrilla groups, the M-19, the FARC, the ELN, the EPL and the Quintin Lame, amidst renewed anti-Communist sentiments in Washington. The Second Cold War thinking had already toughened U.S. policy towards Central America. Furthermore, at least two groups, the FARC and the M-19, had ties with the illegal drug industry at a time of increasing sensibility towards illegal drugs and trafficking, which could further lure the United States into interfering and stopping his peace process.

The ties between drugs and insurgency had been uncovered early on, in the late 1970s, when hearings on the Cuban drug-connection had tangentially touched Colombia. On that occasion, Ambassador Boyatt attested in Congress to the involvement of M-19 members in the Guillot-Lara affair. During the following two decades Colombian and U.S. officials would constantly be debating the actual range and scope of the guerrilla involvement in the drug trade. An irritating episode occurred in 1984 with the discovery of Tranquilandia. The charismatic U.S. Ambassador in Bogotá Lewis Tambs attempted to publicise the existence of 'narco-terrorists' in Colombia. Tambs caused both indignation and irritation among the Colombian officials who were struggling to sell the peace process to reticent segments of the Betancur administration, the Armed Forces and the public. The image of criminal guerrillas was simply unhelpful.

Tambs's policy chessboard, however, was set outside Colombia, and he had little need to sabotage a peace process that was already faltering on its own. Instead, Tranquilandia came in handy for the U.S. Executive's propaganda directed at convincing Congress of the need to support the Nicaraguan Contras as part of the campaign to halt the spreading of alleged international narco-terrorism. Yet, on the
other hand, the cumulative effect of heavily publicised episodes of narco-guerrilla links gave way to more sober assessments based on technical measurements, which actually resulted in a closer study of Colombia's domestic situation. In 1985, for example, INM estimated that FARC charged traffickers $445 (at a 110 pesos to $1 dollar) per cultivated hectare, and $410 per processed kilo.\(^{86}\) They calculated that FARC earned $99 million in taxes and services in a single year. A 1987 INM report established that FARC had acquired labs of their own, and that FARC's First Front controlled production and processing in the department of Guaviare. At the same time that these studies were being conducted, the actual narco-guerrilla relation on the ground was rapidly expanding. Guerrillas were earning increasing amounts from the illegal industry, which allowed them to pay for new recruits and escalate operations.\(^{87}\)

A realist interpretation of U.S.-Colombian relations, would have dictated that United States officials consider toughening their stance on both Colombian guerrillas and drug trafficking and reproduce the Central American pattern in Colombia. This, however, never happened.\(^{88}\) Washington's restraint owed to several factors. Despite the greater amount of information on Colombia, U.S. officials failed to re-evaluate old preconceived ideas on Colombia. First, there was an element of procedure in the U.S. bureaucracy, where reports had to be 'objective'. So for most of the 1980s documents that circulating within the government disclosed innovative data, but were stripped of analysis and revised interpretations. The 1984 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, for example, recorded the murder of Minister Lara but failed to mention drug trafficking as a source of violence. Instead it stated: 'Responsibility for such violent acts is difficult to assign'. Second, Washington squabbles over Central America

\(^{85}\) U.S. Senate, The Cuban Government's Involvement, p. 59.
\(^{86}\) INCSR, 1985, p. 62
\(^{87}\) INCSR, 1987.
\(^{88}\) Deas explains U.S. restraint given the size, degree of independence and civil tradition in Colombia, Malcolm D. Deas, 'Colombia durante el gobierno del gobierno del Presidente Betancur: las relaciones entre política exterior, crisis centroamericana y proceso de paz nacional. Dos enfoques', Documentos Ocasionales, 5 (1988).
distorted readings on Colombia in surprising ways. Those who questioned Reagan's policies and were eager to counterbalance hard-liners' excesses tended to downplay the narco-guerrilla links everywhere in the region. For instance, Wroblewski said INM had wasted time searching for 'conclusive evidence' linking FARC and M-19 to drug trafficking. 89 Third, there was a limit to bureaucratic focus and capacity, and officials in Washington were bogged down with Central America. As a result, the default mode was continuity on the ideas about and policy on Colombia. And U.S. officials continued to honour the implicit norm of limited interference in domestic affairs and did not try to promote democracy in Colombia by invasion, incorporation or intimidation. As McClean claimed: 'Colombia was a democracy, a big country, and you just didn't interfere in its affairs; it was a whole different story than Central America'. 90

Finally, economic policy contributed to promoting a sense of affinity between the two countries. The Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s enlivened criticism on the architecture of the international economic system. Latin American economies were mired in recession and inflation, unable to pay exorbitant amounts of debt owed to international and commercial banks, while facing citizens' demands for economic growth, jobs and social equity. The vexing circumstances turned out to be a unique opportunity for Colombia to uphold its historical record of moderate behaviour, and seal its reputation for being one of the 'most stable economies in Latin America'.

To start, Colombia's foreign debt, standing at $9,600 million (30% of exports) in 1982, was considerably smaller than Brazil's debt at $90,000 million (85% of exports), Mexico's at $81,000 million (73% of exports), or Argentina's at $40,000 million (40% of its exports). 91 The size of its foreign debt, however, was not the reason why

89 U.S. House, Colombian Drug Trafficking, p. 20.
90 Interview with McLean.
Colombia became a convenient 'model' in Latin America. Rather, Colombia's management of the debt made it strategically attractive to the U.S. Department of Treasury, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the creditors' *de facto* cartel.

Latin American responses to the crisis varied, but converged on the idea that commercial banks, encouraged and financially supported by the United States, had to negotiate and compromise to accommodate the needs of the region. Several, like Cuba and Peru, proposed radical solutions to the region's economic problems, involving a total regional debt pardon. Above all, American officials feared a scenario of defaulting dominos (a debtors' cartel) that could undermine the international financial markets.

Living up to his diplomatic reputation and responding to domestic demands, Betancur convened a debtors summit. In 1984 and 1985 the Latin American Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance met in Cartagena, in Mar del Plata and Santo Domingo with the purpose of designing a common position regarding partial defaults, and to protest against U.S. protectionism. Betancur, however, suggested that forming a debtors' cartel to stop payment of debt services was never his intention and that neighbours may have had false expectations, interview, Bogotá, June 1999.

Colombian foreign policy expert Gabriel Silva said there was no action in Colombian history so 'bold and comprehensive'. While Betancur hosted the Cartagena meeting, however, Colombian technocrats at the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of the Republic, and the National Planning Department, had already chosen Colombia's strategy along orthodox economic lines. Colombia's economic and financial decision-makers calculated that the timely payment of foreign debt service would secure future loans and foreign investment because both banks and multilateral institutions would appreciate and reward Colombia's commitment in a neighbourhood that suffered from little financial credibility. A Mexican-like re-
Chapter 4, Business as Usual

negotiation was discarded. In September 1984, Minister of Finance Roberto Junguito, the representative from the Central Bank's Executive Board and future president Virgilio Barco, and Colombia's Ambassador in Washington D.C. Alvaro Gómez initiated negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank to tap on new credits.

This unleashed criticism inside Colombia, where Betancur was accused of pro-American alignment. The United States cooperated to salvage Betancur's independent image and in 1985 U.S. Federal Reserve Chief Paul Volker lobbied IMF to concede Colombia a 'monitoring' agreement instead of a standard stand-by agreement. The United States supported Colombia's demands because it wanted to show other Latin American countries that the debt crisis could be resolved along liberal economic lines without resorting to radical options. In turn Colombia received $273 million from the World Bank and $1000 million (the Jumbo credit) from commercial banks. In April 1985, too, Colombia signed a treaty with the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). In substance the monitoring agreement contained neo-liberal adjustment policies, such as reducing public expenditure, controlling inflation and introducing liberalisation. These measures, however, coincided with Colombian economic policy makers' preferences. In two years Colombia had reached stunning results surpassing IMF and World Bank initial conditions. As for Latin American debtors, a cartel was never formed and the United States belatedly launched the Baker Plan in October 1985. But the planned injection of $20 billion into Latin America never took place. The Brady initiative was proposed later under the Bush administration. Finally, unlike most of the region, Colombia

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95 Vásquez, Betancur y la crisis, p. 162, 182, 197-9.
96 For U.S. role see Alfredo Angulo, 'Colombia y el FMI: el imperfecto caso de un caso perfecto' Debates de Coyuntura Internacional, 1, p. 31 and Reina, 'Las relaciones entre Colombia y Estados Unidos', p. 38.
97 Vásquez, Betancur y la crisis, p. 197.
98 Reina, 'Las relaciones entre Colombia y Estados Unidos,' p. 34.
maintained relative growth rates at a time when Latin American neighbours suffered the 'lost decade' contracting 7.3% from 1981 to 1990.

Assessing the Barco Administration

Compared to the Betancur years, the Barco administration encountered greater challenges regarding bilateral drug-control to the extent that the United States and Colombia relationship came close to a fallout over drug policy implementation in 1988. But at the same time, there was tighter cooperation, and the 1988 mini-embargo affair evolved into a renewed and enhanced anti-drug alliance, as illustrated in chapter 5.

On 16 August 1986, after paying a minuscule bail, drug lord Jorge Luis Ochoa was released by a corrupt judge in Cartagena. Assistant Attorney General Richard Gregorie accused the Colombian government of ineptitude, while U.S. Embassy officials in Bogotá expressed their frustration, not least because episodes like these caused Washington to question the Embassy's own efficacy. Barco responded by swiftly ordering an investigation of the judge, but Ochoa remained free until 1987. On the other hand, U.S. critiques gave Barco the opportunity to play the American card in those circles where the drug war was less popular, for he could argue that Colombia had no choice but to toughen drug policy given U.S. pressure. As regards U.S. policy makers, the assassination in 1986 of Guillermo Cano of El Espectador, who was an outspoken critic of drug trafficking, diffused for some time U.S. critiques. Cano's death at the hands of the Medellín drug lords illustrated the overwhelming power of Colombian drug traffickers.

In August 1987 Cali cartel leader Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela was also released under suspicious circumstances, highlighting the virtual collapse of the Colombian judicial system. The level of anxiety among U.S. officials in Bogotá and Washington
swelled progressively. Traffickers were not being prosecuted in Colombia, and extradition was constantly being sabotaged by fear, corruption and nationalism, and Barco's record of coca eradication was dismal. Only 3,450 hectares had been eradicated from 1985 to 1988, and by 1988 Colombia ranked again as the major producer and exporter of marijuana, showing a serious setback compared to Betancur's achievements. In addition, due to their links with the drug trade, the guerrilla movements, especially FARC, had expanded from 2,000 men in 1980 to 10,000 in 1988. Also, there were more than 100 paramilitary groups of mixed origins, amalgamating drug traffickers, large landowners, frustrated peasants and unruly military officers who claimed to be fighting against the guerrillas and their extortion and kidnapping tactics. From 1988 to 1990, 204 massacres by paramilitaries and guerrillas took place with a death toll of 1,132. Together, this irregular war and common crime in the cities were claiming next to 14,000 deaths per year.

Ochoa was imprisoned again on 21 November 1987. At this point, drug traffickers had declared they would launch an 'absolute and total war' against the Colombian government if Ochoa was extradited. After previous mistakes by the Colombian administration, Ochoa's potential extradition to U.S. soil was extremely significant. While it would have little direct impact in stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, extradition was a symbolic battle triumph that Americans in the Executive branch could show the U.S. Congress, and they in turn could show the public. Moreover, Colombia could demonstrate that, although not perfect, it still had functioning institutions, as expected from any Western democracy. On 30 December 1987, however, a clever ruse by his lawyers set Ochoa free by legal means. The

100 Ibid, p.181.
102 *Informe al Congreso*, 5, p. 27.
Department of State sent an official note of protest, while the U.S. Embassy had made up their minds to escalate diplomatic pressure, enough to 'shake' Colombian drug policy. Otherwise patient friends in Congress were now stridently demanding extradition: '[A]ll we are saying is that if we have some type of agreement as friends, as allies, as neighbours, that the least you could do is send us those people who violated all our international laws', said Rangel.

For a period of one month the United States retaliated by applying strict customs procedures to Colombia's travellers and exports, stopping and thoroughly checking Colombian citizens in American airports and searching exported uncut flowers and shrimp by the book. The bilateral relationship had reached an unprecedented low point. But U.S. retaliation was suddenly questioned from within the administration. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South America Robert Gelbard, who had explained that U.S. policy constituted a warning to drug traffickers and not a retaliation against the Colombian government, was sceptical about applying full sanctions. Deputy Council Minister McLean supported the idea of a tough warning, yet admired Barco and his team and had no intention of hindering Colombia over the long term. U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Anthony Gillespie and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliot Abrams believed a rupture in U.S.-Colombian relations was neither an American aim in itself, nor a functional step towards curbing drug trafficking, nor an adequate procedure applicable to international friends.

While U.S. officials hesitated, Colombia began mobilising its diplomatic machinery to protest against American actions. Minister of Foreign Affairs Londoño ordered Carlos Lemos Simmonds, the Colombian Ambassador to the OAS, to file a formal

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104 The Medellín mayor Juan Gómez Martínez had been kidnapped and released to transmit the message to the government. *El Espectador*, 24 November, 1987.
105 *INCSR*, 1988, p. 86 and interview with McLean.
108 Interviews with Elliot Abrams and Gillespie.
complaint in the organisation. In principal, this was consistent with Colombia's embedded diplomatic tradition of resolving disputes through formal multilateral and legal mechanisms. No previous U.S.-Colombian disagreement had ever been handled in and by the OAS, however; the countries had traditionally resorted to quiet diplomacy. But on the other hand, Colombia was encountering an unprecedented situation, and on the 14 of January an extraordinary session of the Permanent Council of the OAS met to discuss Colombia's complaint on the grounds of unsubstantiated discriminatory actions by the United States violating Articles 19 and 34 of the OAS charter. But soon Ambassador Gillespie decided to ease the tension by turning to the old ways of quiet diplomacy and met Reagan to obtain a friendly letter that noted Colombia's contribution in the war against drugs and outlined areas for further cooperation. Gillespie personally delivered the letter to Barco, the OAS adopted a resolution stating both governments' pledges to continue drug control cooperation, there were no apparent economic backlashes, and drug control continued. For the DEA Administrator John Lawn, the Ochoa incident did not hinder activities in Colombia, cooperation among law enforcement agents was 'excellent', and 'morale and effectiveness were generally high'. The daily routine had remained intact, and Lawn urged the Colombian government to accept greater U.S. assistance 'now, more than ever'. Yet Colombia perceived that its image had been badly bruised and that the United States had reversed crucial norms of friendship and engagement.

Despite difficulties, Barco's administration was highly praised when it came to giving final verdicts on its performance as an ally in the war against drugs. The 1989 INCSR noted: 'Few countries, if any, have contributed more of their national resources or lost so many lives in the effort to curb narcotics trafficking. We continue to stand in

110 Ibid. p. 248
111 U.S. House, Recent Developments in Colombia, p. 55 and interview with Philip McLean.
112 Ibid. p. 44.
admiration of Colombia's determination. In regional perspective, the 1988 affair paled in comparison to strains with Mexico over the Camarena case, or the continuous conditionality enforced upon Bolivia after Luis García Meza's accession to power. Nor did Colombia's inefficiency lead to military counter-drug operations like the 1986 Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia, which had been supported by McLean during his tenure there. Also, extraterritorial abductions by U.S. agents, considered and justified for Mexico and Honduras, did not take place in Colombia. Apart from the 1988 episode, relations were business as usual.

In addition to the drug problems, the deterioration of Colombia's human rights was one issue that could have prompted a re-evaluation of Colombia's state of affairs. International non-governmental organisations had slowly begun reporting on Colombia. In 1988 Amnesty International even spoke of a 'human rights emergency in Colombia' and claimed the military high command colluded with death squads in a campaign to wipe out opposition. These accusations surfaced at a time when U.S. human rights policy had regained relevance in foreign policy after being set aside to repair relations with the larger Latin American countries ruled by right-wing dictatorships.

The domestic situation in Colombia, human rights non-governmental organisations reporting, and U.S. monitoring prompted the Barco administration to take significant steps. Although well intended, these measures did not improve conditions, but did efficiently send the right signals to the international community. Barco expelled several military and police officers, and opened a Human Rights Advisory office attached to the President's office in 1988, led initially by Professor Alvaro Tirado. Moreover, Londoño decided to avoid what he defined as a harmful 'politicalisation' of

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113 Ibid.
the human rights issue by engaging Colombia in the new international human rights diplomacy.116 Londoño boasted about Colombia's election to the United Nations Human Rights Commission by a record vote of 52 out of 55 possible votes. Colombia had earned a position of 'respect' and 'leadership' in human rights, which clearly differentiated it from 'isolated' countries such as Chile and South Africa, he noted.117 In addition, Colombia had concrete evidence that spoke in favour of its commitment to democracy. For example, the Betancur and Barco administrations had been instrumental in opening channels for participation to parties other than the Liberal and Conservative parties. U.S. officials especially regarded as an exemplary step the popular election of mayors and department governors in 1988. The 1980s had in fact witnessed a process of state modernisation, further democratisation, economic liberalisation and internationalisation that balanced out signs of internal deterioration. Thus, invariably throughout the 1980s, Colombia was ranked in U.S. documents as a 'constitutional multiparty democracy' where 'private enterprise plays a dominant role'.118

Finally, in terms of affinity with the United States on hemispheric and world politics, the Barco administration mended relations but kept a 'mature dissent'. Barco and his team gave less rhetorical attention to Central America, bestowed a pragmatic tone upon foreign policy, said little about Cuba, and boosted the ongoing process of diplomatic diversification, and the strengthening of Latin American relations. By then, old maximalist definitions of full foreign policy coincidence had disappeared, and expressing different views on regional and world affairs was no longer a source of diplomatic outrage for American policy makers.119

116 'Política exterior para una Colombia nueva. Apartes del informe del Presidente de la República Virgilio Barco al Congreso Nacional el 20 de julio de 1989.' Colombia Internacional, 7 p. 31.
117 'Entrevista con el canciller Julio Londoño Paredes,' Colombia Internacional, 10 (1990), p. 8.
118 See CRHRP for the 1980s.
Many academics and politicians have pessimistically concluded that while Barco was president, the US-Colombian relationship was one of estrangement. Many have pointed at issues such as foreign debt, regional trade, aid, Central America, democratisation, regional security, and illegal drugs as examples of deterioration in U.S.-Colombian relations. A picture dominated by conflict has been reinforced by the expansion of the drug market, the adoption of U.S. foreign drug policies with greater topical and geographical reach during the Reagan and Bush administrations, and the evolution of drug prohibitionism at large. Conversely, there is substantive evidence suggesting a trend of general convergence. Colombia adhered to a tighter alliance in the war against drugs under the assumption that drug trafficking constituted a threat to national security. Colombia liberalised its economic system and increasing trade with the United States. Finally, it continued its process of democratisation. Londoño was right in his assessment of U.S.-Colombian relations in the 1980s when he noted that, 'Relations with the United States have not deteriorated at any moment, but there have been complex situations which have demanded a certain degree of management'.

To conclude, during the first and second phases of U.S.-Colombian cooperation in the war against drugs, the drug issue and drug control progressively gained political salience. And from the mid 1980s onwards, drugs and drug trafficking came to be perceived as a matter of national security. By 1988, drugs had become a top issue in the bilateral agenda. Moreover, no other topic had received the same kind of political and bureaucratic attention. For instance, only drugs had prompted U.S. congressional missions to travel to Colombia to talk with the president, the cabinet, the Anti-Narcotics Police, judges and the Congress. And only drug control had involved the

120 See for example Alfredo Vásquez Carrizosa, 'La política exterior de la administración Barco, 1986-1988,' Colombia Internacional, 3 (1988), pp. 3-9; Diego Cardona Cardona, 'Evaluación de la política exterior de la administración Barco,' Colombia Internacional, p. 6-29. For a realist account see Juan G. Tokatlian, 'La política exterior del gobierno del president Virgilio Barco: en busca de la autonomía perdida,' in Deas and Ossa, El gobierno Barco, pp. 127-50.
121 'Entrevista con el canciller', p. 7.
creation of formal mechanisms that opened the door for greater trans-governmental contact and U.S. involvement in Colombia. In the 1980s, the conditions were set for the full institutionalisation of drug control activities, as seen in the next chapter. Overall, however, there were strong elements of continuity. The U.S. treated Colombia as a friend whose shortcomings, such as drug trafficking and violence, were tolerated. The core norms of engagement were not questioned.
PART III: FRIENDSHIP RESILIENT, 1989-1994

In 1989 Colombia and the United States entered the third of four phases of bilateral cooperation in the war against drugs. The start was marked by the September 1989 launching of Bush's Andean Strategy and the comprehensive February 1990 Cartagena agreements. This period of accelerated and deep institutionalisation featured three developments namely, the consolidation of the institutionalisation of U.S. foreign drug policy, further advances in the Colombian prohibition regime, and the expansion, routinisation and formalisation of bilateral endeavours. Most strikingly, Colombia and the United States were able to maintain essentially friendly relations despite the challenges of drug control, which has escaped most critics of drug policy. In contrast, during the same years, from 1989 to 1994, the United States gave conditional waivers to Bolivia and Peru, and severed relations with Panama partly on the count of drugs. Chapter 5 focuses on the emergence of a renewed partnership in the war against drugs; chapter 6 examines the challenges of implementing the new anti-drug partnership; and chapter 7 analyses the shifts in the understandings of the drug problem in terms of security and democracy and its effects on the terms of the relationship given the degree of institutionalisation of the war against drugs.
As the 1980s advanced and unveiled the complexities of violent drug trafficking and its control, there was a steady stream of observers who argued that American and Colombian national interests, as related to drug policy, were increasingly moving apart. Yet, despite the lack of efficacy of prohibition, the United States redoubled its cooperation efforts convinced that the drug fight had only been fought half-heartedly with limited funds and scant political attention on its side. Also, contrary to the sceptical forecasts, the Barco administration (1986-1990) opted to enhance prohibition in Colombia believing it constituted an imminent threat to the physical and ethical integrity of the state. This chapter analyses the emergence of the comprehensive anti-drug partnership between the Bush and Barco governments, which jumpstarts the phase of accelerated and deep institutionalisation of bilateral prohibition. The first section analyses the factors that led to United States' decision to increase its support to Colombia and to the Cartagena agreements of February 1990. As an innovation, it discusses the logic used by policy-makers in Colombia and the United States to cooperate. The main purpose is to highlight the existence of substantial common ground in the understanding of the drug problem, and to show Colombia's active participation in the making of the alliance. The second section examines the main themes of the partnership, pointing at its comprehensive character. Major innovations include the greater involvement of U.S. and Colombian military in drug control, the direct linkage of economic issues to the war against drugs, and U.S. involvement in
Chapter 5, Institutionalisation of Prohibition

judicial reform. The third section focuses on the consolidation of the institutionalisation of U.S. foreign drug policy, which increased the leverage of U.S. bureaucrats and law enforcers specialised on drug issues in shaping U.S. policy towards Colombia, and in turn, the terms of the relationship as a whole.

1. Forging a New Partnership: The Andean Strategy and the 1990 Cartagena Summit

Several influential analysts at this time saw little chances for cooperation between Colombia and the United States. For example, Tokatlian in 1988 posited that 'the distance between their respective diagnosis and approaches has tended to widen. The ambivalent profile of cooperation-conflict which has characterised their bilateral relations thus far appears to be evolving in direction of more friction and dissent...'
Furthermore, he explained conflict would arise 'owing in no small part to the fact that to date Colombia has assumed much the greater share of the cost of the "war on drugs"', and to the divergent diagnosis, objectives and interests of the parties' [emphasis added].

Pessimism was well justified, for the management of drug-related issues during the Barco-Reagan years had turned far more complex than in the past.

Upon taking office in August 1986, Virgilio Barco had encountered stiff obstacles and challenges to his drug policy in Colombia, which only worsened during the course of his administration. U.S. officials were right to doubt his commitment to uphold the rule of law and fight drug traffickers. Drug trafficking had steadily flourished despite eradication and interdiction efforts. The cultivation of coca leaf was beyond 27,000 hectares. Even poppy fields and at least two heroin laboratories were detected in 1988, a sign of Colombia's potential to become a leading producer country, as well as a

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trafficking hub. The worst of the narco-terrorist wave began with the bomb attack on the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad in December 1989, which was followed by at least 200 subsequent attacks in Bogotá, Cali and Medellín over the next three years, and the assassination of prominent politicians. Consensus at the societal and state levels over an anti-drug strategy was often fragile. Some thought that Colombia's anti-drug actions would have no effect in denting the world drug market.

As narco-terrorism escalated, others wondered whether peaceful coexistence or an amnesty, as opposed to full persecution and extradition, were better options to re-establish order in Colombia. 'The dialogue would be Christian because it would avoid many deaths', argued the mayor of Medellín Juan Gómez Martínez. For Gómez, a generalised amnesty was also justifiable given the level of penetration of the drug industry: 'we all made mistakes and many honest people hurried to do legal business with the drug traffickers'. In 1988 and 1989 rumours of possible negotiations with the cartels had brought tension to U.S.-Colombian relations.

Moreover, drug-related corruption had weakened law enforcement capabilities; the sluggish passage of anti-drug legislation, irregular prosecution, jailbreaks and unsuccessful interdiction operations lent credit to the allegations in the U.S. media of narco-bribery in the judicial system, the military and the Colombian Congress. Also, drugs were intertwined with other pressing issues such as insurgency, right-wing paramilitarism, vigilantism and other forms of rural and urban violence. All these groups had directly and indirectly benefited from the proceeds of the illegal drug

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3 *The Miami Herald*, 26 September 1989, p. 10A.
industry, which had ensured them a steady growth all throughout the 1980s. As a consequence of the expansion of these groups, a less publicised 'dirty war' broke out between paramilitary groups, in occasional association with Colombia's security forces, and the guerrillas. This cost the lives of a civilian rural population caught in the crossfire. By the third year of the Barco administration, in 1989, Colombia was indeed on the brink of chaos. Rafael Pardo, advisor to Barco and Minister of Defence of the Gaviria administration described the period between 1989 and the beginning of 1990 as one of most pressing in Colombia's history:

[T]he stability of the political system was in real and imminent danger of collapsing. The atrocious narcoterrorist was without a visible end, frustration over failed reforms, the assassination of Luis Carlos Galán and the accelerated de-legitimisation of an establishment incapable of solving the problems of its citizens painted a desolating panorama.5

The perceptions of many Colombians were pessimistic and the material conditions adverse. Yet, there is no evidence to suggest that Bush forced the Barco administration into the agreement using coercive diplomacy or the deliberate threat of military intervention. This is not to deny that United Sates had the power, in terms of diplomatic leadership, knowledge resources and material backing to shape the terms of the alliance. Yet, the Cartagena summit and its agreements had been long sought by the Barco administration and, as described below, the alliance made considerable advances in including a revamped socio-economic agenda taking into account several of Colombia's preferences. It also acknowledged the 'responsibility' of consumer and money-laundering countries, as well as the existence of other flaws present in the American system.

A more moderate interpretation of the Cartagena agreements, given by Walker III, is that Latin American countries at large accepted Bush's drug policy initiatives -- which he still calls a conscious move by American policy makers to guarantee

makers were also aware of narco-corruption and various forms of drug trade-related violence, see INCSR, 1988, 1989 and 1991.
hegemony-- because they expected to receive a future flexible U.S. treatment on drug issues, as well as other benefits such as debt relief and trade preferences. Indeed, Colombian foreign policy makers had often hoped to be given preferential economic and diplomatic treatment based on 'good' behaviour. However, there were greater shared understandings of the drug problem than this view implies.

Both illegal drugs and Latin America figured in George Bush's electoral campaign. During the 1988 campaign a poll showed 54% of the population agreed that illegal drugs were a crucial foreign policy issue and 87% considered it to be one of the greatest concerns of American society. It became important for the officials and politicians to appear to be 'doing something' against the 'gravest present threat to [U.S.] national well-being'. Moreover, it had already become widely accepted that drugs were a national security threat, striking 'at the heart of the nation's values.' To be sure, there was a bipartisan consensus on the desirability of intensifying anti-drug efforts. Anti-drug crusaders in Congress had been asking for a Hemispheric Drug Summit since 1985, and a multinational strike force. Domestic politics and American perceptions of the drug problem worked in favour of giving a greater emphasis to the foreign aspects of U.S. drug policy.

As regards Latin America, there was a consensus in Washington concerning the idea that the Reagan had grossly strained U.S. relations in the region through his

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6 Pardo, *De primera mano*, p. 211.
support to the Contras in Central America, unwillingness to side in favour of Argentina in the Malvinas (Falklands) war, and by objecting to a multilateral negotiation of the debt crisis. Some Washington leading think tanks on Latin American issues, the Inter-American Dialogue and the Democrat-dominated Congress, called for smoothening relations in the region. In addition, it was perceived that drug policy had been, as in the 1970s, side-stepped to favour other foreign policy concerns such as fighting Communism, and that therefore the United States' credibility on furthering prohibition was questionable. The Iran-Contras scandal and the disclosure of links between drug traffickers and the Panamanian leader General Manuel Antonio Noriega, a former ally and CIA collaborator, suggested to many in the United States and the region that double-standards were being applied. Later on, the Panama invasion on 31 December 1989, partly linked to drugs, generated resentment in the region. The perceived need to improve relations with Latin America, while at the same time underscoring the foreign drug agenda, predisposed U.S. policy makers to the pursuit of compromise and to a more attentive consideration of the requests put forward by their Latin American neighbours.

In addition, Bush inherited a firm legal and institutional base for the new policy. The ambitious National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690) mandated the formulation of a National Drug Control Strategy, and provided a blank check in terms of strategic options and, to some extent, funds for the regional drug war. All these factors helped to justify the Andean Strategy --an enlarged anti-drug agenda going well beyond strictly drug operations-- and the adjunct range of policy packages developed during the Bush administration.

Colombian national interests, as formulated by the policy-making elite, underpinned its contribution to the formulation of the Cartagena agreements and its active participation in the U.S. package of initiatives. As regards the drug issue, Colombians believed that there was a unique and conducive momentum to advance their own position regarding prohibition. The American move towards broadening the war against drugs seemed receptive. There was also an international impetus in favour of revamping and reforming the international prohibition regime through the 1988 Vienna Convention and the U.N. Special Session that declared the 1990s the 'Decade against Drug Abuse' --instead of a decade against drug trafficking only. It was the perfect opportunity to materialise what Barco called the 'internationalisation' and 'multilateralisation' of drug control, by which he meant sharing with consumer nations the burden of political responsibility in the emergence of the drug problem, and getting those nations to finance prohibition activities.

More importantly, Barco and his aides were particularly keen in redeeming Colombia's image; they wanted the world to know that his country was not exporting the evils of illegal drugs and keeping the profits for itself. Rather, drug trafficking was an international phenomenon that affected Colombian institutions as much as it did American and European societies. Barco was especially successful at letting Americans know how exactly they were contributing to the drug problem. He declared: 'Every tactic and every weapon in the war against narcotics pales into significance compared with the need to reduce demand. Those who consume cocaine are contributing to the assassination of my people [...]'. Solving the drug problem demanded collective action under the principle of co-responsibility and needed funding from those economies which could most afford it. '[W]e are calling for a fair

reallocation of resources where they are most needed. ...[W]e are proposing that those industrialised countries that have a stake in the drug war joined together to provide Colombia with a large-scale, one time financial assistance of 1 billion', declared the Colombian Ambassador in Washington Victor Mosquera Chaux in a U.S. Senate hearing.15 By constructing the image of 'Colombia the victim of drugs' as opposed to 'Colombia the home of drug trafficking', Barco was legitimising Colombia as an ally for the anti-drug Andean Strategy, for market-oriented economic partnership, and for post-Cold War democracy.

Colombia did not seek to reframe the drug debate outside the realm of prohibition, or to challenge the securitisation of drugs. Its understandings of the drug problem and its drug policy-related goals lay within the same arena identified by the United States. Barco spoke of the need for a 'total world war'.16 This applied to politicians' views, as well as the ideas of law enforcers and technocrats involved in drug enforcement. Colombia, thus, was not a passive actor in forging the new partnership, still less one whose involvement had to be imposed or coerced. Colombian officials had at full pitch solicited more, not less U.S. assistance. As drug trafficking-related violence escalated in Colombia, demands for help to step up prohibition became more pressing. Every single international meeting had heard Barco's plea for international cooperation in fighting illegal drugs and drug trafficking. In a March 1989 speech at Johns Hopkins University, given by Mosquera the Colombian Ambassador, complained that the United States was giving Colombia only $2.5 million of a proposed $10 million package for drug control.17

16 29 September 1989 speech at the UN General Assembly.
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The assassination on 18 August 1989 of the presidential candidate from the Nuevo Liberalismo party Luis Carlos Galán served to increase mobilisation. On 28 September 1989, Barco met in Washington with President Bush, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, Drug Czar William Bennett, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs General Brent Scowcroft and other high ranking officials to discuss future assistance to Colombia.\(^\text{18}\) That same month, Minister of Justice Mónica De Greiff hurried to ask for $19 million to buy armoured cars, bullet-proof vests, metal detectors and other equipment to protect judges from the reach of narco-terrorism.\(^\text{19}\) In January 1990 Embassy official Eduardo Muñoz told a panel of Congressional researchers: 'I would like to leave you with the message that our situation is indeed urgent. That our national security is compromised and that we need quick and effective actions'.\(^\text{20}\) Colombians were active at shaping the terms of the Cartagena Declaration through an articulated discourse on the general guidelines of international anti-drug cooperation, at the formal pre-summit negotiating sessions, through lobbying at the Department of State and at U.S. Congress hearings, and through the congressional study missions that visited Colombia in 1989 and early 1990.\(^\text{21}\)

In addition, narrower bureaucratic interests played out to drive Colombia into increasing cooperation with the United States. Certain Colombian agencies relied on and expected U.S. donations and training, thus backing the commitments of Barco and his successor César Gaviria to maintain Colombia on the prohibition wagon. Such was the case of the Special Division for International Technical Cooperation, the agency officially in charge of managing and channelling international funding into other bureaus and non-governmental actors, and of those actors with law enforcement and interdiction functions, such as the Anti-Narcotics Police and the military, who had long

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\(^{19}\) *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 September 1989, p. 1.


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benefited from anti-narcotics assistance. At times, the additional drug control responsibilities that Colombian agencies adopted, partly motivated by the access to extra funding, implied over-stretching their capacities and taking on cumbersome tasks. In the long-term they might have been better off dispensing with aid, but in the short-term the gains seemed to justify action. Furthermore, accepting international funding and bringing in international donor's agencies ran against the often declared Colombian national interest to preserve as much autonomy as possible and specifically minimise U.S. interference. Yet, bureaucrats or government leadership hardly made calculations involving long-term strategic thinking or setting actions against the larger foreign policy picture.

Galan's death, and the 'declaration of war' issued on 24 August by the Extraditables gave a sense of urgency to the Barco and Bush policies. The U.S. response to Galan's assassination and Colombia's subsequent attack to drug mafias were strong and immediate. On 25 August President Bush invoked section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and ordered the delivery of $65 million in military supplies for the Armed Forces and the police. The international community, too, sympathised with Barco's struggle. Some days after the narco-bomb attacks in Medellín and Bogotá, in September 1989 the Colombian leader received a standing ovation at the U.N. General Assembly.

Moreover, Bush used the occasion to launch his new National Drug Control Strategy that included the Andean Strategy. In a televised speech on evening of 6 September 1989, President Bush stated:

You and I agree with the courageous president of Colombia Virgilio Barco, who said that if Americans use cocaine, then Americans are paying for murder... We have the responsibility not to leave our brave friends in Colombia to fight alone... I spoke with President Barco last week and we

22 Competition for funds between the Colombian military and police was exacerbated in this period, however.
23 The Colombian National Police received almost $10.5 million of that assistance. In Fiscal Year 1990 Peru did not accept military aid, and on 30 September 1990 the United States programmed 30.9 million for Colombia.
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hope to meet with the leaders of affected countries in an unprecedented drug summit...\textsuperscript{24}

By then, 65% of Americans perceived drugs to be the nation's most important problem, the highest recorded for any single issue since 1976.\textsuperscript{25}

The Cartagena presidential summit took place on 15 February 1990. Barco, Bush, Jaime Paz Zamora of Bolivia and Alberto Fujimori of Peru met to discuss drug control policies in the region in a lengthy and candid exchange – the first presidential session was intended to last one hour but lasted three instead. The Declaration contained a section dedicated to the economic aspects of cooperation including crop substitution, trade and investment and the principal that drug trafficking actually harmed Andean countries' economies; a list of tools to attack illegal drugs; and a third section outlining an agenda for joint diplomatic initiatives.

Officials in the United States and Colombia were pleased. 'We went to Cartagena to achieve two principal goals. One was the commitment of the four Summit countries to a long term partnership against drug trade. The second was to demonstrate the national will and determination... Our achievements in Cartagena were no small feat', commented U.S. Drug Czar Bennett.\textsuperscript{26} Bernard Aronson, Deputy Assistant for Inter American Affairs was also fully supportive,

I believe in Cartagena the four presidents solved a more than decade old argument about how to combat drug trafficking in this hemisphere. For many years we wasted our times pointing fingers... I think we came together in recognition that producing countries and consuming countries have a common problem, we face a common enemy and we have a joint and mutual responsibility ... I think we also ended an argument that has gone on for a number of years about which comes first, drug interdiction or economic development because in the Declaration of Cartagena we made it clear that both must happen...\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{24} The Washington Post, 6 September 1989, A18.
\textsuperscript{26} U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Drug Summit in Cartagena, Colombia, 28 February 1990, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{27} U.S. House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Drug Control, The Andean Summit Meeting, February 15, 1990, 7 March 1990, p.5.
Amongst the participants, Colombia had made a positive impression. Assistant Secretary of State of International Narcotic Matters, Melvyn Levitsky, claimed Colombia was the 'shining example', the 'country on line' to head start the whole Andean Strategy. Two years later, on 26-7 February 1992 Ecuador, Venezuela and Mexico were invited to the follow-up meeting in San Antonio, Texas. The draft proposal for San Antonio worked along the same lines of Cartagena, but called for more technical details explaining how to administrate justice and prevent environmental damages.

The language of Barco's and Gaviria's drug policy discourse explicitly stated that Colombia's goal was to 'de-narcotise' its agenda with the United States, yet Colombia's treatment of the drug issue, as well as its move towards pegging other topics to drugs, for instance trade, achieved the exact opposite. In contrast, U.S. National Drug Control Strategy included among its objectives the 'elevation of drugs as a bilateral foreign policy issue'. Indeed, the anti-drug partnership, as formulated, had patently narcotised the agenda, to the extent that it assured the political priority of drugs, it broadened the scope and range of the anti-drug agenda, and all topics of the U.S.-Colombian relationship had come to be conceived as constituent parts of the anti-drug efforts. Drugs embraced them all.

In sum, the existence and particular character of this expanded partnership was, therefore, the result of twenty-years of history of drug control cooperation; converging understandings that drug trafficking constituted a serious threat to Colombia's and United States' national securities; an agreement on the need to broaden the anti-drug agenda; bureaucracies dependent upon the continuation of drug control; and finally, affinity on the basic principles regarding economic liberalism and democracy. Equally,

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the new agreements upheld, to a great extent, the traditional norm on the mutually accepted degree of U.S. intervention in Colombian domestic affairs, although this would be gradually relaxed as a result of the implementation of the agreements between Colombia and the United States.32

It is worth stressing that at the time, and all throughout the 1980s, U.S.-Colombian relations contrasted with the wave of diplomatic friction on drug issues elsewhere in the region. Bolivia, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Peru had all engaged in frenzied rows with the United States over drug control issues. Although power asymmetry and hegemony, a regional structural condition, pertains to all countries in Latin America, it does not predetermine that all relations be equally harmonious or conflictive. A regional approach only takes the analysis of bilateral relations so far, for each relation has come to develop its own set of explicit and tacit guiding norms. Moreover, the very existence of a bilateral alliance forged in 1990 and held until December 1994 necessarily raises questions pertaining the diplomatic crisis during the Samper years. Why were harmonious relations possible in 1990, a period of expanded drug trafficking power and high political instability in Colombia, and not in 1994? This shall be discussed in the chapters to follow.

2. Terms and Topics of the Anti-Drug Partnership

The Cartagena Declaration, the bilateral U.S.-Colombian communique and several side agreements and memoranda of understanding encompassed the core agreements and elements that delineated the new spirit of the relationship. The new U.S.-Colombian anti-drug alliance was comprehensive, and all topics other than drugs were subsumed

32 Walker rightly argues that the Andean Strategy was possible because similar options that linked development needs and security had been previously used in the U.S. policy towards the region. The Alliance for Progress is an example, Walker III, 'The Bush Administrations' Andean Drug Strategy'.

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into the drug agenda. Moreover, with its comprehensive character, the partnership reinforced the traditional aspects underpinning amicable bilateral relations.

The economic issues were amongst the salient topics. Colombian officials had argued that the war against drugs entailed high costs and that the unfavourable international economic conditions bestowed additional burdens to the Colombian state and to the society at large. During his September 1989 meeting with Bush, Barco warned that the break down of the Coffee Pact could cost Colombia $400 million, and proposed the reduction of American tariffs to bolster Colombian's economy. On 19 January 1990, Colombian Ambassador Mosquera, who arduously promoted Colombia's economic prestige, told U.S. Senators at a hearing about the Coffee Pact impasse and criticised a recent move by the Department of Commerce that placed retroactive surcharge on cut flowers exported in 1988-89 period. Colombian officials, however, were careful not to be associated with the reasoning behind the compensation ethos surrounding the elimination of the illegal drug industry in Bolivia and Peru, which according to them, stemmed from economic weakness and dependence on the drug economy. Colombia required economic assistance for different reasons. Following arguments from academia, Colombian officials argued that Colombia was not profiting from the drug economy, but rather the limited portion of repatriated proceeds (2 to 4% of GDP) were 'disruptive'. This sent the political message that

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33 The parties recognized that drugs, development and trade were 'interconnected and self-reinforcing', U.S. Government, White House, Executive Branch Documents from the Cartagena Summit. Appendix I reproduced in U.S. House, Review of the International Aspects, p. 75-102, especially pp. 76, 95.
34 The Miami Herald, 29 September 1989, p. 4A. Colombian officials could have realistically expected the United States to reconstitute the cartel or, also likely, they could have chosen to publicise the Coffee Agreement case to emphasise the need for compensation.
36 Colombian officials benefited from Colombian academic analyses stemming from the community of foreign (U.S.-trained) economists who argued that Colombia was losing in economic terms from the drug trade. One the one hand, the perverse effects of drug trafficking such as violence and corruption only weakened Colombia's institutions and with out them the country's economy would be unable to prosper. On the other hand, drug revenues distorted the economy, which was better left to perform under market conditions as opposed to distortions, see for example J. Gómez, The Colombian Illegal Economy: Size, Evolution, Characterestics
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Colombia was clean and cooperative, and signalled to the market that Colombia was worth investing in. Also, they reminded Americans of their good fiscal behaviour. '[W]e are perhaps the only country in Latin America that has not re-negotiated its debt', incessantly stressed Barco, who also expected U.S. good offices to create a positive atmosphere in the financial system. 37

Including economic issues was also part of the U.S. agenda, for one of Bush's leading projects in the region was hemispheric economic integration. 38 Economic recovery and reform along liberal lines in the region were pivotal for the Bush administration, for it conceived new post-Cold War world as divided into rivaling trading blocks, and Latin America was expected to fall within United States'. However, promoting economic development in Latin America, for example by lowering trade barriers, increasing investment, negotiating debt relief, and providing other economic aid initiatives, was sought not only as a goal in its own right, but as a way to create opportunities for coca growers to leave illicit cultivation and engage in legitimate economic activities. The so-called debt-for-drugs plan proposed by Democrat Senator Joseph Biden, for example, identified the limitations imposed by the debt burden on the Andean nations, and addressed the connection between economic hardship and drug production. 39 Americans were willing to recognise that winning the war against drugs required a sustained effort, as well as economic assistance --a 'breakthrough' in foreign drug policy, commented the Democrat Representative and Chair of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Drug Control Charles Rangel. 40 This consensus within the administration and among Republicans and Democrats in

and Economic Impact', in Francisco Thoumi and Juan G. Tokatlian (eds.), State and Society in Contemporary Colombia (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1988).
38 Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, 'Western Hemisphere Holds Unique Place for Freedom', DOS Dispatch, 2/23.
Congress was crucial for Bush to respond to Colombia's demands on development assistance and trade opportunities. The International Narcotics Control Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-231) included provisions in that sense. To be sure, the Bush administration did not unilaterally force the linkage of drugs and economy. Senator Biden's report illustrates the point. 'It was interesting to me at Cartagena how much stress the Andean presidents put on these other factors, trying to resurrect and stabilize the coffee agreement, cut flowers as alternative crops and so on'.

Of all the Andean countries, Colombia was seen as a good recipient for economic cooperation in the form of trade preferences because of its healthy economy. The reasoning was that the economic aid had the potential to make a difference. Colombia's reputation for economic stability and orthodoxy played a role. Representative Campell of the House Select Committee approved of economic aid going to a country 'physically conservative' and with a 'sensible approach' to economics. U.S. policy-makers also felt encouraged to help Colombia specifically, because they perceived 'some real progress' was being made there. The death of the drug kingpin Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, the extraditions before the 1991 banning, and the fall of coca-price fall of the time were encouraging signals.

Colombians deemed the inclusion of economic issues as a diplomatic victory. The bilateral anti-drug communique included lines such as 'The Presidents stressed the importance of a successful completion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, and recognized the significance of increased access for Colombia's

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41 The NSC drug policy review of 1989 review contemplated economic aid, an idea supported by the Department of State. Congress support for economic aid continued at least until the passage of ATPA, see U.S. Senate, The Drug Summit in Cartagena, p. 10 and U.S. House, Andean Strategy.
42 U.S. Senate, The Drug Summit in Cartagena, p. 10.
43 Ibid, p. 22.
tropical products'. In the Document of Cartagena, the parties pledged 'to work together to increase trade'. At the September 1989 meeting, the United States also offered Colombia support in lobbying other potential donors, including European countries, commercial banks and multilateral banks. For example, the USAID complained that the World Bank loans to Colombia had fallen to $150-80 million from levels of $700 million per year in 1985-1986, and that Inter-American Development Bank lending to Colombia has averaged $250 million per year with sharp annual fluctuations urging support for the drug programme.

Bush's regional package included the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), benefiting Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The ATPA was proposed to Congress in November 1989 and finally approved in November 1991 albeit in a scaled down form. Overall, it was expected to reduce U.S. tariffs on approximately $325 million worth of imports including cut flowers, leather handbags, luggage and vegetables. The Colombian Institute for Foreign Trade estimated in 1991 that 8.3% of Colombian exports to the U.S. would benefit from the ATPA. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), originally developed independently from drug politics to promote debt relief, trade and investment in all of Latin America, served as complement, giving robustness to Bush's commitment. In July 1990, Colombia was the first country to embrace the EAI by signing a framework agreement that created a Bilateral Commission on Trade and Investment to have a permanent space for consultation and dissemination of information on trade opportunities and trade legislation. It also established an Immediate Action Agenda to deal with ATPA, GATT, promotion of foreign investment and non-tariff trade barriers. The commission also facilitated

46 U.S. Senate, The Drug Summit in Cartagena, pp. 4 and 59.
contact between Colombian and American entrepreneurs through a private sector task force.  

Trade preferences were granted more easily than other types of economic aid. Bush's original strategy in 1989 had not envisaged donations and highly concessionary economic aid for Colombia because it was relatively too prosperous to justify it. Yet, Colombian officials elaborated extensively on the need for aid. They argued that they were not raising enough taxes in order to sustain a steady military and police budget. ESF funds provided through USAID were obtained after arguing vigorously that Colombia had incurred heavy losses from the break of the Coffee Pact. 'Assuming the continuation of sound economic policies and demonstrated anti-drug performance', assistance from USAID was envisaged to come from ESF cash transfer to help finance the external debt, administration of justice, drug awareness and allegedly development training, and export promotion programmes with ESF transfers. In the process USAID also came under the scrutiny of Congress, which forced it to think about performance measures.

The United States declined Colombia's demand for crop substitution and alternative development funds. Political assessments were in favour of delivering such assistance; Democrats were traditionally sympathetic toward the idea of promoting economic development abroad and even Republican hardliners agreed on alternative development, albeit for different reasons. Ambassador David Jordan, for example, thought it was functional to counter insurgency and overall diplomacy for this act signalled U.S. credibility and maintained American influence. Denying this line of

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51 U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Overview of the Agency for International Development's Economic Assistance Strategy for the Andes and Other Programs, 3 April 1990, pp. 18-9.
funding was mostly the result of USAID's diagnosis. The agency had already begun working in Bolivia and Peru since the mid 1980s, and their ongoing projects demanded additional funds there. Moreover, Colombia had been traditionally categorised as a transit country, while Bolivia and Peru were being blamed for the greater bulk of coca production. Also, USAID officials argued that drug cartels hired cheap labour across the country inducing a migration of workers to cultivation areas in Guaviare, Caquetá and Putumayo. Hence, according to USAID, they were not real peasants who deserved help. In part, USAID's assessment can be attributed to Colombia's own discourse. Its tendency was to differentiate itself from the other Andean nations in order to claim a Western identity.

Tokatlian argues that Cartagena was a clear-cut deal that favoured the U.S. economy but was detrimental to Colombia's interests. It was in February 1990, the same month of the Cartagena meeting, that Barco announced a five-year liberalisation programme with a first stage focused on simplifying and eliminating prior import licensing, and a second stage to reduce tariffs. The United States was reportedly providing economic assistance if and only once the Andean countries reformed their economies towards along market oriented policies. In this reading, drugs were at best an excuse for domination. Yet, attributing Colombia's first steps towards economic liberalisation followed by the full-fledged apertura reforms to the war against drugs is misleading and inaccurate, for economic orthodoxy had long been advocated by the economic technocracy in key arenas of economic policy, like the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank and the National Planning Department. Reforms had been progressively introduced during the Barco administration before Cartagena, underpinned by a consensus that the old import substitution model was not yielding the

desired economic growth rates. For instance, in 1987 restrictions affecting foreign investors were relaxed allowing 100% ownership in most activities and expanding permitted earnings remittances. In other words, Colombia was a constitutive part of that 1990s window of opportunity and the 'Washington Consensus' that encouraged the Bush administration to propose a new regional integration architecture.57

While trade and economic reform were undoubtedly a priority for both Colombia and the United States, the Cartagena Document also referred to the need to 'work within a framework that respected human rights', for which democracy was a requisite. The United States could claim leadership in 'history's first entirely democratic hemisphere' and democracy was perceived to facilitate cooperation.58 However, facts on the ground challenged Colombia's record. For the first time, Colombia appeared in the reports of leading human rights agencies, which registered the alarming figure of more than 14,000 killings per year in the late 1980s.59 Colombian officials attributed responsibility for it to the impact of drug trafficking, and initiated a feeble purge in the security forces. Barco formed a high-level commission (Comisión Anti-Sicarial) in April 1989 also to look into the paramilitary death-squads. Above all, Barco was careful to reproduce the idea of a democratic Colombia in a way that was acceptable to the American audience, 'We are the oldest and most stable democracy in Latin

56 Tokatlian, 'Drug Summitry', pp. 131 and 137.
57 Marta Osorio and Carlo Nasi argue that Barco's February 1990 announcement was partly the results of World Bank conditionality, see Nasi, Carlo, and Marta Osorio, 'Dos dimensiones de la política exterior de Colombia en 1990: apertura e integración', Colombia Internacional, 13 (1991), p. 3. Conversely, analyses by economists posit that Colombian policy makers, supported by several interests groups in Colombia, formulated apertura independently from the pressure of international financial institutions, see Reina, Mauricio, 'La Iniciativa para las Américas un año después: El caso de Colombia', Colombia Internacional, 16 (1991), pp. 3-11 and Eduardo Muñoz Gómez, 'Relaciones comerciales entre Colombia y Estados Unidos: visión retrospectiva y situación actual', Colombia Internacional, 21 (1993), pp. 11-5. On the other hand, EIA explicitly required Latin American countries to follow adjustment and liberal reform according to World Bank and IMF prescriptions, see George Bush, 'Message to the Congress Transmitting the Enterprise for the Americans Initiative Act of 1990', Washington D.C., 14 September 1990.
58 Eagleburger, 'Western Hemisphere Holds Unique Place for Freedom'.
America, almost as old as that of the United States'. The U.S. Republican administration attributed human rights violations to guerrillas and drug traffickers, thereby removing any state responsibility. U.S. officials identified guerrillas as the greatest communist threat in the continent, whose power was now increasing with drug trafficking. U.S. reports on narco-guerrilla links were progressively more sophisticated and described the connection between drug traffickers and guerrillas well. Nevertheless, the United States did not place obstacles to Colombia's ongoing peace process with the guerrillas.

Of all topics, the greater role of U.S. and Andean military in the war against drugs was the one that sparked most controversy in U.S. and Colombia, especially in the circle of academics and in the media. For academics, the 'securitisation' of the fight against drugs was an unnecessary political construction of drugs as an overwhelming threat to U.S. security that carried the drug problem away from the purely social sphere and into international politics. This favoured American interests by taking away from their society and government the burden of investing larger amounts of money on consumption prevention, drug user's treatment and rehabilitation. Using the war metaphor, says Mabry, preconditioned policy makers to provide a military solution and conditioned the public to expect military operations. An already sensitive theme in U.S.-Latin American relations, American participation was often distorted and portrayed as an overt invasion or a second Vietnam. While fears proved right in

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60 Barco, 'El narcotráfico y la violencia'.
61 See for example, INCSR, 1990.
63 Walker III, 'The Bush Administrations' Andean Drug Strategy'.
64 Mabry, 'The Role of the Military', pp. 101-10.
Panama, and Peru signed up for counter-insurgency counter drug battalions in 1990, operations in Colombia were still somewhat different.\(^5\)

In the United States, calls to incorporate the U.S. military in anti-drug efforts dated back to 1977, when the newly created House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, which suggested the use of military assets. A 1982 amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act authorised the Department of Defence to provide limited logistical support to law enforcement agencies and to share relevant information collected by the military during their routine operations or training missions. Involvement of the military within and beyond American borders progressively stepped up in the 1980s, first with Operation Bahamas and Turks (OPBAT) and HAT Trick in the Caribbean in 1982 to 1985 and then with Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia in June 1986, where military personnel were allowed to engage in the planning of strike operations, the transport of troops and the training of foreign personnel. Blast Furnace turned the tide in favour of expanding the role of the military, for it was rated a success in terms of lowering the process of cocaine, and seen as an inexpensive 'quick fix' to the drug problem. While Reagan's National Security Directive 221 of 1986, which had asked for 'additional emphasis on narcotics as a national security issue in discussions with other nations,' certainly provided a legitimate underpinning to expand the role of the military.\(^6\) In 1987 AWACS planes were first flown for drug interdiction purposes, a regional anti-narcotics air-wing was initiated, and by the end of 1988 the military had been instructed to create a communications and intelligence network, to train foreign military personnel and U.S. and foreign police forces, a practice that had been banned after the counterinsurgency experiments of the 1960s.

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\(^5\) In Peru, the Santa Lucía base in Upper Hulluaga Valley was built to train six narcotics-battalions. Colombia adopted a similar model in 1999.

\(^6\) The NSDD No. 221 has gone into history as the official document that jostled the drug issue into the realm of security 'high politics'. However, a careful reading suggests that a primary aim besides fighting drugs was countering left-wing insurgency, 'NSDD No. 221: Narcotics and National Security', in CRS, *International Narcotics Control: A Compilation of Laws*, p. 548.
Operation Snow Cap and the Operation Support Justice series followed Blast Furnace. They constituted an ambitious plan to institutionalise multilateral military cooperation in the region with American leadership and served the purpose of providing a permanent door of influence for U.S. military in the zone after Cold War arrangements became obsolete. In this way, counternarcotics had became a permanent feature of military doctrine, first in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) manuals and then inserted in the 1990s Operations Other Than War (OOTW), LIC's post Cold War successor, inheriting strategic and tactical features of old time counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{67}

In a comparative study of the causes of military doctrinal change in the United States, Downie concludes that the militarisation of counter-narcotics was the product of institutional learning, rather than a response to external variables, namely the changing manifestations of drug trafficking or the need to ensure a budget.\textsuperscript{68} However, political endorsement from the upper tiers of policy making had a strong impact in keeping the military in, since their participation in drug control had not always been enthusiastically embraced. The Reagan administration, for example, encountered two reticent Secretaries of Defense, Carlucci and Weinberger. Instead, Bush's Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, welcomed the new function. Counternarcotics was seen as a less expensive activity consistent with their policy to cut down the military budget. Bush's secret National Security Directive 19 of 18 August 1989 specifically directed the U.S. military to assist law enforcement agencies and participate in an inter-agency operation under the Drug Czar that included the Departments of State and Transportation, the CIA, the DEA and Customs.\textsuperscript{69}


\textsuperscript{68} Downie, \textit{Learning from Conflict}, pp. 209-18.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid, p. 192
Despite antecedents of military collaboration, and despite the increasing perception in Washington that the military ought to play some sort of role, there was much debate on the matter, especially on the degree of U.S. and foreign military engagement in the war against drugs. Expanding the role of the military was partly justified by the diagnosis in the U.S. policy circles of the failure to suppress drug trafficking, namely, that efforts had been feeble at best. Moreover, the war on drugs would guarantee financial resources and provided a good ground for training.\(^{70}\) Some, however, voiced their caution and dissent. Some members of Congress feared that economic aid and law enforcement by the police would receive a smaller share if they had to compete with the military budget.\(^{71}\) It is important to clarify that a relevant share of aid under 'military' heading was in fact going to law enforcement police forces.

Stronger critics of militarisation invited academics and human rights non-governmental institutions, such as the Washington Office for Latin America, to testify in Congress and invoked the failure of prohibition and the potential violation of human rights by American troops or by alleged disreputable foreign armies. In the end, the Department of Defense took up the official task of isolating key producing areas and preventing the entry of chemicals, destroying labs and other infrastructure, and providing equipment, training, intelligence and planning assistance to Latin American forces. The level of presence of American troops and their access to commanded operations in foreign soil were to be negotiated individually with each country in Latin America.

U.S. policy makers also believed that Latin American militaries should play an important role in drug control activities. In fact, the idea became uncontested in policy-making circles. 'It has become clear that Andean countries cannot conduct effective counter-narcotics operations without the involvement of their armed forces,' claimed

Ambassador Jordan's appraisal was pragmatic in terms of U.S. foreign policy. '[I]t is simply impossible to be successful in this endeavour and not to work for influence on and good relations with the security authorities of these nations.' However, he rejected the idea of using American troops. Why risk a 'Vietnam' if native military forces could be used.

Surprisingly, discussions in Washington differentiated the needs and situations in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. It was clear for some policy-makers, though not all Congressmen, that the U.S. role in Colombia followed somewhat different norms. Colombia, for example, was not formally part of Snow Cap, which included a high degree of penetration. Most remarkable was the contrast in the analysis and policy suggestions for Peru in dealing with Sendero Luminoso and its alleged connection to the illegal drug industry. While engaging simultaneously in counterinsurgency and counternarcotics was feasible and desirable among the U.S. anti-drug and security communities, fighting FARC or ELN in Colombia was never mentioned. It was the role of the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá to spell out country specific-rules, which had most of the time been accepted, but other times defied. The task also fell largely on Colombians themselves to make their preferences explicit. 'Joint [military] operations? Never' said General Miguel Antonio Padilla, Director General of the Colombian National Police. 'Any aid they can give us in terms of advice and equipment would certainly be welcome. But no joint operations, emphatically not.'

The U.S. response to Galán's death triggered a scandal over U.S. military aid to Colombia. The media dramatised the issue and Bennett's and Chief of Staff Sununu's

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71 U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, The Andean Initiative, 6 and 20 June 1990.
72 Efficiency and matching up to cartels capabilities were the major functional motivations. U.S. House, The Andean Initiative, p. 92.
73 U.S. House, Andean Strategy, p. 3.
75 At least explicitly and openly.
careless declarations saying the United States would be 'willing to risk American servicemen' in Colombia contributed to misunderstandings. Sununu hinted that the U.S. was ready to reproduce Blast Furnace, only at a greater scale.\textsuperscript{77} Colombian public opinion, especially after Panama, feared an invasion. The early January fiasco involving U.S. vessels \textit{John F. Kennedy} and \textit{Virginia} approaching without prior protocol consultations the Colombian coast to carry out interdiction operations contaminated the environment even further. This was the first friction that the alliance encountered. The scandal was rapidly handled with a personal conversation in which Bush acknowledged it had been all an unfortunate 'misunderstanding'.\textsuperscript{78} Overall, it was clear that there was officially no combat role foreseen, and Americans were careful to point out that Colombia had not asked for combat troops.\textsuperscript{79} Instead, Colombia requested for both its military and police, transportation and communications equipment, radio monitoring equipment, telephone scrambling devices and helicopters, 'creative' military equipment to track down cartels in urban areas and increased sharing of intelligence.\textsuperscript{80} Contrary to media reports, Colombian authorities welcomed military aid which could also be used for counter-insurgency purposes.\textsuperscript{81} While content to embrace harsh drug prohibition measures and work with U.S. authorities, the Barco administration maintained a traditional position on the matter observing historical definitions of sovereignty when it came to the United States. Undoubtedly, the views of Minister of Foreign Affairs Julio Londoño influence Colombia's official position. He was an ex-military specialised on Colombian borders and suspicious of U.S. and industrialised countries' intentions.\textsuperscript{82} Nevertheless, the new

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{The New York Times}, 9 July 1989, Section 4, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{78} PPP, Bush, 1, p. 29-30.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid, pp. 16-7; Barco, 'El narcotráfico y la violencia'
\textsuperscript{81} For an example of media reports see Andrés Oppenheimer, 'Military to Boost Drug Fighting Role, New Chief Says', \textit{The Miami Herald}, 1 October 1989, p. 20A.
\textsuperscript{82} Londoño's perception of the U.S. and the state of affairs with the U.S. differed radically from other officials' views who furthered a more congenial approach to the U.S. such as Minister of
military cooperation envisaged the increase of U.S. military advisers up to 100 at any
given time including communications specialists, computer operators, munitions
specialists and logistics personnel. This slowly opened the door for greater U.S.
involvement.

As regards the involvement of its own military, Colombia's perception of threat from narco-terrorism, referring to terrorist attacks launched by drug traffickers and drug funded right-wing paramilitary squads, justified at least a selective involvement of its own military through specially trained forces. For instance, Barco responded to the assassination of Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos in January 1988 having the 4th Brigade of the Colombian Army carry out successive raids. Already before Galán's death, on 21 July, the United States had agreed to Colombia's petition for an Eximbank loan of $200 million to purchase military equipment to Colombia for allegedly anti-narco purposes.

One factor opening the door for military participation in anti-drug activities was the often conflated picture of security threats. On 25 November 1988, for example, Barco invoked emergency measures against terrorism at large, which grouped guerrillas and drug traffickers in one same category. Measures included the creation of special anti-terrorist unit, the Elite Force, which would fight both. Yet, restrictions on an expanded role of the Colombian military, endorsed by the United States, stemmed partly from the interests of the Colombian Anti-Narcotics Police. The expectation of a generous aid package had triggered bitter quarrells between the police and the military. There

Communications and ideologue of the administration Fernando Cepeda and Barco's aide Gabriel Silva, who became Gaviria's point-man for the United States and then Ambassador in Washington from 1992 to 1994. See Londono's views in 'Entrevista con el canciller Julio Londoño Paredes', Colombia Internacional, 10 (1990), pp. 3-9.

The U.S. MilGgroup and the Ministry of Defense also signed a military personnel exchange agreement, 'para promover lazos de amistad'. Memorando de Acuerdo Sobre Intercambio de Personal Militar Entre los Ejércitos de los Estados Unidos y de Colombia (Programa PEP). Signed by General Oscar Botero Restrepo (no date).

Colombian academia, however, was against using national military forces because it criticised punitive measures on principle and because the military would be exposed to corruption, see Leal, 'Political Crisis and Drug Trafficking', p. 8.
were, however, disagreements within the Bush administration on whether to pressure Colombians on the use of their military or not. While INM accepted Colombia's preference for a limited role, the Inspector General of the Department of State criticised Colombia's selective use. Gaviria maintained Barco's approach to cooperation and gradually made the rule of U.S. engagement more flexible, especially during the crisis generated by the escape from prison of Pablo Escobar, as next illustrated in chapter 7.

Militarisation included another proposal, that is, the creation of a Regional Multilateral Anti-Drug Strike Force. It had been originally introduced with full congressional backing in the 1988 Anti-Drug Act and had similar features to those later on developed in Snow Cap and Operation Support Justice. Latin Americans did not receive the idea well. As Jamaica's Prime Minister Michael Manley politely stated: 'There [was], quite frankly, I think, a certain anxiety as to whether it really would work'. Despite the apprehensions on full U.S. troop participation in their soil, mutual distrust among the Andean countries surely made it an unattractive proposition. With the knowledge that Cartagena was now set in the calendar, some U.S. Congressmen revived the idea and cajoled the administration to adopt it, but the initiative was not forcefully pursued by the Executive branch, which Senator Biden accused of being 'less than enthusiastic'. Senator Arlen Specter had managed to decipher the controversy behind it:

We had a chance to discuss this issue with President Barco when he was in Washington a few weeks ago, and I think it is fair to say that while President Barco is totally opposed to any U.S. support directly because of sovereignty issues, that there is some receptivity to the concept... it is a very delicate matter because if the United States moves too abruptly or too forcefully it has the overtone of too much U.S. domination.87

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85 See the U.S. Anti-Abuse Act of 1988.
Unlike Bolivia and Peru, Colombia was also willing to back eradication. While Bolivia made cultural arguments against eradication, Peru alleged to have security reasons. Fujimori argued it would hamper its counterinsurgency strategy against Sendero Luminoso. There was a shift in Colombia's position on the issue if massive eradication, which had been done partially and cautiously in the past. The adoption of a complete aerial eradication programme was especially endorsed by the Anti-Narcotics Police, who would directly benefit from U.S. aid.

Contrary to widespread views on the matter, militarisation in the 1990s did not trigger major disputes between Colombian and American authorities. The Cartagena and San Antonio Declaration explicitly included in its agreements, the involvement of Armed Forces of the respective countries and information sharing and intelligence cooperation. For Colombians, unlike Mexicans for example, military cooperation was far less problematic. Hence, the acceptance of more military equipment and training. On the other hand, U.S. officials respected Colombia's terms, and militarisation did not bring 'coercion, threat, pressure and retaliation', thereby making U.S-Colombian relations highly conflictual in the 1990s, as Tokatlian suggests.

In terms of strategy, the formulation of the September 1989 U.S. National Drug Control Strategy shifted the emphasis of U.S. international counternarcotic policies onto the dismantling of cartels. It coincided with Colombia's quest for the crackdown of the Medellín cartel and provided direction to Colombia's own drug control strategy in the longer term. For this purpose, and while Bush was in office, military assistance considerably increased. For example, gathering drug intelligence became crucial and relied mostly on high technology equipment usually administrated by the military. Radars, fixed or AWACS, and their operators came to play an important role. In terms

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88 Bruce M. Bagley, *Myths of Militarization: The Role of the Military in the War on Drugs in the Americas* (Miami: University of Miami, North-South Center, 1991). Colombians required, however, that Colombian personnel take command and control during operations in its territory, interview with Clemencia Forero.

89 Tokatlian, *Drogas, dilemas*, pp. 11-9.
of funding, from 1988 to 1989 U.S. military assistance increased in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru respectively from $0.4 to $5.8 million, $4 to $70.2, and $0.4 to $2 respectively. In 1991 the three countries were respectively granted $30.9, $37.1 and $18.9 million in military aid. CRS analyst Raphael Perl suggests that many in Washington had come to believe that, whether it curbed the flow of drugs into the U.S. or not, disrupting drug organisations was warranted, given the magnitude of the power wielded by such organisations that challenged stability and democracy via corruption and violence. As we shall see, this idea continued to develop, and by the 1990s a new consensus had emerged over the need to target drug criminals more for their power to disrupt governance than for their output in terms of drugs, and justifying the continuation of drug control activities despite the inability to cut down production.

The U.S. Executive branch and Congress came to appreciate the complexities of the drug problem, and were usually aware of the fact that eliminating drugs was not a short-term endeavour nor could be left entirely to the military. Dismantling cartels also entailed initiating legal cases, exchanging legal information, and prosecuting drug traffickers. This demanded that both law enforcement and judicial-legal action work efficiently and in tandem. Thus, judicial cooperation entered the bilateral agenda, with important consequences for the management of the relationship. Judicial cooperation was not entirely new. A small programme had been developed after the Palace of Justice siege in 1985. The Colombian contractor, the Fundación para la Educación Superior (FES), worked with a $1.5 million package over three years that sought to increase the access to judicial information, systematise judicial administration and provide training courses for judges. Among the activities were, for instance, an Overview of Investigative Techniques course for the new judicial police body, Cuerpo Técnico Investigativo (CTI), created in 1988, and basic help such as giving judges free copies of legal codes. Following the completion of AOJ-1 in 1989, the Agency for

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International Development began developing a sequential program which was further justified by the consensus on the need for cooperation in resuscitating the justice sector.\textsuperscript{91}

There were two main arguments for judicial cooperation, judges needed to be physically protected against assassination; Americans were scandalised by the 'plomo o plata' mafia tactic. Also, judges needed to receive adequate instruction since, in the view of American specialist lawyers and drug control authorities, the inquisitorial system was too permeable to corruption and highly inefficient.\textsuperscript{92} Americans were appalled by the absence of juries, but especially by the fact that judges had to investigate, collect evidence, as well as pass sentence. Furthermore, an early FES project had found out that one out of three judges were unable to identify the elements of law needed to obtain a legal conviction.\textsuperscript{93} The moment could not have been more propitious to receive judicial aid with open arms. Since the late 1980s the Colombian government had been trying to reform its constitution, the political system and many other institutions, including the judicial branch. There was also a Colombian consensus on the inefficiency in the judicial branch which translated into impunity and corruption.

As for counternarcotic strategies and tactics, the improved and intensified agenda was, above all, inclusive. Before, American and Colombian drug enforcers had relied mostly on eradication and interdiction of transported drugs. In this phase, drug policy-makers no longer chose between demand or supply-side activities, eradication or interdiction, a punitive approach or a socio-economic incentives to lure people away from the illegal drug industry. Rather, they designed a comprehensive menu of

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid. See also INCSR, 1989.
initiatives on the grounds that no one single activity would suffice on its own.\textsuperscript{94} Given the influence exercised on the policy agenda by the bureaucrats engaged on drugs and by drug-control enforcers across borders, receptive politicians were supplied with ever increasing listings of anti-drug initiatives. The trend towards an expansion of action in this direction testified to the deepening of the institutionalisation of drug policy. On the other hand, the inclusion of certain topics was reinforced by Colombia's own foreign drug policy agenda, which sought to draw the international attention upon those stages of the drug industrial process that took place in industrialised countries, such as money laundering, chemical precursor smuggling, weapons licit and illicit commerce. In the United States there was unprecedented support for anti-money laundering and chemical precursor interdiction, while the control over the production of assault weapons and semi-automatic machine-guns obtained little political support.\textsuperscript{95} The Cartagena and San Antonio declarations also incorporated seizure and forfeiture of illegal proceeds, sharing of such proceeds, eradication and discouragement of illicit crops, control of weapons, planes, shops, explosives and communications equipment, strengthening public opinion in favour of an intensification of the war against drugs, promoting the 1989 Economic Summit in Paris, reporting to the UN Special Session, reporting to the OAS and supporting the World Demand Reduction Summit in London.

\textsuperscript{94} McAllister records the same trend for the international drug regime, although he criticises the lower priority given to the treatment of consumers, McAllister, \textit{Drug Diplomacy}, pp. 240-6.

in April 1990, among others. Despite the bilateral consensus, there was still space for nuance and emphasis as to the implementation of each one of the areas of action.

There were general and specific objectives stipulated in the alliance, according to which the performance of the alliance would be evaluated. For the most part, the United States set the goals through its Andean Strategy. It sought to strengthen political will of partners; to increase the effectiveness of military and police by increasing their intelligence, providing them with air mobility, equipment and training; to isolate key growing areas; to block the shipment of precursor chemicals and destroy labs; to reduce net production and inflict significant damage on drug organisations. Aims were set in terms of foreign drug production, as it had been stipulated a decade ago during the discussions on how to measure policy performance both of U.S. agencies and foreign countries. They were also set in terms of drug flow into the United States. Illegal drugs entering the United States had to diminish by 15% within 2 years (by the end of 1991) and 60% within 10 years (by 1998). In practical terms, experts and politicians could only look at production indicators, since estimating inflow was nearly impossible. In 1991, U.S. policy makers adjusted their goals aiming to reduce 20% by 1993 and 65% by 2001. Reducing production was not achieved when expected, and, finally, policy makers, half acknowledging the reality on the ground, and half disillusioned, eliminated fixed percentages altogether. The Barco administration never got to establish goals in terms of production.

The anti-drug alliance had a highly cooperative language and assigned a role to each part. 'They do not and will not stand alone', declared Bush. The Andean Strategy budgeted $2.2 billion for fiscal years 1990-1994. Colombia's role, was to teach by example. 'The message of Colombia has been heard throughout the Western

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Hemisphere and I believe that it has shifted the momentum in our favour. Most nations throughout Latin America are stepping up their commitment... It is a window of opportunity which we must not let pass', said DEA Chief David Westrate. In addition, the new phase of cooperation had ambitious responsibilities and commitments across the board, on drug control, economic cooperation and compensation, and political consultation on drug matters. The actual results would be, as usual, only limited and, in the longer term, disappointing to all parts.

It is worth mentioning that Europe had, too, a role to play. Despite the strong consensus in Washington to improve U.S. foreign drug policy by providing a larger amount of funds and making the strategy as comprehensive as possible, the United States wanted Europe and international organisations to shoulder part of the financial costs of such an endeavour. In addition, engaging Europe in drug control efforts would work to continue promoting and enhancing prohibition internationally. At the same time, the Barco administration, as well as his successor César Gaviria, struggled to raise the awareness in Europe of the drug problem in Colombia, stressing the particular difficulties and costs of fighting drug trafficking. It was part of the 'internationalisation' and 'multilateralisation' campaign even though it defeated the traditional Colombian desire to restrict external interference in its domestic affairs. On the other hand, like their predecessors, Colombian government officials believed that Europe and multilateral organisations like UNDCP could mediate between Colombia and the United States, balancing off a potential escalation of diplomatic friction due to drug policy. They also believed that Europe had a 'softer' approach to the drug problem.

100 Ibid. p. 101-2.
and would therefore provide aid for crop substitution, and grant trade preferences and soft loans, all unconditional and detached from certification procedures. Also, Colombian bureaucrats involved in international technical cooperation at Special Division for Technical Cooperation immediately saw the potential of new resources for their stock of miscellaneous projects awaiting foreign donations. 102 In 1989 and 1990, Barco personally lobbied Jacques Chirac in France and Margaret Thatcher and John Major in the United Kingdom Europeans to fund his Special Cooperation Programme. At the same time, the United States pushed for European engagement at high-level meetings like the 1989 Paris Summit. 103 Europe's participation was important, for it contributed to the process of institutionalisation of drug prohibition, and with it, to sustain legislation, agencies and programmes functional to U.S.-Colombian cooperation.

3. The Institutionalisation of Drug Control Cooperation: Insights into U.S. Foreign Drug Policy

A process of institutionalisation involves the creation of formal agendas with long-term plans, the existence of permanent staff and budget, the formation of routines, and the entrenchment of norms. The International Narcotics Control Acts of 1988, 1989 and 1992 and the Andean Drug Strategy deepened the institutionalisation of U.S. foreign drug policy along the mentioned areas. Subsequently, this development in the United States became one of the forces driving the expansion of U.S.-Colombian drug control actions from 1989 onwards. In this section I shall refer to the administrative structure of U.S. foreign drug policy-making and implementation, to formal and informal procedures of the technical and political evaluations of U.S. foreign drug

103 However, an early congressional study criticised U.S. lobby to Europe for being scant. It also reported Europe's complaint for not having been invited to the February 1990 Cartagena meeting. U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Integration, The United States
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policy performance, and to the meaning of such procedures in the context of the relationship. The topical content of policies has already been developed in the second section of this chapter.

As the U.S. promotion of prohibition abroad expanded in 1980s, debates in the Executive branch and Congress emerged on whether the institutional structure of U.S. foreign drug policy making and implementation was adequate for the success of international programmes.104 Besides, members in Congress had long complained about the lack of inter-agency coordination, and criticised the then National Drug Policy Board for its lack of leadership. In response, the Executive branch suggested the creation of the Office for National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) at the cabinet level to raise the political importance of drug policy, overcome bureaucratic fragmentation, bring clarity to national priorities, and formulate national and foreign policies in a coherent manner. Not all in Congress were satisfied with the proposed solution, however, since ONDCP increased the powers of the President to the detriment of Congress, and created unnecessary bureaucratic expenses. Notwithstanding, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 effectively eliminated the old Board, and created the figure of the Drug Czar directing ONDCP.105 President George Bush appointed the first Czar, William Bennett, in 1989, and by 1992 the bureau was staffed with 112 people. ONDCP was intended to become the single agency leading domestic and foreign drug policy, yet in practice ONDCP turned into one of the various competing agencies in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.106 However, its creation highlighted an important trend: narcotics departments mushroomed. The sheer

105 National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690)
accumulation of offices involved in drug policy-making highlighted the importance of the drug issue relative to other topics.

A main tier of actors in the Executive branch included the Departments of State, Defense, Justice and the Embassies, the intelligence community, ONDCP and the National Security Council. The new anti-drug duties of the Department of Defense contributed to give the drug issue higher political and bureaucratic attention, given the nature of defence and security activities in state affairs. Moreover, expanding the role of Defence in drug control put greater weight on the foreign policy aspects of drug control to the detriment of domestic activities and demand control, since the theatre of operation of the Defence Department lay outside U.S. borders. Thus, by adopting anti-drug functions, the Department of Defense gained a place in the world of drug policy and post-Cold War Latin American policy. In the case of Defense, its participation assured the continuity of a punitive emphasis to drug control enforced with military strategies and procedures, which reduced the possibility of re-directing policy towards, for instance, harm-reduction approaches. The FY 1989 National Defense Authorization Act, the legislation detailing the substantial expansion of the military in narcotics operations, had provided the Department of Defence with an important incentive, that is, an additional $210 million in their budget for drug interdiction activities. Finally, given the institutionalised nature of its involvement, Defense often ended up by having an important input in the making of U.S. policy towards Colombia.

Among the reasons that ONDCP was at times unable to exercise the expected leverage and management in foreign drug policy was the nature of the role of the Department of State in foreign policy. Formally, only the Bureau for International Narcotics Matters in the Department of State (INM) was specifically assigned to foreign drug policy, and for many years it had to compete against other bureaus inside the Department in order to make drug policy an important component of foreign policy as a whole. INM began gaining status due to an internally fuelled 'mission creep', the
ideational turn of drugs into a security issue, the increasing political attention to drugs in the United States, and to the growth and sophistication of the illegal drug industry in the world. These factors, together with the task to implement foreign drug policy on the ground, assured INM larger budgets for more projects in foreign countries. INM exerted greater influence within the Department of State as a result of the broadening of the scope and range of the new illegal drug agenda. In sum, the so-called 'cop' of the Department of State, as INM was nicknamed, were now building the opportunity to shape and steer foreign policy, not just drug policy.

INM, however, had no absolute or guaranteed monopoly over foreign drug policy. The importance of drugs in U.S.-Latin American relations, and the lack of a strong Latin America policy in U.S. overall foreign policy, also meant that key agencies with anti-drug functions were sometimes leading their own 'foreign policies'. Such was the case of agencies in the Department of Justice. Moreover, Ambassadors' functions increased with the new boost to the drug war. For instance, Ambassadors, as opposed to the Secretary of State or the Attorney General, could authorise U.S. officers to be present and assist foreign officers in effecting an arrest -- a relaxation of the Mansfield Amendment on U.S. participation in foreign police actions. In other words, Ambassadors could control the level of presence and penetration of U.S. officials. Ambassadors also had at their disposition new Narcotics Affairs Sections in their embassies.

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107 One of the reasons why INM retained more leverage, was the frequent turnover at ONDCP. For ONDCP's problems see Perl, 'U.S. Andean Drug Policy', p. 31.
108 Interview with Elliot Abrams.
109 The U.S. Department of Justice established their own contacts with their counterparts in Bogotá in order to disrupt the Cali cartel, see Jim McGee and Brain Duffy, Main Justice. The Men and Women Who Enforce the Nations's Criminal Laws and Guard its Liberties (New York: Touchstone, 1997), chapter 11, especially p. 165.
110 On extended role of Ambassadors see U.S. GAO, Drug War. Observations (September 1991), p. 15. From Washington's point of view this seemed to increase efficiency, which in turn was expected to improve cooperation.
The U.S. Congress increased its power and actual level of participation in drug policy at the same time that the Executive branch expanded its functions and budget, for it was Congress' role to approve the budget of the Executive branch, and monitor its activities.\textsuperscript{112} In the case of drug policy, a small but core group of Congressmen had carved out for the U.S. legislative a protagonic and permanent role in U.S. foreign drug policy by the end of the 1980s, and had been acting through the House Select Committee on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, established in 1977, and the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, established in 1985. Often, they carried their ideas and interests related to drug policy onto other committees, such as the appropriations, intelligence or judiciary committees.

After the 1986 omnibus legislation, Congress began to pass legislation that went beyond setting overarching markers or assigning a given budget to the Executive branch. Instead, legislation became detailed and defined the content and character of both drug policy and foreign policy. Congress had engaged in 'micro-management'. The certification process, which had been regularised by law constituted the single main arena through which Congress moulded drug foreign policy. The International Narcotics Control Acts of 1988 and 1989 further entrenched certification as the main instrument through which foreign drug policy was carried out.\textsuperscript{113} For instance, Section 487 of the 1988 Act, titled 'Prohibition on Assistance to Drug Traffickers', was designed for Panama and General Noriega, and introduced special legislation on Bolivia, Jamaica and Peru.\textsuperscript{114} Certification also required formal bilateral agreements on extradition, evidence exchange and law enforcement.\textsuperscript{115} It also impacted the handling

\textsuperscript{112} See for example U.S. House, \textit{Overview of the Agency for International Development}, especially p. 29.

\textsuperscript{113} See also the Foreign Relations Authorization and Foreign Appropriations Acts of 1988 (P.L. 100-202 and P.L. 100-204).

\textsuperscript{114} Continuing Appropriations Act, Title V, Sec. 534 of the Foreign Operations Act of 1988.

and gathering of information on foreign countries. The International Narcotics Control Act of 1992 (PL 102-583) heavily extended the reporting requirements which increased U.S. monitoring over the countries receiving counter-narcotics aid. Furthermore, discretionary trade and aviation sanctions were introduced in the law.\textsuperscript{116}

The nature of these procedures increased the propensity of the United States to be intrusive in other countries: monitoring the implementation of U.S. foreign drug policy required monitoring the formulation and implementation of domestic drug policies elsewhere.

The dynamic between U.S. officials in Congress and the Executive branch dedicated to the making and implementation of drug policy had by now become a routine, thereby reinforcing the relevance of the drug issue and each other's role in drug foreign policy. Thus, despite the apparent atmosphere of confrontation stemming from the formal Congress-Executive divide (and often exacerbated by partisan clashes), there was much collaboration among drug bureaucrats and politicians, and among Democrats and Republicans focusing on the drug issue. They all shared the drive towards expanding and enhancing the foreign drug policy agenda. During the phase of the institutionalisation of bilateral prohibition, this node of actors increased their potential to shape U.S. foreign policy towards Colombia, in particular taking into account that drugs had become the leading and overarching issue in the relationship.

To be sure, the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690) had added the legal, formal, support to prioritising the drug issue; the law declared that the 'suppression of international narcotics trafficking is the among the most important foreign policy objectives of the United States'.

To conclude, the developments of institutionalisation within the United States, and the mechanisms that triggered the deepening of prohibition in Colombia created crucial

\textsuperscript{116} Requirements impacting on source countries were originally valid for only FY 1993 and 1994 and then made permanent after the Corrections Act of 1994.
opportunity structures which constituted necessary conditions for future conflict. The
next chapter will address the implementation of the new agreements, that is, the
process of institutionalisation at work.
Anti-drug efforts had ultimately failed to reduce drug trafficking from Colombia. Besides continuing to refine 80% of the cocaine consumed in the United States, Colombia was producing approximately 30,000 hectares of coca lead per year. In the end, the Colombians were paying a high political and economic price by following a prohibition regime, for, paradoxically, it was prohibition itself what made the business so lucrative. And the more the drug trade thrived the stricter and greater sophistication of drug control measures devised by state officials, and the larger the political, administrative and budgetary burdens on the state and society. Nevertheless, prohibition and cooperation with the United States continued. This is the main theme of this chapter. The first section discusses why the César Gaviria administration (1990-1994) embraced prohibition and the legacy of the Barco-Bush partnership given its costs. It argues that embedded prohibition ideas and institutions played a major role in the choice. The second section examines the implementation of the main areas of cooperation during its phase of deep institutionalisation, and the progressive relaxation of old norms that formerly excluded U.S. officials from arenas in Colombia traditionally perceived as exclusively domestic. Finally, the third section examines some of the key challenges of the Gaviria administration to continue honouring cooperation agreements with the United States in the face of the constant relaxation of the Colombian surrender policy, the June 1991 banning of extradition during the

1. Gaviria's Revolcón Embraces Drug Control

According to power systemic and materialist approaches to drug politics in the Americas, and according to Colombian critics on the left, we might have expected Colombia to defect from the drug war when Gaviria took office in 1990. Drug traffickers' attacks on the government were escalating in response to Barco's decision to activate extradition on 17 August 1989; public support for a frontal confrontation was dwindling; and some politicians in Colombia were calling for flexible approaches to drug traffickers. General malaise in Colombia made American officials, once again, uncertain whether the incoming administration would continue confronting drug trafficking. Despite the apparent gains of defection, Gaviria did not waver from prohibition and the inherited anti-drug partnership recently forged with the Bush administration. Instead, the Colombian leader put into effect and extended most of the agreements. This required further institutionalisation of bilateral drug control cooperation through an increase and at times formalisation of practices involving Colombian and American officers, the creation of new Colombian anti-drug agencies and the incorporation of drug control functions into Colombia's development, financial and judicial agencies.

The circumstances surrounding Gaviria's election bound him to the war against drugs. A young, but experienced, politician who had served as both Minister of Finance and Government under Barco, Gaviria was chosen to replace Luis Carlos Galán as Liberal party candidate in the 1990 presidential race. During his campaign Galán had threatened to tighten anti-drug laws and endorse extradition, thereby provoking the Medellín drug cartel to order his assassination in 1989. Galán became a
national martyr and his death made it morally difficult to turn away from the cause against drug trafficking, and concomitant policies in this struggle.

Yet pivotal to the continuation of prohibition and the U.S.-Colombian cooperation alliance was the trend within Gaviria's administration to accept anti-drug norms as the natural route to follow. Prohibition and the idea that narco-violence constituted a threat were embedded in the thinking of Gaviria's core team officials.¹ In Colombia, the struggle against drug trafficking is a question of both principles and survival, stated one key official document, which then proceeded to outline the inventory of administrative agencies in charge of tackling drug traffickers, following the format of public policy planning documents.² For the young and pragmatic technocrats of Gaviria's administration, drug policy was hardly an aberration, rather it mirrored a public policy common to all those which identified themselves as modern Western states.

Moreover, the content and character of Gaviria's main government programmes contained elements that facilitated a continuing partnership with the United States. The new Colombian leader had a mandate for state modernisation and democratic renovation. It emanated from the historical plebiscite of March 1990 in which students and NGOs distributed an unofficial ballot asking voters to approve a constitutional reform. The idea of a National Constituent Assembly won with 4,991,887 affirmative votes, against 226,451. Colombians, enveloped in a spirit of optimism, anticipated across the board reconstruction that was to bring an end to problems as diverse as insurgency, drug trafficking, corruption, state inefficiency, inequality, crime,

¹ The most influential figures on drug policy were International Affairs counsellor and Ambassador to the United States Gabriel Silva, Security counsellor and Minister of Defence Rafael Pardo, and DNE director Gabriel de Vega. However, apart from his closest aides, who had elaborate and informed opinions on prohibition, there were mid-level officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Justice, the Anti-Narcotics Police, and the DNE who reproduced prohibition by exercising their roles in the bureaucracy, and who were part of the broader transnational drug policy network.

² República de Colombia, La respuesta jurídico-institucional del estado colombiano frente al problema de la droga (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, April 1991).
centralisation of power and ethnic discrimination. Gaviria embraced the mandate and the challenge to turn Colombia around; he 'welcomed' Colombians 'to the future' and announced the Revolcón, a powerful programme of political and economic liberalisation along with technocratic revolution. Subsequently, by being enshrined in the Revolcón, Colombia's drug policy became a modern project of institution building in itself, which further justified and legitimised its existence.

Gaviria's approach to drug policy was attuned to the U.S. trend, thereby placing both countries inside similar discursive and programmatic parameters and increasing opportunities for interaction based on convergence. To recall, President George Bush's Andean Strategy was a comprehensive drug policy package with overtones of institution building and, later on, Clinton's administration further developed the strategy, emphasising some of the nation building dimensions of foreign drug policy, as illustrated in detail in chapter 7. Thus, for example, foreign drug policy lines of action during the Bush and Clinton years included reforming the judicial sector; drafting new prohibition legislation which spilled over into areas beyond just illegal drugs; creating new anti-drug agencies; revamping law enforcement; modernising the security forces to respond better to drug trafficking challenges; and even fostering trade as a means of increasing economic growth and development, which, in turn, sought to prevent people from engaging in illicit activities as a means of sustenance. All of the above areas of action overlapped with Gaviria's own agenda and were perceived by Gaviria's team to advance the democratisation, modernisation and economic development policy goals.

However there was still one major theme of the war against drugs in Colombia that could spark friction with the United States, namely, halting narco-terrorism. For some in Colombia, extradition was the sole cause of the violent behaviour connected with drug trafficking and drug control, and therefore its abolition would spare some of the costs of implementing prohibition. To reinforce the case against the use of extradition,
it was often highlighted that extraditing traffickers did not decrease the size of the illegal drug industry. Rather extradition was the expression of American stubbornness and unwillingness to bear the cost of consumption. Conversely, for other Colombian policymakers extradition had turned into the most fierce and only credible weapon against drug traffickers, given that the main kingpins had circumvented trials and incarceration in Colombia and that extradition was the only measure they feared. With these considerations in mind, the Gaviria administration set out to debate whether to extradite or to negotiate the surrender of drug traffickers by excluding the controversial component of extradition to the United States. Gaviria and his team soon designed a formula, the voluntary surrender policy (política de sometimiento). The plan consisted of a plea bargain system to lure drug traffickers into surrendering and to obtain valuable information leading to the dismantling of organisations at large. Those who surrendered and confessed were exempted from extradition. Gaviria's plan, however, conflicted with one of the essential components of cooperation in drug control as conceived by Americans and Colombians since the 1980s. With the new formula, extradition was to be applied only selectively with a high possibility for drug traffickers to remain in Colombia. Thus Gaviria had a serious foreign policy challenge, namely showing American policymakers that altering Colombia's behaviour on extradition and negotiation were not in themselves a departure from bilateral cooperation, nor a defection from the prohibition regime altogether. Gaviria transmitted this message by declaring that the illegal drug industry manifested itself differently in each country and that states had to battle the ominous effects of drug trafficking by adjusting to its specific manifestations, while relying on international collaboration. Narco-terrorism

3 Such was the position of Senator Hernando Durán Dussán, who lost against Gaviria in the 1990 primary elections.

4 Such were the positions of President Virgilio Barco, Fernando Cepeda, Carlos Lemmos Simmonds and Enrique Parejo. Parejo resigned from his post as Ambassador to Switzerland in protest against the banning of extradition in May 1991.
constituted a Colombian problem and emergency, while drug trafficking, as a whole, was an international problem, he argued. Like Barco, Gaviria insisted on the need to involve consumer countries and multilateral organisations in drug control and on the 'co-responsibility' principle. Gaviria was not seeking to antagonise or blame the United States for drug trafficking. Instead, the Colombian president was setting out clear national goals, candidly acknowledging a potential clash with U.S. drug control preferences, and calling for joint management as the optimal option:

We do not take for granted a natural harmony of interests as a guide to our bilateral relations with the United States, but we will, however, make every effort in our power to deal with all topics on the bilateral agenda in a friendly and constructive, as well as realistic manner.

Gaviria, however, added special emphasis on economic trade opportunities for Colombia derived from drug control. Colombia was seeking to diminish the various costs stemming from drug trafficking and implementation of prohibition, while eliciting assistance at the same time. Gaviria's so-called 'denarcotisation', a concept introduced by Colombian academia into the political discourse and often misleading, was not intended to remove illegal drugs from the agenda, but to avoid negative linkages across issue areas, especially trade. In the end, the Gaviria administration was not questioning repressive prohibition, nor discarding international action. For example, Gaviria's strategy called for intensified U.S. cooperation in nearly every other aspect of drug control. He obtained ratification of the Vienna Convention in the Colombian Congress on 11 May 1993, and took several resolutions to the INCB and CICAD. Matthiesen refers to nationalist and internationalist state and societal forces in Colombia pushing against and in favour of cooperation with the United States. In

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5 República de Colombia, La respuesta jurídico-institucional, pp. 12-9.
8 República de Colombia, La respuesta jurídico-institucional.
her view, Gaviria was a nationalist that got away with defection. Labelling Gaviria as nationalist, however, is misleading since Gaviria was, above all, a pragmatist and an internationalist.\textsuperscript{11}


\textit{Assistance in the Justice Sector and Its Main Consequences}

The Gaviria administration increased cooperation in the justice sector after reformulating the emphasis that Barco had given to it. To recall, the Barco administration focused first on basic safety issues. For example, from 5 September 1989 to 15 February 1991, American and Colombian specialists taught 31 courses training showing judges, administrators and high level officials how to conduct security surveys, deploy security to protect justice buildings and develop personal security awareness.\textsuperscript{12} After the initial programmes that aimed to protect the lives of judges, the attention of Americans and Colombians shifted toward tackling the very essence and structure of the Colombian judicial system. Funds allocated to the Judicial Protection Program were transferred to projects under the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the U.S. Department of Justice, and in 1991 the Gaviria administration signed a new agreement featuring an ambitious $36 million Justice Sector Reform Program (JSRP) scheduled to last until 1997. For Gaviria, cooperation in this sector was relevant in the context of state modernisation. In addition, it was a component of his plan to force drug traffickers to surrender, as explained further on, using a robust justice system that could produce judicial evidence and have access to foreign legal information. The United States and

\textsuperscript{11} Tatiana Matthiesen, \textit{El arte político de conciliar. El tema de las drogas en las relaciones entre Colombia y Estados Unidos, 1986-1994} (Bogotá: Fedesarrollo, Fescol, Cerec, 2000). It is also important to note that Gaviria was not elected on a nationalist ballot.

\textsuperscript{12} ICITAP, Colombia Project Description and Budget (1991), mimeo, pp. 10-1.
Colombia had already signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), but a second agreement on evidence exchange was signed after San Antonio in 1992. When Gaviria assumed the presidency, cooperation in the justice arena became a pivotal process with profound consequences for both Colombian domestic politics and the management of U.S.-Colombian relations. There were two main reasons. First, justice reform became the ultimate proof of Colombia's willingness to cooperate in the war against drugs. In an effort at democratisation, Colombia's renovation through the Constituent Assembly had exposed it to all types of interests. A sense of nationalism combined with the lobby of drug traffickers resulted in the controversial Article 35 of the new 1991 Constitution that banned extradition, by which Gaviria lost a crucial deterrent that had enticed drug traffickers to surrender. Colombia had to resort to its own law enforcement and rule of law capabilities to track down, prosecute and incarcerate powerful drug traffickers. Colombian justice was in the limelight and national prestige was at stake. Later, Pablo Escobar's surrender in July 1991 and the creation of the Special Order Jurisdiction (the so-called faceless judges) designed to minimise threats against judges underscored the relevance of a reform to make evidence and trials effective. In addition, inter-branch politics in the United States reinforced the political weight of justice reform in Colombia. To defend Bush's Andean Strategy against Congressional threats to dismount it, based on the number of setbacks on the ground, U.S. officials in the Executive branch told Congress that the battle was to continue depending on the strengthening of judicial systems.

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13 Fernando Cepeda, 'International Cooperation and the War on Drugs', in Bagley and Walker III (eds.), Drug Trafficking in the Americas, p. 515.

14 With the sponsorship from USAID, FES members traveled to Italy to learn from the judicial tools used during the mani pulite investigation. Colombians introduced the anonymity of judges into the Specialised Jurisdiction for Public Order that was implemented from mid-January 1991 until mid-1999. The system was designed to combat narco-terrorism and the initiative was interpreted by USAID as a sign of commitment to adopt the accusatorial system.

The second set of events that made justice reform so important in U.S.-Colombian relations was the creation of the Fiscalía General (Articles 249-51 of the 1991 Constitution), which to some extent emulated the figure of the Attorney General in the United States under the accusatorial system, and the introduction of accusatorial procedures into the Colombian system. By soliciting technical cooperation from the United States, Colombians had offered Americans an entry window into their reform process, and Americans used it to incorporate elements of their own judicial model and ensure the continuation of drug prohibition to support the war against drugs.  

The Fiscalía General was established to handle criminal cases by investigating, charging, and presenting evidence in court. It is the chief prosecutor's office in Colombia, analogous to the Attorney General’s Office in the United States under the accusatorial system. The Fiscalía General is characterized by its role in the impeachment process of former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, which has sparked debates about the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law in Colombia. The Fiscalía General’s leadership has been marked by controversy, with accusations of political interference and corruption. The office has faced criticism for its handling of high-profile cases, including the investigation of Uribe, which has been considered a major test of the Colombian justice system's commitment to impartiality and due process. The Fiscalía General's role in investigating cases involving political figures and prominent individuals is a significant aspect of its impact on Colombian politics and the perception of judicial independence.
in the mentality of the judges and prosecutors to adopt the new accusatorial system.\textsuperscript{18} However, after ICITAP officials realised that changing ingrained practices among Colombian prosecutors, judicial police and judges had been more difficult than planned visits to the United States were encouraged.\textsuperscript{19} Most training included developing investigative and forensic capabilities, writing manuals, setting standards of internal ethical behaviour, introducing the new concept of prosecutors and the theoretical pillars of the accusatorial system, improving coordination and communication among agencies and gathering evidence that could be valid in courts. Apart from training, the JSRP also donated the usual goods: office equipment, vehicles and radios, which Colombian bureaucrats welcomed and expected.\textsuperscript{20} As part of the formal and regular bureaucratic evaluation procedures of the American system, Colombian counterparts too were obliged to submit regular reports, once or twice a year, as a requisite for the disbursement of further funds. Consequently, U.S. agencies were adopting an oversight function, making Colombian actors and institutions accountable to the United States, instead of Colombian agencies. The hegemon was effectively exercising domestic oversight, a role that Colombia’s own institutions had failed to perform.

ICITAP and OPDAT had explored engaging the ANP in their programs, taking advantage of existing close ties and with U.S. help, the ANP established six investigative units, one for each operational zone. But according to one American official the ANP was more interested 'in acquiring vehicles, radios, weapons, armoured vests, etc., as opposed to formally documenting and implementing command and control responsibilities'.\textsuperscript{21} So ICITAP and OPDAT turned to other judicial police authorities such as the intelligence bureau DIJIN, DAS and the Fiscalía’s own judicial

\textsuperscript{18} ICITAP, programme document, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{19} ICITAP, Colombia Project Description and Budget, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{20} ICITAP, Colombia Action Plan FY 1994, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{21} 1993 Draft Document on AID JSRP, mimeo, p. 2.
police corps, the Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación (CTI). Soon the main Colombian counterpart of the JSRP became the new Fiscalía, with whom the U.S. built important ties, similar to its friendship with ANP. Those ties allowed the U.S. to influence the Fiscalía's structure and substantive work.

ICITAP and OPDAT worked out an organisational structure for the Fiscalía featuring 13 Specialised Units several of which covered drug-related crimes, such as the units for anti-money laundering, anti-corruption and maritime interdiction. USAID assisted in developing the information system of the Fiscalía, providing computers and software to design a record of steps for case management and a data base to interrelate information on different cases. Colombian authorities complemented this effort installing a nation-wide communications network using both satellite and microwave technology. ICITAP also served on the Fiscalía Coordinating Committee of the Police Training Programme (PRISMA) with voice and vote, where it could make substantial suggestions for their programmes. ICITAP produced a judicial police manual defining the roles of the various investigative agencies under the new Colombian legal system, a Crime Scene Manual and Investigative Help Agency Guide and a Prosecutor's Manual similar to the U.S. Attorney Manual.

The national anti-money laundering regime began to take shape with the new Fiscalía and Organic Statute on the Financial System of 1993 (Articles 102-105, 209 and 211 of Decree 663 of 1993). Incipient legislation was introduced with Law 30 of 1986, yet the new regime was technically sophisticated and involved several key financial institutions in its implementation, which further reinforced a body of norms

22 200 of CTI's 6500 agents formed an elite anti-narcotics unit, and U.S. officials estimated they worked closely with 60 of these agents, see ICITAP, Colombia Action Plan FY 1994, p. 2.
23 See for example, GAO, Foreign Assistance. Promising Approach, p. 6. U.S. documents and media have translated the Colombian Fiscalía interchangeably as, the Office of the Prosecutor General or the Attorney General. I will refer to the name in Spanish.
24 ICITAP, programme document, pp. 3-4, 8.
Chapter 6, The Gaviria Administration

pertaining to drug prohibition. In the new system, the Fiscal's office initiated investigations and received reports on suspicious transactions identified by private or public financial institutions, such as banks, exchange houses or trade-brokers. The DAS, National Police, Ministry of Finance, Superintendencia Bancaria, Superintendencia de Valores, Dirección Nacional de Impuestos y Aduanas (DIAN), Incomex and the Central Bank, acquired prevention and investigative responsibilities. Colombia's development of an anti-money laundering regime was also reinforced by developments at the international level with the 1988 Basel Declaration of Principles on the Regulations of Financial Institutions and the creation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989. In turn, Colombia began strengthening the regional and international anti-money laundering regimes through its 1994 proposal to set up the Southern American Financial Action Task Force.26 One crucial spillover from this generation of anti-drug measures was the strengthening of anti-corruption legal norms and values. Automatically, legislation against drug trafficking and money laundering incorporated measures against white-collar corruption, tax evasion and corporate financial corruption.27 Soon anti-corruption measures were justified on their own right or as a requisite for democracy and for the market economy to work and deliver.

Finally, a crucial function developed by the Fiscalía was taking charge of judicial evidence exchange with the United States used in cases against drug traffickers. This assignment placed great expectations and responsibilities in the hands of the Fiscalía and its chief. The first Fiscal General Gustavo De Greiff, failed to fulfil U.S. expectations, as illustrated below. But Americans welcomed the arrival of Alfonso Valdivieso, who became a close ally during the legal process against President Ernesto Samper on charges of drug-related corruption (see chapters 8 and 9).

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26 Iniciativa Colombiana para la Creación de Una Convención Hemisférica sobre Blanqueado de Activos de Origen Ilícito (mimeo)
27 Law 190 of 1995, the Anti-Corruption Law.
In strictly technical terms, the results of justice cooperation and the mixed inquisitorial-accusatorial system were limited. A mid-term evaluation conducted in 1995 by U.S. authorities concluded that little progress had been achieved in terms of the three major performance indicators, namely, the overall criminal case load, the time it takes to process the cases, and the general public's perception of its accessibility. Moreover, instruments to address other areas of criminal activity, such as the violation of human rights, extortion and kidnapping, were underdeveloped or unattended in the 1990s. Notwithstanding initial technical weaknesses, creation of the Fiscalía would have far-reaching normative and political implications for Colombia and for the bilateral relationship. It became one of the most relevant anti-drug trafficking and anti-corruption institutions in charge of enforcing post Cold War values; during the crisis in U.S.-Colombian relations of 1995-1997 the Fiscalía was one of the few formal interlocutors the United States accepted (see chapter 9); and lastly, the Fiscalía reflected legitimacy and credibility in Colombia amidst the deep erosion of the Colombian state in the mid 1990s and beginning of the 2000s.

**Eradication and Interdiction: Opening the Back Door to Military Cooperation**

The Fiscalía did not overshadow the ANP. Eradication, a task previously assigned to ANP, gained new momentum with the strategic configuration of drug policy during the Bush administration and especially with Clinton's focus on source countries. In addition, there were new threats on the ground. Early in 1991 the U.S. media reported on high quality Colombian heroin being distributed on New York streets, and in November the Colombian DAS found 2,000 hectares of poppy, which ANP started eradicating manually. Massive eradication with glyphosate followed, sanctioned by

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the charismatic director of the newly created Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes (DNE), Gabriel de Vega, who allowed a glyphosate spraying plane to fly over him to counter pro-environment Congressmen and their accusations that the herbicide was lethal.\footnote{Interview with Gabriel De Vega, former director of DNE, Bogotá, May 1999.} ANP chief, Brigadier General Rosso José Serrano, who was to become an international hero of the drug war, was also fully in favour of spraying, arguing manual eradication was a 'logistical nightmare.'\footnote{The New York Times, 17 February 1992, p. A5.} To be sure, the new aerial eradication program would bring the ANP fresh funds and helicopters. In February 1994 the program was extended to coca on a permanent basis.

In 1992 Iván Urdinola Grajales, who controlled most of the poppy trade, was apprehended, yet efforts to destroy poppy fields were ultimately unsuccessful and by the end of the Gaviria administration 20,000 hectares remained untouched. Although one could speculate that Colombia's rapid reaction to poppy retarded a major heroin production wave in the country. Burma (153,700 hectares) and Laos (25,610 hectares) continued to be the leading producers in the 1990s. Results with coca were even more disappointing; hectares under cultivation did not diminish significantly in the early 1990s and then grew in 1994 to 45,000 hectares from 37,500 hectares in 1991.\footnote{INCSR, 2000.} Yet institutionalising massive eradication operations had effects other than curbing drug production. It guaranteed ANP an important bureaucratic stance and political weight with respect to other government agencies involved in drug policy. Moreover, ANP's standing was enhanced by Serrano's own agency. He learned the benefits of contacting U.S. officials directly, especially Congress, for it had the power to decide not least over the budget, but to shape concrete aspects of U.S. drug policy. At San Antonio, for example, Colombia and the United States agreed to re-direct $75 million in aid from

30 Interview with Gabriel De Vega, former director of DNE, Bogotá, May 1999.
the Colombian army to the police. The DEA continued to work with the ANP, and rated cooperation on intelligence exchange and interdiction to be 'exemplary' even at the time when Escobar’s scandals were generating friction between the political authorities of Colombia and the United States. By now, however, DEA was sharing the ground with various U.S. forces and agencies of the U.S. intelligence community that had been progressively incorporated on a permanent basis in the drug fight in Colombia, such as the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA).

The nature of ANP’s role and Gaviria’s intensification of interdiction, as part of overall counter-drug strategy expanded the participation of the Colombian Army, Air Force and Navy in drug control operations. It also increased the demand for U.S. military assistance and willingness to go along with the U.S. trend to involve its security forces in counter-drug operations. The Colombian Air Force supported the police through air transportation and direct involvement in anti-narcotics operations on those occasions when ANP’s own INM-funded air-wing was unable to perform. Colombia's military, for example, made Latin America's first airborne assault on a drug target. Also, the Gaviria administration put into effect decree 1874 of 1979 ordering the creation of a Coast Guard in the Navy as part of tighter controls over maritime jurisdiction in order to stop the traffic of drugs, weapons, explosives and chemicals. Airspace and territorial control, in general, was reinforced by the installation of U.S. and Colombian radars. In early 1990, tactical radars were installed in Barranquilla and Apiay to operate jointly with three other U.S. Air Force radars previously deployed in Colombia and to complement the detection and monitoring operations of the Southern

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37 Tokatlian, 'Política pública internacional contra las drogas de la administración Gaviria y las relaciones entre Colombia y Estados Unidos', in Francisco Thoumi (ed.), *Drogas ilícitas en Colombia. Su impacto económico, político y social* (Bogotá: Editorial Ariel, UNDP, DNE, Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, 1997), p. 522
Command-launched AWACs and P-3s that had recently begun surveillance flights over the Caribbean and Andean regions. SouthCom mobile training teams, tactical analysis teams and planning assistance teams were involved in the operation of radars to obtain intelligence. The U.S. placed other radars in Southern Colombia and assisted in the construction of a riverine anti-narcotics base at Puerto López, for which U.S. Mobile Training Teams instructed Colombian Marine Infantry, who then conducted raids along the Putumayo and Puerto Leguízamo rivers.

The Gaviria administration also relaxed former restrictions on certain U.S. military engagement, which was part of the tacit rules governing the bilateral relationship. For the first time Colombia allowed effective extraterritorial military law enforcement when it invited the Delta Force, part of U.S. Special Forces, to collaborate in the search for Pablo Escobar after his 22 July 1992 escape. The controversial Juan Chaco multipurpose exercise also constituted a significant departure from previous practices. The exercise was a confidence building measure in the form of a civil action operation featuring U.S. Marines building a school and an airstrip in a small town not far from Cali; it was also intended to signal to the Cali group Colombia's intentions to confront them. For Gabriel Silva, Barco's advisor on foreign relations and Colombian Ambassador to the United States during the Gaviria administration, the Juan Chaco operation did not constitute a violation of Colombia's sovereignty, but a step to regain

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41 This assessment challenges Matthiesen's argument that one of the reasons why Gaviria allegedly had little interest in drug control military assistance was his preference for a negotiation with the guerrillas, Matthiesen, El arte político, pp. 257-8. However, he did receive military aid, and a major component of Gaviria's approach to the guerrillas was using force as a deterrent.
42 Ambassador Morris Busby requested the participation of Delta, see Bowden, Killing Pablo, www.killingpablo.com.
sovereignty, which was being systematically violated by drug traffickers. However, the Colombian public was less condescending in the face of such an unprecedented presence of Marines on Colombian soil, which proved costly for Gaviria, especially when the media misconstrued the operation as an invasion. In addition, a jealous Colombian Congress accused Gaviria of violating the constitution by not consulting them. In the end, Gaviria defended the operation, arguing it was a routine cooperation exercise that did not require the authorisation of either the State Council or the Senate and he continued to endorse further cooperation with the United States. In 1992, for example, Gaviria signed a surveillance flight agreement that allowed U.S. aircraft to enter Colombian airspace at any time without requesting authorization for each single flight.

Nevertheless, Gaviria and his team continued to have misgivings about setting up an independent fully equipped counter-narcotics unit in the military and refused the U.S. offer of a $2.8 million package for that purpose. The decision came about despite the knowledge of increased ties between guerrillas and the illegal drug industry. A 1993 Colombian report to the CICAD's Experts Meeting on Alternative Development clearly described the intertwining of illegal crops, drug trafficking and the guerrilla

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problem in at least 115 out of 1609 municipalities. Guerrillas, the report ascertained, were involved in production and processing; they provided security to growers and laboratories; and had contacts with the main drug cartels. The same report suggested that the Gaviria administration was seeking to decrease guerrilla influence through alternative development, on the assumption that attending to the socio-economic grievances of rural workers would hypothetically decrease the guerrilla's popularity,\(^{46}\) and at least during the peace negotiations before 1992, that the government would at times refrain from launching eradication operations in guerrilla-controlled areas, which INL tolerated.\(^ {47}\) Moreover, U.S. policy makers did not seem to regard Colombia's situation as pressing as Peru's with Sendero Luminoso. In reference to Peru, INM chief Levitsky noted: '[W]e understood that the insurgency and the drug problem were inextricably linked. [...] So we have never been shy about saying that, yes, the insurgency has to be dealt with as well'.\(^ {48}\) In the case of Colombia, the possibility of providing assistance to combat narco-guerrillas with a combination of counterinsurgency and counternarcotic strategies had elicited occasional remarks which were responses to informal consultations within the Washington policy making circles. In 1991 the GAO assistant comptroller, General Frank C. Conahan accepted the existence of narco-guerrillas and thought it was 'proper, therefore, that U.S. assistance be made available to counter that kind of activity', as long as it did not turn into counterinsurgency only.\(^ {49}\) Yet there was no Colombian or U.S. policy on narco-guerrillas as such, only awareness of the connections and improvised action.

ANP's ability to ensure U.S. funding, the nature of their activities and Gaviria's expansion of participation by Colombian military in anti-drug operations increased overall U.S. military assistance. A plan for U.S. military assistance was drafted in 1991

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\(^{47}\) INCSR, 1990.


\(^{49}\) U.S. House, Oversight Investigation, p. 59.
programming with $27 million in total military aid for FY 1991, allocating $10 million to the police and $17 million to the military. Moreover, the United States increased its flexibility to grant military aid by using draw-down authorities and allowing the FMF to fund the purchase of military equipment by the police not just the military, as long as they were used for counter-drug operations. In 1990, for example, the 506(a) draw-down facility gave SAPOL an additional 12 helicopters to the 27 it already had.

Colombia, however, increased its counter-drug budget in other activities. While it stiffened provisions on interdiction and eradication, it also introduced crop substitution and alternative development, without U.S. cooperation, for USAID continued to argue that Colombian growers were just drug trafficker's pawns who scarcely resembled the case of peasants in Bolivia and Peru that depended on the production of coca and had historical-religious ties to the plant. Expanding on a small project funded by the United Nations in Cauca in 1985, the 1990 PEC initiative included nine alternative development projects. European donors and UNDP-UNDCP, financed at first only four projects worth $20 million, in Cauca, Putumayo, Caquetá and Calamar in Guaviare. This modest beginning, executed by a transitional partnership between the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Rehabilitation Plan, and the National Police evolved in 1995, during the Ernesto Samper administration (1994-1998), into the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo (PLANTE) managed by a permanent bureau attached to the presidency in charge of designing alternative development policy, lobbying for international funds, and coordinating implementation on the ground through regional officers. CICAD, UNDCP and IADB became the leading institutions promoting alternative development.

51 U.S. House, Oversight Investigation, p. 89.
Economic Assistance, Trade and Liberalisation as Part of Drug Control Cooperation

The anti-drug partnership contributed to a flourishing of economic cooperation. Based on an internal consensus indicating economic deregulation and liberalisation to be the appropriate growth strategy for Colombia, Gaviria had hailed a new age of *apertura* making increased foreign trade and access to foreign investment the cornerstones of his economic development policy.\(^{53}\) International events also pushed Gaviria into forging closer economic ties with the United States. On the one hand, Colombian officials believed that the new Post Cold War world in the making increased the number of actors competing for trade agreements, investment and loans. There was a fear that, once more, as in the days of the Marshall Plan, the United States would devote resources to Europe, in this case Eastern Europe, thereby neglecting Latin America's needs. Colombia, hence, had to act decidedly and swiftly. On the other hand, the emerging economic order, as perceived in Colombian academia and economic policy making circles, brought strategic windows of opportunities instead. Rival economic blocks appeared to be forming and Colombia was to become part of a U.S.-led block.\(^{54}\) The 1989 congressional fast track authority granted to the Bush administration, which eventually gave birth to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, generated great expectations in Colombia, turning Colombia's potential adherence to NAFTA into a top priority goal.\(^{55}\) With that in mind, Gaviria's regional integration spree, featuring revival of the Andean Pact, the Grupo de los Tres, LAIA and the agreements with Venezuela were viewed as a step towards further integration with the United States, not as a balancing of power. Thus, for example, under Ambassador Gabriel Silva's leadership, Colombia designed a policy to


diffuse information on the *economic liberalisation* process, to lobby U.S. Congress members on the economic benefits to their states of a free trade agreement with Colombia, and to publicly endorse NAFTA negotiations, as well as the Clinton-launched Miami Summit of Americas.⁵-six

In practice, the 'narcotisation' of relations furthered Gaviria's aim to obtain favourable economic trade and investment agreements for Colombia.⁵-seven The Gaviria administration drew from Barco's drug policy blueprint, which in effect linked economic cooperation to solving the drug problem and to mitigating the effects of drug control. As an innovation, Gaviria steered the focus towards trade, as opposed to assistance in kind and other traditional aid projects, but without necessarily rejecting them. 'Rhetorical support, and declarations that we are victims and not to be blamed, are surely not enough', he warned, asking for an 'end to discrimination against Colombian exports' plus support in the form of 'trade opportunities'.⁵-eight Within policy making circles in Bogotá and Washington, the 'No aid, fair trade' campaign called for an expansion of CBI provisions for Colombia. This encompassed the U.S. removal of its original veto to Colombia's entrance into GATT and accession to the GSP, the dismounting of subsidies and barriers that hindered export of manufactures and agricultural products, installation of a mechanism to settle trade disputes and access to U.S. government concessionary loans.

After 1990 ATPA legislation was written and negotiated by U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills and Myles Frechette, a career diplomat who was later

⁵-six Embassy of Colombia in Washington, compilation of documents on accomplishments under the Gaviria administration, Chapter 1, Free Trade. Muñoz, former Deputy Chief for Bilateral Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, notes that it was the first time that Colombia hired U.S. professional lobbying for trade-related purposes, Muñoz, 'Relaciones comerciales', p. 13.

⁵-seven Muñoz attributes U.S. cooperation on trade issues to the Bush administration willingness to compensate Colombia for the fall of the Coffee Agreement and the negative consequences of the fight against drugs, Ibid, pp. 11-5. Goncalves and Soto argue that drug politics gave Colombia a better bargaining position in terms of trade, Chris J. Goncalves and Andrés Soto, 'Relaciones económicas entre Colombia y Estados Unidos: la búsqueda de mayor autonomía', *Colombia Internacional*, 19 (1992), pp. 11-22.

appointed U.S. Ambassador in Bogotá. The trade act was introduced for Congressional approval in October 1990 by Representatives Philip M. Crane, Raymond J. McGrath and Charles Rangel, a Colombia friend and a leader on narcotics policy that also sat on the Committee of Ways and Means. Legislation passed in November 1991 and made effective from July 1992 to 2001. Colombians perceived the passage of ATPA as a significant triumph considering the level of Congressional anxiety over the U.S. budget, which had caused some to be reticent to spend on the Andean Strategy. Of the four Andean countries Colombia benefited the most from ATPA. U.S. ATPA imports increased by 120% from 1990 to 2000. And in 1999, Colombia products (mainly cut flowers and pigments) accounted for 45% of the total dollar value of ATPA exports to the United States in 1999. However, in overall terms, the merits of ATPA turned out to be restricted, for less than 15% of the value of its exports to the United States benefit from the agreement.

A major breakthrough also occurred in July 1990, when the United States finally withdrew its veto on Colombia's entrance to GATT and GSP. The U.S. decision was linked to both U.S. policy of cooperating on economic development issues as a way to reduce drug production and to Colombia’s introduction of key reforms, such as eliminating the export subsidy Tax Reimbursement Certificate (CERT) and provisions of the old Plan Vallejo. After kingpin Pablo Escobar's death in 1993, Gaviria thanked the 'nations that have helped Colombia... particularly the commercial preferences of the United States and the EC'.

As a consequence of economic liberalisation, diversification of exports and especially investment and trade links between both counties, a broader range of Colombian private sector actors, not just coffee growers, became more involved in

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foreign policy making to the extent that political relations impinged on their economic interests. For example, the single sector that benefited the most from ATPA until 1995 was the fresh cut flower sector, with exports exceeding 300 million in 1995.\textsuperscript{62} Asocolflores, the Colombian flower growers association, turned into a key player during the 1995-1997 crisis in the U.S.-Colombian relationship when they became vulnerable to potential economic sanctions stipulated in certification procedures.

3. Increasing Problems with the Implementation of Drug Control in Colombia

\textit{The Surrender Policy, Extradition and Pablo Escobar}

Decree 2047 of 5 September 1990 set in motion the plea bargain plan that sought to lure traffickers into a peaceful surrender. It offered a one-third reduction of the sentence and no extradition to those who turned themselves in and confessed all crimes. These privileges would not, however, apply to crimes committed after the issue-date of the decree. Upon launching this new scheme, Gaviria extradited three apprehended Colombian drug traffickers to signal his willingness and capability to use the law enforcement 'stick' effectively. Most Colombians welcomed the strategy.

Meanwhile, Medellín drug traffickers, unsatisfied with the offer, hurried to formulate further demands: full political amnesty, such as that granted to guerrillas and abolition of confession. To force their terms, they initiated a kidnapping campaign against well-chosen victims, including public figures of national appeal or relatives of key politicians. Within a month, by the end September 1990, Francisco Santos (prominent journalist of the Santos family), Germán Montoya (son of former Presidential Chief of Staff to Barco), Marina Montoya de Pérez (Montoya's aunt) and Diana Turbay (journalist, daughter of former president Julio César Turbay) had been

abducted. Prominent politicians, led by former presidents López, Turbay and Pastrana, created a commission of Notables Dignitaries and initiated a nerve-wracking mediation between the Government and the Extraditables. Amidst agitated debates, the administration gave in; on 8 October decree 2372 effectively altered the initial terms by granting immunity from extradition to those who confessed to at least one drug or terrorist-related crime. Not satisfied, the Extraditables struck again in November, kidnapping Galán's sister in law, Maruja Pachón. Drug traffickers demanded to be relieved from the confession requisite altogether, to be treated as political criminals, to be exempted from extradition and to reside in maximum security jails.

By then, the negotiation game had become futile, at least for the government. Drug traffickers had set their eyes on the Constituent Assembly, which had been set the task of reforming the constitution, as a means to mould laws in their favour and their moves were aimed at influencing the Assembly. Journalists Azucena Liévano and Hero Buss were liberated, but others were still captive. Gaviria's plan had yielded scant results; only one high-ranking drug trafficker, Hernando Gaviria, had been eliminated and no one had surrendered. Gaviria softened the rules once more with Decree 3030 of December 1990, which included confession, but increased benefits for the confession of at least one crime. Finally, later that month and January 1991 two of the Ochoa brothers turned themselves in. Colombian officials heralded victory. But the apparent triumph was clouded when the government was accused of giving the Ochoas a lenient treatment and failing to bring Escobar to justice.

Under great pressure, given the remaining hostages, the Gaviria administration conceded for a third time. Decree 303 of January 1991 deleted the clause that denied the extradition pardon for crimes committed after 5 September 1990. The decision, however, had come too late for Marina Montoya, who was assassinated, and Diana Turbay who died in cross-fire in an interdiction operation one day before enacting the decree. The surrender policy decrees and other anti-drug measures were eventually
revised (Law 81 of 1993) and included in the new Penal Code that came into force in November 1993. An evaluation commission set up in 1995 stated that implementation of the law had been excessively lenient and many times abused by judges.\textsuperscript{63}

All along Gaviria's responses had caused great alarm in the United States. The U.S. media had reported the policy to be 'Colombia's capitulation to the cartels' and a 'bargain with the devil'.\textsuperscript{64} Whereas academic experts rightly questioned the ultimate strategic virtues of the plan, explaining that it was an 'opening up of opportunities for a second echelon of players' to replace former kingpins bringing about no real impact on supply reduction.\textsuperscript{65} Moreover, the implementation of the plea-bargain system further exposed the weaknesses of Colombia's judiciary.\textsuperscript{66} Although Colombia had passed a new anti-drug legal framework, the actual development of legislation and its translation into concrete action was deficient or painfully slow. In particular, U.S. policy makers were scandalised by the prospect of low sentences and the fact that most properties and assets seized could be returned to drug traffickers on simple technicalities.\textsuperscript{67} Similar reasons inspired domestic voices of scepticism coming from \textit{El Espectador}, the former Minister of Justice and radical prohibitionist Enrique Parejo, as well as the former Minister of Justice Carlos Lemmos Simmonds, who declared Colombia was 'not submitting the criminals to the law, but the law to the criminals'.\textsuperscript{68}

With the Constituent Assembly in session, the game focused on the possibility of banning extradition from the new constitution being drafted. This time, the Gaviria administration had less room to manoeuvre than Barco had in 1989, when he


\textsuperscript{65} Argument set forth by Peter Reuter of Rand Corporation, who was regularly consulted by the Executive and the Congress, see U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, \textit{Andean Drug Strategy}, 26 February 1991, p. 54.


eventually halted constitutional reform because undesired clauses that abolished extradition had leaked into the proposed bills. Stopping the Assembly this time was impossible. First, it was a nation-wide unprecedented political process based on bottom-up massive activism. Second, the Assembly had acquired total formal independence from the Executive branch and had unrestricted power to legislate across all themes. Third, the ruling Liberal Party had only obtained 25 of 92 seats.\(^{69}\) Last, the Assembly had become a key element of the peace process with the M-19 and other guerrilla groups.\(^{70}\) Hence, once in the domain of the Assembly, extradition slipped away from Gaviria's hands. In private exchanges, U.S. officials warned Gaviria that bilateral relations were in danger of serious deterioration.\(^{71}\)

The Assembly debated extradition (Article 35) on 14 May 1991, and abolished it on 19 June with 51 votes against, 13 in favour and 5 abstentions. Five hours later, Escobar turned himself in, but without extradition, Gaviria's strategy had no credible threat to force confession or the surrender of his assets. The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs summoned its members to an emergency hearing to discuss the bleak Future of Colombian Narcotics Control and how it jeopardised the whole 'future of the Andean Initiative'.\(^{72}\) U.S. policy makers were now focused on Escobar, whose imprisonment and future sentence had come to embody Colombia's willingness to cooperate. To be sure, the United States sent strong warnings: 'I trust that the Colombian government and hopefully the Colombian people will demand severe

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\(^{69}\) The former guerrilla group M-19 obtained 19 seats, the Alvaro Gómez's Movimiento de Solidaridad Nacional 11, and the Conservative party 5, the remainder were obtained by minorities, such as religious groups, indigenous peoples and communist parties.


punishment. If justice is not done, we will have a problem between the Colombian and American peoples and between the Colombian and American governments. ⁷³

Having the main drug traffickers 'dead or in jail', as the government propaganda boasted, did not bring an end to the saga. Constant news about Escobar's luxury jail and drug traffickers running business from prison only eroded Colombia's credibility even further. Appalled by the situation, Drug Czar Robert Martinez said Colombia was 'on trial' for keeping Escobar in a luxury hacienda. ⁷⁴ But the worse was still to come. On 21 July 1992 Escobar escaped. The war was lost. The U.S. Congress held yet another emergency session, this time titled *The Future of the Andean War on Drugs after the Escape of Pablo Escobar*. ⁷⁵ Confidence in Colombia had been 'shaken' and voices called for unilateral U.S. action, that should be covert if necessary. While Americans dwelled on the escape, Colombians dramatised U.S. reactions.

After the Escobar affair other hapless episodes questioned Colombia's commitment to prohibition. The first Colombian Prosecutor General, Gustavo De Greiff publicly broke ranks with the administration at a seminar held in Baltimore, United States, criticising the internal logic of prohibition. ⁷⁶ Though he vowed to abide by the existing regime in the absence of realistic alternatives, De Greiff's declarations were particularly damaging because they came from the leading authority in charge of enforcing prohibition and were widely broadcast by the American and Colombian media. The incident continued to grow out of proportion when his declarations were

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perceived as unwillingness to prosecute the Cali group, which had been in contact to explore the terms of their possible surrender. 'The United States must engage in a major rethinking of its relationship to law enforcement in Colombia. Recent actions and statements by Colombia's chief Prosecutor, Gustavo De Greiff, threaten to bring about this nation's capitulation to the Cali cocaine cartel', argued John Kerry, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations who waged a furious attack on the Colombian prosecutor. 77

'[C]an he be removed prior to the termination of his tenure?' inquired Representative Lantos. 78 The harshest reaction came from the U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and the Department of Justice, who stopped exchanging evidence. The U.S. denied responses to 11 letters rogatory sent by Colombia. 79 They also accused De Greiff of allowing key confidential legal information to leak, which caused the death of witnesses and informers in Colombia and spoiled legal evidence. Also, in March and April 1994 there was much controversy surrounding the case against drug trafficker La Quica, apprehended in the United States. Attorney Reno criticised De Greiff for using irregular channels with the Department of Justice to communicate information on La Quica. 80 In the end, U.S. diplomatic pressure and Colombia's fear of being labelled a foe prompted De Greiff's retirement after President Gaviria and Minister of Defence Rafael Pardo publicly rebutted his views. Legal cooperation was resumed upon De Greiff's dismissal.

The storm of criticism in the United States against Bush's Andean Strategy did not contribute to Colombia's cause or the task of those in the Executive branch willing to

80 Embassy of Colombia in Washington, compilation of documents on accomplishments under the Gaviria administration. Chapter 2, Cooperación Anti Narcóticos, p. 7.
support the country and continuation of U.S. aid. Bitter criticism emanated from the media, Washington-based think-tanks and human rights NGOs, all of which filtered their ideas through the U.S. Congress. Thus, despite being instrumental in the making of the Andean Strategy, Congress also acted as its executioner.

Turf battles within the U.S. government contributed to the contamination of the atmosphere. Congressmen worried about the bad news reaching the media and influencing their constituents; they were particularly harsh on Drug Czar Martinez for not publicising the achievements of the strategy. An angry cable from the NAS director in the Bogotá Embassy referring to alleged INM inefficiency leaked to Congress fuelling their anger against the Executive branch and, by default, Colombia. The General Accounting Office also clashed with Department of State officials because they had not facilitated information for their inquiry on the Andean Strategy, while the Department of State argued GAO had failed to follow consultation procedures. The feud gave GAO reports Drug War. Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia and Observations on Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru greater visibility than usual.

In general, the reports found problems such as the lack of management and monitoring by the Executive branch, waste of resources, limited effectiveness and abuse of equipment. Congress felt the Executive was exaggerating the effectiveness of the strategy and hiding 'the real numbers' from them. They demanded 'some answers'. No other drug initiative had been so carefully scrutinised by Congress, NGOs and international media. By the end of 1991, INM chief Levitsky had been summoned to Congress to debate the Andean Strategy more than 16 times, while the

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84 Ibid, p. 4. Drug Czar Martinez was under fire for allegedly omitting figures showing the rise on heroin consumption.
85 Ibid, p. 2.
average attendance to hearings per year would have been 3 or 4. In total, throughout his term at INL, he was summoned 56 times. The Executive branch was feeling the degree of power that Congress had progressively acquired in the formulation of U.S. drug policy and the consequent intrusion on U.S. foreign policy. The Executive accused Congress of 'micro-management' achieved by introducing country-specific provisions that interfered with diplomatic management into the legislation. Congress thought micro-management was necessary to make up for the Executive's leniency and inefficiency. The Department of State proposed a simplification of the law, which Congress understood as a challenge to its power, thus the proposal to reform certification never succeeded. Furthermore, developments in Bolivia and Peru deteriorated the general reputation of the Andean Strategy. Bolivia was drowned in narco-corruption scandals and the recently elected Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori had turned into a troublesome partner.

The War Against Drugs Introduces Human Rights into the Agenda

The increase of funds and assets for the war against drugs had not quelled the illegal drug industry in Colombia. Instead, by the mid 1990s, they contributed to introduce human rights into the bilateral agenda, opening yet another potential area of friction.

Human rights NGOs concerned with the actual and potential military and police abuses resulting from the escalation of the war against drugs and its increasing use of punitive methods began monitoring U.S. drug policy closely since the launching of the Andean Strategy and its much advertised military component. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Bolivia and Peru received most of the media and NGO attention given both the

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86 Ibid, p. 104.
87 Ibid, p. 4.
89 For example, the 1990-1991 Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs annual report to Congress spoke of the 'Nuevos temas en la agenda de la political exterior', see MRE, 1990-1991, 1, p. 40
greater level of U.S. involvement in those two countries and their unfortunate human rights records under past authoritarian regimes. Yet scrutinizing eyes began turning to Colombia too and international reporting on human rights increased steadily since 1989. Most importantly, what differentiated these reports from past denunciations was the level of advocacy behind them and that they explicitly aimed at Washington policy making circles. Thus several key reports reached Congress such as *The Colombian National Police, Human Rights and U. S. Drug Policy* by the Washington Office on Latin America in May 1993, *Feeding the Tiger. Colombia's Internally Displaced People* by the U.S. Committee for Refugees in July 1993, *State of War. Political Violence and Counterinsurgency in Colombia* by Human Rights Watch in November 1993, *Colombia: Public Order, Private Injustice* by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in February 1994 and *Colombia. Political Violence: Myth and Reality* by Amnesty International in April 1994. They all pointed at U.S. weapons, equipment and training of Colombian Armed Forces intended for drug control purposes being abused to target innocent civilians in either counternarcotic or counterinsurgency operations. In the worst cases, U.S. aid was transferred to paramilitary responsible for most massacres and political killings in Colombia since the mid 1980s. In contrast, the Department of State's annual Country Human Rights Reports had focused on guerrillas, drug traffickers and paramilitaries as the main agents violating human rights whereas NGOs accused Colombia's security forces, the Colombian state and ultimately the United States.

U.S. Congressional receptivity to human rights issues in the 1990s was higher than in the past. This was partly related to the increasing international awareness and the agency of human rights advocacy. In Congress, especially Democrat members incorporated human rights into their political portfolio. Thus Congress and the

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90 On 7 February 1994, Ambassador Gabriel Silva sent a letter to *The Washington Post*, 'Violence in Colombia' rebutting Cynthia Arson's declarations on behalf of *Human Rights Watch* and the statements of Charles Roberts of *Colombia Human Rights Network*. The Colombian Embassy in Washington pointed at these reports as particularly damaging for Colombia's image, see Embassy of Colombia in Washington, compilation of documents on accomplishments under the Gaviria administration. Chapter 3, Derechos humanos, p. 2.
Executive branch were unable to expand the role of the military in the war against drugs without including at least minimal provisions to monitor both U.S. forces and foreign forces. The International Narcotics Control Acts of 1989 and 1990, for example, stated that to qualify for counternarcotics aid foreign law enforcement agencies and armed forces must not 'consistently' violate human rights, and the 1990 Act also called for a presidential certification on corruption. But while NGO reports were critical of the Colombian state, the Bush presidency and the first Clinton administration were condescending with the human rights record in Colombia. In 1991 Peru's judgement was withheld, while Colombia received an approving statement. In 1994, Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy introduced new legislation specifically aimed at Colombia; aid would be banned if there was 'credible evidence' available to the Department of State that 'gross violations of human rights' were taking place. The amendment also introduced additional periodic reporting on Colombia's human rights record.

Overt conditionality bound by formal legislation specific to Colombia was a clear departure from the way expectations were set and settled in the U.S.-Colombian relationship. The Executive branch during the Bush presidency in particular continued to be uncritical of the Colombian state, demanding only token actions. Bush administration officials often argued that drug traffickers and guerrillas were leading misinformation campaigns against the government that distorted the behaviour of the security forces. And, the Clinton administration continued certifying Colombia on human rights without controversy until 1996. On the ground, although the Colombia's

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93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
ability to protect human rights was deficient in terms of policing and convicting perpetrators, especially if they were members of the security forces, the Gaviria administration had concrete advances to show. It initiated a revolution in terms of human rights norms; the 1991 Constitution included 83 articles on basic, social, economic and political rights, created the tutela, Gaviria also created an Ombudsman, and in September 1991 he appointed Rafael Pardo to be the new civilian Minister of Defence.

*The United States Fails to Deliver: The Radar Episode and Other Complaints*

As usual, faults in the cooperation from the United States side irritated Colombians, for example, it was the United States who failed to keep up the pace of Colombia's advances in drug trafficker aircraft shoot-downs. In early 1993 Colombia announced its intention to adopt such measure for which it needed U.S. radar capability and intelligence. There were precedents; aircraft shoot-down had been temporarily used in Colombia during the 1970 marijuana raids and, most importantly, Peru had been highly successful in shooting down drug trafficking planes since 1992. This however, had the unintended consequence of turning Colombia's air space into a safe haven for drug flights. But in 1994, lawyers in the Department of Defence were able to stop U.S. cooperation warning against potential legal liabilities against Americans in case of shooting down innocent aircraft. On 1 May 1994 the Department of Defense suspended the transmission of data to Colombian drug enforcers provided by radars installed in Araracuara and Leticia; Colombians accused Americans of lack of cooperation. The U.S. Congress eventually introduced the necessary amendments enabling the sharing of information without becoming responsible for its use. Presidential Determination 95-7 ordered radars to be 're-connected' in December 1994,
during the Samper administration. 95 Colombians also complained of the lenient sentences dictated to Washington D.C. mayor Marrion Barry after he was filmed using crack (a cocaine derivative); the relocation of AWACs to the Middle East during the Gulf War; the multiple obstacles set on evidence exchange; the unwillingness at San Antonio to commit to fixed demand reduction percentages similar to those used for supply reduction; the rejection to create a multilateral force on intelligence and the refusal to set an international criminal court to try drug-related crimes. 96

To conclude, collaboration on drug control increased considerably from 1990 onwards, and prohibition was further refined in Colombia. Maintaining this cooperation and good bilateral relations, however, became increasingly difficult due to the characteristics of the drug trade and to the demands and high expectation of ambitious anti-drug programmes. The progressive stiffening of certification procedures added to these challenges. The International Narcotics Control Act of 1992 (PL 102-583), for instance, heavily extended the reporting requirements, which in turn increased U.S. monitoring. 97 Besides, Bush's defeat in November 1992 put an early end to the Andean Strategy and to the adjunct implicit agreements that buttressed the new partnership. The next chapter illustrates how the arrival of the Clinton administration acted as a catalyst in changing the way United States dealt with Colombia.

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96 Colombia suggested a 50% reduction of both demand and production by 2000 and a 70% by 2010, Tokatlian, 'Política pública internacional', p. 498.
97 Requirements impacting on source countries were originally valid for only FY 1993 and 1994 and then made permanent after the Corrections Act of 1994.
MANAGING THE PARTNERSHIP II: THE CLINTON REFORMS TO U.S. DRUG POLICY AND THE GAVIRIA ADMINISTRATION

This chapter introduces Clinton's reforms and refinements to U.S. drug policy and analyses the factors that enabled Gaviria to maintain friendly relations with the United States, despite important failures in the implementation of drug control and amidst the higher standards of performance expected by the United States. One of the core arguments of this thesis is that the main development to prompt a move from friendship to conflict between Colombia and the United States in 1995 was a change in the content and standards of U.S. foreign and drug policy which altered the rules according to which U.S. policy-makers appraised Colombia's political cooperation during the annual drug certification process. The United States expected from Colombia a substantial reduction of the drug industry, which they believed was in itself a sign of clean, democratic and efficient institutions. This change was induced by the post Cold War emergence of norms on democracy and governance that included particular meanings of good governance, hence legitimacy, such as efficiency in the delivery of public goods and anti-corruption, as well as notions of international security --the 'democracy-security normative framework'. On the other hand this normative shift did not fall in a vacuum. Instead it came to shape the existing cumulative process that had institutionalised both prohibition in Colombia and the United States and bilateral collaboration on drug control. This process had expanded and deepened the drug agenda so, that drug-control encompassed the whole gamut of institution-building programs and became the rationale that articulated the relationship.
Drug certification thus had turned into the tool whereby the United States set the terms of U.S.-Colombian relations. At the time of Clinton's reforms of February 1993 Gaviria had been in office for two years and a half. He had come from working closely with Bush to bolster the war against drugs, except Gaviria encountered serious challenges in the implementation of drug control. The 1991 National Constitutional Assembly in charge of rewriting Colombia's constitution proved to be highly porous to narco-corruption, ending in the banning of extradition from the new 1991 Colombian constitution. In June 1992 Pablo Escobar escaped from the high security Itagüi jail after having turned it into a luxury home and then bribing guards to set him free. Finally, the cultivation of coca leaf began rising and poppy crops were discovered. The first section shows ideas at work; it analyses how norms trickled down into policy and into action. The second section describes the steps of the Gaviria administration in managing drug diplomacy. The third section focuses on the political and economic contexts in which drug politics was played out.

1. The Clinton Administration Reforms to United States' Foreign Drug Policy

When Clinton was elected in November 1992, Colombians expected some adjustments in U.S. policy towards the region, which related to Clinton's particular platform, and to the international demands of the end of the Cold War. In general, most Colombians expected a decrease in aid as a result of Eastern Europe's new transition to democracy, and an easier collaboration on the drug problem based on a substantial improvement in United States' attitude toward the role of its domestic drug demand in fuelling the illegal drug industry. Modifications did occur, but not necessarily as expected. Instead, the emerging norms of democracy and governance reinforced the weight of

1 For Gaviria's expectations see *El Tiempo*, 8 November 1992, p.11A. Expectations of Colombian experts and journalists on these points are documented in *El Tiempo*, 26 March 1993, p. 1A-8A; *El Tiempo*, 11 July 1994, p. 7A; *El Espectador*, 5 March 1995, p. 6A.
Chapter 7, Clinton's Drug Policy Reform and Gaviria

the foreign dimensions of U.S. drug policy and increased the potential for friction in the hemisphere.

Clinton's first instinct regarding drug policy was to raise the profile of the domestic side of the drug problem by emphasising demand reduction and the treatment of addicts, and reduce and redistribute the entire anti-drug budget by targeting goals more efficiently. This approach was based on the Democrat's thinking on social welfare, and drug policy experts' estimates of the high cost of transit zone military interdiction. For example, the Clinton administration tried early on to cut ONDCP personnel by 83% (to 25 from 112 persons), and to reduce its annual budget to $5.8 million from $17.3 million. A task force led by Vice President Al Gore proposed merging the DEA and the FBI. And in June 1993, Clinton appointed former New York Police Department Superintendent Lee P. Brown as his first Drug Czar with the mandate to focus on urban crime and to develop what became the influential Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. However, while Clinton attended to the domestic side of drugs and related crime, other factors helped to guarantee the institutional and political weight of the foreign side of drug policy. Thus, the ONDCP recovered part of its personnel and resources; the DEA and FBI continued as separate bodies with overlapping functions; Clinton replaced Brown with a former U.S. SouthCom General, Barry McCaffrey, in March 1996; certification was further stiffened; INL increased its budget; military interdiction in transit zones continued; and U.S. programmes abroad were made intrusive.3

Entrenched ideas on prohibition, a bloated drug control bureaucracy seeking its own subsistence, and congressional pressure --all aspects of the institutionalisation of foreign drug policy in the United States-- contributed to the maintenance of a

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repressive and internationalist model of prohibition. The ONDCP was first given a
domestic mandate and foreign tasks were given to the Department of State Bureau for
International Narcotic Matters (INM), which after 1994 self-conducted policy review
adopted additional anti-drugs and transnational crime responsibilities, and became the
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). INL increased
its leverage inside the Department of State. Domestic politics, too, contributed to the
continuation of foreign anti-drug action. Clinton's public 'confession' of having tried
cannabis was a gift to Republicans in Congress eager to discredit the Arkansas
politician. Clinton's apparently lenient stance on drugs was a political target for those
in Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, who wanted to strengthen the anti-drug
agenda. Congressional members presented distorted versions of Clinton's initial
announcements, and his refurbished international strategy of 1994, portraying him as
having totally abdicated on foreign drug policy. A heated debate arose in Congress on
whether to continue channelling drug-control money to transit-zone interdiction. The

4 Republicans obtained a majority in November 1994 giving way to one of the most
controversial periods in Executive-Congress relations.
5 See for example U.S. House, Counternarcotics Strategy for the Western Hemisphere,
especially pp. 3-4; U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International
May 1993. The critiques of Benjamin Gilman in ibid., pp. 132-33 (speech at the Conference on
Multilateralism and Drugs held at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies on 15 July
1993) and in U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International
Security, International Organizations and Human Rights, International Aspects of the
President's Drug Control Strategy, 3 November 1993, p. 10.
6 Discussions among politicians tended to distort the technical terminology. For the Clinton
government interdiction referred to the activity by Customs and the Department of Defense in
transit areas in Central America and the Caribbean mostly. Opponents like Gilman and F.
James Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin interpreted it as not having a foreign policy, see U.S.
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, International Drug
Supply, Control and Interdiction, 15 July 1993, especially pp. 2-3, 9, where the term
involuntary interdiction is really referring to eradication. For comparison, see the more
technical versions of the same issues in GAO, and U.S. Agency for International Development,
Drug Control: Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance is Not Paying Off (Washington D.C.:
GAO, U.S. Agency for International Development, 1993); GAO, Drug Control: Interdiction
Efforts in Central America Have Had Little Impact on the Flow of Drugs (Washington D.C.:
GAO, 1994); Apart from genuine strategic questions, behind the interdiction debate was a
battle between DEA and the Department of Defense for funds, The New York Times, 31
October 1993, p. 27.
Heritage Foundation, an influential Republican think tank in Washington that became heavily involved in the squabble, titled a 1994 paper 'How the Clinton Administration is Abandoning the War Against Drugs'.

Congressional members driving the drug agenda pressed for greater interdiction and source country action. Bickering and accusations against Clinton's drug policy had worsened after the Republican triumph in the November 1994 elections, which allowed hawks to take powerful positions in Congress and on drug-related issues, such as Jesse Helms, who became Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Drug control radicalism, politely called 'partisanship' in policy-making circles, peaked during the Clinton years. On the other hand, the INL, was aligning itself with the hawkish elements in Congress on the question of certification, and gained much power in shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America as a whole. To understand the channels how domestic politics influenced drug policy, it should be recalled from previous chapters that Congress had come to drive the expansion of prohibition in the United States and, subsequently, due to U.S. international leadership, in the rest of the world. It had done so by legislating more concretely on foreign drug policy through Chapter VIII of the Foreign Assistance Act. The congressional Research Service's own forecast expected Congress to 'remain a major player in the foreign drug policy arena into the 21st century'. By 1997, U.S. legislation contained 21 active reporting requirements related to international narcotics control, binding the Executive to close congressional scrutiny.

The institutionalisation of prohibition kept foreign drug policy on the agenda. However, the exact content of drug policy and its meaning in international politics

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7 John P. Sweeney, 'How the Clinton Administration is Abandoning the War Against Drugs', The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, 989 (1994).
8 Perl argues that in 1990-1996, during the 4th of 5 phases of congressional involvement in drug policy, congressional and public interest decreased, CRS, International Narcotics Control, 1997, p. xxvii. However, he fails to observe that decreased societal interest did not translate into a less coercive U.S. policy.
9 Ibid, p. xxiv and xxviii
10 Ibid, p. xxxi
underwent a mutation. The direction of this shift was influenced by new security ideas that emerged in the post Cold War normative context and emphasised the values of Western democracy and legitimate governance. This thesis contends that 'securitisation' alone, associated in the literature with the use of military assets and language in drug policy, does not capture the changes of U.S. drug policy in the mid-1990s. Furthermore, securitisation, which developed as early as the mid-1980s, does not explain the crisis of U.S.-Colombian relations in 1995-1997. The fact that illegal drugs and drug cartels were seen as a national security threat to the United States had not led U.S. policy-makers, prior to 1995, to antagonise Colombia. Instead, the adjustment of U.S. drug policy according to the post-Cold War impetus of democracy explains the onset of the unprecedented diplomatic fight between Colombia and the United States in 1995. The following paragraphs analyse the mechanics of this adjustment.

As the Cold War ended with the unexpected implosion of the former Soviet Union, unguarded American academics and policy makers struggled to re-think and re-formulate America's 'mission' in terms of defining what constituted international security threats and what exactly had to be defended. In time, U.S. policy makers clung to what was most familiar to their political thinking, namely democracy and free trade --the self proclaimed fundamental values of American society.\textsuperscript{11} An avalanche of democracy rhetoric had permeated discourse, identity, interests, institutions, and policy

\textsuperscript{11} An interesting example of the uncertainty in government circles as to the characteristics of the post Cold War setting and the U.S. role is CRS, \textit{U.S. Power in a Changing World. Proceedings of a Seminar held by the Congressional Research Service, November 19-20, 1989} (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1990). During this seminar, congressional staff invited among others John Mearsheimer, Joseph Nye, and Paul Kennedy to discuss these themes. Insightful discussions on how democracy promotion emerged as the dominant U.S. foreign policy theme in this process can be found in Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi (eds.), \textit{American Democracy Promotion, Impulses, Strategies and Impacts} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Tony Smith, \textit{America's Mission}. See also Rick Travis and James A. Scott (eds.), \textit{After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War} (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).
goals, and U.S. security was defined in terms of democracy. An underpinning idea, spreading quickly amidst post Cold War euphoria, was that democracies were more likely to behave peacefully and cooperate with the United States. This made the maintenance of democracy a pivotal security goal. Therefore, those who threatened democracy were seen to threaten the United States. This democracy-security normative framework underpinned how U.S. policy makers identified new sources of threat to the security of the United States, such as terrorism and transnational crime. Then, Clinton's foreign policy team helped to put a new accent on the foreign component of drug policy by tying drugs to these threats. In sum, these new understandings served as a conceptual guide for policy-makers to alter anti-narcotic policies, goals, and strategies; alter the way they interpreted events; and alter their expectations of others' behaviour.

Strands of this security reasoning had already been emerging in academia and international institutions such as the UN. Yet the Clinton administration's long and tedious review of drug policy from January 1993 to February 1994 had a catalytic function that consolidated the policy transition. By the time of the launch of the 1994 National Drug Control Strategy, the new ideas had been clearly articulated into policy:

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13 Smith, 'National Security Liberalism'. Ikenberry claims further, that the 'character of the domestic regimes of other states as hugely important for the attainment of American security and material interests', see John G. Ikenberry, 'America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post War Era' in Cox et al, American Democracy Promotion, p. 103.

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The Strategy also challenges us to change the way in which we look at international drug control programs. International drug trafficking is a criminal activity that threatens democratic institutions, fuels terrorism and human rights abuses, and undermines economic development. ...The global drug trade affects America's security and welfare in important ways. Rich, violent and powerful drug syndicates pose a growing and fundamental threat to fragile democracies and their economic growth. ...The United States finds that democratic, market-oriented governments are much easier to work with and more willing to cooperate with the international community in a common effort against the illicit drug industry.16

Clinton's 1995 speech at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado captures the thinking behind drug policy within the general foreign policy and security agendas.

In these new different times we must pursue three priorities to enhance our security. First, we have to combat those who would destroy democratic societies, including ours, through terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking. Secondly, we have to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction... Third we have to provide our military, you and people like you, with the resources [against these threats]. The struggle against the forces of terror, organized crime and drug trafficking is now uppermost in our minds because of what we have endured as a nation, the World Trade Center bombing, the terrible incident in Oklahoma city and what we have seen else where [such as] the organized crime now plaguing the former Soviet Union, drug cartels in Latin America and Asia that threaten the open societies and the fragile democracies there.17

A transition had taken place from conceiving drugs as a national security concern alone, to conceiving illegal drugs and drug cartels and all perilous effects of drug trafficking as threats to the essence of U.S. identity and foreign policy, namely, democracy. And this was reflected in the INL's new primary objectives, 'to combat international crime; to help emerging democracies strengthen their national judicial and law enforcement institutions' and to provide support for UN initiatives on drug control.18

In examining the threat of drug cartels within the democracy-security framework, attention was directed towards corruption. Though holding corruption as a weighty

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17 Clinton, PPP 1995 I, pp. 763-70.
hindrance to drug enforcement was no innovation, there was a new impetus for an anti-
corruption agenda which altered the accepted standards for state behaviour.\textsuperscript{19} In a 1996
*Foreign Policy* article, Robert Leiken noted: 'Corruption … represents a hazard to free
trade, investment, a threat to democracy and development, and, in collusion with
international crime, a danger to national security and public health and safety'.\textsuperscript{20} This
impetus was linked to notions of democracy, good governance and sustainable
economic development disseminated by international organisations (UN and OAS),
international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, IADB)\textsuperscript{21} and NGOs like
Transparency International (established by former WB employees in 1993). In 1996
the OAS held the first Anti-Corruption Summit, and World Bank president James
Wolfensohn identified corruption as a major global problem. Also in 1996, the UN
adopted a convention against international corruption and bribery.\textsuperscript{22} The anti-
corruption agenda was also driven by corporate actors, who needed transparency rules
to be applied across the globe in order to compete on equal basis.\textsuperscript{23}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{19} For the case of Latin America see Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph E. Espach (eds.), *Combating
Whitehead's analysis also supports the argument of changing standards in the 1990s: 'During
the Cold War it was tempting for some political scientists to implicitly condone such
corruption, either on the grounds that the detached observer should eschew value judgements,
or in the belief that corruption assisted economic growth and provided an alternative to
communism. Since 1990 both of these assumptions have been abandoned...', Laurence
Whitehead, 'High Level Political Corruption in Latin America. A "Transitional"
\textsuperscript{20} Robert S. Leiken, 'Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic', *Foreign Policy*, Winter, 105
\textsuperscript{21} For the IADB approach see Edmundo Jarquin and Fernando Carrillo. 'The Complexity of
\textsuperscript{22} Speech at the World Bank Annual Assembly in October 1996 quoted in Alan Doig and
\textsuperscript{23} Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella, 'The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey on Some
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Corruption became a major issue in counternarcotic rhetoric and policies.\textsuperscript{24} For instance, Deputy Secretary Wharton said to the Council of the Americas on 3 May 1993:

> We want to share our experience to help democratic governments to fight corruption and other abuses of power. Corruption is a cancer that will destroy democracy --and investment opportunities-- if it is not eradicated. We will work in partnership with the governments of this region to fight narco-traffickers, whose corruption and violence threaten the survival of democratic institutions.\textsuperscript{25}

Clinton's 1994 Counter Narcotic Strategy for the Western Hemisphere stated that kingpins were the main target because they 'are personally responsible for the smooth and efficient management of the trade, and because their ability to corrupt and intimidate constitutes the most serious drug-related threat to democracy, the rule of law and economic stability'.\textsuperscript{26} In other words, by extension, corruption had become a threat to the core of U.S. foreign policy interests.

The 1993 INCSR, the first one of the Clinton administration included a section called 'Corruption and political will', that states 'by supporting those democratic governments which show the necessary political resolve to take in the drug cartels, the United States is investing in the future democratic stability of the hemisphere'.\textsuperscript{27} The focus on corruption as a phenomenon that undermined both counternarcotic efficiency and democracy underscored the responsibility of governments to win the war against drugs. Cooperation was now about willingness, not capability, as the 1980s reports had stipulated.\textsuperscript{28} Hence the 1994 National Drug Control Strategy stated:


\textsuperscript{26} *FY Country Programs. A Counternarcotic Strategy for the Western Hemisphere*, INL webpage.

\textsuperscript{27} U.S. Department of State, INL, *INCSR 1993*.

\textsuperscript{28} The greater emphasis on political will of host nations is also mentioned in Rapahel Perl, 'Clinton's Foreign Drug Policy', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 35/4 (1993-1994), p. 145.
The United States will assist those nations that have the political will to fight the illegal drug trade. ...Meanwhile, in those countries where anti-narcotics political will and commitment remain weak, diplomatic and other cost-effective initiatives will continue to strengthen their will to combat narcotics production and trafficking, [emphasis added].  

U.S. officials associated corruption in Latin American countries, particularly the Andean countries, exclusively with drug trafficking and questioned their willingness to cooperate with the United States, based on narco-corruption incidents. 

Drug policy was formed with input from above and outside, by norms, but also from below, by the already existing policy practices regarding strategy and tactics. Here, the concrete strategies and tactics of Clinton's drug policy inevitably drew from the Bush legacy of an integrated approach, as detailed in chapter 5. Clinton's drug policy-makers did not depart from this logic, and so they, too, had a comprehensive foreign drug policy. However, they chose to emphasise operations inside source countries and withdraw funding from transit-zone interdiction, especially radar surveillance in Central America and the Caribbean.

Focusing on source countries had three tracks. First, to target organised crime. The DEA's new Kingpin Strategy also supported this line of action. Second, to strengthen public institutions. This addressed what U.S. officials in the Clinton administration believed was the key problem behind the endurance of drug trafficking, corrupt institutions. Third, to increase eradication. This was supported by the long-held idea that it was easier and cheaper to eliminate drugs before they were produced, or when they were still held in large blocks before being divided for retail distribution on U.S.

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30 Also, as have been pointed out throughout the thesis by interests from within, from the bureaucracies living from drug control, and interests from without, such as politics and lobby of private businesses that may benefit from a given policy, for example helicopter manufacturers.
Both interdiction and eradication had long been incorporated in U.S. foreign drug policy, and 'going to the source' in general had been included in military manuals in 1993, with the new Operations Other Than War doctrine, except that these three tracks stood to receive greater attention with the new emphasis. This meant supporting policies which would necessarily be intrusive to the host nations given that they aimed at closely monitoring and judging the behaviour of national and local institutions.

More importantly, INL's policy called for a stricter application of certification procedures. Aware that congressional committees had questioned the application of certification in the past, the 1993 review included a full examination of certification 'to develop clearer descriptions of foreign government cooperation'. In November 1993 Drug Czar Brown warned:

In the past we have tended to look at program management and efficiency as appropriate measures. [But] they did not tell us how well individual programs contributed to the accomplishment of our strategy. [Now] since many of our programs entail the development of host nation capabilities, their effectiveness is often difficult to measure. ...These challenges, however, do not make measures of effectiveness any less important or necessary. The President has made it a priority that this area be addressed. ...As part of this effort we will look at goals such as dismantling major trafficking organizations, strengthening judicial capability, promoting sustained economic growth, and participating in multilateral law enforcement efforts.


The International Narcotic Control Act of 1992, already had included 'legal and law enforcement measures to prevent and punish public corruption, especially by senior government officials' as criteria issued to be considered in the certification process, but the standard was not made permanent until the 1994 International Narcotics Corrections Act.\(^{36}\) Stiffening certification standards were the result of the new focus on making other countries accountable for the failures in U.S. drug policy, and of congressional complaints that certification was only used to bully traditional pariah states. In the 1991 certification there were 25 countries listed as problematic; Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, and Syria were decertified and Lebanon had received a national conditional waiver. The same countries were decertified and waivered in 1992, although the list added two targets, China and Venezuela. The 1994 certification process placed more countries than ever before in the categories that called for U.S. evaluation, and 10 out of the 26 scrutinised countries were either denied certification or granted a conditional waiver. 'They apparently thought that performing at last year's levels would be sufficient', said Assistant Secretary of State for INL Robert Gelbard.\(^{37}\)

'These were not just pariah nations', he added proudly, in a tone of accomplishment.\(^{38}\) However, the new categorisation and its underlying reasoning would effectively broaden the category of pariah states. In 1994 Panama fell once more out of favour with the United States and Bolivia, and Peru were deemed non cooperative but still eligible for aid. In 1995 there were 31 countries on the list, of which 15 were Latin American. Taiwan was added in 1996, and Aruba and Cambodia in 1997, pushing the final tally to 33 countries.\(^{39}\)


\(^{38}\) Ibid, p. 8.

\(^{39}\) U.S. Department of State, INL, INCSR 1997, p. vi.
The INL also found 'an improved way of keeping the attention of key drug countries', as Gelbard announced in the explanatory notes that went along with certification, which by now he had ably converted into démarches with a list of required actions and expected standards. In March 1994, the Gaviria administration was certified with a scolding explanatory note. But in June 1994, the INL issued a démarche outside the accustomed schedule. In Gelbard's words 'business as usual is no longer good enough'. The Clinton administration, in an 'unusual behaviour', according to the Colombian Embassy in Washington, sent explicit directions on the steps required for Colombia to attain full certification in 1995. The U.S. placed particular emphasis on dismantling the Cali cartel and made the continuation of evidence exchange conditional to the stiffening of sentences for drug traffickers. This letter was mainly intended to signal to the incoming Samper administration that the United States expected specific results in drug control, yet it broke with the spirit of cooperation between the two countries during the Bush presidency.

That Colombia was fully certified in 1989-1994 was a very significant symbol of friendship given the significance of the drug issue in the bilateral relationship. Despite the moves to toughen certification, and despite the new benchmarks rating cooperation, the Gaviria administration continued to have good relations with the Clinton administration as it had done with the preceding Bush administration. The constant modification of the surrender policy, the increasingly visible flaws of the justice system, the banning of extradition, Escobar's escape,

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41 Already, since 1991 Colombia had been receiving an accompanying statement, which had been the Department of State's solution to Mexico's complaint about being singled out by receiving a statement. Subsequently, DoS produced statements for all countries. See U.S. House, Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights Foreign Affairs. The 1993 International Narcotics, p. 91.
43 Colombia threatened to renounce to U.S. economic aid in its 8 July 1994 response. But news leaked to the media and Colombia softened its tone, explaining the episode as a routine diplomatic management exchange. See Embassy of Colombia in Washington, compilation of documents on accomplishments under the Gaviria administration. Chapter 2, Cooperación Anti Narcóticos, p. 7 (electronic version) and Hernández, Una agenda con futuro, pp. 77-80.
and all the other problems encountered in the new phase of drug cooperation from 1989 to 1994 did not cause a serious breach in U.S.-Colombian relations. Throughout the Gaviria presidential term, the United States continued friendly practices such as consultation, which were conspicuously absent from other bilateral relations featuring drugs as a dominant and problematic theme. For example, in the case of Bolivia, Gamarra notes that 'counternarcotic activities were planned by the United States with little or no Bolivian input'.

2. Gaviria's Management of Emergencies in Colombia's Drug Policy Implementation

One of the greatest puzzles in the history of U.S.-Colombian relations and drug politics is the absence of a major diplomatic fallout during the presidential tenure of César Gaviria in 1990-1994. In fact, academic analyses rarely address the actual development and institutionalisation of the prohibition regime in general, and, particularly during this period. Narratives and analyses of the instances of friction, are more common though they fail to mention that it is advanced prohibition and collaboration what often originates new demands, new tensions, and new disappointments. While the expansion of anti-drug cooperation has been described in chapter 6, this and the following sections of chapter 7 seek to answer why diplomatic conflict between Colombia and the United States did not break out during Gaviria's tenure as president from August 1990 to 1994.

Matthiesen sets forth three reasons why relations remained cordial. First, Gaviria had a 'good bargaining position', and was therefore able to implement policies that would have otherwise elicited coercive responses from irritated U.S. officials. Second, Gaviria inherited a reputation for cooperation from his predecessor, Barco, which is why he had a good bargaining position. And third, the reality that obstacles in achieving a successful drug policy would always exist left the United States no choice

44 Gamarra, 'U.S. Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts', p. 244.
but to accept Gaviria's terms.\textsuperscript{45} In this case Matthiesen's reasoning implies that U.S. weaknesses rather than Colombian strengths might have played in favour of Gaviria. However, as the dynamics of conflict from 1995 to 1998 demonstrate, the United States could have exercised coercive diplomacy if it had chosen to, irrespective of whether its drug control policies were inherently flawed or not. On the other hand, Gaviria did inherit much from Barco in the drug policy field, such as the reputation of commitment, the first articulate foreign drug policy discourse, and several collaborative prohibition initiatives in embryonic form, just ready to hatch. Yet, above all, Gaviria continued to embrace prohibition, developed trust, and thus was able to obtain positive results from his foreign policy management.

Confrontation with the United States during the remaining period of the Bush administration, from August 1990 until the end of 1992, was averted due to the combination of several elements. First, the new drug war partnership was still in an initiation period, bureaucrats and Congressmen exercised more patience than usual. INM and other officials of the Department of State who had helped to conceptualise the Andean Strategy were still in place and motivated to see their project work. Also, they had faith in the Colombia project, for they were enveloped by the atmosphere of institutional renovation and modernisation. The balance between INL and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs in the Department of States at the time also was helpful; INL understood its mission as a complement to the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and coordinated policy closely with them. This was facilitated by policy direction from above: the Andean Strategy had presidential attention and, although drug-centric, the strategy was an integrated Good Neighbour attempt to solve the drug problem. The other potential source of irritation, Congress, was generally sympathetic towards Colombia, which they perceived as a friendly yet troubled neighbour grossly suffering

\textsuperscript{45} Matthiesen, \textit{El arte politico}, pp. 256-7. Mattiesen deals thoroughly but only with the first two years of the Gaviria administration.
from the evils of drug traffickers. The Bush administration had middle-tier bureaucrats, who largely managed the relation with Colombia on an every-day basis, and were sympathetic to the country because they believed it was on its way to consolidate democratic modernisation. On the other hand, though optimistic, the U.S. policy-makers in the Bush administration were also realistic and recognised the difficulties of process as complex as the Constituent Assembly, peace with illegal armed groups, economic reform and drug control. Here, the way in which Gaviria and his team explained Colombia's 'reality' to U.S. policy-makers and their diplomatic management made a large difference.

Gaviria and his team, who were skilful at managing instances of potential conflict, adopted a three-fold approach. First, they provided timely and transparent communication about their policies, as well as about the critical episodes like the banning of extradition and capturing Pablo Escobar. For instance, on 8 January 1991, following the announcement of key decrees shaping the surrender policy Gaviria invited a U.S. House Select Committee study mission to Cartagena and made his key cabinet members and advisors available for questions. Also early on, Gaviria candidly warned Americans about the high probability that the Constituent Assembly would declare extradition unconstitutional, and about the implications of this change for the surrender policy, leaving the government without its chief deterrent weapon. Bush, the INM, the Department of State, and Attorney General Richard Thornburg responded positively to the 'frank discussions', and Bush promised 'multimillion dollar,
long-term agreements. Gaviria and his team had mustered support from top to bottom within the U.S. Executive branch, and such sympathy was instrumental to keeping the U.S. Congress on Colombia's side, since it was the Executive-branch who was usually the main source of information going to Congress.

In 1991 Colombia used a creative media campaign in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* to counter bad propaganda on the banning of extradition and the concessions to Escobar that could discourage Congress and the Executive-branch from cooperating with Colombia. It was the first time that the Colombian government consulted with legal advisors and lobbyists for foreign policy issues. Most relevant was the language and discourse used to communicate with Americans, for it referred to goals, values, and attitudes held by the U.S. public and policy-makers. When Gaviria publicly announced the surrender policy on 28 September 1990, he spoke for instance of Colombia's *right and urgent need to protect democracy*, with or without the help of friends. Gaviria also neutralised potential American censure by engaging U.S. policy-makers in the process of developing and implementing the surrender policy. For example, Security Advisor Rafael Pardo and Minister of Justice Jaime Giraldo consulted with U.S. officials on the polemical Decree 3030 of December 1990.

Furthermore, Gaviria reassured the United States of Colombia's commitment to prohibition when he increased interdiction operations against drug trafficking rings,

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48 George Bush PPP, v 1, p. 177.
49 His 30 June 1991 OpEd piece in *The Washington Post*, 'We Didn't Surrender To Escobar', was pedagogic. Also, the after extradition's abolition and Escobar's surrender the Colombian government published in the *Washington Post* a one-page add saying 'For years they were drug lords. Now they are dead or in jail', 21 June 1991, p. A14.
51 César Gaviria, *Discursos*, p. 251.
52 This decree was issued shortly after Azucena Liévano's release. That same day, drug dealer Fabio Ochoa surrendered. In Pardo's memoirs he extensively narrated how the plea-bargain system was his personal idea after weeks of meditation. Later on, he acknowledges the participation of U.S. in crafting the decrees. Moreover, the U.S. ICITAP's project for Colombia shows that there was constant contact of U.S. officials and Colombian judicial reform. See 'ICITAP, Colombia Project Description and Budget', p. 13, mimeo provided by U.S. CRS and Pardo, *De Primera Mano*, pp. 286-7 and 309.
and he strengthened this trust when he asked for greater U.S. participation in interdiction activities. This led Drug Czar Bob Martinez to argue following the 1991 banning of extradition: ‘[W]e also know that in the enforcement side, that they have been the most aggressive, continually the most aggressive in the pursuit of the interception of narcotics and the pursuit of those who engage on wrong doing. And I think that is the good story there’.\(^{53}\) Hence, unlike the dynamics that developed during the Samper administration (1994-1998), when the U.S. completely denied Colombia's counternarcotics results on the grounds that no effective cooperative action was possible with such a corrupt leader, whatever interdiction results achieved during Gaviria's tenure were proof of his commitment.

Escobar's escape in July 1992 was managed according to the same procedures. In Colombia, Gaviria agreed to arduous sessions of congressional inquiry, where the Colombian government told the facts and acknowledged its mistakes to the Colombian legislative and the public. The administration held guards and security forces accountable and ousted Deputy Justice Minister Eduardo Mendoza.\(^{54}\) The inquiry signalled that Colombia followed fully democratic procedures as in the United States. Gaviria sent personal letters to friends in the U.S. House Select Committee and the Senate Task Force, and a delegation travelled to Washington to establish immediate contact with the Bush administration and Congress.\(^{55}\) Furthermore, Gaviria invited U.S. security forces to help a 600-strong Colombian Special Joint Force (Comando Especial Conjunto, also known as the Bloque de Búsqueda) in the search for Escobar. The U.S. Special Forces Group Delta also operated clandestinely in Colombia for 15 months until December 1993.\(^{56}\) As a result, even after Escobar's 22 July 1992 escape


\(^{56}\) See Mark Bowden, *Killing Pablo* (www.killingpablo.com). Reportedly, other units also joined, such as the Navy Seals and National Security Agency in addition to CIA, FBI and
from prison, the U.S. Drug Czar Martinez continued to regard Colombia as the 'staunchest partner' in the war on drugs. In Congress, Representative Rangel interceded in Colombia's favour: 'for us to throw out the baby with the bath, for us to say, now we are going to have just to scuttle a long-time friend and not to take into consideration the increase in activity... it seems to me that we ought to monitor, give support and not cause them further embarrassment'.

The Clinton years had the potential to generate more controversies in the relationship given the emerging ideas on how drug trafficking posed a security threat in the post Cold War years. By then the Andean Strategy was less glamorous and Republicans in Congress now had less incentive to be benign to a Democrat President. However, the timing of some of the process of the drug policy formulation during the Clinton administration worked to Gaviria's advantage. Clinton's administration drug policy review took some time to gel and was only fully in place in February 1994, five months before Gaviria's term ended. Still, the single most important force for good relations was a shared sense of affinity regarding the new political and economic direction that Western Hemisphere countries were to follow and the implications of this for Colombia's relationship with the United States, as explained in detail in the next section. In 1993, for instance, the Clinton administration viewed Colombia as an actual partner to join the NAFTA possibly after Chile, who was the first South American country in line. In Clinton's words: 'Colombia, not a very big country, has a president struggling to liberate its country from the scourge of the dominance of drugs, struggling to develop a diversified free market economy. In the last 2 years, that little

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DEA. The operation became controversial later on due to the Bloque's connection with the Castaño brothers, members of the vigilante and drug trafficking group Los Pepes.


58 Ibid, pp. 21-2.
country's increased their purchases of American products by 69 and 64% on their own. The president of Colombia says, "I want to be a part of NAFTA".  

In conclusion, Gaviria was effective in preventing diplomatic conflict only because particular conditions prevailed. Colombia appeared to be at the vanguard of the region with regards to its behaviour on political and economic reform, as well as drug policy as understood within the emerging normative framework. The image of Colombia as a credible and reliable partner still held. Colombia thus was honouring the terms of the alliance in its broader sense. Colombia was complying with all the other understandings on 'encouragement of trade and investment', economic cooperation and democracy. Thus, despite frustrations among U.S. officials with enduring problems to fight the drug trade, there was no consensus on abandoning cooperation with Colombia on the basis that that Colombia was a defector of the war against drugs. Gaviria's signals to the United States had emanated from a credible sender that operated according to similar codes.

3. Gaviria's Revolcón Meets Clinton's Democratic Enlargement: Maintaining the Foundations of Friendship

The Clinton administration formulated the new U.S. grand strategy as a 'Democratic enlargement'. National Security Council Advisor Richard E. Feinberg envisaged the challenge facing the United States to be the creation of a new model for sustainable peace based upon a world consensus for democracy and free markets, similar in

60 See language of the alliance in U.S. Government, White House, Executive Branch Documents from the Cartagena Summit, p. 76.
historical relevance to agreements such as 'Westphalia, Vienna, Versailles, Munich and Yalta'. As regards Europe, this meant reconfiguring the map by making sure Eastern European countries and Central Asia embraced democratisation and economic liberalisation, keeping Russia involved in the Western community, and addressing the questions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's purpose and expansion.

In regards to Latin America, democratic enlargement referred to other developments, since the region had already gone through a decade of democratic transition and economic liberalisation. U.S. policy makers believed that, problems notwithstanding, Latin America was also further along mainstreaming democracy and institutionalising the idea that democracy was an incontestable security goal. For example, the OAS was a pioneer in this process when it adopted the Santiago Declaration (Resolution 1080 of 1991), which committed the entire Western Hemisphere to the collective defence of democracy. Interconnected and equally important, U.S. goals in the Western Hemisphere were, first, to prepare the economic and social terrain to enlarge NAFTA into a Free Trade Area of the Americas, and second, to ensure 'effective democratic governance'. More specifically, the second goal was about readjusting 'legal and administrative structures so as to prevent corruption and improve effectiveness' through democratic processes that allowed the voices, needs, and interests of citizens to play a part in change. The United States for

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example, was instrumental in IADB's adoption of state modernisation as one of the guiding principles of the Eight Replenishment in April 1994. Although democracy had been an important foreign policy referent throughout the United States' history, the 1990s good governance agenda contained concrete elements beyond the holding of elections. Elections had been the proxy for democracy in the past. Instead, the U.S. understandings of democracy of the 1990s entailed sophisticated recipes for institutional design, voting methods, judicial conversion, criminal codes, high standards of efficiency and civil society participation, all guided by improved ethical benchmarks. Thus, some forces of globalisation challenged the role and notion of nation-states, while other forces called for the strengthening of states so that they could perform key administrative tasks. As Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Alexander Watson claimed, 'Our security interests are now most affected by the character of governments in the region and their ability to deal effectively with the political, economic, and social problems they face'.

The United States' foreign policy and Colombia's domestic and foreign policy agendas were, in essence, fully compatible. There was a true 'substantive symmetry' between the Clinton and Gaviria administrations outlooks. Thus, for instance, the Clinton administration had come to view the 1991 National Constituent Assembly as a development compatible to U.S. interests. It was seen as national social contract constructed on democratic ideals, since the Assembly introduced a comprehensive body of legislation on human rights and a new framework to strengthen the judicial


Finnemore makes a similar analysis for the content of norms of humanitarian intervention throughout a 150-year period, p. 159. In Quebec April 2001 the summit approved the introduction of a democracy clause in the FTAA negotiations and mandated the draft of Democracy Charter, largely a Peruvian proposal.

Watson, 'U.S.-Latin American Relations in the 1990s'.

branch with an Attorney General and a Constitutional Court. There were also provisions to ensure the participation of previously excluded political groups, provisions for ethnic minorities, guiding principles for liberal economic policy and a mandate for economic integration as an explicit foreign policy.

Gaviria focused much of his personal energy on economic liberalisation and internationalisation. The Gaviria administration changed the foreign currency regime, opened international access to Colombia's financial markets, allowed foreign investment without previous authorisations (Resolution 49 of 1991) and created an agile and modern Ministry of Foreign Trade. Already, by the end of 1991, 97% of goods could be imported to Colombia without previous licensing, and tariffs dropped on average from 25% to 15%. In June 1992, the pace of liberalisation accelerated. Tokatlian suggests that this was a direct exchange for U.S. leniency on the surrender policy and the banning of extradition. However, as mentioned before, Colombia’s liberal economic policy was not the result of U.S. arm-twisting. Mauricio Reina, who served as Vice Minister for Foreign Trade in 1993-1995, notes that macroeconomic monetary pushed the accelerating liberalisation in 1992. And the further reduction of tariffs was deemed necessary to ease increasing inflationary pressures in 1991 and 1992, when inflation in Colombia reached well above 20%. Also, according to former Minister of Communications Mauricio Vargas, Gaviria and his economic team had been carefully monitoring the effects of liberalisation after the first reforms were introduced in 1990, and the view among economic experts that half-way measures created serious distortions finally won out. The composition of Gaviria’s cabinet reflected the internal preferences on economic policy. Minister of Finance Rudolph Hommes, who was known to be a staunch supporter of rapid reforms stayed with Gaviria during his full term, until August 1994, while Ernesto Samper, who was...
Gaviria's first Minister for Development and opposed fast liberalisation, was asked to resign in 1992. 69

Economic liberalisation was the force behind Gaviria's emphasis on regional economic and political integration, which became, together with drug control, the core topics of Colombia's foreign policy. Colombia's new integration policy was guided by 'open regionalism', following a different spirit than the sub-regional integration initiatives of the 1960s, which Latin American members had intended to be, to a great extent, a political power-balancing act against the United States. Therefore, in contrast to Kissinger's suspicions during those years, as illustrated in chapter 3, Clinton's staff in the Department of State envisaged the 1990s integration as a building of blocks that progressively expanded zones of trade, democracy, and peace, with the ultimate goal of reaching full hemispheric integration with the United States. 70 Despite the United States' clarity about the long-term goal (hemispheric integration), the short-term processes generated, at times, concerns over the gains and losses in negotiations with sub-regional groups, which is why U.S. policy-makers viewed the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) as competing model that enhanced the bargaining position of Latin American countries to the detriment of the United States. These concerns, however, did not apply to Colombia, which had only recently begun exploring the possibility of joining MERCOSUR, and had signalled its willingness to join NAFTA first. 71 Colombian experts saw NAFTA also as an insurance policy against possible failure of the GATT negotiations.

69 Mauricio Vargas, Memorias Secretas del Revolcón (Bogota: TME, 1993).
70 Watson, 'U.S.-Latin American Relations in the 1990s'.
71 For Colombia's aspiration to join NAFTA see Eduardo Muñoz, 'Las relaciones entre Colombia y los Estados Unidos: una visión prospectiva', Colombia Internacional, 24 (1993), pp. 11-16, Embassy of Colombia in Washington, compilation of documents on accomplishments under the Gaviria administration. Chapter 1, Comercio, pp. 3-4 (diskette version). El Tiempo, 6 January 1991.
But meanwhile, Colombia concentrated on smaller, less ambitious arrangements in this first stage of its *apertura* in which it could exercise relative leadership. It therefore took the lead in reviving the Andean Group and reforming it into the Andean Customs Union in 1995, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela had a Common External Tariff entering into effect, and sought the formalisation of trade accords with the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). It worked to jumpstart the Group of Three (G-3) with Venezuela and Mexico to promote collaboration in the energy sector, scientific and technological development and to consult on common guidelines in their policies towards the Caribbean sub-region. The G-3 High-Level Group on Trade was created in 1990, and the three countries signed a Free Trade Agreement in June 1994. Colombia also signed bilateral tariff reduction agreements with Chile, which was not part of any group, and worked to revamp the Rio Group, the South American political consultation group created in 1986.

Given the affinity in their political and economic agendas, and Gaviria's rising leadership in the region, Colombia became an ideal partner to rally both regional and U.S. domestic support for Clinton's main initiatives in Latin America, such as the congressional approval of NAFTA, and the launch of the Summit of the Americas set to take place in Miami in December 1994. The Summit was intended to be the main forum for designing and driving a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005, and went well beyond addressing just trade. The Summit agenda included education, civil society participation, as well as drug prohibition. As he made clear at the 1993 UN General Assembly, Gaviria was receptive to Clinton's request for his and other Latin American presidents' public support of the idea of the Summit and the FTAA. At the October 1993 Grupo de Rio meeting, for example, Gaviria pushed for the Rio Group to send a letter to the U.S. Congress calling for the approval of

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72 Cardona and Tokatlian. 'Los desafíos', p. 8 and Cardona 'El primer bienio', p. 4.
NAFTA. And he was invariably generous in his public declarations in Colombia and abroad when referring to the importance of NAFTA and the viability of a FTAA. Once again the endorsement did not translate into full reciprocity on trade issues. Squabbles among the two countries over the tariffs on textiles, which had not been included in the 1991- approved ATPA, continued.

Colombia was also cooperative with the United States on the issue of Haiti. During his presidential campaign, Clinton had criticised Bush for ordering the U.S. Coast Guard to return Haitians to their country despite the lack of guarantees for their safety following Raul Cedras 1991 coup against the democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide. When Clinton took office, democracy in Haiti had not been restored, and the island's crisis was becoming increasingly problematic for the Clinton administration on both the domestic and the foreign fronts. The Haitian crisis directly impacted the United States through the wave of refugees seeking shelter in U.S. territory, and the Black Caucus in Congress had incorporated the issue into its agenda. In the meantime, regional neighbours expected the U.S. to help Haiti but were traditionally concerned with U.S. intervention. On the other hand, the Haiti issue had become a testing ground for the continent's commitment to collectively defend democracy. Since October 1991 Colombia had withdrawn its Ambassador from Haiti and joined other OAS members on a first embargo against Haiti, and in June 1993 it supported the UN embargo. Later, with the prospect of a possible intervention in Haiti, Gaviria's Ambassador in Washington D.C., Gabriel Silva, suggested in informal consultations Colombia's willingness to join the United States in a multinational force to restore democracy in Haiti. Yet the most critical moments of the crisis would come in June 1994, and Gaviria had only few weeks left in office. Ernesto Samper, had been elected

73 The Financial Times, 18 October 1993, p. 4
to succeed him and would take office in August. The developments thereafter are analysed in the next chapter.

There was less coordination regarding Cuba, which had also become a sensitive topic in U.S. domestic politics. While the Clinton administration opted to prevent another wave of refugees by tightening sanctions and restricting travel, the Gaviria administration decided to reinstate diplomatic relations with Cuba after having broken off relations in 1979. In 1990, after exploring during informal consultation United States' possible reaction, the Colombian Ambassador in Washington, Jaime García Parra, communicated to Deputy Secretary of State Cliffton Wharton Colombia's decision to normalise relations with Castro. He provided three strong arguments: improved relations with Castro would create an atmosphere of confidence in Colombia for the ongoing peace negotiations between the Colombian government and insurgency groups; engagement was the key to induce liberal reform in the island; and reinstating relations was in accordance with Colombia's 'universalismo' in diplomatic relations.⁷⁶

This presentation elicited a grudging consent from Wharton, an uproar from Robert Gelbard, who was Deputy Assistant for Inter-American Affairs at that time and the tacit acceptance of other officials. Like in Central America and Contadora, Colombia had the backing of most of the Latin American countries, and pledged to ensure a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba without coercive diplomacy. Yet, unlike the case of Contadora, the differences in foreign policy approach did not spark resentments. Given Gaviria's active cooperation on all other matters, the Department of State did not perceive this move as a fundamental signal of defiance.

To conclude, many of the political and economic transformations taking place during the Gaviria administration put Colombia, alongside Chile, in the vanguard of

liberal reform in Latin America.\(^{77}\) Within Colombia, optimism reigned. Many believed it was, finally, the beginning of the way out of underdevelopment. 'In practice, we can be eligible for NAFTA on all conditions --democratic tradition, economic stability, foreign investment legislation and deregulation', said Minister of Trade Juan Manuel Santos in January 1994.\(^{78}\) The U.S. media echoed this Colombian enthusiasm; a *New York Times* article stated: 'Today, business people predict that Colombia in the mid-1990s will increasingly look like the Southeast Asian "tigers" of Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore'.\(^{79}\) And Gaviria epitomised the kind of leader the Latin Americans needed, a 'high quality', 'strong', and 'dynamic' individual, which is why the United States, in an unusual diplomatic practice, openly endorsed his candidacy to become Secretary General of the OAS.\(^{80}\) Yet behind deep and substantive improvements in Colombia on democratisation and economic growth lay equally glaring problems. The government's peace process with several of Colombia's insurgency groups remained incomplete after FARC and ELN refused Gaviria's generous offers to share council participation by half in municipalities where their presence was strong.\(^{81}\)

Enthusiasm, both in Colombia and in the United States, had temporarily hidden the shortcomings in Colombia's democratisation, which included a wide range of problems, like for example the growing level of corruption, the lack of a strong civil service, the ongoing paralysis of the justice sector despite the reform attempts and finally the weaknesses in the implementation of drug control. Nevertheless, Colombia appeared to be living up to its traditional image of political and economic stability, and its traditional record of cooperation in the war against drugs. For U.S. policy makers Colombia was not under-performing or presenting extraordinary obstacles compared to

\(^{77}\) Although simultaneous to these processes were equally strong currents undermining the very existence of the Colombian state, such as the growth of narco guerrillas and paramilitaries, the obsolescence of old political organisations and state corruption. Thus, it is not argued here that Gaviria’s policies had necessarily halted Colombia’s long-term problems.


\(^{80}\) Feinberg, 'Substantive Symmetry'; Watson, 'U.S.-Latin American Relations in the 1990s'.

\(^{81}\) Vargas, *Memorias Secretas del Revolcón*, p. 225
Bolivia and Peru.82 Peru, for example, had refused to carry out massive eradication and other measures against production because of two key reasons: the programmes would clash with the counterinsurgency strategy against Sendero Luminoso, and the government was still informally relying on the drug economy to cushion the shock stabilization programme implemented by Fujimori since August 1990. During the first years of the implementation of the Andean Strategy, reports on Bolivia and Peru were extremely critical on several fronts, from implementation of drug control measures, to corruption and the violation of human rights with reference to the deep-and-across the board weaknesses of both countries' institutions.83 No comparable official reports existed on Colombia.

82 Peter R. Andreas and Kenneth E. Sharpe, 'Cocaine Politics in the Andes', Current History, 91 (1992), pp. 74-9. They differentiate well the cases of the three countries and call Peru's and Bolivia's adoption of drug control measures during Paz Zamora and the early Fujimori administration a mere public relations exercise to appease the United States. In Peru 15% of the work force was tied to coca-economics and in Bolivia 20% of the work force during very difficult economic conjunctures for both countries. See also Levitsky's, oversight agency and CRS assessments in Perl, 'U.S. Andean Drug Policy', pp. 27-9. For U.S.-Bolivia relations during the Bush and Clinton administrations see Eduardo Gamarra, 'U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts' and 'Las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Bolivia durante el gobierno de Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada' in Andrés Franco (ed.) Estados Unidos y los países andinos, 1993-1997: poder y desintegración (Bogotá: Centro Editorial Javeriano, 1998), pp. 15-36. For U.S.-Peruvian relations during the same period see David Scott Palmer, 'Peru, Drugs and Shining Path', in Bagley and Walker III, Drugtrafficking in the Americas, pp. 179-200 and 'Las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Perú durante los gobiernos del presidente Clinton', in Franco, Estados Unidos y los países andinos, pp. 113-36.

83 Apart from reference above see also for Peru, GAO, The Drug War. Observations on Counternarcotics Programs, 23 October 1991.
Since the launch of the war against drugs Colombia and the United States had averted a significant diplomatic conflict over the impossibility to curb the drug trade and their disagreements on drug policy matters. In fact, by the mid 1990s, they reached a period of 'deep institutionalisation' of both national prohibition and bilateral anti-drug cooperation. The cumulative process that raised the political profile of drugs contained some of the germs for future conflict. However, the terms of relationship, articulated by U.S. drug policy, changed substantially with the post Cold War democracy-security normative context. Chapters 8 and 9 look at the move from friendship to conflict. Chapter 8 examines U.S. decertification of the Samper administration amidst allegations of narco-corruption. Chapter 9 focuses on the characteristics and implications of diplomatic conflict.
Chapter 8

THE ELECTION OF ERNESTO SAMPER AND THE UNITED STATES: NEW STANDARDS, NEW RELATIONSHIP, AUGUST 1994- MARCH 1995

In June 1994, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Robert Gelbard warned that countries listed to be certified on drug control cooperation should not think 'that performing at last year's levels would be sufficient'. That same month, news broke in Colombia suggesting the Cali mafia had funded the presidential campaign of the newly elected Ernesto Samper. This narco-corruption rumour was different than previous ones in Colombia in two ways. It pointed to a large sum of money, $6 million, entering the headquarters of a presidential campaign, and it occurred at a time when the post Cold War democracy-security normative context had decreased U.S. legal and political tolerance toward drug-related corruption. This chapter examines how norms on democracy and governance, and ideas on post Cold War security, as applied to U.S. foreign policy thinking and drug control during the Clinton administration, contributed to deteriorating previously friendly relations between Colombia and the United States. The first section begins with the so-called 'narco-scandal' on Samper's presidential campaign. It describes how the U.S. response was first critical but cautious, and then evolved to antagonise Samper. Sections two and three refer to the question of why the United States chose to grant Colombia a national conditional waiver on 1 March 1995, instead of opting for a discrete engagement given that Colombia's difficulties in previous years had been dealt with using more latitude. Section two spells out several cognitive processes that led to

1 U.S. House, Counternarcotics Strategy for the Western Hemisphere, p. 58.
changes in U.S. policy makers' ideas on Colombia's character, resulting in the escalation of the discourse of conflict. It is an account of how the 'enemy' image was constructed to further justify U.S. coercive behaviour. Section three analyses Colombia's refusal to cooperate with the United States in the 1994 intervention of Haiti and its effects, which included alienating soft-liners on Colombia within the U.S. Department of State, losing the opportunity to make Colombia strategically indispensable and further undermining Samper's tarnished reputation.

1. The Ernesto Samper Election and the June 1994 Narco-Funding Scandal: Colombia Fails on Drug Control Performance

The Liberal party was optimistic about winning the 1994 presidential election in Colombia. Ernesto Samper, an able Liberal politician who promised to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor was leading in the polls against the Conservative Andrés Pastrana, son of former President Misael Pastrana. The two-round electoral system had been introduced during the 1991 constitutional reform, was being applied for the first time, and politicians were still learning about its political and strategic implications. Therefore, many working for Samper's campaign had not discarded the possibility of having to face a run-off if their candidate failed to obtain more than 50% of the vote on the first round on 29 May 1994.

Samper came in first, but to the frustration of his team, with only 45% of the 5,791,332 votes. Pastrana fared better than expected. He came in second with just 18,439 votes less than Samper. The race for a second round began, and both sides were concerned about the financial costs of this round. Campaigning continued after May, and Samper won the elections on 19 June 1994 with just 51% of the votes. Investigations on the elections conducted by the Colombian Fiscalía and unveiled only two years after, indicated that members of Samper's campaign treasurer, Santiago Medina, and the campaign manager and future Minister of Defence, Fernando Botero,
either accepted or solicited a $6 million contribution from the Cali cartel to underwrite the costs of the second round.

After 21 June 1994 the Colombian media disclosed stories on Cali drug money and the electoral. It disclosed the so-called 'narco-cassettes' containing the voice of a Cali cartel member planning to finance Samper and other politicians. Disgruntled Colombian intelligence agents had sent the tapes to Pastrana a few days before the second round, and Pastrana's campaign manager, Luis Alberto Moreno, delivered the tapes to the U.S. Embassy, hoping the United States would help to hold Samper accountable. But the Department of State instructed U.S. Ambassador Morris D. Busby not to disclose the tapes before the elections, since they contained no conclusive information. Besides, the United States risked being accused of pro-consular behaviour for interfering in the elections. Instead, Busby passed the tapes on to the DEA for further investigation. Disappointed by the Embassy's decision not to reveal the content of the tapes, the DEA Director in Bogotá, Joe Toft, made sure they reached the press with no delay. Yet, at the time of the 1994 elections, and prior to Botero's confession on 22 January 1996, it was uncertain whether drug money had reached the campaign or not. In fact, it was never clarified whether Samper instructed his aides to procure funds, implicitly seconded the move by turning a blind eye to Medina and Botero's actions, or whether drug money infiltrated the campaign 'behind his back', as he claims.

Incidents of drug money in Colombian politics were not new, and thus many in Colombia regarded the initial rumours in the media of drug money in Samper's campaign as simply routine. Drug-related corruption seemed to be not generalised, albeit frequent. For two decades, traffickers had increasingly bought favours from politicians, state officials, judges, police and military officials at the local and national levels. Often, those not lured by money, fell prey to violent intimidation by traffickers.
In 1988, for instance, former Liberal Congressmen and politician Eduardo Mestre was isolated and ousted from the Barco government for his links to the Cali mafia. In 1991 Gaviria's team was continuously troubled by the drug connections of few members of the National Constituent Assembly who were paid to represent trafficker’s interests in the making of the 1991 constitution. And in 1994, hoping to avoid over-reactions among U.S. policy-makers with regards to the 1994 elections, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Alexander Watson attested to narco-corruption in politics being a common phenomenon in Colombia. There was no exact knowledge of the magnitude of the penetration of drug mafia interests in the Colombian society and state institutions because academia and law enforcement had not systematically investigated or quantified the phenomenon. There was also a lack of public awareness on the government's efforts to fight corruption. Official measures that ultimately undermined narco-corruption, such as Barco's cleansing of the military and police, had not been clearly defined or widely advertised as policies against narco-corruption, but rather routine modifications of institutions. Gaviria was the first to explicitly adopt anti-corruption as a government policy. In the end, much of the history and characteristics of narco-corruption in Colombia came to be known through the investigations of 1995 and 1996, triggered by the Samper scandal.

The official U.S. position from June 1994 to March 1995 was one of apparent caution and restraint. Watson publicly and cordially asked for a quick resolution of the tape controversy. And the incoming U.S. Ambassador, Myles Frechette, was instructed to 'work' with Samper. In the meantime, Samper insistently claimed that his campaign had implemented strict controls on fund-raising and assured U.S. officials of

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2 Toft resigned from the DEA six weeks later.
3 Interview with Felipe Ortiz, Secretary for the Second Commission of the Colombian Senate, Bogotá, May 1999. Ortiz was asvisor to constituent Armando Holguin, who was later imprisoned on illicit enrichment charges.
his commitment to the war against drugs. Nevertheless, there were sectors in the U.S. Congress and the Department of State that were pushing against a lenient response to the Colombian situation. Three days after the Colombian elections, for instance, Congress was already inquiring about developments in Colombia. This came in the context of one of the dozens of hearings in Washington in which Clinton's foreign drug policy was bitterly criticised. Moreover, as the days went by, opponents to Clinton in the U.S. Congress began suggesting that the Samper episode was a symptom of Clinton's alleged retreat from the war against drugs.

INL, too, was in favour of a firm response to the Samper scandal. To highlight Samper's responsibility, stemming either from omission or commission, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotic Affairs Robert Gelbard revealed he had informed Samper at an informal meeting in New York, as early as 1993, that illegal money was infiltrating his campaign. And shortly before the inauguration of the Samper government, Gelbard warned a Colombian high-level delegation of the risks of decertification. He then reported to the U.S. Congress: 'The meeting ended with all cards on the table. President-elect Samper knows the cooperation that the United States hopes for from his government, and we understand what he expects of us.'

According to Skol, Gelbard had chosen to follow INL's own diplomatic strategy: to 'talk hard' to Samper as a way of ensuring the continuation of drug control and preventing any arrangement between Samper and the Cali group from coming to

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6 Before his inauguration to the presidency, Samper met Ambassador Morris Busby assuring him strict measures had been used to monitor campaign funding. 'Colombia in Gloom over Drugs Accusations', The Times, 25 June 1994, 'Colombia president-elect Meets with U.S. Ambassador; Envoy Troubled by Drug Cartel Allegations', The Washington Post, 25 June 1994. Samper's declarations, however were inaccurate, it was widely known by the core campaign members that the accounting had been altered to receive a large donation from the Colombian businessman Julio Mario Santodomingo in violation of the set funding ceilings, which is why several of the younger members had been asked to conceal the money. The violation was never prosecuted due to a legal technicality.


fruition. Rather the way in which U.S. policy makers made sense of the information surrounding them is crucial in explaining their policy choices. In this case, U.S. officials considered high-level narco-corruption to be a serious occurrence and worthy of coercion.

Samper, who had little interest in and experience with international affairs, learned for the first time of the certification procedure with the scandal surrounding his election. At first, the new Colombian president, his cabinet, and aides believed that the Clinton administration would be lenient with Colombia. This calculation reflected the commonly-held perception among many in Colombia that Democrats were non-confrontational, non-interventionists and more prone to give assistance to Latin America, while Republicans loathed aid and tended to use a 'stick' approach towards the region. Hence, Samper had expected Clinton to break away from 'old conservative models' regarding drugs. The early reports on Clinton's desire to redistribute drug control funds to favour rehabilitation and treatment, and reduce international transit-zone interdiction appeared, in Colombian officials minds', to confirm their intuitions. More concretely, from the meeting of 29 June 1994, the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs Rodrigo Pardo concluded that Colombia's dialogue with the United States had established a bilateral 'agreement in order to make the relationship manageable'. The 'gentleman's agreement', as Skol referred to it, was an implicit understanding that the U.S. administration would judge Samper according

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9 Interview with Skol, Washington, September 1999.
12 Samper, _Aquí estoy_, p. 254.
to his future anti-drug performance once in office after 7 August, and not to the misbehaviour of some of his campaign staff.\textsuperscript{14}

The technical details of the 'agreement', that is, the specific list of drug control policy measures that were expected from Colombia, were included in a corrected and revised version of the note previously handed to the Gaviria administration. Among these tasks, Colombians believed that to U.S. officials, the dismantling of the Cali cartel was the symbol of Colombia's commitment. Hence, despite the United States' refusal to issue a favourable public declaration supporting Samper's government, Samper, Pardo and other cabinet members were confident that the United States would be tolerant of the narco-scandal if the Colombian administration delivered important results in the drug war, especially if they captured the Cali drug traffickers. Samper and his aides based this calculation on their own particular interpretation of history. For them, the experience of U.S.-Colombian relations especially during the Gaviria years showed that the amicable resolution of problems, even when sensitive drug issues were involved, was possible. Even though Samper could see United States' irritation, he failed to grasp the actual shift of standards contained in U.S. policy and its underpinning normative logic.

During the following months, there were further exchanges that Colombian officials interpreted as progress. Inside Colombia the narco-scandal died down, at least for some months, feeding the perception that the scandal would soon be forgotten. Moreover, on 15 July Samper wrote to Senator Helms and other members of the U.S. Congress announcing some of his anti-drug programmes. These included reforming the penal code, criminalising money laundering and increasing judicial cooperation. In July, Pardo, Botero and Minister of Justice Néstor Humberto Martínez met Gelbard and other U.S. officials again to further 'discuss how the Samper administration might

\textsuperscript{14} Interview with Skol; see also interviews with Skol and Watson in Russell Crandall, \textit{The Eagle and the Snowman}, chapter 4.
counteract the negative allegations of drug cartel influence in the campaign and the public perception of such, by taking positive measures to *demonstrate willingness* to fight drug trafficking' [emphasis added].\textsuperscript{15} The U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette gave signals of prudence, expressing his concerns in private, while following a discrete public diplomacy. 'My instructions are to work as hard as possible with the new president', he said to the press.\textsuperscript{16} Also, Colombians thought Skol had showed optimism at the 3 August 1994 hearing in Capitol Hill, giving additional suggestions as to where Colombia could improve bilateral relations, such as hemispheric integration:

> Colombia is much more than a producer of drugs. It is a dealer within a hemisphere in economic reform. Its economic management within a period of decades stands as a model for other economies. ... Colombia is a healthy, prosperous country with a sound economy. U.S. assistance serves the interests of both our countries, but it is not essential to Colombia's economic well-being. What Colombia needs from us is cooperation, and it is the act of cooperation which opens other doors and gives us the tools with which we forward our goals. ... Colombia is today a major player in regional and hemispheric issues. Its outgoing president is the incoming Secretary General of the OAS, we also want and need to work with Colombia on crucial hemispheric issues. By looking at the future with the Samper administration and by not prejudging our ability to work together, we hope to lay the groundwork for a fruitful relationship on multilateral issues.\textsuperscript{17}

Yet, there were caveats. Gelbard mentioned to Congress, that he had raised the 'concern that, if the allegations were true, they would drastically impair our efforts to dismantle the Cali cartel and, in turn, measurably alter' relations.\textsuperscript{18} This added to an amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill introduced in July 1994 by Helms which changed assistance requirements for Colombia. Before Samper's inauguration, he and his team travelled to Washington to lobby against the bill, which never passed, for it encountered opposition. Democrat Representative Rangel, Republican members Benjamin Gilman, Richard Lugar, Robert Livingston, Robert

\textsuperscript{15}U.S. House, *U.S. Relations with Colombia*, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{16} 'Rechazo a la actitud de la DEA', *El Tiempo*, 13 July 1994, see also 'El Embajador Frechette', *El Tiempo*, 8 August 1994.
\textsuperscript{17} U.S. House, *U.S. Relations with Colombia*, p. 38
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, p. 44.
Toricelli and Dennis DeConcini, and Watson and Skol in the Department of State were willing to proceed with caution on the Colombian case. Democrats Jose Serrano of New York and Esteban Torres of California were also crucial in burying Helms' bill. In the end, Helms agreed to a softer White House report on Colombia due by the end of December 1994.

**Building Trust: Samper's Anti-Narcotics Measures before March 1995**

After the confusion and agitation of June and July 1994, the Samper government began launching and implementing its anti-drug projects. Those in the United States who favoured the use of coercive diplomacy towards Colombia, as well as anti-prohibition academics in Colombia, have attributed Samper's exemplary drug control record to U.S. pressure. Indeed, U.S. 'hard talk' and the threat of economic sanctions made the controversial president focus on the war against drugs. Samper, however, was not starting the drug war anew or alone; he was picking up drug control where the Gaviria administration had left it. Besides inheriting a larger drug problem, Samper received institutionalised punitive prohibition, which predetermined certain policy choices.

The development of the prohibition regime in Colombia had begun accelerating since 1990 based on Colombian officials' perception that drugs were damaging and that drug trafficking constituted a security threat, or national and international dimensions, to stability, democracy and governance. Thus, for example, by the time of his presidential campaign, Samper had already discarded the possibility of legalising cannabis, which he had once proposed in the 1970s. Equally important to the growth of the prohibition regime were the identity and bureaucratic interests of anti-drug agencies in Colombia and abroad, which worked to maintain prohibition alive. Finally,

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19 In his presidential memoirs Samper reveals his reservations against prohibition and his prejudices against the United States. However, he discards legalisation on the basis that modern drug trafficking organisation constitute a real threat, and require law enforcement action. Samper, *Aqui estoy.*
institutionalised prohibition included a series of international treaties and partnerships of which the agreements with the United States were the most crucial. This explains, for instance, why many joint actions involving Colombia and the United States had routinely carried on despite the change of administration in Colombia.

Some initiatives came directly from the presidential Palacio de Nariño, with political strategic calculations surely in mind, since to Samper's understanding the immediate steps before the 1 March 1995 certification process were crucial in redeeming his reputation. Other initiatives, however, stemmed from convinced drug policy technocrats and law enforcers dismayed by United States' accusations of inefficiency --whether they believed in bolstering Samper's reputation or not. Samper created a new elite force with the sole task of dismantling the Cali organisation. It was another Bloque de Búsqueda, like the one created to dismantle the Medellin cartel. Interdiction operations were directly commanded by Police General Rosso José Serrano, whom the United States had hand picked for the job, replacing the controversial Police General Octavio Vargas. Serrano was promoted to chief of the Colombian National Police on 6 December 1994. The carefully selected Bloque de Búsqueda had CIA and DEA approval, and was trained in the United States. In early 1995, Samper also created a select and confidential group to follow key events in drug control operations in particular the dissolution of the Cali cartel. Nicknamed 'the Club', it included the Ministers of Justice, Defense and Foreign Affairs; the Foreign Affairs presidential advisor; the Director General of DAS; and Serrano. Law enforcement operations against the Cali group, on both the Colombian and American ends, were

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21 Rosso José Serrano (con la colaboración de Santiago Gamboa), Jaque Mate (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 1999), pp. 85-6.
22 Ambassador Frechette asked that he be part of this high-level group but was reminded that the group was a national committee, Samper, Aquí estoy, p. 301.
already well underway when the new Bloque was formed, but Serrano made sure to prioritise the task in Colombia.\textsuperscript{23}

Operations yielded impressive results in 1995. Unfortunately, the progress came after 1 March 1995. Exactly one day after the announcement of the national conditional waiver, Jorge Eliécer Rodríguez Orejuela, the youngest of the Rodríguez brothers was captured. The Anti-narcotics policy continued its function of eradication, strengthened by a new agreement signed on December 1994 at the inter-institutional level between the Ministry of Defense and the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá with specific operational instruction to conduct Operación Resplandor, which was a medium-term massive fumigation project in Guaviare and Putumayo. It was established that the NAS was to fund the operation with INL budget, lend 11 of the 23 aircraft needed, produce destruction records jointly with Colombian authorities, and write a monthly evaluation to ascertain progress. For U.S. officials, an agreement at the agency level allowed greater influence, leverage and monitoring on Colombia. For Colombians, it clarified performance expectations in the achievement of full certification. With the launching of Resplandor, Samper announced he expected to eliminate all crops in two years, and from September to December 1994 substantial progress was made with the eradication of 6,900 hectares of coca in main cultivation areas.\textsuperscript{24} Parallel to eradication, Samper institutionalised crop substitution by creating PLANTE in the Presidency, funded with $300 million coming from the national budget and IADB loans. Protests against eradication ended in assaults against the Colombian oil company Ecopetrol in Orito and La Hormiga. It was a small sample of what awaited Colombians in the years to come. In Guaviare and Putumayo the government negotiated not to spray family-size coca plots of three hectares and less,

\textsuperscript{23} Jim McGee and Brain Duffy, \textit{Main Justice. The Men and Women Who Enforce the Nation’s Criminal Laws and Guard its Liberties} (New York: Touchstone, 1997) and Serrano, Jaque Mate.

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{El Espectador}, 5 March 1995, p. 5A.
and to continue targeting industrial-sized production, which was overtly financed by
drug mafias.\textsuperscript{25}

The Samper government, in particular the Ministry of Justice, also began working
to refine part of the existing anti-drug legislation that Barco and Gaviria had
introduced. For example, in January 1995, an evaluation commission was established
to modify the surrender policy, which had too generous a reward system, and,
according to experts like Antonio José Cancino, was not punitive enough.\textsuperscript{26} The
Samper administration also submitted to the Colombian Congress in 1994 one of the
centrepieces of modern prohibition legislation, the Anti-Corruption Law, which
criminalized assets proceeding from illegal activities whether drug-related or not,
refined anti-money laundering provisions, and included innovative laws regarding
public and white-collar corruption. Americans used this opportunity to press for the
reinstatement of extradition, despite the fact that it required a major constitutional
reform process with obvious risks in terms of domestic political infighting. Aware of
the implications of such a mammoth enterprise and of his political limitations after the
narco-scandal, Samper and his team opted to leave the banning of extradition as it
stood. They also believed that in the end, the United States could continue working
with Colombia without extradition, just as during the Gaviria years.

Samper also worked on the human rights front, since the topic had recently become
part of the bilateral agenda and was connected to drug control cooperation. This had
been in part the result of human rights NGOs advocacy in Washington against Bush's
foreign drug policy on the grounds that its militarisation of the war against drugs
increased state-sponsored human rights violations in the Andean region. Later on, the
human rights cause found new sympathizers among Democratic congressmen and

\textsuperscript{25} For a thorough account of social protest against eradication and its intertwining with
insurgency violence see Ricardo Vargas, \textit{Fumigación y conflicto. Políticas antidrogas y
deslegitimación del Estado en Colombia} (Bogotá: Transnational Institute, TME, Acción
Andina, 1999).

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{El Espectador}, 17 January 1995, p. 3A.
officials in the Clinton administration, like Frechette, who were glad to push the agenda in Colombia. In the meantime, illustrated in chapter 6, the U.S. Congress had introduced human rights requirements on Colombia in 1994 in order to receive drug control assistance. The political implication of these addenda was setting human rights standards as criteria to define whether Colombia was a cooperative country or not.

Other motivations behind Samper's special emphasis on human rights, at the domestic and foreign policy levels, were developments abroad, more specifically, the increasing international scrutiny over Colombia's worsening human rights record. In particular, February and March of 1995 were difficult months. On 6 February the Commission's Investigation on the Trujillo massacre of 1988 was being presented to the Inter American Human Rights Court, holding the Colombian state accountable for the brutal assassination of 34 peasants. And the European parliament, which otherwise had little to do with Colombia, was holding sessions with critical assessments on massacres and internal displacement. The same topics were also on the UN agenda.27 The same liberal normative agenda that gave greater impetus to democracy and governance was driving this scrutiny over Colombia on human rights, except that globalisation was changing the locus and dynamics of accountability. In the post Cold War years, sub-state, state and international actors across the world, not just the United States, were now holding Colombia accountable.

The Samper government then adopted the following measures, keeping in mind U.S. and other international pressure. It classified genocide as a crime; introduced cash retributions to victims of violations by state agents; designed projects for internally displaced people; and pushed the Fiscalía to do more work in cases of human rights violations.28 Colombia also agreed to open a United Nations High Commissioner's Human Rights office in Bogotá, but declined the UN suggestion to use a UN

27 *El Tiempo*, 6 February 1995, pp.1A, 6A.
28 *El Tiempo*, 10 September 1994, pp. 1A, 6A.
Rapporteur. For Colombian officials, this appeared to be double decertification that further undermined its legitimacy in the international community and at home.29

With all these initiatives, Samper and his team were confident that Colombia was fulfilling United States' expectations and that the tapes impasse could be left behind. Yet to their surprise, Ambassador Frechette gave mixed signals with regards to the United States' stance towards Colombia in his 27 January 1995 speech at the Council of the Americas in New York, where businessmen and bankers gathered. The Ambassador lauded the country's economic policy, Samper's human rights policies and the swift opposition to a corrupted bill that made its way into the Colombian Congress during the second semester of 1994 which would have softened sentences for drug traffickers. On the other hand, he warned that Washington was disappointed with what they claimed were flagging achievements in the war against drugs, asserting that Colombia could do more in the area of anti-money laundering and lengthening sentences. He also tossed in a mild scolding to Colombia for having reinstated relations with Cuba.30 Perceptions in Washington that Samper was at best 'soft on drugs' and at worst corrupt, and that his actions and omissions constituted a threat to U.S. foreign policy goals had continued to spread among policy makers and agencies involved in U.S. foreign drug policy. The February 1995 Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report on Colombia mentioned some areas where they believed Colombian cooperation was lacking, such as enforcing the plea bargain system, incarcerating Cali cartel members, investigating narco-corruption, legislating on anti-money laundering, achieving full eradication, and creating a Caribbean Basin drug-force. On the other hand, the overall spirit of the report left little room to interpret Colombia's actions as cooperation and disqualified joint actions, prescribing isolation instead.

29 El Espectador, 4 March 1995, p. 5A
30 El Tiempo, 2 February 1995, pp. 1A, 6A.
Colombians viewed Frechette's speech and Washington's assessments of their anti-drug efforts hitherto as treason from an Ambassador that had promised cooperation. A scathing editorial article in *El Tiempo* titled *Dear Mr. Frechette* and written by liberal journalist D'artagnan captured Colombians' frustration:

What would truly be an aberration, Mr. Ambassador, is to disregard the mentioned efforts. However, if due to a possible decertification (which seems like an extortion), in which you would have an indisputable influence, you decide to side with Colombia's snipers, we would have lost not only a crucial interlocutor for healthy relations among our countries, but the war as well... A war that we fight not against United States' power, as it has been myopically interpreted by leaders like Helms, but against drug trafficking.\(^31\)

On 6 February 1995, a few days after Frechette's news, Samper formally and explicitly announced his counternarcotics strategy, *Compromiso de Colombia Frente al Problema Mundial de la Droga: Plan Nacional, 1995*, which included all the initiatives that had been underway since August 1994. In general terms, it had similar programmes to those developed in the Gaviria administration and followed the same type of punitive prohibition preferred by U.S. policy-makers.\(^32\) That month, too, wary of possible decertification Ministers Botero, Pardo and Martínez travelled once more to Washington to meet Department of State officials and congressional members.\(^33\) But Colombian efforts yielded only partial results. U.S. officials claimed the February launch of Colombia's drug policy was a belated and cosmetic response to the possibility of decertification, and it only helped to support the idea that Samper was a stereotypical Latin American populist politician. On 1 March 1995, the U.S. government granted Colombia a national interest waiver, downgrading it for the first time ever. Although Colombia did not receive a full decertification, the political effect and the uproar in Colombia were the same as if it had. Over and over, Samper and his

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\(^{31}\) *El Tiempo*, 5 February 1995, p. 5A.


\(^{33}\) 'Canciller se reúne con representante Toricelli', *El Tiempo*, 10 February 1995.
team accused the United States of unilateralism and hypocrisy.\textsuperscript{34} Nevertheless, Colombia boldly pledged to continue in the war against drugs even if the United States ultimately decided to withdraw from the fight in Colombia, which did little to stop the rounds of altercations ahead.

That Colombia's thriving illegal drug industry and its cases of narco-corruption were no longer tolerable to the United States can be attributed to the democracy-security normative framework. This framework, together with its footprint in drug policy, bestowed new meaning and importance on episodes of high-level corruption. The legitimacy of states was no longer solely based on physical control over its territory, but on good and democratic administrative and political behaviour too. New security discourse brought even further opprobrium upon drug trafficking, and specifically drug-related corruption, viewing it as particularly threatening to the physical, administrative and moral integrity of states through the erosion of institutions and alteration of values and interests among public officials, in addition to the violent attacks launched by drug traffickers. Furthermore, drug-related corruption became an inflammable topic for the U.S.-Colombian relationship since first, drug policy had turned into the overarching principle guiding the relationship, and second, U.S. prohibition spelled out clear procedures in the certification provisions on what to do in cases of narco-corruption. Therefore, U.S. disapproval of Colombia came through a national conditional waiver with an explanatory text that hinted mainly at public sector drug-related corruption, as being the problem:

Individual officials from the Police and of other kinds who operate on the fields demonstrate a considerable determination... The sporadic and ambivalent support of some sectors of the political establishment in Colombia do not allow them to harm Colombian cartels significantly... In 1994 no high rank governmental official was accused of corruption... There was a visible lack of support by some sectors of government to

\textsuperscript{34} 'La certificación, una decisión unilateral', \textit{El Tiempo}, 8 March 1995.
reinforce and support the achievements obtained by those governmental institutions that operate in the field.\textsuperscript{35}

Previous reports had also mentioned corruption, along with other factors that hindered effective drug control. Invariably, GAO reports from 1991 to 1997 provided comprehensive lists with the same factors. For example, in 1993 GAO cited the following: 'the limited ability of some Colombian agencies to plan and implement effective programs, increased insurgency and narco-terrorist activities, the expansion of drug trafficking activities into opium cultivation, corruption within the Colombian government, and the lack of effective anti-drug programs in other neighbouring countries'.\textsuperscript{36} Yet from 1994 onwards diagnosis changed. In essence, drug control in Colombia faced difficulties as usual and performance continued to be limited as usual, but standards and the definition of cooperation referred now to good governance. The formalisation of the democracy-security norms through their incorporation into law and administrative procedures reduced the leeway with which the United States could handle the Samper case, although it did not eliminate it completely.

2. Reconstructing Colombia

Notwithstanding the normative context and the legal rigidity brought about by certification procedures, the United States still had the option, as Frechette declared to the press, to 'work with Samper' and formally recommend that the U.S. Congress certify Colombia, while setting pressure through \textit{démarches} to ensure Samper continued operations against the Cali group and other traffickers. After all, there was no concrete proof of Samper's solicitation of narco-funds or the existence of a deal to compensate Cali drug traffickers with either a lenient surrender or the toleration of

\textsuperscript{35} 'Justificación por intereses nacionales vitales. Colombia (traducción extra-oficial)', mimeo obtained in Secretaría Privada, Despacho del Presidente, Palacio de Nariño, República de Colombia.

\textsuperscript{36} GAO, \textit{The Drug War. Colombia is Implementing Antidrug Efforts, but Impact is Uncertain} (Washington D.C.: GAO, 1993).
their activities. However, at the time of the March 1995 certification process, American officials' perceptions of Colombia had become transfigured. No longer was that country viewed as a friend, but rather a foe. This contributed further to discarding the option of a less confrontational approach by creating a consensus among U.S. agencies on the appropriateness and justification of changing the old diplomatic record of amicable resolution of problems. As one U.S. official noted, 'when a friend of yours does something bad you are willing to overlook some of his deficiencies, but if it is not a friend then you will condemn every mistake'.

In early 1995, the idea of a threat posed by illegal drugs coming from Colombia changed into to 'the increasing drug threat posed by Colombia [emphasis added]. Instead of being recognised as the committed ally or the longest and most stable democracy in Latin America, it was called the 'world's first narco-democracy'. Colombia the narco-democracy became a generalised term repeated over and over in policy circles. Different messengers worked to spread these ideas in Washington. For example, The Heritage Foundation called for a Just say no to Colombia campaign, dubbing Nancy Reagan's famous Just say no campaign against drugs. In this process of reconstructing Colombia's image, all the essential qualities that had gained it respectability in international spheres and served as pillars for friendship with the United States, were questioned and reassessed. Such qualities were its democratic status, the stability of its economy and its cooperation and alliance in regional security.

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39 The term was coined by Senator John Kerry and Joe Toft, former director of the DEA mission in Colombia. See also U.S. House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, A Review of President Clinton's Certification Program for Narcotics Producing and Transit Countries in Latin America, 25 March 1995, p. 2.
40 The Heritage Foundation is a Republican think tank based in Washington that has great influence on U.S. foreign policy making. The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder 1028, 21 March 1995.
affairs. As much as Colombia's reputation had been key in sustaining 30 years of alliance amidst drug problems, its new character rendered it uncooperative. The transition of Colombia's status from friend to foe was far from automatic, and there remained a lingering dissent in Washington on what Colombia represented and how to approach it, as illustrated below in chapter 9.

There were several simultaneous cognitive processes at work. One was the demonisation of Samper. Cresencio Arcos, Gelbard's Deputy Assistant at INL, for example, said of Samper after the June 1994 meeting: 'This man has that air of arrogance common to the corrupt. He reminds me of the president of Honduras, one day when I asked about a huge ring his wife was wearing and that everyone knew the origin of'. In addition, Samper's unhelpful past gained new meaning. That he had supported legalisation of marijuana in the 1970s debate had suddenly become a solid proof of his alliance to drug traffickers in the 1990s. The once forgotten rumours that he had agreed to take donations from drug traffickers during his work for the López presidential campaign of 1982 surfaced again, this time as an unquestioned fact.

Finally, Samper's refusal to cooperate with the United States in the 1994 Haiti intervention, added to the idea that the Colombian president was devious and unreliable, as explained in detail in section three. And Samper's perceived deviousness,

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41 Finnemore speaks of affect in state relationships and the process of identification, as opposed to 'identity'. But this case shows that affection can be connected to the identity of the actors. Martha Finnemore, 'Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention' in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity on Power Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 160
42 At least Secretary of State Warren Christopher was reticent about the 1995 conditional waiver. See 'Christopher reacio a negar certificacion', El Tiempo 20 February 1995, and 'La certificacion condicionada no existe', El Tiempo 16 February 1995.
43 Vargas et al., El presidente que se iba a caer, p. 47.
a reason for his alleged unwillingness to combat drug trafficking, was Colombia's own unwillingness to cooperate.\textsuperscript{45}

Another process that took place in the realm of ideas was exaggerating the consequences of drug money in the Samper campaign. In September 1994, DEA Director Thomas Constantine, linked underdevelopment and the distortions of neoliberal reforms in Latin American societies and Colombia to drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{46} Constantine asserted:

As the country's reliance upon illicit drug revenue continues to increase, the Colombian drug cartels' influence within the private and governmental sectors threatens to widen the gap between rich and poor. In this liberalised economic atmosphere with the continuous absence of strict financial laws, the financial sway of the drug cartels threatens to undermine the success of the current economic reforms; [if the Colombian government does not act], criminal elements will continue to flourish, jeopardising not only Colombia's economic growth, but regional security throughout Latin America.\textsuperscript{47}

Colombia's domestic problems were portrayed as if entirely new and caused by the Cali group's corrupting power over Samper, failing to place Colombia's weaknesses in historical and structural perspective.\textsuperscript{48} Colombia had been, all of a sudden, ruined and brought to 'civil war' by the Cali cartel.\textsuperscript{49} That drug trafficking had corrupted state institutions was certainly true. However, the effects of drug trafficking had been at work for 30 years, and Colombia's predicaments in 1994 were perhaps no worse than

\textsuperscript{45} Attribution theory, contends that observers, in this case policy-makers, will interpret a behaviour outcome according to the personal traits of leaders or nations, see Deborah Larson Welch, \textit{Origins of Containment. A Psychological Explanation} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 34-42.

\textsuperscript{46} Constantine had been Superintendent of the New York State Police and got involved in investigations against the Cali Cartel. He was obsessed with the Cali cartel and loathed the idea of not having an extradition treaty in place with Colombia. See U.S. House, \textit{Counternarcotics Strategy for the Western Hemisphere}, pp. 32-3. He had been in the job since April 1994.

\textsuperscript{47} U.S. Department of Justice, DEA, 'Colombian Economic Reform: The Impact on Drug Money Laundering within the Colombian Economy', Drug Intelligence Report, Intelligence Division, DEA-94072, Washington, September 1994. This report was circulated to 30 agencies, among them, the National Security Council, the ONDCP, the Department of Defense, the Department of Treasury, Department of State, U.S. Customs Service and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

\textsuperscript{48} Interviews conducted in the U.S. Department of State, Washington, September 1997.

\textsuperscript{49} The expression 'civil war' was used by Anne McDonald and other officials from USAID, interview, Washington, September 1997.
in 1992 or 1989. Americans also failed to take into consideration that political parties had been losing legitimacy since the National Front, that public corruption and narco-corruption had been present before Samper's time, that the state had suffered long from inefficiency, that unequal distribution of wealth still fuelled social grievances, and that the guerrillas and paramilitaries were major sources of unrest.

An idea that became popular was attributing defeat in general in the war against drugs, as well as the lack of progress in reducing the size of the illegal drug industry in Colombia more specifically to Samper's corruption. According to interviews conducted by Mitchell, ONDCP and Department of Defense officials believed so. A GAO report followed the same reasoning: 'Corruption continues to undercut the willingness and ability of host nations to combat the drug trade. The U.S. Ambassador to Colombia [Myles Frechette] said that corruption in Colombia is the greatest single impediment to a successful counternarcotics efforts'.

U.S. officials recreated Colombia to fit new notions of security threats. In part, this process was about giving new meaning to known information about Colombia. The picture that many U.S. policy makers had formed about Colombia throughout its history had been invariably optimistic compared to what material conditions on the ground would have hinted, and more generous than what Colombians imagined. Raphael Perl, CRS specialist on drug issues and Latin America for the past years explained it in a very illuminating way: 'Colombia is more European', he asserted. Apparently, Colombia had been viewed as a country with a Western-valued intellectual elite of largely white descent that differed from other Latin American stereotypes, especially in Central America and the Andean region. Perl said the

elements of friendship included 'economic development, liberal values, free trade, democracy, trust and ethnic similarity'. Until the mid-1990s, this 'rosy' picture had remained unaltered, because no exceptionally critical situation in Colombia, at least one that the U.S. identified as such, had generated a critical mass of scholars or policy makers considering the complexities of the country. But several years of 'learning', underpinned by new ideational contexts, were giving U.S. officials enough elements to pigeonhole Colombia differently. When the process of institutionalisation of counternarcotic cooperation began, both countries were driven into a more intense and decentralised interaction that required going beyond the existing superficial knowledge they had about each other. Law enforcement agents through their investigations, bureaucrats that had to file reports answering to accountability checks, the deployment of officials in Colombia filling the expanded prohibition bureaucracy, technocrats attending expert meetings and conferences all added up. In sum, U.S. policy makers learned about Colombia's weaknesses and associated them with the available conceptions on drug issues and Latin America. U.S. officials were updating their understandings of Colombia to match the new post Cold War setting. In Gelbard's words:

The tragedy of Colombia has been violence for many decades, going back many, many years; and particularly, I think one of the really dramatic and serious problems that we and the rest of the international community need to focus on more is -- particularly in the post Cold War period, we have new international security threats which are affecting democratic institutions, social and economic institutions. Transnational crime is clearly one of the most extraordinary that has developed. Drug trafficking and transnational crime are corrupting institutions everywhere, and Colombia, sadly is one of the more dramatic cases, as you see. We have seen that the extraordinary financial power of the drug traffickers has now enabled them to corrupt a government, and lots of other elements throughout that society, including economic and social institutions. This is one of the greatest tragedies because it's one of the oldest democracies in the Western Hemisphere.53

Finally, analogies with Bolivia and Peru were drawn. Gelbard read and reacted to Colombia by drawing analogies from his experience as an Ambassador in Bolivia.\textsuperscript{54} 'I was Ambassador to Bolivia during the time of much of that government. Certainly members of the cabinet, some members of the cabinet were involved and at my insistence the President of Bolivia fired the Minister of Interior'.\textsuperscript{55} In his view, the entire Paz Zamora administration was involved in drug trafficking and he did not see why things in Colombia should be different.

Those in Washington who did not share these ideas and join in the trend to stiffen the U.S. approach to Colombia became isolated from the decision-making process, since whoever suggested an alternative policy was accused of betraying prohibition and defecting from the war against drugs. Hence, U.S. policy came to be dominated by a coalition of hawks in Congress and the Executive-branch, most notably, Senator Jesse Helms and his staffers at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and INL in the Department of State. There were also sceptical officials in the Departments of Justice such as Attorney General Janet Reno and DEA chief Thomas Constantine, and others in Defense, and in the Office for National Drug Control Policy. Among these, Gelbard in INL took the lead. D'Artagnan, the Colombian journalist, called him the reincarnation of Theodore Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{56} Gelbard skilfully isolated the moderates from the Inter-American Affairs section of the Department of State, such as Alexander

\textsuperscript{54} Interview with McLean. He said that much of the crisis had to do with personality. He said Gelbard did not drop issues, that he would personalise everything and be loud about it, and that this was the way in which he had handled the Samper case.


\textsuperscript{56} 'Extradición para la certificación', \textit{El Tiempo}, 14 January 1996, p. 5A.
Chapter 8, Election of Ernesto Samper

There were other backstage players and think tanks, which fed U.S. officials with pessimistic and many times inaccurate interpretations of Colombia. Such were former Assistant Secretary of State for INL and future staffer of the International Narcotics Caucus in Congress William J. Olson, former Deputy Director of the Supply section of ONDCP under Bush and fellow for the Hudson Institute John P. Walters, and the Heritage Foundation. Finally, the U.S. Embassy, led by Myles Frechette, was also important to the ideational mapping. Although a Democrat, Frechette, too, distrusted Samper and blamed him for the dire human rights conditions in Colombia.

In general, the mid 1990s changes in U.S. foreign drug policy and the strengthening of a hard-line drug policy-making coalition in the U.S. administration impacted Latin American countries most, which inevitably bore the burden of stiffened cooperation benchmarks given their participation in the drug industry and the special nature of their relationship to the United States. Hence, new frictions sparked all across. In March 1994, Mexico, Bolivia and Peru received national conditional waivers; the same happened to Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru in 1995. Yet not all countries that failed to reach the new standards, according either to facts or perceptions, were decertified or dragged into extended diplomatic conflict like Colombia. Variable treatment was largely a result of the nuances of each single bilateral relationship and the political biases influencing the decisions on certification. Peru was re-certified in 1996 because, according to the United States, a denial would impede economic restructuring and hamper the Peru-Ecuador peace process. In essence, Peru was certified because of

57 Since 1994, the ultra conservative Senator Helms had been pledging for a full decertification and the abrogation of ATPA prerogatives for Colombia.
58 The use of certification on Latin American countries lost some of its effect and credibility thereafter, given the number of times many of its provisions were circumvented and the international and U.S. domestic political controversies over its application. Some in the Clinton administration, like McCaffrey supported the idea of mutual evaluation in the region through CICAD. The Mutual Evaluation Mechanism produced its first report in 2000, yet U.S. Congressmen stressed that this mechanism did not erase or replace U.S. law.
59 For an argument on certification and political linkages see Elizabeth Joyce, 'Packaging Drugs: Certification and the Acquisition of Leverage', in Victor Bulmer-Thomas and James
its overriding problems and fragility. Mexico also blatantly escaped decertification in 1996 and 1997, but for other reasons. The country had come into the limelight for the increasing evidence of political high-level collusion with drug traffickers including the humiliating exposure of the Juarez cartel's payments to General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, the director of one of Mexico's leading anti-narcotics agencies the Instituto Nacional Contra las Drogas. Not without much wrangling and pondering, U.S. policy makers in Washington chose to certify Mexico, overriding genuine concerns over corruption, as well as the guidelines stipulated in the foreign drug policy legislation. The main considerations were of geopolitical and economic nature in a Realist sense. Mexico was a NAFTA partner. Decertification, together with the effective application of sanctions and diplomatic conflict, could backfire in terms of decreasing trade and investment, and increasing immigration.

Conversely, analysts have contended that Colombia was ultimately decertified because drugs dominated the agenda and it had no strategic importance. On the other hand, in contrast to the rationale behind Peru's 1996 and 1997 certifications, Colombia did not come across as being too vulnerable either, at least to the degree that decertification could be thought to have devastating effects. Colombia, however, had an opportunity to increase its perceived strategic relevance, and thus increase U.S. perception of the costs of decertification. This opportunity was Colombia's cooperation in the September 1994 intervention of Haiti.

3. The Haiti Affair: A Lost Opportunity to Avert Conflict?

After the 1991 coup in Haiti, all diplomatic attempts to restore democracy in the island had failed. In addition, human rights violations and political killings had continued

Ibid.
Mitchell, '¿Una espiral descendente?', pp. 22-5.
despite the 1993 Governors Islands agreement provisions negotiated under UN auspices. Then, in July 1994, Raul Cedras expelled all UN and OAS monitors. At the same time domestic pressure mounted. The director of TransAfrica Randall Robinson, influential with congressional Black Caucus started a hunger strike to force Clinton to restore democracy in Haiti. While Democrat preferences differed, Republicans like Helms used the topic to bash Clinton and the Department of State. These events prompted the Clinton administration to consider intervention. Yet the administration believed that it should proceed with regional acquiescence, and, as innovation in Western Hemisphere interventions, with UN approval and collaboration. U.S. policymakers' perception that amicable relations were important to further U.S. long-term interests was not uncommon. While the United States had too often embarked on controversial operations in Latin America without regional consultation, it had also sought to procure regional endorsement for its policies. Here, for instance, the Clinton administration had also viewed that regional members' support was indispensable for the Summit of the Americas meetings beginning in December 1994, which would lay down the main post Cold War guidelines for hemispheric politics.\(^62\)

U.S. officials requested cooperation from the Gaviria administration, which expressed its intention to join the United States in future multilateral peace-keeping operations. But Gaviria was already at the end of his term and it fell to Samper to carry out the commitment. Communication between the outgoing and incoming administrations in Colombia was highly defective and Samper's team knew little about the Haiti issue. According to Watson, Samper gave his approval to deploy Colombian

forces to Haiti when they met in Panama for the inauguration of President Ernesto Pérez Balladres on 1 September 1994.63

Former Deputy Counsel Minister in Bogotá and Deputy Assistant for South America Phillip McLean had already suggested to Samper that Haiti was a good opportunity for him to demonstrate his personal commitment to cooperate with United States.64 McLean candidly told the Colombian president he rated poorly among U.S. officials. However, Samper had delegated most of the international political affairs to Minister Pardo, who advised against collaborating in Haiti. Pardo's training in the United States had only reinforced his disapproval of United States's policy toward Latin America, and he believed Colombia should jealously guard its autonomy and sovereignty by opposing any U.S. policy that appeared interventionist. For him Haiti was setting a precedent for a future invasion of Colombia. The decision crafted inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus, was to discard Colombia's role in the first and second phases of the peace operations in Haiti, which involved the use of military forces to oust Cedras, and policing operations. Instead, Colombia offered to cooperate in the third phase on social and institutional reconstruction. Samper transmitted the news to Clinton in an unfortunate telephone conversation. Later, Pardo produced an official note. To Clinton and the rest of U.S. officials, Samper had failed to keep his promise. Haiti only confirmed Samper's devious character.65

63 Internal Memorandum, U.S. files, MRE. Samper's own account of the meeting reveals how the Colombian team, which included the president, Minister Pardo and the Presidential Advisor on Foreign Affairs Mónica de Greiff plus other two or three presidential staffers, did not discard the possibility of sending Colombian troops. However, Americans took as a firm commitment what Samper, in his very characteristic informal style, saw as non-committal. Ernesto Samper Pizano, Aquí estoy y aquí me quedo. Testimonio de un gobierno (Bogotá: El Ancora editores, 2000), pp. 249-53.
64 The content of the conversation between Samper and McLean was apparently submitted to the record by the U.S. official. Future disclosure of documents should allow a complete insight into this interesting episode in Colombian foreign policy. McLean also mentioned to former president López the positive effects of a Haiti participation. Interview, Washington 1999. In his memoirs Samper claims to have consulted various former Colombian presidents on the Haiti issue, and that they advised him to abstain from any participation. Samper, Aquí estoy y aquí me quedo, p. 250
65 Internal Memorandum, U.S. files, MRE.
Outsider and insider assessments of the Haiti episode vary, although no systematic academic debate on the issue has taken place. In his memoirs published in 2000, Samper admits the Haiti episode stained bilateral relations. According to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs internal memorandum, the affair had two consequences. First, Clinton's distrust of Samper and disengagement of Colombian affairs, which resulted in his unwillingness to 'bail out' Colombia from squabbles with the INL. Second, the loss of Alexander Watson as a Colombia friend in U.S. foreign policy making. Colombian officials viewed Watson to be a 'soft-liner' in his stance towards Colombia, willing to bypass the rules of certification in favour of a conciliatory political approach, which contrasted with the 'enforcement-wing' (ala policiva) embodied by Gelbard and Helms. When Watson failed to deliver Colombia in the U.S. planning of the Haiti operation, he lost influence in the White House and in the Department of State. This made it easier for hawks on drug policy and generally speaking hard-liners in the Department of State to isolate Watson and take the lead in U.S. policy formulation toward Colombia.

It is not suggested that the Haiti affair alone triggered the deterioration of U.S.-Colombian relations in 1995-1997, that Watson alone could have prevented the 1995 conditional certification and the escalation of diplomatic conflict thereafter. However, what should be highlighted is that INL was in a position to lead U.S. policy towards Colombia in the absence of alternatives. INL had the bureaucratic standing, capability, and credible justifications to muster a consensus --even if temporary-- on the need to decertify Colombia and isolate Samper. This was the result of the embodiment of prohibition in U.S. institutions and entrenchment of prohibition ideas and values, which gave INL a receptive audience that could identify with its arguments. As

66 Fernando Cepeda and Francisco Coy claim the Haiti episode was key in the deterioration of relations, while Andelío García says its impact was minimal.
67 Samper, Aquí estoy, p. 253. Samper fails to question the soundness of Colombia's decision and rather attributes the U.S.-Colombian misunderstandings to a Gavirista plot against him.
Chapter 8, Election of Ernesto Samper

Finnemore notes, justifications are important because they 'speak directly to a normative context’. They draw on and articulate 'shared values and expectations held by other' policy makers. In sum, the Haiti episode affected president Clinton's personal views on the character of Samper, U.S. officials' views on Colombia's president, United States' assessment about Colombia's cooperation in the region, and, finally, Colombia's general status as a U.S. friend.

Clinton's personal reaction to Colombia's refusal to participate in Haiti and the remarks of officials in the Department of State thereafter indicated to Colombian officials that they had lost a valuable opportunity to make their country strategically important, at least enough to attain U.S. presidential support to possibly placate INL and congressional criticism. Mexico had avoided decertification, despite strong congressional activism in favour of a coercive policy, because it was closer, larger, and a NAFTA partner. It was, in political, economic and strategic terms, too important.

Colombians inside the government, in particular top officials of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as the Vice-minister for the Americas Diego Cardona, believed there was still a second opportunity for Colombia. Cardona believed they had received signals from the National Security Council and the Department of State regarding Colombia's participation in the December 1994 Summit of the Americas. Franco contends that an apparent lull up until early 1995 was the result of the Bureau for Inter American Affairs and the White House's plea to INL not to worsen relations before the Summit of the Americas Meeting. Inter American Affairs diplomats at the Department of State believed that a rift with Colombia would contaminate the atmosphere and potentially damage the Summit initiative, which was the main and only one Clinton had for the Americas at the time. Convinced that collaboration in Summit affairs

68 Finnemore, 'Constructing Norms', p. 159.
would contribute to ease tensions with the United States, Colombia raised the profile of those projects in which it could work best with the United States. However, Samper's support for the Summit of the Americas had little effect in changing Washington's distrust of the Colombian leader.

To conclude, U.S.-Colombian relations deteriorated in 1995 because key U.S. officials in the Clinton administration believed that Colombia, under the leadership of Samper, failed to comply with essential norms on legitimate political behaviour, which were key to U.S. foreign policy goals on the maintenance of secure democratic governance. Colombia's refusal to cooperate in the operations to restore democracy in Haiti helped to form a negative image of Samper and Colombia and closed the doors to a 'gentlemen's' agreement to continue bilateral collaboration based on important achievements in the drug war. The next chapter will turn to the dynamics of the diplomatic crisis.
Chapter 9

LOCKED IN CONFLICT, MARCH 1995-MARCH 1998

This chapter examines the height of the crisis in U.S.-Colombia relations from March 1995 to March 1998, before a slow process of normalisation began. Immediately after the 1 March conditional certification, the relationship delved into an unprecedented spiral of diplomatic conflict reflected among others by the 1996 and 1997 total decertifications, the threat of economic sanctions, public and unrestrained bickering, U.S. attempts to forces an impeachment trial against Samper, the withdrawal of Samper's visa in June 1996 and the stirring of bitter anti-Americanism in Colombia. Most striking was the gap between the objective achievements of Colombia's drug operations during March 1995 and 1998 and U.S. officials' claim that Colombia was failing to cooperate. The chapter has three objectives: to explain the unusual duration and intensity of diplomatic conflict; to trace the dynamics of conflict arising from non-compliance with longstanding implicit and explicit norms that had underpinned good relations in the past; and to illustrate that joint drug control activities took place despite the diplomatic conflict. Moreover, it argues that U.S. foreign policy had unintentional perverse consequences, such as accelerating the deterioration of security, political and socio-economic conditions in Colombia. The first section focuses on the decertification processed of 1996 and 1997 and examines the dynamics of conflict while highlighting Colombia's achievements in drug control. The second section illustrates U.S. meddling in Colombian domestic politics and the intertwining of domestic politics and U.S.-Colombian relations.
1. Explaining the Duration and Intensity of Diplomatic Conflict

The national interest waiver of 1 March 1995 marked the beginning of the most critical period in U.S.-Colombian relations since Theodore Roosevelt instructed the *Nashville* to steam into the harbour of Colón to aid the secession of Panama in 1903. Disagreements and confrontations of the past, whether related to illegal drugs, bilateral trade or regional politics, had usually been smoothed over within weeks. Not this time, however. Diplomatic bickering spiralled, and from March 1995 up to March 1998 Colombia and the United States were locked in conflict. For Colombians, the United States became the conspirator hegemon, while American policy-makers believed that national and individual reputations were at stake, and that regional security was being undermined by Colombia because of Samper's alleged lack of 'concrete results' in the war against drugs.¹

The three-year duration of this diplomatic crisis was not an obvious development considering the historical record of good relations and amiable resolution of differences. Also, that a diplomatic crisis of such magnitude based on Colombia's alleged defection of prohibition would have occurred at a time when the enforcement of punitive prohibition was yielding the best ever results seemed contradictory. The uniqueness of this episode in the history of U.S.-Colombian relations and what it may teach about the nature of U.S.-Latin American relations are two justifications for examining the political rift between Colombia and the United States. An additional justification, which will surely merit future inquiry, is the place of this unusually extended bilateral diplomatic conflict within the wider context of the Colombian crisis that unfolded with the weakening of the Samper administration. Ironically, the United States' policy condemning Samper contributed to his permanence in power, while

simultaneously it weakened state institutions. Samper was obsessed with redeeming his personal reputation and domestic political standing. This absorbed most of the administrative and political attention of the government and distorted policy priorities. State failure occurred parallel to the accelerated rise of guerrilla and paramilitary violence that increasingly has pushed Colombia into a state of internal war since 1996.

**Analytical Overview**

Political rigidity in 1995-1998 and the policy choices of both Colombia and the United States that worked to sustain it can be attributed to a combination of factors. The United States had alternatives other than applying decertification in 1996 and 1997. For instance, to approach the narco-scandal in the same flexible way that difficulties with Escobar were handled during the Gaviria administration. However, as was explained in the previous chapter, the revised standards that defined legitimate political cooperation and drug control cooperation, and the conviction that Samper was untrustworthy, excluded any leniency. Another option was to uphold the gentlemen's agreement. This involved conditionality and close monitoring by the United States, but discarded open disqualifications of Colombia as long as Samper, guilty or not, delivered concrete results. However, three main factors contributed to impeding a pragmatic and less conflictive U.S. policy.

First, Robert Gelbard continued to direct INL. INL continued to exercise leadership in U.S. decision-making on Colombia, based on the assumption that Samper would not cooperate because of his alleged links to drug mafias. This was possible due to three conditions, namely: the lack of high-level guidance in U.S. policy towards Latin America, which allowed mid-level agencies to have so much power; the degree of embeddedness of drug prohibition in U.S. state bureaucracy; and the common understandings among U.S. officials that narco-corruption
constituted unacceptable behaviour. As the diplomatic crisis swelled, the rhetoric of conflict heightened and shaped U.S. perceptions of Colombia's performance. Once Colombia was identified as an unwilling country, none of its actions constituted acts of cooperation.

Second, there was ongoing political wrestling between Democrats and Republicans which accentuated the tendency by the Clinton administration to adjust foreign policy to domestic political needs. Cavelier's and Mitchell's analyses suggest that the Executive branch succumbed to Republican Congressmen's insistence to decertify Colombia. This thesis contends that in 1996 and 1997 it was INL which advocated decertification against the advise of the core group of Democrat and Republican Congressmen traditionally involved in drug policy issues such as Gilman, Burton and Hastert. They believed decertification obstructed the war against drugs in Colombia because it reduced aid. However, despite this disagreement, most distrusted Samper and could not afford 'doing nothing' about the narco-funding. All agreed that narco-corruption was unacceptable. Furthermore, since the Republicans had systematically and effectively criticised Clinton's drug policy, INL could use Helms's anti-Colombia campaign to justify to other Department of State officials the need to adopt a tough policy towards Colombia. And, as explained further below, Helms's advocacy was important to bolster the credibility of INL's policy preferences.

1 Mitchell attributes INL's leverage to the relative size of their budget. However, to explain decertification he also lists as systemic causes the absence of the Soviet Union counterweight, the diversification of the Cold War agenda. As the state/domestic level he focuses on the internal cohesion of U.S. agencies and the leadership of agency directors. Finally, he argues that a lack of a pro-Colombia lobby in Washington composed of economic or strong civil-society interest-groups worked against Colombia, Mitchell, "Una espiral descendente?", pp. 1-38.

2 Attribution theory, contends that observers, in this case policy-makers, will interpret a behaviour outcome according to the personal traits of leaders or nations, see Deborah Larson, Origins of Containment. A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 34-42.
Finally, INL's move to officially peg certification to such specific domestic developments and unofficially tie the process to Samper's trials made U.S. foreign drug policy a prisoner of local dynamics. The development of drug policy into a comprehensive nation-building exercise and its mandate to 'go to the source' allowed INL's actions. U.S. foreign drug policy was thus being driven by the tempo and tones of Colombian infighting where Colombian actors used Americans for their own domestic battles. It was a bewildering instance of domestic and international spheres welding together.

The available literature routinely ignores Colombia's role in shaping U.S.-Colombian relations because of the inequality of power. It has been argued throughout in this thesis, however, that Colombian actors have been often active in the making of norms governing the relationship, and influencing U.S. policy. On this occasion Colombians, too, had a role in prolonging and intensifying diplomatic friction with the United States. The internal crisis of the Samper administration and the investigations against corrupt politicians unleashed a bitter confrontation among political factions and among Colombian state institutions, and some individuals encouraged U.S. coercive policies against the Samper administration. Moreover, just as there was no American presidential leadership on U.S. policy towards Colombia, there was no effort on the side of Samper to structure a coherent state policy in favour of resolving clashes with the United States. Samper encouraged anti-drug actions, as he was concerned about his reputation, yet he focused mainly on fending off opponents, whom he called national conspirators. Samper and his aides opportunistically used Colombia's diplomatic

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5 Cavelier argues that INL's stance was also shaped by Gelbard's own political aspirations and his hawkish inclination to foreign policy, see Andrés Cavelier Castro, 'El proceso de decertificación en la lucha antidrogas. ¿Por qué Estados Unidos decertificó a Colombia en Febrero de 1997?' in Restrepo (ed.) *Estados Unidos*, p. 74. See also Douglas Farah, 'US Deepens Bogotá Leader's Crisis; Decertification Carries Political Punch but Lesser Economic Impact', *The Washington Post*, 2 March 1996.
conflict with the United States to delegitimise opposition. The intertwining of problems in U.S.-Colombian relations with the highly complex events of Colombian politics worsened and lengthened the diplomatic crisis. The following sections illustrate these dynamics.

The Road to 1996 Decertification

As of the 1 March 1995 conditional certification, the United States formally and informally transmitted to Colombia the new terms for cooperation through the public pronouncements of policy makers, the INCSR, the famous INL drug policy démarches, diplomatic communications and visits. These reflected the set of broader norms and rules upon which the United States expected Colombia to model its post Cold War identity, and addressed concrete procedures in the area of law enforcement, human rights, and drug policy. They were all packaged under the drug policy banner and transmitted within the drug policy game. If Colombia fulfilled the requirements, it would recover its usual status of ally granted by the process of certification. Moreover, U.S. congressmen, who were not transmitting the official line, also generated parallel, complementary or reinforcing expectations, and defined their own terms of cooperation. One key set of players was Senator Jesse Helms and his staff at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Other Senators who became engaged in U.S. policy towards Colombia, together with the group of Representatives of the House who were traditionally attentive to anti-drug policy, also did their part by calling for greater action in specific strategic and tactical areas of counter-narcotics and choosing the Anti-Narcotics Police as the main legitimate body with which the United States could cooperate.

6 Former Congressional staffer for Senator Helms, Dan Fisk attributed Helms' persistence on the issue of Colombia to his personality and his inclination to thoroughly follow through the details of assigned tasks. Interview, Washington, July 1999.
The 1995 démarche, which became the official compass orienting the requisites for certification in 1996, listed the following as compulsory tasks 'to demonstrate the willingness to cooperate more fully': the arrest of at least one member of the Cali cartel; the approval of anti-money laundering legislation; increased sentences for drug-related crimes; and eradication of at least 12,000 hectares of illegal crops. Samper inadvertently contributed to the definition of the new terms of cooperation by making private and public announcements in a generous rhetoric that set high achievement benchmarks. The 15 July 1994 letter Samper sent to the Senate, which Helms made public, was crucial for the years to follow. He promised therein to capture the entire Cali cartel, to strengthen anti-corruption and anti-money laundering legislation, and to create an elite anti-narcotics force.

Soon after 1 March, Helms protested against the Clinton administration for allegedly choosing to 'do nothing' about Colombia's abysmal record, 'a grave moral and political mistake'. He wanted full decertification and, once more, he introduced legislation setting further sanctions on Colombia. He also threatened to unveil concrete evidence against Samper's reported past and recent connections with the drug mafias by summoning Maria, a DEA informant, to Congress. Finally, in February 1996, the Senate published yet another detailed report titled Corruption and Drugs in Colombia. Democracy at Risk. Since 1994 Helms's office had become an informal intelligence gathering point on Colombia, with his staff actively seeking information on Samper and also receiving unsolicited information from Samper opponents. By then further allegations against Samper had surfaced. On 22 January Fernando Botero, Samper's

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9 Maria testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 30 July 1996 but her declarations on Samper lacked credibility in Colombia and in the United States.
11 Interview with Fisk.
campaign manager and first Minister of Defence, confessed to receiving money from
the Cali drug lords and in February he testified that Samper was aware of this cartel
funding. Samper's role in soliciting the funds was still unclear, however this news
served to lend credibility to Gelbard's and Helms's perceptions of Samper's
untrustworthiness. Extremely detailed and more radical than the previous 1995
version, the Senate report of 1996 advocated sanctions and the ousting of Samper,
arguing that anti-narcotics actions enforced by Colombian authorities could not
possibly exist:

However, no government can be completely committed to obliterating the
drug cartels, drug corruption and drug-related violence, nor effective in
achievements of these goals, if its senior officials owe fealty to drug
kingpins. The Colombian government will never be dedicated to fighting
drugs or drug corruption as long as Ernesto Samper is its leader[.]

In brief, the Senate propagated the idea of zero cooperation.

Despite being considered a reactionary maverick by many, Helms commanded
considerable influence in certain foreign policy topics. In the case of Colombia his
advocacy was effective because it echoed INL's own agenda and Gelbard could use
Helms's pressure to further justify decertifying Colombia. That his voice in Congress
mattered was part of the particular setting of American politics during the Clinton
administration. Clinton presided over a divided government and was especially
receptive to polls and domestic pressures. Besides, Clinton had implicitly delegated
U.S. policy making on Colombia to the middle tiers of bureaucracy. One additional
element that amplified Helms's views was the way in which he resonated in the
Colombian media and the attention Colombian policy-makers gave to his declarations.
Dan Fisk, one of Helms's key staffers working on Colombia, was pleasantly surprised
when their staff report, which he considered to be a low priority document in the world
of Washington politics, was published with great fanfare in Colombia. Finally, the

12 Staff Senate, Corruption and Drugs.
Heritage Foundation contributed to strengthening and further spreading anti-Colombia discourse in Washington decision-making circles. Their March 1995 report, *Colombia's Narco-Democracy Threatens Hemispheric Security*, iterated the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's demands and its confrontational spirit.\(^{13}\)

Colombian authorities, including the president, the cabinet and the agencies involved in drug control, resented the U.S. approach to counternarcotics operations in Colombia more for its form than for the drug control substantive issues, with the important exception of the calls to oust Samper and reinstate extradition. The March 1995 decision saw an avalanche of protest, but Colombians had vowed to carry on with the war against drugs because it was an ingrained part of their national project, and because U.S. recognition of their efforts was important. Different actors had different motives. Most Colombians found public opprobrium humiliating. Minister of Justice Martinez believed it was a 'matter of national dignity', as did the Colombian Ambassador in Washington Carlos Lleras.\(^{14}\) Lleras added that maintaining ATPA provisions and access to U.S. intelligence for the prosecution of drug dealers were sufficient reason to seek certification. For others, averting potential economic repercussions resulting from the withdrawal of U.S. support in international trade and finance arenas was the main issue at stake. U.S. power relied as much on its material capability as on its accepted moral authority, which stemmed from Colombia's self-identification as a Western nation and the recognition it granted the United States' role of holding it accountable, even if it despised the consequent hierarchy.\(^{15}\) Conversely, national conditional waivers had mattered little to Syria, Afghanistan or Burma.


\(^{14}\) *El Espectador*, 5 March 1995, p. 5A.

\(^{15}\) Rodney Bruce Hall argues that 'moral authority acquires utility as a power resource to the extent that it is institutionalised as a convention' and that it can be used 'when it becomes socially embedded in a system of actors whose social identities and interests impel them to recognise it as a power resource', see Rodney Bruce Hall, 'Moral Authority as a Power Resource', *International Organisation*, 51/4 (1997), pp. 594.
Colombia’s drug control achievements were remarkable. The Colombian Congress approved the Anti-Corruption and Asset Forfeiture Laws in May 1995, and other provisions Samper introduced in late 1994. These increased money-laundering sentences from up to a maximum of 18 years. The Samper administration created the anti-money-laundering unit in the Superintendencia Bancaria and the Interinstitutional Coordination Commission for the Control of Assets, and typified illegal enrichment and fronting as crimes to be penalised with 5 to 10 years of jail and a fine (Decrees 2062 and 2238 of 1995). With guidance from the U.S. Department of Justice, the administration also introduced substantial reforms to the penitentiary system, seeking to correct the voids and mistakes of the Gaviria administration that led to the embarrassing Escobar escape. With U.S. assistance Operación Resplandor eliminated in 1995 alone 25,402 hectares of coca leaf and 5,074 of poppy, while Gaviria eradicated less that 7,000 hectares of coca in his entire administration. Interdiction and seizures figures were equally impressive and superior to the Gaviria years; for example in 1995, the ANP destroyed 573 processing laboratories, confiscated 3.5 million kilos of solid chemical precursors and 1.2 gallons of liquid input. The crackdown against the Cali group was harsh. The new interdiction elite force captured Jorge Rodríguez Orejuela on 2 March 1995, his brother Gilberto on 9 June 1995, and the third brother Miguel on 6 August 1995. Three more high-ranking drug lords turned themselves in, Henri Loaiza, Víctor Patiño and Phanor Arizabaleta. In total, the Colombian police captured 2,885 presumed drug traffickers. Moreover, the raids against drug traffickers uncovered information about mafia links to several Colombian politicians, and, in April 1995, the Fiscalía initiated formal investigations, the so-called 'Proceso 8000'. Finally, Colombia continued its traditional activism in further developing and strengthening the international prohibition regime, in particular within the OAS, and following the Summit of the Americas Action Plan.
Alongside achievements, frictions continued. Two months after the March 1995 national interest certification, in a symbolic retaliatory reaction, Colombia introduced formal regulations for DEA and CIA agents operating in their territory. Gelbard protested angrily, since U.S. law enforcement officials had long enjoyed Colombian flexibility on monitoring, which contrasted with major difficulties in Mexico on the same issues. U.S. officials, especially Frechette and Gelbard, commented and criticised most of Samper's initiatives, often portraying them as defections from the fight against drug trafficking. For example, Frechette claimed that modifying the Special Justice Order, which had established the faceless judges, was a major setback that would result in terrorism. U.S. officials energetically protested against the bill on illegal enrichment, for its first version contained legal language that would have ended the ongoing investigations into corrupt Congressmen and hindered legal suits against apprehended drug dealers.

Most disturbing to U.S. officials were the findings of the 8000 case on the connections between traffickers and politicians, and the results of investigations on Samper's presidential campaign. News cluttered the Colombian media for over a year beginning April 1995, and triggered a monumental political crisis in Colombia. Some Colombians even toyed with the idea of staging a coup against Samper. The emerging information only served to support Washington's claims that narco-corruption had taken over Colombian institutions and that no helpful counternarcotic action could emanate from Samper's government. Furthermore, American officials, enthused by the possibility of finding useful evidence for the trial against Samper, began tracking and influencing the domestic legal and political processes, as will be elucidated in the next section. The United States' intrusiveness, rejected by most and exploited by others, was
the subject of colourful public altercations with Samper administration officials, in particular Minister of Interior Horacio Serpa, who spoke of U.S. plot to dominate Colombia.

Ongoing clashes notwithstanding, Samper officials remained optimistic about attaining full certification in 1996. In their view, they had outperformed the demarche when they captured more than one major Cali drug lord, and surpassed the eradication quota. The periodic bilateral meetings with U.S. officials led Minister of Foreign Affairs Pardo to believe that Colombia would receive a passing mark. But United States underplayed Colombia's achievements and decided on full decertification in March 1996. According to the INCSR, Colombia

remained the main producer and distributor of cocaine in the world... The coca leaf illegal crops increased and during 1994 Colombia became, despite its eradication efforts, the second major producer of coca surmounting Bolivia. Colombia is the home of drug dealing organisations... there was a lack of compromise from Samper's administration...it did not judge and sentence the leaders of the Cali cartel that were incarcerated....Colombia failed in passing a legislation that increased drug-related sentences and did not reach a bilateral agreement with the U.S. to fight drugs in maritime zones... The Colombian government did nothing to improve the security of information provided by the U.S. [and] corruption remained a serious impediment in the progress of fighting drug trafficking in Colombia.

There was generalised anger and confusion when Samper and his officials learned about decertification at 6am on 1 March 1996. The exact implications for Colombia were unclear. Frechette announced that the United States would 'not lobby against Colombia' in multilateral banks. Meanwhile INL delayed $35 million in counternarcotics assistance, and Frechette added that economic sanctions would ensue if there were 'no concrete results'.

20 'Documento Oficial de Decertificación', 1996.
21 Samper, Aquí estoy, p. 267.
The Road to 1997 Decertification

The report unleashed another round of altercations between Ambassador Lleras and ANP on one hand, and INL and Frechette on the other, over the eradication figures, a technical discussion relevant for Colombians as proof of their delivery of their part of the deal. Colombians pointed out that Frechette had approved the measurements on eradicated zones through the Evaluación Periódica de Resultados del Plan Resplandor para Erradicación de Cultivos Ilícitos Act 03 of 22 November 1995. Gelbard's reply to Lleras, however, revealed just how irrelevant these eradication numbers had been for INL's decision to decertify Colombia in March 1996. 'Most of the INCSR text was written prior to having these figures, so we simply indicated in the text that figures on hectareage destroyed had not yet been verified'.

INL had fixed its attention on Samper's corruption case. Colombia came to consider hiring the services of a French satellite to be able to take measures without relying on U.S. equipment, but then settled in December 1996 for a new bilateral Verification Protocol with clearer rules.

In June 1996, just before the final verdict in the Colombian Congress on Samper, INL sent Colombia a mid-year démarche with new goals: to enact tougher asset forfeiture and sentencing laws; reforming the 1995 money laundering law, which Gelbard had called inadequate; to use the herbicide Imazapyr and to switch to post-fumigation measuring; enacting extradition; to support investigations and prosecutions against public officials; and to sign the maritime interdiction agreement. INL had reduced the crux of Colombia's cooperation to Samper's resignation and to the passage of extradition. The Department of Justice had joined INL, setting further pressure on Colombia by making the re-enactment of extradition compulsory. On 26 June 1996 the message was transmitted loud and clear when, aware that extradition had been voted unconstitutional in 1991, Attorney General Janet Reno requested the extradition of the

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four Cali drug dealers. Re-enacting extradition was not an easy task; it took eight debates in Congress before the constitution could be reformed.

Meanwhile, Samper began an international campaign against certification using every meeting and summit to accuse the United States of unilateralism and to rally support in favour of a multilateral mechanism that could submit the United States to equal scrutiny. In Colombia, decertification was working in Samper's favour; with the excuse that the United States was unfairly firming up its grip on Colombia and that certification was being used against him. The beleaguered Colombian president elicited domestic sympathy and manoeuvred his way out of taking political responsibility for the illegal funding of his campaign.

While wrangling continued between Samper and his cabinet, and Frechette and Gelbard, anti-narcotics cooperation continued among law enforcers at the operational level and prohibition was further developed. After the Director of the DEA office in Colombia, Joseph Toft, publicised the narco-tapes, the DEA renewed its traditional warm relations with its counterpart, the ANP, and General Serrano found close allies in the U.S. Congress. Serrano wrote in his memoirs:

At least we have been able to build a friendly relationship with the North Americans that was put to the test during those four years and transparent. Let's be honest: it was beneficial for the country. During this political crisis, the Police received more aid than at other times. I think the only institution that took advantage of the political crisis for its development was the National Police.

U.S. Congress Republican Representatives, like Benjamin Gilman and Dennis Hastert had forged good relations with Serrano, and the Colombian Police Director had learned well that the U.S. Congress had the power to affect directly the volume and type of equipment his agency received. It was congressional pressure that pushed INL to finally turn over some of the aid Gelbard had chosen to delay and to amend

24 Samper, *Aqui estoy*, pp. 271 and 274.
25 Serrano, *Jaque Mate*, p. 211
certification terminology, so as to continue providing aid, since the 1996 decertification prohibited FMF, impacting on Colombia's acquisition of spraying and other aircraft.26 'Can you help us or enlighten us as to why that decision to decertify was taken when no one seems to have understood, basically, the ramifications, at least in the movement of equipment, to General Serrano and others that needed that equipment after decertification?' Hastert firmly asked Gelbard in a heated hearing debate hosted by the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice.27 Even Representatives who were not traditionally involved in drug policy took to criticising Gelbard, such as Republicans Mark E. Souder of Indiana, and Steven C. LaTourette from Ohio, who bluntly questioned Gelbard's reasoning that connected the drug money allegation to Samper's allegedly campaigning to obstruct drug control operations.28 INL finally delivered the first six of 18 UH-1H Huey-Helicopters in January 1997 and promised to send the remaining 12 in May 1997.

Congress also called to increase the volume of assistance and after the 1996 decertification, the U.S. government announced an increase in drug-related assistance of up to $80 million dollars, $34.4 million of which were for ANP and $11.6 million for judicial reform and modernisation.29 With U.S. aid, Colombia deployed 5,000 men from ANP and the army for the new Operación Conquista, the follow up to the 1995 Operación Resplandor, eradicating 22,536 hectares of coca leaf and 7,233 of poppy. Fumigation surpassed the original target set at 18,000 and 5,000 eradicated hectares respectively30 ANP began experimenting with Imazapyr. This time, however, FARC exploited eradication to jumpstart the largest anti-drug control demonstration in

28 Ibid, pp. 25 and 36.
29 *El Tiempo*, 7 March 1996, p. 6A.
Colombia's history so far. A small march of coca growers from Guaviare had snowballed, with FARC funding, into a full-fledged demonstration of 239,000 peasants, who concentrated in the town of Miraflores, Calamar, El Retorno and other localities of Guaviare with replications in Bolivar, Caquetá, Meta, Norte de Santander and Putumayo.31

Again, interdiction yielded important results; law enforcement confiscated 1.35 million pounds of coca leaf and 124,575 of pure cocaine and base, and more than $400 million in drug traffickers' assets. And on 5 March, ANP captured another of Cali's major drug traffickers, José Santacruz. The Samper administration also continued to refine anti-drug legislation. On 20 July 1996, the Samper administration sent a new package of bills to Congress, which included the following: a modification of the surrender policy; tougher sentences for convicted traffickers reaching maximum 20 years of prison for trafficking charges and 60 years when concurrent crimes exist, and tougher anti-money laundering sentences of up to 15 years of prison; and greater power to confiscate traffickers' properties by 'making the asset forfeiture retroactive to the date on which the asset generating activity became a crime'. Some of the bills passed Congress on 12 December that year and others during an extraordinary session on 19 February 1997.32 Furthermore, Colombia and the United States signed the Maritime Agreement in February 1997.

In all, Colombian certification appeared to be more likely in 1997. Those in Congress, who once advocated tougher application of certification, had begun to argue that Gelbard's own 'stick approach' was hampering the war against drugs. In addition, there was a turn over in some of the key mid-level positions officially engaged in U.S. policy-making towards Colombia. In the Bureau for Inter-American Affairs at the

30 Presidencia de la República, *La lucha contra las drogas ilícitas, 1996. Un año de grandes progresos*, Bogotá (no date, most likely published in 1997).
32 Presidencia de la República, *La lucha contra las drogas ilícitas, 1996; INCSR 1997.*
Department of State, Jeffrey Davidow replaced Watson, who had been isolated by INL because of his conciliatory stance on Colombia and Cuba. Davidow distrusted Samper, but believed U.S. policy had become a futile crusade and INL had gained disproportionate power in the Department of State. General Barry McCaffrey replaced Drug Czar Lee P. Brown, who had left the leadership of U.S. foreign drug policy to INL. As former Commander in Chief of SouthCom, McCaffrey had greater experience with the foreign aspects of U.S. drug policy, but believed that confrontation only reduced U.S. potential to engage in joint operations. McCaffrey became a critic of certification and promoted the idea of a multilateral mechanism. Comments on the inconsistencies and disadvantages of Gelbard's approach to Colombia became progressively more frequent. Skol, who left the Department of State in 1996, candidly explained the problems that U.S. policy faced:

Colombia is a country in the midst of a startling paradox. And we all know what the paradox is. The same government, the same administration which is being accused by other Colombians of having taken money from the Cali Cartel during the election of 1994 is the same government which has the best record against the traffickers of any Colombian government. 33

He also criticised U.S. enmeshment in the 8000 process as 'one of the purest definitions of counterproductivity [he had] ever encountered in 30 years in the foreign service'. 34

There was, too, an important turnover on the Colombian side. Ambassador Lleras, who had never established positive working relations in Washington, left the Colombian Embassy in June 1996. For a period of seven months, the United States refused to accredit a new Ambassador, yet Charge D'Affairs Mauricio Echeverry, a lawyer of good repute trusted by U.S. officials, made important progress in easing the tension between the Colombian Embassy and Washington-based U.S. officials in the

33 U.S. House, Oversight of United States, p. 4
34 Ibid, p. 5.
Department of State. Finally, in February 1997, Juan Carlos Esguerra, who had been serving as Minister of Defence, took on the role of Ambassador in Washington. Maria Emma Mejia, who was Minister for Education, was appointed to replace Pardo in Foreign Affairs on 10 July 1996 and from her first day in office she set out to achieve a normalisation of relations. Those who had been directly involved in procuring illegal funds for Samper's campaign were no longer in government.

The consensus in Washington that the United States was to condemn cases of high level corruption and that the United States' interests were best served with coercive diplomacy began to flounder. However, at the time of the March 1997 decision Gelbard still commanded the greatest influence on issues regarding Colombia. And so Colombia was decertified again in 1997. The INCSR openly stated: 'In a process which can only be described as flawed, President Samper was exonerated of charges of corruption by the Colombian Congress'. It also argued that the passage of legislation was too slow, resulting in light sentences for the Rodriguez brothers; that Colombia had not attended to U.S. requests for extradition of four drug traffickers; that it had opposed the 'full' use of granular herbicides; and that Samper had promoted and given 'public praise' to a drug-tainted military general, a 'behaviour which reinforces USG concern about the credibility of his stated commitment to serious narcotics control for Colombia'. All achievements in drug control were attributed to the ANP, but they were deemed insufficient to merit certification. INL issued a new list of demands accompanied by renewed threats of sanctions. The new post-decertification conditions included: the passage of extradition; effective implementation of anti-drug legislation; the use of an even more effective herbicide; fighting corruption; and punishing drug traffickers who continued to do business from prison.

Joyce argues that Colombia was decertified in 1997 because the Clinton administration could not afford to decertify Mexico and needed to 'give' something to foreign policy hardliners accusing the U.S. president of being 'soft' on drugs. Joyce, 'Packaging Drugs', p. 216.
Once more Samper rejected the outcome: 'The government [of Colombia] considers that the decertification given to our country is demoralising and unfair.\(^\text{37}\) Colombia suspended eradication, but only for three days and joint drug control activities soon continued their pace, encountering progress as well as routine obstacles.

**Easing Tensions**

After the March 1997 certification process, Gelbard left INL to be posted in Bosnia. Frechette returned to Washington that summer amidst heavy criticism for his performance in Bogotá and he left the civil service. The new Ambassador, Kurtis Kamman, was given the mandate to reverse the trend of loud diplomacy exercised by Frechette. Randy Beers did the same for INL in the Department of State when he took the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Law Enforcement and Narcotics Matters. In July 1997, the DEA challenged the reasoning that Colombia could not engage in anti-drug cooperation if Samper was the president by declaring that it was unaware of potential plots by Samper to stop operations.\(^\text{38}\) U.S. officials acknowledged that, independently of Samper, Bogotá had continued to be its most dedicated partner in the war against drugs. Moreover, GAO published a highly damaging report for INL and the U.S. Embassy clearly forcing a review of their policy hitherto. GAO claimed: 'The Department of State has delayed us and imposed undue restrictions on our access to documents. Moreover, in some cases, the Department of State has deleted some information from these documents'.\(^\text{39}\) Thus, taking advantage of Congress' demand to reappraise policy, Assistant Secretary State Davidow and Colombia Desk Officer

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\(^{36}\) The Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, 'Presidential Determination Regarding Certification of the Thirty Two Major Illicit Narcotics Producing and Transit Countries' (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1997).

\(^{37}\) Ernesto Samper, 'Palabras del Sr. Presidente de la Republica Dr. Ernesto Samper Pizano, con Motivo de la Decertificación', Casa de Nariño, Bogotá, 28 February 1997.


Harry O'Hara tried to recreate U.S. policy towards Colombia.\textsuperscript{40} They pointed out that Samper's term was coming to end, and wanted to prevent potential anti-American feeling shaping the 1998 presidential elections. To de-emphasise the 'drugs-first' policy, Davidow also began drawing U.S. officials' attention to the escalation of violence in Colombia and the precarious security conditions in Colombia, which demanded a different approach. Colombia was ceasing to be the enemy to become a troubled friend on the brink of collapse, needing American help. Finally, the 1997 decision to decertify Colombia and certify Mexico, despite the evidence of narco-corruption among Mexican public officials, brought the political intricacies of certification to the forefront, and reduced its moral authority. McCaffrey called the process United States' 'creative hypocrisy'.\textsuperscript{41} Three years later, in September 2000, at the Andean Development Corporation Annual Conference held at the an Inter-American Dialogue, Peter Romero, Interim Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, publicly stated that prolonging the altercation with Colombia had been a mistake, and that U.S. policy had contributed to worsening the security conditions in Colombia. In October 1997 McCaffrey visited Colombia, signalling the new trend in Washington.

Washington's decision to take a critical view of its own policies and rethink its strategy towards Colombia did not, however, lower the profile of the drug problem in the bilateral agenda, for underlying ideas classifying drug trafficking as a critical threat to post-Cold War democratic stability continued to exist. Thus, in 1997, the question of extradition became the largest irritant. This time the U.S. Department of Justice, not content with a simple re-activation of extradition, insisted on a full retroactive application of extradition in order to target the incarcerated Cali drug lords.\textsuperscript{42} In early

\textsuperscript{40} Interview and conversation with Harry O'Hara, Washington August 1997 and July 1999.

\textsuperscript{41} The Economist, 8 March 1997, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{42} Crandall suggests that the United States calculated that once imprisoned in the United States, Cali leaders would provide concrete and valid evidence against Samper, Crandall, The Eagle
April 1997, once political support for extradition increased in Colombia, Samper endorsed a constitutional reform to revoke the ban, but he postponed submitting a bill that included retroactivity. Not without controversy, the Colombian Congress re-enacted extradition in December 1997. It is hard to establish whether the desire to reach certification in 1998, the view that extradition was a useful drug control tool, or the acknowledgement that drug dealers had influenced the 1991 ban decision, prompted the change of attitude in official circles. United States' reaction to Colombia's partial compliance was relatively moderate compared to the outbursts of 1995 and 1996, since the Department of State seemed more aware of the potential negative effects of sparking anti-American sentiments in Colombia. In March 1998 Colombia received a national conditional waiver.

2. Trespassing Boundaries

The first part of this section examines U.S. pressures on Colombian authorities to carry on drug-related corruption investigations, and to hold an impeachment trial against Samper. It also looks at the distortive effects of U.S. policies in Colombian politics. The second part examines the expansion of U.S. actions in countering narco-guerrillas, and the new human rights conditions attached to military aid. These developments reflected important changes in the relationship.

The United States' Failed Struggle to Depose Samper and its Effects on Colombian Domestic Politics

During the three-year long diplomatic crisis the bilateral relationship was transformed. U.S. prudence turned into haste and engagement into intrusion. The long-term
cumulative processes of drug control cooperation had progressively brought about a relaxation of the implicit norms and rules of association that determined the volume, areas, and form of U.S. participation in affairs traditionally considered to be primarily domestic. However, the diplomatic fallout featured confrontational meddling. This interference contrasted with the tradition in U.S.-Colombian relations, set a precedent for future U.S. engagement in Colombia, prolonged the diplomatic conflict, and deepened the Colombian domestic crisis.

In September 1994, the former head of the DEA in Colombia, Joseph Toft, declared in a prime-time news broadcast, 'there was no doubt that Ernesto Samper's campaign received money from narcotraffic'. He continued: 'my opinion is based on what I know, on intelligence information. I am not sure, though, whether he [Samper] was aware of it. But it would surprise me if he wasn't'. In August, Colombia's first Fiscal, Gustavo De Greiff, had dismissed the authenticity of the narco-tapes, but after the U.S. developed misgivings over De Greiff, he was replaced by Alfonso Valdivieso, who took charge of the Fiscalía in September. The institution was at its early formation stage and the United States was fully engaged in its development as part of the justice sector reform cooperation with Colombia. With U.S. encouragement Valdivieso re-opened the investigations on drug money and connections to politicians.

Thus, while on the one hand, it used the threat of decertification to make sure Colombians focused on narco-corruption investigations, on the other it forged good working relations with the Fiscalía and provided selective intelligence information to the special team of prosecutors set to trace cases of political corruption. The first results of collaboration with the Fiscalía came on 21 April 1995. The new Fiscal announced the existence of ongoing investigations under the '8000 process', issued an

43 El Tiempo, 27 February 1997, p. 8A. Also, the escape of José Londoño Santacruz seemed to have boosted public support for extradition, El Tiempo, 14 January 1996, p. 5A.
44 Quoted in Vargas, et al, El presidente, p. 78.
45 Interview, Hermann Rincón, September 1999.
arrest warrant against former Congressman Eduardo Mestre, and sent files of nine other Congressmen to the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice. The United States turned Valdivieso, together with Police General Serrano, into a second drug war hero, set out to embrace the Fiscalía, and openly pitched the institution against Samper. The Fiscalía and Valdivieso became a liability to Samper and the Executive in Colombia, who sought desperately to squelch public allegations that were hurting their reputation. They also became a threat to several Congressmen investigated on drug-related corruption charges.46 Thus, in 1995, Samper's team drafted a plan to force Valdivieso out of office on a legal technicality, and to undermine the faculties of the Fiscalía. The battle was lost, however, when the State Council ruled in November 1995 that the Valdivieso could remain in office until 1998. All along, the United States protected Valdivieso with the certification process. The 1996 INCSR stated for example:

A critical point that determines the U.S.'s view that Colombia did not cooperate fully in the war against drugs in 1995 is the fact that corruption remains unpunished despite the efforts of some dedicated Colombians... However, the anti-corruption efforts of the Attorney General were hindered by members of Samper's administration, who publicly criticised his effort to enforce the law and tried to put a limit to his term as Attorney.47

Valdivieso's growing popularity led him to launch his presidential candidacy in 1997, and for several weeks public opinion polls placed him in first and second places with 30% and 22% approval.48 In 1998 he adhered to Andrés Pastrana's campaign.

In July 1995, former treasurer of Samper's presidential campaign, Santiago Medina, was arrested on charges of illicit enrichment, and one month later he finally acknowledged his participation in the Cali drug lords' $6 million contribution to Samper's campaign.49 His declarations triggered a full investigation on the Samper and

46 More than 50 politicians were investigated, and 9 imprisoned.
47 'Documento oficial de decertificaión 1996, mimeo.
48 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Colombia, 3rd Quarter 1997, p. 11.
49 Medina provided 400 documents linking the Samper campaign to the Cali cartel and received a 64 month-sentence, see Santiago Medina Serna, La verdad sobre las mentiras (Bogotá: Planeta, 1997).
his aides, and following the Colombian constitution it was established that a special Accusations Commission of the House of Representatives was to decide whether the allegations against Samper warranted an impeachment trial. On 14 December 1995, amidst intense political disputes, the Commission absolved Samper. The commission's reputation was tarnished and many doubted its impartiality. Some of its members were under investigation on drug-related corruption charges themselves; all but one belonged to the President's Liberal party; and the Samper government had sought to buy its favour with public posts and extra funds for public works. Yet most Colombians saw the Commission's final decision as a window of opportunity to close a devastating episode of instability caused by presidential illegitimacy. Whether guilty or not of procuring funds or being aware that his aides had contacts with the mafia, Samper's weakness wreaked staggering costs for the country. On the international front, Colombia's international reputation deteriorated; and on the domestic front, Samper was unable to deal with rising security emergencies. The favourable outcome, therefore, paved the way for Samper to either opt for a 'dignified resignation' (salida digna) or to continue governing free from the shadow of official pending accusations. However, both outcomes were partly shattered by the United States' open discrediting of Samper, which in effect prolonged an enfeebled government.  

Immediately after Samper's exoneration on 14 December 1995, Frechette warned that certification was now in jeopardy, while Gelbard claimed:

> It is evident that this had not been a serious investigation, but at the same time I understand that the Prosecutor's Office investigation will continue. I hope president Samper vetoes the conclusion of this committee so as to show the world that he is serious in his will to allow a totally transparent effort.  

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50 The lack of consensus on a succession formula also discarded Samper's resignation as an option. For example, Samper was adamant not to follow the constitution rules since Vicepresident Humberto De la Calle, part of the rival Gavirista faction, would have been officially entitled to take over. De la Calle finally resigned in September 1996 and was replaced by Carlos Lemmos, former Minister of Government in the Virgilio Barco government and staunch prohibitionist.
Gelbard's defiant declarations became a personal challenge to Samper, who soon gave up the idea of resigning. However, Gelbard's threats and ongoing collaboration with the Fiscalía also assured a second Commission vote on whether to hold an impeachment trial or not. Meanwhile, investigations and indictments continued, and on 22 January 1996, six months after his arrest, the once lauded Defence Minister Fernando Botero testified against Samper, and on 14 February, he specifically incriminated Samper saying the president 'knew' all along about the deals with the Cali traffickers. High- and middle-level public officials resigned, among them Minister of Health Augusto Galán, Minister of Trade Luis Alfredo Ramos and Minister of Transport Juan Gómez.

After Botero's declarations, Helms publicly asked Clinton's government to decertify Colombia arguing 'Samper's machinations with the cartels are an insult [...] , the continuation of cooperation with a government under Samper's leadership will only delay the day of a true war against the Colombian cartels.'

Next, Gelbard offered certification only if Samper resigned. Thus, after January 1996, investigations continued, Colombia's government was further discredited and the domestic political crisis deepened. The Fiscalía presented new evidence to the Colombian Congress recommending Samper be charged with illegal enrichment, concealment, falsifying documents, and electoral fraud. Colombia was decertified in March 1996 and, days later, investigations into Samper's campaign funding widened to include Pardo, Minister of Interior Serpa, and Minister of Communications David Turbay. In May 1996, the Comision, with 11 to 3 votes, decided there was insufficient evidence to warrant a full Congressional investigation and a trial. However, it was the lower chamber in full that legally had the last word. Once again, the United States disapproved of the Comission's recommendation, and waited for the House's

51 El Tiempo, 18 December 1995, p. 1A.
52 El Tiempo, 24 January 1996, p. 11A.
pronouncement while mounting additional pressure. On 13 May 1996, at a conference held at Florida International University, Gelbard openly threatened there would be further hostility in U.S.-Colombian relations if the House of Representatives accepted the Commission's decision.\textsuperscript{53} Then, on 1 June 1996, Gelbard threatened to apply economic sanctions if Samper was again declared innocent.\textsuperscript{54} According to a memo leaked to the Colombian media on 30 June, Frechette had explicitly recommended to Washington headquarters to 'isolate' and 'debilitate' Samper.\textsuperscript{55} Except for Lyndon Johnson's spontaneous and swiftly discarded suggestion in 1965 to topple Valencia from power in view of his inefficiency in fighting guerrillas, never before had U.S. officials entertained the idea of helping to depose a Colombian president.\textsuperscript{56} In contrast, unwanted leaders in Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Panama had experienced United States' bullying. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee continued to push for a full investigation of Colombian government officials and claimed to have collected in its February Staff report enough evidence to prove Samper was guilty. The Senate Committee was de facto taking up the role that INL and Frechette expected from the Colombian Congress.\textsuperscript{57}

Furthermore, Gelbard and other U.S. officials believed it was possible to muster enough resistance against Samper by disclosing compromising evidence, encouraging the opposition, and empowering civil society actors, especially private sector actors who had much to lose from possible economic sanctions. U.S. officials played up the threat of sanctions and at the same time endorsed the private sectors' new activism in

\textsuperscript{53} Fernando Cepeda, 'El Congreso colombiano ante la crisis', in Leal, \textit{Tras las huellas}, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{El Tiempo}, 7 June 1996, p. 8A
\textsuperscript{56} Johnson believed the Dominican intervention was successful and could replicated in other places of Latin America, 'U.S. Weighed Sending Troops to Colombia in 1965', \textit{Financial Times Information}, 1 June 1999.
foreign policy issues. Their aim was to push the private sector into calling for Samper's resignation. With scarce knowledge on U.S. foreign legislation, but generally aware that U.S. economic sanctions were possible, Colombian *gremios* (industrial associations) had begun approaching U.S. policy makers in early 1995 to lobby Congress and the Department of State on avoiding sanctions against their products, but not necessarily against Samper. In 1996 business associations grouped under the Consejo Nacional Gremial including among others Asocolflores, Asobancaria, Analdex, ANDI, SAC and Asocaña. Cavelier argues the *gremios* were crucial in ensuring decertification without sanctions in 1996 and especially in 1997. The *gremios* also suggested Samper's early resignation.

Despite U.S. pressure, on 12 June 1996, the House of Representatives voted 111 to 43 in favour of absolving Samper. The United States threatened Colombia again saying the government had 'the next month or two to convince the United States' that it was going to be a 'more serious', and Colombia would 'in effect be a pariah state', should it choose to go down this road. Finally, on 11 July, the United States cancelled Samper's U.S. visa. Helms congratulated the Clinton administration for being 'right on target' and submitted to the U.S. Attorney a list of 25 people to observe and deny entry in the United States.

Overt U.S. manipulation gave Samper the perfect opportunity to diffuse attention away from his own political responsibility and to blame political instability in Colombia on an alleged U.S.-led conspiracy. Even incisive critics of Samper believed Colombia could not afford to act and look weak when it came to U.S. accusations and

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59 Cavelier, 'El proceso de decertificación', p. 56.
60 The *gremios*, however, were opposed by the Santo Domingo business group the single most influential private sector conglomerate in Colombia and funder of Samper's campaign, see Angelika Rettberg, *The Political Preferences of Diversified Business Groups: Lessons from Colombia (1994-1998)*, *Business in Politics*, 3/1 (2001), pp. 47-63.
interference. General Bernardo Urbina, for example, who was the former director of
military intelligence that wanted Samper's resignation, considered the United States'
cancellation of Samper's visa to be a 'great injustice --an insult to the people of
Colombia'. Hernando Santos, director of El Tiempo known for his critical views of
Samper, asserted that if he 'were the President he would not have doubted, for a single
moment, in asking Mister Frechette to return to his noble country'. In the end, in
December 1996, the Constitutional Court rejected the last attempt to open new
enquires into the allegations against Samper. Colombia became divided, with part of
the population clearly in Samper's favour and the rest against him.

As the United States sought to isolate Samper, U.S.-Colombian relations became
intertwined with domestic politics. State institutions and politicians chose to ally
themselves with or oppose the United States, betting that their selected association
would bolster their position in internal political struggles. In addition, the U.S. topic
became a theme in Colombian party politics and being pro- or anti-American was
pegged to other incendiary policy issues, and turned into a criterion in the definition of
political affiliation. For instance, Samper's most loyal ally, Minister Serpa, claimed
that the Colombian crisis was 'the product of a conspiracy between neo-liberal circles,
who, in alliance with North Americans, intend[ed] to take revenge on Samper because
of its social and national orientation'. According to the Samper administration,
gaviristas (former Liberal President Gaviria's followers) and pastranistas (the
Conservative Pastrana house) came under the category of pro-Americans and
conspirators. While samperistas, serpistas (within the Liberal party) and lentejos
(Conservatives willing to work with Samper), were seen as committed patriots.

62 Helms to Clinton, 16 July 1996.
64 'Yo echaria a Frechette', in Cambio 16, 21 October 1996, quoted in Pardo, 'Colombia y
Estados Unidos', p. 317.
65 Restrepo, 'El Ejecutivo en la crisis', p. 54. Horacio Serpa profited immensely from the
deterioration in U.S.-Colombian relations and the domestic crisis. His loyal, yet prudent,
Samper, and those who remained loyal, worked to isolate or prune from government those who opposed their social and economic policies and those who supported anti-corruption investigations on the grounds they were pro-American conspirators.

The Samper episode epitomises the complexity and limitations of U.S. power in Latin America, which is rooted in the United States' own approach to the region, as well as in Latin America's way of addressing and responding to U.S. incentives. It is in the nature of the U.S.-Colombian relationship and of U.S.-Latin American relations in general, albeit to differing degrees, that state, government and institutional legitimacy are partially constructed from without. Hence, the absence of United States' recognition has the potential to undermine the stability of any government in the region. Yet the legitimisation of U.S. authority coexists with a deep-rooted historical resentment against the tone and substance of U.S. policies in the region, and consequently anti-Americanism can be strong enough to sustain domestic support for a given government, institution or policy. This is why the means used by the United States in its struggle against Samper and the dynamics of certification politics in Colombia had both the effects of weakening and strengthening the Samper government as well as specific Colombian institutions.

From Counternarcotics to Counterinsurgency

It was during the Samper government that U.S. and Colombian officials finally brought the narco-guerrilla problem to the forefront of bilateral relations, and paved the way for further U.S. involvement in Colombia. Colombian armed groups had grown steadily since the early 1980s with financing from extortion, kidnapping and the illegal drug industry. In particular, the 1990s sub-regional reconfiguration of the illegal drug trade structure helped to boost guerrilla and paramilitary finances which in turn increased their military capability. Colombia turned into the world's largest cocaine support for Samper gained him wide favourability, especially among the middle and low
exporter since 1982, the world's largest coca leaf producer since 1997, and since 1996, an important source of heroin entering the United States. The pace of this transformation speeded up in 1994: in 1994 Colombia had 39,700 harvestable hectares of coca leaf (17% of the total world cultivation), in 1996 it had 67,200, and in 2000 the figure skyrocketed to 136,200 hectares (74% of total world cultivation). In Peru, harvestable hectares of coca leaf decreased from 129,000 in 1992, 94,400 in 1996 and 34,200 in 2000 due to a disease affecting the plants, the successful that intercepted aerial transportation between Peru and Colombia, and Peruvian authorities' tight control over drug trafficking activities. This decrease in Peruvian crops pushed cultivation into other areas in South America but especially into Colombia. Despite the full embrace of prohibition, Colombia lacked effective state control over vast rural areas, had the existing precedent of drug trafficking, and suffered a severe agricultural crisis which provided the right conditions for illegal coca crops to flourish. The greater number of crops yielded greater revenues for armed groups. They taxed peasants, intermediaries and drug traffickers; charged for security services; served as links with regional and international criminal networks; and even participated in parts of the production chain. FARC grew from a 3,600-strong armed group in 1986 to having reportedly 7,000 to 10,000 troops in 1996, while ELN grew from 800 to 3,000 over the same period. The enhanced capacity of armed groups was evidenced with the 17 August 1996 FARC watershed attack on the Armed Forces base of Las Delicias, holding 60 soldiers hostage for 9 months. Throughout the following months it waged continuous attacks, extending its presence to new municipalities, and in October 1997 it stepped up hostilities aiming to sabotage the municipal elections. FARC ignored

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income sectors.

66 INCSR, 1997 and 2001. In 2001, after the fall of Fujimori, it became known that the Peruvian Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional exercised control to reduce drug trafficking competition and extract profits from drug traffickers' bribery in exchange for information on the time and place of drug operations.

67 Alfredo Rangel, Colombia: Guerra en el Fin de Siglo (Bogota: TME, 1998), p. 12. Unlike FARC, ELN's growth in the 1980s also derived from extorting oil companies.
Samper's overtures to begin a peace process, and increased their demands to include the clearing state security forces from three large municipalities in Meta and Caquetá as a pre-requisite for negotiations. ELN excluded the government from its peace talks and chose instead to carry on a peace process with civil society. Finally, the Colombian president failed to muster the necessary support from the military to engage in a peace process and lacked the capacity to use military strength to contain the guerrilla attacks. Meanwhile, the Samper administration devoted most of its energy to placating the allegations of corruption, important political and private sectors also withdrew their support, and economic growth slowed partly because of the eroding business confidence.

Besides the clear change of circumstances on the ground in Colombia, Samper's strategy to avoid the 1996 decertification drew U.S. officials' attention to the guerrilla threat. Breaking with the Colombian tradition to underplay the insurgency threat, Samper and a small circle of advisors, among them the Viceminister for the Americas and later Foreign Affairs Presidential Advisor Diego Cardona, believed they would dissuade the United States from fully decertifying Colombia by arguing the guerrilla threat had dramatically escalated, and decertification would undermine Samper's authority to fight rebels or lure them into a peace process. They spoke of 'cartel-guerrillas' and emphasised that Colombia's security was truly at stake, and that the country's stability was essential in maintaining regional stability given the potential spillovers of the conflict into neighbouring countries. Ultimately, it was the United States' own security that was at stake, they told the Department of States and National Security Council officials. Therefore, American officials could legitimately invoke a 'national interest' waiver. Colombia's plan failed to persuade U.S. officials of the need to certify Colombia, but contributed to increase Washington's awareness of the state of Colombia's security situation. It also reinforced the notion that drug trafficking and
insurgency were inextricably linked. Samper's strategy contrasted significantly with Betancur's approach in the early 1980s to the issue of narco-guerrillas and U.S. foreign drug policy. For Betancur, Colombia's national aim was to reach a peace process with guerrillas, and so his policy was to underplay in domestic and U.S. circles the drug link in order to avoid U.S. interference and the de-legitimisation of the peace process. Conversely, Samper's aim was to redeem his reputation by obtaining certification, and he believed that drawing attention to the drugs-insurgency link served his goal without calculating that in the long-term, his behaviour would invite greater U.S. presence and make a peace process difficult. U.S. officials reacted against Samper's endeavours to solve the Las Delicias affairs in July 1997 --a strong warning of the difficulties that awaited the Colombian peace process in the years to come. In order to rescue the 60 soldiers and 10 marines, Samper agreed to FARC's request to a ceasefire in certain guerrilla-controlled areas, and members in the U.S. Congress were concerned that such cease fire undermined drug control operations.69

Playing up the insurgency threat and its links to the illegal drug trade also became the strategy of the Colombian General Commander in Chief General Harold Bedoya to avoid the military aid cuts prescribed by decertification, and to procure additional military assistance. Bedoya opposed the idea of a peace process as much as he loathed Samper, and he was set on increasing U.S. assistance to repel the growing guerrilla threat. Bedoya told U.S. policy makers that FARC was 'a group made up of armed traffickers that in large part has come to rely upon the drug production as their principal source of funding.'70 'There are approximately 10,000 narcotics terrorists that used to be called guerrillas,' he insisted.71 In Bedoya's view, this justified his request for additional cooperation.72 But the controversial topic of narco-guerrillas reached far

68 Interview with Diego Cardona.
71 Ibid, p. 75.
72 Ibid, p. 67.
beyond cancelling out decertification sanctions. Extremely vexing questions for both Colombias and the United States were at stake. To what extent were standard counternarcotics operations suited to fighting narco-guerrillas? Should the United States engage in counterinsurgency in Colombia? And was a peace process viable with armed rebels allegedly turned drug criminals?

The complexity of the topic was obvious to all, though not its direct and indirect implications over time. For several months in 1997 and 1998, the debate went back to whether narco-guerrillas really 'existed' or not, meaning to what extent they were involved in drug trafficking, and if their behaviour compared to that of traditional criminal organisations. Frechette became a leading opponent of the term narco-guerrilla, as he adamantly opposed potential U.S. engagement in counterinsurgency. The security community in Washington harshly criticised Frechette. Major F. Andy Messing Junior, a retired U.S. military and Executive Director of the National Defence Science Foundation, claimed: '[A]s a distortion of this picture, the State Department and select others [referring to Frechette] have harped on a flawed strategy of bifurcating the now drug guerrillas from the drug trade in spite of overwhelming open source evidence to the contrary.'

Former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, and former military man, Morris Busby declared that it was a true 'head-in-the-sand attitude' to separate drug trafficking and insurgency. 'Colombia could, in fact, collapse as a nation', argued American security analysts. After several months, a tacit agreement that guerrillas were somehow linked to the illegal drug industry emerged, and debates turned to the policy options available for Colombia and the United States. In 1998, after Colombia elected Andrés Pastrana to the presidency, Colombia and the United States agreed to create three U.S. trained and funded counternarcotics battalions of

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73 Ibid, p. 89. The foundation sponsored a team of low intensity conflict experts in 1996 and 1997 to assess the Colombian situation. They concluded the drug war was being lost because the police and the military were not receiving funds from the U.S. due to decertification. p. 96.
74 Ibid, p. 82.
1000 troops each, marking a turning point in drug control and, above all, in the nature of U.S.-Colombian relations. Also, for the first time ever, the United States agreed to fund alternative development acknowledging that the Colombian government needed to woo peasants and settlers before they joined ranks with the guerrillas.

From an historical perspective, the turn to counternarcotic-counterinsurgency battalions was amongst the policy options because of the existing U.S. involvement in the war against drugs in Colombia and Colombia's embrace of punitive prohibition. The introduction of military tactics and assets into drug control activities and the inclusion of counter-drugs into U.S. military doctrine since 1993 had already set in place much of the organisational and bureaucratic structure needed to develop the multi-task battalions. Therefore Colombia and United States need not start anew.

The greater awareness of the Colombian conflict, greater counternarcotics military aid and the prospects of U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency contributed to push the human rights at the heart of the bilateral agenda. The Human Rights Bureau in the Department of State finally produced a critical interpretation of human rights violations in Colombia. Also, for the first time, the United States openly condemned the links between paramilitary groups gathered under the umbrella organisation Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia and the Colombian security forces and drug trafficking. Before Frechette left Colombia in 1997, he gave an important speech singling out human rights abuses in Colombia. He specifically referred to crimes reportedly committed by the XX Brigade. The Brigade was disbanded in 1998. In 1997 the U.S. Congress debated the performance of Colombian security forces and the restrictions to further counternarcotic military aid. The new conditions not only set specific human rights standards for the Colombian Police and Armed Forces, but contemplated responsible members being 'brought to justice'. They also requested

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detailed reporting from the Secretaries of Defense and State, which in turn implied further United States' monitoring and overseeing of Colombian security forces, and further involvement in domestic issues. As part of this trend, on 1 August 1997, Colombia and the United States signed an End-Use Monitoring agreement and a human rights agreement to fulfil conditions required by the American law.76

To conclude, after the diplomatic crisis U.S.-Colombian relations entered a different era. Four elements made relations different. First, new ideas on security, democracy and free trade had come to steer U.S. relations with the world. Second, the legitimacy crisis of Samper and the damaging political infighting propelled Colombia into mayhem. They helped to worsen the internal war between narco-guerrillas, reactionary narco-paramilitary forces and the Colombian state. This situation set entirely different challenges to the United States and the relationship. Third, U.S. officials perceived that they had a natural role to play in the Colombian conflict because of its connections to drug trafficking. They also believed that stopping the Colombian conflict was in their interest because it threatened regional stability. Fourth, the United States became heavily involved in Colombia, so any decisions to expand its role did not involve starting from zero; there was already inside Colombia a voluminous operative machinery made up of civil servants, aid workers, law enforcers, intelligence agents, and military advisors. Finally, the U.S. had set an important precedent of meddling in Colombian affairs.

In March 1996 and March 1997 the United States decertified Colombia. It withheld aid; removed Samper's visa to the United States; applied targeted sanctions to suspected drug smugglers; and threatened to enforce other sanctions provided for in the U.S. legislation. To regard all this as typical bickering in U.S.-Colombian relations due to drug prohibition while neglecting that a critical threshold had been crossed in would clearly be a mistake. This was the first time ever that Colombia and the United States had reached such a level of confrontation over issues related to drug trafficking and it was the first time since 1903 that bilateral relations had deteriorated so dramatically.

It is understandable that the deal between Samper's aides and the Cali traffickers to transfer $6 million to the presidential campaign in June 1994 would have prompted a U.S. warning. Yet it is less evident why U.S. officials would have chosen to engage in a three-year long counterproductive scheme to 'isolate' and 'debilitate' Samper. The open isolation of Samper was not an obvious policy choice given the lack of public and conclusive proof against him; the precedents of U.S. tolerance with previous cases of narco-funds in politics; the record achievements in interdiction, featuring the dismantling of the Cali cartel; and finally, the steady ascendancy and development of prohibition in Colombia since 1971--especially as compared to many other countries on the drugs 'black list'.

Seen from this perspective, some essential questions emerged. Was it true, as several analysts claimed, that Colombia and the United States had mostly disagreed on
drug policy issues; that, as a result, there had been little, if any, counternarcotics cooperation; and that a drug-related diplomatic crisis was just a matter of time? Why had relations remained harmonious for so long, especially after drugs had become a security threat for both Colombia and the United States, and the illegal drug industry had been steadily expanding in Colombia? Why was there such a dramatic diplomatic fallout in 1995 if relations had successfully weathered previous challenges? And finally what other changes to the relationship had the war against drugs brought? This thesis thus set out to examine continuity and change in U.S.-Colombian relations by taking a critical look of the role of drug politics in the relationship. The answers to these main questions and several other subsidiary findings relevant to Colombian foreign policy and U.S.-Colombian relations are drawn together in this concluding chapter.

After the traumatising secession of Panama, Colombia and the United States constructed a relationship that was essentially amiable, even if unequal. Military intervention, U.S. confrontational enmeshment or a long political strife never occurred even if there were some important low points. One such low point happened when Bentancur contradicted Reagan's plans in Central America by joining in the Contadora initiative to advocate U.S. withdrawal from the imbroglio. Another was the 1988 two-month-long embargo following the recommendation of U.S. Embassy staff in Bogotá to put pressure on Barco after the drug trafficker Ochoa escaped prosecution.

This long lasting friendship is remarkable, not only because the history of the continent has been marked by U.S.-Latin American contention, but also because Colombia was never strategically important enough to have warranted special consideration on the part of the United States, thus defying the neo-realist explanation in this respect. This thesis has argued that in the case of Colombia and the United States, friendship was constructed on other premises. An important element was
Conclusions

Colombia's self-perception as a Western and reputable member of the international community. This generated a sense of general affinity with the United States, which prompted Colombia to join, follow or adhere to U.S. foreign policy tenets during the Second World War, the Cold War and the post Cold War. Thus, while jealous of its sovereignty and autonomy, like any other Latin American country that has encountered the overwhelming presence of the United States in its neighbourhood, Colombia did not seek to redress the regional balance of power. In contrast, for instance, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba and Mexico developed stronger manifestations of nationalism based on the rejection of U.S. power. The way the United States perceived Colombia was equally important to this equation. Indeed, amidst what U.S. policy makers perceived as an unstable neighbourhood, Colombia was labelled the 'oldest democracy of Latin America' and the 'most stable economy' in the region. This characteristic of the U.S.-Colombian relationship suggests that ideational variables may explain bilateral nuances in U.S.-Latin American relations.

Friendship between the two countries manifested itself in several ways. In dealing with Colombia, the United States refrained from military incursions and covert operations, avoided public recriminations and cordially resolved disagreements. Most important during the years when the drug issue became controversial was the tendency to overlook Colombia's faulty performance on counternarcotics on the grounds that Colombia was a good-willed democratic friend.

The move to prohibition in Colombia was not a consequence of U.S. imposition. The United States did not coercively impose drug prohibition on Colombia when Nixon called out for international collaboration in the war against drugs in 1971 nor at any time thereafter. Besides a societal tacit approval of the idea of prohibition, the Colombian policy-making elite chose to participate in the making and refining of the international drug prohibition regime because it saw such participation as a natural
expression of their Western identity. In addition, the tradition of cooperation with the
United States, the condemnation against the wave of the terrorism launched by drug
traffickers, and the expectation of aid by Colombian government agencies worked to
keep Colombia's adherence to the war against drugs, despite other possible costs.
During the 1980s and 1990s, drug-related violence created difficult choices for
Colombian policy-makers, and several academics and practitioners argued that
abandoning or relaxing prohibition was, in the end, less costly for Colombia -- except
for the fact that the United States would never tolerate a defection from the war against
drugs. However, as argued in this thesis, based on the idea that drug trafficking
constituted a serious security threat, anti-drug bureaucracies and collaboration with the
United States had become increasingly institutionalised, which tilted the balance in
favour of continuing with punitive prohibition. Thus, in the end, Colombia's drug
policies were not very different than the U.S. approach, and unlike other Latin
American countries, the Colombian government was open to collaboration with U.S.
bureaucrats, law enforcement agents. The only issue of important dissent was
extradition. But even then, U.S. officials, in practice, tolerated its intermittent
application and even its being banned in 1991. It was only after diplomatic conflict
broke out that extradition, as well as other issues, became so controversial that the
United States did not cease to exert pressure until it got its way. Extradition, for
instance, was reinstated in 1997 after a constitutional reform. The United States
showed it was willing to use strong-armed measures when it believed Colombia had
failed to reach the prohibition standards of the time. For the most part, however, the
United States was instrumental to the institutionalisation of prohibition in Colombia
mainly through positive incentives such as aid and technical assistance. Since 1970,
the United States destined more that $350 million in drug-related assistance to
Colombia.
Conclusions

Highlighting the coincidences in Colombian and U.S. views on the need to combat drug trafficking and underscoring the existence of bilateral collaboration should not obscure the concerns and frustrations on both sides throughout this long so-called war against drugs. The foreign dimension of U.S. drug policy occasionally made Colombians anxious over their sovereignty and autonomy. Also, Colombians resented the lack of U.S. willingness to implement unpopular policies on its own soil while demanding exactly that from Latin Americans. And clearly, Colombians were often irritated that the United States wrote report cards on others' anti-drug performance and not the other way around. Yet all these were part of the inevitable inequality in the relationship. Colombians grew accustomed to them and continued a friendly relation with the United States nevertheless. In addition, Colombia's active solicitation of U.S. aid, and Colombians' eagerness to obtain recognition for their efforts constituted a \textit{de facto} acceptance and a legitimising signal of U.S. authority.

Against these developments one may ask how much margin of manoeuvre Colombia has had. One finding that has emerged from this study is that potential existed for Colombian agency in shaping policy outcomes within the framework of friendship. While power asymmetry implies that the United States can make its preferences prevail, U.S. choices and ideas on Colombian issues have been informed by its interaction with Colombian policy makers. Clear examples are the United States' interpretations of Colombian guerrilla groups as not constituting real threats --which resembled the views of the Colombian elite-- and also of the events during the Gaviria government concerning the banning of extradition --that it was inevitable in a truly democratic regime. In contrast, the United States has been able to steer elements of the Colombian anti-drug agenda when Colombia lacked a well-defined policy. For instance, the emphasis on eradication and developing the air wing of the Anti-
Narcotics police was not the result of a thought-out national Colombian plan but rather the outcome of the United States' own anti-drug policy priorities.

The cumulative process of institutionalisation of prohibition in Colombia, of foreign drug policy in the United States and drug-control cooperation had important consequences for Colombia and the U.S.-Colombian relationship. It contributed to bringing about several main interconnected trends that made the relationship different to what it was prior to 1970.

First, it altered the configuration of the bilateral agenda. In 1986, even before the end of the Cold War, drugs were a high priority in the relationship. And since 1989, with the deep institutionalisation of U.S. foreign drug policy and the U.S.-Colombian partnership in the war against drugs, the drug issue permeated other political and economic topics. Drug policy became the overarching and unifying rationale driving all U.S. policies in Colombia. The linking of drugs to other topics owed to the way drug policy developed and to the underlying understanding of the drug problem: as a security threat, the drug problem required not only better funding, but a comprehensive approach combining economic, military, political, and diplomatic measures. In the 1990s, new ideas about post-Cold War security and the emerging normative framework centred on democracy kept drugs high on the agenda. The 'drugs-first approach' has become so entrenched that it continues to dominate U.S.-Colombian relations at a time when the deterioration of security conditions in Colombia demands an approach that focuses not on counternarcotics alone, but on the ability of the Colombian government to govern and protect its citizens.

Furthermore, in the shaping of the bilateral agenda, the drug issue became a vehicle for introducing human rights in the relationship. The initial pressure came from U.S.-based human rights NGOs protesting against U.S. foreign drug policy, particularly after the launching of the 1989 Andean Strategy. NGO advocacy in the U.S. Congress
forced the U.S. government to improve reporting on Colombian human rights; to make aid conditional on human rights performance; and to bind Colombian security forces to end-use monitoring agreements. General norms on anti-corruption were also introduced to the agenda as a spillover of attempts to curb drug-related corruption, and anti-corruption became a crucial feature of Colombian politics and legislation.

Second, the actors involved in the formulation and implementation of the two countries' policies towards each other changed. In the United States, executive branch bureaus involved in drug policy, and the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State increased their leverage. Of these, the Department of State's INL gained disproportionate power in the policy-making process with respect to the mid-level bureaucrats in the Bureau for Inter-American Affairs. In addition, a small but vocal group of Democrats and Republicans in Congress, from the House of Representatives for the most part, became key in designing the content and terms of U.S. policy towards Colombia. Though U.S. policy towards Colombia continues to be designed primarily by mid-ranking officials, the expansion of Congress' role led to a modification of the practices of traditional diplomacy. For instance, Colombians learned to influence U.S. policy by lobbying Congress, and so the relationship was partly managed from 'below' and from 'inside' the United States, as opposed to using regular diplomatic channels.

A third trend brought about by the war against drugs is the increasing level of U.S. enmeshment in Colombia. After the settlement of Panama, and in comparison to its involvement in other Latin American countries, the United States exercised a prudent engagement in Colombia characterised by limited intrusion in its domestic affairs. Yet, the nature of U.S. counternarcotics policies and Colombia's expanding collaboration with the United States introduced U.S. monitoring of Colombian politics and raised the stakes of the United States in Colombian domestic processes such as the passage of
laws and the administration of justice. Most remarkably, Colombia increasingly allowed U.S. security forces to operate on Colombian soil as technical advisors or directly in law enforcement operations, such as the pursuit in 1992 and 1993 of Escobar by the Delta Force team. Although greater enmeshment made friction more likely, only the United States' attempts to influence the outcome of the Samper investigations were of a clearly confrontational nature. Nevertheless, the discussion among Colombian policy-makers and academics about the country's sovereignty and autonomy attests to the continuing relevance of this topic. Paradoxically, Colombia's adherence to prohibition and, especially, its requests for assistance in the war against drugs have been at cross-purposes with its declared quest for greater autonomy and sovereignty, because they have worked to bring the United States 'in'. Barco, for instance, opened the door for USAID to return after programs had been phased out in 1976, and this, in turn, increased the role of U.S. bureaucrats in Colombia's drug policy-making.

These changes, brought about by the cumulative process of the institutionalisation of prohibition, contained the germs that led to the outbreak of unprecedented conflict in 1995. Differences on drug policy were not the main cause behind the conflict. Rather, the deepening and expansion of the war against drugs created particular ideational and bureaucratic opportunity structures, such as the level of 'narcotisation' of relations, and the leverage of U.S. drug policy bureaucrats over the formulation of U.S. policy towards Colombia, which were necessary pre-conditions for the 1995-1998 diplomatic crisis. The turning point in the relationship, however, was brought about by the Samper narco-corruption scandal, which came at a time when there had been a fundamental shift in the U.S. understanding of the drug problem, informed by post-Cold War norms on effective governance and democracy, and new ideas on security. These gave new content to U.S. drug policy and changed U.S. expectations of
Conclusions

Colombia. Thus, whereas in the past the United States had been tolerant of cases of narco-corruption and was satisfied with partial results in the war against drugs, after February 1994, when the Clinton administration’s drug policy review produced a final guiding document that updated drug policy according to a new normative framework, the United States was less willing to leave cases of corruption unpunished and to tolerate mediocre drug control performance. This more hard-line approach explains the United States' admonishing note to Gaviria in June 1994 and its reaction to the use of drug money in Samper's presidential campaign. Most countries in Latin America also saw a stiffening of drug certification conditions. Colombia's symbolic importance as an example of democracy for the continent was called into question after the Samper scandal, the growing awareness among U.S. policy makers of the deterioration of Colombia's institutions, the escalation of violence in Colombia, and its refusal to cooperate during the operations to restore democracy in Haiti. This is an example of how broader norms, mediated by the agency of states and bureaucracies, are translated into concrete policy, and how, ultimately, norms may shape political behaviour.

The diplomatic conflict between Colombia and the United States was exceptionally long and intense, considering the bilateral tradition of swift and diplomatic resolution of differences. This was related to the disproportionate leverage of INL in the Department of State, and to the 'cognitive rigidity' of certain U.S. policy officials, demonising Samper and exaggerating the consequences of drug money in the Samper campaign. In addition, the intertwining of the Colombian domestic crisis and the U.S.-Colombian diplomatic conflict contributed to the U.S. decision to withhold certification in 1996 and 1997. The Assistant Secretary of State for Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at the time, Robert Gelbard, insisted on using certification to force the ouster of Samper, believing that Samper’s alleged direct involvement in procuring funds from the Cali mafia was preventing Colombia from achieving
substantial results in the war against drugs. During this period, the U.S. broke with the routines of friendship. It meddled in Colombian domestic affairs; sought the impeachment of a Colombian president by providing selective information to the attorneys investigating political corruption; conditioned certification on the ouster of Samper; lent political support to Samper opponents; engaged in negative propaganda against Samper; and encouraged private sector actors to demand an impeachment trial. The United States also tightened up conditionality on drug control aid, used coercive diplomacy to pressure for reforms in Colombia's legislation, and retreated from benign assessments of Colombia's drug control performance and governance. Finally, the United States issued targeted sanctions against individuals and firms who they believed were connected to drug trafficking.

After the 1995-1998 diplomatic conflict, and once a new government was elected in Colombia, relations with the United States normalised. One of the justifications U.S. policy-makers gave for this reversal in the summer of 1998 was that Colombia was an old friend in need of help. The fighting between paramilitaries, guerrillas, and Colombian security forces had displaced more than one million people, and the new president, Andrés Pastrana, was asking Americans for political and financial aid to carry out an ambitious peace process estimated to cost $7.5 billion. But how far were relations going back to normal?

The legacies of U.S.-Colombian cooperation on drug control and of the confrontation with Samper, such as the greater U.S. presence and monitoring and the precedents of conditionality, may impact and modify the old practices of friendship. The Samper scandal forced a more critical interpretation of Colombia and brought about the idea in Washington circles that past friendship and camaraderie among officials of the two countries had left faulty performance in Colombia unchecked.
Today, the idea that Colombians 'must get their act together' to attain durable peace has led policy-makers to be less flexible about mediocre performance.

Dominant ideas about requirements for effective governance have set more stringent standards for Colombian authorities. These ideas are informed by the broader democracy-security framework that has emerged in the post-Cold War era, and they continue to be refined and modified with the passage of time and the occurrence of shocking events such as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.. Since Colombian policy makers continue to subscribe to a Western identity, relations between Colombia and the United States, good or bad, will depend on how much Colombia keeps up with the standards set for so-called Western countries.
Coca Leaf Production

Source: INL, International Narcotic Control Board Reports

Annex I
Annex 2
Anti-Narcotics Aid to Colombia before 1989

U.S. Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia
FY 1973-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US Dollars</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>257</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>552</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>10650</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>10600</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>11553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>9767</td>
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</table>

Source data, in x1000 dollars, from the U.S. House and Senate, *Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Authorizations*. 
## Annex 3

### General Aid to Colombia from 1989 to 1998


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S. AID to Colombian Programs</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Countermarco</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Other Assistance/Spending</th>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>62.6</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td>112.2</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<td>71.0</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>106.9</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
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<td>80.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
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<td>19.9</td>
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<td>116.6</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td>119.6</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>28.7</td>
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</table>

### Notes

- This chart includes direct U.S. foreign aid, which are usually counted in the Economic and Countermarco categories in Cuba. The United States also provides a small amount of DOD Excess Defense Articles (EDA) to Colombia. Other funds are spent in Colombia on countermarco and other activities that are considered part of U.S. programs. DOD detection and monitoring funds cover U.S. detection and monitoring of drug flights.

- In these years, there was assistance in this category of less than $50,000.

- The following data is drawn from various sources, including the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations (Green Book) prepared by the AID budget office, the Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts book prepared by the Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, with data as of September 30, 1998. Information was also provided directly by the Department of State and Defense that are not recorded in these publications, and by the General Accounting Office (GAO) for 1996-1998. (See GAO report GAO-01-26.) Where contradictions existed, GAO data was preferred, and then other published data was used. In particular, GAO used data on the amounts of DOD drawdown assistance actually delivered in FY1996 through FY1998, other sources showed the amount authorized. In FY1996, $40.5 million in FY1996, $14.2 million in FY1997, and $41.1 million in FY1998. Because of a possible lack of data or inaccuracies, some yearly totals may be understated or overstated, particularly prior to FY1996.
1. Official Documents in Colombia

Except for the annual memoirs that the Presidency, the Ministries and special government bureaus must submit to Congress, Colombian official publications do not follow a regular publishing cycle or format, nor does the depositary library carry all government published material. Material was usually obtained during visits to the different government agencies or in interviews. The following references seek to reflect relevant information in publications. Some official speeches on foreign policy have been reproduced in Colombia Internacional, an international affairs journal of the Universidad de los Andes, and are cited here.


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**2. Official Documents in the United States**

I have consulted the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate the *Foreign Assistance Related Programs Authorizations* from 1976 to 1998, which contain information on the type of drug control programmes the United States has conducted overseas and the funding for these programs; and the *Legislation on Foreign Relations* from years 1985 to 1997, which contain all U.S. laws pertaining foreign drug policy.
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3. Interviews

Interviews were conducted in Bogotá and Washington D.C. from 1997 to 2001.


Acosta, Juan Fernando, worked for the Samper campaign and the presidential dispatch, Bogotá, May 1999.

Alzate, Sandra, former official of the Ministry of Justice during the Samper administration who was part of the team negotiating the Maritime Interdiction agreement of 1997, Bogotá, May 1999.

Bauchman, Brain, Colombia Officer for INL, Washington D.C., September 1997.


Cepeda, Fernando, Minister for Comunications during the Barco administration, Bogotá, May 1999.


Carrillo, Fernando, Minister of Justice during the Gaviria administration, Washington D.C. September 1999.

Coy, Francisco, Colombian foreign service, worked in the Colombian Embassy in Washington during the Gaviria administration and was the first ever U.S. desk officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the Samper administration, we conducted several interviews in Bogotá and Washington from 1997 to 2001.

De Vega, Gabriel, former Director of the DNE, Bogotá, September 1998.


Forero, Clemencia, Viceminister for the Americas in 1997-2001 and Senior Advisor during the Barco administration, Bogotá May 1999.


Hatheway, Gina Marie, former Senior Staffer for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Congressman DeWine, August 1999.

Maklin, Gilbert, Stagger for Representative Gilman and former Special Forces in Colombia interdiction operation against Escobar, Washington D.C., September 1999.

Martinez, Nestor Humberto, Minister of Justice during the Samper administration, Bogotá, September 2000.

McDonald, Anne and other officials from USAID office in the Department of State, Washington D.C., September 1997.

McLean, Philip, DCM at the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá under Ambassador Gillespie and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Andean Affairs for the Bush administration Washington D.C. August 1999.


O’Hara, Harry, former Colombia Desk Officer in the Department of State, Washington D.C., August 1997 and August 1999.


Ortiz, Felipe, Secretary for the Second Commission of the Colombian Senate, Bogotá, May 1999.

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Pardo, Rafael, Minister of Defense in the Gaviria administration, Bogotá, June 1999.


Reales, Clara Elena, former Advisor on Narcotics Matters during the Samper administration, Bogotá, September 1997.

Rincón, Hermann, one of the three Fiscales investigating drug-related corruption under Fiscal Alfonso Valdivieso, Washington D.C., September 2000.

Salazar, Ana Maria, former USAID contractor for justice reform in Colombia and former official in the Department of Defense, Washington, September 2000.

Tirado, Alvaro, the first Colombian Presidential Advisor for Human Rights during the Barco government, several meetings, Bogotá 1998-2000.

Torres, Javier, former Chief of Security and Justice Unit of the National Planning Department under the Gaviria administration, Washington, May 1999.


4. Newspapers

The daily Colombian newspapers El Tiempo and El Espectador were consulted at different times using different databases or in original form. In those cases where page numbers were not available, I have included de title of the article. The main U.S. newspapers include The New York Times and The Washington Post. The Christian Science monitor reports often on Colombia.

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