Welfare Politics in East Asia

An Analysis of Welfare Legislation Patterns in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan



Jaemin Shim

Department of Politics and International Relations

University of Oxford

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Abstract

The project mainly seeks to explain the structural logic behind the welfare expansion trend in three developed East Asian democracies—Korea, Japan, and Taiwan—since 1990. The major finding of the research is that the dispersed power structure (e.g. coalition, minority, divided governments) was a hitherto unnoticed significant political factor behind the transformation of fragmented, indirect, and weak welfare benefits into universal, direct, and generous ones.

Unlike the conventional approach using welfare expenditure data in analysing welfare politics, the project examined possible relations between the changes in power structure and the legislative activities of major political actors using the whole universe of bills—roughly 50,000 in total—in three nations during the past two decades. Among others, the research focused on how dimensions such as the number, the success ratio, or the primary political sponsors have changed along with the different levels of power dispersion/concentration applying regression analyses. Moreover, the key analysis includes both orthodox and unorthodox social policies and applies multiple methods (e.g. social network analysis, media content analysis, or theory-informed narratives) to verify/triangulate/fine-tune findings from the legislation patterns.

The result suggests that when bargaining among a number of parties/politicians prevailed, welfare policy tended to be premised on the lowest common denominator—the median voters such as consumers, women, labourers who often were unorganized and not geographically concentrated. As a result, the dispersed power structure went hand in hand with a loose but broad issue coalition—for specific welfare expansions–among academia, civil society, bureaucrats, and politicians irrespective of their ideology. In contrast, the concentrated power structure has seen radical turns to zero-sum political or ideological issues such as the constitutional reform in Japan or military measures toward North Korea/Mainland China in South Korea/Taiwan. This, in turn, marginalized welfare-related issues.

For my parents,

Wolsup Shim and Youngsuk Hwang

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Abbreviations

BOJ: Bank of Japan

CGP: Clean Government Party (usually called by its Japanese name, Komeito) (Japan)

CME: Coordinated Market Economy

CP: Conservative Party (Japan)

DJP: Democratic Justice Party (Korea)

DLP: Democratic Labour Party (Korea)

DP: Democratic Party (Korea)

DPP: Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)

DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan (Japan)

DSP: Democratic Socialist Party (Japan)

DUP: Democratic United Party (Korea)

GNP: Grand National Party (Korea)

ISI: Import Substitution Industrialization

JCP: Japanese Communist Party (Japan)

JSP: Japanese Socialist Party (later changed its name to Social Democratic Party) (Japan)

JRP: Japan Restoration Party (Japan)

KMT: Kuomintang (Taiwan)

LDP: Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)

LP: Liberal Party (Japan)

LP: Labour Party (Korea)

LME: Liberal Market Economy

LTCI: Long Term Care Insurance (the fifth public insurance in Korea and Japan)

MDP: Millennium Democratic Party (Korea)

MITI: Ministry of International Trade and Industry (became METI from 2001—Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry)

MMM (P): Mixed-Member-Majoritarian (Proportional) electoral system

MOF: Ministry of Finance (Japan)

MPs: Member of Parliaments (indicate members of the National Assembly in Korea; members of the Diet in Japan; members of the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan)

NP New Party (Taiwan)

NDRP: New Democratic Republican Party (Korea)

NKP: New Korea Party (Korea)

PFP People First Party (Taiwan)

PPGC: Pro-Park Geun-hye Coalition (Korea)

PR: Proportional Representative electoral system

PARC: Policy Affairs Research Council (Japan)

SP: Senuri Party (Korea)

SMD: Single Member District election system

SME: Small and Medium Enterprises

SNTV: Single Non-transferable Vote electoral rule

TSU Taiwan Solidarity Union (Taiwan)

ULD: United Liberal Democrats (Korea)

UNDP: United New Democratic Party (Korea)

UP: Uri Party (Korea)

UPP: United Progressive Party (Korea)

VoC: Varieties of Capitalism

YP: Your Party (Japan)

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1. Major Puzzles and Arguments

The whole project has been inspired by the following two puzzles of welfare system change in Korea and Japan: i) why do we see welfare expansion since 1990 along with the ever-growing neo-liberal influence? And ii) why there have been more welfare expansion happening during the periods when the political power was dispersed? Let me put each puzzle more in context.

Considering that the "developmental welfare state" is based on the idea of discouraging people from dependence on the state while providing necessary benefits for those working in productive sectors (Holliday and Wilding, 2003), the welfare state transitions observed in Korea and Japan from the 1990s onwards reflect important changes. The steady transformation of welfare benefits from a fragmented, indirect, and insufficient type into a universal[1], direct, and generous one suggests that Korea and Japan are now moving beyond the developmental welfare state (Kwon, 2005). Interestingly, this is happening through a "credit-claiming" welfare politics in Korea and Japan even in the midst of neo-liberal influence. This is a huge contrast to Anglo-European countries where retrenchment trend and "blame-avoidance" in welfare politics has become the norm. Given this context, the first puzzle of this study is to understand this counter-intuitive welfare expansion trend in two developed democracies in East Asia.

Second, legislative studies scholars often argued that majority situations outperform minority situations when it comes to legislative success (Cheibub, 2007). Echoing this, students of welfare studies have argued that having a large number of veto players is detrimental to welfare expansion since minority groups can easily block what can benefit the majority (Immergut, 1992; Steinmo, 1993; Huber and Stephans, 2001). However, insofar as Korea and Japan are concerned, a large number of landmark welfare legislation pieces, e.g. long-term

[1] The term "universal/particularistic" will be used interchangeably with "programmatic/clientelistic" through this work. Similarly, there are several other terms used inter-changeably throughout the chapters. i) "social policy" with welfare policy, social policy benefits, or welfare benefits; ii) welfare state with welfare model or welfare system, iii) welfare laws with welfare legislation or welfare bills, iv) "legislators" with MPs (Member of Parliaments), elected politicians, or lawmakers, and v) "cabinet/private member bills" with bureaucrat-sponsored/individual legislator-sponsored bills.

care insurance, health insurance, or rights-based public assistance, were enacted/amended/abolished[2] during minority/coalition government situations such as 1999-2002 in Korea or 1993-1996 in Japan.

To understand the twin trends of welfare expansion itself and more expansion during power dispersion in Korea and Japan, I argue that we need to go beyond the conventional boundaries of welfare state literature which tend to be based on i) orthodox social policies like pension, childcare, and insurance, ii) programmatic party competition with clear pre-election promises and post-election mandates, and iii) key cleavage revolving around socio-economic issues. In other words, it is imperative to draw insights from the latest development in welfare state literature recognizing multiple forms of welfare, multiple cleavages competing with each other, and multiple linkages connecting parties and voters (Estevez-Abe, 2008; Seelkopf and Starke, 2015; Hausermann et al., 2012; Kitschelt and Kselman, 2013).

With respect to the multiple forms of welfare, it is a well-accepted fact that Korea and Japan have achieved high levels of welfare outcomes with low social expenditure. "Growth with equity without state welfare" has long been a big riddle for the students of welfares state who tried to understand East Asian cases just with orthodox welfare benefits. For instance, From the perspective of classical welfare regime categories (Esping-Anderson, 1990)—which are solely based on orthodox social policies—Korea and Japan share key characteristics of all three welfare regimes, such as achieving high levels of egalitarian welfare outcome (socio-democratic) with low social expenditure (liberal) based on stratified social-insurance system (conservative). In this sense, it comes as no surprise that the recent meta-analyses of welfare regimes resulted in inconsistent categorization for Korea and Japan. For instance, Japan has been categorized as a specific welfare regime with only around 60% consistency (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011; Ebbinhaus, 2011). Similarly, after reviewing the details of 26 published studies about the Korean welfare regime between 1990 and 2012, Powell and Kim (2014) labelled the Korean system a "chameleon" that changes its appearance to different viewers, ranging from the classical classification (4) to hybrid (3), fourth regime (9), distinct world (4), or an immature (4) one.

As a way to understand this inconsistency, students of East Asian studies have often noticed various ways of achieving desired welfare outcomes beyond orthodox social policies, e.g.

[2] Compared to failed bills, enacted/amended/abolished bills are all successfully processed bills. From here onwards, I will indicate these successful bills just as "enacted" bills for simplicity's sake.

corporate welfare, the role of family, agricultural subsidies, construction projects, using a number of different terms such as "the welfare mix" (Rose and Shiratori, 1986), "political side-payment" (Pempel, 1998), "welfare state in a broader sense" (Campbell, 2002), "functional equivalents" (Estevez-Abe, 2008), "social policy by other means" (Mishra, 2004), or "surrogate social policy" (Kim, 2010). However, we do not know about the details of this "unorthodox welfare" such as the extent to which they have been used, who they target, who are the prime supporters, and what political and social processes they use before materialising and taking effect as bills. More importantly, we do not know the whole picture of welfare system changes if we consider both orthodox and unorthodox social policies in one country. Bearing this in mind, the study here will not only incorporate unorthodox social policies in the conceptual toolkit but also will attempt to theorize by showing what contribution it can have on understanding welfare politics in general.

Regarding multiple cleavages and party-voter linkages, Hausermann et al (2013) posed a sobering ***wake-up call positing that major cleavages, linkages, or preferences among major political actors and voters at specific time should not be simply assumed but carefully contextualised.*** For instance, as noted by Kitschelt (2001), going beyond the "frozen-labour-capital cleavage" put forward by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), major parties could compete not just over socio-economic issues but also over religion, environment, culture, or moral issues. The state-church cleavage in continental Europe (Van Kersbergen, 2009), the urban-rural cleavage in Nordic countries (Manow, 2009), or the ethnic, linguistic, or socio-cultural cleavages revolving around post material values (Inglehart, 1997) all represent important secondary cleavages affecting the form of welfare state change. Taking cue from this line of argument, I will show that the primary cleavage in Korea and Japan has not been socio-economic issues but issues more closely related to foreign policy/nationalism/authoritarian values; and I argue that this can be understood applying Lipset and Rokkan's framework focusing on political dynamics of the democratic transition period. As will be clear later, having non-social welfare issues as the primary cleavage can have very different implications on future welfare politics.

In a similar vein, going beyond the programmatic party competition postulated by Downs (1957), parties and electorates can be linked through clientelistic channels based on *quid-pro-quo* principle. Although this tends to go hand-in-hand with the developing countries with less democratic experience, the evidence shows this form of linkage can exist even in rich

developed countries (Kitschelt and Kselman, 2013). In the case of Korea and Japan, a long-lasting legacy of one-party dominant era is still visible in this form with particularistic social policies and co-exists with programmatic party competition based on more universal social policies.

As rightly pointed out by Picot (2009), specific linkage or cleavage a party focuses is strategic contingent upon changes in institutional arrangements and other parties positioning and my key findings directly resonates with this piece of insight.

By weaving key insights from these latest theoretical developments in welfare studies, I found that the dispersed power structure—e.g. divided, coalition, minority governments—of both nations was a hitherto unnoticed significant political factor behind the transformation of fragmented, indirect, and weak welfare benefits into universal, direct, and generous ones. That is, when bargaining among a number of parties prevailed during dispersed power periods, politics tended to be based on social welfare issues—which is secondary/tertiary cleavage in both countries—and welfare policies were likely to be orthodox ones for the median voters such as consumers, women, the disabled, or the elderly. This went hand in hand with a loose but broad issue coalition—for specific welfare expansions–among academia, civil society, bureaucrats, and politicians from a wide range of political spectrum. In contrast, the concentrated power structure often witnessed *quid-pro-quo* distributive politics based on particularistic and unorthodox social policies like construction projects, agricultural subsidies, and labour regulations for insiders without transparent democratic deliberation process. Moreover, it also has seen radical turns to the zero-sum first cleavage political or ideological issues such as the constitutional reform in Japan or military/diplomatic measures toward North Korea in South Korea. Obviously, this challenges the well-accepted proposition advanced by power-resource scholars that strong and encompassing trade unions and leftist parties are necessary institutional preconditions of universal welfare expansion

In reaching this conclusion, unlike the conventional approach using welfare expenditure data in analysing welfare politics, my analysis was based on an original dataset which includes the whole universe of bills (roughly 50,000), welfare related newspaper articles (roughly 30,000) and key attributes of elected politicians (roughly 2500) between 1987 and 2012. And also leveraged multiple methods such as logistic regression, elite interviews, social network analysis, and media content analysis to cross-validate and fine-tune my key findings.

2. Structure of Chapters

The plan of this study is as follows. Chapter 2 will expound the main model regarding the effect of power dispersion on welfare expansion. And, with relevant empirical details of each country, it will explain why Korea and Japan were chosen in light of factors known to be affecting welfare system changes in the welfare studies literature. The rest of the chapter will be used to emphasize the relevance and strengths of using hitherto under-explored legislation data in analysing welfare politics and with which sequence certain methods will be applied to test specific parts of the core theoretical claim.

Chapter 3 will test the existence of two crucial scope conditions my model is based on using quantitative legislation pattern data in addition to qualitative interviews and relevant secondary literature. Chapter 4 examines the theorized relationship between power dispersion and welfare expansion by relying on descriptive statistics and logistic regressions of welfare legislation patterns. Chapter 5 aims at further corroborating the key causal claim by leveraging on multiple methods such as social network analysis, media content analysis, and theory-informed narratives. Each method will test particular theoretical expectations going beyond leverage gained from variations between independent and dependent variables in the previous chapter. These methods will be focusing on aspects such as how legislators form bill co-sponsor networks over different kinds of welfare issues (social network analysis), to what extent and how welfare issues get portrayed in the major newspapers (media content analysis), and what choices relevant political actors engaged in law-enacting and revising processes, e.g. elite bureaucrats, parties, legislators, NGOs, journalists, have made and avoided on key welfare issues at different power dispersion levels (theory-informed narratives).

Chapter 6 introduces another most similar case Taiwan to show that cross-national variations in the degree and speed of welfare expansion can be explained with differences in electoral rules—candidate-centred election rule in Taiwan and majoritarian electoral rule in Korea and Japan—and constitutional structure—presidential Korea, semi-presidential Taiwan, and parliamentary Japan. Chapter 7 is the conclusion and it begins by summarizing the key aspects of the welfare politics in three countries since 1987 grounded in a wide range of empirical evidence this project presents. This then will allow us to see potential theoretical,

conceptual, methodological, and practical contributions of this work. The chapter closes by admitting limitations of the current project and suggests fruitful avenues of future research.

Chapter 2. East Asia and the Theory of the Welfare Development

1. Theory of Welfare Politics

Before the beginning of multi-party competition in the late 1980s, Korea and Japan could be categorized as a "developmental welfare state" which discouraged people from dependence on the state while providing necessary benefits for those working in productive sectors (Holliday, 2000; Kwon, 2005). However, as the intensity of competition between parties grew in the 1990s, students of East Asian welfare state have noted that the multi-party competition is a pivotal force of transforming the welfare system in this region into the western type (Wong, 2004; Aspalter, 2002; Estevez-Abe, 2008). However, this has not been a smooth democratic consolidation process going beyond civil rights and political rights to social rights (Marshall, 1992) based on more socioeconomically substantive understanding of democratic citizenship. And the expansion process has been undergoing through a lot of wax and wane and twist and turn.

Along with the varying degrees of expansion in Korea and Japan at different time periods, both countries have experienced several forms of power configurations—e.g. majority/minority government or coalition/single-party government—for the past two decades. This ample variation provides us a rare opportunity to test the effect of veto players on the welfare system change and the relevant argument has been developed as follows

From the classical perspective of veto players (Tsebelis, 2002)—the number of political actors who can block bills—it is natural to assume that a larger number of veto players is unfavourably associated with the development of universal welfare state as it would be difficult to pass relevant legislation. In this regard, *ceteris paribus*, ***having a dispersed power structure, e.g. coalition or minority government, is detrimental to the development of the welfare state.*** However, when it comes to empirical findings, scholars diverge on their verdict. On the one hand, some results show that having a large number of veto players hampers universalistic welfare state as it becomes easy for minority groups to block what benefits the majority (Immergut, 1992; Steinmo, 1993; Huber and Stephens, 2001). On the other hand, other findings show ***it is easier to change the status quo to an expansionary direction with a higher number of parties*** (Weingast, 1979; Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Crepaz, 2001).

Moreover, the negative association between the number of veto players and the size of welfare state contradicts well-established findings linking the larger numbers of parties—mostly created through PR electoral rule—to a more generous expansionary welfare state (Lijphart and Crepaz, 1991; Iverson and Soskice, 2006; Swank, 2002). As a way to reconcile these contradictory findings, there have been attempts to distinguish between different kinds of veto players and posit—*albeit* for different reasons—some veto players can facilitate welfare expansion.

For instance, Estevez-Abe (2008) differentiates constitutional veto players created by the constitution (e.g. a strong judicial court, a practice of referendum, a presidential system, a presidential system, or federal structure) from parliamentary veto players formed by election results (e.g. the number of parties in a government)[3], and argue that the latter can lead to a larger welfare state as it increases the tax raising capacity. Drawing insights from party identifiability (Hallerberg, 2001) and accountability (Strom, 2003) literature, Estevez-Abe argues this is possible during coalition or minority governments since no single party involved in raising tax can be easily identified and voted out in the next election. Similarly, some scholars (Birchfield and Crepaz, 1998; Crepez, 2004) differentiate collective veto players (e.g. parties in coalition governments) from competitive veto players (e.g. federal structure, president, bicameral legislature) in the sense that the former share collective political responsibility and are constantly exposed to face-to-face interactions while the latter represent separate agencies and compete with each other.

Notwithstanding timely attempts to recognize qualitative difference between veto-players, underlying political logic behind these distinctions is not very clear. For instance, for Estevez-Abe's distinction, how can we explain the increase of non-budgetary rights-based welfare benefits with the parliamentary veto players? More importantly, with regards to Estevez-Abe and Crepaz's distinction, what can be the primary analytical benefit of categorizing the president and the upper house as constitutional/competitive veto players considering their inter-dependency in the law-making? For instance, the frequent occurrence of oversized coalition governments in the lower house with the consideration of the ruling party's minority position in the upper house (Strom, 1990) shows an important element of

[3] Based on similar reasons, other scholars divides veto players with different labels, e.g. institutional and partisan (Tsebelis, 2002) and counter-majoritarian and consociational (Armingeon , 2002) veto players.

collective political destiny of two houses by electoral results. In a similar vein, individual legislators' reluctance in submitting bills directly against the president's preference is another aspect representing the inter-dependency between the legislative and executive branch (Larocca, 2006). So I argue that ***when it comes to accounting for national-level welfare politics, it is more analytically sensible to combine institutions whose actors are directly involved in national-level legislation process, collectively responsible for the legislative outputs, and constantly under electoral pressures based on direct elections***, i.e. president, lower house legislators, or upper house legislators[4]. Moreover, insofar as national-level legislation is concerned, the importance of these three actors cannot be over-emphasized since almost all bills should go through each of this actor on a regular basis. This is a considerable difference to other veto players like "a practice of referendum by the public", "federal structure", "judiciary branch", or "central bank" whose scope of intervention on legislation is limited or passive. Given these qualitative differences, I will separately label president, lower house, and upper house legislature as "election-based veto players".

More importantly, in addition to the conceptual shortcomings, the literature is yet to specify ***under which contexts veto players are more likely to promote/hamper welfare expansion*** with an elaboration of micro-foundation grounded in individual preferences and strategies of key political actors. Particularly problematic to the East Asian context is that welfares state theories developed from Anglo-European cases have narrowly focused on orthodox social policies such as pension, health insurance, and public assistance. Moreover, creation and expansion of these orthodox social policies often tended to be assumed as a result of welfare politics based on programmatic party competitions revolving around the labour-capital cleavage. However, these assumptions do not travel to many non-Anglo European countries and three particularly relevant reasons can be expounded with a particular emphasis on East Asian examples.

First ***is the lack of class-based political cleavage.*** In other words, a left-right cleavage based on social distribution was not entrenched in the mainstream politics which tend to be frequent in many Anglo-European countries. This can be attributed to both demand and supply factors. As for the demand factor, some countries can have less need for redistribution to begin with.

[4] The president or the upper house can be recognized as election-based veto players only of they have legislation veto powers. Going beyond these actors, if other directly elected political actors such as governor or mayor satisfy the conditions I satisfied, they can also be included.

Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are cases in point. Due to the legacies of post-war growth with equity, the gap between haves and have-nots was narrow in these countries and that guaranteed a comparatively close social distance between social classes which resulted in the high levels of support for solidarisitc values (Peng and Wong, 2010). Implicit in this growth with equity is that the economic costs of redistribution are not as large as other developing countries which have experienced serious inequality problems during their growth stage.

The power resources theory is one of the most established finding in welfare studies and its key argument is based on two political actors—left-wing parties and trade-unions—pushing for more welfare expansion. However, in many countries, this crucial supply factor can be lacking. For example, in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, the ***two central pillars of class-based politics have been significantly weakened:*** both countries excluded trade unions from national-level policy making through various means, e.g. allowing trade unions to be organised only at firm level or forbidding their political activities (Pempel and Ksunekawa, 1979; Deyo, 1987; Yang, 2006); and the creation of communist/socialist parties (or similar parties with communist-like redistributive appeals) has been legally forbidden in Korea and Taiwan under the authoritarian military rule (McAllister, 2007). Considering their close relationship with the US during the cold war and antagonist relationship/rivalry with neighbouring communist China and North Korea, an anti-communist/socialist norm has been particularly strongly imposed during the cold war time. However, what is puzzling is that three countries have experienced substantial welfare expansion since the 1990s even without an active involvement of trade-unions and left-wing parties.

To understand this, we should keep in mind that key cleavages have been other than capital-labour conflict for many non-Anglo European countries. Anyone with a passing familiarity with party politics in non-Anglo European countries can tell that the major axis of party competition in many African countries revolves around “ethnicity” and “regionalism” (Takougang, 1996) and “religion” for Middle Eastern countries (Razi, 1990). For Korea and Japan, reflecting the political dynamics of democratic transition, the left and right have been revolving around foreign policy/nationalism issues. In the case of Japan, despite the existence of a major left-wing party—the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP)—the primary divide was not on the distributive-economic issue but on approval or rejection of Japan’s constitution and military alliance with the U.S. Likewise, in Korea, the left-right cleavage was heavily focused on political reforms to further democracy—especially before 1987—or a diplomatic or

military stand toward North Korea or the U.S. Coupled with these demand and supply factors, particular political dynamics of key transition periods made foreign policy/nationalism issues the key dividing line between the left and right and this unexpectedly provided the ideological flexibility in later stage welfare politics after the late 1980s.

Second important aspect that should not escape our attention is that ***several countries still rely heavily on unorthodox social policies*** even with the increasing level of multi-party competition and global market integration. As will be specified in greater detail, unorthodox social policies refer to 1) policies which are functionally equivalent to the usual range of formal welfare state schemes or 2) policies which incentives regular involvement of non-state actors as providers or funders of public goods. Despite the under-recognition of unorthodox social policies in the mainstream welfare state literature, they have been widely used to protect people from various risks and maintain their income level. For instance, America's civil war veteran benefits are equivalent to old-age and disability pensions (Skocpol, 1995), Japan's life-long employment is equivalent to unemployment benefits (Pempel, 1989), Australia's immigration controls are equivalent to minimum wage protections (Castle, 1985), and the Soviet Union and Latin America's price controls and subsidies are equivalent to income maintenance (Standing, 1996; Huber and Bogliaccini, 2010). Moreover, we can also think of things such as job grants in Canada (Crampton, 2004), agricultural credits in India (Cole, 2009), electrification in India (Min, 2010), allocation of forest land in Kenya (Morjaria, 2011), infrastructure expenditures in Egypt (Blaydes, 2011), government-owned bank interest rates in Italy (Spienza 2004), and the list goes on.

For countries like Korea and Japan, unorthodox social policies have been more "orthodox" than orthodox social policies given their breadth and depth of application so far. Both countries directed their policy attention to a wide range of benefits such as enterprise-related fringe benefits (Song, 2003; Jacobs, 2000; 43P), occupational pensions (Conrad, 2012), agriculture subsidies (Kim, 2010; Hwang, 2016), family welfare (Izuhara and Forrest, 2013), postal savings (Estevez-Abe, 2008), lump-sum retirement grants (Hwang, 2016), or construction projects (Jun, 2010). The extensive degree of usage on this type of social policies can be supported with examples such as roughly 15% of Japan's total GDP being invested in construction (Okuda, 2001) employing 10% of workforce (Woodall, 1996: 83) and the agriculture sector in some rural regions like Gunma being one protected by 990% tariff on imports (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). These various ways of achieving desired

welfare outcomes beyond orthodox social policies have been recognized by scholars in East Asia using a number of different terms such as "the welfare mix" (Rose and Shiratori, 1986), "political side-payment" (Pempel, 1998), "welfare state in a broader sense" (Campbell, 2002), "functional equivalents" (Estevez-Abe, 2008), "social policy by other means" (Mishra, 2004), or "surrogate social policy" (Kim, 2010).

In Korea and Japan, unorthodox social policies can also be characterised by their political linkage with the right-wing parties. That is, the developmental state literature (Deyo, 1987; Pempel, 1993; Woo-Cumings, 2000) tells us that, between 1950 and 1980, both Korea and Japan had a stable political-bureaucratic connection guaranteed by one-party dominance; and with the easy access to the state resources, they could afford to be the primary provider/supporter of unorthodox social policies such as agricultural subsidies, life-long employment, regulatory protections, or family-based welfare. Considering the fact that the right-wing parties in both countries these days are basically the same parties of one-party dominance era, it is not unreasonable to expect that they are more likely to support and provide unorthodox social policies even after 1990, with the entrenched clientelistic networks they have built over decades. As unorthodox social policies usually target specific geographic constituents or organized groups, they can serve as an important means for the dominant right-wing parties to maintain their winning coalition as limited as possible. At the same time, heavy reliance on unorthodox social policies in the past means, orthodox social policies are not "owned issue" by any party in the competitive political market place. Moreover, since orthodox social policies are better equipped to deal with new types of emerging risks related to socio-demographic transitions and global integration, their demand has been increasing.

Third, politics has been mostly about "office-seeking" than "policy-seeking" since the late 1980s. This is not hard to explain because the basic assumption of programmatic policy-based party competition—the parties that emerge with universal enfranchisement will soon turn into responsible "mass parties"—does not hold in many of the non-Anglo European countries these days. Unlike the western-democracies which had moved step-by-step from national integration to industrialization, and finally to democratization process, two or even three processes are inter-mingled and happening at the same time in the third wave democracies (Huntington, 1993). ***In this context, it would not be natural to have institutionalized party system with clear ideological commitments.*** Large numbers of swing voters, high levels of electoral volatility, and frequent high-jacking of rival parties' popular

electoral platforms are all common features of non-programmatic party competition. Among these countries, the key party-voter linkage is more likely to be based on charismatic leadership, identity components (ethnicity, race, religion), or clientelistic *quid-pro-quo* exchanges (Kitshelt, 2015). Coupled with the de-polarized nature of social welfare issues, highly office-seeking politics is mostly likely to make major parties composed of factions with different views on social policies. Reflecting this, party competitions have not been quite programmatic in Korea and Japan as the western counterpart. As Appendix 7 shows, frequent relabeling in party names, as well as constant merges and splits between major left and right wing parties indicate that politics has been short-sighted. Moreover, on average, politicians were re-elected only 2-3 times in Korea and Japan during the multi-party competition period. In this political climate, elected politicians have had short-term horizon on policy issues so consistency between pre-election pledges and post-election mandates has not been high.

Considering the existence multiple cleavages, multiple forms of social policy, and multiple party-voter linkages in several non-Anglo European countries, the following two-by-two table can provide a more comprehensive understanding of welfare system change.

<Table 1> Combined Effect of Cleavage and Power Dispersion on Welfare System Change


	Power Dispersion	**Power Concentration**
Socio-economic Key Cleavage	Constrain Welfare Expansion/Retrenchment	Promote Welfare Expansion/Retrenchment
Non Socio-economic Key Cleavage	Promote Welfare Expansion	Constrain Welfare Expansion/Retrenchment & Promote Non-Socio-economic issues

Here the dispersion and concentration of power primarily refers to the increase/decrease in the number of election-based veto players. And the key cleavage can be either social welfare issues like many of Anglo-European countries or other issues based on nationalism,

authoritarian values, foreign policy, religion, ethnicity, or race. For simplicity's sake, I assume socio-economic cleavages and other cleavages do not cross-cut each other.

Many Anglo-European countries' cases fall into the upper left and right cells in Table 1. If social welfare is the key dividing line between the left and the right, we can expect to see higher degrees of welfare expansion or retrenchment depending on which party is in power during power concentration periods. In contrast, by conferring minority groups a substantial amount of legislative power to block bills going against their core preference, dispersed power structure will slow down both welfare expansion and retrenchment process. Then, how can we explain the relationship between welfare system change and power dispersion among countries having non-social welfare issues as their core cleavage? To tightly link expected changes in these countries with micro-logic grounded in individual-level preferences and strategies, we can think of the following circles of preference.

<Figure 1> Preference Circles on Welfare System Change



Here the amount of intersected area refers to the possible degree of compromise. By definition, non-social welfare issues—illustrated as A1 and A2[5]—are the key dividing point in these countries. In other words, these are ideological issues shaping the key DNA of major

[5] Although A1 is inside B1, it is not a subset of B1 by definition (welfare issues cannot be part of non-welfare issues). Therefore, A1 and B1 are mutually exclusive and so are A2 and B2.

parties illustrated by no inter-section point between A1 and A2. Just like key socio-economic issues do not leave much room for compromise in many of Anglo-European countries, e.g. Affordable Healthcare Act of the USA, other primary cleavage issues tend to be much less negotiable for a substantial number of non-Anglo European countries. On the contrary, for these countries, there is much less ideological contradiction in pushing for welfare issues represented by a substantial proportion of intersection between B1 and B2.

Given this set of preferences and other three key political conditions I pointed out, what can we expect during periods of power concentration and dispersion respectively? Starting from the times of power concentration, it will be natural for key political actors to prioritise something they deeply care or can make substantial change only during this time—the first cleavage issues. This ranges from things like strengthening/weakening the linkage between religion and state in Turkey to privileging certain ethnic groups in Taiwan.

For Korea and Japan, the core executives of so called right-wing parties like the GNP (Korea) or the LDP (Japan), will try to touch on the first-cleavage issues like resetting diplomatic relationships with the US (Japan)/North Korea (Korea) and revising/reinterpreting constitutions (Japan). Just like right-wing parties, they will be tempted to engage in ideologically charged issues like recovering relationship with North Korea (Korea) or maintaining the peace constitution (Japan). Moreover, given a near four decades of right-wing party governance, the rule of game was set more favourably towards the mainstream right-wing parties in both countries. Particular thorns on the left-wing/centre-left wing parties' side were conservative and resisting bureaucrats and public prosecutors, so more energy will be put to political reforms such as 'making elected politicians taking the initiative' or 'democratizing the judiciary/executive branch' to level the playing field.

In contrast, as power becomes dispersed during minority government or coalition government**,** it becomes constitutionally (not meeting the legislative threshold to pass relevant bills) and politically (by the pressure of targeting median voters who care more about bread-and-butter issues) infeasible to push zero-sum ideological issues in circle A1 and A2. Instead, parties as a whole and legislators individually are more likely to promote issues that can be negotiated to a greater extent with opposition parties like positive-sum welfare issues in circle B1 and B2 as illustrated with the dotted arrows in Figure 1. Even though welfare issues do not align with the core concerns of many major parties, not making any legislative attempt would be a

politically risky strategy since they then can be punished collectively by voters under the name of lower productivity and legislative malfunction (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989).

As can be clear in the logic specified here, there is a mismatch between key political actors' top preferences, e.g. first cleavage issues, and what median voters value more in general, e.g. welfare issues, during concentrated power structure while this gap gets minimized as power gets dispersed.

To understand this chronic political problem, although barely applied to East Asian cases, I argue that key insights can be directly drawn from Lipset and Rokkan's "freezing cleavage hypothesis". As pointed out by Meir (2001), this hypothesis becomes no more than a piece of "empirical observation" on history of European party politics if we expect national and industrial revolution happening step-by-step through a long stretch of time and "class cleavage" appearing as the dominant axis of political conflict everywhere. However, we can make it as a hypothesis going beyond European experiences if we abstract the key idea that particular political dynamics during critical junctures get crystallized and can have a lasting stamp on the subsequent political development (Bornschier, 2009).

In this sense, ***the mismatch of fundamental priorities between key political elites and electorates can be attributed to the stickiness of first-cleavage formed during the democratic transition period*** (the period of full mobilization of electorates) when the collective political identities of key parties were shaped. This then resisted to be self-updated or replaced by other emerging parties reflecting more pressing matters at the later stage (since the key parties already dominated the political marketplace). With regards to the particular mechanism of stickiness of the two countries' first cleavage, key insights can be gleaned from "path dependency" argument popularized by historical institutionalists (Thelen, 1999; Pierson, 1997): once a certain path is taken, the costs of reversal get increasingly high. In our cases, the taken pass is "having nationalism/foreign policy oriented cleavage" during the democratic transition stage[6]. As pointed out by Pierson (2001), this political dynamics got self-reinforced and perpetuated overtime due to "self-adaptation" and "high initial set-up costs".

[6] However, along with the short history of party competition, the influence of clientelistic linkage between voters and parties can reduce the clarity of this cleavage from time to time.

Having specified the key structural logic of welfare politics going beyond Anglo-European countries, we can go a step further by asking ***what type of welfare is more likely to be developed during high power dispersion periods***. Among various dimensions of welfare, e.g. funding-structure, functions, target, or saliency, one unsolved puzzle in the welfare state literature is that higher political competition seems to lead to either more universal welfare or particularistic welfare. In light of the three political conditions I specified, for non-Anglo European countries, both programmatic and clientelisitc party competition are highly likely to coexist. Given the close elective affinity between programmatic party competition and universal welfare on the one hand and clientelistic party competition and particularistic welfare on the other hand, what the literature needs is an analytical tool helping us to understand substantial level of with-in welfare variation in these countries.

As for the relationship between power dispersion and the type of welfare expansion, one line of literature emphasizes on the possibility of "race-to-the-top" expansion to universal welfare type. For instance, Schmidt (2010) argues that opposition parties with institutionalised cooperation ability or outright veto positions could lead to a social policy race such as in Germany in 1972 between the social-liberal government and Christian Democratic opposition. Similarly, based on the Korean and Taiwanese case, Wong (2004) points out that when electoral competition occurred among political entrepreneurs, it resulted in a "race to the top" and a "ratcheting up" of promises concerning welfare policy reform. From the perspective of legislative studies, this can happen because when bargaining among a number of parties prevail, policy tended to be premised on the lowest common denominator—the median voters such as consumers, women, labourers who are mostly unorganized and not geographically concentrated (Downs, 1957). In contrast, some scholars predict "divide-and-satisfy" situation through particularistic goods. For instance, Persson and Tabellini (1999) point to the demand side of multi-party system by arguing that the system facilitates each party in the government wanting to spend on its own group, thereby leading to a common pool problem with excessive spending (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006; Crepaz, 1998). According to this explanation, politicians would target certain groups or regions, and their welfare provisions are likely to be based on the *quid pro quo* principle—expecting votes from beneficiaries with the possibility of monitoring and punishing.


Then how can we reconcile between these two different contradicting lines of argument? Here, I draw insights from electoral studies on the mediating effect of electoral rules.

Particularly relevant to my argument is the degree of personalization electoral incentive provides. And for this, established work by Shugart and Carey (1995) shows that personal vote can be incentivized depending on i) access to and rank on ballots by the party leadership ii) degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes and iii) whether voters cast a single intra-party vote. Applying this logic, Estevez-Abe (2008) derives the possible direction of welfare system changes in Japan from whether it was under the Mixed Member District-Single Non-Transferrable Vote rule (henceforth, MMD-SNTV) or the SMD-oriented majoritarian electoral rule. Since votes cannot be transferred with-in the same party members and more than 2-6 candidates get elected per district (depending on district the number varies), the MMD-SNTV system makes same party members to compete with each other. This can be attributed to the fact that any party seeking to win a parliamentary majority should win more than two seats per district and, in that case, party label cannot be a distinguishing selling point. Under this circumstance, co-partisans had to resort to expensive personal appeals with gifts and favours and this has been a central cause of "money politics" in Japan causing lots of financial scandals (Reeds and Thies, 2010).

In contrast, Japan's mixed member electoral rule since 1994 is a strong majoritarian one which consists of 60% of single member district seats and 40% of proportional representative seats. The district magnitude of PR varied from 7 to 33 and many of them are filled by best-loser candidates from the district tier thereby creating strong majoritarian incentives for running candidates in general. Therefore, Estevez-Abe (2008) shows welfare benefits to be more particularistic under the old rule while more universal with the new rule during minority or coalition government periods. This logic can also be applied to countries which went through similar transition from MMD-SNTV to a strong majoritarian rule like Taiwan.

Taking cue from this line of reasoning, I am contending that the ***power dispersion levels interact with the degree of personalizing incentives created by electoral rules.*** Therefore, along with the intensification of political crisis during high dispersion periods, I expect parties and legislators to prioritize more on catering particularistic benefits to a wider range of targeted groups under highly personalized electoral rule (like the dotted arrows in Figure 2) while the Downsian logic will make them focus more on providing universal benefits to median voters under the majoritarian electoral rule (like the dark strait arrows in Figure 2).

<Figure 2> Preference Circles[7] on With-in Welfare Change



For countries like Korea and Japan which had had a highly majoritarian electoral rule for most of the periods between 1987 and 2012, it is quite clear that "race-to-the top" will be more likely instances driving more universal welfare expansion during the dispersed power structure. ***Furthermore, the idea of competition and cooperation are likely to exist at the same time*** during dispersed power structure and raise the success rate of legislative attempts for universal welfare issues. Regarding this, I can specify four different mechanisms of this race-to-the top welfare politics on universal welfare in light of the three specified scope conditions. To reiterate, beyond Anglo-European countries, it is not uncommon to observe short-sighted office-seeking politics, political actors' ideologically flexibility on welfare issues, and relatively unchartered nature of universal welfare benefits due to heavy reliance on unorthodox bills in the past.

Within this context, we can think of four different political dynamics in relation to particular welfare issues depending on the "popularity of welfare" and "position of key political actors (legislators, parties, and core-executives) on them".

[7] Here, the space containing particular benefits (big black circles) does not intersect between two parties. However, due to the interest-based nature of particularistic benefits, they are not as ideological distant as primary cleavages like A1 and A2 thereby providing more room for political compromise.

First is for highly salient bills both parties agree in principle. Upon facing situations when rival parties/party members submit these welfare bills, the rational action would be to outbid them by submitting similar welfare bills with higher benefit levels to win favour from median voters (given the short-sighted nature of politics I assume political actors do not contemplate seriously on future budget constraints). Social investment welfare bills like education, training, or childcare can be good examples falling into this category (cell B). Second, as for the low saliency welfare bills some political actors agree, there would not be serious rivalry between parties given their minimal effect on future electoral competitions. In this case, it is likely that political actors from different parties form a coalition and push that agenda in a cooperative fashion. Cross-party coalition on gender welfare bills is a good illustration of this (cell A)

Even if political actors are in disagreement on certain welfare issues (like situations cell in cell c and d), it is not very likely to reject each other's legislative attempts on universal welfare bills during dispersed power structure periods. As I pointed out, for many developed non-Anglo European countries, there is high demand for universal welfare owing to their unbalanced reliance on unorthodox social policies during the one-party dominance time and their growing inadequacy to tackle new emerging risks. Given the high demand of universal welfare bills in general, it can be politically risky to turn them down and get exposed to scrutiny by monitoring NGOs or the media. For example, if one individual legislator is pushing for welfare bills focusing on marginalized people who do not possess much political clout and electoral saliency, opposing political actors (even though they are "opposing" the opposition is not likely to be ideological but functional or logistical given the depolarized nature of social welfare issues) are more likely to take no position instead of making an active attempt to turn it down. Welfare bills for patients with rare illness can be a relevant example to this case. Finally, for high saliency bills such as public assistance, health care, or pension, some politicians might be opposed to universal welfare expansion representing particular interest groups with different preferences, e.g. doctoral association or business groups. Therefore, for legislative attempts to increase the level of benefits for median voters at the expense of specific interest groups, opposing politicians can criticize that the expansion attempt is a "vote-buying exercise" but they are less likely to mobilize politically to bring down that bill considering the political backlash afterwards and the risky political condition of high power dispersion when parties are desperate for single vote. In a similar vein, even if

one wants to cut-down welfare benefit level, it is unlikely to actively make herself expressive during this period.

All in all, given the particular political contexts I specified, strategically moving from non-welfare issues to welfare issues can involve a lot of competitions but still can be cooperative in the sense that no particular political actor will actively try to reject legislative attempts for universal welfare expansion (this is why the welfare politics is labelled as "conciliatory". As a result, other things being equal, the success ratio of universal welfare bills are likely to go up during high concentration periods.

<Table 2> Four Patterns of Conciliatory Welfare Politics

	Low Saliency	**High Saliency**
Political Agreement	A: Cooperate (gender welfare)	B: Compete (education, childcare)
Politically Disagreement	C: Abstain (rare illness)	D: Criticize (health care, pension)

2. Research Scope and Case Selection

Here, I chose Korea and Japan for this particular project and the reason is twofold. First, as a sub-field of welfare state research, welfare politics in East Asia has been largely under-explored despite its potential real-world implications. Second, more importantly, ***the two countries are ideally poised to test the effect of political institutions on welfare system change in the wider context of co-existing multiple cleavages, party-voter linkages, and welfare forms.*** That is, insofar as Korea and Japan are concerned, we can see politics being played over multiple cleavages (e.g. ethnicity, foreign policy, authoritarian values), and politicians providing both orthodox and unorthodox social policies to voters though programmatic or clientelistic or linkages. Moreover, there has been ample variation in both countries in power dispersion level— a particular aspect of political institution—and welfare legislation patterns between 1987 and 2012. In contrast, several aspects that can potentially

explain the ebb and flow of welfare politics—culture, colonial legacy, previous welfare institutions, economic structures and development level, socio-demographic transitions, and other aspects of political institutions other than power dispersion levels—have either not changed or changed to one direction almost linearly. Therefore, having minimized the influence of confounding variables by design, both countries are ideal cases to test the influence of one variable over time as a parallel case comparison.

2.1. Imperatives of Comparison

Peter Lindert (2004: 377) once noted the "Robin Hood paradox" of social spending: "Redistribution from the rich to the poor is least present when and where it seems most needed". Ironically, for several decades, the comparative welfare policy literature has exhibited a similar paradox. Mares (2009: 374) notes that "it has generated immense knowledge about welfare policy in the richest countries of the world and too little about cases where welfare policy can have the biggest impact". For instance, although scholars were well aware of the developmental paths (Woo-Cumings et al., 2000) and democratic transformations (Diamond, 1998) in post-war East Asia, little attention was paid to the parallel development, or lack thereof, of welfare policies until the late 1980s. This can be attributed to the immaturity of welfare programmes in the region, and lack of systematically comparable data. However, the steady economic growth went hand-in-hand with low inequality and poverty rates—*albeit* with low levels of social spending—and spurred academic interests of scholars from the late 1980s (Choi, 2006). The sub-field began with several western scholars writing overview articles on East Asian social policy (Midgley, 1986; Jones 1990) and was followed by many East Asian scholars looking into their own countries in depth (Takahashi, 1997; Ku, 1997; Tang, 1998; Kwon, 1999). Further academic attention was drawn to these countries when several ambitious social security programs and public assistance enlarged the basis of the welfare state infrastructure after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. This widespread interest brought scholars who approached the welfare state scholarship from various angles (from policy, system, or regime) and scopes (as a single case, as a region, or as a trans-regional comparison), and even reached the point of conducting a meta-analysis (Ku and Finer, 2007) to keep track of the trends. However, no research to date has focused on comparing the welfare politics of more than one East Asian country at the scale I propose here. Understanding the contexts, effects, and mechanisms of welfare politics

has never been more important in East Asian countries, since intensified political competition often led short-sighted politicians to over-promise and under-deliver. This pattern not only caused lower welfare outcomes than expected, but also undermines the legitimacy of elected government with democratic mandates. In the long term, it can also fail to strike a balance between various needs of today's voters and future generations, but also disillusion citizens with politics itself.

2.2. Potential Explanatory Factors and Comparability between Korea and Japan

2.2.1. Historical and Cultural Background

Despite its clear influence through various paths—constraining post-colonial ideas, continuing economic and political ties that survive de-colonization, and administrative structures—colonial legacy is often a blind spot in comparative social policy research (Midgely, 2011). It is particularly relevant to social policy research in that we tend to observe policy makers in newly independent countries following an institutional setting created by their colonial masters (Kangas, 2012). For instance, Schimitt (2015)'s analysis of 91 Spanish, French, and British colonies from 1820 to the present time shows that colonial heritage has been a crucial factor in accounting for the adoption and form of social security programs. For instance, heterogeneous social security programs reflect the British Empire's decentralized strategy. Park and Jung (2008)'s work extends the same logic to the Japanese Empire, ascribing Korea and Taiwan's social insurance model to Japan's colonial legacy and later developmental stage, and Singapore and Malaysia's provident funds model to their British colonial legacy.

Korea and Japan took highly similar developmental trajectories with the shared colonial legacy and experience of external land reform for the first half of the 20th century; and a comparable development path—*albeit* at different speeds—afterwards. As noted by Cumings (1987: 11), roughly fifty years of Japan's distinctive colonizing left strong imprints in Korea's political economies. For instance, railroad lines were laid, ports were opened, and agricultural output, e.g. rice in Korea, increased by leaps and bounds (ibid). However, more importantly, a series of externally imposed land reforms, e.g. by Japan, by the U.S., and even by North Korea (in the case of South Korea), during the first half of the 20th century provided

a favourable condition for later state-directed development. Particularly important was the United States' regional strategy, which made Korea and Japan undertake land reforms against the preference of vested interests in order to prevent socialist revolutions (Kwon, 1998). In contrast to Latin America, this dismantled the class structure and potentially gave more leeway to the state, serving as a favourable condition for welfare expansion.

The cultural dimension is another aspect students of East Asian welfare state often point to as a crucial determinant of social policy structure between East Asian countries. For instance, the "Confucian welfare state" argument put forward by Jones (1990, 1993) continued to influence East Asian welfare studies, at least, until the late 1990s (Rieger and Leibfried). According to this explanation, East Asian governments' minimal welfare commitments can be ascribed to several characteristics of Confucian values such as self-reliance, filial piety, respect for seniors, paternal benevolence, and placing group before the individual (Goodman and Peng, 1996). These Confucian traits put the caring burden on the shoulder of the family instead of the state and, in a similar vein, companies were seen as a family writ-large and took care of their employees with paternalism. This is clearly represented in Jones' definition of the Confucian welfare state (1993: 214): "Conservative corporatism without (Western-style) worker participation; subsidiarity without equality; *laissez faire* without libertarianism… welfare states—run in the style of a would-be traditional, Confucian, extended family". Taking a more quantitative approach, Huang and Chang (2016) analyses how cultural legacy affects people's welfare preference in the People's Republic of China—the motherland of Confucianism—using the Asian Barometer Survey. Building on Shin's work (2011), this study dissolves Confucianism into the three components—paternalism, communitarianism, and familialism—and shows that these are positively related to more direct state-based welfare provision.

Simple and intuitive as the cultural approach may be, it could not escape criticism from various angles. Several scholars have argued that i) this approach is too static to explain on-going changes, especially the recent welfare state expansion in some East Asian countries; ii) the sheer diversity (Walker and Wong, 2005) and vagueness (White and Goodman, 1998) of Confucian values does not render itself to a systematic analysis; iii) family-based welfare might be not the reflection of Confucian value but a forced dependency lacking alternatives (Esping-Anderson, 1997); and more fundamentally, Confucianism is not the predominant social norm in some Asian countries such as the largely Catholic Philippines or mostly

Muslim Indonesia. Although the jury is out regarding the influence and specific direction of Confucian culture on welfare systems in East Asian countries, we cannot deny that both Korea and Japan share the same cultural code in this aspect.

2.2.2. Developmental Path, Economic Structure, and Developmental Gap

The Varieties of Capitalism approach (VoC) has provided key insights into the linkage between economic structure and welfare system. First, the scholarship has moved beyond the traditional notion of the antinomy between capitalist and labour proposed by the power resources scholars. Second, it also broadened the scope of previous rational choice institutionalism by underscoring the institutional complementarities among the production regimes, welfare arrangements, and political configurations (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Specifically, supporters of the Varieties of Capitalism approach (Iverson and Soskice, 2006; Hall and Soskice, 2001) point out that generous welfare benefits are institutionally inter-complementary to Coordinated Market Economies (CME) and Proportional Representation. The approach succeeded in turning this macro-level association to casual relations by linking the findings with micro-level preference of key actors and tracing back to the 19th century to explain the origins and co-evolving processes of different institutions in light of their surrounding socio-economic and political conditions (Thelen, 2004; Iverson and Soskice, 2009)[8].

Although still in its embryonic stage, the VoC approach also started to receive attention from East Asian scholars, as researchers began to look for the causal link between state coordination, business power, and social protection. For instance, Kim (2012) emphasized that the state's mobilization through saving and the "capital accumulation" oriented tax policy were key factors in explaining the interaction between the developmental welfare

[8] Despite its invaluable contribution to the welfare state literature, one major limitation of this approach is that it presumes coherent preferences among capitalists and overlooks other possible variables that can account for preference variations within each type of economy (Mares, 2009); just to name a few, the level of competition in product markets (Swenson, 2002), the level of risk between firms (Mares, 2003), the existence of private policies (Hacker, 2002), and the political contacts established by the firm (Martin, 1990). Furthermore, although this approach can be useful in explaining welfare benefits directly linked to the job market such as unemployment benefits or industrial accident insurance, it falls short of accounting for other important welfare benefits—which receive a substantial part of total welfare expenditure—such as pension and childcare benefits.

regime and the developmental production in South Korea and Japan. Similarly, in accounting for the difference in the national pension funds between Korea and Taiwan before democratization, Choi (2008) points out the motivation of the Korean government's desire to upgrade industrial structure towards heavy and chemical industry (Shin, 2003) while the Taiwanese government was less eager to mobilise huge funds owing to its SME-oriented industrial structure.

Although it does not draw insights directly from the VoC approach, the developmental welfare state/productivist regime explanation[9] (Kwon, 2005; Holliday; 2000) had been one of the most accepted theories explaining the East Asian welfare state based on the unique developmental paths of both countries. Specifically, it takes a cue from the well-established developmental state literature (Johnson, 1982; Deyo, 1992; Woo-Cumings, 2000), which explains the rapid economic development of the "Asian Tigers" and Japan with the strong coordinating role of the government. The crux of this argument is that social policies have been subordinate to the overarching goal of economic development in East Asian countries—the *raison d'être* of the authoritarian state. This is well supported by i) the weak notion of social rights; ii) "the strategy of commodifiation plus state regulation in welfare provision" (Aspalter, 2011: 741); iii) the high spending for education and implementation of health and industrial-accident insurance on the one hand, and the underdevelopment of income maintenance programs and social service on the other hand. According to Kwon (2005), East Asian countries still bear the imprint—*albeit* with a more inclusionary character—of the developmental welfare state, even after their democratic transitions and on-going socio-demographic shifts[10].

[9] While the developmental welfare state is associated with the historically specific and complicated inter-linkage between the state, business, and the international environment of developmentalism, the productivist regime is a more narrow definition only used to describe the productivist nature of East Asian welfare regimes (Choi, 2012).

[10] Unlike the Confucian welfare regime argument, developmental welfare state explanation is widely accepted among scholars in spite of the following criticisms: i) productivist elements such as work-type public assistance and limited benefit coverage cannot be distinguished from western liberal regime (Choi, 2006); ii) it falls short of explaining the development of essentially non-productivist welfare benefits towards the disabled, children, and the poor, which are the result of party competitions and coalitions between non-state actors such as academics, opposition parties, and civil society; and iii) it lacks quantifiable and systematic indicators to measure its core concepts like 'social policy subordination to economic policy' (Kim, 2008).

In addition to the shared culture and colonial legacies, Korea and Japan feature striking levels of similarity in their developmental paths and economic structure[11]. Given their geo-political significance, both countries received disproportionally generous military and economic aid from the U.S. in the 1950s compared to Latin American and African countries. Moreover, just as Japan enjoyed war-time procurement from the Korean War during the 1950s, Korea benefited economically from the Vietnam War in the 1960s. However, in addition to these external factors, both nations went further and even coined the term "East Asian Growth Model" based on the following characteristics (Vogel, 1991; Deyo, 1987): i) stable rule by a political-bureaucratic elite that did not give into political demands that would undermine economic growth; ii) cooperation between public and private sectors under the overall guidance of a pilot planning agency; iii) heavy and continuing investment in education for everyone, combined with policies to ensure the equitable distribution of the wealth created by high-speed growth; and iv) a government that understands the need to use and reject methods of economic intervention based on the price mechanism. As a result, both countries excluded trade unions from national-level policy making, exploited women's labour, and kept state expenditure on welfare low. Moreover, it is particularly interesting that as Korea industrialized in the post-war era, they increasingly adopted Japan's pre-war *zaibatsu*-like corporate structure based on familial hierarchy and filial loyalty such as "New Spirit" movement of Korea (Cumings, 1987: 13). This movement was felt particularly strong in Korea, and is well captured by East Asian specialist Ezra Vogel (1991: 53):

> The Korean Finance Ministry and Ministry of Trade and Industry looked very much like Japan's Ministry of Finance and MITI. To promote foreign trade, MITI had established JETRO (the Japan External Trade Organization), and South Korea established KOTRA (the Korea Overseas Trade Association). To manage technology introduced from abroad, MITI had established AIST (the Agency for Industrial Science and Technology), and South Korea established KIST (the Korean Institute for Science and Technology). Japan early on had a Reconstruction Bank that was later replaced by the Japan Development Bank. South Korea also initially had a Reconstruction Bank that was later renamed the Korean Development Bank. South Korea founded a Federation of Korean Industries similar to Japan's Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren)

[11] Even Soskice (1999) separately clusters two countries as "group-based coordination economies".

to deal with general management issues and a Korean Employers' Association similar to the Japan Federation of Employers' Association (Nikkeiren) to deal with labour issues. After Japan set up the Japan Economic Institute in Washington, D.C., to provide information to American officials, South Korea set up a Korean Economic Institute there with similar goals.

Despite these similarities, one might argue that both countries are incomparable given the economic structure and developmental level. As can be seen from Table 3, the economic structural gap between both nations narrowed prior to the 1990s, and was highly similar since then.

<Table 3> Industrial Structure Transition and Development of Key Public Insurance

Korea	**Japan**
<u>Industrial Structure</u>	
Labour-intensive Import Substitution Industry (1960-1962)	Labour-intensive Light Industry (1880-1930)
Labour-intensive Light Industry (1962-1970)	Capital-intensive Heavy Industry (1930-1965)
Capital-intensive Heavy Industry (1970-1980))	Knowledge-intensive High-Tech Industry (1965-present)
Knowledge-intensive High-Tech Industry (1980-present)	
<u>Major Welfare Expansions (Adoption year, Universalization year)</u>	
Health Insurance: 1977, 1999	Health Insurance: 1922, 1938
Pension Scheme: 1973, 1986	Pension Scheme: 1941, 1959
Industrial accident: 1953, 1963	Industrial accident: 1911, 1947
Unemployment Insurance: 1993, 1993	Unemployment Insurance: 1947, 1974
Long Term Care Insurance: 2008	Long Term Care Insurance: 2000

Source: Deyo (1987) and Social Security Programs throughout the World (2013)

With regards to the levels of economic development and modernization, it is hard to deny that Japan had been more advanced than Korea during our period of observation (particularly before 1995). This gap between the two countries can be raised from the point of view of the first generation of Anglo-European welfare state literature rooted in the functional or

structural perspective. This approach aimed to understand the emergence of the welfare state with the logic of economic development, modernization, or democratization. The earliest research on the welfare state sought to identify the broad structural preconditions of welfare spending over the *longue duree*. Wagner (1892) conjectured that higher levels of income would be associated with higher levels of spending on social programs. For other scholars, the primary causal factor accounting for the development of social programs was not economic development *per se* but the labour market transformations triggered by industrialization (Polanyi, 1944).

Simple as this explanation may be, it could not account for variance among rich capitalist countries, let alone differences in policy design within a country. To make matters worse, the effect itself sometimes disappears or significantly weakens after controlling for additional economic variables or political variables (Adsera and Boix, 2002; Haggard and Kaufmann, 2008). Likewise, the linear understanding of the structural approach does not even pass a *prima facie* evaluation when it comes to explaining the welfare development, or lack thereof, of Korea and Japan. For instance, it could not explain why East Asian economies retained minimalist welfare states despite increasing income levels and public revenue. The fact that Japan has been the world's second largest economy since the 1960s without having to expand its welfare state is a good illustration of this (similarly, the U.S. has been the world's largest economy for a long time despite its minimalist welfare state). This clearly shows that the level of economic development is far from a sufficient condition for a generous welfare state. Even if one argues that a certain level of economic development is a necessary condition for the western-style welfare system, Korea passed this threshold when it became an OECD member (the so called "rich countries' club") in 1996.

Finally, despite similarities in developmental path, economic structure, and developmental gap, we should not discount that Korea had had a more favourable economic environment than Japan during our period of observation. As can be clear from Haggard and Kaufmann's (2008) comparison of several East Asian countries (including Korea and Taiwan) with Latin America and Eastern Europe, having fewer fiscal constraints can be a crucial condition for a more generous and universal welfare expansion: many Latin American and Eastern European countries had long-term and structural constraints. In this sense, Japan is known for its two "lost decades", and this difference will be considered in the later regression models by including "annual GDP growth rate" as a control variable.

2.2.3. Welfare Legacy

The new institutionalism approach is notable in considering the impact of a country's welfare legacy on welfare system change. Unlike the description-oriented old institutionalism, the new institutionalist approach—rekindled by March and Olson (1989)—brought institutions back as an explanatory tool. Among others, the historical institutionalism strand focuses on the historical legacies of earlier institutional choices, such as a choice of a particular type of welfare program or a state structure (King, 1995; Weir and Skocpol, 1985). Scholars who adhere to this approach explain cross-national differences in terms of historical institutional legacies using sophisticated concepts such as timing and sequence, critical juncture and path dependence, or unintended consequences (Pierson, 2004). In light of welfare politics, programs with a large-scale managing organization, wider beneficiaries, and longer history will be better positioned to have political clout (Hacker, 2002). For instance, a contribution-based social security benefit for the aged is likely to be more broadly popular than a mean-tested cash-assistance program for the poor (who are politically weak and fragmented). In addition to the material consequences—resource distribution between different groups—of the policy feedback, an equally important element is the ideational consequence, which happens cumulatively over time (Mares, 2009; Swank, 2002). That countries with more universal and generous welfare benefits display high levels of popular support and a belief that the benefits are fair is a good illustration of this.

These insights on "policies create politics" have been systematically theorized in the welfare studies field by making ***a clear distinction between "old" and "new" politics of the welfare state.*** Pioneered by Pierson (1994, 1996), this approach argued that the old politics of welfare state occurred during the Golden Age of welfare expansion and dealt with credit-claiming and partisan politics. However, the 1980s ushered in an era of permanent austerity and the logic of new politics in times of welfare retrenchment is fundamentally different from the welfare expansion. This is because i) it concentrates losses for specific groups whilst dispersing gains to all taxpayers; and ii) the expansion era bolstered the popularity of welfare programs along with well-connected politically active vested interests. Therefore, welfare politics in this era is about blame-avoidance, which explains the apparent resilience of the welfare state, rendering the structural approach or power resource theory a weak explanatory tool.

On this matter, Korea and Japan stand apart from not only developed Anglo-European countries but also Latin America and Eastern Europe. Considering the fact that unorthodox social policies had been the primary means of protecting risks and maintaining income levels, the state-based welfare was minimal. So, by the time both countries entered the era of multi-party competition, welfare issues were *tabula rasa* in the political marketplace. In contrast to this, Haggard and Kaufmann (2008) point out that even before 1990, Latin American welfare states were deep (but not wide) while Eastern European welfare states were wide (but not deep). This then created a hostile political condition for welfare reforms, since politicians had to deal with both existing beneficiaries and groups with a stake in the status quo, e.g. public service providers, the financial sector, pharmaceutical companies, socially-oriented NGOs.

Regarding the particular type of social welfare development, surprisingly, both countries have adopted a social insurance model (instead of provident fund, employer-liability, or social assistance model) in tackling risks related to work injury, health, old-age, and unemployment. As Table 3 shows, by 2000, both countries universalized the five major forms of social insurance, including long-term care for the elderly. In addition, the insurance model had been preferred even before the multi-party competition era in the form of patient capital—pension or life-insurance funds designed for the government's financial mobilization to upgrade/shift industrial structure (Estevez-Abe, 2001). However, their "modern" welfare states similar to those in the West are still at the burgeoning stage. If we assume that ceiling effects trigger welfare state retrenchment owing to the investment and accumulation decline problem, and regard the threshold of social spending as, say, 40% of the GNP, both nations have a lot more to expand, given the level of spending over the past two decades.

2.2.4. Socio-demographic Transitions and Welfare Demand

Needless to say, on-going socio-demographic transitions have been one of the most important push factors for higher welfare demand. From the welfare state literature, ***particularly noteworthy*** is the attention to new risks as a result of socio-demographic shifts (Bonoli and Natali, 2012). Simply put, a ***distinction can be made between old risks, (e.g. infant mortality, old age, malnutrition, industrial accidents) and new risks (e.g. single parenthood, precarious employment, work-family balance) and each is linked with different political***

dynamics. The welfare state for old risks was advocated by people with relatively homogeneous preferences and political mobility (e.g. old people or manufacturing labourers) and is matured already, while provisions for new risks are still in the developing stage in many countries and supported by different groups with heterogeneous preferences, lacking both solidarity and political influence.

In contrast to the latest retrenchment trend in Anglo-European countries, the politics of welfare expansion are evident in areas such as family policies (Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011) or active labour market policies (Hausermann, 2012) in the face of population ageing, changing gender and family roles, and an increasingly dualizing labour market. Going beyond simple measures coping with risk problems, welfare policies began to be approached as a "social investment" (Esping, 2002; Vielle et al., 2005) minimizing future welfare state dependency and tapping the potential labour force to the fullest extent. Reflecting this mixed trend, politicians can still claim "credit" by cutting back previous expensive income-transfer benefits dealing with old risks and, at the same time, expanding welfare benefits to incorporate more people the labour market and help young parents with work-life balance.

In case of Korea and Japan, both nations face problems coping with socio-demographic change, due to the risk-structure backwardness of their welfare system. These include fertility rate decrease, life-expectancy increase, women's advances in the job market, and breakdown of the extended family. Moreover, both countries have seen changes in the conventionally stable and linear male life course: men face greater employment instability and earlier exits after the late 1990s neoliberal-oriented economic restructuring. These conditions hampered traditional inter-generational risk-sharing and male-breadwinner model, and call for state-level welfare these days.

<Figure 3> Life Expectancy and Fertility Rate: 1960-2012





Figure 3, 4, 5, and 6 provide an accurate sense of how serious and rapid socio-demographic transitions are happening in both countries. Indicators below are from UNU-WIDER Inequality Dataset, OECD statistics. To begin with, there has been a steady decline in fertility rate and, at the same time, an increase in life expectancy. As of 2012, the average fertility rate is no more than 1.2 children per woman, far below the population replacement rate—2.1 for developed countries—and the life expectancy is around 80. As the most developed country of both, Japan has been experiencing this trend for quite a while, while the change is more abrupt for Korea.


As a natural result of the twin trends above, the proportion of the population older than 65 has seen almost a threefold increase in both countries over the past three decades: from 4/7% in 1984 to 12.5/25% in 2012 in Korea/Japan, respectively. Needless to say, this greying society will increasingly put a severe strain on each country's budget. Another important trend that should not escape our attention is the rapid urbanization and growing portion of service sector workers. As a manifestation of modernization in resource-poor countries, roughly 70-90% of people live in urban areas and service sector consists of 60-80% in 2012 in Korea and Japan.

<Figure 4> Ageing Population, Urbanization, and Service Sector Employment: 1960-2012




In addition to the on-going socio-demographic transitions, Figure 5 shows that jobs are becoming ever-more precarious. Part-time jobs are now 15-20% of the total employment in Korea and Japan and the youth unemployment rate in the two countries double that of the national average—10/15 % in Korea/Japan.

<Figure 5> Youth Unemployment and Part-time Employment Rate: 1980-2012



<Figure 6> Female Tertiary Education Enrolment and Labour Participation Rate: 1971-2012



Finally, there has been a clear increase of female to male tertiary education enrolment and the female labour participation rate over the past three decades—reaching 90/78% and 69%/69% in Korea/Japan by 2012.

With-in the context of these socio-demographic transitions, ***unorthodox social policies would not be an effective means to solve social welfare issues.*** For instance, life-long employment can be a cause of deepening polarization between insiders and outsiders. Moreover, previous research repeatedly pointed out a strong negative association between female labour market participation and the level of fertility (Kogel 2004; Matysiak and Vignoli, 2008). As noted by Esping-Anderson (2003), this can be mediated by generous family policies which minimize women's trade-offs between choosing a career and forming a family. In this sense, as clearly manifested by decreasing fertility rates, unorthodox social policies which had promoted and institutionalized the male-breadwinner model and extended family structure (which put the caring burden on the shoulders of women) can be detrimental in adjusting to the new environment. This makes Korea and Japan similar to the Southern European countries whose once highest fertility rates have dropped to the lowest among European countries (Castles, 2003). They are also similar in the sense that family-oriented cultural traditions were most pronounced, and in which women's labour market participation was lowest in Europe.

Reflecting this mismatch between unorthodox social policies and emerging new risks, numerous surveys conducted in both countries show the impending demand for active state intervention. For instance, from the seven surveys presented in Tagegawa's work (2010)—conducted between 1997 and 2005 by Tokyo University Social Policy and Social Consciousness Survey—we can see that about 50-60% of Japanese people prefer a "high-benefit/high-cost" system to the current "low-benefit/low-cost" system. Similarly, in all three surveys conducted by Korea Survey Opinion Institute in 2007, 2010, and 2011, more than a majority of people answered "yes" to a question asking "paying more tax and having more welfare benefits". This tells us that the demand for welfare state expansion by median voters has been present for the period of interest. However, as will be made clear in the later analysis, this demand is not sufficient for welfare-related bills to be enacted and implemented. What is needed is a sufficient political impetus for these issues to rise in importance in the political agenda, and for any meaningful change to happen.

2.2.5. Political Institutions

The potential impact of political institutions on the welfare state has been one of primary foci of the rational choice institutionalism approach. Just like other strands of institutionalism, the rational choice branch emphasizes that institutions create the opportunities and incentives for political action (or inaction) and maintain stability by resisting dramatic change. However, this strand focuses more on the role of institutions in setting the rules of the political game, which shape political actors' incentives and strategies (Tsebelis, 2002).

Rational choice institutionalists have examined the potential effect of various forms of political institutions. Even when the focus narrows to those aspects relating to the welfare state, there are long lists of literatures trying to find relations between welfare system/generosity/outcomes and political institutions. These include: electoral systems and party system (Iverson and Soskice, 2006; Estevez-Abe, 2008); federalism (Obinger et al., 2005; Rodden, 2010); international organizations (Strang and Chang, 1993); presidentialism (Persson and Tabellini, 2001; Gerring et al. 2008); or more general frameworks such as veto-players (Tsebelis, 2002) or consensus/majoritarian democracy (Lijphart, 2012 ;Crepaz, 1996).

This last sub-category includes other institutional elements such as decentralization, judicial branch, and central bank independence.

Even among students of East Asian politics, rational choice institutionalism is becoming popular in explaining welfare system change. For instance, Kwon (2005) argues both the timing of elections and electoral competition affect levels and distributive patterns of government expenditure in democratized Korea. In addition, Horiuchi and Lee (2008) found that—in Korea's specific institutional and cultural settings—incumbent presidents allocate disproportionately larger amounts of pork-barrel benefits not only to their own turf but also to their rival's, while distributing smaller amounts to regions where votes are more evenly divided between the camps. However, the most sophisticated application of rational choice institutionalism in East Asia to date is *Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan* by Estevez-Abe (2008). In explaining the inter-temporal and cross-policy variations of Japan in the welfare field after the war, she successfully applied an institutional model of welfare politics on the basis of: (i) the government type-–majoritarian, coalition, or minority; (ii) district magnitude–the number of seats assigned to an electoral district; and (iii) the importance of the personal vote.

As for the specific political institutions, these two nations share a striking number of similarities. First and foremost, both countries had been governed by one party—the LDP (Japan), the Liberal Party/DRP/GNP (South Korea)—for most of the second half of the 20th century. Moreover, given the Cold War dynamics, close alliance with the U.S., and their growth-oriented strategy, there was not much room for left wing parties, labour unions, and NGOs to institutionalize and become politically influential. And while the one party dominant systems ended, they became close to two (or two-and-a-half) party systems without much ideological polarization or the existence of anti-system parties[12]. Secondly, both countries have been led by elite career bureaucrats (Johnson, 1982; Vogel, 1993) who are known to be competent (graduates of the best university who joined the bureaucracy through merit-based test early on in their lives) and not captured by the private interests. ***In a related vein, they have a similar number of veto players—political actors who can block a bill—and its implication on legislative activities is noteworthy.***

[12] About the party system typology or anti-system party see Sartori (2005).

To begin with, both countries do not have a federal structure, strong judicial review like the US, nor strong central bank independence, all of which can potentially sabotage bills. Although there exist some difference in legislature structure—bicameral Japan in contrast to unicameral Korea—and constitutional structure—parliamentary Japan and presidential Korea, their difference balance each other out. That is, both the Korean president and Japanese upper house have statutory authority to reject most bills from the National Assembly and the lower house, respectively; these vetoed bills can only be overridden by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly (for Korea) or the lower house (for Japan)[13]. Going beyond the veto power aspect, a recent global expert survey of national legislatures (Fish and Kroenig, 2009) which included 32 items on four legislative dimensions—influence over executive, institutional autonomy, institutional capacity, specified power—yielded surprisingly similar scores for the both countries (Japan 0.66; Korea 0.59). Another institutional similarity that merits our attention is the "parliamentary" aspects of the Korean presidential system. Unlike the ideal-type U.S. presidential system, in Korea, not only legislators but also bureaucrats have a right to propose bills as in a parliamentary system. Trivial as this may seem, as the ensuing analysis will detail, the distrinction serves as a pivotal proxy in analysing the power dynamics between the legislative and executive branch in both nations with different constitutional structure based on different mechanisms—the separation/fusion of powers. In addition, both Korea and Japan adopted mixed member electoral systems in 2003 and 1993, respectively—which gives voters two votes for both the Single Member District tier and the Proportional Representative tier. Most importantly, both nations witnessed multiple institutional transitions during the period of interest (see appendices 4, 5). As will be specified later, considering the fact that this study's primary theoretical interest lies in the changes in the levels of power dispersion caused by political institutions, many changes in political institutions provide an advantageous condition for testing. Table 4 encapsulates the similarities and dissimilarities of major political dimensions between the two countries. The categories mainly follow the ones used in Arend Lijphart's seminal work "Patterns of Democracy".

[13] This part has been clearly enshrined in article 53 (Korea), and article 59 (Japan) of each country's constitution.

<Table 4> Multiple Political Institutions in Korea and Japan

	Korea	Japan
Executive-Legislative	Presidential (with *de jure* veto power)	Parliamentary
Party System	One-party dominant system (before 1990) → Multi-party system (after 1990)	
Division of Power	Unitary state	
Legislative Systems	Unicameral	Bicameral (upper house with veto power)
Electoral System	Modified Plurality SMD w/ "PR" list allocation → MMM (2004)	MMD+SNTV → MMM (1994)
Judicial System	Civil law tradition and weak judicial review	
Central Bank	Weak central bank independence	
Political Actors	Traditionally Strong elite-bureaucrats; Weak trade unions, left-wing parties, and NGOs	
Legislative Initiative	Both bureaucrats and individual legislators	

2.2.6 Timing of Welfare Politics

The positive impact of democratization and multi-party competition on welfare expansion has been repeatedly noted from different lines of thought. One the one hand, from the historical perspective, Marshall (1992) points out the progression from civil rights and political rights to social rights based on more socioeconomically substantive understanding of democratic citizenship. In other words, welfare expansion is a token of democratic transition and consolidation. On the other hand, using the rational choice framework, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) find the timing of public goods provision from the size of the necessary winning-coalition. Here, the key assumption is that leaders in authoritarian regimes are supported by their winning-coalition and goods and services should be provided to prevent the winning coalition from defection which can result in overthrowing the leaders. Even though leaders naturally prefer keeping a small circle of winning coalition to maximize their share, if winning coalition becomes too big to be maintained by private goods, they start to provide

public goods. In this sense, democratization is the tipping point for political elites to provide services and goods to a wider range of people—roughly 50%—to maintain power. These insights have been borne out by a wealth of empirical works proving the positive effect of democratization on welfare expansion going beyond Anglo-European countries (Haggard and Kaufmann, 2009). However, what matters is not just the democratization and multi-party competition *per se*, but their timing. As rightly pointed out, Pierson (2004: 55) argues, "If two events or particular processes occur at the same historical moment, the results may be very different from when they are temporally separated". Just as the timing of bureaucratization and democratization matters in making government jobs susceptible to clientelistic influence (Shefter, 1977), the timing of multi-party competition can be crucial in shaping/changing the nature of welfare politics.

In this sense, ***both Korea and Japan have experienced steady multi-party competition since the late 1980s, and the previous era features a very different logic of welfare system change*** than the welfare politics logic I specified in this study's theory section. Specifically, 1987 was the year Korea experienced a democratic transition from an authoritarian era based on the direct voting right of people and, at the same time, the beginning of electoral competition. For our other subject, if we were to simply apply the "procedural democratic country" threshold in analysing welfare politics, Japan qualifies long before 1987. However, we should keep in mind that *de jure* institutionalization of direct democracy does not automatically result in the *de facto* practice of meaningful contestation. Similar to the long reign of one conservative party in Korea and Taiwan after the war, Japan also lacked a competitive electoral system due to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)'s dominance from 1955 to 1989[14]. This is the reason why Johnson (1987) labelled Japan "soft authoritarianism". For both countries, the following three political mechanisms seemed to be the driving forces of welfare system change during the one-party dominance era.

First, welfare policies were mainly used as a means to consolidate authoritarian leaders' political power and state-building in Korea**.** This resonates with the established literature in authoritarian regime studies showing that the primary motivations of welfare provision in authoritarian states are: i) to control strategically important groups like the military or the

[14] Rather than 1989, 1987 was chosen as the beginning of multi-party era comparison in order to: i) increase the duration of most concentrated power structure (one-party government); and ii) to put Japan on par with Korea.

government bureaucracy (Kornai, 1992); ii) pre-empt potential social unrest (Nechemias, 1980); or iii) create a social base of support by securing loyalty from industrial workers, as 19th century Bismarkian Prussia did with social insurance legislation (Rimlinger, 1971). Specifically, in Korea between 1948 and 1987, governments introduced a series of welfare laws and increased welfare expenditure during periods of political turmoil, but restored the *status quo* when their political legitimacy was no longer at stake (Ham, 1986). In addition, most welfare benefits were directed towards civil servants, the military, or teachers in order to address the presidents' lack of legitimacy—as he was not popularly elected but came to power by the means of military coup. Similar to the rare provision of public welfare, which happened only during political turmoil, prior to 1989 there had been only two brief periods of major public welfare expansion in Japan. The first instance was a major welfare budget increase in 1957 to expand social security, and the other took place in 1972, which Japan promulgated as "the year one of welfare" and institutionalized free medical service for the elderly. As pointed out by Calder (1991), both were clearly a result of political crisis, since they occurred when the rival Socialist Party was on the rise[15].

Secondly, as emphasized by the developmental welfare state literature, welfare policies tended to be tools used to further economic development**.** In Korea's case, although President Park failed to introduce the public pension law in the 1970s owing to the unexpected oil crises, the law had been passed in 1973 with the goal of mobilizing a significant amount of pension funds for the nation's heavy industry development. In a similar vein, the national health insurance was managed by the peak business organization—The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI)—as an incentive to attract skilled workers. This logic also applies to Japan. As has been shrewdly observed by Estevez-Abe (2001), unlike the privately managed U.S. pension funds, the pension and life insurance fund were two major pillars of "patient capitals" for government's financial mobilization. This shows that, even in Japan, welfare policy has been utilized for economic purposes**.**

Finally, political actors were not seriously constrained by institutions in either country. In Korea, presidents could manipulate electoral rules for political gain. For example, from the 6th to 8th National Assembly sessions, the president intentionally adopted an electoral system

[15] Although these expansions resonate with the logic of power dispersion based on electoral politics since 1989, they were short-lived and too temporarily distant and intermittent to be included with the expansion era (after 1989). Therefore, they are only exceptions to the pre-1990s welfare expansion.

with strong majoritarian features to further the gap between the ruling party and other parties (Shim and Kim, 2002). In contrast, from the 9th to 12th National Assembly sessions, recognizing that the centripetal influence of the previous majoritarian rule was causing a two-party system, the president increased the proportionality of electoral rule (ibid.). Although Japan was a democracy, ***if we focus on the micro-level electoral rules typically ignored by the previous literature, outright manipulation looms large.*** Although party leaders were repeatedly blocked from replacing the post-war Middle Member District (MMD)-Single Non Transferable Vote (SNTV) system by intraparty incumbents, they had greater leeway in altering rules that generated fewer intraparty conflicts (McElwain, 2008). For example, between 1960 and 1990, the LDP implemented approximately fifty changes to campaign regulations, most of which were aimed at enhancing the incumbency advantage of all rank-and-file legislators (ibid.).

2.2.7. Summary of Similarities

As can be clear from the summary below, both countries feature high levels of similarities regarding almost all potential explanatory factors known to be affecting welfare system change. It is particularly important that except for the political institution of interests—varying power dispersion levels (see Appendices 4 and 5)—other factors are either static (because it happened in the past or has not changed at the moment) or change in the same linear direction. This, by design, provides a rare chance to conduct a parallel comparison of two countries to examine the key variable's over-time effect. In this case, this key variable is changing power dispersion levels, and the rest of the study will test whether its effect can be observed as I specified in the theory section leveraging on this research design.

<Table 5> Similarities between Korea and Japan in Potential Explanatory Factors

Potential Explanatory Factors	**Korea**	**Japan**
Colonial Legacy	Part of Japanese Empire in the early 20th century	Established Japanese Empire in the early 20th century
Culture	Confucianism	Confucianism
Previous Welfare Institution	Insurance-based model	Insurance-based model
Economic Structure and Development Level	Similar economic structure shifts and reached developed economy	Similar economic structure shifts and reached developed economy
Socio-demographic Transition	Ageing society, decreasing fertility rate, increasing urbanization, dualizing labour market,	Ageing society, decreasing fertility rate, increasing urbanization, dualizing labour market,
Timing of Welfare Politics	From the late 1980s	From the late 1980s
Political Institutions of Interests	Fluctuating power dispersion levels	Fluctuating power dispersion levels
Other Political Institutions (e.g. veto player numbers, judicial system, legislative processes, central bank, division of power)	Highly similar (other than the constitutional structure)	Highly similar (other than the constitutional structure)

3. Analysing Legislation Patterns

3.1. Importance of Relevance

3.1.1. Welfare Legislation Patterns and Welfare Politics Analysis

So far, I have specified that Korea and Japan are the ideal cases to test the influence of political institutions on welfare system change in the broader context of multiple cleavages, party-voter linkages, and welfare forms. Considering that the key to understanding welfare

politics is measuring elite political actors' preferences, the ideal data and unit of observation should be able to capture this reliably and accurately. In this regard, the legislative pattern—derived from coding each piece of legislation—should be put at the forefront of welfare politics analysis. Besides the obvious fact that most of the important changes are grounded in legislation, several analytical vantage points put analysing legislation patterns far beyond other data. Specifically, from the many dimensions of legislation pattern, we should focus on bill sponsorship data to see how different political actors sponsor particular welfare bills. The specific strength of this data will be pointed out after recognizing limits of other commonly applied data and relevant approaches.

First, there has often been a considerable "leap of faith" between causal chains in the welfare politics literature. At the cost of simplification, the social policy process can be divided into four stages[16]: input (reflecting public's attitude about welfare), throughput (policy-making process of political parties, mediated by political and economic institutions), output (early stage: welfare legislation; later stage: welfare expenditure, number of social workers and facilities), and outcome (e.g. inequality reduction, employment level, mortality rate). The most common mistake is to fail to distinguish between the sequential differences in output indicators, which has often been observed in analyses using welfare expenditure. For instance, considering the varying degrees of time-lag between a piece of welfare legislation and the associated social policy expenditure, we cannot simply assume the timing of welfare expenditure is actually reflecting the political dynamics of that specific period with a certain interval, e.g. 1-5 year time lag used in statistical analysis. Pension reforms are a good example of this, which are designed to take effect on expenditure in the long run (Allan and Scruggs, 2004) in an unpredictable way such as linking the benefit levels to macroeconomic indicators (Scruggs, 2012). In this sense, the partisan influence (throughput stage) should be linked not to welfare expenditure levels (later stage of output) but to specific welfare laws (earlier stage of output) from which we can plausibly trace related political actors' intentions and constraints[17]. There is also a type of research which directly associates public opinion on

[16] The recent work by Klitgaard and Elmelund-Præstekær (2013) regards government legislation as the input, not output, stage. Different categorization can be attributed to what a study focuses on. Unlike my approach, which looks at public opinion as the starting point of social policy-making process, Klitgaard and Elmelund-Præstekær limited their analytical attention within the government, thereby making the legislation stage the input.

[17] Sometimes, the intentions we observe from the voting record about a piece of legislation is not the true preference (first-order preference) of specific political actor, but only a revealed preference


social policy (input stage) to specific welfare legislation (output stage) (e.g. Brooks and Manza, 2006), or links welfare regime type (a combination of output and outcome) to public attitude (input stage) using public survey data (Jaeger, 2006). Finally, some political institutionalists often link specific throughput mechanisms such as the number of veto players (e.g. Tsebellis, 2002) or power-sharing-based consensus democracy (e.g. Liphjart, 1999) directly to the outcome of interests, e.g. provision of public goods or inequality. Intuitive as this may be, it does not specify and test a clear mechanism between the output stage and outcomes.


Then, how does the welfare legislation pattern fare better regarding the leap of faith problem? I argue that it is the most ideal data in this sense, since ***there is no heroic assumption needed about the time-lag of political effect, as it looks at the linkage between throughput and output with instant observation.*** As correctly pointed out by Esping-Andersen (1990), the primary issues concerned in politics of welfare is not about "welfare spending *per se"* but more about specific parts of legislation. Seen in this light, the expenditure data has an inherent limit in revealing the distributional logic of welfare policies (Siegel, 2007). In contrast, looking directly at legislative patterns does not require many assumptions about the time-lag of political effects, given the fact that we can observe changes not only month-to-month[18] but also day-to-day, in both countries (Figure 7). The possibility of observing day-to-day changes gives a huge advantage in terms of analysing the "timing" of welfare politics. Moreover, as we shall see later, not only the number but also other dimensions pertinent to welfare politics, (e.g. the political entities of bill initiation and their co-sponsorship networks, the succeed ratio) have varied from time to time. All of this can serve as an invaluable point to deepen and nuance our understanding of welfare politics.


(second-order preference) taking into account certain contextual restraints. Still, a careful tracing of memoirs, minutes, or stenographic records help us to address this problem by showing how actors' preferences interact with constraints over time.


[18] There exist cycles in legislating activities within a year (the last two to three months of legislative year). This seasonality aspect will be controlled later in the regression analysis.

<Figure 7> Average Proportion/Numbers of Enacted Bills by Month (Left: Korea; Right: Japan) and Day (Top: Korea; Bottom: Japan): 1987-2012










Second, even though we can potentially observe changes on a daily basis, this would not be of much use if there are not enough numbers or if variation is lacking. In this sense, the aggregated-level expenditure data lack analytical leverage. ***For instance, the changes in annual welfare budgets in proportion to the total central government budget for the past 25 years show no more than a steady increase with little fluctuation in both nations.***

<Figure 8> Social Security Expenditure as Percentage of Total Budget



<Source: Asian Development Bank>

Disaggregating the expenditure into different policies and controlling other confounding socio-demographic or macro-economic variables would address its linear trend problem to a certain extent. And as pointed out by Kuitto (2011), this can be a valid measure of overall welfare efforts in times of economic hardship, when political actors are conscious of budget constraints. But still it lacks the number of observations as the data are only released to the public once or twice a year, and each subcategory often includes different things owing to occasional sub-department level rearrangements.

In contrast, the sheer amount of variation within legislation data makes it an attractive point of focus in analysing political dynamics. Table 6 gives a general sense of the welfare-related legislation record (the number of both proposals and enacted laws) in relation to other types of legislation between 1987 and 2012, which has been created through several instances of iterative hand-coding over the past four years (see Appendix 1 for details). There were roughly 32,000 proposals, 11,000 of which had been accepted in both nations. If we limit our scope to just welfare-related laws—combining orthodox welfare policies and unorthodox social policies—there were 15,000 proposals, nearly 30% of which were approved.,

<Table 6> General Statistics of Legislation

	All Bills		Welfare Bills	
	Enacted	Proposed	Enacted	Proposed
Korea	7532	27815	2613	12338
Japan	3309	4757	1507	2266

(Source: Integrated Legislation Knowledge Management System (Korea), House of Representatives Legislation Record (Japan), House of Councillors Legislation Record (Japan), National Diet Library Law Index (Japan)).[19]

Third, other data are not inclusive enough to incorporate the multi-dimensionality of welfare benefits (such as clientelistic benefits, unorthodox social policies, or orthodox welfare policies without any budget change). In orthodox welfare benefits' case, laws with future redistributive implications or some aspects of people's wellbeing simply perceived as "rights" are examples going beyond the expenditure category. The gender aspect of the welfare state is a good illustration of this. In addition to "spending categories" supporting essential things such as i) paid women's work or ii) women's capacity to maintain an autonomous household (Orloff, 1993), laws relating to women's rights-based well-being include gender parity in employment, abortion, or divorce (see Appendix 1 for further examples). The fact that less than half of welfare-related bills in Korea and Japan have accompanied changes in the budget underlines the importance of a more comprehensive approach (Fukumoto, 2001; The National Assembly Legislation Information System, 2013). Moreover, in addition to state-provided unorthodox social policies—e.g. industrial or agricultural policy—even a large amount of non-state-provided welfare benefits can be traced back to government laws. That is, even other forms of welfare such as enterprise welfare or family-based welfare can be accounted for by analysing government legislation. For instance, in Korea and Japan, there have been various mandatory enterprise welfare programs such as the retirement allowance programs under the Labour Standards Act (Kim, 2010) or the Special Act for Vocational Training, under which companies with more than a certain number of employees are obliged to train their workforce to avoid a fine. Even nominally "voluntary" enterprise welfare programs have actually been incentivized by the government using various means like tax exemptions, administrative assistance, or subsidies (ibid.).

[19] All other legislation-related analysis in this study is based on these sources.

Although more indirect in form, certain types of family welfare have been promoted by the Japanese government, which introduced a pension program for housewives in 1985 that qualified them as recipients without any personal contribution (Miyamoto, 2003). In this sense, echoing Hacker (2005)'s concern, paying attention to each piece of national-level legislation can capture informal but substantially important changes in the long run. These include drifting, conversion, or layering, which would be missed by only focusing on legislative changes accompanying a substantial degree of budget change.

Fourth, most of data used in welfare studies are aggregated by anonymous staffs (either regularly or irregularly) and ***do not have real names of people supporting/rejecting particular constituent parts.*** In contrast, by the virtue of being a public record, individual legislator bills have actual names of politicians who submitted certain types of welfare bills, from whom s/he collected co-sponsorship signatures, and by whom these specific bills were rejected or amended in the legislature. Furthermore, for most of the bills, we can observe how the media portrays relevant politicians by, for instance, looking at the major newspapers over time. We can also trace how their preferences and strategies have changed, by examining relevant floor speeches and debates in the legislature. Needless to say, these aspects are huge analytical vantage points from which we can deepen and nuance our understanding of welfare politics and gain invaluable insights into the primary causal mechanism. Considering that the legislation data is the focal point of various other data sources, it opens a wide range of possibilities for methodological cross-fertilization as well. For instance, social network analysis can be applied to the co-sponsorship dimension of each welfare bill; regression analysis to the with-in variation between welfare bills; survival analysis to the time dimension of welfare bills such as between introduction and final decision; or text analysis to the content of legislative speeches and debates of welfare bills.

Lately, scholars of East Asian welfare states have begun to direct their attention to sources that provide the legislative content of individual programs, such as the "Social Security Programs throughout the World" dataset (Park and Jung, 2012). Furthermore, a systematically comparable dataset—the Korean Welfare State Dataset—was recently created by East Asian scholars and merged with an international-level dataset—the Comparable Welfare State Dataset (Ahn and Lee, 2012). My project here continues this line of the data collection effort and, based on four years of data collection, I have created a detailed database on East Asian welfare politics (so far based on data from Korea, Japan, and Taiwan). It

includes several key relevant aspects on both independent and dependent variable sides, described in Table 7. In general, works in comparative politics research draw their findings from various data sources collected for different motives and based on different methods (Schedler, 2012; Herrera and Kapur, 2007). In contrast, a key strength of my dataset lies in its unity and consistency, since it has been created to address a key theoretical puzzle of this particular project.

<Table 7> Data Compilation Summary on East Asian Welfare Politics

Independent Variables	**Dependent Variables**
I-a: Political Institutions Electoral/legislative rules, cabinet structure, government types (coalition/single; minority/majority); the number of effective parties; legislative structure **I-b: Legislator Attributes (8000 legislators)** Gender, elected-tier (party-list or district), party-affiliation, age, past career, elected district, standing committee affiliation, elected numbers, received votes, party position	**D-a: Submitted Bill Characteristics (45000 bills):** Duration, legislative session, success/failure, amendment/enactment, revised/original, roll-call vote results, bill initiator and sponsors, relevant legislative speeches and debates **D-b: Hand-coded Welfare Bills (12000 bills):** Expansion/retrenchment, substantial/trivial, universal/targeted, welfare category (25 sub-categories), welfare function (15 categories) **D-c: Welfare newspaper articles (23000 articles):** Letters per article, numbers and proportion of welfare-related articles, reporting style (fact report, quotation, suggestion, assessment), subject, and tone (negative, positive, neutral)

Finally, ***insofar as Korea and Japan are concerned, no other elite data can capture the preferences of the elite over time for the period of interest***. In general, elites' policy preferences have been frequently measured by first assigning coding categories to the left and right in an *a priori* way, and then examining changes in parties' programs with the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Budge et al. 2001; Laver and Budge, 1992). Another frequently employed method has been conducting expert surveys by asking leading experts in the field to locate parties on a single left-right dimension (Castles and Mair, 1984; Benoit and Laver, 2006). Established as these methods may be, they have faced various criticisms due to problems arising from wording, endogeneity, or context-insensitivity (Laver, 2014). And more importantly, there is no reliable and comparable dataset for both CMP and expert

surveys for our cases here. In this sense, deriving legislators' policy position from roll-call vote records with the established NOMINATE method (Poole and Rosenthal, 2000) can be a possible option. However, roll-call votes are available only for a limited number of years for our cases and legislators mostly vote along the party lines in Japan (with its parliamentary system). Moreover, bills reaching roll-call votes are known to be highly selective and strategic (Carrubba et al., 2006).

In addition to the data availability in Korea and Japan, analysing welfare legislation patterns with bill sponsorship is the most ideal source of information on two key elite political actors' preferences—core executives and individual legislators. Specifically, bill sponsorship data is known for sending ***signals to their specific constituents*** (Mayhew, 1974; Campbell, 1982) ***or general median voters*** (Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996), ***and usually takes a substantial amount of effort to prepare.*** In other words, it goes beyond simple talk (Wilson and Young, 1997), legislators take it seriously since it becomes a public record for which specific legislators get rewarded or criticized (for instance, by "NGO monitor group" in Korea, "Tokyo Press Club" in Japan). Moreover, there is no problem caused by wording as in expert surveys, since the researcher does not get involved in the data creation process; and, compared to the roll-call data, it is mostly free from the strategic self-selection problem given the fact that it only requires 10-20 co-sponsors from fellow legislators.

All things considered, the welfare legislation pattern is a better proxy than other datasets to capture on-going welfare politics in Korea and Japan. This is especially true because of the similarities in the legislative requirements and processes in Korea and Japan (that I will specify soon). This makes legislative pattern analysis even more appropriate for this research.

3.1.2. Limitations and Solutions

Despite the various analytical strengths legislation data provide, this approach is not without limitations. The most serious problem has to do with the quality of legislation. That is, not every piece of legislation has been designed with the same level of commitment, and can have varying degrees of significance even if it becomes law. For instance, more than half of legislator submitted bills fail in both countries and, even if they succeed, some of them are

"trivial" since they serve no more than ceremonial purpose. Bearing this in mind, I will show results for both submitted and enacted bills side-by-side to test the key causal claim, and consider "direction" and "substantiality" of each enacted bill following the below definition.

In addition, to minimize confusion, I will narrow down our unit of observation to each piece of legislation and who is directly affected by it. That is, if we try to aggregate, say, the legislative changes to Korea's health insurance between 2002 and 2006, we would see that sixteen pieces of legislation were submitted, of which six were enacted. These include several substantial and multi-directional changes. Then, on what grounds should we choose to focus on a specific legislative change among many? This aspect has not received rigorous academic scrutiny and, in my view, can be a source of the cherry-picking problem. However, if we only focus on major change/changes caused by one piece of legislation at a specific time, the direction of change becomes more distinguishable (for the coding of more complicated cases, I specified rules with examples in Appendix 1). Likewise, analysis would be more manageable if we focus on the first-order effect of change based on people directly affected by it (for more details see Appendix 1)

3.1.2.1. Significance of Welfare Change

The first possible weakness that merits our attention is whether a specific welfare policy is substantial or not. Anyone who had chance to see government publications regarding laws, policies, or decrees would soon notice that not all changes are substantial. For example, some are no more than stylistic changes (e.g. making esoteric legal documents more accessible by removing jargon) or concern implementation details. Aside from these trivial changes, the level of significance varies even for substantial changes. For instance, the level of governmental intervention in health policy can vary from eliminating choices, restricting choices, guiding through incentives or disincentives, or channelling default policy. Defining legislative significance is a complex task that is sometimes easier to recognize than to define (Cameron, 2000).

So far, in defining the significance of each bill, legislative studies scholars have often used multiple atheoretical criteria. These range from simple things such as size or length of legislation, to the amount of accompanied budget or the number of people directly affected.

However, as noted by Tsebelis (1999), these proxies do not capture the "significance" of legislation, in that the size or length can be a mere enumeration of exceptions or areas of applicability, while the budget size or beneficiary scope are not capable of recognizing rights-based non-budgetary issues like abortion, divorce, or euthanasia. Recognizing these limitations, other scholars have used external criteria like media saliency, the retrospective judgement of policy specialists, or key publications including a list of "significant" laws (Mayhew, 2005; Norton, 1991; Tsebelis). Convenient as this may be, it does not guarantee that the "significance" of laws defined by so-called "experts" resonates directly with one's core theoretical concerns. As a way to overcome this problem, instead of relying on external proxies to define what is "significant", my coding of "significance" is manually coded based on specific contents directly pertinent to core theoretical concerns of welfare studies.

For future comparability's sake, I referred to what established welfare studies projects conventionally have focused on. For instance, one of the biggest data-collection projects in welfare studies field is the Comparative Welfare Entitlement Data project by Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto (website: http://cwed2.org/). Their data collection focuses on dimensions such as coverage, qualification period, replacement rate, the ratio of employee contribution, retirement age, or benefit duration. Although the continuous nature of these dimensions does not easily lend itself to a simple categorization, I divided substantiality into medium-level and high-level for simplicity's sake as follows. The high-level significance includes most of the aspects that students of welfare states analyse as their key targets (for further details see Appendix 1).

Trivial: Stylistic changes; Automatic abolitions after reaching the effective date; Implementation details.

Medium-level significance: Managing and developing related organizations; Rearranging and Streamlining organizations; Prescribing Rights and Duties, i.e. Framework Acts; De-regulation of Business, Contracts, etc..; Increasing administrative efficiency for registration; Increasing accessibility, e.g. selling drugs in convenient stores; Proclaiming Discrimination and Injustice Prevention.

High-level significance: Providing services, e.g. medical, education, job-search, nursery, elderly care, inoculation, communication; Establishing/unifying organization/organizations for recipients; Establishing/stabilizing the financial base by creating an earmarked fund or

linking the funding to general tax-base; Widening the scope of recipients [20]; Tax/debt/expense/fine reduction/exemption; Increasing the amount of subsidy/loan/compensation; Extending the benefit receiving period; Relaxing the benefit receiving conditions, e.g. contribution period, benefit receiving period; Stabilizing price; Legalizing quota, e.g. mandatory women/disabled people employment.

3.1.2.2. Direction of Welfare Change

Another potential weakness is the direction of welfare policy. Namely, particular attention will be directed to whether a change occurring in welfare policy is an expansion or a retrenchment. Although this sounds like a simply dichotomy, it has been recognized as conceptually tricky territory among the students of welfare studies. For instance, we can see many forms of welfare restructuring going on in advanced countries nowadays that welfare scholars label "recommodification" or "recalibration" (Pierson, 2001). These changes are usually multi-faceted, bringing some sorts of expansion to some people while retrenchments to others, e.g. providing less benefit to more people. Given this potential confusion, the definition of either retrenchment or expansion should be based on the primary change and target in a piece of legislation (for more details on the coding, see Appendix 1).

With regards to the contents of expansion and retrenchment, this project builds on the recent work by Klitgaard and Elmelund-Præstekær (2013: 60).[21] Each direction can be defined as follows:

i) **Retrenchment:** 1) If a bill is about revoking specific measure/measures created to realize any change aspect listed in the "substantiality definition"; 2) If a bill is about accompanying specific measure/measures to prevent any change aspect listed in the "substantiality definition" for certain actors, e.g. narrowing the definition of sexual discrimination; 3) If a bill is about accompanying specific measure/measures opposite

[20] Widening the scope of recipients is not bounded to financial benefits here. In other words, it also recognizes expanding the legal boundary of rights-based welfare such as LGBT issues, euthanasia, or civil partnership.

[21] According to Klitgaard and Elmelund-Præstekær, laws are recognized as retrenchments if they intend to reduce the extent and/or quality of the welfare programme, the financial viability and/or political and administrative capacity to pursue policies of expansion in the future. Laws are seen as expansions if they intend to increase the extent and/or quality of the programme, the financial viability, and/or political and administrative capacity to pursue expansion in the future.

to any change aspect listed in the "substantiality definition" for certain actors, e.g. tighter regulation of business; 4) If a bill is about forcing other actors, e.g. employers, local governments, to follow the changes (then the bill will be coded as retrenchment for that specific actor).

ii) **Expansion:** If a bill is about accompanying specific measure/measures listed in the medium-level or high-level significance[22].

In our cases, the recurring examples of expansion range from commonly accepted changes such as widening the scope of recipients, tax/debt/expense/fine reductions or exemptions, increasing the amount of subsidy/loan/compensation, extending the benefit receiving period, relaxing the benefit receiving conditions, e.g. contribution period and benefit receiving period. Moreover, things that started to get noticed from "social exclusion" and "capability approach" like prescribing rights and duties, preventing discrimination and injustice, or increasing accessibility, e.g. selling drugs in convenient stores are also frequently recurring examples.

In addition to the significance and direction of welfare legislation, another possible weakness of the legislation pattern analysis is that some important issues are not captured by looking at the variation patterns. Namely, unlike welfare issues whose various dimensions and political saliency tend to be reflected in either the increase or decrease of sponsored bills in the legislature, other politically important issues related to nationalism and foreign policy cannot be understood in terms of changing legislative quantity. In this sense, the issue of revising the "peace constitution" in Japan, for instance, cannot be directly compared with welfare issues by examining whether parties and legislators submit one type of bill more than another. Therefore, to minimize the danger of comparing apples to oranges, these important non-welfare-issues will be discussed in the qualitative narrative section by considering the relevant contexts[23].

[22] If a change does not indicate any expansion or retrenchment, it will be coded as no-direction.


[23] Furthermore, there are other potential weaknesses of legislation pattern analysis. For example, in cases where bills are designed for window-dressing purposes or are implemented differently by street-level bureaucrats (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009), the legislation data is of limited use in understanding a country's welfare politics. Moreover, from time to time, important political dynamics can be captured only by examining sub-level decrees or informal administrative guidance.

3.2. Requirements and Processes of Legislation Submission and Deliberation

Insofar as the requirement side is concerned, both countries allow bills to be submitted by both legislators and bureaucrats. As discussed in the section on case selection, Korea allows bureaucrats to propose bills despite adopting a presidential system (only legislators are allowed to propose bills in the ideal type presidential system such as the U.S.). At any rate, this makes both nations more comparable. Added to this, in both countries, MP-proposed bills can be divided into individual MP submitted ones and committee-head submitted ones. In the case of former, a Japanese MP must have the support of 10 or more members in the upper house and 20 or more members in the lower house, while 10 or more members[24] of the parliament are required in Korea[25]. This requirement is in parallel between Korea and Japan, considering the number of members in each house[26]. As for bills submitted by committee heads in Korea and Japan, there is no co-sponsorship requirement and known to be bi-partisan. The requirement for bills proposed by bureaucrats is stricter in both nations compared to that of legislators, and can be summarized as follows: i) a legislative bill to be introduced by the Cabinet is drafted by the ministry with the corresponding jurisdiction; ii) on the basis of this first draft, consultations take place with other ministries concerned. In addition, where necessary, procedures are followed for its referral to advisory councils or to public hearings; iii) all legislative bills that are to be introduced by the Cabinet are examined, legally and technically, by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau before being brought before Cabinet meetings; iv) if the Cabinet decides in favour without objection, Prime-Minister/President signs the bill and sends to the parliament (either to the lower house or to the upper house).


[24] Until 2003, the threshold was 20 in Korea.
[25] This condition applies only to non-budget bills in Korea and Japan. If a bill accompanies any budgetary change, the threshold almost doubles in Korea and Japan—from 10 to 20 in Korea; from 20 to 50 (Lower house); from 10 to 20 (Upper house) in Japan.
[26] Although the number varies by time, there have been approximately 500 lower house members and 250 upper house members in Japan, and roughly 300 house members in Korea.

<Figure 9> Process of Government Proposal before Legislative Session



The parliaments in both countries operate for only a limited period within a year, made up of one main session in Korea (150 days) and Japan (100 days). In addition, if needs arise, each country organizes several temporary sessions—30-50 days in Korea and Japan[27]. On average, the parliament functions for about 200-250 days per year in both countries. When a proposed bill—submitted by either bureaucrats or legislators —reaches parliament during this time, it is referred to a committee, whose role is to undertake the first stage of serious deliberation[28]. The committee—which reflects the seat shares of every party[29]—then conducts an examination, which often includes inviting government employees and related parties, or holding public hearings about pros and cons for a certain stance. A committee may amend or shelve a bill. It may also reject a bill, concluding that it is not worthy of submission to a plenary sitting.

<Figure 10> Process of Legislative Deliberation during Legislative Session



[27] This specific period is crucial for Japan's case. Entire bills die, by default, unless parliament approves them for further examination or enacts them as a law within the session bills are submitted. In Korea, bills only die by default if there is a new parliamentary election (which happens once every four years).

[28] Korea and Japan changed from a plenary session-oriented style to a committee-oriented style (in 1947 in Japan and 1963 in Korea) so this is, by and large, the major site for legislative deliberation. Unlike other developed countries, both countries also have a 'procedural committee' among the standing committees, which is in charge of legislative scheduling in general. This covers which submitted bills are to be processed to a further stage, on what sequence, and how much time should be spent to each.

[29] Even the proportion of committee heads is based on the seat shares among parties in both countries (since 1988 in Korea). This is another parliamentaristic aspect of Korean presidentialism.

When a bill examined by a committee comes up for consideration in a plenary sitting of the house, the committee chair first makes a report on the course of the committee's deliberation and the result. Questions regarding the bill may then be asked, and debate follows. With the close of the debate, the house makes its decision by voting[30]. Interestingly, in addition to the lower house in Japan and the National Assembly in Korea, there is another important veto player with similar strength that should be taken into account. That is the upper house in Japan and the President in Korea, both of whom can reject a bill in the final stage (or simply leave without reaching decision) and raise the threshold from a simple majority to a two-thirds majority. Provided that a bill passed the parliament (both houses in Japan) and the President (in Korea) and turned in to a law, it must be promulgated within and 15/30 days in Korea/Japan.

4. Methodology

By any standard, the welfare state scholarship has been a forefront of methodological cross-fertilization. This unusually fruitful dialogue between quantitative and qualitative research was achieved either by approaching similar subject matter from a variety of different methods or by combining them into a single research design (Amenta and Hicks, 2010). Ranging from well-established pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Iverson and Cusack, 2000) and comparative historical analysis (Pierson, 1994; Steinmo, 1993) to emerging methods such as qualitative comparative analysis (Epstein et al. 2008; Kvist, 2007; Vis, 2010) or event-history analysis (Vanhyuee, 2012), the welfare state area as a whole benefitted immensely. For instance, QCA enable scholars to conduct more theory-informed analysis and reveal multiple and conjectural paths to the welfare state development (Amenta and Hicks, 2010) or emergence and continuance of pensioner's parties in Europe (Hanley, 2012) while event history analysis helps to understand the timing of cutback/expansion and enable to trace intentional decisions by actors by treating each adoption of legislation or program as qualitative outcomes (Starke, 2006; Hicks, 2004). Furthermore, on the qualitative front, content analysis has been used to capture the subtle

[30] In the case of bicameral Japan, when the legislative bill passes both the committee and the plenary of the House to which it was first submitted, it is sent on to the other House (i.e. from the House of Representatives to the House of Councillors, or vice versa). The same procedure involving deliberation and decisions both by a committee and a plenary is then followed by the second House.

beliefs and positions of major political actors about recent welfare reforms across countries and over time. Thorton's work (2014) looking at the parliamentary-budget debates by Labour and National MPs in New Zealand between 1970 and 2012 or Hausermann's analysis (2010) of major political actors' positions on pension reforms in Germany, France, and Switzerland from 1970 and 2005 are good illustrations of this.

Students of East Asian welfare states were no exception to this trend. For instance, going beyond one case historical narrative method, scholars have recently employed qualitative comparative analysis to explore change and continuity of the Western and Korean Welfare States (Jung and Yang, 2012), conduct cluster analysis to see whether East Asian welfare regime can be distinguished from the three worlds (Lee and Ku, 2007) or meaningful clusters can be found within East Asian welfare regime in the contents of major welfare programs (Park and Jung, 2012). In addition, there have been attempts to mix methods in one research design such as time-series analysis and fuzzy-set analysis (Ahn and Lee, 2012).

Given the openness of welfare studies to various methodologies, it comes as no surprise that this study is based on a mixed-method research design. Ideally, the mixed-method design should get the best of every world such as regression analysis evaluating causal effects and case studies providing insights about casual mechanisms. However, as noted by Gehlbach (2015:12), a study using several methods may result in sub-standard scholarship with "theoretically ungrounded ethnographies, poorly identified regressions, inexpertly conceived experiments, mathematically incoherent models". Moreover, there is also a danger of turning mixed method research into a new dogma in which every researcher incorporating all possible means available (Ahmed and Sil, 2009). ***Bearing this in mind, it should be clarified at the outset that the mixed-method design adopted here is not an end itself but more of a pragmatic response to understand complicated and multi-faceted reality of welfare politics both countries.*** So the study here clearly shares the problem-driven spirit of welfare state research. Moreover, for a more systematic application of the mixed-method research design, I draw key insights directly from the on-going mixed-method debate set off by "Rethinking Social Inquiry" (Brady and Collier, 2010).

4.1. Two Types of Evidence

With regards to several mixed-method debates, what should be the guiding logic of using several different methods in this study? In the language of Brady and Collier (2011: 2), the kind of evidence this study is based on is both DSOs (data-set observations) and CPOs (causal process observations) each of which has distinctive advantages. For instance, used as part of the process-tracing method, CPOs can be used to address methodological problems related to omitted variables, spurious relations, reciprocal causations, and selection bias, causal sequence mismatch which often rise from co-variation regression analysis (Collier, 2011; Haggard and Kaufman, 2016). As for the particular methodologies applied here, in general, regression analyses are based on DSOs while social network analysis, narratives, and media content analysis are based on CPOS. Following Mahoney's (2010) distinction, each type of evidence can be defined as follows: "a causal-process observation as an insight or piece of data that provides information about context, process, or mechanism, and that contributes distinctively to causal inference. A data-set observation (DSOs), by contrast, is the standard quantitative data found in a rectangular data set"[31]. In other words, the latter focuses on the average treatment effect of cause while the former approaches cause from set theory and mechanism (Haggard and Koefmann, 2016).

Given its well-established methodological status in political science, understanding DSOs is not a difficult task since it draws its primary analytical leverage from variations between independent and dependent variables. Mostly using regression techniques, statistical significance is the key piece of evidence for one's causal claim.

In contrast, CPOs merit detailed specification given its relatively new methodological status. To illustrate the logic behind CPOs, we can draw on the metaphor of a criminal detective investigating a murder case with multiple traces left behind (Mahoney, 2010). For instance, if someone's death was really by murder, multiple clues such as signs of struggle, direction of entry wound, blood splatter, and suspicious suicide note should match with the investigator's expectation. In a similar vein, for instance, if the decline in labour union was a decisive factor

[31] Although this distinction has not been widely accepted in the academic community yet, more and more scholars are incorporating these terms explicitly into their analysis and getting published in various journals and books (e.g. Haggard and Kaufman, 2012; Meng and Palmer-Rubin, 2012).

affecting the privatization of retirement policy in the US, we also should expect a similar phenomenon in other types of welfare as well, e.g. an increase of non-standard workers (cheap labour), a widening salary gap, and a relocation of companies to foreign countries.

CPOs can be used for both theory generating and testing purposes. As for the theory-testing CPOs, it can be used for providing information about the presence of an independent variable, examining the intervening mechanism suggested by a theory, or investigating whether certain things that are highly likely to be happening along with our outcome of interests—like the above examples—are actually happening (ibid.)[32]. CPOs can also be either qualitative or quantitative data gathered from a wide array of sources like memoirs, official document, informal interview, regression analysis, survey, or focus group. Notwithstanding the diversity of CPOs, ***a single non-comparable observation can be more discriminating in testing different hypotheses than many comparable observations (Gerring, 2007).*** Bayesian inference enables this by putting different probative values across heterogeneous data (Bennett, 2008). Specifically, "the Bayesians treat statistical parameters probabilistically, attaching subjective probabilities to the likelihood that hypotheses are true and then updating these probabilities in the light of new evidence" (Benett, 2008: 708)[33]. Others things being equal, sources can be of greater value if each is independent from other providing more opportunities for data triangulation (Beach and Rasmus, 2014)

In evaluating different probative values for each data point, qualitative scholars have made some progress. For instance, building on the work of Van Evera (1997), Bennett (2010) links four tests—straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking-gun, and doubly decisive—with necessary and sufficient condition in differentiating the quality of data. That is, doubly decisive evidence is necessary and sufficient while straw-in-the-wind is neither sufficient nor necessary (but still updates our belief). In contrast, hoop and smoking gun evidence lie in-between the two, as the former is necessary but not sufficient while the latter is not necessary but sufficient. Among the four, a piece of evidence passing doubly decisive test is of highest value as it affirms one explanation while eliminating rival explanations at the same time. Drawing example from criminology, this is like a video camera evidence of a robbery which confirms

[32] Similarly, Beach and Pederson (2013) distinguish different types of evidence as pattern, sequence, trace, and account evidence.

[33] Scholars using CPOs in the social sciences have used Bayesian mathematics to clarify ones logic (Bennett, 2008) without explicitly assigning priors and likelihood ratios (Benett, 2014) since doing so can lead to giving a sense of false precision with numbers (Beach and Pedersen, 2013)..


certain criminal and eliminates others at the same time. In a similar vein, hoop test is like alibi evidence which is necessary for a person to conduct a murder (but not sufficient) while smoking-gun evidence is like spotting a man holding a smoking-gun just next to a dead man after a murder which is sufficient (but not necessary). Straw-in-the wind evidence is things indicating specific murderer's motive like emails, bank accounts, and personal history all of which can serve as important clues to implicate someone as a murderer. ***In political science, it is not easy to find doubly-decisive or smoking-gun evidence to support a certain theory, so, with few exceptions, most of the evidence has probative value of hoop or straw-in-the-wind tests[34].*** This too is the case for this particular study and, as will be clear in specific applications later, whether a piece of evidence is necessary or not—the key criteria between hoop and straw-in-the-wind test—will be decided in light of specific theoretical expectations.

In light of the key causal claim I am putting forward here, DSOs are used to see whether welfare legislation pattern is associated with different levels of power dispersion. And CPOs are primarily employed to examine contextual evidence behind the claimed causal relations. To be precise, several pieces of evidence—CPOs—I obtain from the application of social network analysis, media content analysis, interview-based narratives in this study will be used to further examine and specify causal mechanisms underlying macro-association found with the DSOs along with its operating political contexts. In this sense, the primary uses of CPOs here are to test theories based on both qualitative and quantitative evidence. Recently, using CPOs to test different possible explanations has been called with different names like "intensive with-in case testing" (Coppedge, 2007), "theory-testing variant of process-tracing" (Beach and Pederson, 2012), or "systematic process tracing" (Hall, 2003). Despite varying labels, they all emphasize that possible explanations should be deduced from existing theories. The explanatory power of each theory should be specified *ex ante* by outlining the kinds of empirical patterns that should be observed if the hypothesis is true. By doing so, we can prevent ex-post rationalization. Following this line of logic, I am elaborating particular observable implications in light of the key aspects of my theory and probative value of each using Van Evara's distinction.

[34] Ideally, what is necessary or sufficient should be based on strong theories created through many prior cases. However, as Bennett pointed out (2014), social sciences often lack such solid data so researchers should begin with more subjective guesses on probabilities. Although my estimation of what is necessary and sufficient can be different from other, I expect it to be minimized as I present various pieces of relevant evidence along with more concrete contexts.

4.2. Theory and Method Applications

<Figure 11> Schematic Summary of Key Causal Claim



The key causal claim—higher power dispersion leads to more welfare expansion (particularly universal expansion) through race-to-the-top welfare politics mechanism—can be summarised as the Figure 11. And, as I pointed out, this argument stands on three key scope conditions of welfare politics in both countries. The myopic catch-all nature of politics can be easily substantiated with Appendix 7 showing frequent merge and split of parties without further explanation[35]. However, the other two conditions—"ideologically depolarized nature of social welfare issues" and "widespread usage of unorthodox social policies which link parties and voters in a clientelistic manner"—require a close examination. Chapter 3 will use both DSOs and CPOs to prove the existence of these scope conditions.

To test whether the key political cleavage in both countries does not lie in social welfare issues, I will utilize legislation data to examine whether social welfare bills were submitted more during left wing government periods than right wing government periods. In a similar vein, I will investigate whether individual legislators affiliated with centre-left/left-wing parties sponsor more welfare bills than right-wing members. If social welfare issues have been truly de-polarized, we should not expect to see any meaningful difference between the two ideological camps. Obviously, this test is based on DSOs using logistic regression. Complementing this, elite interviews and secondary literature data will be used as CPOs to test the lack of socio-economic cleavage. Particularly, I will examine whether there have

[35] In addition, high party volatility, fragmentation, legislators' short tenure, and lack of clear manifestos are also symptomatic of short-sighted politics in both countries.

been frequent and flexible coalitions between various political actors from different political spectrum for welfare issues. If this has been the case, it will strengthen my argument since it is unlikely to see this in a country with highly polarized politics over social welfare issues. This will be close to the straw-in-the-wind test evidence since passing this is neither sufficient nor necessary for my claim (still a useful piece of information). I also expect to find some smoking-gun evidence from key political actors, e.g. elite bureaucrats, journalists, or politicians, explicitly pointing out that there is no clear difference between left and right-wing parties/newspapers/NGOs in Korea and Japan.

Similarly, the second scope condition—the clientelistic nature of unorthodox social policies—will be tested with both DSOs and CPOs. The former will be based on legislation data to see whether unorthodox social policy bills are more likely to be associated with targeting specific geographic constituents or organized groups. Drawing on the submerge state literature which emphasizes low saliency of unorthodox social policies (Surrey, 1970; Hackett, 2016; Mettler 2010), the latter will complement DSOs by showing whether unorthodox social policies have less visibility than orthodox social policies by comparing media and legislative saliency between two social policy types. This will be no more than a straw-in-the wind type test but, still, useful in validating the key scope conditions.

After examining the two key scope conditions, Chapter 4 will test the key causal claim this study is making: whether dispersion of power lead to more welfare expansion through the primary causal claims: conciliatory race-to-the top welfare politics in Korea and Japan. This part will be solely based on DSOs using descriptive statistics (mainly cross-tabulation of relevant variables) and logistic regressions. Two crucial pieces of evidence I expect to find are i) higher power dispersion leading to higher proportion of welfare bills and if so, more universal welfare bills (testing "the more welfare expansion part" and ii) higher power dispersion leading to higher success ratio of universal welfare bills (testing the "non-conflict-ridden race-to-the top mechanism part). The robustness of these expected relationships will be tested by not only considering significance or direction of welfare bills but also using different model specifications and operationalizations. In addition to testing the key causal claim, richness of legislation data will be explored in the final part of this chapter to get more insights into welfare politics in Korea and Japan: welfare bills will be broken down into 35-37 sub-categories and several key individual attributes of legislators—elected tier, gender,

party affiliation, elected terms—will be cross-tabulated to explore who submit which welfare bills under which political conditions.

Going beyond evidence based on DSOs, chapter 5 uses CPOs applying three different methods—social network analysis, media content analysis, and narratives—to further corroborate and fine-tune the key causal claim of this study. First, among many other indicators of social network analysis, I will examine cohesion and centrality scores of bill co-sponsorship networks to test my argument. That is, I will examine whether higher power dispersion periods is associated with better co-sponsorship network scores for universal welfare bills than lower dispersion periods and vice versa for particularistic welfare bills. Considering that better network scores indicate more flow of information and diverse paths to connect each other, expecting higher quality co-sponsorship networks of universal welfare bills during this period can be a straw-in-the-wind test. Second, media content analysis will be applied as a hoop-test to examine the core underlying assumption of welfare politics: voters have easy access to the relevant information. As key newspapers have been the primary medium from which people in Korea and Japan obtain daily news, I should expect to see a high proportion of newspaper coverage (measured by articles numbers, and important categories welfare articles are published) related to welfare issues in genera; moreover, the contents of newspapers should be directly pointing at particular government actors in particular. Without this necessary element, the whole idea of parties and legislators approaching to median voters—according to the Downsian logic—during the power dispersion periods does not make sense. In this study, both social network indicators and media saliency are treated as "symptoms" of welfare politics instead of factors carrying "independent causal forces" shaping welfare politics.

Finally, going beyond abstract numbers of regressions and networks, the narrative part will investigate how key political actors with real names have made/shunned choices over time in relation to primary welfare bills with high salience. This will be examined with various pieces of evidence based on straw-in-the-wind and hoop test. For the straw-in-the wind test, we should observe welfare issues (particularly universal welfare bills) getting more attention from parties and politicians in the form of fast-tracking already submitted bills or initiating new bills when power gets dispersed. In contrast, we should observe either highly ideological non-welfare issues (related to foreign policy/authoritarian values/nationalism) or

particularistic welfare bills getting prioritized during the times of power concentration[36]. Even if trade unions and left-wing parties were not at the centre of welfare expansion in Korea and Japan, there had to be some political forces, e.g. academia, NGOs, or journalists, playing an active role in promoting welfare expansion in both countries. To fill this empirical gap, the hoop test here will be to find out whether there were these actors and how they pushed the welfare agenda, e.g. individually or collectively? In addition to testing my key causal claim, I will use the narrative part in this chapter to find other potential mechanisms at work and potential factors that can fine-tune my measurements.

Unlike other empirical chapters focusing on inter-temporal variation of welfare issues in Korea and Japan, chapter 6 tests cross-national difference by adding another most similar case Taiwan. Following the exactly same process, I will first test whether the two key scope conditions of my key argument—depolarized social economic issues and heavy reliance of clientelisitc unorthodox social policies— exist in Taiwan using both CPOs and DSOs. Then, I will test the mediating effect of Taiwan's highly candidate-centred electoral rule which predicts something opposite to Korea and Japan's majoritarian electoral rule: more particularistic welfare than universal ones as power gets dispersed. Following the same sequence I specified in Chapter 4 and 5, I will use both DSO and CPO (with regression analysis and narratives respectively) to test the expected mediating effect of Taiwan's electoral rule—MMD+SNTV. Here, the types of evidence I expect to see are the same.

The latter part of this chapter aims to test cross-national difference of welfare expansion—both the degree and speed—from the perspective of constitutional structure of the three countries: presidential Korea, parliamentary Japan, and semi-presidential Taiwan. The key casual claim I am making here is that the growing importance of independent and diverse legislators in promoting welfare issues and structural incentives in Korea and Taiwan facilitate this much more than Japan. Similar to other chapters, both DSOs and CPOs will be examined in turn to prove this claim. The DSOs look at the legislation data to investigate whether i) higher degrees of presidentialism (presidential Korea > semi-presidential Taiwan > parliamentary Japan) lead to higher proportion of welfare bills than non-welfare bills and whether ii) individual legislators are increasingly taking more proportion of sponsored

[36] Although I will sort out the "key welfare bills" based on media saliency, it still will be far from covering all crucial bills and there can also be unexpected selection-bias. In this sense, it is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for my argument and fall into "straw-in-the-wind" category.

welfare bill. Going further, I will also look at with-in welfare difference expecting that higher proportion of universal welfare bills is positively associated with higher degrees of presidentialism. To strength my claim, CPOs will be employed using both narratives and media content analysis. Specifically, based on elite interviews and secondary literature findings, the narrative part will pay particular attention to find whether there is a noticeable difference in legislators' discretion between presidential Korea and parliamentary Japan. Similarly, I will examine whether there had been cases in Korea and Taiwan when individual legislators played an indispensable role in promoting/blocking certain welfare expansion/retrenchment bills. These pieces of evidence will fall into the hoop-test category without which my central claim becomes highly infeasible. Add to this, the media content analysis part will provide another straw-in-the-wind test by showing whether we can observe higher correlation between welfare related bills and welfare-related newspaper articles in Korea and Taiwan than Japan. The core logic behind this is that if there exists more active welfare politics in the two presidential countries, the media should reflect that. This is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for my key argument but still can be a useful piece of information in corroborating the effect of constitutional structure on welfare politics. How key pieces of evidence with will be tested applying which particular methods can be summarised like Table 8 below.

Finally, regarding the sampling method, no sampling was needed for any analysis using the sponsorship legislation data since it is based on the entire universe of submitted bills. For social network analysis and media content analysis, certain number of bills and welfare-related articles were chosen based on the stratified random sampling method (details are specified in Appendix 2).

<Table 8> Key Theoretical Claims, Relevant Evidence, and Applied Methods

Key Theoretical Claims	Relevant Evidence	Applied Methods
Chapter 3: Depolarized Social Welfare Issues	a. Welfare legislation pattern difference between i) left and right wing government periods and ii) left and right wing legislators (DSO) b. Flexible coalition between left and right wing political actors on welfare issues (CPO, straw-in-the wind) c. Explicit remarks on depolarized nature of social-economic issues by major political actors (CPO, smoking gun test.	Descriptive Statistics and Logistic Regressions (for a) Elite Interviews and Secondary Literature (for b and c)
Chapter 3: Clientelistic Right-wing-based Unorthodox Social Policies	a. Positive Association between unorthodox social policies and organization/geographic targeting (DSO) b. Partisan-bias between unorthodox social policies and right-wing parties (DSO) c. Lower media/legislative saliency of Unorthodox social policies (CPO, straw-in-the wind)	Descriptive Statistics and Logistic Regressions (for a and b) Elite Interviews and Secondary Literature (for b and c)
Chapter 4 and 5: Higher Power Dispersion leading to Welfare Expansion through Competitive and Cooperative Welfare Politics	a. Positive Association between higher power dispersion and higher proportion of welfare bills. With-in welfare bills, higher proportion of universal welfare bills (DSO) b. Positive Association between higher power dispersion and higher success ratio of universal welfare bills (DSO)	Descriptive Statistics and Logistic Regressions (for a and b)
	a. Better co-sponsorship network quality for universal welfare bills during higher power structure i) compared to concentrated power structure ii) and compared to particularistic welfare bills (CPO, straw-in-the-wind) b. Increasing newspaper coverage on welfare issues focusing on key political actors (CPO, hoop test) c. Higher legislative attention on welfare issues by key political actors during higher power dispersion (CPO, straw-in-the wind) d. Higher legislative attention on key cleavage issues by key political actors during lower power dispersion (CPO, straw-in-the wind)	Social network analysis (for a) Media content analysis (for b) Elite interviews, archival research, and secondary literature (for c, d, e)

	e. Existence of alternative political coalition form beyond power resources model (CPO. Hoop)	
Chapter 6: Effect of Electoral Rule on Welfare Type during power dispersion	a. Comparability test of Taiwan: "Depolarized Social Welfare Issues and Clientelistic Right-wing-based Unorthodox Social Policies" tested with the same pieces of evidence used in Chapter 3 b. Positive Association between higher power dispersion and lower proportion of universal welfare bills and lower success ratio (DSO) c. Higher legislative attention on particularistic welfare issues by key political actors during higher power dispersion (CPO, straw-in-the-wind)	Methods used in Chapter 3 (for a) Descriptive Statistics and Logistic Regressions (for b) Elite interviews, archival research, and secondary literature (for c, d, e)
Chapter 6: Effect of Constitutional Structure on Welfare Type during power dispersion	In presidential Korea and semi-presidential Taiwan more of the following evidence should be observed than parliamentary Japan a. More welfare (particularly universal welfare) bills submitted (both absolute and proportion), DSO b. More involvement of individual legislators on welfare bills (particularly universal welfare), DSO c. Higher independence and preference diversity of individual legislators, CPO (hoop) d. Existence of cases showing the influence of individual legislators in promoting welfare expansion/sabotaging welfare retrenchment, CPO (hoop) e. Higher correlation between of welfare newspaper articles and welfare bills, CPO (straw-in-the wind)	Descriptive Statistics and Logistic Regressions (for a, b) Elite interviews, and secondary literature (for c, d) Statistical Correlation (for e)

4.3. Elite Interview, Social Network Analysis, and Media Content Analysis

Although the specific application of each method will be explained in greater detail at the correspondingly data presentation and analysis, a brief summary on the background of the elite interview, social network analysis, and media content analysis method—two relatively new methods applied in this study for explaining welfare system change—will be explained.

4.3.1. Elite Interviews

The elite interviewing method adopted here is based on a year of fieldwork in three countries (three to four months in each country. See Appendix 8 for the full list of interviewees and dates) since June 2013. The primary object of the interviews is to understand and explain changing incentives and constraints of elected politicians and elite bureaucrats in drafting, enacting, revising, or rejecting welfare bills over time. Many of the written materials are sometimes not created to record important processes since some of politician's actions are not deemed important enough or are too sensitive to be documented. Therefore, semi-structured interviewing with key political actors who were directly involved in the legislative activities was of particular importance. Considering the fact that any welfare legislation making process nowadays necessarily involves a large number of relevant political actors going beyond the bureaucrats and politicians, I also interviewed academics (researchers in related think-tanks and professors working on welfare politics), media reporters and journalists (editors of "society", "health", and "politics" session in major newspapers), and NGOs and interest groups (those who are actively involved in welfare issues). Since the main concern of choosing interviewees was not having a large sample size for "representativeness" but to get "key insights" about welfare legislation process, I used, so called, the "snowball sampling" method (Morgan, 2008) which starts from a small pool of initial informants and, through their recommendations and networks, find relevant people with specific knowledge.

The interviews not only benefited the project to gain deeper insights into the welfare-legislation process in government ministries, standing committees, and plenary session but

also helped to get a more complete and un-biased picture by asking similar questions to different political actors.

Moreover, as suggested by source-criticism literature (Beach and Pederson, 2013), I Interviewed both left and right wing individuals from various backgrounds who are not known to be directly related to each other to minimize the danger of obtaining same-biased sources repeatedly. Moreover, the interviews were held in accordance with the formal process outlined by the Oxford Ethics Committee (such as sending the research background form in advance and getting a signature consent before the start of each interview). I also tried to have three to four days of interval to digest past interviews and to prepare future interviews. In total, the interviews resulted in 77 hours" worth of recordings, all of which was successfully transcribed (totalling 172 pages). However, the interview results were not used as stand-alone evidence in the narrative part. Following various pieces of advice by Tansey (2007), interviews were constantly triangulated with other relevant qualitative data such as memoirs of key political figures, meeting minutes, internal stenographic records, and various newspapers with different political spectrum as well as quantitative data I obtained from the legislation pattern analysis.

4.3.2. Social Network Analysis

Unlike the statistical analysis and narratives, network analysis has not been in the major toolkit of political science methodology for a long time. On the contrary, it has been well accepted and proven useful in sociology, whose main interest lies in structural relations that go beyond individual-level characteristics (Ward et al., 2011). However, recognizing the interdependence nature of individuals, organizations, and institutions in achieving political goals, more and more political scientists start to explore network analysis recently. Ranging from an analysis by Valdis Krebs" (2002) on terrorist networks involved in the attack of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon to core problems in comparative politics such as democratic performance (Gibson 2001), social movements (Siegel 2009), and legislative behaviour (Golder, 2006), network analysis has been producing useful and novel insights (Siegel, 2011). Network characteristics have been used both as a cause, e.g. well-connected

politicians having higher legislative output and re-election prospect, and as an outcome, e.g. certain personal characteristics such as gender, race, religion, class leading to better connected networks. Among various related network indicators, ones related to centrality has been widely used as a proxy to "power" in political science. So far, political science tended to equate power as the possession of resources (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery, 2009) such as the trade union rate in welfare studies. Moreover, influenced by public opinion research, statistical methods in political science has been based on the assumption that individuals are asocial so observations are distributed independently from one another (Lazer, 2011). However, power is a relative term and makes sense only when we interpret in the context of actors' web of science (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery, 2009); and also well accepted social science findings like "homonphily", "herd mentality", "prisoner"s dilemma" indicate people's decisions and preferences are dependent on each other. In this sense, social network analysis is an ideal complementary method bringing these dimensions to the forefront of analysis with its holistic and relational orientation. With respect to the legislation analysis, Fowler (2006) conducted a pioneering work by analysing co-sponsorship networks of all 2,800,000 pieces of legislation proposed in the US House and Senate in light of various network measures and predicting roll-call choices with them. Directly drawing on this line of work, in addition to the logistical regression analysis focusing on the sponsorship part, this study will focus on co-sponsorship networks of MP-submitted welfare bills according to the power dispersion levels, and the nature of bill—particularistic or universal.

4.3.3. Media Content Analysis

Similar to network analysis, and notwithstanding the tradition in other fields like journalism, media content analysis has yet to gain widespread use in political science. However, along with the advancement of digital technology, more and more data are being stored in electronic text databases or can be easily acquired using automated scraping methods and Optical Character Recognition (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). Furthermore, software like NVivo 10 even allows scholars to store and organize the text data acquired in different languages with relative ease while Khcoder enables researchers to apply several quantitative techniques without the programming knowledge. For instance, it is now simple to observe the frequency and structure of certain key words from an entire text. In addition to this

accessibility aspect, the possibility of more nuanced analysis incorporating qualitative differences has led scholars to focus on floor speeches in legislatures (Quinn et al., 2010), presidential or party statements (Grimmer, 2010), committee hearings (Jones et al., 2009), and treaties (Spirling, 2012). Some works even has been developed as huge data collection projects such as Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001). Insofar as text categorization is concerned, as rightly pointed out by Quinn et al. (2010), methods vary on how many assumptions one takes before conducting a research. For instance, different amount of substantive knowledge and time is required regarding the number of pre-existing categories and relevant text features. In this sense, reading the whole text requires few assumptions while a complete machine-based automated coding requires many assumptions (ibid.). In the case of analysis adopted for this study, the method lies in between these two extremes as I will be hand-coding sampled welfare-related articles from different newspapers according to the pre-defined categories such as tone, target, and reporting-format. However, the analysis will go a step further from simple categorization by examining how key words related to welfare issues are included within a sentence as well as looking at what are the co-occurring/unique keywords in each category by applying quantitative techniques.

Chapter 3. Multiple Cleavages and Unorthodox Social Policies: Testing the Theory's Scope Conditions

The key piece of empirical evidence this project aims to discover is whether higher power dispersion actually led to more universal welfare expansion through race-to-the top welfare politics in Korea and Japan. However, this causal claim stands on the crucial scope conditions: depolarization of social welfare issues and the clientelistic nature of massive-scale unorthodox social policies. Given the unconventionality of these scope conditions in the welfare state research, each ought to be tested rigorously, rather than be assumed. As for the focal points of the first scope condition's test, I will look at: i) Welfare legislation pattern difference between left and right-wing government periods/left and right wing party legislators; ii) Flexible cooperation between various political actors on welfare issues; and iii) Explicit remarks on social welfare issue depolarization by key political actors. The second half of this chapter will be devoted to testing another scope condition by examining three key aspects: i) The positive association between unorthodox and targeted welfare legislation; ii) The elective affinity between unorthodox social policy and right-wing governments; and iii) Unorthodox social policies and low media and legislative saliency.

1. Multiple Cleavages and Welfare Politics

1.1. Background

In South Korea, one of the legislators from the Grand National Party (henceforth, GNP) Park Jae Wan formed an informal coalition with left-wing NGOs, the centre-left wing Democratic Labour Party, and trade unions in February 2007 and succeeded in voting down a national pension bill—which was designed to increase the contribution rates and decrease benefit levels—at the plenary session of the national assembly. In February 2012, the GNP changed its name to the "Saenuri Party (New Frontier Party)" and included "building happy welfare state" at the top of the party platform. In Japan, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (henceforth LDP) promulgated 1972 as "the year one of welfare state" and institutionalized free medical service for the elderly.

Without prior knowledge of each party, any student of welfare politics would be forgiven for assuming that the GNP and LDP are left-leaning parties, based on the examples above. However, both are labelled as "centre-right wing parties" without much hesitation by academics and journalists in each country. As I pointed out, students of East Asian welfare states have often noted that multi-party electoral competition has been a major driving force for welfare expansion since 1990 (Aspalter, 2002; Fell, 2005); and the above examples capture the competitive dynamic between left and right wing parties resulting in a "race to the top" and a "ratcheting up" of welfare policy reform promises (Wong, 2004). This did not go unnoticed by key political actors on the ground. Similarly, in Korea, after witnessing an unexpected increase in the nurturing benefits as a result of an up-bidding process by both left and right wing parties in 2012, then vice-minister of Ministry of Welfare Sohn complained: "Politicians are making matters worse. When dealing with the legislature, there ought to be division between parties. As both parties voice the same thing, it's harder to cope with".

From the perspective of established works explaining political logic behind welfare expansions (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983), what has been happening in the two most developed democracies in East Asia is counter-intuitive. That is because the strength of the labour movement and left-wing parties have been known as the key factors driving welfare expansion. And this is not surprising since, in most Anglo-European democracies, socio-economic issues have been central to political competition and party systems (e.g. Bartels, 2010; Dalton, 2006; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) during the welfare expansion era.[37]

However, going beyond the conventional geographic boundary of welfare state analysis, one would notice that the East Asian cases described here are not the only outliers. For instance, in Eastern Europe, left-wing parties in general were more likely to implement welfare expenditures cuts, while right-leaning parties tended to spend more to minimize pain caused by market reforms in the 1990s (Tavit and Letki, 2009). Likewise, in Turkey, upper-class voters tend to support the centre-left social democratic party while poorer voters support right leaning parties (Aydogan and Slapin, 2015). Despite this obvious difference in welfare politics, students of welfare studies have conventionally applied the same partisan logic to non-Anglo European cases in their analysis. In the case of East Asian countries, it was either

[37] Although there are works emphasizing the role of other political actors during the welfare expansion stage, e.g. middle class (Baldwin, 1990) or employers (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Swenson, 2002), no work, up to my knowledge, argues left-wing parties and trade unions were insignificant to the extent of East Asian cases.

direct applications of power resources theory using indicators such as strikes, union density or percentage of votes for left party in the general election (Ahn and Lee, 2012; Yang, 2013) or more indirect applications using established welfare regime types (which is based on power resources theories) to categorize specific East Asian countries (Powell and Kim, 2014).

After briefly reviewing the relevant literature concerning welfare politics and political cleavage, I will show that major political cleavages in the three Asian countries do not revolve around social-distribution issues, and explain how other primary cleavages came into being. Then, I will present quantitative and qualitative evidence to demonstrate the de-politicized nature of class-conflicts in the political scene over the past decades.

1.2. Previous Literature and Cleavage Structure in East Asia

1.2.1. Previous Literature

In light of the established welfare state literature, the Golden Age of welfare state expansion took place between 1950 and 1970, largely due to strong and encompassing trade unions and leftist parties as necessary institutional conditions for the expansion trend (Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1990). That is, the industrial class structure was the basis of political mobilization for left-wing parties; and if they were large enough to wield political power, it led to welfare expansion through the democratic process. This pattern goes hand-in-hand with a key finding in the party politics literature that wealth redistribution is a long-standing source of political disagreement (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) and had been supported by the evidence of consistent class-based voting patterns through the late 1970s (Franklin et al., 1992).

However, from the 1980s onwards, the traditional distinction between left and right based on class conflict became increasingly less relevant, for various reasons. First, an influential theorization of "old" and "new" politics (Pierson, 1994) explains that the 1980s ushered in an era of permanent austerity and the logic of new politics in times of welfare retrenchment is fundamentally different from the welfare expansion. This is because i) it concentrates losses for specific groups whilst dispersing gains to all taxpayers; and ii) the expansion era had

bolstered the popularity of welfare programs along with well-connected politically active vested interests. Therefore, welfare politics in this era is about blame-avoidance, which explains the apparent resilience of the welfare state despite the declining influence of trade unions and left-wing parties.

Second, more recent works tackle the very assumption of conventional analysis by pointing out the changing electoral constituents the "left-wing" parties represent (Gingrich and Hausermann, 2015; Hausermann et al., 2012): from lower wage earners and the working class in the manufacturing sector to highly skilled middle class voters in the service sector. Regarding welfare system change, this line of inquiry distinguishes new risks, (e.g. single parenthood, precarious employment, work-family balance) from old risks (e.g. infant mortality, old age, malnutrition, industrial accident) and argues that the politics of welfare expansion is still present in the former. For instance, areas largely supported by middle class voters such as family policies (Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011) or active labour market policies (Hausermann, 2012) are expanding in the face of population ageing, changing gender and family roles, and an increasingly dualizing labour market.

A third factor is the rise of cultural cleavages based on post-material values like feminism, ecology, nuclear energy, or immigration (Inglehart, 1997; Bornschier, 2010). This can erode the conventional class-based voting, since it cuts across social groups. Culturally conservative parties attracting working class voters over immigration in Europe is a good example of this pattern. Despite this trend, some scholars posit that class voting is still relevant and a crucial factor in predicting voting patterns, if we reconceptualise class by "occupation" or "sector", going beyond blue-collar workers (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014). In addition, as recognized by Pierson in his later work (2001), the influence of class-voting can be more indirect but still present. That is, even in the era of permanent austerity, a type of welfare regime created during the welfare expansion era (as a result of specific class-conflict dynamics) shapes how affluent countries restructure their programs (Pierson, 2001) to focus more on re-commodification, cost containment, or recalibration.

Although class voting has become less relevant in understanding voting behaviours and welfare system changes after 1980, ***it is hard to deny that it was a critical political fact during the welfare expansion era for Anglo-European countries, whose influence still lingers on in one form or another.*** In contrast, in the case of two East Asian countries, the left-right distinction based on class does not seem to be a relevant factor in explaining their

welfare expansion trend since 1990 (nor occasional retrenchments on old-age pension and healthcare).

1.2.2. Cleavage Structure in East Asia

Accordingly, how can we make sense of East Asia's welfare expansion trend since 1990, which often witnessed left-wing politicians doing "right" things and right-wing politicians doing "left" things? ***To understand this, we first need to clarify the meaning of two inter-related concepts: "left and right" and "cleavage"***. For the distinction between left and right, it is quite clear that these labels should be a relational concept, which has nothing to do with substantial issues or principles (Bartolini, 1980). Therefore, what each means can vary from place to place over time. The context-specificity of this concept has been empirically proven by Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) and also has been repeatedly supported by subsequent studies (Zechmeister and Corral, 2012). However, party politics scholars have conventionally associated "left and right" with being pro-labour versus being pro-business. For instance, in measuring policy positions of parties in political space, scales proposed by Laver and Budge (1992) or Jahn and Obsert (2012) identify left and right deductively with Marxist writings. Similarly, in their review essay on party politics and welfare, Hausermann et al. (2013) note that a large number of established works in welfare politics continue to conceptualise left parties as advocates of the traditional working class.

Seen through the preconceived lens of "left and right", the type of welfare expansion the two East Asian countries have experienced remains a riddle. However, if we are open to multiple definitions of left and right, it is not surprising to see one country's left and right-wing parties leapfrogging into "each other's" domain.

Next, despite his ground-breaking work, Rokkan (1970) did not clearly define "cleavage" itself. Even after a large number of studies using this concept (more than 10,000 Google-scholar citations on Rokkan's works related to cleavage), a univocal definition of "cleavage" is still lacking (Bertoa, 2014). Generally, the term is understood to separate the voters into advocates and adversaries on a certain issue, or voting for a certain party. However, ***on the one hand, we can intuitively sense that the concept should not be about just any political***

attitude, behaviour, or conflict at specific time. For instance, we can see the gender, environment, and immigration issues gaining media attention, and different political forces forming a confrontation line on these issues. But we do not always identify them as politically-relevant "cleavages", and neither did Lipset and Rokkan (1967) when they named only four cleavages—Church-state, the central-periphery, the primary-secondary economy, and the owner-worker cleavage—as constant through centuries of political development in Europe. ***On the other hand, we should also be careful not to define the concept too narrowly and limit its analytical value.*** For instance, renowned party-system expert Peter Mair (2006: 372) points there are three necessary conditions for anything to be labelled as "cleavage":

> The shift from society to politics occurs when a particular social divide becomes associated with a particular set of values or identities, and when this is then brought into the political world, and made politically relevant, by means of an organized party or group.

He goes on to add another condition, saying "they are deep structural divides that persist through time and through generations". From my point of view, this is too strict a definition since there can be stable and consistent political divides in a country without entailing self-conscious demographic groups with distinct political organization sharing a similar mind-set. In other words, in addition to "structural cleavages" that can be measured relatively easily with socio-demographic data like religion, income, ethnicity, race, language, or location, we should also take into account "issue cleavages" such as between material and post-material values (Inglehart, 1997), foreign policy orientations (Lijphart, 1984) or tension between democratic and authoritarian values (Berglund, 2013). Each of these often cross-cut socio-demographic boundaries without having a distinguishable organizational structure. Issue divides are increasingly relevant, since their effect on voting compensates for the declining role of structural cleavages (Dalton, 1996). So for "cleavage" to have wider analytical value**,** ***it should be defined as a major political dividing line based on either structures or issues (or combination of both) that has lasted for a considerable amount of time beyond the period of its emergence.***

Having defined two relevant concepts, can we now say that the primary and persistent political line dividing the left and right in two East Asian countries has been social distribution between different classes? Simply put, no. As will be specified with more

empirical evidence, the social distribution issues have not been deeply entrenched in mainstream politics in Korea and Japan (Fukumoto, 2000; Pempel, 1989), although it frequently tends to be in many Anglo-European or Latin-American countries. This is not surprising, since some of the necessary pre-conditions of class-based political cleavage were lacking in Korea and Japan.

First, due to the legacies of post-war growth with equity, the gap between the haves and the have-nots was narrow. This guaranteed a comparatively close social distance between social classes, which resulted in high levels of support for solidaristic values (Peng and Wong, 2010). Despite rapid economic growth, Korea and Japan have had the low Gini coefficients on par with the Nordic countries (Fournier and Gurgand, 1999; Estevez-Abe, 2008). Reflecting this, at one point Japan congratulated itself for having a "society of 100 million middle class people". Implicit in this equitable growth is that the economic costs of redistribution are not as large as in other developing countries, which have experienced serious inequality problems during their growth stage. Second, given the antagonist relationship/rivalry with neighbouring communist China and North Korea, an anti-communist/socialist norm has been strongly imposed (particularly in Korea). This has been reinforced by their geo-political significance and their close relationship with the United States[38]. ***As a result, two central pillars of class-based politics have been lacking or significantly weakened:*** both countries excluded trade unions from national-level policy making through various means, (e.g. allowing trade unions to be organised only at the firm level[39] or forbidding their political activities (Pempel and Ksunekawa, 1979; Deyo, 1987; Yang, 2006; Jeong, 2008; Ho, 2010)); and Korea's authoritarian military regimes legally forbid the creation of communist/socialist parties (or similar parties with redistributive appeals) (McAllister, 2007). Specifically, in Japan, many socialists and communists were imprisoned during the pre-war period and, after the war were divided by foreign policy issues (McElwain, 2014). Subsequently, in the 1960s, the social distribution issue was hijacked by the centre-right LDP, which emphasised economic growth and fair distribution of its fruits to every sector of society; it even went so far as proclaiming 1972 "year one of welfare state". To sum up, East Asia's developmental state depoliticized class conflict with its "growth with

[38] Both countries had received disproportionally generous military and economic aid from the US in the 1950s, compared to Latin American and African countries.

[39] In this sense, Alford's index of class voting—assumes white-collar worker support for conservative parties and blue-collar support for left-wing parties—is inapplicable to Korea and Japan since both blue-collar and white-collar workers in the same company are organized as one organization..

equity" strategy, combined with fragmented or politically hamstrung trade unions and non-existing or weak left-wing parties. Moreover, the both countries also share other favourable conditions for reducing class-based tension, such as i) successful land reforms in the first half of the 20th century (Cumings, 1987), ii) racial and linguistic homogeneity (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004), or iii) war-time mass mobilization (Kasza, 2002).

If class has been depoliticized, then what were the key dividing lines between the left and the right in Korea and Japan? We can measure this by approaching it from two different sides: one is to examine the broad public's policy preferences, using mass opinion surveys or voting patterns, and another is to investigate the political spectrum of the elites with party manifestos, legislative speeches, legislative voting, or bill sponsorship/co-sponsorship records. As for the former, the literature on East Asian party politics has pointed out several competing structural and issue cleavages specific to each country. If we look at the structural cleavage with public voting records or mass opinion surveys, the most important political dividing lines are reported as age and the regional divide between Honam (Southwest province) and Youngnam (Southeast province) in Korea (Choi and Cho, 2008; Choe, 2003); age and the urban-rural divide in Japan (McElwain, 2014; Choe, 2003). And as one can expect, these divides do not necessarily go hand-in-hand with income or asset differences. Confirming the de-politicized nature of class, no research, to my knowledge, argues that class has been a key explanatory factor in party choice in both countries.

Issue cleavages have been equally as important as structural cleavages in shaping electoral outcomes. For Korea, needless to say, until 1990 the single most important issue cleavage had been the authoritarian-democracy divide (Choi and Cho, 2008; McAllister, 2007). However, during the era of democratic transition and consolidation, nationalistic issues emerged as a significant contributing political factor. In Korea, the primary issue divide revolved around diplomatic or military stance toward North Korea or the U.S. Namely, the left/right favours more dovish/hawkish approach to North Korea while holding less-dependent/dependent views towards the US[40]. the influence of issue cleavage formed during the democratic transition/consolidation era—between 1940s and 1950s—continues to linger on in Japan. That is, despite the existence of several left-wing parties—the Japanese Socialist

[40] Using the roll-call vote data between 2000 and 2007, Jun and Hix (2010) show that the security aspect related to North Korea and the United States is a more important diverging political dimension between left and right than the economic policy aspect.

Party (JSP) or the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)—the primary divide was not on the distributive-economic issue but on approval or rejection of Japan's constitution and military alliance with the U.S (McElwain, 2014). The two most important issues revolved around the US-Japan Security Treaty (permitting American military bases) and Constitution Article 9 (peace constitution forbidding war). This is not surprising, considering the country's totalitarian legacy before the war. With respect to the consistency and clarity of these first cleavages, I wouldn't say they have been as obvious as the labour-capital cleavage during the welfare expansion era like many Anglo-European countries. After all, having a clear commitment on particular cleavage assumes well-functioning programmatic party competition. However, as will be specified in the latter part of this chapter, this was not the case for both countries.

1.3. Welfare Politics and Ideological Flexibility: Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence

1.3.1. Quantitative-Evidence

As described above, public voting records in the both countries show the primary concern affecting people's voting choice has not been their class status. ***For a more complete picture, we also need to approach the issue from elite politicians' perspective and check whether the observed pattern can be validated.*** And for the list of reasons I specified, analysing welfare legislation patterns with a particular focus on bill sponsorship can be the most ideal way to capture elite preference. Bearing in mind the fact that enacted bills tend to be highly influenced by particular political dynamics at specific periods (this point will be made clear in the ensuing chapters), it makes more sense to focus on submitted bills to gauge the preference dimension. Therefore, I will be limiting my analysis to the submitted bills for this chapter without adding a separate analysis just based on enacted bills.

Instead of measuring the degree of left-right partisanship in a conventional way—based on the proportion of cabinet seats between left and right wing parties at certain period (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Döring and Schwander, 2015), ***I combined government types (coalition or single party government) and the nature of the ruling party***


(centre-left or centre-right[41]) to measure the degree of partisanship at different points in time. This is a more comparable way of measuring partisanship in both countries because, in presidential democracies like Korea, cabinet posts tend not to be shared between parties during divided/co-habitation government periods (although the partisan influence of the biggest opposition party on the legislative process grows stronger with its majority position in the legislature[42]). Applying this coding rule, in Japan, the level of partisanship is coded as "right" under the single party majority government by the LDP (1987-1989), "left" when it was under the single party majority government by the DPJ (2009-2010) or coalition government headed by the non-LDP prime ministers (1994-1995), and "middle" for other periods. Similarly, in Korea, the level of partisanship is coded as "right" when it was under the single party majority government by President Roh Tae Woo (1988-1992), Kim Young Sam (1993-1997), or Lee Myung Bak (2008-2012), "left" when it was under the single party majority government by President Roh Moo Hyun (2004), and "middle" for other periods. For Taiwan, there was no left-wing majority government during the period of interest.

Starting with simple descriptive statistics, Figure 12 shows the proportion between non-welfare and welfare bills submitted by both the legislative and executive branch from 1987 to 2012 (both non-welfare and welfare bills are mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive). ***In line with our expectation, as we move from left-wing to centre to right-wing government, we do not see the proportion of welfare bills increasing in any country.***

[41] Here whether a particular ruling party is centre-left or centre-right follows widely accepted distinction in each country.

[42] For the empirical evidence, see Oh (2004) for Korea.

<Figure 12> Proportion between Welfare Bills by Government Partisanship




The analysis went a step further by examining the proportional difference between non-welfare and welfare bills according to individual legislators' party affiliation. The result in Figure 12 regarded the ideological spectrum of presidential/prime-ministerial party and the government type as a barometer of the left and right. Simple as this may be, it is not a fine-grained measure, bearing in mind that it assumes that ideology stays constant during prime-minister/president's tenure (regardless of important political changes like cabinet reshufflings or increase/decrease of left/right wing party members' seat share after re-elections or by-elections). Considering this limitation, individual legislators' party affiliation is another important proxy of elite preference and can be examined separately for cross-validation purposes. ***That is, we can see whether so called "left-wing/centre-left wing" party members submit more welfare bills than "centre-right wing" party members[43]. And, as presented in Figure 13, the non-partisan nature of welfare issues seems to be validated once more in***

[43] Following the conventional distinction, I coded each party category as follows. **The full list of Korean parties** between 1987 and 2012: centre-right (Grand National Party, Democratic Liberal Party, Democratic Justice Party, Liberal Democracy Coalition, Democratic Liberal Party, Pro-Park Coalition, Korea People Party, Korea Democracy Party), centre-left (Uri Party, United Democratic Party, Democratic Party, New Democratic Republic Party, Creative Korea Party, United Democratic Party, Democratic Peace Party, New Politics People's Congress, New Korean Democratic Party), left (Democratic Labour Party, New Progressive Party), and others (independent and other small parties). **The full list of Japanese parties** between 1987 and 2012: Centre-right (Liberal Democratic Party); centre-left (Komeito, Democratic Party Japan, Sakigake, New Progressive Party, Liberal Party), left (Japan Communist Party, Jap.an Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party, Democratic Socialist Party), and others (independent and other small parties)

Korean case. For instance, as the Korean case shows, both major central-left/left (e.g. Uri party and UDP[44]) and right wing party (GNP) members initiate a similar proportion of welfare-related bills to non-related ones—24% to 25%. However, the Japanese case follows the conventional expectation, showing centre-left DPJ members submitting more welfare-related bills to non-related ones than the centre-right LDP members—36% to 25%. The mixed picture of partisan influence on welfare issues between individual legislators here calls us for a more rigorous regression analysis controlling other confounding factors as follows.

<Figure 13> Proportion between Welfare and Non-welfare Bills by Legislators' Party Affiliation (Top: Korea, Bottom: Japan)



[44] Parties in South Korea are known for constant relabeling to make a break with the past and effectively signal its new commitment (Kim, 2015). So here I chose the most representative left-right wing parties whose members had been actively involved in bill-sponsorship during the period of interest.

To test the findings so far, logistic regression analyses were applied to the whole universe of hand-coded bills—roughly 32,000—submitted in Korea and Japan between 1987 and 2012. Two models are tested here: first to test the partisan influence of the ruling party during their governing period (based on all submitted bills), and second to test the partisan influence of an individual legislator's affiliated party (based only on individual legislators' bills). The outcome variable is binary (0/1) for both models—welfare (1) or non-welfare (0). The predictor variables of interest are i) the level of government partisanship—right wing (0), centre (1), left wing (2)—as I specified previously for model 1 (as a continuous variable) and ii) ideological spectrum of individual legislators' affiliated parties (centre right-wing parties 0, centre left-wing parties 1, left-wing parties 2, others 3) for model 2 (as a multi-nominal variable considering that independent legislators and members of parties without clear ideological orientation are included as "others").

Other variables used here as control variables are drawn from established legislative studies works (Gamm and Kousser, 2013; Carey, 2009; Morgenstern and Nacif, 2002). For model 1 they are: i) the governmental position of bill sponsor (cabinet 0 individual legislators from lower house 1 and upper house 2[45], standing committee heads/party[46] 3); ii) initiation status of a bill—whether it was a new enactment or amending existing bills (enactment 0 amendment 1); iii) status of parliamentary session—whether a bill was submitted during the permanent session or temporary session[47] (permanent 0 temporary 1); iv) whether it was before the electoral reform (from Medium Member District + Single Non Transferable Vote rule to two-tier Mixed Majoritarian Member rule in Japan)[48] or after (before 0 after 1; v) the result of a submitted bill: whether it was successfully amended/enacted (failure 0 success 1); and vi) the annual growth of GDP (continuous)

[45] Since South Korea and Taiwan have unicameral legislatures, there is no distinction made between lower house and upper house. Therefore, this distinction is valid only for Japan.
[46] A bill can be submitted by standing-committee heads in Korea and Japan.
[47] This distinction is only valid for Korea and Japan since almost all bills are submitted during permanent session in Taiwan.
[48] The electoral reform has been known to make electoral incentives more medium-voter friendly (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010).

<Table 9> Logistic Analysis Results of Depolarized Social Economic Issues

	Model 1 **All submitted bills**			**Model 2** **Individual legislator submitted bills**	
	Korea	**Japan**		**Korea**	**Japan**
Government Partisanship	0.02 (0.03)	0.06 (0.09)	**Party Ideology** (base: Centre-right) Centre-left	-0.017 (0.03)	0.41 (0.26)
Submission entity (base: cabinet) Individual (L)	0.32*** (0.05)	0.19 (0.13)	Left	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.3)
Individual (U)		0.56*** (0.16)	Others	-0.18* (0.09)	0.37 (0.5)
Committee	0.61** (0.07)	0.73*** (0.11)	**Elected Tier**	0.26*** (0.04)	-0.07 (0.09)
Session Status	0.04 (0.03)	0.22*** (0.09)	**Gender**	0.47*** (0.05)	0.71*** (0.23)
Bill Format (base: enactment) Amendment	-0.28*** (0.04)	0.11* (0.07)	**Number of Terms**	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.04)
Abolition	-0.93*** (0.18)	-0.47* (0.3)	**Upper House** (base: Lower House)		-0.28*** (0.22)
Success	-0.79*** (0.05)	-0.17 (0.12)	**Co-sponsor #**	-0.03 (-0.04)	0.07 (0.13)
Electoral Reform	N/R	-0.04 (0.14)	**Success**	-0.69*** (0.07)	-0.1 (0.32)
			Electoral Reform	N/R	-0.05 (0.33)
			Session Status	0.017 (0.03)	-0.23 (0..16)
			Bill Format (base: enactment) Amendment	-0.4*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.15)
			Abolition	-1.05*** (0.22)	-0.86* (0.45)
GDP Growth	-.007 (0.005)	-0.01 (0.07)	**GDP Growth**	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.05 (0.13)

Constant	-1.02*** (0.07)	-1.23*** (.023)	**Constant**	-0.55*** (0.11)	-0.42 (0.66)
Observation	27815	4758	**Observation**	19038	983[49]

Note: ***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p<0.1

In addition to this, control variables for model 2 include individual-level attributes of legislators: elected-tier (district-based 0 party-based 1), gender (male 0 female 1), position in the legislature (lower house 0 upper house 1[50]), the number of co-sponsors for a certain bill (continuous variable, logged), and elected terms (continuous variable). The results in Table 9 are based on robust standard errors, which take into account the heteroskedasticity problem.

Based on Model 1, lack of partisan-bias on welfare issues can be corroborated with the evidence that being centre-left/left-wing government (compared to centre-right wing government) is not even a weak predictor of a submitted bill being welfare after controlling other confounding variables. Specifically, the predicted probability of a submitted bill being orthodox welfare changes from 23% to 24% in Korea and from 24% to 26% in Japan. Similarly, Model 2 tests the influence of individual legislators' party affiliation, and the results are in line with our expectation: bills submitted by major central-left/left-wing party legislators are not more likely to be welfare then the ones submitted by centre-right wing party legislators in both countries. And the pattern is similar between centre-right wing and centre-left wing legislators .

Ideally, the non-significance of two explanatory variables in my models should be validated with the opposite result from other Anglo-European countries (where partisanship is known to be a significant factor) affecting welfare difference using the same co-sponsorship legislation dataset. However, given the intensity of collecting and coding legislation data, it is

[49] This is much less than the total number of individual legislators submitted bills since I do not have information on "elected terms" for more than 300 legislators in Japan. Therefore, by including "elected terms" as a control variable I removed the corresponding information. To prove the robustness of my findings, I ran another regression with 1289 observations by removing "elected terms" and the party-affiliation did not alter the pattern here. For most of regression models from now on, 0~5% of the observations are missing from the total numbers as some control variables I include have missing values. However these missing values are not systematic and do not alter any of the key findings I present (details on the robustness tests can be found in the online appendix)

[50] Considering the unicameral legislative structure in Korea, this variable is only relevant in Japan. Likewise "electoral reform" is not relevant variable in Korea.

not possible for now. Instead, I will complement this weakness with the following qualitative evidence.

1.3.2. Qualitative Evidence

So far, I have presented quantitative evidence based on legislative patterns to examine the lack of partisan-bias on welfare issues from elite political actors' preferences. To further corroborate this finding, I will here examine three types of different but complementary qualitative evidence. They are derived from elite interviews, archival research, and secondary literature.

The first piece of evidence looks at how ideologically flexible/non-ideological major political actors have been on welfare issues. Although the quantitative evidence tells us that welfare bills have been similarly prioritized between left and right wing parties, it does not mean welfare bills tend to be bi-partisan. That is, there still can be high levels of fragmented and institutionalized competition by partisanship. If welfare issues have been de-politicized (owing to the lack of class-based identity difference between the left and right in our cases), ***we should observe major political actors from across the political spectrum making coalitions with each other crossing party lines for welfare issues.*** Considering that any welfare law-making process nowadays necessarily involves a large number of political actors, it is imperative to show the de-politicized nature of welfare issues going beyond legislator-based quantitative indicators, such as the degree of multi-party co-sponsorship or cross-party roll call voting. Therefore, in addition to bureaucrats and legislators, I interviewed academics (researchers in related think-tanks and professors working on welfare politics), media reporters and journalists (editors of the "society", "health", and "politics" sections in major newspapers), and NGOs and interest groups (those who are actively involved in welfare issues) to get a complete picture.

First, ideological flexibility on welfare issues can be found between journalists affiliated with major newspapers. For example, Korea's left-wing *Hankyorae* newspaper's society and welfare section journalist admits "when it comes to welfare issues, the spectrum between the left and the right is very narrow. So I often get sources from the Saenuri Party (the current

centre-right ruling party) as well"; "if there is an overlap of interest between the discourse creator and consumer, that's it. There is no such thing as a permanent alliance between the government and the press".

Similarly, Japan's right-wing newspaper *Yomiuri Daily*'s welfare and society section journalist stated "insofar as welfare is concerned, major Japanese newspapers all recognise the necessity of expansion these days". Validating this, she pointed out that the major push for Japan's Long Term Care Insurance bill (fifth public insurance in Japan, adopted in 2000) came after *Yomiuri*'s influential national survey proved the necessity of long–term care insurance in the late 1990s. Combining the ideological flexibility of Japanese parties with the increasing number of political actors like the NGO and media we can draw a complex symbiotic inter-linked web between actors regarding welfare issues. First, the ministry of welfare tries to use the media to explain some complicated technical welfare issues to get policy legitimacy, fast-track certain bills, or decide which welfare issues they can prioritize/de-prioritize after the major elections. On the other hand, the media can influence the government policy indirectly with their opinion survey results, e.g. *Yomiuri* conducted one to prove the necessity of Long–term care insurance in the 1990s, or directly attending some deliberative council meetings for specific welfare issues, e.g. Social Security Reform committee in 2012. Between interest groups and the media, interest groups like Doctors' Association can ask major newspapers to publish their opinion regarding some government social policies directly affecting their interest and, in return, sponsor financially in the form of generous advertisement fee. As long as they can get their message across, the wider media saliency they get, the better. Given their interest-driven nature, they approach any party in the government to get regulatory or financial favour by promising political donation or campaign support.

Other key political actors do not deviate from this pattern. For instance, regarding interest groups in Japan, an experienced policy staff in the Diet notes, "during the DPJ government time, major interest groups like Doctors' association, Pharmacists' association, or Business Federation did not mind approaching the new government. They go where power is**"**. Even before the DPJ government, it is a well-known fact that the Japanese Medical Association—previously a vote-gathering machine of the LDP—decided to support different candidates prefecture-by-prefecture after facing Prime-minister Koizumi Junichiro's medical care service deregulation. Relationship between the ministry of welfare and the ruling party

legislators can be more subtle. Faced with politically sensitive issues without much credit-claiming possibility, legislators can delegate the issue to be dealt with expert bureaucrats in an attempt to depoliticize and minimize the electoral backlash. In return, they can fast-track some welfare bills the ministry needs to pass to execute its policies.

Relatedly, NGOs have been known as a key player in welfare politics particularly in Korea (Peng and Wong, 2010). What is especially interesting about these cases, during these processes, NGOs have formed issue-by-issue coalitions with various political actors from a wide range of political backgrounds. This aspect was quite evident during the interviews I conducted with major advocacy NGOs. Specifically, welfare-related NGOs do not seem to discriminate by party affiliation, so long as the legislators appear in line with their goals. Here are some relevant examples. First, the most important contribution of Korean NGOs on welfare issues is when they actively pushed for the introduction a rights-based public assistance National Basic Livelihood Scheme (NBLS) in 2000. During the introduction process, many NGOs were in active contact with the MPs from both ruling and opposition parties. They even made "a strategic choice to make the legislative petition through an assemblyman of the opposition GNP rather than the ruling centre-left National Congress for New Politics, which formed the government (Hwang, 2006)". A strategic alliance of this sort would have been impossible, had they had a long-lasting and ideological inclination to the left-wing party. Similarly, during one of my interviews with a co-representative of Korean NGO Welfare State Society, the co-representative welcomed the right-wing Senuri Party's welfare initiative on "life-long customized welfare" in October 2011 which consists of nurturing, education, employment, housing, and elderly care. And according to the head of welfare division of another left-wing NGO (Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice), "flexible alliance is possible because we ourselves consist of people with various backgrounds, with some people focusing more on economic issues while others emphasizing welfare issues". Proving this with-in organizational diversity, the staff pointed out "we don't discriminate political parties [for welfare isses]. Some of our welfare plans were taken by [central-right] Senuri Party before the 2012 election".

Going further, there are other pieces of relevant evidence cross-validating the ideological-flexibility of major political actors on welfare issues. First is the "professionalization" of the welfare agenda among major political actors. To begin with, in contrast to the welfare NGO members with roots in the democratic struggle in the early 1990s, more and more people with

the relevant university degrees, e.g. social welfare, economy, public administration, were hired in the 2000s. Similarly, within the legislative branch, increasingly there are more expert welfare policy assistants who can easily cross party-lines and support MPs affiliated with different parties depending on the election results. Likewise, major newspapers like *Hankyorae* or *Choon-ang Daily* recognised the importance of welfare issues and kept expert journalists on the welfare beat. Second, the ideological flexibility of welfare issues indicates there is much more room for concession or cooperation compared to primary cleavage issues like foreign policy.

The evidence from both countries shows that most of the serious legislative-gridlocks, legislature breakdowns, and physical confrontations between MPs occurred in relation to non-welfare related issues (particularly first-cleavage issues), such as political reforms or diplomatic negotiations (Choi, 2011; Kim, 2008). In contrast, works by legislative specialists like Fukumoto (2000) or Oh (2011) shows a higher revision ratio and supplementary resolutions of welfare bills than other ones in Korea and Japan; and this indicates welfare bills lend themselves to compromise between different parties.

Along with the ideological flexibility of major political actors, other pieces of qualitative evidence that should not escape our attention are the primary political concerns of *centre-left/left-wing parties.* Considering that there is less need for political compromise during periods of political stability, we can expect centre-left/left-wing parties to reveal their primary political concerns when they form a majority government. Since the period of centre-left/left-wing majority government had been relatively short in our cases—about one year in Korea and Japan—it is crucial to go beyond the quantitative analysis and glean further insights from qualitative data. Moreover, although there is a plethora of literature showing right-wing parties adopting "left-wing" policies during a political crisis (Pempel, 1989; Calder, 1989; Aspalter, 2002) we lack evidence for centre-left/left-wing parties committing themselves to non-welfare issues during their political peak time. ***The evidence so far shows centre-left/left-wing parties prioritized the key cleavage issues (other than welfare)—military/diplomatic/constitutional issues—or conducted political reforms to level the playing fields.***

In Korea's case, the assembly impeached and suspended President Roh for his political neutrality violation before the 2004 general assembly election. Unexpectedly, this action caused an electoral backlash, which awarded Roh's party a majority in the general assembly.

Having secured a majority and regained his office according to the constitutional court's verdict, the President suddenly started to focus on highly sensitive political issues such as banning the national security law or setting legal ground to punish colonial era pro-Japanese figures. These zero-sum issues made the policy-making process more contentious and lowered legislative activities in general. By the same token, during the honeymoon period of Roh's presidency in 2003, more attention was given to political reforms such as dismantling the hierarchical and rigid public prosecutors, instead of universal welfare issues. ***In contrast, the biggest welfare roadmap—vision 2030 requiring 1100 trillion Korean won—appeared not during either the honeymoon period or time of the most concentrated power structure, but in 2006 when political power had been seriously dispersed and the president did not have any other cards to play.***

As for Japan's case, the DPJ's constant efforts on all fronts paid off in September 2009 when a landslide victory enabled the party to secure a majority position in the lower house. Although some of the relatively easy welfare promises had been materialized in the early 2010, the DPJ's main concern was not welfare issues at that time. Similar to the Korean centre-left Roh Moo Hyun government, the new DPJ administration was more keen on touching politically sensitive issues like relocating the American military base outside Okinawa or transferring power back to politicians from bureaucrats. For instance, at the beginning of Hatoyama administration, no single person with a bureaucratic background was included in the cabinet. Furthermore, the willingness to reform can be clearly manifested from the abolition of administrative vice ministers meetings (the top civil servants from each of the cabinet ministries), "which had often served as the final forum for deliberation on a bill before it would be rubber-stamped by politicians in the cabinet and then in the Diet" (Vogel, 2010:236).

In addition to centre-left/left-wing parties' non-attention to welfare issues during their peak times, there are other important complementing pieces of evidence indicating the non-ideological nature of socio-economic issues in both countries (e.g., "left-wing parties" doing "right-wing" things). For instance, in Korea, President Roh announced Free Trade Agreement negotiations between Korea and the US in 2006, and was labelled as a "left-wing neoliberal". Surprising as it may sound, in Japan, the DPJ was a pro-neoliberalism party in the 1990s, advocating market reforms against the LDP's construction-state. However, after the LDP prime-minister Koizumi hijacked that reform card from the DPJ, the DPJ moved to become a

welfare-state party to embrace people hurt by Koizumi's neo-liberal reforms, such as farmers (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010). In any case, we can say that the DPJ is not an ideological-inclined centre-left party we tend to see in Anglo-European countries but more of another catch-all party formed by the centripetal electoral incentive after the electoral reform in 1994.

1.4. Generalizability

To consider the generalizability of the findings here, it is reasonable to ask "is it uncommon to observe a non-capital/labour issue as the primary cleavage other than East Asia?" The answer is emphatic "no". Anyone with a passing familiarity with party politics in non-Anglo European countries can tell that the major axis of party competition revolves around "ethnicity" and "regionalism" in many African countries (Takougang, 1996; Young, 1993), "religion" and "identity" for Middle Eastern countries (Razi, 1990; Deegan-Krause, 2006), or "religion", "ethnicity", and "caste" in Southeast Asia (Chibber, 1999). Of non-Anglo European countries, as far as I am aware, only those in South America experienced the class-based political cleavage, and similarly went through the party development stage specified by Lipset and Rokkan (Dix, 1989; Roberts, 2002). Of course, it is too premature to directly compare developing/underdeveloped countries with my cases applying the same framework. However, the key findings based on two Asian countries in this study suggest the implications of having non-class-based political cleavage on welfare politics can go far beyond East Asia, and will be increasingly relevant to other developing/newly developed countries. A case in point concerns three other OECD countries that have not received sufficient academic attention—Hungary, Poland, and Turkey.

Can we see similar "left is right and right is left" phenomena in these countries? Yes. In Hungary, the Socialist government during the Bokros Period (1995-1996) pushed for a liberal reorganization of welfare state institutions, such as introducing means-tested benefits, cutting spending, or accelerating privatization (Morlang, 2003; 40), while right-wing government coalition led by the Hungarian Democratic Forum used both "credit-claiming" and "blame-passing" strategies by increasing public spending (Morlang, 2003) and criticizing Socialist governments' economic reforms (Racz, 2000). In terms of being non-right-wing/left-wing in the traditional sense, Polish parties were no different in the 1990s, in that left-wing Social

Democracy of Polish Republic (SdRP) was in favour of radical market reform, whereas right-wing parties even called for the return to communist era welfare provisions (Curry, 2003). In a similar sense, in Turkey, the major leftist party, the CHP (Republican People's Party), looks like a typical right-wing party in that it explicitly supports military influence (Oktem, 2007), receives support from voters in the wealthy districts (Ciddi, 2008), is less interested in social policy commitment and welfare state expansion (Ayata and Ayata, 2007), and uses rhetoric more typically associated with the right (Ayogan and Slapin, 2015). In contrast, the centre-right wing party AKP (Justice and Development Party) draws supports from the poor and the underprivileged, with its religious and nationalist appeals (Ayata and Ayata, 2007).

Similar to the three Asian cases compared here, ***these examples are not counter-intuitive if we consider specific contexts of democratic transitions or nation-state building periods.*** Just as East Asia's developmental state depoliticized class conflict with its "growth with equity" strategy, the Communist legacy (by definition) prevented the emergence of property owning classes in Eastern Europe. Bearing in mind that Communist successor parties in Eastern Europe tried to break from the past regime (Orenstein, 1998) by committing themselves to democratic values and market principles during their democratic transition and consolidation stages, it comes as no surprise that no left-wing party came out in favour of universal welfare (Aidukaite, 2009: 13). Likewise, in Turkey, the centre-left-wing CHP is a "state-founding" party that formed a single-party government between 1923 and 1950, with the legacy of elite-led modernization (Ciddi, 2008). Given its origins and legacy, again, it is not surprising that the party attracts support from the elite and focus more on secularization issues than social policy reforms.

2. Unorthodox Social Policies and Party-Voter Linkage

2.1. Background

Despite the under-recognition of unorthodox social policies in mainstream scholarship, they seem to be ubiquitous, covering different continents and regimes (both before and after democratic transitions), targeting both consumers and producers, using various actors as providers (family, NGOs, firms, churches, etc.), and coming in different forms (agricultural policy, tax policy, housing policy, etc.) with varying degrees of enforceability (legally binding or not). Insofar as East Asia is concerned, several scholars have noted various ways of achieving desired welfare outcomes beyond orthodox social policies, using a number of different terms such as "the welfare mix" (Rose and Shiratori, 1986), "political side-payment" (Pempel, 1998), "welfare state in a broader sense" (Campbell, 2002), "functional equivalents" (Estevez-Abe, 2008), "social policy by other means" (Mishra, 2004), or "surrogate social policy" (Kim, 2010). However labelled, the unconventional ways of protecting people's income while lessening risk are, *albeit* to a lesser extent, still widely adopted in the two most advanced East Asian democracies—Korea and Japan—today even after democratic transition and global-market integration. For instance, roughly 15% of Japan's total GDP was invested in construction (Okuda, 2001) employing 10% of workforce (Woodall, 1996: 83) and the agriculture sector in some rural regions like Gunma was protected by 990% tariff on imports (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).

From the perspective of classical welfare regime categories (Esping-Anderson, 1990)—which are solely based on orthodox social policies—Korea and Japan share key characteristics of all three welfare regimes, such as achieving high levels of egalitarian welfare outcome[51] (socio-democratic) with low social expenditure (liberal) based on stratified social-insurance system (conservative). In this sense, it comes as no surprise that the recent meta-analyses of welfare regimes resulted in inconsistent categorization for Korea and Japan. For instance, Japan has been categorized as a specific welfare regime with only around 60% consistency (Ferragina

[51] As mentioned elsewhere, based on IMF data, both Korea and Japan feature high levels of educational attainment (90% secondary education enrolment since 1985/1975 in Korea/Japan), falling infant mortality level (3-4 deaths per 1000 by 2012), low inequality (Scandinavian levels until 2000) without sacrificing economic growth (5~10% GDP growth annually for more than three decades until 1995/1990 in Korea/Japan).

and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011; Ebbinhaus, 2011). Similarly, after reviewing the details of 26 published studies about the Korean welfare regime between 1990 and 2012, Powell and Kim (2014) labelled the Korean system a "chameleon" that changes its appearance to different viewers, ranging from the classical classification (4) to hybrid (3), fourth regime (9), distinct world (4), or an immature (4) one. Then, how can we make sense of these seemingly obvious "outliers" from the Anglo-European viewpoint?

One way would be to recognize the idiosyncrasies of East Asia and try to explain these countries as deviant cases. For example, one can create a regime type inductively using labels such as Oikonomic, productivist, developmentalist, or Confucianist (Ku, 2007). ***However, I believe it is possible to approach and understand East Asian welfare states more systematically by incorporating unorthodox social policies into our conceptual toolkit and comparing how they differ from orthodox social policies***. Among other aspects, the unique political purpose of each social policy type has been under-explored until now. Therefore, the paper will examine how the party-voter political linkage differs between unorthodox social policies and orthodox ones. Specifically, the primary analytical focus will be whether orthodox/unorthodox social policies are used to form clientelistic/programmatic linkage between parties and voters. The nature of linkage can be captured by looking at who each welfare benefit is targeting and how publicly visible they are

With this goal in mind, this part proceeds as follows. First, it will show the extensive usage of unorthodox social policies in a wide range of policy areas in Korea and Japan. Second, drawing insights from several definitions of clientelism pointed out in the distributive politics literature, I will examine how orthodox and unorthodox social policies target different beneficiaries. It first shows that more than 50% of social policy-related bills have featured unorthodox social policies; moreover, about 90% of these were clientelistic, targeting specific organized groups or geographic constituents through local construction projects, agricultural subsidies, or labour regulations for insiders. Going further, a logistic regression analysis based on roughly 15,000 submitted social policy bills from both countries confirms the elective affinity between unorthodox social policies and clientelistic linkage. Finally, as an auxiliary analysis, media and legislative saliency will be compared and show that unorthodox social policies tend to less visible (one symptom of clientelism) than orthodox social policies lending, further credence to the former's clientelistic nature.

2.2. Definition and Application of Unorthodox Social Policy in East Asia

Simply put, unorthodox social policies can be defined as welfare benefits that are i) indirectly regulated/financed by the government ***by having other actors provide orthodox welfare benefits***, e.g. mandatory private health care or ii) directly provided by government ***but in the form of other measures such as industrial or agricultural policies*** that are functionally equivalent to orthodox social policies, e.g. tax benefits, agricultural subsidies (more detailed examples listed in Appendix 1 with the coding rules). Straightforward as this may sound, we should notice that the boundary of unorthodox social policies hinges on the definition of orthodox social policies. Then, what are orthodox social policies and how they came to be defined as such? More importantly, which is the key linkage between orthodox and unorthodox social policies? Given the inchoate stage of discussion on these issues, we need a constructive debate that can bring out the analytical richness of unorthodox social policies and, at the same time, discipline the concept so that it does not get stretched too much. Appendix 1 details which are orthodox social policies and which particular unorthodox social policies did get matched one-to-one; and here I will expound how I reached that particular decision in addition to fleshing out necessary contexts.

2.2.1. Definition of Orthodox and Unorthodox Social Policy

As rightly pointed out by Estevez-Abe (2008: 20), "most studies of welfare states focus exclusively on a narrow range of orthodox social spending programs and rarely ask how different countries draw upon a combination of non-welfare policies to protect their citizens' well-being". Specifically, the welfares state literature has focused heavily on orthodox welfare policies such as insurance, pension, or public assistance (mostly statutory welfare benefits and services) in understanding the welfare states. Before specifying my conceptualizing process of unorthodox social policies, let us briefly think why scholars have focussed predominantly on orthodox welfare policies and how expanding the definition to unorthodox social policies is relevant for our particular cases.

2.2.1.1. Orthodox Social Policy

The narrow definition of orthodox welfare policies is a natural logical corollary of the fact that the very definition of welfare state being tacitly [52] ***based on the following characteristics***: i) democratic institutions with accountability, ii) parties primarily competing over programmatic goods, iii) capitalist system with the commodified labour who are, at the same time, the major source of political mobilization for left-wing parties, iv) high levels of welfare commitment, e.g. welfare expenditure, by the state (Therborn, 1983, 2), iv) independent state with high levels of administrative capacity directly providing welfare benefits; and v) welfare perceived and provided as "rights" across a wide range of essential human needs irrespective of class or status (Briggs, 1961; 27).

However, as rightly pinpointed by Walker and Wong (2004), this definition has a strong ethno-centric bias since it abstracts certain characteristics of some Anglo-European countries' historical path; and, as a result, excludes other forms of social policies adopted in different settings such as places where i) goods and services are produced directly and employment is happening in informal labour markets, e.g. Africa; ii) major linkages between voters and parties are personalised, segmented, and discretionary, e.g. Latin America; iii) primary source of political mobilization is by ethnicity, religion, peasants; iv) a large amount of expenditure is optional (but state-incentivized)/mandatory private, e.g. East Asia and v) high levels of welfare outcome was achieved through serious policy commitments but undemocratic, e.g. the Soviet Union. In addition to the tautological tone of the definition, it is even self-contradictory given the fact that the literature i) traces back the origin of definition from the non-democratic Prussia in the late 19th century and ii) includes United States without any universal healthcare.


To substantiate this bias, I conducted a brief survey of major social policy areas to which East Asian welfare state-related research articles focus on—published between 1988 and 2014. ***The primary purpose of conducting this survey was to examine the way in which students of East Asian welfare state associate the concept welfare state with specific social policies.*** Considering the fact that East Asian welfare system started to draw academic interests since

[52] As criticized by many established predecessors like Richard Titmuss (1963) or Briggs (1985), students of social policy have not used the term "welfare state" with explicit coherent definition.

the 1980s (Choi, 2006), articles/books published between 1988 and 2014 were chosen here. I conducted this survey by using key words "welfare state, East Asia" "welfare state, Japan" "welfare state, Korea", and "welfare state, Taiwan" on Web of Science and JSTOR—established websites with a wide range of research article/book database. The search returned 1400 articles/books for Web of Science and 453,000 articles/books for JSTOR. For a more focused and replicable comparison, I narrowed down to the ones which i) explicitly include both welfare state/model/regime/system/capitalism and East Asia/Japan/Korea/Taiwan in their title or subtitle, ii) written in English, and iii) relevant to social science literature[53].

The result vindicates our concern. ***Only roughly 25% of research articles/books covering East Asian welfare state mention unorthodox social policies*** such as enterprise-related fringe benefits, occupational pension, agriculture subsidies, family welfare, postal savings, lump-sum retirement grants or construction projects.

<Figure 14> Unorthodox Social Policies and Academic Literature in East Asia



Regarding this point, only half of the welfare state articles/books focusing on unorthodox social policies had put them as their core analytical concern (covering more than 50%)

[53] This process was undertaken by reading titles and subtitles of 1400 articles/books for Web of Science search results. Owing to the sheer number of articles, I just read until page 10 for the JSTOR articles (besides, books/articles after this point were becoming irrelevant). After removing overlapping articles/books between Web of Science and JSTOR only 104 articles/books were directly related to East Asian welfare states.

whereas the other 50% pointed out in passing (less than 2 pages). Besides, the number of articles/books published per year has basically stayed same between 1988 and 2014—roughly 1-2 a year—showing no particular surge in interest at any time. Given the steady increase in the total number of welfare-related articles over time, the flat number suggests unorthodox social policies are getting less significant than orthodox policies. If we look at the specific countries articles/books are based on, one noticeable ***pattern is that unorthodox social policies literature is heavily Japan-oriented from three countries.*** Out of 25 articles/books, 14 dealt with solely Japan, while only 3 focused on Korea, and none on Taiwan.

Despite the narrow definition of welfares state research based on "orthodox" welfare policies designed and implemented by welfare states in Anglo-European countries, it should be acknowledged that ***what should be included as "orthodox" has varied from one strand of literature to another.*** For instance, although four major insurances (industrial accident, unemployment, health, long-term care) and national pension scheme rarely go unnoticed, other relevant benefits such as health, education, and housing policies have not received due attention in the field of welfare studies for a long time.

To make matters worse, in their volume *Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language* Beland and Petersen (2014: 5) critically points out that the comparative welfare state research is "plagued by problems of similar policies can be disguised by different terminology and different policies, agencies, and instruments that possess almost similar labels" . Therefore, the same term can carry very different connotations between countries and over different time periods as policy concepts tend to get filtered by cultural and institutional repertoires (Campbell, 2004). For instance, the term "welfare/welfare state" is closely related to means-tested benefits for poor single mothers in the US (Steensland, 2008) while it has often been associated with "European/English disease" indicating big government and economic stagnancy in Japan (Shinkawa and Tsuji, 2014). Relatedly, Kwon's (2014) analysis of "welfare state" concept in Korea shows the usage has changed over time from indicating "the ideal state of affairs where the nation stage provides a comprehensive range of social protection to citizens" to "a set of institutions aiming for social protections".

Despite the difficulties of defining social policies, I adopted the following contents the working definition of orthodox social policies for this study

i) Social security: health insurance, pension, accident insurance, employment insurance, elderly insurance;

ii) Public assistance: income maintenance, emergency aids, national compensation, supports for the disabled, supports for refugees and immigrants, minimum income;

iii) Social service: childcare, elderly care, juvenile care, mother/women care, hygiene and safety, medical protection and social protection, housing, education, labour welfare, civil welfare, immigration, depositor/consumer welfare.

2.2.1.2. Unorthodox Social Policy

Among several similar terms such as unorthodox social policies, social policy by other means, or surrogate social policy, the term "unorthodox" is adopted here. And these unorthodox social policies have been matched with orthodox social policies for this study as specified in Appendix 1. Here, I will explain in details on what grounds these two social policy types are matched. With regards to this, I argue that we should focus on "core and direct effect" part of orthodox welfare policies to incorporate as many different analytically meaningful and equivalent policies as possible**. *In other words, for a policy to be labelled as an "unorthodox welfare" of orthodox welfare policy, intention, process, or the related indirect effects do not matter insofar as it fulfils the core and direct effect part of orthodox policy. Moreover, that "effect" should be regarded as valid if it is at work "during the specified time to specified recipients"*.** So, a benefit enjoyed only by one person for a day or week qualifies as a unorthodox social policy as far as it has the effect of what orthodox social policy aims to achieve. To elaborate on this in response to counter-arguments, there have been some criticisms about the "equivalent" nature of, say, family or company welfare compared to those provided by the state considering the intention—whether one welfare benefits are provided as "rights" or "incentives"—and indirect effects—whether it decommodifies labourers, stratifies society, unifies the recipients, or how long the benefit lasts (ibid.). Valid as this strict definition may be for certain research, its drawbacks surpass its advantages for a study like this whose primary intention lies in clarifying different political dynamics between orthodox and unorthodox social policies. As will be clear in the ensuing analysis, Since each

type of welfare can be associated with different political intentions, deliberation processes, and second-order effects, bundling everything into one would simply miss our chance to nuance various patterns of welfare politics. Moreover, considering that conceptualization of unorthodox social policies is in the embryonic stage, it makes more sense to cast the net widely. For example, if one claims a policy can be labelled as a unorthodox social policy of certain orthodox policy, if and only if, all major dimensions—direct/indirect effect, intention, scope—exactly coincide, it would inevitably exclude policies lacking some of this and then important analytical vantage point would be lost. To be specific, if we disagree that agricultural subsidies in Japan are not equivalent to the state-provided income maintenance based on the *quid-pro-quo* intention of the ruling party, we will miss the chance of accounting for the different political configurations associated with the formation of each policy. In this sense, it is imperative to remain value-neutral and to select a broad definition of unorthodox social policies.

Even though we can set the relational dimension between orthodox welfare policies and unorthodox social policies as above, several more conceptual tasks need to be undertaken. First, analytically tricky as it may be, we should think government policies as both "actions" and "inactions". For instance, if we have good reasons to believe that the government is intentionally letting irregular or black economies to prosper by not taking any measure, it can be regarded as one form of policy. The aspect of inaction is particularly relevant (and prevalent) among developing countries and Holland's idea (2015) of "forbearance" poignantly captures this dimension. Focusing on property law violations by the urban poor, she shows that politicians choose to distribute resources and signal their commitments by not enforcing relevant laws in many Latin American countries. Similarly, Dorlach's analysis (2015) on the negligence of Turkish government's informal business activities and Lopez-Cariboni's analysis (2015) on Uruguay proves a clear forbearance of the government on illegal electricity consumption as a counter-cyclical transfer to the urban poor are other relevant examples.

Coming back to the discussion on definition, how can we then define the "effect" part of any policy? ***Considering both the preventive and compensatory dimension of orthodox social policy, we can define a social policy's "effect" as its potential to reduce risks or maximize investment ex ante or compensates past damages/contributions ex post. Likewise, to maintain maximum analytical flexibility, risks/damages/contributions/investments can be***

not just real but also perceived and claimed. For instance, even though the actual probability of crime has not changed at all, increasing exposure to the media in relations to crime, terror, etc. would increase people's perceived risk. The increased perceived risk can be partly reduced by politicians enacting more and more legal regulations and controls. A similar story could be told for "claimed risks" such as the possible future damage by the installation of nuclear facilities claimed by local constituents who actually do not think any harm will be done.

Finally I want to point out that the specific nature of risks/harms/contributions/investments can vary in form and size, which makes it impossible to specify them ex-ante. In the Appendix 1, I listed several unorthodox social policies by matching them with specific orthodox ones and also indicating whether they are provided by other actors or by other policies. However, the matching process I adopted here was based on not automated machine coding but four years of repeated hand-coding; so it is not free from reliability issues. In other words, the specific numbers and types of coded unorthodox social policies can vary from person to person based on one's case-specific knowledge[54]. For instance, providing a future job opportunity or benefit, e.g. setting a quota or recognizing the years in the salary, to soldiers in Korea and Taiwan can be regarded as a unorthodox social policies of employment part of universal welfare benefits. On the other hand, it will be just coded as a unorthodox social policy to a particularistic benefit in Japan. I can do this because I know that the military service is mandatory in both Korea and Taiwan for 1-2 years while it is a professional job in Japan (Korea and Taiwan also have professional armies and if a bill confines a benefit to them, it will be treated just like the Japanese case). Likewise, privatisation of Japan's postal service is coded as a unorthodox social policy to retrenchment of particularistic benefit as it was a legislative attempt to remove the pipeline of pork-barrel politics. Considering the context-specific nature of the coding, it is bound to form a back-and-forth process and I expect other changes will be made as I learn more about each case in the future. To prevent the coding error from distorting/exaggerating my finding, uncertain coding was reported in the online appendix and to what degree they change the

[54] Following the latest trend in quantitative text analysis, applying an automatic content analysis method, e.g. dictionary methods or supervised methods, was considered to raise reliability and minimize the amount of labour (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). However, there are not known keywords or categories given the preliminary research stage on unorthodox social policies. Even if they exist, highly context specific nature would require them to vary depending on country and period.

pertinent findings of this project. Along with this inter-coder reliability scores by other area and case expert coders will be included in the future research.

2.2.2. Application of Unorthodox Social Policy

Examples of unorthodox social policies have been found in industrial countries as a mix of market-taming instruments such as America's civil war veteran benefits being equivalent to old-age and disability pension (Skocpol, 1995) or Australia's immigration control being equivalent to minimum wage protection (Castle, 1985). However, I want to emphasize that more academic light should be shed on the two East Asian cases in this regard, as the degree differs substantially from other developed countries and, at the same time, these policies are known to have served as essential tools in achieving steady growth and low inequality.

For instance, based on the well-established developmental state literature (Johnson, 1982; Deyo, 1992; Woo-Cumings, 2000), we know that both countries invested heavily in education and training in combination with unorthodox social policies, (e.g. agricultural subsidies, large-scale construction projects, and life-long employment) to ensure the equitable distribution of the wealth created by high-speed growth. Scholars like Wade (2003) and Amsden (1989) argue that this was possible through well-managed intervention of the government, enabling innovation and rewarding features of the market.

However, other studies show that unorthodox social policies are no more than a sub-optimal choice. For instance, Australia's high levels of tariff and immigration control (Castle, 1985) came at the cost of making its manufacturing sector inefficient and uncompetitive (Mishra, 2004); agricultural protectionism in Japan and Switzerland led to high prices for consumers (Bonoli and Mach, 2000); the cost of the life-long employment system in Korea was borne by those laid off during the 1997 Asian financial crisis without any proper unemployment protection (Kwon, Dong and Moon, 2010); and, most notoriously, the cheap credit accessible to American businesses and consumers led to the 2008 financial meltdown (Rajan, 2011). Thus, we can say the jury is still out regarding the welfare outcome levels of each social policy type.

Of all the types of unorthodox social policy, both countries directed their policy attention to a

wide range of benefits such as enterprise-related fringe benefits (Song, 2003; Jacobs, 2000), occupational pensions (Conrad, 2012), agriculture subsidies (Kim, 2010; Hwang, 2016), family welfare (Izuhara and Forrest, 2013), postal savings (Estevez-Abe, 2008), lump-sum retirement grants (Hwang, 2016), or construction projects (Jun, 2010).

For instance, studies by Song (2003), Jacob (2000), and Hwang (2016) look at how enterprise welfare programmes such as health care, sick pay, bonuses, lump-sum retirement, housing, education, or recreation were offered to employees in large firms along with the now all-too-famous life-long employment and seniority wage system. In a similar vein, Andersen (1990) points out the existence of numerous mandatory company-based welfare funds and mutual-aid associations. These benefits are similar to what Titmuss (1943) described as "occupational welfare" and the evidence shows that participation in many of these programs was either forced or heavily incentivized by the government. For instance, there have been various mandatory enterprise welfare programs such as the retirement allowance program in Korea, and Japan under the Labour Standards Act (Kim, 2010). Even nominally "voluntary" enterprise welfare programs have actually been incentivized by the government using various means like tax exemptions, administrative assistance, or subsidies (ibid.). Inheriting the Japanese-type conglomerate (*Chaebol*[55]) model, Korea features similar enterprise welfare programs. One telling example showing the ubiquity and intensity of unorthodox social policy can be found from anecdotal evidence by Stiglitz and Yusuf about Korean enterprise welfare (2001: 370)

> *Chaebol* firms provide for their employees' needs in every way. The typical Hyundai worker drives a Hyundai car, lives in a Hyundai apartment, gets his mortgage from Hyundai credit, gets health care from a Hyundai hospital, sends his children to school on Hyundai loans or scholarships, and eats his meals at Hyundai cafeterias. If his son graduates out of the blue-collar work force and enters the ranks of well-educated technocratic professionals (which is the goal of every Korean parent), he may well work for Hyundai research and development. The extreme form is seen in the construction teams that Hyundai has long sent to the Middle East: every worker departs in a Hyundai T-shirt and cap and carrying a Hyundai bag, lives and eats in

[55] Chaebol firms are similar to the zaibatsu firms (the words are cognates from the same Chinese characters), referring to industrial and financial business conglomerates in the Empire of Japan.

Hyundai dormitories, and uses Hyundai tools and equipment to build Hyundai cities in the desert

As can be guessed from the increasing numbers of part-time and temporary workers in both countries (Figure 5), this practice is considerably less prevalent now than in its heydays. However, several works have shown that, in Japan, the practice is still widespread enough in internationally-oriented large firms (Vogel, 2010; Thelen and Kume, 2009) and surveys show unorthodox social policies like life-long employment are strongly supported by the young and the old, employers and employees alike (Kato, 2001).

Going beyond enterprise welfare benefits—which cover less than the 20% of the total workforce employed in large firms—other works have examined unorthodox social policies for farmers, small-and-medium enterprises, or rural constituents, and show that these economic actors have enjoyed benefits in the form of subsidies, regulations, or large-scale construction projects (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010). Needless to say, these unorthodox social policies have served the function of employment security and income maintenance for a large number of people. For instance, Japan spent over 1 trillion US dollars for construction projects and assistance for small and medium-sized firms between 1992 and 2000 (Pempel, 2000). Moreover, the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan has granted lenient tax provisions, turned a blind eye to large-scare tax evasion, and provided no-collateral, low-interest loans to small and medium-sized enterprises using the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) (Okimoto, 1989: 187; Scheiner, 2005). In the case of anti-competitive regulatory policies, *albeit* their less "insulative" and "sector-specific" form since the 2000s, Elder and Schaede (2001) note that there still are many "permeable" and "sector-wide" industrial policies such as R&D supports to IT and environmentally friendly products, or promoting venture businesses.

Construction projects are known to have long played a substantial role in Japan's political economy, employing 10% of workforce and amounting to 15% of Japan's GDP (Woodall, 1996: 83). In agriculture protection, Japan and Korea are known to be second to none. Various measures taken by the government either took the form of protection, like restricting imports on agricultural products that domestic farmers produce or setting quotas, or directly raising farmers' income through price supports or subsidies to purchase large-scale equipment (Boestel et al., 2013). The levels of various agricultural protections have risen much faster than in the industrial west, which is clearly manifested by the nominal rates of

agricultural protection: 151%/116% in Korea/Japan compared to 54% of EC average in 1990 (Homma, 1994: 62). Although more indirect in form, certain types of family welfare benefits were also experimented with, for instance in Japan, which introduced a pension program for housewives in 1985 which qualified them as recipients without any personal contribution (Miyamoto, 2003).

Finally, going beyond minimizing risk and maintaining income, top-level politicians in Japan are known to provide parties and gifts to their party supporters and organize lavish trips to hot springs or baseball games without any costs. Furthermore, similar to American urban party machines at the turn of the century, politicians offered services like job/marital introduction or school placement (Curtis, 1971). Politicians constantly carrying a white tie and a black tie for weddings in the morning and funerals in the evening illustrate the continued extent of this practice (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010). Recently, as a solution to the low fertility problem, the Japanese government even stepped-in the marriage market by launching several government-funded dating services. For instance, a survey conducted in 2010 shows that 66% of prefectural governments are implementing various forms of marriage support (Bloomberg, 2014).

Although these works (Estevez-Abe, 2009; Kim, 2010; Hwang, 2015) give us important insights into key unorthodox social policies in both countries, with few exceptions, ***they were not systematically analysed along with orthodox social policies and usually remained at one-country level***. More importantly, no work to date has aimed at systematically comparing specific political dynamics between the two types of social policy. For this goal, among others, I will focus on comparing party-voter linkage—clientelistic or programmatic—between orthodox and unorthodox social policies, with detailed patterns of welfare legislation.

2.3. Defining and Measuring Clientelistic Party-Voter Linkage

2.3.1. Definition

Comparing major benefit recipients is of particular importance, since it allows us to understand the unique party-electorate linkage of each social policy type: ***whether each welfare form results from programmatic or clientelistic linkage.*** Politicians generally seek

the support of voters necessary for their (re)election with the promise of "distributive advantages", and they favour certain types depending on the incentives of the specific political configurations in which they act. Although this has been central theme of the distributive politics literature (Golden and Min, 2013) and is closely related to welfare politics in many countries, it has not been integrated with welfare studies yet. This division often stems from the view that developed democracies are characterised by programmatic welfare politics and free from clientelistic distributive politics. However, several works have repeatedly proven that the clientelistic linkage between voters and politicians often adapts and endures in the face of economic development (Hicken, 2011) and democratic transition (Kitschelt, 2000; Magaloni et al. 2007). Of course, meeting voters personally and directly handing out foods, building materials, or medicine is becoming increasingly difficult (and less necessary) in developed democracies. However, ***even with middle/high-income voters, clientelistic linkages can be formed through indirect measures*** such as infrastructure controls, bureaucratic jobs, import rights, relaxing technical qualifications, tax cuts, or creating room for private acquisitions during privatization or liberalization periods. And although direct monitoring of the electorates' voting decisions is not possible any more, voting behaviour can be closely monitored if ballots are tallied at the village level—often no more than few hundred votes in total—as in Japan. Oftentimes, for vote-poor resource-rich clients, ***the mode of exchange can go beyond receiving votes***, such as guaranteeing high-paying second careers at large companies (Scheiner, 2006)[56].

If one type of social policy is substantially more associated with the clientelistic linkage, the results can be problematic, as the cost of welfare benefits will be borne by the general public without having to regard them as due beneficiaries. In this sense, it comes as no surprise that research shows that clientelism has been linked to under-provision of national public goods (Keefer, 2006, 2007). To make matters worse, such targeted benefits are usually not distributed based on clearly defined rules, but are rather decided as a result of private arrangements or non-transparent with-in party negotiations. This can result in issuing licences to less qualified doctors or technicians, and outsourcing research projects to less competent academics with tax-payers' money (Scheiner, 2006). Furthermore, relevant works show that

[56] Both in Korea and Japan, this practice has been quite prevalent. Terms like *amakudari* "descent from heaven" (Japan) or *nakasaninsa* "parachute appointment" (Korea) indicates the institutionalized practice where senior bureaucrats and politicians retire to high-profile positions in the private and public sectors.

it consolidates incumbency advantage (Lyne 2007), increases corruption (Singer, 2009), and make voters more disillusioned and cynical about politics (Kitschelt, 2010). However, where programmatic appeals lack credibility (or there are no other alternatives), this can be the only linkage voters can expect to form with the political elite (Magaloni, 2014). Although the clientelistic linkage can help further people's social well-being, it is undeniable that it severs the link between voters' preferences and policy choices (Stokes, 2007; 77).

Despite the widespread usage, it is not easy task to come up with a working definition of clientelism. Although it was traditionally defined as personal face-to-face exchanges between patrons and clients based on goods and services, it increasingly has become an umbrella term covering a wide range of informal and illegal practices such as patronage, vote buying, or bribery (Hilgers, 2011). For instance, Piattoni (2001:4) defines clientelism as "the trade of votes or other kinds of partisan support in exchange for public decision with divisible benefits" while Scheiner (2006) specifies it as "targeted, case-by-case, discretional provision of benefits whose delivery tends to depend on support for the party or candidate". Intuitive as these definitions may be, there is no authoritative definition of what clientelism is, and how it can be distinguished from similar terms like particularism, pork, and vote buying (Hicks, 2011: 290). Therefore, instead of imposing an authoritative definition, I will focus on key necessary components of clientelism that can be distinguished from programmatic party-voter linkage. In this sense, along with other criteria such as contingency/reciprocity, hierarchy, or iteration**,** most of the established works include ***"targeting to specific individuals or groups" as a key necessary condition of clientelism*** (Hicks, 2011; Stokes et al., 2013; Scheiner, 2006).

Although this is just one necessary (but not sufficient) component of clientelism, it can serve as ***a reasonable starting point to distinguish the nature of party-voter linkage between orthodox and unorthodox social policies.*** Specifically, I will focus on whether benefits are catered to "organized groups"[57] or/and specific "geographical constituents"[58] (specific

[57] Although this largely goes hand-in-hand with specific occupational boundaries, (e.g. labour federations and business organizations, physicians, nurses, pharmaceutical companies), it can also include groups based on things such as religion, ethnicity, or education. In my analysis, agriculture, banking, insurance, distribution, real estate, trucking, construction, liquor, drugs, fishing and game, radio and television, dentistry, nursing, cemeteries, railroads, gambling, movie, food processing, and R&D are the most frequently occurring sectors.

[58] This relates to a specific, identifiable places (or to a very small number of specific, identifiable places), including specific counties, cities, villages (fishing village, farming/agricultural village, mountain village, mining village, river village) towns, townships, people (with identifying addresses), churches, roads, highways, railroad lines, canals, businesses, water districts, park districts, local

categories whose distinctions are drawn from Gamm and Kousser's work (2010: 159-161). If benefits are targeted to certain groups or regions, it is likely that the welfare provision is based on the *quid pro quo* principle—expecting votes from beneficiaries with the possibility of monitoring and punishing—or, at least, generating good-will among recipients in anticipation of supporting the benefactor candidate or party[59].

<Table 10> Electoral Targets of Social policy

	Organised	**Unorganised**
Geographical	A Particularistic (farmers in region K)	B Particularistic (infrastructure development in region K)
Non-geographical	C Particularistic (national level doctors' association)	D Programmatic (children, the elderly, the disabled, women)

However, "targeting" is no more than one necessary component, and therefore is by no means sufficient to make a particular social policy clientelistic. Even with the same type of targeted benefits such as conditional cash transfers, such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil or Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico, are known to have alleviated poverty, strengthened citizen rights, and enhanced democracy (Pereira, 2015).). On the other hand, they are often characterized by discretional antipoverty strategies that incumbent parties utilized to maximize their election-winning potential, like Hugo Chavez's social funds in Venezuela (Penfold-Becerra, 2007).). Similarly, sometimes there is no way to distinguish whether providing construction jobs is a clientelistic targeting or a Keynesian macroeconomic strategy. This is particularly true since these measures' purposes are officially described in flowery terms such as building civic solidarity or reinvigorating the economy. For a clearer distinction, we need to winnow out whether a targeted social policy meets other necessary components of clientelism like contingency/reciprocity, hierarchy, or iteration. Ideal as this may be, this is a

utilities, industrial complex, research complex.

[59] With regards to the legislation pattern data this study bases, reflecting the *quid-pro-quo* nature of particularistic welfare, the proportion of retrenchment were substantially higher than universal welfare in both countries—13/10% for particular welfare to 3/4% for universal welfare in Korea/Japan. This can be one indication of clientelistic potential of targeted benefits in that they can be more easily repealed in case voters do not vote for certain parties.

notoriously difficult task since one should be able to measure how politicians interact with voters and what were their true intentions[60].

Still, focusing on the "target" component of social policy benefit is crucial, since if a social policy is not targeted to specific groups or regions, it is sufficient to be labelled as "non-clientelistic" (although it can be "populistic"). That is, if social benefits are geared towards median voters or marginalised groups such as women, children, immigrants, the elderly, or the disabled, it is more reasonable to label them as "programmatic" considering the wide range of recipients (who tend to be geographically dispersed, mobile, and unorganized) and the lack of any realistic means of guaranteeing that people will vote in return[61]. And, in reality, only a fraction of recipients may vote for them. In other words, politicians engage in a non-contingent indirect political exchange (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007) in which they cast their social benefit net widely and hope that some of beneficiaries will vote for them in return.

2.3.2. Measurement

Having clarified the working definition of clientelistic welfare benefits, how can we measure them? Due to the slipperiness of the concept, scholars have conventionally measured it through indirect proxies such as corruption or the rule of law (Keefer, 2007; Manzetti and Wilson, 2007). Useful as this may be, these phenomena are more of symptoms of clientelism than its core constituent parts. One exception is Kitschelt et al. (2009)'s work, which directly measures country-level clientelism based on expert assessments of party practices in numerous countries. Despite its strength, this measure is not suited for comparing political linkage between orthodox and unorthodox social policies since one-to-one matching with a

[60] Without looking into the interaction and intention of actors, we can tell without much difficulty that some targeted benefits are unlikely to meet the "reciprocity" and "iteration" criteria. For example, even though a politician is sponsoring for an emergency welfare bill regarding a certain geographically concentrated area, say Fukushima in Japan after the Tsunami in 2011, it is more correct to categorize victims as receivers of programmatic welfare benefits, considering the non-intentionality of recipients and randomness of the incident. The same principle applies to specific victimized groups such as dismissed public servants or teachers whose situation—being fired or laid off—can neither be regarded as regular, nor happened to get benefits from politicians. Therefore, during the hand-coding process, these bills are not coded as "particularistic".

[61] Of course, this falls far short of the ideal responsible government model but can be a reasonable working definition for this research.

particular type of social policy is not possible with this data. In addition, as pointed out by Weitz-Shapiro (2014), it is more likely to reflect practices of large cities where academics and journalists tend to reside. As a solution to this problem, one can think of comparing spending data on various types of goods and services such as Magaloni et al. (2007). However, considering the varying degrees of time-lag between legislators' political attempt (such as passing a relevant piece of legislation) and the associated welfare expenditure, we cannot simply assume that the timing of welfare expenditure actually reflects the political dynamics of that specific period.

Considering the limitations of other methods, the bill sponsorship is the most ideal data to measure the party-voter linkage through political elites' policy orientation towards social policy issues. And, again, the analysis will be focused on submitted bills to capture the preference aspect of welfare politics similar to the previous regressions.

2.4. Receivers and Supporters of Unorthodox Social Policies

2.4.1. Receivers or Unorthodox Social Policies

To investigate the relation between two different types of social policy and party-voter linkages, I hand-coded the whole universe of submitted bills (roughly 30,000) in both countries between 1987 and 2012 into the following three dimensions: whether a bill concerns social policy or not; if so, whether it is i) orthodox or unorthodox; and ii) programmatic or clientelistic[62]). An interesting picture looms large if we cross-tabulate each type of social policy with each party-voter linkage I just described.

To begin with Figure 15, it is surprising to see more than 50% of the total pieces of welfare legislation—both submitted and enacted—are unorthodox social policies in both countries, and shows ***a strong correlation between a welfare law being "orthodox and programmatic" and "unorthodox and clientelistic"***. In other words, orthodox social policies tend to be more programmatic, that is, designed for the median voters/marginalised people such as consumers,

women, the disabled, or the elderly. In contrast, unorthodox social policies were more likely to be clientelistic, or targeted at specific organized groups or geographical constituents like local construction projects, agricultural subsidies, and labour regulations for insiders. Specifically, 80% and 62% of orthodox welfare bills are programmatic in Korea and Japan, respectively, while roughly 90% of unorthodox social benefits are clientelistic in both countries—the correlation coefficients are 0.65 and 0.42, respectively, and are statistically significant at 1% level.

<Figure 15 > Social Policy Type and Electoral Target




Table 11 is a more detailed breakdown of the above cross-tabulation results, and it shows "which specific recipients each type of welfare targets". Given the sheer variety in the number of target categories—236 in Korea and 87 in Japan—I did not include the whole list here. Nevertheless, for the ones which represented the most significant portion, there are clearly distinguishable patterns between the two types of welfare in both countries. For a parallel comparison, I listed the exact proportion specific target categories both in orthodox and unorthodox welfare form in order. "Higher Orthodox" in Table 11 indicates that particular welfare benefits were provided in the form of "orthodox" substantially more than "unorthodox" while "Higher Unorthodox" suggest the opposite. For instance, in the case of welfare benefits for the general public in Korea, the proportion of orthodox to unorthodox form was 43.27% to 9.16%.

In general, several interesting patterns stand out. On the one hand, many of the orthodox welfare benefits are heavily geared towards medium voters like the general public, elderly, children or some occupation groups with high public value like public servants, prosecutors, or teachers. On the other hand, orthodox welfare policy is sensitive to the needs of marginalised people like victims of disasters, veterans, refugees, the disabled, or foreign workers, or rising demands by women, consumers, and depositors of banks coming from the technological and socio-demographic shifts.

Major recipients of unorthodox social policies are quite different, and the following two patterns are particularly recognizable. Given that the most important clientele of unorthodox social benefits are farmers/agriculture industry, fishermen/fishing industry, small-medium enterprises, and small retailers on the one hand, and the culture industry, R&D industry, on the other hand, we can say that the primary function of unorthodox social policy is to protect/promote a particular country's economy. In this sense, it resonates with the East Asian developmental welfare state literature (Deyo, 1987; Woo-cuming et al., 2000) and explains why these types of benefit have been the dominant form of welfare before the multi-party competition period.

<Table 11> Major Electoral Targets of Each Social Policy Type (%)

Korea	**Higher Orthodox**	General public (43.27, 9.16), civil servant (1.72, 0.13), public prosecutor (0.18, 0.07) teachers (1.36, 0.13), military (2.89, 0.46), women (1.45, 0.66), depositor (0.56, 0.2), foreigner (0.43, 0.26),veteran (2.98, 0.53) disabled (2.44, 1.26) Youth-juvenile (1.45, 0.53),victims (18.52, 1.33), students (0.99, 0.27), elderly (0.81, 0.27)
	Higher Unorthodox	agriculture (0.54, 5.91), farming and fishing village (0, 0.67) entertainment and culture industry (0.18, 1.59) small enterprises (0, 0.46) fishing (0.27, 0.73), small and medium enterprises (0.27, 6.17), region (0.99, 5.57), particular firms (0, 2.59), particular industry (0.63, 5.84)
Japan	**Higher Orthodox**	General public (27.01, 8.26) civil servant (31.88, 1.24) labour (2.85, 1.45) refugee (0.5,0) children (1.68,0), veteran (2.52,0), disabled (2.35, 0.83), victim (16.44, 2.48)
	Higher Unorthodox	Development and construction (0,2.69), agriculture (2.01,8.88), shipping (0.34, 1.45) trading (0, 1.03), R&D (0.17, 1.24) forestry (0, 1.86), region (1.17, 24.38) railway industry (0.17, 0.62) particular industry (0.17, 7.64) particular organization (0.17, 0.62)

Another pattern that should not escape our attention is that, unlike the easily describable boundary of orthodox welfare targets, a substantial portion of the targets for unorthodox

social policies are particular firms, particular industries, particular organizations/groups that are not easy to explain without describing the context. They go beyond conventional boundaries and are bundled together as "particular", which often combines different regions, socio-demographic groups, and specific tasks they perform.

2.4.2. Supporters of Unorthodox Social Policies

The general decline notwithstanding, this has not been a steady trend because, oftentimes, political-institutional conditions prioritized a certain kind of party-voter linkage over others. Among others, partisanship-bias should not escape our attention. As for the influence of partisanship, the power resources theory tells us that the strength of the labour movement and left-wing parties are known as the key factors driving welfare expansion (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1993). However, the first half of this chapter presented evidence that right-wing party governments/legislators necessarily do not focus less on orthodox welfare benefits (nor do centre-left/left-wing governments/legislators necessarily focus more). Despite the depolarized politics on orthodox social policies, the developmental state literature (Deyo, 1987; Pempel, 1993; Woo-Cumings, 2000) tells us that, between 1950 and 1980, both Korea and Japan had a stable political-bureaucratic connection guaranteed by one-party dominance, which was the primary provider/supporter of unorthodox social policies such as agricultural subsidies, life-long employment, regulatory protections, or family-based welfare. Considering the fact that the centre-right wing party in both countries these days are basically the same parties[63] of one-party dominance era, it is not unreasonable to expect that they are more likely to support and provide unorthodox social policies even after 1990, with the entrenched clientelistic network they have built over decades.

[63] In Japan this has been consistently the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), while the centre-right wing parties have changed names several times in Korea, e.g. Democratic Justice Party, Grand National Party, or Saenuri Party.

<Figure 16> Partisanship and Unorthodox Social Policy




Figure 16 examines the elective affinity between right-wing government and unorthodox social policies[64]; and in line with my expectation, there seems to be a noticeable political bias. That is, as we move from left-wing government to centre to right-wing government, we can see the proportion of unorthodox social policies decreasing almost steadily in both countries. For instance, in Korea, as the steady increase in the proportion of unorthodox social policy bills—from 53% to 55% and then to 61%—between left and right-wing government means the decrease of orthodox social policy bills—from 47% to 45% to 39% (this is because orthodox and unorthodox social policy bills are mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive).

2.5. Testing Clientelistic Unorthodox Social Policy: Legislation Patterns and Media Saliency

2.5.1. Regression Analysis

For a more rigorous test, a logistic regression analysis was applied to all submitted social policy bills (both orthodox and unorthodox) in both countries between 1987 and 2012 to examine whether the findings so far hold. The outcome variable is binary (0/1) for both

[64] Similar to the analysis on "depolarized nature of government partisanship" I combined government types (coalition or single party government) and the nature of ruling party (centre-left or centre right) to measure the degree of partisanship at different times.

models—unorthodox (1) or orthodox (0). The predictor variables of interest are i) the primary target of a bill—clientelistic (1) or programmatic (0)—for model 1; ii) the level of government partisanship—right wing (0), central (1), left wing (2) and iii) the governmental position of bill sponsor (cabinet 0 individual legislators from lower house 1 and upper house 2[65], standing committee heads 3) for model 2. Based on the previous patterns, we should expect to see a close positive relation between unorthodox social benefits and clientelistic linkage, particularly during right-wing government periods by the executive branch—who has direct access to the state resources.

Other variables used here as control variables are exactly same as the previous regression analyses: i) initiation status of a bill, ii) status of parliamentary session, iii) before or after the electoral reform, iv) the result of a submitted bill, and vi) GDP growth (continuous). And, likewise, the results in Table 12 are based on robust standard errors which take into account the heteroskedasticity problem.

<Table 12> Logistic Regression Results of Clientelistic Unorthodox Social Policy

	Model 1 (All submitted welfare bills)		**Model 2 (All submitted welfare bills)**	
	Korea	**Japan**	**Korea**	**Japan**
Universal	-3.1*** (0.05)	-2.60*** (0.12)		
Government Partisanship			-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.16* (0.09)
Submission Entity (base: cabinet) Individual (L)	-0.15** (0.07)	0.18 (0.23)	-0.19*** (0.06)	-0.8 (0.2)
Individual (U)		0.45 (0.31)		0.09 (0.22)
Committee	-0.25** (0.11)	-0.68*** (0.15)	-0.48*** (0.09)	-0.58*** (0.15)
Session Status	-0.06 (0.25)	-0.98*** (0.13)	-0.11*** (0.04)	-0.48*** (0.11)
Bill Format (base: enactment) Amendment	0.11 (0.07)	-2.57*** (0.47)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.18** (0.09)
Abolition	-0.12 (0.34)		0.34 (0.23)	0.5 (0.37)
Electoral Reform	N/R	0.28 (0.23)	N/R	0.18 (0.19)

[65] South Korea has unicameral legislature, so there is no distinction between lower house and upper house.

Success	0.47*** (0.07)	0.12 (0.23)	0.66*** (0.06)	0.34* (0.19)
GDP growth	0.008 (0.009)	0.12 (0.1)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.13 (0.09)
Constant	-1.59*** (0.13)	-1.65 (0.38)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.58
Observation	12339	2266	12339	2266

Note: ***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p<0.1

Based on Model 1, the clientelistic nature of unorthodox social policy was corroborated with the evidence that being clientelistic (targeted to specific organized groups or geographical constituents) is a strong predictor of a submitted welfare bill being unorthodox, after controlling other confounding variables (statistically significant at 1% level). Specifically, by changing the welfare form from programmatic to clientelistic while holding other variables to the mean value, the predicted probability of a submitted welfare proposal being unorthodox increased from 19% to 84% in Korea and from 30% to 84% in Japan. Model 2 tests the influence of partisanship and the governmental position of the supporter on unorthodoxy of submitted welfare bills. The results are in line with our expectations: executive branch-driven cabinet bills are more likely to be unorthodox social policies than legislative branch-driven individual legislators' bills (Korea) or committee head legislators' bills (Korea and Japan). And this is more likely to happen under right-wing government periods. Specifically, the predicted probability of a submitted bill being welfare increases from 52% to 58% in Korea and from 51% to 58% in Japan as we move from right wing government to left wing government periods.

2.5.2. Saliency Comparison

So far, the evidence indicates that unorthodox social policies are more likely to form clientelistic party-voter linkages than orthodox social policies. ***Then, how visible are unorthodox social policies compared to orthodox social policies?*** Lately, works on the "submerged state" have focused on a set of indirect benefits and subsidies governments channel through private delivery mechanisms, e.g. tax subsidies, rebates, credits, housing vouchers (Surrey, 1970; Hackett, 2016; Mettler 2010). Among others, Mettler's work (2010) points out that these indirect supports are known to i) be less visible to average citizens than

direct government provision, and so tend to obscure the role of government and exaggerate that of the market; ii) be associated with upward redistribution, since they tend to be allocated disproportionally to the rich by making benefits eligible only for people involved in specific activities or belonging to particular class of persons; iii) create legal loopholes, thereby increasing the influence of vested interests who are well poised to maximize their informational advantages; and iv) have elective affinity with right-wing governments, since they can deliver goods and services to their core constituents without expanding direct spending programs or bureaucracies in the process.

The negative sides of the submerged state have been well-echoed by other empirical works so far. Gingrich's (2014) work shows that low visibility of unorthodox social policies (like tax breaks or mandatory private spending) tend to go hand-in-hand with voters' placing less importance on social policy and having a harder time connecting to the political process, compared to orthodox benefits. In her analysis on the politics of religious private schools in the US, Hackett (2016) found that more submerged aid policies are less likely to be politically/legally challenged despite their presumed unconstitutionality. Furthermore, in his seminar work "Privatizing Risk without Privatizing Welfare State", Hacker (2004) points out examples of various forms of informal welfare retrenchments, e.g. creation and expansion of tax subsidies for private retirement accounts (layering) or tax breaks for voluntary workplace benefits (conversion), all of which tend to fall into "unorthodox social policy" categories. In other words, similar to the examples of private/club goods the clientelism literature often point out, many of ***the indirect benefits and subsidies of submerged state overlap with what this special issue define as "unorthodox social policies".***

Drawing insights from the submerged state literature, I will compare how its core characteristic "invisibility" resonates with the comparison made here. Just like several other analyses treat "corruption" as a symptom of clientelism, I treat "invisibility" as a crucial indication of clientelistic linkage. Therefore, as an auxiliary analysis, I will briefly compare how orthodox and unorthodox social policies differ in this regard, as a piece of complementing evidence.

The following saliency analysis, based on a basic keyword search from welfare-related newspaper articles and legislative record, shows that unorthodox social policies receive substantially lower levels of media saliency and public scrutiny in the legislative branch compared to programmatic/orthodox policies. For a parallel comparison, I derived the

keywords from 14-18 most frequently appearing pieces of legislation for both orthodox and unorthodox social policies as listed in Table 13. Major "noun" part/parts of each keyword, e.g. for Act on Special Rural Development Tax, key word was "Special Rural Development Tax", was typed into a legislative/newspaper search engine in each country to get specific hits from which we can get a sense of media and legislative saliency. To control any possible ideological bias, the media saliency is based on major left- and right-wing newspapers from each country (*Yomiuri* and *Asahi* for Japan, and *Donga* and *Hankyorae* for Korea)

<Table 13> Frequently Appearing Welfare Bills by Orthodoxy and Electoral Target

	Korea	**Japan**
Orthodox-Universal	Act on assistance, etc. To patients suffering from actual or potential after-effects of defoliants Employment insurance act Public officials pension act Act on the honourable treatment and support of persons, etc. Of distinguished services to the state Industrial accident compensation insurance act National health insurance act National pension act Military pension act Labor standards act Act on the honorable treatment of persons of distinguished service to independence Infant care act Depositor protection act Rental housing act Act on welfare of persons with disabilities Juvenile welfare support act Act on compensation to persons who performed special military missions	Postal life insurance act Long term care insurance act National health insurance act Employment insurance act Act on compensation of environmental pollution Basic Act on Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake Mother's Body Protection Act Special act on compensation of nuclear bomb victims Services and Supports for Persons with Disabilities Act; Child Welfare Act Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act Industrial Safety and Health Act National pension act Act on Relief of War Victims and Survivors
Orthodox-Particularistic	Private school teachers and staff pension act	Act on compensation of fishery accident Pension act Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Credit Insurance Act

Unorthodox - Universal	Workers vocational skills development act Act for the deregulation of corporate activities Monopoly regulation and fair trade act Act on special measures for the promotion of venture businesses Promotion, etc. Of employment of disabled persons act Regulation on special tax reduction act Act on the promotion of technology innovation of small and medium enterprises Fair transactions in subcontracting act	Act on Stabilization of Employment of Elderly Persons Unfair Competition Prevention Act Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade Act on Stabilization of Supply, Demand and Prices of Staple Food
Unorthodox - Particularistic	Tourism promotion and development fund act Act on distribution and price stabilization of agricultural and fishery products Act on fostering and supporting agricultural and fisheries enterprises Act on special rural development tax Act on the maintenance and improvement of urban areas and dwelling conditions for residents Act on the promotion of cultural industries Act on special cases concerning support of techno parks Industrial cluster development and factory establishment act Promotion of the motion pictures and video products act Act on facilitation of purchase of small and medium enterprise-manufactured products and support for development of their markets	Urgent measure on stabilization of financial function Agricultural Improvement Promotion Act Urban Renewal Act Act on Promotion of Private Finance Initiative Postal saving act Temporary Measures to Facilitate Financing for smes , etc. Act on promotion of local employment Okinawa Development Finance Corporation Act


The numbers in Figure 17 show average hit counts for particular policy type, e.g. 2046 hits in the first column indicates the average number of hits for the 16 most frequent universal-orthodox welfare in Korea using the legislative search engine.

For the media saliency of each type ***of social policy, the results in Figure 17 shows that on average, orthodox social policies get 50-60% more keyword hits in Korea and 200-300% in Japan than unorthodox social policies.*** The same pattern can be observed—*albeit* to a lesser extent—for the legislative scrutiny between orthodox social policies and unorthodox social policies, as the former gets 18% more hits in Korea, while 54% more in Japan than the latter.

Since orthodox social policies tend to be "universal" covering median voters, one would wonder they are bound to draw higher media and legislative attention. I would say this is not necessarily the case considering there are several unorthodox and particularistic welfare benefits such as pension scandals between high-profile politicians, e.g. prime minister Hata or Hatoyama not paying the pension premiums (Japan Times, 2004), or overgenerous subsidies to elderly farmers which have been salient welfare issues for a long time in both countries.

With regards to the political spectrum of newspapers, despite the high-levels of correlation coefficient between left and right-wing newspapers between keyword hits—ranging from 0.95 to 0.99 in both countries (statistically significant at 1% level)—there seems to be ***an elective affinity between right-wing media/left-wing media and orthodox social policies/unorthodox social policies in both countries***.

<Figure 17> Media and Legislative Saliency between Orthodox and Unorthodox Social Policy.



	Korea		Japan	
Legislature	2475	1488	1368	545
Right wing Media	1198	708	4022	1425
Left wing Media	1237	658	5027	1724

3. Summary

The prime purpose of this chapter was to test the existence of the two scope conditions I have assumed in the theoretical section: the depolarized nature of social welfare issues and the clientelistic nature of massive-scale unorthodox social policies.

The first half of this chapter was devoted to proving the first scope condition. I argued that class-based conflict was de-politicized during the one-party dominance era—1950 to 1990—by the East Asian developmental state's "growth with equity" strategy, as well as its strong anti-communist stance weakening trade unions and left-wing parties with socialist/communist orientations. Drawing insights from Lipset and Rokkan's "freezing cleavage hypothesis", the analysis has shown that instead of the labour-capital cleavage, other structures and issues became the primary diverging points between left and right-wing parties during the democratic transition and consolidation stages, shaped by unique historical and political circumstances. In this context, it is not surprising to see "race-to-the-top" welfare promises from across the political spectrum since the beginning of multi-party competition. Both quantitative and qualitative evidence have been presented to prove this point. Using an original dataset that includes the whole universe of bill-sponsorship data between 1987 and 2012, quantitative evidence shows there has not been much difference in the relative proportion of submitted welfare bills between left and right-wing government periods, or left and right-wing party individual legislators. Qualitative evidence lends further credence to this pattern by showing frequent political coalitions on welfare issues between left and right-wing journalists, academics, NGOs, and party members. And finally, drawing from Eastern European and Turkish cases, the paper shows that the findings here can extend beyond the three Asian cases, with evidence that non-capital/labour primary cleavages are prevalent outside of Anglo-European countries, as is "left is right and right is left" welfare politics.

The second half of this chapter examines the second scope condition. It first shows that the politics of unorthodox social policies have been under-explored in the East Asian welfare state literature, despite their frequent and extensive applications in reality. The analysis then attempted to compare the political purposes behind orthodox and unorthodox social policies by examining likely party-voter linkage. With the same bill sponsorship dataset, it applied

legislative pattern analysis, and the evidence shows that unorthodox social policies tend to result from *quid-pro-quo* clientelistic politics targeting specific organized groups or geographic constituents. This tendency was clear during right-wing government periods, which is indicative of right-wing governments' lingering attachment to particularistic benefits, through which they had established a wide range of clientele during the one-party dominance era. This is a quite a contrast to the first half of this chapter, which shows no partisan difference on orthodox social policies. As an auxiliary piece of evidence demonstrating unorthodox social policies' clientelistic nature, the paper also revealed lower media and legislative visibility of unorthodox benefits than orthodox ones.

Chapter 4. Power Dispersion and Welfare Politics: Analysing Legislation Patterns

The previous chapter confirmed the two major scope conditions of my core argument for both countries: the key cleavage does not revolve around socio-economic issues; and unorthodox social policies have been widely used, which tended to link parties and voters in a clientelistic manner. Given the existence of these scope conditions, I can now move on and test the core causal argument of this project: higher power dispersion leads to more welfare expansion in general, and universal welfare expansion in particular. And this happens through "race-to-the-top" welfare politics, which has both competitive and cooperative dimensions between legislators. Relevant observable implications for this test would be a positive association between i) higher power dispersion levels and more universal welfare; and ii) higher power dispersion levels and higher success ratio of universal welfare bills.

Before testing this key causal claim, the chapter will provide a general sense of welfare legislation patterns during the multi-party competition era by comparing them with those of the one party dominant time. Then relevant observable implications for the key causal claim will be tested using both descriptive statistics and logistical regressions. Going beyond the theory testing, the latter part of this chapter includes an exploratory theory-generating analysis showing which types of legislator (based on individual attributes such as gender, elected terms, elected tier) are more prone to support welfare bills in general and universal welfare bills, in particular. It also cross-tabulates 35-37 different sub-categories of welfare policy with variables that turned out to be significant in Chapters 3 and 4 and examines the face validity of that pattern.

1. Welfare Legislation Patterns: One-party Dominance and Multi-party Competition Eras


Let us see whether we can observe any differences between the two periods in concrete legislation pattern. Our primary concern is to find relevant pieces of evidence showing that the periods of multi-party competition and one-party dominance are substantially different from each other.


To begin with the Korean case, the top part of Figure 18 indicate the change in the number of enacted welfare and non-welfare bills, while the bottom two concern the proportional change within the welfare laws between universal welfare and three different forms of particularistic welfare. As I specified, universal welfare legislation mostly supplies benefits to median voters, while "region" and "organized" are particularistic welfare for specific local constituents or groups. Moreover, the Korean case clearly demonstrates a major difference between the one-party dominance and the multi-party competition eras.


First, around 50 welfare-related bills were enacted per year during the one-party dominance era, less than half of the multi-party competition era average. Ascertaining the authoritarian leaders' tendency to use welfare benefits to cope with social unrest or consolidate political positions (Nechemias, 1980; Kornai, 1992), all four major increases—1948, 1962, 1973, and 1979—coincide with the emergence of new authoritarian leaders or new republics after pro-democratic public resistance.


Next, if we move our attention to within welfare law variation, the proportion of universal welfare legislation (of total welfare legislation) is another excellent proxy showing the closed nature of Korea's authoritarian one party system. In contrast to the 40-60% of universal welfare laws enacted/amended during the multi-party competition era, the one party dominant system features no more than 20-30% of universal welfare laws. ***Akin to the welfare and non-welfare dimension, the timing of universal welfare law proportion increase–1948, 1962, and 1972—coincides with the rise and fall of new authoritarian leaders/republics.***

<Figure 18> Changes in Welfare and Non-welfare Laws (upper-left: one-party dominance era; upper-right: multi-party competition era) and Proportional Change within Welfare Laws (lower-left: one-party dominance era; lower-right: multi-party competition era) in Korea













Japan has been a democratic polity since 1945—the year of American Occupation—despite the LDP's dominance until 1989. The period between 1945 and 1955 is particularly interesting, during which Japan saw active legislative attempts at passing welfare laws by different parties, which could be categorized as the period of "multi-party competition". One good indication of this is the number of annually enacted/amended welfare bills during this period, which was 150, on average. ***Japan's active party competition during its first post-war decade was not just about enacting/amending more welfare laws, but also about making welfare laws more universal.*** Between 1945 and 1955, the proportion of universal welfare laws was close to that of the later part of multi-party era in Japan: 50-60%. However after this period, Japan ushered in over forty years of LDP dominance which often has been characterised as "1955 conservative system" (Winkler, 2012; Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987). This led to the steady decline of legislation activities in general (and universal welfare, in particular) until the beginning of multi-party competition in the late 1980s as illustrated in Figure 19.

<Figure 19> Changes in Welfare and Non-welfare Laws (upper-left: one-party era; upper-right: multi-party competition era) and Proportional Change within Welfare Laws (lower-left: one-party era; lower-right: multi-party competition era) in Japan










Going beyond the aggregated-level pattern, another clear sign of electoral pressure-driven welfare politics is the increasing prominence of legislators (compared to the cabinet) on welfare issues in the multi-party competitive era. Figure 20 shows the proportion of enacted welfare bills sponsored by legislators (both individual and committee head legislators). For both countries, these election-sensitive actors took substantially more interest in welfare bills during the multi-party competition period than one-party dominance period; the proportions changed from 40/14% to 70/20% in Korea/Japan.

<Figure 20> Proportion of Legislator-sponsored bills by Period




To show that the above increase was not simply a by-product of legislators' active involvement in all legislative affairs, we need some counterfactual comparison. That is, we should expect to see substantially higher levels of involvement from individual legislators on welfare laws in general (than non-welfare laws) and universal welfare laws (than particularistic welfare laws) in particular. In this regard, we can see both countries resembling each other, as well.

First, there is no noticeable difference between welfare and non-welfare laws submitted by individual MPs in both countries during the one-party dominance era. The proportions for MP-submitted bills are 40/16% of welfare laws to 41/14% of non-welfare laws in


Korea/Japan. ***In contrast, we can see a clear tendency towards welfare laws during the multi-party competition time***—70/21% of welfare-related laws to 52/14% non-welfare related laws in Korea/Japan.

<Figure 21> Proportion of Legislator-sponsored Bills between Periods by Bill Type



Second, when we shift our attention to the within welfare law variation, a similar pattern emerges. Akin to the proportion of welfare to non-welfare laws, the one-party dominant era saw minimal difference in the proportion of universal and particularistic welfare laws submitted by individual MPs: 39/17% of universal welfare laws to 40/15% particularistic laws in Korea/Japan. On the contrary, the gap has widened during the multi-party competition era: 72/23% of universal welfare laws to 67/18% particularistic laws in Korea/Japan. From this, we see a hint on the importance of party politics and MPs' extra effort on universal welfare bills during the multi-party competition periods.

<Figure 22> Proportion of Legislator-sponsored Bills between Periods by Welfare Bill Type



In sum, it is not an exaggeration to say that the welfare legislation patterns in the one-party dominant era are qualitatively different from those of the multi-party competition time. This is based on the facts that: i) The number of welfare bills submitted and the proportion of universal welfare within welfare laws were less than half in Korea (which can be attributed to the regime's undemocratic nature, and its attempts to minimize public goods provision); ii) Both bureaucrats and MPs did not differentiate welfare and non-welfare laws (nor between universal or particularistic welfare laws) in Korea and Japan; and iii) Election-conscious individual legislators played a much minimal role for welfare issues in Korea and Japan.

1. Power Dispersion and Welfare Legislation

A brief comparison of the general welfare legislation pattern between the one-party dominance and multi-party competition eras confirmed the qualitative difference in welfare politics. Here, by focusing on the multi-competition era, I will now test the influence of power dispersion on welfare system change by setting the working definition of "power dispersion".

2.1. Defining Power Dispersion

I defined orthodox and unorthodox social policies in the previous chapter, and will follow that definition here. Orthodox social policies consist of several sub-categories of social security, social service, and public assistance as listed in Appendix 1, and unorthodox social policies are welfare benefits that are: i) Indirectly regulated/financed by the government ***by having other actors provide welfare benefits***, (e.g. mandatory private health care); or ii) Directly provided by government ***but in the form of other measures, such as industrial or agricultural policies*** that are functionally equivalent to orthodox social policies. This last subtype includes tax benefits or agricultural subsidies (more detailed examples of how orthodox and unorthodox social policies can be matched are listed in Appendix 1, with specific coding rules).

Although there is no single agreed-upon indicator to measure varying levels of power dispersion in different countries over time[66], the definition presented below draws from the previous comparative politics literature, which aggregates multi-dimensional ordinal scales into an interval-scale index[67]. Among others, Marshall et. al (2009)'s Polity IV project measuring levels of democracy, and Shugart and Carey's (1992) method of assessing presidential powers[68] are two model examples. The scoring scale varies from 1 to 4 for each dimension, and the first and second ones are weighted given their substantial significance in legislative activities. The added importance of majority and coalition government formats in power dispersion is well substantiated by a wide range of coalition formation literatures, primarily focusing on the majority threshold and the number of parties (Riker, 1962; Deswann, 1973; Strøm, 1990; Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Still, to prove the robustness, the online appendix shows the results with different specifications, e.g. adding or subtracting one point to each dimension. The four dimensions used here are outlined below, and how the actual power dispersion levels—the aggregated sum of the four dimensions—have changed

[66] Although the dimensions pointed out by veto players capture the idea of power dispersion to a considerable extent, the scope of power dispersion exceeds them, as will be specified in detail.

[67] Converting an ordinal variable into an interval variable is not ideal since it artificially creates "meaning" between the scales. However, without this conversion process, the interpretation of power dispersion levels becomes too complicated, as it should be presented as different combinations of four dimensions.

[68] Shugart and Carey designate 0 to 4 for several relevant dimensions such as veto power, decree power, budgetary power, or legislation initiation power, and then sum up to gauge the total strength of the president.

over time in Korea and Japan is detailed in Appendices 4, 5, and 6 along with other major political changes such as the president/prime-minister, electoral system, and various election results.[69]

i) ***Whether a government is a majority or not.*** In this sense, a minority government is more dispersed than a majority government. Given the fact that this criterion is directly related to passing each piece of legislation in both countries —adopting a majority threshold for law enactment/revision—four point level dispersion will be given to a minority government.

ii) ***The number of parties in a government.*** The more parties in a government, the more dispersed the power structure gets. Although the influence of several parties in government is direct, the dispersion level cannot be as high as in a minority government given the usual similarity of preference among the coalition parties. So, a coalition government with more than one party will add two points to the dispersion level.

iii) ***Whether the president/prime-minister's party is the largest party in the legislature or not***. This is based on the assumption that if a president/prime-minister has substantial power, whether constitutional or extra-constitutional; the chief executive coming from the largest party would concentrate the power structure. Therefore, power is more dispersed if the president/prime minister's party is not the largest party. Usually this corresponds to divided government situations in presidentialism, and much has been written about its effect (Sundquist, 1988; Cutler, 1988; Mayhew, 2005; Elgie, 2001; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995). Considering the indirect influence this political situation has on legislative politics, one point will be given.

[69] Although the four aspects listed here are based on national-level presidential elections, general elections, and nation-wide simultaneous local elections, there are other possible elections such as re-elections or by-elections that can change the dynamics of national-level welfare politics. Similarly, the specific seat/vote difference between the ruling party and the largest opposition party can be a proxy for the level of political threat at a certain time. For simplicity's sake, these aspects are left out for the quantitative analysis but will be considered in the theory-informed narrative analysis.

iv) ***Whether the ruling party/parties won a majority in the nationwide local election.*** Given the simultaneity and mid-term judgement aspect of nationa-wide local-level elections in both countries, politicians take the result seriously; the poll often leads to reshuffling the core executive staff in government. Therefore, if the ruling party/parties did not receive a majority of seats from the nation-level local elections, it will be regarded as dispersing the ruling party's concentrated power until the time of another election. This adds one point to the dispersion level.

Considering the four dispersed situations above, any political situation can fall between the minimum and maximum dispersion level—0 to 8. Just like the way previous literature measured "presidential power" and "levels of democracy", the scores on each aspect were summed to arrive at an overall power dispersion indicator for a specific period. Given the frequent changes in the levels of dispersion in Korea (21 times) and Japan (11 times), ***it is a rare opportunity to observe how a dispersion level affects important changes in welfare policy patterns.*** Furthermore, unlike other macro socio-economic changes, all four changes are immediately noticeable (and actually noticed) by major political actors such as MPs, bureaucrats, advocacy NGOs, or interest groups, which adapt legislative preferences and strategies accordingly. To make comparison more parallel and comprehensible between different power dispersion levels and across countries, original dispersion scores are converted into either low-level dispersion or high-level dispersion (categorized dispersion scores of 0, 1, or 2 are labelled "low level" and beyond 3 as "high level" considering the distribution of observation[70]) and will be presented in that way for the descriptive statistics analysis section. However, for accuracy's sake, the original scores—which ranged from 0 to 6 in Korea and 0 to 7 in Japan—will be used for the regression analysis.


2.2. Power Dispersion and Welfare Legislation Patterns

Figure 23 shows the proportion of welfare and non-welfare laws in both low and high power dispersion periods in Korea and Japan. In line with the core argument put forward in the theoretical section, an increase in the proportion of enacted welfare laws during high

[70] By using the power dispersion level 3 as the cut-off point, almost half of the observations fall below and half above in both countries.


dispersion periods is evident in both countries. In addition, the success ratio of welfare laws increase substantially during the high dispersion periods.

<Figure 23> Proportion and Success Ratio of Welfare Bills by Power Dispersion Levels (Left: Korea; Right: Japan)




However, the broad definition of "welfare" I chose for this particular project goes beyond the mainstream welfare state literature, whose scope tends to be limited to orthodox welfare. In other words, one can attribute the above legislation pattern to the inclusion of unorthodox social policies. Therefore, I narrowed the definition of welfare to only orthodox social policies to see what difference it made. And, as Figure 24 represents, the pattern of higher dispersion-higher welfare proportions and higher dispersion-higher welfare bill success ratio became even clearer then in Figure 23, which includes both orthodox and unorthodox social policies.


<Figure 24> Proportion and Success Ratio of Orthodox Welfare Bills by Power Dispersion Levels (Left: Korea; Right: Japan)



Another major concern of this research is the variation *within* welfare laws. The primary logic of welfare politics in both countries is that political actors converge to attract median voters as the level of political competition grows and political crisis deepens. According to this, we should observe more universal welfare laws than particularistic ones during high-dispersion level periods. For both countries, Figure 25 precisely confirms this expectation.

<Figure 25> Proportion and Success Ratio of Universal Welfare Bills by Power Dispersion Levels (Top: Korea; Bottom: Japan)






Here I compared enacted welfare bills (i.e. successful welfare bills) to all submitted ones. One interesting pattern that should not escape our attention is the mediating influence of power dispersion levels in deciding which welfare bills are successful. As I pointed out in the data description part, the proportion of submitted bills is less likely to be affected by particular political configurations such as minority or coalition governments. In contrast, which bills are more likely to reach the final legislative stage is more likely to be determined by "power dispersion levels" and other environmental factors. Figure 25 proves this pattern


by showing that there is not much difference in the proportion of submitted universal welfare bills between low and high dispersion periods. In contrast, the difference is substantial for enacted bills and success ratio (which is a manifestation of political institutions' mediating influence).

Before moving further, it is important to note a caveat in interpreting the above results: trade-offs between the quality and the quantity of legislation (Tseblis, 2002; Doering, 1995). Tsbelis (2002) discovered a phenomenon of "legislative inflation" when a large number of veto players maintain the status quo of significant legislation and force political actors to focus on many non-significant issues within a limited amount of time. According to this logic, the higher success ratio of legislation and more welfare-related laws during the dispersed power periods can be a by-product of passing insignificant laws. This amounts to saying that there will be no *substantial* variations in welfare legislation between low and high dispersion periods. Similarly, one can also argue that if half of the enacted welfare bills concern cutting already existing welfare benefits, it is not easy to call observed increase welfare "expansion".

To address these concerns, I looked into whether there is any meaningful difference between low and high power dispersion levels in terms of "significance" and "direction". As I specified elsewhere, the significance of each welfare-related law is coded into three categories: trivial, medium-level, or high-level significance. As the data manifest clearly in Figure 26, there is no linear trend showing higher power dispersion levels leading to more trivial welfare in either country. Moreover, trivial laws make up no more than 14% of the total any specific period presented here, and are much less, on average. Likewise, the direction was divided into "no-direction", "retrenchment", and "expansion and Figure 26 shows there is no meaningful difference between power dispersion levels. Overall, the welfare retrenchment bills were less than 10% of the total welfare bills.

<Figure 26> Significance and Direction of Welfare Laws by Power Dispersion Levels






All things considered, ***there is neither a trade-off between quality and quantity*** nor an imbalance between retrenchment and expansion during high dispersion periods.


So far, the legislation pattern results have been presented at the aggregated level without considering each law's particular political sponsor. To gain more precise insights into these countries' welfare politics, we need to understand which political actors play crucial roles in welfare issues. As specified in the legislation requirement part, both countries allow three types of actor to sponsor a bill: individual legislators, standing committee-head legislators, and cabinet members. We can leverage this recorded distinction and examine within actor variation from welfare legislation patterns. Figure 27 looks at the relative proportion of welfare to non-welfare bills (enacted ones) sponsored by each actor between 1987 and 2012. If we combine individual legislators and standing committee-head legislators under the label "MPs", we see that ***MPs in both countries enact or amend welfare bills in higher proportions than non-welfare bills.*** This indicates the election-friendly nature of welfare bills.

<Figure 27> Proportion of Legislator-sponsored Bills by Bill Type



To add another layer of nuance, we can investigate which particular political actors have been at the centre of submitted welfare bills (since "submission" captures the preference dimension) over time, compared to other political actors. In this regard, Figure 28 clearly demonstrates that, ***as multi-party competition proceeded after 1990, MPs took increasingly important roles for welfare bills in both countries.*** This becomes particularly clear if we compare the periods before and after 2000. Although many of their legislative attempts fail in the end, election-conscious political actors clearly care about welfare issues—a symptom of dynamic welfare politics.

<Figure 28> Proportion of Welfare Bills by Sponsor Type: 1987-2012 (Top: Korea, Bottom: Japan)



2.3. Regression Analyses

Based on the veto player theory and the recent welfare expansion trend in Korea and Japan, we can test "the race to the top" aspect of welfare politics more rigorously with the logistic regression analysis, considering several related variables at the same time. If the findings so far are true, we are more likely to observe higher levels of power dispersion leading to an submitted/enacted bills being welfare (Model 1 and Model 2), a submitted/enacted welfare law being universal (Model 3 and Model 4), and an increasing success ratio of submitted universal welfare bills (Model 5). Models 1 to 4 indicate that as power becomes dispersed, more legislative attention is likely to be directed to welfare laws in general, and universalistic ones in particular. Model 5 shows an aspect of conciliatory welfare politics, with both "competitive and cooperative" dimensions. The outcome variable is binary (0/1) for all five

models, model 1 and model 2 being welfare (1) or non-welfare (0), model 3 and 4 being universal (1) or particularistic (0), and model 5 being success (1) or failure (0). The predictor variable of interest is the levels of power dispersion (0 to 6 in Korea, 0 to 7 in Japan).

Other variables used here include all the control variables used for the previous models: i) sponsoring actors; ii) government partisanship; iii) before and after the electoral reform (for Japan only); iv) initiation status of a bill; vi) result (success or failure); vii) annual GDP growth; and viii) the nature of parliamentary session. Beyond this, since models 2 and 4 only deal with enacted laws, the following four additional control variables are added here: i) Whether a bill was enacted during the annual legislative session's final month (other month 0, final month 1)[71]; ii) The level of substantiality (trivial 0, medium-level significance 1, high-level significance 2); iii) The direction of change (retrenchment or no-direction 0, expansion 1)[72]; and iv) The termination status of a bill (original 0, revised 1). The regression analyses are based on robust standard errors, which take into account the heteroskedasticity problem.

Results in Table 14 mostly confirm the primary theoretical concern. That is, the level of power dispersion positively affects the probability of submitted/enacted bills being welfare ones (models 1 and model 2), submitted/enacted welfare bills being universal (models 3 and model 4), and the success of submitted universal welfare bills (model 5) in Korea and Japan. This can be substantiated by the statistical significance of 9 out of 10 power dispersion variables in five models (only model 1's enacted bill being welfare in Korea shows no significance).

Given the core theory's emphasis on median voters, the most crucial aspect is to examine the "universal" nature of a submitted/enacted welfare bills. In this regard, the predicted probability of a welfare law being universal—holding other variables to their mean values—increases roughly 6% from dispersion levels 0 to 6 in Korea—42% to 48%—and 16% from dispersion levels 0 to 7 in Japan—31% to 47%[73]. Likewise, as power becomes dispersed, the

[71] More bills tend to be enacted/amended during the final month of each legislative year (December in Korea and June in Japan) than in other months. So this variable controls the seasonal aspect of legislative activity.

[72] As I pointed out elsewhere, direction and significance have not been coded for submitted but failed welfare bills.

[73] Despite the statistical significance, one might think the degree of change in the predicted probability is not substantially significant. However, if we think that both countries have specialized standing committees (15~25 committees), each of which regularly expected to enact/amend a certain number of bills every year, the scope for change is quite limited. In this sense, 6-16% of change in the predicted probability is not a negligible difference.

predicted probability of a submitted universal welfare bill being successful increases from 10% to 23% in Korea, and 39% to 87% in Japan.

If we shift our attention to the actor-level, more submitted/enacted bills are likely to be welfare ones if they are initiated by committee head MPs or individual MPs than bureaucrats in both countries (model 1 and model 2). This confirms the increasing importance of legislators in welfare politics presented in Figure 28. ***This pattern similarly holds for the universal/particularistic dimension, as more submitted/enacted welfare bills tend to be brought by MPs*** than by bureaucrats (model 3 and model 4). This result seems to reflect that welfare bills in general (and universal ones in particular) are something election-conscious legislators care more about than do bureaucrats. Relatedly, another interesting picture looms large if we focus on the success ratio dimension of actors (model 5). For both countries, individual legislators' legislative attempts fare worse than bureaucrats', while committee-head legislators far better. As will be specified later in the cross-sectional analysis part, the former is a symptom of legislative inflation (in that individual legislators submit similar expansionary welfare bills), while the latter indicates bi-partisan welfare bills (which are submitted and enacted in a much shorter time span than other bills).

<Table 14> Regression Analysis Results of Power Dispersion and Welfare Expansion

	Model 1: Welfare or Non-welfare (All Enacted Bills)		Model 2: Welfare or Non-welfare (All Submitted Bills)		Model 3: Universal or Particularistic (All Enacted Welfare Bills)		Model 4: Universal or Particularistic (All Submitted Welfare Bills)		Model 5: Success of Failure (All Submitted Universal Welfare Bills)	
	Korea	**Japan**	**Korea**	**Japan**	**Korea**	**Japan**	**Korea**	**Japan**	**Korea**	**Japan**
Power dispersion	**0.005 (0.015)**	**0.09*** (0.03)**	**0.025** (0.008)**	**0.04* (0.02)**	**0.05* (0.025)**	**0.09** (0.04)**	**0.03*** (0.012)**	**0.08** (0.03)**	**0.17*** (0.03)**	**0.33*** (0.13)**
Submission Entity (Base: Cabinet) Individual (L)	0.5 (0.07)	0.24 (0.19)	0.25*** (0.03)	0.211* (0.12)	-0.09 (0.11)	0.3 (0.29)	0.12** (0.05)	0.42** (0.19)	-2.4*** (0.1)	-4.7*** (0.29)
Individual (U) (Japan: upper house)		-0.22 (0.49)		0.91*** (0.15)		2.18** (0.9)		0.23 (0.22)		-6.07*** (0.49)
Committee	0.54*** (0.08)	0.5*** (0.1)	035*** (0.05)	0.55*** (0.1)	0.49*** (0.13)	0.28* (0.16)	0.5** (0.08)	0.17 (0.15)	5.5*** (0.6)	1.01* (0.63)
Electoral Reform	N/R	-0.02 (0.15)	N/R	0.016 (0.13)	N/R	-0.08 (0.26)	N/R	0.02 (0.19)	N/R	-0.86* (0.46)
Government Partisanship	-0.1* (0.05)	0.2** (0.09)	-0.08*** (0.027)	-0.12 (0.08)	0.2** (0.09)	0.36*** (0.14)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.03 (0.12)	0.32*** (0.11)	-0.15 (0.31)
Result Status (base: original) Revised	0.12* (0.07)	-0.04 (0.1)			0.2* (0.11)	1.08*** (0.17)				
Direction						0.92*** (0.21)				
Success			-0.046*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.12)			-0.56*** (0.06)	-0.52** (0.19)		
Bill Format (base: enactment) Amendment	-0.44*** (0.07)	0.16** (0.08)	-0.35*** (0.04)	-0.009 (0.07)	0.005 (0.11)	-0.24* (0.13)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.26*** (0.09)	-0.73*** (0.13)	0.06 (0.26)
Abolition	-0.85*** (0.21)	0.71* (0.43)	-0.94*** (0.14	0.31 (0.24)	0.12 (0.4)	-0.09 (0.58)	-0.7** (0.23)	-0.58 (0.36)	0.21 (0.57)	-1.66* (1.03)
GDP growth	0.008 (0.007)	-0.17** (0.07)	0.0006 (0.005)	-0.09* (0.06)	-0.009 (0.013)	0.22* 0.13)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.12 (0.09)	-0.03** (0.014)	0.26 (0.23)
Substantiality					0.4*** (0.08)	0.05 (0.13)				
Session	-0.11**	-0.03		-0.1*	0.21**	-0.6***	0.09**	-	0.03	0.42

Status (base: permanent) Temporary	(0.05)	(0.09)		(0.73)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.04)	0.51*** (0.11)	(0.09)	(0.38)
Final Month	-0.0002 (0.05)	0.013 (0.04)			-0.004 (0.09)	0.09* (0.05)				
Constant	-0.77*** (0.11)	-0.31 (0.24)	-0.2** (0.065)	0.13 (0.22)	-1.12*** (0.26)	-2.8*** (0.6)	0.24** (0.1)	-0.46 (0.33)	0.63*** (0.19)	1.39** (0.72)
Observations	7532	3164	27815	4757	2614	1432	12476	2266	6584	1014

Note: ***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p<0.1

2.4. Further Exploration: Individual Attributes and Welfare Sub-categories

2.4.1. Legislator Attributes and Welfare

The previous section has clearly shown the growing significance of legislators in welfare issues with the progression of multi-party competition. Going a step further, ***this part will disaggregate "individual" legislators by bringing three important personal attributes to the analysis: gender, party affiliation, and number of terms***. By doing so, we would be able to gain further insights into the dynamics of welfare politics. In light of the fact that individual MPs are increasingly playing crucial roles not only in initiating/co-sponsoring welfare bills but also enacting/amending/rejecting them, it is imperative to understand which individual attributes are systematically related to different types of bills. For instance, do MPs elected from the PR tier submit more universal welfare bills than the SMD tier? Can the same story be told for female MPs? In addition to the academic contribution, being able to answer these questions has serious policy implications, since both countries try to raise the PR portion of their mixed electoral tiers and nominate more female candidates. And with respect to the re-election numbers, if more welfare bills became positively related to first/second-time term legislators after the 2000s, this can mean that welfare issues have become either i) an essential career-building tool, or ii) an initial symptom of on-going and ever-expanding welfare politics in the future (for both new and old legislators).


With respect to the core theory of this study, there is no expectation on which types of legislator will be more active in expanding welfare during dispersed power structure. However, we can still derive some expectations on the potential effects of these attributes to welfare issues in general as follows.

Regarding gender, there is a wealth of research indicating a close relationship between female legislators and welfare policies. Specifically, existing works suggest that female politicians tend to be more oriented to care and compassion for vulnerable groups like children and families, to promote education and health (Huddy, Cassese, and Lizotte 2008; Hutchings et al. 2004), and more likely to pass measures that benefit them (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Carroll 2001). In contrast, male politicians tend to prioritize issues such as illegal immigration, taxes, outsourcing, energy, military, crime, agriculture, construction, and business (Reingold, 2000; Campbell, 2006; Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2009). Second,

regarding the elected tier of legislators (in our case between district-based Single Member District (SMD) and party-based Proportional Representation (PR)), scholars seem to attribute PR to the large welfare states, *albeit* for different reasons (Lijphart and Crepaz, 1991; Iverson and Soskice, 2006). Finally, for the number of legislators' terms, we can expect universal welfare policies to be negatively associated with continued re-election. This is not difficult to imagine, since more experienced legislators not only tend to have closer access to state resources, but also have a wide range of entrenched networks and channels to distribute those resources to specific groups and constituents. This will be particularly relevant for Japan, since almost four-decades of continuous LDP rule created fertile soil from which policy tribes (*zoku-giin*) could maximize expertise in specific fields such as construction or agriculture sprouted (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2010).

The three figures below show descriptive statistics of welfare legislation patterns in relation to the three individual attributes of MPs. In an attempt to emphasize legislators' preferences, I am presenting submitted bills here. First, for the elected tier, it is clear that individual MPs from the PR tier prioritize welfare-related bills more than non-welfare bills, compared to the SMD tier MPs in both countries. This is in line with the expectation of the previous literature. If we break down the welfare bills into universal and particular ones, the observed pattern becomes even clearer in the Korean case, while it disappears in Japan.


<Figure 29> Proportion of Welfare and Universal Welfare Bills by Elected Tier



Second, in a similar vein, female MPs in both countries are more likely to give more attention to welfare bills (than non-welfare ones) than male MPs. The same pattern holds (the

difference even gets more revealing) if look we into the difference within welfare bills, by dividing them into universal or particularistic welfare. This clearly resonates with the established argument.

<Figure 30> Proportion of Welfare and Universal Welfare Bills by Gender




Finally, when it comes to the number of terms, we again can observe the expected pattern for welfare bills. For simplicity's sake, I merged first and second time Korean legislators into a "low number" category, and labelled those with more than three terms as "high number". However, I used a different threshold for Japan considering that, by virtue of being a parliamentary democracy since the late 1940s, it has elections more frequently and also has greater continuity before and after the beginning of multi-party competition in the late 1980s. Factoring in these aspects, I categorized legislators elected to 1-4 terms as having a "low number", while "more than five times" as "high number". Rather than looking at how often legislators sponsor welfare or non-welfare bills and universal or particularistic welfare bills, I will be just comparing between "low elected number" and "high elected number" legislators, to examine how much they contribute to welfare and universal welfare bills, respectively.

In both Korea and Japan, less experienced legislators clearly tend to contribute to welfare issues more than experienced legislators. Interestingly, this pattern is extreme for the Korean case, with roughly 90% of welfare bills introduced by first or second term MPs. This substantial difference continues to be observed for universal welfare bills in Korea. In


contrast, the difference disappears in Japan, disproving the expectation that more senior legislators are inclined to focus on particularistic welfare bills.

<Figure 31> Proportion of Welfare and Universal Welfare Bills by Number of Terms



Finally, by ***comparing submitted and enacted welfare bills, we can see that Japan has a strong bias towards SMD/Male/"High-number" re-elected legislators.*** The above results are based on submitted bills only, and clearly show PR/Female/"Low-number" re-elected legislators are more welfare-oriented in both countries. However, in Japan, when we consider the proportion of welfare bills that are enacted, we see the opposite pattern. This aspect can be captured by difference in the success ratio (which is a result of dividing submitted bills by enacted ones) seen below. We see a substantial difference in the success ratio of welfare bills between all three individual attributes: higher success ratios for male/SMD/"high-number" re-elected legislators. Interestingly enough, although a substantial difference exists, the degree is much less for non-welfare bills for all three attributes. Although I do not have a good explanation for why this is happening, this is an interesting exploratory finding requiring further investigation in the future.

<Figure 32> Success Ratio of Welfare and Non-welfare Bills by Elected Tier, Gender, and Term Numbers in Japan



Although the contrast is not as substantial as in Japan, the positive linkage between PR/female/less elected legislators and welfare is attenuated in the Korean case, as well (not presented here).

To find out the consistency of above patterns, we can control other variables and see whether the above findings hold. To this goal, several logistic analyses were applied here with more legislator-related variables. Given that the primary purpose of this test is to examine how particular individual legislators' attributes are related to welfare issues, it comes closer to capturing the preference dimension. Therefore, the test will limit its scope to only submitted bills.

The outcome variable is binary (0/1) for the both models, with model 1 being welfare (1) or non-welfare (0) from all submitted bills, and model 2 being universal (1) or particularistic (0) from all submitted welfare bills. The predictor variables of interest are elected-tier (district-based 0, party-based 1), gender (male 0, female 1), and number of terms (continuous). Other variables used here as control variables are exactly same as other regression models so far. The results below are based on robust standard errors just like the previous regression models.

Table 15 indicates that most of the findings stand so far, lending further credence to the previous patterns. First, in Korea, in comparison to the district-based MPs, party-elected MPs turn out to be a significant factor in deciding whether a bill is welfare (model 1) and deciding whether a welfare bill is universal or particularistic (model 2) in comparison to the district-

based MPs. Approximately, the predicted probability of a bill being welfare increases from 46% to 50% for the former, and from 53% to 58% for the latter in Korea by replacing district-tier MPs with party-tier MPs, while holding other variables to the mean value.

Second, gender is an important factor in both countries for both the welfare to non-welfare dimension, and the universalistic to particularistic dimension. That is, the probability of a submitted bill being welfare/universal (instead of non-welfare/particularistic) increases if the bill's initiator is female. Specifically, the predicted probability of a submitted welfare bill becoming universal goes up roughly 13% in both countries—from 52% to 65%, and from 55% to 68% in Korea and Japan, respectively—by moving from male to female MPs. Third, the number of terms are only negatively related to the universal versus particularistic welfare dimension in Korea, while only the welfare versus non-welfare dimension in Japan, as expected. Specifically, the predicted probability goes down from 56% to 41% if we replace the most-elected legislators with the least elected legislators—fifth time to first time elected—in Korea; the figure declines from 62% to 31% in Japan between legislators elected from sixteenth times to one time. This tells us that less experienced Korean legislators distinguish themselves from more experienced legislators by the type of welfare they sponsor, while their Japanese counterparts tend to prioritize welfare issues themselves (as opposed to non-welfare issues) compared to experienced legislators. ***To sum up, the evidence gathered here in general demonstrates the importance of PR tiered, female, and less-elected MPs in emphasizing welfare bills in general (and universal ones in particular).***

<Table 15> Regression Analysis Results of Legislator Attributes and Welfare

	Model 1 **Welfare or Non-welfare** **(All legislators submitted bills)**		**Model 2** **Universal or Particularistic** **(All legislators submitted welfare bills)**	
	Korea	**Japan**	**Korea**	**Japan**
Elected Tier	0.15*** (0.04)	-0.07 (0.08)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.002 (0.1)
Party (base: centre- right) Centre-left	0.001 (0.03)	0.22 (0.21)	-0.001 (0.05)	0.4 (0.3)
Left	0.05 (0.08)	0.58** (0.27)	0.02 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.37)
Other	0.045 (0.074)	0.35 (0.49)	-0.35*** (0.11)	0.65 (0.62)
Gender	0.25*** (0.04)	0.52** (0.25)	0.53*** (0.064)	0.56** (0.29)
Co-sponsor #	-0.08*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.11)	0.04 (0.03)	0.24 (0.17)
Number of Terms	-0.009 (0.018)	-0.08** (0.03)	-.101*** (0.03)	-0.002 (0.04)
Electoral Reform	N/R	0.48* (0.3)	N/R	0.21 (0.46)
House (base: lower House) Upper House	N/R	0.2 (0.19)	N/R	-0.04 (0.26)
Bill Format (base: enactment) Amendment	-0.5*** (0.05)	-0.54*** (0.14)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.27 (0.18)
Abolition	-1.2*** *0.18)	-0.1*** (0.39)	-0.95*** (0.32)	-0.37 (0.55)
Session Status (base: permanent) Temporary	-0.06** (0.03)	0.09 (0.15)	0.08* (0.04)	-0.24 (0.2)
Success	-0.27*** (0.05)	0.006 (0.27)	-0.59*** (0.08)	-0.26 (0.39)
GDP Growth	-0.0001	-0.09	0.002	-0.03

	(0.006)	(0.12)	(0.009)	(0.19)
Constant	0.58** (0.12)	0.18	0.29***	0.22
Observation[74]	19038	1288->982	9101	684->525

Note: ***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p<0.1

[74] As I specified in Table 9, the number of Japanese individual legislators' submitted bills used in models 1 and 2 are much less than the actual total number, since more than 300 (150 for model 2) do not have information on legislators number of terms. However, even if I remove "re-elected number" as one of the explanatory variables (which then brings the total number close to the original number), this does not change both statistical significance and predicted probability change of "gender" and "elected-tier" as I described here.

2.4.2. Patterns from Welfare Sub-categories

Now we have reached the final step of the legislation pattern analysis. Here social policy itself was broken down into three categories[75]—social security, public assistance, and social service—and then further into 35-37 specific subcategories for further examination. ***Specifically, the proportion and success rate of each of the 35-37 welfare categories*** has been examined as follows.

<Table 16> Welfare Policy Sub-categories by Proportion and Success rate (Top: Korea, Bottom: Japan)

Korea								
	Proportion (from total)	**Success ratio**		**Proportion (from total)**	**Success ratio**		**Proportion (from total)**	**Success ratio**
Public assistance	45.55	25.00	**Social Security**	5.42	21.23	**Social Service**	47.55	18.37
Old age allowance	0.21	11.54	Health Insurance	1.60	15.23	Family Welfare	0.58	22.54
Minimum Livelihood Support	0.55	14.71	Employment Insurance	0.88	24.77	Public Servant Wage	0.39	25.00
Business Support	15.88	32.31	Teachers' Pension	0.35	27.91	Teachers welfare	0.19	0.00
Tax support	9.83	3.79	National Pension	1.08	10.53	Education welfare	2.55	17.14
etc	0.99	27.05	Military Pension	0.33	36.59	Military welfare	0.20	56.00
Small and medium enterprise support	2.13	33.08	Long-term care Insurance	0.21	15.38	Labour welfare	4.44	25.73
Region support	6.77	31.98	Industrial Accident Insurance	0.50	38.71	Elderly welfare	1.22	10.00
Damage Compensation/ emergency aid	8.86	26.72	Public Servant Insurance	0.47	27.59	Hygiene welfare	5.03	13.87
Public Servant Welfare	0.33	36.59				Business management and regulation	4.70	18.79

[75] One of the most accepted textbook definitions of middle-range sub-category of social policy in both countries.

						etc..	0.01	100.00
						Social Protection	1.63	23.38
						Consumer welfare	3.85	16.00
						Civil welfare	1.82	12.95
						Child welfare	3.10	9.95
						Safety regulation/disaster prevention	4.69	22.80
						Foreigner/refugee/immigrant welfare	1.58	16.92
						Medicare welfare	4.02	11.49
						Welfare for the disabled	2.03	18.00
						Housing welfare	1.62	23.50
						Juvenile/youth welfare	2.10	26.25
						Mother/gender welfare	1.82	25.00

Japan								
	Proportion (from total)	**Success ratio**		**Proportion (from total)**	**Success ratio**		**Proportion (from total)**	**Success ratio**
Public assistance	47.95	78.83	**Social Security**	3.80	77.58	**Social Service**	44.96	55.38
Minimum Livelihood support	0.88	45.00	Life Insurance	0.75	100.00	Public servant welfare	5.07	73.04
Business support	17.33	85.05	Long-term Care Insurance	0.40	77.78	Teacher's welfare	0.09	0.00
Tax support	5.21	54.24	Health Insurance	0.93	76.19	Education welfare	2.03	17.39
etc…	0.84	89.47	Employment Insurance	0.31	14.29	Labour welfare	8.73	48.48
Small and medium enterprise support	2.56	94.83	Public Servant Insurance Pension	0.40	100.00	Elderly welfare	1.28	68.97
Region support	4.81	80.73	Teacher's Pension	0.04	100.00	Hygiene Welfare	1.85	47.62
Damage compensation/ emergency aid	8.77	62.63	etc..	0.04	0.00	Business Management and Regulation	5.65	54.69

Public Servant wage	7.59	97.09	Social Security Basic Framework	0.04	100.00	Social Protection	1.01	69.57
			Industrial Accident Insurance	0.26	100.00	Consumer Welfare	2.12	47.92
			National Pension	2.38	57.50	Civil Welfare	0.93	42.86
						Child Welfare	2.38	51.85
						Safety regulation/disaster prevention	4.10	56.99
						Female/mother welfare	1.59	50.00
						Foreigner/refugee/immigrant welfare	1.41	40.63
						Medical welfare	2.87	53.13
						Welfare for the disabled	2.60	45.76
						Housing welfare	0.79	94.44
						Juvenile/youth welfare	0.44	30.00

Since it covers five major insurances in our case, social security is the most important sub-category if we approach social policy from the proportion of total social policy expenditures (usually taking more than 70% in most major developed countries). However, from the point of view of laws, that is not the case. Both public assistance and social service make up about 90% of the total welfare laws enacted in both countries. For public assistance, business support/management and budget/tax support are the most frequently occurring sub-categories, while national pensions and health care insurance top the social security category. In the case of social service, labour welfare is the most frequently occurring subcategory for both countries, followed by public servant welfare (Japan) and hygiene welfare (Korea). From the perspective of success ratio, we can see more variation from country to country than between sub-categories of welfare policy. On average, the success ratio is 20% in Korea, 60-70% in Japan. Given this tendency, I will point out unusually successful sub-categories in relation to each country's average success rate. ***It appears most of the unusually successful sub-categories in both countries are particularistic (unorthodox social policies) in nature.*** For instance, small and medium-sized enterprise support, teachers' pensions, postal pensions,

regional support/subsidies, military pensions, public servant pensions, and land management/regulation belong to this category. ***This comes as no surprise, since these particularistic/unorthodox social policies benefits are less vulnerable to legislation inflation (this aspect will be specified in Chapter 6) given their region/group-based specificity and low publicity.*** However, even from orthodox/universal welfare benefits, there are exceptions like industrial accident insurance or safety regulations, which are known to be less politically controversial due to their pro-growth nature and lack of moral-hazard. Other country-specific things that stand out are unusually high success ratio of public rental housing in Japan.

Going beyond the proportion and success ratio of each category, Table 17 shows the most frequently occurring welfare categories in light of seven dimensions that turned out to be significantly affecting welfare politics in Korea and Japan so far: electoral reform, government partisanship, and power dispersion level for institutional variables; orthodox or unorthodox social policies and universal or particularistic for welfare policy variables; and elected-tier and gender for individual MP attribute variables. This cross-tabulation was conducted to give a more intuitive sense of variable effects—to associate the key variables' discriminating effects by associating them with more concrete and familiar welfare categories. In other words, it can be a useful attempt to test the face validity of my argument so far.

To begin with, it is obvious that electoral reform made median voters central to welfare politics. This is well illustrated by the fact that in both countries, consumer, family/children/women, and hygiene/safety/social protection are the most frequently occurring sub-categories. ***In contrast, the previous era's primary foci were the governments' core political supporters, such as teachers or civil servants***, growth-friendly welfare laws like healthcare/industrial accident insurance, or unorthodox social policies such as budget/tax support or regional support.

<Table 17> Frequently Occurring Welfare Sub-categories by Multiple-dimensions

		Korea	Japan
Electoral reform	**Before**	Healthcare, civil servant wage/welfare, labour, industrial accident, budget/tax support,	Postal saving, civil servant wage, teachers, industrial accident, regional support
	After	Consumer, civil welfare, child, foreigner, family, safety regulations	Consumer, civil welfare, child, foreigner, disabled, juvenile, National pension, social protection
Partisan	**Right**	Housing, civil servant, industrial accident, civil welfare civil servant, old-age pension, civil welfare	Employment insurance, civil servant pension, teachers welfare
	Middle	Health care, civil servant pension, old-age pension, civil welfare	long-term care, health care, national pension, elderly care, women, children, civil welfare, safety
	Left	Consumer, civil servant welfare,	Civil servant pension/welfare, medical welfare, juvenile
Conventionality	**Unorthodox**	Small and medium enterprise, regional support, budget/tax, enterprise management/support, civil servant, labour	Postal saving, housing, Small and medium enterprise, regional support, budget/tax, enterprise management/support, employment insurance, education, juvenile
	Orthodox	Five insurances/pension, family, women, children, military, damage compensation, foreigner	Four insurances/pension, family, children, public servant, damage compensation.
Electoral Target	**Particular**	Small and medium enterprise, regional support, budget/tax, enterprise management/support, civil servant, labour, small and medium, public servant, military	Enterprise management/support, regional support, budget/tax, enterprise management/support, means-tested cash, housing, small medium enterprises
	Universal	Five insurances/pension, family, children, military, damage compensation, labour, social protection, women, foreigner, elderly,	Five insurances/pension, public servant, education, social protection, children, foreigner, medical, damage compensation
Gender	**Male**	Public servant welfare, old-age welfare, elderly, enterprise	Teachers welfare, education, hygiene, enterprise management,

		management, budget/tax, foreigner, housing	consumer, civil, foreigner, disabled, juvenile
	Female	Women/mother, children, medical, social protection, hygiene, LTCI, national pension, family	Minimum livelihood, labour, children, women/mother
Elected Tier	**SMD**	Budget/tax support, housing, foreigner	Employment insurance, hygiene, consumer, civil, education, minimum livelihood, juvenile
	PR	Family, health care, national pension, old-age pension, LTCI, social protection, children, safety,	LTCI, health care, employment insurance, teachers, labour, hygiene, women, foreigner, medical, national pension
Power Dispersion	**Low Dispersion**	Enterprise management and support, safety regulation	LTCI, civil servant welfare/wage, regional support
	High dispersion	Education, military, minimum livelihood, budget/tax support, consumer, female/mother welfare	Elderly, enterprise management, social protection, budget/tax support, foreigner,

Then, what about the partisan bias? As repeatedly confirmed by analysis so far, there is no clear difference between right and left wing governments. However, ***during the periods of ideologically middle-ground government (measured by combining the nature of ruling party and government form) , more attention was paid to universal/orthodox welfare bills covering a wide range of people, such as healthcare, old-age pension, elderly care, or civil welfare in Korea and Japan.***

In line with our expectation, the most frequently occurring sub-categories during high level dispersion periods were primarily universal/orthodox ones such as education, minimum livelihood support, consumer welfare, childcare in Korea and elderly welfare, social protection, or welfare benefits for foreigners in Japan. On the contrary, more particualristic/ unorthodox welfare peaked during low dispersion periods, like enterprise management, civil servant welfare, or region support.

Finally, validating the evidence so far—that being a PR or/and female MP is associated with universal/orthodox welfare benefits—***more PR or/and female MPs tend to focus on welfare benefits for marginalized/median voters***. For instance, childcare, medical care, LTCI, pension, family benefits, education, safety or means-tested cash topped the most frequently occurring welfare sub-categories in both countries. On the contrary, SMD or/and male MPs

are more associated with particularistic/unorthodox welfare like welfare for public servants or teachers, or "unorthodox social policies" such as enterprise management or budget/tax supports. When male MPs do propose orthodox benefits, they seem to focus more on old age welfare/elderly service/foreigner/disabled in Korea and Japan.

3. Summary

The chapter contains both theory testing and generating aspects, and the following patterns particularly stand out: First, a greater proportion of welfare laws in general (and universalistic welfare laws in particular) tend to be prioritized as power gets dispersed, which is in line with the core theory's expectation. Moreover, the conciliatory aspect of race-to-the top welfare politics also has been confirmed, with the increase of success ratio during higher power dispersion periods.

Second, both regression and descriptive statistics show that electorally-pressured MPs tend to play increasingly important roles on welfare issues, as multi-party competition unfolds. And, as an exploratory attempt, the study narrowed its scope to only the bills submitted by individual MPs to understand individual-level factors affecting welfare politics. Specifically, three important attributes—elected tier, number of terms, and gender—were brought in to the analysis. The results demonstrate that ***being female, PR tier, and relatively new to parliament turned out to be important factors associated with submitting/enacting welfare bills in general, and universal ones in particular.*** Another exploratory attempt has been made by breaking down welfare bills into 35-37 sub-categories to get a general sense of findings so far. This was done by cross-tabulating welfare sub-categories with several factors that turned out to be affecting welfare system change based on the previous empirical chapters: institutional variables, welfare policy variables, and individual MP attribute variables. The patterns by and large show strong face validity.

Chapter 5. Media, Co-sponsorship Networks, and Narratives of Welfare Politics

In testing the key causal claim, the previous chapter drew inferential leverage from rectangular datasets. Based on the legislation data, the key theoretical expectations were tested and confirmed, showing that higher dispersion went hand-in-hand with: i) More welfare expansion (particularly in a universal manner); and a ii) Higher success ratio of universal welfare bills. These are important pieces of evidence lending credence to the conciliatory "race-to-the-top" welfare politics during power dispersion periods. In this chapter, I will further corroborate this causal claim with other kinds of evidence. First, with the media content analysis, it is expected that key media in each country have actively reflected events in the legislative arena by examining the degree of welfare issue saliency and portrayal of political actors who are directly engaged in welfare politics. This piece of evidence will help us confirm the key assumption of welfare politics: that median voters monitor key political actors' important words and deeds. Second, the social network analysis should prove that, in addition to the sponsorship dimension of universal welfare bills, we can observe better quality universal welfare legislation networks in dispersed power structure than concentrated power periods, even from the co-sponsorship dimension. Finally, the narrative part constructed from elite interviews and secondary literature ought to confirm that, insofar as major pieces of welfare legislation are concerned, real political actors have made/shunned key choices according to the "power dispersion logic" described here. Moreover, as a complementary piece of evidence, instead of conventional key players such as left-wing parties or trade-unions, we should be able to find alternative political actor/actors contributing to welfare expansion in Korea and Japan. This evidence will shed light on how welfare expansion is possible, going beyond the power resources theory.

1. Media Content Analysis and Welfare Politics

1.1. Significance of Media in Welfare Politics

Implicit in the welfare legislation pattern analysis above is that voters who are following what is happening in the legislature and political actors are conscious of this. However,

people who actually visit government web-pages or receive government publications to update themselves are few and far between. Instead, it is commonly accepted that voters absorb political issues through the media and, insofar as both countries are concerned, ***major nation-wide newspapers can be regarded as one of the most important mediums for the period this project covers.*** For Japan, the sheer number of average daily circulation for the two major newspapers this study bases—10 million for *Yomiuri* and 8 million for *Asahi* (World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers, 2010)—speaks for its influence (which are ranked as the world's first and second). For Korean newspapers, the circulation is much less—between 500,000 to 800,000 per day for the two newspapers compared here—but still serves as a reliable reference point to gauge how the public had got in contact with social issues between 1987 to 2012. Based on surveys conducted by the Korea Press Foundation every other year, about 99.6% of the respondents were exposed to newspapers in 1986 but went down to 81.5% in 2000 and even to 44.8% in 2011. However considering the fact that i) about 60% were exposed to newspapers until 2008 (and much more for people age 40 who happens to vote significantly more than younger people who use the internet as the primary medium of absorbing news); and ii) other rival mediums like the internet or TV get the primary source from newspapers, analysing newspapers are still a valid way of measuring on which issues people get affected and how those issues have been portrayed.


The primary intention of this part is to check the implicit assumption of welfare politics—what is happening in the political arena is conveyed to the public—explicitly by examining the patterns of welfare-related newspaper articles and how they are related to the previous legislation patterns. *As* specified in Appendix 2, with the help of newspaper search engines, the analysis here is based on a large number of welfare-related articles drawing from exhaustive databases of both left and right wing newspapers in each country. Among others, *Hankyorae* (left-wing) and *Donga* (right-wing) were chosen for Korea, *Asahi* (left-wing) and *Yomiuri* (right-wing) for Japan. Keywords based on universalistic welfare benefits are searched for relevant articles and compared with universalistic welfare laws[76] (see online appendix for the full list of keywords). Search engine for each newspaper covers different time periods as follows: 1990 to 2012 for *Hankyorae* and *Donga* while 1987 to 2012 for *Asahi a*nd *Yomiuri*.


[76] Although the same keywords are used for all newspapers, each search engine uses different algorithm in retrieving relevant welfare articles. So it is of limited use to compare the absolute numbers between newspapers within countries

1.2. Saliency and Focus of Welfare Issues by Media

To begin with, a glimpse at Figure 33 shows that welfare issues are getting more salient over time in Korea in terms of the number of welfare-related articles regardless of newspapers' political inclination. No apparent linear trend is observed in Japan like the Korean case. However, we can still say the welfare issues are getting substantially more attention overtime based on the average number difference in welfare newspaper articles between the 1990s and 2000s. Specifically, the average number of welfare articles in *Asahi/Yomiuri* has risen from 177/239 per year between 1987 and 1999 to 224/356 between 2000 and 2012.

<Figure 33> Changes in the Number of Welfare Newspaper Articles and Welfare Laws (Top: Korea; Bottom: Japan)








In addition to this, examining to which part each welfare article is categorized tells us the importance of welfare issues. According to the journalists I interviewed, it goes without


saying that articles appearing in the "comprehensive" section (articles coming at the front pages are categorised as such by newspaper companies) can be regarded as the most important ones along with the "editorial" section where the most experienced and established journalists put forward the company's opinion/perspective on particular issues. In parallel with the saliency trend observed by the previous two proxies, more and more articles tend to appear in "comprehensive" and "editorial" section over time in Korea (figure 34) while the proportion of these categories picked only between 1998 and 2001 in Japan's case.

<Figure 34> Changes in the Proportion of Welfare-related Articles' Categories (upper-left:Hankyorae upper-right:Donga, lower-left:Ashai, lower-right:Yomiuri)









From the previous chapter, I showed that election-conscious legislators are playing increasingly important roles in promoting welfare bills. To make the whole idea of welfare politics more convincing, it is natural to expect that the evidence in the increase of media saliency on welfare issues I just presented treat government-related actors at the centre of coverage. Trivial as this might seem, there is a respected tradition in discourse analysis showing the importance of "how" things are presented. Foucault (1981) posits that discourses reflect certain groups' power and, at the same time, can be used to exercise their power. On the one hand, a media can exaggerate, add, and remove certain facts to make readers to recognise the reality in the way they would like to. As noted by Nimmo and Combs (1990), this can be problematic as average people take in the "framed reality" without being critical. In this sense, understanding how voters would perceive welfare issues by closely examining the structure and contents of welfare articles can add further insights about the contexts of welfare politics. With this in mind, ***this section will go a step further to examine "how welfare issues are written putting which actors at the centre of their subject"***. For this more in-depth analysis, about 400-500 articles were sampled (see Appendix 2 for details) from each newspaper.

To begin with, I examine whether welfare articles include the government-related individual political actors such as bureaucrats, politicians, or the president and collective entities like parties or ministries at the centre of their subjects. Specifically, I have examined the proportion of welfare articles which included any government-related actors as the core subject. Going beyond this "the reporting style" part coded how a piece of welfare newspaper article was written. Was it just about reporting facts in a neutral fashion? Or was it about actively suggesting particular solutions or evaluating the current status of welfare issues? Or was it about quoting particular reports, analysis, remarks from established scholars or institutions to make certain point? Here I treat "suggestion", "assessment", or "quotation" as an active attempt to reflect welfare politics while "fact reporting" as a passive one. The active attempts involve more "act of interpretation" from certain newspapers on welfare issues thereby making political actors more self-conscious of their words and deeds in welfare politics.

<Table 18> Subject and Reporting Style of Welfare Articles

		Subject	Reporting Style			
		Govt.related actors	**Fact Report**	**Quotation**	**Suggestion**	**Assessment**
Korea	**Hankyorae (left-wing)**	337 (69%)	212 (43%)	41 (8%)	71 (15%)	164 (34%)
	Donga (right-wing)	303 (81%)	184 (49%)	33 (9%)	47 (13%)	112 (30%)
Japan	**Asahi (left-wing)**	331 (66%)	350 (70%)	42 (8%)	33 (7%)	75 (15%)
	Yomiuri (right-wing)	276 (55%)	331 (66%)	69 (14%)	20 (4%)	77 (15%)

Table 18 summarises the major data for the two dimensions I coded—subject and reporting style. First, in Korea, 70-80% of welfare-related articles focus directly on government-related actors. Moreover, the reporting style dimension shows that more than half of the newspaper articles go beyond simple fact reporting.

For Japan, 55-65% of newspaper articles written on welfare issues directly put political actors at the centre of their theme. Similar to Korea, this is a substantial portion. As for the reporting style, roughly 30% of Japanese newspaper articles go beyond fact-reporting which again is not a negligible proportion. Dovetailing nicely with the proactive nature of media on welfare issues, both in Korea and Japan, it has been almost the norm for legislators and government organizations engaged in relevant issues to subscribe in newspapers with various spectrums and check how they are portrayed in particular newspapers on a daily basis (usually by secretaries). Depending on the nature of article, the described part can be used both by corresponding subjects and opponents to attack/persuade/defend particular views/actions on welfare. Given these evidence, it is not far-fetched to assume that the newspapers are actively reflecting the on-going welfare politics in Korea and Japan.

2. Network Dynamics of Welfare Politics

So far, the legislation pattern analysis has shown that the dispersed power structure leads to more universal welfare expansion by making legislation process more conciliatory. Added to

this it also has presented the growing influence of legislators on welfare issues in both countries which has been complemented by corresponding increase in media saliency. The foregoing legislation pattern analysis in Chapter 4 rested on the implicit assumption that any decision to sponsor a bill is an independent decision. That is, at the heart of statistical analyses I have applied so far is the assumption that individuals are asocial, so observations are distributed independently from one another (Lazer, 2011). This assumption has been realistic since we have just looked at the sponsorship aspect of legislation so far.


However, as I specified in the legislative requirement part, both countries clearly set the minimum number of co-sponsors—roughly 10-20—required for any kind of individual legislator-sponsored bills. And for the co-sponsorship data, the assumption on independence of observation is highly unrealistic since that amounts to treating legislators co-sponsoring welfare bills as independent decision. However, in reality, legislative collaboration is more likely to be enhanced by shared characteristics like similar partisanship or types of local constituents/occupational groups they represent.

Given the importance of individual legislators' contribution on welfare issues, this co-sponsorship aspect of welfare bills merits a closer investigation. But it requires a different assumption and method from the ones we have used so far which can take into account "dependency" of decisions and network characteristics of co-sponsorship. With its emphasis on "relations", social network analysis is an ideal tool to capture difference in the quality of welfare co-sponsorship networks between high and low dispersion levels on the one hand and between universal and particularistic welfare on the other hand. In general, high quality network indicates better flow of information and stable interaction between inter-connected actors for a longer time. In this sense, to complement the fact that higher dispersion led to higher success ratio of universal welfare bills, we should expect to see higher quality co-sponsorship network on universal welfare bills during dispersed power structure times than concentrated power structure; likewise, the fact that higher dispersion were more likely to lead to prioritizing universal welfare bills than particularistic ones should be resonated with corresponding network scores here. Among many other social network indicators scores, I choose "cohesion" and "centrality" as two proxies for network quality each of which shows holistic and individualistic quality of network respectively.

Before showing the results with the relevant network indicators, I want to briefly explain the data conversion process. First, as clarified in detail in Appendix 3, roughly 100 welfare bills

were chosen systematically from both countries using the stratified random sampling method for analysis. And bearing in mind the "dependency" aspect of co-sponsoring, the ***analysis here treats connections between individual legislators who co-sponsored welfare bills as the unit of networks.*** And this analysis between legislation is possible by converting, in the language of network analysis, "two-mode data" into "one-mode data". Specifically, as outlined in Figure 35, there can be several pieces of welfare bills (in this case bill 1- bill 5) and different legislators co-sponsoring one or several of them. In this instance, Bill 1 is supported by MP1 and MP2 while Bill 5 is supported by MP7, MP8, and MP9. So, we can say that MP1 and MP2 are connected to each other by Bill 1, as are MP7, MP8, and MP9 by Bill 5. Likewise, MP2 and MP8 have a network for Bill 3 and, by repeating this process, we can draw a network just between MPs in the end.


<Figure 35> Graphical Demonstration of Bill Co-Sponsorships between Legislators



The graphic below shows this conversion process with visual graphic examples based on an actual welfare co-sponsorship network.

<Figure 36> Graphical Demonstration of Data Conversion

2 mode data (bills and co-sponsors) **1 mode data (co-sponsors)**



2.1. Network Quality and Co-sponsorship Patterns of Welfare Politics

Major findings can be encapsulated within Table 19. ***The first four indicators are related to "cohesion" of network and they provide information on the characteristic of networks as a whole.*** "Density" is simply the ratio of actual present ties in relation to all possible ties and "connectedness" refers to how many possible paths are present between actors in the whole network. In a similar vein, "distance" indicates the number of actors—called "nodes" in network analysis—one should pass to be connected with others while "fragmentation" captures the proportion of pairs of actors that cannot reach each other[77]. Therefore, simply put, ***having high density and connectedness strengthens networks while high distance and fragmentation shows looseness and vulnerability of networks***

[77] Information about specific algorithm used to derive each indicator can be found from the UCINET homepage (http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/hs4209.htm)

<Table 19> Network Indicators for 12 Welfare Co-Sponsorship Networks

		Density	Connectedness	Fragmentation	Avg Distance	Degree	Closeness	Betweenness	Eigenvector
Korea	Network a Part. level 1	0.06	0.271	0.729	1.932	5.991	0.692	0.085	4.66
	Network b Part. level 5	0.017	0.137	0.863	2.538	1.677	0.528	0.071	3.698
	Network c Univ. level 1	0.057	0.244	0.756	1.931	5.746	0.656	0.077	4.18
	Network d Univ. level 5	0.121	0.382	0.618	1.838	12.092	0.866	0.108	5.088
Japan	Network e Part. level 1	13.72	0.029	0.971	1.401	1.752	0.146	0.001	1.864
	Network f Part. level 5	6.416	0.012	0.988	1.305	0.819	0.137	0.0	1.459
	Network g Univ. level 1	84.47	0.127	0.873	0.819	10.79	0.198	0.002	2.944
	Network h Univ. level 5	94.76	0.22	0.78	1.48	12.1	0.221	0.014	2.875

In light of the findings so far, as more dispersed power structure went hand-in-hand with higher success ratios, we should expect to observe higher scores for the first two indicators while lower scores for the latter two than concentrated power structure. And given the higher chance of submitted/enacted welfare bills being universal ones than particularistic ones during the periods of dispersed power structure, universal welfare bills should have higher density and connectedness, at the same time, lower average distance and fragmentation in Korea and Japan than concentrated power structure periods. On the contrary, it is more natural to expect concentrated power structure having better network indicators for particularistic welfare benefits than universal ones.

Table 19 shows results from welfare bill co-sponsorship networks most of which are in line with the expectation I specified above. Density and connectedness of networks went up while

fragmentation went down for universal welfare networks—network c to d in Korea and g to h in Japan. A complementing story could be told from the point of particularistic welfare benefits in Korea and Japan. In contrast to the universal benefits, particularistic welfare benefits had lower density and connectedness but higher fragmentation than universalistic ones during dispersed power structure than concentrated one (a and b in Korea, e and f in Japan).

Then what happens if we approach the nature of networks from the individual level? The last four indicators represent the "centrality" of networks collected, aggregated, and averaged from individual members. To be specific, "degree" is the simplest centrality indicator showing how many ties an actor has to others while "closeness" centrality is the sum of shortest distances to all others. In this regard, higher degree centrality and closeness centrality[78] can be two proxies of one's influence to others—affecting many people in short time. On the other hand, "betweenness" centrality and "eigenvector" centrality capture an actor's power in a more nuanced way. The former centrality can be defined as how often a given actor is located between the shortest paths of other actors while the latter centrality takes into account the centrality of other neighbouring actors. In other words, high betweenness shows a high likelihood of someone working as a "bridge" between others while a high eigenvector indicates the extent to which an actor is connected to well-connected people. Needless to say, having high betweenness and eigenvector centrality indicates the strength of an actor's influence.

The right half of Table 19 shows the mean values of all actors' centrality measures in eight networks. ***Just like the cohesion measures, the changes are in line with our expectations*** for universalistic benefits showing much stronger and better connected individuals during the dispersed power structure than concentrated one in Korea and Japan (c and d in Korea and g and h in Japan).

[78] The value we see in the table is inversed sum of shortest distances so higher score shows higher closeness.

2.2. Graphic Illustration of Welfare Co-sponsorship Networks

Luckily, with the help of network analysis software, the findings above can be easily visualized and a more nuanced understanding of welfare politics is possible ***by linking networks with some individual level characteristics—party affiliation, gender, and electoral origin (elected by proportional representative tier or single-member-district tier).***

For the simplicity's sake, all the relevant information is put into network graphics using the following distinctions and the visual graphics can be interpreted along with this.


i) Different colours indicate different parties
ii) Large shapes indicate those who are elected by the proportional representative tier and the small shape are the ones elected by the single member district tier
iii) Upward-triangles indicate female MPs while squares show male MPs
iv) Thin lines show MPs are connected to each other by no more than one bill while darker lines show more than one bill.

Let us begin with the co-sponsorship networks of universal welfare bills in Korea first. To begin with, let us look at the bottom two graphics of Figure 37. In contrast to the level 1 (network c), level 5 (network d) of universal welfare bill co-sponsorships show marked differences in several regards. First, the quality of network strength has improved dramatically by sponsoring more than one bill by the same pairs—represented by thick lines through the network—and various ways to connect between two major party clusters. Besides, more district-based politicians are drawn to welfare bills as we move from dispersion-level 1 to 5 and reached the point of almost all the party members being involved in one universal welfare bills or another in dispersion-level 5 looking.

A quick glance at the network graphics of particularistic welfare benefits on top enables us to notice that the concentrated power structure network (network a) is more multi-clustered than dispersed power structure network (network b). Although multi-clustered, each cluster can be reached to each other through various pathways and there is frequent repeated co-sponsoring of bills by the same MPs indicated by the thick lines. As for the dispersed power structure (network b), the story is straightforward. Unlike the extremely dense networks of universal bills during dispersed power structure (network d), both the quantity and quality of network b


drops rapidly in every aspect hinting us the reason behind higher concentration and success of universal welfare bills.

<Figure 37> Visual Graphic of Welfare Bill Co-sponsorship Networks in Korea (upper-left: network a; upper-right: network b; lower-left: network c; lower right: network d)



If we shift our attention to Japan, one thing is immediately noticeable. That is, the contrasting difference in the network quality between concentrated and dispersed power structure for universal welfare benefits (network e and f) like the Korean case. Both in terms of the quantity (the number of co-sponsors) and quality (the proportion of repeated ties and relatively isolated ties), we can see the co-sponsorship network of the universal ones getting dramatically better as power gets dispersed (g and h) while the opposite is true for particularistic ones (e and f).

<Figure 38> Visual Graphic of Welfare Bill Co-sponsorship Networks in Japan (upper-left: network e; upper-right: network f; lower-left: network g; lower right: network h)



3. Narratives of Welfare Politics

Until now, the analysis about the effect of power dispersion on welfare system has assumed no prior knowledge about actual welfare benefits promised by politicians and parties in both countries. The results were presented in an abstract way based on descriptive statistics, regression coefficients, or social network indicators. Although they are theoretically-intriguing in and of themselves, ***it does not add much value if it does not resonate with actual stories from real parties, politicians, bureaucrats, and other political actors. In this section, my primary aim is to check the validity of my findings so far using narratives as a final confirmation method.*** That is, I will examine whether political actors are acting consistently in accordance with specific expectations derived from the core theory of welfare politics: power dispersion incentivizes key political actors to focus more on universal welfare benefits; relatedly the other side of my core theory will be examined as well: whether first-cleavage issues or particularistic welfare benefits get prioritized during power concentration periods.

Going beyond the theory testing purpose, the narrative part is exploratory as well. Then I will take a close look at the actors engaged in law-enacting and revising processes by focusing on the choices they made, the paths taken and shunned, and the manner in which their choices generated events and outcomes (Bates et al., 1997). At the same time, attention will be paid to the periods that are not easily explained by the expected mechanism the study has discovered so far and examine what can be other possible mechanisms at work or whether several explanatory factors specified here are interacting together.

As for the selection of narratives, the study chose "period distribution" and "theoretical relevance" as two guiding principles. That is, to get a balanced view over two-and-a-half decades, narratives related to welfare politics are evenly drawn from three distinguishing periods: 1987-1997, 1998-2007, and 2008-2012. Unlike the ten year interval of the first two periods, welfare politics after 2008 has been given a particular attention given its more activated welfare politics than previous periods and the availability of in-depth data through elite interviews during fieldwork. More than 500 types of ***welfare laws were enacted during the period of our interest but narratives are constructed mainly based on the 11 orthodox/universal welfare laws below although some other non-welfare and welfare laws***

(including unorthodox/particularistic) will be included to examine changes during concentrated power structure. And the reasons for choosing 11 orthodox laws are twofold. First, as have been shown repeatedly from the previous findings, given their high media saliency and wide impact, universal welfare benefits are the ones most closely related to credit-claiming and blame-avoidance welfare politics[79]. So they are ideal cases to test the logic of power dispersion. Second, these laws also happen to be the most recurring ones throughout the time periods selected, which can help us to show how the same laws are treated differently during different levels of power dispersion (see Appendices 4, 5, and 6). With respect to the sources, as I pointed out elsewhere, the narratives constructed here are based on elite interviews, memoirs of key political figures, meeting minutes, internal stenographic records, and various newspapers with different political spectrum.

Employment Insurance Act; National Health Insurance Act; National Basic Living Insurance Act; National Pension Act; Welfare of the Aged Act; Mother and Child Health Act; Industrial Accident Act; Child Welfare Act; Infant Care Act; Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities; Minimum Age Act

3.1. Korea

3.1.1. The 1987-1997 Period

It is a well-accepted fact that 1987 is "the year one of Korean democracy" with the start of the direct vote among the public. Although it does not accompany any change in the power dispersion based on four indicators applied here, a regime shift from an authoritarian to democratic polity also shares the idea of power dispersion since it takes away dominance of one party. In this sense, President Chun Doo Hwan's pledge on three ground-breaking pieces of welfare bills—the national pension scheme, universalising health insurance, and minimal wage scheme—before the direct presidential election in 1987 can be regarded as

[79] Considering the popularity of these legislation, many similar bills had been submitted for most of the time from 1987 to 2012. The ones included in this narrative are selected based on particularly high media saliency (at least more than 50 newspaper articles). The list of every submitted bill can be found from the online appendix. The sampling method used here is adopted to reflect substantial importance and internal validity at the cost of representativeness.

the start of competitive electoral politics. In an attempt to guarantee votes for the next presidential candidate—Roh Tae Woo—the then president Chun pledged the three above-mentioned welfare package at a public summer press conference (Yang et al., 2008). Due to these populist promises and to the split between the opposition parties, in December 1987, Roh Tae Woo became the first president to win a presidential election in thirty years without a democratic deficit. However, in the National Assembly election of April 1988, his Democratic Justice Party (DJP) secured only 41.81 percent of seats, meaning that the three opposition parties could overrule the ruling party's decision.

According to the logic of power dispersion this study has shown so far, this must have facilitated expansionary welfare politics among parties and it indeed did. Riding on this momentum, the bottom-up societal mobilization and patchwork coalition building in the legislature aimed to further the universalisation of health insurance by integrating administration. That is, more than 70 organizations representing students, farmers, labourers and academics came together and form a issue-specific grand coalition. Despite their success to pass the bill in the legislature, President Roh Tae Woo vetoed the legislation in March 1989 on the grounds that the bill contained illegal components. This failure of collective endeavour notwithstanding, it was a remarkable shift from the previous party politics confined within a small circle of conservative politicians.

At the beginning of 1990, there had been a concentration of the power structure through forming a coalition government—which usually does not happen in ideal type presidential regimes—among the three of the four main parties: Roh Tae Woo's DJP, Kim Jong Pil's New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP), and Kim Young Sam's Unification Democratic Party (UDP). The three parties came together under one name as the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) as President Roh sought to overcome the crisis of governance which resulted from the 1988 assembly election. This concentration of power backpedalled the then burgeoning welfare politics. The conservative coalition marginalised progressive social forces from the political and policymaking arenas, and civil society again receded to the political sidelines (Wong, 2004). As rightly observed by Wong (2004:94),

> The crackdown on labour mobilization, which began in late 1989 and continued through the early 1990s, decimated the independent labour movement […] the high courts ruled against workers throughout the early

> 1990s, upholding the government's prohibition of third-party intervention in labour-management bargaining. […] the newly formed DLP also amended the Sixth Five-Year Plan, scaling back proposed welfare initiatives in favour of high growth and opening the national economy.

However, as the general and presidential election approached in 1992, each of the loosely-coordinating parties started to walk its own path again. For instance, the introduction of unemployment insurance was pledged by all three parties—Kim Young-Sam's Democratic Liberal Party, Kim Dae Jung's Democratic Party, and Kim Jong Pil's Unified Liberal Democratic Party (ULDP)—and this seems to have rekindled welfare politics. Although not included in the four dimensions of power dispersion for this study, this suggests "lame-duck" period in presidentialism tend to disperse power and facilitate "credit-claiming" welfare politics.

In spite of this seemingly rejuvenated attempt in welfare politics, the ensuing victory of Kim Young Sam in the 1992 presidential election and his party at the next general election created a single party majority government, indicating the most-concentrated type of power structure. As expected, the level of competitive welfare politics degraded even further. Having secured a majority, the president's ambition was to touch upon the then most politically sensitive issues such as the passage of the "real-name-transaction law" and "monopoly regulation and fair trade act" which regulated cross-investment, cross-subsidisation, and cross-payment guarantees between companies. Obviously, these measures were devised to swing the pendulum of power from the *chaebols*—the Korean conglomerates benchmarked after Japanese *zaibtasu*—to the government and is in line with the spirit of "rule-setting" tendency of concentrated power structure periods. Moreover, just like other concentrated power structure time, Kim Young Sam government introduced a temporary earmarked tax for the agricultural and fishing sector with the aim of strengthening agricultural competitiveness, improving living conditions and welfare of rural areas (ibid).

In terms of progressive welfare policy reform, however, Kim's regime failed to meet popular expectations and even backpedalled due to the political pressure from the conservative faction of the ruling party. Among others, the most notorious one was the rubber-stamping of business demands for labour flexibility, particularly with regard to

hiring and firing of workers in 1996 (Hwang, 2006). Surprisingly, "the ruling New Korea Party (NKP) secretly called in its affiliated lawmakers to the National Assembly at 6 o'clock in the morning on the day after Christmas. They then unanimously passed the draft proposed by the government within seven minutes, excluding the opposition lawmakers who held a sit-in in the parliament building for days to block physically the passage of the bills" (Shin, 2003:162)[80]. Just like that of 1992, the concentrated power structure slowly but surely got dispersed with the loss of a majority position in the 1996 general election in conjunction to the president's lame duck status. Unlike the unsuccessful attempt of Health Care Reform Committees in widening the range of risk-pooling in 1994, during the last months of the Kim Young Sam regime in 1997, a centre-right ruling party legislator Hwang Seong-Gun introduced a partial integration reform bill, the 1997 Medical Insurance Act, which would consolidate all 227 regional self-employed insurance societies into a unified fund (Wong, 2004).

3.1.2. The 1998-2007 Period

Between 1998 and 2008, Korea was at the peak of its electoral competition, which boosted the race to the top welfare politics and accordingly, accompanied an unprecedented welfare expansion. More specifically, from 1998 to 2004, in addition to the rapidly increasing demand in welfare policy caused by the Asian Financial Crisis, Korea experienced either a majority coalition government or government with a majority opposition, i.e. divided government. Having dealt with the emergent welfare demand caused by the crisis in 2000, the expansion could have been suspended afterwards. However, what followed was a period when the power structure was most dispersed, between 2005 and 2008, in the form of minority government with/without the largest ruling party. However, after the 2008 general election, the power structure returned to its most concentrated form, that of a single-ruling-party-majority government, and as expected, a decline in welfare expansion was witnessed.

[80] This is clearly a centre-right wing party taking a right-wing measure from the perspective of mainstream party politics and welfare state literature. However, this does not contradict the de-polarized nature of social welfare issues in Korea since "de-polarized" does not mean right-wing parties are less likely to do right-wing thing than left-wing parties. It is more about parties readily crossing "conventionally positioned" ideological spectrum in social welfare issues without having to face much contradiction.

Before explaining the three distinctive periods based on major welfare expansion episodes, a specific political dynamic ought to be explained.

Unlike in western welfare states, Korea has always lacked influential left-wing parties that represent labour during its expansion stage, thereby limiting the explanatory power of power resource theory. Instead, broad issue-based coalitions led by civil society organizations were the beating heart of the welfare policy expansion. These coalitions have incorporated middle-class activists, members of the professional class, academic experts, and politically marginalised socioeconomic groups into their ranks and transcended particularistic interests and appealed broadly to the general public (Wong, 2004). So, gone was the radical and ideological alliance between the poor in urban areas, students, workers, and anti-regime politicians to subvert an authoritarian regime using confrontational strategies. The single-issue focus of the coalition was highly realistic in the sense that it facilitated cooperation among otherwise antagonistic social activist groups. Despite their growing influence during the Kim Young Sam administration, the concentrated power structure in combination with its pro-business nature prevented the alliance from entering the policymaking process. However, they started to play an active role in welfare policy formation after the IMF financial crisis and the emergence of the more progressive president Kim Dae Jung in December 1997. President Kim first brought the representatives from labour, business, and government together by brokering the Tripartite Commission in early 1998. In addition to the creation of the Tripartite Commission, citizens' participation in welfare policy issues became increasingly apparent by their evaluating, approving or vetoing of government proposals (Hwang, 2006). Specific activities range from mild involvement such as announcing public statement, publishing and disseminating research results, having press interviews to more aggressive ones like appealing to constitutional court, evaluating election pledges, sit-in demonstrations, publishing a list of should/should-not-get elected politicians.

Of particular importance regarding MPs legislation activity is that a coalition of more than 100 NGOs evaluate, publish, and award MPs legislation output on a regular basis. Then highly ranked MPs advertise this in every possible form like their individual webpage, election pamphlet, or local newspapers. In 2012, the government even published a book titled “NGO’s petitions and related bills” showing how specific laws can be traced to particular NGO’s suggestions. Despite central-left wing Kim Dae Jung government’s

initiative to bring NGOs to the forefront of the political scene, most of them were not bounded by particular welfare ideology. During my interviews with three welfare-oriented NGOs, interviewees all underlined how much effort they put to be politically independent such as funding themselves by their membership fee or forbidding politically appointed/nominated members to maintain their membership status.

During Kim Dae Jung's tenure, we can observe a dramatic change in almost all welfare policy areas and most of the changes were in line with my analyses so far. First and foremost, thanks to the negotiation of the Tripartite Commission and a strong push from the civil society, the government could go further from the partial integration of national health insurance to the full integration in 1998. Although the ruling party was in a minority situation, the renamed opposition party Grand National Party (GNP, formerly the ruling New Korea Party), did not impose an official party line. Although there were some opponents, they remained relatively quiet knowing that the voting down of the integration bill means running the risk of electoral backlash from the median voters such as workers, women, and middle-class civic groups. This is in line with the previous finding that dispersed power structure increases welfare bill success ratio by making different political actors more concilatory.

Secondly, going further from a tacit agreement, an active credit claiming by politicians can be observed when it came to the expansion of employment insurance. Before 1998, only companies with more than 30 people and 70 people were eligible for the unemployment benefits and the active labour market policies, respectively. However, upon facing massive layoffs during the financial restructuring in 1997, the political debate was not about whether to change or not but about the degree of relaxing the criteria and furthering benefits. This led to bids by different political actors regardless of political persuasion and ended up extending the benefits even to the self-employed in 1998.

Third, similarly, there was a substantial extension of public assistance through the introduction of the National Basic Livelihood Scheme (NBLS) in 2000 compared to the Livelihood Protection Act of 1963, which not only "eliminated the eligibility criteria" by allowing anyone with income and property below a certain level to get the benefit but also "expanded the level of benefit". The biggest contributor to this act was civil society groups which had actively engaged in the agenda formation, alternative policy suggestion, and even policy implementation monitoring afterwards (Kim and Fiori, 2011).

Finally, there also have been several milestone changes in the national pension reform in both expansion and retrenchment dimensions in line the specified logic. As the expansion, the urban self-employed—the last group still excluded from the pension program mainly because of the difficulties in ascertaining incomes—began to be covered in 1999, thereby making it a universal program. As the expansions have been primarily driven by electoral concerns, it did not take long to realise that national pensions were unsustainably structured due to its low contribution—6 percent of the wage—and high benefit level—70 percent income replacement—from the start[81](ibid.). Although a fundamental restructuring of the national pension was favoured by both the ruling and opposition parties, interestingly, the left-wing presidential party initiated the reform in 1998 which resulted in reducing the level of income replacement from 70 to 60 percent; increasing the pension age gradually starting in 2013; and raising contribution rates of both employers and employees to 4.5 percent of the monthly wage. Brave and necessary as this effort might have been, they were seen as the government "passing the buck" to the public and incurred electoral defeat to the president's party in the 16th general election in 2000. Due to the rapidly ageing population and financial unsustainable pension structure, there was a second attempt to reform pension in 2002. Again, the reform was suggested by the centre-left wing presidential party led by the new president Roh Moo Hyun. Counter-intuitive as it may sound, this reform was heavily criticised and vetoed by the then conservative opposition party—the GNP—which was in cooperation with the civil society groups.

The period between 2005 and 2007 fell mostly under the latter part of Roh Moo Hyun's presidency and had experienced both power concentration and dispersion.

To begin with, Roh's government experienced 11 months of the most concentrated power structure between 2004 and 2005 which had shown a rapid political turn to politically sensitive issues between left and right. In 2004, the President Roh had been suspended from the presidency as the assembly passed the impeachment law blaming the president's political neutrality violation before the general assembly election. Unexpectedly, this action had been received among the public as "overstepping of power by opposition parties" and the event caused an electoral backlash which gave president Roh's party a majority position in the general assembly election. Having secured a majority and redeeming its presidency according to the constitutional court's verdict, the president suddenly started to focus on

[81] Exceptionally, this level is equivalent to Scandinavian countries.

highly sensitive political issues such as banning the national security law and setting legal ground to punish pro-Japanese figures during the colonial era. This zero-sum issues turned policy making process between parties more contentious and ended up lowering legislative activities in general. By the same token, during the honey moon period of his presidency in 2003, more attention was given to political reforms such as dismantling hierarchy and rigidity of public prosecutors instead of universal welfare issues.

Period between 2005 and 2006 falls into the high dispersion and it has seen fierce competition surrounding welfare bills among MPs and led to totally counter-intuitive results. First, national pension reform is a good illustration of this. Considering the political sensitivity of pension reform—increasing contribution rate and decreasing benefit level—old age pension was considered side-by-side as a blame-avoidance strategy by Roh's government in September 2006. Specifically the then central-left-wing ruling party was planning to give approximately 5% of average income to 60% of people above age 65. However, other opposition parties—even including the central-right Grand National Party—requested more generous benefit level like 15% of average income and wider range of beneficent such as 80% above age 65 from left-wing Democratic Labour Party and 100% above age 65 from central-right Grand National Party (Cho et al., 2009). What is more interesting is that, although two bills passed the standing committee stage with the contents designed by the ruling party, one of the MPs from Grand National Party Park Jae Wan formed an informal coalition with left-wing NGOs, left-wing Democratic Labour Party, and trade unions in February 2007 and succeed in voting down just the national pension bill at the plenary session (ibid). Ministry of Welfare public relation officer recalls this as "This was clearly political. Election-conscious MPs made voters only to swallow the sweet candy leaving the bitter pill behind".

Second, when it comes to the new enactment of major orthodox welfare policies, the most dispersed period recorded—2006 and 2007—initiated, processed, and enacted the most significant welfare legislation in the 2000s: long term care insurance for the elderly. It is the fifth national insurance law in Korea which consists of 70 articles and four additional clauses and designed to socialize healthcare costs to long-term care beneficiaries who manifest a high prevalence of chronic conditions. Similarly, the biggest welfare roadmap—vision 2030 requiring 1100 trillion won—appeared not during either the honey moon period or the most concentrated power structure time but in 2006 when the political power had

been seriously dispersed and the president did not have any other cards to play. In addition, there had been consolidation of existing policies in the form of revision. For example, the Roh Administration relaxed the requirement for receiving public assistance by limiting the mandatory support group boundary from the extended family to nuclear family. Moreover, this period also started to give attention to the still marginalised social service sectors such as adoption, childcare, women or benefits to the disabled. To name a few, equal employment opportunity act in 2006, act on prohibition of discrimination of disabled persons in 2007, and child welfare act in 2006.

Third, President Roh advocated an increase in the participation and involvement of citizens and NGOs in the production and delivery of social welfare services. In other words, to compensate for the lack of political resources coming from partisanship, during the dispersed power structure period, there had been a substantial increase in the incidences of co-management, co-production, and co-governance between private and public sector—e.g. the Food Bank and Hope Start programs and the Local Councils on Social Welfare (LCSWs)—under the slogan of "participatory welfare" (Kim,2009). In a similar vein, this is the time when the local governments also started to take a more active role in providing welfare benefits.

3.1.3. The 2008-2012 Period

Just like any other presidents, Lee Myong Bak pledged several welfare benefits during the electoral campaign using labels like "human new deal", "stepping-stone welfare", "integration with people" or "active welfare" and set 42 welfare-related national agendas. However, not many of them got serious attention and ended up being "drifted" for the first two years when he had both will and support to focus on the priorities he was most interested in. On the contrary, as pointed out by journalists and scholars alike, the last three years of this period represent the peak of race-to-the top welfare politics in Korea.

To begin with his presidency, interestingly enough, just like the concentrated power structure of the central-left-wing Roh-Moo Hyun government, in the latter part of 2008, the previous president Lee Myung Bak also began to refocus on highly sensitive political issues such as relaxing the beef import standard from the US to recover the diplomatic relationship after

having secured a majority position in the legislature in April 2008. Although this looks like a centre-right party implementing a typical neoliberal agenda, rather than a socio-economic issues, it was more perceived as touching on the first-cleavage issue in terms of losing national sovereignty. As a result, it led to a series of large scale candle demonstrations by the public.

Moreover, similar to the central-right Kim Young Sam government in 1993, there also was a rapid growth in particularistic welfare benefits. The Grand Canal project extending 540km and 34 new town projects (in the Seoul metropolitan area alone) causing speculative real-estate investments are two major illustrations of this and closely linked to the increase of national debt by more than 180 billion won. By any means the president seemed to be more interested in executing his 747 pledge (7% annual economic growth, reaching $40,000 GDP per capita, and become the world's seventh largest economy) than the welfare one. But as criticized by a right-wing NGO Citizens United for Better Society, his means to achieve the goal was through social overhead capital project which is at odds with neo-liberal ideal. Moreover, unlike the rapid expansion of social welfare after the 1997 financial crisis, Lee's government had mainly employed temporary livelihood assistance and public works for low income groups, all of which turned out to be ineffective in solving the increasing social risks following the financial meltdown in 2008 (Shin, 2009).

However things started to turn upside down from 2009 with a debate about "free meals for elementary school children" sparked by Kim Sang Gon who was then the superintendent of education in Keongki province. A survey conducted regarding this issue in November 2009 showed more than 70% of elementary school parents were in favour of this and was taken on-board as a main election pledge by opposition parties and progressive NGOs for the nation-wide local election in June 2010. The result was a victory by opposition parties led by the Democratic Party—the biggest opposition party at the time—to include "achievement of universal welfare state" as the main party platform. Riding this momentum, it expanded its free pledge series as 3F plan (three free plans) from elementary school meal to medical fees and nurturing costs in 2011 and prepared for the upcoming elections. For this attempt, even a welfare expert journalist at left-wing newspaper Hankyorae admits there was an element of populism to win over people's votes for the upcoming elections. The journalist also added that "a similar idea was proposed by [left-wing] the Democratic Labour Party several years ago but it seems the issue was hi-jacked by [central left-wing] the Democratic Party."

The current president Park Geun-Hye was then a promising president candidate in the ruling party and stepped foot in the race-to-the top welfare politics at the early stage. Starting from emphasizing "disciplined capitalism" in her Stanford University speech in May 2009 she even mentioned that realizing the welfare state was her father's—President Park Chung Hee—ulimate goal and economic development was no more than a means. Going further, she had her first public hearing about "a framework act about comprehensive revision of social security" in December 2010.

Despite Park Geun-Hye's attempt to appeal to a wider range of voters from 2009, the ruling party at the time maintained rather sceptical/half-hearted position about welfare issues—as can be expected by the logic of concentrated government—but started to realise that they are on the wrong track after being defeated three times in a row—local election in June 2010, by-election in April 2011, and a national referendum about "free meal for elementary students" in August 2011. In June 2011, all seven legislators running for the floor leader election said they would expand welfare benefits. As a counter-measure to the opposition Democratic Party, it came up with a welfare package name "life-long customized welfare" which consists of nurturing, education, employment and housing, and elderly care in October 2011. This package was often labelled as the "70% welfare". Going further, it even changed the party name from Grand National Party to Saenuri party in Feb 2012 and included the "building happy welfare state" as the top party platform like the Democratic Party. What is interesting is that both the Democratic Party and the Grand National Party alike did not debate on how to raise tax to realize a series of welfare benefits they had pledged. Instead they drew a rosy picture of securing the necessary budget, for instance, by minimizing budget inefficiencies.

The above-mentioned party-level competition can be evidenced on the legislative front as well. To list a few, the expansion of nurturing benefit merits particular attention. Although the Ministry of Welfare agreed to provide free food to the poorest 70% of children between age 0 and 2 in 2011, both the ruling and opposition party suddenly agreed to expand this to everyone between age 0 and 2 during the national assembly budget deliberation in November. Going further, they even decided to include children between age 3 and 4 in 2012 for obvious reasons—the year of general and presidential election. For this, the then vice-minister of Ministry of Welfare Sohn complained that "politicians are making matters worse. When dealing with the legislature, there ought to be division between parties. As both parties voice the same thing, it's harder to cope with". Another fierce battlefield for welfare competition

was old age pension. Originally pledged by Democratic Party for 2011 general election, it became an up-for-grab bill for other candidates within and outside the party promising to double and triple the amount old people can receive. Finally, MPs even went further by promising to cut or abolish the pension scheme for themselves before the major elections in 2012. Although this attempt turned out to be no more than a lip service after the elections, they seemed to be quite serious at before the election by taking measures such as creating a task force team or submitting several related bills.

3.2. Japan

3.2.1. The 1987-1997 Period

Until 1989, the power structure in Japan was highly concentrated as the long-ruling LDP was in control of both houses. Unlike the time of political crisis in the 1970s, the LDP stabilized its power and attempted to pass the buck of welfare provision to family and society in the 1980s by emphasizing "welfare society", instead of "welfare state". At the same time, as can be expected with its highly personalized electoral rule—MMD and SNTV—the 1980s can also be characterised as the peak of pork-barrel politics fraught with particularistic welfare benefits. As the LDP increasingly turned to a catch-almost-all party by the means of *quid pro quo* style politics, politics become increasingly costly. Therefore, it had to introduce a new consumption tax in 1989 to prevent the LDP from collapsing under its own weight. Inevitable as it might have been at the time, this was the death knell of the LDP and the beginning of a new competitive welfare politics. The introduction of the tax made unorganised voters to think that the LDP was imposing another cost on them in order to finance pork for their constituents and this resulted in the LDP to lose its absolute majority in the Upper House in 1989—although it still continued to govern the lower house alone until August, 1993. And this ushered in the era of multi-party competition with fluctuating levels of power dispersion as described in Appendix 5.

The higher power dispersion from 1989 incentivized parties and legislators to prioritize both universal and particularistic welfare benefits in Japan. That is, on the one hand, the new

balance of power in the Upper House forced the LDP to make compromises by making them focus on comprehensive programs which are difficult for the opposition parties to oppose. On the other hand, it also tried to reflect distributive concerns of other opposition parties in exchange for votes on the Diet floor. For the universalisation effort of welfare programs, the LDP came up with the Gold Plan—The Ten-Year Strategy for the Promotion of Elderly Citizens' Health and Welfare—in 1989 which was followed by the reform of the Elderly Health and Welfare Law in 1991, which increased government subsidies for the non-medical portion of the elderly care. In the case of incorporating the preference of the major opposition forces—the JSP and Japan Communist Party—we can point out the improvement in services and benefits to families with children. This political dynamic led the LDP to increase the national government spending on public day care centres and the introduction of the Child Care Leave which is in stark contrast with its earlier attempt to support a cut in the Chilren's Allowance in the 1980s (Estevez-Abe, 2008). Furthermore, reflecting the political dynamics of dispersed power structure, three major opposition parties—Social Democratic Party of Japan, Komeito (also known as Clean Party Government), and the Democratic Socialist Party—requested a 4.26 trillion ten tax cut package from the 1993 budget which comprised of income tax rebate for a standard family of four, tax breaks for housing and education expenses, and tax cuts for small and medium enterprises (Japan Times, 1993).

The year 1993 had seen a further decentralisation of the power structure and led to a further increase in the level of welfare benefits. On August 9, Ichiro Ozawa and his followers left the LDP and formed a non-LDP coalition with other opposition parties. In this regard, Estevez-Abe notes that (2008:235),

> Although new political parties such as the Japan New Party drew support from unorganized urban voters, the established parties (such as the Japan Socialist Party, Democratic Socialist Party, and Komeito) relied upon certain organized constituent groups. Unionised workers formed the core constituencies of the Japan Socialist Party and the Democratic Socialist Party; and Soka Gakkai (a religious group) formed the core constituency of Komeito. Soka Gakkai members were primarily drawn from the low-income and lower-middle-income urban population. Reflecting this membership, Komeito tended to favour redistributive

public welfare benefits, which it used in lieu of targeted benefits for its members alone.

To meet the needs of these various groups, the coalition government had to expand its resources and this was achieved under the name "The People's Welfare Tax". As for the milestone changes in universal welfare, the following three merits particular attention. First was the introduction of a ten-year plan called the Angel Plan, which aimed mainly at increasing the public support for working mothers and families with children by allocating 60 billion yen over a ten-year period to improve regulatory and public service infrastructure for working parents. In an attempt to secure funding, the Ministry of Welfare created the Children's Future Foundation (Estevez-Abe, 2008). Secondly, the Employment Insurance Reform introduced two new cash benefits: paid benefits for child care leave and wage subsidies for older workers in 1994. Third is the initiation and implementation of the long-term care insurance bill. This is known to be the most important new welfare legislation for Japan between the periods of our observation. Consists of 215 articles and five additional clause, this was the fifth national insurance and an attempt to socialize long-term health care in Japan. Interestingly, just like the Korean case, this bill had been initiated and implemented during the periods of highest power dispersion.

When the non-LDP coalition government collapsed in June, 1994, the LDP came back to power with the JSP and Sakigake. Despite this change, most of the previous policy initiatives were carried over to the LDP-led coalition government and were legislated. Even with the LDP back in power, the coalition government had a dynamic of its own with its dispersed power structure, maintaining the universality aspect of welfare policy; however, as can be expected from logic of MMD-SNTV electoral rule, the LDP's effort to curry favour with its own constituents returned to the political scene[82] more explicitly. To maintain the generosity of both universal and particularistic welfare policies, the coalition government agreed to raise the consumption tax from 3 percent to 5 percent.

[82] Major public works spending projects that had been suspended under the non-LDP coalition were restarted and Murayama Cabinet also approved a huge multiyear agricultural budget (Estevez-Abe, 2008).

3.2.2. The 1998-2008 Period

As elaborated elsewhere, the major difference between before and after 1996 lies in the change of electoral rules and the strengthening of prime-ministerial authority. The new electoral rules using SMD substantially reduced the level of intraparty competition and a series of legislative rules empowered the prime-minister.

First, under a SMD system with strengthened leadership, a party leader is likely to allocate more resources to swing districts to maximize the party's overall electoral performance. As this being median voters such as women, workers, or the elderly in congested areas, we can expect welfare policies becoming more universalistic. Second, unlike the previous MMD system, when cooperating parties field their own candidate in one district, the SMD rule incentivises cooperating parties to avoid competition in a specific district to maximise their joint seat share (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010). Under this Westminster-type majoritarian system, parties were more incentivized to focus on median voters with a particular emphasis on universal welfare.

Although it differed in degree, the post 1996 era continued to constitute a medium-level power dispersion until 2007. The Hashimoto Cabinet which formed soon after the 1996 Lower House election continued to be a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party and Sakigake, because the LDP lacked an absolute majority in the Upper House. Next was Obuchi Cabinet, from September 1997 to January 1999, which was a *de facto* coalition government relying on the guaranteed supports of parties outside the government to overcome its lack of an absolute majority. After this, except from a short-lived coalition in 1999 with the Conservative Party, the LDP governed in coalition with Komeito from October 1999 to August 2009. Within this last period, the victory of the Democratic Party Japan (DPJ) in the upper house election in 2007 is particularly noteworthy as it broke the stability and moved Japan into the high power dispersion periods.

Similar to the Korean case, the rise of NGOs in Japan should not escape our attention. The dispersed power structure has been associated with the involvement of theretofore marginalised groups. That is, the electoral competition which began in the late 1980s opened up opportunities for historically less influential groups such as women's groups to gain entry into public policy making (Peng, 2005). However, we should keep in mind that

these civil society groups did not join the political scene out of the blue; they were the result of an unintended consequence. That is, grass root organisations and voluntary sector groups grew gradually during the 1980s based on a conservative motivation: the LDP government sought to build community and voluntary sector capacity in social welfare to transfer the delivery of social services from the public to private and the voluntary/non-governmental organisation sectors (Peng, 2005:90). However, as time passed, they not only provided social service but also helped to build the social and political mobilisation capacities of its main groups by institutionalising expert-led lobby groups—including academics, lawyers, and policy experts. For instance, the Women's Committee for the Improvement of the Aged Society became an umbrella group for over 1,500 local groups working on the same issue in the 1990s, and the Aged Society NGO Association expanded during the 1990s and formed extensive networks across the country with each other.

Particularly the milestone event for NGOS had been the Kobe Earthquake in January 1995 during which NGOs played a crucial role in rescuing people and got a positive limelight from the media. This led the then coalition government to introduce NPO legislation in the same year which gave many non-profit organizations a legal status along with various kinds of financial and administrative supports. The influence of NGOs reached their peak during the DPJ cabinet by partnering with local municipalities to cater customised welfare to the public. In 2010, there were around 40,000 registered NPOs in Japan and about 58% were dealing with health and welfare issues. Given the fact that the DPJ did not have a stable political base like the LDP, this could be comprehended as a rational strategy for them[83]. Besides, many of the elected MPs in the DPJ had civil society background. However, despite the growing influence, there never were comprehensive advocacy-welfare NGOs like Korea's Welfare State and Society.

Having specified the logic of electoral rule and the change of power structure, we are expected to observe more medium-voter oriented welfare politics between 1997 and 2007, which was the case. To be precise, the following two strategies were prevalent among political actors within these institutional constraints. First is the removal of existing particularistic benefits provided to organized or geographical constituents. This was highly

[83] In a similar vein, the DPJ cabinet also opened the media to a wider range of foreign news agencies like Bloomberg and Reuters

rational for politicians not only because of the reduced electoral importance but also it could be used as a means to further universalistic benefits instead of taking politically risky strategies such as drafting a new tax or curtailing existing benefit level. Here are major illustrations of this attempt. In 1996, Prime-minister Hashimoto's "Financial Big Bang" deregulated financial product markets and opened the doors to new players (Laurence, 2001). This removed the protection of market-restricting regulation for banks and insurance companies. Going further, to solve structural problems by allowing bankruptcies or buyouts, the government eliminated the Large Scale Retail Store Law of 1974, which had existed to protect small shopkeepers from larger competitors. Even after Hashimoto, the momentum was retained by Obuchi Cabinet as it decided to terminate wage subsidies for workers in declining industries and introduced the new Agricultural Basic Law, which made market efficiency explicitly a policy goal in addition to self-sufficiency of the national food supply.

Moreover, in the late 1990s, exemptions of medical fees for some public corporation employees had been criticized as a case of excessive preferential treatment so had to be removed. The peak of removing particularistic welfare benefits occurred during the Koizumi cabinet. It is well known fact that Koizumi conducted a large-scale postal reform to get rid of the pipeline of pork-barrel politics (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010) even by holding a snap election in September 2005. Similarly, riding on this momentum, he also conducted a record-level 4% cut in medical treatment fees in November 2005 which included doctors' remuneration. This created schism between the LDP and the Japan Medical Association—with roughly around 160,000 members—which once was the LDP's vote-gathering machine. The leaders of the association left which district candidates to back up to prefectural chapters (Japan Times, 2005).

The second strategy the government adopted was increasing welfare benefits in a universalistic manner. For instance, it was decided that the level of government subsidies should be increased at the 2000 pension reform (Otani, 2000) from one-third to one-half of the total cost. Relatedly, the plan also included to limit hikes in salaried workers' pension contribution which was designed to be increased in line with increase in their annual salary. Furthermore, the reforms of the Employment Insurance and Children's Allowance in 2001 and 2004 correspond to other major examples. To be specific, the Employment Reform of 2001 not only changed the eligibility criterion to allocate more benefits to those who were laid off but also extended the coverage to part-time workers. The Children's Allowance was

also expanded in 2004 which was financed by the tax revenue generated from reductions in income tax deductions for dependent family members (ibid.). In addition to the highly salient welfare benefits, there had been other attempts for low key universal welfare expansion. In 2002, the LDP pushed for the implementation of the Organ Transplant Law to substantially increase the pool of organ donors along with other parties in the form of bi-partisan meetings. Moreover, in 2004, responding to the all-time high HIV careers in Japan, the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare started free HIV tests for the public.

In the run-up to the 2007 upper house election, the importance of election-oriented welfare politics furthered by the power-craving opposition DPJ and ruling LDP alike. For instance, within the DPJ, MPs like Kan Naoto agreed on 3% increase in consumption tax for welfare expansion in 2004. However, in preparing the upper house election in 2007, an opportunistic heavyweight legislator Ozawa Ichiro suddenly started to voice against it and changed the party manifesto to not include any tax increase. Fierce competition was observed at other fronts as well. For example, as a solution to highly complex welfare benefit structure, the LDP pledged to make pension payment histories available to all current and future pension recipients and introduce social security cards with which people can obtain information related to social security plans like health insurance or pension. Similarly, the DPJ promised to issue pension passbooks which feature enabling people to check premium payment records at any time. In the end, the LDP coalition lost the upper house in 2007 and broke the equilibrium of medium-level power dispersion.

3.2.3. The 2008-2012 Period

Except for 11 months of the most concentrated power structure from Sep 2009 to June 2010 by the DPJ government, this is the period of highest power dispersion during which we can expect to see accelerated race for welfare politics. The fierce competition can be observed on several legislative fronts.

First, with the aim of getting the lower house in addition to the upper house, the DPJ spur on the intensity of welfare politics either by criticizing the wrongdoings of ruling LDP or actively appealing to all kinds of voters. For instance, in 2008, when the Ministry of Welfare was accused on the mismanagement of the public pension record, the DPJ fiercely criticized

the LDP to drag down its public credential. Similarly, by forming a coalition with other opposition parties—the Japanese Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the People's New Party—the DPJ sponsored a bill in an attempt to abolish the then new public health insurance system introduced by the LDP which imposes higher medical expense to people aged above 75.

Moreover, as for the election pledges of the 2009 lower house election, the DPJ tried to bid itself up on the welfare benefits suggested by the LDP. First, when the LDP promised to relax employment insurance registration period from one year to six months, the DPJ asked for one month. Second, along with its coalition partner Komeito, the LDP proposed to shorten the minimum pension premium contribution period from 25 years to 10 years as part of its election pledge. In response to this, the DPJ proposed all-encompassing pension program which asks people to pay premiums according to their income level in addition to guaranteeing 70,000 yen monthly pension to everyone by law. Third, the LDP promised to increase the monthly salary for nursing-care workers about 15,000 yen while the DPJ pledged to raise the amount by about 40,000 yen. Fourth, the DPJ even co-opted with the LDP's coalition partner to achieve its ultimate political goal. For example, along with the LDP's coalition partner Komeito, the DPJ promised to raise the state's contribution on long term care insurance.

Going further, the DPJ came up with a series of appealing welfare package to meet the needs of almost everyone in the society. To list a few, it promised to remove highway—extending 8500km—usage fee, to guarantee free high school education by providing 118,000 yen subsidy per student every year, to lower corporate tax rate by 11%, and provide 26000 yen of childcare subsidy to everyone until children graduate from middle school. Amid the ever-increasing process of bidding-up welfare politics, one thing that should not escape our attention is that there still was room for cooperation when it comes to low salient welfare issues. For instance, in May 2009, a group of legislators from both the LDP and DPJ submitted a new bill on Organ Transplant which would ease restriction on organ donation.

Akin to the Korean case, one piece of evidence clearly shows that welfare politics in Japan also was short-sighted: the DPJ was not very forthcoming about tax issue. That is, instead of suggesting to raise the consumption tax, the party promised it could secure the budget by reducing unnecessary personnel costs of public servants, the number of umbrella organizations, and inefficiency of the tax system. Regarding these promises, the welfare and

society session Yomiuri journalist remarks "the DPJ did not think earnestly about the whole welfare package. It just focused on something that could be easily accepted by the public. As an opposition party not in the situation to deal with financial issues, instead of being upfront, it intentionally dodged it".

After all, the DPJ's constant efforts on all fronts paid off and took the lower house in September 2009 with a landslide victory making the government the most concentrated power structure. Although some of the relatively easy welfare promises had been materialized in the early 2010, the DPJ's main concern was not welfare issues now. Similar to the Korean central-left Roh Moo Hyun government, it was more keen on touching politically sensitive issues like relocating American military base outside Okinawa[84] or bringing the power back to politicians from bureaucrats. For instance, at the beginning of Hatoyama administration, no single person with a background as a bureaucrat was included in the cabinet. Furthermore, the willingness to reform can be clearly manifested from the abolition of administrative vice ministers meetings, the top civil servants from each of the cabinet ministries, "which had often served as the final forum for deliberation on a bill before it would be rubber-stamped by politicians in the cabinet and then in the Diet" (Vogel, 2010:236). By the same token, the PARC also has been eliminated "which in the LDP era had served as a critical locus of coordination among party politicians, bureaucrats, and industry groups" (ibid.). Regarding the welfare budget, as expected, the DPJ was short of necessary budget. On this note, a staff from the Ministry of Welfare remarked "when asked to secure the relevant budget for promised welfare programs, it was a near impossible task. The amount we can realistically save differed by a digit". The DPJ government realised it should increase the amount of consumption tax only at the later stage.

A year later, when another upper house election approached, the LDP was in the position of power-yearning challenger and took more active initiatives in suggesting welfare benefits. While the DPJ was occupied with non-welfare issues and dealing with the budget shortage problem, the LDP suggested to lower the eligibility for the elderly medical insurance from 75 to 65 along with relaxing pension receiving condition from 25 year contribution to 10 year contribution. Coupled with the DPJ Prime-minister Kan Naoto's politically dangerous remark

[84] The issue on the continued use of land in Okinawa Prefecture has long been a key dividing line between parties in Japan. For instance, when a survey was conducted for this issue in 1997 by the Yomiuri Shimbun, 90% of the LDP legislators were in favour of the continued usage while the 88% of the Social Democratic Party members were opposing it.

on raising consumption tax before the election, the LDPs' efforts helped to gain power back in the upper house.

In 2011, the Fukushima disaster struck by surprise and changed the landscape of welfare politics. In April there was a 7.1 magnitude earthquake in Fukushima area in Sendai city, followed by tsunamis. This claimed the lives of more than 15,891 people and the then ruling party DPJ had to use a substantial amount of its budget to cope with this situation. Approximately 4.2 billion yen were required immediately as an emergency fund and, needless to say, pledged welfare benefits were easy targets. The amount of childcare subsidy had to be halved and the budget used for free highway was put on hold. To make matters worse, the intended tax reform and bureaucracy streamlining process turned out to be not successful making the budget shortage problem even worse. Just like the DPJ criticized pension miss-management scandal in 2008, the LDP and Komeito took a hard stance on DPJ's incompetence. Especially, reflecting the widespread cynicism of the public at the time, both parties bashed the DPJ's over ambitious and populist welfare promises most of which could not come to fruition. One by one, the DPJ had to make inevitable compromises. In July 2011, the DPJ presented a proposal to reduce the amount of child-rearing allowances for high income people—earning more than 10 million yen and above annually—reflecting the input by the LDP and New Komeito. In April 2012, the DPJ also had to postpone the idea of guaranteed minimum pension faced with the LDP's preference to maintain the existing pension structure. In return, the LDP decided to support the DPJ's plan to raise the consumption tax rate from 5% to 10% over a number of years.

In the end, the DPJ had to yield to the LDP and Komeito in 2012 and formed a tripartite party commission to deal with childcare support and consumption tax problem as a package. The compromise was reached in the form of using the raised consumption tax for paying welfare benefits like pension and childcare allowance without having to issue new government bonds. This might look a bitter defeat for the DPJ, but experienced welfare legislators and bureaucrats I interviewed recall this as "a responsible step forward". And with regards to the power-dispersion logic, just like other tax-welfare combination reforms, this happened during a minority government when welfare politics become more concilatory.

4. Summary

The key points of this chapter can be summarised with the primary findings of each method—media content analysis, social network analysis, and theory-informed narratives. Each of these methods has shed further complementary light on the findings of the previous chapter.

First, the media content analysis used here provided rich contextual information regarding the on-going welfare politics. Most directly, the content analysis of welfare article patterns from major newspapers ***indicated a growing salience of welfare issues in Korea and Japan along with the progress of multi-party competition***. Furthermore, symptomatic of active welfare politics, it showed major newspapers actually targeting government-related actors as their major coverage target for welfare-related articles, and content going beyond mere fact-telling in both countries.

Second, the network analysis applied here helped us to confirm the theory of race-to-the top welfare politics from the co-sponsorship dimension in addition to the sponsorship dimension of the previous chapter. That is, the dispersed power structure tended to go hand-in-hand with better co-sponsorship networks—based on eight network indices—among MPs fwho sponsored universalistic bills in Korea and Japan. This suggests that because of the dispersed power structure, MPs can expect better flows of welfare-related information, more stable legislation activities based on multiple focal actors, and more legislative cooperation between different parties. This fact also has been visually confirmed with relevant graphics increasing the face validity of my argument.

Just like the network analysis and media content analysis, the narrative part further corroborated the evidence of race-to-the-top welfare politics with real MPs, parties, and bureaucrats. First, based on key stories presented chronologically, it confirmed the tendency for universal welfare expansion during times of higher power dispersion in both countries with a strong-majoritarian electoral rule. In Japan this was the case of after 1996. Before that, it was under a highly candidate-oriented electoral rule and both universal and particularistic welfare benefits tend to expand hand-in-hand as power gets dispersed. In contrast, at times of concentrated power, the ruling parties suddenly shifted their agenda to tackle the most sensitive political issues like constitutional amendments (Japan), revisiting relationship with North Korea (South Korea), or political reforms (Korea and Japan). This ended up hampering

the universalistic welfare state expansion. Second, the narrative section found key political actors who were the central force in welfare expansion. Lacking the existence of a strong left-wing party supported by well-organised trade unions, parties have formed issue-based coalitions with civil society, which transcended the ideological spectrum (particularly in Korea). These coalitions usually consist of a wide range of supporters such as journalists, interest groups, or academics, many of whom are armed with professional expertise in developing welfare policies.

Third, going beyond the four indicators I used to measure power dispersion levels in this study, ***the narrative part has revealed the existence of other events dispersing and concentrating power.*** For instance, "lame-duck periods" cause power dispersion in presidential democracies. This is because presidential candidates tend to distinguish themselves from the outgoing president, and sometimes the very process of selecting candidates, such as "primary elections", drive a wedge between key members within a party. In a similar sense, the results of highly salient local elections, as well as other crucial polls like by-elections or re-elections, can serve as a mid-term judgement and increase centrifugal tendency within a party. Moreover, whether the ruling party maintains a razor-thin or stable parliamentary majority also should be taken into account in measuring power dispersion levels.

Chapter 6. Cross-country Difference: Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structure

Leveraging both quantitative and qualitative evidence, the previous two chapters confirmed that power dispersion incentivizes political actors to prioritize welfare issues in a competitive and, at the same time, a cooperative manner. Going beyond a parallel inter-temporal comparison of Korea and Japan, ***the primary purpose of this chapter lies in explaining differences in type and degree of welfare expansion between countries.*** Towards this goal, the first half of analysis examines how the primary causal claim can be mediated by other political institutions, by choosing another highly similar case: Taiwan. As detailed in the theory part, I expect that highly candidate-centred electoral rules—MMD and SNTV—would make legislators focus on particularistic welfare benefits (as much as or more than universal ones) during high power dispersion periods. Going beyond the effect of electoral rules, the second half of analysis aims to account for varying degrees of welfare expansion in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan by centring our attention on one key diverging aspect of political institutions—executive-legislative relationship. Building on the presidential studies literature, I will expound how higher degrees of legislators' independence and heterogeneity in presidentialism can lead to faster and more universal welfare expansion in presidential Korea and semi-presidential Taiwan compared to parliamentary Japan.

1. Another Most Similar Case: Taiwan

Before delving into the two cross-sectional analyses, it is imperative to confirm whether Taiwan is actually the most similar case in light of the potential explanatory factors I specified and, if so, the existence of two crucial scope conditions—depolarized social-economic cleavage and clientelistic nature of wide-spread unorthodox social policies—can be tested and verified.

1.1. Similarities in the Potential Explanatory Variables

Among many potential countries for a further inter-temporal comparison, Taiwan seems to be the closest country to Korea and Japan. For instance, students of East Asian welfare states have noted that Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have experienced a similar type of welfare system change since 1990. Regarding this phenomenon, Peng and Wong (2010: 658) note that, unlike the individualistic and market-based cases of Singapore and Hong Kong, the welfare systems in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are "evolving into a set of programmes based on social solidarity, universality, and with redistributive implications." Similarly, other East Asian welfare state scholars now categorize the three countries as "inclusive welfare states" (Kwon, 2005) or "developmental-universalist" (Holiday and Wilding, 2003), and Kam's (2012) latest cluster analysis lends further credence to this grouping by showing that Korea, Japan, and Taiwan fall into the same cluster.

Taking a cue from this line of observation, I will examine whether Taiwan stands up to concrete scrutiny in light of potential explanatory factors and scope conditions affecting welfare system change. As I listed in Chapter 2, potential factors known to affect welfare systems include colonial legacy, culture, economic developmental path/structure/gap, previous welfare system as institutional legacy, socio-demographic transitions, and various political institutions.

To begin with, given its linguistic and geographic links to mainland China, Taiwan clearly shares Confucian culture with Korea and Japan. Besides, Korea and Taiwan share a legacy of Japanese colonial rule, and half a century of colonialism moulded two societies highly similar to each other in various senses (Deyo, 1987). Following the end of the Second World War, Taiwan fell under the influence of US like Korea and Japan, and similarly conducted land reforms, received large amounts of aids, and benefitted from the Vietnam War special procurement in the 1960s.

Going beyond the historical and cultural similarities, Taiwan is also known as one of the "four dragons" of the East Asian growth model (Woo-Cumings, 1999; Amsden and Chu, 2003) along with Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, all of which followed Japan's developmental state model. As a result, all three countries excluded trade unions from national-level policy making, exploited women's labour, and kept state expenditure on

welfare low. What is particularly interesting is that as Taiwan and Korea industrialized in the post-war era, they increasingly took Japan's pre-war *zaibatsu*-like corporate structure, based on familial hierarchy and filial loyalty, which developed into the "New Life" movement of Taiwan and "New Spirit" movement of Korea (Cumings, 1987: 13). Even in terms of shifts in industrial structure, Taiwan has experienced a highly similar trajectory moving from labour-intensive light industry (1950-1960), to labour-intensive light industry (1960-1970), to capital-intensive heavy industry (1970-1980), and then to knowledge-intensive high-tech industry (1980-present). And since 1990, it has maintained a level of economic development and growth similar to that of Korea[85].

Even if we just focus on welfare legacy area, Taiwan features heavy reliance on unorthodox social policies, such as high levels of agricultural protection and inter-generational risk-sharing, and has adopted social insurance model for most of key orthodox social policies[86]. Paralleling Korea's welfare development pace, Taiwan has completed the universalization of four major types of national insurance (health, pension, industrial accident, and unemployment) in the 2000s, with a fifth one—long-term care insurance—under way.

Furthermore, Taiwan is no exception to socio-demographic crisis. Data from The Executive Yuan's Accounting and Statistics Department in Taiwan show that by 2012, the country's fertility rate hit 1.2 while life expectancy soared to nearly 80. The twin trends of rapid urbanization and growing service sector—reached 72% and 59% in 2012, respectively—caused an imbalance between rural and urban areas as well. Coupled with the ever-increasing globalization trend, this means that jobs are increasingly becoming precarious, destabilizing the previous male breadwinner model and causing youth unemployment to reach 20% in 2012. Recognizing these impending problems, public demand (as measured by various surveys) for more state-based welfare has increased over time. For instance, the General Attitude Survey of Social Attitudes conducted by Academia Sinica in 1991—a nation-wide survey conducted on a total of 1590 people—showed that 44% of respondents found state

[85] The only reason Taiwan could not join OECD is because it has not been recognized as an independent state by the international community since the 1970s, due to its relationship with mainland China.

[86] In my view, that all three countries with developmental state legacy adopted the social insurance model is not a simple coincidence. There is an elective affinity between the state insurance model and countries adopting the developmental state model. A Professor in the Social Work Department of National Taiwan University noted the government's preference for the insurance model as "Tax-based model puts too much financial burden on the government while the privatization model leaves little room for the government intervention. So, the state insurance model is a natural choice".

welfare unsatisfactory, while 70% thought welfare expenditure should be increased in the future (Ku, 1997). Moreover, when a 2009 telephone survey in Taiwan (using a random sampling method by Wang et al. (2013)) asked over 1100 people questions about the government's role in social welfare, roughly 90% of respondents wanted a greater role for the state in: i) implementing progressive taxation or ii) improving living standards of low-income people.

A striking number of similarities can be observed in the political dimension as well. First, just like Korea and Japan, Taiwan was controlled by a dominant party until the late 1980s and then entered into a period of multi-party competition. Similar to Korea, 1987 was the year Taiwan lifted its four-decade-long martial law and officially allowed party competition and freedom of the media. Before this period, it is difficult to say that key political actors were constrained by democratic institutions as in the multi-party competition era. For example, to maximize electoral gain, the ruling KMT party manipulated district magnitude under the SNTV rule (Hsieh, 1999) and used zoning systems that operated like party machines in American cities (Liu, 1999). More indirectly, the KMT also adopted campaign rules unfavourable to opposition political actors by means of maximum 10 day campaign period, limited television coverage, and limited spending (Nathan, 1993).

For similar reasons to Korea and Japan, Taiwan also features weak trade unions, NGOs, and left-wing parties, while having strong elite bureaucrats often recruited from top universities. Second, from the veto players' perspective, Taiwan can be characterised as having a unitary state, weak judicial review, weak central bank independence, unicameral legislative structure, and semi-presidential constitutional structure, all of which lead to having similar numbers of veto players to Korea and Japan[87]. Furthermore, Fish and Kroenig's global expert survey on national legislatures scored Taiwan's legislature as surprisingly close to Korea and Japan (Japan 0.66; Korea 0.59; Taiwan 0.59). Taiwan also followed on Korea and Japan's footsteps by changing its electoral rule to a mixed-member electoral system in the late 2000s. Most importantly, Taiwan has experienced several transitions in power dispersion level—a key condition to test the causal claim put forward in this project—as specified in Appendix 6. In

[87] In Taiwan's case, the president does not have a direct veto, but can request his own government to ask the legislative branch to reconsider a bill and this executive veto can only be overridden by a two-thirds majority from the legislative branch (Fish and Kroenig, 2009)

addition, the twin facts of allowing bureaucrats[88] to submit bills and requiring mandatory co-sponsoring by fellow legislators for individual legislator-sponsored bills make Taiwan a highly ideal case for comparison[89]. Besides, the bill deliberation process also is quite similar to Korea and Japan[90].


Going further, the Taiwanese legislature also has roughly 250 days in session a year, giving a possibility of bills to be submitted every month and every day; and just like Korea and Japan the legislature "procedural committee" as one of its standing committees whose primary role is to schedule bill deliberation process, duration, and sequence. Between 1987 and 2012, roughly 15,000 bills were submitted, of which approximately 6000 were successful. About one third of total bills—5000—were on welfare issues and, in the end, 40% of them were enacted or amended. Figure 39 shows us the dispersion of enacted bills both by month and day. We can clearly observe that bills have been processed quite evenly between months and days, offering huge analytical potential to capture particular political dynamics at any time.


[88] Unlike Korea and Japan, whose bureaucrat-submitted bills are uniformly labelled as "cabinet-bills", Taiwan distinguishes them between bills submitted by the Judicial Yuan, Executive Yuan, Examination Yuan, and Control Yuan. Furthermore, it also allows bills to be submitted at party caucuses. However, bills submitted by the Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan, and Control Yuan are negligible both in their numbers and relevance to welfare issues.

[89] The legislator must have the support of 15 or more members of parliament in Taiwan (the minimum number was 33 until 2008, which reflects the legislature's halving the total members from 225 to 113 that year).

[90] When a bill reaches parliament during this time, it is read out loud during the first reading and is referred to one of the committees. The committee then conducts an examination and decides whether it is worthy of submission to a plenary sitting, by conducting necessary measures like amending, rejecting, or shelving a bill. The plenary sitting after the standing committee is divided into the second and third readings. Unlike the relatively fast-paced deliberation of Korea and Japan, the second reading is of great importance in Taiwan, and engages in thorough discussions, revisions, re-examinations, or revocations. The third reading includes no more than rephrasing of bills and voting by the entire Legislative Yuan. Provided that a bill passed the parliament and is approved by the president, the law must be promulgated within 10 days in Taiwan.

<Figure 39> Average Proportion/Number of Bills Enacted by Month/Day in Taiwan





Despite the many similarities on various potential explanatory factors, two important differences in the political dimension are noteworthy. First, although Taiwan changed its electoral system to mixed-member electoral rule with a strong majoritarian orientation in 2006 (and had the first general election under this rule in 2008), it was under the old rule—middle member district combined with a single non-transferrable vote—for the most of period this project covers. Japan also had this rule, but made a change at a much earlier stage, in 1994. Given the old rule's strong personal-vote orientation, it has had a different implication on welfare politics during high-dispersion periods. Second, since 1997, Taiwan adopted a semi-presidential constitutional structure. ***Considering high levels of regional and period clustering, it is extremely rare to find three highly similar countries differing on the executive-legislative dimension.*** That is, we can see the prevalence of semi-presidentialism in Africa and in the former Soviet Union, parliamentarism in Europe, and presidentialism in South America. Similarly, Cheibub el al. (2013: 527)'s description of each constitution type's trends over time between 1920 and 2006 shows that the number of presidential and semi-

presidential regimes dramatically jumped in the 1940s and 1980s, respectively. Considering that countries with similar historical, cultural, and developmental backgrounds usually go hand-in-hand with particular regions and periods, the three East Asian cases here are exceptionally well poised to test the influence of constitutional structure. Guided by theories put forward by the established literature, the second half of this chapter will explore the difference Korea's presidentialism, Taiwan's semi-presidentialism, and Japan's parliamentarism had on welfare politics over the past two decades.

1.2. Similarities in the Media Saliency and Timing of Welfare Politics


Having clarified commonalities and differences in the potential explanatory factors, we can first examine whether saliency and other scope conditions of welfare politics in Taiwan are on par with Korea and Japan.


To begin with, we can test whether entering the multi-party competition era has made a qualitative difference in welfare politics by looking at the proportion of welfare bills and the role of election-conscious legislators.


The Taiwanese case illustrated in Figure 40 shows a striking similarity to the Korean case in many regards, despite the shorter time period of Taiwan's authoritarian era recorded here—from 1977 to 1987—due to data availability. ***First, the number of welfare laws enacted per year during the authoritarian era was around 10-20, which is less than one-fifth of the multi-party era average.*** In a similar vein, universal welfare laws were no more than 20-30% of total welfare laws before 1987, but doubled since then. ***Second, like in the Korean case, we can see an increasing trend—albeit with some fluctuation from year to year—in the number of welfare-related laws and the proportion of universal welfare laws after democratic consolidation.***


Even when it comes to the actor level, Taiwan features substantially more involvement by legislators than cabinet members during the multi-party competition era. Between 1977 and 1987, only 8% of welfare laws were sponsored by legislators. However, this figure jumped to 72% after 1987, and by breaking down the type of welfare into universal and particularistic we can see even stronger involvement of legislators: 81% of universal welfare laws were sponsored by legislators, in comparison to 47% of particularistic welfare laws.

<Figure 40> Changes in Welfare and Non-welfare Laws (upper-left: one-party era; upper-right: multi-party competition era) and Proportional Change within Welfare Laws (lower-left: one-party era; lower-right: multi-party competition era) in Taiwan











Second, as I pointed out repeatedly, ***implicit in the above welfare politics' logic is that voters following what takes place in the legislature, and political actors are conscious of this.*** Similar to Korea and Japan, it is commonly accepted that Taiwanese voters absorb political issues through the media, and ***major nation-wide newspapers can be regarded as one of the most important mediums for the period this project covers.*** For instance, in Taiwan, the Nielsen Company (a global information and measurement company) reports that newspaper readership in Taiwan peaked at 76.3% in 1991 and has steadily declined to 43.9 % in 2008. However, annual surveys from 2004 to 2008 conducted by Shih Hsin University show that newspapers are still the second most important primary source of news, only trailing television. In addition, the Mandarin-Chinese version of the Liberty Times (the newspaper this project analyses) *Jiyou-shibao* had the second highest circulation rate, on top of being known as the most influential and high-quality published dailies in Taiwan. Given the fact that election-conscious legislators play an increasingly important role in welfare politics, it would be unnatural to see their words and deeds not being reflected in the media. To verify this, I examined the degree of media saliency on welfare issues, based on the same indicators I used for the Korean and Japanese cases.

To examine these dimensions, the *Taipei Times* was chosen because of the availability of its search engine in English, reliability, and influence (it translates most articles in *Jiyou Shibao*, it can be safely assumed that the same content is read by the public). This is an ideologically middle-ground English newspaper and the search engine goes back only to 1999. Given the shortage in the number of years, data points were recorded quarterly instead of annually.

To begin with, a glimpse at Figure 41 shows that welfare issues are becoming more salient over time in Taiwan, in terms of the number of welfare-related articles. In addition to this, I also examined to which part each welfare article is categorized, to gauge the importance of welfare issues. For the *Taipei Times*, two important sections are categorized as "front page" and "editorial". Reflecting the saliency of welfare issues, Taiwan shows a slight increase in the proportion of "front page" and "editorial" sections, particularly after 2005.

<Figure 41> Number and Categorization of Welfare Articles in Taiwan: 1999-2012






Like I did for Korea and Japan, I went a step further to examine how welfare issues are written by looking at "to whom it was written in what ways'. For this purpose, about 400 articles were sampled (sampling process specified in Appendix 2). First, Figure 42 shows the proportion of welfare articles dealing with government-related individual political actors as their core subject. For Taiwan, approximately 60% of newspaper articles on welfare issues directly put political actors at the centre. Second, for the reporting style, roughly 40% of newspaper articles went beyond fact-reporting. ***Considering the evidence here, it is safe to assume that the newspapers are reflecting the on-going welfare politics in Taiwan just like they do in Korea and Japan.***

<Table 20> Subject and Reporting Style of Welfare Newspaper Articles in Taiwan

	Subject	Reporting Style			
	Govt-related actors	**Fact Report**	**Quotation**	**Suggestion**	**Assessment**
Taipei Times	228 (57%)	243 (61%)	50 (13%)	34 (9%)	73 (18%)

Furthermore, I checked whether election-conscious political actors (individual legislators and parties) are more welfare-prone than public servants. Reflecting the high-levels of media attention given to welfare politics, welfare bills are more likely to be prioritized by individual legislators and parties than non-welfare bills in Taiwan.

<Figure 42> Proportion of Legislator-sponsored Bills by Type in Taiwan



2. Multiple Cleavages and Clientelistic Party-Voter Linkage in Taiwan

In addition to the timing and increasing saliency of welfare politics, the two key set-up conditions for my power dispersion argument are the ideological flexibility of welfare issues between major political actors, and the clientelistic linkage between parties and voters through a substantial portion of unorthodox social policies. In light of the remarkably similar developmental paths and political legacies, I expect these scope conditions to be observed in Taiwan as well, and can be tested using the same method I applied to Korea and Japan.

2.1. Depolarized Social Welfare Issues in Taiwan


Central to testing this scope condition is to examine whether the ***two central pillars of class-based politics have been lacking or significantly weakened.*** And various pieces of evidence clearly support this. Specifically, like the Korean case, Taiwan has excluded trade unions from national-level policy making through various means (Deyo, 1987; Ho, 2010) and authoritarian military regimes legally forbid the creation of communist/socialist parties (or similar parties with redistributive appeals) (McAllister, 2007). Specifically, the ruling KMT party suppressed the class cleavage from emerging by setting up its party organizations and recruiting members in every industry (Li, 1989). Then what have been the alternative cleavages? Mass opinion surveys and voting records reflect that age and ethnicity have been the key dividing lines in Taiwan (McAllister, 2007) and these divides have not necessarily went hand-in-hand with income or asset differences. Going beyond the structural cleavage of age and ethnicity, it is a well-accepted fact that diplomatic/military stance towards mainland China has been the core issue cleavage determining voting behaviour (Hsieh and Niou, 1996). That is, the right believes that Taiwan and China should unify, while the left suggests Taiwan is a sovereign country therefore should seek for more recognition from the international community (Tsai and Chao, 2008). Reinforced by the overlapping structural cleavage (the ethnic division between Mainlanders and native Taiwanese), this issues is known to be the most crucial political cleavage in Taiwan.

Both quantitative and qualitative evidence reflect the non-ideological nature of socio-economic issues in Taiwan. For comparability's sake, I used the bill sponsorship data to test

the scope condition for the quantitative part, and elite interview results for the qualitative part. The presentation of results follows the exact same sequence as in Chapter 3.

Starting with simple descriptive statistics, Figure 43 shows the proportion between non-welfare and welfare bills (only orthodox welfare bills) submitted by both the legislative and executive branch from 1987 to 2012. In line with our expectation, as we move from right-wing to centre governments[91], we do not see the proportion of welfare bills increase in Taiwan.

<Figure 43> Proportion between Welfare and Non-welfare Bills by Partisanship in Taiwan



Repeating the same analysis, I examined the proportional difference between non-welfare and welfare bills according to individual legislators' party affiliation[92] for cross-validation purposes. That is, we can see whether so called "centre-left/left-wing" party members submit more welfare bills than "right-wing" party members. The result below shows virtually no difference between legislators from Taiwan's two biggest parties—the centre-left DPP and centre-right KMT.

[91] Similar to Korea and Japan, the government partisanship has been measured in Taiwan by combining the nature of ruling party and government form—whether it was under minority/coalition government. For Taiwan, there was no left-wing majority government during the period of interest. Accordingly, the whole period will be divided into "right" during the presidencies of Chiang Ching-kuo (1987), Lee Teng Hui (1988-1999), or Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2012), and "middle" for Chen Shui-bian's presidency (2000-2007).

[92] The full list of Taiwanese parties between 1987 and 2012 is: Centre-right (New Party, KMT, New People's Party); centre-left (Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan Independence Party); left (Taiwan Solidarity Union); and others (independent and others).

To validate the pattern above while minimizing the influence of other potential factors, I ran logistic regressions with almost the same control variables as I used for Korea and Japan (only "session status" is missing in Taiwanese case). And, as can be clear in Table 21, there has not been any statistical difference in submitting welfare bills between left and right-wing government periods (model 1) and between left and right-wing party legislators (model 2). Specifically, none of the models are statistically significant, and the predicted probability of a submitted bill being welfare barely changes between right and left-wing government periods—13% to 14%.

<Table 21> Logistic Regression Results of Depolarized Welfare Issues in Taiwan

	Model 1: Welfare or Not All submitted bills		**Model 2: Welfare or Not All Individual legislator submitted bills**
Government Partisanship	0.03	**Party** (base: Centre-right) Centre-left	-0.05
Submission entity (base: cabinet) Individual	0.45***	Left	-0.14
Party	0.21*	Others	0.3
Bill Format (base: enactment) Amendment	0.08	**Elected Tier**	0.03
Success	-0.07	**Gender**	0.41***
Electoral Reform	0.33***	**Number of Terms**	0.004
		Co-sponsor #	0.18***
		Success	-1.22***
		Electoral Reform	0.14**
		Bill Format (base: enactment) Amendment	0.14*

GDP Growth	0.031***	**GDP Growth**	0.019**
Constant	-2.32	**Constant**	-2.1
Observation	15390	**Observation**	9460

Note: ***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p<0.1

I presented three key pieces of evidence for the non-ideological nature of social welfare issues in Korea and Japan : i) Flexible attitudes for social welfare issues and frequent formation of issue-by-issue coalitions between key political actors; ii) Deprioritizing/prioritizing of social welfare issues by centre-left/centre-right wing parties during their highly favourable/unfavourable political periods; and iii) centre-left wing parties conducting so called "right-wing" reforms during their rule. All three pieces of evidence I listed above can be observed in Taiwan, lending further credence to the existence of same scope condition.

First, important political actors shaping welfare politics (such as the media, NGOs, interest groups, or academics) hold flexible attitudes towards welfare issues. This was clear from the remarks they made during interviews conducted as part of this project. To begin with, an experienced Taipei correspondent of *Yonhap News* (the biggest news distribution agency in Korea) pointed out that the major dividing line between left and right wing newspapers in Taiwan is a newspaper's attitude towards mainland China—Liberty Times holds pro-independence view so it is left while China Times and United Daily News are right-wing, with their pro-unification view. An ex-Chunghwa Broadcast Vice-President confirmed this distinction and further clarified by saying "even Liberty Times started to back the DPP only after the inauguration of President Ma-ying Jiu in 2008". For Taiwanese welfare advocacy NGOs, a secretary general of Taiwan Association for Psychological Rehabilitation (and the spokesperson for the National Health Insurance Civil Surveillance Alliance) puts their ideological flexibility as "we often provide workshops to educate journalists and it is quite comfortable to talk about welfare issues with different journalists since they are not ideological". She also pointed out that her NGO approaches professors from the centre-right KMT quite often for their expertise and noted that "regardless of party affiliation, politicians in Taiwan are in favour of welfare expansion and agree on our proposal for elderly care or

child care expansion before elections. However, they tend to adumbrate when I start to bring real numbers".

Considering that the political sensitivity is the other side of ideological rigidity, a former DPP legislator recalled while being interviewed "Come to think of welfare issues, as an opposition party, we did not have much problem getting information from the KMT government [between 2008 and 2012]. I think that is because welfare issues are not sensitive and zero-sum". Finally, a professor in the Social Work department of National Taiwan University pointed out that Taiwan's primary benchmarking welfare model without a hesitation "it is from everywhere, we benchmark our healthcare from Canada, LTCI from Japan and Korea, and family policy from Scandinavian countries". This shows Taiwan has followed the footsteps of three different welfare regimes based on Esping-Andersen's category and it is a clear token of its ideological flexibility on welfare issues. All in all, the ideological flexibility of welfare issues were confirmed by all major political actors interviewed in addition to the data mentioned so far.

Another piece of complementary evidence is that female MPs were and there have constantly been organized (and sometimes cross-party) attempts to advance women-related welfare. For instance, in June 2000, female legislators from various parties gathered to build consensus on women's issues. A month later, female KMT MPs threatened to vote against the national budget when male legislators did not attend a panel session regarding women's rights. Going further, there were more institutionalized attempts in 2004 like several pan-blue (how the coalition between centre-right wing parties is labelled) lawmakers forming the Female Legislators Alliance to promote women's welfare issues in the Legislative Yuan, or the DPP proposing a policy white paper which aimed at boosting women's representation to 40 percent of the cabinet.

Second, ***there have been several examples of centre-left wing DPP deprioritizing social welfare issues for median voter over other ones.*** For instance, the DPP's hard work came to fruition and the party won the Taiwanese presidential elections in 2000 (although it did not secure a majority position in the legislature). And as the first ever centre left-wing government enjoying a honeymoon period, this could have been the best chance to expand welfare benefits to median voters and the marginalised. However, their welfare ideals were de-prioritised (Wong, 2004; Ku and Aspalter, 2008) as Chen came into power and announced, at a press conference in September, "Social welfare can be delayed, but economic

development cannot be" (Wong, 2004). As a result, the party's signature 3-3-3 plan (Simply put, the policy was designed to hand out NT$3000 a month to the elderly, to subsidize mortgages at a 3 % interest-rate to first-time home buyers, and entailed the government sponsoring healthcare for children below age 3) had to be postponed (Taipei Times, 2002). Besides, the president used his precious political capital on issues like the installation of a fourth nuclear power plant or cross-strait economic and trade policy at the beginning of this term. The mood was well captured by a *Taipei Times* headline that read, "The DPP is sacrificing welfare for the economy" (Taipei Times, 2001).

The other side of this evidence is finding centre-right wing parties prioritizing social welfare issues. There are numerous instances of this tendency, and one of the primary examples is the KMT (Chinese National Party) hi-jacking the national health insurance issue from the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan. The KMT fast-tracked the legislative process by submitting a bill at the end of 1993, and completed the third reading in the summer of 1994 after only several days of debate. The resulting law came into effect in 1995, a full five years earlier than the KMT had originally planned in 1989. For this leap-frogging, DPP legislator Chen chi-mai noted that the KMT, a so-called right-wing party, behaved much like the British Labour Party (Fell, 2005). Another key example is that the centre-right KMT pushed for expanded labour welfare benefits after the 2000 presidential election. Although a 40-hour work week was originally promised by president Chen, the Council of Labour Affairs agreed on 44 hours with the employers and the labour group. However, the opposition KMT suddenly reversed its previous anti-labour stance, voting in December 2000 for an even shorter 84 hour in a two-week period (Lin and Chou, 2007). This also drove a wedge between labour groups and the DPP, the latter being perceived as traitors (ibid.)

Finally, as a clear token of ideological flexibility on socio-economic issues, ***the DPP administration actively implemented neo-liberal policies*** such as waiving trade tariffs, lifting commercial restrictions, privatizing state owned enterprises (parts of the banking, telecommunications, and utilities sectors), and minimizing state financial regulations between 2000 and 2008.

2.2. Clientelistic Party-Voter Linkage in Taiwan


Another key scope condition to my causal claim has been the heavy reliance on unorthodox social policies and their clientelistic linkage with the party. The fact that Taiwan is often noted for its "Black and Gold" politics (Chin, 2003) illustrates the linkage between voters and parties is based on not programmatic policy competition, but more by exchanges of particularistic goods, services, or regulations. "Black Gold" politics also indicates the involvement of gangsters, corruption, and illegal financial transactions. Akin to the LDP in Japan, the long ruling KMT is known for its intra-party factions and emphasis on agricultural subsidies and construction projects (Fell, 2003).

To be specific, it should not escape our attention that Taiwan had MMD+SNTV system until 2008, just as Japan did until 1996 (Fell, 2004; Hsieh, 1999). As I specified elsewhere, this electoral rule is notorious in promoting factions and *quid-pro-quo* particularistic welfare benefits. Although the electoral system did not incur huge political costs during the authoritarian era, its high candidate-oriented nature started to resemble Japan, notably in the importance it gave to elections after 1987. Both the KMT and DPP periods were no exception to this. Just as LDP legislators constantly carried a black tie and a white tie for funerals and weddings (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010), it had been often said that it was a local custom for Taiwanese candidates to attend funeral services in the morning and wedding banquets in the evening. Although Taiwan is not known for strong insider-protecting labour market rules such as life-long employment in large firms, it features dependency on unorthodox social policies like strong agriculture protections (Boestel et al., 2013) or large scale construction projects. These expectations can be tested with the legislation data.

To begin with, as specified in the definition of clientelism in Chapter 3, one of the key assumptions of *quid-pro-quo* politics is that provided benefits are contingent upon supporting certain parties. In line with the patterns observed in Korea and Japan, only 6% of universal social policies in Taiwan dealt with retrenchment, in contrast to the 24% retrenchment of particularistic social policy bills. This is an important sign of particularistic social policies veering towards clientelism. ***Moreover, the prevalence of unorthodox social policies in Taiwan can be confirmed with the fact that around 60% of the total enacted welfare bills (760/1879) between 1987 and 2012 were in the unorthodox form.*** Moreover, Figure 44 illustrates a strong correlation between a welfare law being "orthodox and universal" and

"particularistic and unorthodox". Specifically, 54.81% of universal welfare laws are orthodox ones in Taiwan, while roughly 70% of particularistic benefits are unorthodox ones—correlation is significant at 1% level.

<Figure 44> Social Policy Type and Electoral Target in Taiwan



As for the specific target of each social policy, there were more than 129 sub-categories of welfare in Taiwan. Table 22 includes the list of major welfare targets, and a clear difference is noticeable in the provided welfare form (each parenthesis includes the exact proportion of orthodox and unorthodox social policies in order and "higher orthodox" means social policies that have been disproportionately provided in that form). Similar to the Korean and Japanese cases, Taiwan yielded two noticeable patterns : i) Orthodox social policies tend to be targeted at general median voters, the marginalized, or particular occupations with high levels of public expectation; while ii) Unorthodox social policies are more likely to be focusing on particular economic actors.

<Table 22> Major Welfare Targets of Each Social Policy Type in Taiwan (%)

Higher Orthodox	Family (1.05, 0.09) army and veteran (3.95, 0.9) labour (9.35, 2.87) elderly (5.93, 0.63) children (2.64, 1.53) women (1.05, 0.18), foreigners (3.29, 0.99) Aborigines (3.56, 0.45) disabled (5.27, 1.17), victims of natural disasters, unjustified layoffs, etc.. (6.19, 063), students (2.24, 0.81), patients (2.77, 0.99)
Higher Unorthodox	Development and construction (0.4,1.71), transportation, shipping, and trade (0.39, 2.52), firms (0.26, 2.15), regions (0.66, 5.92), particular industry (0.26, 2.78), R&D (0.26, 0.72)

To corroborate the clientelistic linkage in Taiwan, I ran exactly the same regression model as I did for Korea and Japan. The results are shown in Table 23, and, as can be expected, a submitted welfare bill is more likely to be in the unorthodox form if it targets particular groups or geographical constituents. Specifically, holding other variables to the mean, the predicted probability increases from 27% to 64%. However, unlike Korea and Japan, there is not much statistical difference between left and right wing government with regards to utilizing unorthodox social policies.

<Table 23> Logistic Regression Results of Clientelistic Unorthodox Social Policies in Taiwan

	Model 1 Welfare or Not (All submitted bills)	**Model 2** Universal or Particularistic (All submitted welfare bills)
Clientelistic	1.6*** (0.07)	
Partisan		-0.02 (0.08)
Submission Entity (base: cabinet) Individual	0.09 (0.08)	0.25*** (0.08)
Party	0.19 (0.15)	0.1 (0.14)
Bill Format (base: enactment) Amendment	0.05 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.09)
Electoral Reform	0.06 (0.07)	-0.14* (0.08)
Success	0.3*** (007)	0.35*** (0.06)
GDP growth	0.002	0.002

	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.79*** (0.11)	0.31*** (0.12)
Observation	4692	4692

Note: ***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p<0.1

3. Power Dispersion and Welfare Politics: Mediating Influence of Electoral Rules

So far, as expected, the most similar country has shown highly similar results with regards to the two key scope conditions: non-ideological socio-economic issues and clientelistic party-voter linkage. What about the effect of power dispersion on welfare politics? Would that lead to more universal welfare expansion, as in Korea and Japan? As specified in the theoretical part, high power dispersion can lead to two different forms of welfare expansion. On the one hand, it can facilitate "race-to-the-top" by making parties and legislators focus on median voters (Schmidt, 2010; Wong, 2004). On the other hand, it tends to push a "divide-and-pacify" tendency (Persson and Tabellini, 2000) by incentivizing each party in the government to spend on its own group. Reconciling these contradictory predictions, Estevez-Abe (2008) argues that the particular welfare orientation during dispersed power periods (which she defines as coalition or minority government) can be mediated by the type of electoral rule. She then specifies that under Japan's MMD-SNTV rule, welfare expansion tended to be more particularistic, while it became more universalistic after the 1994 electoral reform switched to a mixed member system. The difference between MMD-SNTV and mixed-member rule on welfare expansion type can be understood given the notoriously high personalization tendency of the MMD-SNTV rule (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005).


For Korea and Japan, the "race-to-the-top" mechanism became the prime driver of welfare politics as power dispersed, as both countries functioned under strong majoritarian electoral rules for most of the period. That is, even before the electoral reform, Korea already had a strong majoritarian electoral rule, distributing PR tier seats based on the proportion of seats a major party received in the SMD tier. The transition to the two-tiered system in 2004 only reserved 1/6 of the total seats for the PR tier, thus maintaining predominantly majoritarian inclination. The Japanese case is similar to Taiwan in the sense that it had MMD-SNTV rule

before the electoral reform. But the reform itself was conducted at a much earlier stage, in 1994. Moreover, even with 2/5 of the total seats reserved for the PR tier, the twin facts of allowing any member to be dual-listed, and using the PR tier to select the "best losers" in the SMD tier created a highly majoritarian bias. In contrast, we can expect more "divide and pacify" type welfare politics along with the dispersion of power from the Taiwanese case. This is likely because the country spent more than 80% of the time between 1987 and 2012 under the MMD-SNTV rule. We can confirm this expectation with the changing welfare legislation pattern between low and high power dispersion periods.

3.1. Power Dispersion and Welfare Legislation Patterns

The legislation pattern in Figure 45 clearly confirms our expectation derived from the mediating influence of electoral rule. Both the proportion of enacted universal welfare laws[93], and their success ratio go down substantially as we move from low-dispersion level to high-dispersion level.


<Figure 45> Proportion and Success Ratio of Universal Welfare Bills by Power Dispersion Levels in Taiwan



[93] Here universal and particularistic welfare laws are mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive. Therefore, the proportion of particularistic welfare in each power dispersion period can be derived from subtracting a specific proportion of universal welfare laws from 100%.

To verify whether the legislation pattern difference above is meaningful, I examined both the significance and direction of enacted welfare bills. Similar to Korea and Japan, most of the enacted bills in Taiwan were above medium-level significance and not systematically related to a particular dispersion level. Likewise, around 85% of the total enacted welfare bills concerned expansion, indicating the expansionary welfare politics of Taiwan.

<Figure 46> Significance and Direction of Welfare Laws by Power Dispersion Level in Taiwan



Using the logistic regression analysis, the robustness of pattern is tested based on almost the exact same control variables as Korea and Japan. Corroborating our expectation, the direction of power dispersion effect now turned negative for both the proportion and success ratio (Model 1, 2, and 3). However, only success ratio turned out to be statistically significant (at 1% level). As for the predicted probability, the likelihood of a submitted bill being welfare decreases from 34% to 27% as we move from level 0 power dispersion to level 7, while a submitted welfare bill being universal decreases from 54% to 48% for the equivalent change. The degree of predicted probability in the success rate dropped from 66% to 11%

<Table 24> Logistic Regression Results on the Effect of Power Dispersion in Taiwan

	Model 1: Universal or Particularistic (All Enacted Welfare Bills)	**Model 2: Universal or Particularistic (All Submitted Welfare Bills)**	**Model 3: Success of Failure (All Submitted Universal Welfare Bills)**
Power dispersion	-0.007 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.4*** (0.1)
Observations	1770	4692	2426

Note: ***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p<0.1

To further corroborate the mediating influence of electoral rules, I ran a separate regression with Japan between the period before and after the electoral reform. As can be expected, the combined impact of the MMD+SNTV rule with power dispersion on type of welfare expansion was quite clear. As Table 25 shows, higher power dispersion did not lead to a submitted welfare bill being more universal prior to the electoral rule reform (Model 1). This is quite a contrast to the clearly positive effect of power dispersion level on universal welfare in Model 2. Similar to Taiwan, the power dispersion level was negatively related to the success of universal welfare bills prior to the electoral reform, but changed into the positive direction afterwards (Model 3 and Model 4). Lending further credence to my argument, after the electoral reform, the situation changed to what the logic of majoritarian electoral rules would predict.

<Table 25> Logistic Regression Results Before and After the Electoral Reform in Japan

	Before Reform	After Reform	Before Reform	After Reform
	Model 1: Universal or Particular (all submitted welfare bills)	**Model 2: Universal or Particular (all submitted welfare bills)**	**Model 3: Universal Successful (all submitted universal welfare bills)**	**Model 4: Universal Successful (all submitted welfare bills)**
Power dispersion	0.03 (0.08)	0.014*** (0.05)	-0.09 (0.19)	0.34*** (0.2)
Observations	667	1587	225	759

Note: ***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p<0.1

3.2. Narratives of Welfare Politics in Taiwan

So far, analyses have presented evidence showing that two scope conditions of welfare politics in Korea and Japan also exist in Taiwan and, within this context, welfare expansion tended to be more particularistic during the periods of power dispersion. Finally, I will examine whether these findings resonate with stories based on real parties, politicians, bureaucrats, and other important political actors shaping welfare politics like journalists or NGOs. The primary purpose of this part is to investigate whether the primary political actors in welfare politics have acted according to the key patterns legislation data have presented in this chapter: the more power gets dispersed, the more party and individual legislators focus on welfare issues in general and particularistic welfare issues in particular. Moreover, complementing the minimized role of trade unions and left-wing parties, there had to be key political actor/actors who played an indispensable role in welfare expansion in Taiwan. Going beyond the confirmation of theory, I will use this part to find out other possible mechanisms at work and other events affecting power dispersion level aside from the four dimensions I pointed out so far.

The distinction of periods (1987-1997; 1998-2007; 2008-2012) and selection of major pieces of welfare legislation (11 orthodox welfare laws) are based on the same criteria I used for Korea and Japan in the previous chapter.

3.2.1. The 1987-2000 period

Unlike the bottom-up radical Korean democratic transition which was spearheaded by an active anti-authoritarian movement, Taiwan has seen rather gradual top-down democratization after the KMT lifted the martial law in 1987. As a result of this, the first direct democratic election happened was in 1992 (a general election), and there had been some welfare-related concessions made by the ruling KMT to the public like in the case of Korea during the democratization process.

For example, indicating that the democratization is a form of power dispersion, the KMT took several measures like extending health insurance to cover farmers in 1985 over several years or forming a task-force team to consider single-payer health insurance system in 1988 (Wong, 2004; Ku, 1997). In contrast, the central-left wing DPP put more political emphasis on national identity and independence issues, rather than welfare issues until it suffered a disastrous electoral defeat in 1991 (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008). From the point of the theory I described, this was an irrational move as an opposition party considering that it was not in a politically stable position to touch on highly sensitive issues.

Realizing that the party should use now a different strategy, the DPP decided to tap into a relatively unchartered electoral terrain expected to yield high levels of political benefits. That is, for the first time, the DPP included a wide range of welfare promises like pensions, housing subsidies, expanded social assistance (ibid.) to its 1993 White Paper. This formed the first official attempt to bring welfare issues at the core of national-level electoral competition in Taiwan. Although there had not been any power dispersion level change until 1998—based on the four criteria I specified elsewhere—this confirms that the ***wax and wane of welfare politics can also be explained by other political factors dispersing power such as changes in the proportion of seat between parties, the outcome of executive elections, e.g. mayor or governor, in major cities, or lame-duck period of the president.***

For the first half of the 1990s, welfare politics had revolved around old-age pension and health-care insurance; and this was sparked by the increasing power dispersion caused by results of local-level executive elections. Specifically, in preparing for the executive elections between 1993 and 1994, DPP candidates pledged to offer pension to the elderly while the KMT did not attempt to co-opt this issue at the party level (although some threatened candidates like Huang Pa-ye in Kaohsiung County did so in attempts to outbid the DPP candidate) (Fell, 2004). Despite the fact that they could not fund the pension due to the lack of central-government support later, many DPP candidates were elected. After this, the KMT recognized the electoral importance of welfare issues and hi-jacked national health insurance from the DPP and fast-tracked the legislative process by submitting a bill at the end of 1993 and completed the third reading in the summer of 1994 after only two or three days of debate. Going further, in campaigning for the 1995 general election, the legislation came into effect in 1995 five years earlier than the KMT had originally planned in 1989 (ibid.). As rightly pointed out by DPP legislator Chen chi-mai, the KMT, so called a right-wing party, did something close to the British Labour Party (ibid.).

The high public satisfaction rate of the NHI helped the KMT to realize the importance of welfare issues and began to direct its attention to old-age pension in the 1997 Taipei County Municipal election. The party then promised to pay NT$5000 to people over age 65, an idea backed by the president Lee Tung hui. However, due to the opposition within the party and government, the old-age pension bill failed to materialise at the national level. The issue then became owned by the DPP (Fell, 2005) and the KMT experienced a serious electoral loss in the 1997 and 1998 local elections. Based on the power dispersion logic, this should have sparked even more severe welfare competition, which is what was observed.

Riding on the electoral momentum created by welfare promises, in the run up to the 2000 presidential election, DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bien came up with the idea of a comprehensive welfare package including theretofore marginalized family and labour welfare.

First is a catchy family-welfare benefit called “3-3-3 plan” (the policy was designed to hand out NT$3000 a month to the elderly, to subsidize mortgages at 3 % interest-rate to first-time home buyers, and entailed the government sponsoring healthcare for children below age 3). Coupled with the 3-3-3 plan Chen also promised “5-5-5 plan” for women which included increasing the number of babysitter by 50%, reducing women’s burden on family care by 50 percent, and raising the female employment by 50 %. To address welfare for workers, Chen

pledged to create 100, 000 job opportunities and implement a 44-hour workweek by 2002 (Lin and Chou, 2007). Although the social welfare issue was high on the agenda for the KMT, the presidential candidate Lien Chan focused on a rather passive strategy like self-praising the successful implementation of the previous NHI law by the KMT or attacking DPP's reckless welfare expansion promises as vote buying and criticizing previous failures like the old age allowance. Regarding this, another independent presidential candidate, James Soong, criticized Lien for his inaction on social welfare in a televised debate (Taipei Times, 2002).

However, as can be expected from the mediating influence of electoral rule, power dispersion caused by a series of electoral losses not only incentivized parties to push universal welfare benefits but also particularistic welfare benefits. That is, intensified electoral competition under MMD+SNTV rule made the ruling KMT to focus on construction projects such as Taipei metro project or the Six Year Development Plan in the early 1990s. Relatedly, the level of agricultural protection has risen rapidly during this period (Boestel et al., 2013). As noted by Fell (2005), the KMT-local faction patron client relationship was maintained by local executives considerable power over particularistic welfare benefits. This process often involved gangsters in politics and clientelisitc activities ranged from insider trading on the stock exchanges, big public construction projects, business licences, and military purchases (ibid.)

3.2.2. The 2000-2008 period

In the end, the DPP's hard work came to fruition and the party won the Taiwanese presidential elections. And as the first ever central left-wing government enjoying honey-moon period, this could be the best chance to expand welfare benefits to median voters and the marginalised. However, their welfare ideals were deprioritised (Wong, 2004; Ku and Aspalter, 2008) as Chen came into power and announced, at a press conference in September, "Social welfare can be delayed, but economic development cannot be" (Wong, 2004). As a result, its signature 3-3-3 plan (hand out NT$3000 a month to the elderly, subsidize mortgages at a 3 % interest-rate to first-time home buyers, and entailed the government sponsoring healthcare for children below age 3) had to be postponed and only NT$ 2.8billion was allocated for it from the planned NT$92.3 billion increase (Taipei Times 2000b).

Unfortunate circumstances like the large-scale earthquake on September 21 1999 claiming more than 4000 lives and taking away a large amount of public money for disaster relief, the unemployment rate hitting all-time low, or the rapid fall of the stock-market value contributed to this change. However, the DPP was opportunistic just like its rival KMT regarding welfare issues if one considers the fiscal implication of the 3-3-3 plan and what other welfare/non-welfare things Chen had prioritised. For instance, based on Lin and Chou's estimation (Fell, 2000), the free medical care for children under three would cost NT$1.7 billion while a monthly allowance of NT$3000 would require an annual budget of NT$16 billion. However, Chen did not give a clear financial planning for this let alone mention raising taxes to foot the bill. For this reason, the monthly allowance to the elderly had to be dropped in August 2000.

Instead, in line with the theoretical expectation, both sensitive first-cleavage issues and particularistic welfare benefits received more political attention. For instance, more particularistic laws were enacted favouring retired civil servants and excluding ordinance workers (Taipei Times, 2002). Furthermore, from a NT$92.3 billion budget increase in 2001, NT$21 billion was used to raise salaries for the civil servants, soldiers, and teachers (Taipei Times 2000b). Besides, the president used his precious political capital on issues like the installation of a fourth nuclear power plant or cross-strait economic and trade policy at the beginning of this term. The mood was well captured by a *Taipei Times* article "The DPP is sacrificing welfare for the economy".

Between 2004 and 2008, a similar pattern has recurred in Taiwan: increases in both universal and particularistic benefits before key elections while more emphasis on first-cleavage issues during politically stable periods. First, in the run up to the 2004 presidential election, both parties continued trying to win the heart of median voters with a wide range of universal welfare benefits. Among others, efforts on women and elderly welfare merit our attention. Ahead of Women's day in 2003, both parties stressed the importance of women's welfare by i) establishing a group of women's campaigners (KMT) and ii) opening care centre for female DPP legislators (DPP). Likewise, both presidential candidates Chen Shui-bian and Lien Chan endorsed the white paper on welfare for the elderly—drafted by the non-profit League of Welfare Improvement for Older People in March 2004. Specifically, Chen pointed out that without the boycott of the KMT, the DPP's pension scheme could have come into effect with the profit generated from the public lottery (Taipei Times, 2003). For the KMT,

on behalf of Lien, legislative speaker Wang said the current benefit NT$3000 could be raised to NT$8900 in case Lin was elected. This is quite a U-turn considering that until then, the KMT had derided DPP's old age pension as a vote-buying initiative.

In the end, President Chen was re-elected in March 2004 but the previous pattern recurred. That is, instead of channelling his political energy towards welfare-related issues, the DPP government proposed a NT$610 million arms procurement plan with the US—eight diesel-powered submarines, 12 P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, and six PAC-3 Patriot anti-missile batteries—leading thousands of angry protestors to march on Taipei City (Taipei Times, 2005). Despite the President Chen's assurance that this procurement would not affect the nation's social welfare budget, the Chairman of KMT Lien, at the Party Congress, did not miss this chance by pointing out that "the government should cut most of arms procurement budget and allocate money to education and social welfare".

Along with universal welfare benefits, as the logic of power dispersion under MMD-SNTV predicts, numerous particularistic/unorthodox were designed and implemented with further power dispersion in Taiwan between December 2004 and March 2008. The most remarkable measure was the increase of the monthly pension for elderly farmers and fishermen from NT$4000 to NT$5000 passed on December 2005. This was estimated to benefit 710,000 farmers and fishermen costing NT$23 billion per year (Taipei Times, 2005). Both the DPP and KMT went a step further and increased this pension from NT$5000 to NT$6000 after holding an extra legislative session in June 2007, notwithstanding criticism from the Social Welfare Association of Taiwan and academics about its unfair nature (Taipei Times 2007), clearly the more important thing for legislators and presidential candidates were upcoming elections—both presidential and general—in 2008. Another noteworthy target for particularistic welfare benefits was aboriginals. In addition to a law establishing employment quotas for Aborigines at every level of government in 2001, a pension bill was passed in 2002, setting the age requirement for Aborigine citizens to draw their pensions at 55 (a whole decade earlier than other citizens). Furthermore, laws passed in 2003 recognized the autonomy of Aborigines, enabling the region to preserve their unique culture, language and land, and to set another mandatory quota for 5 %of port labourers being aborigines. After witnessing continuous vote-buying from politicians across party lines for several years, in April 2007, several civic groups representing the welfare of underprivileged people asked politicians to "refrain from casually proposing increases in subsidies to elderly farmers,

elderly citizens and elderly Aborigines [as a form of electioneering]", to no avail. Based on their analysis of 16 bills proposed by legislators, the political escalation reached the point of raising the monthly subsidies to elderly farmers from NT$5000 to NT$15000 and to elderly Aborigines from NT$3000 to NT$10000.

On the unorthodox social policy front, president Chen did not hesitate to expand construction projects or create public service jobs to boost employment. The president earmarked NT$50 billion for public construction projects and used NT$20 billion to create 750,000 public service jobs in 2004 (Lin and Chou, 2007). Going further, as a form of active labour market policy, the government constantly relaxed labour regulation in the hopes of increasing female or/and part-time workers. The KMT was no exception in using unorthodox social policies to curry favour to its political supporters. The most exemplary attempt was to compensate veterans by either requiring the government to compensate veterans accepting house renovation plans during 1988 and 1993 (totalling NT$2.6 billion) or paying renovation fees of 430,000 veterans living outside the military communities (costing NT$1.5 trillion) by submitting relevant bills in January 2007.

3.2.3. The 2008-2012 period

One significant event singling 2008 out from the period preceding it is that the general election took place with a new electoral rule. Just like Japan, Taiwan dropped its notorious MMD+SNTV system and instead adopted Mixed Member Majoritarian electoral rule letting people vote at both the district and party tier—the proportion of PR tier is roughly 30% (compared to 16% in Korea and 40% in Japan). In addition, the number of total legislators was halved from 225 to 113. Following the structural logic of new electoral rule bias, the system now should reduce the level of intra-party competition and make legislators pay more attention to universal benefits for median voters than particular ones. And this indeed was the case. This is particularly surprising given the concentration of power between 2008 and 2012 and the return to power of a central-right wing government led by president Ma-ying jiu.

Unlike the MMD and SNTV rule, the government started to take median voters such as women, young couples, employees, or consumers more seriously. To give a brief sense of

this increase with the legislation pattern, both the number and proportion of universal welfare bills had increased from 582 to 890 (and 49% to 57% for the proportion from the total welfare bills) during the legislative session after the electoral reform (2009-2012) compared to the session prior to it (2004-2008). As for the concrete examples, DPP premier Liu announced he would set a 60% replacement rate for workers taking unpaid leave in June 2008; the KMT went as far as offering 80%. The KMT also submitted long-term care legislation in 2008 which is designed to factor in carers' needs. Considering the fact that women have conventionally been in charge of childcare and the elderly, women can be the primary beneficiaries of these attempts. These measures are a step forward for women's welfare in comparison to the pre-2008 period during which most legislative attempts only went as far as passing the basic framework act or groundwork such as establishing organizations to promote women's welfare. Other noteworthy welfare measures targeted at median voters include the government issuing NT$3600 worth of consumer voucher for every citizen in November 2008 or allowing an extra 7000 young people to apply for the government's preferential interest rate home loan program in May 2009. On a more strategic level, both KMT and DPP further institutionalized welfare issues by deciding to nominate a wide array of welfare experts or representatives, e.g. child experts, nurses, doctors, or the disabled, to the PR tier of general elections. As borne out by the legislation pattern evidence after 2008, this has had a positive effect on extending the range of welfare spotlight to the marginalized. A senior staff member working for a KMT legislator who was elected through this nomination process pointed out "MPs have a natural inclination to focus on big issues like pension and health care but less on things like rare disease or foreign workers. That's because it does not bring money nor votes to them. For this, there should be consistent attention and painstaking persuasion efforts by someone who cares and knows about them". With regards to specific legislative strategies, he went further and noted "if a welfare bill gets too much saliency, it inevitably becomes a focal point of electoral competition between major parties. So it is often better to remain issues as low key and get necessary cross-party supports". This remark directly resonates with one of the micro-mechanisms of conciliatory race-to-the top welfare politics I specified in the theory part.

Although not captured by the four indicators of power dispersion, January 2010 was an important month which changed the political dynamics of Taiwan. The change was due to landslide victory by the opposition DPP in all three by-elections seats in Taoyuan, Taichung, and Taitung counties. This had a symbolic significance since it was the first-ever DPP victory

in Taitung, and the Taoyuan region was a KMT stronghold (Taipei times, 2010). Unexpected victory like this can be interpreted as a mid-term judgement and tend to disperse the power structure of the ruling party. A senior research specializing in Taiwanese Politics at Academia SINICA explains this in the following way: "important local level elections have nation-wide implications and serve as a referendum for the current government". After this defeat, going beyond the median voters, the ruling party KMT also began to dole out welfare benefits to marginalised groups preparing for the future elections. For instance, the "no child left hungry" program was launched in March 2010 by the Ministry of Education to enable disadvantaged schoolchildren to receive breakfast and dinner in the form of emergency relief. In a similar vein, the amendment to the Act on Assisting Families in Special Situations extended tax deductions to economically disadvantaged students in November 2011. However the most significant manoeuvre was Executive Yuan's attempt to redefine the poverty level by amending the Social Assistance Act in September 2010. This defined people living in poverty as below 60 percent of the median disposable income per capita per month in a given residential area and made 52,000 people more eligible for social assistance.

In addition to a more aggressive expansion of universal welfare benefits, the post-2008 era features several attempts to cut down particularistic benefits. Under the new electoral rule, particularistic groups are clearly of less political significance than under the old model and some measures taken by the KMT illustrates this point. For example, in September 2011, Minister Chen Wu-hsiung tried to exclude rich farmers from the farmer' pension scheme on the ground that the national pension and veterans' pensions also exclude the rich. Another interesting example is KMT Premier Sean Chen's attempt to limit the coverage of year-end pension benefits for government retirees who receive a monthly pension of less than NT$20,000 in December 2012. Although the premier failed to win the support from his own party, such a move would have been unthinkable under the old electoral rule, but has become a rational option since 2008 especially if a rolling back of particular groups' welfare benefit can be perceived by the general public as addressing inequality and injustice.

Finally, in addition to the median-voter oriented welfare expansion I want to point out the political difficulty of cutting back popular universal welfare benefits—the other complementary side of supporting the constant expansion trend in Taiwan. Attempts to save the cash-strapped NHI program have continued since 2009 but could not reach any substantial agreement between major stakeholders. In February 2009, a major reform was

devised by the ministry of Health, known as the 1.5 generation NHI act, which was designed to affect 2.2 million people by making NHI premium calculation going beyond salary and include year-end bonuses, stocks, dividends, bank interest, and rent. However, the bill was shelved by the minister of Health on the ground that individuals and businesses are feeling pressure from the global economic downturn after the premier expressed concern to the Health department about the potential negative public response. Similarly, in August 2010, the second generation health plan was launched, which takes into account total household income rather than an individual's salary in calculating premiums. However, there had been many dissenting opinions about the specifics with-in both the KMT and DPP so the bill had to be postponed until December.

Similar to Korea and Japan, it should be noted that NGOs have been at the centre of pushing welfare benefits in Taiwan. For instance, NGOs blocked NHI privatization and the premium increase bill in 1997 by forming a broad political alliance over 200 NGOs (Wong, 2004). Just like in Korea, lacking a strong social-democratic party or politically united trade union, NGOs have formed issue-by-issue coalitions with various political actors such as academics, bureaucrats, politicians, or journalists. As an unintended consequence, their role started to be recognised during the 1999 earthquake recovery period when NGOs proved to the public how useful they can be. This pattern is redolent of the situation in Japan after the 1995 Kobe Earthquake. The fact that KMT even including representatives from NGO in the PR tier in 2012 general election is a clear manifestation of their growing importance. Similar to the Korean case, Taiwan has welfare advocacy NGOs whose primary interest lies in universal welfare state. However, due to the small size of each NGO—on average with 10 members or less—they often formed a coalition, e.g. National Health Insurance Civil Surveillance Alliance and acted together for important universal welfare benefits (in some cases, four to five NGOs share the same space near the Legislative Yuan).

4. Presidentialism and Welfare Politics

The first half of cross-sectional analysis has presented evidence showing the mediating influence of electoral rule in Taiwan: highly candidate-centred MMD-SNTV electoral rule in Taiwan incentivized parties and legislators to focus on both universal and particularistic

benefits (but more towards particularistic ones) during power dispersion periods. However, beyond the mediating influence of electoral rule in shaping the type of welfare benefits, a careful observer might have noticed that there are not negligible differences between the three nations in the degree of welfare and engagement of relevant political actors. Bearing this difference in mind, ***the second half of cross-sectional analysis aims to account for the cross-national difference in the degree of welfare expansion by focusing on executive and legislative relations.*** This part does not bear direct relevance to the core theory put forward in the introduction and highly exploratory given there have not been any attempt in either welfare or presidential studies to explain welfare variation with differences in constitutional structure from most similar cases. However, I decided to include this cross-sectional analysis since it is another form of important institutional effect clearly visible under the wider contexts of welfare politics I specified in the theory part: multiple cleavages, multiple party-voter linkages, and multiple welfare forms. In addition, the welfare variations between the three countries are interesting in their own right.

As will be clearly shown by the results, Korea and Taiwan are moving more rapidly towards a generous and universal welfare state than Japan based on more active welfare politics. I argue that the faster and more universal welfare expansion was possible in Korea and Taiwan due to increasingly independent, well-resourced, and diverse legislators who saw social welfare issues as unchartered terrain in the competitive political marketplace. Legislators in Korea and Taiwan could afford to be welfare entrepreneurial, owing to the structural incentives and opportunities provided by each country's constitutional structure—presidentialism and semi-presidentialism—and the unique political contexts of three countries creating pro-welfare bias. And this tendency tended to be clearer as democratic consolidation (more transparency and accountability) proceeds. As noted by Samuels and Shugart (2010), this happens because presidential constitutions promote parties to be more presidentialized which often divides parties internally since each member can be motivated by different political incentives.

To give a sense of cross-national difference in welfare politics, let me begin by presenting a data showing the trend of each country's legislative competition on three key measures of national insurance. As you can see, Table 26 summarizes how many welfare bills with the same legal title have been submitted during the six-year time intervals between 1995 and

2012; and the data indicate that welfare issues have become progressively more popular in Korea and Taiwan.

<Table 26> Overlapping Sponsorship Timing of Key Social Insurance Bills: 1995-2012

		1995-2000	2001-2006	2007-2012
Employment/Labour Insurance	Korea	8	28	69
	Japan	2	3	7
	Taiwan	17	33	87
National Health Insurance	Korea	12	57	103
	Japan	5	5	2
	Taiwan	39	36	19
National Pension	Korea	12	37	80
	Japan	2	4	15
	Taiwan	4	2	53

In addition, the qualitative dimension of welfare expansion tells a similar story: since 1990 faster and more extensive increases can be observed in Korea and Taiwan, compared to Japan (Social Security Administration, 2013). A case in point is the consolidation of National Health Insurance: Korea and Taiwan developed universal programmes in the 1990s but went beyond Japan by further integrating fragmented insurance funds into a single national agency, thereby increasing administrative efficiency as well as the financial capacity for redistribution (Kwon, 2009)[94]. Moreover, comparing the long-term care insurance bills in Korea and Japan (the fifth public insurance bill in both countries) at the time of initial enactment—2007 and 1996 respectively—clearly show a more universal quality of the Korean one: it pooled the risk from wider population by including all citizens as recipients and having nation-wide government agency as an insurer. In contrast, only people aged above 40 were eligible for the benefits in Japan and each local municipality

[94] For instance, in September 1995, the National Federation of Health Insurance in Japan reported that more than half of nation's 1815 health insurance unions for large companies are in the red (Japan Times, 1995)

was in charge of the service as an insurer. As will be presented later, the cross-national differences go beyond just these popular welfare bills.

The rest of this chapter will proceeds as follows. First, after a brief introduction of the previous literature on presidentialism and welfare states, I point out two major limitations that need to be addressed. Second, drawing insights from both welfare studies and presidential studies, I will specify how two essential components of presidentialism—separate elections and fixed term mandates—incentivized individual legislators in Korea and Taiwan to be more independent and diverse and led them to become a major contributor of welfare expansion. Third, both quantitative and qualitative evidence will be presented. The quantitative part will present legislation pattern evidence which shows that individual legislators in Korea and Taiwan were at the centre of sponsoring welfare bills in general and universal welfare bills in particular; complementing this, the qualitative evidence is based on elite interviews and will demonstrate that individual legislators' independence, diversity, and roles in race-to-the top welfare politics in Korea and Taiwan. Going further, as a method of confirming convergent validity, the media content analysis section will show there is a stronger correlation between the number of welfare-related newspaper articles and welfare bills over time in Korea and Taiwan than in Japan.

4.1. Presidential Studies and Welfare State

Given the many ways of defining presidential/semi-presidential/parliamentary regimes (Lijphart 2012; Elgie, 1999), I want to begin by clarifying that this project follows the distinction made by Samuels and Shugart (2010). That is, the three regime types can be distinguished from each other depending on the origin and survival of the head of government, according to i) whether the head of government is popularly elected, either directly or via a popularly elected presidential electoral college, and ii) whether the head of government's position is based on legislative confidence. A regime can be categorized as "semi-presidential" if it satisfies both conditions, while it is "presidential" (directly elected head of government for a fixed term) or "parliamentary" (legislature-selected head of government and based on vote of confidence) if it just satisfies one.

So far, only a few works have attempted to directly examine the relation between constitutional structure and welfare state type. Gerring et al. (2008)'s work show that parliamentarism is more associated with higher levels of human development, longer life expectancy, and lower levels of infant mortality. This has resonated with empirical findings from Persson and Tabellini (2001) and Persson et al. (2000) which show, based on spending data, that presidential regimes tend to redistribute more to powerful minorities and under-provide public-goods such as social security and welfare programs. Likewise, in his seminar work "Patterns of Democracy", Lijphart (2012) reports that consensual democracies fared better than majoritarian democracies (which includes parliamentarism and presidentialism as one key dimension) when it comes to welfare outcomes such as rich-poor ratio, family policy, corruption index, and women's representation. However, despite recognizing the fact that parliamentary systems are more likely to provide policies aimed at broad national constituencies, Shugart (1999)'s analysis shows a more nuanced empirical finding: for less-developed countries lacking nationally oriented parties, establishing a nation-wide presidential executive can facilitate the provision of collective goods.

Although there has not been much research conducted on the relationship between presidents and the welfare state, empirical works so far show, in general, that ***having a presidential regime is detrimental to a universal and generous welfare state***. However, these findings should be interpreted with caution. First, no research to date has clearly specified how key defining aspects of constitutional regime affect preferences and strategies of major political actors and then lead to this observed difference. That is, students of presidential studies have yet to compare individual-level actors' behaviour, e.g. legislators and bureaucrats, between different constitutional regimes and demonstrate how this led to varying degrees of welfare outcomes. This problem has been aggravated by researchers using different time periods, countries, methods, and welfare state-related proxies (Elgie, 2016). For instance, measured through expenditure on transportation, education, police, and health, Saha (2007)'s work concludes there is not much difference between presidential and parliamentary regimes in providing public goods. Therefore, it is too early to establish a clear causal linkage.

Second, political contexts of observed regime effects on welfare outcome have been under-specified. As can be clear from the context-specific finding of Shugart's analysis on presidentialism in less developed countries (1999), parliamentary and presidential democracies show varying strengths and weaknesses contingent on different cultural, socio-

economical, and historical contexts (Gerring et al., 2008) or along different policy dimensions (Weaver, and Rockman, 1993). For instance, as Elgie (2005) pointed out, the second-wave of presidential studies have repeatedly demonstrated that other institutional factors such as electoral system, party system, or government formation rules interact with constitutional regime type and produce different outcomes (Travits, 2009; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring, 1993). Going further, Cheibub et al. (2013) demonstrate that where and when the constitution was written is more useful in understanding the strengths of executive and legislature in a particular country than whether one country has a presidential or parliamentary system. Works testing regime effects on the welfare state tend to cover a large number of countries over an extended period, e.g. Persson and Tabellini's work covers 60 countries between 1960 and 1998, so one could not specify in their models the political contexts and how they interact with presidential/semi-presidential/parliamentary regime type to produce particular outcomes.

In an attempt to overcome these shortcomings, I will specify how two key defining attributes of constitutional regimes incentivize legislators—one of the key political actors—to be independent and entrepreneurial, to a different extent.

4.2. Effect of Legislative Independence and Diversity

4.2.1. Legislative Independence and Diversity

As rightly pointed out by Cheibub et al. (2013), if we were to test the effect of executive-legislative relationship, any analysis should be able to directly link how two defining attributes—assembly confidence and popularly elected head of state—lead to a particular outcome. In other words, we should not associate elective attributes such as executive decree, emergency powers, executive veto, or cabinet appointment with particular constitutional regimes, and use these factors to account for variations in certain outcomes[95].

[95] In their extensive research of 826 national constitutions between 1789 and 2006, Cheibu et al (2013) found that these optional characteristics are only loosely related to particular regime type. However, scholars have stereotyped particular optional attributes onto presidential/parliamentary

The project here puts the causal effect of two defining attributes at the centre of analysis and draws insights directly from a point made by Samuels and Shugart (2011:6): "the separation of powers fundamentally shapes parties' organizational and behavioural characteristics, in ways that are distinct from the organization and behaviour of parties in parliamentary systems". Two crucial organizational and behavioural characteristics stemming from the separation of origin and survival are legislators' independence and preference heterogeneity.

Regarding the separation of survival, the fixed term mandate for the president and for legislators facilitates legislative independence. As a result, in presidential systems both the administrative and legislative branches conduct legislative activity more actively than in parliamentary systems (Olson, 1994; Vogel, 1993). The underlying logic behind this has to do with the incentive mechanisms of each. In a presidential system, both the president and legislators are guaranteed for a fixed term. Hence, within a given term, legislative activity by either side cannot be fundamentally checked by threatening their political life. For instance, in both pure and semi-presidential systems, parties cannot remove a president elected with a fixed term mandate, either for ineffectiveness or for other worse reasons (Samuels and Shugart, 2010). In the case of pure presidentialism, the president cannot threaten elected legislators' political lives during their term. In contrast, in a parliamentary system, the government always has to consider a "no-confidence motion" by the legislative branch, and the legislative branch should bear in mind the possibility of "parliamentary dissolution" by the prime-minister calling for a new election; hence, it is not easy to submit bills that are expected to face severe opposition from another branch. For this reason, the confidence mechanism is known to raise the overall level of party discipline in parliamentary democracies (Cheibub, 2007). In addition to the "fixed term" factor, more independence is given to legislators in the presidential system due to the principle of "separation of powers". Since the checks and balances is the central pillar upholding this principle, individual members in the legislative branch and the head of government in the executive branch are generally better resourced in presidential regimes—in terms of staffs and funding—than their parliamentary counterparts (Malamud, 2001).

In addition to the separation of survival, the separate electoral origins of the executive and legislative branches (even if of the same party) means that each can be motivated by

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regime, e.g. arguing that veto power is typical of presidential constitutions (Tsebelis, 2002; Shugart and Carey, 1992).

different political incentives in presidential systems. Namely, legislators and the president may be running for election for different reasons, to respond to different policy demands (Shugart and Samuels, 2010). Empirical evidence shows that institutional factors such as electoral cycle between general and presidential election (concurrent or not), electoral formula (party or candidate centred), or legislative congruence between president and legislators' constituency (nation-wide or regional) can further amplify the difference (Shugart, 1999; Shugart and Carey, 1992). As a result, a president wanting to represent nation-wide median voters can have a different preference from median members of her party. Higher proportions of non-partisan ministers and various career paths of the president (before and after her term) in presidential systems are symptomatic of heterogeneous preferences, going beyond the ruling party (Shugart and Samuels, 2010; Neto and Samuels, 2011)

Going further, preference heterogeneity in presidentialism can further increase when the president detaches herself with the ruling party, or during lame-duck periods. For instance, the president can resign from the leadership of the ruling party for the sake of political neutrality. Should this occur, the president loses essential authorities such as election nomination or party fund appropriation. This will then lower the level of party discipline and open legislators to be influenced by other stakeholders, ranging from local constituents, governors, and even super-national entities like EU parties (Carey, 2009). Similarly, during the lame-duck period, ruling party members can distance themselves from the current president and approach potential presidential candidates. This tendency has been empirically confirmed with roll-call vote behaviour in the US, which demonstrates higher levels of ideological and participatory shirking during the lame-duck sessions than regular sessions (Nokken, 2013).

By all means, party discipline can be lowered and individual legislators can have diverging preferences in parliamentary democracies, based on many factors like personalized electoral rules, coalition/minority government periods, decentralized campaign funding, or the existence of open primary elections. However, unlike in presidential democracies, centrifugal tendencies cannot be attributed to factors related to different electoral origins (in parliamentary democracies). Therefore, *ceteris paribus*, we can expect higher levels of preference difference between the head of government, ruling party, and individual legislators in presidential/semi-presidential democracies.

4.2.2. Expected Results

In a separation-of-powers system, high levels of legislator independence and preference diversity assure more points of access and a space for new policy ideas (Gerring et al., 2008). In our two presidential cases, increasing legislative transparency and monitoring practices by external observers provide a breeding ground for independent legislators to be policy entrepreneurs. Along with the growing influence of media, being able to observe "who introduce certain bills supported by which other legislators and who accept or reject them based on what grounds during the legislative process" can lead to greater competition among legislators. And as rightly noted by Eaton (2000: 363), we can expect higher levels of transparency in presidential systems where a bill must work its way through separately elected branches. Under these political circumstances, what would be favourable policy choices among legislators? As specified in the chapters testing the scope conditions, in the three countries, there has been great demand for more generous and universal welfare benefits among the public, and social welfare issues have not been an ideologically polarizing dimension between the left and right-wing parties. In other words, in the competitive political marketplace, social welfare issues have been unchartered terrain not "owned" by any political force. ***Considering the growing political demand by median voters and high visibility of welfare issues, it is reasonable to think that providing generous and universal social benefits has increasingly become a politically appealing area for policy entrepreneurs.*** This will be a particularly tempting choice for young individual legislators without strong political base such as organized support groups or local constituents.

To summarize, under the specified East Asian political contexts, we should expect to observe legislators from across the political spectrum to focus on welfare benefits more in Korea and Taiwan than in the Japanese counterpart. This tendency should be particularly clear for universal welfare benefits, which directly target median voters.

<Figure 47> Summary of Constitutional Structure Effect on Welfare Politics




Figure 47 illustrates the central causal claim this project makes, and it is evidently clear why we can observe more generous and universal welfare expansion in presidential/semi-presidential Korea/Taiwan during our period of observation than in parliamentary Japan. However, ***how can we distinguish the expected effect between presidential Korea and semi-presidential Taiwan?*** Can we expect almost similar degrees of welfare expansion between the two, or more from one (and why)? To derive accurate expectations, let us examine each country's institutional details.

According to the definition specified at the introduction, Korea clearly falls into the presidential regime type during our period of observation[96]. In the case of Taiwan, after the 1997 constitutional reform, it clearly moved from presidentialism to semi-presidentialism with the introduction of: i) the president's constitutional power to both appoint and dismiss the premier; and ii) the legislature's authority to trigger votes of no-confidence for the cabinet. More specifically, in light of the specific sub-types of semi-presidentialism introduced by Shugart and Carey (1992)—premier-presidential and president-parliamentary[97]—Taiwan clearly has the latter type. Although the label "semi" gives an impression of the system situating equidistant between presidentialism and parliamentarism, a wide range of empirical

[96] Although the Korean presidential system has a prime-minister side-by-side with the directly elected president, it cannot be categorised as semi-presidentialism since the cabinet is not responsible to the legislature but only to the president.

[97] While the former type makes the prime-minister and cabinet exclusively accountable to the asembly majority, the latter one is dually accountable to the assembly majority and the president.

patterns presented in Samuels and Shugart (2010)'s work show this type closely resembles presidentialism. However, upon a closer examination of institutional details, we can expect higher degrees of legislator independence and preference diversity in presidential Korea than in semi-presidential Taiwan.

First, the possibility of parliamentary dissolution (as a result of the vote of no-confidence) can make individual members more disciplined in semi-presidential Taiwan than in presidential Korea. However, in reality, this effect has been minimal in Taiwan due to the high coordination hurdles between parties and personal costs of running elections (Wu and Tsai, 2011). In other words, we could say that legislators' tenure has been *de facto* fixed in Taiwan, similar to in a presidential system.

Second, in Taiwan, there can be an "executive-divide" during "cohabitation" periods when the president and prime-minister are from opposing parties. Unlike divided government periods of presidentialism, this can help to minimize diverging preferences between legislative and executive branch since the head of government can be from the party holding the legislative majority. However, except a brief period of co-habitation—severals months during Chen Shui-bien's administration in 2000—the president always selected the prime-minister from his own party within the period of this study. Therefore, again, we can only expect a minimal level of "preference homogenizing" effect from Taiwan's semi-presidentialism.

Third, in light of other presidentialism/semi-presidentialism-specific institutional factors, (e.g. lame-duck, electoral cycle, structure of election primary, existence of presidential run-off, duration of minority government or legislative congruency between president and legislators) we can expect higher degrees of preference diversity from Korean presidentialism. For instance, unlike Taiwan's presidents who can be re-elected once, re-election is constitutionally forbidden for Korean presidents. This inevitably brought more frequent lame-duck sessions and intensified diverging preference between legislators supporting the current president and future potential president. Furthermore, although Taiwan has had both presidential and general elections in the same year since 2004, in Korea the two types of election overlapped only once—in 2012—during our period of observation. This furthered preference divergence among Korean legislators. As for the other four factors—structure of election primary, existence of presidential run-off, duration of minority government, legislative congruence between president and legislators—the two countries were broadly

similar in that i) primary elections are increasingly open to the public and a wider range of party members since 2000; ii) the presidential election is based on one time nation-wide direct vote; iii) both countries experienced roughly 8 years of divided government between 1987 and 2012; and iv) other than legislators directly elected from the nation-wide PR tier after the electoral reform (2003 in Korea and 2006 in Taiwan), there has been incongruence between legislators' and presidents' constituencies.

Overall, we can expect a higher degree of legislator independence and preference diversity in presidential Korea than semi-presidential Taiwan based on the four institutional factors listed here: the possibility of parliamentary dissolution and co-habitation, more frequent lame-duck sessions, and non-concurrent electoral cycle. Therefore, ***in light of the causal claim put forward in this chapter, we should observe more active welfare politics between legislators aiming for generous and universal expansion in Korea than in Taiwan***

4.3. Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence

4.3.1. Independence and Preference Heterogeneity of Individual legislators

As a first step, the general theories I laid out to explain higher legislator independence and preference diversity ought to be verified with the three cases to link welfare variation to the causal linkage I am proposing. For this purpose, I conducted several ***interviews with legislators and their senior staffs in Korea and Japan and the contents clearly revealed the expected difference***. For instance, a senior policy assistant of a (centre-right) Saenuri Party legislator in Korea noted: "here, each legislator is clearly regarded as an independent legislating institution. So there is definitely competition even within the party members regarding legislation activities so the Bill Office is not allowed to tell others who submitted which bill during the application period." In contrast, a four-time elected legislator from the (centre-right) Liberal Democratic Party in Japan complained: "it is very rare for an individual legislator to be free from the party line when it comes to legislation. As far as I remember, it was only when we were dealing with inner organ transplant law". This is the reason why it is not easy to see much strategic coordination between an individual legislator and the media, e.g. getting better attention from the newspaper by giving exclusive

interviews, nor with NGOs, e.g. accepting petitions from NGOs and propose an individual member bill. If there happens to be some degree of co-ordination, as pointed out by a Minnano Party's legislator staff during my interview "that is not because of any political alliance between two political actors but more as a result of interests aligning at the same time". Reflecting different levels of independence, Korean legislators were better supported with six government-provided full-time staff members, while the number was only three in Japan.

Moreover, it is substantially easier to draft a piece of legislation in Korea. As a senior staff member of the (centre-left) Democratic Party in Korea noted: "If you hurry, it can be done within a week and even a minor change is accepted by Bill Office as an independent bill. As for the co-sponsorship of other legislators, if you diligently move around, you can get 10 stamps in two hours". On the contrary, according to a senior staff member of Japan's (centre-right) Your Party legislator with more than 10 years of experience: "it takes at least good two months to draft a bill. And usually it is not easy for a legislator-proposed bill to be more than about basic framework or principles considering the technicality of bill-drafting". This staff went on to say, "even if you prepare a bill meeting all the technical requirements, the legislative bureau would not accept it if is not based on enough party consensus". Confirming this point, Makita's (2013: 253) latest work shows the difference between applied bills and actually submitted ones, which validates this point. That is, for any bill to even be registered as an official "submitted bill", it should first get an approval from the legislative bureau. More than half of the "applied bills" between 1987 and 2012 did not even pass this stage and, as noted by Mikita, one of the important reasons is because the bills could not reach enough party consensus. This is a huge contrast to the Korean case, where applied bills by individual legislators get accepted by the legislative bureau unless they are not "almost similar".

This pressure of individual legislator trying to be "independent law-making institution" has increased with the rise of monitoring NGOs in Korea and Taiwan. For instance, in Taiwan, Citizen Congress Watch had been formed in 2007, an initiative formed of 100 individuals with different backgrounds, who evaluate legislators' performance (including the number of legislative proposals they've made, or attendance rate) on a regular basis. They not only award high-performing legislators (and put low performers on a watch-list) but also have pushed for a higher legislative transparency by asking to video-record legislature or open the

procedural committee to the public. An experienced female KMT MP discussing the influence of Citizen Congress Watch noted "For people like me with a stable political base and with-in party reputation, the evaluation would not matter too much. However, it can be a different story for newly elected MPs or PR-tier MPs without a strong regional base"

Similarly, in Korea, a coalition of more than 100 NGOs evaluate, publish, and award MPs legislation output on a regular basis. Then highly ranked MPs advertise this in every possible form like their individual webpage, election pamphlet, or local newspapers. In 2012, the government even published a book titled "NGO"s petitions and related bills' showing how specific laws can be traced to particular NGO's suggestions.


Second, when it comes to the diverging preference between different political actors in presidential/semi-presidential systems, ***following examples of presidents' party-government detachment in Korea and Taiwan clearly manifests the influence of constitutional regime***. By definition, this is impossible in parliamentary systems, but very plausible in presidential systems. This is politically significant since a president forsaking her ruling party leadership often loses essential political powers such as election nomination or party fund appropriation. Considering the existence of many regional strongholds (which virtually leads to a victory for nominated candidates) forsaking the party leadership means giving up an important bestowed partisan power. Unlike his predecessors, Korean President Roh Muh Hyun forsook his position as the party leader in 2001 to clarify the separation between party and politics, as a part of his political reform agenda. As can be expected, this unleashed centrifugal tendencies not only within his own party, but also furthered diverging preference gap between the Blue House (the executive office in Korea), the cabinet members, and the ruling party. As a result, Roh had a difficult time getting approval from his own party for his signature political initiatives such as dispatching the Korean army to Iraq in 2003 or forming a grand-coalition in 2005. Similar to the Korean case, unlike his predecessor, Taiwanese President Ma did not take the role of party leadership nor any party post (he was only a member of the KMT) after securing a stable majority position in 2008. Just like Korean President Roh, he upheld the policy of "the separation of the party and the government" (Matsumoto, 2013). As a result, President Ma did not consult the KMT party leader Wu Poh-Hsuiung in appointing his premier and no cabinet post was given to the ruling party legislators. This led to discontent among KMT legislators, and the low success rate of cabinet bills (less than 65%) manifests differences in policy preferences between the president and the ruling party legislators (ibid.).

Following my expectation on varying degrees of legislators' preference diversity, empirical works on roll-call vote show that on average, 30/20% of legislators deviate from the party vote in Korea/Taiwan (Rich, 2014), while the rate goes below 5% in Japan


4.3.2. Welfare Legislation Patterns: Descriptive Statistics and Regression

Figure 48 shows that the cross-national differences go beyond just popular welfare bills described in the introduction part. That is, ***substantially more welfare bills have been submitted (5.5/2.2 times) and enacted (1.5/1.2 times) in Korea/Taiwan compared to Japan.*** This difference is remarkable considering the fact that Japan has roughly 2.5/5 times larger population and 2.5/5 times more legislators compared to Korea/Taiwan. Even when it comes to the proportion of enacted universal welfare bills—1083/556/870 in Korea/Japan/Taiwan—both Korea and Taiwan were higher than Japan: 41/46% in Korea/Taiwan while 37% in Japan. However, this difference is based on both orthodox and unorthodox social policies but the previous literature showing the relationship between the effect of presidentialism on welfare system change was based only on orthodox social policies. Therefore, for comparability's sake, I will just narrow my focus to orthodox social policies. And as can be clear from the bottom side of the Figure 48, the difference still remains quite clearly.

<Figure 48 > Cross-National Difference in Welfare Legislation Sponsorship (Top: Orthodox and Unorthodox Social Policies; Bottom: Orthodox Social Policies)




	Korea	Japan	Taiwan
Welfare Submitted	12338	2266	4702
Welfare Enacted	2613	1507	1881
Universal Welfare Enacted	1083	556	870



	Korea	Japan	Taiwan
Welfare Submitted	6685	1234	1893
Welfare Enacted	1107	792	791
Universal Welfare Enacted	936	483	496

And too add another layer of nuance with the time dimension, we can see that the gap became clear and widening with the progression of multi-party competition and further democratic consolidation. Specifically, Figure 49 shows the total number of welfare bills submitted from 1987 to 2012 (Korea is based on the left-side axis—0 to 1200—while Taiwan and Japan are based on the right-side axis—0 to 250.


<Figure 49> Number of Welfare Bills Submitted by Country: 1987-2011





However, the increase presented here can be attributed to other factors such as i) better institutional supports from the government, e.g. more high qualified staffs; ii) legislators' becoming more experienced, as re-election has become more common after the democratic transition; or can even be iii) a result of mere legal practice change, e.g. breaking one large bill into several small ones. To validate whether individual legislators have been the centre force of welfare politics in Korea and Taiwan, we need more evidence such as whether individual legislators are increasingly playing an important role on welfare issues over time compared to other political actors, and other non-welfare issues. In this regard, Figure 50 clearly demonstrates that, ***as multi-party competition proceeds in the three countries, individual legislators are taking more and more important roles for welfare bills*** (this becomes particularly clear if we compare the periods before and after the year 2000).

However, what is interesting is proportions they take in Korea and Taiwan. Compared to Japanese individual legislators, who, after 2000 sponsored 30-40% (maximum 50%) of the total welfare bills, both Korean and Taiwanese individual legislators took more than 80-90%. This is a striking difference and a clear manifestation of legislators' growing influence on welfare issues incentivized by the presidential/semi-presidential structure.

<Figure 50> Proportion of Welfare Bill Sponsorship by Political Actors: 1987-2012
(Top: Korea, Middle: Japan, Bottom: Taiwan)









Including submitted non-welfare bills as counter-factual, individual legislators' commitment on welfare issues become even clearer. As shown in Figure 51, in all three countries, individual legislators tend to focus more on welfare bills than non-welfare bills. Moreover, the difference between countries is in line with the expectation I specified.

<Figure 51> Proportional difference of Welfare and Non-welfare Bills by Sponsor Type



Given the nature of "race-to-the top" welfare politics, we can expect individual legislators to put more energy and attention towards universal welfare bills targeting median voters like women, the elderly, or children, than particularistic welfare bills for specific organized groups or geographic constituents. Figure 52 confirms this point in all three countries. However, while the difference is minimal in Korea (1% difference), there are substantial gaps in Japan and Taiwan.

<Figure 52> Proportional of Universal and Particularistic Welfare Bills by Sponsorship Type



Logistic regression analyses were applied by pooling all submitted bills by individual legislators in the three countries between 1987 and 2012—roughly 32,000— to examine whether the findings so far hold. Two models are tested here: i) whether the degree of presidentialism affects a submitted bill to be more "welfare" (Model 1); and, if so, ii) whether it is more universal welfare instead of particularistic welfare (Model 2). The outcome variable is binary (0/1) for both models—welfare (1) or non-welfare (0) for Model 1 and universal welfare (1) or particularistic welfare (0) for Model 2. The predictor variable of interest is constitutional structure (0 parliamentarism, 1 semi-presidentialism, 2 presidentialism but dealt as continuous variable indicating "degrees of presidentialism")

Other variables used here as control variables are similar to the previous models: gender, elected tier, ideology of affiliated party, GDP growth, electoral reform, or result of submitted bills (success or failure). However, considering this is a pooled data and some control variables do not exist in all three countries, e.g. session status and elected terms, or exist with different meaning, e.g. bill initiation and the number of bill-sponsoring legislators. Therefore, they are left out and only those variables which exist at the same time with the same meaning in all three countries are included. The results in Table 27 are based on robust standard errors.

Based on Model 1, the influence of constitutional structure on welfare issues can be corroborated with the evidence that ***having higher degrees of presidential constitutional structure is a strong predictor of a submitted bill*** being welfare, after controlling other

confounding variables. Similarly, Model 2 tests the influence of constitutional structure on types of welfare bills, and the result is in line with our expectation: ***having more presidential constitutional structure makes a submitted welfare bill more likely to be universalistic***. Specifically, the predicted probability of a submitted bill being welfare changes from 16% to 24% between parliamentarism to presidentialism; and, likewise, a chance of submitted welfare bill being a universal welfare bill (instead of particularistic welfare) increases from 76% to 84%.

<Table 27> Logistic Regression Results of Presidential Effect on Welfare

	Model 1:Welfare or not (all submitted bills)	**Model 2: Universal or Particularistic (all submitted welfare bills)**
Constitutional Structure	0.23*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.05)
Party Ideology (base: centre-right)		
Centre-left	0.02 (0.03)	0.24*** (0.07)
Left	-0.014 (0.07)	0.11 (0.17)
Others	-0.012 (0.07)	-0.16 (0.15)
Electoral Reform	0.3*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.08)
Success	-0.48*** (0.04)	-0.24*** (0.09)
Elected Tier	0.26*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.07)
Gender	0.37*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.08)
GDP Growth	-0.005 (0.005)	0.02** (0.01)
Constant	-1.86*** (0.06)	0.73*** (0.12)
Observation	32135	7446

Note: ***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p<0.1

For the robustness of findings, although not presented here, a separate regression analysis was conducted using the narrower definition of welfare—excluding bills related to immigration, education, and housing. Similarly, another regression was run including the

"power dispersion" as a control variable. And neither of this altered the findings presented here.

So what legislation pattern analysis is telling us so far is that it is clear that welfare issues are increasingly becoming important and individual legislators are taking more part over time in all three countries. However, with the built-in institutional mechanisms promoting separation of powers and purposes, presidential Korea and semi-presidential Taiwan facilitate the full legislative potential of legislators which then lead to faster and more universal welfare expansion than parliamentary Japan. However, what is missing is the mechanism of expansionary welfare politics. How exactly do individual legislators contribute to the expansionary welfare politics in Korea and Taiwan? How can we associate more numbers and higher proportion of welfare bills to "more welfare expansion" by expansion-oriented individual legislators? The following additional legislation pattern analysis can give us some insights into this process.

First what we can see from all three countries is that as we move from non-welfare, welfare, universal welfare, popular universal welfare, we can clearly see that individual legislators are taking substantially more part showing their election-driven median voter-targeting nature. And the fact that almost 100% of these individual sponsored universal welfare bills are about expanding benefits shows there is a high-level of expansion-bias.

Coupled with this, the table 28 summarises the trend of legislative inflation over time in all three countries. It shows how universal welfare bills with the same legal title have been submitted by different individual legislators at three different time points (indicating specific number of bills submitted in three particular years). For Korea and Taiwan, ***the number of same universal welfare bills submitted at specific time has clearly increased over time***[98]**.** For instance, universal bills with the same legal title have been submitted by, on average five, in a specified year during the 1990s and the early 2000s. This average moved upward to 10 per year in the mid-2000s and then to almost 20 after 2010.

[98] For Japan, due to the sheer lack of years universal welfare bills with the same legal title have been submitted, I had to combine two neighbouring years

<Table 28> Legislation Overlaps of Popular Welfare Bills over Time

	Universal Welfare Bills	Number of Overlaps		
Korea	**Employment Insurance**	5 (2002)	12 (2010)	16 (2011)
	National Veteran Support	6 (2001)	13 (2005)	14 (2011)
	National Health Insurance	7 (1993)	10 (2003)	22(2011)
	Minimum Livelihood	4 (2004)	8 (2008)	13 (2011)
	National Pension	4 (1998)	11 (2004)	20 (2009)
	Elderly Care	4 (2003)	12 (2008)	23 (2011)
	Gender Equality on Employment	3 (1997)	6 (2005)	13 (2011)
	Industrial Compensation	3 (1993)	7 (2009)	9 (2011)
	Childcare	3 (1997)	9 (2005)	27 (2011)
	Public Rental Housing Protection	3 (1989)	7 (2009)	10 (2011)
	National Health Insurance	4 (2002)	2 (2008)	
Japan	**Employment Insurance**	4 (2010)		
	Short-term Labor Contract Management	3 (2004)	3 (2007)	
	Welfare for the Disabled	4 (2000)		
	Childcare	4 (2001)		
	National Pension	7 (2007)		
	War-time Sexual Harassment Compensation	5 (2000)		
	National Health Insurance	4 (2002)	2 (2008)	
Taiwan	**Elderly Welfare**	4 (2003)	6 (2005)	14 (2007)
	National Pension	3 (1993)	18 (2009)	8 (2012)
	Labour Insurance	6 (1995)	11 (2005)	43 (2012)
	Labour Standard	2 (1992)	5 (2000)	28 (2012)
	Social Assistance	2 (2003)	11 (2009)	5 (2012)
	Gender Equality	1 (2003)	4 (2010)	14 (2012)
	Food Hygiene	2 (2005)	5 (2009)	24 (2012)
	Childcare	2 (2005)	16 (2009)	7 (2011)
	National Health Insurance	5 (1993)	9 (1995)	11 (2005)
	Employment Insurance:	3 (2007)	7 (2009)	6 (2011)

And if we look into the contents of submitted bills, the mechanism of expansion gets clear. For instance, many of the submitted bills around similar period ***are not so much different from each other in the sense that they added/amended minor thing from the original law or bureaucrat submitted bill such as tinkering with the numbers***[99] ***or changing certain legal***

[99] Relatedly, another legislative expert at Academia SINICA pointed out "Sometimes it becomes like a joke. [The fact that] even an MP with a background in the entertainment business submits a National Health Insurance bill is a clear sign of this".

***terms more accessible*[100].** I can give an example based on bills with the highest concentration of submission within a given month in Korea. As you can see from the Table 28, 23 bills regarding Elderly Care were submitted by individual MPs in 2011 and five of them where submitted in December alone—four by individual MPs and one by committee-head MP.

Compared to bureaucrat submitted bills, they were all shorter (sometime a line or two) and, more importantly, political and non–technical. Specifically, they were about i) raising penalty in case an institution does not report elderly abuse; ii) changing the term "elderly" to "senior", iii) subsidizing heating/cooling and reducing electricity/gas fee for elderly care facilities, iv) unifying terms indicating elderly facilities, v) removing "legally-incompetent" and "legally quasi-incompetent" from the employment disqualification condition. Going beyond this particular elderly law, many of contents of other popular welfare bills take this form and, as presented in the narrative parts, some of them are just tinkering with the numbers, e.g. increasing benefit level by 5%, 7%, or 10% (this is one of the reasons dragging down the overall success ratio since only one particular bill with specific number can be included at one time).

Many of these are not as substantial as what conventional welfare state scholars have focused, e.g. reducing pension age, increasing benefit duration. And it is true that many of these bills do not get enacted in the end[101]. However, we cannot deny that several expansion-oriented popular welfare bills submitted at similar time by individual legislators has a strong "race-to-the-top" tendency to facilitate welfare expansion (in both substantial and trivial ways). A case in point is bills processed as "alternative abolition" form in Korea. This form of legislative result can be regarded as in-between success and failure in that a specific bill is rejected but some part of it is included in an alternative successful bill. As for the welfare, there had been 9606 bills submitted by individual MPs from which 3162 (33%) were processed as "alternative abolition"; similarly, from 5269 universal welfare bills 1694 (32%) were processed in this form. Considering that most of the submitted bills are about "expansion",

[100] Although these changes are minor in terms of "amount of legislative efforts", they are "high-level" significance for beneficiaries based on how I defined "substantiality" in this project.

[101] This was no surprise to a professor specializing in legislative studies at Soochow University who remarked "for many legislators, the purpose of submitting a legislation is symbolic in that the act of bill sponsorship is to show they care about this issue or are angry about the cabinet bill submitted by the government".

this indicates one-third of failed welfare bills are likely to have contributed to some kind of expansion in the successful alternative ones in one form or another.

Proving this expansionary tendency, there are numerous detailed examples of how the independence and diverse preference of legislators led to more active race-to-the top welfare politics in Korea and Taiwan. For instance, in Korea, a fierce battlefield for welfare competition concerned old age pensions in the run up to the 2012 general election. Originally pledged by the Democratic Party for the 2011 general election, the issue became an up-for-grabs topic for other candidates within and outside the party, promising to double and triple the amount elderly people can receive. Another example shows that sometimes the influence of expansionary bias is felt in preventing welfare retrenchment. For instance, a lawmaker from the (centre-right) Grand National Party Park Jae Wan formed an informal coalition with left-wing NGOs, the left-wing Democratic Labour Party, and trade unions in February 2007 and succeeded in voting down a national pension bill—which was designed to increase the contribution rate and decrease benefit levels—at the plenary session of the national assembly.

A similar story could be told with Taiwanese examples. First, initiated by the Ministry of Welfare, Hygiene, and Environment, there has been an increase in the monthly pension for elderly farmers and fishermen from NT$4000 to NT$5000 passed on December 2005. This was estimated to benefit 710,000 farmers and fishermen, and cost NT$23 billion per year (Taipei Times, 2005). Both the DPP and KMT went a step further and increased this pension from NT$5000 to NT$6000 after holding an extra legislative session in June 2007, notwithstanding criticism from the Social Welfare Association of Taiwan and academics about its unfair nature (Taipei Times 2007). Based on an analysis conducted by several civic groups in 2007, 16 bills were proposed by legislators, and the political escalation reached the point of raising the monthly pension to elderly farmers from NT$5000 to NT$15000. Clearly the most important impending issues for legislators and presidential candidates were upcoming elections—both presidential and general—in 2008. Second, because of the disproportionally high benefit-low premium problem of the country's National Health Insurance, Taiwan was suffering from a chronic deficit problem in the late 1990s. Therefore, the ruling KMT party in 1997 tried to introduce private insurers or raise the insurance premium. However, such measures fell victim to political pressure from opposition party

members and also the ruling party legislators who were conscious of the political backlash (Aspalter, 2002).

4.3.3. Constitutional Structure and Media Saliency

As I pointed out earlier, implicit in the race-to-the top argument is that voters follow events in the legislature, and that political actors are conscious of this; and voters absorb political issues through the media and, insofar as our three countries are concerned, major nation-wide newspapers can be regarded as one of the most important mediums for the period this project covers. ***The primary intention of this section is to check the convergent validity by examining to what extent welfare-related newspaper articles are related to the welfare legislation patterns in each country.*** Based on the findings so far, higher degrees of presidentialism are more closely related to active welfare politics. Therefore, I will expect higher levels of correlation between changes in welfare-related articles and welfare legislation in presidential Korea and semi-presidential Taiwan than in parliamentary Japan.

Using the same newspapers like the previous media content analyses, the comparison here is based on *Hankyorae* (left-wing) and *Donga* (right-wing) between 1990 and 2012 for Korea, *Asahi* (left-wing) and *Yomiuri* (right-wing) between 1987 and 2012 for Japan, and *Taipei Times* (centre) between 1999 and 2012 for Taiwan. Keywords based on universalistic welfare benefits are searched for relevant articles and compared with universalistic welfare laws (see Appendix 2 for the selection process).

<Table 29> Correlation Coefficients between Welfare Newspaper Articles and Welfare Bills

Korea				Japan				Taiwan		
	Hankyorae	**Donga**	**Welfare**		**Asahi**	**Yomiuri**	**Welfare**		**Taipei**	**Welfare**
Hankyorae	1			**Asahi**	1			**Taipei Times**	1	
Donga	0.91***	1		**Yomiuri**	0.82***	1		**Welfare**	0.58***	1
Welfare	0.79***	0.61***	1	**Welfare**	0.16	0.09	1			


***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p<0.1

Table 29 confirms the expected pattern. Unlike the strong correlation coefficients between left and right wing newspapers in Korea and Japan (0.83 in Japan and 0.91 in Korea), the correlation between universal welfare bills and welfare newspaper article diverges substantially, with strong/intermediate level correlation in Korea (0.79 for *Hankyorae* and 0.61 for *Donga*), while the correlation in Japan is weak or non-existing (0.16 for *Asahi* and 0.09 for *Yomiuri*). In line with our expectation, the correlation coefficient lies in-between Korea and Japan in semi-presidential Taiwan (0.58 for *Taipei Times*).

Going beyond this correlation, other saliency evidence from media content analysis also points to the same conclusion. As mentioned in the contents of welfare newspaper articles in Table 18 and Table 20, the reporting style and the degree of government-related actors, e.g. arties, legislators, or presidents/prime-ministers, included as "major subject" are two important signs of active welfare politics. According to this, 70-80% of welfare-related newspaper articles directly deal with government-actors in Korea while it is 50-60% in Japan. Similarly, 50-60% of the total welfare-related articles go beyond fact report in the form of quotation, suggestion, or assessment in Korea while the equivalent figure is only 30-35% in Japan. Just like the correlation, Taiwanese case fall in-between Korea and Japan in terms of the contents of welfare related articles by having 60% of government-related actors as subject and 40% going beyond mere fact reporting. Finally, one last piece of evidence I want to suggest is the proportion of newspaper articles including "welfare policy" or "social policy" from the total number of articles published every year over-time in Korea and Japan. Unlike changes in the absolute number of articles this method puts two countries in direct

comparison with each other by controlling the denominator. And Figure 53 below clearly shows social welfare issues in presidential Korea is receiving substantially more attention than parliamentary Japan as multi-party competition proceeds.

<Figure 53> Proportion of Welfare Issue Coverage between Korea and Japan: 1990-2012



5. Summary

Taking a cross-country perspective, empirical findings in this chapter confirmed the influence of the two key political institutions. First, by adding another most-similar-case "Taiwan" to the analysis, ***the first half of cross-sectional analysis nuanced race-to-the-top welfare politics with both quantitative and qualitative evidence.*** Quantitatively, the welfare legislation pattern tends to be more particularistic during power dispersion as an effect of Taiwan's highly candidate-centred electoral rule. A similar pattern can be observed in Japan if the legislation pattern analysis is conducted only with the bills processed prior to its electoral reform (when Japan had the same highly candidate-oriented electoral rule). Qualitative evidence confirms this tendency by showing key political actors' prioritization of both universal and particularistic welfare bills during the periods of power dispersion in Taiwan (similar to the pre-electoral reform period in Japan). This is an important contrast to Korea and Japan (after the electoral reform), when power dispersion was accompanied by more universal welfare combined with the rolling back of particularistic welfare.

The second half of cross-national analysis proved that presidential/semi-presidential Korea/Taiwan experienced faster and more expansive universal welfare expansion than did parliamentary Japan. The primary reason behind this difference was attributed to the higher independence and preference diversity of individual legislators in presidential/semi-presidential systems. This claim was supported first by quantitative legislative evidence showing higher numbers and proportion of welfare bills (particularly universal welfare bills) in Korea and Taiwan compared to Japan, most of which were sponsored by individual legislators. In addition to validating this pattern with pooled logistic regressions, qualitative evidence drawn from elite interviews and secondary literature clearly proves: i) higher independence and preference diversity of legislators in presidentialism; and ii) expansionary and inflationary up-bidding by entrepreneur legislators indicated by higher number and proportion of welfare bills in presidential Korea and semi-presidential Taiwan.

Chapter 7. Conclusion: Summary, Contributions, and Limitations

1. Summary of Welfare Politics in the Multi-Party Competition Era

Weaving together various pieces of evidence I presented in the previous empirical chapters, ***the two puzzles outlined in the introduction can be answered as follows.*** As for the first question, "Why do we see welfare expansion in the two most developed East Asian democracies since 1990 alongside ever-growing neo-liberal influence?". The answer is twofold. During their post-war "economic miracles", Korea and Japan heavily relied on unorthodox social policies such as agricultural subsidies, construction projects, and strong labour market regulations. However, such methods are increasingly inadequate to protect against new emerging risks (e.g. precarious employment, work-life imbalance, low fertility rates, disappearing practice of inter-generational risk-sharing) caused by socio-economic transitions and global integration. As a result, we are seeing shifts to a more state-based/initiated orthodox welfare, and this shift can be captured as "expansion" from the welfare studies point of view. In addition, given their clientelistic nature, previous unorthodox social policies are becoming increasingly infeasible political choices in the era of multi-party competition when politicians need to draw votes from a wider range of voters to maintain their winning coalition.

The second question, "Why have there been more welfare expansions during periods when the political power was dispersed?", can be understood from the perspective of multiple cleavages going beyond socio-economic issues. That is, in non-Anglo European countries like Korea and Japan, it is quite common for key political conflicts to revolve around non-socio-economic issues such as foreign policy, identities (ethnic, racial, or linguistic), or democratic vs. authoritarian values. Since these issues have been imprinted in major parties' political DNA, it is naturally tempting to focus on them during times of undiluted political power. However, when faced with situations like coalition or minority governments, tinkering with first-cleavage issues becomes politically infeasible, and parties must compromise. Because welfare issues i) have not been part of major parties' political DNA and ii) have been unclaimed political territory despite rising public demand, key parties naturally incline towards these issues, from which they can gain opposing parties' concessions and by which they attract median voters' attention.

Going beyond these two questions I posed in the introduction, I raised another important question in the final cross-country comparison chapter: why do we see faster and more universal welfare expansion in presidential Korea and semi-presidential Taiwan than parliamentary Japan? Although conventional findings have indicated that a presidential structure should result in more fragmented and particularistic forms of welfare benefits, the three countries I compared suggested otherwise. My direct answer to this puzzle was that under the political context of "high public demand-flexible elite supply" on welfare, having independent and diverse individual legislators can be a significant push factor in welfare expansion. Our two presidential democracies constitutionally guaranteed high levels of independence and diversity, which also have been increasingly amplified with the consolidation of multi-party competition.

<Table 30> Summary of Key Findings

		Korea	**Japan**	**Taiwan**
Scope Conditions	Depolarized Social Welfare Issues	High	High	High
	Clientelistic Unorthodox Social Policies	High	High	High
Key Causal Claim	Effect: Higher Power Dispersion → Welfare Expansion	High	High	High
	Mechanism: Conciliatory Welfare Politics	High	High	High
	Mediation: Electoral Rules	Universal Expansion	Universal + Particularistic (~1996) → Universal Expansion (1996~)	Universal + Particularistic Expansion (~2008)
Additional Causal Claim	Effect: Presidential democracy → Welfare Expansion	High	Low	Medium
	Mechanism: Entrepreneur Legislators' with Legislative Independence and Diversity	High	Low	High

The findings of this study can be summarised in Table 30. Given the variety of methods and the sheer amount of different evidence, it would be a daunting task to point out every piece of evidence I found from the empirical chapters. Instead, I will briefly summarise key pieces of evidence through which I reached my verdict and from which I derived my answers to the three questions listed above.

To begin with the two key scope conditions, it was abundantly clear that social welfare issues have been depolarized and unorthodox social policies were clientelistic in all three countries. Applying logistic regressions, elite interviews, and media content analysis, these patterns could be supported with the evidence such as: i) The lack of difference in sponsoring welfare bills between left and right-wing members; ii) Frequency of issue-based political coalitions on welfare issues between political actors from across the political spectrum; iii) High proportions of unorthodox social welfare bills and their strong tendency to target particular geographical constituents or organized groups; and iv) Low media saliency of unorthodox social policies.

By setting up the scope condition of multiple cleavages, multiple party-voter linkages, and multiple forms of welfare, the core causal claim could be tested using logistic regressions. The most directly relevant piece of evidence proving the effect of power dispersion on welfare system change was the positive association between more power dispersion and a higher proportion of welfare bills. Evidence corroborated the mechanism through which this effect took place, showing a strong relation between higher power dispersion and higher success ratio of universal welfare bills. Going beyond logistic regressions, both the effect and mechanism of power dispersion on welfare system change were backed up by manifold evidence I draw from applying social network analysis, media content analysis, and theory-informed narratives. I found: i) better co-sponsorship network quality on universal welfare bills during dispersed power periods than concentrated power ones; ii) high (and increasing) newspaper coverage of welfare issues, focusing on key political actors; and iii) Changes in legislative attention by key political actors—which was evident in their words and deeds—from zero-sum foreign policy /national issues to positive-sum welfare issues.

Finally, the mediating effect of electoral rules was obvious in deciding the type of welfare expansion, particularly during the dispersed power structure periods. Specifically, a positive association between power dispersion and universal welfare bills in Korea (and Japan after 1996) proved the Downsian median voter targeting of majoritarian electoral rules. In contrast,

a weak positive/no association was observed between power dispersion and particularistic welfare bills in Taiwan and Japan before 1996, displaying the influence of candidate-focused electoral rules—MMD and SNTV. The narrative section in Japan (before 1996) and Taiwan (before 2008) refined this association by showing increases in both universal and particularistic welfare bills during dispersed power eras. Going beyond this study's key causal claim, the last part of analysis proved that higher degrees of presidentialism have been positively related to more welfare expansion in our three countries. I emphasized the importance of individual legislators in welfare expansion, and elite interviews and secondary literature clearly indicated that more independent and diverse legislators in the two presidential democracies have played active roles in bidding up/blocking important welfare expansion/retrenchment. Analysis of a pooled dataset on individual legislators' sponsored bills showing higher prioritization of welfare bills in general and universal welfare bills in particular in presidential Korea and semi-presidential Taiwan than parliamentary Japan further supports this claim.

2. Expected Contributions

This project's expected contributions are fourfold: theoretical, conceptual, methodological, and practical.

First, with respect to welfare studies, my analysis provided important insights into the timing and types of welfare expansion in non-Anglo-European countries. For instance, students of East Asian welfare states have noted the growing importance of multi-party competition in expanding welfare systems in developed democracies like Korea, Japan, and Taiwan (Aspalter, 2002; Estevez-Abe, 2008; Wong, 2004). More specifically, ***Peng and Wong (2010) emphasized a "new" path to welfare expansion in these countries—based on flexible issue coalitions between various political actors.*** My analysis builds on this line of work, and confirmed this pattern with an original dataset. This clearly challenges the well-accepted proposition advanced by power-resource scholars that strong and encompassing trade unions and left-wing parties are necessary institutional preconditions of universal welfare expansion (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983).

However, going beyond corroborating this key political path, this study aimed to specify the timing and type of expansion by adding "power dispersion" to the analysis. Specifically, regarding the timing of welfare expansion, various pieces of evidence indicate that when leading parties experience power dispersion-induced "political crises", politics shifts to social welfare issues and politicians are more likely to make welfare promises than non-welfare promises. In contrast, when ruling parties stabilize politically (the periods of power concentration), the case countries often take radical turns to zero-sum political or ideological issues, such as constitutional reform in Japan or diplomatic measures towards North Korea/Mainland China in South Korea/Taiwan. This, in turn, marginalized welfare-related issues.

Regarding welfare type, the study has proved the mediating influence of electoral rules. Specifically, under electoral rules with a strong majoritarian bias like those in Korea and Japan, power dispersion is more likely to prioritize welfare expansion geared towards median voters (such as consumers, women, the disabled, or the elderly). In contrast, candidate-centred electoral rules lead to *quid-pro-quo* distributive politics based on particularistic and unorthodox social policies, like construction projects or agricultural subsidies, without much transparent democratic deliberation process. In other words, although power dispersion accelerates welfare expansion in all three countries, the kind of welfare likely to be expanded was contingent upon specific electoral rules.

As can be clear from this structural logic, the timing of conventional universal welfare expansion in this analysis was considered along with that of non-welfare issues and unconventional particularistic welfare. ***This comprehensive multi-dimensional approach was possible by building on the latest welfare studies emphasizing the importance of multiple cleavages, multiple party-voter linkages, and multiple forms of benefits*** in understanding welfare system change (Estevez-Abe, 2008; Seelkopf and Starke, 2015; Hausermann et al., 2012; Kitschelt and Kselman, 2013). By gleaning insights from this new line of thinking and directly applying them in my analysis in a synthetic manner, the study here greatly expanded and systematized analytical and conceptual tools in explaining welfare system change beyond Anglo-European countries.

Regarding unorthodox forms of welfare, although welfare state scholars have focused on unorthodox and unconventional social policies by referring to agricultural subsidies, family/corporate welfare, economic regulations, or construction projects, ***no academic work***

to date has aimed at conceptualizing them systematically with detailed examples. Here, I not only indexed various types of unorthodox social policies (side by side with orthodox welfare benefits), but also specified the extent to which our three East Asian cases compared relied on them, who they target, and which groups are this type of welfare benefits' primary supporters. More importantly, with a text analysis of welfare-related newspaper articles and legislative records, the work here presents evidence that unorthodox social policies tend to be associated with clientelisitic forms of party-voter linkage (*quid-pro-quo* distributive politics) without much transparent deliberation or media attention**.** By all means, this goes beyond a simple exercise in definitions and furthers our understanding of the political nature of unorthodox social policies. In a similar vein, drawing insights from Lipset and Rokkan's frozen cleavage hypothesis, I have attempted to understand the "stickiness" of first-cleavage issues that divide the left and right in the three countries. More importantly, the analysis here has presented their tendency to surface during the times of power concentration and overshadow welfare issues.

Going beyond welfare studies, the findings here also have important theoretical implications to legislative studies, both in terms of refining "veto-player" concepts and clarifying scope conditions of their expected causal impact on welfare system change. Regarding the former, ***the way in which "power dispersion" was operationalized drew insights from the latest attempts to distinguish between veto-players.*** Work here separated presidents and lower and upper house MPs as "election-based" veto-players and showed that welfare expansion was more likely when they shared power. Although this positive-relationship is similar to the findings posited by other welfare scholars using similar terms like constitutional veto-players (Estevez-Abe, 2008) or collective veto-player (Crepaz, 2004), the work here clarified the scope condition of the relationship from the perspective of multiple-cleavages. Namely, having more election-based veto players could lead to welfare expansion in three countries because the main-cleavage dividing left and right was not social distribution issues. This calls for a more careful generalization of veto-players, by ***being sensitive to the historical context shaping major political actors' preferences.***

Third, in line with the spirit of methodologically plural welfare studies, ***the work here has tried to push a step further by creating a comprehensive new welfare politics dataset and applying two rather unnoticed methods—social network analysis and media content analysis.*** From the viewpoint of mixed-method research, the analysis conducted here has

shed light on the strengths of applying various methods to verify, triangulate, and nuance the central causal claim. Besides, based on the latest approach applying multi-method analysis with two different types of evidence (Collier, 2011; Mahoney, 2010; Haggard and Kaufmann, 2012)—dataset observations and causal process observations—I have disciplined the application of each method by explicitly specifying which pieces of evidence should be observed in advance to refute/corroborate particular parts of my theory and to what extent it weakens/strengthens my claim.

Specifically, unlike the conventional approach of using welfare expenditure data in analysing welfare politics, the study examined a relationship between changes in power structure and the legislative activities of major political actors using the whole universe of hand-coded bills between 1950 to 2012—roughly 50,000 in total—with descriptive statistics, logistic regression, media content analysis, and social network analysis. After complementing the current dataset with the roll call vote records and legislative floor speeches and debates, I plan to allow other students of East Asian welfare politics to replicate, verify, and extend original findings. This goal can be achieved by storing my data with the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and Oxford Online Database Service (ORDS), which can enrich, preserve, and disseminate data collections for the East Asian welfare studies community.

Last but not least, the topic of welfare politics itself has wide-ranging policy implications. Specifically, economic modernization of the current post-industrial era accompanied rapid nuclearisation of family and changes in gender relations. While there has been a steady increase in divorce rates and in the number of single parent households, fertility rates and the numbers of three-generational households have dropped dramatically. In addition, the three nations' ageing societies has placed greater emphasis on the welfare state, especially in areas such as old age income security, long-term care, and health. At the other end of the demographic profile, the decline of the young population made fewer resources saved for the welfare system. In this context, it is not an exaggeration to say that the welfare state's role is larger than ever before in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Interestingly, on some occasions, politicians legislate welfare bills regarding particular organized groups, (e.g. business organizations or pharmaceutical companies) or geographical constituents, (e.g. farmers or fishermen); on other occasions, politicians directed welfare benefits towards marginalised people such as the elderly, children, women, or the disabled. Furthermore, irrespective of to

whom a welfare benefit caters, some bills tended to factor in future fiscal implications, whereas others do not. Considering that an ideal welfare state should be able to strike a balance between various specific needs of current and future generations, it is particularly important to understanding the institutional conditions related to certain types of welfare state development. Moreover, a detailed analysis of three developed countries in East Asia would be useful for reformers in other areas in search for ideas and inspiration. For instance, the three developed East Asian democracies' experiences could be the most obvious and probably the most promising point of departure for Southeast Asian countries, by showing appropriate institutional designs in coping with rapid socio-demographic transitions or increased welfare benefit requests after democratisation. The welfare politics dataset I have been collecting would help to trace individual politicians' legislative endeavours and results regarding welfare issues. That is, along with the latest attempts to make parties more accountable with election manifestos, the results of individual-level welfare legislation pattern analysis would help to gauge the quality of democracy in three countries. It can also complement the latest efforts by NGOs like Legal Consumer Alliance (Korea), Tokyo Press Club (Japan), and Citizen Congress Watch (Taiwan), all of which evaluate individual legislators based on performances such as the number of bills legislators initiated and their attendance record.

3. Limitations and Future Research

Although the project here aimed to explain and understand welfare politics in three countries as thoroughly as possible, by applying different methods from various angles, it is not without its limitations. In concluding the whole project, I want to point out four particularly important limitations and suggest several fruitful avenues for future research.

First, the research here does not concern welfare outcomes. As I specified in the legislation pattern analysis section, the work here examines the throughput (policy making process of political parties which often get mediated by political and economic institutions) and output (welfare legislation, welfare expenditure, number of social workers and facilities) stages. ***In other words, it does not say anything about some welfare outcomes we find inherently valuable, such as reducing inequality or mortality, or raising employment rates or***

educational attainment. With the welfare output expansion evidence I presented here, one might wonder why the three Asian countries do not seem to fare better than during their high-growth years boasting low employment rate, low inequality, and rising real incomes with less state welfare. Although explaining this requires a separate and thorough analysis, I want to point out that we are living in a very different time from the high growth years, when particularistic/unorthodox social policies were enough to meet people's welfare needs. As I presented with the socio-demographic transition data in Chapter 2, it is becoming increasingly hard to maintain non-state welfare based on company or family these days and, had these countries done so, the welfare outcomes would have likely been worse. Besides, within the context of consolidating democracy and globalizing economy, it would be politically infeasible to maintain previous welfare measures. Japan's massive failure to change its welfare system into a "welfare society"—putting more burdens on families and societies—in the 1980s is a good illustration of this. ***As pointed out repeatedly, the welfare systems in three countries are transforming from ones based on particularistic/unorthodox to orthodox/universal welfare. The occasionally intensified welfare politics during times of dispersed power have accelerated that process.*** However, there is still a long road to travel in order to meet people's welfare needs to the extent of developed welfare states. ***And building on the output-oriented research, the next task is to examine the link between welfare output and welfare outcome.*** Especially, in light of these findings, intensified short-sighted welfare politics often led politicians to over-promise and under-deliver. Lack of trained carers or facility infrastructure, budget shortages of the local-governments implementing welfare services, illegal welfare benefit recipients, and ad-hoc fund securement with luxury/gamble/alcohol/tobacco taxes are good examples of this. This is happening frequently in all three countries, and contributes to implementation failure, causing lower welfare outcomes than expected. Therefore, it is crucial to examine the political conditions under which these failures are more likely and, more specifically, what kinds of welfare policies promised by whom, (e.g. left-wing male MPs or right-wing district-tier MPs), are causing this.

Second, enacted welfare bills coded here as "high-level significance" can have varying degrees of substantial difference. As a limitation of coding the whole universe of bills, I had to make a practical decision of simplifying each welfare bill's degree of importance trichotomously. So, based on my coding, a bill increasing the pension age and a bill providing a one-time subsidy to farmers in a specific region are coded in the same way-as "high-level significance" legislation—despite the vast difference in the number of beneficiaries, the

amount of budget change, and the duration of welfare benefits. Although the research here tried to maintain face validity of key arguments with the narrative analysis, it was not as systematic as the legislation pattern analysis***. So, this tells us that it is possible to reach very different conclusions if the coding is just based on fewer, larger welfare bills using different thresholds.*** As I pointed out when discussing the analytical potential of welfare legislation patterns and the coding examples, focusing on several well-accepted mega bills has its own limitations, such as not having many observations, disregarding different political dynamics associated with less significant, low-profile welfare bills, or missing an opportunity to understand efforts that can bring changes as important as mega bills by establishing/unifying administration/organizations. Given the limitation of each approach, we should think of a way to get the best of both worlds. ***One way to do this is to weigh how much budget change each welfare bill accompanies, and the scope of beneficiaries affected by each bill.*** The former data can be found by looking at each bill's expense estimate report, while the latter information can be gathered by linking purported beneficiaries of each bill to government census data. Daunting as this task might be, it can further differentiate different degrees of significance systematically, and also serve as invaluable archived data for future studies.

Third, the coding reliability should be verified with a more rigorous method. Even if I listed the details of coding rules, relevant examples, and their robustness with different coding specifications, the reliability of coding has not been tested. As I pointed out repeatedly, due to the context-specificity and language-intensiveness of coding, it would not be easy to find coders who are fluent in three languages I cover here and also familiar with East Asian welfare politics. ***However, considering the fact that the whole project is based on hand-coded welfare bills and welfare-articles, the reliability part should be tested in one form or another*** to make my key points more convincing. Bearing this in mind, a future work building on this project should, at least, include inter-coder reliability tests by well-trained coders of randomized samples.

Fourth the welfare legislation pattern analysis should prove wider external validity. Since this was the first attempt to hand-code the whole universe of welfare bills, the results here can lack external validity. For instance, would we observe polarization of welfare issues by looking at hand-coded bills of Anglo-European countries during their expansion era? For instance, will there be a clear difference between left and right wing party members in

sponsoring welfare bills in the U.K. and Sweden between 1950 and 1970? The polarizing effect of social welfare issues has been proven by other cross-national dataset concerning expenditure, attitude surveys, or roll-call votes, but not yet with the legislation sponsorship data. To further validate that findings I have presented here are not driven by *sui generis* aspect of bill sponsorship data, but by the causal claim I put forward here, the same method using the same type of dataset should be applied to Anglo-European countries.

Appendix 1. Codebook for Welfare Legislation

1. Summary

This codebook contains the details on different dimensions of welfare bills of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan which is based on four rounds of coding from 2010[102]. Although I tried to maintain the coding process as consistent and accurate as possible, inevitably because of the size of the project and its context-specific nature, some errors or biases may have occurred. The fifth round of coding is expected soon and will include inter-coder reliability and the direction and significance of welfare bills that were submitted but failed to be enacted.

2. Basic Info

1) **Period:** Jan 1987 - April 2012 (Korea), Jan 1987 - Dec 2012 (Japan), Jan 1987 - Dec 2012 (Taiwan)
2) **Numbers:** In total 2266/12338/4702 welfare bills were submitted in Korea/Japan/Taiwan.
3) **Coded dimensions:** All submitted welfare bills were coded by electoral target (universal or particularistic) conventionality (orthodox or unorthodox). Insofar as enacted bills are concerned, direction (expansion or retrenchment) and significance (substantial change or trivial change) dimensions are added.

4) General Coding rules

A. Coding is based on an ***official summary*** of each bill by the government.
B. Each bill is only ***coded into one certain category per dimension***.
C. If each bill contains several changes, coding is based on the change each ***official summary emphasizes from the first lines***.

[102] The first round of coding (2010) saw whether a bill is welfare or not, and if welfare, whether it is particularistic or universalistic in Korea and Japan. The second round of coding expanded the definition of welfare legislation to unorthodox social policys (2011) and the third round (2012) added two more detailed information about each piece of enacted/amended/abolished welfare bills—the direction of legislation (expansion or retrenchment) and significance (substantial or trivial). The fourth round (2013-2015) added Taiwan and each bill was coded into all the dimensions I did for Korea and Japan from round one to three.

D. If the first lines of each official summary contain several changes, e.g. expansion and retrenchment, one category is chosen based on the ***significance*** (which one is more substantial change) and ***numbers*** (which one has more changes)

E. If first lines of a bill include have equal degree of significance and number of changes for directions (expansion and retrenchment), conventionality (orthodox or unorthodox) and/or electoral targets (universal and particularistic), it will be coded as "expansion" for the direction dimension, "orthodox" for the definition dimension, and "universal" for electoral target dimension.

5) Notes

A. **Context-specificity of coding**: some of the information contained in the legislation summary does not clearly indicate to which specific category a bill should be coded. For instance, raising retirement age from 60 to 65 can be coded as retrenchment for some people if it means delaying the period of pension-receiving age but as expansion if that enables one to stay longer in a well-paid stable job. Similarly, rationalising a national compensation scheme based on the degree of risk or reasons for death can have mixed effects on different people. **In this case, the coding is based on the introductory context described in the bill summary part.** For the retirement age, if a specific bill describes the rationale of that bill as tapping into the skilled labour and expertise of people between age 60 and 65, it is coded as "expansion". On the contrary, if the context emphasizes on the recent deficit of pension fund and the corresponding necessity to minimize it, then raising the age can be coded as retrenchment.

B. Further specifics of each dimension: there are other dimension-specific rules for the coding which will be specified along with the relevant examples in the ensuing part.

6) Examples of General Coding Rule Application

A. Partial Revision on the Promotion of Small and Medium-size start-ups (enacted on 2nd July, 2007 in Korea)

To activate job creation and to further economic growth through promotion of small and medium-sized start-ups, (a) 11 charges such as Farmland Preservation Charge or Alternative Green Space Development Charge will be exempted for three years from the starting date of a firm. On the other hand, to make the discretion activity transparent, (b) regulations such as the registration of venture-capital investment will be readjusted.

➔ This short unorthodox social policy bill does not distinguish the introductory part explaining the reason for the bill introduction and what will be major changes from the main part detailing the specifics of changes. Since we cannot distinguish changes based on the general coding rule C, the whole bill can be coded as the introductory summary. And the bill includes two major changes: (a) to exempt some fees relevant to start-ups for three years and (b) to readjust regulations to promote transparency. With regards to the direction dimension, (a) is an expansion while (b) is a retrenchment. However, (a) is more substantial than (b) based on the definition I chose in this project, so applying the general coding rule d, the bill is coded as a substantial "expansion" of unorthodox social policies.

B. Partial Revision on Child-care support Law (enacted on 29th June, 2009 in Japan)

Considering the living condition of single-parent families, both divorced parents should, for a while, protect the children and in case guardians other than mother, like children's father, aims to maintain the livelihood until then, (a) the government should provide the child allowance. The major contents are as follows.

a. Conditions for providing childcare allowance to guardians other than mother: when parents got divorced; mother's death, mother's disability, uncertainty of mother's death

b. Despites the condition listed above, in case of the following situations, the allowance would not be provided: when there is no registered address in Japan; when the family is eligible for compensation for the bereaved set by labour standard act; living with either mother or father and maintains the same level of livelihood like before.

➔ In the case of this orthodox welfare benefit, there is a clear division between the introductory summary and the major contents. If we look at the contents part, the first part (i) clearly is about expansion since it is extending the scope of childcare allowance to children's guardian other than mother. However, the second (ii) part brings some new limiting conditions to the childcare allowance as a whole so it is a retrenchment. In this case, two changes are equal since both are substantial changes and each is counted as one. Nevertheless, following the general coding rule C, this should be coded as a substantial expansion of orthodox universal welfare since the summary part underlines just the expansion part.

7) Sources

A. Korea: Deliberation Summary Record by The National Assembly Legislation Information System (http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/jsp/main.j) and National Legislation Search Centre (http://www.law.go.kr/main.html) by the Ministry of Justice

B. Japan: Deliberation Summary Record by House of Councillors Internet Library (http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/kaiki/index.html#D1) and Japan Legislation Search (http://hourei.ndl.go.jp/SearchSys/) by the Diet Library.

C. Taiwan: Deliberation Summary Record by Legislative Yuan (http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lydbc/lydbkmout?000297680001C90100000000000012C00100001E000000000^) and Legislation Search (http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgcgi/lglaw?@@846930886) by Legislative Yuan.

3. Coding Categories

1) Matching Orthodox and Unorthodox Social Policies

A. **Definition:** taking orthodox welfare policy as given, unorthodox social policies are welfare i) provided by the government other than welfare policy, e.g. industrial policy, immigration policy, financial policy, or ii) regulated and or financed by the government to make other non-governmental actors, e.g. charity organization, firms, families, employers, to provide/not provide certain benefits to meet the core effect of orthodox welfare policies. The examples below show whether a unorthodox social policy is the former case ("p" indicates other policies) or the latter one ("a" indicates other actors).

Category	Sub-Category	Orthodox Welfare	Unorthodox Welfare
Social Security	Health Insurance	Raising National Health Insurance premium Transportation subsidies for patients residing in remote areas , Insurance fee exemptions to the nationals residing abroad	Allowing and subsidizing private health care (a) Tax increase on luxury goods, alcohol, cigarettes, gambling to increase health insurance financial base (p)
	Pension	Integrating National Pension financial base Reducing Civil Servants' Pension or public school Teachers' Pension	Allowing Tax-deferred savings accounts (a) Subsidizing Employee Welfare Fund and Small and Medium Enterprise Pension (a) Allowing Lump-sum retirement payment (a)
	Accident Insurance	Extending Industrial Accident Insurance to self-employed Extending the scope of Work Injury Insurance to sexual harassment Creating Agricultural Products Disaster Insurance	Mandatory regulation making buildings higher than four-story to enrol the disaster insurance (a)
	Empl	Extending Unemployment	Wage subsidies (p)

	oyment Insurance	Insurance to irregular workers	Public construction works (p) Public sector employment (p) Temporary Business Protection Act for Certain Shipping Manufacturing (p) Employment Security Act for the Elderly (a) Direct state ownership of enterprises (p) Tax incentives to firms investing in building social infrastructure (a)
	Elderly Insurance	Establish a public insurance for Long-term Care	Making private firms easier to run long-term care business by changing the regulation from advance approval to post notification (a)
Public Assistance	Income Maintenance	Providing Minimum-livelihood Income based on individual's financial status (without checking the financial status of nuclear or extended family)	Price stabilizing for livestock Industry and Agriculture Products (p) Increasing agriculture land usage and electricity subsidies (p) Tax breaks and exemptions for Tax-free loans/extending the pay-back period to firms building public cultural facilities (a) Allowing free usage of public facilities for small-medium enterprise convention (p)
	Emergency Aids	Increasing the amount of Emergency Aids for Fire, Oil Pollution, Flood, Layoffs Extending the coverage to the damage caused by thunder-storm	Act on Reducing Tax burden for Disaster Victims (p)
	National Compensation	Compensation for installing unpopular public facilities like dams, nuclear plants Compensation for criminal victims, war-time veterans Extending the definition of "death in the line of duty" to fire-workers.	Making private schools to re-hire teachers who got laid-off due to the participation of political events in the past (a)
	Supports for the disabled	Providing high quality trained-dogs to the blind Vocational Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons Special Education for Disabled Persons	Mandatory requirement of the disabled person quota for large firms (a) Preferential Purchase of Products Manufactured by Persons with Perverse Disability (p) Mandatory requirement of making building over certain size as barrier-free (a)
	Supp	Alien Registration Act	Mandatory removal of employment or wage

	orts for refugees and immigrants	Extending the Recognition of Refugee Providing culture and language education to multi-cultural families	discrimination based on nationality (a)
	Minimum Income	Raising the mandatory minimum income level	Raising criminal punishment/financial penalty for not providing minimum wage to employees (a) Prohibiting basic levels of pension from being taken away as a result of mortgage contract (a)
Social Service	Child care	Raising free childcare support age Providing free psychological treatment to harassed children	Mandatory video-camera installation in nurturing facilities to prevent harassment (a)
	Juvenile care	State counselling service for violence victims Increasing state-run local youth training/culture experience facilities	Mandatory age-check policy by liquor store/bar/pub owners
	Military Care	Raising monthly wage for conscripted soldiers Providing financial support to discharged soldiers	Mandatory recognition of years spent on military service as work term by employers (a)
	Elderly Care	Free dental/eye check-up for the elderly Free public transportation to people over age 65	Promotion of the Elderly Welfare facility renovation by private entrepreneurs with tax incentives (a) Relaxing green-belt restriction for elderly facility constructions (a)
	Mother/women Care	Increasing the amount of childcare subsidies Recognizing paid maternity/paternity leave as pension contribution period.	Mandatory requirement of providing child leave to both male and female employees (a) Installation and operation subsidies for private nurturing facilities (p) Mandatory sexual harassment incidence report policy to employees (a)
	Hygiene and Safet	State-run food safety and sanitation checks Special measures concerning	Mandatory enhancement of fire extinguishing system (a) Enhanced regulation of bio-hazard materials (a)

	y	nuclear emergency preparation State provided infant inoculation Increasing first-aid kits in the public space	Limiting beef importation to prevent mad-cow disease (p) Mandatory notification of country of origin for imported foods (a)
	Medical Protection and Social Protection	Compensation on medical side-effects Providing free rehabilitation to offenders Suicide prevention education	Free state legal support for individual patients for medical lawsuits against a hospital (p)
	Housing	Increasing public rental housing in the city area Housing allowance Preferential allocation of public housing to the low income class, elderly, and the disabled.	Rent control (p) Publicly financed rental housing construction (a) Special interest loan to first-home buyers (p) Public support of corporate housing (a) Promotion of rural house construction (a)
	Education	Raising mandatory education age from primary to secondary school Extra-curricular activity subsidies	Tax incentives for running life-long education facilities (a) State recognition of cyber universities as a valid higher education degree (p)
	Consumer/ Depositor Protection	Increasing customer service centres Continuance of major insurance benefits to recently bankrupted people	Mandatory notification duty of recent product recalls (a) Capping interest rates in the usury business (p) Allowing convenient stores to sell basic drugs (a)
	Civil welfare (culture, sports, communication)	Increasing free Wi-Fi access in the public space Free access to the museums and art galleries to the disabled State supports to low income people on public sports facility	Promotion of corporate libraries for employees (a)
	Labo		Mandatory transition of part-time employees to full-time

	ur welfare	Free state-run job-seeking counselling Job-seekers' allowance	after 2 years (a) Mandatory over-time extra payment (a) Mandatory guarantee of collective bargaining and strike in private firms (a)

B. Coding-rules

a. There can be cases where one welfare bill can be unorthodox social policies of two different orthodox ones. For instance, subsidizing female farmers' employment can be unorthodox social policies of both income maintenance and gender welfare. There is no weighting in this case so the bill will be just coded as the unorthodox social policies.

b. There can be some orthodox welfare bills that are unorthodox social policies to other orthodox welfares. Paving a new pedestrian road with clear safety signs is a good illustration of this since it falls into orthodox industrial safety welfare category and, at the same time, income maintenance for some construction sector employees. In this case, it would not be counted as unorthodox welfare but just as orthodox welfare.

c. Assigning certain welfare obligations, e.g. footing half of the childcare welfare, to different levels of government is not regarded as unorthodox welfare since it still remains in the boundary of the pure public sector government. However, if the duty is passed to semi-public entities like state-funded NGOs or public corporations, it will be regarded as a unorthodox welfare.

C. **Context-specificity of unorthodox welfare**: as you can guess from the comparison above, based on the definition used in this project, what is exactly unorthodox welfare and what is not is contingent upon how one confines the boundary of orthodox welfare. For instance, if one defines orthodox welfare to be only four insurances and public assistance, all other orthodox welfare I described above will be either unorthodox welfare or non-welfare based on my definition. For instance, if one defines withdrawing certain welfare benefits from immigrants as more of an

immigration policy than an orthodox welfare policy, it will be either a unorthodox welfare of income maintenance or not a welfare policy in any sense. Here the boundary of orthodox welfare categories is broader than conventional analysis since it is based on what the ministry of welfare and established welfare scholars in each country cover in their analysis, budget appropriation, and policy implementation. Defining the boundary of orthodox welfare is inherently a political process and also strongly shaped by the rising demand, e.g. consumer/depositor protection, and functional integrations, e.g. between welfare, hygiene, environment, immigration, safety. For those who think "civil welfare, consumer welfare, housing, immigration" do not belong to the definition of orthodox welfare, I ran several separate analyses without them for most of the key findings of this study for the robustness's purpose. Even if we combine these four, they were no more than 9/5/7% in Korea/Japan/Taiwan and did not alter any key findings (see online appendix for details).

2) Electoral Target

A. **Universal welfare benefits**

a. Frequently appearing welfare targets

Labourers, women, the elderly, consumers (in general), depositors, children, the disabled, workers (in general), veterans, patients, the unemployed, students, refugees, family, criminal victims, medical casualties, discharged public servants or teachers, immigrants, foreigners (in general) etc..

b. Examples of Bills

Act on the Support of Housing and Saving of Workers; Prevention of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Act; Equal Employment Opportunity for both Genders Act; Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping From North Korea; Act on Construction of Dams and Assistance to their Environment; Depositor Protection Act; Special Act on the Protection of Lessees of Insolvent Constructed Public Rental Housing; Act on the Protection, Use, Etc of Location Information; Framework Act on Consumers; Act on the Hour Restoration of and Compensation to Persons related to Democratization Movements; Act on Temporary Measures to Unemployed Miners; Act on Protection of Scarified Veteran Families; Act on Partial Revision of Welfare Pension Law; Act on Partial Revision of Social Welfare for the Elderly; Act on Tax-Related Special Temporary Measures for Hanshin Earthquake Victims; Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act; Ordinance for Enforcement of the Employment Security Act.

B. Particularistic welfare benefits (region)

a. Frequently appearing welfare targets:

Fishing village, farming/agricultural village, mountain village, mining village, industrial complex, research complex, event-hosting cities (e.g. Olympics, expositions, conferences), river village

b. Examples of bills

Special Act on the Assistance to the Development of Abandoned Mine Areas; Special Act on the Development of Jeju island; Special Act on the Support of Daedok Special Research and Development Zone, etc; Act on the Promotion of Local Cultural Centres; Special Act on Maintenance of New Tokyo International Airport Region; Special Act on Development and Promotion of Okinawa; Act on promotion of Regional Employment

C. **Particularistic welfare benefits (groups)**

a. Frequently appearing categories

Army (volunteered not conscripted); Software Industry; Religious Groups; Ethnic Groups Public Servant; Member of Parliament Teachers (both Public and Private); Specific organizations with names; Researchers; Research industry; Retail stores; Medical sector; Pharmaceutical companies; Movie industry Farmers; Agriculture sector; Freight industry; Shipping Industry; Development Industry; Distribution Industry; Forestry Mining Industry; Venture Companies; Nursery Centres; Elderly care centres; Real Estate Agencies; Academia; Research Sector; Cultivating Industry; Information and Communication Industry; Sports Industry; Material Industry; Game Industry; Energy Industry; Design Industry; Traditional markets; Deep-sea Fishery; Robot Industry; Food Industry; Atomic Energy Industry; Trade and Investment Organizations; Food Service Industry; Comic and Animation Industry; Horse Industry

b. Examples of bills

Software Industry Promotion Act; Korean Traditional Temples Preservation and Support Act; Act on Allowances, etc, for National Assembly Members; Distribution Industry; Development Act; Act on Facilitation of Livestock Product Consumption; Act on Promotion of Chinese Medicine; Act of Welfare of Artists; Agricultural Mechanization Promotion Ac;t Act on Promotion of Cartoons; Act on Special Measures for Development of Small and Micro Enterprises; Act on Special Measures Concerning Revitalization of Industry and Innovation in Industrial; Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade; Trade Insurance and Investment Act; Teacher's Labour Union Act

D. Particularistic welfare benefits (Region and Organized)

Balanced Regional Development and Support for Local Small and Medium Enterprises Act; Act on the Establishment Dangjin-si, Chungchoengnam-do Urban-Rural Complex Form; Special Act on the Support of Local Newspaper; Act on the Establishment and Management of Local Medical Centres; Act on the Promotion of Local Cultural Centres

E. **Coding Rules:** Although most of the welfare legislation pieces are directly targeting one entity, some aim to influence ultimate target by having other ones (intermediate target) do/not do certain actions. For example, if the government is imposing a certain level of financial penalty to an employer not providing minimum wage to employees, the ultimate aim is to guarantee employees' income security. And it does so since following the suggested action by the government means providing minimum income to employees. Therefore, in this case, the bill should be coded as universal. However, in other cases, although the aim is to affect certain ultimate target, say, the general public, the relationship between intermediate targets' action/inaction and the claimed effect is not obvious as the minimum wage example. Public construction projects are good examples. Although the claimed goal is to improve public welfare by letting companies and construction workers to conduct the task, the benefits going to the public are not clear as employed construction workers and commissioned companies. So, in this case, the bill will be coded as "particularistic" regarding employed workers and commissioned companies as the main target of the bill.

3) Significance and Direction Dimension

A. Trivial

a. Categories: Stylistic changes, e.g. making legal languages more accessible; Automatic abolitions (e.g. removing a bill that became redundant after enacting a more inclusive one); Implementation details

b. Examples of bills: Act on Abolition of Labour Committee Law; Act on Abolition of Emergency Financial Measures; Act on Implementation of Commercial Act

B. Medium-level significance

a. Frequently appearing categories

i. Managing and developing related organizations;
ii. Rearranging and streamlining organizations
iii. Prescribing rights and duties, i.e. Framework Acts
iv. De-regulation of business, contracts, etc..
v. Increasing administrative efficiency for registration
vi. Increasing accessibility, e.g. selling drugs in convenient stores
vii. Proclaiming discrimination and injustice prevention

b. Notes on the direction of change:

- **Expansion:** i) if a bill is about accompanying specific measure/measures to realize the above-mentioned aspects for certain actors.

- **Retrenchment:** i) if a bill is about revoking specific measure/measures created to realize the above-mentioned aspects; ii) if a bill is about accompanying specific measure/measures to prevent the above-mentioned aspects for certain actors, e.g. narrowing the definition of sexual discrimination. iii) if a bill is about accompanying specific measure/measures opposite to the above-mentioned aspects for certain actors, e.g. tighter regulation of business. iv) if a bill is about forcing other actors, e.g. employers, local governments, to follow the changes (then the bill will be coded as retrenchment for that specific actor)

c. Examples of bills

Framework Act on Construction Industry; Act on Prohibition of Age Discrimination in Employment and Elderly Employment Promotion Small and Medium Enterprises Cooperatives; Act Intra-Company Labour Welfare Fund Act; Special Act on the Construction of Housing Monopoly; Regulation and Fair Trade Act; Immigration Control

Act; Framework Act on Health Examination; Act on Improving Operational Efficiency of Nation Pension; Act on Implementation of Social Security; Act on National Holidays and Elderly; Welfare Privacy Protection Act.

C. High-level significance

a. Frequently appearing categories

i) Providing services, e.g. medical, education, job-search, nursery, elderly care, inoculation, communication
ii) Establishing/unifying organization/organizations for recipients
iii) Establishing/stabilizing the financial base by creating a earmarked fund or linking the funding to general tax-base
iv) Widening the scope of recipients
v) Tax/debt/expense/fine reduction/exemption
vi) Increasing the amount of subsidy/loan/compensation,
vii) Extending the benefit receiving period
viii) Relaxing the benefit receiving conditions, e.g. contribution period, benefit receiving period
ix) Stabilizing price
x) Legalizing quota, e.g. mandatory women/disabled people employment

b. **Notes on the direction of change:** same as the mid-level significance

D. **Notes:** even if a change in one piece of legislation is "middle-level significance", it does not necessary mean that it is less important than "high-level significance" bills in the long-term. That is, although rearranging and streamlining organizations is "middle-level significance" based on the current coding scheme, it can be more significance than a piece of legislation with high-level significant changes like widening the scope of recipients or tax/debt/expense/fine reduction/exemptions. For instance, although postal reform in Japan during the Koizumi administration is just coded as "rearranging an organization" it is expected to reduce pork-barrel particularistic benefits in the long term.

Appendix 2. Selection Process for Media Content Analysis

1. Summary

The process specified here contains how specific newspaper articles were chosen for two levels of analyses. The first one is a preliminary analysis looking at the changing saliency of welfare issues based on the number of welfare-related articles, and what specific predefined categories each article belongs to. The second part examines the subject and reporting style of each article too get a more nuanced sense of ideological difference of left and right leaning newspapers and .governments.

2. Basic information

1) **Period:** Jan 1987-Dec 2012 (Japan), Jan 1990- Dec 2012 (Korea), Sep 1999-Dec 2012 (Taiwan). For Korea and Taiwan Jan 1990 and Sep 1999 were the initial searchable period each database engine contains

2) **Newspapers:** For Korea and Japan, two major newspapers were chosen from each country based on the political inclination, the amount of circulation, and the availability of searchable database. For Korea I chose *Donga* Ilbo (right-wing newspaper) and *Hankyorae* (left-wing newspaper) and for Japan, *Yomiuri* (right-wing newspaper) and *Asahi* (left-wing newspaper). Due to my limited linguistic fluency, my option was narrowed to English newspaper that reflects most of the contents written in Mandarin Chinese and with a searchable database on the web. So, Taipei times was chosen.

3) **Coded-dimension for preliminary analysis:** whether an article is welfare-related or not

4) **Articles for preliminary analysis:** 2659 (*Hankyorae*, Korea), 2012 (*Donga*, Korea), 5216 (*Asahi*, Japan), 7731 (*Yomiuri*, Japan), 1134 (*Taipei Times*, Taiwan) were chosen based on the following sequence.

A. Narrowed down the searching option to “nation-wide” and “morning” newspapers

B. Collected all the articles using search words "welfare policy" or "social policy" (Korea, Japan, and Taiwan)

C. Collected all the articles using major welfare-related search words "national pension" or "industrial accident insurance" or "employment insurance" or "minimum income law" or "social welfare service" or "childcare" or "elderly care" or "mother care" or "disabled care" or "public housing" or "sanitary law" or "refugee law" or "medical protection" (for only Korea and Japan)

D. Combining both B and C and removing overlapping articles (for Korea and Japan) resulted in 7673 (*Hankyorae*, Korea), 7007 (*Donga*), 5817 (*Asahi*), 11807 (*Yomiuri*). Taiwan was just based on B and the search engine gave 1389 articles (*Taipei Times*).

E. Hand-coded each article to confirm whether it was an article related to welfare policy or welfare politics based on the title and summary of each article. As a result, 2659 (*Hankyorae*, Korea), 2012 (*Donga*, Korea), 5216 (*Asahi*, Japan), 7731 (*Yomiuri*, Japan), 1134 (*Taipei Times*, Taiwan) were chosen for the analysis.

5) **Coded-dimension for main analysis:** the subject (politicians, bureaucrats, NGOs), reporting style (fact-reporting, critical judgement/diagnosis, quotation, suggestsion)

6) **Articles for main analysis:** 488 (*Hankyorae*, Korea), 376 (*Donga*, Korea), 400 (*Asahi*, Japan), 500 (*Yomiuri*, Japan), 400 (*Taipei Times*, Taiwan) were chosen and analysed based on the following sequence.

A. With the welfare-related articles, the random sampling method was used to choose 400-500 articles from each newspaper.

B. Hand-coded each article according to key subject and reporting style.

7) **Sources**

A. Korea: *Donga* and *Hankyorae* (http://www.kinds.or.kr/)

B. Japan: *Yomiuri* (http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/rekishikan/ryokin/); *Asahi* (http://database.asahi.com/library2e/)

C. Taiwan: *Taipei Times* (http://www.taipeitimes.com/)

Appendix 3. Selection Process for Social Network Analysis

1. Summary

This part explains how specific numbers and types of welfare bills were chosen to compare co-sponsorship networks in Korea and Japan.

2. Basic information

1) **Period:** For Korea and Japan, the specific dispersion periods were chosen with-in the same legislative session led-by the same ruling party (Uri-Party for Korea and DPJ for Japan) to minimize possible difference coming from the composition of the MPs in the legislative branch.

A. Low-dispersion level: May 2004-April 2005 for Korea, September 2009-June 2010 for Japan.

B. Low-dispersion level: May 2005-July 2007 for Korea, July 2010-December 2012 for Japan.

2) **Compared dimensions:** i) difference in welfare bill co-sponsorship networks between particularistic welfare benefits and universal benefits ii) difference in welfare bill co-sponsorship networks between low and high-level power dispersion

3) **Selection process:** roughly 50-70 bills were chosen from each country based on the following process

A. Korea

a. **Universalistic and particularistic benefits:** to cover a wide range of universal welfare benefits, bills with high publicity were chosen from social security, social service, and public assistance as follows. Given the high numbers of MP-submitted bills in Korea, bills with the same or almost similar title could be repeatedly chosen from different

dispersion periods. Same logic applies to particularistic welfare benefits.

Universal

Employment Insurance Act; National Health Insurance Act; National Basic Living Insurance Act; National Pension Act; Elderly Welfare Act; Mother and Child Care Act; Industrial Accident Act; Child Welfare Act; Infant Care Act; Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities; Minimum Age Act

Particularistic

Game Industry Promotion Act; Tourism Promotion Act; Act on Allowances for National Assembly Members; Act on the Promotion of Life Quality of Farmers and Fishermen and Regional Development of Agricultural and Fishing Villages; Agricultural Mechanization Promotion Act; Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural Industries; Pension for Private School Teachers and Staff Act; Special Act on Assistance to Fisherman and Development of Fisheries following the conclusion of fisheries agreement; Distribution Industry Development Act; Act on the Promotion of Collaborative Cooperation between Large Enterprises and Small-Medium Enterprises; Act on the Promotion of Local Newspapers; Special Act on the Assistance of the Development of Abandoned Mine Areas

b. In total, the following numbers of different bills were submitted for each type of welfare at different power dispersion periods.

   i) Universal (low level dispersion): 45
   ii) Universal (high level dispersion): 207
   iii) Particularistic (low level dispersion): 38
   iv) Particularistic (high level dispersion): 96

c. Taking into account the specific duration of each period (lower dispersion level lasted 11 months and high dispersion level 29 months), the following number of bills were randomly selected from the total submitted bills

   i) Universal (low level dispersion): 13
   ii) Universal (high level dispersion): 22
   iii) Particularistic (low level dispersion): 13

iv) Particularistic (high level dispersion): 13

d. Four networks are Universal/Dispersion level 1; Universal/Dispersion level 5; Particularistic/Dispersion level 1; Particularistic/Dispersion level 5.

B. Japan

a. **Universalistic and Particularistic benefits:** Given the low numbers of MP-submitted bills in Japan, the analysis could not prioritize choosing bills with the same (or almost similar) legal titles from different dispersion periods nor cover a wide range of universal welfare benefits including social security, social service, and public assistance. The situation is not different for particularistic bills. So the bills were just randomly selected from the MP-submitted ones and they are as follows.

Universal
National Pension Act; Child Protection Act; Child Allowance Act; Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities; National Compensation for Tsunami Victims; Medical Support for Allergy Patients, Special Measure for Contagious Disease

Particularistic
Tax deduction act on Youth Education Organization; Act on Punishment of Bribery of Public Servant; Act on Promotion of Local Agricultural Product Consumption; Basic Frame Act on Sports Industry; Act on Promotion of Tea Business; Subsidy on Agricultural Sector to Promote its multi-functionality; Support on Schools for Foreigners; Debt Removal Act for National Railway; Act on Legislator's Expense; Act on Promotion of Foreign Art Products

b. In total, the following numbers of different bills were submitted for each type of welfare at different power dispersion periods.

i) Universal (low level dispersion): 15
ii) Universal (high level dispersion): 42

iii) Particularistic (low level dispersion): 13

iv) Particularistic (high level dispersion): 32

c. Taking into account the specific duration of each period (lower dispersion level 10 months and high dispersion level 30 months), the following number of bills were randomly selected from the total submitted bills

i) Universal (low level dispersion): 13

ii) Universal (high level dispersion): 13

iii) Particularistic (low level dispersion): 13

iv) Particularistic (high level dispersion): 11

d. Four networks are Universal-Dispersion level 1; Universal-Dispersion level 5; Particularistic-Dispersion level 1; Particularistic-Dispersion level 5.

4) **Sources**

A. Korea: Deliberation Summary Record by The National Assembly Legislation Information System (http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/jsp/main.j)

B. Japan: House of Representative/Councillors submitted Bills, National Diet Library (http://iss.ndl.go.jp/)

Appendix 4. Transitions of Political Institutions in Korea (Source: Yoo (2006), National Election Committee (1987-2012))

Years	Power Dispersion Status	Leader	Electoral System	Election Results
1987	Majority/Single/Largest/No local = Dispersion 0	Chun Doo Hwan		Presidential Election (1987.12.16): Roh-Tae Woo (36.6%) General Election (1988.4.26) Total: 299 seats DJP: 125 (87+38); PDP: 70 (54+16); ULD: 59 (46+13); NDRP: 35 (27+8)
1988	Majority/Single/Largest/No local (~1988.4) =Dispersion 0 Minority/Coalition/Largest/Local Winner (1988.5~) =Dispersion 4	Roh-Tae Woo	Mixed Member Proportional System 224 seats (SMD), 75seats (PR) SMD: SNTV/Plurality Rule PR seat: ½ of the seats to the first party. Other seats distributed to other parties in proportion to seat share in local districts.	
1989	Minority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 4	Roh-Tae Woo		
1990	Majority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 2 (1990.1~)	Roh-Tae Woo		
1991	Majority/Coalition/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 2 (1990.1~)	Roh-Tae Woo		Local Election (1991.6.20) DLP: 564; NDA: 165; DP: 21 DPP: 1; Independent: 115
1992	Majority/Coalition/Largest/No Local =Dispersion 2 (~1992.2) Minority/Single/Largest/No local =Dispersion 4 (1992.3~1992.4)	Roh-Tae Woo	Mixed Member Proportional System 237 seats (SMD), 62 seats (PR)	General Election (1992.3.24) Total: 299 seats DLP: 149 (116+33); DP 97 (75+22); UPP 31 (24+7); NPP 1 (1+0); Ind. 21 (21+0)

	Majority/Single/Largest/No local =Dispersion 0 (1992.5~)		SMD: SNTV/Plurality Rule PR seat: All seats distributed in proportion to seat share in local districts	Presidential Election (1992.12.18): Kim Young Sam (42%)
1993	Majority/Single/Largest/No local =Dispersion 0	Kim Young Sam		
1994	Majority/Single/Largest/No local =Dispersion 0	Kim Young Sam		
1995	Majority/Single/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 1	Kim Young Sam		Local election (1995.6.27) DLP: 284; DP: 353; LDA: 23 , 86; Independent: 53, 152
1996	Majority/Single/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 1 (~1996.3) Minority/Single/Largest/No local =Dispersion 4 (1996.4~1996.5) Majority/Single/Largest/No local =Dispersion 0 (1996.6~)	Kim Young Sam	Mixed Member Proportional System 253 seats (SMD), 46 seats (PR)	General Election (1996.4.11) NKP: 139 (121+18); NPPC: 79 (66+13); LDA: 50 (41+9); UDP: 15 (9+6); Independent: 16 (16+0)
1997	Majority/Single/Largest/No local =Dispersion 0	Kim Young Sam		Presidential Election (1997.12.18): Kim Dae Jung (40.3%)
1998	Majority/Single/Largest/No local =Dispersion 0 (~1998.1) Minority/Single/Not-largest/Local winner=Dispersion 5 (1998.2~1998.7) Majority/Coalition/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 2 (1998.8~)	Kim Dae Jung	SMD: SNTV/Plurality Rule PR seat: All seats distributed in proportion voting share in local districts	Local election (1998.6.4) GNP: 224; NPPC: 271; LDA: 82; PNP: 0; Independent: 39
1999	Majority/Coalition/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 2	Kim Dae Jung		
2000	Majority/Coalition/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 2 (~2000.4)	Kim Dae Jung	Mixed Member Proportional System	General Election (2000.4.13) GNP: 133 (112+21); MDP: 115 (96+19); LDA: 17 (12+5); DPP: 2

	Minority/Single/Not Largest/No local =Dispersion 5 (2000.5~)		227 seats (SMD), 46seats (PR) Mixed Member Proportional System SMD: SNTV/Plurality Rule PR seat: All seats distributed in proportion voting share in local districts	(1+1)
2001	Minority/Single/Not Largest/No local =Dispersion 5 (~2001.3) Majority/Single/Not Largest/No local =Dispersion 1 (2001.4~)	Kim Dae Jung		
2002	Majority/Single/Not Largest/No local =Dispersion 1 (~2002.5) Majority/Single/Not Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 2 (2002.6~)	Kim Dae Jung		Local Election (2002.6.13) GNP: 467; MDP: 143; LDA: 32; DLP: 11; Independent: 26 Presidential Election (2002.12.19): Roh Moo Hyun (48.9%)
2003	Majority/Single/Not Largest/No local=Dispersion 1 (2003.1~)	Roh Moo Hyun		
2004	Majority/Single/Not Largest/No local=Dispersion 1 (~2004.4) Majority/Single/Largest/No local=Dispersion 0 (2004.5~)	Roh Moo Hyun	Mixed Member Majoritarian System 243 seats (SMD) 56 seats (PR) SMD: SNTV/Plurality Rule PR seat: Voters vote separately for this tier	General Election (2004.4.15) GNP: 100(41.2%) + 21(37.5%) = 121 (40.4%) MDP: 5(2.1%) + 4(7.1%) = 9 (3.01%) UP: 129(53.2%) + 23(41.1%) = 152 (50.84%) LDA: 4(1.6%) + 0 (0%) = 4 (1.34%) DLP: 2(0.8%) + 8(14.3%) = 10 (3.34%) Independent: 2(1.1%) + 0(0.0) % = 2 (0)
2005	Majority/Single/Largest/No local=Dispersion 0 (~2005.4) Minority/Single/Largest/No local=Dispersion 4 (2005.5~)	Roh Moo Hyun		
2006	Minority/Single/Largest/No local=Dispersion 4 (~2006.5) Minority/Single/Largest/Local loser=Dispersion	Roh Moo Hyun		Local election (2006.5.31) UP: 52; GNP: 557; DP: 80; PCP: 15; Independent: 14

	5 (2006.6~)			
2007	Minority/Single/Largest/Local loser=Dispersion 5 (~2007.7) Minority/Single/Not largest/Local loser=Dispersion 6 (2007.8~)	Roh Moo Hyun		Presidential Election (2007.12.19): Lee Myung Bak (48.7%)
2008	Minority/Single/Largest/No local=Dispersion 4 (2008.1~2008.4) Majority/Single/Largest/No local=Dispersion 0 (2008.5~)	Lee Myung Bak		General Election (2008.4.9) GNP: 131 (54%) + 22(39.2%) = 153(51.2%) UDP: 66(27.2%) + 15(26.8%) = 81 (27.1%) LPP: 14(5.7%) + 4(7.14%) = 18 (6%) PPGC: 6 (2.5%) + 8(14.3%) = 14 (5%) DLP: 2 (0.8%) + 3(8.93%) = 5 (1.67%) CKP: 1 (0.4%) + 2(3.57%) = 3 (1%)
2009	Majority/Single/Largest/No local=Dispersion 0	Lee Myung Bak		
2010	Majority/Single/Largest/No local=Dispersion 0 (~2010.5) Majority/Single/Largest/Local loser=Dispersion 1 (2010.6~)	Lee Myung Bak		Local election (2010.6.2) GNP: 252; DP: 328; LAP: 38; DLP: 18; PNP: 0;PPP: 3
2011	Majority/Single/Largest/Local loser=Dispersion 1 (2010.6~)	Lee Myung Bak		
2012	Majority/Single/Largest/Local loser=Dispersion 1 (~2012.4) Majority/Single/Largest/No local=Dispersion 0 (2012.5~)	Lee Myung Bak		General election (2012.4.12) SP: 127 + 25 = 152 (50.83%); DUP: 106+ 21 = 127 (42.47%); UPP: 17 + 6 = 23 (0.08%); LAP: 3 + 2 = 5 (0.02%) Presidential election (2012.12.19) =Park Geun-hye (51.6%)

Appendix 5. Transitions of Political Institutions in Japan (Source: Estevez-Abe (2009), Statistics Bureau (1987-2012))

Years	Government Type	Leader	Electoral System	Election Results
1987	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0 (~1987.3)	~1987.11 1987.11~ Takeshita	Lower House (4 years in office, but subject to early dissolution): MMD (2-6) with SNTV/Plurality Rule 511 seats in 129 districts Upper House (6 years in office, 76 MPs selected every three years): 152 Prefectural seats, 100 PR seats Prefectural: MMD (district size: 1-5) with SNTV/Plurality; PR: closed-list	Local election (1987.4.12) LDP: 1382; JSP: 443; CGP: 186; DSP: 104; JCP: 118; SDA: 5; other: 35;Independent: 397
1988	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0	Takeshita		
1989	Majority/Single/Largest/ Local winner=Dispersion 0 (~1989.6) Minority/Single/Largest/ Local loser=Dispersion 4 (1989.7~)	~1989.6 Uno (LDP) 1989.6~1989.8 Kaifu (LDP) 1989.8~ Miyazawa (LDP)		Upper house (1989.7.23) LDP: 36, JSP: 46, CGP: 10, JCP 5, DSP 3, Rengo 11
1990	Minority/Single/Largest/ Local loser=Dispersion 4	Miyazawa (LDP)		Lower house (1990.2.18) LDP: 275; JSP136; CGP 45; JCP16; DSP 14
1991	Minority/Single/Largest/ Local winner=Dispersion 4	1991.11~ Miyazawa (LDP)		Local election (1991.4.7) LDP: 1543; JSP: 345; CGP: 150; JCP: 98; DSP: 82; SDP: 4; Others: 33
1992	Minority/Single/Largest/ Local winner=Dispersion 4	Miyazawa (LDP)		Upper house (1992.7.26) LDP: 68; JSP: 22, CGP 14 , JCP 6, DSP 4
1993	Minority/Single/Largest/ No local=Dispersion 4 (~1993.7) Minority/Coalition/Not largest/ No local=Dispersion 7 (1993.8~)	~1993.8 Miyazawa (LDP) 1994.8~ Hosokawa (JNP)		Lower house (1993.7.18) LDP: 223, JSP 70, NFP 55, CGP 51, JCP 15, DSP 15, JNP 35, Saki 13
1994	Minority/Coalition/Not largest/ No local=Dispersion 7 (~1994.6) Majority/Coalition/Not largest/ No local=Dispersion 3	~1994.4 Hosokawa (JNP) 1994.4~1994.6	Lower House (4 years in office, but subject to early dissolution):	

	(1994.7~)	Hata (Shinsei) 1994.6~ Hata (Shinsei)	Mixed Member Electoral System with two tiers	
1995	Majority/Coalition/Not largest/ Local winner=Dispersion 3	Hata (Shinsei)	SMD Tier: 300 seats in 300 districts, Plurality Rule PR Tier: 200 seats in 11 districts, Closed-List PR	Local Election (1995.4.9) LDP: 1275; NPP: 140; JSP: 277; Saki: 9; JCP: 91; CGP: 148; other: 78; Independent: 587 Upper house (1995.7.23) LDP: 46; JSP: 16, New Saki 3, NPP: 40, JCP 8
1996	Majority/Coalition/Not largest/ No local=Dispersion 3 (~1996.1) Majority/Coalition/Largest/ No local=Dispersion 2 (1996.2~)	~1996.1 Hata (Shinsei) 1996.1~ Hashimoto (LDP)		Lower house (1996.10.20) LDP:239, DSP: 15, New Saki: 2, NPP: 156, DPJ: 52, JCP: 26
1997	Majority/Coalition/Largest/No local=Dispersion 2	Hashimoto (LDP)		
1998	Majority/Coalition/Largest/No local=Dispersion 2	~1998.7 Hashimoto (LDP) 1998.7~ Obuchi (LDP)		Upper house (1998.7.12) LDP: 45; DPJ: 27; CGP: 9; LP: 6; DSP: 5 JCP: 15
1999	Majority/Coalition/Largest/No local=Dispersion 2 (~1999.3) Majority/Coalition/Largest/Local loser=Dispersion 3 (1999.4~1999.9) Majority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 2 (1999.10~)	Obuchi (LDP)		Local election (1999.4.11) LDP: 1288; DPJ: 170; CGP: 166; LP: 20 JCP: 152; DSP: 64; Saki: 2; other: 79; Independent: 698
2000	Majority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 2	~2000.4 Obuchi (LDP) 2000.4~ Mori (LDP)	Lower House (4 years in office, but subject to early dissolution): Mixed Member	Lower house (2000. 6. 25) LDP: 233, DSP: 19, CP 7, CGP 31, DPJ 127, JCP 22, LP 22

			Electoral System with two tiers SMD Tier: 300 seats in 300 districts, Plurality Rule PR Tier: 180 seats in 11 districts, Closed-List PR	
2001	Majority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 2	~2001.4 Mori (LDP) 2001.4~ Koizumi (LDP)	Upper House (6 years in office, 76 MPs selected every three years): 146 Prefectural seats, 96 PR seats Prefectural: MMD (district size: 1-5) with SNTV/Plurality; PR: Open-list	Upper house (2001.7.29) LDP: 65; DPJ: 26; CGP: 13; LP: 6; DSP: 3 JCP 5; CP: 1
2002	Majority/Coalition/Largest/ No local =Dispersion 2	Koizumi (LDP)		
2003	Majority/Coalition/Largest/ Local winner =Dispersion 2	Koizumi (LDP)		Local election (2003.4.27) LDP: 1309; DPJ: 205; CGP: 178; LP: 25 JCP: 107; DSP: 73; NCP: 4; other: 46 Independent: 687 Lower house (2003.11.9) LDP: 237, DSP: 6, NCP 0, CGP: 34 , DPJ: 177, JCP 9
2004	Majority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 2	Koizumi (LDP)		Upper house (2004.7.11) LDP: 49; DPJ: 50; CGP: 11; DSP: 2 JCP 4
2005	Majority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 2	Koizumi (LDP)		Lower house (2005.9.11) LDP: 296, DSP: 7, CGP 31, DPJ: 113, JCP 9, NPJ 4
2006	Majority/Coalition/Largest/ No local =Dispersion 2	~2006.9 Koizumi (LDP) 2006.9~ Abe (LDP)		
2007	Majority/Coalition/Largest/ Local winner =Dispersion 2 (~2007.7)	~2007.9 Abe (LDP)		Local Election (2007.4.8)

	Minority/Coalition/Largest/ No local =Dispersion 6 (2007.8~)	2007.9~ Fukuda (LDP)		LDP: 1212; DPJ: 375; CGP: 181; JCP: 100 DSP: 52; NPJ: 1; other: 40; Independent: 583 Upper house (2007.7.29) LDP: 37; DPJ: 60; CGP: 9; DSP: 2 JCP 3; NPJ: 2
2008	Minority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 6	~2008.9 Fukuda (LDP) 2008.9~ Aso (LDP)		
2009	Minority/Coalition/Largest/ No local =Dispersion 6 (~2009.8) Majority/Single/Largest/Local =Dispersion 0 (2009.9~)	~2009.9 Aso (LDP) 2009.9~ Hatoyama (DPJ)		Lower house (2009.8.30) LDP: 119, DSP: 7, CGP 21, DPJ 308, JCP 9, NPJ 3, NJP 1,YP 5
2010	Majority/Single/Largest/Local =Dispersion 0 (~2010.6) Minority/Single/Largest/Local =Dispersion 4 (2010.7~)	~2010.6 Hatoyama (DPJ) 2010.6~ Kan (DPJ)		Upper house (2010.7.25) LDP: 51, DSP: 2, CGP 9, JCP 3, NRP: 1; DPJ: 44, YP: 10
2011	Minority/Single/Largest/Local =Dispersion 4 (~2011.3) Minority/Single/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 5 (2011.4~)	~2011.8 Kan (DPJ) 2011.9~ Noda (DPJ)		Local Election (2011.4.22) DPJ: 346; LDP: 1119; CGP: 171; JCP: 80; DSP: 30; YP: 41; other: 98; Independent: 442
2012	Minority/Single/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 5 (~2012.12)	~2012.12 Noda (DPJ)		Lower House (2012.12.16) LDP: 294; DPJ: 57; JRP: 54; CGP: 31; YP: 18; JCP: 8; JFP: 9; DSP: 2; NPJ: 1

Appendix 6. Transitions of Political Institutions in Taiwan (Source: (2009), Statistics Bureau (1987-2012))

Years	Government Type	Leader	Electoral System	Electoral Results
1987	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0	Chang Ching-Kuo	73 directly elected (for Taiwan Province, Taipei and Kaoshiung) + 27 delegated (for Mainland Chinese living in Taiwan)	General (1986.12.6) KMT: 79; Chinese Youth Party: 2; Independents: 18
1988	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0	Lee Teng Hui		
1989	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0	Lee Teng Hui	101 directly elected (for Taiwan Province, Taipei and Kaoshiung) + 28 delegated (for Mainland Chinese living in Taiwan)	Local Council (1989.12.2) KMT: 14; DPP: 6; Independent: 1 General (1989.12.3) KMT: 94; Chinese Youth Party: 1; Democratic Progressive Party: 21; Independent: 14 (Total: 129)
1990	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0	Lee Teng Hui		
1991	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0	Lee Teng Hui		
1992	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0	Lee Teng Hui	Semi-Proportional SNTV (MMD) w/ PR list allocation 119 seats (MMD), 6 (aboriginals), 30 (domestic PR), and 6 (overseas PR)	General (1992.12.21) KMT: 95; DPP: 51; China Social Democratic Party: 1; Independent: 14
1993	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0	Lee Teng Hui		
1994	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0	Lee Teng Hui		Local Mayor (1994.12.3) Taiwan Province: KMT; Taipei City: DPP; Kao-siung: KMT Local Council (1994.12.3)


				KMT: 91; DPP: 52; New Party: 14; Independent: 17
1995	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0	Lee Teng Hui	Semi-Proportional SNTV (MMD) with PR list allocation 122 seats (MMD), 6 (aboriginals), 30 (domestic PR), and 6 (overseas PR)	General (1995.12.2) KMT: 85; DPP: 54; New Party: 21: Independent: 4
1996	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0	Lee Teng Hui		Presidential (1996.3.23) Lee Ten-hui (KMT): 54%; Peng Ming-min (DPP): 21.1%; Lin-Yang-kang (Independent): 14.9%
1997	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0	Lee Teng Hui		
1998	Majority/Single/Largest/Local winner =Dispersion 0 (~1992.11) Majority/Single/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 1	Lee Teng Hui	Semi-Proportional SNTV (MMD) with PR list allocation 168 seats (MMD), 8 (aboriginals), 41 (domestic PR), and 8 (overseas PR)	General (1998.12.5) KMT: 123; DPP: 70; New Party: 11; Democratic Union of Taiwan: 4; New National Party: 1; Taiwan Independent Party: 1; Nationwide Democratic Non-partisan Union: 3; Independent: 12 (Total: 225) Local Mayor (1998.12.5) Taipei: KMT, Kao-siung: DPP Local Council (1998.12.5) KMT: 98; DPP: 48; New Party: 10; Independent: 10
1999	Majority/Single/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 1	Lee Teng Hui		
2000	Majority/Single/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 1 (~2000.3) Minority/Coalition/not-Largest/No local =Dispersion 7 (2000.4~)	Chen Shui - bian		Presidential (2000.3.18) Chen Sui-bian (DPP): 39.3%; Soong Chu-Yu (Independent): 36.8%; Lien Chan (KMT): 23.1%
2001	Minority/Coalition/not-Largest/No local =Dispersion	Chen Shui -		

	7 (~2001.11) Minority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 6 (2001.12~)	bian		General (2001.12.1) DPP: 87; KMT: 68; People First Party: 46; Taiwan Solidarity Union: 13; New Party: 1; Independent: 10
2002	Minority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 6 (~2002.11) Minority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 7 (2002.12~)	Chen Shui - bian		Local Council (2002.12.7) KMT: 32; DPP: 31; PFP: 15;New Party: 5; TSU: 2, Independent:11
2003	Minority/Coalition/Largest/Local =Dispersion 7	Chen Shui - bian		
2004	Minority/Coalition/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 7 (~2004.3) Minority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 6 (2004.4~)	Chen Shui - bian		Presidential (2004.3.20) Chen Shui-bian (DPP): 50.11% Lien Chan (KMT): 49.89% General (2004.12.11) KMT: 79; People First Party: 34; New Party: 1; DPP: 89; Taiwan Solidarty Union: 12; Non-Partisan Solidarity Union: 6; Independent: 4
2005	Minority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 6	Chen Shui - bian		
2006	Minority/Coalition/Largest/No local =Dispersion 6 (~2006.11) Minority/Coalition/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 7 (2006.12~)	Chen Shui - bian		Local Council (2006.12.9) KMT: 41; DPP: 33; PFP: 6; New Party: 4; TSU: 3, Independent: 9
2007	Minority/Coalition/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 7	Chen Shui - bian		
2008	Minority/Coalition/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 7 (~2008.3) Minority/Coalition/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 2 (2008.4~)	Ma Ying-jeou	Mixed Member Majoritarian system (with a separate PR list)	Presidential (2008.3.22) Ma Ying-Jeou (KMT): 58.45%; Frank Hsieu Chang-ting (DPP): 41.55%


			73 (SMD), 6 (aboriginals), 34 (PR)	General (2008.3.22) KMT: 71; PFP: 8; New Party:2; Non-partisan solidarity Union: 3; People First Party:1; DPP: 27; Taiwan Solidarity Union: 0; Taiwan Constitutional Association: 0
2009	Minority/Coalition/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 2	Ma Ying-jeou		
2010	Minority/Coalition/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 2 (~2010.11) Minority/Coalition/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 3 (2010.12~)	Ma Ying-jeou		Local Council (2010.11.27) KMT: 130; DPP: 130; PFP: 4; New Party: 3; TSU: 2, Independent: 95
2011	Minority/Coalition/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 3	Ma Ying-jeou		
2012	Minority/Coalition/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 3 (~2012.1) Minority/Coalition/Largest/Local loser =Dispersion 2 (2012.2~)	Ma Ying-jeou		Presidential (2012.1.14) Ma Ying-jeou (KMT): 51.6%; Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) 45.63%; James Soong Chu-yu (People First): 2.77% General (2012.1.14) KMT: 64; PFP: 3; New Party: 0; DPP: 40; TSU: 3; Independent: 1

Appendix 7. Evolution of Parties in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan (1987-2012)


Korea



Japan


1987
1993
1996
1998
2000
2002
2005
2009
2012
JSP
JCP
LDP
JNP
JRP
Saki
Komei
NFP
NSP
SDP
DPJ
LP
New Komei
LP
NPP
RC
FP
VPP
FF
GG
CP
NCP
NPJ
PNP
YP
JRP

Taiwan


1987
KMT
DPP
1990
1993
New Party
1996
TIP
2000
PFP
2001
TSU
NPSU
2004
2008
2012

Appendix 8. Interview Dates and Interviewee List

Date and Place	Background
16:00~17:00, 16th July 2013 Seoul, Korea	Senuri Party Legislator's senior staff
20:30~22:00, 24th July 2013 Seoul, Korea	Democratic Party Legislator's senior staff
15:25~16:10, 25th July 2013 Seoul, Korea	Democratic Party Legislator's senior staff (welfare standing committee)
10:00~11:00, 30th July 2013 Seoul, Korea	Senuri Party Legislator's senior staff
11:00~12:00, 30th July 2013 Seoul, Korea	Senuri Party Legislator's senior staff
15:00~16:00, 30th July 2013 Seoul, Korea	Democratic Party Legislator's senior staff (welfare standing committee)
16:00~17:00, 1st August, 2013 Seoul, Korea	Senuri Party Legislator's senior staff (welfare standing committee)
10:10~11:20, 8th August , 2013 Seoul, Korea	Choongang Daily Newspaper Reporter (politics session)
17:00-20:00, 12th August, 2013 Seoul, Korea	NGO Welfare State Society co-representative
14:00-15:00, 16th August, 2013) Seoul, Korea	Choongang Daily Newspaper Reporter (welfare & society session)
19:00-21:00, 16th August, 2013 Seoul, Korea	Yonghap NEWS reporter (society session)
15:00-17:00, 20th August, 2013 Seoul, Korea	Citizens United for Better Society (society and welfare session)
13:30-14:30, 23rd August, 2013 Seoul, Korea	Ministry of Welfare, Public Relations Officer
15:05-16:20, 23rd August, 2013	Ministry of Welfare, Regulation and Legislation Officer

Seoul, Korea	
11:05-12:15, 27th August, 2013 Seoul, Korea	Hankyorae Newspaper reporter (society and welfare session)
15:00-16:15, 27th August, 2013 Seoul, Korea	NGO Citizen's Coalition for NGO Justice (society and welfare session)
16:00-16:35, 30th August, 2013 Seoul, Korea	Korea University Public Administration Department Professor (field of specialization: Welfare and Society)
17:00-17:30, 30th August, 2013 Seoul, Korea	Hankyorae Newspaper reporter (health and medical issue session)
17:00-18:15, 17th September, 2013 Tokyo, Japan	Choongang Daily Newspaper (Tokyo correspondent)
19:30-22:00, 27th September, 2013 Tokyo, Japan	Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication bureaucrat
19:30-21:30, 3rd October, 2013 Tokyo, Japan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucrat
10:15-11:30, 7th October, 2013 Tokyo, Japan	Waseda University Political Science department researcher (field of specialization: legislative politics)
11:30-13:00, 15th October, 2013 Tokyo, Japan	Gakushuin University Law department professor (field of specialization: legislative politics and methodology)
13:30-14:15, 20th October, 2013 Tokyo, Japan	Ministry of Justice bureaucrat
11:15-12:40, 22nd October, 2013 Osaka, Japan	Osaka City University Law Department Professor (field of specialization: welfare politics)
17:00-18:15, 22nd October, 2013 Kobe, Japan	Kobe University Political Science Professor (field of specialization: legislative politics)
16:40-18:00, 23rd Oct, 2013 Osaka, Japan	Kyoto University Law Department Professor (field of specialization: political institutions)
18:10-20:30, 28th Oct, 2013 Niigata, Japan	Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare bureaucrat

10:00-11:00, 4th Nov, 2013 Tokyo, Japan	Liberal Democratic Party Legislator (elected 4 times)
09:30-10:00, 11th Dec, 2013 Tokyo, Japan	Liberal Democratic Party Legislator (elected 4 times)
11:00-12:15, 11th Dec, 2013 Tokyo, Japan	Minnano Party legislator (elected 2 time, Welfare standing committee)
11:00-12:20, 12th Dec, 2013 Tokyo, Japan	Yomiuri Newspaper reporter (society and welfare session)
08:00-09:00, 16th Dec, 2013 Tokyo, Japan	Prime minister's Office Senior Staff
19:00~21:00, 25th Mar, 2014 Taipei, Taiwan	Yonhap News Agency Taipei Correspondent
15:00~17:00, 27th Mar, 2014 Taipei, Taiwan	Ex Chunghwa Broadcast Vice-President
15:00~17:00, 29th Mar, 2014 Taipei, Taiwan	Professor, National Chengzhi University Social Policy Department
17:00~18:30, 7th Apr, 2014 Taipei, Taiwan	Professor, National Taiwan University Sociology Department; Ex Minister without portfolio
15:15~17:10, 11th Apr, 2014 Taipei, Taiwan	Professor, National Chung-Chen University, Social Policy Department
14:00~15:15, 16th Apr, 2014 Taipei, Taiwan	Senior Researcher in Academia Sinica, Taiwan Politics Specialist
14:00~15:15, 17th Apr, 2014 Taipei, Taiwan	KMT Legislator, Welfare Specialist
15:30~16:20, 17th Apr, 2014 Taipei, Taiwan	Professor, National Taiwan University, Social Work Department
16:45~18:15, 17th Apr, 2014 Taipei, Taiwan	Secretary General, Welfare NGO
14:35~15:50, 18th Apr, 2014	Professor, Department of Political Science,

Taipei, Taiwan	Soochow University
10:35~13:05, 21st Apr, 2014 Kaohsiung, Taiwan	Previous KMT Legislator, Welfare Specialist and a professor
14:00~14:55, 24th Apr, 2014 Taipei, Taiwan	KMT Legislator, Welfare Specialist
15:00~16:00, 24th Apr, 2014 Taipei, Taiwan	DPP Legislator, Welfare Specialist
10:00~13:00, 16th Jan, 2015 Seoul, Korea	NGO People's Alliance for Participatory Democracy, Parliamentary Monitoring Team

Appendix 9. Online Appendix

Due to the space limitation, statistical results based on i) different cut-off points, e.g. power dispersion level, ii) different boundaries of concepts, e.g. wider and narrower definition of social policy, and iii) with/without some control variables cannot be presented here. Instead, detailed results can be found from the online appendix of this dissertation (follow https://sites.google.com/site/jaeminshimdpir/)

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