

Lebanese Sectarianism

Understanding and Mitigating Bias



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Abstract

Intergroup biases are correlated with an erosion of civil society, uneven distribution of public goods, sub-optimal economic outcomes, political corruption, and intergroup conflict. These negative consequences have inspired generations of researchers to devise theories to understand the nature of bias and to develop methods to mitigate such bias. The objective of this book is to apply these theories to the Lebanese context to understand the extent and nature of biases among Lebanese sectarian groups. Specifically, this book explores intergroup relations among Lebanese Christians, Shias and Sunnis. The book then tests whether bias mitigation strategies that were developed in Western contexts may ameliorate intergroup biases in Lebanon.

This book uses two studies to make five principal contributions to the literature. The first study administers conjoint and lab-in-the-field investment experiments to students in four Lebanese universities. The second study uses similar experimental instruments and captures a broader swath of the Lebanese population in towns and village dispersed throughout the country. The evidence from these studies shows that bias exists among sectarian, partisan, and religious groups. Furthermore, bias along partisan lines is substantially stronger than bias along sectarian lines. This finding is in line with a growing literature on the primacy of affective polarization in Western context. The book then assesses three possible ways to mitigate intergroup bias. First, this book tests the contact hypothesis in Lebanese universities, finding limited evidence that intergroup contact in the university context has a positive effect on students' attitudes and behaviors. Second, the book assesses whether variation in social geography creates opportunities for intergroup reconciliation or triggers intergroup threat perceptions. Finally, this book tests whether an episode of a unifying national narrative that transcends partisan and sectarian divisions is capable of diminishing intergroup bias. Results for the positive effects of a unifying national narrative are suggestive, but muted.

Chapter 1

The Puzzle

"Go to Hariri hospital, leave through Hariri airport, or catch up with Rafiq Hariri in person."

— Bishara, 2021. A common refrain that echoed on Lebanese social media platforms in the midst of violent anti-government protests that began in October 2019. Former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who gave his name to many of the buildings he modernized, was assassinated in 2005.

Once hailed as the Paris of the Middle East, Beirut became embroiled in a series of political conflicts and violent battles in the last half century. The violence reached its apex between 1975 and 1990 when Lebanon was plunged into a brutal Civil War that devastated its government, economy, civil society, and infrastructure. To this day, Lebanon continues to bear the scars of the devastating conflict in the loss of a large proportion of its population to violence and emigration. Whether in the capital, the suburbs or the countryside, the scars of the Civil War are evident in bullet-riddled buildings and in the segregated enclaves that constitute the social geography of Lebanon.

Conflict did not fully abate when the Ta'if Agreement of 1989 ended the Civil War and laid the foundation for political reconciliation among Lebanon's war-weary sectarian groups. For one thing, the Shia-dominated Hezbollah refused to lay down its weapons, even when its leadership developed a political branch and was elected to Parliament. The

militia had formed during the Civil War to combat Israeli occupation and uplift the Shia community — a mission it continues to use as a pretext for its refusal to disarm. For another, Lebanon remained subject to a myriad of influences from foreign actors. Syrian and Israeli occupation throughout the 1990s meant that Lebanon continued to be engulfed in low-level political and armed violence. Specifically, Hezbollah waged a successful guerrilla war against Israel in the South. Meanwhile, the country contended with persistent political violence from the heavy-handed Syrian occupation. At the turn of the millennium, Lebanon finally gained its independence from foreign occupation. Hezbollah expelled Israel from Lebanese territory. And, the peaceful 2005 Cedar Revolution forced Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, bringing an end to political repression. Self-determination, peace, and economic prosperity were finally within reach as political parties made promises to rebuild the war-torn country and to reestablish the long-awaited national unity that the Civil War had destroyed. Those hopes were extinguished during the succeeding decade and a half when it became clear that the structural weaknesses created by sectarian power-sharing would persist indefinitely.

The Ta'if Agreement ended the war, but failed to change the confessional power-sharing system that had contributed to the Civil War in the first place. The Agreement reaffirmed the consociational arrangement that allocated parliamentary seats according to the population proportion of each sect. By the late 1980s this meant that the power-sharing formula had to be adjusted to account for the simultaneous increase in the Muslim population and the decline in the Christian population. The Agreement brought the 6:5 proportional arrangement that favored Christians before the Civil War to parity with the Muslim sects after the war. Today, many decry the equal representation between Christian and Muslim sects in Parliament, citing evidence that Lebanese Christians comprise less than half of the national population.¹

¹The last official government census was carried out in 1932. Since that time, and especially, after the Civil War, the prospect of conducting another census has been a politically charged topic. It has not been undertaken. Data gathered by private companies suggests that 31.9% of the population is Sunni, 31% is Shia, 32.4% is Maronite, and 4.52% is Druze (*Report on International Religious Freedom: Lebanon* 2019).

The Agreement further ensured that top posts remain divided by sectarian identity: the President is always Christian, Prime Minister is Sunni, and Speaker of Parliament is Shia. Although the war had formally ended at a stalemate, the conflict left Lebanese Christians at a disadvantage. The Agreement reflected this political change by substantially weakening the Christian President relative to the Sunni Prime Minister and Shia Speaker. The adjustment in the power-sharing formula in Parliament and the substantial weakening of the President have since had a substantial impact on Lebanese politics and society. Arrangements at the top trickle down proportionally through the government bureaucracy, the military, and most other institutions through quotas and patronage networks.

The great flaw underlying the consociational arrangement is the assumption that identities are primordial. This assumption underlies the decision to base political representation on sectarian identities. Each sect is represented separately and distinctly to ensure that all groups are given a voice in the political process (Lijphart, 1977). In practice, this system of power-sharing gives rise to political parties that each draws the majority of its support from a single sectarian group. Three principal negative consequences emerge from this arrangement. First, consociationalism fosters corruption and erodes the equitable provision of public goods and services. To garner votes, political parties cultivate patronage and clientelist networks among the sectarian communities they represent to disburse goods, services, and opportunities through a well-established system of incentives and intimidation (Corstange, 2012; Cammett, 2014). An individual's economic opportunities may be enhanced or restricted by the individual's ability to gain and maintain access to a party's patronage. The ability to even enter an industry may depend on which sectarian group dominates the particular private or public sector. On the aggregate, patronage networks create inefficiency and promote vote-buying and the uneven distribution of benefits.

Second, the fact that each party draws support from a single sectarian community equates partisan identities with sectarian identities. Blurring the line between party and sect cultivates the perception that political competition is a zero-sum game in which the

political victory of one sectarian group occurs at the expense of another. Political actors utilize the rhetoric of zero-sum competition to foster loyalty to their parties and animus toward opposing parties. Insofar as parties are equated with sects in the political arena, the animus directed toward a political party may transfer toward the sect it represents.

Finally, consociationalism entrenches existing sectarian political parties and hinders the rise of secular or cross-sectarian parties. Lebanese politics are dominated by former military veterans, militia leaders, and powerful families who consolidated their power during the Civil War. In opposition to entrenched political control by a small group of families and military leaders, a significant proportion of the Lebanese population periodically rebels in large-scale cross-sectarian demonstrations. During the 2015 "You Stink" movement and the mass anti-government uprisings of 2019, demonstrators sought to reform the inefficient, divisive, and corrupt consociational system. These mass movements were met with resistance and some nominal concessions from political elites, but no significant reform followed. Even instances when mass mobilization culminates in the creation of new political parties, these parties find it nearly impossible to break into the established sectarian party system.

For example, a non-sectarian, independent movement of intellectuals and technocrats under the banner of Beirut Madinati contested the 2016 municipal elections in Beirut, but failed to win any seats. The loss was blamed on the majoritarian, or first-past-the-post, electoral system that permitted entrenched sectarian parties to collude together across partisan cleavages to defeat the nascent political movement. The narrative surrounding the defeat of Beirut Madinati centered on how bitter sectarian rivals willingly cooperated to defeat threats to their entrenched power. However, when the votes were tallied, they revealed that Beirut Madinati failed to garner votes commensurate with its purported popular support. In addition to structural barriers and political collusion on the part of establishment parties, voters were less enthusiastic about the secular party than originally anticipated.

The persistence of sectarian parties in light of significant episodes of mass mobilization against entrenched political forces is somewhat puzzling. Although Lebanon is not

a democracy, it is also not a dictatorship. Therefore, corruption, intimidation, and vote-buying alone are insufficient to explain the persistence of sectarian political parties. Instead, it is important to acknowledge that, despite the system's many flaws, Lebanese parties are nevertheless dependent on voters' preferences. Two relevant considerations lend support to this contention. First, overtly sectarian political parties may represent at least some voters' actual preferences. After all, post-conflict societies do not magically transform into unified "nations" once military hostilities cease. Rather, post-conflict societies often remain balkanized into mutually hostile groups that compete for power and resources. In Lebanon, entrenched divisions in the political arena may actually reflect voters' private attitudes toward out-group sects. These attitudes may not be so negative as to inspire the Lebanese to engage in a conflict reminiscent of the Civil War, but evidence shows substantial levels of intergroup bias in the Lebanese population (see, e.g., Paler, Marshall, and Atallah, 2020).

Second, the sectarian political system permits a modest amount of party competition within sectarian communities. The discussion earlier in this chapter focused on the fact that parties draw the majority of their support from a single sectarian community. That discussion omitted an important caveat: each sectarian community is represented by *multiple* political parties. The existence of multiple competing parties indicates that interests in each sectarian community are not monolithic. Rather, voters in each sect express diverging preferences that are captured by different parties within that sect's orbit. In short, the sectarian party system is more complex than a simple replication of entire sectarian identities into single distinct political parties. Thus, studying intergroup relations in Lebanon requires an investigation of both its sectarian and partisan modes of self-identification. Partisan affiliation may represent another form of identity that interacts with and modifies an individual's sectarian identity.

This brief introduction reveals the fundamental motivating questions of this research: (1) to what extent do people's preferences explain the persistence of sectarian politics, and (2) given evidence that sectarian identities are further fractured in the political

arena, what factors underlie Lebanese divisions? The purpose of this book is to understand individual attitudes and behaviors among members of Lebanon's sectarian groups in the aftermath of the Cedar Revolution. This information is relevant to study the extent to which the Lebanese people support and comply with the consociational system. It will further reveal the factors that underlie Lebanese divisions and contribute to intergroup conflict.

The Social Psychology of Bias

Lebanon is home to eighteen officially-recognized sectarian groups, but relevant social and political cleavages are drawn around four groups: Christian, Druze, Shia, and Sunni. Social science theories predict that highly diverse societies like Lebanon will be volatile and prone to divisions and conflict. According to this literature, social diversity is linked to a number of negative social consequences, including the uneven provision of public goods, sub-optimal economic outcomes, and political corruption (Habyarimana et al., 2007). In extreme circumstances, when diversity is premised on exclusionary identities, which means that identifying with one social group precludes membership in another, social diversity can lead to intergroup conflict (Lake, 2017; Riek, Mania, and Gaertner, 2006; Tajfel and J. C. Turner, 1986). Extensive work has been done to understand the mechanisms that underlie the connection between social diversity and these negative outcomes. The main objective of this literature has been to discover ways to prevent conflict and to reconcile formerly warring groups once conflict has ceased.

Most of this scholarship is founded on a simple premise: all people demonstrate bias in favor of their in-group. According to social psychology, the natural way in which individuals navigate their social environment is to categorize the people they encounter into groups (Allport, 1954; Enos, 2017). The act of categorizing is immediate and automatic. Once it occurs, categorization prompts the mind to assign stereotypical characteristics associated with the group to the newly encountered individual. This cognitive process is a result of an evolutionary development in the human brain. To survive in the world, individuals de-

veloped methods to reduce complexity in their changing and hostile environments (Neuberg and Newsom, 1993), and to do so immediately with available information (Oakes and J. C. Turner, 1990). The problem with this automatic process of categorization and stereotyping is that it often leads to negative outcomes. Social psychology has for decades catalogued empirical evidence demonstrating that categorization and stereotyping inevitably, and without exception, lead to bias.² Whenever the process of categorization distinguishes an individual's in-group from an out-group, the individual adopts attitudes and makes decisions that give preference to the in-group.

In Lebanon's diverse social environment, categorization serves the important function of distinguishing members of the sectarian in-group from members of the out-group. This function would have been useful for surviving the Civil War, when militias divided and controlled large swaths of the country and populations were forced to seek protection from in-group militia leaders. Yet, even in peacetime, distinguishing between members of the in-group and out-group remains an important way for people to navigate a social environment comprised of distinct, and often adverse, sectarian groups. As will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters, self-identification with sectarian in-groups fosters social bonds, permits consistent electoral mobilization, provides access to public services, and creates economic opportunities (Cammett, 2014; Corstange, 2012; Fawaz Traboulsi, 2014). Inevitably, self-identification into distinct sectarian groups creates social divisions in Lebanon that give rise to intergroup biases.

Consistent with expectations about divided societies, evidence from the research conducted for this book shows significant levels of intergroup bias among Lebanese respondents. The research is comprised of two distinct studies: a study among undergraduate students in four Lebanese universities (hereinafter referred to as the "university study") and a study among a representative sample of residents in twelve Lebanese towns dispersed

²A necessary caveat to the process of categorization will be made in Chapter 2 with reference to variation in the salience of social groups.

Table 1.1: Mean Results of Behavioral Strategies

		Out- group mean	In-group mean	t-statistic	p-value
Universities	Prisoner's Dilemma	0.47	0.67	4.35	0.00
	Modified PD ¹ (out-group)	0.48	0.55	1.34	0.18
	Modified PD ¹ (increasing out- group)	0.42	0.55	2.14	0.03
Neighborhoods	Prisoner's Dilemma	0.37	0.55	7.63	0.00
	Dictator Game ²	1.28	0.22	-12.45	0.00
	Preemptive Strike ²	0.51	0.29	-6.73	0.00

Note: The games from the university study and the neighborhood study will be explained in great detail in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.

¹ Mean results represent the percent likelihood of investing when the partner belongs to the out-group and the in-group. A higher mean for the in-group demonstrates discrimination.

² Means for the Dictator Game represent the absolute value difference in dollars allocated between two partners. Mean results for the Preemptive Strike game show the percent likelihood that a respondent will defend himself against a supposed strike from a partner. In both games, a higher mean for the out-group is evidence of discrimination.

throughout the country (hereinafter the "neighborhood study"). Both studies involve lab-in-the-field experiments that evaluate differences in respondents' behaviors when respondents are randomly assigned to interact with members of the in-group versus the out-group.³ These experiments are situated within a well-established social sciences literature that uses similar methodologies to investigate bias in intergroup relations.

An example of an experimental game used widely in the literature and replicated in both the university and the neighborhood studies is the prisoner's dilemma. That game matched two respondents and gave them the opportunity to invest together for mutual

³A detailed description of each study, as well as the substantial differences in methodology between the two studies, will be thoroughly reviewed in Chapter 4 for the university study and Chapter 5 for the neighborhood study.

gain. As the partners were not allowed to interact or collude, each partner had to make an independent decision based only on knowledge about the opponent's identity. Respondents demonstrated bias when they chose to invest with members of the in-group more often than with members of the out-group. Table 1.1 presents mean results that demonstrate respondents' rates of decision-making with the in-group and the out-group across the two studies and multiple experimental games.

In all but the first modified prisoner's dilemma game, respondents show statistically significant mean differences in their rates of decision-making toward members of the in-group versus members of the out-group ($p < 0.05$). These diverging rates demonstrate a consistent pattern of intergroup bias. Respondents are more likely to invest with members of the in-group in the prisoner's dilemma games; they are more likely to shortchange a member of the out-group in the dictator game; and they are more likely to preempt members of the out-group in the preemptive strike game.

The Factors that Underlie Lebanese Divisions

The aggregated data points reproduced in Table 1.1 affirm the existence of intergroup biases in Lebanon, but are insufficient for understanding the quality and nature of bias. If the narrative of Lebanon's social divisions could be simply captured by noting that members of the in-group sect are biased against members of the out-group sect, then the inquiry could end with reference to Table 1.1, followed by a catalog of recommendations from other contexts about how to mitigate those biases. As subsequent chapters will reveal, however, intergroup bias in Lebanon is complicated by a number of factors. First, local and regional political agendas may create conflicts between some sectarian groups, but not among others. Specifically, if the Middle Eastern Sunni-Shia divide is replicated in Lebanon, then biases between the Muslim sects may be greater than between members of either of the Muslim sects and Christians. The analysis of attitudes in this book will shed light on the magnitude of biases between each pair of sects. In addition to the magnitude of bias, a

second important factor is the direction of bias. The dominant finding in the literature is that intergroup bias normally takes the form of in-group favoritism, rather than out-group derogation (Dovidio et al., 2010). The natural and automatic ways in which categorization, stereotyping, and in-group bias occur has led some researchers to speak of a "banality of bias" (Fiske, 2000). While bias in the form of in-group preferences may be banal, bias that derogates, demonizes, and creates animosity with the out-group is surely not. Thus, a primary objective of this book will be to determine whether biases in Lebanon rise to the level of the more problematic out-group derogation.

Third, notwithstanding the presence of salient sectarian biases, Lebanon's population is remarkably acculturated to the idea of national diversity (Ofeish, 1999). Similarly, on the political level, the rhetoric consistently avows the multi-confessional character of the state, without proposing chauvinist alternatives. One of the primary objectives of this book will be to reconcile the persistence of sectarian divisions with evidence that sectarian diversity is an accepted feature of the country. Finally, although Lebanon is comprised of many different sectarian groups and the nation's divisions are formally sectarian, a significant literature on Lebanon argues that sect is a facade for another underlying divisive variable. Among the alternative variables proposed are class, religious faith, and partisan affiliation. The analysis in this book will employ new data to compare each of the underlying explanations for intergroup divisions in Lebanon.

Theorists who propose that class underlies Lebanese divisions argue that the Lebanese political and economic elite are either indistinguishable from each other or are closely associated. These elites collude horizontally across sectarian lines to distribute wealth and power among themselves, but rely on vertical patronage and clientelist networks to consolidate their power within their own sectarian communities (Fawwaz Traboulsi, 2012; Baumann, 2016). Sectarianism persists because the elites cooperate with each other to destroy class consciousness in the working class, which would otherwise unite across sectarian lines to demand material changes (Fawwaz Traboulsi, 2012; Baumann, 2016). Experimental evidence

for such political economy explanations reveals a latent class consciousness in individual attitudes (Corstange, 2013; Paler, Marshall, and Atallah, 2020). This literature hypothesizes that the Lebanese lower and middle classes espouse class interests in private, or when experimental interventions provide sufficient anonymity. However, the same people temper their perspectives under social pressure to appear loyal to the in-group sect. The explanations that focus on the role that class plays in creating Lebanese divisions are substantive enough that they cannot be simply dismissed. This book intends to acknowledge them, offer some suggestive evidence that these explanations are exaggerated, and propose that other variables may better explain observed divisions.

Another explanation for the persistence of sectarianism in Lebanon is that sects actually matter to the Lebanese. To further explore this factor, a crucial distinction must be made between "sect as religion" and "sect as identity." The same labels — Christian, Shia, and Sunni — denote both the religious communities and the politicized social groups that comprise Lebanon. Despite some overlap in membership between the two identity groups, they are distinct in the Lebanese political system. "Sect as religion" can be defined as the personal adherence to the teachings and dogma of a particular faith. Many people of faith, especially those who internalize the Biblical commandment to "love thy neighbor," would eschew the competition and violence that is often a ramification of sectarian allegiances. In contrast, "sect as identity" refers to the political organization of people who may or may not adhere to the particular faith community denoted by the sectarian label. That is, sectarian identity indicates a cultural belonging to a community, and says very little about an individual's religious commitment. An illustrative analogy to "sect as identity" is ethnicity — a community of people who share a cultural background. In the vast literature on Africa, scholars debate whether ethnicity is a primordial construct or an instrumental one. Scholars like Posner (2004) argue fall on the instrumental side of this debate, contending that ethnicity is used by elites for political gain. Just as ethnic identities are harnessed for political ends (see, e.g., Carlson, 2015), so too are Lebanon's sectarian identities. When this book refers

to sects, it denotes this latter politicized social group.

Nevertheless, a prominent early version of the argument that sects underlie divisions in Lebanon states that fundamental doctrinal religious differences make co-existence between Muslims and Christians untenable. This explanation has been widely discredited (see, e.g., Ofeish, 1999), as it fails to account for three empirical observations. First, identifying with a sect does not equate to religious belief. Sectarian identity among the Lebanese is often founded on kinship ties that sanction and constrain exit from the group. Second, Christians and Muslims in Lebanon have coexisted in relative peace since independence longer than they have been at war. Furthermore, extensive conflict between the Shia and Sunni, and among factions of Christians during the Civil War, complicate the simple story of a Christian-Muslim divide. The purported incompatibility between Christian and Muslim groups requires more convincing arguments and evidence to be viable.

The dominant version of the argument that sects underlie divisions in Lebanon treats sect as a social identity analogous to ethnicity. The literature in this vein acknowledges that people have compelling reasons to adhere to their identity groups. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the history of sectarian conflict has surely shaped people's perspectives and preferences about the social groups that surround them. Collective memory about who to trust and who to fear and derogate is not easy to update. From the perspective of a voter, the politicization of sectarian identity may be a way to replicate personal biases in the political arena.

However, this literature fails to account for a variety of factors that make sects highly malleable. First, as already mentioned, each sectarian community is represented by multiple political parties, indicating that sects do not have a monolithic set of interests. The fragmentation within each community begs the question: what is the sectarian interest? Second, about 50% of Lebanese citizens who are eligible to vote instead choose to sit out elections (Mitchell and Rowsell, 2019). Many factors may explain political disengagement, including the ideological conviction that existing parties can do little for the success of

the identity group. Finally, sectarian coalitions and divisions are not static. Geopolitical and internal politics have an impact on the relative power of sectarian groups, and thus their preferred alliances. For example, the Christian-Muslim divide of the Civil War has transformed today into a Shia-Sunni divide. According to Majed (2020), sectarian divisions result from the dynamic process of political realignment at critical junctures of Lebanese political history. When two or more sectarian groups unite behind a partisan cause, their sectarian and political identities align with each other and create a divide with other sectarian groups. Even if the resulting divisions appear sectarian, the creation of cleavages is best understood with reference to political change and partisan preferences (Majed, 2020).

This book will make a forceful case for a partisan foundation to Lebanese divisions. Party identification may be a function of either instrumental or affective partisanship. Voters are instrumental partisans when they cast their ballots based on evidence of positive party performance, the alignment of party platforms with their ideological beliefs, or their ideological proximity to party policies (Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe, 2015). Evidence of extensive patronage and clientelist networks in Lebanese politics give some credence to the explanatory power of instrumental partisanship. If voters are instrumental partisans, they will perceive politics as a competitive arena in which their ability to access goods and services depends on the success of their political party.

Recent studies have questioned the narrative that voters make instrumental decisions based on party performance. This literature contends that party identification may actually dictate voters' expectations about how parties will perform. In other words, voters are affective partisans who filter their perceptions of party performance through a partisan lens. Studies in Western contexts, most prominently in the United States, found that partisan affect constitutes the most powerful source of intergroup bias (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar and Westwood, 2014; Westwood et al., 2018). This book will extend this hypothesis to the Lebanese context to evaluate whether partisan affect is the best explanation for the underlying divisions and intergroup biases in Lebanon.

How to Mitigate Bias

After assessing the extent of intergroup biases and the underlying causes of division in Lebanon, this book will test two prevailing theories that purport to mitigate intergroup bias. Empirical evidence mainly from the U.S. and Europe shows that by increasing and improving *contact* and/or diminishing perceptions of out-group *threat*, social policy can decrease, if not altogether eliminate, negative attitudes and behaviors toward members of the out-group. Underlying these theories is a simple assumption: if categorization and stereotyping lead to bias, then bringing people into contact to correct those stereotypes through personal interactions will diminish bias (Allport, 1954).

The contact hypothesis has been one of the most prominent, well-supported, and promising mechanisms for improving group relations. However, research conducted to understand the effects of contact often encountered the opposite effect: contact between groups can lead to perceptions of discomfort and threat. Further developments in this line of research showed that high-status groups experience threat to their material (e.g. economic), non-material (e.g. status), and symbolic (e.g. beliefs) resources when the proportion of an out-group increases (Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995; Rios, Sosa, and Osborn, 2018). Intergroup threat theory is founded on the high-status group's fears that the out-group will seek to engage in competition and usurp the high-status group's position in society.

Further refinement of the two theories determined that the contact hypothesis is likely to take effect at the neighborhood level, while threat theory becomes triggered at a higher level of aggregation, such as a city or region. As these geographic specifications suggest, changing individual attitudes and behaviors depends on reshaping the social and physical environments in which the social groups live and interact. An example of the successful implementation of the contact hypothesis in the U.S. is the process of school desegregation in the South. In the 1960s, that process involved a series of Supreme Court

cases, federal legislation, and the deployment of the National Guard.⁴

The inherent difficulty in making profound social changes without significant state interference means that the literature on the contact hypothesis and threat theory was hampered by researchers' inability to make causal inferences about the changes they observed. For decades, researchers observed changes in people's attitudes and behaviors, but were unable to isolate the cause of these changes. Consider, for example, that the decrease in racism among white Americans in the last half century occurred at different speeds in different parts of the country. What is the cause of this difference? Is it that the intensity of racism differed across the country, or that some parts of the country experienced contact with black Americans in schools and universities at a higher rate than other parts? Either, both, or any number of other factors may explain the different rates at which attitudes changed. Observational studies can only state that a change occurred, not what caused the change. Thus, the early literature on contact and threat was constrained to observational studies, without being able to show the mechanisms underlying these phenomena.

The reader may wonder how causal inferences are made in the social sciences. Ideally, causation in the social sciences is evaluated using a similar methodology to a randomized clinical drug trial. To put it simply, a researcher in a clinical drug trial randomly administers treatment and placebo to a study population to determine the efficacy of the treatment. After a time, the researcher observes the changes in each member of the study population, making sure to measure the condition of patients in both the treatment and control arms of the experiment. The causal effect of a drug in a randomized clinical trial is the difference in health outcomes between patients in the treatment arm and patients in the control arm of the experiment at a particular point in time.

In conducting this experiment, the researcher remains indifferent as to which segment of the study population received the drug treatment and which received the placebo.

⁴In the background of these formal government actions was the transformation in the national consciousness and culture that made continuing segregation between white and black Americans untenable.

This is crucial for making causal conclusions in an experiment: randomization permits the researcher to control for possible confounding variables that would arise between the treatment and control populations if the researcher selected patients for treatment in a non-random manner. To illustrate what this means, consider a scenario in which the researcher specifically selects only the most sick patients for the possibly life-saving treatment. In this scenario, the researcher abandons the possibility of making causal inferences. Since the treatment population is different from the rest of the study population, the researcher cannot disentangle the effects of the drug from the effects of these differences.

Analogously, causal inferences in the social sciences are possible when treatment is assigned to a population at random. The researcher can compare the treatment and control segments of the populations at a future time to determine the causal effect of treatment. Innovations in research methodologies and data gathering techniques permitted researchers to exploit natural experiments, which are random or seemingly random interventions into a population introduced by a government or institutions that are outside the control of the researcher. Natural experiments are rare. However, when they occur, they permit researchers to measure how the *cause* of the intervention creates the *effect* of attitudinal change, as compared to a population that did not receive the treatment. Relying on such natural experiments, researchers explored how interventions that permit positive intergroup contact change attitudes and behaviors (see, e.g., Corno, La Ferrara, and Burns, 2019; Rao, 2019; Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2007).

Recent studies improved prospects for making causal inferences even further. Researchers have themselves begun to introduce randomized interventions into small populations of respondents. If changes are observed, researchers can clearly identify the cause of the changes to be their randomized intervention. Researchers have used these types of experimental studies to understand the effects that their interventions have on respondents' attitudes and behaviors (see, e.g., Scacco and Warren, 2018; Enos, 2017; Enos and Celaya, 2018; and for a similar study in Lebanon, see (Paler, Marshall, and Atallah, 2020). Unfor-

tunately, this scholarship suffers from a fundamental problem: these interventions are often made in artificial laboratory settings under the supervision of the researchers and their assistants. The settings in which these studies are conducted place their applicability to the real world in doubt.

This book employs a natural experiment in the university study to test the contact hypothesis and a randomized experiment in the neighborhood study to test intergroup threat theory. The university study exploits a natural experiment for intergroup contact that occurs when students spend a year or more studying and interacting together in the university setting. The study compares changes in attitudes and behaviors among cohorts of first-year and upperclassmen students to determine whether contact mitigates intergroup biases. Then, the neighborhood study randomly assigns different experimental treatments to people living in the same geographic setting to determine whether varying peoples' perceptions about their physical environment changes their attitudes and behaviors. According to intergroup threat theory, people who are assigned treatment showing that they are in the local minority should demonstrate greater levels of intergroup bias than people who are assigned treatment showing that they are in the local majority.

Both the contact hypothesis and intergroup threat theory have been widely tested in Western contexts. These studies provide some insight into what these theories are likely to reveal about Lebanon. Nevertheless, this book will question whether theories developed almost exclusively in Western contexts may be effectively implemented outside the West.

The intention of this book is to put the social paradigms and theories discussed in this section to the test in the distant context of Lebanon. The word "distant" is used here in both a literal and metaphorical sense. Lebanon stands at a great geographical distance from the U.S. and most of Western Europe. It stands even further in terms of its history, culture, and governing structures. Therefore, Lebanon is a hard case for these theories. If the theories can explain the social and political dynamics prevailing in Lebanon, then this book will assert, with cautious optimism, that these theories are founded on universal assumptions

about human nature and social organization. If these theories fail in Lebanon, then a re-consideration of their applicability outside Western contexts is necessary. Of course, theory testing moves in both directions: exceptions introduced from testing theories in Lebanon may provide insights to inform how these theories are applied in the West.

1.1 Layout of the Book

This book proceeds in nine chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 are theoretical chapters, while Chapters 4 through 8 will analyze empirical evidence collected in the course of the university study and the neighborhood study. Chapter 2 will discuss the literature on bias, as well as the two main theories proposed in the literature on how to mitigate intergroup biases. Chapter 3 will explore the three variables — class, sect, and partisanship — proposed in the literature as the most powerful explanations for the persistence of group divisions in Lebanon. Chapters 4 and 5 will explore whether intergroup biases exist in Lebanon and the extend to which they are expressed. The main thrust of these chapters to determine the primary locus of bias as sectarian and partisan divisions. The remaining chapters, Chapter 6, 7 and 8 will assess three possible ways of diminishing this bias. Chapter 6 will engage with the contact hypothesis in the university context. Chapter 7 will look to the existence of intergroup threat theory in neighborhoods. Finally, Chapter 8 will consider whether protest can create the type of unifying narrative that can diminish intergroup bias. The book concludes with Chapter 9.

The objective of this book is not only to assess the nature of group bias in Lebanon, but also to discover whether existing theories can provide effective solutions to mitigate these biases.

Chapter 2

A Social Problem

"... the in-groups are psychologically primary. We live in them, by them, and sometimes, for them... Because of their basic importance to our own survival and self-esteem we tend to develop a partisanship and ethnocentrism in respect to our in-groups."

— Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*, p. 42

During my travels in Lebanon, I befriended people of many different sectarian communities. The people I met spoke with me, toured with me, and taught me about their wonderful country. One incident came to my recollection as I wrote this chapter because of how subtly it demonstrated the ideas explored in these pages. On one Spring afternoon, I toured the Qadisha Valley in northern Lebanon with three friends: a middle-class Maronite, my Sunni driver, and his Shia friend from school who was on break from college. The four of us spoke about things that young people in their 20s discuss about life, friendships, and university studies. Sectarian, national, and partisan questions never arose during our conversation. By the end of the tour, however, it became apparent that the companions I had introduced to each other during our trip would rather never meet again.

The Qadisha Valley, translated to "Holy Valley" from the original Aramaic, was historically a shelter for Christian monastic orders fleeing persecution and death. The Valley continues to be home to Christian monks and contains some of the most ancient holy places

of the Christian Church. For my Maronite friend, the tour served as both a cultural and religious visit — she prayed at the alters built by ancient Church fathers and spoke with the monks who administered the religious places. For our Sunni and Shia companions, the Valley was simply *a valley*, and their interest in the location waned quickly. They waited for us patiently, but chuckled at solemn moments and failed to show requisite respect to the monks who greeted us. There was no malice in their intent, but a clear sense of awkward foreignness in this overtly Christian atmosphere. To my Maronite friend, their behavior was exceedingly disrespectful, a fact she communicated to me while explaining how differently she had behaved in Muslim historic and religious sites. At the end of the day, when we had parted ways with my Maronite friend, the young Shia and Sunni men stated acerbically that they hoped never to interact with more of my "pretentious Lebanese friends."

The function of this rather banal example is to demonstrate the subtle dynamics that underlie intergroup relationships. All parties involved were polite, engaged in conversation, and tolerant for as long as was socially acceptable. Unfortunately, they left having confirmed their biases and chose not to associate further. This episode reveals an important facet of societies like Lebanon where diverse groups of people have spent centuries living side-by-side, but have retained their separate identities. People are socially graceful enough to interact when they are forced together (in this case by my visit to Lebanon), but the distance between them remains expansive. Whether this social chasm persists through deliberate action or by simple convention, I venture to say that neither I nor my companions could rightly discern.

The reader of this anecdote and of this chapter will learn that subtle episodes of bias are commonplace and part of a larger problem of intergroup conflict. This chapter will explore what constitutes bias, how it arises in the human heart, and what is problematic about it. Next, the chapter will describe two principal theories, the contact hypothesis and intergroup threat theory, which have dominated the literature on intergroup relations. The contact hypothesis proposes a mechanism by which to mitigate bias, while intergroup threat

theory provides a convincing explanation for the reasons that contact has and will continue to fail.

2.1 Bias

The literature on bias traces its roots to the 1920s and 1930s, with extensive early work conducted by European émigrés to the U.S. who sought to explain growing antisemitism and racism in Europe (Fiske, 2000). The study of bias accelerated in the 1940s, motivated by a desire to explain the Nazi persecution and extermination of European minorities. A highly influential theory developed by the Frankfurt School mapped patterns of cognition into two personality types: the prejudiced (authoritarian) personality and the liberal (non-authoritarian) personality (Haslam and Dovidio, 2010). The authoritarian personality was treated as a pathology that afflicted a small proportion of the population.¹ This early cognitive research was soon construed as simplistic and inadequate to explaining the evidence that bias is universal (Haslam and Dovidio, 2010). Nevertheless, it set a methodological precedent that survives to this day: bias can be measured as a function of an individual's perspective on his environment.

Researchers were also strongly influenced by evidence that European fascism of the 1930s and 1940s was not isolated to individual pathology, but pervaded entire nations. The systematic targeting for annihilation of Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, and other minorities across Europe was achieved through the acquiescence, and collaboration, of large portions of European civilian populations. Furthermore, the effort to defeat, colonise and enslave the Slavs of the Soviet Union was an effort toward which the Nazis and their allies from a variety

¹A significant flaw in the theory was that it linked what it defined as the authoritarian personality with conservative values and a belief system shaped by capitalism (Adorno, 1950). Equating authoritarianism with conservatism and capitalism was a reflection of the biases of the theorists. A more accurate, and neutral theory, would situate the authoritarian personality as a tendency of radical ideologies along the entire political spectrum.

of European nations worked through public-private collaboration to achieve. Isolated cases of individual pathology were inadequate to explain mass mobilization toward these ends. The frequently cited experiments by Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues helped elucidate the group dynamics underlying this form of mass mobilization.

Himself a Turk who lived in his homeland during the Armenian Genocide, the Balkan Wars, and the Great Famine of Mount Lebanon, Sherif demonstrated an unsurprising interest in the forces that drive identity-based hatred and violence. From a series of pioneering experiments conducted in 1949, 1953 and 1954, Sherif and his colleagues developed the Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RCT), which posited that bias results from intergroup competition.² The experiments brought young boys to summer camps, divided them into two groups, and documented their behavior through a series of active and engaging camp activities. Once internal cohesion within each group was established (i.e. in-group organization and group spirit), researchers introduced intergroup competition. The researchers observed that as the boys in each group cooperated to solve researcher-induced problems, they assumed roles and responsibilities, formed hierarchies and specializations, crowned leaders and punished shirkers. When the boys were made to engage in zero-sum competition for scarce resources, they developed out-group derogation even as their in-group cohesion grew more pronounced. This research provided two important innovations to the study of bias. First, it showed that well-adjusted and evidently normal boys could develop the type of intra-group cohesion and inter-group antagonism reminiscent of real group conflict. Second, the research showed the organic way in which collective beliefs about in-group attachment and out-group antagonism form.

The two approaches discussed thus far - broadly conceived as individual analysis (i.e.

²Sherif's studies are widely cited and praised in the literature. However, similar to other studies of this era, including the Stanford Prison Experiment (Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo, 1973) and the experiment conducted by Peter Neubauer separating Jewish twin children (McCormack, 2018), the ethics of the Robber's Cave Study is dubious. Sherif admits that he neither sought nor received permission to conduct the study from the children or their parents (Sherif, 1956). Manipulating unwitting children into group conflict is an exercise in exploitation.

the research on the authoritarian personality) and contextual analysis (i.e. Sherif's study of the boys in summer camp) - survived in competition through generations of research on intergroup bias (Fiske, 2000). In future iterations, however, the individual analysis strand of the literature was rightly revised. Rather than an aberration in a portion of the population, bias was conceived as an attitude capable of pervading any individual. Gordon Allport (1954) ushered in this fundamental revision. He claimed that bias was universal and a result of "erroneous generalization" and "hostility." The generalization Allport referenced has come to be defined in the literature as the process of categorization (Enos, 2017).

The literature defines the process of categorization as an evolutionary adaptation of the human mind. People have a limited cognitive capacity, but are immersed in a world full of new and unexpected stimuli (Fiske and Taylor, 1984). To deal with this reality, evolution endowed the human mind with two significant cognitive skills: an ability to retrieve stable internal representations of their environment (i.e. stability) and an ability to respond to new, and often unexpected, stimuli (i.e. plasticity) (Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000). The former is a schema of beliefs stored in memory. Whenever people encounter an object they have seen before, they make automatic associations between the encountered object in the environment and the attributes of that object that are stored in their memory. Theoretically, if the human mind relied exclusively on memory, then people would be unable to understand and respond to new and unexpected stimuli. Yet people continue to make sense of the ever-changing world around them.

The literature's invocation of the evolutionary development of plasticity in the human brain provides the answer. The human brain quickly draws parallels and connections between the new object and similar objects that the individual has encountered in the past. These connections collapse the distinction between the new and old objects and permit the individual to rely again on memory. The association of the new stimulus to established schema is the result of an individual's attempt to simplify and systematize the process of perception (Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000). An illustrative example is found in the rare

encounter with a wild beast. A person who first encounters a growling wolf cannot rely on his memory of the wild animal to understand it. Instead, he must deduce his understanding of the wolf from the association he makes between the growling wolf and a growling dog. Once this automatic and immediate association occurs, the individual will recall the attributes he has stored in his memory about the growling dog and his brain will quickly trigger a cognitive response: fear and flight. The perceived object (i.e. the wolf) is different from the familiar object (i.e. the dog), but memory collapses the distinction between the two animals to permit people to make rational decisions in response.

Put another way, a limited cognitive capacity, accompanied by a constant barrage of new stimuli in daily life, transforms the individual into a "cognitive miser," who uses time-saving shortcuts between the object perceived and its categorization (Fiske and Taylor, 1984). Rather than analyzing each new stimulus according to its unique attributes, the individual categorizes the stimulus into existing schema for which a wealth of associations already exist. Evidence for the evolutionary origins of these cognitive skills has found support in the clinical sciences. Cognitive neuroscience has uncovered two regions in the brain that govern stability and plasticity (Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000). The neocortical system houses stable beliefs and norms accumulated from repeated exposure to stimuli, while the hippocampal system processes new and surprising stimuli (Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000). The evolutionary purpose of separating the two processing systems is to insulate the cognitive schema stored as memory in the neocortical system. New stimuli are thus unable to overturn the information that is stored in memory. Nevertheless, an individual updates, or learns, from the new stimuli around him after repeated exposure to the new stimuli creates its own set of associations and responses.³

Although the process of categorization is inevitable and biological, it creates prob-

³The alternative — a constant updating of memory — would impede learning and could be costly to an individual's chances of survival.

lems when applied to people (Enos, 2017). The process of categorizing activates mental schema to derive preexisting evaluations and impressions about how the target should be perceived. In other words, categorization leads to stereotyping (Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000). In the social environment, individuals develop beliefs about the attributes of social groups in their midst through repeated exposure to members of those groups. Repeated exposure gradually encodes these group-based attributes into their neocortical system. Once encoded in their memory, people retrieve this information for use in forming judgements about individual members of the social groups in subsequent encounters (Stangor and Schaller, 2000). These processes are inevitably filled with error as a person's existing knowledge and personal idiosyncrasies play a significant role in how he processes information about others (Stangor and Schaller, 2000). Thus, mental schema created about social groups can be automatically accessed, but the existing schema are not necessarily accurate. When an individual encounters a target person and categorizes that person into a social group, neither the characteristics associated with the social group nor the characteristics now attributed to the person as a member of that group are necessarily fair or correct. More obviously, the target person, though he may fit into the social group on a superficial level, may not share any of the characteristics associated with the social group. Allport (1954) captured these issues when he labeled the process of categorizing people an "*erroneous* generalization."

At this point, the reader should take note of two main theoretical assertions from the literature. First, categorizing and labeling (i.e. stereotyping) is an evolutionary adaptation in human cognition. Second, stereotyping is universal. To put it bluntly, stereotyping is so universal and pervasive as to be a "natural" part of human cognition. If stereotypes are so common and pervasive, why is so much negativity attached to the process of stereotyping?

The answer lies in the powerful link between stereotyping and bias. A widely accepted premise in social psychology and social science is that categorization of individuals (which elicits group-based stereotypes) leads to intergroup bias (Stangor and Schaller, 2000; Fiske, 2000). Recall that Allport's (1954) original definition of bias involved both "*erroneous*

generalization" and "*hostility*." The literature has consistently vindicated this point. Evidence shows that merely belonging to a group, or the perception of belonging to a group, can lead to intergroup bias that favors the in-group. In an influential study, Tajfel and his colleagues used a minimal group example to show that identification with a group — no matter how superficial the group — leads to bias. Specifically, randomly assigning schoolboys into groups supposedly reflective of their preferred artist, Klee or Kandinsky,⁴ led the boys to express strong in-group favoritism. This and other minimal group experiments have consistently shown that in-group bias neither requires a prejudiced personality, nor a history of intergroup animus and real-world conflict. Instead, in-group bias is a cognitive response motivated by the human tendency to categorize oneself and others into distinct groups.

An important caveat to consider is that stereotyping need not always be automatic (Brewer, 1996). Instead, stereotyping can be subject to individual control (Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000). People do not always make use of the stereotypical associations they possess because not all social categories are salient at all times. The salience of a category relies on its cognitive *accessibility* to the perceiver and the *fit* between the target and the category. For example, socioeconomic class often serves as a salient category for dividing people into groups. However, wealth disparities are relational: the disparity disappears if everyone belongs to the same class. Thus, in a country club setting, where substantial annual contributions provide strict barriers to membership, club members are unlikely to perceive group distinctions based on wealth disparities. When a particularly dandy member of the country club decides to take a trip abroad, however, distinctions based on socioeconomic class become inescapable. An economy passenger, who walks past the comforts of the airline's business class or, worse still, is prohibited from even glancing into the luxuries of first class, is

⁴The experimental manipulation showed respondents abstract paintings by both artists and recorded respondent preferences for the paintings. Nevertheless, respondents were randomly divided into each group so as to ensure that self-selection based on taste was not possible. The artists Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky both worked at the turn of the twentieth century and were highly influential in the development of abstract art.

made to feel the distinct categories to which he and the country club member belong. From the perspective of the economy passenger, the upper class category is *accessible* because of the presence of class-based cabins on the airplane. And, the country club dandy clearly *fits* into the category of the upper class.

The prominent Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) uses *accessibility* and *fit* to explain why people categorize themselves and others into politically and socially salient groups (J. C. Turner et al., 1987). The *accessibility* of a category is defined as the readiness with which a perceived target can be identified as belonging to that category. Categorization that is frequently accessed and easily retrieved is considered to be "chronically accessible." In the modern American context, categories of European nationalities are no longer socially or politically salient. Categorizing most white Americans into their ancestral national origins provides very little information about them and does not connect them to any politically relevant group. The situation is markedly different with Americans of non-European national origin. America's violent history of race relations makes racial categorizations into black and white social groups "chronically accessible."

Category salience also relies on comparative *fit*, which is the correspondence between the target and the category. *Fit* is considered strong if the attributes of the target correspond closely to the known attributes of other members of the category. The relative fit of a target is determined both by the stored stereotypes in the perceiver's memory and the attributes of the target person. For illustration imagine a Nigerian immigrant to the U.S. Consistent with expectations, an American who encounters the Nigerian immigrant would readily fit her into the category of black American and draw corresponding stereotypes stored in memory about black Americans. However, if the Nigerian immigrant is Muslim and covers her head with a hijab, her fit into the category of black American becomes dubious. Depending on past personal experiences, an American may categorize the Muslim Nigerian immigrant as black, Muslim, or as a member of both or neither social groups. Both Nigerian immigrant women would elicit thoughts of salient categories, but only the Christian Nigerian

woman demonstrates a predictably strong fit into the category of black American.

According to SCT, *fit* is a function of both inter-category similarities and intra-category differences. Individuals are more likely to stereotype when perceived differences are smaller *within* groups and are larger *between* groups (J. C. Turner et al., 1987). The inevitability of stereotyping is exacerbated by the finding in social psychology that people have a tendency to reduce differences *within* groups, while accentuating differences *across* groups (Tajfel, 1969). In one condition of Tajfel's classic experiment, respondents were shown a series of eight lines that differed in length by a constant ratio. Tajfel labeled the first four lines of shorter length "A" and the last four lines of longer length "B." The experiment asked respondents to estimate the length of each line. Compared to the control condition of the same eight lines without category labels, respondents were more likely to evaluate the lines of Group A to be more similar to each other and more different from the lines in Group B. Labeling the groups of lines increased the fit of the elements within each group and thus widened the difference between them. The act of labeling and categorizing was enough for respondents to perceive salient differences between the two groups. This example comports with real world intergroup dynamics. Individuals have a tendency to categorize people and, in so doing, to saddle them with certain predefined characteristics (i.e. to stereotype them). Since people categorized into the in-group are alike on some identifiable characteristics, persons who do not share those characteristics are excluded from group membership.

Stereotypes, derived from attaching attributes to categorized objects, are "one of the great contradictions of humanity" (Enos, 2017, p.55): they are simultaneously useful for making sense of the world and responsible for triggering bias. The point at which the process of stereotyping crosses the threshold from innocuous to harmful involves the separation of people into salient social groups. The salience of social groups is largely defined by real social and political cleavages. If in-group favoritism could be achieved in Tajfel's lab experiments with arbitrarily created groups, it follows that in-group favoritism under conditions of real-world salient social groups will be even more pronounced and consequential. In fact,

intergroup relationships among salient social groups may involve not only in-group bias, but also out-group derogation.

In the lab experiments conducted for this book, Lebanese respondents are members of real sectarian groups and are primed with partners who belong to real in-group and out-group sects. As the next chapter will highlight, sectarian differences are among the most salient social identities in Lebanon. Consistent with established theories, Lebanese respondents who are informed about the identities of their partners, and are thus able to categorize and stereotype their partners, will demonstrate strong in-group favoritism, and perhaps even out-group derogation.

Bias arises because people categorize, stereotype, and then express attitudes and act in ways that favor members of their in-group (and possibly derogate the out-group). At the same time, bias among salient social groups further entrenches social cleavages and may give rise to real social harm, including acts of discrimination and violence. This reinforcing relationship should not be surprising to constructivists who point out that social groups are socially and historically constructed. Therefore, the identities of social groups and relationships between groups both reflect and impact social divisions.

To this point, this chapter has focused on individual-level cognitive processes. How individual expressions of bias aggregate to group-level divisions, and how group-level biases inform the attitudes of constituent individuals, is a complex and dynamic process. The remainder of this section will focus on the relationship between individual- and group-level biases. Stereotyping on both the individual- and group-level is founded on similar motivations: maintaining self-esteem and satisfying human needs to explain and predict the social environment (Stangor and Schaller, 2000). However, Tajfel (2001) proposes that stereotyping serves three separate and unique functions for the cohesion of a salient social group's worldview: causality, justification and differentiation. First, stereotyping satisfies the group-level need to make sense of complex, and often distressing, large-scale social events. Groups

invent and perpetuate the *causality* that informs the myth of the group's historic humiliation, struggle or defeat. For illustration, consider that a common refrain in the Weimar Republic attributed the capitulation of the German military during World War I to Dolchstoßlegende,⁵ the betrayal of the German soldier by domestic politicians, socialists, and Jews. At the same time, stereotyping may also *justify* despicable actions already committed or planned to be carried out. Stereotypes that vilify the out-group can serve to justify asymmetrical violence against the out-group, while mythologizing the in-group's innocence and collective self-esteem. For example, Turkey continues to justify genocide against Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians and other minorities during WWI as legitimate government action against "traitors."⁶

Finally, group-level stereotyping allows social groups to accentuate intergroup *differences*. This function of stereotyping is especially important when group relations are characterized by power asymmetries. Fearing that the status quo power asymmetry between the groups may change, one group will choose to increase the social distance with the out-group through self-differentiation. The greater the distance between groups, the stronger the in-group's claim that it is superior to the out-group. In Lebanon, intergroup relations have historically been characterized by consequential power asymmetries. The Civil War was largely fought as a reaction to the changing relative power of sectarian communities. On the one hand, Christians became minorities in Lebanon with the influx of Sunni Palestinian refugees. On the other hand, the Iranian imam, Musa al-Sadr, traveled to Lebanon in the 1960s to provide the sectarian and region-specific discourse that inspired Shia social movements for greater equality (Fawwaz Traboulsi, 2012). The driving force behind the Shia community's achievement of economic progress and full political participation was

⁵Translated commonly to the "stab-in-the-back" myth.

⁶The abhorrent falsity of the claim is made apparent by the fact that the Turks grotesquely promised to keep one Armenian man and one Armenian woman as exemplars of their "type" once they succeeded in completely annihilating that nation.

their gradual "transformation into a structured and official sect" (Fawwaz Traboulsi, 2012, p. 184). The influx of Sunni refugees, the rise of the politicized Shia sectarian group, and the presence of Palestinian militias created the circumstances for the Muslims to challenge Christian dominance in the country. The intended goal was to change the power asymmetry in their favor by differentiating themselves from the dominant Christians.

These group-level functions for stereotyping are diffused through successive generations of group members. Group-level stereotypes are learned, transmitted, and amended through communal authorities — parents, teachers, the press, and political and religious leaders (Stangor and Schaller, 2000). Evidence suggests that children inherit prejudicial attitudes from their parents (Pirchio et al., 2018), and media has a measurable impact on personal beliefs and social norms governing groups in divided societies (Paluck, 2009). Language plays an important role in expressing and maintaining stereotypes within the collective group psyche. Groups develop language to name, label, and categorize social groups and social phenomena around them (Stangor and Schaller, 2000). The language used among members of a social group to navigate the world is filled with implied meaning and creates rich interpersonal understanding. This language is deliberately exclusionary of out-groups. Once a group defines a concept and endows it with meaning, the individuals who share in that group's culture begin to process their social environment through the paradigms established by their culture. The individual tendency to stereotype is thus inseparable from the contextual social environment.

The group-level biases then inform the individual-level biases observed in the researcher's lab experiment. However, this point should not be overstated. Collective consensus can vary substantially among sub-groups of each community (Stangor and Schaller, 2000). The chapters that follow will demonstrate the varying strengths of intergroup bias in different sub-groups of Lebanese respondents. A sectarian group may demonstrate in-group bias in general, but the strength of bias may depend on sub-group variations on attributes like

class and partisanship.⁷ The diversity in individual expressions of bias is a major reason why Tajfel (2001) proposed approaching the phenomenon of stereotyping first from an analysis of its group functions and then of its individual functions.

Tajfel and Turner (1986) proposed Social Identity Theory (SIT) to reconcile group-level motivational functions for stereotyping and bias with individual-level cognitive functions of bias.⁸ SIT is founded on three main assumptions: (1) individuals seek to maintain or enhance their self-esteem (see also Steele, 1988); (2) social groups are associated with positive or negative values,⁹ as determined by consensus within and across social groups; and (3) individuals determine the relative prestige of their own group by comparing their in-group to other groups in the social sphere (Tajfel and J. Turner, 1986). From these assumptions, SIT draws a series of intuitive theoretical principles. Individuals seek to enhance their self-esteem by maintaining a positive social identity, which is achieved through positively differentiating their in-group from competing out-groups (Tajfel and J. Turner, 1986; Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990). When social group comparisons yield a negative evaluation of the in-group, Tajfel and Turner (1986) propose that individuals within the in-group will either seek to leave the in-group or force a reevaluation of the values associated with the in-group. It is this latter process that drives competition for group superiority. Once competition begins, the status of groups becomes unstable or is perceived to be illegitimate. On the verge of possible status change, lower status groups adopt beliefs and actions that challenge higher status groups, while higher status groups in turn embrace beliefs and actions that defend and justify their social position.

⁷The further interactive effect between sectarian and partisan attributes on bias will be explored in detail with the analysis of a voting experiment in Section 4.2.3. The experiment will demonstrate the extent to which sectarian biases are contingent on partisan affiliation.

⁸Tajfel and Turner (1986) developed SIT to revise Sherif's Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RCT). The authors contended that Sherif ignored the importance of in-group identification, and treated it as a byproduct of intergroup conflict. The goal of SIT was thus to show the independently powerful force of in-group identification in giving rise to and maintaining intergroup conflict.

⁹The authors use the word "values" throughout their explication of the theory. The word "value" refers to what they call "stereotypes" in other contexts.

SIT emphasizes the symbolic foundations for the expression of intergroup bias. In minimal group lab experiments, where the real-life consequences of actions are particularly distant, individuals nevertheless show in-group favoritism by allocating more money to the in-group as a way to elevate the in-group relative to the out-group (Tajfel and J. Turner, 1986). Crucially, evidence suggests that individuals are concerned about the relative status of groups. Individuals are willing to forego absolute gains, when it means that the in-group will remain inferior, for relatively smaller gains that elevate the in-group relative to the out-group (Tajfel and J. Turner, 1986).

Evidence that relative gains are more important than absolute gains has important implications for the direction of intergroup bias — whether it is expressed as in-group favoritism or out-group derogation. If relative stature among groups is more important than absolute stature, then individuals can achieve relative superiority by either method of bias. Theoretically, individuals can raise the status of the in-group by taking steps to benefit the in-group or, alternatively, taking action that harms the out-group.

To this point in the chapter, discussion of intergroup bias has referred to expressions of in-group favoritism, not out-group derogation. There is good reason for this omission. Out-group derogation is rare and an indication of powerful negative emotions verging on fear, hatred, and disgust (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, 2002). In contrast, empirical evidence demonstrates that in-group favoritism is universal. Everyone categorizes, stereotypes, and expresses bias that favors the in-group. This book will thus proceed with caution with findings that show in-group favoritism. If in-group favoritism is universal, then it says little about the nature of Lebanese intergroup biases. Of greater concern in the chapters to come will be whether respondents show evidence that they derogate members of the out-group.

2.2 Two Dominant Theories

Social diversity does not inevitably lead to conflict, but social psychology shows that groups with exclusionary identities, are prone to conflict (Lake, 2017; Riek, Mania, and Gaertner, 2006; Tajfel and J. Turner, 1986). These identities create social cleavages that can lead to violence both within the state and across state borders (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Cederman and Girardin, 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Wucherpfennig, 2017; Denny and Walter, 2014; Bosker and Ree, 2014). Even when situations do not rise to the level of violence, social cleavages are associated with an erosion of civil society, uneven distribution of public goods, sub-optimal economic outcomes and political corruption (Hewstone, 2006, Habyarimana et al., 2007). When social cleavages are significant enough to create conflict and/or negative outcomes, states can mitigate against these consequences by creating specialized institutional structures. Among the most common institutional solutions to perennial conflict are consociationalism (Lijphart, 1969), ethnofederalism (Roeder, 2009; Wolff, 2009) and decentralization (Brancati, 2006). When the development of institutional solutions is not possible due to state weakness, scholars have proposed secession as a viable last resort to end ethnic conflict (Sorens, 2012; Downes, 2007).

While such drastic measures are sometimes required in the wake of violent conflict, evidence that groups can co-exist in relative peace calls for an altogether different approach. In Lebanon, the ceasefire of the Civil War ushered in a period of minimal intergroup violence. Separation of Lebanon's sectarian groups need not be contemplated, but continued peace may depend on implementing policies to improve intergroup relations. The literature proposes that mitigating intergroup bias of the kind described in the previous section requires expansive social interventions. Specifically, institutional and even structural changes would need to be implemented to fundamentally change the ways in which the competing groups that populate Lebanon interact. How people navigate public spaces and institutional settings, where different groups come into contact and have the opportunity to interact, has been a

major focus of the literature. Does living in close proximity to members of the out-group make individuals more tolerant of the out-group? Does belonging to common institutions provide a foundation for decreasing intergroup differences? Tested extensively in Western contexts, especially in the process of American desegregation, the research linking context to attitudes has provided conflicting evidence for the direction of attitudinal change. The two major theories in the literature — the *contact hypothesis* and *threat theory* — predict that diversity changes bias in opposite directions. Intergroup proximity promotes contact and decreases intergroup bias per the contact hypothesis, while threat theory maintains that diversity is associated with greater intergroup bias.

Allport's (1954) impact on the literature was not limited to the proposal that bias is universal (see Section 2.1); his claim that bias results from "erroneous generalization" and "hostility" also led him to develop the contact hypothesis. According to Allport, if erroneous generalizations about the out-group produce prejudice, then these generalizations need to be overturned to reduce intergroup prejudice. He proposed that contact between groups, under certain conditions, could correct false beliefs about the out-group and lead to greater intergroup understanding. The aim of the contact hypothesis is to introduce an intervention — intergroup contact — that can break the ignorance and insularity that motivates groups to differentiate themselves from out-groups as a way to enhance their sense of self-esteem. Successful contact can theoretically curb the cognitive and motivational processes predicted by SIT that lead to intergroup bias.¹⁰ Contact among members of different groups can produce a degree of personal engagement that inhibits automatic cognitive categorization.

Allport's contact hypothesis has been substantially validated in an expansive literature spanning several decades. In a meta-analysis of 515 studies, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) found that 94% of sampled datasets demonstrated that contact reduces prejudice (fixed model: $r = -0.225$; random effect model: $r = -0.210$; where r is the correlation coefficient).

¹⁰Please refer the discussion about Tajfel and Turner's (1986) SIT in the previous section.

cient representing the mean effect size). The effect of intergroup contact holds across different types of groups, including racial, ethnic, LGBTQ, and age cohorts (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Evidence shows that having friends and colleagues who belong to the out-group reduces bias against these groups (Savelkoul et al., 2011). Furthermore, neighborhood diversity increases contact among neighbors and decreases bias (Hewstone and Schmid, 2014).

Allport proposed four conditions for achieving successful contact between groups: common goals, intergroup cooperation, equal status between groups, and institutional support for continued interaction. The literature has since criticized excessive reliance on these four conditions because they tend to limit the scope of research and thus the potential explanatory power of contact effects (Dixon, Durrheim, and Tredoux, 2005). Meta-analysis has shown that the four optimal conditions together enhance the positive effect of intergroup contact, but they are not necessary for positive outcomes (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). The condition found to be most relevant for improving the positive effect of intergroup contact was institutional support (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006).¹¹ The positive effects yielded by the institutional condition are encouraging for the first study conducted in this book in Lebanese universities. The university is a setting where intergroup contact is required and encouraged by its institutional design and administrators.

The literature frequently tests the contact hypothesis in educational institutions and finds support for the positive effect of institutions on intergroup relations. Evidence shows that education increases tolerance through institutional indoctrination (Ortega and Polavieja, 2012). First, formal education can transmit values and ideologies that emphasize tolerance and positive regard toward out-groups. Furthermore, support for intergroup contact and harmony among students can diminish intergroup bias. For example, at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, researchers exploited the university's policy of random

¹¹Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) advise that this finding should be approached with care. Institutional support for intergroup contact can have negative consequences if the groups interact in a competitive environment or if groups interact under unequal status conditions.

roommate allocation to understand how inter-racial exposure affects intergroup stereotypes (Corno, La Ferrara, and Burns, 2019). The study found that white students who had black roommates demonstrated less prejudice against black South Africans.

Studies show that intergroup contact can lead to diminished bias in educational institutions when effective interventions are implemented. Rao (2019) took advantage of a natural experiment in a school in Delhi, India. A law required private schools to offer free admission to poor students. Once in school, the students were randomly assigned to study partners, so that some study partnerships were a combination of rich and poor students. Exposure to poor students in school improved rich students' pro-social and egalitarian preferences and decreased discrimination against poor students (Rao, 2019). Having poor classmates made rich students more likely to volunteer in school charity activities and act more generously toward both poor and rich students in a dictator game. Rich students were also more likely to agree to interact with poor students outside of school if they were exposed to poor classmates. These affirmative action policies in Delhi schools clearly had a profound impact on individual behaviors.

Another study shows that implementing the cooperative group learning method, which was originally designed to de-emphasize individualistic or competitive learning, fosters a unified group culture and intergroup friendship (Slavin and Cooper, 1999). However, the literature is careful to note that the cooperative group learning method does not fully extinguish identity-based group cultures. Identity groups represent important forms of association and sources of self-esteem for their members. Elsewhere, the literature observed whether the development of a common superordinate identity could supersede identity-based groups. In a multi-cultural American high school, the development of a common superordinate identity did not eliminate subgroup identities (Gaertner, Rust, et al., 1994). Instead, the superordinate identity promoted positive out-group regard by providing a forum for intergroup contact. Despite some successes, the encouragement of dual identities has been criticized for disregarding the preferences of subordinate groups to achieve "pluralistic integration" rather

than "assimilation" (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, 2002).

In a study that had a major impact on the design of the experiments in this book, Scacco and Warren (2018) investigated the impact of contact on Christian and Muslim young men in Kaduna, Nigeria, known as a hotbed of violent religious conflict. The study consisted of three levels of treatment: (1) assignment to a vocational training program, (2) assignment to heterogeneous or homogeneous classrooms and (3) assignment to in-group and out-group religious partners. The effect of contact on each treatment group was measured with attitudinal and behavioral tests. While the attitudes of their Kaduna sample of respondents did not change, the respondents' behaviors changed, so that they were more generous and less discriminatory toward the out-group (Scacco and Warren, 2018).

Evidence that contact mitigates intergroup bias in a divided society like Nigeria, where religious and ethnic cleavages contribute to sporadic episodes of violence, bode well for prospects that contact will effectuate changes in Lebanon. Students who enter university as freshmen should experience a decrease in out-group prejudice by the time they graduate. The experience of studying in a diverse context should reduce stereotyping and out-group hostility by fostering intergroup friendship and cooperation. However, the literature offers some reasons to doubt the inevitability of this result. Shook and Fazio (2008), who traced the impact of interracial roommate arrangements in an American university, found that interracial roommates were less likely to be requested, and if randomly assigned, were more likely to dissolve than single-race roommates. Intergroup contact failed in their study: some interracial roommate pairs chose to dissolve their living arrangements rather than learn to accommodate each other. Shook and Fazio (2008) note that successful interracial relationships occurred among students who had a pre-existing friendships with the racial out-group, or showed a prior willingness to befriend the racial out-group.

The preceding experiment provides reasons to be pessimistic about the university study conducted for this book. It is possible that by the time Lebanese students enter university, their attitudes about the out-group have already been determined. This would mean

that students would self-select into contact opportunities. Students who harbor negative attitudes about the out-group before entering university would not engage with the out-group while in university. In contrast, students who have positive attitudes about the out-group would engage in substantive contact with the out-group. If Lebanese students self-select into contact, then the study would show no significant changes in students' attitudes between the first and later years of university. In that case, contrary to a vast literature, this study will show that institutional contact does not lead to attitudinal change. Chapter 6 will test the effectiveness of contact in the university setting.

Institutional support for intergroup contact may alleviate intergroup biases, but how are attitudes shaped outside the institutional setting? This question is interesting for two main reasons. First, those who experience intergroup contact in schools and universities may not apply their learned tolerant perspectives outside the institutional setting. While some evidence shows that such attitudes extend beyond the direct institutional setting (Rao, 2019), the tendency has not been systematically studied. Further, many schools and universities are located in segregated neighborhoods thus precluding contact opportunities in the first place. Second, large proportions of the population are unlikely to have access to the institutional experiences provided by universities. Given these limitations on the possibility of contact in institutional settings, the literature has also extensively studied contact in residential neighborhoods.

The slow process of American desegregation and recent decades of mass immigration into Western democracies have changed the demographic composition of cities, towns and neighborhoods in the U.S. and Europe. These changing demographics have brought racial and ethnic minorities into close proximity with native populations, thus igniting questions about the role of intergroup contact in relations between majority native populations and ethnic minority and immigrant populations. In a famous study, Robert Putnam (2007) challenged findings from the contact hypothesis. Using data from major American cities,

Putnam showed that residents of homogeneous cities were more trusting of neighbors and people of different ethnicities than were residents of racially heterogeneous cities. Putnam argued that heterogeneous contexts encourage white Americans to “hunker down” whereas homogeneous contexts encourage white residents to bond with their neighbors. The publication of Putnam’s findings launched a period of renewed interest in the contact hypothesis, as well as efforts to invalidate his politically inconvenient findings. Gesthuizen et. al. (2008) tested Putnam’s proposition that ethnic diversity reduces social solidarity and social capital in twenty-eight European countries. They found the relationship between ethnic diversity and dimensions of social capital to be spurious. Instead, social capital is reduced by economic inequality and improved by a long and stable history of democracy (Gesthuizen, Meer, and Scheepers, 2009). Subsequent analysis of the data used in Putnam’s book, *Bowling Alone* (2000), showed that the link between ethnic diversity and social capital is similarly spurious in the American context (Portes and Vickstrom, 2011).

Further research into the contextual determinants of intergroup relations painted a more complicated picture than the one Putnam and his detractors proposed. This new literature argues that the geographical scale of analysis plays a substantial role in determining whether the contact hypothesis behaves as predicted by Allport or by Putnam (Oliver and Wong, 2003). According to Oliver and Wong (2003), out-group size correlates with intergroup competition and hostility at the greater metropolitan level, but is associated neither with negative evaluations nor hostility at the local neighborhood level. The contact hypothesis is thus at play in the neighborhood, but absent from the metropolis. Similar findings were obtained in the analysis of voting behavior in the United Kingdom. White British voters are more likely to show support for the far-right British National Party (BNP) when they experience diversity at the district level than on the neighborhood level (Bowyer, 2008). White voters who live in ethnically diverse neighborhoods, and are thus in direct contact with ethnic minorities, are less likely to support the BNP. Instead, support for the BNP is strongest among white voters who live in predominantly white neighborhoods embedded in

diverse districts.

The evidence that diversity leads to negative attitudes toward minorities has been systematized into *intergroup threat theory*. First articulated by Blumer (1958), intergroup threat theory postulates that a higher status group may feel its position and resources threatened or encroached upon by lower status groups. The higher status group will then react with prejudice against the lower status groups, even in the absence of threat to the interests of individual members of the higher status groups. The relative size of the lower status group is theorized to play a key role in fostering fear and prejudice in the higher status group.

An increase in the size of the lower status group creates two avenues by which the higher status group perceives threat: through the possibility of credible competition for scarce resources and through the potential political mobilization against the interests of the higher status group (Blalock, 1967). Both are realistic threats to the higher status group's ability to retain its social position. Quillian's (1995) study across twelve Western European countries shows that perceived threat depends on the relative size of the lower status group and on the economy. Bias is high when the size of the lower status group is large relative to the higher status group and economic conditions are poor. The assumption is that blame for poor economic conditions is attributed to the lower status group.¹²

The realistic group threat paradigm of Blalock (1967) and Quillian (1995), where groups are locked in zero-sum competition for scarce material (e.g. economic) or non-material (e.g. status) resources, is only one way in which perceptions of threat are created. Researchers have also explored how symbolic threats to the higher status group's values and belief systems could foster bias against lower status groups (Rios, Sosa, and Osborn, 2018). Evidence suggests that realistic and symbolic threat do not have to actually exist to impact group attitudes (Rios, Sosa, and Osborn, 2018). In a study conducted in Germany, for exam-

¹²See Esses et al., 2001 for research in a similar vein addressing zero-sum competition between groups in North America.

ple, the perception of group size, rather than actual numeric group size, was enough to lead the higher status group to perceive threat to its interests and values (Semyonov, Raijman, et al., 2004). A subsequent cross-national study in Europe and the U.S. validated these findings with evidence of a "pervasive syndrome" among native populations to overestimate the number of immigrants in their countries (Citrin and Sides, 2008).

This description of intergroup threat theory likely recalls to the reader the process of identity formation proposed by SIT. Perceptions of intergroup threat lead to group differentiation and the activation of intergroup biases. However, whereas SIT also accounts for identity formation among low status groups, the focus of group threat theory is largely on the higher status group. Intergroup threat seeks to explain the circumstances under which higher status groups embrace beliefs that justify their social position, while also adopting negative attitudes about the out-group. Consistent with the individual and collective stereotyping processes underlying SIT, intergroup threat theory also acknowledges that threat is perceived on the individual and collective levels (Stephan and Renfro, 2016). At the individual level, realistic threats can include the fear of pain, torture, or economic deprivation, while symbolic threats can include ridicule, embarrassment or threats to self-esteem. At the group level, realistic threats can be economic, political or military, while symbolic threats can target the dominant group's religion, culture, ideology, morality and worldview. According to Stephan and Renfro (2016), intergroup threat theory is self-reinforcing: threat perceptions lead to attitudinal prejudice and behavioral discrimination that in turn reinforce future perceptions of threat. For example, prejudice in response to threat may strengthen both in-group and out-group identities, which can influence the manner in which future threat is perceived (Stephan and Renfro, 2016).

Predictions from the literature state that group relations in divided societies like Lebanon should be characterized by intergroup threat. In a meta-analysis of ninety-five samples in the intergroup threat literature, Riek et. al. (2006) find that the relationship between threat and out-group attitudes were of moderate magnitude (realistic threat: $r =$

0.42, symbolic threat: $r = 0.45$, where r is the average Pearson correlation). The study further shows the relationship between realistic group threat and negative attitudes was stronger when the out-group belonged to a lower status group than when the out-group belonged to a higher status group (Riek, Mania, and Gaertner, 2006). This finding makes the applicability of intergroup threat theory precarious in the Lebanese context. A great deal of commentary about Lebanon places one or another of the three main sectarian groups — Christian, Shia and Sunni — above the other. It is therefore highly debatable which of the three sectarian groups would constitute the low versus the high status group. For example, the historic poverty, marginalization and dispossession of the Shia sect could make it especially threatening to the higher status Christian and Sunni groups. On the other hand, the ascendance of the Shia sect since the end of the Lebanese Civil War has made it the clear dominant political and military power. A lack of clarity about which sectarian group dominates in Lebanon and which threatens from its subordinate position may mean that intergroup threat does not operate in predictable fashion, nor does resulting intergroup bias.

Another complication for analyzing intergroup threat is that groups vary in their attitudinal responses to the same stimuli. Black and white Americans' attitudes trend in opposite directions in response to neighborhood racial heterogeneity (Marschall and Stolle, 2004). Even if this result can be ascribed to a specificity of American race relations, and the imbalance in population size, evidence also shows variation in attitudinal responses among American minority populations (Oliver and Wong, 2003). Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in the U.S. show substantially different attitudes in response to contextual diversity. If intergroup threat leads to out-group bias in Lebanon, the results are likely to similarly vary by sectarian group.

2.2.1 Segregation and Threat

The two theories discussed thus far — the contact hypothesis and intergroup threat theory — both rely on a simple mechanism: as the size of an out-group increases, the attitudes and behaviors of the in-group change in response. The theories predict this change occurs in opposite directions. The contact hypothesis postulates that an increase in the out-group will create opportunities for intergroup contact that will decrease intergroup bias. In contrast, intergroup threat theory predicts that an increase in the out-group will trigger perceptions of threat and contribute to an increase in intergroup bias. A vast literature adjudicates between the two theories to untangle their causal pathways. While closely related, contact and threat are very different processes (Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ, 2010). The contact hypothesis relies on individual and group experiences: the out-group must be real and large enough to permit positive interpersonal contact. Once achieved, positive contact reduces threat and anxiety and leads to a decrease in intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ, 2010; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008). In contrast, intergroup threat may depend on perceptions about the out-group in the absence of actual individual experiences. As mentioned before, people tend to overestimate the size of the out-group (Citrin and Sides, 2008; Semyonov, Raijman, et al., 2004), exaggerating the relevance of the out-group and the threat that it poses to themselves and their collective in-group. Evidence shows that *perceptions* of out-group size account for more than half of the effect of *actual* out-group size on intergroup bias (Koopmans and Schaeffer, 2016).

Why do people overestimate the size of the out-group? The literature gives two main reasons: the out-group poses a threat to one’s culture and way of life (Rios, Sosa, and Osborn, 2018; Citrin and Sides, 2008), or the out-group poses a threat to one’s economic well-being (Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995). For example, people can be manipulated and indoctrinated into believing that the out-group is a large and damaging competitor in the labor market. High unemployment, accompanied by a widespread belief that the out-group is taking away jobs, can be exploited and exaggerated by demagogic politicians and the

mass media to increase perceptions of out-group threat (Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ, 2010; Koopmans and Schaeffer, 2016). Such manipulation on the part of political actors would be especially effective if people have little contact with and lack information about the out-group — if people are geographically segregated. Recent influential studies have demonstrated that a possible reason that early studies found evidence both for contact and threat in the same context is due to failure in those studies to account for neighborhood segregation.

By definition, the neighborhood is "a vehicle for separating one group from another," creating "exclusions" and "boundaries" between groups of people who settle into "enclaves promoting social insularity and separation" (Talen, 2018). People who reside in segregated neighborhoods have little contact with the out-group. In American cities, racial and class segregation are associated with lower levels of high school and college completion for disadvantaged groups (Quillian, 2014), lower rates of generalized trust and volunteering (Rothwell, 2012), and negative economic growth (H. Li, Campbell, and Fernandez, 2013). On the international scale, ethnic and linguistic segregation are correlated with the incidence of violence, ranging from protest to civil war (Corvalan and Vargas, 2015), as well as substantially lower qualities of government (Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2009).

When accounted for in analysis, neighborhood segregation has been shown to adjudicate between the contact hypothesis and intergroup threat theory. In a study of the American Deep South, Zingher and Thomas (2014) traced white voter turnout (i.e. a measure of "white political backlash," according to the authors) in precincts with varying percentages of black Americans. Racial diversity in precincts with low to moderate levels of segregation was associated with lower levels of white voter turnout, indicating a liberalizing effect of diversity on white attitudes. However, in segregated precincts, white Americans were more likely to turn out to vote as the percentage of black Americans at the precinct level increased (Zingher and Thomas, 2014). Thus, diversity without contact contributed to white Americans' threat responses. Similar results were obtained from a study tracing

membership patterns in the far-right BNP party in Britain. White British adults are more likely to belong to the BNP in cities where the proportion of minorities is large enough to be perceived as a threat, but these minorities are segregated from the white majority (Biggs and Knauss, 2012). To summarize, an increase in the size of the out-group can lead to intergroup cooperation and harmony if intergroup contact occurs. However, a similar increase in the out-group will likely lead to perceived threat and intergroup bias if the in-group and out-group are segregated in space, precluding opportunities for contact.

In three contributions to the literature that substantially inspired the research in this book, Enos and his colleagues build a convincing case for the detrimental effects of neighborhood segregation on intergroup relations. In Israel, Enos and Gidron (2016) demonstrate that high levels of residential segregation are associated with increased in-group bias among both secular and ultra-Orthodox Jewish populations. A year later, Enos (2017) sought to change the demography of a white Boston suburb by introducing Spanish-speaking, Mexican immigrant men to nine train stations over the course of two weeks. Surveys with white suburban commuters on the same trains before and after the introduction of the immigrants captured a radical change in attitudes about immigration in general, and Mexican immigration in particular. The white suburban subjects of his survey were upper-class liberals who were expected to perceive neither economic threat from stereotypical working-class immigrants, nor cultural threat given liberal dispositions to support immigration. Nevertheless, after seeing the Mexican immigrants in their suburban train stations, the white commuters were more likely to express support for deportation, reduced immigration, and adoption of English as the official language of the U.S. (Enos, 2017).

Enos interprets these results as evidence that cognitive mechanisms trump motivational causes of threat perception. Simply increasing the size and proximity of an out-group was enough to trigger cognitive mechanisms that eliminate in-group differences and increase the salience of the out-group (Enos, 2017). He confirmed and expanded these findings with a subsequent randomized controlled trial. Respondents invited to participate in a lab study

were assigned arbitrary groups (denoted by orange and purple folders) and placed in one of two seating arrangements: an integrated condition of interspersed colors and a segregated condition where folder color determined which side of the room the respondents were seated. Respondents in both seating arrangements were prohibited from speaking so as to eliminate possible contact effects (Enos and Celaya, 2018). All subsequent tests of respondents' attitudes and behaviors showed that respondents in the segregated condition favored their artificially assigned in-group over the artificially assigned out-group. The mere spacial segregation of respondents affected intergroup relations. In short, Enos and his colleagues contend that the segregation of people in space has an independent and powerful effect on intergroup biases.

2.2.2 The Problem of Self-Selection

A primary criticism launched against any research dealing with the contextual determinants of individual attitudes and behaviors is whether the study is capturing the independent effect of context or people's self-selection into particular contexts. If the latter, then any effect observed in individual attitudes and behaviors is less affected by context than by the individual's decision to locate himself in that context. In fact, a substantial amount of evidence shows that individuals self-select into their residential neighborhoods. The migration of Americans since the late 1970s has led to a "big sort" in geography that has created clusters of communities that share similar beliefs, lifestyles and political ideologies (Bishop, 2008). Researchers have shown that Americans tend to live with others who have similar racial and ethnic backgrounds, as well as those who adhere to similar political and religious creeds (Motyl et al., 2014). Experimental evidence suggests that this correlation is not spurious, but rather reflects people's preferences. University students made to think that their university was becoming incongruous with their personal views expressed a greater desire to transfer out, a perspective that was fully mediated by students' desires to achieve a sense of belonging (Motyl et al., 2014). The same authors also showed that perceived

fit between personal and community ideology increased students' sense of belonging and decreased their desire to transfer.

Beyond the university, Semyonov and Glikman (2009) show that initial predispositions toward ethnic minorities affect how intergroup contact occurs. Europeans who reside in majority-European environments are likely to be exposed to non-representative ethnic minorities whose higher socioeconomic status permits them to assimilate. Intergroup contact under these circumstances will not be consequential for reducing bias toward ethnic minorities (Semyonov and Glikman, 2009). In contrast, Europeans who reside in ethnic minority neighborhoods may feel "trapped" in their environment, experience fear of competition, and demonstrate high levels of prejudice. If these Europeans "cross higher psychological barriers" to establish intergroup contact and friendship, the affect of contact on mitigating their prejudices will appear large (Semyonov and Glikman, 2009). The point Semyonov and Glikman (2009) want to make is that class affects where people live, and thus affects how people engage with the out-group.

The primary problem of self-selection is that it prevents researchers from establishing clear causality in the relationship between context and individual attitudes and behaviors. To establish causality, a researcher would need to place one person in two different contexts simultaneously and measure the effect of each context on his attitudes and behaviors over time. Taking the European example above, the same European person would have to be placed in the ethnic minority neighborhood and European-majority neighborhood simultaneously. After a period of time, testing that European's attitudes and behaviors in each of the locations would provide two data points about how context changes him. A comparison across contexts would reveal the causal effect of neighborhood diversity on a European's biases toward ethnic minorities. Clearly, one person cannot be placed in two different locations at once and so the causal information cannot be obtained in such a straightforward fashion.

The good news is that problems of causal inference are rampant throughout the social sciences and researchers have developed ingenious methods for overcoming them. Some

studies report correlations (Enos and Gidron, 2016), while others attempt to strengthen correlation results using instrumental variables (see for example, Quillian, 2014 and Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2009). To account for selection bias in observational studies of neighborhood effects, researchers have opted to ask respondents about their preferences for living in integrated neighborhoods. This additional variable is used to subset respondents to replicate main findings (Enos and Gidron, 2016), or to include as an indicator in regression analysis (Oliver and Wong, 2003). In both studies, self-selection is found not to play a significant role in explaining the correlation between segregation and negative out-group attitudes.

Other studies seize on rare opportunities provided by real-world random assignment of context. A commonly cited natural experiment in five American cities in the mid-1990s randomly assigned housing vouchers to families in high-poverty circumstances to move to substantially better neighborhoods (Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2007; Barnhardt, 2009). Known as the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment, the goal of the intervention was to investigate the effect of neighborhood context on otherwise similar groups of families. Five years after random assignment, a study of individual outcomes found no discernible effect on the economic self-sufficiency of adults in the population that moved to a better neighborhood compared to the population that stayed in the high-poverty environment (Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2007). The authors concluded: housing mobility does not appear to have an effect on individual economic conditions or welfare participation (Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2007). Subsequent studies have cautioned against extrapolating too much from the study's null results (Sampson, 2008). The implication from these criticisms is that contextual effects should be properly measured in future studies with proper safeguards against problems of self-selection.

Finally, experimentally varying people's perceptions about context offers even greater opportunities to overcome problems associated with selection bias. Introducing members of the out-group to train platforms in the Boston suburbs permitted Enos (2017) to sidestep the issue of selection bias. Rather than comparing people across different contexts, which makes

measurement vulnerable to selection bias, Enos' experiment measured attitudes for the same people across time, much like the MTO experiment. Thus, measuring the same people's attitudes before and after their context was experimentally manipulated makes selection bias less relevant.

The study conducted in Chapter 7 of this book similarly relies on an experimental intervention to overcome the problem of selection bias. Instead of the temporal variation employed by Enos and the MTO experiment, the study in Chapter 7 uses random assignment to experimental treatment to test the theory that context has a direct effect on individual attitudes and behaviors. Most Lebanese people live in segregated towns clustered in highly segregated regions (see Figure 3.1 in the next chapter). Nevertheless, a small number of towns, which are populated by majorities of one sect, are embedded in regions that are dominated by majorities of another sect. An experimental intervention will exploit this variation in the demographic composition at the local and regional levels. The experiment in Chapter 7 will randomly vary information about respondents' residential demography in order to change people's perceptions about their context.

To be clear, the people living in the neighborhoods targeted for the neighborhood study likely did not arrive in their contexts by chance or random assignment. The residential decisions among the Lebanese have been shaped by history and decades of war and violence that has constrained their movement or compelled them to relocate in search of safety. It can thus be said with certainty that the people whose attitudes and behaviors will be analyzed in Chapter 7 have not been randomly assigned to their neighborhoods. However, the random assignment of treatment to this population should neutralize the effects of selection bias on the causal effect of perceived context on attitudes and behaviors. If changing perceptions about context changes respondents' attitudes, then this book will provide further support to the scholarship of Enos and his colleagues. If changing perceived context fails to change respondents' attitudes, however, then the results in this book will cast doubt on the proposed causal effect of social geography on intergroup bias.

2.2.3 Beyond the U.S. and Modern Europe

The contact hypothesis and the intergroup threat theory have received enormous attention and empirical support in the West. The majority of the literature testing the effects of contact and threat has explored the relationship between white American and European majorities on one side and ethnic and racial minorities on the other. The divide between these majority in-groups and the minority out-groups has often been clearly delineated, often by culturally distinct attire and skin color. Such clarity on observable characteristics has meant that stereotyping in the West has been easy. Group relations in the West have also been assumed to be hierarchical. The literature has thus unsurprisingly focused on producing attitudinal and behavioral changes in the dominant group. To achieve tolerance, the literature advocates contact for the dominant group so that its members may correct false beliefs and assumptions about subordinate groups.

When the contact hypothesis and threat theory are applied to contexts outside the West, however, group divisions are not always so visible and group hierarchies are not always so well-delineated. Attempts to test contact and threat in African contexts have made clear that ethnic groups are not strictly "ranked" along a single power dimension (Kasara, 2013). The Ibo of Nigeria, for example, are both "distrusted and despised" and admired for their "Western education, salaried jobs, and higher standards of living" (Kasara, 2013; Horowitz, 1985). The assumption that groups are organized along a kind of hierarchical caste system is increasingly put in doubt in other contexts as well. Context-related studies in Nigeria (Scacco and Warren, 2018), Turkey (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu, 2019), and Georgia (Schaub, 2017) all explore intergroup dynamics where group hierarchies are uncertain. In all three studies, intergroup relations do not neatly conform to the theoretical expectations of contact and threat. Furthermore, the distinctions between groups are not so obvious. In Aytaç and Çarkoğlu's (2017) study, phenotype distinctions between Turks, devout Muslim Turks, and Kurds are not always readily apparent.

Lebanon more closely resembles contexts outside the West. A lack of clarity about

group hierarchy in Lebanon makes it difficult to predict what effects contact and threat will have on Lebanon's different sectarian groups. The literature dealing with both theories concentrates its predictions on dominant/majority groups, and provides mixed predictions for subordinate/minority groups (Marschall and Stolle, 2004; Oliver and Wong, 2003). In modern-day Lebanon it is difficult to define which of the three principle sectarian groups — Christian, Shia or Sunni — is dominant. Christians have lost much of their pre-Civil War power, but cannot be called subordinate given their cultural and historic preeminence. The Shia were historically dispossessed, but have since risen in economic and political power to rival the Sunnis and Christians. For the Sunni and Shia, moreover, local status is complicated by the regional and international context. Both sectarian groups enjoy substantive economic and military support from regional powers. Given these considerations, there is little reason to predict how contact and threat will affect each sectarian group. The chapters that follow will provide answers in due course.

Chapter 3

A Divided Society

"Me against my brother, my brother and I against my cousin, and all of us against the stranger."

— An old Bedouin proverb

Lebanon is a country of remarkable diversity. Home to both Christians and Muslims of various sectarian identities, Lebanon achieved independence in 1943 after centuries as a governorate to a succession of empires. In the middle of the twentieth century, Lebanon was distinguished by a vibrant economy and a dynamic interplay of both Western and Eastern beliefs, customs, and cultures. Lebanon could not long withstand the pressures from regional geopolitical conflicts. The wars and armed insurrections against Israel, its southern neighbor, soon had spillover effects that powerfully affected Lebanon's ability to control its borders. Lebanon's internal security and administrative capacity were substantially weakened by an armed Palestinian presence, as well as the targeted export of Shia-empowerment from Iran. Lebanon's diversity, which had heretofore made it a vibrant country, transformed into a structural weakness and contributed to a breakdown in the political order that culminated in a brutal Civil war between 1975 and 1990.

Lebanon has eighteen officially-recognized sectarian groups, though relevant cleavages are largely drawn among four groups: Christians, Shias, Sunnis and Druze. Lebanon is also comprised of four principal nationalities: Lebanese, Armenians, Syrians, and Pales-

tinians. The native Lebanese are the largest population. Armenians are a distinct ethnic group, but were granted Lebanese citizenship and enjoy political representation within the political system. Syrians and Palestinians are refugees, majorities of which are not granted citizenship and are confined to refugee camps. The political and military presence of Palestinian refugees was a major catalyst for the Lebanese Civil War, and the more recent influx of Syrian refugees has led to significant economic and political turmoil. Since Syrian and Palestinian refugees have no formal political rights or claims, and Armenians are sufficiently integrated within the sociopolitical system, inter-ethnic relations will not be the focus of this book. Instead, this book will focus on conflict between sectarian social groups.

Sectarian divisions were embedded into the architecture of the Lebanese political system from its inception. In 1943, when Lebanon sought independence from France, President Bishara al-Khuri and Prime Minister Riad al-Solh designed a National Pact that formed the basis of the new nation's political system and institutionalized sectarian power-sharing. Assuming representation for the Christian and Muslim communities, respectively, the two leaders sought to create an independent state that eschewed political dominance from both the East and the West. While a noble goal aimed at ensuring neutrality, the Pact suffered from a fatal flaw: *"deux negations ne feront jamais une nation"*¹ (Naccache, 1949). The leaders had articulated what the state ought not to do, but had neither introduced a national vision to unify its diverse communities, nor created institutions capable of withstanding the onslaught of competing regional interests that helped pull the country apart along sectarian lines.

Nevertheless, the two leaders' rejection of foreign interference in the national system was prescient. The conflict of 1958, the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), and other small-scale conflicts originate, at least in part, from the machinations of foreign powers. Despite state collapse and a protracted Civil War, the sectarian power-sharing system was reinforced

¹The phrase translates to: "two negations can never make a nation."

with the 1989 Ta'if Agreement that ended the war. Even though the treaty established peace, sectarian divisions continue to contribute to rampant political corruption and clientelist relationships in the provision of public goods and services.

The aim of this book is to understand the nature of Lebanese divisions and test theories that may ameliorate these divisions. This chapter will discuss Lebanese divisions and uncover three underlying variables that may explain why sectarian divisions persist.

3.1 Division in Lebanon

The Ta'if Agreement of 1989 ended the Civil War and laid the foundation for political reconciliation among Lebanon's war-weary sectarian groups. Unfortunately, the Agreement failed to change the confessional power-sharing system that had contributed to the Civil War in the first place. The Agreement kept the consociational system of government, which bases political power on sectarian identity. The effect of this institutional arrangement has been the entrenchment of sectarian identities not only in the political arena, but also in the general population. Sectarian divisions in the population have been further exacerbated by Lebanon's history of violence and mass displacement that has segregated the national geography by sect. Figure 3.1 on the following page demonstrates that the Lebanese are clustered together geographically along sectarian lines in towns and regions throughout the country.²

Notwithstanding the powerful presence of sectarian identities, the modern Lebanese state does not appear to be divided by religious essentialism. From a historical perspective, a cursory analysis of Lebanon in the past century reveals the flaws inherent in a primordial analysis of sectarian divisions. Specifically, history shows that sectarian cleavages have waxed and waned over time, pitting different sectarian groups against each other at dif-

²The map shows the majority sect in each delineated territory. Grey areas, labeled "undefined," are too sparsely occupied to have a distinct sectarian orientation.




Figure 3.1: Distribution of Sects in Lebanon

ferent historical junctures. The Christian-Druze cleavage of the founding era gave way to the Christian-Muslim conflict of the Civil War and today has evolved into the Sunni-Shia divide (Majed, 2020; Hanf, 2015). In light of these fluctuating cleavages, a forceful literature on Lebanon has persistently criticized the consociational arrangements of the political system and the sectarian interests it is purported to defend. This literature contends instead that consociational institutions empower political parties to harness sectarian differences to increase the power of the elite, even when sect holds little social significance for the constituency (Khazen, 2003; Ofeish, 1999; Corstange, 2013). In an ingenious study, Corstange (2012) showed the extent to which vote trafficking occurs in Lebanon. Over 50% of Christians, Shias and Sunnis admitted to selling their votes to political parties in exchange for material benefits, including cash and government jobs. An influential recent study has further shown the extent to which party promises of services and infrastructure create incentives for sectarian voting (Cammett, 2014). Still another prominent line of thought makes a Marxist argument about how the transition from feudalism to capitalism has consolidated economic and political power in an elite that uses sectarianism as a tool to maintain power (Fawaz Traboulsi, 2014). These studies paint a convincing picture of citizens trapped by the political infrastructure of the state into a web of sectarianism.

Even if sect is not the root of division in Lebanon, it is also not invisible. Posner's (2004) Chewas and Tumbukas may show salient political cleavages in a competitive political landscape, and not in other contexts, but they are distinct cultural groups in both settings. So are Lebanon's sectarian groups. A brief retelling of the histories of the groups that populate modern-day Lebanon will demonstrate how these social group identities were shaped in distinct ways.

The land that was carved out in 1920 by the French mandate to form modern Lebanon has been continuously populated since Neolithic times almost nine thousand years ago. In antiquity, the Lebanese coastal cities of Tyre, Sidon and Byblos constituted the

main ports of the ancient Phoenician kingdom. Conquered first by Assyria, Babylonia, the Achaemenid Empire and Alexander the Great, Lebanon became a part of the Roman Empire and an early convert to Christianity. The country's main Christian population, the Maronites, trace their religious origin to the fourth century monk and ascetic Saint Maron who preached and administered in Syria. Saint Maron's disciples brought Christianity to Lebanon in the fifth century and converted the Phoenician inhabitants of Mount Lebanon. Between the late seventh and tenth centuries, persecution in Syria drove the Syriac Maronites south to Mount Lebanon to join and expand the existing community there. From the time of the Byzantine Empire and through the Arab expansion, the Crusades, the repressions of the Mamluk Empire, and conquest and violence of the Ottoman Empire, the Maronites maintained their singular identity as Christian disciples of Saint Maron and heirs of the Phoenician civilization.

The Sunni and Shia of Lebanon share similarly long histories. As they belong to the vast communities of Sunnism and Shiism of the Middle East and North Africa, the history of Sunnis and Shias in the land of modern-day Lebanon is intimately connected to the trajectories of these larger communities. The expansion of the Islamic faith from the Arabian Peninsula to the Levant in the seventh century eliminated the rule and influence of the Byzantine Empire. Over the succeeding centuries, the new Arab Muslim rulers converted many of the formerly Christian populations. When Asia Minor fell to Islamic rulers, the Byzantine Empire sought support from the Pope in Rome. Between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, the Catholic nations of France, Italy, England, and Germany launched a series of Crusades to take back the Holy Land from Islamic rule. These two events — the expansion of Islam from Arabia and the Crusader conquests that followed — have been crucial to the identity formations of Christians and Muslims in Lebanon. Evidence suggests a divergence in the Lebanese Christian and Muslim populations that reflects European Crusader influences on Lebanese Christians and the impact of the Islamic expansion from the Arabian Peninsula on Lebanese Muslims (Zalloua et al., 2008). While these differences do

not amount to ethnic distinctions, they have created significant divergence along religious lines.

A divide materialized between the Shia and Sunni sects early in the development of the Islamic religion. When the prophet Muhammad died in 632, he had united the tribes of Arabia into the nation of Islam, or the *umma*, but had left no heir and had not specified a line of succession. His followers became divided on the issue of succession. The majority believed that the Islamic elite should name the next *caliph*, or leader, while a minority insisted that only a member of Muhammad's family should succeed him. This minority placed its support in Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, Ali. The majority, or the Sunni, prevailed and appointed a caliph, later building the expansive Umayyad caliphate that spanned from Central Asia to Spain. The minority that supported Ali, and became known as the Shia, did not concede defeat. In 681, Ali's son (and Muhammad's grandson) Hussein led a retinue of family members and supporters to confront the Umayyad caliph. Met by the caliph's army at the Battle of Karbala, Hussein and the surviving members of Muhammad's family all perished. Far from being the death knell to Shia claims to the caliphate, however, Hussein became a martyr and the violence at Karbala galvanized the Shia community to form a distinct identity with its own rituals and a collective memory of trauma and victimization.³

The Shia remained a minority group, often persecuted by the Sunni imperial authority. In Lebanon, the Shia congregated in southern Mount Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley, just as the Christian minority had done for protection in northern Mount Lebanon. In the eleventh century, the Druze emerged out of a branch of Shiism and began to populate southern Mount Lebanon.⁴

In the case of all three sectarian groups that will constitute the focus of this book

³The Battle of Karbala continues to be commemorated every year during the *Ashoura*.

⁴Despite their Islamic origins, both the Shia and Sunni deny that the Druze follow Islam. Accepted Shia branches include the largest Twelver branch, Ismaili, Zaydi and Alawi. See Ariav, n.d. and Pruitt, 2019 for details on the schism between the Sunni and Shia sects and the different branches of Islam.

— Christians, Shias and Sunnis — centuries of conversion, cultural exchange, intermarriage, violence, and repression have molded and shaped their group boundaries. Technological change and the progress of human knowledge have inevitably impacted their worldview and the manner in which these groups and their members engage with the social world. The impact of trade and patronage from abroad have also influenced Lebanese sectarian divisions. Some experts on Lebanon trace contemporary sectarian divisions to the nineteenth century trade in silk between the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon and Europe that bestowed differential benefits to confessional groups (Makdisi, 2000; Baumann, 2016). Harris (2009) places the historical link to contemporary identities even earlier in history: "communal identities dating back to the centuries between the Islamic conquest and the Crusades represent an essential precursor to modern political sectarianism" (p. 11). The presence of Crusaders in the Levant from 1099 until the mid-thirteenth century was crucial to entrenching sectarian identities (Harris, 2009). The Maronite, Shia and Druze groups in Mount Lebanon were able to secure their interests by playing off the Crusaders and the Muslim authorities. By the time the Sunnis of the Mamluk Empire defeated the Crusaders, these sectarian communities had established themselves as distinct cultural entities (Harris, 2009). Regardless of the length of its roots, Lebanese sectarianism delineates distinct communities that routinely mobilize for political, social and military ends.

Two points are relevant to clarify about Lebanese divisions and how they will be approached in this book. First, while significant historical and social differences exist among different Christian denominations, these differences were disregarded in the analysis. The decision to consolidate Christian denominations into a single "Christian" sectarian category for analysis is informed by the political realities of modern-day Lebanon. The Christian sects, including the two largest — Maronites and the Greek Orthodox — are internally divided into separate party blocs (Atallah and Zoughaib, 2019). Thus, a Lebanese Christian's sectarian identity does not automatically refer to a party or partisan bloc. Without a clear political

dividing line among the Christian sects, the decision was made to aggregate all the smaller sectarian entities into the larger Christian category. This decision is further informed by the historic politicization of sectarian identities that constituted the Lebanese Christian through resistance to violent confrontations with Sunni, Shia, and Druze sectarian groups. A glaring recent example of this division is the Green Line that was erected during the Civil War to separate East and West Beirut. Through a process of displacement and voluntary movement, East Beirut became Christian and West Beirut Muslim. The line, in other words, divided Muslims and Christians, not more specifically Sunnis and Maronite.

A second point that needs to be clarified is that the Druze have been excluded from sub-group analysis. The reason for their exclusion is that their sect is represented by far fewer Parliamentary seats than are Christian, Shia and Sunni sects.⁵ A consolidation of the Muslim sects into a single "Muslim" category akin to the decision made for the Christian sects was not undertaken for this research. Shia and Sunni differences are historically and politically significant. Furthermore, neither the Shia nor the Sunni sect accepts the Druze as a constituent religious entity.

The decision to exclude the Druze is unfortunate, however, and far too often employed in the literature (Corstange, 2012; Corstange, 2013; Paler, Marshall, and Atallah, 2020). Their exclusion is unfortunate mainly from the standpoint of Lebanese political realities. The Druze are numerically smaller than the Christian, Shia, and Sunni sects, but have enjoyed substantial political relevance. The founder of the PSP, Kamal Jumblatt, led the Muslim National Movement, in alliance with the Palestinian Liberation Authority, against the Christian Lebanese Front during the Civil War. After 2005, the PSP continued to play an important role under the leadership of Jumblatt's son, Walid, who has been dubbed the political "weathervane" by local and foreign press. The absence of the Druze in this and other research thus prohibits greater understanding of a small but important Lebanese

⁵The Muslim sects are granted 64 seats in Parliament, of which the Druze occupy only 8 seats, compared with 27 each for the Shia and Sunni sects. The Christian sects are granted 64 seats in Parliament.

minority. Future research should aim to include the Druze in experimental studies.

For now, the three principal groups that will be the subject of this research are Christians, Shias, and Sunnis. Each of these sectarian communities is represented by at least two political parties. While sectarian communities may select between multiple parties, each political party is largely constituted of a single sectarian community. To be clear, the fact that each sect is represented by multiple political parties does not necessarily mean that voters are permitted a real partisan choice. Since 2005, Lebanese party politics have been dominated by the rivalry between two political blocs: the March 8 Alliance and the March 14 Alliance. The dominance of this political cleavage significantly restricts the range of political choices and opportunities for new political parties to emerge. Following the most recent Parliamentary election in 2018, a total of 22 political parties won seats to represent eleven sectarian groups (Atallah and Zoughaib, 2019): the Muslim sects represented are the Shia, Sunni, Druze and Alawites; the Christian sects represented are the Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Evangelical and other Christian minorities. Overtly partisan politicians occupy 97 seats in Parliament, while a quarter of the seats (i.e. 31) are occupied by non-party members, though 24 among them are allied with the major partisan blocs (Atallah and Zoughaib, 2019).

The origin of the March 8 and March 14 political blocs traces back to the 2005 assassination of the Sunni Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. That event sparked the Cedar Revolution and a great political transformation. The assassination was initially blamed on Syria. The Syrian government built a vast military and intelligence apparatus in Lebanon after their invasion in 1976 during the Lebanese Civil War (Shields, 2008). Under their heavy-handed occupation, assassinations, imprisonments, torture, and other forms of political violence were rampant. Suspecting that the Syrians were behind the assassination, the Sunni political party Hariri had founded, the Future Movement, and its allies mobilized against the occupation — this mobilization came to be known as the March 14 bloc. March 14 was a cross-sectarian alliance that espoused a Lebanese national identity. Among the

alliance members were the Druze Progressive Socialist Party and Christian Lebanese Forces and Kataeb parties.

In opposition to this new political movement, the Shia parties, led by Hezbollah, rallied in support of Syria. Hezbollah feared the loss of its Syrian patron, which worked in tandem with Iran to arm and financially secure the Shia militia as a bulwark against Israel. Despite support from Lebanese Shias, the Syrian army withdrew from Lebanon under pressure from March 14 and the international community. This withdrawal provided an opportunity for the leader of the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), Michel Aoun, to return from exile in France (Shields, 2008). General Aoun had been exiled from Lebanon after fighting a bloody battle against Syria and pro-Syrian militias in the late 1980s (Shields, 2008). Upon his return to Lebanon in 2005, however, he brokered a politically expedient alliance with his former rivals, Amal and Hezbollah, who supported his ascension to the presidency in 2016 (Shields, 2008). The political alliance between the Shia parties and FPM has come to be known as the March 8 bloc.⁶

The studies conducted in this book invoke eight political parties: the Christian FPM, Lebanese Forces, Kataeb and Tashnag; the Shia Hezbollah and Amal; the Sunni Future Movement; and the Druze PSP. Table 3.1 provides a short description of each of the established political parties. All but Tashnag and Kataeb are major parties that hold substantial power in the Lebanese Parliament. Tashnag is a small party that represents the Armenian ethnic group, and the Armenian Orthodox sect, in particular. Although a relatively small political party (occupying only 3 seats in Parliament as of 2018), many students professed support to Tashnag in an Armenian university that was included in the university study of this book. Kataeb is a right-wing Maronite party that has substantially

⁶Since its 2005 emergence, the March 14 bloc has substantially diminished. The political unity of March 14 was weakened when the Future Movement and the Lebanese Forces both reached political settlements with the March 8 alliance in 2016 (Gaier and Toubia, 2018). The settlement permitted the election of FPM's Michel Aoun to the presidency, the designation of the Future Movement's Saad Hariri as Prime Minister, and the inclusion of Lebanese Forces in the government.

Table 3.1: The Main Political Parties and their Sectarian Affiliations

Party	Origins	Sect	Confession	Party Bloc
Kataeb	A nationalist Christian youth organization established in 1936. Both a party and militia, the organization forged strong ties with Israel during the war.	Maronite	Christian	March 14
Lebanese Forces	Founded in 1976 as a militia associated with the Kataeb Party, LF became an independent political party after the assassination of its founder and leader Bachir Gemayel.			March 14
Free Patriotic Movement	Established in 2005 by the former commander of the Lebanese army and current President Michel Aoun, the party is partially responsible for the division in the Christian community.			March 8
Tashnag	An Armenian nationalist, socialist political party established in the 19th century. It operates in Armenia and throughout the Armenian diaspora.	Armenian		March 8
Hezbollah	Founded, armed and trained in the 1980s with support from Iran and Syria, Hezbollah has both a militant and political wing.	Shia	Muslim	March 8
Amal Movement	Established in 1975 as a leftist pan-Arabist movement, Amal went on to fight against the PLO and Hezbollah for control of the Shia community.			March 8
Future Movement	The party became an official political organization in 2007 under the current Prime Minister Saad Hariri after the assassination of his father and former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.	Sunni		March 14
Progressive Socialist Party	Founded in 1949, the PSP fought alongside the PLO during the civil war. The PSP is known to fluctuate between both the March 8 and March 14 blocs.	Druze		March 14

Note: Information to create this table comes from Hermez (2017) and Majed (2020).

diminished in power since the end of the Civil War. In addition to these established parties, the studies in this book also invoke two secular, civil society movements: Independent and Sabaa. The first is a non-specific title used in the university study to indicate that an individual is not aligned with an official political party. At the time that the university study was fielded (November 2016 to March 2017), a prominent civil society organization, Beirut Madinati, had lost an election and was slowly disintegrating. Using "Independent" as a partisan category permitted this study to invoke a non-aligned partisan identity, without specifying a political party that had little chance of survival.

Before its eventual collapse, Beirut Madinati emerged as a promising alternative to the partisan establishment. Beirut Madinati was created in the wake of large-scale protests over corruption in 2015 and contested the 2016 Beirut municipal elections. The party was comprised of independent, non-sectarian candidates who campaigned to establish a technocratic and professional city government (Chaaban et al., 2016). While Beirut Madinati failed to win any seats on the council, its share of the vote was purported to be 32% (Chaaban et al., 2016). The significant support garnered by Beirut Madinati in 2016 inspired other independent political movements, chief among them Sabaa, LiHaqqi and LiBaladi. Despite contesting the 2018 Parliamentary elections in large numbers for the first time, the independent political parties garnered only modest levels of support across the country. Ultimately, only one independent party candidate succeeded in winning a Parliamentary seat (Mitchell and Rowsell, 2019).

Lebanese citizens often lament the state of sectarian politics in their country for its failure to provide simple services like 24-hour electricity and reliable garbage disposal. Nonetheless, as the failures of the independent political movements above demonstrate, most voters continue to elect sectarian political parties. The section that follows will attempt to explain why sectarianism is so pervasive and persistent.

3.2 Three Foundations for Social Divisions

The previous section previewed the divisions that are embedded in the fabric of the Lebanese state and society. This section will engage with the spirited debate in the literature on the underlying causes of the divisions that make sectarian consociation so enduring. In presenting the three principle explanations that the literature has used to analyse Lebanese divisions, this section will demonstrate that bias exists across different groups in society. Income, sect and party are all powerful explanations for the existence of intergroup divisions and conflict. Although the intention of this book is ultimately to make a case for the preeminence of one of these explanations - partisan identity - the substance of this section is to show that the factors underlying intergroup bias are complex and multidimensional. This may be the very reason why divisions in Lebanon persist - bias is founded on several fundamental factors simultaneously.

3.2.1 Class in Lebanon

A substantive literature on Lebanon maintains that sectarian identity is an instrument used by the political elite for electoral and material gain. The framework of "identity as instrument" draws on long-standing theories developed in African contexts (Posner, 2004; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner, 2010). The literature on the politicization of ethnic identities in Africa countries provides a familiar model: elites make identities salient to garner electoral support and people exchange their votes to co-ethnic elites for the provision of public goods.

Drawing on this literature, the Lebanese scholar Sami Ofeish (1999) wrote that sectarianism is "an elite-promoted mode of differentiation among religiously affiliated members of the society in terms of access to power and control over resources" (p. 100). He maintains that the elite mobilize the lower and middle classes along sectarian lines to achieve two main objectives. First, sectarian divisions allow elites to draw on a reliable base of support. Second, sectarianism creates divisions in the lower classes that co-opts cross-sectarian de-

mands for reform in the economic, social and political sphere. Sects are thus instruments by which the status quo is maintained and elite power remains unchallenged. The endurance of powerful families and militia leaders through the decades lends support to this "identity as instrument" perspective. The leadership of some principal political parties has been passed down through generations of the same family: the Jounblatts of the PSP, Gemayels of Kataeb, Frangiehs of the Marada Movement, and Hariris of the Future Movement (Haines-Young, 2018). Other party leaders have not created dynastic succession, but have held on to power they first gained by leading militias during the Civil War: Nabih Berri of Amal, Michel Aoun of FPM, and Samir Geagea of the Lebanese Forces (Haines-Young, 2018).

While Ofeish's narrative that the Lebanese elite harness sectarian divisions to maintain power has substantial support in recent Lebanese history, this early account of Lebanese sectarianism overlooks two important considerations the literature has since addressed. First, Ofeish's elite-driven explanation does not address the process by which elites stymie proposed alternatives to the sectarian status quo. Second, Ofeish's focus is top-down with emphasis on elites, without considering how people express their loyalty and acquiescence to the political status quo.

First, an explication of the process by which political elites maintain power is relevant because it provides a succinct snapshot of Lebanon's economy and the factors that have led to the current economic crisis. Hannes Baumann studied the Lebanese post-war economy and the three decades of developments that brought the Lebanese economy to its knees in the fall of 2019. According to Baumann, the Lebanese Civil War permitted two groups to ascend to power: a new business elite that pursued neo-liberal economic policies and the entrenched militia leadership. These new actors usurped much of the power of the merchant families that dominated Lebanon before the war, but did not change the political economy of Lebanon. Wealth and income remained concentrated among the elite, while the majority of people remained dependent on this elite through clientelist networks.

According to Baumann (2016), the new business elite, led chiefly by the business-

man and politician Rafic Hariri, chose to pursue reconstruction and currency stabilization to mold Lebanon in the image of a neo-liberal state. Reconstruction created a rentier system reliant on foreign direct investments and remittances. To attract Gulf capital to Lebanon, a main pillar of the national economic plan was to stabilize the Lebanese lira against the American dollar by paying high interest rates on government debt. At the same time, as Prime Minister from 1992 to 1998, and again from 2000 to 2004, Hariri used his political influence to pass legislation that permitted the transfer of property rights from thousands of private owners in Beirut to his development company (Baumann, 2016).

The other important source for the flow of capital were remittances. For most of the 2000s, remittances comprised 20% of GDP, helping to finance the government budget and current accounts deficits (Baumann, 2019). These short-term capital inflows allowed Lebanon to fund its enormous government debt, which stood at 51% of GDP in 1993 (Baumann, 2016) and rose to 170% of GDP in 2020 (Jones, 2020).

The beneficiaries of reconstruction and excessive government borrowing were the Gulf contractors, the Lebanese diaspora, businessmen and militia leaders who had amassed fortunes during the Civil War. When foreign capital inflows were at their peak, the economy drifted along with moderate levels of economic growth, high unemployment and high rates of poverty. Meanwhile, the economic elite, enmeshed with the political elite, enriched themselves from the rentier system they had created (Baumann, 2016).

Against the backdrop of this neo-liberal pursuit of public-private partnerships, foreign investments, and capital accumulation, Baumann (2016) notes that two other groups of actors pursued economic agendas. The militia leaders who came to occupy positions of power after the war continued the pre-war practice common among the powerful merchant families of monopolizing resources and redistributing them through clientelist networks along sectarian lines (Baumann, 2016). These militia leaders obtained resources for redistribution from state coffers and by extracting a share of rents from the capital procurement of the neo-liberal elite. According to Baumann (2016), competition between the neo-liberal elite

and militia leaders played a key role in the co-optation of the nation's trade unions.

Long a force that challenged the economic and political status quo, the Lebanese trade unions organized after the Civil War under the umbrella of the General Confederation of Workers in Lebanon (GCWL) to demand greater welfare expenditures, higher wages, improved access to education and health services and political freedom (Baumann, 2016). The Lebanese political elite responded with repression. Prime Minister Hariri imposed a ban on street demonstrations in 1993, declared a state of emergency in 1996 to deploy the military against the trade unions, deployed the Internal Security Forces to prevent free union elections in 1997, and eventually arrested the GCWL leader (Baumann, 2016). In addition to overt repression, the government also acted covertly. When they prevented free elections for GCWL leadership, the government installed their own candidate. Some political parties aligned themselves with different trade union federations to outvote their opponents on the GCWL executive council (Baumann, 2016).

The combination of repression and covert action co-opted the GCWL and made it beholden to sectarian political parties. From this point forward, Hariri's political rivals could use the trade unions as a lever with which to extract rents from the neo-liberal spoils system (Baumann, 2016). Once thought of as a bulwark against the entrenched political and economic elite, the trade unions were brought into the fold of the entrenched sectarian system. A key point made by Baumann and others who write about the political economy of sectarianism is that the Lebanese people are not passive observers of their own exploitation. Rather, their every attempt to redefine social cleavages along socioeconomic, rather than sectarian lines, are met with elite repression.

The strictly instrumental view of Lebanese sectarianism described so far best conforms with an understanding of politics as a battleground for the distribution of material resources. Sect is a means to a material end for the elite who can harness sectarian division as a tool for exploitation. For the people, sects are less an identity that has intrinsic value than a means for maximizing welfare provisions. An innovative list experiment conducted

in Lebanon following the 2009 Parliamentary elections explicitly revealed the transactional nature of the relationship between political elites and their voters. Corstange's (2012) list experiment showed that about 55% of a representative sample of the Lebanese electorate engaged in vote selling - the exchange of material goods from political parties for votes.

An influential tract from the Marxist Lebanese scholar Fawwaz Traboulsi argues that the Lebanese social order is a "manifestation of privilege, inequality and exploitation" created by the complex relationship between sect and class (Fawaz Traboulsi, 2014). Traboulsi characterized this complexity in the following way: "the relationship between [sect and class] is not one of separate but parallel entities, but rather a complex network of interaction and disengagement, mutual influence and competition, on the grounds that both are frameworks for engaging in the battle for domination and the acquisition of the social surplus" (p. 100-101). According to Traboulsi, sects modify Lebanese class structure through two main channels. First, in line with the literature previewed above, the ruling class negotiates economic interests to ensure outcomes reflect the balance of their power through the "apportioning of state contracts and the division of various forms of rents between the sectarian blocs and alliances" (Fawaz Traboulsi, 2014, p. 21). Second, sects provide the means by which individuals experience upward social mobility by benefiting from goods and services distributed outside official institutional channels of the state. This latter process ensures that people express loyalty toward the sectarian system.

Recent studies have explored the relationship between sect and class from the point of view of the Lebanese population. Using experimental evidence, these studies have sought to leverage individual-level data to substantiate the comprehensive political economy studies produced by scholars like Baumann and Traboulsi above. Daniel Corstange (2013) found that Lebanese respondents profess sectarian preferences publicly, but hold beliefs in solidarity with their class in private settings. The reason that class trumps sect when unspoken beliefs are measured is that social desirability biases, specifically socially induced praise for conformist pronouncements and sanctioning of unpopular pronouncements, are eliminated (Corstange,

2013). In the absence of public scrutiny, Corstange argues, Lebanese respondents reveal their true preferences to be dependent on their class position.

The effect of class on preferences is not always hidden in unspoken beliefs, however. In a dynamic environment where people were encouraged to interact, Lebanese respondents who belonged to the same class, but different sectarian groups, showed a marked decrease in support for sectarian politics (Paler, Marshall, and Atallah, 2020). Consistent with predictions from the contact hypothesis, interaction among members of different sectarian groups permitted intergroup learning and diminished perceived intergroup differences. Intergroup learning about shared economic needs, coupled with the absence of social pressure from co-sectarians to conform to sectarian politics, permitted respondents to express class-based preferences (Paler, Marshall, and Atallah, 2020). In another study, the same researchers showed that groups characterized by class differences undermine women's cooperation in a public goods experiment more than do groups characterized by sectarian differences (Marshall and Paler, 2021). Conforming to predictions in the political economy literature, same-class identification may foster communion, while different-class identification undermines relationships.

In line with the experimental studies described above, this book uses information about respondents' income to understand how class impacts respondent behavior. The theory tested in this chapter is whether class provides a convincing explanation for observed sectarian biases. The reader will note that the literature cited above and the studies conducted in this book conflate class and income, even though the two variables are distinct. Traboulsi (2014) would raise issues with analysis of income as if arranged "into a pyramid," without regard as to the sources of income, the sectors where it is earned, and the ownership of capital and means of production. The use of income as a proxy for class in the literature and in this book is flawed, but remains the best estimate of class in the absence of thorough, and often unobtainable, information about respondent socioeconomic states. For now, information about respondent income should suffice to make approximate conclusions about cross-class relations.

3.2.2 Sect in Lebanon

An important distinction must be made about the two ways with which to understand "sect" in Lebanon. Sect denotes both an identity, akin to ethnic identities, and a religious community. Sectarianism is the adherence to a politicised group that professes a religious orientation. In the context of divided societies, sectarians demonstrate a preference for their in-group sect and feelings of antipathy and competition with members of the out-group sect. Sectarianism is thus defined as a politicization of religious identity.

In contrast, "sect as religion" is the personal and communal adherence to the teachings and dogma of a particular religion. Adherence to sectarianism does not imply religiosity, and vice versa. Many sectarians are culturally and politically committed to the religion of their sect, but do not show any proclivity for worship. Similarly, many religiously faithful, especially those who internalize the Biblical commandment to "love thy neighbor," would eschew the competition and violence that is often a ramification of sectarian allegiances. Religious individuals may hold political beliefs as a result of their religious convictions (e.g. anti-abortion stances among faithful Christians, Jews, and Muslims), and they may believe in the primacy of their particular faith, but they do not necessarily advocate for the exclusive dominance of their faith in the social and political sphere. Christianity enshrines separation between Church and State, for example, by virtue of Jesus' exhortation to "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's" (Mathew 22:21, The Holy Bible). In contrast, Islam demands that Sharia law supersede all civil authority. Nevertheless, Islamic communities throughout the world often accept secular political authority. In Lebanon, calls for Christian autonomy or the creation of a religious state by Islamic groups emerged in times of violence, only to be quickly abandoned as "inapplicable and extremist" (Ofeish, 1999, p. 99). Religious individuals belonging to different faiths have in the past and continue to co-exist in Lebanon without demanding secession or domination.

Further, the literature has persistently eschewed a primordialist interpretation of

Lebanese sectarian divisions. To reiterate Ofeish (1999), "sectarianism is not a 'natural' byproduct of the presence of sect" (p.99); religiosity is not driving discrimination against the out-group. Evidence in this book will also suggest that intergroup bias is not a result of deterministic religious differences. Rather, bias among sectarian groups will be more in line with the sociopolitical notion of sect.

The dominant literature on Lebanon insists that sect is an instrument of politics and conceives of Lebanese sectarianism as a "dependent" rather than an "independent" variable (Ofeish, 1999, Majed, 2020). In a recent study, Majed (2020) illuminates the intersection between sect and politics and how political developments determine sectarian divisions. Using network analysis, Majed traces patterns of political party coalition formation during street mobilizations before and after 2005, a watershed year for Lebanese politics. The assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in February 2005 prompted mass street mobilizations that realigned party coalitions from a Christian-Muslim divide in the pre-2005 period to a Sunni-Shia divide after 2005 (Majed, 2020). This realignment took ultimate shape in the formation of the March 8 and March 14 blocs that continue to define the factions of Lebanon's political landscape.

Before 2005, Lebanese political party mobilization centered around Pan-Arab activism among Muslims and anti-Syrian activism among Christians (Majed, 2020). The shift ushered in after 2005 redrew coalition boundaries and gave rise to new political cleavages. Political parties organized larger and more frequent street mobilizations, concentrated on domestic issues at the expense of regional concerns, reduced calls for socioeconomic reform in favor of political concerns, and de-emphasized Pan-Arabism (Majed, 2020). Changes in the political interests of the parties led to a realignment in coalitions. The new fault line was established around the divide between the anti-Syrian March 14 movement that called for an end to Syrian occupation and disarmament of Hezbollah and the pro-Syrian March 8 movement that formed in opposition.

Majed's main contention in the analysis of these changing political coalitions is that

sectarian divisions resulted from the dynamic process of political realignment. "[P]olitical mobilization quickly becomes conflated with sectarian boundaries, which activates the salience of sectarian cleavages, thus sectarianizing the political conflict" (Majed, 2020, p.22). The realignment, which she and others have called the Sunni-Shia divide of Lebanon, pits the Sunni (Future Movement), Druze (PSP), and Christian (Lebanese Forces and Kataeb) political parties together in opposition to the Shia (Hezbollah and Amal), Christian (FPM) and Druze (Lebanese Democratic Party and the Lebanese Unification Movement) political parties. The divide is thus only incidentally sectarian for the Sunni and Shia, but is independent of sect for Christians and Druze who demonstrate divided loyalties in the two political coalitions.

Majed's analysis has important implications for understanding the relationship between sect and party politics. As Table 3.1 demonstrated, the major Lebanese political parties are each founded on the representation of a single sectarian group. Thus, sect and party can be synonymous in the Lebanese political landscape. This observation raises a couple of key questions. First, when a respondent shows out-group derogation toward a Shia individual, is that an indication of bias against the Shia sect, Amal or Hezbollah political parties, or the March 8 bloc? Similarly, when a respondent shows out-group derogation toward a partisan of Hezbollah, is that an indication of partisan animus or derogation against the Shia sect?

Analysis from researchers like Majed, Traboulsi, Baumann and Cammett imply that these distinctions are irrelevant given that divisions in Lebanon are purely economic or political. This explanation may be compatible with the Shia sect, whose partisan mobilization is "conflated with sectarian boundaries." However, the intra-sectarian political divisions among the Christians and Druze, especially, require further consideration. What does out-group derogation against the Christian sect imply? Members of the Christian sect are divided into multiple political parties, which are split between the March 8 and March 14 alliances. Consequently, the Christian sect is not a stand-in for any particular political

party, or even partisan bloc. It stands to reason that the Christian sect is a separate social group from any Christian party. If sect and party are detachable, then bias toward out-group sectarians and out-group partisans may be expressed in different ways and to different degrees. Chapters 3 and 4 will explore respondent biases toward out-group members who belong to the out-group sect, out-group party, and out-group sect and party. This analysis will help untangle how biases are expressed in Lebanon and what out-group attributes are most salient.

3.2.3 Partisan Identification in Lebanon

An unassailable claim in the literature maintains that group identities are constructed, contingent, and fluctuating. Far from being fixed and exogenous to social and political developments (i.e. the primordial perspective of identity), an influential definition of constructivism maintains that "individuals have multiple identities that can change endogenously to politics and economics" (Chandra, 2012). While the literature acknowledges that identities can be temporarily fixed, the crucial point is that the political environment, influenced by social identities, can in turn change these very identities. Thus, constructivist literature emphasizes that the study of group conflict should not focus on conflict between distinct identity groups, but rather on the "ways in which - and conditions under which - this practice of reification, this powerful crystallization of group feeling, can work" (Brubaker, 2004; p. 167). Conflicts are not identity-based per se, but rather deliberately cast in the framework of identity through the process of politicization. The constructivist literature urges the study of the process of politicization in its own right and prior to the study of what happens between groups after they are already politicized (Brubaker, 2004). The process by which identity is politicized in Lebanon has been touched on briefly in this chapter and explored in great detail in other studies (Cammett, 2014; Corstange, 2012). The focus in this section will be on the consequences of identity politicization.

An ongoing debate in the literature interrogates whether partisan identification is

instrumental or affective. The instrumental arm of the literature approaches people's party identification as a function of party performance, ideological beliefs, and people's ideological proximity to preferred party policies (Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe, 2015). Although Huddy et. al. (2015) use this definition of instrumental party identification for the American context, which is defined by free and democratic elections, the definition can be extended to quasi-democratic, or "hybrid," regimes like Lebanon.⁷ A substantial instrumental reason for partisan identification was already explored in a previous section, with a discussion of the political economy of sectarianism. In that section, partisan identification relied to a significant extent on the clientelist relationship between political elites and their constituencies to deliver goods and services in exchange for votes. The interests of social groups are not only material, however. Symbolic interests, including concern for group status and respect, can also explain party identification (Huddy, 2013). Drawing on Social Identity Theory and other similar approaches, the literature maintains that a belief in a common social group fate may inspire political cohesion behind a party that elevates the group's collective esteem and respect in the broader social context.

Instrumental party identification can also arise from ideological commitments and ideological proximity to political parties. Studied at length in the American context, the role of ideology has been described in this way: "The growing consistency of ideology and party identification has important consequences for voting behavior because voters whose party identification and ideological orientation are consistent are much more loyal to their party than voters whose party identification and ideological orientation are inconsistent" (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2006, p. 186). Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) demonstrate

⁷The Economist Intelligence Unit classified Lebanon as a hybrid regime for its 2020 Democracy Index. The publication defines a hybrid regime in these terms: "Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common. Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies — in political culture, functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically, there is harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the judiciary is not independent" (*Democracy Index 2020: In sickness and in health?* 2021, p. 57).

that changes in the patterns of Americans' support for the Republican and Democratic parties are consistent with the ideological realignment of white voters since the 1970s. Although Lebanese political parties are not programmatic in the same vein as American clearly articulated issue-based party platforms, Lebanese parties and party blocs nevertheless espouse distinct positions that may draw or repel constituents. For example, the March 14 bloc, and its constituent political parties (e.g. Future Movement and Lebanese Forces), were united in support of policies that would disarm Hezbollah's militia and prevent the militia from interfering in external conflicts in Israel and Syria (Gaier and Toubia, 2018). Hezbollah's unilateral decision to engage in full-scale war against Israel in 2006 opened the way for the policy on disarmament to transcend narrow sectarian interests in favor of the national policy approach.⁸

In the most recent 2018 parliamentary election, the political parties adopted distinct party platforms to attract voters. For example, Amal promised to create a national oil company and sovereign wealth fund, FPM promised to build infrastructure and institutions to more effectively engage with the diaspora, and the Future Movement campaigned on providing tax incentives to businesses and establishing programs to alleviate poverty and extend health insurance (Hassan, 2019). Evidence from studies on Lebanese voting behavior covered in the section on class casts doubt on the extent to which Lebanese voters take such nominal platforms seriously or make ideological decisions at the ballot box.

Evidence for ideological voting is expressed most strongly among voters who support non-establishment political movements, including those led by Beirut Madinati and Sabaa. According to Hassan (2019), independent parties (and the substantively weakened Kataeb) put forward "more comprehensive platforms covering a variety of policy issues" (p.

⁸The policy of disarmament was abandoned following Hezbollah's 2008 decision to confront its opponents in government with violence in West Beirut. Fearing a resumption of sectarian conflict similar to the Civil War Lebanese political actors and regional governments brokered a compromise among opposing Lebanese parties known as the Doha Agreement of 2008. This agreement put an end to hopes by March 14 parties to disarm the Hezbollah militia.

2), in contrast to establishment parties. Theoretically, more thoroughly developed platforms could provide the ideological framework for voters to cast ballots on the basis of ideological parity or proximity. The appearance of these political parties promised to offer viable programmatic alternatives to the sectarian status quo. Despite the appearance of programmatic alternatives, however, it is not clear whether voters' support for non-establishment parties are founded on their ideological parity and proximity to these parties or, alternatively, in voters' rejection of sectarian parties. Without a clear way to distinguish between these alternatives, the instrumental perspective on party preferences remains the dominant explanation for vote choice in Lebanon.

Increasingly, however, studies on vote choice in Western democracies are introducing a new way of thinking about voters' decision-making at the ballot box. In contrast to instrumental and rational assessments about party performance, this literature explores party identification as a function of affect. Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002) made a powerful case for the role of social group identities in party identification in the U.S. In their influential book, they claim that "people ask themselves two questions when deciding which party to support: What kinds of social groups come to mind as I think about Democrats, Republicans, and Independents? Which assemblage of groups (if any) best describes me?" (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002, p. 8). Once voters determine the best fit between their social identity and political party, they adopt a stable party identification. From that point, party loyalty determines how they evaluate politicians and policy issues and how they cast their ballots (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002). Furthermore, party identification remains stable and largely unaffected by contemporary issues like economic boom and bust cycles.

A fundamental assumption about political parties is that they exist to represent group interests. It follows that group identity is inextricably linked to partisan affiliation (Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe, 2015). In the U.S., where the two-party system creates big-tent interests, identity can become synonymous with partisan affiliation, though the same

is not true in reverse. Black Americans, Native Americans, and sexual minorities tend to demonstrate robust in-group cohesion in their support for the Democratic Party. However, Democratic partisanship does not predict identity as the party is home to a diversity of races and ethnic identities.

A growing literature demonstrates that partisan affiliation in the West has transformed into a type of social identity. Consistent with findings from Social Identity Theory, Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes (2012) demonstrate that mere identification with a political party leads Americans to not only evaluate out-group partisans negatively, but also to ascribe negative traits to out-group partisans. For example, Americans are increasingly more likely to express displeasure at the prospect of cross-party marriage for members of their family (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012). This evidence shows that the gap in the social distance among partisans has widened between the 1960s to 2010.

Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes (2012) further show a weak and inconsistent relationship between partisan affect and partisan ideology. Americans are not evaluating policy positions to determine their partisan identification, but rather expressing affective attachment to the party identity they acquired in youth, which persists into adulthood (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012). Iyengar and Westwood (2014) find that distrust based on partisan affiliation trumps distrust based on race, the deepest social cleavage in the U.S. Iyengar and his colleagues extended their empirical analysis of affective polarization beyond the American context to include Great Britain and more divided societies like Spain and Belgium. Their findings confirm that in both unified (i.e. U.K. and U.S.) and divided (i.e. Belgium and Spain) societies, citizens are more trusting of in-group partisans than of out-group partisans, and "partyism" exerts a greater influence on trust than ethnic, linguistic and religious attributes (Westwood et al., 2018).

The literature on partisan affect also postulates reasons for the empirical evidence that partyism trumps other forms of intergroup bias. First, overt hostility on the basis of party identification is not socially circumscribed: "the intensely competitive nature of

democratic representation encourages parties to demonstrate overt hostility toward their opponents - hostility that is un-tempered by the social norms of respect and tolerance that regulate competition between most social groups" (Westwood et al., 2018, p. 334). Overt rhetoric or acts of racism in the West are considered untenable. On the other hand, partisan animosity is an accepted form of discourse. Partisan hostility may, in fact, be implicit in the definition of "party": "parties exist both to act as agents for like-minded citizens and to elicit hostility between partisans and their opponents" (Westwood et al., 2018, p. 351). Thus, both identity-based and partisan hostility may exist between groups, but only partisan hostility is given free reign in social and political spheres.

Another reason why partisans are hostile may be due to the perception that individuals *choose* their party identity. In Western democracies, partisan affiliation is "voluntary" and serves as a "good indicator of who that person is, their values and what they think" (Westwood et al., 2018, p. 351). A person is not able to choose his skin tone, for example, but is expected to be able to choose his affiliations. Holding someone accountable for his beliefs, rather than his immutable characteristics, appears reasonable to most people (Westwood et al., 2018).

Turning now to the Lebanese context, affective polarization may also be a useful explanation for the divisions that underlie Lebanese society. It is the contention of the literature on affective partisan identities that in contexts where an overarching national identity dominates, party identification constitutes the strongest form of intergroup polarization (Westwood et al., 2018). In contrast, in divided societies where social group identities, rather than national identity, dominate, party identification could be a more modest pretext for polarization than group identity. Nevertheless, "[b]ecause the competing group interests defined by social cleavages give rise to party politics, it can be expected that the sense of identity and polarisation based on these cleavages carries over to partisan identity and polarisation" (Westwood et al., 2018, p. 334). The literature on affective polarization predicts that aggregation of social identities into parties could transform identity-based biases into

partisan biases. This literature would also predict that in their politicized form, partisan biases would be stronger than sectarian biases.

Although Lebanon is a divided society, with a political landscape that is different from the Western contexts in which affective polarization has been tested, the model proposed by Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes (2012) may still have application there. Most Lebanese sectarian group identities are fragmented among multiple political parties. Thus, while party affiliation predicts sect, sectarian affiliation says little about party. Sectarian affiliation is even less revealing about the March 8 and March 14 blocs. The polarization introduced by the emergence of these two blocs suggests that partisan affect may have a role to play in Lebanese biases.

Per the mechanism proposed for how affective polarization develops (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002), Lebanese voters have the opportunity to observe existing groups of constituents within each partisan alliance and decide which groups of constituents are most like them. For Shia voters, the decision is largely constrained to two parties in the March 8 bloc - Amal and Hezbollah. In contrast, Sunni and Christian voters may choose among parties within both the March 8 and March 14 bloc. Sunni voters are represented by nine political parties: the Future Movement of the March 14 bloc and eight smaller parties, some of which are allied to the March 8 bloc. Christian voters are more equitably divided between the two major alliances. Christians may choose, among other parties, FPM and Tashnag of the March 8 bloc or the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb of the March 14 bloc. In addition, Lebanese voters may also select among independent movements and candidates.⁹ The fact that the same sect may be divided among multiple political parties across the two alliances suggests that the Lebanese are making judgments about their partisan belonging along more complex dimensions than simply their sect. One explanation for the multiplicity of political parties could be that Lebanese social cleavages transcend sectarian divisions and include interac-

⁹Since 2018, Parliament has 32 non-partisan members, though 25 of them are allied with one of the political blocs (Atallah and Zoughaib, 2019).

tions between sect and such relevant group divisions as class, region, and kinship networks. Whatever the combination of reasons that exist to explain the multiplicity of parties to represent each sect, it is clear that partisanship in Lebanon is more complex than a replication of sectarian identities in the political arena. Partisan affiliation is quite possibly an identity in its own right with consequences for intergroup relations.

If partisanship in Lebanon is a separate social identity that leads to affective polarization, then partisanship should elicit inter-party biases. Similar to the taboos associated with racial and ethnic prejudices in the West, overt sectarian biases in Lebanon are considered a relic of the Civil War. In contrast, partisan biases should be far more pronounced in Lebanon, as they are in the West.

The section that follows will explore the existence of bias among different types of respondents, including partisans, sectarians, and respondents with different income levels. This evidence should help situate the studies conducted for this book in the context of the literature that has been thoroughly surveyed thus far.

3.3 Bias Among Lebanese Respondents

One set of explanations for Lebanese divisions asserts that sect constitutes a set of ethnic, cultural and religious characteristics that separate social groups into distinct and non-overlapping categories. From this line of reasoning, substantial religious differences between Christians and Muslims and smaller, though still relevant, differences between the Shia and Sunni make peaceful coexistence unachievable. Inherent differences among the sectarian groups are said to be simply too vast to permit the creation of a single national identity, or any sense of shared nationhood.

In opposition to this view, neo-Marxists propose a class-based explanation for Lebanese group divisions. An economic upper class upholds sectarian divisions as a distraction for the masses, while it exploits a lack of a powerful working class consciousness to

enrich itself. To maintain its hold on power, the exploitative upper class establishes vertical networks of in-group sectarians to provide it with a base of support and forges horizontal inter-sectarian alliances. As for the people: deprived of a working class movement to assert their rights, they are forced to cope with a system in which they exchange their votes for goods and services.

Finally, rejecting the theory of religious incompatibility of the first explanation and the neo-Marxist determinism of the second, the third explanation for Lebanese divisions makes the case that these divisions are founded on partisan affect. The Lebanese state is organized in a way that acknowledges and perpetuates sectarian divisions, but sects are not replicated in the political sphere. Instead, there is reason to believe that parties constitute unique forms of identity and that they inspire far greater intergroup animus than sectarian identities and class position (Paler, Marshall, and Atallah, 2020; Corstange, 2013).

Before proceeding to a discussion of the three attributes underlying intergroup bias, it is important to note that this book does not purport to authoritatively adjudicate among these variables, nor to suggest that any one variable operates in isolation of the others. Rather, as in all dynamic social environments, it is likely that all three variables are at play simultaneously and vary in salience from one moment in time to another. The intention in this section is therefore to suggest the general primacy of one variable over its rivals.

Each of the three explanations for Lebanese divisions creates an impetus for intergroup bias. The effect each of these variables has on intergroup bias will be demonstrated using data from the university study and the neighborhood study. Both studies include a prisoner's dilemma game in which respondents were randomly paired with a member of the in-group or a member of the out-group and asked to decide whether or not to invest with their partner. The difference in the rate of investment with members of the in-group versus members of the out-group is the respondent's demonstrated bias.

Table 3.2 presents OLS regression results for investment rates with out-group partners across the two studies, dependent on one of the three attributes of interest - class, sect

Table 3.2: Testing Three Main Explanatory Variables for Intergroup Divisions

	Universities			Neighborhoods			
	Income (1)	Sect (2)	Party (3)	Income (4)	Sect (5)	Religious (6)	Party (7)
Intercept	0.420*** (0.075)	0.616*** (0.043)	0.570*** (0.050)	0.340*** (0.037)	0.495*** (0.046)	0.519*** (0.025)	0.463*** (0.044)
Out-group	0.149 (0.126)	-0.042 (0.083)	0.071 (0.078)	-0.163** (0.041)	-0.124** (0.050)	-0.232*** (0.029)	-0.051 (0.047)
Income ¹	0.181*** (0.058)			0.117*** (0.014)			
Income x out-group	-0.211** (0.089)			-0.026 (0.016)			
Shia		-0.069 (0.068)			0.113** (0.056)		
Sunni		0.204** (0.081)			0.103* (0.063)		
Shia x out-group		0.035 (0.120)			-0.225*** (0.063)		
Sunni x out-group		-0.307** (0.127)			-0.037 (0.069)		
Religious observer ²						0.231*** (0.050)	
Religious observer x out-group						0.025 (0.056)	
March 8 Partisan			0.044 (0.066)				0.121** (0.053)
March 14 Partisan			0.344*** (0.095)				0.287*** (0.070)
March 8 Partisan x out-group			-0.230** (0.110)				-0.242*** (0.059)
March 14 Partisan x out-group			-0.523*** (0.146)				-0.362*** (0.079)
Covariates	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
N	118	118	118	408	408	408	408
R ²				0.124	0.053	0.087	0.053
Adjusted R ²				0.123	0.051	0.085	0.050

Note: Models 1-3 are ordinary least squares models with seven datasets of predictive mean matching imputations. Models 4-6 are ordinary least squares models. Dependent variables: respondent decides to invest with his/her partner(s). Bias in the prisoner's dilemma game is measured by the respondent's willingness to invest with a member of the in-group, but not the out-group. Models 1, 2 and 3 demonstrate results for the university students asked to participate in this study. Models 4, 5 and 6 demonstrate results for the adult male residents of 12 Lebanese towns.

¹ Income for both studies is measured on an ordinal scale. Respondents in the university study self-reported the relative income of their household as poor, below average, average, above average and rich. Respondents in the neighborhood study self-reported their income within ranges: less than \$500, \$501-\$1000... above \$3,001.

² Religious observer is an indicator variable (0/1) for an individual who professes attending a religious institution once a month, once a week or multiple times a week.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

and partisanship. The outcome variable for each column in Table 3.2 is a respondent's decision to invest (0/1) with a randomly assigned out-group partner. Results show whether and to what extent a respondent's income, sect or partisan affiliation affects his decision to invest with a member of the out-group. The variable "out-group" is defined in the same way across all of the columns in Table 3.2: a partner belongs to the out-group if the partner's sect, party or both sect and party are in the out-group from the perspective of the respondent. Partners whose sectarian identity or partisan affiliation are not revealed to the respondents are also classified as members of the out-group.

The neo-Marxists' class-based explanation for the underlying causes of Lebanese divisions predicts that the Lebanese people are less biased in private contexts than in public contexts (Corstange, 2013). The main reason for this observation is that the elite-driven organization of vertical sectarian networks discourages and punishes dissent. Thus, people are more likely to conform to social expectations about bias toward out-groups when they are in a public setting. This line of research also suggests that people who belong to higher socioeconomic classes demonstrate lower levels of out-group bias. The straightforward reason for this, according to Marxist theory, is that intergroup bias is a manipulative tactic used by the upper classes to control the lower classes. Thus, wealthier people are less likely to "buy into" their own manipulation.

Columns 1 and 4 of Table 3.2 operationalize class as respondent income. In both studies, a respondent's income was determined by using a self-reported scale.¹⁰ The results from Columns 1 and 4 show the effect of respondent income on investment rates with the out-group. Income has a statistically significant effect on investment with members of the out-group in the university study, but not in the neighborhood study. As income rises among respondents in the university study, respondents demonstrate greater discrimination in their investment rates with members of the out-group. In contrast, rising income decreases

¹⁰In the university study, respondents assessed their wealth on a scale from "poor" to "rich." In the neighborhood study, respondents selected their income brackets (e.g. \$500 - \$1500 income per month).

discrimination across the board for both the in-group and out-group among respondents in the neighborhood study. In the neighborhood study, rising income appears to make respondents more generous toward all their partners, regardless of the partner's sectarian identity.

Results from the university study conform to expectation from the class-based explanation for divisions in Lebanon. However, results are inconsistent across studies. The distinction made in the literature between private and public expressions of bias is not relevant for the studies in this book. Respondents made investment decisions privately and so had equal opportunity across the two studies to demonstrate lower levels of bias. The fact that similar decision contexts yielded different results across the two studies points to a possible weakness in the income attribute for explaining out-group bias. On the other hand, income is a famously imperfect measure of class. This qualification is possibly further exacerbated in a society like Lebanon where generational wealth and status may be more elucidating about a person's socio-economic position in society than his monthly income. Future research into class in Lebanon should attempt a more systematic and effective measure of respondents' class position.

Results in Columns 2 and 5 in Table 3.2 explore the theory that sect underlies Lebanese divisions. These results demonstrate the effect of respondents' sectarian backgrounds on their decisions to invest with the out-group. Respondents of all three sectarian backgrounds across both the university and neighborhood studies show in-group favoritism. However, respondents' sectarian background affects their rate of investment with members of the out-group in different ways across the two studies. In the university study, Christian and Shia respondents show low levels of out-group bias (i.e. the investment rate for Christians with the out-group was 57% compared to 62% with the in-group, while for Shias the rate with the out-group was 54% compared to 55% with the in-group). In contrast, Sunni respondents show significant levels of intergroup bias, with investment rates with the out-group at 47% compared to 82% with the in-group. In the neighborhood study, all three sectarian groups

showed significant levels of intergroup bias. Investment rates with the out-group were 37% for Christians, 42% for Sunnis, and a low level of 26% for the Shia.

Similar to the results obtained for the income attribute, the sectarian attribute does not show consistent results across the two studies. Rates of investment with members of the in-group and out-group vary substantially across studies. Such differences in sectarian bias will be explored in greater detail in later chapters, but a brief contextual explanation here may be useful.

The university study was fielded between November 2016 and March 2017, a period of time when the Shia political parties (i.e. Hezbollah and Amal) and their Christian allies were ascendant on the national stage. After years of negotiation, these parties secured in October 2016 a political victory with a consensus presidential candidate. A robust finding in the literature on the social psychology of bias maintains that embattled groups, in this case respondents belonging to the Sunni sect, demonstrate bias against ascendant out-groups. In contrast, by the time the neighborhood study was initiated in December 2019, the same Shia and Christian political parties were still in power. Beginning in the Fall of 2019, a deteriorating economic situation in the country had eliminated the optimism of previous years. Mass civil protests challenged the governing coalition, which is led by the Shia political parties. The tables turned and respondents of the Shia sect assumed the position of the embattled group, thus demonstrating higher rates of bias against members of the out-group.

The lower rates of investment across all three sectarian groups in the neighborhood study also point to growing nationwide unease with the economic situation in the country. As discussed in the previous chapter, intergroup threat theory predicts that economic crises lead to feelings of fear that give rise to greater entrenchment of in-group identities and distrust toward members of the out-group.

Although sect refers to religious communities, sectarian affiliation says little about an individual's religious beliefs and practices. Sect in Lebanon is more akin to ethnic identity elsewhere. Consequently, to understand whether religious faith affects out-group investment

rates in the neighborhood study, an analysis of the level of respondents' religiosity on their level of bias was conducted in Column 6 of Table 3.2.¹¹ The variable, religious observer, is a binary indicator for respondents who profess attending religious services at least once a week.

Results from Column 6 provide two main results. First, both religious and non-religious respondents show bias toward the out-group. Religious respondents invest with the in-group 75% of the time and with the out-group 54% of the time, while non-religious respondents invest with the in-group 52% of the time and with the out-group 29% of the time. Second, although both groups are biased against the out-group, religious respondents are more generous toward both the in-group and the out-group. These results demonstrate that religiosity has a significant effect on raising generosity, but it has limited effects on mitigating intergroup bias.

Finally, the discussion turns to the effect of partisanship on out-group bias. Results in Columns 3 and 7 in Table 3.2 show how partisan affiliation with the March 8 and March 14 partisan blocs affects respondents' investment behaviors with the out-group. The reference category for the partisan variable is comprised of respondents who did not report support for any political party. Partisan affiliation dramatically affects investment rates with members of the out-group. In the university study, partisans of the March 8 movement invest with the out-group at a rate of 45%, compared to 61% with the in-group. March 14 partisans invest with the out-group at a rate of 46%, compared with 91% with the in-group. In the neighborhood study (Column 7), partisans of March 8 invest with the out-group at a rate of 29%, compared to 58% with the in-group. March 14 partisans invest with the out-group at a rate of 34%, compared to 75% with the in-group.

Unlike the variables for income and sect explored thus far, the partisan variable behaves similarly across the two studies. Respondents in both the university and the neigh-

¹¹The prisoner's dilemma game conducted in the university study did not gather information about respondents' degree of religiosity.

neighborhood studies demonstrate powerful intergroup biases. While the magnitudes of bias differ across partisans of the March 8 and March 14 political movements, and across studies, the direction of investment rates remains the same across the two studies.

The substantial effect of partisan affiliation on intergroup biases suggests that partisanship is important to explaining Lebanese divisions. Identifying with a party substantially increases bias toward members of the out-group as compared to respondents who do not identify with a party. In the university study, 43% of respondents are non-partisans.¹² They are least likely to be Shia, more likely to be female, and more likely to have average or below average wealth. Specifically, non-partisan respondents are comprised of 46% Christians, 23% Shias, and 31% Sunnis. Approximately 37% of non-partisans are male and 43% have above average wealth.

In the neighborhood study, 46% of respondents are non-partisans.¹³ These respondents are least likely to be Shia and only slightly more likely to be non-religious and to have below average wealth. Specifically, non-partisan respondents are comprised of 43% Christians, 13% Shias, and 44% Sunnis. Approximately 47% of non-partisans are religious and 47% have above average wealth.¹⁴

The composition of non-partisan respondents across the two studies reveals three important points. First, in the university study, female respondents comprise the majority of non-partisans.¹⁵ As non-partisan respondents demonstrate significantly less intergroup bias than do partisan respondents, it appears that women in the sample are less biased toward members of the out-group. This evidence comports with recent findings that women display

¹²In the university study, 45% of Christian respondents are non-partisan, 34% of Shia respondents are non-partisan, and 52% of Sunni respondents are non-partisan.

¹³In the neighborhood study, 61% of Christian respondents are non-partisan, 17% of Shia respondents are non-partisan, and 63% of Sunni respondents are non-partisan.

¹⁴All respondents in the neighborhood study are male. Chapter 5 will discuss the reasons that the neighborhood study was restricted to men alone.

¹⁵Among female respondents in the university study, 61% are non-partisan, 29% are partisans of March 8, and 10% are partisans of March 14.

strong norms of communal and pro-social behavior (Hyde, 2014).

Second, in the neighborhood study, the majority of Shia respondents are partisan and are likely driving the results observed for partisan intergroup biases in Table 3.2. Further evidence of the strength of out-group bias among Shia respondents, along with speculation about the likely causes of this bias, will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5. Finally, neither religious observance nor wealth appears to be significantly correlated with partisan affiliation. That is, religious respondents are almost equally likely to be non-partisan and partisan. Similarly, wealth does not predict whether a respondent is partisan or non-partisan. From these results, it appears that partisanship is an independent form of identification from religion and income.

Based on this brief overview of aggregate results, respondents with a partisan affiliation, compared to those without a partisan affiliation, demonstrate a greater degree of intergroup bias than do respondents of Muslims sects compared to Maronites, and religious respondents compared to non-religious respondents. A key finding in this section is that there is no difference in bias between religious and non-religious people. By contrast, the strong bias shown toward the out-group by respondents who have a partisan affiliation suggests that partisanship plays an important role in intergroup biases. Thus, intergroup bias appears to be related to people's partisan identification, and not to their degree of religious observance. Furthermore, neither religious observance nor income appear to be correlated with a respondent's partisan affiliation. These findings are consistent with the idea that partisanship is an independent variable that predicts intergroup bias.

Of course, the evidence that partisanship is a better explanation for intergroup bias than is religion is also consistent with the idea that people with more sectarian animus are more likely to be politically affiliated. In this case, the real underlying cause of intergroup divisions would be sectarian animus. The variable "sect" does not offer an explanation here because the comparison in Table 3.2 is between Christians and Muslims. The table does not capture a comparison between sectarians and non-sectarians, even if this were possible

to determine in Lebanon. The discussion of intergroup bias thus far does not provide an opportunity to adjudicate between these two explanations. Instead, the question of the relative explanatory power of sect and party are left to Chapters 4 and 5.

Chapter 4

Lebanese Universities: Comparison of Sect and Party as the Locus of Bias

"Student elections should not be so political... Even the independents are no longer independent. They have to run with a major party in order to be heard and to get funding for campaigning"

— Samaha, 2006

The literature in the West has demonstrated that campus diversity is an important, and often necessary, policy for correcting past injustices. Diversity in admissions has provided opportunities for under-represented minorities, improved the intellectual development and future prospects of university students, and fostered intergroup understanding and cooperation. Nevertheless, diversity policies have been a subject of contention, as detractors have charged that affirmative action and quota policies have the potential to supersede merit. Carey et. al. (2019), on whose research in American universities the design of the conjoint experiment in this chapter is based, charge that students are an important and interested constituency for diversity policies. As students are the group most affected by the composition of the student body and faculty, the effects of diversity on their attitudes and behaviors is a direct measure of the success of diversity policies.

The diversity inherent in private universities in the Lebanese capital city of Beirut

provides an opportunity to test intergroup attitudes. Students of different sectarian groups study together for three or more years, coming into contact with each other in the classroom, during extracurricular activities and sports, and, for some, in college dormitories. Students exposed to a diverse campus community are familiar with members of the out-group and develop opinions about whether individuals in the out-group "deserve" to be there. The experiments administered in this chapter will reveal students' preferences, informed by the stereotypes and biases they have accumulated before and during their university studies.

This chapter will proceed in two parts. First, a conjoint experiment will focus on Lebanese students' preferences about who should be granted admission and who should be employed as professors in their universities. The conjoint experiment will test students' preferences for diversity and merit to understand the existence and extent of intergroup biases in Lebanese universities. In addition to measuring attitudes with the conjoint, this chapter will also explore student behaviors using two experimental trust games. One of these games was featured prominently in the previous chapter, and will be analyzed again in this chapter using different regression specifications.

The university study was conducted in the American University of Beirut, Lebanese American University, University of Saint Joseph, and Haigazian University. A survey was administered in all four universities and across nine campuses in Beirut, Tripoli, Byblos, Zahle and Saida. The universities and their campus locations are shown in Figure 4.1. Behavioral games were confined to the three campuses located in Beirut. All four universities selected for this study are private and independent liberal arts institutions. Students in these universities are fluent, or nearly fluent, in English allowing for the dissemination of survey materials in English. While each of these universities is a historically Christian institution, the universities are now all characterized by mixed student and faculty bodies.

Two of Lebanon's most prestigious universities, the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the University of Saint Joseph (USJ), were founded in the 1860s and 1870s by Christian missionaries (Tfaily, Diab, and Kulczycki, 2013). Today, AUB is a secular, private




Figure 4.1: University locations around Lebanon, with studies conducted.

and independent university with American accreditation. Widely recognized as a leading institution in the region, AUB accepts students of all sectarian backgrounds from around the world. Due in part to its international reach, students at AUB are among the elite of Lebanon and the Arab world. Since its founding in 1875, USJ has been a key cultural center linking Beirut to Paris (Rabil, 2011). Intellectual life in the university has played a significant role in creating and reinforcing a Christian identity for Lebanon’s Maronite Christians (Rabil, 2011). While Maronite dominance has diminished in the university, as it has at AUB (Tfaily, Diab, and Kulczycki, 2013), USJ remains a French-speaking and majority Christian institution.

The Lebanese American University (LAU) was initially founded in the 1860s by Christian missionaries for the purpose of educating women. The university became co-educational in the 1970s. Today a secular and private American university, LAU is comprised of two campuses: one campus approximately two kilometers south of AUB in the Sunni-majority community of Hamra in Beirut and another campus in the Maronite-majority city of Byblos (or Jbeil). Finally, Haigazian is a private university in Beirut founded in 1955 by Armenian Evangelicals. The university accepts students of all sectarian backgrounds, but maintains a substantial proportion of students of Armenian heritage.

As private elite institutions, the universities targeted for this research are neither representative of the Lebanese population, nor the majority of Lebanese university students. While financial aid helps some students overcome economic barriers to entry, AUB, LAU and USJ are especially likely to educate students of middle and upper class backgrounds. Low income households comprised 33% of the university sample ($N = 1,611$).¹ In the course of university selection, other campuses were considered for inclusion. The Lebanese University, the only public institution of higher education in Lebanon with campuses disbursed throughout the country, was considered and would have been a positive addition to the study. Unfortunately, local campus deans would not permit the dissemination of a survey that elicited salient political and sectarian identities. Students on the campus located in Beirut's southern suburbs, for example, had staged demonstrations when campus administrators sought to survey student opinions. While the inaccessibility of Lebanese University campuses is disappointing for the purposes of this study, the episode demonstrates the strength of partisan and sectarian emotions that permeate institutions of higher education.

Political fault lines are reflected among Lebanese university students, who have demonstrated a long history of campus activism. Beginning in the 1930s, students at AUB, LAU and USJ participated in protests in solidarity with Arab nationalism, Lebanese na-

¹See Table A.1 in Appendix A and Table B.1 in Appendix B for full sample descriptions.

tionism, communism, socialism, Palestinian revolutionary aims, and the various camps of the Lebanese Civil War (Anderson, 2008).² Since the 2005 national political realignment, student activism has taken shape around the dividing lines of the March 8 and March 14 blocs (Samaha, 2006; “Beirut Clashes” 2016; “Students Fight in Beirut” 2013; “Hariri-March 8 Supporters Clash at LAU, 4 Students Wounded” 2011; Anderson, 2008). Funded by the national political parties, student elections for campus leadership roles have reflected national political contests and have sporadically turned violent. One student at AUB lamented the state of student elections: "What is going on at AUB is wrong. Student elections should not be so political... Even the independents are no longer independent. They have to run with a major party in order to be heard and to get funding for campaigning" (Samaha, 2006). National political divisions are of consequence on Lebanese campuses.

The presence of sectarian and partisan fault lines in the universities sampled in this study will be explained in the sections to come. Analysis in this chapter will use a conjoint experiment to determine whether and to what extent: (1) respondents demonstrate preferences for merit and salient characteristics, and (2) respondents’ own sectarian and partisan backgrounds affect their preferences. The chapter will then explore results from two behavioral games to determine: (3) whether sect or party elicits evidence of greater bias and (4) how respondents react to an increase in the out-group. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of implications and motivations for conducting the neighborhood study.

4.1 Measuring Bias with a Conjoint Experiment in the University Study

Eliciting honest opinions about sensitive topics related to diversity and bias is prone to error. Respondents may hesitate to give their true opinions and instead provide "socially

²At the time, LAU was known as the Beirut Women’s College.

desirable" responses. Further, issues can arise if respondents are explicitly asked to make decisions based on sensitive topics. They may refuse to complete the task or again fall back on "socially desirable" responses. The social science literature has thus adopted a new experimental approach that conveys sensitive information within a broader, more neutral framework that allows respondents to express their honest preferences without explicitly reporting potentially unpopular opinions. The new approach, called the fully randomized conjoint experiment, relies on the potential outcomes framework of causal inference. Measured by estimating average marginal component effects (AMCEs) and marginal means (MMs), the experiment provides a reliable indication of the effect of an experimental intervention on an individual's preferences (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto, 2014; Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley, 2019).³ A conjoint experiment administered in Lebanese universities asked respondents to evaluate profiles of prospective student applicants or prospective faculty candidates. Half of the respondents were asked to place themselves in the position of an admissions officer to select one of two potential student applicants to their university, while the other half were asked to evaluate pairs of potential faculty candidates for faculty recruitment. Respondents received the student applicant conjoint or the faculty recruitment conjoint at random.⁴

Profiles in each conjoint pair were described by eight attributes that took the value of a randomly assigned level (e.g. the attribute "gender" took two levels: "male" and "female").⁵ As Figure 4.2 demonstrates, attributes assigned to each profile included merit-based characteristics, including SAT score for student applicants and reputation and credentialing institutions for faculty candidates. All profiles included attributes for sectarian background, nationality, partisan preferences and gender. The order of attributes was randomly generated for each survey to help avoid order effects. However, the order of attributes in each

³See Appendix A for a description of AMCEs and MMs.

⁴The design of this conjoint experiment draws on a similar study conducted by Brown et. al. (2017) at Dartmouth College.

⁵See Figure 4.3 in this section for a full list of possible attributes and levels utilized in the conjoint experiment.

survey was consistent to alleviate undue strain on respondents (Brown et al., 2017). All attribute levels were randomly assigned. Each respondent evaluated five pairs of profiles of either students applicants or faculty candidates.

In presenting a bundle of attributes covering both identity and merit, the conjoint experiment asked respondents to select one of two profiles without specifying the reasons for selection (i.e. the attribute which tipped the scale between two possible profiles). As far as the respondent is concerned, there are as many reasons to select a given candidate as there are attributes listed for that candidate. The conjoint design thus provides assurance to the respondent to give honest opinions without fearing social consequences from unpopularly held beliefs.

Following the conjoint experiment, respondents were asked a series of questions about themselves and their attitudes toward Lebanese politics and society. These variables were used to divide the sampled population into sub-groups to conduct marginal means comparisons. A small amount of missing data from the survey (5.5%) was imputed using multiple imputations with chained equations (MICE) (see S. v. Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011).⁶ The survey was administered by 18 enumerators, who were undergraduate and graduate students at those universities at the time of data collection. The enumerators had diverse sectarian backgrounds to mirror the diversity that existed within each university. Enumerators introduced the research and collected consent forms, but respondents self-administered the survey and conjoint experiment.

Despite best efforts to embed sensitive information in neutral - and even mundane - attributes, some respondents are likely to discover that the variables of interest to the researcher are sect and party (though gender could also appear salient). The likelihood

⁶See Appendix A for details about missing data, the imputation process and the construction of variables used in sub-group analysis. Imputations using MICE are regression-based and create multiple complete datasets, with some variation in the imputed values across datasets. A total of seven imputed datasets were created with 35 variables, consistent with a rule developed by Lall (2016) that the number of imputations should equal the average of the missing data rate of all variables in the imputation model.

Please read the descriptions of the faculty candidates carefully. Then, please indicate which of the two candidates you would personally prefer to see selected to teach at your university?

	Candidate A	Candidate B
City of origin*	Druze from Hasbaya	Sunni from Aleppo
Nationality	Lebanese	Syrian
Gender	Female	Male
Received under-graduate from	Beirut Arab University	American University of Beirut
Received PhD from	Princeton University	Oxford University
Reputation as teacher	Excellent	Fair
Academic program	Business	Social sciences
Partisan preference	Progressive Socialist Party	Future Movement

Candidate A

Candidate B

Figure 4.2: Example conjoint table presented to respondents who received the faculty candidate conjoint treatment.

* Both the city and sect of the candidate are described to eliminate any ambiguities about the identity of the candidate. The "City of origin" attribute took seven levels, including two Christian options and three Sunni options. To differentiate among these, the city of the candidate was also included to indicate the candidate's unique background. For example, a "Christian from Bourj Hammoud" indicates someone ethnically Armenian while a "Christian from Jounieh" indicates someone ethnically Lebanese. Similarly, a "Sunni from Aleppo" is Syrian, "Sunni from Ein El Hilweh" is Palestinian and "Sunni from Tripoli" is Lebanese. See Figure 4.3 for a full list of levels in the "City of Origin" attribute.

of such discovery may be exacerbated by the rarity or implausibility of some profiles with uncommon combinations of sect and party created by the instrument's randomized design. In Lebanon, there is a clear link between political parties and the sectarian communities they represent. For example, a Shia is more likely to be a partisan of Hezbollah or the Amal Movement than of any other party. The same is true for Sunnis and the Future Movement, and for Christians and Kataeb, Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement. The conjoint experiment's fully randomized design, however, randomly generated sect and party combinations that are less commonly linked in the real world (e.g. a Shia partisan of the Future Movement or a Christian partisan of the Amal Movement). While uncommon, such combinations are not impossible. In the Parliamentary elections of 2018, for example, Christians, Shias, Sunnis and Druze candidates ran under the Amal/Hezbollah alliance in southern district elections.⁷ Furthermore, the major proponents of the conjoint experiment in political science, Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014), are explicit: "it is precisely by varying some attributes independently and thereby breaking the correlations that exist in reality that we can isolate the separate effect of each attribute" (p. 26). Atypical combinations in profiles do not create issues for internal validity since randomization permits the creation of unbiased estimates. However, atypical combinations may damage external validity (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto, 2014). A robustness check for the effect of atypical combinations of sect and party was conducted in Figures A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A.⁸ Different levels of atypical profiles cause some variation in estimates, but none significant enough to damage external validity.

While some students may guess the purpose of the conjoint experiment, this knowl-

⁷See Appendix C.2 for a translated example ballot from the 2018 Parliamentary elections.

⁸To conduct a robustness check, every profile was classified as "typical" or "atypical." Respondents were then divided into three groups depending on the number of atypical profiles to which they were exposed. For the applicant conjoint, respondents were divided into groups exposed to low (0-3), medium (4-5), or high (6-9) numbers of atypical profiles. For the candidate conjoint, respondents were divided into groups exposed to low (0-3), medium (4), or high (5-8) numbers of atypical profiles.

edge is unlikely to have much of an adverse impact on results. Asking university students to make decisions about prospective students and faculty is likely to elicit their self-interest. Students have a stake in the composition of their university environment. They have an interest in ensuring that faculty and students in their universities are highly qualified, especially in selective universities where the decision to enroll depends in part on institutional ranking and reputation. Yet university students may also look beyond qualifications in selecting prospective faculty and students. A study in four American universities has shown that American university students place a premium on admitting diverse students and recruiting diverse faculty (Carey, Clayton, and Horiuchi, 2019).⁹ That study reasoned that preferences for ethnic minorities, and a lower likelihood of selecting white candidates, among both white and minority respondents is an indication of preferences for greater diversity. There are reasons to believe that Lebanese students may also demonstrate preferences along salient characteristics. However, stark contextual differences between the U.S. and Lebanon would make evidence of in-group preferences, and lack of support for out-groups, an indication of intergroup bias. The section that follows will test on which attribute - sect or party - that bias is expressed.

Possible findings in the university study are that respondents' preferences will show bias on: (1) political, (2) sects, and (3) parties and sects. The first possibility will constitute evidence for affective partisanship, the second for classic ethnic intolerance, and the third for a possible contingent relationship between sect and party. The third possibility raises the greatest number of questions and will require further exploration about relative effects in subsequent sections.

⁹In the American context, affirmative action policies are widely used in public and private universities to ensure student body diversity. One set of arguments claims that the purpose of affirmative action is to counteract historical racial exclusion through positive preferences for minorities. Another set of arguments contends that diversity is a net benefit to the university and should be pursued for its own sake. The policy has been controversial since inception and has faced significant recent challenges in court from Students For Fair Admissions for placing too significant an emphasis on race in admissions.

4.1.1 Bias Among Students

The conjoint experimental results are presented as average marginal component effects (AMCEs), with clustered standard errors. AMCEs show the average change in the probability that a respondent will select a profile when a particular level is present, as compared to a baseline level, and averaging over all other possible combinations (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto, 2014). For example, the "partisan preference" attribute takes the baseline level "Independent" and seven other levels. The AMCE for the "Free Patriotic Movement" indicates how much more (or less) likely a profile with FPM is to be selected relative to the baseline, where the average is taken over all possible combinations of the other candidate attributes. The baseline level rests on the vertical line with a value of 0. All other levels are AMCEs calculated from the baseline level. The horizontal bars around AMCEs are 95% confidence intervals.¹⁰ A positive AMCE indicates that respondents are more likely to select an applicant or candidate with that attribute level than with the baseline level, while a negative AMCE indicates that they are less likely to do so.

In Figure 4.3, the largest effect on respondent preferences are applicant and candidate qualifications. Respondents are 36% more likely to prefer a student applicant with a perfect SAT score compared with the relatively lower score of 1600, and 32% more likely to prefer a faculty candidate with an "excellent" reputation compared to a poor one.¹¹ Where

¹⁰A confidence interval that crosses the vertical line at 0 means that the estimate is not statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.

¹¹Since this study was fielded, SAT scoring changed to 1600 as the highest possibly score.




Figure 4.3: Preferences for student and faculty candidates using AMCEs with cluster robust standard errors. The plots above describe the level of favorability shown toward profiles that have a particular feature level, holding all other features constant. The plot on the left shows preferences for student applicant profiles. The plot on the right shows preferences for faculty candidates.

prospective faculty candidates received their education is also very important in determining respondent preferences. The importance respondents place on qualifications remains dominant when respondents are divided into sub-groups by sect, party preferences, and income.¹² Respondents give importance to qualifications above other attributes.

Nevertheless, respondents are also sensitive to salient attributes in student applicant and faculty candidate profiles. Compared to the Christian reference category, respondents are 6% to 17% less likely to prefer a student applicant or faculty candidate belonging to a Muslim sect group, including Druze, Shia and Sunni.¹³ These estimates are especially pronounced for Sunnis of foreign origin. "Sunni from Aleppo," or Syrian, is 17% less likely to be selected as a student applicant and 14% less likely to be selected as a faculty candidate. Similarly, the "Sunni from Ein el Hilweh," or Palestinian, is 13% less likely to be selected as a student applicant and 15% less likely to be selected as a faculty candidate.¹⁴ This bias against foreign applicants and candidates also holds in sub-group analysis by sect, party and income.

While bias against refugees is consistent with well-documented evidence from Western and other contexts, the more surprising finding is that Lebanese Muslim groups, namely the Sunni ("Sunni from Tripoli"), Shia and Druze, are less likely to be selected than are Christians. To better understand the underlying preferences of this finding, Figure 4.4 conducts the same analysis using marginal means (MMs). The MM of a level is interpreted as the mean outcome across all appearances of that level, averaging across all other attributes.

¹²See marginal means analysis plots on sub-groups of respondents in Figure A.9 and A.10 for sect, Figures A.11-A.14 for partisan preferences, and A.24 and A.25 for income in Appendix A

¹³The reference category selected for the "City of Origin" attribute is "Christian from Jounieh," which indicates a Maronite Christian. The universities analyzed in this study are all historically Christian-dominated universities. As Maronites are the largest and most dominant Christian group in Lebanon, they are used as the reference category. "Christian from Bourj Hammoud" indicates a Christian of Armenian ethnicity.

¹⁴Located in the south near the city of Sidon, Ein el Hilweh is the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon. Palestinians living in Lebanon are not foreign in the sense that they were likely born and raised in Lebanon, especially those who originate from the well-established Ein El Hilweh camp. Nevertheless, Lebanese law dictates that Palestinians in the camps not receive Lebanese citizenship (*Country Policy and Information Note Lebanon: Palestinians* 2018), and Palestinians are considered foreign in Lebanese society.




Figure 4.4: Preferences for student and faculty candidates using marginal means with cluster robust standard errors. The plots above describe the degree of favorability shown toward profiles that have a particular feature level, holding all other features constant. The plot on the left shows preferences for student applicant profiles. The plot on the right shows preferences for faculty candidates.

MMs average 0.5, but values above 0.5 indicate levels that increase profile favorability while values below 0.5 indicate levels that decrease profile favorability.

Figure 4.4 demonstrates the independent likelihood that each profile will be selected based on the levels described. Respondents are more likely to give preference to Christian student applicants and faculty candidates, and show neutral preferences for Muslim profiles. That is, respondents select Muslim profiles about half the time, a result that is not indicative of bias. On the other hand, respondents clearly show greater favorability toward Christian profiles. The significant preferences for Christian profiles are a possible indication of consistent in-group bias among Christian respondents, a hypothesis that will be further explored in Section 4.1.2.

In addition to biases on the sectarian dimension, respondents in Figure 4.3 also show that respondents are between 5% and 13% less likely to select applicants and candidates who are partisans of established Lebanese political parties than they are to select a profile that is politically Independent. Parties belonging to the ruling coalition (i.e. Hezbollah and Amal Movement) were most penalized. Turning to results on the partisan dimension in Figure 4.4 reveals respondents' independent preferences on each partisan level. Respondents clearly show greater favorability for the Independent partisan orientation, and lower favorability for Amal and Hezbollah. Respondents are otherwise indifferent to all other political parties, selecting them half the time.

Results from Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 permit drawing three conclusions. First, respondents demonstrate the strongest preferences for profiles that demonstrate merit. Second, respondents are significantly less likely to select foreign profiles, demonstrating a significant anti-refugee bias. Third, respondents show biases along both sectarian and partisan dimensions. Respondents are more likely to select Christian profiles and profiles that profess Independent partisan orientations. Clear evidence of bias along salient characteristics substantially weakens support for the hypothesis that respondents prefer greater institutional diversity.

The conjoint experiment discussed in this section raises four fundamental questions, three of which will be addressed in the sections that follow. First, the conjoint analysis treated identity and merit as separable attributes of a student applicant or faculty candidate profile. However, instances of actual student admission and faculty recruitment cannot detach identity from merit. An individual is inherently multidimensional and university policies specify a holistic approach to admission and recruitment. It is possible, therefore, that profiles with certain sectarian identities are rewarded (or penalized) for showing high (or low) merit. For example, a Shia student with an excellent SAT score may be preferred for admission more than Christians and Sunnis with the same score as a means to redress historical exclusion of the sectarian group from institutions of higher education. While this formulation for admission and recruitment is most familiar as an American phenomenon, the Lebanese system of sectarian quotas also requires universities to take affirmative steps toward diversity. In a similar study conducted in American universities, Carey et. al. (2019) allude to the conditional relationship between identity and merit, but did not thoroughly investigate its implications. Further research will have to be undertaken to account for this conditional relationship.

Second, there is some indication of in-group bias among Christian respondents and partisan biases against Amal and Hezbollah. However, the characteristics of respondents who hold these biases have not been clarified. The section that follows will conduct sub-group analysis by respondents' sectarian and partisan identities to determine how these aggregate biases are constituted.

Another question raised by this conjoint analysis involves the relative importance of the sectarian and partisan attributes. Both attributes affect respondents' preferences, but the relative strength of these preferences has not been studied. Thus, further analysis on the relative strength of sect and party attributes on respondent preferences is warranted to provide a decisive answer to the hypothesis proposed in the previous chapter that partisan affect trumps other forms of intergroup divisions.

Finally, the conjoint experiment conducted for this chapter cannot provide any clarity about the direction of bias. The conjoint experiment provides information about the relative likelihood that a profile will be selected for a given level. The experiment is not designed to specify if a greater likelihood of selection is due to positive preferences for the given level or aversion to alternative levels. Thus, the question of whether bias in the university study is due to in-group favoritism or out-group derogation requires further analysis.

To this end, Section 4.2 below will use two experimental laboratory games to take up the latter two outstanding questions. That section will test: (1) the relative strength of sect and party on respondent preferences, and (2) whether bias is expressed as in-group preference or out-group derogation.

4.1.2 Bias by Sub-groups of Students

Evidence in the previous section did not vindicate the prediction that university students demonstrate preferences for institutional diversity. Yet the previous section did not clarify how respondents express in-group and out-group preferences. For example, Christian profiles were preferred in the aggregate, but it is not clear whether Christians are expressing in-group bias or whether Muslims believe that Christians are more deserving, or both. This section will analyze respondent preferences by sub-group to shed greater light on preferences for diversity. This section will also provide a robustness check about respondent preferences. The expectation is that respondents will demonstrate preferences that favor the in-group across both sectarian and political dimensions.

This section compares effect sizes by sectarian sub-group using Marginal Means (MMs) analysis. MMs demonstrate the mean outcome for a level over all occurrences of the level, averaged across all other attributes. Marginal means for all levels average 0.5 when the conjoint design forces a choice between profiles - indicating that the profile is selected about half of the time. Estimates above 0.5 indicate that the attribute level increases the

probability that a profile is selected, whereas estimates below 0.5 indicate a lower probability of profile selection. The advantage of using MMs is that they calculate preferences for each level independently of any baseline, thus allowing for variation in sub-group preferences on the baseline levels in the previous section.

MMs analysis by respondents' sectarian background in Figure 4.5 helps shed light on what is driving these preferences.¹⁵ Figure 4.5 makes clear that each sectarian group shows a marked preference for selecting profiles that belong to the in-group. Christian respondents are especially likely to prefer their in-group sects, "Christian from Jounieh" and "Christian from Bourj Hammoud," selecting them at a rate of 63% to 66%. Shia and Sunni respondents also show a greater likelihood of selecting their in-group members, but their in-group selection rates are slightly lower than those among Christian respondents.¹⁶

Another significant finding from Figure 4.5 is that Christian and Shia respondents are driving the lower likelihood of selecting refugee profiles. A complete explanation for the lower likelihood of selecting foreign profiles needs further exploration through targeted survey design, but three possible explanations will be discussed here. First, anti-refugee sentiment mediated through the mechanism of group threat is well-documented in the literature. Nativist fears of an increasing foreign presence could explain why Christian and Shia respondents oppose Syrian and Palestinian profiles, but this explanation fails to account for

¹⁵Only Christian, Shia and Sunni groups are compared in this subgroup analysis. The survey also captured Agnostic (N = 14), Atheist (N = 23), Druze (N = 103) and Jewish (N = 2) respondents. These groups were excluded from sectarian subgroup analysis because they do not constitute a large enough sample in the dataset for reliable comparison. These respondents are included in the analysis of all other figures, including Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.6, and 4.7. The inclusion of these respondents in all other analyses in this chapter does not substantially change results. Figure A.4 in Appendix A shows AMCE analysis with only the main sects, excluding Agnostic, Atheist, Druze and Jewish respondents. The results in Figure A.4 are not substantially different from those in Figure 4.3. Thus, the respondents who are removed from sectarian sub-group analysis do not show systematically different preferences from those of the three main sects (Christian, Shia and Sunni).

¹⁶Importantly, this evidence does not adjudicate between in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. Both AMCEs and marginal means are only measures of likelihood. A greater likelihood of selecting the in-group could be a result of in-group favoritism, or out-group derogation, or both. Conjoint analysis does not reveal which mechanism is at play.




Figure 4.5: Preferences for student and faculty candidates by respondent sect using Marginal Means with cluster robust standard errors. The plots above have split the full samples based on respondent sect. Analysis is

the indifference shown by Lebanese Sunni respondents.

Another plausible explanation is anti-Sunni sentiment. Yet a lack of anti-Lebanese Sunni preference in Figure 4.5 demonstrates that a strictly sectarian explanation falls short. A final explanation for anti-refugee sentiment is also the most plausible. Lebanon's consociational political arrangement ensures that political power is held by and dispensed through Lebanon's sectarian communities. Without an official government census to inform proportional division of power among the various sects, Parliament is equally divided among

Christians and Muslims.¹⁷ Despite this equitable division, it is widely acknowledged that Christians do not represent half of Lebanon's population, as evidence suggests that 31.9% of the population is Sunni, 31% is Shia, 32.4% is Maronite, and 4.52% is Druze (*Report on International Religious Freedom: Lebanon* 2019). Significant sectors of Lebanese society, especially among Christians and Shias, fear that changes to the sectarian composition of the country could upend the status quo power distribution. These fears are not unfounded. The influx of Palestinian refugees into Lebanon was a significant factor leading to the Civil War. In fact, concern about disturbing the uneasy sectarian balance struck at the end of the Civil War is part of the reason why Syrian refugees are not granted permanent residency and why Palestinian refugees have not been granted Lebanese citizenship despite their presence in the country for nearly 70 years. Since the foreign populations of Syrians and Palestinians are both majority Sunni, an increase in a rival sect threatens Christian seats in Parliament and the political preeminence of the Shia community, which dominates Lebanese politics through its two main political parties, the Amal Movement and Hezbollah. Regardless of whether an increase in the Sunni sect would actually lead to a renegotiation of political power or strengthen the ability of Sunni leaders to credibly threaten the use of force against their political rivals, an increase in the Sunni population is a matter of concern for many in the Christian and Shia communities.

Further subgroup analysis was conducted in Figures 4.6 and 4.7 to evaluate how respondents' party identification shapes their preferences. Less than half of the respondents identified membership in an established political party (N = 670), while a majority (N = 941) reported preferences for either anti-establishment parties or for new political leadership. The variable for a respondent's party identification was transformed in two ways for data analysis. First, for Figure 4.6, respondent party identification was coded into the March 8 and March

¹⁷The last official government census was carried out in 1932. Since that time, and especially, after the Civil War, the prospect of taking another census has been a politically charged topic. It has not been undertaken.

14 party blocs, excluding 941 respondents who reported that they were not aligned with establishment parties. The second transformation for Figure 4.7 included all respondents by categorizing the March 8 and March 14 partisans together in the "Establishment" sub-group and the non-aligned in the "New Leadership" sub-group.

Figure 4.6 shows sub-group analysis for respondents who professed party identification with an establishment political party. The March 14 bloc includes respondents who identified as partisans of the Sunni-majority Future Movement and Christian-majority Kataeb and Lebanese Forces parties. The March 8 bloc is comprised of respondents who identified as partisans of a coalition of the Shia Hezbollah and Amal Movement and Christian FPM. Figure 4.6 shows statistically significant differences in preferences between respondents in the two blocs. Most estimates trend in expected directions, but they are not all statistically significant. Respondents who belong to the March 14 bloc are more likely to select their co-partisans, while showing between 12% and 16% lower likelihood of selecting a Hezbollah profile. The expected positive rate of selecting the Future Movement and negative rate of selecting FPM and Amal do not materialize among respondents in the March 14 bloc. Respondents in the opposing March 8 bloc show a greater likelihood of selecting FPM and Hezbollah, but are slightly less likely to select Kataeb partisans. Respondents in the March 8 bloc are surprisingly indifferent to most other political parties, including the allied Amal Movement and the opposing Future Movement and Lebanese Forces. Results in Figure 4.6 are thus not entirely consistent with expectations: respondents show a greater likelihood of selecting some in-group parties, a lower likelihood of selecting some out-group parties, and indifference to a number of parties both in the in-group and the out-group.

The plots in Figure 4.6 also demonstrate preferences that reinforce the link between sect and party. Respondents in the March 14 bloc are less likely to select Shia profiles, and more likely to select profiles of Christians and Sunnis (i.e. "Sunni from Tripoli"). Preferences towards these sects correspond closely with a demonstrated lower likelihood of selecting Hezbollah and greater likelihood to support Kataeb and the Lebanese Forces. Similarly,





Figure 4.6: The plot at the top shows preferences for student applicants by respondent party bloc. The plot on the bottom shows preferences for faculty candidates by respondent party bloc. Both sets of plots use Marginal Means with cluster robust standard errors.





Figure 4.7: The plot at the top shows preferences for student applicants by respondent leadership preference. The plot on the bottom shows preferences for faculty candidates by respondent leadership preference. Both sets of plots use Marginal Means with cluster robust standard errors.

respondents in the March 8 bloc are more likely to select Christian and Shia profiles. These preferences on the sectarian dimension are reflected in greater likelihood of support for the FPM and Hezbollah. Far from a consistent reinforcing link, however, sect and party are connected by a complex relationship. Greater likelihood of selecting a party is linked to selecting the sect associated with that party (among March 14 partisans, see support for Christian profiles and Kataeb and Lebanese Forces parties). However, a lower likelihood of selecting a party does not translate to a lower likelihood of selecting the sect associated with the party (among March 8 supporters, see bias against selecting the Future Movement, but no corresponding bias against Lebanese Sunnis).

Finally, preference for a sect does not necessarily result in higher rates of selection for all parties associated with the sect. This latter point is evident in the support shown for Christian profiles accompanied by mixed support for the FPM, Kataeb, and Lebanese Forces. These results reflect the substantive division in the Christian community between the Sunni-aligned March 14 parties (i.e. Kataeb and the Lebanese Forces) and the Shia-aligned March 8 parties (i.e. FPM). This division has origins in the Civil War when the Lebanese Forces, then a militia, clashed with the Lebanese National Army, which was headed by General Michel Aoun who later established the FPM. The clashes between the two Christian factions were bloody and debilitating, acting as a harbinger for the permanent decline of Christian political power. Thirty years after the bloody confrontations, his Christian rivals from the Lebanese Forces gave their support to elect Aoun as president in 2016. Yet Aoun's alliance with Hezbollah in the March 8 bloc has cemented divisions in the Christian community.

Turning now to include the majority of non-partisan respondents, Figure 4.7 plots differences in preferences between sub-groups of March 8 and March 14 partisans in the left panel and non-partisans in the right panel. Combining supporters of March 8 and March 14 party blocs is consistent with actual party behavior during 2016 municipal elections in Beirut and other such cross-bloc collaborations around the country during the 2018 parliamentary elections. There are no statistically significant differences in party preferences between re-

spondents who support established parties and those who do not. This unusual result is due to the fact that preferences among partisan respondents act in opposite directions for those aligned with the March 8 bloc and those aligned with the March 14 bloc. Effectively, these opposing preferences, when placed into the same sub-group in Figure 4.7, pull preferences to the vertical line. A comparison of respondents who prefer new leadership with partisans in Figure 4.6 shows some marked differences in preferences, especially about the FPM, Amal, Lebanese Forces and Kataeb. Respondents in the non-partisan camp show bias toward Shia political parties, Amal and Hezbollah, possibly indicating a displeasure with the majority government of the time.

As discussed in Chapter 2, antipathy for establishment political parties is strong in Lebanon. Before this survey was fielded, thousands of citizens filled the streets in protest in 2015 and 2016 against the sectarian political system, corruption, and lack of basic public services. The protests were sparked by a waste disposal crisis, but evolved toward a broader message against the political status quo and launched a political movement, Beirut Madinati. In 2016, Beirut Madinati ran for municipal elections in Beirut against an alliance of most other establishment political parties. The establishment rallied together against the secular, issue-based political movement and won 60% of the vote and all 24 municipal seats.¹⁸ Beirut Madinati over-performed expectations, and inspired later independent political movements like Sabaa, which will be discussed in the next chapter. The most important extrapolation from the 2016 municipal elections was the willingness of bitter rivals in the political establishment to join together against a new political movement.¹⁹ The willingness of the establishment political parties to unify, despite substantive differences and rivalries, demonstrates the strength of their will to maintain sectarian consociationalism and their

¹⁸Elections were based on a first-past-the-post system, which meant that candidates with a plurality of votes won the election.

¹⁹Only Hezbollah chose not to join the united list of parties that contested elections against Beirut Madinati, as Hezbollah chose to concentrate its efforts in other municipal elections.

own position within the political system. The cooperation among opposing parties in the 2016 municipal elections provides a basis of support for the decision to group the rival March 8 and March 14 blocs together in Figure 4.7.

The sub-group analysis presented in this chapter has accomplished two main objects. First, it has provided a robustness check for the university study. Respondents demonstrate preferences consistent with expectations: respondents prefer profiles that belong to the in-group sect and in-group party. Respondents even demonstrate preferences that reinforce the relationship between profile party and sect, though such preferences are not consistent. Second, this section has provided further evidence that university students are not committed to increasing diversity in their institutions. Like the previous section, however, this section clarifies neither the direction of bias nor the relative strength of sectarian and partisan biases. Evidence from Figure 4.5 suggests that sectarian preferences are stronger than partisan preferences. However, results were mixed in Figure 4.6. The section that follows uses two investment games to test: (1) the relative strength of sect and party on respondent preferences, and (2) whether bias is expressed as in-group preference or out-group derogation.

4.2 Measuring Discrimination with a Prisoner's Dilemma Game in the University Study

The previous section used a conjoint experiment to determine whether and to what extent attitudinal biases exist among students in Lebanese universities. In deciding which of two student applicants or faculty candidates to select, respondents were most interested in the relative merits of the profiles they assessed. Nevertheless, respondents also demonstrated biases along sectarian and partisan attributes. This section will expand on those findings to explore how biases are manifest in behaviors. Are intergroup biases characterized by in-group preferences or out-group derogation? What is the relative effect of sect and party on expressions of intergroup bias? Finally, in a test of threat theory, how does an increase in

the out-group proportion affect respondent behavior?

Using two investment games, this section will determine whether intergroup biases emerge in respondents' decisions to cooperate with in-group and out-group partners. Whereas the previous section found evidence of attitudinal prejudice, this section will determine whether these attitudes manifest in behaviors that show intergroup bias. This section will also conduct a test of threat theory by measuring changes in respondent behavior to an increasing proportion of the out-group in their environment.

A total of 17 investment game sessions were held on three Beirut campuses at AUB, LAU and Haigazian. Respondents were invited to participate in the investment experiments after completing the survey fielded in the conjoint experiment in the previous sections. The games were held in university computer labs, and each respondent was seated at his or her own computer. Respondents played 10 rounds of the prisoner's dilemma and five rounds of a modified prisoner's dilemma with multiple players²⁰. In each round of the game, players were asked whether they wished to invest \$4 with their partner(s). Total investment from all players was multiplied by 1.5 and divided between each player. Participants received a show-up fee of \$4, in addition to earnings from the investment games (for total minimum earnings of \$12 and maximum of \$25).²¹ Participants earned money based on the decisions they made in the games.

Each session of investment experiments hosted an average of 12 participants. The composition of the sessions was not regulated. Nevertheless, all sessions had a mix of participants from various sectarian backgrounds. Prior to the arrival of participants to the laboratory, each sessions was designated as either a control session (i.e. participants were not made aware of the salient identities of other players) or a treatment session (i.e. participants learned about their partners' sect or partisan preferences). In the control sessions,

²⁰The experimental games fielded in the universities drew on the design implemented by Aksoy, 2015

²¹The exchange rate in 2016 and 2017 was approximately 1,500 Lebanese Lira for \$1. As a reference point, average minimum wage in Lebanon is approximately \$4.




Figure 4.8: Investment game design: treatments in the prisoner’s dilemma and modified prisoner’s dilemma

respondents only learned about their partners’ family background and academic interests. In the treatment sessions, each round randomly assigned the partner to one of three treatment arms that dictated the information the respondent received about the partner. As Figure 4.8 demonstrates, respondents in the treatment sessions could be exposed to a (1) "neutral" treatment (i.e. neither the sect nor party of the partner was revealed); (2) "sect" treatment, or (3) "party" treatment.

The "control" and "neutral" assignments are equivalent in that the sectarian backgrounds and party preferences of respondents’ partners were not revealed. Both the control sessions and "neutral" rounds in the treatment sessions were included in the design of the game to provide a baseline comparison point to the "sect" and "party" treatments. The inclusion of these "neutral" treatments into the design of the experiment is founded on the assumption that respondents will be indifferent to "neutral" partners: that is, respondents will invest with partners whose sectarian and partisan identities they do not know 50% of the time. The assumption here is that respondents ignore the sect and party of their partners when they are not given any cues about these salient identity variables. Information about respondents’ investment rates under these "neutral" conditions will serve as a neutral baseline for their decisions under treatment conditions. From this baseline information, investment rates with partners whose sect and party are made explicit will show whether re-

spondents' decisions are founded on in-group favoritism or out-group derogation (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, 2002). If respondents invest with members of the in-group more than 50% of the time, then they are demonstrating in-group favoritism. In contrast, if respondents invest with members of the out-group less than 50% of the time, then they are demonstrating out-group derogation.

It should be noted, however, that respondents exposed to "neutral" partners may nevertheless make assumption about their partners' characteristics. Specifically, even in the absence of information about their partners, respondents may assume that their partners belong to the in-group or the out-group. In that case, the "neutral" conditions could not be said to serve as a baseline. To partially address this concern, the control session and the "neutral" rounds in the treatment sessions were both used in the design of the game. Respondents who play consecutive rounds with in-group, out-group, and "neutral" partners may be more likely to make assumptions about the "neutral" partners' backgrounds since sect and party have already been made salient during the course of the game session. In contrast, as respondents in the control sessions were never exposed to salient information, investment decisions made during the control sessions may provide cleaner evidence of respondents' decisions toward partners who belong neither to the in-group nor the out-group. The control sessions may thus serve as a robustness check for the results from the "neutral" rounds in the treatment sessions.

As Figure 4.9 in the next session demonstrates, investment rates from the control sessions and "neutral" rounds in the treatment sessions behave consistently with each other and as expected from the design of the experiment: respondents invest with partners whose salient identities they do not know about 50% of the time. At any rate, the assumption that the "neutral" rounds serve as a baseline measure for investment rates is only relevant for untangling information about in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. The assumption is irrelevant to the comparison made in the next section about the relative strength of sectarian and partisan biases.

During the treatment sessions, respondents were primed to the identity of their partners. Descriptions of partners were presented as short paragraph vignettes. Four example vignettes are represented in Table 4.1.²² The vignettes used in the games were generated from information respondents provided in survey responses when they participated in the conjoint experiment described in the previous section. Thus, since the vignettes represented respondents' abridged personal biographies, no two vignettes were the same. Players were asked to bring the random four-digit survey codes associated with their conjoint survey to the game sessions. Those who did not bring the codes into the laboratory session, were asked to fill out an abridged questionnaire prior to game play.

An important caveat to note is that information about a respondent's hometown of origin does not automatically trigger knowledge about that respondent's sectarian background.²³ Although divided countries like Lebanon are usually segregated geographically, most cities and towns in Lebanon are not monolithic. Cities and towns are instead comprised of segregated sectarian enclaves, or communities. The name of the city and town alone does not specify which segregated community is described.²⁴ Thus, information about respondents' hometowns are not determinative of sectarian background unless also accompanied by a respondent's first and last name. The combination of family name and hometown usually does trigger information about a person's sectarian background. In the experimental instruments used in this chapter, respondents' first and last name were not revealed.

The prisoner's dilemma is a type of public goods game that documents respondents' "strategy selection" differences when matched with in-group and out-group partners (Habyarimana et al., 2007). In the prisoner's dilemma, a player decides whether or not to cooperate with a partner by sharing his or her allotted money. When social identities are

²²None of the vignettes reproduced here represent real people.

²³This caveat is especially important in light of the research design discussed in Chapter 5.

²⁴With that said, the name of a small village alone could potentially trigger information about a respondent's sectarian background. However, as the universities targeted for this research are private institutions, and thus attract middle and upper class students, the issue of small villages did not come up.

Table 4.1: Investment Game Vignettes

Control Session		Treatment Sessions	
Control	Neutral	Sect	Party
Your partner was born in Beirut to a middle class family. His father is a employed and has a Master's degree. His mother is a housewife and has a Bachelor's degree. Before coming to this university, he went to a religious private school and was involved in his community. Regarding the public services in his hometown and the country in general, he has various thoughts on how they should be provided. He is currently studying engineering, and is undecided about a future occupation.	Your partner was born in Jeddah to a lower class family. Her father is a technician and has a Technical degree. Her mother is a principal's assistant, and has not completed high school. Before coming to this university, she went to a public school and was involved in her community. Regarding the public services in her hometown and the country in general, she has various thoughts on how they should be provided. She is currently studying early childhood education, and hopes to become a teacher.	You partner was born in Beirut to an upper class family. Her father is a businessman and has not completed high school. Her mother is a school supervisor and has a Master's degree. Before coming to this university, she went to a private school and observed her faith in a Shia mosque. Regarding the public services in her hometown and the country in general, she has various thoughts on how they should be provided. She is currently studying biology, and hopes to become a doctor.	Your partner was born in Saida to a middle class family. His father is a business owner and has a Master's degree. His mother is a housewife and has a Master's degree. Before coming to this university, he went to a private school and was involved in his community. Regarding the public services in his hometown and the country in general, he typically agrees with Amal on how they should be provided. He is currently studying computer science, and hopes to become a network security engineer.

introduced into the game, a player's behavior becomes contingent on his or her expectations of the partner's behavior, which is revealed only after the respondent makes a decision. The design of the prisoner's dilemma administered in this study relies on similar studies that have evaluated how identity heterogeneity can impede cooperation (Aksoy, 2015; Chen and S. X. Li, 2009; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Simpson, 2006).

In the absence of social preferences, the predicted behavior in the prisoner's dilemma is mutual non-cooperation. A player will earn a higher individual payoff by not cooperating, regardless of the partner's actions. The literature has demonstrated that people do not conform to these predictions. Individuals are not strictly motivated by self-interest into not cooperating. Instead, people tend to cooperate with partners whose identities they do not know to increase chances that they will both receive mutual benefits. An assumption in this book is that respondents will show some degree of cooperation with their "neutral" partners. The extent of this cooperation will be demonstrated empirically.

When social preferences about identity groups are added to the equation, predicted behavior in the prisoner's dilemma game changes dramatically. If the reader recalls from

Chapter 1, individuals are expected to demonstrate bias when in-group and out-group identities are invoked. The literature predicts that the presence of salient out-group identities will lead to categorization, stereotyping, and bias that favors the in-group. In a prisoner's dilemma games, respondents are expected to forgo absolute gains, as the process of stereotyping is likely to trigger feelings of distrust and thus lower levels of cooperation with the out-group. In contrast, stereotyping is likely to enhance trust in the in-group and thus lead to higher levels of cooperation. The modal finding in the literature is that individuals trust their in-group, and show a marked lack of trust in the out-group (Aksoy, 2015). A player discriminates when choosing to systematically trust, and cooperate with, members of the in-group at a higher rate than with members of the out-group. Discrimination rises to the more extreme level of out-group derogation when a player chooses to systematically defect when matched with the out-group. This latter set of decisions requires cooperation with the out-group to fall below levels of cooperation with "neutral" partners.

Immediately following the prisoner's dilemma game, respondents played five rounds of a different type of public goods game: a modified prisoner's dilemma with multiple partners. In each round of the game, respondents were randomly matched to three partners, each of whom was randomly assigned to a "neutral", "sect" or "party" treatment. A respondent could be matched with zero, one, two or three out-group partners in each round. An out-group partner is defined as a partner who belongs to an out-group "sect" or "party", while an in-group partner is someone who belongs to the in-group "sect" or "party." Neutral partners were also included in these rounds. The neutral partners are not counted among members of the out-group for purposes of analysis.²⁵

²⁵See the discussion in Appendix B.1 on the benefits and drawbacks of defining rounds with a combination of in-group and neutral partners as the reference category. To state the case briefly, only out-group identities were relevant because the modified prisoner's dilemma is intended to demonstrate respondent behavior as the number of *out-group* partners increases in a round. Rounds comprised exclusively of in-group partners, as well as rounds with in-group and "neutral" partners, were treated as reference categories. If anything, results from this experiment underestimate the effects of an increasing out-group, as respondents tend to show strong in-group preferences when prompted by the presence of an in-group.

In this modified prisoner's dilemma game, the respondent and each of his or her three partners make independent decisions about whether or not to invest with each other. The payoff for each player in the game depends on the number of players who decide to invest. Similar to the incentives in the regular prisoner's dilemma game, the best joint outcome for the four players would be mutual cooperation, but defection is always rewarding to the individual player. However, unlike the regular prisoner's dilemma, the players in the modified prisoner's dilemma are still better off if only one of the four players defects.²⁶ Thus, the game creates a sliding scale for mutual cooperation: respondents are all better off if they all cooperate and remain so, with slightly diminished rewards, if only one player defects.

The key outcome of interest in the modified prisoner's dilemma is the effect on a respondent's strategy selection as the number of out-group partners increases. The expectation is that respondents may be willing to cooperate in the presence of one member of the out-group, but that fears that more than one member of the out-group will defect will preclude cooperation as the number of out-group members in the game increases.

The modified prisoner's dilemma tests group threat theory, which predicts that an increase in the actual or perceived proportion of an out-group may cause people to feel that their position or resources are threatened or encroached upon. Respondents may credibly fear a threat to their resources as the investment game involves real money allocations. On the other hand, the money does not belong to the respondents *ex ante*, thus possibly diminishing the strength of the threat. If that is the case, then effects of threat theory could be explained by purely cognitive mechanisms (Enos and Celaya, 2018; Enos, 2017). Simply increasing the size and proximity of an out-group is enough to trigger cognitive mechanisms

²⁶Each player can invest \$4 toward collective resources. The amount invested by the players is multiplied by 1.5 and divided equally between the four players. Players who do not invest nevertheless receive payment from the collective resources. Thus, if all four players invest, each player receives \$6; if three players invest, each player receives \$4.5, which means that three players have a net gain of \$0.50 while the player who chose to defect walks away with \$8.50; if two players invest, each player receives \$3, which means that two players have lost \$1 each and two players walk away with \$7 each; if only one player invests, then that player loses \$2.50 while the other three players gain \$1.50.

that eliminate perceived differences among the in-group and accentuate the salience of the out-group. From this point, the mechanism is similar to what was illustrated in the previous paragraph: the salience of the out-group leads to biases that increase distrust toward the out-group. As the number of out-group members in a round of play increases, respondents are likely to experience diminished trust and respond by defecting.

The prisoner’s dilemma and the modified prisoner’s dilemma employed in this study are advantageous because they measure respondent behaviors in response to real social identities. Respondents who came to the lab were told that they would be matched with other players in the room and that they would be interacting with real people in real time. While it is clear that a controlled lab setting has substantive drawbacks in comparison to real-world interactions, a lab experiment with real identities nonetheless can provide some insight into respondent behaviors.

4.2.1 Evidence of Discrimination in the University

This section explores intergroup behavioral discrimination with two investment games conducted in three Lebanese universities. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions were used to analyze the experimental games and results are presented in Table 4.2 without covariate controls.²⁷ To account for the possibility that socio-demographic factors may influence regression results, models from Table 4.2 were re-run with controls for sect, party bloc, gender, family socioeconomic status, family income and citizenship in Appendix B.²⁸ No significant changes emerged when covariate controls were added, thus indicating that the

²⁷While fixed effects and cluster-robust standard errors are not used in the main analysis in Table 4.2, these methods are applied in analysis in Appendix B. The direction and magnitude of treatment variables in the fixed effect models and models that implement cluster-robust standard errors track closely with the models in Table 4.2. See Tables B.6, B.7 and B.8 for model estimates with fixed effects and Tables B.9, B.10 and B.11 for model estimates with cluster-robust standard errors.

²⁸A small amount of missing data (about 7%) from the surveys conducted prior to game play was imputed using multiple imputations with chained equations (MICE). See Appendix B for an explanation of the process.

Table 4.2: Intergroup Bias

	Direction of Prejudice		Sect vs. Party		Increasing Out-group	
	Full Sample (1)	Main Sects (2)	Full Sample (3)	Main Sects (4)	Full Sample (5)	Main Sects (6)
Intercept	0.536*** (0.016)	0.528*** (0.017)	0.589*** (0.038)	0.626*** (0.040)	0.533*** (0.033)	0.553*** (0.035)
In-group partner	0.054 (0.035)	0.104*** (0.035)				
Out-group partner	-0.122*** (0.032)	-0.087** (0.036)			-0.040 (0.047)	-0.073 (0.052)
Two or three out-group partners					-0.107** (0.053)	-0.130** (0.060)
Treatment: in-group partisan			0.043 (0.057)	0.015 (0.061)		
Treatment: out-group sect			-0.116 (0.068)	-0.099* (0.056)		
Treatment: out-group partisan			-0.234*** (0.064)	-0.317*** (0.064)		
Covariates	No	No	No	No	No	No
N	184	175	127	118	129	120

Note: Ordinary least squares models with seven datasets of predictive mean matching imputations. Dependent variables: respondent decides to invest with his/her partner(s). In models 1 and 2, the reference category is the "neutral" partner whose sect and politics are unknown to the respondent. In models 3 and 4, the reference category is the "in-group sect." In models 5 and 6, the reference category is the homogeneous game session. Bias in both the prisoner's dilemma and public goods games are measured by the respondent's willingness to invest with a member of the in-group, but not the out-group. Models 1, 3 and 5 includes all sampled respondents. Models 2, 4 and 6 exclude Druze respondents and estimate results with the three principal sectarian groups which are the focus of this research: Christian, Shia and Sunni.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

models presented in this chapter are reliable. Models 2, 4 and 6 in Table 4.2 exclude Druze respondents to permit comparison of results for the major sects of interest with results in Chapter 4.²⁹ Models 1 to 4 present results from the prisoner's dilemma, while Models 5 and 6 from the modified prisoner's dilemma.

Models 1 and 2 arbitrate between in-group favoritism and out-group derogation from evidence showing that respondents are less likely to invest with out-group partners. The reference category for both models is a respondent's investment decision when interacting

²⁹For more information about respondent characteristics and covariate balance between treatment and neutral rounds, see Table B.2 in Appendix B

with a "neutral" partner (i.e. a partner whose salient sectarian background and partisan preferences are not revealed to the respondent). The rows for "in-group partner" and "out-group partner" combine priming information for partners' sectarian and partisan identities. In Model 1, respondents are 12% ($p < 0.01$) less likely to invest with an out-group partner and show no particular preference for members of the in-group. If the readers recall the discussion from the previous section, a lack of evidence for positive in-group bias may be a result of respondents' assumptions that "neutral" partners are actually members of the in-group. Thus, while the evidence from Models 1 and 2 are not dispositive, they are suggestive of out-group derogation.

The likelihood of investing with a member of the in-group is not significantly different from the likelihood of investing with a "neutral" partner. When Druze respondents are excluded in Model 2, respondent behaviors are characterized both by in-group favoritism and out-group derogation, with in-group preference emerging as a slightly stronger effect. Respondents are 10% ($p < 0.01$) more likely to invest with a member of the in-group, and 9% ($p < 0.05$) less likely to invest with a member of the out-group. The differences in Models 1 and 2 are driven by Druze respondents who demonstrate strong out-group derogation and no in-group preferences. The anomalous result for Druze respondents is a consequence of the sample selection and group design employed in this lab experiment. Respondents were placed into random group combinations when they arrived in the lab. As a consequence, of the nine Druze participants in the sample, four were the sole representatives of their sect in their game sessions. Thus, four Druze respondents never had a chance to interact with a member of the in-group. The small proportion of Druze respondents thus skew the results in Model 1.

Models 3 and 4 in Table 4.2 explore the relative importance of sect and party in respondents' expression of bias in the prisoner's dilemma. Respondents were primed with partners belonging to four different identity categories: in-group sect, in-group party, out-group sect, and out-group party. Separating information about sect and party permits the

design of this game to understand the effect of the sect and party variables separately.³⁰ The sample size for Models 3 and 4 has decreased as all instances in which respondents were matched to "neutral" partners have been removed. The reference category for Models 3 and 4 is a respondent's investment decision when interacting with a partner belonging to the in-group sect.

Results for Models 3 and 4 track closely together. Intercepts for both models show that respondents tend to invest with the in-group sect at higher rates (59% and 63%) than they would if they were indifferent to investing with their partners (50%), or if matched with "neutral" partners (i.e. 54% and 53% from Models 1 and 2). Respondent investment decisions when matched with in-group partisans and out-group sectarians do not show statistically significant differences from the reference category. However, respondents show a sharp decline in the likelihood of investing when matched with an out-group partisan. Respondents are nearly 28% ($p < 0.01$) less likely to invest with out-group partisans than in-group partisans in Model 3. This is a significantly larger difference than the 12% difference in investment rates between in-group and out-group sectarians. Investment rates with members of the out-group decrease even more dramatically in Model 4. Respondents are 33% ($p < 0.01$) less likely to invest with an out-group partisan than an in-group partisan, compared to only 10% less likely to invest with an out-group sectarian than an in-group sectarian.

Results from Models 3 and 4 are significant because they provide evidence for the contention made in the previous chapter that the most powerful basis of social divisions in Lebanon are partisan. Respondents in Model 4 demonstrate a modest decrease in likelihood of investing with members of the out-group sect, but this result does not reach statistical significance. In contrast, respondents demonstrate strong bias toward out-group partisans. In other words, partisan affect has a clear and strong effect on respondent behaviors when compared to purported sectarian biases.

³⁰It is possible that respondents inferred sect from information about party, and party from information about sect. This possibility will be discussed and corrected in the next chapter.




Figure 4.9: Effect of treatment condition on a respondent’s probability of investing with the matched partner. The plot shows predicted probabilities of choosing to invest with a partner, 95% confidence intervals.

The regression in Model 4 is used to calculate predicted probabilities for investment by Christian, Shia and Sunni respondents in Figure 4.9.³¹ Results in Figure 4.9 show

³¹To create the figure for predicted probabilities, Model 4 was rerun on the full sampled population and with covariates for partisan identification, gender, socioeconomic status, family income, socioeconomic status, and whether the respondent is born in a foreign country. Socioeconomic status is an index compiled of four variables describing respondents’ parents’ education levels and professions. See detailed descriptions of covariates in Appendix B.

respondent behaviors when matched with partners under different treatment conditions. No significant differences exist between the predicted probability of investing with partners in the neutral treatment and partners in the control sessions. Respondents exposed to the neutral treatment, when this treatment was embedded among salient treatments, are about as likely to invest with their partners as respondents in the control sessions, where only the neutral treatment was administered.³²

If the reader recalls from the previous section, the control sessions are meant to serve as a robustness check for the assumption that the "neutral" partner elicits behavior from the respondent that serves as a baseline for findings of in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. The caveat to this assumption is that respondents may have assumed their partners' sectarian and partisan identities even when this information was withheld. Omitting sect and party cues from some rounds in the treatment sessions, while including them in other rounds may have nonetheless allowed respondents to assume the sectarian and partisan backgrounds of their "neutral" partners. In contrast, as respondents in the control sessions never learned any salient information about their partners, the investment decisions under control conditions may serve as convincing evidence that respondents truly ignored their partners' sect and party.

Another relevant comparison from Figure 4.9 shows remarkable similarity in the predicted investment rates for the three sects across each treatment. Christian, Shia and Sunni respondents make very similar investment decisions about neutral, in-group and out-group partners. Consistent with results from the conjoint experiment, respondents of all three sectarian backgrounds demonstrate a greater likelihood to favor the in-group sect and in-group party. Respondents invest with the in-group with a probability of about 65%. Respondents show indifference in predicted investment rates with partners belonging to the

³²The similar investment rates between control sessions and the neutral treatment in the treatment sessions shows why the two different treatment conditions were combined into a single reference category in Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.2.

out-group sect. Investing with members of the out-group sect at a rate of 50% makes this group comparable to the "neutral" partner treatment. Predicted investment that demonstrates out-group derogation is only evident toward members of the out-group party. The strongest indication of intergroup bias from Figure 4.9 demonstrates partisan affect.

Finally, Models 5 and 6 from Table 4.2 perform a test of group threat theory. Using the modified prisoner's dilemma, these models show how respondents behave when the number of their out-group partners increases. Each respondent is matched to three partners over the course of five rounds, with the number of out-group partners varying from zero to three in each round. The reference category in Models 5 and 6 is a respondent's investment decision when none of the partners belong to the out-group. The addition of one out-group partner does not lead to a statistically significant change in respondents' investment behaviors. As the number of out-group partners increases to two or three out-group members, however, the probability of investment decreases by 11% ($p < 0.05$) in Model 5 and 13% ($p < 0.05$) in Model 6.

Two different arguments explain the findings in Models 5 and 6, although the experiment cannot distinguish between them. First, group threat theory explains why the addition of one out-group partner has no effect on cooperation and why an increasing out-group does. The modified prisoner's dilemma is a game about trust: respondents matched to in-group partners will trust that their partners will cooperate with them and so will choose to invest in the public good to increase collective gains. However, the increase in the size and proximity of out-group partners triggers a respondent's cognitive mechanisms to eliminate perceived differences among members of the in-group and to accentuate the salience of the out-group. The sudden salience of the out-group creates fear and distrust that translates to lower levels of cooperation during the game.

Alternatively, the results from Models 5 and 6 can also be explained with a rational or instrumental lens. The pay-off structure of the game works to maximize joint profits when all four partners cooperate. When all four partners invest \$4, each partner receives a payout

of \$6.³³ However, respondents can also make a profit when three of the partners cooperate. In that case, the three partners who cooperate walk away with \$4.50 each, which represents a \$0.50 profit from their ex ante monetary allocation. The sole defector walks away with \$8.50.³⁴ Thus, cooperation among four or three partners ensures mutual gains.

On the other hand, as the number of out-group partners increases to two or three, each respondent is confronted with a trust dilemma. Respondents tend not to trust members of the out-group to cooperate for the public good. Under these circumstances, if a respondent chooses to cooperate in the presence of two or more "distrusted" out-group partners, the respondent will lose a portion of his ex ante monetary allocation.³⁵ Thus, instrumental or rational-minded respondents are likely to choose to defect in order to lower the risk of losses.

4.3 Discussion

Together, the evidence in this chapter is consistent with extensive findings in the literature that making social identity characteristics salient leads to intergroup bias. The conjoint experiment revealed that respondents care most about the merits of prospective student applicants and faculty candidates. Respondents are 36% more likely to select a student applicant with a perfect SAT score and 32% more like to select a faculty candidate with an excellent reputation. Nevertheless, respondents also demonstrate preferences about candidates' identity attributes. Christian, Shia, and Sunni respondents demonstrated a greater likelihood of selecting members of the in-group sect. At the same time, Christian and Shia respondents showed a lower likelihood of selecting foreign profiles, indicating a

³³ $\$4 \times 4 \text{ players} \times 1.5 \text{ boost} = \24 . Then, \$24 divided among four players allows each player to walk away with \$6 each.

³⁴ $\$4 \times 3 \text{ players} \times 1.5 \text{ boost} = \18 . When \$18 is divided among the four players, the cooperating partners walk away with \$4.50 each thus making them better off than before they decided to cooperate. The sole defector walks away with \$8.50.

³⁵When only two partners cooperate: $\$4 \times 2 \text{ partners} \times 1.5 = \12 . Then, $\$12/4 = \3 . This means that the cooperating partners walk away with \$3 each, while the defecting partners with \$7 each.

strong bias against Syrian and Palestinian candidates. March 8 and March 14 partisans also demonstrate a greater likelihood of selecting candidates who belong to the in-group sect and candidates who belong to the in-group party. While the conjoint experiment provided some evidence for a reinforcing relationship between preferences for sect and party preferences, the evidence was inconsistent. The conjoint did not vindicate expectations about partisan affect as preferences about sect and party were of similar magnitude.

Two investment games conducted in Lebanese universities further shed light on the nature of intergroup bias. As predicted by the literature, respondents demonstrated both in-group favoritism and out-group derogation in the prisoner's dilemma. Furthermore, analysis into whether sect or party led to greater intergroup biases revealed that respondents show stronger bias against out-group partisans. The greatest difference in investment rates was between in-group and out-group partisans.

Finally, a modified prisoner's dilemma, which matched four respondents in each round of play, showed that respondents invest less with their partners as the proportion of the out-group in the matched partner group increases. Two equally likely arguments explain these findings. First, a rational or instrumental approach explains that respondents are likely to defect when, with the addition of more than one out-group, individual benefits from investment disappear. Alternatively, group threat theory predicts that increasing the out-group presence makes the out-group more salient, triggers stereotyping, and leads to bias that reflects diminished intergroup trust.

While the university study revealed interesting details about intergroup relations in Lebanon, questions remain to be answered. First, further analysis is warranted about the relationship between party and sect. Chapter 3 discussed in detail that information about an individual's sect says little about that individual's partisan preferences. However, information about party readily reveals information about sect. It is possible that information about a partner's party identity in the prisoner's dilemma implicitly creates a multiplicative effect of information about party *and* sect. For example, priming a respondent about a part-

ner's support for Hezbollah indicates to the respondent that his partner is a Shia supporter of Hezbollah. The chapter that follows will use a more granular design to understand the individual and compounded effects of sect and party.

Second, university students are considered a convenience sample in the literature. The chapter that follows broadens the scope of the population whose attitudes and behaviors are tested. The research moves away from the convenience sample of university students to the broader Lebanese population to provide further insight into Lebanese intergroup relations.

Chapter 5

Segregated Lebanese Neighborhoods: Comparison of Sect and Party as the Locus of Bias

*"Les guerres au Liban et les menaces qu'en subit son système politique
sont une menace pour tous les systèmes de coexistence dans le monde."*
— Labaki and Abou Rjeily, 1993, p.9

Lebanon is a small country of great diversity and immense segregation. Historically, sectarian groups were concentrated in certain regions of Lebanon. However, demographic changes, mass displacements and massacres perpetrated during the Civil War changed the geographic distribution of the country substantially, entrenching segregation. It is estimated that one in three Lebanese, or 827,500 people, were displaced during the 15-year Civil War (Labaki and Abou Rjeily, 1993). Many people who were displaced left the country, while others sought refuge under the protection of their sectarian groups. The displacements occurred in the wake of sudden bursts of violence, but also as part of a steady trickle over the grinding years of war and Israeli and Syrian occupations. One particularly brutal period during the Civil War from 1983 to 1985 saw the "quasi-complete" expulsion of 163,000 Christians from 200 villages in the Mount Lebanon region as well the southern districts of

Saida and Jezzine (Camarena and Hagerdal, 2020). The ethnic cleansing was orchestrated by a united Druze, Palestinian and Sunni force. The majority of the displaced Christians moved to the suburbs of East Beirut (Camarena and Hagerdal, 2020). Patterns of displacement were not relegated to the rural areas, however. Before the war, West Beirut was 40-45% Christian, which dropped precipitously to 10-15% by 1986 (Labaki and Abou Rjeily, 1993). East Beirut, meanwhile, became majority Christian. Economic development and continued demographic change has blurred the lines of Muslim West Beirut and Christian East Beirut, but these demarcations have nonetheless persisted.

While Lebanese people today move through common spaces, hold cross-sectarian friendships and even sometimes intermarry, residential segregation remains the reality in much of Lebanon. For her 2014 book *Compassionate Communalism*, Melani Cammett identified 838 zones (from over 1,600) which have enough institutional capacity to provide private or public welfare services (Cammett, 2014). A look at this dataset reveals that the majority of Lebanese zones are highly segregated. In fact, more than 90% of the population in most zones (613 of 838 zones) is comprised of citizens belonging to a single sect.

A minority of Lebanese citizens live in segregated communities embedded in regions dominated by out-group sects. This study isolated 12 such segregated towns to serve as research sites. In collaboration with a professional research firm, a town was selected for this study if a majority of its residents belonged to one sectarian group (e.g. Shia), but was surrounded by towns whose population belonged to a difference sectarian group (e.g. Sunni).¹ This selection criteria made the towns targeted for this research rather unusual in the Lebanese geographic landscape. Forty-one such zones were identified around Lebanon. The final 12 zones were selected by excluding zones with too few residents (e.g. "vacation villages"), zones with significant populations of out-group sects (i.e. where minorities constituted 40% and more of the town's population), and zones that were situated next to other

¹The firm, Statistics Lebanon, located in Hazmiyeh, Lebanon also worked in collaboration with Cammett (2014).

Table 5.1: Zones Selected for Survey Administrations

Majority in District	District	Town	Majority in Zone	Registered Voters 2018
Christian	Baabda	Borj el Brajneeh	Shia	17,410
	Aley	Qmatiyeh	Shia	2,691
	Batroun	Heri	Sunni	815
	El Koura	Nakhle	Sunni	828
Shia	Nabatiyeh	Rahbat	Christian	482
	Baalbeck-Hermel	Talia	Christian	923
	Saida	Dekerman	Sunni	8,838
Sunni	Baalbeck-Hermel	Fekha	Sunni	5,124
	West Bekaa	Aana	Christian	1,130
	Minieh-Danieh	Markabta	Christian	1,228
	Zahle	Nasriyeh	Shia	914
	Chouf	Wardaniyeh	Shia	2,432

zones with the same sectarian composition. Thirty-four respondents were surveyed in each of the 12 selected zones for a total sample size of 408 respondents.

One town, Ein Ebel, was replaced in February, 2020. The replacement was necessary in the wake of mass anti-government demonstrations that began in October, 2019 and intensified in January. By February, tensions were rife and restrictions on travel were put in place in the south where Ein Ebel is located. That region of the south, known as the "border strip," is considered a high security area by the Lebanese army and Hezbollah due to its proximity to Israel. The town was replaced by another southern town called Rahbat. The final list of towns where the survey was fielded is described in Table 5.5 and mapped in Figure 5.1.

Local and regional geography were carefully considered when selecting the 12 towns for two main reasons. First, as the majority of Lebanese towns are segregated by sect, this study sought to capture respondents from segregated contexts. The segregated context differed markedly from the environment of the university study where students were embedded within highly diverse environments. Variation in the type of environment between the two studies ensures greater diversity in the sampled populations. Second, the variation in the




Figure 5.1: Towns selected for this research.

sectarian composition of the local and regional levels will be exploited for experimental treatment in the analysis conducted in Chapter 7.

The neighborhood survey was administered on tablets by a group of enumerators led by a team leader who directed sample selection procedures on the ground. A random stratified sampling technique was used to ensure that respondents were representative of the range of socioeconomic diversity in each town. Each town was first divided into geographic clusters and coded by socioeconomic class. A set of clusters was then randomly selected from each socioeconomic grouping. Then, buildings were selected within each cluster following a

pre-defined skip pattern.² In addition to socioeconomic specifications, all respondents are male,³ Lebanese, over the age of 18, and members of the Christian,⁴ Shia and Sunni sectarian groups.

The intention of this chapter is to answer some of the outstanding questions raised in the previous chapter, as well as to expand the population of this research to a broader segment of Lebanese society. As before, this chapter seeks to understand the driving forces behind intergroup bias: (1) whether and to what extent respondents demonstrate intergroup biases, (2) the relative importance of sect and party, and (2) whether bias is determined by in-group favoritism or out-group derogation. The chapter proceeds with a conjoint experiment and a prisoner's dilemma game. The chapter concludes with a discussion of results and an introduction of the chapters that follow.

5.1 Measuring Bias with an Election Conjoint Experiment in the Neighborhood Study

Analysis of attitudinal prejudices in the neighborhood study was also conducted using a conjoint experiment. Respondents were shown three pairs of profiles and asked to select which of two political candidates they would prefer for election to Parliament. Similar to the conjoint experiment analyzed in the last chapter, the voting experiment described in

²See Appendix C for a detailed explanation of sample selection.

³Female respondents were excluded from the sample for two main reasons. First, the sample of 408 respondents is modest. Increasing heterogeneity on the gender variable would require a larger sample size to achieve the same degree of power. Budgetary constraints limited the sample size. Second, respondents were recruited by enumerators who entered respondents' homes and administered surveys in person. To be able to target all households at random, including conservative households, it is appropriate to request interviews with the male head of household. That is not to say that interviewing female members of the household would be inappropriate in all cases. Rather, interviewing female members of the household in some cases would require planning and coordination that was not deemed necessary for this project.

⁴The three Christian sects included in the neighborhood study were Maronite, Greek Orthodox and Catholic, which represent the three largest Christian groups in Lebanon.

this section will show the causal effect of each attribute, averaged over all other attributes, on the likelihood that a candidate will be selected. This multidimensional manipulation will thus reveal the relative importance respondents place on candidates' salient attributes (e.g. sect and party) and competence (e.g. record of accomplishments). The experiment will also reveal whether, like the students in the last chapter, respondents show bias in their evaluations.

The election conjoint will shed light on the extent to which voting occurs along sectarian and partisan lines. Evidence for sectarian and affective partisan voting was covered in Chapter 3. However, a forceful contention in the literature eschews the notions that Lebanese social divisions are founded on sectarian identities. Instead, this literature maintains that sectarian voting occurs because people's choices are constrained by a political economy that maintains itself through clientelist networks (Cammett, 2014; Fawaz Traboulsi, 2014; Corstange, 2012; Paler, Marshall, and Atallah, 2020). The literature uses different methods to make the same point: citizens are forced to cast their votes for sectarian parties for the promise of reciprocal goods and services. Another version of this theory uses instrumental partisanship as a foundation for social divisions. In this view, voters make instrumental decisions to cast their ballots for parties that promise to deliver goods and services. Although the literature on Lebanon does not deny the existence of affective partisanship, it also does not engage with this possibility.

The conjoint experiment presented in this chapter will demonstrate whether voters make choices that implicate sectarian and/or partisan preferences. The conjoint will further help untangle the relative explanatory power of sect and party in respondent vote choice. The literature on Lebanon maintains that people are motivated by economic concerns, rather than sectarian or partisan identity, when researchers succeed to eliminate the effects of social desirability bias (Corstange, 2013; Paler, Marshall, and Atallah, 2020). Respondents participated in the experiments presented in this chapter anonymously and without the assistance of survey administrators. These efforts diminished the effects of social desirability

bias. Therefore, the expectation in this chapter is that respondents will be motivated by economic concerns rather than sectarian or partisan affect in casting their votes. If this is not the case, then it is possible that the literature on Lebanon overstates the primacy of economic and instrumental voting behavior.

Profiles employed in this conjoint design contain five attributes detailing the candidate's sect, political party, prior work experience, record of accomplishment, and proposed platform (see Figure 5.2 for an example conjoint table).⁵ All attribute levels were randomly assigned to each profile. The order of attributes was randomized across respondents, but kept constant for each respondent to minimize cognitive strain (Brown et al., 2017). Respondents were asked to select which of the two candidates they would prefer to win the election, and to rank their preference for each candidate on a scale from 1 to 7.

Two caveats should be mentioned about the election conjoint experiment employed here. First, as the political candidate profiles were generated through a fully randomized design, some of the profiles featured unusual combinations of sectarian identity and partisan preferences. For example, a Christian running as a Hezbollah or Amal candidate is an unusual occurrence. Nevertheless, because Lebanese political parties form coalitions to run for Parliament, it is commonplace for members of various sects to join a list of candidates running under the same coalition, or even the same party. Figure C.2 in Appendix C translates a sample ballot paper from the 2018 Parliamentary elections is a case in point. Furthermore, while an average Christian voter will be a partisan of a Christian political party, if he is a partisan at all, Lebanese Christians do sometimes show preferences for Muslim parties. Lebanese political parties administer patronage systems to all citizens within their jurisdictions, regardless of sect (Cammett, 2014). Thus, it is very likely that individuals captured within the patronage network of a purportedly out-group party will give support to that party during elections.

⁵See Figure C.3 in Appendix C for a full list of attribute levels.

Suppose the two candidates below will compete in Parliamentary elections.
Which of them will you support?

	Candidate A	Candidate B
Party	Hezbollah	Future Movement
Sect	Shia	Sunni
Current Job	Businessman	MP
Record	Created jobs	Built a clinic
Promises	Create better jobs	Increase power generation

Candidate A

Candidate B

Figure 5.2: Example conjoint table. The design of the election conjoint experiment draws on a similar study by Carlson (2015) in Uganda.

Second, the reader may wonder about the sparse set of attributes used to build the candidate profiles. After all, voters' choices about candidates are often influenced by a number of additional features, including a candidate's education, gender, age, and income. The concern with these omissions is that they may bias results calculated as average marginal component effects (AMCEs). These concerns are valid and future research that uses a larger sample size of respondents should implement these additional variables. In the current study, the sample size of 408 respondents did not permit expanding the coverage of attributes due to concerns with statistical power..

Despite these possible setbacks, the conjoint experiment is especially useful in voting experiments because it helps combat social desirability biases, and its vote-specific complement, the Bradley effect (Carlson, 2015; Hopkins, 2009).⁶ Even in societies where identity-

⁶The Bradley effect was coined in the U.S. after the narrow loss suffered by Tom Bradley in the 1982

based voting is common practice, including Lebanon, social norms may nevertheless discourage overt expressions of sectarian preferences. Multiple randomly generated attributes, which include a combination of salient and unobtrusive attributes, thus provide a respondent with the opportunity to make socially undesirable choices without specifying the grounds for that decision.

Randomly varying candidate attributes also permits this chapter to test the conditional relationship among identity, party, and a candidate's performance. The literature on instrumental party identification maintains that support for parties may depend on party performance, ideological beliefs, and citizens' ideological proximity to preferred party policies (Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe, 2015). While the latter two concepts have been discussed already and judged plausible, but unlikely to be at play in Lebanon, the former needs further consideration. Party identification may inform the way that voters interpret past party performance, which is implied by Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes (2010), and the expectations voters have for the party's future performance. Similar arguments in the literature on ethnic voting maintain that voters engage in identity-based voting in part because they expect co-ethnics to deliver on their promises (Carlson, 2015; Gerber and Huber, 2010). A three-variable interaction in Section 5.2.2 will help determine how highly Lebanese voters value party performance by measuring if it mediates support for the sectarian and/or partisan in-group.

5.1.1 Bias in Elections

Main results for respondent preferences are presented in Figure 5.3. The plots show AMCEs for levels calculated from specified reference categories that rest on the vertical

California gubernatorial race, despite polling data showing that he was ahead of his opponent. The Bradley effect was meant to capture the idea that white voters lied about their support for black politicians like Bradley in telephone polling surveys to appear less biased, but cast private ballots in line with their biased attitudes.

line, averaged over all other combinations of attributes.⁷ The plot on the left represents respondent ratings of candidate profiles recoded from 0 ("never support") to 1 ("always support"), while the plot on the right is a forced choice between two candidate profiles. The two plots show remarkable consistency on candidates' salient characteristics, signifying that respondents vote for profiles they rank most highly. Results between the two plots in Figure

⁷As described in the previous chapter, the horizontal lines around point estimates are 95% confidence intervals. An AMCE is statistically significant at $p = 0.05$ level when its confidence interval does not cross the vertical line.




Figure 5.3: Preferences for Parliamentary candidates. The plots above describe the level of favorability toward profiles that have a particular feature level, holding all other features constant. The plot on the left shows respondents' ratings of the candidate. The ratings have been rescaled to represent 0 ("never support") to 1 ("always support"). The plot on the right is a forced choice between two prospective candidates.

5.3 are less consistent for candidate qualifications and platforms: respondents do not rate candidates highly for a good record, but they select them for it. The difference between the rating outcome and the choice outcome captures the kind of decision-making individuals must make at the ballot-box when they make "trade-offs" across many dimensions (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto, 2014). Respondents may give a lower rating for a candidate who has some objectionable attributes, but they may nevertheless cast a vote for that candidate when the alternative is even more objectionable. Figure 5.3 reveals that respondents prefer candidates with a history of job creation and a platform promising to create jobs.

The forced choice plot on the right of Figure 5.3 shows that the biggest determinants of respondent preferences for Parliamentary candidates are their qualifications and proposed political platforms. Respondents are 7% more like to support a candidate who built a clinic and 17% more likely to support a candidate who created jobs than a candidate without a record of accomplishments. Respondents are also 11% more likely to prefer a candidate who promises to create jobs than one who promises to increase power generation.⁸ These findings are consistent with the conjoint experiment administered in the university setting, which also demonstrated the powerful effect of qualifications on respondent preferences.

Interestingly, despite the large Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon, and the economic burdens that a refugee presence has imposed on Lebanon, respondents are not more interested in government policy that returns refugees back to Syria. This result is surprising in light of the significant bias shown toward Syrians in the university study. In the previous chapter, this bias was given a political explanation: an increase in the rival Sunni sect could upend the political status quo against Lebanese Christians and Shias. The stark contrast in preferences between the university study and the neighborhood study likely also has a

⁸Prior to the complete deterioration of government services in the wake of Lebanon's economic collapse in 2020, Lebanon suffered through sporadic electricity shortages. Most families that could afford it, filled gaps in the state electricity supply with privately-owned diesel-powered generators. Since the economic collapse, power cuts from the state supply have become longer and more frequent. Meanwhile, the increase in fuel costs has meant that many households can no longer afford private electricity.

political explanation.

In the two years since the university study was administered, the Lebanese government has taken significant steps against the Syrian refugee presence, including imposing penalties on businesses that hire refugees and adopting policies aimed at repatriation. Furthermore, the government had settled on a policy that would not grant a path to citizenship to the refugees. Therefore, with the policy on Syrian refugees already settled by the time the neighborhood study was administered, the refugees may no longer have appeared as threatening as they did two years before.

On the other hand, a rapidly declining economy, which was widely blamed on the government, may account for differences in preferences expressed between the university and neighborhood studies. Between November 2016 and March 2017, when the university study was fielded, students looked forward to entering a politically volatile, but economically improving country with increased tourism and 2% GDP growth (Bank, 2016).⁹ In contrast, the neighborhood study, administered between December 2019 and February 2020, was fielded in the midst of a deepening economic crisis.¹⁰ In such an economic context, job creation may understandably be of topmost importance for respondents.

While candidate qualifications are the main drivers of respondent preferences, candidates' salient attributes are also significant. Figure 5.3 shows that Shia candidates are 6% and candidates belonging to Hezbollah are 10% more likely to receive support than Christians and the non-sectarian Kulluna Watani party. To understand the social groups driving these preferences, Figure 5.4 shows sub-group marginal means analysis for Christian, Shia

⁹In the five month period when the university survey was administered, the political situation remained uncertain. Parliament had failed to elect a president during the preceding two years. And, the Syrian Civil War across the border continued to create refugees and drain the economy of Lebanon.

¹⁰Between December 2019 and February 2020, Lebanon's economic crisis was in full swing, with rising unemployment and inflation. By the summer of 2020, these rates had risen to 30% unemployment and the currency had lost more than 80% of its value on the black market. As of this writing, the Lebanese lira has lost 90% of its value and Lebanon is suffering through food, fuel and medicine shortages.




Figure 5.4: Preferences for Parliamentary candidates. The plot above demonstrates marginal means results by sectarian sub-group.

and Sunni sectarian groups.¹¹ Figure 5.4 provides substantive evidence for both sectarian and partisan influences on vote choice. All three sectarian groups prefer candidates who belong to the in-group sect. Christian are 8%, Shias are 16% and Sunnis are 12% more likely to select their in-group. Shia and Sunni respondents also show a 9% decrease in favorability toward Christian candidates. Christian respondents are 8% less likely to select a Sunni candidate, but are indifferent to Shia candidates.

Figure 5.4 also provides some evidence of partisan affect. Shia respondents over-

¹¹If the reader recalls from the previous chapter, marginal means calculate the mean outcome for a level over all occurrences of the attribute averaged across all other attributes.

whelmingly prefer candidates who are partisans of Hezbollah (31% boost in favorability), demonstrate modest preference for the allied Christian FPM (10% increase in favorability) and are significantly less likely to select rival partisans of the Future Movement (16%) and Christian Lebanese Forces (19%). Despite more muted results, Sunni respondents show strong preferences for the Future Movement (an increase of 10%), and an 11% drop in favorability for FPM. Christians are indifferent to all political parties, including parties that are purported to represent their communities, FPM and Lebanese Forces. Thus, only Shia respondents unambiguously demonstrate partisan affect: the magnitude of Shia preferences about in-group and out-group parties are substantially larger than their preferences on the sectarian attribute.

Rather than simple partisan affect, however, results from Figure 5.4 show some reinforcing links between preferences for candidate sect and party. Shia respondents favor Shia candidates and Shia partisans. Similarly, Sunni respondents favor Sunni candidates and Sunni partisans. Despite evidence for a reinforcing link between sect and party among Shia and Sunni respondents who evaluate the in-group, respondents are able to separate the sect and party attributes for the out-group. More precisely, respondents evaluate a candidate's partisan affiliation separately from his sectarian background. Both Shia and Sunni respondents are less likely to select Christian candidates, and show bias against rival Christian partisans (i.e. Sunnis against FPM and Shias against Lebanese Forces). Shia and Sunni respondents unambiguously support the in-group, but their preference on the out-group, as well as Christian preferences in general, do not conform to expectations of a simple sectarian voting model.

Figures 5.5 and 5.6 divide respondents into partisan sub-groups to determine how party identification affects voting choices. Preferences among partisan sub-groups in Figure 5.5 move in predictable directions and are statistically significant on nearly all dimensions. Respondents who belong to the March 14 bloc show preferences for in-group parties, namely the Future Movement (19%) and Lebanese Forces (15%). The same March 14 respondents

are less likely to prefer members of the out-group: Shia candidates (12%), FPM (15%) and Hezbollah (20%). Similarly, respondents who belong to the March 8 bloc demonstrate a greater likelihood of selecting candidates who belong to the in-group sect and party: Shia candidates (12%) and Hezbollah (27%) and FPM (12%) partisans. Mar 8 partisans are also less likely to select out-group partisans: Future Movement (15%) and Lebanese Forces (16%). A startling feature is the strong anti-Christian bias among March 8 respondents. Despite support for the Christian FPM, Muslim respondents in the subgroup are driving down support for Christian candidates. In the March 8 sub-group, respondents are represented by 110 Shias, 32 Christians and 12 Sunnis. The Shias show a 39% likelihood of selecting Christian candidates, Sunnis 35% and Christians 50%. Thus, while Christians are not more likely to select their in-group, both Shia and Sunni respondents are substantially less likely to do so.

All instances of bias are eliminated among respondents who express political non-alignment with established parties, the "New Leadership" sub-group (Figure 5.6). Respondents who express support for new political leadership are indifferent to the sectarian backgrounds and party affiliations of political candidates. This sub-group of respondents bases its voting decisions exclusively on the candidate's qualifications (see Figure C.6 in Appendix C). Respondents in the "New Leadership" sub-group include 85 Christians, 26 Shias and 88 Sunnis. This breakdown by sect is important to put into context because it means that 65% of Sunnis and 63% of Christians in the neighborhood study sample are not partisans of established parties as compared with 19% of Shias. Shias in the "New Leadership" subgroup do not show in-group preference for Hezbollah. In contrast, in the "Establishment" subgroup where the Shias dominate (110 Shias, 51 Christians and 48 Sunnis), the same pro-Hezbollah and anti-Christian preferences prevail.

Three implications are worth noting from the combined evidence in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. First, the sample is divided evenly between respondents who support establishment political parties and those who wish to change the sectarian political system. Although the sampled population in the neighborhood study is not representative of the Lebanese national




Figure 5.5: Preferences for Parliamentary candidates by respondent party bloc.




Figure 5.6: Preferences for Parliamentary candidates by respondent leadership preference.

population, the even divide between supporters of the establishment and new leadership sheds light on why political sectarianism persists. A sizable proportion of the Lebanese population supports sectarian political parties and is straightforward in its preferences. A comparison between Figure 5.5 and the "New Leadership" sub-group in Figure 5.6 reveals an interesting dynamic: partisans demonstrate partisan affect and sectarian biases, while non-partisans are nearly indifferent on all attributes. Two different reasons, or the combination of the two, could explain the indifference of the non-partisans. Non-partisans may be completely disengaged non-voters. After all, the 2018 voter turnout for the Parliamentary elections was at 48.02%, a drop from 53.37% in 2008 (Mitchell and Rowsell, 2019). Political disengagement could translate to indifference to party and politicized sectarian representation. On the other hand, the non-partisans may represent the large number of instrumental voters about whom the literature on Lebanon has extensively written. For example, Corstange (2012) found that nearly 55% of the Lebanese electorate sells its votes to the political parties. It would make sense that voters who consider their vote to be a transaction would show no affective connections to party and sect. The conclusion to be reached is that whatever degree of partisan affect or sectarian voting exists in Lebanon, it is only expressed among partisans; non-partisans demonstrate neither sectarian nor partisan bias.

Second, respondents who report preference for new political leadership do not show an increased likelihood of selecting the non-sectarian political movement known as Kulluna Watani, a coalition of civil society forces that stood for election in 2018 and secured one seat in Parliament. Compared to the consistent support for an "Independent" partisan in the university study, the non-sectarian Kulluna Watani has received no support among respondents in the neighborhood study. One reason for this difference is that Kulluna Watani is a political organization with a distinct platform and electoral experience. In short, more than the "Independent" level in the university study, Kulluna Watani has earned a reputation

as an established party by virtue of its electoral experience.¹² The lack of support for Kulluna Watani, a newly-minted "establishment party," makes clear how serious the Lebanese are when they chant "all means all" when protesting against the Lebanese political status quo.

Finally, both Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 demonstrate sectarian and partisan biases that testify to some level of partisan affect and sectarian voting behavior. However, it is also clear from Figure 5.3 that respondents place a great deal of emphasis on a candidate's record of accomplishment. The section that follows will attempt to reconcile the effects of the three variables on vote choice. Of interest will be whether candidate record mitigates biases demonstrated on sectarian and partisan dimensions.

5.1.2 The Effect of a Good Record on Selecting Political Candidates

The previous section revealed that respondents demonstrate bias on both sectarian and partisan attributes. This evidence was interpreted to be an indication of both partisan affect and sectarian voting. Nevertheless, respondents give greatest preference to political candidates with a positive record of accomplishment. Main results from Figure 5.3 demonstrate that respondents are 6% more likely to support a candidate who built a clinic and 17% more likely to support a candidate who created jobs than a candidate without a record of accomplishments. The evidence that all three variables matter to respondents' voting decisions raises two further questions that will be addressed in this section. First, how do in-group identity and in-group party interact in shaping vote choice? Second, what is the effect of a candidate's record on vote choice in a divided society where identity matters?

These questions are particularly complicated in Lebanon because the country's consociational system of government has allowed political parties to monopolize representa-

¹²The voting conjoint does not provide information about respondent preferences for a comparable "Independent" candidate. Thus, comparisons of preferences across the university and neighborhood studies is hindered by the fact that the two levels, "Independent" and "Kulluna Watani," are qualitatively different despite sharing a non-sectarian character.

tion along sectarian lines. Most of Lebanon's political parties draw majority support from distinct sectarian communities. Thus, voting for a political party is presumably a vote for the sect's interest. This makes a vote for the political party indistinguishable from a vote for the sect. Chapter 3 had cast doubt on such a simple relationship between sect and party by showing evidence that sectarian groups divide their support among multiple parties. The intention was to show that sects are not synonymous with parties, and that there is reason to believe that Lebanese voters make voting decisions based on partisan affect, rather than sectarian loyalties. Separating the effects of party and sect in the conjoint, and analysing their separate and contingent effects can help shed light on which of these attributes is most important to respondents. This information will help determine the extent to which vote choice is decided by sectarianism and partisan affect.

The second question implicates instrumental party identification. Instrumental approaches emphasize that party identification is contingent on party performance, voters' ideological beliefs, and voters' ideological proximity to party policies (Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe, 2015). The merits of these functions were discussed in Chapter 3. The former function - party performance - is the most relevant for the conjoint experiment analyzed in this chapter. The classic formulation of vote choice in divided societies maintains that voters cast ballots for their co-ethnics, not least because they expect that co-ethnic partisans will offer them the benefits of clientelism (Cammett, 2014), or neo-patrimonialism (Fawaz Traboulsi, 2014). Increasingly, the literature has complicated this model by showing that ethnic voting is either made necessary by the absence of alternatives or is mediated by expectations that co-ethnic elites will deliver on promises of good performance. For example, Carlson (2015), whose experiment in Uganda inspired the formulation of the conjoint experiment analyzed in this chapter, has shown that vote choice in Uganda is contingent on an interaction between ethnicity and performance. Her experiment in Uganda shows that voters only prefer candidates who are co-ethnic and who have a good record of past political performance. Candidates without a positive record gain no advantage from co-ethnicity, and candidates

who belong to the out-group do not gain an advantage from good performance (Carlson, 2015). She concludes: "this result is indeed caused by voters' beliefs that politicians target resources to their own coethnics" (Carlson, 2015, p. 354). Thus, voters support only co-ethnic candidates with a good record because they believe that the same positive performance will be extended in their favor. In contrast, the well-performing out-group and the poorly performing in-group cannot be relied upon to deliver.

This contingent view of co-ethnic voting can also be extended to co-partisan voting. Respondents may reward only co-partisan candidates with a positive record of performance, and doubt that out-group partisans and poorly performing in-group partisans can deliver. Such instrumental partisan identification models stand in stark contrast to the partisan affective and sectarian voting models. Both of the latter models predict that the in-group will be favored regardless of performance.

The analysis in this section will measure the separate and contingent effects of party, sect and performance on respondents' vote choice. The linear probability models in Table 5.2 and predictive probabilities in Figure 5.7 rely heavily on the analytical framework used in a voting experiment by Eggers, Vivyan, and M. Wagner (2017).

Table 5.2 shows the likelihood that a candidate will be elected to Parliament. In-group sect and party designations are determined vis-à-vis the respondent. In Model 1, a candidate's positive record is independent from his identity and partisan status. Respondents are 13% more likely to support a candidate with a positive record, regardless of the candidate's identity. Candidate who belong to the in-group sect are 18% more likely to be selected, a slightly higher effect size than a candidate's record. Co-partisans experience the largest effect size, with a 24% increase in probability of being selected. In the language of ethnic voting, respondents appear to be more confident that co-partisans, rather than co-sectarians, will deliver on the clientelist relationship. The significantly larger effect from the co-partisan variable also shows the strength of partisanship and offers support for vote choice being reliant on partisan affect. Overall, a positive record gives an in-group candidate

Table 5.2: Probability of Selecting a Political Candidate by Candidate Record, Respondent Sect and Respondent Party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.306*** (0.017)	0.301*** (0.020)	0.297*** (0.018)	0.299*** (0.022)
Positive record	0.125*** (0.022)	0.133*** (0.026)	0.139*** (0.024)	0.137*** (0.029)
In-group sect	0.183*** (0.021)	0.198*** (0.037)	0.183*** (0.021)	0.176*** (0.041)
In-group party	0.239*** (0.023)	0.238*** (0.023)	0.283*** (0.041)	0.246*** (0.051)
Positive record \times in-group sect		-0.022 (0.045)		0.006 (0.052)
Positive record \times in-group party			-0.067 (0.049)	-0.020 (0.061)
In-group sect \times party				0.112 (0.078)
Positive record \times in-group sect \times in-group party				-0.144 (0.097)
Covariates	No	No	No	No
Observations	2,448	2,448	2,448	2,448
R ²	0.078	0.078	0.079	0.079
Adjusted R ²	0.077	0.076	0.077	0.077

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

a 62% chance of being selected, which jumps to 86% when the candidate is a co-partisan, while the probability of selecting an out-group candidate with a positive record stands at 44%.

Models 2 and 3 present interaction models between a candidate's positive record and in-group status. Model 2 does not support Carlson's prediction: the in-group does not enjoy a significant boost from a demonstrated positive record. Similarly, support for a co-partisan is not significantly amplified by that candidate's positive record.

Finally, Model 4 includes a three-way interaction between in-group sect, in-group party and record. This interaction term is not significant. The conditioning effect of in-group status on being selected does not vary by the candidate's record. Panel A in Figure 5.7 plots




Figure 5.7: The estimates for figure A on the left are based on Model 4 in Table 5.4. Figure A shows the effect of a political candidate’s positive record on the likelihood of being selected, based on candidate and respondent sect and party affiliation. Figure B on the right shows the predicted probability of voting for a political candidate based on Model 4 specifications with covariates (see appendix Table C.1 Model 8).

the estimated treatment effect of a candidate’s record across different combinations of sect and party. Among both in-group and out-group partisans, the effect of a positive record does not differ significantly by a candidate’s sect. In other words, political record has the same effect on both in-group and out-group sectarian candidates, regardless of their partisan status.

Predictive probabilities for Model 4 with covariates are presented in Panel B of Figure 5.7. Two main conclusions can be drawn from this figure. First, among candidates in the out-group party, a positive record increases the likelihood of being selected for candidates

in both the in-group and out-group sect. Second, among candidates in the in-group party, in-group sect is driving the increase in the likelihood of selection, while a positive record does not have a statistically significant effect. Respondents appear indifferent to record once the candidate is a member of the in-group party, although this may be caused by a "ceiling effect" in respondent preferences.

The results in this section challenge both the classic formulation of ethnic voting and the revisions introduced by Carlson (2015). Unlike predictions from the classic formulation, respondents are not only affected by ethnic identity, but also by political record. Contrary to Carlson's findings that a good record affects only members of the ethnic in-group, respondents in this survey also reward the sectarian out-group. For the Lebanese respondents in this survey, identity matters for vote choice, but so does a positive political record. Candidates in both the in-group and out-group sect are more likely to be selected if they demonstrate a positive record. Thus, neither a purely sectarian voting model, nor a purely instrumental model are sufficient to explain these results.

Results are further complicated by the powerful effect of party on respondent vote choice. As predicted, respondents hold the strongest preferences about party. The in-group party is nearly 25% more likely to be selected, an effect that is substantially larger than the effects of positive record (14%) and in-group sect (18%). In Panel B of Figure 5.7, predicted probabilities show that partisanship is the most powerful determinant of vote choice, driving out-group selection from 35% to 65% and in-group selection from 53% to 80% for candidates with a positive record. The effect of a positive record disappears altogether when the candidate is an in-group partisan. In these cases, it appears that party identification is enough to signal the party performance that voters can expect from the political candidate. Evidence that party is the strongest driver of preferences and that party identity moderates perceptions of party performance is indicative of partisan affect.

Taken together, the evidence in this section provides a strong case for the presence of partisan affect in respondent vote choice. However, sect and record are also relevant, albeit

to a lower extent. To conclude, the driving force behind candidate selection is partisanship, followed by sectarianism. A positive record does not close the gap in bias between in-group and out-group.

5.2 Measuring Discrimination with a Prisoner's Dilemma Game in the Neighborhood Study

The previous section demonstrated that respondents reveal intergroup biases along both sectarian and partisan dimensions. Respondents show preferences for the in-group sect and party, and are often less likely to select members of the out-group sect and party. This section will determine whether these attitudinal prejudices are reflected in discriminatory behavior toward the out-group. Respondents were asked to allocate resources in a prisoner's dilemma game with members of the in-group and out-group. Building on the design of the prisoner's dilemma discussed in the university study in Chapter 4, the game in the neighborhood study takes a more granular approach. The prisoner's dilemma in this section will demonstrate both the separate and interactive effects of sect and party on respondent behaviors.

The reader will recall that the section on "Sect" in Chapter 3 discussed the possible confounding effects between sect and party. For example, in the absence of other information, learning that an individual is a partisan of Hezbollah also indicates that the individual belongs to the Shia sect. Similarly, in the absence of further information, priming an individual's sect as Shia also indicates that the individual is a partisan of either Hezbollah or Amal. In Chapter 3 this complication was addressed by appealing to the Christian and Sunni sects and political parties. Priming the latter two sects does not unambiguously indicate their political party, though priming the Future Movement, FPM, Lebanese Forces and Kataeb does indicate sect. However, survey instruments in Chapters 3 and in the preceding sections of this chapter have treated sect and party as separate attributes. The assumption

underlying this decision was that the two attributes are fully separable. There is reason to believe that this assumption does not precisely capture the Lebanese social context. The aim of the prisoner's dilemma experiment in this section, then is to explore the separate and interactive effects of sect and party.

Investment games like the prisoner's dilemma require dynamic and incentivized interactions between partners. Respondents are expected to make decisions that are contingent on their expectations of what their partners will do. In order for respondents to form expectations about their partners' behaviors, respondents must believe that their partners are real and also in the process of making decisions in real time. Thus, researchers usually invite participants to a common location where respondents can be certain that they are interacting with real people and that their decisions have real-world consequences, similar to the approach taken in the university study administered in the previous chapter. The university study followed these best practices by inviting students into a computer lab to play with partners in real-time and receive compensation at the end of play.

In contrast, the neighborhood study was conducted in respondent homes, without the physical presence of game partners. Unfortunately, it was logistically difficult to synchronize play times between partners in real time and across homes, neighborhoods, and towns. Respondents participated in the prisoner's dilemma game at asynchronous times and in their homes. One possible way to include partners' responses would have been to generate random responses or fixed patterns of responses within the algorithm of the game. As this research used no deception, respondents would have to be told that their partners are not actually real people, but a computer algorithm. The problem with suspending the dynamics of interactive decision-making is that respondents would cease to have expectations about their partners. Specifically, a respondent's beliefs about his partner's play would become disconnected from any information he has about groups that the partner belongs to and about the stereotypes that characterise members of those groups. The games would effectively become hypothetical. Studies investigating the relative accuracy of decisions made

under real and hypothetical conditions show mixed results, but real incentives are preferable where possible (Gillis and Hettler, 2007; Lozano, 2016; Vlaev, 2012).

The solution employed in the neighborhood study was to recruit individuals in an initial stage of the study and record their decisions *ex ante* for use in the subsequently administered primary survey. This two-step process for gathering respondent data has been successfully used in other research (including Whitt and Wilson, 2007; Enos and Gidron, 2016; Schaub, 2017). An initial 25 individuals were recruited from neighborhoods in greater Beirut: eight Sunnis from Tariq Jdidi, eight Shias from Shiah, and nine Christians from Ein Rmene. When completing the interactive game portions of the survey, these individuals interacted with randomly generated decisions from the game algorithm. Decisions made by these individuals were then coded into the game software as 25 distinct persons. The 25 persons were described by a name and hometown specific to a sectarian identity, as well as by political party (e.g. "John Hbeish from Ajaltoun, Free Patriotic Movement").¹³ The real decisions made by these 25 persons were coded into the software to serve as "partners" to respondents who took part in the primary survey. The actual names and hometowns of the 25 individuals were not used in order to ensure their anonymity. However, the sectarian identities of the 25 persons coded into the software matched their real sectarian identities.

In the primary stage of the survey, each respondent played six rounds of the prisoner's dilemma game and was matched with a different partner in each round. Respondents were randomly matched with a member of the in-group or the out-group. Respondents were also randomly assigned to an information treatment that dictated the type of information they learned about their partners. As Table 5.3 illustrates, respondents were assigned to one of four treatments: (1) a neutral treatment (i.e. neither the sect nor party of the partner was evident); (2) "sect" treatment (i.e. the name and hometown combinations unambiguously

¹³In Lebanon, a combination of name and hometown may signal an individual's sectarian background. See Appendix C for a full list of combinations and details on how the name and hometown combinations were generated.

Table 5.3: Prisoner’s Dilemma Vignette Variations

Neutral	Sect	Party	Sect x Party
Tarek Semaha from Beirut	George Abi Rached from Chiyah	Ibrahim Sokkar from Beirut Hezbollah	Omar Qadri from Mdoukha Future Movement

signaled the partner’s sectarian background); (3) "party" treatment with the party explicitly stated, or (4) "sect" and "party" treatment.

The prisoner’s dilemma analyzed in this section sheds further light on two questions explored in the previous chapter: does intergroup bias result in in-group preferences or out-group derogation; and, is sect or party a stronger determinant of intergroup bias?

5.2.1 Evidence of Discrimination in the Neighborhood

Linear probability models for respondent decisions in six rounds of the prisoner’s dilemma game are shown in Table 5.4. The reference category for models explaining the *Direction of Prejudice* is a "neutral" partner (i.e. a partner whose salient sect and party identity were not disclosed to the respondent). The same assumptions and caveats about the "neutral" category laid out in the previous chapter are relevant here. To restate them briefly here, the "neutral" treatment serves as a baseline comparison for understanding whether respondents show in-group favoritism or out-group derogation. The inclusion of the "neutral" treatment is based on the assumption that respondents will be indifferent to "neutral" partners: respondents will invest with partners whose sectarian and partisan identities they do not know 50% of the time. However, it may actually be the case that respondents exposed to "neutral" partners make assumptions about their partners’ characteristics.

To understand the extent of this problem and mitigate against it, the university study included "control" sessions in its design. The "control" sessions never primed respondents to salient partner characteristics and thus plausibly showed respondent decisions in

the absence of identity-based social preferences. Then, a comparison between the "control" sessions and "neutral" rounds in the treatment sessions revealed similar, and expected, results: respondents invested with partners whose identities they did not know under both "control" and "neutral" circumstances at the same 50% investment rate (see Figure 4.9). While this evidence does not fully resolve the possibility that respondents impute sectarian and partisan identities to their unidentified partners, it certainly shows that this effect is not very large. In looking to the results presented in this chapter, the reader should have greater confidence in the conclusions drawn about whether in-group favoritism or out-group derogation is at play.

While the full sample in Table 5.4 shows that respondents act with both in-group preferences ($p < 0.01$) and out-group derogation ($p < 0.05$), sub-group analysis provides greater detail about these results. Shia respondents are driving results that show in-group preference. The probability of a Shia respondent investing with a member of the in-group (the coefficient captures both co-sectarians and co-partisans) is 38% higher, on average, than investing with a partner whose identity is unknown. Since Shia respondents show very low levels of investment with the "neutral" partner (i.e. they are only 23% likely to invest with neutral partners), Shia respondents appear to be averse to anyone other than the in-group. In contrast, Christian and Sunni respondents invest at higher rates with neutral partners than Shia respondents, but behave in a manner consistent with out-group derogation. Christian and Sunni respondents tend to invest with the "neutral" partner about half the time. But their likelihood of investing with the out-group is about 11% less, on average, than with a "neutral" partner. Thus, while in-group partners receive no boost in trust, Christian and Sunni respondents are less likely to trust an out-group partner than a neutral partner.

Models for *Sect vs. Party* examine the relative strengths of various combinations of sect and party treatments in the full sample and sub-group samples. These models take "in-group sect" as the reference category. The sub-group analysis is relevant in illustrating how markedly behaviors differ across sectarian groups. Shia respondents demonstrate no

Table 5.4: Drivers of Intergroup Bias

	<i>Direction of Prejudice</i>				<i>Sect vs. Party</i>			
	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni
Intercept	0.428*** (0.032)	0.488*** (0.054)	0.230*** (0.053)	0.550*** (0.055)	0.510*** (0.031)	0.436*** (0.055)	0.556*** (0.048)	0.531*** (0.055)
In-group	0.151*** (0.039)	0.008 (0.071)	0.379*** (0.061)	0.048 (0.071)				
Out-group	-0.068** (0.034)	-0.116** (0.058)	0.031 (0.056)	-0.112* (0.059)				
Treatment: in-group politics					0.120** (0.056)	0.120 (0.127)	0.071 (0.073)	0.165 (0.117)
Treatment: in-group sect, politics					0.182*** (0.056)	0.333** (0.146)	0.106 (0.073)	0.208* (0.117)
Treatment: in-group sect, out-group politics					-0.073 (0.051)	-0.009 (0.081)	-0.000 (0.117)	-0.117 (0.085)
Treatment: out-group sect					-0.159*** (0.038)	-0.050 (0.067)	-0.363*** (0.060)	-0.063 (0.067)
Treatment: out-group politics					-0.120*** (0.036)	-0.058 (0.064)	-0.206*** (0.059)	-0.098 (0.064)
Treatment: out-group sect, politics					-0.181*** (0.038)	-0.088 (0.067)	-0.317*** (0.059)	-0.118* (0.068)
Covariates	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
N	408	136	136	136	408	136	136	136
R ²	0.031	0.011	0.110	0.017	0.040	0.017	0.127	0.023
Adjusted R ²	0.030	0.009	0.108	0.014	0.037	0.008	0.120	0.014

Note: Ordinary least squares models. Dependent variable: respondent decides to invest with his partner. In the models for the "Direction of Prejudice", the reference category is the "neutral" partner whose sect and politics are unknown to the respondent. In the models that explain the relative importance of sect and politics, the reference category is the partner belonging to the in-group sect.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

statistically significant difference in the probability of investing with partners who belong to the in-group. In contrast, Shia respondents are significantly less likely to invest with members of the out-group. Shia respondents are 28% less likely to invest with an out-group partisan, as compared with an in-group partisan. They are also 36% less likely to invest with a member of the out-group sect, as compared to a member of the in-group sect. Finally, the most significant difference occurs when Shia respondents are matched to partners whose sect and party identities are revealed: Shia respondents are 42% more likely to invest with a member of the in-group sect and party than with a member of the out-group sect and party.

In contrast, Christian and Sunni respondents show a different pattern of investment behaviors. The only significant effects for Christian and Sunni respondents occur when their partners belong to the in-group or out-group of the interaction between sect and party. Christian respondents are 40% more likely to invest with a member of the in-group sect and

party than with a member of the out-group sect and party. Sunni respondents are 33% more likely to do so.

Results for the full sample demonstrate that respondents are more likely to invest with in-group partisans and less likely to invest with out-group partisans. Furthermore, the interaction between sect and party makes the likelihood of investment with the in-group greater and the likelihood of investment with the out-group lower than either variable does on its own. The combined information about a partner's sect and party thus has a larger effect on investment decisions than does information about sect or party alone. This evidence is consistent with the theory of affective partisanship: "When social and partisan cleavages are reinforcing, partisans are especially distrusting of their opponents" (Westwood et al., 2018, p.350). Analysis in Table D.6 in Appendix D runs the same regression equation shown under *Sect vs. Party* in Table 5.4 for sub-groups of partisans and non-partisans. Results from sub-group analysis reveals that non-partisans do not discriminate at all based on sect, party, or the interaction between the two variables. Instead, the results are fully accounted for by partisan respondents. Partisans are 41% more likely to invest with a member of the in-group sect and party than with a member of the out-group sect and party.

Predicted probabilities for sub-group models that demonstrate information treatment effects (i.e. *Sect vs. Party*) in Table 5.4 are plotted in Figure 5.8. This figure expands on findings in the previous chapter. To remind the reader, results from the prisoner's dilemma in the university study showed in-group preferences on the sect and party dimensions, indifference toward out-group sect, and aversion on the out-group party dimension. The results in the university study were not granular enough, and so did not show the multiplicative effect of sect and party on investment decisions with both the in-group and out-group. The results in Figure 5.8 in the neighborhood study correct for this deficiency: sect and party treatments are administered separately and in interaction. Respondents show no in-group bias when only information about a partner's sectarian background is shown. When partisanship is introduced, however, respondents show statistically significant levels




Figure 5.8: Effect of treatment condition on a respondent’s probability of investing with the matched partner. The plot shows predicted probabilities of choosing to invest with a partner, 95% confidence intervals..

of discrimination. All three sectarian sub-groups show preferences for in-group partisans, and this effect is strengthened when the in-group partisan also belongs to the in-group sect. Christian and Shia respondents derogate against members of the out-group party and sect, an effect that is strengthened when sect and party interact.

5.3 Discussion

As the respondents in the neighborhood study do not constitute a representative sample of the Lebanese nation, only modest conclusions can be drawn from the results in this chapter. The results remain useful, however, because they conform to theoretical expectations. Specifically, the conjoint experiment and the prisoner's dilemma make a strong case for an understanding of Lebanese intergroup biases as a consequence of affective partisanship. Party played a significant role in respondents' preferences about prospective candidates to Parliament in the conjoint experiment. The effect of partisanship was even more pronounced in the prisoner's dilemma game. The results for information treatment effect (see *Sect vs. Party* in Table 5.4) make the strongest case yet for the strength of partisan biases. Respondents show a greater likelihood of investing with in-group partisans than they do with members of the in-group sect. These effects are further accentuated when sect and party interact. Respondents show greater discrimination on the basis of partisan differences *and* partisans are driving evidence of discrimination.

The substantial effects for partisan affect observed in this study compares favorably with results obtained by Westwood et. al (2018) in their cross-national study of the comparative effects of social identity and partisanship on intergroup biases. In their study, the authors formally tested the primacy of "partyism" with likelihood ratio tests, demonstrating that coefficients for partisan divides are significantly different from coefficients for social divides. The χ^2 tests they conducted, along with a similar test conducted for the Lebanese neighborhood study conducted in this chapter, is reproduced in Table 5.5.¹⁴

A comparison of coefficient tests in Table 5.5 demonstrates that the results from the Lebanese study presented in this chapter conforms to results from studies conducted in other contexts. Lebanon is thus like other countries in the west: partisan divisions clearly trump identity-based divisions. Similar to European and American contexts, partisanship is

¹⁴See Table 1 on page 350 in the Westwood et. al. (2018) journal article.

Table 5.5: Comparison of Partisan and Social Divide Coefficients with Evidence from Westwood et.al. (2018)

Case	χ^2	P
Great Britain	6.6	<0.01
Spain	15.4	<0.001
Lebanon	20.5	<0.001
United States	23.3	<0.001
Belgium	24.7	<0.001

more important in explaining the behavior of Lebanese respondents in these games.

An important caveat should be made to the contention that Lebanese respondents demonstrate political affect. This chapter has not conducted a test of instrumental partisanship and so cannot decisively eliminate it as an explanatory model. In fact, instrumental and affective models of partisanship may explain vote choice at different times, under different conditions, and among distinct segments of the electorate (Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe, 2015). Evidence from Table D.6 in Appendix D shows that partisans discriminate on sect and party characteristics, but non-partisans do not. It should not be surprising that individuals who choose to identify support for a political party, when no incentives are provided within the game to do so, also demonstrate biases consistent with partisan affect. People for whom party is important personally are also likely to consider partisanship to be important in their social environment.

In contrast, respondents who choose to identify as non-partisans may be either genuinely unaligned politically, or may be instrumental voters whose party identification is activated in response to clientelist relationships during elections (Corstange, 2012). The lack of bias among non-partisans is thus equally consistent with the theory of political non-alignment *and* instrumental partisanship. As the neighborhood study does not provide

empirical tests to resolve the latter distinction, instrumental partisanship cannot be discarded as (at least a partial) explanation for the observed behavior in this study.

Notwithstanding this caveat, this chapter has successfully shown that the model of affective polarization developed in Western contexts can be transported to Lebanon. Despite the primacy of political affect, however, respondents are not altogether indifferent to sectarian identity. In the conjoint voting experiment, all respondents showed preferences for candidates belonging to the in-group sect. Furthermore, Shia and Sunni respondents showed a lower likelihood of selecting a Christian political candidate. In Section 5.1.2, respondents made choices about Parliamentary candidates that depended on the candidates' record, party *and* sect. Contrary to recent findings (see Carlson, 2015), the in-group did not uniquely benefit from a positive record. Rather, positive record, in-group sect, and in-group party each increased the likelihood of selection, without any interaction effects. Finally, in the prisoner's dilemma, a partner's sect matters to a respondent's decision to invest. However, the effect depends on the respondent's own sectarian background. Shia respondents demonstrate no statistically significant difference in the probability of investing with the in-group, but they do derogate against the out-group.

At various points in this chapter comparisons were made between the university study and the neighborhood study. With the conjoint experiments, for example, one of the strongest findings across both studies was the importance respondents placed on the qualifications of the candidates they evaluated. Respondents were 12% to 17% more likely to support a qualified political candidate and 30% to 35% more likely to select a qualified student or faculty candidate in the university study. Stark differences in conjoint tasks (voting versus student/faculty recruitment) make direct comparisons between the two studies difficult. Nevertheless, both the university and the neighborhood studies demonstrate the limits to which identity-based characteristics impact respondents' preferences. Respondents across both studies show in-group favoritism, especially along the partisan dimension, but qualifications are also important.

Chapter 6

Time Spent at University: A Test of the Contact Hypothesis

"It required years of labor and billions of dollars to gain the secret of the atom. It will take a still greater investment to gain the secrets of man's irrational nature."

— Allport, 1954, p.15

The analysis of bias in Lebanese universities in Chapter 4 demonstrated that universities are loci of substantial partisan contention. Analysis of student biases revealed that students show sectarian in-group preferences and significant partisan discrimination. These results are somewhat surprising in light of clear evidence in the literature that institutions mitigate biases through the contact hypothesis. The contact hypothesis operates on the local level when diverse individuals can take advantage of opportunities for substantial interactions. The literature has found that individual interactions in social institutions (i.e. churches, community centers, schools and universities), workplaces and neighborhoods create sufficient contact to decrease levels of intergroup bias.

The most relevant condition necessary for improving the positive effects of intergroup contact is institutional support (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). The university is thus an ideal setting in which to test the effects of the contact hypothesis. The Lebanese uni-

versities that served as institutional settings for the study conducted in this book recruit a diverse faculty and student body and encourage intergroup cooperation and tolerance. The university equalizes the social status of students and further reinforces their status by subordinating them as a class in an institutional hierarchy to professors and administrators. The distinct identity created within the hierarchy should further improve prospects for the contact hypothesis to affect intergroup biases. The contact hypothesis in the university setting predicts that interacting with members of the out-group will allow individuals to show a marked decrease in intergroup biases over the course of their undergraduate education.

Lebanon complicates that clear prediction. Customarily, Lebanese university students do not live on college campuses. Instead, a majority of students commute daily to university campuses from home. This fact limits the extent of interaction that is observed in many top American universities where students study, eat, live and socialize together for months at a time. A comparison of the frequency and extent of interaction between Lebanese and American universities would require thorough qualitative research into students' daily experiences in both contexts over time, an endeavor not undertaken in this study. A safe assumption that can be made in this book is that student interactions on elite Lebanese university campuses are not as extensive, on average, as they are in many elite American universities. This assumption is further supported by evidence of formal limits to interactions among ultra-orthodox Muslim students who are prohibited by their religious beliefs from cross-gender interactions (Itani, 2016). These students make up a minority, however. In AUB, for example, 11.4% of female students wore the Islamic veil in 2011, but not all of them followed the dictate against cross-gender interaction (Itani, 2016).

While no statistics exist on the sectarian compositions of university campuses, or the degree of religiosity among students, a conservative assumption would be that at least as many male students hold ultra-orthodox views about cross-gender interactions. Despite these formal limits to interactions between genders, there are no religious guidelines against inter-sectarian interactions among students of the same gender.

Notwithstanding these caveats, this study accepts prima facie evidence that the Lebanese university setting provides ample opportunities for intergroup contact. Even though they commute daily, Lebanese students nevertheless spend a significant portion of their days interacting in and outside of the classroom, in student clubs and organizations, and in other college-related activities. This chapter thus tests the extent to which the observed intergroup interactions on Lebanese university campuses decreasing intergroup biases. The contact hypothesis is put to the test in the same four Lebanese universities discussed in Chapter 4: AUB, LAU, USJ and Haigazian.

The contact hypothesis predicts that any biases demonstrated by freshmen students when they first enter the university setting will diminish, if not be fully eliminated, by the time students become upperclassmen in their second, third, and fourth years in university. This chapter uses a conjoint experiment to measure student preferences on a set of salient and non-salient characteristics about prospective student applicants and faculty candidates to university. As in Chapter 4, respondents are considered to be biased when they make decisions that are predicated on the salient characteristics of prospective applicants and candidates. That is, a respondent is biased when he or she prefers a prospective applicant or candidate because of that applicant or candidate's sectarian or partisan identity. If the contact hypothesis is correct, then a comparison of preferences among freshmen and upperclassmen students should reveal a substantial decrease in intergroup biases over time.

Freshmen students are new to the university environment and have not yet experienced the extensive intergroup contact encouraged and facilitated by the university. In contrast, upperclassmen students spend at least one full year interacting with their fellow classmates, possibly in ways that can decrease intergroup biases. Whether contact affects biases is explored in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.¹ Bias in these Figures is measured with Marginal

¹Figures 6.1 and 6.2 combine respondents in years two through four together into a single sub-group of "Upperclassmen." Figures A.18 and A.19 in Appendix A further subdivide the "Upperclassmen" sub-group into "Second," "Third," and "Fourth" years. This further sub-divisions demonstrates that respondents continuously increase their level of intergroup bias from year-to-year, with fourth year students demonstrating

Means (MM) analysis. The reader will recall from Chapter 4 that the MM of a level is interpreted as the mean preference outcome across all appearances of that level, averaging across all other attributes. MMs average at 0.5, but values above 0.5 indicate levels that increase profile favorability while values below 0.5 indicate levels that decrease profile favorability. A decrease in prejudice among upperclassmen would mean that any biased preferences observed among freshmen transition to the vertical line for upperclassmen (i.e. the point at which respondents are indifferent to those profile attributes).

Ideally, a study that measures attitudes at different points in a person's life would use a longitudinal research design to measure the effects of an experimental intervention (i.e. contact in the university setting) on the same person over time. This study, however, employs a repeated cross-sectional design to measure preferences among cohorts of students. Specifically, this research compares cohorts of students in different years of their undergraduate careers to understand how university contact affects these students across cohorts. The main drawback to employing a repeated cross-sectional model is that the analysis compares different groups of people, rather than the same person over time (Verbeek, 2008). Comparing cohorts of different people inevitably introduces new variables (both observable and unobservable) that are likely to bias results. A seminal paper by David Deaton (1985), however, showed the possibility of using cohorts to estimate a fixed effects model from repeated cross-sections by using individuals' years of birth to separate them into cohorts. In this study, cohorts are separated by the year at which they are in university.

As the Figures 6.1 and 6.2 reveal, the contact hypothesis is only weakly supported. In Figure 6.1, a positive effect does appear in a limited way: upperclassmen are less likely than freshmen to prefer Shia profiles and profiles that express support for the Free Patriotic Movement. Changes in these estimates between cohorts support the idea that bias has decreased, but the majority of estimates show an increase in bias or remain unchanged.

the highest levels of prejudice. See Table A.2 in Appendix A for a balance test of freshmen and upperclassmen cohorts.




Figure 6.1: Preferences for student applicants by respondent cohort.




Figure 6.2: Preferences for faculty candidates by respondent cohort.

Figure 6.2, on the other hand, does not show any decrease in bias. The only statistically significant difference between cohorts is for the Amal Movement, which represents an increase in bias. Although the difference estimate for Hezbollah does not reach statistical significance, upperclassmen show greater bias on this political dimension as well. Preference for Christian profiles and a lower likelihood of selecting foreign profiles remains unchanged across cohorts. The contact hypothesis predicts that time spent at university would diminish pro-Christian prejudices, and eliminate anti-foreign prejudices. This prediction does not materialize.

Still, contact with the out-group may have an impact on respondents' preferences when students enter university having experienced diversity in other institutional contexts. When completing a survey accompanying the conjoint experiment, respondents were asked about the level of diversity in their pre-university environment. This measure of pre-university diversity was constructed as an index of five indicators about diversity in the respondent's (1) neighborhood, (2) primary school, (3) middle school, (4) secondary school, and (5) among friends in secondary school. Respondents rated the level of diversity in each environment on a four-point scale: "entirely people of a different religious group," "mostly people of a different religious group," "mostly people of my own religious group," and "entirely people of my own religious group." A principal component analysis indicated that the five diversity indicators could be summarized into a single index with high reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.90$). The index ranges from 0 ("entirely people of my own religious group" on all five indicators, 5.9% of respondents) to 3 ("entirely people of a different religious group" on all five indicators, 3.6% of respondents). The subgroups of interest are those whose environments showed low sectarian diversity (0 to 1, inclusive) and those whose environments had high sectarian diversity (2 to 3, inclusive).²

²Respondents who were excluded from analysis are those whose environments were characterized by a mix of in-group and out-group sects, approximately one third of the sample. These respondents are evaluated in Figures A.22 and A.23 in Appendix A. Respondents whose social environments before the university were characterized by "mid-level diversity" demonstrate a higher degree of biases than those whose environments had "high diversity," but a lower degree of diversity than those whose environments had "low diversity." Figures A.22 and A.23 show a negative correlation between diversity and bias: as diversity increases, bias




Figure 6.3: Preferences for student applicants by pre-university diversity.




Figure 6.4: Preferences for faculty candidates by pre-university diversity.

Subgroup analysis by the level of diversity in a student's pre-university environment is presented in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. Respondents whose pre-university environment was characterized by low sectarian diversity are compared to respondents whose pre-university environment had high sectarian diversity. As the figures demonstrate, prejudice on the sectarian dimension disappears completely among respondents who come from high diversity environments. All point estimates move to the vertical line, making preferences about sect statistically insignificant and indicating that respondents are indifferent to the sectarian backgrounds of the profiles they evaluate.

Furthermore, respondents are largely indifferent to the various establishment political parties, with the exception of the Christian Kataeb in Figure 6.3 and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party in Figure 6.4, which does not achieve statistical significance. Respondents from high diversity environments are 11% to 14% more likely to select profiles with Independent political preferences. An increase in the likelihood of selecting the Independent political dimension among respondents from high diversity backgrounds may be consistent with a decrease in prejudice. In the context of Lebanese sectarianism and evidence of partisan affect, preferences for the Independent dimension signify a degree of affective neutrality. Independent partisanship indicates a lack of alignment with established sectarian parties and support for national programmatic policies. Thus, support for Independent partisanship is an indication that respondents are interested in transcending narrow sectarian and/or partisan interests.

6.1 Discussion

Results presented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 do not vindicate predictions made by the contact hypothesis. Despite ample opportunities for contact in the university context, with substantial institutional support and encouragement to engage across the sectarian

decreases.

divide, respondents do not demonstrate decreases in bias over time. Cohorts of freshmen and upperclassmen demonstrate similar levels of bias along the same set of dimensions. It is important to note, however, that expressions of bias across both cohorts is not excessively large - the biggest effect is a 9% increase or decrease in the likelihood of selecting applicants or candidates based on certain salient attributes. While even low levels of apparent bias should not be dismissed, it is important to put this evidence in proper context. Bias among cohorts of respondents in the university study is not systematically substantive and so does not necessarily constitute a substantial social problem. Given low levels of attitudinal prejudice, to begin with, it should not be surprising that the contact hypothesis has little to no effect on student attitudes.

Three main caveats are worthy of note about the results in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. First, biased and unbiased respondents may be unequally dispersed between the freshmen cohort and the upperclassman cohort. In that case, even if the contact hypothesis succeeds with a subset of the population in the upperclassman cohort, that effect will be drowned out by an excess of biased upperclassmen or especially unbiased freshmen. Thus, a main problem with the results presented in the figures may be that the contact hypothesis affects people differently and aggregating results quashes those distinctions. Second, the difference between the freshman cohort and the upperclassman cohort is between one and three years. Although the contact hypothesis does not specify a time horizon for success, a period of years of ongoing out-group contact should be sufficient to affectuate the benefits of contact. At the same time, politics is volatile and tensions may ebb and flow from year-to-year. For example, any benefits from contact may be countered by a particularly contentious period of political conflict. The aggregated results in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 do not distinguish such periods to better contextualize results.

Finally, an important point not explored thus far is the idea that some significant factor may be working alongside the contact hypothesis and counteracting it. Universities are as much loci of intergroup contact as they are places where political and social identities can

be activated through student and professor-led social movements. Chapter 4 documented a few instances of student social movements that were cultivated in the Lebanese universities that served as the sites for this research. For example, in the 1930s, students at AUB, LAU and USJ participated in protests in solidarity with Arab nationalism and the Palestinian cause (Anderson, 2008). And, since 2005, the national political blocs - March 8 and March 14 - have played a significant role in funding and supporting university student elections (Samaha, 2006). Thus, whatever mitigating effect that contact may play, an equally strong counter-mitigation mechanism may be pushing toward greater bias among the upperclassman cohort. None of these details would be apparent in the aggregate figures presented in this chapter.

Both of the latter critiques could be partially addressed by taking cohort effects into account. A future experiment that measures the effect of contact on different university cohorts should include a third population arm in the experimental design: university-age students who do not in fact attend university. The addition of this placebo arm to the study will help determine whether the changes observed between first year and upperclassmen university cohorts are caused by university attendance or other national-level factors.³

This chapter also showed evidence that pre-university hometown and institutional environments may impact students' attitudes toward the out-group. If this evidence could be fully and unequivocally verified, then it would go a long way in explaining why the contact hypothesis does not appear to affect upperclassmen cohorts in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. The pre-university environment may determine respondents' attitudes and behaviors to such an extent that university-level contact has little effect. As will be discussed here, however, the effect of pre-university diversity on respondents' attitudes presented in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 should be approached with caution and only as suggestive evidence for future research.

³Scacco and Warren (2018) include a placebo arm in their experimental test of the effect of a vocational training program on intergroup relations. After conducting an initial interview of young men, the researchers assigned a proportion of the surveyed young men to the program ($N = 550$), while a smaller proportion ($N = 300$) was never exposed to the program.

First, when respondents from low diversity environments were compared to respondents from high diversity environments, evidence showed that the latter are less biased. The type of environment to which students are exposed as children and teenagers matters to how they perceive the out-group as young adults. While these results may be proof of the importance of contact in pre-university environments, they may also be evidence that less biased people self-select into diverse environments. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 cannot untangle the direction of causation between contextual diversity and intergroup biases.

Second, adding to the ambiguity above, diversity in respondents' pre-university environment is correlated with respondents' household income ($r = 0.10$, $t = 9.1648$, $p < 0.05$). Wealthier respondents tend to come from more diverse hometowns and attend more diverse institutions. Despite this correlation, sub-group comparisons of low and high income students in Figures A.24 and A.25 in Appendix A do not show significant differences in preferences. Both sub-groups demonstrate anti-foreign and pro-Christian preferences. Differences in income show significant effects when incorporated into measures of institutional and contextual diversity, but show no significant effect on attitudes in isolation.

Third, the results in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 should be approached with skepticism because of the issues inherent in self-reported assessments. Respondents may over- or underestimate the extent of diversity in their neighborhoods through simple problems of perception, or because they are more or less likely to seek out members of the out-group. Self-reported values may also represent what respondents hope or wish to be the case, rather than what is the case. For example, an individual who is open to interactions with members of the out-group may be more likely to report being a part of a diverse environment than someone who is less interested in such interactions.

Thus, while the evidence from Figures 6.3 and 6.4 is interesting, it suffers from significant methodological and theoretical issues that should be further explored in future research. A simple first step would be to determine where respondents live and then to independently measure the degree of diversity in that environment. This will not fully

solve the problem however. As discussed in Chapter 2, testing for the direction of causality between context and attitudes is impeded by the fact that where people live is not randomly determined. Historical forces, socioeconomic conditions and individual choices can uniquely or in combination determine neighborhood configurations. Randomly assigning individuals to contexts would permit causal inference, but experimental tests of the relationship have thus far been sparse, with some notable exceptions (Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2007). Recent research has nonetheless deployed unique methodologies to lend support to the hypothesis that context affects intergroup attitudes (Enos, 2017; Enos and Gidron, 2016; Biggs and Knauss, 2012; Oliver and Wong, 2003).

In light of these observational studies, the chapter that follows will describe a unique experimental design that avoids the issue of self-selection. Chapter 7 will explore whether context affects intergroup relations through the mechanism proposed by intergroup threat theory. Results from the experiments that follow may vindicate observational studies that link context and attitudinal change, or lend support to criticisms that these studies overstate causal effects. Although findings from Chapter 7 will represent a direct measure of intergroup threat theory, they will also be relevant to the findings in this chapter about the contact hypothesis. After all, both the contact hypothesis and intergroup threat theory explain attitudinal change in a given context, albeit at different levels of aggregation. Thus, evidence that context has an impact on intergroup threat bodes well for future research on the effect of context on the positive effects of the contact hypothesis.

Chapter 7

Perceived Context in the Neighborhood

Study: A Test of Threat Theory

...

Your house shall be not an anchor but a mast.

It shall not be a glistening film that covers a wound, but an eyelid that guards the eye.

You shall not fold your wings that you may pass through doors, nor bend your heads that they strike not against a ceiling, nor fear to breathe lest walls should crack and fall down.

You shall not dwell in tombs made by the dead for the living.

And though of magnificence and splendour, your house shall not hold your secret nor shelter your longing.

For that which is boundless in you abides in the mansion of the sky, whose door is the morning mist, and whose windows are the songs and the silences of night.

— Khalil Gibran, "On Houses"

While the contact hypothesis was the main focus of the previous chapter, this chapter will shift to an examination of group threat theory. The contact hypothesis and group threat theory operate on different geographic scales and in opposite directions. The

role that spacial scale plays in adjudicating between contact and threat mechanisms is well-documented in the literature (Biggs and Knauss, 2012; Bowyer, 2008). The contact hypothesis, by requiring substantive interactions between individuals to affectuate changes on the aggregate level of groups, operates on the local level. When the out-group increases in one's neighborhood, for example, the contact hypothesis predicts that intergroup contact will decrease biases and improve intergroup relations. Threat theory, on the other hand, predicts that perceptions of threat will be activated when the number of out-group individuals increases in the broader regional level. If an increase in the out-group occurs in the town or city, for example, threat theory predicts that individuals will experience material or symbolic threats from the presence of an increasing out-group that will lead to greater bias and worsening intergroup relations.

This chapter tests whether changing respondents' perceptions about their contextual environment changes respondents' attitudes through the mechanism of perceived threat. As discussed in Chapter 2, and again in 6, an obstacle to making causal inferences about the relationship between residential context and attitudinal change is self-selection. Where people live is rarely randomly determined. The map of Lebanese sects in Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 demonstrates that the distribution of sectarian groups is not random. The geographic distribution of sects in Lebanon is today determined by a series of factors, including historical sorting into in-group safety zones, history (i.e. "we've always lived here"), demographic changes (i.e. demographic boom especially among the Shia) that have pushed people to leave crowded neighborhoods for better opportunities elsewhere, and economic changes that have brought people to the cities for economic opportunities. As discussed in Chapter 4, mass displacement during the Civil War further segregated people into homogeneous sectarian clusters. Where people live in Lebanon is thus not randomly determined.

Another obstacle to making causal inference about the relationship between context and intergroup biases is that it is rarely feasible to randomly assign context to individuals. Since measuring the same person in different contexts at the same time is impossible, re-

searchers have adopted random assignment methodologies reminiscent of medical clinical trials. To measure the causal effect of context on individual attitudes and behaviors, researchers can randomly assign groups of individuals to different contexts and compare effects across sub-groups in the two different locations. However, logistical, financial, and ethical constraints stand in the way of such randomized studies.

To overcome these constraints while still conducting causal inference, the neighborhood study relied on a unique experimental design that varied respondents' *perceptions* of their context. Rather than randomly assigning respondents to context, this study randomly assigns context to respondents. Without changing the target unit of recruitment (i.e. the Lebanese town), respondents were randomly presented with information either (1) about the sectarian distribution of their town, where their sectarian group constitutes a majority, or (2) about a wider geographic region where their town is embedded and where their sectarian group is a minority.

Chapter 5 described a site selection technique in which towns were chosen if the majority sect of the town represented a minority in the surrounding region. Twelve such towns were selected (see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5 for a list of selected towns and a map of their distribution in Lebanon). Respondents who participated in the neighborhood study were thus majorities on the local town level, and minorities on the regional level.

Example treatment graphics used in the town of Nasriyeh in Zahle district are shown in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2. Nasriyeh is a Shia-majority town in the East surrounded by a Sunni-majority region in the Zahle district. The graphical treatments were randomly administered to Shia residents in Nasriyeh. Figure 7.1 on the left is the "majority" treatment graphic that shows Shias in the majority, constituting 84% of the population, while Christians constitute 13% and Sunnis 3%. Figure 7.2 on the right is the "minority" treatment graphic as it shows that Shias are 5% of the population, while Sunnis are 72% and Christians are 23%. As no deception was used in this study, the titles on the graphics read "Nasriyeh" in Figure 7.1 and "Nasriyeh and surrounding towns" in Figure 7.2.




Figure 7.1: "Majority" Treatment




Figure 7.2: "Minority" Treatment

By targeting individuals in one location, but varying their perceptions about their context, the neighborhood study exploits the opportunity to conduct a randomized experiment. Threat theory predicts that the "minority" treatment will increase biases, while the "majority" treatment will decrease biases. In contrast to the predictions from threat theory, evidence from an experiment in Ghana showed the opposite relationship between minority status and geography (Ichino and Nathan, 2013). In that experiment, the vote choice of minority groups in rural communities conformed to the preferences of the local majority (Ichino and Nathan, 2013). The authors of the article postulate a mechanism that extends the logic of instrumental ethnic voting. In response to voters' demands for development, politicians target public policies to benefit their co-ethnic constituencies who tend to concentrate together in geographical space. Politicians prefer to deliver "club goods" (e.g. schools, roads, and health clinics) to benefit voters in the local area around those facilities. This type of geographically targeted social policy is both cost-effective and creates observable benefits that can be credited to the politician. Although politicians target club goods to co-ethnic voters, they cannot exclude voters who are not co-ethnics from benefiting from the same club goods if the voters live in the geographic area. In turn, receiving such benefits creates incentives for voters to elect politicians whose co-ethnics represent the majority in the local geography.

The two mechanisms described above - group threat theory and instrumental vot-

ing theory - predict opposite results for voters in the local minority. Nevertheless, both mechanism explore the impact of geography on individual choices. If the experimental treatment used in this study succeeds in changing perceptions about context but does not change intergroup biases, then this research will provide suggestive evidence that observational approaches overstate the effect of context. If the experimental treatment does change biases, then this research will strengthen recent findings that context has an independent causal effect on individual attitudes and behaviors.

The attitudinal and behavioral measurement instruments used in the neighborhood study were administered in the field. Three main reasons make administering the study in the field superior to relying on centralized laboratory locations. First, the towns targeted for this research are remote enough that reliable computer labs of the kind relied on in the university study could not be found. Second, recruiting respondents into a laboratory is likely to lead to a biased sample of younger and more sophisticated respondents. While the respondents recruited to this research are not representative of the Lebanese population given the specificity of site selection, they are representative of their towns.¹ Finally, as the focus of this research is on the effects of perceived residential context on attitudes and behaviors, permitting participation in the study in the actual context where respondents live and interact with others is likely to yield more realistic outcomes.²

The chapter proceeds by reviewing the effect of the contextual treatment on respondent attitudes in a conjoint experiment and on respondent behaviors with three investment games. The chapter then explores whether actual variations in context changes respondent behaviors through predicted probability models.

¹See Section D.2 in Appendix D for a description of the respondent selection technique in each town.

²This latter reason also played a significant role in the decision by Enos and Gidron (2016) to administer their study in Israeli towns.

7.1 Contextual Determinants of Prejudice in the Neighborhood Study

The effect of context on respondents' attitudes was measured with a conjoint experiment, which was explained in great detail in Chapter 5. To remind the reader, the conjoint experiment administered in the neighborhood study asked respondents to select between pairs of prospective Parliamentary candidates. The candidates were described by five attributes that provided information about the candidate's sect, party, current job, record of accomplishment, and campaign promise. Respondents selected between pairs of candidates, but were not asked to specify the attribute on which their selection was based. Respondents were asked to select one prospective Parliamentary candidate from a pair. Each respondent interacted with three pairs of candidates.³ Results were analyzed using Marginal Means (MMs).⁴

Figure 7.3 demonstrates sub-group results for respondents who were given the "majority" treatment informing them that they are in the majority in their town, and the "minority" treatment informing them that they are in the minority in the wider geographic region. Results demonstrate a statistically significant effect of treatment on respondents' preferences about the Parliamentary candidate's sect. Respondents who received the majority treatment are indifferent to a candidate's sectarian identity, while respondents who

³Chapter 5 acknowledged and discussed the sparsity in the set of attributes used to build the Parliamentary candidate profiles. Clearly, voters' choices about candidates are often influenced by a number of additional features, including a candidate's education level, gender, age and income. As mentioned in that chapter, these concerns are valid and should be corrected in future research. The simple explanation behind limiting the number of attributes used to build each Parliamentary profile has to do with issues of power. The number of respondents included in the neighborhood study did not permit substantially expanding the coverage of attributes in the conjoint experiment.

⁴To remind the reader from Chapter 5: MMs represent the mean outcome for a level over all occurrences of the level, averaged across all other attributes. Marginal means for all levels average 0.5 when the conjoint design forces a choice between profiles - an indication that the profile is as likely as not to be selected. Estimates above 0.5 for a given level indicate that the attribute level increases the probability that a profile will be selected, whereas estimate below 0.5 for a given level indicate lower probability for profile selection




Figure 7.3: Preferences for Parliamentary candidates by majority treatment.

receive the minority treatment are 6% less likely to support Christian candidates and 6% more likely to support Shia candidates. The effect of treatment on respondents' preferences for political parties is not statistically significant. Respondents' preferences are unchanged by the administration of different treatments.

The results for the effect of context on attitudes is in line with theoretical expectations provided by the group threat hypothesis. Respondents who received the minority treatment demonstrate sectarian biases, as predicted by group threat theory. Being informed that they are in the minority leads respondents to show prejudice against an out-group that they may feel threatens their material and symbolic (i.e. cultural) interests. In contrast, respondents who received the majority treatment demonstrate no sectarian prejudice. In the absence of a salient out-group, respondents appear indifferent to the sectarian origin of Parliamentary candidates.

This latter point raises a possible alternative mechanism for explaining the results

in Figure 7.3. Respondents who receive treatment that informs them that they are in the local majority can credibly ignore the sectarian identity of their prospective Parliamentary representative. Lebanese electoral politics allocate Parliamentary seats by sectarian identity. A homogeneous local environment resolves any possible inter-sectarian friction in deciding which of the sects will be represented in the person of the Parliamentarian. In contrast, respondents who are given the minority treatment are confronted with politicians who belong to both the out-group sect and party. If the salience of sect is neutralized by information that everyone in the locality belongs to the same sect, the political party of the candidate can become the focus of the choice, while the sectarian attribute loses significance as seen in the majority treatment graph.

7.2 Contextual Determinants of Behavior in the Neighborhood Study

In addition to attitudinal measures of prejudice, the effect of context on behavioral discrimination is measured with three behavioral experiments: the prisoner's dilemma, the dictator game and the preemptive strike game. Three experimental games were used to measure discrimination to capture three different behavioral mechanisms by which bias may be expressed. The games described in this section reflect the formulations developed and tested in other contexts (Habyarimana et al., 2007; Enos and Gidron, 2016; Scacco and Warren, 2018; Schaub, 2017).

The prisoner's dilemma game was described in detail in Chapter 5, so it will be discussed here only briefly. The prisoner's dilemma is a "strategy selection" game that measures differences in a respondent's strategy selection with members of the in-group and out-group. The outcome variable is the decision to cooperate with a partner by investing \$3 in a mutual fund that will be multiplied by 1.5 and divided equally between the two partners. The highest payout for both partners occurs when both partners cooperate. In

contrast, the worst payout occurs for the partner who cooperates when his partner does not. Thus, in the absence of social preferences, the predicted behavior for profit-maximizing partners in the prisoner's dilemma is mutual non-cooperation. The literature has shown, however, that people rarely conform to this prediction. People tend to cooperate with partners whose identities they do not know to increase chances that they will both receive mutual benefits. Furthermore, when identity factors are involved, people tend to cooperate more with members of the in-group than with the out-group (see Chapters 4 and 5 for support).

As discussed in great detail in Chapters 4 and 5, the systematic tendency to cooperate more with the in-group than with the out-group demonstrates intergroup bias. While the literature has proposed a number of mechanisms to explain this pattern of behavior, the explanation repeatedly relied on in previous chapters has been about trust. Respondents who cooperate more with members of the in-group demonstrate a greater degree of trust that the in-group partner will reciprocate cooperation. By extension, lower levels of cooperation with members of the out-group indicate a lower degree of trust. When this lowered trust is solely a result of social identity cues about the game partner, then mistrust is based on sectarian suspicion or animus that indicates intergroup bias.

In addition to measuring trust through the prisoner's dilemma, this chapter will use a modified dictator game to measure "other-regarding preferences." The traditional formulation of the game asks players to divide a given amount of money between partners or keep the money for themselves. The game was modified for the experiment administered in the neighborhood study to capture the relative allocation between partners. This version of the game is not interested in measuring the degree of self-regard among respondents.

Respondents were asked to allocate \$5 between two partners in any way that they chose. Respondents played three rounds of the modified dictator game, with one round comprised of two in-group partners (in-group round) and two rounds with an in-group and an out-group partner (out-group round). An unbiased respondent is expected to allocate

equitably between the partners, regardless of whether the respondent is participating in the in-group round or the out-group round. In contrast, a biased partner is likely to allocate equitably between partners in the in-group round, and to favor the in-group partner at the expense of the out-group partner in the out-group round.

The outcome variable of interest in the dictator game is the absolute value difference in the amount allocated between the two partners in each round. In the in-group round, where both partners belong to the in-group, the absolute value difference on average between allocations to the two partners should be 0. In fact, results from the dictator game reveal that, on average, the absolute value difference in allocations between the two partners in the in-group round is 0.217 (sd = 0.925). In the out-group rounds, the absolute value difference in allocations between the in-group and out-group partners is expected to be positive. The average allocation difference in the out-group rounds is 1.28 (sd = 2.05). In regression analysis, the allocation difference in the in-group rounds will be the reference category.

Finally, a preemptive strike game was used to measure fear and its corresponding defensive behavior (for examples of the game used elsewhere, see Schaub, 2017; Simunovic, Mifune, and Yamagishi, 2013). The general trend in the literature has been to show bias in positive expressions of in-group favoritism. The literature has placed less emphasis on the measurement of negative behavior toward members of the out-group for a number of normative reasons and methodological constraints. Research that has attempted the measurement of negative behavior toward members of the out-group has shown only muted findings. The reason cited for such muted findings is that overt acts of harm are considered socially inappropriate across cultures, as compared with in-group favoritism or passive avoidance of cooperation with the out-group (Weisel and Bohm, 2015).

Similar to past findings, the expectation is that the preemptive strike game will yield modest results with regards to negative behavior toward the out-group. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the game serves an important methodological purpose. First, to understand the nature of intergroup bias, it is important to measure the extent to which people are

willing to show both positive and negative behaviors toward members of the out-group. As mentioned previously, out-group derogation, rather than in-group favoritism constitutes a more fundamental problem for intergroup relations. The preemptive strike game is a better measure of out-group derogation than games that prompt positive actions. Second, this chapter seeks to test the explanatory power of intergroup threat theory in the Lebanese context. Intergroup threat theory elicits perceptions of threat and fear that may cause people to react to members of the out-group in a hostile manner. The preemptive strike game will measure any hostile reactions by incentivizing people to act in a defensive manner when confronted with threat from their partners. To determine the extent to which respondents are willing to take negative actions against members of the out-group, the preemptive strike game provides an experimental test that elicits defensive behavior toward members of both the in-group and out-group (Schaub, 2017; Scacco and Warren, 2018).

Played over three rounds, the preemptive strike game matches a respondent in each round with a partner belonging to either the in-group or the out-group. With 20 seconds on the clock, respondents must make the decisions whether or not to preemptively strike against their partner by pressing a red button on their screens. If both partners refrain from clicking, they both walk away with the best outcome of the game: the initial allocation of \$4. If, on the other hand, one or both of the partners decides to preemptively strike, then the one who clicks first loses \$1 while causing a \$3 loss to his partner. The respondent must decide whether he trusts or fears his partner. If he trusts his partner, then he may refrain from taking preemptive action, or at least delay the action. On the other hand, if he feels fear or threat from his partner, then he is expected to respond defensively and to take preemptive action. Striking a partner preemptively inflicts a cost on the respondent, so he is not expected to do so carelessly.

The outcome variable for the preemptive strike game is the amount of time it takes the respondent to strike his partner, which ranges from an immediate strike (0.1 seconds) to 19.9 seconds after the start of the game. Respondents who chose not to strike their partners

Table 7.1: Intergroup Bias with Majority Treatment

	Prisoner's Dilemma		Dictator Game		Preemptive Strike	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.548*** (0.031)	-1.033*** (0.128)	0.181 (0.125)	-3.174*** (0.592)	9.231*** (0.606)	-8.274*** (2.952)
Out-group	-0.223*** (0.036)	-0.220*** (0.034)	1.123*** (0.154)	1.123*** (0.142)	-2.967*** (0.742)	-2.967*** (0.708)
Majority treatment	0.066 (0.045)	0.085** (0.042)	0.070 (0.175)	0.061 (0.161)	0.971 (0.842)	1.010 (0.805)
Majority treatment x out-group	0.001 (0.051)	-0.027 (0.047)	-0.120 (0.214)	-0.120 (0.197)	-0.626 (1.031)	-0.626 (0.984)
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	408	408	408	408	408	408
Observations	2,057	2,057	1,224	1,224	1,224	1,224
R ²	0.039	0.180	0.075	0.219	0.034	0.127
Adjusted R ²	0.038	0.175	0.073	0.211	0.031	0.118

Note: Ordinary least squares models with and without control variables.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

were coded at 21 seconds for regression analysis.⁵

In each round of the three games described above, respondents were matched to a member of the in-group or out-group. Each of these games measures whether perceived context affects intergroup discrimination. Respondents were shown either the "majority" treatment or the "minority" treatment before they participated in the behavioral games. the effect of the "majority" and "minority" treatments on intergroup behaviors. Regression results for the three behavioral games are presented in Table 7.1.⁶

Models 1, 3 and 5 show results without covariates, while Models 2, 4, and 6 include covariates. The majority treatment is positive in all models and significant in Model 2 (prisoner's dilemma with covariates). Being told that they are in the majority in their towns makes respondents less biased. The majority treatment makes respondents more generous

⁵See Appendix D for Tobit estimation of this right-censored data. As the values above the 20 second game cut-off are unknown, a tobit regression accounts for those missing values in its output (Henningsen, 2019).

⁶The regression estimates in Columns 2, 4 and 6 include individual-level and context-level controls. Individual-level controls include income, employment status, education, home ownership and age. Context-level controls are: percent out-group in town, town size, presence of a Palestinian refugee camp within 4 miles of the town and percent of Syrian refugees registered in the district where the town is located.

toward both the in-group and out-group by increasing trust in the prisoner's dilemma and decreasing defensive behavior in the preemptive strike game. A positive value on the majority treatment for the dictator game indicates an increase in bias.

Contrary to expectations, the majority treatment does not affect out-group bias. Respondents demonstrate bias against out-group partners across all models. Respondents are less likely to invest with a member of the out-group in the prisoner's dilemma, are quicker to preemptively strike a member of the out-group in the preemptive strike game, and are more likely to allocate more money to the in-group partner than the out-group partner. However, this bias is not mitigated by information that the respondent is in the majority in his town.

In the prisoner's dilemma, the probability of investing with a member of the out-group decreases by 22%. While this effect is somewhat counteracted by the positive effect of the "majority" treatment (0.085, $p < 0.05$) in Column 2, bias in the investment rate between the in-group and out-group remains. In the preemptive strike game, respondents choose to act defensively against a member of the out-group approximately three seconds quicker than with a member of the in-group. Given that the game took 20 seconds to complete, a three-second difference in strike time is strong evidence that respondents perceive greater threat from the out-group than the in-group.⁷ The "majority" treatment does not appear to affect preemptive strike behavior toward the out-group, as the coefficient does not achieve

⁷The preemptive strike game gave respondents 20 seconds to decide whether or not to defensively strike their partners. A significant portion of responses (approximately 27%) did not result in strikes at all. To account for these non-responses, the data was analyzed in Appendix D, Table D.16 through a right-censored Tobit model. The Tobit models are consistent with the results in Models 5 and 6.

Furthermore, approximately 25% of respondents chose to preemptively strike their partners within one second of the beginning of the game. Simunovic, Mifune and Yamagishi (2013) write about respondents who choose to act according to this strategy: "participants who pressed the button did so with a clear understanding of the implications of their actions, as it would be logical to press the red button as quickly as possible." To test this assumption, respondents were asked to predict whether or not they believed the partners they would be matched with would chose to strike them first. These questions were posed prior to the start of game play, and referred to the same partners to which respondents were subsequently matched in the game. Appendix D Table D.17 regresses respondents' decision to strike on their prediction that the partner will strike them. Results show that respondents who predict that their partners will strike them are 37% more likely to strike an in-group partner and 51% more likely to strike an out-group partner.

statistical significance (see Column 6).

Finally, the dictator game measures the absolute value difference in money allocation between two in-group partners in the in-group round versus the absolute value difference in allocation between an in-group partner and an out-group partner in the out-group round.⁸ The allocation difference in the in-group rounds serve as the reference category. Columns 3 and 4 show that the difference in the amount of money respondents allocate is greater in an out-group round than in an in-group round. The allocation difference in an out-group round is about \$1.12 greater than in an in-group round. Evidence that the absolute value difference in allocation is higher in the out-group rounds signifies that respondents discriminate against the out-group.

Unlike the prisoner's dilemma and the preemptive strike games, the majority treatment in the dictator game moves in the opposite direction. The coefficients for the majority treatment in Models 3 and 4 are very imprecise, with large standard errors. These coefficients thus say little about the effect of the majority treatment on respondents' behavior in the dictator game. Respondents appear to be unaffected by perceived context when they act in an altruistic manner toward members of the in-group.

7.3 Behavioral Discrimination with Actual Contextual Variation in the Neighborhood Study

The previous sections explored the effect of *perceived* context on intergroup biases and showed mixed support for the relationship between context and individual attitudes

⁸To provide for greater clarity, the outcome variable in Models 3 and 4 is calculated with the following formula, where i is the individual:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Allocation}_i = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{OutGroupRound}_i |P_1 - P_2| + \beta_2 \text{MajorityTreatment}_i \\ & + \beta_3 \text{OutGroupRound}_i |P_1 - P_2| \times \text{MajorityTreatment}_i \\ & + \text{Controls}_i + \varepsilon_{i,r} \end{aligned} \tag{7.1}$$

and behaviors. *Perceived* majority status at the local level decreased attitudinal biases (see Section 7.1), but had no effect on behavioral biases (see Section 7.2). As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the neighborhood study prompted respondents with *perceived* context: half of the respondents were told that they belong to the local majority while the other half *in the same town* were told that they belong to the regional minority. This methodology thus converted context into a random and exogenous variable that permitted this chapter to make causal inferences about the relationship between context and intergroup bias. The methodology was utilized specifically to overcome issues of self-selection. The prevailing evidence shows that where people live is not randomly determined, but relies on a combination of individual choices, socioeconomic factors, history and other structural factors. Had this research measured the relationship between *actual* context and individual attitudes and behaviors, any resulting difference in bias would not clearly be attributable to a causal effect of context.

Despite the flaws inherent in comparing biases across *actual* contexts, this section demonstrates this relationship to understand the extent of any *actual* contextual effects on respondent behaviors. It was made clear in Chapter 5 that the towns targeted for this research share two main characteristics: (1) the towns are dominated by a majority of a single sectarian group, and (2) the towns are embedded in regions where another sectarian group constitutes the majority. Nevertheless, some variation exists on the first characteristic. The proportion of the out-group in the towns targeted for this study ranged from 0% to 30% of the total population. Thus, while the out-group does not constitute a majority in any town, the percentage of the out-group varies sufficiently to create differences in respondent behaviors across towns.

Figure 7.4 demonstrates predicted probabilities for the three behavioral games explored in the previous section. The models represented in Figure 7.4 hold the out-group variable at 1, *Control* variables at their mean or modal values, and allow the proportion of




Figure 7.4: Predicted biases in the prisoner’s dilemma, dictator game and preemptive strike game by the proportion of the out-group in a respondent’s town. Covariates are held at their mean or modal values. The prisoner’s dilemma measures a respondent’s likelihood to invest with a member of the out-group. The dictator game measures the extent to which monetary allocation between partners is greater when the partners belong to the in-group and out-group versus two members of the out-group. The preemptive strike game measures how long it takes a respondent to strike a member of the out-group. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

the out-group in each town to vary from 0% to 30%.⁹

For the full sample in Figure 7.4, changing context by increasing the out-group proportion from 0% to 30% does not lead to a statistically significant change in out-group bias. Moving across the range of out-group proportion in the prisoner’s dilemma decreases out-group bias by 17%, but these results only approach statistical significance ($p < 0.1$). Context has no effect on respondent behavior in the dictator game and the preemptive strike

⁹See Appendix D.5 for corresponding regression models.

game. Nevertheless, results are heterogeneous across sub-groups of respondents. When moving across the range of out-group proportion, Sunni respondents show a decrease in out-group bias in the prisoner's dilemma game of 36% ($p < 0.01$), and are less generous toward both the in-group and out-group in the dictator game ($p < 0.05$). Shia respondents are more likely to trust both in-group and out-group partners in the preemptive strike game ($p < 0.01$).

The effect of *actual* context on behaviors presented in Figure 7.4 is mixed across sects. Nevertheless, evidence shows that individual-level behaviors vary by differences in the sectarian composition of the *actual* context. Due to issues of self-selection, not much more can be said about the causal implications of these results. A comparison between these results and those obtained by Enos and Gidron (2016) will help put these results into context. In their paper on the effect of context on attitudes and behaviors in Israel, the authors tested cases where out-group proportion varied from 0% to 30% and found statistically significant results more pronounced than those observed in Figure 7.4. For example, Enos and Gidron (2016) find that an increase in the proportion of the out-group decreases in-group bias by 60%. Despite the more muted results obtained in this chapter, the trend is similar across both studies and thus attests to the viability of the contextual hypothesis.

7.4 Discussion

This chapter explored whether context can affect individual-level attitudes and behaviors. The introduction proposed two competing mechanisms - group threat theory and instrumental voting theory - as possible predictors of the direction of individual-level prejudices. Only threat theory received empirical support in this chapter.

Absent an ability to randomly assign respondents to context, this study instead assigned *perceived* context to respondents. The "majority" treatment told respondents that they were in the majority in their town, while the "minority" treatment told respondents

that they were in the minority in their local region. Respondents were assigned to treatment randomly. Intergroup threat theory predicts that increasing the proportion of out-group members in an individual's environment creates threat perceptions that lead to an increase in bias. The "minority" treatment reflects this effect by informing respondents that they are in the minority in proportion to the out-group. The predicted result of the "minority" treatment is an increase in bias, while the "majority" treatment should decrease bias.

Results from the conjoint experiment in Section 7.1 showed that the "majority" treatment decreases intergroup biases on the sectarian dimensions. Respondents who were told that they are in the majority in their towns demonstrated significantly less biases than respondents who were told that they are in the minority. In the behavioral games in Section 7.2, the majority treatment made respondents more generous toward both in-group and out-group partners in the prisoner's dilemma and preemptive strike games, but it had no effect on the dictator game and failed to mitigate out-group bias. In the behavioral games, respondents continued to treat members of the out-group with bias. The lack of evidence for an interactive effect between the majority treatment and being matched with a member of the out-group raises two main questions. First, was the manipulation in this experiment too weak to induce change in respondent perceptions? Second, does context have a weak effect on intergroup behaviors?

It is important to concede that a visual treatment demonstrating the sectarian distributions of the local and regional context is a weak persuasion tool when people can fall back on years of their lived experiences for conceptualizing their environments. The site selection for this study was an attempt to correct for this weakness. The treatments invoked extremes in both the majority and minority treatments to help overcome the weakness of the manipulation. Specifically, when a respondent was informed about being in the majority, the respondent's sect made up between 70% and 100% of the local population. Similarly, a respondent who was informed that he was in the minority made up between 3% and 32% of the population. A manipulation check for the effect of treatment revealed that 27% more

respondents identified themselves to be in the majority when given the majority treatment than when given the minority treatment. Of the respondents who received majority treatment, 75% reported that they were in the majority, while 48% of those who received the minority treatment did so.

The second contention - that the observational literature overstates the effect of context on intergroup relations - is not borne out by the results in this chapter. The treatments administered in this study had a statistically significant effects on respondents' attitudes and behaviors. This was made especially evident when results for *perceived* context from Table 7.1 were compared to results for *actual* context in Figure 7.4. Changing respondents' perceptions about their context changed their behaviors. For example, while an *actual* increase in the out-group proportion decreased bias among Sunnis in Figure 7.4, a *perceived* decrease in the out-group decreased bias for all respondents in Table 7.1. Evidence that experimental cues about *perceived* context can change behaviors is encouraging for the validity of the observational literature that has repeatedly found a causal relationship between context and individual-level attitudes and behaviors. This evidence is also important for informing policy choices to mitigate intergroup biases.

More broadly, the possibility that *perceived* context can change biases in Lebanon is promising for other contexts around the world. Lebanon is a small and immensely diverse country comprised of salient social groups. Furthermore, Lebanon is an old society with a long history of intergroup interactions. The Lebanese people have coexisted with each other for generations and have clear knowledge of the presence of out-groups, their relative sizes, and their relative socioeconomic and political powers in the local, regional and national levels. The out-group is always present in Lebanon and in close proximity. Therefore, the perceived relative increase in the out-group should not substantially change Lebanese people's threat perceptions. Evidence in this chapter that *perceived* context can, in fact, changed individual-level attitudes and behaviors is thus a promising indication for the potential this mechanism has for other contexts.

Chapter 8

Protests: A Test of Unifying Narratives from the Neighborhood Study

*The voice of freedom remains the loudest
No matter how strong the injustice wind blows
And how long the dark nights are...
I breathe freedom, don't cut me out of air
and oppress me, or we will fall down together*

— Julia Boutros, "I Breath Freedom," a unifying revolution anthem
frequently chanted during the 2019 protest

An omitted part of the discussion of the contact hypothesis is the notion that inter-group contact can help overcome contention between groups by decategorizing or recategorizing identities. The first of these processes, decategorization, works via two simultaneous and reciprocal cognitive processes (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, 2002). First, an individual learns to differentiate between members of the out-group. Second, an individual learns to personalize members of the out-group by identifying the uniqueness in each out-group member and by viewing each out-group member in relation to the self. These two cognitive processes effectively blur the distinctions between the in-group and the out-group by dissolving group distinctions and instead individuating members of the out-group. By dif-

ferentiating and personalizing members of the out-group, an individual makes the out-group similar to members of the in-group. Theory predicts that over time, contact between individuals under the precepts of decategorization will lead established social group categories to be perceived as less useful and so used less often (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, 2002).

An alternative model, recategorization, is the process by which social identities at lower levels of aggregation (e.g. Christian, Shia and Sunni) are supplemented with superordinate identities (e.g. Lebanese citizen). The superordinate identity does not replace the lower order identity, but rather reclassifies individuals who were previously identified with the out-group into members of the in-group. The main benefit of recategorization is that it breaks the monopoly of group identities without forcing individuals to give up their original identities.

Both decategorization and recategorization have faced criticism for creating only temporary cognitive states that cannot replace the long-term explanatory power and benefits offered by in-group identification at lower levels of aggregation (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, 2002). However, the models have received increasing experimental support (see Bettencourt et al., 1992; Gaertner, Rust, et al., 1994; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; Robinson, 2016). A recent study in Malawi, for example, provides suggestive evidence that activating the nationalist identity can mitigate positive in-group preferences, thereby closing the trust gap between members of the ethnic in-group and out-group (Robinson, 2016). An experimental study among Malawian villagers revealed that co-nationality plays just as important of a role as co-ethnicity in determining the ethnic trust gap. When an experimental intervention makes national identity contextually salient, the coethnic trust premium is eliminated entirely among respondents who have weak pre-experimental nationalist identification (Robinson, 2016).

This chapter seeks to conduct a similar test of the effect of national identification on intergroup biases in the Lebanese context. Between the pilot and administration stages of the neighborhood survey, Lebanon experienced a sudden surge of nationwide protests against

its political class. Protests began in October 2019, and ended abruptly in March, 2020 when a national lockdown was called to manage the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic. Protests resumed again in June, 2020 when the lockdown was eased. The catalyst for the protests was a new tax on the popular communication platform, WhatsApp, but protests resulted from a culmination of discontent about government policies that had led the country to imminent economic collapse. Thousands of Lebanese people of all sectarian backgrounds staged protests around the country. With slogans like, "All means all," protesters called for the resignation of the government. While establishment political parties eventually succeeded in dividing, co-opting, and silencing protesters through violence, the early stages of the protests beginning in October were marked by remarkable cross-sectarian unity. The neighborhood survey was administered within this initial period.

National protests that transcend sectarian divisions offer an opportunity for respondents to recategorize their identities from separate sectarian groups to a unified national identity. Alternatively, marching together in protest among people of diverse sectarian backgrounds could decategorize identities and accentuate individual attributes.¹ Even people who did not physically participate in the protest movement could be moved through family and acquaintance networks and media coverage by a sense of unity that could change their conception of in-group and out-group categories.

The neighborhood study did not implement a specific methodology to measure whether, and to what extent, the processes of decategorization or recategorization occurred among respondents. Instead, this chapter seeks to provide suggestive evidence for one of these mechanisms should respondents demonstrate decreased levels of bias in response to being primed to information about the protests. To capture the impact of the protests, a randomized treatment was added to the survey. The treatment invoked the protests and posed a question to further reinforce the treatment. The protest treatment read: "Beginning

¹The process of decategorization is less likely to be at play because it requires individuals to abandon their former social categories - an unlikely proposition in most settings (Robinson, 2016).

in October, Lebanon experienced a series of large-scale protests against the government. What do you think the protests mean for Lebanon?" Half of the respondents were randomly selected to receive the protest treatment, while the other half were asked a neutral question about how often the respondent's family visits the local neighborhood park. While protests are sometimes divisive and threatening, the assumption in this chapter is that the national and cross-sectarian nature of the 2019-2020 protests may have actually led to a decrease in intergroup bias.

8.1 The Effect of Protests on Attitudinal Prejudice

Subgroup analysis of the conjoint experiment administered in the neighborhood study is used to determine the effect of the protest treatment on attitudinal prejudices. The conjoint experiment was described in detail in Chapter 5, and again in Chapter 7. To remind the reader, the conjoint experiment represented pairs of prospective Parliamentary candidates described by a set of randomly-generated attributes. The set of attributes included both salient characteristics (i.e. sect and partisan affiliation of the candidate) and non-salient characteristics (i.e. information about the candidate's previous job, main platform promise, and past record of accomplishment). Respondents were asked to select one of the candidates from each pair of prospective candidates. The results are analyzed using Marginal Means (MMs).²

The subgroup analysis in Figure 8.1 shows preferences for respondents primed with the protest treatment and respondents primed by a neutral treatment about local parks. Based on results in Figure 8.1, the protest treatment does not show a statistically significant

²To remind the reader from Chapter 5: MMs represent the mean outcome for a level over all occurrences of the level, averaged across all other attributes. Marginal means for all levels average 0.5 when the conjoint design forces a choice between profiles - an indication that the profile is as likely as not to be selected. Estimates above 0.5 for a given level indicate that the attribute level increases the probability that a profile will be selected, whereas estimate below 0.5 for a given level indicate lower probability for profile selection




Figure 8.1: Preferences for Parliamentary candidates by protest treatment.

effect on respondent attitudes. Respondents who are primed about the protests and those who are not demonstrate similar patterns of preferences for Parliamentary candidates. In both subgroup graphs, respondents appear to be indifferent to the sectarian background and partisan preferences of the candidates, with the exception of evident preference for candidates who belong to Hezbollah. The results in Figure 8.1 do not bear out the prediction that priming respondents to a cross-sectarian protest movement will decrease intergroup bias.

8.2 The Effect of Protests on Behavioral Discrimination

The protest treatment is more promising in reducing behavioral discrimination. The experimental instruments used to measure behavioral discrimination are the three games described in great detail in Chapter 7. The three games are the prisoner's dilemma, dictator game, and preemptive strike game. The prisoner's dilemma measures differences in a re-

Table 8.1: Intergroup Bias with Protest Treatment

	Prisoner's Dilemma		Dictator Game		Preemptive Strike	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.650*** (0.033)	-0.924*** (0.130)	0.213* (0.128)	-3.199*** (0.599)	9.604*** (0.619)	-8.279*** (2.990)
Out-group	-0.286*** (0.037)	-0.292*** (0.035)	1.181*** (0.157)	1.181*** (0.145)	-3.351*** (0.758)	-3.351*** (0.723)
Protest treatment	-0.131*** (0.045)	-0.127*** (0.042)	0.007 (0.175)	0.132 (0.162)	0.240 (0.844)	0.260 (0.809)
Protest treatment x out-group	0.124** (0.051)	0.116** (0.047)	-0.223 (0.214)	-0.223 (0.198)	0.111 (1.034)	0.111 (0.987)
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	408	408	408	408	408	408
Observations	2,057	2,057	1,224	1,224	1,224	1,224
R ²	0.039	0.180	0.077	0.220	0.033	0.126
Adjusted R ²	0.037	0.174	0.075	0.211	0.030	0.117

spondent's strategy selection with members of the in-group and out-group. If a respondent chooses to systematically invest at a higher rate with members of the in-group than with member of the out-group, then the respondent demonstrates intergroup bias. The dictator game measures other-regarding preferences by asking respondents to allocate money between two partners. Respondents played three rounds of the modified dictator game, with one round comprised of two in-group partners (in-group round) and two rounds with an in-group and an out-group partner (out-group round). The outcome variable is the absolute value difference in the amount allocated between the two partners in each round. If a respondent chooses to allocate more to the in-group partner than the out-group partner in the out-group round, the the respondent demonstrates intergroup bias.

Finally, the preemptive strike game measures fear and its corresponding defensive behavior. The preemptive strike game matches a respondent with a partner who belongs to either the in-group or the out-group. With 20 seconds on the clock, the respondent must make the decision whether or not to preemptively strike against their partner. If a respondent chooses to preempt members of the out-group in a systematically shorter period of seconds than members of the in-group, the respondent demonstrates intergroup bias.

Regression analysis for Models 1 and 2 in Table 8.1 shows that the protest treatment

decreases investment with the in-group by nearly 13% percent.³ Thus, the protest treatment decreases bias by lowering the rate of investment with the in-group as compared with the rate of investment with members of the out-group.

The protest treatment has no effect on altruism and threat perception. Bias is diminished in the dictator game when the difference in money allocation between in-group and out-group rounds grows smaller. Bias decreases in the preemptive strike game when the difference in strike time between in-group and out-group gets closer to 0. Although the coefficients for "*Protest x out-group*" in Models 3-6 point in the correct direction, they are not statistically significant.

8.3 Discussion

The protest treatment is successful in reducing bias in favor of the in-group in the prisoner's dilemma game only. While limited in scope to only one game, this result is substantial. It indicates that a national movement that involves diverse sectarian groups can have a substantial effect on decreasing bias. The administration of the protest treatment is not specific enough to determine whether the observed decrease in bias occurred through the process of decategorization or recategorization of sectarian identities.

Subgroup analysis in Table D.8 in Appendix D, reveals that the effect of the protest treatment on out-group bias is driven by Shia respondents. In fact, the coefficient estimate on "*Protest x out-group*" increases the probability that a Shia respondent will invest with the out-group by 26%, which offsets the effect of investing with a member of the out-group by nearly half. In so doing, the prime decreases the trust gap between the in-group and out-group. As discussed in Chapter 5, Shia respondents are driving out-group aversion in

³Controls in the models include the individual-level (income, employment status, education, home ownership and age) and context-level (percent out-group in town, town size, presence of a Palestinian refugee camp within 4 miles of the town and percent of Syrian refugees registered in the district where the town is located) covariates.

the prisoner's dilemma, especially toward out-group partisans. Thus, Shia respondents have the largest bias gap to fill to decrease discrimination. The positive effect of priming Shia respondents to a cross-sectarian movement is encouraging because it means that discriminatory behaviors are not fixed. The point should not be overstated because the protest prime does not completely eliminate different rates of investment between the in-group and the out-group. Nevertheless, the result is encouraging and points to possible policy implications. Unifying national movements, especially when directed against a common opponent (in this case, the government), can help reign in bias among the people.

The protest treatment exerts no statistically significant change on respondent behaviors in the dictator game and the preemptive strike game. It is possible that the nature of the protest prime encourages greater unification (through recategorization) or greater individuation (through decategorization) in a way that impacts only intergroup trust, but has no effect on altruism or threat. In that case, other priming mechanisms should be developed to change decrease bias in altruism and threat perception.

To conclude, the mixed results in this chapter should not be surprising. The literature is critical about the prospects that decategorization and recategorization can effectuate attitudinal and/or behavioral change. First, if these models are "temporally unstable solutions" as the literature maintains (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, 2002, p. 590), then they are also weak and may not have a substantive impact on individual attitudes. Second, these models may have only limited applicability in contexts where intergroup relations are characterized by a long history of enmity and violence. In that case, a short period of national unity may just as easily make changes to identification and to bias short-lived.

Finally, evidence suggests that attempts at recategorization may increase threat perceptions, especially among minority groups (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, 2002). A unifying agenda or message may actually be interpreted as an attempt to eliminate, rather than assimilate, group identity. In this case, the groups that interpret that their identity is targeted for assimilation, may experience an increase in intergroup bias.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

"National unity is a pre-requisite for democracy since people must first consent to living together in order to avoid civil war and, second, ensure the presence of effective bases for mobilisation such as political parties that cut across ethnic lines"

— Haddad, 2002, p.304

9.1 Comparing Sect and Party as the Locus of Bias

This book has sought to understand the factors underlying Lebanese sectarianism and intergroup biases. Using the university and the neighborhood study, this book has engaged with some of the leading theories of intergroup bias and prospects for co-existence. First, evidence from Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrates that bias exists in both population studies. In the competitive environment provide by experimental games, respondents are biased in favor of their in-group, and sometimes act in ways that derogate the out-group. Respondents demonstrated bias in the university study and the neighborhood study on both the identity and partisan attributes of their partners.

On the one hand, bias under these circumstances should not be surprising. Chapter 2 described how merely triggering trivial group identities, such as preferring the paintings of Klee versus Kandinsky, could lead to intergroup bias. This is because bias is a cognitive

response founded in the mind's tendency to categorize and stereotype. Therefore, finding bias when group identities are triggered in the lab is expected. Why then should the results from Chapter 4 and 5 matter? The reason that social science is concerned about intergroup bias when social identities are based on real competing social groups is that these biases survive the computer lab environment. In the case of Klee and Kandinsky identities, the observed bias begins and ends at the urging of the experimenter and within the confines of the lab setting. In contrast, biases that arise out of real social identities exist before, during, and after the experiment is concluded. Such biases may be restrained or exaggerated in the lab setting, but they are not created by the experimenter or the lab setting.

The biases that exist between real social groups are created and reinforced through the dynamic process of accessibility and fit. If the reader recalls from Chapter 2, the accessibility of a social category is defined as the readiness with which a perceived individual can be readily identified as belonging to that category (J. C. Turner et al., 1987). Meanwhile, fit is defined as a function of both inter-category similarities and intra-category differences (J. C. Turner et al., 1987). Individuals are more likely to stereotype when perceived differences are smaller within groups and are larger between groups. In a socially and politically divided society like Lebanon, these two dynamic processes are created and reproduced both in and out of the lab. Thus, evidence of bias demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5 is a certain reflection of the types of biases that permeate the Lebanese social and political spheres.

Chapter 4 and 5 sought to do more than simply demonstrate the existence of intergroup bias in the populations targeted for the university and neighborhood studies. Those chapters also intended to compare sect and party to show where the locus of bias in Lebanon is situated. In line with a growing literature on the primacy of partisan cleavages in Western democracies, this book found support for affective partisanship among Lebanese respondents. Biases on partisan affiliation trump biases based on sectarian identity. Furthermore, both the university and neighborhood studies demonstrate that partisans are driving evidence of bias. Non-partisans show prejudice on neither the sectarian nor partisan dimensions (see

Table 5.4 in Section 5.2, especially). Thus, partisan animus, rather than sectarian hostility, explains most of the prejudice and discrimination observed in the preceding chapters.

An important caveat for the arguments made in Chapters 4 and 5 about the primacy of partisan affect is in order. Party identification may be a function of instrumental or affective polarization. A great deal of compelling empirical evidence shows the viability of the instrumental model. Political economy arguments, especially, make a forceful case for the underlying economic interests that structure political support and representation (see, especially Section 3.2). However, as the political economy arguments have not been tested in this book, but have only been discussed in Chapter 3, this book does not aspire to conclusively adjudicate between the affective and instrumental explanations of partisan polarization. Instead, the intention in this book has been to transport the model of partisan affect from the Western contexts in which it was developed and show its explanatory success in non-Western contexts like Lebanon.

Notwithstanding evidence of partisan affect, the conjoint experiments administered in both the university and neighborhood studies demonstrate that sectarian prejudice plays a modest, but discernible, role in intergroup biases. Respondents show biased attitudinal preferences on the sectarian dimension when selecting between pairs of conjoint profiles (see Section 4.1 for the university study and 5.1 for the neighborhood study). In the experimental games, respondents show in-group bias on the sectarian dimension, but only the neighborhood study demonstrates out-group derogation (see Section 4.2 for the university study and Section 5.2 for the neighborhood study).

One concern that arises in any discussion of sect and party in Lebanon is the extent to which one suggests the other. For example, invoking someone's support for Hezbollah almost unambiguously signals that that person belongs to the Shia sect. Similarly, revealing that someone belongs to the Shia sect invariably assumes that that person is a supporter of either Hezbollah or Amal. Clearly, people are not monolithic and exceptions to these general associations abound. However, the rule is so pervasive as to require affirmative contradiction.

In this context, what does it mean when a respondent derogates the party Hezbollah or the sect Shia?

The neighborhood study, especially, tackled this issue by priming respondents with information about their partners' sect, party, and combination of sect and party in separate rounds of the prisoner's dilemma game. Thus, Section 5.2 was able to disaggregate the relative strength of each attribute and to assess their interactive effect. As already mentioned, when sect and party are measured separately, the effect of party on biases trumps that of sect. However, results for the interaction between sect and party lead to the strongest evidence of bias in this book. The evidence that identity and partisanship reinforce each other is in line with findings in the literature on the reinforcing effects of social and partisan cleavages (Westwood et al., 2018).

Finally, notwithstanding evidence of partisan and sectarian biases, the conjoint experiments in both the university and neighborhood studies show that respondents are most interested in the merit-based attributes of the profiles presented. Respondents are most likely to select well-performing students and faculty members in the university study (see Section 4.1). They are also most likely to select political candidates with a history of creating jobs (see Section 5.1). Among the Lebanese respondents who participated in the studies conducted for this book, merit trumps identity and partisan attributes.

However, merit-based characteristics do not mitigate the effect of out-group bias. Section 5.2 explored the relative and interactive effects of merit, identity and partisanship in respondents' selection of political candidates. That section found that merit, in-group identity, and in-group partisanship each had a positive effect on the likelihood that a candidate would be selected. However, merit did not help candidates who belong to the out-group identity or out-group party bridge the bias gap. Evidence from Section 5.2 further conflicts with a growing literature, especially in African contexts, which argues that a positive record boosts the in-group's chances of being selected (Carlson, 2015). In that literature, voters are hypothesized to find an in-group's positive record to be credible evidence for future good

performance. In this book, the evidence showed no interaction between identity and record of performance. Respondents reward political candidates separately for having a good record, for being a co-sectarian, and for being a co-partisan.

9.2 Three Ways to Diminish Bias

Once the underlying cause of bias and its extent was understood, this book proceeded to explore three possible ways to diminish bias: coeducation in Chapter 6, cohabitation in Chapter 7, and the unifying narrative of protest in Chapter 8.

Prospects for mitigating bias through coeducation in Chapter 6 were not encouraging. The literature proposes that the contact hypothesis, which states that close interpersonal contact between members of competing groups, especially under institutional auspices, can update misconceptions and provide opportunities for genuine interpersonal understanding, trust, and cooperation. Chapter 6 tested the contact hypothesis in four Lebanese universities by comparing attitudes among freshmen and upperclassmen students. The expectation was that time spent at university would allow sufficient and substantive interpersonal contact among students of various sectarian groups to permit upperclassmen to update and diminish their biases. However, results did not vindicate this hypothesis. Upperclassmen did not show a decrease in bias in comparison to freshmen students. Despite ample opportunities for contact in the university context, the contact hypothesis does not appear to have an effect on student respondents.

Analysis of survey data revealed that students who self-reported being exposed to diverse neighborhoods and schools prior to entering university were less biased than students who had come from less diverse pre-university environments. As discussed at length in Chapter 6, however, this evidence is only descriptive and suggestive. This evidence does not permit drawing any causal inferences between contextual diversity and student attitudes. Aside from the unreliability of self-reported evidence, a significant problem relates to is-

sues of self-selection. People self-select into their environments so that their attitudes and behaviors likely reflect those already prevailing in the environment ex-ante. In this case, progressive Lebanese families may have elected to expose their children to diverse sectarian and international environments, while traditional Lebanese families may have chosen to enroll their children in religious schools and Sunday school environments.¹ Thus, ideological and attitudinal self-selection into high diversity or low diversity environments came to shape students' attitudes, not vice versa.

Notwithstanding these limitations, a growing observational literature has attempted to show that context can, in fact, lead to changes in attitudes. Taking inspiration from work conducted in Israel (Enos and Gidron, 2016), the U.S. (Enos, 2017), and the university laboratory (Enos and Celaya, 2018), Chapter 7 took on the challenge of testing the effects of *perceived* context on individual attitudes and behaviors. The towns where the research was conducted were specially selected to permit the design of the neighborhood study to experimentally vary respondents' perceptions of their context. Specifically, towns where one sectarian group constituted the majority population were embedded in regions where another sect was dominant. Respondents in these towns were randomly given one of two treatments: (1) the "majority" treatment, which informed respondents that they were in the majority in their town, or (2) the "minority" treatment, which informed respondents that they were in the minority in their region. As this study could not randomize actual context, the study used *perceived* context to randomize respondents' perceptions of their context. This randomization permits Chapter 7 to make causal inferences.

The "majority" and "minority" treatments used in the neighborhood study exploit a prominent theory, known as the intergroup threat theory, which predicts that an increase in the out-group will lead individuals to perceive threat and thus demonstrate bias. Contrary to the cultivation of interpersonal relationships required by the contact hypothesis, intergroup

¹Both Christians and Muslims have Sunday School administered by religious institutions.

threat theory is usually triggered at a larger geographic plane when one groups perceives an increase in the population of another group. This perceived increase in the population of the out-group purportedly threatens the material (e.g. economic), non-material (e.g. status), and symbolic (e.g. beliefs) resources of the dominant group (Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995; Rios, Sosa, and Osborn, 2018). The expectation in the neighborhood study was that the "minority" treatment would trigger intergroup threat theory and thus increase bias.

Results from Chapter 7 were mixed. Variation in perceived context appeared to change respondent attitudes in the conjoint experiment and respondents' behaviors in the prisoner's dilemma, but not their behaviors in the dictator game and the preemptive strike game. In Section 7.1, respondents who received the "minority" treatment showed higher levels of bias than respondents who received the "majority" treatment - thus conforming to expectations. In section 7.2, the "majority" treatment improved respondents' trust toward both the in-group and out-group in the prisoner's dilemma. However, the treatment was insignificant in the dictator game and the preemptive strike game.

Finally, the neighborhood study took advantage of a protest movement that began in the Fall of 2019 against government mismanagement of the economy. Initially, these protests were non-sectarian and captured the majority of the country in opposition to the political class. The protests thus offered an opportunity to test whether decategorization or recategorization of salient social group identities under a united national movement could diminish intergroup biases.

The neighborhood study introduced a randomized experimental manipulation to test the effect of priming respondents about the national protests on their attitudes and behaviors. The protest treatment had no effect on attitudes in the conjoint experiment. The protest treatment had a statistically significant effect on investment in the prisoner's dilemma, but not in the dictator game or the preemptive strike game. In the prisoner's dilemma, the protest treatment led to a decrease in the rate of investment with the in-group thus diminishing the effects of bias. This result is encouraging and should be further explored

in future research. If a simple prime of a unifying national movement can substantially diminish intergroup bias, then this kind of intervention can serve as an effective policy method for decreasing intergroup biases.

An inevitable question that arises from the summary of results above is why some experiments show statistically significant effects and why others provide null results. One explanation is that the experiments require fundamentally different actions from the respondents. The prisoner's dilemma is an interactive trust game, the dictator game a one-side test of generosity, and the preemptive strike game an interactive game that elicits negative behavior. Respondents may genuinely adopt different strategies in each of these games, thus leading to diverging results for the significance of the contextual and protest treatments. Other explanation relate to design issues that may lead to an experimenter effect and a learning effect.

Research designs that prime sectarian and partisan identities are not entirely unobtrusive. Respondents may have been affected by social desirability bias, for example. Although the design of this research went to great lengths to prevent experimenter effects, they may still have played a role in respondents' choices. In the neighborhood study, all experiments were administered in respondents' homes in the presence of a survey administrator. The survey administrators belonged to the same sectarian community as the respondents. Furthermore, survey administrators made sure that respondents completed the experimental games on their own, apart from the gaze and aid of the survey administrator. Nevertheless, given the salient nature of the study instruments, respondents may have been affected by the presence of the survey administrator while participating in the study.

A further complication may be a result of learning on the part of the respondents. Every respondents across the university study and the neighborhood study first encountered the conjoint experiment. Given the salient nature of the conjoint experiment, which primed respondents about sect and party, respondents likely learned something about the research. When respondents then participated in the experimental games, they likely brought

those learned concepts to bear on their subsequent choices. This issue is unfortunately an inevitable result of administering multiple research instruments to the same respondent. Future research could correct for both experimenter and learning effects by capturing a larger sample size and administering only one game to each respondent.

9.3 Lessons from Lebanon

The results presented in this book across the university and neighborhood studies vindicate expectations from the literature in parts, and are less than glowing endorsements of the literature in others. First, it is clear that Lebanese respondents exhibit patterns of in-group favoritism. Second, Lebanese biases are expressions of partisanship: partisans are biased, non-partisans are not. Third, Lebanese partisans show greater bias on partisan attributes than on sectarian attributes. The latter two points are consistent with a growing literature in the West that contends that for partisans, partisanship trumps identity based discrimination.

Alongside these strong results, tests of the contact hypothesis, intergroup threat theory, and recategorization and decategorization models have been only modestly effective in changing attitudes and behaviors among Lebanese respondents. Some of the reasons for these modest findings have already been discussed elsewhere. Here, the discussion will turn to a more sweeping consideration of the theories and how they relate to Lebanon.

First, an underlying assumption of these theories is that salient social groups are aligned along an identifiable social hierarchy. From this starting point, these social theories assume that one group (i.e. the "high-status" group) imposes a social system on another group (i.e. "low-status" group). Intergroup relations within that social environment begin at a point of power asymmetry and appear to remain at that stage through cycles of violence, competition, and even during periods of reconciliation. The focus of the established theories is to explain why dominant groups demonstrate bias and create barriers to the success and

ascendance of minority groups. Bias reduction mechanisms proposed thus tackle the issue of bias by targeting the attitudes and behaviors of dominant groups. While this formulation of the social environment may explain American race relations and European attempts to manage mass migration in the last half century, it does not accurately or comprehensively explain intergroup relations outside the West.

In fact, the literature has come to recognize that social group competition outside the West does not always begin from a similar pattern of group hierarchy. Kasara (2013) notes that "ethnic politics outside the West lack centuries-old folk theories regarding why marginalized groups (e.g. blacks in the United States or the Roma in Europe) are innately inferior on multiple dimensions" (p. 923). Tests of the contact hypothesis and intergroup threat theory in African contexts make clear that ethnic groups are not strictly "ranked" along a single power dimension (Kasara, 2013). The Ibo of Nigeria, for example, are both "distrusted and despised" and admired for their "Western education, salaried jobs, and higher standards of living" by the Kanuri (Kasara, 2013; D. L. Horowitz, 1985). Similarly, context-related studies in Nigeria (Scacco and Warren, 2018), Turkey (Aytaç and Çarkoglu, 2019) and Georgia (Schaub, 2017) all explore intergroup dynamics where relative group hierarchy is indeterminate or contingent. Unfortunately, the established theories have not been revised to account for these non-Western settings.

Lebanon clearly falls within this latter group of contexts where group hierarchy is neither set in stone, nor clearly delineated at any given moment in time. The political story of Lebanon in the last century has been characterized by instability. First, Christians and Shias were despised and persecuted minorities at the periphery of the Ottoman Empire. Once the Ottoman Empire collapsed, Lebanon came under the French mandate in 1923 and then achieved Independence in 1943. From 1923 until the beginning of hostilities between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its Lebanese allies in 1967, Christians remained preminent. That short-lived period gave way to a brutal Civil War that sought to weaken Christian dominance and witnessed the commission of mass atrocities against

Christians. The period of the Civil War led to the death and/or emigration of many Lebanese Christians and Muslims. At the end of the war, the Sunni gained preeminence with the support of Gulf investment. Since the late 2000s, Hezbollah has challenged that position as its foreign-backed militias operate separately from the national government and effectively hold a monopoly of military force in the country. The power center has thus moved between the sectarian communities, but the groups that lost preeminence have not disappeared or been made decisively inferior. The consociational division of power, which seeks to provide equitable representation to each sectarian community, means that no sectarian group is seriously disadvantaged.

Historically, Christians were the best educated, wealthiest, and politically most powerful group. Their political power has greatly diminished, and it is unlikely that they would be able to withstand a military assault by the Shia and their allies, or by the Sunni and their allies. Nevertheless, Christians remain socially and culturally important. As the Sunni and Shia have gained political power and martial strength, they have also caught up with Christians in economic and educational achievements (Corstange, 2013; Paler, Marshall, and Atallah, 2020). The maintenance of political power by each of the three sectarian communities, along with parity on social dimensions, means that it is not clear which group is the "high-status group" whose biases should be feared, condemned, and changed.

Another crucial feature about Lebanon that makes the revision of the established theories worth exploring is that the Lebanese people are not new to each other. The majority of Lebanese people may live in segregated neighborhoods, but intergroup contact and interaction in Lebanon is far more common historically than in the West. When the contact hypothesis and the intergroup threat theory were first developed, the white majority cultures of the West often knew little about the new and emerging minorities in their midst. White and black Americans were segregated by institutional design, while newly-arrived immigrants are expectedly foreign at first. The intergroup threat theory thus explained why white majorities were biased toward the minority groups, and the contact hypothesis was

proposed to encourage the majority to interact with and understand the minority. These mechanisms are not as useful in Lebanon, where the out-group is well-known and its threat is well-understood. It is thus unsurprising that implementing these theories does not effectuate real change in Lebanese respondents - they are too well-integrated already to be surprised by or taught about each other.

A great deal has been said in this book and in the literature that condemns the sectarian system of power-sharing. The problem with consociationalism is that it divides the country and has empowered corrupt sectarian politicians to enrich themselves at the expense of the nation and its people. The result of this system of government has been the continued entrenchment of within-group identities and differentiation across groups. Haddad (2002) quotes from Crow (1980): "Functionally, for the Lebanese, the religious community is his nation; that is the people to whom he belongs and with whom he identifies" (p.295 in Haddad, 2002). The solution proposed to ameliorate this situation is to entrench notions of national unity. Haddad (2002) asserts, "National unity is a pre-requisite for democracy since people must first consent to living together in order to avoid civil war and, second, ensure the presence of effective bases for mobilisation such as political parties that cut across ethnic lines" (p. 304). The reorganization of social groups from a sectarian orientation to a national orientation would redraw party cleavages as well. Party cleavages that cut across sectarian divisions would possibly transform partisan affect to biases that strictly revolve around party identity, and eliminate the corresponding biases along sectarian lines.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Attitudes in the University

A.1 The Survey: Indices and Variables

The conjoint experiment and accompanying survey was administered to 1,611 respondents in four Lebanese Universities: the American University of Beirut, Lebanese American University, University of Saint Joseph and Haigazian University. Respondents were randomly selected from each university student body. Both the conjoint experiment and survey were self-administered by respondents using pen and paper. The survey component had 5.5% missing data in questions about respondents' background characteristics. A pattern of missing data is presented in Figure A.1. Only a portion of the 38 variables in the dataset are presented here. The variables presented in Figure A.1 are the five variables used to construct the "Diversity Index" for the degree of diversity in a respondent's pre-university environment and variables for respondent sect and partisan affiliation.

The missing data was imputed seven times using MICE (multiple imputations with chained equations). The number of imputations follows a rule developed by Lall (2016) who asserted that the number of imputations should equal the average of the missing data rate of all variables in the imputation model. This approach is similar to one advocated by van Buren (2012). Descriptive statistics of participants in the conjoint experiment are presented

in Table A.1.

Three indices were created within each of the seven imputed datasets: "Diversity Index," "Political Activism Index," and "Social Openness Index." The Diversity Index is comprised of five variables describing respondents' pre-university environments. Respondents were asked to characterize the level of diversity in their (1) neighborhood, (2) primary school, (3) middle school, (4) secondary school, and (5) among secondary school friends. Respondents classified the degree of diversity on a scale: "entirely people of my own religious group," "mostly people of my own religious group," "mostly people of a different religious group," and "entirely people of a different religious group." A principal component analysis on the five diversity variables indicated that the variables can be combined into an index of acceptable reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.90$). The Diversity Index ranged from 0 (i.e. a homogeneous pre-university environment) to 3 (i.e. an environment consisting entirely of the out-group). At the extremes, 94 respondents reported having an entirely homogeneous environment and 58 respondents reported an environment comprised entirely of the out-group. The vast majority of respondents ($N = 1,442$) characterized their pre-university environment on multiple values of the scale.

The Political Activism Index was created from three responses about the frequency with which respondents (1) attended a community meeting, (2) got together with others to raise an issue and (3) attended a protest or demonstration march. Respondents could specify that they did so "never," "once or twice," "several times" or "often" in the past year. A significant majority of respondents ($N = 558$) had shown no political activism, while a remaining 1,058 had participated in at least one such political activity.

Finally, the Social Openness Index measures the degree to which respondents expressed progressive views about their society. The index was created from six variables to which respondents could respond along a scale: "strongly disagree," "disagree," "agree," or "strongly agree." The six variables were created from the following statements: (1) it is probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bot-




Figure A.1: Missing data in conjoint survey. The variables depicted are not exhaustive, but represent the most important variables used to create the "Diversity Index" and to document respondent sect and partisan affiliation.

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Participants in the Survey and Conjoint

	Min	Max	Full Sample	Student Applicant	Faculty Candidate
Male	0	1	0.440	0.423	0.456
Private school	0	1	0.909	0.910	0.908
Christian	0	1	0.443	0.455	0.430
Shia	0	1	0.205	0.195	0.215
Sunni	0	1	0.262	0.258	0.266
March 8 partisan	0	1	0.210	0.194	0.225
March 14 partisan	0	1	0.209	0.219	0.199
New Leadership	0	1	0.582	0.587	0.576
Partisan	0	1	0.418	0.413	0.424
Low Income	0	1	0.326	0.334	0.318
Father advanced degree	0	1	0.603	0.617	0.590
Mother advanced degree	0	1	0.611	0.613	0.609
Foreign born	0	1	0.248	0.229	0.265
Hometown diversity	0	3	1.287	1.259	1.312
College friends diversity	0	3	1.719	1.689	1.748
Campus unity	0	1	0.722	0.718	0.727
Conservative	0	1	0.147	0.135	0.157
Liberal	0	1	0.750	0.504	0.745
Politically active	0	3	0.644	0.639	0.648
Sharia law	0	1	0.421	0.398	0.443
Social openness	0	3	2.169	2.179	2.158
Marry out-group	0	1	0.634	0.635	0.634
First year	0	1	0.370	0.337	0.402
AUB			0.361	0.380	0.343
Haigazian			0.125	0.105	0.145
LAU			0.299	0.281	0.315
USJ			0.215	0.234	0.197
N			1611.000	791.000	820.000

tom, (2) inferior groups should stay in their place, (3) we should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups, (4) we should increase social and political equality, (5) dating members of other religious groups should be avoided, and (6) marrying members of other religious groups should be avoided. The scales for the variables in points 1, 2, 5, and 6 were reversed to create the Social Openness Index. The index took values between 0 and 3. The majority of respondents ($N = 1,108$) reported their agreement with progressive views, falling on or above 2 on the scale.

Three variables collected during the survey were used in sub-group analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. The variable for respondent sect took the following values: Agnostic ($N = 14$), Atheist ($N = 23$), Christian ($N = 713$), Druze ($N = 103$), Jewish ($N = 2$), Shia ($N = 329$) and Sunni (426). Respondents who reported belonging to various Christian denominations, including Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, Evangelical, and Greek Orthodox, were all grouped together as "Christian."¹ In Figures A.9 and A.10, the sect variable was subset to exclude all but Christians, Shias and Sunnis. This was done for two main reasons. First, the small N for the Druze and others does not provide sufficient power for comparison with the main sects. Second, analysis of the three main sects only allows comparison to be made with similar analysis by respondent sect from the neighborhood study.

The respondent party variable was transformed in two ways to create the "party bloc" variable and the "new leadership" variable. Respondents selected the name of their preferred political party from a list (e.g. Lebanese Democratic Party, Kataeb Party, or Amal Movement) or recorded that they did not support established political parties. More than half of respondents ($N = 860$) indicated that they did not support establishment parties. These respondents were not used to create the party bloc variable. Instead, the party bloc variable was a subset of respondents ($N = 750$) whose preferred parties belonged to the

¹See Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation about the decision to aggregate Christian denominations.

March 8 or March 14 political blocs.² The new leadership variable was constructed from the full sample. Respondents whose parties belonged to March 8 or March 14 blocs were placed into the "establishment" sub-group, while those who indicated that they did not support establishment parties were placed into the "new leadership" sub-group.

Finally, income was measured by asking respondents to situate their household income relative to a national statistic. "According to the World Bank, 70% of the Lebanese population generates an annual income of less than USD 10,000. Is your household income" (1) much below the stated income, (2) below the stated income, (3) the stated income, (4) above the stated income or (5) much above the stated income. Responses were then transformed to a binary "low income" (for responses 1, 2 and 3) and "high income" (for responses 4 and 5). The number of respondents who fell into the high income sub-group (N = 526) were nearly twice as many as those in the low income sub-group (N = 265). This finding is not surprising as attendance in elite universities correlates with higher levels of household wealth worldwide (Jaschik, 2019, Markovits, 2019). While this measure of income is rather crude, it allows for a binary comparison of low and high income students and captures a substantive proportion of students from low-income backgrounds.

A.2 Conjoint Experiment: Plots of Full Models

In addition to being randomly selected, respondents were randomly assigned either to the "Student Applicant" or the "Faculty Candidate" treatment. Respondent decisions made in the conjoint experiments are analyzed by estimating average marginal component effects (AMCEs), with cluster robust standard errors. AMCEs show the average change in the probability that a respondent will select a profile when a particular level is present, as compared to a baseline category, and averaging over all other possible combinations (Hain-

²See Chapter 2 for a detailed description of the formation and membership of the political blocs

mueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto, 2014). For example, AMCE estimates will reveal how much more likely respondents are to select a partisan of the Future Movement (a level of the partisan attribute) than an Independent partisan (the baseline category of the partisan attribute), averaged over all other combinations of levels in the conjoint profile. The baseline level is set at 0 and any movement to the left or right of that baseline, over the range from -1 to 1, represents a respondent's level of favorability for a particular level in either the positive or negative direction. AMCEs thus provide estimates of relative favorability. By defining baseline categories for each attribute — often arbitrarily — AMCEs capture the marginal effect of moving from one level to another. To compare effect sizes across sub-groups, however, requires the assumption that preferences for the baseline level are equal across sub-groups (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley, 2019). There are a lot of reasons to assume that preferences for baseline levels are not equal across sub-groups. The very reason that researchers are interested in sub-group analysis is that they assume that sub-groups are not identical in their preferences. If preferences for the baseline level across sub-groups are not equal, then any comparison between sub-groups is distorted. To avoid such inferential errors, Leeper and his colleagues propose comparing sub-group marginal means, which represent the mean outcome for a level over all occurrences of the level, averaged across all other attributes. Marginal means for all levels average 0.5 when the conjoint design forces a choice between profiles - an indication that the profile is as likely as not to be selected. Estimates above 0.5 for a given level indicate that the attribute level increases the probability that a profile will be selected, whereas estimate below 0.5 for a given level indicate lower probability for profile selection. Because marginal means are descriptive quantities for each level, independent of all other levels, they permit comparing differences in preferences between sub-groups. Marginal means are reported for all levels, including the baseline category that the AMCE omits in its estimation.

The plots that follow in Appendix A show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned student applicant or faculty candidate attributes on the probability that the student

or faculty member will be selected. Estimates are either average marginal component effects (AMCEs) with clustered standard errors or marginal means (MMs) with clustered standard errors. Horizontal bars represent 95% confidence intervals. In plots with AMCE estimates, points without horizontal bars denote the attribute value that is the reference category for each attribute. Plots that show MM estimates do not have a reference category as MM describes the probability of selection for every attribute.

The full list of randomized attributes and levels used in the conjoint experiment are found on the vertical axis on each plot. One attribute, the "Nationality" attribute, which took the levels of "Lebanese", "Palestinian" and "Syrian," was excluded from the conjoint analysis. That attribute was purely descriptive and its values were determined by the "City of Origin" attribute. The "City of Origin" attribute and "Nationality" attribute were effectively a single attribute.

The "City of Origin" attribute includes both the city and the sect of the individual described in the profile. The city to which the applicant or candidate purportedly came from was listed so as to remove any ambiguity about the identity of the profile. The "City of Origin" attribute was described by one of seven levels, including two Christian and three Sunni levels. Identifying the city helped convey the specific identity of a "Christian" or a "Sunni" applicant and candidate. For example, "Christian from Bourj Hammoud" indicates someone of Armenian Christian origin, while "Christian from Jounieh" indicates someone of Lebanese Christian origin. Similarly, "Sunni from Aleppo" indicates a Syrian, "Sunni from Ein el Hilweh" indicates a Palestinian, and "Sunni from Tripoli" identifies someone who is Lebanese Sunni. Without indicating the city, the sect remains ambiguous. Each city names in the "City of Origin" attribute is a "typical case" of the given sectarian group in the profile. Yet it is important to note that a resident of Jounieh is most likely to be Christian, but the city is not so homogeneous as to preclude a Muslim resident. So, using a combination of "Christian" and "Jounieh" best conveys that the applicant or candidate is a Lebanese Christian from a majority-Christian city. Each of the cities listed is both

historically (i.e. within the living memory of the respondents and their parents, at least) and currently populated by members of the sects attached to them in the attribute.

The levels in the "Partisan Preference" attribute were selected to represent Lebanon's large and salient political parties. Notable omissions are the Christian Marada, Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the Armenian Tashnag Party, but they only held two to three seats in parliament at the time this survey was administered (November 2016 to March 2017). Marada and Tashnag were in an alliance with the Free Patriotic Movement, and within the larger bloc with Amal and Hezbollah. In the most recent 2018 parliamentary elections, Marada had changed its alliance to Amal and Hezbollah. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party has been an ally of Amal and Hezbollah in both parliamentary periods.

The political parties in the attribute fall in two major political blocs: March 8 (Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah, Amal Movement) and March 14 (Future Movement, Lebanese Forces, Kataeb Party). The Progressive Socialist Party was a pro-March 8 independent party. The "Independent" level in 2016 and 2017 did not signify an established political party.




Figure A.2: Estimates are AMCEs with clustered standard errors. In the plot on the left, the dependent variable is a binary choice between two student applicant profiles. The plot on the right shows the rating assigned to each student applicant profile, where the rating has been rescaled from 0 'never support' to 1 'always support'. Respondents both rated and made a binary choice for every set of profiles in the survey.




Figure A.3: Estimates are AMCEs with clustered standard errors. In the plot on the left, the dependent variable is a binary choice between two faculty candidate profiles. The plot on the right shows the rating assigned to each faculty candidate profile, where the rating has been rescaled from 0 'never support' to 1 'always support'. Respondents both rated and made a binary choice for every set of profiles in the survey.




Figure A.4: Estimates are based on seven imputations of AMCEs with clustered standard errors. The respondent sub-groups in these plots are individuals who reported belonging to one of the majority Lebanese sectarian groups: Christian, Shias, and Sunni. The plot on the left shows the effects of the randomly assigned student applicant attributes on the probability of being preferred for admission. The plot on the right shows the effects of the randomly assigned faculty candidate attributes on the probability of being preferred for employment.




Figure A.5: Estimates are AMCEs with clustered standard errors. The estimates show the effects of the randomly assigned student applicant attribute on the probability of being preferred for admission conditional on the number of choice tasks. These plots are a test of carryover effects: whether respondents would select the same profile in the profile set they encountered, regardless of the profiles they had already seen or would see later.




Figure A.6: Estimates are AMCEs with clustered standard errors. The estimates show the effects of the randomly assigned faculty candidate attribute on the probability of being preferred for employment conditional on the number of choice tasks. These plots are a test of carryover effects: whether respondents would select the same profile in the profile set they encountered, regardless of the profiles they had already seen or would see later.




Figure A.7: Estimates are AMCEs with clustered standard errors. The estimates show the effects of the randomly assigned student applicant attribute on the probability of being preferred for admission conditional on the group of respondents exposed to low, medium and high levels of atypical profiles. These plots provide a robustness check for atypical profiles: whether the level of realism of student applicant profiles (the relevant realism here involves sect and party) damages external validity.




Figure A.8: Estimates are AMCEs with clustered standard errors. The estimates show the effects of the randomly assigned faculty candidate attribute on the probability of being preferred for employment conditional on the group of respondents exposed to low, medium and high levels of atypical profiles. These plots provide a robustness check for atypical profiles: whether the level of realism of faculty candidate profiles (the relevant realism here involves sect and party) damages external validity.

Student Applicant

N = 719




Figure A.9: Estimates are based on seven imputations of MMs with clustered standard errors. The plot shows estimates of the effects of randomly assigned student applicant attributes on the probability of being preferred for admission among a sub-group of respondents who belong to one of the three majority sectarian groups in Lebanon: Christian, Shias and Sunni.

Faculty Candidate

N = 749




Figure A.10: Estimates are based on seven imputations of MMs with clustered standard errors. The plot shows estimates of the effects of randomly assigned faculty candidate attributes on the probability of being preferred for employment among a sub-group of respondents who belong to one of the three majority sectarian groups in Lebanon: Christian, Shias and Sunni.




Figure A.11: Estimates are based on seven imputations of MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned student applicant attributes on the probability of being preferred for admission for two partisan sub-groups of respondents. The third plot is a difference of estimates for the two sub-groups.




Figure A.12: Estimates are based on seven imputations of MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned faculty candidate attributes on the probability of being preferred for employment for two partisan respondent sub-groups. The third plot is a difference of estimates for the two sub-groups.




Figure A.13: Estimates are based on seven imputations of MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned student applicant attributes on the probability of being preferred for admission for two respondent sub-groups. The third plot is a difference of estimates for the two sub-groups. The respondents in the "Establishment" sub-group are partisans of the March 14 and March 8 political blocs, while respondents in the "New Leadership" sub-group are those who prefer non-establishment representatives.



Figure A.14: Estimates are based on seven imputations of MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned faculty candidate attributes on the probability of being preferred for employment for two respondent sub-groups. The third plot is a difference of estimates for the two sub-groups. The respondents in the "Establishment" sub-group are partisans of the March 14 and March 8 political blocs, while respondents in the "New Leadership" sub-group are those who prefer non-establishment representatives.

A.3 Test of the Contact Hypothesis

The test of the contact hypothesis in Chapter 6 evaluates whether time spent at university changes student attitudes. An effort was made to over-sample freshmen students for both the student and faculty samples of the conjoint to provide power to make cohort comparisons between freshmen and upperclassmen. A freshmen cohort is compared to a cohort of students in years two through four. Results of this analysis are presented in Figures A.15 and A.16. Differences between cohorts are minimal, and upperclassmen continue to show bias at similar levels to freshmen respondents. The contact hypothesis does not appear to succeed in the university institutional setting.

Splitting the full sample into two sub-samples to receive either student applicant or faculty candidate treatment apparently caused an imbalance in each sub-group sample. Table A.1 provides a Balance Check on respondent characteristics in each cohort. Balance for the student applicant sample and the faculty candidate sample is not always achieved. Notably, there is a lack of balance on sectarian and partisan characteristics, which raises concerns about the validity of results in the cohort analysis. However, when the two separate samples are aggregated, most imbalances, and key imbalances in sect and party, disappear. Analysis on the aggregated sample was conducted in Figure A.17, showing the attributes shared across the student applicant and faculty candidate experiments: "city of origin," "partisan preferences" and "gender." Estimates in Figure A.17 track closely with the cohort analysis done separately for the student applicant and faculty candidate experiments. The imbalances in the sub-groups of the two samples have not had a significant effect on results. The cohort analysis conducted in Figures A.15 and A.16 is thus a reliable measure of the contact hypothesis in Lebanese universities.

Further analysis was conducted by separating the "Upperclassmen" cohort into its component sub-groups of second year, third year and fourth year university students. These results are presented in Figures A.18 and A.19. Results by sub-group show persisting biases on the "City of Origin" (i.e. sectarian identity) and "Partisan Preference" dimensions,

despite some variation on the attributes that are preferred in each year at university. These plots demonstrate that biases persist throughout the time students spend at university.

Nevertheless, evidence shows that environment matters to respondents' attitudes. In Figures A.20 and A.21, respondents who were exposed to a high diversity environment prior to matriculating at university show significantly lower levels of bias than do respondents whose pre-university environments were characterized by low diversity. As described in Section A.1, the diversity variable is an index of five items measuring the relative diversity of respondents' (1) neighborhood, (2) primary school, (3) middle school, (4) secondary school and (5) secondary school friends. The degree of diversity in each of these items was self-reported by the respondents. The Diversity Index ranged from 0 to 3, indicating the degree to which a respondent's environment was characterized by out-group diversity. The Diversity Index was divided in two to make group comparisons in Figures 6.3, 6.4, A.20, and A.21. Respondents whose reported pre-university diversity fell below or on 1 on the scale were placed into the "Low Diversity" group, while those whose reports placed them above or on 2 were placed into the "High Diversity" group.

This division into groups eliminated 480 respondents who fell between 1 and 2 on the scale. Figures A.22 and A.23 include those 480 respondents into the "Mid-Level Diversity" plot for comparison. These respondents, who experienced some diversity prior to matriculating at university, show lower levels of bias than those in low diversity environments, but are more biased than those from high diversity environments. The "Mid-Level Diversity" plots in Figures A.22 and A.23 thus meet expectations.

Table A.2: Balance in Cohort Analysis: Freshmen vs. Upperclassmen

		Min	Max	Freshmen mean	Upperclassmen mean	Diff	SE	Pval
Student Applicant N = 791	Male	0	1	0.425	0.422	-0.003	0.012	0.789
	Private school	0	1	0.906	0.912	0.006	0.008	0.416
	Christian	0	1	0.424	0.470	0.045	0.015	0.003
	Shia	0	1	0.228	0.179	-0.049	0.011	0.000
	Sunni	0	1	0.272	0.252	-0.020	0.012	0.106
	Partisan	0	1	0.462	0.389	-0.073	0.013	0.000
	Low income	0	1	0.361	0.320	-0.041	0.017	0.025
	Father advanced degree	0	1	0.610	0.621	0.011	0.016	0.500
	Mother advanced degree	0	1	0.632	0.604	-0.028	0.014	0.046
	Foreign born	0	1	0.253	0.217	-0.036	0.012	0.004
	College friends diversity	1	3	1.704	1.682	-0.021	0.018	0.243
	Hometown diversity	0	3	1.257	1.258	-0.001	0.023	0.970
	Social openness	0	3	2.194	2.171	-0.023	0.015	0.120
	Political activism	0	3	0.584	0.668	0.084	0.020	0.000
Faculty Candidate N = 820	Male	0	1	0.471	0.446	-0.024	0.011	0.032
	Private school	0	1	0.927	0.896	-0.031	0.008	0.00
	Christian	0	1	0.410	0.443	0.032	0.014	0.025
	Shia	0	1	0.208	0.219	0.011	0.012	0.349
	Sunni	0	1	0.285	0.254	-0.032	0.012	0.007
	Partisan	0	1	0.424	0.423	-0.001	0.013	0.913
	Low income	0	1	0.331	0.310	0.021	0.013	0.116
	Father advanced degree	0	1	0.578	0.598	0.020	0.013	0.151
	Mother advanced degree	0	1	0.603	0.613	0.010	0.017	0.563
	Foreign born	0	1	0.307	0.237	-0.070	0.011	0.000
	College friends diversity	0	3	1.713	1.772	0.059	0.018	0.002
	Hometown diversity	0	3	1.392	1.260	-0.132	0.022	0.000
	Social openness	0	3	2.148	2.166	0.018	0.016	0.256
	Political activism	0	3	0.597	0.683	0.086	0.020	0.000
Full Data N = 1,611	Male	0	1	0.450	0.434	-0.016	0.026	0.536
	Private school	0	1	0.918	0.904	-0.013	0.015	0.383
	Christian	0	1	0.416	0.457	0.041	0.026	0.123
	Shia	0	1	0.217	0.198	-0.019	0.022	0.382
	Sunni	0	1	0.279	0.253	-0.026	0.023	0.253
	Partisan	0	1	0.441	0.405	-0.036	0.026	0.163
	Low income	0	1	0.344	0.315	-0.030	0.026	0.252
	Father advanced degree	0	1	0.592	0.609	0.017	0.026	0.516
	Mother advanced degree	0	1	0.616	0.608	-0.008	0.026	0.754
	Foreign born	0	1	0.283	0.227	-0.056	0.023	0.013
	College friends diversity	0	3	1.709	1.726	0.017	0.037	0.642
	Hometown diversity	0	3	1.332	1.260	-0.072	0.042	0.086
	Social openness	0	3	2.168	2.169	0.000	0.028	0.988
	Political activism	0	3	0.592	0.676	0.084	0.037	0.022




Figure A.15: Estimates are MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned student applicant attributes on the probability of being preferred for admission for two respondent sub-groups. The third plot is a difference of estimates for the two sub-groups. The plots test the contact hypothesis: whether time spent at university from the first-year (freshmen sub-group) to later years (upperclassmen sub-group) changes student attitudes.




Figure A.16: Estimates are MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned faculty candidate attributes on the probability of being preferred for employment for two respondent sub-groups. The third plot is a difference of estimates for the two sub-groups. The plots test the contact hypothesis: whether time spent at university from the first-year (freshmen sub-group) to later years (upperclassmen sub-group) changes student attitudes




Figure A.17: Full conjoint model, combining the student applicant sample and faculty candidate sample of the survey along three common dimensions (sect, party and gender). Estimates are MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned attributes on the probability of being preferred two respondent sub-groups. The third plot is a difference of estimates for the two sub-groups. The plots provide evidence that estimates results are similar to Figures A.15 and A.16 with when the respondent sample is balanced.




Figure A.18: Estimates are MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned student applicant attributes on the probability of being preferred for admission for four respondent sub-groups. The second, third and fourth plots show the "Upperclassmen" cohort from Figure ?? by component sub-groups.




Figure A.19: Estimates are MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned student applicant attributes on the probability of being preferred for admission for four respondent sub-groups. The second, third and fourth plots show the "Upperclassmen" cohort from Figure ?? by component sub-groups.




Figure A.20: Estimates are based on seven imputations of MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned student applicant attributes on the probability of being preferred for admission for two respondent sub-groups. The third plot is a difference of estimates for the two sub-groups. The plots test the effect of pre-university diversity on attitudes.




Figure A.21: Estimates are based on seven imputations of MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned faculty candidate attributes on the probability of being preferred for employment for two respondent sub-groups. The third plot is a difference of estimates for the two sub-groups. The plots test the effect of pre-university diversity on attitudes.




Figure A.22: Estimates are based on seven imputations of MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned student applicant attributes on the probability of being preferred for admission for three respondent sub-groups. The plots compare how different levels of pre-university diversity affect attitudes.




Figure A.23: Estimates are based on seven imputations of MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned faculty candidate attributes on the probability of being preferred for employment for three respondent sub-groups. The plots compare how different levels of pre-university diversity affect attitudes.




Figure A.24: Estimates are based on seven imputations of MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned student applicant attributes on the probability of being preferred for admission for two respondent sub-groups. The third plot is a difference of estimates for the two sub-groups.




Figure A.25: Estimates are based on seven imputations of MMs with clustered standard errors. The plots show estimates of the effects of randomly assigned faculty candidate attributes on the probability of being preferred for employment for two respondent sub-groups. The third plot is a difference of estimates for the two sub-groups.

Appendix B

Behavioral Strategies in the University

B.1 Investment Games: Description of Covariates

Two investment games were administered to Lebanese students on three university campuses: AUB, LAU and Haigazian. The investment games were the prisoner's dilemma with two partners and the modified prisoner's dilemma with four partners. Respondents played 10 rounds of the prisoner's dilemma and 5 rounds of the modified prisoner's dilemma. Many of the students who participated in the laboratory games had already taken the conjoint survey in the classroom setting and had come to the lab with an invitation. Their background information was pre-recorded in the game software. Nevertheless, given that some students who came to the lab had not taken the conjoint survey or did not recall the code that matched them to the conjoint experiment, a short questionnaire was administered to all student prior to game play. This insured that all students experienced uniform pre-game tasks.

Participants were asked about their sectarian identity, partisan preference, gender, place of birth, family income, and parents' education and profession. The survey asked participants to identify their partisan preference by selecting from a list of political parties (e.g. Free Patriotic Movement or Future Movement). Each party was then coded into the

broad partisan alliance to which it belongs: the Hezbollah-dominated March 8 movement or the Sunni March 14 movement. The reference category for the partisan variable is "no partisan affiliation", i.e. participants who indicated that they do not support any existing major party. Participants' gender and place of birth were coded as dummy variables.

Family income was measured on an ordinal scale that took "low", "below average", "average", "above average" and "high" values for income. This variable was not a sufficient measure of family income or family socioeconomic status, however. The regression models thus also take into account parental socioeconomic status (SES) to control for participants' social class and income. Parental SES was measured with four indicator variables for parents' educational and occupational levels. The education variable for each parents was coded according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) and then converted to the International Standard Level of Education (ISLED), developed by Schroder and Ganzeboom (2014). The conversion from ISCED to ISLED followed the general conversion table for countries that do not participate in the European Social Survey. The disadvantages of the ISCED, namely that it is a categorical variable and fails to account for country-specific educational details, were not solved in this conversion. The education variable for each parent took the following values: no schooling completed (17.3), did not complete high school (30.6), completed high school (44.9), technical degree (63.5), bachelor's degree (74.2), master's degree (80.9), and doctoral degree or equivalent (90.4). Despite following a scale from 0 to 100, these values are consistent for the entire dataset and thus do not account for differences in education systems for those educated in Lebanon and abroad. The questionnaire did not collect information fine-grained enough to account for country-level education differences.

Parents' occupation variables were measured according to the International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO-08) and then converted to the International Socio-Economic Index of occupational status (ISEI-08) (Ganzeboom and Triman, 2010). The main advantage of the ISEI is that it gives an estimate of socioeconomic position on the occupa-

tional status hierarchy. The ISEI captures the indirect effect of education on earnings by correctly placing occupations on a scale that ranges from 0 to 100.

The survey portion of the investment games was missing 7% of data. As the missing data was dispersed throughout respondents, total missingness would have constituted 34% of respondents. To prevent a loss of observations in regression analysis, the data was imputed using the "mice" package in R. Multiple imputation replaces missing cells with multiple values generated from information in the observed portion of the data set. The multiple imputation method is superior to listwise deletion because it provides an unbiased solution to missing data when the pattern of missing data is not completely random (Lall, 2016). The pattern of missing data is presented in Figure B.1. Figure B.1 demonstrates that 65% of the data contains no missing values, and the remaining 35% of data contains missing values that fall into 21 difference patterns.

Multiple imputation was applied to the data creating seven imputed data sets from 10 iterations. The number of imputations follows a rule of thumb where the number of imputations equals the average percentage rate of missingness in the variables (Bodner, 2008, White, Royston, and Wood, 2010). This approach is similar to one advocated by van Buuren (2012). The number of iterations was determined from evidence that between five and ten iterations are sufficient for inferential validity (Oberman, S. v. Buuren, and Vink, 2020).

A principal component analysis on the parents' educational and occupational variables indicated that the variables can be combined into an index of acceptable reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.72$).¹ The Cronbach's α was calculated separately for each imputed data set and an average taken. To form an index, the four variables were standardized to a Z-metric (mean = 0, standard deviation = 1) and averaged. Similar to the approach taken by Brons, Liefbroer, and Ganzeboom, 2017, the four variables were averaged together to

¹George and Mallery (2003) indicate that a value of 0.7 is acceptable, whereas 0.8 is good and 0.9 is excellent. Hair et. al. (2010) propose that values as low as 0.6 could also be acceptable.




Figure B.1: Pattern of Missing Data

create a joint parental SES, as the regression models are indifferent to the relative strength of the father's and mother's SES.

B.2 Investment Games: Sample Description

Respondents were invited to participate in the investment games after completing the survey and conjoint experiment in the classroom setting. Of the 1,611 respondents who

participated in the classroom, 184 chose to come to a lab session. A total of 17 lab sessions were held, with an average of 12 respondents in each session. Table B.1 provides descriptive statistics for respondents who were primed with "neutral" information about their partners and respondents who were "treated" with salient information about their partners. The two respondent samples differ most markedly on the dimensions of private school attendance (16%) and partisanship (11%). Differences occur because assignment was done at random and the N is not so large as to equalize the two samples. As all other variables achieve sufficient parity across the two treatment arms, the samples can be used for comparison.

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics of Participants in the Investment Games

	Min	Max	Full Sample	Treatment Rounds	Neutral Rounds
Male	0	1	0.707	0.708	0.706
Private school	0	1	0.925	0.776	0.936
Christian	0	1	0.284	0.284	0.218
Shia	0	1	0.358	0.358	0.387
Sunni	0	1	0.297	0.297	0.331
Father has advanced degree	0	1	0.586	0.587	0.591
Mother has advanced degree	0	1	0.602	0.601	0.614
Family low income	0	1	0.087	0.087	0.099
Born in Lebanon	0	1	0.886	0.887	0.891
Partisan	0	1	0.413	0.534	0.415
AUB			0.587	0.585	0.625
Haigazian			0.261	0.264	0.282
LAU			0.152	0.151	0.093
N			184	184	154

B.2.1 Prisoner's Dilemma

A basic distributions in Table B.2 shows mean investment decisions by treatment type. For the prisoner's dilemma, difference in mean investment in the "control" sessions (mean = 0.50) and the "neutral" treatment in the treatment sessions (mean = 0.54) is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). Respondents show a greater likelihood of investing with partners whose identities they do not know in contexts where they interact with partners

Table B.2: Mean Investment Decisions by Treatment

	Prisoner's Dilemma	Modified PD
Control	0.504	0.474
Neutral	0.542	—
In-group	0.570	—
No out-group	—	0.533
One out-group	0.430	0.493
Increasing out-group	—	0.426

belonging to the in-group and out-group. This tendency to show pro-social behavior toward "neutral" partners may be due to the presence of out-group partners. A debate in the literature focuses on the effect that an out-group presence has on behavior. Early studies showed that an out-group presence increases pro-social behaviors toward all in the environment (). Studies challenging this view have argued the opposite by showing that an out-group presence leads to identity entrenchment and differential behaviors that favor the in-group (). More recently, studies engaged with this debate have added a great deal of nuance to the circumstances under which the out-group leads to behavioral changes (explain what they are AND). Given the much lower likelihood of cooperation with out-group partners (mean = 0.430) than with "control" and "neutral" partners, it is clear that an out-group presence among respondents in this study does not lead to universal pro-social behaviors. Instead, the evidence here points to a possible entrenchment of distinct identities that differential "us" vs "them." In this context, greater cooperation with a "neutral" partner may indicate that respondents are construing "neutral" partners as more *trustworthy* than an out-group partner, when interactions with out-group partners are common. To test this hypothesis fully, control sessions should be compared to (1) sessions with neutral and in-group partners and (2) sessions with neutral and out-group partners. Without this additional experimental data, conclusions here are only speculative.

B.2.2 The Modified Prisoner's Dilemma

The empty values on the "neutral" and in-group treatments for the modified prisoner's dilemma in Table B.2 raises another important questions that needs further discussion. As in the prisoner's dilemma, the modified prisoner's dilemma randomly assigned partners to the "neutral", "sect" and "party" treatments during the treatment sessions. This means that a respondent was matched to three partners assigned to some combinations of "neutral", "sect" and "party" treatments. Due to random matching, no round was comprised exclusively of "neutral" partners. Thus, there is no way to calculate respondent behavior under the "neutral" treatment for the modified prisoner's dilemma.

The inclusion of the "neutral" treatment in the modified prisoner's dilemma has an important implication for understanding behavioral results. As the question of interest in administering the modified prisoner's dilemma was to track respondent behavior as the number of out-group partners increased from no out-group partner to three out-group partners, the game design was indifferent to the composition of partners in the reference category. Rounds with exclusively in-group partners, as well as rounds with in-group and "neutral" partners, were both treated as reference categories for measuring the effect of increasing the out-group in regression analysis. Combining these two types of rounds into the same reference category has lowered the mean investment rate of the reference category. If the rate of investment with the in-group in the prisoner's dilemma (mean = 0.570) is compared with the same rate in the modified prisoner's dilemma (mean = 0.533), the effect of combining in-group rounds with in-group and "neutral" rounds is made clear.

Why not exclude all rounds with in-group and "neutral" partners, and make the in-group round into the reference category? The random assignment of treatments to partners, and the random matching of partners to respondents, means that the number of rounds where a respondent is matched to three in-group partners is not large enough for reliable regression analysis. The inclusion of rounds that combine "neutral" and in-group partners in the reference category was thus deemed necessary.

The dampening effect on respondent investment rates by the inclusion of rounds with "neutral" and in-group partners also has an impact on regression results. In the real world, it is likely that respondents encounter environments where they are surrounded by members of the in-group and people whose salient background they do not know. On the other hand, it is clear from the prisoner's dilemma experiment that respondents invest less readily with "neutral" partners (mean = 0.542) than with in-group partners (0.570). It is thus evident that "neutral" partners are also deemed to be less *trustworthy* than members of the in-group. Respondents are less likely to invest with "neutral" partners than they are with in-group partners. As there is differential treatment of "neutral" and in-group partners, rounds should ideally be created to separate the two groups to understand the *true* impact of different kinds of environments on respondent behavior. The ideal regression would then transform rounds with three in-group partners into the reference category and estimate the effects of gradually adding "neutral" and "outgroup" partners. Time and budget constraints did not permit the addition of such rounds. The reference category used in regression analysis in this book is created by combining in-group rounds with in-group and "neutral" rounds. Regression results that measure the impact of an increasing out-group are thus underestimating the effect that adding out-group partners to an otherwise in-group environment would have on investment.

B.3 Regression Models

The regression models in Tables B.3 - B.11 that include covariates were derived by pooling together the results of seven data analyses on each of the seven imputed data sets. In the regression models presented in Tables B.3 - B.11, the reference category for the sectarian identity variable is "Druze" when all respondents are included and "Christian" when the data is subset to the main sectarian groups that are the focus of this book (Christian, Shia, and Sunni). The tables that follow present models for the direction of prejudice (Table

B.3), the relative strength of sect and party in eliciting biases (Table B.4), and the effects of an increasing out-group on changing biases (Table B.5). The models are presented with and without covariates for the full sample of respondents (Models 1 and 2), excluding the Druze (Models 3 and 4), and excluding respondents who never invest or invest all the time (Models 5 and 6). Respondents who invest with all partners or who defect with all partners may be skewing results by not engaging with the investment games and the tasks at hand. Excluding these respondents and running regressions only with the "sometimes investors" permits a robustness check of Models 1 and 2. The "sometimes investors" are respondents who have engaged with the investment games and made differential investment decisions across the 10 rounds of play. Results for "sometimes investors" are similar to those of the full sample of respondents in Tables B.4 and B.5. In Table B.3, however, "sometimes investors" demonstrate only in-group preferences and no out-group derogation. This result indicates that the driving force behind results in Models 1-4 for out-group derogation are respondents who chose to invest with all partners ($N = 23$) or with none of the partners ($N = 9$) across all prisoner's dilemma rounds. With these respondents excluded from the sample in Models 5 and 6, the estimate on the intercept has fallen dramatically to 0.386 (0.086). This indicates that the excluded respondents tended to invest with "neutral" partners at higher rates than "sometimes investors." In contrast, "sometimes investors" appear to show preference for the in-group, while investing with "neutral" partners and members of the out-group at similar rates.

Tables B.6 - B.8 recreate the models for the direction of prejudice and the relative strength of sect and party with respondent fixed effects. Tables B.9 - B.11 recreate the models for the direction of prejudice and the relative strength of sect and party with cluster-robust standard errors on the respondent. Both sets of statistical operations produce treatment estimates that match the estimates on the main models in magnitude and direction.

Table B.3: Prisoner's Dilemma: Direction of Prejudice

	Sect		Income		Party	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.616*** (0.043)	0.649*** (0.064)	0.316*** (0.105)	0.319*** (0.120)	0.570*** (0.050)	0.599*** (0.063)
Out-group	-0.042 (0.083)	-0.025 (0.085)	0.264 (0.173)	0.287 (0.174)	0.071 (0.078)	0.100 (0.080)
Shia	-0.069 (0.068)	-0.047 (0.072)				
Sunni	0.204** (0.081)	0.231*** (0.085)				
Shia x out-group	0.035 (0.120)	0.020 (0.121)				
Sunni x out-group	-0.307** (0.127)	-0.331** (0.128)				
Income			0.143*** (0.046)	0.154*** (0.047)		
Income x out-group			-0.165** (0.071)	-0.171** (0.071)		
March 8					0.044 (0.066)	0.055 (0.069)
March 14					0.344*** (0.095)	0.364*** (0.097)
March 8 out-group					-0.230** (0.110)	-0.256** (0.112)
March 14 x out-group					-0.523*** (0.146)	-0.556*** (0.148)
Male		-0.068 (0.059)		-0.049 (0.059)		-0.063 (0.060)
Parental SES		-0.014 (0.035)		-0.035 (0.035)		-0.036 (0.035)
Foreign born		0.045 (0.088)		0.032 (0.086)		0.044 (0.086)
N	118	118	118	118	118	118

Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with seven datasets of predictive mean matching imputations. All models exclude Druze respondents and estimate results with the three principal sectarian groups which are the focus of this research: Christian, Shia and Sunni.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.4: Prisoner's Dilemma: Direction of Prejudice

	Full Sample		Main Sects		Sometimes Investors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.536*** (0.016)	0.578*** (0.073)	0.528*** (0.017)	0.511*** (0.061)	0.449*** (0.018)	0.386*** (0.086)
In-group	0.054 (0.035)	0.100*** (0.036)	0.104*** (0.035)	0.098*** (0.037)	0.139*** (0.040)	0.119*** (0.039)
Out-group	-0.122*** (0.032)	-0.100*** (0.035)	-0.087** (0.036)	-0.101*** (0.037)	-0.032 (0.036)	-0.044 (0.037)
Sect: Christian		-0.093 (0.060)				0.089 (0.076)
Sect: Shia		-0.086 (0.062)		0.012 (0.036)		-0.004 (0.079)
Sect: Sunni		-0.110* (0.060)		-0.028 (0.043)		-0.041 (0.074)
Party: March 8		-0.073** (0.034)		-0.089** (0.035)		-0.055 (0.038)
Party: March 14		-0.004 (0.041)		0.009 (0.043)		0.045 (0.046)
Male		-0.039 (0.030)		-0.041 (0.031)		-0.015 (0.034)
Parental SES		-0.023 (0.021)		-0.019 (0.022)		-0.005 (0.023)
Family income		0.053** (0.021)		0.043** (0.022)		0.041* (0.025)
Foreign born		0.040 (0.043)		0.065 (0.047)		0.019 (0.050)
N	184	184	175	175	152	152

Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with seven datasets of predictive mean matching imputations. Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 include all respondents: Druze, Christian, Shia and Sunni. Models 3 and 4 exclude Druze respondents and estimate results with the three principal sectarian groups which are the focus of this research: Christian, Shia and Sunni.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.5: Prisoner's Dilemma: Sect vs. Politics

	Full Sample		Main Sects		Sometimes Investors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.589*** (0.038)	0.685*** (0.133)	0.626*** (0.040)	0.585*** (0.101)	0.600*** (0.040)	0.559*** (0.150)
In-group politics	0.043 (0.057)	-0.021 (0.063)	0.015 (0.061)	-0.019 (0.063)	-0.010 (0.060)	-0.051 (0.067)
Out-group sect	-0.116 (0.068)	-0.135** (0.059)	-0.099* (0.056)	-0.119** (0.059)	-0.127* (0.064)	-0.125** (0.062)
Out-group politics	-0.234*** (0.064)	-0.328*** (0.065)	-0.317*** (0.064)	-0.334*** (0.066)	-0.253*** (0.075)	-0.317*** (0.069)
Sect: Christian		-0.121 (0.105)				0.005 (0.130)
Sect: Shia		-0.132 (0.112)		-0.015 (0.057)		-0.073 (0.137)
Sect: Sunni		-0.180* (0.109)		-0.075 (0.067)		-0.104 (0.133)
Party: March 8		-0.088* (0.053)		-0.084 (0.053)		-0.085 (0.055)
Party: March 14		0.057 (0.075)		0.108 (0.080)		0.090 (0.079)
Male		-0.055 (0.050)		-0.043 (0.052)		-0.016 (0.054)
Parental SES		-0.042 (0.036)		-0.030 (0.036)		-0.026 (0.038)
Family income		0.081** (0.035)		0.064* (0.036)		0.068* (0.037)
Foreign born		-0.061 (0.073)		-0.040 (0.081)		-0.046 (0.081)
N	127	127	118	118	115	115

Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with seven datasets of predictive mean matching imputations. Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 include all respondents: Druze, Christian, Shia and Sunni. Models 3 and 4 exclude Druze respondents and estimate results with the three principal sectarian groups which are the focus of this research: Christian, Shia and Sunni.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.6: Public Goods: Increasing Out-group

	Full Sample		Main Sects		Sometimes Investors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.533*** (0.033)	0.415*** (0.139)	0.553*** (0.035)	0.479*** (0.106)	0.508*** (0.037)	0.586*** (0.161)
Out-group partner	-0.040 (0.047)	-0.081 (0.053)	-0.073 (0.052)	-0.085 (0.054)	-0.005 (0.053)	-0.054 (0.060)
Increasing out-group	-0.107** (0.053)	-0.143** (0.063)	-0.130** (0.060)	-0.137** (0.064)	-0.067 (0.059)	-0.160** (0.073)
Sect: Christian		0.056 (0.110)				-0.121 (0.118)
Sect: Shia		-0.025 (0.116)		-0.023 (0.059)		-0.147 (0.128)
Sect: Sunni		0.034 (0.111)		-0.024 (0.074)		-0.069 (0.123)
Party: March 8		-0.053 (0.057)		-0.046 (0.057)		-0.057 (0.064)
Party: March 14		0.101 (0.078)		0.153* (0.084)		0.095 (0.092)
Male		0.046 (0.054)		0.040 (0.055)		0.094 (0.061)
Parental SES		-0.068* (0.037)		-0.070* (0.037)		-0.037 (0.040)
Family income		0.038 (0.038)		0.028 (0.039)		0.006 (0.045)
Foreign born		0.022 (0.081)		0.095 (0.090)		-0.033 (0.097)
N	129	129	120	120	104	104

Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with seven datasets of predictive mean matching imputations. Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 include all respondents: Druze, Christian, Shia and Sunni. Models 3 and 4 exclude Druze respondents and estimate results with the three principal sectarian groups which are the focus of this research: Christian, Shia and Sunni.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.7: Prisoner's Dilemma: Direction Models with Fixed Effects

	Full Sample, No Fixed Effects		Full Sample, Fixed Effects		Main Sects, No Fixed Effects		Main Sects, Fixed Effects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.536*** (0.016)	0.578*** (0.073)	0.778*** (0.135)	0.439 (0.460)	0.528*** (0.017)	0.511*** (0.061)	0.777*** (0.135)	0.834 (0.610)
In-group	0.054 (0.035)	0.100*** (0.036)	0.073* (0.042)	0.069* (0.039)	0.104*** (0.035)	0.098*** (0.037)	0.077** (0.038)	0.070* (0.040)
Out-group	-0.122*** (0.032)	-0.100*** (0.035)	-0.084** (0.039)	-0.088** (0.036)	-0.087** (0.036)	-0.101*** (0.037)	-0.092** (0.038)	-0.092** (0.038)
Sect: Christian		-0.093 (0.060)		0.394 (0.448)				
Sect: Shia		-0.086 (0.062)		0.496 (0.374)		0.012 (0.036)		0.101 (0.274)
Sect: Sunni		-0.110* (0.060)		0.443** (0.209)		-0.028 (0.043)		0.048 (0.534)
Party: March 8		-0.073** (0.034)		-0.029 (0.326)		-0.089** (0.035)		-0.029 (0.327)
Party: March 14		-0.004 (0.041)		-0.007 (0.196)		0.009 (0.043)		-0.007 (0.196)
Male		-0.039 (0.030)		0.130 (0.385)		-0.041 (0.031)		0.131 (0.386)
Parental SES		-0.023 (0.021)		0.044 (0.283)		-0.019 (0.022)		0.044 (0.284)
Family income		0.053** (0.021)		-0.024 (0.253)		0.043** (0.022)		-0.024 (0.254)
Foreign born		0.040 (0.043)		0.011 (0.202)		0.065 (0.047)		0.011 (0.203)
N	184	184	184	184	175	175	175	175

Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with seven datasets of predictive mean matching imputations. Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 include all respondents: Druze, Christian, Shia and Sunni. Models 3 and 4 exclude Druze respondents and estimate results with the three principal sectarian groups which are the focus of this research: Christian, Shia and Sunni.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.8: Prisoner's Dilemma: Sect vs. Politics with Fixed Effects

	Full Sample, No Fixed Effects		Full Sample, With Fixed Effects		Main Sects, No Fixed Effects		Main Sects, With Fixed Effects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.589*** (0.038)	0.685*** (0.133)	0.370 (0.269)	0.178 (0.740)	0.626*** (0.040)	0.585*** (0.101)	0.356 (0.268)	0.621 (0.652)
In-group politics	0.043 (0.057)	-0.021 (0.063)	-0.037 (0.068)	-0.018 (0.070)	0.015 (0.061)	-0.019 (0.063)	-0.023 (0.070)	-0.014 (0.071)
Out-group sect	-0.116 (0.068)	-0.135** (0.059)	-0.145* (0.076)	-0.115* (0.064)	-0.099* (0.056)	-0.119** (0.059)	-0.127** (0.062)	-0.112* (0.064)
Out-group politics	-0.234*** (0.064)	-0.328*** (0.065)	-0.226** (0.086)	-0.262*** (0.074)	-0.317*** (0.064)	-0.334*** (0.066)	-0.280*** (0.075)	-0.275*** (0.076)
Sect: Christian		-0.121 (0.105)		0.441 (0.297)				
Sect: Shia		-0.132 (0.112)		-0.201 (0.314)		-0.015 (0.057)		-0.634*** (0.204)
Sect: Sunni		-0.180* (0.109)		0.482 (0.524)		-0.075 (0.067)		0.052 (0.575)
Party: March 8		-0.088* (0.053)		-0.222 (0.220)		-0.084 (0.053)		-0.219 (0.220)
Party: March 14		0.057 (0.075)		-0.030 (0.447)		0.108 (0.080)		-0.035 (0.447)
Male		-0.055 (0.050)		0.437 (0.572)		-0.043 (0.052)		0.433 (0.572)
Parental SES		-0.042 (0.036)		0.258 (0.399)		-0.030 (0.036)		0.262 (0.400)
Family income		0.081** (0.035)		-0.089 (0.246)		0.064* (0.036)		-0.091 (0.246)
Foreign born		-0.061 (0.073)		0.163 (0.679)		-0.040 (0.081)		0.325 (0.633)
N	127	127	127	127	118	118	118	118

Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with seven datasets of predictive mean matching imputations. Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 include all respondents: Druze, Christian, Shia and Sunni. Models 3 and 4 exclude Druze respondents and estimate results with the three principal sectarian groups which are the focus of this research: Christian, Shia and Sunni.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.9: Public Goods: Increasing Out-group with Fixed Effects

	Full Sample, No Fixed Effects		Full Sample, With Fixed Effects		Main Sect, No Fixed Effects		Main Sect, With Fixed Effects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.533*** (0.033)	0.415*** (0.139)	0.600*** (0.206)	0.469 (0.646)	0.553*** (0.035)	0.479*** (0.106)	0.618*** (0.201)	0.161 (0.592)
Out-group partner	-0.040 (0.047)	-0.081 (0.053)	-0.001 (0.057)	-0.042 (0.061)	-0.073 (0.052)	-0.085 (0.054)	-0.045 (0.061)	-0.047 (0.063)
Increasing out-group	-0.107** (0.053)	-0.143** (0.063)	-0.089 (0.073)	-0.172** (0.080)	-0.130** (0.060)	-0.137** (0.064)	-0.164** (0.082)	-0.168** (0.083)
Sect: Christian		-0.056 (0.110)		-0.313 (0.310)				
Sect: Shia		-0.025 (0.116)		-0.914*** (0.329)		-0.023 (0.059)		-0.604*** (0.214)
Sect: Sunni		0.034 (0.111)		0.927** (0.446)		-0.024 (0.074)		-0.610 (0.456)
Party: March 8		-0.053 (0.057)		0.423* (0.219)		-0.046 (0.057)		0.423* (0.218)
Party: March 14		0.101 (0.078)		1.107*** (0.393)		0.153* (0.084)		1.101*** (0.392)
Male		-0.022 (0.054)		0.122 (0.512)		0.040 (0.055)		-0.126 (0.511)
Parental SES		-0.068 (0.037)		-0.063 (0.321)		-0.070* (0.037)		-0.061 (0.320)
Family income		0.038 (0.038)		0.216 (0.229)		0.028 (0.039)		0.215 (0.228)
Foreign born		0.022 (0.081)		-1.807*** (0.590 =)		0.095 (0.090)		-0.314 (0.538)
N	129	129	129	129	120	120	120	120

Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with seven datasets of predictive mean matching imputations. Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 include all respondents: Druze, Christian, Shia and Sunni. Models 3 and 4 exclude Druze respondents and estimate results with the three principal sectarian groups which are the focus of this research: Christian, Shia and Sunni.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.10: Prisoner's Dilemma: Direction Models with Cluster Robust Standard Errors

	Full Sample, No Clustered SEs		Full Sample, Clustered SEs		Main Sects, No Clustered SEs		Main Sects, Clustered SEs	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.536*** (0.016)	0.578*** (0.073)	0.536*** (0.031)	0.571*** (0.144)	0.528*** (0.017)	0.511*** (0.061)	0.528*** (0.032)	0.500*** (0.096)
In-group	0.054 (0.035)	0.100*** (0.036)	0.058 (0.041)	0.101** (0.047)	0.104*** (0.035)	0.098*** (0.037)	0.104** (0.045)	0.100** (0.047)
Out-group	-0.122*** (0.032)	-0.100*** (0.035)	-0.119*** (0.041)	-0.101** (0.046)	-0.087** (0.036)	-0.101*** (0.037)	-0.087* (0.048)	-0.102** (0.048)
Sect: Christian		-0.093 (0.060)		-0.097 (0.122)				
Sect: Shia		-0.086 (0.062)		-0.086 (0.126)		0.012 (0.036)		0.016 (0.062)
Sect: Sunni		-0.110* (0.060)		-0.108 (0.118)		-0.028 (0.043)		-0.023 (0.075)
Party: March 8		-0.073** (0.034)		-0.071 (0.060)		-0.089** (0.035)		-0.087 (0.060)
Party: March 14		-0.004 (0.041)		-0.002 (0.078)		0.009 (0.043)		0.012 (0.085)
Male		-0.039 (0.030)		-0.040 (0.052)		-0.041 (0.031)		-0.041 (0.053)
Parental SES		-0.023 (0.021)		-0.025 (0.036)		-0.019 (0.022)		-0.021 (0.037)
Family income		0.053** (0.021)		-0.055 (0.034)		0.043** (0.022)		0.046 (0.035)
Foreign born		0.040 (0.043)		0.042 (0.078)		0.065 (0.047)		0.067 (0.087)
N	184	184	184	184	175	175	175	175

Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with seven datasets of predictive mean matching imputations. Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 include all respondents: Druze, Christian, Shia and Sunni. Models 3 and 4 exclude Druze respondents and estimate results with the three principal sectarian groups which are the focus of this research: Christian, Shia and Sunni.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.11: Prisoner's Dilemma: Sect vs. Politics with Cluster Robust Standard Errors

	Full Sample, No Clustered SEs		Full Sample, With Clustered SEs		Main Sects, No Clustered SEs		Main Sects, With Clustered SEs	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.589*** (0.038)	0.685*** (0.133)	0.591*** (0.035)	0.683*** (0.152)	0.626*** (0.040)	0.585*** (0.101)	0.626*** (0.046)	0.577*** (0.123)
In-group politics	0.043 (0.057)	-0.021 (0.063)	0.042 (0.059)	-0.017 (0.071)	0.015 (0.061)	-0.019 (0.063)	0.015 (0.069)	-0.016 (0.071)
Out-group sect	-0.116 (0.068)	-0.135** (0.059)	-0.113*** (0.044)	-0.136** (0.068)	-0.099* (0.056)	-0.119** (0.059)	-0.099 (0.066)	-0.120* (0.068)
Out-group politics	-0.234*** (0.064)	-0.328*** (0.065)	-0.238*** (0.050)	-0.328*** (0.068)	-0.317*** (0.064)	-0.334*** (0.066)	-0.317*** (0.073)	-0.335*** (0.069)
Sect: Christian		-0.121 (0.105)		-0.128 0.147				
Sect: Shia		-0.132 (0.112)		-0.135 (0.152)		-0.015 (0.057)		-0.012 (0.082)
Sect: Sunni		-0.180* (0.109)		-0.183 (0.148)		-0.075 (0.067)		0.073 (0.091)
Party: March 8		-0.088* (0.053)		-0.085 (0.069)		-0.084 (0.053)		-0.081 (0.068)
Party: March 14		0.057 (0.075)		0.057 (0.087)		0.108 (0.080)		0.109 (0.092)
Male		-0.055 (0.050)		-0.054 (0.062)		-0.043 (0.052)		-0.042 (0.065)
Parental SES		-0.042 (0.036)		-0.043 (0.047)		-0.030 (0.036)		-0.031 (0.047)
Family income		0.081** (0.035)		0.082** (0.036)		0.064* (0.036)		0.065* (0.035)
Foreign born		-0.061 (0.073)		-0.62 (0.089)		-0.040 (0.081)		-0.042 (0.101)
N	127	127	127	127	118	118	118	118

Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with seven datasets of predictive mean matching imputations. Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 include all respondents: Druze, Christian, Shia and Sunni. Models 3 and 4 exclude Druze respondents and estimate results with the three principal sectarian groups which are the focus of this research: Christian, Shia and Sunni.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.12: Public Goods: Increasing Out-group with Cluster Robust Standard Errors

	Full Sample, No Clustered SEs		Full Sample, With Clustered SEs		Main Sect, No Clustered SEs		Main Sect, With Clustered SEs	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.533*** (0.033)	0.415*** (0.139)	0.552*** (0.044)	0.497*** (0.128)	0.553*** (0.035)	0.479*** (0.106)	0.553*** (0.045)	0.497*** (0.113)
Out-group partner	-0.040 (0.047)	-0.081 (0.053)	-0.061 (0.053)	-0.075 (0.054)	-0.073 (0.052)	-0.085 (0.054)	-0.068 (0.055)	-0.078 (0.055)
Increasing out-group	-0.107** (0.053)	-0.143** (0.063)	-0.134** (0.058)	-0.143** (0.066)	-0.130** (0.060)	-0.137** (0.064)	-0.137** (0.062)	-0.142** (0.068)
Sect: Christian		-0.056 (0.110)		0.003 (0.088)				
Sect: Shia		-0.025 (0.116)		-0.031 (0.097)		-0.023 (0.059)		-0.032 (0.069)
Sect: Sunni		0.034 (0.111)		-0.023 (0.097)		-0.024 (0.074)		-0.033 (0.077)
Party: March 8		-0.053 (0.057)		-0.054 (0.059)		-0.046 (0.057)		-0.049 (0.060)
Party: March 14		0.101 (0.078)		0.092 (0.090)		0.153* (0.084)		0.136 (0.087)
Male		-0.022 (0.054)		0.006 (0.059)		0.040 (0.055)		0.011 (0.064)
Parental SES		-0.068 (0.037)		-0.050 (0.031)		-0.070* (0.037)		-0.047 (0.034)
Family income		0.038 (0.038)		0.036 (0.036)		0.028 (0.039)		0.033 (0.037)
Foreign born		0.022 (0.081)		-0.007 (0.088)		0.095 (0.090)		0.047 (0.101)
N	129	129	129	129	120	120	120	120

Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with seven datasets of predictive mean matching imputations. Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 include all respondents: Druze, Christian, Shia and Sunni. Models 3 and 4 exclude Druze respondents and estimate results with the three principal sectarian groups which are the focus of this research: Christian, Shia and Sunni.
 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Appendix C

Attitudes in the Neighborhoods

C.1 Control Variables

The neighborhood study sought to measure the effect of experimental treatment interventions on respondents attitudes and behaviors. Analysis of survey instruments included a series of individual-level and contextual-level control variables. These variables are described here.

C.1.1 Individual-Level Controls

Anti-establishment partisan: Respondents were asked which political party they support. Respondents could select: "Free Patriotic Movement", "Lebanese Forces", "Future Movement", "Kataeb", "Hezbollah", "Amal Movement", "Marada Movement", "Syrian Social Nationalist Party", "Sabaa/Kulluna Watani" or "other". Respondents could specify any other party they supported if they selected "other". Most respondents specified that they were independent. This indicator variable was coded for those who specified an independent political orientation or support for "Sabaa/Kulluna Watani": (0,1).

Household Income: Respondents were asked to specify their monthly household income from a list of income ranges provided. The ranges included: "less than \$500", "\$501 -

1,000", "\$1,001 - 1,500", "\$1,501 - 2,000", "\$2,001 - 2,500", "\$2,501 - 3,000", "Above \$3,001". Each of the income ranges was standardized to a single average income. For example, "\$1,001 - 1,500" was standardized to "\$1,250". The average income was then recalculated using a standard OECD formula to account for household size:

$$\text{Income} = \frac{\text{HH Income}}{\sqrt{\# \text{ in HH}}} \quad (\text{C.1})$$

The log of income from the OECD formula was taken to deal with right skew.

Employed: Respondents were asked if they currently have a job that pays a cash income: (0,1).

Education: Respondents were asked to specify the highest level of education they had completed. Options included: "did not complete elementary school", "elementary school level", "intermediate school level", "secondary school level", "vocational school level", "Bachelor", "Master/PhD". The educational variable was transformed into a continuous variable taking values (0,6).

Home owner: Respondents were asked whether they rent or own their house/apartment: (0,1).

Age: Respondents were asked to specify their age. Respondents ranged in age from 18 to 85. Median age is 47, mean age is 46 in the dataset.

C.1.2 Contextual-Level Controls

Percent out-group in town: The percent out-group in the towns selected for the neighborhood study was calculated as part of the design of the treatment intervention. The variable ranged from 0% in the out-group to 29% in the out-group.

Town size: Town size calculates the total population in each town. The log of the variable was taken to eliminate right skew.

Palestinian camp (4mi radius): Only official Palestinian camps were included as part of this control variable. Lebanon has 12 officially recognized Palestinian refugee camps that are administered by Lebanon. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East provides services in these camps (see <https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon>). The number of camps within four miles of the towns selected for the neighborhood study ranged from (0,3).

Syrian refugees in district: This variable calculates the percent of Syrian refugees in each district where the towns selected for the neighborhood study are located. The percentage of Syrian refugees was calculated using data about Syrian refugees in Lebanon from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (see <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/596df29b4.pdf>) and data from the Lebanese Directorate General of Civil Status about the number of voters in the district, based on calculations from the 2018 Lebanese elections (see <https://www.dgcs.gov.lb>).

C.2 Respondent Selection

Respondents were selected using a random stratified sampling technique. The goal of this stratification technique was to select a representative sample of respondents by family income. First, the income distribution of each town was determined. The selection of respondents in each town proportionally reflected the income distribution of the town. The town used to illustrate the sampling technique is Borj el Brajneh.

Next, each Lebanese town is subdivided into clusters of residential buildings (see Figure C.1). These clusters are geographical lines drawn around buildings so as to evenly divide the population in each town by clusters. Then, only clusters that have households belonging to the target family income are selected (see Figure C.3). A random skip pattern then selects target clusters of the total number of clusters that were initially selected. Once the target clusters are selected, another skip pattern is initiated to select the buildings within the selected cluster that will be targeted (see Figure C.4). These buildings are usually

confined within a residential bloc. Finally, another skip pattern is initiated to select the precise households within the precise buildings that will yield respondents (see Figure C.5).



Figure C.1: Borj el Brajneah is sub-divided into clusters of equal population.




Figure C.2: The red dots represent the residential buildings in Borj el Brajneah.



Figure C.3: The clusters outlined in red are those that have households with the target family income. A random skip pattern selects a subset of these total clusters.



Figure C.4: In one of the subset of clusters selected in C.3, a subset of buildings is selected.

C.3 Election Conjoint

The conjoint experiment fielded in Lebanese universities created choice profiles with randomly varying attribute levels. Some of the profiles featured unusual combinations or sectarian identity and partisan preference, such as a Christian who supports a Shia political party like the Amal Movement or Hezbollah. While it is true that the average Lebanese Christian will be a partisan of a Christian political party like Lebanese Forces, Kataeb or the Free Patriotic Movement, or will espouse no partisan preferences whatsoever, Christian preference for Muslim parties is not out of the question. Lebanese political parties administer patronage systems to all citizens within their jurisdictions, regardless of sect (Cammett, 2014). Thus, it is very likely that individuals captured within the patronage network of an out-group party will give support to that party in elections. Furthermore, because Lebanese political parties form coalitions to run for Parliament, it is common for members of various sects to join a list of candidates running under the same coalition, or even the same party. Figure C.6 of a sample ballot paper from the 2018 Parliamentary elections is a case in point. Translations for each color-coded list are below, from right to left.

Two points are worthy of note from the ballot paper. First, Christians, Druze and Sunni candidates stand for election under explicitly Shia lists (see the green and dark blue lists). Candidates of all sectarian backgrounds stand for election under the lists of Christian and Sunni political parties (see the orange and red lists). And, candidates of all sects stand for election under lists that are not explicitly sectarian (see the yellow and light blue lists). Second, the ballots explicitly state both the party coalition and the sectarian background of each candidate. The electoral conjoint experiment in the neighborhood study employs sect and party as attributes based on this evidence from actual Lebanese ballots.



Figure C.6: Sample Ballot from the General Parliamentary Elections of May 6, 2018. The ballot was presented to voters in the minor district of Marjayoun and Hasbaya (towns in Lebanon).

Green: (list comprised of an alliance between the Amal Movement and Hezbollah)

Al Amal Wal Wafaa/Hope and Loyalty

Mohammad Hassan Raad, Shia, Nabatieh

Hani Hassan Koubeissi, Shia, Nabatieh

Yassine Kamel Jaber, Shia, Nabatieh

Ali Hasan Khalil, Shia, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Ali Rashid Fayyad, Shia, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Qassem Omar Hashem, Sunni, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Anwar Mohammad El-Khalil, Druze, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Assaad Halim Hardan, Greek Orthodox, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Hassan Nizameddine Fadlallah, Shia, Bint Jbeil

Ayoub Fahed Hmayed, Shia, Bint Jbeil

Ali Ahmad Bazzi, Shia, Bint Jbeil

Dark blue: (list led by a member of a large Shia feudal family in opposition to Amal and Hezbollah)

Fina Nghayer / We Can Change

Ahmad Mohammad Kamel El-Assaad, Shia, Nabatieh

Rabah Kasem Abi Haidar, Shia, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Abir Ghaleb Ramadan, Shia, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Adnan Hassan Al-Khatib, Sunni, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Moneh Elias Saab, Greek Orthodox, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Kanj Mahmood Alameddine, Druze, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Mohamad Farajallah Faraj, Shia, Bint Jbeil

Abdallah Mahmood Al Salman, Shia, Bint Jbeil

Orange: (list backed by the Future Movement, the Free Patriotic Movement and the Lebanese Democratic Party)

Al Janoub Yastaheq / The South Deserves

Hisham Mahmood Moufid Jaber, Shia, Nabatieh

Mostafa Ali Badereddine, Shia, Nabatieh

Nadim Samih Osseiran, Shia, Nabatieh

Abbas Mohammad Charafeddine, Shia, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Morhaf Ahmad Ramadan, Shia, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Chadi Jeris Massaad, Greek Orthodox, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Wissam Kamal Sharrouf, Druze, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Mohammad Mostafa Kdouh, Shia, Bint Jbeil

Hussein Jihad Al-Shaer, Shia, Bint Jbeil

Imad Fouad El- Khatib, Sunni, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Yellow: (list comprised of the Lebanese communist party and independents)

Sawt Wahad Lil Taghyir / One Vote for Change

Ahmad Mohammad Mourad, Shia, Bint Jbeil

Hussein Mohammad Amin Baydoun, Shia, Bint Jbeil

Abbas Ali Srour, Shia, Bint Jbeil

Ali Hussein Hajj Ali, Shia, Nabatieh

Said Mohammad Issa, Sunni, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Ghassan Mhanna Hdeifah, Druze, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Hala Philip Abou Kasm, Greek Orthodox, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Red: (list of candidates running in opposition to Hezbollah, supported by Lebanese Forces)

Shbe'na Haki / We've Had Enough of Talking

Rami Salman Ollaik, Shia, Nabatieh

Ahmad Sami Ismail, Shia, Nabatieh

Imad Mohammad Koumayha, Shia, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Fadi Klim Salameh, Greek Orthodox, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Ali Mohammad Hassan Al-Amine, Shia, Bint Jbeil

Light blue: (list of civil society groups and Sabaa Party)

Kollona Watani / We are All National

Jamil Mohammad Ali Ballout, Shia, Nabatieh

Salah Mahdi Nouredine, Shia, Bint Jbeil

Rima Ali Hmayed, Shia, Bint Jbeil

Akram Mohammad Kaiss, Druze, Marjayoun and Hasbaya

Fadi Issam Abou Jamra, Greek Orthodox, Marjayoun and Hasbaya




Figure C.7: Marginal Means: Preferences for political candidates to Parliament.

Lebanese Towns

N =408



Figure C.8: Preferences for Political Candidate by Respondent Sect




Figure C.9: Preferences for Political Candidate by the Respondent's Party Bloc




Figure C.10: Preferences for Faculty Candidates by the Respondent's Party Bloc




Figure C.11: Preferences for Political Candidates by the Majority Treatment




Figure C.12: Preferences for Political Candidates by the Majority Treatment



Figure C.13: Preferences for Political Candidates by Respondent's Income (Comparison to GNI)




Figure C.14: Preferences for Political Candidates by Respondent's Income (Quartiles)

C.4 Interaction: Political Candidate's Record and Identity

Table C.1: Decision to select a political candidate by the candidate's record, and the relationship between the candidate's and the respondent's sect and party: main regression results with cluster-robust standard errors, with and without covariates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.306*** (0.017)	0.215*** (0.046)	0.301*** (0.020)	0.209*** (0.047)	0.297*** (0.018)	0.204*** (0.048)	0.299*** (0.022)	0.200*** (0.049)
Positive record	0.125*** (0.022)	0.123*** (0.022)	0.133*** (0.026)	0.129*** (0.026)	0.139*** (0.024)	0.135*** (0.024)	0.137*** (0.029)	0.132*** (0.029)
In-group sect	0.183*** (0.021)	0.182*** (0.021)	0.198*** (0.037)	0.194*** (0.037)	0.183*** (0.021)	0.182*** (0.021)	0.176*** (0.041)	0.171*** (0.042)
In-group party	0.239*** (0.023)	0.310*** (0.029)	0.238*** (0.023)	0.310*** (0.029)	0.283*** (0.041)	0.351*** (0.045)	0.246*** (0.051)	0.312*** (0.054)
Positive record × in-group sect			-0.022 (0.045)	-0.018 (0.045)			0.006 (0.052)	0.010 (0.052)
Positive record × in-group party					-0.067 (0.049)	-0.062 (0.049)	-0.020 (0.061)	-0.014 (0.062)
In-group sect × party							0.112 (0.078)	0.120 (0.079)
Positive record × in-group sect × in-group party							-0.144 (0.097)	-0.147 (0.098)
Anti-establishment partisan		0.117*** (0.013)		0.117*** (0.013)		0.116*** (0.013)		0.116*** (0.013)
Income		-0.001 (0.005)		-0.001 (0.005)		-0.0004 (0.005)		0.0004 (0.005)
Employed		-0.008 (0.007)		-0.007 (0.007)		-0.008 (0.007)		-0.008 (0.007)
Education		0.002 (0.003)		0.002 (0.003)		0.002 (0.003)		0.001 (0.003)
Home owner		-0.003 (0.010)		-0.003 (0.010)		-0.003 (0.010)		-0.003 (0.010)
Age		0.001** (0.0002)		0.001** (0.0002)		0.0005** (0.0002)		0.001** (0.0002)
Candidate held prior office		-0.039* (0.021)		-0.039* (0.021)		-0.039* (0.021)		-0.038* (0.021)
Percent out-group in town		0.028 (0.040)		0.029 (0.040)		0.025 (0.040)		0.027 (0.040)
Town size		0.003 (0.003)		0.003 (0.003)		0.003 (0.003)		0.003 (0.003)
Palestinian camp (4 mi radius)		-0.0004 (0.005)		-0.0004 (0.005)		-0.0004 (0.005)		-0.001 (0.005)
Syrian refugees in district		0.055 (0.081)		0.054 (0.081)		0.055 (0.081)		0.057 (0.081)
Observations	2,448	2,448	2,448	2,448	2,448	2,448	2,448	2,448
R ²	0.078	0.089	0.078	0.089	0.079	0.090	0.079	0.091
Adjusted R ²	0.077	0.084	0.076	0.084	0.077	0.084	0.077	0.084

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.2: Main regression results by the subsample of respondent sect: with cluster-robust standard errors, with and without covariates

	Christian		Shia		Sunni	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.353*** (0.041)	0.337*** (0.078)	0.282*** (0.039)	0.132 (0.099)	0.299*** (0.022)	0.236*** (0.042)
Positive record	0.105** (0.052)	0.092* (0.053)	0.058 (0.053)	0.061 (0.052)	0.137*** (0.029)	0.132*** (0.029)
In-group sect	0.136** (0.069)	0.122* (0.070)	0.146* (0.076)	0.153** (0.078)	0.176*** (0.041)	0.170*** (0.041)
In-group party	0.147 (0.121)	0.224* (0.130)	0.280*** (0.067)	0.319*** (0.069)	0.246*** (0.051)	0.311*** (0.054)
Positive record × in-group sect	-0.019 (0.087)	-0.002 (0.087)	0.153 (0.096)	0.146 (0.097)	0.006 (0.052)	0.010 (0.052)
Positive record × in-group party	0.068 (0.142)	0.081 (0.143)	0.094 (0.081)	0.097 (0.081)	-0.020 (0.061)	-0.014 (0.062)
In-group sect × party	0.231 (0.156)	0.243 (0.160)	0.180* (0.105)	0.184* (0.107)	0.112 (0.078)	0.119 (0.079)
Positive record × in-group sect × in-group party	-0.279 (0.197)	-0.299 (0.198)	-0.327** (0.145)	-0.329** (0.146)	-0.144 (0.097)	-0.147 (0.098)
Anti-establishment partisan		0.111*** (0.023)		0.144*** (0.024)		0.115*** (0.013)
Income		-0.003 (0.007)		0.009 (0.014)		0.001 (0.005)
Employed		-0.009 (0.010)		0.004 (0.020)		-0.008 (0.007)
Education		0.001 (0.005)		0.005 (0.008)		0.001 (0.003)
Home owner		-0.013 (0.020)		-0.003 (0.018)		-0.003 (0.009)
Age		0.0003 (0.0003)		0.001** (0.001)		0.005** (0.0002)
Candidate held prior office		-0.055 (0.037)		-0.025 (0.034)		-0.038* (0.021)
Observations	816	816	816	816	816	816
R ²	0.048	0.059	0.152	0.165	0.079	0.091
Adjusted R ²	0.039	0.042	0.145	0.150	0.077	0.085

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.3: Robustness check of main regression results in the first choice task subsample

	<i>All Tasks</i>	First Task	<i>All Tasks</i>	First Task	<i>All Tasks</i>	First Task	<i>All Tasks</i>	First Task
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.306*** (0.017)	0.280*** (0.026)	0.301*** (0.020)	0.269*** (0.030)	0.297*** (0.018)	0.259*** (0.029)	0.299*** (0.022)	0.263*** (0.033)
Positive record	0.125*** (0.022)	0.163*** (0.034)	0.133*** (0.026)	0.179*** (0.041)	0.139*** (0.024)	0.193*** (0.040)	0.137*** (0.029)	0.202*** (0.046)
In-group sect	0.183*** (0.021)	0.209*** (0.036)	0.198*** (0.037)	0.243*** (0.060)	0.183*** (0.021)	0.210*** (0.036)	0.176*** (0.041)	0.199*** (0.071)
In-group party	0.239*** (0.023)	0.201*** (0.032)	0.238*** (0.023)	0.201*** (0.032)	0.283*** (0.041)	0.284*** (0.057)	0.246*** (0.051)	0.226*** (0.074)
Positive record × in-group sect			-0.022 (0.045)	-0.051 (0.073)			0.006 (0.052)	-0.029 (0.086)
Positive record × in-group party					-0.067 (0.049)	-0.129* (0.074)	-0.020 (0.061)	-0.107 (0.096)
In-group sect × party							0.112 (0.078)	0.176 (0.127)
Positive record × in-group sect × in-group party							-0.144 (0.097)	-0.065 (0.154)
Observations	2,448	816	2,448	816	2,448	816	2,448	816
R ²	0.078	0.087	0.078	0.088	0.079	0.090	0.079	0.093
Adjusted R ²	0.077	0.084	0.076	0.083	0.077	0.085	0.077	0.085

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.4: Robustness check of main regression results in the first choice task subsample, with covariates

	<i>All Tasks</i>	First Task	<i>All Tasks</i>	First Task	<i>All Tasks</i>	First Task	<i>All Tasks</i>	First Task
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.215*** (0.046)	0.145* (0.085)	0.209*** (0.047)	0.134 (0.084)	0.204*** (0.048)	0.122 (0.087)	0.200*** (0.049)	0.130 (0.086)
Positive record	0.123*** (0.022)	0.163*** (0.035)	0.129*** (0.026)	0.180*** (0.041)	0.135*** (0.024)	0.194*** (0.040)	0.132*** (0.029)	0.203*** (0.047)
In-group sect	0.182*** (0.021)	0.213*** (0.036)	0.194*** (0.037)	0.248*** (0.061)	0.182*** (0.021)	0.213*** (0.036)	0.171*** (0.042)	0.203*** (0.073)
In-group party	0.310*** (0.029)	0.275*** (0.044)	0.310*** (0.029)	0.274*** (0.044)	0.351*** (0.045)	0.358*** (0.065)	0.312*** (0.054)	0.300*** (0.081)
Positive record × in-group sect			-0.018 (0.045)	-0.053 (0.073)			-0.010 (0.052)	-0.029 (0.087)
Positive record × in-group party					-0.062 (0.049)	-0.130* (0.074)	-0.014 (0.062)	-0.106 (0.096)
In-group sect × party							0.120 (0.079)	0.174 (0.129)
Positive record × in-group sect × in-group party							-0.147 (0.098)	-0.070 (0.157)
Anti-establishment partisan	0.117*** (0.013)	0.117*** (0.023)	0.117*** (0.013)	0.117*** (0.023)	0.116*** (0.013)	0.117*** (0.023)	0.116*** (0.013)	0.117*** (0.023)
Income	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.0004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.013)
Employed	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.013)
Education	0.002 (0.003)	0.005 (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)	0.005 (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)	0.005 (0.005)	0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)
Home owner	-0.003 (0.010)	0.001 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.010)	0.001 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.017)
Age	0.001** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.0004)	0.001** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.0004)	0.0005** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.0004)	0.001** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.0004)
Candidate held prior office	-0.039* (0.021)	0.008 (0.037)	-0.039* (0.021)	0.009 (0.037)	-0.039* (0.021)	0.009 (0.037)	-0.038* (0.021)	0.007 (0.037)
Percent out-group in town	0.028 (0.040)	-0.002 (0.069)	0.029 (0.040)	0.001 (0.069)	0.025 (0.040)	-0.009 (0.70)	0.027 (0.040)	-0.002 (0.070)
Town size	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.006)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)
Palestinian camp (4 mi radius)	-0.0004 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.0004 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.0004 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.009 (0.008)
Syrian refugees in district	0.055 (0.081)	0.074 (0.147)	0.054 (0.081)	0.087 (0.149)	0.055 (0.081)	0.095 (0.148)	0.057 (0.081)	0.107 (0.149)
Observations	2,448	816	2,448	816	2,448	816	2,448	816
R ²	0.089	0.098	0.089	0.098	0.090	0.100	0.091	0.104
Adjusted R ²	0.084	0.082	0.084	0.081	0.084	0.083	0.084	0.083

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix D

Behavioral Strategies in the Neighborhoods

D.1 Generating "Partners"

Investment games are dynamic experimental manipulations that seek to understand how respondents make decisions when they are informed about the identities of their partners and thus develop expectations about how their partners will behave. The most common way to administer investment games is to invite respondents into a computer laboratory and ask them to interact either in person or via computer. In taking this approach, researchers are certain that respondents understand that they are (1) interacting with real people and (2) making decisions that have real-world consequences. The neighborhood study was administered in respondents' homes, however, in isolation of any prospective partners. As deception was not used in this study, and research shows that respondents find real game partners more convincing than hypothetical partners (Gillis and Hettler, 2007; Lozano, 2016; Vlaev, 2012), a two-step methodology was adopted in the administration of the neighborhood study.

The first stage involved gathering data from 25 individuals in the greater Beirut area and coding their decisions during the investment games into the algorithm of the games.

These decisions then served as the partners' decisions when the survey was administered in the primary stage of the study. Each of these 25 individuals was assigned a name and hometown that clearly defined his sectarian identity. The individuals were also each assigned a political party. None of the names designate a real person, but the sectarian identity the name indicates matches the sectarian identity of the 25 individuals who participated in the first stage of the study.

The names and hometowns generated for the 25 coded partners were derived from extensive pilot tests of the name and hometown combinations. These pilot tests revealed that the names and hometowns designate the intended sect between 71% and 100% of the time. The four entries at the bottom of Table D.1 designate individuals whose sect is not clear from their name and hometown combinations. Respondents during pilot testing expressed uncertainty about the identities of these individuals.

The name, hometown and party combinations, as well as the rate of successful identification with the designated sect, are presented in the table below. FPM designates the Free Patriotic Movement, LF the Lebanese Forces, and FM the Future Movement. The combinations of name, hometown and party were presented as the "partners" to respondents in the primary stage of the study administration.

Table D.1: Partner Name, Hometown and Party for the Investment Games

Sect	Name	Hometown	Party	ID Success (%)
Christian	John Akiki	Ajaltoun	FPM	97
	George Abi Rached	Chiyah	LF	100
	Elie Saliba	Dbayeh	FPM	100
	Joseph Salibi	Adma	LF	100
	Carlos Kairouz	Deir El Ahmar	FPM	99
	Botros Abi Nader	Jezzine	LF	97
	Joe Khoury	Haret Sakher	FPM	99
	Shia	Hassan El-Husseini	Hermel	Hezbollah
Qassem Mokdad		Lassa	Amal	90
Mahdi Kobeissy		Arabsaleem	Hezbollah	89
Haidar Haidar		Sarafand	Amal	91
Jaafar Khreis		Khiyam	Hezbollah	98
Hussein Mousawi		Braachit	Amal	99
Ali Amhaz		Laboue	Hezbollah	96
Sunni		Omar Qadri	Mdoukha	FM
	Khaled Fleeti	Aarsal	FM	96
	Tareq Damaj	Barja	FM	86
	Salah Al-Shmouri	Qalamoun	FM	78
	Othman Othman	Birqayel	FM	71
	Omar Khaled	El Marj	FM	89
	Ayman Kabbara	Deir Aamar	FM	78
	Neutral	Ibrahim Sokkar	Beirut	FPM
Shadi SHahine		Beirut	FM	
Salim Fayad		Beirut	Hezbollah	
Tarek Semaha		Beirut	No party	

D.2 Prisoner's Dilemma

The regressions in Table D.2 to D.8 show full models for regression analysis conducted in the chapter of the book. Tables D.2 and D.3 show the relative importance of different respondent attributes on their decisions to invest with members of the out-group. Discussions about these tables can be found in Chapter 2. Table D.4 describes the direction of prejudice and Table D.5 demonstrates the relative importance of sect, party, and the combination of the two variables. Tables D.6 to D.8 provide results for the prisoner's dilemma under different treatment conditions.

Table D.2: Prisoner's Dilemma: Sect, Income, Party

	Decision to Invest					
	Sect	Sect	Income	Income	Party	Party
Intercept	0.495*** (0.046)	-0.157 (0.120)	0.223*** (0.049)	0.051 (0.112)	0.463*** (0.044)	-0.091 (0.113)
Out-group	-0.124** (0.050)	-0.124** (0.049)	-0.137* (0.055)	-0.141* (0.055)	-0.051 (0.047)	-0.048 (0.045)
Shia	0.113** (0.056)	0.129** (0.063)				
Sunni	0.103* (0.063)	0.182** (0.076)				
Shia x out-group	-0.225*** (0.063)	-0.212*** (0.062)				
Sunni x out-group	-0.037 (0.069)	-0.043 (0.067)				
Income			0.117*** (0.015)	0.119*** (0.015)		
Income x out-group			-0.026 (0.016)	-0.026 (0.016)		
March 8					0.121** (0.053)	0.123** (0.052)
March 14					0.287*** (0.070)	0.301*** (0.069)
March 8 x out-group					-0.242*** (0.059)	-0.234*** (0.057)
March 14 x out-group					-0.362*** (0.079)	-0.369*** (0.077)
Employed		-0.010 (0.024)		-0.019 (0.023)		-0.005 (0.024)
Education		0.055*** (0.009)		-0.020* (0.010)		0.050*** (0.009)
House owner		0.081*** (0.032)		0.072* (0.031)		0.081** (0.032)
Age		-0.001 (0.001)		-0.002* (0.001)		-0.0005 (0.001)
Percent out-group in town		0.009 (0.245)		0.495*** (0.123)		0.458*** (0.126)
Town size		0.053*** (0.011)		0.034** (0.010)		0.042*** (0.011)
Palestinian camp (4 mi radius)		-0.075*** (0.016)		-0.040** (0.015)		-0.062*** (0.015)
Syrian refugees in district		0.772** (0.316)		-0.496* (0.250)		0.190 (0.268)

Table D.3: Prisoner's Dilemma: Religious Observers

	Decision to Invest							
	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni
Intercept	0.519*** (0.025)	0.358*** (0.057)	0.577*** (0.034)	0.522*** (0.050)	0.127 (0.106)	0.447** (0.178)	0.332*** (0.103)	0.627*** (0.116)
Out-group	-0.232*** (0.029)	-0.074 (0.062)	-0.339*** (0.040)	-0.178*** (0.055)	-0.234*** (0.028)	-0.064 (0.062)	-0.327*** (0.040)	-0.187*** (0.055)
Religious observer	0.231*** (0.050)	0.356*** (0.092)	0.167** (0.077)	0.278*** (0.095)	0.227*** (0.049)	0.382*** (0.092)	0.155** (0.078)	0.238** (0.094)
Religious observer x out-group	0.025 (0.056)	-0.101 (0.101)	-0.047 (0.093)	0.027 (0.105)	0.029 (0.055)	-0.135 (0.100)	-0.049 (0.091)	0.036 (0.103)
Employed					-0.007 (0.023)	0.073* (0.040)	-0.070* (0.040)	-0.072* (0.042)
Education					0.037*** (0.008)	0.034** (0.014)	0.061*** (0.014)	0.026 (0.016)
Home owner					0.074** (0.031)	-0.085 (0.127)	0.155*** (0.038)	0.121*** (0.043)
Age					-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.004** (0.002)
Percent out-group in town					0.441*** (0.124)			
Town size					0.045*** (0.010)			
Palestinian camp (4mi radius)					-0.065*** (0.014)			
Syrian refugee camp in district					-0.377 (0.251)			
Observations	2,057	663	724	670	2,057	663	724	670
R ²	0.087	0.081	0.124	0.092	0.135	0.116	0.169	0.129
Adjusted R ²	0.085	0.077	0.120	0.088	0.131	0.107	0.161	0.120

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.4: Prisoner's Dilemma: Direction of Prejudice

	Decision to Invest							
	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni
Intercept	0.428*** (0.032)	0.488*** (0.054)	0.230*** (0.053)	0.550*** (0.055)	-1.130*** (0.124)	-0.310 (0.238)	-1.165*** (0.152)	-0.905*** (0.168)
In-group	0.151*** (0.039)	0.008 (0.071)	0.379*** (0.061)	0.048 (0.071)	0.175*** (0.036)	-0.011 (0.068)	0.390*** (0.055)	0.076 (0.065)
Out-group	-0.068** (0.034)	-0.116** (0.058)	0.031 (0.056)	-0.112* (0.059)	-0.061* (0.031)	-0.116** (0.055)	0.049 (0.051)	-0.108** (0.054)
Majority treatment					0.062*** (0.019)	0.073** (0.034)	0.118*** (0.029)	-0.009 (0.034)
Protest treatment					-0.038** (0.019)	-0.125*** (0.035)	-0.095*** (0.030)	0.117*** (0.033)
New politics					0.073*** (0.021)	-0.0001 (0.036)	0.020 (0.041)	0.043 (0.036)
Income					0.240*** (0.016)	0.194*** (0.030)	0.227*** (0.024)	0.291*** (0.028)
Employed					-0.029 (0.022)	0.045 (0.038)	-0.098*** (0.038)	-0.059 (0.039)
Education					-0.028*** (0.009)	-0.021 (0.017)	0.005 (0.014)	-0.063*** (0.018)
Home owner					0.081*** (0.029)	-0.120 (0.121)	0.113*** (0.034)	0.090** (0.040)
Age					-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Percent out-group in town					0.506*** (0.114)			
Town size					0.027*** (0.010)			
Palestinian camp (4mi radius)					-0.018 (0.014)			
Syrian refugees in district					-0.503** (0.242)			
N	408	136	136	136	408	136	136	136
R ²	0.031	0.011	0.110	0.017	0.171	0.118	0.273	0.206
Adjusted R ²	0.030	0.009	0.108	0.014	0.166	0.106	0.264	0.195

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.5: Prisoner's Dilemma: Sect vs. Politics

	Decision to Invest							
	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni
Intercept	0.510*** (0.031)	0.436*** (0.055)	0.556*** (0.048)	0.531*** (0.055)	-1.042*** (0.124)	-0.374 (0.241)	-0.883*** (0.154)	-0.920*** (0.166)
Treatment: in-group politics	0.120** (0.056)	0.120 (0.127)	0.071 (0.073)	0.165 (0.117)	0.187*** (0.052)	0.124 (0.124)	0.104 (0.067)	0.320*** (0.107)
Treatment: in-group sect, politics	0.182*** (0.056)	0.333** (0.146)	0.106 (0.073)	0.208* (0.117)	0.240*** (0.053)	0.322** (0.142)	0.112* (0.067)	0.326*** (0.107)
Treatment: in-group sect, out-group politics	-0.073 (0.051)	-0.009 (0.081)	-0.000 (0.117)	-0.117 (0.085)	-0.113** (0.047)	-0.015 (0.078)	-0.009 (0.111)	-0.132* (0.076)
Treatment: out-group sect	-0.159*** (0.038)	-0.050 (0.067)	-0.363*** (0.060)	-0.063 (0.067)	-0.144*** (0.035)	-0.033 (0.064)	-0.332*** (0.054)	-0.062 (0.060)
Treatment: out-group politics	-0.120*** (0.036)	-0.058 (0.064)	-0.206*** (0.059)	-0.098 (0.064)	-0.121*** (0.034)	-0.051 (0.061)	-0.184*** (0.054)	-0.098* (0.057)
Treatment: out-group sect, politics	-0.181*** (0.038)	-0.088 (0.067)	-0.317*** (0.059)	-0.118* (0.068)	-0.171*** (0.035)	-0.074 (0.065)	-0.310*** (0.054)	-0.108* (0.061)
Majority treatment					0.070*** (0.019)	0.071** (0.035)	0.126*** (0.031)	0.013 (0.034)
Protest treatment					-0.034* (0.019)	-0.121*** (0.035)	-0.079** (0.031)	0.098*** (0.033)
New politics					0.097*** (0.022)	0.028 (0.038)	0.015 (0.043)	0.116*** (0.038)
Income					0.235*** (0.016)	0.177*** (0.030)	0.235*** (0.025)	0.293*** (0.027)
Employed					-0.019 (0.022)	0.054 (0.038)	-0.083** (0.038)	-0.071* (0.039)
Education					-0.023** (0.009)	-0.011 (0.017)	0.008 (0.014)	-0.068*** (0.017)
Home owner					0.070** (0.029)	-0.095 (0.121)	0.108*** (0.036)	0.091** (0.040)
Age					-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)
Percent out-group in town					0.513*** (0.116)			
Town size					0.028*** (0.010)			
Palestinian camp (4mi radius)					-0.027* (0.014)			
Syrian refugees in district					-0.388 (0.244)			
N	408	136	136	136	408	136	136	136
R ²	0.040	0.017	0.127	0.023	0.187	0.113	0.292	0.233
Adjusted R ²	0.037	0.008	0.120	0.014	0.180	0.096	0.278	0.218

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.6: Prisoner's Dilemma: Sect vs. Politics by Partisanship

	Decision to Invest			
	Partisans		Non-partisans	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.555*** (0.041)	-1.074*** (0.197)	0.463*** (0.045)	-1.098*** (0.160)
Treatment: in-group politics	0.075 (0.061)	0.107* (0.057)		
Treatment: in-group sect, politics	0.138** (0.061)	0.158*** (0.058)		
Treatment: in-group sect, out-group politics	-0.381*** (0.105)	-0.378*** (0.099)	0.025 (0.064)	0.015 (0.056)
Treatment: out-group sect	-0.279*** (0.051)	-0.263*** (0.047)	-0.036 (0.055)	-0.015 (0.049)
Treatment: out-group politics	-0.207*** (0.050)	-0.195*** (0.047)	-0.040 (0.052)	-0.043 (0.046)
Treatment: out-group sect, politics	-0.273*** (0.051)	-0.264*** (0.047)	-0.084 (0.055)	-0.067 (0.049)
Majority treatment		0.067** (0.026)		0.038 (0.027)
Protest treatment		-0.059** (0.026)		-0.019 (0.027)
Income		0.242*** (0.023)		0.194*** (0.022)
Employed		-0.093*** (0.034)		0.103*** (0.030)
Education		-0.058*** (0.012)		0.032** (0.014)
Home owner		0.050 (0.039)		0.093** (0.043)
Age		0.0001 (0.001)		-0.004*** (0.001)
Percent out-group in town		0.084 (0.180)		0.919*** (0.155)
Town size		0.054*** (0.019)		0.035*** (0.011)
Palestinian refugee camp (4 mi radius)		-0.049** (0.021)		-0.004 (0.022)
Syrian refugees in district		-0.467 (0.345)		-0.092 (0.359)
N	209	209	199	199
R ²	0.099	0.223	0.004	0.226
Adjusted R ²	0.095	0.211	0.001	0.215

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.7: Prisoner's Dilemma: Investment with Out-group by Majority Treatment

	Decision to Invest							
	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni
Intercept	0.548*** (0.031)	0.441*** (0.063)	0.580*** (0.042)	0.587*** (0.063)	-1.033*** (0.128)	-0.440* (0.260)	-0.849*** (0.152)	-0.731*** (0.173)
Out-group	-0.223*** (0.036)	-0.105 (0.070)	-0.377*** (0.051)	-0.155** (0.070)	-0.220*** (0.034)	-0.072 (0.067)	-0.352*** (0.047)	-0.200*** (0.064)
Majority treatment	0.066 (0.045)	0.119 (0.093)	0.062 (0.061)	0.022 (0.088)	0.085** (0.042)	0.134 (0.090)	0.101* (0.056)	0.004 (0.080)
Majority treatment x out-group	0.001 (0.051)	-0.048 (0.102)	0.049 (0.073)	-0.011 (0.098)	-0.027 (0.047)	-0.077 (0.098)	0.026 (0.067)	0.005 (0.089)
New politics					0.067*** (0.022)	-0.001 (0.039)	0.004 (0.043)	0.078** (0.038)
Income					0.242*** (0.017)	0.183*** (0.032)	0.234*** (0.025)	0.291*** (0.029)
Employed					-0.020 (0.023)	0.054 (0.040)	-0.072* (0.039)	-0.072* (0.041)
Education					-0.025*** (0.010)	-0.012 (0.018)	0.005 (0.015)	-0.063*** (0.018)
Home owner					0.066** (0.030)	-0.066 (0.130)	0.100*** (0.036)	0.079* (0.042)
Age					-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.002)
Percent out-group in town					0.545*** (0.120)			
Town size					0.032*** (0.010)			
Palestinian camp (4mi radius)					-0.027* (0.014)			
Syrian refugees in district					-0.441* (0.252)			
N	408	136	136	136	408	136	136	136
Observations	2,057	663	724	670	2,057	663	724	670
R ²	0.039	0.016	0.122	0.016	0.180	0.101	0.265	0.203
Adjusted R ²	0.038	0.011	0.118	0.012	0.175	0.089	0.256	0.192

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.8: Prisoner's Dilemma: Investment with Out-group by Protest Treatment

	Decision to Invest							
	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni
Intercept	0.650*** (0.033)	0.569*** (0.068)	0.766*** (0.043)	0.500*** (0.066)	-0.924*** (0.130)	-0.368 (0.255)	-0.548*** (0.153)	-0.845*** (0.174)
Out-group	-0.286*** (0.037)	-0.135* (0.074)	-0.513*** (0.052)	-0.102 (0.073)	-0.292*** (0.035)	-0.112 (0.072)	-0.474*** (0.049)	-0.157** (0.067)
Protest treatment	-0.131*** (0.045)	-0.138 (0.093)	-0.300*** (0.060)	0.176** (0.088)	-0.127*** (0.042)	-0.143 (0.090)	-0.270*** (0.056)	0.156* (0.080)
Protest treatment x out-group	0.124** (0.051)	0.027 (0.102)	0.314*** (0.072)	-0.100 (0.098)	0.116** (0.047)	0.023 (0.098)	0.262*** (0.067)	-0.065 (0.089)
New politics					0.070*** (0.022)	-0.004 (0.039)	0.016 (0.043)	0.073* (0.038)
Income					0.243*** (0.017)	0.194*** (0.032)	0.222*** (0.025)	0.296*** (0.029)
Employed					-0.022 (0.023)	0.047 (0.040)	-0.095** (0.039)	-0.065 (0.040)
Education					-0.026*** (0.010)	-0.014 (0.017)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.065*** (0.018)
Home owner					0.066** (0.030)	-0.083 (0.129)	0.103*** (0.036)	0.079* (0.042)
Age					-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.002)
Percent out-group in town					0.571*** (0.121)			
Town size					0.031*** (0.010)			
Palestinian camp (4mil radius)					-0.025* (0.014)			
Syrian refugees in district					-0.469* (0.252)			
N	408	136	136	136	408	136	136	136
Observations	2,057	663	724	670	2,057	663	724	670
R ²	0.039	0.023	0.142	0.026	0.180	0.110	0.274	0.214
Adjusted R ²	0.037	0.018	0.138	0.022	0.174	0.098	0.265	0.204

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.9: Prisoner's Dilemma: Investment with Out-group by Majority and Protest Treatment

	Decision to Invest							
	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni
Intercept	0.617*** (0.039)	0.514*** (0.081)	0.735*** (0.051)	0.495*** (0.078)	-0.942*** (0.131)	-0.443* (0.260)	-0.642*** (0.156)	-0.843*** (0.178)
Out-group	-0.287*** (0.044)	-0.117 (0.088)	-0.536*** (0.062)	-0.100 (0.086)	-0.280*** (0.041)	-0.081 (0.085)	-0.486*** (0.057)	-0.160** (0.079)
Majority treatment	0.070 (0.045)	0.116 (0.093)	0.069 (0.060)	0.010 (0.088)	0.088** (0.042)	0.131 (0.089)	0.107* (0.055)	-0.008 (0.080)
Protest treatment	-0.133*** (0.045)	-0.135 (0.093)	-0.302*** (0.060)	0.175** (0.089)	-0.130*** (0.042)	-0.142 (0.090)	-0.271*** (0.055)	0.157* (0.080)
Majority treatment x out-group	-0.002 (0.051)	-0.041 (0.102)	0.041 (0.072)	-0.006 (0.098)	-0.029 (0.047)	-0.069 (0.098)	0.020 (0.066)	0.007 (0.088)
Protest treatment x out-group	0.122** (0.051)	0.022 (0.102)	0.311*** (0.072)	-0.099 (0.098)	0.115** (0.047)	0.019 (0.098)	0.260*** (0.066)	-0.065 (0.089)
New politics					0.066*** (0.022)	-0.006 (0.039)	0.011 (0.043)	0.073* (0.038)
Income					0.242*** (0.017)	0.195*** (0.032)	0.225*** (0.025)	0.296*** (0.029)
Employed					-0.024 (0.023)	0.048 (0.040)	-0.081** (0.039)	-0.065 (0.041)
Education					-0.026*** (0.010)	-0.017 (0.017)	0.006 (0.014)	-0.065*** (0.018)
Home owner					0.070** (0.030)	-0.063 (0.129)	0.112*** (0.036)	0.079* (0.042)
Age					-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.002)
Percent out-group in town					0.561*** (0.120)			
Town size					0.029*** (0.010)			
Palestinian camp (4mi radius)					-0.025* (0.014)			
Syrian refugees in district					-0.483* (0.252)			
Observations	2,057	663	724	670	2,057	663	724	670
R ²	0.043	0.030	0.152	0.026	0.184	0.117	0.289	0.214
Adjusted R ²	0.041	0.023	0.146	0.019	0.178	0.102	0.278	0.201

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.3 Dictator Game

Table D.10: Allocation Deficit to the Out-group by Majority Treatment

	Allocation Difference							
	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni
Intercept	0.181 (0.125)	0.093 (0.178)	0.203 (0.246)	0.256 (0.199)	-3.174*** (0.592)	0.366 (0.953)	-3.683*** (0.930)	-1.428** (0.706)
Out-group	1.123*** (0.154)	0.788*** (0.218)	1.867*** (0.301)	0.684*** (0.244)	1.123*** (0.142)	0.788*** (0.207)	1.867*** (0.286)	0.684*** (0.229)
Majority treatment	0.070 (0.175)	0.155 (0.253)	0.185 (0.345)	-0.130 (0.268)	0.061 (0.161)	0.107 (0.241)	0.311 (0.330)	-0.180 (0.254)
Majority treatment x out-group	-0.120 (0.214)	-0.291 (0.310)	-0.100 (0.423)	0.070 (0.328)	-0.120 (0.197)	-0.291 (0.295)	-0.100 (0.402)	0.070 (0.308)
New politics					-0.763*** (0.100)	-0.611*** (0.149)	-0.547** (0.252)	-0.918*** (0.156)
Income					0.149* (0.078)	0.019 (0.120)	0.408*** (0.154)	0.194 (0.121)
Employed					0.436*** (0.109)	0.029 (0.155)	0.793*** (0.240)	0.433** (0.172)
Education					0.212*** (0.045)	0.266*** (0.067)	0.180** (0.089)	0.110 (0.077)
Home owner					-0.505*** (0.143)	-0.838* (0.486)	-0.490** (0.222)	-0.288 (0.176)
Age					0.013*** (0.004)	0.001 (0.006)	0.016** (0.008)	0.017*** (0.006)
Percent out-group in town					0.442 (0.562)			
Town size					0.177*** (0.047)			
Palestinian camp (4mi radius)					-0.046 (0.068)			
Syrian refugees in district					4.718*** (1.195)			
Observations	1,224	408	408	408	1,224	408	408	408
R ²	0.075	0.043	0.155	0.047	0.219	0.149	0.247	0.173
Adjusted R ²	0.073	0.036	0.149	0.040	0.211	0.130	0.230	0.154

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.11: Allocation Deficit to the Out-group by Protest Treatment

	Allocation Difference							
	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni
Intercept	0.213* (0.128)	0.184 (0.189)	0.297 (0.251)	0.156 (0.194)	-3.199*** (0.599)	0.471 (0.954)	-3.546*** (0.934)	-1.494** (0.712)
Out-group	1.181*** (0.157)	0.577** (0.232)	2.019*** (0.307)	0.919*** (0.237)	1.181*** (0.145)	0.577*** (0.220)	2.019*** (0.293)	0.919*** (0.223)
Protest treatment	0.007 (0.175)	-0.026 (0.255)	0.0003 (0.345)	0.052 (0.266)	0.132 (0.162)	-0.032 (0.244)	0.224 (0.332)	0.146 (0.251)
Protest treatment x out-group	-0.223 (0.214)	0.123 (0.312)	-0.383 (0.422)	-0.372 (0.326)	-0.223 (0.198)	0.123 (0.297)	-0.383 (0.403)	-0.372 (0.306)
New politics					-0.764*** (0.100)	-0.614*** (0.149)	-0.531** (0.253)	-0.917*** (0.156)
Income					0.149* (0.078)	0.013 (0.121)	0.401*** (0.154)	0.180 (0.121)
Employed					0.434*** (0.109)	0.032 (0.155)	0.761*** (0.241)	0.404** (0.169)
Education					0.212*** (0.045)	0.265*** (0.067)	0.175* (0.089)	0.116 (0.077)
Home owner					-0.503*** (0.143)	-0.821* (0.486)	-0.507** (0.222)	-0.286 (0.176)
Age					0.013*** (0.004)	0.0003 (0.006)	0.016** (0.008)	0.016** (0.006)
Percent out-group in town					0.439 (0.562)			
Town size					0.176*** (0.047)			
Palestinian camp (4mi radius)					-0.045 (0.068)			
Syrian refugees in district					4.701*** (1.197)			
Observations	1,224	408	408	408	1,224	408	408	408
R ²	0.077	0.042	0.159	0.053	0.220	0.147	0.246	0.175
Adjusted R ²	0.075	0.034	0.153	0.046	0.211	0.128	0.229	0.157

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.12: Allocation Deficit to the Out-group by Majority and Protest Treatment

	Allocation Difference							
	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni
Intercept	0.179 (0.154)	0.109 (0.225)	0.207 (0.302)	0.226 (0.238)	-3.234*** (0.602)	0.420 (0.961)	-1.482** (0.722)	-3.778*** (0.957)
Out-group	1.235*** (0.189)	0.718*** (0.275)	2.059*** (0.370)	0.870*** (0.292)	1.235*** (0.174)	0.718*** (0.262)	0.870*** (0.274)	2.059*** (0.353)
Majority treatment	0.069 (0.175)	0.156 (0.254)	0.186 (0.345)	-0.135 (0.268)	0.055 (0.162)	0.108 (0.242)	-0.189 (0.254)	0.301 (0.330)
Protest treatment	0.004 (0.175)	-0.031 (0.255)	-0.008 (0.346)	0.061 (0.267)	0.130 (0.162)	-0.035 (0.244)	0.160 (0.252)	0.215 (0.332)
Majority treatment x out-group	-0.109 (0.214)	-0.295 (0.311)	-0.084 (0.423)	0.096 (0.328)	-0.109 (0.197)	-0.295 (0.296)	0.096 (0.309)	-0.084 (0.403)
Protest treatment x out-group	-0.218 (0.214)	0.132 (0.313)	-0.379 (0.424)	-0.378 (0.327)	-0.218 (0.198)	0.132 (0.297)	-0.378 (0.307)	-0.379 (0.404)
New politics					-0.763*** (0.100)	-0.610*** (0.149)	-0.911*** (0.156)	-0.543** (0.253)
Income					0.150* (0.078)	0.014 (0.121)	0.189 (0.122)	0.407*** (0.154)
Employed					0.435*** (0.109)	0.031 (0.155)	0.429** (0.172)	0.786*** (0.242)
Education					0.212*** (0.045)	0.268*** (0.067)	0.112 (0.077)	0.180** (0.089)
Home owner					-0.504*** (0.143)	-0.839* (0.487)	-0.288 (0.176)	-0.487** (0.222)
Age					0.013*** (0.004)	0.0003 (0.006)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.016** (0.008)
Percent out-group in town					0.443 (0.562)			
Town size					0.176*** (0.047)			
Palestinian camp (4mi radius)					-0.045 (0.068)			
Syrian refugees in district					4.706*** (1.198)			
Observations	1,224	408	408	408	1,224	408	408	408
R ²	0.077	0.044	0.160	0.054	0.220	0.150	0.177	0.249
Adjusted R ²	0.074	0.032	0.150	0.042	0.210	0.126	0.154	0.228

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.4 Preemptive Strike

Table D.13: Decision to Strike Out-group by Majority Treatment

	Decision to Strike Preemptively							
	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni
Intercept	9.231*** (0.606)	8.918*** (1.021)	10.246*** (1.003)	8.470*** (1.118)	-8.274*** (2.952)	-7.770 (5.337)	-6.522* (3.857)	-10.055** (4.095)
Out-group	-2.967*** (0.742)	-1.876 (1.250)	-5.183*** (1.229)	-1.767 (1.369)	-2.967*** (0.708)	-1.876 (1.159)	-5.183*** (1.188)	-1.767 (1.326)
Majority treatment	0.971 (0.842)	-0.615 (1.454)	2.109 (1.408)	1.448 (1.505)	1.010 (0.805)	-0.945 (1.351)	2.423* (1.367)	0.928 (1.471)
Majority treatment x out-group	-0.626 (1.031)	0.256 (1.781)	-1.155 (1.725)	-1.064 (1.843)	-0.626 (0.984)	0.256 (1.651)	-1.155 (1.668)	-1.064 (1.785)
New politics					-1.252** (0.500)	-0.791 (0.833)	-1.545 (1.045)	-1.239 (0.904)
Income					3.281*** (0.388)	3.512*** (0.671)	2.685*** (0.638)	3.444*** (0.704)
Employed					0.884 (0.542)	1.013 (0.868)	-0.991 (0.993)	1.875* (0.995)
Education					-0.042 (0.227)	0.360 (0.375)	0.260 (0.370)	-0.689 (0.448)
Home owner					-0.144 (0.712)	-2.019 (2.719)	0.094 (0.919)	0.256 (1.020)
Age					-0.019 (0.019)	-0.073** (0.032)	0.023 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.037)
Percent out-group					5.175* (2.806)			
Town size					0.034 (0.234)			
Palestinian camp (4mi radius)					-0.389 (0.338)			
Syrian refugees in district					-21.822*** (5.965)			
Observations	1,224	408	408	408	1,224	408	408	408
R ²	0.034	0.010	0.106	0.019	0.127	0.163	0.177	0.093
Adjusted R ²	0.031	0.003	0.099	0.011	0.118	0.144	0.158	0.073

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.14: Decision to Strike Out-group by Protest Treatment

	Decision to Strike Preemptively							
	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni
Intercept	9.604*** (0.619)	9.317*** (1.079)	10.929*** (1.029)	8.553*** (1.072)	-8.279*** (2.990)	-8.787* (5.295)	-5.148 (3.890)	-11.355*** (4.038)
Out-group	-3.351*** (0.758)	-1.280 (1.322)	-4.909*** (1.260)	-3.766*** (1.313)	-3.351*** (0.723)	-1.280 (1.224)	-4.909*** (1.221)	-3.766*** (1.263)
Protest treatment	0.240 (0.844)	-1.274 (1.454)	0.731 (1.414)	1.352 (1.473)	0.260 (0.809)	-1.446 (1.355)	0.938 (1.381)	1.709 (1.420)
Protest treatment x out-group	0.111 (1.034)	-0.852 (1.780)	-1.625 (1.732)	2.667 (1.804)	0.111 (0.987)	-0.852 (1.648)	-1.625 (1.679)	2.667 (1.736)
New politics					-1.214** (0.499)	-0.865 (0.826)	-1.445 (1.053)	-1.509* (0.883)
Income					3.287*** (0.388)	3.713*** (0.671)	2.643*** (0.641)	3.605*** (0.686)
Employed					0.938* (0.544)	0.930 (0.862)	-1.195 (1.004)	2.019** (0.957)
Education					-0.043 (0.227)	0.268 (0.372)	0.230 (0.372)	-0.768* (0.437)
Home owner					-0.190 (0.712)	-1.855 (2.696)	-0.031 (0.923)	0.255 (0.995)
Age					-0.018 (0.019)	-0.065** (0.032)	0.021 (0.032)	0.001 (0.036)
Percent out-group in town					5.286* (2.806)			
Town size					0.066 (0.236)			
Palestinian camp (4mi radius)					-0.400 (0.339)			
Syrian refugees in district					-21.432*** (5.979)			
Observations	1,224	408	408	408	1,224	408	408	408
R ²	0.033	0.022	0.101	0.053	0.126	0.174	0.169	0.136
Adjusted R ²	0.030	0.014	0.095	0.046	0.117	0.156	0.150	0.117

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.15: Decision to Strike Out-group by Majority and Protest Treatment

	Decision to Strike Preemptively							
	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni	All	Christian	Shia	Sunni
Intercept	9.131*** (0.745)	9.591*** (1.283)	9.921*** (1.234)	7.851*** (1.318)	-8.516*** (3.007)	-8.355 (5.341)	-6.884* (3.970)	-11.797*** (4.093)
Out-group	-3.039*** (0.912)	-1.415 (1.571)	-4.383*** (1.511)	-3.120* (1.615)	-3.039*** (0.871)	-1.415 (1.453)	-4.383*** (1.462)	-3.120** (1.554)
Majority treatment	0.962 (0.844)	-0.576 (1.450)	2.081 (1.411)	1.363 (1.484)	0.998 (0.807)	-0.901 (1.344)	2.383* (1.370)	0.763 (1.442)
Protest treatment	0.195 (0.845)	-1.256 (1.457)	0.640 (1.413)	1.260 (1.479)	0.209 (0.810)	-1.417 (1.358)	0.860 (1.377)	1.658 (1.427)
Majority treatment x out-group	-0.633 (1.033)	0.283 (1.776)	-1.087 (1.728)	-1.252 (1.818)	-0.633 (0.986)	0.283 (1.642)	-1.087 (1.672)	-1.252 (1.750)
Protest treatment x out-group	0.141 (1.035)	-0.861 (1.785)	-1.578 (1.731)	2.752 (1.811)	0.141 (0.988)	-0.861 (1.651)	-1.578 (1.674)	2.752 (1.743)
New politics					-1.256** (0.500)	-0.832 (0.828)	-1.525 (1.050)	-1.505* (0.886)
Income					3.276*** (0.388)	3.716*** (0.672)	2.680*** (0.639)	3.610*** (0.689)
Employed					0.914* (0.545)	0.925 (0.864)	-1.024 (1.004)	2.033** (0.974)
Education					-0.039 (0.227)	0.292 (0.374)	0.260 (0.371)	-0.770* (0.439)
Home owner					-0.157 (0.713)	-1.993 (2.704)	0.109 (0.922)	0.254 (0.997)
Age					-0.019 (0.019)	-0.065** (0.032)	0.022 (0.032)	0.002 (0.036)
Percent out-group in town					5.153* (2.808)			
Town size					0.051 (0.236)			
Palestinian camp (4mi radius)					-0.401 (0.339)			
Syrian refugees in district					-21.591*** (5.980)			
Observations	1,224	408	408	408	1,224	408	408	408
R ²	0.034	0.022	0.108	0.055	0.128	0.176	0.178	0.137
Adjusted R ²	0.030	0.010	0.097	0.043	0.117	0.153	0.156	0.113

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.4.1 Tobit Regression of Preemptive Strike Data

The preemptive strike dataset shows right censoring. Use package "CensReg". Right censoring at seconds = 21.

Table D.16: Tobit Model for Right-Censored Preemptive Strike Game Data

	Decision to Strike Preemptively	
	(1)	(2)
Intercept	11.203*** (1.034)	-11.338*** (4.072)
Out-group	-4.079*** (1.254)	-4.090*** (1.191)
Majority treatment	1.593 (1.172)	1.587 (1.117)
Protest treatment	0.318 (1.175)	0.389 (1.121)
Majority treatment x out-group	-1.087 (1.424)	-1.029 (1.353)
Protest treatment x out-group	0.180 (1.427)	0.129 (1.356)
New politics		-1.695** (0.682)
Income		4.300*** (0.525)
Employed		1.172 (0.738)
Education		-0.078 (0.309)
Home owner		-0.260 (0.969)
Age		-0.031 (0.026)
Percent out-group in town		7.355* (3.827)
Town size		0.044 (0.322)
Palestinian camp (4mi radius)		-0.521 (0.460)
Syrian refugees in district		-30.088*** (8.164)
logSigma	2.425*** (0.026)	2.371*** (0.026)
Observations	1,224	1,224
Log Likelihood	-3,782.027	-3,722.598
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,578.054	7,479.196
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	7,613.824	7,566.064

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.17: Respondent Predictions about Partner's Strike Behavior before Game play

	Decision to Strike Preemptively	
	(1)	(2)
Intercept	0.387*** (0.034)	0.820*** (0.159)
Out-group	0.259*** (0.040)	0.248*** (0.040)
Predict partner strike	0.369*** (0.043)	0.311*** (0.043)
Predict partner strike x out-group	-0.115** (0.052)	-0.106** (0.051)
Majority treatment		-0.048** (0.023)
Protest treatment		-0.011 (0.024)
New politics		0.034 (0.025)
Income		-0.103*** (0.020)
Employed		-0.022 (0.027)
Education		0.007 (0.011)
Home owner		0.019 (0.036)
Age		0.002 (0.001)
Percent out-group in town		-0.144 (0.142)
Town size		0.010 (0.012)
Palestinian camp (4mi radius)		0.019 (0.017)
Syrian refugees in district		0.892*** (0.302)
Observations	1,224	1,224
R ²	0.137	0.173
Adjusted R ²	0.135	0.163
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	